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    {
        "text": "# On The Outside Looking In Remarks By Steven Aftergood Federation Of American Scientists At The 8Th Annual Intelligence Community Legal Conference\n\n## May 7, 2014\n\n\nThank you for the opportunity to address this conference. As someone who has often been a critic of, and sometimes a litigant against, U.S. intelligence agencies, I was somewhat surprised but even more impressed to be invited to come speak to you. Your invitation shows a kind of intellectual curiosity and openness to alternate points of view that aren't always easy to find in your Community or in mine. I probably can't tell you anything about national security law that you don't already know. But I can tell you something about what it's like to be a member of the public who is interested in intelligence law and policy and who wants to engage with it from the outside. I can tell you what it's like to be me.\n\n## How Did I Get Here?\n\nAs a policy advocate, I had two formative experiences over the years that strongly influenced my perspectives on government secrecy and how to deal with it.\n\n## 1. Timber Wind And The Abuse Of Classification Authority\n\nIn the early 1990s, I was studying safety and environmental issues associated with the use of nuclear power supplies in space, whether for deep space exploration (like the NASA\nVoyager probes) or for military applications in Earth orbit. One day, to my astonishment, I received a package in the mail with no return address containing a stack of classified documents that described a Department of Defense program called TIMBER\nWIND. It was an effort to develop a nuclear reactor-driven rocket engine for potential anti-ballistic missile applications. I thought I knew pretty much everything about what was going in space nuclear research and development, but I didn't know about this program, and I wasn't supposed to. TIMBER WIND was what DoD calls an \"unacknowledged special access program.\" That is, even the fact of its existence was classified. So it got my attention. Why was it set up as a highly classified program? A DoD official privately told me outright: The program managers' intent was to evade the anti-nuclear public controversy which they anticipated that the program would encounter, at least until the basic technical concept could be validated. While this was an understandable move, it was not a permissible use of the national security classification system. As you know, classification is not supposed to be a tool for managing public perceptions.\n\nSo my very first exposure to classified information was also my introduction to classification abuse.\n\nAside from that, the TIMBER WIND episode taught me that the unauthorized disclosure of secrets can be a powerful political gesture. It seems like there is a latent potential energy in a secret document that can generate powerful consequences when it is released outside of official channels.\nMy boss at the Federation of American Scientists, Jeremy Stone, told me that before I could publicly release any classified documents on TIMBER WIND, I had to give the government a chance to explain its position on the matter. So I contacted an Air Force officer whose name I recognized on the list of those who had been read-in to the program. (The list of participants had also been sent to me). He told me he could not authorize or approve of any disclosure of classified information. But he said that if I was going to go ahead anyway, I ought to withhold technical documentation of TIMBER WIND's innovative particle bed reactor fuel design, because it could only be of interest to someone who was trying to replicate the technology. That made sense to me, and I did withhold that information. But I released the rest of the story to the press, and it was frontpage news in the *New York Times*, the *Washington Post*, and other papers on April 3, 1991. I also filed a complaint with the DoD Inspector General, who issued a report in December 1992\nconcluding that the establishment of TIMBER WIND as a special access program was \"not adequately justified.\" (The program managers disagreed and presented dissenting views in the IG\nreport.) The program itself was formally terminated in 1994.\n\n## 2.  A Foia Lawsuit Against The National Reconnaissance Office\n\nA second formative experience that shaped my outlook on government secrecy involved the Freedom of Information Act. In 2005 I asked the National Reconnaissance Office to release unclassified portions of its latest Congressional Budget Justification Book (CBJB), and NRO officials said no. They said that the CBJB was exempt from FOIA under what's known as the operational files exemption. I appealed the denial, and then I filed suit under FOIA as a *pro se* litigant.\n\nThe operational files exemption was a legal backwater that had rarely been litigated before (NRO's own specific exemption had not been), and it got a workout in this case. Among the legal questions at issue were: Was the CBJB technically a \"record\" or was it a \"file\"? What form of document dissemination is sufficient to nullify the exemption? And so on. It was not a particularly simple case.\n\nTo everyone's surprise, including my own, I won. DC District Judge Reggie Walton, who heard the case, ruled against the multi-billion dollar intelligence agency (NRO), and in favor of the FOIA requester (me) who didn't even have his own attorney.\nThat doesn't happen very often, but it happened to me. And it was a tremendous antidote to cynicism. If the TIMBER WIND nuclear rocket case led me to conclude that the classification system was prone to abuse, my FOIA lawsuit against NRO taught me that overcoming inappropriate government secrecy is an achievable goal. I may be wrong about that, but that was the lesson I came away with.\n\n## So Where Are We Today?\n\nWhat strikes me - in the aftermath of the unauthorized disclosure of the bulk telephony metadata collection program by Edward Snowden - is that the intelligence community had an unfamiliar realization: transparency or public disclosure of intelligence information is not necessarily a problemit can serve the interests of the IC too.\nDeclassification, the intelligence agencies discovered, can be used to correct errors in the record, it can provide relevant context for public deliberation, and it can help to counteract cynicism about official activities and motivations.\n\nAnd as you know, the government has actually acted on this newfound realization.  More classified government records about ongoing intelligence surveillance programs - not just historical programs - have recently been declassified than ever before. The number of pages of Top Secret records about bulk collection programs in particular that have been officially declassified is roughly double the number of pages leaked by Snowden that have been published in the news media. Several new government websites have been established to publicize and disseminate declassified intelligence records, including records pertaining to the privacy interests of U.S.\n\npersons (e.g., *IC on the Record*, the website for the FISA Court, the NCTC site). For the first time, a presidential directive on signals intelligence\n(PPD-28) was issued by President Obama in unclassified form. (It forms a bookend in a way to the Top Secret PPD-20 on Cyber Operations that was released by Snowden.) New policy debates have emerged on previously remote topics such as what consideration, if any, should be given by US\nintelligence to the privacy rights of foreigners abroad, or the reported role of U.S. intelligence agencies in weakening public encryption standards or stockpiling known software vulnerabilities.\n\n*\nOn the other hand, secrecy has remained a source of friction and public consternation. And while the IC has been opening up on some fronts, it is shutting down and tightening control on others. The new dawn of transparency so far has been largely limited to issues of bulk collection of telephone metadata. If you want to know how many civilian non-combatants have died as a result of US drone strikes, the government won't tell you, since those deaths occurred under the rubric of covert action and are not supposed to be acknowledged or discussed. If you want to know under what circumstances the US government can target and kill a US citizen without any judicial process beforehand or public accountability after the fact, that too is a secret.\n\nIf you would like to read a Senate Intelligence Committee review of CIA interrogation activities that took place a decade ago, stand by and maybe, just maybe, portions of the executive summary will be declassified. Sometime.\n\nFor the first time in more than four decades, the public no longer has access to open source news reports collected and translated by the ODNI Open Source Center (formerly the Foreign Broadcast Information Service). The channel by which the public could subscribe to those products (known as the World News Connection) was terminated by the CIA last December 31.\n\nThe cup of secrecy regularly overflows. Last month, ODNI released a redacted version of Intelligence Community Directive 304 on Human Intelligence, which blacked out all references to the fact that the Director of CIA is the National HUMINT Manager.\n\nWe thought that was silly and inappropriate, and we made the unredacted directive available on our website. Another new directive -- Intelligence Community Directive 119 on media contacts -- prohibits IC employees from having unauthorized contact with reporters or anyone who disseminates information to the public without prior approval. You're not only prohibited from disclosing classified information - that has always been true - but now you can't even discuss *unclassified*\ninformation that is \"intelligence-related.\"\nA newly updated ODNI Instruction - 80.04 on prepublication review - requires that all official and non-official information intended for public release must be approved in advance. Information that is to be released must be \"consistent with the official ODNI position or message.\" So if you ever disagreed with the official ODNI position on anything, you had better keep it to yourself. I think that kind of regimented approach to information management is a mistake. It's bad for me, it's bad for you, it's bad for the IC. It creates a wall between the public and government that doesn't need to be there. I think the DNI was not well served by whoever advised him to adopt these policies -- especially the directive on media contacts -- and I hope that they will be reconsidered and rescinded.\n\n## * But Let's Go Back To Something More Positive.\n\nIn recent interviews and testimony, DNI Clapper has stated his conclusion that the need for greater transparency is one of the major lessons to be learned from the past year. In particular, he said it would have been prudent and proper to seek public consent for the bulk collection of call records from the start. \"Had we been transparent about this from the outset right after 9/11... we wouldn't have had the problem we had,\" he said in an interview with the *Daily Beast*.\n\nThis acknowledgment that greater transparency would have benefited the intelligence community all along creates an opening for a new conversation about what is wrong with current classification practices, and what can be done to rectify them. After all, overclassification or unnecessary classification doesn't really help anyone. For the IC, it creates both financial and operational costs, it impedes information sharing inside and outside the government, and it contributes to a climate of public cynicism. For those same reasons, reducing overclassification would positively serve government interests. It has the potential to lower costs, to foster information sharing, and to engender public confidence. Nobody criticizes the Internal Revenue Service for keeping people's income tax returns too secret or too secure;\neverybody understands that that sort of secrecy is in their own interest. The IC should strive for an optimal level of secrecy that is justified in the same way, so that people have reason to believe it serves them, not that it threatens them. That sounds good. But how to do it?\n\n*\nI think that the key to achieving significant reductions in official secrecy is to submit agency classification decisions to some form of external review and critique.\nWhat makes me think that is that it is already being done, at least on a small scale, by an executive branch body called the Interagency Security Classification Appeals Panel, or ISCAP.\nBetween 1996 and 2012, the ISCAP completely overturned the classification judgments of executive branch agencies in 27% of the cases that it reviewed, and it partially overturned classification decisions in another 41% of such cases. That is a much more dramatic record of secrecy reversals than you would ever find in Freedom of Information Act appeals or litigation. I think it can be explained by considering the fact that the ISCAP as a body, though it is fully committed to protecting legitimate national security interests, does not share the specific bureaucratic interests of the member agencies whose classification judgments it rejected. By subjecting those individual agency classification decisions to an external evaluation (albeit still within the executive branch), the ISCAP process has consistently yielded a reduction in secrecy.\n\nBut whatever the explanation is, the process works. Having been validated in practice year after year, this basic principle could now be applied more broadly. One conceivable way to apply it would be to submit relevant IC classification guides - the official guidance on exactly what types of information are to be classified and at what level - for independent review and critique to an external entity. This could be an ad hoc review body, an expanded ISCAP, or an existing entity such as the Public Interest Declassification Board (PIDB) or the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board. The PIDB, an official advisory board whose members are appointed by the White House and Congress, wrote in a 2012\nreport:\n\"The classification system exists to protect national security, but its outdated design and implementation often hinders that mission. The system is compromised by over-classification and, not coincidentally, by increasing instances of unauthorized disclosures. This undermines the credibility of the classification system, blurs the focus on what truly requires protection, and fails to serve the public interest. Notwithstanding the best efforts of information security professionals, the current system is outmoded and unsustainable; transformation is not simply advisable but imperative.\" It would be interesting to find out what the PIDB would do if it were to perform a review of IC classification guidance. What would the Board members see that others have missed? And how might they contribute to a more streamlined and effective classification system? Another more focused sort of independent critique of specific classification practices could be solicited from the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board (PCLOB). This Board could be asked to identify current intelligence community classification practices that have significant implications for personal privacy, to assess their validity, and to recommend appropriate changes in secrecy policy. There are other \"best practices\" for classification review that already exist and that could easily be incorporated throughout the intelligence community and the executive branch as a whole.\n\nFor example, the Department of Energy has a formal regulation\n(10 C.F.R. 1045.20) under which members of the public may propose declassification of information that is classified under the Atomic Energy Act. I have made use of this regulation myself. A similar provision could be envisioned by which the public could challenge the classification of privacy-related and other national security information throughout the government. While one can already request declassification review of a particular document, the proposed approach would go beyond that to challenge the classification status of an entire topical area, and to ask that it be independently revisited and reconsidered. The current executive order on national security information allows for classification challenges, but only by security-cleared employees who have already have access to the information. Naturally, the key to a successful classification challenge is that it must be reviewed impartially by someone other than the original classifier. But that is entirely achievable. In FY2012, government employees filed 402 such challenges, one-third of which were granted in whole or in part (according to data compiled by the Information Security Oversight Office). But even these internal procedures are not widely known in every agency. Anyway, recall the remark by DNI Clapper that it would have been better if the government had openly acknowledged the fact of bulk collection of telephone metadata from the very start. He didn't say that bulk collection was not properly classified. He said that even if it was properly classified, it should have been disclosed. Of course, that kind of open acknowledgment never happened, and it doesn't seem realistic that any agency would spontaneously or unilaterally disclose such information. The only way it might happen is if key classification judgments are submitted to external critical review in some form. We all have blind spots, and we all have personal or institutional interests of our own, and what we see repeatedly is that those blind spots get translated into faulty, defective policies. But it doesn't have to be that way.\n\nIf you think that transparency has some virtue to it, and that unnecessary secrecy should be avoided if possible, then the point is that there are practical ways to move in that direction.\n\n*\nBeyond adjusting the nuts and bolts of the secrecy system, which is difficult but do-able, I think the IC could and should do more to release unclassified, open source analysis into the public domain.\n\nThe CIA World Factbook must be one of the most popular, widely used intelligence publications ever produced. But there is so much more where that came from. The Open Source Center which I mentioned earlier not only collects and translates foreign news reports, it also does its own analysis of open source intelligence. A lot of that material is neither classified nor copyrighted and could be made available to the interested public. This would be a very direct, down to earth way for the IC to enrich the public domain and to provide the taxpayers with what you might call an increased return on investment. Unfortunately, as I said, the Open Source Center is moving in the opposite direction, blocking access to the kind of information people have relied on for decades. If I were the DNI, I would turn that around and direct the OSC to release as much unclassified material as it could.\n\n*\nIn closing, I just want to say how much I appreciate your attention and your willingness to listen to my comments. I think that even when we disagree, we are all somehow part of the same enterprise. When we fight, we oppose each other with arguments, and within a framework of law. That is not something that anyone should take for granted, especially since it is not true in so many other parts of the world. Steven Aftergood saftergood@fas.org"
    },
    {
        "text": "## Executive Summary\n\n DNI Haines and DDCIA Cohen established the IC Experts Panel on Anomalous Health Incidents (AHIs)\nto help elucidate potential causal mechanisms of the AHIs affecting US Government personnel. The panel comprised experts from inside and outside the US Government with expertise in relevant areas of science, medicine, and engineering. The panel did not examine questions related to attribution of AHIs to an actor, including the question of whether a foreign actor may be involved. The panel's findings are one of several inputs that will inform the IC's work on AHIs moving forward.\n\n## Methodology And Scope\n\n Information sources. Access to information was central to the panel's process. In response to a request from DNI Haines, departments and agencies provided the panel with dozens of briefings and more than 1000 classified documents on a range of scientific, medical, and intelligence topics. This information included the findings of compartmented programs sensitive intelligence reporting, and AHI incident reports and trend analyses. Affected individuals also shared their personal experiences and medical records.\n\n **Potential causal mechanisms.** As a starting point, the panel examined the plausibility of five potential causal mechanisms identified by the IC: acoustic signals, chemical and biological agents, ionizing radiation, natural and environmental factors, and radiofrequency and other electromagnetic energy. Throughout the study, the panel worked to identify possible mechanisms and to avoid bias for or against any of these hypotheses. The panel did not examine in detail combinations of mechanisms, although it judged some combinations, particularly those involving chemical or biological agents, to be worthy of further exploration.\n\n Core characteristics. To narrow the problem, the panel assessed the potential for each mechanism to account for reported aspects of those AHIs that were particularly difficult to explain through other means. The panel's focus on these incidents should not be interpreted as diminishing the importance of other incidents. Four \"core characteristics\" were prominent among these AHIs: the acute onset of audio-vestibular sensory phenomena, sometimes including sound or pressure in only one ear or on one side of the head; other nearly simultaneous signs and symptoms such as vertigo, loss of balance, and ear pain; a strong sense of locality or directionality; and the absence of known environmental or medical conditions that could have caused the reported signs and symptoms.\n Plausibility. The panel considered a mechanism to be feasible if all members agreed there was at least some credible evidence that it was technically and practically feasible in each of five areas-- a concealable source that could generate the required stimulus; propagation of the stimulus to an individual; coupling of the stimulus to the human body; ability of the coupling to cause biological effects;\nClassified By: Derived From: Declassify On:\nand ability of the biological effects to explain the reported clinical signs and symptoms--and other evidence did not exclude the mechanism.\n\n## Findings\n\n The panel reached six main findings. Some are limited by knowledge gaps or assessments that could be resolved or tested through implementing the recommendations in the next section.\n\n *The signs and symptoms of AHIs are genuine and compelling.* The panel bases this assessment on incident reports, medical data from affected individuals and interviews with their physicians, and interviews with affected individuals themselves. Some incidents have affected multiple persons in the same space, and clinical samples from a few affected individuals have shown early, transient elevations in biomarkers suggestive of cellular injury to the nervous system. The reported signs and symptoms of AHIs are diverse and may be caused by multiple mechanisms, but no case should be discounted. Prompt medical evaluation and care is particularly important; many individuals who have been treated immediately after an event have improved.\n\n A subset of AHIs cannot be easily explained by known environmental or medical conditions and could be due to external stimuli. Although some signs and symptoms of AHIs are common in known medical conditions, the combination of the four core characteristics is distinctly unusual and unreported elsewhere in the medical literature, and so far have not been associated with a specific neurological abnormality. Several aspects of this unique neurosensory syndrome make it unlikely to be caused by a functional neurological disorder. The location dependence and sudden onset and offset, for example, argue for a stimulus that is spatially and temporally discrete. The perception of sound and pain within only one ear suggests the stimulation of its mechanoreceptors, a specific cranial nerve, or nuclei in the brainstem, all of which mediate hearing and balance. The lack of other symptoms also helped rule-out known medical conditions.\n Pulsed electromagnetic energy, particularly in the radiofrequency range, plausibly explains the core characteristics, although information gaps exist. There are several plausible pathways involving various forms of pulsed electromagnetic energy, each with its own requirements, limitations, and unknowns. For all the pathways, sources exist that could generate the required stimulus, are concealable, and have moderate power requirements. Using nonstandard antennas and techniques, the signals could be propagated with low loss through air for tens to hundreds of meters, and with some loss, through most building materials.\n\nof these biological systems has been credibly demonstrated in cells and tissues, and persons accidentally\n\nexposed to radiofrequency signals described sensations similar to the core characteristics.\n\nHowever, there is a dearth of systematic research on the effects of the relevant electromagnetic signals on humans.\n\n Ultrasound also plausibly explains the core characteristics, but only in close-access scenarios and with information gaps. The required energy can be generated by ultrasonic arrays that are portable, and produce a tight beam. Ultrasound propagates poorly through air and building materials, restricting its applicability to scenarios in which the source is near the target, It could couple to the body through the external auditory canal, interstitial spaces, or the vestibular apparatus of the inner ear. Ultrasound is used to open the blood-brain barrier in medical procedures, and acoustic stimulation of the aforementioned anatomical areas could produce symptoms consistent with AHIs. Studies of \"ultrasound sickness\" and related audiovestibular symptoms have reached mixed conclusions, but the panel was presented with\n\nindependent, first-hand accounts in which researchers were exposed to high-power ultrasound beams and subsequently experienced some of the core characteristics.\n\n Psychosocial factors alone cannot account for the core characteristics, although they may cause some other incidents or contribute to long-term symptoms. No known psychosocial factors explain the core characteristics, and the incidents exhibiting these characteristics do not fit the majority of criteria used to discern mass sociogenic illness. However, psychosocial factors may compound some of the incidents with core characteristics. Other incidents could be due to hypervigilance and normal human reactions to stress and ambiguity, particularly among a workforce attuned to its surroundings and trained to think about security. Some of these reactions could lead to functional neurological disorders or worsen the effects of existing conditions.\n\n Ionizing radiation, chemical and biological agents, infrasound, audible sound, ultrasound propagated over large distances, and bulk heating from electromagnetic energy are all implausible explanations for the core characteristics in the absence of other synergistic stimuli. These mechanisms are unlikely, on their own, to account for the required effects or are technically or practically infeasible.\n\nIonizing radiation, for example, produces known biological effects that are easily measured and inconsistent with the core characteristics, and chemical or biological agents alone would not cause the reported location-dependence or directionality.\n\n## Recommendations\n\n The panel offers seven main recommendations to help the US Government better understand, prevent, and manage AHIs. Implementing these recommendations will require a coordinated approach because the challenges and solutions transcend organizational boundaries. Panelists emphasize the importance of appropriate classification, privacy, and security controls on research and information that may result. Four recommendations are of especially high priority:\n\n-\n Data. Collect and coordinate incident and medical data across the US Government using\na strengthened uniform database structure and enhanced standardized data, building on\n and other efforts. Correlate comprehensive patient data with structured\nincident data, and strengthen the capacity for timely investigation of events. To protect the data,\n\n\n-\n Biomarkers. Identify and validate new biomarkers that are more specific and more\nsensitive for diagnosis and triage of AHIs, to reduce reliance on traumatic brain injury (TBI) biomarkers, which were validated for a specific and possibly different clinical condition. Test for the presence of these biomarkers as soon as possible after an event, ideally within hours.\n-\n Detectors.\n\n-\n Communications. Develop a coordinated communications strategy to inform and\neducate the US Government workforce. Prompt and forthright communication can help lessen\nthe effects of psychosocial factors and functional neurological disorders, regardless of cause. It can also build trust, strengthen resilience, and promulgate and protective or mitigation strategies.\n\n Three recommendations are longer-term priorities:\n\n-\n Clinical measurements. Develop better methods for taking objective clinical\nmeasurements of vestibular, inner ear, and cognitive function and make them practical for use\nin the field and at locations where AHIs occur. Collect patient histories and measurements within hours of an event when possible.\n-\n Biological effects.\n-\n Devices to aid research.\n\n## A Closing Note\n\n The panel was moved by the experiences of individuals affected by AHIs. They deserve the best possible care, as well as appreciation for their sacrifices. Panelists were also greatly impressed with the many members of the IC and broader US Government with whom they engaged. The panel feels fortunate to have supported their work."
    },
    {
        "text": "U.S. Department of Justice\n\nREPORT OF THE\nATTORNEY\nGENERAL'S\nCYBER\nDIGITAL\nTASK FORCE\n\nU. S. Department of Justice\n\nOffice of the Deputy Attorney General\n\nThe Deputy Attorney General\n                                                         Washington, D.C. 20530\n\nJuly 2, 2018\n\nDear Mr. Attorney General:\n\nYou have emphasized that \"upholding the Constitution and protecting the rule of law is\n\nthe foundation ofeverything we do\" at the Department ofJustice. Our impo11ant duties include\nkeeping America safe by fighting crime and preserving the Nation's security.\n\nAs President Trump has observed, \"The United States faces an extraordinarily dangerous\n\nworld, filled with a wide range ofthreats that have intensified in recent years.\" Director of\nNational Intelligence Dan Coats explained earlier this year that the cyber threat \"is one of[our]\ngreatest concerns and top priorities.\" The Department ofJustice shares that assessment.\n\nEvery day, malicious cyber actors target our citizens, our businesses, our military, and all\n\nlevels ofour government. They cause billions ofdollars in losses and attempt to undermine our\ndemocratic values. Combating cybercrime and cyber-enabled threats to our Nation's security\nmust remain among the Department's highest priorities.\n\nIn February 2018, you directed the formation ofa Cyber-Digital Task Force to undertake a comprehensive assessment ofthe Department's work in the cyber area, and to identify how federal law enforcement can even more effectively accomplish its mission in this vital and evolving area.\n\nThe initial assessment is complete. It is my privilege to present this report ofthe Attorney General's Cyber-Digital Task Force.\n\nI hope this report will assist as all Americans keep moving forward to protect our people, promote our economy, and preserve our values.\n\nSincerely,\n\n## Report Of The Attorney General's Cyber Digital Task Force\n\n\nUnited States Department of Justice Ofce of the Deputy Attorney General Cyber-Digital Task Force 950 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W. Washington, D.C. 20530 https://www.justice.gov/cyberreport\n\n## Table Of Contents\n\n\n\nLetter from the Deputy Attorney General **........** i\nAttorney General's Cyber-Digital Task Force **........** vii\n\n\nIntroduction **........**  xi\n\n\nChapter 1\nCountering Malign Foreign Influence Operations ........ 1\n\n\nChapter 2\nCategorizing Sophisticated Cyber Schemes ........ 23\n\n\nChapter 3\nDetecting, Deterring, and Disrupting Cyber Threats........  9\n\n\nChapter 4\nResponding to Cyber Incidents ........ 83\n\n\n\nChapter\nTraining and Managing Our Workforce ........ 95\n\n\nChapter 6\nLooking Ahead ........109\n\n\nAppendices\nAppendix 1: Memorandum Establishing the Task Force ........ 131\nAppendix 2: Recent Successful Botnet Disruptions ........ 133\nAppendix 3: Recent Successful Dark Web Disruptions ........ 137 Appendix  : Glossary of Key Terms ........1 1\n\n## Task Force Members Attorney General's Cyber-Digital Task Force Task Force Members\n\nAssociate Deputy Attorney General Ofce of the Deputy Attorney General Andrew E. Lelling United States Attorney District of Massachusetts John P. Cronan Assistant Attorney General (Acting)\nCriminal Division David T. Resch Executive Assistant Director Federal Bureau of Investigation John C. Demers Assistant Attorney General National Security Division Beth A. Williams Assistant Attorney General Ofce of Legal Policy Carl Ghattas Executive Assistant Director Federal Bureau of Investigation John M. Gore Assistant Attorney General (Acting)\nCivil Rights Division Peter A. Winn Chief Privacy & Civil Liberties Ofcer (Acting)\nDirector, Ofce of Privacy & Civil Liberties\n\n## Task Force Contributors\n\nMatthew J. Sheehan Counsel to the Deputy Attorney General\n\nStaf Director Elizabeth Aloi Brendan Groves Erica O'Neil Leonard Bailey Aarash Haghighat Richard Pilger Michael F. Buchwald William Hall Jason Poole Mark Champoux Christopher Hardee Andrew Proia Tomas Dettore Adam Hickey Kimberley Raleigh Richard Downing Ray Hulser Peter Roman Benjamin Fitzpatrick Anitha Ibrahim Opher Shweiki Lindsey Freeman Matthew Kluge Michael Stawasz Tashina Gauhar John T. Lynch, Jr.\n\nAndrew Warden Josh Goldfoot Katrina Mulligan J. Brad Wiegmann Bonnie Greenberg Sean Newell Cory Wilson And representatives from:\nBureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives Ofce of Strategic\n\nIntelligence & Information Drug Enforcement Administration Ofce of Investigative Technology Federal Bureau of Investigation Counterintelligence Division Federal Bureau of Investigation Counterterrorism Division Federal Bureau of Investigation Criminal Investigative Division Federal Bureau of Investigation Cyber Division Federal Bureau of Investigation Digital Transformation Ofce Federal Bureau of Investigation Information Technology Branch Federal Bureau of Investigation Ofce of Private Sector Federal Bureau of Investigation Ofce of the Chief Information Ofcer Federal Bureau of Investigation Ofce of the Director Federal Bureau of Investigation Ofce of the General Counsel Federal Bureau of Investigation Operational Technology Division INTERPOL Washington, the U.S. National Central Bureau Justice Management Division Ofce of the Chief Information Ofcer/\n\nCybersecurity Services Staf United States Marshals Service Investigative Operations Division United States Marshals Service Judicial Security Division\n\n## Introduction\n\nCyber-enabled attacks are exacting an enormous toll on American businesses, government agencies, and families. Computer intrusions, cybercrime schemes, and the covert misuse of digital infrastructure have bankrupted frms, destroyed billions of dollars in investments, and helped hostile foreign governments launch infuence operations designed to undermine fundamental American institutions. Te Department of Justice's primary mission is to keep the American people safe. We play a critical role in the federal government's shared efort to combat malicious, cyber-enabled threats.\n\nI\npolicygrounded in our longstanding principles of political neutrality, adherence to the rule of law, and safeguarding the public trustthat governs the disclosure of foreign infuence operations.\n\nn February 2018, the Attorney General established a Cyber-Digital Task Force within the Department and directed the Task Force to answer two basic, foundational questions:  How is the Department responding to cyber threats?  And how can federal law enforcement more efectively accomplish its mission in this important and rapidly evolving area?\nTis report addresses the frst question. It begins by focusing on one of the most pressing cyber-enabled threats our Nation faces: the threat posed by malign foreign infuence operations.  Chapter 1 explains what foreign infuence operations are, and how hostile foreign actors have used these operations to target our Nation's democratic processes, including our elections.  Tis chapter concludes by describing the Department's protective eforts with respect to the upcoming 2018 midterm elections, and announces a new Department Chapters 2 and 3 discuss other cyber-enabled threats our Nation faces, particularly those connected with cybercrimes.  Tese chapters describe the resources the Department is deploying to confront those threats, and how our eforts further the rule of law in this country and around the world.  Chapter 4 focuses on a critical aspect of the Department's mission, in which the Federal Bureau of Investigation plays a lead role: responding to cyber incidents.  Chapter 5 then turns the lens inward, focusing on the Department's eforts to recruit and train our own personnel on cyber matters.  Finally, the report concludes in Chapter 6 with thoughts and observations about certain priority policy matters, and charts a path\n\nfor the Task Force's future work.  Over the next few months, the Department will build upon this initial report's fndings, and will provide recommendations to the Attorney General for how the Department can even more efciently manage the growing global cyber challenge.\n\n\n\n## Te Department's Cyber Mission\n\ncriminals rely upon to penetrate our borders.\n\nWe use legal authorities to take control of virtual infrastructuresuch as networks of compromised computers called \"botnets\" to prevent future victimization.  We share information gathered during our investigations to help victims protect themselves. And we do all of these things to fght modern threats while remaining faithful to our Nation's respect for personal freedom, civil liberties, and the rule of law.\n\nComputer intrusions and attacks are crimes, and the Department of Justice fghts crime. Tat is true regardless of whether the criminal is a transnational organized crime group, a lone hacker, or an ofcer of a foreign military or intelligence organization.  In addition, the Department has unique and indispensable cybersecurity roles in the realm of foreign intelligence and counterintelligence.\n\nWhere appropriate, we also work closely with our interagency partners to support fnancial, diplomatic, and military measures to bring all possible instruments of national power to bear against cyber threats. Other departments have the primary responsibility for helping victims recover from cyberattacks; we have the primary responsibility for conducting the investigation into who is responsible.  We do not have the federal government lead for assisting election ofcials in securing their systems, but we do have the primary responsibility for investigating our foreign adversaries' eforts to target election infrastructure.\n\nSimilarly, we do not have the government's lead role in protecting private or government networks, in designing security standards, or in regulating how the private sector must defend itself.  Tose are important functions for which other government departments take responsibilityofen, with our support and assistance.  Our mission is to enforce the law, to ensure public safety, and to seek just punishment.\n\nIn fghting criminal computer intrusions and attacks, the Department identifes, dismantles, and disrupts cyber threats.  In doing so, we provide justice to victims and deter others from committing similar ofenses.  To fulfll our mission, we deploy criminal justice and intelligence tools to fnd malicious hackers, arrest them, incarcerate them, and require them to pay restitution to their victims.  We shut down the dark markets criminals depend upon to buy and sell stolen information.  We deprive criminals of the tools and services they use to attack American families and businesses.  Working with private sector partners, we seek to deny foreign governments the infrastructure they would use to conduct illegal infuence operations.  We seize or disable the servers, domain names, and other infrastructure that transnational\n\n## Introduction How We Succeed\n\n\n\ncrimes and to help identify cyber threats; and upon the assistance of international partners to gather foreign evidence, apprehend criminals, and extradite suspects.  Ofen, those authorities are exclusive to the Department  of Justice and other law enforcement agencies. For example, the Department has the authority to obtain the subpoenas, court orders, and search warrants that the law requires in order to compel online service providers to produce crucial records that can reveal criminal activity.\n\n\nBy faithfully executing the Department's crime-fghting mission, we have produced tangible and positive results for the American people. Tese results are refected by the caliber of criminals we have taken ofine and taken of the streets; the millions of computers we have liberated from botnets that harness their processing power for fraud and thef; the web cameras that no longer spy on unwitting victims; the dark markets selling illicit drugs, weapons, and child pornography we have disrupted and shuttered; the virtual currency we have seized from criminals; and the malicious sofware that is no longer offered for sale.\n\"Our mission is to enforce the law, to ensure public safety, and to seek just punishment.\"\n\n\nTese tangible results have a secondary efect: deterrence.  Deterrence is one of the primary objectives of criminal law, and it is a key factor in improving our Nation's cybersecurity. An efective deterrence policy requires us to have a credible capability to enforce the law, and therefore to deter ofenders.  A credible capability to enforce the law, in turn, requires the Department to be able to credibly investigate cybercrime. Without evidence, there is no attribution.  Without attribution, there will be no consequences for ofenders, and thus no deterrence.\n\n\nPreserving these investigative authorities and capabilities, and using them responsibly and consistent with law, is therefore vital to the Nation's cybersecurity. It is also a Department priority.  Te Department's agents and prosecutors need the authority and tools to obtain evidence; the technical skill to understand it; and the ability to introduce that evidence at trial and explain what it means. Maintaining these capabilities is, in part, a question of making sure investigators retain the lawful authority to access evidence in a changing digital landscape.  It is also a question of building and maintaining a talented and dedicated workforce.\n\nTe Departmentalong with the entire U.S. governmentwants Americans to be able to Yet, the reality is that identity-masking technologies and international investigative barriers pose unique challenges for deterring cyber threats.  Tis report details the ways in which we approach those challenges.  We depend upon legal authorities to investigate computer crimes; upon the cooperation of the public and of the private sector to report As Americans have shifed much of our economy, our communications, our news media, and our daily lives to the Internet, we are now discovering how vulnerable that shif makes us.  To defend against cyberattacks from nation states and from equally sophisticated criminals, the American public should be able to turn to the government for leadership.  Tis report details how the Department of Justice is responding to that call.\n\n\nuse their devices and computers secure in the knowledge that their data is safe.  Many government departments and agencies are working toward that cybersecurity goal. And while this report catalogs the many ways that the Department is at the cutting edge of keeping Americans safe from cyber threats, we are also keenly aware that our tools and authorities are not sufcient by themselves to accomplish that goal.\n\nOur work is critical to cybersecurity, but our work, alone, is not enough to secure the Nation.\n\nostile foreign actors have long sought to infuence, and to subvert, our Nation's democratic institutions.  Mod-\n\n## Chapter 1 Countering Malign Foreign Influence Operations H\n\nern technologyincluding the Internet and social media platformshas both empowered and emboldened foreign governments and their agents in their attempts to afect U.S. attitudes, behaviors, and decisions in new and troubling ways.\n\nannounce a Department policy regarding the factors to be considered in disclosing malign foreign infuence operations to victims, other afected individuals, and the public.  Tis policy provides guideposts for Department action to expose and thereby counter foreign infuence threatsconsistent with the fundamental principle that we always must seek to act in ways that are politically neutral, compliant with the First Amendment, and designed to maintain the public trust.\n\n\nUltimately, one of the most efective ways to counter malign foreign infuence operations is to shine a light on the activity and raise awareness of the threat.  In order to prevail against our adversaries, all of society must work together: from government at all levels; to social media providers and others in the private sector; to political candidates and organizations; to, perhaps most signifcantly, an active and informed citizenry.\n\nTe Department of Justice plays an important role in protecting the Nation's democratic processes from malign foreign infuence operations. While the States, under the Constitution, have primary jurisdiction over the administration of elections,1 the Department for decades has enforced federal criminal laws involving certain forms of ballot fraud.2  We will continue our traditional commitment to combating such frauds, including any that foreign governments or their agents may attempt to perpetrate.  (*See* page 4).\n\n\n\n## Malign Foreign Infuence Operations\n\nForeign infuence operations include covert actions by foreign governments intended to sow division in our society, undermine confdence in our democratic institutions, and otherwise afect political sentiment and public discourse to achieve strategic geopolitical objectives.  Foreign infuence operations can pose a threat to national securityand they can violate federal criminal law.3  Operations\n\nForeign cyber-enabled and other active efforts to infuence our democratic processes, including our elections, demand an urgent response.  In the following pages, we provide background on malign foreign infuence operations generally; outline fve distinct types of foreign infuence operations aimed at our elections or at broader political issues in the United States; and describe the Department's protective eforts with respect to such operations, including eforts designed to protect the upcoming 2018 midterm elections.  We also\n\n\ntent on multiple sides of controversial issues including race relations and gun control.\n\naimed at the United States are not new. Tese eforts have taken many forms across the decades, from funding communist newspapers and fnancing ostensibly independent nonproft groups to promote favored policies, to more recent eforts at creating and operating false U.S. personas on Internet sites designed to attract U.S. audiences and spread divisive messages.  Te nature of the problem, howeverand how the U.S. government must combat itis changing, as advances in technology allow foreign actors to reach unprecedented numbers of Americans covertly and without setting foot on U.S. soil.  Fabricated news stories and sensational headlines like those sometimes found on social media platforms are just the latest iteration of a practice foreign adversaries have long employed in an efort to discredit and undermine individuals and organizations in the United States. Although the tactics have evolved, the goals of these activities generally remain the same: to spread disinformation and to sow discord on a mass scale in order to weaken the U.S. democratic process, and ultimately to undermine the appeal of democracy itself.\n\nAs one component of this strategy, foreign infuence operations have targeted U.S. elections. Elections are a particularly attractive target for foreign infuence campaigns because they provide an opportunity to undermine confdence in a core element of our democracy: the process by which we select our leaders.  As explained in a January 2017 Intelligence Community Assessment published by the Ofce of the Director of National Intelligence (\"ODNI\") addressing Russian interference in the 2016 U.S. presidential election, Russia has had a \"longstanding desire to undermine the U.S.-led liberal democratic order,\" and that nation's recent election-focused \"activities demonstrated a signifcant escalation in directness, level of activity, and scope of efort compared to previous operations.\"4   Russia's foreign infuence campaign, according to this assessment, \"followed a longstanding Russian messaging strategy that blends covert intelligence operations such as cyber activitywith overt eforts by Russian Government agencies, state-funded media, third-party intermediaries, and paid social media users or 'trolls.'\" 5\n\n\nMalign foreign infuence operations need not favor one political fgure, party, or point of view. Foreign adversaries can take advantage of social media platforms to send contrary (and sometimes false) messages simultaneously to diferent groups of users based on those users' political and demographic characteristics, with the goal of heightening tensions between diferent groups in our society.  By exacerbating and infaming existing divisions, foreign-promoted narratives seek to spread turmoil, mistrust, and acrimony. For example, Russian-afliated social media activities have been detected promoting con-\nMalign foreign infuence operations did not begin in 2016, but the Internet-facilitated operations in that year were unprecedented in scale.  Te threat such operations pose to our society is unlikely to diminish.  As the Director of National Intelligence recently observed, \"Infuence operations, especially through cyber means, will remain a signifcant threat to U.S. interests as they are lowcost, relatively low-risk, and deniable ways to retaliate against adversaries, to shape foreign perceptions, and to infuence populations.\"6\n\n\"Russia probably will be the most capable and aggressive source of this threat in 2018, although many countries and some nonstate actors are exploring ways to use infuence operations, both domestically and abroad.\"7\nsia's strategy for conducting foreign infuence operations against the United States, which may well inspire other countries to pursue similar operations, includes a broad spectrum of activity targeting U.S. democratic and electoral processes.  We categorize such activity as follows:\nTese actions require a strong and sustained response.\n\n\n## Types Of Foreign Infuence Operations Targeting Democratic And Electoral Processes\n\n\n\n1. Cyber operations targeting election infrastructure.  Cyber operations could seek to undermine the integrity or availability of election-related data.  For example, adversaries could employ cyber-enabled or other means to target election-associated infrastructure, such as voter registration databases and voting machines, or to target the power grid or other critical infrastructure in order to impair an election.  Operations aimed at removing otherwise eligible voters from the rolls or attempting to manipulate the results of an election (or even simply spreading disinformation suggesting that such manipulation has occurred) could undermine the integrity and legitimacy of our free and fair elections, as well as public confdence in elec-\nIn advance of the 2018 midterm elections, the Department is mindful of ODNI's assessment that \"Moscow will apply lessons learned from its campaign aimed at the U.S. presidential election to future infuence eforts in the United States and worldwide, including against U.S. allies and their election processes.\"8 Te Intelligence Community\n(\"IC\") has recently assessed that Russia views the 2018 midterm elections as a potential target for continued infuence operations.9 Rus-\n\n## Identifying Potential Targets Of Election Interference\n\nForeign adversaries could target these categories of potential targetsor othersto interfere in U.S. elections through cyber operations.\n\n## Department Of Justice Program For Combating Ballot Fraud\n\n\n\n\"Every voter in a federal . . . election, . . . whether he votes for a candidate with little chance of winning or for one with little chance of losing, has a right under the Constitution to have his vote fairly counted, without its being distorted by fraudulently cast votes.\" Anderson v.\n\nUnited States, 417 U.S. 211, 227 (1974).  Te Department has a longstanding program for predicating, investigating, and prosecuting ballot fraud schemeswhich may overlap with a criminal or national security investigation into a foreign infuence operation.  Te Department's ballot fraud program brings together several components, including the Federal Bureau of Investigation (\"FBI\"); the Criminal Division's Public Integrity Section (\"PIN\"); United States Attorney's Ofces around the nation; the Civil Rights Division (\"CRT\"); and the Department of Homeland Security (\"DHS\").  (Each component's specifc role in the program is described in the endnotes.16)\nIn the weeks and months leading up to the 2018 midterm elections, these components will plan responses to election-related issues and identify lines of coordination and communication.  On Election Day, they and a commissioner from the U.S. Election Assistance Commission will arrange regular secure video teleconferences with Department leadership and other agencies, including the National Security Council.  Other PIN and CRT managers and personnel also will be available throughout the period to answer telephone calls about suspected ballot fraud activity and to respond to questions from federal prosecutors and law enforcement agents, who in turn will be in close communication with state and local partners.\n\ntion results.  To our knowledge, no foreign government has succeeded in perpetrating ballot fraud, but the risk is real.\n\n\n2. Cyber operations targeting political organizations, campaigns, and public offcials. Cyber operations could also seek to compromise the confdentiality or integrity of targeted groups' or targeted individuals' private information.  For example, adversaries could conduct cyber or other operations against U.S. political organizations and campaigns to steal confdential information and use that information, or alterations thereof, to discredit or embarrass candidates, undermine political organizations, or impugn the integrity of public ofcials.  Te IC has assessed that, during the 2016 election cycle, \"Russia's intelligence services conducted cyber operations against targets associated with the 2016 U.S. presidential election, including targets associated with both major U.S. political parties.\"10\n\n3. Covert infuence operations to assist or harm political organizations, campaigns, and public ofcials.  Adversaries could also conduct covert infuence operations to pro-\n4. Covert infuence operations, includ-\n\n\ning disinformation operations, to infuence public opinion and sow division.  Using false U.S. personas, adversaries could covertly create and operate social media pages and other forums designed to attract U.S. audiences and spread disinformation or divisive messages. Tis could happen in isolation or in combination with other operations, and could be intended to foster specifc narratives that advance foreign political objectives, or could be intended simply to turn citizens against each other.  Tese messages need not relate directly to political campaigns.  Tey could seek to depress voter turnout among particular groups, encourage third-party voting, or convince the public of widespread voter fraud to undermine confdence in election results.  Tese messages could target discrete U.S. populations based on their political and demographic characteristics.  Tey may mobilize Americans to sign online petitions and join issue-related rallies and protests, or even to incite violence. For example, advertisements from at least 2015 to 2017 linked to a Russian organization called the Internet Research Agency focused on divisive issues, including illegal immigration and gun rights, among others, and targeted those messages to groups most likely to react.\n\n\n\nvide assistance that is prohibited from foreign sources to American political organizations, campaigns, and government ofcials. Tese operations might involve covert ofers of fnancial, logistical, or other campaign support toor covert attempts to infuence the policies, positions, or opinions ofunwitting politicians, party leaders, campaign ofcials, or the public.  For example, a federal grand jury indictment in February 2018 of thirteen Russian nationals recounts, among other things, instances in which Russians allegedly provided covert assistance and fnancial support to unwitting U.S. persons, unwitting individuals associated with a presidential campaign, and other unwitting political activists seeking to coordinate political activities.11   Te indictment also alleges that the Russians sought to discourage some Americans from voting in the 2016 presidential election, and denigrated certain candidates while supporting others.  Russian actors also allegedly staged political rallies inside the United States while posing as U.S. grassroots entities and organized rallies inside the United States *afer* the presidential election, both in protest of the election results and in support of the results.12   Such covert infuence operations could be reinforced by the use of\n\"bots,\" which are automated programs that can expand and amplify social media messaging and bolster desired narratives.  Tese operations can also be amplifed by stolen information illicitly acquired through illegal cyber operations targeting government institutions, media, and political organizations or campaigns.  Foreign agents could then use this stolen information to reinforce divisive narratives through systematic, controlled leaks timed to maximize political damage.\n\n5. Overt infuence eforts, such as the use of lobbyists, foreign media outlets, and other organizations, to infuence policymakers and the public.  Finally, adversaries could use state-owned or state-infuenced media outlets, or employ lobbyists or lobbying frms, to reach U.S. policymakers or the public.  Foreign governments can disguise these eforts as independent while using them to promote relating to espionage, sabotage, subversive activities, and related matters.\n\n\ndivisive narratives and political positions helpful to foreign objectives.  Overt infuence eforts by foreign governmentsincluding by our adversariesmay not be illegal, provided they comply with the Foreign Agents Registration Act (\"FARA\"),13 and with Federal Communications Commission regulations.  However, the American people should be fully aware of any foreign government source of  information so they can evaluate that source's credibility and signifcance for themselves.\n\n## Te Department Of Justice's Role In Countering Malign Foreign Infuence Operations\n\n- Various federal statutes authorize the FBI to conduct investigations of federal crimes, make seizures and arrests, and serve warrants, both under national security authorities (title 50 of the U.S. Code) and law enforcement authorities (title 18 of the U.S. Code).  For example, the FBI has primary investigative authority for all computer network intrusions relating to threats to national security, including \"cases involving espionage, foreign counterintelligence, [and] information protected against unauthorized disclosure for reasons of national defense or foreign relations . . .\" 18 U.S.C.  1030(d)(2).\n\nTe Department of Justice has a signifcant role in investigating and disrupting foreign government activity in the United States that threatens U.S. national security.  In particular, the Department has an important role in identifying and combating malign foreign infuence operations, and in enforcing federal laws that foreign agents may violate when engaging in such operations.\n\n- Executive Order (\"E.O.\") 12333, as amended, establishes the FBI as the lead counterintelligence agency within the United States, and authorizes the FBI to conduct counterintelligence activities, collect foreign intelligence, or support foreign intelligence collection requirements of other agencies within the IC, and produce and disseminate foreign\nintelligence and counterintelligence.  See E.O.\n12333,  1.7(g).\n\n- Tese lead responsibilities are also refected in presidential policies, such as Presidential Policy Directive (\"PPD\")-41 and PPD-21.\nConsistent with its longstanding mission, the Department has broad authorities in this area that encompass both its law enforcement and counterintelligence responsibilities:\n\n\nWorking closely with our IC partners, the Department uses these authorities to identify, analyze, and disrupt the most signifcant threats from foreign infuence operations. As explained below, the Department can act against these threats in several ways, either using its own authorities or supporting the\n\n- Te FBI is the primary investigative agency of the federal government and is authorized to investigate all violations of federal laws that are not exclusively assigned to another\nfederal agency.  See 28 U.S.C.  533.  In addition, 28 C.F.R.  0.85(d) designates the FBI to take charge of investigative work in matters\nactions of other agencies.  Te Department also uses its investigative authority to develop information that can inform private sector eforts to guard against or deter foreign infuence operations.\nies, to build consensus with other nations to condemn such activities, and to build coalitions to counter such activities.  Likewise, we work closely with DHS to share information about foreign infuence operations in furtherance of DHS's election security mission.\n\n\nTird, the Department's investigations produce information about threats and vulnerabilities that we can share with State and local election ofcials, political organizations, and\nother potential victims.  Because these entities lack the FBI's investigative resources and legal authorities, sharing investigative information about the nature of the threat posed by foreign infuence operations can help these entities detect and prevent operations that target them.\nFirst, the Department's investigations may reveal conduct that warrants criminal charges. Criminal charges not only are a tool the Department uses to pursue justice, but also can help deter similar conduct in the future.  We will work with our international partners to obtain custody of foreign defendants whenever possible.  Tose who seek to avoid justice in U.S. courts will fnd their freedom of travel signifcantly restricted.  Criminal charges also provide the public with information about the illegal activities of foreign actors we seek to hold accountable.\n\n\nFourth, the Department maintains strategic relationships with social media providers that refect the private sector's critical role in addressing this threat.  Social media providers have unique insight into their own networks and bear the primary responsibility for securing their own products, platforms, and services.  Te FBI can assist the providers' voluntary eforts to identify foreign infuence activity and to enforce terms of service that\nprohibit the use of their platforms for such activities.  Tis approach is similar to the Department's recent approaches in working with providers to address terrorist use of social media, and more traditional collaboration to combat child pornography, botnets, Internet fraud, and other misuse of digital infrastructure.  By providing information about potential threats, the Department can help social media providers respond to malign use of their platforms, identify foreign infuence\nSecond, in some cases, the Department's investigations can support other U.S. government agencies' actions, such as fnancial sanctions or diplomatic and intelligence efforts.  Afer a federal grand jury indicted thirteen Russians in connection with their alleged infuence activities, for example, the Secretary of the Treasury imposed fnancial sanctions against those individuals under an executive order that authorizes sanctions for malicious cyber-enabled activity.  Te Department of the Treasury's actions blocked all property and interests in property of the designated persons subject to U.S. jurisdiction, and prohibited U.S. persons from engaging in transactions with the sanctioned individuals.  In addition, the State Department ofen uses information from our investigations and criminal indictments in diplomatic eforts to attribute malign conduct to foreign adversaroperations on those platforms, share information across diverse products and services, and better ensure their users are not exposed to unlawful foreign infuence.\n\ncoordinating the Department's counter-foreign infuence eforts with other federal agencies, including DHS, the State Department, the National Security Agency, and the Central Intelligence Agency.  Te FBI is also responsible for developing strategic relationships with state and local authorities, international partners, and the private sector, including social media and other technology companies, as part of a comprehensive approach to combating the foreign infuence problem.\n\nFinally, information developed in our investigations can be usedeither by the Department or in coordination with the Intelligence Community and other government partnersto help protect the public by exposing the nature of the foreign infuence threat.\n\nTe Department may alert victims or targets about foreign infuence operations consistent with its longstanding policies and practices. As discussed below, in certain circumstances, public disclosure and attribution can also be an important means of countering the threat and rendering those operations less efective.\n\n## Te Department Of Justice's Framework To Counter Malign Foreign Infuence Operations\n\nArmed with a deeper understanding of our foreign adversaries' operational methods and committed to leveraging the full range of our authorities, the Department has developed a strategic framework for countering foreign infuence operations.  *See* **Fig. 1**. Tis framework seeks to employ the Department's longstanding authorities proactively to pursue aggressive countermeasuresusing traditional law enforcement tools, sharing information with potential victims and the private sector where appropriate, and exposing and attributing foreign infuence operations where doing so is in the national interest.  Te Department's strategy aims to increase the resilience of democratic and election processes against the foreign infuence threat, while recognizing that we cannot expect to eliminate those activities unless the responsible foreign governments alter their behavior.\n\nTe Department is preparing ahead of the 2018 midterm elections to ensure that we address as efectively as possible the fve distinct types of foreign infuence operations described above.  To underscore this priority, the FBI in November 2017 established the Foreign Infuence Task Force (\"FITF\"), which serves as the central coordinating authority within the FBI for investigations concerning foreign infuence operations.  Te FITF integrates the FBI's cyber, counterintelligence, counterterrorism, and criminal law enforcement resources to ensure that the Department better understands the threat presented by malign foreign infuence operations.  An important part of the FITF's responsibility is\n1. Cyber operations targeting election infrastructure.  Although the States are responsible for administering elections, and DHS has the federal government lead for assisting election ofcials in securing their systems, the FBI has the primary responsibility for investigating our foreign adversaries'\n\nDOJ and FBI Actions\nOvert influence efforts to\ninfluence policymakers\nand the public\nInvestigate possible FARA\nviolations.\n-\nProsecute where possible.\n-\nCompel registration as\nappropriate.\nDOJ and FBI Actions\nCovert influence operations to\ninfluence public opinion and\nsow division\nInvestigate and, as appropriate,\ndisrupt foreign influence operations.\n-\nAttribute and expose activity,\nconsistent with applicable guidance.\n-\nProsecute where possible.\nNotify social media, other providers\nof foreign influence operations and\nother abuse of their platforms.\nDOJ and FBI Actions\nCovert influence operations to\nassist or harm political\norganizations, campaigns and\npublic officials\n\n\n-\nInvestigate and disrupt activity by\nunregistered foreign agents.\n-\nBrief potential targets, consistent with\napplicable guidance.\n-\nProsecute where possible.\n-\nRaise awareness about malicious\ncyber operations, mitigation, and\nmaintaining \"cyber hygiene.\"\nDOJ and FBI Actions\nCyber operations targeting\npolitical parties, campaigns,\nand public officials\n(confidentiality of data)\nIdentify threats and warn potential\ntargets, with DHS.\n-\nInvestigate and disrupt intrusions\nand attacks, alerting victims\nconsistent with applicable guidance.\nProsecute where possible.\nRaise awareness about malicious\ncyber operations, mitigation, and\nmaintaining \"cyber hygiene.\"\n\n## Department Of Justice Framework To Counter Malign Foreign Influence Operations\n\nCyber operations targeting\nelection infrastructure\n(integrity and availability\nIdentify threats and warn potential\ntargets (state officials), with DHS.\n-\nInvestigate and disrupt intrusions\nand attacks, alerting victims\nconsistent with applicable guidance.\n-\nProsecute where possible.\n-\nRespond to reports of election\nday crimes (e.g. voter\nsuppression, computer\nintrusions).\nKey Considerations\nOther Agencies and Their Activities\n-\nDHS and State Dept. conduct\noutreach on trends in influence\noperations to domestic and foreign\naudiences.\n-\nState Dept. responds to violations\nof norms by foreign actors.\nOpen communications by\nregistered foreign media may be\nlawful.\nKey Considerations\nOther Agencies and Their Activities\nDHS and State Dept. conduct\noutreach on trends in influence\noperations to domestic and foreign\naudiences.\nDHS provides tools to private\nindustry to protect against malign\ninfluence.\nPossible diplomatic, financial, or\noperational responses.\nTechnology companies bear\nprimary responsibility for\nsecuring their own products,\nplatforms, and services.\nOther Agencies and Their Activities\n-\nIC produces intelligence on foreign\ninfluence efforts, goals.\n-\nDHS and State Dept. conduct\noutreach on trends in influence\noperations to domestic and foreign\naudiences.\n-\nPossible diplomatic, financial, or\noperational responses.\n-\nMay require cooperation of affected\nindividuals and organizations to\ncounter the threat.\n-\nMany engagements with foreign\ngovernments are legitimate.\nKey Considerations\nOther Agencies and Their Activities\nIC produces intelligence on\nmalicious cyber operations.\nDHS shares intelligence (warnings)\nand best practices with victims and\nassists with recovery efforts after\nan intrusion (if requested).\n-\nPossible diplomatic, financial, or\noperational responses.\n-\nPrivate parties own systems and\ndata and are responsible for their\nsecurity.\nLimited ability to protect against\nmisuse of stolen information.\nassists with recovery efforts after\noperational responses.\n\nOther Agencies and Their Activities\nan intrusion (if requested).\n-\nPossible diplomatic, financial, or\n-\nStates own the election systems\nand are responsible for their\nadministration and security.\n-\nIC produces intelligence on\nmalicious cyber operations.\n-\nDHS shares intelligence (warnings)\nand best practices with victims and\n\nover 20 partnering agencies from across law enforcement, the IC, and the Department of Defense, with representatives who are co-located and work jointly to accomplish the organization's mission from a whole-of-government perspective.\n\nEstablishing close relationships with State and local ofcials is also important to enable the Department to respond quickly to a major cyber intrusion before or during an election.  Te Department works closely with DHS in connection with such incidents.  Te Department will continue to work with DHS and State and local ofcials to plan what they should do, whom they should contact, and what assistance they may seek in the event of a signifcant intrusion into their systems. Te FBI's general incident response activities are described in greater detail in Chapter 4.\n\neforts to target election infrastructure.  In the event of a known or suspected cyber incident, the FBI will investigate the intrusion and will alert targets of the intrusions where appropriate.  Prosecutors will follow the Principles of Federal Prosecution14 in determining whether federal criminal charges are appropriate.  Te FBI also may identify threats and vulnerabilities to election infrastructure in the course of other criminal or intelligence investigations.  Consistent with the Department's disclosure policy (described below), it will attempt to warn State and local ofcials who operate election systems about attempts to penetrate their systems and to share appropriate information about vulnerabilities they should patch or mitigate.  In this regard, the FBI works closely with DHS and with the U.S. Election Assistance Commission, which certifes voting systems and establishes voting system guidelines.\n\n\n\n2. Cyber operations targeting political organizations, campaigns, and public offcials. Te FBI investigates computer intrusions and attacks against U.S. victims, using its broad investigative authority and leveraging its close relationship with other IC agencies that have the authority to collect foreign intelligence outside the United States. Federal prosecutors may then charge the perpetrators, as appropriate.  Te FBI also alerts victims where possible and helps them respond to intrusions, ofen working closely with DHS, and provides threat information when necessary to address a specifc threat or incident. Te FBI is working with DHS to ensure that political organizations and individuals within such organizations whom foreign adversaries may target are aware of the specifc cyber To that end, in February 2018, the FBI, together with DHS and the IC, provided classifed briefngs to election ofcials from all 50 States to help increase awareness of foreign adversary intent and capabilities against the States' election infrastructure, as well as actions State and local ofcials can undertake to mitigate those threats.  Establishing close relationships with those ofcials, in partnership with DHS, is critical because the Department's ability to identify and disrupt cyber actors who target election infrastructure requires the ofcials who operate that infrastructure to promptly share threat information with the FBI.  Te Department has emphasized the need for State and local ofcials promptly to share threat information with the FBI's National Cyber Investigative Joint Task Force (\"NCIJTF\").  NCIJTF includes\n\n## Department Of Justice Policy Regarding Non-Interference With Elections\n\nTe Department of Justice has a strong interest in the prosecution of election-related crimes, such as those involving federal and State campaign fnance laws, federal patronage laws, and corruption of the election process, and Department employees must safeguard the Department's reputation for fairness, neutrality, and non-partisanship. Partisan political considersations must play no role in the decisions of federal investigators or prosecutors regarding any investigations or criminal charges. Law enforcement ofcers and prosecutors may never select the timing of investigative steps or criminal charges for the purpose of giving an advantage or disadvantage to any candidate or political party.\n\nFor further guidance, prosecutors and law enforcement ofcers may contact the Criminal Division's Public Integrity Section.  More detailed guidance is also available in sections 1-4.000 and 9-85.000 of the United States Attorneys' Manual, and in a treatise published by the Department called Federal Prosecution of Election Offenses (8th ed. 2017).17\n\n\nthreats and vulnerabilities we are monitoring. Tese eforts have included providing defensive briefngs to major political organizations such as the Republican and Democratic National Committees.\n\n\n\nTe Department will aggressively enforce federal laws that require foreign agents to register with the U.S. government and that prohibit foreign nationals from tricking unwitting Americans into participating in, or accepting support from, foreign infuence eforts.  Along those lines, the Department has stepped up enforcement eforts against individuals and entities that had not fulflled their obligations under the Foreign Agents Registration Act (\"FARA\"), including by educating prosecutors and agents nationwide about the importance of the statute and how to investigate it; expanding our outreach to individuals and entities who may be required to register; and achieving the registrations of sophisticated individuals and entities that had not fulflled their legal obligations, including the American agents of Russian state-funded media networks (RT and Sputnik).  Going forward, we will increase FARA awareness and compliance through increased outreach,\n3. Covert infuence operations to assist or harm political organizations, campaigns, and government ofcials. Te FBI counters the activities of foreign governments and their proxies by proactively investigating unregistered foreign agents in the United States, alerting these foreign agents' targets (or intended targets) where appropriate, and raising public awareness of foreign infuence methods and efective countermeasures both through appropriate enforcement actions and through assistance to other federal agencies and State or local authorities with enforcement authority.\n\nby making additional advisory opinions public, and by issuing guidance if appropriate under Department policy.  In addition, we will investigate and prosecute criminal violations of FARA and other laws that restrict the activities of foreign agents acting within the United States.\n\nsuccess of a foreign infuence campaign via the Internet and social media depends heavily on the adversary's ability to obscure the true motivation and origin of its activities something the Internet can facilitatethe infrastructure of online accounts required to carry out such a campaign also provides the Department with opportunities for identifcation and disruption.  For example, the FBI and IC partners may be able to identify and track foreign agents as they establish their infrastructure and mature their online presence, in which case authorities can work with social media companies to illuminate and ultimately disrupt those agents' activities, including through voluntary removal of accounts that violate a company's terms of service.\n\nTe Department also will seek to increase understanding of the foreign intelligence threat in order to reduce the efectiveness of covert activities and eforts to obscure the true motivation and origin of foreign infuence operations.  Te FBI can provide defensive counterintelligence briefngs to political organizations and campaigns as necessary to protect against and improve awareness of the foreign infuence threat.  In addition, the FBI continues to pursue criminal and traditional counterintelligence investigations to address the range of potential covert operations targeting political organizations.\n\n\n\n4. Covert infuence operations, includ-\n\ning disinformation operations, to infuence public opinion and sow division.  Depending on the facts, a foreign government's eforts to use the Internet as part of a hostile efort to multiply its propaganda's malign infuence on the American public may violate a number of federal laws on which the Department may base criminal investigations and prosecutions.  Te Department is also considering whether new criminal statutes aimed more directly at this type of activity are needed.\n\n\nTe Department has crafed a strategy to counter each phase of the foreign malign infuence campaign cycle.  *See* **Fig. 2**. While the In addition to these activities, in some circumstances, public exposure and attribution of foreign infuence operations, and of foreign governments' goals and methods in conducting them, can be an important means of countering the threat and rendering those operations less efective. Of course, partisan politics must play no role in the decision whether to disclose the existence of a foreign infuence operation, and such disclosures must not be made for the purpose of conferring any advantage or disadvantage on any political or social group.  In addition, the Department must seek to protect intelligence sources and methods and operational equities, and attribution itself may present challenges.  It is also important not to take actions that merely exacerbate the impact of a foreign infuence operation, or that re-victimize its victims.  Given the competing in-\n\nterests sometimes at stake, the Department has established a formal policy on the disclosure of foreign infuence operations to guide its actions in this critically important area. Tat policy is found at pages 1617.\n\nin addressing foreign infuence operations aimed at sowing discord and undermining our Nation's institutions.  Combating foreign infuence operations requires a whole-of-society approach that relies on coordinated actions by federal, State, and local government agencies; support from potential victims and the private sector; and the active engagement of an informed public. Even so, investigating and prosecuting those who violate our laws, disrupting particular operations, and exposing covert foreign activities can be useful in defending against this threat.  It is therefore critical that the Department consistently evaluate existing law and policy governing its actions, as well as its strategic approach to the problem.  In the short term, the Department must use all current authorities to counter the foreign infuence threat, working closely with the IC, DHS, State and local governments, and where appropriate, the private sector.\n5. Overt infuence eforts, such as the use of foreign media outlets to infuence policymakers and the public.  Overt foreign government eforts to infuence the American public or policymakers may be lawful so long as the relevant government complies with U.S. laws requiring public disclosure, along with other applicable laws.  When foreign media outlets or lobbyists act as agents of foreign governments, they may be required to register as foreign agents under FARA.  Media outlets with links to China, Japan, Russia, and South Korea have done so.  Apart from enforcing such laws, the Departmentin concert with the U.S. government as a whole, as well as with American society more broadlycan help increase public understanding of foreign infuence operations.\n\n## Conclusion\n\nWe also must ensure that we are sharing information about the threat with potential victims, other afected individuals, and the public, consistent with our policies and our national security interests.  In the longer term, we must consider what additional authorities or policies would be useful and appropriate to enable us to respond as efectively as possible to the foreign infuence threat.\n\n\nTe nature of foreign infuence operations will continue to change as technology and our foreign adversaries' tactics change.  Our adversaries will persist in seeking to exploit the diversity of today's information space, and the tactics and technology they employ will continue to evolve.\n\n## * * *\n\n\nTe story is told that a woman named Elizabeth Powel approached Benjamin Franklin when he was walking home afer the Constitutional Convention in the summer of 1787. Powel asked Franklin what type of govern-\nTe Department plays an important role in combating foreign eforts to interfere in our elections, but it cannot alone solve the problem. Tere are limits to the Department's roleand the role of the U.S. government\n\n## Countering Malign Foreign Influence Operations\n\n\n\nment the Founders had created.  Franklin replied: \"A republic, madam, if you can keep it.\" Powel's question illustrates that it was not inevitable that our Nation would begin as a democratic republic. Franklin's answer reminds us that it is not inevitable that we will remain a democratic republic.15\nOur Nation's democratic processes are strong.\n\nBut the Constitution comes with a condition: we need to keep it.  We are all keepers of the republic, and it is incumbent upon all of us, as a society, to counter the foreign infuence threat.  Te Department of Justice will certainly play its part.\n\n## Department Of Justice Policy On Disclosure Of Foreign Influence Operations\n\nForeign infuence operations include covert actions by foreign governments intended to sow divisions in our society, undermine confdence in our democratic institutions, and otherwise afect political sentiment and public discourse to achieve strategic geopolitical objectives. Such operations are ofen empowered by modern technology that facilitates malicious cyber activity and covert or anonymous communications with U.S. audiences on a mass scale from abroad.\n\nOur Nation's democratic processes and institutions are strong and must remain resilient in the face of this threat.  It is the policy of the Department of Justice to investigate, disrupt, and prosecute the perpetrators of illegal foreign infuence activities where feasible.  It is also the Department's policy to alert the victims and unwitting targets of foreign infuence activities, when appropriate and consistent with the Department's policies and practices, and with our national security interests.\nIt may not be possible or prudent to disclose foreign infuence operations in certain contexts because of investigative or operational considerations, or other constraints. In some circumstances, however, public exposure and attribution of foreign infuence operations can be an important means of countering the threat and rendering those operations less efective.\nInformation the Department of Justice collects concerning foreign infuence operations may be disclosed as follows:\n\n\n- To support arrests and charges for federal crimes arising out of foreign infuence\noperations, such as hacking or malicious cyber activity, identity thef, and fraud.\n- To alert victims of federal crimes arising out of foreign infuence operations,\n\nconsistent with Department guidelines on victim notifcation and assistance.18\n\n- To alert unwitting recipients of foreign government-sponsored covert support,\nas necessary to assist in countering the threat.\n\n- To alert technology companies or other private sector entities to foreign infuence operations where their services are used to disseminate covert foreign government propaganda or disinformation, or to provide other covert support to political organizations or groups.\n\n\n## Department Of Justice Policy On Disclosure Of Foreign Influence Operations, Continued\n\n- To alert relevant Congressional committees to signifcant intelligence activities,\nconsistent with statutory reporting requirements and Executive Branch policies.\n\n\n- To alert the public or other afected individuals, where the federal or national\n\n\ninterests in doing so outweigh any countervailing considerations.19\nIn performing these functions, the Department will be mindful of the following principles and policies:\n\n\n- Partisan political considerations must play no role in eforts to alert victims, other afected individuals, or the American public to foreign infuence operations against the United States.  Such eforts must not be for the purpose of conferring any advantage or disadvantage on any political or social group or any individual or organization.\n\n- In considering whether and how to disclose foreign infuence operations, or\nthe details thereof, the Department will seek to protect intelligence sources and methods, investigations, and other U.S. government operations.\n\n\n- Foreign infuence operations will be publicly identifed as such only when the Department can attribute those activities to a foreign government with high confdence.  Disinformation or other support or infuence by unknown or domestic sources not acting on behalf of a foreign government is beyond the scope of this policy.\n\n- Where a criminal or national security investigation during an election cycle is\nat issue, the Department must also be careful to adhere to longstanding policies\nregarding the timing of charges or taking overt investigative steps.20\nTe Department (including the FBI) will not necessarily be the appropriate entity to disclose information publicly concerning a foreign infuence operation.  Where a Department component is considering whether to alert the general public to a specifc foreign infuence operation, consultation with the National Security Division is required.  Nothing in this policy is intended to impair information sharing undertaken by Department components for investigative or intelligence purposes.\n\n\n\n## Notes\n\n\n\n1 *See* U.S. Const. art. I,  4 (Congressional elections) & art. II,  4 (Presidential elections).\n\n\n2 Te term \"ballot fraud\" in this context includes fraud in the processes by which voters are registered or by which votes are cast or tabulated.\n\n\n3 Foreign infuence operations, while not always illegal, can implicate several U.S. federal criminal statutes, including (but not limited to):  18 U.S.C.  371 (conspiracy); 18 U.S.C.  951 (acting in the United States as an agent of a foreign government without prior notifcation to the Attorney General); 18 U.S.C.  1001 (false statements); 18 U.S.C.  1028A (aggravated identity thef); 18 U.S.C.  1030 (computer fraud and abuse); 18 U.S.C.  1343, 1344 (wire fraud and bank fraud); 18 U.S.C.  1519 (destruction of evidence); 18 U.S.C.  1546 (visa fraud); 22 U.S.C.  618 (Foreign Agents Registration Act); 52 U.S.C.  30109, 30121 (soliciting or making foreign contributions to infuence federal elections, or donations to infuence State or local elections).\n\n\n\n4 Office of the Director of National Intelligence, Background to \"Assessing Russian Activities and Intentions in Recent U.S. Elections\": The Anal tic Process and C ber Incident Attribution ii (Jan. 2017)\n(\"ODNI Report\"), available at: https://www.dni. gov/fles/documents/ICA_2017_01.pdf (last accessed June 29, 2018).\n\n\n\n5 ODNI Report at 2; *see also* U.S. House of Representatives Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, Report on Russian Active Measures viii (March 2018) (\"In 2015, Russia began engaging in a covert infuence campaign aimed at the U.S. presidential election.  Te Russian government, at the direction of Vladimir Putin, sought to sow discord in American society and undermine our faith in the democratic\n\n\n\nprocess.\"), available at: https://intelligence.house. gov/uploadedfles/fnal_russia_investigation_report.pdf (last accessed June 29, 2018); Minorit Members of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, Report on Russian Active Measures 12 (March 2018), available at: https://democrats-intelligence.house.gov/ uploadedfiles/20180411_-_final_-_hpsci_minority_views_on_majority_report.pdf (last accessed June 29, 2018) (summarizing Russian covert cyber eforts and other intelligence and social media operations during the 2016 elections); U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Russian Targeting of Election Infrastructure During the 2016 Election: Summar of Initial Findings and Recommendations 1 (May 2018) (\"In 2016, cyber actors afliated with the Russian Government conducted an unprecedented, coordinated cyber campaign against state election infrastructure . . . Tis activity was part of a larger campaign to prepare to undermine confdence in the voting process.  Te Committee has not seen any evidence that vote tallies were manipulated or that voter registration information was deleted or modifed.\"), available at: https:// www.burr.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Russ- RptInstlmt1-%20ElecSec%20Findings,Recs2.pdf (last accessed June 29, 2018).\n\n\n6 Daniel R. Coats, Dir. of National Intelligence,\n\"Statement for the Record: Worldwide Treat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community,\" at 11 (Feb. 13, 2018), available at: https://www. dni.gov/files/documents/Newsroom/Testimonies/2018-ATA---Unclassifed-SSCI.pdf  (last accessed June 29, 2018).\n\n7 Id.\n\n\n8 ODNI Report at 5.\n\n\n9 Daniel R. Coats, Dir. of National Intelligence,\n\n\"Annual Treat Assessment: Opening Statement,\"\nWorldwide Treats: Hearing Before the Senate Select Comm. on Intelligence, 115th Cong. (Feb.\n\n13, 2018), at 18, available at: https://www.dni. gov/files/documents/Newsroom/Testimonies/ ATA2018-asprepared.pdf  (last accessed June 29, 2018).\n\n\n10 ODNI Report at 2.\n\n\n11 Indictment in United States v. Internet Research Agency, et al., No. 18-cr-32-DLF (D.D.C.\n\nFeb. 16, 2018), available at: https://www.justice.\n\ngov/fle/1035477/download (last accessed June 29, 2018).\n\n\n12 Id.\n\n\n13 22 U.S.C.  611 *et seq*.\n\n\n14 See \"Principles of Federal Prosecution,\" U.S.\n\nAttorne s' Manual, Title 9, Section 27.000, available at: https://www.justice.gov/usam/usam-9-27000-principles-federal-prosecution (last accessed June 29, 2018).\n\n\n15 Tis story and its associated lessons are recounted in Rod J. Rosenstein, Deputy Attorney General, \"Constitution Day Address,\" National Constitution Center (Sept. 18, 2017), available at:\nhttps://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/deputy-attorney-general-rod-j-rosenstein-delivers-constitution-day-address (last accessed June 29, 2018).\n\n\n\n16 As part of the Department's ballot fraud program, the FBI must maintain an Election Crimes Coordinator (\"ECC\") in each of its Divisions. Te ECCs are the Department's primary liaison with State and local police agencies, and election administrators, as well as with other federal agencies, in the feld.  Tey attend regular trainings, coordinate local task force communications with State and local counterparts during elections, and handle intake reporting of ballot fraud allegations from non-government groups or individuals.  Te FBI then investigates properly-predicated ballot fraud cases, in coordination with a local **U.S. Attorney's Ofce (\"USAO\").**  Te FBI\nand USAO are free to exercise their discretion to conduct a preliminary investigation afer assessing the case and ensuring non-interference with the election process. Tey may pursue a full feld and grand jury investigation, and seek charges, afer consultation with the Criminal Division's Public Integry Section (\"PIN\"). However, the FBI and other federal law enforcement agencies may not conduct investigations that would infringe the Department's non-interference with elections policy (*see* page 11), or that would unlawfully result in an armed federal presence at a polling site.  See 18 U.S.C.  592.  For almost forty years, PIN has provided the feld with an Election Crimes Branch Director.  Pursuant to the United States Attorneys' Manual, the Director, assisted as needed by other managers and staf at PIN, functions as a mandatory consultant for the USAOs on all ballot fraud matters that progress beyond a preliminary investigation, see U.S.A.M.  9-85.210, and as a subject matter expert available to provide advice and assistance to USAOs and the FBI.  Te Director coordinates and conducts mandatory live training with designated feld personnel of the USAOs and FBI.  Te Director also leads an Election Day Watch program during federal election seasons to monitor and coordinate responses to election events while the polls are open on each federal election day.  Te Election Day Watch program is the Department's mechanism for ensuring consistent and efcient communication and coordination between interagency representatives, federal prosecutors and investigators in the feld, and State and local partners.  Each USAO must maintain a District Election Ofcer (\"DEO\") among its cadre of Assistant United States Attorneys.  Te DEOs are the Department's primary liaison with State and local counterparts in the feld.  Tey attend regular trainings, and as part of the Election Day\n\n\n\nWatch program, coordinate local task force communications with State and local counterparts leading up to and during the elections.  DEOs also coordinate press releases concerning election-day procedures to facilitate reporting to the federal government of ballot fraud allegations from non-government groups or individuals. Te Voting Section and Criminal Section of the Department's **Civil Rights Division (\"CRT\")** coordinates regularly with PIN to ensure that ballot fraud allegations are routed to the best response entity.  CRT maintains a hotline that operates all year, including throughout federal election days, to facilitate reporting of allegations of potential voting-related federal law violations.  CRT's Voting Section also enforces the civil provisions of a wide range of federal statutes that protect the right to vote, including the Voting Rights Act; the National Voter Registration Act; the Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act; the Help America Vote Act; and the Civil Rights Act. CRT's Criminal Section enforces federal criminal statutes that prohibit voter intimidation and voter suppression based on race, color, national origin, or religion.  Finally, the Department of Homeland Security (\"DHS\") recently has joined existing eforts to combat ballot fraud in the specifc area of cyber threats.  In particular, DHS provides advice and resources to State and local counterparts to assess the risks to their computer systems for voter registration, balloting, and tabulation.  DHS also has certain resources for incident response, though the FBI has greater local resources and, under PPD-41, retains the lead on incident response.\n\n\n17 Tis treatise is available online at: https://www.\n\njustice.gov/criminal/fle/1029066/download (last accessed June 29, 2018).  Te most relevant discussion can be found at pages 84-85:  \"Te Justice Department's goals in the area of election crime are to prosecute those who violate federal criminal law and, through such prosecutions, deter corruption of future elections.  Te Department\n\n\ndoes not have a role in determining which candidate won a particular election, or whether another election should be held because of the impact of the alleged fraud on the election . . . . In investigating an election fraud matter, federal law enforcement personnel should carefully evaluate whether an investigative step under consideration has the potential to afect the election itself. Starting a public criminal investigation of alleged election fraud before the election to which the allegations pertain has been concluded runs the\nobvious risk of chilling legitimate voting and campaign activities.  It also runs the signifcant risk of interjecting the investigation itself as an issue, both in the campaign and in the adjudication of any ensuing election contest . . . . Accordingly, overt criminal investigative measures ordinarily should not be taken in matters involving alleged fraud in the manner in which votes were cast or counted until the election in question has been concluded, its results certifed, and all recounts and election contests concluded.  Not only does such investigative restraint avoid interjecting the federal government into election campaigns, the voting process, and the adjudication of ensuing recounts and election contest litigation, but it also ensures that evidence developed during any election litigation is available to investigators, thereby minimizing the need to duplicate investigative eforts.  Many election fraud issues are developed\nto the standards of factual predication for a federal criminal investigation during post-election litigation.\"\n\n18 See Attorney General Guidelines for Victim and Witness Assistance (May 2012), available at:\nhttps://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/olp/ docs/ag guidelines2012.pdf (last accessed June\n29, 2018); *see also* 42 U.S.C.  10607 (Victims'\nRights and Restitution Act).\n\n\n19 For example, there may be an important federal or national interest in publicly disclosing a foreign infuence operation that threatens to un-\n\n## Countering Malign Foreign Influence Operations\n\nacerbate the foreign government's messaging, or may re-victimize the victim.\n\n\n20 *See,* e.g., U.S. Dept. of Justice, Federal Prosecution of Election Offenses 8-9, 84-\n85 (8th ed. 2017), quoted in *supra* note 17.\n\ndermine confdence in the government or public institutions; risks inciting violence or other illegal actions; or may cause substantial harm, alarm, or confusion if lef unaddressed.  On the other hand, in some cases, public disclosure of a foreign infuence operation may be counterproductive because it may amplify or otherwise ex-\n\n## Chapter 2 Categorizing Sophisticated Cyber Schemes\n\n\n\nalign foreign infuence operations represent a signifcant cyber-enabled threat to American society and naschemes; (4) crimes threatening personal privacy; and (5) crimes threatening critical infrastructure.\n\nM\n\n## 1. Damage To Computer Systems\n\ntional security.  But they are not the only one. Every day, criminals and other hackers within the United States and around the world seek to use computers, smart devices, and other chip-enabled technologyas well as the networks that connect themto victimize American consumers and businesses, or to do our government harm.\n\n\nMany cyber threats directly target computer systems and networks, seeking to damage the integrity or availability of data and services housed on those systems.  For example, a Distributed Denial of Service (\"DDoS\") attack involves the orchestrated transmission of communications engineered to overwhelm the victim network's connection to the Internet in order to impair or disrupt that network's ability to send or receive communications.  Because they require the near simultaneous and sustained sending of communications against a discrete target, DDoS attacks usually are launched by a large network of hijacked computers called a botnet. (For further discussion of botnets, see page 41.) Common targets of DDoS attacks include websites that the criminals wish to disable and push of-line, either because they disagree with the content, or because they wish to drive trafc to sites they prefer.\n\nIn this chapter, we describe some of the most prevalent and dangerous types of cybercrime schemes our Nation currently faces.  Various actors, with varying motivations, perpetrate these schemes, targeting various categories of victims.  All of these schemes, however, rely on the malicious, unauthorized use of computers to penetrate into another person's computer or network.  Tis technical baseline provides a set of common operational techniques across the range of complicated cybercriminal plots.  Indeed, in a threat landscape that constantly evolves and features a diverse set of actors, motivations, and targets, the prevalence of certain key techniques is a signifcant and rare constant.\n\n## Cybercrime Schemes\n\nIn the current landscape, cyber-enabled schemes tend to fall into one or more of fve basic categories: (1) damage to computer systems; (2) data thef; (3) fraud/carding DDoS attacks can have crippling, far-reaching efects.  In October 2016, for example, a massive DDoS attack targeting a U.S.-based company that controls much of the Internet's domain name system infrastructure brought down many of the world's best-known websites for several hours, including sites belong-\n\nas they worked to neutralize and mitigate the attacks on their servers.  In 2017, the Department of the Treasury added the seven hackers to the Ofce of Foreign Assets Control (\"OFAC\") Specially Designated National and Blocked Persons List.5\n\n\nMalign actors also use **ransomware** to infict damage to a victim's computer systems. Ransomware is malicious computer code (or \"malware\") that blocks a victim's access to data on its systems, typically by encrypting the data and demanding that the victim pay a ransom, ofen in the form of a difcult-to-trace virtual currency, to restore the data.  *See* **Fig. 1**.\n\n\ning to Twitter, Pinterest, CNN, Fox News, and Netfix.  Te botnet used to launch this attack was originally created a few years before.  Te Department recently convicted the botnet's creators afer the leader of the group admitted that he and his conspirators developed it in part to initiate powerful DDoS attacks \"against business competitors and others against whom [they] held grudges.\"1   Tey also used the botnetwhich, in an alarming new twist, enlisted everyday so-called\n\"Internet of Tings\" devices into its network of hijacked machines, thereby amplifying its strength by orders of magnitude2to provide a source of revenue, either by renting it out to third-parties in exchange for payment, or by employing it to \"extort hosting companies and others into paying protection money in order to avoid being targeted\" by DDoS attacks.3\n\n\nRansomware can be delivered in a variety of ways, including through fraudulent e-mails. Such e-mails can be drafed to look like they are from trustworthy senders, containing malicious attachments or links that, once opened or clicked, activate the ransomware. Some variants also try, once they have gained a foothold in a victim's network, to spread laterally across the network to encrypt fles on other computers or servers to which the victim's device has access.  A second common method involves planting ransomware in hacked websites, which infect the computers of visitors to the sites.  In addition, it is not uncommon for criminals to use botnet infrastructure and code to facilitate the widespread delivery of ransomware. Like DDoS attacks, ransomware attacks can impose immense costs. For example, in 2017, the \"WannaCry\" ransomware attack spread rapidly and indiscriminately around the world over a mere four days.  Tis campaignwhich ultimately was attributed to Hostile governments, too, may employ DDoS attacks to advance their geopolitical goals and undermine our national security.  In March 2016, for example, a federal grand jury in New York indicted seven Iranian hackers belonging to two companies that worked for Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps for their role in DDoS attacks targeting the public-facing websites of nearly ffy U.S. banks.4   Tese DDoS attacks against the U.S. fnancial sector began in approximately December 2011, and occurred sporadically until September 2012, at which point they escalated in frequency to a near-weekly basis.  On certain days during the DDoS campaign, victim computer servers were hit with massive amounts of traffc, which cut of hundreds of thousands of customers from online access to their bank accounts.  Tese attacks collectively cost the banks tens of millions of dollars to remediate the North Korean governmentrendered useless \"hundreds of thousands of computers in hospitals, schools, businesses, and homes in over 150 countries.\"7   Total damages likely ran into the hundreds of millions of dollars.  High-profle incidents such as the March 2018 attack that crippled Atlanta's city government make clear that ransomware schemes remain a threat.\n\nwith nation states and other entities that have broader motivations.  To be sure, destructive attacks may come disguised as ransomware campaigns; the malware linked to the notorious \"NotPetya\" attack launched by the Russian military in June 2017, for example, locked up its victims' fles and purported to demand a ransom.  It soon became clear, however, that this cyberattack was \"meant to paralyze, not proft,\" as victims who tried to pay found it almost impossible to do so.9\n\nTypically, cybercriminals run ransomware campaigns: the goal is to damage the victim's computer system in the short-term in order to get the victim to pay.  If the scheme is to succeed, in other words, the victim needs to get their fles back.  By contrast, destructive attacksanother type of cyber threat that directly targets computer systems and networksdestroy the victim's data.  For that reason, these attacks ofen are associated Tis attack, which was \"part of the Kremlin's ongoing efort to destabilize Ukraine,\" resulted in \"the most destructive and costly cyberattack in history,\" \"causing billions of dollars in damage across Europe, Asia, and the Americas.\"10   Similarly, the \"WannaCry\"\nattack described above did not prove to be very lucrative to the attackers. Rather, it was a reckless attack that resulted in havoc and destruction; any money that was raised was purely a side beneft.11\n\nPerhaps the most notorious example of a destructive attack launched against a U.S. company was the November 2014 cyberattack by North Korea on Sony Pictures Entertainment (\"SPE\").  Tis attack destroyed much of SPE's computer systems, compromised private information, released valuable corporate data and intellectual property, and threatened employees, customers, and flm distributers with violence.  Te attackers stole a large number of fleswhich included private correspondence, unreleased flms, salary records, and social security numbersand released much of the information to the public, imposing signifcant fnancial and other consequences. Te attack forced SPE to take its company-wide computer network ofine and lef thousands of its computers inoperable.\n\nIn response to the cyberattack on SPE, the U.S. government publicly attributed the incident to the North Korean government, and then sanctioned a North Korean government agency, two trading companies, and ten North Korean individuals.13\n\n\n## 2. Data Tef\n\n\nAs the world grows increasingly reliant on digital technology, and as companies store ever larger quantities of data about their customers and other individuals, criminals have sought to steal and proft from control over that data.  Te past decade has witnessed numerous publicly reported instances of criminals hacking into computer systems and stealing personally identifying information\n(\"PII\") about hundreds of millions of individuals.\n\n\ngeneral public, but also their own employees.\n\nTis fact makes them valuable targets.  For example, the U.S. Ofce of Personnel Management announced in 2015 it had been victimized through two separate but related cyberattacks that resulted in the thef of highly sensitive background investigation records of current, former, and prospective federal employees and contractors, as well as the thef of personnel data of over 21 million people.17\n\nData breaches like these degrade public trust in government agencies.\n\n\nAccording to one report, there were at least\n686 data breaches reported in the frst quarter of 2018, resulting in the thef of as many as\n1.4 billion records.14   Stolen PII can include dates of birth, social security numbers, credit card numbers, e-mail addresses, drivers' license numbers, payroll and tax information, and even answers to security questions used to log into systemsnamely, everything needed to misappropriate victims' identities, make fraudulent purchases (including fling fraudulent claims for tax refunds), and craf phishing and other social engineering attacks on specifc targets. Breaches of major retailers can reveal transaction information and expose these companies to massive fnancial losses, while imposing upon members of the public the risk that their identities will be used to commit other fnancial crimes, with all of the associated impacts.  Crimes of this sort are tremendously costly to all involved. According to one estimate, the average total cost in 2017 to a victim company from a data breach was approximately $7.35 million.15   Te Internet Crime Complaint Center (\"IC3\"), the FBI unit that receives and tracks cybercrime complaints from victims, received a total of 3,785 complaints of corporate data breach in 2017, with reported losses exceeding $60 million.16\n\nSometimes, nation states facilitate the work of criminals who seek to steal and proft from user data.  In March 2017, the Department announced criminal charges against two offcers of the Russian Federal Security Service (\"FSB\") and two additional conspirators involving computer hacking, economic espionage, and other ofenses in connection with a conspiracy to access Yahoo's network as well as information concerning millions of individual webmail accounts.18  Tose charges revealed that ofcers from the FSB unit that serves as the FBI's point of contact in Moscow on cybercrime matters were using criminal hackersone of whom already had been publicly charged in two separate investigations in the United Statesto target American webmail providers and technology companies, among others.\n\nTe public revelation that FSB ofcers for years had worked with a wanted cybercriminal, and had allowed him to further victimize his targets (for example, by searching compromised accounts for credit card and other information that could be monetized), laid bare for the public and international com-\nGovernment agencies face similar threats.  As agencies try to use new information technologies to make it easier for individuals and entities to submit and obtain information necessary for paying taxes, obtaining benefts, or providing services, the avenues for potential breaches dramatically increase. Of course, government agencies collect and store sensitive information concerning not only the\n\n\nmunity the nexus between the Russian state apparatus and the Russian criminal underworld. Tese charges also demonstrated that the Russian government has not always been a responsible stakeholder in the fght against international cybercrime. One of the indicted hackers was arrested in Canada and brought to the United States; he pled guilty to eight criminal counts in U.S. federal court in November 2017, and was sentenced to a fve-year prison term in May 2018.19   In December 2016, OFAC designated the FSB under a new executive order issued to expand the authority under E.O. 13694, which empowers the President to block the property of persons who engage in signifcant malicious cyber-enabled activities.20   On March\n15, 2018, the Department  of the Treasury also designated the FSB pursuant to section 224 of the Countering America's Adversaries Trough Sanctions Act, which targets cyber actors operating on behalf of the Russian government in particular.\n\n\n\nMalign actors can also use data thefs to further terrorist acts. In June 2015, an ISIL- linked hacker named Ardit Ferizi stole PII belonging to tens of thousands of customers of a U.S. company,  including members of the military and other government personnel. Ferizi subsequently culled the PII belonging to 1,300 particular individuals employed by the U.S. government and provided that information to Junaid Hussain, a now-deceased ISIL recruiter and attack facilitator. In August 2015, Hussain posted the names on Twitter in the name of the Islamic State Hacking Division with a message saying, in part:  \"We are in your emails and computer systems, watching and recording your every move, we have your names and addresses, we are in your emails and social media accounts,\n\nwe are extracting confdential data and passing on your personal information to the soldiers of the khilafah, who soon with the permission of Allah will strike at your necks in your own lands!\"  Malaysian authorities detained Ferizi, who subsequently consented to extradition to the United States.  He pleaded guilty and was sentenced to 20 years in prison for providing material support to ISIL, and for accessing a protected computer without authorization and obtaining information in order to provide material support to a designated foreign terrorist organization.21\n\n## The Costs Of Intellectual Property Crime\n\nEstimates vary regarding the size of economic loss that can be attributed to the thef of intellectual property and trade secrets.  Te Commission on the Tef of American Intellectual Property has estimated that the annual cost to the U.S. economy through the thef of trade secrets, and through counterfeit goods and pirated sofware, exceeds $225 billion and could be as high as $600 billion.22\n\n\n\nAccording to a cybersecurity industry report, the direct costs of cyber thef in 2014 for over 50 U.S.-based private and public sector organizations ranged from just under $2 million to $65 million each year per company, an increase of 82 percent over six years.23 Pricewaterhouse Coopers estimated in 2014 that the United States lost between one and three percent of its gross domestic product each year due to trade secret thef.24\n\n\nand the others were arrested in 2012 in New Zealand, but their extraditions to the United States still remain on appeal in that nation. Despite delays in the criminal case, the Department of Justice has prevailed in a civil forfeiture action in U.S. federal court to forfeit the proceeds of the criminal conspiracy.\n\n\n\nTe **thef of intellectual property** represents another signifcant data thef problem. Te two most notable types of cyber-enabled intellectual property crime are the infringement of copyrighted material over the Internet and the misappropriation of trade secrets stored in a digital format.  Internet sites that proft from the unauthorized distribution of copyrighted movies, music, sofware, and other digital works can have a global reach, generate millions of dollars of illicit revenue for the operators, and cause extensive fnancial harm to the owners of the works being shared.  While copyrighted works generally are intended to be accessible to the public under terms set by the copyright owner, trade secrets receive criminal protection specifcally because they involve knowledge that is not known to the public and derive value from remaining secret.\n\n\nFollowing the takedown of Megaupload.com, other online piracy sites grew in popularity. On July 20, 2016, Artem Vaulin of Ukraine\nwas arrested in Poland based on U.S. federal charges for conspiracy to commit criminal copyright infringement, conspiracy to commit money laundering, and criminal copyright infringement.26\nVaulin is alleged\nto have run one of the world's most visited illegal fle-sharing websites, Kickass Torrents (\"KAT\"), which was seized as part of the operation.  KAT enabled users to illegally reproduce and distribute hundreds of millions of copyrighted motion pictures, video games, television programs, musical recordings, and other electronic media.  Initial investigation indicates that the copyrighted material was collectively valued at well over $1 billion, and that the site, which was in the top 100 most frequently visited sites on the Internet, received more than 50 million unique visitors\neach month.\n\nOn the trade secret front, the Department obtained a conviction in January 2018 in U.S. federal court against a China-based manufacturer and exporter of wind turbines that stole trade secrets from a U.S.-based company.  Te Chinese company, Sinovel Wind Group Co. Ltd., conspired with others to steal proprietary wind turbine technology from the American corporate victim in order to produce its own wind turbines and to retroft Kim Dotcom, Finn Batato, Mathias Ortmann, Bram van der Kolk, and others are members of a worldwide criminal organization whose members allegedly engaged in criminal copyright infringement with estimated harm to copyright holders well in excess of $400 million, and which yielded over $175 million in illicit proceeds.25  Te conspirators operated a commercial website and service called Megaupload.com, which reproduced and distributed copies of popular copyrighted content without authorization and claimed at one time to account for four percent of total Internet trafcincluding more than one billion total visits, 150 million registered users, and 50 million daily visitors. A federal grand jury charged members of the conspiracy with a number of conspiracy, racketeering, copyright infringement, money laundering, and fraud ofenses.  Dotcom\n\nexisting wind turbines with stolen technology.  Tese crimes cost the victim more than $1 billion in shareholder equity and almost 700 jobsover half its global workforce.27\nIn addition, the Department has pursued charges not only against criminals seeking monetary gain, but also against nation-state actors engaged in economic espionage through cyber means.  In May 2014, for ex-\nDepartment of the General Staff Department of the People s Liberation Army (3PLA), Second Bureau, Third Office, Military Unit Cover Designator (MUCD) 61398, at some point during the investigation.  The activities executed by each of these individuals allegedly involved in the conspiracy varied according to his specialties.  Each provided his individual expertise to an alleged conspiracy to penetrate the computer networks of six American companies while those companies were engaged in negotiations or joint ventures or were pursuing legal action with, or against, state owned enterprises in China. They then used their illegal access to allegedly steal proprietary information including, for instance, e mail exchanges among company employees and trade secrets related to technical specifications for nuclear plant designs.\n\n\n\nIf you have any information concerning these individuals, please contact your local FBI office or the nearest American Embassy or Consulate.\n\nample, a federal grand jury indicted fve uniformed members of the Chinese military on charges of hacking and conducting economic espionage against large U.S. entities in the nuclear power, metal, and solar energy industries.  Te lengthy statement of charges described numerous specifc instances where ofcers of the People's Liberation Army (\"PLA\") were alleged to have hacked into the computer systems of U.S. victims to steal\n\n\nno meaningful response,\"32  the Department acknowledged as much and unsealed the indictment, providing insight into the status of China's adherence to norms it purportedly had embraced.\n\n## 3. Fraud/Carding Schemes\n\ntrade secrets and sensitive, internal communications for commercial advantage or private fnancial gain. *See* **Fig. 2**. Although the fve charged PLA ofcers remain at large, this case illustrated how the Department's independent investigations and actions can play an important role as part of a broader, coordinated approach designed to support American companies, deter our adversaries, and otherwise change their behavior.\n\n\n\nAt the core of fraud lies deceit.  It can manifest in an intent to deceive by those one knows and trusts, or, as is ofen the case with cybercrime, by criminals defrauding victims by abusing the Internet's lack of a trusted and efective means to authenticate another's identity.  Online systems with weak authentication and few indications for determining another's true identity have opened the door for fraudsters to commit numerous crimes by faking their online identities or fraudulently adopting the identities of others.  Cyber fraud schemes take many forms, including Nigerian-letter scams in which fraudsters e-mail victims claiming to be Nigerian government ofcials in need of assistance in transferring stolen funds out of Nigeria.  Recipients who respond are encouraged to cover upfront the supposed expenses for the transfers themselves, upon the fraudulent promise of later repayment, and to provide personal banking information and other identifying informationwhich is later used to drain victims'\nbank accounts.33 Other forms include frauds that convince victims to donate to fake charities, especially afer natural disasters, and fraudulent online transactions or exchanges in which no payment is made to, or no good or service is received by, the victim.34\n\nOther schemes entice victims to purchase investment and fnancial instruments, ofen Te indictment sent a clear message that the state-sponsored thef of trade secrets or other confdential business information, with the intent of providing competitive advantages to companies or commercial sectors, is unacceptable.  Tis norm thereafer gained widespread acceptance, most notably in a bilateral agreement between the United States and China in September 2015,28  and among the G20 at the Antalya Summit in Turkey in November 2015.29   Although some U.S.\n\ncybersecurity frms indicate that computer intrusions by Chinese state-sponsored hackers targeting U.S. frms have decreased since then,30 the U.S. government continues to monitor China's compliance with the norm, and with that nation's September 2015 commitment to cooperate on investigations of crimes emanating from its territory.  To that end, in late 2017, the Department charged three Chinese nationals who worked for the purported Internet security frm known as Boyusec with stealing trade secrets and other confdential information from American frms until as recently as May 2017long afer the Chinese commitments of September 2015.31   Afer the Department sought assistance from the Chinese authorities in investigating the allegations and \"received\n\nhacking, phishing attacks, and social media manipulationto gain access to sensitive, often sexually explicit information that they use to extort, harass, or stalk all types of people, including vulnerable youth and young adults.\n\n\nmarketed with misleading claims of ofering low-risk, high-reward guaranteed returns or overly consistent returns.  Examples include Ponzi schemes, advance fee frauds, pyramid schemes, and market manipulation frauds. Tese schemes can target members of afnity groups, such as groups with a common religion or ethnicity, in order to exploit that supposed connection to build trust and operate the investment fraud against the victim.35\n\nCarding schemes are another major fnancial threat.  Tese schemes involve criminals selling and purchasing hacked credit card information, typically through dark markets devoted to criminal activity, that is then used to commit fraudulent ATM transactions, purchase pre-paid gif cards, and buy goods that are then re-shipped to criminal organizations.  In just one example, a group of Russian criminals hacked into systems at credit card processors, banks, retailers, and other companies, and stole over 160 million credit card numbers.36\n\n## 4. Cyber-Enabled Crimes Threatening Personal Privacy\n\n\nCriminals regularly abuse the global reach, connectivity, and anonymity of information technology services to commit a wide range of crimes targeting specifc individuals. Many of these behaviors represent reprehensible and ofen dangerous violations of the victim's privacy rights, and can have lasting, damaging impact.  Examples of these crimes include sextortion and non-consensual pornography (sometimes colloquially called \"revenge porn\"), as well as cyber-enabled harassment and stalking of victims.  Criminals are using online tacticsincluding computer\n\nSextortion fact patterns vary, but some typical scenarios have emerged.  A common fact pattern involves a perpetrator demanding something of value, typically sexually explicit images, from a victim.  Te perpetrator enforces these demands through threats to distribute material that the victim seeks to keep private, such as embarrassing or sexually explicit images involving the victim, or through threats to harm the victim's friends or family, for example by using stolen account information to bankrupt them. A primary tactic that sextortionists use is to lure the victim to share a compromising image or information, which, once obtained, the criminal can use to blackmail the victim into providing additional images or videos.  Ofen, criminals use social engineering tactics to target victims.  A common approach is to misrepresent themselves as peersfor example, using profle photos or avatars on social media websites bearing images close in age to the victim\nto convince victims they are communicating with an age-appropriate individual who is actually interested in them.  By fraudulently building a rapport using fattery, romance, and manipulation, criminals are able to befriend victims and entice them to share sensitive images or information.  Other criminals have presented themselves as representatives from a modeling agency that is interested in representing the victim; still others have successfully impersonated the victim's partner in order to trick the victim. In addition, criminals also obtain material from victims'\nonline social media accounts, such as personal information and \"friends lists,\" which the criminals exploit to present themselves as acquaintances or someone with similar interests.  Finally, some criminals simply hack into a victim's computer and install malware that controls the device's cameras, thereby surreptitiously capturing compromising or personal video footage of the victim.  As major consumers of social media, children and young adults are particularly vulnerable to these types of ofenses.\n\nincludes any course of conduct or series of acts taken by the perpetrator that places the victim in reasonable fear of death or serious bodily injury, or causes, attempts to cause, or would reasonably be expected to cause substantial emotional distress to the victim or the victim's immediate family.  Prohibited acts include repeated, unwanted, intrusive, and frightening communications from the perpetrator by phone, e-mail, or other forms of communication; harassment and threats communicated through the Internet, such as social media sites; and the posting of information or spreading rumors about the victim on the Internet.  Cyber-enabled harassment, by contrast, involves more generalized threats to victims, and includes swatting and doxxing.  **Swatting** involves deceiving emergency responders to dispatch a SWAT team or other police unit to the victim's home or location, purportedly because the victim has taken hostages or is otherwise armed and dangerous, which tragically has resulted in deadly outcomes.   **Doxxing** involves broadcasting personal information about the victim on the Internet, exposing him or her to further harassment by others.\n\nNon-consensual pornography describes the distribution of nude or sexually explicit images and videos of an individual without the victim's consent.  Images taken consensually during an intimate relationship are released once the relationship ends.  Other times, perpetrators obtain consensually produced images by hacking into systems, or obtain non-consensually produced imagery through hidden cameras or by recording sexual assaults.  Te images may be posted online, ofen with identifying information and links to social media profles, or may be sent directly to the victim's co-workers, friends, and family.37   Non-consensual pornography sometimes overlaps with sextortion, particularly when the perpetrator threatens to distribute sexually explicit images of the victim unless the victim provides additional images or some other thing of value.\n\nTe Department vigorously pursues these acts when they rise to the level of federal crimes.  As just one example, we prosecuted a Department of State employee at the U.S. Embassy in London for engaging in a widespread international computer hacking, cyberstalking, and sextortion campaign.39\n\n\nCyber-enabled stalking and **harassment** are other particularly pernicious cyber threats against individuals.  Tese terms cover similar criminal activity that threatens victims, though only cyberstalking is explicitly defned in federal criminal law.38   Cyberstalking Tis defendant's scheme involved, among other steps, sending e-mails to thousands of potential victims pretending to be from his targets' e-mail provider. Te defendant then used these e-mails to trick victims into revealing their account passwords, which\n\n\nthat can be used in the future to disrupt operations or to steal valuable proprietary information.  In addition, perpetrators of ransomware schemes, as described above, have sought to exploit society's need for critical infrastructure to remain continuously operational by targeting (and extorting) hospitals, and other vital institutions, that cannot aford any downtime.\n\nhe then used to hack into the accounts and search for sexually explicit photographs. Once the defendant located private photos, he searched for additional personal information about his victims, such as addresses and family member names. Using this information and the stolen explicit images, he then engaged in a cyberstalking campaign, threatening to release the photos if victims did not comply with his demands.  Tis defendant ultimately was sentenced to 57 months in federal prison.40\n\n\n\n5. Cyber-enabled crimes threatening\ncritical infrastructure\nOur Nation's critical infrastructure provides the essential services that underpin American society and serves as the backbone of our economy, security, and health systems.41\n\n\n\nIncreased connectivity has helped U.S. companies manage and monitor their businesses, but it also has made critical infrastructure vulnerable to cyberattack.  Modernization has been a double-edged sword: while it has unlocked new potential for efciency and performance, the resulting increased connectivity between devices and systems, and especially vital systems like the electrical grid and water treatment facilities, have also created new vulnerabilities and attack vectors that\nmust be defended.43   As a result, the industrial-control systems that manage and monitor many of our most important industrial facilities and systems are increasingly being targeted by adversaries intent on wreaking\nhavoc.44  Tis is not a hypothetical threat:\none of the Iranian hackers indicted for the DDoS attacks against the U.S. fnancial sector\nis also alleged repeatedly to have gained access to the Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (\"SCADA\") system of a dam in New York, allowing him to obtain information regarding the dam's status and operation.  Had the system not been under maintenance at the time, the hacker would have been able to control the dam's sluice gate.45\n\nBecause private entities own and operate the vast majority of the Nation's critical infrastructure, the FBI works to make threat Critical infrastructure includes the fnancial services sector, the electrical grid, dams, electoral systems, and over a dozen other sectors of society whose assets, systems, and networks are considered so vital to the United States that their incapacitation or destruction would have a debilitating efect on our national security, national economic security, national public health or safety, or any combination thereof.42  Tese sectors are highly reliant on IT systems and networks. As such, threats targeting critical infrastructure deserve particular attention.  For example, major energy systems, such as pipelines and refneries, operate using networked industrial control systems that permit remote operation of massive, geographically dispersed facilities and machines.  Tese systems rely on sophisticated computer and communication networks that adversaries target by seeking to identify vulnerabilities\n\ninformation available to afected sectors through briefngs and widely distributed technical alerts developed jointly with DHS. In March 2018, for example, the FBI and DHS announced that for at least two years, Russian government cyber actors had \"targeted government entities and multiple U.S. critical infrastructure sectors, including the energy, nuclear, commercial facilities, water, aviation, and critical manufacturing sectors.\"46\nmost important responsibility is to keep Americans safe, it must continue combating these threats and aggressively monitoring how they evolve.  One of the most important ways we can stay abreast (if not ahead) of cybercriminals is to fully understand the techniques they use to cause harm.  Te threats themselves will likely change, but the methods and tools these criminals use to commit computer intrusions and to steal from others have shown remarkable resilience.\n\n## Techniques Used To Facilitate Cyber Attacks\n\nTis technical alert described a multistage Russian intrusion campaign that compromised small commercial facilities' networks and used them to stage malware and to conduct spear-phishing attacks, which allowed the Russians to gain remote access into energy sector networks.  Te Russian cyber actors then conducted network reconnaissance, before moving laterally across the network and collecting information pertaining to Industrial Control Systems.  U.S. Treasury Secretary Steven Mnuchin referenced this activity when announcing that OFAC had sanctioned fve Russian entities and nineteen Russian individuals.47\n\nTe availability of sophisticated technology allows criminals to commit crimes from distant locations, and to avoid detection by victims and law enforcement.  Indeed, these technologies greatly expand our adversaries' reach and impact, permitting a small number of criminals to execute intrusions, schemes, and attacks that afect millions of victims.  Four of the most common tools that criminals exploit to increase the scale of their attacks include social engineering, malicious sofware, botnets, and criminal infrastructure.\n\n## 1. Social Engineering\n\nLikewise, in May 2018, the FBI and DHS issued a technical alert notifying the public about the FBI's high confdence that malicious North Korean government cyber actors have been using malware since at least 2009 \"to target multiple victims globally and in the United States,\" across various sectorsincluding critical infrastructure sectors.48\n\n\n## * * *\n\nSocial engineering is a tactic criminals use to convince or trick targets into engaging in a specifc activity, ofen by adopting a false identity online of someone the target knows or otherwise believes to be innocuous.  Unfortunately, because it preys upon widespread trust that online identities are legitimate, social engineering is surprisingly efective and Tis non-exhaustive list highlights the varied nature of the most serious cyber threats our Nation faces.  To the extent the Department's\n\n\nis a technique used in the vast majority of data breaches and online scams that the FBI investigates.49\n\n\n\ntive, such as the company's Chief Executive Ofcer. In some cases, the scammers pick an address that does not belong to the executive but appears to be a real address for the executive, such as being of by one letter.  In more sophisticated schemes, BEC fraudsters gain access to the victim company's e-mail system and send requests from the senior executive's actual e-mail account.  In 2016, these schemes caused over $360 million of losses reported to the FBIthe largest of any category of cybercrime tracked by IC3.52 In\n2017, IC3 received over 15,000 BEC complaints with adjusted losses of over $675 million, which once again placed these schemes at the top of the loss list.52\n\n## 2. Malware\n\n\nIn a **phishing** scam, for example, criminals impersonate a person or entity trusted by the victim in order to pressure the victim to engage in conduct that benefts the criminal. Tese schemes may involve sending fraudulent e-mails that appear to come from a legitimate source, such as a victim's bank or Internet Service Provider (\"ISP\"), requesting the recipient to click on a link to a website controlled by the criminals and to divulge personal account information, or seeking to get the victim to download malware under false pretenses.50   Other fraudsters use intimidation and threats to entice the victim to act, such as by threatening to close an account, and ofen ask for usernames, passwords, dates of birth, Social Security numbers, bank numbers, PIN numbers, payment card numbers, or a mother's maiden name.  Te goal is to acquire PII that the fraudsters can then sell or use to commit other crimes, such as making fraudulent purchases, or to gain access to the victim's computer to steal information or install malware.\n\n\n\nBusiness e-mail compromise (\"BEC\")\nscams are another variant of social engineering, where the goal is not to have the victim provide information, but rather to transfer money. Sometimes operating as part of sophisticated transnational criminal organizations, BEC scammers can send e-mails to employees with access to a company's fnancial system, tricking them into wiring payments to accounts controlled by the criminals.  Te e-mails ofen are designed to look as if they came directly from a senior execu-\nMalware is malicious sofware that disrupts, damages, or otherwise compromises the integrity of computer systems and networks. It is frequently disseminated by fraudulently or otherwise unlawfully obtaining access to a victim's computer or system and then launching a malicious payload on the victim's system.  Malware takes many diferent forms. Some versions are written to erase data or even render computers unusable, for example by overwriting critical information on their hard drives, thereby preventing the computers from starting. Other types of malware, such as ransomware programs (discussed above), render the data inaccessible by encrypting victims' systems and demanding a ransom with the promise of restoring the victims' data upon paymenta promise that is not always fulflled.  Spyware, including keyloggers, secretly record users' activities on computers, especially the entering of passwords, and transmit sensitive information back to criminals for further exploitation.  Any of these actions may be performed by Trojans, which are programs disguised as legitimate sofware that, once uploaded onto victims' systems, launch hidden malicious sofware that operates in the background without the victims' knowledge.\n\n## 3. Botnets\n\n\ncreased as individual hackers and organized criminal groups have used ever more sophisticated techniques to infect computers, encrypt communications, and avoid detection by investigators. Finally, as **Fig. 3** illustrates, the recent staggering growth in Internet-connected consumer devicesthe so-called \"Internet of Tings\"has allowed malicious actors to build botnets from under-protected IoT devices to launch DDoS attacks.53\n\n## 4. Criminal Infrastructure\n\n\nOperating a criminal enterprise with some form of online presence requires a backend technical infrastructure that can be hidden from law enforcement. While some criminals may rely on their own computers and servers, more sophisticated operations lease services from \"**bulletproof hosters**,\" that is, web hosting companies and data centers that purposefully are extremely lenient in what content they will host, make little to no efort to verify the true identity of their customers, and are designed to be unhelpful to law enforcement requests for information about their customers.  Bulletproof hosters ofen are located in countries with less stringent cyber regulations and under-developed domestic cybercrime law enforcement capabilities, and are akin to digital safehouses where criminals can stash malware exploit kits,  run botnets, and store PII stolen from hacked databases.\n\n\nIn addition to bulletproof hosters, cybercriminals regularly use the Dark Web, the collection of hidden sites and services that are only accessible to users of specifc routing and anonymizing services and sofware. In recent years, criminals have launched so-\nBotnets are vast networks of malware-infected computers and devices that criminals remotely control to conduct a wide range of cybercrime, including sending malware and spam against targets, launching DDoS attacks, and providing infrastructure for ransomware schemes.  Botnetsa shortening of \"ro*bot net*works\"operate as force multipliers for criminals, giving them control of hundreds, thousands, or even millions of computers to advance their schemes.  Because of the relatively low cost of attempting to infect computers with malware, even a comparatively low infection rate can populate a botnet with a vast haul of compromised computers.  Further, botnets help criminals cover their tracks from law enforcement by creating an intermediary layer of remotely controlled compromised systems between the criminals and investigators, making it even more challenging for law enforcement to determine who controls the botnet. Moreover, criminals running botnets ofen are located abroad, which further protects them due to the numerous challenges the Department faces in investigating foreign threats: limited access to digital evidence; delays caused by reliance on mutual legal assistance processes; and the possibility of safe haven from arrest or prosecution in their country of residence.  Te threat from botnets has in-\n\n## Categorizing Sophisticated Cyber Schemes\n\ncalled dark markets, that is, websites hosted on the Dark Web in which vendors and buyers congregate to buy, sell, and trade illicit goods such as narcotics, credit card numbers, hacking tools, and stolen PII in an environment that protects the vendors' and buyer's anonymity.  In the midst of an ongoing opioid crisis, the open availability of dark markets where fentanyl and other illicit narcotics are available for purchase and are delivered direct to consumers in the United States poses a signifcant public health threat. Another persistent problem on the Dark Web are online child exploitation communities where like-minded sex ofenders gather to promote the sexual abuse of children, provide an environment where such conduct seems \"normal,\" educate each other about how to perpetrate child sex abuse without getting\n\n## The Onion Router (Tor)\n\nTor operates by routing of the Tor network.  Comencrypted communicamunications sent through tions through a series these nodesknown as of relay computers. Tis the Guard, Relay, and Exit obscures the route of the nodesare encrypted in a communications, theremanner that conceals both by frustrating monithe contents of the commu-\n\ntoring by third-parties, nication and the IP address such as law enforcement.  Communiof the computer that sent the commucations sent from a computer using Tor nication.  Each node knows only which are bounced through a series of intermeother node gave it data, and which node diary servers, known as relays or nodes, is receiving data.  None of the intermechosen from among thousands of servdiate Tor nodes ever has access to both ers located throughout the world that the sender's true IP address and the acindividuals have volunteered to be part tual content of the communication.\n\ncaught, incentivize the production of images that document child sex abuse, and share images and videos depicting the sexual abuse and exploitation of children as young as infants and toddlers.  Such communities are disturbingly commonplace, and frequently involve tens of thousands of members. Te growth and continued operation of these sites and communities is made possible by anonymizing technology that efectively hides the servers hosting the sites, as well as users, from normal law enforcement techniques.  Te best-known technology of this type is free sofware called Te Onion Router (\"Tor\").  Tor transmits internet trafc through a global volunteer network of thousands of relays (i.e., proxy computers), using layers of encryption to obscure users' identities and geographical locations.  Tor not only\n\n\nanonymizes criminals' Internet trafc, but also allows them to host websites, called Hidden Services, on servers whose location is similarly masked using Tor. Criminals have exploited Hidden Services to facilitate numerous forms of illicit commercial and other criminal activity.  Some of the most infamous Hidden Services are dark markets, including the now-shuttered Silk Road and Alpha- Bay,  as well as notorious child exploitation communities. Te Department's successes in shutting down these illicit marketplaces are described in further detail in Chapter 3. Criminals' exploitation of increasingly sophisticated technologies to cover their tracks and avoid being caught represents a signifcant challenge to law enforcement.  Criminals executing ransomware schemes ofen use anonymizing networks such as Tor to communicate with victims, even going so far as to set up Tor Hidden Services websites to answer victims' questions and to facilitate payment. In addition, the use of anonymizing proxy networks interferes with law enforcement's ability to trace these communications and identify the actors running the ransomware. Criminals also increasingly require payments to be made using virtual currencies or other mechanisms that complicate law enforcement eforts to track those payments.  We discuss the impact of such anonymizing technologies on our investigations in Chapter 3. For now, sufce it to say that no discussion of the cyber threats our Nation confronts would be complete without the simple observation that as the Department continues to wage battle against cybercriminals, it will need to adequately meet the challenges posed by anonymizing technologies.\n\n## Notes\n\nthe-wannacry-malware-attack-to-north-korea-121917/  (last accessed June 29, 2018).\n\n\n\n1 From the guilty plea materials in United States v. Paras Jha, No. 17-CRM-164 (D. Alaska, Dec.\n\n5, 2017), available at:  https://www.justice.gov/ opa/press-release/fle/1017546/download\n(last accessed June 29, 2018).\n\n\n8 Andrew E. Kramer, \"Ukraine Cyberattack Was Meant to Paralyze, not Proft, Evidence Shows,\" N. Y. Times (June 28, 2017), available at: https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/28/world/europe/ukraine-ransomware-cyberbomb-accountants-russia.html (last accessed June 29, 2018).\n\n\n2 See \"Alert (TA16-288A): Heightened DDoS\nTreat Posed by Mirai and Other Botnets,\" United States Computer Emergency Readiness Team, U.S. Dept. of Homeland Security (last revised Oct. 17, 2017), available at: https://www. us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA16-288A\n(last accessed June 29, 2018).\n\n\n\n3 Jha guilty plea, *supra* note 1.\n\n\n\n4 *See* Indictment in United States v. Ahmad Fathi, et al., No. 16-CRM-48 (S.D.N.Y., March\n24, 2016), available at: https://www.justice.gov/ opa/fle/834996/download (last accessed June 29, 2018).\n\n\n\n9 See the grugq, \"Pnyetya: Yet Another Ransomware Outbreak,\" The Medium (June 27, 2017), available at: https://medium.com/@thegrugq/pnyetya-yet-another-ransomware-outbreak-59afd1ee89d4 (last accessed June 29, 2018) (contemporaneous reporting noting that \"the worm . . . has an extremely poor payment pipeline,\" observing that \"the pseudo-ransomware is in fact a wiper, with no potential for successfully recovering from an attack,\" and concluding: \"[T] he real Petya was a criminal enterprise for making money. Tis is defnitely not designed to make money.  Tis is designed to spread fast and cause damage, with a plausibly deniable cover of 'ransomware.'\").\n\n\n\n5 See Press Release, \"Treasury Targets Supporters of Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and Networks Responsible for Cyber-Attacks Against the United States,\" U.S. Dept. of Treasury (Sept. 14, 2017), available at: https://www. treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/ sm0158.aspx (last accessed June 29, 2018).\n\n\n10 \"Statement from the Press Secretary,\" The White House (Feb. 15, 2018), available at:\nhttps://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/statement-press-secretary-25/  (last accessed June 29, 2018).\n\n\n6 See Sujit Raman, \"Petya or NotPetya? It All Just Makes You WannaCry!\" RSA Conference 2018 (April 16, 2018) at 3, available at: https:// published-prd.lanyonevents.com/published/ rsaus18/sessionsFiles/8546/SEM-M03-Ransomware-and-Destructive-Attacks-Raman.pdf  (last accessed June 29, 2018).\n\n\n11 \"Press Briefng on the Attribution of the WannaCry Malware Attack to North Korea,\" The White House (Dec. 19, 2017), available at: https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefngs-statements/press-briefing-on-the-attribution-ofthe-wannacry-malware-attack-to-north-korea-121917/  (last accessed June 29, 2018).\n\n7 \"Press Briefng on the Attribution of the WannaCry Malware Attack to North Korea,\" The White House (Dec. 19, 2017), available at: https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefngs-statements/press-briefing-on-the-attribution-of-\n12 See Keith Wagstaf, \"Sony Hack Exposed\n47,000 Social Security Numbers, Security Firm Says,\" NBC News (Dec. 5, 2014), available at:\n\n## Categorizing Sophisticated Cyber Schemes\n\nhttp://www.nbcnews.com/storyline/sony-hack/\nsony-hack-exposed-47-000-social-security-numbers-security-frm-n262711  (last accessed June 29, 2018).\n\n\n\n13 Press Release, \"Treasury Imposes Sanctions Against the Government of Te Democratic People's Republic Of Korea,\" U.S. Dept. of Treasury (Jan. 2, 2015), available at:  https://www.treasury. gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/jl9733. aspx  (last accessed June 29, 2018).\n\n\n14 Risk Placement Services, Data Breach QuickView Report, First Quarter 2018 2, 9 (2018), available at:  https://www.rpsins. com/knowledge-center/items/data-breach-report-q1-2018/  (last accessed June 29, 2018).\n\n\n\n15 Ponemon Institute, 2017 Cost of Data Breach Study: United States, p. 1, available at https://www.ponemon.org/library/2017-costof-data-breach-study-united-states (last accessed June 29, 2018).\n\n\n\n16 Federal Bureau of Investigation, 2016\nInternet Crime Report 20, 21, available at: https://pdf.ic3.gov/2016_IC3Report.pdf  (last accessed June 29, 2018).\n\n\n17 \"What Happened,\" Office of Personnel Management Cybersecurity Resource Center (2015), available at: https://www.opm.gov/\ncybersecurity/cybersecurity-incidents/  (last accessed June 29, 2018).\n\n\n18 \"U.S. Charges Russian FSB Ofcers and Teir Criminal Conspirators for Hacking Yahoo and Millions of Email Accounts,\" U.S. Dept. of Justice (March 15, 2017), available at: https://www.\n\njustice.gov/opa/pr/us-charges-russian-fsb-officers-and-their-criminal-conspirators-hacking-yahoo-and-millions  (last accessed June 29, 2018).\n\n\n 19 \"Canadian Hacker Who Conspired With and\n\nDept. of Justice (November 28, 2017), available at: https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/canadian-hacker-who-conspired-and-aided-russianfsb-ofcers-pleads-guilty  (last accessed June 29, 2018).\n\n\n\n20 Executive Order 13757, \"Taking Additional Steps to Address the National Emergency with respect to Signifcant Malicious Cyber-Enabled Activities,\" available at: https://www.treasury. gov/resource-center/sanctions/Programs/Documents/cyber2_eo.pdf  (last accessed June 29, 2018). Tis order was later modifed to permit U.S. persons shipping technology goods to Russia to obtain licenses from the FSB, as required by the Russian government. \"General License No. 1, Authorizing Certain Transactions with the FSS,\" available at: https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/Programs/Documents/ cyber_gl1.pdf  (last accessed June 29, 2018).\n\n\n\n21 Press Release, \"ISIL-Linked Kosovo Hacker Sentenced to 20 Years in Prison,\" U.S. Dept. of Justice (Sept. 23, 2016), available at: https:// www.justice.gov/opa/pr/isil-linked-kosovohacker-sentenced-20-years-prison (last accessed June 29, 2018).\n\n\n\n22 Commission on the Tef of American Intellectual Property, Update to the IP Commission Report, at 1 (2017), available at: http://www.\n\nipcommission.org/report/IP_Commission_Report_Update_2017.pdf (last accessed June 29, 2018).\n\n\n23 National Counterintelligence and Security Center, Evolving Cyber Tactics in Stealing U.S. Economic Secrets: Report to Congress on Foreign Economic Collection and Industrial Espionage in Cyberspace, at 1 (Nov. 2016).\n\n\n24 Center for Responsible Enterprise And Trade\n& PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP, Economic Impact of Trade Secret Tef 3 (2014), available at: https://create.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/07/\nCREATe.org-PwC-Trade-Secret-Theft-FINAL-\nFeb-2014_01.pdf  (last accessed June 29, 2018).\n\n\n25 Press Release, \"Member Of Megaupload Conspiracy Pleads Guilty to Copyright Infringement Charges and is Sentenced to One Year in U.S. Prison,\" U.S. Dept. of Justice (Feb. 13, 2015), available at:\nhttps://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/\nmember-megaupload-conspiracy-pleads-guiltycopyright-infringement-charges-and-sentencedone  (last accessed June 29, 2018).\n\n\n26 Press Release, \"U.S. Authorities Charge Owner of Most-Visited Illegal File-Sharing Website with Copyright Infringement,\" U.S. Dept. of Justice (July 20, 2016), available at: https://www. justice.gov/opa/pr/us-authorities-charge-owner-most-visited-illegal-file-sharing-website-copyright-infringement  (last accessed June 29, 2018).\n\n\n27 See Press Release, \"Chinese Company Sinovel Wind Group Convicted of Tef of Trade Secrets,\" U.S. Dept. of Justice (Jan. 24, 2018), available at:\nhttps://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/\nchinese-company-sinovel-wind-group-convicted-thef-trade-secrets  (last accessed June 29, 2018).\n\n\n\n28 See Press Release, \"FACT SHEET: President Xi Jinping's State Visit to the United States,\" The White House (Sept. 25, 2015), available at:\nhttps://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-pressoffice/2015/09/25/fact-sheet-president-xi-jinpings-state-visit-united-states (last accessed June 29, 2018).\n\n\n29 See Press Release, \"FACT SHEET: Te 2015\nG-20 Summit in Antalya, Turkey,\" The White House (Nov. 16, 2015), available at: https:// obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2015/11/16/fact-sheet-2015-g-20-summitantalya-turkey (last accessed June 29, 2018).\n\n\n30 \"Findings of the Investigation into China's\n\nActs, Policies, and Practices related to Technology Transfer, Intellectual Property, and Innovation under Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974,\" Office of the United States Trade Representative (March 22, 2018), at 169, available at: https://ustr.gov/sites/default/fles/Section%20 301%20FINAL.PDF (last accessed June 29, 2018) (citing reports).\n\n\n31 Press Release, \"U.S. Charges Tree Chinese Hackers Who Work at Internet Security Firm for Hacking Tree Corporations for Commercial Advantage,\" U.S. Dept. of Justice (Nov. 27, 2017), available at: https://www.justice.gov/opa/ pr/us-charges-three-chinese-hackers-who-workinternet-security-firm-hacking-three-corporations (last accessed June 29, 2018).\n\n\n\n32 Elias Groll, \"Feds Quietly Reveal Chinese State-Backed Hacking Operation,\" Foreign Policy (Nov. 30, 2017), available at: http://\nforeignpolicy.com/2017/11/30/feds-quietly-reveal-chinese-state-backed-hacking-operation/ (last accessed June 29, 2018) (quoting Department spokesperson).\n\n\n\n33 Federal Bureau of Investigation, \"Nigerian Letter or '419' Fraud,\" available at: https:// www.fi.gov/scams-and-safety/common-fraudschemes/nigerian-letter-or-419-fraud (last accessed June 29, 2018).\n\n\n34 Federal Bureau of Investigation, \"Business Fraud,\" available at https://www.fi.gov/ scams-and-safety/common-fraud-schemes/business-fraud (last accessed June 29, 2018).\n\n\n35 Federal Bureau of Investigation, \"Investment Fraud,\" available at https://www.fi.gov/ scams-and-safety/common-fraud-schemes/investment-fraud  (last accessed June 29, 2018).\n\n\n36 Press Release, \"Two Russian Nationals Sentenced to Prison for Massive Data Breach Conspiracy,\" U.S. Dept. of Justice (Feb. 15, 2018), available at:\nhttps://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/\ntwo-russian-nationals-sentenced-prison-massive-data-breach-conspiracy (last accessed June 29, 2018).\n\n\n\n37 See Joey L. Blanch & Wesley L. Hsu, \"An Introduction to Violent Crime on the Internet,\" United States Attorneys' Bulletin (May 2016), at 2.\n\n38 See 18 U.S.C.  2261A.\n\n\n\n39 Press Release, \"Former U.S. State Department Employee Sentenced to 57 Months in Extensive Computer Hacking, Cyberstalking and \"Sextortion\" Scheme,\" U.S. Dept. of Justice (March 21, 2016), available at: https://www.justice.gov/opa/ pr/former-us-state-department-employee-sentenced-57-months-extensive-computer-hacking (last accessed June 29, 2018).\n\n\n\n40 Tis report does not detail related crimes involving the sexual exploitation of children.  For more detail on this criminal threat, *see* U.S. Dept.\n\nof Justice, Te National Strategy for Child Exploitation Prevention and Interdiction (Apr. 2016), available at: https://www.justice.gov/psc/ fle/842411/download (last accessed June 29, 2018).\n\n\n\n41 \"Critical Infrastructure Security,\" U.S. Dept.\n\nof Homeland Security, available at: https://\nwww.dhs.gov/topic/critical-infrastructure-security (last accessed June 29, 2018).\n\n\n42 42 U.S.C.  5195c(e).\n\n\n43 See Richard J. Campbell, \"Cybersecurity Issues for the Bulk Power System,\" Cong. Research Serv., 9R43989, at 9 (June 10, 2015), available at: https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R43989.pdf (\"Over time, modifcation of SCADA [Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition] systems has resulted in connection of many of these older, legacy systems to the Internet.\") (last accessed June 29, 2018).\n\n\n44 *See id*.\n\n\n45 *See Fathi* indictment, *supra* note 4, at 14-16.\n\n\n46 Alert TA18-074A, \"Russian Government Cyber Activity Targeting Energy and Other Critical Infrastructure,\" U.S. Computer Emergency Readiness Team, U.S. Dept. of Homeland Security (March 15, 2018), available at: https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA18-074A (last accessed June 29, 2018).\n\n\n47 Press Release, \"Treasury Sanctions Russian Cyber Actors for Interference with the 2016 U.S. Elections and Malicious Cyber-Attacks,\" U.S. Dept. of Treasury (Mar. 15, 2018), available at: https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/ sm0312 (last accessed June 29, 2018).\n\n\n48 Alert TA18-149A, \"HIDDEN COBRA -\nJoanap Backdoor Trojan and Brambul Server Message Block Worm,\" U.S. Computer Emergency Readiness Team, U.S. Dept. of Homeland Security (last revised May 31, 2018), available at: https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/ TA18-149A  (last accessed June 29, 2018).\n\n\n49 *See generally* Mollie Halpern & Patrick Geahan, \"FBI, Tis Week: Social Engineering,\" Federal Bureau of Investigation (Oct. 14, 2016) (podcast transcript), available at: https://www.\n\nfi.gov/audio-repository/fw-podcast-social-engineering-101416.mp3/view (last accessed June 29, 2018).\n\n\n50 \"Consumer Information: Phishing,\" Federal Trade Commission (July 2017), available at:\nhttps://www.consumer.fc.gov/articles/0003-phishing  (last accessed June 29, 2018).\n\n\n51 Federal Bureau of Investigation, 2016\nInternet Crime Report 1, 9, available at: https:// pdf.ic3.gov/2016_IC3Report.pdf (last accessed June 29, 2018).\n\n\n\n52 Federal Bureau of Investigation, 2017\nInternet Crime Report 3, 12, available at: https:// pdf.ic3.gov/2017_IC3Report.pdf (last accessed June 29, 2018).\n\n\n\nGuilty In Manhattan Federal Court On All Counts,\" U.S. Dept. of Justice (Feb. 5, 2015), available at: https://www.justice.gov/usao-sdny/ pr/ross-ulbricht-creator-and-owner-silk-roadwebsite-found-guilty-manhattan-federal-court (last accessed June 29, 2018).\n\n\n56 Press Release, \"AlphaBay, the Largest Online\n'Dark Market,' Shut Down,\" U.S. Dept. of Justice (July 20, 2017), available at: https://www.justice. gov/opa/pr/alphabay-largest-online-dark-market-shut-down (last accessed June 29, 2018).\n\n\n53 See \"A Report to the President on Enhancing the Resilience of the Internet and Communications Ecosystem Against Botnets and Other Automated, Distributed Treats,\" U.S. Dept. of Commerce & U.S. Dept. of Homeland Security (May 22, 2018), available at: https://www.\n\ncommerce.gov/sites/commerce.gov/fles/media/ files/2018/eo_13800_botnet_report_-_finalv2. pdf (last accessed June 29, 2018).\n\n\n57 See, *e.g.*, Press Release, \"Colorado and Illinois Men Sentenced to Prison for Engaging in Child Exploitation Enterprise,\" U.S. Dept. of Justice (Oct. 18, 2016), available at: https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/colorado-and-illinois-men-sentenced-prison-engaging-child-exploitation-enterprise (last accessed June 29, 2018).\n\n54 Exploit kits are a type of malicious toolkit used to exploit security holes found in sofware applications for the purpose of spreading malware.  Tese kits come with pre-written exploit code and target users running insecure or outdated sofware applications on their computers.\n\n\n55 Press Release, \"Ross Ulbricht, Te Creator And Owner Of Te \"Silk Road\" Website, Found\n\n## Chapter 3 Detecting, Deterring, And Disrupting Cyber Threats Key Investigative Techniques\n\nT\n\nhe Department of Justice plays an essential role in detecting, deterring, and disrupting cyber threats.  As the Nation's chief law enforcement ofcer, the Attorney General leads the Department's criminal and national security initiatives. Working with and through the Criminal Division, the National Security Division, and the 93 U.S. Attorney's Ofces across the country, the Attorney General sets priorities for how those activities are conducted.1\nTo successfully bring malign cyber actors to justice, law enforcement frst must gather evidence of their criminal activity and attribute that activity to particular individuals, organizations, or nation states.  Te key methods and sources of evidence for disrupting cyber threats include: gathering materials during incident response; reviewing open source data; conducting online reconnaissance; searching records from online providers; undertaking undercover investigations; engaging in authorized electronic surveillance; tracing fnancial transactions; searching storage media; and applying a variety of special techniques.  Ofen, investigators also must work cooperatively with foreign partners to access evidence and disrupt transnational cyber threats.\n\n## 1. Evidence Collection During Incident Response\n\nSince the early 1990s, when the commercial Internet was in its infancy, the Department has combated computer crime.  In the intervening years, the Department has expanded its focus to address burgeoning threats to public safety, economic security, and national security fowing from the widespread adoption of the Internet.  Today, the Department deters and disrupts a broad spectrum of the Nation's cyber threats by enforcing federal laws through the array of legal tools and capabilities that its investigators and prosecutors have at their disposal. In this chapter, we describe the key methods investigators and prosecutors use to gather evidence about cyber threats.  We then explain the key legal authorities the Department applies to bring perpetrators to justice, or otherwise to disrupt and dismantle malicious cyber activity.\n\nOfen the frst evidence collected in an investigation concerning a cyber threat comes from the victim as part of the incident response.  Te Department encourages victims to contact law enforcement as soon as they believe they are the victim of a computer intrusion.  Although many victims will simply provide consent to investigators collecting\n\ndigital evidence on scene, subpoenas and search warrants can be obtained if the victim prefers.  In either case, investigators are committed to working collaboratively with victims to minimize any disruption to business during an investigation.\n\n\nTe frst step in online reconnaissance ofen involves use of the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers' WHOIS database.3  WHOIS is a directory of all of the IP addresses and domains on the Internet. WHOIS records usually display the name and contact information of the registrar (the business that sold the IP address or domain). Investigators can use the contact information to send legal process to the registrar in order to discover more information about the registrant (the user of the IP address or domain). WHOIS ofen contains self-reported information about the registrant, as well. In addition, an investigator ofen can tell from WHOIS and related information where a website is being hosted or who is hosting the e-mail server for a website, either (or both) of which can provide additional avenues for investigation.\nAfer obtaining digital copies of any afected devices, investigators may then turn to other devices in the victim's architecture, including frewalls, log servers, and routers, to look for additional evidence of the perpetrator's presence.  Investigators will also image these devices, as needed, and forensically examine them.  Such devices ofen contain traces of a criminal's passage through the infrastructure on the way to the afected device.  In particular, many devices maintain log fles that show when, and from where, the device was accessed.  In addition to preserving and copying digital evidence, investigators may interview employees (especially those tasked with responding to cyber threats or securing infrastructure), regular users of the afected systems, and management.\n\n## 2. Online Data Review And Reconnaissance\n\nAfer consulting WHOIS, investigators often perform online reconnaissance of the identifers they have collected.  Tis reconnaissance includes web searches looking for whether the identifers have been used elsewhere and searches of social media to determine whether the identifers are related to any accounts.\n\n## 3. Searching Records From Online Providers\n\nSuccessful WHOIS searches and online reconnaissance ofen results in the identifcation of e-mail providers, social media companies, registrars, and web hosting and computer hosting companies that may control additional evidence about a subject or Afer reviewing information obtained from a victim or other primary sources of information regarding a cyberattack, investigators frequently will review online data, which may be open source, to determine their next investigative steps.  In undertaking these actions, as with all their actions, investigators are trained to act consistently with our Nation's rule of law principles, and with our society's foundational respect for civil rights and civil liberties.2\n\n## 4. Online Undercover Operations\n\nIn order to investigate cyber threat activity, investigators may establish covert personas or consensually assume the accounts and identities of victims or cooperators to communicate online with the targets of the investigation.  From such undercover operations, investigators gather inculpatory contents from communications, additional accounts, IP addresses, criminal proceeds, and records of criminal transactions such as the purchase of malware, botnets, or stolen credit cards.\n\n## 5. Electronic Surveillance\n\ntarget of an investigation.  At this stage, an investigator will rely heavily on the provisions of the Electronic Communications Privacy Act (\"ECPA\"),4 which specifcally permits investigators to request evidence from providers of electronic communications and computer processing.  Investigative teams may issue subpoenas to collect basic information about a subscriber to an identifed account.  Investigators also may use court orders issued under the authority of section 2703(d) of title 18, United States Code, which allows them to access additional non-content records for online accounts, such as log fles or the e-mail addresses of others with whom the subscriber has corresponded.\n\nInvestigators may also need to conduct online surveillance on their targets.  Tere are three federal statutes that authorize the collection of data on a real-time basis:  the pen register and trap and trace (\"PRTT\") statute,6\nthe wiretap statute,7 and the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (\"FISA\").8  All three generally require investigators to obtain court authorization.\n\n\nFinally, with probable cause, investigators can seek a search warrant from a judge to obtain the contents of accounts, including copies of e-mails, photographs, text messages, and any other fles stored with a provider up to and including the contents of an entire computer belonging to a target of the investigation and hosted with the provider.5  Because cyber threat actors ofen communicate with each other using electronic communications to plan and execute their activities, these accounts can contain vast quantities of useful evidence.  In addition, cyber threat actors sometimes keep other evidence in the contents of their accounts, such as records of their criminal activities, pictures that place them at the scene or with other members of the conspiracy, and other evidence that can help identify the actors and connect them to the illicit activity.\n\nA PRTT allows investigators to obtain the dialing, routing, addressing, and signaling information of communications, including dialed calls, IP addresses, and e-mail headers.  PRTTs can be obtained for cell phones, e-mail accounts, and other social media or messaging applications. Although a PRTT does not obtain the content of any communications, it can be useful in determining whether an account is still being used for criminal purposes, to help identify co-conspirators, or to locate a target.\n\n## (New) Rule 41(B)(6)\n\nUnder Rule 41(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, which went into efect in December 2016, \"a magistrate judge with authority in any district where activities related to a crime may have occurred has authority to issue a warrant to use remote access to search electronic media and to seize or copy electronically stored information located within or outside that district if: (A) the district where the media or information is located has been  concealed through technological means; or (B) in an investigation of a violation of 18\nU.S.C.  1030(a)(5), the media are protected computers that have been damaged without authorization and are located in fve or more districts.\" Tis provision makes two narrow, but important, changes in the law.  First, where a suspect has hidden the location of his or her computer using technological means, the new Rule ensures that federal agents know which judge to go to in order to apply for a warrant. Second, where the crime involves the hacking of computers located in fve or more diferent judicial districts, the new Rule ensures that federal agents may identify one judge to review an application for a search warrant rather than having to submit separate warrant applications in each judicial district across the nationup to 94where a computer is afected.  In sum, Rule 41(b)\n(6) addresses the unique challenges created by botnet activity by clarifying that courts may issue warrants authorizing the search of multiple computers when the identifed computers are located in multiple judicial districts.\n\nCourt-authorized wiretaps under the Wireactivity, and confrm previous activity.  Every tap Act or FISA permit investigators to listen federal wiretap application must be approved to or observe the contents of communicaby a senior Department ofcial before it is tions in or near real time.  For example, insubmitted to a court.  Federal courts, in turn, vestigators can intercept wire and electronic apply rigorous standards both in authorizing communications over a target's cell phone or and supervising wiretaps.\n\nread the target's e-mail as it is sent, allowing them to locate targets, confrm relationships within a conspiracy, disrupt new criminal\n\n\n## 6. Special Techniques\n\n\n\nnets are controlled by command and control servers (\"C2 servers\"), which periodically issue orders to the bots.  One way to disrupt a botnet is to seize control of the C2 server. Investigators can use criminal authorities to seize C2 servers; they can also use civil injunctive authority to seek the redirection of computers under the control of the botnet to a server controlled by the court, instead of by the threat actor's C2 server.\n\n## 7. Tracing Financial Transactions\n\nCyber threat actors ofen try to hide their identities by disguising their IP address. A common way to do this is by using a proxy computer, which sits between the actor and his victim, to obfuscate the actor's IP address.  As described in Chapter 2, threat actors also will ofen use Te Onion Router (\"Tor\"), which is a particularly sophisticated network of relay computers, to hide their true IP address.  To circumvent the challenges presented by threat actors' use of proxies and Tor, investigators can use Network Investigative Techniques (\"NITs\"). NITs include computer code that investigators can send covertly to a device that is hidden behind proxies.  Once installed, a NIT can send law enforcement particular information, often including the device's true IP address which investigators then can use to identify the subscriber and user of the device.\n\n\nPursuing illicit assets is an important part of any fraud investigation, and computer crime cases are no exception.  To pursue traditional bank accounts, the United States has made extensive use of asset forfeiture authorities, including seizures involving correspondent bank accounts, as well as of sanctions programs, including the Global Magnitsky sanctions authority, to keep tainted funds out of the U.S. fnancial system.  Yet, cybercriminals increasingly use **virtual currencies** to advance their activities and to conceal their assets. Because most virtual currencies lack any central authority, seizing them requires diferent approaches.\n\n\nIn recent years, the Department has relied on a variety of legal authorities to seize virtual currency that has been derived from illegal activity. Tese authorities include civil forfeiture orders, seizure warrants, and search warrants.  Where, for instance, a target of an investigation stores virtual currency with a third-party servicetypically, a virtual currency exchangerinvestigators may seize that virtual currency by obtaining a seizure warrant for the user's account at that As described in Chapter 2, botnets pose unique challenges for law enforcement and so require special techniques to investigate and disrupt them. Identifying victim computers (or \"bots\") can be very difcult because the bots may be spread throughout the world.  Criminal dark markets that rent or sell botnet access ofen obfuscate the location and other identifying information about individual bots.  Until recently, this posed a signifcant jurisdictional hurdle, as an investigator had to know the location of a bot to get a search warrant for it.  Now, thanks to a recent Department-led initiative to amend the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure (see page 52), magistrate judges can authorize search warrants even if the location of the subject of the warrant is unknown.  Bot-\n\n## Virtual Currencies\n\n\n\n\"Virtual currencies\" such as Bitcoin, Ether, and Monero are electronic assets that are circulated over the Internet as a form of value but are not backed by any government. Tough virtual currencies have legitimate uses, they also ofen enable individuals to transfer money with high levels of anonymity to other users worldwide. Cyber criminals frequently transact in virtual currencies, and online criminal markets rely on virtual currencies to third-party service.  If the target stores the virtual currency locally (for example, on his own electronic devices, or on servers he controls), or even by printing the private keys onto a physical medium, investigators may seize the virtual currency through a traditional search warrant that allows the government to learn the private key.  Te seizure of virtual currency requires transferring the virtual currency to a government-controlled virtual currency wallet.  If the virtual currency is stored with an overseas exchange, the Department will work with our foreign counterparts to efect the seizure.\n\nBecause of the risks that early conversion may pose, in most cases, virtual currency the government seizes is kept in the form it was seized and not liquidated (i.e., converted to fat currency or other virtual currency) until a fnal order of forfeiture is entered or an administrative forfeiture is fnal. 9  Agencies or prosecuenable the purchase and sale of a wide variety of illegal goods and services.  While law enforcement has made strides in its ability to trace virtual currency transactions, criminals ofen launder their virtual currency by mixing one user's money with multiple other users', or sending their virtual currency through a convoluted series of transactions, a process ofen called\n\"mixing\" or \"tumbling.\"\ntors may, however, seek an order for the interlocutory sale of virtual currency at the request and/or consent of all parties with an ownership interest.  Consultation with the Criminal Division's Money Laundering and Asset Recovery Section is required prior to any pre-forfeiture conversion, or seeking an order for interlocutory sale of virtual currency.\n\nAny liquidation of virtual currency should be executed according to established written policies of the seizing agency and the U.S. Marshals Service.10  Te Department is developing guidance regarding disposition of alternative virtual currencies (*i.e.*, anonymity enhanced cryptocurrencies and ICO tokens) for which the Marshals Service does not yet have a process in place to take custody or liquidate via auction. As detailed above, the Department in recent years has regularly used civil forfeiture au-\n\n\nthorities11 and seizure warrants to seize virtual currency derived from malicious cyber activity associated with the Dark Web and botnets. More recently, in July 2017, the Department announced the indictment of a Russian national and an organization he allegedly operated, BTC-e, for facilitating transactions for international cybercriminals, and for receiving the criminal proceeds of numerous computer intrusions and hacking incidents, as well as of other crimes.12\nevasion.   In particular, evaders can abuse the anonymous and decentralized structure of virtual currencies in an attempt to conceal their income and assets.  Te relative lack of reporting requirements for virtual currency also contributes to its secrecy and thus to its usefulness in committing tax crimes.  And with the increase in value of virtual currencies in recent years, this anonymity and secrecy may tempt individuals not to report as income their gains from the sale of virtual currency.\nAccording to the indictment, BTC-e's virtual currency exchange allegedly did not require users to validate their identity, obscured and anonymized transactions and source of funds, and eschewed any anti-money laundering processes.  Perhaps unsurprisingly, the exchange is alleged to have become popular with criminals.  At the time of the indictment, the investigation revealed that BTC-e was alleged to have received more than $4 billion worth of virtual currency through its operation.\n\n\nIn parallel with the Department's actions, the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (\"FinCEN\") assessed a $110 million civil money penalty against BTC-e for willfully violating U.S. anti-money laundering laws.\n\nTe operator of the exchange was assessed a $12 million penalty for his role in the violations.  FinCEN's announcement underscored the importance of the Department's partnerships with regulatory agencies in seeking to deter those who facilitate ransomware, dark net drug sales, and other illicit activity using virtual currency.\n\n\nTis is a particularly novel area for tax enforcement.   But investigators pursuing tax investigations involving virtual currency can employ many of the techniques learned from money laundering investigations involving virtual currency.  For instance, investigators can track the movement of funds across the public ledger of a virtual currency and identify when money moves into or out of virtual currency through exchanges and other parties.  Moreover, the Internal Revenue Service (\"IRS\") Criminal Investigation division is making criminal tax evasion using virtual currencies a focus of its eforts, and the IRS is also pursuing civil and administrative remedies.  Within the Department, the Tax Division is partnering with the IRS and U.S. Attorneys' Ofces to investigate and prosecute tax crimes involving virtual currencies, and to litigate civil enforcement actions. Recently, the Tax Division, working with the IRS, issued and enforced the frst virtual-currency-related \"John Doe\" summons to Coinbase, one of the largest virtual currency exchanges in the world.13  As a result of this civil enforcement action, in March 2018, the exchange turned over to the IRS information Just as virtual currencies have provided a new way for criminals to launder money, they also provide another avenue for tax\n\nregarding accounts \"with at least the equivalent of $20,000 in any one transaction (buy, sell, send, or receive) in any one year during the 2013-2015 period.\"14  Tis information should be useful in identifying particular individuals and transactions for further investigation.\n\na target's residence, business, or automobile, looking for storage media that may contain evidence of the cyber threat.  As with storage media collected during the initial incident response, investigators will image any electronic storage media before searching it, to preserve the contents for future searches and for use in court.\n\n## 9. Cooperation With Foreign Governments\n\nIn addition, Tax Division prosecutors are working with investigators and attorneys at IRS, as well as at the Department's Computer Crime and Intellectual Property section, to develop training and guidance for criminal tax cases involving virtual currencies.   Because the tax treatment of virtual currencies is a new area, there are many uncertainties in the law that investigators and prosecutors will need to navigate.  Te Tax Division's trial attorneys also have worked with the FinCEN Intelligence, Cyber & Emerging Technology Section to identify appropriate techniques for civil tax investigations and litigation.\n\n## 8. Traditional And Forensic Searches Involving Storage Media\n\nCyber threats ofen emanate from international locations and use criminal networks that stretch across jurisdictions, many of which are not friendly to the rule of law or democratic values. At the same time, foreign sovereignsincluding some of our closest alliesput limits on our government's ability to act on its own in every investigation where the targets, or evidence of their crimes, are located in another jurisdiction.  Fortunately, the Department has built relationships with its counterparts around the world, that facilitate nimble information sharing in the event of an incident.  Tis information sharing enables mitigation of the incident, and also promotes the preservation of evidence, even in situations where the evidence (or the perpetrators) are located outside the United States.\n\nOnce a criminal is identifed and arrested, investigators will seek electronic evidence from his personal storage media, including his laptops and phones.  Such storage media ofen contain records that link the target to the evidence collected from providers or the victim, such as matching IP addresses, e-mail accounts, and photos and other personal identifers.  Tis evidence completes the connection between the criminal activity and the target.  Such a search usually requires a traditional search warrant, based on probable cause.  Investigators also will search For more formal use of the information (e.g., to support charges and hold criminal actors accountable), the Department employs a vast network of international treaties and other relationships.  Te Criminal Division's Ofce of International Afairs (\"OIA\"), for example, leverages extradition treaties, mutual legal assistance treaties (\"MLATs\"), and other in-\n\n## Te Cloud Act\n\nDue in part to the large volume of foreign government requests seeking electronic evidence in the custody or control of U.S.-based service providers, and the pressure those requests were placing on the smooth functioning of the MLAT process, the U.S. Congress, in March 2018, enacted, and the President signed into law, a statute called the Clarifying Lawful Overseas Use of Data (CLOUD) Act. Te CLOUD Act has two major efects.  First, it clarifes that all warrants, subpoenas, and court orders issued pursuant to the Stored Communications Act, 18 U.S.C.  2701 *et seq*the law that governs the disclsoure of stored communicatons and transactional records held by third-party Internet service providersapply to all data within a provider's possession, custody, or control, regardless of whether the data is stored inside or outside the United States.  Second, it allows for bilateral treaties between the United States and foreign countries for the direct sharing of electronic evidence, without needing to use the MLAT process.  Te CLOUD Act incorporates safeguards to assure that such agreements are entered into only with countries with robust privacy and civil liberties protections, and that adhere to the rule of law.\nTe CLOUD Act represents a major commitment by the American government to continue the global fght against crime by ensuring that rights-respecting and privacy-protecting foreign governments gain access to the electronic evidence they need to pursue their own investigations of serious crime, even as the Act reduces pressure on the MLAT process generally, and encourages higher privacy and civil liberties standards around the world.\n\ntence, and the rule of specialty. Extradition requests that result in defendants facing trial in the United States or serving a U.S. criminal sentence generally require carefully prepared documentary submissions and extensive coordination between OIA, U.S. prosecutors, and law enforcement, including the FBI, U.S. Marshals Service, the State Department, and the foreign government.\n\nstruments and available legal tools to support U.S. investigations and prosecutions of cybercriminals by returning fugitives to the United States to face trial, and by obtaining the evidence located overseas that is needed to build a case against them.  OIA also facilitates the extradition of fugitives located in the United States and transfers evidence to foreign partners for those nations' criminal investigations.\n\n\nTe ease and speed with which fugitives can travel across jurisdictions highlight the importance of a treaty-based mechanism known as a provisional arrest. When the United States learns that a fugitive will be traveling toor througha country with which it has an extradition treaty, there ofen is not enough time to assemble and submit a formal request for extradition.  Where time is of the essence, OIA can submit a provisional arrest request, which will enable the foreign partner to arrest and detain the fugitive for a short period of time until OIA submits the formal extradition request.\n\nWhen a criminal located overseas is wanted for prosecution or to serve a criminal sentence in the United States, OIA uses all the legal tools at its disposalextradition, deportation, and other lawful measuresto ensure that the defendant will be transferred to the United States to stand trial in a U.S. court and be held accountable.  Te processes that must be followed to efectuate this result vary greatly in each case and depend on a range of factors, including, among others, the location of the criminal actor, his or her nationality, our law enforcement relationship with the host country, and the alleged criminal conduct at issue.\n\n\nTe United States currently has bilateral extradition treaties with over 100 countries.15\nTese treaties, which establish reciprocal obligations to extradite persons charged with or convicted of certain crimes, contain varying features, including some that give the requested state the discretion to decline to extradite its nationals.  Other common treaty provisions can afect the charges an individual may face afer extradition. Tese include the statute of limitations, assurances against the imposition of a capital sen-\nTere are also countries with which the United States does not maintain an extradition treaty.  In cases where the United States seeks the return of a fugitive from a non-treaty partner, OIA attempts to accomplish this through other legal means, including, where possible, securing extradition under the domestic law of the foreign country, and requests for deportation, expulsion, or other lawful transfer.  Te range of options available varies from case to case, including using lawful measures to ensure the wanted person's transit to a country from which the United States can secure his extradition.\n\n## Extraditions\n\nSuccessfully prosecuting international computer crime cases has been notoriously difcult.  Fortunately, the Department's international outreach has made it easier. In addition, the Department has relied on longstanding tools and processes, such as extradition treaties and alternatives to extradition, to ensure that some of the most notorious cybercriminals face justice in the United States.\n\n## In Custody\n\nIn August 2016, for example, a U.S. federal court jury convicted **Roman Seleznev,** a Russian national, of various crimes associated with his thef and sale on the black market of tens of thousands of credit card numbers, which resulted in over $170 million in fraudulent purchases. A \"pioneer\" cybercriminal who became \"one of the most revered point-of-sale hackers in the criminal underworld,\" Seleznev is the \"highest profle long-term cybercriminal ever convicted by an American jury.\"16 Seleznev was arrested in the Maldives in July 2014 and was subsequently expelled to the United States, where he is currently serving a 27- year federal sentence for his hacking crimes, concurrent to a 14-year federal sentence stemming from his involvement in a $50 million cyberfraud ring.17\n\n\nMore recently, in February 2018, the alleged creator of the Kelihos botnet (see Appendix 2), a Russian national named Peter Levashov, was extradited from Spain, and in March 2018, **Yevgeniy Nikulin,** of Moscow, made his initial appearance in U.S. federal court following his extradition from the Czech Republic to face allegations that he illegally accessed computers belonging to LinkedIn, Dropbox, and Formspring.\n\nAs these cases and others like them demonstrate, we have successfully dismantled international criminal rings and apprehended some of the most notorious international cybercriminals.  At times, we have received valuable evidence from foreign authorities, including Russian law enforcement.\n\nBut challenges remain, including an increased willing-\n\nness by the Russian government to protect its nationals from extradition or other removal to the United States when its nationals are located in a third country.  In such circumstances, Russia has applied pressure on the U.S. partner, seeking to thwart the U.S. extradition or other removal request.  Tis practice is yet another factor that complicates our eforts to bring international cybercriminals to justice in the United States.\n\n\nIn sum, cybercriminals should not be immune from justice simply because they operate outside of U.S. borders.  Although there are state sovereignty principles that limit our ability to act unilaterally, OIA has a diverse toolkit that it can use to obtain foreign countries' cooperation and ensure that cybercriminals face justice in U.S. courts.\n\ncrime, terrorism, child exploitation, and criminal organizations using the Dark Web. As a result, OIA receives a high-volume of requests for electronic records in the custody or control of U.S. providers.  OIA executes these requestsmany of which concern cases involving foreign actors whose schemes have victimized U.S. citizensas appropriate and pursuant to its treaty obligations. Doing so both increases the likelihood that foreign governments will be able to disrupt the illegal conduct and ensures their reciprocal cooperation when needed for the United States to obtain assistance from abroad.\n\n\nInvestigating and prosecuting cyber criminals ofen also requires access to evidence located in foreign jurisdictions and assistance from foreign governments.  Tis evidence and assistance may include electronic records, bank and business records, witness interviews, public records, investigative materials, and seizure of assets, to name a few examples.  Each year, OIA receives thousands of such requests for mutual legal assistance from both domestic and foreign prosecutors seeking important evidence that may break open an investigative dead-end or secure a criminal conviction.  Such requests for assistance to foreign governments are typically made pursuant to bilateral MLATs, regional instruments, or multilateral conventions, such as the international Convention on Cybercrime (known as the Budapest Convention).  As the Central Authority for the United States under international instruments, OIA makes requests for assistance to treaty partners on behalf of U.S. prosecutors and executes requests it receives from abroad.\nImportantly, these cross-border requests for electronic evidence typically must meet the legal requirements of the requested state.  In the United States, this means that for requests seeking the contents, say, of an e-mail account, a Department of Justice attorneyusually from OIA but sometimes from a partner U.S. Attorney's Ofcemust obtain a search warrant from a U.S. court on the foreign government's behalf. Probable cause is a distinctly American concept, and many countries struggle to articulate a sufcient basis in their requests to meet this legal standard.  OIA works closely with requesting state partners to develop, where possible, the necessary basis to obtain a search warrant. Other U.S. legal requirements, including the \"fltering\" of any resulting productions, add to the complexity of this practice. Because there are few rules governing most providers' retention of data in the normal course, it is important that electronic records associated with targeted accounts be \"preserved\" before they are deleted.  Pursu-\nMany of the world's communications service providers are U.S. companies, and electronic records in their custody or control are ofen critical to cybercrime investigations, as well as other types of criminal and national security cases such as those targeting violent\n\n## The Budapest Convention\n\n\nTe Budapest Convention (ofcial name: the Council of Europe's Convention on Cybercrime) is a multilateral treaty that enhances international cooperation in cases involving computer-related crime.  Te treaty entered into force in 2004, requires Parties to have a basic level of domestic criminal law in the cyber feld, and provides a platform for transnational law enforcement cooperation in investigations, evidence sharing, and extradition.  Te Convention also requires Parties to criminalize computer-related crimes such as computer hacking, fraud, and child sexual exploitation, and requires that Parties have the ability to efectively investigate computer-related crime through the collection and sharing of electronic evidence.\n\nMembership in the Convention is open to any nation.  To date, nearly 60 countries spanning Europe, Asia, Australia, Africa, and North and South America have fully ratifed the treaty, as illustrated below.  Te United States participated in the drafing of the Convention and became a Party to it in 2006.\n\n## 10. Joint Or Parallel Investigations\n\nLaw enforcement agencies from separate countries may wish to cooperatively investigate crimes having relevance and jurisdiction in both countries through joint or parallel investigations. Although these investigations may be established in the absence of a treaty, a number of existing treaties address the ant to U.S. law, U.S. investigators and prosecutors preserve targeted account data prior to obtaining a search warrant or other legal process for its disclosure.  OIA and the Department's Computer Crime and Intellectual Property section routinely assist prosecutors and law enforcement around the world in performing this early, but important, investigative step.\n\n\ncreation of joint investigative teams (\"JITs\"), thereby highlighting the potentially useful impact of such arrangements.  Tese include, for example, global multilateral instruments like the 2000 United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime,18\n\nand, in the case of the United States and the European Union, the 2003 Agreement on Mutual Legal Assistance between the United States of America and the European Union.19\nowners of computers the right to control who may access their computers, take information from them, change how the computers work, or delete information on them.  Just as the criminal laws against trespassing protect property rights in land, the CFAA protects property rights in computers.  As such, the CFAA commits the United States to a cybersecurity policy that is founded on private property rights, and backed by enforcement of criminal law.  Te CFAA defnes multiple crimes, and assigns each a diferent statutory maximum penalty.\n\n\nAlthough a detailed description and analysis of each ofense established by section 1030(a) is beyond the scope of this report,21\nbelow we provide a high-level overview of how the CFAA combats cyber threats.\n\nJITs can be useful tools to conduct joint operations, facilitate information sharing, and thwart criminal conduct. However, they are not perfect solutions for all cases with multi-jurisdictional dimensions.  U.S. criminal law and practice difer in signifcant respects from that of foreign partners, and as a result, the prudent course is to assess opportunities for JITs on a case-by-case basis and to fashion cooperative eforts in a manner that works for all relevant participants.\n\n\n\n## Accessing A Computer And Obtaining Information: 18 U.S.C.  1030(A)(2) Key Prosecution Tools\n\nOnce investigators have gathered evidence of cyber threat activity, the Department's prosecuting attorneys then determine whether that evidence is sufcient to bring charges under U.S. federal law.  Cyber threat activity is a U.S. federal crime if it violates one or more of the following statutes, among others:\n\n\n\n1. Computer Fraud and Abuse Act:\n18 U.S.C.  1030\nSection 1030(a)(2) protects the privacy of information stored on computers by criminalizing the act of accessing such information without authorization.  Te statute sets forth three distinct but overlapping crimes that collectively prohibit the unauthorized accessing of certain fnancial records stored on computers of fnancial institutions, of information from U.S. government computers, and of information from computers used in or afecting interstate or foreign commerce (for example, computers connected to the Internet).  Tis provision applies both to outside hackers who gain access to victim computers without authorization from anywhere around the world, and to those who have Te Computer Fraud and Abuse Act\n(\"CFAA\")20 remains the U.S. government's principal tool for prosecuting computer crimes.  In lay terms, the CFAA gives the some authorization to access a computer, but who intentionally exceed that access.22\ndamage to computers by fooding an Internet connection with data during a distributed denial of service (\"DDoS\") attack.\n\n## Accessing A Computer To Defraud And Obtain Value: 18 U.S.C.  1030(A)(4)\n\nTo violate section 1030(a)(2), a person must access, and thereby obtain, the prohibited information \"intentionally.\" Mere mistake, inadvertence, or carelessness is insufcient.23\nAdditionally, to be charged, the defendant must have understood that the access was unauthorized.  Accordingly, federal prosecutions focus on hackers and insiders whose conduct evidences a clear intent to enter, without proper authorization, computer fles or data belonging to another.\n\n## Damaging A Computer: 18 U.S.C.  1030(A)(5)\n\nSection 1030(a)(4) establishes a felony offense that prosecutors use against hackers who access a protected computer without appropriate authorization in furtherance of a fraud to obtain something of value.  Te section bears similarities to the federal mail and wire fraud statutes (discussed below), but has a narrower jurisdictional scope by requiring that the cybercriminal victimize a protected computer without authorization or in excess of authorization. Prosecutors use this provision against defendants who obtain information from a computer, and then later use that information to commit fraud.  For example, section 1030(a) (4) was charged in a case involving a defendant who accessed a telephone company's computer without authorization, obtained calling card numbers, and then used those calling card numbers to make free long-distance telephone calls.24  Te provision also may be used to prosecute a defendant who alters or deletes records on a computer, and then receives something of value from an individual who relied on the accuracy of those altered or deleted records.25\n\n## Treatening To Damage A Computer: 18 U.S.C.  1030(A)(7)\n\nSection 1030(a)(5) is a critical tool for prosecuting criminals who \"damage\" computers protected under the CFAA by causing computers to fail to operate as their owners intended.  Section 1030(a)(5) is used to prosecute hackers or intruders who gain unauthorized access to a computer and commit criminal acts that, in any way, impair the integrity of data, a program, a system, or information, as well as change the way a computer is intended to operate.  Te statute extends to intruders who gain unauthorized access to a computer and send commands that delete fles or shut the computer down.  Subsection (a)(5) also may be used against cybercriminals who install malicious sofware that compromises a computer's integrity.  Tus, installing remote access tools, bot code, and other attempts to persist on a victim's system are all chargeable under section 1030(a)(5). Tis provision is also an important tool for prosecuting criminals who cause intentional To deter high-tech attempts to commit old-fashioned extortion, section 1030(a)(7)\n\n\ncriminalizes threats to interfere in any way with the normal operation of a protected computer or system, as well as threats to compromise the confdentiality or integrity of information contained therein.  Tis provision encompasses threats by criminals to deny access to authorized users, erase or corrupt data or programs, or slow down or shutdown the operation of the computer system, such as via a DDoS attack.  Te provision also reaches threats to steal confdential data.\n\n## Charging Policies\n\nished under a wire fraud charge.28  Section\n1343 shares a number of common proof elements with section 1030(a)(4) of the CFAA, including the requirement that a defendant act with fraudulent intent; however, the wire fraud statute authorizes more punitive penalties that may be more commensurate to the harm sufered by victims in cases involving signifcant loss amounts.  Section 1343 violations also can serve as a predicate for the Racketeer Infuenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (\"RICO\") and money laundering charges, whereas most CFAA violations cannot.29  Accordingly, the wire fraud statute is a particularly efective tool for prosecuting intricate networks of criminal hacker groups engaged in transnational organized crime.30\n\n## 3. Identity Tef: 18 U.S.C.  1028(A)(7) And 1028A\n\nTe Department's decisions about when to open an investigation or charge a case under the CFAA are guided by the Intake and Charging Policy for Computer Crime Matters.26  As the policy explains, prosecutors must consider a number of factors in order to ensure that charges are brought only in cases that serve a substantial federal interest.27  Te policy also requires prosecutors to conduct certain consultations to assure consistent practice across the Department. In particular, prosecutors must consult with the Department's Computer Crime and Intellectual Property section before bringing charges under the CFAA.\n\nCybercriminals ofen commit computer intrusions to compromise and steal PII that may be sold on the black market, or directly used to commit other crimes, such as wire fraud. A criminal who misuses or trafcs in stolen PII ofen violates a variety of identity thef statutes, including 18 U.S.C.  1028(a) (7) and 1028A.\n\n## 2. Wire Fraud: 18 U.S.C.  1343\n\n\nIn relevant part, section 1028(a)(7) criminalizes the unauthorized transfer, possession, or use of a \"means of identifcation of another person\" with the intent to commit (or aid and abet) a violation of federal law, or any State or local felony.  Te term \"means of identifcation,\" in turn, broadly refers to \"any name or number that may be used, alone or Te wire fraud statute is another particularly powerful and commonly applicable charge in computer crime cases involving fraud. Indeed, courts long have recognized that e-mails and other forms of Internet transmissions constitute \"wire, radio, or television communication[s]\" that may be punin conjunction with any other information, to identify a specifc individual.\"31\npredates the modern era of cybercrime, the increased digitalization of trade secrets, the rise of cyber espionage, and the global expansion of online marketplaces that trafc in intellectual property, have signifcantly magnifed the threats that insiders, hackers, and nation states present to U.S. individuals and companies who maintain valuable trade secrets.35  Indeed, in recent years, businesses across key sectors of the U.S. economy have sufered sophisticated and systematic cyber intrusions designed to steal sensitive commercial data from compromised networks, including research and design data, sofware source code, and plans for commercial and military systems.\n\n\n\nIn computer intrusion cases, the Department also uses section 1028A (the \"aggravated\" identity thef statute) to prosecute individuals who engage in the unauthorized transfer, possession, or use of a \"means of identifcation of another person\" during and in relation to felony violations of certain enumerated federal ofenses that are commonly associated with computer crime.32  For example, \"carders\" who sell or trade stolen credit or debit card account information on online forums, or \"phishers\" who obtain the same type of information via fraudulent e-mails, ofen violate a predicate crime for a section 1028A violation.  Similarly, defendants who violate the CFAA and obtain identity or account information may also violate this section.  Although section 1028A is limited to a far narrower list of predicate ofenses than section 1028(a)(7), it is an important and powerful tool in the Department's prosecutions of cybercriminals because those who are convicted of section 1028A are subject to a mandatory minimum two-year term of imprisonment.33\n\n## 4. Economic Espionage And Tef Of Trade Secrets: 18 U.S.C.  1831-32\n\n\nTrade secret law prohibits the unauthorized disclosure of confdential and proprietary information (for example, a formula or compilation of information) when that information possesses an independent economic value because it is secret, and the owner has taken reasonable measures to keep it secret.34\nTe Department's principal tool for preventing and deterring serious instances of trade secret thef is the Economic Espionage Act (\"EEA\").  Te EEA criminalizes two types of trade secret misappropriation: economic espionage under section 1831, and trade secret thef under section 1832. Te economic espionage provision prohibits the thef of trade secrets for the beneft of a foreign government, instrumentality, or agent.  Te thef of trade secrets provision prohibits the commercial thef of trade secrets to beneft someone other than the owner.  Although the provisions defne separate ofenses, they share a number of common proof elements. Notably, conviction under either statute requires the government to demonstrate beyond a reasonable doubt that: (1) the defendant misappropriated information; (2) the defendant knew or believed this information was proprietary and that he had no claim to it; and (3) the information was in fact a trade secret (unless the crime charged is a conspir-\n\n\nAlthough the problem of trade secret thef\n\n\n\nlease copyrighted materials, such as a commercial flm, song, video game, or sofware, that are still \"being prepared for commercial distribution,\" by making the material \"available on a computer network accessible to members of the public.\"\n\n## 6. Access Device Fraud: 18 U.S.C.  1029\n\nacy or an attempt). Further, both provisions are subject to the EEA's broad defnition of a \"trade secret,\" which includes all types of information that the owner has taken reasonable measures to keep secret and that itself has independent economic value.36 Both provisions also punish attempts and conspiracies to misappropriate trade secrets.37  To promote enforcement, federal law provides special protections to victims in trade secret cases to ensure that the confdentiality of trade secret information is preserved during the course of criminal proceedings.38\n\n## 5. Criminal Copyright: 17 U.S.C.  506\n\n\nSection 1029 of title 18, United States Code, broadly prohibits the production, use, possession, or trafcking of unauthorized or counterfeit \"access devices,\" such as PII, instrument identifers, or other means of account access that may be used \"to obtain money, goods, services, or any other thing of value, or that can be used to initiate a transfer of funds.\" Prosecutors commonly bring charges under section 1029 in \"phishing\" cases, in which a cybercriminal uses fraudulent e-mails to obtain bank account numbers and passwords. Section 1029 also is an efective tool in \"carding\" cases where a defendant purchases, sells, or transfers stolen bank account, credit card, or debit account information.  Forfeiture is also available in many cases.40\nCopyright law provides federal protection against infringement of certain exclusive rights, such as reproduction and distribution, of \"original works of authorship,\" including computer sofware, literary works, musical works, and motion pictures.39  As with trade secrets, the increased digitalization of copyrighted materials, as well as the global expansion of online marketplaces that trafc in intellectual property, have enhanced their attractiveness and, in turn, vulnerability to cybercriminals.\n\n## 7. Racketeer Infuenced And Corrupt Organizations (Rico) Act: 18 U.S.C.  19611968\n\nComputer hacking conducted by transnational criminal groups poses a signifcant threat to American cybersecurity.  Equipped with sizable funds, organized criminal groups operating abroad employ highly sophisticated malicious sofware, spear-phish-\nTe Department's principal tool for preventing and deterring serious instances of copyright infringement is section 506(a) of title 17, United States Code, which criminalizes willful copyright infringement if committed \"for purposes of commercial advantage or private fnancial gain,\" or \"by the reproduction or distribution\" of copyrighted works during a 180-day period that satisfes the statute's minimum retail value.  Section 506(a)(1)(C) also makes it a crime to pre-reinterception by another,44 prohibits disclosure of any illegally intercepted communication,45 and criminalizes unlawful use of that communication.46  Te Wiretap Act has proven to be an especially valuable tool for prosecuting cases involving spyware users and manufacturers, intruders using packet snifers (i.e., tools that intercept data fowing in a network), persons improperly cloning e-mail accounts, and other cases involving the surreptitious collection of communications from a victim's computer.\n\nTo prosecute a defendant under this statute, however, federal courts have generally required that the \"intercepted\" communications be acquired \"contemporaneously\" or at approximately the same time as their transmission.47  Accordingly, merely obtaining a copy of the contents of a recorded communicationfor example, a year-old e-mail on a mail serveris not necessarily a criminal \"intercept[ion]\" of the communication under the Wiretap Act, though such an action may violate other provisions of law, including the Stored Communications Act, 18 U.S.C.  2701.48\n\ning campaigns, and other hacking tools\nsome of which rival in sophistication those that nation states useto hack into sensitive fnancial systems, conduct massive data breaches, spread ransomware, attack critical infrastructure, and steal critical intellectual property.  For transnational cybercrime rings engaged in \"racketeering\" activity, such as identity thef, access device fraud, or wire fraud, a RICO charge may be a particularly efective tool for prosecuting individual members of the group.  For instance, the RICO statute authorizes more severe penalties than the CFAA, including maximum sentences of 20 years or more depending on the nature of the predicate ofense,41 consecutive sentencing for RICO substantive and conspiracy convictions or violations of two substantive RICO subsections,42 and forfeiture of all reasonably foreseeable proceeds of racketeering activity on a joint and several basis.43  Section 1963(d)(2) of title 18, United States Code, also empowers prosecutors to obtain a pre-trial restraining order that preserves any assets that may be subject to forfeiture following conviction. In addition, a RICO conspiracy charge under section 1962(d) of title 18 allows prosecutors to hold one defendant responsible for the conduct of the enterprise.\n\n## 9. Money Laundering: 18 U.S.C.  1956, 1957 8. Wiretap Act: 18 U.S.C.  2511\n\n\n\nCybercrimes are ofen committed for fnancial gain. And as with other crimes, those committing cybercrimes will seek ways to conceal and spend their ill-gotten gains. Federal money laundering laws are thus an important tool for combatting cybercrime. Tese laws criminalize certain transactions undertaken with the proceeds of designated crimes, referred to as \"specifed unlawful ac-\nTe same surveillance statutes that empower law enforcement to collect evidence also protect the privacy of innocent Americans by criminalizing the unlawful collection of private communications. For example, the Wiretap Act shields private wire, oral, or electronic communications from illegal\n\ntivity\" (\"SUA\").49  Crimes classifed as SUAs include many common charges brought in cybercrime cases, such as violations of the CFAA and wire fraud.\nthough civil and regulatory provisions are the Act's primary enforcement mechanisms, it also created several new criminal ofenses. Section 1037 addresses more egregious violations of the CAN-SPAM Act, particularly where the perpetrator has taken signifcant steps to hide his or her identity, or the source of the spam, from recipients, ISPs, or law enforcement agencies.  Prosecutors have used this statute in the context of disrupting or dismantling botnets.\n\n## 11. National Security Statutes\n\nSection 1956 of title 18, United States Code, is the main money laundering charge.  Among other things, this statute makes it a crime for a person to carry out a fnancial transaction involving SUA proceeds when the person knows the transaction involves illicit proceeds of some kind, and the transaction is designed to promote the carrying on of an SUA,50 or to conceal \"the nature, the location, the source, the ownership, or the control of the proceeds\"51 of the predicate crime.\n\nSection 1957 prohibits knowingly conducting certain monetary transactions involving SUA proceeds when the value is greater than $10,000. Courts have broadly interpreted the scope of the transactions covered by the money laundering laws.  In particular, courts have upheld the use of money laundering charges involving transactions in virtual currencies.52\n\n## 10. Controlling The Assault Of Non- Solicited Pornography And Marketing Act: 18 U.S.C.  1037\n\nTe Controlling the Assault of Non-Solicited Pornography and Marketing (\"CAN-\nSPAM\") Act of 200353 provides a means for prosecuting those responsible for sending large amounts of unsolicited commercial e-mail messages (i.e., \"spam\"), including messages sent on social media sites. Al-\n\nSome statutes that protect sensitive national security information are implicated in computer hacking investigations, when that information is targeted or stolen.  For example, defense articles and services listed on the U.S. munitions list, 22 C.F.R.  121.1, cannot be exported without a license without violating the Arms Export Control Act, 22 U.S.C.  2778 (\"AECA\").  Other U.S.-origin items and related technology that have both commercial and military applications or otherwise warrant control are subject to the Export Administration Regulations (\"EAR\"), 15 C.F.R. pts. 730-74, and may require a license for export to certain countries or for certain uses.  Te statute that criminalizes violation of the EAR (among other regulations) is the International Emergency Economic Powers Act, 50 U.S.C.  1705 (\"IEEPA\"). A Chinese aerospace engineer was recently convicted of violating AECA for helping hackers in the Chinese air force choose which defense contractors to target and which fles related to military projects\n\n\nnow serving a 20-year sentence for providing material support to ISIL.56\n\nto steal;54 and a network of Iranian computer hackers (one of whom was apprehended) was charged with violating AECA and Iranian sanctions under IEEPA for stealing specialized sofware from the networks of American sofware companies, which the defendants are alleged to have resold for proft to Iranian government entities.55\n\n## Other Means Of Dismantling, Disrupting, And Deterring Computer Crimes\n\n\nClassifed information and national defense information, too, are protected by a number of criminal statutes.  Te CFAA specifcally prohibits obtaining certain restricted data and information protected against disclosure for reasons of national defense or foreign relations through unauthorized access to a computer, see 18 U.S.C.  1030(a)(1), and espionage statutes prohibit the unauthorized retention of national defense information or its dissemination to an unauthorized person (whatever the means of doing so).  See 18 U.S.C.  793 & 794.\n\nWhile criminal prosecutions of malicious cyber activity (and seizing the ill-gotten gains of such activity) are an important aspect of the Department's approach to combating cybercrime, we recognize that the United States cannot simply prosecute its way out of the problem.  Instead, the Department has embraced a comprehensive approach to deterring cyber threats that builds upon a broad array of criminal, civil, and national security authorities, tools, and capabilities. Indeed, the government as a whole relies on a range of civil and administrative tools to raise the costs associated with malicious cyber activity, and to disrupt ongoing activities in the cyber underworld.\n\nTo support this broader approach, we work to interdict cyber threats before they become actual incidents by denying malign actors access to infrastructure, tools, funds, and victims, as well as by working with international partners and members of the private sector, who ofen may be better positioned to prevent cybercrime. Congress has given the Department the legal authority to disrupt, dismantle, and deter cyber threats through a blend of civil, Finally, material support to terrorists is likewise prohibited, even if that support is provided online.  *See* 18 U.S.C.  2339A, 2339B.\n\nAs discussed in Chapter 2, for example, Ardit Ferizi was an Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (\"ISIL\")-linked hacker living in Malaysia who may never have met ISIL recruiters in Iraq.  But when Ferizi broke into the networks of an American retailer, stole PII for thousands of U.S. persons, and culled that list down to approximately 1,300 military and other government personnel that he shared with ISIL for purposes of publishing a kill list and enabling ISIL to \"hit them hard,\" he provided such support.  Ferizi was apprehended, brought to the United States, and is\n\n## 1. Disrupting And Disabling International Botnets\n\nIn recent years, the Department has successfully disrupted and disabled a number of international botnets not only by arresting and prosecuting the criminals involved in their creation and administration, but also by leveraging other civil, criminal, and administrative authorities.  For instance, the Department uses civil injunctive authority under section 1345 (injunctions against fraud) and section 2521 (injunctions against illegal interception) to authorize actions such as seizing domains the botnet is using to communicate with command-and-control serversto disrupt and disable a botnet's ongoing commission of fraud crimes or illegal wiretapping.  Accompanying temporary restraining orders (\"TROs\") secured under Rule 65 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure also are important to disrupting\n\n\ncriminal, and administrative powers beyond traditional prosecution.  As a result, the Department has been a driving force behind the U.S. government's most notable and effective measures to disrupt online crime.  As mentioned above, the Department ofen uses civil injunctions, as well as seizure and forfeiture authorities, to disrupt cybercriminal groups by seizing the computer servers and domain names those actors use to operate botnets.  In cases where the actors cannot quickly be identifed, such toolsexercised with proper judicial oversighthave helped the Department disrupt and dismantle ongoing criminal schemes, thereby protecting the public from further victimization.  Finally, the Department, with the assistance of other U.S. government and international partners, also executes trade actions, and participates in various cyber operations designed to neutralize and eradicate international cyber threats.\n\n## Detecting, Deterring, And Disrupting Cyber Threats\n\na botnet, and taking immediate steps to prevent it from reconstituting.\n\n\nFurther, as discussed above, if law enforcement is able to take over the command-and-control structure of a botnet, the Department may now use the recently promulgated venue provision of criminal Rule 41(b)(6)(B) to issue commands to bots across a number of districts.  For example, law enforcement may obtain identifying information from afected bot computers in order to contact owners and warn them of the infection.  In addition, law enforcement might engage in an online operation designed to disrupt the botnet and restore full control over computers to their legal owners. Rule 41(b)(6)(B) allows the government to apply for warrants in a single judicial district to use these techniques. Several successful examples of the Department's strategy for disrupting and disabling botnets are illustrated in **Fig. 1,**  and  described in greater detail in Appendix 2.\n\n## 2. Dark Web Disruptions\n\nIn recent years, the Dark Web's anonymity and low barriers to entry have attracted scores of criminals to Dark Web markets, including those trafcking in child pornography, illicit frearms, illegal drugs, murderfor-hire, and human trafcking.  Sophisticated hackers also frequent Dark Web forums for the newest malware or stolen data, and might use the Tor network to host botnet command-and-control infrastructure that is more resistant to disruption and take-downs. Despite the many challenges the Dark Web poses, law enforcement around the world have successfully disrupted criminals operating in the cyber underground by de-anonymizing users engaging in illegal activity;\nhensive strategy to combat malicious activity on the Dark Web.\n\n## 3. Sanctions And Designations\n\nTo ensure that investigative information is used efectively to protect the Nation, the Department regularly interacts with the Departments of Commerce, Treasury, and State, as well as with other agencies and regulatory bodies, to support those departments' actions to identify and impose sanctions on malicious cyber actors.\n\nseizing their websites, domains, servers, and ill-gotten gains; and criminally prosecuting them.  For instance, to pierce the Dark Web's anonymizing technology, the Department diligently pursues traditional investigative techniques, studies patterns of criminal activity, collaborates with international law enforcement partners, and develops human sources.  Further, where anonymizing technologies make less intrusive investigative options inefective, the Department also obtains warrants to perform remote searches using network investigative techniques under limited circumstances.57  For example, appropriate scenarios for seeking a warrant to authorize a remote search include, but are not limited to: (1) obtaining stored content from a hidden provider by using a username and password; (2) identifying a criminal using a web-based e-mail account by sending a NIT to the criminal's e-mail account; and (3) identifying users of a hidden child pornography forum by sending a NIT to each computer used to log on to the website.\n\n\n\nSanctions imposed by the Ofce of Foreign Assets Control at the Department of the Treasury can deprive subjects of their access to the U.S. fnancial system and their ability to do business with U.S. persons, and can be particularly efective in reaching foreign companies that beneft from stolen information.  Since 2011, the Treasury Department has had the authority to block the property of transnational criminal organizations under Executive Order 13581 (\"Blocking Property of Transnational Criminal Organizations\"). Treasury also makes use of country-specifc regimes to respond to nation-state behavior. As mentioned in Chapter 2, following North Korea's destructive malware attack on Sony Pictures Entertainment, the President in 2015 issued Executive Order 13687 (\"Imposing Additional Sanctions with Respect to North Korea\").  Using this new sanction authority, the Treasury Department designated three entities for being \"controlled entities of the Government of North Korea\" and ten\n\nOnce the cloak of anonymity has been pulled back, the Department leverages a range of civil and criminal tools, including civil and criminal forfeiture authorities, seizure warrants, and requests under mutual legal assistance agreements to dismantle the infrastructure undergirding the Dark Web systems and recover the proceeds of these illegal activities.  Further, in many instances, individuals responsible for creating, operating, and using Dark Web forums and marketplaces are also criminally prosecuted.  We describe in Appendix 3 some recent prominent examples of the Department's compre-\n\n## Detecting, Deterring, And Disrupting Cyber Threats\n\nindividuals for being \"agencies or ofcials of the North Korean government.\"58 In 2015, the President also issued Executive Order 13694 (\"Blocking the Property of Certain Persons Engaging in Signifcant Malicious Cyber-Enabled Activities\"), which authorized the Secretary of the Treasury, in consultation with the Attorney General and the Secretary of State, to impose sanctions on individuals or entities that engage in malicious cyber-enabled activity that results in, or materially contributes to, a signifcant threat to the national security, foreign policy, or economic health or fnancial stability of the United States.59  In December 2016, the President amended this executive order in \"order to take additional steps to deal with the national emergency with respect to sig-\nDeputy Attorney General Rod Rosenstein announces on March 23, 2018 the fling of criminal charges against nine Iranians alleged to have conducted a massive cyber thef campaign on behalf of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps.  Te Treasury Department imposed sanctions the same day.\n\n\n\nnifcant malicious cyber-enabled activities\n . . . in view of the increasing use of such activities to undermine democratic processes or institutions.\"60  Te 2016 amendment expanded cyber-related sanctions and in an annex designated fve Russian entitiesincluding that nation's domestic and foreign intelligence servicesand four Russian individuals who were determined to have interfered with or undermined U.S. election processes or institutions.61  Te list of designated parties was expanded again on March 15, 2018,62 and yet again on June 11, 2018.63\nDesignations under E.O. 13694 are not limited to Russian actors.  On March 23, 2018, in consultation with the Department, OFAC designated an Iranian entity, the Mabna Institute, and ten Iranian individuals who\n\nCredit: Amy Mathers, U.S. Department of Justice\n\n\n## 4. Trade Actions\n\n\nengaged in thef of valuable intellectual property and data from hundreds of U.S. and third-country universities and a media company for private fnancial gain.64  (Tat same day, the Department unsealed criminal charges against the same entity and nine individuals.65 See page 73.)\n\nTe Ofce of the United States Trade Representative (\"USTR\") can raise the issue of foreign cyber intrusions against American businesses in the context of its trade actions under various U.S. laws or trade agreements.  As declared in a USTR report made public in April 2017, \"Te United States uses all trade tools available to ensure that its trading partners provide robust protection for trade secrets and enforce trade secrets laws.\"68  Te Department has worked closely with USTR to ensure that the Trade Representative is appropriately informed about cyber-enabled activity by nation states that may be actionable under U.S. trade laws.\n\nTe Department will continue to support sanctions under such authorities by helping the Treasury Department draf sanction nomination packages based on the information gathered during our investigations. Where, for example, investigations identify hackers who victimize U.S. individuals or companies, or those who proft from criminal hacking by using stolen personal information or trade secrets, the Department works with the Treasury Department to craf appropriate sanctions against those responsible.\n\nDue in part to China's cyber-enabled thef of U.S. intellectual property and sensitive commercial information, the U.S. government in March 2018 announced various tarifs against China and various restrictions on Chinese investments.69  Te announcement came afer USTR released a comprehensive public report as part of its investigation under section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974.70\n\n\nTe USTR report establishes a clear record of China's cyber intrusions and cyber thef based on information provided by the Department, among other parts of the U.S. government. Te report indicates that the Chinese government has used cyber intrusions to serve its strategic economic objectives and that \"incidents of China's cyber intrusions against U.S. commercial entities align closely with China's industrial policy objectives.\"71\n\nFor example, the PLA's thef of trade secrets from Westinghouse, Inc., as documented in an indictment brought by the Depart-\nSimilarly, the Commerce Department can place persons and companies on its Entity List if it fnds that they are engaged in activities that are contrary to U.S. national security or foreign policy interests.66  Persons and entities on the Entity List are subject to special licensing requirements for the export, re-export, and/or transfer (in-country) of items listed in the EAR.  In 2014, for example, in addition to the Department of Justice's prosecution of a Chinese engineer for consulting with Chinese military hackers who stole aerospace technology, the Commerce Department placed his company on the Entity List, based on the FBI's nomination.67  Such a listing can have dramatic consequences, cutting the frm of from U.S. exports and causing U.S. and foreign businesses to reconsider doing business with the designated entity.\n\n## Detecting, Deterring, And Disrupting Cyber Threats\n\nDepartment has played an important role in bringing these threats to our national security to light.\n\n## 5. Cyber Operations\n\nment, illustrates how China uses cyber-enabled thef as one of multiple instruments to achieve its state-led technology development goals.72  Likewise, the USTR report noted that \"[i]n September 2017, the Department fled an indictment against three Chinese nationals who were owners, employees, and associates of the Guangzhou Bo Yu Information Technology Company Limited (\"Boyusec\"), a company that cybersecurity frms have linked to the Chinese government.\"73\nTe USTR report contains other examples that illustrate how China uses cyber-enabled intrusions to further the commercial interests of Chinese state-owned enterprises, to the detriment of its foreign partners and competitors.  Available evidence also indicates that China uses its cyber capabilities as an instrument to achieve its industrial policy and science and technology objectives.  Te Finally, the Department also assists other agencies in analyzing the legal and policy implications of operations conducted through cyberspace, and ensuring that these operations comply with the Constitution and applicable law.  Where additional authority or injunctive relief is required to address conduct within the United States, the Department works with investigators and, as appropriate, the U.S. Attorney community, to pursue it.  Intelligence gathered by the FBI using its national security investigative authorities may also assist agencies in planning or carrying out such operations.\n\n## Notes\n\n\n1 Te Department components responsible for this work are described in Chapter 5.\n\n2\nFor example, the FBI, as the federal govern-\n\n\nment's primary investigative agency, must comply with Te Attorney General's Guidelines for Domestic FBI Operations, available at: https://www.\n\njustice.gov/archive/opa/docs/guidelines.pdf (last accessed June 29, 2018), and the FBI Domestic Investigations and Operations Guide, available at:\nhttps://vault.fi.gov/FBI%20Domestic%20Investigations%20and%20Operations%20Guide%20 %28DIOG%29/fbi -domestic -investiga - tions-and-operations-guide-diog-2013-version/ FBI%20Domestic%20Investigations%20and%20 Operations%20Guide%20%28DIOG%29%20 2013%20Version%20Part%2001%20of%2001/ view (last accessed June 29, 2018), which standardizes the FBI's criminal, national security, and foreign intelligence investigative activities.\n\nTe *Attorney General's Guidelines* establish a set of basic principles that serve as the foundation for all FBI mission-related activities, and the professional identity of each FBI agent, including: (1) protecting the public includes protecting their rights and liberties; (2) investigating only for a proper and authorized law enforcement, national security, or foreign intelligence purpose;\n(3) ensuring that an independent, authorized law enforcement or national security purpose exists for initiating investigative activityrace, ethnicity, religion, or national origin alone can never constitute the sole basis for initiating investigative activity; (4) performing only authorized activities in pursuit of investigative activities; (5) employing the least intrusive means for investigation that do not otherwise compromise FBI operations; and (6) applying best judgment to the circumstances at hand to select the most appropriate investigative means to achieve the investigative goal.\n\n3\nSee ICANN WHOIS, available at: https://\nwhois.icann.org/en (last accessed June 29, 2018).\n\n\n\n4\nPub. L. No.  99508, 100 Stat. 1848 (1986)\n(codifed at 18 U.S.C.  2510 *et seq.*).\n\n5\nSee 18 U.S.C.  2703.\n\n6\nId.  3121 et seq.\n\n7\nId.  2510 et seq.\n\n8\n50 U.S.C.  1801 *et seq*.\n\n\n\nVirtual currency seizures with a value of\n$500,000 or more must be forfeited judicially. Te value is assessed on the date of agency seizure.\n\n\n\n10 See, e.g.,\n\"For Sale Approximately\n3,813.0481935 Bitcoins,\" U.S. Marshals Service (Jan. 2018), available at: https://www. usmarshals.gov/assets/2018/bitcoinauction/ (last accessed June 29, 2018).\n\n\n11 18 U.S.C.  981-983.\n\n\n\n12 *See* Press Release, \"Russian National And Bitcoin Exchange Charged In 21-Count Indictment For Operating Alleged International Money Laundering Scheme And Allegedly Laundering Funds From Hack Of Mt. Gox,\" U.S. Dept.\n\nof Justice (July 26, 2017), available at: https:// www.justice.gov/usao-ndca/pr/russian-national-and-bitcoin-exchange-charged-21-count-indictment-operating-alleged (last accessed June 29, 2018).\n\n\n\n13 A \"John Doe\" summons is an administrative summons that may be used, with court approval, to seek information about an ascertainable group or class of persons who may be involved in violating federal tax laws.  *See* 26 U.S.C.  7609(f)\n(2012).\n\n\n\n14 United States v. *Coinbase, Inc. et al.*, Order Regarding Petition to Enforce IRS Summons at 14 (Doc. 78), Case No. 3:17-cv-01431 (N.D. Cal.).\n\n\n15 *See* 18 U.S.C.  3181 note (listing the countries with which the United States currently has a bilateral extradition agreement).\n\n\n\n16 Quoted from the United States's sentencing memorandum in United States v. Roman Seleznev, No. 11-CRM-007 (W.D. Wa., Apr. 14,\n2017), available at: https://assets.documentcloud.org/documents/3673513/Seleznev-US-Atty-Sentencing-Memo.pdf (last accessed June 29, 2018).\n\n\n\n17 *See* Press Release, \"Russian Cyber-Criminal Sentenced to 14 Years in Prison for Role in Organized Cybercrime Ring Responsible for $50 million in Online Identity Tef and $9 Million Bank Fraud Conspiracy,\" U.S. Dept. of Justice (Nov. 30, 2017) (describing all of Seleznev's federal sentences), available at: https://www. justice.gov/opa/pr/russian-cyber-criminal-sentenced-14-years-prison-role-organized-cybercrime-ring-responsible (last accessed June 29, 2018).\n\n\n18 https://www.unodc.org/documents/middleeastandnorthafrica/organised-crime/ UNITED_NATIONS_CONVENTION_\nAGAINST_TRANSNATIONAL_ORGA-\nNIZED_CRIME_AND_THE_PROTOCOLS_ THERETO.pdf (Art. XIX) (last accessed June 29, 2018).\n\n\n19 https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/180815.pdf (Art. V) (last accessed June 29, 2018).\n\n\n\n20 Although the CFAA is primarily a criminal statute, individuals and companies may also bring private civil suits against CFAA violators.\n\nSee 18 U.S.C.  1030(g).  Tis report does not address the civil provisions of the statute except as they may pertain to the criminal provisions.\n\n\n21 More specifc guidance on the CFAA is available at: https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/ fles/criminal-ccips/legacy/2015/01/14/ccmanual.pdf (last accessed June 29, 2018).\n\n\n\n22 In the Second, Fourth, and Ninth Circuits, signifcant recent decisions have limited the defnition of \"exceeds authorized access\" in 18 U.S.C.\n\n 1030(e)(6) \"to violations of restrictions on access to information, and not restrictions on its use.\" See, e.g., *United States v. Nosal*, 676 F.3d 854,\n863-64 (9th Cir. 2012).  Other language in Nosal suggests that the Ninth Circuit's ultimate holding is broader: that an individual can \"exceed[] authorized access\" only by accessing data that he or she was never authorized to access, under any circumstances.  Accordingly, in those circuits, the Department recommends against charging any case that relies on the defnition of \"exceeds authorized access\" in 18 U.S.C.  1030(e)(6), unless it can be proven that the computer user had absolutely no authorization to access the relevant information.\n\n\n23 See, *e.g.*, S. Rep. No. 432, 99th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2479, 2483.\n\n\n\n24 See United States v. *Lindsley*, 254 F.3d 71 (5th Cir. 2001).\n\n\n\n25 See, e.g., United States v. *Butler*, 16 Fed. Appx.\n\n99 (4th Cir. 2001) (unpublished).\n\n\n26 See Memorandum from Eric Holder, Attorney General, \"Intake and Charging Policy for Computer Crime Matters,\" (Sept. 11, 2014), available at:\nhttps://www.justice.gov/criminal-ccips/fle/904941/download (last accessed June 29, 2018).\n\n\n27 *See id*.\n\n\n\n28 See, e.g., United States v. *Selby*, 557 F.3d 968,\n978-79 (9th Cir. 2009) (fnding defendant's act of\n\nSubcomm. on Crime and Terrorism of the S. Judiciary Comm., 113 Cong. 4 (2016) (statement of Randall C. Coleman, Assistant Dir., Counterintelligence Div. FBI), available at: https://www. govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CHRG-113shrg96009/ pdf/CHRG-113shrg96009.pdf  (last accessed June 29, 2018).\n\nsending a single e-mail \"sufcient to establish the element of the use of the wires in furtherance of the scheme\"); United States v. *Drummond*, 255\nFed. Appx. 60, 64 (6th Cir. 2007) (unpublished) (afrming wire fraud conviction where defendant made airline reservation with stolen credit card over the Internet).\n\n\n\n36 18 U.S.C.  1839(3).\n\n\n29 As explained below, exceptions exist for terrorism-related violations of section 1030(a)(1) and 1030(a)(5)(A).\n\n\n\n30 Te United States Attorneys' Manual provides further guidance regarding wire fraud charges, see U.S. Dept. of Justice, United States Attorneys' Manual,  9-43.000, as does the manual, Identity Theft and Social Security Fraud (Ofce of Legal Education 2004).\n\n\n37 *See id.*  1831(a)(4)-(5), 1832(a)(4)-(5). For an attempt, the defendant must (1) have the intent needed to commit one of the two crimes, and (2) perform an act amounting to a \"substantial step\" toward the commission of that crime.\n\nUnited States v. *Hsu*, 185 F.R.D. 192, 202 (E.D.\n\nPa. 1999).  For a conspiracy, the defendant must agree with one or more people to commit a violation, and one or more of the co-conspirators must commit an overt act to efect the object of the conspiracy.  18 U.S.C.  1831(a)(5), 1832(a) (5).\n\n\n38 *See id.*  1835.\n\n\n\n39 *See* 17 U.S.C.  102(a), 106 (2012).\n\n\n\n40 *See* 18 U.S.C.  1029(c)(1)(C), (c)(2).\n\n\n41 Id.  1963(a).\n\n\n31 18 U.S.C.  1028(d)(7). Although there is little dispute about classifying a unique identifer, such as a social security number, as a \"means of identifcation,\" some courts have questioned whether non-unique identifers, such as names or birthdates, qualify as a \"means of identifcation\" when standing alone.  Compare United States v. Silva, 554 F.3d 13, 23 n.4 (1st Cir. 2009)\n(fnding doctor's signature constitutes a \"means of identifcation\"), *with United States v. Mitchell*,\n518 F.3d 230, 232-36 (4th Cir. 2008) (requiring that non-unique identifers be combined with additional information that permits the identifcation of a specifc person).\n\n\n42 Organized Crime & Gang Section, U.S.\n\nDept. of Justice, CRIMINAL RICO: 18 U.S.C.\n\n1961-1968, A Manual For Federal Prosecutors (May 2016), https://www.justice.gov/ usam/fle/870856/download (last visited June 29, 2018).\n\n32 *E.g.*, 18 U.S.C.  1028(a)(1)-(6), (8), 1029,\n1030, 1037, 1343.\n\n\n43 Id. at 238-39.\n\n\n\n44 18 U.S.C.  2511(1)(a) & (b).\n\n33 18 U.S.C.  1028A(a)(1); *see also id*.\n1028A(a)(2) (providing a minimum fve-year term for terrorism-related aggravated identity thef).\n\n## Detecting, Deterring, And Disrupting Cyber Threats\n\n\n\n48 Similarly, other surveillance statutes like the Pen Trap Act and FISA criminalize violations of their provisions.  *See* 18 U.S.C.  3121 (Pen Trap Act); 50 U.S.C.  1809 (FISA).\n\n\n49 18 U.S.C.  1956(c)(7) (defning SUA).\n\n\n50 *Id.*  1956(a)(1)(A)(i).\n\n\n\n51 *Id.*  1956(a)(1)(B)(i).\n\n\n\ntools appropriately and lawfully. Additionally, the FBI is required to adhere to the Attorney General's Guidelines for Domestic FBI Operations and the FBI's Domestic Investigations and Operations Guide in conducting remote searches and seizures; *see supra* note 2.  Tese documents require the FBI to use the least intrusive method that is feasible when conducting a search.  See Guidelines for Domestic FBI Operations,  1(c) (2)(A); Domestic Investigations and Operations Guide,  18.2.\n\n\n\n52 See United States v*. Budovsky*, 2015 WL\n5602853, at *12-13 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 23, 2015) (holding that virtual currency created by Liberty Reserve constituted funds within the meaning of\n 1956); United States v. *Ulbricht,* 31 F. Supp. 3d\n540, 569-70 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (holding that transactions involving Bitcoin were fnancial transactions within the scope of  1956).\n\n\n53 Pub. L. No. 108-187, 117 Stat. 2699 (2003).\n\n58 Press Release, \"Treasury Sanctions Additional North Korean Ofcials and Entities in Response to the Regime's Serious Human Rights Abuses and Censorship Activities,\" U.S. Dept. of the Treasury (Oct. 26, 2017), available at: https://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/sm0191.aspx  (last accessed June 29, 2018).\n\n\n\n59 Exec. Order No. 13694, 3 C.F.R. 297 (2016).\n\n\n60 Exec. Order No. 13757, 3 C.F.R. 1 (2017).\n\n\n61 Id.\n\n\n\n54 Press Release, \"Chinese National Who Conspired to Hack into U.S. Defense Contractors' Systems Sentenced to 46 Months in Federal Prison,\" U.S. Dept. of Justice (July 13, 2016), available at: https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/chinese-national-who-conspired-hack-us-defensecontractors-systems-sentenced-46-months (last accessed June 15, 2018).\n\n\n\n62 Press Release, \"Treasury Sanctions Russian\nCyber Actors for Interference with the 2016 U.S. Elections and Malicious Cyber-Attacks,\" U.S. Dept. of Treasury (March 15, 2018), available at:\nhttps://home.treasury.gov/index.php/news/\npress-releases/sm0312 (last accessed June 29,\n2018).\n\n55 Press Release, \"Two Iranian Nationals Charged in Hacking of Vermont Sofware Company,\" U.S. Dept. of Justice (July 17, 2017), available at:\nhttps://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/\ntwo-iranian-nationals-charged-hacking-vermont-sofware-company (last accessed June 15, 2018).\n\n\n63 Press Release, \"Treasury Sanctions Russian\nFederal Security Service Enablers,\" U.S. Dept. of Treasury (June 11, 2018), available at: https:// home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sm0410 (last accessed June 29, 2018).\n\n56 Press Release, \"ISIL-Linked Kosovo Hacker Sentenced to 20 Years in Prison,\" U.S. Dept. of Justice (Sept. 23, 2016), available at: https:// www.justice.gov/opa/pr/isil-linked-kosovohacker-sentenced-20-years-prison (last accessed June 15, 2018).\n\n64 Press Release, \"Treasury Sanctions Iranian\nCyber Actors for Malicious Cyber-Enabled Activities Targeting Hundreds of Universities,\" U.S. Dept. of Treasury (March 23, 2018), available\nat: https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sm0332 (last accessed June 29, 2018).\n\n\n65 Press Release, \"Nine Iranians Charged With Conducting Massive Cyber Tef Campaign on Behalf of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps,\" U.S. Dept. of Justice (March 23, 2018), available at:\nhttps://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/\nnine-iranians-charged-conducting-massive-cyber-thef-campaign-behalf-islamic-revolutionary (last accessed June 29, 2018).\n\n\n66 Export Administration Regulations, Control Policy: End-User and End-Use Based, 15 C.F.R.  744.1.22 (2016), available at: https://www. gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CFR-2016-title15-vol2/xml/ CFR-2016-title15-vol2-part744.xml\n(last accessed June 29, 2018).\n\n\n67 \"Addition of Certain Persons to the Entity List,\" 79 Fed. Reg. 44680 (Aug. 1, 2014), available at: https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2014-08- 01/pdf/2014-17960.pdf (last accessed June 29, 2018) (adding PRC Lode Technology Corporation, a company owned by Su Bin, a Chinese national serving a prison term for conspiring with Chinese air force ofcers to exploit computer systems of U.S. companies and of DoD contractors to illicitly obtain and export information, including controlled technology, related to military projects).\n\n\n68 \"2017 Special 301 Report,\" Office of the United States Trade Representative at 18 (April 2017), available at: https://ustr.gov/sites/ default/files/301/2017%20Special%20301%20 Report%20FINAL.PDF (last accessed June 29, 2018).\n\n\n\n69 *See* \"Remarks by President Trump at Signing of a Presidential Memorandum Targeting China's Economic Aggression,\" The White House (March 22, 2018), available at: https://\nwww.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/ remarks-president-trump-signing-presidential-memorandum-targeting-chinas-economic-aggression/ (last accessed June 29, 2018).\n\n\n\n70 \"Findings of the Investigation into China's Acts, Policies, and Practices related to Technology Transfer, Intellectual Property, and Innovation under Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974,\" Office of the United States Trade Representative (March 22, 2018), available at: https:// ustr.gov/sites/default/files/Section%20301%20 FINAL.PDF (last accessed June 29, 2018).\n\n\n71 Id. at 153.\n\n\n72 Id. at 166.\n\n\n73 Id. at 168.\n\n## Chapter 4 Responding To Cyber Incidents 1. Operational Engagement\n\nA\ns discussed in Chapter 3, the Department's role in disrupting and preventing cyber threats not only embraces the traditional model of criminal law enforcementwhich involves arresting suspected criminals and imprisoning offenders afer they have been convictedbut also extends beyond that model to the use of non-criminal authorities and remedies.\nIn building relationships with potential victims of cyberattacks, the FBI employs \"operational engagement\"that is, tailored and targeted outreach.  Building trust is fundamental to this approach, which initially may seem difcult to achieve, given concerns about privacy, legal privileges, and the protection of sensitive information.  To address these concerns, the FBI as a frst step seeks to share its own information with industry, through a variety of outreach initiatives and information sharing programs.\n\nIn this chapter, we discuss other non-criminal, yet critically important, aspects of the Department's overall cyber mission: responding to, preventing, and managing cyber incidents.\n\n\n\n## Building Relationships And Sharing Cyber Treat Information\n\n\n\nTe FBI disseminates numerous reports geared directly to the private sector regarding cyber threats. See **Fig. 1.** Common FBI-issued reports include Private Industry Notifcations (\"PINs\"), which provide contextual information about ongoing or emerging cyber threats, and FBI Liaison Alert System (\"FLASH\") reports, which provide technical indicators gleaned through investigations or intelligence.  Tese communication methods facilitate information sharing with either a broad or sector-specifc audience, and provide recipients with actionable intelligence to protect against cyber threats and to detect ongoing exploitation. Te FBI also ofen collaborates with other government agencies, including DHS, to release joint products, such as Joint Analysis Reports (\"JARs\") and Joint Technical Advisories (\"JTAs\").\n\nWhen responding to cyber incidents, preparation is key.  Preparation will help victims of cyber attacks speed their response, lessen the efects of exploitation, and hasten recovery. In order to best assist potential victims of cyber threats, the Department needs to prepare, too.  Our preparation eforts involve relationship building, routine information sharing, and engaging with organizations and sectors that are at particular risk. And when incidents do occur, open lines of communication enable reporting and facilitate response efforts.\n\nIn certain circumstances, the FBI will join with sector-specifc agencies1  to execute an\n\"action campaign\" to quickly and efciently advise a defned group of stakeholders of a particular cyber threat requiring their attention. *See* **Fig. 2.**  Tese eforts serve a dual purpose of helping potentially targeted entities and advancing the FBI's cyber threat investigations. Te FBI also hosts targeted engagement events intended to bring together C-suite executives with government subject matter experts in order to build partnerships, encourage information sharing, and better understand the challenges the private sector faces in protecting against cyber threats.\n\n\nIn 2015, the FBI's Cyber Division began hosting a semi-annual Chief Information Security Ofcers (\"CISO\") Academy at the FBI Academy in Quantico, Virginia.  Te Academy seeks to enhance participants' understanding of the government and its functions by hosting approximately 30 CISOs representing key critical infrastructure sectors for a three-day training session.  Te event's sessions provide the latest information and intelligence on cyber threats, explain how the government interacts with private industry before, during, and afer a cyberattack, explore investigative case studies, and engage participants in tabletop exercises.  As of April 2018, the FBI had hosted four CISO Academies with over 120 total participants.\n\nHealthcare Industry Classified Briefings (Spring 2016)\nexecutives participated.\nEnergy Sector Action Campaign (Spring 2016)\nbriefings to owners and operators of electric facilities.\nfour via webinar, with 1,600 total industry representatives briefed.\nRansomware Campaign (Spring/Fall FY 2016)\nCouncil of ISACs, hosted workshops, or \"road shows,\" targeting\nsmall, medium, and large organizations at the C-Suite level.\nBusiness E-mail Compromise (BEC) Campaign (FY 2017/FY **2018)**\nidentified pre-scheduled events to conduct briefings to industry\nexecutives. Additionally, FBI and USSS hosted executives in field offices\n\nIn addition, the FBI's Cyber Division, in collaboration with a host FBI feld ofce and U.S. Attorney's Ofce, organizes one-day General Counsel Cyber Summits to bring corporate attorneys and CISOs together with Department personnel.  At these summits, partici-\n\n\n\npants discuss how to overcome obstacles in information sharing and how best to work with the U.S. government when responding to a cyber incident.  To date, the FBI has conducted four summits with over 500 total attendees.\n\n## 2. Enduring Partnerships\n\nTe FBI has several established programs that enable connectivity, information sharing, and collaboration with the private sector on a range of hazards, including cyber threats.  Tese programs include:\nrelevant to the protection of the nation's critical infrastructure.  In contrast to DSAC, InfraGard members join as individuals, not as corporations. Tere are over 50,000 vetted InfraGard members nationally, representing all critical infrastructure sectors, organized into 84 local chapters called \"InfraGard Member Alliances.\" Each chapter is associated with its corresponding local FBI feld ofce.\n\n## Domestic Security Alliance Council\n\n(\"DSAC\") was founded in 2006 as a national membership program to encourage public-private engagement between corporate chief security ofcers and the FBI on emerging threats facing the nation and economy. DHS was later added as a partner organization.  With over 500 member companies, DSAC provides the FBI and DHS direct engagement with decision-makers in the U.S. economy's largest corporations and critical insight through the DSAC Executive Working Group.\n\nInfraGard is a partnership between the FBI\nand members of the private sector for sharing information and promoting mutual learning National Cyber-Forensics & Training Alliance  (\"NCFTA\") was conceived in 1997 and the non-proft 501(c)(3) corporation was created in 2003.  Headquartered in Pittsburgh, this organization has become an international model for joining law enforcement, private industry, and academia to build and share resources, strategic information, and cyber threat intelligence. Since its establishment, the NCFTA has evolved to keep up with the ever-changing cybercrime landscape.  Today, the organization deals with threats from transnational criminal groups including spam, botnets, stock manipulation schemes, intellectual property thef, pharmaceutical fraud, telecommunication scams, and other fnancial fraud schemes that result in billions of dollars in losses to companies and consumers.  Te extensive knowledge base within the NCFTA has played a key role in some of the FBI's most signifcant cyber cases in the past several years.\n\nInternet-facilitated criminal activity and to develop efective alliances with law enforcement and industry partners.  Since 2000, the IC3 has received complaints crossing the spectrum of cybercrime matters, to include online fraud in its many forms, including Intellectual Property Rights (\"IPR\") matters, computer intrusions, economic espionage, online extortion, identity thef and others. It is through this reporting that the program is able to analyze complaints for dissemination to the public, private industry, and for intelligence/investigative purposes for law enforcement.\n\n## 3. Reporting Cyber Incidents And Notifying Targeted Entities\n\nNational Domestic Communications Assistance Center (\"NDCAC\") is a national hub for technical knowledge management among law enforcement agencies that also strengthens law enforcement's relationships with the communications industry.  Operated by the FBI's Operational Technology Division, the NDCAC leverages and shares law enforcement's collective technical knowledge and resources on issues involving real-time and stored communications to address challenges posed by advanced communications services and technologies. NDCAC develops and maintains relationships with industry to ensure law enforcement's understanding of new services and technologies, and it provides a venue to exchange information, streamline processes, and facilitate more efcient interaction between law enforcement and industry. NDCAC also educates industry on law enforcement's evidentiary processes and works with industry to verify that technical solutions work as expected.\n\nTrough the numerous FBI and U.S. Attorneys' ofces nationwide, the Department is uniquely positioned to interact with organizations that have experienced a cyber incident. Te FBI has 56 feld ofces throughout the country, and has assisted victims of crime for over 100 years, including since the earliest days of computer crime.  Te FBI may learn through law enforcement or intelligence sources that a U.S. person or organization has sufered an incident or is the target of illicit cyber activity, and can proactively notify the targeted entity.  Conversely, victims may be the frst to detect the incident and then can notify the FBI.  In either case, the Department stands ready to investigate the unauthorized activity and support victims.\n\n\n\n## Victim Notifcation\n\nInternet Crime Complaint Center (\"IC3\")\nprovides the public with a reliable and convenient reporting mechanism to submit information to the FBI concerning suspected Te Department identifes victims of cyber intrusion through a variety of means, such bute malicious cyber activity due to its dual criminal investigative and national security responsibilities.\nas from the FBI's ongoing contact with victims, from investigations of threat actors, from other members of the U.S. Intelligence Community, and from foreign partners.  Tis information may be highly classifed or may carry special handling or sharing restrictions based on the sensitivity of the source and the information provided.  Te FBI takes all reasonable steps to identify the targeted individual or entity, determine if there was an actual compromise, and assess if there is actionable information it may share.\n\nDepending upon the circumstances, the FBI can undertake direct or indirect notice to victims or potential victims. \"Direct\" notifcation is typically handled in-person through established liaison contacts, such as by notifying the representatives of an institutional victim.  Larger scale data breaches involving thousands or millions of afected customers are more complicated.  In such circumstances, the FBI relies on victimized institutions to provide notifcation to afected individuals. In those cases, the victimized institution may be better situated to notify its customers or members of a large-scale data breach.\n\n## Reporting Intrusions To The Fbi\n\nWhile cyberattacks are typically conducted through technical means, behind the malicious activity is an actual individual or group perpetrating a crime.  When the FBI is promptly notifed, it can work to determine who caused the incident, link the incident to other incidents, maximize investigative opportunities, and potentially provide context regarding the actor, their tradecraf, and their motivations.  Understanding who is targeting a victim's networks and for what purpose can inform defensive strategies and prevent future attacks.  By notifying and assisting law enforcement, victims also help the FBI identify and pursue those responsible which can help prevent future crimes against other victims. Such identifcation and pursuit is not limited to criminal response options. For example, attribution resulting from FBI investigative activities can support other U.S. government agencies' abilities to impose regulatory (e.g., sanctions), diplomatic, and technical costs upon those responsible for, or benefting from, malicious cyber activities. Finally, notifying law enforcement may also place a victim company in a positive light with regulators, shareholders, and the public.\n\n\nTe Department encourages key organizations, particularly critical infrastructure owners and operators, to identify and form relationships with personnel in their local FBI feld ofce, including through the partnerships detailed above, *before* an incident occurs.  Tese pre-established relationships While law enforcement and intelligence agencies can sometimes uncover malicious cyber activity before a victim detects it on their networks, in other cases a targeted organization will be the frst to detect anomalous activity. It is critically important to report incidents to law enforcement, as each incident potentially involves the commission of a federal crime and may warrant investigation.  Te FBI is uniquely positioned to investigate and attriand open lines of communication will speed reporting and response eforts.\n\na nationally signifcant cyber incident, these activities are carried out in a coordinated way by the afected entity, by its third-party cybersecurity providers (if any), and by relevant federal agencies.\n\nPPD-41 designates the Department of Justice, through the FBI and the National Cyber Investigative Joint Task Force (\"NCIJTF\"), as the lead federal agency for threat response activities in the context of a signifcant cyber incident.  Trough evidence collection, technical analysis, and related investigative tools, the FBI works to quickly identify the source of a cyber incident, connect that incident with related incidents, and determine attribution.\n\nTe White House's Council of Economic Advisors recently observed that most data breaches are not reported to the U.S. government.2  Tis reluctance may be driven by a fear of regulatory action, of reputational harm, or of an interruption to business operations.  Te reluctance of organizations and businesses to disclose that they have been attacked constitutes a major challenge for the U.S. government in its battle against cybercrime. Law enforcement cannot be efective without the cooperation of crime victims.  A lack of cooperation may not only prevent discovery of evidence that could lead to identifying and holding the threat actors accountable, but also creates barriers to fully understanding the threat environment.\n\n## Responding To Cyber Incidents And Managing Crisis 1. Policy Framework\n\nIn addition to the cyber incident response framework laid out in PPD-41, the federal government also has adopted a Cyber Incident Severity Schema,4 a rubric for describing an incident's signifcance and improving the federal government's response.  An incident of national signifcance is rated as a Level\n3 \"High\" (Orange), or greater.  While the FBI does not allocate resources based exclusively on the schema rating, the rating serves as an enabler to various multi-agency coordination procedures and incident response eforts.\n\n\n\nBoth PPD-41 and the severity schema recognize that not all cyber incidents are \"signifcant\" from a national perspective.  Tus, the scale and speed of a federal response will vary based on the facts and circumstances of particular cases.  Te FBI has capability, plans, and procedures to manage routine incidents. It also is prepared to react to circumstances Presidential Policy Directive (\"PPD\")-41, titled \"United States Cyber Incident Coordination,\" defnes the term \"cyber incident,\"3  and describes cyber incident response in terms of three concurrent and mutually benefcial lines of efort: **threat response** (investigation, attribution, and threat pursuit); asset response (remediation and recovery); and intelligence support. It also refers to a fourth, unnamed line of efort that is best described as **\"business response\"** (ensuring business continuity, addressing legal and regulatory issues, and external afairs).  In the context of requiring a more robust approach. Responses to both types of incidents are discussed below.\n\n## 2. Routine Incident Response\n\nTe FBI also has a strong international reach through a network of approximately 80 Legal Attache ofces throughout the world.  It has supplemented 20 of these international ofces with cyber-specifc investigators to facilitate cooperation and information sharing to advance its cybercrime and national security investigations.\n\nTe FBI's nationwide reach puts it in an optimal position to engage with potential victims.  Te FBI's feld-centric model also allows it to respond quickly, and in-person, to cyber incidentsofen in a matter of hours.\n\nBecause cyber threats and incidents occur around the clock, the FBI in 2014 established a steady-state, 24-hour watch capability called CyWatch.  Housed at the NCIJTF, CyWatch is responsible for coordinating domestic law enforcement response to criminal and national security cyber intrusions, tracking victim notifcation, and partnering with the other federal cyber centers many times each day.  CyWatch provides continuous connectivity to interagency partners to facilitate information sharing, and real-time incident management and tracking, as part of an efort to ensure that all relevant agencies are in communication.\n\n## 3. Signifcant Incident Response\n\nEach FBI feld ofce houses a multi-agency Cyber Task Force (\"CTF\") modeled afer the FBI's successful Joint Terrorism Task Force program.  Te task forces bring together cyber investigators, prosecutors, intelligence analysts, computer scientists, and digital forensic technicians from various federal, State, and local agencies present within the ofce's territory.  Te CTFs not only serve as a force multiplier, but also provide a forum for coordination amongst local partners for more efective incident response.  Tis model also allows the FBI to draw on the relationships, expertise, authorities, and tools of the task force members.\n\nAs directed by PPD-41, the FBI activates certain \"enhanced coordination procedures\" in the event of a \"signifcant cyber incident.\"5\nTese procedures include naming an accountable senior executive to manage the response and establishing a dedicated command center with a full array of communication capabilities. Members of the local FBI Cyber Task Force will respond to the signifcant incident and a designated special agent will serve as the U.S. government's point of contact to the victim throughout the response.  Nearby FBI feld In addition to these cyber-specifc resources, the FBI has other technical assets it can use as needed to combat cyber threats.  Te FBI's Operational Technology Division develops and maintains a wide range of sophisticated equipment, capabilities, and tools to support investigations and to assist with technical operations.  While every FBI feld ofce has a computer forensics laboratory, certain feld ofces host a larger Regional Computer Forensic Laboratory.  Tese resources can be leveraged throughout the FBI's response and investigative cycle to respond to cyber threats.\n\n## Tips For Cooperative Cyber Incident Response Preparation\n\n'\n\n\nDevelop a response plan that incorporates **notifying and collaborating with law enforcement**.\n**Establish a relationship with your local FBI Cyber Task Force and U.S. Attorney s Office** in\nadvance of an incident; invite them to participate in exercises.\nUnderstand the threats and trends that may affect your organization and adjust defenses\naccordingly; FBI and DHS regularly publish relevant reports.\n\n## Discovery & Response\n\n|    |     |     |     |     |\n|----|-----|-----|-----|-----|\n|    |     |     |     |     |\n|    |     |     |     |     |\n|    |     |     |     |     |\n|    |     |     |     |     |\n|    |     |     |     |     |\n|    |     |     |     |     |\n|    |     |     |     |     |\n|    |     |     |     |     |\n|    |     |     |     |     |\n|    |     |     |     |     |\n\nNotify the FBI* **when you experience an incident**; your issue may be part of a larger adversary\ncampaign.\n**Preserve key evidence** that will enable investigators to attribute the incident and pursue the\nactors (e.g., logs and artifacts, affected devices, analysis reports).\nDiscuss options for leveraging **advice and other services** offered through other government\nagencies including DHS with the responding FBI team.\n\n## - Recovery & Follow Up\n\n-\n\n\n\n**Share feedback on your experiences** with the local DOJ and FBI representatives. Consider\nconducting an after action review to discuss learnings to improve plans and performance in\nanticipation of future events.\n\n\n\n-\n* Notify the FBI through the local Cyber Task Force or CyWatch (24/7) at 855 292-3937 or CyWatch@fbi.gov\n* Notify the FBI through the local Cyber Task Force or CyWatch (24/7) at 855-292-3937 or CyWatch@fi.gov dents.  CAT's management and core team are based in the Washington, D.C. metro area and are supplemented by carefully selected and highly trained feld personnel.  Te FBI also has technical analysis and operations units that directly support the response team through deep-dive malware analysis and digital forensics, and by implementing custom-built technical solutions to advance an investigation.\n\nIf a cyber incident generates physical impacts rising to the level of a crisis, the FBI has exofces can provide surge support and expertise as necessary, as each feld ofce maintains personnel specifcally trained on responding to incidents involving critical infrastructure and control systems. Te response team may be further augmented by specialty support from FBI headquarters.  For example, the FBI Cyber Action Team (\"CAT\") is the agency's elite rapid response force.  On-call CAT members are prepared to deploy globally to bring their in-depth cyber intrusion expertise and specialized investigative skills to bear in response to signifcant cyber inci-\n\n## Conclusion\n\ntensive crisis management capability. Te FBI Crisis Management Unit coordinates the FBI's tactical and disaster relief eforts. Te unit also provides the capability to activate command posts anywhere in the United States, and coordinates the FBI's vast investigative resources and infrastructure to support large-scale incidents regardless of type.\n\nTe Department stands ready to assist victims of cyberattacks. By leveraging our feld-centric model, investigative expertise, and partnerships at home and abroad, the Department works to pursue malicious cyber actors and to predict and prevent future attacks.  We must continue to build trusting relationships and to work collaboratively to address the global cyber threat, and to impose costs on nation states, cybercriminals, and other malign cyber actors.\n\nFinally, the FBI maintains a feet of aircraf to support deployments when an immediate response is necessary, as well as command post vehicles to support on-scene operations.\n\n## Notes\n\n\n\n1 See \"Sector Specifc Agencies,\" U.S. Dept. of Homeland Sec rity (July 11, 2017), available at: https://www.dhs.gov/sector-specifc-agencies (last accessed June 29, 2018) (describing the \"16 critical infrastructure sectors whose assets, systems, and networks, whether physical or virtual, are considered so vital to the United States that their incapacitation or destruction would have a debilitating efect on security, national economic security, national public health or safety, or any combination thereof,\" and listing the \"Sector-Specifc Agency\" associated with each of these critical infrastructure sectors).\n\nJune 29, 2018) (defning a \"cyber incident\" as \"[a]n event occurring on or conducted through a computer network that actually or imminently jeopardizes the integrity, confdentiality, or availability of computers, information or communications systems or networks, physical or virtual infrastructure controlled by computers or information systems, or information resident thereon. For purposes of [PPD-41], a cyber incident may include a vulnerability in an information system, system security procedures, internal controls, or implementation that could be exploited by a threat source.\").\n\n\n\n4 *See* \"NCCIC Cyber Incident Scoring System,\" U.S. Comp ter Emergency Readiness Team, available at: https://www.us-cert.gov/ NCCIC-Cyber-Incident-Scoring-System (last accessed June 29, 2018).\n\n\n\n2 \"Te Cost of Malicious Cyber Activity to the U.S. Economy,\" Co ncil of Econ. Advisors, Exec. Office of the President, at 33 (Feb. 2018), available at: https://www.whitehouse.gov/ wp-content/uploads/2018/02/Te-Cost-of-Malicious-Cyber-Activity-to-the-U.S.-Economy.pdf (last accessed June 29, 2018).\n\n\n\n5 A \"signifcant\" cyber incident is one \"that is likely to result in demonstrable harm to the national security interests, foreign relations, or economy of the United States or to the public confdence, civil liberties, or public health and safety of the American people.\" See PPD-41, supra note 3.\n\n\n3 *See* \"Presidential Policy DirectiveUnited States Cyber Incident Coordination,\" The White Ho se (July 26, 2016) (\"PPD-41\"), available at:\nhttps://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-pressoffice/2016/07/26/presidential-policy-directive-united-states-cyber-incident (last accessed\n\n## Chapter 5 Training And Managing Our Workforce\n\nT\no appropriately identify, disrupt, dismantle, and deter computer intrusions and cyber-enabled crimes, the Department must develop and maintain a broad cadre of highly trained prosecutors, agents, and analysts.  Whether identifying and locating cyber threat actors; collecting vital evidence through lawful process; or developing the latest tools to overcome sophisticated technologies criminals use to conceal their activities, Department personnel must understand how technology both facilitates criminal activity and can be used to detect, disrupt, and dismantle the same activity.\ncal background and experience necessary to make appropriate decisions in technology cases.  Second, we seek to retain a group of non-lawyer professionals whose primary expertise is technology.  Tese computer scientists, engineers, and digital forensic investigators collaborate with attorneys and investigators, together forming a team with all necessary skills.  Cultivating a workforce of technologically-savvy employees requires care in hiring and training, but also, crucially, requires that the Department make the right decisions about how it manages and organizes its employees.\n\n\n\nInvestigators, for example, require advanced tools and resources to stay at least one step ahead of increasingly sophisticated anonymizing technologies that criminals and other adversaries exploit to avoid detection. Meanwhile, forensic analysts must possess the latest know-how to extract key evidence from sophisticated electronic media, such as encrypted cell phones and hard drives.\n\nFinally, prosecutors must tackle complex questions regarding legal authorities, jurisdiction, privacy, and other issues raised by investigating cybercrime and prosecuting those responsible for it. Te Department pursues two objectives in developing its workforce and specialized training initiatives.  First, we seek to cultivate a multitude of attorneys who, in addition to superior legal skills, have the technologi-\nHow the Department internally organizes itself, and especially how it assigns cyber work, is a central part of the strategy to carry out its critical cyber mission and to recruit, train, and retain a technologically-expert workforce.  In some respects, this challenge is not new.  For example, prosecuting environmental crimes requires mastery both of a complex area of law and of relevant scientifc facts; likewise, prosecuting antitrust and other complex business cases requires in-depth knowledge of how industries operate.  Te Department's solution to these challenges has been to build headquarters components and networks of attorneys and investigators that specialize in these technical areas of law enforcement.  A similar strategy has worked well for cyber cases: the Department has concentrated its work of identifying, dismantling, disrupting, and than if the work were dispersed indiscriminately around the Department.\n\ndeterring computer intrusions and other cyber-enabled crimes into a select number of headquarters components and into networks of specialized attorneys and investigators.  Tis method of organization yields at least three benefts for recruitment, training, and retentionwhich, in turn, benefts the investigation and prosecution of cyber cases.\n\n\n\nFinally, the Department is constantly working to retain experienced attorneys and investigators in government employment.  Te skills of cyber investigators and attorneys are in heavy demand in the private sector, where salaries are much higher.  Te Department will lose this competition for talent if the only consideration is salary.  Fortunately, that is not the only consideration for most employees.  Only public service provides employees with so great an opportunity to protect and defend their country; in many ways, the work is itself a reward. To make maximum use of that reward, however, the Department's talented cyber workforce needs to be given regular opportunities to work on the cases and subject matter they feel most passionate about.  Only an arrangement of specialized ofces can ofer that beneft.\n\nFirst, despite ever-increasing competition in the technology job market, the Department can attract skilled prospects who are inspired by our mission. Te Department now has employees who, in addition to being excellent lawyers or investigators, also have deep experience in network defense, computer forensics, and sofware engineering.  Tese employees very ofen came to work at the Department precisely because they wanted to work on cyber cases.  Ofering prospective employees the chance to work exclusively (or near-exclusively) in the rewarding and challenging feld of computer crime is a signifcant recruiting advantage.  But making that promise is credible only if the Department can ofer employment in specialized units, where cyber work has been concentrated.\n\n\nIn this spirit, the Department's criminal law enforcement entities, its United States Attorneys' Ofces, and its relevant litigation divisions have dedicated workforce units and training initiatives that anchor the Department's broader strategy to recruit, train, and retain a technologically expert workforce in order to carry out its core cyber mission. Tese units and their specialized training initiatives are described below.\n\n## 1. Federal Bureau Of Investigation\n\nSecond, training employees in cyber cases requires far more than classroom instruction or reading from textbooks.  Every seasoned attorney and investigator knows that the bulk of his or her expertise came from practical, on-the-job experience.  Because the Department's specialized cyber units both at headquarters and in the feld expose attorneys and investigators to cyber investigations, and do so repeatedly, they build skills and human capital much more efectively As described in Chapter 4, the FBI is ofen a \"frst responder\" to a cyber incident.  With Cyber Task Forces located in each of its 56\nhome agencies. Te NCIJTF coordinates, integrates, and shares cyber threat information to support investigations and operations for the intelligence community, law enforcement, military, policy makers, and trusted foreign partners in the fght against cyber threats. Te NCIJTF is responsible for coordinating whole-of-government cyber campaigns, integrating domestic cyber data, and sharing domestic cyber threat information.\n\n\nfeld ofces across the country, the FBI is prepared to respond to and investigate cyberattacks and intrusions wherever they may occur.  Its agents serve both as investigators and high-tech specialists, capable of applying the most current technological know-how to collect evidence at the scene of a cyberattack or intrusion, analyze data forensically, and trace a cybercrime to its origins.  Trough its Cyber Division located at FBI headquarters in Washington, D.C., and the Operational Technology Division located at Quantico, Virginia, the FBI provides leadership to its global eforts to investigate cyber threats, whether they stem from criminal or national security actors. Te Cyber Division has organized itself, both at headquarters and in FBI feld ofces, to focus its investigations and operations exclusively on computer intrusions and attacks, and related online threats.\n\nTe FBI Criminal Investigative Division has created the Hi-Tech Organized Crime Unit (\"HTOCU\") to launch a long term, proactive strategy to target transnational organized crime groups using advanced technology to conduct large scale computer-enabled and computer-facilitated crime.  HTOCU works to bring traditional organized crime techniques, tradecraf, and strategies to bear on transnational criminal enterprises that use high technology to perpetrate criminal activity.  HTOCU, in coordination with the FBI's Cyber Division and the Money Laundering Unit, has developed and implemented strategies to dismantle transnational criminal enterprises engaged in large-scale fraudulent activity. Furthermore, HTOCU\nworks to identify new sources, technical vulnerabilities, collection opportunities, and emerging trends in cyber-enabled transnational organized criminal activity. Te Joint Criminal Opioid Darknet Enforcement (\"J-CODE\") Team is a new FBI initiative, announced by Attorney General Sessions in January 2018, to target drug trafcking especially fentanyl and other opioidson the Dark Web. Building on the work that Te FBI is also responsible for the operation of the National Cyber Investigative Joint Task Force (\"NCIJTF\"), a multi-agency cyber center that serves as the national focal point for coordinating cyber investigations across government agencies.  Te NCIJTF is comprised of 30 plus partnering agencies from across law enforcement, the intelligence community, and the Department of Defense, with representatives who are co-located and work jointly to accomplish the organization's mission from a whole-of-government perspective.  Members have access to and analyze data that provides a unique, comprehensive view of the Nation's cyber threat while working together in a collaborative environment in which they maintain the authorities and responsibilities of their\n\n\nthe technological landscape rapidly evolves.\n\nFor instance, the FBI is implementing the \"Cyber Certifed\" training and certifcation program for investigators, intelligence analysts, technical specialists, and attorneys, whether currently in the Cyber Program or working in other mission areas. Tese employees will be observed for future training and development activities.\nbegan with the government's dismantling of Silk Road and AlphaBay, the FBI is bringing together agents, analysts, and professional staf with expertise in drugs, gangs, health care fraud and more, as well as federal, State, and local law enforcement partners from across the U.S. government, to focus on disrupting the sale of illegal drugs via the Dark Web and dismantling criminal enterprises that facilitate this trafcking.  Te J-CODE will create a formalized process to prioritize dark markets, vendors, and administrators for strategic targeting; to develop strategies to undermine confdence in the Dark Web; and to formulate de-confiction and operational requirements with other domestic and international partners.\n\nIn an attempt to rapidly increase the level of cyber knowledge shared throughout the organization, and in an efort to infuse cyber knowledge into traditionally non-cyber programs, the FBI has also created the Workforce Training Initiative (\"WTI\").  Te WTI is designed to increase the number of employees who are capable of responding to, investigating, and analyzing a variety of cyber-related cross-programmatic matters, and its courses cover the breadth of cyber-related topics.\n\n\nIn accordance with the requirements set forth in the Federal Cybersecurity Workforce Assessment Act of 2015, the Department, including the FBI, is identifying and coding federal positions that perform information technology, cybersecurity, and other cyber-related functions based on the work roles described in the National Initiative for Cybersecurity Education Framework.1  Tis analysis will underpin an efort to prioritize areas of critical need within the workforce, and support possible recommendations for introducing new job roles that will improve the FBI's ability to respond to Internet-enabled crimes and technologically advanced threat actors. With respect to training, the FBI has a number of programs to ensure its workforce possesses the key cyber skills and tools to succeed in their investigations, especially as Te On the Job Training (\"OJT\") initiative is a combination of classes and real world experiences encountered daily on a cyber squad.  Te OJT program takes place over a six-month period and requires a full-time commitment from participants.  Te participants are reassigned to a cyber squad and are expected to work cyber cases under the mentorship of cyber-skilled professionals. At the conclusion of the six-month program, participants return to their original squads with enhanced cyber skills to address cyber threats within that program and to share their knowledge.  Upon completion of this program, participants will be designated Cyber Certifed.\nsis of Windows, Macintosh, UNIX, and mobile operating systems, Internet artifacts, secure device access, vehicle forensics, and Internet of Tings related challenges.\n\n## 2. Te Criminal Division\n\n\n\nComputer Crime and Intellectual Property Section Te FBI Digital Forensics program ofers digital evidence related training and certifcations to personnel dedicated to managing digital evidence challenges, and also ofers technical training to the broader FBI workforce which familiarizes them with the challenges of properly preserving and handling digital evidence.   Te Forensic Examiner certifcation program includes over ten weeks of total training, practical exercises, mentorship, and a moot court which includes Department attorneys and senior examiners. Te FBI's Cyber Executive Certifcation Program provides high-level cyber training and prepares executives for their role in the cyber investigation process.  Participants have the opportunity to obtain two industry standard certifcations, in addition to the internal FBI certifcate. Additionally, the digital evidence program ofers advanced training to personnel supervisors of digital evidence workforce, preparing them to ensure the technical requirements of FBI investigation are met by the digital evidence staf.\n\nIn 1996, the Department consolidated the Criminal Division's expertise in computer crime matters into a single ofce called the Computer Crime and Intellectual Property Section (\"CCIPS\"), with prosecutors devoted to pursuing computer crime prosecutions fulltime.  Over the years, CCIPS's mission has grown beyond prosecution to include spearheading cyber policy and legislative initiatives, training and support, public outreach, and cybersecurity guidance.  CCIPS consists of a team of specially trained attorneys dedicated to investigating and prosecuting high-tech crimes and violations of intellectual property laws, and to advising on legal issues concerning the lawful collection of electronic evidence.\n\nFinally, FBI-led cyber training takes place at Cyber Academy campuses located at diferent points in the country, while digital evidence training occurs at Regional Computer Forensics Laboratories, and at FBI headquarters.   Cyber training ranges from the Cyber Basic School, a two-week curriculum designed to instill cybersecurity fundamentals in all employees, to advanced training for seasoned cyber investigators.  Digital evidence training includes guidance in analy-\nToday, CCIPS is responsible for implementing the Department's national strategies to combat computer and intellectual property crimes worldwide by working with other Department components and government agencies, the private sector, academic institutions, and foreign counterparts, among others.  Section attorneys work to improve the domestic and international legal, technological, and operational legal infrastructure to pursue network criminals most efectivenecessary search warrants and court orders, collect electronic evidence, and ultimately, build a criminal case.  Pursuant to departmental regulation, U.S. Attorneys are responsible for ensuring that experienced and technically-qualifed AUSAs serve as the district's CHIP prosecutors; ensuring that CHIP resources are dedicated to CHIP program objectives; ensuring that the USAO notifes, consults, and coordinates with CCIPS and other USAOs; and promoting and ensuring efective interaction with law enforcement, industry representatives, and the public in matters relating to computer and intellectual property crime.\n\n## Money Laundering And Asset Recovery Section\n\nly.  Working in support of and alongside the\n94 U.S. Attorneys' Ofces (\"USAOs\"), CCIPS prosecutes violations of federal law involving computer intrusions and attacks.  CCIPS has also worked with the Treasury Department's Ofce of Foreign Asset Control to use new authorities under Executive Order 13694 to bring sanctions against foreign nationals for malicious cyber-enabled criminal activities.  In conjunction with the Executive Offce for United States Attorneys (\"EOUSA\"), described below, CCIPS conducts at least four multi-day in-person trainings and up to twelve webinars a year.  It also maintains an internal website with information available to all Department components that is visited more than 90,000 times a year, and has a rotating daily duty-attorney system that responds to approximately 2,000 calls for advice a year.\n\n\nTe Criminal Division's Money Laundering and Asset Recovery Section (\"MLARS\") leads the Department's asset forfeiture and anti-money laundering enforcement efforts.  MLARS is responsible for, among other things, coordinating complex, sensitive, multi-district, and international money laundering and asset forfeiture investigations and cases; providing legal and policy assistance and training to federal, State, and local prosecutors and law enforcement personnel; and assisting Departmental and interagency policymakers by developing and reviewing legislative, regulatory, and policy initiatives.\n\nIn addition, the Criminal Division established the Computer Hacking and Intellectual Property (\"CHIP\") coordinator program in 1995 to ensure that each USAO and litigating division has at least one prosecutor who is specially trained on cyber threats, electronic evidence collection, and technological trends that criminals exploit.  Te CHIP\nnetwork now includes approximately 270 prosecutors from USAOs and Main Justice, and aids in the coordination of multi-district prosecutions involving cyber threats. Specialized CHIP units exist in 25 designated USAOs.  CHIP Assistant U.S. Attorneys (AUSAs) work with law enforcement partners from multiple law enforcement agencies at the outset of an investigation, ofen in consultation with CCIPS, to provide legal guidance, help craf an investigative plan, obtain With respect to cyber-enabled threats in particular, MLARS has established a Digital Currency Initiative that focuses on providing support and guidance to investigators, prosecutors, and other government agencies on cryptocurrency prosecutions and forfei-\n\nand law enforcement agencies on the use of electronic surveillance.  Tey also assist in developing Department policy on emerging technology and telecommunications issues.\n\n## Ofce Of International Afairs\n\ntures.  Te Digital Currency Initiative will expand and implement cryptocurrency-related training to encourage and enable more investigators, prosecutors, and Department components to pursue such cases, while developing and disseminating policy guidance on various aspects of cryptocurrency, including seizure and forfeiture. Trough the Initiative, MLARS will also advise AUSAs and federal agents on complex questions of law related to cryptocurrency to inform charging decisions and other prosecutorial strategies.\n\n\n\n## Ofce Of Enforcement Operations, Electronic Surveillance Unit\n\nTe Criminal Division's Ofce of International Afairs (\"OIA\") returns fugitives to face justice, and obtains essential evidence for criminal investigations and prosecutions worldwide by working with domestic partners and foreign counterparts to facilitate the cooperation necessary to enforce the law, advance public safety, and achieve justice. Drawing upon a vast network of international agreements and its expertise in extradition and mutual legal assistance, OIA in recent years has worked with domestic and foreign law enforcement to hold cybercriminals accountable in U.S. courts and obtain the evidence needed to untangle complex transnational cybercrime schemes.\n\n\nElectronic surveillance is one of the most efective law enforcement tools for investigating many types of criminal enterprises, including cyber-based criminal enterprises that use electronic media and Internet-based technologies to perpetrate their crimes.  Te Electronic Surveillance Unit (\"ESU\") in the Criminal Division's Ofce of Enforcement Operations is responsible for reviewing all federal requests to conduct interceptions of wire, electronic, or oral communications pursuant to the Wiretap Act. ESU's specialized attorneys provide suggested revisions and ofer guidance to ensure that electronic surveillance applications meet all constitutional, statutory, and Department policy requirements.  Every federal wiretap application must be approved by a senior Department of Justice ofcial before it is submitted to a court, and ESU makes recommendations to those ofcials based on its review. Additionally, ESU attorneys regularly conduct webinars and in-person trainings, and provide legal advice to federal prosecutors In addition to its work supporting investigations and prosecutions of cybercriminals, OIA uses mutual legal assistance to obtain electronic evidence for foreign and domestic law enforcement personnel.  As the need to obtain electronic evidence in virtually every type of criminal case has burgeoned, OIA has worked to modernize its practice in this area by creating a team of attorneys and support personnel specially trained in obtaining electronic evidence, and by implementing process efciencies to ensure swif attention to requests from prosecutors and police. OIA is also actively engaged in the policy, legislative, and multilateral arenas in which topics concerning access to electronic eviees, which is taught by NSD and CCIPS attorneys.\n\n\n\ndence and law enforcement cooperation are discussed and debated to ensure that the Department's mission is advanced and that our law enforcement personnel get the tools they need to keep pace with ever-evolving threats. Consistent with these goals, OIA conducts regular training for U.S. prosecutors on the tools available to them to obtain evidence located overseas and to secure the return of fugitives. OIA also provides frequent regional and bilateral trainings to our foreign partners to bolster their ability to stop criminal activity before it reaches our shores.\n\n## 3. Te National Security Division\n\nIn addition, in 2012, NSD launched the National Security Cyber Specialist (\"NSCS\") network to equip USAOs around the Nation with prosecutors trained on national security cyber threats, such as nation-state cyber espionage activities and terrorists' use of technology to plot attacks. NSCS-Main is comprised of lawyers and other experts drawn from NSD's component sections and ofces, as well as from CCIPS and ESU in the Criminal Division.  NSCS-Main also coordinates as needed with other Department headquarters components, including the Civil Division, the Antitrust Division, the Ofce of Legal Policy, and the Ofce of Legal Counsel, and works closely with the Department's investigative components, including the FBI.\n\nTe investigation, disruption, and deterrence of national security cyber threats are among the highest priorities of the Department's National Security Division (\"NSD\").  Tese priorities come from a recognition that network defense alone is not enough to counter the threat. To the contrary, we must also impose costs on our adversaries using all of the U.S. government's lawfully available tools. Tis \"all-tools\" approach informs NSD's efforts to combat cyber threats to our national security, with the goal of deterring and disrupting cyber-based intrusions and attacks.\n\nIn this context, national security cyber cases are those perpetrated by nation states, terrorists, or their agents or proxies, or cases involving the targeting of information that is controlled for national security purposes.\n\n\nTe NSCS Network also includes AUSAs in each of the USAOs; these AUSAs serve as their ofces' primary points of entry for cases involving cyber threats to the national security and coordinate closely with NSCS- Main.  NSD and CCIPS, in conjunction with EOUSA, provides annual training for NSCS members.  Te NSCS training covers a number of national security cyber topics to enhance the education of the prosecutors who handle these matters.  In addition, through the National Security/Anti-Terrorism Advisory Council, there are approximately seven training courses conducted annually for national security prosecutors.  Tose trainings generally include a number of cyber-related sessions for national security prosecutors.\n\nAll NSD attorneys must take a cyber course within two years of joining the division.\n\nNSD also conducts annually a one-day cyber training in-house for all NSD employof technology to plan attacks.  Te USAOs also coordinate as needed with Department headquarters components, such as the Criminal and National Security Divisions, in a further efort to ensure the efectiveness of such cyber-oriented investigations and prosecutions.\n\nFinally, this year, for the frst time, NSD is offering a Cyber Fellowship for those selected attorneys who applied to further their education on technology-related issues.  Five attorneys were selected to participate in 2018 and have been attending a series of trainings ofered by the FBI, the CIA, Carnegie Mellon University, and the SANS Institute.  Tose selected have also agreed to assist with training and other cyber initiatives at NSD.\n\nEOUSA provides executive and administrative support for the 93 United States Attorneys.  Such support includes legal education, administrative oversight, technical support, and the creation of uniform policies, among other responsibilities.\n\n## 4. United States Attorney's Ofces / Executive Ofce For United States Attorneys\n\n\nTe National Advocacy Center, which EO- USA operates, provides numerous courses every year addressing a wide variety of cyber-related topics.  Tese courses are attended by prosecutors from across the country and are tailored to address the training needs of attorneys with varying levels of experience handling cyber matters.  Working with CCIPS and the National Security Division's Counterterrorism and Counterespionage sections, these cybercrime courses range from introductory to advanced level and have included training addressing the nature of computer forensics, the investigation of computer intrusions, and the use of electronic evidence, among other related topics. In short, each year, the Department trains hundreds of federal prosecutors in cybercrime and national security cyber matters.\n\nTe United States Attorneys serve as the nation's principal litigators, under the direction of the Attorney General.  Tere are 93 United States Attorneys stationed throughout the United States, Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, Guam, and the Northern Mariana Islands.2  Each United States Attorney is the chief federal law enforcement ofcer of the United States within his or her particular jurisdiction. United States Attorneys conduct most of the trial work in which the United States is a party.  Although the distribution of caseloads varies between districts, each USAO deals with every category of cases, including cybercrime prosecutions.  As referenced above, the role of the CHIP AUSA was established to ensure that each USAO has personnel trained on cyber threats, electronic evidence collection, and technological trends exploited by criminals.  Similarly, the NSCS program discussed above was designed to equip USAOs around the nation with prosecutors specially trained on national security cyber threats, such as nation state cyber espionage activities and terrorists' use In addition to these in-person training programs, EOUSA, through the Ofce of Legal and Victim Programs and the Ofce of Legal Education (\"OLE\"), sponsors additional cyber training, including webinars that are seminates to the feld guidance relating to these issues.  STSO is attempting to bring DEA employees into a more advanced awareness of today's cyber world, so they can adapt to that environment while performing the daily tasks of Internet research and investigations.\n\n## 6. Interpol\n\nbroadcast nationwide.  Tese webinars allow the Department to provide supplemental cutting-edge training and allow prosecutors to view these presentations from their own ofces, while still enabling them to remotely ask the presenters questions and download related materials. For example, EOUSA sponsored a webinar discussing new provisions of a Federal Rule of Evidence relating to electronic evidence, immediately afer those provisions became efective.  Almost\n1,000 Department employees viewed that program.  Working closely with CCIPS and OEO, additional notable webinars have included programs addressing legal standards for obtaining cell phone location information, searching and seizing computers and other digital devices, cryptocurrency, and social media and online investigations, to name just a few.\n\nTe mission of INTERPOL Washington\n(United States National Central Bureau), is to advance the law enforcement interests of the United States as the ofcial representative to the International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL); to share criminal justice, humanitarian, and public safety information between our Nation's law enforcement community and its foreign counterparts; and to facilitate transnational investigative eforts that enhance the safety and security of our Nation.\n\nOLE, working with CCIPS, has also issued standalone written materials that prosecutors can use for training and law enforcement purposes.\n\n## 5. Drug Enforcement Administration\n\n\nTe DEA enforces the Nation's controlled substance laws and regulations.  Trough its participation in J-CODE and beyond, DEA is developing its expertise in Dark Market investigations.  DEA's Operational Support Unit (\"STSO\") serves as the point of contact between DEA ofces and the technology and communications industry, in order to identify, address, and resolve subpoena and related compliance issues, as well as other legal and regulatory issues.  STSO also dis-\nINTERPOL Washington leverages a network of 192 countries connected by a secure communications platform to share information for the purpose of enhancing international cooperation in all areas of criminal investigation, including cybercrime investigations. INTERPOL Washington maintains an offce dedicated to advancing the cybercrime investigations of U.S. law enforcement by establishing and maintaining relationships with the heads of cybercrime units of other countries; sharing information through the secure communications platform to assist cybercrime investigations conducted by the agencies of the Department of Justice and the Department of Homeland Security; and providing support to other federal, State, local, and tribal law enforcement agencies.\n\nthereby also increasing our own capacity to thwart cyber threats.\n\n## 7. Foreign Government Training Initiatives 8. Department-Wide Cybersecurity Awareness Training\n\n\n\nIn addition to the specialized units and training described above, the Department recognizes that cybersecurity efectiveness depends on everyone in the organization. Users are still one of the most attacked entities in the organization.  Social engineering attacks (described in more detail in Chapter 2) come in many forms, are still efective, and can target anyone in the Department. As such, all Department employees must have a basic understanding of their responsibilities when handling the Department's information and accessing its information system, while being held accountable for abusing those responsibilities.\n\n\nAll Department personnel receive annual cybersecurity awareness training.\n\nIn ad-\nIn addition to training its own personnel, the Department also provides training and technical assistance to foreign governments to ensure that they are equipped to address their own domestic cyber threats.  As countries develop their own capacity to address cyber issues, they are also better equipped to assist the United States in investigations involving criminal conduct emanating from within their own borders. Te Department has maintained a robust program for encouraging foreign governments to develop their criminal and procedural laws to address emerging cybercrime threats and capabilities, consistent with the Budapest Convention on Cybercrime.  As discussed in Chapter 3, the Budapest Conventionwhich the United States ratifed over ten years agoprovides a legal framework for criminalizing key types of cybercrime, developing the tools necessary to investigate such crime, and establishing the network for rapid international cooperation that must exist to investigate and prosecute cyber actors wherever they are located.\n\ndition, all employees and contractors must sign the \"Department of Justice Cybersecurity and Privacy Rules of Behavior (ROB) for General Users\" agreement, which confrms that the employee or contractor completed the training and understands the applicable cybersecurity requirements and responsibilities.  As the agreement makes clear, \"each [Department] user is responsible for the security and privacy of [Department] information systems and their data.\" Adequate training ensures that everyone within the Department has a basic understanding of the relevant threats, their role in protecting our information and information Using a balanced approach of frank policy discussions with countries that have technical capabilities similar to our own, combined with multilateral training initiatives aimed at countries whose legal infrastructure for addressing cyber threats is in earlier stages of development, the Department has continued to improve the capacity of other countries to address cyber threats around the world,\n\nissues.  In addition, the Department's Ofce of the Chief Information Ofcer hosts an annual Cybersecurity Symposium, which provides a forum for employees to gain an understanding of the latest trends in cybersecurity from federal and industry leaders. Tese events help educate the Department's workforce on the most current trends in information security and privacy.\nsystems, and how to detect and respond to cybersecurity events. Typical web-based training is most common; however, many training delivery mechanisms are used to get the broadest penetration of the material.  For example, phishing exercises are conducted throughout the year, and in-person briefngs and topic-specifc training sessions are offered for special audiences and material.\n\nWhile the Department employs a robust training program, we can do more to carry the Department into the future.  Training can reinforce best practices, enable advanced threat detection, and improve security and safety across the Department as we all work to carry out its critical cyber mission.\n\nFinally, the Department has also hosted a number of Department-wide trainings and awareness campaigns to educate the Department's workforce on privacy and cybersecurity.  Te Ofce of Privacy and Civil Liberties organizes an annual Privacy Forum, which gathers the Department's privacy ofcials to discuss current privacy and civil liberties\n\n## Notes\n\nSee National Institute for Standards and Tech-\n\n\n1\n2\nOne United States Attorney is assigned to each of the 94 judicial districts, with the exception of Guam and the Northern Mariana Islands, where a single United States Attorney serves in both districts.\n\nnology, Special Publication 800-181, National Initiative for Cybersecurity Education (NICE) Cybersecurity Workforce Framework (Aug. 2017), available at: https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/ SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-181.pdf  (last accessed June 29, 2018).\n\n## Chapter 6 Looking Ahead 1. Challenges In Preventing And Responding To Cyber Incidents Working With The Private Sector\n\nT\nhis report describes the most significant cyber threats our Nation faces, and catalogs the ways in which the Department confronts and combats those threats.  As the discussion in previous chapters reveals, the Department has had many successes.  At the same time, we face a number of challenges. In this chapter, we further explore those challenges and identify specifc areas for additional inquiry.  We also outline eight key areas of future efort that will defne the Department's work in the months ahead.\n\n## Specifc Challenges\n\nVirtually every instance of cyber-related crime implicates the private sector in some way, whether the private sector is the target of malicious cyber activity, the provider of technology or services through which cybercrimes are committed or concealed, or the repository of evidence (such as communications) relating to cyber-enabled criminal activity.  As such, the relationship that the Department, including the FBI, builds and maintains with the private sector is critical to our eforts to combat cybercrime.  Fortunately, the Department and the private sector already have engaged in numerous formal and informal collaborations.  Even so, the Department must deepen these relationships, particularly as technology evolves and the cast of service providers and technology manufacturers continues to change.\n\nEach part of the Department's eforts to confront cyber threats(1) preventing and responding to cyber incidents (Chapter 4); (2) investigating and prosecuting cyber-related crimes (Chapter 2); and (3) dismantling, disrupting, and detering malicious cyber threats (Chapter 3)bears its own unique challenges.1\n\n\n## A. Te Computer Security Research Community\n\nHere, we describe those challenges and, where applicable, discuss how the Department has begun addressing the challenge or what actions we may yet take to sharpen our eforts.  Where appropriate, we also highlight issues that require further consideration and development due to the complex or evolving nature of the threat.\n\nTe computer security research communitywhich is comprised of not only computer security companies but also individuals and organizations with expertise in computer securityhas made valuable contributions to combating cyber threats by discovering even more important as IoT devices proliferate, perform more household tasks, and collect more data capable of being monetized by criminals.\n\nsignifcant exploitable vulnerabilities afecting, among other things, the confdentiality of data, the safety of Internet-connected devices, and the security of automobiles.  Some security researchers have also been allies in law enforcement eforts to dismantle cyber threats.  For example, assistance with malware analysis and mitigation techniques has helped law enforcement conduct operations against various cybercriminals, including through botnet takedowns.\n\n\nEven so, some in the computer security research community harbor concerns that law enforcement may misconstrue as criminal activity their methods of searching for and analyzing vulnerabilities. Some researchers have even expressed anxiety that such concerns have chilled legitimate security research.\n\nTe Copyright Ofce has initiated its next rulemaking process to evaluate extending the DMCA exemptions.  Te Department has submitted input to the Copyright Ofce in support of extending and expanding the current security research exemption, with caveats intended to protect public safety and avoid confusion over legal research activities.4  At the same time, the Department should continue evaluating existing laws and regulations to identify other opportunities to support and encourage legitimate computer security research. Finally, the Criminal Division's Cybersecurity Unit should conduct additional outreach to the computer security community.  In doing so, the Unit should seek out opportunities to: (1) explain how the Department's policies and practices address concerns about unwarranted prosecutions for legitimate security research; and (2) better educate the computer security research community about the federal criminal laws implicated by computer security activities.\n\n## B. Encouraging Private Sector Reporting Of Cyber Incidents\n\nAnother important component of the Department's collaboration with the private sector is the public-private work on information sharing and threat assessment.  As discussed in Chapter 4, the FBI disseminates numerous reports directly to members of To ensure the Department maintains and fosters a positive, collaborative working relationship with computer security researchers, the Department should consider potential legal options to encourage and protect legitimate computer security research. For instance, a three-year exemption to the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (\"DMCA\")2the result of rulemaking by the U.S. Copyright Ofce3has allowed researchers to conduct vulnerability research on consumer products, including Internet of Tings (\"IoT\") devices.  IoT devices are prime targets of cybercriminals for use in illicit activities like distributed denial of service attacks.  Finding and repairing vulnerabilities in consumer devices is important and will likely become\n\nthe private sector to inform them of cyber threats.  Tis information sharing provides the private sector with actionable intelligence that enables them to take appropriate precautions.\n\nger civil or even criminal liability, or may impact U.S. foreign relations.  Regardless of the reason, lack of reporting is a signifcant impediment to the Department's eforts to thwart cybercriminals and to address threats to national securityparticularly when new threats are emerging.\n\n\nInformation sharing, however, is most efective when it fows two ways.  When a private sector entity reports a breach or attempted intrusion, the Department gains valuable insights into threat activity that can help direct, in real time, law enforcement eforts to investigate and disrupt the malicious activity. Prompt reporting also provides information that ofcials can accumulate and share with other private sector entities to facilitate appropriate security measures.  Indeed, eforts by the Department and FBI to help manage cyber incidents and, later, to bring perpetrators to justice through prosecution are best accomplished when the victimwho may be the frst to discover an incidentreports the incident or intrusion in a timely manner.\n\n\nEncouraging reporting from private sector victims is thus critical to enhancing the Department's ability to prevent, deter, investigate, and prosecute (or otherwise disrupt) cybercrimes.  To facilitate reporting, the Department should consider not only how to build deeper trust with the private sector, but also understand and address the private sector's needs and concerns related to reporting.  Tis assessment should include understanding how best to incentivize reporting as well as how to eliminate obstacles or barriers.  Te Department should also continue its outreach to the private sector to identify additional areas for collaboration, especially with respect to reporting and information sharing.  In the past, such outreach has resulted in industry-targeted guidance such as the Criminal Division Cybersecurity Unit's Best Practices for Victim Reporting and Responding to Cyber Incidents.5\n\nTe Department must also consider the role that DHS and other government agencies play in working with the private sector to ensure federal agencies' eforts are complementary and cooperative.  In addition to DHS and other federal partners, the Department should continue to work with the agencies that regulate the private sector to evaluate Unfortunately, many cyber incidents in the United States are never reported to law enforcement. Victimsespecially businesses ofen decide not to report cyber incidents for a variety of reasons, including concerns about publicity and potential harm to the company's reputation or profts, and even concerns of retaliation by a nation state where they wish to do business. Some victims may simply not know how to report the incident to appropriate authorities.  And still others, particularly larger companies, may try to act on their own to pursue, confront, or disrupt the perpetrator, though doing so may trigexpectations and encourage clear thresholds for reporting.\nof the harmthe Department should review the AG Victim Guidelines to ensure, among other things, that the guidelines, and any related victim notifcation policies and practices, appropriately account for the unique and ofen nuanced nature of cybercrime.\n\n## Preventing Cyber-Related Vulnerabilities In Connection With Foreign Investment And Supply Chains\n\n\nAs part of its eforts to prevent cybercrime, the Department is concerned with mitigating vulnerabilities that threaten national security.  Such areas concern foreign investment in domestic assets and foreign supply chains.\nTe Department's additional eforts on private sector reporting should also include attention to statutory data breach notifcation requirements.  Currently, all 50 States have enacted separate notifcation laws setting standards governing notifcation by private entities when a data breach occurs, but there is no federal reporting requirement or standard. As such, companies must navigate and comply with the varying requirements in 50\nState jurisdictions.6  In the wake of recent high-profle data breaches exposing Americans' personal information, Congress has a revived interest in national notifcation requirements.  A national data breach standard could increase federal law enforcement's effectiveness to pursue hackers and prevent data breaches.\n\n## C. Reviewing Guidance On Victim Notifcation\n\nFor example, a March 22, 2018 Presidential Memorandum observed that \"China directs and facilitates the systematic investment in, and acquisition of, U.S. companies and assets by Chinese companies to obtain cutting-edge technologies and intellectual property and to generate large-scale technology transfer in industries deemed important by Chinese government industrial plans.\"7  Under ambitious industrial policies, China aims to use foreign investment as a means of dominating cutting-edge technologies like advanced microchips, artifcial intelligence, and electric cars, among others.\nIn 2012, the Attorney General issued General Guidelines for Victim and Witness Assistance (\"AG Victim Guidelines\" or \"guidelines\") that, among other things, discussed two statutesthe Victims' Rights and Restitution Act, 42 U.S.C.  10607, and the Crime Victims' Rights Act, 18 U.S.C.  3771which accord certain rights to individuals who meet the statutory defnition of \"victim.\"  Te AG Victim Guidelines also address when FBI notifcation to victims and witnesses is appropriate and warranted.  Given the evolving nature of cyber-enabled crimesincluding the fact that it is not always easy to identify a cybercrime \"victim\" or the extent or nature Currently, the Department responds to threats posed by foreign investment in the United States and the export of sensitive technology by enforcing U.S. export controls and through the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (\"CFIUS\"), a statutorily-established body that has au-\n\n## 2. Challenges In Investigating And Prosecuting Computer Crime Accessing Data In The United States\n\nthority to review transactions that could result in control of a U.S. business by a foreign person.  As the March 22, 2018 Presidential Memorandum indicates, further coordination through CFIUS, enforcement of existing technology transfer controls, and other interagency eforts will be necessary to tackle risks from foreign investment in sensitive industries and technologies.\n\nIn addition to foreign investment, the Department is generally concerned with hardening supply chains. Technology supply chains are especially vulnerable, because the hardware components and sofware code that go into technology products ofen come from foreign sources, including developers in Russia and China.8 To address these concerns, the Department coordinates with other government agencies and the private sector to efectively manage and mitigate cybersecurity risks in U.S. supply chains.\nData not only is key to understanding the nature of cybercrime and the identity of perpetrators, but also is a primary source of evidence for prosecution.  Unfortunately, the relevant data is ofen hard to reach, hidden on computers in diferent States or even in countries half a world away, lurking on dark markets, or protected by anonymized host servers or encryption.  Recognizing that accessing data is the starting point and ofen the cornerstone of computer crime investigations and prosecutions, the Department has made concerted eforts to improve its ability to collect data related to criminal activity.  However, several challenges to accessing data remain and require further collaboration with federal, State, and private sector partners.\n\nFor example, the Department contributes to Team Telecom, an ad hoc interagency working group that considers the law enforcement, national security, and public safety implications of applications for licenses from the Federal Communications Commission involving a threshold percentage of foreign ownership or control.  Moving forward, the Department should continue to engage with these and other interagency eforts to determine the best ways to strengthen defenses against national security risks.\n\nOne such challenge is the reality that cybercrime ofen does not take place in one identifable, physical location.  Sophisticated cybercriminals can control botnets spread throughout several States or countries and can hide their illegal activities on proxy networks.  Te rules governing law enforcement eforts, however, have largely not kept pace with these criminal realities.  For this reason, the Department proactively engaged with the Federal Rules Committee and on December 1, 2016, an amended version of Rule 41 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure went into efect. (Tat new Rule is discussed in detail in Chapter 3.)\n\nTe circumstances that the amendments to Rule 41 address are important, but they do not cover all instances where data related to criminal activity are stored in varying or unknown locations within the United States. Te Department should identify any additional common or recurring circumstances where current legal authorities fall short of providing law enforcement with the tools necessary to access relevant data within the United States and determine whether changes similar to the recent Rule 41 amendments would be efective.\n\n## Accessing Data Abroad\n\nmation subject to a court order that is within their \"possession, custody, or control,\" even if the electronic servers containing that information are located overseas.  Te CLOUD Act also authorizes our government to enter into formal agreements with other nations that remove legal barriers that would otherwise create confict of laws problems where a provider is subject to a foreign court order to produce data stored in that other country.  Te Act requires both governments to\n\"certify\" that the laws and practices of the other country provide adequate protections for human rights and personal privacy.  Te agreements must also implement transparency measures and periodic reviews to ensure ongoing compliance.  Te Department is currently considering how it should implement such agreements.\n\nTe Department faces similar challenges in accessing data located outside the United States. As with the Rule 41 amendments in the domestic context, the Department recently engaged with partners to enhance our investigative authority in such circumstances.  In particular, as the result of a joint efort between the private sector and the Department to bring clarity to investigative demands for data stored overseas, the Clarifying Lawful Overseas Use of Data Act (\"CLOUD Act\") became law on March 23, 2018. (Te CLOUD Act is also discussed in Chapter 3.)\nChallenges remain, however, when investigating computer crimes that extend overseas, particularly because the CLOUD Act addresses only those instances where the relevant overseas data is possessed or controlled by an entity subject to U.S. jurisdiction. Many types of evidence fall outside those criteria, and traditional mutual legal assistance treaty (\"MLAT\") procedures may also fall short.\n\nPassage of the CLOUD Act institutes a framework for technology companies to comply with investigative demands for data stored outside of the requesting country's territory, and creates processes to resolve thorny confict of laws problems. Te Act clarifes that the U.S. government's traditional authority in this area remains in force: communications service providers must disclose infor-\nFor those reasons, the Department continually aims to improve its international outreach eforts and to engage with international Internet governance bodies to encourage them not to apply rules that unreasonably restrict or interfere with valid investigations. For example, the Department is currently monitoring and assessing the impact of the European Union's sweeping General Data Protection Regulation (\"GDPR\"), which went into efect on May 25, 2018.\n\nrisk associated with noncompliance with the GDPR, however, the private organization responsible for maintaining WHOIS has decided to remove much of the registrant data from the publicly-available segments of the system while the organization works with stakeholders, including the Department, to develop a GDPR-compliant system.\n\nBroadly speaking, the GDPR regulates how private companies and governments process, store, and transfer data concerning E.U. residents, including how such data and information is handled and transferred into and out of the E.U.  Violators could be subject to fnes up to 4% of their gross revenue worldwide or 20 million Euros, whichever is greater, creating a serious fnancial incentive for covered entities not to violate the new regulation.  Exceptions written into the GDPR should ensure that it does not afect the ability of U.S. law enforcement to obtain evidence through MLATs.  Also, law enforcement-to-law enforcement sharing is covered by a separate directive and is thus outside of the scope of the GDPR.  Still, signifcant questions and uncertainties exist about the GDPR, which could negatively afect law enforcement, including by impeding information sharing. For example, some interpret the GDPR to require that the publicly-available WHOIS system remove information about the registrants of Internet domain names from public access, thereby necessitating the building and maintenance of secured law enforcement portals to access that information.  As described in Chapter 3, prosecutors and law enforcement agencies around the world use the WHOIS system thousands of times a day to investigate crimes ranging from botnets to online fraud.  Te registrant data in WHOIS can create crucial leads to targets' identities, locations, and other pieces of their criminal infrastructure.  Tis data can also help identify additional victims.  Due to the signifcant Tis is only one example of how the GDPR may be interpreted to impede the ability of law enforcement authorities to obtain data critical for their authorized criminal and civil law enforcement activities.  Uncertainty about the GDPR also has placed in question not only voluntary disclosures of information about criminal activity*e.g.*, by their employees, contractors, or customersto U.S. law enforcement agencies, but also may cause companies with a signifcant E.U. presence to become reluctant to comply even with disclosures required by legal process, such as warrants and subpoenas, for fear that such a disclosure would be in violation of the GDPR.  Absent ofcial guidance, companies with signifcant E.U. business may become reluctant to participate in mandatory data transfers to U.S. law enforcement and regulatory authorities, which would impede efective tax collection, limit the ability of agencies to stop anti-competitive business practices, impair the work of public health and safety agencies, and undermine   the integrity of global banking, securities, and commodities markets.  Tis could also undercut the Department's mitigation programs for businesses and individuals that wish to cooperate in areas such as fraud, bribery, money laundering, sanctions violations, and antitrust mattersprograms that yield information that ofen results in criminal referrals, and thus relate to the Department's core mission.\n\n\nIn short, given the uncertainty that the GDPR presents in certain key areas, the Department (as well as the U.S. government as a whole) must continue to collaborate with European authorities and stakeholders to carefully monitor the GDPR's impacts.\n\n## Te \"Going Dark\" Problem\n\nwiretap orders.  In the past several years, the Department has seen the proliferation of default encryption where the only person who can access the unencrypted information is the end user.  Te advent of such widespread and increasingly sophisticated encryption technologies that prevent lawful access poses a signifcant impediment to the investigation of most types of criminal activity, including violent crime, drug trafcking, child exploitation, cybercrime, money laundering\n(including through cryptocurrencies), and domestic and international terrorism.\n\nOne of the most signifcant challenges to the Department's ability to access investigative data is the \"Going Dark\" problem.  \"Going Dark\" describes circumstances where the government is unable to obtain critical information in an intelligible and usable form (or at all), despite having a court order authorizing the government's access to that information.  Te problem impacts a range of issues, including data retention;9 anonymization;\nprovider compliance (or absence thereof); foreign-stored data; data localization laws; tool development and perishability; and other similar issues.  Te challenges posed by the Going Dark issue have achieved greatest prominence in the context of encryption.\n\nFaced with the challenges posed by encrypted information, investigative agencies have sometimes looked to other sources of information and evidence, which can be costly to procure and maintain.  While these eforts have occasionally been successful, evidence and information lost to encryption ofen cannot be replaced solely by pursuing other sources of evidence.  For example, communications metadata, such as non-content information about who contacts whom in phone records, can be helpful in putting the pieces together, but it provides less information than the content of data and communicationsa diference that can prove outcome-determinative in the context of a criminal investigation, where prosecutors must prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.  Moreover, metadata is also ofen simply unavailable because there is no mandate for providers to be able to access it.  Relatedly, in the context of a judicial order authorizing the real-time interception of communications, the court must fnd, by law, that alternate sources of data do not exist or are insufcient to meet the investigation's goals.\n\nTese challenges have signifcantly grown in recent years as the sophistication of encryption has increased.  In the past, only the most sophisticated criminals encrypted their communications and data storage; today the average consumer has access to better technology than sophisticated criminals had twenty years ago. Previously, providers used encryption of some sort but generally retained a way of accessing the unencrypted data if necessary or desired, including to comply with law enforcement search warrants or\n\n## Going Dark\n\nWarrant-proof encryption poses a serious challenge to efective law enforcement.\n\n\"To those of us charged with the protection of public safety and national security, encryption technology and its application...will become a matter of life and death which will directly impact our safety and freedoms.\"\n\"We have engaged the tech community aggressively to help solve this problem.  You cannot take an absolutist view on this.  So if your argument is strong encryption, no matter what, and we can and should, in fact, create black boxes, then that I think does not strike the kind of balance that we have lived with for 200, 300 years.\"\n\"To be very clear - the [U.K.] government supports strong encryption and has no intention of banning end-to-end encryption.  But the inability to gain access to encrypted data in specifc and targeted instances is right now severely limiting our agencies' ability to stop terrorist attacks and bring criminals to justice.\"\nAugust 1, 2017\n\n\"Few issues have vexed law enforcement agencies more than this one.  Tey can't get access to the data they need to stop crime and hold criminals to account. 95 per cent of [our intelligence organization's] most dangerous counter-terrorism targets actively use encrypted messages to conceal their communications.  We need access to digital networks and devices, and to the data on them, when there are reasonable grounds to do so.  Tese powers must extend beyond traditional interception if our agencies are to remain efective and pre-empt and hold to account criminal activity.  Tere will also need to be obligations on industry - telecommunications and technology service providers - to cooperate with agencies to get access to that data . . . . \"\n- Australian Minister for Law Enforcement & Cybersecurity Angus Taylor\n\"While convinced of the problem, I'm open to all constructive solutions, solutions that take the public safety issue seriously. We need a thoughtful and sensible approach, one that may vary across business models and technologies, but . . .  we need to work fast.\"\nJune 6, 2018\nExploiting sofware vulnerabilities can be another way to access encrypted (or otherwise inaccessible) data on a phone or other\n\n\"Responsible encryption is achievable. Responsible encryption can involve efective, secure encryption that allows access only with judicial authorization. Such encryption already exists. Examples include the central management of security keys and operating system updates...\"\n Deputy Attorney General Rod Rosenstein, October 10, 2017\n\n\ndevice.  Te Department has, in some instances, lawfully exploited security faws to access electronic data, including data stored on smartphones. Tis is a promising technique, and the Department should expand its use in criminal investigations. However, so-called \"engineered access\" is not a replacement for all the evidence, including evidence subject to a court order, that is lost. Moreover, expanding the government's exploitation of vulnerabilities for law enforcement purposes will likely require signifcantly higher expendituresand  in the end it may not be a scalable solution.  All vulnerabilities have a limited lifespan and may have a limited scope of applicability.  Sofware developers may discover and fx vulnerabilities in the normal course of business, or the government's use of a vulnerability could alert developers to its existence.  Finally, each vulnerability might have very limited applicationslimited, for example, to a particular combination of phone model and operating system. Te challenges posed by the Going Dark problem are among law enforcement's most vexing.  To address these challenges, the Department's eforts should include: (1) considering whether legislation to address encryption (and all related service provider access) challenges should be pursued; (2) coordinating with international law enforcement counterparts to better understand the international legal, operational, and technical challenges of encryption; (3) collecting accurate metrics and case examples that demonstrate the scope and impact of the problem; (4) working to use technical tools more robustly in criminal investigations; (5) insisting that providers comply with their legal obligations to produce all information in their possession called for by compulsory process, and holding them accountable when they do not; (6) working with State and local partners to understand the challenge from their perspective and to assist them technologically in signifcant cases; and (7) reaching out to academics, industry, and technologists to fully understand the implications and possibilities for lawful access solutions.\n\n\nAdditional Investigative Authorities\n\ntelephone calls10in national security investigations.  ECTRs do not include the content of communications, but they can provide crucial evidence early in national security investigations, when investigators do not yet have a clear indication of a subject's network of contacts.  Information obtained from EC- TRs, such as e-mail addresses, can help establish the probable cause necessary to get a Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act order or search warrant to allow the FBI to obtain the content of stored communications, identify a potential confdential human source who may be able to provide valuable intelligence, or help eliminate a subject from suspicion.  As electronic networks increasingly have supplanted telephone networks as the means for terrorists and foreign agents to communicate, the ability to access these records efciently has become even more important to the FBI's work.\n\nTe Department has identifed at least two additional legal authorities it needs to support cyber-related investigations.  First, exceptions to the court order requirements of the Pen Register statute, 18 U.S.C.  3121, are unnecessarily narrow.  Tat statute governs the real-time collection of non-content \"dialing, routing, addressing, or signaling information\" associated with wire or electronic communications.  Tis information includes phone numbers dialed as well as the \"to\" and \"from\" felds of e-mail. In general, the statute requires a court order authorizing collection of such information on a prospective basis unless the collection falls within a statutory exception.  Te exceptions to the Pen Register statute, however, are not coextensive with the exceptions to the Wiretap Act, codifed at\n18 U.S.C.  2511 *et seq*, which generally governs wiretaps to obtain the content of wire or electronic communications.  Tis results in the illogical situation where non-content information associated with a communication is subject to more extensive protection than the content of the communication itself. Moreover, the Pen Register statute's consent provision could be clarifed to allow users to provide direct, express consent for implementation of a pen/trap device by the government to facilitate cooperative investigation eforts.  Te Department stands ready to assist Congress in developing legislation to implement this needed improvement.\n\nUnder 18 U.S.C.  2709, electronic communication service providers are obliged to provide ECTRs in response to certain requests sometimes called National Security Letters (\"NSLs\")made in connection with qualifying national security investigations.  Companies, however, have invoked an omission in section 2709 to refuse to provide ECTRs in response to NSLs.  Te statute states in paragraph (a) that wire or electronic communication service providers have a duty to provide ECTRs in response to a request made by the Director of the FBI under paragraph (b).  But paragraph (b) fails expressly to include EC- TRs in the categories of information the Director may request, even though paragraph (a) explicitly references ECTRs.\n\nSecond, the Department faces similar problems in obtaining electronic communication transactional records (\"ECTRs\")the e-mail equivalent of toll billing records for\n\n\nClarifying the statutory authority would strengthen the Department's ability to conduct counterintelligence investigations and to identify and disrupt terrorist plots in the United States.  Law enforcement has obtained equivalent telephone records with a simple subpoena for decades, and the courts have held that non-content metadata of this kind, held by third-party service providers, is not protected by the Fourth Amendment.11\nproceedings against, a criminal defendant.\n\nPrior to the amendment, Rule 4 did not explicitly provide a method to serve process on an organization with no physical presence in the United States, an artifact of the pre-cyber era when organizations could hardly commit crimes in the United States without having a physical presence here.  As discussed in Chapters 2 and 3, today, technology allows foreign actors to commit intellectual property and computer crimes in the United States from virtually anywhere in the world.\n\nA proposal to clarify that the FBI may obtain ECTRs by issuing NSLs would reafrm a similar type of authority to the equivalent type of electronic communications information.\n\n## Apprehending Criminals Located Abroad\n\nEven when accessible data allows law enforcement to understand the nature of the crime, to identify potential perpetrators, and to build a case for prosecution, holding the guilty party or parties accountable can still be a challenge.  While the Department has made several advances to enhance its ability to prosecute sophisticated cybercriminals, difculties apprehending criminal suspects, as well as the need for additional prosecutorial authorities, continue to hinder our eforts to bring malicious cyber actors to justice.\n\n\nRule 4, amended as of December 1, 2016, now provides prosecutors with a \"non-exhaustive list of methods\" for serving \"an organization not within a judicial district of the United States.\" Most importantly, the amended Rule 4 allows the government to serve a foreign organization \"by any . . . means that gives notice.\" For example, the government has relied on the amended Rule 4 to serve foreign organizations by mailing and e-mailing process to the foreign organization's U.S.- based defense counsel.  Te government has also served foreign organizations by mailing process to the registered agent for a recently dissolved U.S. subsidiary of the foreign organization or, in another case, by personally serving process on the president of a U.S. organization that shared a common \"parent\" organization with the subject of the summons. Tis change is particularly important in situations where a state-owned enterprise is charged with a crime but the foreign jurisdiction is unwilling to assist with eforts to serve process.\nFor example, as with our successful efort to amend Rule 41, the Department worked with the Federal Rules Committee to tackle the problem of serving criminal defendants accused of committing computer crimes. Rule 4 governs the service of criminal process upon individuals and organizations essentially the process by which prosecutors give notice of charges to, and initiate court Service, however, is only one facet of the problem that the Department faces in atpartment prosecute and deter malicious cyber activity.\n\n## A. Protecting Election Computers From Attack\n\n\nTe principal statute used to prosecute hackersthe Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (\"CFAA\")currently does not prohibit the act of hacking a voting machine in many common situations.  In general, the CFAA\nonly prohibits hacking computers that are connected to the Internet (or that meet other narrow criteria for protection).  In many conceivable situations, electronic voting machines will not meet those criteria, as they are typically kept of the Internet.  Consequently, should hacking of a voting machine occur, the government would not, in many conceivable circumstances, be able to use the CFAA to prosecute the hackers.  (Te conduct could, however, potentially violate other criminal statutes.)\n\n## B.  Insider Treat/Nosal Fix\n\ntempting to hold sophisticated cybercriminals accountable.  As noted throughout this report, attributing a cyber-incident to an individual or group of actors is difcult due to anonymizing technologies and encryption techniques that allow cybercriminals to remain hidden from law enforcement. Additionally, there are cybercriminals who, though identifed, manage to remain beyond the reach of U.S. law enforcement, especially when they are located abroad.  While the Department has several mechanisms to bring cybercriminals to the United States to face trial, including extradition treaties and collaborative relationships with other countries\n(see Chapter 3), these eforts are not always successful.  Some foreign sovereigns choose not to cooperate or will do so only afer imposing unreasonable limitations on law enforcement.  Other countries may not punish perpetrators for the specifc computer crime the United States is seeking to prosecute or may lack sophisticated domestic cybercrime law enforcement capabilities.  In addition to continuing to build strong relationships with other countries and assisting their eforts to meet the requirements to join the Budapest Convention (also discussed in Chapter 3), the Department should continue to identify necessary additional authorities and potential mechanisms for bringing foreign-based cybercriminals to justice.\n\n## Additional Criminal Prohibitions\n\n\n\nUntil recently, the Department regularly used the CFAA's prohibition on \"exceeding authorized access\" to prosecute insider threatsin particular, employees who abused permitted access to their employers' systems by stealing proprietary information or accessing information for their own illicit purposes and gain.  Te Department, for example, prosecuted police ofcers who sold their access to confdential criminal records databases, government employees who accessed private tax and passport records without authority, and bank employees who abused access to steal customers' identities. Tese employees had Once malicious cyber actors are identifed, it is important for the Department to have the authorities necessary to prosecute those individuals for the illicit activity.  Additional criminal prohibitions would help the Desome right to access those computers, but their conduct was a crime under the CFAA because they intentionally exceeded their employer's computer use rules.\naccess for illicit means.  Any such authority should also ensure appropriate consideration and treatment of legitimate privacy-related concerns.\n\n## C. Cfaa As Rico Predicate\n\n\n\nAs discussed in Chapter 3, the Racketeer Infuenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (\"RICO\") is an important prosecutorial tool for charging organizations engaged in a pattern of criminal activity because RICO violations carry substantial sentencing penalties as well as the ability for the government to seize assets of the criminal organization. RICO requires proof of, among other things, a pattern of \"racketeering activity,\" which is defned as violations of two or more qualifying predicate criminal acts.\n\n\nCurrently, computer fraud under the CFAA does not qualify as a predicate act under the RICO statute, whereas similar conduct, such as wire fraud and mail fraud, does qualify. Adding the CFAA as a predicate ofense for RICO purposes could increase our ability to fght cybercrime and take down criminal organizations engaged in such activities.\n\n\nDecisions in the Second, Fourth, and Ninth Circuit Courts of Appeals, however, have limited the defnition of \"exceeds authorized access\" in section 1030(e)(6) of the CFAA.\n\nIn United States v. *Nosal*, 676 F.3d 854 (9th Cir. 2012) (en banc), the Ninth Circuit held that an indictment did not state a violation of the CFAA when it alleged that a former employee had asked current employees to access information in a proprietary database to aid him in starting a new frm.  Te company had computer policies that limited employee access to legitimate work purposes. Although the employees' eforts to access information for the beneft of the former employee's new frm violated the company's policies, the court held such an activity did not violate federal criminal law.  According to the *Nosal* court, the defnition of \"exceeds authorized access\" in section 1030(e)(6) \"is limited to violations of restrictions on access to information, and not restrictions on its use.\" Id. at 863-64.12\n\n## D. Combating Sextortion\n\n\"Sextortion\" and related ofenses are discussed in Chapter 2.  Although such conduct may implicate certain existing criminal laws, there are no federal criminal statutes specifically addressing sextortion and non-consensual pornography. Additionally, while stalking, bullying, and harassment have more commonly been dealt with by local law enforcement or outside the criminal justice Such decisions have caused grave damage to the government's ability to prosecute and protect against serious insider threats. If the CFAA can be used only against outsiders with no right at all to access computers, many insider threatsincluding those in the intelligence and law enforcement communities with access to extremely sensitive informationmay go unpunished.  Prosecutors should have adequate statutory authority to pursue insiders who abuse their computer\n\nmunications sent from computers running Tor, and second, by allowing individuals to operate websites on the Dark Web called Tor \"Hidden Services\" without divulging location information of the websites' servers.\n\nsystem, the use of computers and mobile networks has turned many such crimes into multi-jurisdictional and even multi-national ofenses.13 Te increasingly expansive nature of these crimes, in addition to the use of new technologies, may merit a federal response.  New federal criminal ofenses specifcally targeting sextortion and non-consensual pornography, as well as possible new sentencing enhancements for such ofenses under existing authorities, could have merit.\n\n\n\n## 3. Challenges In Connection With Other Legal Actions To Dismantling, Disrupting, And Deterring Malicious Cyber Conduct\n\nWhile sometimes used for innocuous and even benefcial purposes, the anonymity afforded by Tor also poses a unique and significant threat to public safety.  Te anonymizing technology is efective, making it difcult to identify the physical location of dark market websites either to shut them down or to identify who is administering them. Te result is that law enforcement investigators can observe and document the fact that disturbing criminal activity is occurring, but they cannot use the sort of investigative steps that ordinarily would allow them to determine who is perpetrating the crimes.\n\n\nAs described in Chapter 3, in addition to traditional investigation and prosecution, the Department has an array of other techniques and tools to dismantle, disrupt, and deter cyber threats, including a blend of civil, criminal, and administrative powers.  Te Department has employed these tools to disable botnets, disrupt dark markets, and pursue sanctions against specifed malicious actors. As with our investigation and prosecution activities, however, the Department needs additional tools and authorities to maximize efectiveness.\n\n## Tackling Tor/Dark Markets\n\nCombating criminals' abuse of Tor and their exploitation of dark markets requires a concerted efort.  Te Department should work with partners to develop new technological tools that will enable law enforcement to identify the true location of Hidden Services websites engaged in criminal activity.  Efective development and use of these tools will enable law enforcement to locate and lawfully seize servers hosting such sites, and to identify the administrators, vendors, buyers, and participants who use them.  In addition, the federal government should carefully evaluate its role in funding these anonymizing technologies, as currently the U.S. government is the primary source of funding for the Tor Project, the organization responsible for maintaining the Tor sofware.\n\nTe Department cannot disrupt cyber activity that it cannot fnd.  Tis makes Tor and the existence of dark markets one of the greatest impediments to our eforts.  As discussed in detail in Chapter 2, Tor provides anonymity in two waysfrst, by anonymizing com-\n\n## Enhancing Our Ability To Disrupt Botnets\n\nOn May 22, 2018, DHS and the Department of Commerce released a joint report titled, \"A Report to the President on Enhancing the Resilience of the Internet and Communications Ecosystem Against Botnets and Other Automated, Distributed Treats.\"14  Te report encourages collaboration between the government and private industry, recognizing that addressing the global botnet problem requires further discussions on market incentives and on securing products at all stages of their life cycle.  Te Department should play an active role in these eforts.\n\nUnfortunately, botnets can be and ofen are used for many other types of illegal activity beyond fraud or illegal wiretapping.  As explained in Chapter 2, for example, malicious actors can employ botnets to steal sensitive corporate information, to harvest e-mail account addresses, to hack other computers, or to execute DDoS attacks against websites or other computers.  When these crimes do not involve fraud or illegal wiretapping, courts may lack the statutory authority to issue an injunction to disrupt the botnet.  Te Department should evaluate the merits of creating a more comprehensive authority for courts to address all types of illegal botnets.\n\n## Advancing A Cfaa Forfeiture Fix\n\nAs discussed in Chapter 3, the Department in recent years has regularly used civil forfeiture authorities to disrupt cybercriminal groups by seizing valuable assets such as computer servers and domain names used to operate botnets, as well as profts derived from illegal activity.15  Tese actions are permissible even when it is not yet possible to arrest the ofenders. Expanding forfeiture authority to CFAA ofences could enhance the Department's capacity to dismantle, disrupt, and deter cyber threats by targeting the instruments of, and profts from, cybercrime.\n\n## Issues For Further Evaluation\n\nDespite being the principal law enforcement agency tasked with disrupting and dismantling botnets, the Department's current statutory authority is limited.  As it stands today, the law gives federal courts the authority to issue injunctions to stop the ongoing commission of specifed fraud crimes or illegal wiretapping through the use of botnets, by authorizing actions that prevent a continuing and substantial injury.  Te Department used this authority efectively in its successful disruption of the Corefood botnet in 2011 and of the Gameover Zeus botnet in\n2014. *See* Appendix 2. Because the criminals behind these particular botnets used them to intercept communications containing online fnancial account information and, with that information, committed fraud, the existing law allowed us to obtain court authority to disrupt the botnets by stopping the criminals' commands from reaching the infected computers.\n\nIn addition to helping facilitate action on the specifc recommendations made above and elsewhere in this report, the Department should initiate a deeper evaluation of several key areas where strategic coordination is especially important.  Some of these evaluations are already underway; others will be part of the Department's ongoing eforts to evaluate its authorities, practices, and resources.\n\n\nTe eight non-exclusive areas for deeper evaluation include:\n\n\ndressing the complex issues raised by the legal and technical barriers that prevent law enforcement from obtaining information in electronic form is another Department priority. As discussed above, it is critical that the Department maintain the ability to identify those who employ technology for illicit means and, with appropriate legal authority, to obtain evidence to bring criminals to justice.  Te Department should continue to develop a framework to ensure that these public safety and national security objectives can be met even as encryption and anonymizing technologies continue to evolve.  In addition, the Department should explore and, as appropriate, adopt new investigative methods to replace the investigative opportunities that have been lost.\n\n1. Strengthening Our Own Defenses:\nConsistent with the President's May 2017 Executive Order on Strengthening the Cybersecurity of Federal Networks and Critical Infrastructure,16 the Department is continually reassessing how best to defend its networks and reduce vulnerabilities. Te Department should consider next steps and a longer-term strategy to maintain the security of its own defenses.\n\n\n\n2. Enhancing Efective Collaboration with the Private Sector:  Te Department's ability to work collaboratively and efectively with the private sector will continue to be one of the most critical elements of our strategy to fght cybercrime.  In the coming months, the Department should engage in a more extensive evaluation of our work with the private sector by seeking specifc input from private sector participants. Where appropriate, we will make recommendations to enhance these collaborative eforts, including with regard to information-sharing, threat and incident notifcation, data breach notifcation standards, and frameworks for joint disruptive eforts, such as botnet takedowns.\n\n## 3. Addressing Encryption And Anonym-\n\n\n\nity (the Going Dark Array of Issues):  Ad-\n4. Addressing Malign Foreign Infuence Operations:  As discussed in Chapter 1, hostile foreign actors exploit the Internet and social media platforms to conduct infuence operations against our Nation, including by spreading disinformation and propaganda online on a scale greater than has ever been observed before.  In addition to implementing the disclosure policy discussed in Chapter 1, the Department should consider additional ways to improve our ability to respond to malign foreign infuence operations, including whether new criminal statutes aimed directly at this threat are needed, and whether there are new ways we can work with the private sector in this area.  Because this problem requires a whole-of-government solution, the Department should also consider how best to use existing or additional interagency coordination mechanisms to address the threat.\n\n\n\n5. Addressing the Global Nature of Cyber-Enabled Crime:  A hallmark of technology-enabled crime is that it increasingly cuts across international boundaries, even when less sophisticated actors are behind the malicious activity.  As discussed above, the global nature of cybercrime carries with it numerous impedimentsboth technological and arising out of foreign laws and international agreementsto the Department's ability to identify and locate malicious actors and bring them to justice.  Tese impediments bear no easy solutions and may only grow as technology continues to evolve.  Te Department should continue evaluating this set of challenges and make additional recommendations to improve its global investigative and prosecutorial reach.\n\n7. Sharpening Departmental and Interagency Organization of Eforts to Fight Cyber-Enabled Crime: Te Department's cyber-related mission requires efort and expertise from many components.  Similarly, the Department's eforts make up just one part of the U.S. government's approach to cyber issues.  As such, the Department must continuously review its internal coordination approach and resources, as well as how it interacts with its interagency partners, to determine if any improvements or adjustments are needed.  Relatedly, the Department should continue evaluating how most efectively to recruit and retain attorneys, investigators, and professional staf with the necessary skills and mission-oriented mindset to ensure it has the human capital it needs to confront evolving cyber threats.\n\n\n\n8. Strengthening the Department's Tools and Authorities:  Tis report has described numerous additional recommendations to strengthen the Department's tools and authorities.  Where such improvements are already known, the Department should seek ways to advance those improvements, including by seeking interagency approval to advocate for legislation, where appropriate.\n\nIn each of these key areas, the Department should not be merely reactive to known challenges and obstacles, but rather should pursue a strategic and forward-looking approach.\n\n6. Preparing for Emerging and Future Technology: Te technology behind current cyber-enabled threats will continue to evolve. Te Department must ensure that its continued recalibration of eforts and resources not only aims at the major threats of today, but also prepares it for the emerging threats of tomorrow.  Te Department should continue to evaluate how its investigative and prosecutorial abilities can keep pace with, and even stay ahead of, the evolving technological threat. For example, the Department should continue evaluating the emerging threats posed by rapidly developing cryptocurrencies that malicious cyber actors ofen use, and autonomous vehicle technology, which has both ground and aerial applications (*e.g.*, unmanned aircraf systems).\n\n## Notes\n\n1\nChallenges specifc to foreign infuence op-\n\nerations are discussed in detail in Chapter 1 and so are not repeated here.\n\n\n2\nTe Digital Millennium Copyright Act, codifed at 17 U.S.C.  1201, prohibits the circumvention of technological controls, such as encryption and password protocols, that protect copyrighted works.  Section 1201 also includes a rulemaking process that recognizes that, in some cases, exceptions to the general prohibition may be justifed.  Section 1201 requires the Copyright Ofce to conduct a rulemaking every three years to evaluate proposed exemptions proposed by the public to the anti-circumvention provision and to recommend appropriate proposals for adoption by the Librarian of Congress.  Te exemptions last only three years unless they are renewed in a subsequent proceeding.\n\n\n\n3\nTe last rulemaking process conducted in\n2016 resulted, *inter alia*, in a three-year exemption for \"security research\" conducted on particular categories of devices, including machines designed for use by individual consumers, motorized land vehicles, and certain medical devices. Security research included \"good faith testing for and the identifcation, disclosure and correction of malfunctions, security faws and vulnerabilities in computer programs.\" *See generally* U.S.\n\nCopyright Office, \"Section 1201 Rulemaking: Sixth Triennial Proceeding to Determine Exemptions to the Prohibition on Circumvention,\" (Oct. 2015), available at: https://www.copyright. gov/1201/2015/registers-recommendation.pdf (last accessed June 29, 2018).\n\n\n\n4\nSee John T. Lynch, Jr., Chief, Department of Justice Computer Crime and Intellectual Property Section, to Regan Smith, General Counsel and Associate Register of Copyrights, Library of Congress (June 28, 2018), available at: https://www. justice.gov/criminal-ccips/page/file/1075496/ download (last accessed June 29, 2018).  To date, the Department is unaware of any claims that the current security research exemption has thwarted or interfered with criminal investigations or prosecutions.\n\n\n5\nAvailable at:\nhttps://www.justice.gov/\nsites/default/files/criminal-ccips/lega -\ncy/2015/04/30/04272015reporting-cyber-incidents-fnal.pdf (last accessed June 29, 2018).\n\n\n\n6\nSee \"Alabama Rolls with Tide as Last State to Adapt Breach Notifcation Law,\" Taf Stettinius & Hollister LLP (Apr. 30, 2018), available at: https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx- ?g=cc0e9bb3-fe24-4211-b9dc-1ffd350637f (last accessed June 29, 2018).\n\n\n7\n\"Presidential Memorandum on the Actions by the United States Related to the Section 301 Investigation,\" The White Ho se (March 22,\n2018), available at: https://www.whitehouse. gov/presidential-actions/presidential-memorandum-actions-united-states-related-section-301-investigation/ (last accessed June 29, 2018).\n\n\n8\nFor example, due to such concerns, DHS in September 2017 issued a directive requiring federal agencies to remove and discontinue use of antivirus sofware provided by Moscow-based Kaspersky Lab.  Several months later, Congress enacted a government-wide ban on Kaspersky products and services that exceeded the scope of the DHS prohibition.  Both measures came in response to growing national security concerns presented by the presence of Kaspersky products on U.S. information systems.  Kaspersky challenged both measures in court, and both suits were dismissed at the pleading stage.  Litigation continues in the court of appeals. Also in 2017, Congress amended 10 U.S.C.  491 to restrict Department of Defense procurement of certain telecommunications equipment or services with particular Chinese or Russian origins.\n\n\n9\nAccessing data is further complicated in some circumstances by the lack of any uniform data retention standards or requirements for service providers.  Without such requirements, data that is potentially critical to law enforcement investigations is simply not retained or in some cases is not retained long enough to be useful.\n\n\n10\nTelephone toll billing records include the originating phone number, the phone number called, and the date, time, and length of the call. ECTRs for e-mail show the sending e-mail address, the e-mail recipients, and the date, time, and size of the e-mail message.\n\n\n11\nSee, e.g., *United States v. Forrester*, 512 F.3d\n500, 510 (9th Cir. 2008) (holding that e-mail and Internet users have no reasonable expectation of privacy in to/from addresses of their messages or in IP addresses of websites visited).\n\n\n12\nSee also WEC Carolina Energy Solutions\nLLC v. Miller, 687 F.3d 199, 207 (4th Cir. 2012)\n(\"[W]e reject an interpretation of the CFAA that\nimposes liability on employees who violate a use\npolicy[.]\"); *United States v. Valle,* 807 F.3d 508\n511 (2d Cir. 2015) (an individual \"'exceeds authorized access' only when he obtains or alters information that he does not have authorization\nto access for any purpose which is located on a computer that he is otherwise authorized to access\").\n\n\n13\nFor instance, a criminal in one State can easily disseminate graphic images and personally-identifying information of his victim in another State or around the world.  He can store the images and information on servers in unfriendly foreign jurisdictions, using proxy technology to conceal his true location.  He can threaten and extort the victim using end-to-end encrypted communication applications that store little or no information about subscribers.  Without leaving home, the perpetrator can commit an elaborate and hard-to-trace scheme using technology easily accessible to anyone.  Worse, someone with no technical sophistication at all can hire someone to do the harassment for him from a dark market online.\n\n\n14\n\"A Report to the President on Enhancing\nthe Resilience of the Internet and Communications Ecosystem Against Botnets and Other Automated, Distributed Treats,\" U.S. Dept. of Commerce & U.S. Dept. of Homeland Sec - rity (May 22, 2018), available at: https://www. commerce.gov/sites/commerce.gov/fles/media/ files/2018/eo_13800_botnet_report_-_finalv2. pdf (last accessed June 29, 2018).\n15\n18 U.S.C.  981-83.\n16\nExec. Order No. 13,800, 82 Fed. Reg. 22391\n(May 16, 2017).\n\n## Appendix 2 Recent Successful Botnet Disruptions Vpnfilter\n\n\nIn May 2018, the Department took steps to disrupt the operation of a global botnet of hundreds of thousands of infected home and ofce (\"SOHO\") routers and other networked devices under the control of a group of actors known as the \"Sofacy Group\" (also known as \"apt28,\" \"sandworm,\" \"x-agent,\" \"pawn storm,\" \"fancy bear\" and \"sednit\").1  Te botnet, which the FBI\nand cybersecurity researchers called \"VPNFilter,\" targets SOHO routers and network-access storage devices. In order to identify infected devices and facilitate their remediation, the U.S. Attorney's Ofce for the Western District of Pennsylvania applied for and obtained court orders authorizing the FBI to seize a domain that is part of the malware's command-and-control infrastructure.  Te FBI also put out a public service announcement urging individuals and organizations to reset their routers.2\n\nTe cumulative efect of these actions would be to purge parts of the malware from the routers that were reset, and to direct attempts by the remaining malware to reinfect the device to an FBI-controlled server, which captured the Internet Protocol (\"IP\") address of infected devices. A non-proft partner organization agreed to disseminate the IP addresses to those who can assist with remediating the botnet, including foreign CERTs and Internet service providers. Although the devices would remain vulnerable to reinfection while connected to the Internet, these eforts maximized opportunities to identify and remediate the infection worldwide in the time available before Sofacy actors learned of the vulnerability in their command-and-control infrastructure.\n\n## Kelihos\n\nOn April 10, 2017, the Department announced an extensive efort to disrupt and dismantle the Kelihos botneta global network of tens of thousands of computers infected with the Kelihos malware.3  Under the control of a cybercriminal, Peter Levashov, that botnet facilitated a range of malicious activities, including harvesting login credentials, distributing hundreds of millions of spam e-mails, and installing ransomware and other malicious sofware.   Te enormous volume of unsolicited spam e-mails sent by the botnet advertised counterfeit drugs, work-at-home scams, and a variety of other frauds, including deceptively promoted stocks in order to fraudulently increase their price (so-called \"pump-anddump\" stock fraud schemes). To liberate the victim computers from the botnet, the Department obtained civil and criminal court orders that authorized measures to neutralize the Kelihos botnet by (1) seizing domain names that the botnet used to communicate with the command-and-control servers, (2) establishing substitute servers that received the automated requests for instructions so that infected computers no longer communicated with the criminal operator, and (3) blocking any commands sent from the criminal operator attempting to regain control of the infected computers.  As described in Chapter 3, Levashov was arrested in Spain and extradited to the U.S. to face justice.\n\n## Avalanche\n\nOn November 30, 2016, the Department, in coordination with German state and federal police, Europol, and various other countries and entities, conducted a takedown operation against the Avalanche malware infrastructure. Tis takedown led to the disabling of seven botnets that relied on this infrastructure and impacted approximately 10 diferent malware families that had utilized the Avalanche network. Te Avalanche network ofered cybercriminals a secure infrastructure, designed to stand in the way of detection by law enforcement and cyber security experts, over which the criminals conducted malware campaigns as well as money laundering schemes known as \"money mule\" schemes. Access to the Avalanche network was ofered to the cybercriminals through postings on exclusive underground online criminal forums. In these schemes, highly organized networks of \"mules\" purchased goods with stolen funds, enabling cybercriminals to launder the money they acquired through malware attacks or other illegal means. Te types of malware and money mule schemes operating over this network varied. Ransomware, such as Nymain, encrypted victims' computer fles until the victim paid a ransom (typically in a form of electronic currency) to the cybercriminal. Other malware, such as GozNym, was designed to steal victims' sensitive banking credentials, which were directed through the intricate network of Avalanche servers to backend servers controlled by the cybercriminals and used to initiate fraudulent wire transfers.\n\nTe Avalanche network, which had been operating since at least 2010, was estimated to involve hundreds of thousands of infected computers worldwide. Te monetary losses associated with malware attacks conducted over the Avalanche network were estimated to be in the hundreds of millions of dollars worldwide, although exact calculations are difcult due to the high number of malware families present on the network.\n\nTis operation required an unprecedented level of international coordination to seize, block, and sinkhole over 800,000 malicious domains associated with the Avalanche network. Tese domains had been used to send commands to infected devices, pass banking credentials to cyber criminals, and obfuscate eforts by law enforcement to investigate this conspiracy. Te USAO for the Western District of Pennsylvania and the Computer Crime and Intellectual Property Section obtained a temporary restraining order which greatly assisted in this efort. Te Department continues to build on the success of this operation, using information obtained through seized infrastructure to identify and arrest criminals responsible for the creation of the malware distributed via Avalanche.\n\n## Gameover Zeus & Cryptolocker\n\nIn 2014, the Department led a coalition of nearly a dozen foreign countries and a group of elite computer security frms to disrupt and dismantle the highly-sophisticated \"Gameover Zeus botnet.\"4  At its peak, that botnet consisted of a global network of between 500,000 and 1 million computers infected malware that used keystroke logging to collect online fnancial account information and, in turn, inficted more than $100 million of losses to individuals in the United States.  Te Gameover Zeus network was also used to spread the Cryptolocker ransomware, which used cryptographic key pairs to encrypt the computer fles of its victims and ofen lef victims with no choice but to pay hundreds of dollars to obtain the decryption keys needed to unlock their fles.  As of April 2014, security researchers estimated that Cryptolocker had infected more than 234,000 computers and, according to one estimate, caused more than $27 million in ransom payments in its frst two months in circulation.\n\n\nTo disrupt both the Gameover Zeus botnet and the Cryptolocker malware, the Department deployed a combination of criminal and civil tools available to law enforcement.  As an initial matter, a federal grand jury indicated a key administrator of the botnet (Evgeniy Bogachev) with a 14-count indictment, and the Department fled a separate civil injunction against Bogachev as the leader of a tightly-knit gang of cyber criminals based in Russia and Ukraine responsible for both the Gameover Zeus and Cryptolocker schemes.\n\nFurther, as in Kelihos, the Department obtained civil and criminal court orders authorizing measures to redirect requests for instructions by computers victimized by the two schemes away from the criminal operators to substitute servers established pursuant to court order.  Te FBI was also authorized to obtain the IP addresses of the victim computers reaching out to the substitute servers, and to provide that information to DHS's Computer Emergency Readiness Team (US-CERT) to help victims remove the Gameover Zeus malware from their computers.5\nTo identify servers as command-and-control hubs for the Gameover Zeus botnet and Cryptolocker malware, and to subsequently facilitate victims' eforts to remediate the damage to their computers, the Department also enlisted the assistance of numerous computer security frms and leading universities.\n\n## Corefood\n\n\nIn 2011, the Department disrupted and disabled the decade-old \"Corefood\" botnet through a civil complaint, search warrants, a criminal seizure warrant, and a temporary restraining order.6\nTis botnet was a global network of 100,000 computers infected with a particularly harmful type of malware named Corefood, which could be controlled remotely to steal private personal and fnancial information from unsuspecting computer users.  Te botnet's administrators, in turn, used the stolen information for a variety of criminal purposes, including stealing funds from the compromised accounts.  In one example described in court flings, for instance, Corefood leveraged information gleaned through illegal monitoring of Internet communications between a user and the user's bank to take over an online banking session and cause the fraudulent transfer of funds to a foreign account.\n\n\n\nTe Department employed a multi-prong enforcement strategy to dismantle the Corefood botnet. It obtained search warrants to seize fve command-and-control servers that remotely controlled hundreds of thousands of infected computers, and a seizure warrant to secure 29 domain names that the botnet used to communicate with the command-and-control servers. Federal authorities also obtained a temporary restraining order that authorized the government to replace the illegal command-and-control servers with substitute servers.  To prevent the defendants from reconstituting the botnet through new servers, domains, and updated sofware, the TRO also authorized the government to respond to routine requests for direction from the infected computers in the United States with a command that temporarily stopped the Corefood malware from running on the infected computers.  By limiting the defendants' ability to control the botnet, computer security providers and victims were given the time and opportunity to remove the malware from infected computers.  Te Department also fled a civil complaint against 13 \"John Doe\" defendants associated with the botnet.\n\n## Notes\n\n1\nPress Release, \"Justice Department Announc-\n\n4\nPress Release, \"U.S. Leads Multi-National Ac-\n\n\nes Actions to Disrupt Advanced Persistent Treat 28 Botnet of Infected Routers and Network Storage Devices,\" U.S. Dept. of Justice (May 23,\n2018), available at: https://www.justice.gov/opa/ pr/justice-department-announces-actions-disrupt-advanced-persistent-threat-28-botnet-infected (last accessed June 29, 2018).\n\ntion Against \"Gameover Zeus\" Botnet and \"Cryptolocker\" Ransomware, Charges Botnet Administrator,\" U.S. Dept. of Justice (June 2, 2014), available at:\nhttps://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/\nus-leads-multi-national-action-against-gameover-zeus-botnet-and-cryptolocker-ransomware (last accessed June 29, 2018).\n\n2\nFederal Bureau of Investigation, \"For-\n\n\n5\nAt no point during the operation did the FBI\nor law enforcement access the content of any of the victims' computers or electronic communications.\n\neign Cyber Actors Target Home and Ofce Routers and Networked Devices Worldwide\" (May 25, 2018), available at: https://www.ic3.gov/ media/2018/180525.aspx (last accessed June 29, 2018).\n\n\n3\nPress Release, \"Justice Department An-\n\n\nnounces Actions to Dismantle Kelihos Botnet,\" U.S. Dept. of Justice  (Apr. 10, 2017), available at:\nhttps://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-de-\n\n6\nPress Release, \"Department of Justice Takes\nAction to Disable International Botnet,\" U.S. Dept. of Justice (Apr. 13, 2011), available at: https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/department-justice-takes-action-disable-international-botnet (last accessed June 29, 2018).\npartment-announces-actions-dismantle-kelihos-botnet-0 (last accessed June 29, 2018).\n\n## Appendix 3 Recent Successful Dar  Web Disruptions Alphabay & Hansa\n\n\n\nOn July 20, 2017, the Department announced the seizure of AlphaBay, an online criminal marketplace that had operated for over two years on the dark web and facilitated the sale throughout the world of deadly illegal drugs, stolen and fraudulent identifcation documents and access devices, counterfeit goods, malware and other computer hacking tools, frearms, and toxic chemicals. Around the time of its takedown, AlphaBay was the largest criminal marketplace on the Internet.  Indeed, prior to the site's disruption,  one AlphaBay staf member claimed that it serviced over 200,000 users and 40,000 vendors.  Alpha- Bay operated as a hidden service on the \"Tor\" network, and used cryptocurrencies including Bitcoin, Monero, and Ethereum in order to hide the locations of its underlying servers and the identities of its administrators, moderators, and users.  Based on law enforcement's investigation of AlphaBay, authorities believe the site was also used to launder hundreds of millions of dollars deriving from illegal transactions on the website. Te operation to seize the AlphaBay site coincided with eforts by Dutch law enforcement to investigate and take down the Hansa Market, another prominent dark web market.  Like Alpha- Bay, Hansa Market was used to facilitate the sale of illegal drugs, toxic chemicals, malware, counterfeit identifcation documents, and illegal services.  To maximize the disruptive impact of the joint takedowns, Dutch authorities took covert control over the Hansa Market during the period when AlphaBay was shutdown.  Tat covert control not only allowed Dutch police to identify and disrupt the regular criminal activity on Hansa, but then also allowed the authorities to sweep up all those new users who were displaced from AlphaBay and needed a new trading platform.  Te success of this joint operation stands out as yet another example of what international law enforcement can accomplish when working closely together to neutralize a cybercrime marketplace.\n\n## Silk Road\n\nIn late 2013, the Department joined with various law enforcement partners across the government to disrupt the hidden \"Silk Road\" website, and to prosecute its creator and owner, Ross Ulbricht.1 For the two years leading up to the Department's actions, Silk Road stood out as the most sophisticated and extensive criminal marketplace on the Internet, serving as a sprawling black-market bazaar where unlawful goods and services, including illegal drugs of virtually all varieties, were regularly bought and sold.  At its height, several thousand drug dealers and other unlawful vendors used the site to distribute hundreds of kilograms of illegal drugs and other unlawful goods and services to well over 100,000 buyers, and to launder hundreds of millions of dollars deriving from these unlawful transactions. To remain outside the reach of law enforcement, Silk Road's administrators anonymized the site's transactions by operating it on the Tor network and including a Bitcoin-based payment system designed to conceal its users' identities and locations.  Despite these eforts, law enforcement ultimately pierced Silk Road's cloak of anonymity and seized control of the website, its domain, its servers, and 29,655 Bitcoins residing on those servers (worth approximately $28 million at the\n\ntrators associated with these Dark Web markets were criminally prosecuted.\n\n## Darkode\n\ntime of seizure). Te creator and administrator of Silk Road, Ross Ulbricht, was also arrested and ultimately convicted of seven charges relating to money laundering and computer hacking, among others, and sentenced to life in federal prison.  Te government seized an additional 144,336 Bitcoins from Ulbricht's computer hard drive (worth approximately $130 million at the time of seizure).\n\nOn July 15, 2015, the Department announced the dismantling of a computer hacking forum known as \"Darkode\" as part of a coordinated law enforcement action across 20 countries that led to the search, arrest, or charging of 70 Darkode members and associates.3\n\n## Operation Onymous\n\n\n\nAt the time of its takedown, the Darkode forum represented a uniquely grave threat to the integrity of data on computers because it provided a platform where highly-sophisticated cybercriminals congregated to buy, sell, and trade malware, botnets, and PII used to steal from U.S. citizens and individuals around the world. Before becoming a member of Darkode, prospective members were allegedly vetted through a process in which an existing member invited a prospective member to the forum for the purpose of presenting the skills or products that he or she could bring to the group.  As part of Operation Shrouded Horizon, the FBI was able to disrupt and dismantle Darkode by infltrating the forum's membership.\n\nBuilding on the success of the Silk Road takedown, in November 2014, U.S. and European authorities took joint action against the underground website known as \"Silk Road 2.0,\" as well as dozens of additional dark market websites that were facilitating the sale of an astonishing range of illegal goods and services on hidden services within the Tor network, including weapons, drugs, murder-for-hire services, stolen identifcation data, money laundering, hacking services, and others.2  Silk Road 2.0 was created in November 2013 to fll the void lef by the government's seizure of the Silk Road website in October 2013. As with Silk Road, the Department used civil forfeiture authorities to seize control over 400 Tor website addresses known as \".onion\" addresses, as well as the servers hosting them.  Adminis-\n\n## Notes\n\n1\n Press Release, \"Manhattan U.S. Attorney An-\n\n\nnounces Seizure of Additional $28 Million Worth of Bitcoins Belonging to Ross William Ulbricht, Alleged Owner and Operator of \"Silk Road\" Website,\" Federal Bureau of Investigation\n(Oct. 25, 2013), available at: https://archives.\n\nfbi.gov/archives/newyork/press-releases/2013/ manhattan-u.s.-attorney-announces-seizure-of-additional-28-million-worth-of-bitcoins-belonging-to-ross-william-ulbricht-alleged-owner-and-operator-of-silk-road-website (last accessed June 29, 2018).\n\n\n2\nPress Release, \"Dozens of Online 'Dark Markets' Seized Pursuant to Forfeiture Complaint Filed in Manhattan Federal Court in\n\nConjunction with the Arrest of the Operator of Silk Road 2.0,\" Federal Bureau of Investigation  (Nov. 7, 2014), available at: https://www. fi.gov/contact-us/feld-ofces/newyork/news/ press-releases/dozens-of-online-dark-marketsseized-pursuant-to-forfeiture-complaint-filedin-manhattan-federal-court-in-conjunctionwith-the-arrest-of-the-operator-of-silk-road-2.0\n(last accessed June 29, 2018).\n\n\n\n3\nPress Release, \"Major Computing Hacking Forum Dismantled,\" U.S. Dept. of Justice (July 15, 2015), available at: https://www.justice.gov/ opa/pr/major-computer-hacking-forum-dismantled (last accessed June 29, 2018).\n\n## Appendix 4 Glossary Of Key Terms\n\n| Acronym                                                            | Meaning    |\n|--------------------------------------------------------------------|------------|\n| AECA                                                               |            |\n| Arms Export Control Act                                            |            |\n| AUSA                                                               |            |\n| Assistant  nited States Attorney                                   |            |\n|                                                                    |            |\n| BEC                                                                |            |\n| Business Email Compromise                                          |            |\n| Boyusec                                                            |            |\n| Guangzhou Bo Yu Information Technology Company Limited             |            |\n| C&C                                                                |            |\n| Command-and-Control                                                |            |\n| C.F.R.                                                             |            |\n| Code of Federal Regulations                                        |            |\n|                                                                    |            |\n|                                                                    |            |\n|                                                                    |            |\n| C                                                                  |            |\n| Command and Control                                                |            |\n|                                                                    |            |\n|                                                                    |            |\n| CAATSA                                                             |            |\n| Countering America's Adversaries Through Sanctions Act             |            |\n| CAN-SPAM                                                           |            |\n| Controlling the Assault of Non Solicited Pornography and Marketing |            |\n| CAT                                                                |            |\n| Cyber Action Team                                                  |            |\n| CCIPS                                                              |            |\n| Computer Crime and Intellectual Property Section                   |            |\n| CFAA                                                               |            |\n| Computer Fraud and Abuse Act                                       |            |\n|                                                                    |            |\n| CHIP                                                               |            |\n| Computer Hacking and Intellectual Property                         |            |\n| CFIUS                                                              |            |\n| Committee on Foreign Investment in the  nited States               |            |\n| CISO                                                               |            |\n| Chief Information Security Officer                                 |            |\n| CLOUD                                                              |            |\n| Clarifying Lawful Overseas  se of Data                             |            |\n| CNN                                                                |            |\n| Cable News Network                                                 |            |\n| CTF                                                                |            |\n| Cyber Task Force, Federal Bureau of Investigation                  |            |\n| DDoS                                                               |            |\n| Distributed Denial of Service                                      |            |\n| DEA                                                                |            |\n| Drug Enforcement Administration                                    |            |\n| DHS                                                                |            |\n| Department of Homeland Security                                    |            |\n| DMCA                                                               |            |\n| Digital Millennium Copyright Act                                   |            |\n| DOJ                                                                |            |\n| Department of Justice                                              |            |\n| DSAC                                                               |            |\n| Domestic Security Alliance Council                                 |            |\n|                                                                    |            |\n\n\n\n-\n\n\n| Acronym                                       | Meaning    |\n|-----------------------------------------------|------------|\n| EAR                                           |            |\n| Export Administration Regulations             |            |\n| ECPA                                          |            |\n| Electronic Communications Privacy Act         |            |\n| ECTR                                          |            |\n| Electronic Communication  ransactional Record |            |\n|                                               |            |\n| EEA                                           |            |\n| Economic Espionage Act                        |            |\n| EOUSA                                         |            |\n| Executive Office for United States Attorneys  |            |\n| ESU                                           |            |\n| Electronic Surveillance Unit                  |            |\n| FBI                                           |            |\n| Federal Bureau of Investigation               |            |\n| FinCE                                         |            |\n| Financial Crimes Enforcement Network          |            |\n| FISA                                          |            |\n| Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act         |            |\n|                                               |            |\n|                                               |            |\n| FLASH                                         |            |\n| FBI Liaison Alert System                      |            |\n|                                               |            |\n|                                               |            |\n|                                               |            |\n| FSB                                           |            |\n| Russian Federal Security Service              |            |\n| GDPR                                          |            |\n| General Data Protection Regulation            |            |\n| HTOCU                                         |            |\n| Hi- ech Organized Crime Unit                  |            |\n| IC3                                           |            |\n| he Internet Crime Complaint Center            |            |\n|                                               |            |\n| IEEPA                                         |            |\n| International Emergency Economic Powers Act   |            |\n| I TERPOL                                      |            |\n| International Criminal Police Organization    |            |\n| IoT                                           |            |\n| Internet of hings                             |            |\n| IP (address)                                  |            |\n| Internet Protocol                             |            |\n| IPR                                           |            |\n| Intellectual Property Rights                  |            |\n|                                               |            |\n| IRS                                           |            |\n| Internal Revenue Service                      |            |\n|                                               |            |\n| ISIL                                          |            |\n| Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant          |            |\n|                                               |            |\n|                                               |            |\n| ISP                                           |            |\n| Internet Service Provider                     |            |\n|                                               |            |\n| JAR                                           |            |\n| Joint Analysis Report                         |            |\n| J-CODE                                        |            |\n| Joint Criminal Opioid Darknet Enforcement     |            |\n| JITs                                          |            |\n| Joint Investigative  eams                     |            |\n|                                               |            |\n| JTA                                           |            |\n| Joint  echnical Advisory                      |            |\n| KAT                                           |            |\n| Kickass orrents                               |            |\n\n\n| Acronym                                                       | Meaning    |\n|---------------------------------------------------------------|------------|\n| MLARS                                                         |            |\n| Money Laundering and Asset Recovery Section, Criminal ivision |            |\n| MLAT                                                          |            |\n| Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty                                |            |\n| MUCD                                                          |            |\n| Military Unit Cover esignator                                 |            |\n| NCCIC                                                         |            |\n| National Cybersecurity and Communications Integration Center  |            |\n| NCFTA                                                         |            |\n| National Cyber-Forensics and Training Alliance                |            |\n|                                                               |            |\n|                                                               |            |\n| NCIJTF                                                        |            |\n| National Cyber Investigative Joint Task Force                 |            |\n| NDCAC                                                         |            |\n| National  omestic Communications Assistance Center            |            |\n| NIC                                                           |            |\n| National Initiative for Cybersecurity Education               |            |\n| NITs                                                          |            |\n| Network Investigative Techniques                              |            |\n|                                                               |            |\n| NSCS                                                          |            |\n| National Security Cyber Specialists                           |            |\n| NSD                                                           |            |\n| National Security  ivision                                    |            |\n| NSL                                                           |            |\n| National Security Letter                                      |            |\n| OFAC                                                          |            |\n| Office of Foreign Assets Control                              |            |\n| OIA                                                           |            |\n| Office of International Affairs, Criminal ivision             |            |\n| OJT                                                           |            |\n| On the Job Training                                           |            |\n| OL                                                            |            |\n| Office of Legal Education                                     |            |\n| P2P                                                           |            |\n| Peer-to-Peer                                                  |            |\n| PII                                                           |            |\n| Personally Identifiable Information                           |            |\n| PINs                                                          |            |\n| Private Industry Notifications                                |            |\n| PLA                                                           |            |\n| People's Liberation Army                                      |            |\n|                                                               |            |\n|                                                               |            |\n| PPD                                                           |            |\n| Presidential Policy irective                                  |            |\n| PRC                                                           |            |\n| People's Republic of China                                    |            |\n| PRTT                                                          |            |\n| Pen Register and Trap and Trace                               |            |\n| PSA                                                           |            |\n| Public Service Announcement                                   |            |\n| RICO                                                          |            |\n| Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act            |            |\n|                                                               |            |\n| ROB                                                           |            |\n| Rules of Behavior                                             |            |\n| SCADA                                                         |            |\n| Supervisory Control and  ata Acquisition                      |            |\n\n## Cyber-Digital Task Force Report\n\n| Acronym                                                    |\n|------------------------------------------------------------|\n| SPE                                                        |\n| Sony Pictures Entertainment                                |\n|                                                            |\n|                                                            |\n| STSO                                                       |\n| Operational Support Unit (Drug Enforcement  dministration) |\n|                                                            |\n| SUA                                                        |\n| Specified Unlawful ctivity                                 |\n|                                                            |\n| Tor                                                        |\n| The Onion Router                                           |\n| TRO                                                        |\n| Temporary Restraining Order                                |\n|                                                            |\n| USAO                                                       |\n| United States ttorney's Office                             |\n|                                                            |\n| USNCB                                                      |\n| United States National Central Bureau (INTERPOL)           |\n| US-CERT                                                    |\n| United States Computer Emergency Readiness Team            |\n| USTR                                                       |\n| United States Trade Representative                         |\n| RRA                                                        |\n| Victims' Rights and Restitution ct                         |\n|                                                            |\n| WTI                                                        |\n| Workforce Training Initiative                              |\n|                                                            |\n|                                                            |\n|                                                            |\n|                                                            |\n|                                                            |\n|                                                            |\n|                                                            |"
    },
    {
        "text": "# Information Operations In Operations Enduring Freedom And Iraqi Freedom - What Went Wrong? A Monograph By Major Joseph L. Cox Us Army\n\nSchool of Advanced Military Studies\nUnited States Army Command and General Staff College\nFort Leavenworth, Kansas\nAY 05-06\nThe public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions.\n\nsearching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing the burden, to Department of Defense. Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports (0704-0188), 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that not withstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to any  penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number.\n\nInformation Operations in Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom - What Went Wrong?\n\n## 7. Performing Organization Name(S) And Address(Es)\n\nSchool of Advanced Military Studies 250 Gibbon Ave Ft. Leavenworth, KS 66027\n\n| 9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)    |\n|------------------------------------------------------------|\n| CGSC, SAMS                                                 |\n| 11. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S REPORT                               |\n| NUMBER(S)                                                  |\n\nCommand and General Staff College 1 Reynolds Ave Ft. Leavenworth, KS 66027\n\n## 12. Distribution/Availability Statement\n\nAPPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE; DISTRIBUTION IS UNLIMITED\n\n## 13. Supplementary Notes\n\n14. ABSTRACT\nThere are essentially three issues commanders must confront to integrate IO: doctrine, intelligence support to IO and resourcing the IO efforts. First, Army doctrine does not provide commanders adequate guidance for integrating IO into their operations. Second, IO requires proper intelligence support to be effective, but intelligence doctrine and resourcing do not allow intelligence support to IO to be effective.  Third, the Army has not resourced itself to conduct IO in an effective manner. As a result of these three issues with the Army's concept of IO, commanders just do not understand how to integrate IO.  This monograph will provide a series of recommendations that if implemented will help prepare commanders for the task of integrating IO.  Those recommendations include doctrinal changes and modifications, organizational changes, training requirements, material resourcing requirements, leadership and education requirements, and personnel resourcing requirements.  If implemented these recommendations will make long-term changes to how the Army prepares commanders to integrate IO into their  operations\n15. SUBJECT TERMS\nInformation Operations, Operation Iraqi Freedom, OIF, Operation Enduring Freedom, OEF, CPA, Bremer, Third Army, USCENTCOM, Iraq, Afghanistan\n\n16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF:\n17 LIMITATION OF\n18. NUMBER 19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON\nABSTRACT\nOF\n  PAGES\nREPORT\nb. ABSTRACT\nc. THIS PAGE\n19B. TELEPHONE. NUMBER (Include area code)\n(U)\n133\n(913) 758-3300\n(U)\n(U)\n (U)\n\n## School Of Advanced Military Studies Monograph Approval\n\nInformation Operations in Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom - What Went Wrong?\n\nApproved by: __________________________________\n\nMonograph Director, Charles N. Eassa, LTC, FA\nSchool of Advanced\n\n\n                                                                           Military Studies\n\n___________________________________\n\nDirector, Kevin C.M. Benson, COL, AR\nSchool of Advanced\n\n\n                                                                           Military Studies\n\n___________________________________\nDirector, Robert F. Baumann, Ph.D.\n\nGraduate Degree Programs\n\n## Abstract\n\nINFORMATION OPERATIONS IN OPERATIONS ENDURING FREEDOM AND IRAQI\nFREEDOM - WHAT WENT WRONG? by Major Joseph L. Cox, US Army, 124 pages.\n\nThis monograph examines the integration of Information Operations (IO) during Operations Enduring Freedom (OEF) and Iraqi Freedom (OIF).  As a rule, most commanders considered IO ineffective because IO was unable to respond to the complex environments of Afghanistan and Iraq.   This monograph examines how the Army prepared commanders to integrate IO into operations in Afghanistan and Iraq.  Both theaters offer good examples of how commanders integrated IO effectively and how commanders failed to integrate IO effectively.\n\nThere are essentially three issues commanders must confront to integrate IO: doctrine, intelligence support to IO and resourcing the IO efforts.  First, Army doctrine does not provide commanders adequate guidance for integrating IO into their operations.  Doctrine presents IO in a disjointed manner and as a function that is essentially separate from the commander's other requirements and missions, not as something that must be integrated into all his requirements and missions.  Second, IO requires proper intelligence support to be effective, but intelligence doctrine and resourcing do not allow intelligence support to IO to be effective.  Intelligence doctrine provides little practical guidance on support to IO and intelligence processors and analysts are currently unprepared to provide the in depth analysis of the information environment IO requires. Third, the Army has not resourced itself to conduct IO in an effective manner.  There are currently only sixty percent of the required IO officers in the Army.  None of the Army Battle Command Systems (ABCS) can adequately portray the information environment, nor can they process the reporting that would allow them to analyze and portray the information environment. Professional Military Education and unit training programs do not stress IO as an integrated function and do not present commanders with realistic situations in which they must achieve success in the information environment.  As a result of these three issues with the Army's concept of IO, commanders just do not understand how to integrate IO.\n\nAfter examining why and how commanders were unable to integrate IO effectively, this monograph will provide a series of recommendations that if implemented will help prepare commanders for the task of integrating IO.  Those recommendations include doctrinal changes and modifications, organizational changes, training requirements, material resourcing requirements, leadership and education requirements, and personnel resourcing requirements. Some of these recommendations are already in the process of being implemented, others could be implemented relatively quickly, while the remaining recommendations will need more detailed study to fully implement so as to make long-term changes in the Army and how the Army prepares commanders to integrate IO.\n\nThe appendices provide the reader with more detailed information on IO that could not realistically be included in the length requirements of this monograph.  While reading them is not essential to understanding the issues presented in the monograph, the appendices do help in providing more depth or understanding of the subjects presented in the main body of the monograph.  These appendices discuss the relationship of Public Affairs to IO, provides an overview of IO organizational and equipment capabilities of the units identified in the main body of the monograph and provides a more detailed  breakdown of the various units which served in OEF and OIF.\n\n## Introduction\n\nTo subjugate an enemy's army without doing battle is the highest of excellence.\n\n- Sun Tzu, The Art of War. Conducting operations that influence the enemy's will to fight is as old as warfare itself.\nHistory is replete with examples of Military Deception (MILDEC), Psychological Operations (PSYOP), Electronic Warfare (EW), Operations Security (OPSEC) and the destruction of the enemy's Command and Control (C2) Nodes.  The US military even developed doctrine to conduct Command and Control Warfare (C2W).  In the 1990s, a concept called Information Operations (or Information Warfare) began to take hold, first in the Joint community and then in the Army.  US Operations in the Balkans posed renewed challenges to the US military as it strove to change attitudes and perceptions of combatant and non-combatants as the Military enforced United Nations and NATO mandates concerning Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo.  In 1999, the Army created the Information Operations (IO) Career Field to provide commanders with a dedicated IO staff to ensure the unit plans and executes IO carefully.\n\nWhile the military would learn many valuable lessons from operations in the Balkans, the real test of IO would come during Operations ENDURING FREEDOM and IRAQI FREEDOM (OEF and OIF).  It was during these operations that the military would test and expand the tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs) developed in the Balkans crises.  The initial feedback from commanders in the field and senior leaders was less than enthusiastic.  It is still common to hear phrases like \"We are losing the information war\" or \"We face information overmatch and are not competing effectively.\"  What is it about the Army's implementation of IO that produced lackluster results in Afghanistan and Iraq?\n\nA review of unit after action reviews (AARs), analysis from the Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL), and feedback from commanders in the field reveal four significant trends that if corrected will allow IO to be a force multiplier throughout the full spectrum of military operations.  In summary, those four trends are: Army Doctrine was not adequate to provide guidance for shaping the information environment in full spectrum operations at all Army echelons; Intelligence support to IO was inadequate; Units lacked the resources to integrate IO in to their operations; and commanders, staffs and IO officers did understand how to integrate IO with all the tools (Civil Affairs, Public Affairs, maneuver, fire support, logistics, etc.) available to them to shape the information environment in which they would operate.1\nSuccessful operations require commanders to be personally involved in the planning and execution of their unit's operations.  How the commander is involved in the unit's planning and execution of his plan is in essence the art of battle command.  Furthermore, FM 3-0 provides clues as to how this occurs when it states:\nCommanders, assisted by the staff, *visualize* the operation, *describe* it in terms of intent and guidance, and *direct* the actions of subordinates within their intent.  Commanders direct operations in terms of the battlefield operating systems (BOS). They directly influence operations by personal presence, supported by their command and control (C2) system.2 (emphasis added)\nThe best commanders are those who are able to take their vision of the battlefield and assist their staffs and subordinate commanders in preparing and executing an operation that uses the units' resources in the most effective manner possible while simultaneously reducing the risk to the unit to a manageable level.  Proper utilization of the commander's (and unit's) resources requires a total integration of those resources to ensure they are working to achieve the commander's intended end state.\n\nArmy, 2001), 5-1.\n\nFor the staff to integrate IO into a unit's operations, it must be a priority for the commander, and expressed such by him.  First, a commander must visualize the information environment and how his operation will influence that environment.  He must then express his concept of the operation and how the use of information will complement his operation.  In some cases, he will describe IO as the decisive operation; in other cases, IO will be a supporting operation.  Finally, he directs his subordinates through his intent, which should provide clear guidance for them to execute.\nWhile this process may look good in theory, in practice it rarely occurred as described above.  Commanders understood the need to integrate IO, but were struggling with its implementation.  This struggle essentially came from a misunderstanding of what IO really was. In the minds of many Army leaders, IO remained a nebulous concept with some sort of focus on shaping people's perceptions and attitudes.  Most commanders could recite the definition of IO as \"actions taken to affect adversary, and influence others', decision making processes, information and information systems while protecting one's own information and information systems.\"3\nMany commanders have had difficulty articulating a definition of IO beyond the relatively simplistic definition found in Army doctrine.  Perhaps it would be better if commanders thought of IO as a combination of four functions: influence, inform, attack and protect, whose coordinated use produces an effect on the battlefield greater than merely adding the results of the individual functions together.\n\nInfluence operations are those operations designed to change the behavior of a target audience.  In major combat operations, influence operations are primarily against military forces. In stability operations, influence operations are primarily aimed at influencing non-military persons to comply with US (or coalition) instructions or in the case of Counterinsurgency (COIN) operations to influence the populace to support US operations.\nIf the essence of COIN operations is, as David Galula, one of the preeminent theorists of COIN in the late twentieth century and author of Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice, stated that separating the insurgents from the populace, then influence operations is the decisive operation in COIN.4  If most people fall into three categories, pro-US, pro-insurgent and neutral, then the focus should be on the group that has the most impact on the fight.  Given that relatively small percentages (somewhere around 10%) of the population fall on either extreme of the pro-US/pro-insurgent spectrum and will not change their opinions and perceptions, then the High Payoff Target (HPT) in such a scenario is those who have not clearly declared an allegiance, the neutral population.  It is the neutral population that allows the insurgents to move and operate with impunity. 5  Changing the attitude of the neutral populace to a pro-US attitude will cause the insurgents to lose their ability to operate freely.  The following diagram depicts methods for influencing the neutral populace.  (The diagram is not intended to show that kinetic or non-kinetic are exclusive to either end of spectrum, but rather to show where kinetic and non-kinetic operations would be more likely).\n\n## Figure 1: Influencing The Neutrals\n\nWhile most assume that keeping the neutrals, or fence sitters, from choosing a side, is the key to successful coin operations, in actuality it is by targeting them to gain their support that will ultimately achieve victory in COIN operations.\n\nThe inform function of IO is, quite simply, providing target audiences information on US\nactivities, intentions, and operations.  Although there may be a secondary influence objective, the primary objective is purely to provide information.  PSYOP units call this \"Command Information.\"  In OIF, the effort to inform the Iraqis and the world of progress in Iraq consumed a large percentage of the IO staffs' time and efforts.  Informing can occur through the following methods, Public Affairs (PA), Civil Military Operations (CMO), leader engagements by combat leaders, engagements with the local populace by forces in the course of their operations, and PSYOP.\n\nThe attack function of IO is to neutralize, suppress, degrade or destroy an adversary IO\ncapability.  When used in conjunction with informing operations and influencing operations, the effect can be multiplied beyond the effect of the initial attack. These attacks can be kinetic or non-kinetic.  Types of attacks include but are not limited to; EA; Physical Destruction through maneuver, fire support or airborne delivery platforms; computer network attacks (CNA); and MILDEC.\n\nThe final function of IO is protection.  This prevents the adversary from neutralizing, suppressing, degrading, or destroying the friendly IO capability.  Protection has two aspects.  The first aspect is to protect friendly information capabilities (information and information systems and decision making capabilities).  The second aspect is to protect the information environment friendly forces are trying to create.  This prevents the adversary from creating an information environment that favors him.   Some of the tools available to protect friendly information capabilities include computer network defense (CND), counter-intelligence (CI) operations, counter-propaganda by PA and PSYOP, and radio net encryption.\n\nCommanders must not only ensure that IO is integrated horizontally across the Battlefield Operations Systems (BOS) in his unit, he must also ensure that IO is integrated vertically, that is his intent nests with his higher commander's IO intent.  Only when IO is integrated cross-BOS and between echelons of command, can the commander truly be sure he is influencing the information environment, and diminishing the enemy's capability to influence that same information environment. One must remember, these functions are NOT separate, but are interrelated and dependant upon one another to be effective.\nEven if commanders understood IO in Afghanistan and Iraq in terms of influence, inform, attack and protect, the Army had not prepared commanders to integrate IO.  The remainder of this monograph will discuss how the Army prepared commanders for the task of integrating IO and how commanders chose to resource and integrate IO.  Through an understanding of the doctrinal, intelligence and resourcing challenges facing commanders, the reader will gain an appreciation for the decisions commanders faced as to how each commander integrated IO.  Examples of how commanders integrated IO will show how commanders made intuitive judgments on how to integrate IO given the lack of doctrinal guidance and resources each commander had available to him.\n\nChapter Two will focus on Army doctrine and how it fails to adequately provide guidance and give a framework with which commanders can integrate IO into their operations.\nThere are three issues with Army doctrine that cause it to be inadequate to guide IO integration.\nFirst, current Army doctrine is in a state of flux and has been for roughly six years as the Army attempts to grapple with the changes in the contemporary operating environment.  Many of the changes to doctrine which have occurred since 2001 have yet to propagate through all the Army's doctrine.  Second, the current Army doctrinal manuals do a poor job of integrating IO into operations.  None of the Army Capstone doctrinal manuals (FM 1-0, FM 2-0, FM 3-0, FM 4-0, FM 5-0 and FM 6-0) presents IO in conjunction with operations.  Furthermore, the subject and functional manuals (FM 3-13, FM 6-20-10, etc) also do not present IO as being integrated fully with a unit's operations.  Third, current doctrine does not provide guidance for integrating the elements of IO with one another.  Because current doctrine is inadequate, training programs based on doctrine are not adequately preparing commanders or their staffs for the task of integrating IO into operations.\n\nChapter Three will discuss intelligence support to IO.  Intelligence must assist the\n\"commander in visualizing his battle space, organizing his forces, and controlling operations to achieve the desired tactical objectives or end-state.\"6 Two shortcomings in intelligence organizations, however, make them incapable of providing the intelligence the commander needs to influence the information environment.  The first shortcoming is in intelligence doctrine as it relates to supporting IO.  Intelligence doctrine does not address with sufficient detail the type of information that IO requires.  The second shortcoming is the resourcing of intelligence support to IO.  These resources include collection assets, analysis tools and trained analysts that understand the information environment.\n\nChapter Four will examine IO resourcing.  Even though changes to IO force requirements are occurring as the Army transforms in accordance with Task Force Modularity, resources still remain inadequate for the task of integrating IO.   With the first truly modular units just beginning their rotations into OIF, it is difficult to determine if resources are truly adequate.  Understanding that changes have occurred in the last two years, this chapter will examine how IO tends to be resourced.  Using case studies from OEF  and OIF, this chapter will show where the most significant shortfalls in resourcing occur.  Some of these shortfalls will continue despite the Army's transformation plan.\n\nChapter Five will address how IO is integrated into operations.  The problems with integration stem directly from the lack of guidance in doctrine.  Because commanders struggled with how to integrate IO, they each developed their own methods for integrating IO.  While some commanders made a deliberate attempt to ensure IO integration, others were less certain and provided little clear guidance for integrating IO.  Most failures in integrating IO were a result of the commander failing to visualize the complete operational environment.  As a result, commanders viewed IO solely in terms of what was presented in the media and used IO to help spread the good news (inform) rather than change the perceptions of the target audiences (influence) or degrading their adversaries ability to manage perceptions (attack) or even defending the information environment the commander was trying to create in his area of operations (protect).\nChapter Six will summarize the findings on the previous four chapters.  It will also address the changes that have occurred in IO based upon the lessons learned in Afghanistan and Iraq.  Finally, it will provide a series of recommendations that address Army doctrine, intelligence support to IO, what resources IO needs to be effective, and how to improve commanders, staffs and IO Officers' ability to implement IO.\n\nThe appendices will focus on material that will aid the reader in understanding some of concepts presented in the monograph, but the discussion of those topics would not fall cleanly into the issues presented in the main body of the paper.  These topics include a discussion on the relationship of IO and the media, the Army's targeting process, and the development of IO force structures in both Afghanistan and Iraq.\n\n## Army Doctrine And Io\n\nThe Doctrinal concept of information operations (IO) as a combat multiplier seems to be universally misunderstood at nearly every level of the Army.\nCenter for Army Lessons Learned If the US Army is, as its leaders have repeatedly stated, a \"doctrine-based Army,\" then doctrine must form the cornerstone for all Army operations, including the use of IO.  Overall, doctrine failed to prepare commanders to integrate IO into their operations.  As a result, commanders tended to view IO as \"another staff stovepipe with undefined and unresourced missions, a vertical staff effort that does not seem relevant to combat operations.\"7 There were few principles which guided the integration of IO into a unit's operation.  Of course, part of the problem was that current Army (and to some degree Joint) doctrine has been in a state of transition and has been for the better part of the last five or six years.  This caused the emergence of new tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs) that were not in doctrine, but that have slowly worked their way into doctrine.  The second issue with Army doctrine was present even in the newer doctrine material, there was no clear guidance on integrating IO.  In some cases, the guidance was vague and sometimes contradictory.\n\nEvents since the 11 September 2001 attack on the United States have forced a rethinking of the way the United States applied military forces against complex problems often requiring elusive solutions.  Army doctrine writers had to create doctrine in the midst of two conflicting challenges.  First, the counterinsurgency operations in Afghanistan and Iraq have forced the military, especially the Army, to consider new ways of US military forces to achieve political ends.  Second, the Army has begun conducting the largest transformation of its structure and organization since World War II.  This transformation would not just restructure the Army, but force it to consider new ways of employing its forces.\n\nTransformations are difficult to accomplish under the best of circumstances, but the Army is attempting to transform itself while simultaneously conducting a war.  Under normal circumstances, the Army would develop unit designs, create at least an interim doctrine for those units, field new equipment and then transform existing units to the new design, train the newly formed unit for a period of time (usually months) and then certify the unit was ready for deployment.  The transformation combined with the requirements of the Global War on Terror required that units transform, train and develop their own TTPs for employing the unit and then shortly thereafter participate in combat operations.  In fact, some units who participated in the current OIF rotation shipped their equipment directly to Iraq from one of the Combat Maneuver Training Centers.  This pace of transforming deploying has caused doctrine to fall behind situations in the field.\nTo make matters worse, the traditional model of doctrinal development would require two to three years to re-write a single manual.  Under this paradigm, the lessons learned from OIF-1 (2003 - 2004) would just now become part of current doctrine.  If one were to take this time frame for re-writing doctrine as a literal requirement, re-writing doctrine would be relatively straightforward.  All a doctrinal proponent needed to do was start a new manual and two years later, the Army would publish a new doctrinal manual.  That is not, however, the case.  The structure of Army doctrine and the need to ensure consistency in approved doctrine means it takes several years for new doctrinal principles to propagate throughout the Army's doctrinal manuals and may take even longer for those principles to become ingrained into the Army's procedures.\n\nThe following table shows how some of Army doctrine relating to IO has undergone change.  Notice that current targeting doctrine was seven years old when IO doctrine was updated.  The targeting doctrine of 1996 did not include a discussion of non-lethal targeting.  For a more thorough discussion of Army targeting doctrine, refer to Appendix B.\n\n| Manual                   | Title                               | Pub Date                          | Replaced    | Pub Date                    |\n|--------------------------|-------------------------------------|-----------------------------------|-------------|-----------------------------|\n| with                     |                                     |                                   |             |                             |\n| FM 3                     | Operations                          | June 2001                         |             |                             |\n| FM 3-05.401              | Civil Affairs TTPs                  | Sep 2003                          |             |                             |\n| FM 3-07                  | Stability and Support Operations    | Feb 2003                          |             |                             |\n| FMI 3-07.22              | Counter-insurgency Operations       | Oct 2004                          |             |                             |\n| FM 3-55.12               | COMCAM                              | Mar 2003                          |             |                             |\n| FM 3-61.1                | Public Affairs TTPs                 | Oct 2000                          |             |                             |\n| FM 6-02.40               | Visual Information Operations       | Jan 2002                          |             |                             |\n| FM 6-20                  | Fire Support in the Air Land Battle | May 1988                          |             |                             |\n| FM 6-20-10               | TTP for the Targeting Process       | May 1996                          |             |                             |\n| Oct 1989                 | FM 6-20-30                          | TTP for Fire Support for Division |             |                             |\n| and Corps Operations     |                                     |                                   |             |                             |\n| FM 6-100*                | IO                                  | Aug 1996                          | FM 3-13     | Nov 2003                    |\n| FM 33-1                  | PSYOP                               | April 1983                        | FM 3-05.30  | April 2005                  |\n| FM 33-1-1                | PSYOP TTP                           | May 1994                          | FM 3-05.301 | Dec 2003                    |\n| Sep 1994                 | FM 2                                | May 2004                          | FM 34-1     | Intelligence and Electronic |\n| Warfare (IEW) Operations |                                     |                                   |             |                             |\n| Mar 1994                 | FM 34-2                             | Collection Management and         |             |                             |\n| Synchronization Planning |                                     |                                   |             |                             |\n| FM 34-3                  | Intelligence Analysis               | Mar 1990                          |             |                             |\n| FM 34-8                  | CDRs Handbook on Intelligence       | Sep 1992                          | Obsolete    |                             |\n| FM 34-10                 | Division IEW Operations             | Nov 1986                          |             |                             |\n| Jan 1991                 | FM 34-37                            | Echelons Above Corps IEW          |             |                             |\n| Operations               |                                     |                                   |             |                             |\n| FM 34-45                 | TTP for Electronic Attack           | June 2000                         |             |                             |\n| FM 34-130                | IPB                                 | July 1994                         |             |                             |\n| FM 41-10                 | Civil Affairs                       | Feb 2000                          |             |                             |\n| FM 46-1                  | Public Affairs                      | May 1997                          |             |                             |\n| FM 100-1                 | The Army                            | June 1994                         | FM 1-0      | June 2005                   |\n| FM 101-5                 | Staff Organization and Operations   | May 1997                          | FM 5-0      | Jan 2005                    |\n| FM 6-0                   | Aug 2003                            |                                   |             |                             |\n\n## Table 1: Army Io Doctrine Re-Write Dates8\n\nIn taking over twenty-years (1986 to present) to update doctrine relating to IO, the Army has inadvertently ensured its doctrine for integrating IO would remain disjointed, incomplete and out of date.\nTo ensure doctrinal principles remained consistent throughout all the doctrinal manuals, the Army developed a hierarchical approach to structuring doctrine.  The hierarchical concept was actually straightforward.  The Capstone manuals introduced broad principles.  Specific subject manuals (IO, targeting, IPB, etc) provided direction on implementing those principles. Finally, unit manuals provided guidance on implementing specific subject matter direction that was appropriate for the unit based on its organization, resources and capabilities.  Other manuals\n(Operations Manuals), such as FM 3-7 (Stability Operations) provided guidance for conducting operations in that unique environment.  These manuals were cross-BOS in that they provided direction for all the BOSs in that environment.\n\nThe following chart depicts how this system was supposed to work.  In practice, this was usually less clear.  The chart has been simplified for ease of understanding.\n\nUsing Figure 2 as a framework, what should be represented in doctrine?  First, all doctrinal manuals needed to have the same definition of IO.  For manuals written after 2001 this was indeed the case.  Unfortunately, as discussed in Chapter One, the definition did little to clarify in commanders' minds what IO really was.   Recently, commanders have come to perceive IO almost from a purely non-kinetic point of view and determined the effectiveness of IO based on what actions and activities made it on the international news circuit and whether that press coverage was positive or negative.  The tendency became to dismiss reporting that was repeatedly negative because it was based on the bias of an anti-US organization.  Examples of dismissing negative press reporting included the Army's responses to negative reporting from Al Jazeerah, Agence-France Presse, and even in some cases, the BBC or the *New York Times*.\n\nSecond, each Capstone manual needed to provide guidance for IO within their subject matter.  This needed to start with FM 1-0 mentioning IO in full spectrum operations, and not limit IO to information superiority.  FM 2-0 needed to clearly identify support requirements for IO to lay the foundation for subsequent intelligence manuals to build a more in depth understanding of intelligence support to IO.  FM 3-0 had to stress that IO had a role in influencing the environment in which all forces will operate.  The manual needed to provide guidance on using \"non-IO\" resources to achieve IO objectives.  It also needed to provide commanders guidance on how to visualize, describe and direct what he wanted to achieve in the information environment as a subset of the overall operational environment.  FM 4-0 had to address how IO affects CSS operations.  The manual had to show how IO could help CSS units accomplish their mission and how these units could participate in achieving an information objective.  FM 5-0 needed to include planning requirements for the information environment and how best leverage the information environment so the commander could achieve his end state.  Finally FM 6-0 had to include a discussion on how the information environment could affect the commander's ability to exercise effective command and control of his forces.\nThird, IO specific doctrine as expressed in FM 3-13 needed to provide not only guidance on how to integrate into Army operations, but it also had to provide guidance on integrating the various elements of IO with each other to achieve the commander's objectives and ultimately his end state.  Part of the discussion on integration needed to include a discussion of the capabilities and limitations of the elements of IO available to an organization to conduct IO.   This discussion needed to include the various systems used by PSYOP, EW, and Combat Camera to support IO. This discussion should not merely discuss core element tools, but should also include tools such as maneuver forces, fire support, CA, and PA.  While FM 1-13 stated requirements to integrate, it provided few details on how to achieve that integration.  It also did not address integrating IO into maneuver, fire support, logistics or any other function a unit could perform.\n\nFourth, the IO element (core, related and supporting) manuals needed to clearly articulate the role of that element in a unit's overall effort to shape the information environment.  It was not enough to simply state what EW, or PSYOP, or PA, or even CMO was, but the doctrine had to provide some basis for understanding how those elements related to the other elements of IO. Within these manuals, there needed to be clear guidance on who is responsible for shaping the information environment, especially in the areas of PSYOP and PA.  Currently no manual provided that kind of contextual data or guidance delineating responsibility.9\nNext unit (such as FM 71-100, *Division Operations*) manuals needed to provide clear guidance on integrating IO at that specific unit based on the resources that unit could have and the types of missions that unit could face.  By the same token, operation specific (such as FM 3-07 Stability Operations) manuals needed to provide clear guidelines on integrating IO within that type of operation.  In this case, doctrine needed to include the types or resources most effective in meeting the IO integration requirements for the operation.\n\nIn closing the discussion on Army doctrine and IO integration, the reader should remember the following three points.  First, Army doctrine is in a state of flux caused by a greater understanding of the current operating environment and the Army-wide transformation currently underway.  Because of the nature of the transformation, it will take time for doctrinal re-writes to run their course and reach the army in the field.  Second, the structure of Army doctrine is designed to ensure consistency of doctrinal principles throughout all Army manuals, but that consistency will only work when proponents of the various Army doctrinal manuals ensure their manuals meet the intent of the hierarchical structure beyond a numbering scheme.  Third, current doctrine does not provide guidance on integrating IO into unit operations.   Doctrine generally dealt with IO as separate from unit planning and operations.  To be effective, a discussion of IO must occur within the context of unit operations and planning processes.  Doctrine must view IO integration in the same manner it views river crossings or counter fire - an activity that requires close coordination with all BOS elements to be successful.\n\nA solid baseline doctrine allows the commander to understand all the tools at his disposal.  These tools will help him to visualize the operating environment in its totality, not just in terms of military forces.  Once the commander has a clear vision of the operating environment, he can then describe his framework for achieving his end state and then direct his staff and subordinates on what they must do in order for the unit to obtain the end state the commander desires.  Once doctrine clearly articulates IO as an integrated function, much like river crossing operations or counterfire operations, then commanders will no longer view IO as \"another staff stovepipe with undefined and unresourced missions, a vertical staff effort that does not seem relevant to combat operations.\"10\n\n## Intelligence Support To Io\n\nUnderstanding the effect of operations as seen through the lens of the Iraqi culture and psyche is a foremost planning consideration for every operation.\nMG Peter Chiarelli11\nIntelligence support to IO is critical to achieving operational success.  As a key to visualizing the operational environment, intelligence helps the commander understand what elements of the information environment the commander needs to effect in order to achieve his end state.  The commander can then describe how he wants to affect those elements by articulating which information objectives were decisive and which elements were supporting operations. Focused intelligence collection, directed through Priority Intelligence Requirements (PIR), allows the commander to determine whether he is achieving his objectives and getting closer to achieving his end state.\nIntelligence faced two challenges in providing support to IO.  First, intelligence doctrinal shortcomings did not lay a foundation that allowed the G2 to properly analyze the information environment.  The most critical doctrinal shortcoming involved Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB).  Second, resourcing issues prevented the G2 from dedicating assets that would collect, process, analyze and disseminate intelligence reporting that provided details on the information environment.\n\n## Intelligence Preparation Of The Battlefield\n\nIntelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB) helped the commander visualize the all the dimensions of the operational environment.  Combined with the an analysis of the interaction of the critical variables with the six dimensions of the operational environment, the commander began to understand his environment and what he had to do to effect that environment and achieve his desired end state.  If the IPB did not adequately address the information environment, then the commander could not understand that aspect of the environment and as a result, would not address the information environment.  Figure 5 depicts the operational environment and the critical variables that IPB must provide analysis for.  (The reader should recall that each dimension interacts with every other dimension, so affecting one dimension has an affect on all dimensions.)\nEven though this chart clearly indicates that intelligence analysts must analyze the entire environment, including the information environment, intelligence doctrine only provides details on analysis in threat dimension and land combat operations of the operational environment. Intelligence doctrine focused on analysis supported by technical collection methods (primarily SIGINT and IMINT) with limited confirmation from HUMINT (SALUTE) reports while essentially ignoring anything that did not fall neatly into a technical realm.\n\nA recent Rand Study on intelligence support to IO during OIF determined that intelligence failed in providing the commanders with the level of support they required to conduct their operations.  According to this study, the failure stemmed from a failure of intelligence doctrine to address adequately IO support requirements.  The study acknowledged a requirement to support IO: \"Successful IO require a thorough and detailed IPB. IPB includes information about enemy capabilities, decision-making style, and information systems. It also considers the effect of the media and the attitudes, culture, economy, demographics, politics, and personalities of people in the AO.\"13 The issue lies in the fact that intelligence doctrine does not provide a method to achieve the results the commanders needed.  The study presented two key reasons for intelligence failures in Iraq.  First, \"although intelligence doctrine implied support to IO, there was no systematic method or analytical model for providing intelligence support to IO.\"14\nSecond, the \"current IPB process (as defined in FM 34-1 and FM 2-01.3) requires more detailed analysis to account for IO requirements.\"15\nBasically, IPB had to identify to the commander, what elements of the information environment he could affect, how to affect those areas and what most likely responses to his attempts to influence the information environment would be.  IPB also had to identify what elements in the information environment he should protect against.  This required a detailed study of at least the culture, religion, key communicators, demographics, history, decision making processes, and information systems of a given information and operational environment.  Much of this information should appear in Appendix 1 (Intelligence Estimate) of Annex B (Intelligence) of the Operations Order.  But Army intelligence doctrine does not provide any guidance on what information should be in the intelligence estimate.\nThis author's study of intelligence doctrine both through service as an Intelligence Officer and as research for this monograph has lead this author to adding one more reason why intelligence continually fails to provide adequate support for IO.  Intelligence doctrine, like other doctrine, views IO as a totally separate function.  The revised FM 2-0 and other draft intelligence manuals present IO as a totally separate and distinct function that a commander must use, but not necessarily integrating that function across his operations.  Manuals may say \"integrate\" but no manual provides clear guidance on how intelligence supports integrated IO.\n\n## Assessment\n\nWhile IPB was the key to understanding the information environment, assessment was the key for understanding what effect the unit's operations had on the information environment. There were two issues with conducting accurate and meaningful assessments.  First, doctrine provided little guidance on how to conduct assessments.  Second, assessments have traditionally been associated with Battle Damage Assessment, in other words the lethal targeting process. Lethal targeting tied the assessment process to the Air Tasking Order (ATO) cycle.  This was especially at the operational level.  There was no provision for assessing targets several days or even weeks after delivering an ordnance (or message) to a target. Finally, the non-intelligence reporting that would aid the G2 in providing an accurate assessment was not readily available to the G2 for analysis.\n\nBecause there was not a single Army doctrinal manual devoted to conducting assessments, this author had to review roughly six different manuals to cover the full spectrum of Army assessment doctrine.  A reading of IO doctrine, intelligence doctrine and targeting doctrine led this author to conclude that doctrine required three steps in conducting assessment.  The first step was to develop accurate measures of effectiveness (MOE) (Did the target react in a way we wanted it to? Were the number of systems destroyed (or damaged) enough to meet the commander's requirements)?  The second step was to develop a collection plan that tracked the target set and was capable of determining whether the target had been affected by the delivery platform.  (Delivery platform was not limited to kinetic systems, but could be PSYOP, CA, leader engagement, etc).  The third step was to develop measures of performance (MOP) to assess the effectiveness of the deliver asset (Did the delivery platform do what it was supposed to do?).\nAll the various doctrinal manuals implied that the assessment process was a joint function between operators (IO, PSYOP, fires, etc) and intelligence analysts.  Working together, they developed MOE that were measurable and accurate.  It is with these MOE that the G2 would develop a collection plan to identify changes in the environment.  Together, the operators and the G2 determined if the objectives had been met by a particular time. This deadline for achieving the desired effect on the target drove when collection assets needed to collect on the target by when analysts had to determine if the effect had been achieved.  The third assessment step, developing MOPs, did not require intelligence input.  This was purely an operator function.  In it, the operator determined whether the delivery mechanism delivered its payload/message to the intended target at the right location at the right time.\n\nCurrent doctrine provided no guidance on developing MOE and there was little training available on developing MOE, so it should not be a surprise that of all steps to the assessment process, developing MOE would be the one most often performed poorly.  The tendency became to track MOP as MOE.  This was based on the assumption that, if a delivery platform delivered a message, then the target received the message, it understood the message and acted according to the message.  Furthermore, if the MOE were not measurable, then collection assets could not identify the MOE was occurring and there was no feedback.  The same is true if the timing for observation of the MOE was incorrect.  In this case, however, collection assets would not be present to observe the MOE.  The end result was the same; there was no feedback to determine if the ordnance/message had the desired effect on the target.\nBecause current assessment practice had been associated with lethal targeting, the assessment cycle became tied to the ATO cycle.  The consequence of linking assessment to the ATO cycle did was an expectation for near instantaneous feedback.  IO was generally incapable of producing instant results and generating meaningful instant feedback.  At the tactical level, it could take days or even weeks for the results to become evident.  At the operational level, that time frame could extend to months or even years.  IO assessment tied directly to the ATO cycle cannot work, a more reasonable assessment timeline needed to be developed.\nSo far in the discussion of intelligence support to IO, this monograph has discussed the inadequacy of the intelligence doctrine, specifically IPB doctrine to help the commander visualize the information environment.  This monograph has also examined the inability of intelligence to provide meaningful assessment of the commander's operations on the information environment. This item of intelligence support to IO is the resourcing requirement to provide proper intelligence support to IO.\n\n## Intelligence Resourcing\n\nThe lack of solid doctrine was not the only issue intelligence faced when it came to supporting IO.  There were also resourcing issues that hindered effecting intelligence support to IO.  There were three areas that typical did not have enough resources.  First, there were not enough trained analysts to deal with the multiple reports and reporting formats that IO could generate.  Much of the reporting generated by IO did not fall neatly into the United States Message Text Format (USMTF).  This required analysts to read each CA, PSYOP, or patrol report individually.  This placed a heavy burden on the ACE and the G2.  Now not only did they need to sort through the reports generated from their own sensors, they also had to read the reports the CA and PSYOP teams generated.  There simply were not enough trained analysts to do this efficiently.  Second, the data processing systems between IO and intelligence were incompatible.  IO reports were free text reports and were unable to parse into an ASAS database. Analysts often used a separate non-standard database or spreadsheet in order to track the IO reporting.  This meant the analyst now worked two or more different computers to do his job.\n\nLack of standardized databases also made it difficult for the G2 and the IO section to share information.  As a rule, neither the G2 nor the IO section collaborated to make standard overlays for their maps and other presentations.  There was no standard tracking system to ensure both the G2 and the IO section viewed the same battlefield at the same time in the same manner.\n\nOne noteworthy exception to this failure of intelligence to support IO was in the First IO\nCommand (Land).  Because of its unique relationship to the Army's Intelligence and Security Command (INSCOM), the First IO Command was able to produce some fine products describing the information environments in Afghanistan and Iraq.  These products were exceptional and provided units deployed to Afghanistan and Iraq with valuable contextual data.  Unfortunately, these products usually lacked the detail to be practical to tactical units who often needed to know who the key communicators in a given town were, not just the key communicators for a particular region.  Another issue with the First IO Command products was the difficulty units had in obtaining them and then analyzing them to see what was pertinent to their areas of responsibility. Bandwidth issues would plague the first rotations to Afghanistan and Iraq.  Although there is more bandwidth available now, there is still not enough to allow unrestricted reach back capability from the field to the First IO Command.\n\nIn summary, intelligence support to IO is critical to ensuring the commander's success.\nFor intelligence support to meet the detailed requirements to support IO, several areas must be addressed.  First, intelligence doctrine must view IO as an integrated function much the same it views rivers crossings or counterfire.  Second, commanders must drive the intelligence process to provide support to IO.  Third, intelligence doctrine must provide more on guidance on the \"how\" of intelligence support.  It cannot simply direct to collect, process and disseminate information.\nFourth, intelligence must have the resources to support IO.  These resources include collection assets capable of reporting on the information environment, data management systems that can process the various reporting formats that IO generates and trained analysts capable of providing a detailed analysis of the reporting that various assets operating in the information environment generate.\n\n## Resourcing Io\n\nIf IO is a critical task that units must conduct, and it must integrated across all the BOS\nelements and executed across the full spectrum of combat operations, then it must have adequate resources to accomplish its mission.  Examining how units resourced IO would indicate the importance commanders placed on IO.  In many cases, Army doctrine, overall Army resourcing capabilities, and higher headquarters requirements would limit what resources commanders could dedicate to supporting IO.  In many instances, commanders had to divert assets from one mission requirement to support the IO requirement.  This chapter will examine how the Army and ultimately its commanders have chosen to resource IO.\nThis chapter will examine the resourcing issues the Army has with IO.  Through an examination of the manpower, equipment and training provided to ensure IO is integrated into operations, this paper will highlight the shortages the Army must address to give IO a better chance of success.  Next, this chapter will identify the resources that were available to the commanders participating in OEF and OIF.  The chapter presents a brief discussion of the overall operational/strategic situation in Afghanistan and Iraq to better place the resource allocations in context.  Within each operation, this chapter highlights what IO resources were available at the major points of the campaigns.  For the sake of clarity and simplicity, this monograph will only discuss to Division level resolution what resources were available in Afghanistan and Iraq. Below division level, task organizations changed so often that tracking teams and detachments would be impossible.  To aid the reader, Appendix C provides a brief description of the organization of the IO units as well as the unclassified capabilities of the major systems they have.\n\n## Manpower\n\nSince the inception of the IO Career Field (FA 30) in 1999, the career field has been continually undermanned.  Between FY 05 and FY13, the IO requirements jumped from 193\nrequired field grade officers to 305 officers.  The large increase in requirements is due to the Army's transformation.  Prior to transformation, IO officer assignments were limited primarily to Corps and higher with a couple Divisions being authorized IO cells.  As a result of transformation, every maneuver brigade in the Army received an IO officer.  Other IO positions were also in the several fires brigades, each corps, the numbered armies, the First IO Command, most unified and sub-unified commands.\n\nCurrently, the Army is short almost forty percent of the required IO officers.  The US\nArmy IO Proponent (USAIOP) has developed an active recruiting program to meet personnel requirements, but it will still take until FY 2013 to fill all the manning requirements. The graph below depicts current and projected IO requirements and fill according the USAIOP.\n\nWhile Table 2 presented an accurate timeline, the USAIOP based the numbers on meeting their accession goals.  This year, the USAIOP was unable to meet that goal.  The other problem with the USAIOP's recruiting efforts is that there has been no attempt to recruit combat arms officers.  In the FY 2006 accession board, well over half of the potential IO officers were from non-combat arms field, most of whom were from the Combat Service Support branches.\nWhile these officers may display exceptional technical competence, their lack of experience with maneuver operations could place them at a disadvantage in communicating with Combat Arms officers.  This could potentially cause additional issues with integrating IO.\n\nTo assist in the acknowledged, but unresourced requirement for units in the operational army, the First IO Command (known as Land Information Warfare Activity, or LIWA,  prior to\n2003) developed a plan to provide short-term assistance to units who would deploy.  This assistance came in the form of Field Support Teams (FST).  The FST would usually deploy to meet the unit in its deployed location, occasionally; the FST would participate in pre-deployment training with the unit the FST would support.  FSTs would rarely remain with a unit more than a year.  If operations lasted longer than a year, then the FSTs would rotate out of theater and a new FST would replace them.  The First IO Command originally intended for FSTs to support corps and higher headquarters, but on occasion would support divisions.  The FST brought capabilities to the unit that the unit could never hope to match, a reach back to national databases.  These databases would provide a more detailed analysis of the information environment than the unit could accomplish on its own.  This pattern of deploying FSTs still continued in support of OEF and OIF.\nBy 11 September 2001, the Army had only two Divisions with an authorization for IO\nOfficers, the Fourth Infantry Division and the First Cavalry Division, both at Fort Hood, TX.  The remaining IO Officers were at corps and higher headquarters, but many of those headquarters remained undermanned.  None of the units that would initially participate in OEF had dedicated IO support.  This support would come from the First IO Command.  This monograph will address IO resourcing for both OEF and OIF later in this chapter.\n\nAlthough the TOEs developed by TF Modularity did much to set the conditions for the growth of the FA 30 career field, they did leave some items that still need to be addressed.  First, the organizations were officer heavy; this was because there was no enlisted MOS for IO.  There were MOSs for PSYOP, CA, PA but none for IO in general nor for EW, OPSEC or MILDEC.\n\nThere were NCO positions on the IO section TOEs, but these NCOs were combat arms and the soldiers who filled those slots probably did not have any background in IO when they arrive in the section.  The lack of prior IO training for the NCOs left the training of those NCOs to ensure they understood IO squarely on the unit.\n\nTwo key positions on the TOEs that were filled less than optimally were the positions of the EW officer and the deception officer.  Current unit TOEs required EW officers at the brigade level and deception officers at the division and higher level.  While personnel issues may have been the driving factor, having no EW officer at the division seriously hampered the division's ability to synchronize all aspects of IO in its battle space.  Additionally, according to the latest TOEs, both of these positions were filled by MI officers.  These positions were probably filled with MI officers because, MI officers coded 35G (SIGINT) received training in radio wave propagation and SIGINT and would in theory make adequate EW officers, most MI officers receive some training on the capabilities of collection assets of potential adversaries and would therefore make adequate deception officers.  Neither of these officers received training that was specific to perform the duties of an EW officer or as a deception planning officer, and the Army did not have a training program geared toward either of these job requirements.  MI officers also received little training on IO and how their specialties would compliment the other elements of IO and assist the commander in achieving his overall objectives.\n\n## Equipment\n\nEven though the TOEs developed by TF Modularity provided the IO section with basic equipment to be moderately functional, there were still key pieces of equipment missing.  The most critical shortage was in automated data processing (ADP) equipment.  There was no provision in the TOEs that provided a system the IO section could use receive reporting, process the reporting, analyze it the reporting and make assessments as to what is happening in the information environment.\n\nThere was ADP available when TF Modularity developed the TOEs, but these systems were not compatible with other Army ADP systems.  The Joint Information Operations Center (JIOC) proffered the Information Operations Navigator (ION), which was perhaps the best software for planning and monitoring the execution of IO operations.  But even this software was not fully compatible with the Army's systems.17  There was no satisfactory interface with any of the Army Battle Command Systems (ABCS), there was also no interface with the Global Command and Control System (GCCS).  Furthermore, the Army's planning software build around Command Post of the Future (CPOF) was not designed to allow input from IO and other staff sections that did not conform with a strict 24 hour planning/execution (or ATO) timeline. Either there had to be new IO software that was compatible with current ABCS and planning systems or current ABCS systems had to build IO functionality.\n\nThe army also lacks EA assets.  Since the retirement of the AN/TLQ-17 and EH-60\nQuickfix tactical jammers, the Army has not had any tactical jamming capability.  The inability for Army units to provide short range EA in support of Army operations requires the Army to be totally reliant upon EA assets from the Air Force or the Navy.  While these airborne platforms are extremely capable, ground units attempting to utilize these assets soon discover the ground priorities often conflict airborne priorities.  In practical terms this means if the Air Force or the Navy was not planning an EA mission at the same time and roughly the same area as the Army, then the Army conducted its operations without EA support.  In the late 1990s and early 2000s there was a discussion about adding an EA capability to a UAV or the AN/MLQ-40 PROPHET SIGINT collection system, but to date neither system currently exists.  For the system to be effective, the platform should include many of the same capabilities found on the EA-6B or the EC-130H and have both aerial and ground-based emitters.\n\n## Training\n\nThe Army has been struggling since the 1990s on how to train commanders and their staffs on integrating IO.  Training IO officers was not enough, the Army also needed to train unit staffs and commanders on how to implement IO.  Current training programs were inadequate to train commanders and their staffs on properly integrating IO.  Although each of the Combat Maneuver Training Centers (CMTCs) has made improvements on training IO, the artificialities of those exercises tended to give commanders two false impressions about IO.  First, the CMTCs created an expectation that IO could produce relatively quick results.  The commander did not have to wait six weeks or longer to achieve some kind of effect, mainly because the timeframe of the exercises did not permit long range IO planning. Second, the CMTCs did not penalize commanders for failing to integrate IO into their operations.  During the IO Symposium of 15-16 December 2005 at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, one of the participants remarked candidly, \"If you tell a commander he can win without integrating IO, then he won't bother to integrate IO.\"  Given that unit training could not easily support IO integration, commanders and their staffs needed to receive more in depth training on IO as part of their professional development.\n\nNon-IO officers needed to receive more IO training during their branch courses, the Intermediate Leader Education (ILE), the Army War College and other Army sponsored training. This training could no longer be just a review of the principles of IO, but needed to focus on how to integrate IO.  Practical Exercises in Army courses needed to give more hands on experience with integrating IO.  This training also needed to include instruction on how information affects the operational environment.  When commanders understood how operations influenced the information environment and the information environment influenced the operational environment, then they would have a better understanding as to how to use operations to shape both environments.\n\nIn addition to more training on IO, commanders needed more cultural awareness training.\nPrior to OEF and OIF cultural training usually consisted of general cultural guidelines, usually along the lines of cultural do's and don'ts. This rudimentary does nothing to advance the commander's knowledge of the environment in which he is operating.  Commanders needed more detailed knowledge the aspect of religion, family structures, political structures, tribal issues, demographics, cultural norms and mores and culturally based personal information processing methods to understand what effect his operations would have in a given area. 18\nIO Officers needed more in-depth, more focused training.  As of this writing, the FA 30\nqualification course was expanding to nine weeks to include more detail and in depth instruction in implementing IO.  Instead of providing an overview of the elements of IO, the course needed to provide more details on each of the elements, then integrating those elements with one another, and finally on integrating IO with other functions a unit would perform when deployed.  While the IO Officer did not need to be an expert on all the elements of IO, he did need a working knowledge of each of the elements so understand clearly their capabilities and limitations.\n\nBesides general IO training, IO officers also needed specialty training on each other core elements of IO.  If this training were not available during the qualification course, then IO officers needed to attend either, an Army school, another service school or a joint school that focused on that element.  Three courses in particular that the officer could benefit from are, OPSEC, EW and MILDEC.  (Perhaps the deception and EW positions on the staff could be coded for officers who have attended training specific to those areas).  While IO officers did not need to attend the PSYOP, PA or CA courses, these officers needed more exposure to those areas.\nAll IO officers could also benefit from instruction by civilian public relations firms, either as training with industry, or a block of instruction during the IO qualification course.  This would give them insight into how the concept of branding and corporate images was used to change the perceptions, attitudes and actions of the typical American consumer.  During a visit to Barkley Evergreen and Partners, the largest public relations firm in Kansas City, this author learned that public relations firms used a similar planning structure as IO planners.  Public relations firms also integrated information and actions to change the perception of a company, product, or brand.  This was in essence the same technique commanders should use to manage perceptions on the battlefield.   Exposure to civilian techniques of marketing and public relations could help IO officers to broaden their skill sets especially in areas related to influencing peoples' perceptions.\n\nSo far, this monograph has only addressed the resourcing issues the Army faced.  The issues the Army faced with resourcing would come to forefront during OEF and OIF.  Both operations would face resourcing challenges that would threaten the commanders' success on the battlefield.  While the operations in Afghanistan and Iraq were unique, the commanders in each theater developed similar solutions to the problems they faced.  In many cases, the commanders in Iraq copied, to some degree, those actions that were successful in Afghanistan.\n\n## Operation Enduring Freedom\n\nOn 7 October 2001, the United States and its allies initiated operations in Afghanistan to\n\"disrupt the use of Afghanistan as a terrorist base of operations, and to attack the military capability of the Taliban regime.\"19  The attacks on the Taliban and Al Qaeda were a response to the 11 September 2001 attacks that damaged the Pentagon and destroyed the World Trade Center. The US response to the attacks would be unlike previous responses to Taliban attacks on US\ntargets.  This time, the nation stood behind the president as he sought to not only exact revenge on Al Qaeda, but also to destroy the regime that provided Al Qaeda its base of support.  By 2005, over 30 different nations had participated in operations in Afghanistan, only a handful of nations actually participated in combat operations, but the remaining nations provided resources to hrlp rebuild Afghanistan.\n\nThe tasks of defeating Al Qaeda in Afghanistan and removing the Taliban from power were quickly accomplished. It took the Coalition Forces just 70 days from the date of the first attacks on Taliban air defense and C2 nodes until Hamid Karzai took the oath to be the interim president of Afghanistan.  US and Coalition Special Forces (SF) working with Afghan tribes would conduct the bulk of the operations against Al Qaeda and their Taliban supporters. Coalition and US Air Force and Navy aircraft would provide the critical force the Northern Alliance forces needed to defeat the Taliban.\nTo defeat the Taliban and Al Qaeda, CENTCOM had limited but effective resources at his disposal.  These resources included SF teams on the ground working directly with Afghan resistance forces to provide targeting information to Coalition attack aircraft.  These SF teams, working with CIA teams also had the mission to convince neutral Afghan warlords to join the fight against the Taliban.  In the air CENTCOM was able to use the EC-130H Commando Compass and the EA-6B Prowler to disrupt Taliban and Al Qaeda communications links and air defense networks.  To influence the bulk of the Afghan populace, CENTCOM used the Joint Psychological Operations Task Force (JPOTF) with an element in Qatar to develop various PSYOP products designed to win the support of the Afghan people.  The JPOTF's assets included the EC-130J Commando Solo and SOMS-B to broadcast messages on Afghan radio and television frequencies.  The JPOTF would also create posters, leaflets and handbills to be given to the Afghans to provide them information.\n\nIn December 2001, efforts would shift from defeating the Taliban to helping establish a viable long-term government in Afghanistan.  It was at this point that US maneuver forces began to deploy to Afghanistan.  These forces formed around the 10th Mountain Division would form Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF)-180 (later renamed to CJTF-76).  In June 2002, the Combined Forces Command - Afghanistan (CFC-A) would assume responsibility from the Combined Force Land Component Command (CFLCC, also known as Third Army) forward headquarters for operations in Afghanistan.  The CFC-A focused on country wide issues, including coordination with the UN Mandated International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) while a separate force the CJTF-76 would focus on day to day operations for most of Southern Afghanistan outside of Kabul, until ISAF was able to assume responsibility for specific areas.\n\nWhile CFC-A used a Joint Manning Document (JMD) to develop its entire structure, CJTF-76 used a division Modified Table of Organization and Equipment (MTOE) augmented through a JMD to develop its structure.  The JMD specified the rank and specialty required for each billet. In some cases the billet required a six-month fill, in other cases, the billet required a twelve month fill.\nOver the course of OEF, the structure would remain essentially the same, with only minor changes usually driven by unit peculiarities or available forces and personnel.  In general, the IO assets available to the CFC-A included access to theater assets such as the EA-6B Prowler and EC-130H Compass Call for EA.  As the improvised explosive device (IED) threat became more intense, ground-based jammers helped protect the convoys and installations used by CFC-A from the remote controlled IED (RCIED) threat.  For PSYOP support, the CFC-A used EC-130C or EC-130J and a Special Operations Media System - B (SOMS-B) for PSYOP broadcast support, and after 2003, a PSYOP Support Element (PSE) for PSYOP product development support. One shortfall that would plaque OEF was the inability to mass produce PSYOP products in Afghanistan.  All PSYOP product production occurred either in Qatar, Kuwait or Fort Bragg. This caused there to be a two to four week process for the production of new PSYOP products.\nThe assets available to the CJTF allowed the CJTF to reach target audiences within its area of operations and provide support to achieve strategic and operational IO objectives.  Those assets included a tactical PSYOP company (TPC) and combat camera (COMCAM) section.   Figures 4\nthrough 8 depict the composition of the forces deploying to OEF from October 2001 until the present time.  The data concerning IO force structure is from the USAIOP at Fort Leavenworth, KS.\n\nUSCENTCOM  initially used the Third US Army (also known as CFLCC) to provide a higher headquarters for the 10th Mountain Division. By June 2002, the XVIII Airborne Corps replaced CFLCC as the higher headquarters to become CJTF-180.  Because the unit MOTEs did not support an IO cell in 2001, any IO support came through FSTs and other augmentation provided to the units deploying to Afghanistan.  By late 2002, the military situation in Afghanistan changed as the UN, with NATO taking the lead, deployed ISAF to Afghanistan.  It was also at this time, that CFC-A assumed responsibility for the Afghan area of operations and CJTF-180 became a subordinate command to CFC-A.\nIn October 2002, the 82nd Airborne Division would deploy with an authorization for an IO officer on its MTOE, but due to shortages of IO officers in the Army's force pool, would not receive an IO officer and would still be dependant upon 1st IO Command FSTs for its IO support.\nCFC-A through the JMD would receive IO officers tasked to support CFC-A.  Ordinarily, these officers came from the Reserve Component IO Commands either in Texas, Washington or Vermont.  By the end of these rotations, the Army began to address some of the resource shortfalls, including the PSYOP product production.  These changes would begin to take shape during OEF-4.\n\nBy the time the 10th Mountain Division deployed to Afghanistan in 2003, the Division had authorizations up to three IO officers (2 Majors and 1 Captain).  The division still depended on JMD authorizations to complete its IO cell.  At the end of its rotation, the Division would begin its conversion to modularity at which point it would be authorized 11 IO Officers at the Division Headquarters.\nOEF-5 was the first time the CJTF deployed with MTOE authorized IO personnel.  Even though the 25th Infantry Division had the IO personnel authorizations, the Army's personnel shortages in IO officers prevented the division from deploying with a complete IO cell.  The JMD authorized some personnel to fill the requirements the division could not, but the various US armed services were unable to fill all the required positions on the JMD.  One such failure to fill the JMD requirement was the lack of an EW officer from the Navy, so the CJTF filled the position with a Field Artillery warrant officer from the Division Fire Support Element.23\nThe US Southern European Task Force (SETAF) would be the first organization to have Lieutenant Colonels authorized to be in the IO cell.  Because the MTOE IO cells were not robust, the SETAF would depend on the JMD to fill its IO cell requirements.\nAs CFC-A and CJF-76 became more mature organizations, they were able to more adequately determine their IO resource requirements.  Lessons learned between October 2001 and October 2005, when the latest OEF rotation occurred, helped shape the resourcing provided to operations in Afghanistan.  Even though the Army attempted to address resource shortfalls, there were still issues that for a variety of reasons, failed to be resolved.  First, there was a lack of translator support, not just for the IO cell, but for all the forces in theater.   There simply were not enough linguists available in the Department of Defense to meet all the language requirements. Second, PSYOP support was still too slow to provide timely support to the commander's information requirements.  Third, even though IO cells were becoming more robust, there were still not enough IO officers in country. Again this problem was an Army-wide issue that would only be resolved once there were enough IO officers to support all the Army's requirements.\n\nFinally, although not an issue yet, the decision to limit the mobilization time for reserve component soldiers has begun to create a situation where PSYOP organizations were deploying as ad hoc organizations rather than  coherent units that had trained and prepared for the deployment to Afghanistan.  The units may have deployed with all the required personnel, but they did not deploy with soldiers from the same unit.  Instead these units were composed of soldiers from multiple PSYOP units across the country who had neither trained nor worked together for any significant period of time prior to the deployment to Afghanistan.  These same issues would confront the Army in supporting OIF. How the Army resourced OIF is the subject of the next section.\n\n## Operation Iraqi Freedom\n\nAfter over a year of planning and diplomatic wrangling in the United Nations, the United States and coalition forces attacked Iraq.  Although the debating was often intense, there was no consensus in the United Nations Security Council as to whether or not force was authorized, the United States and the \"Coalition of the Willing\" pressed on for operations against Iraq.  On 19 March 2003, intelligence reports from Iraq indicated that Saddam Hussein and his sons Uday and Qusay were gathered in a farm outside Baghdad.  Based on this information, President George W. Bush authorized an air attack on the farm to decapitate the Iraqi leadership and perhaps hasten the end of the war. Once the attack was over and the aircraft were out of Iraqi airspace, President Bush announced, \"coalition forces are in the early stages of military operations to disarm Iraq, to free its people and to defend the world from grave danger.\"25\nOperation IRAQI FREEDOM was the first pre-emptive war of the Global War on Terror.\nWhen Operations began on 19 March, between one-third and one-half of the Army's combat power was either in theater or would be in theater within 30 days. The stated goal of OIF was to force Iraqi compliance with UN resolutions regarding weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and to remove Saddam Hussein's regime from power.  Figure 9 shows the forces available to CFLCC until shortly after President Bush announced the end of major combat operations in Iraq.\nAt the beginning of Phase III (Major Combat Operations) the 4th Infantry Division and the 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment were still deploying to Iraq and completed their deployments by the time the president announced the end of major combat operations.   In hindsight, although this force was sufficient for removing Saddam's regime, it proved to be insufficient for setting proper conditions for Phase IV (Stability Operations).\n\nUSCENTCOM's IO assets were primarily for shaping the overall theater's information environment.  This required primarily airborne platforms.  Airborne Information Operations resources during the fight to Baghdad included the EC-130C/J Commando Solo based in Qatar or Kuwait.  The EC-130J broadcast not only on civilian frequencies, but also broadcast on Iraqi military frequencies to influence the soldier to capitulate and not fight Coalition Forces advancing into Iraq.    The EC-130H Compass Call and the EA-6B Prowler conducted EA on the Iraqi C2, fire support and air defense networks.  Depending on where these three aircraft flew, they could provide IO support to reach over ninety percent of the Iraqi military and civilian populace.  All these aircraft (Commando Solo, Compass Call and Prowler) were available for CFLCC to request through the normal targeting and apportionment process at USCENTCOM.\n\nIn terms of PSYOP support, CFLCC had direct access to the JPOTF to develop PSYOP\nproducts for the theater.  Although the JPOTF remained in Qatar, it provided a forward element to CFLCC to ensure the ground attack had the PSYOP product development and product support it required.  While the JPOTF could produce products locally, it still had to get the paper PSYOP products to the delivery mechanisms for dissemination.   This was difficult in that delivery platforms flew from bases in the United States, Europe, the Middle East and Diego Garcia.  For delivery of CFLCC's printed PSYOP products, the CFLCC IO cell was at the mercy of the apportionment process at USCENTCOM.  Leaflet bombs were competing with kinetic target missions by the Coalition Air Forces.  Once maneuver forces secured Baghdad, the JPOTF moved a SOMS-B into the Iraqi theater to supplement Coalition broadcasts from the Commando Solo, but production of paper products remained in Kuwait or the United States.\n\nThe two major US commands of CFLCC, V Corps and 1MEF, could request support through CFLCC, but had no ability to affect their battles pace directly.  While V Corps did have the 9 PSYOP Battalion, it could not mass produce PSYOP products nor could it directly control PSYOP broadcasting from the Commando Solo or SOMS-B because these systems typically receive their programming and broadcasting instructions from the JPOTF.  Because of a combination of CFLCC targeting to isolate the regime from the Iraqi populace and widespread looting following the collapse of the regime, neither V Corps not 1MEF were able to co-opt Iraqi television or radio because the media outlets no longer existed as viable transmission points.  The inability to use broadcast media to reach the Iraqi populace would remain an issue for the remainder of 2003.\n\nEvery US Division that crossed into Iraq, had at its disposal tactical PSYOP units, usually a TPC, up to four Combat Camera Teams, and a Mobile Public Affairs Detachment (MPAD). The TPCs even though they had a limited production capability, they were limited in their ability to create products that better supported their Division commanders because the PSYOP product approval process required that the Commander of USCENTCOM approve newly created PSYOP\nproducts before they could be used.  This left the TPCs with a limited supply of generic products that while supporting the USCENTCOM and CFLCC Commanders did little to assist the TPCs in reaching their local audiences with pertinent information.\nThe Divisions also lacked any EA capability.  As part of the Army's Electronic Warfare modernization program, the Army removed the AN/TLQ-17 TRAFFICJAM and EH-60 QUICKFIX from the active component Army inventory.  Variations of the PROPHET would replace both systems, but not before Fiscal Year (FY) 2007.  They could request EA assets through the targeting process, but the ground fight progressed too rapidly for the initial units to be able to predict where they would be in 72 hours.  By the time the 4ID occupied Tikrit, the Iraqi military was no longer a coherent military against which to use EA assets and the developing insurgency used other, non-radio communications (primarily signal flares, light signals, smoke, and couriers) methods, to communicate.  Even as the insurgents developed a more robust communication system based on portable radios and cell phones, the Divisions never obtained a method to degrade those communications methods.\n\nThe actual combat to remove Saddam's regime from power would only last three weeks.\nBetween 19 March and 9 April, the largest Army in the Middle East would crumble before a force less than half its size.  On 1 May, President Bush announced the end of major hostilities in Iraq.  The effort to rebuild had begun and the United States started to settle in for a protracted engagement in Iraq.  The long-term use of military forces was contrary to the wishes of the president, but the situation in Iraq demanded a strong US presence to keep the country from disintegrating.  For the remainder of 2003 and until the 28 June 2004, when the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) returned sovereignty of Iraq to an Iraqi government, Coalition forces focused on defeating insurgent forces made up of former military officers, disgruntled members of the former regime, disgruntled Sunni Arabs and foreign fighters, many of whom has some allegiance to Al Qaeda.\nThe arrival of the CPA marked the end of CFLCC's mission in Iraq.  The V Corps was renamed to CJTF-7 and assumed responsibility for military operations in Iraq and CFLCC\nredeployed most of its personnel and assets back to the US.  Unfortunately for CJTF-7, the IO assets supporting CFLCC redeployed when CFLCC redeployed.  Significantly, the JPOTF no longer supported Iraq from a forward command post; all support would come from Fort Bragg. (This repeated the mistake of not having a forward JPOTF with production capability supporting Afghanistan).  The JPOTF support from Fort Bragg would continue until late 2003 when the JPOTF deployed back to the Iraqi theater.  What this meant in practical terms for the CJTF-7 was that it could not produce PSYOP products locally and operational level PSYOP became irrelevant to OIF as tactical units leaned on their assigned PSYOP organizations for more and more support.\n\nAssets to assist the forces who remained in country remained scarce.  The Commando Solo, when it flew in the theater, flew only a few hours a day and did not reach the entire country. The SOMS-B broadcasts covered Baghdad and little more.  Even though fledgling newspapers, radio stations and television stations were forming, a nation-wide Iraqi media entity was nonexistent.  To complicate matters, the JPOTF redeployed to Fort Bragg and was no longer supporting operations with an element in theater. 27 This changed in late 2003, when the JPOTF\nreturned to Iraq.  From November on strategic and operational product development with some limited production could occur in theater and was no longer dependant upon a reach back to Fort Bragg.  The JPOTF forward also provided some support to operations in Afghanistan until a JPOTF forward became operational there.\nEven as V Corps transitioned to become CJTF-7 they had little ability to influence the information environment for their subordinates.  Because CJTF-7 had no distribution assets itself, any message CJTF-7 or even CPA wanted to get to the Iraqi populace had to be delivered by the maneuver forces on the ground.  Figure 10 shows what units were available during OIF-1 Phase IV operations.\n\nThe IO structure to support operations in Iraq for the remainder of the time the CPA was in charge remained totally inadequate for the task.  The CPA could not compete against the Iraqi rumor mill, partisan Iraqi media outlets, or even foreign satellite broadcasts such as Al Jazeerah. To complicate the situation leaders in CPA had no understanding of the capabilities and limitations of the assets at its disposal.\n\nThe divisions supporting CJTF-7 retained control of the PSYOP, COMCAM and MPAD\nassets they brought forward from Kuwait.  There would be a limited turn over of COMCAM and PAO assets in the theater, but generally every unit retained what it had at the beginning of the war.  COMCAM had two resourcing issues that plagued the commander to use its unique capabilities to their fullest.  First, there just were not enough COMCAM teams to cover the entire country.  At one point there were only 13 teams in the entire country.  While COMCAM doctrine required a platoon (twelve teams) to support a Division, most divisions had the equivalent of one squad (two to three teams) to cover their operations.  That was not even enough to provide a COMCAM team to every maneuver brigade in theater.  The second issue for COMCAM was the lack of high-speed transmission methods.  The teams initially had INMARSAT access, but this access was slow and expensive, so the teams tended not to use it.  Late in 2003, three COMCAM satellite terminals arrived in Iraq.  This sped up the transmission process, but required the teams to travel from where ever they were working to the closest uplink station (in the case of the 4th Infantry Division this meant the teams traveled a minimum of thirty minutes from the units they supported to the uplink station).  The shortage of teams and transmission equipment prevented the COMCAM teams from covering the entire theater with timely responsive photography and video coverage.  That coverage could be used by CPA in its daily press briefs or by the DoD in Washington as they prepared briefings for the press or Congress or even the White House.\n\nA lack of media outlets in the divisions' areas limited the divisions' ability to reach their populace quickly and efficiently.  The divisions set out to create media in the areas of responsibility.  Their PSYOP units used PSYOP operational funds back by the divisions using the Commander's Emergency Response Program (CERP) funds for more expensive purchases.  By the end of 2003, every Division had created a number of newspapers, radios and TV stations.\nMany of the radio and TV stations became affiliated with the Iraqi Media Network (IMN).\nThe IMN was a coalition sponsored network designed to get an Iraqi presence on radio and TV.  The IMN achieved limited success while it was operational.  One of the largest obstacles the IMN had was overcoming the impression that IMN was a Coalition broadcast, (on an ABC news program \"20/20\" broadcast Dan Senor, a Coalition spokesman referred to IMN as a voice of the Coalition).  The IMN also had limited ability to produce quality programming; they certainly could not produce programming that was comparable in quality to the broadcasts of Iran, Syria, or Al Jazeerah.  The third significant obstacle IMN faced was that it lacked satellite based transmission capability.  To overcome these obstacles, the CPA hired SAIC, a contractor from the United States to build an Iraqi television and radio network.  The first contractor, who has no background in broadcast media, was successful in that it helped build a network or radio and TV stations, but accomplished little else.   A name change tried to break the stigma of being associated with the Coalition, the new network was called, Iraqiya, but to no avail.  IMN did gain access to a satellite, but it was one of the least watched satellite transmissions in the region and most Iraqis outside of Baghdad would remain unaware of IMN on satellite.\nCPA hired the Harris Corporation in late 2003 who assumed responsibility in 2004\nachieved more success.  New and better equipment helped the Iraqis produce quality programming; media training helped the Iraqis working with IMN understand the role of the media in a democratic society.  Eventually, Iraqiya gained access to better satellite transmission capability when owners of the most popular broadcast satellite in the region agreed to allow Iraqiya to use the bandwidth that Saddam's regime had already paid for, but was no longer using. Despite all these advances, the Coalition still could not compete with media outlets funded by competing political parties. Perhaps the greatest enemy was the Iraqi Rumor Network.\n\nUnder Saddam's regime, the state controlled media became a propaganda outlet for the regime.  The Ministry of Information determined what newspapers and magazines could print and what radio and TV stations could broadcast.  Most citizens also could not own satellite television capabilities.  To get around these restrictions, an underground rumor network developed.  Iraqis began to believe the rumor network more than they believed the official government media outlets.  Over time, the rumor network became more capable of spreading urban myth type information than accurate information.  Some of these included stories such as soldiers Night Vision Goggles possessed an \"x-ray vision\" capability and soldiers were using the technology to view women's genitalia or the anti-malaria medicine taken by US troops made the soldiers less susceptible to the Iraqi which allowed them to conduct operations during the hot Iraqi summers (in fact the medicine had the opposite effect - soldiers were more susceptible to the heat and had to increase their fluid intake while on the medicine to prevent heat injuries).  While those stories seem preposterous by American standards, the Iraqis readily believed them.  Some of the more believable stories were that Saddam was in US custody well before December 2003 and he had secretly brokered a deal with the US that would allow him to return to power.29\nThe increased use of RCIED prompted the creating of Task Force IED (TF IED).  One result of TF IED was the ability to use EA-6B and EC-130H aircraft to disrupt the ability of the insurgents to detonate their RCIEDs.  This capability remained a secret until sometime in 2005 when reports in the press indicated the US was using aircraft to jam RCIED frequencies.  Other vehicle borne anti-RCIED devices and EA systems for use by tactical forces were developed, but their methods of employment are still classified and this monograph will not discuss them.\n\nIn January 2004, fresh units from across the Army began to replace units who had participated in OIF-1.  The first unit to leave Iraq was the 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault)\nwhen it left Iraq in January 2004; the last unit was the 1st Armored Division which left in the summer of 2004.  For the remainder of 2004 and 2005, total US strength would vary between 117,000 and 160,000 depending on rotational schedules and critical events occurring with the new Iraqi government as it followed the Transitional Administrative Law (TAL), which formed the roadmap to the December 2005 national elections for a permanent four-year parliament. Figure 11 shows the units who participated in OIF-2 from 2004 - 2005.\n\nResources continued to be scare during this time.  Along with the changing force structure came an awareness that killing the insurgents alone would not be enough to achieve victory.  More commanders began to realize the importance of shaping the information environment and structured their staffs along lines that allowed them to become more aggressive in the information environment.\n\nOnce the CPA returned sovereignty to an Iraqi government, Coalition forces still focused on defeating the insurgents, whom the coalition initially labeled as Anti-Iraqi Forces.  During this period, control of the military portion of OIF fell to two separate military Commands.  The senior command was Multi-National Forces - Iraq (MNF-I).  MNF-I's responsibility was to concentrate on the strategic portion of the operation, including consultations with the US embassy in Baghdad and the fledgling Iraqi government.  This allowed the Multi-National Corps - Iraq (MNC-I) to focus on the day to day problems of defeating the insurgency and the execution of the massive coalition rebuilding effort.  MNF-I would use a JMD to determine its force requirements while the MNC-I would use the Corps' MTOE to form the basis of its structure.  The Corps would receive augmentation to allow it to operate in a Joint and Multi-National environment.  The major events of 2004 after the CPA dismantled were the second clash in Fallujah in an attempt to defeat the insurgents who were using Fallujah as a base of operations for activity across the Sunni Triangle and the Al Anbar province; unrest in the Shiite areas of Najaf and Karbala because of provocations by Muqtada Al Sadr and his Mahdi Army.  Other events included the preparation for the January 2005 elections and the creation of the Multi-National Security Transition Command - Iraq (MNSTCI).  MNSTCI became the lead element in training Iraqi security forces, especially the fledgling Iraqi Army.  January 2005 began the year of elections in Iraq.\n\nThe resources available to OIF-2 did not vary much from those available during OIF-1.\n\nOne improvement was that each US Division now had an IO Officer to help coordinate its IO efforts.\nIn January 2005, as the OIF-3 rotation was beginning, the Iraqis participated in the first of three elections and referendums that would shape the new Iraqi government.  The January election was to determine who would participate in the parliament which would draft the new Iraqi Constitution.  Although Shiites and Kurds had great participation in this election, the Sunnis for the most part boycotted the elections, a mistake they would regret later in the year.  After weeks of inter-party squabbling, the parliament finally assembled in April.  Over the next few months, the parliament debated the new constitution.  In October, the Iraqi people voted on whether to accept the constitution.  The Sunnis were determined not to be locked out of the political process, and, this time, participated in the referendum.  Although the majority of Iraqis voted for the constitution, it almost failed the referendum as over 80% of the populace in Al Anbar and Salah Ad Din (two of the three majority Sunni provinces, the other being Diyala) voted against the constitution.  (Had one other province rejected the constitution the drafting process would begin again).  In December 2005, the Iraqis voted for a new, permanent, parliament.  This parliament would be elected for a four-year term and would be given the ultimate responsibility of governing Iraq.  It would have to deal with the remaining contentious issues that went unresolved in an effort to keep the TAL's timeline.\n\nDuring the elections, the role of MNF-I and MNC-I continued to be supporting the developing Iraqi government.  Both organizations did this by helping get inform the Iraqis about the upcoming elections, and by working with the new Iraqi security forces to create a more stable environment in which elections could be held.  OIF-3 would also mark the first time a reserve component unit would receive a significant portion of Iraq to provide security for.  Figure 12\nshows the forces available during OIF-3.\n\nThe types of forces and resources available to OIF-3 changed little from OIF-2.  The most significant change was the 3rd ID, which was in a partially modularized configuration.  This allowed the 3rd ID to have a more robust IO cell than any division before it.  This rotation also marked the first time a predominantly reserve component headquarters would be responsible for a large area of Iraq.\n\nOne creative attempt to resolve the shortfall in resourcing was the use of contractors to provide IO support to MNC-I and MNF-I.  Given the large number of public relations firms, it was surprising that the Department of Defense selected the Lincoln Group, an organization with NO public relations experience to spearhead an effort to publicize the good news events occurring in Iraq.  The Lincoln Group attempted to get US good news stories published in Iraqi media by paying Iraqi media outlets to print or distribute Coalition good news stories.  Although these stories were essentially true, Lincoln group wrote the stories to make them appear as though they were generated by Iraqis themselves instead of from Coalition Forces.  In doing so, they violated one of the key principles of PSYOP and PA which was to make it clear to the target audience that the articles were from Coalition Forces.  The deception failed in that the articles were so poorly written that is was clear to most Iraqis the articles were from the Coalition.  When the LA Times first published a story revealing to covert operation, the Department of Defense and MNF-I wasted time responding to charges that they had abused the press and made it simply a propaganda arm of the Coalition.\n\nOn a positive note, Al Iraqiya continued to flourish as a separate element of the Iraqi Ministry of Information serving as the Iraqi National Radio, TV and Newspaper.  (See Figure 13 for a map showing the locations of Iraqi television transmitters). The Iraqi government has been using Iraqiya to reach its people.  Coalition forces also sponsored programming (usually in the form of Public Service announcements) to be played or Iraqiya radio and television.  Iraqiya radio was on the air in AM and FM stations and covers the entire country as well. Al Sabah, the Iraqi national newspaper is also being distributed country-wide. As of late 2004, Iraqiya television was broadcasting in 26 cities covering all of Iraq, addition to satellite transmissions which can be see all other the region.  The network boasts the most watched evening news program in Iraq.  The president of Iraq even had a weekly talk show in which he discussed events and issues currently before the government.32\nAll three outlets also developed distinct websites, some of which are interactive allowing their audiences to provide feedback on programming and other issues.\n\nResourcing IO has remained a critical issue for commanders at all levels.  Shortages across the Army have caused commanders to make judgments on how to best utilize the scarce resources he has.  The Army has a responsibility to provide the resources its commanders to be successful.  The most significant resource shortages are personnel, equipment, and training.  In the personnel arena, the Army must close the gap between requirements and available officers. There must be a concerted effort to recruit not just technically oriented officers, but officers who understand and can combat arms operations.  The USAIOP must aggressively recruit some of the Army's best and brightest to serve in this career field.\n\nAs far as equipment is concerned, the Army must invest in systems that support IO\nplanning but are compatible with the ABCS/CPOF architecture.  The Army can either use a separate system that is ABCS/CPOF compatible or it can change a current ABCS platform to allow them to support IO information requirements.  The Army also needs mass media systems that will allow the Army to reach civilian audiences in areas that the information infrastructure has been damaged or closed to the Army's information campaigns.  While reach back has been touted as capable of supporting commanders forward, the reality is infrastructure and an inability of the rear units to get a true sense of the environment are hindering the ability of reach back to live up to its potential.  The Army must invest more in a communications architecture that allows rapid transmission of information from Brigade to Divisions and higher.  Additionally, there should always be an element of the CONUS based unit forward in the area of operations to help give that unit a better understanding of the operating environment.  COMCAM teams must have better transmission capabilities.  This is especially true for those COMCAM teams that find themselves operating in a diffused environment such as Iraq.\nTraining must also be more realistic and concerned with preparing commanders, staffs and IO officers for integrating IO.  This means all professional military education must include more in depth instruction in IO.  Unit training must provide opportunities for commanders to integrate IO and provide penalties for commanders who do not integrate IO.  IO training must include in depth instruction on all the elements of IO.  EW and MILDEC officers especially need specialized training in those areas, the Army should consider requiring officers who fill these billets attend either a joint course on EW or deception or an army course specifically geared to EW or deception.\n\n## Integrating Io\n\n\"Understanding the effect of operations as seen through the lens of the Iraqi culture and psyche is a foremost planning consideration for every operation.\"34\nMG Peter Chiarelli From its conception, IO was always intended to be integrated into a unit's operations.\nBecause doctrine provided commanders so little guidance on how to effectively integrate IO, commanders had to figure it out for themselves.  This chapter will examine how commanders serving in OEF and OIF integrated IO into their operations. As has been stated earlier, if the commander considered integrating IO into his operations important, then he expressed the importance of IO in his intent, only then, did integrating IO become important to his staff and subordinate commanders.\n\nIn examining several case studies from OEF and OIF, this chapter will examine how commander actually integrated IO.  Regardless of how well commanders chose to integrate IO, several trends did manifest themselves.  First, lacking doctrinal guidance on implementation, commanders developed their own organizations to help with integrating IO.  Usually, the Fire Support Element (or some modification of it) became responsible for completing the integration process.  Second, because doctrine lacked guidance on the IO Working Group, units implemented the IOWG differently.  Those working groups that had key decision maker involvement (Deputy Commander or G3) in the working group tended to provide better recommendations to the commander for integrating IO.   Third, because a single incident involving a platoon of soldiers can have strategic implications commanders tend to over control the use of IO by their subordinates.  Commanders are not satisfied with setting the conditions for their subordinates' success; they also want to limit how subordinates conduct IO.  Fourth, unresponsive higher headquarters IO elements become irrelevant in the IO fight.  Fifth, commanders still view IO as a function of creating conditions that would cause the international media to cover stories the commander wanted, instead of covering stories about US deaths or insurgent attacks.  Sixth, commanders are having difficulty in grasping how the media operates and how to use media to their advantage.  Seventh, there is no clear consensus on integrating IO and PA.  Finally, IO sections are producing talking points and point papers to assist keeping everyone \"on message,\" even though IO doctrine does not mention producing talking points or position papers.\n\nThis chapter includes case studies from OEF and OIF in which IO integration was done well and when it was done poorly.  Each of these case studies will demonstrate at least some of the trends identified earlier in this chapter.  Each case study will use the following format.  First, a review of the strategic and operation goals and supporting IO objectives if they were available will be discussed.  Second, there will be a discussion of the following elements of IO as various commands used them: EA - primary targets and assets used to attack those targets; PSYOP - primary targets and message delivery mechanism; MILDEC - target of the deception and resources used to conduct the deception; Maneuver Forces - how maneuver forces supported IO, usually this will be in the form of leader/commander face to face engagements with key communicators; Physical Destruction - targeting C2 and communications with kinetic attacks; Media Operations - How commanders utilized the media to achieve their objectives; and finally intelligence support - how intelligence provided support to IO.\n\n## Defeating The Taliban\n\nOperation ENDURING FREEDOM exemplified the success an operation can have when commanders have a correct understanding in the environment in which they operated and articulated clear objectives for their subordinates.  The guidance from the Secretary of Defense through USCENTCOM, CFLCC and what ultimately reached the forces on the ground made it clear that while kinetic operations would easily defeat the Taliban and Al Qaeda militarily, influence operations would set the conditions for success in Afghanistan.\nThe objectives of OEF straight forward.  First, the operation had to defeat the Al Qaeda in Iraq and remove their Taliban supporters from power.  Second, the coalition had to prevent the Afghan populace from perceiving the attacks on the Taliban as an attack on Afghanistan.  Third, the operation had to set conditions for an Afghanistan to have a new government that did not support terror, but that would not require a large nation building effort.  Fourth, the rapid defeat of the Taliban and Al Qaeda had to receive worldwide news coverage to reinforce the capabilities of the Coalition.  Finally, world audiences had to realize that despite the violence of the attacks against the Taliban, the Coalition was doing everything it could to minimize the loss of life an property by Afghan civilians.\n\nElectronic Warfare focused on the ADA and C2 networks supporting the Taliban.  While EC-130H Compass Call aircraft conducted barrage jamming of Afghan C2 frequencies, EA-6B Prowlers accompanied strike aircraft to their targets.  This allowed the rapid destruction of the limited Integrated Air Defense System (IADS) in Afghanistan and key C2 facilities and combat forces on the ground.  Because there was limited information available about Taliban and Al Qaeda positions in southern Afghanistan, most of the targeting would occur in northern Afghanistan in support of the Northern Alliance attacks on the Taliban.\nPsychological Operations focused on three objectives.  First, leaflets and EC-130E/J\nradio broadcasts attempted to influence Taliban and Al Qaeda fighters to surrender.  These products stress the capabilities of coalition forces and futility of a continued struggle given that the leaders of the Taliban and Al Qaeda had gone into hiding and had deserted the average fighter.  Second, leaflets and radio broadcasts attempted to influence the Afghan populace to provide information that would lead to the capture or deaths of key Taliban and Al Qaeda leaders. A rewards program helped provide the incentive for providing this information.  Third, leaflets provided information on the Humanitarian Assistance (HA) operations that occurred simultaneously with the combat operations.  These products described the nature of the HA and how the Afghans could receive the HA.\n\nAlthough not planned, net intrusions into and deceptions on Afghan and Taliban radio networks by US Special Forces helped guide the aircraft to their targets.  The Special Forces posing as Taliban fighters on the radio convinced the Taliban forces under attack to provide feedback and targeting correction information for air strikes by having the Taliban report how far away and in what direction the bombs were exploding.  The Special Forces then used this information to correct the bombing runs attacking those positions.\n\nKey to achieving the strategic objectives for OEF was securing basing and over flight rights from Afghanistan's neighbors.  This required personal engagement by General Franks, Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld, Secretary of State Powell and even President Bush.  These engagements offered political and economic incentives to Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and Pakistan to provide support to the US led coalition.  In the end, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan provided basing rights while Pakistan provided over flight and over shoot rights.35  The nature of the tribal and ethnic structure of Afghanistan made it difficult to unite the various factions to achieve a common goal.  Even the Northern Alliance was less united than its name would suggest.  To maintain the alliance and allow it to grow CIA agents and Special Forces Officers conducted intense meetings with key tribal leaders, primarily in the north, but also in the south.  Money and a demonstration of superior fire power eventually convinced many tribal leaders to back what they saw as the winning side - the US led coalition.\n\nBombs were not the only items dropped on Afghanistan, US transport aircraft also dropped HA rations to areas that USCENTCOM identified as being susceptible to food shortages once the attacks began.  The PSYOP leaflets dropped in the same area described what the yellow plastic containers on the ground were - rations provided by Coalition forces to prevent the Afghans from starving.  The operations were successful in that no areas suffered any serious reports of starvation due to the coalitions operations.  Daily Pentagon press briefings made a point of identifying HA food drops as part of the military operations in Iraq (See Figure ).\n\nBoth USCENTCOM and the Pentagon kept the informed through daily press conferences.  These conferences described the previous days' operations and would give examples of the successes of the coalition attacks against the Taliban.  In Doha, Qatar, General Franks briefed the press while Secretary Rumsfeld or General Myers would normally provide the pentagon briefings.  This pattern would continue until Hamid Karzai took the oath of office of President on 4 December 2001.  From that point, pentagon briefings would only include operational updates as the situation warranted.\n\nIntelligence on Afghanistan was sparse, especially in the south where the CIA had and USCENTCOM had almost no resources.  Despite the CIA's involvement in supporting the Afghan rebels during the Soviet occupation of the 1980s and 1990s, the CIA had relatively few contacts inside the country.  The Afghan terrain hindered effective collection, especially by imagery platforms.  By the time the attacks began in October 2001, the Taliban and Al Qaeda had become extremely proficient at fooling imagery sensors by hiding in caves and other deception efforts.  SIGINT proved just as problematic as Al Qaeda became aware that US intelligence agencies were tracking the Taliban's and Al Qaeda's leaders through their satellite cell phones and subsequently severely restricted their cell phone usage.  Pakistan was able to provide some information, but given that its security service was an initial supporter of the Taliban, some of this information was surely misleading.  The most reliable reporting came from Special Forces teams and CIA agents working with the Northern Alliance.  National and strategic reconnaissance systems, including Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs), other reconnaissance aircraft and even satellites provided intelligence support to USCENTCOM.\n\n## Afghan National Elections\n\nThe Bonn Agreement of 5 December 2001, which laid the framework for establishing an Afghan government after the fall of the Taliban provided the timeline for the national Presidential Elections.  The elections needed to occur within two years of the ELJ that determined the Transitional Government of Afghanistan.  As the timeline developed two series of elections would occur.  The first was the October 2004 Presidential Election.  In these elections, the interim President Hamid Karzai won 55% of the vote.37  The second election was the National Assembly and Provincial Council Elections of September 2005.  While the Joint Electoral Management Body (JEMB) would have the responsibility of running the elections, CFC-A would bear the burden of preparing the Afghans for the elections.   Preparing the Afghans for the elections ultimately meant teaching them about democracy, encouraging participation in the process while creating and sustaining a secure environment in which the elections could be held.\n\nBetween ISAF and CFC-A four themes emerged to support the elections, security, legitimacy, transparency and resolve.  Security meant convincing the Afghans that the Afghan\n37 http://www.elections-afghanistan.org.af/Election%20Results%20Website/english/english.htm government would ensure the elections could be held in a safe and secure environment.  The legitimacy theme, worked to convince that the elections were fair so the Afghans would accept the results.  The transparency theme was meant to reinforce the openness of the elections.  The large number of international observers monitoring the election helped to ensure and reinfornce the notion of the openness of the elections.  The resolve theme, which was focused on international audiences, attempted to influence the members of the UN to continue with the elections no matter what anti-democratic forces in Afghanistan said or did.38\nTo coordinate these themes and their supporting messages, CFC-A leveraged already existing organizations to focus on the election process.  The JIEG would modify itself to become the Election Information Group (EIG) and would ensure a coordinated approach for public information and civic education activities of the Transitional Islamic State of Afghanistan including the Ministries of Defense and Interior, Joint Electoral Management Body (JEMB, the joint Afghan and UN organization responsible for managing the Afghan Presidential election), and United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan, International Security Assistance Force\n(ISAF) and CFC-A in support of the Presidential elections in Afghanistan.39\nThe EIG was responsible for developing all messages that supported the presidential elections.  These messages and associated products were delivered to The EIG was so successful that the US embassy and other agencies operating in Afghanistan came to rely upon the capabilities of CFC-A to plan and execute operations. 40\nBoth EW and PSYOP played critical roles in setting the conditions for the elections.\nElectronic Warfare contributed to creating a secure environment by jamming both communications and RCIED transmitters.  Coalition forces used both the Compass Call and the Prowler for these missions.  Even though PSYOP was still working to separate the antidemocratic forces from the Afghan populace, it also focused on products supporting the election.\nUsing the themes developed by the EIG the JPOTF developed posters, booklets, handouts, and radio and television broadcasts to encourage the Afghans to participate in the elections.\n\nThe tactical forces in CJTF-76 would be critical to ensuring the success of the elections.\nThe CJTF would play two roles in preparing for the elections.  First, working with Afghan security forces, the CJTF would ensure the elections would occur without disruption by antidemocratic forces.  This included several deliberate operations such as Operation LIGHTNING\nRESOLVE to defeat the enemy forces before the elections as well as assisting the Afghan security forces maintain security during Election Day.  Second, CJTF would use its tactical forces to influence the populace in the area the CJTF was responsible for.  The 2-27 Infantry Brigade developed a traveling road show to help instruct the Afghans on the electoral process.41 All of the CFC-A efforts would ensure the elections proceeded smoothly and were successful.  By the end of 2005, the Afghans would have their first democratically elected government in over 30 years.\n\nBecause the EIG had an intelligence cell embedded in it, the cell was able to leverage the intelligence assets and reporting to maximum effectiveness.  Working with the Joint Effects Assessment Group (JEAG), the EIG was able to develop measures of effectiveness (MOE) that as a rule were detectable and achievable.  Sometimes, the MOE was as simple as the number of voters who registered, other times, the MOE was the number of attacks in an area or media statements concerning the elections.  These MOE came from a variety of sources including, intelligence reports, units' operational reports, face to face engagement reports and media analysis.\n\nThe reasons commanders at all levels were successfully integrated into their operations stemmed from a common understanding of the operational environment in which the commanders found themselves.  This common understanding allowed the commanders' guidance to be consistent from the Secretary of Defense to the tactical commanders.  The commanders on the ground also integrated their staffs to better leverage IO.  This integration caused staffs to focus on leveraging all the units' capabilities to achieve the commanders' objectives. Unfortunately, the lessons learned about having a common understanding of the environment, consistent guidance from strategic to tactical commanders and staff integration would not transfer to OIF.  Almost none of the successful TTPs transferred from Afghanistan to Iraq, while none of the problems identified in OEF would be addressed for OIF.  Because commanders supporting OIF did not transfer applicable lessons learned from Afghanistan to Iraq, the forces in Iraq would commit many of the same mistakes forces in Afghanistan made.  This was all the more remarkable considering the same strategic and operational headquarters would plan and execute OIF.\n\n## Initial Operations In Iraq\n\nThe opening stages of OIF was one of the best examples of integrating IO into combat operations and what could go wrong when commanders did not understand the environment in which they operated.  An incomplete IPB at all levels of command, supported by false strategic assumptions would lead commanders to believe that the defeat of the Iraqi Army followed by the swift capture of Baghdad would lead to the downfall of Saddam Hussein's regime and the rapid development of new democratically elected government.  While Saddam's regime collapsed quickly, it would take almost three years for a democratic government to assume control of Iraq. This total focus on defeating the military and capturing Baghdad meant commanders did not focus any real attention on the aftermath of the invasion.   Hardly any intelligence focused on what could happen after the regime fell and no IO products were available to set appropriate conditions in Iraq or prevent the looting and anarchy that occurred once the regime fell.  In spite of this, both USCENTCOM and CFLCC integrated IO to support the combat operations that became known as Phase III operations.  The execution of the plan, however, indicated that integration was more difficult to achieve than planning the integration.  The IO cell at CFLCC\ncompeted with the lethal targeting cell for scarce resources.  Invariably, the lethal targeting effort took priority over the non-lethal IO effort.  The changed attack timeline created by the early unplanned attack on Saddam on 19 March also disrupted the integration of IO into the operation. The changed plan created conditions in which the IO cell was unable to respond fast enough to the situation on the ground to remain truly integrated.\n\nBecause there were so few IO personnel at the units below CFLCC, (Only one IO officer\n- from V Corps, crossed the Iraqi border as part of the initial invasion force) the subordinate commands essentially depended on their PSYOP organizations to maintain continuity of effort with CFLCC and USCENTCOM.  The USCENTCOM and CFLCC IO Objectives for combat operations were fairly straightforward.  First, the Iraqis could not destroy or severely damage the southern Iraqi oil fields whose oil production would be critical for the rebuilding effort.  Second, the Iraqi forces had to capitulate instead of surrender or just desert their units.  The third objective was to prevent the use of weapons of mass destruction.  The fourth objective was to minimize collateral damage and associated civilian casualties.\n\nThe EW shaping of the battlefield prior to the invasion began as an extension of Operation SOUTHERN WATCH (OSW).  Central Air Force (CENTAF) and coalition aircraft began a process called \"condition jamming\" to desensitize the Iraqi reconnaissance and air defense units to disruption of their communications and radar systems.  Additionally, through a series of progressively more aggressive responses to Iraqi attempts to interfere with OSW missions, coalition aircraft began to isolate Iraqi forces in southern Iraq by destroying the fiber optic and communications networks between southern Iraq and Baghdad.  In part because of the successful conditioning jamming, the initial coalition air attacks caught the Iraqi defenders by surprise.   Within days, the coalition air forces were able to fly anywhere over Iraq with out being concerned with long-range air defense systems.\n\nIn support of the EW shaping of the battlefield, PSYOP leaflets reinforced the messages not to target coalition aircraft and not to rebuild destroyed or repair damaged fiber optic nodes.\nAs the war drew nearer PSYOP began the next phase of its operations, influencing the Iraqi forces to capitulate if they were attacked, to refrain damaging the oil infrastructure and to refrain from the use of WMD.  Combinations of Iraqi tactical net radio broadcasts (called net intrusions) and leaflets ensured all the Iraqi units in the south received these messages over and over.\n\nThe original IO plan called for most units to receive several days of PSYOP leaflet bombs encouraging the soldiers to surrender.  The most capable units of the Iraqi army never received these leaflets; coalition aircraft attacked these units without warning.  The PSYOP products used these attacks as a means to demonstrate what would happen to any unit that did not capitulate.  At the end of the \"no attack period\", any unit that had not indicated its intent to capitulate was attacked.  This reinforced the message to the remaining units to capitulate or be destroyed.  The intent was that when ground forces came into contact with Iraqi forces, the Iraqi forces would have already capitulated and returned to their garrisons.42  The early attack on the Dora Farm Complex outside of Baghdad caused this plan to be useless since there would no longer be two week period of air attacks prior to initiating the ground attack into Iraq.  Some units received these PSYOP products but essentially ignored the capitulation instructions.  Once the war began, many units just disintegrated with its soldiers abandoning their equipment and returning home.\n\nThe PSYOP program designed to prevent the destruction of the southern oil fields focused on Iraqi military forces and the oil field workers.  Additionally, the 1MEF's immediate mission was to secure the oil fields to prevent the destruction of the pumps and other oil infrastructure in the area.  When the 1MEF arrived, they noticed that explosives were in place, but many devices were rendered useless or the oil workers simply refused to carry out the orders to detonate the explosive devices.\n\nThe PSYOP program to convince the Iraqi commanders not to use WMD targeted commanders at all levels by stressing the penalties each would face if they gave the order to use WMD.  These messages came via emails, and phone calls to commanders, as well as net intrusions and leaflets targeting WMD capable units.  At the strategic level, the Department of Defense began to prepare the US public for the possibility of WMD use by warning where WMD\nuse was most likely and during the ground advance provided intelligence reporting indicating that the coalition forces were approaching a \"red line\" at which field commanders were ordered to use WMD.\n\nWhile PSYOP was successful in its role of preventing the destruction of the southern oil fields, encouraging Iraqi units to capitulate and preventing the use of WMD, PSYOP like the other elements of IO failed to set the conditions for the events that would follow the collapse of the regime.  The JPOTF produced no products to prevent or limit looting or provide the civilians with instructions for dealing with coalition military forces, except avoid the roads at night and avoid Iraqi military equipment.  There were not even products available to announced USCENTCOM's rewards program for information leading to WMD stockpiles, or former regime members.\n\nThere were three different deception efforts during the advance to Baghdad.  The first deception aimed at Saddam Hussein.  The intent was to confuse Saddam about the main effort of the Coalition Advance.  To do this, USCENTCOM created the impression that the main attack would come from Jordan.  The timing of the attack by the Special Forces and the destruction of the Iraqi surveillance posts on the Jordanian border would give the impression that the main attack would come from the Western Desert of Iraq.  The second deception served to confuse Saddam about the possibility of an attack from Turkey.  USCENTCOM sent indicators to Saddam that the 4th Infantry Division was actually going to come through Turkey.  The intent was to keep the Nebuchadnezzar Republican Division positioned along the Green Line between Iraq and Iraqi Kurdistan until any repositioning was too late to affect operations south of Baghdad.\n\nThe messages sent to Saddam were that the Turkish Parliament vote was a sham and that the parliament would at the last minute approve the movement of forces through Turkey.43  The third deception involved V Corps' attack through the Karbala gap.  The object of the deception was to confuse the Adnan Republican Guard Division as to the main effort of V Corps.  This would prevent the division from positioning itself to attempt to defeat the attack.44\nEven if there were products available to set the conditions for the aftermath of the combat operations, reaching the Iraqi populace became problematic with the fall of the regime.  Because Saddam used the radio and TV broadcasts to command his troops in the field and to continue to spread propaganda, USCENTCOM directed attacks on the radio and TV transmitters.  The side effect of the attacks was the destruction of the only nationwide radio and TV networks.  Because none of the assets in the JPOTF's equipment inventory was capable of reaching the entire country, there was no way to broadcast instructions to the Iraqi people, especially to those who resided outside of Baghdad.  It would take almost a year before there was a satellite broadcast from Baghdad to the rest of the country and it would take almost two years to rebuild the terrestrial radio and television networks.\n\nIn an effort to reduce the suffering of the Iraqi people, the targeting effort attempted to limit collateral damage.  Sometimes military requirements either exceeded collateral damage concerns or collateral damage considerations played a minor role in determining targets.  Two examples of this occurred in Bayji and Tikrit.  Both bridges allowed the Iraqi military to cross the Tigris River and were the only bridges across the Tigris for over 20 miles in each direction from the bridges, but they also provided telecommunications and electricity connectivity, and, in the case of the Bayji bridge served as a critical oil pipeline from the oil fields of Kirkuk to the refinery in Bayji.  When CENTAF destroyed these bridges they prevented the Iraqi military from crossing the Tigris River at these critical points, but they also isolated Bayji and Tikrit from the eastern side of the Tigris River.  It would take a year to repair the Bayji Bridge and almost two years to repair the Tikrit Bridge.\n\nThe media played a key role in shaping the information environment for OIF.  In addition to daily press briefings from the Pentagon, the Department of Defense began a new program to provide reporters unprecedented, but controlled access to the battlefield.  The embed program allowed registered media to travel with Coalition Forces into battle.  These reports from the field allowed audiences across the world to witness the fastest ground assault in the history of warfare. This allowed the Coalition Forces to provide the access reporters demanded while exercising some control over what the reporters had access to.  Daily press briefings from the Pentagon attempted to provide a more complete picture that what the embedded reporters saw and reported. Overall, the system worked well and reporting from the field generally presented coalition operations in a favorable light even if the Washington Press Corps disliked the daily briefings because they lacked the detail the embedded reporters provided.\n\nIntelligence support to IO was essentially non-existent.  Neither CFLCC nor V Corps had dedicated intelligence support to their IO efforts.  There was no permanent intelligence presence in the IO cells of either organization.   None of the commanders' PIR focused on any IO objectives beyond the capitulation of the Iraqi forces.  Because PID did not focus on IO objectives, no collection assets collected information that could help either CFLCC or V Corps determine whether or not they were achieving their IO objectives.\n\nAlthough Saddam's regime collapsed and the Iraqi military was essentially non-existent, things were not as coalition planners had hoped.  Looting was rampant across the country, but especially in areas that had significant regime presence prior to the war.  The worldwide media broadcasted the Marines pulling down the statue of Saddam on 9 April and then shortly afterwards broadcasted the looting of Baghdad by a mob of seemingly crazed Iraqis and American Soldiers and Marines standing by, watching the looting.  The popular uprising predicted by Ahmed Chalabi and several other Iraqi expatriots did not occur. The Iraqi technocrats so vital to keeping the government functioning did not return to work.  Public services became non-existent.  Electricity generation and distribution which had been a problem dropped to such a low level, that people had more hours without power than they had with power. Iraqi oil production and exports, which never quite reached pre-1990 levels, ceased.  On 21 April, the Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA), formed in February 2003\nmoved from Camp Doha, Kuwait to Baghdad, Iraq but proved incapable of handling the situation.\nThe military found itself responsible for a country that it had no intention of running.  The military had become a de facto occupation force even if officially it was not an occupation force. Something needed to be done to bring order to Iraq.  With Ambassador L. Paul Bremer's arrival in Baghdad on 12 May, the CPA assumed control of Iraq.  On 22 May, the UNSC passed Resolution 1483, which acknowledged the Coalition's occupation of Iraq and called upon the occupying powers to speed the transition from occupation to a free Iraqi government.45\n\n## The Cpa Assumes Control\n\nThe CPA was the Bush Administration's response to the inability of ORHA to bring order to the chaos that had become Iraq.  Strategically, the Bush Administration attempted to do the impossible, gain UN acceptance of the Coalition's occupation of Iraq.    The CPA inherited the military's misunderstanding of the situation in Iraq, and would make its own mistakes in assuming control.  The CPA did not come to Iraq prepared to deal with the information environment; most of the details were left to the CJTF-7.  Typically the CPA would issue a policy or decree and then the CJTF-7 would have to develop a program to implement the policy.\n\nEarly in the occupation, Ambassador L. Paul Bremer indicated he had several goals, the defeat of the insurgents, an eventual transfer of power to the Iraqis, to rebuild the country and to foster the development and growth of a free enterprise system in Iraq.46  Every policy he instituted was aimed at achieving those goals.  Despite criticism from those within and outside of Iraq he announced the dissolution of the Iraqi Army citing the Ministry of Defense's role in oppressing the Iraqi people.  He also announced an intense de-Ba'athification policy that had the immediate effect of putting the Iraqi bureaucracy out of work.  This effectively shut down what was left of the government.  He then began a clumsy program of restoring the Iraqi economy and getting public services operational.  The implementation of the reconstruction programs would become a major focus not only of the IO apparatus in the country, but also of every major command subordinate to CJTF-7.  The reconstruction program would also highlight a shortcoming in CPA and CJTF-7's understanding of IO, actions matter more than words.  The CPA press briefings and IO products would provide a focus on reconstruction efforts, but often words were more optimistic than reality could support.\n\nThe CJTF-7 initially did a poor job of integrating IO and unit operations. While the commanders of the subordinate US divisions to CJTF-7 reorganized their staffs to some sort of effects based approach, designed to integrate combat operations, reconstruction and IO, the commander of the CJTF-7 kept his traditional staff organization.  It was not until early 2004, with the arrival of the first elements from the III Corps staff, that CJTF-7 began to take the same approach to effects as its subordinates did.  Generally combat operations were controlled by the C3, reconstruction operations were controlled by the C5, and IO was controlled by the C3 IO. There was not a formal organization that brought all three elements together.  This often resulted in IO programs that were disconnected from other operations.\n\nOnce major combat operations ceased, EA played an extremely limited role in OIF.   As RCIEDs became more prevalent, Compass Call and Prowler aircraft began to play a significant role in defeating the RCIEDs.  Coalition forces also began fielding vehicle-mounted counter- RCIED systems.  Most of these systems protected high value leaders as they traveled around Iraq. The CJTF-7 IO cell did have an Air Force EW officer who coordinated with USCENTCOM for EA support, but the subordinate divisions did not, in fact they generally remained oblivious to CJTF-7 EA operations.  Even the fielding of the vehicle-borne RCIED jammers was handled through the C3 with little IO involvement, especially in the subordinate divisions.\n\nThe major method of reaching the Iraqis was PSYOP.  PSYOP units provided loudspeaker scripts, handbills, posters and booklet for everything from curfew announcements to the CJTF-7 rewards program to information about Transitional Administrative Law.  As individual Iraqi media outlets became functional, primarily with PSYOP support, tactical PSYOP units would use those fledgling outlets to support their product dissemination.  Despite a shortage of PSYOP resources (teams, mass media and timely product development) in theater, the tactical PSYOP units did a good job of reaching the Iraqi populace.\n\nThe issue with PSYOP integration during CPA's tenure in Iraq stemmed more from a failure to understand the limitations the PSYOP forces had.  CPA and CJTF-7 programs habitually overestimated the effectiveness of the tactical PSYOP units in country.  It was more common to see CPA/CJTF-7 programs that had unrealistic timelines for dissemination of products and equally unrealistic timelines for those products to have an effect on the populace. One notable example was the CPA weapons control program.  From the announcement of the program in May 2003 until its implementation just two weeks later, the PSYOP organizations had to provide information on the program to 26 million people, all without the aid of radio and television.  When the program failed, officials blamed the CJTF-7 IO staff and tactical PSYOP companies for failure to convince the Iraqis to comply with the program.\n\nOne of the most effective tools in the hands of Coalition forces was the very forces that were on the ground interacting with Iraqi citizens. The regular leader engagements between Coalition forces and Iraqi key leaders that most units conducted proved to be one of the best ways to influence events in the Iraqi tribes and governance.  This program received a boost in the late summer with General Abizaid personally met with key leaders from every governorate in Iraq. The only issue with these engagements was that there was no formalized method to gather feedback from these meetings.\n\nA tool the CJTF-7 used to share the good news with the Iraqis was the development of directed talking points.  These talking points, written by the IO section, covered major operations or a two-week period and allowed all the members of the CJTF-7 to speak essentially with one voice.  Originally talking points were only published sporadically as part of major operations or a specific focus area.  Finally under pressure from its subordinate, the CJTF-7 developed a biweekly order that consolidated talking points for use during a specific two week time frame. Although the talking points did not change a great deal from week to week, they did provide some focus for the CJTF's subordinate commands when meeting with local Iraqis.\n\nOne person the CPA could never meet with was the Ayatollah Sistani.  Prior to the war, Sistani was a senior Iraqi Shi'a cleric but no one understood his importance.  By the time the CPA realized he was the most respected Iraqi Shi'a cleric, it was too late to influence him positively.  Out of a desire not to legitimize the occupation of Iraq, Sistani refused to meet with anyone from the CPA.  He did meet with Iraq leaders and even members of the Iraqi Governing Council.  Sistani would remain a thorn in the CPA's side as he criticized not only reconstruction efforts, but also criticized the plan Bremer put forward in November 2003 to transfer sovereignty to the Iraqis.\n\nThe reconstruction of Iraq was a significant focus of IO in Iraq.  The main problem with was that reconstruction was not tied to information objectives.  The CPA, CJTF-7 and each of the subordinate commands spend billions of dollars to repair Iraq's infrastructure but apparently with no focus.  The Iraqi economy and infrastructure were in such bad shape that everything became priority.  Even the school repairs seemed to be done without a focus.  Instead of repairing specific items (schools, hospitals, warehouses, etc) in targeted locations to improve the Iraqi perception of Coalition forces, repairs were conducted on everything that was broken.  This caused incremental improvement in the lives or most Iraqis, but paid few dividends in good will.  IO's role was simply to publicize the good news of things being repaired.  IO did not influence the decision making as what would or should be repaired, simply to tell that something HAD been repaired.\n\nThe media continued to play a significant role in the CPAs efforts in Iraq.  In fact, the media would become the primary method for communicating to the rest of the world what was happening in Iraq.  The embed program continued, but it became more frequent to see reporters moving on their own throughout Iraq.  In general, the media covered significant combat operations and tried to stay as close to either Baghdad or to units engaged in the hunt for Saddam Hussein as possible.  In an attempt to keep the press informed of events in Iraq, the CPA conducted daily press briefings to which ever media outlets would attend.  Initially, the CPA wanted to hold two separate briefings, one for non-Iraqi press, conducted by a CPA spokesman and one briefing for the Iraqi press conducted in Arabic by a PSYOP Officer.  The Iraqi press refused to attend the special briefings for them and the idea was eventually scrapped in favor of a single consolidated briefing.\n\nIntelligence support to IO during the CPA's tenure was no better than it had been during major combat operations.  Because CPA was primarily a civilian organization, it had few resources of its own it could use to obtain feedback from across the country.  The CPA really depended on feedback it received from the CJTF-7 or from Iraqis participating in the Governing Council.  Even though the CPA was technically in charge of the situation in Iraq, its focus on reconstruction and economic development put it at odds with the CJTF-7's focus on defeating the insurgents usually meant the military's collection assets focused on insurgent targets and not on whether Iraqi attitudes were changing.  (In fact the longer the occupation drew on, the more Iraqis began to demand sovereignty over the own affairs).  Of all the organizations in Iraq only the CJTF-7 had dedicated intelligence support to IO, but that did not matter as long as the commander's collection priorities continued to be on the insurgents and the fifty-five most wanted.\nThe OSINT analysts worked directly for the CPA Office of Strategic Communications\n(IO).  The CJTF-7 OSINT cell produced a daily product called the \"Baghdad Mosquito\" which was a summary of reporting in local and regional media.  The Baghdad Mosquito provided daily summaries of the regional and local media reporting on Iraq.  Once a week the Mosquito featured an article on the rumors currently persisting on the streets of Baghdad.  This was probably the most widely read of intelligence reporting in Iraq because it was posted not just on secret networks, but eventually was posted on the Army Knowledge Online website.\n\nIO feedback from the subordinate commands was haphazard at best.  This was as much a function lack of focus from the CJTF-7 IO section as well as the inability to decide what format subordinate reporting would be in made it difficult to solicit feedback from the subordinate IO sections.  Most feedback focused on documenting measures of performance instead of measures of effectiveness.  It was as though the CPA and CJTF-7 were unconcerned about whether their programs were effective and more concerned with whether or not their subordinates complied with the operations orders the command issued even if complying with the operations order would ultimately be detrimental to the information environment in which the subordinate commanders operated.\n\nIO during the CPA's tenure in Iraq was generally unsuccessful.  While there were some successes, IO failed to perform up to its potential.  IO failed primarily because of a lack of focus on integrating IO into operations.  By failing to allocate adequate resources to IO, CJTF-7 helped to ensure IO would not be effective.  Combined overambitious timelines for the execution of IO programs, an inability to target infrastructure repairs for maximum effect, and inadequate feedback mechanisms to determine the effectiveness of IO programs, the CJTF hindered the ability of IO to support the operational objectives.   As CJTF-7 transitioned to MNC-I, it corrected many of the mistakes made in 2003, but the CPA and CJTF-7 had lost the opportunity to shape Iraqi perceptions of the Coalition and for most of the next two years the Multi-National Force - Iraq and the Multi-National Corps - Iraq would attempt to turn around the perception of the Iraqi people and world audiences.  From 2004 through early 2006, two opportunities for the Coalition to turn things around would present themselves, the development of an Iraqi Constitution and Government, and the creation of functional security forces.\n\n## Conclusions And Recommendations\n\nIntegrating IO into unit operations remains a significant challenge for commanders.  Over the last five years, commanders have increasingly understood the necessity for integrating IO into their units' operations.  Commanders at all levels readily discuss the importance of shaping the information environment.  For many commanders, IO no longer remains an operational element that does not deserve the commander's personal attention.  Those commanders understand, they must set the IO priorities to ensure IO is integrated into his operation.  The remainder of this chapter will discuss ways the Army can better prepare its commanders for integrating IO.\n\nThis monograph has highlighted several challenges in the areas of doctrine, intelligence support to IO, and resourcing IO that the Army must address to create a solid foundation upon which commanders can build and train their staffs.  The Army can ill afford to allow its commanders to grope blindly in an attempt to develop their own solutions. It is incumbent upon the Army to provide the tools and training the commanders need to effectively integrate IO.\n\nIn its discussion of Army doctrine, this monograph has shown that current Army doctrine was insufficient for providing guidance on integrating IO into unit operations.  First, in reducing IO purely to an element of information superiority, Army doctrine perpetuated the misunderstanding that IO was a separate function and not an integrating function.  Second, Army doctrine also has not provided clear instruction on integrating the elements of IO with each other. This included discussions on the capabilities and limitations of the various elements of IO and the assets and resources available to those elements.  Third, the doctrine manuals of the elements of IO did not provide any information on how those elements relate to the other elements of IO. Finally, unit doctrinal manuals did not provide guidance for integrating IO at the unit level.\n\nThe discussion of intelligence support identified three shortcomings with intelligence support to IO.   The first shortcoming in intelligence support to IO was a doctrinal shortcoming. Like other Army doctrine, intelligence doctrine suffered from the same issues as other Army doctrine, intelligence doctrine described IO primarily in terms of achieving information superiority and not as an ability to help commanders dominate not just the information environment but also the operational environment.  This meant that intelligence was incapable of helping the commander visualize the environment.  The inability to visualize the information environment clearly meant the commander could not articulate his priorities for shaping the overall operational environment through the information environment.  This generally meant that unit either ignored the information environment, and provided too few resources to influence the environment, or the unit targeted the wrong elements of the information environment and in turn failed to properly influence the information environment.  Furthermore, intelligence support to IO assessment could not provide the long-term detailed assessments IO required to determine the effectiveness of the commander's attempts to influence the information environment.  Both IO officers and intelligence analysts have failed to develop appropriate MOEs that the G2 could use to track the effectiveness of the commander's efforts to influence the information environment. Finally, there were insufficient resources for intelligence to support IO.  These resources included, collectors, analytical tools (including automation support) and trained analysts to provide accurate assessments of the information environment.\n\nThrough its discussion of resourcing IO, this paper has shown there are critical resourcing issues for IO in the army.  These resource shortfalls have caused commanders to develop ad hoc organizations to resource their IO efforts.  The first resource issue is a personnel issue.  The Army has almost a 40% shortage of required IO officers to meet requirements.  Under the current USAIOP's recruiting program, it will another seven years to fill this requirement.  If the results of the 2005 career field board was an indication of the types of officers drawn to IO, IO will continue to attract officers who are technically gifted but with little combat arms experience.  The second resourcing issue concerned equipment issues.  There was no ABCS compatible system that allowed IO planning and execution of IO operations.  ABCS and CPOF did not provide adequate support IO planning and execution and current IO planning tools are incompatible with ABCS requirements.  The final resourcing issue was training officers on integrating IO.  Current training programs have not exposed commanders to the realities of integrating IO and have essentially taught commanders that it was not necessary for them to integrate IO into their operations in order for the unit to be successful.\nAll the issues mentioned in this monograph came to light as commanders worked to integrate IO in combat operations.  Those commanders who were successful made integrating IO a priority.  In making IO a priority, they ensured the IO effort had sufficient resources to allow it to succeed.  These commanders also ensured unity of effort in the information environment through every echelon of command.  The most successful IO integration efforts involved the development of an Office of Strategic Communications.  These organizations synchronized all information efforts within the command and provided embedded intelligence analysis capability to be able to focus more clearly on the information objectives.\n\nBased on the findings expressed in this monograph, this author makes a series of recommendations to help commanders integrate IO.  These recommendations follow the Doctrine, Organization, Training, Material, Leadership and Education, Personnel and Facilities (DOTMLF) format.  While individual units have implemented some of these recommendations, the Army should implement these recommendations across the Army.\n\n## Doctrine\n\nDevelop a definition of IO that reduces the ambiguity of what IO is in practice.  Express that definition in terms of influence, inform, attack and protect.\n\nEnsure Army doctrine presents IO as an integrated function that can influence the information and the operational environments.  Army doctrine must provide a baseline for helping the commander visualize the information environment, then describe how he wants to influence the information environment and finally how to direct his subordinates through a clear commander's intent.\nFM 3-13 must include guidance on the use of Combat Camera.  This guidance should also include TTPs for the use of COMCAM teams and capabilities.  Joint COMCAM doctrine indicated COMCAM assets directly supported the IO effort, but Army doctrine did not even mention the use of COMCAM.\nFM 3-13 must include practical guidance on integrating the elements of IO.  The manual focused primarily on developing themes and objectives without presenting a baseline understanding of the capabilities and limitations of each element of IO.\n\nFunctional manuals for the elements of IO must include a discussion of the relation of that particular element to the remaining elements of IO.\n\nFM 3-13 must include guidance on establishing and running an IOWG.  Formalize the required input and output from the IWOG.  (i.e. talking points, targeting input)\nTargeting doctrine must be brought up to date to include both lethal and non-lethal targeting methodologies.  Include a discussion of using CA to be a part of the \"deliver\" step of targeting, not just the \"decide\" or \"assess\" steps.\n\nClarify the relationship between IO and PA.  Doctrine in both areas must clearly articulate the relationship between IO and PA.\n\n## Organization\n\nContinue implementation of USAIOP plan to modernize the IO force structure recommended in the 15 September 2005 Leaders Update.\n\nCreate an office of Strategic Communications within division and higher headquarters.\nThis office will ensure unity of effort of IO and PA while keeping the firewall between IO and PA.  This organization can also serve to replace the IOWG if desired.  The STRATCOM office should have a similar structure to the STRATCOM offices currently in use in Afghanistan and Iraq in that it must include IO, PA, Intelligence and some sort of POLAD representation.\n\n## Training\n\nDevelop training exercises that provide a penalty for commanders not integrating IO into their operations.  Unless commanders are unable to complete their missions without successfully integrating IO, they will not view IO as a priority, even if their operations orders claim IO is a priority.\n\nProvide IO officers opportunity to participate in Train-with-Industry programs.  Civilian public relations firms have a wealth of knowledge the army must access to be able to effectively shape the information environment.\n\nAllow IO officers to attend joint (or army developed) EW, OPSEC and MILDEC\ncourses, program into the IO professional development curriculum.  This is especially critical for officers who will serve as EW, OPSEC or MILDEC officers.\n\nOfficer professional development courses must include instruction that stress the integration of IO into unit operations.  From Officer Basic Course to the War College, educational training must reinforce the requirement to integrate IO and provide practical examples on integrating IO.\n\n## Materiel\n\nProvide IO data basing capabilities that are compatible with Army planning tools and Army Battle Command Systems.  This can be through modifying current ABCS systems to support IO planning and execution monitoring requirements or modifying current IO planning tools (like ION) to be compatible with ABCS.\n\nIncrease organic the data transmission capabilities of Combat Camera Teams by providing all teams access to high-speed satellite based transmission systems.  The satellite systems serving as transmission hubs in Iraq are small enough for most COMCAM teams to carry as part of their team equipment.  Issue one satellite transmitter per COMCAM squad as a minimum unit of issue.\n\nDevelop an Army EA platform.  The platform must have similar capabilities to the EA-\n6B and the EH-130H.  This will relieve some of the Army's dependence on the Air Force and Navy EA assets which may have conflicting priorities serving their various components.\n\n## Leadership And Education\n\nCommanders must demand IO integration into all their operations.  In describing his view of the unit's operation the commander must include a description of how he intends to influence the information environment.\n\nDecision makers must participate in the IOWG.  As long as the commander, Chief of Staff or the G3 does not participate in the IOWG, the IOWG will remain dysfunctional and not receive full support from the staff and subordinate commanders.\n\nThe senior IO Officer must have the same access to the commander as other staff sections.  Access to the commander is an indicator of how important an effort is.  If the G-7 cannot have the same access to the commander as the G-3, G-4 or even the commander's special staff then IO will remain a lesser important function of the unit.\n\n## Personnel\n\nCreate an EW and MILDEC Additional Skill Identifier and code the unit TOEs for officers who have attended an EW or MILDEC qualification course.\n\nDevelop an IO enlisted MOS or at least an ASI for enlisted soldiers that allows them to tracked as IO trained personnel.  Code all non-IO MOS positions within the G-7 with that skill identifier.  Soldiers who fill those positions must attend the ASI producing course.\n\nContinue the USAOIP recruitment program to meet the personnel requirements of the USAIOP IO campaign plan.  Make a concerted effort to recruit officers who possess tactical combat arms experience.\n\nThe Army has begun adapting to the environment in which it must fight the Global War on Terror.  The environment requires that commanders understand the impact of information on the operational environment.  Commanders have begun to more clearly visualize the information environment.  Their descriptions of how they want to affect the environment have provided better guidance for their subordinates to understand their intent as it relates to the information environment.  For the most part, commanders have had to adapt to the environment on their own. Commanders have done this without clear doctrinal guidance, adequate intelligence support or appropriate resources for the tasks required.\n\nArmy doctrine must change to capture the lessons learned from OEF and OIF and provide clear, executable guidance for integrating IO.  The most important change to doctrine is that IO can no longer be a separate function that requires little focus from the commander, but must be an integrated function that accounts for all the activities a unit could perform.  Once a doctrinal baseline exists, the required support to IO will follow.  Commanders will drive the intelligence process by including IO related PIR, which in turn drives intelligence collection and analysis requirements.  The revised doctrine will also cause changes to force structure and equipment requirements for the Army.  These structure changes will ensure commanders have the resources they need to successfully conduct IO.  Implementing the recommendations presented in this monograph will help provide the tools commanders need for success in the information environment.  Eventually, the Army can achieve the level of competence in IO as it does in the realm of kinetic force on force operations.\n\n## Appendix A: Io And Public Affairs\n\nWinning the media war is crucially important to Western war-planners, and increasingly sophisticated methods for doing so have been developed - albeit with varying results.\n\n## Kenneth Payne\n\nIn September 2004,when Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff issued a policy memorandum to the Joint Chiefs and the commanders of the Unified Commands.  In the memorandum, he stated that IO and PA are and must be separate functions within the command. He gave several reasons for this.  First, PA and IO had different target audiences.  PA focused on informing the \"American public and international audiences is support of combatant commander public information needs at all operational levels, while IO \"serves to influence foreign adversary audiences using psychological operations capabilities.\"47  Second, while admitting that PA and IO both supported military objectives by countering disinformation and deterring hostile action, the Chairman insisted both functions required separate organizations (presumable an IO cell and a PA cell).  General Myers did acknowledge a requirement for coordination between IO and PA, but cautioned against the intermingling of the two.\n\nThe Chairman would not have written this memo if he did not perceive there were an issue with the way IO and PA were becoming integrated.  Since 2001, there have been at least two major incidents involving the blurring of the distinction between PA and IO.  The first incident was the aborted \"Office of Strategic Influence\" (OSI).  OSI was a Department of Defense (DoD) initiative begun shortly after the 11 September 2001 attacks on the United States, to shape the perceptions of foreign audiences.  OSI would even use disinformation to shape the target audiences' perceptions.48  In February, the Pentagon closed the OSI in the midst of concern that disinformation from the OSI would eventually by picked up by US media outlets and then the disinformation would reach a US audience.49\nThe second controversial incident involving the blurring of lines between IO and PA\nstarted in 2005, when the *LA Times* published an article claiming that DoD contractors from the Lincoln group were paying Iraqi newspapers to publish pre-written pro-US articles in their papers. The paper pointed out that although the articles were \"basically factual\", they were biased and presented only the US side and ignored information that was less than favorable to the US.50   In both of these incidents, the US press was most critical because it claimed that Pentagon's actions were damaging the perception that media was an impartial presenter of the news.  The press also claimed that there were potential violations of US law by using the media to influence US audiences.\n\nThese two incidents have drawn attention to an issue that until the last fifteen years could not have been an issue - how IO and PA relate to one another.  This was not an issue in World War II, Vietnam, Korea or even to some degree Desert Storm primarily because information disseminated in a theater of war stood little chance of reaching audiences in the United States. With the advent of the internet, twenty-four hour global news coverage, relatively inexpensive satellite phones and radios it became possible for information meant for one target audience to be received by another target audience.  CNN used as an example the ability of shortwave radio operators in the US to receive PSYOP radio broadcasts urging the Taliban in Afghanistan to surrender.  In effect, technology blurred the lines between PA and IO without the Pentagon's help.\n\nIn his article \"Why Public Affairs Is Not Information Operations,\" Colonel William Darley argued that integrating IO and PA somehow diminished the value and usefulness of PA.\nHe based his article on the false notions that PA and IO were at their roots incompatible and that there is a clear distinction in the information available to US, friendly or neutral foreign audiences and hostile audiences.  In other words, there could be no bleed over from information given to foreign (adversary) audiences and information given to US and foreign (non-adversary) audiences.  While commanders understood that adversary audiences and US audiences were different targets requiring different information, the realities of modern technology made it increasingly difficult to ensure separation.\n\nIn January 2005, the Public Relations Society of America (PRSA), the largest Public Relations professional organization, issued a Professional Standards Advisory (PSA) that provided the following guidance:\nTo reduce the confusion inherent in wartime communication, there must be a firewall separation between IO and PA and a mechanism based on disclosure, exposure and public discussion to reestablish a basis of truth and trust when situations of honesty, clarity and truthfulness have been breached. Coordination between PA and IO is essential to maintain the firewall.51 (Emphasis added)\nThe PRSA gave little guidance to maintaining that separation and used the guidance from GEN Myers to support their argument.  The PRSA used the deception involving a potential Marine landing in Kuwait during Operation DESERT STORM to illustrate the dilemma the PAO faced when he was aware of the deception and how it was a vital part of the commander's plan to defeat the Iraqi forces in Kuwait.\n\nSo how do commanders maintain that \"firewall\"?  Surprisingly, doctrine gave little direction.  Lack of guidance in doctrine and the transformation of IO to a Public Relations (give the good news) mindset, especially in Iraq, would cloud the issue even more.   Sometimes commanders would use PA strictly to communicate to the US and international press and use PSYOP to communicate with indigenous press.   Because PSYOP soldiers were comfortable dealing with local audiences and communicated well to the indigenous press, this method achieved some degree of success in keeping IO and PA separate, until the indigenous press demanded US commanders treated them the same those commanders treated the international press.  So they had the same problem again, how to reach local audiences and international audiences with potentially different messages without compromising the message to either audience.\n\nAs a practical measure, this author would like to suggest the following as a TTP: IO in its responsibility for shaping the information environment develops the information objectives for the operation.\nIt is the responsibility of the PAO and PSYOP planners and executors to ensure that their products and releases support that environment.\n\nThe IOWG becomes the forum that de-conflicts products and general releases from PSYOP and PAO.  This requires that a decision maker for the command actually attend the meeting.\n\nHave a command spokesperson who can speak to the press and who hosts whatever press briefings there may be.  The PAO can help prepare the spokesperson but should not serve as the spokesperson.\n\nMinimize the PAO's involvement in deception planning.  This allows the PAO to maintain the ethical standards of profession by not putting him in a position where he would intentionally provide false or misleading information.\n\nTreat all press the same regardless of whether it is indigenous or not. Create a series of battle drills that help synchronize the command when it has to deal with unexpected crises and when unity of message may be critical.\n\nIn the highly interconnected world of the twenty-first century, it has become increasingly difficult to maintain a separation between IO and PA.  Misunderstandings in the public about the functioning of IO and PA and their relationship to one another require that the Army examine this relationship.  Failure to do so will ensure that the commanders continue to blur the distinction between IO and PA.  Combining IO and PA causes two problems for the commander.  First, the commander could cross a legal boundary.  Second, the command loses credibility with both target audiences.  Either result will create a situation that causes problems for the command and will take significant effort to repair the damage this causes.\n\n## Appendix B: Io And Targeting\n\nThe ability to properly identify, track, deliver the intended message and then to assess the effect of the message of critical to conducting effective IO.  The current version of FM 5-0 stated:\nTargeting is the process of selecting targets and matching the appropriate response to them, taking into account of operational requirements and capabilities (JP 1-02). It is an integral part of Army operations.  Based on the commander's targeting guidance and targeting objectives, the targeting team determines what targets to attack and how, where, and when to attack them. It then assigns targets to systems best suited to achieve the desired effects.52\nThe targeting process as defined by FM 5-0 was characterized by four distinct steps, Decide, Detect, Deliver, and Assess (D3A).  Even though FM 5-0 indicated the G-7 (IO Officer) is on the targeting board, Army doctrine tended to look at targeting from a kinetic perspective. Because FM 6-20-10, *TTPs For the Targeting Process*, was written before current operations doctrine, it does not consider the requirements for IO targeting.   Even FM 3-13 Information Operations addressed targeting primarily from a kinetic perspective.  To be sure, FM 3-13 did mention non-lethal targeting and requirements of non-lethal targeting such as the long lead times and unique assessment requirements, but Appendix E (IO Targeting) seemed to present non-lethal targeting more as a subset of lethal targeting and not a subset of targeting in general.\nThe targeting process occurs inside of the MDMP Cycle and the Operations Process of Planning, Preparation, and Execution with assessment providing feedback throughout the process. The following chart from FM 3-13 presents a view of the targeting process overlaid in the MDMP.  This chart is a modification of the targeting process presented in FM 5-0.  The modifications in FM 3-13 identify the IO requirements for each step in the process.\n\n| Operations                                 | Targeting                                |\n|--------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------|\n| Process Activity                           | Process Activity                         |\n| Planning                                   | Decide                                   |\n| Mission Analysis                           |                                          |\n|  Develop IO-related HVTs                  |                                          |\n|  Provide IO input to targeting guidance   |                                          |\n| and targeting objectives                   |                                          |\n| A                                          |                                          |\n| COA Development                            |                                          |\n| S                                          |                                          |\n| S                                          |                                          |\n|  Designate potential IO-related HPTs      |                                          |\n|  Contribute to TVA                        |                                          |\n|  Deconflict and coordinate potential      |                                          |\n| HPTs                                       |                                          |\n| COA Analysis                               |                                          |\n| E                                          |                                          |\n| S                                          |                                          |\n| S                                          |                                          |\n|  Develop HPTL                             |                                          |\n|  Establish TSS                            |                                          |\n|  Develop AGM                              |                                          |\n|  Determine criteria of success BDA        |                                          |\n| requirements                               |                                          |\n| Orders Production                          |                                          |\n| M                                          |                                          |\n| E                                          |                                          |\n|  Finalize HPTL                            |                                          |\n|  Finalize TSS                             |                                          |\n|  Finalize AGM                             |                                          |\n|  Submit IO IRs/RFIs to G2                 |                                          |\n| N                                          |                                          |\n| Preparation                                |                                          |\n| T                                          |                                          |\n| and Execution                              |                                          |\n| Detect                                     |  Execute collection plan                |\n|  Updated PIRs/ IO IRs as they are         |                                          |\n| answered                                   |                                          |\n|  Update HPTL and AGM                      |                                          |\n| Deliver                                    |  Execute attacks in accordance with the |\n| AGM                                        |                                          |\n| Assess                                     |  Evaluate effects of attacks            |\n|  Monitor targets attacked with non-lethal |                                          |\n| IO                                         |                                          |\n\n## Example Integration Of Mdmp, Targeting And Io\n\nGiven the framework presented in FM 3-13 and the four functions of IO presented in the introduction of this monograph, this author would like to present a method for conducting targeting that ensures the integration of all the elements (core, related and supporting) of IO with each other and ensures IO's integration with the operation to ensure IO supports the overall commander's intent.  The example occurs in Table 4 in the next four pages.  Using concrete examples of targets, information requirements, delivery systems, collection systems and assessment tools, this example should help clarify integrating IO into the unit's operations.  For background, this scenario occurs in an environment similar to Iraq today.  Although the entire scenario is hypothetical, the elements that make up the scenario did occur.\n\n| Targeting                                                                                                                                 | MDMP     | Staff     | Product    |\n|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------|-----------|------------|\n| Step                                                                                                                                      | Step     | Proponent | Considered |\n| Commander's Planning Guidance: I want to ensure movement of petroleum products along Highway 1 to prevent a shortage of gasoline as we go |          |           |            |\n| into the Muslim new year.  I also want to give the new police forces a chance to prove their abilities to provide security.               |          |           |            |\n| Initial HVTL:                                                                                                                             |          |           |            |\n| Key Communicators                                                                                                                         |          |           |            |\n| Sheik in Bayji (Neutral)                                                                                                                  |          |           |            |\n| Religious Leaders                                                                                                                         |          |           |            |\n| Mullah in Tikrit (Pro-Insurgent)                                                                                                          |          |           |            |\n| Insurgent Financiers                                                                                                                      |          |           |            |\n| IED maker in Ad Dawr                                                                                                                      |          |           |            |\n| IED Makers                                                                                                                                |          |           |            |\n| Market in Dujayl (known arms market)                                                                                                      |          |           |            |\n| Insurgent Leaders                                                                                                                         |          |           |            |\n| Roadside shop keepers between Tikrit and Bayji                                                                                            |          |           |            |\n| HUMINT Collectors                                                                                                                         |          |           |            |\n| Civic Leaders                                                                                                                             |          |           |            |\n| Former military                                                                                                                           |          |           |            |\n| Decide                                                                                                                                    |          |           |            |\n| Mission                                                                                                                                   |          |           |            |\n| Status of infrastructure                                                                                                                  |          |           |            |\n| Analysis                                                                                                                                  |          |           |            |\n| Cultural Issues                                                                                                                           |          |           |            |\n| G2                                                                                                                                        |          |           |            |\n| Upcoming holidays                                                                                                                         |          |           |            |\n| (With                                                                                                                                     |          |           |            |\n| Cost of munitions on black market                                                                                                         |          |           |            |\n| input from                                                                                                                                |          |           |            |\n| Current civilian gasoline production and                                                                                                  |          |           |            |\n| other                                                                                                                                     |          |           |            |\n| distribution into AO                                                                                                                      |          |           |            |\n| sections)                                                                                                                                 |          |           |            |\n| Current Electricity production                                                                                                            |          |           |            |\n| Past gasoline and electricity consumption                                                                                                 |          |           |            |\n| CA Assessments                                                                                                                            |          |           |            |\n| PIR:                                                                                                                                      |          |           |            |\n| Reporting from:                                                                                                                           |          |           |            |\n| What times are the IEDs being placed on HWY 1?                                                                                            |          |           |            |\n| THTs                                                                                                                                      |          |           |            |\n| Will civilians hoard fuel before the New Year?                                                                                            |          |           |            |\n| CA Teams                                                                                                                                  |          |           |            |\n| Who is financing IED manufacturing                                                                                                        |          |           |            |\n| ?                                                                                                                                         |          |           |            |\n| PSYOP                                                                                                                                     |          |           |            |\n| Subordinate Units                                                                                                                         |          |           |            |\n| UAV                                                                                                                                       |          |           |            |\n| Higher Headquarters                                                                                                                       |          |           |            |\n| Targeting                                                                         | MDMP      | Staff     | Product    |\n|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------|-----------|------------|\n| Step                                                                              | Step      | Proponent | Considered |\n| EEFI:                                                                             |           |           |            |\n| Enemy collection capability                                                       |           |           |            |\n| Convoy Routes                                                                     |           |           |            |\n| Indicators of Coalition action and intent                                         |           |           |            |\n| Convoy Times                                                                      |           |           |            |\n| IO                                                                                |           |           |            |\n| Raid Timeline                                                                     |           |           |            |\n| Raid Location                                                                     |           |           |            |\n| Location of RCIED jammers in convoys                                              |           |           |            |\n| Initial Targeting Guidance and Objectives:                                        |           |           |            |\n| Neutralize anti-coalition propaganda                                              |           |           |            |\n| Reduce availability of munitions in the AO Prevent hoarding of or run on gasoline |           |           |            |\n| Suppress IED threat on Highway 1                                                  |           |           |            |\n| Give indigenous security forces the lead where possible.                          |           |           |            |\n| Prioritized Targets:                                                              |           |           |            |\n| Lead time for PSYOP                                                               |           |           |            |\n| IED maker in Ad Dawr - Maneuver lead                                              |           |           |            |\n| Collection time for CA teams to determine price                                   |           |           |            |\n| Market in Dujayl  - Maneuver Lead, PSYOP/CA                                       |           |           |            |\n| of fuel                                                                           |           |           |            |\n| Decide                                                                            |           |           |            |\n| COA                                                                               | Targeting |           |            |\n| Support                                                                           |           |           |            |\n| Time to move COMCAM to cover raid, process                                        |           |           |            |\n| Development                                                                       | Section   |           |            |\n| Roadside shop keepers between Tikrit and Bayji -                                  |           |           |            |\n| and transmit images                                                               |           |           |            |\n| Maneuver                                                                          |           |           |            |\n| Le                                                                                |           |           |            |\n| ad, PSYOP Support                                                                 |           |           |            |\n| Sheik in Bayji -                                                                  |           |           |            |\n| M                                                                                 |           |           |            |\n| aneuver Lead, CA Support                                                          |           |           |            |\n| Mullah in Tikrit - Maneuver Lead                                                  |           |           |            |\n| Prioritized Targets (AGM):                                                        |           |           |            |\n| IED maker in Ad Dawr - Maneuver lead                                              |           |           |            |\n| Market in Dujayl  - Maneuver Lead, PSYOP/CA                                       |           |           |            |\n| Support                                                                           |           |           |            |\n| COA                                                                               |           |           |            |\n| Targeting                                                                         |           |           |            |\n| Roadside shop keepers between Tikrit and Bayji -                                  |           |           |            |\n| Analysis                                                                          |           |           |            |\n| Section                                                                           |           |           |            |\n| Maneuver                                                                          |           |           |            |\n| Le                                                                                |           |           |            |\n| ad, PSYOP Support                                                                 |           |           |            |\n| Sheik in Bayji -                                                                  |           |           |            |\n| M                                                                                 |           |           |            |\n| aneuver Lead, CA Support                                                          |           |           |            |\n| Mullah in Tikrit - Maneuver Lead                                                  |           |           |            |\n| TSS for targeting                                                                 |           |           |            |\n| Targeting                                           | MDMP     | Staff     | Product    |\n|-----------------------------------------------------|----------|-----------|------------|\n| Step                                                | Step     | Proponent | Considered |\n| MOE:                                                |          |           |            |\n| When is the information needed?                     |          |           |            |\n| Reduction in the number of IED emplaced             |          |           |            |\n| Who can collect the information?                    |          |           |            |\n| Increase in black market price of munitions         |          |           |            |\n| How is the information collected?                   |          |           |            |\n| Targeting                                           |          |           |            |\n| Number of reports from shop owners about activity   |          |           |            |\n| Section                                             |          |           |            |\n| on HWY 1                                            |          |           |            |\n| (IO, CA,                                            |          |           |            |\n| Sheik publicly advocates cooperation with coalition |          |           |            |\n| G2, FSE)                                            |          |           |            |\n| Reduction in threats against Mullah                 |          |           |            |\n| Length of lines at gas stations                     |          |           |            |\n| Price of gas                                        |          |           |            |\n| Generate OPORD:                                     |          |           |            |\n| Use task oriented language - Neutralize, defeat,    |          |           |            |\n| 1BCT - Influence Sheik in Bayji to support          |          |           |            |\n| suppress, identify, engage, document, etc.          |          |           |            |\n| Coalition                                           |          |           |            |\n| IO annex should include IO Objectives, talking      |          |           |            |\n| 1BCT - Neutralize IED maker in Ad Dawr              |          |           |            |\n| points, etc                                         |          |           |            |\n| 2BCT - Secure HWY 1 between Tikrit and Bayji        |          |           |            |\n| Include IO synch matrix as appropriate              |          |           |            |\n| 3BCT - Neutralize arms market in Dujayl             |          |           |            |\n| Include reporting timelines as required             |          |           |            |\n| MP - Protect fuel convoys                           |          |           |            |\n| PSYOP appendix should include supporting PO,        |          |           |            |\n| TPC - Develop program to influence civilians not to |          |           |            |\n| SPO                                                 |          |           |            |\n| hoard fuel                                          |          |           |            |\n| EW annex includes guidance for EA assets            |          |           |            |\n| TPC - Develop program to convince civilians to      |          |           |            |\n| OPSEC Annex include measures for protecting         |          |           |            |\n| Orders                                              |          |           |            |\n| provide information on IED makers & planters        |          |           |            |\n| EEFI                                                |          |           |            |\n| Production                                          |          |           |            |\n| PAO - Inform of the capture of arms dealer in Ad    |          |           |            |\n| May include guidance as to preferred method is      |          |           |            |\n| Dawr                                                |          |           |            |\n| lethal or non-lethal.                               |          |           |            |\n| SJA - Ensure reward program funds flow smoothly     |          |           |            |\n| Collection Plan focuses on PIR                      |          |           |            |\n| Coordinating Instructions                           |          |           |            |\n| - Monitor fuel prices in AO                         |          |           |            |\n| - Monitor length of lines at gas stations           |          |           |            |\n| - Inform civilians of successes in AO               |          |           |            |\n| - Allow indigenous security forces to take the lead |          |           |            |\n| where possible.                                     |          |           |            |\n| Targeting                                          | MDMP                                          | Staff                                         | Product    |\n|----------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------|------------|\n| Step                                               | Step                                          | Proponent                                     | Considered |\n| G2                                                 |                                               |                                               |            |\n| Monitor execution of collection plan               | Process reporting from maneuver units; PSYOP, |                                               |            |\n| (Assisted                                          |                                               |                                               |            |\n| CA, MP, OSINT, MI Collectors                       |                                               |                                               |            |\n| Detect                                             |                                               |                                               |            |\n| by other                                           |                                               |                                               |            |\n| agencies)                                          |                                               |                                               |            |\n| Maneuver                                           |                                               |                                               |            |\n| Execute tasks to subordinate units                 | First indications of MOPs being fulfilled.    |                                               |            |\n| Units and                                          |                                               |                                               |            |\n| Deliver                                            |                                               |                                               |            |\n| Execution                                          |                                               |                                               |            |\n| Staff                                              |                                               |                                               |            |\n| Elements                                           |                                               |                                               |            |\n| G2                                                 | MOP - Did units do what they were assigned?   | Process reporting from maneuver units; PSYOP, |            |\n| (Assisted                                          |                                               |                                               |            |\n| MOE - Did our actions achieve the desired results? |                                               |                                               |            |\n| CA, MP, OSINT, MI Collectors                       |                                               |                                               |            |\n| Assess                                             |                                               |                                               |            |\n| by other                                           |                                               |                                               |            |\n| agencies)                                          |                                               |                                               |            |\n| Targeting                                                                                                 | MDMP    | Staff     |\n|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------|-----------|\n| Supporting or Additional Information                                                                      |         |           |\n| Step                                                                                                      | Step    | Proponent |\n| Considered                                                                                                |         |           |\n| 1BCT - Working with local security forces, arrested IED maker in Ad Dawr.  Local security forces          |         |           |\n| actually enter the building to arrest suspect, US forces form outer cordon. Embedded reporter from Fox    |         |           |\n| covers raid, reports US and local security forces arrested major bomb make in Ad Dawr.  BN CDR            |         |           |\n| meets with local sheiks to discuss fuel situation in Ad Dawr, lines are 50% longer than average.          |         |           |\n| 2BCT - Increased patrols along HWY 1, patrol leader engagements with roadside shop owners                 |         |           |\n| identified two merchants who were providing information on convoy movement on HWY 1 south of              |         |           |\n| Bayji, two days later one shop owner no longer seen on the road, the other shop owner is arrested.  The   |         |           |\n| Brigade Direct Support CA teams in meetings with the neutral sheik in Bayji learns that he is             |         |           |\n| concerned the fire department does not have the capability to respond to a fire larger than a small stand |         |           |\n| alone building.  The CA team recommends to the Brigade Commander to provide upgraded fire trucks          |         |           |\n| As execution occurred:                                                                                    |         |           |\n| to the station, since the current trucks are over thirty years old.  The commander approves the request   |         |           |\n| and forwards the request to the Division Commander for his approval.                                      |         |           |\n| 3BCT - Supports indigenous security force midnight raid on arms market in Dujayl, hundreds of             |         |           |\n| weapons and explosives seized. COMCAM accompanies local security forces on raid.  Stills and video        |         |           |\n| used in PSYOP programs to highlight success of security forces.                                           |         |           |\n| MP - escorted convoys through Division AO, one convoy attacked with RCIED, three killed.  Three           |         |           |\n| RCIEDs explode before convoy reaches kill zone.  PAO rides with MPs generates a new report that is        |         |           |\n| featured on local US paper.                                                                               |         |           |\n| SIGINT leads from monitoring IED maker's communications leads to two more arrests outside Ad              |         |           |\n| Dawr                                                                                                      |         |           |\n\nTo make an example like this work, FM 2-0, FM 3-0, FM 3-13, FM 5-0 and the revisions to FM 6-20-10 and FM 34-130 (FM 2-01.3) must present IO as integrated into a units operations including targeting.  The D3A process in doctrine must focus on timelines beyond the traditional ATO cycle and provide guidance on developing and tracking MOEs that develop over an extended period of time (perhaps weeks or months).  This also requires a change to the collection management process.  Collection management can no longer concern itself with MI sensors alone, but must take into account reporting from non-MI sources.  Collection management must also change its methodology of tracking targets over a twenty-four hour period to tracking targets for weeks if necessary.  To support analysis and assessment, there must be standardized reports from CA, PSYOP, PA, EW, Leader Engagements, and Routine Patrols, that ABCS can process and aid in analyzing the reporting to determine the effectiveness of the targeting effort.\n\n## Appendix C: Io Unit Structures And Equipment Capabilities\n\nAs an aid to understanding the Capabilities of the IO assets discussed in this monograph, this Appendix provides information on the assets used to shape the information environment during OEF and OIF.  The first section provides information on the PSYOP units and equipment. The second section covers PA assets.  The third section covers COMCAM organization and equipment.  The fourth section covers unclassified EA assets.\n\n## Psyop Units And Equipment Ec-130E/J Commando Solo\n\nThe EC-130 Commando Solo (Figure 15) is an airborne radio and television broadcast platform.  There are currently only six aircraft in the inventory.  All six are flown by the 193rd Special Operations Wing of the Pennsylvania Air National Guard.  Although its primary mission is support of PSYOP, it has the ability to conduct EA missions and to perform limited SIGINT\nmissions.\n\nIt has the capability to broadcast on AM, FM, Shortwave radio frequencies and VHF and UHF television frequencies.  Its transmitters can target both civilian and military frequencies.   At a flight altitude it has an approximate transmission range of about 174 KM before line of sight issues degrade reception by the receiver.  Quality television reception is generally significantly less.55\nTransmission Capabilities:56\n\n| Modes              | Number of      |\n|--------------------|----------------|\n| Transmitters       |                |\n| Frequency Range    | Power          |\n| Output             |                |\n| 1                  | .45 - 2 MHz    |\n| 1                  | 2 - 30 MHz     |\n| 2                  | 30 - 230 MHz   |\n| 2                  | 100 - 500 MHz  |\n| 2                  | 470 - 1000 MHz |\n| 1                  | 47 - 88 MHz    |\n| AM/SSB             |                |\n| AM/SSB             |                |\n| AM/FM              |                |\n| AM/FM              |                |\n| AM/FM              |                |\n| TV Channels 2 - 69 |                |\n| 170 - 230 MHz      |                |\n| 470 - 860 MHz      |                |\n\n## Special Operation Media Systems - B (Soms-B)\n\nThe SOMS-B (Figure 16) is a ground-based HMMWV mounted radio and television broadcast system.  Like the EC-130C/J it can broadcast on AM, FM, SW and VHF television frequencies.  The SOMS-B also has the capability to produce programming for radio and television broadcasts. The ranges listed in Table 6 are maximum transmission ranges, actual ranges are usually much shorter.\n\nTransmission Capabilities58\n\nAM Transmission Range\nFrequency\n400 KM\n530 - 1710 KHz\nPower\n5Kw\nFM Transmission Range\nFrequency\n64 KM\n66 - 108 MHz\nPower\n1Kw\nTelevision Transmission Range\nChannels\nN/A but is probably\nPower\n1Kw\nless than 60 KM59\n1 - 13 in PAL,\nSECAM or NTSC\n\n## Tactical Psyop Battalion\n\nThe organization shown Figure 17 is the typical Tactical PSYOP Battalion structure.\nThis is the type of Battalion that supported CJTF-7 in OIF.  Ordinarily the Tactical POB would also receive assets from the Dissemination PSYOP Battalion from the supporting PSYOP Group. With these additional assets, the POB can now produce and disseminate print and broadcast PSYOP products throughout the JTF's Area of Responsibility. 61 Without additional production capabilities, the POB is limited to its Risograph for producing printed products.  (120 pages per minute or 93,000 single color leaflets in 24 hours)62\n\n## Tactical Psyop Company\n\nThe TPC shown in Figure 18 generally supports a division-sized element.  It has a limited capability to develop and produce printed PSYOP products, radio messages and loudspeaker scripts for its three Tactical PSYOP Detachments (TPDs).  The Product Development Detachment (PDD) is responsible for PYSOP product development for the company.  Within the PDD, the Plans and Program Team (PPT) is responsible for implementing the PSYOP plan to support the commander.  The Target Audience Analysis Team (TAAT) identifies and refines potential targets for the PSYO Products.  The Product Development Team (PDT) does the actual product development.64\n\n## Mobile Public Affairs Department\n\nThe MPAD has the capability to augment the supported unit's PA assets.  Although Figure 19 indicates there are three teams in the MPAD, the MPAD could in fact only have two teams assigned to it.  The MPAD brings the capability to produce and distribute text, audio and visual products for use within and external to the command.  It can also help manage media operating in the unit's area of operations.66\n\n## Combat Camera\n\nThe organization in Figure 20 depicts a typical COMCAM Squad similar to the organizations that provided documentation support to OEF and OIF.  An Army COMCAM documentation squad generally consists of three teams of two persons each.  Each team has the capability to document operations using still photography and video.  Although the teams have a limited ability to produce final edited products, their main function is to document events on the battlefield and provide properly annotated products for use in unit briefings, PSYOP and PA products, higher headquarters products, and ultimately at the Department of the Army and SECDEF Level.  Each team may have INMARSAT access for short term uploading of products to a central server (at the Joint Combat Camera Center) for use by the editing teams normally found at an operational level headquarters or higher. 68  Unless the documentation teams provide their own high-speed transmission capability (which is rare), the team is dependant upon the capabilities of the unit they support.\n\n## Electronic Warfare\n\nWith the exception of ground based assets used in TF IED, the Army does not have any EA assets of its own.  Instead it must rely on assets provided by the Air Force and the Navy. Those assets are the EC-130H Compass Call and the EA-6B Prowler.  Both aircraft can jam tactical communications, some cell phones, as well as some remote control devices used to detonate RCIEDs.\n\n## Ec-130H Compass Call\n\nThe Compass Call (Figure 21) is an airborne communications jamming platform that can jam multiple frequencies both in the civilian and military portions of the spectrum.  It has the capability of jamming multiple frequencies at once.  The crew can upload mission profiles prior to the mission and still receive updates to that profile while it is in flight.70  Because it is a slow aircraft with a fixed orbit and its jamming systems are so powerful, the Compass Call is usually used to cover a broad area and rarely crosses into enemy airspace.\n\nDuring OEF and OIF, the aircraft focused on ADA, fire support and C2 nets for the major combat operations, later they would become part of TF IED.\n\nThere are currently thirteen aircraft in the inventory.  They are in two squadrons of six aircraft each and based out of Davis-Monthan Air Force Base in Tucson, AZ.\n\n## Ea-6B Prowler\n\nThe EA-6B Prowler (Figure 22) is airborne jamming system.  In combat operations the Prowler accompanies strike aircraft to their target.  In addition to its jamming capabilities it also has the High Speed Anti-Radiation Missile (HARM) to destroy the radars of ADA systems that target the aircraft.  The Air Force, Marines, and Navy all fly this aircraft.  Every aircraft carrier includes at least one squadron of Prowlers (4 aircraft) in its compliment of aircraft.  During major combat operations it supported strikes against combat forces.  Today it serves as part of TF\nIED.72\n\n## Appendix D: Selected Unit Io Structures And Organizations\n\nThe following charts depict the IO organizational structures from units that participated in OEF and OIF.  The first few charts depict the authorized TOE for the IO sections of units that participated in OEF and OIF.  The next charts depict the actual IO task organization these units developed to conduct their IO programs.\n\nPrior to 2004, most Divisions and every Corps had minimal IO staffs.  The Divisions\n(Figure 23) had authorizations for only one IO officer, one PSYOP Officer and one PSYOP\nNCO.  The Corps (Figure 24) had authorizations for three IO officers, one PSYOP officer and one PSYOP NCO.  Only the 4th Infantry Division and the 1st Cavalry Division (Figure 25) had authorizations for more than one IO officer on their staffs.\n\nEven though units listed in Figure 23 had authorizations for IO officers, personnel shortages within the IO career field, meant that these divisions did not have IO officers as part of their permanent staffs.  If they received IO officers, they would be in the form of augmentees assigned to the Division only for the duration of the conflict.\n\nAll the Corps deploying in support of OEF and OIF had authorizations for five person IO\ncells, but the same personnel shortages that prevented the Divisions from having fully-manned IO cells would prevent the Corps from having fully manned IO cells.  The Corps would have to depend upon Joint Manning Documents to provide the IO staff resources they required to complete their missions.\n\n## Figure 25: Force Xxi Io Organizations75\n\nThe Force XXI divisions had the most robust IO staff organizations of any units in the Army.  They would not have a complete staff prior to their deployments to OIF.  Even in theater, the staffs depended upon 1st IO Command FSTs or Division internal staff reorganization to provide resources to the IO cells.\n\nAs units began to deploy to OEF and OIF, they began requesting IO officers to round out their MTOE requirements.  Units would receive what was available in the active Army, but that essentially meant there were no IO officers available.  Units generated requests for FSTs, but the Army G3 disapproved most division requests.  Corps would receive some FSTs.  Any unit with a JMD would receive IO officers, some from the Active Force and some from the Reserve Component IO Commands.\n\nThe deployment of the 3rd Infantry Division to Iraq in 2004/2005 was the first deployment of units using the new modular design (Figure XX).  While the 3rd Infantry Division used a hybrid version of the modular design, the 4th Infantry Division and the 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) deployed in late 2005 with structures closer to the modular design.\nIn Afghanistan, the only IO officers initially supporting OEF were the three IO officers as part of the CFLCC forward staff.  In 2002, the XVIII Airborne Corps arrived and began functioning as the CJTF-180.  Resourcing requirements for the JTF and CFC-A would come from the JMD.  Figures 27 and 28 depict the IO structures of the CJTF-76 and CFC-A in 2005.\n\nThis manning did not reflect the JMD stated requirements.  The IO Chief by JMD should have been a Marine LTC, but the officer the Marines provided arrived after the Division had deployed to Afghanistan and the Chief of Staff assigned the officer to other duties.  The Targeting/EW officer was a US Navy responsibility to fill, but the Navy did not fill the billet, so the IO Chief used the night time Division Targeting Officer to fill the billet.78\nCJTF-76 working as the tactical command for CFC-A, had to ensure its IO objectives nested with CFC-A.  To ensure CFC-A's information objectives stayed synchronized, CFC-A used its effects cell (Figure 28) to synchronize all the messages from IO and PA within the political environment in which CFC-A operated.\nThis organization proved critical to ensuring CFC-A and its subordinate commands remained synchronized in their attempts to shape the information environment.  Part of what makes this organization so successful is that it has intelligence collection and analysis capabilities (JEAC) devoted to assessing the effects on the information environment.  The collaboration of intelligence and IO and PA allows the section to develop realistic MOEs and then generate tasking for intelligence collectors to identify the MOEs.\n\nAs forces operating in OEF developed force structures that were more effective than what the MTOEs for the Army units allowed, units in OIF were doing the same thing.  In March 2003, the IO structure was too small to be effective, by 2004 the IO force structure was more capable and the end of 2004, the IO force structure was even more capable.  Commanders made decisions to resource their IO efforts and provide fewer resources to other activities.  The next series of charts highlight the evolution of IO staff agencies from April 2003 until the present time.\n\n\nThe 4th Infantry Division was the only division to participate in OIF-1 with a dedicated IO Officer and staff.  Figure 29 shows the IO structure in the Division Headquarters.\n\nThe structure depicted in Figure 29 makes it appear as though the IO support was more robust than it actually was.  Only two people (the IO Chief and the PSYOP Planner) deployed initially.  All the other resources became part of the IO section after the Division arrived in Iraq. The section had a part-time contract interpreter for about 6 months of the rotation.  The rest of the time there was no interpreter support for the section. OSINT became an element of the IO section when this author asked to take responsibility for OSINT from the G2 to ensure OSINT provided the types of products that would be more useful to the section and could provide better oversight of the OSINT cell than the G2 could.  The Division's IO Cell provided direct input to Division's effects cell, which was responsible for synchronizing IO, CMO, and to some degree combat operations.\nAfter May, when CFLCC redeployed to the United States, V Corps transitioned (Figure\n30) CJTF-7's (Figure 31), the IO section become more robust as the JMD began to take shape and the US military began to fill the required billets.\n\nEven though the CJTF-7 had a more robust IO cell, it continued to be only marginally effective.  Two issues prevented the IO cell from becoming more useful.  First, the persons manning the IO cell only remained in Iraq for 90 - 180 days.  This short turnover prevented the IO cell from developing a more detailed appreciation of the Iraqi environment.  Most members of the CJTF-7 IO cell had little knowledge of the conditions in which the subordinate divisions fought and made very little effort to understand their subordinates' environments.  Second, CJTF- 7 focused almost entirely on tactical level operations and did not set conditions to allow its subordinate organizations to succeed in their IO efforts.  Because CJTF-7 was fixated on the tactical level operations, there were few resources available to shape and analyze the operational level information environment.\n\nCPA's structure was more along the lines of a Strategic Communications (STRATCOM)\norganization.  Figure 32 depicts the structure of the STRATCOM Office:\nCPA's STRATCOM Office was no less dysfunctional than CPA itself.  It was CPA's STRATCOM that had the responsibility for developing the overarching information campaign to shape the Iraqi Theater of Operations.  Working against STRATCOM's ability to shape the strategic information environment was the poor relations between Brigadier General Kimmett, the CPA spokesman and STRATCOM.  That relationship was strained at best and hostile at worst. To make matters worse, CPA's daily press briefings focused on tactical combat operations and with few exceptions did little to shape the strategic and operational level information environments.  If the IO cell at CJTF-7 was out of touch with the situation within the divisions' areas of operations, CPA's STRATCOM was completely disconnected from the reality outside of Baghdad because with the exception of traveling to and from Camp Victory (CJTF-7 Headquarters) the individuals in STRATCOM rarely traveled outside of the Green Zone and so had almost no sense of the information environment except by the reporting that came from CJTF-7 to CPA or some of the reporting that CPA regional teams generated.  Even if CPA's STRATCOM Office had more accurate reporting, it would have done little good since Ambassador Bremer tended to ignore feedback from Iraqi society and proceeded with the agenda he (or those in Washington, D.C) had developed, regardless of how the Iraqis viewed those programs.\n\nWith the dissolution of CPA and the activations of MNF-I and MNC-I the IO structures again changed.  Lessons learned during OIF-1 were beginning to bear fruit in the way forces in OIF-2 changed how they viewed the information fight.  The following charts depict the major IO\nstructures of OIF-2, the 1st Infantry Division, 1st Cavalry Division, MNC-I and MNF-I.\n\nThe 1st Infantry Division commander took a more traditional approach in structuring his staff.  Much like the 4th Infantry Division, the IO cell was a subcomponent of the Division Effects Cell.  The responsibility of the Division IO Coordinator was to ensure the elements of IO were synchronized to support the commander's effects objective.  This method proved successful despite the fact that the Division Chief of Staff diverted key personnel to perform tasks that would prevent them from concentrating on their IO support tasks.  The 1st Infantry Division was the first division in Iraq to have an FST assigned to it.  The FST did not come through the normal request channels, but its presence was a result of direct contact between the 1st Infantry Division and the Texas Army National Guard (TXARNG).\n\nEven though the 1st Cavalry Division deployed to Iraq without its fully authorized IO\ncell, the division took an aggressive approach to IO.  The commander created a robust organization that was able to influence the information environment in Baghdad.  The total number of personnel working in the exceeded 30 for most of the time the division was deployed. This would be the largest IO cell deployed to Iraq.  The commander's decision to place a Colonel in charge of the information effort helped to ensure that the staff and subordinate commanders placed an appropriate focus on IO themselves.\n\nThe structure of MNC-I was not all that different from CJTF-7.  This is probably a result of the JMD process that developed the manning for CJTF-7.  The most significant difference between CJTF-7 and MNC-I was unity of effort between the tactical, operational and strategic operations.  With MNF-I focusing on the strategic information environment, MNC-I could focus on the operational and tactical information environments.  The relationship between MNC-I and its subordinate commands was less strained than the relationship between CJTF-7 and its subordinates.\nMNF-I developed a very robust STRATCOM structure.  Among the improvements over the CPA STRATCOM Office was the inclusion of a dedicated assessment cell.  Like other STRATCOM organizations, MNF-I's STRATCOM would provide unity of effort for IO and PA. STRATCOM helped ensure that few strategic information surprises affects MNF-I's subordinate commands.   If STRATCOM had a failing, it was in its extreme focus on the desire to tell the good news of the rebuilding effort in Iraq.  It was this focus that led to the hiring of the Lincoln Group who planted good news stories in the Iraqi media.   The next rotation of OIF would see the introduction of a partially modularized division to the Iraqi Theater.\n\nAfter its redeployment from Iraq in 2003, the 3rd Infantry Division became the first division to undergo conversion to the modular design.  Figure 37 shows the division headquarters' IO staff.\n\nThe 3rd Infantry Division's IO structure was not a completely modular structure.  The Army's lack of IO officers prevented the division from deploying with all the officers the MTOE\nauthorized.  The 3rd Infantry Division's deployment marked the continuation of a trend that the 1st Cavalry Division began, providing dedicated intelligence support to the IO cell.  Although the IO\nwas significantly smaller than the IO cell of the 1st Cavalry Division, which the 3rd Infantry Division replaced, the cell still appeared to be somewhat successful.  During its tour, the division was responsible for continuing the training of the Iraqi security forces and helping to create stable conditions in Baghdad for the 2005 constitutional referendum, and national elections.\n\nThese changes in IO force structure from 2001 until the current time reflect the Army's adaptation to an environment in which possessing information superiority became a priority. Early in both conflicts, commanders (some better than others) understood that combat operations alone would not achieve victory, and that changing the attitudes of the peoples of Afghanistan and Iraq would be the key to success in both countries.  This was reflected in how they chose to resource their information efforts.  The development of Offices of Strategic Communication (a non-MTOE organization) demonstrated that commanders realized they had to synchronize their information efforts more through an organizational approach than through an IO Working Group. By creating an organization that collocated PA and IO and having them report together to a higher authority, the commander could ensure that both efforts remained distinct while ensuring their efforts complemented one another.\n\n## Bibliography\n\n2004 Afghan Elections Project Website. Available from http://www.elections-afghanistan.org.af;\nInternet.\n\nBaker, Prestiss O. US Army Information Operations Proponent, Specified Proponent Chief.\nInterview by the author, 16 November 2005. Fort Leavenworth.\nBircher, Chip. Nelson, Scott. \"Strategic Communications and the Afghan Presidential Election.\"\n2005.\nBircher, Chip. Director of Information Operations CJTF-76. Information Operations in\nAfghanistan. PowerPoint Presentation.\n________. US Army Information Operations Proponent Electronic Warfare Division Chief.\nInterview by author, 23 January 2006. Fort Leavenworth.\nBremer, L. Paul. *My Year in Iraq: The Struggle to Build a Future of Hope*. New York: Simon and\nShuster. 2005.\nCable News Network (CCN) Website.  http://cnn.com\n\nCenter for Army Lessons Learned. CTF Warrior Initial Impressions Report - Operation Enduring\nFreedom 04-10. Fort Leavenworth: May 2004.\n________. *Information Operations CAAT Initial Impressions Report 05-03*. Fort Leavenworth:\nMay 2005.\n________. Initial Impressions Report: Stability Operations - Support Operations Operation Iraqi\nFreedom. Fort Leavenworth: December 2003\n________. OEF/OIF CAAT Initial Impressions Report: Stability Operations - Support\nOperations. Fort Leavenworth: December 2003.\n________. *Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) CAAT II Initial Impressions Report 04-13*. Fort\nLeavenworth: May 2004.\n________. Targeting for Victory: Winning the Civil Military Operations.  Tactics, Techniques\nand Procedures 03-23 Fort Leavenworth: September 2003.\nChiarelli, Peter W. Patrick R. Michaelis. \"Winning the Peace, the Requirement for Full-Spectrum\nOperations.\"  *Military Review* (July-August 2005): 4-17.\nReport of the Defense Science Board Task for On: The Creation and Dissemination of All Forms\nof Information in Support of Psychological Operations (PSYOP) in Time of Military\nConflict.  Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics. Washington, DC: 2000.\nDarley, William M. \"Why Public Affairs Is Not Information Operations.\" *Army*. January 2005.\nhttp://www.ausa.org/webpub/DeptArmyMagazine.nsf/byid/CCRN-6CCSFT\nDiamond, Larry. Squandered Victory, The American Occupation and the Bungled Effort to Bring\nDemocracy to Iraq. New York: Times Books. 2005.\nField Manual 2-0, *Intelligence*. Headquarters Department of the Army. Washington, D.C.: 2004. Field Manual 3-0, *Operations*. Headquarters Department of the Army. Washington, D.C.: 2001. Field Manual 3-05.30, *Psychological Operations*. Headquarters Department of the Army.\nWashington, D.C.: 2005.\nField Manual 3-07, *Stability Operations*. Headquarters Department of the Army. Washington,\nD.C.: 2003.\nField Manual-Interim 3-07.22, Counterinsurgency Operations. Headquarters Department of the\nArmy. Washington, D.C.: 2004.\nField Manual 3-13. *Information Operations*. Headquarters Department of the Army. Washington,\nD.C.: 2003.\nField Manual 3-55.12. Multiservice Tactics, Techniques and Procedures for Joint Combat\nCamera Operation. Headquarters Department of the Army. Washington, D.C.: 2003..\nField Manual 3-61.1. *Public Affairs Tactics, Techniques and Procedures.* Headquarters\nDepartment of the Army. Washington, D.C.: 2003.\nField Manual 5-0, *Army Planning and Orders Production.* Headquarters Department of the\nArmy. Washington, D.C.: 2005.\nField Manual 6-20-10, Tactics Techniques and Procedures for the Targeting Process.\nHeadquarters Department of the Army. Washington, D.C.: 1996.\nField Manual 46-1, *Public Affairs Operations*. Headquarters Department of the Army.\nWashington, D.C.: 1997.\nFederation of American Scientists Website.  Available from http://fas.org; Internet.\n\nFoley, Robert.. 3rd Infantry Division G-7. Email interview by author. 15 January 2006.\nFontenot, Gregory, E.J. Degan, David Tohn. On Point: The United States Army in Operation\nIraqi Freedom.  Annapolis: Naval Press Institute. 2005.\nFord, Christopher M. \"Speak No Evil: Targeting a Population's Neutrality to Defeat an\nInsurgency.\" *Parameters* (Summer 2005): 51-66.\nFranks, Tommy. *American Soldier.* New York: Harper-Collins. 2004 Galula, David. *Counterinsurgency Warfare Theory and Practice.* New York: Frederick A.\nPraeger. 1968 Reprint New York: Frederick A. Praeger. 2005\nGarrett, Mark.  III(US) Corps IO Coordinator. Email interview by author. 15 January 2006 Global Security Website.  http://www.globalsecurity.org\nIraqi Media Net Website.  http://iraqimedianet.net/\n\nJohnson, Sam. Chief Joint Interagency Effects Cell. Combined Forces Command Afghanistan.\nMarch 2005: *CFC-A Effects Brief.* PowerPoint Presentation.\nKrumm, Kenneth. *FA-30 Man the Force: Senior Leader Update.* United States Army Information\nOperations Information Operations Proponent. 4 January 2006. PowerPoint Presentation.\nJoint Publication 2-0. *Intelligence Support to Joint Operations.* Department of Defense:\nWashington, DC. 2000.\nJoint Publication 3-53. *Doctrine for Joint Psychological Operations*. Department of Defense:\nWashington, DC: 2003.\nKyle, Chuck, Intelligence Section Chief, Intelligence and Security Branch, Army National Guard\nBureau.  Email interview by author 15 January 2006.\nLA Times Website.  http://www.latimes.com; Internet.\nMogavero, Greg.  Information Operations Branch Assignment Officer. Email interview by\nauthor. 15 January 2006.\nMcFate, Montgomery. \"The Military Utility of Understanding Adversary Culture.\" Joint Forces\nQuarterly. July 2005. 42 -\nLieutenant General McKiernan, David.  September 2003: Operation Iraqi Freedom CFLCC\nObservations.  Briefing to Senior Intelligence Leaders. PowerPoint Presentation\nGeneral Richard C. Myer, Memorandum titled, \"Policy on Public Affairs Relationship to\nInformation Operations.\" 24 September 2004.\nNelson, Scott, US Army Information Operations Proponent Division of IO Leader Development\nand Education.  Interview by author, 23 January 2006. Fort Leavenworth.\nNelson, Scott. 9 December 2005: Strategic Communications Overview and Emerging TTP.\nPowerPoint Presentation.\nPayne, Kenneth. \"The Media as an Instrument of War.\" *Parameters*. Spring 2005. 81-93. Public Relations Society of America website.  http://www.prsa.org; Internet.\nSnyder, Michael.  1st Infantry Division IO Coordinator. Email interview by the author. 15 January\n2006.\nSpecial Warfare Center and School. Psychological Operations Handbook:  Equipment Types,\nSpecifications, and Capabilities. Fort Bragg: 2005.\nStrykula, John. *Intelligence Support to Information Operations*. Rand Corporation 2005.\nTurabian, Kate L. *A Manual for Writers of Term Papers, Theses, and Dissertations*. 6th ed.\nChicago: University of Chicago Press.  1996.\nUnited States Army Training Support Center Website. Available from http://www.adtdl.army.mil;\nInternet.\nUnited States Army Force Management Support Agency Website. Available from\nhttps://webtaads.belvoir.army.mil; Internet.\nUnited States Army IO Proponent. January 2006: *Organizational Update Briefing*. PowerPoint\nPresentation.\nUS President George W. Bush. \"Address to the Nation.\" (7 October 2001) Available from\nhttp://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/10/20011007-8.html; Internet.\nUS President George W. Bush. \"Address to the Nation.\" (19 March 2003) Available from\nhttp://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/03/20030319-17.html; Internet.\nWolesi Jirga and Provincial Council Elections 2005 Website.  Available from\nhttp://www.jemb.org/index.html; Internet\nWoodward, Bob. *Bush at War.* New York: Simon and Schuster. 2002 Woodward Bob. *Plan of Attack.* New York: Simon and Schuster. 2004"
    },
    {
        "text": "(viii) Abdur Rehman @ Abu Abdar Rehman (Chhota - 21 yrs) r/o\nArifwala, Multan Road, Pakistan.\n(ix)\nFahadulla (23 yrs) r/o Ujrashah Mukim, Rasur Road, Okara,\nPunjab, Pakistan.\n\n## Material Objects Recovered\n\n11.\n\nOn the basis of the interrogation and searches, the investigators have recovered the following material objects:\n\n(i)\n M.V. Kuber, a fishing trawler\n(if)\n GPS instruments\n(iii)\nA satellite phone\n(iv)\nAn eleven seater inflatable dinghy with outboard motor\n(v)\nNumerous articles (list with photographs at Annexure-II)\n12.\n\nM.V. Kuber is a fishing trawler that belongs to Vinod Bhai Masani of Porbander in the State of Gujarat, India. As the narration below will show, it was hijacked by the terrorist group.\n\n13.\n\nThe GPS instruments and the satellite phone were provided to the terrorists by their masters. A photograph of the GPS instruments and an analysis of the GPS data is contained in Annexure-III.\n\n14.\n\nThe satellite phone has yielded several telephone numbers that links the terrorists to top functionaries of the LeT\nin Pakistan.\n\nA\nphotograph of the satellite phone and the telephone numbers retrieved from the satellite phone are contained in Annexure-IV.\n\nOne of the numbers is that of a Thuraya satellite phone and is (+88 216) 44 44\n7049. This number belongs to Abu Al Qama, a senior known functionary of LeT.\n\n15.\n\nThe eleven seater inflatable dinghy was recovered off the shore near Badhwar Park, Mumbai.\n\nIt was fitted with an outboard motor made by Yamaha Motor Corporation. An attempt was made by the terrorists to erase the engine number but it has been retrieved by the investigators.\n\nThe outboard motor number is 67 CL-1020015 manufactured by Yamaha Motor Corporation, Japan and imported into Pakistan and distributed by a company by name\n\"Business\n& Engineering Trends\" located at No.\n\n24, Habibullah Road, off Davis Road, Lahore. The telephone number of the company is +92 42 63 11044.\n\n16.\n\nThe articles that were recovered include toiletries, medical kit, food articles, drums containing diesel, clothing items etc and they bear clear evidence of having been manufactured in Pakistan\n(please see Annexure-II).\n\n## R I Mumbai\n\n17.\n\nThe terrorists started in a small boat from Karachi at approximately\n0800\nhrs on November 22, 2008. After traveling for about 40 minutes, they were shifted to a larger boat, 'Al-Husseini', which, according to the captured terrorist, belongs to Zaki-ur-Rehman Lakhvi, Chief Commander of the LeT.\n\nThere were already seven LeT members on board.\n\nThe terrorists spent the entire day on board the A/-Husseini. On November 23,\n2008, at about 1500 hours, the captured terrorist noticed another boat docked next to the Al-Husseini. This was an Indian registered fishing vessel called\n'MV\nKuber, which had five crewmembers.\n\nFour crewmembers of MV Kuber were shifted to the Al-Husseini. These four crewmembers were later killed by the LeT members. The captain of the trawler (Amar Singh Solanki) was allowed to remain on board the MV\nKuber and it was he who navigated the MV Kuber for approximately 550\nNM to Mumbai.\n\n18.\n\nThe ten terrorists were given their individual pack bags, containing a Kalashnikov, ammunition,\n9 mm pistols, hand grenades, dry fruits, etc.\n\nThey were also handed over a bag each, which contained an IED.\n\n19.\n\nThe ten terrorists performed watch duties on board MV Kuber. Log sheets maintained by them have been seized (Annexure-V). The MV\nKuber reached a point four nautical miles off Mumbai at 1600 hours on November 26,\n2008.\n\nAs soon as it was dark, the team leader, Ismail Khan, contacted their handler in Pakistan, who directed them to kill Amar Singh Solanki, the captain of MV\nKuber.\n\nAfter killing Solanki, the terrorists, along with their weapons and IEDs, boarded the inflatable dinghy. They traversed the last four nautical miles to Mumbai in about\n1\nhour and\n15\nminutes, reaching the locality of Badhwar Park\n(Cuffe Parade) in South Mumbai at about 2030 hours.\n\n## Rrori Reak In I Irs\n\n20.\n\n After alighting, the ten terrorists divided into five teams according to the pairing decided earlier. Mohammed Ajmal Amir Kasab was paired with the group leader, Ismail Khan. They took taxis to different target destinations.\n\nIED\ndevices were planted in two taxis and they later exploded\n- one at Wadi Bunder and the other at Vile Parle\n-\nkilling the two taxi drivers.\n\n## The Targets; Cst Railway Station\n\n21.\n\nCST Railway Station is the headquarters of Central Railways. More than 3.5 million passengers pass through the station everyday., At about\n21:20 hrs, two terrorists (Mohammed Ajmal Amir Kasab and Ismail Khan)\nentered the station and started firing indiscriminately from their Kalashnikov rifles and also lobbed grenades. The carnage resulted in 58\ndead and 104 injured.\n\n22.\n\nThey were challenged by a small number of policemen at the station. They left the station, crossed an over-bridge and fled into a lane towards Cama Hospital. Near Cama Hospital they were challenged by a police team and there was an exchange of fire. As they exited the lane, they fired on a police vehicle carrying three senior police officers and four policemen. Believing that all the occupants had been killed, they pulled out the bodies of the three police officers and hijacked the police vehicle.\n\nHowever, only six were killed and one policeman survived the assault. He is Constable Arun Jadhav and is an eyewitness to the events.\n\nAfter traveling some distance, the terrorists abandoned the police vehicle and hijacked another passenger car.\n\nThe car came up against a police barricade at Girgaum Chowpatti and, in an exchange of fire with the police, Ismail Khan was killed and Mohammed Ajmal Amir Kasab was captured. An Assistant Sub-Inspector, Tukaram Ombale was killed while overpowering Mohammed Ajmal Amir Kasab. Two police officers were injured.\n\n23.\n\nThe police recovered two Kalashnikov rifles, eight magazines, two pistols, ammunition, empty cases and five hand grenades from the two terrorists.\n\n## Nd Tar: I Id Cafe An R\n\n24.\n\nThe Leopold Cafe\nand Bar, established in\n1871, is a popular watering hole and is frequented by foreigners as well as Indians. At about\n21:40\nhrs, two terrorists\n(Hafiz Arshad\n@ Abdul Rehman Bada and Naser @ Abu Umar) entered the Cafe and started firing indiscriminately using AK-47 assault rifles. One grenade was lobbed and it exploded. Ten persons were killed and many injured. After about five minutes, the two terrorists ran towards the Taj Mahal Hotel, situated about half a kilometer from the Cafe.\n\n25.\n\nPolice later recovered from the scene of the attack five AK-47\nmagazines\n(of which three were empty and two contained\n13\nbullets), empty cases of ammunition, one metal butt of an AK-47\nrifle and two mobile phones.\n\n'\n\n## Thir Rget: Taj Mahal Hotel\n\n26.\n\nThe Taj Mahal Hotel, constructed in 1903, is a heritage building and an icon in Mumbai.\n\nIt has two wings, the heritage wing with 290 rooms and the Taj Towers with 275 rooms.\n\n27.\n\nFour terrorists\n(Shoaib and Javed and the two terrorists who attacked the Leopold Cafe and Bar, namely, Hafiz Arshad and Nasir)\ntargeted the Taj Mahal Hotel. The first pair entered the main lobby at\n21:38 hrs and opened fire, killing 20 persons in the first few minutes. The second pair entered the hotel from the North Court entrance at 21:43 hrs and fired indiscriminately and hurled grenades. The four terrorists moved up to the sixth floor of the Heritage Wing, killing anyone who came in their way. They set fire to a portion of the hotel. The first, fifth and sixth floors of Heritage Wing were badly gutted. Some of these events have been captured in the CCTV cameras installed in the hotel.\n\n28.\n\nEight police personnel from the local police station rushed to the hotel and cordoned off the area. Thereafter, commandos of the Indian Navy reached the hotel. The next morning, the National Security Guards flew in from Delhi and took charge of the operations.\n\n29.\n\nThere was a hostage situation because many guests had locked themselves in their rooms and many were sequestered in different parts of the hotel. The operations continued until the morning of November 29,\n2008. Nearly 450 guests were rescued. The terrorists killed 32 persons including hotel guests and staff.\n\nA major of the NSG was killed and another commando was injured. At the end of the operations, the four terrorists were killed.\n\n30.\n\nThe police recovered four Kalashnikov assault rifles, eight magazines, three pistols and magazines, a number of unexploded grenades, live and empty cases of ammunition, mobile telephones and one GPS instrument.\n\n31.\n\nThroughout the period, the terrorists were in touch with their controllers in Pakistan via telephone.\n\nThey received a stream of instructions and it was apparent that the controllers were monitoring Indian television channels. The controllers were keen that the terrorists should take hostage some wazirs (meaning Ministers) who might have been present in the hotel.\n\n## E I Oberoi-Tri 1\n\n32.\n\nThe hotel has two wings, one named Oberoi and the other Trident.\n\nTogether they have 877 rooms.\n\n33.\n\nAt about 22:00\nhrs, two terrorists (Abdul Rehman Chotta and Fahadullah)\nentered Trident Hotel through the main entrance and started firing indiscriminately.\n\nThey crossed over to the Oberoi and sprayed bullets into a restaurant. Two IEDs were exploded. The terrorists moved to the upper floors of the Oberoi, killing guests and staff who came in their way. Finally, they holed up on the 16\" and 18\" floors where they kept many guests hostage.\n\n34.\n\nNSG Commandos took charge of the operations on the morning of November 27, 2008. The operations were concluded after 42 hours on the afternoon of November 28, 2008. The two terrorists were killed.\n\n35.\n\nIn the attack on the Oberoi-Trident, 33 persons were killed.\n\n36.\n\nPolice recovered two Kalashnikov rifle, six magazines of which two were loaded, a number of empty cases and hand grenade clips.\n\n## Fi : Ri\n\n37.\n\nNariman House is a five-storied building, which had been purchased two years ago by an orthodox Jewish organisation called Chabad Liberation Movement of Hasidic Jews. It was renamed as Chabad House. A\nRabbi and his family lived in the building and generally accommodated visiting Jews.\n\n38.\n\nAt about 22:25 hrs, two terrorists (Babar Imran and Nazir) began firing outside Chabad House and gained access to the building. Several persons were taken hostage.\n\n39.\n\nThe terrorists and the police exchanged fire throughout the night of November 26, 2008 and into the next day. A powerful IED explosion blew away the wall at the rear of Nariman House. During the operations, the police rescued\n14 persons from Chabad House. The maidservant of the Rabbi also escaped carrying the Rabbis two-year-old son.\n\n40.\n\nThe NSG pressed helicopters into service and landed commandos on the terrace of Chabad House. Eventually, both the terrorists were killed.\n\nOne NSG Commando was killed and two injured.\n\nFive hostages were found dead.\n\n41.\n\nThroughout the operations, the terrorists received instructions over telephone from their controllers. The controllers warned the terrorists about the use of helicopters and about the landing of commandos on the terrace.\n\n42.\n\nThe police recovered two Kalashnikov rifles, four magazines, three pistols, about 250 live rounds of ammunition, four mobile phones and one GPS instrument.\n\n## The Evidence Gathere Far\n\n43.\n\nReference has been made to the Kalashnikov rifles, pistols, ammunition, grenades, mobile telephones, GPS sets etc recovered from the terrorists from the scenes of the crimes.\n\n44.\n\nTen IED devices were given to the terrorists. Seven had exploded and three were recovered and defused later. The three devices are similar and bear the unmistakable signature of having been made by the same individual or same team at the same time.\n\nEach IED\nweighed approximately 8 kilograms and each contained 4-5 kilograms of tightly packed black greasy RDX.\n\nEach had a black-coloured programmable electronic timer switch with five wires numbered from\n1\nto\n5.\n\nWire numbers\n1\nand\n4 were found connected in all the devices while wire numbers\n2,\n3\nand\n5\nwere left unconnected.\n\nEach device had two detonators and steel ball bearings of 4 to\n6 mm diameter, which were embedded and placed around the charge. The power source was two 9-\nvolt batteries of Duracell make.\n\nThe timer bore instructions in Urdu language for setting the time.\n\n45.\n\nThe 9 mm pistols that were recovered from different scenes of the crimes bore the marking of \"Diamond Nedi Frontier Arms Company, Peshawar\". (Peshawar is in Pakistan).\n\n46.\n\nThe hand grenades that were detonated and that were found unexploded were manufactured by Arges, an Austrian company. Inquiries have revealed that Arges Company had given a franchise to manufacture hand grenades to a Pakistan Ordnance Factory near Rawalpindi. Similar hand grenades were used in the serial blasts that shook Mumbai on March\n12, 1993 and in the attack on the Parliament House on December 13,\n2001. (Photographs of pistols/grenades are at Annexure-VI)\n47.\n\nM.V. Kuber, the fishing trawler has been recovered. It contained the body of Amar Singh Solanki, the captain.\n\n48.\n\nThe satellite phone recovered from the fishing trawler was used to call a number of telephones. Some of these telephone numbers have linkages with the LeT (please see Annexure-IV).\n\n49.\n\nA GPS Set was recovered from the fishing trawler. Data retrieved from the set reveals that the route was set from about 150 km South East of Karachi to Mumbai. The GPS was also pre-programmed to help the terrorists reach the shore near Badhwar Park, Mumbai\n(please see Annexure~III).\n\n50.\n\nMany items of personal use recovered from the fishing trawler contain unmistakable signs of having been manufactured in Pakistan\n(please see Annexure-II).\n\n51.\n\nAn email claiming responsibility for the Mumbai attack was sent to the media by a hitherto unknown organization styled as\nDeccan Mujahideen'.\n\nThe IP\naddress of the email ID\ndeccanmujahideen@\ngmail.com'\nresolved to a proxy server in Russia.\n\nExamination of the server data has indicated that Zarrar Shah, Communication Coordinator of LeT, had organized the creation of a new email account in the evening of November\n26,\n2008\nspecifically in order to send the email claiming responsibility for the attack. It has also been learnt that Zarrar Shah was using another email ID\n'drmoazam@ymail.com' which was registered from Pakistan via IP address 118.107.140.139\nat 1440\nZ on June\n24,\n2008.\n\n## Telephone Links\n\n52.\n\nThe controllers/handlers of the terrorists passed instructions over telephone throughout the operations. They used VOIP calling platforms.\n\nInvestigations into the numbers used by the controllers/handlers have revealed that one number is a 'virtual number' and five are DID numbers with the country code of Austria.\n\nThe virtual number carries the US\ncountry code and is +1 201 2531824. This virtual number was used to route calls to the terrorists in India. The virtual number was initially set up with a US\ncompany, by name Callphonex, by an individual who identified himself as Kharak Singh from India. The account was activated by a moneygram transferred in the name of Mohammed Ashfaq pk, code\n88647675.\n\nKharak Singh also requested Callphonex to assign five Austrian Direct Inward Dialing (DID) numbers because his clients called from different Countries, including India. The payment for the account was through Western Union Transfer. The payment was made to the Western Union agent, Nizar Alsharif whose address is Madina Trading, Corso Garibaldi S3\nA, Brescia, BS 25100, Italy with the information: \"MTCN:\n0579326626, Sender:\nJavaid Igbal, Amount: US$238.78\" on November\n25,\n2008. According to Western Union, Javaid Igbal's date of birth is December\n31,\n1962\nand the form of IV\nhe provided was Pakistani Passport No KC 092481.\n\nInvestigations have revealed that Callphonex asked Kharak Singh if he was from India why the Western Union Transfer was coming from Pakistan. Apparently, Callphonex received no reply.\n\n## The Transcripts\n\n53.\n\nEven while the terrorists had occupied the target buildings and the security forces were engaging them, the terrorists were in contact with their controllers/handlers over mobile telephones. They also used mobile telephones belonging to hostages/victims. Shortly after the attack on Taj Mahal Hotel, Indian agencies were able to intercept mobile telephone calls made from and to the Hotel. The controllers/handlers used the virtual number to contact a mobile telephone with one of the terrorists. This conversation was intercepted and, thereafter, all calls made through the virtual number were also intercepted and recorded.\n\nThe interceptions revealed three Austrian numbers, which were given to the terrorists by the controllers/handlers and conversations with these numbers by the terrorists, were also intercepted and recorded.\n\nThe Austrian numbers correspond to the DID numbers referred to in paragraph\n52 above.\n\nA\nsample of the transcripts of the intercepted conversations is at Annexure-VII.\n\nThe transcripts show that the terrorists were being instructed and guided by their controllers/handlers.\n\n## Interrogation Of Mohammed Ajmal Amir Xasab\n\n54, The interrogation of the captured terrorist has reveaied a wesith of information. Mohammed Ajmal Amir Kasab tac claimed that he had met some important LeT leaders. When shown a photograph taken from the passport of the person concerned, he identified the person as the one who had briefed the terrorists in the LeT camps near Muzzafarabad and in Azizabad. He described the person as the most important person in the LeT\nand the mastermind behind the operations in Mumbai.\n\nThe photograph shown to him was that of Zaki-ur-Rehman Lakhvi.\n\n55.\n\nThe evidence gathered so far unmistakably points to the territory of Pakistan as a source of the terrorist attacks in Mumbai between November 26 and November 29, 2008.\n\nIt is also abundantly clear that senior functionaries of the LeT were the controllers/handlers of the ten terrorists. The evidence unmistakably establishes that the ten terrorists were chosen, trained, despatched, controlled and guided by the LeT which is the organisation responsible for the terrorist attacks in Mumbai.\n\n| List    | of    | Foreigners    | Killed          | in         | Mumbai      | Terrorist    | Attacks    |\n|---------|-------|---------------|-----------------|------------|-------------|--------------|------------|\n| [       | 81    | Name          | Age             | |[Sex|     | Nationality |              |            |\n| No.     |       |               |                 |            |             |              |            |\n| 1       | |     | Ms.           | Naomi           | Shear      | 25          | F            | |          |\n| 2       | |     | Mr.           | Allan           | Michele    | Shear       | 58           | M          |\n| 3       | |     | Mr.           | Sandeep         | Kishan     | Jeswani     | M            | |          |\n| 4       | |     | Mr.           | Bread           | Gilbert    | Tailor      | 49           | M          |\n| 5       | | Mr. | Douglas       | Markell         | 50         | M           | |            | Australian |\n| 6       | |     | Mr.           | Mike            | Steweart   | Moss        | 73           | M          |\n| 7       | |     | Ms.           | Elizabeth       | Russel     | 65          | F            | |          |\n| 8       | |     | Mr.           | T               | Tsuda      | Bilasi      | 41           | |          |\n| |9      | |     | Mr.           | Mourad          | Amersey    | 49          | M            | |          |\n| 10      | |     | Ms.           | Loumi           | Amersey    | 32          | F            | |          |\n| 11      | |     | Mr.           | Jugran          | Heinz      | Schmidt     | 68           | M          |\n| 12      | |     | Ms.           | Dapane          | Schmidt    | 50          | M            | |          |\n| 13      | |     | Mr.           | Ralph           | Buruei     | 51          | M            | |          |\n| 14      | |     | Ms.           | Pillai          | Hema       | 43          | F            | |          |\n| 15      | |     | Ms.           | Rivka           | Holtzberg  | 28          | F            | |          |\n| 16      | |     | Rabbi         | Gavriel         | Holtzberg  | 29          | M            | |          |\n| 17      | |     | Mr.           | Yocheved        | Orpaz      | 34          | M            | |          |\n| 18      | |     | Ms.           | Norma           | Rabinovich | 50          | F            | |          |\n| 19      | |     | Rabbi         | Leibish         | Teitelbaum | 50          | M            | |          |\n| lived   | in    | Jerusalem     |                 |            |             |              |            |\n| 20      | |     | Mr.           | Bentzion        | Chroman    | 28          | M            | |          |\n| 21      | |     | Mr.           | Lorenza-Antinio | 45         | M           | |            | Italian    |\n| 22      | |     | Mr.           | William         | John       | Berbush     | 38           | M          |\n| 23      | |     | Ms.           | Low             | Hawai      | Yen         | 27           | F          |\n| 24      | |     | Ms.           | Jina            | Jira       | Kanmani     | 27           | F          |\n| 25      | |     | Mr.           | Livera          | Andres     | 73          | M            | |          |\n| 26      | |     | Mr.           | Gunness         | Chaitlal   | 45          | M            | |          |\n| List    | of        | it        | tograph    | overed    |\n|---------|-----------|-----------|------------|-----------|\n| ik      | Pickle    |           |            |           |\n| 2;      | Diesel    | Container |            |           |\n| 3y      | Match     | box       |            |           |\n| 4.      | Detergent | Powder    |            |           |\n| 5.      | Tissue    | Paper     |            |           |\n| 6.      | Wheat     | Flour     |            |           |\n| 75      | Mountain  | Dew       | Bottle     |           |\n| 8.      | Medicam   | Dental    | Cream      |           |\n| 9.      | Touchme   | Shaving   | Cream      |           |\n| 10.     | Sogo      | Spray     | Paint      |           |\n| 11.     | Yamaha    | Engine    | Cover      |           |\n| 12.     | Milk      | Powder    | packet     | (Nestle)  |\n| 13.     | Floor     | cleaning  | brush      |           |\n| 14.     | Bermuda   |           |            |           |\n| 15.     | Towel     |           |            |           |\n| 16.     | Jackets   |           |            |           |\n\n## Bl Ofelimioary Gbs Dataraslaved From The Et Gbs Smulamants\n\nOn caraful analysis of 17 Waypolnts retrievad from the target GPS, It s cancluded that the Waypoints obtalned can be divided Into thres distinct groups , as explalned below :\n\n1)\nSTART, RETURN & REFERENCE Point  MOB (Man On Board)\nMo8\n. CRTD 0654\nT\natarasonR\n22-NOv-2008\n.\n6789 525\"\nBesring - 317\nDistance 407.7 naut mile\nMOB Is 20 kms South-Wast\nfrom Kajhar Crask, near Keti Bandar In Pakiston, The point ls 150\n\nkma South-East of Karachl, This Is the polnt from where the militants switched on thelr GPS and started their journey, as well 25 planned to return to this very polnt after compietion of attack.\n\n2)\n PATH THAT WAS SUPPOSED TO BE FOLLOWED\n|\n\n| OCENSE      | QCEAN    | /      | SEA          | 240    | 433\"    | N    |\n|-------------|----------|--------|--------------|----------|---------|------|\n| Besring     | -        | 317   | 6799'52.6\"E |          |         |      |\n| Distance    | =407,    | naut   | mile         |          |         |      |\n| OCENS2      | OCEAN    | /      | SEA          | 827      | WIN    |      |\n| Buaring     | -        | 316   | $749'       | 053\"     |        |      |\n| Distance    | =        | 392.6  | naut         | mila     |         |      |\n| QCENS3      | CRTD     | 06:12  | 2313         | 173N    |         |      |\n| 22-N0V-2008 | 6740'   | 05.3\"  | K            |          |         |      |\n| Baaring     | -        | 318   |              |          |         |      |\n| Distance    | =        | 382.9  | nsut         | mile     |         |      |\n| OCENSA      | OCEAN    | /      | $6A          | .        | IS      | TN   |\n| Reforance   | -        | JALA-1 | 7249        | 3207E    |         |      |\n| Bearing-    | 125     | .      |              |          |         |      |\n| Distance    | =312.7   | naut   | mile         |          |         |      |\n\nThe OCENS polnts were pre-programmed In GPS for navigation to reach Mumbal through sea rauts. These points wara Intended to help milltants In reaching at OCENSA, ('A\"\npossibly indicating 'Arrival'), Badhwar Park Kollwada Cuffa Parade, Mumbal. Though they deviated from the pre-planned route dus to its closer proximity with Indlan coastal ceglons, and followad the path marked 85 JALA {explaingd below), Tha GPS also shows a symbol of a car at the arrival point (ODENSA) and the terrorists sctuslly took 8 taxi from the place,\n\n28-NOV-2008\nBaaring - 202\nT004\nDistance - 0.88 naut mile\nCRTD 10:32\n28-NOV-2008 Bearing - 314\n'Distance =432.7 naut mile\nT003\nCRTD 20:32\n28-NOV-2008\nBearing - 314\nDistance =432.7 naut mile CATD 10:32\n28-NOV-2008\nBearing- 314\nDistence\n- 4329 naut mile\nT001\nCRTD 10:32\n28-NOV-2008\nBearlng - 317\nDistance\n- 407.7 naut mile\n\nThe T001 0 7007 are TRAGBACK polnts marked In GPS with mention of date 28,11.2008(10:32).\n\nIt seems that 7007 and MAP ware the RV for thel Intended retum after the attack, The route to be followed would have been T007 through T001,\n\n| 7250'      | 366\"    |     |\n|-------------|---------|------|\n| 2343'      | 262N    |      |\n| 6705'      | 481\"    | E    |\n| 2943'24\"N  |         |      |\n| 6708        | 491\"    |      |\n| BN          |         |      |\n| 705'      | 45\"     |      |\n| 2040        | 830N   |      |\n| 6799'525\"E |         |      |\n3)\n ROUTE ACTUALLY FOLLOWED FOR REACHING MUMBAI:\nJaua-y\nOCEAN / SEA\n21055 47.0\" N\nBearing - 307\n6817'07.0E\nDistance = 314,8 naut mile\nJALA2\nOCEAN / SEA\n'201946.0\" N\nBoaring - 300\n7016 37.0E\nDistance - 166.2 naut mile\nIAA3\nOCEAN / SEA\n.\n1056 20.0N\nBuaring - 205\n720442608\nDistance - 8.78 naut mile\nIALA4\nOCEAN / SEA\n18 55 100\" N\nBearing - 322\n72049 31.0\nDistance =2.13 naut mile\ns\n\nSince the originel route decided was having closer proximity with Indlan coastal reglons, the militants maintained  safe distanca of 60 to 80 Kms from Indlan soll tll they reachad Mumbal, During thelr journey, they marked four positions as showad above as JALA, showing the actual positions on thelr way to Mumbal.\n\n## 4) Planned Route For Return Journey After Attack:\n\n| MAP         | CRTD    | 23:06     | 18    | 53\"    | 31.5\"    | N    |\n|-------------|---------|-----------|--------|--------|----------|------|\n| 27-NOV-2008 | 72     | 50\"       | 56.7\"  | E      |          |      |\n| Bearing     | -       | 000      |        |        |          |      |\n| Distance    | - 0     | naut      | mile   |        |          |      |\n| TOO7        | CRTD    | 10:32     | 18    | 53/    | 31.5\"    | N    |\n| 28-NOV-2008 | 72%     | 50756:7\"E |        |        |          |      |\n| Bearing     | -       | 0        |        |        |          |      |\n| Distance    | - 0     | naut      | mile   |        |          |      |\n| TO06        | CRTD    | 10:32     | 18    | 53\"    | 01.2\"    | N    |\n| 28-NOV-2008 | 72     | 50\"       | 46.1\"  | E      |          |      |\n| Bearing     | -       | 199      |        |        |          |      |\n| Distance    | ~       | 0.53      | paut   | mile   |          |      |\n| TOOS        | CRTD    | 10:32     | 18    | 52\"    | 42.2\"    | N    |\n\n=\n=/\nI\nJ\n&) J\n) I\n<\nsic Mumbai Tour Sightseeing Bombay Elect And Mech Marine Service\n\n| Sko.         | [         | NAME      | SIME0L    | |     | COMMENTS    |\n|--------------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-------|-------------|\n| 1            | [         | OCEAN/SEA | WTATN     |       |             |\n| 1            | Beaig     | -         | 07       | &     | ITOTE       |\n| Distance     | -         | 3148      | naut      | mie   |             |\n| 2            | [         | |         | OCEAN/SEA | WEECN |             |\n| Beaing       | -         | 300      | T         | I0E   | i           |\n| Distance     | -         | 166.2     | naut      | mie   | e           |\n| 1            | |3        | OCEAN/SEA | 1600N    |       |             |\n| Bearing      | -         | 205      | WPWESE    |       |             |\n| Distance     | -         | 6.78      | naut      | e     |             |\n| 4            | OCEAN/SEA | 1855      | 100N     |       |             |\n| Bearing-327 | TPYNOE    |           |           |       |             |\n| Oistance     | ~2.13     | naut      | mie       |       |             |\n| 5.           | (M        | R         | B         | WINSN |             |\n| 78042008     | TPUSETE   |           |           |       |             |\n| Beariog-000 |           |           |           |       |             |\n| Oistance     | -         | 0         | raut      | mile  |             |\n| [            | OXTD      | 0634      | BYAON     |       |             |\n| N0           | 7k        | 47143     |           |       |             |\n| Bearing-317 |           |           |           |       |             |\n| Distance     | -407.7    | navt      | ke        |       |             |\n| 7.           | |         | oot       | OCEAN/SEA | 0BT   |             |\n| Bearing-     | 317       | PARE      |           |       |             |\n| Qistance     | -         | 4077      | raut      | e     |             |\n| i            | [ome      | OCEAN/SEA | BWARTN    |       |             |\n| Bearing      | -         | 316      | P         | 0S3'E |             |\n| Distance     | -         | 3926      | nast      | mile  |             |\n| 9.           | [ocom     | O         | 0612      | WUIN  |             |\n| N8           | PAYOSTE   |           |           |       |             |\n| Beaing-      | 315      | i         |           |       |             |\nCistance - 3829 raut mle\nPagreof12\nOCEAN /SEA\nWS HEN\nReference - JALK\nT\nNITE\nBearing-125\nOistance -312.7naut mile\n\nQRTD 10:32\nBYsIN\n2HOV-2008\nPSS E\nPearivg\n- 317\"\nDidtance~407.7\nnaut mie\nCRID 1032\nBEOEN\nZBHOV-1008\n670545\nBearig-314\nDistaie\n- 4329 pait e\nO 10:32\n2EULN\n2HOV-2008\nP\nBLE\nBearing -314\nDistance\n- 4307 navtmie\nQX 1032\nWERIN\n2BHOV-2008\ne BYE\nBearing\n- 314\"\nDistance\n- 4327 raut mile\nQm 1032\nWRLN\n2BH04 2008\nPUBEE\nBearing- 10\nDistance\n~ (.83 raet mile\nam 102\n180N\n2B-H0V-2008\nbrd\n4\nBeaing\n- 199\nDistace\n- .53 vt mile\nRID 1032\nWINSN\nTRN0V-21008\n6T E\nBeing-0*\nDistaoce\n-0 naut mile\nAngexure-Il1\nBWaeN\n6139'525E\n6\nYD 0634\n2-NOV-2008\nBearing-317 Distance\n- 407.7 naut mile\nMOB is 20 ks South-West from Kajhar Creel, Keti Bandar in Pakistan. The poiatis 150 kms South-ast of Karachi\n\n3) PLANNED PATH\nO BE FOLLOWED :\n\n| 7.           | 1         | OCENSE    | OCEAN     | [     | SEA    |\n|--------------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-------|--------|\n| Bearing      | -317     | 619S26E |           |       |        |\n| Distance     | ~         | 7.7       | naut      | mie   |        |\n| S            | OCEAN/SEA | PURTN     |           |       |        |\n| Bearing-316 | SPATOSTE  |           |           |       |        |\n| Distance     | -         | 392       | 6         | naut  | mite   |\n| 9.           | |oCENS    | GRD       | 0612      | BIOIN |        |\n| 12-N0V-2008  | 6P4F0S3E | .         |           |       |        |\n| Bearing      | -         | 315      |           |       |        |\n| Distance     | ~         | 382.9     | naut mile |       |        |\n| 10           | |ocensa   | OCEAN/    | SEA       | 1055  | 1LEN  |\n| Reference    | ~JALA-1   | g         | NTE       |       |        |\n| I            | Bearing-  | 125      |           |       |        |\n| Distence     | ~312.7    | naut mile |           |       |        |\n\n(1 of 12\n\n## Houtes\n\nvaiable ~19\nUsed-2\n\n| WAYPOINTS-    | SUNRISE    |\n|---------------|------------|\n| 1514M         |            |\n| (229          |            |\n| 0706          |            |\n| 2.            | JAAL       |\n| bR            |            |\n| 49            |            |\n| o             | A          |\n| COURSE        | DISTANCE   |\n| w             | o          |\n| g             | 51         |\n| 100           | 3t         |\n| s             |            |\n| 4             | M          |\n053\n3 W@\nb, T006\n199\n000NM\n206\n053\ne\n088\nc T\n(518\nd. T004\nAs\n00%\n%\nus\no\n[\n@\ne B\nTR\na8\ng To01\n| Trip         | Computer    |\n|--------------|-------------|\n| Trip         | Odometer    |\n| v            |             |\n| 1314m        |             |\n| Trip         | Timer       |\n| 01235        |             |\n| AverageSpeed |             |\n| 626          |             |\n| Matimum      | Speed       |\n| aux          |             |\n| L            |             |\n\nAnnesure-111\nPage 120712\nSMS contents retrieved from numbers connected to Thuraya No. 8821655526412 and IMEI No. 352384000408640 received from Indian boat MFB Kuber\n\n| IMEI             | No.             | To        | Date       | &      | Message    |\n|------------------|-----------------|-----------|------------|--------|------------|\n| Time             |                 |           |            |        |            |\n| 352384000541520  | 88216676759     | 23.11.08  | \"26        | 03     | 000<=>     |\n| (probably        | used            | by        | 11:05(IST) | 000    | I          |\n| number           |                 |           |            |        |            |\n| 8821655526412    |                 |           |            |        |            |\n| 3523840001345050 | 8821655526550   | 20.11.08  | \"\"SEND     | ME     | A          |\n| 08:43            | BALNS\"          |           |            |        |            |\n| -DO-             | -DO-            | 22.11.08  | \"AB        | GHOR   | WALI       |\n| 8:35             | PER             | PHONCH    | GAY        |        |            |\n| HAIN             | KIA             | AGHER     | DIN        |        |            |\n| KO               | MUNASIB         | HO        | TO         |        |            |\n| MULAQAT          | KERIN\"          |           |            |        |            |\n| 352384000408640  | 8821655526463   | 18.11.08  | \"CARD      | NO     |            |\n| 10:58            | 23270973242324\" |           |            |        |            |\n| -DO-             | 8821644447049   | 19.11.08  | \"SAAD      |        |            |\n| 19:49            | 8821655526571\"  |           |            |        |            |\n| -DO-             | 8821644447049   | 21.11.08  | \"KIA       | HALAAT | HAIN?\"     |\n| 17:33;           |                 |           |            |        |            |\n| -DO-             | 8821655526571   | 23.11.08  | \"\"HARAS    | SAY    | MILNAY     |\n| 08:14            | KI              | SEATING   | KARLO\"     |        |            |\n| -DO-             | 8821655526412   | 24.11.08  | \"PLEAS     | SEND   | ME         |\n| 00:28            | POSITION        | &         | SPEED\"     |        |            |\n| -DO-             | 8821655526412   | 25.11.08  | \"GR        | DAIN.  | KIA        |\n| 10:01            | HALAAT          | KIA       | HAIN.      |        |            |\n| BARF             | KITNY           | DIN       | KI         |        |            |\n| BAQI             | HY?\"            |           |            |        |            |\n| 352384001196680  | 8821655526550   | 222.11.08 | \"AOA       | FAHUD  | BHAI       |\n| (used            | by              | ITNI      | DER        | IS     | JAGA       |\n| 882165526571     | KHRA            | HONA      | MONASIB    |        |            |\n| probably         | by              | a         | person     | NHI.   | AGR        |\n| called           | SAAD)           | AGY       | CHLY       | JAIEN. |            |\n| SAAD\"            |                 |           |            |        |            |\n| -DO-             | 8821644447049   | 23.11.08  | \"A         | O      | A          |\n| 06:48            | GUHR            | LGA       | KNHI.      | HUM    |            |\n| KETI             | BNDR            | PR        | HEIN.      |        |            |\n| SAAD\"            |                 |           |            |        |            |\n| 352384000236350  | 8821655526412   | 23.11.08  | \"MUJH      | SY     | IS         |\n| 09:06            | PER             | RABTA     | RAKHNA     |        |            |\n\nHY. WAST\"\n\n## Log Of Kuber 24 Hours Poori Safar (24 Hours Complete Journey)\n\n|            |        |         |    |        |          |    |    |   Name  | Timings    |\n|------------|--------|---------|----|--------|----------|----|----|---------|------------|\n| Fahadullah | +      | Saquib  | +  | Muheeb | 6        | am | to |      8  | am         |\n| Ali        | +      | Hayazi  | +  | Umar   | 8        | am | to |     10  | am         |\n| Ismail     | +      | Qayahiz | +  | Umar   | 10       | am | to |     12  | pm         |\n| Fahadullah | 12     | pmto    | 2  | pm     |          |    |    |         |            |\n| Ali        | 2      | pmto    | 4  | pm     |          |    |    |         |            |\n| Ismail     | 4      | pm      | to | 6      | pm       |    |    |         |            |\n| Fahadullah | 6      | pm      | to | 8      | pm       |    |    |         |            |\n| Ali        | 8      | pm      | to | 10     | pm       |    |    |         |            |\n| Ismail     | 10     | pm      | to | 12     | midnight |    |    |         |            |\n| Fahadullah | 00     | am      | to | 2      | am       |    |    |         |            |\n| Ali        | 2amto4 | am      |    |        |          |    |    |         |            |\n| Ismail     | 4      | am      | to | 6      | am       |    |    |         |            |\n|        |           |          |            |           |           | Sl    | no.     | Code    | Meaning    |\n|--------|-----------|----------|------------|-----------|-----------|-------|---------|---------|------------|\n| 1      | \"Machli   | lag      | rahi       | hai\"      | (Fish     | is    | \"Haalat | theek   | hain\"      |\n| being  | caught)   | (Things  | are        | OK)       |           |       |         |         |            |\n| 2      | \"Bhai     | log\"     | (brothers) | Civil     | Boat      |       |         |         |            |\n| 3      | \"Yaar     | log\"     | (friends)  | Navy      | Boat      |       |         |         |            |\n| 4      | \"Yaar     | logon    | ka         | group\"    | (friends' | |     | Navy    | Ship    |            |\n| group) |           |          |            |           |           |       |         |         |            |\n| 5      | \"Machine\" | \"Uljhan\" | (problem)  |           |           |       |         |         |            |\n| 6      | \"Maal\"    | (goods)  | \"Madad\"    | (help)    |           |       |         |         |            |\n| 7      | \"Baraf\"   | (Ice)    | \"Safar\"    | (journey) |           |       |         |         |            |\n\n\"GR dene wala (3) jama karega aur lene wala khud (3) nakki karega\" (GR providers (3) will deposit and receivers (3) themselves will finalise)\n\"'Satellite khula rakha hai (10pm - 10 am)\n(Satellite is on (10 pm - 10 am)\n\n## Page 3\n\n\"Yahan ka phone number\" (Phone number of this place)\n\"Yahan ka satellite number (Satellite number of this place)\n\"Naksha ki photographian\" (Photocopies of maps)\n\"Hoyal seton ki simen\" (SIMs of Hoyal sets)\n\"TT pistol 2\" ( 2 TT pistols)\nMineral Water Aqua fina\n\"Khajoor Achhi 10 kg\" (good quality dates 10 kg)\nCurrent Store Charger\n\"GPS ya Navigator\" (GPS or Navigator)\n0.\n\nSatellite + phone card\n1. Biscuit (Candy + bakery)\n2. \"Suiyan (bareek)\" (thin needles)\n3. \"Aata lal\" (Red flour)\n4. \"Drum (saman ke liye mai tala)\" (drum with lock to keep things)\n\n## Page 4\n\nGun\n1 piece Magazine\n8 pieces Grenade\n8 pieces GPS group\n1 piece Chain\n1 piece Itkafi bullets as per requirement Mobile + Batteries\n\n## Page 5\n\n23270972879217\nColaba, Cuffe Parade, Machlimar Nagar, Raja bhai Tower, Regal Chowk, Nathalal Marg, Nariman Point, WTC, Regal Cinema\n18.56_200\n\nG\n18-56-000\n72-67-560\nD\n18-55-600\n72-48-900\nQ\n18-5500-300\n72-49-56\n18-55-190\n72-49-500\n18-55-180\n72-49-535\n21 55 470\" 68 17' 070\"\n20 13' 460\"\n70 16' 370\"\n18 56' 200\"\n12 44' 260\"\n18 55' 100\"\n72 49\" 310\nL,.:, /f(,ou Aoty ul/__,-zu....\n\n.\n\nw;gug ufi'dfll'l.\n\n~pe 2\n\n| SS7__ule'.    | i    |\n|---------------|------|\n| 6817,         | T    |\n| 26            |      |\n| I3            |      |\n| g             |      |\n\n## Names Of Terrorists Figuring In The Conversation During The Attack (Phonetic)\n\nA.\nHotel Taj\ni)\nShuaib\ni)\nAli\niii)\n Abdur Rehman\niv)\n Umer\nV)\nIsmail (not present at Taj, killed at Girgaum Choupati)\nB.\n Hotel Oberoi\ni)\nAbdul Rehman @ Saquib\ni)\nFahadullah @ Fahad\nC.\nNariman House\ni)\nImran Babbar @ Imran @ Kasha\ni)\nUmar\n\n## Names Of Pak Based Handlers Figuring In The Conversations (Phonetic)\n\nA.\nNariman House\ni)\nWassi\ni)\nZarar\niii)\n Jundal\niv)\n Buzurg\nV)\nMajor General\nB.\n Hotel Oberoi\ni)\nKafa\ni)\nWassi\niii)\n Zarar\nC.\nHotel Taj\ni)\nWassi\n\n## Lat. F Ected G 1 Conversations\n\n(Locations and names, etc.\n\nhave been indicated on the basis of internal evidence of conversations)\n\n| |         | Taj        | I:          | 2       | :       | 10        | hr       |\n|-----------|------------|-------------|---------|---------|-----------|----------|\n| Greetings | !          |             |         |         |           |          |\n| Receiver  |            |             |         |         |           |          |\n| Caller    |            |             |         |         |           |          |\n| Greetings | !          | There       | are     | three   | Ministers | and      |\n| Secretary | of         | the         | Cabinet | in      | your      | hotel.   |\n| know      | in         | which room. |         |         |           |          |\n| Oh        | !          | That        | is      | good    | news      | !        |\n| Receiver  |            |             |         |         |           |          |\n| Caller    | Find       | those       | 3-4     | persons | and       | then     |\n| want      | from       | India.      |         |         |           |          |\n| Receiver  |            |             |         |         |           |          |\n| Pray      | that       | we          | find    | them.   |           |          |\n| Caller    | Do         | one         | thing.  | Throw   | one       | or       |\n| Navy      | and        | police      | teams,  | which   | are       | outside. |\n| Receiver  | Sorry.     | I           | simply  | can''t  | make      | out      |\n| 2         | F          | r           |         |         |           |          |\n| Caller    | Greetings. | What        | did     | the     | Major     | General  |\n| Receiver  |            |             |         |         |           |          |\nGreetings. The Major General directed us to do what\nwe like. We should not worry. The operation has to\nbe concluded tomorrow morning. Pray to God. Keep\ntwo\nmagazines\nand\nthree\ngrenades\naside,\nand\nexpend the rest of your ammunition.\n\n## Annexure-Vii\n\n|           |          |          | Hotel      | Taj      | Mahal:    | 27.11.2008    | :         | 0126      | hrs    |\n|-----------|----------|----------|------------|----------|-----------|---------------|-----------|-----------|--------|\n| Caller    | 7        | Are      | you        | setting  | the       | fire          | or        | not       | ?      |\n| Receiver  | :        | Not      | yet.       | I        | am        | getting       | a         | mattress  | ready  |\n| Caller    | g        | What     | did        | you      | do        | to            | the       | dead body | ?      |\n| Receiver  | Left     | it       | behind.    |          |           |               |           |           |        |\n| Caller    | H        | Did      | you        | not      | open      | the           | locks     | for       | the    |\n| (Probably | of       | MV       | Kuber)     |          |           |               |           |           |        |\n| Receiver  | :        | No,      | they       | did      | not       | open          | the       | locks.    | We     |\n| because   | of       | being    | in         | a        | hurry.    | We            | made      | a         | big    |\n| Caller    | :        | What     | big        | mistake  | ?         |               |           |           |        |\n| Receiver  | When     | we       | were       | getting  | into      | the           | boat,     | the       | waves  |\n| quite     | high.    | Another  | boat       | came.    | Everyone  | raised        | an        |           |        |\n| alarm     | that     | the      | Navy       | had      | come.     | Everyone      | jumped    |           |        |\n| quickly.  | In       | this     | confusion, | the      | satellite | phone         | of        |           |        |\n| Ismail    | got      | left     | behind.    |          |           |               |           |           |        |\n| ri        | H        | .11.2    | :          | 2226     | hr        |               |           |           |        |\n| Caller    | :        | Brother, | you        | have     | to        | fight.        | This      | is        | a      |\n| prestige  | of       | Islam.   | Fight      | so       | that      | your          | fight     | becomes   | a      |\n| shining   | example. | Be       | strong     | in       | the       | name          | of        | Allah.    | You    |\n| may       | feet     | tired    | or         | sleepy   | but       | the           | Commandos | of        |        |\n| Islam     | have     | left     | everything | behind.  | Their     | mothers,      |           |           |        |\n| their     | fathers. | Their    | homes.     | Brother, | you       | have          | to        | fight     |        |\n| for       | the      | victory  | of         | Islam.   | Be        | strong.       |           |           |        |\n| Receiver  | :        | Amen     | !          |          |           |               |           |           |        |\n| i         | i        | 27.1%:   | i          |          |           |               |           |           |        |\n| Caller:   | Brother  | Abdul.   | The        | media    | is        | comparing     | your      | action    |        |\n| to        | 9/11.    | One      | senior     | police   | officer   | has           | been      | killed.   |        |\n| Abdul     | Rehman:  | We       | are        | on       | the       | 10TM/11%       | floor.    | We        | have   |\n\n## Annexure-Vii\n\nCaller 2 (Kafa):\nEverything is being recorded by the media. Inflict the\nmaximum damage.\nKeep\nfighting.\nDon't\nbe taken\nalive.\nCaller:\nKill all hostages, except the two Muslims. Keep your\nphone switched on so that we can hear the gunfire.\nFahadullah:\nWe\nhave\nthree\nforeigners\nincluding women.\nFrom\nSingapore and China.\nKill them.\nCaller:\n\n(Voices of Fahadullah and Abdul Rehman directing hostages to stand in a line, and telling two Muslims to stand aside.\n\nSound of gunfire.\n\nCheering voices in background Kafa hands telephone to Zarar)\n\nZarar:\nFahad, find the way to go downstairs.\n\n## Hotel Taj I: 27.11. : 0137 Hr\n\n|            |               | Caller:    | Let     | me         | talk      | to      | Umar,     |\n|------------|---------------|------------|---------|------------|-----------|---------|-----------|\n| Receiver:  | Note          | a          | number. | Number     | is        | 00437   | 20880764. |\n| Caller:    | Whose         | number     | is      | this       | ?         |         |           |\n| Receiver:  | It            | is         | mine.   | The        | phone     | is      | with      |\n| Caller:    | The           | ATS        | Chief   | has        | been      | killed. | Your      |\n| important, | Allah         | is         | helping | you.       | The       | \"Vazir\" |           |\n| (Minister) | should        | not        | escape. | Try        | to        | set     | the       |\n| fire.      |               |            |         |            |           |         |           |\n| Receiver:  | We            | have       | set     | fire       | in        | four    | rooms.    |\n| Caller:    | People        | shall      | run     | helter     | skelter   | when    | they      |\n| flames.    | Keep throwing | a          | grenade | every      | 15        | minutes |           |\n| or         | so.           | It         | will    | terrorise. | Here,     | talk    | to        |\n| Caller     | (2):          | A          | lot     | of         | policemen | and     | Navy      |\n| the        | entire        | area.      | Be      | brave      | !         |         |           |\n\n## Annexure-Vii Hotel Taj I: : 0108 Hr:\n\n| Caller:    | How    | many    | hostages    | do       | you        | have    | ?      |\n|------------|--------|---------|-------------|----------|------------|---------|--------|\n| Receiver:  |        |         |             |          |            |         |        |\n| We         | have   | one     | from        | Belgium. | We         | have    | killed |\n| There      | was    | one     | chap        | from     | Bangalore. | He      | could  |\n| controlled | only   | with    | a           | lot      | of         | effort. |        |\n| Caller:    |        |         |             |          |            |         |        |\n| 1          | hope   | three   | is          | no       | Muslim     | amongst | them   |\n| Receiver:  |        |         |             |          |            |         |        |\n| No,        | none.  |         |             |          |            |         |        |\n\n## H .11.2 : Hr:\n\nWassi:\nKeep\nin mind that the hostages are\nof use only as\nlong as you do not come under fire because of their\nsafety.\nIf you are still threatened, then don't saddle\nyourself\nwith\nthe\nburden\nof\nthe\nhostages,\nimmediately kill them.\nReceiver:\nYes, we shall do accordingly, God willing.\nWassi:\nThe Army claims to have done the work without any\nhostage\nbeing\nharmed.\nAnother\nthing;\nIsrael\nhas\nmade a request through diplomatic channels to save\nthe hostages.\nIf the hostages are killed,\nit will spoil\nrelations between India and Israel.\nReceiver:\nSo be it, God willing.\nWassi:\nStay alert.\n\n## Section - 1L\n\nMinistry of External Affairs\n\n## Il. Pak Response To Mumbai Attacks\n\n| Pakistani      | leaders    | and      | Officials    | after     |\n|----------------|------------|----------|--------------|-----------|\n| attack         | on         | Mumbai   | made         | different |\n| statements     | that       | indicate | continuous   |           |\n| prevarication. |            |          |              |           |\n\n## Visit Of Dg, Isi To India\n\n| +                 | Initial    | position:    | On             | 28        | Nov     | 2008,    |\n|-------------------|------------|--------------|----------------|-----------|---------|----------|\n| Pakistan          | PMO        | and          | FO             | issued    | Press   |          |\n| Releases          | that       | DG           | S|             | would     | visit   | India.   |\n|                  | Changed    | Position:    | Later          | on,       | on      | 28\"      |\n| 2008              | night      | a            | spokesman      | for       | Prime   |          |\n| Minister's        | House      | said         | that           | a         |         |          |\n| representative    | of         | the          | Inter-Services |           |         |          |\n| Intelligence      | (ISI)      | will         | visit          | India     | instead | of       |\n| the               | Director   | General.     |                |           |         |          |\n| On                | 30         | Nov          | 2008,          | President | Zardari | said     |\n| an                | interview: | \"There       | was            | a         |         |          |\n| miscommunication. | We         | had          | announced      |           |         |          |\n| that              | a          | director     | will           | come      | from    | my       |\n| That              | is         | what         | was            | requested | by      | the      |\n| (Indian)          | prime      | minister     | and            | that      | is      | what     |\n| we                | agreed\".   |              |                |           |         |          |\n\nMinistry of External Affairs\n\n## Air Space Violation And Military Buildup\n\n+\nOn 13 Dec 2008, PM Gilani said\nit was a minor\ntechnical mistake.\nInformation Minister Sherry\nRehman said\nit was inadvertent.\n\nOn 14 Dec 2008, President Zardari said\nit was a\ntechnical mistake\n On 18 Dec 2008 Pakistan conveyed its concern\non technical and air space violations by Indian\naircraft alleged on 12 and 13 December 2008.\n+ Airspace violation was denied by India on\n13.12.2008 itself.\n\n## Kasab's Identity And Involvement Of Pakistani Nationals\n\n*\nA Sunday Observer Newspaper report on 7/12/08 has\nestablished that the lone surviving\ngunman caught by Indian\nolice during\nlast week's terrorist attacks on Mumbai came from\naridkot village in the Okara district of the Pakistani Punjab\n*\nOn 13 Dec 2008, GEO TV reported that when Ajmal Kasab's father\nwas shown therlc(ures published in newspapers after Mumbai attacks, he confirmed that the man in the picture was his son\n+\nOn 9 Dec 2008, PR of Pakistan to UN at UNSC said that i) the\nGovernment of Pakistan has already initiated investigations on its\nown pertaining to the allegations of involvement of persons and\nentities in Mumbai ii) an intelligence led operation strongly\nsupported by law enforcement agencies is already underway to\narrest the individuals alleged to be involved in the Mumbai attacks.\n\n## Kasab's Identity And Involvement Of Pakistani Nationals (2) Changed Position\n\n* On 17 Dec 2008 Pakistan's High\ncommissioner to India, Shahid Malik said\nthat Ajmal Kasab is not a Pakistani citizen.\n* On 17 Dec 2008, President Zardari in an\nInterview to BBC said that there is still no\nproof that the gunmen who attacked\nMumbai came from Pakistan\n\n## Chronology Of Contradictory Statements On Masood Azhar\n\n+\nOn 9-12-08 Defence Minister Chaudhry Ahmed\nMukhtar told CNN-IBN that Masood Azhar has\nbeen detained and that Pakistan \"might allow\"\nIndian investigators to question him.\n On 9-12-08 itself a Bhawalpur police official told\nAaj TV that Masood Azhar's movements have\nnot been restricted.\n+ On 10-12-08 PM Gilani told reporters that \"We\nare awaiting the latest reports about Masood\nAzhar\".\nHe did not confirm or deny Masood\nAzhar's detention.\n\n## Ministry Of External Affairs Chronology Of Contradictory Statements On Masood Azhar (2)\n\n+\nOn 17-12-08, Pakistan High Commissioner\nto India told\n'Network 18' that Pakistan government had not detained\nAzhar as part of the ongoing clampdown on militant and\nterrorist groups.\nHe also claimed\nMasood Azhar was not\nin Pakistan,\n+\nOn 17-12-08 FM Qureshi told \"News Eye\" at 9 pm that\nMasood Azhar is \"in custody\".\n+\nOn 17-12-08 at 10 pm FM Qureshi said that \"Masood\nAzhar is wanted by the government of Pakistan, but he is\nnot in our custody and he is at large\"\n+\nOn 18-12-08 MFA PR stated \"The Foreign Minister had\nsaid that Mr. Masood Azhar is wanted by the law enforcement authorities of Pakistan and'is at large\".\n\n## Hoax Call Issue\n\nGovernment of Pakistan Officials claimed that the President of Pakistan received a threatening call from the External Affairs Minister of India on 28-11-08.\n\nIt subsequently emerged that the call was a hoax.\n\nPakistan has however continued to harp on this to build up hysteria about India-Pakistan tensions. It has been clarified by our External Affairs Minister that\n\n\"My last and only conversation with President Zardari was in\nIslamabad during my May 2008 visit\".\n\"The only telephonic conversation with a Pakistani leader\n| had was\non 28-11-08 with FM Pakistan in New Delhi\"\n\n\"I can only ascribe this to those in Pakistan, who wish to divert attention from the fact that a terrorist group operating from the Pakistani territory, planned and launched a ghastly attack on Mumbai\"\n\n| January    | 09    | Ministry    | of    | Exteral    | Affairs    | 67    |\n|------------|-------|-------------|-------|------------|------------|-------|\n\n## Mrs. Benazir Bhutto's Assassination Enquiry\n\nMrs.\n\nBenazir Bhutto was assassinated on Dec 27, 2007 and the crime scene was cleared before any forensic examination could be completed.\n\nDetails of the plot of the assassination remained a mystery. Mrs Bhutto herself in a letter in Oct 2007, to the President of Pakistan had named serving and retired intelligence officers as being involved in a plot to Kill her.\n\nMany believed that the Government was involved in the assassination, leading to wide spread demands in Pakistan for an impartial enquiry. On\n31\nMay\n2008\nPakistan formally requested UN\nSecretary General to establish an independent Commission of Inquiry into the circumstance of the killing of former PM Benazir Bhutto.\n\nUN Secretary General announced on 26\" December 2008 that UN\nis in consultations with the GOP to set up such a Commission\n\n| January    | 09    | Ministry    | of    | Exteral    | Aftairs    | 68    |\n|------------|-------|-------------|-------|------------|------------|-------|\n\n## Section - Li I1L. Evidence Shared With Pakistan\n\nInformation has been shared with Pakistan in different meetings from August 2004 till November 2008 repeatedly on:\n\n Terrorist Attacks in India by Organisations\nand Entities in Pakistan\n* Fugitives from Indian Law\n Other terrorism related cases.\n\n## Home Secretaries' Talks 10-11Aug, 2004\n\n\n Details of 20 major incidents of terror in Jammu and Kashmir and other\nparts of India caused by Pakistan based /ISI sponsored terrorist outfits.\n+\n Details of 21 major terrorist modules busted in various J)ans of India\nrevealing involvement\nof Pakistan based/)S) sponsored\nterrorist outfits.\n\nList of 12 known training camps in Pakistan /Pakistan occupied Kashmir\nused by terrorist outfits along with map.\n\nList of 31 communication control stations in Pakistan/Pakistan occupied\nKashmir used by terrorist outfits along with maps.\n\n List along with details of 25 most wanted fugitives from law in India who are\nresiding in Pakistan.\n+\nSample cases showing\ninvolvement of IS and Pak nationals in circulation of\nFake Indian Currency\nNotes (FICNs)into India.\n\n List of 257 Pakistani nationals and foreign mercenaries killed in Jammu and\n?asgmlr as claimed by terrorist outfits based in Pakistan/Pakistan occupied\nashmir.\n\n## Home Secretaries' Talks 29-30Th August , 2005\n\n+\nList along with detals of most wanted fugitives from law in India who aro residing in Pakistan: Dawood Ibrahim Kaskar\n@ Shaikh Dawood Hasan @\nDawood Sabi (Indian), Memon Ayub Abdul Razak\n(indian), Memon Ibrahim @ Tiger\n@ Mushiag @ Siander (indian), Shaikh Shaked! @ Chnota Shakeel (indan).\n\n{brahim Athiar\n@Ahrmed All Mohd All Sheikh @ Siddiqui Javed @ Chief @ AA Sheikh Ibrahim (PAK)\nAzhar Yusuf @ Mohd. Salim (PAK). Mistri Zahur ibrahim @ Bhola AK), Sayeed Shahid Akhtar @ Doctor @ Moti Khalid (PAK), Shakir Md.\n\nnankar @ Rajesh Gopal Vemia@ Ram Gopal Verma @ Fargoq Abdul Aziz Siddial\n(PAK). lshaq Ata Hussain @ Al Moosa (Indiar), Sagir Sabir All Shaknh (Inian).\n\nMaulana Mohammad Masood Azhar Alvi @ Maulana Masood Azhar @ Vali Adam Isa\n(PAK), Mohd. Yusuf Shah @ Salauddin (Indan). Gainder Singh @\nGAlnder Singh halsa (Indian), Lakhbir Slrh @ Singh Lakhbir Rode@ Sth Lakhbir (Indian), Paramt Singh Paniar @\nParamil Famma @ Gian Singh (ingan). Ranit Singh @\nManpreet Singh @\nNeeta (indiar). Wachawa Singh (ncian) Amuar Arened\n1o Jamal Theba (Indian). Anis Ibrahir Kaskar Shaikh (Indian).Mohammad Ahmed Dosa\n(Indian). Amanuiiah Khan (PAK), Aftab Batki (PAK), Abdul Rauf (PAK), Javed Patel@\nIaved Chkna @ Javed Dawood Talor (ndian) Karula Habib Shaikn (ndian)\nfaim Abdu)\nGani Gazi (Indian), Riyaz Abu Bakar Knair (indian), Munat Abdul tajd Halari ( Indian), Mohd.\n\nTainur Mohd. Phansopkar Salim Mujahid\n(Indian).\n\n## Home Secretaries' Talks 30-31St May, 2006\n\nDetails of recent major incidents of terror in J&K and other parts of India\ncaused by Pakistan /Pakistan occupied Kashmir-based/IS| sponsored\nterrorist outfits.\nDetails of recent major terrorist modules neutralised in various\nparts in\nIndia revealing involvement of Pakistan/Pakistan occupied Kashmirbased/ ISI sponsored terrorist outfits.\nProfile of a ISI element involved in narcotic smuggling and pushing in of\nfake Indian currency for terrorist actions. List of known major training camps in Pakistan / Pakistan occupied\nKashmir and Northern Areas used by terrorist outfits along with maps.\nList of communication Control Stations in Pakistan/ Pakistan occupied\nKashmir used by terrorist outfits along with map.\nList (of 35) along with details of most wanted fugitives from law in India\nwho are residing in Pakistan.\nList of Pakistan and foreign mercenaries recently killed/ arrested in India.\n\n## Foreign Secretaries' 14-15Th Nov, 2006 Document Handed Over By Indian Foreign Secretary To Pakistan Foreign Secretary On 14Th November, 2006 Regarding Pakistan Links To :\n\nVaranasi twin blasts on March 7, 2006\nDelhi Serial Blasts on October 29, 2005.\n\nSuicide bombing at STF office, Hyderabad on Oct 12, 2005.\n\nTerrorist attack at Ayodhya on July 5, 2005\n\n## | Meeting Of Jatm 6Th March, 2007\n\nDetails of 35 Red Corner Notice Subjects residing in Pakistan\nalready shared with the Pakistani side at Home Secretary Talks on\nCounter Terrorism and Drug Trafficking (30th -31st May, 2006).\nA document containing details of following 12 cases was handed\nover:\nDeportation of Mohammad Faisal Naeem from Bangladesh to Pakistan.\nHaren Pandya murder case Explosions in public transport buses in Ahmedabad.\nSuicide bombing at Special Task Force (Hyderabad Police) office\nRecovery of arms, ammunition and explosives in Aurangabad\nFidayeen attack on Congress rally in Srinagar.\nGrenade attacks on tourists in Srinagar\nViolence carried out by Mohammad Amin Baba of Hizb-ul-Mujahideen\nPlanting of improvised explosive devices in Baramulla, J&K\nAttack on security forces at Boniyar, Baramulla, J&K\nEscape of Ghulam Rasool Shah from police custody.\nSerial blasts in Mumbai local trains\nJanuary 09\nMinistry of Extemal Affairs\n75\n\n## Home Secretaries' Talks 3 -4 July, 2007\n\nDetails of recent major incidents of terror in J&K and other parts of India\ncaused by terrorist outfits based in Pakistan/ Pakistan occupied Kashmir.\nDetails of recent major terrorist modules exposed in J&K and other parts\nof India revealing involvement of terrorist outfits based in\nPakistan/Pakistan occupied Kashmir\nSpecific cases of involvement of elements in Pak Intelligence\nestablishment in fomenting anti-India activities including terrorism,\nnarcotic smuggling, circulation of FICN, etc.\nList of known major training camgs in Pakistan /Pakistan occupied\nKashmir & Northern Areas used by terrorist outfits along with maps.\nList of Communication Control Stations in Pakistan/Pakistan occupied\nKashmir used by terrorist outfits along with map.\nList along with details of most wanted fugitives from law in India who are\nresiding in Pakistan.\nList of Pakistani and other foreign terrorists recently killed/arrested and\ntheir involvement in terrorist activities in India.\nJanuary 09\nMinistry of External Affairs\n\n## Il Meeting Of Jatm 22Nd Oct, 2007\n\nDocument handed over by India containing information based on interrogation on the following: Muhammad Younas @ Bilal of Lashkar-e-\nTayyaba, Abdullah @ Asgar Al of Lashkar-e-Tayyaba Muzaffar Ahmed Rather @\nRafi of Lashkar-e-Tayyaba, Muhammad Bilal@\nZubair of Jaish-e-Muhammad, Adnan Younis Bhatti@\nMuhammad Sohail Afzal of Jaish-e-Muhammad, Jalaluddin Mulla@ Babu Bhai of Harkat-ul-Islami, Muhammad Naushad of Harkat ul-Jehadal-Islami, Nasir Hussain of Harkat-ul-Jehad-al-Isiami, Muhammad Yaqub of Harkat-ul-Jehad-al-Islami, Sheikh Mukhtar Hussain of Harkat-ul-Jehad-al-Islami, Muhammad Ali Akbar Hussain of Harkat-ul-Jehad-al-islami, Muhammad Yasin @\nAbu Saraka of Lashkar-e-Tayyaba, Akhtar Teli @ Akhtar-al-Islam of Lahkar-e-\nTayyaba, Mubarak Ahmed Wani of Hizb-ul-Mujahideen.\n\nInformation gathered in the investigations of tho following events: Attack on Mangal Ram Sharma (ex Dy CV) Stinagar on 13-07-2004, Tertoris atiack on Prime Minister's meeting ~\nSrinagar on\n17-11-2004, Terrorist Attack on Bombay\n-\nGujrat Hotel Srinagaron 29-07-2005, Terroris! attack on M.Y. Tarigami (MLA/ICPM) and assassination of Ghulam Nabi Lone (Ex-MOS, Education) on 18-10-2005, Terrorist attack on CRPF Camp, Nageen, Srinagar, Terrorist attack on Firdaus Cinema Hall - Srinagar on 23-11-2005 and Robbery at J&K Bank in Stinagar on\n30-11-2005. A consolidated list of 48 (absconders wanted in Mumbai Blast Cases 1993 +\nHijackers of IC-814 + Attackers of Parliament + Sikh Terrorists + Accused involved in illegal arms smuggling + Other activities) was handed over\n\n| January    | 09    | Ministry    | of    | Exteral    | Affairs.    | b    |\n|------------|-------|-------------|-------|------------|-------------|------|\n\n## Il Meeting Of Jatm 24Th June, 2008\n\ng information based on the\n\n|                   |          |                   |              |                    | Document          | handed             | over               | cont               |\n|-------------------|----------|-------------------|--------------|--------------------|-------------------|--------------------|--------------------|--------------------|\n| interrogation     | of:      | Imran             | Shahza       | ?                  | 'Abu              | Shama              | of                 | Lashkar-e-Tayabba, |\n| Muhammad          | Farooq   | Bhatti            | @            | Abu                | Zaar of           | Lashkar-e-Tayabba, | Sabahuddin         |                    |\n| Ahmad             | @        | Farhan            | of           | Lashkar-e-Tayabba, | Muhammad          | Sharief            | g                  | Suhail             |\n| Lashkar-e-Tayabba | involved | in                | the          | Attack             | on                | CRPF               | camp               | at                 |\n| Januray           | 01,      | 2008              |              |                    |                   |                    |                    |                    |\n| Nissar            | Ahmad    | Bhat              | @            | Gazi               | Misbahuddi        | of                 | Hizbul             | Mujahideen         |\n| Islam             | @        | Asif              | of           | Hizbul             | Mujahideen        | involved           | in                 | the                |\n| Lashkar-e-Tayabba | (LeT)    | at                | Samba,       | J&K                |                   |                    |                    |                    |\n| Muhammad          | Abid     | @                 | Safdar       | of                 | Jaish-e-Muhammad, | Saiful             | Rehman             | @                  |\n| Khan              | of       | Jaish-e-Muhammad, | Mirza        | Rashid             | Beig              | @                  | Raja               | of                 |\n| Muhammad          | involved | in a              | Plan         | to                 | kidnap            | a                  | political          | personality        |\n| Saqib             | Aziz     | Malik             | @            | Abu                | Sayeed            | of                 | Lashkar-e-Tayyaba, | Tafeem             |\n| Hashmi            | @        | Feema             | of Al        | Badar,             | Qurban            | Ali                | @                  | Zubair             |\n| and               | Zafar    | Igbal             | Sudan@       | Rehman             | of                | Jaish-e-Muhammad   | involved           | in                 |\n| explosion         | in       | Shrinagar         | Cinema       | Hall,              | Ludhiana,         | Punjab             | on                 | 14-10-07           |\n| List              | of       | terrorists        | of           | Lashkar-e-Tayyaba  | (LeT)             | killed             | in                 | India              |\n| in                | JuD/     | LeT               | periodicals. |                    |                   |                    |                    |                    |\n| January           | 09       | Ministry          | of           | External           | Affairs           | 78                 |                    |                    |\n\n## Special Meeting Of Jatm 24-10-2008\n\n+\nDocument handed over by India containing information based on the interrogation of Karimullah Osain Khan @ Karimullah Habib of Dawood Ibrahim Gang\n(Karimulla has confirmed presence of 14 criminals accused in Bombay blasts in 1993 in Karachi, Pakistan)\nRaziuddin Nasir @ Abdul Rehman of Lashkar-e-Tayyaba (LeT) Muhammad Fahad @ Neduthanni @ Muhammad Koya of Al Badar Muhammad Ali Hussain @ Jehangir @ Kasim of Al Badar Muhammad Imran Butt @ Umar Saani of Lashkar-e-Tayyaba (LeT)\nSflk_agder Azam Sani Butt @ Abu Hurrera of Lashkar-e-Tayyaba\n(Le murfi;nmad Hashim Khan @ Darvesh of Harkat-ul-Mujahideen ul\n\n+\nLeads on attack on Indian Embassy in Kabul on 7th July, 2008\n\n## Home Secretaries' Talks 25-26 Nov 2008\n\n Details of 32 Indian and 10 Pakistani\nfugitives and who are based in Pakistan\nhanded over. The list contains the names\nof fugitives like Dawood Ibrahim, Masood\nAzhar, Tiger Memon, and others.\n\n## Sample Of Responses Given By Pakistan To Evidence Shared During Meetings\n\n*\nInvestigations so far have not yielded anything\nlinked to attack on the Embassy being present in\nPakistan (Special Session of JATM) in October\n2008\n On the evidence given on statements and\noperations of JeM, LeT, JuD, the Pakistani\nresponse was that all these groups were banned\nor under watch in Pakistan.\n*\nLeT & JeM have already been banned in\nPakistan\n\n## Section - Iv V. Pakistan's Commitments And Obligations\n\nBilateral, International, and Multilateral commitments obligate Pakistan to act against Terrorism emanating from its territory. These are listed in the following slides:\nMinistry of External Affairs.\n\n## Bilateral Commitments\n\n|                  | *         | President    | Musharraf    | assured     | Prime     | Minister    |\n|------------------|-----------|--------------|--------------|-------------|-----------|-------------|\n| Vajpayee         | that he   | will         | not          | permit      | any       | territory   |\n| under Pakistan's | control   | to           | be           | used        | to        | support     |\n| terrorism        | in        | any          | manner.      | [Joint      | Statement | of          |\n| January          | 2004;     |              |              |             |           |             |\n|                 | President | Zardari      | reassured    | Prime       | Minister  |             |\n| Manmohan         | Singh     | that         | the          | Government  | of        |             |\n| Pakistan         | stands    | by           | its          | commitments | of        | January     |\n| 6,               | 2004,     | not          | to           | permit      | any       | territory   |\n| Pakistan's       | control   | to           | be           | used        | to        | support     |\n| terrorism        | in        | any          | manner.      | [Joint      | Statement | of          |\n| 24%              | September | 2008]        |              |             |           |             |\n\n## International Obligations  International Convention For The Suppression Of Terrorist Bombings, 1997.\n\n- Article 2 makes it an offence to detonate an explosive in or\nagainst a place of public use, a state or govt. facility. Any person\nwho participates as an accomplice is also covered as an\noffender.\n- Under Article 7 a State which receives information about such\noffender is required to take measures to ensure his presence for\nprosecution or extradition.\n- All persons who participated in or contributed to the terrorist\nattack are covered under this Convention.\n- Pakistan as a State Party is required to extradite or prosecute\nsuch offenders and also provide mutual legal assistance in\ninvestigation or prosecution.\nMinistry of External Affairs\n\n## International Obligations  International Convention Against The Taking Of Hostages, 1979.\n\n- Applicable as the terrorists had taken\nhostages and murdered them later.\n- Pakistan as a State Party is obliged under this\nConvention to cooperate in investigations\nincluding extradition.\n\n## Multilateral Obligations * The Saarc Convention On Suppression Of Terrorism, 1987\n\n- Mumbai attack is covered under it as a\nterrorist act.\n- The Convention requires States Parties to\nprovide mutual legal assistance and has\nprovisions for extradition.\n\n## Multilateral Obligations  Additional Protocol To The Saarc Convention On Suppression Of Terrorism, 2004 [Entered\n\ninto force on 12t January 2006]\n- Has provisions related to suppression of financing of\nterrorism (similar to UN Terrorist Financing\nConvention).\n- Pakistan is required to take measures to freeze funds\nused for committing terrorist attacks.\n\n## Section -V\n\nMinisty of External Afairs\n\n## V. What Pakistan Should Do\n\nThis was a conspiracy launched from Pakistan.\n\nGaps in knowledge can be filled by investigation and interrogation of conspirators there. Some of the actions that India expects Pakistan to undertake in extending cooperation to bring the terrorists to justice are listed in the following slide."
    },
    {
        "text": "Sponsor: USEUCOM Contract No.:\nW56KGU-17-C-0010 Project No.:\n0719S120\n\nThe\n     views\n            expressed\n                       in\n                           this\n\ndocument are those of the author\nand do not reflect the official policy\nor\n    position\n               of\n                    MITRE,\n                             the\n\nDepartment of Defense, or the US\ngovernment.\n\n\n\n# Three Discussions Of Russian Concepts: 1.Russian Information Weapons; 2.Baltic Defenses (Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania) Against Russian Propaganda; And 3.Russia's Development Of Non-Lethal Weapons\n\n\nAuthor: Timothy Thomas March 2020\n\nApproved\n           for\n                 Public\n                         Release:\n\nDistribution Unlimited. Case Numbers\n20-0235; 20-0050; 20-0051; 19-3194;\nand 20-0145.\n\n2020\n         The\n               MITRE\n                        Corporation.\n\nAll rights reserved. McClean, VA\n\n\n## Foreword Russia Has Long Been Captivated By The Power Of Information As A Weapon, Most\n\nnotably in a historical sense using propaganda to influence and persuade audiences. With the onset of the information age, the concept's development and application increased dramatically. The power of information-technologies when applied to weaponry increased the latter's capabilities due to increased reconnaissance and precision applications. The power of social media was used to influence populations both at home and abroad. Both developments fit perfectly into Russia's information warfare concept, whose two aspects are information-technical and information-psychological capabilities. Information's universality, covertness, variety of software and hardware forms and implementation, efficiency of use when choosing a time and place of employment, and, finally, cost effectiveness make it a formidable commodity when assessed as weaponry. Russian efforts to define and use IWes are well documented. In the 1990s there were efforts to define information weapons (IWes) at the United Nations, efforts that failed. At the turn of the century an initial Information Security Doctrine was published in Russia, a doctrine later updated in 2016. Over a decade ago, Russia began hosting twice-yearly conferences on information topics, where each year the first conference was conducted in Garmisch, Germany and the second in Russia or another nation. Russian specialists began teaming up with Chinese specialists as well. These and other issues will populate the contours that follow. Chapter One discusses the various types of IWes that Russia addresses. Through the years, they have defined an IWe in many ways, and a quick look at these definitions over the past 20 years is located at the Appendix to Chapter One. Russia considers precision guided weaponry, electronic warfare, reconnaissance assets, computers, and satellites, among other assets, as information-technical weaponry. Propaganda, nongovernmental organizations, nonlethal capabilities, reflexive control methods, neuro-linguistic programming, so-called color revolutions, and social media, among other assets, are considered as informationpsychological means. Russian theorists continually stress the importance of attaining information superiority with such weaponry in order to control the initial period of war; and they recognize that the race to process information faster than your opponent is a race that must be won, since it is crucial to success. The discussion is a little longer than this author's article on the same topic that appeared in the summer edition of Cyber Defense Review.\n\n\nChapters Two, Three, and Four discuss Russia's IWes used against the three Baltic nations of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania in that order. These nations are on the frontline fight against Russian IWes, the latter composed primarily of information-psychological means.  These nations, all NATO members, have developed measured yet insightful contingency plans that address Russian efforts. Estonia's leadership has noted that the key to changing the attitude of ethnic groups in Estonia is to bring them into Estonia's information space instead of just Russian information space. Latvia has proposed laws, developed an ideological foundation to overcome susceptibilities, and developed messages\n\nand images to stabilize Latvian values. The nation's leadership is encouraging its citizens to educate themselves on Russian media techniques and methods of argumentation. Lithuanian officials have developed several templates that describe Russian propaganda targets, dissemination techniques, and information themes, and the nation has developed a new National Cyber Security Strategy.\n\n\nFinally, in Chapter Five, Russia's focus on developing nonlethal weaponry (NLWs)\nis outlined, which some theorists describe as IWes. The Russian discussion of NLWs is divided into their use internally and externally. The former describes how Russia's National Guard will use NLWs for crowd control and other uses, while externally they will be used against terrorists first and then against an opponent along with traditional forms of warfare. For example, laser blinding devices might be fitted to drones along with a remote nonlethal electric shock device, according to one report.\n\n\nIt is thus important for Western audiences to understand the expanding nature of Russia's comprehension of IWes. Their forms and methods of application vary in some detail from the way that the West understands the concept.\n\nTimothy Thomas\nEUCOM Information Operations Domain Specialist\nMITRE Corporation, 2020\n\n\n## Executive Summaries Executive Summary For Information Weapons:\n\nInformation weapons (IWes) have a comprehensive meaning in Russia that encompasses both strategic and operational applications. IWes are considered as nonnuclear strategic weapons that have the capability, with their cyber and precision-weaponry components (among others), to conduct economic, social, or physical disorganization or destruction of an opponent's infrastructure or normal operating procedures and induce deterrence without the use of nuclear weapons or ground-based forces. Operationally, IWes can affect tactical decision-making and cause chaos in planning. Three goals that are pursued include the development and use of IWes; the ability to limit other nations access to IWes (from the 1990s to as late as 2015 Russia was pressing for the adoption of universal laws or resolutions to prohibit the development of IWes) and to defend against their use by other nations; and the use of IWes to influence and manipulate others. Russians note that IWes universality, covertness, the variety of the forms of software and hardware implementation, radicalism of effects, adequate choice of time and place of employment, and, finally, cost effectiveness make them formidable assets. The Kremlin remains obsessed with confronting what it considers to be Western IWe developments and organizations. Such elements include nonlethal weapons (NLWs), which Russia is also pursuing, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), so-called color revolutions, and other factors not normally associated with IWes in the West. These concerns are further advanced due to the Kremlin's paranoia and suspicion of the intentions of others to use IWe. Russia's military is as concerned with the development of IWes as is the Kremlin, pointing out that two issues will determine the outcome of future conflicts: gaining information superiority in the initial period of war and processing information faster than your opponent, making IWes crucial to success. General Staff Chief Valery Gerasimov has noted that information resources have essentially become one of the most effective types of weapons, which continue, from the military's viewpoint, to be broken into informationtechnologies (those embedded in weaponry) and information-psychological developments (those that assist in the development of influence operations). Military sources have discussed the former in relation to the development of information-strike, precision-guided, electronic, and theater IWes. With regard to the latter, the military has investigated how to manipulate objective reality through the use of the media and more exotic weapons (psychotronic, whose use is suspect) that exert an effect on a person's mind and subconscious; cyber manipulation via trolls and bots; neuro-linguistic programming; and disinformation, fake news, and propaganda, all designed to manipulate public opinion. They can cause an opponent to make \"unconscious decisions\" that are advantageous to the other side, an idea that mirrors Russia's reflexive control concept. One astute Russian military theorist also noted that information has had such an enormous impact on military leaders that it has changed \"Napoleon's Square\" (based on will and brains) to a cube (will, brains, informatics) for decision-making and planning (which is important for systems versus systems warfare thinking). Different in scope and application from the Western understanding, Russia's IWe concept is thus worthy of closer examination.\n\nExecutive Summary for Estonia:\nRussian influence operations aim to shape Estonia as an undemocratic community and a problematic partner for Estonia's allies. Russia's media offensive is focused both on splitting Estonian society and using media tools to conduct foreign policy. Fake accounts from Russia are designed to interfere with internal Estonian discussions and polarize people's views, distort topics, and escalate public debates. Russia offers covert financial assistance, if necessary, to the Estonian government's opponents; discredits officials by stealing and leaking internal information; and intentionally spreads false information in social media, a specific way to target youth. Estonia's leadership has responded to these challenges, noting that the key to changing the attitude of ethnic groups in Estonia is to bring them into Estonia's information space instead of just Russian information space. This has resulted in the creation of Estonian TV channels that feature presentations in the Russian language. In addition, an increased military presence of NATO nations in Estonia strengthens the nations resolve and deterrent posture. Estonia's Defense Minister Hannes Hanso stated that a psychological gap between Russia and Estonia is growing and that \"if we look at internal Russian politics we see that the legitimacy of the regime is built on confrontation with the West.\"1 In his opinion, this anti-Estonian focus diverts the Kremlin population's attention away from its own domestic problems.\n\nExecutive Summary Latvia:\nA Latvian writer for the news and information service *Delfi* noted that Russian propaganda is like carbon monoxide gas, since it flows into a room unnoticed, cannot be smelled, and puts people's logic to sleep. It disinforms, demoralizes, and destabilizes audiences. Latvian journalists and state officials believe that efforts to confront Kremlin propaganda cannot be accomplished alone with only simple bans or protests. Latvia needs to reinforce its own value system to strengthen its culture and self-confidence. These attempts to limit Russian disinformation have met with some success. Latvia has proposed laws, developed an ideological foundation to overcome susceptibilities, and developed messages and images to stabilize Latvian values. Latvia is encouraging its citizens to educate themselves on Russian media techniques and methods of argumentation. Educational opportunities are further supported by studies being conducted at Latvian think tanks, which are available for downloading and reading. Latvia's successes and disappointments are discussed in their information struggle to educate Latvian society in critical thought and thereby immunize them from Russian propaganda.\n\nExecutive Summary Lithuania:\nLithuanian officials have developed several templates that describe Russian propaganda targets, dissemination techniques, and information themes, among other issues. The nation has developed a new National Cyber Security Strategy and is regarded as the fourth best country in the world regarding cybersecurity issues. Russian propaganda works to create wedges by creating problems, violating international law, and creating geopolitical tensions. Lithuania's continued information and cyber diligence directed at Russia's propaganda assault helps everyone better picture what these wedges are and their shape as well as where the Kremlin is directing its efforts. To counter these wedges, Lithuanian officials developed what they call the five layers of Russia's propaganda image and they have outlined Russia's propaganda dissemination network. Russian propaganda's further goals are regime change and attempts to falsify history. A Lithuanian Army\n\nrepresentative noted that there is a Russian information campaign designed to focus on regime change.\n\n## Executive Summary Nonlethals:\n\nRussian military analysts believe that nonlethal weapons (NLWs) offer commanders new options and ways to handle crises, providing flexible responses to situations and reducing the chances of serious injury among noncombatants. Physical NLWs are used to incapacitate opponents, control crowd behavior, or induce psychological effects, while others (chemical, biological, and radiological NLWs) are used to block access to areas or disrupt electrical components of transport, among other uses. New forms of NLWs are constantly under development in Russia, and the planning process seeks to identify NLW trends 20-25 years out.  Russian discussions of NLWs divide their use into internal and external areas of application. The former indicates that the Russian National Guard will be involved in the use of NLWs for crowd control and other uses, while externally they will be used against terrorists first and then against an opponent in conjunction with traditional forms of warfare. For example, laser blinding devices, which can cause temporary loss of vision without harmful consequences, can be fitted to drones along with a remote electric shock device, according to one report. Perhaps NLWs are an aspect of President Vladimir Putin's asymmetric approach to conflict.\n\n\n## Chapter One: Information Weapons Introduction\n\nFor many years now, Russia has defined and even expanded on its concept of\n\"information weapons (IWes).\"2 At one point, Russia attempted to get the concept introduced into United Nations resolutions, which at the time helped to guarantee Russian information and national security. This occurred in the 1990s, when Russia was at its weakest and unable to compete with other nations in information warfare capabilities. At this time, Russia's information warfare weakness was so pronounced that a prominent Russian scientist stated the following at an international conference in Moscow in 1995:\n\nIn studying the potential catastrophic consequences from an enemy's use of strategic information warfare systems on, for example, the economy or government control...we must unequivocally declare that in the case of their use against Russia, we reserve the right to conduct a first strike (nuclear) against the information warfare system and forces which are directing that weapon, and then also against the aggressor-government.3 This stark warning was intended to send a message to other nations, and it served its purpose well. \"Don't mess with Russia\" if you want to keep Russia from messing with you. Since the revival of Russia's military prowess, a variety of its authors have continued to focus on information-related topics, to include the following: information warfare, information struggle, information resources, information confrontation, information sphere, information field, information effects, information superiority, information security, and, in line with the focus of this article, IWes. At times, IWes address the information-related technologies used in precision-guided and reconnaissance type weaponry, and at other times IWes are presented more simply as weapons that help in the manipulation of social media and propaganda. The West seldom considers information to be a \"weapon\" as Russia does, nor does the West break the term into information-technical and information-psychological aspects. The information-technical aspect of IWes includes technologies used extensively by Russia and many other nations in global positioning, reconnaissance, electronic warfare, and other types of equipment world-wide. The information-psychological aspect refers not only to Russia's use of information as an online weapon in the social and political arenas, which has become unsettling to Western audiences, but also to Russia's use of disinformation, fake news, nongovernmental organizations, and a tendency to define objective reality as the Kremlin sees fit, and thus avoid \"the truth.\" Their use appears to be a modern version of Soviet active measures, which were operations developed years ago in Section A of the First Chief Directorate of the KGB. They aimed to shape operations abroad and influence events in another country and were often referred to as \"political warfare.\" Related terms were \"assistance programs\" or \"assistance operations,\" tactics designed to change the policy or position of a foreign government in a way that would\n\"assist\" the Soviet position. A Russian foreign intelligence officer who defected to the U.S\nin 2000 noted that there is no difference between \"active measures\" and \"assistance operations,\" and that when the KGB went away after the demise of the Soviet Union, the active measures office was renamed to assistance operations. Active measures reportedly were based on 95 percent objective information \"to which something was added to turn the data into targeted information or disinformation.\"4 Thus, Russian IWes must be considered for its utility in military, political, and psychological warfare, plus also its utility in manipulating news and social media. As a result, IWes have become non-nuclear strategic weapons of choice. This article will examine several Russian views of IWes that cover these aspects, beginning with the bigger picture of IWes as strategic weapons. That discussion is followed by an overview of the Russian military literature that has addressed IWes over the past two decades. The discussion includes theater information weapons, information-strike weapons, cyber weapons, and social-media weapons, among others. The analysis concludes with a very brief commentary by one Russian specialist about the next generation of weapons, such as quantum computing and artificial intelligence concerns; and with a discussion of both other ways to consider an IWe (as the overt rejection of the truth and as its use as an information deterrent) and with a Western analyst's thoughts on how to counter media-related IWes. A list of Russian definitions of IWes from different time periods is located at the Appendix.\n\n\n## The Big Picture: Iwes As Non-Nuclear Strategic Weapons\n\nIWes are considered non-nuclear strategic weapons in Russia due to their wide reach, even to continents far away (thus, a planetary weapon). According to Russian newgeneration warfare expert Vladimir Slipchenko, IWes have also enabled a shift from a\n\"quantitative-force sphere to a quantitative-intelligent sphere.\"5 He adds that countries are creating \"strategic non-nuclear forces, which will find wide use in new-generation wars and subsequently also will take on a deterrence function.\"6 Numerous weapons depend on information technologies. Acoustic, electromagnetic effect, radiation, beam, and heat weaponry7 are under development as is the \"unity of intelligence collection and destruction,\" namely the development of reconnaissance-strike and reconnaissance-fire complexes.8 Slipchenko views the development of space groupings as a key directional shift as forces transition from a ground-based force to one based on aerospace and information. Intelligence collection from space will provide information that \"will become the basis for planning massive high-precision strikes in the course of a strategic air-spacesea strike operation.\"9 Slipchenko's thoughts coincide with a Russian concept known as the strategic operation to destroy critically important facilities (SODCIT) as discussed by numerous outlets. In 2010, a *Red Star* article flagged changes in the nature of wars that would manifest in the various forms in which the Armed Forces are used: \"SODCIT has been developed.\"10 Retired Colonel General Viktor Barynkin added that \"it has become expedient to combine strategic defensive and offensive operations and strategic operations in the ocean theater of hostilities into a single strategic operation.\"11 In conducting such operations, the expansive reach of IWes will play a crucial role.\n\nFor example, as the Russian journal *Air-Space Defense* stated in 2013:\n\n It is possible to use various space systems in support of each of these\noperations. Thus, supporting a strategic operation to destroy critically\nimportant enemy targets necessitates the use of space-based means of\nreconnoitering these targets; electronic intelligence assets; meteorological reconnaissance assets in the interests of a proper selection of attack weapons and their combat employment methods; and space-based navigation,\ncommunications, relay, and strike evaluation systems.12\n As noted, these assets rely on information technologies. A *Military Thought* article in 2014 mentioned SODCIT. It stated that determining combat missions, methods, and variations of long-range precision-guided munitions (PGMs) can be presented according to a priority-ranked subprocess that included SODCIT.13 The authors added that in the makeup of the special mathematical and software support (SMPO) for employing long-range PGM forces, a central place must be set aside for their use against systems of complex-structure targets. Calculations must be oriented toward correlating the combat capabilities of long-range PGM groupings with weapon targets; and optimization problems can be used to solve operational issues, to include SODCIT.14\n\nThus, the term SODCIT implies the extended use of IWes as non-nuclear strategic weapons or assets. Such use in conjunction with aerospace forces or precision-guided munitions is significant since both possess long-reach capabilities into the depth of an adversary's territory anywhere on the globe. Russian planetary warfare theorists must find such concepts intoxicating. For Western analysts, SODCIT should raise concerns as to what Russia is planning.\n\n\nHow did Russia ultimately arrive at this conclusion that IWes provide a non-nuclear strategic capability? The following discussion that has transpired over the past two decades offers how the concept of IWes gradually evolved and incorporated new developments in information technologies, which in turn led to new ways to consider information-technical and information-psychological applications of IWes. The First Important IWe Discussions Detailed descriptions of IWes and their uses began to develop slowly in the 1990s.\n\nOne of the first (and still considered outstanding) Russian articles to define and discuss an IWe is the article by Major S. V. Markov, which was authored and published in 1996 in the journal *Bezapasnost (Security).* Leading specialists still refer to his many thoughts and definitions. Markov defined an IWe as:\n\nA specially selected piece of information capable of causing changes in the\ninformation processes of information systems (physical, biological, social,\netc.) according to the intent of the entity using the weapon.15 This understanding of IWes and its impact on the information-technical and\ninformation-psychological activity of Russia produces a much different national will and language of dialogue than that to which the West is accustomed. Markov is convinced that international and state control over the creation and use of IWes is essential.16 According to Markov, IWes can be used in the following ways:\n\n To destroy, distort, or steal data files  To mine or obtain the desired information from these files after\npenetrating defense systems/firewalls\n To limit or prevent access to them by authorized users  To introduce disorganization or disorder into the operation of\ntechnical equipment\n To completely disable telecommunications networks and computer\nsystems and all the advanced technology that supports the life of\nsociety and the operation of the state.17\n\nIn 2000, the work of five authors at the Institute of Systems Analysis superseded Markov's IWe article in importance. They wrote the first authoritative, detailed introduction to, and explanation of, IWes in a pamphlet titled The Information Weapon\nA New Challenge to International Security,18 which describes various forms of IWes. One\n\nauthor, Andrey Krutskikh, became President Putin's point man on cyber issues and where he continues to serve today. These authors classified IWes based on several attributes to include single and multi-mission/universal purposes; short- and long-range operations; individual, group, and mass disruption or destruction capabilities; various types of carriers; and destructive effect. They further classified IWes as belonging to one of six forms:\n\n\n1. Means to precisely locate equipment that emits rays in the\nelectromagnetic spectrum and destroys that equipment by conventional fire\n2. Means to affect components of electronic equipment 3. Means to affect the programming resource control modules\n4. Means to affect the information transfer process 5. Means to disseminate propaganda and disinformation 6. Means to use psychotronic weapons.\n\nThe pamphlet then discussed the significance and potential types of each of these weapons. The first form, the means for precision location, included the effective detection of individual elements of C2 information systems, to include their identification, guidance, and physical destruction (by firing for effect). The second form, the means for affecting electronic equipment components, included the temporary or irreversible disabling of individual elements of electronic systems. Weapon types included electronic suppression (such as generators of super-high frequencies) and means to disable equipment (such as the head resonance of hard disks), burn out monitors, erase RAM, or affect reliable power sources. The third form, the means for affecting programming resource control modules, was designed to disable or alert the operating algorithms of control systems through special programming means. These weapon types included the means for defeating information security systems; penetrating the enemy's information systems; disabling all of, or a specific portion of, an information system's software, possibly at a very specific point in time or when a specific event occurred in the system; making a covert, partial change in an operational algorithm of a piece of software; collecting data that is circulating in the enemy's information system; delivering and inserting certain algorithms into a specific place in an information system; and affecting the security systems of facilities (with viruses, worms, etc.). The fourth form, means for affecting the information transfer process, is designed to stop or disorganize the functioning of subsystems exchanging information by affecting the signal-dissemination environment and operating algorithms. Types of weapons belonging to this class included electronic equipment, especially ground and air stations (helicopters, unmanned airborne vehicles, etc.) that interfere with radio communications; disposable, air-droppable interference transmitters; means that affect the protocols of data transmission by communication systems and the data transmission itself; means that affect\n\nalgorithms used for addressing and routing; means for intercepting and disrupting information as it passes through the technical channels of its transmission; and means for causing system overload by making false requests of a communications system.\n\n\nThe authors analysis of the fifth and sixth forms, which, because they are less prominently covered in the Western press, merit further discussion. The fifth form, propaganda and disinformation, can change the information component of C2 systems by creating a virtual picture that alters reality, changes the system of human values, and manipulates the moral-psychological life of the enemy population. This type of weapon can create disinformation in secure systems and alter navigation systems, information and meteorological-monitoring systems, precision-time systems, and so on. The sixth form, psychotronic weapons, describes weapons that leverage psychology and the subconscious to attack a person's will, and otherwise suppress and/or temporarily disable or zombify that person. These weapon types include:\n\n\n Psycho-pharmacological substances  Psycho-dyspeptics  Tranquilizers, anti-depressants, hallucinogens, and narcotics  Specially structured medicines  Special-beam generators that affect the human psyche\n Special video graphic and television information (25th frame effect,\nelevating blood pressure, inducing epileptic seizures, etc.)\n Means for creating virtual reality that suppresses the will and induces\nfear (e.g., projecting an image of \"God\" onto clouds, etc.)\n Technologies of zombification and psycholinguistic programming.19 The authors note that information technologies can serve as IWes, which are\nintegral components of high-precision ammunition that can be used to guide missiles via position finding and reconnaissance, as well as by visual, electronic, and other means. These functional subsystems can also be treated as IWes in that they gather, process, and disseminate information. The pamphlet defined information war as \"actions taken for securing information superiority by damaging information, information-based processes, and information systems of the enemy along with protecting one's own information, information-based processes, and information systems.\" This definition is like the US definition at the time and contradicts several other purely Russian definitions. It is unknown exactly why the authors chose this definition.\n\nMoving On: Interesting 2001-2019 Discussions Russia's perception of the West's focus on noncontact warfare and advanced cyber weapons in the 1990s led Russian theorists to conclude that adversaries wanted to develop a \"clean\" war run by special agents and programmers against a still vulnerable Russia. This\n\nled Russian authorities to envision how IWes as helping to offset the Kremlin's national security weaknesses. Russian theorists saw the many benefits of IWes and praised them for their universality, covertness, and variety of implementation forms (software and hardware), their radical effects and ability to select a precise time and place of employment, and, finally, their cost effectiveness. But recognizing these attributes also raised concern for Russia's national security,20 since other nations were farther along in IWe developments. Russia began to manufacture both offensive and defensive IWes and, due to their number of outstanding mathematicians, began to catch up quickly with other nations in the software options. For example, cyber or information-strike weapons (described below) were soon developed and considered as Russian offensive IWes, while over-the-horizon radar stations were developed and considered as Russian defensive IWes.21\n\nThe following explanation discusses specific elements of Russia's focus on IWes over the past two decades and demonstrates the growing importance of the concept and how it has been integrated, through Russian eyes, into information warfare's informationtechnical and information-psychological components; and how IWes have underscored the growing importance of nonmilitary means to influence and win confrontations.\n\n\nIn **2001**, the PIR Center in Moscow published a paper that included a key chapter on IWes, noting that, like the military, information superiority now determines battle outcomes. Invariably, the first to process battlefield information is less vulnerable. Disabling an opponent's command and control systems is key to information superiority. IWes can be high-precision weapons, electronic warfare assets, electromagnetic pulse weapons, or software viruses, among others. The paper noted that an IWe's effectiveness in achieving information warfare missions is often pivotal.22 The authors then discussed the same six IWe types and their characteristics and effects as were discussed by the 2000 IWe pamphlet authorsno surprise, because one of the 2000 pamphlet authors also coauthored the PIR Center report (V. N. Tsygichko). IWe effects were divided into three areas, information technologies (as components of munitions and reconnaissance, propaganda, and software systems), energy (as components of EW, microwave, and cruise or unmanned aerial vehicles), or chemical (gases, aerosols, pharmacologic agents, etc.).23\nSeveral other IWes advantages included general freedom of access to many information systems, especially in social media; the blurring of traditional legal and ethical borders (are we witnessing a crime or an act of war?); the difficulty in controlling perceptions due to the wide range of \"facts\" available; and the potential for the covert preparation of a battlefield years in advance through the placement of specific software.24\n\nIn **2002**, in an important article in Armeyskiy Sbornik (*Army Journal*) by Vladimir Slipchenko, who used the term \"new-generation warfare\" as early as 2000, noted that information's role will only grow in the coming century. IWes will be system destroying, he noted, as they will disable entire combat, economic, and social systems, rendering them an effective non-nuclear strategic weapon. Offensive means include destroying or disrupting an adversary's information infrastructure, his process of operational command and control, and attacks on computer networks. Defensive measures include operational and strategic camouflage, physical defense of information infrastructure facilities, disinformation, electronic warfare, and other means. Slipchenko added that electronic suppression would remain the most important component of a nation's information resources, predicting they eventually would become an independent countermeasure. He also flagged cybernetic warfare as a promising potential element of independent development.25 Of special interest is that the majority of what Slipchenko wrote about in 2001/2002\nhas come to pass in contemporary times. Electronic warfare is now thought to be an independent branch of service, and the basic content of General Staff Chief Valery Gerasimov's yearly addresses to the Academy of Military Science about information resources and warfare echo much of Slipchenko's theory and understanding of information's impact on Russian warfare techniques (no stereotyping, blurring of war and peace, etc.). Russia now has cyber forces without an indication that they have become an independent branch of service.\n\n\nAlso, in **2002**, two authors described IWes as nonlethal weapons (NLWs), noting the development of the mass media an information NLW prerequisite. Of interest is that psychological NLWs also were considered as IWes but had not yet been scientifically confirmed. These NLW types included telepathy, telekinesis, clairvoyance, and other psychological means,26 all measures under study in Russia for decades but have yet to produce known discernable results.\n\n\nIn **2003,** an article in the journal *Military Thought* noted that the Cold War's end brought with it a desire to eliminate many weapons of mass destruction. This caused the military to focus more attention on precision-guided and other IWes, both lethal and nonlethal. The Persian Gulf War, the article noted, integrated precision-guided weapons with global navigation, intelligence, communications, command and control, and electronic warfare systems and created theater information weapons (TIWes). Specialists began to consider information-strike operations, whereby a force could achieve military objectives without land forces. These authors viewed TIWes as the information-technical component of IWes. The information-psychological component, on the other hand, is designed to break the enemy's will to resist, where the main targets are troop morale, public opinion, and the decision-making systems of the opposing side.27 One goal is to develop the means and methods for a targeted information-psychological impact, one that might cause an opponent to make \"unconscious decisions\" that are advantageous to the other side, to include using psychotropic substances or manipulative information amid distracting messages. New technologies increase the opportunities to develop and use such effects as neuro-linguistic programming.28\n\nIn a **2003** book titled The *Information Weapon*, the author examined IWes more narrowly, focusing on hackers, the cyber weaponry of various nations, and the revelation\n(to that book's author) that the Cold War had not ended.29 In **2007**, Sergey Ivanov, Russia's Defense Minister from 2001 until February 2007, noted the important potential of IWes to influence the conduct of future war. He was particularly impressed with the widespread applicability of IWes in conducting operations without becoming involved in a military conflict:\n\n The development of information technology has resulted in information itself turning into a certain kind of weapon. It is a weapon that allows us to carry out would-be military actions in practically any theater of war and\nmost importantly, without using military power.30\n\nIn **2008**, Major General V. D. Ryabchuk wrote on the intellectual-information\nconfrontation between and among states, adding that confrontations are a mix of information, the intellect, and forecasting. The strong influence of informatics and computer science on operations has necessitated that the information-confrontation factor be added to Russia's calculation of the correlation of forces. Further, the influence of informatics has changed operations, in Ryabchuk's opinion, to include a so-called \"Napoleons Square,\" composed of a base of \"will\" and a height of \"brains.\" Informatics has expanded the square to a cube due to its ability to add depth to an assessment. This enhances a commander's intelligence gathering beyond his inherent capabilities.31 While not directly naming informatics as an IWe, Ryabchuk strongly implies that this is how they should be understood.\n\nIn **2009**, again while addressing IWes only tangentially, another *Military Thought*\narticle stated that breakthroughs in information technologies had \"provided a basis for developing a totally new generation of tools of warfare\" and \"stimulated the continued\n\ndevelopment of forms in which troops and methods for conducting military operations are used.\"32 A 21st century warfare trend was stated as follows:\n\n\nGrowing weight will be given in wars anticipated in the 21st century to\ninformation as a component of armed struggle because troops are equipped with weapon systems using information technologies, electronic warfare, and other systems. Accordingly, trying to achieve superiority in the use of information over the adversary will become a principal condition for\nsuccessful military operations.33\n\nIn **2011**, two Russian military specialists wrote on information-strike operations in\nthe journal *Armeyskii Sbornik (Army Journal)*. They viewed the classic triad of fire, strike, and maneuver as no longer capturing the essence of a battle or operation. Radio-electronic, electronic-fire, and information-strike operations were the new forms of armed struggle.\n\nThe latter is particularly important as defined below:\n\n The information-strike operation (ISO) is the totality of mutually associated information strike engagements (*srazhenie*), information-strike battles (boi), and information strikes (*udar*), coordinated with respect to goal, missions, place, time, and method of conduct, carried out with the aim of disorganizing an adversary's troop and weapons command and control\nsystem and destroying his information resources.34\n\nIWes conduct information strikes against an adversary's information resources. The\ntypes of strikes include information-psychological (which disinform or mislead an adversary), information-psychotropic (to disrupt a person's psyche), radio-electronic, and program-computer. ISO's help gain the initiative and superiority in the information sphere, including command and control of troops and the reflexive control of opponents. ISO's have no spatial limitations, a variety of forms and methods of use, no weather or seasonal constraints, can often be used covertly, and can target command posts and communication nodes.35\n\n\nISOs can be conducted in three stages. First, information support systems of\ncommand and control for intelligence, air defense, and rocket defense are disorganized. Second, under the cover of jamming, destructive strikes are madeoperational-tactical and tactical rockets. Third, information support of tactical and army aviation and field artillery is disorganized.36 To prepare an ISO, an adversary's command and control system must be studied and exposed, and objectives for fire and radio-electronic destruction determined in advance. Disorganizing the enemy's command and control system is critical to planning and coordinating friendly fire destruction elements.37 The authors then note that there are various types of information-psychological weapons that will enhance an ISO, and energy-information-psychological weapons under study for ways to modulate super high frequency ultrasonic infrared waves that affect the human nervous system. Psychotropic-information weapons use narcotics and chemicals to produce information-control effects on biological processes and the nervous system. Technical means (e.g., generators) of virtual information-psychological and other types of weaponry offer different potential capabilities to affect the human psyche (author's note: no actual results were offered, just these theories). Information-psychological weapons are to be integrated with fire, radio-electronic, and energy effects to broaden the operationalstrategic methods for achieving ISO goals. Radio disinformation, active and passive jamming, false radar targets, and fake communication centers facilitate misleading an opponent. The ISO is basically an offensive action, but it can acquire a defensive character if needed.38\n\nAn influential **2012** article titled \"Information Weapons: Theory and Practice of Their Employment in Information Warfare\" views the infosphere as an inexhaustible information space, supply, and replenishment source, and one that also features the compactness of information carriers, and bloodless responsesall infosphere features that have exponentially intensified information warfare. IWes can at least be partially kept secret, can cross borders and impact sovereignty, and can be used in both military and civilian structures. More importantly, the authors stated that IWes cause the greatest losses when used against command and control systems and the human mind.39 The authors classified IWes according to effects, which they termed as physical, informational, software, or radio electronic. Physical effects included specialized storage batteries for high-voltage impulses, the means to generate electromagnetic impulses, graphite bombs, and microbes that interfere with electronic circuits and insulation materials. Information effects included mass information resources, global networks, and voice \"disinformation\" stations. Software attack weapons included computer viruses, logic bombs, and the means to suppress information exchanges. No radio-electronic effects were offered. However, \"dynamic IWes\" was defined as a \"unified system of comprehensive, combined, beam, targeted, and strike employment of all forces and means of technical, communications, and information-psychological effects against the subconscious of the objective of the attack.\"40 Methods for the implementing dynamic IWes are mathematically, algorithmically, or software-hardware based, and are most effective when employed as a set in offensive, defensive, or support forms. The military and political leaderships as well as world public opinion (when conducted with special informationpsychological operations) are specific targets of destruction.41 The authors noted that information-psychological effects result from:\n\n A purposeful psychological attack against concrete areas of the human\nmind, the minds of a group of people, or the public consciousness. Effects can be implemented with respect to the means of information stimuli by using the entire spectrum of methods and forms of technical, visual, aural,\nmedical, physical, painful, and virtual suppression of the will.42 Information confrontation was stated to be a special set of countermeasures\ndesigned to forestall an enemy's destructive designs against the mind of a person making C2 decisions. The goal of information confrontation is to protect one's own information resource security via the use of several means: the physical protection of objects, covert surface surveillance, technical equipment, effective camouflage, disinformation, and counterpropaganda combined with radio-electronic warfare. Other protective means are required to ensure there is no power disruption. It is usually electromagnetic impulses or electromagnetic bombs that are the most threatening to computer networks in the authors'\nopinion.43 Electromagnetic weapons (EMW) are well-known for disrupting or interfering with information system operations. They can disrupt a country's economy, production, and defense capabilities. Disrupting systems that exchange information for command decisions can have serious consequences. C4ISR is the main target of EMW effects. It was noted that \"the principle of EMW action is based on short-term electromagnetic radiation of great power, capable of incapacitating radio-electronic devices that comprise the basis of any information system.\"44 The authors conclude as follows:\n\n Universality, covertness, variety of the forms of software and hardware implementation, radicalism of effects, adequate choice of time and place of employment, and, finally, cost effectiveness make IWes extremely dangerous. They are easily camouflaged as protection resources of, for\nexample, intellectual property. They make it possible to even conduct\noffensive operations anonymously, without a declaration of war.45\n\nNear the end of **2012**, S. G. Chekinov and S. A. Bogdanov defined the initial period\nof war (IPW) in *Military Thought* as the time when forces are deployed before the start of a conflict to create favorable conditions for committing their main forces. Under the new military, political, and economic conditions, the authors attribute special significance to IPW for winning a conflict:46\n\n\nThe IPW may become the hardest phase in which the warring sides will be striving to make the most of the power of its groups of forces built up in advance and deployed in secret to achieve the main goals of the war. This period will be the most critical phase of the war and have a great effect on its outcome.47 Of interest are malware and other types of information technologies secretly placed in the infrastructure or computers of potential opponents in peacetime that would help accomplish some of the main means for winning a war, such as totally upending an opponent's command and control system. Such technologies are IWes. IPW success allows for one side to control the operations of its forces and assert supremacy over an opponent.\n\nThe authors noted that \"major military, political, and strategic objectives of the war must be achieved in its initial period.\"48 Inserting key IWes into the systems of an adversary in peacetime creates favorable conditions for either winning victory before conflict starts or for the massive disorganization of an opponent, rendering his systems less dependable and more vulnerable to destruction with other types of weaponry.\n\nIn early November **2013** the State Duma Security and Anticorruption Committee recommended amending a Federal Security Service (FSB) law to allow police investigations to counter threats to Russia's information security, such actions previously permitted only as to state, military, economic, or environmental security threats. The report indicated that harmful software, for example, can be used as an information weapon49 that could threaten security. That same year, Russia's Security Council noted that information and communication technologies are a looming threat as IWes, since they can threaten strategic stability, violate the territorial integrity of other nations, and act in both the military and political spheres of interest.\n\n\nIn **2013** Chekinov and Bogdanov discussed new generation warfare, highlighting on numerous occasions the importance of information technologies,50 noting that \"decisive battles in new generation wars will rage in the information environment,\" where computer operators will manipulate computers far away from the conflict. Information operation will induce world public opinion to accept the need to restore democracy and fight tyranny.51\nOnce information superiority is achieved in peacetime; conflict may even be avoided. If a conflict appears inevitable, it is visualized information technologies will heavily influence and possibly dominate its opening, as there will emerge a targeted information operation, an electronic warfare operation, and high-precision weaponry loaded with information technology.52\n\n\nIn **2015**, at a presentation in Garmisch, Germany, noted Russian information warfare experts I. N. Dylevsky and S. A. Komov offered a paper titled \"Rules of Conduct in Information SpaceAn Alternative to an Information Arms Race, noting that \"[a]nother aspect of confrontation in the information sphere is a rapid advancement and proliferation of information weapons.\"53 Their use can lead to industrial disasters or, worse yet, critical infrastructure (finance, energy, transport, etc.) destruction. The authors, while urging that it was time to adopt universal laws to prohibit their development,54 did not expand on how this could be done, or how nations could control the risk of their development elsewhere. Later that year, *Military Thought* described nonlethal weapons (NLWs) as effective information warfare assets, implying their potential as an IWe. In handling internal issues, NLWs can \"defuse the bellicose moods stoked by propaganda and isolate the most outrageous advocates of the indiscriminate use of military force.\"55 Ironically, the \"mood\"\nof recent anti-Kremlin demonstrations in Moscow was provoked or exacerbated by the Kremlin's decision to keep certain people off election ballots. So, moods can either be \"provoked\" or \"defused\" (with NLW) by the same government officials. Russia's *National Security Strategy*, published in 2015, referred 36 times to the term \"information\" without ever mentioning the term \"cyber.\" The primary use of information, it seems, is as an instrument \"set in motion in the struggle for influence in the international arena\" (along with political and financial-economic instruments). The Strategy reported that confrontation in the global information arena is \"caused by some countries' aspiration to utilize informational and communication technologies to achieve their geopolitical objectives, including by manipulating public awareness and falsifying history.\" For most Westerners, this appears to be exactly what Russia did in Ukraine, never mentioning Putin's influence on Ukrainian President Yanukovych and striking out on an information campaign that, according to even some Russian analysts, surpassed anything seen during the time of the Soviet Union. Information is also mentioned as one way to enhance strategic deterrence. The \"inadvertent\" mention of the Status-6 top secret torpedo on Russian TV is an example of an influence operation designed to utilize information deterrence to counter the US's use of its Prompt Global Strike system. Information associated with extremism or  terrorism is taken to be a significant threat to public security and, countering such threats requires an information infrastructure that ensures the public's access to information on issues relating to the sociopolitical, economic, and spiritual life of Russia's citizens.56\n\nIn **2016**, during his annual speech at the Academy of Military Science, General Staff Chief Valery Gerasimov discussed the impact of so-called \"color revolutions\" and how their utility could be quickly furthered through the adaptive use of information resources as a weapon: Essentially, any \"color\" revolution is a state revolution organized from without. Their basis is information technologies, which envision the manipulation of the protest potential of the population in combination with other nonmilitary means. Here, mass targeted effects on the consciousness of the citizens of a statethe objects of aggression by means of the global 'Internet' networkacquire important significance. Information resources have essentially become one of the most effective types of weapons. Their extensive use makes it possible to 'shake up' the situation in the country from within in a matter of days.57 \"Information resources\" the West uses against Russia, according to Russian sources reported in the *New York Times*, are nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and operations aimed at the young. For example, President Putin's 2007 speech in Munich expressed concerns about NGOs, alleging they \"are used as channels for funding, and those funds are provided by governments of other countries.\" That flow of foreign money to assist opposition political organizations in Russia, he said, is \"hidden from our society.\n\n\"What is democratic about this?\" he asked. \"This is not about democracy. This is about one country influencing another.\"58\n\nIn **2017** Chekinov and Bogdanov shifted focus from new generation wars to the importance of \"new type\" warfare, stating that globalization threatens war a \"new type\" of war, which could \"become the pivot of historical life in the 21st century.\"59 New type warfare is characterized using \"political pressure, information sabotage, cashing in on humanitarian issues, secret service activity, and unfair and cunning diplomacy.\"60 Earlier in the article, the authors addressed the growing impact of information warfare. Information, computers, and telecommunication technologies suppress adversaries by disorganizing command and control and introducing chaos into their work. This work misinforms army personnel and the population and psychologically crushes them.61 The realm of the virtual, both informational and cognitive, is exploited.62 Again, while not specifically mentioning IWes, the article clearly views IWes as major components of new type warfare.\n\nIn **2019,** the journal Vestnik Akademii Voennykh Nauk (Journal of the Academy of Military Science) published an article on the impact of information processes on Russia's national security. It stated that the information society, globalized information processes, and the democratization and heightened importance of socio-political factors in society had created an information struggle. Internally, the struggle is about controlling large numbers of people. Externally, the information struggle rages both in times of peace and war among states, regardless of whether the states are allies or enemies. Twenty-first century struggles include a state's information capabilities, which work to achieve the strategic advantages63\nthat come from information superiority. Information, the authors note, moves through space and time via processes of\n\"searching, collecting, storing, processing, presenting, accumulating, disseminating, and decision-making.\"64 Depending on how information is used and where it is located (in military weapons technology, in a human's mind, in command and control processes, etc.)\nit produces different effects (precise targeting, manipulation of data, etc.). The authors defined IWes as follows:\n\n Information weapons are the totality of technical, software, and other special resources, constructively intended for the formation of information effects for the purpose of disrupting information processes by means of effects against the elements of an information resource (information target) by a special pattern of organized flows of emissions of energy of different physical natures or a specific pattern of selected and structured\ninformation.65 The authors believe the concept of \"means of information effects\" more broadly\ndescribes the essence of IWes. Technical effects, linguistic and software products, and other means can produce effects against an opposing side's information resources. Effects used to gain information superiority against an opponent include radio-electronic warfare resources, software that disables automated C2 systems, psychotropic generators, special pharmacological means, and the mass media. Information superiority was defined as superiority in timeliness, reliability, and completeness attained by C2 organs for use in the processing and timeliness of decision-making and control in the execution of plans.66\n\nAnother **2019** article, this time by a US author, discussed Russia's use of the \"big lie,\" that is, Russia's tendency to define objective reality as the Kremlin sees fit and thereby avoid responsibility for the \"truth.\" This is a different type of IWe. The article described Russia's recent admonition to Iran to never admit guilt in the downing of the Ukrainian airliner that it had recently caused. A deputy head of Russia's State Duma's Defense Committee noted that it was far more important to blame the US.67 This has been a typical Russian response to avoid responsibility at all costs, even to the detriment of its own credibility. Russia is quick to openly deny complicity in any accusation leveled against it by other nations. To date, its responsibility for the shootdown of MH-17 airliner over Ukraine and its involvement (based on credible evidence) in the poisonings of former Russian intelligence operators Aleksandr Litvinenko and Sergey Skripal (both on UK\nterritory) are such examples. So is its failure to accept responsibility for the doping of its athletes in the Sochi Winter Olympics, a charge first levied by a Russian! From such examples it is clear that openly using the \"big lie\" and presenting its (in some cases, numerous) alternative explanations of objective reality provides Russia with the mistaken assumption that it can deflect attention from concrete facts and avoid responsibility for their wrongdoings or mistakes. Joshua Yaffa, in a late 2019 article in *The New Yorker*, provided another good example of how Russia uses lying to manipulate objective reality and the truth to avoid responsibility. Yaffa spent many years in Russia, interviewed hundreds of people, and recently wrote a book titled *Between Two Fires* that discusses how Russians have adapted to the authoritarian views of President Vladimir Putin. The books interview with Konstantin Ernst, the head of Russia's *Channel One* TV, a pro-Kremlin outlet, was one of the most interesting for its observation of how Russia uses objective reality to its benefit.68\nErnst noted that \"Today the main task of television is to mobilize the country. Our task No.\n\n2 is to inform the country about what is going on.\"69 Ernst considers himself a statist, described as the belief in the inherent virtue of the state.70 You are expected to \"intuit\" the rules of the state rather than have them spelled out, a system that makes everyone err on the side of caution.71 False stories are an integral part of the Putin system's postmodern approach to propaganda as a result:\n\n Today, state outlets tell viewers what they are already inclined to believe, rather than try to convince them of what they can plainly see is untrue. At the same time, they release a cacophony of theories with the aim of nudging viewers toward believing nothing at all, or of making them so overwhelmed that they simply throw up their hands. Tring to ascertain the truth becomes\na matter of guessing who benefits from a given narrative.72\n\nErnst added that \"its's become increasingly clear to me that justice, democracy, the\ncomplete truththey don't exist anywhere in the world. People who make television are citizens of a specific country, from a certain nationality, with particular cultural codes.\"73\nAlexei Yurchak, a Russian-American anthropologist, in a book titled Everything Was Forever, Until It Was No More, agrees with Ernst's sentiment. Jaffa quoted Yurchak as noting that \"Since nothing about the representation of the world was verifiably true or false, the whole of reality became ungrounded.\"74\nThis idea that objective reality does not exist is seldom understood in the West, but it is well understood in Russia as the state's IWe, which can be applied at any time the state so desires. Thus, the only way to get ahead in Russia is to \"intuit\" what is expected of you while simultaneously trying to extract some benefit for yourself out of the situation, all the while avoiding the state's IWe that is designed to bring charges against you. Since the government engages in half-truths about reality, the people do too. This internal IWe does not work or have the same authority beyond Russia's borders except in other totalitariantype regimes. One final use of IWes should be noted, one that was not covered in any of the presentations above but was noted by Slipchenko is the use of information deterrence.  He noted that \"strategic non-nuclear forces will find wide use in new-generation wars and subsequently also will take on a deterrence function.\" Russia surreptitiously uses IWes in legal cases that may not be obvious. For example, there is the case of Russian efforts to use the UN to support its legal claims to the Arctic, where Russia has spent much time and money to digitally (that is, information-wise) map the Arctic Sea. If Russian representatives can prove their case with images or numbers, it may be able to reserve for itself exclusive access to the region's oil and gas riches and would, in effect, have \"informationally deterred\" other nations from the region with its application of digital means to provide legal justification for its case, deterring other nations from entering the region. This type of deterrent force supports the Russian \"containment\" role of deterrence more than its usual \"intimidation\" role.\n\nCountering Russian IWes Only one aspect of countering Russian IWes, that being Russian attempts to create social division in societies, is covered here and only briefly. Counters to Russian attempts to use social media to divide audiences were explained most succinctly through the testimony of Clint Watts before the Senate's Intelligence Committee. Watts, a former FBI Special Agent on a Joint Terrorism Task Force and National Security Branch consultant, noted that the West is facing a different threat, that being Russian active measures online. These measures are supported through Russia's ability to implore the \"plausible deniability\" of their participation and thus influence in these measures. Watts noted that through such measures Russia Today (RT) and *Sputnik*, two media outlets, have tarnished reputations of political figures and undermined democratic institutions; weakened confidence in financial markets; undermined citizen trust in government; and incited fears of global conflicts (nuclear, climate, etc.). Russia adeptly identifies specific audiences inside electorates that appear amenable to their messages and through intricate strategic planning offers methods that might work. Social media's generation of automated responses are used to drown out opposing viewpoints.75 To counter these efforts, Watts offered several recommendations. First, the U.S.\n\nState Department would develop a website that responds to false claims about U.S. policy outside U.S. borders; and a Homeland Security website would do the same for domestic operations. Second, hackers would continue to be brought to justice. Third, the Treasury and Commerce Departments would develop an education campaign for U.S. businesses to thwart damaging false claims. Fourth, Homeland Security would work to improve publicprivate partnerships to expand the sharing of cyber trends. Fifth, U.S. intelligence agencies would work to counter Russian active measures. Sixth, newspapers, cable -news channels, and social-media companies would vow not to report on stolen information that amplifies Russian influence campaigns. Seventh, social media companies should tag fake news stories for readers, which would help counter \"information bubbles\" where voters see stories and opinions that suit their preferences/biases.  Finally, social media companies could band together to create an Information Consumer Report that would evaluate all media organizations across a range of variables to produce news ratings representative of the outlet's accuracy. Consumers would then know the danger/risk of going to the sites with lower ratings.76\n\n\n## From Information Weaponry To Kokoshin's Technosphere\n\nNow shifting attention from IWes to artificial intelligence (AI) and quantum computing issues, while these topics are beyond the scope of this article, their mention is important, given their significance in the continuing evolution of IWes. Andrey Kokoshin is both a former Secretary of the Russian National Security Council and a Deputy Defense Minister of Russia's military. He is a renowned researcher on military and scientific issues.  He wrote in a 2019 issue of the Journal of the Academy of Military Science that the military Technosphere is a complex combination of technologies from several generations, and in several dimension, that must be studied and used to forecast and implement change. These technologies will affect both operational and strategic plans. Various components of the Technosphere, to include the combat and noncombat employment of forces and means, need to be assessed77 for how technical issues can strengthen or weaken their use. Crucial Technosphere developments currently include AI and quantum computing capabilities, along with the use of information influence. Kokoshin stated that the ability to impose information effects on an opponent, including political and psychological effects, can deter confrontations. Each effect relies on \"a persuasive, carefully thought-out demonstration of our military technical and operational-strategic capabilities.\"78 Information confrontations can include fakes and deliberate disinformation, and these can contribute to an escalation of the situation and affect decision-makers. While never citing the term IWes directly, Kokoshin describes AI systems, robotics, and military confrontations in space all as information-based technologies, thus implying that they are IWes. Kokoshin views AI's development strategy as complex, requiring consideration of uncertainty and risks: some (if not all) AI applications may have unexpected consequences, particularly when decision-making and command and control issues are at stake. Further, leaders need information as to political-military, operational-strategic, and tactical situations during information confrontations and struggles for cyberspace superiority. The last two issues must be included in war games to create a precedent for decision-making support systems.79 Kokoshin also views quantum technologies and quantum cryptography as critically important. Because China may have the edge with quantum telecommunication network superiority, he also believes that China can perhaps deliver \"a blow against the contemporary information-centric methods of waging war\" that the US Armed Forces have developed.80 Conclusions Russia is far removed from the days when it threatened the US with a nuclear attack if an information attack was conducted against the Kremlin. Russia now possesses its own arsenal of IWes, one with different forms than what the West is familiar with. Russia believes IWes are non-nuclear, strategic weapons capable of inflicting numerous types of destruction or influencing potential opponents, from disorganizing command and control and disabling critical infrastructure to manipulating and persuading public opinion and causing chaos in state administrations and electoral processes. Information technologies lie at the center of IWes and, while they can be found in the arsenals of most nations, they are used in different information-technical and information-psychological ways in Russia. Information resources are sued to manipulate objective reality in favor of the Russian perception of events, all the while disregarding logic and the accumulation of available evidence and proof that totally offset the Russian version of events. They include forms and methods to introduce into an adversary's systems false scientific theories, paradigms, concepts, and strategies, designed to influence another nation's state administration, population, and military force.\n\n## For Russia, A Nation With A History Of Using Propaganda, Active Measures, And\n\nmanipulation techniques (such as reflexive control, getting someone to do something for themselves they are actually doing for you), the information age has served as a blessing. It now possesses the capabilities, forms, and methods that allow Russian operators to disorganize or deter potential opponents simply with the application of various information techniques. Russian theorists focus their IWes in the following characteristics, types, advantages, targets, and challenges:\n\n\n IWe characteristics: universality, covertness, variety of the forms of\nsoftware and hardware implementation, radicalism of effects, adequate choice of time and place of employment, and, finally, cost effectiveness\n\n IWe types: NLWs, color-revolutions, NGOs, high-precision weapons,\nelectronic warfare assets, electromagnetic pulse weapons, software viruses,\n\n\nenergy-information-psychological weapons;\npsychotropic-information\n\nweapons; technical means (generators, etc.) of virtual informationpsychological\nweaponry;\nand\ninformation-psychological\nweapons\nintegrated with fire, radio-electronic, and energy effects\n\n IWe advantages: can be used in secret, can cross borders with impunity, and\ncan be used against military and civilian structures; offer freedom of access to adversary information systems, such as social media; and allow for the covert preparation of battlefields years in advance with placement of specific software in an adversaries cyber operations\n\n IWe targets: warfighting (combat), economic, and social systems, along\nwith computers; programmable apparatuses, command and control means,\ncommunication and decision-making channels, and the human intellect and\nmass consciousness\n\n IWe problems (Note: this is a Russian perspective): IWes threaten strategic\nstability and the violation of territorial integrity; it is hard to get UN agreement to limit IWe development; it is important to guard against the Western use of color revolutions and nongovernmental organizations to falsify history and manipulate public opinion against Russia; be vigilant for information sabotage\n\n\n IWe effects: physical, informational, software, or radio electronic; special\npharmacological means and the mass media; information technologies that intensify the accuracy of munitions and reconnaissance assets and offer the pervasive application of propaganda and software; energy (as components of EW, microwave, and cruise or unmanned aerial vehicles); and chemical (gases, aerosols, pharmacologic agents, etc.).\n\nIn summary, the Russian understanding of an IWe is much broader than how the term might be understood in the West. There is much for analysts to consider as they ponder Russian access to and use of the IWe, especially as Russia will continue to search for new and innovative applications of their use.\n\n## Appendix: Iwe Definitions\n\nThere are several ways that IWes have been defined over the past twenty years.\n\nThis section will summarize several of them. The concept has been a consistent theme and interest of Russian analysts for a few years.\n\n## 1996 An Information Weapons Is A Specially Selected Piece Of Information Capable Of\n\ncausing changes in the information processes of information systems (physical, biological, social, etc.) according to the intent of the entity using the weapon.81\n\n2000\nAn IWe is a means to disrupt (copy, deny, or destroy) information resources at stages of their creation, development, dissemination, and (or) retention. The objectives of this action include programs and information support; programmable apparatus, telecommunication means and other means of information and command and control; communications channels that support the circulation of information sources and integrated command and control systems; and the human intellect and mass consciousness.82\n\n2002\nAn IWe is a tool aimed at activating (or blocking) processes of interest to the subject using the weapon in an information system. It is not necessary \"to input energy\" into an IWe to destroy an adversary. It is assumed from the outset that the adversary has all the necessary means for self-destruction. Any technical, biological, or social tool (system) for the purposive generation, processing, transfer, presentation (display), or blocking of data and/or processes operating with data can act as an IWe. The use of an IWe involves: 1. Analyzing the methods and mechanisms to activate programs of self-destruction, selfsuppression, self-restriction, and so on that are built into a specific system of an adversary; 2. Developing a specific IWe; 3. Using an IWe against a specific object within the framework of the planned information operation.83 IWes are directly related to algorithms, which is why any system capable of processing an algorithm based on input data may be said to be an informant systeman object of information warfare.84\n\n2010\nIWes are special devices and means designed to eliminate (destroy) or modify information by way of influencing an information resource, an information environment, information carriers, or information processes, as well as subjects that use information in their activities...the author sees IWes as, first of all, material items (that is, material devices and means) that influence objects and subjects of the material world, and, only indirectly, information (or traces of the interactions among the material world objects existing as data)...An IWe purposefully actualizes in the opposing side's information sphere such processes as the weapon user desires. As a rule, these processes are aimed at causing selfelimination or malfunctions of the enemy's social or respective technological information system.85\n\n## 2011 IwesInformation Technologies, Systems, And Methods Used To Wage Information\n\nwarfare.86\n\n## 2012 Iwes Are Means Of Destroying, Distorting, Or Misappropriating Masses Of\n\ninformation, extracting from them what is necessary after overcoming protection systems, restricting or preventing legitimate users from accessing them, disorganizing the operation of technical resources, and incapacitating telecommunication networks, computer systems, and all high-tech support for the everyday life of society and the functioning of the state.87\nDynamic IWes are a unified system of comprehensive, combined, beam, targeted, and strike employment of all forces and means of technical, communications, and information-psychological effects against the subconscious of the objective of the attack.88\n\n## 2014 Iwes Are 1. The Forces And Means Of Generating Information Directed At Doing Harm\n\nto an enemy, and 2. Its delivery to the target of destruction.89 Cognitive weapons are a new generation of IWes. The latter is defined as \"the introduction into an enemy country's intellectual environment of false scientific theories, paradigms, concepts, and strategies that influence its state administration in the direction of weakening significant national defense potentials.\"90\n\n## 2019 Information Weapons Are The Totality Of Technical, Software, And Other Special\n\nresources, constructively intended for the formation of information effects for the purpose of disrupting information processes by means of effects against the elements of an information resource (information target) by a special pattern of organized flows of emissions of energy of different physical natures or a specific pattern of selected and structured information.91\n\n\nMinistry of Defense of the Russian Federation, p. 5. 87 N. P. Shekhovtsov and Iu. E. Kuleshov, \"Information Weapons: Theory and Practice of their Employment in Information Warfare,\" *Vestnik Akademii Voennykh Nauk (Journal of the Academy of Military Science)*, No. 1 2012, p. 35. The author would like to thank Dr. Harold Orenstein for the translation of this article. 88 Ibid., p. 36. 89 S. S. Sulakshin, \"Cognitive WeaponsA New Generation of Information Weapon,\" Vestnik Akademii Voennykh Nauk (Journal of the Academy of Military Science), No. 1 2014, p. 57. The author would like to thank Dr. Harold Orenstein for the translation of this article. 90 Ibid., pp. 57-58. 91 Lata, Annenkov, and Moiseev, p. 136.\n\n\n\n## Chapter Two: Estonia Introduction\n\nEstonia, since declaring its freedom from Russia on 6 September 1991, has endured several soft power attacks from Moscow. Most have been in the form of propaganda attacks, but a few have been more belligerent and even destructive. For example, in response to Estonian desires to move the so-called \"Bronze Soldier\" (for most Estonian's, a symbol of the Soviet occupation of the country) from its location in central Tallinn to the city's outskirts,92 on 27 April 2007 Russia, which never directly admitted complicity, initiated a massive information technology attack against Estonia. Numerous institutions were targeted (banks, media, police, government institutions) and some Russian news stories denying their involvement continued into November 2017. The information weapons used were botnets that led to denial of services through a barrage of requests on the targeted sites. NATO later established its Cooperative Cyber Defense Center of Excellence in Estonia's capital, Tallinn. In addition, other areas of perpetual tension continue to exist between Estonia and Russia. This pertains in particular to the large Russian population that elected to stay in Estonia after the latter's declaration of independence from the Soviet Union (a 2016 census indicated that the vast majority of the Estonian population was either ethnic Estonian\n[900,000 plus] or Russian [330,000 plus]).93 As a result, the loyalty of some Russian residents to Estonia is sometimes questioned. One town, Narva, is of real concern to Estonian authorities. Narva is a key industrial and natural resource area which precariously juts out into Russia, sharing a border on three sides and thus could easily be cut off and isolated. In Narva, 96 percent of the population are native Russian speakers and 88 percent ethnic Russians. One report noted that 47 percent of the city's inhabitants are Estonian citizens and 36 percent are Russian Federation citizens.94 Such an ethnic mix makes Narva not only attractive as a future asset to Russia, but also provides some justification for aggressive actions if they would so chose to assert them. Russia's annexation of Crimea further exacerbated this concern when Russia acted with impunity. For one month in 2018, Kersti Kaljulaid, Estonia's President, even moved her office from Tallinn to Narva as a sign of support to the city.95 But it is the drip of propaganda from Russian sources that concerns Estonian officials daily. The Estonian Information Board wrote in 2017 that Russian influence operations aim to shape Estonia as an undemocratic community and a problematic partner for their allies.96 Along with attempting to legitimize the occupation of Crimea in the press and on TV, Russia appears to be using media as a foreign policy tool. It is also trying to influence young people, who have little context of what a Soviet-era lifestyle was like. The Russian interpretation of news and the commentary of its guests intermix truth with lies. To help confront this media offensive, Estonia is providing its own Russian-speaking TV channels and other forms of media to counter Russian aggression.\n\n\n\n## A Few Keys To Estonian Reporting On Russian Propaganda\n\nIn the 2018 annual review conducted by Estonia's Internal Security Service, it was stated that the Kremlin attempts to manipulate the young, to create public tension over memorials, and to legitimize the annexation of Crimea. In this sense the governmentcontrolled Russian media is used as a foreign policy tool. Russia appears to seek out anxieties and tensions that could be \"escalated into something worse through provocation.\"97 Young people lack the context of the operations that Russia conducted against the nation in the past. Russia's goal is to attract the young to Russia's sphere of influence through the cultivation of the myth of Russia's Red Army as liberators (instead of aggressors) and as partners in the fight against terrorism.98 The report of the Internal Security Service mentioned numerous organizations and personnel that, Kremlin backed, seek to characterize Estonia as a Nazi nation or develop other anti-Estonian activities.99 One Estonian article discussed the Russian concept of what it means to be a\n\"Russophobe.\" The Russian portal *Sputnik* defined a Russophobe as follows: If one speaks out against peoples lawfully expressed will, one is against Russians, and that is what is called Russophobia. The article listed some criteria under which *Sputnik* considers an Estonian to be a so-called Russophobe:\n\n\n Calling for Estonia's Russian-speaking population to be denied an\neducation in their native language\n Habitually referring to Russians as \"tibla\" (offensive term for Russians\nor Soviets)\n Aiding the Ukrainian nationalist party Right Sector  Blaming Russia for all mortal sins and personal problems  Criticizing Russian authorities and calling for their overthrow  Making offensive comments about the lawfully elected Russian head of\nstate, Vladimir Putin\n Protesting against the Russian regime, which is supported by the\nmajority of Russians\n And expressing doubt regarding whether the Russian population really\nsupports its current legal president and his policies.100\n\n\n\nIt was also noted that this is a warning signal for people who have not been so addressed up to now but might be Russophobes. Politicians, journalists, and businessmen are all among those who need to accept a \"word to the wise.\"101\n\nEstonian Foreign Minister Sven Mikser stated in 2018 that Russia's media is directly or indirectly under Kremlin control and imparts its national message as part of its fight for information space with the Western world. As a result, Estonia has allocated resources that can serve as an alternative for the Russian-speaking population in Estonia.102\nThat is, Estonia is providing its own Russian-speaking channels for this element of its population. Efforts in this area extend back to 2015, when Germany and Estonia decided to cooperate in the media sphere to counterbalance Russian propaganda. Specific steps then included supporting *Estonian Public Broadcasting* and online services in Russian, sharing TV and web programs produced in Russian by *Deutsche Welle*, and supporting training for journalists and journalism students via the German Academic Exchange Service. The idea was to offer Russian-speaking residents of Estonia a form of neutral information instead of just responding to Russian propaganda.103 Another 2018 report noted that Russian covert propaganda is hidden in between entertainment shows on the Perviy Baltisky Kanal (First Baltic Channel or PBK), RTR Planeta (*Planet*), and NTV Mir (*World*) that are all controlled by the Kremlin. The interpretation of news and the commentary of guests proceed from the viewpoint of Russia's official position, where truth and lies are intermixed. On the one hand, access to these shows helps spread Russian fake news among the population. Russian networks are even available in basic network packages, while European channels (such as Finnish channels) are only available in custom packages. Spreading misinformation or slander must be condemned and measures taken. Messages that incite hatred or undermine Estonia's constitutional order must be stopped. In the past Lithuania, Latvia, and Ukraine have already fined or banned some channels for a period due to the airing of programs with misinformation. On the other hand, since Estonia values democratic freedom of speech and the press if they comply with Estonia laws, it has continued to offer Russian networks based on these important national values. 104\n\nEurope's recent Action Plan, designed to improve cooperation between member states and institutions and to encourage civil society to counter disinformation, was unveiled in early December 2018. Estonia's representative to the European Union's Political and Security Committee stated that the Action Plan was important as \"it demonstrates that democratic societies share a common desire to take concrete steps against the spread of disinformation.\"105 The plan proposed to more than double the\n\nStrategic Communication (StratCom) task force budget, established to address Russia's disinformation campaigns, from 1.9 million to 5 million Euros.106\n\n\n## A Look At Other Important Developments Through The Years\n\nWhen viewed through the years, it becomes apparent that there has been a consistent pattern of Russian attempts to manipulate public opinion and persuade the Russian-speaking population of Estonia to follow the Russian information space. Luckily for Estonia, polls indicate that Moscow's propaganda effort has not achieved the results the Kremlin-backed offensive had sought. It is hard to know precisely \"why\" Russian attempts to manipulate public opinion have been thwarted but perhaps it has been because Estonia is more effective at communicating its values than Russia is at communicating its propaganda; or perhaps because Russian Estonians simply prefer their lifestyle in the Baltics under a democracy over what they lifestyle would be in Russia under a kleptocracy.\n\n\n2014\nThere were several important developments in 2014 to protect Estonia from Russian influence operations, from training that was designed to counter disinformation to the deterrent effect of NATO deployments. One of the biggest developments was a decision announced by two generals, Estonian Defense Forces Command Major General Riho Terras and NATO's Supreme Allied Commander Transformation, General Jean Paul Palomeros, to create a NATO military cyber training center in Tallinn.107 Later in the year a retired Estonian General noted that the presence of NATO troops on Estonian soil sends a political message to Russia; further, Estonia's Baltic Sea defense must be strengthened along with its air defense missile systems.108 Additionally, a report out of Tbilisi Georgia noted that Estonia plans to build a fence along its Eastern border with Russia, and to construct around-the-clock technical surveillance for border security. The fence will be 70\nmiles long and was set to start in 2018.109 Not all the news was good. On 5 September 2014 Eston Kohver, an Estonian police officer, was abducted by the Russian Security Services. Estonia states he was abducted on Estonian territory while Russia states he was on Russian territory with weapons, money, and special equipment. In August 2015 he was sentenced to 15 years imprisonment, which Estonian Foreign Minister Marina Kaljurand called a provocation. Others can be expected, she noted, as Russia's actions are simply unpredictable.110 Then, at the end of September 2015, Kohver was suddenly released.111\n\n2015\nIn 2015 it was noted that over the past 23 years (1991-2014), the Kremlin's propaganda has not destabilized the Baltic countries.112 Russia has continued its attempts to split NATO and EU partners with a policy of divide and rule, but it has not worked. A poll in 2015 showed that 68 percent of Estonians support the presence of NATO troops and 25 percent are against it. It was noted that the key to changing the attitude of other ethnic groups in Estonia is to bring them into Estonia's information space instead of their current viewing preferences in just Russian information space.113 Another survey noted that while two-thirds of ethnic Estonians see Russia as the main global threat, only six percent of Russian-speakers living in Estonia feel that way.114 Japan's Vice-Minister of Defense visited Estonia in 2015 and stated that his nation was very interested in cooperating with Estonia in the field of cyber-security. While there, he visited the Information Systems Authority and the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defense Center of Excellence (CCD COE) in Tallinn.115\n\nIn October 2015, the US human rights organization Freedom House released its Internet Freedom Index. As before, Estonia was in second place behind Iceland (the US was sixth). Estonia not only has increased its Internet access over time but has also protected the population's right to privacy. In 2013 close to 97 percent of banking transactions were done with e-banking services, according to Freedom House reports.116\n\nA final 2015 report noted that Moscow's \"relentless information campaign\" and movement of militias and Special Forces troops near border regions raise questions about military readiness and the intelligence capabilities of Estonian forces. Lieutenant General Riho Terras, the country's senior military officer in 2015, noted that \"We need to make sure that we believe in Article Five [the principle of collective defense in NATO's founding treaty], but even more importantly, we need to make sure that Mr. Putin believes in Article Five. And I think we should put a lot of emphasis on that.\"117  Terras added that maintaining defense spending is crucial, and he warned against moves to scrap Britain's aging nuclear arsenal. The article states that the UK is NATO's only European nuclear power, since France has a special opt-out that allows its nuclear forces to operate independently of the alliance.118\n\n2016\nIn 2016 it was noted that the EU Department of External Relations launched an EU\nwebsite (in Russian) to produce more information for examination in Russian information space. Further, the department launched a weekly \"review of disinformation\" has been initiated that aims at unveiling Russian fake news. It was also noted that NATO's leadership was thing about \"creating a new communications directorate to counteract the Russian 'information weapon.'\"119\n\n\nThe Estonian Information Board (EIB, the nation's foreign security and intelligence agency) states that Russian military planning in the Baltic region contains a temporal advantage if it ever decides to conduct a limited military operation. The main goal of such operations would be to impose \"control over some towns or areas close to the border.\"120\nNarva appears a likely first target for such an operation due not only to its geographical location but also due to the predominance of the huge number of Russians that populate the city. The Russian operation may include the threat of tactical nuclear weapons as a deterrent,121 one source stated. A potential Russian goal appears to be to restore its sphere of influence through expanding its media capabilities in the region. For example, Russia launched its *Sputnik*\nnews portals in Estonia in both Estonian and Russian languages in February 2016.122\nSputnik is led by Dmitry Kiselyov, a person who is on the EU sanctions list for being a\n\"central figure of the government propaganda supporting the deployment of Russian forces in Ukraine.\"123 The article noted that another media outlet, Rossiya Segodnya (Russia Today), is the main propaganda tool of Moscow that is aimed toward the West.124\n\nEstonia's Defense Minister Hannes Hanso stated in February 2016 that a psychological gap between Russia and Estonia is growing and that \"if we look at internal Russian politics we see that the legitimacy of the regime is built on confrontation with the West.\"125 This is the new normal. It diverts the Russian population's attention away from its own domestic problems. Also, of special interest was that Hanso believes Belarus is not a friend of Russia, as it and others have been \"bullied into this position or they are given no other option.\"126\n\n2017\nIn 2017 an Estonian historical expert on the Soviet era, David Vseviov, stated that there was talk about fear of Russia being \"part of the Estonian's DNA ever since 1939,\"\nand it was revived with the 2014 annexation of Crimea and the war in Donbass. That year President Vladimir Putin stated that there was little way to criticize the Molotov-\nRibbentrop agreement (where a secret protocol between Stalin and Hitler allowed for Moscow to invade Estonia along with other nations),127 indicating his support for such a tactic. In a February 2017 interview with Mikk Marran, Director General of EIB, it was noted that Russia's advantage occurs since the \"entire influencing process is centrally managed...they observe the guidelines issued from the Kremlin.\" Russia's influence toolbox allows them to create confusion and then exploit it. Moscow also continuously maps the strength of Estonia's information systems. Marran added the following about contemporary intelligence gathering:\n21st century intelligence is a combination of the classics and technology.\n\nHuman intelligence will certainly remain an important part of intelligence because, as always, the information gathered from a person by a person is the most important. ...However, the role of technology and software is growing, which means that intelligence is becoming increasingly more expensive. All the systems which are built up, need to be kept operational. They need maintenance and they need to be upgraded every three to five years. These are huge expenses. But if we do not spend that money, we will soon lag behind.128\n\nThere were also several warnings in 2017 about Russian provocations aimed at unsuspecting NATO soldiers. British troops, sent to participate in war games in Estonia, were warned that Russia sets honey traps, stages pub brawls, and uses other subversive efforts to blackmail soldiers on social media accounts. Russian efforts create a false impression of Western aggression using such stories.129  Danish soldiers scheduled to arrive in Estonia later in 2017 were also warned to expect Russian provocations aimed at compromising them.130\n\nIn April 2017 Estonia's parliamentary committee published a new version of Estonia's security policy principles, which included cyber space as a new security environmental dimension. According to the bill:\n\n\nEstonia's main security risks are the deepening of global security problems,\nthe declining impact of the Euro-Atlantic region, and of a value space that is based on democracy, the market economy, and a law-governed state, as well as the weakening of integration based on the European Union\nprinciples and Russia's provocatively aggressive behavior, including by\nusing force near its borders as well as elsewhere in the world.131 It is envisioned that a new element, the so-called hybrid method, is being used\nagainst Estonia where both military and nonmilitary issues function in symbiosis.132\n\n\nLater in the year Estonia's Internal Security Service's Annual Review was\npublished, which focuses on counter-intelligence activities and how to defend against various destabilizing forces. Its focus was the Russian Special Services, a reference to\n\nintelligence organizations. The latter's influence and subversive operations were highlighted, especially the people and organizations working for them. A main objective of Russia's activities appears to be to destabilize the political systems of Estonia and others in the West. Russia recently organized and incited incidents in Serbia and Montenegro and generated scandals and controversies in the West to demonstrate that Western politicians are no less corrupt than those politicians the Western press accuses in Russia.133 Finally, in November 2017 there was an important report published by the Estonian National Defense College's (ENDC) Center for Applied Studies. Titled \"Russian Information Warfare against the Ukrainian State and Defense Forces: April-December 2014,\" the report is available in English at the website of ENDC.134 It contains some examples of Russian efforts to control information space in Ukraine.\n\n\n2018\nIn January 2018, the Estonian Police and Border Guard Board showcased its nine ELIX-XL drones which will survey the eastern border and monitor rescue operations and border incidents. They have a flight time of one hour and a range of five kilometers.135 As Colonel Eero Rebo, Commander of the 2nd Infantry Brigade, noted:\n\nIt is strategically important that the border is clearly marked and wellnoticeable on the terrain, so that we know what is always going on. A good border is vital to a small country with such a neighbor [as Russia]. No less important is the daily prevention of criminal activity; the more so since we have heard from the media and read in the annual report of the Internal Security Service about the connections between smugglers and our eastern neighbors' special services.136 Estonian President Kersti Kaljulaid stated at the Munich Security Conference in February that NATO's Enhanced Forward Presence (EFP) in the Baltics and Poland has been successful in countering Russia's policy, but deterrence still requires a realistic reinforcement strategy. Only in this way can it convince an adversary that its defense is credible.137 A sizeable deterrent near its border area is one way to strengthen its strategy.\n\n\nBorder security is important to Estonia for both geopolitical and security reasons, but it is only one of several factors supporting national security. For example, one report stated that decoupling Estonia from Russia's power grid and integrating Estonia with the Continental European power system prevents Russia from blackmailing Tallinn into\n\nacquiescing to the Kremlin's demands.138 This issue and other national security concerns must remain at the top of the Estonian leadership's considerations when addressing Russian geopolitical motivations.\n\n\nCyber security is one of those vitally important issues for Estonia. In May 2018, exercise \"Locked Shields 2018\" was kicked off at NATO's CCD COE in Tallinn. It embraced a technical and strategic game whose aim was to \"rehearse protecting vital services and military systems in the event of a large-scale cyber-attack.\" 139 Teams had to report incidents, make strategic decisions, and solve challenges involving external communications and issues in the legal and media fields. Teams will be \"protecting the computer systems and information systems of an imaginary country that has come under attack.\"140\n\nIn a June 2018 interview with *Defense News*, Jonatan Vseviov, Permanent Secretary of the Estonian Ministry of Defense, stated that Estonia is setting up a cyber command within the armed forces. Regarding policy, he noted it is important to maintain a strong degree of constructive ambiguity. Estonia cannot let adversaries know what events would trigger Article 5 because, if it did, then opponents would conduct attacks that would fall below that threshold. The cyber domain requires a whole-of-society approach to security.141 It has been noted that cyber defense, military mobility, and a preparedness to respond to hybrid threats are for Estonia the most significant areas of EU-NATO\ncooperation.142 In late summer 2018, Estonia appointed Tiirmaa-Klaar as its first ambassador at large for cybersecurity. She noted that Estonia is well prepared to fend off cyber-attacks, with the State Information System's Authority (RIA) and private sector specialists working in cooperation with one another. But technical capacity alone is not enough, as strategic thinking is required as well to compose the bigger picture that is confronting Estonia. For example, if attacked, a response must be proportional and in accordance with international law. Sanctions in other domains may hurt the attacking nation more than a cyber counterattack. That is, strategic thinking is needed to determine the exact deterrent response against the assailant (such as finding ways to make them lose face, etc.). In December, RIA was in Ukraine to teach that nation's central electoral committee how to adopt basic cyber security measures.143 Regarding propaganda, the Tallinn website *Propastop* covered anti-Estonian manipulation, lies, and propaganda. Members of the Estonian Defense League, a voluntary military organization, run the site. They cover Russian-related networks that actively participate in media and communication propaganda efforts in Estonia. *Propastop* has singled out Vladimir Putin's Russkiy Mir (*Russian World*) organization that allegedly supports Russian language instruction but is more commonly viewed as a front for influence operations. Apparent non-governmental organizations doing the same are the Pushkin Institute, the Baltic Youth Alliance, and the *Reval Media Agency*.144 It was noted that a growing Russian community, demonstrating pro-Kremlin and pro-Russia and anti-\nWestern sentiment, is observable in Baltic social media.145\n\nOne area that Russia has exploited in Estonia is the latter's value of a democracy's policies of freedom of speech and the press. If a nation complies with Estonia's laws, then they should be allowed on TV channels according to a center-right Pro Patria Party member. Contrasting this view was that of IKRE Parliamentary Group Chairman Mart Helme who believes that propaganda channels should be restricted.146 It was noted that Russian TV channels are often included in basic packages offered by Estonian TV. This means that Estonia pays licensing fees to these Russian channels, which include Pervyi Baltiiski Kanal, NTV-Mir, *RTR-Planeta*, and *Ren TV*. Thus, while Estonia is trying to stop Russian propaganda, at the same time its people are paying Russia for its state news and comments. The latter are directed at destroying cooperation within Europe. Meanwhile European channels are \"optional channels\" which can be ordered but only for an additional fee.147\n\n2019\nTwo reports in 2019 from the *Baltic News Service* indicated NATO's continued interest in uncovering Russian propaganda aimed against Estonia and other Baltic members. First, Estonia's Minister of Foreign Affairs Sven Mikser noted that the private sector, media, and state institutions are working together to fight disinformation. New developments, such as the European Union's action plan to fight disinformation, are important ways to confront Russian propaganda. Facebook reportedly closed 13 pages related specifically to Estonia (with 19,000 followers) since the pages were linked to employees of the Russian channel *Sputnik*.148 Other fake accounts appeared designed to interfere with internal Estonian internal discussions, polarize people, distort topics, and escalate public debates.149 Second, in July 2016, NATO established an EFP in Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland. This resulted in a battalion-sized battle group deployed in each country to serve as a deterrent to Russia. In January 2019, the International Center for Defense and Security (ICDS) reported that Russia is the main risk to the EFP of NATO battle groups in the Baltics. Disinformation and incident exploitation involving EFP\npersonnel are its main threats.150 In its March 2019 annual report, the Estonian Foreign Intelligence Service (FIS)\nwarned that the Russian threat is not only asymmetrical but also covert and based on political subversion. There is also a potential Russian military threat to Belarus if a socalled color revolution developed there, which would initiate swift retaliatory action from Moscow. President Putin appears dissatisfied with Belarus President Lukashenko.151 The FIS also noted that Russian cyber spies have had some success in accessing information from Estonian government agencies, as they continuously map various Estonian information systems. Such information is often then used against Estonia in phishing campaigns.152 Another FIS report noted that Russia is likely to intervene in European Parliamentary elections to gain some seats for pro-Russian or Eurosceptical political forces. In this way EU unity could be diluted. It was further noted that Russia supports its allies through Russian-controlled media; organizes high-level meetings and visits that attract media attention; offers covert financial assistance if necessary; discredits opponents (by stealing and leaking internal information); and intentionally spreads false information in social media.153\n\nConclusions It is apparent that Russia continues to attempt to disrupt Estonian society with media and cyber offensives. Some media offensives are designed to split Estonian society while others serve as Russian foreign policy tools.  Estonia's leadership has responded to these challenges, noting that the key to changing the attitude of ethnic groups in Estonia is to bring them into Estonia's information space instead of just Russian information space. Estonian TV channels in Russian as well as an increased military presence of NATO nations in Estonia and a higher degree of cooperation with the European Union have been major ways that Estonia has countered Russian efforts. Despite all the dangers associated with cyber issues, Estonia continues to press forward with a digital policy that covers the country's enterprises from banks to industry.\n\nRecently Estonia developed an e-residency program that allows foreigners to obtain a digital ID and to start an Estonian company online without ever visiting the nation.154  So far there has been no word of this effort being abused. Estonia's President, Kersti Kaljulaid, is a huge supporter of such programs. She realizes that other nations cannot emulate Estonia immediately so her advice to other nations wishing to start a similar system are somewhat limited. They should start with smaller services, she notes, say with school applications, to build trust in becoming a digital nation online before trying something more daunting like e-voting. The nation aims to have 10 million e-residents by 2025, with a focus on those living in Britain affected by Brexit. Officials estimate that Estonia lifts its GDP by 2 percent\n\nannually and saves paperwork due to the conduct of so many online contacts with the state.155\n\n## Estonia Is Also Doing What It Can At Improving Its National Security Through A Comprehensive Border Security Initiative, Constantly Improving Its Cyber Security, And Relying Less On Russian Products And Services, Especially Energy Issues. The Nation Is Further Focused On Ensuring That The Minds Of Its Citizenry Do Not Fall Victim To Russian Propaganda And Influence Methods. As The Title To This Work Noted, Estonia Is Always Confronting Russia's Media And Its Attempts To Manipulate Public Opinion.  With Historical Animosity Present On Both Sides, There Are Clearly Problems That Will Not Go Away Soon. Manipulation Techniques Will Continue As Far As One Can See, Or At Least During The Reign Of President Putin.\n\n\n\n## Chapter Three: Latvia Introduction\n\nFor many years, Latvia has been fighting against Russian soft power advances. Otto Ozols, writing for *Delfi,* noted that Russian information and propaganda utilizes three D's in its manipulation effortdisinformation, demoralization, and destabilization. It is lies and half-truths (disinformation) that demoralize and destabilize audiences through the erosion of trust. The same author noted that propaganda is like carbon monoxide gas, since it flows into a room unnoticed, cannot be smelled, and puts people's logic to sleep.156\n\nRussia's propaganda is aimed at manipulating information on Latvia's TV, websites, and printed forms of communication. In response, Latvia has developed specific counters. A primary one has been a focus on educating its population about Russian methods that attack Latvian susceptibilities and weaknesses. It is important to teach Latvians how to be skeptical of media and news releases and how to recognize the covert (trolls, etc.) and sometimes the overt methods, such as fake news, that Russia uses. These Latvian counters, however, battle alternate Kremlinsponsored sites available to Russian members of Latvian society, to include satellite TV and the Internet, and EU penalties that would be assessed if Latvia outright bans Russian TV. In addition to TV, other Russian influence tools include pseudo-academic and expert organizations, tools of economic influence, and spying and cyberspace activities. This article initially will provide a short background summary of Latvian efforts to stop Russian propaganda from 2013-2016. It will then look at Russian efforts and Latvian counters in more detail from 2017-2019.\n\n\n\n## Countering Russian Propaganda: Some Latvian Ideas (2013-2016)\n\nOne article in the Latvian journal *Delfi* noted that soft power cannot be combatted with simple bans, protests, normative acts, or government decisions. Latvia needs its own soft power to not only counter Russian advances but also to strengthen its culture and self-confidence. It is primarily Latvian values that facilitate social integration157 and act as a soft power buffer against Russian aggression. These values should work in conjunction with a skeptical approach to Russian media advances and focus on educating the public about Russian techniques. Russia has often proposed that the history of Latvia is different than that taught in Latvian schools. Latvia has warned its citizens of these Russian efforts to change history. Latvia's parliament has approved amendments that propose criminal liability and even imprisonment for glorifying, denying, white-washing, or doubting the Soviet occupation of the country.158 It is important to study the Russian cliches and narratives that help establish how Russian propaganda efforts are disseminated in Latvia's information world, and to unmask the lies and falsehoods emanating from the Kremlin.159 One Latvian article noted that because of Russia's information war against Latvia, scholarly conferences and discussions are needed and the creation of information defense plans should become a priority. Such measures help to ensure that society is protected against both the degradation and destruction of peoples' consciences.160\n\nA member of Latvia's parliament offered other ideas. First was a recommendation to ban certain TV channels and strengthen Latvian media outlets. Second was a need to improve state and local government services in line with what any normal society would do. Third was an attempt to develop cooperation with the only liberal Russian media outlet, *Dozhd*, which would offer Latvian citizens a more realistic view of Russian policy and thinking from an actual domestic source in Russia not in bed with Russia's propaganda offensive. Finally, there was a recommendation to establish a news studio in Latgale (a province in the Eastern part of Latvia, with little access to local news) so that local stories and government activities will be better equipped to counter Russian propaganda in such regions. Quality education is required but the availability of universal information to all of Latvia is equally as important.161 Russia has let Latvia know that national security is not just the business of the defense sector, as Kremlin behavior aims to influence the mindsets of Latvia's people and sow seeds of doubt against the nation's government. The *Baltic News Service* estimated  that 70-80 percent of the information that Russia produces about Latvia is negative, such as Russian claims that there is a rebirth of fascism in Latvia, that the oppression of Russian-speakers there continues, and that only Russia, not NATO, can save Latvia.162 Latvia needs countermeasures to these asymmetrical threats, and the Defense Minister has called for measures that include nonmilitary ones. After Russia's incursion into Ukraine, Latvia desired greater energy independence, greater coordination of its national efforts with those of other Baltic nations (such as border guard cooperation), and a greater need for the creation of a common information space with Estonia and Lithuania that reflects common values and ties.163 One 2016 report stated that it is not important to provide a separate TV channel that only operates in the Russian language, as that makes it appear there are two ethnic groups in Latvia.\n\nRather, Latvia's media environment in just the Latvian language should be strengthened.164\nLatvian authorities also took a strong stand against the pro-Kremlin news site *Sputnik* in March 2015, shutting it down and calling it a propaganda tool and not a credible media source. Russia, of course, labeled this as blatant censorship,165 ignoring the accusations against it.\n\n\n## Latvian And Russian Information Positions From 2017-2019\n\nCountering Russian disinformation and propaganda in Latvia is difficult for two reasons.\n\nFirst, the size of the Russian diaspora from Soviet times still residing in Latvia is huge and desires Russian news sources. Second, much of the news on Russian channels is slanted against Latvian politics. This makes it difficult to keep both Russian and Latvian members of the population happy. In May 2018, for example, five Russian Television and Radio (*RTR)* stations were under investigation for content involving \"vividly negative propaganda.\"\n\n## Latvia, Like Some Of Its Other Colleagues, Does Not Think It Wise To Close A Tv Channel\n\ncompletely but instead develop amendments that would reduce the operations of offending Russian channels. Initially fines should be levied against channels that do not abide by the rules of neutrality in presenting facts.166 A Latvian National Security Commission member stated that basic cable television packages eventually should exclude those propaganda channels supported by the Kremlin who continue to violate Latvian laws. Commission members were also informed of a 2018 Saeima [Latvian Parliament] Analytical Services study, whose goal was to describe \"Russia's influence in Latvia's information world and ways of limiting this influence.\"167 Politicians were advised to make sure that they do not become a problem through offering Russia a rationale or reason to claim that Latvia is a failed state.168\n\n## 2017 It Was Noted In May 2017 That Educating Latvia's Population Remains At The Top Of A List Of\n\npotential counters to Russian propaganda. President Raimonds Vejonis, whose term ran from 8 July 2015 to 8 July 2019, advocated for teaching critical thought to the public to prepare them for a confrontation with fake news. Janis Sarts, the Director of NATO's Strategic Communication Center of Excellence in Riga, noted that independent thought is the best weapon against fake news. Russian expert Mark Galeotti stated that the three main directions of fake news are to divide, distract, and demoralize society. To him, as to President Vejonis, educating society and helping them think more critically is a vitally important asset to teach.169 Inese Vaidere, a member of the European Parliament from Latvia, suggested a pilot project to the European Commission (content unknown) for countering Russian propaganda, and requested three million Euros for European Commission countries (especially the Baltic nations) to use in their efforts to counter Russian fake news and its disinformation campaigns designed to undermine Western democracy.170\n\nLatvia's Foreign Minister in 2017, Edgars Rinkevics, noted that Russia may probe NATO's resilience to full-spectrum hybrid warfare. He added that this type of warfare includes propaganda and cyber-attacks. Power grids, banks, and security systems all could be left without power if Russia decides to conduct such activities. He noted that Russia's Zapad-2017 exercise, which was performed in its Western Military District that borders on the Baltics, were offensive and not defensive, as Russia advertised them.171 The implication was that Russia used the exercise as a planning venue for future operations if needed.\n\n\n2018\nThere are numerous tools in Russia's manipulation bag of tricks. For example, some Russian propaganda pieces start with a \"discovery\" of some kind. Russian information agents pass off this information as important for the world's consideration. These \"discoveries\" often do more to hide or obfuscate the truth than to expose it. The technique offers misleading narratives to throw Western analysts off course with alternative versions of the truth made to seem as plausible as possible.\n\nRussia believes it is engaged in an information war with the West for credibility.172 To participate in an information war against Russia, Latvia needs to stimulate critical assessments of media content in society and not simply react to Russian propaganda with propaganda of its own. Latvian Foreign Ministry's Parliamentary Secretary Zanda Kalnina-Lukasevica reinforced this point in response to a question about the impact of Russian propaganda on Latvia.173\n\nIn a Latvian report titled \"Russia's Influence in Latvia's Information World,\" it was noted that the differences between propaganda, fake news, and disinformation on the one hand and legitimate freedom of speech on the other are harder and harder to differentiate. Two issues must be addressed before fake news can be considered criminal: the law must define what kind of information is good and what kind is bad; and it must define which institutions have the right to differentiate between the two types of information. Most likely that job will be entrusted to the National Electronic Mass Media Council (NEPLP). In addition to laws, Latvia must strengthen its public education, media skills, and investigative journalism.174 Internally strategic patience is important as it takes time to explain the goals behind Russia's messages. One expert at the Eastern European Policy Research Center, Andis Kudors, stated that people in Latvia live in different information bubbles. Latvians are very self-critical, such that when the Kremlin calls Latvia a failed state, some in that information bubble of self-criticism think that the state really is weak. Thus, the ideological foundations of the population must be strengthened. The goal is to provide \"an elementary approach to media intelligence and an understanding about the political process so that the Kremlin's propagandists cannot manipulate\" either.175\n\nIn a 2017 report from Latvia's Constitution Protection Bureau (CPB), it was noted that Russian propaganda uses cyber-attacks to spread fake news and that its secret services are developing extensive communication control systems to monitor and control data flows. Other Russian influence tools include pseudo-academic and expert organizations, tools of economic influence, and spying and cyberspace activities.176 In its 2018 report, the CPB noted that Russian methods of influence start with propaganda and end with military and cyber threats. Nonmilitary instruments of influence are usually the most discreet but have long-term effects, and their methods of disseminating provocative and discrediting information is becoming more specific. Specifically the report noted that \"Russia has tried to influence internal processes in the EU and NATO member states in its own favor by using political and diplomatic resources, economic relations (especially in the energy sector), a demonstration of military potential, the development of cyberattack capabilities, as well as the targeted distribution of disinformation and propaganda.\"177 In regard to military uses of propaganda (not noted in the CPB report), a source stated that Russian propaganda is aimed at NATO and its soldiers in Latvia. News reports are meant to sow distrust in Latvia and show that it is a failed state.178\n\nLatvian TV channels are perhaps the biggest point of concern to most government officials, since so much of the Russian diaspora in Latvia accesses this forum that in turn is used to foment disinformation. Violations have been exposed by Latvian monitors of several Russian-language TV channels. However, Latvia's National Security Committee will have to produce some new proposals for restricting these propaganda outlets,179 as Russia continues to find ways to work around proposals currently in effect. In early May 2018 criticism mounted against Latvia's National Council for Electronic Media, which, in the opinion of some members of Parliament, is toothless and has done little to suspend the broadcasting of Russian TV that is imbedded with inappropriate content. One member noted that \"Russian propaganda channels are not journalism in the traditional sense of the word, but rather a weapon in hybrid war.\" A Latvian commentary noted that 90 percent of the channels available to Latvians would be in the languages of the European Union and of the 47 channels available, four would then be in the Russian language. Of those four, it is doubtful that the Russian Dozhd (*Rain*) channel, which is not subordinate to the Kremlin, would be part of the offering. Latvian TV budgets are less than those of Russian TV. For example, it was noted that Russian TV channels are sometimes registered in EU member states, which \"means that Latvia cannot unilaterally ban their rebroadcasting.\"\nWhile Latvia's citizenry recognizes and neutralizes the danger of Russian trolls, the latter should not be allowed to conduct messaging in an unlimited fashion. Germany, for example, in 2017 adopted a law in which networks with two million registered users must remove hate speech, fake news, and other unlawful material or risk a 50 million Euro fine. Latvia must prevent its soil (ethnic issues, economic situation, reasons to be called a failed state) from being a place where Russia's propaganda seeds can be dropped and grow. Media skills and media content oversight are needed to help self-regulate the media.180 Further, it was noted that Russian propaganda channels should not be available on basic cable networks.181\n\nTo confront Russia's information war in specific parts of Latvia, new ideas are under discussion, according to media expert Rita Rudusa. Techniques include messages and visual images, where the most important thing is creating the emotional idea of a sense of belonging. The NEPLP wants to improve transmission in Latvia's border zone, where many inhabitants currently live in Russia's media world. Latvian Radio 4 needs to be used more as well in frontier regions.\n\nLatvian public TV needs to be strengthened and media outlets need to reflect events in a precise way. The Russian Perviy Baltisky Kanal (First Baltic Channel or *PBK)* channel, in contrast, makes people feel that Europe is amoral, and NATO does not protect anyone. Russia is focused on the young, because those over 50, the Kremlin believes, have fossilized media usage habits.182 There are other ways to influence Latvia than just via propaganda. Threats are another tool in play for the Kremlin. Latvia's ambassador to Russia, Maris Riekstins, noted that if Russian Iskander missiles, which can carry nuclear warheads, are permanently deployed in Kaliningrad, then NATO states will need to reassess ways to respond. Latvia is already in range of other Russian missiles. Still, the ambassador added, it would be madness for a non-NATO country like Russia to challenge NATO's safety and territorial integrity.183 The Bucharest Nine (Poland, Romania, Hungary, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Bulgaria, Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia) met in June 2018 to state that NATO's presence has complemented the alliance's deterrence policy.184\n\nRiekstins also noted that a portion of Russia's society understands that it is important to separate what to believe and what not to believe in the Kremlin's propaganda. There is a parallel world of information there, where even in Russia some of the public understands that Russia is trying to manipulate the West while others believe the West is out to harm Russia.185 In Latvia's society, there is the realization that Russia does a good job of manipulating and brainwashing with propaganda and influence in the Baltic states. That being the case, Latvians who are Russian and residing in Latvia are worth a pot of gold186 due to their ability to serve as surrogates and influence the population toward Russia in other ways.\n\n\n2018a Russian Perspective about Latvia In February 2018 Russia's *Sputnik Latvia*, a website of the Latvian branch of the Russian Government news agency, discussed a study recently concluded by Latvian scientists.  The study, by Latvia's Center for East European Policy Studies, analyzed how Latvian and Russian media assess the same or similar events. The analysis was contained in the book Reflection of International Developments in the Latvian Internet Media. Eight events were covered that had caused a \"great response\" in Latvia's media: Crimea; MH 17; Western sanctions; Syria; the refugee crisis in Europe; Brexit; the NATO summit in Warsaw; and the doping scandal involving Russian athletes. In the discussion period, Brexit was mentioned but the focus was on the doping issues. These were the only two items of the eight discussed in this Russian report.\n\n\nThe comments that follow are Russia's discussion of the report, and the author, Andrey Solopenko, makes references to the study and the opinions of the researchers who were involved in putting it together.187 It offers a good example of how Russian specialists stress some issues and ignore others. Solopenko noted that the study considered the content in six Latvian online media, the most popular being the *Delfi* portal, in its Latvian and Russian versions. The content of *TVnet* was also viewed in both the Latvian and Russian versions. Two other portals, Latvia's *LA.lv* and Russia's Vesti.lv were viewed separately, the first in Latvian and the second in Russian.188 According to Latvian researcher Didzis Berzins, it was stated in the study that the Latvian language versions contained more facts or ascertaining information, whereas Russian texts offered an estimation or expression of an attitude. Latvian language sites offered exact quotations whereas Russian ones paraphrased them, which is due to literary tradition according to Berzins. With Brexit the Latvian media cited the words of British officials and with the doping scandal, Latvian sources cited the international anti-doping organization. In Russian publications, people connected with Russia, such as the Minister of Sports, were quoted regarding the doping issue. Russian sources in the latter case did not use the term \"disqualification,\" the study noted, and hardly discussed the athletes who were accused but rather stated that the findings offered a prejudiced attitude toward the athletes. The *LA.lv* (Latvian portal) accused Russian authorities of wrongdoing and stated that the athletes should be punished. *Vesti.lv* (Russian portal) noted that the incident was an international conspiracy against Russia.189\n\nSolopenko notes that the study's conclusions are that the use of Russian information used on Latvian news portals \"multiplies the risks of the polarization of Latvian society.\"190 Solopenko finishes his article noting that audiences view the sources that they trust, and the Russian-speaking population remembers \"very well how this state's representatives have deprived them of their citizenship\"191 and have closed their schools and called them occupiers. These people have not forgotten that Russia expresses its support in defending their rights. For a cohesive society, Solopenko concludes, Latvia needs to cease such discriminatory policies.192 This article has been highlighted since it represents a very good example of a Russian propaganda argument, one that is meant to put Western logic to sleep. The outcome of the doping scandal is that the findings offered a prejudiced attitude toward the athletes. The logic of the Russian argument is thus focused on prejudice against Russia, not their implication in wrongdoing. More major cases, such as poisoning a former officer or invading and taking a slice of another country, are ignored as well. Likewise, the conclusive arguments that Solopenko makes are designed to highlight the problems of Russian-speaking Latvians, with no mention of the work that has gone on to integrate these people into Latvian society and absolve them of these problems. Issues are cherry-picked to suit the *Sputnik* style and method/logic of argumentation. Russian language media note that there have been several ways that Latvia has used to stop or limit Russian news outlets in the country. First, even if a decision was made to ban \"Kremlin\"\nchannels on Latvian TV, consumers can still receive them via satellite TV or on the Internet. This means all attempts to combat Russian propaganda are doomed to failure.193 Several Russian language TV programs have been registered in the UK and Sweden. If Latvia prohibits these channels from being viewed in Latvia, then the nation, according to EU regulations, will fine Latvia for each case in the amount of 464 thousand dollars. So, to keep this from happening, politicians decided to work through amendments to the Latvian Law on Electronic Media. The draft idea indicates that there would be no room for Russian channels at all in this law. But such measures can hardly be termed effective, the Russian source explained, since extended packages could be purchased and the alternate venues mentioned above (satellite TV, etc.) and smart TV are also available.194 A second method of stopping Russian media was to separate Latvia's media from the Russian media (and the press of other countries) from one another in kiosks and on store shelves too, so that it was more obvious where Russian sources were located; and there may be attempts to impose increased import duties on Russian newspapers and magazines.195 Here are other Russian charges against Latvia's use of media:\n\n As a counter to Latvian methods to limit Russian media, Russia has stressed\nthat the Baltic states used threats of a Russian bear and little green men to \"deceive NATO\" to get security guarantees and to get more funding.\n Latvian Foreign Minister Edgars Rinkevics stated that Russia's hybrid war\nhas allowed it to interfere in Ukraine, Moldova, and Georgia. As a counter, Russia's *Sputnik Radio* commentator Armen Gasparyan noted that the Baltics have used threats of Russian occupation to squeeze money out of NATO. Where has the money gone? It was noted that it went for corruption,\nnothing else, according to Gasparyan.196\n Russian authorities note that Latvia needs to cease its discriminatory\npolicies if it wants to achieve cohesion.197\n The last two charges here, made in August 2018, are almost identical to the ones Solopenko made in February, a good example of Russia's use of themes they think have traction.\n\nRussian media source *Vesti Segodnya* discussed how Latvia's CPB has accused Russia at every opportunity of conducting illegal activities. The CPB, the Russian source noted, should have issued a 2018 report on the work they had done. The report was used instead to describe how to counteract Russian activities. The report stated that information operations are the main way Russia confronts Latvia to create distrust and challenge Latvia's geopolitical course. The Russian source added that, in addition to Russia's media, Latvians like to cite \"pseudo-academic and expert organizations\" that they say try to negatively influence the Baltic state by creating distrust in the population. Finally, the Russian journal stated that Latvia believes organizations also work at discrediting Latvia at the international level. This includes exacerbating ethnic, linguistic contradictions, and differences in history's interpretation, and challenging Latvia's geopolitical course toward NATO and the EU. Organizations named by Latvia were the Historical Memory Foundation, the Russian Association of Baltic Studies, and the Kaliningradsky Blogpost.198\n\n2019\nLatvian discussions about Russian propaganda continued into 2019. One article noted that Russia has two kinds of destructive influence on Latvia's population. First, Russia's institutions that organize propaganda and information streams aim to deform democracy. Second, they are designed to reduce feelings of security in Latvia. On 31 January 2019, Latvia's NEPLP shut down Rossiya RTR for three months due to hate speech. It should have shut the channel down for a longer period, some believe, and if such hate speech continues, the channels license could be taken away.199 In another report, Latvia's main news outlet *LETA* cited a RAND study on Russian aggression in the Baltics and discussed several suggestions made in the study. The study advised Latvian security planners to prepare a wide range of technologies to enhance total defense capabilities, to coordinate strategic communication efforts among the Baltic countries to thwart Russian information warfare activities (and to create intelligence fusion centers to integrate civil, police, and military analysis capabilities), and to establish decentralized stockpiles and caches of relevant nonmilitary supplies to sustain resistance capabilities in case of war.200 Finally, an article published in *Delfi Online* discussed a Russian article that focused on Kremlin themes designed to divide Latvian society. The Latvian commentary noted that Vairis Godmanis and Viktors Domburs, who write often on Latvia but in English, usually discuss poverty in Latvia, crises in the nation's political life, and threats to the nation caused by NATO's presence.\n\nSome wonder if Godmanis and Domburs are really people. Maybe they are trolls. Articles sometimes appear on the little-known portal *Balticword* (already caught spreading fake information about the Baltic States), and from this portal they are sometimes republished in opinion-related news websites or other webpages and forums. One such webpage is *News Front*, which has been identified as an active Kremlin propaganda web portal headed by Konstantins Kniniks, a participant in Russian political TV shows.201\n\n## Conclusions\n\nLatvia is faced with an aggressive information war from Russia. Riga has a number of Russian-speaking citizens (at the beginning of 2018 it was noted that one-fourth of the population was Russian),202 who are mostly those individuals or families left over from the time Latvia was part of the Soviet Union and decided to remain in Latvia. They tend to feel a need for more information from the Kremlin, as it more closely resembles their remembrance of how news sounded instead of what Latvia is providing. Russia is more than happy to accommodate that desire and, where possible, to overfill the plan with some information aimed at dividing Latvian society. Latvian attempts to limit Russian disinformation have met with some success. They have proposed laws, developed an ideological foundation to overcome susceptibilities, and are developing the messages and images to stabilize Latvian values. Latvia is encouraging its citizens to educate themselves on Russian media techniques and methods of argumentation. Educational opportunities are further supported by studies being conducted at Latvian think tanks, which are available for downloading and reading, and by the work of the CPB to follow Russian efforts and help ensure Latvian digital and psychological security. Starting in September 2019 all secondary schools will transition to the Latvian language of instruction as well, a decision that was naturally protested by many Russians, protests covered by Latvia's Russian-language media.203 Russia, however, continues to contest any legislation and to protest democratic issues as moves to censor Russian material or to declare Latvian proposals as showing a lack of respect for the Russian diaspora. Russian messages are often provocative or demeaning, and the Kremlin continues to state that any move contrary to its intentions is due to an international conspiracy against Russian interests. That is, Russia believes only its understanding of objective reality is the correct one. Further, Latvia's desire to limit Russia's use of propaganda is often hindered by other issues, not the least of which are the alternate Kremlin-sponsored sites available to Russian members of society (Internet, etc.) and the penalties that would be assessed by the EU if Latvia bans Russian TV. Thus, Latvia must continue to battle Russian propaganda while continuing to search for resources and outlets to improve their propaganda-battle worthiness.\n\n\n\n## Chapter Four: Lithuania Introduction\n\nFor several years now Lithuania's government has complained about numerous information and cyber-attacks aimed at not only the government but also its population. In most of the cases under investigation, Russian propaganda vessels (Russia Today or RT, *Sputnik*, etc.), trolls, or secret operatives have been singled out as being responsible for the incursions or attempts at manipulation.\nAs a result of Lithuania's constant attention to this topic, the nation has developed several templates that are of interest to the U.S. and other nations. These templates describe Russian propaganda targets, dissemination techniques, and information themes, among other issues. The nation has developed a new National Cyber Security Strategy as well and is regarded as the fifth best country in the world regarding cybersecurity issues according to the national cyber security index.204\nThis report will examine the information and cyber-attacks that Lithuania has experienced and what lessons its analysts have learned and applied. The first part of the analysis focuses mainly on the propaganda of influence, while the second part focuses more on cyber issues (at times, in both periods, information and cyber issues are mixed). The period under examination is 2017-2019 and where specific templates are addressed, they are boldened.\n\n## Information 2017\n\nV. N. Remarchuk, writing in the *Journal of the Academy of Military Science* in 2017, noted that \"if society and the people are affected, then all the state power institutions, even with every technological perfection, will be doomed.\" 205 Soft power's importance thus lies in its ability to influence the behavior of the masses.206\nIt thus comes as no surprise that the main information activity of Russia is to try to influence Lithuanian society's will to resist. This is done, for example, by continuously pointing out fake NATO shortcomings and representations, such as that it will not come to rescue or defend Lithuania if Russia attacks it. The **ten targets of the propaganda** designed to reduce society's will were stated to be:\n\n1. Lithuanian history 2. Foreign policy 3. Domestic policy 4. Lithuanian military 5. Defense capabilities 6. Ethnic communities (abused Russians and Poles) 7. NATO and the EU\n\n\n\n8. Ties between Lithuania and Poland 9. Culture\n10. The energy sector 207\n\nThe Center for East European Studies further developed the goal of Kremlin propaganda, stated to be the creation of an image of a temporary Baltic state that will eventually side with Russia. This will help Russia create neutral space between Europe and itself. The five layers of Russia's propaganda image are: creating an image of a failing state; creating the myth that the nation is a neo-fascist state; creating mistrust in Western allies and stressing the need to agree with Russia; stimulating the fragmentation of Lithuanian society; and setting society against European ideas. The idea is to fuel nostalgia for the Soviet regime and to demonstrate that Lithuania had fueled tension in the region with artificial threats about Russia.208\nThe same source noted that **Russia's propaganda dissemination network** includes the Internet and public space; political and public organizations, informal movements, and defenders of minority rights; and history, historical heritage groups, and occurrences directed toward higher education and culture. Facebook pages, media outlets in either the Lithuanian or Russian languages, human rights defenses, public political organizations and information movements, historical heritage groups, and intellectual forums or other forms of activities are also part of the dissemination process. Television controlled by the Kremlin is the main dissemination channel along with RT and *Sputnik*.209\nPropaganda has a further goal of regime change and the ability to falsify history. A\nLithuanian Army representative noted that there is a **Russian information campaign** designed to do just that. The main narrative supporting regime change is that NATO is weak and detrimental to Lithuania. Russian citizens back home, on the other hand, are told NATO is strong and growing rapidly and is almost equal to the threat of fascism. Thus, Russia's propaganda is designed to fit the targeted population. Propagandists also note that everything is getting worse in Lithuania and that families are departing the country. The main narratives used to falsify, or influence history are attempts to discredit Lithuanian partisans from World War II who fought against Russia by trying to convince people that they were shooting and killing their own people.\nThe Russian RT budget appears well-funded to conduct reconnaissance. According to one report, in 2016 its budget was 600 million Euros, while the entire Lithuanian defense budget was 650 million Euros. There appears to be an information reconnaissance campaign underway against Lithuanian networks, which is designed to test how long it takes to access and hack into channels and post false news. Such posting of fake news must be countered immediately, as one cannot afford to be reactive210 when Russia is so proactive. Another 2017 article also noted that Russia likes to darken the image of people who are dead and cannot defend themselves. This is particularly true regarding anniversaries designed to honor people who stood up to the Soviet Union, such as World War II partisans (who are a continuous Russian target). Discrediting individuals is even more effective when done by people who would speak on behalf of Russians.211\nAnother source, in line with attempts to change the regime, noted that Russia tries to lower trust in the nation's institutions and in NATO and to create antagonism against liberal values. To counter such propaganda, Lithuania's Education and Science Ministry is trying to educate children about the threat of propaganda and the Culture Ministry has ordered a study of residents' ability to critically assess the media.212\n\nLithuanian Foreign Minister Linas Linkevicius noted in 2018 that Russia often uses European platforms for its operations against Europe. *Russia Today* is registered in London, RTR\nPlaneta in Stockholm, and *Yandex* in Amsterdam. Programmers, however, are in Moscow.\n\nLinkevicius states that, at times, some Lithuanian politicians are thinking that all is good with Russia. These people are naive, he noted, and the hope is that they are not subject to the Stockholm syndrome, where a lack of experience or something else is causing them to make an incorrect analysis. Naturally not everything Russian should be rejected as there are very different people in different places there. But official propagandists will continue to try to divide Lithuania's population.213\nIn June 2018, a conference titled \"Fake News Impact on Media Institutions: Poland's Experience and other Countries' Practices\" was held in Krakow, Poland. Lithuanian LRT Director General Monika Garbaciauskaite-Budriene attended the session and made several important statements. She noted that the most important items on which to focus are 1) media literacy 2) the ability to distinguish reliable sources from unreliable ones, and 3) a need for better ethics, not legal regulation or better algorithms. She went on to discuss how truth is both a basic European tradition and value and they must be honored. Subjective opinions can skew the truth. Information can only be true or false, not subjective. Journalists too often feel pressure regarding promptness and let this feeling rule instead of taking the time to check information thoroughly. The authenticity of images must be also be checked and verified. Finally, she stated that journalists must continue to be trained in their profession as new digital devices appear often these days.214\nHer commentary is important because Lithuania confronts fake report after fake report. For example, a fake hacker report from St. Petersburg, Russia claimed that Lithuanian Defense Minister Raimundas Karobils had harassed a journalist and admitted to being gay. The fake story stated that eight current or former diplomats also had spoken up about harassment. Lithuanian intelligence agencies had warned a year ago that Russia would be trying to discredit not only such official personas but also NATO forces through information and cyber-attacks. The aim is to spread provocative information.215\nBased on a different type of reporting, on 14 February 2018 the Lithuanian Radio and Television commission took the Russian-language channel *RTR Planeta* off the air for a year for inciting war and hatred in their programming. However, in a dissenting opinion, a European Broadcasting Union representative stated that responding to Russian information with creative alternatives such as providing more profound information of higher quality would be more efficient than taking TV channels off the air.216\nThus, fake reporting, references to war and hatred, and means to create tension and confusion in society are all being used by Russia's propaganda outlets. Darius Jauniskis, Head of the State Security Department (VSD) of Lithuania, noted that Russia prepares information operations in peacetime to get the future battlefield prepared for action. Russia demonizes Lithuania as part of NATO and belittles it as a state. Such information actions are conducted constantly.217 Propagandistic portals such as *Sputnik* and *Baltnews* employ the use of topics such as the presence and deployment of weapons as part of their information warfare strategy, which is reminiscent of the use of Soviet-era reflexive control measures (getting someone to do something for themselves that they are actually doing for you), according to a lecturer at Vilnius University.218\nAnother report stated that *Baltnews* was engaged in \"destructive activities in all three Baltic States;\nalso, [it] cooperates with other companies, organizations, and persons...\"219\nRussia continues to ignore reality and historical truth. In 2018 the Baltic nations requested compensation for the Soviet occupation of their country during the last century. The Russian response was to state that Russia may decide to take Vilnius and Klaipeda back as part of its compensation. To Lithuanian analysts, this is another historical manipulation that Russia uses as it continues, in its own way, to ignore its occupation of the Baltic countries. When a demand is made for compensation for its occupation, Russia demands territory as its compensation.220\nBased on this background, Lithuania's national security strategy has listed several information themes that Russia invokes. They are: attempts to skew historical memory; the spread of unfounded and misleading information about the democratic regime and the country's defense; attempts to pit ethnic and cultural groups one against another; attempts to weaken the national identity; information intended to discredit the country's membership in NATO; and information that weakens the citizens' resolve to defend Lithuania. It is necessary for Lithuanians to improve one's \"information radar\" as to what is real and fake; improve one's understanding of what is a fact, what is an interpretation, and what is simply a lie; and improve the ability to select information sources and their reliability. Critical thinking must be improved, investment in education must grow, and a reliance on more than one source is needed. News spread by social networks needs to be viewed in a critical way. Discord may be sewn in electoral processes, in relation to increased defense spending and the nation's socio-economic situation. A citizen's socioeconomic situation can make them more vulnerable to propaganda. 221\nFinally, Lithuania has learned military lessons from the ongoing war in Ukraine. In an interview with a Ukrainian hybrid warfare expert, it was noted that Russia had used propaganda to attack army commanders by calling them unpatriotic, corrupt, and talentless. Soldiers received such messages directly to their cell phones in the field and were encouraged to rebel. The August 2014  battle of Ilovaysk was critical, as Russia's initial assault had caused some panic in Ukrainian society, with mothers, wives, and sisters calling soldiers and persuading them to save themselves and come home (the force had been surrounded by Russian forces and Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko had called President Putin and requested a cease fire in order to get his forces home).\n\nIt was not until army commanders could explain why things were done in certain ways that feelings began to change.222\n\nFor some time, Lithuanian intelligence agencies have been stating that Russia's aggressive policy was the main threat to the nation's national security. The presence of Allied troops in the region in 2018 helped reduce the likelihood of Russia's use of military force against the region. To increase its ability to manipulate Lithuanian society, Russia increased its investment in what might be termed Lithuanian language propaganda, further indicating that it is reviewing strategies and the quality of its work to achieve its goals.223\nIn January 2019 Facebook announced that it had removed hundreds of pages and accounts in Lithuania that were linked to the Russian *Sputnik* channel or its employees. While the pages presented themselves as independent, they were spreading posts about anti-NATO sentiment.\n\nSome were in Lithuanian and some targeted divisive political issues.224\nIn a similar manner, Russian TV continued their propaganda assault of hatred with more fake news about Lithuanian partisans who were awarded the Freedom Prize in January 2019. Channel 24 Russia deemed the partisans to be criminals and offered fake statistics to create tension and distrust in Lithuania as part of Russia's information war,225 which attempts to use propaganda to divide Lithuanians, undermine mutual trust, and influence democratic and decision-making processes. Lithuania's Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs noted that disinformation presents a serious challenge for Western unity and security.226 Character assassination, threatening letters to the Lithuanian embassy in Moscow, and defamation, fake news, intimidation, and various forms of pressure are the usual instruments that the Russian government uses to achieve its goals.227 Any issue that calls out Russian wrongdoing is severely chastised. For example, on 13 January Lithuania ruled against Russia and indicted its military for injuring and killing Lithuanians involved in that nation's 1991 demonstration for independence. Naturally, the Kremlin strongly condemned the ruling without providing any proof that Russia's military had not conducted such actions.228\nIt was also noted that in addition to the traditional tools of fake news, cyber-attacks, hacking, and disinformation campaigns, Russia also uses shadow money, corrupt influence, and other past tools to create useful political movements or to propose candidates that support Kremlin policies. Russia's long-term, traditional way of influence is a complex mixture of issues across the entire spectrum of activities, making it hard to recognize in its entirety.229\nIn summation, the three-year period under examination has found that some Russian information incursions have met with success while most have been singled out as outright slander or disinformation. Perhaps more importantly Lithuania has uncovered the most important Russian propaganda themes and dissemination techniques, as outlined above, for which they must be prepared to defend themselves.\n\n## Cyber 2017-2019\n\nIn late 2017 the Lithuanian Defense Ministry stated that Kaspersky Lab software products posed a potential threat to Lithuania's national security, especially since several critical infrastructures (not named) were using it. Government agencies were told to stop using the product while businesses will have to assess the risk of using Kaspersky products on an individual basis.230\nAnother report stated that five percent of public bodies and agencies were using the software, according to the National Cyber Security Center (NCSC). Kaspersky Lab, the report noted, stated that it does not have inappropriate ties with any government.231 The Lithuanian government noted that it had collected information carefully and did not jump to conclusions. Rather, specific evidence was collected about the software. Defense Deputy Edvinas Kerza noted that \"at least two criminal groups linked with Russia's special services\" were distributing malware.232\nIn addition to Kaspersky products, the NCSC recommended against using the Yandex Taxi ride-sharing app. The app is registered in Amsterdam, but its information technology specialists are in Moscow. The device collects and stores personal data and requests permission to activate a device's camera or microphone or manage its wireless network access.233\nSimultaneously, hacking incidents are increasing against Lithuania. Some have been coordinated with information attacks. Subjects of the attacks have included figures such as Lithuania's National Defense Minister Raimundas Karoblis and Lithuanian troops participating in NATO exercises; and some have included energy or other specific agencies. Russia has been identified as a major culprit behind the attacks, and in many cases criminal groups or trolls were singled out as responsible for the incursions. Lithuania's Deputy Defense Minister Edvinas Kerza noted in one interview that 27 percent of incidents were directed at the energy sector, 22 percent toward the public sector, and 21 percent toward the foreign affairs and security policy sectors. The result is a hybrid threat.234\nLithuania has a host of \"virtual elves\" that try to act as a counterbalance against the efforts of pro-Kremlin trolls to control virtual information space. The elves' aim is to unmask Russian disinformation and fight those who spread it. In response, a Russian search system listed Lithuanian activists who are contesting Russian propaganda. The Russian goal was to organize attacks against the elves and create obstacles that prevent virtual space from supporting Lithuania.235\nIn response to Russia's expanded use of cyber activities, on 13 August 2018 Lithuania approved a new **national cyber security strategy**, which has replaced the existing Electronic Information Safety Development Program for 2011-2019. This was due to new cyber security challenges, especially cyber-attacks against public and energy sectors, airports, media outlets, and infrastructure for national security. Five goals were identified: bolstering cyber resistance and defense capabilities; fighting online crime; promoting innovations and a cyber security culture;\npromoting private-public cooperation; and strengthening international cooperation.236\nThe threat of cyber-attacks from Russia involves specific criminal groups funded by Russian authorities. They can create viruses undetectable by commercial measures with a goal of taking control of computer networks and systems.237 Cyber-attacks appear most often on Lithuanian national holidays, when Russia is being accused of some wrongdoing, or when Russian citizens are banned from entering Lithuania. Russia then observes how Lithuania responds to such provocations and it tests Lithuania's level of cybersecurity at the same time. Media outlets are used to spread disinformation (lies about the situation) and panic (lies about shutting down infrastructure) through intrusions.238\nDefense Minister Karoblis, in another interview, discussed the danger of two Russian programs designated as 1C and ABBYY. A cyber-attack in Ukraine used 1C, an accounting program that was then banned in Ukraine immediately but not in Lithuania. However, the system is being used in Vilnius in a proportional manner until a new program can be constructed. Interim measures are in place until fully secured software is installed. This helps Lithuania continue to pay, for example, the police in the meantime.239\nThe public is not the only target of Russian cyber-attacks. NATO troops in Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland have been told that cyber-attacks are being aimed at their cellphones. As a result, soldiers are surrendering their cellphone service cards and communicating only via safe channels.240 One 2017 report referenced a Wall Street Journal article that \"cited troops, officials, and government representatives of NATO member-states\" as stating that Russia had planned to hack mobile phones in order to obtain information about capacities and the ability to intimidate troops. The campaign was targeting 4,000 NATO troops in Poland and the Baltics.241 Fake news stories have apparently been trying to use soldiers to cause problems in Lithuanian-Polish relations. In one such fake report, a Lithuanian soldier had reportedly said some Polish soldiers look like pigs due to their poor physical preparedness. Of interest is that the author of the fake story is apparently also a made-up character. The domain name that was spreading these stories was registered in Poland, but it is not known who controls it.242 In a 2019 story about military exercises, it was reported that news portals were hacked. As a result, fake news was inserted into the portal, to include reporting about water shortages near Kaunas and the testing of weapons of mass destruction. Kremlin trolls were cited as the source of the news, aimed to cause panic among the population.243\nThe outlook for the future is not completely negative, in fact the Russian activity is driving positive change. Deputy Defense Minister Kerza said there is more than one plan under consideration for what the state would do if a mass cyber-attack occurred. Lithuania has invested in underground infrastructure and the network connections are known and who would ensure the systems function. Opponents will not know who our technicians are or where our cables are located. They are not announced. Lithuania is preparing not only for cyber defense but also for cyber-attacks. As Kerza warned \"We do not aim to claim that we would be trying only to defend ourselves,\"244 a clear statement of the preparation of offensive operations if required.\n\nFurther, the July 2019 issue of Defense News had an article on Lithuania's cybersecurity posture, which is already, according to the 2018 Global Cybersecurity Index, the fourth best prepared country in cyberspace, behind only the UK, U.S., and France. The article noted that the Ministry of National Defense now has sole responsibility for setting cyber policy; that a Cyber Security Center was established in Kaunas in 2018; and that Lithuania participated at the international level by leading the European Union's permanent structured cooperation (PESCO)\nproject on rapid response teams for cyber issues.245\nFinally, political commentator Marius Laurinavicius noted that Lithuania's problem is that it does not realize yet that it is at war with Russia. The current government \"is not creating an antihybrid strategy\" and it does not prioritize issues as it should. For example, the chairman of the ruling party, LVZS leader Ramunas Karbauskis, has a business with a person funding a Russian troll factory and no one seems to worry about this.246 Another report stated that Lithuania's NCSC warned in June 2019 about a risk posed by some Wi-Fi equipment as it uses Russian technology.247\n\n## Conclusions\n\nOne insightful commentary noted that Russian foreign policy creates political wedges by creating problems, violating international law, and creating geopolitical tensions.248 Russian propaganda creates similar information wedges. Lithuania's continued information and cyber diligence directed at Russia's propaganda assault helps everyone better picture what these wedges are and their shape as well as where the Kremlin is directing its efforts.\nThe discussion above listed Russian propaganda targets, dissemination techniques, and information threats/themes that compose Russia's information campaign to influence Lithuania's population. Lithuania has a historical grudge with Russia,249 which makes its focus very precise and documented. Many of these lessons can be applied to other nations that wish to counter Russian efforts to manipulate them, since other European nations also have their own grudges.\nRussia, meanwhile, continues to ignore the importance of values and a quest for truth.\n\nInstead, it works to develop its own objective view of reality, one that is not shared by the European community at large. The Kremlin, from its responses to date, indicates that it is destined to ignore the realities (and there are many) that do not reflect well for actions it has committed. It is prone in many cases (MH-17, Skripal poisonings, Olympic doping, etc.) to invent its own version of reality.\n\n\n\n245 Jen Judson, \"A Necessary Rise,\" *Defense News*, 8 July 2019, p. 9.\n\n\n\n## Chapter Five: Nonlethal Weapons Introduction\n\nFor several years now Russian military authors have discussed the definition and potential use of nonlethal weapons (NLW). NLWs are thought to be a crowd control mechanism or a more humane way to conduct armed conflict. Regarding the latter, they are a way to capture or immobilize people hiding in buildings or behind barricades instead of killing them. Most definitions of the term center on these uses. What is difficult to ascertain is how advanced Russian efforts are in the production of NLWs since most of these experiments are conducted in secret laboratories. Since Russia believes that the US is developing NLW incapacitants (and they discuss US regulations and purported capabilities in some detail in their writings), they are likely to use such accusations to verify their own developments. One NLW analysis demonstrated why Russian authority fears so-called color revolutions:\n\nAnalysis of today's conflict situations shows that political events in such countries as Iraq, Libya, Syria, and Ukraine develop according to similar scenarios. In some cases, it is worth noting the use of incapacitants to stir up panic, various kinds of provocation, and the inadequate behavior by some groups of the public aimed at discrediting the authorities or individual political leaders.250 Discrediting authorities and political leaders are what concerns suspicious Kremlin leaders the most. Russian military authors clearly indicate that NLWs are under development. One source noted that research is directed at developing \"basic theoretical principles of NLWs, in particular, the legitimacy of their employment\" and \"identifying the extent and timing of their employment in combat,\" among other issues.251 The planning process for new weaponry indicates that, once the NLW program is endorsed by the various ministries concerned with their development, the National Military Industrial Commission and Security Council then submit the program to the leadership, both political and military, for approval. Russian NLW development trends are to be projected out 20-25 years, with predictions of critical military technologies that effect NLW development projected 15 to 20 years out. NLWs are used in exercises. One article noted that laser blinding devices, which cause temporary loss of vision without harmful consequences, can be fitted to drones and delivered up to three kilometers. Loudspeakers, sirens, video cameras, and other devices can be fitted to the drone.252 The capabilities of the Filin blinding weapon, purportedly capable of temporarily blinding an opponent up to two kilometers away, are being increased along with its emitter power and angle of exposure.253\nThis article covers specific incapacitants and their most likely utility. First, the changes in the definition of NLWs in Russia are explored. Second, the method by which NLWs are planned and produced is discussed. Third, explanations of when and how NLWs are used for internal and external situations are examined along with tactical innovations. Finally, Russia's cupboard of physical, chemical, biological, and radiological NLWs are examined. While not a game changer, NLWs are set to become an interesting addition to Russian capabilities on both the modern battlefield and, more likely, in domestic crowd control operations.\n\n\n\n## A Change In Definition?\n\nOften described as a way to \"humanize\" armed violence, Russia's NLW concept has morphed in meaning over the years from a focus on personnel and equipment to a more focused approach on personnel. The ability of NLWs to disable equipment, however, is still mentioned, so the change appears to be only one of emphasis. The term in 2011 was defined as the ability to incapacitate enemy manpower as well as disable enemy weapons, equipment, or infrastructure for a limited time. Weapons were defined by purpose and effect, with the latter including electronic shock, acoustic, kinetic, and biotechnological effects, or a combination of them.  Viewed as a supplement to conventional weapons, they could be used in counterterrorist, peacekeeping, and special forces operations to halt hostile moves, limit conflict escalation, or use force where conventional weapons are unacceptable.254 In 2014 incapacitants were described as disabling personnel temporarily to reduce lethality and irreversible harm to humans, but other uses were also described. When applied only to humans, the goal was to achieve results only by more humane methods. NLWs were to be used in both lowintensity (contain movement, limit conflict escalation) and high-intensity (frustrate repairs, interfere with manpower mobilization) conflicts.255 More importantly, they were to immobilize personnel for specific time periods in accordance with the developing situation and penetrate any type of cover.256 Psychotropic agents include anesthetics, narcotic analgesics, and antidepressants, among others. Other chemical NLWs were to cause malfunctions in weapons and equipment. Thus, there was an equipment aspect to the 2014 NLW concept as well. They included antifriction compounds, chemical substances that accelerate the corrosion of alloys, and substances that degrade the quality of petroleum, oils, and lubricants as well as impair optical instruments.257 It was stated that deregulators and substances that cause irreversible injury are banned by the Chemical Weapons Convention of 1993, and that Russia would never use such substances under any circumstances.258\nIn 2015 a Russian article opened with a definition of NLWs that again included both personnel and weapons and equipment, noting that a NLW is\n\n A weapon designed to temporarily disable or immobilize personnel, weapons, military, and specialized machines and equipment, and infrastructure facilities and to reduce fatalities to a minimum without causing irreversible injuries to the health of human targets, or significant physical destruction of material assets and pollution\nof the environment.259 In the same article, however, the authors later noted that the definition is too broad and\ninaccurate from the point of view of logic. It is hardly inhumane to use NLWs against equipment!\n\nThus, the authors wrote that a better definition would be \"weapons designed to incapacitate adversary personnel temporarily and minimize irreversible injuries to their health or incur fatalities.\"260 This discussion led to the eventual exclusion of equipment from most definitions of the term NLW. This change had appeared under consideration earlier, in 2013, when it was noted that NLWs incapacitate manpower for a specific time period without causing lasting harm to personnel.261 It was stated that equipment should not be considered part of the target set.262\n\nThe 2015 article added that NLW's included acoustic, optical (laser and incoherent optical), and extremely high frequency (EHF) radiation weaponry. Incoherent optical radiation can only be used in dark hours and fair weather, and so it was determined to be less useful. So was laser radiation, since it cannot be used on a large scale due to constraints from Protocol IV of the 1995 Vienna Convention. This left only acoustic and EHF radiation for potential NLW use. They were described as all-weather with no limitations due to international law and able to fit on many vehicles due to small-sized radiation emitters. The radiation generator has an immobilization range of up to 60 meters for acoustic use and up to 250 meters for the EHF unit.263 In 2018 it was stated that a NLW is meant to impact only living beings, thus supporting the finding from three years earlier. The NLW term was defined as \"weapons intended for the temporary disablement of adversary manpower with a minimum of lasting health disorders and fatalities.\"264 The authors also defined two other terms. First, a nonlethal injury was defined as a NLW that impacts man where \"the result of the factual use of NLWs by the adversary implies loss of combativity or incapacitation of the impact target for the duration of time **equal to or exceeding**\nthe time needed to carry out the combat (special) task....\"265 Second, the term \"nonlethal suppression\" was defined as \"the result of the factual use of NLWs by the adversary implying loss of combativity (incapacitation) of the target for the time **less than that needed** to carry out the combat (special) task for which the said NLW was used.\"266\n\n\n## The Production Plan For Nlws\n\nIn 2002, new theories were advanced for waging armed conflict and for performing specific missions. Specific weapons, such as acoustic and optical ones, were deemed humane NLWs. The following order was recommended to determine the selection of NLW priorities at that time:\n\n\n The role of these weapons in support of national security  The types of conflicts and situations in which it was proposed to use NLWs  The cost of the development, production, and use of each type of NLW\n The volume of resources needed to create them  The theoretical and experimental ground for equipping troops within allowable\ntimetables and cost\n The infrastructure for their use\n And the ability to organize training in the NLW field.267\nTwo combination types of NLWs were deemed possible, information weaponry combinations and physical/chemical weaponry ones. Today, radiation and biological issues have been added to the NLW mix as the concept evolves over time. In 2012, a *Military Thought* article noted that NLWs should be designed to comply with the following military criteria:\n\n\n Simple design that has an acceptable weight and size  Compliance with combat kit  Preference to NLW carriers already in existence  Performance characteristics matching the required task without the use of\nconventional weapons\n Adversary effects varying in intensity depending on the situation\n And\ncompatibility\ncharacteristics\nwith\nconventional\nweapon\nrequirements.268\nThe basic criteria involved in a military-economic assessment of NLWs included the following factors:\n\n\n Safety in use, to include the ratio of the area on which an adversary is\nexposed to friendly firepower versus the area exposed to friendly NLWs\n Costs of the funds allocated over the lifetime of a NLW  Combat efficiency of employing a NLW to fulfill its missions in a specified\ntime\n Compatibility of a NLW with conventional weapons, that is their\nintegration\n Proportion of the NLWs percentage of a unit's total weapons complement\nto fulfill tasks\n And the assurance that the use of NLWs do not go against existing law.269\nProblems facing the planning and development of NLWs evolved in 2018. They included a lack of precise definitions of terms and their classification, since NLWs were defined differently for the Interior Ministry, the Armed Forces, and the Federal Security Service. This was a serious problem, since all of these agencies use NLWs for policing and counterterrorist operations, which all of these agencies handle. These are important points for the agencies to solve together. Another problem was determining whether NLWs are direct action (incapacitation) or special-purpose NLW agents. The latter NLW agents do not incapacitate an adversary physically but provide an opportunity, for example, for restricting an opponent's freedom of movement.270\n\n It was noted that a NLW development program should include the following steps:\n1. An analysis is made of indigenous and foreign trends, with a forecast offered of\nwhere NLWs seem headed.\n2. A forecast is developed of potential constraints from existing international law,\nand humanitarian, ecological, socio-moral, and other issues that might restrict NLW use.\n3. A discussion is conducted of scenarios and NLW employment opportunities. 4. The results of steps 2 and 3 help validate priority areas of NLW development\nfor the military and law enforcement ministries.\n5. Research is required into aspects of the employment, maintenance,\nmanufacturing, and other constraints on NLW development.\n6. Five-year, ten-year, and 15-year guidelines are drawn up, especially those to be\nfollowed by all agencies.\n7. A Targeted NLW Development Program is prepared, and its feasibility assessed\nin relation to existing financial, manufacturing, technological, workforce, and other constraints. Where unsatisfactory results are discovered, the process\nreturns to Step 3.271\n\nOnce step seven's \"Targeted NLW Development Program\" is endorsed by the various\nministries concerned, then the National Military Industrial Commission and Security Council submit it to the leadership, both political and military, for approval.272  NLW development trends need to be projected out 20-25 years, while critical military technologies with an effect on NLW\ndevelopment are projected out only 15 to 20 years.273 Such a planning and development list suggests, due to its logic, that other Russian weapons planning and development scenarios might follow a similar seven step process. Three types of NLW developments were discussed based on how they affected their targets. First were NLWs with a physical effect, from electromagnetic radiation, acoustics, mechanical constraints, kinetic energy, and electric discharge. Second were chemical NLWs, which have irritant (mucous membranes), odorant (psychophysical effects), and toxins, hallucinogens, simulants, and chemical neuroinhibitory agents. Third were biological NLWs, such as those causing irritation of the sense organs.274 In addition to these three, targeted radiological NLWs were also mentioned.\n\n\n\n## Using Nlws Internally And Externally\n\nThere are several internal and external circumstances under which NLWs could be used.\n\nInternal armed conflicts (IAC) are those (1) between various illegal armed formations or (2) between illegal formations and state law enforcement agencies. Settling these types of conflicts early can prevent a transition to war. IACs are classified according to the causes of their emergence, the degree of state power structure involvement (as one of the opposing sides), the size of the state territory involved (local, regional, etc.), and the organization type (planned or spontaneous) and intensity. Subversive and terrorist activities are inherent in internal struggles, and a state's failure to solve such activities early can result in an atmosphere of fear that permeates society and creates a lack of confidence in state authorities. NLWs help reduce the combat efficiency of opponents in IACs and limit the number of fatalities.275 NLWs employed in police operations generally fall in line with the use of acoustic and electromagnetic radiation weapons and are one option available to reduce fatalities. It is important to develop various NLW systems, including those using electric current and radiation, to help power entities solve such special problems. When protecting major facilities, electroshock mines can be laid, since they help block unauthorized access to important areas.276 It was noted that: At the same time, the distinctive features shared by all IACs suggest that NLWs must be used more extensively for their neutralization effect. Elimination of illegal armed forces with minimal civilian casualties, along with keeping life support, social, and transportation infrastructure facilities in a normal operational mode, will not only help restore the constitutional order in the conflict area, but will also ensure sustainable development of the country at large.277\n\n\nOne Russian military opinion was that NLWs are an effective information warfare asset.\n\nIn handling internal issues, NLWs can \"defuse the bellicose moods stoked by propaganda and isolate the most outrageous advocates of the indiscriminate use of military force.\"278 Ironically, the \"mood\" of recent anti-Kremlin demonstrations in Moscow was provoked due to Kremlin decisions to keep certain people off of election ballots there. This shows that in Russia, moods can be both \"provoked\" and then \"defused\" (with NLW) by the same government officials! In regard to the external use of NLWs, they are being tested during exercises, with priority given to the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) due to the challenges these forces are facing in regard to terrorism, drugs, weapons, and ammunition trafficking along their borders.279 In the three examples below, a special operations brigade of Kyrgyzstan's Armed Forces conducted the first bullet. Russian troop tactical exercises conducted the examples in bullets two and three:\n\n\n To seize a population center captured by militants, smoke screens were\ndeployed from 70 meters to obscure the vision of a sniper hiding in a building. This would be followed, when buildings were stormed, by thermobaric hand and under-barrel grenades. Sound-and-light cluster hand grenades were also used on fighters in rooms. The Osa complex, with target acquisition and terrain illumination capabilities (signal and flare cartridges), was potentially utilized in this exercise.\n To fight off adversary ambushes, incapacitating agents were used, such as\nthermobaric hand grenades, which are 2.5 times more effective than conventional ammunition since they can hit adversaries concealed behind cover and in shelters.\n To clear corridors for military convoys on roads blocked by the population, a\ncombination of sound-and-light, smoke, and irritant-charged hand grenades were used that explode without scattering splinters and produce only a\npsychological effect on crowds.280\n When constructing a plan for the use of NLWs, it must be stated precisely how conventional and NLWs are to be employed together. This is particularly important in regard to time limits, since the employment of NLWs implies that effects only last for a certain period of time. Using NLWs against staffs and control centers will produce the greatest disorganization in an opponent's control cycle.281 NLWs can achieve surprise since they can inhibit countermeasures and destabilize an opponent psychologically. Actions must be taken with resolve once enemy troops are incapacitated and are unable to put up a real fight. In the offense they are most effective on an adversary's troops hiding in buildings, while when confronting a defending adversary NLWs reduce freedom of maneuver and help disorganize his control, reconnaissance, and information gathering.282 It was noted that the Russian Academy of Missile and Artillery Sciences was working on the organization and methodological support for developing NLWs, while the Scientific Research Institute of Applied Chemistry was working on developing, manufacturing, and delivering NLW\nammunition and related devices.283 Thus, NLW development is supported by both military and civilian industry.\n\n\n\n## Physical, Chemical, Biological, Radiation, And Information Nlws\n\nIn 2005 an article in Russia's *Military-Industrial Courier* listed mechanical devices, guns, direct effect sources, circular effects, light and smoke, physical and chemical compositions, and chemical and biological substances as types of NLWs:\n\n\n Mechanical devices (basket throwers, water cannons, and catapults to\ndisperse materials)\n Guns (electromagnetic, subsonic, radio wave, super-high frequency)  Direct effect sources (generators, phased or pulsed emissions)  Circular effects (vortex generators, vibroacoustic devices)  Next-generation light and smoke elements (smoke and pyrotechnic means,\netc.)\n Physical and chemical compositions, compounds, and suspensions (foams,\ngels, powder, etc.)\n And chemical and biological substances (odorants, irritants, marker\nagents, viruses, etc.). 284\nThese types of NLWs can be dispersed by various delivery means. After 2005 a more succinct list of NLWs was developed, with physical, chemical, biological, radiation, and information weapons receiving the most attention. Of interest is that both personnel and equipment are mentioned as targets in the discussion below, with some articles written as late as 2018, indicating that the definitions discussed above may still not be fixed in stone. Physical-based NLWs include lasers that can incapacitate manpower and optoelectronic surveillance devices; microwave weapons that disable weapons and equipment by knocking out electronic components; high-frequency weapons that raise body temperatures; and acoustic weapons that cause dizziness, psychoneurotic breakdowns, and loss of hearing and sight.  The range of these weapons is thought to be a few hundred meters to two or three kilometers.285 Chemical NLWs are those that can cause drowsiness and behavioral dysfunctions; that use adhesive (blocking) properties or alter the quality of fuels and lubricants; that increase the brittleness of metals; and that stall engines or block up ventilation systems. Many are offered in any caliber for NLW ammunition.286 One article noted that NLW systems of greater efficiency are under development, especially for the use of a variety of chemical irritants. This includes a special NLW ammunition is available for machine guns that produce a large irritant cloud. It was also noted that: Another weapon is an irritant aerosol sprayer that can be used as a nonlethal landmine. Still another is a portable autonomous aerosol sprayer programmable to be activated in water in special operations. Small-size ammunition, for example, close combat irritant-containing grenades fired from under the barrels of grenade guns and hand grenades, may have a key role in neutralizing point targets, such as snipers hiding in dispersed locations on terrain or in buildings.287 Another chemical-related NLW discussion covered its advantages. They include the following: incapacitating targets for specific time periods; the ability to selectively affect targets and penetrate various types of shelter; the use of \"damage control\" operations that suit the situation; and the ability to integrate with and complement standard armaments. Chemical NLWs lower the chances of casualties among civilians and friendly units and can include operations such as peacekeeping, the de-escalation of armed conflicts, hostage rescues, and humanitarian support operations, where traditional warfare capabilities are less useful.288 It was stated that:\n\n The idea of non-lethality may also aid the efforts targeting areas of drug production, storage, and transportation, as well as forces preparing inter-or intra-national armed\nactions... At present, commitments to respect state sovereignty restrict conditions\nin which pre-emptive strikes against these targets are possible. The use of NLWs\nmakes such strikes 'politically acceptable.'289 Biological NLWs carry microorganisms that can harm humans, animals, and plants or\ndisable weapons and other such items. Bacteria can decompose lubricants and block fuel flow passages, or it can cause swelling in artillery and firearm barrels.290\n\nRadiation weaponry was the focus of another set of authors.291 Electromagnetic radiation is broken into frequency ranges, to include optical and radio. Optical NLWs include laser radiation\n\n\n\nblinding devices and are used against snipers, observers, and fighting vehicle drivers. Its long range, straight propagation, and little divergence are important principals for deployment. Radio frequency NLWs use extremely high frequencies (EHF). The latter can have NLW effects at a range of 15-700 meters. Most missions only require 250 meters. Acoustic radiation offers good utility in water and in the dispersal of large crowds of rioters at a range of around 60 meters. They do, however, have a wide divergence angle and thus low selectivity. On the positive side, they can be used in any weather or season.292 While the article favored radiation weaponry and stated that it holds the greatest promise, it also noted that no single incapacitating agent is suitable for all operations. The specific effects of all NLWs indicates that they can only be used \"in tactical situations for which they have been found to be fit.\"293 A way must be found to develop \"nonlethal weapons using several incapacitating agents in combination, the effect of which is yet to be studied.\"294\n\nOne article described information weapons as NLWs. The development of the mass media creates the prerequisites for the use of an inflation NLW in the opinion of some writers. Of interest is that psychological NLWs were also considered but have not yet been scientifically confirmed. These type of NLWs included telepathy, telekinesis, clairvoyance, and other psychological means.295 There continued to be NLW links to equipment. In 2018 NLWs were listed as a type of weapon based on new physical principles (NPP). For example, NLWs included glues, fuel-diluent chemical formulations, and enmeshing networks.296 Another article stated that NLWs included traumatic weapons, foam and water cannons, emitters within a spectrum of several hertz to ultrahigh frequencies, and chemical and biological reagents based on adhesion or the ability to change physical and chemical characteristics of substances (elasticity, viscosity, electronical properties, mechanical density or sliding properties).297 Their use is still thought to be focused on restricting freedom of movement, but they also have the ability to incapacitate humans.\n\n\n\n## Conclusions\n\nNLWs are often described as a way to keep crisis escalation in check and to give leaders more time to resolve a conflict before it passes a point of no return. Russian military analysts appear in agreement, as they believe NLWs offer commanders new options and ways to handle crises. Flexible responses to situations offer more efficient methods for controlling them and reducing the chances of serious injury among noncombatants. Recent exercises and discussions in military journals indicate that NLWs are increasing in importance and use. Further, NLWs offer several distinct advantages, to include high efficiency of use, the ability to neutralize an adversary's fighting capabilities, parameter control and selective effect capability, choice of time to take effect, and compatibility and potential integration with existing types of weapons. However, it is just as clear that a final definition of what constitutes NLWs is still in flux.\n\nThe definitions and explanations of NLWs do not coincide with their proposed use against people and equipment. While there seems to be a push to make NLWs a humane choice of engagement, articles continue to appear that describe chemical and biological NLWs that damage equipment. Further, Russian NLWs are not described in the Western press at nearly the same rate as other developments, such as hybrid or asymmetric warfare. They deserve more attention. Perhaps NLWs are part of President Vladimir Putin's asymmetric approach to conflict. With a focus on NLW development trends projected out 20-25 years and critical military technologies predicted at least 15 to 20 years out, the concept appears to continue to play an active role in Russia's weapon technology planning process. Further, it is the types of NLWs that should concern the West, since they are not just physical and information but chemical, biological, and radiological. All can affect a situation and cause unforeseen consequences, to include serious psychological effects.\n\nFinally, Russia's division of NLW use into internal and external areas is of interest. The former implies that Russia's National Guard will undoubtedly utilize NLWs when confronting demonstrators or other protestors, or when confronting terrorists inside the country. Externally to Russia it is most certain that they will be used against terrorists first and then perhaps later against a traditional opponent. Most likely they will be used in conjunction with traditional means of warfare in the latter case. An article in *Armeyskiy Sbornik (Army Journal*) in January 2019 noted that warfare will be waged with the objective of disorganizing enemy efforts in the political and military spheres, with the goal being to coerce a side to accept proposed terms. This will require NLW effects, the author noted. More importantly, the journal is planning on publishing a series of articles on NLWs.298\nThis makes it clear that the concept is drawing additional attention in the Russian military at the moment, indicating that it has become another military priority in Russia to monitor in the near future."
    },
    {
        "text": "\"(2) All workpapers of the Comptroller General and gll records and property of the Central Intelligence Agency that the Comptroller General uses during an audit or evaluation under this section shall remain in facilities provided by the Central Intelligence Agency. Procedures established by the Comptroller General pursuant to paragraph\n(1) of this subsection shall include provisions specifying the method and duration of any temporary removal of workpapers from facilities providsd by the Oentral Intetligemce Agency.\n\n\"(3) Before initiating an audit or evaluation under this section, the Comptroller General shall provide the Director of Central Intelligence with the names and other relevant information concerning each officer and employee of the General Accounting Office who may have access to, or otherwise be provided with, classified or other sensitive information in connection with an audit or evaluation for purposes of security clearance reviews. The Director of Central Intelligence shall complete the necessary security clearance reviews on an expedited basis.\n\n\"(4) The Comptroller General shall provide the Director of Central Intelligence with the name of each officer and employee of the General Accounting Office who has obtained a security clearance from the Central Intelligence Agency and to whom, upon proper identification, the officers, employees, records, and property of the Central Intelligence Agency shall be made available in carrying out this section.\n\n\"(e) This section may be superseded only by a law enacted after the date of enactment of this section specifically repealing or amending this section.\n\n\"(f) The authority provided in this section is in addition to the authority that the Comptroller General has to investigate, audit, and evaluate the financial transactions, programs, and activities of any other establishment or agency of the Government of the United States.\".\n\n(b) The table of sections for chapter\n35\nof title\n31, United States Code, is amended by inserting after the item relating to section 3523 the following new item:\n3n. Audit of Contral Intelligence Agency activities.\"\".\n\nSec.\n\n8.\n\n(a)\nSection 3524\nof title\n31, United States Code, is amended\n\n(1)\nin\nthe\nfirst\nsentence\nof subsection\n(a)(1),\nby\nstriking out \"The\" and inserting in lieu thereof the following: \"Except with respect to audits or evaluations of the Central Intelligence Agency as provided in section 3523a, of this title, the';\n(2) in subsection (c), by inserting \"(other than activities conducted by the Central Intelligence Agency)\"\nafter \"activities\";\n(8) by amending subsection (d) to read as follows:"
    },
    {
        "text": "# National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency\n\n7500 GEOINT Drive Springfield. Virginia 22150\nSteven Aftergood Sent via U.S. mail November 28,2012\nRe: FOIA Case Number: 20100025F\nFederation of American Scientists\n1725 Desales Street NW, Suite 600\nWashington, DC 20036\nDear Mr. Aftergood:\nThis letter responds to your October 29, 2009 Freedom oflnformation Act (FOIA) request, which we received on October 29, 2009. You requested access to documents pertaining to \"U.S.\n\nNational Security and Economic Interests in Remote Sensing: The Evolution of Civil and Commercial Policy by James A. Vedda, Aerospace Corp., February 20, 2009, prepared for NGA Sensor Assimilation Division.\" , A search ofNGA's system of records located one document (37 pages) that is responsive to your request. We reviewed the responsive documents and determined they are releasable in full.\n\nIf you have any questions about the way we handled your request, or about our FOIA regulations or procedures, please contact Elliott Bellinger, Deputy FOIA Program Manager, at 571-557-2994\nor by email at Elliott.E.Bellinger@nga.mil or via postal mail at:\nNational Geospatial-Intelligence Agency FOIA Requester Service Center\n7500 GEOINT Drive, MS S71-0GCA\nSpringfield, VA 22150-7500\nSincerely,\n~\nElliott Belinger Deputy FOIA Program Manager\n\n20 February 2009\nJames A. Yedda NSS Programs Policy and Oversight National Space Systems Engineering Prepared for:\nNational Geospatial-Intelligence Agency Sensor Assimilation Division Sunrise Valley Drive Reston, VA 20191-3449\nContract No. F A8802-09-C-OOO 1\nAuthorized by: National Systems Group Distribution Statement: Distribution authorized to U.S. government agencies and their contractors only; administrative or operational use, 20 February 2009. Other requests for this document shall be referred to NGAIOIPP.\n\nDestruction Notice: For classified, limited documents, follow the procedures in DOD 5200.22-\nM, National Industrial Security Program Operating Manual (NISPOM), Paragraph 5, Section 7.\n\nFor unclassified documents, destroy by any method that will prevent disclosure of the contents or reconstruction of the document.\n\n## Report Documentation Page\n\nThe public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing the burden, to the Department of Defense. Executive Services and Communications Directorate (0704-0188). Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to any penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMP control number.\n\n7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME{S) AND ADDRESS(ES)\n8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER\nThe Aerospace Corporation, Center for Space Policy & Strategy, 1000 Wilson TOR-2009(360 I )-8539\nBlvd., Suite 2600, Arlington, VA 22209\n\n## 9. Sponsoring/Monitoring Agency Name(S) And Address(Es) 10. Sponsor/Monitor's Acronym(S)\n\nNational Geospatial-Intelligence Agency\nNGNOIPP\nSensor Assimilation\n11. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S)\n\n## 12. Distribution/Availability Statement U.S. Government And Contractors 13. Supplementary Notes\n\n14. ABSTRACT\nlbe Aerospace Corporation prepared this report in partial fulfillment of a study for NGA on balancing national security and economic equities in satellite remote sensing. The report chronicles the policy history of civil and commercial remote sensing from 1960 through 2008. It highlights the difficulties in establishing a consistent government role in a field where public good and private profit exist side-by-side, and where business interests have the potential to contribute to and conflict with national security interests.\n\n## 15. Subject Terms Commercial Remote Sensing, Civil Remote Sensing\n\n16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF:\n17. LIMITATION\n18. NUMBER\n19A. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON\nA. REPORT\nB. ABSTRACT\nC. THIS PAGE\nOF ABSTRACT\nOF PAGES\nJames A. Yedda\nu\nu\nu\nuu\n30\n198. TELEPHONE NUMBER (INCLUDE\nAREA CODE)\n(703) 812-7042\n\n20 February 2009\nJames A. Yedda NSS Programs Policy and Oversight National Space Systems Engineering Prepared for:\nNational Geospatial-Intelligence Agency Sensor Assimilation Division Sunrise Valley Drive Reston, VA 20191-3449\nContract No. FA8802-09-C-0001\nAuthorized by: National Systems Group Distribution Statement: Distribution authorized to U.S. government agencies and their contractors only; administrative or operational use, 20 February 2009. Other requests for this document shall be referred to NGAIOIPP.\n\nDestruction Notice: For classified, limited documents, follow the procedures in DOD 5200.22-\nM, National Industrial Security Program Operating Manual {NISPOM), Paragraph 5, Section 7.\n\nFor unclassified documents, destroy by any method that will prevent disclosure of the contents or reconstruction of the document.\n\nApproved by:\n-\")\n./)~~\n[1~r;~ :\nAllan W. LeGrow Principal Director National Space Systems Engineering Systems Planning and Engineering\n\n## Table Of Contents Of Contents\n\n1.\nCivil Remote Sensing Programs, 1960-1992........c.ccereirienieecereeereeerrrreercsnresetessseeseesressssessnsesssesnnes 1\nI.\nCivil Remote Sensing Programs, 1960-1992 ........ I\nI.T\nWeather Satellites......oociioiiiieeieecieieree\net st et\ne\ne et e s\net sar e ba e ss e s e s e esseesnssnesesasnnansesan 1\n1.2\nHuman Earth ObSErvation ........ccuiiiiririniiiinerie\ne cecesetr s et ee e\ne eessete e saesaesensessennseensans 2\n1.3\nLandsat: Experimental or Operational SYSTemM? ........cvveeeiiveriereerieeiieseeeeseeeesssaeseessssenans 3\n1.4\nA Failed Attempt at Privatization........ccccooveevireeniininienieccrrcnecccne\net\ne 4\n1.5\nFactors Affecting the Viability of Commercial Remote Sensing........cccceeeceeeeiercveevierreceeeennc 8\n1.6\n Foreign Interest Leads to a Proliferation of Orbital ObServers ........cccceeeveveeeiiiecreceeececcieeens 9\n2.\nCivil and Commercial Remote Sensing, 1992-2008 ........ocvrieeereniirienieneiiisienecsresreseseresssreesasssesnenes 13\n2.1\n Corrective Action on Remote Sensing POlICY .......ccoviiieericrinsiirinrie et 13\n2.2\nCommercial Remote Sensing Policy Takes Shape ........cccceevveeveeecieecierecieercerereeeevaeesenens 15\n2.3\nRecent Developments in Civil Remote SenSing ....c.cccceeevieiiieeninemiiseecsesveseseesineseeeeseveenas 21\n\nALCTOMYINS\n             ettt\n                        ettt et et vte e\n                                        e st e e\n                                            e e s\n                                                m e e e et e sseassessnseansea e saeesseassaseassessassasataseassserasnssersseanssessnsenreners 29\n\n| 1.1         | Weather Satellites I                           |\n|-------------|------------------------------------------------|\n| 1.2         | Human Earth Observation 2                      |\n| 1.3         | Landsat: Experimental or Operational System? 3 |\n| 1.4         | A Failed Attempt at Privatization              |\n| 1.5         | Factors Affecting the Viability                |\n| 1.6         | Foreign Interest Leads to a Proliferation      |\n| 2.          | Civil and Commercial Remote Sensing, 1992-2008 |\n| 2.1         | Corrective Action on Remote Sensing Policy     |\n| 2.2         | Commercial Remote Sensing Policy Takes Shape   |\n| 2.3         | Recent Developments in Civil Remote Sensing    |\n| Acronyms 29 |                                                |\n\n## List Of Figures List Of Figures\n\nFigure 1. Commercial Remote Sensing Industry EVOIULION.....c.c.cucciiiiciiniiiiee\ne ciecteceecte e\ne 20\nFigure 2. Earth Science Mission Profile 1997-2003.......coocieemirriiiieeciereneesineecseeessrecrsssessessssnsessssessens 25 Figure 3. Earth Science Mission Profile 2004-2011.......ooovieveerimrieiiireeeeieenreesereenresseessssesseessssens 26\nFigure I. Commercial Remote Sensing Industry Evolution ........ 20 Figure 2. Earth Science Mission Profile 1997-2003 ........ 25 Figure 3. Earth Science Mission Profile 2004-2011.. ........ 26\n\n## Foreword\n\nThe documentation and study of lessons learned is an important tool for guiding policy formulation and implementation, just as it is for technology development and operations. The policy history of civil and commercial remote sensing goes back to the beginning of the space age and is closely intertwined with national security policy. It has been remarkably difficult to establish a consistent government role in a field where public good and private profit exist side-by-side, and where business interests have the potential to both contribute to and conflict with national security interests. Despite a number of important achievements in remote sensing technology and applications, the policy history in this area is riddled with missteps, delays, and indecision. As the nation becomes increasingly dependent on civil and commercial satellite remote sensing capabilities for environmental monitoring, climate studies, resource and land use management, and support to national security needs, the errors of the past must be avoided so that the required capabilities can be provided in an affordable and timely manner.\n\nThis report is a component of a larger project begun in fiscal year 2008 by The Aerospace Corporation for the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA). The project seeks to define the balance between the national security sector's needs and aspirations for satellite remote sensing and those of the economic and scientific communities. Aerospace's Center for Space Policy & Strategy contributed the civil and commercial analysis, presented here in two parts. The first part begins in the early days of the space age when NASA, NOAA, and other civilian agencies laid the groundwork for the science, technology, and eventual commercialization of remote sensing. The second part begins in\n1992, a turning point for commercial remote sensing efforts. At that point, a major course correction in national policy began at the same time that technical advances and industry efforts started to show promise. By late 2008, considerable progress was evident in both commercial enterprise and NASA\nEarth science research, but difficult challenges remained for both endeavors.\n\n## 1. Civil Remote Sensing Programs, 1960-1992\n\nEarth observations, in addition to their utility for defense and intelligence purposes, yield important civilian benefits involving a wide range of disciplines. For example, satellite images can be used for weather forecasting, climate studies, map making, land use planning, pollution detection, wildlife conservation, mineral location, crop management, forest conservation, water supply management, and earthquake zone identification. Comprehensive estimates of the national and worldwide societal and economic benefits from applications of satellite remote sensing are impossible to determine.\n\nNumerous case studies related to resource exploration, agricultural use, and natural disaster mitigation and recovery have demonstrated that the benefits are real, though difficult to quantify.\n\nWeather data alone are responsible for saving untold millions of dollars annually in the U.S. in the transportation, utility, and agricultural sectors. 1\nThe potential value of imagery from space was identified long before the dawn of the space age,2 so it should be no surprise that space systems and applications directed toward realizing this potential were early goals of the U.S. civil space program. A logical start was the development of capabilities to augment existing government activities such as monitoring the weather.\n\n## 1.1 Weather Satellites\n\nWeather satellites require low spatial resolution since their primary task is tracking weather patterns that can cover vast areas. The less-demanding sensors for this job were addressed early in the space age and yielded immediate, obvious benefits. The first in a series of civilian weather satellites, the Television and Infrared Observation Satellite (TIROS), began service in 1960. In the decades that followed, civilian and military weather satellite programs developed in parallel with each other.\n\nThe U.S. government's civilian weather satellites are operated by the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), which is in charge of the National Weather Service. Spawned from the Environmental Science Service Administration and other legacy organizations going back to the early 19th century, NOAA was created within the Department of Commerce (DoC) in 1970.3 In keeping with NOAA's mission, sensors for atmospheric research, such as radiometers, accompany the standard weather imaging hardware to perform additional functions such as tracking of atmospheric ozone concentrations. One ofNOAA's polar orbiters documented the seasonal Antarctic ozone hole as early as 1978, though researchers didn't understand what the data meant until it was correlated with British ground observations seven years later.\n\nAs much as we still bemoan the errors made by the \"weather guessers\" on the local TV news, their seven-day forecasts are substantially more accurate than the two-day forecasts that were developed prior to the birth of weather satellites. In the decades since this capability emerged, countless lives, property, and crops have been saved as a result. We take for granted the nightly weather map shown on newscasts, but we are repeatedly reminded that early warning of a severe turn in the weather, made possible by a long-term commitment to satellite technology for the public good, can prove extremely valuable.\n\n## 1.2 Human Earth Observation\n\nUnclassified Earth observations from orbit for purposes other than weather started almost as an afterthought in the early 1960s using some fairly standard equipment: hand-held cameras and astronauts' eyeballs. Initially it was believed that the occupants of spacecraft orbiting at altitudes in excess of 100 miles would be incapable of discerning much detail on the Earth's surface. In fact, ground controllers originally did not believe the Mercury astronauts who reported what they saw below, such as Gordon Cooper's description of a train moving crossing the midwestern United States. 4 But after more experience and photographic proof, it was clear that a potentially valuable capability was in the making.\n\nEarth observation in Project Gemini benefited from longer duration flights, an extra pair of eyes on each flight, a variety of orbital altitudes, and remarkably clear atmospheric conditions. The pictures brought back from the Gemini flights pointed the way for civilian applications of high-resolution imaging systems. This was evident even outside ofNASA, particularly in the U.S. Departments of Interior and Agriculture. Crews aboard Skylab during 1973-74 followed up with even more extensive Earth observations from orbit, but by that time NASA had already launched the first civil remote sensing satellite.\n\nThe space shuttle program continued the tradition of human observations, with each flight bringing back pictures of Earth sometimes numbering more than a thousand. Shuttle astronauts are the most skilled observers the U.S. has sent into space, having been trained by the Space Shuttle Earth Observations Office at the NASA Johnson Space Center. Beyond simply learning how to use the camera equipment, astronauts also are taught how to identify and evaluate interesting phenomena and are briefed on what to look for on their particular flight. As the astronauts' trainers have noted,\n... astronauts are unexcelled at detecting dynamic phenomena whose existence and location cannot be predicted. Astronauts operate in a discovery mode: detecting, evaluating, and documenting anomalous phenomena. This capability is not matched by any existing or planned satellites. 5\n\n## 1.3 Landsat: Experimental Or Operational System?\n\nDrawing on what had been learned from early human spaceflights, the development of weather satellites, and the agency's work on Lunar Orbiters and other space probes, NASA established its first Earth resources program in 1964. The Departments of Interior and Agriculture quickly took interest, but became frustrated with NASA's approach. Interior and Agriculture wanted a simple, affordable satellite system that could be brought into service quickly to serve immediate needs. However, NASA\nwanted an experimental system aimed at advancing the state of the art in sensor technologies and favored the use of manned platforms. NASA did not want to become an operator of an orbital imagery service for other agencies, nor did it want to share the planning or control of the system. By\n1966, the user agencies, especially Interior, wanted to forge ahead on their own, but budget concerns and eventual interagency compromises would prevent this from happening. 6\nThe Bureau of the Budget (later renamed the Office of Management and Budget, OMB) did not want to fund an ongoing operational system unless it could be demonstrated that such a system would pay its way through savings to user agencies and/or fees collected from users outside the U.S.\n\ngovernment. 7 With this restriction in mind, an interagency compromise was reached and NASA\nlaunched its first land remote sensing satellite in 1972. Initially called the Earth Resources Technology Satellite, it was renamed Landsat, a label that has been applied to seven members of the series to date. NASA originally was responsible for designing, procuring, launching, and operating the spacecraft, including data collection at the Goddard Space Flight Center, while the Department of Interior's U.S. Geological Survey (USGS) was given the task of archiving and distributing the data, to be carried out by the newly established EROS Data Center in Sioux Falls, South Dakota.\n\nThe experimental satellite's user community was expected to consist almost exclusively ofNASA, Interior, Agriculture, and their associated research communities around the country. But even before the launch of the first satellite, scientific interest in the U.S. and around the world far exceeded NASA's expectations. 8 By the time it completed its first decade of operation, the Landsat system had users throughout the government, including the Defense Department and state and local agencies;\ncorporations, especially oil and mineral companies, as well as private firms offering processing and analytical services for the raw data; environmental groups; and foreign users in over 130 countries, some of which built their own ground stations to receive the data.9 However, despite the extent and diversity of this community, it was not enough to justify development of an operational system. Users paid only for distribution costs, and it was evident that many would not continue to use the data if they were required to pay a price reflecting the full costs of the system. Also, many potential users did not want to become reliant on a system that could change its specifications or disappear at any time.\n\nThis limited Landsat's constituency, making it difficult to prove the operational utility of Earth resources satellites using an experimental system.\n\nThe first three Landsat spacecraft flew in the 1970s with two instruments, the Return Beam Vidicon and the Multi-Spectral Scanner (MSS). When the time came to plan Landsat 4, NASA wanted to replace the Vidicon with a new sensor called the Thematic Mapper (TM), and the OMB proposed eliminating the MSS on the grounds that it was ready for operational use and therefore did not belong on an experimental satellite. Although the TM would improve spatial resolution to 30 meters\n(compared to 80 meters for the MSS), it would produce data incompatible with the MSS system. The users ofMSS data were a large enough group by this time that the proposed change prompted an outcry to save the MSS and a recommendation by an ad hoc council in the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy to continue flying the MSS. 10 Both the MSS and TM sensors flew on Landsats 4 and 5, launched in July 1982 and March 1984, respectively. Both satellites lasted well beyond their expected lifetime, with marginal functionality still available more than 20 years later.\n\nLandsat 6 was lost in a launch failure in October 1993. Landsat 7 made it to orbit safely in April 1999\nand continues to function as of this writing, although with degraded capabilities. 11 These launches followed more than a decade of activity aimed at stabilizing the land remote sensing program, but this goal would remain elusive.\n\n## 1.4 A Failed Attempt At Privatization\n\nThe seemingly rapid evolution of Landsat applications led some to believe, in the late 1970s, that land remote sensing was ready to be moved out ofthe federal government to become a profit-making private sector activity, as had been done with communications satellites several years earlier.\n\nProposals for an operational Landsat system were brought to Congress and the executive branch, some favoring government management, some preferring the private sector, others encouraging the creation of a quasi-private company similar to Comsat. 12 The issue remained unresolved- partially because several congressional committees claimed jurisdiction over at least some part of Landsat's activities- so the White House attempted to settle the matter with a presidential directive in November 1979. 13 NASA would continue remote sensing technology development, but Landsat operational duties would shift to NOAA, which was chosen because of its experience in operating the weather satellites. Also, it was felt that since NOAA was not a user of the higher-resolution remote sensing data, it would not tend to favor the design of future systems that would serve in-house needs at the expense of other user needs. While NASA, Commerce, and Agriculture approved of this arrangement, Interior and the Agency for International Development felt that Interior should have been given responsibility because it had been managing Landsat data processing and distribution since the start of the program. 14\nPresident Jimmy Carter's directive made NOAA's control of Landsat temporary. One of the agency's assigned duties was to devise a plan for the phased transfer of remote sensing to the private sector.\n\nThis would assure data continuity while the privatization process was being implemented. Funding was included in Carter's final budget request for two additional spacecraft beyond the ones already being planned. This would guarantee coverage into the 1990s, by which time the transfer should be complete.\n\nDespite this high-level attention, the debate was not settled over who should operate the Landsat system or whether land remote sensing primarily served the public good or private interests. The Carter plan did not have the opportunity to demonstrate whether or not it could have resulted in a smooth, albeit lengthy transition for Landsat operations. Ronald Reagan took over the White House a little over a year later with different ideas about the privatization of government programs.\n\nWhen the Reagan administration entered office in 1981, the two additional spacecraft were quickly cut from the budget, and OMB director David Stockman declared that when the fifth Landsat expired\n(then expected to be around 1987), the government would be out of the remote sensing business, and private industry would inherit the responsibility. 15 During 1981-84, OMB downplayed the significance of scientific and foreign relations gains from Landsat, viewing the program as a money sink. The Reagan plan accelerated Carter's privatization timetable: there would be no more government-funded Landsats after number five (which was already being built), so the system would be terminated if no private operator came forward by 1988.\n\nMeanwhile, Comsat Corporation had been keeping its eye on Landsat, and now saw an opportunity to move. Comsat approached OMB with a plan to take over Landsat, provided that the weather satellite system was included in the deal, and that the government would guarantee a minimum annual purchase of data. The OMB saw this as a way to unload Landsat quickly and without direct subsidy.\n\nBut no one had thought about privatizing the weather satellites, so the Cabinet Council on Commerce and Trade (CCCT), along with its numerous advisory groups, studied the idea for almost two years.\n\nThey concluded that even with both systems packaged together, subsidy would still be necessary. The CCCT recommended that Commerce solicit bids for the land and weather systems separately, but that joint bids for both would be allowed. To many this appeared to be a setup for Comsat, since no one else had expressed interest in the weather satellites. 16\nCongress had not been consulted as the administration developed its plan, and the Hill had strong objections to the privatization of the weather satellites. The Land Remote Sensing Commercialization Act of 1984 spelled out how Congress felt the transfer should take place, and prohibited the transfer of weather satellites. 17 Federal subsidy would be provided in the early years ofthe transfer, and the amount that became a guideline in the bidding was $150 million per year, a figure that had been mentioned in a March 8, 1983 administration statement on privatization of Landsat.\n\n18\nThe Landsat debate is an illustration of the classic tug-of-war between Congress and the executive branch. Neither branch wanted the other to seize the initiative in setting the nation's remote sensing policy. The Reagan administration, promoting reductions in government programs, took office and found the Congress still indecisive on the Landsat issue. The White House moved quickly to speed up Landsat privatization, causing Congress to respond hastily, passing ill-conceived legislation that hindered rather than helped the new industry and its user community.\n\nNotably, neither the White House nor the Congress took heed of the finding of the Office of Technology Assessment, reported to Congress two months before the legislation passed: \"Until the market expands substantially, and more efficient spacecraft are developed and deployed, it could cost the Federal Government as much to subsidize a private owner as to continue operating the system itself.\" 19\nThe office of Commerce Secretary Malcolm Baldrige, which was handling the bidding process for Landsat, received seven bids, each requesting a total subsidy of approximately $500 million. The field was narrowed to two bidders: Earth Observing Satellite Company (EOSAT), ajoint venture ofRCA\nand Hughes Aircraft; and the team of Kodak, Fairchild, and TRW. When OMB Director Stockman heard of the subsidy commitment that was about to be made, he intervened to insist that there should be no subsidy at all. When the issue was finally settled at the White House level, a ceiling of $250\nmillion was placed on the total subsidy. As a result, the Kodak team quietly withdrew its bid, and EOSA T became the winner by default. 20\nThe Department of Commerce negotiated an agreement with EOSA T that became effective in September 1985 under which the company would operate Landsats 4 and 5 and market their data. The existing ground and space segments would continue to be owned by the U.S. government, but new hardware -including two follow-on satellites, for which the government would provide $250 million over five years plus launch costs- would belong to EOSA T. As specified in the 1984 Landsat legislation, the company would be required to maintain a non-discriminatory data access policy and abide by international treaties and agreements that affected its activities.21\nPolicies and agreements are only as good as their implementation, and this is where the Landsat arrangement faltered, immediately and repeatedly. A month after the agreement went into effect, DoC\nsubmitted its FY87 budget request but neglected to include funding for EOSAT. Meanwhile, a $90\nmillion supplemental had been obtained to carry EOSA T through 1986, allowing development of the next satellite to begin. However, in mid-1986, OMB Director Stockman refused to release funds from the supplemental, prompting a reaction from industry lobbyists and the Senate Commerce Committee.\n\nWhen a compromise was reached, the subsidy was approved, but EOSA T had to provide additional assurances that it would produce two satellites and forego an escalation clause in its agreement that could have allowed the subsidy to increase. Additionally, it was specified that there would be no guarantee of data purchases by the government. These added risks forced a financial restructuring at EOSAT. 22\nThe House approved $75 million for Landsat in July 1986, but none of this amount was earmarked for EOSA T.23 Subsequently, Congress appropriated only $27.5 million for the transition of Landsat operations to the private sector. As a result, the hardware development subsidy dried up in September\n1986 and EOSA T kept the work going with internal funds until December. 24 Around that time, DoC\nonce again failed to include EOSA T in its annual (FY88) budget request, and a squabble ensued between the two organizations as to whether the company should be expected to produce two satellites as originally promised. The next release of hardware funding did not occur until October\n1987, and the amount was just $5 million.\n\nSomething had to give if the program was to move ahead, so in April 1988 the DoC awarded a $220\nmillion hardware development contract to EOSAT and reduced the company's requirement to one satellite instead of two. A small portion of this award was actually a loan- $2.5 million per year was to be returned, up to a total of$10.8 million. 25\nThe Reagan administration did not request funding to sustain Landsat operations for FY89. With the Landsats expected to expire in a short time, Congress appropriated $9.4 million, enough to continue operations for about six months.26 NOAA temporarily shut down data collection operations at U.S.\n\nground stations in November 1988 to cut costs, although satellite control and data downlinks to foreign stations were maintained. To the surprise ofEOSAT, NOAA announced that it had entered negotiations with the French space agency CNES on a possible merger of the Landsat and SPOT\nprograms to share costs and the customer base.27\nBy March 1989, the situation had gotten so bad that NOAA announced the imminent shutdown of Landsats 4 and 5, prompting the White House National Space Council, newly formed by the George H.W. Bush administration, to intervene. The Space Council brokered a deal in which NASA, DoD, Interior, and Agriculture contributed a few million dollars to keep Landsat alive. A similar arrangement kept Landsat going through 1990 using contributions from DoD ($5.6 million), Agriculture ($3 million), and USGS ($900,000). In the process, the Space Council acknowledged the government's continuing role in satellite remote sensing, recognizing that Landsat could never be fully commercial.28\nEOSA T was unable to get on its feet financially despite the fact that data prices soared from the early\n1980s to the beginning of the 1990s. The price per scene jumped from a few hundred dollars to\n$4400, and redistribution of the imagery was restricted. This priced many data users out of the market, driving some to switch to the free low-resolution data being captured by meteorological satellites. According to Rep. George Brown, who was chairman of the House Science, Space, and Technology Committee in 1991, the scientific community purchased up to 70,000 Landsat images per year in the late 1970s, but this number shrank to around 300 per year a decade later.\n\n29 Furthermore, Landsat was no longer the only game in town. The French SPOT satellite had broken the U.S.\n\nmonopoly in 1986.\n\nDuring the period from the mid-l980s through the 1990s, Landsat system calibration suffered and coverage was far less thorough because data typically was collected only when there was an established customer. As a result, many observations that could have contributed to scientific study were missed. For government agencies, this was a disincentive to making hefty investments in computer hardware and software for a system with unreliable performance and an uncertain future. 30\nThe failure of Landsat privatization since the 1984 legislation prompted the Bush administration in\n1992 to put forth a new strategy calling for completion of Landsat 6, continued operation of Landsats\n4 and 5 until Landsat 6 was operational, development of a government-owned Landsat 7, and the crafting of a plan for management, funding, operation, dissemination, and archiving for the Landsat program, including options for the system beyond Landsat 7. 31 The Land Remote Sensing Policy Act of 1992, which repealed the 1984 statute, became law later that year (discussed further in Part 2).\n\nThe Landsat experience from the 1970s through the 1990s was an example of inefficient and ineffective policy-making. For several years prior to its legislative action in 1984, the Cof1gress had discussed many scenarios for Landsat operations (e.g., a weather satellite model or a Comsat/Intelsat model). Then, goaded by the administration, it joined the executive branch in supporting an approach that was unlikely to succeed given the lack of technical and market maturity of civil remote sensing.\n\nFor its part, the White House failed to achieve its goal of removing Landsat from dependence on taxpayer dollars. Unreasonable expectations, faulty implementation, and a roller-coaster relationship between the contractor and the government sealed the fate of the privatization plan. The ultimate losers were the Landsat data users and the value-added entrepreneurs who were attempting to create a new industry. It should not be surprising that no other companies applied for licenses to operate commercial remote sensing satellites until after the passage of the 1992 Act.\n\n## 1.5 Factors Affecting The Viability Of Commercial Remote Sensing\n\nSeveral factors stand in the way of rapid, widespread acceptance of remote sensing services.\n\nIronically, the fact that remote sensing has such a wide variety of applications can be a hindrance to building a user community. Non-technical users, and even potential professional users who are unfamiliar with the technology and the multitude of data interpretation techniques, have difficulty comprehending its value. Productive use of remote sensing imagery requires special training, unlike satellite communications and navigation services that can deliver benefits through simple-to-use devices.\n\nIn its early years, civil remote sensing did not share the advantages that sparked rapid acceptance of satellite communications at around the same time. While demand for satellite imagery is substantial, it does not have the universal appeal of communications. The basic product, raw digital imagery, is ill-defined, in sharp contrast to homogeneous services like telephone calls or television programming.\n\nConsumers around the world will use communications routinely, for entertainment and personal needs as well as for revenue-generating activities. Not so with remote sensing- potential users require considerable convincing that the imagery provides them with added value worth the price.\n\nSatellite communications also had the advantage that the necessary physical and regulatory infrastructure was already in place around much ofthe globe when it emerged on the scene. Once the ground stations were plugged into the grid, they merged into the network in much the same way as relay towers or undersea cables. Such a network did not exist for satellite remote sensing, and is still in the formative stages.\n\nAlthough President John F. Kennedy attached great importance to weather satellites as the space age began, 32 no presidential fanfare heralded the appearance of other types of civil remote sensing. Only rarely were decisions regarding this activity raised to the highest levels, and no long-term funding commitment was made. Federal support for U.S. civil remote sensing R&D over the years has been a small and irregular part ofNASA's budget.\n\nCommunications satellite systems revolutionized an important industry sector, making it clear to all that they needed to quickly become operational systems. This won them early acceptance into the mainstream of daily activities. In contrast, perhaps the biggest factor holding back the evolution of civil remote sensing in the U.S. was insistence that Landsat remain an experimental system. NASA is partly responsible for this situation. The space agency wanted to keep pushing the state of the art in space-based sensors rather than serve operational users, and also wanted to retain control of the system for as long as possible. OMB drove planning in this direction well before the first Landsat flew by insisting that once a remote sensing system moved from experimental to operational it should no longer be funded by the government.\n\nThe resulting program was planned and implemented across several agencies that split the responsibilities and was overseen by numerous congressional committees. Landsat was assigned experimental frequencies, and no provision was made for rapid processing and distribution oflarge volumes of data (at the insistence of OMB), guaranteeing its inability to function adequately in an operational environment. 33\nSorting out the appropriate roles of the government and the private sector has been complicated by the fact that remote sensing is a public good - an appropriate undertaking for the government - as well as a revenue-generating activity. Sometimes both of these characteristics are present in a single image. So far, private operators have found that the majority of their sales are to government entities, both domestic and foreign, and the public good/private profit debate continues.\n\n## 1.6 Foreign Interest Leads To A Proliferation Of Orbital Observers\n\nIn addition to delivering domestic benefits, the U.S. government's non-discriminatory (\"open skies\")\ndata policy that was established early in the Landsat program helped civil remote sensing become a successful soft-power tool that contributed to American foreign policy. Within five years after the launch ofthe first Landsat in 1972, over 130 countries enjoyed access to satellite imagery, and several countries purchased their own ground stations to allow direct downlink of the satellite data.34 For many developing countries, the benefits were quick and significant. For example, countries with large undeveloped regions were able to make their first accurate maps. Brazil was able to correct the recorded positions of Amazon River tributaries, some of which were off by as much as 20 kilometers.\n\nU.S. embassies around the world reported that substantial good will was gained by the sharing of Landsat images. 35\nSome foreign governments raised objections to the sensing of their countries without explicit permission. In their view, open availability of satellite imagery could undermine their national security or economic competitiveness as commercial interests and other governments exploited the data, possibly without the sensed nations even realizing that the data existed. 36 These objections were largely alleviated by the non-discriminatory access policy. All data collected by Landsat was available to all interested parties at the same price. This practice was in keeping with the spirit of the Outer Space Treaty, which states that \"The exploration and use of outer space ... shall be carried out for the benefit and in the interests of all countries ... \" (Article I) and \"States Parties to the Treaty shall be guided by the principle of co-operation and mutual assistance and shall conduct all their activities in outer space ... with due regard to the corresponding interests of all other States Parties to the Treaty\" (Article IX). 37\nForeign concerns about Landsat predated the launch of the first satellite, as did efforts by the United Nations to defuse the problem. The U.N. General Assembly asked the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space to address international cooperation in remote sensing in December 1969, but the Committee's legal subcommittee did not begin work on the issue until1974. By that time, nondiscriminatory access was standard practice, easing the urgency for action. 38 However, many nations still wished to establish international norms, especially with operational civil and commercial imaging satellites on the horizon. Agreement was finally reached on remote sensing principles in 1986. In general, these principles reiterate Outer Space Treaty concepts in a manner specific to remote sensing, and encourage international cooperation \"taking into particular consideration the needs of developing countries. \"39\nWhile the U.S. struggled with how to make Landsat operational, other countries around the world sought their own indigenous satellite imaging capabilities. The United States' 14-year head start in civil remote sensing eroded quickly after the February 1986launch of the French SPOT satellite.\n\nDeveloped by the European Space Agency and then handed over to a newly formed commercial organization, SPOT offered better spatial resolution than Landsat (10 meters as opposed to the thematic mapper's 30 meters) but inferior spectral resolution (four bands rather than seven). More significant than the technical specifications was the worldwide marketing effort that started three\n\nMack, p. 189.\nCharles K. Paul & Adolfo C. Mascarenhas, \"Remote Sensing in Development,\" *Science* (October 9, 1981),\nVol. 214, pp. 139-145.\nyears before SPOT -1 was launched. The Europeans had planned from the beginning that SPOT would be an operational system serving a global customer base, not an experimental one with limited distribution channels like Landsat.\n\nThe operating company, Spot Image Corp., currently operates the fifth in the series of SPOT\nsatellites. It has maintained an appearance of stability that is unmatched by the Landsat system, an important factor to customers who want an ongoing flow of compatible data products. Spot Image managed to outsell its U.S. competitor by its fourth year of operation.\n\nSoon after the arrival of SPOT, it became clear that other nations would enter the global remote sensing market. Soviet prowess in civil and military applications of space imagery emerged in a diverse assortment of offerings that eventually included photographic, digital, and radar images. The organization Soyuzcarta began by marketing photographic imagery with spatial resolution as good as five meters, although only archival images were for sale and none were made available from areas within Eastern Bloc countries.40 Radar imagery with 15-meter resolution from the Almaz satellite became available in 1991, making the Soviet Union the first nation to launch an operational radar satellite serving commercial users.\n\nAround the world, satellite remote sensing has long been acknowledged to have great value, even though no space imaging system so far has been able to turn a profit without help from a substantial government subsidy. Other nations have followed the lead of the United States, France, and the Soviet Union by investing in their own Earth observing satellites in order to join the world market for satellite imagery. Sometimes this has meant pursuing a niche area that is important to particular national needs. For example, Japan, home to the world's largest fishing fleet, began operating its Marine Observation Satellite in 1987.\n\nIn general, the pretension that remote sensing satellites are profit-making ventures has been disproven so far, as some level of government support has continued to be necessary. Fully equipped spacecraft like Landsat and SPOT have required up to five years and well over $200 million to build, plus launch and ongoing operations costs. Enhancing, interpreting, and integrating the data as a service to end users is the profitable segment of the business, involving hundreds of\"value added\" companies that have appeared globally since the late 1970s.\n\n## 2. Civil And Commercial Remote Sensing, 1992-2008\n\nRenewed interest in environmental monitoring and the high priority assigned to the new U.S. Global Change Research Program prompted both Congress and the administration of George H.W. Bush to adjust remote sensing policy in general, and Landsat policy in particular, to better serve the needs of users inside and outside the U.S. government. Executive branch and legislative policy-makers recognized that Landsat privatization had failed, and that the 1984 Act's goals of maintaining leadership in civil remote sensing and preserving national security were not being served.\n\n## 2.1 Corrective Action On Remote Sensing Policy\n\nIn the early 1980s, the Reagan administration treated civil remote sensing as a drain on the federal budget, an activity that should be handed off to the private sector to thrive or perish. By the early\n1990s, when it was recognized that full privatization of Landsat was not possible, even the promoters of the previous decade's remote sensing commercialization plan who were still in office had to admit that it wasn't working.\n\nA February 1992 White House directive sought to correct this situation and maintain continuity of Landsat-type data by directing U.S. government agencies to:\n\n-\nProvide data which are sufficiently consistent in terms of acquisition geometry, coverage\ncharacteristics, and spectral characteristics with previous Landsat data to allow comparisons\nfor change detection and characterization;\n-\nMake Landsat data available to meet the needs of national security, global change research,\nand other federal users; and,\n-\nPromote and not preclude private sector commercial opportunities in Landsat-type remote\nsensing.41\n(The Clinton administration's Landsat strategy reiterated these policy goals in 1994 and made adjustments to the Bush strategy to compensate for the launch failure of Landsat 6.42)\nCongress followed in October of that year with the Land Remote Sensing Policy Act of 199243 which repealed the Land Remote Sensing Commercialization Act of 1984. The 1992 Act encompassed the strategic elements outlined in the Bush directive, and more. It brought the Landsat program back under government control starting with Landsat 7. The legislation called for a Landsat advisory committee and a management plan under which NASA and DoD would have responsibility for procurement, launch, and operation of that satellite. These duties eventually were assigned to NASA\nalone. 44\nDuring the eight years that the 1984 Act's provisions were in effect, no U.S. company applied for a license to operate a private remote sensing space system. In stark contrast, just four months after passage of the 1992 Act, the first license was issued by the Department of Commerce to W orldView Imaging Corp., and license applications from Lockheed and Orbital Sciences Corp. quickly followed.\n\nChanges to pricing restrictions and data access policies made the difference that turned around the business environment for prospective satellite operators.\n\nThe 1984 Act required continuation of the non-discriminatory access (\"open skies\") policy that had been in place since the earliest days of Landsat. In order to address the concerns of foreign governments regarding possible exploitive use of data on their countries by other governments or corporations outside their borders, raw data was made available to all potential users on the same terms. With the U.S. government as the operator, and the price set at the cost of duplication and distribution, this was a workable system. For the commercial operator, however, this eliminated the ability to offer different terms to different customers, such as bulk discounts, priority service, or exclusive imagery sets. Additionally, as prices jumped enormously in an attempt to approximate the product's true market value,45 a large swath of the academic and developing country customer base could no longer afford the imagery. In effect, the non-discriminatory policy had become discriminatory due to high prices. At the same time, the strict interpretation of non-discriminatory access hindered development of a competitive market, thus preventing the product and service innovations that might have brought prices down and driven capabilities up. The 1992 Act recognized that commercial systems need to operate by different rules than Landsat or other government systems. For commercial operators, non-discriminatory access was redefined to require only that companies make raw data available to the governments of sensed states. Imagery sellers could now price and package their products more flexibly for their civil and commercial customers (within limits, as discussed below). While this does not guarantee a successful business plan, it removes a major obstacle.\n\nAs the door opened for commercial operators to propose their own remote sensing systems, the door closed for privatization of Landsat. Under the new law, the U.S. government would retain ownership of the system and any follow-on satellites. More importantly for research and other non-profit users, the government would hold title to all unenhanced data and would continue its traditional nondiscriminatory access policy, making the imagery available to all users at the cost of fulfilling data requests. Value-added services would continue to be a private-sector function.\n\nDespite the legislation, the future of the Landsat series continued to be in doubt due to budget shortfalls and ideological resistance from some members of Congress, who believed it was neither necessary nor appropriate for the federal government to be in the civil remote sensing business.\n\nBefore discussing the most recent developments in the Landsat story, we now turn to the commercial remote sensing activities enabled by the changed policy environment.\n\n## 2.2 Commercial Remote Sensing Policy Takes Shape\n\nPrior to the 1992 Act, EOSA Thad been the only player in the U.S. commercial remote sensing field.\n\nThrough the rest of the 1990s, the picture changed dramatically. As mentioned earlier, Lockheed was an early applicant for a license, which was granted in April 1994 for its proposed Ikonos satellite. Six months later, Lockheed created a subsidiary called Space Imaging to take over the remote sensing business. Space Imaging grew in 1996 by acquiring EOSAT, which still held the license to operate Landsats 4 and 5 and market their data. 46 This gave the company a presence on the imagery market well in advance of the launch of its first satellite. After the first Ikonos was lost in a launch failure in April 1999, the backup spacecraft was successfully orbited that September, becoming the first highresolution commercial satellite. It featured spatial resolution of one meter for panchromatic imagery and four meters for multispectral.\n\nOn July 1, 2001, about two years after the successful launches of Ikonos and Landsat 7, Space Imaging returned operational responsibility for Landsats 4 and 5 back to the U.S. government and relinquished its right to commercially market Landsat data. This cleared the way for the U.S.\n\nGeological Survey to sell all Landsat 4 and 5 data, and for Space Imaging to focus on developing the high-resolution imagery market.\n\nWith the 1999 launch of Ikonos, commercial remote sensing attained the capability to widely distribute current, militarily useful imagery at a resolution previously available only to the national security components of a few governments. This had been anticipated and addressed by the Clinton administration.\n\nImagery collection from space is a dual-use technology that can contribute to both economic pursuits and national security. Landsats 4 & 5 (30-meter resolution) and the early SPOT satellites (10-meter resolution) did not prompt significant security fears because the military usefulness of their images was limited. But new capabilities in the 1-meter range like Ikonos- able to distinguish, for example, individual vehicles and specific types of airplanes - did raise security concerns if the imagery could be purchased by anyone in the world who could afford it. Presidential direction to head off these concerns came in 1994 with Presidential Decision Directive (POD) 23.47\nPDD-23 wisely did not impose a specific resolution limit on commercial sensors. The interagency team that drafted the directive recognized that the technology, both domestic and foreign, would always be a moving target. Instead, PDD-23 specified case-by-case review of remote sensing license applications, with favorable consideration of systems \"whose performance capabilities and imagery quality characteristics are available or are planned for availability in the world marketplace.\"\nAt first glance, this language would seem to force U.S. businesses to always be followers, never leaders on the world market. In practice, licenses have been issued by the Department of Commerce that keep U.S. operators ahead of their foreign competition, at least for optical imaging systems.\n\nDigital Globe and GeoEye today hold licenses that allow them to operate imaging satellites in the submeter range.\n\nThe conditions attached to the licenses were developed in the regulatory process in the years after PDD-23, which assigned the regulatory duties to the Commerce Department (with advice from the interagency process). The Secretary of Commerce, in consultation with the Secretaries of State and Defense, has the authority to \"require the licensee to limit data collection and/or distribution by the system to the extent necessitated by the given situation.\"48 This authority is known as shutter control, and has caused controversy due to its implications for operators' business plans and marketability as well as the questions it raises on freedom of speech issues.\n\nGovernment officials have said that they would prefer never to use shutter control, but such statements provide no guarantees and leave some outside observers doubtful. To date, shuttler control authority has not been exercised, although in the months following the 2001 invasion of Afghanistan a contractual arrangement was implemented that was labeled \"checkbook\" shutter control. The U.S.\n\ngovernment simply purchased exclusive rights to all high-resolution (1-meter) commercial satellite imagery of Afghanistan that was on the market at the time. This was easy to do because all such imagery came from one satellite (Ikonos) licensed by the U.S. government. Since then, the opportunity has passed for checkbook shutter control to be a viable option. As high-resolution satellite systems proliferate, there is a decreasing likelihood that the U.S. government would be able to buy exclusive rights to all imagery over a particular area for an extended period of time, especially since many capable systems will not be licensed in the U.S.\n\nCommercial remote sensing licenses have contained other restrictive elements in addition to the shutter control provision. For example, commercial systems with foreign ground stations have been required to place limits on the satellite tasking capabilities and distribution rights of those stations, and companies offering imagery with sub-meter resolution have been required to delay distribution for at least 24 hours after it is collected.\n\nOther U.S. laws in addition to the 1992 Act are relevant to remote sensing companies. The most prominent of these, due to its specific applicability to satellite imagery providers, is the Kyl-\nBingaman Amendment, passed in 1996 as part ofthe 1997 defense authorization act. It allows collection and dissemination of satellite imagery of Israel \"only if such imagery is no more detailed or precise than satellite imagery oflsrael that is available from commercial sources.\"49 To date, this has meant that commercially available imagery of Israel has been limited to about two-meter resolution.\n\nIsrael is the only nation to receive U.S. statutory protection from high-resolution observation. It has been justified as a concession to an important U.S. ally that is surrounded by unfriendly neighbors. In the wake of this legislation, other allies, including France and India, sought similar accommodation but did not receive it. 50 However, the value of this arrangement to Israel will be short-lived. As foreign systems join U.S. providers at the one-meter or sub-meter level, the limit on imagery of Israel will change as well, and at some point will become moot.\n\nPDD-23 was superseded by an updated presidential directive (NSPD-27) in April2003. 51 In addition to dealing with the provision of imagery and related technologies to foreign interests, which was the subject matter ofPDD-23, the new directive addressed more broadly the interaction between the U.S.\n\ngovernment and the U.S. satellite remote sensing industry. Its stated goal is to \"advance and protect U.S. national security and foreign policy interests by maintaining the nation's leadership in remote sensing space activities, and by sustaining and enhancing the U.S. remote sensing industry.\" The principal strategy for achieving this goal directs national security and civil federal agencies to \"rely to the maximum practical extent on U.S. commercial remote sensing space capabilities\" and to develop their own remote sensing space systems only to meet \"needs that can not be effectively, affordably, and reliably satisfied by commercial providers because of economic factors, civil mission needs, national security concerns, or foreign policy concerns.\"\nConceptually, this is a straightforward approach. Routine government needs, such as updating maps, would use commercial imagery, freeing government assets to perform more specialized or sensitive duties. Ideally, this would ease tasking bottlenecks and workloads of expensive government systems, possibly reducing the number of satellites needed. As commercial systems improve in product quality and service, no utility would be lost, and some new functionality would be gained as the government received a steady stream of unclassified imagery that could be easily shared with uncleared personnel such as domestic first responders or foreign allies.\n\nImplementation ofNSPD-27 has required that entrenched practices and cultural perspectives be addressed, such as:\n\n-\nReluctance of agency personnel to change habits or procedures.\n-\nAgency accounting practices that make government imagery appear \"free\" while commercial\nimagery drains the budget. 52\n-\nPersistent belief among government users that inferior quality and slow delivery will always\nplague commercial imagery as compared to government sources.\n-\nInadequate budgets to cover the routine tasks that are most appropriate for commercial\nsuppliers.\n-\nComplications caused by the handling and distribution of an external, unclassified\ninformation source.\nThere has been substantial progress in interagency cooperation and government-industry interaction since NSPD-27 was issued. 53 The policy clarified interagency relationships and procedures to facilitate U.S. government purchase and use of commercial imagery. Since the policy went into effect, some licensing restrictions have been adjusted, allowing greater spatial resolution and removing the requirement for a 24-hour hold on the distribution of imagery with resolution no better than 0.5-meter. Also during this time, commercial remote sensing moved more into the social and economic mainstream as Internet mapping sites featuring satellite imagery quickly became commonly used tools.\n\nBy directing the U.S. government to use commercial imagery \"to the maximum practical extent,\"\nNSPD-27 boosted agencies' ability to help cultivate the remote sensing industry. This is best exemplified in the ClearView and NextView programs, which support U.S. companies by contracting for large data purchases and helping to fund a new generation of commercial satellites. Digital Globe and GeoEye have been the benefactors ofthese programs.\n\nBoth of these companies had their origins in the early 1990s, immediately after passage of the 1992\nAct. DigitalGlobe, based in Longmont, Colorado, was founded in 1992 as WorldView, changed its name to Earth Watch in March 1995, and changed to its current name in September 2001. The company obtained licenses for EarlyBird-1 (January 1993) and QuickBird-1 (September 1994), but would suffer failures of both satellites before finally achieving success with QuickBird-2, launched in October 2001. The National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA) awarded a ClearView contract for Quickbird imagery (.6-meter resolution) in January 2003, worth between $72-$500 million over five years. That was followed eight months later by a Next View contract worth over $500 million to support development of the WorldView-1 satellite featuring half-meter resolution. 54 WorldView-1\nwas launched successfully in September 2007, and DigitalGlobe plans to follow up with WorldView-\n2, funded by company resources, in mid-2009. 55 DigitalGlobe reported earnings of$152 million in\n2007. 56\nGeoEye of Dulles, Virginia has roots that go back even farther, accompanied by a complicated gestation resulting in the corporate entity that appeared in January 2006. It started with Orblmage in\n1991, which obtained licenses for the Orb View-1 through 4 satellites in 1994. Orb View-4 was lost in a launch failure in September 2001; the other three were orbited successfully in April1995, August\n1997, and June 2003, respectively. The last of this series, OrbView-3, is capable of 1-meter resolution.\n\nIn addition to marketing the data from its own satellites, Orblmage began selling imagery from other platforms, including SPOT and Radarsat, and providing imagery processing services. In March 2004, NGA awarded Orblmage a ClearView contract for at least $27.5 million of imagery purchases over two years.\n\n57 This was followed in September 2004 with a Next View contract worth $500 million over four years for next-generation satellite development. 58\nThe parallel development of Space Imaging of Thornton, Colorado, its Ikonos satellite, and its acquisition of EOSA T already have been discussed. Space Imaging also sold imagery from the Landsat, Indian Remote Sensing, and Canadian Radarsat satellites, as well as aerial-derived products collected by its Digital Airborne Imaging System (DAIS-1 ). NGA awarded the company a five-year Clear View contract in January 2003 worth between $120-$500 million. 59 However, its failure to win a Next View contract was a serious blow, putting it at a disadvantage compared to its competitors and setting it up for the acquisition by Orbimage that would follow. Announcement of the acquisition came in September 2005,60 and the merger that created GeoEye became official in January 2006. 61\nGeoEye reported earnings of $184 million in 2007,62 and launched its new high-resolution satellite GeoEye-1 on September 6, 2008. 63\nThe discussion of the commercial remote sensing industry so far has focused only on electro-optical\n(EO) imagery in the visible and near-infrared parts of the spectrum. There is a noteworthy absence of U.S. companies in the commercial radar and hyperspectral imagery markets. This is not due to a lack of policy or procedural mechanisms to accommodate the licensing needs of potential operators.\n\nRather, it is the result of U.S. companies' inability to craft viable business plans without a commitment from the U.S. government similar to Clear View or Next View. Radar and hyperspectral are at earlier stages of development than EO imagery: many potential users are not familiar with these data types; value-added resellers are not fully prepared to handle the data; new processing techniques and applications for the data need to be developed; and the space segment is costly to build and operate (and in the case of radar, requires higher power levels for its active sensor). In other words, both technical and market risk are high. Meanwhile, the competition that U.S. companies would face consists of radar satellite programs that are state-supported (at least in part, through public-private partnerships) such as Canada's Radarsat, Italy's COSMO/Skymed, and Germany's TerraSAR, and hyperspectral imaging systems aboard aircraft that have a head start of about two decades.\n\n## Commercial Remote Sensing Industry Evolution\n\nClearVIew\n| license        | granted      |\n|----------------|--------------|\n| becomes        |              |\n| launch         |              |\n| becomes        |              |\n| contract       | teams        |\n| buys           |              |\n| to EarlyBird-1 |              |\n| Earth          |              |\n| Watch          |              |\n| failure        | DigltaiGiobe |\n| with           | Keyhole      |\n| Jan            | 1993         |\n| Mar            | 1995         |\n| Nov2000        | Sep          |\n| Jan            | 2003         |\n| Keyhole        |              |\nlaunched\ncontract\nawarded\nlaunched\nlaunched\n| Mar201U    |\n|------------|\n| Sep2008    |\n\nFrom 1988 through 1999, NASA's Stennis Space Center ran a program called the Earth Observations Commercial Applications Program (EOCAP) designed to provide technical and financial support for a limited time to help develop marketable applications for satellite imagery. This was done through partnerships between government, industry, academic, and non-profit organizations in which industry generally held the leadership role and success was measured by achievements in the marketplace. The initial focus was on EO imagery, for which a series of competitions was held through the early 1990s.\n\nNot all selected projects achieved their goals, and some that did achieve them took longer than expected, but overall the NASA investment in this effort yielded a net gain. 64\nEOCAP branched out into hyperspectral imagery by granting 10 awards in 1998. The intention was to do the same for synthetic aperture radar (SAR) imagery in 1999. However, like the EO projects, the hyperspectral and SAR efforts hinged on data to be provided by government-supported satellite systems. In both cases, this resulted in failure of the projects because some of the satellites never made it to orbit (e.g., OrbView-4 suffered a launch failure, LightSAR was canceled) and the science requirements of the government systems were at odds with commercial requirements (e.g., orbital inclination, resolution, single vs. dual frequency radar). In the earlier EOCAP experiences, the most frequent reason that projects failed the market test was unavailability of data, usually because sensors were not deployed in a timely manner by the government. 65 For the hyperspectral and SAR efforts, this was a fatal flaw for all projects. EOCAP ended before commercially available hyperspectral and SAR data could become a factor in any proposed projects. As of this writing, hyperspectral data still is not provided by any operational space system in the global market. SAR data is available from several sources, but none based in the United States.\n\n## 2.3 Recent Developments In Civil Remote Sensing\n\nIn addition to the economic benefits and regional public good aspects of remote sensing, interdisciplinary studies of the Earth system have received more attention in recent years, both in the scientific community and in public policy circles. Researchers have known for a long time that global climate change occurs routinely, having documented cyclic appearances oflarge-scale events such as ice ages and mass extinctions. Some of the questions that challenge our knowledge and theories include: Are we now experiencing a global climate fluctuation, and if so, where is it going? What combination of factors is affecting regional changes that are evident to us, and how can these be extrapolated to a global scale? How quickly are the regional and global environments changing? How much of the change is due to human activities? And possibly most important of all, given the potential danger to our species, what can we do about it?\n\nFor a study of this scope, scientific disciplines that have been isolated from each other throughout most of their existence must be united to facilitate understanding of complex interactions on a variety of scales- an approach known as Earth System Science. Geology, oceanography, atmospheric sciences, chemistry, and biology, along with their sub-disciplines, must interact in unprecedented ways and across national boundaries. All must have access to large databases established to support integrated study. A substantial portion of the content of those databases will come from orbiting observation platforms. Due to the extraordinary data handling and dissemination requirements, the ground segment for NASA's Earth Observing System (EOS) got more than the usual share of attention. Most of NASA's spaceflight projects devote about three-fourths of their resources to the space segment, with the rest going toward ground support. EOS was unusual in that an estimated 60%\nof the program's budget went to ground support. This is mostly due to the demands ofthe EOS Data and Information System (EOSDIS), which stretched the limits of capabilities in data storage, retrieval, and dissemination. The expected onslaught of incoming data was so huge that new measures were created to describe it. Some data-processing documents refer to terabits of data (trillions of bits), while other sources have used a measure called LOC- the equivalent of all the information contained in the Library of Congress. The program's managers projected that when fully operational, the input to EOSDIS would be on the order of one LOC every few days.\n\nIn cooperation with other countries, the U.S. Global Change Research Program has been pursuing this gargantuan task, led by a NASA program originally called Mission to Planet Earth and more recently labeled the Earth Science Enterprise in the agency's Science Mission Directorate. The Goddard Space Flight Center in Greenbelt, Maryland, is the primary field center for this activity, which involves several satellite programs including Landsat, NOAA's polar orbiters, and the EOS program, 66 which emerged in the late 1980s and became a \"new start\" in FY 1991.\n\nAs originally envisioned, EOS would have been a 15-year project using two very large polar-orbiting platforms with about a dozen instruments on each, having a total program cost of around $30 billion.\n\nThe rationale behind this approach was to permit an assortment of data to be collected over the same target from the same physical perspective at the same time. This would simplify calibration of data sets from different instruments and avoid data integration errors that tend to creep in when using different platforms (variations in altitude, sun angle, cloud cover, season, etc.). The problems with this approach, at least from the policy-makers' perspective, were that it would take too long, cost too much, and involve too much risk.\n\nEOS plans endured a series of major adjustments throughout the 1990s, all linked to budget cuts. This was partially a result of the fact that funding for the space station program was ramping up at the same time, affecting program budgets throughout NASA. Almost immediately, EOS faced a reduction of$6 billion from the amount originally envisioned over the next decade, requiring a major restructuring of the program. In 1992, budget projections declined by another $3 billion, prompting more re-scoping, including a shift to the use of a common spacecraft bus for some missions. The budget cuts and restructuring continued in 1994, 1995, and at a \"biennial review\" in 1997 that addressed the program's implementation strategy. The large EOS-A and EOS-B platforms were transformed into six smaller platforms with more focused missions. These would eventually evolve into Terra, Aqua, Aura, and other spacecraft collectively referred to as Earth Probes.\n\n67 These changes served to reduce program risk in the event of a launch failure as well as lower the cost of each launch because the smaller platforms could fit on less costly boosters rather than the expensive Titan 4 as originally planned.\n\nThe first phase ofthe Earth Science Enterprise, starting in the early 1990s, was comprised of a variety of free-flying satellites, space shuttle observations, and airborne and ground-based studies. The second phase began with the launch of Terra, the first EOS satellite, in December 1999 and continued with the launch and operations of the other EOS spacecraft during the next decade. Additional space systems providing multispectral and radar imaging of landmasses complement the program because EOS (other than Terra) heavily favors instrumentation to study the oceans and atmosphere and has lower spatial resolution than many existing imaging systems. Setting public policy with regard to global environmental concerns is highly contentious both domestically and internationally, and must be done with the most complete and accurate information available. EOS and related spacecraft are making substantial and timely contributions to the policy debate over climate change and natural vs.\n\nhuman-induced effects on the Earth's ecosystem.\n\nWhile EOS and related programs have been a boon to Earth System Science and have led to more informed public debates on environmental and climate issues, their sustainability has been questioned. The Space Studies Board and the Engineering and Physical Sciences division of the National Research Council, in their 2007 report commonly referred to as the Earth Science Decadal Survey, stated that:\nBetween 2006 and the end of the decade, the number of operating missions will decrease dramatically, and the number of operating sensors and instruments on NASA spacecraft, most of which are well past their nominal lifetimes, will decrease by some 40 percent. 68\nAccording to NASA's website there are 19 Earth science missions currently active, including the aging and partially disabled Landsat 7 for the USGS and three weather satellite systems for NOAA. 69\nTwelve of the 15 NASA satellites will be out of service or beyond their design lifetime by the beginning of2009, and two more will expire during the presidential term beginning in that year. (The remaining mission consists of the long-lived LAGEOS 1 & 2 satellites, which are simply laser reflectors.) Six new missions are in development and scheduled for launch from 2008-2012, including two weather satellite projects for NOAA. The four NASA research missions will reach the end of their design lifetime by 2012-2013.\n\nUnder current planning, NASA will replace its Earth science missions at a slower rate than they are expiring, meaning that the robustness enjoyed by the Earth science enterprise since the mid-1990s will not last beyond the early part of the next decade - a time when concerns about global climate change and environmental degradation are likely to increase. The Obama administration will be faced with an urgent need to set the course for future Earth science, and can be expected to pursue a subset of the missions recommended by the Decadal Survey, constrained by the funding available.\n\nMeanwhile, a number of European and Asian nations, as well as Canada and Brazil, are increasing their activities in scientific and operational Earth sensing missions. Within a few years, these efforts will surpass U.S. Earth science work as new U.S. systems are deployed at Jess than the attrition rate.\n\nA prime example of growing international activity is the Global Monitoring for Environment and Security (GMES) program, led by the European Commission and the European Space Agency (ESA).\n\nOver a 1 0-year period starting in 2008, the GMES program plans to launch 15 EO and radar satellites to study the land, oceans, and atmosphere for both scientific investigations and ongoing operations. 70' 71 Collectively, Europe is seeking to be the uncontested world leader in Earth observations from space.\n\nThe strong push by many foreign interests in civil remote sensing seems to contrast with the challenges faced in U.S. civil remote sensing efforts. Proposed programs to advance the state of the art, or to simply maintain data continuity for existing programs, often must endure a lengthy process to overcome organizational, programmatic, and budgetary hurdles. Recent developments in the Landsat program provide a telling example.\n\nAfter the April 1999launch of Landsat 7, the questions of what would come next in the series, who would operate it, and how it would be paid for needed to be answered. These questions were thought to be settled more than five years later (August 2004) by a White House memorandum directing that a Landsattype sensor be placed on board the National Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellite System\n(NPOESS). 72 Technical, schedule, and budgetary problems prompted the removal ofthe Landsat sensor from the NPOESS spacecraft. Sixteen months passed before Dr. John Marburger, Director of the Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP), signed a new memorandum in December 2005 that directed NASA to acquire a single free-flyer spacecraft for the Landsat Data Continuity Mission (LDCM). 73\nNASA selected Ball Aerospace to be the builder of the LDCM instrument, the Operational Land Imager\n(OLI), on July 16, 2007. 74 General Dynamics Advanced Information Systems was chosen on April22,\n2008 to build the spacecraft. 75\nThe December 2005 memo also created the Future of Land Imaging Interagency Working Group, which included representatives from fifteen federal agencies convened under the National Science and Technology Council. The Working Group was charged with developing a sustainable plan to continue the collection of moderate resolution multispectral remote sensing data, a task it completed 20 months later.\n\nThe Working Group's report offered three recommendations:\n\n-\nThe U.S. must commit to continue the collection of moderate-resolution land imagery.\n-\nThe United States should establish and maintain a core operational capability to collect moderateresolution land imagery through the procurement and launch of a series ofU.S.-owned satellites.\n-\nThe United States should establish the National Land Imaging Program (NLIP), hosted and\nmanaged by the Department ofthe Interior, to meet U.S. civil land imaging needs.\n76\nAccording to the report, the NLIP should lead, coordinate, and plan for future U.S. civil operational moderate-resolution land imaging, and promote wide public and private use of land imagery in the United States. The NLIP should acquire global, moderate-resolution land imagery data; manage all U.S. civil moderate-resolution land imaging technologies, satellites, and systems; ensure archival preservation of U.S.-acquired moderate-resolution land imagery; and perform research, development, and training. The program should accommodate private, nonprofit, academic, commercial, and international users, state and local government, and the satellite and land imaging data industries. Implementation of the plan will be a challenging new task for the Interior Department, and it remains to be seen if future administrations and Congresses will provide sufficient resources. As ofthis writing, the plan already has hit a funding snag:\nthe House Appropriations subcommittee responsible for the Interior Department's budget has denied a $2\nmillion request to fund the NLIP in FY09 because of a reluctance to initiate new space operations responsibilities at Interior. 77\nThirty-five years elapsed between the first Landsat launch and the official recognition that the collection of moderate-resolution satellite imagery is an operational function that fulfills national needs and is worthy of being sustained. Unlike weather monitoring from space, it has been treated as an experimental function supporting scientific research with no guarantee of continuous data flow. Under these circumstances, it took more than eight years after the launch of Landsat 7 to come to a decision on what to do next - and the decision would not result in a spacecraft being launched for at least another four years. This and other examples have taught observers that civil remote sensing programs, and the policy guiding both civil and commercial remote sensing, develop at a far slower pace than the relevant technologies and user communities.\n\n## Acronyms\n\nCabinet Council on Commerce and Trade Centre National d'Etudes Spatiales (French space agency)\nDigital Airborne Imaging System Department of Commerce Department of Defense Electro-optical Earth Observations Commercial Applications Program Earth Observing System Earth Observing Satellite Company Earth Observing System Data and Information System Earth Resources Observations Systems European Space Agency Fiscal year Global Monitoring for Environment and Security Laser Geodynamics Satellite Landsat Data Continuity Mission Library of Congress Multi-Spectral Scanner National Aeronautics and Space Administration National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency National Land Imaging Program National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration National Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellite System National Security Presidential Directive Operational Land Imager Office of Management and Budget Office of Science and Technology Policy Presidential Decision Directive Research and development Synthetic aperture radar Television and Infrared Observation Satellite Thematic Mapper United Nations United States United States Geological Survey CCCT\nCNES\nDAIS\nDoC DoD\nEO\nEOCAP\nEOS EOSAT EOSDIS\nEROS\nESA\nFY\nGMES\nLAGEOS\nLDCM\nLOC\nMSS\nNASA\nNGA NLIP NOAA NPOESS NSPD\nOLI OMB OSTP\nPOD\nR&D\nSAR\nTIROS\nTM\nU.N.\n\nu.s.\n\nUSGS"
    },
    {
        "text": "Occasional Paper Number Seven L\nL\nI\nG\nE\nE\nT\nN\nN\nC\nI\nE\nE\nA\nS\nG\nN\nE\nE\nN\nF\nE\nC\nD\nY\nU\nA\nN\nC\nI\nI\nT\nR\nE\nE\nD\nM\nS\nT\nA\nA\nT\nO\nF\nE\nS\n\n## The Joint Military Intelligence College Supports And Encourages Research On Intelligence Issues That Distills Lessons And Improves Support To Policy-Level And Operational Consumers\n\nThis series of Occasional Papers presents the work of faculty, students and others whose research on intelligence issues is supported or otherwise encouraged by the Joint Military Intelligence College through its Office of Applied Research. Occasional papers are distributed to Department of Defense schools and to the Intelligence Community, and additional copies of unclassified papers are available through the National Technical Information Service <www.ntis.gov>; copies of selected papers are also available through the U.S. Government Printing Office <www.gpo.gov>.\n\nProposed manuscripts for these papers are submitted for consideration to the Applied Research Editorial Board. Papers undergo review by senior officials in Defense, Intelligence and occasionally civilian academic or business communities.\n\n## Occasional Paper Number Seven\n\nBy MSgt Robert D. Folker, Jr. (USAF)\nJOINT MILITARY INTELLIGENCE COLLEGE\nWASHINGTON, DC\nJanuary 2000\nThe views expressed in this paper are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government This paper has been approved for unrestricted public release by the Office of the Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs)\n\nIn clear, articulate, unmistakable language, Master Sergeant Folker's learned thesis sets forth the key opposing arguments in the long-standing controversy over the role of structuring in intelligence analysis. The controversy is largely one-sided, because proponents of intuitive analysis see no purpose in debating the issue, as they are completely satisfied with the status quo. It is only the structuring enthusiasts who see a need for drastic change in the way analysis is conducted. Because, as Folker points out, supporters of the status quo include not only most analysts but most commanders as well, the structuring enthusiasts have never made progress in reforming the other side. And they won't make any progress until the superiority of structured analysis over intuitive analysis is proved, which Folker has taken a first giant step in doing.\n\nAnd it is precisely on this point that Folker challenges the Intelligence Community\nindeed the entire U.S. government and the private sector as wellto design and conduct reliable tests to demonstrate which analytic approach is superior: structured or intuitive. Given the wide range of available structuring techniques, each one should be tested in competition with intuition.\n\nThere are many myths prevalent in the analytic community, public and private, concerning structured analysis: It is time-consuming and overly complicated; it eliminates the indispensable role of intuition; it involves numbers and arcane formulae that render analysis mechanical and devoid of creative solutions; and so on. Tests like Folker's will surely dispose of these myths and demonstrate the immense value and power of structuring.\n\nHis thesis, moreover, should encourage students to undertake research experiments that challenge long-held beliefs and test new theories of military interest. JMIC students are especially well placed to conduct thoughtful, creative research because they bring to this scholarly environment a rich mixture of background and viewpoints, and because they remain vitally involved in the business of wringing meaning from a great variety of intelligence information.\n\nFormer intelligence analyst, supervisor and trainer, Central Intelligence Agency\n\nA growing number of JMIC students have begun to incorporate replicable research design into their theses. This distillation of Master Sergeant Folker's thesis shows how fruitful this approach can be. By taking advantage of on-site research funds available from the College, he managed, in brief visits to four Unified Command Joint Intelligence Centers, to carry out a controlled experiment to measure the impact of analyst familiarity with and use of one structured analytic technique - hypothesis testing. His findings, if corroborated by follow-on studies, could have a substantial impact on Intelligence Community analytical practices, and even some influence on how senior policy officials react to analytical products. Managers of analytical personnel might also note that structured methods would appear, from this study of non-specialized joint intelligence center analysts, to be useful to specialized analysts who may be required to move beyond their areas of deep expertise to cover new or unfamiliar assignments.\n\nOf equal importance with his findings is MSgt Folker's documentation of applied field research procedures. His subsequent recommendations for follow-on research illustrate the close relationship between doing research and contributing to the corporate learning environment. The Editor welcomes other students to contribute the story of their unique discoveries about the intelligence profession to this series of Occasional Papers.\n\nThis paper benefited from reviews by a panel of JMIC faculty, the Director of Research of the Defense Intelligence Agency's Directorate of Intelligence, and by Morgan D. Jones, founder of Analytic Prowess, L.L.C. of Montclair, Virginia.\n\nRussell G. Swenson, Editor and Director, Office of Applied Research, AFswerg@dia.osis.gov.\n\nExploiting structured methodologies compels the intelligence analyst to analyze the intelligence problem at hand and distinguishes analytical endeavors from office administration.\n\nThe author\n\n## Preamble\n\nA debate exists between those who prefer to think of intelligence analysis as an art form and those who would highlight the value of a structured, scientific approach to the assessment of intelligence problems. Analytical approaches to intelligence problems can be divided into two overlapping categoriesqualitative and quantitative. Qualitative analysis attempts to answer questions or solve problems that are not easily broken down into quantifiable variables. Qualitative analysis is therefore most often used in political, military, and warning intelligence. Quantitative analysis, which uses variables that are more easily measured, generally attempts to solve scientific or technical intelligence problems. Of the two, qualitative intelligence analysis, if performed carefully, arguably provides the information most useful to national policymakers.1\nA small number of analysts occasionally apply structured methods to qualitative intelligence analysis, but the traditional approach to solve qualitative intelligence problems is non-structured.2 Surprisingly, no research known to this author has adequately examined whether exploiting structured methodologies will improve qualitative intelligence analysis.\n\nIntelligence analysts who do use non-structured methods for qualitative analysis argue that structured methods too narrowly define a problem and ignore factors that cannot be measured. They assert that their intuitive approach produces superior results. For their part, analysts who employ structured methods for qualitative analysis intuitively believe that structured methods ensure sounder, more comprehensive, and accurate findings.3\nHowever, no empirical evidence is available to support either belief.\n\nThe author conducted a controlled experiment among a small sample of nonspecialized analysts at four Unified Command joint intelligence centers to test the effect of applying a structured method to the qualitative analysis of an intelligence problem. Only tentative conclusions can be drawn from the findings in this limited experiment, but the results, if corroborated, have some profound implications for Intelligence Community analysts and their managers.\n\nIn brief, the author found that analysts who apply a structured methodhypothesis testing, in this caseto an intelligence problem, outperform those who rely on \"analysisas-art,\" or the intuitive approach. The modest character of this experiment, and of this finding, clearly calls for follow-on research, but this study at least shows that intelligence value may be added to information by investing some pointed time and effort in analysis, rather than expecting such value to arise as a by-product of \"normal\" office activity.\n\n## The Research Problem\n\nBecause the Intelligence Community has used technology to increase its ability to collect information, intelligence analysts face an ever-increasing stream of intelligence data.4 But the Community has not made similar improvements in its analytical capability, and intelligence analysts are not exploiting all of the analytical methodologies available to them.5 Perhaps in part because intelligence analysts lack familiarity with the proper analytical tools, they are being overwhelmed by the amount of information they are expected to analyze, contributing to \"analysis paralysis.\"6 Congress is well aware of this phenomenon, and has raised the issue publicly.7\n\n## A Research Question\n\nA variety of structured methodologies is available to help the intelligence analyst solve qualitative problems,8 but most analysts display an inability or unwillingness to exploit them.9 Most people instinctively prefer intuitive, non-structured approaches over structured methodologies. Moreover, identifying all relevant qualitative variables in any\n\nPentagon Told,\" *Washington Post*, 12 November 1999, A7.\n8 Robert M. Clark, *Intelligence Analysis: Estimation and Prediction* (Baltimore: American\nLiterary Press, Inc., 1996), 11.\n9 Stephen J. Andriole, senior intelligence researcher and former director of the Cybernetics\nTechnology Office of the Advanced Research Projects Agency, email interview by author, 15 December 1998.\nproblem is difficult, and quantifying them is daunting. The bottom line: Most analysts prefer a subjective approach.10 Can intelligence analysts, specifically those conducting analysis in the \"softer\" sciences such as political intelligence, improve the quality of their analysis by better exploiting structured methodologies? Comparing the analytical results of structured methods with the analytical results derived from traditional non-structured practices used by intelligence analysts should provide valuable insights into improving qualitative intelligence analysis. The need for such an experiment has been clearly identified by a number of specialists.11\nImprovement in qualitative intelligence analysis has been a goal of long standing in the Intelligence Community, but most attempts to improve the process have ignored analysis and focused on restructuring intelligence organization and providing additional training in non-analytical subjects. The U.S. Commission on the Roles and Capabilities of the United States Intelligence Community determined that too few resources are dedicated to allsource analysis, and even fewer resources are obligated to developing and maintaining analytical expertise.12 Currently, only six percent of the intelligence budget authorized by the U.S. Congress is spent on analysis.13 The House of Representative's Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence concluded that \"[a]nalytical pitfalls have been recognized in post mortems and other studies of past warning situations, and limited organizational and training efforts have been undertaken in response.\"14\n\n## A Record Of Analytic Failures\n\nAlthough organizational restructuring may be of some benefit to the Intelligence Community, the root cause of many critical intelligence failures has been analytical failure. \"Failure to predict the North Korean invasion in 1950 was a failure of analysis at higher echelons. ... No analyses accompanied this raw data.\"15 The Intelligence\n\n10 Morgan D. Jones, *The Thinker's Toolkit: 14 Powerful Techniques for Problem Solving* (New\nYork: Random House, Inc., 1998), 8.\n11 Andriole, \"Indications, Warning, & Bureaucracies,\" 12; Stanley A. Feder, \"FACTIONS and\nPolicon: New Ways to Analyze Politics,\" in Inside CIA's Private World: Declassified Articles from the Agency's Internal Journal 1955-1992, ed. H. Bradford Westerfield (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1995), 274-275; and Thomas H. Murray, former analyst and trainer for the Central Intelligence Agency and Senior Vice President of Sequoia Associates, Inc., interview by author, 18 January 1999.\n12 U.S. Commission on the Roles and Capabilities of the United States Intelligence Community,\n\"Chapter 8: Improving Intelligence Analysis,\" in Preparing for the 21st Century: An Appraisal of\nU.S. Intelligence (Washington, DC: GPO, 1 March 1996) URL: http://www.access.gpo.gov/\nsu_docs/dpos/epubs/int/int012.html.\n13 Philip Seib, \"Intelligence Gathering Remains a Vital Function,\" 1 March 1999, Dallas Morning\nNews, URL: <*http://www.dia.ic.gov/admin/EARLYBIRD/990302/s199990302gathering.htm*>,\naccessed 2 March 1999.\n14 Andriole, \"Indications, Warning, & Bureaucracies,\" 8.\n15 James P. Finley, \"Nobody Likes to be Surprised: Intelligence Failures,\" Military Intelligence\nBulletin 20, no. 1 (January-March 1994): 18-19.\nCommunity also failed to predict the Tet Offensive in Vietnam until just hours before the attack. \"The analysis failure occurred in where, when, and why.\"16 Joseph Nye cites the\n\"analytical disarray in 1978 that prevented the drafting of any estimate about the fall of the Shah, and the 1989 prediction that Saddam Hussein would not make trouble for the next three years.\"17 Members of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence recently voiced their concern about the Intelligence Community's inability to warn of the Indian nuclear tests, calling it the \"greatest failure for more than a decade.\"18 Others point out that by improving intelligence analysis the Intelligence Community can better support and protect U.S. embassies from terrorist threats.19\nSome intelligence analysts believe that the ratio of intelligence successes  to failures is actually quite good. Arthur S. Hulnick, a notable veteran in the intelligence profession, is one such believer. He stated in a conference paper delivered at the 1987 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association that the products of the [Intelligence Community] reflect continued growth in the expertise of the analysts, a broader and deeper range of subject materials, and an increasingly sophisticated data base from which to work. Coupled with advances in presentational methodologies, the intelligence product is more useful, timely and relevant than ever before.20\nDespite his optimism for intelligence analysis, Hulnick agrees that the \"analytic process itself is worthy of research.\"21\nBecause of the Intelligence Community's failures to foresee a number of strategically important foreign developments, intelligence consumers have tended to disregard any analysis of intelligence information. \"Whether analysis is good or not, many policymakers will care less about it than they do about collection. They may even resent it, seeing it as naive speculation by junior bureaucrats that wastes their time.\"22 Roger Hilsman, former Assistant Secretary of State for Intelligence Research and Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs, argues that the benefits of funding a large team of field agents is not worth the cost or risk. Covert action tempts presidents into risking the hard work of analysts and diplomats on an \"easy fix,\" damages America's reputation, and is antithetical to a democracy. He concludes that the Intelligence Community should\n\nNew York Times, 21 August 1998, A13.\n20 Arthur S. Hulnick, \"Managing Intelligence Analysis: Strategies for Playing the End Game,\"\nInternational Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 2, no. 3 (Fall 1988): 341.\n21 Hulnick, 329.\n22 Richard K. Betts, \"Intelligence Warning: Old Problems, New Agendas,\" *Parameters* 28, no. 1\n(Spring 1998): 33.\nfocus its efforts on improving its analytical support.23 If the Intelligence Community is to overcome this credibility problem, it must improve its ability to produce accurate, timely, and useful intelligence.\n\nFurthermore, the military's use of precision, information-intensive weapons creates pressure on the intelligence analyst to deliver useful intelligence at faster rates. In the era of modern warfare, fast and precise weapons demand fast and precise intelligence. The intelligence analyst who is unable to conduct analysis quickly can become an information-bottleneck in this environment. It may be arguable that the use of structured analytical techniques helps to speed up the analytical process. This assertion has not been tested, and is beyond the scope of the present research.\n\n## Terms Of Reference\n\nQuantitative intelligence analysis separates the relevant variables of a problem for credible numerical measurement. Qualitative intelligence analysis breaks down topics and ideas that are difficult to quantify into smaller components for better understanding.24\nStructured methodologies are various techniques used singly or in combination to separate and logically organize the constituent elements of a problem to enhance analysis and decisionmaking.25 Some structured methodologies, such as organized brainstorming techniques, complement the analyst's intuition and facilitate creativity.\n\nNon-structured methodology is intuitive. Intuition is a feeling or instinct that does not use demonstrative reasoning processes and cannot be adequately explained by the analyst with the available evidence. For the purposes of this study the term \"improve,\" when referring to qualitative intelligence analysis, means to increase, either singularly or in any combination, without decreasing, either singularly or in any combination, the accuracy, specificity, or timeliness of the result.\n\nThis study assumes that exploiting structured methodologies for qualitative intelligence analysis does not invariably subordinate one's intuition, education, or experience. The analyst must still make a conscious choice as to whether he will accept a conclusion based on exploiting a structured method or reject it in favor of his intuitive judgment. Moreover, intuition plays an inescapable role in analysis. However, although intuition can usually be relied upon to provide effective solutions to simple problems, it cannot cope with the highly complex problems that routinely face intelligence analysts.\n\nMany factors affect the quality of intelligence analysis. This study is limited to arguing how structured methodologies may influence the results of qualitative intelligence analysis. Due to time and cost considerations, it was necessary to restrict the scope of the experiments to intelligence analysts at four of the nine Joint Intelligence Centers (JICs) of the Unified Commands. Specifically, experiments were conducted with intelligence analysts from the U.S. Special Operations Command (SOCOM), the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM), the U.S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM), and the U.S. Joint Forces Command (JFCOM), formerly Atlantic Command (ACOM). Because of these limitations, the evidence presented here should be considered only provisional, not conclusive.\n\n## The Art Or Science Debate\n\nA long-standing debate exists within the Intelligence Community about whether more should be invested in structured methodologies to improve qualitative intelligence analysis. At the heart of this controversy is the question of whether intelligence analysis should be accepted as an art (depending largely on subjective, intuitive judgment) or a science (depending largely on structured, systematic analytic methods). Resolving this question is necessary to provide direction and determine an efficient and effective approach to improve analysis. If qualitative intelligence analysis is an art, then efforts to improve it should focus on measuring the accuracy of one's intuition, selecting those analysts with the best track record, and educating them to become experts in a given field. If, on the other hand, qualitative intelligence analysis is a science, then analysts should be trained to select the appropriate method for a given problem from a variety of scientific methodologies and exploit it to guide them through the analytical process.\n\n## Qualitative Analysis As An Art\n\nProponents of this argument contend that qualitative intelligence analysis deals with an infinite number of variables that are impossible to operationalize because they cannot be adequately quantified or fully collected. A foreign nation that attempts to conceal or disguise information on many of the same variables that an analyst seeks will further complicate the analytical function. Because in many cases the variables are so complex, countless, and incomplete, attempting to analyze them using scientific methods is pseudo-science.26\nTherefore, any attempt to make predictions based on quantifying these variables is futile.27\nOther arguments attack the rational-actor assumption made by most scientific approaches to qualitative intelligence analysis. \"Science can be of little help when dealing with the often irrational and unpredictable human mind.\"28 But these critics acknowledge that the traditional approach to qualitative analysis, being an art, is vulnerable to failure\n- \"humans are still fallible in matters of analysis and response.\"29\n\nQuarterly 33, no. 3 (September 1989): 338.\n27 John L. Peterson, \"Forecasting: It's Not Possible,\" *Defense Intelligence Journal* 3, no. 2 (Fall\n1994): 37-38.\n28 Finley, \"Nobody Likes to be Surprised,\" 40.\nThose who advocate that qualitative intelligence analysis is an art maintain that the most successful analysts take an inductive approach, \"in which powers of pattern recognition are enhanced and intuition is elevated.\"30 They insist that this approach will lead to more creative and original analysis. They argue that qualitative intelligence analysis is an art because it is an intuitive process based on instinct, education, and experience.31 Gary Klein, a cognitive psychologist and pioneer in pattern recognition, makes some convincing arguments to support this claim. He challenges the practicality of using scientific methods for qualitative intelligence analysis outside the classroom.\n\n\"It is time to admit that the theories and ideals of decisionmaking we have held over the past 25 years are inadequate and misleading, having produced unused decision aids, ineffective decision training programs and inappropriate doctrine.\"32 He continues:\nThe culprit is an ideal of analytical decisionmaking which asserts that we must always generate options systematically, identify criteria for evaluating these options, assign weights to the evaluation criteria, rate each option on each criterion and tabulate the scores to find the best option.... The technical term is multiattribute utility analysis.33\nHe concludes that:\n[t]hese strategies sound good, but in practice they are often disappointing. They do not work under time pressure because they take too long. Even when there is enough time, they require much work and lack flexibility for handling rapidly changing field conditions.34\nIt is important to note that the majority of Klein's research has been conducted with leaders in the armed forces and emergency service providers such as firemen, but not specifically members of the Intelligence Community. There has always been a clash of cultures between operators (commanders and other decisionmakers whose focus is on accomplishing the mission at hand) and intelligence analysts. As intelligence analysts have attempted to bridge the gap between the two cultures, they have tended to adopt the same intuitive decisionmaking strategies commonly used by operators.35\n\n32 Czerwinski, 140.\n33 Czerwinski, 140.\n34 Czerwinski, 141.\nStudies in Intelligence 35, no. 2 (Summer 1991): 37-49.\nScience May Offer Only Minimal Analytic Improvements. One argument against the value of structured analysis is that intelligence failures may less accurately be attributed to problems with analysis than to \"the decisionmakers who consume the products of intelligence services.\"36 Given that intelligence consumers can and do perform their own analysis of intelligence information, they may care less about others'\nanalysis than about collection issues, for example.37 Nonetheless, if analysts were to make it possible for policymakers to focus \"on the methodologies of competing intelligence producers, they would be more sensitive to the biases and leaps of faith in the analyses passed to them,\"38 even if the improvement in quality of analysis were minimal.\n\nOpponents of scientific methodologies further claim that, because qualitative intelligence analysis is largely an intuitive exercise, analysts should be encouraged to specialize and be educated into becoming experts in their field. These opponents question the validity of scientific methods and object to others who would use such methods to challenge their expert opinion. To improve analysis, they argue, the analyst must improve his intuitive ability by gaining \"area knowledge\" through frequent contact with the subject of his study. In the face of these challenges, however, and prior to further debating to what degree the quality of analysis may be improved by using structured methods, the basic research question remains unanswered: Will the use of structured methods improve qualitative intelligence analysis?\n\nA Rebuttal. At first glance it seems that opponents of the scientific approach are criticizing the results of scientific methods. Yet they offer no empirical data to show which approach produces more accurate results, the scientific or the intuitive. The critics do denounce the amount of time it takes to scientifically analyze a problem. However, one should recognize that there are many scientific methodologies available to aid decisionmaking, and selecting and using one need only be as complicated and timeconsuming as the analyst wishes.39\nUnquestionably, the complexity of some scientific methodologies prevents them from being regularly exploited by most intelligence analysts. A graduate of the Joint Military Intelligence College (JMIC) made the following observation in his Masters thesis:\nA major issue common to all the methods is customer acceptance. Due to the highly mathematical nature of [Bayesian Decision Analysis], many users will feel uneasy trusting the resulting assessments. This will only be overcome through proper training of the analysts using [Bayesian Analysis] and repeated exposure to Bayes on the part of decisionmakers.40\n\n37 Betts, \"Intelligence Warning: Old Problems, New Agendas,\" 26-35.\n38 Betts, \"Analysis, War, and Decision: Why Intelligence Failures Are Inevitable,\" 83.\n39 Lieutenant Colonel W. Frank Ball, USMC (Ret.), and Morgan D. Jones, \"Improving Marine\nCommanders' Intuitive Decisionmaking Skills,\" *Marine Corps Gazette* (January 1996): 63-64.\n40 Captain David Lawrence Graves, USAF, *Bayesian Analysis Methods for Threat Prediction*,\nMSSI Thesis (Washington: Defense Intelligence College, July 1993), second page of Abstract.\n Nevertheless, this lack of confidence should not be allowed to stand as a sweeping indictment of other, more simple and appropriate methodologies.\n\nIt is apparent that what these critics are saying is that no one in the heat of producing actionable intelligence uses the scientific approach, so why bother? This brings up two important questions:\n(1) Which analysts, if any, are exploiting scientific methodologies when conducting qualitative intelligence analysis?\n\n(2) Which approach (the intuitive or the scientific) produces the more accurate, timely, and useful result?\n\nOther critics concede that utilizing scientific approaches to solve qualitative intelligence problems may improve the product of analysis, but they argue that the benefits are only minor. They insist that allocating resources to other areas such as reorganizing the intelligence bureaucracy, increasing manpower, and improving communication will better improve the intelligence product. One cannot deny that a host of factors affects the quality of intelligence analysis, but improvements to the process do not have to be pursued through a linear approach, nor should effort be wasted trying to determine which approach will yield the most significant improvement. If there is sufficient evidence that a reform promises improvement, it should be pursued.\n\n## Qualitative Intelligence Analysis As A Science\n\nA few analysts see qualitative intelligence analysis as a science. Since 1973 the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) has experimented with quantitative methods in an attempt to apply innovations in the behavioral sciences to political intelligence analysis.41 At that time neither the Departments of State nor Defense had attempted to integrate quantitative methodologies into their political intelligence production.42 Much of the effort to incorporate quantitative methodologies into the realm of qualitative intelligence analysis was rejected by analysts because the scientific methods were thought to be too narrowly focused and not relevant to the questions the intelligence analysts were addressing. Most analysts tended \"to be skeptical of any form of simplification inherent in the application of probabilistic models.\"43\nIn spite of the skepticism, advocates of using a more scientific approach in qualitative intelligence analysis assert that science is a necessary tool to use when conducting qualitative analysis. They argue that, although it is impossible to consider every variable when conducting analysis, one can identify key variables and weigh their importance. And although much may be unknown, identifying what is known and analyzing it scientifically is an effective approach. As one Intelligence Community advocate of a more scientific approach to intelligence analysis notes, the identification and use of big-picture, strategic insights can yield intelligence of more value than merely continuing to try to fathom, through the \"art of intelligence,\" transient ideographic actors or their actions: \"[Y]ou can disregard [military or political leaders'] madness and genius more readily than societal, economic, or political trends (which are scientifically identifiable) in analysis.\"44\n Proponents of qualitative analysis as a science argue that scientific methods help analysts determine the relevancy of information and form conclusions, a process that analysts do not perform well on their own. Hall makes the point that:\nin the absence of concrete guidance or structure[,] analysts generally don't do well in forming conclusions and in discerning relevancy.... They sometimes have difficulty in figuring out relationships among seemingly unconnected pieces of information and in forming fragments of information into a coherent whole.45\nIf qualitative intelligence analysis is art, there is also a concern that the artist will fall in love with his art and be reluctant to change it even in the face of new evidence. The more scientific and objective approach encourages the analyst to be an honest broker and not an advocate.\n\nScience in Other Types of Qualitative Analysis. Scientific methods have been used effectively to assist qualitative analysis in areas outside intelligence. An article in The Economist discusses the use of mathematical formulas to solve \"normal\" business problems that most managers argued could not be solved through quantitative approaches.46 These managers argued that in their decisionmaking process they practice an intuitive art rather than a rational science. However, science and the use of quantitative methodologies in this case proved to be a more systematic and profitable approach than instinctive trial-and-error. Although many of the managers remained skeptical that such methods would continue to work, these methods do provide another approach to decisionmaking that should not be ruled out without evidence from comparative testing.\n\nAlthough still not a standard practice in the private sector, some companies are increasingly exploiting quantitative methods and technology to help them make better decisions, increase profits, and compete in the information revolution.47 If applying quantitative methodologies to qualitative analysis facilitates management of technological\n\nIntelligence Professional Bulletin 18, no. 1 (January-March 1992): 9.\n46 \"Art Hammer: The Numbers Man,\" *Economist*, 8 August 1998, 56. 47 Rod Newing, \"Consumer Information is the Fuel of a New Industrial Revolution,\" Financial\nTimes, 3 February 1999, B7.\ninformation, it stands to reason that the Intelligence Community can selectively use this same approach to improve qualitative intelligence analysis.\n\nInside and Outside of the Classroom. Many proponents of exploiting scientific methodologies to aid intelligence analysis assume that these methods are regularly used in real-world analysis. Hulnick presents the typical view:\nAdvances in analytic methodology seem to have grown remarkably in the past decade. While a discussion of explicit methods goes beyond the scope of this article - and the knowledge of the author - a wide variety of ways of attacking a problem exists. Managers of intelligence must assume that analysts try different techniques, sometimes by giving the problem to separate groups for analysis by different disciplines, sometimes by seeking an outside expert to provide competing analysis.48\n The former chief of the Analytic Support Group in the CIA's Directorate of Intelligence agrees with Hulnick. \"An analyst must have a repertoire of analytic techniques to apply in problem solving. There now exists a rich set of analytic techniques such as pattern analysis, trend prediction, literature assessment, and statistical analysis.\"49\nThe president of Evidence-Based Research, Inc., also expressed the opinion that most intelligence analysts use some type of systematic approach when conducting qualitative intelligence analysis.50\nThis assumption that intelligence analysts use these various scientific approaches is based not on empirical evidence, but on the belief that experience alone does not make an expert, and that an expert must have a tool for structuring knowledge to efficiently solve a problem. Yet the numerous interviews conducted in support of this study, among intelligence analysts from all different agencies and backgrounds, positively invalidate this assumption. Of the 40 intelligence analysts interviewed in direct support of this study, only one maintained that he regularly used a structured methodology (link analysis) and could adequately explain the method and provide current examples of his work.51\nAlthough the other analysts who attempted to explain their analytical methodology described how they were tasked and how they collected information and prepared it for dissemination, they consistently and strikingly made no mention of analysis. The interviews serve only to confirm Klein's more detailed study: \"After studying over 150 experienced decisionmakers and 450 decisions, we concluded that [the intuitive]\napproach to decisionmaking is typical.\"52\nIn further support of the author's findings, JMIC graduate Stewart Eales notes: Evaluating the analytical effort in the PURPLE SUNSET wargame is difficult because there was so little to measure. Despite assertions by some that 'the analyst is at the center of the intelligence process,' the... students virtually ignored analysis. ... As a result, there was little time or effort dedicated to thoughtful analysis and dissemination.53\nThis observation was confirmed during the interviews with the JIC analysts. A\nrepeated complaint was the analyst's lack of time to devote to thoughtful intelligence analysis. In a separate interview at CIA, it was revealed that in spite of most intelligence analysts having a broad definition of what analysis involves, they spend little time or effort conducting analysis.54\nAs noted earlier, Betts asserts that many policymakers see little or no value in intelligence analysis because it is based on the views of less experienced personnel.55 This may be the case because so many intelligence analysts are reluctant to exploit scientific methodologies, and most intelligence analysts are junior to the decisionmakers they support. Decisionmakers typically form conclusions based on intuition developed through years of experience. Therefore, the intelligence analyst who provides an assessment based on inexperience and his own (lesser developed) intuition should not expect to be taken seriously. To be credible the analyst must use objective scientific methodologies to support his conclusions.\n\nWhile the research for this study sought to collect definitive evidence of frequent and widespread use of scientific methodologies within the Intelligence Community, only rare anecdotal information could be obtained showing that such methodologies are actually used by intelligence analysts in real-world situations, despite the ready availability of these methods. The National Warning Staff, for example, uses only one quantitative analytical methodology, a modified-Bayesian technique.56\nA lack of expertise in exploiting scientific methodologies appears to be at the root of the Intelligence Community's failure to use them. One cannot expect intelligence analysts to exploit these methodologies unless they are trained how to select the appropriate analytical method and apply it to a real-world analytical problem. Analysts at the CIA have made use of computer programs, such as FACTIONS and Policon, based on a quantitative methodology, to assist in political analysis and warning. In one application, while both intuitive-based and scientific-based political intelligence forecasts were accurate about 90 percent of the time, intelligence analysts using Policon provided more specific and less ambiguous intelligence.57 Although this example provides limited documentation, it raises the question, why do not other members of the Intelligence Community share, compare, and exploit these methodologies?\n\n## Qualitative Intelligence Analysis As Both Art And Science\n\nThe fallacy in the art or science debate may be the \"either/or\" proposition. If qualitative intelligence analysis is not exclusively an art nor a science, then it may best be considered a combination of both intuitive and scientific methods:\nIn our world is an infinite set of problems which have no logically consistent answer; there are some problems which any framework alone cannot solve. ... Yet strategists must not live by inspiration alone. Inspiration unsupported by rigorous analysis becomes adventurism [sic]. Thus intuitive gifts must be paired with an effective theoretical framework.58\n\n## Availability Of Structured Methodologies\n\nIn order to expand the applicability of quantitative methodologies to qualitative problem solving, relatively uncomplicated methods have been developed to help intelligence analysts structure their analysis. These structured methods, which can be applied to a broad range of problems and do not focus exclusively on mathematical solutions, provide a scientific and demonstrable approach to analysis that can enhance the intelligence analyst's objectivity. Structured methodologies do not try to replace the subjective insight of the intelligence analyst. Instead the intent is to use a logical framework to illustrate and capitalize on intuition, experience, and subjective judgment.\n\nSome publications do identify which methods are best suited to solve particular types of analytical problems,59 but not all intelligence analysts receive training in these methodologies. Morgan Jones, a former analyst for the CIA, has recently added The Thinker's Toolkit: 14 Powerful Techniques for Problem Solving. This book presents 14 structured methods to aid analysis and decisionmaking. Although it is written for both business and personal use, the structured methods he discusses are among those taught to the fraction of Intelligence Community analysts who enroll at the Joint Military Intelligence College or other intelligence schools.\n\nNumerous other books and software are dedicated to teaching an analyst how to apply one specific structured methodology. The Rand Corporation, for example, offers a book providing a specific methodology for predicting ethnic conflict. The authors propose a model divided into three stages meant to help an analyst identify the fundamental\n\n1983) and Jerome K. Clauser and Sandra Weir, *Intelligence Research Methodology* (State\nCollege, PA: HRB-Singer, Inc., 1975).\npotential for strife, the movement of possible strife into probable strife, and whether probable strife will turn into real conflict.60 Many technology companies produce software to assist the user in problem solving by guiding him through a structured methodology and product demonstrations via the Internet.61\n\n## Exploitation Of Structured Methodologies\n\nA structured methodology provides a demonstrable means to reach a conclusion. Even if it can be proven that, in a given circumstance, both intuitive and scientific approaches provide the same degree of accuracy, structured methods have significant and unique value in that they can be easily taught to other analysts as a way to structure and balance their analysis. It is difficult, if not impossible, to teach an intelligence analyst how to conduct accurate intuitive analysis. Intuition comes with experience. What is clear is that, even though a mixture of science and intuition is probably needed to produce superior qualitative intelligence analysis, structured methodologies are severely neglected. Even in the rare cases where a specific methodology is regularly used, there is too much reliance on only one method and not a mix of various methods. No one method is appropriate to every problem. What is needed is a set of analytical tools that can be applied individually or in combination as appropriate.\n\n## Why Are Structured Methodologies Not Used?\n\nStructured thinking is radically at variance with the way in which the human mind is in the habit of working.62 Most people are used to solving problems intuitively by trial and error. Breaking this habit and establishing a new habit of thinking is an extremely difficult task and probably the primary reason why attempts to reform intelligence analysis have failed in the past, and why intelligence budgets for analytical methodology have remained extremely small when compared to other intelligence functions.63\nUnder the accelerating pressures of time, intelligence analysts feel that structured analytical approaches are too cumbersome.64 They also sense that with the increased use of structured methods comes increased accountability. An excessively burdened intelligence analyst is less confident in his own ability and will not unnecessarily expose himself to criticism. Reliance on intuition and the resistance to incorporate scientific approaches complicate the task of getting analysts to exploit structured methodologies to assist qualitative intelligence analysis.\n\n62  Jones, *The Thinker's Toolkit*, 8. 63  Andriole, \"Indications, Warning, & Bureaucracies,\" 10-11. 64  Eales, 121-124.\nIntelligence analysts are also not exploiting structured methodologies when they conduct qualitative intelligence analysis because they are not convinced that this will improve their analysis. If empirical evidence shows that such an improvement will take place, then analysts may consider it worth the investment of time, effort, and risk required on their part to regularly exploit structured methodologies. However, if such empirical evidence shows that exploiting structured methodologies will not significantly improve qualitative intelligence analysis, then analysts can devote their time and effort to enhancing their intuitive skills.\n\nThe results from the series of experiments conducted for this study may provide some empirical data needed by intelligence analysts to make a decision on whether they should begin exploiting structured methodologies.\n\n## The Experiment The Control Group Versus The Experimental Group\n\nArguments both for and against the use of structured methodologies to improve qualitative intelligence analysis may have merit. Therefore, empirical evidence is needed to determine if exploiting structured methodologies will improve qualitative intelligence analysis. A direct comparison of analytical results derived from using a structured method with results derived solely from an intuitive approach is necessary for a relevant experiment. The author designed an experiment to make such a comparison.\n\nThe purpose of the experiment was to compare the analytical conclusions drawn by individual analysts in two different groups: a control group and an experimental group. Individual analysts in the control group would use the traditional intuitive approach to analyze two different qualitative intelligence problems. Analysts in the experimental group would exploit a specific structured methodology to aid them in their analysis of these same two problems. Analysts' answers would be scored as either correct or incorrect and compared statistically to determine whether the experimental group did significantly better than the control group.\n\n## Competing Hypotheses And Level Of Significance\n\nThe experiment would test the truth of both the null hypothesis (H0) and the alternative, or research, hypothesis (H1). The level of significance was set at .05 before the experiment was conducted.65\n\nH0: Exploiting structured methodologies *will not* improve qualitative intelligence analysis. H1: Exploiting structured methodologies *will* improve qualitative intelligence analysis.\n\n## Determining Sample Size And Choosing A Statistical Test\n\nDue to the real-world commitments of the intelligence analysts at each JIC, it was impossible to predetermine how many analysts would be sampled during the experiment. Not knowing the sample size or expected frequencies of each cell beforehand made it impossible to select an appropriate statistical test to analyze the information until all of it was collected. On the day of the experiment each JIC Commander decided which intelligence analysts would be available to participate. The decision of who would participate was made based upon that day's schedule as driven by operational requirements. The decision was not made based upon an attempt to alter the results of the experiment.\n\nThe available analysts from each JIC were randomly assigned to either the control or experimental group. Both the control group and the experimental group had 13 analysts each. The total number of analysts sampled (N) during the experiment was 26. Due to the small sample size and associated low cell frequencies, Fisher's Exact Probability Test was used to determine statistical significance for the hypotheses and for the influence of the controlled factors (rank, experience, education and branch of service).66\n\n## Collection Procedures\n\nAnalysts in both control and experimental groups completed a one-page questionnaire to provide the demographic information needed to crosscheck the validity of the results gathered from the experiment. Each analyst was asked to identify any training or familiarity they had with using various structured analytical methodologies and how frequently, if ever, they used structured methodologies during real-world analysis. Then the analysts in the control group were dismissed and asked to return at a later time. The analysts in the experimental group were given an hour of training on a specific structured methodologyhypothesis testing. The training was standardized at each JIC and taught from the same lesson plan and workbook.67 The analysts in the experimental group were asked not to discuss their training with the analysts in the control group until after the experiment.\n\nWhen the analysts assigned to the control group returned, the two groups were segregated. Each analyst in each group was then given a map, both intelligence scenarios,\n\nmethod is to simply double the one-tailed test result, and not to exceed a probability of 1. Doubling the probability for one-tailed results is the method the author used. Other methods use more complicated mathematical formulas, but yield similar probabilities.\n67  Morgan D. Jones authored the Hypothesis Testing Lesson Plan and workbook, which were used\nby permission. For further information on his hypothesis testing methods, see Chapter 11 of Jones' The Thinker's Toolkit.\nand an answer sheet for each scenario. (See information on following pages). Each person was asked to analyze the first scenario, then to complete the answer sheet as individuals within one hour. Once this task was completed, they were asked to analyze the second scenario and complete its answer sheet as individuals within 30 minutes. At the end of the allotted time they were asked to turn in their completed answer sheets and any other notes they had made. Both groups were given the same amount of time to analyze the scenarios and to complete the answer sheets, so neither group had an advantage of time over the other. All notes made by the analysts were collected to determine what approach analysts in the control group used and to ensure that analysts in the experimental group properly applied the hypothesis testing method. All analysts were interviewed after completing the experiment to gain further insights into how they approached analyzing intelligence problems presented both in the experiment and in their official duties.\n\nOnly the first question on the answer sheet for each intelligence problem was scored. It was scored as either correct or incorrect. For the first intelligence scenario the correct answer was to expect an attack at Port Mia. For the second scenario the correct answer was that the intentions of the adversary government were peaceful.\n\n## Intelligence Scenario 1\n\nYou provide strategic intelligence to the military and political leaders of your country, the Federal Republic of Ysla (FRY). The Sovereign Autocracy of Penin (SAP) and FRY are at war. SAP is conducting air reconnaissance, special operations, and air bombing attacks against FRY to prepare the way for a military attack. You have determined that due to the unique geography of your country and the limited amphibious capabilities of the SAP military, only two places in FRY are vulnerable to an amphibious attack by the SAP military. SAP naval forces can conduct operations out to 250 nautical miles. To best defend FRY you need to determine how and where the SAP military invasion will occur. Using the above assumptions and the scenario map, conduct an analysis of the following intelligence information (it is listed chronologically). Keep in mind that the FRY National Leadership is concerned the SAP military will launch a diversionary attack against Port Mia while the main attack is against Port Eyer. They want your analysis to include information on whether the SAP military is planning to use deception, diversion, or neither in conjunction with their attack. Based on order of battle from multiple sources you know the majority of SAP naval/ amphibious forces are docked in port at Banes. Multiple sources indicate that SAP has relocated most of its ground forces to Haba and reassigned them to the recently modernized Third SAP Corps. COMINT reporting indicates that a new SAP Marine General was assigned as Commander of the Third SAP Corps. On January 28th open sources report that General Sage, the SAP Supreme Military Commander, left SAP to encourage the nearby countries to remain neutral during the conflict; his travel schedule and return date are unknown. The SAP Government publicly announced a ban on all visits to the SAP coast. 007, one of FRY's top HUMINT agents working in Capitol City, reported the SAP main attack will occur near Port Eyer and may be preceded by diversionary attacks elsewhere in FRY. 086, another FRY spy, working near Banes reported that SAP would land a small force at Port Mia before the main attack at Port Eyer. Multiple sources indicate the SAP military has conducted amphibious exercises with submerged obstacles. COMINT reporting indicated major moves of SAP marine military forces to the northwest part of SAP. COMINT reports also indicated a major movement of forces from Capitol City to the northeast. SAP bombing raids against Port Eyer number twice that against Port Mia. The SAP bombing of Ports Eyer and Mia has restricted the flow of traffic in and out of both areas. The majority of SAP air reconnaissance and special operations have been against Port Eyer. On February 19th, FRY air reconnaissance showed no changes in ships at Haba. On February 25th, FRY air reconnaissance showed no change in shipping traffic in Banes. On March 8th, FRY air reconnaissance of both Haba and Banes showed increased shipping around Banes only. On March 30th, FRY air reconnaissance showed 20 new landing craft docked at Haba; air reconnaissance at Banes on the same day was inconclusive due to weather.\n\n## Questions For Intelligence Scenario 1\n\n1. Where and how will the SAP's military attack FRY? 2. Support your conclusion. (Please attach any other notes you made.) 3. What other possible courses of action did you consider?\n4. What analytical method did you use? How did you analyze this scenario? 5. Was this scenario similar to another current or historical event? 6. What is your assessment of the validity of this experiment?\n7. Please provide your name and rank. Your answers and identity will be kept anonymous!\n\n## Intelligence Scenario 2\n\nDue in part to your exceptional analysis, the Federal Republic of Ysla (FRY) successfully defended itself from a major invasion by the Sovereign Autocracy of Penin (SAP). On May 8th of last year, the war ended in a stalemate after the U.S. intervened, and both FRY and SAP\ngovernments signed an armistice. U.S. troops established a presence in FRY to deter SAP from attacking again. The SAP Government is concerned that the FRY military may launch an attack on SAP. The SAP Government wants the U.S. to withdraw its forces from FRY before SAP signs any peace treaty. Tensions between the FRY and SAP remained high throughout the year. However, at the beginning of the New Year, the leader of SAP, President Castrol, appeared to be making peaceful overtures to the FRY Government. Your superiors have asked you to analyze the evidence below and determine whether the SAP Government has new and peaceful intentions. On January 15th, the SAP News Agency, the official news agency of the SAP Government, described an interview that President Castrol had with the editorial committee of a Caribbean newspaper, *The Island Times* on January 10th. President Castrol proposed: \"a peace agreement...may be concluded between SAP and FRY and the military forces of both countries may be cut drastically under the condition where the U.S. imperialist troops are withdrawn from FRY.\"\nIn a subsequent meeting with U.S. Senator Harley (Democrat) in mid-January, President Castrol made it clear that a peace agreement between SAP and FRY could be concluded before U.S. forces were withdrawn. U.S. intercepts since mid-February of secure, high-level, SAP military command communications have revealed no indications of unusual military activities or preparations for hostilities. Over the next seven months the SAP News Agency was consistent in reporting the new peace proposals, only occasionally reverting to a \"hard line\" stance and then attributing this stance to unnamed spokesmen. Last year, shortly after the armistice was signed, Red Cross delegates from both FRY and SAP began meeting on a regular basis to share information to help locate and identify soldiers from both sides who were missing in action during the war. Initially, the SAP News Agency coverage of the Red Cross meetings was very negative. After January of this year, however, the tone of the coverage changed. The reporting became essentially factual and objective. In February of this year, the SAP Government began a national blood donation campaign claiming shortages, although the reason for shortages was not disclosed nor had there been any major disaster causing shortages to occur. Later the same month, President Castrol gave another \"unofficial\" interview to a journalist from the *Washington Times.* In the interview President Castrol again iterated that a peace treaty could be signed between SAP and FRY before U.S. troops withdraw from FRY.\n\n## Intelligence Scenario 2\n\nOn March 15th, SAP announced the execution of five SAP nationals who were members of a FRY spy ring during the war.\n\nThe commander-in-chief of SAP armed forces retired on March 29th and was replaced by the deputy commander-in-chief. The number and tone of SAP propaganda broadcasts changed noticeably in the spring. The number of anti-FRY radio broadcasts declined from about 25 per day to about 16 broadcasts per day. Also, the usual abusive and slanderous words used in the broadcasts were toned down considerably. In April, the two governments signed an agreement allowing each other's military attaches unrestricted movement without pre-travel approval. Monitoring of SAP News Agency wire service releases containing anti-FRY statements declined from a high of 27 percent in January to 10 percent in April. Over the past six months SAP military training has maintained its normal cycle. Training flights of SAP fighter aircraft and bombers have been significantly curtailed over the past four months. In that same period the FRY Government has not detected any attempt by the SAP Government to infiltrate agents or armed guerrillas The unusually large number of SAP reservists called to active duty during the war will be discharged this month. SAP ground-force medical units conducted a large-scale, out-of-training-cycle exercise yesterday. U.S. photoreconnaissance reveals that dozens of landing craft used in the SAP military operations against FRY during the war have not been repaired.\n\n## Questions For Intelligence Scenario 2\n\n1. What are the intentions of the SAP Government? 2. Support your conclusion. (Please attach any other notes you made.) 3. List all the possibilities you considered.\n4. What analytical method did you use? How did you analyze this scenario? 5. Was this scenario similar to another current/historical event? 6. What is your assessment of the validity of this experiment? 7. Please provide your name and rank. Your answers and identity will be kept anonymous!\n\n## Possible Hypotheses Are:\n\nH1: Main attack at Port Eyer, no major deception or diversion.\nH2: Main attack at Port Eyer, with deception pointing to Port Mia.\nH3: Main attack at Port Eyer, with diversionary attack at Port Mia. H4: Main attack at Port Mia, no major deception or diversion. H5: Main attack at Port Mia, with deception pointing to Port Eyer. H6: Main attack at Port Mia, with diversionary attack at Port Eyer.\nEVIDENCE\nH1\nH2\nH3\nH4\nH5\nH6\n1. Multiple Sources (MS), majority of SAP Naval forces at Banes.\nI\nC\nC\nC\nI\nI\n2. MS, majority of ground forces assigned to modernized Third Corps at Haba\nC\nI\nC\nI\nC\nC\n3. COMINT, new Marine general commanding Third SAP Corps\nC\nI\nI\nI\nC\nC\n?\n?\n?\n?\n?\n?\n4. 28 Jan, General Sage visits neutral countries; return date\nunknown 5. SAP bans visits to coasts\nC\nC\nC\nC\nC\nC\n6. 007, main attack at Port Eyer with possible diversion\nI\nI\nC\nI\nC\nI\n7. 086, small force attacks Port Mia then main attack at Port Eyer\nI\nI\nC\nI\nC\nI\n8. SAP conducts amphibious exercises with submerged obstacles\nC\nC\nC\nC\nC\nC\n9. COMINT, Marines move to northwest SAP\nC\nI\nI\nI\nC\nC\n10. COMINT, major movement of forces from Capitol City to northeast SAP\nI\nC\nC\nC\nI\nI\n11. SAP bombs Port Eyer 2X as much as Port Mia\nC\nI\nC\nI\nC\nC\n12. SAP bombing restricts traffic in/out of both ports\nC\nC\nC\nC\nC\nC\n13. Majority of SAP air recon and SOF directed against Port Eyer\nC\nI\nC\nI\nC\nC\n14. 19 Feb and 25 Feb, no change in ships at Haba or shipping at Banes\nI\nC\nI\nC\nC\nC\n15. 8 Mar, increase in shipping at Banes\nI\nC\nI\nC\nC\nC\n16. 30 Mar, 20 new landing craft at Haba; Recon at Banes is inconclusive due to weather\nC\nI\nC\n?\n?\n?\n\n## Hypothesis Testing Matrix Example For Intelligence Scenario 1.\n\nNote: Letters characterize the attributed relationship between evidence and hypothesis:\nconsistent=C; inconsistent=I; ambiguous=?; evidence that is either consistent or ambiguous for all hypotheses is \"lined out\" to show that it was considered, then disregarded, in favor of more telling \"directional\" evidence.\n\n## Hypothesis Testing Illustration: Intelligence Scenario 2 Possible Hypotheses Are:\n\nH1: Peace H2: Business-as-Usual H3: Deception.\n\nEVIDENCE\nH1\nH2\nH3\n1. Jan-Apr, SAP News Agency Anti-FRY statements decline to 10%\nC\nI\nC\n2. Jan-Apr, SAP fighter/bomber training sorties decline\nC\nI\nC\n3. Jan-Apr, FRY detects no SAP infiltration attempts\nC\nI\nI\n4. Jan-Jun, SAP military training cycle is normal\nC\nC\nC\n5. Jan 15, Castrol proposes peace with FRY\nC\nI\nC\n6. Mid-Jan, Castrol says peace before U.S. troops leave\nC\nI\nC\n7. Feb, SAP News Agency begins positive reporting of ICRC\nC\nI\nC\n8. Early Feb, SAP Government blood drive\nI\nC\nC\n9. Mid-Feb, no unusual SAP C2 activity\nC\nC\nC\n10. Late-Feb, Castrol says peace treaty before U.S. leaves\nC\nI\nC\n11. Feb-Aug, SAP News Agency consistently reports peace proposal\nC\nI\nC\n12. Mar 15, SAP executes members of FRY spy-ring\nI\nC\nI\n13. Mar 29, SAP CINC retires and replaced by his Deputy\nC\nC\nC\n14. April, FRY and SAP sign agreement allowing unrestricted travel\nC\nI\nI\n15. April, SAP discharges reservists called up during the war\nC\nI\nI\n16. April, SAP conducts a large, out-of-cycle medical exercise\nI\nC\nC\n17. April, SAP landing craft remain unrepaired\nC\nI\nI\n18. Spring, SAP propaganda broadcasts decrease in number and tone\nC\nI\nI\n\n## Hypothesis Testing Matrix Example For Intelligence Scenario 268\n\n68  Although assigning a C, I, or ? to an individual line of evidence is a subjective judgment, by visually\ndisplaying the evidence and hypotheses in a matrix the analyst can better judge each piece of evidence then aggregate all the evidence to determine which hypothesis is most likely true. Subjective judgments and intuition still play an inescapable role in analysis. Individual analysts will seldom assign C, I, or ? in the same way, but by visually displaying it, other analysts can question their logic, readily identify which pieces of evidence they disagree on, and more quickly form a consensus.\n\n## Experimental Results Arrayed In Contingency Tables\n\nTables 1 and 2 summarize the responses given by analysts in the control and the experimental groups to each intelligence scenario. Tables 3-10 show how the analysts answered each intelligence scenario based on rank, years of experience, level of education, and branch of service.\n\n## A. Comparison Of Responses Between Control And Experimental Groups:\n\n|                        |   Control Group |   Experimental Group |\n|------------------------|-----------------|----------------------|\n| # of Incorrect Answers |              11 |                   10 |\n| # of Correct Answers   |               2 |                    3 |\n|                        |   Control Group |   Experimental Group |\n|------------------------|-----------------|----------------------|\n| # of Incorrect Answers |               4 |                    0 |\n| # of Correct Answers   |               9 |                   13 |\n\n## B. Comparison Of Responses Between Civilian/Officer And Enlisted:\n\n|                        |   Civilian/Officer |   Enlisted |\n|------------------------|--------------------|------------|\n| # of Incorrect Answers |                  9 |         12 |\n| # of Correct Answers   |                  3 |          2 | |                        |   Civilian/Officer |   Enlisted |\n|------------------------|--------------------|------------|\n| # of Incorrect Answers |                  1 |          3 |\n| # of Correct Answers   |                 11 |         11 |\n\n## C. Comparison Of Responses Based On Years Of Experience:\n\n|                        |   Less than 10 years |   10 years or more |\n|------------------------|----------------------|--------------------|\n| # of Incorrect Answers |                   12 |                  9 |\n| # of Correct Answers   |                    2 |                  3 |\n\n## C. Comparison Of Responses Based On Years Of Experience: (Cont'D)\n\n|                        |   Less than 10 years |   10 years or more |\n|------------------------|----------------------|--------------------|\n| # of Incorrect Answers |                    2 |                  2 |\n| # of Correct Answers   |                   12 |                 10 |\n\n## D. Comparison Of Responses Based On Level Of Education:\n\n|                        |   <Bachelor Degree |   Bachelor Degree or Higher |\n|------------------------|--------------------|-----------------------------|\n| # of Incorrect Answers |                 12 |                           9 |\n| # of Correct Answers   |                  2 |                           3 |\n\nTable 7. Response by Level of Education to Intelligence Scenario 1\n\n|                        |   <Bachelor Degree |   Bachelor Degree or Higher |\n|------------------------|--------------------|-----------------------------|\n| # of Incorrect Answers |                  2 |                           2 |\n| # of Correct Answers   |                 12 |                          10 |\n\n## E. Comparison Of Responses Between Military Services:\n\n|                        |   Navy/Marine |   Army/Air Force |\n|------------------------|---------------|------------------|\n| # of Incorrect Answers |             9 |               12 |\n| # of Correct Answers   |             1 |                4 |\n\nTable 9. Response by Branch of Service to Intelligence Scenario 1\n\n|                        |   Navy/Marine |   Army/Air Force |\n|------------------------|---------------|------------------|\n| # of Incorrect Answers |             0 |                4 |\n| # of Correct Answers   |            10 |               12 |\n\nTable 10. Response by Branch of Service to Intelligence Scenario 2\n\n## Analytical Strategy\n\nFisher's Exact Probability Test was used to statistically analyze the data and determine whether the null hypothesis could be rejected. This formula was also used in a two-tailed test to measure any variances in responses based on the different demographic groups. In these cases Fisher's Test would measure the probability that the differences in the answers were caused by some other factor than the use of a structured methodology to assist in qualitative intelligence analysis. The original tables displaying demographic data for the control and experimental groups contained several columns, not just two. However, Fisher's Test can be used to measure data only in a two-by-two matrix, so it was necessary to modify the original tables by combining some columns to arrange the data in an appropriate two-by-two matrix.\n\n## Considerations And Limitations\n\nAlthough this experiment did collect and analyze data on several different factors that might affect the answers an analyst would provide, it could not identify and analyze all factors. To encourage individual participation an agreement was made that the results of individual analysts would not be released. To encourage the JICs to provide as many analysts as possible it was agreed that the specific results of each JIC would be made available only to that particular JIC. This experiment was designed to compare the answers given by the control and experimental groups; it would not compare JIC against JIC. Therefore, the way in which analysts were made available, driven as it was by realworld events, did not alter the validity of the experiment.\n\n## Designing The Experiment\n\nCertainly, one can find some fault in both intelligence scenarios used during the experiment. Nevertheless, both scenarios were submitted to a rigorous pre-testing and revision process to ensure both scenarios were valid and reliable measures of an intelligence analyst's qualitative analytical capability during the time allotted for the experiment and appropriate for the structured methodology taught to the experimental group.\n\nSeveral obstacles hinder the design of an intelligence scenario to measure the accuracy of an analyst's conclusions. A hypothetical scenario begs the question of whether one can authoritatively claim that a correct answer exists. Since the event never occurred, the burden is on the creator of the scenario to ensure only one conclusion can be drawn. In contrast, using an actual historical event as the basis for an intelligence scenario runs the risk that the analyst will recognize the scenario for what it is and base his conclusions on the known outcome rather than on the evidence presented. The intelligence scenarios used in the experiment were based on actual historical events.\n\nThe first scenario was developed in coordination with Tom Murray, former CIA\nanalyst and trainer and currently Senior Vice President of Sequoia Associates, Incorporated. The scenario was based on known strategic intelligence possessed by German intelligence prior to the invasion of Normandy during World War II. It was necessary to alter some of the evidence such as the names of individuals, units, and geographic locations in the scenario to disguise the fact that this scenario was based on the invasion at Normandy, but the basic evidence remained unchanged. In this scenario the analysts were asked to determine where the actual invasion would occur.\n\nThe second intelligence scenario was based upon a case study presented in Intelligence Research and Methodology, by Jerome Clauser and Sandra Weir. The case study examined a series of incidents in which it appeared the North Korean Government was making a sincere effort to improve peace on the peninsula in the 1970's.69 This scenario was modified with the assistance of Morgan D. Jones. The subjects were asked to determine whether the adversary in the scenario was sincerely pursuing peace, using peace as a deception, or conducting business as usual.\n\nVarious students at the JMIC tested both intelligence scenarios before they were used in the experiment at the JICs. The students were asked to analyze both scenarios and complete an answer sheet. The answer sheet asked them to draw some conclusions and also asked whether they recognized the scenarios as any actual historical event. The scenarios were then modified and given to another group of students to test. In the final round of testing only three out of 20 students recognized that the first scenario was related to the Normandy invasion; however, only one of the three who recognized the historical link provided the correct answer. None of the students could identify the actual event used as a basis for the second scenario. During the actual experiment at the JICs, five of the 26 subjects identified the Normandy invasion as the basis for the first intelligence scenario. Four of these five were in the control group and the other was in the experimental group. Of the five only one in the experimental group and another in the control group provided the correct answer to the first scenario. No one at the JICs identified the actual historical event used as a basis for the second scenario. These checks on the historical identifiability of the scenarios address the potential concern of \"analysis as art\" proponents that deep familiarity with a particular region or problem would affect the outcome of this or a similar experiment. It would appear that this concern, though well-founded, can be overcome by careful selection of scenarios. Scenario construction or borrowing is not a simple matter, as a real-world \"outcome\" must be captured to ensure a \"correct\" answer is known.\n\nThe questions on the answer sheets were open-ended rather than multiple choice.\n\nAlthough using a multiple choice test simplifies the scoring process, it does not accurately portray how analysts provide answers outside the classroom. A multiple choice test defines the range of options available; in qualitative intelligence analysis, defining and narrowing the range of options is a part of the answer in itself. Asking open-ended questions provided insights into how many possible hypotheses each analyst considered and how specific a response each analyst felt confident in providing.\n\n## Time Spent Analyzing The Scenarios\n\nRather than allow the analysts to work at their own pace, a specific period of time was allotted to work each problem; however, the analysts were allowed to turn in their answer sheets anytime before the allotted time expired. Although it would be interesting to compare the number of correct answers with the amount of time spent on the problem, it would be of little help in determining whether exploiting structured methodologies will improve qualitative intelligence analysis. Based on observations made during the experiment, it seems that the amount of time spent on analyzing a problem had little to do with the analyst correctly answering a problem or using a structured method. Both control and experimental groups had analysts who completed both problems quickly and had analysts who used the entire amount of time allotted.\n\nMost analysts work under a deadline. Allotting a fixed amount of time to solve each problem put pressure on the analyst (simulating real-world constraints) and ensured the answer sheets were returned in time to be included in this study. It also held the variable of time constant so the results of the experiment were less likely to be tainted by the time factor. Many of the analysts remarked that they enjoyed the opportunity to concentrate on a specific problem without being interrupted.\n\n## The Findings\n\nThis exploratory research provides empirical evidence suggesting that exploitation of a structured methodology (hypothesis testing in this example) will improve qualitative intelligence analysis. Even though this evidence is for a narrowly defined instance (the second intelligence scenario) and not conclusive, such evidence did not exist before this experiment was conducted. Factors such as rank, experience, education, and branch of service did not appear to affect the results.\n\n## Description Of The Findings\n\nAs Tables 1 and 2 show, the overall qualitative intelligence analysis of those in the experimental group was better than that of those in the control group for both scenarios. Despite this, the improvement measured in the first scenario did not meet the threshold of statistical significance (see results for Table 1 in Table 11). Nor did the probabilities computed for Tables 3-10 meet the established threshold of statistical significance (see results for Tables 3-10 in Table 11), confirming that the differences in responses are probably not due to these factors. However, the improved qualitative analysis of the experimental group over that of the control group in the second scenario was statistically significant (see results for Table 2 in Table 11).\n\n|    Table No. | Description            |   Scenario No. |   Fisher's Probability |\n|--------------|------------------------|----------------|------------------------|\n|            1 | Control and Experiment |              1 |                  0.5   |\n|            2 | Control and Experiment |              2 |                  0.048 |\n|            3 | Rank                   |              1 |                  0.844 |\n|            4 | Rank                   |              2 |                  0.718 |\n|            5 | Experience             |              1 |                  0.844 |\n|            6 | Experience             |              2 |                  1     |\n|            7 | Education              |              1 |                  0.844 |\n|            8 | Education              |              2 |                  1     |\n|            9 | Branch of Service      |              1 |                  0.686 |\n|           10 | Branch of Service      |              2 |                  0.244 |\n\n## Expectations\n\nThe results were surprising. The author expected a significant improvement in qualitative intelligence analysis in the first scenario, whose inherent complexity, it seemed, would give the analysts who used the hypothesis testing method an advantage over those who did not employ a structured method. But this advantage did not materialize. Most of the analysts using hypothesis testing seemed to have had difficulty identifying all of the possible hypotheses and determining the consistency of each piece of evidence with each hypothesis.\n\nBecause the second scenario was simple and straightforward, the author thought that there would be little or no advantage to be gained by structuring the problem and sorting the evidence. In the event, however, the structured approach proved more effective.\n\nIn hindsight it was asking too much to expect the analysts to proficiently apply the hypothesis testing method to complex problems like the first intelligence scenario after just one hour of training. This may explain, in part, why the experimental group did not perform significantly better than the control group on the first scenario. Because the first scenario, with six hypotheses to consider, is more complicated than the second scenario, with only three hypotheses, one may be tempted to conclude that the hypothesis testing method is useful for structuring only simple problems. Nevertheless, based on the information gathered during this experiment, the author would guess that the hypothesis testing method can be useful in structuring more intricate problems, provided that the analyst has been adequately trained to proficiently apply the method.\n\n## What Does All This Mean?\n\nQuite simply, the experimental group performed significantly better on the second intelligence scenario than did the control group. The improvement appears to be due to members of the experimental group using a particular structured methodology while the members of the control group did not use any structured methodology to aid their analysis. The improvement does not appear to be a consequence of rank, experience, education, or branch of service. The improvement measured in qualitative intelligence analysis during the first intelligence scenario is not significant.\n\n## Why Improvement In The Second Scenario But Not The First?\n\nThe first scenario may have affected the control group's analysis of the second scenario. In the first scenario it was obvious that some form of deception was being used; the problem was determining which attack was real and which was the deception. The second scenario was more clear and direct; however, some analysts may have been biased and assumed deception was being used in the second scenario because of their recent exposure to the use of deception in the first scenario. It appears that those analysts who used the hypothesis testing method were better able to remain objective and analyze the evidence in the second scenario without being influenced by the first scenario. It seems the analysts who based their analysis solely on their intuition were less objective in their analysis.\n\n## Another Approach To Analyzing The Data\n\nDuring the experiment each analyst was asked one question from both intelligence scenarios. Their answers were marked as either correct or incorrect. Thus, an analyst who answered both questions correctly scored 100 percent. If an analyst answered one question correctly and the other incorrectly, he scored 50 percent. If he answered both questions incorrectly, he scored 0 percent. The scores from analysts who used a structured methodology ranged from 50-100 percent. The analysts who did not use a structured methodology ranged in scores from 0-50 percent. While three analysts in the experimental group answered both questions correctly, no one in the control group answered both questions correctly. By this measure, exploiting a structured methodology improved qualitative intelligence analysis.\n\n## To Reject H0 Or Not?\n\nConsidering all the arguments, the information collected, and the analysis and interpretation of that information, the null hypothesisthat exploiting structured methodologies *will not* improve qualitative intelligence analysiscan be rejected. Of course there are several qualifiers that affect the veracity of the alternate hypothesis that exploiting structured methodologies *will* improve qualitative intelligence analysis. The single most critical qualifier is that analysts must be adequately trained to ensure they are able to proficiently apply the appropriate structured methodology.\n\nUnquestionably one can create a problem where the answer is so obvious that a structured methodology will be of no benefit. Likewise, one can design a scenario so complicated and ambiguous that the correct answer will never be revealed. Nevertheless, as this experiment demonstrated, there are instances where qualitative intelligence analysis can be improved by exploiting structured methodologies. Only by applying different structured methodologies to different types of intelligence problems will one find out where and when structured methods are most effective.\n\nThis experiment examined only one structured methodologyhypothesis testing.\n\nOther experiments that examine different methods, different problems, and utilize different analysts from different agencies could be pursued by other investigators. In the meantime, analysts within the Intelligence Community should be encouraged to exploit various structured methodologies.\n\n## Implications And Recommendations A Conclusion\n\nThis study has produced an answer to the question: \"Will exploiting structured methodologies improve qualitative intelligence analysis?\" The approach taken to answer the question was straightforward. Competing hypotheses were developed based on the research question, arguments supporting both hypotheses were explored, an impartial experiment was designed to provide empirical evidence, and a statistical test was used to determine the significance of the evidence produced. For both scenarios the analysts who used structured methods outperformed the analysts who did not. The improvement measured in the second intelligence scenario was statistically significant; therefore, the null hypothesisthat exploiting structured methodologies *will not* improve qualitative intelligence analysiswas rejected.\n\nThe author has determined that exploiting structured methodologies will improve qualitative intelligence analysis. There are, however, several qualifiers. The improvement is not necessarily automatic or significant for every case. Intelligence analysts must be adequately trained to select an appropriate structured methodology or combination of methodologies germane to the problem and apply the method(s) proficiently. A more precise conclusion drawn from the experiment as presented in this study is: \"Exploiting structured methodologies can improve qualitative intelligence analysis.\" Further research is needed to definitively answer the original research question.\n\n## Other Insights\n\nBased on the numerous interviews the author conducted with intelligence analysts from many different intelligence units and agencies, it is apparent that more basic research is needed in this area of intelligence analysis. Nearly every analyst had a different definition of intelligence analysis. Most analysts believe that analysis occurs automatically as they gather information and prepare that information for dissemination. It is not a function for which they specifically allocate time.\n\nAnalysis involves critical thinking. Structured methodologies do not perform the analysis for the analyst; the analyst still must do his own thinking. But by structuring a problem the analyst is better able to identify relevant factors and assumptions, formulate and consider different outcomes, weigh different pieces of evidence, and make decisions based on the available information. While exploiting a structured methodology cannot guarantee a correct answer, using a structured methodology ensures that analysis is performed and not overlooked.\n\nFrom the discussions with the test subjects after the experiment it became obvious to the author that analysts in the control group were not as clear in their thinking as the analysts in the experimental group. After reading the scenarios members of the control group formed a conclusion, then went back to the scenario to find evidence that supported their conclusion and ignored contradictory evidence. When asked to justify their answers, analysts in the control group often cited some \"key\" information that gave them a flash of insight. Members of the control group seemed to be looking for the one piece of informationthe \"Holy Grail\" that would make sense of everything else. This approach flies in the face of the fact that, more often than not, qualitative intelligence analysis must be accomplished with incomplete information.\n\nMembers of the experimental group examined all evidence provided in the scenario prior to making their decision. They felt confident that they were making the best decision they could with the amount of information available. They acknowledged that their decision may not be the right one and added that if more evidence became available they would reevaluate their conclusion taking into account this new information.\n\nEven though most analysts had not received training in or used structured methods previously, analysts who received training in hypothesis testing expressed the opinion that exploiting such a method would aid and improve their analysis.\n\n## Recommendations\n\nThe author recommends that various structured methodologies be taught to all intelligence analysts of every service and agency during both initial and subsequent training. Intelligence analysts should be encouraged to use structured methodologies when drafting analytical narratives. Analysts should be expected to utilize structured methodologies to visually present their analysis during intelligence briefings. Also, intelligence units conducting real-world qualitative intelligence analysis should be encouraged to experiment with different structured methodologies and compete with other similar units in regular analytical exercises. The results from exploiting various structured methodologies from both real-world situations and during exercises should be published and shared with other intelligence units, services, and agencies.\n\n## Further Research\n\nThe results of this experiment need to be confirmed. The author recommends that a series of similar experiments be conducted, either separately or in any combination, to test other factors that may affect the outcome of qualitative intelligence analysis.\n\nReverse Order of Scenarios. Future researchers may wish to conduct the same experiment as the original except reverse the order in which the intelligence scenarios are given to the analysts. Alternatively the researcher may develop his own scenarios but present them to different test subjects in a different order and track the results to see if the order in which the scenarios were presented affected the results of their analysis.\n\nIntensive Training. Expand the amount of time spent training the experimental group from one hour to three or more hours and include more complex problems. Use the same scenarios as in the original experiment to test this author's theory that more training would have allowed the analysts to proficiently apply the hypothesis testing method to more complicated problems such as the first intelligence scenario.\n\nSophisticated Scenario. Future researchers may wish to conduct a similar experiment using a more sophisticated scenario to determine whether design flaws in the original scenarios affected the results of the original experiment.\n\nBefore and After. Instead of dividing analysts into control and experimental groups, have them analyze a scenario intuitively then train the same analysts in an appropriate structured methodology and have them analyze the same problem using the structured technique. Compare their first response with their second response and measure the improvement. A researcher utilizing this approach must develop a test to measure if the improvement arises from analysts' exploiting a structured method or simply from seeing the same or similar problem again.\n\nDifferent Method. Conduct an experiment using a structured methodology other than hypothesis testing. The researcher must develop a new intelligence scenario appropriate to the structured methodology being tested.\n\nTeam Approach. Instead of measuring the responses of individuals, divide the analysts into teams and ask them to develop a consensus and answer the questions as a team. Have some teams use a structured methodology and have other teams use the traditional intuitive approach.\n\nMeasure Time. Instead of holding time as a constant, ask the analysts to solve the problems as quickly as possible and record how long it takes each analyst to solve the problem. Consider both accuracy and timeliness when measuring improvement in qualitative intelligence analysis.\n\nMultiple Choice. Instead of asking open-ended questions, provide the analysts with a multiple choice answer sheet. This will simplify the scoring process and measure improvement while ensuring that every analyst considers the same possible outcomes.\n\nTwo-Tailed Test. Develop a hypothesis and design an experiment to measure if exploiting structured methodologies will cause a change in qualitative intelligence analysis in either direction. 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New York: Random House, Inc., 1998.\n\nKahaner, Larry. Competitive Intelligence: From Black Ops to Boardrooms - How Businesses Gather, Analyze, and Use Information to Succeed in the Global Marketplace.\n\nNew York: Simon & Schuster, 1996.\n\nKam, Ephraim. *Surprise Attack: The Victim's Perspective*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1988.\n\nKeithly, David M. \"Leading Intelligence in the 21st Century: Past as Prologue?\"\nDefense Intelligence Journal 7, no. 1 (Spring 1998): 78-88.\n\nKent, Sherman. *Strategic Intelligence For American World Policy*. Princeton, NJ:\nPrinceton University Press, 1949.\n\nKifner, John. \"Raids by U.S. Agents and Tirana Police Reportedly Thwart Attack on Embassy.\" *New York Times*, 21 August 1998, A13.\n\nLanders, Daniel F. \"The Defense Warning System.\" *Defense Intelligence Journal* 3, no. 1 (Spring 1994): 21-32.\n\nLoeb, Vernon and Walter Pincus. \"New Spy Satellites at Risk Because Funding Is Uncertain, Pentagon Told.\" *Washington Post*, 12 November 1999, A7.\n\nManheim, Jarol B., and Richard C. Rich. Empirical Political Analysis: Research Methods in Political Science. New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1981.\n\nMann, Steven R. \"Chaos Theory and Strategic Thought.\" *Parameters* 22, no. 3\n(Autumn 1992): 54-68.\n\nManthorpe, William H.J. 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Richards J.\n\nHeuer Jr. Boulder: Westview Press, Inc., 1978.\n\nResch, David T., Captain, USA. \"Predictive Analysis: The Gap Between Academia and Practitioners.\" *Military Intelligence Professional Bulletin* 21, no. 2 (April-June 1995): 26-29.\n\nRobbins, Carla Anne. \"Intelligence Community is Criticized in Review.\" Wall Street Journal, 3 June 1998, A8.\n\nSchweizer, Peter. \"Growth in Economic Espionage.\" *Foreign Affairs* 75, no. 1\n(January/February 1996): 9-14.\n\nSchum, David A. *Evidence and Inference for the Intelligence Analyst*. Volumes I and II. Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1987.\n\nShirley, Edward G. \"CIA Needs Reform, Not New Missions.\" Wall Street Journal,\n19 November 1998, A22.\n\nSeib, Philip. \"Intelligence Gathering Remains a Vital Function,\" 1 March 1999. Dallas Morning News. URL: <http://www.dia.ic.gov/admin/EARLYBIRD/990302/ s199990302/ gathering.htm>. Accessed 2 March 1999.\n\nSiegel, Sydney. *Nonparametric Statistics For the Behavioral Sciences*. New York:\nMcGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1956.\n\nStudeman, William O. \"Leading Intelligence along the Byways of Our Future:\nAcquiring C4ISR Architectures for the 21st Century.\" *Defense Intelligence Journal* 7, no. 1 (Spring 1998): 47-65.\n\nTellis, Ashley J., Thomas S. Szayna, and James A. Winnefeld. Anticipating Ethnic Conflict. Santa Monica, CA: The Rand Corporation, 1997.\n\nToffler, Alvin, and Heidi Toffler. War and Anti-War: Survival at the Dawn of the 21st Century. New York: Little, Brown and Company, 1993.\n\nTufte, Edward R. *The Visual Display of Quantitative Information.* Cheshire, CT:\nGraphics Press, 1983.\n\nTurner, Michael A. \"Issues in Evaluating U.S. Intelligence.\" International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 5, no. 3 (Fall 1991): 275-284.\n\nU.S. Commission on the Roles and Capabilities of the United States Intelligence Community. Preparing for the 21st Century: An Appraisal of U.S. Intelligence. Washington, DC: GPO, 1 March 1996. URL: <http://www.access.gpo.gov/su_docs/dpos/\nepubs/int/int012.html>.\n\nWarning analyst at the National Warning Staff. Telephone interview by author,\n5 November 1998.\n\nWeiner, Tim, and James Risen. \"Decision to Strike Factory in Sudan Based on Surmise: Inferred from Evidence.\" *New York Times*, 21 September 1998, A1.\n\nWohlstetter, Roberta. *Pearl Harbor: Warning and Decision*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1962.\n\n## About The Author\n\nMaster Sergeant Robert D. Folker, Jr. received the Master of Science of Strategic Intelligence degree from the Joint Military Intelligence College in 1999. He is currently Superintendent of the 325th Operations Support Squadron's Intelligence Flight at Tyndall Air Force Base, Florida. Since enlisting in the Air Force in 1986, MSgt Folker's assignments have included Non-Comissioned Officer in Charge (NCOIC), Special Intelligence Team at the Strategic Command's Intelligence and Warning Center, Offutt Air Force Base, Nebraska; NCOIC, Intelligence Element at the 80th Fighter Squadron, Kunsan Air Base, South Korea; and NCOIC, Mission Analysis Flight and Senior Analyst with the Contingency Airborne Reconnaissance Deployable Ground Station 2, Beale Air Force Base, California. MSgt Folker may be contacted at: *<robert.folker@tyndall.af.mil>*.\n\n## Joint Military Intelligence College Occasional Papers\n\nUnclassified papers are available through *<www.ntis.gov>*; selected papers are available through the U.S. Government Printing Office *<www.gpo.gov>*.\n\n1. Classified paper. 2. *Getting Intelligence Right: The Power of Logical Procedure*, Capt (USAF) William\nS. Brei, 1996.\n3. *An Office Manager's Guide to Intelligence Readiness*, Russell G. Swenson, 1996. 4. Classified paper. 5. *A Flourishing Craft: Teaching Intelligence Studies*, Papers Prepared for the 18 June\n1999 JMIC Conference on Teaching Intelligence Studies at Colleges and Universities, 1999.\n6. *Intelligence Essentials for Everyone*, Lisa Krizan, 1999.\n7. Intelligence Analysis in Theater Joint Intelligence Centers: An Experiment in\nApplying Structured Methods, MSgt (USAF), Robert D. Folker, Jr., 2000."
    },
    {
        "text": "## An Assessment Of International Legal Issues In Information Operations May 1999\n\nDepartment of Defense Office of General Counsel\n\n## Acknowledgement\n\nThis assessment of international legal issues in information operations reflects the combined efforts of a superb team of Department of Defense lawyers.  It could not have been produced without the contributions of representatives of the General Counsels of the Army, Navy, Air Force, the National Security Agency and the Defense Information Systems Agency, as well as the Judge Advocates General of the military services and the Legal Counsel to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.  Their insight, wisdom and persistence have not only been of great value but have reflected exceeding well on themselves and their offices.  The principal draftsman, Phillip A. Johnson (Colonel USAF, Retired), is owed a note of special appreciation; his scholarship and dedication were truly extraordinary.\n\n## Table Of Contents\n\n| I.                                                              | INTRODUCTION                                 |    5 |\n|-----------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------|------|\n| A.  Sources and Application of International Law                | 5                                            |      |\n| B.  Essentials of Treaty Law                                    | 7                                            |      |\n| C.  New Legal Challenges Presented by Information Operations    | 8                                            |      |\n| II.                                                             | THE LAW OF WAR                               |    9 |\n| A.  Essentials of the Law of War                                | 9                                            |      |\n| B.  Application to Information Operations                       | 10                                           |      |\n| C.  Assessment                                                  | 14                                           |      |\n| III.                                                            | INTERNATIONAL LEGAL REGULATION OF THE USE OF |      |\n| FORCE IN \"PEACETIME\"                                            | 15                                           |      |\n| A.  International Law Concerning the Use of Force among Nations | 15                                           |      |\n| B.  Acts not Amounting to the Use of Force                      | 19                                           |      |\n| C.  Application to Computer Network Attacks                     | 20                                           |      |\n| D.  An \"Active Defense\" against Computer Network Attacks        | 22                                           |      |\n| E.  Assessment                                                  | 27                                           |      |\n| IV.                                                             | SPACE LAW                                    |   28 |\n| A.  Introduction                                                | 28                                           |      |\n| B.  Space Law Treaties                                          | 28                                           |      |\n| C.  Specific Prohibitions of Military Activities in Space       | 30                                           |      |\n| D.  Domestic Law and Policy                                     | 31                                           |      |\n| E.  International Efforts to Control \"Weaponization of Space\"   | 32                                           |      |\n| F.  Assessment                                                  | 33                                           |      |\n| V.                                                              | COMMUNICATIONS LAW                           |   34 |\n| A.  International Communications Law                            | 34                                           |      |\n| B.  Domestic Communications Law                                 | 36                                           |      |\n| C.  Assessment                                                  | 36                                           |      |\n| VI.                                                               | IMPLICATIONS OF OTHER TREATIES                 |   37 |\n|-------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------|------|\n| A.  Mutual Legal Assistance Agreements                            | 37                                             |      |\n| B.  Extradition Agreements                                        | 37                                             |      |\n| C.  The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS)  | 38                                             |      |\n| D.  Treaties on Civil Aviation                                    | 39                                             |      |\n| E.  Treaties on Diplomatic Relations                              | 40                                             |      |\n| F.  Treaties of Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation              | 40                                             |      |\n| G.  Status of Forces and Stationing Agreements                    | 41                                             |      |\n| VII.                                                              | FOREIGN DOMESTIC LAWS                          |   43 |\n| A.  Introduction                                                  | 43                                             |      |\n| B.  Cooperation in Investigations and Prosecutions                | 43                                             |      |\n| C.  Effect of Foreign Domestic Law on Actions of U.S. Information |                                                |      |\n| Operators                                                         | 44                                             |      |\n| VIII.                                                             | IMPLICATIONS OF ESPIONAGE LAW                  |   47 |\n| A.  Espionage under International Law                             | 47                                             |      |\n| B.  Espionage during Armed Conflict                               | 47                                             |      |\n| C.  Espionage in Peacetime                                        | 48                                             |      |\n| D.  Assessment                                                    | 49                                             |      |\n| IX.                                                               | INTERNATIONAL EFFORTS TO RESTRICT \"INFORMATION |      |\n| WARFARE\"                                                          | 50                                             |      |\n| X.                                                                | OBSERVATIONS                                   |   52 |\n\n## I.  Introduction A.  Sources And Application Of International Law.\n\nInternational law consists of binding legal obligations among sovereign states.\n\nTwo of the basic principles of the international legal system are that sovereign states are legally equal and independent actors in the world community, and that they generally assume legal obligations only by affirmatively agreeing to do so.  The most effective instruments in creating international law are international agreements, which may be either bilateral or multilateral.  Some of these agreements, such as the United Nations Charter, establish international institutions that the parties agree to invest with certain authority.  It is also generally accepted that there is a body of customary international law, which consists of practices that have been so widely followed by the community of nations, with the understanding that compliance is mandatory, that they are considered to be legally obligatory.\n\nInternational institutions have legislative authority to create legal obligations for nations only when their member nations have agreed to give them that authority.  The most prominent example is the power of the UN Security Council to pass resolutions requiring individual nations to perform or refrain from certain actions in order to protect or restore international peace and security in the context of a particular situation.  The decisions of the International Court of Justice are binding upon nations that have accepted the jurisdiction of the Court and are parties to litigation before it.   Other international institutions can also be given the power to impose binding obligations upon nations that agree to submit to their authority. In addition, certain actions of some international institutions, such as the International Court of Justice and the UN General Assembly, are considered to be persuasive evidence of the existence of principles of customary international law.\n\nAs with domestic law, the primary mechanism that makes international law effective is voluntary compliance.  Also as with domestic law, the threat of sanctions is often required as well.  The international legal system provides institutional enforcement mechanisms such as international litigation before the International Court of Justice and other judicial and arbitral tribunals, as well as the right to petition the United Nations Security Council to authorize coercive measures to protect or restore international peace and security.  The international legal system also provides self-help enforcement mechanisms such as the right to use force in individual and collective self-defense and the right in some circumstances to repudiate treaty obligations which have been violated by another party.  An aggrieved nation may always withdraw from voluntary relationships involving diplomatic representation and most kinds of commerce.  Even the right to publicly complain about another nation's illegal behavior may provide an effective enforcement mechanism if such complaints generate diplomatic costs for the offending nation.\n\nChief Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes once wrote, \"The life of the law has not been logic; it has been experience.\"  It seldom happens that a legislature foresees a problem before it arises and puts into place a legislative solution before it is needed. More typically, legislators react to a problem that has already manifested itself.  The international legal system operates in the same manner.  The international community ordinarily does not negotiate treaties to deal with problems until their consequences have begun to be felt.  This is not all bad, since the solution can be tailored to the actual problems that have occurred, rather than to a range of hypothetical possibilities.  One consequence, however, is that the resulting law, whether domestic or international, may be sharply influenced by the nature of the events that precipitate legal developments, together with all their attendant policy and political considerations.\n\nThe development of international law concerning artificial earth satellites provides a good example.  If the nations had sat down with perfect foresight and asked themselves, \"Should we permit those nations among us that have access to advanced technology to launch satellites into orbit that will pass over the territory of the rest of us and take high-resolution imagery, listen in our telecommunications, record weather information, and broadcast information directly to telephones and computers within our borders?\", a very restrictive regime of space law might have resulted.  Instead, what happened was that the first satellites launched by the Soviet Union and the United States were seen as entirely benign devices engaged in scientific research, and it was also perfectly clear that no nation had the capability to interfere with them as they passed over its territory.  In these circumstances, it quickly became accepted customary international law, soon enshrined in the Outer Space Treaty, that objects in orbit were beyond the territorial claims of any nation, and that outer space is available for exploitation by all.\n\nThe history of space law contrasts sharply with that of air law.  Much of the early development of heavier-than-air aviation coincided with the First World War, during which the military power of aircraft for intelligence gathering, attacking ground forces, and bombing enemy cities was clearly demonstrated.  The result was a highly restricted regime of air law in which any entry into a nation's airspace without its permission was to be regarded as a serious violation of its sovereignty and territorial integrity.\n\nSimilarly, we can make some educated guesses as to how the international legal system will respond to information operations, but the direction that response actually ends up taking may depend a great deal on the nature of the events that draw the nations' attention to the issue.  If information operations techniques are seen as just another new technology that does not greatly threaten the nations' interests, no dramatic legal developments may occur.  If they are seen as a revolutionary threat to the security of nations and the welfare of their citizens, it will be much more likely that efforts will be made to restrict or prohibit information operations by legal means.  These are considerations that national leaders should understand in making decisions on using information operations techniques in the current formative period, but it should also be understood that the course of future events is often beyond the control of statesmen.\n\nThe actors in the international legal system are sovereign states.  International legal obligations and international enforcement mechanisms generally do not apply to individual persons except where a nation enforces certain principles of international law through its domestic criminal law, or in a very limited class of serious offenses (war crimes, genocide, crimes against humanity, and crimes against peace) that the nations have agreed may be tried and punished by international criminal tribunals.\n\n## B.  Essentials Of Treaty Law.\n\nIn domestic U.S. law there are important distinctions between treaties and executive agreements. This distinction primarily involves issues of Constitutional authority within the U.S. government, but it is of little importance internationally. Treaties and executive agreements are equally binding between the United States and the other party or parties to an international agreement.  We will use the term \"treaty\" in this paper as a shorthand way of referring to all forms of legally binding state-to-state international agreements.\n\nTreaty obligations are binding on their parties, but international law recognizes certain circumstances in which a nation can regard a treaty obligation as being suspended, modified, or terminated.  The parties can always modify or terminate a treaty by mutual consent.   Some international agreements expire by their own terms after a fixed period of time.   Generally, unless the terms of the agreement establish a right of unilateral withdrawal, a nation may not unilaterally repudiate or withdraw from a treaty unless it has a basis for doing so that is recognized under international law.   Treaty obligations are reciprocal in nature.  If one of the parties commits a material breach of its obligations under the treaty, the other may be entitled to suspend its own compliance, or to withdraw from the agreement entirely.  Also, a fundamental change in circumstances may justify a decision by one of the parties to regard its treaty obligations as suspended or terminated.\n\nOne of these fundamental changes of circumstance is the initiation of armed hostilities between the parties.  Some international agreements specifically provide that they will remain in effect during armed conflict between the parties, such as law of war treaties and the United Nations Charter.  Most treaties, however, are silent on whether or not they will continue to apply during hostilities between the parties.  Many peacetime agreements facilitate tourism, transportation, commerce, and other relationships the continuation of which would be  fundamentally inconsistent with a state of armed conflict between the parties.  Agreements on other subjects, such as boundary settlements and reciprocal rights of inheritance of private property, may be unrelated to the existence of hostilities, and may ultimately be determined to remain in full force.  The issues involved may be particularly complicated when the treaty concerned is multilateral, rather than bilateral.  When two parties to a multilateral treaty are engaged in armed conflict, the result may well be that the effect of the treaty is suspended between the belligerents, but remains in effect among each belligerent and the other parties.  We will see later in this paper that the United States is a party to a variety of bilateral and multilateral agreements containing obligations that may affect information operations.  One of our tasks will be to determine as best we can which of these agreements are likely to remain in effect during hostilities.  The tests we will apply are (1) whether there is specific language in the treaty addressing its effect during hostilities between the parties, and (2) if there is no such language, whether the object and purpose of the treaty is or is not compatible with a state of armed hostilities between the parties.\n\n## C.  New Legal Challenges Presented By Information Operations.\n\nMany traditional military activities are included in current concepts of\n\"information operations\" and \"information warfare,\" including physical attacks on information systems by traditional military means, psychological operations, military deception, and \"electronic warfare\" operations such as jamming radar and radio signals. The application of international law to these traditional kinds of operations is reasonably well settled.  Similarly, electro-magnetic pulse (EMP) weapons and directed-energy weapons such as lasers, micro-wave devices, and high energy radio frequency (HERF) guns will probably operate in a manner similar enough to that of traditional weapons that one could apply existing legal principles to them without much difficulty.  It will not be as easy to apply existing international law principles to **information attack**, a term used to describe the use of electronic means to gain access to or change information in a targeted information system without necessarily damaging its physical components.  One of the principal forms of information attack is likely to be **computer network attack**, or in today's vernacular, the \"hacking\" of another nation's computer systems.\n\nThe proliferation of global electronic communications systems and the increased interoperability of computer equipment and operating systems have greatly improved the utility of all kinds of information systems.  At the same time, these developments have made information systems that are connected to any kind of network, whether it be the Internet or some other radio or hard-wired communications system, vulnerable to computer network attacks.  Moreover, global communications are almost seamlessly interconnected and virtually instantaneous, as a result of which distance and geographical boundaries have become essentially irrelevant to the conduct of computer network attacks.  The result is that many information systems are subject to computer network attack anywhere and anytime.  The attacker may be a foreign state,  an agent of a foreign state,  an agent of a non-governmental entity or group, or an individual acting for purely private purposes.  The equipment necessary to launch a computer network attack is readily available and inexpensive, and access to many computer systems can be obtained through the Internet or another network to which access is easily obtained.\n\nOne major implication is that it may be very difficult to attribute a particular computer network attack to a foreign state, and to characterize its intent and motive.  For the purposes of analysis we will initially assume away issues of attribution and characterization, returning to them near the end of the analysis.  Another major implication is that an attacker may not be physically present at the place where the effects of the attack are felt.  The means of attack may not be tangibly present either, except in the form of anonymous and invisible radio waves or electrons.  This will complicate the application of traditional rules of international law that developed in response to territorial invasions and attacks by troops, aircraft, vehicles, vessels, and kinetic weapons that the victim could see and touch, and whose sponsor was usually readily apparent.\n\n## Ii.  The Law Of War A.  Essentials Of The Law Of War.\n\nThe terms \"law of war\" and \"law of armed conflict\" are synonymous. The latter term has the virtue that it more clearly applies to all international armed conflicts, whether or not they are formally declared wars.  \"Law of war\" is shorter and more familiar, and we will use it in this paper.  The application of the law of war does not generally depend on which of the parties was at fault in starting the conflict.  The law of war applies whenever there is a state of international armed conflict, and it applies in the same manner to all the parties to the conflict.  There is a small subset of the law of war that applies to noninternational armed conflicts such as civil wars, but those sorts of conflict are not immediately relevant to this paper and will not be discussed.  As with other branches of international law, the law of war is composed of treaties and customary international law.  The United States is a party to eighteen law of war treaties, along with their various annexes and protocols, and several more law of war agreements are pending before the Senate.  The United States also recognizes the existence of a considerable body of customary law of war.\n\nThe general principles of the law of war have been expressed in various ways, but their essence can be said to be as follows:\n- Distinction of combatants from noncombatants:  With very limited exceptions, only members of a nation's regular armed forces are entitled to use force against the enemy.  They must distinguish themselves from noncombatants, and they must not use noncombatants or civilian property to shield themselves from attack.  If lawful combatants are captured by the enemy they may not be punished for their combatant acts, so long as they complied with the law of war.  They are required to be treated humanely in accordance with agreed standards for the treatment of prisoners of war, and they must be released promptly at the cessation of hostilities.  Persons who commit combatant acts without authorization are subject to criminal prosecution.\n\n- Military necessity:  Enemy military forces are declared hostile.  They may be attacked at will, along with their equipment and stores.  Civilians and civilian property that make a direct contribution to the war effort may also be attacked, along with objects whose damage or destruction would produce a military advantage because of their nature, location, purpose, or use.  A corollary of this principle is that noncombatants and civilian objects making no direct contribution to the war effort, and whose destruction would provide no significant military advantage to the attacker, are immune from deliberate attack.\n\n- Proportionality:  When an attack is made against a lawful military target, collateral injury and damage to noncombatants and civilian property may be unavoidable. Attacks may be carried out against lawful military targets even if some amount of collateral damage is foreseeable, unless the foreseeable collateral damage is disproportionate to the military advantage likely to be attained.  The military advantage to be gained from an attack refers to an attack considered as a whole rather than only from isolated or particular parts of an attack.  Generally, \"military advantage\" is not restricted to tactical gains, but is linked to the full context of war strategy.  The commander ordering the attack is responsible for making the proportionality judgment.  The calculus may be affected somewhat if the enemy has failed to carry out his duty to separate his troops and equipment from noncombatants and civilian property, since in such circumstances the defender must shoulder much of the blame for any collateral damage that results.  A corollary of the principle of proportionality is that the attacker has a responsibility to take reasonable steps to find out what collateral damage a contemplated attack may cause.\n\n-  Superfluous injury:  The nations have agreed to ban certain weapons because they cause superfluous injury.  Among these are \"dum-dum\" bullets, projectiles filled with glass or other nondetectable fragments, poisoned weapons, and laser weapons specifically designed to cause permanent blindness to unenhanced vision.\n\n-  Indiscriminate weapons:  The nations have agreed to ban certain other weapons because they cannot be directed with any precision against combatants.  Among these are bacteriological weapons and poison gas.\n\n- Perfidy:  The law of war provides certain visual and electronic symbols to identify persons and property that are protected from attack.  Among these are prisoners of war and prisoner of war camps, the wounded and sick, and medical personnel, vehicles, aircraft, and vessels.  Any misuse of these protected symbols to immunize a lawful military target from attack constitutes the war crime of perfidy.   Suppression of such acts is necessary to preserve the effectiveness of such symbols, since known misuse may lead the combatants to disregard them.  For similar reasons, it is unlawful to feign surrender, illness, or death to gain an advantage in combat, as well as to broadcast a false report of a cease-fire or armistice.\n\n- Neutrality:  Nations not engaged in a conflict may declare themselves to be neutral.  A neutral nation is entitled to immunity from attack by the belligerents, so long as the neutral nation satisfies its obligation not to assist either side.  If a neutral nation is unable or unwilling to halt the use of its territory by one of the belligerents in a manner that gives it a military advantage, the other belligerent may have a right to attack its enemy in the neutral's territory.  There is considerable support for the argument that the concept of neutrality has no application during a conflict in which one of the belligerents is a nation or coalition of nations authorized by the UN Security Council to use armed force to protect or restore international peace and security.  This conclusion is based upon Article 49 of the Charter, which provides, \"The Members of the United Nations shall join in affording mutual assistance in carrying out the measures decided upon by the Security Council.\"  In other situations, however, as when a nation uses armed force in individual or collective self-defense without the benefit of a Security Council mandate, it would appear that nations not involved in the conflict retain the option of declaring themselves to be neutral.\n\n## B.  Application To Information Operations.\n\nIt is by no means clear what information operations techniques will end up being considered to be \"weapons,\"  or what kinds of information operations will be considered to constitute armed conflict.  On the other hand, those issues may not end up being particularly important to the analysis of law of war issues.  If the deliberate actions of one belligerent cause injury, death, damage, and destruction to the military forces, citizens, and property of the other belligerent, those actions are likely to be judged by applying traditional law of war principles.\n\n- Distinction of combatants from noncombatants:  This rule grew up when combatants could see each other and make a judgment of whether or not to open fire based in part on whether or not the individual in the sights wore an enemy uniform.\n\nWhen the unit of combat came to be a vessel, tank, truck, or aircraft, it became more important that such vehicles be properly marked than that their occupants wear a distinctive uniform.  If a computer network attack is launched from a location far from its target, it may be of no practical significance whether the \"combatant\" is wearing a uniform.  Nevertheless, the law of war requires that lawful combatants be trained in the law of war, that they serve under effective discipline, and that they be under the command of officers responsible for their conduct.  This consideration argues for retaining the requirement that combatant information operations during international armed conflicts be conducted only by members of the armed forces.  If combatant acts are conducted by unauthorized persons, their government may be in violation of the law of war, depending on the circumstances, and the individuals concerned are at least theoretically subject to criminal prosecution either by the enemy or by an international war crimes tribunal.  The long-distance and anonymous nature of computer network attacks may make detection and prosecution unlikely, but it is the firmly established policy of the United States that U.S. forces will fight in full compliance with the law of war.\n\n- Military necessity: In developed nations both military and civilian infrastructures are vulnerable to computer network attacks.  During an armed conflict virtually all military infrastructures will be lawful targets, but purely civilian infrastructures must not be attacked unless the attacking force can demonstrate that a definite military advantage is expected from the attack.  Stock exchanges, banking systems, universities, and similar civilian infrastructures may not be attacked simply because a belligerent has the ability to do so.  In a long and protracted conflict, damage to the enemy's economy and research and development capabilities may well undermine its war effort, but in a short and limited conflict it may be hard to articulate any expected military advantage from attacking economic targets. Targeting analysis must be conducted for computer network attacks just as it traditionally has been conducted for attacks using traditional weapons.\n\n- Proportionality:  During Desert Storm, one of the earliest targets of the coalition bombing campaign was the electrical power system in Baghdad.  Considering the important military uses being made of electricity from that system, it was clearly a lawful military target.  The Iraqi government then made a public pronouncement that the coalition's attack on the city's electrical power system constituted an act of attempted genocide.  The logic of this position was that the city's sewage system depended on electric pumping stations, so when the electricity went out the sewage system backed up and created a threat of epidemic disease.  No one took this claim very seriously, but this incident highlights the fact that when an attack is made on an infrastructure that is being used for both military and civilian purposes the commander will not be in a proper position to weigh the proportionality of the expected military advantage against the foreseeable collateral damage unless the commander has made a reasonable effort to discover whether the system is being used for civilian purposes that are essential to public health and safety.  This principle operates in exactly the same way whether the attack is carried out using traditional weapons or in the form of a computer network attack.\n\nAs stated above, the law of war places much of the responsibility for collateral damage on a defending force that has failed to properly separate military targets from noncombatants and civilian property.  When military officials decide to use civilian infrastructure for military purposes (or vice-versa), they ought to consider the fact that such action may make that infrastructure a lawful military target.  There may be no choice, as when military traffic has to move on civilian highways and railroads.  There may be little alternative to military use of civilian communications systems,  since it is impractical to put into place dedicated military communications systems that have sufficient capacity to carry all military communications.  Where there is a choice, however, military systems should be kept separate from infrastructures used for essential civilian purposes. Military command and control systems have long been recognized as lawful military targets.  Civilian media generally are not considered to be lawful military targets, but circumstances may make them so.  In both Rwanda and Somalia, for example, civilian radio broadcasts urged the civilian population to commit acts of violence against members of other tribes, in the case of Rwanda, or against UN-authorized forces providing humanitarian assistance, in the case of Somalia.  When it is determined that civilian media broadcasts are directly interfering with the accomplishment of a military force's mission, there is no law of war objection to using the minimum necessary force to shut them down.  The extent to which force can be used for purely psychological operations purposes, such as shutting down a civilian radio station for the sole purpose of undermining the morale of the civilian population, is an issue that has yet to be addressed authoritatively by the international community.\n\n- Superfluous injury:  We are not aware that any weapon or device yet conceived specifically for use in information operations has any potential for causing superfluous injury, but new systems should always be reviewed with an eye to their potential for causing catastrophic and untreatable injuries to human beings to an extent not required by military necessity.\n\n- Indiscriminate weapons:  The prohibition on indiscriminate weapons may apply to information operations techniques such as malicious logic, as when malicious logic launched against a military information system spreads to other information systems being used to provide essential services to noncombatants.  It might also apply if malicious logic spreads to information systems belonging to neutral or friendly nations. Finally, it might be applied indirectly if the consequence of a computer network attack is to release dangerous forces, such as opening the floodgates of a dam, causing an oil refinery in a populated area to explode in flames, or causing the release of radioactivity.\n\n-  Perfidy:  It may seem attractive for a combatant vessel or aircraft to avoid being attacked by broadcasting the agreed identification signals for a medical vessel or aircraft, but such actions would be a war crime.  Similarly, it might be possible to use computer \"morphing\" techniques to create an image of the enemy's chief of state informing his troops that an armistice or cease-fire agreement had been signed.  If false, this would also be a war crime.\n\n-  Neutrality:  If a neutral nation permits its information systems to be used by the military forces of one of the belligerents, the other belligerent generally has a right to demand that it stop doing so.  If the neutral refuses, or if for some reason it is unable to prevent such use by an belligerent, the other belligerent may have a limited right of selfdefense to prevent such use by its enemy.  It is quite foreseeable, for example, that a belligerent might demand that a neutral nation not provide satellite imagery of the belligerent's forces to its enemy, or that the neutral cease providing real-time weather information or precision navigation services. There appears, however, to be a limited exception to this principle for communications relay systems.  The primary international agreement concerning neutrality,  the 1907\nHague Convention Respecting the Rights and Duties of Neutral Powers and Persons in Case of War on Land, to which the United States is a party, provides in Articles 8 and 9 that \"A neutral Power is not called upon to forbid or restrict the use on behalf of the belligerents of telegraph or telephone cables or of wireless telegraph apparatus belonging to it or to Companies or private individuals,\" so long as such facilities are provided impartially to both belligerents.    The plain language of this agreement would appear to apply to communication satellites as well as to ground-based facilities.\n\nThere is nothing in this agreement, however, that would suggest that it applies to systems that generate information, rather than merely relay communications.  These would include the satellite imagery, weather, and navigation systems mentioned above, as well as other kinds of intelligence-producing systems such as signals intelligence and hydrophonic systems.  For example, if a belligerent nation demanded that the U.S. government deny GPS navigation services to its enemy, and if the U.S. were unable or unwilling to comply, the belligerent may have the right to take necessary and proportional acts in self-defense, such as jamming the GPS signal in the combat area. International consortia present special problems.  Information systems built around space-based components require such huge investments and access to such advanced technology that even developed nations prefer to share the costs with other nations. Where an international communications system is developed by a military alliance such as NATO, few neutrality issues are likely to arise.  Other international consortia, however, provide satellite communications and weather data that are used for both civilian and military purposes, and they have a breath of membership that virtually guarantees that not all members of the consortium will be allies in future conflicts.  Some current examples are INTELSAT, INMARSAT, ARABSAT, EUTELSAT, and EUMETSAT. The members of some these consortia have attempted to deal with the possibility that one or more of the member nations will be involved in an armed conflict by limiting the use that may be made of the system during armed conflict.  The INMARSAT agreement, for example, provides that the mobile communications service provided by the system may be used \"exclusively for peaceful purposes.\"  This provision provides less than a perfect solution, however, since the member nations and the INMARSAT staff have concluded that this language permits use of INMARSAT by UN peacekeeping or peacemaking forces acting under the auspices of the UN Security Council, even if they are engaged in armed conflict to accomplish their missions. C.  Assessment.  There are novel features of information operations that will require expansion and interpretation of the established principles of the law of war. Nevertheless, the outcome of this process of extrapolation appears to be reasonably predictable.  The law of war is probably the single area of international law in which current legal obligations can be applied with the greatest confidence to information operations.\n\n## Iii.  International Legal Regulation Of The Use Of Force In \"Peacetime\" A.  International Law Concerning The Use Of Force Among Nations.\n\nAs discussed above, the law of war authorizes a nation engaged in an international armed conflict to employ armed force to attack lawful military targets belonging to the enemy.  Resolutions of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) may also authorize the use of armed force as provided in the UN Charter.  The focus of this section, however, is on the application of international law principles in circumstances where there is neither a state of armed conflict nor a UNSC mandate - i.e., in peacetime, including the conduct of military operations other than war.\n\nAn exploration of the manner in which international law on the use of force among nations is likely to apply to peacetime computer intrusions will serve three distinct purposes: (1) it will enable a government that is resolved to conduct itself in scrupulous compliance with international law to avoid activities that are likely to be regarded by the target nation and the world community as violations of international law; (2) it will enable a government contemplating activities that might be considered to violate international law to weigh the risks of such actions; and (3) it will enable a government that is the victim of an information attack to identify the remedies afforded to it by international law, including appeals to the Security Council, the use of force in self-defense, and other selfhelp remedies not involving the use of force.\n\nThe frequently-heard question, \"Is a computer network attack an **act of war**?\"\ninvokes an obsolete concept not mentioned in the UN Charter and seldom heard in modern diplomatic discourse.  An act of war is a violation of another nation's rights under international law that is so egregious that the victim would be justified in declaring war.  Declarations of war have fallen into disuse, and the act of war concept plays no role in the modern international legal system.  In any event, significant sanctions may follow from much less serious violations of another nation's rights that would not be regarded as acts of war.\n\nThe members of the United Nations have agreed in Article 2 (4) of the UN\nCharter to \"refrain in their international relations from **the threat or use of force** against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.\"\nThis obligation is elaborated in the Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, General Assembly Resolution 2625 (1970), which provides in part:\n\n-\n\"A **war of aggression** constitutes a crime against the peace for which there is\nresponsibility under international law.\"\n-\n\"States have a duty to refrain from **acts of reprisal involving the use of force**.\"\n-\n\"Every State has the duty to refrain from organizing, instigating, assisting or\nparticipating in acts of civil strife or terrorist acts in another State or acquiescing\nin organized activities within its territory directed towards the commission of such\nacts, when the acts referred to in the present paragraph involve a threat or use of\nforce.\"\n-\n\"Nothing in the foregoing paragraphs shall be construed as enlarging or diminishing in any way the scope of the provisions of the Charter concerning cases in which the\nuse of force is lawful.\"\nNOTE:  The United States has often expressed the view that most General Assembly resolutions are only recommendations, but that in exceptional cases particular General Assembly resolutions that are meant to be declaratory of international law, are adopted with the support of all members, and are observed by the practice of states, are persuasive evidence of customary international law on a particular subject.  Representatives of the United States have on several occasions publicly endorsed the Declaration on Friendly Relations as one of the few General Assembly resolutions that the United States regards as an authoritative restatement of customary international law, at least until the practice of states fails to demonstrate that they consider its principles to be legally binding. In its 1974 \"Definition of Aggression\" Resolution, the General Assembly further provided:\n\n-\nArticle 1.  **Aggression** is the **use of armed force** by a State against the sovereignty,\nterritorial\n      integrity or political independence of another State, or in any other manner\ninconsistent with\n      the Charter of the United Nations, as set out in this Definition.\n-\nArticle 2.  The **first use of armed force** by a State in contravention of the Charter\nshall constitute prima facie evidence of an act of aggression although the Security Council may, in conformity with the Charter, conclude that a determination that an act of aggression has been committed would not be justified in the light of other relevant circumstances, including the fact that the acts concerned or their consequences are not of sufficient gravity.\n-\nArticle 3.  Any of the following acts, regardless of a declaration of war, shall, subject\nto and in accordance with the provisions of Article 2, qualify as an **act of aggression**: (a) The **invasion or attack by the armed forces** of a State of the territory of another\nState, or any military occupation, however temporary, resulting from such invasion or\nattack, or any **annexation by the use of force of the territory** of another State or\npart thereof;\n(b) **Bombardment by the armed forces** of a State against the territory of another\nState or the **use of any weapons** by a State **against the territory** of another State;\n(c) The **blockade of the ports or coasts** of a State **by the armed forces** of another\nState;\n(d) An **attack by the armed forces** of a State on the land, sea or air forces, or\nmarine and air fleets of another State;\n(e) The use of armed forces of one State which are within the territory of another State with the agreement of the receiving State, in contravention of the conditions provided for in the agreement or any extension of their presence in such territory beyond the termination of the agreement; (f) The action of a State in allowing its territory, which it has placed at the disposal of\nanother State, to be used by that other State for perpetrating an act of aggression\nagainst a third State;\n(g) The **sending** by or on behalf of a State of armed bands, groups, irregulars or\nmercenaries, which carry out acts of armed force against another State of such\ngravity as to amount to the acts listed above, or its substantial involvement therein.\nNOTE:  The United States delegation noted that the text of this resolution reflected hard bargaining among the 35 states that were members of the Special Committee on the Question of Defining Aggression.  After the resolution was adopted by the General Assembly without a vote, the U.S. delegation stated the view that the resolution did not establish rights and obligations of states, but that it was \"likely to provide useful guidance\" to the Security Council.  Translated, this statement appears to indicate that the United States does not regard the language of this resolution as a completely authoritative restatement of customary international law, but that its essential concepts are correct.  In any event, the question of what constitutes an \"act of aggression\" is unlikely to be as useful for our purposes as is the question, what kinds of information attacks are likely to be considered by the world community to be \"armed attacks\" and \"uses of force.\"\nTurning to the question of when force may lawfully be used by nations, the United Nations Charter provides that in some circumstances the Security Council may authorize the use of coercive measures, including military force:\n\n-\nArticle 39.  The Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat to the\npeace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression and shall make recommendations,\nor decide what measures shall be taken in accordance with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore international peace and security.\n-\nArticle 41.  The Security Council may decide what measures not involving the use of armed force are to be employed to give effect to its decisions, and it may call upon the Members of the United Nations to apply such measures.  These may include complete or partial interruption of economic relations and of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio, and other means of communication, and the severance of diplomatic relations.\n-\nArticle 42.  Should the Security Council consider that measures provided for in Article 41 would be inadequate or have proved to be inadequate, it may take such\naction by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore\ninternational peace and security.  Such action may include demonstrations, blockade, and other operations by air, sea, or land forces of Members of the United Nations.\nPerhaps most significantly, the Charter also provides in Article 51, \"Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an **armed attack** occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security.\"\nRead together, these provisions of the Charter and the related General Assembly resolutions provide a myriad of terms and concepts concerning prohibited uses of force among nations, including the threat or use of force, acts of aggression, wars of aggression, the use of armed force, acts of armed force, invasion, attack, bombardment, and blockade.  These acts may be directed at the victim nation's territorial integrity or political independence, or against its military forces or marine or air fleets.  They all have in common the presence of troops and the use of traditional military weapons.  The question before us is how they are likely to apply to computer network attacks.\n\nFurther, when one looks for provisions describing a sanction or remedy, only two provisions present themselves: the authority of the Security Council to authorize various sanctions, including the use of the members' armed forces, when it finds there is a \"threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression;\" and Article 51's recognition of the inherent right of self defense \"if an armed attack occurs.\"\nThere is no requirement that a \"threat to the peace\" take the form of an armed attack, a use of force, or any other condition specified in the charter.  The Security Council has the plenary authority to conclude that virtually any kind of conduct or situation constitutes a \"threat to the peace\" in response to which it can authorize remedial action of a coercive nature.  Nothing would prevent the Security Council from finding that a computer network attack was a \"threat to the peace\" if it determined that the situation warranted such action.  It seems unlikely that the Security Council would take action based on an isolated case of state-sponsored computer intrusion producing little or no damage, but a computer network attack that caused widespread damage, economic disruption, and loss of life could well precipitate action by the Security Council.  The debate in such a case would more likely center on the offender's intent and the consequences of the offending action than on the mechanism by which the damage was done.\n\nThe language of Article 51, on the other hand, requires an \"armed attack.\"  A close parsing of the language would tend to limit its effect to attacks and invasions using traditional weapons and forces.  On the other hand, there is a well-established view that Article 51 did not create the right of self-defense, but that it only recognized a preexisting and inherent right that is in some respects broader than the language of Article 51.\n\nHistory has also seen the emergence of such derivative doctrines as \"anticipatory selfdefense\" and \"self-defense in neutral territory,\" both of which have been relied upon by the United States in certain circumstances.  \"Anticipatory self-defense\" permits a nation to strike the first blow if it has good reason to conclude that it is about to be attacked. The JCS Standing Rules of Engagement implement this doctrine in their authorization of the use of force in response to a demonstration of \"hostile intent\" by an adversary.  \"Selfdefense in neutral territory\" is the right to use force to neutralize a continuing threat located in the territory of a neutral state, but not acting on its behalf, when the neutral state is unable or unwilling to execute its responsibility to prevent the use of its territory as a base or sanctuary for attacks on another nation.  This doctrine has venerable roots in U.S. foreign and defense policy, dating at least to the *Caroline* incident.  In December\n1837, Canada, which was still a British colony, was fighting an insurrection.  More than 1,000 insurgents were encamped on both the Canadian and U.S. sides of the Niagara River.  A small steamer, the *Caroline*, was used by the insurgents to travel across and along the river.  On the night of December 19, 1837, a party of British troops crossed the Niagara and attacked the *Caroline* in the port of Schlosser, New York, setting the vessel on fire and casting it adrift over the Niagara Falls.  One U.S. citizen was killed on the dock, another was missing, and several others were wounded.  The United States demanded reparations.  The British Government responded that it had acted in selfdefense.  Secretary of State Daniel Webster agreed that the doctrine of self-defense in neutral territory was a valid principle of international law, but asserted that it did not apply in the circumstances of this case.  Britain continued to maintain that its action was legal, but nonetheless apologized for the invasion of U.S. territory.  No reparations were paid.\n\nIn 1986 the United States bombed Libya as a response to Libya's continuing support for terrorism against U.S. military forces and other U.S. interests.  In June 1993 U.S. forces attacked the Iraqi military intelligence headquarters because the government of Iraq had conspired to assassinate former President Bush.  In August 1998 U.S. cruise missiles struck a terrorist training camp in Afghanistan and a chemical plant in Sudan in which chemical weapons had been manufactured.  The rationale articulated for each of these actions was self-defense.  Acts of self-defense must satisfy the tests of necessity and proportionality, but there is no requirement that an act of self-defense use the same means as the provocation, that the object of the attack be either a similar type of target or the means used in the offending attacks, or that the action taken be contemporaneous with the provocation, particularly if the attacker is responding to a continuing course of conduct.\n\n## B.  Acts Not Amounting To The Use Of Force.\n\nIn its 1949 decision in the Corfu Channel Case, the ICJ ruled that the intrusion of British warships into Albanian territorial waters, which it found to have been without justification under any principle of international law, constituted a violation of Albania's territorial sovereignty.  The result seems to be recognition of a general international law of trespass, although the remedy may be limited to a declaratory judgment that the victim's rights have been violated.\n\nThe ICJ's predecessor, the Permanent Court of International Justice, in its 1928\nChorzow Factory Decision, declared that reparations were due to any nation whose rights under international law were violated by another nation.  This concept is often referred to as the doctrine of state responsibility.\n\nThere is also a general recognition of the right of a nation whose rights under international law have been violated to take **countermeasures** against the offending state, in circumstances where neither the provocation nor the response involves the use of armed force.  For example, an arbitral tribunal in 1978 ruled that the United States was entitled to suspend French commercial air flights into Los Angeles after the French had suspended U.S. commercial air flights into Paris.  Discussions of the doctrine of countermeasures generally distinguish between countermeasures that would otherwise be violations of treaty obligations or of general principles of international law (in effect, reprisals not involving the use of armed force) and retorsions - actions that may be unfriendly or even damaging, but which do not violate any international legal obligation. The use of countermeasures is subject to the same requirements of necessity and proportionality as apply to self-defense.  Some examples of countermeasures that have been generally accepted as lawful are the suspension of diplomatic relations, trade and communications embargoes, cutting off foreign aid, blocking assets belonging to the other nation, and prohibiting travel to or from the other nation.\n\nThe international law doctrines of self-defense, reprisal, and countermeasures all require that a nation invoking them do so with the intent of protecting itself against further harm, either by directly blocking further hostile acts against itself or by persuading its tormentor to cease and desist.  The motive must be protection of the nation or its citizens or other national interests from further harm - the satisfaction of extracting revenge, by itself, is not acceptable.  These doctrines also demand that a state do only what is necessary and proportional in the circumstances.\n\nIn summary, it appears that one trend in international law is to provide some kind of remedy for every violation of a nation's rights under international law.  Some of these remedies are in the nature of self-help, such as armed self-defense, the interruption of commercial or diplomatic relations, or public protest.  Other remedies may be sought from international institutions, such as an imposition of coercive measures by the Security Council, or a declaratory judgment or an order to make reparations from an international tribunal.  The issue for the victim is to choose the most effective available sanction.  The issue for a nation contemplating an action that may be considered to violate the rights of another nation under international law is to accurately predict what sanctions such action may provoke.\n\n## C.  Application To Computer Network Attacks.\n\nThere is no way to be certain how these principles of international law will be applied by the international community to computer network attacks.  As with other developments in international law, much will depend on how the nations and international institutions react to the particular circumstances in which these issues are raised for the first time.  If we were to limit ourselves to the language of Article 51, the obvious question would be, \"Is a computer network attack an 'armed attack' that justifies the use of force in self-defense?\"  If we focused on the means used, we might conclude that electronic signals imperceptible to human senses don't closely resemble bombs, bullets, or troops.  On the other hand, it seems likely that the international community will be more interested in the consequences of a computer network attack than in its mechanism.  It might be hard to sell the notion that an unauthorized intrusion into an unclassified information system, without more, constitutes an armed attack.  On the other hand, if a coordinated computer network attack shuts down a nation's air traffic control system along with its banking and financial systems and public utilities, and opens the floodgates of several dams resulting in general flooding that causes widespread civilian deaths and property damage, it may well be that no one would challenge the victim nation if it concluded that it was a victim of an armed attack, or of an act equivalent to an armed attack.  Even if the systems attacked were unclassified military logistics systems, an attack on such systems might seriously threaten a nation's security.  For example, corrupting the data in a nation's computerized systems for managing its military fuel, spare parts, transportation, troop mobilization, or medical supplies may seriously interfere with its ability to conduct military operations.  In short, the consequences are likely to be more important than the means used.\n\nIf the international community were persuaded that a particular computer network attack or a pattern of such attacks should be considered to be an \"armed attack,\" or equivalent to an armed attack, it would seem to follow that the victim nation would be entitled to respond in self-defense either by computer network attack or by traditional military means in order to disable the equipment and personnel that were used to mount the offending attack.  In some circumstances it may be impossible or inappropriate to attack the specific means used in an attack (e.g. because the specific equipment and personnel used cannot be reliably identified or located, or an attack on the specific means used would not be effective, or an effective attack on the specific means used might result in disproportionate collateral damage).   Where the specific means cannot be effectively attacked, any legitimate military target could be attacked, including intelligence and military leadership targets, as long as the purpose of the attack is to dissuade the enemy from further attacks or to degrade the enemy's ability to undertake them.\n\nThere has been some support for the proposition that a nation has an inherent right to use force in self-defense against acts that do not constitute a classic armed attack.  This view is supported by the inclusion in the General Assembly's definition of aggression of acts that do not entail armed attacks by a nation's armed forces, such as the unlawful extension of the presence of visiting forces, or allowing a nation's territory to be used by another state \"for perpetrating an act of aggression against a third State.\" (See pages 14-\n15 above).   U.S. practice also support this position, as demonstrated in the 1986 bombing of Libyan command and leadership targets to persuade Libya to stop sponsoring terrorist attacks against U.S. interests, and in the 1998 attack on the Iraqi military intelligence headquarters to persuade Iraq to desist from assassination plots against former President Bush.  A contrary view was expressed in the International Court of Justice's 1986 ruling in Nicaragua v. U.S. that the provision of arms by Nicaragua to the leftist rebels in El Salvador did not constitute an armed attack on El Salvador, so it could not form the basis of a collective self-defense argument that would justify armed attacks in response, such as laying of mines in Nicaraguan waters or certain attacks on Nicaraguan ports, oil installations and a naval base - acts that were \"imputable\" to the United States.  The Court also said it had insufficient evidence to determine whether certain cross-border incursions by Nicaraguan military forces into the territory of Honduras and Costa Rico constituted armed attacks.  The extent to which Nicaragua's conduct would justify El Salvador and its ally the United States in responding in ways that did not themselves constitute an armed attack was not before the Court.  The opinion of the court nevertheless provides some support for the proposition that the provocation must constitute an armed attack before it will justify an armed attack in self-defense.  It seems safe to say that the issue of whether traditional armed force may be used in self-defense in response to provocations that are not technically regarded as armed attacks is far from settled, and that the positions taken by states may be sharply influenced by the nature of the events concerned, together with all attendant policy and political considerations.\n\nBy logical implication, to the extent that a nation chooses to respond to a computer network attack by mounting a similar computer network attack of its own, the issue of whether the initial provocation constituted an armed attack may become a tautology.  If the provocation is considered to be an armed attack, the victim may be justified in launching its own armed attack in self-defense.  If the provocation is not considered to be an armed attack, a similar response will also presumably not be considered to be an armed attack.  Accordingly, the question of the availability of the inherent right of self-defense in response to computer network attacks comes into sharpest focus when the victim of a computer network attack considers acting in selfdefense using traditional military means.  The issue may also arise if the response causes disproportionately serious effects (e.g., if a state responded to a computer network attack that caused only minor inconvenience with its own computer network attack that caused multiple deaths and injuries).  As in all cases when a nation considers acting in selfdefense, the nation considering such action will have to make its best judgment on how world opinion, or perhaps a body such as the International Court of Justice (ICJ) or the UNSC, is likely to apply the doctrine of self-defense to electronic attacks.  As with many novel legal issues, we are likely to discover the answer only from experience.\n\nIt seems beyond doubt that any unauthorized intrusion into a nation's computer systems would justify that nation at least in taking self-help actions to expel the intruder and to secure the system against reentry.   An unauthorized electronic intrusion into another nation's computer systems may very well end up being regarded as a violation of the victim's sovereignty.  It may even be regarded as equivalent to a physical trespass into a nation's territory, but such issues have yet to be addressed in the international community.  Furthermore, the act of obtaining unauthorized access to a nation's computer system creates a vulnerability, since the intruder will have had access to the information in the system and he may have been able to corrupt data or degrade the operating system.  Accordingly, the discovery that an intrusion has occurred may call into question the reliability of the data and the operating system and thus reduce its utility.  If an unauthorized computer intrusion can be reliably characterized as intentional and it can be attributed to the agents of another nation, the victim nation will at least have the right to protest, probably with some confidence of obtaining a sympathetic hearing in the world community.\n\n## D.  An \"Active Defense\" Against Computer Network Attacks.\n\nA persistent foreign intruder who gains repeated unauthorized entry into a nation's computer systems by defeating a variety of security measures or who gains entry into a number of computer systems may demand a different response.  Such behavior may indicate both that there is a continuing danger and that coercive measures are necessary to stop the intruder's pattern of conduct.  Similarly, there may be a right to use force in self defense against a single foreign electronic attack in circumstances where significant damage is being done to the attacked system or the data stored in it, when the system is critical to national security or to essential national infrastructures, or when the intruder's conduct or the context of the activity clearly manifests a malicious intent.\n\nIf it is capable of doing so, in such circumstances the victim nation may be justified in launching a computer attack in response, intended to disable the equipment being used by the intruder.  Disabling one computer may or may not defeat a statesponsored operation.  It may, however, serve as a \"shot across the bow\" warning of more serious consequences if the offending behavior continues.  It is also an action unlikely to come to public attention unless one of the two governments announces it, making it a potentially useful measure for conflict avoidance.  Conducting a responsive computer network attack as a measure of self-defense against foreign computer network attacks would have the major advantage that it would minimize issues of proportionality, which would be more likely to arise if traditional military force were used, such as firing a cruise missile at the building from which a computer network attack is being conducted. Either response would likely be analyzed on the basis of the traditional criteria of necessity and proportionality.\n\nIf it is impractical to focus an attack on the equipment used in the provocation, any legitimate military target may be attacked.  The primary value of being able to demonstrate a nexus between the provocation and the response is to be able to argue the likely therapeutic effect of the force used in self-defense.  As a practical matter, the next most attractive target after the equipment used in the provocation may be the offending nation's communications systems, or its military or intelligence chain of command. The consequences of a large-scale campaign of computer network attacks might well justify a large-scale traditional military response.  A Russian academic took this argument to its extreme in a published statement to the effect that Russia reserves the right to respond to an information warfare attack with nuclear weapons.\n\nAs stated above, the discussion up to this point has assumed we know who an intruder is, and that we are confident in characterizing his intent.  In practice, this is seldom the case, at least in the early stages of responding to computer intrusions.  The above legal analysis may change if the identity and location of an intruder is uncertain, or if his intent is unclear.\n\nIdentification of the originator of an attack has often been a difficult problem, especially when the intruder has used a number of intermediate relay points, when he has used an \"anonymous bulletin board\" whose function is to strip away all information about the origin of messages it relays, or when he has used a device that generates false origin information.  Progress has been made, however, in solving the technical problem of identifying the originator of computer messages, and reliable identification of the computer that originated a message may soon be routinely available.  Attribution may also be provided by intelligence from other sources, or it might be reliably inferred from the relationship of the attack to other events.\n\nLocating the computer used by the intruder does not entirely solve the attribution problem, however, since it may have been used by an unauthorized person, or by an authorized user for an unauthorized purpose.  A parent may not know that the family computer is being used for unlawful attacks on government computer systems. Universities, businesses, and other government agencies may be similarly unaware that their computer systems are being misused.  The owner of a computer system may have some responsibility to make sure it is not being used for malicious purposes, but the extent of such responsibility, and the consequences of failing to meet it, have apparently not been addressed in any U.S. or foreign statute or court decision.  These considerations should make us cautious in implementing any \"active defense\" system for government computer systems.  Nevertheless, circumstances may arise in which the urgency of protecting critical information systems from serious damage may warrant adoption of a properly designed \"active defense.\"\nSimilarly, characterization of an intruder's intentions may be difficult.\n\nNevertheless, such factors as persistence, sophistication of methods used, targeting of especially sensitive systems, and actual damage done may persuasively indicate both the intruder's intentions and the dangers to the system in a manner that would justify use of an \"active defense.\"  As with attribution, there may be useful intelligence on this issue from other sources, or it may be possible to reliably infer the intent of the intruder from the relationship of the attack to other events.\n\nA determination that an intrusion comes from a foreign country is only a partial solution to the attribution problem, since the attack may or may not be state-sponsored. State-sponsored attacks may well generate the right of self-defense.  State sponsorship might be persuasively established by such factors as signals or human intelligence, the location of the offending computer within a state-controlled facility, or public statements by officials.  In other circumstances, state sponsorship may be convincingly inferred from such factors as the state of relationships between the two countries, the prior involvement of the suspect state in computer network attacks, the nature of the systems attacked, the nature and sophistication of the methods and equipment used, the effects of past attacks, and the damage which seems likely from future attacks.\n\nAttacks that cannot be shown to be state-sponsored generally do not justify acts of self-defense in another nation's territory.  States jealously guard their sovereign prerogatives, and they are intolerant of the exercise of military, law-enforcement, and other \"core sovereign powers\" by other states within their territory without their consent. When individuals carry out malicious acts for private purposes against the interests of one state from within the territory of a second state, the aggrieved state does not generally have the right to use force in self-defense against either the second state itself or the offending individual.  Even if it were possible to conduct a precise computer network attack on the equipment used by such individual actors, the state in which the effects of such an attack were felt, if it became aware of it, could well take the position that its sovereignty and territorial integrity had been violated.  The general expectation is that a nation whose interests are damaged by the private conduct of an individual who acts within the territory of another nation will notify the government of that nation and request its cooperation in putting a stop to such conduct.\n\nOnly if the requested nation is unwilling or unable to prevent recurrence does the doctrine of self-defense permit the injured nation to act in self-defense inside the territory of another nation.  The U.S. cruise missile strikes against terrorists camps in Afghanistan on 20 August 1998 provides a close analogy in which the United States attacked camps belonging to a terrorist group located in the territory of a state which had clearly stated its intention to continue to provide a refuge for the terrorists.  At some point, providing safe refuge for those who conduct attacks against another nation becomes complicity in those attacks.  At a minimum, the offended nation is authorized to attack its tormenters, the terrorists.  As complicity shades into the kinds of active support and direction that are commonly called \"state sponsorship,\" military and leadership targets of the host state may themselves become lawful targets for acts of self-defense.\n\nAttacks on insurgents or on terrorists and other criminals using a neutral nation's territory as a refuge may also be justified when the neutral state is unable to satisfy its obligations.  During the Vietnam war, the United States attacked North Vietnamese military supply lines and base camps in Cambodia after the Cambodian government took the position that it was unable to prevent North Vietnam from making such use of its territory.  This principle might justify using active defense measures against a computer intruder located in a neutral nation if the government of the neutral nation declared it had no way to locate the intruder and make him stop, or if its behavior made it clear that it could not or would not act, or even if the circumstances did not allow time for diplomatic representations to be effective.  As an analogy, it seems unlikely that a nation would complain very loudly if its neighbor nation returned fire against a terrorist sniper firing from its territory.\n\nIn summary, the international law of self-defense would not generally justify acts of \"active defense\" across international boundaries unless the provocation could be attributed to an agent of the nation concerned, or until the sanctuary nation has been put on notice and given the opportunity to put a stop to such private conduct in its territory and has failed to do so, or the circumstances demonstrate that such a request would be futile.   Nevertheless, in some circumstances the National Command Authority (NCA)\nmight decide to defend U.S. information systems by attacking a computer system overseas, and take the risk of having to make an apology or pay compensation to the offended government.  Among the factors the NCA would probably consider would be the danger presented to U.S. national security from continuing attacks, whether immediate action is necessary,  how much the sanctuary nation would be likely to object, and how the rest of the world community would be likely to respond.\n\nThere need be less concern for the reaction of nations through whose territory or communications systems a destructive message may be routed.   If only the nation's public communications systems are involved, the transited nation will normally not be aware of the routing such a message has taken.  Even if it becomes aware of the transit of such a message and attributes it to the United States, there would be no established principle of international law that it could point to as being violated.  As discussed above, even during an international armed conflict international law does not require a neutral nation to restrict the use of its public communications networks by belligerents.  Nations generally consent to the free use of their communications networks on a commercial or reciprocal basis.  Accordingly, use of a nation's communications networks as a conduit for an electronic attack would not be a violation of its sovereignty in the same way that would be a flight through its airspace by a military aircraft.\n\nA transited state would have somewhat more right to complain if the attacking state obtained unauthorized entry into its computer systems as part of the communications path to the target computer.  It would be even more offended if malicious logic directed against a target computer had some harmful effect against the transited state's own equipment, operating systems, or data.  The possibility of such collateral damage would have to be carefully considered by the state launching any such attack.  If there were a high potential for such collateral damage to transited systems, the weapon might even be considered to be an \"indiscriminate\" weapon incapable of being reliably directed against a legitimate target.\n\nThere are at least two ways in which the availability of improved technology may affect the active-defense equation.  First, it might be argued that as a government acquires the ability to build better firewalls and other security systems it will be harder to argue that an active defense is \"necessary.\" This argument might be raised even if the target government has failed to install all possible technological security measures on the system that is under attack.  This demanding approach to \"necessity\" finds little support in the practice of nations.  The focus of self-defense analysis is on events as they unfold, and not as they might have been if different budgeting and acquisition decisions had been made sometime in the past.  If such systems are in place, however, their apparent effectiveness should be taken into account in deciding whether active defense measures are necessary.  This does not mean that a nation has no right of self-defense where a first attempted intrusion fails, or even when a series of intrusions fail.  If an  attacker is permitted to continue mounting a campaign of such attacks it may learn by trial and error, it may employ other capabilities, or it may stumble onto a point of vulnerability.  Just as an infantry unit exercising the right of self-defense may pursue a force that breaks off an attack and attempts to retreat until the attacker ceases to be a threat, decisions on taking measures of self-defense against computer network attacks must take into account the extent to which an attacker continues to present a threat of continuing attacks.\n\nAnother possible implication of a defender's technological prowess may arise when a nation has the capacity for graduated self-defense measures.  Some may argue that a nation having such capabilities must select a response that will do minimal damage. This is a variant of the argument that a nation possessing precision-guided munitions must always use them whenever there is a potential for collateral damage.  That position has garnered little support among nations and has been strongly rejected by the United States.  There is broad recognition that the risk of collateral damage is only one of many military considerations that must be balanced by military authorities planning an attack. One obvious consideration is that a military force that goes into a protracted conflict with a policy of always using precision-guided munitions whenever there is any potential for collateral damage will soon exhaust its supply of such munitions.   Similarly, military authorities must be able to weigh all relevant military considerations in choosing a response in self-defense against computer network attacks.  These considerations will include the probable effectiveness of the means at their disposal, the ability to assess their effects, and the \"fragility\" of electronic means of attack (i.e., once they are used, an adversary may be able to devise defenses that will render them ineffective in the future). In the process of reasoning by analogy to the law applicable to traditional weapons, it must always be kept in mind that computer network attacks are likely to present implications that are quite different from the implications presented by attacks with traditional weapons.  These different implications may well yield different conclusions.\n\nIt may be possible to specify certain information systems that are vital to national security - both government systems and key civilian infrastructure systems.  This process should serve both to give such systems high priority for security measures and also to identify a class of systems any attack on which would immediately raise the issue of whether an active defense should be employed.  This should not, of course, eliminate consideration of using an active defense against attacks on systems not on such a  \"vital systems\" list where the circumstances justify such action.  For example, a vigorous attack that threatens to overwhelm an information system not on the \"vital systems\" list but that performs an important national security function could be a more valid occasion to use active defense measures than would be a trivial and easily defeated attack on a designated \"vital system.\"  A list of \"vital systems\" would serve primarily as a alert mechanism that would bring about a prompt high-level evaluation of all the circumstances.\n\nIn addition, it would be useful to create a process for determining when the response to a computer intrusion should shift from the customary law enforcement and counter-intelligence modes to a national defense mode.  Such a process should include (1) a statement of general criteria to be applied; (2) identification of officials or agencies that will be involved in making the decision; and (3) procedures to be followed.\n\nThere are of course a variety of  treaty obligations that will have to be considered before adopting an \"active defense\" against foreign computer network attacks, and these will be discussed below.  There are also a variety of domestic legal concerns that will have to be addressed, and these will be discussed in the companion assessment of domestic law issues in information operations. E.  Assessment.  It is far from clear the extent to which the world community will regard computer network attacks as \"armed attacks\" or \"uses of force,\" and how the doctrines of self-defense and countermeasures will be applied to computer network attacks.  The outcome will probably depend more on the consequences of such attacks than on their mechanisms.  The most likely result is an acceptance that a nation subjected to a statesponsored computer network attack can lawfully respond in kind, and that in some circumstances it may be justified in using traditional military means in self-defense.\n\nUnless the nations decide to negotiate a treaty addressing computer network attacks, which seems unlikely anytime in the near future, international law in this area will develop through the actions of nations and through the positions the nations adopt publicly as events unfold.  U.S. officials must be aware of the implications of their own actions and statements in this formative period.\n\n## Iv.  Space Law A.  Introduction\n\nInternational law regulating activities in outer space is important to the information operator because space segments are critical to so many important information systems.  These systems perform such functions as communications relay, imagery collection, missile warning, navigation, weather forecasting, and signals intelligence.  In fact, it can be said that at the current stage of space activity, the exclusive functions of both military and civilian satellites are to gather and relay information.  In the conduct of information operations, there will be strong imperatives to interfere with the space-based information systems belonging to an adversary, and to defend one's own.\n\nOne approach to attacking space systems is by targeting their ground stations.\n\nAnother approach is to jam or \"spoof\" their communications links.  Such actions are subject to the normal international law principles governing other terrestrial activity. Sometimes, however, it may be more effective to attack the satellite or satellites that form the space segment of the system.  As we will see, activities in space are subject both to general principles of international law and to a number of treaty obligations that apply specifically to space activities.\n\n## B.  Space Law Treaties\n\nThere is probably no other field of human endeavor that produced so much international law in such a short period.  Within twenty years after the first Sputnik launch in 1957, international diplomatic conferences produced four major widelyaccepted multilateral space law treaties.  Taken together, these treaties provide the foundations of existing space law. - The Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use Of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies  (the Outer Space Treaty, 1967)\n- The Agreement on the Rescue of Astronauts, Return of Astronauts, and the Return of Objects Launched into Outer Space (the Rescue and Return Agreement, 1968)\n- The Convention on International Liability for Damages Caused by Space Objects (the Liability Convention, 1972) - The Convention on the Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space (the Registration Convention, 1975) Note:  There is another treaty called the Moon Agreement of 1979 which the United States has never signed and which has attracted only 9 parties, among whom only France is active in space operations.  In addition, several provisions of the 1980 Environmental Modification Convention apply to space activity.  These agreements are not directly relevant to information operations, however, and they will not be discussed further here.\n\nThe four major space treaties together establish the following principles that are directly relevant to information operations.  These principles have been so widely accepted that they are generally regarded as constituting binding customary international law, even for non-parties to these agreements.\n\n-  Space is free for exploration and use by all nations.  It is not subject to national appropriation by claim of sovereignty, use, occupation, or any other means.\n\n- Activities in space shall be conducted with due regard for the interests of other states.\n\n- States that launch space objects are liable for any damage they may do in space, in the air, or on the surface of the Earth.  Different standards of liability are established for damage done to other items in space, for which a \"fault\" standard applies, and damage done on the surface of the Earth and to aircraft in flight, for which absolute liability applies.\n\n- Space activities are subject to general principles of international law, including the UN Charter.\n\nSeveral conclusions are apparent from these general principles.  The first is that the rules on the use of force discussed in Section III of this paper apply fully to activities in outer space.  Among these are that nations are obliged not to use force in their relations with each other unless they are acting in self-defense or when authorized to do so by the UN Security Council.  Once again, however, as with other forms of information operations, one has to consider what actions by or against objects in space will be considered to be uses of force.  The world community would probably not hesitate to regard as a use of force the destruction of a satellite by a missile or a laser.  It would probably react similarly if it could be proven that one nation took over control of another nation's satellite by electronic means and caused it to fire its retro rockets and fall out of orbit.  In such a case, the consequences will probably matter more than the mechanism used.  The reaction of the world community to lesser kinds of interference is hard to predict.  For example, if one nation were able by electronic means to suspend the operations of another nation's satellite for a brief period, after which it returned to service undamaged, it seems likely that the world community would consider such action as a breach of the launching nation's sovereign rights, but not as a use of armed force.\n\nOne could argue, however, that this argument is unimportant because the space treaties create a specific obligation not to interfere with the space activities of other nations, and to pay reparations for any damages resulting from such interference.  This argument appears to have considerable force, at least in peacetime.  During an international armed conflict between the two nations concerned, however, the law of armed conflict would apply unless it was trumped by the principle of noninterference with space systems.  Resolution of this issue depends largely on whether the four space treaties will be considered to apply during an armed conflict.  None of them has any specific provision that indicates whether the parties intended that the agreement apply in wartime.\n\nThere appears to be  a strong argument that the principle of noninterference established by these agreements is inconsistent with a state of hostilities, at least where the systems concerned are of such high military value that there is a strong military imperative for the adversary to be free to interfere with them, even to the extent of destroying the satellites in the system.  As indicated in the discussion of treaty law in the introduction to this paper, the outcome of this debate may depend on the circumstances in which it first arises in practice.  Nevertheless, it seems most likely that these agreements will be considered to be suspended between the belligerents for the duration of any armed conflict, as least to the extent necessary for the conduct of the conflict.\n\nIf the principle of noninterference is regarded as suspended for the period of the conflict, it also seems likely that the liability provisions in these agreements would also be suspended, at least between the parties.  This would not, however, excuse the belligerents from liability to neutral nations if their actions caused damage to their citizens or property\n\n## C.  Specific Prohibitions Of Military Activities In Space\n\nThere is a popular notion that military activities in space are prohibited - that space is a place a little closer to heaven into which the nations have agreed not to introduce weapons and human conflict.  There is a germ of truth in this notion, supported by high flights of rhetoric in international fora, but the existing treaty restrictions on military operations in space are in fact very limited.  These restrictions are included in both the space treaties listed above and in various arms control agreements.\n\nThe Outer Space Treaty provides that the parties will not \"place in orbit around the Earth any objects carrying nuclear weapons or any other kinds of weapons of mass destruction, install such weapons on celestial bodies [i.e., the moon, planets, and asteroids], or station such weapons in outer space in any other manner.\"  The treaty permits placing in orbit weapons other than nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction.   Also, the treaty contains no prohibition against nuclear weapons transiting outer space, as long as they do not enter into an earth orbit and they do not explode in outer space.\n\nThe Outer Space Treaty also prohibits the establishment of military bases, the testing of weapons, and the conduct of military maneuvers on the moon or other celestial bodies.  It permits these activities in orbit around the Earth, and in other places in outer space.  Similarly, there is no prohibition against establishing military space stations or operating other satellites with offensive or defensive capabilities.\n\nThe Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapons Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water (the Limited Test Ban Treaty, 1963) prohibits all nuclear explosions in outer space.  Accordingly, a party to this agreement may not lawfully explode a nuclear device in outer space in order to disable an adversary's satellites by means of the electromagnetic pulse generated by a nuclear explosion, or by its other effects.  A nation operating its own satellite systems is unlikely to take such an action in any event, since its own satellites would be subject to the same effects as those belonging to its adversary.\n\nThe *Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems* (the ABM Treaty,\n1972) provides that no party may \"develop, test or deploy space-based ABM systems or components.\"\nUnder a 1997 theater missile defense (TMD) agreement not yet ratified by the Senate, the United States and Russia have agreed not to place in space theater missile defense interceptor missiles \"or space-based components based on other physical principles, whether or not part of a system, that are capable of substituting for such interceptor missiles.\"\nA number of arms control agreements provide that no party will interfere with the others' \"national technical means of verification.\"  Translated, this means no interference with the orbiting imaging systems used to monitor the strategic arms of another party.\n\nRead together, these agreements permit the development, testing, and deployment of anti-satellite and satellite-defense systems unless they involve either the stationing or testing of nuclear devices in outer space or the orbiting of systems that also have ABM or ATM capabilities.  Their use is subject only to (1) the general principles of international law relating to the use of force; (2) the principle of non-interference with the space systems of other nations in peacetime, subject to the right to use force in self-defense and when authorized by the UN Security Council; (3) the law of war during international armed conflicts; and (4) obligations under relevant arms-control agreements not to interfere with other parties' national technical means of verification.  This leaves a very broad range of permissible \"space-control\" systems and operations.\n\nIn a non-nuclear conflict, the parties might very well determine that the treaty prohibitions against placing nuclear weapons in orbit, against exploding nuclear devices in outer space,  and against placing ABM components and ATM interceptors in orbit remain consistent with a state of limited armed conflict.  Those obligations may well serve to avoid escalation of the conflict to the nuclear level.  The parties' conclusions as to the obligation not to interfere with other parties' national technical means of verification will probably depend to a great extent on the circumstances of the conflict.\n\n## D.  Domestic Law And Policy.\n\nA federal statute, 18 USC 1367, makes it a felony to intentionally or maliciously interfere with a communications or weather satellite, or to obstruct or hinder any satellite transmission.  The application of this statute to national security information operations is discussed in the companion assessment of domestic legal issues.\n\nU.S. domestic policy on developing space control capabilities has been inconsistent at best.  By the early 1980s the U.S. Air Force had developed an anti-satellite missile with an explosive warhead that was carried aloft by an F-15 fighter and launched at high altitude.  A test of this system was conducted in 1985 against a U.S. satellite whose useful life had expired.  Congress soon thereafter decreed that no appropriated funds were to be used to test any weapon against an object in orbit.  In 1987 the USAF program was terminated.  At the time, it appeared that members of Congress voting for the ban had done so for a variety of reasons, among which were: (1) support for the broad principle that space should be free from human conflict; (2) dismay that the first test had generated 285 pieces of trackable space debris; (3) concern that further testing of an antisatellite capability might interfere with continuing strategic arms control negotiations; and (4) concern that the United States should not press ahead with testing an anti-satellite system when the nation had yet to decide where its own long-term interests lie. Concerning this last point, it was obvious that there is a military interest in being able to defend your own space systems and having the ability to interfere with your adversary's, but there was also a contrary consideration that the long-term interests of the United States - as the nation that depends most heavily on space systems - may be better served by promoting the development of a regime of international law that prohibits any interference by one nation with the space systems of another, and inhibits the acquisition of the capability to do so.  That fundamental debate has yet to be pursued to a definitive conclusion.\n\nLater, when public attention was drawn to the possible use of lasers as antisatellite weapons, Congress prohibited the use of appropriated funds to illuminate any object in orbit with a laser.  This restriction was removed in 1995.  In October 1997 the U.S. Army conducted a test in which it illuminated an Air Force satellite nearing the end of its useful life with the MIRACL laser, located at White Sands, New Mexico.  Despite public announcements that the purpose of the experiment was purely defensive in nature - to observe the effects of the laser on the satellite's optical sensors in order to better protect U.S. satellites from deliberate or accidental laser illumination - a public furor ensued.  Shortly thereafter President Clinton exercised his short-lived item veto authority to delete funds from the FY 98 DoD Authorization Act for development of an Army Kinetic Energy Anti-Satellite Missile and two other projects that he considered to be related to space control.  Congress approved additional funds for space control projects in the FY 1999 DoD Authorization Act and urged expenditure of the FY 98 funds that were restored after the Supreme Court ruled that the item veto was unconstitutional.\n\nAt this point, it seems fair to say that the United States has not arrived at a consensus on the fundamental policy issues concerning space control.  It seems likely for the near future that the development of such systems will continue, with renewed controversy to be expected as soon as a decision is imminent on the deployment, or even advanced testing, of an operational system.\n\n## E.  International Efforts To Control \"Weaponization Of Space\".\n\nOver the last decade there has been strong support in the UN General Assembly for negotiation in the Conference on Disarmament (CD) of a draft treaty banning weapons in space.  The most recent action by the General Assembly was its adoption on 4 December 1998 by a vote of 165-0-4 of a resolution entitled \"Prevention of an arms race in outer space.\"  This resolution calls for reestablishment by the CD of an Ad Hoc Committee on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space that existed in prior years. Canada and Egypt are actively promoting consideration of a \"no weapons in space\" treaty in the CD, but so far they have garnered little active support among the other CD\nmembers.  Both Russia and China have also announced their support for negotiations to ban \"weaponization of space,\" but neither has advanced a specific proposal with much vigor.  In summary, there appears to be widespread lukewarm support for the general idea of a treaty banning an \"arms race in space,\" but the subject enjoys a low priority at the moment and no draft treaty has garnered significant support.  This may all change if and when a nation or nations are known to have deployed operational space control systems, or are on the verge of doing so.\n\nChinese and Russian support for a ban on \"weaponization of space\" is seen in some quarters as ironic, since China is reported to be developing a ground-based antisatellite laser system and Russia is the only nation known to have once had an operational anti-satellite missile.  There have been a number of reports that the Soviet Union developed a \"co-orbital ASAT\" that was launched into orbit, where it maneuvered close enough to a target satellite to destroy the target by exploding.  Reportedly, the Soviet system was tested against objects in space 20 times and became operational in 1978. Russia consistently denied that it had tested or deployed such a system until September 1997, when press reports indicate that President Yeltsin said in a letter to President Clinton that Russia at one time possessed an anti-satellite capability, but that it had since \"renounced\" it.\n\n## F.  Assessment.\n\nThere is no legal prohibition against developing and using space control weapons, whether they would be employed in orbit, from an aircraft in flight, or from the Earth's surface.  The primary prohibition is against weapons that entail the placing of nuclear weapons in orbit or that would employ a nuclear explosion in outer space.  The use of space control systems in peacetime would be subject to both the general principles of international law and to treaty obligations not to interfere with other nations' space systems and national technical means of verification.  These obligations would probably be suspended during an international armed conflict, during which the parties' conduct would be governed primarily by the law of war.  U.S. domestic policy on space control, however, is at best unsettled.\n\n## V.  Communications Law A.  International Communications Law.\n\nInternational communications law consists primarily of a number of bilateral and multilateral communications treaties.  The most significant of these treaties is the International Telecommunications Convention of 1982 (ITC), which has over 140 parties and which became effective for the United States in 1986.  This agreement, often referred to as the Nairobi Convention, is the latest in a series of widely adhered to multilateral telecommunications conventions signed in this century, which were preceded by multilateral agreements in the late 1800s providing protection for submarine cables.  The current series of agreements establishes the International Telecommunication Union\n(ITU), which has the status of a specialized agency of the United Nations, and they invest the ITU with the authority to formulate telegraph and telephone regulations which become binding legal obligations upon formal acceptance by ITU member nations. These agreements also establish mutual legal obligations among the parties, several of which are directly relevant to information operations.\n\nPerhaps the most significant of these obligations is in Article 35, which provides that all radio \"stations, whatever their purpose, must be established and operated in such a manner as not to cause harmful interference to the radio services or communications of other Members or of recognized private operating agencies, which carry on radio service, and which operate in accordance with the provisions of the Radio Regulations.\" \"Harmful interference\" is defined in Annex 2 to the Convention as \"interference which endangers the functioning of a radio navigation service or of other safety services or seriously degrades, obstructs or repeatedly interrupts a radio communication service operating in accordance with the Radio Regulations.\"  One of the clearest violations of this provision would be the jamming or \"spoofing\" of a radio navigation service. Without speculating on all the possible permutations of the application of this provision to the broad range of information operations, suffice it to say that this provision on its face would appear to restrict many such operations that involve the use of radio broadcasting.\n\nOn the other hand, Article 38 of the ITC provides a specific exemption for military transmissions:  \"Members retain their entire freedom with regard to military radio installations of their army, naval and air forces.\"  In July 1994, when the United States was considering broadcasting messages to the Haitian people from U.S. military aircraft in international airspace urging them not to set out to sea in hazardous vessels, the Office of Legal Counsel in the Department of Justice relied on the military exemption in Article 38 as one of several bases for determining that the ITC does not prohibit such activity. Article 38 goes on to say, \"Nevertheless, these installations must, so far as possible, observe . . . the measures to be taken to prevent harmful interference, and the provisions of the Administrative Regulations concerning the types of emission and the frequencies to be used, according to the nature of the service performed by such installations.\"  While this provision indicates that military installations do not have carte blanche to interfere with civilian communications, the phrase \"so far as possible,\" read together with the specific exemption for military radio installations, provides considerable room for maneuver for information operations conducted by military forces.\n\nThe ITC also provides specific authority for its member nations to interfere with international telecommunications in certain circumstances:\n- Article 19 allows members to \"stop the transmission of any private telegram which may appear dangerous to the security of the State or contrary to their laws, to public order or to decency, provided that they immediately notify the office of origin of the stoppage of any such telegram or part thereof, except when such notification may appear dangerous to the security of the State.\"\n- Article 19 also permits members to \"cut off any other private telecommunications which may appear dangerous to the security of the State or contrary to its laws, to public order or to decency.\"\n- Article 20 reserves the right of members \"to suspend the international telecommunication service for an indefinite time, either generally or only for certain relations and/or certain kinds of correspondence, outgoing, incoming or in transit, provided that it immediately notifies such action to each of the other Members through the medium of the Secretary-General.\"\nFinally, it seems clear that the ITC's provisions apply primarily in peacetime.\n\nThe treaty does not specifically state how - if at all - it will apply during an armed conflict.  Nevertheless, there is ample precedent in which nations have demonstrated conclusively that they regard the provisions of international communications conventions as being suspended between belligerents engaged in armed conflicts.  Prior to the First World War, for example, all the major European nations were parties to the 1884 Convention for Protection of Submarine Cables.  The first day of the war, the British Navy pulled up and cut the five major submarine cables serving Germany.  Throughout all the wars of this century, communications facilities of all sorts have been regarded as priority military targets.  Since some of the parties to the ITC and other multilateral communications conventions are likely to be neutrals in armed conflicts between other nations, the result may become somewhat complicated.  Most ITC obligations will be considered to be suspended among the belligerents, but they will remain in effect between each belligerent and the neutral parties to the agreement, as well as among the neutral parties. Note:  The issue of the extent to which a neutral nation or an international communications consortium may continue to provide communications services to a belligerent is discussed in the law of war section of this paper.\n\nThe United States has not entered into bilateral communications agreements with very many nations, primarily because the ITC and the ITU provide a framework for handling most international communications issues.  As one might expect, the need for bilateral communications agreements has arisen for the United States primarily with Canada and Mexico, because of the potential for interference in broadcast communications across our common borders.   A number of bilateral communications agreements have also been negotiated between the United States and nations where U.S.\n\nmilitary forces are stationed.  There is a potential for such bilateral agreements to either restrict or facilitate information operations by U.S. military forces.  The agreements concerned should be consulted when such an issue arises.\n\n## B.  Domestic Communications Law.\n\nThe ITC and its predecessors obligate each Member nation to suppress acts by individuals or groups within its territory that interfere with the communications of other members.  In partial satisfaction of this obligation, in 1934 Congress enacted 47 USC\n502, which provides, \"Any person who willfully and knowingly violates any rule, regulation, restriction, or condition . . . made or imposed by any international radio or wire communications treaty or convention, or regulations annexed thereto, to which the United States is or may hereafter become a party, shall, in addition to any other penalties provided by law, be punished, upon conviction thereof, by a fine of not more than $500 for each and every day during which such offense occurs.\"  In October 1993, when the United States was considering broadcasting radio messages to the people of Haiti supporting the return of democracy in that nation, the Office of Legal Counsel of the Department of Justice issued a written opinion to the effect that 47 USC 502 does not apply to the actions of U.S. military members executing the instructions of the President acting within his constitutional powers to conduct foreign policy and to serve as Commander-in-Chief of U.S. military forces.  Further discussion of this statute can be found in the companion assessment of domestic legal issues in information operations. C.  Assessment.  International communications law contains no direct and specific prohibition against the conduct of information operations by military forces, even in peacetime.  The established practice of nations provides persuasive evidence that telecommunications treaties are regarded as suspended among belligerents during international armed conflicts.  Domestic communications laws do not prohibit properly authorized military information operations.  Accordingly, neither international nor domestic communications law presents a significant barrier to information operations by U.S. military forces.\n\n## Vi.  Implications Of Other Treaties\n\nThe State Department's most recent published list of international agreements to which the United States is a party, *Treaties in Force*, January 1, 1997, is 485 pages long.\n\nThe United States is a party to literally thousands of multilateral and bilateral international agreements.  From their sheer numbers, one would think it inescapable that lurking somewhere in those agreements are provisions that will affect particular information operations activities.  This section attempts only to highlight certain kinds of \"typical\" agreements that are likely to contain obligations relevant to the conduct of information operations. A.  Mutual Legal Assistance Agreements.  Mutual legal assistance agreements\n(sometimes called judicial assistance agreements) obligate each party to gather and provide evidence located in its territory concerning litigation or criminal prosecutions that occur within the jurisdiction of another party requesting such assistance.  The United States is a party to several dozen mutual legal assistance agreements.  Some of these agreements apply only to the management of particular litigation or to certain types of offenses such as drug trafficking and money laundering.  Only a few mutual legal assistance agreements apply broadly to all law enforcement investigations and prosecutions.   Such an agreement may supply the only domestic legal authority for the assisting party to investigate offenses that did not occur within its jurisdiction, and it also establishes procedures that expedite the requested assistance.  To be effective in helping to suppress computer crimes and other high-tech offenses, mutual legal assistance agreements must either expressly cover such offenses or they must apply broadly to all crimes. B.  Extradition Agreements.  Extradition agreements obligate the parties in certain circumstances to deliver persons accused of crime to the other party for criminal prosecution.  The United States is a party to more than a hundred bilateral extradition treaties, as well as to a 1933 Convention on Extradition to which thirteen nations in the Americas are parties.  If no extradition treaty is in effect, a national government often will have neither an international obligation nor the domestic authority to deliver custody of an individual to another nation for the purpose of prosecution.  It is important that the list of offenses covered by such agreements include computer intrusions and other hightech crimes.  In addition, the  effectiveness of extradition treaties is often frustrated by provisions providing that the requested nation will not extradite its own citizens, or that it will not extradite persons who commit crimes for political reasons. NOTE:  The Department of Justice has undertaken a major initiative with the \"G8\" countries (the other seven being the United Kingdom, Germany, Japan, Italy, Canada, France, and Russia) to modernize the domestic criminal law of each nation to adequately provide for the investigation and prosecution of computer intrusions and other high-tech crimes, and to put into place any needed improvements to international agreements providing for mutual legal assistance and extradition.  In December 1997 the Attorney General hosted a meeting of the G8 Justice and Interior Ministers to discuss these issues, and a number of follow-up working group meetings have been held since that time.  The United States has also participated in a project undertaken by the Council of Europe to draft an international convention on \"cyber-crime.\"  Recently the United States undertook similar efforts in the Organization of American States and at the United Nations.\n\nC.  The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).  Many provisions of this treaty, which is before the Senate for advice and consent, are considered to express customary international law.  Some of the provisions discussed here are among them, and are therefore considered to be binding on all nations whether or not they are parties to the Convention.  Others constitute new obligations.  One principle widely accepted as existing customary international law is the obligation in Article 19 for a vessel exercising the right of innocent passage through a nation's territorial sea not to engage in activities \"prejudicial to the peace, good order, or security of the coastal State.\"  The prejudicial activities listed in Article 19 include:\n\"-  any threat or use of force against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or political independence of the coastal State, or in any other manner in violation of the principles of international law embodied in the Charter of the United Nations -  any act aimed at collecting information to the prejudice of the defence or security of the coastal State -  any act of propaganda aimed at affecting the defence or security of the coastal State\n-  any act aimed at interfering with any systems of communication or any other facilities or installations of the coastal State\" Once UNCLOS is in general effect, these restrictions on activities aboard vessels in a coastal state's territorial sea will be of relatively minor importance because UNCLOS limits the width of the territorial sea a nation can claim to twelve nautical miles.  At present, a number of nations claim territorial seas as wide as 200 miles.  The twelve-mile limitation on the width of the territorial sea, together with other important guarantees UNCLOS establishes for the free operation of military aircraft and vessels, have led DoD\nto strongly support ratification of UNCLOS.\n\nArticle 109 of UNCLOS  provides that all \"States shall co-operate in the suppression of unauthorized broadcasting from the high seas\" and defines unauthorized broadcasting, for the purposes of the Convention, as \"the transmission of sound radio or television broadcasts from a ship or installation on the high seas intended for reception by the general public contrary to international regulations.\"  The international regulations referred to consist primarily of the provisions of the Nairobi Convention and the ITU's Radio Regulations discussed in section V of this paper.  This provision, which is generally regarded as establishing new law, was designed to deal with \"pirate radio\" broadcasting from vessels and platforms on the high seas, which became a significant problem for a number of countries in the 1960s.  These broadcasts were primarily commercial in nature; by operating from the high seas they escaped the coastal state's regulation and taxation.  Article 109 confers jurisdiction to prosecute persons engaged in pirate radio broadcasts upon the state whose flag the ship flies, the state where a broadcasting installation is registered, the state of which the broadcasting person is a citizen, any state where the transmissions can be received, and any state where authorized radio communication is suffering interference.  Article 109 also provides that any state having jurisdiction to prosecute may \"arrest any person or ship engaged in unauthorized broadcasting and seize the broadcasting apparatus.\"\nArticle 113 requires parties to adopt domestic criminal legislation punishing willful or culpably negligent damage to submarine cables belonging to other parties by ships or persons under their jurisdiction.\n\nThese UNCLOS provisions have the potential to affect only a narrow category of information operations, but they will have to be considered when decisions are made concerning those operations to which they do apply, at least in peacetime.  UNCLOS\ndoes not expressly address how it will apply during an international armed conflict.  In accordance with the general principles discussed in the introduction to this paper, provisions determined to be incompatible with a state of armed conflict will be regarded as suspended among the belligerents.  The established practice of nations leaves no doubt that Article 19's regime governing innocent passage through the territorial sea will be suspended between belligerents.  The same can be said with a high degree of confidence concerning Article 113's protections for submarine cables.  Article 109's provisions for the suppression of unauthorized radio broadcasting from the high seas are relatively new, with little established practice.  Analytically, there would seem to be little reason to suspend its application to commercial broadcasters during an armed conflict, but it would almost certainly not apply to broadcasts from the high seas conducted by a belligerent for military or diplomatic purposes. D.  Treaties on Civil Aviation.  The United States is a party to a number of treaties concerning civil aviation, the most significant of which is the 1944 Convention on International Civil Aviation.  This treaty, which has more than 180 parties, is often referred to as the Chicago Convention.  It establishes the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) and provides the basic legal framework for international civil aviation.  The Convention does not directly apply to state aircraft, except for the obligation stated in Article 3(d):  \"The contracting States undertake, when issuing regulations for their state aircraft, that they will have due regard for the safety of navigation of civil aircraft.\"  This concern for safe navigation by civil aircraft is also reflected in Article 28, which provides that each party will provide navigation and communications services as agreed upon through ICAO procedures, and in Article 37, which provides that the parties will comply with \"international standards and recommended practices and procedures\" on a variety of subjects including communications systems and air navigation aids.  Over the years the ICAO Council has developed and adopted 18 technical Annexes to the Chicago Convention.  Annex 10, Aeronautical Telecommunications, contains agreed provisions on aeronautical communications, navigation and surveillance.  While military aircraft are not directly bound by these provisions, their obligation of \"due regard\" for the safety of civil aircraft generally includes an obligation not to interfere with these systems.\n\nThe United States is currently engaged in negotiations in ICAO concerning the role to be played by the Global Positioning System in future navigation systems for international civil aviation.  In particular, an accommodation must be reached between ICAO's interest in ensuring that navigation services essential to the safety of international civil aviation are not interrupted during an armed conflict, and the military imperative for the United States to be able to deny the use of GPS to a military adversary.  Similar issues are certain to arise in the future in which information operations activities may create implications for the safety of international civil aviation.\n\nThe Chicago Convention is rare among multilateral treaties in that it has a specific provision concerning its application during armed conflict.  Article 89 provides, \"In case of war, the provisions of this Convention shall not affect the freedom of action of any of the contracting States affected, whether as belligerents or as neutrals.  The same principle shall apply in the case of any contracting State which declares a state of national emergency and notifies the fact to the Council.\"  Upon reflection, however, this provision is unlikely be applied as broadly as its language indicates.  It seems clear that many provisions of the Convention are inconsistent with a state of armed conflict.  The most obvious is the principle that aircraft not engaged in scheduled airline service have the right to free passage into or through the airspace of other parties.  Other provisions do not appear to be incompatible with a state of armed conflict among some of the parties.  For example, the existence of a state of armed conflict among certain parties should not be regarded as suspending the belligerents' obligation to carry out their combatant activities with due regard for the safety of civil aviation.  Accordingly, Article 89 does not provide much help in deciding what provisions of the Convention will remain applicable during an armed conflict, and resort will still be required to the general principle that only those obligations that are incompatible with a state of armed conflict will be suspended, and only among the belligerents. E.  Treaties on Diplomatic Relations.  The United States is a party to the 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, a widely adhered to treaty establishing obligations among its parties concerning the treatment of diplomatic personnel and premises.\n\nAmong the protections afforded a party's diplomatic mission in the territory of another state are the right to inviolability of the premises of the mission (Article 2); its \"archives and documents\" (Article 24); the private residences, papers, correspondence, and property of diplomatic agents (Article 30); and diplomatic communications (Article 27). The treaty further provides that the mission may communicate with its government and other missions and consulates of its government by \"all appropriate means, including diplomatic couriers and messages in code or cipher.  However, the mission may install and use a wireless transmitter only with the consent of the receiving State.\"  Conversely, the treaty imposes certain duties on diplomatic missions.  Article 41 provides that personnel of the mission must respect the laws and regulations of the receiving state, that they must not interfere in the receiving state's internal affairs, and that the \"premises of the mission must not be used in any manner incompatible with the functions of the mission as laid down in the present Convention or by other rules of general international law or by any special agreements in force between the sending and the receiving State.\"\nArticle 45 provides that the duties of the receiving state continue in force even in the case of armed conflict between the parties, or if diplomatic relations are broken off between them, even though the staff of the mission is recalled.  Planning for any information operations activity that involves diplomatic premises, persons, archives, documents, or communications, either as an instrument or as a target of the operation, must take into account these international legal obligations. F.  Treaties of Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation.  The United States is a party to a large number of bilateral agreements with other nations providing reciprocal arrangements for expedited tourism, trade, and transportation between the parties.  These agreements have various titles, and their provisions differ somewhat.  Most such agreements do not contain specific provisions on telecommunications, and they constitute perhaps the archetype of agreements that are likely to be regarded as suspended during an armed conflict because their provisions expediting free travel and trade between the parties are incompatible with hostilities between them.  Nevertheless, planning for information operations, especially in peacetime, should include a review of all significant international agreements between the United States and any other nation that may be affected. G.  Status of Forces and Stationing Agreements.  When the military forces of one nation are present in the territory of another nation with its consent, it is customary for the nations involved to execute written agreements establishing the rights and obligations of the parties concerning the visiting forces.  \"Stationing agreements\" establish the consent of the host nation to the presence of foreign troops; set agreed limits on their numbers, equipment, and activities; and identify facilities for their use.  These topics may also be dealt with in a \"defense cooperation agreement\" or some other agreement providing for the overall defense relationship between the parties.  It is also common for the parties to execute a \"status of forces\" agreement (SOFA) that addresses the allocation of various kinds of legal jurisdiction over the visiting forces.  The best known of these agreements is the 1951 Agreement Between the Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty Regarding the Status of Their Forces (NATO SOFA).   As of the end of 1998 the United States was a party to 103 SOFAs, most of which follow the general pattern of the NATO SOFA. SOFAs are necessary because of an overlap of legal jurisdiction exercised by the sending and receiving states.  The receiving state has jurisdiction over persons and activities in its territory, while the sending state has both the right and the duty to exercise control over its armed forces, which is clearly a core sovereign function.\n\nSince the full concurrent exercise of the normal jurisdiction of the sending and receiving states is impractical, status of forces agreements allocate criminal and civil court jurisdiction between the sending and receiving states, and also exempt the visiting force and its members from certain taxes, customs fees and procedures, immigration formalities, and most host nation licensing and inspection requirements.  Typically, an administrative claims procedure is established for personal injuries and property damage caused by the visiting force.  Another common provision requires that the visiting force and its members \"respect\" the host nation's laws. (This requirement will be discussed in detail in the next section of this paper).   The NATO SOFA is implemented in most NATO countries by separate, more detailed, bilateral supplementary agreements, and by numerous other bilateral agreements on specific subjects including communications.\n\nThese agreements contain provisions that must be taken into account if U.S.\n\nmilitary forces intend to engage in information operations activities while present in the territory of the receiving state.\n\n- For example, many such agreements require that the United States notify the host nation of any significant change in the capabilities or uses of installations made available for the use of U.S. military forces.  If U.S. authorities intend to conduct information operations activities from such installations, a determination must be made as to whether the relevant agreements require notifying the host nation, and perhaps even requesting its consent.\n\n- Stationing agreements often provide that the visiting U.S. forces may install and use various communications equipment, but they often provide as well that such equipment must not interfere with host nation communications systems and that it must be used in accordance with host nation laws and regulations.  If this equipment is to be used for information operations activities, it must be determined whether the contemplated activities are consistent with these obligations.\n\n- Many stationing agreements authorize or even obligate the visiting force to use the receiving state's military and civilian communications systems.  Commonly, there are obligations that any U.S. use of host nation communications systems must not cause interference and that such use must be in accordance with host nation laws and regulations.  The potential for information operations to cause interference with the host nation's communications system and the possible application of host nation laws and regulations must be carefully considered, along with the fact that the conduct of offensive information operations through host nation communications systems may subject them to possible countermeasures and acts of self-defense in peacetime, and may make them legitimate military targets during an armed conflict.\n\nFinally, if a host nation discovers that its territory and facilities have been used without its knowledge as a base for U.S. information operations of a nature that may tend to involve it against its will in a conflict or dispute, U.S. diplomatic and military relationships with the host nation are likely to suffer.  The host nation could well take the view that in principle there is little difference between using an ally's territory to launch air strikes and using it to launch computer network attacks or other information operations activities.   As a practical matter, computer network attacks are much more difficult to identify, trace, and attribute.  However, it will not always be impossible to do so, particularly when information on such attacks is available from intelligence sources. Accordingly, decisions concerning whether to conduct information operations from the territory of an ally, and especially whether to do so without the host nation's knowledge and consent, must be made at senior policy levels.\n\n## Vii.  Foreign Domestic Laws\n\nA.  Introduction.  Laws enacted by other nations may have important implications for information operations activities conducted by U.S. military forces.  As discussed in the companion assessment of domestic legal issues in information operations, U.S. criminal statutes addressing computer-related offenses, space activities, communications, and the protection of classified information all raise important issues for information operations. These U.S. statutes are part of the federal criminal code.  Similarly, foreign laws affecting U.S. information operations activities will most likely also consist of criminal statutes.\n\n The sophistication of foreign domestic law on high-tech activities varies enormously, and it will continue to do so for the foreseeable future.  The more technologically advanced countries tend to be better aware of the dangers created by computer hackers and other high-tech criminals, so they typically take the lead in putting legislation into place to criminalize such behavior.  It is no accident that the Justice Department's international program to promote appropriate changes to mutual legal assistance treaties and other nations' domestic laws, which was discussed in Section VI of this paper, concentrated first on the G8 countries and the Council of Europe.  There are other important variables at work besides technological advancement, however, including each nation's public opinion and policy positions concerning high-tech offenses, especially computer hacking.  There are persons in every country, including the United States, who regard hackers as essentially harmless pranksters.  There is a well-established minority view that the Internet and all the computer systems connected to it should be free game, and that defeating attempts to gain unrestricted access to these resources or imposing regulations on personal conduct on the Internet are repressive violations of the hackers' civil liberties.  The argument is even advanced that hackers provide valuable assistance to the operators of the computer systems they attack, by revealing vulnerabilities that otherwise might have been exploited by sinister persons with malicious motives.  On the international scene, there is the additional factor that many individuals love to see one of their fellow citizens succeed in pulling the tail of richer and more powerful nations, especially the United States.\n\nAs a result, the state of domestic laws dealing with high-tech misconduct varies enormously from country to country.  This has important implications for U.S. information operations for two basic reasons:  (1) The state of a nation's domestic criminal law directly impacts the assistance that the nation's public officials can provide in suppressing certain behavior by persons operating in its territory; and (2) The state of the nation's domestic criminal law may have a significant effect on U.S. information operations conducted in the nation's territory or involving communications routed through the nation's communications systems. B.  Cooperation in Investigations and Prosecutions.  It should be readily apparent that law enforcement officials cannot prosecute an individual for conduct that is not defined as a crime in the applicable criminal law.  It may be less obvious, but equally important, that in most constitutional governments law enforcement officials may not use their authority to conduct criminal investigations unless the alleged conduct constitutes a crime.  If a hacker in Country X uses the Internet to gain access to a DoD computer in the Pentagon, copies sensitive data, deletes or corrupts data, and installs malicious logic, the law enforcement officials of Country X may be able to assist in investigating that conduct and may be able to extradite the offender to the United States only if one or more of the hacker's actions constitute a crime under that nation's law.  Even where such legislation exists, the legal system may still not be able to provide either extradition or meaningful criminal punishment, as occurred in the case of a young Israeli hacker given a suspended sentence by an Israeli court after he participated in a series of unlawful intrusions into DoD computer systems in early 1998.\n\nThe domestic laws of some nations may also permit the use of devices specifically designed to frustrate attempts to trace Internet communications to their source.  Since geography is essentially irrelevant to communications on the Internet, devices such as anonymous remailers, which strip off all information about the originator of a message, make it possible for a hacker located anywhere - even in the United States or other country - to avoid identification by routing his or her message through the anonymous remailer.  In this way, weaknesses in the domestic law of one state may provide impunity to hackers everywhere.  The weakest link therefore threatens law enforcement even in countries with robust and sophisticated laws.  Accordingly, the imperative to bring domestic laws in every nation up to a reasonable standard should be readily apparent. C. Effect of Foreign Domestic Law on Actions of U.S. Information Operators.  If a CINC\nor a JTF commander decides to order execution of a certain information operations activity by forces under his or her command who are deployed in a foreign country, the commander may have to consider whether or not such activity is prohibited under local law.  The answer may be important at two different levels of analysis:  (1) The individuals who issue or execute such an order might be subject to prosecution in a host nation criminal court; and (2) The commander might feel obligated on a policy basis to refrain from issuing such an order.\n\nIf a U.S. military member issued an order or performed an act in the course of his or her official duties overseas that was a crime under host nation law, the member could very well be subject to prosecution in a host nation criminal court.  Under many SOFAs, an act done in the course of a military member's official duties falls within the primary right to exercise jurisdiction of the sending state, but that rule applies only when the conduct constitutes an offense under the law of both nations, or only under U.S. law. Where the conduct alleged constitutes an offense only under the law of the host nation, the host nation has exclusive jurisdiction to prosecute.  The United States has consistently taken the position that it would be intolerable for a U.S. military member to be criminally prosecuted for performing an act that is legal under applicable U.S. law, such as the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), and which he or she was instructed to perform in the execution of an official duty.  A similar issue arose recently in connection with the adoption by several NATO member nations of domestic laws making it a crime to possess anti-personnel land mines (APLs).  There is no similar crime under the UCMJ.\n\nIn several cases, the nations concerned have agreed to permit the U.S. forces to retain their APL stockpiles in the host nation's territory for at least some period of time.  In these cases, either specific exemptions from the host nation law or agreed screening procedures for prosecutions have had to be devised to prevent prosecutions of U.S.\n\nmilitary members for performing their official duties.\n\nA similar problem would arise in information operations if a host nation criminal law applied which had no counterpart under the UCMJ.  Such a situation may be much more likely to occur than it would seem at first glance.  If the host country has a reasonably sophisticated computer crimes law, it will probably cover a number of acts that may be performed as information operations activities, including using a computer to obtain unauthorized access to another computer, electronic communications, or data in storage; or to transmit malicious logic; or to interfere with a satellite or with the licensed radio communications of another party to the Nairobi Convention.  All these acts would appear to violate U.S. domestic statutes, but a U.S. military member will not be instructed to perform them unless a specific statutory exemption exists or the statute in question has been authoritatively interpreted as not applying to his or her actions.  (See the discussion of issues of statutory interpretation in the companion assessment of U.S. domestic legal issues in information operations.)  Accordingly, the host nation would have exclusive jurisdiction to prosecute.  The lesson we need to extract from this discussion is that as we busily encourage other national governments to enact effective legislation on high-tech crime, we need to ensure that such legislation provides an effective exemption for U.S. military forces who may be stationed in that country and who may be engaged in information operations.\n\nIn practice, such prosecutions are most unlikely because if U.S. military authorities become aware that performance of certain information operations within the territory of a specific host nation, or that produce harmful effects within its territory, will subject military personnel to possible host nation criminal prosecution, those U.S. military authorities are most unlikely to order that such operations be conducted.  The result will be that U.S. forces are unable to conduct certain activities they would otherwise conduct, or perhaps that they will have to use forces elsewhere to conduct the operation.  The issue thus becomes not so much one of the prospect of criminal prosecution of individual servicemembers but rather of a limitation on the conduct of U.S. information operations.\n\nThis consideration may be not only a policy issue - it may involve binding legal obligations under a status of forces or similar agreement.  For example, Article II of the NATO SOFA provides, \"It is the duty of a force and its civilian component and the members thereof as well as their dependents to respect the law of the receiving State . . . .\"  Similar language appears in most other SOFAs to which the United States is a party.\n\nConsiderable practice has accumulated concerning the application of this obligation to \"respect\" the law of the receiving state.  It has often been argued that the drafters could have said the visiting force must \"comply\" with host nation law but instead chose the less definite term \"respect.\"  The product of almost fifty years of U.S. practice in implementing SOFAs worldwide appears to be that U.S. visiting forces will generally observe the content of host nation law, but are exempt from the law's procedural requirements such as licensing, inspection, and reporting.  If U.S. visiting forces seek to avoid the application of the substance of a foreign law, they generally request the host nation to grant them a specific exemption or at least to reach an understanding that a particular host nation law will not be enforced against the visiting forces.\n\nIf a contemplated information operation activity appear to conflict with host nation law, the commander concerned might choose to consult with host nation officials in an effort to resolve the issue.  If time or other circumstances do not permit such consultations, the commander should carefully consider whether the activities in question should be conducted by forces outside the territory of the host nation concerned, and in a manner that would not make use of or affect that nation's communications systems.  U.S. military and diplomatic authorities  should be able to manage host nation legal issues if we identify them early on and carefully consider the available courses of action.\n\n## Viii.  Implications Of Espionage Law\n\nA brief review of the treatment of espionage under international law may be instructive in predicting how the international community will react to information operations, especially in those mission areas in which the same technical capabilities may be used for both espionage and information operations, and also in other areas where reasonably persuasive analogies present themselves. A.  Espionage under International Law.  For our present purposes, espionage may be defined as the covert collection of intelligence about other nations.  Espionage is a much narrower topic than \"intelligence,\" much of which is collected via open source information, voluntary exchanges of information among nations, and technical means such as satellite imagery and signals intelligence that are generally accepted as legal by the international community.  Roughly stated, covert methods of collecting intelligence are in most cases designed to go undetected by their target, and if detected they are designed to be unattributable to the sponsoring state.  Nevertheless, discovery, attribution, and public disclosure occur fairly often. B.  Espionage during Armed Conflict.  The treatment of spies during armed conflict is well established in the law of war.  A \"spy\" is defined in the law of war as any person who, when acting clandestinely or under false pretenses, obtains or endeavors to obtain information in the area controlled by a belligerent, with the intention of communicating it to a hostile party.  A spy may be a military member or a civilian, and his or her citizenship is irrelevant.  Military personnel wearing their own uniforms are not considered to be spies, even if they engage in collecting intelligence behind enemy lines. Only a person gathering intelligence while relying on protected civilian status or while wearing an enemy uniform is considered to be a spy under the law of war. Accordingly, information operations during an armed conflict will not raise any issue of spying under the law of war unless they involve the presence of individuals inside enemy-controlled territory who (1) are engaged in collecting information with the intent of communicating it to a hostile party, and (2) are wearing civilian clothing or enemy uniforms.  It seems highly unlikely that the notions of \"electronic presence\" or \"virtual presence\" will ever find their way into the law of war concept of spying, for two reasons:  (1) If an individual is not physically behind enemy lines he or she is not subject to capture during the mission; and (2) There will be no issue of acting under false pretenses by abusing protected civilian status or by wearing the enemy's uniform. This will exclude most information operations activities from being considered espionage in wartime. Nevertheless, behind-the-lines missions to collect information, or to install devices that enable the collection of information, may well raise wartime spying issues.\n\nIf caught in enemy territory, a spy can be punished, after an appropriate trial, under the domestic law of the captor.  The punishment can include the death penalty. The nation on whose behalf the spy was acting, however, will not be considered to have violated any international legal obligation.  In addition, if individuals who may have engaged in espionage but successfully complete their missions (that is, they have returned to friendly lines) and subsequently are captured while not engaged in acts of spying, they may not be punished for their previous acts of espionage. C.  Espionage in Peacetime.  Unlike the relatively well developed treatment of espionage under the law of war, there is very little authority on the treatment of espionage under international law in peacetime.  There have of course been many domestic criminal trials of peacetime spies in many countries, including the United States.  By contrast, there has been almost no activity concerning peacetime espionage within the international legal system except for public complaints and the expulsion of implicated diplomats.  This may be because the primary harm done to the victim nation consists of the fact that certain secret information has been compromised, which is a more abstract and indirect type of injury than dead or injured citizens, property damage, or invasions of territory.  The lack of strong international legal sanctions for peacetime espionage may also constitute an implicit application of the international law doctrine called \"*tu quoque*\" (roughly, a nation has no standing to complain about a practice in which it itself engages).  Whatever the reasons, the international legal system generally imposes no sanctions upon nations for acts of espionage except for the political costs of public denunciation, which don't seem very onerous.\n\nThe consequences for individuals caught spying, however, can be very serious.\n\nSuch individuals can be tried for whatever crimes their conduct may constitute under the victim nation's domestic law, whether charged as espionage, as unlawful entry into its territory, or as a common crime such as burglary, murder, theft, bribery, obtaining unauthorized access to state secrets, or unauthorized computer intrusions.  This fact accounts to some extent for the widespread practice of assigning intelligence operatives to embassy staff positions in which they enjoy diplomatic immunity from prosecution. The only remedy for an offended host nation is to declare such persons to be persona non grata, which obligates the sending nation to remove them from the country.\n\nThe treatment of espionage under international law may help us make an educated guess as to how the international community will react to information operations activities.  As discussed in Section III of this paper on the use of force, international reaction is likely to depend on the practical consequences of the activity.  If lives are lost and property is destroyed as a direct consequence, the activity may very well be treated as a use of force.  If the activity results only in a breach of the perceived reliability of an information system, it seems unlikely that the world community will be much exercised. In short, information operations activities are likely to be regarded much as is espionage - not a major issue unless significant practical consequences can be demonstrated.\n\nThat leaves the issue of the possible criminal liability of an information operator who may later come into the custody of a nation that has been the victim of an operation in which he or she has engaged.  As with a spy, there is no evident theoretical reason why such an individual could not be prosecuted for violation of the victim nation's criminal laws.  As a practical matter, however, the problems of detection and attribution of information operations activities at the national level are daunting; the likelihood of being able to prove in court that an individual engaged in a certain information operations activity - while not impossible - seems unlikely.  Perhaps the best policy would be to advise information operators not to vacation in locales where the effects of their activities have been felt, at least until a decent interval has passed.\n\nFinally, it deserves mention that there is an established division of labor within the U.S. government between the intelligence community and the uniformed military forces concerning \"covert action.\"  Generally speaking, the intelligence community conducts covert action operations in peacetime that do not consist of traditional military activities.  It remains to be seen how information operations activities will fall within this division of labor, especially when they are associated with military operations other than war. D.  Assessment.  Information operations activities are unlikely to fall within the definition of spying in wartime, although a limited category of activities related to information operations may  so qualify.  Information operations activities are more likely to fall within the category of peacetime espionage.  Perhaps more importantly, the reaction of the world community to information operations that do not generate widespread dramatic consequences is likely to be very similar to its reaction to espionage, which has traditionally been tepid.\n\n## Ix.  International Efforts To Restrict \"Information Warfare\"\n\nAs soon as the concept of \"information warfare\" began to receive broad press coverage, discussion began of negotiating a treaty that would prohibit or restrict it.  A\ndraft treaty text that circulated on the Internet in 1995 said simply, \"The Parties to this Convention agree not to engage in information warfare against each other.\"  The first public governmental initiative was a resolution tabled by Russia in the UN's First Committee in October 1998 that apparently reflected a serious effort to get the UN to focus on the subject.  The Russian resolution included a call for states to report their views regarding the \"advisability of elaborating international legal regimes to ban the development, production and use of particularly dangerous information weapons.\"  The United States has taken the position that it is premature at this point to discuss negotiating an international agreement on information warfare, and that the energies of the international community would be better spent on topics of immediate concern such as helping each other to secure information systems against criminals and terrorists.  So far there has been little support expressed for the Russian initiative.\n\nThere are both similarities and differences between the concept of a treaty to ban or restrict information warfare and similar efforts to prohibit \"weaponization of space.\"\nOne similarity is the political reality that nations lacking a significant new military capability that they perceive will be dominated by a few wealthy and powerful states have a strong incentive to agree to ban or restrict that capability.  There may be an even greater incentive to prevent interference with information systems, which all nations possess to some degree, than with space systems, in which only 30 nations are currently active and which are dominated by the United States, Russia, and the European Space Agency.  On the other hand, the number of nations that have any reasonable expectation of developing their own space control systems anytime soon can be counted on the fingers of one hand, while anyone with a desk-top computer and an Internet connection thereby has access both to hacker tools and to a wide variety of important information targets worldwide.  Accordingly, as nations appraise where their long-term national interests lie, the calculus is quite different as between international legal restriction of the\n\"weaponization of space\" and similar control of information warfare.  With space systems, most states do not expect to be either an attacker or a defender in the near future. With information systems, all states can reasonably expect to be both.\n\nAs with space control, the United States has not yet addressed fundamental policy decisions about where its long-term interests lie in connection with the possible international legal restriction of information operations.  On the one hand, there is an obvious military interest in being able to interfere with an adversary's information systems, and in being able to protect one's own.  Used as a tool of military power, information operations capabilities have the significant advantage that they minimize both collateral damage and friendly losses of personnel and equipment.  Their use may avoid unwanted escalation of a dispute or conflict.  They are relatively cheap and require much less in the way of forward basing, deployment, and logistical support than do traditional weapons and their delivery platforms.\n\nOn the other hand, as the nation that relies most heavily on advanced information systems, the United States has the greatest vulnerability to attack.  This concern would seem to drive U.S. policymakers to consider the merits of international restrictions on information operations.  If we could negotiate an effective international ban on certain types of information operations activities, might signing such a treaty best serve our longterm national interests?\n\nThe subject of information operations is of course much more complex than that of space control, since there are so many more information systems subject to attack, so many more ways of attacking them, so many more potential players, plus constant rapid changes in the relevant systems and technologies.  As we have learned in our internal U.S. policy deliberations, there are great difficulties in even agreeing on definitions of what ought to be included in discussions of \"information warfare\" and \"information operations.\"  In these circumstances, it seems unlikely that there will be much enthusiasm anytime soon for negotiating an international agreement that would significantly restrict information operations.\n\n## X.  Observations\n\nThere seems to be little likelihood that the international legal system will soon generate a coherent body of \"information operations\" law.  The most useful approach to the international legal issues raised by information operations activities will continue to be to break out the separate elements and circumstances of particular planned activities and then to make an informed judgment as to how existing international legal principles are likely to apply to them.  In some areas, such as the law of war, existing legal principles can be applied with considerable confidence.  In other areas, such the application of use of force principles to adopting an \"active defense,\" it is much less clear where the international community will come out, and the result will probably depend much more on the perceived equities of the situations in which the issues first arise in practice.  The growth of international law in these areas will be greatly influenced by what decision-makers say and do at those critical moments.\n\nThere seems to be no particularly good reason for the United States to support negotiations for new treaty obligations in most of the areas of international law that are directly relevant to information operations.  The principal exception is international criminal cooperation, where current U.S. efforts to improve mutual legal assistance and extradition agreements should continue to receive strong emphasis.  Another idea that might prove fruitful is to negotiate a treaty to suppress \"information terrorism,\" but there seems to be little concept at present how such an agreement would operate or how it would reliably contribute value to information assurance and critical infrastructure protection.\n\nThere are no \"show-stoppers\" in international law for information operations as now contemplated in the Department of Defense.  There are, however, many areas where legal uncertainties create significant risks, most of which can be considerably reduced by prudent planning.  Since so many of these potential issues are relatively novel, and since the actions taken and public positions announced by nations will strongly influence the development of international law in this area, the involvement of high-level policy officials in planning and executing information operations is much more important at present than is the case with more traditional military activities."
    },
    {
        "text": "## Naval Postgraduate School Monterey, California Thesis Online Islamic Organizations And Measuring Web Effectiveness\n\n\nby\n\nMinji Daniels\n\nDecember 2004\n\n Thesis Advisor:\nJames Ehlert Co-Advisor:\nRaymond Buettner Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited\n\n\nTHIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK\n\n## Report Documentation Page\n\nPublic reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instruction, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project (0704-0188) Washington DC 20503.\n\n## 11. Supplementary Notes  The Views Expressed In This Thesis Are Those Of The Author And Do Not Reflect The Official Policy Or Position Of The Department Of Defense Or The U.S. Government.\n\n13. ABSTRACT (maximum 200 words)\nExperts estimate that websites maintained by various Islamic extremists have increased to hundreds in recent years.  Innovative operational capabilities enabled by Internet technology certainly pose serious challenges to U.S. counter-terrorism efforts.  However, greater attention must be given to Islamic organizations that wage information campaigns, perpetuating resentment and discredit against the United States and her allies.  While these sites may not openly call for violence, the sharing of common causes and goals with extremist organizations is worrisome.  The repudiation of Western systems and global Islamization under the Shariah systems is often a transparent theme.  The purpose of this thesis is to evaluate the effectiveness of these websites at attracting and engaging audiences to promote their cause by applying a web performance methodology commonly accepted in the commercial industry.\n\n14. SUBJECT TERMS  Information Campaign,  Effectiveness,  Islamic, Terrorism, Internet, Web\n17. SECURITY\nCLASSIFICATION OF\nREPORT\nUnclassified\n18. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE\nUnclassified\n\nPrescribed by ANSI Std. 239-18\n\n15. NUMBER OF\nPAGES\n75\n16. PRICE CODE\n19. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF ABSTRACT\nUnclassified\n20. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT\n\n\n\nTHIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK\nApproved for public release; distribution is unlimited\n\nONLINE ISLAMIC ORGANIZATIONS AND MEASURING WEB\nEFFECTIVENESS\n\nMinji Daniels Lieutenant, United States Navy B.A., Rutgers University, 1996\nSubmitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of\n\n\nMASTER OF SCIENCE IN SYSTEMS ENGINEERING\nfrom the NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL\nDecember 2004\nAuthor:\n\nMinji Daniels Approved by:\nJames Ehlert Thesis Advisor\n\n\nRaymond Buettner Co-Advisor Dan C. Boger Chairman, Department of Information Sciences\n\n\n\nTHIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK\n\n## Abstract\n\nExperts estimate that websites maintained by various Islamic extremists have increased to hundreds in recent years.  Innovative operational capabilities enabled by Internet technology certainly pose serious challenges to U.S. counter-terrorism efforts.\nHowever, greater attention must be given to Islamic organizations that wage information campaigns, perpetuating resentment and discredit against the United States and her allies. While these sites may not openly call for violence, the sharing of common causes and goals with extremist organizations is worrisome.  The repudiation of Western systems and global Islamization under the Shariah systems is often a transparent theme.  The purpose of this thesis is to evaluate the effectiveness of these websites at attracting and engaging audiences to promote their cause by applying a web performance methodology commonly accepted in the commercial industry.\n\n\n##\n\n\n\n## This Page Intentionally Left Blank\n\nLIST OF FIGURES\n\nFigure 1.\nHistogram of Score Distribution (Created by SPSS11.5)........32\nFigure 2.\nScreenshot of a scoring chart........33\nFigure 3.\nA photograph of Palestinians (Source: www.islamicdigest.org)........34\nFigure 4.\nA photograph of Iraqis (Source: www.islamicdigest.org)........34\nFigure 5.\nExample of a structured homepage (Source: www.islamonline.net)........36\nFigure 6.\nInconsistent appearance (Source: www.islamic-world.net)........36\nFigure 7.\nExample of a good link categorization (Source: www.nzmuslim.net)........40\nFigure 8.\nExample of a good link description (Source: www.nasrollah.net)........40\nFigure 9.\nExample of a good download context (Source: www.khilafah.com) ........42\nFigure 10.\nExample of a good location label by color (Source: www.mpac.org)........43\nFigure 11.\nExample of a good location label (Source: www.islamawkening.com)........43\nFigure 12.\nScreenshot of a forum (Source: www.islamonline.net)........45\nFigure 13.\nScreenshot of a forum (Source: www.nzmuslim.net)........45\n\n\nTHIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK\n\n## This Page Intentionally Left Blank Acknowledgments\n\nI would like to give my sincerest appreciation to my advisor, Jim Ehlert.  This work would not have been possible without his insight, guidance, and patience.  It has been a great opportunity and pleasure to work closely with and learn from him.  I would also like to thank Professor Buettner for his time and support on this thesis.\nMy gratitude extends to fellow classmates, especially, Phil Erdie, Sean Cooney, and Kevin Graves for their assistance and friendship throughout the program.\nMost of all, I thank Bill, my loving husband and best friend who fulfills my life with his support, encouragement, and laughter.  Lastly, we give thanks to Christ for His love, faithfulness and blessing with our son, Aidan during our time in Monterey.\n\n## This Page Intentionally Left Blank\n\n\n\n## I. Introduction A. Background 1. The Global War On Terrorism And Information Age Conflict\n\nAl Qaeda and other terrorist organizations inspired by Islamic extremism undoubtedly constitute one of the most serious threats to the security of the United States today.  The use of commercial aircraft as missiles against civilian targets on American soil was almost unimaginable prior to September 11, 2001.  What distinguishes Al Qaeda even further from the anti-American terrorists of previous decades is its audacity and adeptness in waging an information campaign against the United States.  The New York Times, for example, described Bin Laden as \"...a master of manipulation and formidable propaganda foe, having spent years winning hearts and minds of much of the Muslim world\" *(New York Times* 11 November 2001).  Despite a severe blow to his operational capability from the U.S. retaliation, Bin Laden's years of propaganda have born fruit as an army of recruits inspired to carry Al Qaeda's legacy are cropping up around the world\n(Hegland 2004, p.1399).  So far, the United States has not developed a sound strategy to counteract the adversary's relentless information campaign and the spread of its ideology.\nThis lack of progress is ironic given that \"Information Warfare/Operations\" and\n\"knowledge dominance\" emerged as the prevailing U.S. military theme over 10 years ago.  Despite challenges in conceptualizing and operationalizing its strategy, the United States, nonetheless, has been at the forefront in preparing for information age conflict. The prospect of winning a bloodless war by targeting the adversary's knowledge and belief system with increasingly sophisticated information technology seems attainable given the extensive dependency on the web of information systems.  With this in mind, the U.S. response, described by one author as \"piecemeal, tactical, and reactive instead of strategic, comprehensive and anticipatory\" is even more perplexing (Waller 2002, p. 2).\nWhile new technology is an important aspect of the information age conflict, there is more to consider.  As George J. Stein eloquently stated, \"Cyberspace may be the new 'battlespace,' but the battle remains the battle for the mind.  There must be no confusion of the battlespace with the battle\" (Stein 1996, p. 176).  While the psychological component of conflict is not new, the spectrum of conflict has broadened, traversing societal, economic, and political systems in the coming age (Arquilla and Ronfeldt 1997, p.28).  Therefore, preparing an \"integrated battlefield\" to shape the political context of the conflict at the strategic level (Stein, p. 177) arises as a critical task.\nDouglas H. Dearth asserted that \"war will be fought for the most intimate of human attributes: *identity*...conflict will be waged ever for the minds of *people*\" (Dearth\n2000, p. 11). The mounting threat of Islamic extremism is clearly a manifestation of his prophetic claim.  Terrorism is fundamentally \"a business of changing people's mind\"\n(Tugwell 1992, p. 2).  While the threat of kinetic power and physical destruction posed by terrorist groups should never be dismissed, a critical battle also takes place in the perceptual domain.  Therefore, serious attention must be paid to how a global profusion of modern technology allows the adversary to reach the most lucrative targetthe mind of the target population.\nA troubling fact is that there is a clear indication that the enemy in the GWOT\nunderstands and capitalizes on the advantages of information technology, especially the Internet.  In his 2002 article, John Stanton expressed his apprehension of terrorists and their exploitation of internet, stating:\nI believe that the continued deconstruction of 20th-century modes of thought and institutions, the evisceration of government's scope of power and legitimacy, the redefining of citizenship, and the empowerment relationship of the Internet make fertile ground for the terrorist opportunity.  These factors will be adroitly exploited by intelligent and technologically savvy terrorists, who will be able to manipulate public perception by using the internet to bypass mainstream of information sources while leveraging that advantage to subtly coerce public and private sector institutions to carry and incorporate terrorist propaganda and action items. (Stanton 2002, p. 1018) His beliefs were not farfetched after all.  Websites associated with known Islamic terrorist organizations are mushrooming in cyberspace.  The United States Institute of Peace (USIP) reported,\nIn 1998, around half of the thirty organizations designated as \"Foreign Terrorist Organizations\" under the U.S. Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 maintained websites in 1998; by 2000, virtually all terrorist groups had established their presence on the Internet.  Our scan of the internet in 20034 revealed hundreds of websites serving terrorists and their supporters.  (Weimann 2004)\nThe threat is not confined to websites tied directly to known terrorist organizations.  The real danger of today's terrorism is the radical ideology of global Islamism, rather than just Al Qaeda (Jenkins 2002, p. 24).  Therefore, online Islamic organizations that promote and campaign for global Islamization also warrant greater attention.  While these sites may not openly call for violence, the evidence of sharing common causes and goals with extremist organizations is worrisome.  For instance, these websites often involve jihadistic messages, stress toppling democratic and free governments for Shariah systems of government, and offer disparaging statements against U.S. policies.  Hyperlinks to known terrorist organizations such as Hamas are also a frequent feature on these websites.  Since these websites cleverly operate under the guise of legitimate religious organizations or news agencies, with the associated authority and credibility, the basis for legal action is limited.  A strategy of subtle and sophisticated propagation of jihadistic messages while discrediting U.S. policies may prove to be very effective in undermining public support for the U.S.-led GWOT, especially as the conflict drags on.\nA key distinction of the characteristics of the information warfare age conflict is that the perceptual domain of the conflict is a crucial battlefield.  While the psychological element has always been a part of warfare, modern information technology provides capabilities and tools that adversaries can leverage at an unprecedented level.  The evidence is clear that the enemies in the GWOT are exploiting the internet, the essence of modern information and communication technology, to further their cause.\n\n## 2. American Society: Vulnerabilities In Information Age Conflict\n\nThe United States has been a superpower for decades, and since the collapse of the former Soviet Union, its military might has been unmatched.  This power, however, is less relevant in a changing battlefield, especially as modern conflicts increasingly involve the perceptual domain.  Arquilla and Rondfeldt's notion of \"Netwar\"information aged modes of conflict and crime at societal levels, involving use of network forms of organization,   doctrine,  and  communicationreiterates  the  implication  of  the  global\ndiffusion of information technology in shaping the information environment.  Diffusion and easy access to technology mean that nearly all adversaries can obtain a capability to influence societal perception.\nThere are two notable conditions that exacerbate the U.S. vulnerabilities in this new mode of conflict.  First, the United States is a democratic society.  The constitutionally guaranteed freedom of speech inadvertently provides an adversary a shield to propagate information.  While the best defense against such exploitation is the complete control of information, as is the case for authoritarian regimes, this is not an option in a democratic society.\nSecond, the increasing dependency on the Internet as an important source of information represents a greater target opportunity for adversary.  In the United States, more than 70 percent of Americans who use the Internet consider online technology to be their most important source of information, ranking the Internet higher as an information source than all other media including television and newspapers (University of California Los Angeles, 2003).  Anyone with internet access is a potential recipient of adversaries'\npropagandistic messages that can be freely disseminated without editors in news rooms. The impact of public opinion on policy making in the United States can further exasperate the situations to the adversary's advantage as seen in Vietnam and Somalia.\nThese conditions reiterate the immense challenges to the United States in the GWOT.  The global diffusion of information technology also presents the United States with an opportunity to conduct its own influence campaign in cyberspace.\n\n## B. Scope\n\nThere is clear evidence that many terrorist-affiliated or pro-Jihad religious organizations are taking full advantage of the internet and web based communications. The U.S. reliance on advanced information technology, as well as its social and political dynamics, makes the country vulnerable to web based influence by these organizations. The purpose of this thesis is to evaluate the effectiveness of jihad-motivated websites and the  implications  for  the  U.S.-led GWOT.  This  thesis  utilizes  commercial  marketing\nprinciples and performance measurement methodologies as a guideline in developing a model framework termed Attract, Inform, and Communitythat is applicable to the situation under study.\n\n## C. Organization Of Study\n\nThis thesis is organized into five chapters.  Chapter I, the introduction, has outlined background, purpose, scope and organization of the study.  Chapter II discusses the identity and general characteristics of pro-jihadistic websites.  Chapter III examines the marketing perspective on measures of effectiveness of web based communications. Chapter IV provides evaluation metrics of selected subject websites.  Chapter V analyzes the findings of the study, identifies the implications to the GWOT, and offers recommendations for future research.\n\nTHIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK\n\n\n## Ii. Overview Of Islamic Websites A. Introduction 1. Growing Cyber -Presence\n\nTerrorists' use of information technology and their presence in cyberspace has been documented in a series of reports as increasing attention is given to this potentially troubling occurrence (Stanton 2002, Spencer 2003, Thomas 2003, and Weimann 2004). According to the USIP, hundreds of websites serving terrorists and their supporters have been identified (Weimann 2004).  This estimate, however, is probably just the 'tip of the iceberg' given the uncontrolled and broad nature of the Internet.  While previous studies have focused on websites with alleged ties to known terrorist organizations, this thesis extends the investigation to various Islamic organizations which perpetuate discredit and antagonism against the United States, her allies, and her interests.  In most cases, these organizations cautiously refrain from openly supporting violence, but they actively promote Muslim solidarity and global Islamization by propagating indiscriminate criticisms and thereby creating distrust and hatred against the U.S. government and Western civilization. This chapter discusses the general characteristics of the organizations and website whose prime purpose is to spread radical Islamism.\n\n## 2. Blurred Division\n\n\nThis thesis does not label all Islamic organizations as terrorist organizations.\nHowever, organizations that campaign for the replacement of Western democratic governments with Shariah certainly are a valid concern to the West and moderate regimes, especially in the U.S. led Global War on Terrorism.  At first, it is difficult to discern the organizations making common cause with terrorist groups from lawful organizations.  However, post-9/11 investigations revealed numerous Islamic charities linked to terror organizations.  Although most of the financial support took place in the absence of donors' knowledge of terror activities, such a revelation certainly raises the question of how extensive the influence of radical Islam is in the United States.\n\n## B. Who's Online? 1. Website Selection\n\nExtensive lists of terrorist-affiliated or terrorist-supportive organizations were provided in past studies (Weimann 2003 and SAIC 2004).  A link to sites that share similar political and ideological affiliation was a common feature of these websites, thus providing additional websites suitable for this study.  However, a large number of the websites collected from such lists were excluded from this study because they were purely commercial or social despite being listed as Islamic militant organizations. Equally large was the number of inactive websites.\nThe reason for the discontinuation of any particular website was difficult to ascertain.  Lack of funding and a low return value on investment, as perceived by the sponsoring organizations, may account for the disappearance of some websites, while a forced shut down, as was the case for the \"Alneda\" website, was also certainly possible. \"Alneda\" was believed to be the official website of the Al Qaeda organization, until Jon David Messner, a U.S hacker, hijacked the site.  Prompted by the increased awareness of the terror group's internet use, private groups have launched retaliation by actively tracking and shutting down terror-related websites.  For instance, \"Internet Haganah\", was created to monitor and shut down websites related to Islamic terrorist organizations and claims to have shut down 65 websites in the U.S. and overseas (*Chicago Tribune* 5 January 2003).\nFor the purpose of the thesis, a sample pool of websites was kept at a manageable size of 28 websites.  They were selected based on the relevancy and the adequacy of web contents.  The discussion of Islamic websites in this chapter draws from the findings of previous studies and direct observation of the selected websites.\n\n## 2. Website Characterization\n\nFrom a grisly video of a hostage execution to a Friday sermon of a Wahhabi cleric, the message of radical Islam is presented in various forms.  Given the large volume of Islamic websites and the variety of their content, it is useful to characterize the subject websites into three groups based on content, rhetoric, emphasis, presentation, and affiliation with known terrorist organizations.  These groups are: Known terrorists and extremist organizations, Pro-jihad organizations, and Islamic news agencies.  This breakdown avoids generalizing all Islamic websites as terrorist-associated.  Furthermore, the last two categoriesPro-jihad organizations and Islamic news agenciesreveal a robust and sophisticated information campaign that can potentially undermine the U.S.\n\npublic's resolve and support for the GWOT.  These two areas have been previously neglected in favor of terrorists' Internet-related operational capabilities such as command and control and target data mining.\n\n## A. Known Terrorists And Extremist Organizations\n\nThis category includes websites of the organizations designated as\n\"Foreign Terrorist Organizations\" by the U.S Department of State or websites that exhibit open support and affiliation with such organizations.  In a 2002 study, Weimann reported that standard search engines such as Google and Yahoo yielded 47 terrorist sites world wide.  In a 2004 report, his estimation increased to hundreds.  The precise tracking of a terrorist website is an extraordinary effort as many websites quickly emerge, disappear, and reappear in different locations.  The study indicated a subtle shift in tactics by extremists due to increased scrutiny, publicity, and law enforcement investigations\n(SAIC, p. 11).  For instance, as some English language sites are closed, others appear in another language to take their place.  This is responsible for an exclusion of a large number of terrorist and extremist organizations websites from the thesis as they are only maintained in Arabic.  Arabic-only websites are common for pro-Palestinian terror organizations, such as Al Aqsa Martyrs Brigade and Palestinian Islamic Jihad.  Hamas and Hizbollah also continue to maintain several websites in multiple languages.\n\n## B. Pro-Jihad Sites\n\nThis category constitutes the bulk of the websites examined in this thesis.\nThese websites are maintained by various Islamic religious, academic, and political organizations or individuals who are often based in the United States or western countries such as the United Kingdom, Australia, or Germany.  Many of these websites are in English only and probably target the Muslim and Western populations where the organizations are based.  The dominating theme is a social and political struggle against the western cultures in which they live in a spirit of Jihad and Islamization.  The focus and contents of these websites often differ from traditional Islamic terror organizations such as Hamas and Hizbollah which typically have a limited political objective: to remove Israel and reclaim Palestinian sovereignty in the region.  Their websites are chiefly focused on localized resistance against the Israeli occupation force.  A theme of Israeli persecution is echoed via the pictures of Palestinian victims and suicide bombers who are typically glorified as martyrs. The sites also update the \"number of operations conducted,\" a euphemism for suicide missions.\nJihadist websites, however, call to all Muslims around the globe by preaching the solidarity of Muslim brotherhood and the establishment of Shariah as a religious duty against non-Muslims (Anti-Defamation League 2002, p.3).  Because of global accessibility and ability to disseminate their messages, the internet is an important tool to incite and mobilize their supporters.  This movement poses a potentially greater concern because of a transnational and transregional character, rather than being located in a single geographical area.\nA multitude of pro-jihad websites manifest themselves in various styles.\nFor instance, \"The Center for Islamic Studies and Research\" is a fake organization and is considered to serve as the Al Qaeda's official media organ.  The use of cover names or slogans to bring forth an impression of religious or academic organizations is also common on Jihadist websites.  \"Understanding the Islam of Mohammads and resisting the Islam of Satan\" and \"Site dedicated to the blessed global Islamic awakening\" are just a few examples of slogans found on Jihadist websites.  A direct provocation of violence or graphic images are less visible, but inflammatory anti-U.S. and anti-Israeli messages are carefully intermingled in religious edicts, Quranic verses, or sermons, and sometimes in a press release format, hence providing religious authority and organizational credibility in the fight against the infidel.  Several jihadistic websites post a reproduction of terrorist's communiques such as the fatwah issued by Al Qaeda.  They commonly provide links to the websites of terrorist organizations, thereby increasing public access to these sites.\n\nJihadist messages are often condoned and even endorsed by wellestablished Islamic organizations in the United States (U.S. Congress, Senate 2003). Some well-known organizations, such as Council on American Islamic Relations (CAIR) and American Muslim Council (AMC) continue to be controversial because of their reluctance to make a public condemnation of terror organizations and lukewarm support for the U.S. counter-terrorism effort.  The ambivalence of their stance was especially questionable when the AMC's website advised American Muslims not to cooperate with the FBI and law enforcement shortly after the 9/11 attack (Gaffney Jr. 2002).  These organizations maintain websites which appear professional and well-produced, probably because of their prominence and strong financial support.  Already familiar with U.S. culture and politics, these organizations certainly take advantage of the Web to further pursue their political activism and spread Muslim influence in the mainstream of the United States.\nSeveral radical websites have adopted survival techniques to evade increased scrutiny and law enforcement investigation.  The persistent reappearance of \"Alneda\" is a good example of survivability by embedding radical websites within another website without the site owner's knowledge (Thomas 2003, p115).  There also seems to be an increased use of public forum news groups and chat rooms as message boards for militant groups (SAIC, p. 11).  The utilization of online forums for planning coordination is well illustrated by the denial of service attack conducted against the Internet Haganah (The New Atlantis 2004).  The site was temporarily shut down in 2003 by the denial of service attack launched by supporters of Al Qaeda affiliated forums.  The attack was retaliation against the Internet Haganah's effort that caused eight radical websites to lose their third party DNS service (WorldNetDaily 2003).  In short, there is mounting evidence that pro-Jihadist websites share common causes with terrorist organizations and indirectly support them.\n\n## C. Islamic News Agencies\n\nA growing trend among Islamic websites is the emergence of Islamic news agency sites.  Probably inspired by the success of Al-Jazeera in the satellite broadcasting arena, news agency websites with no apparent affiliation with any known broadcasting organization take advantage of the cynicism and perceived bias of western news reporting to appeal to its viewers.  Similar to the pro-jihad websites described earlier, these mostly English websites suggest that they aim to appeal to Western audiences or Muslims in western countries.   These news agency websites often lure visitors by conveying themselves with such headlines as \"the first Arabic on-line news agency\", \"clear view on the US war on Terrorism\", and \"the news that CNN will never report\".   News articles and editorials are frequently provided by anonymous sources and are carefully combined with reproductions of news articles from well known media sources to be perceived as a trustworthy and legitimate information channel.  However, objectivity is rarely seen, as the websites are primarily a repository of lopsided and skewed reports.  Like the pro-Jihadist websites, sympathy and a shared common cause with terror organizations are subtly conveyed on the news agency websites.\n\n## C. Why Online?\n\nThe Internet provides terrorist organizations with innovative capabilities and opportunities that can compensate for a lack of combat power and other resources.  The use of the Internet for planning, coordination, logistics, and execution of terrorist attacks has been widely reported, especially since the 9/11 attack.  Additionally, the global diffusion, flexibility and anonymity of the web makes it especially suited for information activities such as publicity and perception management.  Although such activities are dedicated to spreading the ideology of global Islamization and are less directly involved in supporting actual terror attacks, they can have broader and gradual implications by garnering sympathy and tolerance toward radical actions by extremists.  This section delineates the operational capabilities and information activities afforded by the Internet.\n\n## 1. Opportunities And Capabilities A. Command, Control, And Communications\n\nAl Qaeda's reliance on the internet in planning and coordinating the 9/11\nattacks is a well known fact.  An email account or a chat room log-ins are easily obtainable and can be accessed from public locations where the connection to terrorists is not traceable.  Digital steganography also provides a means of secure communication by concealing messages.  Such capabilities allow operations to be coordinated from around the globe.\n\n## B. Targeting Information\n\nA wealth of data on potential targets can be obtained from the Internet, including detailed information on U.S. infrastructure and commercial satellite photography.  Terrorists have proven their proficiency at data mining on the internet.  For instance, a seizure of Al Qaeda computers revealed chilling details on Al Qaeda's knowledge of sensitive information gathered on the internet, such as engineering and architectures of critical structures (Weinnan, 26 April 2004).  U.S investigators also found evidence that Al Qaeda's desire to gain control of the computers that manages U.S.\n\ninfrastructure such as water, electrical, transportation and communication systems (Anti- Defamation League 2003).\n\n## C. Funding\n\nThe Internet serves as an ideal tool for global fund-raising.  While organizations like Hizb-ut-Tahrir and Chechen rebels openly solicit funds by publicizing bank account numbers on their websites (Thomas 118), others including Al Qaeda, built their global network to raise operating funds by using charities and nongovernmental organizations as fronts (Weimann 2004).     In fact, the dependency on the general public fund has become more significant as state-sponsored terrorism has declined in recent years (Tibbitts, p. 20).  Numerous private and charity organizations, including \"Benevolence International Foundation\" and \"Global Relief Foundation\" discontinued online operations since their connection to and support for terrorist organizations was exposed by the post 9/11 investigation (Tibbitts, p. 21).  The unregulated electronic financial environment is also a concern for terrorist manipulation for fund transfers and money laundering (Tibbitts, p. 21).\n\n## D. Recruitment\n\nThe Internet allows terrorist organizations to solicit and directly mobilize online audiences to participate in their actions.  A rich media presentation is an added advantage to attract young and susceptible minds.  A report published by SITE institute in 2003 also reveals Al Qaeda's use of chat rooms to provide instruction to willing recruits on how to join the insurgency against the U.S force in Iraq (Lathem 15 September 2003).  In addition, Imam Samudracaptured for his role in the Bali attack in 2002admitted he was inspired by the Internet to wage Jihad.\n\n## 2. Ideological Information Activities\n\nIn many instances, funding and recruiting are closely tied to the information activities because they are essentially a direct result of good publicity.  Three types of information activities are highlighted.\n\n\n## A. Publicity And Perception Management\n\n\nWith direct control of the online messages they create and disseminate, terrorists have an unprecedented opportunity to publicize their cause.  Terrorists do not want to be seen as criminals (Tibbitts, p. 33) in order to elicit sympathy and support\n(Weimann 2004).  To this end, their violent activities are often overshadowed by the injustices and oppression they claim to endure, thereby justifying the legitimacy of their agenda and actions.  Numerous reports confirm the mastery of terrorist and Islamic organizations in exploiting the Internet to affect public opinion.  For instance, when Al Qaeda's strategy of all out war against the West was faced with opposition even from radical Muslim circles, the organization fiercely defended its position in a series of statements posted on its \"Alneda\" website (Eedle 2002).  Another example of Al Qaeda's use of the Internet for perception management was when Saudi cleric Sheik Salman al- Oadah published \"How we can co-exist\"a response to an open letter from 60 U.S. intellectuals supporting \"war on terrorism\"signed by 150 Saudi academics and professionals.  Al Qaeda again posted a furious commentary on its \"Alneda\" website, \"attacking 'How we can co-exist' almost line by line\" (Eedle 2002).  Shortly after the Al Qaeda rebuttal, 80 percent of those who signed \"How we can co-exist\" withdrew their support (Eedle 2002).  This illustrates the importance of the web to Al Qaeda as an effective tool to enrage people and to neutralize moderate opinion.\n\n## B. Propaganda And Disinformation\n\n\nDisinformation and propaganda are typical messages that appear on the Islamic organizations websites.  The polarization of religious and cultural differences is a favorite strategy.  The so-called inferiority of Western democracy compared to the Shariah system and the West's alleged efforts to Christianize the Muslim world are just a few examples of this propaganda.  However, since it is difficult to verify facts online, rumors and false reports are often regarded as true.  The websites frequently make references to a religious leader or the Quran to instill authority and credibility.  Websites portrayed as belonging to an information agency exploits the credibility associated with traditional news media while ignoring the ethics of news reporting.\n\n## C. Spreading Fear\n\n\nSince the 9/11 attack, several websites posted threats of an impending large attack on U.S. soil (Carmon 2003 and Weimann 2004)  With the help of additional media coverage, this tactic can be effective to instill fear and insecurity in the mind of the general public. The key objective of terrorists is to create fear in order to coerce changes favorable to terrorists.  As Garner asserts, \"the success of this strategy is dependent on the degree to which the fear of attack can be magnified out of all proportion to the actual danger\" (Garner 2002).   Therefore, the Internet can be an extremely useful psychological warfare weapon for terrorist groups to exaggerate their capability and to amplify a threat.             **\n\n## D. Engaging Audiences\n\nAlthough the conversion of audiences to their side may be the greatest success of Islamic websites, a chief benefit is to convince the \"fence-sitters\", those who have not formed an opinion or who have mixed feelings about issues important to these organizations (Tibbetts, p.36).  Their ability to reach a variety of audiences with different messages is made possible with web technology.  For example, current versions of web browsers, including Netscape and Internet Explore, support JavaScript functions allowing internet servers to know which language is set as the default for a particular client's computer.  A further capability to build a personal profile allows organizations to target users with sympathy toward a cause, to solicit donations or to control information in a manner most receptive for each audience.  For example, factual information rather than graphic imagery is more effective to persuade educated western audiences while enraging anger via graphic imagery works well in recruiting suicide bombers (p. 36).  There is no confirming evidence that Islamic extremists have acquired such sophisticated use of the Internet technology.  However, their awareness of diverse audiences, especially international bystanders and western audiences can be inferred from multi-language versions of their websites.\n\n## E. Conclusions\n\nThis chapter introduced Islamic websites of various characteristics, encompassing known terrorists, pro-jihad and emerging news agency websites.  Despite the varying degrees of rhetorical violence, an anti American theme unequivocally resounds in almost all of these sites.  It is also clear that the web provides indispensable tools for these organizations and they will likely take advantage of this continuously evolving technology.  The key opportunities and capabilities afforded by the internet technology were also discussed in this chapter.\n\n\n\n## Iii. Web Performance A. Introduction\n\nThe strategic importance of a robust web presence is broadly accepted and much effort has been invested in integrating web technology into the overarching strategy of prominent commercial organizations.  This trend will likely continue in the near future as the WWW is expected to increase by a factor of 20, growing to 200 million sites by 2005 (Palmer 2002, p. 151).  The importance of the WWW in business success and its strategic value have not gone unnoticed by non-commercial organizations, as they have followed suit and have launched operations online.  The growth of various public sector, nonprofit, and activist groups' websites in recent years is especially noteworthy.  In addition, there are numerous websites dedicated to supporting and promoting the online presence and operations of non-commercial organizations.  This chapter discusses the strategic importance of organizations' websites and their perspective on measuring website effectiveness which remains a universal challenge (Ranchhod *et al* 2001, p. 61).\n\n## B. Commercial Organization 1. Need For Measure\n\nWhether marketing via Internet or traditional mass media, marketers and advertisers are intrinsically sensitive to customer response to their advertising/marketing activities.  As corporations increase e-commerce related investment, determining the return-on-investment has become the number one priority.  A good performance measure helps organizations to identify areas of weakness and ways to improve.  There is, however, a lack of standardized methods to measure web site performance, and this hampers organizations' ability to conduct self-evaluations (Kim *et al* 2003, p. 4).\n\n## 2. Taxonomy Of Web Site Effectiveness\n\nInconsistent interpretations of \"website effectiveness\" by market researchers and scholars may exasperate efforts to create a standardized and meaningful measure of web effectiveness.  Of the numerous perceptions of website effectiveness, the taxonomy proposed by Roberts is the most useful and systematic approach available.  It employs a multi-dimensional characteristic of web effectiveness and complexity by identifying three different areas which constitute the web effectiveness: usability, traffic and audience measurement, and site performance (Roberts 2003, p. 299).  Usability assesses user experience and the perceived value of the site.  Web traffic datasuch as the number of visits, files requested, and the duration of the visitmay allow marketers to gauge a web sites success in terms of audience exposure.  Site performance is operational data such as down time and number of broken links, necessary for technicians to keep websites at an acceptable operational status.\nA common problem of website effectiveness in the marketing sector is a skewed focus on traffic and audience measurement.  As Fattah points out, various web metrics have been regarded as an importantif not the only\"indicator of a website's relative health, growth and placement potential\" (Fattah 2000, p. 1).  The list of traffic data that can be collected by sophisticated software is large, and yet a reliance on traffic data alone generates an incomplete and misleading picture of overall site effectiveness.  From a marketer's perspective, web traffic data, such as time spent on a given site or clickthrough rate, do not provide useful information such as \"the user's lifestyle or their psychographics\" (p. 1).  Inaccurate data can often result from automated programs.  Logfile data, for instance, can be inflated by \"spiders\" or \"bots,\" automated programs that access Web pages for various reasons.  Conversely, the data can be deflated when pages are \"cached,\" or stored and accessed from another website (Silber 2002, p.162).\nThe problem is not confined to the inaccuracy of the measure itself.  A greater flaw is the underlying tendency of marketers to utilize the traditional measures of effectiveness of marketing communications (Stewart and Pavlou 2003 p. 381) without taking into account the unique attributes of the Internet.  The use of traditional measures of effectiveness is not an entirely illogical approach since the studies on consumer response suggest that consumers do not respond remarkably differently to the Internet, at least by traditional metrics.  For instance, web banner advertisement was related to a significant increase in brand and ad awareness.  Furthermore, web page complexity and web experience have a positive effect on attitude toward the brand and purchase intention (p. 381).  Despite the similarities, such metrics must be used with caution because \"they may not have the same implications within the interactive context of the Internet as they have within the more static paradigm that has guided the measurement of the effects and effectiveness of traditional media\" (p. 379).\n\n## 3. Multi-Dimensional Qualitative Approach A. Customer Centered Measure\n\n\nThe merit of Robert's taxonomy of website effectiveness is recognized for its systematic definition and how it addresses the multi-faceted issues associated with website effectiveness.  However, it does not provide a practical measuring methodology for an existing website since the author's primary focus was the designing phase of the online marketing.  Recognizing the shortcomings of the common industry practice of web evaluation which only focuses on the web traffic component of Robert's website effectiveness, marketing and communications researchers have proposed several theoretical frameworks and models that can provide more understandable and pragmatic measures for the organizations (Simeon 2001, Palmer 2002, Agarwal and Venkatesh\n2002 and Kim *et al* 2003).  While the traditional metrics can still be useful indicators of a websites' general performance, the ability to derive a meaningful interpretation of such technical data in the context of overall objectives of the web must be stressed.\n\nOf the three key areas of web site effectiveness, the greatest emphasis is now attached to the usability of the website in the discipline of online business (Agarwal and Venkatesh 2002 and Palmer 2002).  Usability centers on a customer's online experience and satisfaction.  Since the website is the primary user interface within organizations, the adage \"the first impression is a lasting impression\" applies equally well to online business.  Subsequently, the repercussions of poor usability designs are severe. One study shows that fifty percent of users will leave if they cannot find information they want and forty percent will not return if they perceive their experience as negative (Kim et al, p. 18).\n\nCustomer-centered usability demonstrates the profound impact of the Internet on the information structure between suppliers and receivers of information (Molenaar 2002, p. 55).  In contrast to traditional media, such as newspaper and television, information suppliers no longer determine what, how much, when, and in what manner to distribute information.  Instead, the Internet empowers users to initiate information collection and process it at their convenience.  Of even greater significance is the relationship created between the user and the information provider or seller in twoway communications via the Internet.  The emergence of Customer Relationship Management (CRM) as today's leading business strategy clearly exemplifies the customer-centered business environment.  In a customer-centered online business environment, the promotion of a product or service alone is not the most critical function.\nThe online experience must offer a value that is not provided by the physical market to customers.  Highly customized shopping experiences and personalized selection are essential to deliver compelling incentives to customers. As pointed out by Stewart and Pavlou, the mere substitutionreplacement of products or services without adding any value for which customers were willing to payis attributable to the failure of many dot.com businesses (Stewart and Pavlou, p. 378).\n\n## B. Heuristics\n\n\nA multitude of literature has been published to provide a helpful usability measure, ranging from a simple checklist to a more complicated process of psychometrics (Agarwal and Venkatesh 2002, Kent 2003, Kim *et al* 2003, and Palmer\n2003).  Nielson proposed eight distinct approaches for evaluating usability: heuristic evaluation, guideline reviews, pluralistic walkthroughs, consistency inspections, standards inspections, cognitive walkthroughs, formal usability inspections, and feature inspections (Agarwal and Venkatesh 2002, p. 170).  However, the heuristic evaluation appears to be favored by a majority of authors of the literature reviewed.\n\nHeuristic evaluations are assessments conducted by a small group of evaluators against a pre-established set of guidelines or \"heuristics\" (p. 170).  Heuristic evaluation is typically performed in three phases.  The first is to establish a basis for evaluation.  The basis or guideline is referred in various terms, such as criteria, evaluation category, and key factor.  Each evaluation category may be further segmented to subcategories.  This is to ensure various dimensions of the major category are well represented.  The second is to establish the relative importance by using weights and ratings.  The evaluator, or web user, provides the relative importance (or weights) of the different categories.  The last phase is for users to rate various websites in terms of their quality on the particular attribute.  What distinguishes this analytic measure is that it assesses the strategic potential of a website rather than after-the-fact orientation, which is the case for web traffic data.\n\nIn spite of the popularity of the heuristic method there are considerations and limitations associated with it, and it should not be viewed as a flawless stand-alone measure.  For example, organizational characteristics and instrumental goals affect the perceived importance of the evaluator.  This bias was confirmed in a study that evaluated 21 websites across four different industry sectors: airline, bookstore, auto manufacturer, and car rental (Kim *et al*, p. 25).  The relative importance of particular attributes weighted by the user varied from industry to industry.  The findings also determined that rating relative importance is a useful gauge for organizations to orient its website functionality to user expectation.  In addition to organizational characteristics, the predisposition of the evaluator affects personal interpretation or interaction with the test subject, making strict objectivity difficult to achieve (Agarwal and Venkatesh, p. 170).  Therefore, the integration of multi-faceted evaluation techniques is recommended to achieve increased reliability and validity.  A plethora of usability evaluation criteria proposed echoes a lack of consensus among the researchers as summarized in Table 1.\n\n## C. Aipd Model\n\n\nSimeon's AIPD model (Simeon 2001) is derived from four distinct capabilities that websites must utilize in order to be effective and successful: Attract, Inform, Position, and Deliver.  The first capability means that the primary objective of a website must be to attract a variety of visitors once it establishes its presence online. Some of the most popular techniques include registering with search engines and developing advertising campaigns.\n\nThe \"inform\" capability means that websites must present information about products, services, people, events or ideas.  The importance of this function is underscored by the study that identified the number one reason people turn to the Internet is to seek information.  The \"position\" capability is characterized by a differentiation in service provided which helps to create an organization's image or market position.  The\n\"Delivery\" capability pertains to the technical infrastructure for the presentation and delivery of information and service.\n\n\nSimeon's evaluation is also a heuristic procedure in which the key components of four activities are determined and measured.  This AIPD model depicts a systematic classification of interrelated capabilities rather than a combination of random fragments as seen in previously discussed studies.  The model is inclusive enough to minimize the risk of overlooking any significant criteria and adjustable enough to fit websites of diverse purposes.\n\n## C. Public And Nonprofit Organizations\n\nOften operating on a limited budget compared to commercial entities, public and nonprofit organizations are looking to the WWW for an effective and economical channel to promote their cause.  Nonprofit and public organizations are about more than \"revenue\" or \"sales\".  Unlike commercial companies, nonprofit and public organizations face a unique and significant challenge of inspiring viewers to join or support their cause often without any tangible and immediate return.\n\n## 1. Nonprofits\n\nThe WWW has been an ignored resource for organizations outside of the commercial arena, but this may no longer be the case.  The potential benefit of the Web as a prime instrument to engage and mobilize a population for various social and political causes is gaining wide acceptance by nonprofit organizations.  There is an increasing effort to alert and to share information among nonprofit or voluntary organizations in order to support and to capitalize on web technology.  For instance, online sources devoted to assisting nonprofit organizations' (NPOs) with the creation of effective websites are easily found.  An even more noteworthy point is the increasing effort to understand effective web use via systematic analysis and assessment of their performance.  This is not too different from the performance improvement process commonly practiced in the business industry today.  The findings and recommendation from such studies parallel that of studies conducted on commercial organizations.  For example, content, online community, easy navigation, and customer retention are equally important for the NPOs online.  Personalization is especially critical to charities, which depend on donor loyalty and continued support (Wenham *et al* 2003, p. 216).  The study by Wenham, however, revealed that NPO websites are generally more organizationoriented than customer-oriented, and generally lack customization features.\nDespite the apparent similarities, there is also an interesting contrast in web use between profit and nonprofit organizations.  Both desire to attract audiences and create a positive perception of the organizations.  For a commercial organization, image branding is an intermediary required before the user makes an ultimate decision to acquire one product over a competitor's.  The nonprofit organizations' goal is to inspire viewers to join their cause, often without any tangible return.  This is a unique and significant challenge for nonprofits as it is difficult to persuade people to exchange something they value, such as money or time, for something beneficial to others but more difficult to quantify or to portray (Wenham *et al*, p. 215).\n\nNPOs are generally in the business of sharing and spreading ideas, and changing attitudes, whether about health, education, or the environment, etc.  In short, the purpose of NPOs rests in processing information and ideas (p. 216).  This reinforces the proposition that the web is the most powerful instrument available to the NPOs since the real power of the internet is the freedom to gather, process, and disseminate information. However, it is necessary for NPOs to depart from organization-oriented utilization of the web by delivering individualized gratification to its visitors in order to maximize its potential.   (p. 221).\n\n## 2. Public Sectors\n\nGovernment and public sectors are not excluded from the opportunities of the WWW.  Democracy is characterized by the active participation of its citizens in making a decision that may influence public life.  Therefore, a good practice of eGovernment will be the \"combination of electronic information-based services for citizens with the reinforcement of participatory elements\" (Bertelsmann Foundation 2001).  Lee investigated a web site development strategy model exclusively for public institutions\n(Lee 2003).  His exploratory model augmented Simean's AIPD model with a different set of perspectives.  Lee theorized less relevancy of positioning in the AIPD model, attributing to a lack of market competition quality among the pubic websites.  Instead, a sense of communityenabling members to interact and provide services based on the differentiation strategies on a web sitewill be a more significant factor, thereby revising Simeon's AIPD model to AICD: Attract, Inform, Community and Delivery.\nThis view has further bearing in the context of eDemocracy in that a sense of community is an antecedent that cultivates enriching and mature participations from citizens of its society.\n\n## D. Application: Aic Matrix\n\nIslamic organizations' websites subject to investigation for this thesis share similarities with emerging online activists, i.e. marketing their idea to create a virtual community with the same vision such as \"to diminish US and Israel influence on Islamic nations and to establish government of Islamic law\".  The web's utility for such overarching objectives is its ability to attract likeminded people by publicizing their messages and offer activities they can participate in.  In this regard, Lee's AICD is a suitable measure for an inspection.\nHowever, a modification is necessary since the indicators or the components of the AICD activities are divided into two categories using Shneiderman's Objects Actions Interface (OAI) Model, which underscores website characteristics in terms of traditional communication sense and intrinsic web technology.  A website is a unique communication medium that integrates traditional and innovative methods to engage a message recipient.  An effective website maximizes web potential by employing both with a balance.  The OAI model follows a hierarchical decomposition of objects and actions in the task and interface domains, hence providing a helpful guide to web site designers in decomposing a complex information problem and fashioning a comprehensible and effective web site (Shneiderman 1998, p. 61).  While the meticulous process of decomposing and aggregating atomic objectsbasic element of information transparent user, such as color swatch, icon, and logo, etc.is beyond the scope of this paper, this concept provides two angles of approach for web evaluation.  First is the presence and the quality of information content (hereafter labeled as \"content\").  The second is the \"structure\" which corresponds to the facilitation of action via a systematic structure and innate internet technical capabilities, such as fast loading.  Since the\n\"structure\" is very compatible to \"delivery\" in the AIPD model, it is eliminated in the AIC matrix.   The  components  of  the  matrix  are identified as shown in Table 2.  Some\nattributes are not mutually exclusive.  For instance, prioritizing content and the clear appearance are important for aesthetic appeal to attract visitors as well as increase information seeking ability.\n\n##\n\n|                                    | Content         |\n|------------------------------------|-----------------|\n| attractive features                |                 |\n|                                    |                 |\n| -                                  |                 |\n|                                    |                 |\n| search engine registration         |                 |\n| -                                  |                 |\n|                                    |                 |\n| quick loading of homepage          |                 |\n| -                                  |                 |\n|                                    |                 |\n| balanced use of video/audio clip   |                 |\n| -                                  |                 |\n|                                    |                 |\n| no file/downloading error          |                 |\n| -                                  |                 |\n|                                    |                 |\n| visible & structured content table |                 |\n|                                    |                 |\n|                                    |                 |\n|                                    |                 |\n|                                    |                 |\n|                                    |                 |\n|                                    |                 |\n| Attract                            |                 |\n|                                    |                 |\n| -                                  |                 |\n|                                    |                 |\n| clear & consistent color and icon  |                 |\n| -                                  |                 |\n|                                    |                 |\n| logo                               |                 |\n| -                                  |                 |\n|                                    |                 |\n| meaningful pg title,               |                 |\n| -                                  |                 |\n|                                    |                 |\n| last update                        |                 |\n| -                                  |                 |\n|                                    |                 |\n| prioritized content layout  (size, |                 |\n| color, animation) & grouping       |                 |\n| -                                  |                 |\n|                                    |                 |\n| promote coming event               |                 |\n| Credibility:                       |                 |\n| Easy navigation :                  |                 |\n|                                    |                 |\n| Organization Information           |                 |\n| External Links                     |                 |\n| -                                  |                 |\n|                                    |                 |\n| various external links             |                 |\n| -                                  |                 |\n|                                    |                 |\n| context of link (id/title, content |                 |\n| breadth                            |                 |\n| -                                  |                 |\n|                                    |                 |\n| notify when link to offsite        |                 |\n|                                    |                 |\n| Internal navigation                |                 |\n|                                    |                 |\n|                                    |                 |\n|                                    |                 |\n|                                    |                 |\n|                                    |                 |\n|                                    |                 |\n|                                    |                 |\n|                                    |                 |\n|                                    |                 |\n| Inform                             |                 |\n|                                    |                 |\n| -                                  |                 |\n|                                    |                 |\n| background(bios)                   |                 |\n| -                                  |                 |\n|                                    |                 |\n| mission                            |                 |\n| -                                  |                 |\n|                                    |                 |\n| projects                           |                 |\n| -                                  |                 |\n|                                    |                 |\n| FAQ                                |                 |\n| -                                  |                 |\n|                                    |                 |\n| easy to find contact information   |                 |\n|                                    |                 |\n| Reliability :                      |                 |\n|                                    |                 |\n| -                                  |                 |\n|                                    |                 |\n| icon to return to main page        |                 |\n| -                                  |                 |\n|                                    |                 |\n| label of current position          |                 |\n| -                                  |                 |\n|                                    |                 |\n| visible navigation button          |                 |\n| -                                  |                 |\n|                                    |                 |\n| no back trapping                   |                 |\n| -                                  |                 |\n|                                    |                 |\n| search(archives)                   |                 |\n| -                                  |                 |\n|                                    |                 |\n| system status feedback (file size, |                 |\n| wait time, etc.)                   |                 |\n| -                                  |                 |\n|                                    |                 |\n| downloadable media/audio           |                 |\n| -                                  |                 |\n|                                    |                 |\n| preview of long download           |                 |\n| -                                  |                 |\n|                                    |                 |\n| downloadable text                  |                 |\n| -                                  |                 |\n|                                    |                 |\n| downloadable in multi format       |                 |\n| -                                  |                 |\n|                                    |                 |\n| printer ready                      |                 |\n| -                                  |                 |\n|                                    |                 |\n| email document                     |                 |\n| -                                  |                 |\n|                                    |                 |\n| link to related articles           |                 |\n| -                                  |                 |\n|                                    |                 |\n| source of documents                |                 |\n| -                                  |                 |\n|                                    |                 |\n| document creation date             |                 |\n| -                                  |                 |\n|                                    |                 |\n| author information                 |                 |\n| -                                  |                 |\n|                                    |                 |\n| contact regarding document         |                 |\n| -                                  |                 |\n|                                    |                 |\n| timely information                 |                 |\n|                                    |                 |\n| Relevancy :                        |                 |\n|                                    |                 |\n| -                                  |                 |\n|                                    |                 |\n| timely information                 |                 |\n| -                                  |                 |\n|                                    |                 |\n| real world events                  |                 |\n| (political election,               |                 |\n| holiday, etc.)                     |                 |\n|                                    |                 |\n|                                    |                 |\n|                                    | Dialogical Loop |\n|                                    |                 |\n| -      eMagazine/newsletter        |                 |\n| -                                  |                 |\n|                                    |                 |\n| donate online                      |                 |\n| -                                  |                 |\n|                                    |                 |\n| action link (vote registration,    |                 |\n| email official, etc.)              |                 |\n| Community                          |                 |\n|                                    |                 |\n| -                                  |                 |\n|                                    |                 |\n| encourage feedback                 |                 |\n| -                                  |                 |\n|                                    |                 |\n| bookmark/favorite                  |                 |\n| -                                  |                 |\n|                                    |                 |\n| email to a friend                  |                 |\n| -                                  |                 |\n|                                    |                 |\n| forum/message board                |                 |\n| -                                  |                 |\n|                                    |                 |\n| seed conversation topics           |                 |\n| -                                  |                 |\n|                                    |                 |\n| secure transaction                 |                 |\n| -                                  |                 |\n|                                    |                 |\n| members only                       |                 |\n| -                                  |                 |\n|                                    |                 |\n| multi language                     |                 |\n| -                                  |                 |\n|                                    |                 |\n| recognize return visitor           |                 |\n| -                                  |                 |\n|                                    |                 |\n| email alert                        |                 |\n\nWhile there is a lack of consensus on evaluation methodology, researchers unequivocally caution against the delusion of a perfect stand-alone method.  Web sites vary greatly in audience, objectives, and purpose, and therefore there is no single standard to capture all of the embodiments of a good website.\n\n## E. Conclusions\n\nThis chapter reviewed diverse perspectives and principles of measuring website effectiveness in commercial industry.  A growing trend is to shift away from the over reliance on metric centric measures.  The use of websites by nonprofit and public organizations and the unique issues associated with this use were also discussed.  It underscored measuring methodology and criteria are not always identical to that of commercial industry since organization characteristics and strategic mission determines what the organization website must accomplish, therefore what should be measured.  The conjecture is that Islamic websites subject for evaluation share considerable commonalities with nonprofit and pubic organizations in their objective of forming an ideological alliance.  The AIC matrix is derived from the conceptual basis of website performance which has been tested empirically for reliability and consistency.  Therefore, its application is assessed to be suitable for the subject websites of this thesis.\n\n\nTHIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK\n\n## Iv. Analysis A. Introduction\n\nAs discussed in Chapter II, 28 Islamic websites of various characteristics were selected to assess their web effectiveness.  By comparing the websites to the AIC matrix developed in the preceding chapter, this chapter analyzes the findings by identifying the weaknesses and strengths of the websites.   At first glance, most sites already featured the key elements of web communications prevalent in mainstream organizations' websites, such as a combination of rich graphics, downloadable audio and video clips, text based information, membership, and subscriptions to email newsletter.\n\n## B. Scoring\n\nThe AIC matrix identified 49 components (or attributes) of three key performance areas of the websites: attracting, informing, and building community.  Binary scoringa simple method of checking off the presence or absence of a componentwas determined appropriate for items that are one-dimensional, such as the presence of contact information or a search archive.  While imperfect, it is sufficient for this research since each category is sampled adequately to minimize the risk of omitting critical contributing factors.  Nonetheless, some components are inherently more intricate than others and the dispersion of quality is too wide, thus binary scoring alone was insufficient.  For instance, a site with 10 download errors should not be rated the same as a site with a single error. Similarly, the mere presence of a table of contents cannot be a sole indicator of a structured content presentation.  Therefore, this necessitated the author's individual judgment to balance between an excessive itemization of evaluating criteria and the capture of essential elements.  As a result, two-point scoring is also used to complement the binary scoring mentioned above.  The score was dispersed between 14 and 38 out of a maximum score of 56 (See Appendix).  This dispersion of scores indicated that the effectiveness of each website varied widely.  The entire scoring scheme is summarized in Table 3.\n\n\n\nATTRACT\n\nAttribute\nMetrics\nConsistent color and icon\nYes = 1, No = 0\nVisible organization logo\nYes = 1, No = 0\nPage title\nYes = 1, No = 0\nVery good = 2 Good =1 No = 0\nPrioritized layout : Grouping of similar topics Good use of color, animation, size Streamlined and clean appearance Promote coming event/attraction\nYes = 1, No = 0\nContent\nMaximum subtotal\n7\nSite is search engine registered\nYes = 1, No = 0\nStructure\nQuick homepage loading\nLess than 15 seconds = 1\nOver 15 seconds = 0\nNo file or downloading error\nError less than 3 = 2\nError between 4 to 6 = 1 Error over 6 = 0 Very good = 2 Good =1 No = 0\nVisible & Structured content : Homepage is not overcrowded Visible table of content or menu A good categorization of subjects\nVery good = 2 Good =1 No = 0\nBalanced use of media : A good combination of visual elements and text based information No distracting media usage\nMaximum subtotal\n8\nINFORM\n\nAttribute\nMetrics\nOrganization background\nYes = 1, No = 0\nContent\nMission\nYes = 1, No = 0\nFAQ\nYes = 1, No = 0\nEasy to find contact information\nYes = 1, No = 0\nSource of document :\nYes = 1, No = 0\nDocument creation date\nYes = 1, No = 0\nAuthor information : Name\nand\ncredential\nconsistently\nprovided\nVery good = 2 Good =1 No = 0\nContact information regarding document Yes = 1, No = 0 Timely information\nYes = 1, No = 0\nMaximum subtotal\n11\nStructure Various external links\nYes = 1, No = 0\n| Context of links                                   | Yes = 1, No = 0    |\n|----------------------------------------------------|--------------------|\n| Structure                                          |                    |\n| Notify when link to offsite                        | Yes = 1, No = 0    |\n| Visible icon to return to main page                | Yes = 1, No = 0    |\n| Visible navigation button                          | Yes = 1, No = 0    |\n| Label of current position                          | Yes = 1, No = 0    |\n| No back trapping of site                           | Yes = 1, No = 0    |\n| Search Archive                                     | Yes = 1, No = 0    |\n| System status feedback                             | Yes = 1, No = 0    |\n| Downloadable media (video/audio)                   | Yes = 1, No = 0    |\n| Preview of a long download                         | Yes = 1, No = 0    |\n| Downloadable text                                  | Yes = 1, No = 0    |\n| Downloadable in multi format                       | Yes = 1, No = 0    |\n| Printer ready                                      | Yes = 1, No = 0    |\n| Email document                                     | Yes = 1, No = 0    |\n| Link to related articles                           | Yes = 1, No = 0    |\n| Maximum subtotal                                   | 16                 |\n|                                                    |                    |\n|                                                    |                    |\n|                                                    |                    |\n| COMMUNITY                                          |                    |\n|                                                    | Attribute          |\n| Newsletter or magazine subscription                | Yes = 1, No = 0    |\n| Content                                            |                    |\n| Donate online                                      | Yes = 1, No = 0    |\n| Action link                                        | Yes = 1, No = 0    |\n| Maximum subtotal                                   | 3                  |\n| Encourage feedback                                 | Yes = 1, No = 0    |\n| Structure                                          |                    |\n| Bookmark or favorite now                           | Yes = 1, No = 0    |\n| Email site logo or address to friend               | Yes = 1, No = 0    |\n| Reader comment to articles                         | Yes = 1, No = 0    |\n| Forums or Message boards                           | Yes = 1, No = 0    |\n| Seed conversation topics                           | Yes = 1, No = 0    |\n| Secure transaction                                 | Yes = 1, No = 0    |\n| Multi language                                     | Yes = 1, No = 0    |\n| Members only                                       | Yes = 1, No = 0    |\n| Recognize return visitor                           | Yes = 1, No = 0    |\n| Email alert                                        | Yes = 1, No = 0    |\n| Maximum subtotal                                   | 11                 |\n|                                                    |                    |\n| Table 3.                                           | Scoring Matrix     |\n|                                                    |                    |\n| The score distribution is illustrated in Figure 1. |                    |\n|                                                    |                    |\n|                                                    |                    |\n|                                                    |                    |\n\n\n## C. Discussion Of Results 1. Attract\n\nAll websites incorporated graphics extensively to make visual appeals.  However, slow loading websites were a common problem.\n\n## A. Graphic Richness\n\nIt was clear that all websites took advantage of the graphic richness of the online environment.  Each website was marked by unique logos and colors which signify the organization's identity.  Articles were often accompanied by images, relating to the article subject.  For instance, a picture of collateral damage was typically inserted in antiwar articles.  Only 6 of 28 websites were noted for the minor use of photographs (less than 3 photographs).  The purpose of using photographs was to display the organizations'\nrecent activities such as a street demonstration or a conference, as well as the organizations' leadership.  \"Hamasonline\" provided extensive photo images in tribute to Sheike Achmed Yassin and Abdelaziz Rantiss, a Hamas founder and a leader, respectively, who were assassinated in Israeli military operations.  Another common theme of photographs was the perceived Israeli and U.S brutality.  \"Islamicdigest\" and \"Islamonline\" provided photo galleries which stored over a hundred of images of wounded civilians in Palestine and Iraq, appealing to the truism, \"pictures speak for themselves\" as seen in Figure 3 and 4.\n\n## B. Fastloading\n\nRich graphics certainly play a role in creating an attractive appearance, but experts urge caution when using them.  This is due to the short attention span of users in the web environment.  Delays of more than 10 seconds will almost certainly lead to attention loss (Keeker 1997) and users will find other sites to visit.  Another contributing factor is the dependency of modem connections for access.  Although broadband technology is quickly spreading in the United States, it may take a few more years to reach a majority of the U.S. population and possibly longer in the other parts of the world.  Therefore, the popular modes of access as well as the intended audience are important to consider when designing a website.  For the purpose of this thesis, a 49.2\nkbps modem was used, given the telephone modem is still the most common mode of access at ordinary households (University of California Los Angeles 2003).  A site received a point if the loading was completed in less than 15 seconds.  13 of 28 sites loaded under 15 seconds, while 9 sites took more than 30 seconds.  Offering two versions of a website may mitigate the problem of slow loading.  For instance, a site affiliated with\n\"Hizb-ut-Tahrir\" provided two versions: one is primarily text based for users with a slow connection while the other incorporates greater visual and audio elements.\n\n## C. Miscellaneous\n\nThe overall quality of appearance and visual attractiveness varied significantly between sites.  However, all sites contained elements of catchy headers, colors, graphics, and content tables that are similar to mainstream websites. \"Islamonline\"an Islam information portal websitewas a good example of a website that was consistent in color and appearance as seen in Figure 5.  The site offered a rich amount of features, but avoided a distracting and flashy appearance by juxtaposing colors and borders to organize the main body of the page.  In contrast, the homepage of the \"Islamic-world\" was a mix and match of images and fonts which did not exude a consistent and structured appearance as shown in Figure 6.  However, judging aesthetic appeal is a highly subjective matter.  This highlights the need to consider a cultural context when planning and evaluating web based operations.\n\nAll websites were registered with the \"Google\" search engine.  A search engine is a significant instrument for these websites to make their presence known.  This is especially true for organizations whose offline promotional activity is constrained due to its illegal and dubious nature.  Lack of promotional activity was one of the common weaknesses of websites.  While a drastic make over of a website is not recommended (Kent 2003, p. 17), conveying fresh content and adding new attraction is certainly important (Keeker 1997).  15 out of 28 sites updated the calendar date on their homepages, this did not equate, however, to actual content update.  Four of them have not updated regularly, including one site dated back in March 2004.  Conversely, 6 of 13\nwebsites that did not display current date on their homepages, did update their contents.\n\n## 2. Inform :  Information Richness Vs Information Chaos\n\nNo web site falls short of a rich information source in terms of an amount of information.  However, a commonly lacking quality was a structured presentation of information.  This exacerbates unbounded and chaotic nature of the internet and can potentially overwhelm or disinterest a viewer.\n\n## A. Credibility\n\nA website's ability to deliver information is critical, given the fact that the primary reason people go online is in search of information.  Experts agree that relevant information content is the single most important factor (Agarwal and Venkatesh 2002, p. 178, Kim *et al* 2002, p.18, and Kent 2003, p.17).  It is important for users to perceive the site as reliable and useful to ensure a return visit.  Confidence and trust in the website is often synonymous to credibility and relevancy of the site owner.  Providing background information such as the biographies of key leaders or the organization's missions can project credibility and relevancy to the user.  Most websites assessed offered an introductory page that described the mission, goal, vision, and projects to some extent (21 out of 28).\nOften, the source of information was not immediately apparent.  Eighteen sites posted articles that were both self-produced as well as adopted from external sources.  When the article is hyperlinked to the source directlyinstead of being reformatted into the website as 11 sites did it would be useful to cue the user when the link will lead to a destination outside the original website as well as where the destination is.  This was observed in only one site.  The disclosure of the author's name, his credentials, or his contact information for self-produced or contributed articles was not practiced by many websites.  No website provided such information on a consistent basis.\nHowever, 16 sites provided at least the author's name and 4 sites provided contact information for the user regarding articles.\n\n## B. Prioritization Of Content\n\nThe greatest deficiency in many sites was not a lack of information, but too much information without orderly structure, thereby creating information chaos.\nMerely posting articles or a linear compilation of information it not the greatest merit of a web.  Such activity alone does not offer any added value to an information repository in the traditional sense, such as newsletters or encyclopedias.  An effective website must provide information in an organized and hierarchical structure by employing the innate technological capability of the internet to its full capacity.  A hierarchical information structure groups a wide breadth and depth of information into smaller, but more meaningful and manageable units to prevent information overload or chaos.   Websites must prioritize what is most important and display this information in the most visible manner by manipulating color, size, or animation.  In the category of prioritized content presentation, 9 sites received 2 points.  17 and 2 websites scored 1 and 0, respectively.\nIn contrary to experts' advice to keep websites simple and lean, jamming homepages with excessive amounts of information was a common error (7 out of 28). Information overload frustrates users when users cannot find or access the information he or she seeks. This impedes the user's cognitive ability and the user subsequently loses interest.  The temptation to prove everything on a homepage must be abandoned (Keeker\n1997).  A well organized and hierarchical table of contents relieves the problem of information overload.  Users are less likely overwhelmed or sidetracked when they can access information in a progressive sequence, thereby broadening their knowledge at their own pace.\n\n## C. Links: Balancing Between Information Breadth And Depth\n\nThe importance of links in the online environment is second to none.  The effective use of links can balance information breadth and depth (Keeker 1997).  Like television programs, websites seek mass appeal and a wide audience, though maybe to a lesser extent.  A great advancement of the web, however, is the capability to offer a variety of subjects, thereby appealing to a broader audience.  The web can concurrently accommodate niche audiences who may seek a greater depth of knowledge of the topic through the use of links.  Links are very peculiar with regards to the power relationship between users and site owners.  While links fulfill and control the user's pursuit of information at their level, it is done so only through a predetermined path by the site owner.  To some extent, links subtly reiterate an organization's agenda through association.  Therefore, organizations should be attentive to their links since the characteristics of the associated entities often reflect on themselves, thereby affecting their own credibility and authority.\n\nEighteen of 28 sites provided links to various destinations outside of the websites. Each website varied greatly in the number of links provided, ranging from one by \"Mindspring\" to nearly hundreds by \"Islamic-World\". Providing a description of the link and grouping the links into categories are useful for enhancing information seeking ability. However, only 8 sites provided such features. A good categorization was provided by \"nzmuslim\" as seen in Table 7. Two sites\"Nasrollah\" and \"Khilafah\" were noted for a more descriptive context. The website of \"Nasrollah\" is shown in Table\n8.\n\nIslamic organizations of various backgroundsacademic, cultural, political, religious resource, and Middle Eastern news media such as Al Jazeerawere the most popular.  The endorsement of sites within Islamic organizations, especially of a similar nature was quite common.  For instance, the Hizbollah affiliated \"Islamic Digest\" linked to the official Hizbollah website and \"Al Manar\", a Hizbollah media organ.  The Hizb-ut-Tahrir affiliated news website, \"Khalifah\", linked to other pro-shariah political websites such as \"1924\" and \"Mindspring\".  Other frequently promoted sites were \"Jihadunspun\" and \"Islamonline\".  However, links were not limited to Islamic organizations.  News websites such as CNN, BBC, and especially Al-Jazeera were commonly available.\n\n## D. Downloading\n\nDownloading is another unique web capability.  15 out of 28 sites offered downloadable audio or video clips.  Lectures (or sermons) by Islamic scholar or clerics were the most common materials available for download.  Several websites also provided Islamic music and print as a promotion tool.  Visual and audio media is certainly a powerful means of conveying emotional elements of communication that can be easily lost in text.  An audio speech or video of a charismatic speaker can intensify the user's emotions and experience.  In a stream of video released following the 9/11 attacks, Bin Laden's calm demeanor and his soft, but confident speech was clearly intended to inspire the Arab audience (Tuman 2003, p. 138).\nThe amount of downloadable materials available on each site varied significantly.   7 of the 13 sites that featured downloadable media provided less than 20 clips while 6 of the 13 sites provided over 100 clips.   However, many website downloads failed due to system incompatibilities or other reasons.  Due to the sheer volume of downloadable materials, it was not feasible to test every single one of them.  A long download waiting (over three minutes with 49.2kpbs modem) frequently occurred due to large file sizes.  The prudent use of audio/visual downloads has been strongly suggested (Keeker 1997 and Kent 2003) in consideration of waiting times for the user.  One useful feature that can mitigate the frustration of long download times is to implement an interactive feedback of download context and status, such as the time or file size remaining (Keeker 1997).  A warning of a long wait time or a synopsis of the material also assists the user in establishing a reasonable expectation and making the decision to continue (Keeker 1997).  An interactive feedback was lacking in all websites.  9 of the 13 provided the context of the download, such as the name of the speaker, the title, the date, the length of a speech, the file size and occasionally a synopsis of the speech, prior to downloading.\nStreaming was also available on 5 sites for media access.  Figure 9 shows an example of a helpful download context for the user.\n\n\n## E. Miscellaneous\n\nClear labeling enhances easy navigation.  Labeling of the current position and an option to return to a main menu or homepage keeps users on track and prevents frustration from purposeless meandering.  This simple but extremely useful feature was missing in many websites. (13 out of 28 sites)   Figure 10 and 11 illustrate a good labeling of the current position.\n\n\n\n## 3. Community : The Weakest Link\n\nThe formation of eCommunity is the least utilized feature on most websites as they fall short of cultivating a sense of belonging, empowerment, and participation.\nAlthough innovative web technology is considered ideal and instrumental to shape such an environment, the results indicate that its utility is not maximized by the sites examined for this thesis\n\n## A. Message Boards And Forums\n\nKeeping an open dialogue between members and the organization is a good starting point in building a relationship.  Responsive interaction also strengthens the credibility and the perceived reliability of organizations. This in turn induces positive responses from the users towards the organizations' objective.  Providing the organization's contact information is a minimum requirement.  Only 2 of 28 sites did not provide any contact information.  However, posting an email address alone is futile unless the organization is committed to sincere and timely responses.  Equally important to the relationship between members and organization is a discourse among members to further shape the online relationship into a community.  Message boards and forums are a more advanced technique that enables real time interaction without being constrained by location and a number of participants.  7 out of 28 utilized at least one of two features.\nOf the 7 sites, 2 required a password to enter, and hence precluded a review.  All 5\nmessage boards and forums appeared active with current postings.  While this revolutionary communication technology is hailed by visionaries as a marketplace of ideas, some are more wary of its use.  The latter view is attributed to its resource intensiveness required to monitor and moderate.  The need for an insightful moderator and meaningful topic was highlighted by the frivolous and immature comments which often smeared the discussion in the moderator's absence.   On the issue of Islam or U.S. policy, most participants already had biased views, often protesting the occasional opposing view with vehement criticism, disparaging remarks, or sometimes name calling. An example is shown in Figure 12 and 13.\n\n## B. From Awareness To Action\n\nMany websites focus too much attention on raising awareness of the issues, but not enough attention on advancing actions which can generate an impact on the real world.  This may include providing an online donation function, an email link to decision makers, and more.  Only 8 out of 28 sites utilized their website for fundraising by providing a secure online credit card donation option.  Some sites provided an address where the user could make donations by mail.  Political activist organizations such as CAIR were more skillful in exploiting this capability.  Their efforts included a voter registration guide to impact the upcoming elections and a link to members of Congress.\nThe organization provided a scripted electronic card that the user can email to Congress as a part of the organization's \"anti-torture\" campaign.  Another online campaign endorsed by several Islamic organizations was the \"Boycott Israel\" campaign.  This website listed more than 25 renowned corporations, charging that their business ties and investments in Israel implicate them in Palestinian suffering.  The site also provided scripted letters that users can email to each company.\n\n## C. Miscellaneous\n\nMost organizations offered memberships, which include subscriptions to email newsletters.  The capability to email organizational banners, logos, or articles is a useful promotional tool.  6 of 28 sites encouraged and provided a capability to share site logos, banners, or homepages with others via email.  12 of 28 sites provided a capability to email articles.  The value to community building lies in the power of \"word of mouth\" promotion since people are more receptive to recommendations by someone they know. A bookmark option was another useful tool that was offered on 6 sites.  On many occasions, the user is taken to a particular site by a complex and untraceable web of links. Therefore, bookmarks can counter the web's random nature and encourage users to return.\n\n## V. Conclusion A. Summary Of Findings\n\nThis thesis investigated various Islamic organizations' web based influence operations and developed a purposeful methodology to assess the effectiveness of such organizations' websites.  In doing so, it was useful to examine commercial industry's practice of web based business operations and their issues and perspectives of web site effectiveness as they have accumulated valuable experiences and lessons through their early pursuit of web based business practice.  It was also noteworthy to recognize the web potential and usage by public and nonprofit organizations for the unique strategic goal of creating an ideological alliance that is distinct from commercial industries.  Following a comparative analysis of conjectures and published frameworks of web site effectiveness, the AIC (Attract, Inform, and Community) matrix was derived to evaluate the effectiveness of 28 Islamic websites obtained from previous studies.\nThe AIC matrix identified 49 components of scoring criteria with a maximum possible score of 56.  The final outcome of scoring ranged between 14 and 38 with a mean value of 27.3.  This result is lower than anticipated based on the gravity and urgency of the problem asserted by previously published reports on Islamic websites. However, these reports often relied on anecdotal evidence rather than empirical data. This disparity may also be attributed to the scoring method used for the evaluation.  The AIC approach is still rudimentary and the limitations in representing divergence in quality would make it prudent to examine additional data sets before relying on the conclusions reached in this study.  Also, the presupposition to view online Islamic organizations as activist organizations may be an overestimation of the organizations' objectives.  This may have been responsible for significantly low scoring on the \"community\" category, averaging only 1.6 out of 11 points.  Raising awareness exposing U.S. and Israeli injustice from Islamist's perspectiveby feeding misinformation and propagandistic messages, may have fulfilled the organization's primary objectives.\nAs mentioned above, caution is necessary not view the final scores as an absolute indication of the websites' performance due to the elementary scoring method and a lack of comparative data of other websites collected using equivalent criteria.  Nonetheless, a gradual and lasting effect of the websites' sophisticated propaganda campaign cannot be disregarded.  They certainly manipulate diverse opinions and editorials within the prestigious news media in Western society by selectively highlighting only those that support their image as a victim of U.S. imperialism and help criticize the United States government's policies.  Known as \"issue framing\" and recognized as a controversial subject in mainstream media, this technique has a powerful and manipulative influence on the viewer's perception, attitude, and their receptiveness of the issues (Nelson *et al*\n1997).  On a similar note, it is imperative to actively combat hate media as the historical lesson clearly proves its malignant effect on population's mind (Kaufman 2002, p. 119).\nThe strengths of these websites must be recognized and not be underrated.  In the category of attract and inform, they differentiate themselves as \"an alternative information resource\" to attract those who are cynical of mainstream media, thereby inciting skepticism and eroding confidence in U.S. policies and distorting the truth.  Most websites presented a rich information environment.  The websites' effort to attract new audiences was construed from various features.  For instance, online promotional activities such as offering an email account and a subscription, or the option to import and exchange of site banners (or logos) were commonly seen.  Their appeal for users to recommend the site to others was especially noticeable.    Given the continuous profusion of the Internet and psychological impact of media bias, the Internet presents unprecedented opportunities for anti-U.S. Islamic organizations in pursuit of their cause. They will likely to continue exploiting this technology and refine their skills.\n\n## B. Future Research\n\nThe scope of this thesis is limited to the internal factors of websites in evaluating its effectiveness.  However, this is only one dimension of web-based communications and does not account for external factorsincluding audience predisposition, experience, and cultural contextthat greatly contribute to the receptiveness of communicated messages. A web experience survey by a large sample audience will provide a better understanding of the persuasive communication effect of the websites investigated.  Innovative and aggressive monitoring and intelligence collection techniques must be developed to identify and understand target audiences of anti-U.S. Islamic organizations.  This is necessary to corroborate the pervasiveness of web based information campaigns and the resultant behavior as well as to develop a counter strategy.\nIn a free society, there is no good way to legally bar hateful messages and disinformation.  Instead, more effort must be focused on using the presence of insidious websites to our own advantage by monitoring and learning the adversary's perspective, activities, strengths and weaknesses.  Finally, the most important task is to develop an aggressive counter-information campaign strategy that is comprehensive and farsighted.\nThe greatest challenge in this endeavor is not a lack of technological or physical capabilities, but a shift from a paradigm which brands perception management, especially at home, as deceitful and immoral.  Further, it is necessary to re-examine our own rationale and role of Public Affairs (PA).  The so-called \"projection of objective information\" by PA representatives is static and predictable.  This may have worked when there was a reasonable firewall between the public and the government in terms of sharing information on its affairs.  In the global information age, such an approach is insufficient to engage the public and promote U.S. ideas, both at home and abroad, since it has to compete with countless sources of information.  Given a lack of legal means against hate messages, the counter strategy can start by offering alternatives.\nThe Internet undoubtedly presents an unprecedented opportunity for such a strategy as advocated by several studies (Lungu 2001 and Blakely 2003).  The findings of this thesis may also serve as a lesson learned for future online information campaigns.  A truly strategic information campaign rests beyond the domain of the Department of Defense.  Therefore, it is imperative to establish a policy to coordinate and de-conflict within various U.S. agencies that overrides a perpetual bureaucratic, cultural and organizational schism.\n\nTHIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK\n\n\n## Appendix List Of Websites\n\n28 Islamic websites examined in the thesis are listed.  Inclusion on this list does not necessarily imply that they are supportive of terrorist groups or engaged in any illegal activities.  The websites are selected for research purposes only.  All websites were accessed between May through September of 2004.\n\n\nOrganization/Website\nURL\nScore\n24\n20\n21\n23\n29\n34\n14\n29\nwww.hamasonline.com www.moqawama.org\nwww.nasrollah.net\nwww.hizb-ut-tahrir.org www.khilafah.com www.tanzeem.org\nwww.shareeah.org\nwww.jamaat.org\nHamas :\nHamas fan site. Islamic\nResistance\nSupport\nAssociation:\nHizbollah website. Nasrollah :\nA website of a Hizbollah leader, Sheikh Hasan Nasrallah.\n\nHizb-ut-Tahrir :\nA radical Islamist political organization that operates in 40 countries with headquarters apparently in London.\nKhilafah :\nIslamic news website affiliated with Hizb-ut-Tahrir.\nTanzeem-e-Islami :\nIslamic movement organization based in Pakistan.\nSupport for Shareeah :\nWebsite of Abu Hamza Al Masri at the Finsbury Park Mosque, UK. Jamaat-e-Islami :\nIslamic fundamentalist party based in Pakistan, suspected of a link to\nAl Qaeda.\n21\n37\n31\n\n\n26\n31\n33\n18\n18\n33\n18\n38\n31\nJihadunspun :\nPro-Qaeda and Jihad news site. Distinguished for its sleek media\nproduction.\n\nIslamicawakening :\nPro-Qaeda news and discussion forum.\nAlharamain Foundation :\nSaudi sponsored charity organization.  Under investigation for alleged financial support to\nterrorists.\n\nAlminbar :\nPosts numerous anti-U.S. and anti Semitic sermons.\nIviews :\nIslamic news site. The Muslim News :\nIslamic news and online publication site.\nThe Quest:\nAnti-U.S. online publication.\nJihadonline:\nAnti-U.S. online publication.\n\nNzmuslim :\nIslamic web resources.\nInnovative Mind:\nAnti-U.S. and Pro-Palestine.\nElectronic Intifada:\nPro-Palestine online activist.\nIslamic Digest:\nAnti-West and anti-Israel online publication. Hizbollah affiliated.\nwww.jihadunspun.com\nwww.islamawakening.com www.alharamain.org\n\n\nwww.alminbar.net\nwww.iviews.com\nwww.muslimnews.co.uk\nwww.the-quest.info\nwww.jihadonline.bravepages.com\n\n\nwww.nzmuslim.net www.inminds.co.uk\nwww.electronicintifada.net\nwww.islamicdigest.org\n25\n30\n34\n30\n33\n33\n23\n26\nIslamic World:\nOnline resource.\nUmmah :\nOnline Muslim directory.\nIslam Online :\nIslam news and resources.\nCouncil on American-Islamic Relations:\nPolitical activist organization.\nMuslim Student Association:\nCampus organization allegedly financed by Saudi fundamentalist. Chapters in over 70 universities across the U.S and Canada.\nMuslim Public Affairs Council :\nPolitical activist organization.\nMindSpring:\nAnti-US and pro-Shariah activist and online publication. 1924:\nAnti-US and Pro-Shariah activist and online publication.\nwww.islamic-world.net\nwww.ummah.com www.islamonline.net\nwww.cair.net\nwww.msa-natl.org\nwww.mpac.org\nwww.mindspring.eu.com\nwww.1924.org\n\n## This Page Intentionally Left Blank Bibliography\n\nAgarwal, Ritu, and Viswanath Venkatesh. \"Assessing a firm's Web presence: a heuristic evaluation procedure for the measurement of usability.\" *Information Systems Research* 13 (June 2002) :  168-186.  Retrieved from ProQuest online database on 15 March 2004. Arquilla, J. and Ronfeldt, D, \"Cyberwar Is Cominge!\" in In Athena's Camp : Preparing for Conflict in the information Age. Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1997.\n\n\nBertelsmann Foundation. \"E-Government-Connecting Efficient Administration and Responsive Democracy\".  Retrieved from  www.begix.de on 6 June 2004.\n\nBlakely, James F. \"Terrorism and the Role of Information: Building Relationships Online.\" Master's  Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2003.\n\n\nBlinken, Antony J. \"Winning the War of Ideas.\" *The Washington Quarterly* 25 (Spring 2002) : 101-114.  Retrieved from Project MUSE online database on  8 May 2004. Carmon, Yigal. \"Assessing Islamist Web Site Reports of Imminent Terror Attacks in the U.S.\"  Retrieved from  www.memri.org   30 April 2004. Dearth, Douglas H. \"The Human Factor in Future Conflict: Continuity and Change\" In Cyberwar 3.0: Human Factors in Information Operations and Future Conflict, ed. Allan Campen and Douglas H. Dearth, 7-17.  Fairfax, VA: AFCEA 1996 Eedle, Paul. \"Al-Qaeda takes fight for 'hearts and minds' to the web.\" *Jane's Intelligence*\nReview.  Retrieved from Jane's Intelligence Review Online on 18 April 04.\n\n\nFattah, Hassan. \"The Metrics System.\" *Adweek*, 13 November 2000, 98-102.  Retrieved from ProQuest online database on 24 May 2004. Feith, Douglas J., \"U.S. Strategy for the War on Terrorism\"  A speech given at Political Union University of Chicago, Chicago, Illinois on 14 April 2004\nGaffney Jr., Frank. \"The Truth About the AMC\" Retrieved from www.Foxnews.com on\n17 July 2004. Hegland, Corine. \"Global Jihad.\" *National Journal,* 36 (May 2004): 1396-1402. Retrieved from Retrieved from ProQuest online database on 1 August 2004. Jenkins, Brian. *Countering Al Qaeda.*  Santa Monica, CA : 2002. Kaufman, Edward. \"A Broadcasting Strategy to Win Media Wars.\" The Washington Quarterly  25 (Spring 2002): 115-127.  Retrieved from Project MUSE online database on\n2 June 2004.\n\nKeeker, Kevin \"Improving Web Site Usability and Appeal: Guidelines compiled by MSN\nusability research.\" Retrieved from http://msdn.microsoft.com on 20 May 2004 Kent, Michael L. \"Does your Web site attract or repel customers? Three tests of Web site effetiveness.\" *Public Relations Quarterly* (Winter 1998/1999): 31-33. Retrieved from ProQuest online database on 22 May 2004. Kent, Michael L, and Maureen Taylor. \"Maximizing media relations: A Web site checklist.\" *Public Relations Quarterly* (Spring 2003): 14-18. Retrieved from ProQuest online database on 22 May 2004. Kim, Sung-Eon, Thomas Shaw, and Helmut Schneider. \"Web site design benchmarking within industry groups.\" *Internet Research*  13 (2003) : 17-26.  Retrived from ProQuest online database on 15 May 2004. Lee, Jae-Kwan. \"A model for monitoring public sector Web site strategy.\" Internet Research: Electronic Networking Applications and Policy 13 (2003) : 259-266. Retrieved from Emerad online database on 2 June 2004. Lungu, Angela M. \"WAR.COM: The Internet and Psychological Operations.\" A paper submitted to Naval War College, 2001. Retrieved from DTIC online database on 7 May\n2004. Molenaar, C.N.A. The future of marketing: Practical strategies for marketers in the postinternet age. Great Britain, Pearson Education Limited., 2002. Nelson, Thomas E., Rosalee A Clawson, and Zoe M Oxley. \"Media framing of a civil liberties conflict and its effect on tolerance.\" *The American Political Science Review*\n(September 1997) 91/3 : 567-583.  Retrieved from ProQuest online database 4 April 2004. Palmer, Jonathan W. \"Web site usability, design, and performances metrics.\" Information Systems Research  13 (June 2002) : 151-167.  Retrieved from ProQuest online database 29 April 2004. Pew Research Center for the People and the Press. \"A Year After Iraq War : Mistrust of America in Europe ever higher, Muslim anger persist A survey report.\" 16 March 2004.\n\nRetrieved from  http://peoplepress.org/reports/display.php3?ReportID=206 on 2 July\n2004. Ranchhod, Ashok, Julie Tinson, and Fan Zhou. \"Factors Influencing Marketing Performance on the Web.\" In *Internet Marketing Research: Theory and Practice,* ed.\n\nOok Lee, 61-76. Hershey, PA 2001. Roberts, Mary Lou. *Internet Marketing: Integrating Online and Offline Strategies.* New York: McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc., 2003.\n\nSAIC, \"Global Issues Report.\" 2004. A policy support document for Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense-Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict Shneiderman, Ben. Designing the User Interface: Strategies for Effective Human- Computer Interaction. Addison Wesley Longman, Inc., 1998. Silber, Debra Juge. \"Sizing up Internet benchmarking tools.\" Folio: The Magazine for Magazine Management (2002) ABI/INFORM Global.  Retrieved from ProQuest online database on 8 June 2004. Simeon, Roblyn. \"Evaluating the branding potential of Web sites across borders.\" Marketing Intelligence & *Planning* 19 (2001): 418-424.  Retrieved from Emerald online database on 25 April 2004. Spencer, Robert.\n\n\"Internet Jihad.\"\n16\nDecember\n2003.\n\nRetrieved from www.frontpagemag.com  on 28 April 2004. Stanton, John J. \"Terror in Cyber Space.\" *The American Behavioral Scientist* 45 (February 2002): 1017-1032. Stein, George J. \"Information Warfare\" In Cyberwar: Security, Strategy, and Conflict in the Information Age , ed. Allan Campen, Douglas H. Dearth, and R. Thomas Goodden, 175-183.  Fairfax, VA: AFCEA 1996. Stewart, David W. and Paul A Pavlou. \"From Consumer Response to active consumer:\nMeasuring the effectiveness of Interactive Media.\" Academy of Marketing Science Journal 30 (Fall 2002) : 376 -396.  Retrieved from ProQuest online database on 2 May 2004. Thomas, Timothy L. \"Al Qaeda and the Internet: The Danger of Cyberplanning.\"\nParameters, Spring 2003, 112-123.   Retrieved from http://carlisle-www.army.mil on 20\nApril 2004. Tibbetts, Patrick S. \"Terrorist Use of the Internet and Related Information Technologies.\" Monograph, United States Army command and General Staff College, 2001. Retrieved from DTIC online database in 18 July 2004. Tugwell, Maurice. \"Revolutionary propaganda and possible countermeasures: an unpublished thesis,  Department of War Studies, Kings College: University of London\n(1992). Quoted in Robert S. Earl and Norman E. Emery, Terrorist Approach to Information Operations, 10. Master's  Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2003. Tuman, Joseph S. *Communicating Terror : The Rhetorical Dimensions of Terrorism.*\nThousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, Inc., 2003.\n\nThe New Atlantis. \"Dot-Com Terrorism: How Radical Islam Uses the Internet to Fight the West.\" (Spring 2004) Retrieved from www.thenewatlantis.com on 28 July 2004. University of California, Los Angeles. \"Internet Report: Surveying the Digital Future.\"\nFebruary 2003. Retrieved from http://ccp.ucla.edu/pdf/UCLA-Internet-Report-Year- Three.pdf  on 29 March, 2004. U.S Congress. Senate.  Committee on the Judiciary, \"Terrorism: Growing Wahhabi Influence in the United States: Hearing before the Subcommittee on Terrorism, Technology and Homeland Security\" 108th Cong., 1st sess., 26 June 2003.\nRetrieved from www.gpoaccess.gov/index.html on 10 July 2004. Waller, J Michael.  \"Losing a Battle for Hearts and Minds\" *Insight,* 22 April 2002, 18-19.\n\nRetrieved from ProQuest online database on 10 May 2004. Weimann, Gabriel. \"www.terror.net: How Modern Terrorism Uses the Internet.\" United States Institute of Peace special report. Retrieved from   http://www.usip.org\non 24 March, 2004. Wenham, Kate, Stephens Derek, and Rachel Harday. \"The marketing effectiveness of UK environmental charity websites compared to best practice.\" International Journal of Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Marketing. 8 (Aug 2003): 213-223.  Retrieved from ProQuest online database on 2 May 2004. Whine, Michael. \"Islamist Organizations on the Internet.\" (April 1998)  Retrieved from www.ict.org.il on 11 April 2004.\n\n\n\n## Initial Distribution List\n\n1.\nDefense Technical Information Center Ft. Belvoir, Virginia\n2.\nDudley Knox Library Naval Postgraduate School Monterey, California\n3.\nMr. James Ehlert Naval Postgraduate School\nMonterey, California\n4.\nDr. Raymond Buettner Naval Postgraduate School Monterey, California\n\n5.\nMinji Daniels COMPACFLT Pearl Harbor, Hawaii"
    },
    {
        "text": "Panel of Experts established\nPursuant to Resolution 1874 (2009)1 I. Executive Summary\n\n1. On 12 June 2009, the Security Council unanimously adopted resolution 1874 (2009)\nin which it requested the Secretary-General to establish a Panel of Experts mandated to: gather, examine and analyze information regarding the implementation of the measures imposed by the Council in resolutions 1718 (2006) and 1874 (2009), in particular incidents of non-compliance; make recommendations on actions the Council, the Committee or Member States may consider to improve implementation of those measures; and, assist the 1718 Committee in carrying out its functions.\n\n2. The measures imposed by resolution 1718 (2006) and strengthened by resolution\n1874 (2009) include: (a) a ban on the provision to and the procurement from DPRK of nuclear-related, other weapons of mass destruction-related and ballistic missile-related items as well as all arms and related materiel, except for small arms and light weapons and their related materiel provided to the DPRK; (b) a ban on the transfer to or from the DPRK of services and assistance related to the provision, manufacture, maintenance or use of the proscribed items; and (c) a ban on the provision of luxury goods to the DPRK.\n\n3. Resolution 1874 (2009) also introduced a strong interdiction system, which calls upon all Member States to inspect all cargo to and from the DPRK in their territory and to inspect vessels with the consent of the flag State on the high seas, if the Member State concerned has information that provides reasonable grounds to believe the cargo contains proscribed items. A Member State discovering such items is required to seize and dispose of them. The inspecting Member State is also required to submit a detailed report on such cases to the 1718 Committee.\n\n4. No official allegations have been presented to the Committee since the adoption of resolution 1718 (2006) concerning the provision of proscribed nuclear-related or ballistic missile-related items, technology or know-how to or from the DPRK. Nevertheless, the Panel of Experts has reviewed several government assessments, IAEA reports, research papers and media reports indicating continuing DPRK involvement in nuclear and ballistic missile related activities in certain countries including Iran, Syria and Myanmar. The Panel of Experts believes that special attention should be given by all Member States to inhibit such activities. Further study of these suspected activities by the DPRK should be conducted for a more thorough understanding of the facts.\n\n\n5. The 1718 Committee has been notified, since the adoption of resolution 1874 (2009), of four non-compliance cases involving arms exports. An analysis of these cases indicates that the DPRK continues to engage in exporting such proscribed items. In these cases, the DPRK has used a number of masking techniques in order to circumvent the Security Council measures, including false description and mislabeling of the content of the containers, falsification of the manifest covering the shipment, alteration and falsification of the information concerning the original consignor and ultimate consignee, and use of multiple layers of intermediaries, shell companies, and financial institutions.\n\nThe Panel of Experts recommends in this regard that extra vigilance be exercised in accordance with local norms at the first overseas maritime port handling such DPRK shipments or transshipments with regard to containers carrying cargo originating from the DPRK. The Panel also recommends that consideration be given to introducing procedures that, without overburdening international maritime commerce, would assure that onward transshipment ports are aware of the cargo's DPRK origin so that they could also apply extra vigilance.\n\n6. The Panel of Experts also notes that air cargo poses certain other issues and vulnerabilities. Difficulties involved in the inspection of cargo in an aircraft in transit and inability to subject direct flights to inspection leaves in place important vulnerabilities with respect to the implementation of the resolutions. The Panel recommends that consideration be given by Member States over whose territory such aircraft may fly, stop or transit, that efforts be undertaken in those cases to closely monitor air traffic to and from Sunan and other DPRK airports, and that cargoes to and from the DPRK be declared before over flight clearance is provided.\n\n7. The Committee has also received two reports of seizure of luxury goods. There was a clear understanding in both of these cases that the goods involved were proscribed luxury items. However, such understanding is not always present. Most national implementation reports omit any mention of luxury goods. National definitions of luxury goods vary and associated national export controls are implemented in an uneven manner, which risks undercutting the effectiveness of this measure vis-a-vis the DPRK. To close these potential gaps, the Panel of Experts proposes in this report basic principles and important factors that should be considered in designating luxury goods.\n\n\n8. The DPRK also employs a broad range of techniques to mask its financial transactions, including the use of overseas entities, shell companies, informal transfer mechanisms, cash couriers and barter arrangements. However, it must still, in most cases, rely on access to the international financial system to complete its financial operations. In structuring these transactions, attempts are made to mix illicit transactions with otherwise legitimate business activities in such a way as to hide the illicit activity. Therefore, the Panel of Experts underscores the importance of exercising extra vigilance to assure that financial transactions and services do not contribute to the DPRK's proscribed activities.\n\nSpecial attention is drawn, in this regard, to non proliferation and anti-money laundering and combating the financing of terrorism (AML/CFT) principles and guidelines published by the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) and to FATF's Typologies Report on Proliferation Financing.\n\n9. The Committee has designated eight entities and five individuals for financial (and travel in the case of individuals) sanctions. These few designations seriously understate the number of known entities and individuals engaged in proscribed activities, and are inadequate to the task of effectively inhibiting key DPRK parties from engaging in proscribed activities. No account has yet been made also to deal with those substituting for or acting for or on behalf of these entities and individuals. Thus, all Member States should be invited to provide to the Committee for its consideration the names of entities and individuals who are believed to be engaged in proscribed activities, and especially those that have been implicated in non-compliance cases reported to the Committee. Consideration should also be given to making sure that those entities and individuals that are already designated are not able to avoid the Security Council measures through the use of aliases.\n\n10. Special attention is drawn also to the fact that a substantial number of Member States have not yet filed the national implementation reports called for in the resolutions. These reports are essential to an overall evaluation of the steps being taken to implement the Security Council measures and to ensure they are implemented effectively. II. Introduction\n\n11. In response to the continuing non-compliance of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) with its international obligations and following the nuclear test conducted by the DPRK on 25 May 2009, the Security Council adopted resolution 1874 (2009) on 12 June 2009. With that resolution the Council strengthened measures previously adopted in resolution 1718 (2006) and stressed that the Democratic People's Republic of Korea must abandon all its nuclear-related, other existing weapons of mass destruction-related and ballistic missile-related programmes and return to full compliance with its international obligations.\n\n12. The adoption by the Security Council of the measures contained in resolution 1874\n(2009) followed upon numerous diplomatic bilateral and multilateral attempts to convince the DPRK to comply fully with its international obligations, including returning at an early date to and complying with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (\"the NPT\") which the country acceded to in 1985.\n\n13. Faced with the DPRK's announced withdrawal from the NPT and its renunciation of its obligations under the Safeguards Agreement between the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (INFCIRC/403), the Security Council, on 11 May 1993, adopted resolution 825 (1993) formally calling upon the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to honor its non-proliferation obligations and to comply with its IAEA Safeguards Agreement. In addition, concerned countries undertook numerous and repeated demarches to persuade the DPRK to return to full compliance with its treaty obligations, and the DPRK agreed to \"suspend\" its announced withdrawal from the NPT. After a short period of cooperation, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea again increased tension in the region on 31 August 1998, by launching an object propelled by a missile over the territory of Japan, which fell into the sea in the vicinity of Japan.2  This missile launch had been conducted without prior notification to the countries in the region, or to the international organizations concerned. Responding to this incident, the Security Council issued a press statement on 15 September 1998, expressing its concern and urging the DPRK to refrain from any such further actions.\n\n14. The DPRK expelled all remaining IAEA inspectors on 27 December 2002, and informed the Security Council on 10 January 2003 that it had decided \"to revoke the 'suspension' on the effectuation of the withdrawal from the NPT.\"\n\n15. In an effort to defuse growing tension stemming from these DPRK actions, and to return the DPRK to NPT- and IAEA-related and other international obligations, China, Japan, Republic of Korea, Russian Federation and the United States on 27 August 2003, entered into joint talks with the DPRK (\"Six-Party talks\"). The Six-Party talks continued over the next two years without producing the desired results. On 19 September 2005 in the \"Joint Statement of the Fourth Round of the Six-Party Talks,\" the Six-Party participants unanimously reaffirmed that \"the goal of the Six-Party talks is the verifiable denuclearization for the Korean Peninsula in a peaceful manner\" and \"the DPRK committed to abandoning all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programmes and returning, at an early date, to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and to IAEA safeguards.\" In November 2005, however, the DPRK ceased its participation in this Six-Party process. On 5 July 2006, the DPRK, in defiance of previous undertakings and Security Council pronouncements, launched seven ballistic missiles, including a long range ballistic missile. 3   Condemning these actions, the Security Council, on 15 July 2006, adopted resolution 1695 (2006) demanding that the DPRK \"suspend all activities related to its ballistic missile programme, and in this context re-establish its pre-existing commitments to a moratorium on missile launching.\"4\nThe resolution also \"requires\" all Member States to prevent the provision to, or acquisition from, the DPRK of \"missile and missile-related items, materials, goods and technology.\" The Council also urged the DPRK to abandon all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programmes, and to return immediately to the Six-Party talks without precondition.\n\n\n16. Despite these efforts to bring the DPRK back to the Six-Party talks, the DPRK on 3\nOctober 2006 announced its intention to conduct a nuclear test, and in disregard of the Security Council Presidential Statement of 6 October 2006 (S/PRST/2006/41) urging the DPRK not to proceed, the DPRK announced that it had conducted a nuclear test on 9\nOctober 2006. And, on 14 October 2006 the Security Council adopted resolution 1718 (2006), deciding under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter that the DPRK shall, inter alia, abandon all nuclear weapons, existing nuclear programmes, all other existing weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missile programmes in a complete, verifiable and irreversible manner. The resolution also imposed a series of sanction measures against the DPRK to compel compliance and established a committee to monitor their implementation. The resolution also called upon the DPRK to return immediately to the Six-Party talks.\n\n17. With regard to the non nuclear categories of weapons of mass destruction, i.e., chemical and biological weapons, the DPRK acceded to the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) in March 1987 but not to the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC).\n\nSecurity Council resolution 1718 (2006) decided under Chapter VII that the DPRK shall abandon \"all other existing weapons of mass destruction ...programme in a complete, verifiable and irreversible manner.\" Although this decision was not repeated in resolution 1874 (2009), its validity remains in place.\n\n18. The Six-Party talks were resumed in December 2006, and on 13 February 2007 the parties announced agreement on first phase actions aimed at DPRK denuclearization. This was followed on 3 October 2007, with an agreement on \"Second-Phase Actions for the Implementation of the Joint Statement.\" Under these agreements the DPRK undertook, in return for 50,000 tons of fuel oil aid and other economic assistance to shutdown its Yongbyon reactor within sixty days, and plans were subsequently laid for the return of IAEA inspectors. However, the Six-Party talks reached a new impasse soon thereafter. And, in September 2008, the DPRK reversed its position on the closing of Yongbyon nuclear facilities, requested the IAEA to remove seals and surveillance equipment, and prohibited further IAEA access to the site.5\n\n19. International tensions were further increased in April 2009, as the DPRK, acting in contravention of Security Council resolution 1718 (2006), launched a multi-stage ballistic missile 6  again, which the DPRK claimed was an effort to place an experimental communications satellite7 into orbit. The Security Council issued a presidential statement on 13 April 2009 (S/PRST/2009/7), condemning this launch. And, on 14 April 2009, the DPRK declared that it would \"never participate in such Six-Party talks nor will it be bound any longer to any agreement of the talks....\" It was further stated that \"the DPRK will boost its nuclear deterrent of self-deterrence in every way.\" Further DPRK ballistic missile launches took place in July and October 2009.\n\n20. On 25 May 2009, the DPRK conducted a second underground nuclear test leading the Security Council on 12 June 2009, to adopt resolution 1874 (2009) strengthening the measures previously adopted in resolution 1718 (2006). Resolution 1874 (2009) also repeated decisions in resolution 1718 (2006) to suspend all ballistic missile-related activities and to re-establish the moratorium on missile launches. These and other decisions taken under Chapter VII have imposed legally binding obligations on the DPRK. III. Background\n\n21. An understanding of the measures adopted by the Security Council, their application, implementation and impact, requires some discussion of the context in which these measures have been applied. This includes a review of the principal reasons cited by the DPRK for its nuclear, other WMD and ballistic missile-related programmes as well as the prevailing economic situation in the country.\n\n22. While the decision-making process with regard to the DPRK's nuclear, other WMD\nand ballistic missile-related programmes remains unclear, many experts with whom the DPRK's conduct was discussed believe that it is influenced by a mixture of perceived security concerns and domestic factors. The DPRK believes also that its nuclear programme can provide the country a way to achieve its stated goal of becoming a\n\"strong and prosperous country\" (*kangsongdaeguk*) by the year 2012 without succumbing to what they view as \"foreign influences.\" They also consider their nuclear capability as a valuable asset which provides them important leverage in dealing with the rest of the world.\n\n23. Two elements which stand out in the DPRK's calculations are its \"military first\"\n(*Songun*) policy and its emphasis on \"self reliance\" (*Juche*). It has broadly been reported that the DPRK amended its constitution in 2009 to elevate this \"military-first\" policy into a national guiding principle, 8  thereby solidifying the military's preeminent role. A\nnumber of government officials stressed to the Panel that these policies and attendant political uncertainties, have seriously complicated dealing with the DPRK concerning its nuclear, other WMD and ballistic missile-related programmes.\n\n24. While few reliable economic statistics are published by the DPRK, several recent reports produced by credible foreign sources indicate that the DPRK's state directed economy is suffering from a number of serious setbacks.9 The DPRK's continuous trade deficits, the lack of foreign currency reserves, chronic food shortages and the recent currency restructuring have had a substantial negative impact on the overall economy and the well being of large segments of the DPRK's general population. While consensus estimates place per capita income in purchasing power parity (PPP) values in the range of US $1,700 to US $2,25010 (in foreign exchange rate values in US $900 to US $1,200) per year, these figures are skewered by a disproportionate distribution of national income which is devoted to the country's military programme and foreign purchases. At the same time a considerable share of the general rural population remains on the edge of starvation and is largely dependent on international food assistance. A December 2008\njoint report by the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) and the World Food Programme (WFP) indicated that some 40 percent of the population - an estimated 8.7\nmillion people - would need food aid during the coming (2008-09) winter11.\n\n\n25. The DPRK government has placed special emphasis on the development of a militaryindustrial complex including a significant armaments industry and an industry capable of supporting the country's nuclear, other WMD and ballistic missile-related programmes. DPRK's military-related industries (which also manufacture dual use items)\nare virtually indistinguishable from those supplying civilian needs. The DPRK reported that for 2009 it had allocated some 15.8 % of its US $3.7 billion budget to national defense expenditures12 but government officials and experts with whom the Panel met have indicated that this figure is significantly understated.\n\n26. While the DPRK releases no official statistics concerning its export trade, estimates prior to resolution 1874 (2009) placed it in the range of US $1.5 and US $3 billion, with the DPRK running an annual trade deficit in excess of US $1 billion.13 This continuing deficit, together with a decrease in overall trade, is having an increased adverse impact on DPRK's economy, especially since the second nuclear test in May 2009, and subsequent imposition of the further sanctions measures adopted in resolution 1874 (2009).14\n\n27. The DPRK relies heavily for its foreign exchange earnings on a very limited range of exports including rice, pig iron, rolled steel, cement, machinery of various types, chemicals, magnetite (iron ore), textiles, armaments, and gold. The military sector has also been given a prominent export role and concentrates on developing overseas markets for its locally produced military arms and equipment. However, these exports are now subject to Security Council measures which prohibit Member States from importing or exporting such items to or from the DPRK. To supplement its foreign earnings, the DPRK has long also been engaged in illicit and questionable international transactions. These transactions are reported to include the surreptitious transfer of nuclear and ballistic missile-related equipment, know-how and technology, illicit drug and cigarette smuggling and counterfeiting of currencies and cigarettes. A number of these\n\nsurreptitious procurement and transfer techniques are now being used also to circumvent\nthe Security Council mandated controls placed on DPRK's exports and imports.\nIV. Security Council Measures\n\n28. The Security Council, in resolution 1874 (2009) sought to strengthen and build upon\nthe measures previously adopted by the Council in resolution 1718 (2006) with a view of\nconvincing the DPRK to comply with its Security Council imposed obligations, to return\nto the Six-Party talks, and to take significant irreversible steps to carry out its undertakings pursuant to previous Six-Party talks agreements. The measures adopted were also designed to inhibit the DPRK's ability to acquire equipment, material, technology and financial and other resources related to its nuclear, other weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missile programmes. These measures now include:\n\n- a ban on the provision to the DPRK of all items, materials, equipment, goods and\ntechnology as specified in the resolution, as well as other items, material, equipment, goods and technology, determined by the Security Council or the Committee, which could contribute to the DPRK's nuclear-related, other weapons of mass destructionrelated, or ballistic missile-related programmes;\n- a ban on the provision of all arms and related materiel to the DPRK (with the\nexception, subject to notification requirements, of small arms and light weapons and\ntheir related materiel);\n- a ban on the procurement from the DPRK of listed and other items determined by the\nSecurity Council or the Committee, which could contribute to nuclear-related, other weapons of mass destruction-related, or ballistic missile-related programmes;\n- a ban on the procurement from the DPRK of all arms and related materiel, including,\nsmall arms and light weapons and their related materiel;\n- a ban on the transfer to and from the DPRK of financial transaction, technical\ntraining, advice, services or assistance related to the provision, manufacture, maintenance or use of all the items cited above (except for small arms and light weapons provided to the DPRK);\n- a ban on the provision of luxury goods to the DPRK.\n\n29. In addition, Member States (and relevant international financial and credit\ninstitutions) are also called upon:\n- to prevent the provision of financial services or the transfer to, through, or from their\nterritory, or to or by their nationals or entities organized under their laws (including branches abroad), or persons or financial institutions in their territory, of any financial\nor other assets or resources that could contribute to the DPRK's nuclear-related, other weapons of mass destruction-related, or ballistic missile-related programmes or activities;\n- to refrain from entering into new commitments for grants, financial assistance, or\nconcessional loans to the DPRK, except for humanitarian and developmental purposes directly addressing the needs of the civilian population, or the promotion of\ndenuclearization;\n- not to provide public financial support for trade with the DPRK (including the granting of export credits, guarantees or insurance to their nationals or entities involved in such trade) where such financial support could contribute to the DPRK's nuclear-related, other WMD-related, or ballistic missile-related programmes or activities; and,\n-  to exercise vigilance and prevent specialized teaching or training of DPRK nationals within their territories or by their nationals, of disciplines which could contribute to the DPRK's proliferation sensitive nuclear activities and the development of nuclear weapon delivery systems.\n\n30. Resolution 1718 (2006) also provides for the designation of individuals and entities engaged in or providing support for, including through illicit means, the DPRK's nuclearrelated, other existing weapons of mass destruction-related and ballistic missile-related programmes. All Member States are obliged to take steps to prevent the entry into or transit though their territories of such persons and to freeze immediately funds, other financial assets and economic resources that are owned or controlled, directly or indirectly, by those persons or entities, or those acting on their behalf or at their direction.\n\n31. Member States are called upon, by resolution 1874 (2009), to inspect, in accordance with their national authorities and legislation, and consistent with international law, all cargo to and from the DPRK, in their territory, if the Member State concerned has information that provides reasonable grounds to believe the cargo contains items the supply, sale, transfer or export of which is prohibited by the resolution. A special interdiction regime also authorizes Member States to carry out such inspections, with the consent of the flag State, on the high seas. And when such consent is not forthcoming, an obligation is placed on the flag State to \"direct the vessel to proceed to an appropriate and convenient port for the required inspection by local authorities....\" A Member State which discovers prohibited items in the course of an inspection is to seize and dispose of those items. Member States are also obliged to prohibit the provision of bunkering services to DPRK vessels suspected of carrying prohibited items.\n\n32. Paragraph 26 of resolution 1874 (2009) also requested the Secretary-General to establish a Panel of Experts for an initial period extending to 11 June 2010 and charged with:\n(a) assisting the 1718 Committee in carrying out its mandate;\n(b) gathering, examining and analyzing information from States, relevant United Nations bodies and other interested parties regarding the implementation of the measures imposed by the Council in resolutions 1718 (2006) and 1874 (2009), in particular incidents of non-compliance; (c) making recommendations on actions the Council, the Committee or Member States may consider to improve implementation of those measures. The Panel was also assigned the task of providing both an interim and final report on its work to the Security Council, with the final report to be submitted to the Security Council by 12 May 2010.\nV. The Panel of Experts\n\n33. The Panel of Experts was appointed by the Secretary-General on 12 August 2009 as follows 15: David J. Birch (United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, coordinator), Masahiko Asada (Japan), Victor D. Comras (United States of America), Erik Marzolf (France), Young Wan Song (Republic of Korea), Alexander Vilnin (Russian Federation), and Xiaodong Xue (People's Republic of China).\n\n34. The Panel of Experts has carried out its work on the basis of the terms of its mandate provided in paragraph 26 of resolution 1874 (2009) and direction received from the Committee. Internal decisions have been taken jointly. If, and when, divergent views have arisen on substantive issues among the members of the Panel, the perspective of the majority has been reflected, and an opportunity provided for the presentation of alternative view(s). Information that has been provided to the Panel of Experts on a confidential or restricted basis has been handled accordingly and in a manner consistent with the responsibilities of the Panel of Experts pursuant to resolution 1874 (2009).\n\n35. In carrying out its activities the Panel of Experts has been mindful of the evidentiary methodological standards established by best practice and recommended by the Informal Working Group of the Security Council on General Issues of Sanctions in its report\n(S/2006/997), relying on verified documents and, wherever possible, first-hand, on-site observations by the experts themselves.\n\n36. Since it began its work on 14 September 2009, the Panel of Experts has pro-actively carried out the various aspects of its mandate pursuant to paragraph 26 of resolution 1874\n(2009). This has included examining and analyzing reports submitted by Member States;\nconducting inquiries, research and travel related to the implementation of, and compliance with, the measures contained in resolutions 1718 (2006) and 1874 (2009); outreach activities; and advice and assistance to the Committee and Member States. In this regard the Panel of Experts has assisted the Committee in:\n\n- examining and taking appropriate action on information regarding actual and alleged violations of measures imposed by Security Council resolutions;\n- considering and taking appropriate action on reports received from Member States on their inspection or seizure and disposal of cargo;\n- preparing guidance on implementation of paragraph 8 (a) (iii) (luxury goods) of resolution 1718 (2006), paragraph 10 (small arms and light weapons) of resolution 1874 (2009), and paragraph 21 (activities of diplomatic missions) of resolution 1874 (2009);\n- conducting a comprehensive review of the Member States' national implementation reports pursuant to resolutions 1718 (2006) and 1874 (2009); and,\n- its deliberation on additional designation of goods, entities and individuals.\n\nEach of these areas will be addressed subsequently in this report.\n\n37. The Panel of Experts intends to continue its work on a number of additional tasks which, due to time constraints, have not yet been completed. These tasks include, inter alia, best practices to identify and avoid the provisions of specialized teaching or training of nationals of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, within their territories or by their nationals, in disciplines which could contribute to the proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and its development of nuclearweapon delivery systems; examine the use by the DPRK of informal financial transfer mechanisms such as cash couriers and other well known techniques that can be used for money-laundering or other surreptitious transactions; and develop guidelines, tools and best practices related to the vetting of projected investments in and public financing for, the DPRK.\n\n38. In accordance with paragraph 26(d) of resolution 1874 (2009), the Panel presented an interim report to the Security Council on 12 November 2009.16  This interim report provided information on the work of the Panel in assisting the Committee in the implementation of its mandate during the reporting period and general outline of the work programme of the Panel to implement the mandate pursuant to paragraph 26 of resolution 1874 (2009). It reviewed measures that Member States took to implement provisions of the resolutions 1718 (2006) and 1874 (2009) and recommended a number of actions to be undertaken by the Panel to enhance effectiveness of the measures contained in the resolutions.\n\n39. The Panel has also been active in supporting the Committee's outreach, dialogue, assistance and cooperation activities. This has included assisting the Committee in the preparation of informal guidance to Member States concerning the preparation of national implementation reports and in providing specific guidance, when requested by Member States, concerning the implementation of measures of the Security Council resolutions.\n\n40. In furtherance of its mandate the Panel has sought broad consultations and dialogue with as many relevant interested countries and appropriate experts as possible. In this regard, Panel members met with representatives of several missions in New York and have visited several countries involved in the Six-Party talks, including the United States of America (19-20 November 2009), the Republic of Korea (9-11 December 2009), Japan (14-15 December 2009) and the Russian Federation (18-19 February 2010). In each of these countries briefings were received from government authorities and nongovernmental experts concerning the political context and rationale for the Security Council measures as well as their application and efficacy. Briefings were also provided concerning national implementation and enforcement measures. The Panel will look forward to conducting a similar visit to the People's Republic of China.\n41. Panel members also visited Busan, Republic of Korea; Yokohama, Japan; Singapore;\nKuala Lumpur, Malaysia; Canberra, Australia; Vienna, Austria; as well as the Commission of the European Union in Brussels and the International Atomic Energy Agency in Vienna to obtain information concerning the implementation and enforcement of the Security Council measures and related compliance issues. On the occasion of the Panel's participation in the 17th Asian Export Control Seminar held in Tokyo from 26-28\nJanuary 2010, Panel members had the opportunity to exchange views with and collect information from most of the 26 participating countries and territories regarding the effective implementation of the resolutions. Furthermore, Panel members consulted with non-governmental experts on reported DPRK-related illicit arms trade, ballistic missile and nuclear proliferation activities as well as concerning the modalities of cargo forwarding, inspection and interdiction. During their visit to Busan, the Panel members had the opportunity to investigate the seized protective suits on which the Republic of Korea reported to the Committee. The Panel is awaiting similar opportunities with regard to other compliance-related cases reported to the Committee.\n\n42. The Panel of Experts has conducted its travel in accordance with modalities established by the Committee, and reflected in Note Verbale (S/AC.49/2010/OC.4)17. In this regard, the Panel has provided written reports to the Committee concerning these visits.\n\nVI. Reports of Member States\n\n43. Resolutions 1718 (2006) and 1874 (2009) specifies two types of reporting by Member States. One involves reporting to the Security Council on the steps Member States have taken to implement the measures imposed by both resolutions and the other is to report to the Committee on cases of inspection, seizure and disposal of cargo whose provision is prohibited to or from the DPRK. National Implementation Reports\n44. Paragraph 11 of resolution 1718 (2006) calls upon all Member States to report to the Security Council on \"the steps they have taken with a view to implementing effectively the provisions of paragraph 8\" of the resolution. This reporting system is reiterated in resolution 1874 (2009), paragraph 22 of which calls upon all Member States to report to the Council on \"concrete measures they have taken in order to implement effectively the provisions of paragraph 8 of resolution 1718 (2006) as well as paragraphs 9 and 10 of this resolution, as well as financial measures set out in paragraphs 18, 19 and 20 of this resolution.\" Submission of national implementation reports is important to an overall that, with regard to modalities for travel, the Panel is required to ensure that travel is related to carrying out the Panel's mandate, as specified in paragraph 26 of resolution 1874 (2009); to provide the Committee with an advance notice of any travel, including a draft itinerary and proposed objectives, at least two weeks before departure, and in the event of urgent travel as much advance notice as possible; to provide the Committee with a written report on each visit as soon as possible after returning (preferably within two weeks); and, to meet at least once a month with the Committee to brief the Committee on the Panel's activities, including travel, and answer questions from Committee Members.\nevaluation of the steps being taken to implement the Security Council measures and to ensure they are implemented effectively.\n\n45. As of 30 April 2010, 73 Member States and the European Union have submitted their national implementation reports pursuant to resolution 1718 (2006) and 48 Member States have done so pursuant to resolution 1874 (2009). An analysis of the 112 nonreporting/late-reporting Member States indicates that 51 are in Africa, 28 in Asia, 25 in Latin America and the Caribbean, 6 in Eastern Europe and 2 in Western Europe. It is noted by the Panel that the DPRK historically has had trade relations with many of these non-reporting/late-reporting Member States.\n\n46. The number of national reports submitted to date pursuant to resolutions 1718 (2006)\nand 1874 (2009) appears consistent with other Security Council resolutions calling for the submission of national implementation reports. Previous studies conducted by other experts groups on non-reporting or late-reporting Member States indicate that reasons for this may include lack of resources, a lack of experience, a lack of awareness, insufficient understanding, different national priorities, and time-consuming inter-agency procedures. It is presumed that many of these same reasons may have contributed to the large number of Member States not submitting their reports in a timely fashion. A study by the Panel of Experts of the reasons for the non-reporting or late-reporting by Member States pursuant to resolutions 1718 (2006) and 1874 (2009) could serve to improve this situation.\n\n47.  The Panel of Experts has provided a number of recommendations to the 1718\nCommittee to help stimulate increased and more in depth reporting concerning national implementation of the measures contained in the resolutions. These recommendations were contained in its February 2010 Quarterly Review Update Report to the Committee. That report suggested, among other measures, that the Committee send a note verbale reiterating the importance attached to these national implementation reports. It was also suggested to send a note verbale to indicate the availability of assistance from the Committee and the Panel of Experts in this regard. Outreach activities undertaken by the Committee and the Panel of Experts would also prove useful. Such outreach could include briefing by the Committee and participation in or organization of regional or subregional seminars and conferences. Coordinated outreach activities with other committees of the Security Council and their groups of experts might also prove beneficial. It would also be helpful to provide an optional guideline template as a check-list to Member States in order to show them a possible structure for the submission of their reports to the Security Council. The Panel of Experts further recommended that an explanation of the obligations of Member States to report on their national implementation under both resolutions and an informal guidance paper on preparing reports be prepared by the Committee with the assistance of the Panel of Experts.\n\n\n48. The national implementation reports submitted to date vary considerably in content, detail and format. Several set forth in detail the measures taken by Member States to implement the resolutions, and also include measures taken by them autonomously. A large number of reports, however, state only that steps have been or will be taken to implement the resolution but provide little or no detail. A number of reports make reference only to the names and citations of legislation. It was clear that a number of Member States had not enacted all necessary measures within the reporting timeframe provided for by the resolution. It would be difficult, if not impossible, for the Panel of Experts to evaluate the implementation of resolutions 1718 (2006) and 1874 (2009) based solely on such limited level of information. Member States should be reminded that paragraph 22 of resolution 1874 (2009) calls upon Member States to report on the \"concrete measures\" taken to implement provisions of both resolutions 1718 (2006) and 1874 (2009).\n\n49. There appear to be certain lacunae in the resolutions with regard to the measures about which Member States are called upon to report. For example, Member States are not called upon by resolution 1874 (2009) to report on the measures taken to prohibit the provision of bunkering services to DPRK vessels suspected of carrying prohibited items\n(para. 17) as well as measures taken to prevent specialized teaching or training of DPRK\nnationals of disciplines which could contribute to the DPRK's proliferation sensitive nuclear activities and the development of nuclear weapon delivery systems (para. 28). As the measures taken to implement those provisions are important to evaluate the steps being taken to implement the resolutions, all Member States should be invited to include them in their national implementation reports. The detailed inspection-related provisions of resolution 1874 (2009) concerning inspection of cargo (para. 11), inspection on the high seas (para. 12), obligation to direct the vessel to a port (para. 13), and seizure and disposal of items (para. 14) should be treated similarly, as they constitute useful complementary information to those provided under paragraph 8(f) of resolution 1718 (2006) regarding the \"cooperative action including through inspection of cargo\" which Member States are called upon to take. The reporting by Member States on the implementation of these measures could also assist the Committee and the Panel of Experts in the targeting of awareness and outreach activities.\n\nCompliance-related Reports (Inspection, Seizure and Disposal)\n\n50. Paragraph 15 of resolution 1874 (2009) requires that any Member State that undertakes an inspection or seizes and disposes of cargo promptly submit \"reports containing relevant details to the Committee on the inspection, seizure and disposal.\" The resolution in paragraph 16 also specifies that Member States that do not receive the cooperation of the flag state to authorize inspection of the vessel on the high seas or to direct the vessel to a port for inspection are required to report such refusals to the Committee with the relevant details. The obligation to submit such inspection-related reports is underscored by the fact that the Security Council chose specifically to \"require\" such reports. As inspection, seizure and disposal are to be conducted in cases of suspected non-compliance with the measures imposed by the resolutions, the Panel has chosen to describe these reports herein as \"compliance-related reports.\"\n\n51. Six non-compliance cases have been reported to the Committee since the adoption of resolution 1874 (2009).18  Upon receiving these reports, the Committee, in each case, sent notes verbale to all Member States which could provide additional relevant information on the case. The response rates to these inquiries have varied considerably. In the case reported by the UAE, most Member States responded to the Committee's inquiry by providing additional information. In the other cases, only a limited number of additional reports have yet been received. 19  All Member States should be reminded that paragraph\n27 of resolution 1874 (2009) \"*urges* all States... and other interested parties, to cooperate fully with the Committee and the Panel of Experts, in particular by supplying any information at their disposal on the implementation of the measures imposed by resolution 1718 (2006) and this resolution.\"\n\n52. The Panel of Experts believes that consideration should also be given to including in compliance-related reports those cases where inspections have been undertaken on suspicion of proscribed cargo even if no such cargo is discovered. Likewise, circumstances such as when proscribed items are known to have been supplied to the DPRK (i.e. accomplished cases), when the export of a proscribed items to the DPRK is stopped before they actually enter into international commerce (i.e. attempted cases), or when export permission is sought but denied by the relevant authorities (i.e. denied cases)\nshould also be reported. It should be recalled that the Panel of Experts is mandated to examine and analyze all \"incidents of non-compliance.\" \"Non-compliance\" in this context should be interpreted to include not only interdicted cases but also accomplished, attempted and denied cases. Here again, it should be recalled that all States and other interested parties are urged to cooperate fully with the Committee and the Panel by supplying relevant information at their disposal.20\n\nVII. Trade-related Measures Overview\n53. According to trade statistics compiled by the International Monetary Fund, the DPRK, prior to the imposition of Security Council measures, had established trading relations with some 80 countries or customs territories. Of these, China, the Republic of Korea, Japan and Russia represented the DPRK's most important trading partners, although significant trade was also being conducted with various EU member countries, particularly Italy and Germany. Since the imposition of the additional measures contained in resolution 1874 which was adopted in June 2009, DPRK trade21 has declined sharply with many of these countries, particularly in terms of exports to the DPRK. Several countries such as the United States, Japan, Australia, the Republic of Korea, and the Members of the EU have placed further domestic restrictions on trade, investment and financial dealings with the DPRK.\n\n\n(US $ in millions)\nDPRK's Exports (to the following countries)\n\n2000\n2001\n2002\n2003\n2004\n2005\n2006\n2007\n2008\n2009\nWORLD\n1,319\n1,171\n1,291\n1,266\n1,561\n1,568\n1,909\n2,535\n2,801\n----\nRepublic of Korea\n152\n176\n272\n289\n258\n340\n520\n765\n932\n934\nChina\n37\n167\n271\n395\n582\n497\n468\n582\n754\n501\nU.S.\n0\n0\n0\n0\n1\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\nJapan\n257\n226\n236\n174\n164\n132\n78\n0\n0\n0\nRussia\n8\n15\n10\n3\n5\n7\n20\n34\n14\n21\nE.U.\n140\n86\n76\n75\n145\n66\n196\n87\n153\n79\nIndonesia\n1\n2\n3\n0.4\n7\n9\n0.5\n3\n8\n8\nMalaysia\n2\n1\n0.2\n0.2\n0\n0.2\n0.4\n2\n2\n0.2\nPhilippines\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\n0\nSingapore\n3\n3\n1\n1\n2\n7\n7\n1\n0.3\n2\nThailand\n20\n24\n44\n51\n90\n132\n168\n36\n29\n14\n\nDPRK's Imports (from the following countries)\n\n2000\n2001\n2002\n2003\n2004\n2005\n2006\n2007\n2008\n2009\nWORLD\n1,859\n3,086\n1,973\n2,051\n2,616\n3,388\n2,908\n3,437\n4,127\n----\nRepublic of Korea\n273\n227\n370\n435\n439\n715\n830\n1,032\n888\n745\nChina\n451\n573\n467\n628\n795\n1,085\n1,232\n1,392\n2,033\n1,210\nU.S.\n3\n0.7\n25\n8\n24\n6\n0\n2\n52\n1\nJapan\n207\n1,065\n133\n91\n89\n63\n44\n9\n8\n3\nRussia\n36\n56\n47\n112\n205\n224\n191\n126\n97\n41\nE.U.\n183\n235\n290\n266\n176\n202\n157\n79\n145\n109\nIndonesia\n14\n4\n2\n2\n4\n7\n13\n0.4\n7\n8\nMalaysia\n1\n7\n4\n7\n20\n17\n7\n8\n17\n11\nPhilippines\n0\n0\n0.4\n0.3\n0.1\n0.1\n0.1\n0\n0\n0\nSingapore\n46\n112\n84\n60\n55\n73\n60\n55\n120\n55\nThailand\n184\n106\n172\n204\n239\n206\n227\n192\n48\n30\n\n\n\nDPRK's Balance of Trade\n\n2000\n2001\n2002\n2003\n2004\n2005\n2006\n2007\n2008\n2009\nBalance of Trade\n-540\n-1,915\n-682\n-785\n-1,055\n-1,820\n-999\n-901\n-1,326\n----\n\n\nSources: Data for the ROK from Ministry of Unification of the ROK. Data for China, Japan, Russia, the EU, and partial list of ASEAN countries from Global Trade Atlas. Data for the US from Global Trade Atlas and TradeStats Express National Trade Data, accessed via U.S. Department of Commerce website, in April 2010.\n\n54. The DPRK maintains a wide network of trade offices which work in close conjunction with DPRK diplomatic missions overseas. These offices are charged with both procurement and developing select trade opportunities of interest to the DPRK's leadership, including arranging and handling DPRK illicit trade and covert acquisitions. Some of these activities have been aimed principally at identifying opportunistic markets for both licit and illicit exports. While much of the DPRK's illicit or covert acquisition activities are handled by these offices, the DPRK has also established links with overseas criminal networks to carry out these activities, including the transportation and distribution of illicit and smuggled cargoes. This may also include WMD-sensitive goods and arms and related materiel smuggling. Compliance Related to Nuclear, other WMD and Ballistic Missile Activities\n55. Resolutions 1718 (2006) and 1874 (2009) place special emphasis on inhibiting the ability of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to acquire, and to provide to others, materials, equipment, goods, technology and technical know-how with regard to nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction as well as ballistic missiles. Resolutions 1718 (2006) and 1874 (2009) require all Member States \"to prevent the direct or indirect supply, sale or transfer to the DPRK, through their territories or by their nationals, or using their flag vessels or aircraft, and whether or not originating in their territories, of ...all items, materials, equipment, goods and technology as set out in the lists in documents S/2006/814 and S/2006/815... as well as other items, materials, equipment, goods and technology, determined by the Security Council or the Committee, which could contribute to DPRK's nuclear-related, ballistic missile-related or other weapons of mass destruction related programmes....\"22\n\n56. In addition to the obligations imposed by resolutions 1718 (2006) and 1874 (2009)\nmost Member States have also undertaken binding legal obligations under treaties to which they are parties, or have made other commitments aimed at preventing the proliferation of nuclear, chemical or biological weapons, and have taken effective measures to account for, secure and physically protect sensitive materials, such as those required by the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT), the Chemical Weapons Convention, the Biological Weapons Convention, and the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials as well as those recommended by the IAEA Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources. Security Council resolution 1540 (2004) also directs Member States to:\n\" (a) develop and maintain appropriate effective measures to account for and secure such items in production, use, storage or transport; (b) develop and maintain appropriate effective physical protection measures; (c) develop and maintain appropriate effective border controls and law enforcement efforts to detect, deter, prevent and combat, including through international cooperation when necessary, the illicit trafficking and brokering in such items in accordance with their national legal authorities and legislation and consistent with international law; (d) establish, develop, review and maintain appropriate effective national export and trans-shipment controls over such items, including appropriate laws and regulations to control export, transit, trans-shipment and re-export and controls on providing funds and services related to such export and trans-shipment such as financing, and transporting that would contribute to proliferation, as well as establishing end-user controls; and establishing and enforcing appropriate criminal or civil penalties for violations of such export control laws and regulations....\"\n57. To date, some 80 Member States and the European Union have submitted their national implementation reports pursuant to resolution 1718 (2006) and/or 1874 (2009), while as many as 112 Member States have not as yet provided a national report under either resolution. 23 A review of the reports submitted indicates that most reporting countries have adopted or intend to adopt customs, export and financial control measures designed, in part, to address international nuclear proliferation concerns and to inhibit also the availability and proliferation of ballistic missiles. Special attention is now also paid to restricting the availability to items associated with the development of other weapons of mass destruction. These measures also apply to monitor and control transactions with the DPRK, and to assure compliance with resolutions 1718 (2006) and 1874 (2009).\n\n58. No official allegations have been presented to the Committee concerning the provision of proscribed nuclear related or ballistic missile-related items, technology or know-how to or from the DPRK since the adoption of UN Security Council resolution 1874 (2009).\n\n59. Nevertheless, the Panel of Experts has reviewed several government assessments,24\nIAEA reports 25 , research papers and media reports indicating continuing DPRK\ninvolvement in nuclear and ballistic missile related activities in certain other countries including Iran, Syria and Myanmar. A number of government and private experts with whom members of the Panel of Experts have spoken also expressed concern that the DPRK has the capability as well as the propensity to provide nuclear and ballistic missiles-related equipment, facilities, technical advice to and through clients overseas.\n\n60. Evidence provided in these reports indicates that the DPRK has continued to provide missiles, components, and technology to certain countries including Iran and Syria since the imposition of these measures. The Panel of Experts has also reviewed government issued reports indicating that the DPRK has provided assistance for a nuclear programme\n\nin Syria, including the design and construction of a thermal reactor at Dair Alzour. The IAEA is still attempting to obtain updated reports concerning the current status of this site and the activities involved. 26\n\n61. The Panel of Experts is also looking into suspicious activity in Myanmar including activities there of Namchongang Trading (NCG), a 1718 Committee designated entity, and reports that Japan, in June 2009, arrested three individuals for attempting to illegally export a magnetometer to Myanmar via Malaysia, allegedly under the direction of a company known to be associated with illicit procurement for DPRK nuclear and military programmes.\n\n62. The Panel of Experts believes that the information referred to paragraphs 59 to 61\nmerits the close attention of Member States with regard to the implementation and enforcement of the Security Council measures. Further study with regard to these suspected activities will be conducted by the Panel in order to develop a more thorough understanding of the facts. The Panel will seek the cooperation of relevant organizations, including the IAEA, in this regard.\n\n63. Recalling that Security Council resolution 1874 (2009) calls upon all Member States to undertake inspections of suspected cargoes within their territories or on the high seas (subject to the consent of the flag state) and directs that a Member State which discovers such items seizes and disposes of them, and reports such actions to the 1718 Committee. However, unlike the case of arms and related materiel, discussed below, there have been no reports submitted to the Committee to date concerning nuclear and ballistic missile related items. It may be that no interdiction has taken place with regard to such items; or it may be that reports have not been submitted due to their sensitivity. In either case a better understanding of the reason for non-reporting would be useful.\n\nCompliance Related to Arms Exports and Imports\n\n64. According to paragraph 8 of resolution 1718 (2006) as amended by paragraph 10 and\n11 of resolution 1874 (2009), all Member States shall prevent supply, sale or transfer to the DPRK of all arms and related materiel, except for small arms and light weapons and their related materiel; shall prohibit the procurement from the DPRK of all arms and related materiel; and, shall prevent any transfer to or from the DPRK of financial transactions, technical training, advice, services or assistance related to the provisions, manufacture, maintenance or use of all arms and related materiel, except for small arms and light weapons supplied to the DPRK. While calling upon all States to exercise vigilance over the supply, sale or transfer to the DPRK of small arms and light weapons, paragraph 10 of resolution 1874 (2009) prescribes that States shall notify the Committee at least five days prior to selling, supplying or transferring small arms or light weapons to the DPRK. To date, there has been no report from any Member State to the Committee on the supply, sale or transfer to the DPRK of any small arms and light weapons, and related materiel.\n\n\n65. The Democratic People's Republic of Korea has established a highly sophisticated international network for the acquisition, marketing and sale of arms and military equipment, and arms exports have become one of the country's principal sources for obtaining foreign exchange. Several government agencies of the DPRK play key roles in arms and related materiel exports. In particular, agencies under the National Defense Commission (NDC), the Workers' Party of Korea (WPK) and the Korean People's Army\n(KPA) are most active in this regard.27 How these agencies actually work is shrouded in secrecy. However, it is broadly believed that the Second Economic Committee of the National Defense Commission plays the largest and most prominent role in nuclear, other WMD and missile-related development programmes as well as in arranging and conducting arms-related exports. The Military Arms Production Department of the Korea Workers' Party oversees the matters related to the Yongbyon nuclear plant and its nuclear weapons programmes. The Second Academy of Natural Sciences is in charge of research and development of arms and military equipment, and participates in the exports of missiles and parts, services and assistance related to maintenance and use of such missiles. And, the General Bureau of Surveillance of the Korean People's Army is involved in production and sales of conventional armaments.\n\n66. In response to the 1718 Committee's designation in 2009 of 8 entities and 5\nindividuals known to be engaged in proscribed transactions including arms sales, the DPRK quickly moved to substitute other companies to assume their activities and/or to act on their behalf. In this fashion, Green Pine Associated Co. (a.k.a. Paeksan Associated Co.) replaced Korea Mining Development Trading Corporation (a.k.a. Changgwang Sinyong Corporation; a.k.a. Changgwang Trading Corporation; a.k.a. \"KOMID\"), and is now responsible for about half of the DPRK arms and related materiel exports. Green Pine Associated Co. is under control of the General Bureau of Surveillance of the Korean People's Army.\n\n\n67. A review of past cases indicates that prior to the adoption of resolution 1874 (2009), the DPRK often used DPRK-flagged vessels to deliver weapons shipments to recipient countries. In January 2009, the *Bi Ro Bong,* a ship registered in the DPRK, delivered a shipment of weapons to the Democratic Republic of Congo28. In June 2009, shortly after the adoption of resolution 1874 (2009), suspicions attached to a cargo aboard the Kang Nam 1, owned by and flying the flag of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, and bound for Myanmar. Faced with refusal of the entry into port by countries in South-East Asia, the *Kang Nam 1* reversed its course and returned to port in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. Due to the deteriorating conditions of the DPRK's maritime fleet29\nand the enhanced vigilance on DPRK-owned and/or DPRK-flagged vessels since the adoption of resolution 1874 (2009), the DPRK appears now to rely increasingly on foreign-owned and -flagged ships to carry all or part of its illicit cargo.\n\n\n68. An analysis of reported cases after the adoption of resolution 1874 (2009) 30  indicates that the DPRK has employed several different techniques to circumvent measures in resolutions 1718 (2006) and 1874 (2009) and to mask its illicit trades in arms and related materiel. In some cases closed crates or containers were falsely described and mislabeled by the exporters in the DPRK and shipped under DPRK customs seal to ports in other countries, where they would then be packed with extraneous items and/or repacked into standard size maritime shipping containers. The content of the containers would then be marked and documented to reflect the added extraneous cargo or otherwise be falsely described and labeled. The manifests covering the shipments would also likely be falsified to reflect this cargo description. Information concerning the original consignor and ultimate consignee would also likely be obscured, altered or falsified. In several cases the consignors even took further steps to hide the real contents by further laundering the documentation as the container passed through key transshipment points in East Asia. Multiple layers of intermediaries, shell companies and financial institutions would also be used to hide the true originators and recipients. While this process of packing and repacking is carried out by the freight forwarder, in most cases it is acting on instructions received from the original consignor and has no knowledge of the actual content of the containers.\n\n69. The DPRK is also believed to use air cargo to handle high valued and sensitive arms exports. Such cargo can be sent by direct air cargo from the DPRK to the destination country. Some modern cargo planes, for example, can fly non stop from the DPRK to Iran (when routed directly through neighboring air space). However, most aircraft would be forced to make refueling stops, with or without such neighboring air space over flight rights, as in the case of the DPRK arms shipment seized in Thailand. Difficulties involved in inspection of the cargo in these aircraft in transit, and inability to subject direct flights, to the inspection procedures contained in resolutions 1874 (2009) leaves in place an important vulnerability with respect to the implementation of the resolution.\n\n70. A technique now being used by the DPRK to conceal its arms exports is to ship components for the assembly of arms overseas in the form of \"knock-down kits\" which can be delivered to foreign assembly plants. In some cases, this is a turn-key operation with the participation of DPRK scientists, technicians and specialists. In other cases, assembly is carried out only by local staff. During its examination of the case of seizure of DPRK-origin military related materiel at Durban harbor, South Africa, being shipped to the Republic of Congo, the Panel had learned that scores of DPRK technicians and specialist workers were contracted for through private sector channels and brought to the Republic of Congo to carry out the work on the military equipment.\n\n\n71. In August 2009, the United Arab Emirates reported to the Committee that they had seized on 22 July 2009 military shipment aboard *ANL Australia.* The Committee requested further information from relevant Member States and the Panel of Experts began its own inquiries. The *ANL Australia* is owned by ANL Container Line Pty Ltd\n(\"ANL\"), an Australian registered company. The ship was registered on the Commonwealth of the Bahamas Ship Registry. The shipper of the cargo was the Pyongyang representative office of OTIM SPA, an Italian shipping company. The cargo was falsely described on the shipping documents as oil boring machine (spare parts). The cargo was custom sealed and loaded on a DPRK ship in the port of Nampo, DPRK, and transshipped multiple times on its way to the declared destination, Bandar Abbass, Iran.\n\n72. The Government of the Republic of Korea informed the 1718 Committee on 13\nOctober 2009 that the relevant authorities of the Republic of Korea inspected at the port of Busan a container ship flying the Panama flag with the name of *MSC Rachele*, owned by Mediterranean Shipping Company, a Swiss firm, and found that four containers were filled with working protective garments which were deemed to have military utility for chemical protection. The Republic of Korea authorities further indicated that their investigation had revealed that the shipment of the four containers in question had originated in the port of Nampo, DPRK, and were shipped on or about 11 September\n2009 to Dalian, China. In Dalian the containers were placed on board the *MSC Rachele*.\n\nThe intended recipient of the goods was declared as the Environmental Study Center in Syria. The Government of Syria disavowed the shipment. In December 2009, the Panel was given an information briefing from ROK officials and experts on the case and the nature of the goods. The Panel was also able to physically examine the goods in the port of Busan. Based on the information provided and expertise of the Panel, it concluded that these goods would primarily have military application in the protection against certain chemical agents.31\n\n73. In February 2010, the Panel of Experts was apprised of the discovery and seizure of a shipment of spare parts destined to refurbish T54/T55 military tanks and other military goods located in the Republic of Congo. The shipment was interdicted by the South African Government in the Port of Durban on route to Pointe Noire, Republic of Congo.32\nThe cargo had its origin in the DPRK and was forward to Dalian, China where it was loaded aboard the UK flagged vessel *CGM Musca*, owned by the French company CMA\nCGM, on 20 October 2009. A large quantity of rice grains packed in sacks lined the containers. The shipper was subsequently identified as Machinery Exp. and Imp. Corp. in the DPRK. After leaving Dalian, China, the cargo was offloaded in Port Klang, Malaysia and transferred to the *Westerhever*, a ship flying the Liberia flag chartered by Delmas Shipping, a subsidiary of CMA CGM. The shipping documents listed the contents of the containers only as \"spare parts of bulldozer.\"\n74. As noted in paragraph 69 above, the DPRK also uses air transport routes for its illicit trade of proscribed items. On 11 December 2009, Government of Thailand authorities interdicted an aircraft, Ilyushin-76, carrying 35 tons of arms and related materiel. The interdicted cargo was discovered aboard a chartered aircraft operated by Air West Company, which departed from Sunan Airport in Pyongyang, DPRK, and landed at Don Mueang Airport in Bangkok to refuel.33 The airway bill covering the shipment had been issued by Air Koryo, national carrier of the DPRK. It indicated the cargo as 145 crates of\n\"mechanical parts.\" However, the Thai inspection of the cargo revealed that the content consisted of some 35 tons of conventional arms and munitions including 240mm rockets, RPG-7s, TBG-7s and MANPADS surface-to-air missiles. It was also established that the shipper was Korea Mechanical Industry Co.Ltd, a DPRK entity, and that the consignee was Top Energy Institute located in Iran. A puzzling factor in this case is the numerous flight plans filed for the outbound and projected return route of the aircraft. This has raised suspicions concerning the nature of the transaction and ultimate destination of the cargo and should entail further inquiry. The aircraft used in this illicit trade is owned by a company in the United Arab Emirates and registered in the Republic of Georgia as 4L-\nAWA. It was leased to SP Trading Limited, a shell company registered in New Zealand, and then chartered to Union Top Management Ltd (UTM), another shell company registered in Hong Kong. This routing may have been an attempt to mask the aircraft's true destination.\n\n75. The 1718 Committee has been notified of four non-compliance cases involving arms exports, since the adoption of resolution 1874 (2009). There is no way of determining how many other illicit arms transactions may have gone undetected. However, based on the cases notified to the Committee so far, the Panel of Experts believes that the DPRK\ncontinues to engage in exporting such items. There are no official and comprehensive statistics regarding the export of arms by the DPRK prior to resolutions 1718 (2006) and\n1874 (2009). The DPRK withholds statistical information concerning its arms exports and few recipient countries report such imports. Historical data compiled by the United Nations Commodity Trade Database (COMTRADE) from those few countries reporting such trade prior to its being banned shows that the DPRK had been exporting arms and related materiel for more than 3 decades. Reported transactions involving such exports amounted to only some US $ 22.9 million from 2000 to 2009. According to government and other experts, actual DPRK arms/missile exports are believed to be US $100 million or more per year. It is noteworthy in this regard that the shipment of DPRK-origin arms seized in Bangkok, Thailand, in December 2009 is reportedly worth some US $18 million. It is not yet known what effect the strengthened and expanded provisions of resolution 1874 (2009) have actually had on this trade and the Panel of Experts will continue to examine this question.\n\n0\n7,332,005\n6,366,989\nAmericas\n13,441\n166,332\n3,666,042\nAsia\n53,893\n3,701,993\n12,810,331\nEurope\n0\n1,172,603\n17,244\nOceania\n3,036\n0\n6,141\n\n Compliance Related to the Ban on Luxury Items\n\n76. Paragraph 8 (a) of resolution 1718 (2006) requires that all Member States shall prevent the direct or indirect supply, sale or transfer to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK), of luxury goods through their territories or by their nationals, or using their flag vessels or aircraft, and whether or not originating in their territories.\n\n77. In its 27 July 2009 national implementation report, Italy informed the Committee that it had blocked the shipment to the DPRK of high-end electrical/electronic apparatus for recording and reproducing sound and images.34  It had also blocked the sale of two luxury yachts to an Austrian company under the suspicion that they were destined for a buyer in the DPRK. The Italian authorities had received information concerning the dubious nature of this yacht transaction from Austrian Government sources. The Austrian authorities subsequently confirmed the suspicions and placed the value of the transaction at 13 million euros. The two boats were seized by Italian authorities on 28 May 2009 and the advance payment was frozen. An Austrian businessman and his accomplice were subsequently charged with a criminal offence.\n\n78. During its recent visit to Vienna, the Panel of Experts was informed by Austrian authorities that the Austrian customs authorities had seized in December 2007 three Steinway concert pianos (with a total value of 162,500 euros)35 at Vienna International Airport. It was later determined that the Embassy of the DPRK in Vienna had purchased the pianos with a view to exporting them to Pyongyang, DPRK.36\n\n79. The Government of Japan also informed the Panel of Experts that on three occasions, in October and December 2008, two Japanese trading companies had exported luxury goods, i.e. 34 pianos, 4 Mercedes-Benz automobiles and cosmetics37, to the DPRK\nthrough a third country. Legal proceedings have been undertaken against those persons involved.\n\n\n80. The above-cited examples of successful interdiction and prosecution underscore the importance that must be attached to vigilance and close cooperation between Member States. The successful interdiction of the yacht transaction in Italy is attributable to the close cooperation established between Italy and Austria with regard to notification, sharing of information, and coordination of enforcement. The Panel of Experts notes that, in all of these cases, there was a clear understanding that the goods involved were proscribed luxury items. However, such understanding as to what constitute luxury goods is not always present, and in many cases 38 , differences and loopholes exist in implementing such controls.\n\n81. Since the adoption of resolution 1718 (2006) questions have been raised by Member States seeking to clarify precisely which items are to be considered covered by the luxury items ban.\n\n82. After considerable discussion of this matter, the Chairman of the 1718 Committee, on behalf of the Committee, sent a letter to Member States on 16 April 2007 reiterating a statement made by the previous Chairman of the 1718 Committee on 11 January 2007 indicating that \"any definition of luxury goods as may be necessary for Member States to implement this provision of the resolution would be the national responsibility of individual Member States.\" He also reaffirmed in the letter that the measure on luxury goods should be implemented in a manner consistent with the objectives of the resolution and that it was not intended that this prohibition would restrict the supply of ordinary goods to the wider population of the country or have a negative humanitarian impact on the DPRK. The letter also referred Member States to national reports submitted pursuant to operative paragraph 11 of resolution 1718 (2006) as indications of the way this provision was being implemented by various Member States.\n\n83. A review of Member States' national implementation reports indicates that many omit any mention of luxury goods and many countries have yet to adopt controls over such exports to the DPRK. National definitions of luxury goods vary and associated national export controls are being implemented in an uneven manner, which risks undercutting the effectiveness of this measure vis-a-vis the DPRK. One Member State, for example, indicated in its report pursuant to resolution 1718 (2006) that \"keeping in view the requirement of a uniform list of such items for necessary action by Member States,\" it would have to await the finalization of such a list of luxury goods by the Security Council before exercising such controls. These potential gaps in definition and the application are amplified by the fact that few countries exercise any control over the re-export of such goods from third countries.\n\n84. To close these potential gaps, the Panel recommends that Member States should be encouraged to include in their reports pursuant to paragraph 11 of resolution 1718 (2006)\nand paragraph 22 of resolution 1874 (2009) an indication of the goods considered by them to fall within the category of luxury goods. They should also be invited to inform the Committee of instances where the export of such items to the DPRK has been denied or where a legal action has been instituted after their export. Similarly, to facilitate a more consistent application of the measure placed on the export of luxury goods, all Member States should be encouraged to engage in consultations, as necessary, with any Member States prohibiting such items prior to authorizing the export of essentially identical goods to the DPRK.39\n\n85. In its efforts to assist Member States concerning the application of controls on luxury goods as prescribed in resolution 1718 (2006), the Panel of Experts proposes that the following principles and factors should be taken into account: A. Proposed Basic Principles\n(i)\nParagraph 8 (a) of resolution 1718 (2006) requires that all Member States prevent the direct or indirect supply, sale or transfer to the DPRK of luxury goods.\n\n(ii) The prohibition on the supply of luxury goods to the DPRK should be implemented in a manner consistent with the objectives of resolutions 1718 (2006) and 1874 (2009).\n(iii) Care should be taken not to restrict the supply of ordinary civilian use goods to the wider population of the DPRK nor have a negative humanitarian impact on the country.\n\n(iv) It should remain in the sovereign discretion and national responsibility of each Member State to determine for itself how best to reflect these objectives in its domestic legislation and regulations. However, Member States should strive to adopt coherent and harmonized policies in this regard, taking into account their own national characteristics as well as the application of such measures by other Member States.\n\n(v)\nMember States should refer to national reports submitted pursuant to paragraph\n11 of resolution 1718 (2006) and paragraph 22 of resolution 1874 (2009) as\nindications of the way this provision is being implemented by other Member States.\n(vi) The prohibition on the supply of luxury goods should be implemented without\nprejudice to the activities of the diplomatic missions in the DPRK pursuant to paragraph 21 of resolution 1874 (2009). B. Important factors to be considered in defining and/or designating luxury goods:\n\n(i)\nWhether the goods are affordable by, and intended for the use of, the general\npopulation of the DPRK, taking into consideration that their annual per capita\nincome in foreign exchange rate is between US $900 and $1,200 in 2009.\n(ii) Whether the goods are specially designed, manufactured, or otherwise\nassociated with brands whose names are known for premium goods for a select\ngroup of the population.\n(iii) Whether the goods have special features, durability, or functionality beyond\nthose for which a given category of items are normally made and thus considered as high end in that category.\n(iv) Whether the goods are essential for the general population's basic needs, health\nand well being with due consideration given to the possible humanitarian impact\nof the prohibition of such items might have on the general population of the\nDPRK. VIII. Interdiction\n86. Security Council resolution 1874 (2009) significantly strengthened the tools available\nto Member States to interdict the shipment of proscribed items to and from the DPRK. Paragraphs 11 through 17 of the resolution elaborates an interdiction system which calls upon all Member States to inspect all cargo to and from the DPRK in their territory, and to inspect vessels with the consent of the flag state on the high seas, if the Member State\nconcerned has information that provides \"reasonable grounds\" to believe the cargo may\ncontain proscribed items. In cases where the flag state denies permission for such \"high seas\" inspections, it must \"direct the vessel to proceed to an appropriate and convenient port for the required inspection by the local authorities.\" And, in cases where an inspection request is denied the requesting Member State is to report the details immediately to the Security Council. Paragraph 17 of the resolution specifies also that DPRK vessels shall be denied bunkering or other services if there are reasonable grounds\nto believe that they are carrying any proscribed items until such time as the cargo has been inspected and all proscribed cargo seized and disposed unless such services are\nnecessary for humanitarian purposes.\nTrade and Transportation Infrastructure\n87. The DPRK relies on a limited number of shipping means and routes to handle its exports and imports. These include a small number of maritime ports, rail and road connections40 to China and Russia. The DPRK also has rail links with the Republic of Korea, however, little DPRK cargo is now moving in this direction. The DPRK's international air connections are also limited. 41  The only commercial airline in the DPRK, Air Koryo, has a limited heavy cargo carrying capability. Due to these limited transportation options, the DPRK's foreign trade is handled by a handful of freight forwarders approved by the DPRK government and is often customs sealed before it departs the DPRK.\n\n88. There are three railway lines connecting the DPRK to China and one to Russia. The rail links to China are SinuijuDandong, NamyangTumen, and ManpoJian, 42 while the link to Russia is SonbongKhasan. Road traffic plays a less important role, with road carriage of cargo for export usually accounting for short distances to ports or rail links. There are eleven roads linking the DPRK and China across the Yalu (Aprok) and Tumen (Tuman) rivers, however due to mountainous and poor road conditions in the DPRK relatively little cargo is moved along these routes.\n\n89. Foreign maritime trade is channeled through eight DPRK ports, and through the port of Dalian which serves as an important hub for transshipment in Northeast Asia. Nampo is the DPRK's largest general cargo port. The city of Nampo itself is an industrial center located on the west coast some 45 kilometers from Pyongyang. The port relies heavily on stevedoring services and has only limited small container handling capacity. The DPRK's other west coast ports include Haeju which mostly services small coastal freighters and Songrim which is used for oil imports. The DPRK also has a series of smaller ports on its east coast including at Chongjin, Rajin, Sonbong, Hungnam, and Wonsan.\n\n90. The DPRK's maritime fleet consists of some 142 general cargo ships, 20 tankers, 9\nbulk carriers, 3 container ships, and 19 other miscellaneous cargo carrying vessels (see Table 3). Much of this fleet is small, old, and in poor condition. For this reason as well as generally enhanced vigilance on DPRK-owned and/or DPRK-flagged vessels, the DPRK\nnow relies heavily on foreign-owned and -flagged vessels to carry a substantial amount of DPRK related cargoes. Interdiction Actions\n91. Since the adoption of these measures there have been several incidents involving inspection, interdiction and seizure of proscribed items. These inspection/interdiction cases include, inter alia, the *ANL Australia* which was inspected in the port of Khor Fakkan, the MSC *Rachele* which was inspected in the Port of Busan, the Westerhever, inspected in the Port of Durban, and an Ilyushin Il-76 cargo plane bearing the number AWG 732 at Don Mueang Airport in Bangkok. 43 All four of these cases involved proscribed arms or related military equipment.\n\n92. No interdiction of cargo on the high seas has yet been reported to the Committee.44\nHowever, shortly after the adoption of resolution 1874 (2009), the *Kang Nam 1*, owned by and flying the flag of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, departed its port of Nampo and began traveling south in international waters parallel to the Chinese coast.\n\nsuch maritime smuggling techniques to circumvent the arms export prohibitions contained in the resolutions.\n\nWhen reasonable suspicions surfaced that the vessel was carrying a cargo alleged to contain proscribed weapons, and faced with refusal of the entry into port by countries in South-East Asia, the *Kang Nam 1* reversed its course and returned to port in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. While no inspection had been conducted, the Security Council measures served to deter the delivery of what was believed to be a proscribed cargo in compliance with the terms of the resolution. The Panel of Experts is also aware of other inspections that have been conducted in the territorial seas of Member States where no proscribed cargoes were found.45\n\n93. An analysis of the cases reported to the Committee indicates that interdiction of DPRK proscribed exports once they have entered the flow of international commerce is heavily reliant on (1) intelligence, (2) information sharing, (3) the cooperation of ship or airplane owner/operator and/or flag State or State of registry, and of shipping and/or forwarding companies and (4) inspection by relevant authorities in subsequent ports of call. In each of the cases reported to date the proscribed cargo originated in the DPRK.\n\nThe countries undertaking the inspection of these cargoes were advised in advance of concerns that proscribed cargoes had been secreted on board using false labeling and documentation.\n\n94. Interdiction of proscribed exports destined for the DPRK remains heavily dependent on establishment of regulatory export control regimes, and effective national monitoring and export and customs controls. This, in turn, has been shown to be most effective when principles of due diligence and \"know your customer\" rules are applied as part of a \"red flag\" export license review process.46  It should also be recommended that local suppliers of sensitive dual use items be advised to consult with export licensing authorities as early as possible with regard to non repetitive export transactions that may raise \"red flags\" because of their novelty or circumstance. In such cases the transactions should be vetted with export licensing authorities at the earliest possible stages, such as receipt of first inquiries as to price, specifications and availability from previously unknown overseas customers. Such special attention is now being devoted by a growing number of countries to exports of sensitive dual use items related to the nuclear industry or having possible application to the production of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery means.\n\nIntelligence gathering and information sharing is also vital for such enhanced national controls to be most effective. The accomplishments and goals of such enhanced export control measures were stressed at the January 2010 Asian Export Control Seminar in Tokyo which was attended by Panel members. Several officials participating in the Seminar indicated that their governments had already adopted such enhanced and sophisticated export and customs control systems and technologies. These preventive factors may have reduced interdiction cases involving such sensitive dual-use items after the goods have departed the national jurisdiction and may well help explain the scarceness of reported cases of such interdiction.47\n\n95. The interdiction of luxury exports to the DPRK appears, however, to continue to lag due to a lack of uniform nationally administered controls in such cases. Several countries have reported an inability to control or regulate such exports in the absence of clearer guidance as to what constitutes luxury items. However, as explained in the yacht case in paragraphs 77 of this report 48 , close cooperation between national authorities can effectively curtail such shipments, at least for commonly recognized luxury items.\n\n96. The Panel of Experts also notes several other factors that may hamper successful interdiction of DPRK proscribed cargoes. These vulnerabilities include, inter alia, the lack of uniform documentation and documentation controls with regard to maritime exports, and the lack of suitable controls over movement of cargo by air transport. These issues continue to be an area of inquiry for the Panel's work.\n\n97. The international maritime cargo industry is replete with varying documentation procedures and systems. The documentation that accompanies maritime shipments varies markedly from one freight forwarder to another and between different shipping companies and port handlers. Customs related documentation requirements also vary from port to port and as to whether cargoes are landed for entry or for transshipment. Another complicating factor is that all such maritime related documents may be replaced, supplemented or altered at almost any time during the course of the movement of the covered cargo. This maritime document morass opens the process to potential significant abuse.\n\n98. The volume of international maritime traffic has greatly expanded in size over the last three decades as containerization has replaced crate shipping. The use of container handling transshipment hubs, particularly in East Asia and Southeast Asia, has also increased dramatically in recent years. Transshipment has become an extremely important and competitive business for these ports. Business is attracted by simplifying transshipment procedures, reducing land holding and transshipment times, and holding down the costs shipping lines may incur for these services. Inspection of transshipment cargoes slows this process down, and, in their efforts to become more important hubs of maritime transportation, ports are reluctant to undertake such cargo inspections unless they are presented with very strong evidence that important contraband cargo is involved.\n\nTaken together with the loose documentation requirements described above, these factors provide significant opportunities to mask the nature, origin and ultimate destination of certain cargoes for the purpose of circumventing sanctions and other control measures.\n\nThese factors were emphasized in some detail to Panel members during their discussions at the Asian Export Control Seminar and their recent visit to several East Asian and Southeast Asian ports.\n\n\n99. The successful interdiction cases reported to the Committee to date indicate that the DPRK has taken advantage of many of these vulnerabilities by using intermediaries and shell companies, mislabeling and documentation fraud in its attempts to circumvent the Security Council measures. The Panel of Experts recommends that further steps be taken to address these shipping vulnerabilities.\n\n100.\n\nGiven the DPRK's demonstrated use of false descriptions and fraudulent documentation, special precautions should be taken to verify cargoes when exported from the DPRK, whether or not under DPRK customs seals, prior to placing them on board ship for onward shipment. The Panel of Experts also recommends that extra vigilance be exercised in accordance with local norms at the first overseas maritime port handling such DPRK shipments or transshipments with regard to containers carrying cargo originating from the DPRK. Transshipment ports often are not provided with information beyond the previous and next port of call. The Panel of Experts recommends that further study be undertaken to determine what steps might be taken, without overburdening international maritime commerce, to assure that onward transshipment ports are aware of the cargo's DPRK origin so that they can also apply extra vigilance.\n\n101.\n\nAir cargo poses other issues and vulnerabilities. Modern aircraft have increased distance and payload capabilities, and can link the DPRK directly with countries in most of the regions in the world. Aircraft operators are able to vary flight plans and pick and choose between refueling alternatives. Such air traffic may not be susceptible to inspection at airports on route, and in certain cases, where relevant information provides reasonable grounds that suspect cargoes are on board, may call for the dangerous practice of forced landings for inspection purposes. The Panel of Experts recommends that consideration be given by countries over whose territory such aircraft may fly, stop or transit, that efforts be undertaken in those cases to closely monitor air traffic to and from Sunan and other DPRK airports, and that cargoes to and from the DPRK be declared before over flight clearance is provided.\n\n102.\n\nSeveral governments have requested guidelines or information on the disposal of proscribed items after seizure. Government officials with whom the Panel of Experts had consultations frequently mentioned that the lack of relevant guidelines was causing enormous inconvenience to Member States and the parties concerned. It was also mentioned that disposal can entail great financial and other burdens for the Member State seizing items. Appropriate remedies should be developed to lessen such burdens. The Panel of Experts recommends that guidelines be prepared by the Committee with the assistance of the Panel of Experts and disseminated to interested Member States. In any event, the Panel should be given an opportunity to inspect and establish documentary evidence, including a photographic record of the items and documentations, before the disposal occurs.\n\nIX. Financial Measures\n\n103.\n\nEffective implementation of the measures contained in resolutions 1718 (2006)\nand 1874 (2009) entails careful monitoring and control of all financial dealings and transactions involving the DPRK. Paragraph 18 of resolution 1874 (2009) calls upon Member States specifically:\n\"to prevent the provision of financial services or the transfer, to, through or from their territory, or to or by their nationals or entities organized under their laws\n(including branches abroad), or persons or financial institutions in their territory, of any financial or other assets or resources that could contribute to the DPRK's nuclear-related, ballistic missile-related, or other weapons of mass destructionrelated programmes or activities, including by freezing any financial or other assets or resources on their territories or that hereafter come within their territories, or that are subject territories subject to their jurisdiction or that hereafter become subject to their jurisdiction, that are associated with such programmes or activities and applying enhanced monitoring to prevent all such transactions in accordance with their national authorities and legislation.\"\n\n104.\n\nParagraph 19 of resolution 1874 (2009) also calls upon all Member States and relevant international financial institutions \"not to enter into new commitments for grants, financial assistance, or concessional loans to the DPRK, except for humanitarian and developmental purposes directly addressing the needs of the civilian population, or the promotion of denuclearization,\" and \"to exercise enhanced vigilance with a view to reducing current commitments.\" In addition, paragraph 20 of the resolution calls upon all Member States \"not to provide public financial support for trade with the DPRK (including the granting of export credits, guarantees or insurance to their nationals or entities involved in such trade) where such financial support could contribute to the DPRK's nuclear-related or ballistic missile-related or other WMD-related programmes or activities.\" Transactions\n105.\n\nA review of the reports submitted by Member States pursuant to paragraph 11 of resolution 1718 (2006) and paragraph 22 of resolution 1874 (2009) provides no indications concerning any funds or transactions that have been frozen or blocked pursuant to these resolutions.49  However, the Panel noted reports from Italy and Austria indicating actions they took to block transactions related to the attempted sale of proscribed luxury items to the DPRK.50\n\n106.\n\nThe Financial Action Task Force (FATF) has long determined that the loopholes exploited for money laundering and financing of terrorism can be used for WMD\nproliferation financing. 51 In February 2010, the FATF reiterated its finding that the DPRK remains a country of concern for anti-money laundering and combating the financing of terrorism (AML/CFT). The FATF statement indicated that:\n\n\"The Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) has not committed to the AML/CFT international standards, nor has it responded to the FATF's request for engagement on these issues. DPRK's lack of a comprehensive AML/CFT regime poses a risk to the international financial system. DPRK should work with the FATF to develop a viable AML/CFT regime in line with international standards.\"52\n\nOVERVIEW OF A FOREIGN TRADE PATTERN ABUSED FOR PROLIFERATION\n\nAn importer may arrange for the shipment of goods directly with an exporter or could use a front company, broker or both a front company and a broker.\n\nSimilarly, payments may be settled with a manufacturer's bank either: directly; using a Front Company; using a Broker; or the manufacturer may arrange for payment using Letter of Credit or other payment method.\n\n\n\nSource: Canada.\n\n107.\n\nThe DPRK employs a broad range of techniques to mask its transactions including the use of overseas entities, shell companies, informal transfer mechanisms, cash couriers and barter arrangements. However, it must still, in most cases, rely on access to the international financial system to complete its financial operations.53 (See Table 4) Therefore, in structuring these transactions, attempts are made to mix illicit transactions with otherwise legitimate business activities in such a way as to hide the illicit activity. This may involve the use of a combination of overseas entities and shell companies. Overseas business entities owned and/or controlled by the DPRK and accounts maintained overseas by these firms are often used for or on behalf of the DPRK parent entity. In the recent case of DPRK arms interdicted in Thailand, for example, the DPRK used shell companies set up in Ukraine, Hong Kong and New Zealand to handle the financial arrangements as well as the air carriage of the arms which were falsely labeled as oil boring equipment destined for Iran.\n\n108.\n\nA general veil of secrecy obscures the DPRK's financial activities. A handful of DPRK banks have been authorized by political and military leadership to engage in limited foreign operations, usually in conjunction with approved foreign trade, or the receipt of foreign aid or international investments. Several DPRK banks maintain overseas correspondent accounts for this purpose.54 Action has already been taken by the Security Council to designate the Tanchon Commercial Bank due to its activities as a principal financial entity for handling DPRK sales of conventional arms, ballistic missiles, and goods related to the assembly and manufacture of such weapons. However, certain other DPRK banks have begun to substitute for Tanchon Commercial Bank in handling such transactions.\n\n109.\n\nThe DPRK relies heavily on overseas branches of its banks and on their correspondent accounts to handle surreptitious transactions. This scenario is exemplified by the activities of Korea Kwangson Banking Corporation (KKBC), which continues to maintain overseas branches. KKBC has repeatedly been involved in transactions for and on behalf of the entities designated by 1718 Committee including Tanchon Commercial Bank55, the Korea Mining Development Trading Corporation (KOMID), Korea Hyoksin Trading Corporation and Korea Ryonbong General Corporation. According to information provided to the Panel of Experts, KKBC has handled several transactions involving millions of dollars directly related to transactions conducted between the Korea Mining Development Trading Corporation (KOMID) and Myanmar.56\n\n110.\n\nInformation provided to the Panel of Experts also indicates that the DPRK's Amroggang Development Bank, an entity closely associated with Tanchon Commercial Bank, was also implicated in routing proscribed transactions through correspondent accounts on behalf of KOMID. Amroggang Development Bank was also reported involved in handling financial transactions related to ballistic missile transactions between KOMID and Shahid Hemmat Industrial Group (SHIG), an Iranian entity.57\n\nForeign Investment in the DPRK58\n\n111.\n\nThe Panel of Experts, with reference to paragraphs 18 and 19 of resolution 1874\n(2009), has also begun looking into recent reports concerning new or on going investments in the DPRK. As indicated previously, the DPRK is again actively seeking direct foreign investment to bolster its sagging economy. Beginning in late 2009 DPRK leadership began again to actively promote investment opportunities in such new foreign investments. However, due to lack of interest and/or reserved evaluation by major potential investors in the Republic of Korea, Japan and EU countries, concerning the validity of the DPRK's economic policy, this investment has been slow in materializing. As a result the DPRK has increasingly turned to China for such investment with particular emphasis on mineral extraction (particularly coal and iron ore). The DPRK has also sought to benefit from the growing Northeastern China revitalization programme which projects extensive investment in upgrading regional transportation and other infrastructure.\n\n112.\n\nThe DPRK has also announced its intention to open up 12 special zones for foreign investors. With new investment potentially flowing into these areas the Panel of Experts believes that special attention and enhanced vigilance should be placed by the Committee as well as Member States on such activities to assure that such investments, to the extent that they may involve \"new commitments for grants, financial assistance, or concessional loans to the DPRK,\" are well vetted and \"directly addressing the needs of the civilian population.\" They should also assure that all investments emanating from their territory or nationals not contribute to the DPRK's nuclear, other WMD, or ballistic missile-related programmes.\n\n\nSource: For Foreign Direct Investments statistics, United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, FDI\ndatabase, accessed April 2010. http://stats.unctad.org/FDI/. For Inter-Korean Direct Investment, Ministry of Unification of the Republic of Korea (Inter-Korean Direct Investment figures show amount approved by the ROK Government, not actual investment, and does not include investment in Kaesong Industrial Complex).\n\n\nNote: FDI flow and total data for 2009 not yet available. Unintended Impact on Diplomatic Missions\n113.\n\nThe Panel of Experts and the 1718 Committee have received information from certain Member States that their missions in the DPRK are facing operational difficulties which they attribute to the lack of access to required financial and other services and supplies from abroad. This has been attributed, in part, to the reluctance of a number of foreign private sector financial and other entities to engage with individuals or entities located in the DPRK. The 1718 Committee, with the support of the Panel of Experts, has actively begun to look into issue with a view to determining what steps might be taken to alleviate such unintended difficulties. The first step in this process is determining the scope of difficulties and which financial institutions and suppliers might be approached to re-establish controlled access for diplomatic missions that meet their concerns without jeopardizing the application and integrity of the Security Council measures. The Panel of Experts has proposed inputs to the Chair of the Committee to help elucidate this issue.\n\nX. Designation of Goods, Entities and Individuals\n\n114.\n\nSecurity Council resolution 1718 (2006) under paragraph 8 (d) directs all Member States to freeze the funds, other financial assets and economic resources that are owned or controlled by the \"persons or entities\" designated by the Committee or by the Council as being engaged in DPRK's nuclear-related, other existing WMD-related and ballistic missile-related programmes. It also requires under paragraph 8 (e) all Member States to take the necessary steps to prevent the entry into or transit through their territories of the\n\"persons\" designated by the Committee or the Council as being responsible for such activities. Furthermore, the Council and the Committee are expected under paragraph 8 (a) (ii) of resolution 1718 (2006) to designate additional items, materials, equipment, goods and technology which could contribute to DPRK's nuclear, other WMD and ballistic missile-related programmes. These designation systems, constituting \"targeted sanctions,\" are intended to maximize the effect of sanctions by focusing coercive pressure on those responsible for wrongdoing or restricting the measures to selective products or activities, while minimizing unintended negative impacts on innocent and vulnerable populations.59 Designation of Goods\n115.\n\nOn 24 April 2009, the Committee decided, in response to the Security Council Presidential Statement of 13 April 2009, to revise the ballistic missile-related list subject to paragraph 8 (a), (b) and (c) of resolution 1718 (2006) and to include the items contained in S/2009/205. The Committee also decided on 16 July 2009 to add two additional ballistic missile-related items for the purpose of paragraph 8 (a) (ii) of resolution 1718 (2006) as contained in S/2009/364. Further consideration might now be given by the Committee to adopting an updated list taking into account the experience of other missile control regimes.\n\n116.\n\nConcerning nuclear-related items, Security Council decided in resolution 1874\n(2009), paragraph 23, that measures set out in paragraphs 8(a), (b) and (c) of resolution\n1718\n(2006)\napply to the items listed in the updated documents of INFCIRC/254/Rev.9/Part 1 and INFCIRC/254/Rev.7/Part 2.\n\n117.\n\nWith regard to non-nuclear WMD-related items, there have been no additional designations. The control list remains essentially the same as that referred to in resolution 1718 (2006), except for the replacement of the original list for chemical and biological programmes list contained in S/2006/816 with a new list contained in S/2006/853 (and Corr.1).\n\n118.\n\nThe Panel's assessment and recommendations for possible additions to these lists is ongoing. The Panel of Experts notes in this regard that the relevant lists of proscribed items are contained in different documents which may cause some difficulties to Member States in their national implementation of the mandated measures. It may be advisable to create, for presentational purposes, a more user-friendly consolidated list for each category of proscribed items.\n\n119.\n\nWhile resolution 1874 (2009) has expanded the scope of arms embargo vis-a-vis the DPRK to include all arms and related materiel, it makes an exception for small arms and light weapons and their related materiel as far as their supply to the DPRK is concerned. At the same time, the resolution calls upon Member States to exercise vigilance over the supply of such items to the DPRK and directs that they notify the Committee when they supply such items to the DPRK. There has been no notification communicated to the Committee to date, nor is there any national implementation report, that elaborates on the measures related to small arms and light weapons.\n\n120.\n\nAs with the case of luxury goods, a lack of definition or guidance regarding what constitutes small arms and light weapons not only makes it difficult for Member States to implement the relevant paragraph of the Security Council resolutions but may result in uneven application of these measures. With this in mind, the Panel of Experts has worked in assisting the Committee preparing guidance on small arms and light weapons. Although this work is not yet complete, the Panel of Experts continues to examine relevant international lists and documents, including, inter alia, the Report of the Openended Working Group to Negotiate an International Instrument to Enable States to Identify and Trace, in a Timely and Reliable Manner, Illicit Small Arms and Light Weapons, as well as the reports of the Panel of Governmental Experts on Small Arms. Designation of Entities and Individuals\n\n121.\n\nOn 24 April 2009, the Committee agreed on the designation of three entities for the purpose of implementing paragraph 8 (d) of resolution 1718 (2006). It further decided on 16 July to designate five entities 60 for the purpose of paragraph 8 (d) and five individuals61 for the purpose of paragraph 8 (d) and (e).\n\n122.\n\nThe designation of such a small number of entities and individuals understates the number of known entities and individuals engaged in proscribed activities. These few designations are inadequate to the task of effectively inhibiting key DPRK parties from engaging in proscribed activities and no account has yet been made to deal with those substituting for or acting for or on behalf of these entities and individuals. The Panel of Experts recommends that all Member States be invited to provide to the Committee for its consideration the names of entities and individuals who are believed to be engaged in proscribed activities, particularly those that have been implicated in compliance-related cases reported to the Committee.\n\n123.\n\nThe Panel of Experts also notes that a number of Member States have designated additional DPRK parties and have imposed autonomous measures to re-enforce or supplement those contained in resolutions 1718 (2006) and 1874 (2009). As of time of this report, Japan has designated 12 entities and 1 individual that have not been designated by the 1718 Committee,62 while the United States has done so with regard to\n13 entities and 4 individuals.63  Similarly, the European Union has listed 4 entities and bodies and 13 individuals in addition to those designated by the 1718 Committee.64\nAustralia has autonomously designated 9 entities and 1 individual.65 A large number of designated entities and individuals overlap in these autonomous lists66. They should be considered as potential candidates for designation by the Committee.\n\n124.\n\nConsideration should also be given to making sure that those entities and individuals that are already designated are not able to avoid the Security Council measures through the use of alias. One way of assuring it is, in the case of individuals, to include as much identifying information as possible in the designation list, such as their birth date and passport number. This would also help avoid a case of mistaken identity. Identity determination may sometimes be more difficult in the case of entities. In fact, the Committee designated entities already include those with several different company names. The Panel of Experts recommends that all Member States be invited to provide as much information as possible to assist in the identification of the designated entities and individuals.\n\n\nXI. Conclusion - Effectiveness of the Security Council Measures\n\n125.\n\nAlthough opinions differ whether the measures imposed by Security Council resolutions 1718 (2006) and 1874 (2009) will lead the DPRK to return to the Six-Party talks, and to \"abandon all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programmes,\" most interlocutors with whom the Panel spoke agreed that sanctions on the DPRK are having the intended impact. The many statements by the DPRK government officials demanding the lifting of sanctions as a condition for their returning to the Six-Party talks attests the impact that the Security Council measures have been having on it. This is attributed to the steps taken by many Member States to implement and enforce the Security Council measures, and to exercise enhanced vigilance and due diligence to prevent, inhibit and deter the activities proscribed by the resolutions. The adoption and enforcement of these measures, in turn, reflects a broad international commitment to maintaining the integrity and credibility of the international non-proliferation regime.\n\n126.\n\nThe Security Council measures imposed pursuant to resolutions 1718 (2006) and\n1874 (2009) are directed specifically at DPRK activities of concern including its nuclear, other WMD, and ballistic missile programmes. They cover a specific range of exports and/or imports, principally arms and military equipment; nuclear, other WMD and ballistic missile related items and technology; and luxury goods. Travel ban and asset freeze provisions of the resolutions apply only to a small number of designated DPRK individuals and entities engaged in these activities or acting for or on their behalf.\n\n127.\n\nThese measures have significantly constrained the DPRK's ability to market and export arms, and other proscribed nuclear and ballistic missile items which had previously provided a significant source of the DPRK's foreign earnings. And, the international condemnation of the DRPK's disregard for its nuclear and ballistic missile nonproliferation-related obligations, and its known involvement in illicit trade activities, has caused several countries to supplement these Security Council measures with their own national measures. In addition, many private sector business and financial entities have, themselves, deferred or halted their own dealings with the DPRK.\n\n128.\n\nWhile acknowledging the substantial impact that the Security Council measures have had on the DPRK and its leaders, it would be difficult to ascribe to these Security Council measures the severe economic circumstances impacting the DPRK's general population. The DPRK has lived under various social and economic strains and difficulties for several decades, dependent on foreign aid, direct foreign investment, long term loan and illicit trade activities to fill its trade deficit. The DPRK's own economic policies, including its recent domestic currency reform, have contributed markedly to the downturn in the DPRK's domestic economic activities. These trends have accelerated greater efforts on the part of the DPRK leadership to solicit and obtain foreign investment and assistance. However, it is unlikely that the DPRK will achieve its economic goals without complying with Security Council resolutions and providing a more conducive environment for such investment.\n\n129.\n\nThere are no indications, as yet that the DPRK is ready to move forward on denuclearization or to step back from its other existing WMD and ballistic missile development programmes. The DPRK has continued to engage in activities proscribed by the relevant Security Council resolutions and has continued to boycott the Six-Party talks. It continues to market and export its nuclear and ballistic technology to certain other States. The Panel has also become aware of several non-compliance issues related to the DPRK's exports of arms and military equipment and importations of proscribed luxury items.\n\n130.\n\nWhile the DPRK continues to verbally dismiss the Security Council measures, other participants are now expressing cautious optimism that these talks may soon again resume. In this regard, exploratory contacts have already taken place between DPRK\nofficials and representatives of the other Six-Party participants. Several of these participants have indicated that relaxation or removal of the sanctions cannot be contemplated as a precondition to recommencing the Six-Party talks, and that the Security Council measures can only be eased on the basis of irreversible steps being taken by the DPRK toward carrying out its previous Six-Party talks commitments.\n\n131.\n\nBut, there continue to be serious reasons to doubt that such progress is being made. On 4 July 2009, the DPRK test-fired seven ballistic missiles off its eastern coast in violation of Security Council resolutions including 1718 (2006) and 1874 (2009). And, on 12 October, it launched a series of five short-range ballistic missiles again in violation of the resolutions. In addition, the DPRK announced in a letter to the Security Council dated 3 September 2009 that \"experimental uranium enrichment has successfully been conducted and entered into the completion phase,\" and \"reprocessing of spent fuel rods is in its final phase and extracted plutonium is being weaponized.\" In late January 2010, the DPRK's Korean People's Army (KPA) again fired live artillery rounds toward islands off the west coast of the Republic of Korea. And, most recently on 21 April 2010, the Korean Central News Agency (KCNA), official news agency of the DPRK, disseminated a Foreign Ministry memorandum which announced that the DPRK would manufacture nuclear weapons as much as it deems necessary, and claimed the status of a nuclearweapon State. The Panel of Experts believes that this announcement underscores the importance of the implementation of the resolutions 1718 (2006) and 1874 (2009) to the fullest possible extent and calls for enhanced vigilance by all States of the international community.\n\nXII. Recommendations\n132.\n\nThe mandate provided by the Security Council to the Panel of Experts in resolution 1874 (2009) directs that the Panel \"make recommendations on actions the Council, or the Committee or Member States, may consider to improve implementation of the measures imposed in resolution 1718 (2006) and in this resolution\". Based on the work of the Panel over the last eight months, and its findings and conclusions reflected in this report, the Panel of Experts presents the following recommendations to the Security Council for its consideration:\nMonitoring and Oversight\n\n1) The Panel of Experts believes that the 1718 Committee has an extremely important role to play in overseeing and monitoring the implementation and enforcement of the measures contained in resolutions 1718 (2006) and 1874\n\n(2009). It is essential that the Committee have the appropriate methods and tools to exercise this important oversight responsibility and that it remain fully informed concerning implementation and enforcement of the relevant Security Council measures. These tools should include (i) continuing reporting by all\nMember States to the Committee on their implementation of resolutions 1718 (2006) and 1874 (2009) to assure that the Committee remains informed of any relevant new factors or developments, and (ii) a panel of experts that can assist in\nevaluating such information and that can proactively conduct independent\ninquiries to assure that relevant information concerning compliance with the Security Council measures is available to the Committee.\n\n2) The importance of the cooperation of all States, relevant UN bodies and other\ninterested parties with regard to the implementation of the resolutions 1718\n(2006) and 1874 (2009), in particular, sharing of information at their disposal\ncannot be overemphasized. The Committee and the Panel of Experts should be provided with such cooperation to the fullest possible extent and, to this end, the\nCommittee is advised to communicate with relevant States, UN bodies and other\nparties to seek such cooperation as it deems necessary.\n\n3) The Committee should provide special attention to soliciting national\nimplementation reports from all countries that have not yet provided such reports, and reminders concerning such reports should be communicated on a regular basis. The Panel of Experts should be assigned special tasks to enter into a dialogue with, or provide assistance to, non-reporting/late-reporting Member States with respect to the completion and submission of national implementation\nreports. In this regard, the Panel of Experts has previously suggested that the\nChair of the 1718 Committee send a note verbale reiterating the importance attached to these national reports and indicating the availability of assistance from the Committee and the Panel of Experts.\n\n4) The national implementation reports so far submitted vary considerably in detail\nand format, making it difficult to evaluate them adequately without first obtaining\nadditional information. The Panel of Experts should be asked to engage with such countries in obtaining the required information. It may be useful also to provide a guideline template as an optional check-list to Member States in order to assure\nthe provision of information required for such an assessment.\n\n5) The Committee should clarify that compliance-related reports include all relevant\ninformation concerning any actions taken with regard to prevention of illicit exports from their territory as well as interdiction of suspect items that have\nalready entered international maritime or aviation commerce, including, inter alia, directing vessels to port, inspection of vessels, inspection of cargo, seizure and disposal of items, and denial of services.\n\n6) Effective implementation of the Security Council measures should take into\nconsideration the impact such measures may unintentionally have on the overall humanitarian situation prevailing in the DPRK.\n\nInterdiction\n\n7) Due to the continuing importation and exportation of proscribed items by the\nDPRK in contravention of Security Council resolutions 1718 (2006) and 1874 (2009), Member States should be encouraged to take further steps to enhance their ability to interdict proscribed DPRK exports. As the DPRK engages in evasive practices including the false labeling of cargoes, close attention should be paid to\nall cargoes originating in the DPRK whether or not they bear DPRK custom\nlabels or seals. Extra vigilance should be exercised in accordance with local\nnorms at the first overseas maritime port handling such DPRK shipments or\ntransshipments with regard to containers carrying cargo originating from the DPRK. Transshipment ports often are not provided with information beyond the previous and next port of call. The Panel of Experts recommends that further study be undertaken to determine what steps might be taken, without overburdening international maritime commerce, to assure that onward transshipment ports are aware of the cargo's DPRK origin so that they can also apply extra vigilance. The Committee, Member States and the Panel of Experts should assist in providing outreach opportunities for the dissemination of best practices. And, they should provide technical and other assistance as requested.\n\n8) Modern aircraft have increased distance and payload capabilities, and can link the\nDPRK directly with countries in most of the regions in the world. Such transport\nposes unique opportunities to circumvent the sanctions measures. Enhanced Customs vigilance should be applied at airports and consideration should be given by countries over whose territory such aircraft may fly, stop or transit to closely\nmonitor air traffic to and from Sunan and other DPRK airports, and to require that\ncargoes to and from the DPRK be declared before over flight clearance is\nprovided.\n\n9) The Panel of Experts has expressed concern that certain countries such as Syria,\nIran, Myanmar, continue to be associated with the DPRK in regard to proscribed activities and believes that special attention should be taken by all Member States\nto inhibit such activities. Further study should be conducted by the Panel of\nExperts, and by the Committee, for a more thorough understanding of such activities. Cooperation with other relevant international organization including the IAEA should be sought in this regard.\n\n10) Interdiction of proscribed exports destined for the DPRK remains heavily\ndependent on establishment of regulatory export control regimes, and effective national monitoring and export and customs controls. Local suppliers of sensitive dual use items should be advised to consult with export licensing authorities as\nearly as possible with regard to non repetitive export transactions that may raise \"red flags\" because of their novelty or circumstance.\n\n11) All Member States are called upon to inspect, in accordance with relevant\ninternational law and authorities and legislation, all cargoes if there are reasonable\ngrounds to believe that the cargoes contain proscribed items. Due consideration\nshould be given to a request for inspection and/or interdiction from other Member\nStates when made with relevant information. The Panel of Experts recommends\nthat the Committee and the Panel examine cases where reasonable suspicions existed and no inspections have been conducted. Disposal of goods\n12) Several government officials have requested guidelines or information on the\ndisposal of the seized proscribed items. It was frequently mentioned that the lack of relevant guidelines caused enormous inconvenience to the Member States and the parties concerned. The Panel of Experts recommends that such guidelines be prepared by the Committee with the assistance of the Panel of experts and disseminated to all interested Member States.\n\nLuxury Goods\n\n13) Member States should be encouraged to include in their national implementation\nreports an indication of the goods considered by them to fall within the category\nof luxury goods. They should also be invited to inform the Committee of\ninstances where the export of such items to the DPRK has been denied or where a legal action has been instituted after their export. To facilitate a more consistent application of the measure placed on the export of luxury goods, all Member States should be encouraged to engage in consultations, as necessary, with any Member States prohibiting such items prior to authorizing the export of essentially identical goods to the DPRK.\n\n14) The Committee should provide to Member States more detailed guidelines\nconcerning the definition of luxury goods in order to foster a more uniform application of these measures. Such guidelines could be based on the principles and factors outlined in paragraph 85 above. Financial Measures\n15) An effective AML/CFT control regime is essential for the prevention of abuse of\nthe international financial system for the purposes of financing or otherwise supporting the DPRK's illicit transactions. All Member States should be encouraged to adopt and implement the non proliferation and AML/CFT guidelines published by FATF. Special attention and study should be given to the\nproliferation financing examples provided in FATF's Typologies Report on\nProliferation Financing.\n\n16) Special vigilance should be applied to proposed new investments in the DPRK to\nassure that any \"new commitments for grants, financial assistance, or concessional loans to the DPRK,\" are intended to \"directly addressing the needs\nof the civilian population.\" They should also assure that all investments emanating from their territory or nationals not contribute to the DPRK's nuclear, other WMD, or ballistic missile-related programmes.\n\n17) The Committee, with the assistance of the Panel of Experts should continue its\nstudy of those factors which have unduly hampered access of diplomatic missions in the DPRK to normal financial and other related services from abroad. All Member States should be asked to adopt appropriate measures that encourage financial institutions and other companies to provide appropriate services to\ndiplomatic missions in the DPRK.\n\nDesignation of Goods, Entities and Individuals\n\n18) The Committee has designated only eight entities and five individuals. These few\ndesignations are inadequate to the task of effectively inhibiting key DPRK parties from engaging in proscribed activities. All Member States should be invited to provide to the Committee for its consideration the names of entities and individuals who are believed to be engaged in proscribed activities, particularly those substituting for or acting for or on behalf of these entities and individuals or otherwise implicated in a compliance violations.\n\n19) In order to counter the use of alias adopted by designated entities, Member States\nshould be invited to provide as much information as possible to assist in the identification of the designated entities and individuals.\n\n20) Consideration should be given to establishing a more user-friendly consolidated\nlist for each category of proscribed items and incorporating additions and changes\nas they are made.\n\n21) Pursuant to the objectives outlined in paragraph 8(a), (b) and (c) of resolution\n1718 (2006) further consideration should be given by the Committee to adopting on a regular basis updated lists of nuclear, other WMD and ballistic missiles related items.\n\n22) The Committee, with the assistance of the Panel of Experts should move forward\nexpeditiously to complete the task of developing and disseminating guidance to Member States as to what constitutes small arms and light weapons.\n\nOutreach\n23) The outreach activities of the Committee and Panel of Experts should be\nexpanded to assure a better awareness of the Security Council measures, reporting\nrequirements, and best practices with regard to implementation and enforcement.\n\n\n\nReport to the Security Council from the\nPanel of Experts\nPursuant to Resolution 1874 (2009)\nAnnex A\nCONTENTS Section\n\n\nPage A.1 - Items Designated by the Member States as \"Luxury Goods\"\n2\nA.2 - List of Autonomous Designations\n11\nA.3 - North Korea: Correspondent Banking Relationships\n19\nA.4 - DPRK Main Transportation Routes\n27\n\n\n\nANNEX A.1\n\n## Annex A.1 - Items Designated By Member States As \"Luxury Goods\" Member States\n\n| Items            | Australia    | Canada    |\n|------------------|--------------|-----------|\n| European         |              |           |\n| Union            |              |           |\n| Japan            |              |           |\n| New              |              |           |\n| Zealand          |              |           |\n| Live Animals     |              |           |\n|                  |              |           |\n|                  |              |           |\n|                  | Pure-bred    |           |\n| Horses           |              |           |\n|                  |              |           |\n| Caviar,          |              |           |\n| Crustaceans      |              |           |\n| (all), e.g. Rock |              |           |\n| Lobsters,        |              |           |\n| Abalone,         |              |           |\n| Molluscs and     |              |           |\n| Aquatic          |              |           |\n| Invertebrates,   |              |           |\n| e.g. Oyster in   |              |           |\n| any form         |              |           |\n|                  |              |           |\n| Gourmet          |              |           |\n| Foods and        |              |           |\n| Ingredients,     |              |           |\n| Lobster          |              |           |\n| Caviar and       |              |           |\n| Caviar           |              |           |\n| Substitutes;     |              |           |\n| Truffles and     |              |           |\n| Preparations     |              |           |\n| Thereof          |              |           |\n| Beef, Fillets of |              |           |\n| Tunas, Caviar    |              |           |\n| and Caviar       |              |           |\n| Substitutes      |              |           |\n| Caviar and Its   |              |           |\n| Substitutes,     |              |           |\n| Chocolate,       |              |           |\n| Crustaceans,     |              |           |\n| Molluscs,        |              |           |\n| Aquatic          |              |           |\n| Invertebrates,   |              |           |\n| and Goods        |              |           |\n| Containing       |              |           |\n| These Species,   |              |           |\n| Honey and Its    |              |           |\n| Derivatives,     |              |           |\n| Tuna,            |              |           |\n| Toothfish,       |              |           |\n| Salmon, and      |              |           |\n| Goods            |              |           |\n| Containing       |              |           |\n| These Species    |              |           |\n| Food Items       |              |           |\n| Wine, Spirits    |              |           |\n| (all kinds)      |              |           |\n|                  |              |           |\n| Alcoholic        |              |           |\n| Beverages        |              |           |\n| High Quality     |              |           |\n| Wines            |              |           |\n| (including       |              |           |\n| Sparkling        |              |           |\n| Wines),          |              |           |\n| Spirits and      |              |           |\n| Spirituous       |              |           |\n| Beverages        |              |           |\n| Alcoholic        |              |           |\n| Beverages        |              |           |\n| Alcoholic        |              |           |\n| Beverages        |              |           |\n| Alcoholic        |              |           |\n| Beverages        |              |           |\n| (Wines, Ethyl    |              |           |\n| Alcohol,         |              |           |\n| Spirituous       |              |           |\n| Liquors, and     |              |           |\n| Other            |              |           |\n| Alcoholic        |              |           |\n| Beverages)       |              |           |\n| Alcoholic        |              |           |\n| Beverages        |              |           |\nRepublic\nFederation\nSingapore\nSwitzer-\nRussian\nUnited\nof Korea\nland\nStates\n\n\nCaviar and\nCaviar\nSubstitutes\nPrepared From Fish Eggs\n\nCognac, Wines and Other Liquors for more than 5,000 rubles\nWines and Spirits\nWines and Spirits\nAlcoholic Beverages (Wine, Beer, Ales, and Liquor)\n\nMember States\nItems\nAustralia\nCanada\nEuropean\nUnion\nJapan\nNew\nZealand\nTobacco and\nTobacco\nProducts\nTobacco Products\nCigarettes\nHigh Quality\nCigars and Cigarillos\nTobacco\nTobacco\n\n\nCigars\nCigars\nTobacco and\nTobacco Products\nCosmetics (all), Perfumes and Toilet Waters\nPerfume\nCosmetics including Beauty and Make-up Products, Luxury Perfumes, Toilet Waters\nMakeup, Perfumes\nCosmetics, Perfumes\nCosmetics (Perfumes, Cosmetics, including Foundations and Manicurerelated, and Pedicurerelated\nProducts)\nCosmetics,\nFashion\nAccessories\nApparel and Clothing accessories, Furs, Leather Travel Goods\n\nDesigner Clothing and Accessories, Furs\nHigh Quality Garments, Clothing Accessories and Shoes\n(regardless of their material); High Quality Leather, Saddlery and Travel Goods,\nHandbags and Similar Articles\nLeather Bags, Clothes and Others, Fur Skins and Artificial Fur\nManufactures\nDesigner Clothing, Deer Velvet, Fur Products and Artificial\nFur Products, Leather Bags and Clothes\n\n## Apparel, Leather And Fur Items\n\nRepublic\nFederation\nSingapore\nSwitzer-\nRussian\nUnited\nof Korea\nland\nStates\nPerfumes for more than 5,000 rubles\nPerfumes and Cosmetics\nHigh-Quality Perfumes, High-Quality Personal Care and Beauty Products\nCosmetics, including Beauty and Make-up, Perfumes and Toilet Waters\nLeather Goods (Trunks, Suit Cases, Cosmetic Cases,\nExecutive Cases, Briefcases, Satchels, and Other Similar Bags, Handbags,\nPockets or Other Products that may be carried in handbag, Clothing and Accessories),\nFur Items (Fur Clothing, Accessories, and Other Fur\nProducts)\nFur Production for more than 250,000 rubles\nFur Products ; Leather Bags and Clothes\nHigh- Quality Apparel and Clothing Accessories\nHigh-\nQuality Shoes,\nApparel and Fashion Items (Leather Articles, Silk Articles, Fur\nSkins and Artificial Furs, Fashion Accessories: Leather Travel Goods, Vanity Cases,\nBinocular and Camera Cases, Handbags, Wallets, Silk Scarves, Designer Clothing:\nLeather Apparel and Clothing Accessories)\nHigh- Quality Leather\n\nMember States\nItems\nAustralia\nCanada\nEuropean\nUnion\nJapan\nNew\nZealand\nDrinking Glasses (lead crystal)\n\nCutlery or Precious Metal or Plated or Clad with Precious Metal; High Quality Tableware of Porcelain, China, Stoneor Earthenware or Fine Pottery;  High Quality Lead Crystal Glassware\nDrinking Glasses of Lead Crystal\nBone China, Crystal Glassware\nCeramic and\nGlass/\nTableware\nRepublic\nFederation\nSingapore\nSwitzer-\nRussian\nUnited\nof Korea\nland\nStates\n\n\nCutlery,\nPlated or Platinum Plated\nTableware of Porcelain or Bone China, Items of Lead Crystal\n\n## Member States\n\n| Items          |\n|----------------|\n| European       |\n| Union          |\n| Japan          |\n| New            |\n| Zealand        |\n| Silver, Gold,  |\n| Jewelry,       |\n| Precious and   |\n| Semi-          |\n| Precious       |\n| Stones         |\n| (including     |\n| Diamonds and   |\n| Pearls),       |\n| Precious       |\n| Metals         |\n|                |\n| Jewelry,       |\n| Gems,          |\n| Precious       |\n| Metals         |\n| Pearls,        |\n| Precious and   |\n| Semi-          |\n| Precious       |\n| Stones,        |\n| Articles of    |\n| Pearls,        |\n| Jewelry, Gold- |\n| or Silversmith |\n| Articles       |\n| Jewelry,       |\n| Precious       |\n| Metals,        |\n| Precious       |\n| Metalwork      |\n| Jewelry,       |\n| Precious       |\n| Metals,        |\n| Precious and   |\n| Semi-          |\n| precious       |\n| Stones, and    |\n| Articles made  |\n| from them      |\n| Jewelry,       |\n| Precious       |\n| / Semi-        |\n| precious       |\n| Articles       |\nRepublic\nFederation\nSingapore\nSwitzer-\nRussian\nUnited\nof Korea\nland\nStates\nPearls and Jewelry (Natural or Hatchery Pearls, Diamonds, Jewelry, Silver, Gold, Gilded Products, White Gold, White Goldplated Products, Ornaments and Their Accessories, Products that contain\njewelry).\nJewelry made of gold, platinum, diamonds and other precious stones for more than 50,000 rubles\nPrecious Jewelry\nPearls, Precious and Semi- Precious Stones, Jewelry and Silverware\nJewelry (Jewelry with Pearls, Gems, Precious and Semi-Precious Stones [including Sapphires, Rubies and Emeralds], Jewelry of Precious Metal or of Metal Clad with Precious Metal) Gems and Precious Metals (Gold,\nSilver, Platinum, Diamonds, Precious and Semi-Precious Stones [including\nSapphires, Rubies and Emeralds])\n\nMember States\nItems\nAustralia\nCanada\nEuropean\nUnion\nJapan\nNew\nZealand\nConsumer Electronics (Televisions, Videos, DVD Players, PDAs, Laptops, MP3 players - and any other relevant exports), Electronic Entertainment/ Software\nComputers, Televisions and Other Electronic Devices\nHigh-end Electronic Items for Domestic Use; High-end Electrical/ Electronic or Optical Apparatus for Recording and Reproducing Sound and Images\nPortable Information Devices, Audiovisual Instruments and Software\nComputers, Audiovisual Equipment (for example CD Players and DVD Players), Data or Software (for example films, music, or both, recorded or\nstored on CDs or DVDs), and Things on which data or software is or may be recorded or\nstored. Mobile Telephones, Portable Information and Media Devices (for example,\nPersonal Digital Assistants (PDAs) and MP3 Players or Other Digital Audio\nPlayers)\nElectronic\nItems\nRepublic\nFederation\nSingapore\nSwitzer-\nRussian\nUnited\nof Korea\nland\nStates\nElectronic Goods (Transmitter Products for Radio or Televisions, Television Cameras, Digital Cameras, and Videocassette Recorders, Monitors, Projectors, and Related Products Excluding Television Transmitter\nProducts)\n\nPlasma\nTelevisions ; Personal digital Musical Players\nHigh- Quality Consumer Electronic Devices\nElectronic Items (Flat- Screen, Plasma or LCD panel Televisions or other Video Monitors or Receivers [including High- Definition Televisions], and Any Television larger than 29 inches, DVD Players, PDAs,\nPersonal Digital Music Players, *Computer Laptops)\n\nMember States\nItems\nAustralia\nCanada\nEuropean\nUnion\nJapan\nNew\nZealand\nPhotographic Equipment\n\nSee Electronic Items\nCamera and Cinematographic Instruments\nCameras and Movie Equipment\nPhotographic/\nCinematic\nItems\nWatches & Clocks\nWatches\nLuxury Clocks\nand Watches and Their Parts\nWrist- Watches and Other Watches\nWristwatches\nTimepieces\n(Wristwatches Pocket Watches, and Other Wearable Timepieces)\nClocks and\nWatches\n\n\nHigh Quality\nMusical Instruments\nMusical\nInstruments\nMusical\nInstruments\nMusical\nInstruments (Pianos, Harpsichords, and Other Stringed Keyboard Instruments,\nString Instruments, Wind Instruments, Electronic Musical Instruments)\nMusical\nInstruments\nRepublic\nFederation\nSingapore\nSwitzer-\nRussian\nUnited\nof Korea\nland\nStates\nOptical Instruments (Cameras, Movie Cameras and Projectors for Movies)\n\n\nHigh-\nQuality Electronic and Optical Image Recording and Reproducing Equipment\n\nWristwatch for more than 50,000 rubles\nWatches of Metal Clad with a Precious Metal\nWatches and Clocks\nLuxury Watches (Wrist, Pocket, and Other with a case of precious metal or of metal clad with precious metal)\n\nMusical\nInstruments\nQuality\nMusical Instruments\nMusical\nInstruments\n\nMember States\nItems\nAustralia\nCanada\nEuropean\nUnion\nJapan\nNew\nZealand\nAutomobiles and Other Vehicles to transport people, Yachts and Pleasure Craft\nPrivate Aircraft\nLuxury Vehicles for transport of persons on earth, air or sea, as well as their accessories and spare parts\nMotor Cars, Motor Cycles, Motorboats Yachts and Others\nCars, Motorcycles, Snowmobiles, Motorboats, Yachts, Aircraft, and Their Parts and Accessories\nVehicles,\nAircraft,\nVessels and\nOther\nTransport\nEquipment\nSports Equipment\nSporting Goods\nArticles and Equipment for Skiing, Golf,\nDiving and Water Sports\n\nSporting\nGoods and Equipment\nSports Items\nRepublic\nFederation\nSingapore\nSwitzer-\nRussian\nUnited\nof Korea\nland\nStates\nAutomobiles (Passenger Cars and Other Vehicles, Motorcycles and Bicycles or Sidecars With Assistant Motors), Vessels (Yachts, Other\nVessels for Excursion or Exercise, Boats with Paddles, and Canoes)\nMotorcars for more than 3,000,000 rubles\nLuxury cars; Luxury Motorboats and Yachts\nLuxury Vehicles for air, road and water transport as well as parts and accessories to\nTransportation Items (Yachts and Other Aquatic Recreational Vehicles [such as Jet Skies], *Luxury Automobiles [and Motor Vehicles]: Automobiles\nand Other Motor Vehicles to transport people [other than public transport]\nincluding Station Wagons, Racing Cars, Snowmobiles, and Motorcycles,\nPersonal Transportation Devices [Segways])\n\n\nRecreational\nand Sports Equipment\n\nMember States\nItems\nAustralia\nCanada\nEuropean\nUnion\nJapan\nNew\nZealand\nWorks of Art (all)\n\nCoins and Banknotes, not being legal tender; Works of Art, Collectors' Pieces and Antiques\nWorks of Art, Collectors' Pieces and Antiques\nWorks of Art, Collector's Pieces, and Antiques\nWorks of Art,\nCollector\nPieces &\nAntiques\nFountain Pens, Carpets\n\nHand-knotted Carpets, Handwoven Rugs and\nTapestries; Articles and Equipment for Billiard, Automatic Bowling, Casino Games\nand Games Operated by Coins or Banknotes\nCarpets, Fountain Pens\nCarpets and Tapestries, Designer Furniture,\nFountain Pens\nOthers\n\n * U.S. Luxury Items List (Provisional): Categories of items with an asterisk will be exempted from the general denial if they are being imported by legitimate organizations involved in humanitarian relief efforts, other internationally sanctioned efforts, or items in the interest of the United States Government.\n\nRepublic\nFederation\nSingapore\nSwitzer-\nRussian\nUnited\nof Korea\nland\nStates\nArtwork and Curios (Collections and Specimens, Curios)\n\nWorks of Art,\nCollector's Pieces and Antiques\nCoin (other than the legal tender), Works of Art, Collectors' Pieces and Antiques\nWorks of Art (including Painting, Original Sculptures and Statuary), Antiques (more than 100 years olds), and Collectible Items,\nincluding Rare Coins and Stamps\nCarpeting Goods (Carpeting Products and\nOther Textile Carpets)\n\nCarpets\nHandmade\nCarpets, Handwoven Tapestries\nDesigner Fountain Pens, Rugs and Tapestries\n\n\nANNEX A.2\n\n## Annex A.2 - List Of Autonomous Designations67 I. Entities\n\n\nNames\nDesignated\nby\nReasons\nAlias(es)\nAddress(es)\nRelated to Tanchon Commercial Bank (entity designated by the 1718 Committee, 24.04.2009), the financial arm of KOMID (another entity designated by the 1718 Committee, 24.04.2009)\nAmnokkang Development Bank\nTongan-dong, Pyongyang, Democratic People's Republic of Korea\n1\nAmroggang Development Banking Corporation\nUSA\n-\n9F-1, No. 22, Hsin Yi Rd., Sec. 2, Taipei, Taiwan\n-\n1st Floor, No. 49, Lane 280, Kuang Fu S. Road, Taipei, Taiwan\nBusiness Registration Document Number: 12873346 (Taiwan)\nOwned or controlled by Alex H.T. Tsai who provided, or attempted to provide, financial, technological or other support for, or goods or services in support of KOMID (entity designated by the 1718 Committee, 24.04.2009).\na.k.a. Trans Scientific Corp.\n2\nGlobal Interface Company Inc.\nUSA\nSubsidiary of KOMID (entity designated by the 1718 Committee, 24.04.2009).\n\nPyongyang, North Korea\nAustralia\nJapan\nUSA\n3\nHesong Trading Corporation\n4\nKorea Complex Equipment Import Corporation\nAustralia\nJapan\nUSA\nSubsidiary of Korea Ryongbong General Corporation (entity designated by the 1718 Committee, 24.04.2009).\n\nRakwon-dong, Pothonggang\nDistrict, Pyongyang, North Korea\n\n\n67 As of 30 April 2010, for Information Only.\n\n  These lists are not exhaustive lists of Member States that have made autonomous designations. The elements below are a compilation of those provided by Member States in support of their autonomous designations. Not all designating Member States provide reasons therefore.\n\n\n\nNames\nDesignated\nby\nReasons\nAlias(es)\nAddress(es)\nTies to Korea Ryonbong General\nCorporation (entity designated by the United\nNations, 24.04.2009).\n5\nKohas AG\nAustralia\nJapan\nUSA Subsidiary of Korea Ryongbong General Corporation (entity designated by the United Nations, 24.04.2009).\n6\nKorea International Chemical Joint Venture Company\nAustralia\nJapan\nUSA\nProvide financial services in support of both\nTanchon Commercial Bank (entity designated by the 1718 Committee, 24.04.2009) and Korea Hyoksin Trading Corporation (entity designated by the 1718 Committee, 16.07.2009)\n7\nKorea Kwangson Banking Corp (KKBC)\nUSA\nSubsidiary of Korea Ryongbong General Corporation (entity designated by the United Nations, 24.04.2009).\nAustralia\nJapan\nUSA\n8\nKorea Kwangsong Trading Corporation\nSubsidiary of Korea Ryongbong General Corporation (entity designated by the United Nations, 24.04.2009).\nAustralia\nJapan\nUSA\n9\nKorea Pugang Trading Corporation\n10\nKorea Pugang Mining and Machinery Corporation ltd\nEU\nSubsidiary of Korea Ryongbong General Corporation (entity designated by the United Nations, 24.04.2009\nAustralia\nJapan\nUSA\nEU\nSubsidiary of Korea Ryongbong General Corporation (entity designated by the United Nations, 24.04.2009).\n11\nKorea Ryongwang/Ryengwang Trading Corporation\n|                                  | Route des Arsenaux 15, Fribourg,    |\n|----------------------------------|-------------------------------------|\n| FR 1700, Switzerland; C.R. No.   |                                     |\n| CH-217.0.135.79-4 (Switzerland)  |                                     |\n| -                                |                                     |\n|                                  |                                     |\n| Chosun International             |                                     |\n| Chemicals Joint                  |                                     |\n| Operation Company                |                                     |\n| -                                |                                     |\n|                                  |                                     |\n| International Chemical           |                                     |\n| Joint Venture                    |                                     |\n| Coporation                       |                                     |\n| -                                |                                     |\n|                                  |                                     |\n| Choson International             |                                     |\n| Chemicals Joint                  |                                     |\n| Operation Company                |                                     |\n| -                                |                                     |\n|                                  |                                     |\n| Hamhung, South Hamgyong          |                                     |\n| Province, North Korea            |                                     |\n| -                                |                                     |\n|                                  |                                     |\n| Mangyongdae-kuyok,               |                                     |\n| Pyongyang, North Korea           |                                     |\n| -                                |                                     |\n|                                  |                                     |\n| Mangyungdae-gu,                  |                                     |\n| Pyongyang, North Korea           |                                     |\n|                                  | Jungson-dong, Sungri Street,        |\n| Central District, Pyongyang,     |                                     |\n| North Korea                      |                                     |\n|                                  | Rakwon-dong, Pothonggang            |\n| District, Pyongyang, North Korea |                                     |\n|                                  |                                     |\n|                                  | Rakwon-dong, Pothonggang            |\n| District, Pyongyang, North Korea |                                     |\n|                                  |                                     |\n| Korea Ryengwang Trading          |                                     |\n| Corporation                      |                                     |\n|                                  |                                     |\n| Rakwon-dong, Pothonggang         |                                     |\n| District, Pyongyang, North Korea |                                     |\n\nNames\nDesignated\nby\nReasons\nAlias(es)\nAddress(es)\nSubsidiary of Korea Ryongbong General\nCorporation (entity designated by the United\nNations, 24.04.2009).\n-\nKorea Ryenha\nMachinery J/V\nCorporation;\n-\nChosun Yunha Machinery Joint Operation Company;\n-\nRyonha Machinery Joint Venture Corporation)\n-\nCentral District, Pyongyang,\nNorth Korea;\n-\nMangyungdae-gu, Pyongyang, North Korea;\n-\nMangyongdae District, Pyongyang, North Korea\n\n12\nKorea Ryonha Machinery Joint Venture Corporation\nAustralia\nJapan\nUSA\n13\nKorea Tonghae Shipping Company\nJapan\n\n\n14\nPonghwa Hospital\nJapan\n\n\n15\nPyongyang Informatics Centre\nJapan\n\n\nState-owned company, involved in research into, and the acquisition of, sensitive products and equipment. It possesses several deposits of natural graphite, which provide raw material for two processing facilities which, inter alia, produce graphite blocks that can be used in missiles.'\nSobaeksu United Corp.\n\n16\nSobaeku United Corp.\nEU\nAustralia\nJapan\nUSA\nSubsidiary of KOMID (entity designated by the United Nations, 24.04.2009).\n\nPyongyang, North Korea\n17\nTosong Technology Trading Corporation\n\nNames\nDesignated\nby\nReasons\nAlias(es)\nAddress(es)\nSubsidiary of Global Interface Company Inc\nand managed by Alex H.T. Tsai who\nprovided, or attempted to provide, financial, technological or other support for, or goods or services in support of KOMID (entity designated by the 1718 Committee, 24.04.2009).\n18\nTrans Merits Co. Ltd.\nUSA\nResearch centre which has taken part in the production of military-grade plutonium. Centre maintained by the General Bureau of Atomic Energy (entity designated by the 1718 Committee 16.07.2009).\n19\nYongbyon Nuclear Research Centre\nEU\n\n|                                | 1F, No. 49, Lane 280, Kuang Fu    |\n|--------------------------------|-----------------------------------|\n| S. Road, Taipei, Taiwan        |                                   |\n|                                |                                   |\n| Business Registration Document |                                   |\n| Number: 16316976 (Taiwan)      |                                   |\n|                                |                                   |\n\n## Ii. Individuals\n\n|                                                        | Names                           |\n|--------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------|\n| Designated                                             |                                 |\n| by                                                     |                                 |\n| Rationale                                              | Alias(es)                       |\n| Member of the National Defence Commission.             |                                 |\n| Director of the Administrative Department of the       |                                 |\n| Korean Workers' Party.                                 |                                 |\n| JANG Song-Taek                                         | DOB: 2.2.1946 or 06.02.1946 or  |\n| 23.02.1946 (North Hamgyong                             |                                 |\n| province)                                              |                                 |\n| Passport number (as of 2006):                          |                                 |\n| PS 736420617                                           |                                 |\n| 1                                                      |                                 |\n| CHANG Song-taek                                        |                                 |\n| EU                                                     |                                 |\n| 2                                                      |                                 |\n| CHON Chi Bu                                            |                                 |\n| EU                                                     |                                 |\n| Member of the General Bureau of Atomic Energy          |                                 |\n| (entity designated by the 1718 Committee,              |                                 |\n| 16.07.2009), former technical director of Yongbyon.    |                                 |\n|                                                        |                                 |\n| 3                                                      |                                 |\n| CHU Kyu-Chang                                          |                                 |\n| EU                                                     |                                 |\n| First Deputy Director of the Defence Industry          |                                 |\n| Department (ballistics programme), Korean Workers'     |                                 |\n| Party, Member of the National Defence Commission.      |                                 |\n| JU Kyu- Chang                                          | DOB: between 1928 and 1933      |\n| 4                                                      |                                 |\n| HYON Chol-hae                                          |                                 |\n| EU                                                     |                                 |\n| Deputy Director of the General Political Department of |                                 |\n| the People's Armed Forces (military adviser to Kim     |                                 |\n| Jong Il).                                              |                                 |\n|                                                        | Year of birth: 1934 (Manchuria, |\n| China)                                                 |                                 |\n| Secretary of the Central Committee of the Korean       |                                 |\n| Workers' Party, Head of the Central Committee's        |                                 |\n| Military Supplies Industry Department controlling the  |                                 |\n| Second Economic Committee of the Central               |                                 |\n| Committee, member of the National Defence              |                                 |\n| Commission                                             |                                 |\n|                                                        | Year of birth: 1926             |\n|                                                        |                                 |\n| 5                                                      |                                 |\n| JON Pyong-ho                                           |                                 |\n| EU                                                     |                                 |\n| 6                                                      |                                 |\n| KIM Tong-myo'ng                                        |                                 |\n| USA                                                    |                                 |\n| c/o Tanchon Commercial Bank, Saemul 1-Dong             |                                 |\n| Pyongchon, District, Pyongyang, Democratic People's    |                                 |\n| Republic of Korea                                      |                                 |\n| Kim Tong Myong                                         |                                 |\n| Kim Chin-so'k                                          |                                 |\n| Kim Jin Sok                                            |                                 |\n| DOB 1964                                               |                                 |\n|                                                        |                                 |\n|                                                        |                                 |\n| 7                                                      |                                 |\n| KIM Tong-un                                            |                                 |\n| EU                                                     |                                 |\n| Director of \"Office 39\" of the Central Committee of    |                                 |\n| the Workers' Party, which is involved in proliferation |                                 |\n| financing.                                             |                                 |\n|                                                        | Year of birth: 1936             |\n| Passport number: 554410660                             |                                 |\n| 8                                                      |                                 |\n| KIM-Yong-chun                                          |                                 |\n| EU                                                     |                                 |\n| Deputy Chairman of the National Defence                |                                 |\n| Commission, Minister for the People's Armed Forces,    |                                 |\n| special adviser to Kim Jong Il on nuclear strategy.    |                                 |\n| Young-chun                                             | DOB: 04.03.1935                 |\n|                                                        |                                 |\n|                                                         | Names                      |\n|---------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------|\n| Designated                                              |                            |\n| by                                                      |                            |\n| Rationale                                               | Alias(es)                  |\n| Deputy Chairman of the National Defence                 |                            |\n| Commission, supervising the acquisition abroad of       |                            |\n| advanced technology for nuclear and ballistics          |                            |\n| programmes.                                             |                            |\n|                                                         | Year of birth: 1931 (Jilin |\n| Province, China)                                        |                            |\n| 9                                                       |                            |\n| O Kuk-Ryol                                              |                            |\n| EU                                                      |                            |\n| Alex H.T. Tsai's wife, who provided, or attempted to    |                            |\n| provide, financial, technological or other support for, |                            |\n| or goods or services in support of KOMID (entity        |                            |\n| designated by the 1718 Committee, 24.04.2009). Lu-      |                            |\n| Chi Su is an officer in Global Interface Company Inc.   |                            |\n| and Trans Merits Co. Ltd. and is directly involved in   |                            |\n| the companies' operations.                              |                            |\n| Lu-Chi Tsai Su                                          | DOB: August 8, 1945        |\n| POB: Tainan, Taiwan                                     |                            |\n| Passport Number: 131134049                              |                            |\n| (Taiwan)                                                |                            |\n| 10                                                      |                            |\n| SU Lu-chi                                               |                            |\n|                                                         |                            |\n| USA                                                     |                            |\n| Chairman of the Second Economic Committee               |                            |\n| (responsible for the ballistics programme) of the       |                            |\n| Central Committee of the Korean Workers' Party.         |                            |\n| Member of the National Defence Commission.              |                            |\n|                                                         | Year of birth: 1946        |\n| 11                                                      |                            |\n| PAEK Se-bong                                            |                            |\n| EU                                                      |                            |\n| Deputy Director of the General Political Department of  |                            |\n| the People's Armed Forces and Deputy Director of the    |                            |\n| Logistics Bureau of the People's Armed Forces           |                            |\n| (military adviser to Kim Jong II).                      |                            |\n| Chae-Kyong                                              | Year of birth: 1933        |\n| Passport number: 554410661                              |                            |\n| 12                                                      |                            |\n| PAK Jae-gyong                                           |                            |\n| EU                                                      |                            |\n| 13                                                      |                            |\n| PYON Yong Rip                                           |                            |\n| EU                                                      |                            |\n| President of the Academy of Science involved in         |                            |\n| WMD-related biological research.                        |                            |\n| Yong-Nip                                                | DOB: 20.09.1929            |\n| Passport number: 645310121                              |                            |\n| (issued on 13.09.2005)                                  |                            |\n| 14                                                      |                            |\n| RYOM Yong                                               |                            |\n| EU                                                      |                            |\n| Director of the General Bureau of Atomic Energy         |                            |\n| (entity designated by the 1718 Committee,               |                            |\n| 16.07.2009), in charge of international relations.      |                            |\n|                                                         |                            |\n| 15                                                      |                            |\n| SO Sang-kuk                                             |                            |\n| EU                                                      |                            |\n| Head of the Department of Nuclear Physics, Kim Il       |                            |\n| Sung University.                                        |                            |\n|                                                         |                            |\n| President of Kohas AG                                   | STEIGER Jakob              |\n| SG, Switzerland)                                        |                            |\n| 16                                                      |                            |\n| STEIGER Jacob                                           |                            |\n| Australia                                               |                            |\n| Japan                                                   |                            |\n| USA                                                     |                            |\n|                                                          | Names     |\n|----------------------------------------------------------|-----------|\n| Designated                                               |           |\n| by                                                       |           |\n| Rationale                                                | Alias(es) |\n| Provided, or attempted to provide, financial,            |           |\n| technological or other support for, or goods or services |           |\n| in support of KOMID (entity designated by the 1718       |           |\n| Committee, 24.04.2009).                                  |           |\n| 17                                                       |           |\n| TSAI Alex H.T.                                           |           |\n| USA                                                      |           |\n|                                                          |           |\nHsein Tai Tsai\n\n\nDOB: August 8, 1945 (Tainan,\nTaiwan)\nPassport Number: 131134049 (Taiwan)\n\n\n\nANNEX A.3\n\n## Annex A.3 - North Korea: Correspondent Banking Relationships Bankers Almanac, As Of April 12, 2010 1. Amroggang Development Bank68\n\nCP = Commercial Payments FX = Foreign Exchange MM = Money Markets\n\nCurr Bank\nSwift/BIC Account No\nCP FX MM Other CP FX MM\nEUR Commerzbank\nCOBA\nDE FF\nAG, Frankfurt am\nMain\n400887117000, ffc\nDonau-Bank AG,\nVienna,; SWIFT: DOBA AT WW Acct.No: 11.00.0615178.900\n\n\nRUB Far Eastern\nFAEC RU 8K\nCommercial Bank\n\"Dalcombank\",\nKhabarovsk\n\n## 2. Korea Kwangson Banking Corporation69 Cp = Commercial Payments Fx = Foreign Exchange Mm = Money Markets\n\n| Curr           |                    | Bank   |     | Swift/BIC   |  Account No    |\n|----------------|--------------------|--------|-----|-------------|----------------|\n| C              |                    |        |     |             |                |\n| P              |                    |        |     |             |                |\n| F              |                    |        |     |             |                |\n| X              |                    |        |     |             |                |\n| M              |                    |        |     |             |                |\n| M              |                    |        |     |             |                |\n| Othe           |                    |        |     |             |                |\n| r              |                    |        |     |             |                |\n| 82079648021038 |                    |        |     |             | EUR            |\n| Bank of China  |                    |        |     |             |                |\n| BKCH           |                    |        |     |             |                |\n| CN BJ          |                    |        |     |             |                |\n| Limited        |                    |        |     |             |                |\n| ,              |                    |        |     |             |                |\n| Beijing        |                    |        |     |             |                |\n| EUR            |                    |        |     |             |                |\n| China          |                    |        |     |             |                |\n| PCBC CN        | 210331065220100929 |        |     |             |                |\n| Curr               |     | Bank   |     | Swift/BIC   |  Account No    |\n|--------------------|-----|--------|-----|-------------|----------------|\n| C                  |     |        |     |             |                |\n| P                  |     |        |     |             |                |\n| BJ LND             |     |        |     |             |                |\n| Construction       |     |        |     |             |                |\n| Bank               |     |        |     |             |                |\n| Corporation        |     |        |     |             |                |\n| ,                  |     |        |     |             |                |\n| Dandong            |     |        |     |             |                |\n| EUR                |     |        |     |             |                |\n| Far Eastern        |     |        |     |             |                |\n| FAEC RU            |     |        |     |             |                |\n| 8K                 |     |        |     |             |                |\n| 301119788000000000 |     |        |     |             |                |\n| 06                 |     |        |     |             |                |\n| Commercial         |     |        |     |             |                |\n| Bank               |     |        |     |             |                |\n| \"Dalcombank\"       |     |        |     |             |                |\n| ,                  |     |        |     |             |                |\n| Khabarovsk         |     |        |     |             |                |\n| HK                 |     |        |     |             |                |\n| D                  |     |        |     |             |                |\n| PCBC CN            |     |        |     |             |                |\n| BJ LND             |     |        |     |             |                |\n| 210131065002201009 |     |        |     |             |                |\n| 49                 |     |        |     |             |                |\n| China              |     |        |     |             |                |\n| Construction       |     |        |     |             |                |\n| Bank               |     |        |     |             |                |\n| Corporation        |     |        |     |             |                |\n| ,                  |     |        |     |             |                |\n| Dandong            |     |        |     |             |                |\n| PCBC CN            |     |        |     |             |                |\n| BJ LND             |     |        |     |             |                |\n| 210271065002201009 |     |        |     |             |                |\n| 33                 |     |        |     |             |                |\n| JPY                |     |        |     |             |                |\n| China              |     |        |     |             |                |\n| Construction       |     |        |     |             |                |\n| Bank               |     |        |     |             |                |\n| Corporation        |     |        |     |             |                |\n| ,                  |     |        |     |             |                |\n| Dandong            |     |        |     |             |                |\n| FAEC RU            |     |        |     |             |                |\n| 8K                 |     |        |     |             |                |\n| 301113925000000000 |     |        |     |             |                |\n| 05                 |     |        |     |             |                |\n| JPY                |     |        |     |             |                |\n| Far Eastern        |     |        |     |             |                |\n| Commercial         |     |        |     |             |                |\n| Bank               |     |        |     |             |                |\n| \"Dalcombank\"       |     |        |     |             |                |\n| ,                  |     |        |     |             |                |\n| Khabarovsk         |     |        |     |             |                |\n| 82079648021014     |     |        |     |             | USD            |\n| Bank of China      |     |        |     |             |                |\n| BKCH               |     |        |     |             |                |\n| CN BJ              |     |        |     |             |                |\n| Limited            |     |        |     |             |                |\n| ,                  |     |        |     |             |                |\n| Beijing            |     |        |     |             |                |\n| USD                |     |        |     |             |                |\n| China              |     |        |     |             |                |\n| PCBC CN            |     |        |     |             |                |\n| BJ LND             |     |        |     |             |                |\n| 210141065002201009 |     |        |     |             |                |\n| 19                 |     |        |     |             |                |\n| Construction       |     |        |     |             |                |\n| Bank               |     |        |     |             |                |\n| Corporation        |     |        |     |             |                |\n| ,                  |     |        |     |             |                |\n| Dandong            |     |        |     |             |                |\nF X\nM M\nOthe r\n\n\n\n| Curr               |     | Bank   |     |\n|--------------------|-----|--------|-----|\n| C                  |     |        |     |\n| P                  |     |        |     |\n| F                  |     |        |     |\n| X                  |     |        |     |\n| M                  |     |        |     |\n| M                  |     |        |     |\n| Othe               |     |        |     |\n| r                  |     |        |     |\n| USD                |     |        |     |\n| Far Eastern        |     |        |     |\n| FAEC RU            |     |        |     |\n| 8K                 |     |        |     |\n| 301118402000000000 |     |        |     |\n| 06                 |     |        |     |\n|                    |     |        |     |\n| Commercial         |     |        |     |\n| Bank               |     |        |     |\n| \"Dalcombank\"       |     |        |     |\n| ,                  |     |        |     |\n| Khabarovsk         |     |        |     |\n|                    |     |        |     |\n\n## 3. Korea United Development Bank\n\nCP = Commercial Payments FX = Foreign Exchange MM = Money Markets\n\n\nCurr Bank\nSwift/BIC\nAccount No\nCP FX MM Other\n\n\n\nBLBB BY 2X\nBYR\nBelarusian Bank for Development and Reconstruction\n'Belinvestbank' JSC,\nMinsk\n\n\n\nCHF\nBanca Commerciale\nLugano, Lugano\nBCLU CH 22\nCP FX MM Letters\nCHF\nBank of China\nLimited, Macau\nBKCH MO MX\n01-29-520- 0442-1\nof Credit\n\n\n\nBPCP CH GG\nCHF\nBanque de Commerce\net de Placements SA,\nGeneva\n\n\n\nCNY China Construction\nPCBC CN BJ\nBank Corporation,\nBeijing\nDKK **Amagerbanken A/S**,\n52010800226\nCP FX\n\nCopenhagen\nAMBK DK KK\n265281\nCP FX MM\nEUR\nBanca Nazionale del\nLavoro SpA, Rome\nBNLI IT RR\nCP FX MM Letters\nEUR\nBank of China\nLimited, Macau\nBKCH MO MX\n01-25-520- 0440-9\nof Credit\nCP FX MM\nEUR\nCommerzbank AG,\nFrankfurt am Main\nDRES DE FF\n8089 486 11 888\nCP FX MM Letters\nGBP\nBank of China\nLimited, Macau\nBKCH MO MX\n01-21-520- 0439-8\nof Credit\nCurr Bank\nSwift/BIC\nAccount No\nCP FX MM Other CP FX MM Letters\nHKD Bank of China\nLimited, Macau\nBKCH MO MX\n01-11-520- 0437-4\nof\nCredit\n\n\n\nBUDA HU HB\nHUF\nBudapest Credit & Development Bank\nNyrt, Budapest\nCP FX MM Letters\nJPY\nBank of China\nLimited, Macau\nBKCH MO MX\n01-28-520- 0444-4\nof Credit\n\n\n\nIRTY KZ KA\nKZT\nAlliance Bank Joint\nStock Company,\nAlmaty\n\n\n\nKZT\nDevelopment Bank of\nKazakhstan, Astana\nDVKA KZ KA\n\nCP FX MM Letters\nMOP Bank of China\nLimited, Macau\nBKCH MO MX\nof Credit\nMYR Malayan Banking\nMBBE MY KL\nBerhad, Kuala\nLumpur\n\n\n\nLetters of Credit\n\n\n\nPLN\nKredyt Bank SA,\nWarsaw\nKRDB PL PW\n\n\n\nVTBR RU MM\nRUB\nVTB Bank (open\njoint-stock company),\nMoscow\nCP FX MM Letters\nSGD\nBank of China\nLimited, Macau\nBKCH MO MX\n01-32-520- 0443-4\nof Credit\nCP FX MM Letters\nUSD\nBank of China\nLimited, Macau\nBKCH MO MX\n01-20-520- 0438-1\nof Credit\n\n## 4. Koryo Commercial Bank Cp = Commercial Payments Fx = Foreign Exchange Mm = Money Markets\n\n| Curr                       |     | Bank   |     | Swift/BIC   |     |\n|----------------------------|-----|--------|-----|-------------|-----|\n| Account                    |     |        |     |             |     |\n| No                         |     |        |     |             |     |\n| CP                         |     | FX     |     | MM          |     |\n|                            |     |        |     |             | EUR |\n| Banca Nazionale del Lavoro |     |        |     |             |     |\n| SpA                        |     |        |     |             |     |\n| , Rome                     |     |        |     |             |     |\n| BNLI IT                    |     |        |     |             |     |\n| RR                         |     |        |     |             |     |\n|                            |     |        |     |             | EUR |\n| Landesbank Hessen-         |     |        |     |             |     |\n| HELA DE                    |     |        |     |             |     |\n| FF                         |     |        |     |             |     |\n| Thuringen Girozentrale     |     |        |     |             |     |\n| ,                          |     |        |     |             |     |\n| Frankfurt am Main          |     |        |     |             |     |\n|                            | HKD |        |     |             |     |\n| The Hongkong and           |     |        |     |             |     |\n| HSBC HK                    |     |        |     |             |     |\n| HH                         |     |        |     |             |     |\n|                            |     |        |     |             |     |\n| Shanghai Banking           |     |        |     |             |     |\n| Corporation Limited        |     |        |     |             |     |\n| ,                          |     |        |     |             |     |\n| Hong Kong                  |     |        |     |             |     |\n\n## 5. **North East Asia Bank**Cp = Commercial Payments Fx = Foreign Exchange Mm = Money Markets\n\nCurr Bank\nSwift/BIC Account No\nCP FX MM Other\n82104128021038  CP\n\n\nEUR Bank of China\nLimited, Beijing\nBKCH CN BJ\n1600420020001\nCP\n\n\nEUR Closed Joint Stock\nCRDE UA\n2N\nCompany Commercial Bank\n'Credit - Dnipro',\nDnepropetrovsk\n1600420020001\nCP\n\n\nCRDE UA 2N\nJPY\nClosed Joint Stock Company Commercial Bank\n'Credit - Dnipro',\nDnepropetrovsk\nUSD Closed Joint Stock\nCRDE UA 1600420020001\nCP\n\n\nCurr Bank\nSwift/BIC Account No\nCP FX MM Other\n2N\nCompany\nCommercial Bank\n'Credit - Dnipro',\nDnepropetrovsk\n\n\n\nANNEX A.4"
    },
    {
        "text": "# Issues Related To The Bureau Of Industry And Security's Budget And Responsibilities For International Treaty Implementation And Compliance Bureau Of Industry And Security\n\nFinal Briefing No. IPE-19463\nOctober 2008\nOffice of Audit and Evaluation UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE\nThe Inspector General Washington, **D.C.** 20230\n\n .*\"\n    OF%+\n{ !@!\n       $ *\n\nOctober 7,2008\n\nThe Honorable Daniel K. Akaka\nChairman\nSubcommittee on Oversight of Government Management,\n the Federal Workforce, and the District of Columbia\nCommittee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs\nSH-605, Hart Senate Office Building\nWashington, DC 205 10\n\nDear Senator Akaka:\n\nMy office has completed the review that you requested on June 9,2008. You asked that\nwe investigate budget management practices in the Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS)\nrelated to international treaty implementation and compliance activities. We met with\nyour staff on September 30,2008, to present the results of our review.\n\nTo summarize our findings, conference report language accompanying the FY 2006\nappropriations bill stated that the funding previously spent on international treaty\nimplementation and compliance activities could now be spent on \"national security\nrelated programs.\" Based on this language, BIS started funding other programs with the\nfunding previously dedicated to the Treaty Compliance Division. With regard to the\nChemical Weapons Convention attache being curtailed from his posting in The Hague,\nthis action was taken by BIS management due to what it described as budget constraints.\nWe found that funding was available, but was used instead by BIS for other national\nsecurity programs. Finally, we found that the electronic system to compile the U.S.\nAdditional Protocol (AP) declaration would not have been ready in time to accept the\nfirst round of submissions from U.S. industry in late 2008 even if spending on the project\nhad continued. The development of the system had not been well managed-it\n                                                                          was only\n35 percent complete in January 2008 when BIS stopped any further work on it.\nReverting to a paper-based process for the AP declaration is inefficient, but in speaking\nto all the agencies involved in AP implementation, none of them felt'it would have any\nimpact on the submission of the initial AP declaration to the International Atomic Energy\nAgency.\n\nWe have enclosed a copy of our briefing and an identical letter has been sent to Senators\nBiden and Lugar. If you have any questions, please feel free to contact me at (202) 482-\n4661 or Lisa Allen, Deputy Assistant Inspector General for Inspections and Program\nEvaluations, at (202) 482-5422.\n\nSincerely,\n\n          ' /\nTodd J. Zinser\n\nEnclosure UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE\nThe Inspector General Washington, **D.C.** 20230\n--\nOctober 7,2008\n**N OF *co%* \"\n%-,C\n\nThe Honorable Joseph R. Biden, Jr.\nChairman\nCommittee on Foreign Relations\nSD-439, Dirksen Senate Office Building\nWashington, DC 205 10-6225\n\nDear Senator Biden:\n\nMy office has completed the review that you requested on June 9,2008. You asked that\nwe investigate budget management practices in the Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS)\nrelated to international treaty implementation and compliance activities. We met with\nyour staff on September 30,2008, to present the results of our review.\n\nTo summarize our findings, conference report language accompanying the FY 2006\nappropriations bill stated that the funding previously spent on international treaty\nimplementation and compliance activities could now be spent on \"national security\nrelated programs.\" Based on this language, BIS started funding other programs with the\nfunding previously dedicated to the Treaty Compliance Division. With regard to the\nChemical Weapons Convention attach6 being curtailed from his posting in The Hague,\nthis action was taken by BIS management due to what it described as budget constraints.\nWe found that funding was available, but was used instead by BIS for other national\nsecurity programs. Finally, we found that the electronic system to compile the U.S.\nAdditional Protocol (AP) declaration would not have been ready in time to accept the\nfirst round of submissions from U.S. industry in late 2008 even if spending on the project\nhad continued. The development of the system had not been well managed-it\n                                                                          was only\n35 percent complete in January 2008 when BIS stopped any further work on it.\nReverting to a paper-based process for the AP declaration is inefficient, but in speaking\nto all the agencies involved in AP implementation, none of them felt it would have any\nimpact on the submission of the initial AP declaration to the International Atomic Energy\nAgency.\n\nWe have enclosed a copy of our briefing and an identical letter has been sent to Senators\nAkaka and Lugar. If you have any questions, please feel free to contact me at (202) 482-\n4661 or Lisa Allen, Deputy Assistant Inspector General for Inspections and Program\nEvaluations, at (202) 482-5422.\n\nSincerely,\n\nTodd J. Zinser\n\nEnclosure UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE\nThe Inspector General Washington, D.C. 20230\n\n          OF %+\nd !$f \\\n     ep\n %.- s\n\n                                                                                                                                           - --\nOctober 7,2008\n\nThe Honorable Richard G. Lugar\nRanking Member\nCommittee on Foreign Relations\nSD-439, Dirksen Senate Office Building\nWashington, DC 205 10-6225\n\nDear Senator Lugar:\n\nMy office has completed the review that you requested on June 9, 2008. You asked that\nwe investigate budget management practices in the Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS)\nrelated to international treaty implementation and compliance activities. We met with\nyour staff on September 30,2008, to present the results of our review.\n\nTo summarize our findings, conference report language accompanying the FY 2006\nappropriations bill stated that the funding previously spent on international treaty\nimplementation and compliance activities could now be spent on \"national security\nrelated programs.\" Based on this language, BIS started funding other programs with the\nfunding previously dedicated to the Treaty Compliance Division. With regard to the\nChemical Weapons Convention attach6 being curtailed from his posting in The Hague,\nthis action was taken by BIS management due to what it described as budget constraints.\nWe found that funding was available, but was used instead by BIS for other national\nsecurity programs. Finally, we found that the electronic system to compile the U.S.\nAdditional Protocol (AP) declaration would not have been ready in time to accept the\nfirst round of submissions from U.S. industry in late 2008 even if spending on the project\nhad continued. The development of the system had not been well managed-it\n                                                                          was only\n35 percent complete in January 2008 when BIS stopped any further work on it.\nReverting to a paper-based process for the AP declaration is inefficient, but in speaking\nto all the agencies involved in AP implementation, none of them felt it would have any\nimpact on the submission of the initial AP declaration to the International Atomic Energy\nAgency.\n\nWe have enclosed a copy of our briefing and an identical letter has been sent to Senators\nAkaka and Biden. If you have any questions, please feel free to contact me at (202) 482-\n4661 or Lisa Allen, Deputy Assistant Inspector General for Inspections and Program\nEvaluations, at (202) 482-5422.\n\nSincerely,\n\nTodd J. Zinser\n\nEnclosure\n\n# Briefing For U.S. Senate Requesters\n\nIssues Related to the\nBureau of Industry and Security's\nBudget and Responsibilities for\nInternational Treaty\nImplementation and Compliance\n\n## Background\n\n- The President's Budget Request for FY 2008 included $78.78\nmillion to fund BIS programs. Both the House and Senate marks were at this same funding level.\n- On December 18, 2007, the consolidated appropriations act\npassed, which included a $72.85 appropriation for BIS.  This was approximately 8 percent less than the President's request.\n- In May 2008, Congress approved a $2.1 million transfer from\nother Commerce accounts to BIS.  According to BIS management, this additional funding enabled it to fill key management positions and avoid rolling staff furloughs.\n- On June 8, 2008, Senators Akaka, Biden, and Lugar\nrequested that the Commerce OIG review several decisions BIS made as a result of the cut to its FY 2008 budget.  The OIG agreed to address the questions listed on the next slide.\n\n## Senate Questions\n\n(1)\nSince 2006, what has the \"inspections and other activities related to\nnational security\" (Category B) subset been spent on?  Has money from that subset been spent on areas other than international treaty responsibilities?\n(2)\nWhat is the history of the Commerce/BIS attache to the Organization for\nthe Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW)?  How did it come about and how was the position funded? What was BIS' rationale for pulling the attache from The Hague?\n(3)\nWhat is the status of compiling the United States' Additional Protocol (AP)\ndeclaration?  What is the deadline for filing the declaration?  Will the deadline be missed and if yes, why?  What are BIS' specific responsibilities regarding the AP declaration?\n(4)\nWhat funding has been directed to creating an electronic system to\ncompile the necessary data for the AP declaration and what is the status\nof the system? What are the consequences of stopping work on the\nsystem and returning to a paper system? Was a cost-benefit analysis completed before making this decision?\n(5)\nWas a cost-benefit analysis made before moving the Treaty Compliance\nDivision from Rosslyn, Virginia into the main Commerce building?\n\n## Findings: Category B Spending\n\n-\nThe \"inspections and other activities related to national security\" subset\n(Category B) of the base BIS appropriation first appeared in the FY 1998\nCommerce, Justice, State appropriations act.  This exact language, to describe the Category B funds, has been in every appropriations act since.\n[Note: The FY 1998-2008 history of BIS' base appropriation and the Category B subset is included as an Appendix to this briefing.]\n-\nPrior to FY 2006, Category B funds were primarily used to fund BIS'\ninternational treaty implementation and compliance programs, which were housed in the Treaty Compliance Division (TCD).\n-\nIn FY 2006, the Category B funding increased from $7.2 million to $14.77 million. The conference report stated that these funds were for \"national\nsecurity related programs.\" Based on this language, BIS began to fund other national security related programs, in addition to TCD, with Category B funds, including:\n- Office of Strategic Industry and Economic Security, - Office of Technology Evaluation, - Overseas export control attache program, - End-use check program, and - Seized computer evidence recovery program.\n\n## Findings: Category B Spending\n\n-\nThe FY 2008 President's Budget submission did not specifically list an amount to be\nspent on international treaty compliance activities.  The FY 2006 and FY 2007 President's Budget submissions stated that $7.2 million was dedicated to BIS' Performance Goal 2\"Ensure U.S. Industry Compliance with the Chemical Weapons Convention.\"\n-\nOur analysis found that BIS obligations for TCD's international treaty programs declined by about $200,000 in FY 2006.  More significant reductions occurred in FYs 2007 and 2008.\n\nFiscal\nYear\nTotal TCD Obligations,\nIncluding Overhead\nPercentage Decline\nOver FY 2005 Baseline\n2005\n$5,736,529\nNA\n2006\n$5,510,514\n4%\n2007\n$3,596,193\n37%\n20081\n$3,277,822\n43%\n\n1: OIG estimate of full year, based on figures as of August 31, 2008 (11 months of FY).\n\n-\nOur analysis indicates that BIS did not spend $7.2 million on TCD's programs during\nthe past several years. However, determining the exact amount of obligations that should be allocated to TCD would require a detailed cost allocation audit, which was beyond the scope of this analysis.\n-\nAccording to BIS management, despite the reduced spending on TCD's programs, all CWC inspections have been completed on time and all declarations have been submitted on time.  Additionally, BIS is also helping industry meet its obligations under the CWC and completed two requested site assistance visits in FY 2008.\n\n## Findings: Cwc Attache\n\n- The Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW),\nlocated in The Hague, The Netherlands, has the mission of monitoring the implementation of the CWC Treaty, which entered into force in 1997.\n- The United States maintains a permanent on-site delegation to the\nOPCW, which is currently led by Ambassador Eric M. Javits.\n- Presidential Decision Directive/NSC-70 (1999) states the Department\nof Commerce shall \"provide members of the U.S. Delegation to the OPCW, including an Alternate Permanent U.S. Representative to the OPCW, who will be resident in The Hague.\"\n- BIS, the Commerce bureau with the lead on CWC implementation,\nsent the first CWC attache to The Hague in September 1999.\n- Other than a brief, two-month period in 2005, when the incumbent\nattache unexpectedly resigned, the position had been continually filled until August 2008.\n- BIS paid for the CWC attache position with Category B funds.\n\n## Findings: Cwc Attache\n\n- In February 2008, BIS management decided to curtail the\nassignment of the attache due to budget constraints.  Because many of the costs to keep the attache and his family in The Hague for FY 2008 had already been paid, it was decided to curtail his assignment on/about July 15, 2008. The attache's 3-year posting was due to finish in October 2008, so he was effectively curtailed 3 months early.\n- There were no significant cost savings in FY 2008 resulting from this\ndecision. BIS reported to us that it made the decision out of concern for its FY 2009 budget situation. Specifically, BIS would have had to commit funds (e.g., housing, school, overhead expenses, etc.) to the State Department in FY 2008 in order to keep the attache in The Hague for FY 2009. However, BIS did not believe it was prudent to do this given the continuing uncertainty of the bureau's budget and the likelihood of a lengthy continuing resolution due to the Presidential election and a new Administration.\n\n## Findings: Cwc Attache\n\n-\nAccording to BIS management, they have committed to filling the vacant\nCWC attache position as soon as sufficient funding becomes available. Based on our analysis, the decision not to fund the CWC attache was a management decisionCategory B funding was available but BIS chose to spend those funds on other national security programs.\n-\nBIS management also told us that they will send staff to key CWC meetings,\nas funds permit. For example, they are sending a staffer to the CWC Executive Council meeting in The Hague in October 2008.\n-\nIn late August 2008, we spoke to Ambassador Javits who expressed concern\nabout the effectiveness of the U.S. delegation to the OPCW without the Commerce CWC attache. Specifically:\n- The U.S. has some momentum after a successful CWC Review\nConference in April 2008.  This Conference is held once every 5 years and it spawned a number of opportunities to negotiate changes to the treaty that the U.S. either proposed or supports.  Thus, the Ambassador expected that the remainder of FY 2008 and FY 2009 would be a very busy period for the delegation.\n- Many of the opportunities involve addressing shortcomings in the treaty\nrelated to the commercial chemical industry.  The State attache and DOD attache will do their best to represent U.S. industry interests, but without the assistance of a knowledgeable Commerce attache who is intimately familiar with the U.S. chemical industry, the Ambassador fears U.S. influence during negotiations on industry-related issues will decrease significantly.\n-\nThere is currently no \"deadline\" for filing the first Additional Protocol (AP)\ndeclaration because the U.S. has not deposited its instrument of ratification of the AP with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).\n-\nAccording to BIS officials, the President has indicated that he would like to\ndo so before the end of his term.  Thus, the interagency working group (State, Defense, Energy, Commerce, the Attorney General, and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission) is working to have all necessary requirements completed by December 31, 2008.\n-\nOnce the instrument of ratification to the AP is deposited, the first U.S.\ndeclaration under the AP will be due to the IAEA in 180 days.\n-\nThere are five key requirements that must be met before the President can deposit the instrument of ratification to the AP.  Three have been completed:\n(1)\nRatificationthe U.S. signed the AP to the U.S./IAEA Safeguards on\nJune 12, 1998, and the Senate provided its advice and consent, with two conditions, on March 31, 2004.\n(2)\nEnactment of Implementing Legislationon December 18, 2006, the President signed the United States Additional Protocol Implementation Act (Public Law 109-401).\n(3)\nIssuance of an Executive Orderon February 5, 2008, the President signed an Order directing the responsible agencies to issue regulations and take other necessary actions to implement the *Act* and meet U.S.\nobligations under the AP.\n- The final two requirements that must be met before the President\ncan deposit the instrument of ratification to the AP are:\n(4)\nIssuance of Agency Regulationsby the Departments of Commerce (for provisions of the AP affecting U.S. industry and others not regulated by the NRC), Defense, and Energy, and by the NRC.\n(5)\nCertification of Senate Conditionsthe President must certify that the two conditions added by the Senate, involving national security exclusions and site vulnerability assessments of locations with direct national security significance, will be met within 180 days after the deposit of the instrument of ratification.\n- Status of Commerce's Implementing RegulationsBIS issued its\ndraft AP implementing regulations on July 25, 2008. The 30-day comment period closed August 25, 2008. BIS plans to issue the final regulation by late October or early November 2008.  Entities subject to the regulation must declare their civil nuclear fuel-cycle activities to BIS within 30 days of the final AP regulation being issued.\n- Status of Other Agencies' Implementing\nRegulationsThe regulations that must be issued by Defense, Energy, and NRC are either (1) on target to be issued in time to support the President depositing the instrument of ratification prior to leaving office or (2) do not have a bearing on the President being able to make the deposit.\n- Status of Certifying the Senate's Two Conditions\nBecause the work to meet the conditions has just begun, it is unclear when the Secretaries of Defense and Energy will be able to provide the President with the necessary assurances that the two Senate conditions can be met.\n- Once the instrument of ratification is deposited, the National\nSecurity Presidential Directive (NSPD) 57 states that BIS will be responsible for:\n- (U) Combining the civil nuclear fuel-cycle related filings it\npreviously received (in the 30-day period after the publication of its final AP implementing regulations) with the filings from Defense, Energy, and the NRC to form the\nbasis for the initial U.S. declaration.\n- (U) Providing IAEA inspectors with complementary access\nto declared commercial locations and obtaining necessary administrative warrants for IAEA inspector complementary access.\n- This second responsibility won't start until sometime after\nthe initial declaration is filed with the IAEA.\n\n## Findings: Ap Reporting System\n\n- Starting in 2004, BIS began developing the Additional Protocol\nReporting System (APRS), an electronic system to collect declarations from both industry and government filers subject to the AP and compile them into an overall U.S. declaration for submission to the IAEA. BIS estimated it would take about 2 years and $2.0 million to develop and complete APRS.\n- In January 2008, BIS management stopped development of\nAPRS due to budget constraints.  TCD was directed to revert to a paper-based system for collecting declarations and compiling the overall U.S. declaration for submission to the IAEA. BIS did not do a cost-benefit analysis of reverting to a paper-based process.\n- Approximately $1.6 million had been expended on APRS at the\npoint development was halted.\n- Even if BIS had continued development of APRS in its existing\ndesign, and had sufficient funds to do so, the system would not have been ready in time to accept the first round of declarations in late 2008.\n\n## Findings: Ap Reporting System\n\n- In February 2008, the BIS Chief Information Officer brought in an\noutside consultant to provide a technical assessment of APRS and determine whether the development effort could be salvaged. The consultant found that the overall project was only 35 percent complete and much of the necessary lifecycle management documentation was non-existent.\n- The consultant recommended that APRS be abandoned in favor of a\nnew design that would be in compliance with BIS' security, architecture, and lifecycle management requirements.\n- BIS management acknowledges that reverting to a paper-based\nprocess for the AP declarations is inefficient. But, they are confident the initial U.S. declaration, as well as subsequent declarations, will be submitted on time and in the format required by the IAEA.\n- We spoke to cognizant officials at each of the agencies involved in\nthe AP implementation and they all told us that a paper process for AP declarations is laborious and cumbersome. However, they do not believe it will impact the initial IAEA submission.\n\n## Findings: Tcd Move\n\n- According to BIS management, the decision to move TCD from\nRosslyn, Virginia, to the main Commerce building in May 2008 was largely driven by the FY 2008 budget situation. However, BIS reportedly had been contemplating such an action for the past few years given TCD's shrinking space requirements.\n- No formal cost-benefit analysis of this decision was done.\nHowever, BIS did provide us with some rough calculations that\nshowed consolidating TCD into existing BIS space in the main Commerce building ($140,024 annual cost) would be less expensive than continuing to rent separate space in Rosslyn ($261,423 annual cost). The cost of vacating the Rosslyn space and moving personnel and equipment to the main Commerce building was $26,200.\n- According to BIS management, some savings were also realized\nfrom eliminating TCD's separate IT-support contract and bringing that work under the BIS Chief Information Officer's IT-support contract.\n\n## Appendix: Bis Appropriations Fys 1998-2008\n\nFiscal\nYear\nBase BIS Appropriation3\nCategory B1 Subset of\nBase BIS Appropriation\n1998\n$43,900,000\n$1,900,000\n1999\n$52,231,000\n$1,877,000\n2000\n$54,038,000\n$1,877,000\n2001\n$64,854,000\n$7,250,000\n2002\n$68,893,000\n$7,250,000\n2003\n$74,653,000\n$7,250,000\n2004\n$68,203,000\n$7,203,000\n2005\n$68,393,000\n$7,200,000\n2006\n$76,000,000\n$14,767,000\n20072\n$75,393,000\n$14,767,000\n2008\n$72,855,000\n$13,627,000\n\n1: Category B is for \"inspections and other activities related to national security.\"\n\n2: Figures obtained from the Department, instead of applicable Public Law, due to full\nyear continuing resolution.\n3: Does not include any rescissions, carryover, recoveries, or transferred funds.\nNote:  Between FYs 1998 and 2002, BIS was also provided funding in its base appropriation for its work toward CWC implementation. The high amount was $3.4 million in FY 2000."
    },
    {
        "text": "C y beR spACe p ol IC y  R ev I e w\nAssuring a Trusted and Resilient Information and Communications Infrastructure\n\n## Preface\n\n\n\nCyberspace touches practically everything and everyone. It provides a platform for innovation and prosperity and the means to improve general welfare around the globe. But with the broad reach of a loose and lightly regulated digital infrastructure, great risks threaten nations, private enterprises, and individual rights. The government has a responsibility to address these strategic vulnerabilities to ensure that the United States and its citizens, together with the larger community of nations, can realize the full potential of the information technology revolution.\n\n\n\nThe architecture of the Nation's digital infrastructure, based largely upon the Internet, is not secure or resilient. Without major advances in the security of these systems or significant change in how they are constructed or operated, it is doubtful that the United States can protect itself from the growing threat of cybercrime and state-sponsored intrusions and operations. Our digital infrastructure has already suffered intrusions that have allowed criminals to steal hundreds of millions of dollars and nation-states and other entities to steal intellectual property and sensitive military information. Other intrusions threaten to damage portions of our critical infrastructure. These and other risks have the potential to undermine the Nation's confidence in the information systems that underlie our economic and national security interests.\n\n\n\nThe Federal government is not organized to address this growing problem effectively now or in the future. Responsibilities for cybersecurity are distributed across a wide array of federal departments and agencies, many with overlapping authorities, and none with sufficient decision authority to direct actions that deal with often conflicting issues in a consistent way. The government needs to integrate competing interests to derive a holistic vision and plan to address the cybersecurity related issues confronting the United States. The Nation needs to develop the policies, processes, people, and technology required to mitigate cybersecurity-related risks.\n\n\n\nInformation and communications networks are largely owned and operated by the private sector, both nationally and internationally. Thus, addressing network security issues requires a publicprivate partnership as well as international cooperation and norms. The United States needs a comprehensive framework to ensure coordinated response and recovery by the government, the private sector, and our allies to a significant incident or threat.\n\n\n\nThe United States needs to conduct a national dialogue on cybersecurity to develop more public awareness of the threat and risks and to ensure an integrated approach toward the Nation's need for security and the national commitment to privacy rights and civil liberties guaranteed by the Constitution and law.\n\n\n\nResearch on new approaches to achieving security and resiliency in information and communica\ntions infrastructures is insufficient. The government needs to increase investment in research that will help address cybersecurity vulnerabilities while also meeting our economic needs and national security requirements.\n\n## Executive Summary\n\nThe President directed a 60-day, comprehensive, \"clean-slate\" review to assess U.S. policies and structures for cybersecurity. Cybersecurity policy includes strategy, policy, and standards regarding the security of and operations in cyberspace, and encompasses the full range of threat reduction, vulnerability reduction, deterrence, international engagement, incident response, resiliency, and recovery policies and activities, including computer network operations, information assurance, law enforcement, diplomacy, military, and intelligence missions as they relate to the security and stability of the global information and communications infrastructure. The scope does not include other information and communications policy unrelated to national security or securing the infrastructure. The review team of government cybersecurity experts engaged and received input from a broad cross-section of industry, academia, the civil liberties and privacy communities, State governments, international partners, and the Legislative and Executive Branches. This paper summarizes the review team's conclusions and outlines the beginning of the way forward towards a reliable, resilient, trustworthy digital infrastructure for the future.\n\n\n\nThe Nation is at a crossroads. The globally-interconnected digital information and communications infrastructure known as \"cyberspace\"underpins almost every facet of modern society and provides critical support for the U.S. economy, civil infrastructure, public safety, and national security. This technology has transformed the global economy and connected people in ways never imagined. Yet, cybersecurity risks pose some of the most serious economic and national security challenges of the 21st Century. The digital infrastructure's architecture was driven more by considerations of interoperability and efficiency than of security. Consequently, a growing array of state and non-state actors are compromising, stealing, changing, or destroying information and could cause critical dis ruptions to U.S. systems. At the same time, traditional telecommunications and Internet networks continue to converge, and other infrastructure sectors are adopting the Internet as a primary means of interconnectivity. The United States faces the dual challenge of maintaining an environment that promotes efficiency, innovation, economic prosperity, and free trade while also promoting safety, security, civil liberties, and privacy rights.1 It is the fundamental responsibility of our government to address strategic vulnerabilities in cyberspace and ensure that the United States and the world realize the full potential of the information technology revolution.\n\n\n\nThe status quo is no longer acceptable. The United States must signal to the world that it is serious about addressing this challenge with strong leadership and vision. Leadership should be elevated and strongly anchored within the White House to provide direction, coordinate action, and achieve results. In addition, federal leadership and accountability for cybersecurity should be strengthened. This approach requires clarifying the cybersecurity-related roles and responsibilities of federal departments and agencies while providing the policy, legal structures, and necessary coordina tion to empower them to perform their missions. While efforts over the past two years started key programs and made great strides by bridging previously disparate agency missions, they provide\n\n\n\nan incomplete solution. Moreover, this issue transcends the jurisdictional purview of individual departments and agencies because, although each agency has a unique contribution to make, no single agency has a broad enough perspective or authority to match the sweep of the problem.\n\n\n\nThe national dialogue on cybersecurity must begin today. The government, working with industry, should explain this challenge and discuss what the Nation can do to solve problems in a way that the American people can appreciate the need for action. People cannot value security without first understanding how much is at risk. Therefore, the Federal government should initiate a national public awareness and education campaign informed by previous successful campaigns. Further, similar to the period after the launch of the Sputnik satellite in October, 1957, the United States is in a global race that depends on mathematics and science skills. While we continue to boast the most positive environment for information technology firms in the world, the Nation should develop a workforce of U.S. citizens necessary to compete on a global level and sustain that posi\ntion of leadership.\n\n\n\nThe United States cannot succeed in securing cyberspace if it works in isolation. The Federal govern\nment should enhance its partnership with the private sector. The public and private sectors'interests are intertwined with a shared responsibility for ensuring a secure, reliable infrastructure. There are many ways in which the Federal government can work with the private sector, and these alternatives should be explored. The public-private partnership for cybersecurity must evolve to define clearly the nature of the relationship, including the roles and responsibilities of each of the partners.2,3,4  The Federal government should examine existing public-private partnerships to optimize their capacity to identify priorities and enable efficient execution of concrete actions.5,6,7\n\nThe Nation also needs a strategy for cybersecurity designed to shape the international environ ment and bring like-minded nations together on a host of issues, such as technical standards and acceptable legal norms regarding territorial jurisdiction, sovereign responsibility, and use of force. International norms are critical to establishing a secure and thriving digital infrastructure. In addi tion, differing national and regional laws and practicessuch as laws concerning the investigation and prosecution of cybercrime; data preservation, protection, and privacy; and approaches for net\nwork defense and response to cyber attackspresent serious challenges to achieving a safe, secure, and resilient digital environment. Only by working with international partners can the United States best address these challenges, enhance cybersecurity, and reap the full benefits of the digital age.\n\nThe Federal government cannot entirely delegate or abrogate its role in securing the Nation from a cyber incident or accident. The Federal government has the responsibility to protect and defend the country, and all levels of government have the responsibility to ensure the safety and well being of citizens. The private sector, however, designs, builds, owns, and operates most of the digital infrastructures that support government and private users alike. The United States needs a\n\n\n\ncomprehensive framework to ensure a coordinated response by the Federal, State, local, and tribal governments, the private sector, and international allies to significant incidents. Implementation of this framework will require developing reporting thresholds, adaptable response and recovery plans, and the necessary coordination, information sharing, and incident reporting mechanisms needed for those plans to succeed. The government, working with key stakeholders, should design an effective mechanism to achieve a true common operating picture that integrates information from the government and the private sector and serves as the basis for informed and prioritized vulnerability mitigation efforts and incident response decisions.\n\n\n\nWorking with the private sector, performance and security objectives must be defined for the next-generation infrastructure. The United States should harness the full benefits of technology to address national economic needs and national security requirements. Federal policy should address requirements for national security, protection of intellectual property, and the availability and continuity of infrastructure, even when it is under attack by sophisticated adversaries. The Federal government through partnerships with the private sector and academia needs to articulate coordinated national information and communications infrastructure objectives. The government, working with State and local partners, should identify procurement strategies that will incentivize the market to make more secure products and services available to the public. Additional incentive mechanisms that the government should explore include adjustments to liability considerations (reduced liability in exchange for improved security or increased liability for the consequences of poor security), indemnification, tax incentives, and new regulatory requirements and compliance mechanisms.8,9\n\n\n\nThe White House must lead the way forward. The Nation's approach to cybersecurity over the past\n15 years has failed to keep pace with the threat. We need to demonstrate abroad and at home that the United States takes cybersecurity-related issues, policies, and activities seriously. This requires White House leadership that draws upon the strength, advice, and ideas of the entire Nation. The review recommends the near-term actions listed in Table 1.\n\n## Table 1: Near-Term Action Plan\n\n\n\n1.\nAppoint a cybersecurity policy official responsible for coordinating the Nation's cybersecurity policies and activities; establish a strong NSC directorate, under the direction of the cybersecurity policy official dual-hatted to the NSC and the NEC, to coordinate interagency development of cybersecurity-related strategy and policy.\n\n\n2.\nPrepare for the President's approval an updated national strategy to secure the information\nand communications infrastructure. This strategy should include continued evaluation of CNCI\nactivities and, where appropriate, build on its successes.\n\n\n\n3.\nDesignate cybersecurity as one of the President's key management priorities and establish performance metrics.\n4.\nDesignate a privacy and civil liberties official to the NSC cybersecurity directorate.\n\n\n5.\nConvene appropriate interagency mechanisms to conduct interagency-cleared legal analyses of priority cybersecurity-related issues identified during the policy-development process and formulate coherent unified policy guidance that clarifies roles, responsibilities, and the application of agency authorities for cybersecurity-related activities across the Federal government.\n6.\nInitiate a national public awareness and education campaign to promote cybersecurity.\n\n\n7.\nDevelop U.S. Government positions for an international cybersecurity policy framework and\nstrengthen our international partnerships to create initiatives that address the full range of\nactivities, policies, and opportunities associated with cybersecurity.\n\n\n\n8.\nPrepare a cybersecurity incident response plan; initiate a dialog to enhance public-private partnerships with an eye toward streamlining, aligning, and providing resources to optimize their contribution and engagement\n\n\n\n9.\nIn collaboration with other EOP entities, develop a framework for research and development\nstrategies that focus on game-changing technologies that have the potential to enhance the\nsecurity, reliability, resilience, and trustworthiness of digital infrastructure; provide the research community access to event data to facilitate developing tools, testing theories, and identifying workable solutions.\n\n\n\n10. Build a cybersecurity-based identity management vision and strategy that addresses privacy and\ncivil liberties interests, leveraging privacy-enhancing technologies for the Nation.\n\n## Introduction\n\nWhat is cyberspace?\n\n\nNational  Security  Presidential Directive  54/Homeland Security  Presidential Directive 23 (NSPD-54/HSPD 23)  defines  cyberspace  as the  interdependent  network of  information  technology infrastructures,  and  includes the Internet, telecommunications  networks,  computer systems,  and  embedded processors  and  controllers  in critical  industries.   Common usage  of  the  term  also  refers to  the  virtual  environment  of information  and  interactions between  people.\nThe globally-interconnected digital information and communications infrastructure known as \"cyberspace\"  underpins almost\nevery facet of modern society and provides critical support for\nthe  U.S.  economy,  civil  infrastructure,  public  safety,  and  national security.   Information  technology  has  transformed  the  global economy  and  connected  people  and  markets  in  ways  never imagined.  To realize the full  benefits of the digital revolution,\nusers must have confidence that sensitive information is secure,\ncommerce is not compromised, and the infrastructure is not\ninfiltrated.   Nation-states  also  need  confidence  that  the  networks that support their national security and economic prosperity are\nsafe and resilient.  Achieving a trusted communications and infor mation infrastructure will ensure that the United States achieves the full potential of the information technology revolution.  The\nDecember  2008 report  by  the Commission  on  Cybersecurity\nfor the 44th Presidency states the challenge plainly:  \"America's\nfailure  to  protect  cyberspace  is  one  of  the  most  urgent  national security problems facing the new administration.\"10\nProtecting cyberspace requires strong vision and leadership and will require changes in policies, technologies, education, and perhaps laws.  Demonstrating commitment to cybersecurity-related\nissues at the highest levels of government, industry, and civil society will allow the United States to continue to lead innovation and adoption of cutting-edge technology, while enhancing national security and the global economy.\n\n## Case For Action\n\nThreats to cyberspace pose one of the most serious economic and national security challenges of the 21st Century for the United States and our allies. A growing array of state and non-state actors such as terrorists and international criminal groups are targeting U.S. citizens, commerce, critical infrastructure, and government. These actors have the ability to compromise, steal, change, or completely destroy information.11 The continued exploitation of information networks and the compromise of sensitive data, especially by nations, leave the United States vulnerable to the loss of economic competitiveness and the loss of the military's technological advantages. As the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) recently testified before Congress, \"the growing connectivity between information systems, the Internet, and other infrastructures creates opportunities for attackers to disrupt telecommunications, electrical power, energy pipelines, refineries, financial networks, and\n\n\n\nother critical infrastructures.\" The Intelligence Community assesses that a number of nations already have the technical capability to conduct such attacks.12\n\n\nThe growing sophistication and breadth of criminal activity, along with the harm already caused by cyber incidents, highlight the potential for malicious activity in cyberspace to affect U.S. com petitiveness, degrade privacy and civil liberties protections, undermine national security, or cause a general erosion of trust, or even cripple society. For example:\n\n\n-   *Failure of critical infrastructures.*   CIA reports malicious activities against information tech\nnology systems have caused the disruption of electric power capabilities in multiple regions\noverseas, including a case that resulted in a multi-city power outage.13\n\n-   *Exploiting global financial services.*   In November 2008, the compromised payment pro\ncessors of an international bank permitted fraudulent transactions at more than 130 auto\nmated teller machines in 49 cities within a 30-minute period, according to press reports.14\nIn another case reported by the media, a U.S. retailer in 2007 experienced data breaches\nand loss of personally identifiable information that compromised 45 million credit and\ndebit cards.15\n-   *Systemic loss of U.S. economic value.*  Industry estimates of losses from intellectual property\nto data theft in 2008 range as high as $1 trillion.16\n\n## Clean-Slate Review\n\nRecognizing the challenges and opportunities, the President identified cybersecurity as one of the top priorities of his administration and directed an early 60-day, comprehensive review to assess U.S. policies and structures for cybersecurity. The review addressed all missions and activities associated with the information and communications infrastructure, including computer network defense, law enforcement investigations, military and intelligence activities, and the intersection thereof with information assurance, counterintelligence, counterterrorism, telecommunications policies, and\n\n\n\ncybersecurity policy as used in this document includes strategy, policy, and standards regarding the security of and operations in cyberspace, and encompasses the full range of threat reduction, vulner ability reduction, deterrence, international engagement, incident response, resiliency, and recovery policies and activities, including computer network operations, information assurance, law enforce ment, diplomacy, military, and intelligence missions as they relate to the security and stability of the global information and communications infrastructure. The scope does not include other information and communications policy unrelated to national security or securing the infrastructure.\n\n\n\ngeneral critical infrastructure protection. The review team of government cybersecurity experts inventoried relevant presidential policy directives, executive orders, national strategies, and stud ies from government advisory boards and private-sector entities. The review team solicited input from departments and agencies on their specific cybersecurity-related activities, authorities, and capabilities across these requirements and requested departments and agencies to identify any new or existing requirements that may not have been identified as part of the initial inventory. Scores of legal issues emerged, such as considerations related to the aggregation of authorities, what authorities are available for the government to protect privately owned critical infrastructure, the placement of Internet monitoring software, the use of automated attack detection and warning sensors, data sharing with third parties within the Federal government, and liability protections for the private sector.\n\n\n\nThe review team reached out to a wide array of stakeholders inside and outside the Federal govern\nment. The review team sought to be transparent by engaging a broad cross-section of industry, academia, the civil liberties and privacy communities, State governments, international partners, and the Legislative and Executive Branches to identify and assess other relevant programs and issues. Recognizing that there are opportunities for everyoneacademia, industry, and governmentto work together to build a trusted and resilient communications and information infrastructure, the review team engaged these stakeholders about the scope of the reviews and asked for input on pertinent areas of interest. The engagement process included more than 40 meetings and yielded more than 100 papers that provided specific recommendations and goals. Stakeholders'responses and public statements (e.g., Congressional testimony) helped to identify key requirements, illumi nate policy gaps, suggest areas of improvement or collaboration, and frame the decision space for cybersecurity-related policies.\n\n\n\nThe review team found that throughout the evolution of the information and communications infrastructure, missions and authorities were vested with various departments and agencies by laws and policies enacted to govern aspects of what were then very diverse and discrete technologies and industries. The programs that evolved from those missions were focused on the particular issue or technology of the day and were not necessarily considered with the broad perspective needed to match today's sweeping digital dependence.\n\n\n\nThe impact of technology on national and economic security needs has led the Federal government to adapt by creating new laws and organizations. For example:\n\n\n\n-  In a 1918 Joint Resolution, Congress authorized the President to assume control of any\ntelegraph system in the United States and operate it as needed for the duration of World War I.\n\n\n\n-  The Communications Act of 1934 formed the Federal Communications Commission (FCC)\nfrom the Federal Radio Commission and established a broad regulatory framework for all\ncommunications, by wire and radio, that has influenced the development of these tech nologies ever since.\n\n\n-  The Brooks Act of 1965 gave the National Bureau of Standards (NBS)now the Department\nof Commerce's National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST)responsibilities for developing automatic data processing standards and guidelines pertaining to federal computer systems.\n\n\n-  In 1984, Executive Order 12472 re-chartered the National Communication System (NCS) as\nthose telecommunication assets owned or leased by the Federal government that can meet\nU.S. national security and emergency preparedness needs. The Department of Homeland\nSecurity inherited the NCS in 2003.\n\n\n\n-  In 1994, through the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, the Department of State was\ndelegated authority over foreign policy related to international communication and infor\nmation policy.\nAnswering the question of\"who is in charge\"must address the distribution of statutory authorities and missions across departments and agencies. This is particularly the case as telecommunications and Internet-type networks converge and other infrastructure sectors adopt the Internet as a primary means of interconnectivity. Unifying mission responsibilities that evolved over more than a century will require the Federal government to clarify policies for cybersecurity and the cybersecurity-related roles and responsibilities of various departments and agencies. The review team analyzed responses from more than 20 federal departments and agencies and identified cybersecurity-related policy gaps, overlaps in mission areas, and opportunities to improve collaboration.\n\nAs the threats have grown in sophistication, efforts to address the risks of cyberspace and harmonize department and agency efforts have evolved over time as well. Presidential Decision Directive 63\n(PDD-63), signed in May 1998, established a structure under White House leadership to coordinate the activities of designated lead departments and agencies, in partnership with their counterparts from the private sector, to \"eliminate any significant vulnerability to both physical and cyber attacks on our critical infrastructures, including especially our cyber systems.\"17 This policy was updated in\n2003 with *The National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace.* It was further augmented later that year in Homeland Security Presidential Directive 7 (HSPD-7), which assigned the Secretary of Homeland Security the responsibility for coordinating the nation's overall critical infrastructure protection efforts, including for cyber infrastructure, across all sectors working in cooperation with designated sector-specific agencies within the Executive Branch.18 Both of these policies focused purely on defensive strategies, and HSPD-7 did not encompass protection of Federal government informa tion systems. In 2007, the Comprehensive National Cybersecurity Initiative (CNCI) took a different approach. Core to this strategy is the \"bridging\" of historically separate cyber defensive missions with law enforcement, intelligence, counterintelligence, and military capabilities to address the full spectrum of cyber threats from remote network intrusions and insider operations to supply chain vulnerabilities. The CNCI strategy was codified in NSPD-54/HSPD-23 and initiated programs focused\n\n\n\n## Introduction\n\nprimarily on the security of Executive Branch networks, which represent only a fraction of the global information and communications infrastructure on which the United States depends.\n\n\n\nThis paper summarizes the review team's findings and outlines initial areas of action to help the United States achieve a more reliable, resilient, and trustworthy digital infrastructure for the future. It does not provide an in-depth analysis of options or an extensive audit of programs. Instead, it presents the need for greater coordination and integrated development of policy. The paper struc\ntures the specific findings and options for action under five key topics: (1) leading from the top, (2) building capacity for a digital nation, (3) sharing responsibility for cybersecurity, (4) improving infor mation sharing and incident response, and (5) building the architecture of the future. In addition, the paper is accompanied by appendices, including (A) a bibliography, (B) the study methodology, and (C) a brief history of modern communications technology.\n\n## I. Leading From The Top\n\nEnsuring that cyberspace is sufficiently resilient and trustworthy to support U.S. goals of economic growth, civil liberties and privacy protections, national security, and the continued advancement of democratic institutions requires making cybersecurity a national priority. Accomplishing this critical and complex task will only be possible with leadership at the highest levels of government.\n\n\n\n## Anchor Leadership At The White House\n\n\n\nAnchoring and elevating leadership for cybersecurity-related policies at the White House signals to the United States and the international community that we are serious about cybersecurity.\n\nMany departments and agencies as well as components of the Executive Office of the President (EOP) will need to harmonize disparate responsibilities and authorities to contribute effectively to cybersecurity. Currently, no single individual or entity has the responsibility to coordinate Federal government cybersecurity-related activities. Independent efforts will not be sufficient to address this challenge without a central coordination mechanism, an updated national strategy, an action plan developed and coordinated across the Executive Branch, and the support of Congress. The Administration already has established an Information and Communications Infrastructure Interagency Policy Committee (ICI-IPC), chaired by the National Security Council (NSC) and Homeland Security Council (HSC),19 as the primary policy coordination body for issues related to achieving an assured, reliable, secure, and survivable global information and communications infrastructure and related capabilities.\n\n\n\nThe President should consider appointing a cybersecurity policy official at the White House, report ing to the NSC and dual-hatted with the NEC, to coordinate the Nation's cybersecurity-related policies and activities. This individual would chair the ICI-IPC and lead a strong process in consulta tion with other elements of the EOP to resolve competing priorities and coordinate interagency development of policies and strategies for cybersecurity.20 The cybersecurity policy official should participate in all appropriate economic, counterterrorism, and science and technology policy dis\ncussions to inform them of cybersecurity perspectives.21,22\nTo be successful, the President's cybersecurity policy official must have clear presidential support, authority, and sufficient resources to operate effectively in policy formulation and the coordination of interagency cybersecurity-related activities. The cybersecurity policy official should be supported by at least two Senior Directors and appropriate staff from the NSC and at least one Senior Director and appropriate staff from the NEC. These directorates would report through the cybersecurity policy official and work together in pursuit of the goals set forth in this paper and established as national policy. In addition, to achieve additional scale and integration across the NSC, each NSC\n\n\n\nregional and functional directorate should designate an individual to be responsible for following cybersecurity-related issues in the directorate's portfolio and coordinating with the directorate for cybersecurity.\n\n\n\nThe cybersecurity policy official should not have operational responsibility or authority, nor the authority to make policy unilaterally. Using interagency coordination processes, the cybersecurity policy official should harmonize cybersecurity-related policy and technology efforts across the Federal government, ensure that the President's budget reflects federal priorities for cyberse\ncurity, and develop a legislative agenda, all in consultation with the Federal government's Chief Technology Officer and Chief Information Officeralong with the appropriate entities within the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), the Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP), and the NEC. 23\n\nThis appointment also would make crisis management more effective by establishing the cyberse curity policy official as the White House action officer for cyber incident response (a similar role to the action officers who help the White House monitor terrorist attacks or natural disasters); depart ments and agencies would continue to perform their operational roles.\n\n\n\nTo facilitate coordination, all federal departments and agencies should establish a point-of-contact in their respective executive suites authorized to interface with the White House on cybersecurity related issues.\n\n\n\nThe cybersecurity policy officialthrough the interagency policy development processshould prepare for the President's consideration an updated national strategy to secure the information and communications infrastructure. The strategy should include continued evaluation of CNCI\nactivities and build, where appropriate, on its successes.24 The national strategy should focus senior leadership attention and time toward resolving issues that hamper U.S. efforts to achieve an assured, reliable, secure, and resilient global information and communications infrastructure and related capabilities.25 The strategy would assist government efforts to raise public awareness, renew and build international alliances and public-private partnerships, establish a more comprehensive national cyber response and recovery plan, and promote an aggressive research and development agenda that has the potential to result in new technologies that will enhance cybersecurity. The Federal government should continue the principle of \"mission bridging\" started under the CNCI. Departments and agencies should expand the sharing of expertise, knowledge, and per\nspectives about threats, tradecraft, technology, and vulnerabilities between network defenders and the intelligence, military, and law enforcement organizations that develop U.S. operational capabilities in cyberspace. In addition, the cybersecurity policy official should help coordinate intelligence and military policies and strategies for cyberspaceincluding for countering terrorist use of the Internetto ensure integration of all mission equities.The cybersecurity policy official should engage external advisory bodies. Many advisory bodies touch on cybersecurity-related issues, including the National Security and Telecommunications Advisory Committee (NSTAC), the\n\n\n\nNational Infrastructure Advisory Council (NIAC), the Critical Infrastructure Partnership Advisory Council (CIPAC), and the Information Security and Privacy Advisory Board (ISPAB). The cybersecurity policy official should review the responsibilities of these bodies and propose changes as necessary to optimize advice and eliminate unnecessary duplication.\n\nOther structures will be needed to help ensure that civil liberties and privacy rights are protected. Such structures would signal transparency and build trust between the civil liberties and privacy community, the public, and the program for cybersecurity, especially if implemented from the outset.26 It is important to reconstitute the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board (PCLOB), accelerate the selection process for its board members, and consider whether to seek legislative amendments to broaden its scope to include cybersecurity-related issues.27 Other options include:\nfacilitating regular engagement of government civil liberties and privacy advisors on policy matters for cybersecurity or designating a dedicated privacy and civil liberties officer within the NSC (or, more broadly, the EOP) to engage with the private-sector civil liberties and privacy community, an oversight board, and government civil liberties and privacy officers.28, 29\n\nEqually important to developing cybersecurity policy, is assuring the effective execution and imple\nmentation of that policy to meet the goals of the larger strategy. Accordingly, the cybersecurity policy official, in consultation with OMB and other EOP entities, will need to ensure effective imple mentation of cybersecurity-related policy and activities. During the course of the 60-day review, stakeholders suggested a variety of options to coordinate and oversee cybersecurity activities. Several commentators identified strong executive leadership as well as focused, multi-year atten tion across the participating departments and agencies as critical elements to ensure that the U.S. Government has the mechanisms needed for an effective cybersecurity program. Currently, some of these oversight functions for existing cybersecurity efforts are being performed outside of the EOP. For example, the Joint Interagency Cyber Task Force (JIACTF), under the Director of National Intelligence, currently is responsible for coordinating and monitoring the implementation of the CNCI. The cybersecurity policy official, in consultation with OMB and other EOP entities, should develop structural options to perform appropriate oversight, implementation, and other functions.\n\nThese could include among others, developing a JIACTF-like function30 in OMB or elsewhere in the EOP, creating an entity similar to President Eisenhower's Operations Coordinating Board,31 or estab\nlishing some other entity that, among other things, assists in assessing department and agency performance and oversees federal compliance with cybersecurity standards. Unless and until such an office is established, the work of the JIACTF should continue.32\n\n## Review Laws And Policies\n\n\n\nThe President's cybersecurity policy official should work with departments and agencies to recom mend coherent unified policy guidance where necessary in order to clarify authorities, roles, and responsibilities for cybersecurity-related activities across the Federal government. Law applicable to information and communications networks is a complex patchwork of Constitutional, domestic, foreign, and international laws that shapes viable policy options. In the United States, this patchwork exists because, throughout the evolution of the information and communications infrastructure, the Federal government enacted laws and policies to govern aspects of what were very diverse industries and technologies.\n\n\n\nAs traditional telecommunications and Internet-type networks continue to converge and other infrastructure sectors adopt the Internet as a primary means of interconnectivity, law and policy should continue to seek an integrated approach that combines the benefits of flexibility and diver\nsity of applications and services with the protection of civil liberties, privacy rights, public safety, and national and economic security interests. A paucity of judicial opinions in several areas poses both opportunities and risks that policy makers should appreciatecourts can intervene to shape the application of law, particularly in areas involving Constitutional rights. Policy decisions will necessarily be shaped and bounded by the legal framework in which they are made, and policy consideration may help identify gaps and challenges in current laws and inform necessary develop ments in the law. That process may prompt proposals for a new legislative framework to rationalize the patchwork of overlapping laws that apply to information, telecommunications, networks, and technologies, or the application of new interpretations of existing laws in ways to meet technological evolution and policy goals, consistent with U.S. Constitutional principles. However, pursuing either course risks outcomes that may make certain activities conducted by the Federal government to protect information and communications infrastructure more difficult.\n\n\n\nThe Administration should partner appropriately with Congress to ensure adequate law, poli\ncies, and resources are available to support the U.S. cybersecurity-related missions. Congress has demonstrated interest and bipartisan leadership regarding the cybersecurity-related needs of the Nation, and the Administration would benefit from Congressional knowledge and experience. The cybersecurity policy official, working with departments and agencies, should consult with industry to understand the impact of laws and policies on business operations.\n\n## Strengthen Federal Leadership And Accountability For Cybersecurity\n\nEffective leadership anchored at the White House alone will not be sufficient to achieve the broad range of objectives necessary to lead the United States in the digital age. Leadership and account\nability must extend throughout the Federal government. Including cybersecurity among the President's management priorities and assessing the progress of departments and agencies against stated goals would provide additional means to ensure accountability and progress. The cyberse curity policy officialin consultation with NSC, OMB, NEC, and OSTPwould define the milestones and success criteria and raise the visibility of cybersecurity within all agency budgets.\n\n\n\nTo bring transparency and effective management to the overall portfolio for cybersecurity, OMB should use its program assessment framework to ensure departments and agencies use perfor\nmance-based budgeting in pursuing cybersecurity-related goals. A formal program assessment framework for cybersecurity would have departments and agencies define each program's purpose and goal as well as identify metrics to evaluate whether goals are achieved.33 The CNCI has used a variation on this approach successfully.\n\n\n\nDepartment and agency leaders must be held accountable, as required by the Federal Information Security Management Act (FISMA) of 2002. The Administration should work with Congress to update and strengthen this legislation. Performance plans of the department and agency leadership should include reporting on progress made to secure systems by each department and agency. The Federal government should develop options to hold department and agency leadership accountable for compliance with cybersecurity policies and to enforce implementation of appropriate cybersecurity procedures.\n\n\n## Elevate State, Local, And Tribal Leadership\n\nState, local, and tribal governments should consider the need to elevate cybersecurity as an issue by designating a single leader to ensure effective coordination between Chief Information Officers (CIOs), Chief Information Security Officers (CISOs), and State Homeland Security Advisors (HSAs). The review team heard from representatives of the National Governors Association that cybersecurity is the weakest link in their efforts to protect critical infrastructure assets in their individual states.34,35\n\n\n\nHSAs can spend funds under a number of Department of Homeland Security (DHS) grant programs for cybersecurity efforts, but historically grant funds to a large extent have not been prioritized for cybersecurity. State, local, and tribal governments should consider whether to elevate cybersecurity as an issue and should ensure that CIOs, CISOs, and HSAs coordinate to achieve a robust defensive posture.\n\n## Ii. Building Capacity For A Digital Nation\n\nThe Nation is at a crossroads. Computers have transformed nearly every aspect of daily life, both at home and in the workplace. Online banking, shopping, and tax-filing are commonplace. The Nation's infrastructure is undergoing a revolution as digital and network technologies are being integrated across large systems with programs such as Smart Grid and the Next Generation Air Traffic System. Components of the recently enacted American Recovery and Reinvestment Act encourage the deployment of modern information and communications infrastructure to improve America's competitiveness and use technology to solve some of the Nation's most pressing problems. The United States faces the dual challenge of maintaining an environment that promotes innovation, open interconnectivity, economic prosperity, free trade, and freedom while also ensuring public safety, security, civil liberties, and privacy.\n\n\n\nThe general public needs to be well informed to use the technology safely. In addition, the United States needs a technologically advanced workforce to remain competitive in the 21st Century economy. In schools, math and science must be a priority. The United States should initiate a K-12 cybersecurity education program for digital safety, ethics, and security; expand university curricula; and set the conditions to create a competent workforce for the digital age. As the President has noted, \"America faces few more urgent challenges than preparing our children to compete in a global economy.\"36 To help achieve these goals, the Nation should:\n\n\n\n37,38\n-  Promote cybersecurity risk awareness for all citizens;\n\n\n-  Build an education system that will enhance understanding of cybersecurity and allow the\nUnited States to retain and expand upon its scientific, engineering, and market leadership\nin information technology;\n\n-  Expand and train the workforce to protect the Nation's competitive advantage; and\n\n\n-  Help organizations and individuals make smart choices as they manage risk.\n\n## Increase Public Awareness\n\n\n\nBroad public awareness of the risks of online activities and how to manage them will require an effective communications strategy. The Federal government, in partnership with educators and industry, should conduct a national cybersecurity public awareness and education.39 The President's cybersecurity policy official should lead the development and direct the implementation of this public awareness strategy and should seek endorsement by Congress; State, local, and tribal gov ernments; the private sector; and the civil liberties and privacy communities. The strategy should\n\n\ninvolve public education about the threat and how to enhance digital safety, ethics, and security. Malicious actors often take advantage of people's willingness to accept information from or pro\nvide personal information over the Internet. This campaign should focus on public messages to promote responsible use of the Internet and awareness of fraud, identity theft, cyber predators, and cyber ethics. Past successful public safety campaigns such as *Smokey Bear* on fire safety and the *Click It or Ticket* campaign for seat belt safety could be used as a model to inform and persuade the public about the importance of cybersecurity. These public service campaigns should focus on making cybersecurity popular for children and for older students choosing careers. Celebrities, the generation that has grown up with the technology, and new types of media can play critical roles in delivering the message effectively.\n\n## Increase Cybersecurity Education\n\n\n\nSimilar to the period after the launch of the Sputnik satellite in October, 1957, the United States is in a global race that depends on mathematics and science skills. According to a report published by The Economist, talented information technology (IT) employees \"are already in short supply every\nwhere, but the situation will get tougher, as the nature of skills needed is changing. In addition to technical knowledge, tomorrow's IT employee will require expertise in project management, change management and business analysis.\" The study notes that the United States continues to boast the most positive environment for IT firms in the world, combining scale and quality in the key areas that promote competitiveness: education, infrastructure, encouragement of innovation, and legal protection.40 The 2007-2008 Taulbee Survey on Computing Degree and Enrollment Trends, however, showed a continued decline in U.S. computer science and engineering bachelor's degree production to about half of its 2004 peak.41 The Nation cannot afford to see this decline continue.42\n\n\nThe Federal government, with the participation of all departments and agencies, should expand support for key education programs and research and development to ensure the Nation's contin ued ability to compete in the information age economy. Existing programs should be evaluated and possibly expanded, and other activities could serve as models for additional programs. For example:\n\n-   The National Science Foundation (NSF) in 2006 began to solicit grant proposals under its\n\"Pathways to Revitalized Undergraduate Computing Education.\"   This program seeks to develop a \"U.S. workforce with the computing competencies and skills imperative to the Nation's health, security and prosperity in the 21st Century.\"43\n-   Scholarships have provided direct incentives for students to pursue not only cybersecurity\neducation, but also careers in the Federal government.  NSF and DHS sponsor the Scholarship\nfor Service program in 34 institutions.44   More than a thousand students received support\n\n## Ii. Building Capacity For A Digital Nation\n\n\nduring the first eight years of the program, with more than 80 percent receiving jobs in the Federal government.  The NSF stresses that the proven synergy between research and educa tion cannot be over-emphasized in light of the pressing need to expand the workforce.45\n\n-   The  National  Centers  of  Academic  Excellence  in  Information  Assurance  Education  and\nResearch, founded in 1988 by the National Security Agency and co-sponsored by DHS since\n2004,  promotes  higher  education  in  information  assurance  in  94  institutions  in  38  States\nand the District of Columbia.46   These  centers  have  built  partnerships  beyond  the  most\nwell-known institutions to include community, Hispanic, and historically Black colleges. The Defense Department also sponsors the Information Assurance Scholarship Program\nin those institutions.\n-   The National Collegiate Cyber Defense Competition, the Mathematical Association of\n\nAmerica's Math Olympiad, the Department of Energy's Science Bowl, and the Siemens\nFoundation's Math, Science, and Technology Competition offer competition-oriented mod els.  A group of academics organized by NSF cited DARPA's grand challenges, the Malcolm\n\nBaldrige National Quality Award, and the competition to create the Advanced Encryption\nStandard as other models.47\n\n## Expand Federal Information Technology Workforce\n\n\nThe President's cybersecurity policy official, in coordination with the ICI-IPC, should consider how to better attract cybersecurity expertise and to increase retention of employees with such expertise within the federal service. Departments and agencies have had success attracting new employees from industry, but the time required to obtain, transfer, or renew security clearances leads to lost opportunities. Federal employees need to be able to build portfolios and advance careers in ways they might not be able to do within a single agency. Shared training and rotational assignments across agencies and potentially with the private sector would not only be efficient, but would pro\nmote beneficial cross-fertilization and the building of professional networks.\n\n## Promote Cybersecurity As An Enterprise Leadership Responsibility\n\n\n\nThe Federal government should continue to facilitate programs and information sharing on threats, vulnerabilities, and effective practices across all levels of government and industry. It is not enough for the information technology workforce to understand the importance of cybersecurity; leaders at all levels of government and industry need to be able to make business and investment deci sions based on knowledge of risks and potential impacts. State, local, and tribal governments face similar issues. State governments often serve as incubators for innovation and thus may be able to provide lessons learned in managing information and communications infrastructure. The Federal government should continue to work with industry to identify and disseminate effective practices in secure design and operation of information technology products.\n\n\n\n## Iii.  Sharing Responsibility For Cybersecurity\n\n\n\nThe Federal government cannot succeed in the many facets of securing cyberspace if it works in isolation. The public and private sectors' interests are intertwined with a shared responsibility for ensuring a secure, reliable infrastructure upon which businesses and government services depend. Government and industry leadersboth nationally and internationallyneed to delineate roles and responsibilities, integrate capabilities, and take ownership of the problem to develop holistic solu tions. Only through such partnerships will the United States be able to enhance cybersecurity and reap the full benefits of the digital revolution. The global challenge of securing cyberspace requires an increased effort in multilateral forums. This effort should seekin continued collaboration with the private sectorto improve the security of interoperable networks through the development of global standards, expand the legal system's capacity to combat cyber crime, continue to develop and promote best practices, and maintain stable and effective Internet governance.\n\n## Improve Partnership Between Private Sector And Government\n\n\n\nThe Federal government has the responsibility to protect and defend the country, and all levels of government have the responsibility to ensure the safety and well-being of their citizens. The pri vate sector, however, designs, builds, owns, and operates most of the network infrastructures that support government and private users alike. Industry and governments share the responsibility for the security and reliability of the infrastructure and the transactions that take place on it and should work closely together to address these interdependencies. There are various approaches the Federal government could take to address these challenges, some of which may require changes in law and policy.\n\n\n\nPrivate-sector engagement is required to help address the limitations of law enforcement and national security. Current law permits the use of some tools to protect government but not private networks, and vice versa. Industry leaders can help by engaging in enterprise information shar\ning and account for the corporate risk and the bottom line impacts of data breaches, corporate espionage, and loss or degradation of services. Industry leaders can demand higher assurance from vendors and service providers while taking responsibility to create more secure software and equipment. Businesses need effective means to share detection methods, information about breaches and attack methods, remediation techniques, and forensic capabilities with each other and the Federal government.\n\n\n\nIf the risks and consequences can be assigned monetary value, organizations will have greater ability and incentive to address cybersecurity. In particular, the private sector often seeks a business case to justify the resource expenditures needed for integrating information and communications system security into corporate risk management and for engaging partnerships to mitigate collective risk. Government can assist by considering incentive-based legislative or regulatory tools to enhance\n\nthe value proposition and fostering an environment that facilitates and encourages partnership and information sharing.48, 49, 50\n\n\n\nThe President's cybersecurity policy official should work with relevant departments and agencies and the private sector to examine existing public-private partnership and information sharing mechanisms to identify or build upon the most effective models. Public-private partnerships have fostered information sharing and served as a foundation for U.S. critical infrastructure protection and cybersecurity policy for over a decade. During that time, the Federal government and the private sector have engaged in a number of forums on cybersecurity and information and communications infrastructure issues.51\n\n\n\nThese groups perform valuable work, but the diffusion of effort has left some participants frustrated with unclear delineation of roles and responsibilities, uneven capabilities across various groups, and a proliferation of plans and recommendations. As a result, government and private-sector person nel, time, and resources are spread across a host of bodies engaged in sometimes duplicative or inconsistent efforts. Partnerships must evolve to clearly define the nature of the relationship, the roles and responsibilities of various groups and their participants, the expectations of each party's contribution, and accountability mechanisms. The Federal government should streamline, align, and provide resources to existing organizations to optimize their capacity to identify priorities, enable more efficient execution, and develop response and recovery plans.\n\n\n\nThe 60-day review considered a number of models of effective public-private partnerships.52 While these models perform very different functions, they share important attributes. Each has a clearly defined institutional mission, well-defined roles and responsibilities for participants, and a clear value proposition that creates incentives for members to participate. Each model also mitigates concerns that would otherwise discourage participation by establishing and maintaining an envi ronment of trust among the members. Existing cybersecurity partnership bodies might apply the most effective characteristics of these models.\n\n\n\n## Evaluate Potential Barriers Impeding Evolution Of Public-Private Partnership\n\nSome members of the private sector continue to express concern that certain federal laws might impede full collaborative partnerships and operational information sharing between the private sector and government. For example, some in industry are concerned that the information sharing and collective planning that occurs among members of the same sector under existing partnership\n\n\n\nmodels might be viewed as \"collusive\"or contrary to laws forbidding restraints on trade.53 Industry has also expressed reservations about disclosing to the Federal government sensitive or proprietary business information, such as vulnerabilities and data or network breaches.  This concern has per sisted notwithstanding the protections afforded by statutes such as the Trade Secrets Act and the Critical Infrastructure Information Act, which was enacted specifically to address industry concerns with respect to the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). Beyond these issues, industry may still have concerns about reputational harm, liability, or regulatory consequences of sharing information. Conversely, the Federal government sometimes limits the information it will share with the private sector because of the legitimate need to protect sensitive intelligence sources and methods or the privacy rights of individuals. These concerns do not exist in isolation. Antitrust laws provide important safeguards against unfair competition, and FOIA helps ensure transparency in government that is essential to maintain public confidence. The civil liberties and privacy community has expressed concern that extending protec\ntions would only serve as a legal shield against liability.  In addition, the challenges of information sharing can be further complicated by the global nature of the information and communications marketplace. When members of industry operating in the United States are foreign-owned, man datory information sharing, or exclusion of such companies from information sharing regimes, can present trade implications.\n\n\nAs part of the partnership, government should work creatively and collaboratively with the private sector to identify tailored solutions that take into account both the need to exchange information and protect public and private interests and take an integrated approach to national and economic security. These solutions should identify clear, actionable objectives for the sharing of data and define standards for incident reporting. The private sector would be more comfortable with shar\ning solutions that do not require data ownership changing hands, such as occurs with the British model of using vetted information security providers as a nexus for combining data rather than the government.\n\n\n\nFinally, the Federal government should engage academia, civil liberties and privacy groups, advo\ncates of open government, and consumers to ensure that government policy adequately considers the broad set of interests that they represent. Few problems can be reduced to a discrete question of process, policy, or technology. Changes in technology often precipitate policy considerations and may require changes in existing processes. Changes in policy (for example, adoption of regulation or tax incentives) can affect decisions regarding procurement or technological research and devel opment. The Federal government could also consider ways in which it could focus more resources on research into possible \"game-changing\" areas, such as behavioral, policy, and incentive-based cybersecurity solutions. The interwoven nature of these issues underscores the need to ensure that all stakeholders'interests are represented.\n\n\n\n## Partner Effectively With The International Community\n\n\n\nInternational norms are critical to establishing a secure and thriving digital infrastructure. The United States needs to develop a strategy designed to shape the international environment and bring like-minded nations together on a host of issues, including acceptable norms regarding ter\nritorial jurisdiction, sovereign responsibility, and use of force. In addition, differing national and regional laws and practicessuch as those laws concerning the investigation and prosecution of cybercrime;54 data preservation, protection and privacy; and approaches for network defense and response to cyber attackspresent serious challenges to achieving a safe, secure, and resilient digital environment. Addressing these issues requires the United States to work with all countries including those in the developing world who face these issues as they build their digital economies and infrastructuresplus international bodies, military allies, and intelligence partners.\n\n\n\nIn the past decade, federal communications, infrastructure, and cybersecurity-related policies devel\noped along multiple paths. A more integrated approach to policy formulation would ensure mutu\nally reinforcing objectives and allow the United States to leverage its international opportunities with consistent, more effective positions. The United States should adopt an integrated approach to national interests across a range of substantive areasincluding cybersecurity and the protec\ntion of free speech and other civil libertiesto develop consistent policies.\n\n\nThe President's cybersecurity policy official should, working with departments and agencies, strengthen and integrate interagency processes to formulate and coordinate international cyber\nsecurity-related positions. In addition, the Federal governmentcontinuing the long-term his tory of collaboration with the private sectorshould develop a proactive engagement plan for use with international standards bodies. This would include taking stock of current policies and coordinating the development, refinement, or reaffirmation of positions to ensure that the full range of cybersecurity-related economic, national security, public safety, and privacy interests are taken into account.55 More than a dozen international organizationsincluding the United Nations, the Group of Eight, NATO, the Council of Europe, the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum, the Organization of American States, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development,theInternationalTelecommunicationUnion(ITU),andthe InternationalOrganization for Standardization (ISO)address issues concerning the information and communications infra\nstructure.56 New organizations are beginning to consider cybersecurity-related policies and activities, while others are expanding the scope of their existing work. These venues consider policies and conduct activities that sometimes conflict and often overlap. Agreements, standards, or practices promulgated in these organizations have global effects and cannot be ignored. The sheer number, variety, and differing focuses of these venues strain the capacity of many governments, including the United States, to engage adequately.\n\n## Iii. Sharing Responsibility For Cybersecurity\n\n\n\nThe President's cybersecurity policy official should work with departments and agencies to enhance the identification, tracking, and prioritization of international venues, negotiations, and discussions where cybersecurity-related agreements, standards, activities, and policies are being developed. Past experience indicates the United States will need to remain engaged in a range of international activities. The Federal government should then increase its work with the private sector and other countries to ensure full engagement in appropriate forums with respect to the issues that are most important to U.S. interests in the future of the global information and communications infrastructure. The United States and its international allies should leverage each other's participation in regional or other forums to drive common policy objectives, focus the work of existing international orga nizations, and limit duplication of effort among them. For example, standards for cybersecurity forensics are being developed in both the ITU and the ISO. The United States also should identify opportunities to promote the security and growth of the information and communications infra\nstructure in projects undertaken in forums devoted to broader topics.\n\n\n\nWorking with the private sector, the Federal government should coordinate and expand international partnerships to address the full range of cybersecurity-related activities, policies, and opportunities associated with the information and communications infrastructure upon which U.S. businesses, government services, the U.S. military, and nations depend. New agreements between govern ments and industry may need to be documented to enable international information sharing as well as strategic and operational collaboration. The Federal government should increase resources and attention dedicated to conducting outreach and building foreign capacity. For example, the United States should accelerate efforts to help other countries build legal frameworks and capac\nity to fight cybercrime and continue efforts to promote cybersecurity practices and standards. The United States also should work with allies to ensure the stability and global interoperability of the Internet, while increasing security and reliability for all users.57\n\n## Iv. Creating Effective Information Sharing And Incident Response\n\n\n\nThe United States needs a comprehensive framework to facilitate coordinated responses by gov\nernment, the private sector, and allies to a significant cyber incident. Federal, State, local, and tribal governments should work with industry to improve the plans and resources they have in place in advance to detect, prevent, and respond to significant cybersecurity incidents. Because such incidents are likely to affect interconnected networks across government and industry sectors, coordination of such plans and activities is important before, during, and after significant incidents. For example, despite advance warning and instructions on how networks could be protected, had the \"Conficker\"worm activated on April 1, 2009 with a malicious payload, some federal departments and agencies were not prepared to respond.\n\n## Build A Framework For Incident Response\n\nDuring a significant cyber incident, as with other major national incidents, only the White House has the authority to coordinate the wide array of capabilities and authorities involved in incident response. Departments and agencies conduct their relevant mission responsibilities in line with overall White House strategic direction. The President's cybersecurity policy official should be the White House action officer for cyber incident response (a similar role to the action officers who help the White House monitor terrorist attacks or natural disasters).\n\n\n\nThe Federal government should have a clear and authoritative cyber incident response frame\nwork that needs to be documented in a revised Cyber Incident Annex for the National Response Framework. To date, federal responses to cyber incidents have not been unified. For situations involving National Security/Emergency Preparedness (NS/EP) communications, Executive Order 12472 delineates established authorities and processes; however, under current law and policy, each department and agency is responsible for deciding on and implementing measures to isolate, secure, and restore its own cyber networks and data.\n\n\n\nResponsibility for a federal cyber incident response is dispersed across many federal departments and agencies because of the existing legal, but artificial, distinctions between national security and other federal networks. Depending on the character of an incidentfor example, a major vulner\nability, a criminal attack, or a military incidentdifferent departments or agencies may have or share the lead role for response, while others may never learn of the event. Moreover, the lead for the overall incident may not be clear. Although each player has defined areas of expertise and legal authorities, they are difficult to pull together into a single coordinated structure. Any consolidation of authorities in a unified structure may require legislation. The ICI-IPC process should define roles, responsibilities, and resources for different departments and agencies with respect to incident responseharmonized or enhanced as necessaryrecognizing the different aspects of incident response and the different strengths various communitiesnetwork security, law enforcement, intelligence, and militarybring to the table.\n\n\n\n## Network Operators And Service Providers\n\n|     |     |     |     |      |\n|-----|-----|-----|-----|------|\n|     |     |     |     |      |\n|     |     |     |     |      |\n|     |     |     |     |      |\n|     |     |     |     |      |\n|     |     |     |     |      |\n|     |     |     |     |      |\n|     |     |     |     |      |\n|     |     |     |     |      |\n|     |     |     |     |      |\n|     |     |     |     |      |\n|     |     |     |     |      |\n|     |     |     |     |      |\n|     |     |     |     |      |\n|     |     |     |     |      |\n|     |     |     |     |      |\n|     |     |     |     |      |\n|     |     |     |     |      |\n|     |     |     |     |      |\n\nThe Internet is operated by a combination of businesses that manage operations and pro vide services for their customers. Network operators build and maintain information and communications infrastructure in order to provide connectivity and bandwidth for customers. Service providers may provide an access gateway to the Internet, security services, storage or processing services, or access to information (for example, Internet addresses or news) and applications (for example, search engines). Individual companies may provide a unique mixture of access, information, and services (for example, social networks).\n\nNumerous commentators have stressed the importance of developing thresholds for incident reporting and response. Network operators and service providers deal daily with large numbers of incidents that do not rise beyond the \"nuisance\" level. Hidden among these low-level incidents are a relatively few sophisticated, potentially highimpact intrusions or attacks that are difficult to detect. Knowledge of the technical details of such incidents would be of great interest to operators of other government and private-sector networks to help them defend their own networks against similar threats, as well as to law enforcement and intelligence entities tracking and seeking to stop criminal and foreign cybersecurity-related threat activities.\n\n\n\nThe Federal governmentin collaboration with State, local, and tribal governments and industry should develop a set of threat scenarios and metrics that all can use for risk management decisions, recovery planning, and prioritization of R&D. Modeling and simulation capabilities should be devel oped to help exercise these plans and determine potential levels of damage.\n\nThe ICI-IPC should develop clear, enforceable rules for timely reporting of incidents by departments and agencies to enable an effective and efficient interagency response. Departments and agencies are uneven in their incident reporting outside their own boundaries. The overall federal response would benefit from immediate reporting of significant events across a wider range of departments and agencies having incident response roles.\n\n\n\nThe President's cybersecurity policy official, working with the ICI-IPC, should determine the most efficient and effective method of developing and maintaining situational awareness and incident response capabilities. The CNCI effort should continue to improve federal network defenses but con\nsider the need for adjustments or additions to implementation plans. In particular, the President's cybersecurity policy official should:\n\n\n\n-  Work with the private sector to explore how best to apply technical capabilities to the\ndefense of the national infrastructure and what legal framework would be required to\nensure the protection of privacy rights and civil liberties.\n\n\n-  Review the operational concept and the implementation of the National Cybersecurity\nCenter (NCSC) to determine whether its proposed responsibilities, resource strategy, and\ngovernance are adequate to enable it to provide the shared situational awareness necessary to support cyber incident response efforts.\n\n\n-  Continue to pursue the goal of the Trusted Internet Connection program to reduce the\nnumber of government network connections to the Internet but reconsider goals and\n\n\ntimelines based on a realistic assessment of the challenges. Some departments and agen cies during the past two years made progress reducing the number of connections and beginning the deployment of systems that will help the Federal government prevent as well as detect malicious behavior. The government, however, still has considerable work to do before full capability is achieved and may need to consider additional policies to enable full implementation of the strategy.\n\n\n\n-  Evaluate and continue, as appropriatein ongoing consultation with the civil liberties and\nprivacy communitypilot deployments of intrusion detection and prevention systems for the benefit of federal networks, evaluate the performance of these systems, and continue studies of the issues that would arise if such capabilities were used with State government systems. These sensors will be vital to gaining situational awareness for federal networks, and the government will benefit from any policy, legal, or technology lessons learned as\nthese deployments move forward.\n\n-  Explorein collaboration with industry and the civil liberties and privacy community\nadditional, long-term architectures for intrusion detection and prevention systems.\n\n\n\nThe Federal government should improve its ability to provide strategic warning of cyber intrusions and attacks to the President. The Federal government should continue to leverage the Nation's long-term investments in the fundamental development of cryptologic and information assurance technologies and the necessary supporting infrastructure. These investments, along with other intelligence capabilities, are critical to national strategic warning for attacks through cyberspace. In addition, the Federal government should identify any gaps in law enforcement capacity or investi gative authority needed to defend the Nation's infrastructure. Any new authorities would need to be consistent with the protection of civil liberties and privacy rights.\n\n\n\nThe U.S. Government should invest in processes, technologies, and infrastructure that will help prevent cyber incidents. Options include increased security testing, investment in systems that automate or centralize network management, and more restricted connectivity to the Internet for some unclassified systems.\n\nThe government needs a reliable, consistent mechanism for bringing all appropriate information together to form a common operating picture. Federal cybersecurity centers often share their infor\nmation, but no single entity combines all information available from these centers and other sources to provide a continuously updated, comprehensive picture of cyber threats and network status, to provide indications and warning of imminent incidents, and to support a coordinated incident response. The Defense Department is responsible for aggregating information on network health and status, attempted intrusions, and cyber attacks for its networks, the Intelligence Community for its networks, and US-CERT for civilian federal agencies and to some extent the private sector. Law enforcement and intelligence agencies collect information on criminal and foreign cyber-related threat activities but require additional capacity to deal with the scale of criminal activities.\n\n\n\nThe Federal government should consider whether available alternative or reserve communica tions would be adequate in the event of a major disruption of information and communications\n\n\ninfrastructure, particularly as information and communications networks converge. Replacement or repair of infrastructure may also require additional planning and resources, particularly in the event of physical damage to networks or hard-to-replace components of the power grid.\n\n\n\nThe Federal government should develop processes between all levels of government and the private sector to assist in preventing, detecting, and responding to cyber incidents by leveraging existing resources. To help build situational awareness related to the information and communications infrastructure, the Federal government should leverage existing resources such as the Multi-State Information Sharing and Analysis Center and the 58 State and local Fusion Centers that have been set up around the country.\n\n## Enhance Information Sharing To Improve Incident Response Capabilities\n\n\n\nInformation is key to preventing, detecting, and responding to cyber incidents. Network hardware and software providers, network operators, data owners, security service providers, and in some cases, law enforcement or intelligence organizations may each have information that can contribute to the detection and understanding of sophisticated intrusions or attacks. A full understanding and effective response may only be possible by bringing information from those various sources together for the benefit of all.\n\n\n\nThe Federal government should work with State, local, and tribal governments and the private sectorincluding data owners, network operators, and experts on privacy and civil libertiesto develop options for cybersecurity-related information sharing that address concerns with privacy and proprietary information and make information sharing mutually beneficial in the national interest. Private companies are concerned about the potential uses of their information. The gov\nernment must protect privacy rights, law enforcement equities, intelligence sources and methods, and government information that would provide unfair competitive advantages. Clarity and accountability for both government and the private sector are needed to address these concerns. Possible options include:\n\n\n\n-  Creation of a not-for-profit non-governmental organization to serve as a trusted third-party\nhost where government and private sector information may be shared to enhance the\nsecurity of critical government and private-sector networks. Such an organization could leverage commercial services without disrupting the growing security service market.\n\n\n-  Continued engagement between the Federal government (e.g., law enforcement agencies)\nand individual firms or groups of firmspossibly with the participation of State, local, and\ntribal governmentsthat could achieve a level of voluntary information sharing within a particular sector or region beyond what could be achieved in a broader setting.\n\n\n\nThe Administration should consider, in consultation with affected parties and Congress, develop\ning tailored incentives for information sharing. These measures might include, as a last resort, regulatory measures as part of an integrated approach to satisfying society's interests in robust and resilient critical infrastructures, civil liberties and privacy protections, and maintaining the fair and open economic markets that underlie the U.S. economic system. Privacy enhancing\n\n\n\ntechnologies such as encryption or controlled access authentication could ameliorate some risks in sharing information.\n\n\n\nThe Federal government should undertake a comprehensive review of policies (such as security classification and clearance requirements) that inhibit interagency sharing of cybersecurity infor\nmation, seek improvements in information sharing, and ensure that they preserve civil liberties and privacy rights and appropriate protection for sensitive information. Current policies governing the collection, use, retention, and dissemination of information by federal departments and agencies vary greatly based on statutory authorities, privacy and civil liberties concerns, sources and methods concerns, and historical practice. These policies present significant barriers to sharing cybersecurity information across the Federal government. This review should take into account the progress that the Federal government has made through the Security and Suitability Reform Initiative and the Information Sharing Environment effort in examining all facets of the security and suitability processing components. The Federal government should work with the private sector to develop standards for incident reporting by private-sector network operators to the Federal government. Industry has expressed concerns about reporting cyber incidents to which they have fallen victim, including the potential for negative impacts from resulting shareholder concerns, market reactions, or regulatory action.58\n\n\n\nOne industry group has proposed a government-industry working group to define sector-specific cyber incident thresholds that warrant reporting to security officials.59 Use of such information by the government would require rules and oversight, particularly for the protection of privacy rights and civil liberties. Another way to increase reporting is through consideration of appropriate data breach notification laws that require notification to the public and to the government, including law enforcement entities that could pursue investigations. The Federal government also should examine the effectiveness and scope of existing reporting requirements for regulated markets.\n\n\n\nAt the same time, the Federal government needs to define processes and rules for sharing its incident reporting with the private sector. Formulation of these rules should consider classification and pri\nvacy issues. In addition, the Federal government should help the research community gain access, with appropriate controls, to cybersecurity-related event data that could be used to develop tools, test theories, and develop workable solutions. Such sharing would need to address the protection of sensitive or proprietary data and personal identity information.\n\n\n\nThe Federal government should explore expanded sharing of information about network incidents and vulnerabilities with major allies, seeking bilateral or multilateral arrangements that improve cybersecurity consistent with the protection of other U.S. economic and security interests and the protection of civil liberties and privacy rights. International collaboration makes effective govern ment-private sector collaboration in the United States more challenging. Legitimate private-sector concerns over sharing information will increase if the government plans to share that information with other countries. Once again, clarity and accountability are needed for control, dissemination, and use of information shared by the private sector with the Federal government, including under\n\nstandings governing the use of information shared between the United States and the international community.\n\n## Improve Cybersecurity Across All Infrastructures\n\n\n\nThe Federal government should work with the private sector to define public-private partnership roles and responsibilities for the defense of privately owned critical infrastructure and key resources. The common defense of privately-owned critical infrastructures from armed attack or from physi cal intrusion or sabotage by foreign military forces or international terrorists is a core responsibility of the Federal government. Similarly, government plays an important role in protecting these infrastructures from criminals or domestic terrorists. The question remains unresolved as to what extent protection of these same infrastructures from the same harms by the same actors should be a government responsibility if the attacks were carried out remotely via computer networks rather than by direct physical action. Most private network operators and service providers consider it to be their responsibility to maintain and defend their own networks, but key elements of the private sector have indicated a willingness to work toward a framework under which the government would pursue malicious actors and assist with information and technical support to enable private-sector operators to defend their own networks.60\n\n\n\nThe Federal government should consider options for incentivizing collective action and enhance competition in the development of cybersecurity solutions. For example, the legal concepts for \"standard of care\" to date do not exist for cyberspace. Possible incentives include adjustments to liability considerations (reduced liability in exchange for improved security or increased liability for the consequences of poor security), indemnification, tax incentives, and new regulatory require\nments and compliance mechanisms.\n\n\nThe President's cybersecurity policy official should work with all levels of government, the private sector, and our international partners to develop strategies and plans to encourage the develop ment of innovative cybersecurity solutions and ensure the security and resilience of infrastructure systems. Infrastructure examples include:\n\n\n\n-  The Administration should assist international financial institutions, such as the World Bank\nand the International Monetary Fund, with the necessary information, tools, and expertise\nand encourage their use of best practices to protect their information systems, which suf fered a series of serious intrusions in 2008.61\n\n\n\n-  The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act reserves funding to advance the use of\nhealth information technology. Protection of patient information will be critical to gaining public acceptance as electronic record keeping becomes more pervasive and accessible through the Internet.\n\n\n-  The Department of Energy should work with the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission\nto determine whether additional security mandates and procedures should be developed\nfor energy-related industrial control systems. In addition, as the United States deploys new Smart Grid technology, the Federal government must ensure that security standards are developed and adopted to avoid creating unexpected opportunities for adversaries to penetrate these systems or conduct large-scale attacks.\n\n\n-  The Department of Transportation's Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) has developed\na long-term plan for transitioning to the Next-Generation Air Traffic Control System while\nstill maintaining the current system. The Department's Inspector General on March 18, 2009 advised the House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure Subcommittee on Aviation of the need to assess potential security vulnerabilities and develop a robust cybersecurity strategy and design.62\n\n## V.  Encouraging Innovation Resiliency Requirements\n\n\n\nThe infrastructure must be resilient against physical damage, unauthorized manipulation, and electronic assault. In addition to protection of the information itself, a risk mitigation strategy for cyber\nspace must focus on the devices used to access the infrastructure, the services provided by the infrastructure, support\ning elements of the networks, and all means of moving, storing, and process ing information. The strategy also must include prevention, mitigation, and response against threats to or subversion of the people who operate and benefit from the infrastructure, the processes that run or take advantage of the infra structure, and the supply chains used to build and maintain the infrastructure.\n\n\n\nThe information and communications sector is moving toward a converged platform where data, voice and video applications share a common infra structure. The decentralized nature of the current Internet model allows individuals and entrepreneurs to develop and deploy innovative applications at the edges of the network without obtaining permission. Innovation has sparked new multi-billion dollar busi nesses that have revolutionized the way users inter\nact with the network and each other. As technology becomes more critical to the United States, maintain ing confidence and trust in this constantly evolving infrastructure is essential. The President has called for the federal government to work with industry on the development of\"next-generation secure computers and networking for national security applications,\" \"tough new standards for cybersecurity and physi cal resilience,\" and \"standards for securing personal data.\"63\n\n\n\nThe United States should harness the full benefits of innovation to address cybersecurity concerns. Many technical and network management solutions that would greatly enhance security already exist in the market place but are not always used because of cost or complexity. In addition, exist\ning solutions can only do so much given the underlying design of the Internet architecture. In the long run, openness and innovation will help create a stronger infrastructure with transparency and accountability. Federal policy must address national security requirements, protection of intellec tual property, and the availability and continuity of infrastructure, even when it is under attack by sophisticated adversaries. The Federal government also must be careful not to create policy and regulation that inhibits innovation or results in inefficiencies or less security.\n\n## The Future\n\n\n\nAccording to a 2006 National Academies Report, Renewing U.S. Telecommunications Research, \"Telecommunications networks are large, complex systems whose reliability, security, and evolv\nability are dependent on the development of a coherent and well-conceived architectural concept.\"64\nThe report goes on to note that:\n\"[M]ultiple vendors'products are used to configure U.S. telecommunications infra structure and deliver services ... that cross provider boundaries. As a result of the industry's shift to a horizontal structure and its fragmentation into a large number of firms, neither vendors nor service providers are prepared to take responsibility for end-to-end systems design.\"\n\n\n\nAs a result, no single, integrated vision exists to guide decision-making by the private sector, academia, and government about policies, standards, research, market development, or procure\nment. The Federal government, the private sector, and other stakeholders together should define technology-neutral performance and security objectives for future infrastructure, both to meet its own requirements as a consumer as well as in its capacity as a steward of the public interest. The Federal government and its partners should create a family of coordinated national information and communications infrastructure objectives, customized by sectors and organizations. These objec\ntives could consider different models of computing platforms or network control concepts, and the emergence of technology solutions from government, academic, or industry research programs.\n\n\n\nThe movement of data and services to third-party network-based servers, referred to as the \"cloud,\"\nintroduces new policy challenges for the private sector and governments around the globe. The movement of data across jurisdictional boundaries presents challenges for law enforcement, the protection of privacy and civil liberties as defined by different countries, and liability decisions in the event of data or network breaches. Some customers will seek to limit where service providers move and store data, whereas others with multinational operations will seek to take advantage of geographic and time-zone diversity.\n\n## Infrastructure Security Visions\n\n\n\nA number of efforts exist to define visions for some technology or infrastructure sectors. For example, the U.S. Department of Energy, in collaboration with industry, in 2005 published a 10-year roadmap for securing control systems used in the power grid (see *www.controlsystemsroadmap.net*). The vision for this effort is that by 2015\"control systems for critical applications will be designed, installed, operated, and maintained to survive an intentional cyber attack with no loss of critical function.\" An advisory group for the Defense Advanced Research Project Agency (DARPA) describes defense of cur\nrent Internet Protocol-based networks as a losing proposition and calls for an \"independent examina tion of alternate architectures,\"leading to experimentation and evaluation of the best candidates. According to a March 2009 briefing, DARPA is proceeding with a six-month analysis of alternatives.\n\n\n\n## Link R&D Frameworks To Infrastructure Development\n\n\n\nUnder the leadership of the President's cybersecurity policy official, in collaboration with other EOP entities and the ICI-IPC, the Federal government should provide a framework for research and development strategies that focus on game-changing technologies that will help meet infrastruc\nture objectives, building on the existing Networking and Information Technology Research and Development (NITRD) strategies and other R&D-related work. The Federal government should\n\n\ngreatly expand coordination of these strategies with industry and academic research efforts to avoid duplication, leverage and synchronize complementary capabilities and agendas, and ensure that technology transitions and enters into the marketplace.\n\n\n\n-  To enhance U.S. competitiveness, the Federal government should work with industry to\ndevelop migration paths and incentives for the rapid adoption of research and technology\ndevelopment, including encouragement of collaboration between academic and industrial laboratories.\n\n\n-  The Federal government, in collaboration with the private sector and other stakeholders,\nalso should use the infrastructure objectives and the R&D framework to help define goals\nfor national and international standardsbodies.\n\n## Establish Identity Management As An Option\n\n\n\nWe cannot improve cybersecurity without improving authentication, and identity management is not just about authenticating people. Authentication mechanisms also can help ensure that online transactions only involve trustworthy data, hardware, and software for networks and devices. With the systems available today for most Internet transactions, the electronic equivalent of cues people use to establish trust might be absent, incomplete, or difficult to understand and act upon.65 Identity management has the potential to help individuals and organizations form trusted communities based on varying degrees of identity exposure and mutually agreed accountability, while helping exclude unwanted intruders or inappropriate membership. Identity management also has the potential to enhance privacy through additional protection against the inappropriate release of personal identifiable information. The Federal governmentin collaboration with industry and the civil liberties and privacy commu nitiesshould build a cybersecurity-based identity management vision and strategy for the Nation that considers an array of approaches, including privacy-enhancing technologies. The Federal gov\nernment must interact with citizens through myriad information, services, and benefit programs and thus has an interest in the protection of the public's private information as well. Increased use of on-line transactions involving financial, health, and commerce require a basis for building trust between the parties to a transaction.\n\n\n\n-   The Nation should implement, for high-value activities (e.g., the Smart Grid), an opt-in array\nof interoperable identity management systems to build trust for online transactions and to enhance privacy.\n-   The National Science and Technology Council's (NSTC's) Subcommittee on Biometrics and\nIdentity Management in 2008 published a report that provides a vision for future federal\nidentity management and a series of research and development recommendations.66  The\nFederal  government  should  use  this  report  as  a  starting  point  for  identity  management\nstrategies.\n\n\n\n-  The Federal government should work with international partners to develop policies that\nencourage the development of a global, trusted eco-system that protects privacy rights and civil liberties and governs appropriate use of law enforcement activities to protect citizens and infrastructures.\nThe Federal government, following the guidance of Homeland Security Presidential Directive 12\n(HSPD-12), is seeking to leverage the federal interoperable identity credentialing mechanism across the federal enterprise. The Federal government should ensure resources are available for full federal implementation of HSPD-12. The Federal government also should consider extending the avail ability of federal identity management systems to operators of critical infrastructure and to privatesector emergency response and repair service providers for use during national emergencies.\n\n## Integrate Globalization Policy With Supply Chain Security\n\n\n\nOne of the results of the information technology revolution and free trade policies is a global envi ronment for research, design, manufacturing, and servicing of information and communications products by corporations with facilities spread across the globe. This global marketplace has created tremendous benefits for U.S. industry by opening markets worldwide for high-tech U.S. goods and services. However, the emergence of new centers for manufacturing, design, and research across the globe raises concerns about the potential for easier subversion of computers and networks through subtle hardware or software manipulations. Counterfeit products have created the most visible supply problems, but few documented examples exist of unambiguous, deliberate subversions.\n\n\n\nA broad, holistic approach to risk management is required rather than a wholesale condemnation of foreign products and services. The challenge with supply chain attacks is that a sophisticated adversary might narrowly focus on particular systems and make manipulation virtually impossible to discover. Foreign manufacturing does present easier opportunities for nation-state adversaries to subvert products; however, the same goals could be achieved through the recruitment of key insiders or other espionage activities.\n\n\n\nThe best defense may be to ensure U.S. market leadership through continued innovation that enhances U.S. market leadership and the application of best practices in maintaining diverse, resil ient supply chains and infrastructures. The President's cybersecurity policy official, working with departments and agencies, should:\n\n\n\n-  Define procurement strategies through the General Services Administration, building on\nwork by the National Security Agency for the Department of Defense, for commercial prod ucts and services in order to create market incentives for security to be part of hardware and software product designs, new security technologies, and secure managed services;\n\n\n-  Expand partnerships with State, local, and tribal governments and international partners\nto maximize the market influence of these procurements;\n\n\n-  Work with Congress to identify mechanisms that would enable departments and agencies\nunder appropriate, limited situationsto incorporate threat information into acquisition decisions; and\n\n\n-  Work with industry to provide threat information and identify best practices for managing\nsupply chain and insider risks, both from economic and threat perspectives.\n\n## Maintain National Security/Emergency Preparedness (Ns/Ep) Capabilities\n\n\n\nThe Federal government's obligation to protect the American people and to provide for the com mon defense includes a responsibility to ensure that the Nation can communicate and respond in times of crisis. The communications system itself might bear the brunt of such events and must have resilience or the capability to recover to manage a response and preserve governmental functions. The Communications Act of 1934 authorized the President, if he deems it necessary in the national security or defense and the requisite threshold condition exists, to use, control, or close commu nications services, systems, and networks under the jurisdiction of the Federal Communications Commission in conditions ranging from \"state of public peril\"to \"war.\" Executive Order 12472 estab\nlished a joint government-industry National Coordinating Center to assist in the initiation, coordina tion, restoration and reconstitution of communications services or facilities under all conditions of crisis or emergency. NSPD-51/HSPD-20 on\"National Continuity Policy\"(May 4, 2007) assigns roles in the Federal government regarding continuity communications.\n\n\n\nThe Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is working toward the goal of providing national security and emergency users with access to the converged information services of next-generation networks in a manner that provides a high likelihood of service success during disasters and other events that cause public users to experience severe degradation or loss of communications ser vices. The national security enhancements to next-generation networks will include services for data, voice, and video. The DHS effort is complicated by the variations in architectures envisioned by the major carriers and service providers. As such, DHS is examining and comparing different approaches and will seek industry consensus on approaches to be brought forward for consideration by standards organizations. The Federal government should:\n\n\n\n-   Develop a coordinated plan for national security and emergency preparedness commu\nnications  capabilities  over  next-generation  networks,  including  milestones  and  funding\nrequirements;\n-   Develop options for additional services the Federal government could acquire or direct\n\ninvestments the government could make in the information and communications infra structure to enhance the survivability of communications during a time of natural disaster,\ncrisis, or conflict;\n-   Coordinate with international partners and standards bodies to support next-generation\nNS/EP communications capabilities in a globally distributed next-generation environment;67\nand\n\n-   Ensure that efforts associated with the development of Executive Branch continuity com\nmunications  architectures  and  next-generation  services  programs  are  adequately  staffed and resourced.\n\n## Vi. Action Plans\n\nThe review team recommends the near-term and mid-term actions listed in Tables 2 and 3.\n\n## Table 2: Near-Term Action Plan\n\n\n\n1.\nAppoint a cybersecurity policy official responsible for coordinating the Nation's cybersecurity policies and activities; establish a strong NSC directorate, under the direction of the cybersecurity policy official dual-hatted to the NSC and the NEC, to coordinate interagency development of cybersecurity-related strategy and policy.\n\n\n2.\nPrepare for the President's approval an updated national strategy to secure the information and communications infrastructure. This strategy should include continued evaluation of CNCI activities and, where appropriate, build on its successes.\n\n\n\n3.\nDesignate cybersecurity as one of the President's key management priorities and establish performance metrics.\n4.\nDesignate a privacy and civil liberties official to the NSC cybersecurity directorate.\n\n\n5.\nConvene appropriate interagency mechanisms to conduct interagency-cleared legal analyses of priority cybersecurity-related issues identified during the policy-development process and formulate coherent unified policy guidance that clarifies roles, responsibilities, and the application of agency authorities for cybersecurity-related activities across the Federal government.\n\n6.\nInitiate a national public awareness and education campaign to promote cybersecurity.\n\n\n7.\nDevelop U.S. Government positions for an international cybersecurity policy framework and strengthen our international partnerships to create initiatives that address the full range of activities, policies, and opportunities associated with cybersecurity.\n\n\n\n8.\nPrepare a cybersecurity incident response plan; initiate a dialog to enhance public-private partnerships with an eye toward streamlining, aligning, and providing resources to optimize their contribution and engagement\n\n\n\n9.\nIn collaboration with other EOP entities, develop a framework for research and development strategies that focus on game-changing technologies that have the potential to enhance the security, reliability, resilience, and trustworthiness of digital infrastructure; provide the research community access to event data to facilitate developing tools, testing theories, and identifying workable solutions.\n\n\n\n10. Build a cybersecurity-based identity management vision and strategy that addresses privacy and\ncivil liberties interests, leveraging privacy-enhancing technologies for the Nation.\n\n## Table 3: Mid-Term Action Plan\n\n\n\n1.\nImprove the process for resolution of interagency disagreements regarding interpretations of law and application of policy and authorities for cyber operations.\n2.\nUse the OMB program assessment framework to ensure departments and agencies use performance-based budgeting in pursuing cybersecurity goals.\n\n\n\n3.\nExpand support for key education programs and research and development to ensure the Nation's continued ability to compete in the information age economy.\n\n\n\n4.\nDevelop a strategy to expand and train the workforce, including attracting and retaining cybersecurity expertise in the Federal government.\n\n\n5.\nDetermine the most efficient and effective mechanism to obtain strategic warning, maintain situational awareness, and inform incident response capabilities.\n\n\n\n6.\nDevelop a set of threat scenarios and metrics that can be used for risk management decisions, recovery planning, and prioritization of R&D.\n\n\n\n7.\nDevelop a process between the government and the private sector to assist in preventing, detecting, and responding to cyber incidents.\n\n\n8.\nDevelop mechanisms for cybersecurity-related information sharing that address concerns about privacy and proprietary information and make information sharing mutually beneficial.\n\n\n9.\nDevelop solutions for emergency communications capabilities during a time of natural disaster, crisis, or conflict while ensuring network neutrality.\n\n\n10. Expand sharing of information about network incidents and vulnerabilities with key allies and seek\nbilateral and multilateral arrangements that will improve economic and security interests while protecting civil liberties and privacy rights.\n\n\n11. Encourage collaboration between academic and industrial laboratories to develop migration\npaths and incentives for the rapid adoption of research and technology development innovations.\n\n\n12. Use the infrastructure objectives and the research and development framework to define goals for\nnational and international standards bodies.\n\n\n13. Implement, for high-value activities (e.g., the Smart Grid), an opt-in array of interoperable identity\nmanagement systems to build trust for online transactions and to enhance privacy.\n\n\n14. Refine government procurement strategies and improve the market incentives for secure and\nresilient hardware and software products, new security innovation, and secure managed services.\n\n## Appendix A: Bibliography\n\nAccenture, \"Secure Enterprise Network Consortium: Helping Provide Comprehensive Cyber Security Approaches for High Performance\" (undated)\n\n\nAliant, \"Developing a Telecommunications Roadmap: Preparing for the promise of convergence\" (undated) American Chemistry Council, ChemITC, \"Making Strides to Improve Cyber Security in the Chemical Sector,\" 2009 Update, March 2009\n\n\nAmerican Chemistry Council, Christine Adams, untitled memorandum of the Chemical Sector Cyber Security Program's responses to four questions from the White House 60-day Cyber Policy Review (undated)\n\n\n\nBoard of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, and Securities and Exchange Commission, \"Interagency Paper on Sound Practices To Strengthen the Resilience of the U.S. Financial System,\" Federal Register, Volume 68, Number 70, April 18, 2003\n\n\n\nBrecht, Lyle A., Capital Markets Research, \"National Cyber Systems Infrastructure Security Review Concept Paper,\" February 15, 2009\n\n\nBusiness Executives for National Security, \"Commercial/Civil Cyber Community Snapshot\"\n(undated)\n\n\nBusiness Executives for National Security, \"Cyber Strategic Inquiry: Enabling Change Through a Strategic Simulation and Megacommunity Concept\", December 2008\n\n\nBusiness Executives for National Security, \"Cybersecurity Roundtable, March 19, 2009, City Club, Washington DC,\" March 26, 2009\n\n\nBusiness Executives for National Security, *\"National Cybersecurity Center Policy Capture\"* (undated)\n\nBusiness Software Alliance, \"National Security & Homeland Security Councils Review of National Cyber Security Policy,\" March 19, 2009\n\n\nCarnegie Mellon CyLab, Pradeep Khosla, \"Information Security for the Next Century: Why we need an information-centric approach to data protection\" (undated)\n\n\nCarnegie Mellon University, Lynn Robert Carter, \"Computing Infrastructure Risk: Issue, Analysis, and Recommendation,\" December 23, 2008\n\n\nCenter for Applied Cybersecurity Research, Indiana University, Fred H. Cate, \"Comments to the White House 60-Day Cybersecurity Review,\" March 27, 2009\n\n\nCenter for Democracy and Technology, \"Comprehensive Privacy and Security: Critical for Health Information Technology,\" Version 1.0, May 2008\n\n\nCenter for Democracy and Technology, letter from Ari Schwartz and Gregory T. Nojeim, March 20, 2009\n\n\nCenter for Education and Research in Information Assurance and Security, Purdue University, presentation by Eugene Spafford entitled *\"NITRD Strategic Plan Forum,\"* February 2009\n\n\nCenter for Infrastructure Protection, George Mason University, *\"The CIP Report,\"* Volume 7, Number 8, February 2009 Center for National Security Studies, letter from Kate Martin, April 4, 2009 Center for Progressive Regulation, Rena Steinzor, \"Democracies Die Behind Closed Doors: The Homeland Security Act and Corporate Accountability,\" March 12, 2003\n\n\nCenter for Strategic and International Studies Commission on Cybersecurity for the 44th Presidency, *\"Securing Cyberspace for the 44th Presidency,\"* December 2008\n\n\nCenter for the Development of Technological Leadership, University of Minnesota, presentation by S. Massoud Amin entitled \"Smart Grid: Opportunities and Challenges Toward a Stronger and Smarter Grid\" at the 2009 MIT Energy Conference - Accelerating Change in Global Energy, Cambridge, Massachusetts, March 6, 2009 Computer Science & Artificial Intelligence Laboratory, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, presentation by John C. Mallery entitled \"Mobilizing for Cyber Defense: Transforming Computation & Networking,\"March 2009\n\n\nComputing Research Association, paper by Stuart Zweben entitled \"Computing Degree and Enrollment Trends: From the 2007-2008 CRA Taulbee Survey\" (undated)\n\n\nCongressional Research Service, report by Harold C. Relyea entitled \"The Executive Office of the President: An Historical Overview,\" updated November 26, 2008\n\n\nCongressional Research Service, report by John Rollins and Anna C. Henning entitled\n\"Comprehensive National Cybersecurity Initiative: Legal Authorities and Policy Considerations,\"\nMarch 10, 2009\nDavidson, Mary Ann, Oracle Corporation, *\"The Monroe Doctrine in Cyberspace\",* March 2009\n\nDefense Advanced Research Projects Agency, \"The National Cyber Range: A National Testbed for Critical Security Research\" (undated)\n\n\n\nDepartment of Defense, \"Defense Security Information Exchange (DSIE) A partnership for the Defense Industrial Base\" (undated)\n\n\nDepartment of Defense, Lt. Col. Michael Barry and Steven D. Shirley, \"DoD Cyber Crime Center\n(DC3) Prioritization,\" March 12, 2009\n\n\nDepartment of Health & Human Services, Office of the National Coordinator for Health Information technology, \"The ONC-Coordinated Federal Health IT Strategic Plan: 2008-2012,\"\nJune 3, 2008\n\n\n\nDepartment of the Treasury, \"2008 Update to Banking and Finance Sector-Specific Plan: Sector Profile and Goals\" (undated) Department of the Treasury, \"2008 Update to Banking and Finance Sector-Specific Plan: Appendix B:\nStatutory Authorities\" (undated)\n\n\n\nDepartment of the Treasury, FSSCC/FBIIC Cyber Security Intelligence and Information Sharing Work Groups, \"Roadmap for Improved Information Sharing: Situational Analysis and Recommendations for Action\" (undated)\n\nDepartment of the Treasury, memorandum regarding 60-day cyber review questions (undated) Economist Intelligence Unit, The, \"The means to compete: Benchmarking IT Industry Competitiveness\", July 2007\n\n\nEducational Technology, Policy, Research, and Outreach, \"2008 National Cyberethics, Cybersafety, Cybersecurity Baseline Study\", study conducted on behalf of the National Cyber Security Alliance, October 2008 Electronic Frontier Foundation, letter from Lee Tien and Peter Eckersley (undated) Financial Services Information Sharing and Analysis Center, letter from William B. Nelson, March 23, 2009\n\n\nForrester, \"IT Security Remains An Integral Part Of The Enterprise: The State Of Enterprise IT Security: 2008 To 2009\", January 29, 2009\n\nGourley, Bob, Crucial Point LLC, *\"Cloud Computing and Cyber Defense,\"* March 21, 2009\n\nGourley, Bob, Crucial Point LLC, *\"Open Source Software and Cyber Defense,\"* March 30, 2009\n\nHarper, Jim, Cato Institute, *\"Government-Run Cyber Security? No, Thanks,\"* TechKnowledge Newsletter, Issue #123, March 13, 2009\n\n\nHarris Interactive, *\"Online Security and Privacy Study\",* conducted on behalf of Microsoft and the National Cyber Security Alliance, March 2009\nInformation Sciences Institute, University of California, \"Report on National Cyber Defense Initiative Industry Workshop: Report and Recommendations,\" March 27, 2009\n\n\nInformation Systems Audit and Control Association, \"IS Standards, Guidelines and Procedures for Auditing and Control Professionals,\" January 15, 2009\n\n\nInformation Technology Information Sharing and Analysis Center, letter from Brian Willis, February 27, 2009 Information Technology Sector Coordinating Council and Communications Sector Coordinating Council, *\"Response to White House Cyber Review Questions,\"* March 20, 2009\n\n\nIntelligence and National Security Alliance, *\"60 Day Cyber Study INSA Response,\"* March 26, 2009\n\n\nIntelligence and National Security Alliance, \"Critical Issues for Cyber Assurance Policy Reform:\nAn Industry Assessment,\" March 26, 2009\n\n\nIntelligence and National Security Alliance, *\"The Missing Link in U.S. Cybersecurity,\"* March 21, 2009\n\n\nInternet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers, \"Factsheet: Root server attack on 6 February 2007,\" March 1, 2007\n\n\nInternet Security Alliance, \"ISA Comments to Hathaway on creating an International Cyber Security Anchor Program\" (undated) Internet Security Alliance, \"ISA Initial Comments on Hathaway 60-Day review - a top 10 list of Cyber Principles\" (undated)\n\n\n\nInternet Security Alliance, \"The Cyber Security Social Contract Policy Recommendations for the Obama Administration and 111th Congress: A Twenty-First Century Model for Protecting and Defending Critical Technology Systems and Information\" (undated)\n\n\nInternet Security Alliance, \"The Economic and Security Costs of Obsolescent Computer Laws\" March 24, 2009\n\n\nInternet Security Alliance, paper by Jeff Brown, Raytheon Company, entitled \"A National Model for Cyber Protection Through Disrupting Attacker Command and Control Channels,\" March 2009\n\n\nInternet Security Alliance, paper by Larry Clinton entitled \"Cross cutting Issue #2 How Can we create public private partnerships that extend to action plans that work?\" (undated)\n\n\nInternet Security Alliance, paper by Larry Clinton entitled \"Cyber-Insurance Metrics and Impact on Cyber-Security\" (undated) Internet Security Alliance, paper by Larry Clinton entitled \"Issue Area 3: Norms of Behavior Hathaway Questions\" (undated) Internet Security Alliance, paper by Scott Borg entitled \"Securing the Supply Chain for Electronic Equipment: A Strategy and Framework\" (undated)\n\n\nInternet Security Alliance, paper by Sentar, Inc., \"Position paper for Obama 60 Day review on Cyber Security: Utilization of Small Business (SBs) for Innovative Cyber Security Research and Development\", March 26, 2009\n\n\nJackson, William, *\"Agency Award'Federal Aviation Administration: Protect and serve,\"* Government Computer News, October 7, 2007 Kellermann, Tom, Core Security Technologies, *\"Proactive Public Policy per Cybersecurity,\"* March 18, 2009\n\n\nKellermann, Tom, Core Security Technologies, *\"Red teaming idea in detail,\"* March 11, 2009\n\n\nKhater, Rami and Rachel Schaffer, Georgetown University, untitled memorandum, April 13, 2009\n\n\nMarkle Foundation, \"Nation at Risk: Policy Makers Need Better Information to Protect the Country,\" March 10, 2009\nMassachusetts Institute of Technology, The Microphotonics Center, executive overview of the 2005 communications technology roadmap entitled \"Microphotonics: Hardware for the Information Age,\" 2005\n\n\n\nNational Association of State Chief Information Officers, NASCIO State CIO-CISO Cybersecurity Priorities Survey Summary, March 3, 2009\n\n\n\nNational Coordination Office for Networking and Information Technology Research and Development, Sally E. Howe, presentation entitled \"Workshop Deliverables: Roadmap, Hard Problems, and Report\" at the HCSS-Sponsored National Workshop on Beyond SCADA: Networked Embedded Control for Cyber Physical Systems, November 8, 2008\nNational Cyber Forensics & Training Alliance and Cyber Initiative & Resource Fusion Unit, \"Cyber Fusion Center, Pittsburgh, PA: Executive Briefing\" (undated)\n\nNational Cyber Security Alliance and Symantec, \"NCSA-Symantec National Cyber Security Awareness Study: Newsworthy Analysis,\" October 2008\n\n\nNational Cyber Security Alliance, *\"National Cyber Security Alliance in Brief\"* (undated) National Research Council, report edited by Robert W. Lucky and Jon Eisenberg entitled \"Renewing U.S. Telecommunications Research,\" 2006\n\n\nNational Science and Technology Council, Subcommittee on Biometrics and Identity Management, *\"Identity Management Task Force Report 2008,\"* 2008\n\n\n\nNational Science Foundation / Intelligence Advanced Research Projects Activity / National Security Agency, workshop report by David Evans, (University of Virginia) Principal Investigator, for the NSF/IARPA/NSA Workshop on the Science of Security, Berkeley, California, November 17-18, 2008 (unpublished) National Science Foundation, *\"Notes for White House 60-day Cyber-Policy Review,\"* March 25, 2009\n\n\nNational Science Foundation, *\"NSF Security Program Overview,\"* March 26, 2009\n\n\n\nNational Science Foundation, \"Responses to Questions Posed by Ms. Melissa Hathaway During Her Presentation at the National Science Foundation on March 18, 2009,\" March 31, 2009\n\nNational Security Telecommunications Advisory Committee, \"NSTAC Response to the Sixty-Day Cyber Study Group,\" March 12, 2009 Networking and Information Technology Research and Development Program, High Confidence Software and Systems Coordinating Group, \"High-Confidence Medical Devices: Cyber-Physical Systems for 21st Century Health Care,\" February 2009\n\n\nOffice of the Director of National Intelligence, Joint Interagency Cyber Task Force, Steven R.Chabinsky, presentation entitled \"Intrusion Detection and Prevention (What, Where, How and Who)\" (undated)\n\n\nPederson, Perry, Wurldtech Labs, *\"Project Aurora and the Smart Grid\"* (undated)\n\nPinkney, Kevin R., \"Putting Blame Where Blame is Due: Software Manufacturer and Customer Liability\nfor Security-related Software Failure,\"  Albany Law Journal of Science & Technology, Volume 13, 2002\nRaduege, Harry D., Jr., *\"Evolving Cybersecurity Faces a New Dawn,\"* SIGNAL Magazine, December 2008\n\n\nRaduege, Harry D., Jr., *\"Future Defense Department Cybersecurity Builds on the Past,\"* SIGNAL Magazine, February 08\nSANS Institute, *\"The United States Cyber Challenge,\"* May 8, 2009\n\nSAS Institute, *\"INSA Cyber Task Force Submission\"* (undated)\n\n\nSchneider, Fred B., and Birman, Kenneth P., Cornell University, \"The Monoculture Risk put into Context,\" IEEE Security & Privacy, January/February 2009\n\n\nSpafford, Eugene H. and Annie I Anton, *\"The Balance of Privacy and Security,\"* Controversies in Science and Technology, Vol II, ed. by Daniel Lee Kleinman, Karen A. Cloud-Hansen, Christina Matta, and Jo Handelsman, pub. MaryAnn Liebert, Inc, NYC, NY, 2008\nSpoonamore, Stephen and Ronald L. Krutz, \"Smart Grid and Cyber Challenges: National Security Risks and Concerns of Smart Grid\", March 2009\n\n\nSRI International, Computer Science Laboratory, technical report addendum by Phillip Porras, Hassen Saidi, and Vinod Yegneswaran entitled \"Conficker C Analysis,\" March 19, 2009\n\n\nTechAmerica, *\"TechAmerica Response to 60-Day Cyber Security Review,\"* March 2009\n\nTrevithick, Paul, William Coleman, John Clippinger, and Kim Taipale, \"Identity and Resilience\" (undated) U.S. Chamber of Commerce, letter from Ann Beauchesne, March 27, 2009 United States Congress, American Recovery and Reinvesment Act of 2009, Public Law 111-5\nUnited States Congress, Year 2000 Information and Readiness Disclosure Act, Public Law 105-271 United States Government Accountability Office, David A. Powner, \"Information Technology:\nFederal Laws, Regulations, and Mandatory Standards for Securing Private Sector Information Technology Systems and Data in Critical Infrastructure Sectors,\" September 16, 2008\n\n\nUnited States House of Representatives, 111th Congress, \"A bill to authorize the Secretary of Homeland Security to establish a program to award grants to institutions of higher education for the establishment or expansion of cybersecurity professional development programs, and for other purposes.\" (H.R.266), as introduced in the House, January 7, 2009\n\nUnited States House of Representatives, hearing before the Armed Services Committee, Subcommittee on Strategic Forces, *\"Status of US Strategic Programs,\"* March 17, 2009\n\n\nUnited States House of Representatives, hearing before the Armed Services Committee, Subcommittee on Strategic Forces, \"Statement of General Kevin P. Chilton, Commander, United States Strategic Command,\" March 17, 2009\n\n\n\nUnited States House of Representatives, hearing before the Committee on Homeland Security, Subcommittee on Emerging Threats, Cybersecurity, and Science and Technology, \"Statement of Chairman Bennie G. Thompson, 'Reviewing the Federal Cybersecurity Mission,'\" March 10, 2009\n\n\nUnited States House of Representatives, hearing before the Committee on Homeland Security, Subcommittee on Emerging Threats, Cybersecurity, and Science and Technology, \"Testimony of Amit Yoran, Netwitness Corporation, 'Reviewing the Federal Cybersecurity Mission,'\" March 10, 2009\n\n\nUnited States House of Representatives, hearing before the Committee on Homeland Security, Subcommittee on Emerging Threats, Cybersecurity, and Science and Technology, \"Federal Cybersecurity Mission,\" March 10, 2009\n\n\nUnited States House of Representatives, hearing before the Committee on Homeland Security, Subcommittee on Emerging Threats, Cybersecurity, and Science and Technology, \"Statement for the Record of Sean P. McGurk, Director, Control Systems Security Program, National Cyber Security Division, National Protection and Programs Directorate, Department of Homeland Security,\"\nMarch 24, 2009 United States House of Representatives, hearing before the Committee on Homeland Security, Subcommittee on Emerging Threats, Cybersecurity, Science and Technology, \"Statement of Chairwoman Yvette D. Clarke,\" March 10, 2009\n\n\nUnited States House of Representatives, hearing before the Committee on Homeland Security, Subcommittee on Emerging Threats, Cybersecurity, and Science and Technology, \"Statement of David Powner, Director, Information Technology Management Issues, United States Government Accountability Office, 'National Cybersecurity Strategy: Key Improvements are Needed to Strengthen the Nation's Posture,'\" March 10, 2009\n\n\n\nUnited States House of representatives, hearing before the Committee on Homeland Security, Subcommittee on Emerging Threats, Cybersecurity, and Science and Technology, \"Statement of James A. Lewis, Center for Strategic and International Studies, 'Reviewing the Federal Cybersecurity Mission,'\" March 10, 2009 United States House of Representatives, hearing before the Committee on Homeland Security, Subcommittee on Emerging Threats, Cybersecurity, and Science and Technology, \"Testimony of Mary Ann Davidson, Chief Security Officer, Oracle Corporation,\" March 10, 2009\n\n\nUnited States House of Representatives, hearing before the Committee on Homeland Security, Subcommittee on Emerging Threats, Cybersecurity, Science and Technology, \"Written Testimony of Scott Charney, Corporate Vice President, Microsoft Corporation's Trustworthy Computing, 'Securing America's Cyber Future: Simplify, Organize and Act,'\" March 10, 2009\n\n\n\nUnited States House of Representatives, hearing before the Committee on Science and Technology, \"Statement of Dr. Christopher L. Greer, Director, National Coordination Office for Networking and Information Technology Research and Development,\" April 1, 2009\nUnited States House of Representatives, hearing before the Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, Subcommittee on Aviation, \"Statement of James C. May, President and CEO, Air Transport Association of America, Inc., 'Air Traffic Control Modernization and NextGen: Near-Term Achievable Goals,'\" March 18, 2009\n\n\n\nUnited States House of Representatives, hearing before the Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, Subcommittee on Aviation, \"Statement of The Honorable Calvin L. Scovel III, Inspector General, U.S. Department of Transportation, 'Federal Aviation Administration: Actions Needed to Achieve Mid-term NextGen Goals,'\" March 18, 2009\n\n\n\nUnited States House of Representatives, hearing before the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, *\"Annual Threat Assessment\"* by Dennis C. Blair, Director of National Intelligence, February 25, 2009\n\nUnited States House of Representatives, Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, \"HPSCI\nWhite Paper on Cyber security,\" December 10, 2008\nUnited States Secret Service, memorandum entitled *\"Electronic Crime task Forces (ECTF)\"* (undated)\n\n\nUnited States Senate, 111th Congress, Senate Bill S.773, *\"Cybersecurity Act of 2009\",* as introduced in the Senate, April 1, 2009\n\n\nUnited States Senate, 111th Congress, Senate Bill S.778, \"A bill to establish, within the Executive Office of the President, the Office of the National Cybersecurity Advisor\", as introduced in the Senate, April 1, 2009 United States Senate, hearing before the Committee on Energy and Natural Resources, \"Questions for Patrick Gallagher, National Institute of Standards and Technology,\" March 3, 2009\n\n\nUnited States Senate, hearing before the Committee on Energy and Natural Resources,\n\"Statement of Patricia Hoffman, Acting Assistant Secretary for Electricity Delivery and Energy Reliability, U.S. Department of Energy,\" March 3, 2009\n\n\nUnited States Senate, hearing before the Committee on Energy and Natural Resources \"Testimony of Patrick D. Gallagher, Ph.D., Deputy Director, National Institute of Standards and Technology, United States Department of Commerce,\" March 3, 2009\n\n\n\nVijayan, Jaikumar, *\"PCI security standard gets flayed at House hearing,\"* Computerworld, April 1, 2009\n\n\n\n## Appendix B: Methodology\n\n\n\nThe globally interconnected information and communications infrastructure often known as\n\"cyberspace\"underpins every facet of American society and provides critical support for the national economy, civil infrastructure, security, and military power. Recognizing its importance to the nation, the President directed the National and Homeland Security Councils to conduct a 60-day compre\nhensive, \"clean-slate\"review to assess U.S. cyberspace policies and structures. The review begins to carry out the President's pledge to \"lead an effort, working with private industry, the research com munity and our citizens, to build a trustworthy and accountable cyber infrastructure that is resilient, protects America's competitive advantage, and advances our national and homeland security.\"\n\n## Defining The Scope Of The Review And Establishing A Clear End-State Goal\n\n\n\nPursuant to the President's direction, the White House staff established the review's scope and defined the end-state goal, which was vetted through the Interagency Policy Committee (IPC) pro\ncess and approved by the NSC-HSC Deputies Committee. When achieved, that end goal of trusted and resilient communications and information infrastructures built through a national public-private partnership and action plan will:\n\n\n\n-  Enhance economic prosperity and facilitate U.S. market leadership in the information and\ncommunications industry;\n\n-  Enable the United States to deter, prevent, detect, defend against, respond to, and remedi\nate interruptions and damage to U.S. information and communications infrastructure;\n\n\n-  Ensure U.S. capabilities to operate in cyberspace in support of national goals; while at the\nsame time\n\n-  Protect privacy rights and preserving civil liberties.\n\n\n\nThis review addresses all missions and activities associated with the information and communica\ntions infrastructure, including computer network defense, military, and intelligence missions and the intersection thereof with information assurance, counter intelligence, counter terrorism and telecommunications policies. It seeks to identify the policy gaps, organizational redundancies, overlapping missions, legal questions, civil liberties and privacy concerns, and other unresolved issues across the above mission spaces. The review does not provide an in-depth analysis of options or an extensive audit of programs; rather, it presents the need for a more balanced and integrated policy-making approach to address the convergence of the Nation's economic and security interests in the digitally-dependent global environment of the 21st Century.\n\n## Inventorying Requirements Of Cyber, Communications, And Homeland Security And Counter-Terrorism Mission Areas As Well As Recommendations From Government Advisory Boards And Private-Sector Studies\n\n\n\nDuring the first ten days, the review team inventoried more than 250 requirements (some overlap\nping) from the relevant Presidential policy directives, executive orders, national strategies, and studies from government advisory boards and private sector entities. The review team solicited input from departments and agencies on their specific cyber activities, authorities, and capabilities across these requirements and requested departments and agencies to identify any new or existing requirements that may not have been identified as part of the initial inventory. During this phase, governmental legal experts identified more than 80 issues associated with the scope of the 60-day cyber review. Those lawyers are addressing the highest priority legal issues in papers that identify common facts, applicable law, differences in legal interpretation, and options for resolution. In addition, the review team consulted governmental civil liberties and privacy officials to identify and assess relevant issues.\n\n## Capturing The Viewpoints Of Key Cyber Stakeholders On Requirements To Meet The End-State Goal\n\nThe review team reached out to a wide array of stakeholders inside and outside the Federal gov\nernment. Recognizing that there are opportunities for everyoneacademia, industry, and gov ernmentto work together to build a trusted and resilient communications and information infrastructure, the review team ensured that these stakeholders were aware of the review's scope and asked for input on pertinent areas of interest.\n\n\n\nThe engagement process included over 40 meetings and yielded over 100 papers that named specific recommendations and desired goals. Stakeholders'responses and public statements (e.g., Congressional testimony) helped to identify key requirements, illuminate policy gaps, suggest areas of improvement or collaboration, and frame the decision space for cyberspace policy. The review team synthesized the results into overarching themes and issues for further consideration.\n\n\n\nIn some cases, the individuals who submitted materials did so in their personal capacity as experts, rather than as representatives or affiliates of particular entities (such as universities). In all cases, the participants'submission of information does not imply that they endorse the results of the review in part or in full.\n\n## The Private Sector\n\nThe U.S. depends upon a privately owned, globally operated digital infrastructure. The review team engaged with industry to continue building the foundation of a trusted partnership. This engage\nment underscored the importance of developing value propositions that are understood by both government and industry partners. It also made clear that increasing information sharing is not enough; the government must foster an environment for collaboration. The following industry groups and venues participated: the Armed Forces Communications and Electronics Association\n\n\n(AFCEA), Business Executives for National Security (BENS), the Business Software Alliance (BSA), the Center for Strategic and International Studies'(CSIS) Commission on Cybersecurity for the 44th Presidency, the Communications Sector Coordinating Council (C-SCC), the Cross-Sector Cyber Security Working Group (CSCSWG), the Defense Industrial Base Executive Committee, the Financial and Banking Information Infrastructure Committee (FBIIC), the Financial Services Sector Coordinating Council (FS-SCC), the Intelligence and National Security Alliance (INSA), the Internet Security Alliance (ISA), the Information Technology Sector Coordinating Council (IT-SCC), the National Infrastructure Advisory Council (NIAC), the National Security Telecommunications Advisory Committee (NSTAC), TechAmerica, and the U.S. Chamber of Commerce.\n\n## Civil Liberties And Privacy Community\n\n\n\nRobust protections for civil liberties and privacy needed to be considered at the outset. The 60-day review team began a dialogue with key members of the civil liberties and privacy community, includ ing both advocates and independent experts, to discuss measures for protecting the information and communications infrastructure and how those measures may impact individual users. The review team's civil liberties and privacy community engagement included affiliates of the American Civil Liberties Union, the American Library Association, the Cato Institute, the Center for Democracy and Technology, Carnegie Mellon University, Consumer Action, the Center on National Security Studies, Cornell University, the Electronic Frontier Foundation, the Electronic Privacy Information Center, George Washington University, Harvard University, Indiana University, Johns Hopkins University, OMB Watch, Ohio State University, the National Security Archive, and the University of California-San Diego.\n\n## Academic And Research Community\n\n\n\nThe academic and open cybersecurity research community has contributed many important tech nological innovations and continues to be a valuable resource for the future of the nation's efforts to design, build and deploy trustworthy systems. The National Science Foundation assembled more than sixty academics from universities across the country to contribute to the 60-day cyber policy review. Their areas of interest included privacy; computer networking and security; cryptography and web security; trust and risk; Internet commerce, usability, and feasibility; usable privacy and security; network security and architecture; theory of network security; biologically-inspired security; systems security; systems and software engineering; systems and wireless security and botnets; host security and usability; e-vote security; the power grid; clean-slate security; and theoretical computer science and nanotechnology, among other disciplines. These academics were affiliated with the following institutions: Brown University, Carnegie Mellon University, Columbia University, Cornell University, Dartmouth College, Georgia Tech, Indiana University, Johns Hopkins University, the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, New York University, North Carolina State University, Purdue University, Princeton University, SRI International, Stanford University, the University of California-Berkeley, the University of California-Santa Barbara, the University of Illinois at Urbana- Champaign, the University of New Mexico, the University of Southern California, the University of Washington, and Yale University.\n\n## State And Local Constituents\n\n\n\nState governments are experiencing many of the same network intrusions and infections as the Federal government. Recognizing that the Nation must identify ways to leverage State resources, provide assistance, and continue cooperation, the 60-day cyber policy review team engaged with state Chief Information Security Officers (CISO) and Chief Information Officers (CIO) through the Office of Management and Budget's E-Government and Information Technology Office and the Department of Homeland Security's US-CERT. The Multi-State Information Sharing Advisory Council\n(MS-ISAC) and National Governors Association were also engaged to gain a better understanding of State and local needs.\n\n## Independent U.S. Government Agencies\n\n\n\nWhile it is often preferable to allow markets to create appropriate incentives for desired behaviors, there are occasions when government intervention is necessary. Ensuring the health, security, and growth potential of the U.S. information and communications infrastructure will require a success ful partnership between government and the private sector. The 60-day cyber policy review team reached out to regulatory agencies for their views on sound regulation for an effective market\nplace. The Commodity Futures Trading Commission, the Federal Communications Commission, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, the Federal Reserve Board of Governors, the Federal Trade Commission, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (a component of the Department of the Treasury rather than an independent agency), and the Securities and Exchange Commission all provided information or met with the review team.\n\n\n\nThe 60-day cyber review team also met with independent agencies such as the Social Security Administration which uses on-line services to interact daily with the American public. Additional information was considered regarding the Federal Aviation Administration and the informational services it provides to the Nation.\n\n## The United States Congress\n\n\n\nThe 60-day cyber policy review team recognizes that Congress must be engaged at every stage of the review and will have important roles to play going forward. Creating and maintaining a trans parent and connected democracy is a key tenet of the Administration. Accordingly, the review team engaged Members and staff of the Congress across 10 committees in both chambers and also provided a briefing to the House Cyber Caucus.\n\n## Foreign Partners\n\n\n\nThe United States cannot succeed by acting in isolation, because cyberspace crosses geographic and jurisdictional boundaries. The United States must work actively with countries around the world to make the digital infrastructure a trusted, safe, and secure place that enables prosperity for all nations. The 60-day cyber policy review team engaged with key U.S. allies to learn how they are organizing for this challenge and to understand their mission requirements and priorities. One area needing further study is whether and in what ways elements of the information and communica tions infrastructure ought to be treated as a global commons.\n\n## Conducting Gap Analyses, Reviewing Program Effectiveness, And Identifying Policy Gaps, Overlaps, And Opportunities For Collaboration\n\n\n\nThe review team queried and analyzed responses from 21 Federal departments and agencies to identify areas where cyberspace policy gaps exist, where mission areas overlap, and where there are opportunities for collaboration between agencies. This analysis suggested that any complete national cyber policy must consider, at a minimum, the following elements:\n\n\n\n-  *Governance:* Encompasses U.S. Government (USG) structures for policy development and\ncoordination of operational activities related to the cyber mission across the Executive Branch. This element includes reviewing overlapping missions and responsibilities that are the result of authority being vested with various departments and agencies.\n\n\n\n-  *Architecture:* Addresses the performance, cost, and security characteristics of existing infor\nmation and communications systems and infrastructures as well as strategic planning for the optimal system characteristics that will be needed in the future. This element includes standards, identity management, authentication and attribution, software assurance, research and development, procurement, and supply chain risk management.\n\n\n-  *Norms of Behavior:* Addresses those elements of law, regulation, and international treaties\nand undertakings, as well as consensus-based measures, such as best practices, that col lectively circumscribe and define standards of conduct in cyberspace.\n\n\n\n-  *Capacity Building:* Encompasses the overall scale of resources, activities, and capabilities\nrequired to become a more cyber-competent nation. These include resource requirements, research and development, public education and awareness, and international partnerships, and all other activities that allow the USG to interface with its citizenry and workforce to build the digital information and communications infrastructure of the future.\n\n\nThe review team also identified areas that cut across all of the foundational elements and included these in the analysis framework: Information Sharing and Access; Public-Private Partnerships; Legal, Policy, and Authorities; Protecting Civil Liberties and Privacy Rights; International Partnerships and Forums; Incident Response, and Research and Development.\n\n## Developing A Roadmap To Identify Short-, Mid-, And Long-Term Issues, An Organizational Structure To Address These Issues, And An Accountability Mechanism To Ensure Compliance\n\n\nThe review team synthesized the input from the requirements compilation and the extensive engagement functions to begin developing a roadmap that outlines a way forward.\n\n\n\nWithin the roadmap, the team prioritized issues for further consideration. The roadmap includes an organizational structure and proposals for accountability mechanisms that will ensure coordinated policies.\n\nThis review produced recommendations on an optimal White House organizational construct to coordinate all issues related to U.S. and global information and communications infrastructures and capabilities. It also led to the broad outlines of a proposed interagency cyber policy action plan.\n\n\n\n# Appendix C:  Growth Of Modern Communications Technology In The United States And Development Of Supporting Legal And Regulatory Frameworks\n\n\n\nThis paper highlights some of the significant historical milestones in the growth and convergence of modern communications media and information technology in the United States over the last century, along with the increasing importance of these media to support commercial, societal, and governmental purposes. It also attempts to trace at a high level some of the corresponding milestones in law, regulation, and policy that were intended to accommodate needs associated with these changing uses. Rooted in the Nation's experience with wire and radio media and com munications in the 20th Century, present U.S. laws and policies governing cyberspace reflect serial attempts to keep pace with newly emerging challenges presented by the rapid technological and marketplace changes in communications, computing, networking, and security technologies.\n\nThis review is not meant to be exhaustive; nor does it seek to present legal analysis of the laws and instruments discussed.1 Rather, it attempts only to capture noteworthy highlights of the histori\ncal progression to survey the landscape of Federal authorities that now apply to information and communications technology and systems. The picture that emerges shows this landscape to be an elaborate patchwork of domestic and international laws and structures that shape policy options.\n\n## Early Development And Use Of The Media For Civil And Commercial Purposes\n\n\n\nThe development of the electric telegraph in the 1840s and the telephone in the late 1870s made rapid long-distance communications possible. Both media began in local areas and then rapidly spread to connect large parts of the Nation and the world. Fewer than five years after its introduc\ntion, over 47,000 telephones were being used in the United States. The growth of these commu nications media accelerated the pace of social interaction, migration, commerce, and government activities.\n\nThe telegraph and, to a greater degree, the telephone continued to be the principal media for telecommunications for most of the 20th Century. The introduction of undersea cables in the late 1850s enabled worldwide communications structures and the expansion of the leading telecom munications companies to a dominant position in the industry.\n\n\n\nThe invention of \"wireless telegraphy\"(now known as\"radio\") at the turn of the 20th Century greatly increased the mobility of official and personal communications and made greater volumes of com munications possible. Radio quickly emerged as both a medium for point-to-point (e.g., ship-to shore) and point-to-multipoint telecommunications (e.g., police dispatch) and a mass medium for information, entertainment, and commerce. Fueled by technological advances like the amplifying vacuum tube in 1913, both coast-to-coast telephony and transatlantic radio transmission became possible, weaving the world even closer together. The utility and consequent worldwide adoption and rapid evolution of these new communications media prompted the creation of new legal and regulatory regimes both internationally and domestically to set rates, standardize terms of service, and allocate frequency bands to radio services by country.\n\n\n\nThe advent of international communications via telegraph led to the International Telegraph Union Convention and the formation of the International Telegraph Union in 1865, and the United States became a member in 1908. The Department of State has led U.S. delegations to this organization (and its successor) since the United States first joined it. Communication via radiotelegraph led to the International Radiotelegraph Convention in 1906.\n\n\n\nOn the domestic front, the Radio Act of 1912 established a radio licensing regime within the Department of Commerce and required certain ships to carry radios for communications. Due to conflict between amateur radio operators and the U.S. Navy and corporations, the Radio Act further regulated private radio communications, thus setting the precedent for federal regulation of wire\nless communications.\n\nIn the Radio Act of 1927, Congress directed the transfer of this radio frequency licensing regime from the Department of Commerce (with the notable exception of federal agencies' authorization to use radio frequencies) to a newly created five-member independent agency, the Federal Radio Commission. The Radio Act of 1927 also outlawed the interception of private radio messages and divulging their contents. Regulation of wireline communications remained separate from wire\nless, however, with responsibility shared between the Commerce Department and the Interstate Commerce Commission. Following on the popularity of radio, television debuted in the 1920s and by the 1950s was firmly entrenched.\n\n\n\nThe next noteworthy developments came less than a decade later, in 1934. First, the International Telegraph Convention and the International Radiotelegraph Convention combined, and the International Telegraph Union was renamed the International Telecommunication Union (ITU). In 1949, the ITU became a specialized agency of the United Nations. The ITU Constitution and Convention are updated every four years and will next be negotiated again in 2010 at the ITU Plenipotentiary Conference in Veracruz, Mexico.\n\n\n\nSecond, coinciding with the establishment of the ITU, Congress enacted the Communications Act of 1934, which replaced the Federal Radio Commission with a new agency, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) and consolidated in it authorities for both wireless and wireline communications. In particular, the Communications Act gave the FCC broad authority to regulate:\n\n\ninterstate and foreign commerce in communication by wire and radio so as to make available, without discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion, national origin, or sex, a rapid efficient, Nation-wide, and world-wide wire and radio communica tion service with adequate facilities at reasonable charges, for the purpose of the national defense, for the purpose of promoting safety of life and property through the use of wire and radio communication . . . .2\n\n\n\nSince its inception, the FCC has remained the primary institution responsible for formulating and implementing U.S. policies and regulations governing private, commercial electronic communica tions within the United States and between the United States and other countries. Its jurisdiction over \"communication by wire and radio\" has been reinforced by multiple amendments to the Communications Act over the years. This has enabled the FCC to affect the economic and technical development of virtually all types of electronic communications, including telegraph, telephone service, cable television, radio, television, wireless telecommunications and, more recently, emerg ing advanced telecommunications technologies and services. Separate from the FCC, however, the White House with support from the Department of Commerce retained a role in management of the Federal government's use of radio spectrum, and in the development of executive branch policies related to communications, for another 44 years.3\n\n\n\nInnovation in electronic communications continued to progress during the 1940s. The need to deliver television signals to communities in remote mountain areas led to the early development of community antenna television (CATV) systems, which, with the adoption of coaxial cable, and more recently fiber optic cable, would later evolve into the modern cable television systems that now compete with telephone companies to deliver video, voice, and data services to customers. It was also during this decade that radio and telephony intersected with the invention of the transistor and the advent of mobile radiotelephone technology. Broader commercial and public use of mobile telephone service began in the 1970s, and the first commercial cellular networks were developed in 1982 and 1983. By 2004, wireless subscribership in the United States had exceeded 180 million.\n\n\n\nThe first experimental communications satellite was launched in 1962. It was the first satellite to receive, amplify, and simultaneously re-transmit signals from earth. The development of satellite communications available not only to governments but also the commercial sector and individuals led to even greater volumes of communications worldwide.\n\n\n\nAs noted above, for most of the 20th Century, the White House directly managed executive branch communications policy and the Federal government's use of the radio spectrum, supported by the Department of Commerce. In 1978, however, the Carter Administration disaggregated and reorganized telecommunications functions within the Executive Branch. In Executive Order 12046,4\nPresident Carter dissolved the White House Office of Telecommunications Policy (OTP) and trans\n\nferred its responsibilities, respectively, either to the Commerce Department or back to the President for re-delegation to other components within his Executive Office.\n\n\n\nResponsibility for Federal radio spectrum management and development and presentation of telecommunications and information policies on behalf of the Executive Branch were transferred to the Commerce Department, and a new agency, the National Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA), was established to perform them.5 These responsibilities were codified by the NTIA Organization Act in 1992.6 By contrast, OTP's responsibility to advise the President, and develop and establish policies, regarding procurement and management of Federal telecommuni\ncations systems, were reassigned to the Office of Management and Budget (OMB).7 Similarly, OTP's responsibilities relating to emergency and national security communications were reassigned to the National Security Council (NSC) and the Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP).8\n\n## Use Of Communications Technologies In Support Of Critical Government Functions\n\n\n\nAs public adoption of each new generation of communications and information technology grew, use by government correspondingly increased. State, local, and tribal authorities have adopted these technologies for a variety of applications ranging from more efficient execution of routine administrative functions and improving government services and access to government informa tion, to support for law enforcement efforts. The Federal government has employed evolving communications and information technologies for all of these purposes as well, but it has also applied them for critical national functions including foreign affairs, military command and control, and *intelligence* efforts.\n\n\n\nFor example, following the deployment of the first successful transatlantic cable in 1866, the tele\ngraph became an important tool for U.S. diplomacy and remained so through most of the 20th Century. Spurred by the development of Morse Code, the telegraph was widely employed for mili tary purposes as well during the U.S. Civil War, and as early as 1904, the U.S. Navy was using wireless telegraphy for communications with its bases in the Caribbean Sea.\n\nRecognizing the pivotal importance of communications to support the execution of government functions during a crisis, Congress, by joint resolution in 1918, authorized the President to assume control of any telegraph, telephone, marine cable or radio system or systems in the U.S. and to operate them as needed for the duration of World War I.9 Relying on this Congressional authoriza\ntion, President Wilson issued a proclamation asserting possession, control and supervision over\n\n\n\nevery telegraph and telephone system within the United States.10 To preserve support for critical government communications needs during times of crisis, Congress later included in Section 706 of the Communications Act of 1934 authority for the President to control private communications systems within the United States during wartime.11\n\nAs governments around the world increased their use of electronic communications for diplomatic, military, and other functions, vulnerabilities of long-range radio communications made it possible to intercept foreign communications from faraway locations without the knowledge of the communi cators. The potential for \"signals intelligence\"(SIGINT) greatly increased. Conversely, the potential for interception of electronic communications led to the need for improved communications security (COMSEC) technologies and efforts: Nations including the United States sought more sophisticated means to protect their communications from interception, generally relying on electromechanical machines to encipher and decipher messages. COMSEC and Computer Security (COMPUSEC) prac\ntices were merged in the late 1980s to create Information Systems Security and, later, Information Assurance. Pursuant to Executive Order 12333, as amended, the Secretary of Defense serves as the Executive Agent for SIGINT and the Director of the National Security Agency (NSA) serves as Functional Manager for SIGINT and National Manager for National Security Systems.12\n\nUse of electronic surveillance for legitimate purposes such as intelligence and law enforcement investigation, as well as for illegitimate purposes, spurred enactment of a number of laws intended to comprehensively address such activities. Congress enacted the first federal wiretap statute as a temporary measure to prevent disclosure of domestic telephone or telegraph communications during the First World War.13 The Communications Act of 1934 extended the ban on intercepting and divulging of messages to telephone and telegraph communications. In 1968, Congress passed Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act (the Federal Wiretap Act),14 and 18 years later enacted the Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986 (ECPA),15 which substantially revised Title III to provide coverage for the technological advances developed in the area of electronic com munications since the passage of the original act. In 1978, Congress enacted the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA),16 which established the framework for conducting electronic surveillance for foreign intelligence purposes.17\nWorld events and changes in the communications marketplace also prompted changes in govern ment organizational structures and policies. In response to communications problems experienced during the Cuban Missile Crisis, President Kennedy in 1963 established the National Communications\n\n\n\nSystem (NCS).18 Two decades later, responding in part to the break-up of AT&T, President Reagan re\nchartered and strengthened the NCS, increasing its membership and establishing an administrative structure to ensure that national telecommunications infrastructure is responsive to national security and emergency preparedness (NS/EP) needs.19 By its terms, the executive order was intended to support \"improved execution of national security and emergency preparedness telecommunica tions functions,\" but it did not address information systems, or converged information and com munications networks which now provide the foundation for most critical NS/EP communications requirements.\n\n\n\nExecutive Order 12472 continued the disaggregation and realignment of telecommunications responsibilities started in E.O. 12046, especially with respect to NS/EP functions. First, it established two new roles, Executive Agent and Manager of the NCS, who were responsible for oversight and day-to-day administration of the NCS organization.20 It also bifurcated responsibilities for certain NS/EP functions among elements within the Executive Office of the President (EOP). For example, it charged the NSC to provide policy direction for the exercise of the President's war power functions under the Communications Act but gave the OSTP responsibility to direct the exercise of those functions.21 The E.O. created a similar split of responsibilities with respect to the exercise of the President's non-wartime emergency telecommunications functions; the identification, allocation, and use of the Nation's telecommunications resources during a crisis or emergency; and planning and oversight activities.22\n\n## Emergence Of Computing, The Internet, And The Convergence Of Information And Communications Technology\n\n\n\nComputers. The development of electronic computing systems following World War II fostered the transition from analog to digital technology. Increasing miniaturization led to high adaptability of computers for many different modes of communications.  The first e-mail program was created in 1971, and the first PC modem was invented in 1977, enabling digital computers to communicate with one another over analog telephone lines. The first popular computers for the mass consumer market first emerged in the early 1980s, coincident in time with the emergence of the Internet as a global network-of-networks. This new, retail computing capability was quickly adopted by govern ment, private commercial entities, and the general public.\n\n\n\nAs the data speeds of modems progressively increased, computer users were encouraged to con nect to the telephone network to access newly-emerging online services (e.g., CompuServe and America Online), which, in turn, fueled the market for new online applications and services of value to consumers. The World Wide Web, first conceptualized in 1984, came into widespread public use a decade later as a ubiquitous environment accessible through the telephone network. The corre\n\nsponding progressive migration from the traditional copper telephone infrastructure and co-axial cable to fiber optic infrastructure has delivered increased bandwidth and speed to users.\n\nAs information technology and systems evolved, Congress enacted a separate body of law governing computers and information systems. The Brooks Act,23 enacted in 1965, gave the National Bureau of Standardsnow the Department of Commerce's National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST)responsibilities for developing automatic data processing standards and guidelines pertain ing to Federal computer systems. The responsibilities assigned to NBS, however, did not apply to the procurement of automatic data processing equipment or services by the Central Intelligence Agency or to what are now called \"national security systems\" by the Department of Defense. The Computer Security Act of 1987,24 which further amended the Brooks Act, gave NIST the authority for developing standards and guidelines for the security of non-national security systems and required NIST to collaborate with NSA.\n\nThe Federal Information Security Management Act of 2002 (FISMA)25 amended the Computer Security Act, leaving intact the roles of NIST and NSA, but it gave OMB expanded information secu rity oversight responsibilities over all Executive Branch departments and agencies; it authorized the Director of OMB to require agencies to follow the standards and guidelines developed by NIST, review agency security programs annually and approve or disapprove them, and take authorized actions to ensure compliance. FISMA did not change, however, the dichotomy that exists in the treatment of civilian and national security systems.\n\nWhile national security systems continued to be excluded from NIST oversight,26 other regimes were established to deal with them, most notably National Security Directive 42. NSD-42, issued in July 1990, expanded the scope of a previously chartered national security telecommunications policy coordinating body to encompass information systems as well. In addition, it established a new body, the National Security Telecommunications and Information Systems Security Committee (NSTISSC). The NSTISSC was charged, among other things, to provide systems security guidance for national security systems for Executive Branch departments and agencies and to develop appropri ate \"operating policies, procedures, guidelines, instructions, standards, objectives, and priorities as may be required . . . .\"27 The NSTISSC shared many of the structural characteristics of the NCS, includ\ning an interagency membership structure (which included the Manager of the NCS) administered by an Executive Agent, which function was assigned to the Secretary of Defense, and a National Manager (the Director of NSA) that assists the Secretary in executing assigned information assur\nance responsibilities.28\n\n\n\nDevelopment of the Internet. Consistent with the need to ensure the continuity of communications for these critical national security needs, the Federal government, in 1962, commissioned a study on how the government could maintain command and control over its missiles and bombers after a nuclear attack. This effort yielded a concept for a network that would break up the information into \"packets\"sent through various computers and could be reassembled at the destination location. Unlike the conventional hub and spoke telephone system available at the time, an attack on any one part of the proposed system would allow the undamaged portions to continue operating. During the 1960s, what is now the Department of Defense (DOD) Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) sought to develop this network idea, eventually establishing ARPANET, a computer link between the University of California, Los Angeles, and the Stanford Research Institute, in 1969.29\n\n\n\nARPANET expanded significantly during the 1980s, interconnecting with numerous educational institutions and a growing number of companies that were participating in government research projects or providing services to entities participating in such projects. Moreover, during this time, other packet-switched networks were emerging in the United States and elsewhere around the world (e.g., Europe, Australia, Japan, Singapore, and Thailand) and seeking to connect to this\n\"Internet.\"30 This network-of-networks continued to grow over the course of the next decade until, in 1997, the United States government undertook to privatize the Internet's domain name and addressing system (DNS) in a manner intended to increase competition and facilitate international participation in its management.\n\n## A Shift In The Law, And The Emergence Of \"Cybersecurity\"\n\n\n\nAs the Internet grew, the government, like the private sector, rapidly adopted this new medium for a wide variety of applications including interconnecting the civilian department and agency, defense, and intelligence community networks across the government to facilitate more rapid com munications and common processing tasks. While this evolution was progressing, policy makers in Congress and the Executive Branch were separately considering dramatic changes to the legal and regulatory framework that had governed communications technologies and markets for decades. Invigorated by the emergence of competition in the long distance telephone market following the breakup of AT&T, policy makers reexamined regulatory frameworks that had historically perpetu ated monopolistic market structures (e.g., local exchange telephone and cable television services) and sought to replace them with new regimes that would stimulate the emergence of competition, lowering costs for consumers and accelerating the development and deployment of advanced telecommunications infrastructures.\n\n\n\nThe Telecommunications Act of 199631 represented the first major overhaul of telecommunications law since the enactment of the Communications Act. Its stated purpose was to \"promote competi tion and reduce regulation in order to secure lower prices and higher quality services for American telecommunications consumers and encourage the rapid deployment of new telecommunica\ntions technologies.\"32 The 1996 Act significantly deregulated U.S. telecommunications markets, eliminating regulatory barriers that had previously prevented various types of service providers from competing with one another: it opened the door for local telephone companies to provide long distance services and for long distance carriers and cable television operators to provide local phone service. Cognizant of the potential of then-emerging digital communications networks, the 1996 Act articulated that:\n\n\n\nthe policy of the United States [is] . . . to promote the continued development of the Internet and other interactive computer services and other interactive media\n. . . [and] preserve the vibrant and competitive free market that presently exists\nfor the Internet and other interactive computer services, unfettered by Federal or State regulation . . . .33\n\n\nThe thirteen years since the Telecommunications Act was passed have witnessed significant growth and transformation in the telecommunications marketplace. Advanced wireline and, increasingly, wireless broadband network infrastructures have been (and continue to be) deployed that provide an increasingly diverse array of applications and services to both commercial and individual users, accessible over a growing variety of fixed and mobile devices. They support the clearing of bil lions of dollars in transactions among financial institutions, trading on exchanges, online banking, e-commerce, as well as billing and account management for many retailers and service providers; they facilitate rapid, global communications and the storage and transfer of enormous volumes of information, including proprietary business information, intellectual property, customer account and transaction information, and other personally identifiable private user information such as health records; they make an array of heretofore inaccessible information available at the user's fingertips with a few keystrokes. They have also become essential elements in the operation and manage\nment of a range of critical infrastructure functions, including transportation systems, shipping, the electric power grid, oil and gas pipelines, nuclear plants, water systems, critical manufacturing, and many others.\n\n\n\nThe capabilities of these systems have also changed the way governments at all levels do business: they enable advanced communications for law enforcement, public safety, and emergency response officials; make government more accessible (e.g., e-FOIA); and have led to innovative new means of delivering a wide variety of services and benefits to citizens (including motor vehicle licensing and registration, social security benefits, tax administration, and grants management). As noted above, they also support continuity of the most critical functions of national government, including command and control of the armed forces, foreign affairs, intelligence, crisis response, and national criminal investigation and law enforcement.\n\n\n\nAs dependence on these converged systems grew, users and network managers became aware of new types of vulnerabilities in the infrastructure. Moreover, the rapid emergence of the online commercial environment, the growing monetary value of transactions, and the increasing volume of sensitive information accessible online have also increased the online threat landscape by fuel\ning the growth of organized criminal elements and other adversaries. Not only was it necessary to protect the information content, it became necessary to ensure the confidentiality of information as well as the authenticity of its sender and recipient.\n\n\n\nAlthough these trends increased following the 1996 Telecommunications Act, they had already been under way for some time. Thus, by 1998, as the scope of the risk associated with these depen dences expanded to encompass not only converged government communications and information systems, but also the systems supporting national critical infrastructures, policy makers began to recognize the need for an integrated effort that coupled the capabilities of government and the private sector to mitigate these risks. \"Cybersecurity\"emerged as a distinct policy area. Presidential Decision Directive 63 (PDD-63), signed in May 1998, established a structure under White House leadership to coordinate the activities of designated lead departments and agencies, in partnership with their counterparts from the private sector, to \"eliminate any significant vulnerability to both physical and cyber attacks on our critical infrastructures, including especially our cyber systems.\"34\n\n|     |     |     |     |     |\n|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|\n|     |     |     |     |     |\n|     |     |     |     |     |\n|     |     |     |     |     |\n|     |     |     |     |     |\n|     |     |     |     |     |\n|     |     |     |     |     |\n|     |     |     |     |     |\n|     |     |     |     |     |\n|     |     |     |     |     |\n|     |     |     |     |     |\n|     |     |     |     |     |\n\nAs these efforts matured, the White House in late 2001 augmented the structure by formally char\ntering the *President's Critical Infrastructure Protection Board*, an interagency body with cabinet-level representation from the departments and agencies and chaired by the Special Advisor to the PresidentforCyberspaceSecurityintheNSCwhowas\"assistedbyanappropriatelysizedstaff within the White House Office.\"35 The board was charged to\"recommend policies and coordinate programs for protecting information systems for critical infrastructure, including emergency preparedness communications, and the physical assets that support such systems.\" This mandate also included specific responsibilities to coordinate, in consultation with relevant offices, a range of functions including: outreach to and consultation with the private sector and State and local government, information sharing, cyber incident response programs and policies, federal government research and development for information system security and emergency preparedness communications, law enforcement programs against cyber crime, international information infrastructure protection, and legislative recommendations relating to protection of information systems.36\n\n\n\nThis coordinating function continued until March 2003, when the White House dissolved the board and its supporting staff function incident to the creation of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). The Homeland Security Act of 2002 (HSA) made the Department of Homeland Security responsible for coordinating national efforts to protect critical infrastructure across all sectors, including information technology and telecommunications systems. It also gave the Secretary of Homeland Security wide access to information relating to threats of terrorism against the United States and to all information concerning infrastructure or other vulnerabilities of the U.S. to terrorism.\n\n\n\nFrom an operational standpoint, the HSA transferred to DHS responsibility for managing the National Communications System (NCS) as well as the Federal Computer Incident Response Center (FedCIRC), which had previously been operated by the General Services Administration. Within months after coming into existence, DHS established the National Cyber Security Division within its Office of Infrastructure Protection as a differentiated component to manage the Department's cyber security policy and operational responsibilities.37 Shortly after creating the NSCD, DHS established the United States Computer Emergency Readiness Team (US-CERT) as the successor to FedCIRC, to serve as the principal cyber watch, warning, and analysis center for Federal civilian departments and agencies and an operational point of coordination with the private sector for cyber incident response.\n\nHomeland Security Presidential Directive 7, issued in December 2003, superseded PDD-63. It reiterated U.S. policy to enhance the protection of the nation's critical infrastructure, including its cyber infrastructure. It further assigned the Secretary of Homeland Security the responsibility for coordinating the nation's overall critical infrastructure protection efforts across all sectors, working in cooperation with designated sector-specific agencies within the Executive Branch. It designated DHS as a the lead agency for the nation's Information Technology and Communications sectors, to share threat information, help assess vulnerabilities, and encourage appropriate protective action and the development of contingency plans.\n\n## Other Important Developments\n\n\n\nComplementing these statutes affecting the structure and economic regulation of the communica tions marketplace, Congress has also over time enacted various laws intended to protect the public from abuses of these communications platforms and to facilitate their use in support of criminal investigations and other law enforcement purposes. The Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act (CALEA), enacted in 1994, amended both the Wiretap Act and ECPA. It further defined the existing statutory obligation of telecommunications carriers to assist law enforce\nment in executing electronic surveillance, including over wireless and digital communications systems, pursuant to court order or other lawful authorization. CALEA was intended to preserve law enforcement's ability to conduct lawful electronic surveillance over emerging digital networks while preserving public safety, the public's right to privacy, and the telecommunications industry's competitiveness.\n\n\n\nTo address the lack of criminal laws available to fight emerging computer crimes following the advent of computers as consumer electronics items in the early 1980s, Congress enacted the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, which included provisions to address the unauthorized access and use of computers and computer networks.38 Two years later, that was followed by the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act of 1986 (CFAA). The CFAA clarified provisions in the 1984 law and also criminalized additional computer-related acts, including theft of property via computer and\n\n\n\nthe intentional alteration, damage, or destruction of data belonging to others.39 The USA PATRIOT\nAct of 2001, passed in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, and reauthorized in 2005, provided a range of tools to support law enforcement capabilities to combat terrorism, including enhancing law enforcement's surveillance capabilities.\n\n## Conclusion\n\n\n\nThe history of electronic communications in the United States reflects steady, robust technological innovation punctuated by government efforts to regulate, manage, or otherwise respond to issues presented by these new media, including security concerns. The iterative nature of the statutory and policy developments over time has led to a mosaic of government laws and structures gov\nerning various parts of the landscape for information and communications security and resiliency. Effectively addressing the fragmentary and diverse nature of the technical, economic, legal, and policy challenges will require a leadership and coordination framework that can stitch this patchwork together into an integrated whole.\n\n## History Informs Our Future\n\nRadio Act of 1927;\nOutlawed intercept\n    of private\n communication\n\nCounterfeit Access\n    Device and\nComputer Fraud and\n  Abuse Act, 1984\n\nCommunications Act of 1934;\nFormed the FCC\nModern ITU formed by merger of ITU Convention and IRC, 1934\nFISA\nAmendments Act,  2008\n\n     2002:\n     Federal\n   Information\n    Security\nManagement Act;\nHomeland Security\n   Act of 2002;\n Sarbanes-Oxley\n      Act\n\nHSPD-23\n(2008)\nUSA PATRIOT Act and"
    },
    {
        "text": "Assisting People to Become Independent Learners in the\n                                                        Analysis of Intelligence\n\n                                                                Final Technical Report\n\n                                                              Office of Naval Research\n                                                           Contract N00014-02-C-0203\n                                                                             CDRL A002\n\n                                                                   Author: Peter Pirolli\n\n                                                       Palo Alto Research Center, Inc.\n                                                                 3333 Coyote Hill Road\n                                                                   Palo Alto, CA. 94304\n\n\n## Report Documentation Page\n\nPublic reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden to Washington Headquarters Service, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project (0704-0188) Washington, DC 20503.\n\nPLEASE DO NOT RETURN YOUR FORM TO THE ABOVE ADDRESS.\n\n02-28-2006\nFinal Report\n01-31-2002 to 12-31-2005\n\nN00014-02-C-0203\n\n## 4. Title And Subtitle Assisting People To Become Independent Learners In The Analysis Of Intelligence: Final Technical Report (Cdrl A002)\n\nPirolli, Peter L.\n\n## 8. Performing Organization\n\n7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)\nPalo Alto Research Center, Inc 3333 Coyote Hill Rd Palo Alto, CA 94304\n\n## 10. Sponsor/Monitor's Acronym(S) Onr\n\n9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)\nOffice of Naval Research 875 North Randolph Street, Suite 1425 Code 34 and Code 254 Arlington, CA 22203-1995\n\n## 11. Sponsoring/Monitoring 12. Distribution Availability Statement Approved For Public Release; Distribution Unlimited 13. Supplementary Notes\n\n14. ABSTRACT\nThe purpose of this project was to conduct applied research with exemplary technology to support post-graduate instruction in intelligence analysis. The first phase of research used Cognitive Task Analysis (CTA) to understand the nature of subject matter expertise for this domain, as well as leverage points for technology support. Results from the CTA and advice from intelligence analysis instructors at the Naval Postgraduate School lead us to focus on the development of a collaborative computer tool (CACHE) to support a method called the Analysis of Competing Hypotheses (ACH). We first evaluated a non-collaborative version of an ACH tool in an NPS intelligence classroom setting, followed by an evaluation of the collaborative tool, CACHE at NPS. These evaluations, along with similar studies conducted in coordination with NIST and MITRE, suggested that ACH and CACHE can support intelligence activities and mitigate confirmation bias. However, collaborative analysis has a number of trade-offs: it incurs overhead costs, and can mitigate or exacerbate confirmation bias, depending on the mixture of predisposing biases of collaborators.\n\n15. SUBJECT TERMS\nIntelligence analysis\n\n## 16. Security Classification Of: Overview\n\nThe purpose of this project (Assisting People to Become Independent Learners in the Analysis of Intelligence) was to conduct applied research with exemplary technology to support post-graduate instruction in intelligence analysis. Part of this effort was aimed at building up empirical studies of analyst knowledge, reasoning, performance, learning, etc, involved in intelligence analysis. This first phase of research used Cognitive Task Analysis (CTA) to understand the nature of subject matter expertise for this domain, as well as leverage points for technology support. Results from the CTA and advice from intelligence analysis instructors at the Naval Postgraduate School lead us to focus on the development of a collaborative computer tool (CACHE) to support a method developed by Heuer (1999) called the Analysis of Competing Hypotheses (ACH). We first evaluated a noncollaborative version of an ACH tool in an NPS intelligence classroom setting, followed by an evaluation of the collaborative tool, CACHE at NPS. These evaluations, along with similar studies conducted in coordination with NIST and MITRE, suggested that ACH and CACHE can support intelligence activities and mitigate confirmation bias. However, collaborative analysis has a number of trade-offs: it incurs overhead costs, and can mitigate or exacerbate confirmation bias, depending on the mixture of predisposing biases of collaborators.\n\n\n\nIntelligence analysis is an example of a class of tasks we have come to call *sensemaking* tasks.\n\nSuch tasks involve finding and collecting information from large information collections, organizing\n\nand understanding that information, and producing some product, such as a briefing or actionable decision.   Examples of such tasks include understanding a health problem in order to make a medical decision, forecasting the weather, or deciding which laptop to buy.  Figure 1 represents our notional understanding of the analyst's process.  The rectangular boxes represent an approximate data flow we have seen across several analysts.  The circles represent the process flow.  The processes and data are arranged by degree of effort and degree of structure. This is a process with lots of back loops and seems to have one set of activities that cycle around finding information and another that cycles around making sense of the information, with plenty of interaction between these. This process diagram summarizes how it is that an analyst comes up with *novel information*.   The overall process is organized into two major loops of activities: (1) a *foraging loop* (Figure 1) that involves processes aimed at seeking information, searching and filtering it, and reading and extracting information, and (2) a *sense making loop* that involves iterative development of a mental model (a conceptualization) that best fits the evidence. Information processing can be driven by bottom-up processes (from data to theory) or *top-down* (from theory to data in an opportunistic mix.\nSection 1 of this report provides an account of our CTA of the process depicted in Figure 1. That analysis, in combination with other CTAs (Pirolli *et al*., 2004), suggested that we focus on (a) foraging; improving the amount of useful data processed per unit time and (b) *sensemaking*; mitigation of confirmation bias. With ACH and CACHE the aim was to achieve these effects by reducing the cost structure of interaction, improving the coverage of data (the total set collectively attended) through collaboration, and technology that supported attention to alternative hypotheses and a process of disconfirmation rather than confirmation.\nSection 2 reports on our evaluation of a computer-based tool to support the ACH method. The basic ACH method involves using a Hypothesis X Evidence matrix, identifying possible hypotheses, listing evidence for/against each hypothesis, and attempting to disprove hypotheses as opposed to confirming hypothesis. The basic claims about the ACH method (Heuer, 1999) are that it promotes the generation of a fuller set of alternative hypotheses, alternative hypotheses receive more equitable distribution of attention, attention is focused on evidence with the greatest diagnostic value, and confirmation bias is reduced. Cheikes *et al*. (2004) performed a study of a non-computerized version of the ACH method and found that, although all subjects showed evidence of confirmation bias, users of ACH showed less distortions of evidence than non-ACH users. These effects were stronger for non-expert analysts than experts. An unpublished study by Emile Morse and Jean Scholtz at NIST had analysts work cases with and without the ACH tool developed at PARC. Among other findings, the NIST study found that analysts were confident that ACH would help improve the thoroughness of analysis, the method was easy to learn and use, and they were inclined to us the method in future work. The PARC evaluation of the ACH tool showed that the computer version of ACH did not differ from doing ACH by hand in terms of amount of evidence considered or hypotheses generated.\n\n\n\nSection 3 describes an evaluation of a follow-on system to ACH called CACHE. Using feedback on ACH, we developed a Collaborative ACH Environment (CACHE) designed to support collaboration\n(synchronous or asynchronous) among communities or groups of analysts. CACHE is designed to support the sharing of evidence and of ACH analysis matrices. The CACHE architecture is a Webbased, client-server architecture. The user interface can be run through any Web browser, which connects to a backend that supports evidence integration, natural language processing, and semantic search. Generally, there is the intuition that one can achieve better intelligence analysis through collaboration because: (1) Like over-the-horizon radar, an individual analyst may receive information otherwise unseen because of the information flowing to him or her from a social network of collaborators. (2) Collectively, by arranging the spotlights of attention of individual analysts to insure maximum, exhaustive coverage of the evidence and hypotheses, one can bring to light some crucial data or insight that might otherwise be missed. (3) Coordinated teams of experts may be assembled in order to exploit years of specialized skill and relevant knowledge about background and precedents, and to deliberately confront problems whose solutions require breakthroughs. (4) Diversity of viewpoints can be brought to bear to provide mutually corrective forces to overcome the cognitive heuristics and biases that often create blindness to impending threats. Each of these beneficial effects is crucial to overcoming the most frequent impediments to intelligence analysts.\n\nHowever, there are also costs to collaboration. As reviewed in Section 3, face-to-face interaction frequently yields biased information foraging because there is a tendency to focus on evidence and hypotheses held in common. The CACHE experiment in Section 3 was motivated by prior research indicating that computer support can mitigate this \"common ground\" effect, and careful construction of groups to insure diversity could mitigate confirmation bias. The results of the CACHE evaluation were mixed. One the one hand, careful construction of diverse groups mitigated confirmation bias as compared to collaborations among groups with homogenous biases, However, diverse groups and solitary users were not significantly different in their reduction in confirmation bias. So, CACHE appears to mitigate confirmation bias in solitary users and diverse groups, but it appears that the overhead of collaboration in CACHE was cancelling out any additional benefits of collaboration over solitary work. However, as this was the first evaluation of CACHE, usability questions revealed a large number of potential improvements that could be made to CACHE to attenuate the collaboration costs in future versions of the system.\n\n\n\nREFERENCES\n\nCheikes, B.A., brown, M.J., Lehrner, P.E.,,  and Alderman, L. (2004). Confirmation bias in complex\nanalyses. (Tech. Rep. No. MTR 04B0000017). Bedford, MA: MITRE.\n\nHeuer, R.J. (1999). *Psychology of intelligence analysis.* Washington, D.C.: Center for the Study of\nIntelligence.\nPirolli, P., Lee, T., and Card, S.K. (2004). Levererage points for analyst technology identified through\ncognitive task analysis (UIR Tech. Rep.) Palo Alto, CA: Palo Alto Research Center.\n\n\n\n                           Section 1\n    What Makes Intelligence Analysis Difficult?\nA Cognitive Task Analysis of Intelligence Analysts\n\n                      Susan G. Hutchins\n                   Naval Postgraduate School\n               Information Sciences Department\n                  589 Dyer Road, Code IS/Hs\n                  Monterey, CA  93943-5000\n\nshutchins@nps.edu\n\n\n\nPeter L. Pirolli and Stuart K. Card\n     Palo Alto Research Center\n  User Interface Research Group\n      3333 Coyote Hill Road\n       Palo Alto, CA  94304\n\npirolli@parc.com\ncard@parc.com\n\n\n\nABSTRACT\n\nIntelligence analysts engage in information seeking, evaluation, prediction, and reporting behavior in an extremely information-intensive work environment.\nA Cognitive Task Analysis (CTA) was conducted on intelligence analysts to capture data that will provide input to support development of a computational model of the analyst's processes and analytic strategies.  A hybrid method was used to conduct the CTA, including a modified version of the critical decision method.  Participants were asked to describe an example of a critical analysis assignment where they had to collect, analyze, and produce a report on intelligence of a strategic nature.  Procedures used to conduct the CTA are described in this chapter along with initial results.  Several factors contribute to making the analyst's task challenging: (i) time pressure, (ii) a high cognitive workload, and (iii) difficult human judgments.  Human judgments are involved in considering the plausibility of information, deciding what information to trust, and determining how much weight to place on specific pieces of data.  Intelligence analysis involves a complex process of assessing the reliability of information from a wide variety of sources and combining seemingly unrelated events.  This problem is challenging because it involves aspects of data mining, data correlation and human judgment.\n\n\n\n## Introduction In This Chapter We Describe Research Involving A Cognitive Task Analysis (Cta)\n\nwith intelligence analysts, in line with one of the themes of this book, namely, strategies used by experts who are confronted with tough scenarios and unusual tasks.  We present what we have learned regarding how experienced practitioners deal with the extremely challenging task of intelligence analysis by summarizing a set of ten CTA interviews conducted with intelligence analysts to identify leverage points for the development of new technologies.\nThe challenges facing practitioners in the modern world where expertise gets\n\"stretched\" by dynamics and uncertainty, a second them for this book, also characterize the problems experienced by intelligence analysts.  Part of the effort reported in this chapter is aimed at building up an empirical psychological science of analyst knowledge, reasoning, performance, and learning.  We expect this will provide a scientific basis for design insights for new analyst technologies.  In addition, this psychological research should yield task scenarios and benchmark tasks that can be used in controlled experimental studies and evaluation of emerging analyst technologies.\n\n## Intelligence Analysis An Ability To Sort Through Enormous Volumes Of Data And Combine Seemingly\n\nunrelated events to construct an accurate interpretation of a situation and make predictions about complex, dynamic events represents the hallmark of the intelligence analysts (IA's) job.  These volumes of data typically represent an extensive and farranging collection of sources, and are represented in many different formats (e.g., written and oral reports, photographs, satellite images, maps, tables of numeric data, to\n\nname a few).  As part of this process, the analyst must make difficult judgments to assess the relevance, reliability, and significance of these disparate pieces of information.  Intelligence analysis also involves performing complex reasoning processes such as inferential analysis, to determine \"the best explanation for uncertain, contradictory and incomplete data\" (Patterson, Roth, & Woods, 2001, p. 225).\nThe nature of the data, the complex judgments and reasoning required, and a sociotechnical environment that is characterized by high workload, time pressure, and high stakes combine to create an extremely challenging problem for the intelligence analyst.  High levels of uncertainty are associated with the data, when \"deception is the rule.\"  Since the validity of the data is always subject to question, this impacts the cognitive strategies used by analysts (Johnson, 2004).  Moreover, the complex problems to be analyzed entail complex reasoning, including abductive1, deductive2 , and inductive3 reasoning.  Finally, high stakes are associated with the pressure not to miss anything and to provide timely, actionable analysis.  Potentially high consequences for failure - where analysis products have a significant impact on policy - also contribute to make the task challenging as decisionmakers, senior policy makers, and military leaders use the products of analysis to make high-stakes decisions involving national security.\nA number of reports have emerged that provide normative or prescriptive views on intelligence analysis.  There have been very few that provide empirical, descriptive\n\n##\n\nstudies of intelligence analysis.  It is likely that there are many CTA studies of intelligence analysis that will never become part of the public literature because of the classified nature of the work involved.  Despite the spottiness of available literature, what does exist reveals that intelligence analysis is a widely variegated task domain. This means that it is important to be careful in making generalizations from any circumscribed types of intelligence tasks or types of analysts. It is equally important not to be daunted by the vastness of the domain, and to start the investigative venture somewhere.\n\nIntelligence analysis is commonly described as a highly iterative cycle involving requirements (problem) specification, collection, analysis, production, dissemination, use, and feedback.  It is an event-driven, dynamic process that involves viewing the information from different perspectives in order to examine competing hypotheses and develop an understanding of a complex issue.  The critical role of the human is to add \"value\" to original data by integrating disparate information and providing an interpretation (Krizan, 1999).  This integration and interpretation entails difficult, complex judgments to make sense of the information obtained.  This \"dis-aggregation and synthesis of collected and created evidence includes sorting out the significant from the insignificant, assessing them severally and jointly, and arriving at a conclusion by the exercise of judgment: part induction, part deduction, and part abduction.\" (Millward, 1993, in Moore, 2003).\nWarning-oriented intelligence includes supporting the need for senior policymakers to not be surprised (Bodnar, 2003).  Analysts need to \"provide detailed enough judgments - with supporting reporting - so that both the warfighter and the policymaker can anticipate the actions of potential adversaries and take timely action to\n\nsupport US interests\" (*ibid.*, p. 6).  For example, the analyst needs to make predictions regarding what the adversary has the capability to do and how likely it is that he will act. These predictions need to include what actions can be taken to change, or respond to these actions, and the probable consequences of those actions (*ibid.*).\nTable 1 presents an analysis of problem types that Krizan derives from Jones (1995) and course work at the Joint Military Intelligence College.  A range of problem types, from simplistic to indeterminate, are explicated by characterizing each level of the problem along several dimensions, such as type of analytic task, analytic method, output, and probability of error.\n\nTaxonomy of Problem Types\nSource: Analysis course material, Joint Military Intelligence College, 1991\nProblem Types\nCharacteristics\nSimplistic\nDeterministic\nModerately\nRandom\nSeverely\nRandom\nIndeterminate\nPredict future events/situations\nWhat is the question?\nObtain information\nHow much? How many?\nIdentify and rank all outcomes\nIdentify outcomes in unbounded situation\nRole of facts\nHighest\nHigh\nModerate\nLow\nLowest\nRole of judgment\nLowest\nLow\nModerate\nHigh\nHighest\nDefine futures factors\nAnalytical task\nFind\ninformation\nFind/create formula\nGenerate all outcomes\nDefine potential\noutcomes Role playing and gaming\nAnalyze models and scenarios\nAnalytical method\nSearch\nsources\nMatch data to formula\nDecision theory; utility analysis\nUse of experts\nAnalytical instrument\nMatching\nMathematical\nformula\nInfluence diagram, utility, probability\nSubjective evaluation of outcomes\nPlausible outcomes\nElaboration on expected future\nAnalytic output\nFact\nSpecific value\nor number\nWeighted alternative outcomes\nProbability of error\nLowest\nVery low\nDependent on\ndata quality\nHigh to very high\nHighest\nExhaustive learning\nFollow-up task\nNone\nNone\nMonitor for\nchange\nRepeated testing to determine true state\n\n\nFigure 1 presents another way of characterizing the domain of intelligence analysis developed by Cooper.  Along one axis there are various types of *intelligence*, along a second are different *accounts* (topics), and along a third axis are different types of *products*. The different types of intelligence (or \"sources\") are functionally organized into:\n\n *human source intelligence* (HUMINT), which includes field agents,\ninformants, and  observers (attaches),\n *imagery intelligence* (IMINT), which includes photo, electro-optical,\ninfrared, radar, and multispectral imagery from sources such as satellites,\n  *signals intelligence* (SIGINT), which includes communications, electronic,\nand telemetry,\n  *measurement and signatures intelligence* (MASINT), which includes\nacoustic and  radiation signals,\n *open source intelligence* (OSINT), which includes public documents,\nnewspapers, journals, books, television, radio, and the World Wide Web,\nand\n  all-source intelligence, which involves all of the above.\n\nDomains (or topics) may address terrorism, military, politics, science and technology (S&T), or economics.  Product types range from those that are close to the raw data, through those that involve increasing amounts of analysis that may eventually lead to national-level estimates and assessments.  As in any hierarchically organized information system, this means that information is filtered and recoded as the analysis process progresses from lower to higher levels.\n\n## Techniques To Enhance Processing Of Intelligence Data\n\nRecent world events have focused attention on some of the inherent challenges involved in performing intelligence analysis (viz., The 9/11 Commission Report).  As a result, increased research is being conducted to develop new training, tools, and\n\ntechniques that will enhance the processing of intelligence data.  As one example, support and training in the organizing and piecing together aspects of intelligence analysis and decision making has been identified by the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Networks and Information Integration (OASD/NII) Research Program as an area that is greatly in need of more basic and applied research.  One current research thread that seeks to address this need is the Novel Information from Massive Data (NIMD) program where the goal is to develop an \"information manager\" to assist analysts in dealing with the high volumes and disparate types of data that inundate intelligence analysts.  The NIMD research program seeks to develop techniques that \"structure data repositories to aid in revealing and interpreting novel contents\" and techniques that can accurately model and draw inferences about (1) rare events and (2) sequences of events (widely and sparsely distributed over time).\nConnable (2001) asserts that the intelligence process would be well served by enhancing the ability to leverage open sources, particularly since open sources provide the Intelligence Community with between 40-80% of its usable data (Joint Military Intelligence Training Center, 1996).  As an example, one of our study participants, who worked on a strategic analysis assignment regarding the question of whether President Estrada, of the Philippines, was going to remain in power or be removed from office, indicated that 80% of the information he needed was found in open-source material.\nInformation foraging theory (Pirolli & Card, 1998; Pirolli & Card, 1999) is being applied in this research on tasks that involve information-intensive work where the approach is to analyze the tasks as an attempt by the user to maximize information gained per unit time.  A computational model of the intelligence analysis process will be developed as a result of this CTA research and used to support tool prototyping and testing.\n\n\nThe goals for the research described in this chapter are threefold.  One purpose of this first CTA phase is to yield \"broad brushstroke\" models of analyst knowledge and reasoning at a large grain size of behavioral analysis.  A second purpose of this research is to identify leverage points where technical innovations may have the chance to yield dramatic improvements in intelligence analysis.  A third purpose of the CTA phase is to guide the development of benchmark tasks, scenarios, resources, corpora, evaluation methods and criteria to shape the iterative design of new analyst technologies.  A CTA is typically used to identify the decision requirements, and the knowledge and processing strategies used for proficient task performance.  The following section presents a brief description of CTA and describes specific techniques that are representative of CTA methods.\nCOGNITIVE TASK ANALYSIS\n\nCTA refers to a group of methods that are extensively used in naturalistic decision-making applications.  Klein's (2001, p. 173) definition of a CTA is \"a method for capturing expertise and making it accessible for training and system design.\"  Klein delineates the following five steps:  (1) identifying sources of expertise; (2) assaying the knowledge; (3) extracting the knowledge; (4) codifying the knowledge; and (5) applying the knowledge.  System design goals supported by CTA include human-computer interaction design, developing training, tests, models to serve as a foundation for developing an expert system, and analysis of a team's activities to support allocation of responsibilities to individual humans and cooperating computer systems.\nDifferent CTA methods are used for different goals.  Our goals for conducting a CTA are twofold.  Our first goal is to capture data that will provide input to support development of a computational model of the intelligence analyst's processes and\n\nanalytic strategies.  Our second goal is to identify leverage points to inform the development of tools to assist analysts in performing the most demanding aspects of their tasks.  CTA extends traditional task analysis techniques to produce information regarding the knowledge, cognitive strategies, and goal structures that provide the foundation for task performance (Chipman, Schraagen, & Shalin, 2000).  The goal of CTA is to discover the cognitive activities that are required for performing a task in a particular domain to identify opportunities to improve performance by providing improved support of these activities (Potter, Roth, Woods, & Elm, 2000).\n\nOur overall approach for the first phase of this research involves the following steps: review of the intelligence literature, use of semi-structured interviews, followed by the use of structured interviews and review of the results by subject matter experts (SMEs).  The second phase for this research, conducted in the summer of 2004, involved developing and comparing several alternative hypotheses based on material presented in a case study.  A prototype tool developed to assist the intelligence analyst in comparing alternate hypotheses was introduced and simulated tasks were performed to empirically evaluate the tool's effectiveness.  A follow-on study will involve the use of think-aloud protocol analysis while using a more advanced version of this tool.  This multiple-phase plan is in line with the approach employed by several successful CTA\nefforts (Hoffman, et al., 1995; Patterson, Roth, & Woods, 2002).  We are using a\n\"balanced suite of methods that allow both the demands of the domain and the knowledge and strategies of domain experts to be captured in a way that enables clear identification of opportunities for improved support.\" (Potter, et al., 2000, p. 321).\n\nTypes of activities that typically require the resource intensive analysis frequently required when conducting a CTA are those domains that are characterized as (i)\n\ncomplex, ill-structured tasks that are difficult to learn, (ii) involving complex, dynamic, uncertain, and real-time environments, and (iii) sometimes include multitasking.  A CTA is most appropriate when the task requires the use of a large and complex conceptual knowledge base; the use of complex goal/action structures dependent on a variety of triggering conditions, or complex perceptual learning or pattern recognition.  Intelligence analysis involves all of these characteristics.\nWhen considering which knowledge elicitation technique is most appropriate, the differential access hypothesis proposes that different methods elicit different types of knowledge (Hoffman, Shadbolt, Burton, & Klein, 1995).  Certain techniques are appropriate to \"bootstrap\" the researcher and generate an initial knowledge base and more structured techniques are more appropriate to validate, refine and extend the knowledge base (*ibid*). A direct mapping should exist between characteristics of the targeted knowledge and the technique/s selected (Cooke, Salas, Cannon-Bowers, & Stout, 2002).\nA detailed, accurate cognitive model that delineates the essential procedural and declarative knowledge is necessary to develop effective training procedures and systems (Annett, 2000).  This entails building a model that captures the analysts'\nunderstanding of the demands of the domain, the knowledge and strategies of domain practitioners, and how existing artifacts influence performance.  CTA can be viewed as a problem-solving process where the questions posed to the subject-matter experts, and the data collected, are tailored to produce answers to the research questions, such as training needs and how these training problems might be solved (DuBois & Shalin, 2000).  A partial listing of the types of information to be obtained by conducting a CTA includes factors that contribute to making task performance challenging, what strategies\n\nare used and why, what complexities in the domain practitioners respond to, what aspects of performance could use support, concepts for aiding performance, and what technologies can be brought to bear to deal with inherent complexities.\n\nUse of Multiple Techniques\n\nAnalysis of a complex cognitive task, such the intelligence analyst's job, often requires the use of multiple techniques.  When results from several techniques converge confidence is increased regarding the accuracy of the CTA model (Cooke,\n1994; Flach, 2000; Hoffman, et al., 1995; Potter, et al., 2000).  Flach (2000) recommends sampling a number of experts and using a variety of interviewing tools to increase the representativeness of the analysis.  During the initial bootstrapping phase of this research, several CTA approaches were examined with an eye toward determining which approach would be most productive for our domain of interest.  The remainder of this section describes two CTA techniques that were used for the initial phase of this research. Applied Cognitive Task Analysis Method.  Our initial set of interviews drew upon the Applied Cognitive Task Analysis (ACTA) Method (Militello & Hutton, 1998; Militello *et al.*,\n1997) and the Critical Decision Method (Hoffman, Coffey, & Ford, in press; Hoffman, Crandall, & Shadbolt, 1998; Klein, Calderwood, & MacGregor, 1989).  The ACTA collection of methods was developed explicitly as a streamlined procedure for instructional design and development (Militello et al., 1997) that required minimal training for task analysts.  ACTA is a collection of semi-structured interview techniques that yields a general overview of the SMEs' conception of the critical cognitive processes involved in their work, a description of the expertise needed to perform complex tasks, and SME identification of aspects of these cognitive components that are crucial to expert performance.\n\nThe standard ACTA methodology4 includes the use of three interview protocols and associated tools: (a) the Task Diagram, (b) the Knowledge Audit and (c) the Simulation Overview.  The ACTA Method uses interview techniques to elicit information about the tasks performed and provides tools for representing the knowledge produced\n(Militello & Hutton, 1998).  Discovery of the difficult job elements, understanding expert strategies for effective performance, and identification of errors that a novice might make are objectives for using the ACTA method.  The focus for researchers using the ACTA method is on interviews where domain practitioners describe critical incidents they have experienced while engaged in their tasks and aspects of the task that made the task difficult.\nOur use of the ACTA method produced valuable data for the initial bootstrapping phase of this research where the goal was to learn about the task, the cognitive challenges associated with task performance, and to determine what tasks to focus on during ensuing phases of the CTA research.  Products typically produced when using the ACTA method include a Knowledge Audit and a Cognitive Demands Table.  After conducting this first group of CTA interviews we opted to use a different method to capture the essence of the IA's job.  The IA's task places greater emphasis on deductive and inductive reasoning, looking for patterns of activity, and comparing hypotheses to make judgments about the level of risk present in a particular situation. We felt it was necessary to broaden the scope of the interview probes used with intelligence analysts.\nCritical Decision Method.  The Critical Decision Method (CDM) is a semistructured interview technique developed to obtain information about decisions made by practitioners when performing their tasks.  Specific probe questions help experts describe what their task entails.  CDM's emphasis on non-routine or difficult incidents produces a rich source of data about the performance of highly skilled personnel\n(Hoffman, Crandall, & Shadbolt, 1998; Hoffman, Coffey, & Ford, in press; Klein, Calderwood, & MacGregor, 1989).  By focusing on critical incidents, the CDM is efficient in uncovering elements of expertise that might not be found in routine incidents and helps to ensure a comprehensive coverage of the subject matter.\nOur use of the CDM was tailored to develop domain-specific cognitive probes that elicit information on how analysts obtain and use information, schemas employed to conceptualize the information, how hypotheses are developed to analyze this information, and the types of products that are developed as a result of their analysis.  A\nstrength of the CDM is the generation of rich case studies, including information about cues, hypothetical reasoning, strategies, and decision requirements (Klein, et al., Hoffman, Coffey, Carnot, & Novak, 2002).  This information can then be used in modeling the reasoning procedures for a specific domain.\nIn the remainder of this chapter we describe the development and use of an adapted version of the CDM and results derived from use of two CTA methods, ACTA and CDM.\n\n## Method\n\nProcedures used to conduct the CTA, using ACTA and the CDM, are described in this section as study 1 and study 2, respectively.  In the first study we learned about the task, the cognitive challenges associated with task performance, and determined\n\nwhat tasks to focus on during ensuing phases of the CTA research.  In the second study we revised the methodology and used a different group of IAs.  Interview probes were developed and used to conduct an adapted version of the CDM where participants were asked to describe a strategic *analysis* problem in lieu of a critical decision problem.\n\n## Study 1 Participants\n\nSix military intelligence analysts, currently enrolled in a graduate school program at the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS), Monterey, CA, were interviewed for the first study.  Participants were contacted via e-mail with the endorsement of their curriculum chair and were asked to volunteer for this study.  (No rewards were given for participation.)  These U.S. Naval officers (Lieutenant through Lieutenant Commander) were students in the Intelligence Information Management curricula at NPS.\nParticipants in both studies had an average of ten years experience working as intelligence analysts.  Thus, they were considered experts as the literature generally defines an \"expert\" as an individual who has over ten years experience and \"would be recognized as having achieved proficiency in their domain\" (Klein, et al., 1989, p. 462).\n\n## Materials\n\nStudy participants (study 1 and 2) had pen and paper, and a flip chart or white board. After a brief introduction to the study participants were asked to complete a demographic survey.\n\n## Procedure\n\nThe CTA process for all study participants took place in a small conference room at NPS. Semi-structured interviews were conducted with the first group of interviewees\n\nwhere intelligence analysts were asked to recall and describe an incident from past job experience.\nACTA. Domain experts were asked to draw a task diagram, to describe critical incidents they had experienced on their job, and identify examples of the challenging aspects of their tasks.  They were asked to elucidate why these tasks are challenging, and to describe the cues and strategies that are used by practitioners, and the context of the work.  Interviews were scheduled for one and one-half hours at a time that was convenient for each participant. Three interviewers were present for each of the first six interviews.  The interviews were tape-recorded and transcribed and the analysis was performed using the transcription and any other materials produced during the interview, e.g., task diagrams.\nThis first group of intelligence analysts had a variety of assignments in their careers, however the majority of their experience was predominantly focused on performing analysis at the tactical level.  (Tactical level analysis refers to analysis of information that will impact mission performance within the local operating area, e.g., of the battle group, and generally within the next 24 hours.)  During this bootstrapping phase of our CTA effort, we learned that there are several career paths for intelligence analysts.  These career paths can be categorized as either having more of a technology emphasis where the focus is on systems, equipment, and managing the personnel who operate and maintain this equipment or an analytical emphasis where the focus and experience is on performing long-range, or strategic, analysis.\n\nInformation gathered during the initial phase served as an advance organizer by providing an overview of the task and helped to identify the cognitively complex elements of the task.  The ACTA method produced valuable data for the initial phase of\n\nthis research.  After analyzing the data from the initial set of interviews, we determined that we needed to broaden the set of interview probes and tailor them for the specific domain of intelligence analysis to uncover the bigger picture of how intelligence analysts approach performing their job.  Thus, tailored probes were developed specifically for the domain of intelligence analysis.\nConcurrent with the decision to use an adapted version of the CDM was the decision to switch to a different group within the intelligence community, specifically analysts who had experience at the strategic, or national, level.5  National level intelligence is more concerned with issues such as people in positions of political leadership, and the capabilities of another country.  In contrast, at the tactical level, the user of intelligence information may only be concerned about a specific ship that is in a particular area, at a certain time; that is, the information will only be valid for a limited time.  Descriptions of experiences at the tactical level did not provide examples of the types of problems or cases that could benefit from the technology envisioned as the ultimate goal for this research.\n\n## Study 2 Participants\n\nFour military intelligence analysts from the National Security Affairs (NSA)\nDepartment were interviewed for the second study.  In the NSA curriculum there is a stronger analytical emphasis and the analysts have had experience with analysis assignments at the strategic level.  We were fortunate in that this second group of participants was very articulate in describing assignments where they had performed analysis of critical topics at the strategic level.  Several researchers have noted the issue of encountering problems with inaccessible expert knowledge (Cooke, 1994; Hoffman, Shadbolt, Burton, & Klein, 1995).\n\n## Procedure\n\nStructured interviews were conducted with the second group of interviewees where intelligence analysts were asked to recall a strategic analysis problem they had worked on. Participants were asked to describe what they did step-by-step to gather the information and analyze it, and to construct a timeline to illustrate the entire analysis process.\n\n## Modified Critical Decision Method\n\n\nMany CTA techniques have been developed and used for tasks that involve the practitioner making decisions and taking a course of action based on these decisions, e.g., firefighters, tank platoon leaders, structural engineers, paramedics, and design engineers.  A goal for many CTA techniques is to elicit information on actions taken and the decisions leading up to those actions.  However, the IA's job does not fit this pattern of making decisions and taking action/s based on these decisions.  One finding that emerged during the initial phase of this research was that making decisions is not a typical part of the IA's task.  The major tasks consist of sifting through vast amounts of data to filter, synthesize, and correlate the information to produce a report summarizing what is known about a particular situation or state of affairs.  Then, the person for whom the report is produced makes decisions and takes actions based upon the information contained in the report.\nA modified version of the critical decision method (CDM) was developed and used for this task domain where the emphasis is on performing analysis (e.g., comparing alternative hypotheses) versus making decisions and taking a course of action.  Thus, interview probe questions provided in the literature (Hoffman, et al., in press) were tailored to capture information on IA's approach to gathering and analyzing information.  Domain-specific probes were developed to focus the discussion on a critical analysis assignment where the analyst had to produce a report on intelligence of a strategic nature.  Examples of such strategic analysis problems might include assessments of the capabilities of nations or terrorist groups to obtain or produce weapons of mass destruction, terrorism, strategic surprise, political policy, or military policy.  Interview probes were developed to capture information on the types of information used, how this information was obtained, and the strategies used to analyze this information.\nCDM.  A structured set of domain-specific interview probes was developed specifically for use with the second group of participants.  One interviewer conducted the initial interviews; each interview lasted approximately one and one-half hours.  Once the initial interview was transcribed and analyzed, the participant was asked to return for a follow-up interview.  All three interviewers were present for the follow-up interviews with this second group of intelligence analysts.  This approach, requiring two separate interviews, was necessitated by the domain complexity and the desire to become grounded in the case before proceeding with the second interview where our understanding was elucidated and refined.\nDeepening Probes.  Domain-specific cognitive probes were developed to capture information on the types of information the IA was seeking, the types of questions the\n\nanalyst was asking, and how this information was obtained.  Additional information was collected on mental models used by analysts, hypotheses formulated and the types of products that are produced.  Table 1 lists the questions posed to the participants during the initial interview. Topics for which participants conducted their analyses included modernization of a particular country's military, whether there would be a coup in the Philippines and the potential impact on the Philippines if there was a coup, and the role for the newly created Department of Homeland Security.\n\n\n\nProbe Topic\n\nProbe\n\nInformation\n\nWhat information were you seeking, or what questions were you asking? Why did you need this information? How did you get that information? Were there any difficulties in getting the information you needed from that source? What was the volume of information that you had to deal with? What did you do with this information?\nWould some other information been helpful?\n\nMental Models/\nSchemas\n\nAs you went through the process of analysis and understanding did you build a conceptual model? Did you try to imagine important events over time? Did you try to understand important actors and their relationships? Did you make a spatial picture in your head?\nCan you draw me an example of what it looks like?\n\nHypotheses\n\n\nDid you formulate any hypotheses? Did you consider alternatives to those hypotheses? Did the hypotheses revise your plans for collecting and marshalling\nmore information?  If so, how? Did you write any intermediate notes or sketches? Intermediate Products\n\n\n\nFollow-up Probes.  Once the data from the initial interviews was transcribed and analyzed, participants were asked to return for a follow-up interview.  The goal during this session was to elaborate our understanding of the IA's task.  The analyst was asked\n\nto review the timeline produced during the first interview session and to elaborate on the procedures and cognitive strategies employed.  Probes used during the follow-up interview are listed in Table 3.\n\n##\n\n\nProbe Topic\n\nProbes\n\nWhat were your specific goals at the time?\n\nGoals Does this case fit a standard or typical scenario?\nDoes it fit a scenario you were trained to deal with? Standard\nScenarios\n\nAnalogues Did this case remind you of any previous case or experience?\n\nHypotheses and\nQuestions What hypotheses did you have? What questions were raised by that hypothesis? What alternative hypotheses did you consider? What questions were raised by that alternative hypothesis? As you collected and read information, what things triggered questions or hypotheses that you later followed up? Information Cues\nfor Hypotheses and\nQuestions Information Tools What sort of tools, such as computer applications, did you use? What information source did you use? What difficulties did you have?\n\n\n\nProbes included questions about the participants' goals, whether this analysis was similar to other analysis assignments, use of analogues, and how hypotheses were formed and analyzed.  Other probes asked about the types of questions raised during their analysis, methods used, information cues they used to seek and collate information, and the types of tools, e.g., computer software, they used to perform their analysis.  During this second interview we went through the same intelligence analysis problem with the goal of obtaining additional details to refine our understanding of the entire analysis process.  This included the types of information they used, and how they structured their analysis to answer the strategic question they had been assigned.\n\n\n _____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________\nCognitive\nWhy Difficult\nCues\nStrategies\nPotential\nDemand\n\nErrors\n______________________________________________________________________________\n\nSynthe-\n-  Lack of technical\nDifficult to know\nEmphasize type of\n- Potential for errors\nsizing\n       familiarity with\nhow to weight\ndata analyst has\n- Tendency to focus on\ndata\n\n       different types of data\ndifferent kinds of\nexperience with,\n   type of data analyst\n-  Domain expertise is\ndata\nand disregard\n   has experience with\n       needed to analyze\n\nother data\n\n   and to ignore data you\n       each class of data\n\n\n   do not understand\n\n     (HUMINT, SIGINT,\n\n\n\n       ELINT, IMAGERY, etc.)\n _____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________\nSynthe-\n-  No one database exists\nSystems produce\nDifferent\n- Users develop comfort\nsizing\n        that can correlate\ndifferent \"results,\"\ncommands rely            level with their system\ndata\n    across systems\ne.g., mensuration\non different\n\n   and its associated\n\n\n-  No one database can\nprocess produces\ndatabases in which\n   database; this can lead\n\n       correlate all inputs\ndifferent latitude/\nthey have developed     to wrong conclusion\n\n        from many different\n longitude coorditrust\n\n       analysts to form one\n nates from\n\n\n        coherent picture\nother systems\n _____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________\nSynthe-\n-  Databases are cumber-\nUsers don't always\nUse own\n-  Rely on trend\nsizing           some to use:  Poor\nunderstand inforexperience\n           information\ndata\n            correlation algorithms\nmation system\n\n\n-  System presents results\npresents. Too many\n\n       that users do not trust,\nlevels in system are\n\n       tracks are \"out of whack.\"\nnot transparent\n\n\n _____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________\nNoticing\n-  Time critical information\nNeed to decide\nNeed to rely on\n- Refer to other\ndata\n           is difficult to obtain\nwhether imagery\nother sources to\n   sources to verify\n\n-  Need to assimilate, verify\nis current enough\nverify current\n\n           and disseminate in a short\nto proceed with\n           time window\nstrike\n\n\nHow long has it been\n\n\nthere?\n_______________________________________________________________________________________________\n\nRESULTS\n\nA description of what has been learned during the first phase of this CTA research with intelligence analysts is presented in this section.\n\nSTUDY 1\n\nThe ACTA method was used with a group that primarily had experience at the tactical level of analysis, thus the discussion was focused on developing a product to\n\nsupport operations at the tactical level.  Using the ACTA method, participants focused on providing descriptions of the cognitively challenging aspects of the task.\n\n## Applied Cognitive Task Analysis\n\nThe initial set of knowledge representations for the IA's job (produced using the ACTA method) provided the basis for the more detailed CTA.  Table 4 presents an example of one of the formats used to codify the knowledge extracted during the CTA using the ACTA method.  This Cognitive Demands Table was produced based on analysis of data captured during an interview with one participant.  A Cognitive Demands Table provides concrete examples of why the task is difficult, cues and strategies used by practitioners to cope with these demands and potential errors that may result in response to the challenges inherent in the task.\n\n\nTable 5 presents an example of a Knowledge Audit, which includes examples of the challenging aspects of the task and the strategies employed by experienced analysts to deal with these challenges.  A challenging aspect described by several IAs includes the need for the analyst to understand the capabilities and limitations of the systems employed for collection.  Understanding the systems' capabilities is important because the systems used to collect data and the tools used to process data can make mistakes due to conflicting databases, complexities of the system that are not transparent to the user and other human-system interaction issues.\n\n\n\nTable 5.  Knowledge Audit for Intelligence Analyst: NPS#4\n_____________________________________________________________________________________________\nEXAMPLE\nCUES & STRATEGIES\nWHY DIFFICULT?\n _____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________\nCollection  Ex:  Task involves much technical knowledge coupled with experience.\n\n\nStart formulating a picture\nKnow what system can do/ limitations\n-  Need to understand systems to\nright away\nConstantly think about nature of the\n    assess validity of information\n\ncollection system\n-  All data is not 100% accurate\n\nAsk:  What do I expect to see here?\n-  Collection systems and pro-\n\nConstantly checking all data coming in\n   cessors make mistakes:  e.g.,\n\n\nradar signatures can be similar\n _____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________\nCollection  Ex:  Need to question all data for validity\n\nAssess validity of information\nCorrelate signals with what is already\n-  Deluged with signals in dense\n\nKnown.  Look for incongruent pieces\n   signal environment\n\n\nof information.\n\n_____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________\nCollection  Ex:  Constant pressure not to miss any little bit\n\n\nHuge amount of raw data\nTry to extend the area that is\n-  Analyst has to find the \"little\n\nmonitored to maintain wide area\n    jewels\" in huge data stream\n\nsituation awareness\n\n_____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________\nCollection  Ex:  Can't miss the radar contact which is the enemy coming out to conduct reconnaissance,\n or attack the battle group. Want to know 10-12 hours ahead of time when the enemy aircraft was coming.\nUnder pressure not to miss anything Look at *everything* recognizing that\n- Can't afford to let anything\n\nprobably 90% is going to be of no use.          slip by without looking at it\n _____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________\n Analysis:  Focus on what additional information is needed\nMultiple ways to obtain certain\nThink about what still need to know\n-  Need some familiarity with\nkinds of information\n   different types of sources\n\n\n-  Requesting assets to get\n\n    information may be expensive\n\n    and conflict with other\n\n    ongoing things\n\n-  Potential political ramifications\n        to requesting asset to get something\n_____________________________________________________________________________________________\nAnalysis:  How to present information to customer\nInterpretation can be challenging\nGood analyst drives operations\n-  Need to ensure customer will\nDo not just pass all the information\n   take appropriate action as a\n\nwithout some level of interpreta-\n   result of report\n\ntion included.\n-  Are almost dictating what\n\n     customer is going to do\n _____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________\n Analysis:   Pressure to reduce the time to respond\nAnalyst brings a lot of knowledge\nWhat is the priority of this target vs.\n-  Things need to be\nto situation that goes beyond\nothers that are out there?\n interpreted in context\nsensor-to-shooter approach\nIs it the most important thing to\n\ndo right now?\n\nWhat has occurred in the past week?\n\n2 months?  2 years?\n\n_____________________________________________________________________________________________\n\n\n\n_____________________________________________________________________________________________\n\nEXAMPLE\nCUES &STRATEGIES\nWHY DIFFICULT?\n _____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________\nDisseminate/ Provide Reports  Ex: Time-critical spot reports need to go out to people who need\nit right away\nWhat does customer need to know\n-  Need to pass time-critical\nPick out event-by-event pieces\n\ninformation right away\n ____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________\n Disseminate/ Provide Reports  Ex:  See something they don't expect, doesn't fit an established picture\nTimes when event does not fit in\nTry to develop coherent picture based\n-  Need to assess how this fits\nwith what analyst has been\non other things that have been occurring        into slightly bigger picture\nobserving recently\nin past 1-2 hours.\n\nWhat do I think will happen in the\n-  More likely to discount\nnext hour?\n information if see something\nHow does the last one event fit in with            you don't expect\n\nall the other recent pieces?\n _____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________\nDisseminate/ Provide Reports  Ex:  See something outside a pattern of what expected\n\n\nAlways call operator :  \"We saw X but\n-  Need to watch your back\n\n\nhere is why we don't think it is\n(not look bad)\n\n\nnecessarily the truth.\"  Look for\n\n\nreasons why it might not be correct\n _____________________________________________________________________________________________\nDissemination:  Push vs. Pull Technology\n\nSimply pushing reports out to\n-  High-level decisionmakers\n\npeople does not always work\n    want individual, tailored brief:\n\nPressure on analyst to ensure all\n    generates differential exchange\n\nhigh-level decisionmakers have\n    of information\n\nsame picture/ information\n\n\n_____________________________________________________________________________________________\n\n\nAnother theme that was addressed by many study participants was the constant pressure not to let anything slip by without looking at it.  They described this aspect of their task as trying to find the \"little jewels in the huge data stream,\" while knowing that 90% of the stream will not be relevant.  An issue germane to analysis, also reported by several analysts, was the tendency to discount information when they see something they don't expect to see, i.e., to look for confirming evidence and to discount disconfirming evidence.  An additional pressure experienced by IAs is the need to ensure the customer will take appropriate action as a result of the report (i.e., you are\n\"almost dictating what the customer is going to do.\")\n\n## Cognitive Challenges\n\nThe remainder of this section summarizes what was learned from the ACTA interviews.\nThe IA task is difficult due to the confluence of several factors, including characteristics of the domain and the cognitive demands levied on analysts.  The following paragraphs describe the cognitive challenges involved in performing intelligence analysis.\nTime Pressure.  Decreasing timelines to produce reports for decision-makers is becoming an increasingly stressful requirement for analysts working at all levels, from tactical through strategic levels.  An example at the tactical level is provided by a participant who described how the effect of timeline compression coupled with organizational constraints6 can sometimes \"channel thinking\" down a specific path.\nAn example of time pressure at the strategic level is provided by one participant\n(from study 2) who had six weeks to prepare a report on a matter of strategic importance when he had no prior knowledge of this area and he did not have a degree in political science.  The assignment involved the question of whether President Estrada, of the Philippines, would be deposed as President, and if so, would there be a coup?  This assignment was to include an analysis of what the impact would be on the Philippines.  Six weeks was the total time he had to gather all the necessary information, including the time needed to develop background knowledge of this area.\nHe began by reading travel books and other ethnographic information.  This finding is in accord with those of Patterson, Roth, & Woods (2001), i.e., that analysts are increasingly required to perform analysis tasks outside their areas of expertise and to respond under time pressure to critical analysis questions.\n\n\nSynthesizing Multiple Sources of Information.  One aspect of the IA's task that is particularly challenging involves merging different types of information - particularly when the analyst does not have technical familiarity with all these types of information.\nAs an example, two analysts looking at the same image may see different things. Seeing different things in the data can occur because many factors need to be considered when interpreting intelligence data.  Each type of data has its own set of associated factors that can impact interpretation.  In the case of imagery data, these factors would include the time of day the image was taken, how probable it is to observe a certain thing, and trends within the particular country.\n\nMultiple sources of disparate types of data (e.g., open source, classified, general reference materials, embassy cables, interviews with experts, military records, to name a few) must be combined to make predictions about complex, dynamic events - often in a very short time window.  To accomplish the data correlation process, analysts need to be able to combine seemingly unrelated events and see the relevance.  The cognitive challenges involved in synthesizing information from these different sources and distilling the relevance can be especially difficult, particularly when different pieces of data have varying degrees of validity and reliability that must be considered.\nFurthermore, domain expertise is often needed to analyze each type of data.\n\nHuman intelligence, electronic intelligence, imagery, open source intelligence, measures and signals intelligence can all include spurious signals or inaccurate information due to the system used or to various factors associated with the different types of data.  Analysts described situations where they gave greater weight to the types of information they understood and less weight to less understood types of information. They acknowledged this strategy could lead to incorrect conclusions.\n\nCoping with Uncertainty.  Regarding data interpretation, a strong relationship typically exists between the context in which data occurs and the perspective of the observers.  This critical relationship between the observer and the data is referred to as context sensitivity (Woods, Patterson, & Roth, 2002).  The relationship between context and the perspective of the observer is an essential aspect of the data interpretation process.  People typically use context to help them determine what is interesting and informative, and this, in turn, influences how the data are interpreted.  Context sensitivity is the framework a person uses to determine which data to attend to and this, in turn, will determine how the data are interpreted.  This relationship between context and data interpretation is the crux of the problem for intelligence analysts:  When high levels of uncertainty are present regarding the situation, the ability to interpret the data based on context sensitivity is likely to be diminished.\n\nHigh levels of ambiguity associated with the data to be analyzed produce an uncertain context in which the analyst must interpret and try to make sense of the huge data stream.  For instance, data that appear as not important might be extremely important in another situation, e.g., when viewed from a different perspective to consider a competing hypothesis.  In general, people are good at being able to focus in on the highly relevant pieces of data based on two factors: properties of the data and the *expectations* (italics added) of the observer. (Woods, et al).  However, this critical cognitive ability may be significantly attenuated for professionals in the intelligence community, as they may not always have the correct \"expectations\" while conducting their search through the data due to the inherent uncertainty associated with the data.\n\nHigh Cognitive Workload.  One of the most daunting aspects of the IA's job is dealing with the high cognitive workload that is produced when a constant stream of\n\ninformation must be continuously evaluated, particularly when the information often pertains to several different situations.  Relevant items must be culled from the continual onslaught of information, then analyzed, synthesized and aggregated.  An additional contributor to the high workload is the labor-intensive process employed when an analyst processes data manually - as is often the case - because many tools currently available do not provide the type of support required by analysts.  For example, no one single database exists that can correlate across the various types of data that must be assimilated.\n\nIAs often wind up synthesizing all the information in their head, a time-consuming process that requires expertise to perform this accurately, and something that is very difficult for a junior officer to do.  Moreover, it is stressful to perform the analysis this way because they worry about missing a critical piece of data and doing it correctly:\n\"Am I missing something?\" and \"Am I getting the right information out?\"\n\nIAs must assess, compare, and resolve conflicting information, while making difficult judgments and remembering the status of several evolving situations.  These cognitive tasks are interleaved with other requisite tasks, such as producing various reports or requesting the re-tasking of a collection asset.  A request to gather additional information will often involve use of an asset that is in high demand.  Re-tasking an asset can be costly and may conflict with other demands for that asset, thus, tradeoffs must be made regarding the potential gain in information when re-tasking the asset to satisfy a new objective.  Potential political ramifications of requesting an asset to obtain data to satisfy an objective must also be considered.\n\nPotential for Error.  The high cognitive workload imposed on IAs introduces a potential for errors to influence interpretation.  For instance, the potential for \"cognitive\n\ntunnel vision\" to affect the analysis process is introduced by the high cognitive load that analysts often experience.  As an example, they may miss a key piece of information when they become overly focused on one particularly challenging aspect of the analysis.  Similarly, the analysis process may be skewed when analysts attempt to reduce their cognitive load by focusing on analyzing data they understand and discounting data with which they have less experience.  Additionally, discrepancies regarding interpretation may result when decision-makers at different locations (e.g., on different platforms, different services) rely on systems that produce different results.\nMoreover, the sheer volume of information makes it hard to process all the data, yet no technology is available that is effective in helping the analyst synthesize all the different types of information.\n\nData Overload.  While data overload is a relatively new problem for the intelligence community, it is a major contributor to making the task difficult.  It was once the case that intelligence reporting was very scarce, yet with technology advances and electronic connectivity it has become a critical issue today.  A former Marine Lieutenant General, describing the situation in the 1991 Persian Gulf conflict commented on the flow of intelligence: \"It was like a fire hose coming out, and people were getting information of no interest or value to them, and information that was (of value) didn't get to them.\" (Trainor, in Bodnar, 2003, p. 55).  Data overload in this domain is attributed to two factors.  The explosion of accessible electronic data coupled with a Department of Defense emphasis on tracking large numbers of 'hot spots' that place analysts in a position where they are \"required to step outside their areas of expertise to respond quickly to targeted questions,\" (Patterson, et al., 2001, p. 224).\n\nComplex Human Judgments.  Difficult human judgments are entailed when (i)\nconsidering the plausibility of information, (ii) deciding what information to trust, and (iii)\ndetermining how much weight to give to specific pieces of data.  Each type of data has to be assessed to determine its validity, reliability, and relevance to the particular event undergoing analysis.  Analysts must also resolve discrepancies across systems, databases, and services when correlation algorithms produce conflicting results or results that users do not trust.  Evidence must be marshaled to build their case or to build the case for several competing hypotheses and then to select the hypothesis the analyst believes is most likely.  Assessing competing hypotheses involves highly complex processes.\n\nInsufficient Tools.  The sheer volume of information makes it hard to process all the data, yet the tools currently available are not always effective in helping the analyst assimilate the huge amount of information that needs to be analyzed and synthesized. Many of the systems and databases available to analysts are cumbersome to use due to system design issues.  For example, users don't always understand information presented by the system, i.e., when there are discrepancies across system databases\n(within the ship, within the service, or across services) or the system presents results that users do not trust, e.g., tracks that don't make sense.  Tools currently available for use by analysts include poor correlation algorithms and have too many levels within the system that are not transparent to the user.\n\nOrganizational Context.  Several themes related to organizational context emerged from the interviews.  The first involves communication between the analyst and their\n\"customers\" (a term used to refer to the person for whom the report or product is produced).  When the customer does not clearly articulate his or her need - and\n\nprovide the reasons they need a specific item - the analyst has an ill-defined problem. When the analyst does not have an understanding of the situation that merits the intelligence need this will make it more difficult for the analyst to meet the analysis requirement/s.  A second organizational context issue is that a goal for analysts is to ensure that all high-level decisionmakers are given the same picture, or information. Yet, high-level decisionmakers will often demand an individual, tailored brief.  This generates a differential exchange of information between the analyst and various decisionmakers.\n\nOrganizational constraints are placed on analysts to maintain the \"status quo,\"\nsuch that new information is filtered through a perspective of being considered as not falling outside of normal operations.  There is pressure not to be \"the boy who cried wolf.\"  This is in accord with other findings (Vaughan, 1996) who describe organizations that engage in a \"routinization of deviance, as they explain away anomalies and in time come to see them as familiar and not particularly threatening.\" (Klein, et al., this volume).  Finally, there is a perception among analysts of feeling unappreciated for their work: Because people often do not understand what is involved there is a perception among IAs that people question \"why do we need you?\"  This credibility issue results in part because different data in different databases produce discrepancies.  Intelligence officers feel they loose credibility with operational guys because of these system differences.  We now turn the discussion to present results from analysis of data gathered using the modified CDM.\n\n## Study 2\n\n\nThe modified CDM method was used with a group of analysts who had experience working on analysis problems at the strategic level.  When using the CDM,\n\nthe emphasis was on having IAs describe tasks where the focus was on analysis of intelligence in order to produce a report to answer a question of strategic interest.  The length of time our second group of interviewees had devoted to the assignments that they described ranged from six weeks to three and one-half years (in the latter case, this time was spent intermittently, while serving on a US Navy ship followed by attending graduate school at NPS).\n\n## Example 1: Likelihood Of A Coup In The Philippines\n\n\nIn this example the person described his task of having to build a brief to answer a political question regarding whether President Estrada would be deposed from the Philippines, whether there would be a coup, and if there was a coup, what the implications would be for the Philippine Islands?  What would be the implications for the US?  He was asked to complete this analysis task within a time span of six weeks on a topic that was outside his base of expertise (i.e., the geo-political area).\n\nFrom the initial search of raw reports he produced an initial profile of what was known.  Many additional searches and follow-up phone calls were conducted to fill in the gaps in his knowledge and to elaborate on what was learned during the initial set of queries.  This step resulted in producing a large number of individual word files on each political person or key player.  These included biographies on approximately 125 people, including insurgency leaders, people in various political groups, people with ties to crime, etc.  The information in these files was then grouped in various ways to consider several hypotheses.  Next he developed a set of questions to use to work backwards to review all the material from several different perspectives to answer a series of questions related to the main question of interest: Will there be a coup?  Will it be peaceful or not?  Will it be backed by the military?  Will the vote proceed, or will the military step in, prior to the vote?  What is the most likely scenario to pan out?\n\nSchemas\nA schema is a domain-specific cognitive structure that directs information search, guides attention management, organizes information in memory and directs its retrieval, and becomes more differentiated as a function of experience.  Schemas are a way of abstracting the information that has been found so far into a representation.  The schema summarizes the external information by abstracting and aggregating information and eliminating irrelevant information.  Schemas are structured to efficiently an effectively support the task in which they are embedded.\nFigure 2 depicts the schema used to represent the dual-problem space of various information sources that the analyst researched to develop a comprehensive understanding of the issue.  The analyst began, in week one, by reading general background information to develop knowledge on the history and cultural ethnography of the country and also by examining prior Naval Intelligence on the previous history for political turnover in the Philippines.  During week two he began contacting Intelligence Centers and reading U.S. Embassy cables, an important source for this particular topic.\nAlthough this step provided valuable information, because this material was from a secondary source it had to be corroborated.  Thus the analyst had to decide which of these reports were to be given greater emphasis and in which reports he did not have much confidence.\nOne way the analyst structured his analysis was to sort people according to whether they were pro-Estrada or anti-Estrada, which figures would be likely to drop allegiance to the constitution, and so on.  The analyst structured, and re-structured, all\n\nthe information to see how it might support various scenarios associated with the analysis questions.  For example, if the US invests money, will the country remain stable?  How should the US react?  What is the most dangerous potential outcome?\nMost/ least likely?\nThe analyst had five hypotheses that he used to organize his material.  Previous coup attempts that occurred around the time of past-President Aquino were reviewed to examine how the allegiance of these people who were involved in past coup attempts might develop.  Voting records provided another way to sort people.  For a portion of his analysis he used nodal analysis software to examine relationships between people.  He used a whiteboard to play \"20 questions\" to come up with new questions to pursue. Relationship diagrams were constructed for each scenario and tables were developed to facilitate comparison of hypotheses.  Many other sources were examined, such as political figures' ties to certain newspapers to determine which camp they would fall into\nFigure 3 depicts the information schema used by this analyst.  Multiple ways of grouping people were used by the analyst to consider competing hypotheses on how their allegiance would \"fall out\" based on their various associations.  This analyst grouped key people in both the military and civilian sectors according to their military associations, political, family, geographic region, and various other associations, e.g., professional groups and boards they belonged to, to try to ascertain their loyalty.  The analyst developed many branches and sequels between people and events in his attempt to examine their affiliations from many different vantage points.\n\n## Schemas\n\nKEY PLAYERS\n     MILITARY\n     POLITICAL\n\n\nOTHERS\n        ARMY\n\n\nSENATORS\n\n\n    ORGANIZED CRIME\n           REGION 1\n\nCLERGY\n\n\n         PRESS\n              <Commander>\nPREV COUP PLOTTERS\n    PROMINENT\nFAMILIES\n          <Assistants>\n\nPOLITICAL PARTIES\n    INVOLVED SOME WAY\n       REGION 2\n\nPOLITICAL ACTION GRPS\n          <Commander>\nPOLITICAL FRONT ORGS\n          <Assistants>\n\n       . . .\n       LOGISTICS INTEL PERSONNEL AIR FORCE . . .\nCLIQUE ASSOCIATIONS\n SOURCES\n ATTITUDES\n\n|      SAME UNIT                                              |          |             |        GENERAL LIT    |\n|-------------------------------------------------------------|----------|-------------|-----------------------|\n| SAME REGION OF ORIGIN                                       | JICPAC   | ANTI-AQUINO |                       |\n| CLASSMATES                                                  |          |             | CABLES                |\n| FAMILTY RELATIONSHIP                                        | WEBSITES |             |                       |\n| PAST CO-PLOTTER                                             |          | EXPERTS     |                       |\n| BOARD CO-MEMBERSHIP                                         |          |             |                       |\n| BUSINESS TIES                                               |          |             |                       |\n|                                                             |          |             |                       |\n| Figure 3.  Schemas Used to Analyze the Intelligence Problem |          |             |                       |\n|                                                             |          |             |                       |\n|                                                             |          |             |                       |\n|                                                             |          |             |                       |\n\n\n\n## Example 2:  Modernization Of Country X'S Military\n\n\nThis analysis problem evolved as a result of a discrepancy the analyst observed between the stated political military objectives of country X and the observations made by this analyst during a six-month deployment on an aircraft carrier.  During his time as strike-plot officer he spent a lot of time collecting and sifting through raw message traffic and interpreting its meaning for the Battle Group.  He had developed a considerable knowledge base for this part of the world and was aboard the carrier during the EP-3\ncrisis, in 2001, when it landed on Hainan Island.  During the EP-3 crisis, he was able to provide background information on what had been occurring up to that point as well as during the crisis.\n\nWhen this analyst reported to NPS to focus on Asia he noticed a disconnect between what professors described in terms of this country's political stance and things he had observed, while operating in this part of the world.  Things discussed in his courses were incongruent with the types of military training exercises he had observed this country engage in and the types of military equipment acquisitions made by this country.  He began with two or three factors that he knew could be used to support a separate hypothesis to explain the incongruity between what the political leaders are saying and what they are doing.  His task was to compare the publicly stated policy of country X regarding their planned military modernization with other possible scenarios for how things might evolve.\n\nThis analysis was based on a comparison of this country's officially stated military policy with data collected during detailed observations, and the associated daily reporting, that occurred over a six-month period while the analyst was onboard the aircraft carrier.  Table 6 presents a Cognitive Demands analysis of this IA problem.  For\n\nanalysis of this intelligence problem, the Cognitive Demands analysis described in the ACTA methodology was modified to represent the process that was used by this analyst.  Since intelligence analysis involves an iterative process of data analysis and additional collection, we arranged the table to focus on specific data inputs and outputs. Additional columns include cues that generate processes that operate on data, and the strategies or methods used by the analyst to achieve goals when working with specific inputs and outputs.  In addition, the table includes expert assessments of why specific inputs and outputs might be difficult.  This provides indications of potential leverage points for system design.  Finally, the table records specific examples mentioned by the analyst.  These examples might be used as task scenarios to guide design and evaluation of new analyst strategies.\nAnalysis for this task included building the case for several other possible military scenarios regarding actions that might be taken by this country in the future.  A\ncomprehensive analysis of two competing hypotheses was developed to take into account future changes in political leadership, the economy, and sociopolitical factors.\nData obtained on factors including economic stability, system acquisitions, and military training exercises conducted were manually coded on a daily basis, placed in a database, and aggregated over larger periods of time to depict trends.\n\n\n\nTable 6.  Cognitive Demands Table for Case 2:\nDevelop Competing Hypothesis Regarding Military Modernization Efforts of Country X\nInputs\nOutputs\nCues/Goals\nStrategy\nWhy Difficult?  Examples\nData files that depict\ncountry X's trends\nCompare stated\nmodernization policy and economic trends within the country\nObservations that\nsupport hypothesis that country X has embarked on a different modernization effort for a number of years. Observed modernization efforts\nDetermine country X's military capability to conduct precision strike\nDoes the political/ economic/ cultural environment support this operation? Notice discrepancies\nbetween stated policy\nand observed activity\nMany prior products:\nIntel- ligence sources,\ne.g., unclassified writings, interviews with political leaders\nDocuments\ndescribing\ndiscrepancies between observed activities and stated policy. Data files of detailed observations gathered over a 6-month period\nHelp operational side of Navy  explore a different view that is not based on established norms of thought\nClassified sources; personal observations; anecdotal memories of deployments and experi-ences from past deployment\nTake analysis to next level of what is occurring\nRead message traffic all day\nTwo seemingly unrelated events are reported on individually Graphs to depict trends of different types of activity\nVolume of information is constrained to the geographic area\nFactor in Army or ground troop movement in addition to Navy activity\nRead every-thing can find\n1. Brief for the Commander each day 2.  Daily Intel Analysis Report\nPick out things that are relevant\nTake raw message traffic (w/o anyone's opinion associ-ated with it)\nForm a model of the situation; imagine events over time\nTo force people to look at a different possibility\nBased on observations of activities that did not match up with what others believed\nParamount to understand who is driving what action\nData on emerging political environment in transition\nUnderstanding of relation-ships between important actors Build timeline to depict more aggressive posture\nLocation of US forces; geo-political landscape; economic decline affecting country X\nWest will not have same influence on economy which leads to political unrest: Political rivalry between old/ new leadership\nDifference between what they're saying and what they're doing\nRevised hypothesis\nInitially 2-3 factors that\nwill support a separate hypoth- esis from the accepted hypoth-esis on what is transpiring.\nTypes of military\ntraining exercises, equipment acquisitions.\nStated (public) policy\nsays one thing: Observations point to potentially very different goals.\nEvaluate the political\nland-scape of country X, by examining economic and cultural shifts in leadership to gain insight into ways they are looking to modernize. To consider other possibilities beyond their stated military modernization goals\nTo build a case for possibilities\nUse observa-tions from exercises, purchases, etc. to see a different perspective, supported with data\nMatch up things seen\nin open press with\nwhat is occurring militarily\nHow do observations\nrelate to each other\nand to the stated policy?\nStated policy of\ncountry X does not\nalign with activities observed during exercises. Tendency is to report every-thing and treat everything as of equal importance\nDifficult to distill the relevance of the informa-tion:  Take 100 reports and find the five gems.\nAvoid \"group think.\" Despite the mountain of evidence to the contrary, you don't want to \"spool people up.\" Ask:  \"Does this make sense?\"\nAnswer question: \"Is this relevant?\"\nGoes against organizational constraints, i.e., events are \"not to be considered outside normal routine training activity.\" Group all different categories of activity, e.g., local activity, aggressive activity, exercise activity\nClassify infor- mation as relevant or irrelevant. Maintain data-bases of activity, e.g., by day/ week/ months\nSeveral hours a day sorting through message traffic; If had a crisis would be completely saturated. Databases do not match up (even capabilities listed in them)\nExtract what think is relevant and highlight activity thought to be relevant\nBuild \"Perry Mason\" clinch argument\nOrganization-al constraints not to \"go against the grain\"\nHad lots of documented real world observations Inconsistent capabilities listed in different databases\nCould not get access to all material (databases) needed for analysis\nNew leadership person is still \"driving\" things: Added credibility to thesis that there is a split\nCredibility issue: operational guys rarely understand analysis, especially strategic\nWhen presented brief on threat, operational personnel did not perceive information as representative of a threat.\nDescribe political factors that could set off a change in direction.  Set stage for how things could go in a fictional scenario Marshall evidence to support alternate hypothesis\nSelecting which pieces of information to focus on\nFact that found so many pieces to support hypothesis indicates hypothesis has to be considered\n\n\n##\n\n\n For this intelligence problem the analyst was looking for evidence to build the case to support several competing hypotheses regarding future political-military scenarios.  Several types of information were viewed as indicative of the type of data that could be used to develop and substantiate alternative hypotheses and several methods were used to represent his analysis of the data.  For example, a timeline was developed that depicted the following information: (1) location of U.S. forces; (2) geopolitical landscape of the world; and (3) the economy, based on economic decline affecting industry in the country.  One scenario depicted a situation where the West would not have the same influence on the economy and the fallout will be some political unrest.  Political rivalry between the old and new leadership will ensue and the scale will tip to the negative side as a result of political factors that have \"gone south.\"\nCongressional papers were used, in addition to all the information developed by this analysis, to write a point paper on an assessment of this country's military activity and the kind of threat he saw as a result of his analysis.\n\n## Sensemaking\n\nSensemaking describes one of the cognitive processes performed by the IA to understand complex, dynamic, evolving situations that are \"rich with various meanings.\" Klein, et al, (this volume) describe sensemaking as the process of fitting data into a frame (an explanatory structure, e.g., a story, which accounts for the data) and fitting a frame around the data.  The story, or frame, adopted by the IA will affect what data are attended to and how these data items are interpreted.  When the IA notices data that do not fit the current frame the sensemaking cycle of continuously moving towards better explanations is activated.  Sensemaking incorporates consideration of criteria typically used by IAs: plausibility, pragmatics, coherence, and reasonableness (*ibid*).\nSensemaking applies to a wide variety of situations.  As Klein, et al, describe it, sensemaking begins when someone experiences a surprise or perceives an inadequacy in the existing frame.  Sensemaking is used to perform a variety of functions, all related to the IA's job, including problem detection, problem identification, anticipatory thinking, forming explanations, seeing relationships, and projecting the future (*ibid*).\n\n## Discussion\n\nIntelligence analysis is an intellectual problem of enormous difficulty (Wirtz,\n1991). Many opportunities for tool development to assist the processes used by IAs exist. Prototype tool development has begun and will continue in conjunction with the next phase of the CTA.   Because the ultimate goal is to develop a computational model of the IA's tasks, detailed data must be captured on analysts performing their tasks.  Use of process tracing methods, e.g., verbal protocol analysis, in conjunction with the Glass Box software, developed for the NIMD Program (2002), should provide a rich source of data to develop a detailed model of the IA's processes.  NIMD's Glass Box is an instrumented environment that collects data on analyst taskings, source material, analytic end products, and analytic actions leading to the end products (Greitzer, 2004)\nUse of an instrumented data collection environment in conjunction with think aloud protocol analysis will enable us to gather detailed knowledge about the knowledge and cognition entailed in intelligence analysis.  The next phase of this CTA will involve asking SMEs to perform an analysis task while thinking aloud.  This\n\ntechnique typically provides detailed data concerning the mental content and processes involved in a specific task.\nIdentification of an appropriate sample of problems or tasks is essential to ensure sufficient coverage of critical skills and knowledge.  The initial set of interviews was conducted to develop a foundation of knowledge regarding the IAs' task domain.  During the next phase of this research additional empirical data will be gathered to further refine the CTA model of intelligence analysis.\n\nOur next phase for this research will involve knowledge elicitation by observing skilled practitioners performing an analysis task using open-source literature.  Working within a system development process, to support critical system design issues, additional data and empirical evidence will be collected.  The CTA process is an iterative process that builds on subsequent design activities.  New tools and training will impact the cognitive activities to be performed and enable development of new strategies.  One goal for this phase will be to predict the impact the technology will have on cognition for the intelligence analyst.\n\n\n\n## References Annett, J. (2000).  Theoretical And Pragmatic Influences On Task Analysis Methods. In\n\nJ. M. Schraagen, S. F. Chipman, & V. L. Shalin (Eds.), *Cognitive Task Analysis*, (pp.\n25-37). Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum.\nBodnar, J. W.  (2003).  Warning analysis for the Information Age:  Rethinking the\nIntelligence Process.  Joint Military Intelligence College.  Washington, DC.\nChipman, S. F., Schraagen, J. M., & Shalin, V. L. (2000).  Introduction to Cognitive Task\nAnalysis. In J. M. Schraagen, S. F. Chipman, & V. L. Shalin (Eds.), Cognitive Task Analysis, (pp. 3-23).  Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum.\nConnable, A. B. (2001).  Open Source Acquisition and Analysis:  Leveraging the Future\nof Intelligence at the United States Central Command. Unpublished Masters Thesis,\nNaval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA.  June 2001.\nCooke, N. J.  (1994).  Varieties of knowledge elicitation techniques.  International\nJournal of Human-Computer Studies, 41, 801-849.\nDuBois, D. & Shalin, V. L.  (2000).  Describing Job Expertise Using Cognitively Oriented\nTask Analyses (COTA)  In J. M. Schraagen, S. F. Chipman, & V. L. Shalin (Eds.),\nCognitive Task Analysis, (pp. 317-340). Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Mahwah,\nNJ: Erlbaum.\nFlach, J. M.  (2000).  Discovering Situated Meaning:  An Ecological Approach to Task\nAnalysis. In J. M. Schraagen, S. F. Chipman, & V. L. Shalin (Eds.), Cognitive Task Analysis, (pp. 317-340). Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum.\nGarst, R.  (1989).  Fundamentals of Intelligence Analysis.  In Ronald Garst, (Ed.)  A\nHandbook of Intelligence Analysis.  2nd ed.  Washington, DC:  Defense Intelligence College.\nGreitzer, F. L., Cowley, P. J., & Littlefield, R. J.  (2004).  Monitoring User Activities in the\nGlass Box Analysis Environment.  Paper presented as part of Panel on Designing\nSupport for intelligence analysts.  Human Factors and Ergonomics Society 48th\nAnnual Meeting, New Orleans, LA.\nHoffman, R. R. (1987). The problem of extracting the knowledge of experts from the\nperspective of experimental psychology. *AI Magazine, 8*(2), 52-67. Hoffman, R. R., Crandall, B., & Shadbolt, N. (1998). A case study in cognitive task analysis\nmethodology: The Critical Decision Method for the elicitation of expert knowledge. Human\nFactors, 40, 254-276. Hoffman, R. R., Coffey, J. W., Carnot, M. J., and Novak, J. D.  (2002).  An Empirical\nComparison of Methods for Eliciting and Modeling Expert Knowledge.  In Proceedings of the Human Factors and Ergonomics Society 46th Annual Meeting,\nSanta Monica, CA: Human Factors and Ergonomics Society.\nHoffman, R. R., Shadbolt, N. R., Burton, A. M., & Klein, G.  (1995)  Eliciting knowledge\nfrom experts:  A methodological analysis.  Organizational Behavior and Human\nDecision Processes.  *Vol. 62*, No. 2, May, 129-158.\nHoffman, R. R., Coffey, J. W., & Ford, K. M. (in press).  The Handbook of Human-\nCentered Computing. Pensacola, FL: Institute for Human and Machine Cognition.\nJohnson, R.  (2004).  http://www.cia.gov/csi/studies/vol147no1/article06.html. Joint Military Intelligence Training Center, Open Source Intelligence: Professional\nHandbook, Open Source Solutions, 1996.\nJones, M. D.  (1995).  *The Thinker's Toolkit.*  New York: Random House, 44-46.\nKlein, G. A., (2001).  *Sources of Power, How People Make Decisions*.  Cambridge, MA:\nThe MIT Press.\nKlein, G., Phillips, J. K., Rall, E. L., & Peluso, D. A. (in press).  A Data/Frame theory of\nSensemaking.  *Expertise Out of Context*.\nKlein, G. A., Calderwood, R., & MacGregor, D.  (1989, May/June). Critical Decision\nMethod for Eliciting Knowledge. IEEE Transactions on Systems, Man, and\nCybernetics, *Vol. 19*, No. 3, 462-472.\nKrizan, L.  (1999).  *Intelligence Essentials for Everyone*.  (Occasional Paper Number\nSix).  Washington, DC:  Joint Military Intelligence College.\nMathams, R. H.  (1995).  The Intelligence Analyst's Notebook.   In Douglas H. Dearth\nand R. Thomas Goodden (Eds.), *Strategic Intelligence: Theory and Application*, (2nd\ned., pp. 77-96). Washington, DC: Joint Military Intelligence Training Center.\nMilitello, L. G., & Hutton, R. J. B. (1998).  Applied Cognitive Task Analysis (ACTA): A\nPractitioners Toolkit for Understanding Task Demands. *Ergonomics, 41*, 164-168.\nOffice of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Networks and Information Integration\n(OASD/NII) Research Program,\nPatterson, E. S., Roth, E. M. & Woods, D. D.  (2001).  Predicting Vulnerabilities in\nComputer-Supported Inferential Analysis Under Data Overload.  Cognition,\nTechnology & Work, 3, 224-237.\nPirolli, P. & Card, S. K.  (1998).  Information foraging models of browsers for very large\ndocument spaces.  In *Advanced Visual Interfaces (AVI) Workshop*, AVI '98. Aquila, Italy, ACM Press.\nPirolli, P., & Card, S. K.  (1999). Information foraging.  Psychological Review, 106, p.\n643-675.\nPirolli, P., Fu, W.-t., Reeder, R., & Card, S. K.  (2002).  A User-Tracing Architecture for\nModeling Interaction with the World Wide Web.  In *Advanced Visual Interfaces*.  AVI\n2002.  2002.  Trento, Italy: ACM Press.\nPotter, S. S., Roth, E. M., Woods, D. D., & Elm, W. C. (2000).  Bootstrapping Multiple\nConverging Cognitive Task Analysis Techniques for System Design.  In J. M. Schraagen, S. F. Chipman, & V. L. Shalin (Eds.), *Cognitive Task Analysis*, (pp. 317-\n340). Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum.\nThe 9/11 Commission Report, Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist\nAttacks Upon the United States.  9/11 Commission.\nVaughan, D.  (1996).  The Challenger launch decision: Risky technology, culture, and\ndeviance at NASA.  Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.\nWirtz, James W.  (1991).  The Tet Offensive, *Intelligence Failure in War*.  Cornell\nUniversity Press.  Ithaca, New York.\nWoods, D. D., Patterson, E. S., & Roth, E. M.  (2002)  Can We Ever Escape from Data\nOverload?  A Cognitive Systems Diagnosis.  *Cognition, Technology, and Work*, 4,\n22-36.\n\n# Section 2 Evaluation Of A Computer Support Tool For Analysis Of Competing Hypotheses\n\n\nPeter Pirolli and Lance Good\n\nwith Julie Heiser, Jeff Shrager, and Susan Hutchins\n\nPalo Alto Research Center, Inc.\n\n## Introduction\n\nThe purpose of this experiment was to evaluate of a computer tool that aims to improve intelligence analysis. This tool provides an external workspace for performing the Analysis of Competing Hypotheses (ACH) method (Heuer, 1999). This experiment focused on a comparison of performance using the ACH computer tool to performance using the ACH method without the computer tool. This experiment was conducted in parallel with a study at NIST (National Institute of Standards and Technology) that focused on an evaluation of the ACH computer tool compared against analysis that does not use the ACH method.\n\n## Problems With Intuitive Analysis\n\nHeuer (1999) reviewed psychological literature relevant to the performance of intelligence analysis and identifies various cognitive and perceptual limits that impede attainment of best practice.  Human working memory has inherent capacity limits and transient storage properties that limit the amount of information that can be simultaneously heeded. Human perception is biased towards interpretation of information into existing schemas and existing expectations. Reasoning is subject to a variety of welldocumented heuristics and biases (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974) that deviate from normative rationality. In problem structuring and decision analysis, people typically fail to generate hypotheses, fail to consider the diagnosticity of evidence, and fail to focus on disconfirmation of hypotheses. ACH is designed to ameliorate the problems with intuitive intelligence analysis that arise from human psychology.\n\n## The Method Of Analysis Of Competing Hypotheses\n\nACH consists of the following steps.\n1. Identify possible hypotheses\n2. Make a list of significant evidence for/against 3. Prepare a Hypothesis X Evidence matrix 4. Refine matrix.  Delete evidence and arguments that have no diagnosticity 5. Draw tentative conclusions about relative likelihoods.  Try to disprove hypotheses 6. Analyze sensitivity to critical evidential items 7. Report conclusions. 8. Identify milestones for future observations ACH requires that you start with a full set of alternative possibilities (hypotheses) rather than a single\nmost likely alternative. For each item of evidence, it requires you to evaluate whether this evidence is\nconsistent or inconsistent with each hypothesis. Only the inconsistent evidence is counted when calculating a score for each hypothesis. The most probable hypothesis is the one with the least\n\nevidence against it, not the one with the most evidence for it. This is because ACH seeks to refute or eliminate hypotheses, whereas conventional intuitive analysis generally seeks to confirm a favored hypothesis.\n\n\n\nFigure 1. The ACH0 tool containing an analysis example concerning Iraq.\n\nACH0 is an experimental program that provides a table oriented workspace for performing the ACH method.  ACH0 allows the analyst to sort and compare the evidence in various analytically-useful ways. It sorts the evidence by diagnosticity, weight, type of source, and date/time. Evidence can be partitioned to compare the probabilities of the hypotheses based only on older evidence versus more recent evidence, or based on open sources versus clandestine sources, or based on the analyst's assumptions and logical deductions versus hard evidence Figure 1 presents a screen shot of ACH0, illustrating its table format. The hypotheses under consideration in the example are the columns labeled H1, H2, and H3. Six items of evidence are present in the example in the rows labeled E1 through E6. In the ACH Method, each piece of evidence is assumed to be independent and the hypotheses are exhaustive and mutually exclusive.\n\nAn entry of \"I\" signals that this evidence is inconsistent with the corresponding hypothesis, and entry of \"II\" signals that it is very inconsistent with the evidence. The \"C\" and \"CC\" entries indicate two levels of consistency. ACH0 distinguishes between \"I\" and \"II\" in lieu of a detailed representation of how evidence conflicts with a hypothesis. In other words, it models evidence as being contradictory without saying *how* it is contradictory. (A more detailed representation that focuses on causes of\n\n\ncontradiction could be useful in generating trees of alternative hypotheses). Rather than employing a symbolic representation of contradiction or a probabilistic one, the ACH method simply provides two\nlevels of inconsistency. Similarly, ACH0 provides three levels of weight assigned to evidence.\nRoughly, this weight is a stand-in for a richer representation of the quality of evidence. Is it reliable? Is\nthe source authoritative? Or is this \"evidence\" really just an assumption?\nACH0 is intended as a simple tool for organizing thinking about analysis. Its simplicity creates both\nstrengths and weaknesses. Here are some strengths:\n- Encourages systematic analysis of multiple competing hypotheses. - Creates an explicit record of the use of hypotheses and evidence that can be shared, critiqued,\nand experimented with by others.\n- Easy to learn. - Uses information that analysts can practically understand and enter into the tool. - Focuses attention on disconfirming evidence - counteracting the common bias of - focusing on confirming evidence. - Does not require precise estimates of probabilities. - Does not require complex explicit representations of compound hypotheses, time, space,\nassumptions, or processes.\n- Works without a complex computer infrastructure Here are some weaknesses. - Does not *and cannot* provide detailed and accurate probabilities.\n- Does not provide a basis for marshalling evidence by time, location, or cause. - Does not provide a basis for accounting for *assumptions*.\n- Many of the cognitive steps in analysis are not covered at all.\nWith these caveats ACH0 can have value when used with a clear understanding of its limitations.\n\n## Basic Claims About Ach\n\nThree are three key aspects of ACH that are aimed at ameliorating the problems of intuitive analysis\nabove:\n1. ACH promotes the generation of a fuller set of alternative hypotheses that each receive equal\nattention.\n2. ACH promotes the identification of key evidence with greatest diagnostic value.\n3. Analysts are shaped to seek evidence to refute hypotheses (disconfirm rather than confirm).\n\nThese aspects have ancillary effects, including:\n- Increasing the odds of getting the right answer - Providing an audit trail of how evidence used in analysis,\n\n- External matrix representation provides a focus of discussion for a group and can raise\ndisagreements\n- External matrix representation increases the amount of information that will receive attention\n- Each element of evidence is tested against a broader set of hypotheses - Greater likelihoods assigned to alternative hypotheses (because of increased attention)\n\n## Related Research\n\nA study conducted by Cheikes, Brown, Lehner, and Adelman (2004) investigated the effect of the ACH method in eliminating *confirmation bias* and the *anchoring heuristic*. Confirmation bias (Wason,\n1960) is the tendency of people to generate, select, or remember information that confirms a previously held hypothesis.  The anchoring heuristic (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974) occurs in judgments under uncertainty when people begin with an estimate of uncertainty (e.g., a probability or confidence rating) and adjust it minimally in light of new evidence. Cheikes et al. (2004) contrasted groups of subjects working with or without ACH on an intelligence problem (Jones, 1995) concerning hypothesized causes of the explosion on the battleship USS Iowa in 1989. Subjects were given three hypotheses to evaluate and received 60 items of evidence. The evidence was delivered to subjects in batches of 15. ACH subjects filled out the ACH matrix with ratings (-2 to 2) of their degree of support of evidence for hypothesis in an ACH matrix. After each batch of 15 items both groups were asked to provide confidence ratings for each hypothesis.\n\nCheikes et al. (2004) found evidence of a confirmation bias, and also found that non-ACH\nsubjects, more so than ACH subjects, tended to distort their evaluations of evidence to confirm the hypotheses they had been given. There was also a tendency to produce higher confirmation ratings for evidence related to the hypothesis preferred by subjects. This effect was mitigated by ACH for subjects with less analysis experience. Overall ACH appeared to mitigate confirmation bias for analysts with less analytic expertise. While there was some evidence of an anchoring effect, there was no evidence that ACH reduced the effect.\n\nThe study presented here was conducted in coordination with one (Scholtz, 2004) conducted at the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST).  The NIST study evaluated ACH0 with six Naval Reservists. Each subject received two problems and solved the first problem using their normal methodology (control condition) and solved the second problem using ACH0 (the order of presentation of the specific problems was counterbalanced across subjects).\n\nOverall, the NIST study (Scholtz, 2004) suggests that the Naval Reservists found the ACH0 tool to be useful. Results suggest that\n- Analysts were fairly confident of their ability to analyze the scenario.\n\n- Analysts were fairly confident about using the tool but questioned the scoring, and in some cases, the outcome.\n\n- The analysts were able to use the tool with very little difficulty.\n- The analysts felt confident that the ACH tool would improve their final report.  They were less\nsure that it would increase the speed at which they could complete the report but felt the\ntradeoff in quality was worth a reduced speed.  Two thirds of the subjects felt that the tool could help show missing evidence to some degree.  They were more confident in the ability of the tool to help with the consideration of more hypotheses.  They also felt that the tool would\nhelp improve the thoroughness of analysis.\n- Analysts felt that it would be more difficult to use the ACH method without the tool.   They were\ninclined to use the ACH method in future work and were quite positive about the use of the ACH method in helping them do their jobs.\n- Analysts felt the ACH method was easy to learn and use.  However, they felt that they had\nmore to learn to apply ACH in their work environment.\n- Quantitative data supported the analysts' view that more hypotheses were explored with the\ntool.\n- The analysts did not use the more advanced features of ACH.  Only one analyst sorted\nevidence;  few deleted evidence.\n\nMETHOD\n\n## Participants\n\nParticipants were students in an operational intelligence class at the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) in Monterey. A total of N = 25 students participated.\n\n## Procedure\n\nParticipants were divided into two groups. N = 12 students were assigned to the ACH-Computer group and N = 13 students were assigned to the ACH-Paper group. Participants in the ACH-\nComputer group worked individually on cases using the ACH software tool, whereas participants in the ACH-Paper group worked the same cases using paper, rulers, writing utensils, and similar office supplies provided by the experimenters. An attempt was made to match the composition of the two groups by prior experience in intelligence work.\nThe study took place in a classroom computer laboratory at the NPS campus. The ACH-Computer group worked at personal computers running the Windows 2000 operating system that were arranged facing outwards around the perimeter of the lab. The ACH-Paper group worked at desks arranged in the center of the lab. Instructions were given using PowerPoint slides presented from the from of the lab by one of the investigators. Participants in both groups heard the instructions at the same time, although portions of the instructions might be noted as relevant to only one group or the other. In addition to the  investigator presenting the instructions, a second investigator presented an ACH\n\ndemo, and three more provided additional assistance. Questions were allowed. Simple questions concerning misunderstanding of the procedure were handled individually. Overall, however, there were less than 10 questions throughout the entire procedure from all students. Almost all of these were simple questions of clarification, although there was one substantive question (see results).\n\nPrior to the experiment, participants were asked to read Chapter 8 of Heuer (1999) which introduces and discusses the ACH method. Participants were also asked to fill out a demographic questionnaire prior to the study. The experiment was divided into two two-hour sessions. Session 1\ntook place 10:00am - Noon and Session 2 from 3:00pm to 5:00pm.\n\n Session 1 began began with a brief introduction to the experiment and investigators, paper work, handing out of materials, and assignment to groups. Participants were asked to read a brief tutorial.\n\nThe tutorial for both groups reviewed the ACH method and discussed the analysis of evidence diagnosticity, evidence weighting, and identifying the most likely hypothesis. The ACH-Computer tutorial contained additional information regarding the ACH software tool. Participants were allowed to read through the tutorial until everyone indicated they were done. Following the tutorial, the investigator noted several differences between Chappter 8 of Heuer and the tutorial: (1) hypotheses were to be written out in full, rather than labeled using H1, H2, and so on, (2) a range of consistency labels (CC = very consistent, C = consistent, N = neutral, I = inconsistent, II = very inconsistent, and NA = not applicable) were to be used instead of +/-, (3) a type column was to be used to label the type or source of intelligence, (4) a weight column was to be used with labels HIGH, MEDIUM, and LOW. All participants were given hardcopies of Chapter 8 of Heuer (1999) and asked to turn to the main example used in that chapter, which is an ACH matrix concerning possible reactions of Saddam Hussein during the buildup to the 1991 Gulf War (Iraq Example)Participants in the ACH-Paper group were provided with a practice ACH matrix (with evidence and hypotheses from the Iraq Example already entered) to fill in using the new consistent labels and evidence types. As the ACH-Paper group worked on the Iraq Example, the participants in the ACH-Computer group were asked to open in ACH a file that corresponded to the Iraq example and were provided with a brief demonstration of the menus and features of ACH.\n\nThe remainder of Session 1 was devoted to solving Case 1 (Ramos Case). Participants worked on Case 2 2 (JCITA Case) in Session 2. Pilot studies conducted at NIST suggested that Case 1 required 1 hr to complete in full, whereas Case 2 required 2 hr to complete in full. To create a situation with moderate deadline pressures, participants in both groups were given 45 min to construct an ACH matrix for Case 1 and 75 min to construct an ACH matrix for Case 2. Booklets containing descriptions of the cases were handed out, face-down, to all participants, and a \"go\" signal was given by the investigator to start everyone at the same time. All participants were told when there were 10 min, 5 min, and 1 min remaining. Participants were also instructed to write down their finish time (from a clock on the wall) if they felt they were done prior to the deadline. After the deadline for completing the ACH matrix, all participants were provided with an ACH Reporting form. ACH\n\nReporting Form required participants to provide a list of their hypotheses for the case, and for each hypothesis to provide a qualitative degree of belief in the hypothesis and a brief (1 - 3 sentence) rationale. Participants were asked to indicate their qualitative degree of belief using one of the following labels: Almost Certain, Very Probably, Probable, Chances about Even, Unlikely, Very Unlikely, and Almost Certainly Not. Participants were given 10 min to complete the ACH Reporting Form.\n\nFollowing Case 2, at the end of Session 2, participants were asked to complete two forms. The first was the NASA-TLX mental workload instrument. The NASA-TLX instrument obtains measures on six factors involved in overall workload:\n- Mental demand, whether the analysis task affects the user's attention or focus\n- Physical demand, whether the analysis task affects the user's health, makes user tired, etc.\n\n- Temporal demand, whether the analysis task takes a lot of time that a user cannot afford - Performance, whether the analysis task is heavy or light in terms of workload - Frustration, whether the analysis task makes a user unhappy or frustrated\n- Effort, whether the user has spent a lot of effort on the analysis task.\n\n Each of the six components is rated on a 7-point scale (1 = low; 7 = high) and each pair of components is compared for difficulty.\n\nThe second instrument was a post-test designed to evaluate the ACH tool. This was designed in collaboration with NIST and the details are discussed in the results section.\n\nRESULTS\n\n## Problem Structuring\n\nTable 1 presents the mean completion time, number of columns of hypotheses and number of rows of evidence in subjects' final ACH matrices. The experiment was designed to have moderate deadline pressure, so we expected most subjects to use all the time available (Case 1 max time was 45 min;\nCase 2 max time was 75 min). However, subjects who finished early recorded their completion times. Consequently, the mean times in Table 1 are based on subject data that have a ceiling of 45 min for Case 1 and 75 min for Case 2.\n\nThere were no significant differences between the two groups on any of the variables in Table 1:\nCase 1 Time, t(15.3) = 1.69, p = 0.11; Case 1 Evidence, t(19.4) = 1.47, p = 0.16; Case 1 Hypotheses, t(14.4) = 0.36, p = 0.72; Case 2 Time, t(16.6) = 0.55, p = 0.59; Case 2 Evidence t(17.6) = 0.69, p =\n0.50; Case 2 Hypotheses, t(17.8) = 1.36, p = 0.19.\n\nIn addition, we examined the proportion of inconsistent (\"I\" or \"II\") relations in subjects final ACH\nmatrices. The ACH-Paper group had a mean 25.2% of their ACH matrices filled with inconsistent relations and the ACH-Computer group had a mean 22.6% inconsistent relations, and this was not a significant difference, t(21) = 0.59, p = 0.56 when computed on the proportions following an arcsine transformation.\n\n\nIn summary, the ACH-Paper and ACH-Computer groups did not exhibit any significant differences on major problem structuring factors that are the main focus of the ACH method: amount of evidence considered, number of hypotheses generated, and amount of inconsistent relations considered.\n\n\n\nMean completion times, number of hypotheses generated, and amount of evidence\nconsidered (standard deviations in parentheses).\n\n\nCase 1\n(Ramos)\n\nCase 2\n(JCITA)\nGroup\nTime1\nEvidence\nHypotheses\n\nTime2\nEvidence\nHypotheses\n\n3.8\n(1.0)\n\n21.1\n(6.3)\n\n71.0\n(6.9)\n\n3.6\n(1.0)\n\n11.7\n(4.0)\n\n39.4\n(7.2) ACH- Paper\n43.0\n(2.5)\n14.2\n(4.1)\n3.4\n(1.6)\n69.2\n(7.4)\n19.4\n(4.4)\n4.3\n(0.7)\nACH- Computer\nNote:\n1Maximum time in Case 1 is 45 min\n\n\n2Maximum time in Case 2 is 75 min\n\n\n## Post-Test Evaluations Workload\n\nResponses to the NASA-TLX instrument were used to compute overall workload ratings (1 = low; 7 = high). The overall workload ratings were higher for the ACH-Paper group (M = 5.1, SD = 0.91)) than the ACH-Computer group (M = 3.9, SD = 1.34), t(12.5) = 2.25, p < .05 (computed on log-transformed data). There were no significant differences on any of the six subfactors (mental, physical, temporal, performance, frustration, effort).\n\n## Tool Evaluation\n\nTable 2 presents results from the ACH Post-test. The only significant difference between the ACH-\nPaper and ACH-Computer groups was on the question \"How confident were you in your ability to use the tool to perform this task: (Question 5m Table 2, t(9.4) = 2.33, p < .05 (computed on logtransformed data), which reflects the novelty of the computer tool\n\nMean ratings on ACH Post-test Questionnaire.\nQuestion\nACH-Paper\nACH-Computer\n1. Did the task you performed resemble tasks you could imagine performing at work? (1 = not realistic-...5 = realistic)\n\n3.6\n(1.5)\n\n2. How did the task compare in difficulty to tasks that you normally perform at work? (1 = less diffiult...5 = more difficult)\n\n3.3\n(1.1)\n\n3. How confident were you of your ability to analyze the scenario?\n(1 = less confident...5 = more confident)\n\n3.9\n(0.3)\n\n4. How confident were you of your ability *to use ACH* to accomplish\nthe assigned task?\n(1 = less confident...5 = more confident)\n\n3.8\n(1.0)\n\n5. How confident were you in your ability to use the tool to perform this task?\n(1 = less confident...5 = more confident)\n\n4.7\n(0.9)\n\n6. How would you assess the length of time that you were given to perform this task? (1 = too little...5 = too much)\n\n2.8\n(1.2)\n\n7. If you had to perform a task like the one described in the scenario at work, do you think that using the ACH method would a. Improve your final report? (1=not at all...5=a lot)\n\n4.4\n(1.2)\nb. Increase the speed of your analysis? (1 = not at all...5 = a lot)\n\n2.9\n(1.1)\n\nc. Determine which pieces of evidence are critical/missing/inconsistent? (1 = not at all...5 = a lot)\n\n4.4\n(0.8)\n\nd. Enable you to consider and evaluate more hypotheses about the\nscenario? (1 = not at all...5 = a lot)\n\n3.5\n(1.4)\n\ne. Increase the thoroughness of your analysis? (1 = not at all...5 = a lot)\n\n4.0\n(0.8)\n\n8. Imagine performing this task using ACH but *without* a tool to help\nyou organize evidence with your hypotheses.    Do you think that task would be (1= easier...5 = more challenging)\n\n4.1\n(0.9)\n9. Imagine performing this without using the ACH method. Would this task be easier or more challenging? (1 = not at all...5 = a lot)\n\n3.6\n(0.7)\n\n10. Could you see yourself using the ACH method in your future work? (1 = not at all...5 = a lot)\n\n3.9\n(0.6)\n\n11. Do you think using the ACH method could help intelligence analysts perform their jobs? (1 = not at all...5 = a lot)\n\n4.1\n(0.6)\n\n12. Did you think the ACH method was easy to learn and use? (1 = not at all...5 = a lot)\n\n4.4\n(0.7)\n\n13. After the training you had today, how familiar do you feel with the\nAnalysis of Competing Hypotheses method? (1 = not at all...5 = a lot)\n\n4.1\n(0.9)\n\n3.9\n(1.3)\n\n3.0\n(1.4)\n\n3.7\n(1.1)\n\n3.6\n(1.4)\n\n3.2\n(1.5)\n\n3.2\n(0.8)\n\n4.0\n(0.7)\n\n3.6\n(0.7)\n\n3.6\n(1.2)\n\n3.8\n(1.2)\n\n4.0\n(0.5)\n\n4.3\n(0.7)\n\n3.8\n(0.8)\n\n3.8\n(0.7)\n\n4.1\n(0.6)\n\n4.2\n(0.7)\n\n3.6\n(0.9)\n\n## General Discussion\n\nOverall, there were few differences between students using the ACH computer tool and students using ACH without computer support. Problem structuring indicators (number of hypotheses, amount of evidence, inconsistent relations) did not differ between the two groups of students. The ACH computer tool did provide improvement in workload.\n\nStudent reviews of the NPS course in which the ACH study was conducted were summarized for us by the instructor, who reported:\nI've received the Student observation input from my course this summer. They are anonymous and electronic and are the final view from the students on what worked and didn't from their perspective.  I'm pleased to tell you all comments on the ACH evolution were all very positive. Many pointed out the ACH\nstudy as a clear highlight for them.  In particular, there were several comments about how beneficial the case study was as it forced them to apply in a practical sense some of the theory of what they had been reading and discussing.\n\nThese qualitative reviews are consistent with the evaluations provided by the Naval Reservists in the NIST (Scholtz, 2004) study.\n\n## References\n\n\nCheikes, B. A., Brown, M. J., Lehner, P. E., & Alderman, L. (2004). Confirmation bias in complex\nanalyses (Technical Report No. MTR 04B0000017). Bedford, MA: MITRE.\nHeuer, R. J. (1999). *Psychology of Intelligence Analysis*. Washington, D.C.: Center for the Study of\nIntelligence.\nJones, M. D. (1995). *The thinker's toolkit*. New York: Random House. Scholtz, J. (2004). *Analysis of Competing Hypotheses Evaluation (PARC)* (Unpublished Report).\nGaithersburg, MD: National Institute of Standards and Technology.\nTversky, A., & Kahneman, D. (1974). Judgment under uncertainty: Heuristics and biases. Science,\n185, 1124-1131.\nWason, P. C. (1960). On the failure to eliminate hypotheses in a conceptual task. Quarterly Journal of\nExperimental Psychology, 12, 129-140.\n\n\n                                                                            Section 3\n           Collaborative Intelligence Analysis with CACHE and its\n               Effects on Information Gathering and Cognitive Bias\n\n                                                                            Dorrit Billman\n                                                                      Gregorio Convertino\n                                                                              Jeff Shrager\n                                                                              J.P. Massar\n                                                                              Peter Pirolli\n\n                                                            Palo Alto Research Center, Inc.\n\n## Introduction\n\nA recent cognitive task analysis of intelligence analysis (Pirolli et al., 2004) suggests that the analytic process is organized into two interacting major loops of activities: (1) an information foraging loop that involves processes aimed at seeking information, searching and filtering it, and reading and extracting evidentiary interpretations and (2) a *sense making loop* (Russell et al., 1993) that involves the development of hypotheses and representations that fit the evidence. This fits a prescriptive view of intelligence analysis that is similar to the idealized practice of science (Kent, 1949), and the problems facing the typical intelligence analyst have much in common with those facing the typical scientist.  Typically, the main problem for the process of information foraging is that there are far more data than can be attended to, given the limitations of time and resources. Typically, the main problem for the process of sense making is insuring that a full space of alternative hypotheses has been generated and the alternatives have been tested against the data in an unbiased and methodical fashion (e.g., by adopting a falsificationist methodology and attempting to disconfirm hypotheses). Each of these kinds of problems could be addressed by cooperation or collaboration. Greater amounts of the available information can be foraged if one increases the number of analysts looking at it, assuming that each looks at slightly different subsets of the data. More hypotheses and greater corrective criticism of reasoning would come from having more analysts exchanging their reasoning, assuming some diversity of backgrounds, biases, viewpoints, etc. Indeed, anthropological studies\n(Sandstrom, 2001) of scientific fields suggest that communities self-organize to form cooperative\n\"informal colleges\" of scholars each of whom looks at slightly different phenomena from a slightly different perspective. Unfortunately, one of the recent criticisms of the intelligence analyst community is that it lacks the technology (and culture) required to support such cooperation and collaboration\n(National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, 2004). The purpose of this paper is present an evaluation of a system called CACHE7 designed to support collaborative intelligence analysis. The experiment reported in this paper focuses on evaluations of how teams of analysts using CACHE compare to individual analysts using CACHE in terms of information foraging effectiveness and reasoning biases. The experiment focuses specifically on effects on confirmation bias and anchoring because they are considered such significant problems in the evaluation of evidence in the intelligence community (Heuer, 1999).\n\n\n\n## Background\n\nSince the early 1970s a great deal of research in social and cognitive psychology has demonstrated that human judgment in decision-making deviates from what is considered normative rationality. Individuals exhibit systematic cognitive biases (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). Confirmation bias is particularly problematic in intelligence analysis (Heuer, 1999). *Confirmation Bias* is the tendency a decision maker to look for (and give more weighting to) confirmatory evidence, dismiss (and weight less) disconfirming evidence, and use neutral or ambiguous evidence as confirmatory (Kahneman, Slovic, and Tversky, 1982). Related to confirmation bias is the *anchoring effect*, which is the insufficient adjustment of the confidence in an initial hypothesis after receiving new evidence that is inconsistent with this initial hypothesis (Tolcott et al., 1989; Cheickes et al., 2004).\n\nHeuer (1999) proposed a simple methodology called the Analysis of Competing Hypotheses\n(ACH) to aid individual intelligence analysis, and a simple computer tool (Figure 1) has been developed to support this method. ACH consists of the following steps.\n\n9. Identify possible hypotheses 10. Make a list of significant evidence for/against 11. Prepare a Hypothesis X Evidence matrix 12. Refine matrix.  Delete evidence and arguments that have no diagnosticity 13. Draw tentative conclusions about relative likelihoods.  Try to disprove hypotheses 14. Analyze sensitivity to critical evidential items 15. Report conclusions. 16. Identify milestones for future observations ACH requires that one develop a full set of alternative possibilities (hypotheses). For each item of evidence, it requires an analyst to evaluate whether the evidence is consistent or inconsistent with each hypothesis. Only the inconsistent evidence is counted when calculating a score for each hypothesis. The most probable hypothesis is the one with the least evidence against it, not the one with the most evidence for it. This is because ACH seeks to refute or eliminate hypotheses, whereas conventional intuitive analysis generally seeks to confirm a favored hypothesis. The intent of the ACH tool is to mitigate confirmation bias and insure that attention is distributed more evenly across all hypotheses and evidence.\n\n\n\nFigure 1. The ACH0 tool containing an analysis example concerning Iraq. Hypotheses are listed in the column headings, evidence is along the rows. The entries in the cells of the table indicate consistent and inconsistent relations between evidence and hypotheses. The formation of groups to perform decision making is commonly considered a means to accomplishing more thorough processes and less biased outcomes. Consequently, \"almost every time there is a genuinely important decision to be made in an organization, a group is assigned to make it - or at least to counsel and advise the individual who must make it\" (Hackman and Kaplan, 1974; cited in Nunamaker et al., 1991). In line with the commonly held belief that it is useful to have a variety of views represented in a group, there is substantial experimental evidence that role diversity or functional diversity among group members mitigates bias (Shulz-Hardt et al., 2000) and improves performance (Cummings, 2004). However, there is a large literature suggesting that decision making by face-to-face groups often exhibits the same or worse biases than individual decision making. For instance, there is a tendency for homogeneous face-to-face groups to exhibit confirmation bias in their information search more so than individuals (Shulz-Hardt et al., 2000). This is a specific instance of a more general phenomenon affecting face-to-face groups: their members tend to focus attention on items they have in common and often fail to pool information that has been uniquely attended to by specific individuals (Stasser and Titus, 1985). Research on information pooling in groups has identified several interventions at the level of task and medium that can reduce this group bias (see Stasser and Titus, 2003 for a review). These interventions include the introduction of expert roles (Stewart and Stasser, 1995), the availability of written records (Parks and Cowlin, 1996), framing the decision task as a problem to be solved rather than a matter of judgment (Stasser and Stewart,\n\n1992), requiring members to rank order decision alternatives rather than choosing the best option (Hollingshead, 1996), and more importantly, introducing the technological aid of group support systems (McGrath and Hollingshead, 1994; Dennis, 1996). Several computer support systems for groups have been found to be effective in improving the communication and brainstorming functions of groups, addressing specific process losses that affect face-to-face groups (DeSanctis and Gallupe, 1987; Nunamaker et al., 1991; Dennis and Gallupe, 1993; see Fjermestad, 2004, for a review). For instance, electronic brainstorming systems appear to mitigate biased information search because all information is recorded in an external bulletin board and because factors governing civil face-to-face interaction are lessened.\nIn general, prior research has suggested that the performance of a decision-making group is affected by properties of the task (e.g., intellectual vs. judgment task; structured vs. unstructured), medium (i.e., face-to-face vs. collaborative system) and group (e.g., diversity of pre-group individual biases and group size). The medium can impact the amount of group bias (Benbasat and Lim, 2000) and the group outcome, especially when a correct answer is missing and response is based on choosing a preferred alternative and reaching consensus (i.e., judgment tasks) (Straus and McGrath, 1994). The composition of a group can affect its performance and this effect can interact with the medium. Heterogeneous group composition introduces in the group the potential for de-biasing itself (Shulz-Hardt et al., 2000). Diversity increases the potential of the group to expose members to different sources of information, know-how, and feedback (Cummings, 2004). However, the costs for translating such group potential into actual group performance might depend on the support provided by the medium of interaction. We should also consider that the presence of different perspective (e.g., roles) and information across the members increases the cost for grounding communication and coordinating (Clark, 1996). However, the role that computer tools can play to improve the quality of judgment in group decision-making remains largely unexplored (Benbasat and Lim, 2001; Lim and Benbasat, 1997).\n\n## Study Goals\n\nThe high-level goal of this experiment is to investigate effects of computer mediated collaborative intelligence analysis on amount of evidentiary information considered and the mitigation of cognitive bias. In the present study, we manipulate the composition of decision making teams in terms of the diversity of biases held by individuals when they began an intelligence analysis task. Through experimental manipulation, members of a decision-making team could be biased toward the same solution to an analysis problem (*homogenous* group) or to different solutions (*heterogeneous* group), prior to doing the analysis task. We then measure the effects of our manipulations in terms of amount of cognitive bias observed in the analysis outcome and the amount of evidentiary information attended (*information coverage*). Analysis in these groups is compared to individual analysts. We are\n\ninterested in evaluating whether (1) heterogeneous groups of analysts produce less cognitive bias than homogeneous groups or individual analysts and (2) if CACHE, our collaborative medium, is able to temper the process cost of group interaction when comparing the performance of interacting\ngroups with the performance of sets of non-interacting individual.\nOur high level goal for this study involves three subgoals:\n1.\nInvestigation of bias in groups: it compares performance across differently composed\ngroups: a Heterogeneous Group, in which group members initially are each biased\ntoward a different hypothesis, a Homogenous Group, in which group members are initially each biased toward a common hypothesis, and a Solo, or Nominal Group,\nCondition in which the (initially biased) participants work alone. Our experimental\ndesign varies the group composition, to assess how task performance supported by\nCACHE changes across group structure. This goal motivates much of our experimental\ndesign, method, and analyses.\n2.\nCACHE evaluation: it evaluates CACHE, providing information about how participants\nuse CACHE and what CACHE's strong and weak points were. All participants in the\nexperiment used CACHE, allowing us to collect as much, broad information as possible\nabout its usability.  Our investigation in this regard is exploratory, not hypothesis testing.\n3.\nExperimental method: it develops and tries out a laboratory method for assessing group\nprocesses in judgment tasks. An important feature of our procedure is that the judgment\ntasks are completed by each individual group member and not by the whole group. This\nenables comparisons between conditions with interacting and nominal groups, at the cost of reducing partially the collaborative nature of the task.\nAs part of this research, we calibrated material, task procedure, and evaluation metrics and we\ninformally report on the method's successes and weaknesses.\n\n## Cache\n\nCACHE is the platform used to support collaboration in this study. CACHE builds upon the ACH\nmethod discussed above. A variation of the earlier ACH0 interface (Figure 1) is at the heart of CACHE (Figures 2 & 3). CACHE employs a a simple decision matrix, where the rows represent evidence and the columns hypotheses. Each cell of the matrix represents the relationship between one piece of evidence and one hypothesis. In the particular implementation described here, the cells may take on values of CC (very consistent), C (consistent), N (neutral), I (inconsistent) or II (very inconsistent). Internally these take on numerical values of:  CC=2, C=1, N/A = 0, I = -1, and II= -2. The use of these values will become clear momentarily. In addition to cell values relating evidence to hypotheses, each evidence item (each row in the matrix) may be given a \"weight\" from among: Very- Low (1/6), Low (2/6 low), Medium (3/6), High (4/6), and Very High (5/6).\n\n CACHE is a client-server system which is used through a standard web browser (i.e., Internet\nExplorer). A given subject (whom we shall always refer to as user \"Alpha\" here) works in collaboration with two other subjects (\"Beta\" and \"Gamma\" - Alpha's \"co-workers\"). Alpha may have open some of the following sorts of windows:\n1. A *primary decision matrix* in which selected evidence is recorded, and in which the relation\nbetween each piece of evidence and each hypothesis is indicated (as above);\n2. One or two windows that enable Alpha to view (but not change) the matrices of Alpha's coworkers (that is, views of Beta and Gamma's matrices);\n3. A *search interface* over the evidence that is available to Alpha and which works much like\nGoogle's search interface (this evidence may be different for Alpha, Beta, and Gamma);\n4. A *ticker* that, when the experiment is in \"collaborate\" mode, indicates when Alpha's\ncoworkers select pieces of evidence that Alpha has not used;\n5. A number of *evidence viewers*, each examining the details of one piece of evidence; 6. A *chat window* enabling broadcast communications among all subjects and with the\nexperimenter.\nFigure 2 shows  schematically a screen with three linked windows.  For collaborating users,\nmany windows might be open at once, particularly if a user kept partners' matrices open. Users were instructed to always keep the main matrix, chat, and ticker windows open.\n\nOn the server side a state machine drives CACHE through the phases of the experiment. In each phase three subjects in an analysis team can see certain types of evidence, and have certain available operations. For example, in the middle phases, each subject in a homogeneous group has access to similar evidence, whereas the three subjects in a heterogeneous group see  have access to different evidence.. Similarly, at the beginning of each phase the subjects must work alone. (I.e., they cannot open viewers into one another's matrices, and the ticker does not report the actions of one's coworkers.) In the latter part of each phase, the ticker is activated, and users can view one another's matrices. (In fact, they are told to do so.)\nEach matrix in the experiment had the same three hypotheses (referred to here as \"Friction\",\n\"Overraming\", \"Suicide\", described in detail below). Only the evidence for or against these hypotheses can be changed. When a user choose to add a piece of evidence to a matrix, s/he could then (and usually should) set the weight of that evidence, and the values of the cells between that piece of evidence and each of the three hypotheses to indicate the level of support that the new piece of evidence gives to each hypothesis. At the bottom of the matrix (see Figures 2&3) the user can also set his or her *subjective* certainty in each of the three hypotheses, represented in terms of integer percentages which sum to 100. Each time settings of this sort are completed, two important actions take place automatically: First, the matrix interface calculates the objective level of support for each hypothesis. This is simply the sum of the cell support values (-2 to +2) times the weight of each piece of evidence (1/6 to 5/6). This, then is normalized to 1.0 over all three hypotheses and the score displayed at the bottom of the matrix (see Figure 2).\n\nThe second thing that happens is that if the subjects are in a collaborative phase (where they can see one another's matrices, and where the ticker is running), the ticker reports to each user what his or her coworkers have changed in their matrix. Specifically, it reports when a coworker has added evidence, deleted evidence, and when cell settings of evidence that both subjects share are different (called here \"inconsistency\").\n\nThe ticker offers the ability for the user to examine the evidence noted in the ticker entry. For example (again from Alpha's point of view), if the ticker reports that Beta has added a piece of evidence that Alpha simply does not have access to it currently, Alpha can examine that evidence by clicking the link in the ticker window (or in the view window onto Beta's matrix). Once Alpha has done this through any means available, that evidence is now available to Alpha as well, even if it was not previously available according to the order of operation of the experimental phases. This is one way that collaboration makes new knowledge available: Once a co-worker has used some piece of evidence, a user (e.g., Alpha) is given the opportunity to use it as well, even if the user did not previously have access to it.\nEvery operation carried out either by the user or by the server (e.g., moving through the phases, some of which are timed) is logged. These logs provide data for .Summary of Hypotheses\n\nIn this CACHE study we experimentally manipulated cognitive bias in individual subjects, and\nmanipulated the mixture of biased individuals forming analyst teams (groups). Our measurements focus on the detection of differences in information gathering (information coverage) and detection of\nchanges in cognitive biases. The main focus of our analysis was on the effects of working collaboratively in a group (as opposed to working solo) and the effects of working in groups with different mixtures of individual biases.  We hypothesized that\n- Heterogeneous groups would show *less judgment bias* than Homogeneous groups.\nBecause CACHE supports sharing information among participants, the differing views in the heterogenous groups should mitigate cognitive biases and  facilitate exposure to greater amounts of evidence (greater information coverage) relative to homogenous\ngroups.\n- Heterogeneous groups would show *no net process loss* relative to the Solo analysts.  We\nexpect that CACHE, the collaborative medium, will mitigate the process costs of group\ninteraction.\n\n## Experimental Design\n\nThese hypotheses were tested with subjects using CACHE to solve an analysis task that involved\nreading through material about the real case of the explosion in one of the  16-inch gun turrets on the battleship USS Iowa that occurred in April 1989, and assessing the relative likelihood of three hypothesized causes of the explosion:\n- Hypothesis 1: **An overram ignited powder**. An unqualified rammerman inadvertently\ncaused a mechanical rammer to explode powder bags\n- Hypothesis 2: **Friction ignited powder** by causing a buildup of static electricity inside the\ngun chamber causing a spark that ignited the powder\n- **Hypothesis 3: Gun captain placed an incendiary device** in order to purposely kill himself\nand others.\nExperimental instructions and materials were designed to systematically induce an initial belief favoring one of these three hypotheses about the cause of the Iowa explosion. This initial bias was induced by assigning roles to individuals. Subsequent manipulation of the presentation of evidence\nabout the case was performed to initially reinforce these biases, but by the end of the experiment participants had access to a collection of evidence that was carefully balanced to equally support each of the hypotheses. Thus, at the end of the experiment the unbiased or the normatively correct judgment would be a balanced distribution of belief among the three explanations: all are similarly supported by evidence (33%, 33%, 33%).\n\n\nGroup Condition /\nInitial Belief\nNominal\nGroup\nHomogeneous\nGroup\nHeterogeneous\nGroup\nTotal\nHypothesis 1 (bias)\n1 group (3 SS) 1 group (3 SS)\n1 group (3 SS)\n3 groups (9 SS)\nHypothesis 2 (bias)\n1 group (3 SS) 1 group (3 SS)\n1 group (3 SS)\n3 groups (9 SS)\nHypothesis 3 (bias)\n1 group (3 SS) 1 group (3 SS)\n1 group (3 SS)\n3 groups (9 SS)\nTotal\n3 groups (9 SS) 3 groups (9 SS) 3 groups (9 SS) 9 groups (27\nSS)\n\n The initial bias toward one of the hypothesis served as a baseline, from which belief change and\nfinal belief could be assessed. As shown by prior research on judgment bias, people frequently overweigh prior belief, over-anchor on initial judgments, and focus on confirming rather than\ndisconfirming evidence (Tversky and Kahneman, 1974). Our goal was to determine if our manipulations of collaborative analysis mitigated these biases and improved information coverage.\nThe independent variables in this experiment were:\na. **Group Condition**. This was a between-subject factor with three levels: Homogeneous\nGroup, Heterogeneous Group, Solo Group. Each group was composed of three individuals,\ninteracting (Heterogeneous and Homogeneous) or working alone (Solo).\nb. **Initial Belief**. This was a between-subjects factor, used for counterbalancing. It was\northogonal to Condition: In each condition a third of the participants had each of the three values of Initial Belief.  In the Homogeneous Condition, individuals in the same group all had the same Initial Belief, with belief changing between groups.  In the Heterogeneous condition, individuals in the same group each had a different initial belief.  In the Solo Group individuals did not interact so variation of Initial Belief may equivalently be thought of\nas within or between group. For our labeling purposes we grouped three individuals with\nthe same Initial Belief into the same Solo Group. The distribution of participants across\nCondition and Initial Belief is shown in Table 1.\nc. **Block.** This was a within-subject factor, Evidence was presented in four blocks and\nblocking is described in the Method section.\nThe dependent variables in this experiment were Bias and Information Coverage. We measured\nbias (or debiasing process) in several, increasingly fine-grained ways.\n1. We directly assessed the **final beliefs**. This provided the simplest, most direct measure of\nbias.  Final beliefs could be compared both across conditions and to a normative distribution of belief.  If participants in all conditions were similarly biased initially, then differences in final\nbelief would reflect different debiasing processes among conditions.\n2. We measured the **change in belief** (degree of debiasing) from the belief expressed at the end\nof the initial bias-inducing procedure to the final belief expressed at the end of the entire judgment task. This measured, individual by individual, the degree (and direction) of belief change. We also considered belief at intermediate points. These first two types of measures\nprovided a \"bottom line\" of bias, from all contributing processes.  They incorporated effects of any anchoring bias from the process of forming and \"committing to\" an estimated value for initial belief, or any confirmatory bias in how later evidence was selectively consulted and incorporated, and of any other biasing processes.\n3. We separated the underlying **judgment processes** that contributed to bias.  Of particular\ninterest, we assessed *how evidence was used and the distribution of evidence use* between\nconfirming and disconfirming evidence, and across evidence relevant to each of the three hypotheses.  We looked at measures reflecting how information was weighted and integrated in reaching judgment and at what information participants read. This third, process-oriented measure provided information about whether and when confirmation bias guided the selection\nor use of evidence. The information coverage of individuals and groups was calculated on the basis of these results. These three measures provided information about judgment bias due to over-reliance on initial\nbeliefs and provide ways to assess the anchoring effect and confirmation bias discussed above.\n\n\n## Method Participants\n\nThe participants were recruited among graduate and undergraduate students at Stanford and PARC in the summer 2005. Thirty-three students participated in the experiment and were assigned to\n3-member same-gender groups (11 groups). 2 of the 11 groups were excluded from the final data analysis because of irregularities in the procedure or technical problems. The final experiment sample comprises 27 participants (9 groups). About 2/3 (17/27) of the participants were males and 1/3 (10/27) were females, the average age was 25.2; only two participants were older than 40 years.\n\n\n## Setting\n\nThe three members of each group were seated at workstations located in separate rooms. They could not see each other and were able to talk to the experimenter through a chat tool. The members of interacting groups could also share information with their partners using the chat tool and the collaborative components of CACHE. Participants in the same group were trained together, and thus had slight familiarity with one another.\n\n\n\n## Apparatus\n\n\nEach participant completed the task using the CACHE system and the chat tool (Figures 2 & 3).\n\nThe CACHE system comprises a suite of tools supporting collaborative decision-making (1). The tools supporting the analysis of each user are the ACH matrix, search page, and read/interpret page. The ACH matrix provides a table-oriented workspace for performing decisions using a structured method for analysis - the Analysis of Competing Hypotheses (ACH) method. CACHE also includes tools supporting collaborative analysis: the ticker, which ireports on differences in the evidence included by the teammates in their matrices, and two read-only views of the entire partners' matrices. The chat tool, paired with the CACHE system, enabled synchronous communication and coordination about the task.\n\nThe participants used the Analysis of Competing Hypotheses (ACH) method for performing their analysis task. This method was developed by the intelligence community for structuring the analysis process and enhancing the quality of decisions about complex decision-making tasks (Heuer, 1999). It helps the decision-maker to assess if (and how strongly) the available evidence supports or refutes the hypotheses that are inherent in arguments. To apply this method, each participant was provided with a set of alternative hypotheses and a large body of evidence.  They were asked to evaluate whether and how strongly multiple evidence items were consistent or inconsistent with each hypothesis. Two general rules were emphasized: (1) analyze all the evidence with respect to all the hypotheses, and (2) emphasize disconfirming evidence. These drive the overall process and are critical to determining the relative likelihood of the competing hypotheses (Cheikes et al., 2004).\n\nAlpha's CACHE workspace\n+\nChat tool\n\n## Task\n\nThe experimental task was to analyze the Iowa Explosion investigation case: assess the relative likelihood of three hypothesized causes of the explosion on the battleship USS Iowa in April 1989. The participants were asked to analyze the hypotheses and four batches of evidence using the ACH method and the CACHE system. The case includes three hypotheses and 80 pieces of evidence, 45\npositive items supporting one of the hyptotheses, 15 negative items disconfirming an hypothesis, and\n20 neutral fillers. The evidence items come from a variety of sources, e.g., results and opinions provided by government investigators, independent testing organizations, and subject-matter experts engaged as consultants.\nThe Iowa Explosion case had been used as the principal exercise for practicing the ACH method in Jones (1998, pp. 209-216) and was adopted by Cheikes et al. (2004) to study confirmation bias in individual analysts. In  adapting the prior task materials (Cheikes et al., 2004) to the collaborative context three main changes were made: the use of a greater number of evidence items, the use of interpretations in combination with each evidence item, and the use of professional roles that favored specific sources of evidence. Roles were assigned to group members consistently with the other information manipulations  in order to induce bias. The amount of positive (supportive) vs. negative\n\n(disconfirming) evidence items and tagged vs. untagged (with the source name) evidence items were balanced across the three alternative hypotheses.\nWe used 80 pieces of evidence and 80 interpretations. The analysis of evidence items and hypotheses was conducted in 4 blocks. In each block the decision-makers had access to 20 new evidence items and 20 new interpretations. Each evidence item was 1 or 2 paragraphs in length and was summarized by a 1-sentence interpretation. It was assumed that each interpretation had been entered by an analyst, who had read the evidence item before. The  interpretations were designed to show whether the corresponding item supported, opposed, or neither supported or opposed one of the hypotheses. The evidence covered various topics (e.g., mechanics, electronics, and psychological diagnoses) and contained conflicting expert testimony connected to different sources of evidence (Navy experts, Sandia labs, FBI experts), as is typical of complex analysis tasks (law enforcement investigations, intelligence analysis, emergency management, and financial analyses).\nOverall, the analysis of the Iowa Explosion case is a structured decision-making task (the ACH\nmethod) conducted with the support of CACHE (see Nunamaker et al. (1991) for the benefits of using structured tasks in computer-supported groups). The content and type of information available to each decision-maker was controlled by the experimenter. The key parameters that were controlled include number of evidence items and interpretations supporting/opposing each hypothesis, type of evidence item (i.e., positive vs. negative, tagged vs. untagged) and source of evidence (Navy, Sandia, FBI). Aspects of the information that were actively manipulated by the experimenter in order to induce bias were:\n- The professional roles of analyst (Navy, Sandia, or FBI expert) favoring one of the sources of evidence\n- The ordering of evidence supporting the three hypotheses within a block (block 1);\n- Relative proportion of evidence supporting the three hypotheses within a block (block 2);\n- Independently rated relevance of evidence supporting the three hypotheses within a block\n(blocks 1-4);\n\n\n## Procedure\n\nDuring the first portion of the experiment the participants signed the informed consent form and received training and background information. They were trained, as a group, on the ACH method and the CACHE tool, and were given the opportunity to practice with both the method and tool. The training lasted about 35 minutes. After a short break, they sat at workstations located in separate rooms. They were given the instructions about the task and the role and background information about the Iowa Explosion case. After they had read the background information they started the analysis task.\nThe task was organized so that the analysis of the case was decomposed into four blocks. During each block each participant received through CACHE a block of interpretations and evidence items.\n\nS/he was instructed to search, read and make sense of the evidence; and to  add to their ACH matrix in CACHE the evidence items considered relevant.  For evidence items entered in the matrix, s/heindicated within the matrix the degree each evidence item supported, or conflicted with each of the hypotheses; indicated the importance of that piece of evidence, and indicated at the bottom of the matrix the overall level of confidence in each hypothesis at the end of each block.  CACHE also generated and displayed at the bottom of the matrix a linear strength-of-evidence measure derived from the user's entries.\nDuring the first block all the participants worked alone. Then, for each of the remaining three blocks the members of interacting (Homogeneous and Heterogeneous) groups collaborated remotely with their partners in addition to performing their individual analysis in CACHE. At the beginning of each block they worked individually for five minutes, before interacting with their team members.  In contrast, the members of Solo (nominal) groups worked individually for the entire duration of the task. The analysis of the case lasted about 1 hour and half. At the end, the participants were administered a questionnaire and a short interview.\n\n## Results Effects Of Group Condition On Bias\n\nThis results section reports on a) the existence of bias, b) effects of condition on overcoming biases from over-reliance on initial beliefs, and c) what we have learned about the judgment process in this task.  We have three main measures: 1) Final matrices, 2) Degree of Belief entered by users into their matrices at the end of each block, and 3) the computer logs preserving user interactions with CACHE.\n\nOur design was to collect a very large number of measures. However, we have missing data on several measures, which influences the strength of conclusions we can draw.  We have complete data, for each user, on the Final Matrix. For the Degree of Belief recorded at the end of each block, we are missing 1 user's data from Block 1, 2 users from Block 2, and 4 users from Block 3.  We have Cache-logs for all three Homogeneous groups, 2 of 3 Heterogeneous groups, and 2 individual solo users.\nMany of the analyses concern bias. Call the hypothesis towards which a particular user was initially directed, the Preferred Hypothesis.  Several measures can reflect bias, which can in turn be tested for interaction with Condition.  The bias measures we use are:\na)  Response to the preferred hypothesis, such as degree of belief in the Preferred Hypothesis; call this the direct measure\nb)  An interaction effect between Initial Bias (between users) and response hypothesis (within user, e.g. judged importance of evidence supporting each of the three hypotheses). Belief in the three response hypotheses should be higher for the hypothesis towards which the user was initially biased, producing the intereaction.\n\nc)  A derived difference measure.\nTo derive the difference measure, subtract the average response to the Alternative Hypotheses from the response to the Preferred Hypothesis,.  Values greater than zero indicate bias. Effects of condition can be measured as main effects (e.g. a main effect of condition on degree of belief in the Preferred Hypothesis), as interaction with a difference score, or as a three-way interaction , Condition and Initial Bias (between-subject factors) with the within-subject variable distinquishing the responses to the three hypotheses.\n\n## Initial Bias\n\n\nTo assess effects of condition on overcoming bias, we had to be able to produce controlled initial biases in all conditions.  We used two dependent variables to assess the existence and nature of bias at the end of Block1.  First, we predicted that the degree of belief in an hypothesis would be affected by the bias manipulation, but not condition. Recall that through the end of Block 1, there was no difference in the way participants in different conditions had been treated.   The Belief for each hypothesis at the end of Block 1 are shown in Figure 4. S.  A repeated measures ANOVA shows a strong interaction between rated hypothesis and bias manipulation, F(4,34)=8.49, p<.001, but no effects of Condition or any of its interactions F<1.\nSecond, we used the direct measure, here Belief entered in the matrix for the Preferred Hypothesis.  If, averaged across counterbalancing of content, more than a third of users' belief is committed to the preferred hypothesis, then users were successfully biased.  The overall % Belief in Preferred hypothesis, and the values for each condition (Heterogeneous Condition mean=56, Homogenous Condition=57, Solo=62) all differed from an unbiased 33%.  Neither Bias, Condition, nor their interaction had significant effects on Belief Preferred at the end of Block 1.  Thus we succeeded in biasing our users, and doing so very similarly across conditions.\n\n## Effect Of Condition On Bias Change\n\n\nDo users in some conditions reduce bias more than those in other conditions?  In particular, has Belief in the Preferred Hypothesis become closer to the normative value of 1/3 in some conditions more than others?  Descriptively, Figure 5 shows that the initial % Belief in Preferred Hypothesis changes over time, with the Solo and Heterogeneous Conditions diverging  from the Homogeneous Condition.  Belief in Preferred Hypothesis increases from 57% to 72% for the Homogeneous Condition (increasing bias), while it decreases in the Heterogeneous and Solo Conditions from roughly 60% to 43%.\nWe conducted  ANOVA's for testing the effect of condition on the  Belief in the preferred hypothesis at each of the 4 blocks. Because of our pattern of missing data, this approach has much more sensitivity than repeated measures ANOVA or MANOVA. Effect of Condition was not significant at Block 1 (F=.13, p=.874) but was significant or marginally significant at Block 2 (F=3.8, p=.041), Block 3 (F=2.93, p=.076), and Block 4 (F=3.92, p=.034). The reduced significance of the effect of Condition at block 3 may be due to the greater  data loss for this block. As a complementary analysis we did a MANOVA on Belief at each of  the four blocks with condition as a factor.  Here Condition overall was not significant, F(8,32)=1.51, p=.193, nor significant on Block 1 , F(2.18)=..41 13, p=.670. It was, however,  significant or marginally significant on the remaining blocks (Block 2, F(2,18)=3.38, p=.057; Block 3, F(2,18)=3.22, p=.064; and Block 4, F(2,18)=3.70, p=.045). Recall that more observations are missing in the intermediate blocks (2 in Block 2 and 4 in Block3), making these points less reliable.\n\n\n\n## Processes In Judgment And Bias\n\n\nGiven the presence of biased judgment and differences among conditions in reducing bias, we can begin to separate constituent influences on judgment.   We report results loosely ordered from earlier processes, such as inclusion of an item in the matrix, to later judgment steps, such as final belief. A. Final Matrix Data\n\nEvidence Counts: Inclusion in the Matrix. Our evidence pool included items with disconfirming information, directly undermining support for one hypothesis.  Because negative information, whether or not disconfirming a favored hypothesis, may be difficult for people to use, we checked the rate of inclusion of positive versus negative evidence.   Overall, users included 68.5% of the 15 pieces of negative evidence and 69.1% of the 45 pieces of positive evidence;  neither Condition, Item Positivity, or their interaction were significant in a repeated measures ANOVA.  This strikingly similar proportion of negative to positive evidence used is of interest in its own right. It suggests that instruction in the ACH method with its emphasis on the value of disconfirming information may have been sufficient to overcome biases against use of negative information.\n\n|                                   |        |       |\n|-----------------------------------|--------|-------|\n| CONDITION                         |        |       |\n|                                   |        |       |\n|                                   |        |       |\n|                                   |        |       |\n| means                             |        |       |\n|                                   |        |       |\n|                                   |        |       |\n|                                   |        |       |\n| (st dev)                          |        |       |\n|                                   |        |       |\n|                                   |        |       |\n| Type of                           |        |       |\n| Response                          |        |       |\n| Specific                          |        |       |\n| Measure                           |        |       |\n| Sig.                              | Hetero | Homo  |\n| Amount                            |        |       |\n| Included in                       |        |       |\n| Matrix                            |        |       |\n| # of Pieces                       |        |       |\n| of Evidence                       |        | 42.33 |\n|                                   |        |       |\n|                                   |        |       |\n| 19.47                             | 11.25  | 13.12 |\n| Amount                            |        |       |\n| Included in                       |        |       |\n| Matrix                            |        |       |\n| Positive                          |        |       |\n| Evidence                          |        |       |\n| Difference                        |        |       |\n| Score                             |        | 1.61  |\n|                                   |        |       |\n|                                   |        |       |\n| 1.95                              | 2.63   | 1.70  |\n| Importance                        |        |       |\n| Positive                          |        |       |\n| Evidence                          |        |       |\n| Difference                        |        |       |\n| Score                             | +      | 1.07  |\n|                                   |        |       |\n|                                   |        |       |\n| 0.21                              | 0.47   | 0.20  |\n| \"Value\"                           |        |       |\n| (Evidence +/-                     |        |       |\n| Rel. to                           |        |       |\n| Hypothesis)                       |        |       |\n|                                   |        |       |\n| Difference                        |        |       |\n| Score                             |        | 3.06  |\n|                                   |        |       |\n|                                   |        |       |\n| 7.92                              | 7.69   | 10.77 |\n| Support                           |        |       |\n| (summed                           |        |       |\n| Importance X                      |        |       |\n| Value)                            |        |       |\n|                                   |        |       |\n| Difference                        |        |       |\n| Score                             |        | 12.11 |\n|                                   |        |       |\n|                                   |        |       |\n| 26.78                             | 29.41  | 42.08 |\n| Strength of                       |        |       |\n| preferred                         |        |       |\n| hypothesis                        | +      | 3.67  |\n| Strength                          |        |       |\n| (CACHE                            |        |       |\n| integrated                        |        |       |\n| measure)                          |        |       |\n|                                   |        |       |\n|                                   |        |       |\n|                                   |        |       |\n| 3.80                              | 3.48   | 8.58  |\n| Belief in                         |        |       |\n| preferred                         |        |       |\n| hypothesis                        | +      | 46.67 |\n| Belief                            |        |       |\n| (User entered                     |        |       |\n| judgment)                         |        |       |\n|                                   |        |       |\n|                                   |        |       |\n| 27.16                             | 15.64  | 29.75 |\n|                                   |        |       |\n|                                   |        |       |\n| + Significant effect of condition |        |       |\n| * Significant bias. Test for bias |        |       |\n| varies with measure; see text.    |        |       |\n|                                   |        |       |\n|                                   |        |       |\n\n\nGiven the similar inclusion rates of negative and positive evidence and similar total amounts of evidence used across conditions, we asked if there was bias in how evidence was selected, and whether there were any differences across conditions in this.  Confirmation bias would be expected to show up as greater inclusion of positive evidence supporting the Preferred versus alternative hypotheses.  The effect of bias on negative evidence might be more complex.  Bias towards a particular hypothesis might either increase attention and inclusion to any evidence relevant to the hypothesis, or discourage inclusion of any contradictory evidence.\nWe used the interaction term between Initial Bias and Matrix Hypothesis as the indicator of bias.\nWe ran a repeated measure ANOVA with Matrix Hypothesis and  Positive/Negative evidence type as within-subject factors and Condition and Initial Bias as between  subject factors. The main effects of Positive/Negative, F(1,18)=186.9, p<<.001 reflected the much greater amount of positive evidence. There was a main effect of Matrix Hypothesis, F(2,17)=4.813, p=.022, but not of Initial Bias or Condition.  The marginally significant interaction of Matrix Hypothesis and Initial Bias, F(4,36)=2.53, p=.057 showed some evidence of bias.  In addition, item type (Positive/Negative) interacted with the bias indicator,  in the three-way interaction, Positive/Negative X Matrix Hypothesis X Initial Bias, F(4,36)=5.79, p=001.  This suggests that Positive and Negative items were biased differently and should be assessed separately. Positive items showed a significant bias effect (interaction F(4,36)=5.35, p=.002), but no condition or Matrix Hypothesis effect (F's <1.6, p>.2). More positive items were included for the Matrix Hypothesis which matched the Initial Bias hypothesis.  No effect of bias on negative or neutral items were found.  In summary, while there is some bias in how positive items are selected for inclusion in the final matrix,  this does not differ with condition.  Neither amount nor distribution of evidence included is significantly affected by Condition; however, on both, the Solo Condition trends toward more favorable performance.\n\n\nWe also asked whether groups, collectively, covered different amounts of evidence in different conditions.  For example, if the three individuals in the heterogeneous condition looked for different types of evidence but combined what they found, they might together use more diverse evidence and produce broader coverage than three independent individuals. For solo, or nominal, groups, we grouped the nine individuals into three groups in two ways, putting users with the same bias together and regrouping to put users with different biases together.  Average group coverage by the three Heterogeneous Groups (mean=63.7/80), three Homogeneous Groups (mean=52/ 80), and six nominal/solo groups (three of homogeneous (mean=64.7/80) and 3 of heterogeneous (mean=67/80) members) was similar, and quite high. The data suggests a disadvantage of homogeneous members, but no advantage of interacting vs nominal group.\n\n\n\nEvidence Importance. A second point at which confirmation bias might affect judgment is weighting the importance of the evidence which has been included in the matrix.  Users' ratings of\n\nevidence importance were converted to a 1-5 importance scale. The summed importance ratings of a particular class of evidence might be influenced by confirmation bias.  An overall bias to give more importance to evidence relevant to the Preferred hypothesis would be expressed as an interaction between Matrix Hypothesis and Initial Bias.  This interaction was significant, F(4,36)=3.276, p=.022, in a repeated measures ANOVA with Condition and Initial Bias as between- subject factors and Matrix Hypothesis within subjects. There was no significant main effect or interaction with condition, p's >.3; main effect of Matrix Hypothesis was significant, F(2,17)=4.159, p=.034.\n\nThe effects of a confirmation bias on positive evidence are clearer, and possibly different from the effects on negative evidence.  Therefore, we ran the parallel analysis on positive evidence alone. Here we found a strong, significant bias (Matrix Hypothesis X Initial Bias), F(4,36)=12.48, p<.001 and also a significant interaction of this bias with Condition (3-way interaction, F(8,36)=2.343, p=.039).  To understand this bias, and translate an interaction into a main effect, we also used the difference score: (the summed importance of preferred-hypothesis evidence) - (average of summed importance of the two alternative-hypothesis evidence).  Table 2 shows this difference score.  An ANOVA on the difference score  shows significant condition differences in amount of bias (condition F(2,18)=6.00, p=.010; and effect of Initial Bias, F(2,18)=2.42, p=.027). The Heterogeneous Condition is significantly less biased than the Homogeneous Condition in summed importance of evidence (Post hoc, Tukey HSD, p=.008)\n\n\nEvidence Value: Relation of Evidence to Hypotheses. Assigning the relation between evidence items and hypotheses is a third point at which confirmation bias might affect judgment.  Users responses from CC to II were coded on a 1-5 scale, where 5 was highly consistent and 3 was neutral.\n\n            We analyzed the summed values of evidence in several ways, all evidence together, separately for positive evidence, for neutral evidence,  and for the difference score on summed value.  Presence of bias would produce significant interaction of Initial Bias and Matrix Hypothesis, and several analyses did have this interaction significant.  However, the pattern of interaction was not  directly that predicted by a confirmation bias.  Nevertheless, the difference score bias measure did differ  from zero, t(1,26)=2.497, p=.019. suggesting some reliable bias. No analysis showed a reliable influence of condition.\n\nEvidence Support: Value * Importance.  We multiplied evidence weights times evidence values, to derive an integrated measure of support.  (This is very similar to the CACHE generated strength measure for each hypothesis displayed to users at the bottom of their matrix, as shown in Figures 2&3.) To assess overall bias, we again constructed a difference score, subtracting the average support for the alternative hypotheses from the support for the favored hypothesis.\nMean support by condition is shown in Table 2.  Though the differential support for the biased hypothesis, mean=39, in the Homogeneous Condition is a larger value than the differential support,\n\nmean=12, in the other conditions, variability is high. We found evidence of bias (1-sample t-test compared value to zero, t=3.20, p=.004).  There was no significant effect of condition in the one-way ANOVA on the difference measure, F(2,26)=1.85, NS, nor was there in any of several ANOVA's and MANOVAs, testing support from all evidence and separately for positive and neutral evidence. (Tests on all evidence and positive evidence found the interaction effect indicating bias, as well.)\n\nBeliefs.  Analysis of Belief (Table 2), in the final matrix were presented in the results section on bias change, establishing the existence of bias at the end of the experiment and the emergence of condition differences. Further, we compared the CACHE-derived Strength measure and found condition differences in degree of bias on this measure as well (Table 2).  For most but not all users, the ordering of degree of belief across the three hypotheses was the same as the ordering derived by linear combination of weight and value of evidence.  By and large, the final judgments seem, indeed, to derive from the steps of entering and evaluating evidence which we requested users to do.  Degree of correspondence between these two metrics is an interesting question for further work. B. Cache Log For 5 groups of users and 2 solo users we had the CACHE-log records of their interaction.  This provided additional information about the processes, in particular, the number of times a user accesses the full evidence, not just the interpretation, presumably in order to read it.   We tallied these as access-to-read.  The 9 Homogeneous condition users read 34.7 items on average, compared to 45.5 items averaged by the 6 Heterogeneous Condition Users. The CACHE-logs also record when users add evidence to their matrix; this can't be less than the number of pieces of evidence in the final matrix, though users can delete evidence after adding it.  Homogeneous users averaged 39.2 items added, compared to Heterogeneous user average of 53.2.\nThe pattern of Heterogeneous users adding (and reading) more evidence than the Homogeneous users is found here as well.  These data allow us one new comparison: between amount read and amount added.  Users add more evidence than they read, in both Homogeneous and Heterogeneous conditions.  This is consistent with a 'breadth first' strategy, of processing a large amount of information superficially, and including unread material in the matrix. We had not anticipated  users developing this strategy.\n\nDuring Blocks 2 and 3, each user has access to some evidence presented only to his or herself.  If another user accesses this information, they must have done so through a collaborative window, either a partner's matrix or the ticker (and not the user's own evidence pool).  These events are a particularly interesting point of collaboration, and the CACHE-log also stores all such Borrow events. Groups and individuals varied enormously.  The two heterogeneous groups had 3 and 53 Borrow events,  with Borrowing distributed across users and evidence.  The Homogeneous Groups had 2, 5, and 16 Borrow events, with the Borrowing in the high use group primarily one user to read and reread a small set of evidence.\n\nC. Confidence Level of confidence in judgment might be a mediating process in debiasing. Shulz-Hardt et al.\n\n(2000) observed that the differences in judgment bias between homogeneous and heterogeneous groups could be mediated by the level of confidence within the group. Consensus within a group (higher in homogeneous groups) increases the level of confidence; this heightened confidence tends to reduce the willingness to engage in effortful processing and search for new information In our study, we asked the participants to indicate how certain (on a scale from 0 to 8) they were about the correctness of their decisions at the end of each block. We tested for differences in the level of confidence across the three group conditions and across blocks. We expected to observe a higher level of confidence in homogenous groups than in heterogeneous groups. This difference was expected to appear after the group members were allowed to collaborate with their partners (after block 2): a significant interaction between Block and Condition. A repeated measures ANOVA with Group Condition and Block (1 and 4) as independent variables shows that Block (1 and 4) had a significant effect on the level of certainty (F(1, 24)=6.95, p=.014) but the interaction between Block and Condition was not significant. Therefore, the significant difference observed was due to Block and not to Group Condition;this does not confirm the findings of Shulz-Hardt et al (2000).. Participants in all group conditions tended to gain more confidence as they examined a larger quantity of evidence during their analysis of the case. D. Summary.\nWe have shown a) that initially, at the end of Block 1, users are biased as intended, b) that initially users in the three grouping conditions are very similarly biased, c) that at the end of the experiment the groups differed in their bias, specifically, the bias of the homogenous groups was high (and increased) while the biases of the homogenous and solo groups were lower (and decreased over exposure to additional evidence). On all measures, whether or not significant differences among conditions were found, this pattern was found: worst performance in homogeneous groups and similarly better performance in the solo and heterogeneous groups.\n\nAlthough the user could simply write in any values for belief, normatively, there are several prior activities which should and apparently do contribute to the final belief judgment.  Because CACHE\nand the task encourage and record these activities, we can begin to localize the component judgments where bias is most visible and where conditions differ most.\nWe could reliably detect bias in inclusion of positive evidence in the matrix, in evidence importance, in the combination of evidence importance and value, and in the final belief.  We could reliably detect condition influences on bias in rating the importance of positive items and in the final beliefs.   We have not addressed the issue of how much we detect the influence of condition where we do because the influence is most potent for the processes reflected in these measures, and how much we detect where we do because these measures have less noise.  Nevertheless, our findings suggest that the primary way in which group structure mediates bias change may be at the point of assessing the importance of pieces of evidence, specifically that evidence relevant enough to be included in the matrix.  Weighting the importance of evidence to be greater when it supports a prior belief can be one expression of a confirmation bias.  In turn, group structure may influence confirmation bias through influencing the assessment of evidence importance.\n\n## Usability Questionnaire Ratings & Free Response Assessment Of  Work Context\n\nThe questionnaire provides information about the task and supporting elements in which CACHE\nwas used. The most important result here is the time pressure experienced by participants in both group conditions, but not in the solo condition.  Evidence comes from both ratings and free response.\n\nRatings on the three task-level questions, on time available to perform the task, confidence in doing the task, and resemblance to real-world tasks, were assessed in a MANOVA, Condition F(6,46)=3.261, p=.009.  This effect was driven by differences in ratings of too little or too much time (Condition F(2,26)=8.27, p=.002).  Participants in the Solo Condition averaged 3.2 (SD=.83), close to a \"3\" indicating neither too much nor too little time.  This contrasts with the ratings of too little time in the Homogeneous (mean =1.9, SD=.78) and the Heterogeneous (mean = 2.1, SD=.60) Conditions. Participants in interacting, versus nominal, groups experienced more time pressure, presumably a result of the additional process costs of managing group interaction.\n\nSupport for the greater time pressure experienced by the interacting groups also comes from the free response measures. Though none of these open questions mentioned the task or experiment, 8\nof 18 interacting users commented on time-pressure or inadequate time, while none of the 9 Solo users did so.\n\nA 6-question MANOVA assessing the ACH method itself and the Chat tool found no condition differences (F<1), and ratings were generally positive. We read free responses for information about task environment and experiment context.  One frequent comment was on insufficient training and practice with CACHE before beginning.\n\nExperienced Usability of CACHE\nCACHE was used successfully in this task, as judged by users' comments and the Usability Questionnaire.  In general users were engaged, found the task interesting and rated CACHE\n\npositively.  For all 35 questions, a rating of 5 marked the positive end of the scale.  We analyzed responses in several ways We formed six composite measures (using 26 of the 35 questions) on 1) improving performance,\n2) learnability of components, 3) ease using different components,4) usefulness of different components, and 5) helpfulness on different subtasks.  In addition, we took an average of these averages to get an overall indicator of usability.\nThe overall average of ratings, for all users, was 4 .04 on the 5-point scale, indicating general acceptance and experienced usability of CACHE. Descriptively, the Solo Condition is slightly more favorable, and the Homogeneous Condition less favorable, on many measures.   A one-way ANOVA on the Overall Rating found a marginal effect of condition, F(2,24)=3.22, p=.058, but a MANOVA on the six composite measures with condition as a factor did not show significance, F(10,42)=1.55, p=.156.   On all six composite measures, the confidence interval for each condition's mean was above 3, the neutral midpoint of the scales.\nWe selected the 23 questions which focused on CACHE as opposed to the task or ACH method, and which were applicable to solo as well as group conditions.  Thus, these ratings on these questions can be seen as repeated assessments of CACHE.  A repeated measures ANOVA (condition as factor, item type repeated measure, F(2,23)=4.56, p=.021) but not the MANOVA (23 dependent variables, Condition as factor, F(44,6)=2.10, p=.177, found significant difference between conditions.\nThese descriptive and inferential statistics show a broad acceptance of CACHE, common across conditions.\n\nCondition Differences and Points for improvement In addition to global assessment we wanted to know a) which aspects of CACHE most differentiated conditions, and b)  which aspects of CACHE most merited improvement.  We used a consistent standard to identify condition differences at the item level: p<.05 on the item's univariate comparison calculated as part of the large, 23-response MANOVA reported above.\nOne item stood out as receiving ratings which were both very low on average and which differed across conditions, F(2,23)=5.867, p=.009: usefulness of  the ticker window.  Participants in both Solo\n(means of 2.3) and Homogeneous (mean 2.2) conditions rated the ticker window very low, both relative to the Heterogeneous Condition (mean 3.8), and in absolute terms.  This was the only item on any aspect of the system which was rated under 3.  For participants in the Solo Condition, the ticker only provided information redundant with experimenter-provided chat, about progress through the experiment.  Hence the ticker probably served little function here.  However, the ticker for Homogeneous as well as Heterogeneous participants posted messages about partner activity, so this use cannot explain the Homogeneous users dislike for the ticker. Further,  Homogeneous and Heterogenous users rated \"value of information from partners\" very similarly (means of 3.7 and 3.9,\n\nrespectively).     Users in the Homogeneous Condition may feel less urgency about using partner information, and wish not to be interrupted to attend to it.\n\nIn addition, conditions differed on rating usefulness of two other components: the window for searching and adding interpretatons, and the window for reading the underlying evidence and adding interpretations.  The ease of learning the window for reading the underlying evidence and adding interpretation was also rated differently across conditions.  One global assessment differed between conditions: confidence in using CACHE to accomplish the task. On these four measures, Solo users rated favorably and Homogenous users less favorably.\n\n\nRecommendations about CACHE\nThree broad areas emerged as areas for improvement.  Interestingly, none of these was directly assessed in the rating questions we had designed.  First,  many users (14/21, distributed across conditions) commented about the need for better tools to order or manipulate evidence in the matrix. Users wanted to be able to flexibly reorganize evidence, for example, ordering by relevance to one hypothesis, grouping contradictory evidence together, and sorting by topic.  Users also found it hard to locate newly added evidence in the matrix. On a slightly different point, some users who had added their own interpretation of evidence found it confusing to track what evidence was entered under what interpretation.\n\nSecond, ten users asked for improved window management and a reduced number of windows.  This was a particular issue for participants in the Heterogeneous Condition (7 of 9 users), probably because these people were making heaviest use of partner matrices, thus increasing the complexity of their window management task.\nThird, users had varied questions and issues about use and coordination of the multiple ratings. It is not clear how much of the difficulties expressed would be addressed with more extensive training, and how much they reflect unwanted costs from manipulating and viewing so many distinct ratings.\n\nThere were three user generated ratings, and all provoked comment.  Seven users expressed concerns about the ratings of evidence relevance, particularly lack of clarity in the labels used and in the role of the values entered, and also frequently forgetting to enter values because of confusion with the default value (Medium).  Our users commented about difficulty using the CC/II ratings of relation between evidence and hypothesis.   One user explained that s/he didn't know when to use NotApplicable versus Inconsistent, particularly if a piece of evidence was irrelevant to a hypothesis.\n\nTo our surprise, the only user mentioning Belief ratings, our primary dependent variable, questioned their value as \"just my gut feeling.\"  Other users may have felt similarly, because we found that it was quite difficult to get users to update the belief values in their matrices when requested to do so.\n\nOn the primary, system-generated measure \"support,\" four users said it was very valuable (3 in the Solo Condition) and five commented about not understanding what it meant or how it was derived.  On the system-generated measure of diagnosticity, ten users commented negatively on the comprehensibility or  usefulness of the ratings; indeed, due to the secondary importance of this information, we had not allocated any training time to this.\n\n## How Does Cache Support Collaborative Judgment High Volume Of Evidence Processed\n\nCACHE facilitated using large amounts of evidence.  Overall, users incorporated 40 of the 80\npieces of evidence in the roughly 70 minutes users had to work with their evidence matrices.  This is a large amount of information considered. We did not include a No-CACHE condition, so we cannot make direct claims about CACHE's role supporting this performance.  However, a cross-study comparison with Pirolli et al (Nov 2005) is suggestive.  They tested a related tool, ACH0, which provides a similar evidence matrix but requires users to type in evidence and hypotheses themselves. The studies differ in multiple aspects: problems were different, the ACH0 users added their own hypotheses as well as evidence, and our users had been introduced to their problem before they began work with the evidence matrices. Nevertheless, comparison is informative.  In the ACH0 study, users had 45 minutes and entered an average of 14 pieces of evidence on one problem and took 75 minutes in entering 19 pieces of evidence for a second problem.  Indeed, based on this study, we designed our task with the intent of giving our users substantially more evidence than they could be expected to process.\nThis contrast in amount of information entered in the matrix when users do or do not have to type in the evidence suggests that allowing users to click-to-add evidence produces a dramatic jump in the amount of information considered.  The benefit from reduced cost of entering evidence may be particularly important for collaborative work.  In our task, evidence had already been set up in an easy-to-enter form.  But in general the costs of finding and setting up evidence in an easy-to-use form should only be borne only once.  An individual user should not have to find and format the same information at different times, and individuals within a collaborative group should not have to bear the cost repeatedly.\n\n\nLowering the cost of collaboration: Shared Matrices and Chat To realize benefits of collaboration, the costs of group processes and accessing information from partners must be low enough that the costs don't outweigh any potential benefits.  The Heterogeneous and Solo conditions were similar in performance.  This suggests that the process cost of collaboration was relatively low, and did not outweigh the benefits of exposure to mixed opinions.\n\nAs suggested in prior work, we used computer-mediated communication, as chat-like tools tend to reduce costs of interaction over face-to-face.  Our group-work innovation was ability to view each member's matrix.  This provides a highly structured, task-based representation, the same for\n\neach user, which might communicate task-relevant information efficiently.  By providing summarized \"bottom line\" assessment of alternatives, it might help identify differences of opinion and hence support debiasing.  In fact, conversations in Chat frequently referred to the bottom-line belief or support in a partner's matrix CACHE allows participants to read and to add evidence to their own matrix, from a partner's. We did not measure when users are looking at a partner's matrix, but we have one measure of using the partner's evidence. We have logs of interacting with CACHE for two homogeneous and three heterogeneous groups.  These give us information about what evidence users read or added.  In Blocks 2 and 3, the users in an interacting group each had 10 unique pieces of evidence. Other users could only gain access to these pieces of evidence by looking in their partners' read-only matrices (or the ticker when the partner did something with this evidence).  We counted the number of times each user read or added one of these pieces of evidence to their own matrix.\n\n\nAccessing this information through the partner varied greatly by group and individual.  One heterogeneous triad read evidence available only through their partner 31 times, added evidence to their own matrix 22 times, and operated on 21 unique pieces of evidence.  Interestingly, this group talked very little and late over chat, and had only 4 turns discussing the problem, all proposing a summary conclusion.  One user in a homogeneous group read such evidence 9 times, added 2 pieces to their own matrix, touching 6 unique pieces of evidence. Of the remaining 9 users, 5 never accessed evidence through their partners' matrices and the remaining 4 touched 1 or 2 pieces.\n\n\nTwo points are of interest. First, group strategies varied dramatically. Second, for 4 of the 5\ngroups with records, the primary way CACHE supported interaction was by allowing viewing the organized information in a partner's matrix, rather than accessing unique information through the partner. Supporting Use of Negative Evidence.\n\n\nTeaching the ACH method and providing the CACHE tool supported use of disconfirmatory evidence. Negative evidence, which provides evidence against an hypotheses, is often more difficult to reason with than positive. Users in this experiment were equally likely to include evidence designed to disconfirm (68.5% of the 16 items) as to confirm (69.1% of the 33 items).  The evidence structure of this problem is complex, and a confirmation bias could mean reluctance to include disconfirming, negative information, or reluctance to include positive information favoring an alternative hypothesis.\nUsers showed no reluctance to include negative evidence and no [significant] bias for including negative evidence for one hypothesis over another.  Apparently, teaching people the ACH method and supporting this with CACHE was sufficient to overcome a bias against negative evidence. Rich Tool-kit\n\nThe CACHE task environment is rich enough for different groups and users to discover alternative strategies. Groups varied in how much they used Chat and in how much they use partner\n\nmatrices (to get evidence from).  The group which Chatted least pulled evidence from partner matrices the most.  Individuals differed in how they used their matrix.  We assumed that users would read evidence, evaluate its relevance, and if relevant include in their matrix. Several users, however, included almost everything, and then dropped or gave low relevance to unimportant information. This may indeed have been a very efficient method for systematically reviewing a large amount of evidence.\n\n## Discussion Summary Of Findings On Group Process\n\nThis study provided computer support to reduce costs of managing the process of collaboration and realize benefits of group diversity.  In particular, we asked whether collaboration might improve information coverage and reduce the cognitive bias resulting from overweighting of initial belief and undervaluing of later information.\nThe task used in our study models a late stage of the analysis of a complex case, when three major alternative hypotheses have already been selected and a large body of evidence relating to these hypotheses has been identified. The evaluation study conducted on the earlier ACH0 interface (Pirolli et al., 2004) had focused on the work done by individual analysts at an earlier stage.\n\nThe task in the current study requires a group of analysts to assimilate a substantial amount of background information, including an initial position or hypothesis.  This served as the prior belief, which users revised in light of new evidence.  CACHE provided users both tools supporting the coordination of evidence and hypotheses at the individual level (the ACH matrix), and tools for sharing information at the group level (sharable partner matrices, evidence, reports on partner actions). Our central question was whether collaborating groups thus supported would do as well as, or even exceed, independent individuals in gathering information and reaching an unbiased final judgment.  In particular, when group members have different initial beliefs, this might enable mutual debiasing, and allow individuals in a heterogeneous group to provide a balanced use of evidence, independent of which information they were given first.  We did find a significant effect of condition on degree of final bias, even with our small number of groups.  Heterogeneous Groups and nominal groups were less biased than the Homogenous Groups.  Interpreting this pattern, we suggest that CACHE reduced the overhead of group coordination sufficiently to yield no net process cost for the Heterogeneous Group.  Since we did not include groups working without CACHE, any causal claims are only suggestive, of course.\nWe collected a large amount of information about the judgment process and this enables us to begin identifying which particular processes or judgments were most prone to bias and where any such bias was most moderated by condition.  In addition to effects of condition on bias in the final, user-entered beliefs, we looked for effects on:\na. Amounts of different types of evidence included in the matrix,\nb. The summed value of degree of consistency or inconsistency of this evidence,\nc. The summed importance of evidence d. A support measure integrating the importance of each piece of evidence with its confirmatory or disconfirmatory relation to the hypotheses.\nWe found significant evidence of bias from initial belief on the amount of evidence included in the matrix, particularly positive evidence, on the importance given to this evidence, particularly the positive evidence, and on the values relating evidence to hypotheses.  This reveals a form of confirmation bias, that is, the tendency of a judge to look for (and weighting more) confirmatory evidence (Kahneman, Slovic, and Tversky, 1982). However, we only found significant effects of condition on the importance given to positive evidence.  Thus, the point at which effects of group structure can most reliably be measured is on evidence importance.  Individuals in a Heterogeneous Group and those working alone (Solo group) did not over-weight evidence supporting their favored hypothesis as much as did individuals in a Homogeneous group. Because sensitivity of various measures differs and because we had a small number of groups, our conclusions are certainly suggestive rather than conclusive.\n\n\n## Method For Studying Technology Support For Group Process\n\nBeyond this initial study, we have a promising method for providing detailed information about how group process affects cognitive judgments performed under uncertainty.  A key feature of our method is creating and measuring initial bias at an individual level, so debiasing can be measured relatively precisely.  A second feature is measuring belief at several points in time. A third feature is use of a problem where the normative answer is roughly equal credibility for each hypothesis.  We believe this makes it easier to measure bias in final judgments than would use of an unambiguous problem where the weight of the evidence strongly favored one possibility.  Since we are concerned with measuring effects of condition on bias, we need a large, controllable bias to work with.  A fourth feature is the effort to differentiate users in terms of role, as well as initial degree of commitment to one or another hypothesis.  We hoped to simulate in the lab a characteristic of most work-based teams: individuals have complementary roles, contributing different information and skills. A fifth, unexpected feature is the mix of constraint and openness in this task.  The combination of  tool-plus-task is constrained enough to give controlled and comparable measures but also rich enough to provoke a variety of unanticipated solution strategies.  A sixth characteristic is requiring users to work on each batch of evidence for several minutes before communicating with their partners.\nDespite its promise, there are several directions for improvement to the method.  First, we tested so much that our measurement disrupted users' work on the task.  Even recording belief at the end of each block, which we had thought would be largely part of their normal process, was experienced as distracting or annoying, and it was hard to get users to comply in a timely way.  Users were working hard, on their own agenda and did not want to be interrupted. Second, we did not provide explicit instruction for group work in the way the task was presented.  Although we suggested different roles, we did not provide any guidance about how these roles might be coordinated.  We did not train users on how, specifically, they might use CACHE tools to facilitate the group process.  For example, users in a group might search for different types of evidence. Third, although we used our and other's measures of strength of support of the evidence, a more precisely calibrated measure could be developed. Fifth, we tried to create time pressure as a method of convincing users that it was worth their time collaborating (while still asking users to look at each evidence-set on their own).  Some users wanted only to collaborate after digesting all the information on their own. Much remains to be explored about how timing of individual and collaborative work influences quality of decision.\n\nA fine-grained assessment method is important because it can tell us which processes are most subject to biases in general, how tools might aid debiasing, and how tools might best focus a debiasing effect of groups. Further, if materials and procedures can be standardized, it would allow comparison of the benefit provided by different combinations of group structure and tool support, to the extent that debiasing can be measured as change from an initial, common bias. The definition of a reference task for investigating collaborative intelligence analysis, as a form of complex decisionmaking, would facilitate CSCW researchers to focus on shared problems, compare results, identify better design solutions, and improve the measured quality of earlier solutions (Whittaker et al., 2000).\n\n## Summary Of Results On Cache Support\n\nWhen supported by CACHE, users in the Heterogeneous Condition preformed similarly to those working individually.  Lack of a difference, here, is noteworthy, because of the various studies, which have found net harm to performance when people are asked to work in groups (e.g., see Steiner,\n1972; Kerr and Tindale, 2004).  Because many tasks must be done collaboratively due to the sheer size of task, simply equating group with solo performance is an important first step.  We believe CACHE reduced the cost of sharing information sufficiently to allow benefits of diverse opinions to balance the process costs of working in a group.\n\nSeveral other findings about the level of performance here are striking.  Users made widespread and extensive use of negative evidence.  They were able to incorporate and made use of large amounts of information in a short time.  They found the working in CACHE and sharing evidence windows generally helpful, easy to learn, and easy to use.  Their solution strategies drew our attention to many, specific challenges in handling the complexity of information needed for this type of task, in a collaborative manner.\n\n## Ideas For Further Development Of Cache\n\nFor this user-task combination, heterogeneous groups had their greatest benefit in debiasing the weight placed on included, positive evidence.   This may be a particularly informative point for technology-based support in a collaborative system.  System support could focus on comparing weights among group members with differing views, localizing evidence with large importance differences, and bring these differences into the group's attention.  System support could also focus on comparing weighted and unweighted judgments for each individual user.  In fact, if weighting evidence importance is indeed a point very prone to bias, it might be useful to for the system to calculate and display a summary judgment based on the unweighed and the weighed sum of  the evidence.  Comparing these might help a user identify and compensate for bias.\n\nIn addition to trying to debias judgments given a particular group composition, CACHE-like tools could also make recommendations about who should be grouped together into a collaborative group. After individuals have worked alone and formed an initial opinion, groups could be formed based in part on diversity in initial viewpoint (e.g., see method used by Shulz-Hardt et al. (2000) with face-toface groups).\n\nCollaboration multiplies the information load placed on users, if they attempt to integrate and make use of the information generated by their partners. In the case of CACHE, this is apparent in the large number of windows supporting collaboration, in particular, partner matrices and the ticker window.  Designing an interface which selects or integrates key aspects of the partners' work may be helpful. A first step in this direction would be to allow flexible reorganization of matrices to selectively align information by topic relevance or degree of disagreement.  In addition, the need for optimizing display of an individual's work is amplified when one must use work from any individuals.  Many of our users commented on the need for more flexible control of how their own matrix is displayed.\n\n## Conclusion\n\nThere is a great need for coordinating multiple knowledge-workers with each other and with large amounts of information.  This coordination must be flexible with respect to the dynamics of collaboration, allowing people to work simultaneously on a problem and also to work at different times, using updated information from partners as it arrives.  It must support not merely accessing the right information, but incorporating this information into complex decisions.\nThe judgments and decisions should be based on a broad coverage of the evidence available and should be influenced by as much relevant information as possible, using as normative a means of integration as possible.  Judgments and decisions should not be influenced by irrelevant factors, such\n\nas presentation order of evidence, anchoring to prior beliefs, and confirmation bias. CACHE provides a broader array of tools than exercised in the present study. However, even the set in play here show considerable promise for supporting individual judgment and allowing diverse groups to benefit from their diversity. Having shown that the structured use of CACHE can make group processes and outcomes comparable to solo analysis, and having identified additional room for improvement to CACHE, the next step is to determine if collaboration can be further improved to produce superior information coverage and more accurate judgments than solitary analysis.\n\n## References\n\n Benbasat, I. and Lim, J., 2000. Information technology support for debiasing group judgments: an empirical evaluation.\nOrganizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 83, 167183.\nClark, H. H. (1996). *Using  language*.  Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Cummings, J.N. (2004) Work Groups, Structural Diversity, and Knowledge Sharing in a Global Organization.\nManagement Science. 50(3), p. 352-364.\nDennis, A. R. & Gallupe, R. B. (1993). A history of group support systems empirical research: lessons learned and future\ndirections. In L. M. Jessup & J. S. 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    },
    {
        "text": "# Directorate General For Internal Policies Policy Department C: Citizens' Rights And Constitutional Affairs\n\n# The Us National Security Agency (Nsa) Surveillance Programmes (Prism) And Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (Fisa) Activities And Their Impact On Eu Citizens' Fundamental Rights\n\n## Note\n\nAbstract In light of the recent PRISM-related revelations, this briefing note analyzes the impact of US surveillance programmes on European citizens' rights. The note explores the scope of surveillance that can be carried out under the US FISA Amendment Act 2008, and related practices of the US authorities which have very strong implications for EU data sovereignty and the protection of European citizens'\nrights.\n\nAUTHOR(S) Mr Caspar BOWDEN (Independent Privacy Researcher) Introduction by Prof. Didier BIGO (King's College London / Director of the *Centre d'Etudes sur les Conflits, Liberte et Securite* - CCLS, Paris, France). Copy-Editing: Dr. Amandine SCHERRER (*Centre d'Etudes sur les Conflits, Liberte et Securite* - CCLS, Paris, France) Bibliographical assistance : Wendy Grossman RESPONSIBLE ADMINISTRATOR Mr Alessandro DAVOLI Policy Department Citizens' Rights and Constitutional Affairs European Parliament B-1047 Brussels E-mail: poldep-citizens@europarl.europa.eu LINGUISTIC VERSIONS Original: EN ABOUT THE EDITOR To contact the Policy Department or to subscribe to its monthly newsletter please write to:\npoldep-citizens@europarl.europa.eu Manuscript completed in MMMM 200X. Brussels,  European Parliament, 200X.\n\nThis document is available on the Internet at:\nhttp://www.europarl.europa.eu/studies DISCLAIMER The opinions expressed in this document are the sole responsibility of the author and do not necessarily represent the official position of the European Parliament. Reproduction and translation for non-commercial purposes are authorized, provided the source is acknowledged and the publisher is given prior notice and sent a copy.\n\nfor\n\n\n| LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS                                                    |   5  |\n|--------------------------------------------------------------------------|------|\n| EXECUTIVE SUMMARY                                                        |   7  |\n| Introduction                                                             |   8  |\n| 1. Historical background of US surveillance                              |  11  |\n| 1.1 World War II and the origins of the UKUSA treaties                   |  11  |\n| 1.2 ECHELON: the UKUSA communications surveillance nexus                 |  12  |\n| 1.3 1975-1978: Watergate and the Church Committee                        |  13  |\n| 1.4 The post-9/11 context: extension of intelligence powers              |  13  |\n| 1.5 Edward Snowden's revelations and PRISM                               |  14  |\n| 1.5.1 \"Upstream\"                                                         |  15  |\n| 1.5.2 XKeyscore                                                          |  15  |\n| 1.5.3 BULLRUN                                                            |  16  |\n| 2. NSA programmes and related legislation: controversies, gaps and       |      |\n| loopholes and implications for eu citIzens                               |  17  |\n| 2.1 Legal gaps and uncertainties of US privacy law: implications for US  |      |\n| citizens and residents                                                   |  17  |\n| 2.1.1 The Third Party Doctrine and limitations to the Fourth             |      |\n| Amendment                                                                |  17  |\n| 2.1.2 CDRs and the 'Relevance Test'                                      |  18  |\n| 2.1.3 'Direct Access' to data-centres granted for surveillance           |      |\n| purposes?                                                                |  19  |\n| 2.1.4 Intelligence Agencies' 'Black Budget': scale and costs of US       |      |\n| capabilities                                                             |  20  |\n| 2.2 Situation of non-US citizens and residents (non 'USPERs')            |  20  |\n| 2.2.1 The political definitions of 'foreign information intelligence' 20 |      |\n| 2.2.2 Specific powers over communications of non-US persons              |  21  |\n| 2.2.3 The Fourth Amendment does not apply to non-USPERs outside          |      |\n| the US                                                                   |  21  |\n| 2.2.4 Cloud computing risks for non-US persons                           |  22  |\n| 2.2.5 There are no privacy rights recognised by US authorities for       |      |\n| non-US persons under FISA                                                |  24  |\n| 2.3 Data export: false solutions and insufficient safeguards             |  25  |\n| 2.3.1 Safe Harbour,BCRs for processors and Cloud Computing               |  25  |\n| 2.3.2 ModelContracts                                                     |  27  |\n| 3. Strategic options and recommendations for the European parliament 29  |      |\n| 3.1 Reducing exposure and growing a European Cloud    |   29  |\n|-------------------------------------------------------|-------|\n| 3.2 Reinstating 'Article 42'                          |   29  |\n| 3.3 Whistle-Blowers' Protection and Incentives        |   31  |\n| 3.4 Institutional Reform                              |   31  |\n| 3.5 Data Protection Authorities and Governance        |   31  |\n| Conclusion                                            |   33  |\n| References                                            |   35  |\n|                                                       |       |\n|                                                       |       |\n|                                                       |       |\n\n## List Of Abbreviations\n\n\n ACLU\nAmerican Civil Liberties Union\nAUMF Authorization to Use Military Force\nCIA Central Intelligence Agency\nCNIL Comite National pour l'Informatique et les Libertes\nDPAs Data Protection Authorities\nEDPS European Data Protection Supervisor\nENISA European Network and Information Security Agency\nFAA Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Amendment Act (2008)\nFBI Federal Bureau of Investigation\n\n## Five Eyes Uk, Us, Canada, Australia, New Zealand: Sharing Intelligence Under Ukusa\n\nFISA Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (1978)\nFISC Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court\nFISCR Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court of Review\nNSA National Security Agency\nPAA Protect America Act (2007)\nSHA EU-US Safe Harbour Agreement (2000)\nTIA Total Information Awareness\nWP29\nArticle 29 Data Protection Working Party\n\n\n## Executive Summary\n\nThis Briefing note provides the LIBE Committee with background and contextual information on PRISM/FISA/NSA activities and US surveillance programmes, and their specific impact on EU citizens' fundamental rights, including privacy and data protection.\n\nPrior to the PRISM scandal, European media underestimated this aspect, apparently oblivious to the fact that the surveillance activity was primarily directed at the rest-of-theworld, and was not targeted at US citizens. The note argues that the scope of surveillance under the *Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 Amendments Act of 2008* (FAA) has very strong implications on EU data sovereignty and the protection of its citizens' rights.\n\nThe first section provides **a historical account of US surveillance programmes**, showing that the US authorities have continuously disregarded the human right to privacy of non-Americans. The analysis of various surveillance programmes (Echelon, PRISM) and US national security legislation (FISA, PATRIOT and FAA) clearly indicates that surveillance activities by the US authorities are conducted without taking into account the rights of non- US citizens and residents. In particular, the scope of FAA creates a power of masssurveillance specifically targeted at the data of non-US persons located outside the US, including data processed by 'Cloud computing', which eludes EU Data Protection regulation.\n\nThe second section gives an overview of the main legal gaps, loopholes and controversies of these programmes and their differing consequences for the rights of American and EU citizens. The section unravels the legal provisions governing US surveillance programmes and further uncertainties in their application, such as:\n\n-\nserious limitations to the Fourth Amendment for US citizens\n-\nspecific powers over communications and personal data of \"non-US persons\";\n-\nabsence of any cognizable privacy rights for \"non-US persons\" under FISA\n The section also shows that the accelerating and already widespread use of Cloud computing further undermines  data protection for EU citizens, and that a review of some of the existing and proposed mechanisms that have been put in place to protect EU citizens' rights after data export, actually function as loopholes. Finally, **some strategic options for the European Parliament are developed**, and related recommendations are suggested in order to improve future EU regulation and to provide effective safeguards for protection for EU citizens' rights.\n\n\n\n## Introduction Background\n\nThis Briefing note aims at providing the LIBE Committee with background and contextual information on PRISM/FISA/NSA activities and US surveillance programmes and their impact on EU citizens' fundamental rights, including privacy and data protection.\nOn June 5th the *Washington Post* and *The Guardian* published a secret order made under s.215 of the PATRIOT Act requiring the Verizon telephone company to give the NSA details of all US domestic and international phone calls, and \"on an ongoing basis\". On June 6th the two newspapers revealed the existence of an NSA programme codenamed PRISM that accessed data from leading brands of US Internet companies. By the end of the day a statement from Adm. Clapper (Director of NSA) officially acknowledged the PRISM\nprogramme and that it relied on powers under the FISA Amendment 2008 s.1881a/702\n(FAA). On June 9th Edward Snowden voluntarily disclosed his identity and a film interview with him was released. In the European Parliament resolution of 4 July 2013 on the US National Security Agency surveillance programme, MEPs expressed serious concern over PRISM and other surveillance programmes and strongly condemned spying on EU official representatives and called on the US authorities to provide them with full information on these allegations without further delay. Inquiries by the Commission1, Art.29 Working Party2, and a few MS\nParliaments are also in progress.\n\n## The Problem Of Transnational Mass Surveillance And Democracy3\n\nSnowden's revelations about PRISM show that Cyber mass surveillance at the transnational level induces systemic breaches of fundamental rights. These breaches lead us to question the scale of transnational mass surveillance and its implications for our democracies.\n\"Our government in its very nature, and our open society in all its instinct, under the Constitution and the Bill of Rights automatically outlaws intelligence organizations of the kind that have developed in police states\" (Allen Dulles, 1963)4\n\n\"There's been spying for years, there's been surveillance for years, and so forth, I'm not going to pass judgement on that, it's the nature of our society\"\n(Eric Schmidt, Executive chairman of Google, 2013). These two quotations are distinct in time by 50 years. They differ in the answers but address the same central question: how far can democratic societies continue to exist in their very nature, if intelligence activities include massive surveillance of populations? For Eric Schmidt and according to most of the media reports in the world, the nature of society has changed. Technologies of telecommunication, including mobile phones, Internet, satellites and more generally all data which can be digitalised and integrated into platforms, have given the possibilities of gathering unprecedented amount of data, to keep them, to organise them, to search them. If the technologies exist, then they have to be used: \"it is not possible to go against the flow\". Therefore it is not a surprise to discover that programmes run by intelligence services use these techniques at their maximum possibilities and in secrecy. The assumption is that if everyone else with these technical capabilities uses them, then we should too. If not, it would be naivety or even worse: a defeat endangering the national security of a country by letting another country benefit from the possibilities opened by these technologies. However, should we have to live with this extension of espionage to massive surveillance of populations and accept it as \"a fact\"? Fortunately, totalitarian regimes have more or less disappeared before the full development of theses capacities. Today, in democratic regimes, when these technologies are used, they are limited on purpose and are mainly centred on antiterrorism collaboration, in order to prevent attempts of attacks. According to Intelligence Services worldwide, these technologies are not endangering civil liberties; they are the best way to protect the citizen from global terrorism. Intelligence services screen suspicious behaviours and exchange of information occurs at the international level. Only\n\"real suspects\" are, in principle, under surveillance. From this perspective, far from being a\n\"shame\", the revelations of programmes like PRISM could be seen as a proof of a good level of collaboration, which has eventually to be enhanced in the future against numerous forms of violence. In front of this \"recital\" given by the most important authorities of the different intelligence services and the antiterrorists agencies in the US, in the UK, in France, and at the EU level, it is critical to discuss the supposedly new nature of our societies. The impact of technological transformations in democratic societies, how to use these technologies as resources for both information exchange and competition over information (a key element of a globalised world), what are the rights of the different governments in processing them: these are the core questions. As stated by Allen Dulles above, justifications given by intelligence services work in favour of a police state and against the very nature of an open society living in democratic regimes. Proponents of an open society insist that, against the previous trend, technologies ought not to drive human actions; they have to be used in reasonable ways and under the Rule of Law. The mass scaling has to be contained. Constitutional provisions have to be applied, and the presumption of innocence is applicable for all human beings (not only citizens). If suspicions exist, they have to be related to certain forms of crime, and not marginal behaviours or life styles. Hence, what is at stake here is not the mechanisms by which antiterrorism laws and activities have to be regulated at the transatlantic level, even if it is a subset of the question. It is even not the question of espionage activities between different governments. It is the question of the nature, the scale, and the depth of surveillance that can be tolerated in and between democracies. The Snowden's revelations highlight numerous breaches of fundamental rights. This affects in priority all the persons whose data have been extracted via surveillance of communications, digital cables or cloud computing technologies, as soon as they are under a category of suspicion, or of some interest for foreign intelligence purposes. However, all these persons are not protected in the same way, especially if they are not US citizens. The EU citizen is therefore particularly fragile in this configuration connecting US intelligence services, private companies that provide services at the global level and the ownership they can exercise over their data. It is clear that if EU citizens do not have the same level of protections as the US citizens, because of the practices of the US intelligence services and the lack of effective protections, they will become the first victims of these systems. Freedom of thought, opinion, expression and of the press are cardinal values that have to be preserved. Any citizen of the EU has the right to have a private life, i.e, a life which is not fully under the surveillance of any state apparatus. The investigative eyes of any government have to be strongly reminded of distinctions between private and public activities, between what is a crime and what is simply a different lifestyle. By gathering massive data on life-styles in order to elaborate patterns and profiles concerning political attitudes and economic choices, PRISM seems to have allowed an unprecedented scale and depth in intelligence gathering, which goes beyond counterterrorism and beyond espionage activities carried out by liberal regimes in the past. This may lead towards an illegal form of Total Information Awareness where data of millions of people are subject to collection and manipulation by the NSA. This note wants to assess this question of the craft of intelligence and its necessary limits in democracy and between them. As we will see, through the documents delivered by Snowden, the scale of the PRISM programme is global; its depth reaches the digital data of large groups of populations and breaches the fundamental rights of large groups of populations, especially EU citizens. The EU institutions have therefore the right and duty to examine this emergence of cyber mass-surveillance and how it affects the fundamental rights of the EU citizen abroad and at home.\n\n## Privacy Governance: Eu/Us Competing Models\n\nA careful analysis of US privacy laws compared to the EU Data Protection framework shows that the former allows few practical options for the individual to live their lives with selfdetermination over their personal data. However a core effect of Data Protection law is that if data is copied from one computer to another, then providing the right legal conditions for transfer exist, the individual cannot object on the grounds that their privacy risk increases through every such proliferation of \"their\" data5. This holds true if the data is copied onto a thousand machines in one organization, or spread onward to a thousand organisations, or to a different legal regime in a Third Country. The individual cannot stop this once they lose possession of their data, whereas for example if the data was \"intellectual property\", then a license to reproduce the data would be necessary by permission. We are all the authors of our lives, and it seems increasingly anomalous that Internet companies lay claim to property rights in the patterns of data minutely recording our thoughts and behaviour, yet ask the people who produce this data to sacrifice their autonomy and take privacy on trust. The EU Data Protection framework in theory is categorically better than the US for privacy, but in practice it is hard to find any real-world Internet services that implement DP principles by design, conveniently and securely. Privacy governance around the world has evolved around two competing models. Europe made some rights of individuals inalienable and assigned responsibilities to Data Controller organizations, whereas in the United States companies inserted waivers of rights into Terms and Conditions6 contracts allowing exploitation of data in exhaustive ways (known as the 'Notice-and-Choice\" principle). The PRISM crisis arose directly from the emerging dominance over the last decade of \"free\" services operated from remote warehouses full of computer servers, by companies predominantly based in US jurisdiction, that has become known as Cloud computing. To explain this relationship we must explore details of the US framework of national security law.\n\n## Scope And Structure\n\nIt is striking that since the first reports of \"warrantless wiretapping\" in the last decade, and until quite recently in the PRISM-related revelations, European media have covered US surveillance controversies as if these were purely parochial arguments about US civil\n\nliberties, apparently oblivious that the surveillance activity was directed at the rest-ofthe-world. This note aims to document this under-appreciated aspect. It will show that the scope of surveillance conducted under a change in the FISA law in 2008 extended its scope beyond interception of communications to include any data in public cloud computing as well. This has very strong implications for the EU's continued sovereignty over data and the protection of its citizens' rights. The aim is here to provide a guide to how surveillance of Internet communications by the US government developed, and how this affects the human right to privacy, integrating historical, technical, and policy analysis from the perspective of the individual EU citizen7. The Note will therefore cover the following:\n\n\n-\n(I) An account of US foreign surveillance history and current known state\n-\n(II) An overview of the main legal controversies both in US terms, and the effects and consequences for EU citizens' rights\n-\n(III) Strategic options for the European Parliament and recommendations\n\n\n\nHISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF US SURVEILLANCE\n\n## Key Findings\n\n A historical account of US various surveillance programmes (precursors to Echelon,\nPRISM, etc.) and US legislation in the field of surveillance (FISA and FAA) shows that the US has continuously disregarded the fundamental rights of non-US citizens.\n In Particular, the scope of FAA coupled with expressly 'political' definitions of what\nconstitutes\n'foreign\nintelligence\ninformation'\ncreates\na\npower\nof\nmasssurveillance specifically targeted at the data of non-US persons located outside the US, which eludes effective control by current and proposed EU Data\nProtection regulation.\n\nA historical account of US surveillance programmes provides the context for their interpretation as the latest phase of a system of US exceptionalism, with origins in World War II. These programmes constitute the greatest contemporary challenge to data protection, because they incorporated arbitrary discriminatory standards of treatment strictly according to nationality and geopolitical alliances, which are secret and incompatible with the rule of law under EU structures.\n\n## 1.1. **World War Ii And The Origins Of The Ukusa Treaties**\n\nIn the 1970s there were the first disclosures of the extent of Allied success in WWII cryptanalysis. The world discovered the secret history of Bletchley Park (aka Station X), Churchill's signals intelligence headquarters. The story of post-war secret intelligence\n\npartnerships at the international level is intertwined with the personal trajectory of Alan Turing, a great mathematician and co-founder of computer science, who was critical to the effort to design automated machines which could feasibly solve ciphers generated by machine, such as Enigma (used for many Nazi Germany communications). Alan Turing travelled to the US in 1942 to supervise US Navy mass-production of the decryption machines (called 'bombes') for the Atlantic war, and to review work on a new scrambler telephone at Bell Laboratories to be used for communications between Heads of Government. Unfortunately Turing was not equipped with any letters of authority, so he was detained by US immigration as suspicious until rescued by UK officials in New York. What was initially supposed to be a two-week trip turned into months, as no precedent existed to grant even a foreign ally security clearance to the laboratories he was supposed to visit. There followed several months of fraught UK diplomacy and turf wars between the US Navy and Army, since the latter had no \"need-to-know\" about Ultra (the name given to intelligence produced from decryption at Bletchley). The UK wanted as few people as possible in on the secret, and the disharmony thus experienced inside the US military security hierarchies became known as \"the Turing Affair\". These were the origins of the post-war secret intelligence partnership between the US and UK as \"first\" parties, Canada/Australia/New Zealand as second parties, and other nations with lesser access as third parties. The treaty is named UKUSA, and we know the details above about its genesis because in 2010 the US National Security Agency declassified the unredacted text of UKUSA treaties8 up until the 1950s with related correspondence (the current text is secret). GCHQ9 did not declassify much in comparison, although the occasion was billed as joint exercise. The purpose of the UKUSA treaties was to establish defined areas of technical cooperation and avoid conflicts. However, no general \"no spy\" clause appears in the versions published up until the 1950s, but expressions of amity comparable to public treaties. It is not known whether any comprehensive secret \"no spy\" agreement exists today between the UK and US, and neither has ever given legislative or executive comment on the matter.\n\n## 1.2. Echelon: The Ukusa Communications Surveillance Nexus\n\nFrom the founding of the US National Security Agency (NSA) in 1952 throughout the Cold War, both the UK and US vastly expanded their signal intelligence capacities, collecting from undersea cables at landing points10, satellites intercepting terrestrial microwave relays, and arrays of antennae usually sited in military bases and embassies. The evolution and nature of these capabilities were documented from open source research in two reports11 to the European institutions culminating in the Parliament's inquiry into ECHELON\nin 2000. ECHELON was in fact a codeword for one particular surveillance system, but became in common usage a synecdoche for the entire UKUSA communications surveillance nexus. The last meeting the EP inquiry committee was on September 10, 2001. The Committee recommended to the European Parliament that citizens of EU member states use cryptography in their communications to protect their privacy, because economic espionage with ECHELON had obviously been conducted by the US intelligence agencies.\n\n## 1.3. **1975-1978: Watergate And The Church Committee**\n\nAfter the US was convulsed by the Watergate scandal culminating in the resignation of Richard Nixon, Senator Frank Church led a Congressional committee of inquiry into abuses of power by law-enforcement and intelligence agencies which had conducted illegal domestic wire-tapping of political and civic leaders under presidential authority, and contrary to the Fourth Amendment of the US constitution which protects privacy against unreasonable searches without a particular warrant, issued on \"probable cause\" (meaning evidence of a 50% likelihood of criminality).\n\nThe Church inquiry reported on the question of whether the Fourth Amendment restricts the mass-trawling and collection of international communications, which they discovered had been secretly conducted since the 1940s on telegrams12. The inquiry canvassed that inadvertent collection of Americans' data transmitted internationally was tolerable, if procedures were made for \"minimization\" of erroneous unwarranted access (and mistakes not used prejudicially against Americans). This idea was codified into the first **Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978** (FISA), which regulated the interception of international (and domestic) \"foreign intelligence information\" from telecommunications carriers. Collection of data by any nation from outside its territory is literally lawless and not restricted by any explicit international agreements.\n\n## 1.4. The Post-9/11 Context: Extension Of Intelligence Powers\n\nAfter the terrorist attacks of September 9/11, privacy and data protection has been deeply challenged by exceptional measures taken in the name of security and the fight against terrorism. The USA PATRIOT Act of 2001 was voted by the US Congress on October 26, 2001, and its primary effect was to greatly extend law enforcement agencies' powers for gathering domestic intelligence inside the US. The revised Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Amendment Act of 2008 (FAA)13 created a power of mass-surveillance specifically targeted at the data of non-US persons located outside the US. These aspects and their implications for EU citizens will be analysed in the following section (Section 2). Numerous new surveillance programmes and modalities were further suggested to President Bush by NSA Director Gen. Hayden, without explicit authorization under statute, and approval was nevertheless given. Those programmes were retroactively deemed lawful in secret memoranda prepared by a relatively junior legal14 official, under the Authorisation to Use Military Force (AUMF) for the war in Afghanistan and associated War on Terror operations. Amongst these programmes was one codenamed *Stellar Wind* which involved placing fibreoptic cable \"splitters\" in major Internet switching centres, and triaging the enormous volumes of traffic in real-time with a small high-performance scanning computer (known as a deep-packet inspection box), which would send data filtered by this means back to the NSA. An AT&T technical supervisor in the San Francisco office was asked to assist in constructing such a facility (\"Room 641A\") and was concerned that this activity manifestly broke US Constitutional protections, because the cable carried domestic as well as international traffic. He took his story with documentation to the *New York Times*, which did not publish15 the story for a year, until 2005 after the re-election of President Bush.\nOther whistle-blowers from the NSA, CIA and FBI emerged with tales of illegal masssurveillance via mobile phones, the Internet and satellites, and even revealed that phone calls of Barack Obama16 (he was then Senator) and Supreme Court judges had been tapped. The controversy was exacerbated because two years before, a former National Security Adviser17 had proposed a research programme for *Total Information Awareness* -\nT.I.A., a massive system of surveillance of all digital data, processed with advanced artificial intelligence algorithms to detect terrorist plots. Immediate adverse media commentary prompted the US Congress to de-fund research into T.I.A., but rumours persisted that it had been absorbed into an intelligence \"black budget\". When the \"warrantless wiretapping\" allegations surfaced in a series of press reports from The New York Times, The *Los Angeles Times*, and The *Wall Street Journal*, the resonance with the supposedly cancelled T.I.A project intensified the level of public unease.\n\n## 1.5. **Edward Snowden's Revelations And Prism**\n\nOn June 5th *The Washington Post* and *The Guardian* published a secret order made under s.215 of the PATRIOT Act requiring the Verizon telephone company to give the NSA details of all US domestic and international phone calls, and \"on an ongoing basis\".  On June 6th the two newspapers revealed the existence of an NSA programme codenamed PRISM, which accessed data from leading brands of US Internet companies. By the end of the day a statement from Adm.Clapper (Director of NSA) officially acknowledged the PRISM programme and that it relied on powers under the FISA Amendment 2008 s.1881a/702. On June 9th Edward Snowden voluntarily disclosed his identity and a film interview with him was released. The primary publication was in three newspapers: The Guardian, *The Washington Post*, and Der Spiegel. Four journalists have played a central role in obtaining, analysing and interpreting this material for the public: Barton Gellman, Laura Poitras, Jacob Appelbaum and Glenn Greenwald. They were joined by *The Guardian* (US edition), the *New York Times* in conjunction with *ProPublica* after the UK government insisted on destruction of The Guardian's copy of the Snowden material in their London offices, under the supervision of GCHQ18.\n\nWhat can be referred to as the 'PRISM scandal' revealed a number of surveillance programmes, including:\n\n## 1.5.1 \"Upstream\"\n\nThe slides published from the Snowden material feature references to \"Upstream\" collection programmes by the NSA adumbrated by various codewords. Data is copied from both public and private networks to the NSA from international fibre-optic cables at landing points, and from central exchanges which switch Internet traffic between the major carriers, through agreements negotiated with (or legal orders served on) the operating companies (and probably also by intercepting cables on the seabed19 when necessary).\n\n## 1.5.2 Xkeyscore\n\nThe XKeyscore system was described in slides20 (dated 200821) published by *The Guardian* on the 31st of July. It is an \"exploitation system/analytic framework\", which enables searching a \"3 day rolling buffer\" of \"full take\" data stored at 150 global sites on 700\ndatabase servers. The system integrates data collected22 from US embassy sites, foreign satellite and microwave transmissions (i.e. the system formerly known as ECHELON), and the \"upstream\" sources above. The system indexes e-mail addresses, file names, IP addresses and port numbers, cookies, webmail and chat usernames and buddylists, phone numbers, and metadata from web browsing sessions (including words typed into search engines and locations visited on Google Maps). The distinctive advantage of the system is that it enables an analyst to discover \"strong selectors\" (search parameters which identify or can be used to extract data precisely about a target), and to look for \"anomalous events\" such as someone \"using encryption\" or \"searching for suspicious stuff\". The analyst can use the result of these index searches to \"simply pull content from the site as required\". This system of unified search allows retrospective trawling through 3 days (as of 2008) of a much greater volume of data than is feasible to copy back to the NSA. The system can also do \"Persona Session Collection\" which means that an \"anomalous event\" potentially characteristic of a particular target can be used to trigger automatic collection of associated data, without knowledge of a \"strong selector\". It is also possible to find \"all the exploitable machines in country X\" by matching the fingerprints of configurations which show up in the data streams captured, with NSA's database of known software vulnerabilities. The slides also say it is possible to find all Excel spreadsheets \"with MAC addresses coming out of Iraq\"23.\nSlide 17 is remarkable because it contained the first intimations of systemic compromise of encryption systems24 (see BULLRUN below).\n\n## 1.5.3 Bullrun\n\nBULLRUN25 is the codename for a NSA programme for the last decade for an \"aggressive multi-pronged effort to break into widely used encryption technologies\", revealed in a joint Guardian26/*New York Times* story on September 1st. This programme has caused the greatest shock amongst the Internet technical security community of all the Snowden material so far, and frantic efforts are underway worldwide to assess which systems might be vulnerable, and to upgrade or change keys, ciphers and systems, not least because adversaries in hostile countries will now be trying to discover any backdoor mechanisms previously only known by the NSA. The programme budget is $250m per annum, and may use some of the following methods: collaboration with vendors of IT security products and software, mathematical cryptanalysis and \"side-channel\" attacks, forging of public-key certificates, infiltrating and influencing technical bodies towards adopting insecure standards, and likely use of coercive legal orders to compel introduction of \"backdoors\". It is important to stress that no evidence has emerged (yet) that the fundamental cipher algorithms in common use have been broken mathematically, however over the past few years doubts have grown about vulnerabilities in the complex \"protocols\" used to set-up and ensure compatibility amongst the software in common use. FISA 702 may require a service provider to \"immediately provide the government with all information, facilities, or assistance necessary to accomplish the acquisition\" of foreign intelligence information, and thus on its face could compel disclosure of cryptographic keys, including the SSL keys used to secure data-in-transit by major search engines, social networks, webmail portals, and Cloud services in general. It is not yet known whether the power has been used in this way.\n\n\n\n## 2. Nsa Programmes And Related Legislation: Controversies, Gaps And Loopholes And Implications For Eu Citizens Key Findings\n\n The complexity of inter-related US legislation pertaining to 'foreign intelligence\ninformation', and its interpretations by secret courts and executive legal memoranda, has led to unlawful practices affecting both US citizens and non-US citizens.\n The consequences of this legal uncertainty, and lack of Fourth Amendment\nprotection for non-US citizens, means that no privacy rights for non-Americans are recognized by the US authorities under FISA\n The accelerating and already widespread use of Cloud Computing further\nundermines data protection for EU citizens.\n A review of the mechanisms that have been put in place in the EU for data export to\nprotect EU citizens' rights shows that they actually function as loopholes.\n\nWhen analysing known US surveillance programmes and related legislation from a Fundamental Rights perspective, the legal 'grey areas' fall into two categories, which constantly interact27:\n\n\n-\na lack of legal certainty resulting in privacy invasions and other potential abuses and malpractices inside the US, through ostensibly unintended effects on American citizens and legal residents;\n-\nthe intent of the US FISA (and PATRIOT) laws to acquire \"foreign intelligence\ninformation', concerning  people who are not American citizens or legal residents.\n\n## 2.1. Legal Gaps And Uncertainties Of Us Privacy Law: Implications For Us Citizens And Residents 2.1.1 The Third Party Doctrine And Limitations To The Fourth Amendment\n\nIn two US cases in 1976 and 1979 the legal doctrine was established that for personal data entrusted to, or necessary to use a service provided by, a \"third party\" such as a bank or telephone company, there was no reasonable expectation of privacy, and therefore no warrant was required by the Fourth Amendment, which protects privacy against unreasonable searches without a particular warrant, issued on \"probable cause\" (meaning evidence of a 50% likelihood of criminality). Consequently such business records as creditcard transactions, bank statements, and itemized phone bills can be obtained by law enforcement authorities through administrative procedures authorized by the law enforcement agency rather than an independent judge, and no \"probable cause\" has to be evidenced. This doctrine has been subject to continuous criticism throughout the development of mobile communications which track individuals' location, Internet services which record of website browsing and search-engine activity, and social networks in which merely the structure of and dynamics social interaction reveal intimate28 details of private life29.\n\nObviously these conditions could not have been foreseen by courts in the 1970s, yet every challenge so far to overturn the doctrine has been unsuccessful. Such privacy concerns were increased by s.215 of the PATRIOT Act 2001, that attracted considerable controversy. It allows security authorities to obtain \"tangible\" business records from companies under a secret judicial order. Although secret non-judicial orders to obtain \"non-content\" data (i.e. \"metadata\") were already available under a procedure called  a 'National Security Letter', s.215 is applicable to any kind of \"tangible\" data held by a great variety of private-sector businesses. After the first revelations about the PRISM programme, Gen. Alexander (Director of the NSA) confirmed over two public hearings of Congressional intelligence review committees that the NSA collects (both domestic and international) telephone call metadata from all major carriers and maintains a database of all such calls for five years30. By the NSA's own account it uses this data for the sole purpose of deciding whether there is a \"reasonable articulable suspicion\" of a connection to a terrorist investigation. The database is searched for whether a candidate target telephone number is within \"three hops\" (i.e. when there exists a \"chain\" of calls sometime over a 5 year period) to a nexus of numbers previously associated with terrorism.\n\n## 2.1.2 Cdrs And The 'Relevance Test'\n\nSo far, the greatest legislative controversy in the US about Snowden's revelations is not in fact about PRISM, but about the indiscriminate blanket collection of all telephone metadata (CDRs - call-detail-records), which appears to exceed the terms of the PATRIOT statute. Data can only be acquired under s.215 in the first place if it meets the standard that it must be \"relevant\" to an authorised investigation. The PATRIOT Act was amended in 2006\nto include the relevance standard, with the intention of limiting the collection of data31, but it appears to have been interpreted as a justification for massive data collection.\nrecords in the EU, beyond the 2-year maximum specified in the Data Retention Directive 2006, would be illegal under the e-Privacy 2002 Directive (and earlier 1998 \"ISDN\" Directive) requirement for such data to erased or made anonymous when any legitimate business purpose has expired.\n\nThe rationale behind this collection is therefore questionable: how is it possible to justify collection of the entire database in the first place, on the basis of establishing that a particular suspect's number has a 3-hop connection to terrorism? As expressed succinctly by one advocate: \"they were conducting suspicion-less searches to obtain the suspicion the FISA court required to conduct searches\"32.\n\nProblems that emerged from FISA were left to the interpretation (in secret proceedings) of the *Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court* (FISC and the higher Review court FISCR) whose judges are appointed solely by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court. It appears that the FISA courts agree with the government's argument that it is common in investigations for some indefinitely large corpus of records to be considered \"relevant\", in order to discover the actual evidence. Some official declassifications of the secret FISC(R) Opinions are in progress, but have not so far explained this logical anomaly.\n\n## 2.1.3 'Direct Access' To Data-Centres Granted For Surveillance Purposes?\n\nThe companies named in the PRISM slides issued prompt denials of \"direct access\" to their datacentres, mentioned in the \"marketing\" slides that revealed PRISM's existence. Their position was that they were simply complying with a mandatory court order, and they had never heard of the PRISM codename (which is not surprising since this was an NSA codeword for a Top Secret programme). Microsoft asserted that they only responded to requests referencing specific account identifiers, and Google and Facebook denied they had \"black boxes\" stationed in their networks giving \"direct access\". The companies are constrained by the secrecy provisions of s.702, on pain of contempt or even espionage charges33. Google and Microsoft are now suing the government for permission to publish a breakdown of the number of persons affected by FISA orders. However there is no substantive inconsistency between the carefully wordsmithed (and apparently co-ordinated34) company denials and the reports of PRISM. The phrase \"direct access\" was likely intended to distinguish this modality from \"upstream\" collection (see above), not necessarily implying a literal capability to extract data without the company's knowledge. However, such literal \"direct access\" is not precluded by the 702 statute, and it may be that this has already occurred with some other companies, or may in future be permitted by the FISC.\n\nA critical further development resulted from a keen observation by *The New York Times*35\non August 8th that in the targeting procedures published on June 20th, the \"selectors\" used to specify the information to be accessed under 702 could include arbitrary search terms. This ought not to be surprising from a plain reading of the statute, but it emphasized that Americans' (and of course non-Americans') privacy could be implicated in arbitrary trawls through a mass of data, rather than access being confined to account identifiers judged\n50% likely to be non-American. A further story disclosed36 that at the government's request in 2011 the FISA court reversed an earlier ruling and thenceforth permitted arbitrary search terms **even if** these included targeting factors characteristic of Americans.\n\nThus it appears that the theoretical protections, which in law existed only for Americans, have been very substantially undermined37 by successively expansive government requests to the court.\n\n## 2.1.4 **Intelligence Agencies' 'Black Budget': Scale And Costs Of Us Capabilities**\n\nOn August 31st, *The Washington Post* published details from the secret (\"black\") budget38 of the US intelligence community, which amounted to $50bn per annum, together with a breakdown of expenditure into various categories. It was reported that the US had spent $500bn on secret intelligence since 9/11. The NSA's budget is about $10bn per annum, but it surprised commentators that the CIA's budget has rapidly grown to $15bn, exceeding that of the NSA.\n\n## 2.2. Situation Of Non-Us Citizens And Residents (Non 'Uspers')\n\nIt is striking that so far in the evolution of the 'Snowden affair', domestic US political commentary has almost exclusively referred to the rights of *Americans*. This is not a rhetorical trope and is meant literally - no reciprocity ought to be assumed39 (in law or popular discourse) which extends rights further40. The rights of non-Americans have scarcely been mentioned in the US media41 or legislature. It is even more surprising that careful analysis of the FISA 702 provisions clearly indicates that there exist two different regimes of data processing and protection: one for US citizens and residents (\"USPERs\"), another one without any protection whatsoever for non-US citizens and residents (\"non- USPERs\").\n\n## 2.2.1 The Political Definitions Of 'Foreign Information Intelligence'\n\nThe FISA definition of \"foreign intelligence information\" has been amended several times to include specific and explicit categories for e.g. money laundering, terrorism, weapons of mass-destruction, but has always included two limbs which seem almost unlimited in scope. When the terms are unwound it includes42:\ninformation with respect to a foreign-based political organization or foreign territory that **relates** to, and if concerning a United States person is **necessary** to the conduct of the foreign affairs of the United States. [emphasis added]\nThis definition is of such generality that from the perspective of a non-American it appears any data of assistance to US foreign policy is eligible, including expressly political surveillance over ordinary lawful democratic activities.\n\n## 2.2.2 Specific Powers Over Communications Of Non-Us Persons\n\nTo end the public controversy43 over \"warrantless wiretapping\" of Americans, the US Congress enacted44 the interim Protect America Act (PAA) in 2007, which amended FISA\n1978, and created a new power targeted at the communications of non-US persons located outside the territory of the US (i.e. the 95% of the rest-of-the-world). The most heated political difficulty was over whether telecommunications companies had broken statute law regulating the privacy of their subscribers by co-operating. Depending on the contested legitimacy of the use of the *Authorization for Use of Military Force* (AUMF) to effect surveillance, which had impinged on Americans, the companies were potentially liable for billions of dollars of damages. The telecommunications companies and the Internet service providers industry were adamant that complete civil immunity was their price for future cooperation. It is here critical to underline that this controversy was about the effects on the privacy of Americans, and that the surveillance of foreigners outside the US, through their communications routed to **or via** the US, was an assumed *fait accompli* and national prerogative45.\n\n## 2.2.3 The Fourth Amendment Does Not Apply To Non-Uspers Outside The Us\n\nThe connection between the controversy over the s.215 PATRIOT Act power and the use of the FISA 702 power in the PRISM programme can now be explained. The database of 5 years of details of domestic and international calls was used to establish a counter-terrorist justification (according to the \"three hops\" principle). A second database was then checked of a directory the NSA maintains of telephone numbers believed to belong to Americans. If that check indicated the number was probably not that of an American, then the contents of that telephone call could be listened to with any further authorisation, under the FISA 702 law. Otherwise, if the number seemed probably that of an American, a further particular warrant for the interception would have to be obtained (under a different section of FISA), justifying the intrusion to a much higher legal standard, and with reference to the circumstances of the individual case. However a close reading of the s.215 shows that an alternative purpose (other than a connection to terrorism) is \"to obtain foreign intelligence information not concerning a United States person\"46. From a non-US perspective this may be an important point which has not so far featured in any of the analysis made in the US, nor is it clear how this provision would interact with the already tangled skein of contested legality. However it is a further illustration of US legislation, which discriminates between the protections afforded by the Constitution to its own citizens, and everybody else. Some remarkable interviews have been given by former NSA Director Gen. Hayden, in which he stressed that \"*the Fourth Amendment* - that prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures and requires any warrant to be judicially sanctioned and supported by probable cause - *is not an international treaty*\"47, and that the US enjoys a \"home field advantage\" of untrammelled access to foreign communications routed via US territory, or foreign data stored there.\n\nThese statements sit uncomfortably with speeches and statements made by US State Department officials prior to 2012 at fora including the Council of Europe's \"Octopus\" conference on Cybercrime, and the annual International Conference of Privacy and Data Protection Commissioners. These statements lauded the protections afforded by the Fourth Amendment48, and since they were directed at an international audience to provide reassurance about America's respect for privacy, in retrospect they can only be construed as deceptive49. The author publicly challenged one representative in 2012 to state categorically that the Fourth Amendment applied to non-US persons (located outside the US), and they fell silent.\n\n## 2.2.4 Cloud Computing Risks For Non-Us Persons\n\nThe interim Protect America Act of 2007 law mentioned above was set to expire shortly before the Presidential election of 2008, and its scope was limited to interception of telephony and Internet access providers. Candidate-in-waiting Obama gave his approval to a bipartisan agreement to put PAA and its immunities for telecommunications companies on a permanent basis with the FISA Amendment Act 2008, which was enacted in July 2008. When FAA was introduced, it contained an extra three words that apparently went unnoticed and unremarked by anyone50. By introducing \"remote computing services\" (a term defined in ECPA\n1986\ndealing with law enforcement access to stored\n\ncommunications),\n                   the\n                         scope\n                                  was\n                                         dramatically\n                                                        widened\n                                                                    from\n                                                                           Internet\n\ncommunications and telephony to include Cloud computing. Cloud computing can be defined in general terms as the distributed processing of data on remotely located computers accessed through the Internet. From 2007 Internet industry marketing evangelized the benefits of Cloud computing to business, governments and policy-makers, beginning with Google and then rapidly followed by Microsoft and others, becoming a new business software sector. In 2012 the LIBE Committee commissioned a briefing Note on \"Fighting Cybercrime and Protecting Privacy in the Cloud\" from the *Centre for European Policy Studies* (CEPS) and the *Centre d'Etudes sur les Conflits, Liberte et Securite* (CCLS), to which the author was invited to contribute51. Sections of the Note clearly asserted that Cloud computing and related US regulations presented an unprecedented threat to EU data sovereignty.\n\nThe Note specifically underlined52 the following:\n\n\n(Cloud providers) cannot fulfil any of the privacy principles on which Safe Harbour is founded. This was never satisfactorily resolved by the Commission before the agreement was hastily concluded over the objections of European DPAs. As a result many US cloud providers advertise Safe Harbour certification with insupportable\nInternational Communications--Is It Reasonable?, Pace International Law Review Online Companion 1-1-2010.\n\nclaims that this legalizes transfers of EU data into US clouds, and since 2009 several have altered their self-certification filings to claim the oxymoronic status of Safe- Harbour-as-a-Processor. The Article 29 Data Protection Working Party (WP29) have clarified that this is insufficient their recent opinion\n\n\nCloud providers are transnational companies subject to conflicts of international public law. Which law they choose to obey will be governed by the penalties applicable and exigencies of the situation, and in practice the predominant allegiances of the company management. So far, almost all the attention on such conflicts has been focussed on the US PATRIOT Act, but there has been virtually no discussion of the implications of the US Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Amendment Act of 2008. 1881a of FAA for the first time created a power of masssurveillance specifically targeted at the data of non-US persons located outside the US, which applies to Cloud computing. Although all of the constituent definitions had\nbeen defined in earlier statutes, the conjunction of all of these elements was\nnew.....the most significant change escaped any comment or public debate altogether. The scope of surveillance was extended beyond interception of communications, to include any data in public cloud computing as well. This change occurred merely by incorporating \"remote computing services\" into the definition of an \"electronic communication service provider\"\n\n...very strong implications on EU data sovereignty and the protection of its citizens' rights. The implications for EU Fundamental Rights flow from the definition of \"foreign intelligence information\", which includes information with respect to a foreign-based political organization or foreign territory that relates to the conduct of the foreign affairs of the United States. In other words, it is lawful in the US to conduct purely political surveillance on foreigners' data accessible in US Clouds. The root problem is that cloud computing breaks the forty year old legal model for international data transfers. The primary desideratum would be a comprehensive international treaty guaranteeing full reciprocity of rights, but otherwise exceptions (\"derogations\") can be recognized in particular circumstances providing there are safeguards appropriate to the specific situation. Cloud computing breaks the golden rule that \"the exception must not become the rule\". Once data is transferred into a Cloud, sovereignty is surrendered. In summary, it is hard to avoid the conclusion that the EU is not addressing properly an irrevocable loss of data sovereignty, and allowing errors made during the Safe Harbour negotiations of 2000 to be consolidated, not corrected.\n\nParticular attention should be given to US law that authorizes the surveillance of Cloud data of non-US residents. The EP should ask for further enquiries into the US FISA Amendments Act, the status of the 4th Amendment with respect to NONUSPERS, and the USA PATRIOT Act (especially s.215).\n\nThe EP should consider amending the DP Regulation to require prominent warnings to individual data subjects (of vulnerability to political surveillance) before EU Cloud data is exported to US jurisdiction. No data subject should be left unaware if sensitive data about them is exposed to a 3rd country's surveillance apparatus. The existing derogations must be dis-applied for Cloud because of the systemic risk of loss of data sovereignty. The EU should open new negotiations with the US for recognition of a human right to privacy which grants Europeans equal protections in US courts.\n\nThe EU needs an industrial policy for autonomous capacity in Cloud computing. The DG INFSO Communication of October 2012 is on this matter not in tune with the\nchallenges analysed in this study. A target could be that by 2020, 50% of EU public services should be running on Cloud infrastructure solely under EU jurisdictional control.\n\nThe study also underlined that since the SWIFT affair, an EU \"High-Level Contact Group\" has been conducting talks in 2011 with the US authorities on an \"Umbrella\" agreement intended to cover transfers of data for law enforcement purposes. So far, the US has been adamant that these will not cover access to EU data from US private parties by US\nauthorities, and thus would exclude precisely the situation of Cloud computing53.\n\n\n## 2.2.5 There Are No Privacy Rights Recognised By Us Authorities For Non-Us Persons Under Fisa\n\nThe acquisition of *foreign intelligence information* under the PRISM programme requires adherence to \"minimization\"54 and \"targeting\"55 procedures, which were revealed (unredacted) by *The Guardian* on 20th June. Together these provide strong evidence that there are no privacy rights for non-Americans recognized by the US authorities under PRISM and related programmes. The revealed documents are heavily tautologous and replete with bureaucratic jargon, but a close reading does not discover any acknowledgement of rights for non-Americans whatsoever. One therefore suspects that US operational practice places no limitations on exploiting or intruding a non-US person's privacy, if the broad definitions of *foreign intelligence information* are met.\n\nMoreover in a May 2012 letter to the Congress intelligence review committees56 the government states that:\nBecause NSA has already made a \"foreignness\" determination for these selectorsin accordance with its FISC-approved targeting procedures, FBI's targeting role differs from that of NSA. FBI is not required to second-guess NSA's targeting determinations...\nThe versions of the targeting procedures released are generic, but the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU)57 obtained redacted copies of slides related to FBI staff training that referred specifically to FISAAA for counter-terrorism purposes. The letter continues:\nOnce acquired, all communications are routed to NSA. NSA also can designate the communications from specified selectors acquired through PRISM collection to be \"dual-routed'' to other intelligence Community elements.(emphasis added)\nThis means that agencies such as the CIA, amongst others of the sixteen agencies of the US intelligence community, can receive their own streams of data to store and analyse, which the NSA has roughly filtered for a 50% likelihood of \"foreignness\". No reporting on documents from Snowden, or other commentary, has referred to this \"dual-routing\" or their mission purposes. According to the leaked \"targeting procedures\" (dated 2009) of FAA, an NSA database of telephone numbers and Internet identifiers58 is used to eliminate known Americans from being inadvertently targeted by s.702. Analysts may only proceed to access \"content data\" under the 702 power if there is more than a 50% likelihood the target is not American and located outside the US, because the Fourth Amendment was held not to apply. Otherwise a particular warrant must be applied for under a different section of FISA. This shows that the \"probable cause\" requirement for evidence of a 50% likelihood of criminality was converted into a 50% probability of *nationality*. This interpretation was first visible in a FISA Court of Review (FISCR) decision of 2008, released briefly in redacted form in 2010, and then apparently withdrawn from the official website (but a copy59 had been kept by a transparency NGO).\nThe reasoning of FISCR was that foreign intelligence surveillance of targets reasonably believed to be outside of the US qualifies for a \"special needs\"\nexception60 **to the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement.** The constitutionality of that judgement is being contested in a number of lawsuits brought by US civil liberties organisations, because this \"coin-flip\" criterion implies many unconstitutional searches of Americans' communications.\n\n## 2.3. **Data Export: False Solutions And Insufficient Safeguards**\n\nIn order to conclude this section, the author would like to draw the Parliament's attention to certain difficulties with current derogations and/or safeguards proposed as solutions to the implications for EU Citizens underlined above. This subsection aims to highlight the loopholes and gaps in several mechanisms that have been put in place for data export. In the author's view, these mechanisms should not be seen as guarantees for the protection of EU citizens' rights.\n\n## 2.3.1 Safe Harbour, Bcrs For Processors And Cloud Computing\n\nThe EU/US Safe Harbour Agreement of 2000 implemented a process for US companies to comply with the EU Directive 95/46/EC on the protection of personal data. If a US company makes a declaration of adherence to the Safe Harbour Principles then an EU Controller may export data to that company (although a written contract is still required). Sometimes described as a 'simultaneous unilateral declaration', the Agreement left ambiguous whether it covered the situation of remote processing of data inside the US, on instruction from Controllers inside the EU. Especially in the case of Cloud computing, such remote processors were most unlikely to be capable of giving effect to the Safe Harbour Principles, which, the US argued, thus became void. Did the deal still apply, for unrestricted export of EU data for remote processing under essentially a self-regulatory framework? In 2000, the EU Commission over-ruled objections from civil society and some DPAs, to conclude a deal. The US negotiators in the Department of Commerce worked closely with US trade lobbies, on a series of \"FAQs\" for US companies to interpret the Agreement to marginalize EU privacy rights, building in loopholes on such questions as what counted as identifiable data, refusing rights of access, and avoiding any duty of finality or right-of-deletion. Safe\n\nHarbour proved so Byzantine that no EU citizen navigated the bureaucracy to lodge a complaint for many years.\nThe official EU review study61 on Safe Harbour of 2004, in a slight treatment of FISA, did not parse the political non-USPER meanings of *foreign intelligence information* discussed above, and stated that \"the controversial provisions of the USA PATRIOT Act are essentially irrelevant for Safe Harbour data flows\". Much of the legal analysis supporting the theory that Safe Harbour applies to Cloud computing can be traced to the work of Dr. Christopher Kuner62, for many years the organizer of a Brussels lobby of privacy officers from predominantly US multinational companies, which became influential with the Commission and DPAs. Dr. Kuner also represented the International Chamber of Commerce in EU discussions over data protection, and has advised major Internet companies as clients. Kuner's textbook of Data Protection commercial law was cited in a Microsoft-sponsored study63, arguing that Safe Harbour sufficed for Cloud processing. The US recently re-iterated this view expressly64.\n\nAgainst this background, a working group of DPAs began discussions about 2009 with major Internet companies on a new proposed derogation which could subsume Cloud computing. This became known as *Binding Corporate Rules for data processors*. The concept was that a US (or other Third Country) Cloud service vendor could obtain a security accreditation for an entire software platform from a reputable auditor, and together with a \"check-list\" of organizational procedures drafted by WP2965, an EU\nController could then lawfully export personal data outside the EU into the foreigncontrolled Cloud. The checklist imposed (and in limited respects strengthened) similar conditions and wording to that which had already been created by the Commission for \"model\" clauses (see below). Perhaps in response to warnings about FISA, two months before Snowden, WP29 issued an apparently minor \"clarification\",  adding66 that the checklist\n\"**only** creates an information process that does not legitimate transfers per se. In the case of a conflict of laws, one shall refer to the international treaties and agreements applicable to such matter\" [emphasis added].\nIt does not seem very prudent to place the burden of responsibility for such a critical evaluation67 of conflicts of international law on a foreign corporation with strong vested interests, that may be subject to espionage charges for compliance with EU law.\n\n\nStudy, European Commission, Internal Market DG Contract PRS/2003/A0-7002/E/27.\n\nBCRs-for-processors might sound like a variant of the existing BCRs (for Controllers), but in actuality they are vastly more risky for Europeans' privacy. The strategic risk to EU data sovereignty, which arises directly from the concept of BCRsfor-processors, is that the global Cloud industry is dominated by software \"platforms\" from Microsoft, Google, Amazon, and a few others. Microsoft's goal for its public-sector salesforce from 2010 was to compete for every contract for data processing by governments68.\n\nThe cost savings for Cloud processing can be massive (sometimes one tenth the cost of processing \"on-premise\" by the Controller according to industry marketing claims). The cost savings are from equipment, overhead, operational staff (increasingly expensive for leading cyber-security expertise), and the major Cloud providers can take advantage of economies of scale, and higher average utilization by spreading processing loads across time-zones globally. Therefore there is already, and will be further, a competitive imperative to migrate European \"on-premise\" data to Cloud processing, and so far the EU\nhas almost no significant indigenous software platforms that can compete (on cost, features, or reliability) with the leading US providers. The exception to this gloomy picture is free and open-source software, which has produced powerful Cloud \"stacks\" competitive with proprietary software and services. In this light, BCR-for-processors can be seen as an expedient strategy both for the Commission and for Data Protection Authorities (DPAs) who wish to maintain the semblance of legal control over EU data, and for the Cloud providers who find the existing EU Data Protection regime generally inconvenient, especially for tax purposes69. The Commission promoted the legal status of the BCR-for-processors concept in the text of the new draft Regulation70. Subsequently, national DPAs have no alternative but to accept their validity once issued. So far, only a few dozen of the existing Controller BCRs have been approved71, and the standard of compliance already is not reassuring72.\n\n## 2.3.2 Model Contracts\n\nFrom 2001 the EU Commission drafted approved \"model\" clauses for inclusion in contracts both for Controllers and Processors located outside the EU, intended to guarantee privacy rights for individuals comparable to those they would have if the data remained inside the EU.\n\n## The Conceptual Flaw In This General Approach Is The Supposition That Computer Systems Can Be \"Audited\" To Guarantee The Three Essential Requirements Of Information Security: Confidentiality, Integrity And Availability. Whilst Integrity73 And Availability Of Data Are Technically And Logically Verifiable Properties, Confidentiality Is Not. It Is Impossible To Know With Certainty Whether Either An \"Insider\" Or External\n\nunauthorised party has seen or copied data. Even if data is encrypted with a mathematically strong cipher, the algorithm implementation may have software defects, or the key may be leaked or stolen secretly.\n\n## The Revelations About Prism Dramatically Illustrate The Folly Of This Legal Stratagem. No Force Of Law Operating In Civil Cases On Private Parties Can Guarantee Privacy Rights In The Face Of An Adversary Such As The Nsa Trying To Breach Them, And Operating Lawfully In It Own Terms.\n\nClause.5(d)174 provided that the processor had to tell the EU exporter about any \"legally binding request\" for data *unless* that was prohibited, such as a prohibition under criminal law to preserve the confidentiality of a criminal investigation. The wording \"such as\" invites a reading that national security laws *a fortiori* overrides any contractual obligation. Although the EU retained powers to terminate the transfers, this required a basis of evidence to do so, and thus the structural temptation for turning a blind-eye was incorporated. Every organizational actor has an incentive to turn a blind-eye under these arrangements. The Commission so they can maintain \"high standards\" of data protection are observed, DPAs so as not to expose their technical limits and exhaust their limited resources in expensive legal actions, Member States whose security hierarchies benefit from access to US counter-terror information, and business in EU and the US who simply want to transact without awkward questions of state mass-surveillance continually arising. Even EU civil society75 seemed quiescent since ECHELON, and has mostly focussed on consumer rights76\ninstead of meaningfully questioning the implications for Fundamental Rights and sovereignty in commercial data-flows to the US. As a legal mechanism for guaranteeing rights and obtaining damages for poor security or privacy practices, such contracts (and their \"model\" clauses) have proved useless in so far as they have not given rise to litigation. In most situations where an EU Controller might want to obtain monetary damages from a Third Country processor/controller, the reputation damage they could suffer in the marketplace (e.g. from a data breach becoming known) would be very unlikely to be recouped. In theory, this disincentive would be removed by the new draft Regulations' requirement77 to notify DPAs of data breaches, but DPAs have signalled that they will not necessarily require data subjects to be informed (and thus effectively make the incident public knowledge), partly in order to shield Controllers from disproportionate reputation damage. When disputes are settled out of court without publicity, it undercuts the function that contract litigation would perform, of informing Controllers about the reliability of those to whom they might export data. Data subjects of course have no idea when their rights may have been infringed under this approach.\n\n## 3. Strategic Options And Recommendations For The European Parliament 3.1. **Reducing Exposure And Growing A European Cloud**\n\nAs explained earlier, the mechanism of BCRs-for-processors, apparently tailor-made to ease the flow of EU data into Third Country cloud computing, is not sufficient to safeguard rights. It contains a loophole that condones unlawful surveillance. It is thus quite surprising that at various stages of development, the concept has been endorsed by the Article 29\nData Protection Working Party78 (WP29), the European Data Protection Supervisor79\n(EDPS), and the French *Commission Nationale de l'Informatique et des Libertes* (CNIL) which led their  formulation. No evidence has emerged that these DPAs understood the structural shift of data sovereignty80 implied by Cloud computing. Rather, an unrealistic and legalistic view has allowed the protection of EU citizens to be neglected.\n\n## Recommendations:\n\n-\nProminent notices should be displayed by every US web site offering services in the EU to inform consent to collect data from EU citizens. The users should be made aware that the data may be subject to surveillance (under FISA 702) by the US government for any purpose which furthers US foreign policy. A consent requirement will raise EU citizen awareness and favour growth of services solely within EU jurisdiction. This will thus have economic impact on US business and increase pressure on the US government to reach a settlement.\n-\nSince the other main mechanisms for data export (model contracts, Safe Harbour) are not protective against FISA or PATRIOT, they should be revoked and renegotiated. In any case, the requirement above for informed consent after a prominent warning notice should apply to any data collected, in the past or in the future, by a public or private sector EU controller, before it can be exported to the US for Cloud processing.\n-\nA full industrial policy for development of an autonomous European Cloud computing capacity based on free/open-source software should be supported. Such a policy would reduce US control over the high end of the Cloud e-commerce value chain and EU online advertising markets. Currently European data is exposed to commercial manipulation, foreign intelligence surveillance and industrial espionage. Investments in a European Cloud will bring economic benefits as well as providing\nthe foundation for durable data sovereignty.\n\n## 3.2. Reinstating 'Article 42'\n\nThe published81 new Regulation omitted 'Art.42' (according to the numbering of a draft82\nleaked two months before the final version), reportedly after very heavy lobbying by US\ninterests83. Article 42 prohibits Third Countries (such as the United States and other non-EU\nMember States) from accessing personal data in the EU where required by a non-EU court or administrative authority without prior authorization by an EU Data Protection Authority. The article has been described as the \"anti-FISA clause\". Recommendations: The deterrent effect of 'Art.42' should be assessed before it is reinstated, and in particular, the following issues should be addressed:\n\n-\nEven though Art.42 in principle mitigates controversial aspects of FISA, it is doubtful that this measure would be effective, because compliance would expose the leadership of US companies to charges of espionage. As the Yahoo CEO declared\nrecently: \"*we faced jail if we revealed NSA surveillance secrets*\"84.\n-\nThe efficiency of sanctions as a compliance mechanism should also be evaluated from the perspective of net economic gains and losses. As an illustration, the EU\ncompetition authority prosecuted a long case against Microsoft for its monopoly of\nlocal-area networking, resulting in a fine of $1bn (the largest ever applied by the EU). The corporate attorney responsible for that strategy was not fired for incompetence but promoted to a Deputy General Counsel. The reason is that Microsoft's profits over the previous decade from the monopoly were conservatively twenty times the size of the enormous fine, and this was  foreseen by Microsoft's legal strategists.\n-\nIf a major Cloud provider failed to comply with Art.42, it could result in irreversible but secret violation of the fundamental rights of millions of citizens, and the Regulation ought to make this a serious criminal offence. At the moment, most MS transpositions of EU 95/46 treat DP offences as minor matters, and some MS do not implement criminal sanctions at all. That is no deterrent against a calculated strategy to ignore EU law, weighed against the penalties applicable under US law.\n-\nAt a general level and beyond the specific scope of Art.42, the level of fines for infractions of the new Data Protection Regulation also need to be substantially increased. They were reduced to a 2% fine on the revenue of a corporation, from higher levels in leaked drafts. The example above of the Microsoft competition case shows that some companies have enormous resources and deep strategies that anticipate and incorporate even billion-dollar fines into their business plans. A fine level of 20% of global revenue may be needed to persuade such corporations to reckon seriously with Art.42 compliance.\n-\nEven after BULLRUN, cryptography is probably intact in theory85, however it is not\nknown which encryption implementations and products may have been rendered insecure. Therefore consideration should be given to extending the scope of 'Art.42'\nalso\nto\ncover\nvendors\nof\nsystems/products\n(as\nwell\nas\nControllers/Processors) in EU markets. Existing encryption security product accreditations, especially if influenced by NSA or GCHQ, must be regarded as suspect.\n\n## 3.3. Whistle-Blowers' Protection And Incentives\n\nRecommendation: Systematic protection and incentives for whistle-blowers should be introduced in the new Regulation. Whistle-blowers should be given strong guarantees of immunity and asylum, and awarded 25% of any fine consequently exacted86. The whistleblower may have to live in fear of retribution from their country for the rest of the lives, and take precautions to avoid \"rendition\" (kidnapping). Ironically, US law already provides rewards of the order of $100m for whistle-blowers exposing corruption (in the sphere of public procurement and price-fixing)87.\n\n\n## 3.4. Institutional Reform\n\nAt a very early stage of consultation the EU Commission rejected the option of establishing a new central pan-European Data Protection Authority, because this appeared disproportionate to the requirement for Member States' subsidiarity. The option was chosen for an evolutionary development of WP29 into the new Data Protection Board. However an intermediate option could have been considered: the creation of a new central authority for cases involving major Third Country data-flows. Recommendation: a central investigative service for cases involving major Third Country data-flows should be created. This service should be given authority and resources to initiate complex prosecutions against transnational companies, who often employ large legal teams to delay and appeal decisions over many years. National DPAs would retain jurisdiction over purely national affairs, and according to the principle of subsidiarity,  could initiate their own national investigations, or refer a case to the central service.\n\n## 3.5. Data Protection Authorities And Governance\n\nThe PRISM scandal and Snowden's revelations have not been the first warnings to EU Institutions in relation to EU citizens' rights. Privacy activists for instance warned the Commission in 2000 that the Safe Harbour Agreement contained dangerous loopholes88.\nMore recently, the above-mentioned note produced on Cloud Computing for the European Parliament's LIBE Committee clearly highlighted the loopholes of FISA and their consequences on EU citizens' rights and protection89. The Committee even held a hearing90 for the presentation of the Note, following a session on the EU Cybersecurity strategy on Feb 20th 2013. Afterwards MEPs asked for immediate proposals to meet the LIBE amendment deadline91 on the Data Protection Regulation.\n\nHowever, from March onwards, the level of interest in the Note declined, and there seemed only a remote possibility that Parliament would support fundamental revisions of the DP regulation. Thanks to the PRISM scandal and Snowden's revelations, such warnings and related concerns have gained a new legitimacy. The question remains why DPAs did not react. In one hundred and fifty Opinions of WP29 issued since 9/11, only the first mentions the PATRIOT Act (in a footnote), and none FISA, or even the term 'foreign intelligence'.\n\nNational DPAs92, the EDPS93, and other institutions94 seemed to be unaware of US\nlegislation or that PRISM was legally possible. They failed to sound the alarm for EU\ncitizens, despite warnings95, and of course the widely reported US scandal before 2008. This may be because  DPAs, ENISA96, and the Trust and Security Unit of DG-CONNECT97, are ambivalent whether the \"national security\" exemption of EU competency means they are - or are not - required to defend their citizens' privacy from Third Country intelligence agencies. In their last state-of-play comments before Snowden, the EDPS noted the above mentioned LIBE proposed amendment for a drastic warning to data subjects before giving consent to Cloud transfers, but rejected98 this on the grounds that it was not \"technology neutral\".\nIt appears the EU DPA institutions have some structural difficulties that need to be addressed. In particular, DPAs clearly lack capacities in technical expertise. Only a few dozen DPA staff (out of about two thousand across Europe) has an informatics background, let alone a post-graduate degree related to the computer and engineering science of privacy. There is a deeply-rooted view that because in general it is preferable to draft laws in a technology-neutral99 way, this excuses regulators from understanding technical matters. For example, WP29 has never conducted any survey of advanced privacyenhancing technologies, or issued any Opinion mandating their use, even in the face of persistent evidence of market failure for their voluntary adoption.\n\nRecommendations: A reform of the EU Data Protection Authorities appointment system should be implemented. The new Regulation does not address this aspect. This is critical in order to prevent inertia and deadlock regarding technology-specific questions. Some options to improve the EU Data Protection governance and capacities could include:\n\n-\ninclusion in the Data Protection Board of at least one special Commissioner with a mandate prioritizing defence of citizens' rights, with a small independent staff, perhaps directly elected by popular (but apolitical) vote at the time of European elections, or by the Parliament;\n-\ninclusion of a special technical Commissioner, nominated from the functional constituency of academic computer scientists specializing in privacy, and potentially another Commissioner from the field of Surveillance Studies, also with small independent staffs;\n-\na requirement that DP Commissioners must be appointed by national Parliaments\n\n2012. Both the EDPS and Deputy were present, as well as senior officials from the Council, Commission and other DPAs, who were emailed a copy afterwards. October 2011. NSA was outside their mandate, but probably realizing this position is untenable, on 6.9.13 issued a statement finessing the issue and incorrectly implying (footnote 21) that ENISA had warned of FISA-type risks in 2009.\n\nand not the executive;\n\n-\na minimum quota for DPAs of 25% technical staff with suitable qualifications (or\nequivalent experience) with a career path100 to the most senior positions;\n-\na subvention of funds to support the civil society sector, although great care must be taken to ring-fence this allocation. Funds should be distributed fairly and on merit, but avoiding the stifling effect of bureaucracy and the danger of institutional\ncapture101.  In the United States, the culture of philanthropy and mass-membership civil society supports four highly professional national NGOs102, with diverse\napproaches, which litigate test cases in privacy and freedom of information, and conduct world-class technical critique of government policies. In contrast, the EU still has a patchwork of dozens of NGOs, who with few resources and lacking the consistent capacity of a permanent  research staff, did not campaign on FISA before Snowden\n\n## Conclusion\n\nAs noted earlier, one of the most extraordinary aspects of the PRISM affair is that not only have the rights of non-Americans not been discussed in the US, they were not even discussed by the European media until well after the story first broke. The rights of non- Americans were rarely raised, and a casual reader would not understand that the intended target of surveillance was non-Americans, and that they had no rights at all. It seems that the only solution which can be trusted to resolve the PRISM affair must involve changes to the law of the US, and this should be the strategic objective of the EU.\n\nFurthermore, the EU must examine with great care103 the precise type of treaty instrument proposed in any future settlement with the US. Practical104 but effective mechanisms are also needed to verify that disclosures of data to the US for justifiable law enforcement investigations are not abused. In assessing the impact of the revelations, three technical considerations should be borne in mind in the search for effective responses. (1) Data can only be processed whilst decrypted, and thus any Cloud processor can be secretly ordered under FISA 702 to hand over a key, or the information itself in its decrypted state. Encryption is futile to defend against NSA accessing data processed by US Clouds (but still useful against external adversaries such as criminal hackers). Using the Cloud as a remote disk-drive does not provide the competitiveness and scalability benefits of Cloud as a computation engine. There is no technical solution to the problem105.\n\n(2) Exposing data in bulk to remote Cloud mass-surveillance forfeits data sovereignty, so confining data to the EU is preferable pending legal solutions. Although NSA has extensive\n\ncapabilities to target particular systems inside the EU, this is harder and riskier to do. However basic reforms to the new Regulation are needed, otherwise *in practice* these two situations will be treated as equivalent, and Cloud business will go to lowest bidder. (3) Although an EU-based company transacting in the US is also subject to conflicts between EU DP and the FISA law, in practice it is less likely they will be served with such secret orders, because the legal staff and management would be more likely to resist, and as EU-nationals are less threatened by US espionage laws. \"Clouds\" can be confined to a location, and arguments this would \"balkanise106 the Internet confuses issues of censorship with the problem of keeping data private.\n\n## *         *         *\n\nThe thoughts prompted in the mind of the public by the revelations of Edward Snowden cannot be unthought. We are already living in a different society in consequence. Everybody now knows, that the US intelligence community might know any personal secret in electronic data sent in range of the NSA. These developments could be profoundly destabilising for democratic societies, precluding exercise of basic political and human rights, and creating a new form of instantaneous and coercive Panoptic power. There is a historical symmetry between the incursions on the Fourth Amendment rights of Americans, and the disregard for the human right to privacy of everyone else in the world. In the period leading up the US War of Independence the British used \"general warrants\"\nwhich authorised any search without suspicion, and it was resentment107 against this power and its abuse that motivated the subsequent Fourth Amendment to the US Constitution. FISA 702 (aka *1881a*) is a general warrant to collect data and trawl for information related to US foreign affairs, but Americans' privacy is legallly sacrosanct (albeit in theory) unless the high legal threshold of \"necessity\" is met. What particularly galled the American revolutionaries was that ten years earlier a famous case in English law108 had prohibited such general warrants. They regarded it as hypocrisy that laws they did not write, and could not change, protected the privacy of their rulers, but not colonial subjects. The same principle is at stake today.\n\n## References\n\n\nACLU FOIA request (2010), Introduction to FISA Section 702, (2010) Course Information, US Department\nof Justice, published December 2010\n\nAnzalda, Matthew A. and Gannon, Jonathan W. (2010), In re Directives Pursuant to Section 105B of the\nForeign Intelligence Surveillance Act: Judicial Recognition of Certain Warrantless Foreign Intelligence Surveillance (paywall), Texas Law Review, Vol 88:1599 2010\n\nART29WP - Article 29 Data Protection Working Party (2012), Opinion on Cloud Computing, WP 196,\nAdopted July 1st 2012\n\nART29WP - Article 29 Data Protection Working Party (2012), Working Document 02/2012 setting up a table with the elements and principles to be found in Processor Binding Corporate Rules, WP 195 Adopted on 6 June 2012\n\nART29WP - Article 29 Data Protection Working Party (2013), Explanatory Document On The Processor Binding Corporate Rules, WP 204, Adopted On 19 April 2013\n\nBigo Didier, Boulet Gertjan, Bowden Caspar,  Carrera Sergio, Jeandesboz Julien, Scherrer Amandine (2012), Fighting cyber crime and protecting privacy in the cloud, Study for the European Parliament, PE 462.509\n\nBloom, Stephanie Cooper (2009), What Really Is at Stake with the FISA Amendments Act of 2008 and\nIdeas for Future Surveillance Reform, Public Interest Law Journal Vol 18:269\n\nBowden, Caspar (2011), Government Databases and Cloud Computing (slides), The Public Voice, Mexico,\nOctober 2011\n\nBowden, Caspar (2012), Is EU data safe in US Clouds? (slides), Academy of European Law, Trier\nSeptember 2012\n\nCloud, Morgan (2005), A Liberal House Divided: How the Warren Court Dismantled the Fourth\nAmendment, Ohio State Journal of Criminal Law, Vol 3:33 2005\n\nCole, David, (2003), Georgetown Law: The Scholarly Commons, Are Foreign Nationals Entitled to the\nSame Constitutional Rights As Citizens? 25 T. Jefferson L. Rev. 367-388\n\nCongressional Research Service - Bazan, Elizabeth B. (2008), The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act:\nAn Overview of Selected Issues, Updated July 7, 2008, RL34279\n\nCongressional Research Service - Liu, Edward C. (2013), Reauthorizattion of the FISA Amendments Act,\n7-5700, R42725, January 2, 2013\n\nCongressional Research Service (2007), P.L. 110-55, the Protect America Act of 2007: Modifications to\nthe Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, August 23, 2007\n\nCorradino, Elizabeth A. (1989), Fordham Law Review, The Fourth Amendment Overseas: Is\nExtraterritorial Protection of Foreign Nationals Going Too Far? Volume 57, Issue 4, Article 4, January, 1989\n\nDe Filippi, Primavera, and McCarthy, Smari (2012), Cloud Computing: Centralization and Data\nSovereignty, European Journal of Law and Technology 3, 2\n\nDesai, Anuj C. (2007), Wiretapping Before the Wires: The Post Office and the Birth of Communications\nPrivacy, Stanford Law Review, 60 STAN L. REV. 553\n\nDhont J., Asinari M.V.P., Poullet Y., Reidenberg J., Bygrave L. (2004), Safe Harbour Decision\nImplementation Study, European Commission, Internal Market DG Contract PRS/2003/A0-7002/E/27\n\nDulles, Allen Welsh (1963), The Craft of Intelligence, New York: Harper&Row.\n\nEuropean Commission (2011), [Draft] Proposal for a General Data Protection Regulation\n\nEuropean Commission (2012), Proposal for a General Data Protection Regulation, 25.1.2012, COM(2012)\n11 final 2012/0011\n\nEuropean Commissioner - Reding, Viviane (2013), Letter to the Attorney General, Ref. Ares\n(2013)1935546 - 10/06/2013, Brussels, 10 June 2013\n\nEuropean Data Protection Supervisor - Hustinx, Peter (2010), Data Protection and Cloud Computing\nUnder EU Law, speech, Third European Cyber Security Awareness Day, BSA, European Parliament, 13 April 2010, Panel IV: Privacy and Cloud Computing\n\nEuropean Data Protection Supervisor (2011), Opinion on the Communication - \"A comprehensive\napproach on personal data protection in the European Union\", Brussels, 14 January 2011\n\nEuropean Data Protection Supervisor (2013), Additional EDPS Comments on the Data Protection Reform\nPackage\n\nFein, Bruce (2007), Presidential Authority to Gather Foreign Intelligence, Presidential Studies Quarterly,\nMarch 2007\n\n\nForgang, Jonathan D. (2009), \"The Right of the People\": The NSA, the FISA Amendments Act of 2008,\nand Foreign Intelligence Surveillance of Americans Overseas, Fordham Law Review, Volume 78, Issue 1, Article 6, 2009\n\nHoboken, J.V.J., Arnbak, A.M., Van Eijk, N.A.N.M (2012), Cloud Computing in Higher Education and\nResearch Institutions and the USA Patriot Act, IVIR, Institute for Information Law, University of Amsterdam, November 2012 (English Translation)\n\nHon, W. Kuan and Millard, Christopher (2012), Data Export in Cloud Computing - How Can Personal Data\nBe Transferred Outside the EEA? The Cloud of Unknowing, Part 4, QMUL Cloud Legal Project, 4 April 2012\n\nHondius, Frits W (1975), Emerging data protection in Europe. North-Holland Pub. Co.\n\nInternational Working Group on Data Protection in Telecommunications (2012), Working Paper on Cloud\nComputing - Privacy and data protection issues - Sopot Memorandum, 51st meeting, 23-24 April 2012\n\nKuner, Christopher, (2008), Membership of the US Safe Harbor Program by Data Processors, The Center\nFor Information Policy Leadership, Hunton & Williams LLP\n\nLoConte, Jessica (2010), FISA Amendments Act 2008: Protecting Americans by Monitoring International\nCommunications--Is It Reasonable?, Pace International Law Review Online Companion 1-1-2010\n\nMedina, M. Isabel, (2008) Indiana Law Journal, Exploring the Use of the Word \"Citizen\" in Writings on the\nFourth Amendment Volume 83, Issue 4, Article 14, January, 2008\n\nPell, Stephanie K. (2012), Systematic government access to private-sector data in the United States,\nInternational Data Privacy Law, 2012, Vol. 2, No. 4\n\nRadsan, John A. (2007), The Unresolved Equation of Espionage and International Law, Michigan Journal\nof International Law, Vol 28:595 2007\n\nSnider, Britt L. (1999): Unlucky SHAMROCK - Recollections from the Church Committee's Investigation of NSA\n\nU.S. Ambassador to the EU (2012), Remarks by William E Kennard, Forum Europe's 3rd Annual European Data Protection and Privacy Conference, December 4, 2012\n\nU.S. Commerce Department (General Counsel) - Kerry, Cameron F. (2013), Keynote Address at the\nGerman Marshall Fund of the United States, 28th August 2013\n\nUS Congress (2008), Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 Amendments Act of 2008, 122 Stat. 2436, Public Law 110-261, July 10, 2008\n\nUS Department of Commerce International Trade Administration (2013), Clarifications Regarding the\nU.S.-EU Safe Harbor Framework and Cloud Computing, December 4, 2012\n\nUS State Department (2012), Five Myths Regarding Privacy and Law Enforcement Access to Personal\nInformation in the EU and the US\n\nVandekerchkhove, Wim (2010), European whistleblower protection: tiers or tears?, in D. Lewis (ed) A\nGlobal Approach to Public Interest Disclosure, Cheltenham/Northampton MA, Edward Elgar, pp 15-35.\n\nWalden, Ian (2011), Accessing Data in the Cloud: The Long Arm of the Law Enforcement Agent, QMUL\nCloud Legal Project, Research Paper No. 74/2011\n\nWeichert, Thilo (2011), Cloud Computing and Data Privacy, The Sedona Group Conference Working Group\nSeries, February 2011\n\nWills Aidan, Vermeulen Mathias, Born Hans, Scheinin Martin, Wiebusch Micha, Thornton Ashley,\nParliamentary Oversight of security and Intelligence Agencies in the EU, Note for the European Parliament, PE 453.207.\n\nYoung, Stewart M, (2003) Michigan Telecommunications and Technology Law Review, Verdugo in\nCyberspace: Boundaries of Fourth Amendment Rights for Foreign Nationals in Cybercrime Cases, Volume 10, Rev. 139"
    },
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H ~...  -~_-_:::' : < . ::~:- ,:~1~;;: ;.,;~( ~-: ~;.\n\nJUYl)l~~~!q;mvesag~ti9pdf:?.~~-gWp.e:c,Lthe.follow'ing;, , :  ;; :.-i_1r; ~-;'~-.<_' ... 7.--,,.~=-  - ..\n\n ..  1. <lii) ' l!iv~.Ageocyle'jnpl~y~s.-twp .~ttorneys, and' three inf9~ti~~ t~bl~togy.'(lT) siiif(~:,. --~;:, .. .->-. j:~~-.\n ''lm~n1~rs,:iQiprQperly:.a~c~s~BSCf-MaJqrjty ~taff-shar@\\dziN~19o the~R'I;fffi~L~  th:t>:::~,:. , ' .. ~t~!:\n\n. oii~:_:t~J:,ffiree:p: suiff~efilbers- ~ho a~~,s~ 'the .ss~r~~9~tyTh~~:~J~::::~ ..   .- ~t ' _::~;>~;\n,, di_s~Jaych' Iac\\c:or,candopab0ut. their activ~ties' when interyie'W!i(l>y't)lei9~?~;;;; ~'-~~-- :::~:, :~\"'~,\n\n, . , - ,  -  . . '  !f..,\"\"'-' '~ I  '~}<;:(~: ' 1.\n\n 2 ); '(U) Tile Agencytfu&l a 'cii_mes report;with the DOJ . repo~~g ilia~ S~CI'$tltf?Je~~!S-- - ::.-::,; ..  ~ ..\n' h. ~ ... \"1 ,<  .: , . ~: .... . .... ,.  . ..... ,. .. tli\"~. ~RD,JI( IN .. ~  .. '~ ... .-,j,ro~Ia .;.  'J,~f~~J~:'<:;.;-'~~~.\";.:. ;.l' .. ;tl~: . m~y. ave!J!llproper y -accessed:A'g!!ncy :mforn1atton on ~: . _ e.t~ .. 'we . _ .:>J~~-<-~~- ., : . . .... :,: .. ,.. .\n\n.. : iin~~-~~~bri dete~ri~ ihat~~c !actil~ basi~ .fpr.'~Ji'~ittfe~':w4~:\\1~o~~a~liili\"d~ili~~.'  _,~,;~'\"t~tf~  .\n_au~QF ,?ftl1~.l~tte.f _pad ;b~nBn>videqjnacc~r~ej.i1f~l;matio~~?~,:wllj.~~?11~~1e.~r,w~_l:~_:_::j~~4::,:'~~:,:~:- .\n\n.:: 'b~~;,.:. ~> .. - 'jf . _: '. ... J.   '''t'\\ ' : .. : .'.:'.; ;>:\\;~~&~+- . ;;;:\n .3,-; (l!) -~~bsegl)ent tqicfuectiye' b . the~ D/C1,A to qa1fthe1~S.ncy:_revi~~{pf,'*~S,.J~~tatr::r~,.,,.,:.  .  ':, ';#f,~:r~''\n\n. ... : . ~ .... \"': .. th' .. t~:RD . IN . . . -~.. ' : . . .... ted ... -~ l= .i..! ).!.-.-~ ~:- -d J _.: .... -_ > .. : . . .. ~ ........ .\n. ,~~~-~-!o , .~?e;.. . .. -\"'et,_ S~un~y PS..:rco.nd~~- .. ,jl .~u~AA . ,':f~< :-'i':\\,;'' :.) .. ,~ .. ,{!;~r: ;f:\n\nH  in~'bhiplete.~i~v~~tigatlbp 'ofS~Clacti~ities on :ih~ RD~~ttha~-i~F.tuqedj L .:- .. ' \\~~;' .. :.. '\nan~ -~;rev1e\\V' 9fg~II).e of the eJ11~S . of SS_CI Majority:staffrn~~~ers .. Qri,'~at . :. .;; .... :~~ . 'i\n\n. , - L..:;,-~e~l-~-.o-rR-~~.-:-... ,_._ -  . . -. . . . !' ~, ' ,\\')'J~~::-::_~::)\\.:~c ~ (U) RD,IN~t w~~ 9~J_t;~t ~ !\\gen~~ fac.ipty ~:,Jttne :2~9 ~~-.-s~ppo_{t. a ssqr ~vie~~,-;'(W ~~5 : .:(. _.,.,/ ,,\\ . {~\nAgenc~ s rc:qdi~o~'):~~tel)ti~~ and,~nt_~o~atton ~ctivttti(S .  RDIN~t_ \\VIi created . t~ ~WR~~~~~~cy< .. ~~-- .:.\n\n stafflo'teView--\"U~~ents for~p~duc~9n lo the ssm._ an<l tq :proyi~e ~~propti~te:q~!.F.~f!,~~ctP ; , : y . ;,r .. the 'S~CI s~~ ;Sepa_rilt~ eJectrohib;li~ _drives were crea~ed~on -RP~~t:fo~f:ili(tfse~~-p~~,-~SCtf.:. ~:,_. ..  .. .\n\n. . .  /\" . . ' . ... .... \" ~ .. i(; ~ ''' i'f''\"?.;l\"\"'\"'. ~. >X-;~t?;;' ? .. ..\n\nMaJeiity ari<;i Minority st~fs. an(ffor tli'e Agency personnel suppof!irig;th~ reyie\\V'Ma tel:i;!ction \"\"\" ... ;;\n   11  :. .t. . ..,~. {~':\n\n.... . : . .i:. :1'.\n\n\\ (ti) oii.36' Aprit-20;!~:-.m,~ DOJ: advised tlie'CIA}O,snector.-Geo~a.llhat DO~r~~d~~~:mpje~~-i~s.: r~vi~~;61.:~he .. ' '> '.. . : . .. ~- :.\n-allegations and .had~no - prosecutorialiniercst. :.~- .  .  .   '   ::  ;, --~\\        ''  _;.:;, .. , ;_,~ ,, <\n\n: .... ''::~t ........ . ~.ji;1 -~::=~- .'.,.: ........ . . : ... ...  .. =. !: . .: ' ~- :~ .... =.: . .:  . ,\n\n~  .. otctc~sa ;N: .o1i.-1'171 6~1cf ~  .. .. '  -. , ..  ,.: .. ,_  ,:_.  :~:~.-~;L;,2~ -'.~ i ~,:;_>~,;;~:t: ~:~.\n,.,. ...\" seefiETNNbfBR~.:-   .' ,_; ..  ''':. .  ::;, : ,. '.\n\n: , . .!'  . . . :: ~ . .. . . . - .. , .. . .. '1 . . .. ~;~~.:. . :::t~?: .;_;.~~f :i~~t:l .= ;, :,( ..\n\n. . -:.: .. .  : . . .  .. :/~.-... .\n\n>_;:_- - ;/ .. ~~---. _. __ :r.:: ... ~t-~:L,:.,~ .. i:~;,:.;:;r;, ::_'-~~~: ___ . ).{:.> .\n\n\n\nC06274838\n\ni'\"\n~ - - ' '.\n\n'l.\n\n, .\n..:...._ .\n\n. , .. ,\" ;.\n\n';_~~::.;-':<: .\n\n.. -...\n\n-:~ .\n\n' . ~- ,_\n\n.. _, ,:_\n\n.. :.\n\n'i~ ::' .':\n\n. . ;.z_ .\n\n... :.~i,~::: ... : .\n:: .. r;\n\n.t--1 _:.\n1;,\n\n... -:..\n\n\" '' ;\n: . \"\"':\" -~\n\n... ~.( . . . :. ' :.-~:- . ~ :. ;;=;:::: ~- /' -~\n\n. ~-:,.. . ...\n.\n\n\n\nC06274838\n--;,  . , .. '~:::\"''~;~~'~\" : ~.' t\\RJ.PEPL. E~AQS.~A.FTOE. ~~? :\"'- .. rr:t:.  ..\n\n......\n\nI :;\n\n., .\n1_.,\n\n[\n ..\n\n.::\n\n-~ ~- '\n\n ~ ,: .\"._! '\n\n. :. . ;.- :L t: V  . . .. .\n\n:~; ::~ .. . !~!!. ,  - . ~~t~i;> ,, 14~J~ri-~2o 1 s . ::, d~?c:~: ... ;:> .. . '\n:,_:, ,. . . .. . ... ;&EGREllfNOFqf,l~ .  . ~. ;_\\:: < .. . .. ~_;~~;:.;_;i~:::.:.:.:i~.:{'.~r :.:: f~ f '.:: ';~~- '~.\n\n'  ~ r  i'l :: ' ~  , .i .', . , .' . :  , ,   . . ' ,q; l 1 ,1.\n\n:of SSCI,.~taf.t:eri; .:on RINet; using:aata previously' tcollect~aib:v ,the -Agenc~~ontbeisYstem:~':aotih ' .-.\"  ,:.t .. :., .: ,\n. .  '   , 1li.it\"' ; ... :t!.._ ~ - ~..... ~ 1 . r \" ..,, ~  :/ '\"\" ... , ,,) ... t..~: .... ~ ;' .. , }\\.>:.  ~ , ':jlr-/1~ ~\n\ntattonl'eys!in,fQrmed lthe 1monitoi!ng :team \\thatthe.ta8~11g was dir.ect~ tl)y;jp~~Dlf:~;.~;~ewev.er, :the :~t . . . '\n. rQ~minv~uga~on~~~wea:mt~Y,iaenc~ 1lliat ithe':tt>tbi:A itir4~rea:r&~i~~ng~~!i~~~1~~~\":a~fo-e:r9t' .  . ~ :.!~:  ,\n\n:the :tilsking:;atitlie:(ime 'it ~was made: ,Based upon .tills tasking,;Jth~ :mtinitorlllg~ii!criil l~taff )~<; ,:. , ,,. . .  ~  - '\n,1' \": '_,. w._, \" 1' T -,.~\"',\":' -::< .. 1 ... '-( -~\" '. , .:r,' . , . -~--   :. ,,'\"''~':\" ._,_.~~- ... :,a,,.~/ .. ',;.:~~~ 3i$:'~r?..lj..-,_'~ 1:;: .... ;~~- .(~ .. 1_..,, -~:  ~\n\n.;perf,qFIPedt~'l'iMte(hrevi~w .. of. SSCl:staff:activity,. usil)g.~iJi~:preyjousJ.y .collCte9.i(l~t~,:~. _ :: .:. ~r..   ,.1 ....\n\n.. . .  7  :t~ .. ~ ~. .. ,  ... ~, ... ~ -~~ .;  ... , ... .  . . _.  \\  ::~:.- : -~hc:~:\".~4r.t :::~~ji~;; C~~\\:':~~:! ~Jt!!.~> : .-!..\n (U) , Offi~~~of Secunt~ iRe.VIe~.~Qt:SSCI<Stafl'.Acpvlty- ;. .   i  . .. _,,:. :'-.-, ~-~ ~~t   _\n\nC'\" ' ' t- .;. ; } .'1 ,, :~~\" '}' J.~l!i t,\n\n. , . , . , <,' .   I  I ), ;:>l;t_, ,.li!': :. \"'' : ~!jl~:..i!.>]?-'1\n~ .  ~ ,.', .~ ~ ~ ~ . ' . ....:-:y-~~~~; .. t: .. ~::':;.,. ,'Ytc.1, ~If w> :On lft 'J.~':l.Y.~~Q14;}_tlle Oj~IA<l:!e(:ame ~ware .~~ th~ r.n?.Pitc;>~~ _t~;~~ib.~':t;e_qg~J~~ .,~ :,,;,1 ~.:-,! , . to .. reyiew~th~'.qy~ti~h'b4~j\\ttiV.itie~ of.lh~ sschtaflon~ ~~t!tfaitdf~~i~~.~~~Q~~f.#~;t. : ' .;~ ~~ ..., .i.~t-~\n\n.st:anddo~'-on ;ariv and a!Uin.vestigati:v1 e. acti:vities .. The.D/CJA15rlefec:t: SSGJ,,Chairln.aiiiFeiris.tein ~>:;::,~ ~~ i-~}.:.\n\"'..- , ,&on~, , '<,' ~ '.' \"~l( .,,~,.  ' .!- ''1( - ~- ..,(,::f'll\"1'r, ~i:lf~'-'\"\"', '\"\"\"~ ~-~- -~;}:'~\"-,-:\n\nOn 1-5: l_rutll~ i,at,, ibased;upon~iofqnn~tJc;>n pro:vided tO hlm:~y t!}l~ '1am~~~~l~~p;spn.f , i:'~. ~::::: ... ''\",.'\n\n<meni~rs1~ati;~tppro~erly ,acfes.~ea ~~g~ncy,documerits. - The 'D70IA,f'eo~enJ.~a\"::~~~~~~~$0l .)~~, ,. : .. .::~ .,,\n~~ll~an and  ice Ch~rinan.ia\"Uoint~fo_r,t:nsic -~v,iew .. ofth~ ~acUvities!O'f :~:Sqj~~~~~~-a~ .. ;  v: .~~~!E' , .. :\n\n .. . ~ \".    ..... -   ,. '  .    ;. ._   :   '( ,, :. !\"0('..._ ... -~ .... ~~-\":1: '\"'~ .. - 'l;; --~~~- ;-~p:,_4j ~)%~'\n':;AgellcyJ>Crsophelori ei$S'C:J{stiared.drive. The gs:was,then __ ask;~~f:by:t1)6~Q~fj<i1'b~4h,~ .);~~~ : .' ;.:;~:  .. :~\ntP~C!Ato ~[.~p.,we ,!o c,ori~Hf,ti~~J.oiltt:fg~eJ,lsicr~;~i.~w,;~wJth;~_s<i J>ri9-f:~J9~~~:c~~~9.~c~iii.~l)~~9~'*)t1t:/ .  .\n\n.. this ],9irit re-..;i.~y.;i;:.~e .~~CI s~~pty Offi~;:~r iwore~Oo~<th~t~ p~r;$2P.aiJ!nan;.F:~~M~~;/~~ .~~- . ':-:\" . . . . . :\n . ~$S$l~as on~.~tf.i4d~owri .. fgr: iii{~1J91ntr~vJe..v~- pespite:.Q4$.:not!~~af~s.ss,r~~~~91Wng~f4. ~s_.;- '{f .. , . _. <\n. .. :interested in .a.ioint1review;00s rMuest&hconcurrence from ,the fD4CIA~s offite~to~r.oceed ...... ~;~;,(>~;':'; .. ,.:,t ,. .\n\n. l\" ,~, ....... . Y., :. ~-,,_.. -~ J ;:r~:-~~ .-~: ~- .- .~. '>!ll.\" ' 0 ' : 0 ,,~,.-,,' 'J~o \"l 0 ',' 'o : ,H.. ',' 0 ' ' 0 r~ i .. ~A.r.:.,.~-~~;- ; ~~;,'~. 4j'\\.~,; ... . .\";''4, -.: \\:~ -~\\'f- J,~l ,:\":~~- '\\, ,l(h~: ~\n\n. ~- wj~~auriii~ter~: rey~ew of Agel)t~d s 'SCl ictivit-y'.On the SSCI ;~~r~ anye~.f\\Y.}.,~9~~~iW~9~g<~> ' .. RL .. .;\n:   for .s)licutrenc~ \\froi4 . 0/GlA .o~:itlire.<:ted ail':inv~Stigaqqp ~~.. sti!ffth~i~u)!~tn'.~~ ' ' : .j};.; :~~~-~r..l:~\n\n .. genenitiQ~ of..a t~~.~ 9:f .SS~I ~C.~\"~Y.:.~n, fl!~ ssq Majo~!Y :~~ ~~~,e;:~t~#~JR4\\~~;~, : ~ ;'\"},~~ ~~;:\" <Y-;~,~\": ,:~\n. -fore~iCiillyte<;~)Jistru~t ;~om&.Rbrtief.~itiJs . betw~~n SS'C.~LSfers. :Ttl~}:e~i~\\V!Y.!'as::~so . , ~:;. .... Jf:l ..\n  base4;:4ri pint, oninfbrmaticin .pre~i6iisiy eollected 'b-;t.he .inonitoringteam~~:,;,~iil~: ::.:1. t .... - ,, ... ~.:'~ . . ,~. f~;I-: .. _ .. .. .~-~- . .....  ..  ..  ....  .  . . .;. , .:~;>~~.c:/ .. ,; :, :.<~:~..-', . :~r~ \"{:: \":\n.:(U~ . Age~c{Crim~s1~~eJ?Qtt().~ Aij~g~ -Misco#dpct iby.:S~QI::$itft~,~:,~ . .:~=:~:~:: .. :(\\\\, _ ~~~~:.  .. ,'  ~.i\n\n. : . : __ ..' >:. - . . . ': ,.. . '\" : . ': ' . . .. . .- -~;.'1 ~ --~: .. :: :-:/ :\\ : : .::i::~.~ - : ._ . ~:-::t~---1~~ ;_ ... ,:';:'' .(\n    (U} -On''(Peb~~<i~P14r:Pi~~ili~fi-k2ting den~a! :portse( who h~d~pry~}qus'iy;:r9S~~~-~~'e1f~\\~.~~~;,;; :=,~?-:(:\n\n',from,.:PI;zel;tted J11a~rs.~d was th~refore.largely~ ~p~~~e .ofpro.~~~~c,;~~~!f}~~VJf~:~ :/ ,~ ... ~-~-~~~,,: ;;. ~ . crime~ repci;:t wi~ tli'e DOJ~. as ~ui,ted by Executiv~ 0r9~ 1~333.il)1Cl1 tb~.J.9,~5 Crjples\":::- ; : \\;;-:-; 11:' .. ,- \"\n Reporting .MeroQrM!iYmi~e.~~~n -the QqJ;~&ilie i.nt~i.ligence'Co~pPj~~ ~f!~p~Fq~;I~~~~r~~~{i ,;~:,+., :\ninfonnation -P.n;r\\.iided:to hj.rh by . s~ .The rime;report ~tated that,SS~l.s~ff~~~.may~K~v,e .. ,.,:;:_ .. J~:; . expldft(!<f_a::softW~ ~u.l.~~r~btli~y ~~ Ro~et t9,0b~~ ac~~!i: to .the :v\\~~~g~h~~~il~o/!.~so.'> ~:t;~~::~ ,.. . '\n\n... cr~ated by~t!l~f~~I\\CY; 'm y.JoJ.4~~n ,of ~<? :~OJ?.I>,Ut~r.f~;~u.Q .an,d ,A~u~.;~,~J,;:~ l~~:;Sig1~ ~iii~ . '.\".  . ~ .. ,,,. <., :  rr.\n\n'fhe r~porl~ w.as ~s9.lcly b~sed :on .in~curate  infoimati<?n yrovit,ted:py W:~ t~~fOBC af~,9tri~~~t~: . .  : .. : ..... !.:.. . .. :~_,.-.. ~.-~~.:.\n. oos~~4~~~\"s ~olsupP,<)Ijed.by; oi copsistri(:with; :the ~lilt$ ' ~f ~~)!li#.i~\"ltt~~~~~~on . 'c :;: ,,_,; :. .';. ... ; f ,:\n\ncpl}d\\icteg:byQS .t~. . The 01G:)~~.~q~a,yon .q~tel1Ilined that . Uter~$as~~~it~Hi,ru,t!W!H~.r~:th~t .: :! :;.;i: :\n\n. atleg'atioh~\"niad~ :~11, ~~ -~~-'~!,es}~ort :   .. . .  .. /'' -'~L~~:;i;.:,'i~L-r3:: :. ~: _::[t~/:: . \\.,,;,;\n::. ~ . , ~ .. ~: ... , ~ ... : .i:~~ : .- '-~~i(;\n\nr ~. .' . ~ .:\n.......\n\n :'\n':\n\n.. s: . \" .. . .! ~ ' :\n  I\n\n._;\n\n\n\nC06274838\n\nSECRET/INOFORN\n\n(U) iL.ack of Q.aiid()f.;iJ)y~-~~rtairl: ~R..DI ~tafT .  ... , - .\n\nAPPROVED FOR RELEASE DATE:\n14-Jan-2015\n\n(U) .'-~~~0r~:ile,~egli'i~oo:tJ1~t:J~El1NetiT\"QffJ~ers:iesponsi}?Iefor~assjsting{jfF~~N:W.cti.p~'th~; .~r sefcn::~! ~f:~s.~cf:Mi.t?~i~~J,~-~-~~ ~~vT: ~~f~.~~t for$cq~g.t~)P~~~lN~~~~;~~~7i~i{ .:~i~~~\n010~ itHnatJhe:ffiti!~:.~o 'qisclos -lo tl)e 010' the :activitj.~s :the)Fi:p~di.!i:':'tt!Q~~a.t.~th~ .attqrneys ~~ f.:\n4ife~-~<>Ef~t~;~~~~s-~lli~ :!sseiM~j9hiy~.sJtrt.lJlif~ .. drii~; . Wheti~iritgFie~~;~;i~~M~~.~~;a.~~i~\nconrr6ht~;:~!tf.t ~~}~idence: orQidv.;~9ti6~; .twQ ~f\\lqe :ait1~ersad.!mtt~~.t<?:Wetr.:.ori~,4~~~~P1a .w.frd offi~er' d~h(i~di:a:i~~o~d .. i~i~r\\;ie~. : : .. . .. : , ':,    , ' .:. Ji'~~: '~:~:;,~::,. :~ ~j::>~;~\\ .~~\n\n. . - ....... : , ..... l . . . . . ' ~- .. ..,. . .~.-.~-. . ....... . .. ~ . -. ... ~\n\n \" '. t ::,~.  .~  ~ '\" :-~. :~  ~'\"'  ' /' ..... .~:~\".~  ~ -~~\n\nOIG:ca:se No'r : 20~441718~1G :..  . . ' . . ~ . .. . ' .. . ........ ~.. ~ ... . . . . : .\n\n~ECRET/!NQ.FQRN\n\n\n\nC06274838\n\nSECRE'TuNOFORN\n\n(U) Thisp~ge has been :intentionally left blar)k~\n\nSECftETNNOFORN ft>.,PPROVED FOR RELEASE DATE:\n14-Jan-2015\n\n\n\nC062 74838\n\n:-=-:- ~--.1\n\n,:\n\n..\n\n. ~ ' .~.\n\n -: ........ ' .\n\n .......  -~:~: :   -  . . !-  . .\n\n. -r:.: 'SEG.REiFl/NO'FORN:.\n. . I ' - . . :\n\n. :;~:. ~~~~~~~~o~, :;\"\"i'. '' . . .  ... !(~~:~-~~; ;~~~f~::-':~~~~rt~,t.:\n.. .  ..  ~~~~~: d:Jji.~Y o~;'i~f!aii9~ ~014, the Offi~e of-~;~~t~r~o~~~~(QIQ;)~6.J~1i~d~;J. .~   :-:: ' .. speti<U:t:SY.~~w !ntoothe acti vities~litc~!p~rsonneF~Jate{i:ta: the acces~>qf Seriate :~et~et\\~::. . ;'_,'  ' .. :\n Colllfl1ittee :~m Iritellig~J;tc~ . (ssc;:p:r~es ClJ!q'.recordsori <the Rendii!P-h.:,Det~ntiori.fanj:1,~~~~;;-;. . ' .. !\\~\n.Intt<rro  a.tion ,netwmk RDINet ,Jocat~ afthe b~UQi~g! :an :Ag~ncy.~faC.ility}in1tne '<>,: ;:.; .. . .. :\n\non'}pariuary . 14, OJc:fa,pned~ :i.qyestig~tioA:;~as~~ton~~ .. : . . .- .  .,\n. L,-i-n\"'fo-x:m-... -.,;~\"'~.,..P\"\"':~:-di\"'. : s:-. .c_o_v_e-=roo-= :-1i-Q~ tJi;,.,ec-:,'(-.~Psc~~.', :t~ -t~view. lQ acea,raanc~ :f,it,h 'Title\":$.~] tJ.:S :~?f~5 11:~Q.1d: ,  : ~ ~: >n.':  . . :\n. repprtoo;the inatter to:th.e'itlepartfueiit-of.Justice (D0J)OP '30r,Januey,~:i0 14 -'for:)petei{tiat_.,;;~~f , : )~<1\\~: .  . .  .\n  .v;ioia:tiBris of..-iiii'e 'Ii;U~~dS~  .25ir:tWliet~p ;A~thmct is:11~s~(i;~{to3o1(b~irifrrte~~E1\"li':.~ ~d ~-.. ~:;~~ii:.(k .:.,: , .:\n: ~~b'is~~:~~t): _' ... -.:- ..... :  . ~ . ..i~:~t~r  ,  .~ -. .< ..... ?~\\:.  ;:::!;~>:::::~~:-~:~!:.:~~~;.;.~~:,.fJ.~~:s:~:~::~~{::::./~::~ ... . :~~\n\n2. '('{)//F.t)UQ)_ ,On~3 .J;wqa.cy 2014, SSCI Cl'il,urmanDtan_ne. Fem~tetn s~n~.:~Jetter (b .~~. ..,: .. . D~tor,-~entr.aJ InteU~geit~.Y,-~ge~~y:.(D/CIA) John Brenii~:a.J.\\eging ~~t .CJ;~  P.rsp~p~~)h4d- :.:.:....  '\n\"conqucted -~ne or in Ore searches'.el$e computer network, ai;an' offsite facilitY Jhadfie~Cii\\ h'ad: : .. '. assigned _exdusively tq ~~ s~ft~CifJhe '[SSCI].\" . The.J~tter detai_Ioo severarques~pns .; -..... -. :. , C~a.Jr!nat):~Feinste~nhad :~gardi~~;!~e .co.nduct of CIApers?ruiei,.:m.d cllleged ,vJ.d~aV~ns of-t~r . :. .~  . ...\n4 .Atpendple~~ ~e ~peech.:an.d, Debate C~ause pf the Cons~Hutio,J;t, th~ Cop:tpute( 'Era\\)d 'and:.  .    . . Ab .,t\" . d' ,.E ... . 0 d ~ '12333. . , .. , . . ,,., ... t.\\\\\n\nuse -~c~ ~.,. xec;u~tive,._, ~ ~r.,.  .. : .- :(:: . ';,. . .~ ;;.?';.-:,..: .,. ' .: ~: :\n', ' ' ~~ ... Y- \"'  !c,~- ~ ' r\n\n1\n,\n\n1\n\nr , , , r ;;;.:,,   ,~ 't~ ,_/;,:~), ~-~ ' ~ ~'   ~ \\  J. ,\n\n1\n\n,. , c~'3.~(tJf/~~) ,;OIG:~Ve~ti~~tion ~asJiqlfted'fQ .tlie ~l~g~ iu;pess;~l{~;~y~:~}ao~ ~:.;/  : .\";: .. :,.'_,,. RDI!fe~ ~y Ag~npy'per~onne~ (E~}1.lblt,A) -tq J'!n1.1acy 2014 an{hne:l!ub,s~~ent~~pns taR!!p: ':'. .. : : .\n\n OIG tij~~s,tigiitia,n covered, the iss~es :of.Agency personnel-_engag!hg.jri ~ur~~tJ:iJ?.'i4c::d .acc~~\\::9r   / -,: : , extee~ffi,g 'auihoriz~(tac~ess tMb~.RDINet, 'Agency mon~t~~ri$ ofth.e: R.D'U:f~~~~:~~: W.he~'~~~ ; .~.  .. ' .~:;~;',:_\nfoQ11ill:~gr~111en(had be(1nmad~.:.~t~~n- t.Qe CIA. ~9ttie..~$Ciregardfng !t.}le; u,~ ofJ~t?Jti.eL '._'.'. <\\:~ ~-;,:\nThe~ activities 'ofSSCI staffpteQJ.~~s -wery delif>eratelyexhi9;ed ,fro~: !.i;l~ invetig~UP.Ii/ft?J< ;.-;  :~ ., ~-.;~ ~;;,, attempt~as ~de to .inteiview S~Cfstaff.member~;:and .'dhiiUll fore[lsics on RQINet,and:Ui.e?': ..  .. :~  : >  . ,.,\n\n. . associ~~~ . \\i>ei'for~~~~t.~)fprG:w~ Hm~teain sop~ i9;4voi~ 'obtair,}j~gJ#~fJ:!1~,tt~9:~.;, .. \\~:;3;}r :: . .\n. rela.~e4 .lo tb~~;ttivities ofS~Cl~sersf,bey9,nd that pr9viqed ~s ;paJ:t .of.t,h~ ,P~iC'a~<?Iiif6tf~~,~\\ .:~,.:;; ,,: .\"j; . ~:\\.'.~!//:\n \" in..vesti'g\\fi~~~';f.he : tJ;r s~ri~te~~~gea 'for:a ,spe~1Pf ~e.vt~~9f.f;be:'a.tl~~~d;~v~.~~P~a.rr~i~~tW1($,~~;::1[:,~:7>;'~ t\"\":. !:;\n\nSenate staff,lt<> be'5;6nd.49tea~by.,~~:.u.s. ~enate Srg!!ant-at~~st : . :-. .,\".':~~~: .. /.\\:.; '':'~;.<; : ,. :\n.~ t  - f  ~~ ~~ .1\"~\": . ;<\n\n IL -;; tv) -POTENTI:AL ~T~~TUTORY c)~ REGUL~T.OR:t::YlPL~~~N(S) .. _,: :,;~i;, ..\n.  ..  .:~ ....  .~ . ... :.. : .. ; -~~ ... ::~-> - - . . . . _: : .. :. __ ,_.:. .  __ .... :~~(:~.>- : .. ; .J :~r~~~~-....... ::.~\n\n.. ~ . ( U.) ,;,~T}tle 18 Unite.4 fi~lJI.~s Code ;25111nterceJjtioti~ :qnd Disclosure pfWire~ (})f,?fJ or-: . ..,  ' : ..\n.; 'Electrmdc CoJitrnuni'c4~f'O~lPt(Jfi.ibited (}Vinitaf.'i'\\.ct)C.' 7\n\n-  -~;--~' . , '': :~T:~-~:  ')~}-;.\" ...\n '' :: ~ w .' ~'.'!\",- , ''' , .\n\n0\n\n,, <~- .- . \": ~ ..  ..   . ' :- ,     :~. \"I :,  : .. ~~( -   ,:~-;~.-.~.-~   '   :.  ;;/;~ .... :\n\n   ..(U J;'Jff~l~ lB (/niifd Sta.{.t:$. pode ,)0,~.0 Fr~y.cfqniJ'\"~~{fl).~(i-A,~!,kity :~lJ ,Pg,ri_~~!jQ,iJ+ivith '\\. . ; , . .~ .\n. , ... C .. ' . (.C 'v .,,._, .nil.Ab A ' ) . .. .. .. . . ,. .c ........ ,.).~) * . ': . .. . . . l\" .omp,uters ... omputer,r-rauu a use  ct -~' ,, :-..:: ,,,.. .  .,_,: :.  .-. ., ~,;,~'>~:\"'''\"'\" ( ; :.: ...... ,,;\n\n' , oiL\\ ~ :::j . : ' { :: : \": , . . .. ,. .. . '; ,, , ': {i,i';~;~l~~l~;;\\,:. :~:c i\n\n. .QIG~:;;; =f4:l171 ~-!Q :.--: . $teR~~~RN;t ... .::,_::~~l~~ss~::~~r'-,i . , .... :. :,, v ... .. '\"r : : .. ~~. .  .. : :;~ ~\\~: ~ :-.:~-:--:>..~::c:.~;-t . .v:\n\n\n\nC062 74 83 8\n. ~~: .  ';-:--n . ~--, .--~::r<. . -. -~:. - 1 --~ ,, . _ ~~;..PROV-Ep . .EQ.R-... -. , ~-- ... -.- .\n\n..;.\n\n:,\n\n'!:\n\n.. ,\n\n. ;\nt,.\n\n: i.: .. <F.>' . . I :i~,~-;, --: r,;ELEfXSE DAlE:_ .. \" . ~: .\n. .. , :\\l  .. :. ,;. ' .... <.- <'. :~ >{?!:~ - ..... 14-Janc2015\n\n'\" : ., .P '~:(\":!l?Cfii!Tf!N~.:o~~: },, F.{ :,~;{ ::~.~1~?0'2. . . ::' . '\n III.. . (U) nAtKGRbu~~i;.::' - ': , .... ~ -. -~~j~I;~-i:: .. ; .... : ~\\-~:~;::,~: .;\\.>,.:~.\n\n    ' . ,,' ........ ,:._   :. .  .   :. :  -~~.. ..  : ' .:  ~: .. ,.,~  'J. J:\n\n(U) Review ofi.h~ ~:~~ndi!i~~tDeteriti~n~mid lnt~rrogil_#,i?~(Pro~r/~~ '- _ '\\' :;~<:,. > _.. ' . :' : ..\n-; :1_. __ .' ' . ' . : - .  . .  . ~t ..... . . .. . . :_.: :.-.: '.-: ....  ..  .. ' ~.. . .. :, ~-. ' . ..  . . .\n\n. . 4~ (U~-: 0n',f~ :Mt~ 2009~ -the SSIjln(oi1,1! .the.1.'\\ that th($,,SGrpll\\~rieci.~to..  ,;:;\nconduct~ !horQ~gh.Jt;~'f~~.'of .tt} .. CIA:'fRDL~r!J~l:~ Qn/2~JQhe :29Q9;~t4,e. .S~.C~: s~~~ga!)   . ..\n\n,:\n\n. . eir r~vi~w. : .The' review p~ssftaied iu;;cess,:b.y sscrsta(f t9.- idarg~ vq~\\,Jm.~~of ~en~iti:Ye,':> ; :~ . . .. ,,\n. . classified,. and- compartmeQt~ ~c!A docuhlents~ In or,d~r to,~x:ovide .. tnel:dik..l!rneats:t6)he SS<;:t .~\":- .. ':'  . ~ . -. staff .. ~d,  en~ure pertinent ipfoima~on. WaS-.pro~id~r;,tb~ eJb es~blii.h~~ :~~}~v1~w :pi.~.~~sf; -~:>-.-::> .. !' ,,::_\n\n-~tia~l y, the _ss~I.Maff.:p~Vid~f~~~h-ter~ to i.ild(;M; Ro,li~~v,~w T~:f'RDI.'t~_';_)J't~. ~~.: .: .. ,,.: ~.--~ . :.. c . tdentify respon~IY.~ d~~ments; Thy '1~0~-t~ t~k~~,AgeJtcy:.~9mponen~:~t.$ s~c;:~g ... ~~~!:,>~ :: ,  ..  . . , ; . databases for toe. req~e~t~ mat~ri~ ~:m~' ~ol.l.e.~t~ . the{P<?.typ~ally .respons!~e.:d~~e?ts: .~~:~ . \"' . :~ ~~:::,_. ,.  . :=, ;\nCl.A t,4s)cti4 cpmpo,tlents oftlie AgeT)~~ ~o ondQc( aqpjtiofl_iW s~cheS'.~ft!leir .. M!d.iJ!gp fC?t .. : ,y.,;::' ,. .  .}: ,t,_  ~~ ... potentially respQnl)ive 'dQc\\lmehts.that were> tben:.pf.ovJ~ed7(oJli~!RDH~i   The .RDJtap1:~'>. .:. ,. :.' ~ . , . ,, :: :::.;\n\n~revieweq. 4i.e .(io~i.t.lllen~s}fpr :re~p~s1yenes~_,-,i~m.9v~~fufonna~o~ desi~at~d =as :E~ecwi~,~- :'. ~ ,,_.._:,~0 :-:-i?:;;; _p,,.;, ).\n ' 1 -~ '  -   1 1 ' ._    .  ,  -(i  .... ~)),'r .-.. .. ' ,t_  ~,, \" t;' ,l' ..... {:~.r ,, ~ .. ,,(,,, .! ' , , ,'_ --~\n\n. Privi~eg~)nt9.rrn!ltiOQ.;;~d'prQ~ided , tQ. SS,q. s~~f.:with acp~:;~ ~~o :~.~4<i.~:';l~~~~: v.~a :tp(~J~~~;'-.~. =:-/~ .. ,~,~-';;;._;:\"\n    ..  ........ s:  cW~> 1n ~:~(f9~:~o::Wid.~rs~4, 4l~~l~tq~it!~/th~- A\"i~1~}~~~~tt~i.~~~:~~~(:~:::\" ,\\\\?~'~:.v~~~\n\n cc;mttnued ~to.:-~!~,ii~~~t,9 :th~ :-~Sp~~~f;{:~tfle ~~plSpc:~~:i~ev,te~. :r~.(~~1J) :w.~s;t:~@O-~~-~M~~,.,}::;._ ',~    ,_,~:y\n2009 . .. 1)i~ SRT.~~~~~ct. ~ps:umen~ ')rnown :$l$ :W~e!<ty.iCase?.Rfiporw(W(};B.$), ,~qlQ~g<?~~r r,:=  . .. ~,r:. \"'. .  ~{,:\n qocument~.  att}le . i:equ~t .:or~en:I~fFDx;_Iie()n::f.~etta~:rqnip~: P!l~IJ?O~~ -qnu~iipgf&r <}!A' _. '~\":: ~-::,.~ :- .. : '\n. management th~. inf~nnati~n:being~Pt<?fuc~i.i:~? : ill~ ssqJ,~~;;r,n appro~~a~~f~}~e~fiiirry. o~~t~T:.h .   .;;,: . :'\n2010, WCR pnxiuc~on was pal~ect'~Y rnem)J~~ of tht:: ~ge!lCY. staif m;r~po11~~ to a. I?e.p~ent . .. ).::\n\n' . of Justice i.Qv~stig~tiori-Ied by)\\:~;,-isiant u:s ~ P,.ttom~y Johp.Pt~rham}~Agen,~y -~taff_itit~rvie~~~r ~\n.. by CIA OIO:interpretep the ... Panea .. ~~yiew\". (aJ~.a: P~e.~~ ~eport)c~s a ~~iilP,i,l~tion<?f ~~ ~, .. :, _ ..\n WCRs . . _ .-..   . .: .,. _ ..  . .: .,  .... : ... :. -.~ . .'- . ~:_\\.: :;:: '_, :. ,;_..\n\n.,.  :. 'I' ?\"\n\n.(U), RD!Net.Sy~t~fn .. }\n. . . . ~: . . . .\n\n6.  (ut/f,~ To faciUtatessd ~tati a~~~s to:the larg~ .n~inber of released . documents, the CiA-created a com utet n~twork~c~Ued _RPIN~t'~- ~b.i:N~t was. established in ~\nsec~r~ CiA, vault in the of tli~ .CIA' l;niilding, with seP-ara:te physical < . . ''\nlocations for ciA analysts to revtew and redact ~ponsi.v.~. doc~ments anda physical \"reading . room\" for SSCl staff .to review re~ponsiv~ documents: -.'The .. ~SCl Majority and _Mil'l?ri!Y ~taffs\n\n~ - ' '. - . .\n\n. :: ..\n' ,\n\n.. '\n\n. ~ , ,.\n\nI (lJ/~) ~~.S~nate has hisr6ria~IIireferred to this as a ~w~y ;on \\ti~ CIA's Pe~ntion and I~te~ogat.ion\".'' r ~ -. -~:\" \" ~\nProgram. The srudy was !au~ched foUowiilg then D/~lA~Micpaet Haydf:~~ ~iscld~ure of the progranl.~~o the .~SGI \"':;:'\nin September 2006. On 5 Mardi 2009, the SSClWQied .tO ;i nitiate a campreh'ensi~c_ review of ~e progr! rit . . ,  : : .\n2 (Ui!Fboo{ The Rni'~~vi~w T~~ h~s h~ seye_~al historieal' {la.i:!)~~; i'net~cii.ng ~eiDii\"((Ctor'& -Revidw G~O,l:IP . ~~~:.' . thepffi~e of.~~nee . A~fairs . -rpe_ t~:-jncJ!Idfd ~t~om~Y.s fr,om;t!'bpt~!~ .of General Q>u<o~~~ ~t?,at;ove~w' th~~~:~::. . <: : \\:, :~,.;:;:\nRPI revtew ~ifo!'ffied by ~SCI andan_ mfor~a4on lCfOnqlpgy ._teat'!)~~!lt. SJ.IpJ1?.11e.d lf.l~; B;I?.I s~s.I~J!l.:..u~for,revt.ew. : ... ,,, ,. . .J.,.\n3 (U/~000) :'in !anuary ~008; ~s~.!~tkjJ/.S f:~~!pp1CY Jg.~(li~~~haqi_.,~~ apP9fil~fi:f<C9Y.;ih~i{?:<},Jj,~~,l~~~ : /~; ~ .. >-<it':S., ..  : ,\n\n.  invesi.J,atio~ int? .. the . ~~lruction:qf~id.ceo.tapes of '!~.~:i~ tt!fr<?ltilti?~.~qf de~~ees:~ ;I_n  !lll_~~~oo-~;;~~J1Ws~~~~~~ ..  . ''>,. :-~~.. , :< .f: <''.\n forc.e:,VfiiS  ~~fi<,mih<dJo mdudeJa revt~w oqhe .d~tepu$).p[a'.qd  th!! 'u~ ofvai1qus: J n~rr!l.~~~9\"J~h!\"~.9~C,~~?~Ii2 ?~/~~:  . .;:; :; ' ->;:~:r\n\n= A~enCy .  '.:~i~ ~ 1 .... _.,.   ~   \"..::~ ~ ' ';  ~ ..... : '   ~ ~.' -~  ~~:~;~~~~:~lfi;~::~~,~;.t~\\ '  ~ :.  ;,>~  ...\n\n' 010 Case .No.:2o14t1J1,81G. ,;~:;~- . f  , ,.~ .. :~ ~:,, . :;, . :; -;~'~':; . : -~;~-~f;:,::~:::~f;{;~~:~.:'? /:::.- ::'. .~~> , .\n:,\n\n.' .. .\n. ,_\n\n.. ::: .. ::-. ..\n\n.I ..\n\n.. : ... ~ . -~~ : .. ..\n.. . ~ :; ;-:.;\n\n.  ? y .  .. '\n\n..\n~ !. \"!\n\n:. 1\n\n\n\nC062 7 4838\n\n,\n\n).\n\n,,\n\n;,\n\n: .,  ~ ..\n\n''' :\n\n. ..\n\n.,-;- .\n\n. ..  .. :_ ..  ...  .. :;\n\n;I -\"~~~ - ..... :'  1 f\"\" 't\" J\"~\" . -~~ .. ~ \"'~ ,~ ~\n\nl' '\n\n' ':;, :,., ...... . .r .. ,  ~. ''',\\' . -~~\n\"~~~Bf:T/7.~Qf-OR.N . .\n: : ~ ... _!   T'\n\n. . . '(. . . ; ~ . .\n.. .\n\n-~ -~\n.f   ;':.\" '\n\n\"'  ... !' ,_ . . : .. ~ ' . -~: .. - ;~ .~:: -~:\n\n' ~ : . '\n\n.  . . . I .. :. < ... :  ... -. ~ ~_.1:~  ::: : ,  :.,;-: . -~ >:.,: . .' ..::~:~ ~ ;:  ..  Weft! late~ .. physidlll.y :s~pat~ :into .t~o  s~cure r~a~ng ro()ms;:<lt:the req!f._~~t of~tJ:ie SSCI~ 'Each: . . . _,. ,\n\n.. of these.oftic~s~t~chid~ s~.ure Clt,\\~pro;vkl,\\~<f~ornp~ter;,~o!lc~tatjq_i}~. :foE'fhe !~yie\\y-~f ma~cii~s ,. . . . releas~<I.:.by;th~ CIA. ~d .for: :~e c.re~tion of-1ndi;Yidualw9r~ :Product. ..... >~'<, ::-\": .:' ''  ... ~i.:;;i:: ...  . ; . :: ..\n\n 7 . . {U/(Pe:QQ) : RP.~e~-Ts a standalone :n~twork.tha~ l:la$  a,,:lim.ited 'c().rj~~tip~toitbe <:. : : .   : ~:\nAgenCJ;:D.ata N,etwork ( AO~ fqr ad.m!nisirati<:ip' pl:JrpO~s; ~~gdqdingthe ._ir]g~~tion: of ~ystelfi:.: :.' . . . . ,:=,~.. . . softw~ .pate~~~ and uPdat~~ and foi.ro~~ne -n~tworl,c,~9ni.tQrlng (E.x~hit:J~}:~~;iJie.-S~CI -and .. ,', ~1!: ~.:'-~;\nCIA w~r~ .provi~i!(t shared s.tora~~:arC3.$ on :~RDl~~ttpal ;ptlysica!ly_ie~id~ oh .~e. ~a.fu~~~3fp ;i~y~.; >. ~::!t; . ... c .. array.  ~eparate' el~tronic st9rag~ Qxives wer~ establjshe4 .for.-bo.th tlie':CIA .89,~ the~~~9 to ~~e . :    .. -'\"\ndocuments and theif 'respe~qy,~1reports. 'f!t~ .SSCI :w;1s ais<;>_,pr9vided .ad<i,i'49q,a!.sta~g~ ;drie~.'.   ::. .. :   J::;\\''!f::. : . further . segrega.~<1 b~tw,e~n ;~.e .. Majm1,~y ap9;Minon_cy:stiif.f. ;~ccess.Jo.:da~ wa~.r.~strjctcif ... -~~\\;\" ... _:.  ... ::'::  .. , through ~e use of;acc.~ss ~a~~oUtsts and 'lqgical~iul.es 'associated ' .with--~~ softwar~: -:.trnis -v,ir(u}il  .' ,,, , . . : \\\n\n-~eparation \\~~~s J.nt.t\\~. ~o :9oritroi :ac9~~s'py: i.Qe : ~an.o~~;p~e~s~~o 'ilie :Ro,~~tl :~;~;.(~~ ~~ry~eni .  :!.;;~-~~ i_'  .jf -\\>\ngeneral CIA RDINet ~~ers frOin--<;>.bservl!'g.or ac~e~~1pg SS_CHiata, and t~~pr~vent SS,q:.us~,~ .. . ' , ...  .:. '1-.. from:obs~rviqg. ~r ~~ces~i:qg ~qA:.:q~~ . tt{al 'li~ :n9.t~qeen:irl~Se<l to~ ll)~m{;;~tu.s ~ot#~;:w,~ i;/, ... , : . :.''';.h; ,:: \" :;\nins~leq :on .. tlie;fietwork;to Jproyiqe ardi:l~(ii~,;Jli),iNet 'effiail capability'~~~rn~ ~miiJ~s~J.Yei:t~'l;~;,, .1,_: ':-;:1~~~ ', . ;- ;\" ''\n\n...... . . f    .~- ..     ~  ~ J.. ...... f'' ) l';~   ..  ...... ~.~-r;..r. ~-'~: ,.. ~..,,J.\n\n. allowed !9r:cominupi:catiori ~ong all.R:DINeNi~ers, J>ot,P Clr.\\<at:id >'SSGI; 1:$~Pi1ftal;Qo~}~,. : d;:::~~-::0: ::'';;\\~~~ 10:, :k. connef~rv.itY. ~6-.th~_ADN . .  : ... :   . <: .. ;.' . :. ,.' ...  ~ _ . :: ..  ... ~ ~>.,~.:~. ': .~: ,. -. ~,~~~~)~~.::~~~;:, ,~:::~:11tf..::,,. ,:'~ ,>?Ji;l~:l:f;;~[:f:\n\n.  . 8; :; (lJ//F..OOO) f,[~t:Il u~c:ptmn;:the Offt'9~: .of'G~*~rarGpun~ef{eGC)'was~charged~t5y,;_;,,, , ::.:, 1K~~;~;.~ .  ~'f;~\nthe:Agencywith.overseeirhiand supportinlfth~ RDI~Prol!ram'reViewJ '':::~;: .. ',' :<;':~-,;~\n\n.. .. ., - .. .... . . . . ' ;-/. ~~- _ ... _:, :t .. ;:1:~\n.;, .;.,;\" :~':- ~ ... I'~.\n\n:'tl\n\n',),\n\n: ; .. ' >';\n\nI'\"\n\n:;: ;:\n-...:.:~ .. - . ,_\n\n. cusal regar~iqg t4e:Rp~ , . . ;  .- .-~:. matt~r, was uvsupervis.~~. PY th~ .O.ffi'ce 'of Genera Counsel ~rtaini!lg t?- -~~s .. m~~~er:\"'' ' :' \"' ' .\n\n. 10; (U/(FOOQ) Qq22June2~.sscrstaf'fmemoers .began~eirrev.le~ 6f:RDl~ '-' :_ _ :.-.. : ::.  . .<~\n-m~tetials at,thfseeurefacil~ty..; . ,..   ..   .:..    ': ... , .\n\nU .. :{UlfPoOO) InNov~illt>er' 20f2; . the 'RDl te~ i~ried bf ~ vul~~ra6ility:\\V.itJf{li:e;>;: ' ,' :~::;, :;;,;,:: -' ;;:~. Goog!t~ -~-PP~,i~c!-< r~fate~. toco~fi~ra~i<>n :settingsfuat haq.~nin pl:ife s'in~~ -fnb''i.qi~i.iib : r! ... . ::  : :  .. ipstallatibn i~ .. November- 2009. ~'0~G~viewed an~April ~01;3email .bet;Weenrp~nt9.e~s. ~f!Ae .. .. . ..  . :-:~(}\nRDINet tT shlff~d~uiili~g ,~t; e,~~t~~g: set~~~$~: ~hidl:i,n~'J~ated, ~ aq;~~'Y?-iltl\"ol,~~f.if:~T~~-~:f?r~:. .  . . .  y. ~\nsearcn:reslilts. :The RDI IT.te_am, u.i?Pa~jhe 'Go()gle''~pp,lianee m !,:\\Pn~.2p13: tQi~ft:l~.f.~W\"~: _ > <.  ' . . ,;?,\n\n chan~er Pr,ior t_o .~s~.upd~~;~~~;~f-~tjpg~twovided to - ~I<?: : ~90.Y>'~~~!~ tpe~~-?,~?t~~-~P?.~~-~~e ~w~:.; : t)i;~- _. , .. . ,:)'/\nnot configur~d to C!tforce ~~<;:cess:gghts~qr: search penru$s~Qn~ wtthm :RDINet -and,Jts hoJC!f,ng~ : :  . :\\~' : ..  .. :'\n\n.. . . . ~ . '  .     : 'i. . ~  -::.   .  . .. !,_~  . ~) ....  ' .  ... ..,..: ~--~ .. { :,, . t -~~~-.\n ', '' , ~1: . \" . ,;~. ~-~-~-- ~~: ' r ' ,.' .~.:; ,, ,.: ' :'~f{'f-7.;~\";~~\\ .:~.... -l.j(;t-~\n\n. . . --- .. ' .. ~ . -~' .,. ' ': ~::: .. ,_~ :-. .; __ ;\nOIGCas~No:-'2d1A~:M7:1a~le   . . . t   ~'-: . ...... :,.i.~~-~.:::.-~~.-...... : .. .-~- ~~~-.. :. . ..... -~ -~f~~-_: ..  ..:.: . . :~;; , ! tl . _(::~\\~~ .. ;~~:.= ... ~).: -~\n,: . ~- s.ECRETJ/NOFOR, } >,  ~ ,,,., \"\";:.\n\n. : .. \"'~~-:{!I .'\n:. ... ' : :j:i;~f> ~:,\"\n\n'; . . .\n. ~ ..\n\n\n\nC0.627 4838\n.. \"\"\"\"\"~' . AR-~.EOVED FOR .r' , ..\n\n.,.,_ ....\n~ .\n\"') ...\n\n~ ..\n\n,.\n\n<\".~ .... - ....\n\n.  .  R~t.:.EASE QATE:\n: ~:::' i ., ,, ~ 4~dan-20} S.'.\n\n ~~p~e:T~~Qf.O~~  ,., :. ,.  <;~  ':< :.  :.\n\n'. .:; ' ..  . : ' c ,:: .. :~.'<' < . .. ~ ;~\\J~;1. . ~.;i0{:~~:~t; ..... ,\n. . . . .. 0nL:November.,201Q,SSpj . . . l~~-: ~;::,. ~-~-f enJ.:aiJ\"~ 'fthe RDI4'f stafC:and : other~16$ii'ifotffi. 'theffi~tha~' ili~~ .. Y~:. :. ~:~ ,,\n\n. ~-~ .. - . ~ ~ .  '\" ' ~ ' ..  ~ . . . -. l . ~- . .Ji,\n\n:n.ew 'G9<Jg!~,;1ppliiifl~~ .w~~;~.noe,xing th..~ M~Jori~y staffhv9rk pro~hi~i,.6n-'a~~:~J:fcf4rivt;: {::,;,,: ' ..\n::requ~~t~ :th.a(i.he ;rr_,~tat:fc.onfigurc the tooL o\". 't  ~~d~xing: theshan~a (.ir-ix~.\\ i~9IG. feu~ ..   , ~ .. tlie Ag~ncy .. did ~Qt~e action ti:> '{ldgress request/: .  :-   : ,.;::' .~~~/ . . ,.' : .. -'> ., .: .~-: , ..\n\n--~:.- . ._ .... : .... : ._t. . . ->~.__.: .. ;_-.. : ..  . . '\"l :y: ' ~ .: . . '_,.,.;.~;;.~~~):: .. .\". - .. ~;~;:~ ..... ):~: : .:-: .. :.~::~~~::;'.\n-' '(U) : M,.e'morandum:of Understanding . .Regardingcthe Operation ofRDINe( :=3;t~~\"; :._, . .. ';> .:  . ~?:::.~~ .\n\n. . :. \".. . . . ' . . :.: )'' :' . . ' .. r: .:~.;\" . ';: > : ,;;:;~.~:~~;~:t~~~: '':~<:~~;~ .. t{, ... :;~. : ...\n~~ ~, : '(3.. :  <0JroQ:U.0tnti~Ii.~:.tile . c.?~~ ~~f~th~Jnv~svg~t~ni~9tG~~~.~t~iW.~~t~~~~~.i~~ ' \" /. '\n\n. . aJ;l~l?~:~it.~ .~m9i:~~~~ ~o,+P~-~~rstandin~ (M0!f=2-~~tw,~~~U)~\"~$..~~K~~a'~~*~W?, .. q1~-~ .. : '\".t\n\n. : ~YI.e~fmcluqwg_~a~e<;ss;c?~!f9.~s~ ,di.d:not extst-  N~ve~~-~~s~. ~1,1ltip,!~{.tp.ter:y;!~~~~~1;r~.rrt?,d.:.~Q~. . '\"\"_ .. ,\n  .::tf~~ext ~t!!nce,9f:B~s.~g~~r.M:(i)lJ':'~1n l\\us r~g!lJ'.d, OIG;fqupd that that.~ .s~n~~):>f,,~tteh letters ,;:;c, ,. ,~~~ .  ~' '\n\n-~ . . .betw~n SSCl'(Chajnnrin .feinstein, then Vice ~hruiin~n Boqdl r, :: 0 . . , aod then and :ciA:.('thiri TI/.GIA. Paridt:a : ~: . ;~rfi~. .  .... k .~:\"if:,  ~J ~~jl  \"  ,''';\"''.1:~, .r and th.er~ . det;illing .the des~)jt:M.c?.:.~iQ~_; -~i~ :i:eg~.~~: ,.,_ \".:; . t~ the).t~e;of QIA ~p~ce and syste):ns, ~d SSCI acces~ tq:qocuments (l;~hjbit:9i-  :Tp~~.Jettt::!'S!'~;;._j.~l 1\n\n , were,{t;>~n<f. t<r.con~n some-c6!1JmQn fa!lguage with regard ~o the -use;~{fJthe cmi$~!1~~~~~ . and :~t ' ,.,, ~-:= ', .: '.  ..\n' ~ ':il><\"\" :ib~:'1)' \\ , \"W'\"'i.J !.f. r\\ r ~ '\n\ncqmpuJ~r: systems, . . .  ,:'.: 'rl\"':j,{;;~~-: :~!i!-t:'~r:i4: 't;.. ;;.;,,. _. ,rr \"~~., .\n~'\" #- w ~ '  '  .. ...,~ ~I  -~~~~ { ~~ ';' o_..l'.n'-..,~'~~..,t..t~~ ' ~~ s. .. ,..,v._\\1 ~I ~\n\n. t4.  (UltfoOO) Th~-last letter.- OIG found o~'the ~Qpic tr~k.Ul~n;~1~~;f.~~tfi.ft~1~;,.>;:. ~,;~:..+ ~~,: .:\nc~.~rin4nfe_in_s~in; ':d.a~e9j}2 N_n~ 2oo9; ~escribeo~mat.'\"an ~agreeme~_t..\\f~,~~~.9~~~~~*~n. c,~:;/~;:   ~. ~:;\n\n. ~~. S~qlstaifpe~9nnel .regiifpu~~ operating pr()cedur~ for f;beSSCI\"re:vi~\\_Y,';~~qt~t.~~~~V~l~t~:-':~Wt ,. :.:\";: .'\n'to ~the Slf1 ~ ~eteri~o~ <md. }?t:e.t:l:~g~tion programs .. \" , Th~;stan~dogeratW~jP!9~~\\lre~: (SQB~), :~~- ; . _: ,~-.-. ~ -'~\n- ~~~:e~f~: ~pp<;ar~-~.tg. ~~g~~J9<J .m &d9Cu~~nt ~~%f~ :stand~d Op~J11,~.~~'-rsf:ed.~r~J?r;~~ff~ : .. :~.0.: / .. 1\n\n . R~y,t_~.W:t . .' a. thr~-pag~;-:I,&;wrnt.:_4~ument proc;l~c&ho::{)fG by. the qfy~F~~~peneraj .GP99.~~!_, . . .<: ~~il.  .. , ... ;\n  . (Exh~p~ t ~:e) J. P.oll)tp. ~q 9fi!q~r!Jpc~hu~ptoi~c\\J~,s~~;bth~GPrniJ1H~~:1!~1i!~ ti~i~~teit~\\yg~I( :'r :/\" '\" :~:  ~?'; :~.f~~~ . :~\n\npro?~Pl\"'on .11: ~~Iep~of~n~twgr~~share~ciiiv.e? apc~ssible. only :oY: .~e~S.~S.Pl'i iW,~~.~-~:fc~~~,-~?:;,.-..  .. t4~:t-  ' 1\n.. ,_ tne)val~.~ Qff netwqrk sn4f~cl~diiv~ wi~' by li~H.e.d ~CIA. 'iA~orma~t?.~~;te~M~~g~r\\t~f;~e,~~cept~~;:~~~~\\'\n as ~uthonz~ b~the : Con,untttee opts staff~\" Po).!!~ ~~ght ~ta~~ thae aJI.~~qw~W~~~~ &r~te~\"':  .. ,~d,:  ~\n. acc~ess ~o: ~~ Rea!:!+ng i~C?*-t~~~e 'require9 to receiye <Ls~e:c;u~~Y, ._briefi.~g;~(Q_l~ .. ~~~e~~.a ~ ..  ~  ,:,:,;~.':~1~ ..... document titl~ \"S~unty;J~n~tip~;'' .dateq ' ~M.~y~~OOQ,'' put found ~~;_~vtstep~c-~itR~.t _the' ~n:tm,&.::~':(-j'' :: , . W;lS ev,er .pro:v.id~ :to. SS~I'&W\"~participating in th~ :R;Oireview. . .. '~?-.~i~\\'.; '.'. ;<< . ( :-~~~~i;.:c .. .\n\n . '  :t ..   ~:L    . .  \",  . .. ;:.~ :~:.\":\\;.~, :''  ~ .~,:'. : .. ~~>:,\" ~~::: .' ... ,:\n\n .    15; ~UI~;A sep. arate document,. titie&.\"Memorandtmt9fttrrlCieis'~9fi)g '!Senat~j),;~~~:i'J.'ft't~: . .\n:. . . . I , .\"''. . ~-.' ~. , ,. . .,-~.: ~ : .. :. ;~ ~ ;.' ... , :-.. : . ; . . ~\\ . -'  ;;''! :\"~.:.;~~-:~,f.f:t~,,;.;\"'\"\":\";;- :;.,,. ... 1;~~':'(\" ,.'' , '5\"\"' .1. . ;; j?vnl.~~J.'\" '\n\n.. \\~;~l~t'~PPIP.tn!J~~ ;,6ri; lfilf!.p~c;~~e;$ . E~~te;-v ~f,FIN s Det.e~tiO.P;a,Q~\\mt~rr~.~~tipp i~S9gfWJl'{:=:p~~;,, : : \":;\n(EXhibit C.a), datcq 28\"Ml!Y2009; statecJ mpotnt. ~;C.\" that; . , :       .'  :~~, \\''L ..\n\n,   .. :., A s~ialJ~- ~~i~e<i- sh~re-qriye wUU~ p~ovid~ on o{~(i,;ency' ~::st~d.;afo~e .... -_ ... 1&i_~ ... ~.:~,;t.~ :'?\\:_:_ :\n.. netWork. As:_SSGI req1.1ires; the &narc-drive can be se~g~t ~tlr9nly SSCI c\n\n access. and 'w.~llCd.:offCIA rf .adffiirilstnitors; except :a.S ~6~e~~e  l!uihpi.jzedby . .< ,.;~~:~ .. -'\n:,  ss~llsic] .   :-... .   ':\" ' .. ''\n\n. . ' ' . . .. ' . . . . . . . . =,~. ' . .. . ' . ;f,. < :,,.,;f~i~;><. , . . :'\\ ..\n4\n\n- (U) 1\\uihoi ~nkn~~~-';:fh~ OICY~id  ootifmd eviden~t;ihai'ihisa~u~ent- ~~:provid~'t6;l!le~ss ''l:!i~;:.~.( ~!\"::.  ., . ~c   , ...\n' ' 11-~ ~ ,~l l ' l>  \\o,  _. ' ' o ' ,\",  .~ ~ ,.,  \"\" l ',  \\ t ; I .:.0\\\"''~t. ... ,;o_,M'.... ...-:,~.:.\"~ ;.;>.;~, ' '~ 1\n\no'~{J.) ~)Agpcy, ~u.tl')oj ~~~'Flie OJ.Q.didrno! find evidence ihal',th!~ .docunic.l)t '\\.Y.~s P.'royiged 1 <;>.',~.~-~q . 1~,: '' ~ ~ . ~ '0.-.: U ~\\'' :- ' ' '\n\nijj~ c~~: ~Q,;~5J4~; 1 ;je~:> : .. ,~EGRETIJNQr.o~N  '   . ''~\"'  ~~;'G'f~~J,('f ;~~ ;; \"j\n\n' . ' I ' .... ', .. ,\".. ; :.~:~.:,~ .~~\n\n.  ,. : .::::   ' ' \"I  : ~  '\"\"\"\":-... ~J\n\n.. , .'; '\\  . j, ...... '~.  :. .~: .\n\nJ;>~} . ' ,. , .j'\"j~~r~;c:~:~lili:::~~~'~*S'\\:\n, ,\n\n. ~\n\n1\n\n. . . ..\n\n> it.~.:::c .. > ,\n\n\n\nC06274838\n\n\"\\.:::  ..  ....\n: : ...  .. '~\nt . ... ;~\n\n:-. ,.\n\n,I r--------------------___,..tf=,EXfi\"' .. ::-:c.'ib:-::-i--:rD=,n\"'\"w:----~ --. --: '  -:\n'-====\"\"\"'--------ll:.-~ -~ t~~--~~:::~~~-- ;-~~\n\n' -::;~ ~ ' ' - :/ ~. :_<;,t~:-~~-... ~~_:i\n......,~--:-r:,---;---:-n~,--.--_I OIGTo4n<J!~9 .evidenc~-:~~tSSCI.rry4;11Jers-:haq;'*ep~pri~f.l!4.!9~k-  __ -. . , , _\n\nL..-.---'\\r:honit?iings(#ific.toRD~e~~-.  _ ..   - '-  _ ;,:\\,{:: ... ---.:'':': ~--. _ _.\n\n -. : _ ~i8 ~:::(4t~ TheRPlli'~h~~~ing b~ped~. the stand~~!. J\\g~o~Y..~.iinti*~;~Mnf.~ti/ ,,  :.: /:!/\n'  ' ,. ' ' , , I '   o '..1.  , ,-, ' \\_. '- ...... , , ' I ' L ' ' ' .,., '\"  ,' - ' ' ,..;,  f,,   ./o  -  1.-~. ' .... ,..' f. J:: > \\ ...... , '\"', ~ ', , ~~\n-,-~QP.Sl~~::<?f_-~ ~_d~i~~~y~_.l .that:~l;.Qsep; are e~pq_sed f() a,t. th~ tjme: ~[~$Jif,h.l~gi~n t.~~mfp: ~n~~~~~~-: ~;:  any -~S9-~.~er_ who Jqg~d o~~o~e RDJN.t!b Th~ : ~!UJllng 1~ Jocate~l9:a djal~gv~~~x . that,the _,,_: ':.>   .. '\"'\n\n, user h_as:to aclaiowledg!! 'P.dor ,to'lqggipg;j~; - ~e- d,ialogue box .c<?.u~ist$ of tl1:f9~-p~ing te~tJ :: ':_? _  ~ _, _;~;+.:\n\n,.. . . :::tr;tii'~J.s : a tJ,_;,~:p~~ernqt~nt I ~ist~m anq- .sh~ l>e~Sed'for .~uih9ry~~:~fPi~m~~~~.h!Y;~,;~Ai~~i/\\ .. . ;,~, \".\n-:~o~~~9~ on' this _~Y~!~ffi:-~s.:~<? .pr9f>e~ ,9J'$~p.s : .G~xern?1,~!}_t;;~JY/~ir,.gh~,t~~:::  ~'~ <~\n\n.. _  (lC~~~scil  w1~out pnor-al,ltllOfl;tati,on . .. Your u&e of this-system may: be~P:I9Pl~().red>.and'yowc ~'\"'.\n: Jiave no _expectation of privacy~. Violation o(~ystem SeGI,lrity reg'ulatimi.( !l-_rid gujdanc~ ,.\n. may result -iii-discipline by the i\\genc.y, .~d yiolators'may t>t -~rlrnJn;tlly .ri.rb_$eli_tep; '. .~: ;- ,~ .,\n\n: ' ~. ',  , ' ' :. ~.' . , ::' , ' ,': ::.' : ''- I ~::'~(';,.: J;r::;~_;:.>: I ' \" ' 1\n\n_ (U) Acting Genera( (:ounset Pepat:ffr!e[!i:of Justi(Je CrimesRipor:i.. ;(. . :,,,::~,,~~ .. _~;_fu. ~;~.hli-, ...  ,, .\n. -'.-...... :'~;,.:,:~-- __ ~ ,. -;1!\\.;~,.. __ -t.. -.-~ _--~.~-- .::= :.-:/:~- -.: .... ::~:r-...,~, ... m~-lCM~ ~--_-,.1\"; -,;~ .. c. _:)9:: :(;tJi~) ;Ori\"Tf~bruary '20J4, C~KA~ng9enehu Co!Jn~d .\n_ roWt'? f,..tt9rrt~Y.J;J.enerytl; enc :J:Iqlder,Jo-re~irtthe matte~ ofpa!enti_!il. 'f.lb -~tipp~ot)\\ ~: _ .::::y. .- .. , _ , . ,\n. USC '{1030 (F,niud~and :Ri.N\\~41\\cti vit}dn Corui~tion W,it4. Co!Jlpi!'t~rs) by~ritell\\~fs ~f.l}le : , .     __ . : . .\n\n. . . .  ...... :.;;, ... . .  ... ' .. ..  . . . . . . . .. , . .,., ._I::  ~~_;_:.~::~_,~--~----~_:_~_-,->, . :_ .. :. - x.:~~~j:.. . , . .'y; .. :'\n\n: ' 0  ' '' 0 0 ' : '  0 ~ . /;~~:~:  ~{;-::~::/:. >~~ -.--::-:-o.y :M ~~<~:\n : \"; I  .. ~f: ~:- .... ~~: < ,.:~:~~:-:,?:~~  ,,:,A:,\\.\n\n~- )'\n\n. . . .\n\n' . ;:.\n\n . ... -JsECRETiiNOfO~N .\n~~~:\\:~ ~; . ~+ .. , . >\n\n. . :\n\n\n\nI C06274838 ,.. ~i;PHQy~.Q,_f:!?,R .\n\n: : .. ~;\n\n. ..\n ..\n\n,\n\nREL.EASEDATE:  ..\n 14-J.an~20-~ 5 .\n\n. ; .. . -<~:.:-:.~:;~,; ~~:_ ,;' .. $E..~~ifhNOFQ,RN, ... . -~ '\" ..\n~ I, , ~, , '~.~  \". ,,\n\n'-.'~ .\n.:. . \":f' , '\n\n:: -~- ' ...\n\n: .:-:=: : : ... . . . . .. :_1;_,_ __ 1 :~. :,.:\"~:~- :.,:' - -,~~~~ -~. ~~\\ 1- ;  ;~\n\n.... _ .. ... . . . '., .. :~<~~'1\":;:,;-\\>':_I::.::,.,.-:\\\nss~ro~~the RDIN~t6~rextii6it:E):: The .rep. otf.d~Ulit~::ili~1;'in tlie N~~efti&~ ;:ioto':tb:~refr~~ta;:-:~:;~     '\n. .. :: .... ,.  ... -'~---- t'\">.~ !\"\"'  1..!- .... , : '\"; -~ . : .. -.~. _ . i .... ~-;::~; ,.. .. ,:j-'\",1_''.~,.~~><-.~y-:7 .. ~\"':'..;.'1\";;,~  .. ~ ~eml)er; q~tpe :~~9~f~taf.f con~\\l;._St~ :~~~~e~~-h .pn :t;he RDIN'~Pl}~~:~!lPPe~; iJ;t~I!d~;t6: 1ic~~~~; ~~::l ;  ..\n Par,t of the syste.p . to'w~ch:;~e_:~~ri)PYt.~q:ilQ,t haV.e autb!i~zed~~c~es~, ':_.  . _ v   . \" . .:.,:~~\nIV~ ;, (-B?: .~~~IG_A:~~l?INViNGS ' ;. :/ ,: ._._-::~:~::i:~JJ ... _~::.t:~~~~~;>~_~~:~~;~:;:,(':J;l~;:1,:,:\n(liJ;)_ ijjxecuiiv.e ium~ry-ofinv.'e:iiigativ.e :Findings  4 ::;'! -;-: : .. ,;~:'2i4 ;:;:, .. :, :. ' ...  ::'f. ,\n\n. .  ~- ;,'' .... ,. . .. . . . ~.!.' ~- . -~ .. ',: --:\"-; __ ...- .... -. : .. ::_;-.:::.;;.:~~\",~--- .. =~-~~::~ __ . . -... ;~:]>;.;-...:\n. . . ~9~ :'(utite~f'QIO .jfi~es,~gat!oii Jqiiriif ;!l~P~rt~fqr.~l~ega~iqp~j~~t!~T~t.~fh~ii '}(;!.~.' . . <:;t-~~ ::41 ...\n iij.~~ntior.mJ{Y~acp~s1.~ fu,e s~ti )s_!iiD.;~:.dr:_i_~.Y.'without lu,1th9#~_~t!~n ~#\\~~S~~~e.st~l~pt@>~~~~g~i,~j~l\\~:., : . :;,~; . -~.\n\n\" .  ~cc~~~:. ~A:dQ.i~:~naiJ.Ytthitee:'VJ.emp]rs;:9f;the-~DIN et'ff!t~am\\vere not~~l!ii9id1wj,t~,:.9!~~t:YI~e.n :. ;~;;,{;\\ 'Zh: .: .,,,: :'~;1,. .\n -int~r\\iie~ed aqd i~~t~<ill;YfailedJ()'!9jsd:ose P1einr~cnt invesqg~tive  ~c~~S..s - t() ~e?$.~_m;l)h.~e-~  A;:,  :  . ;<'\n?rive: '~e i~y~st!~a.tion .diq :n?t.~md supp.ort-:fo~: the all~ga~on :th~tC!t,:P~rt:~~~::!~~l~tfme  ' . .. ,;::.~r::.~.- '':., . mterc(!ptiqn ,()fS~P.:fOmmurucatiopsJonts rev1ew of.   r 1J1 '9~-~sti.~n~~~Q*:9.Yq~,:,~~-;(\\td '//~~ ::. ;: ,.  .  ::: :\n\n revi:~ ~J~r.~~Jftfpi:mati.oq :~~t ;.in.Cl~d~. . arid~~r{~i~w;.Q_f~p~~J.B~lfi'e.*~~)(;~~: ::~,::;di 1\n\nemruls of~S.q M,~~?ri~Y st<UfrP.e:tn;q((J;~ - on . a ne w{)r ' ~--~-. e m,ves.~~~BQ.ll~fQ}lrlQI~~q?.t.~~ ,:it:l,~-: .    :\n. Brennan-td :nor ~~tfic)riz~ .~ ac~~ss .orknow th~ :~xtent.of 'e :access,:: aqt!;QIG,:qb~.n~_, :.  :: _ . , .\n cortlictingte~ti'm<>J;!y :~~gardirig::w~ether or:not-.DJCiABrertn~:h~ ~~~9\\y!~g~~f~l . _ , ~{ ~.  ~~~\n- ~v,jev: P.e~oWi~4~r~tne ~~ors~~~d .. ~riye . ~.tiL~te.f.,~j}J:w~si~~?~Pl.r~~~iPI~~I:i:~~b.,,.::.: ! .. ~  -:~(, mves(!g~!Jon .fJJrther f9undothat tl}e :Otrect~:wo ... e~unty :~p onzed a rev~ew.:of.llie:S...~.L -,;~ -t.\"',.  .,;,: :': , activiti~s. incJu(Uqg.t_tie reconstiuct:lonofthe emajls of.SSC.i staffer&;toUowing;~;s4,lrld:-Ci'own .''::- .~\n\n.. orderby :the DiCIA.~d- a requ.st to wjfudi~w authorization ~by~tlle ,ss,et:8ecuncy~offlcer:''   '  ,: . ;; '<: . .\n finally:;,(;;>t~ ~nv~~igatio_n fqu!l<l:~that th~ GIA r:eferral.pf.G(iffiina:l c<;m.du~r~~Y ~,~C!;.~J~(t~~~~~s;;: ::-.;, --,-,;:,i;< ~) ;.;.' ., predicated;()~tin_acC\"yrate. ffifoniuition'providefi to the $eti-A.cting-'G<?ner~KeqLt~s.et>:~~t~~~  ~~t<.~;~ .. :, , -'\n\n .  ..   .  .. -: .-:-~~. - .. -  . :.: . . ... -  ------: .. : . . _ -<:~~;:-~-: -:_ ... {~_;_:~~;-.<-. _; -~ :~---  __ $:- - :<:~;-~.:._ - . -:.~~r\n(U) Abs~li{:e of a Fon?Wi Memo_f,a'Jilwn of Understandiiig'Rega(.diitg the :Opel:~#on,vf'Rpityi/rj,.:;,,: }::.':::- ... , .. ,.,\n\n   . . . ':. :- . '- ' ' ,. , .. ') ~ .. ' 1\n\n. . 21.  (UJIF0001  OIG.di<fJnot. fi~(;i ~vi <fence ~at~ a!fUiai d,P<;:u.m,e~t.~.'YiS'i~gteerliu~6ri:;i)~;~~:;:,;~.ik:-: ..\n__ both. th~_~ssq ~~:.ml :qp~:-iiny :ct132affien~tion 'tila{ ~ agr~em~nt w.a;;~{i~-iby~'tp:~gf.A :st.~~:~ .-t;:~:. ~'1:il\\ . ~~f SS.P. OIG dia .. J'\"md;' ~owever;: tq~fthere w~~- a. commori''~nde:rsJandl.n~ ~each~- ~e\\~~~;Jt~~;O~~ '' ',:_.. . .  .. ~'\nand the SSCL Several letters .between SSClChairman.Feinstein, then SSCI Vicdsljaiiman , ')~'' ::::.:\nBond, ~d.the.n p;CiA i>anetta-w~~ -~x..changed ii12009  u;~t -c6ntain~_:~h~ugh~~~~-~.~~,g_e;~  , . ..\n~o det1nea worldng agreement. -,The.coinmon -unde.::stan~mg rbetween fl1~ :.SSClanq;~~~-~a , .:,:''' ' _,... .  t~ :;, .. !'\ncontain la~g~ag~ :r~garding- a :wall~~-.off'_~et:-vqr~ shareddrive ~or e_~cl~:s.!.~~ ssp: ~~~~~~~-~7P.t :.->~.1': : . .. 'i.<\"_':~'! ... '\nwhen IT staff requtred access for:m_amt~nal)~e or troul:>leshootmg . .ln aod~tion.to ttu;~~,ortfi!}g .: .  . . . , '-~~,\n\n. agr,eero~Qt. ,t!,le.SSClstaff were p~ovided .a warrung--at e<~;c~ilo.gin that ~e~ \"u~ 9f.:tJtiS,~ ~ s~e~~~;',:(.\":!::.; . ';.:  , ; . rna berilonitoted ahd,you have*nq:~xpecta:t;ion of rivacx~:J.'QIG. f9und~th.a~j:!l~ . ::~ ''.k  l .. , ::/:: ~;~.\n\n1ns.taUe4a:r ilfe ouiset~~(,R,PINei ox ... 1 ~~s. conneqt~~iAt(h~;~qrJP.~l}S?yise'9fi-~ . . .,:',, __ .. ~.  ;;::1::\n'-r-U-Sl~n-e-ss-'ai'id as eoUecteci \"in a:rhanrter copsistent with\\$.e adniliiis~qpp;.of  . .  .',.\n\n:. . .... . . . ., . . . . . . . : . . -' ' .l ~ ' . . . . . .' . . t\n\n.... . . . ' .. ~ ...\n\n- . . - , ~ , , . ~ . . .. . _  . . . ~<-- .: . . ._.  .. _ , -: ~i-:~i~z? _;:  . ', . -, . ';f~~\n6 (U) ' Pi.J rs~;int to :~~io!i'-(6(b)' 'or Ex~cutivc OrderJ ~333. as. lim!!nd.ed; and Section_s ,yrs, VJJ: ,A. :~t-~1!~ ynr:A:.<Jh> .;. . >: ~ .. '';-~:\n\n. the 1995 Crimes RepqrtihgMem6rnndum .ofUndcrstaiidi.cig bt!iw~n ihe ~Departncrii'of J~siic~:.afl.g;i!idi)!~-Uig~n-~,:-. Comm1,1ni ty, the CIA is .required to the rej,oit to the-I'>(jlinfomiatiort~nccniing fcil~r~h~rimf<s. ~- ;;.; .:  , '._. .  . . . . . . ... . .. - \"'.... . . ~' . .... ~ ' :\n\nOIG{;as!' No, f~1f1171s'IG' ..  . . , . . ,, .;ki; :~7:JJtj_~:~i< . , ;;,\n   .. : see~~::f;iNof.o~~>~   ::~ -.\n\n. ..,.~.~- .... .. . ~ .. ~.-~ ; . ...\n\n.:. ':\\ .:_.-~~~;-~;~.<~ ._,~;:;.~~;- :.;;\n\n. .::: ... ::~ : .. :;r~~~}ii;:;~~i\\~~;~;,.: '.! I, :-- : ... ;\n\n. , ~ . . ~~\n\n_,_;, . .....\n\n\n\nC0627 4838\n\n,!\n\n.~\n\n.:; . ~ .\n'!.\n\n. I\n\n. . : ':\n,:.\n\n., I , ;~\\,.,;\n\n'!$~~Eifit~NOFP.~~ .' u    :,<;:~: . : . : .: ..\n- .. - : . .  . . . ) ... : . .y. :.\n\n~- .\n. i  . . . ;,.\n;, .:. i : ... ::,,: ' : !,''.>' ' ,Ad! '.--;,i> 2~' '' ' ': ~\n\n~.'~ \"' . ..: ... ~'. <. '  .. . : . .  ... , ... ~- : :~~~:,':.~,_  .. ~~~.~;,)<,:<L.:. ,f:: ... :\n ''\"'Agenqy~irlf~rma:tion :sy~~~ms ; :. f.\\~cli4qria.il y, .OIG .diet: not fin8fd&;ufi.t~nmtio~~tfigfNDW~~6~~~- .' :.  . sec.~riti;?~e~qgswe~e.~prpy1d~Jo:<?r ;sign<H~y ihe SSQrstaff. .   ; , :  : . : ... }~ ..\n\n' ' I .:\n\n~ '' A ' 0 ' ' . ' ' J ' ~<J~ie :,,\n.. ( ULU)z~utiio~izeiPik~~cess :to. f.L?IN.~t arid i?,elated._Taskit/gs . i .. : : ' ' . j~~~~;~ .. ' . . ' ' : .. ,\n\n. ,  . . ::22: .(U/IP.t$]0 Durln the cou~e o.fithe 4tves~g~t~(?n;:Qf~found thap~:iffif(u~yhq(4;~.:\\:_.>\nfiv~ AseN~Y.;offie( . \"e&-9e~ .~ti~nq#~eq~asc~-~~~<?16:9ir~~~)-~:c~~~Wi ; :.  '~~ -: .. J!i: .  '\n\nt.Q~ .SSCJ!side.:of.:RF> , .~.t~.;~ .. es ~~~e:;ses:_we~:eiiip~'condric~ed'as ;paml0f:'l1',a.O.ni.irii~.tratio):t of,~,~:; r) 't. . <J\n.. -~ ~ , .. r 'tJ:l'!t' w:l: II .. :1- .~ ..... '+ -;o:-,~ - ,..t . , f.i'F- ....  ,.t. , ~ _ w- ' T ~ :'~ ' \"\"',:;-::04,(,~-:_..l' \"!Jl'*i~'\\'~!~ .I'J-~ ,.~<1-r. ,.,.:;-. ~;~. ~y  '\n\n..  ro~tipe:_~g~f19:Y~rnqJlitQrjh_g,~b~t ~ p<m,;qf~a:;.C:JA in,v~N~atj9lj:i,Pt(Oto\\:. :.ss~I::st~ffe.f~1g.PWn~~.\\.-' '' ' '.' .. ,\n\n. . -~opi~s of docu:~~fl.t; :r~:~rie<J ;~~)?s : ~Q~~: ; }..~;' : ' ' .. ,. ' ' r; :' ~- ):~ ~':~;:~:.:::~.;_ ' . eiOGC aitom'\n\nwll , '\n\n. ~ . tol(F0IG ilia( :    ..\n~ec~iun_e_s_u_s_p .. ic' io_u_s-.o\"\"\"'. f\"an-. ~.a-p\"p,....ar_e_n_t_s_ec_u_r-;-it-:y-;:;-b-re-a~c-=-h-o_n_th--::-e.:-:~:': D::--1-=-s-y-_s--:-te-:m_.,_ c;;-.'in-::-.:::n?\"\"ec -. -9m\"\"\" ~i;~Ql~.:.;. 0:  ~ ,.,.. , -~.,;\n\n\\u~pic~qn~_1:&.teffirned fro~ Jett~~s fro-m sscJ c~aY:.maJl~Fe~~tei~\\~~?,s~ .'~ti>r~ud'afi~/:.;: >~ .::lt:\"~;-:~:,~ .. ,\n'. .'-r-eq-:uc-. e....,._ ~-:ti,....Q.-~..-\"~~?Pie~.~qhhe '\"P,an~t~a_.-Re,~i~w.;'' thtN~tter ~f;~~i~h~ s~laior~d~l,u\\JP'ib:e'}P!!iti the'.;~ . ' I: ,\n\n .. rea~o? fo~~'4ela~~&.:C~()lP:'eXFs' cqrir.rnuiti,~n hear~~g :CIA pen9,r~' Oo!J~S~~lJ . ,,..: .,. l:. ' ... _ .   ::: .. '. supposed that !he>'~~anct~Rev~ew\" r~ferrefl,.to SRT d()Cuments orWC~s th~t: .~er~,.~~e~.{l!~~<?.:,\" -~: - .. , . '\nJ>ehest of then D/CIAPan~tta. As a resul~ pld OIG :  gan to.~ons.t~~r~e.- . . . .. ::;:\ncircu~tances ofhow SSCI could haye,obtained.access. to CIA.. otumeri onsi~le!CQ . tO . , , ' . ,;. ;\n\n. .... ~b~:~n,~~propJiate: ,~etwec[l late oecembe.r.:2?P a~<t ear] -~i~u~:i.oJ;~~ .. . . . . ,.xPri~~O:  : . : x;,'ir .\n. susp~cto~s  to ~d ,J!if~rmed pt.l!~tfi~:. R9.ll::{~t :Io s shoUld 15~ .... ~:;, .~. ,'  :  ....\n. reviewed to . determihe~how<SSCI obtain ':   . s .,    -.. . -:! '~~:'~'i;;,:_:>,_2.J ,L, :\n\ntiS!~~*~:': ... ::::;:-.. . :\"1 .. ~,:,,- . L... .. -r:e=-=m=-o=-=r:-:-a...,..!l.\"\"u~m.,...,.'L\":\"~.-~ \"\"~~-e' .R\"e-c ...... Q.,._rd...,....,.re..-:__,.paru-.-. \"\"\"''a.i....-:-;-ti-:::ri;-.-;.e:o:l_i-n...,..e -~~-;:;f..-e-ye-__ n ...... is~?u_rr_o\"'u~-!lT_:.w\"_n-r:.)::--.-:;di...,... sc\"7:-\"o\"'\"v~s~t:Y=-::-!;,~~:f.:,-:rc~~.'r ~y:. : \"  . F: . documef1tS on ~pi.NpT;': (',~MFR\") Exhlt?it F) whtch 'c~:mti:Wl~ <\\. t!Jnelm~ o.f eyents..fi:OW . , . .. . . ... perspective.  rp ~isd~umen. nil,aJ~raJly rea.cheP. the:leg:ij concl~~~on thaU.9~- e  .. .. .  ~- ; , legal .aut.l:tOrity:JC:), t~sk-mcmbe~s;~o o :access ~e S.S.CI :s~~d djlve: a.nd:. ~??.~J~r<-Ai~   . ; :. .... : .. . . ::;r~: ~\n\n-po~urne'rit~ -~O:~w~i , .. eli~yeti'the . stafiers. ~~re riot en~f,l,~ .j fs~!<t:~J~f.I:Uit . _ , '_;, .... :./'  -i:\n taskeq:the IT..,team to-ook for..:sRT documents on the sscr.staffsfde'on 9JariuarY.~2 ' : '~-.... ,, . ~t;> '\"~\"\"~:.':_;\n\n(uY ~vi ~; -t.:;wpi~&;f~~   -.  -      ... , '   .;:'<~ :,. : . ,~~!r~!t' '  ''  .. . ~~? 'F:~.:;: ..... ,. >~\n\n24... '' ::. 20I4 afteradiscussion~j' -. ' ,,..: ,- .. . ~t~d .: ::.>:' .. .J\n\n DINet IT, to.set ~P a ~~er''p.r:o(ile: o~;IW~N~~%at~it.c; :   .:;> . Lc,..... C?-n\"'ti,-g,-~r-ed-.:-~-:i;-r,_ ih,..--,.th-e': s~am-:c: .... :-e;~P,-0:-. v-;:il:-e-~e:--s_a_s_a--::::SSCI M~j6rity staffliser :1 ~equ~s~64: ~\\('.: ,' ' ' . . : :>.' .;,:\n. acces_sinorder:to ~n:-,G~qgl~ g~erie~ wi~ ,~esaine.. rmissfons as: a:SSCI staffer. to,s~g~P~fit'ed r . .~.~:;; ..\n they. were,able .to v,iew in their-search results: ~~~nb .t ;,  ~~\n .the prcse~t~~oFWGR ~YPP~~.9ft;_ihe.;ss.cr ,Majorit shared :drive :wou.gh'~r~~i~~' oflq!~d-~~lbr::\\'  ;:}):. ' \"t:\\\n. sw.ch re~ults .. Afte.r ~identit .in   ili~:docum~n~s ffi.a~pe.4:to_Jhef?l,d:er ~h~!:~~)~~1~; _... ;: .,. '  '   ',,\n\n docum~nts re..'!Ided '~ . usy ~l,iuiJliTI,)' account\" Wl SCI:-li.k:e p~~~g?~$ to --,,:;. ,1\\\n\n. ~ ~~.. . . . .. . .. . . .~ .:. . .;.::r: .?\n~-\"\"'-c......._,,.......;;;;,;,;,;,;\"\"F---:-. -::.- . . . , . . ,.,  . ,_. .... .   . i '.-~ .. 'e: .. 'T.\n7 :~ ~ ........ .,..,.-\"-w_i.s...:c.:i\"\"\"n.i_,tiillly .inter.v,iew~ by ?IG prior to .~ di~overf.o.{:_th~MFR; :Fqlll)w.in~:~$~' '\n\n d i scov~ry of tne echoed to be'mterv1ewcd 'about-Its contents. ~: . ;,  :,. :~'.. '. ~::i::~, .\n:.. . OlG G~s'e Nc5:;20iii~1171a::iG\n\n.. ~ .!.: ~~:-. ~ '. . . . . .\n\n..  _ .......\n: .. ,\n\n........\n\n. .. :secR.ET!m.OFORN '\n ....\n\n: ~ .\n\n. . / .\n .....  .. :\n\n. ......\n. . ,l :\n\n;:.~\n\n\n\nC06274838\n\n,, ... ,\n\n' '\n\n..\n\n..\n\n. ~ .\n\n:, .'i:\n\n.'-.!. :.\n\n\"'! :.~ \\~. . ~ -  : -~\n\n..\n\n' . ...:: :sE:cat-Ft~~of-9~~~< <\nI ',: t\n\n~ '.t. .\n\n.. : ..\n.,, .\n\n ,4\n\n': ..\n\n~>. ~ .' .\n\n_!,  ..\n\n'' I .,:;,\n\n:,: I ' : ._, ~ '.:\n.:\n\n.~. ~ ~ .. ~~: . . ':\n\n\n\nC06274838\n... , - .. , . \"\" .. ~-\"'''' . P..P..BQ.)I,,!;.J? .FOR. . . ... ,_, .. - .~\n\n.. , .j\n\n.;,.. :r ,:\n.. . -~!\n\n~ .. ~ ..\n\n~ , ... , ..\n\n r ..  ,,\n; ~ :\n\n' .. ' -~ .. ,\n::c. ... ;._.\n\n.. -_.\n\n,,\n\n; ...\n,\n\n;.\n\n-to:\n,.\n.\n\n ,\n\n- ..... ,'  ', \"\"'=\"- ro   . , .. - . ..... ;\"''\";'\"': .. ; ..\n  ,f\n\n.. , j3e'cREt/7NoFORN :.: .+;;~f~\n   '  .: :     ' :  :. \"f ,:  ' . :  ,,-~-.  ::\n\n. \\ ...\n. o'.' I\n\n.. . 'i.  \" . .:~~~.J~:~, _:\n\n' :~ ~ . :' .\n. -::\n\nL__--~.,......,.--------.,-:-i The emaiLacknoW.1e~~ed Vtat .tJ:t.tf~a$.:.*}~;~GJ4~~~:~~-~: . \\~~.\n\n.  .:2_9;: ~i~) Olt.t~ .~~uary2014 . . se~t:.an ernaU:.~~~~:~~~~;.i:J~it;tik~~.:t::~: : .\n-f~~CS~~g 'new ~versi?{lS q~ Ul~.}cree~sh'o.ts th~t S QW Q:\\ ~ Vie J,~~P.<;Q~~~~}:\\et.t~~:yte~~!~:;:.;~;~:~~~- .\n~SCI ~s~r -~~cess. to tne'd~ ~e  w~ m.aB~d . \" r~q~~t~;.tl1~se,~~~~~~~Hff.~snq,~~\\;. t;:'~i)l~i .m on;le~ tQ , proyt~e ~e op..ti.c\" _(e: . dts Ia more accurate() :Utatfu.e :fol<le.~\\,'Y~~l,~~teA~-~-~th,~ ' :, . ;:,r;f\n-~SFlMa' orit shar~d .orive, -Bo . co[Qp~~ ~;~~~-~~ll~~t~~~~:;;~/ \\ .. emaded esponses on t3 January 2014. .  . .. .. L. :   ,;.: 't::. :( :.:.;.:.:;x~:q:.  ~ ~ ..  :.  ' .. ,. . . . . .. ,... .. . . . . . . . . : . . . . :. . ... ~f::;~~.~:.:i~~t~~t:~,.2:~:~~:::.~. ;;'::~ \" .\n\n. :~o:  .~~ At OIG~s.r~ . pro~ided OIG ~ en;i@'ap~: att<l~l:Jin~.n:t~ ~~~s::~-.: ~;j;-;-.-, .. :. _ .. l3 J arn.J;u-y ~0 14: fro t and cop.ym :II1i~~li'.,:f~:~~  _:;:._'F '.:\n. '1 d.,   t d th ROIN ITt. ' . t -- ..:~~.,  . ,~ .. ' ....... ' ~>.:i! ... ~fl1fll_   ~um~n e  .. e. .. et  .  earns respo':lse  \"3.ll'J~:t.~ ,~':i':':~-r . ..:~~: ...... , . I contaf!lc~<f sn~ shots. of the contents of the folder . 'iL:\\~tt.!~~~::~~.,,j)f.\"~. :.  ... ;:. ::\n. , p(operue~ '.a{l~' .. ~~\\Jnt~i~~~#.~gs}?t:i>:. ' :~A(:;\n\na ~ocW,IJen,~. titled ' 1\\YC~:MJA/~: 3,11d <rc<ipture ofthe virtti.at f?!der ~~y;CO,w.ft,uteni~.@.~~%1H$<l~~(Y.Y>~:'.  '. ::~\n; drive.' :\\<labeled a~ -~~hare Majority_ r:>~taY . s<;> res  p.ded ~to ,a, ,$el,'les;of: tJe~tiQnS'~li:~> . ;.~yr.:\" :. from . egarding the:ru:nn\"Per:of fi}es 1 :-  .. an9 iri its ~ubfq~d,e~;as well:_~ ,,{tjfo(m~tiori r~g;trdi.Qg -s~Cfprivil~~~~::,~~,~~E~W: ... _ . ,. . . .. '\n. . . : .. ;-~ : . ; . _: .... . .;. .  . . . . . .  , . ...  .: .. .'' ! -~<;-~iy-:  .. ::~~.::!:{;~~.: :>: .. >~~:::/~~1::,;-t .:rj;: .i ~-~J:.\\~:1~~ ', : . :  ...  '.' _'..  .\n\n..   { _ 31.  ,.-~tj,~ .Bet~ee.n 5June.and n: ~une :~o:i4'; OlGancJ~~'~~~~~efg~~~t~ ~;'~ ,:~~\" :~1;<;:~.:'?   .\n ~   .  ... ,. -.: '~'      .... ,   J,. .... , ... ttt  . , .. 'rl\". _ .. ~.r-~\" .. ,, .. ~.'()~-. ~x, 1 .- ,\n\n .  cond~dco:'a _j~i~t fornsi~: ~~vie\\\\f. ~~ ~e~.~DI_N~~~ J'pgdata. ' 'flie r~_yt~.~,-~~~.~P.l,ll~~tllat1rele;~~~~., ;;: :'4,'i~;~~ ~~: .. ~-~JI\n. lo$~ ~o.11 t~!.n!~g::fi!~ ~cce~s  anO,~~J.mty ;~11fo~a~~,on :'!e~f~ot, ~~tat11ed ~B~fP~~~1; .' . J~te~~:-.:&tlf.l~~~ -~,,.:::::y::,;\n\n. . ,?f:til~ .~~~~.~:~,at~ d1~ notsh.ow'~.Y .SIA.~.use~~> as haV:I!g!llte.recL!he, W~~k98S~~I'!' con . tQ.~~ ~;Xf&:< .i.  , .. :: ~\nltty,:.Q:~_;qt;l,~; _but, d1q.not cont~n. suffl.ent mf()r,ro~t~onw ~.&e$s:a~~S!PY S!1q~~9. yJ :f.~ii:);:~{ \"~:': ...\n\n. , , . .  ' :;.::.'r ~- , ..  ... ~. ; , \".. '  ' , ' .  .. :. .  '. , ,;. :. . . .. ~ :.<~~<::~,i~: ';;~i:;; ,(~/ \\i.t. ' ;-~j~~i~1'  : :~~,;~<M!J\n' ..  .. ~ . .,;32:: ,, : ... J :ourin <.lli~ course .. of.th!!.inves,tigati9n, org:~~ti:plirt ..  \":atr~~~-~~, j ,1,.,,::~  , , :;:;)r .. ,. , ~l.:~_,,\n. d?ffk~j,  ere; ~otf;oi,thco~ lUJ !Ut.e~!i!jtiiil irit '\"   w .. ~~Li.~,.~ ~ .. ~;~\n. -~ww1:;d p ;:,hiWu1g.failed to.:disclps_~ theJlssi'stan~eitheyiph:iVide<t\\t ~,$~it ., __ .:,;~~r.'){f~ ::,e:;;~\n\n I{brli.~tlt>~t~teej 9 and l3JMii~i)~\"~f)l4 ..  A~ flrtts~tt?Qid~u~s~~ln~9n4''i.nJ.:x, .. , '\\~f{~ ._,,~~, :.~' .. :~/~:\"  :,:\n.ofti~dl:~ ~pmpl i~;\\vithiffie .i;eeoh,d i.n~erY.iew~i ..  uestsi lin., .,;, ~.: ~1~~~J.h~i ;i:: : ': ;t~ .. ; :/~;\n\n.. conouct wheri.c'oiifronted.with tlle.:infohnationJroffi,the:emilils (leclinG:<Fa: s~cono~ .;r1.:- '-~~::J .   : . int~je~'\\ .  ., . . . ,eview ' ..  . ~/::',.,_~t~ti~~~!~::\n ,.. 'l- ,' '. A f,  -( J 1 'ii1jj...:O!'{)'!,.;r: , ,r.~!;.l' j t \"\n\n. 33.'., . .- /)I<?- . inv~stJ~at\\on_f~und that on. lQ 'J~~~)/20Hj _' .. :::: .. :. ,._: ~::,:: ... ~g.::~t~:::> :;., ...\n~ked . to .conduct a.reviCwof acu 1t  o.n.t,Pe s.sct_.st~e . ofRBfNEt::~-~~~~R~:9~~~,r~y,~~~~ .. ;~~:r.~'-, . _\nreque~ted .. by ran quene$. 4gamst .pre\\;'lO~.sl~ ar,ch!Xefit~~~~,,.da~:f :f to deternnne ~hether  the doc~m~ntsin que8tion.had been it!;.cesse~ ~y sscr:s:4~C :@.~ .9~~.:.-:~::;:.;;~; .. _ .. - .\n , . . . . . ...     >,:;: ~ :.s:t;if~,;:::~~;!t~ .. _\n\n.OIG Case No. 2014--11711HG .  si;CReTiiNO~Rif , ' ''c(:\" ::.~.':.~.'i.).~,~~-;~.\\~4f~:t;;, ..\n\":\"i ,.,/:. ~: :_,: ' .,, 0 .','ll.,,, .II ):.,. :f\n\n0\n,w:;'l\n\n;,, !  -~~~~- ~w~:~':,.{:~~~~~>< ~. :,~~ , .~;:.;..,\n\n::;~ , ;, :  , :~J:~ _ ,:~ x~~;~;~~:t\\~, 7\n:. ::> __ J:~,: :\n\n. ' ...\n\n'.,I ...... \"' .li:;\n\n\n\nC06274838\n~ .\n\n'I\" .,,\n\n'\n\n..,\n\n.\n\n~. :,,\n\n~:.:_ ~\n...... ..,. ... r: 1:\";~ ..\n\n~\"\n\n1' .\n\n' .!\n\n. ,_,.\n\n~ ..    I'\n;, ..  .\n\n:~~ I:\".:~;: .-~J'~,~ .. \":W:'\" ''' .. , :,\n\n: .:\n..:r:\n\n\n\nC06274838\nt~aOY:E.P.-f..OR ,-- ..\n. ~LEAS.f:: ~f.',TE: .  .. ::,\n.. 4.-Jah-20 ~ 5\n\n(, ' ' '.\n\n ..\n\n:,  ' ,t \"'I , ' . ,\n ::  t\n\n: ... ~\n-:.:.}~ . .. :::  .. : . ;~ ;\n\n..  .. J ..\n\n.:\n. ..\n\n.::~ :\n: :''<\n\n~sec~~Jt)~pFo\"'~ .. .    ......\n. , ...\n\n.  .. j\": .. . -~ .. -~ .\n. ...  ... ._ .\n\n.. - ~8.\n-l '    _ ....\n\n: ~-:;' ..\n\n sys.tems.,: ... , .. ;_ ,,\n..  '''\"' .. \\. . . . . .. ~<~;__;: . ._... . .:, .:_ ~:~-  ... \"'.:-~\n\n   39.;. (UiiF~): _Anweling w.as.hdd .irt the Director'-s ~onfef.ence.'ioo~ iQ e ciftentoonJ::!. <, : ~ .: , ;i(\nof 14' Jart,~~y 2014A.tt~nded-by D/(21<\\'B.renn~.l ~I(:), i:;~ . :~:: , :: . .. ~-. } \\1f~!\nN:~l H!ggips {9h~f1Qff}'ce ofC.~q11essionlil .~ff~rs),J J Exe~~qv~Director, : \\: c ... :.   :.::.n-: '.:r\n\n: : :Meroe'. 'Bark;.Ja,rid -,ot\\)~r:s;  At -~i~ ;me~tii1g, D/CIA ;Brennal) :eX:p.re~>se4 .S9fPfJ.S~;~(;l.~~~f!.e.~ ;at Jhe.::  '. :, .  :\nwesence:of QIC officers.:-Severahwitnesses told Oip that D/QIA 13re,iln;was fypset'fF~t~GIC :-' .  .. , _ :..:-_ I .. had peen~Qgag~ ~ip ifh~;in(i_Q_iry, andwas. concerned ab0q~-~e optic ~! the: COUQ~~fi.!lJ~JligeQCe - ~ . .' > .'\narm of the Ageny-~iive,s't~g~ting :t,lte . ~ctivity .of .SSp staff~r5. : D/CJ_A:1B'fepri~qs~ta~1if!~'~'Y-~~ -. . .'' , >\\. ,. sm;prised a,t the:~o~~-;~iit-b1 ilready-beeq _~rf6nned, and explicltl tofdi~~~-eyone:!!tt9~~;;,;::._ :- _-;. :, . . ' '!-';\nn~ee~-~g --~at: t~ Clo(ari.' ,. ~~l.el~e o_w)~e -~~~~h or for~?.~ic.~\\qe:~  '?i9l~':~r~:~'ti~~tPt1_:0!~r~'ighe,~t. --/: ,\n~td not ~-~k.th . vteYJ.;, and'~.~t:th~fe~shouHi :not 'ti<l:ve be_en~Y.~?th,~r .. w,o,~~'B~~~.tpf~ :-_.;,~, ~:;?,/::, .  .\n\n. afte~,~y,- m~t~qg ?,~- ~el~-~ayu :- '2014; I;>/CikB~~nh_~ confiFJ\\~~f-W.Wi\"Olq~~Mr:b~;:W~ -: .'{ ;.:.:_.' :.,\n:surpnsed >;WP~D;~~e}~.j.;~~CJ. , ::.: '  . .. as invotv~ injhe:review;:' :.1 :  , . ~: ~:{~~~:::;(:~~~ .. : ;, '-~.~~-:~:.. :~-- :~-:~ ..\n(U) Of[ice ofS&u;:l& csybefi~Bl~e' Tea~-Re.v}ew  . , . . _:'    ..  .];:,.;~<1?.::,~;r<_' \\- :~.t> .-:_:\n.    40. '(Ui/FOBQ)_ Dunng th~ -meetipg onJ4 J?~u;U-Y, D/CIAB(~nh~ :gaye the orde~:to: :-- : ..\n\n ~ , !'staJ1d Mwn.:' oij':.;anY Ju'~~ir .revi~ws '~ntlJ})e ~ouid; brief: ~e ssq ~n ~~~~~e~~y~s,~O.ii~~rns: and~ ,;. the.actions,taker{tQ dat~: . 01) i5 :J!!buary,,D/P - . . '~ \"::S~1 an~fpt:9posed :!l join~ . :: . . ~-- I ' . '.: -. review : l?et~'een m~--~g~cy- a1ta/SSCI-Secuf'ity f>iIA~Breiln.;Ul 'state4 .ili~t  ;; .:;~ .:-:.,:,:.;.~\nhe did f\\Ot thiflk 'tpaJ-Ch.rudnap .F~inst~iU expli~itly agreed to ajQint reylew th,!!t:.g3:Y! b~t did .. n9t ... : _ ..... ~ ' explicitly.,&.~y ; io 9rdisnu~s the .c~nver~_ation. p/ClA .Brei)nan~thought'~f:.pb~irmafi::F~~-teip .. / '.'\nw~t~ to tal](to abo~Ut  an~ onsider Jhe i4ea: further. ' .D/CIA.~nr~qnj:m state<l mat.D -~,  :'.- . did not:~ie.an)@_ijjg' ter:ifi!s;:qreetlrig with .thessct. and;~i;it :.spou'i&hay~~Q~~f'ag~~Q.afilly;:. _:. ' :'.\n\n,I -_ ~ - :<.,_   . '- \"' . ':.- ~  ,.  .   .  .  .-_ .,l!. ,,.  ..  . .- .,-.._,. \"f:\" -~-~ .. ' . '  ..... ' '\n~lear <ifter th'e p.e~tin~ on~l~W~Jan)Jary .iA b~~-: 9oofe~el).ce room~th~tiilf\\V9.tk'-slio~1Jl~J~~v.~~~t~ppea::-:\"':::\n\n  --~ J > . . '. . ::\"\".:: .. _.:_. :>>:;_~--- }_:-:.::~.i~4~.~::~~;:.~ .. ':~- ~ .\n   .. 4): (lJI~)' - ~ehveen 16 :~-~-rzJanu . : 2014, 'thJ;:-I~'\"f;ffi~.~ :df[~.~~bJYj.W'Wf?.\\;:;\\-, ... :-:\n\nBlue Te~~ ~onducted .aleview of.theR,P.INe eldirigs;an'd pro<iu'ced . ' ' >!' --. . . .. - ' . ..': : ~/ }<_.:.; i::l:;;-::::;~;'; \\' -.... ' . '\" .. : ' '\n~ CUnreoo-) The Cyber f.}~~(feam, e~tablis~ed i'IJ _ _Febf\\l;trY iol ~~ lqenti~e& V.uine~~~~i!We.s~~.4,~8~;':qvanHfi.~s ::_ :> ' ;.  :j~, lffi~8Cts tO !llli~e educated dff!SIOOS,a!ld partners With Other OrgamzatiOOS_ln Or\\Jer_to f11~q~!l~ psk_s,;,among;~~e~. / ,  'f . . . L. du!Jes.    -  :. : .' .  .. . ,; / .. - . ., '\n\n.. . ::. ~:,~~: .. :~: :'\n. y_. --:~ .... ;\n\n......\n\n<\"\n\n... ~-- .\n\n. !\n\n., ... , .... . . .... .. ;\n. \"':, . -:~~; . .. . ~ .. .\n\n .. ' :~ ! .. ..  .. ...\n:_._ . ~ : . l . . . ,'. . :.:::.\n\n,I t:;\n<:~ .\n\n. ~- .\n.. -~: . i ::\n\n.j.' ~~ ... ~ .. ~..; .... ' : . :::~- ;- ~~-~1::: ..\n\n\n\nC06274838 . AF?PROVED .F:OR\n\nI :J.\n\n'.\n\n\n. ' .\n\n;.;.:\ni\n\n' ~ - . . .. '. .\n  ' RELEASE tJATE:  .\n. . ~. 14--.J~m~2015\n\n-~ . . SECREir'\"tNOPQ'ftN ,_. ._,_ :-:.\n\n. . ; \\ .. . : . o\"' ' .  .. ..-q~/:7.~: ;. ; : ..  ; ~;~,~~r:~rf~: ''!~ . . .  :\n ~ :r~ ort~~!~<H~J~n\\J~ : ~OJ.4~ ;<?fffc~ :of.s.ecuf.ity;'.tdl~OIG .. ! ....\n\n Utat :U\"S(b~c~t9~/~~~ .of;the ~~,OJ ~v,ents :on 15.1afttiary ~014;-W.h( _  <]n~cte .\n;a~ home :to i~q~i_r~ :;~ha,Utwould . ~~ Jo,:yonduct .a ~~~~-~Y~W,yiew,,. <{I(j ca~fm:e,d itl1at,<~ .  . ~. , :.: . ..\n\n. .. .. . . -~ no,tpr~.s~nt ~t ~e44. anu~ 20.lf1 rneetm :.?flthi)/CIABrenn~t,~?;'~~s not ,;:: ;~- :\n.. , , --aware ~(~h~ :~~lWdgp~q:ord~r... . s~~ted 1ha . p~~eJ~ .. ::w_h() ~~P}'t'.~~ t~L ... :;~ ::. . !' \\.\n\n. . ~t1SSOIsta,t~~~~~~ss~~a~~~ , ~ .. ~~fj ot-; tho~~~,~-~oi~f5~s;.f...... . t~teaft at.q.;_:::.-~ --....\n\n' -,\n\n. spp ~ to .. P.:1.~5:~am~ary .. ~c;>~4.d',llH~~l! ~~~el;mQ..t.ngM\"~o.!!~~~!fP <?.!).~~'' ''<t'':  ..\n,.J?int.secun~y .reviei!;.qf:the RDINei:i 0 nJ 6 ~~acy 2014' :m:~u~ to,req~e':st_}>'i:\n.concunence.ol)_.tl}e plan of action~ de'   ed by the Qffie.of Se:cutity; :Also:Qp;,  : .a;PIJ.~.  :..: .. _.-_;\n\n1 l:eceive<:J .a~~ email J~ : stating  tp.~t :~~y. w.ere :hn.' ~~st{ina d~~'X?c;ifor :f:)~,~l)t ...  :' ...\n secunJYre.vi~:W Q~;17J~n~uary:2 . . sp()ridea.:t r~\\l~s . i?r.. . .  . .:;r~::.,: ...\n.  co~currenc_e~: 'f: ~ :ili~re :ltas::been ,., ,n~~ . _ev~. opment'1 .an4ir.~~est~; ;\"lf.YoW~~;s9ftl~ ~o ,i.he :(;.', ~~~ \". : '.:' .. . \" . .\n:'[:)irect9fs;Office aro.U.pd Sam:th.ar.~9619 ~fie -ideal:\" :oiG. gi~:n?ffiqd ~ariy~r,~~~~e,lto    :.:: . :,};; !~br~t\\,;; . . . : .: ... ..\n\n1 l re<Ju:esflfor :conc.tirt~nc~, :. q  qq.  :    , ....\n\nJ. ' '  .:'}. , '  . {.,,, . :.  :,~.:-~ ... -~~ .-  ,,,'  I ,\n\n' ... .~-7-'\\~ . . , , \"' .. . . ':. .~)~;~:-~\n\n. . ~~an emailto :Hi.gg1jlsj~d ~opie ' .<!~16 !iinuarr : < ' .\n.2014 and ~t~teq .th~i SS.: C .. ~~Feinstein .wopldbe _sen~ing a let~er:to -~;PlCJA tije . : .:- . . . followil}g <4y .r~ue~ting :~at no -fo~~sic exarninatioq Of the ~sp \"f)etwork~; :ptQ.ceed. : On ., : .. .  ,.\n17 J ~J?:l1afy ~Olk.G~~at! Feins~e_ffi,-~fc;te:to DICTA -Brel1naniafid,request.JJ~~spe~sion~~f :>l:.. ~ ~ .\n,accessto th~8.~rnpu.ters llJ;l(tne.t~qrks usyP.:(b)'.:tl\\e S~CI.:cm~::anyfo~nsic igt'(~tiga~o~ pl~h~~\\;;::~{'  \"\n\n:~-.by the CIA,:-: Ctt~ fein.st~jn expl.icitly:s~atecii~ the:l~q~r ~at .untirshe.c9ijld ~onsi.~6.(~e~::.--::~: .'. :. . '\n. matter nutlle.~~iQ/~IA ~rennan .did nodia'!e her agr~ineiit'for ~y inve~tig~tjy:e)c;tjvity. ,: ' '';~. '- ..:\n\n.  . , . .  . : . . . ' . . . . . ' ~:;. ,.,v .   : :-;  . r=-.::cu.'-----l:::C'=c=-:=-\"71\"'--'-\"\"~-=-==..:c==-=.c:.:....=:-=-=, laied lh ni~#.;;~~~;rf;~:~i; :;7. . ... . L .....-r.....-\"\"'7\"...,........-J---===-j fi rth. . ..-,\";A\"'-tha' fui'  .. ,., ~ - ,,',;,.;,-1:'\";; .. ' . .'.' . '\n\np=..I..:..:....:=::.J_-----'-=\"\"'~:..: \"\"'.e\"\" .. Ic..:s\"\"~~at\"\"'e\"f'-~~~t:: s_.,was.;~ _, ... ,, ... ,,,._ : ,.  . .-,..  ... , ... . f..-.-::,....,..::7'1:'=-=\"..,.-=-f--r.:-~-?:-::: .. :::~a.b~~:IE:~r~::,~:;f~~:.?_::: ' .. : :;.:~:;. ,,. ::\n\n. -,I)~~\" ee .- at ~.~.kqJ.It oL - .  - . . .. , ::'<..,, ... ,, .. . .\n. ~oordination - with 'CIA le(l _ ers .. P .~tany time . . On Januacy'201 effi@: -;:.(, and advise that ~e SSClchaliman :was'dfafting a le!!er. to the Drrector o(tlie ~. .: . : , , . requesting.tqstop the e!ltirepl~ of a9pon f9r the joint review.. I [d~)Cfibed;~~ '_'full plan of .. action\"-tq biG as ... the iri:uiging,of.R.DINet and a:Jull:forerisic -revieW.- aiid' stat~. thatO   . .\n\n. i:rlterpreted' this as1a r.equest to :stqpJI:}~jqim: forensicinv~~{iga~o.n..  ~9-~PC?.~!b.e~jeve:,~;h;''~'\nthat. til~ req~e~fa~~'~ .!~ ~{j_.tfie revie\\\\k~ :or:.lJ.iai ~e CY.q~f;~J~~~~~:'re\\7i~~-.~f~~:.::' ~:~- :., . wa~ alcm to. fo~e\\'}Stc' a,ctlMity~ . .~ ..   , . . : , .: .:~~ . , ' .... :\n\nr'-'-''-'--, , I ~ , ' ' :' , ' ~! . ' ..\n\n 44 . . (S'!/NF) ,On J 7\"Janu~ry,: the Cyl;l_er Biile T~.'met wi q 'r~view Ui~ forensic . en~tated by the .Ssq, staff, -i~cluaing rec;oniitrii~ted emai s tween 'SS:Ci'st~f?n . tile ~ .\n\n.....,,........,'-s~, :r:e=-'of RDIN.et: The Cyber Blue-Teain Report, detailed' th~ .(.: .. team's .e.vlli~.ation or:RD.rNet'systemd\n\n1\nata surroundiQ~ w~ 9,ocume.n~ i,n~q~.<E-~~~~: . 1:~;[gi>olif  ;, )!, ,r: . :. stated tha,t a ~congtessjp_nal ~ser.\" was, able. to , navigate' dir~tly to .~ ushar~ci'(ljt~.tpry::.;~~-:;~ .. access documents  riever.intended I or .4i~sei.nination . to. \"Congress ion~ ~-~ers: ii,: :qbe -re{iof;t' statep~.~;;:\n\n that the user first acce~.:;ed: t.l).e djreetory on 9 November 2Q.i 0, and .copied ~he: ~ta c_ont3.ip.~d .   ;, :.,; :\". ..\n. . . . . . . . . _.' . . . ~-~ ....\n\n: I~.'\n\n. _ 'i ..  . . .. ~- . . :' ~ .\n\n .. , .;.~~ ~i;. ; . . ... .~:.;~.: ~;: .. 1 '2i~\\. . . ', .\n.: -~ .. :: ~  .t' '\n\n. ', ,[~~~~~~~,:~'(,~:~ .... ,, i.<\n\nOIG Case No .. 2014~':1 -1718-16\n\n' . . : . . . .\n\n. ::'. \",\n~ ~!,\" .. . ... :~: .. ::\n\n.. --~i~');~; , . ': .\n...  .. ~ .. : ...  .. .\n\n\n\nC06274838\n\n\":..~::,:to. .....\n~..... ..\n\n. .. .\n\n-. ;f,..;\n\n::g, '\n'f.'. e.~ ..\n\n!;'~( .\n\n,., .\n\n.... :.,.\n\n: ~~\n\n:....~-~~:. ;::,\n\n.. ftl~~:;: -::;\":,  ,,,\n', '''c:~~~~~~~-':;i~~~\n\n\"\n\n.,\n\n.<\n\n.\n; . '(~i!l~_,:\n\n.. ~ . . .\n,.~~ :' . :; ' . .\n\n' ..  ;~-~::~.:-?:~l: ~\n, : _:.P. : ' s' ~. . . , . . .\n\n .. :;:Z\\i:z~~~)~~<-~ ,.,\n\n\n\nC0627 4838\n\n: . .\n\n'\n\n. . ~\n\n.: ..\n'\n\n~:.~~ : ~\n~~-;<~-.\n : ..\n\n:_ -~\n\n+' ,,.\n\n... . ..\n\n...\n\n- ...\n: . ~'\"\n\n. '\n\nAPPROVED .FOB . RELEASE DATE: .\n\n,.  ;. ,_ . ;.j\n\n14-Jan-2Q-1 .5~'\n ' . i'l\" I; ,. :~ .:_.\n\n',: << ._ .. . .  . . ~ .. -ise~t;JE;riiNOFOBN , ::.'   . .  \".,~ ~;<.~f'\\, _ :.!:\n\n,,:~~7:.~ ' . ._ :'' . : ....... _. .. _:. : . .: : ..... ;.,-;;  .. :::-~,/~.\":~~ -'~~:-;J~i~r.~~-: , .. . VI.  , 'fU.9~,~~Yrf'\\CV A(Yf~t\\~~l!)~~R.E-~JD.(:).MYOlt\\iirSEQ~A TI~_~ttA.;~[f.ift; ::;:. :: . : . ,\n\n. ,,~~1~~ , . ..  . , ,  . ' , :.} . .  . . .  :' . . :r;:i1f:tf'::;t~1:~r : t\n, ,._ .,,c.4~:;.,.(tf/~~l T>h!~; f~Po.rt,;ts}p~,p~ope,nr ,oJ th~ ~~ffi~e,oftf!~ctg!lP~~~a~,}u~d' ii: ~- .. ;:?. ~:: .:.\n\n': '~~lG-~~J!~E ~~tY,.:: ApP;f?Pi:i~t~:~~~g4ar~~~~~~1t~b_e._',~,~'1~~(1~~i~q~~gt ~e~?~~J~~l~ t'._,,-. ~~<,: :~. :\n. ~h(!~~~~~~~,'1_llt~1~!o.~n:~. c;>ffiqals ;~tio~h~ve !l n~e_d~8~~ow: ' P~b}~cil~~?l?s.~~ -~~~st_~t~~~f\\~;~~ _;~:<.\n.the :f.r~eool!_l,.p_f>~Ip_f?ID!~tlon .Ac~; lf,Hle ~. U~~.C: -p5_2-, ,~i:l4!\\e P,qvaFy. A,~~. Tttle ~5-!.~f~;E;. 5~f~<, ,l:\nThe teport!may.not be disclosed outside.the.CI'k-wiiliout-prior written'ilpRrovat.;bf;.the Office.of'-.'' .. J.n~p~cto;. ~J'erier~; :includjng l~l~tributipn ;to.c~ --    / -  ..    '' .:/ : ':.~iW~:\"',~ ~< .~  \\.,\n. ' '. ,\" ,, , . . . ~I ' ' ~ '; . . ''\n\n..\n\n~ .. ;., .\n~::.:: ;: . ~- ....\n\n. . l\n\n. ;= : ':_ .    ~1~~~Iji~~;:~.f:~:: ,, .... : ... . !\n' ' ..\n\n .. -..:\"\n. .A~~\n\n,\n\n- ~\n--i\n\n t  ..\n' ..:\n\n.. :.\n\n... :=:~_ .... . :. :\n\n.,.\n\n. ' : ,.~ .. ~ ..\n\n~-.\n\nOIG Case No~,2o1-4; .M 718-IG ..\n; I .,: : :: '  , . \"\n\n!'.\n\n..\n, ... .. . \"\"'\"1..: .\n\n... ~- ' .. .\n\n. f-::\n\n, .\n\n_ ..... .\n\n__ ,\n\n+ ,, .: . . .\n\n: Ni-<;:\n. -~,,\n\n.,:,...:.\n\n: .:~.f~ftl~~' ''.,.,_,.>\n\n.,,\n\n.. :  ..\n\n -. ' j\n\n.. :'. :;:\n\n~ .. '\\!~':'!~.- t,).''', .. _;\":  .\n\n;,_ . :~~.:~J~i~:::.; ... (':\n: .. .:J.- ~ : ;..~ '-' .. ~ .. .... ,--_-.:~--. ,,:;_{'\n\n.J.t~~R -:)\n.,:.:~:.)::\n\n\n\nC06274838\n\n. ..\n\n::.; ..\n\n. _.,.\n\n...\n\"'\n\n\"t: ..  . ~: .\n\n'~-:: ..\n\n, ..\n\nOIG Cas!3 No: 20't4-1171~ciG\n-:.:\n\n'.-.. l-,\n.;\n\n. ~ ,; -~:\n\n .. 1\n\n.. '\n\n. .\n\n~: .\n\n.. :~. _r.,r ' .\n... :.~ .\n\n ,','f l-~ >~; ~\n\n. ~---  ; . .    . : : ~. -. 1\n\n\"\n\n. , ;: .. ;'\n\n-~.:\n\n.. '\n\n., . ~- APPROV.FP EOR .. ,\n.  ::~ :,;,_': Rl=_LEASE 'OATE: ,.:\n\n. : ' ~.:: 14-Jan-2015. ,.\n\n:,-.. .\n\n-~ ... ~ --.\n\n;-_ ..\n... ,. ,. ~ : :_./ .. :).;._.:\n\n. ..\n\n\n\nC06274838\n\nL ,\n\n\"''\n,.:\n\n........\n' ~~ ~:.:\n\n\"'\n\n.. ,\n\n,, .\n\n. ... ~. ;.:..\n\n.... J.\n\nI\n\n-~\ni\n\n. ::. .-: .\n\nI ;'  ,._:.,, ,!1'\n;,; ;;I ..\n\n .. -~-z~.,;. i,~;.:ryi~:;,.)t~, J-; ...\n\n.;\n\n j.,\n\n'.\n\n. ~~ .. ~ . .. ;;;,\n~-===!.!_ ___________________________________ ___, _____ --'!;;: .. ~ : .. . . '' ~ (l.'.\n\n! . - ~ .\n\n'!. '\n\n~~~ /:{... ' . 1\n\n~=====:;;:::::;::=:::::==:=====================================~ ... <. ,.. _,:~{:: ,\n\n\n\nC06274838\n\n .. -~ ;\n\n, '\n\n''\n\n' ....... ... :.\n\n.. >\n\n',I\n\n., .. )_:- ,;,.\n\n.,.:. - :--;\n\n-.\n\n.!.\n\n;,, ::<:\n;.;.~;;:_\n..... :\n\n ..... .\n\n. ~:.. . :r-~.\n\n. - ~\n\n:; ___ ;~~~I;\n\n..... ~r - :.\n\n,;,.:\n\n' ., .\n\n'' ~ I\n\n~~:>\n\n.{,\n\n- '!-~\n\n' -,\n. ~\n:,\n\n' .. ~\n\n.... ~/ -~\n-,;\n.. ~ ...  ... ,_  - .. ', .,. i;,!\n\n'+ :~.'tl ,_.,,',\n\n '\n\n1 ..\n\n-~- '\n\n. ~- (\n)\n\n. : : '. ~\n'\"!'\n ~ .,\n\n \"'.I ~r- :. ~;<~f\n:: .\n\n'!'.:,\n .\n\n  ' ' I\n\n,.  ..  ',.;.\n\n, ~\n\n: ~\n . ' . .\n\n_ ... -~-~ !.~,\n:.'\"::\n\n. . ,~y.x'!:,. ,\n.. :.- .. ,:f:\n\n. , ~-~-~;- ~.i...!:_\n\n\n\nC06274838\n;.\n\n ,.-_\n........ ~~~- f.\n\n... . r\n\n':\n... :.: .. :.. ..,:.;~\"= - ..\n.::;: :. . . . . . . . ~~ . :. {' .. : .\n\n):Ti~9f4\\o?,S ~ FI ~):J !.(1F PO.Q\n\n:,\n\n .'J. .. J ..\n\n,..\n\nI :\n\n< .\n\n.;\n\n.. _:;\n\n'\n\n. ~- (';'.  I\n\n,,:  .J~ .\n. ~::.C,' _:: : -.\n\n.~..:.T ... 't. j,~. ,...~ - .* ,;, .,, T .. r-t lti./*et ,\\l ~ i: /.~ ~~ ; ~~ . I\n\n-~- -;F\n\n\n\nC06274838\n\nEXHIBIT C (a)\n\nAPPROVED FOR RELEASE DATE:\n14-Jan-2015\n\n(U) . Meiporandqm ofUiid~rstanqmg (Ag~ncy aurh~r), S~:Select 'C0~4~~n \"\nIntellig~~~s Review 'of. CIA's Detention an9. mterrogatiori. Pro&ram, <iii~ 28,:~ay 2.009.\n\n\n\nC06274838\n\n. ; ~l~~~:. . .. ,\n\n' ~I '\n\n.....\n,' .:-~\":\n\n:,:-.\n\n ~. ~ .n.:.\n\n'' : .. <:'\n\n. :._ .\n. ~, ..\n\n ..\n\nI::\n\n..'.\n\n/. . .\n\n'\"~ ..\n.( ..\n\n  ='\n\nft\\PP.RO,VED F9R_\n. .. REt EASE. OA'TE:\n'' 1:4-Jan-2016 :,;.:,\n\n:_-;_:~~< , ..\n~ . -. :.;  ..\n\n~. .... . . .\n~; .. .\n\n,, .. ,\n\n . ~-~~J: frll{pce ,AF!CJ.(QA.ac~);.~it.~. . ... ''\"''\" .-o: .  _,, .... ,:-::.\"\n\n.  .. '\\ ..\n\n.I ... __...,__;.;O.v;_ ..:#;oL...\"~\"'!a :..a..;_;J..:Jl . ......,::..'..;..;.....,;..,..  \"  r...J,~.U:\"'- >\".a...: .~.: ( .;  :. . -L; r;:: ..\n~~UU~:~!~~.~~~ -~ -~1- ,~ :~-~~.!~ .,~\"\"~. ~~-!~~~<~)~;~-~ -' ... .  ..... ~' ~,-~:,:\n\n:-=t ) SSCl o.otmcatJoit,~ Cfdaitea~UinriS,otntc:reiDCe Ud(a CtoC:umem ~~Jfis CIA:~~ ~~.tl~ :.. ' ::il  .:; . :: ' . ',~~~~~~~~~~:~~Y~~~:s~~~, .. ~t,\n.   .... ~~:-~ .M, :$SCUs~~ inordtzto~~~and;~~te> -T!fr.  :.'1\\ . .::_1,\n\n.  ;~&eacc~ . _ .... ~~i  DcJ.mfiJialson :~(CJ'A~~caroif rodaCiiilglbc'::' cifioar . .:.:..:~~~~~ !..:......a-WiK 'Uaisc;D:.: . ; . .;:;r~L,:> _. . : >~.- . . : .. ): _ . ..\n\n.  ........ . .  .,~f:., .. , ~\"'~~t.~J'~I--\"I~I!J'~ ~ . ..,_.-.....~~\"''~~, ~ ,1 ,. }.,.. .: .\":.~~M~~~\nm~oe;-:iilformatioo m-on~tta.'iiom 'Oihcr 1~;'  cmmmt -i+=il~~aixf~ .. :.  . .r.;((c '  -~ , .. ,.\n\n. . . . &' - . .. ~.JOY . ~~ .. 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M ~~ ..\n\n.. : ,;:\n.... :. .. ~)~ .. . .. ..\n\n-~'' ... ;~!~~.. ~.?iii~:-. ;  .....\n .. ....\n\n  :~;l\n. .,,~:,.:  ....\n\n\n\nC06274838\n\n).\n\n.: .\n\n~ . ''\n\n, .I\n\n,.\n\n',.1\n\n1  .'\n\n.....\n\n' '\n\n' , . . .. . . . .. . ~. ~-':.~tr~:.~::;4i:;~;~::$'~ :?f:; i?'\"'\n. :)BJ!- :tCIA'MB ~~JJJ ,-ew..waveiitifCHmaaoaliviilitil~at'i. ieeute~;;::.' ..  ~:;!if.~ .. .:. :.,., .r.?&.:. \",,,:\\~ ,.. ~  J .v , ~~~  ........ ., <.' 1\\..oo:;...1~ ' .(\"'>'~''-..' 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'_'~.,~;t _ !;)Y/~~~~~19'1&/0t,. ~~..nt~~ -~,~WP.~;,\"'I:\" ., ,;-~--~~'~;. - _- r\n  -~RQQmrblsedonwarmaiiOn.ooeSSC'JdiDtbi~,Raorp; llF. :\\.:-.:;.;r- . :>\n. :  ...... ;;,;~~!itE!:~P:~~~~-'_.~\"'~~,,;,\n,;~~::;:. .. ;;_: ~-~9~of~.~'.fS/15c;:I,~.,. lO~~.e ,-,,.; .. :::r'.:',,;. c, .~, .. , ;.~-f.\n\n   h~~~J :- ~~:-.pgbJ~--'~WicoDdaatCllisiliemO.o'iiMcWiJD(h.;ill~\\die\"~~'~-\"   '-:4 -- 1 ->i\"'\n\n.. . f :;~.inf~~~-~.is.:.~~D.is~~~!~::.-:.~;-- --~.:.:_  ..\n--,:~<-~ SS.Ciwillbemiadfblofthe'~-Ofsucb~on-.\\ .. : .....  ';y' '\n\nrj[:\"'il:ricwL :   . .-.~ - . -. : ,.,,~,--- ~;,,~;::,,~    _.;:J){s\\~t~;tf~~::  _,. ~~::;.\n\n;- ~~~~~=~~=~~~~~( .. ,;; .. ,,._,_\n. ,~~~'r~~~.~.: '1:-: . ,.;f .. <_,;~; .. _;_,~ .. :_~_\"_._:: . .~.' :~~~.\n\n. . :.~~ .. '!:.\n' r '2, . }~{' .' '\" , .:_ ,,' ~:.-(~; ..\n\n' ~~ . '/,.;.,-;,:.;;: ...... ''/ .\n\n. :~ .. .... :.,;:~~;: ~f~~~r~~:: ... ~.~.;~: ..\n.\n\n--~ .\n\n~I < ~ '\n\n\n\nC06274838\n\n.. '\"'' :\n\n ..\n\n' . .. '\n\n.  f~t..J,.\n\n' ~ I  . I '\n\n.: . .. _.,: ..\n\n... ~.:.\n' ... . .\n\n. : . :. .: .. -~ ..\n\n.. , '\n\n.. ~ .\n\n~\n. SBCRB't.\n\n. . \\ ~ .,, .\n\n-~ ~ '\n\n:\" IAP.P~P'{EO .FO~. ., ... .\n..  RELEAS.Ii,PATE: :, ;; , ; .. .\n\n t4-Ja n:;;2b.{F .  -~,: ,:; , .\n~ .~-~: ~\\.(, !>   ,   ;:\n\n. '!:.\n\nDate  'h\n)' .. l . .-~ :. :::. ~ . . ' ',I J ~ ,\n\n. .. ;: ~.' ...\n\n ..\n\n. : ... ~fi~ ::: :,;:1i~~;l;c.oi:):.<\n}. '\n\n... :'.\n<~ .... :; -;~, .\n\n .... ,;~~{>:);/,~;! .; > ., ~ , .\n:\"\"'\n\n..,\n~.~~Fh:-:, ..\n\n..: ... .. ......\n.: ... . ;,:\n\n. . :. :~.: -.,. :=;{:\n,.J  ..\n\n: . ( ., .. ' .~: .\n\n::'< .\n\n\n\nC06274838\n\nEXHIBIT C(b)\n\nf'\\PPROYED FOR RELEASE DATE:\n14-Jan-2015\n\n({!) _ Le~~~fi~n\\.se~.te, se)~(C,o~~eeo~ Irit~gj&~p:c.~. (sscn. ~~<~Di~~:t~fm~~d V1ce Ch~qui~~Qphc;r Bobd:to :tJi~n Drrector, Cen~ Intelltgen~ :1&~pc;:y;~o~ P,~.~~~-  .. dated 2 June 2009  .' - .  ; ' .,..,-,~\n\n0  0 0 .. : .: :~ .:.  : ~.. 'N 0 0 ~ 0\n\n\n\nC06274838\n\n'.c;.. ...\n1. <.\n\n1\n\n, ..\n\n~. ; \" .\n\nI I\n\nI\n\nI\n! '\n\n'\n\nI\n\n. :. j I l I.\n\n .......\n\n:.:: ... --....------.-. -------- . !APPROVED FOR\n \"'-   :-~>-.c:-:-.:;: RE!lEA;SE 'DATE:':\n\n. ; 14.~J.an-~15\n\n .. ~. .... ::; '~~fi:~~~:_(':  ! ~.-r ... :;.,::~_{.;; ~ -. ,: ... .\n\n,\n\n _: -~.Bonorab1~tionlmetta\n: ~ .. . . . -;:. . . -. , ~  . .. Db'e:ctot . .. .\n\n: ,Cezrir21J JDteW .. - ,:,_ .\n' . ' - .. , .. ~ \"\"'6\":'~'?Y '\n. . -~ :Washi~p~c: ~OSQ~;\n\n. ,,:\n\n.;.: , . . .. . . . -~~ .\n\n_'l)eai~Ditector.P~eJ.18: - .\n\n. .,\n\n. -f~--  .\n. ;::.,..:\n\n~. J .>: . ..::-t0'\n. . ~.:: : .:.:: '1 . :_\n\n~:; .\n\n\n\nC06274838\n\n'\n-.n~- .....\n,:~;.::\n\nI I -;' , ...\n;: .. .\n\n'\n\\, ...\n\n. .\n\n.  ..\n\n. _: ... 1..\n\n: ... :\n:., .\n\n' .::::.  .\n\n. \\J.\n:. <.',/' .,\\\n\n.. .  =~:\n\n~~-_: , ;;  .\n)~\n\n. ' !\n\n. ,., .... AI?PRpVED,J:Q~ _ . _ ...\n.. , RELEA~E DATE: :. ~~- _\n\n 14.-Jan-2015\\.:\n\n. ~ ..... .\n\n\n\nC06274838\n\n.\n\n.~ . ... 1,: .\n. '\n\nI\n\nI\n\n\n\nC06274838\n\n.'L .\n\n~-~\n\nI . . -;.\n'J I\n\n~   . :' ..\n\n.  '\"!'\n\n.:,:: ... ,..'\n\n..  \"\n\n. ',\", :J\n\n: .\n\n,. ,\n\n,. '\n\n... -J::-3<'',\"' ,.;\n:ii: ... : . 1\n\n:.: '\n\n. 't:\n<.! ..\n\n,.: '-..:.\n' .\n\n'. \\\n\n. - ~~ ' :~,~~~-.~~\n ''!June~~/2009\n\n. :\\~ff~~j~~- ~ :\n. .\n\n~\n\n        I .. M.  , .. \" .\n\n ., _,iiO~ ~y~t8S;:~ts,:diaft.~ffi~,,CQOm~~~.:~~,~~k .. ~< ~.c~i.1.~ .\n  ~; ..... \"\"-~~:Co ~~+:...Mazibers ;or ;St81fbizcfon!irifhnnati<>n~ .'~-~;? .. . ; . .. . ,_ . p .. ~ ..... \"l'. ~~ '\"'---  - ' -- . ~ ........ , .. _. ........ '\"\n -a~#]:.lho .~diilt'looiirWill '~,Pz-oP&re<(~alld~9ij:.ts(/,$tt-:-; , , ;  .' ~ J?:\n\n~.--~S~Cll~-wiU .. ~~~~:~~.(llHl(~,n)t_of~~ :r_,::~~:,.=.:\n... :Uii~:so~~IS. _lf,the .~:~~;pro~;(~%,emf~-~ :  .,. .....\n;_._;~~:~:~1.!~~~~to~Q-~~:~~-~~;~~D~~~-~\\~t;=;;~~:;.~~:/', .\n\n'\"\"'mmmcg W'W f~ ~Of .u ap~ w \"WP ' :l .~ ' ' \"I' :\n\n.   .:~q~~~~~ l~n~~.-j~{>. :~~.~~'~ :: :': :;~;.:\n:: : l h;The.:~m&..~.wlll ~ aviilable from:Jl.1.00 . toJ90Q ~h~:ofilQiid:. ;.'.:t;iiti\"~ ., ._\n\n..   ;!:i~~v~ines~~ 'Mmid;.,j;fhie:~p\\ia '. Ildiibr;;jtf&:itilff ~~1';:~~-~i~:' .\n\n .'~~:~~ftitQ~.: ~;.Wpf~J~:;~t~~~wbt,~~::~:~-~~;\\.: - ..\n.nlfike iutang~ents.-with CJA per30im~ With-' as ~ucl\\.;id,v~~ nottu:~s: .. : ~~.~:\n, -~P~i~e~ '  .. . . . . . .. . . . '~~;~~~~!\\;t=~f:;\\~~~~;~~~;~.f.~<;l~t~~~ , :, ,\n12i ;lh. e,eomizuuee Will'..iemonaliz8 . .m~ I\"Nn1Mf1r mn-dOcUtiierltsf.ar;fiit6tiiuiiion: . ..r~. .. >~..i:>, .\n\n.  : . '.~ ., :. .7' ~ .. '-~; ~~-- J .\"~~ ~-.-:\"'~~:  ~ -...1:---:: .. ~~ .. ' .\n-.  fil wrttmgandC!kWJll~respondto thosercqueststr;l\\'4'I'itmg::' ~-: \"'::.   ,.\n\n,. -13~:~-ca~~~st~tr~tod ~ ~~~~~~~:,~~~~i~e~~i~;~;:~  . . .~\n  ~~J~~teetipt ofaCIA s~;brie~.pq?f-~~:ri~:pL\\  \"~ ~~\\ : ::~: .. : J, .~'$, .\n d~~l$. at;the l(~ .. bom. .   - ~ .. ~  .,\n\n ' .\n\n. , .;:\n ..\n\n.f.:'\n\n.. ... . ...\n\n. ~ ; : ,., .\n. . '~ . ~- .\n\n: ~ ...\n\n,: l' '\n\n.. .\n,, _. I . . , ' .\n\n\n\nC062 74838\n\n!\nI\n! Jn~:H:oriorilb!e .Leon Panetta\n\n. .~~~~:2~ ~~~;; .:,~). , : _;. -,; '\nP(lg~::_FJ.ve : .\n\n. '\n\n~PPROVED FOR RELEASE DATE:\n14-Jan-2015\n\n;\": ::we ~~pitC''tQat~~~ttO.the~~eonditx~~-nraa~~y~)lt:.~n.~\nab.ofuCon:imittee   -s ..   ....  a1s   Dsiv.e tothc .Corilmi~'s . .\n\n' ' ....... ,.~ _ to.~-~ ... . ,~.-.~\"-~- ,.,:,\"\"'M'~--.t-. d~~t~~- W~'l~:fotwsrif:to immcdi~taff~;.~~~~ma~als,:\n. :  ,. i!l;~on,~~.Cxp'ecttbithodi~j9n'abd~ent!-pv~.~to-~.e stugy,PlfO~tiOiHli:e  a -maU~festrlcted tp~'Congr~?:a#d'tQe:~.v.~~~~\n~:~!.tidth~~;~nor:~ntive.~~-~t~-PrQvi4~ ~~i;,P,~~:\nto: CJA~8Jiaisori~o: -  .,   . . ' .       .'  -.\n\n. . . - . . > . . , Sincerely, .\n\n.. , ..  ~ .{:' > ~..,~~\n gt:!~  .. . ''\n\n.~\n\nQri~Si~B1\nVi~,~~ ._ ;':\n\nI l l\n\nJ\n\nJ l\n\n\n\nC06274838\nAPPROVED FOR RELEASE DATE:\n14-Jan-2015\n\n. 'r\n\n<;.,-. .. . :: ' '\n\n\n\nC06274838\n:- -~~ .-:. '\n\n..... _;:\n'' ~ ...\n\n. -~ .\n.\n\n' ';' ......\n~ ...\n\n.: .\n\nI (.\n\n!.'o\n\n.,\n\n.. : ~.:\n;H,::..\n. l,_ .. . _;.\n\n:. ' :\n . :'.\n\n: : . -~=  ..\n\n':.\n\n\n\nC06274838\n\n~ :..\n\n\\.\n\n.... f'\\PPRQ'{E,_D FOR\n. ~.~J,.E;f\\~,1;:-DATEi: : .. . ...\n 1~Jan:-zo1s \"\n\n. .-.: ... ,- ...... , . .\n. ': ~: .. .\n\n, ': : ~ .\n\n. . . . ~, .'~~ - :We;~ue~~~S!?P-~~!s.~~illvol~;~!~~~,se~ces;~~~~:~~i~l;~~!:~: .. :: +: .< ;~-~~ ..  .....   ~-~:.,\n. ~o tl,ie :f~;ofl~f~~i~ of1mportance tQ -the con1usions ,Bnd~mmeQ9aqo~:.gf- .-~'\n\n-ypur.~ rqx>rt.- We .ao :noi~to~hin,d~or~~, bijt.~ dc:r~ Y.~':lP ~qrk Wi*J~.to CQ~verwm~ry~:w._ish:.to :ronvey wf.We~ the s8Jne ,i~-.~~p$;~ut~~~:: .  .! . . ::~i/;;   ..... .\n~QO,S}Up ~th our ~~-Ftners. Perhaps not i~g :the sPc:c~~-co~ heip's \". . .; ...   .\n\n ref~ an(rewptdin$.!:nteWsence:.F.Ovided by fQ~~Jiai~n Seiyjc~~f~~. i.! ~ :~;>-,,:: .. ,., .. .- ,,; .. C9!1Veysjour.~e:\\yliile:aistortingwhere ~ inf<!iflimcm'mai~e:periv~,~~ -.: ::-~ .?~:::', ., __ .- ..\n\n. . . may~ th~ ;~ .. :~ q~.iPtellfiS)~>~ to ~-1he meaping or_fo#e ofyg~re.RQ~ . just'~\"~;if is ~,fu ~dBr thB.t;pro~ .~\\D' U~1~Ji equi~.-;~W:c~\\youJ4:;~~~P.~Qf(~> _ ..  .. ;.-~. t: \"' . that bpth ofu5 \\wuldbe ~-~cnt-oo tbis.i$sQe arid -~~witli ~ other~tp:.~'' :~  > :_:.,; :. /.\"\nthat Y~l(c:aJ:l COPVCY.'wtmtCvcT;fOU wish~-~ caD~-~ :9'{lr .D ~J,i~ are~: _: ... , ,\n\n: Pf(rt.~. - . . -.. . . . . . -... . ,. .. ~'~::~r-r.\n:\n. 7.:~- lit rtgatd~to,ijur ~tian of third ~ency infuimation, we,WiJLsiinpji,i:~~~,.., ... :  , :<\n~Jetter~~ out~~lrector'iiifqpliiiig:ibe 'oth~ ~cneieS'~,~ are:prpvl~jng~-tJie~~ir:  ': .. ~~;:tf~:~::/'7'r :;:' -~- ., :'~ ...\n. fufotnlatian to : ou. A:iiOther sOlution tria  be tO have tbe\"DNI draft &Jetter tO tb'C.USG'J- :\n\n. ;~: The~i~~is, ~~\"\"\" ~JY~;~~ ,;.;~~M,w *..l;jc~~9(';,' :;::; _;;,, , ... . : .. . .\n\n'.-. .\n:?::-! .. .to.::.:-.\n\n.. .\n.. : ;-r,l: ,,\n\n. .\n.. \\}' ?: ....\n\n' .1 ':;:: .!- .\n\n. ::!,\n~ -.:~: .\n\n' I 't'\n\n . .\n.. f.-t-,!-:!V' J:_.~_ .. lr_:- _Jlj' ~~ _. ~,. ~ . _;es. ; ,.~.~. c' .. ~#.',:_ .\n\n-.:: > ''i  :--..\n\n'.li', . :--'\n\n. . \\.. .. : . .\n :_-:_ ..L - ...... ~~:..~  :...::,:.,~~t~~ .. . ~: .~.r...:..~~-; ... . .\n\n:~a~.-: .. /  . .... . : .. ~ -~--~ .. t ,\n\n\n\nC06274838 fA.PPROVED FOR RELEASE DATE:\n14-Jan-2015\n\n9. I think we 8re 8I.t in &gre'!ment on.tbe computer issue. ln:anUtshell; youwill\n have a walled-offbard drive oil our networK. No CIA personnel with the e~~O!l IT\n. silpponwill have aceessto the hard drive; The only reason for .IT access tothe ~\ndrive is for It: maintenance and support. This includes adding ll,Ulterial tO your. bard dx:ive for your review. The SSCl retains ownership of anything create4 on this .drive, it is SSCI property and will be handled accordingly vis-A vis the FOIA..\n\n1 Q. I think that covers the~ jssues of our disc~ion. Please -get back to me as soon ~ possible . . I:am inierested in coming to a ~Iution, one W&y or ailotb!=r, as . .. quickly as we can. Please do not send me anything \"official, until we can-work this 9ut offline.\n\n\n\nC0627 4838\n\n..\n~, ..\n\n!~-(,(\n\n-~:;;t; .\n\n.. :i.\n\n. ~: ,.\n\n. I' r\n... ,.. ...\n\n ~ - .. .loo-t_  .,  ,, ~ -;-.. ~ .. ~,  . .: ~;~ .... ~  -. -~ -~.: .. ' .  '\n\n.\n\n,\n\n~~l.!a~- ChlioN -~~~~;,. . ... - ~ .. .\n.....\n_. , . ..\n\n' .\n\n;, ..... .... . .\n~ :\n\n..... _, ..\n\n '\n\n , , .. ~:'li2~;,~~~:.t,t~.~.t.'.i.'..\\:::.~.:.f.~_,:.: .... 1:'!:.!_~ .. 'f1:,,.:.~.1 ...\n\n1\n\n.:.;i .. : .. :\".:: :;~\n,: ;. ':i '' ;:~,~~ ~ ' ;' .. n. .  :\n\n... . . ~:;:;:;;J}~/.; -~ ;:_:\\\\~, ;~~;;, .\n\n.  ...\n\n::r. . J ~~~~?::~;,::-~~\"' \"'\n..., . .. : .. : . . ~~?- : . . ...\n\n. . : ..\n\n'~\n . .......  . !_. .. , . . -<~: ..  ...\n' ''\n\n .. : J ......\n\n'\"'(!\n..,...., .\n\n'':.\n\n-r.--~- ,1;:  . '' ..,\n\n: ....\n\n \\.!'\n\n ,1_\n\nf .. . J_:\n\n\n\nC06274838\n\nEX$BITiG.(~)\n\nAPPROVED FOR RELEASE DATE:\n14-Jan-2015\n\n(U} StanQard Qpetati,ilg Pro~ufes forSSCI R~vi (author unknown), undated.\n\n\n\nC06274838\n. APPRO\\LEP. (OR .\n\n'\n\n..  :, RELEASE. DATE'::\n:.;- .,' ~, .  :,. :)'~;.' 1:4-Jan:.~q:t$,.~~~,  . ~ ... '\n\n..  .\n\n.. <:.\n\n-~\n. . . ~\n\n'.\n!.,\n\n ..\n\n:--.\n\n~ . , .... .\n\n. ,:\n\n.. , ...\n\n'i:_ ........ : :.:'',\n\n.. ~. ~: '. ~ ~~ '\n\n- -. ' ..... .\n,l . . . -~ .\n\n. .  .. ~~h'~~ .. .~:;,, .\n.. . ~:~~-::/ . ;, .. r .. :l(;'\n\n'\n.:. 1:' -~ ~-.;~~~:: ~-~>!:\\)~-:-~::}.!i\\/.~;-:;, .\n\n..  . ;'_; .. -~\n\n,,.\n.~.!:- ..\n\n,.,\n. ~:~~\n\ni. -~-.\n\n.. ....... :~. .. . . . . ..\n\n\n\nC06274838\n\n,:(f.;. ....\n: .. ':co\n\n~:- -:\n\n. - ...\n:-..\n\n. -:-' . ~pp~~Y.J:D . .f.OR RELEASE DATE:\n.14-Jan-2015\n\n9~ 'qA.iDrea(Jsr~.~~oliChe .~:~,.u~;~;.ROotn. u. ~ ~. -,;,;\" .. : . ,.,._ ..\n\n''h,_ ~\n\n;, .\n\n. ; Mcmberi onrall'wilh to ~ . -oflhc ~:Ciblciifroar-lllc:Rel&ti,N '\"'~: . '.\n\n.~;.~a:?~,j-bi~~~~J:~Ji::. ,, ; : .. :,:.;~~ : .\n. JQ:-~-H~~oi-wm :D!J!.:~~&.~iii;~.IDJ~i!~ \\: .. \\~0;:,.: .. ' .;::;-':.\n\n:  ~~~~~ ~: QI' ~~U-~~ijnuit~.~~:.',~;~~~;:J,:~<L;: . _. : :'. .: _ ,;._:~_:_:~ .. :.::  ..\n~ ot-.~m ~JOcatiouor~fadlidcs-.-t?::':-:..':~   _- .-.-- -~~~J~onDido~uur~~>iia&-Juircs~ Cif\"'im.Ot:~?,;t\\ . . .. , . ~~ ,,.:_  -.\n\n_r .._,\"\"\"\":i~-fmt'Jp pamilcat oft.jQ&Ia; or(Cidp ~~~of' . :~;,;;. : ,: :\n-~(Bdq _ .. . '' . . ' '. .-.' ;, :'i/:::;:: -- .. ~ '.: . .\n,. .. . . , :\n. ' ' ... . ..,a-: l::\n\n11 ~.;.,t....t,;,:.,;;: o&.\"-D-..r;...;D:....-.:O~L --...:.J ........ . ' . -~j'. ,.: 1''  ,...,_. ... 1~~\"\"\"6WII~;\"\"\"\"\"\"WIIII11Jf,_..,,._.,,UUDI~~,.---:\"' .. w~'~m:dae-~' .... .;; .... ~Oraaa**'colic:ii:;'.\"-\"\"\".'l\"oo .. . ....  :::,. ,';,_\\ .:\n\n' .  ' .t\"'~a-\"~\"1'.!' . . . . -  ,. \", .,.\n~~tatf.'wBl --'A..~JaemaiCdals.coaA ~...-r 'f41d~-,,,,,,~~;t<::.  . .. . . t'\"\"\"- ~'!'!\"\"~ ' .. ' .. ,. . ' . ~ (;.~,\"'-> ..\n~tWidtadciipHnr'~CIA5~ofcbc:O'can~ ~ .  .. .' ~: ,.;./\n~or..,d~t :~'a RMew-qiC):mtinoei.BC~ b~...::~-:~,k\n~rrpt~~-ww ~ \"\"~ Ofr'tram:aJJ ~pA~.~>  .: .. d0;;':: ... ..\n\n. -12. I~WW~ .. IIe:~~COmmfcioo~s ~ ~ro-zecrcait ~ ~:: :~-/ . :::~~;,:.,:;:?~- .. iifom_aatiou~wri ... mcmiaiDdaci'~IDIImihiritbe~, .. ,,.,,:.,_5,;:~~;;.!.''.:.\n\n.. . '~-~-ri(,:~ J,U,; ..... (i.C): ~ .. . . . . . . . ... < :~~~;?::~!::~;;?~::- ::1,;~{~~~~:A~~r\n13.1beCoirumuCc wiihot prOvidC! iliformatJon piiCci fioiti .~ rc:rieW-Otmaudall   . . :: : :~ ~ . it1he~~t~ ro.a~-~~aMcmbccor~~~-cil~~q:.;CiCC:::.i/: \"': ....\n. .-prier $0 ~ cbat-iilfomaltiou ~the aA Cor a dJsd'?c;moo ...... No  ;~;;.-'>.\n\n' .\n::.:~.\n\n.;\n\n.. i,'\n. .\n'::' ...\n\n   1 ' ' . ~. '.\n\n ';:  : ,,\n~ : : .. :. .' . . ':<.\n\n\n\nC06274838\n\n,:\n\n~ . '\n\nj',\n\n. :\n' '   w~ri:  ;~ . :_:; ..\n\n. .. ~;; ~. _:.E  .\n-~ . . : . : ~;r:: ... :~ ... .\n\nAPPRO~.Q .fPR .. REL.:EAS.E DATE:\n\n- .. : f\n.'\n\n....  14~Jan~201S  . :L, .. . .\n\n:--.\n\n; -~\n',  ',\n\n.., .,'\n\n,.\n\n; .\n\n.\",; ... t 7' ,\n\n. . . . '\n;  '-.,  -... ~ ::'I 'I\n\n ' .\n\n. .. ~ '\n\n(_.,.., . ....\n! -~ rtt\n\n.. .... r-:\n\n'~-\" :: .\".1\n\n., '\n.' '\n\ni ' . .\n\n'': i '\n\n .- .. .\n\n'!: ..\n\n:; ;,~~~:}.' .\n\n. . . ~ : , I\n\n'. -~ ..\n\n..\n~- . -.::. .\n\n.\n\n. '\n. ,. ':\"' -.~ ...\n\n' , .\n.. -'\n\n... ,, ....\n .\n\n; , . ~\n\n\n\nC06274838\n\n~.; .. _ ' ...\n~; \\o\n\n~ .. :. .. .\n,' '\n\n......  .\n. ,\n\n::\n; ....\n\n.:\n\n... _,.....,  . -:-:....,~-~--- -. fA.PP~OVf,:D f OR .. ..\n: '' . , .:_:}''~Y~'<\" .  ~ELE'A$.E DATE:: :0 .  .. . .\n\n..  .    . ...1   14 J h_r.,n'-:. s  '\" .   . . -~--:.. . r a ~v-.r. . . ;-.~ ~ ....\n:-:~--- . . \\ ,~ .. ~. ;; : ... : :.\n\n.: .: .\n''', ,, -:;;: ~ I ''I'  ::~;.;, f,3>: :: '\n\n: I ::  ~11,..:_,_  .. ,, ,,  ,'  .,.:.-t:,,'.,:.~-,'~'-'\"!r ',1, , .,:_.,  i.:. :~ I '\n\n. :~u~s:u~~;~~~,~ti?.llio~ - .<?::~ t_~:-._.:~-~.:_:i; .. ::~.:,:;;,_:i;, __ ;__ :::_,:.j:;,;' .:::;: ...\n. . . .-. . .. . . . . ::: .,. _ . :: :~~.-:r: .::: .:.;.\n\n ' :  I :  .\"' ' : o :' ~~ ,~ ' ' t: '.  ~'\n.i_:'(T.n '.;Ot_ 11et:&ltitea .. IRD. ' 1/M. et'IJ:Ve1iis.  .,   -,,.,., :..i1 . ,   :::,~';\"  f''r'.l '' 'f ' 'I:~; '\n\n' :' -~ . . . . . :~~~ -: .::;'. '.. .. : . .. ..\n\n, L.!(JJ/JFotJQfThe:oiQilepnecfot;sevcrAJ llii~toiicaJ!incidenis :~l~tO;R:QiNei rii~gf~~::;~'\" . :, :-' ~   .. ::;: . . :\ncoutse.ofthis-jnvestigation. ne:inCic)cri~:~~~cited~t}i;muttip~1n.~eW.~as~imu~nsirat~g ~~ . .' .. ~~ :: .\n~SCI .users ytere ~i~usly awareof;.Agepeym.oititoripg o'f~SCI aCti~:.on,RQIN~ ' .. ~ ..  .  .\n\n . . .. .. ..... , . '_{_::!.'\n\n.2. (U!li\"'t;K?) In Janualy:zot q, ~CIA RDrt~m:~ovect>81'f d~m$t~.fi0in:the vitttia.i .   .- .\n. &:adbtg RQOlll andan additiq~. set of 52. cuinentsoo. n May to! q: ~ ~ ~ inienri~~- by fli~\n 010 stated tO&Bhe8e doo~ts:~re;'.'ExCctye Priyilege\":Ciocuments-tli# ~-beer{~oDa.IJy< . . conjingted on ~-RI;llNet with: dO!;uloen~:4 i~ ~onto .th~,ssCI. Wh~nit;~~-U:5CP~- ~ . \". ,. , t.'\n.lhati~~~d9Cunie~ts baOI~n!a'dd:~:to:~e~~~~;R~iP.:S;~#J;~!J (~~r:~jth~ ,~r~iiiri;~~Y:~i~e . ;:-   ;;'' ' ~: ~}: ,. :\naOQu~ent.<i. <(i)n~~~a~Qt 'N ~~f201Qfji4eflNelpt~'in~9ilh~:~sc~~i-documents .w.ere: :removea;rrom  . . .::. ,   . .- -:::.\n:thevirtualiRead!Jl Room. 1SSOi rstaffer ,, tan em~)\\tol . I.,.:-,<, it.-'12 :NfayfoJ o._. ~s.tatm.s tha! '!0l!f,iun~~~~In$,<J.(the,~gre%t~~~- . . .. .. . _,::;;?<. .. .~: ... .. L. w=. e-::-:~=~:-::-=-r--::-:.-_ .\"\"wt~;.,.....YO-.u....,, .rut...,. __ -,Y.-~-. ,\"\"''.w:-. ~~~.~\"\"~it: the eonipu,fer~5Yst~ .. on.~~~ich'r~:y9mffij~ ~edJ~~bti\\~9~ng):~~ ~-':::~ :; ' .-~ ... '\nwo~ld oriljr:;tie ~~bY,:qA. J)eiso~eJ'..for1p\\lr'Cly admiriistrative';IT.'actio~;~.CW.s ~oqs m<\"' :. , , . -:-.  .. .\n\n ~moyi~s:~um~tstro~ .oilr. 8Yf'C~ ~-~-~!H.v~4Jiy Q9t~friistra~~;\":~~-Rpj:i.~~H.~i~'~n;~t:'~:;~< . ~:};:~~. !:;_iC\n.. mfonnea~the reJevant C:~empl.oy~ ,~rll9 fur1b~r d.<X:uilf~f!ts .shol!l!i :~:te!n.:~:v~ ~~;;'tlj~!~.e'aa!I!S: . ...  .,  : .. .,,.,,\n Rootp;.prior _to .~iiiqg\\vithtb_eSSGi'!tatr. .-.~.:;  .:?' -.:;~.;~-~, .. :  ' ' .,.. .'\";~\n\n. . : ~... .~_, .. ;~~:-;, ' .. - .\n~--..::..;~mxJ~~-~~n :QDeceni~ .. ~; .. m'be~\\~.2~'oo9,  :; , .. the sscn :; :\n1---------,--_In_J_!lll~iwy~-=~:~.-~-~--l .....Jo~ -the~~'e;fudWt_ . .-  -~ ~vins.a. ~em,m -~e ,~JilC:  :.. .:. _,. _. -:-'\n\n~=\"\"-\"\"'~=-e.==}j=' ....  \"--\"'-ldid,.notpro:Vide ~~c:amera:ror rev~ .. Tb~:~ndividual w&;9',:: .. ' ... :. <\nidentifi~ as . n.iiDINei ii~ Noyeinber aiJd. ~~ 20.1(). c tbe:ma#,er,was niferrtd to the .CIA CounterintelligfJDceeent.er!s CoYoteresP,ii>riige Group (CEG),-and.the emp.Ioyee was removed from th~-:~. . ..  - .  :.  . ..   .  .. :. . .   . ,.  . , .. ,;.- . .,\n\n ' ji.,..\n\n4. (UI/F'Ot:JG).:On 6:~y;2010, a SSCl~~r ~uesmd\\~m ihe-A~:~e a~mti:u),~ a . . .. '\nsensitive document 1h;m the RDlNei.  ~ $SCI'sia1f.~~~ ~  .. .tO -~;the pri~t restri<)tion by ..  . ,._\n\nL---~--' r=='-----''-=,viewe&flie;fucident and reCommended rem?vingthe pos8i~ility. of sscr  - _., '-'\"'.\n.staffersUtllizin but:bec.a.Jse tii~ ~~billty:wi,S it could not IJC:remov~ or disablea. Th~ ~i~;d,~usSecfL...,--, tli-=--is:-=-iS5-ue-~WI...,., th...,.----:the,----:S::-::S-=c.'=\"'I.sta--:ff=arid--::-: .. _,-remirid...,... \"\"C,:-:-._-:-:Od~-. , th~ of the Jieed for.security ofthesensitive docuni~ts:  :. .. .  .. ,\n\n: ' ~ . ' ' . : ... '\n\n. s; {VI~ In 20J3 ~, ~ '\"~~,ofdet!.!,i~ee vi~~ri~~:j,rpvi~ ~~tbJ: .SSCI b,;_ ~~:f.ti,~~, .  '\nreq~ by_~Scl ~taff: The_RDJ:~iew ~ !'VIIl1J8.t~filie ueSt '~ci;4.~ined:ttH:;v.!~~-:tol~ \"\"\"' ,  ; ;: . outside t)f~.-soope pf.the SS~~,~~ew. A~@p~ 1P the SSQI~er. .asser~~Lili';~~V . .  .. ~:. ;  ~ : , ..  ...\n~ying he hid~a, cloc~ent,~.de_fined th~-!~bnJ9f-tli~ ,vi~~ and .that~wet:e:fo1:reSJ>.9~ive .. '\" ;:.; ::'.;:;:t . . ,.. ~ . detainee sites.-..~ staffer. \".rescintea a.baidc'<i  s...:...;~ .. ~;~-:.;;,:~~\"'-\"ized.:asla >work\". ,cO :  . ~.'_.' .. ' ' . .. ' .. J! - ~- py ~~~~~ , ,.. .., IP8 .PY ., .. , .,\n. roduce(f'~. lliC SRT't1:arii eontinkd: With\\tilesRtaoar st:s -thitthe' ue5~, ~fde:&twer:e ;&: ~ . ::,..:. ,.- .. p \"~-- . .... ., ...... ' .. - -- ~ ... . , ... ,. .. _req,_,., ....... ,. \" ........\n. respof!Sive', aruf.tbAt,J_fof, etes~IVe, Vji;leQS~ttool\"ihe sp~het.it~~,al~~;~,pOO,viOea- Th~ ., . ._;,' :' . :::: .\n\n. ...... ...... .. . . . ..:, . ...  :':\"-''. . . ,.'1t .....  ...... , .. :.:\n\n': ...  !,~~  ,/ ': ,; lo ~ ~\n~ :   ~  ,;I'\n. ': .. ,\n\n I .\n\n\"\" .\n\n..  ...\n\n\n\nC06274838\n\nUNeLA:SSIE:IE;Q/ /-FGIJO\n\n' ~APPROVED FOR RELEASE DATE:\n14-Jan-2015\n\nRDI-ri:,teani revi~wCd . ways the SSCJ  ~taff c:Ould . have.~s~:tl{~. 5P,~heet:ahd~hypoth\"C$,ized that~\nthe~ may baY.~ ~n a Google se8rc_h,~ppii~U~ce ~ln~bility,: :r..q~ .te&m .dis~v~r~c(~the .. Google . '\ns~h a.Pplian~;wa.Scapable :of~ing:b.ofl! th~: SS<;;l si~e as_:w,en ~ .~.e .Rl)y~~~.s!de 9ftli~. .  . Spartan G_ate:_aa~~e: 111 ~~Its o~c;J~le.~~es ~hpw~ ~i9~eill$. fro~: ~~-i~:~:.~~G~;~it -:\nA. seney, sid~~ o.f~INet andJnc!y~~;a)iriJ' :to ca~hed .ver$iqn5 of.~~ do9.uro.~o~:p,yheni~!Jc~c!;~~e:\n\n,. , ~ . ..... . l;; . . . t ~ .. . ... ~ . . . : ... \"\"\"'': . ... .  ,,..,$ . . .:-t. ' ..... ' r r \"\"\n\nca~he t~:prts_et}f#M.he ~x(oftli~~d9.(:~tlj~* it\\ qu~?~?'-11:le RDI IT T~'ime~~ej}~e4 .. ~-~: r4r;:~i~\nvulnerabiJit).r -m :ApnJ: ~oi3~ 'l1te .~Ii\\ rqu~*d .tJurttne :d~upieot .~~estfP~;\"i~.;~~~-~~:'\":: -,' .. electfopip .fonnat.~d the ssCI~er. ~gr,eed U>'do so.~ . . . . . . . , .. .  :=:J:. . ,~( :;~:;_: ...  .. .\n\n' UNCLASSIFIED/ /FOUO\n\n\n\nC06274838\n\nr' . l I.\n\nI r\n\n.. . :\n. ~ ,... ' .'h\n.. 'l: . .\n\n._ ..... ; . .-:!,\n. . ; .\n\n.:_:UNf;LASSI~J:E.Di.~ . . . ..\n\n: ~mtM~lrmEUiorGENG~AGENGt~'i, ... :-~;,;~ ~:~':'' ..\n. . \\~ciq.:~;?!c:;_~>~ - c:. : .. -.. '\"\" . . .. . '\" .\n\n'\n\n.  ..  ....\n\n. . . .. \" . ' -')J1:' ;~:~:': ~:;\n7 Febi~ry#.~~~~~.~ .. . , ... :  : .. ~i:,\n' .. ,: ':.:::\\;_~(~{;~l:::~::~:~~~~;?f~r~;/'~~,;~ '\\!=~   o;\n\nThe Hqnoiable Eric Holder Att;orney -~n~ral\n.oep,artmento:f.:~Justice .:\n~ashin~t?S)~ .. :.n.c~ -20~_3\"(} .\n\n. . . .. ~\ni ;...:!f. . I , : ~\n:ATTEN'.Ii:~oN.: _1Mr:. 'George .or.os;ca~. . .\n :.~puty . 'Assis'ta~tr 4~~t.t'orne:y~ ;Gep~rail\n 'N.~:t;j,onal \"$ecu~~ty Division\n\n' ; .. :'.  .. <~ - ~ :: . 't. . . :. . .\n\n. )i~. f.':: 'if~-~.+  I (' ( .\n\n~ .. . '\n>; .:.\n\n\"''t .'.:)! ..\n\n -;?\n~: . : ..  .\n\n--~.-~-~;:.'.~::  ........ '-;;, .~:~:.:.:,.\n: ~ _. \" ; . ; l  .   . '\n\n. \"> :.-:_:::-~:., . 4-~~i.}~( ... _\\:. ~- ... ' ... --:._},'. >> ::.\n.,:.. ..::1.\n\n~~e ~ : c:r.imes -Reterrai\n. . .. i.\n\n:.:':' . . pear 'Mr . ,Attorney- General: .\n... ..:: f. : :::<:t .\n\n. <-tili t.ou0'>  I am,.\\wi-it~ng t .o .you  pu~~uant  t'a~~~ctl:d'B~1[5j (~1)~~; .. :; :-'  _: _<:\n. ,. -. ,, ' .!..1 . :--:~ : . . ~ ...... ~: . ..  .''1',.-;  '~; .. l':lt\" ,!lij(':'lt'\"t.~/i'f.-,  .. , . ~.\n\n. Of Executi ve Order 12333 ~  a~:.>amended,: ~nC:l .sections )V.L B, :, ./. :  ::;:>:;;   . .  h\n-,VILA.4,  and VIH.A._of ._ the .1_9:9.5 Crim~s ... Reporting M~mqranqWt\\:j~( \\.\". . Upd+;stand.i_ri,g ~~etween,, t _}?e . D~p_a f-tmEmt;, o.f..: ~~st_ice: .. al_l~;;;t.l)~ ,;,.~:::::;~;;~i~:''.~:~v:-:;iN: _ -~ . ; .. ' 1'1.  . .. _.,.. ' +~ . ~~  J.'i  ' \" ''.:.;.~!; . 't)j..\"'~-. 'V.'~ .... ~)t,..,r.\\IJ.K.I .. '\\.'\"'i~'~~\n\n} 'nte .. ~-g~~ce :~Qomml,m~t;y,:- :pe'r.ta'i ,nJ.tlg:J :tq,(~ne r~portJIJ9 ., 9~~:;:~-f\\'i .. \"> ~:;~f?~:r :; '.>\"~ :{i. nt:o~ti,on cohcernin\"~t :fede~~l c;riines ' (~th~ - MOU~J :<~>- \"'';;do; -t;, ..  _.;;:ikL: ., : -. .. 1.\n\n. . .:: , . . ~ :: . . _ , _ .. : .,t_,~ . ~ . . . . , -~ .. : : . . ~. :.~~;S .:. '' :/:~,!.~ . .\n.~ ._ . ,. J~1-/fOP.O!~~:: Th~. oe~tz:a~ .. ~ntel;~igenc~/ Ag~,~qy==:'JCIA): /~~;rr;fi::'!-~~1:(  >~~~:~;  :_:\n~nfo~ation re'lating to poss~b.l;e v:iol-at~ons ot ,a . specJ:~f:ie.a  ,. ...  ,.,,~~\nFeder~1 ci;~nc;l. l-aw by . one qr  mor~ Cindiv:lquals . n~_t ,._effiploy~d'_;i)y . . . . ::\nthe CIA.. Si.nq_e. the : coinpute':r ..~y~~eiri .on. -~ni.h . ~h~~~ <P.'?.~~-~Pl~ .. : !: :~-~~~~t ~::~ . . :J ... :\n\n vlo~aHons  <>~Q.I,irred -coilt~ins::.highly: :cla1i:;Jiie:d i_'rif.~rrt{at:i:C:m >~::t :'~h/'::;' ~':- .:: .. :( ~\nreport'i:ng. in ac;cordapc~  the proced_ure set forth  'in;'- Sectio~:  '   : >:  . \" :: , VI II  C o\"f tl)e MOO.  . . . ,. ., ~/ ::\n\n' ' . ' , ... . ..,' ~- -::~ ,; -~ ........ ~.i:. ~-:/{~/:.~: .\n\n cu )j:~ -~  The :fcHt~owil)_g info~ ti9n-_pr'qvia~s .. . ~- :i:'e~~~:0~:ti1.P!~~:~  . ;_;. ~~:;:;:~; _:\nbasis to , conclude that~:a viol.ation o! 1.8 u.s .: c.  . . :r-o3b car:c'2j <~) ;J;::i .  . a specif-ied Federal criminal law, has occurred. Tl:l'~ .  ;..~ ,, .,~  ,;';; . i n-formation dez;f,ves .fr:oin a lirili teci :secud. t.Y -inv,esti.iga:t~i6il:;\\t~hat~<i ; .  . '~,,\n~as su~p~h~~Ci -~~f~re c~ieti~'n; ' o~ly 'a comp1~-t~~:;_,iJ}v.~~i:;~~~~i:cm '<; .- , . ':.' .. would . determine.\" whether or not a violation occurred ~ : Th'ere , is .a. . .    ,., com~ut~~ ~.st~ ~r . qe~~Pf~ (~:system~l -. ~.9~~-~-~d >;~ -:~ ;~~i/~:;:$~s:~i~,~~t-~ ~;:\\:.:i~.~t:,_;;;,:.. . ..\n\n. Ce;:t~ ;i:n l1P.n~emp~oye~s  ~;!1~ve_: authori;eq: access to: a~;p.g;:~~().~~~pf:~))t~:~;.,~~~-'': .  -'\nthat system . . A-~firew~il}~ e:X:ists bEr~weep .the . poz.:t,~~~':~t:q::fi~c,ry:~:} ...  .. :!\n\nthose nqn~~l~yees-  _hav~ aut:hori:z;e~t: .acces~ and ..  th~::;p9r:t~9li:.:.t_~,.- .:;:::c- :   . .  .~:\n. w~ich. t-h~~y;:~dp ~~9!,  .n~ve ;a~t.P}:l.~~~e~f acce~.-~:\\ :.T~~t.~ ~~~.;.:~ ,s~~~-~sl.!:~/;;i:..~::~~;:r:: .. ; :,:-~~:\ntoo\"l . ori' .the\",-::\"sys.t.em..- th~t  all\"bws \" the non-employees t~;:c9iiaut  ... :,~;-<;,;,.;::   ...\n\n .   ..>   ~ :  ~ -~ :::;:.:~~; >: ;_.~ ...\n\n\n\nC06274838 . . , . PPROVED FO.R REt.EASE~DATE:.\n\n;\n\ni I. f.\n\nI I I i\n\n  , ~~Ja 11~2crt~\n\n. . . UNCLASSIFIED/,~~ : > . : .' .> . .... ,.\n, \" . . . . . . . .. ~ ~ . '. ' .. ~;~:~ ).  .. ' - ; . '. . . , ::;: .. \":\n\nt~~ --~0~~1~~ ~~~~~;~~~- . . .. . .. .. ~~\"'t:bt:~~t~:.~i~~s(:.~,~t~, s~ar,c~es t'o . retrieve J~_ocuments  on ~p~i~ . P<?rt.:i,o~~: of ,tq~~t.s:Ys:t~.:,: .~14:,: -. : .. ;~c Th~f~ .~ec;trch,, t<;Jol h~%'~:a .. ~-ecur;i.ty v:Ulne:t;;:>~l~.ty, . .._~:~-~ -~~~~.i:-1~;~~:: .. ..~~.< ._.  -~'  .:. !\".'f, '\n\n t hat -couil.d -he . eYnloited . ,to allow non:\"!'Pnm1 oyees ~~to ' breacht.. .t he ~ . d:::\\;,,,.. . .;:::\n ~ ,  \"< .r.+.,... if:(  .,., \"!''::r'.. ... .... .... ..    1: ' .n..-r-~ .  ., ~ ~~ .. - ~ ........ -r.p:-: ..... ~- , ,. ~ , . ,.. . ..,G~~l'~~u~. ~-'1 ~~~<!} .\n\n' 'f_d:l1ew.al~:.;.~-~~~-r:~.t:rieV.et.;do~ents .on  tli~ .. P~r~_qf~the ;. ~~Y.S,~~~l~tq~:/;..-.;~,-~;-~.:::,: I':\"'' :-:~~{\nWhi.c;Q th~y . W~re . not. ~~ti:t;ho+izec;f' : acce~s ~ il~. ;Nl . il)C~J.fl~t.e,;, a_ugit :-;  . . :~,;. . . d'\n\nindicate~  t~a,t, 'at . 1eas.t . ~me .'nc>n.-employ~~ exp:)..qiteg that -~'~-:. : '.'./'!'\" -,~~:\nvu l:nerap._~~it;y:,~o - ret~~~ve a - ~Wrib.e~ , .ot:~ C~~  - dpc:;:~~p,t~li;  c;)n.b~:~~ - --::~A>.  :- ~~:i .. PC?+.-~ j, on(>,o~->tQe:.', ;~_ysteili\\~ o.  whi c~ 'h'e.~,ori< s:&~ ~ ;p;g;.~h'ot~' n~t~~;~,t(~nbi,dS:ZJ~~t~~'::._ .. ' ':  _. ac.c~ss.        .,. -~ .... !i\\ .. ~::< .. _::\"\":,,\n\n(U/ ltoub>~ Th~ inf9:r:nlation mad~ av~i.iable  to' m~  .fridfcat~s '. :_\nt hat . .in  th~r~oire.mb~r '2.P~l.O . t~eframe; .: the  no!l-~Ril:Py~e:. :s?iidB~~~:~r,~~~~.;Ji .. ,._' :, .!ik.::\n\n a search that~appear~d . intended .. to  reach -into part:' of.' the< .:--.   ~~~:~.. .  ,, :. computer system to which the .nop-employee did n<!>t, have : ..  ., authorized . acc~ss. _ .In .such a circumstance, the , ~y~tem;,was. '-. . :  ;\nd~~.i:gpe_c;i  t9 br~~_g up  qn the. workstation s~+;~en_ ~~_;pa9~,:-t})~;t::t:';.~~;;~;:\\_{:  ~:e ai;iyi~.~d :tl,'l~~.:'J'l.Q,I)'~emp.lo:Ye.e  was_,; I:lq~. q.uth,prl;z~~ ,-tq_ -~~ces~ . t)t~t! :.~ .-:-:. -~ !-i<(. <.:*~!.;;: _,_.,.!\ndocufu~nt : ., This-pa.ge; . .-howevel\", n.ad . th~ : -~e'cur.i'ty yu),ner~~~~~:(ty_ ~: ._:,,_ ,  . . . . .. tha~ : na~ sirii;:~ been. . d_i.~covered and r .em:edied . .. Th:~:~'se.t;l,lr~t~':';o; :, ' . . . .  . . ~\nvulne.J:~bility.\"was _ that,;~Fhe page ~:J.so .. cori~a,ineq;;-a\\ -~u~.~:; ~~~;_;::~-\" .:,:.\":;c:\\:,(: .. . : -~ . . :\nind,~c~ted whe~7 ttl~ \"-~qifcument .,w_~~ fOc~t~9 ... ,~n, the .~Y-~;~~;1 ~~~-~-J, .f :~~P~:> .>?  . indi:.Yl:d~~l ~QPf~d  the .. q.RL, ancjO:pa~ted it ~i:n~o the'~P.re>~.s~;t:;{:;~-~f/ :}~:: ,;::~k : . :;-'. :, -~~\naddr~ss bar ;:,.{t:he indi-y_idu.al -, col,lld ga,in : ~cc;:es~  .to :~t:::~e .~Ps~en~,;. ;::;.  .\\.: .  :!. copy -.it, :~r~pg .that ~qpy._ acros~ .the f~I;\"ewall; and_;: pas:te~ ;t:t:::intq <>' : ,, .. a fold~r :C?~ -~his o;- n~r.;1 ~ide: of : the fire.~_~l{; TljE~,:'_,~.:rt~.p~t:~9ri :: ' :~,:;.; .. . ,:., . mad~  ~va, .i: -fab'~~: _'to me' i,~q;l:cates ~he non.i. ~j:>~Qyee ~.~9pl~-~~,'~~~:c~~:;;/;r .. '~-~ <  '_-,A::.~'\\:''\np~sted, it . d'i;-ectly  in.tq ',: the brow$et.' s aqdress b'a$~,::. lll)C:f ~};:'9'e~:~d_.' )' , . . . the doc~~nt ~:     , .. ~.::~~ . ~ :: . , :~; !<:!- . ,.\n\n  (tU-~ : ~.he , n!omat-ipn made -a,;~ilabJ;e to :mi:tft::i~~~~;;il::~~~;;:: .. ~~ .. -   ; .~;  indica-tes tn~t :~ -this\" ~non~\"ei(lploy~e . repeated this . ac~,tvl ty::n,unr~x.:~u:~;~,:~r~~::f?~--. '' r . '\ntim:es''i n o:rde~~ -to .acce~.s~ ~ copy.~ ~d brinq ac~oss '-;th,e  fH:~~~.l, ~ :(: :~_::.;;~ .. ciA .doc~ehts :to which  h~ .or . she .. d~d not: have .. ~~~p6~iz~_q : ~~<;:-~~~-~ :~;f.~:-;;,: , If th~: sy~~em. ;woJ:Jce.d: , a:s  Ci~~--1-gneci; . \"OP e~cly occ~s.t,oii~' -~p.~: :~9~=< .  .. -; ;.;.;3!:;~,:'~: . . . ....\n. emp~:C!yee: ~wpt!l:o : have .rec:_e~,v~d- on  the ~~~~~tat'ion-::~~~i~~~X~P~~:~f;;,:;:,.:~ ,:;\\,;c.,:. . . .. '\ninfol:lning. hil')\\' .. :o.r her . t _}:)a:t. ,he or she dl.a was not ~u-~hq;-;~~9'e-~o -:. ..-~-::,:~: . access .the do_c;.ilment. :.'i,t'h~s .non.:.employee c;opied a.+L-9f  th,e.se  _ <.;,; ':\ndoc;\\ln:lf!nt.s in~9. a fil~ 0\"~ ~old~r on. ~he portion . 6'f.;:.~be . sy~~-~ - ~:to ',,_,,~.  J wh~c~~::he1 . Ol::. -~~,e~had' a11~.~:orized . ~ccess; ,:.~:,~~p-~r~~~t~_I:,~.~: '>~~,:t :;:~}.~~.$..~ 1,:.::  , .  -i ~t:  . .  '\"\n.four otl)~~- npp;-emplqy~.e~ ~cces:sed and. pr4.nted tq~~~-~Fl~ :\\'> .. ;, :: .. .. <~ .< .: '\n\n .. :\n. do9UJnfi!n,ts oil. ~multipl~>q.ccasiqps. . It is riot cle~r .. ~fiet}le;';{~py: :_of . . ,: , these. ot}ler -. fo~r no'n'-~loyees ~a-y . also h!'lV:e _.expJ.oJ,ted ~h~ .. :~: : . ;': ;. : .: .~.: ;:\n~ecurity V\\iln~~~pillt-y -. :~;~ ,,       ... =- - '    ';,,  .. ;~\n\n. . : . . . . . . ~r-: . . i-- '-'~-: . q ._ .. '   :  .'.- r::\"t '' '. ' rf,1,r '!5;.''-;.is., - '' >'-~ ~-\"-:$.::~:~~~-)~,; '\n. . :. ~ ..\n\n-~ .\n. .2\n\n  {Jt-~CLASSJ;~I~D/-FO:UO' . ,. i . ... . .. : . .  .. 'V - ... '.\n\n\n\nC06274838\nI _,~. :::'\"\" .. .... f~PPRp.VEP .F.9R ..\n\n:. . RELEASE; DATE:, I\n\n\" .\n. I .~:\n\n.. . , ; ., 14-Jan--2015 .. .\n. . :-: . ..... -;. ~\n\n. :.\n, , . . , . . . :. :\\';r~EJ_{:.::, ..\n\n. __ , : ..\n,r    <:~,;.~~;,;' '\n\n): -~ ... . '~:. ! .\n \"'1 ' . . ... ~ -~.~ ~~.. _: :;:,:.~p~:. ;. ;.~'\"' .\n\n~~)~ I , '.,.. ' < I ' : ', r '  '  ' t I, . '.: ,, t ~_; .... ; ' . -;'' '-  =~ i~.:'.,f~r~-~-' \\\n'rh.-.e ,H<?n9.~ab:l.e,;, t;ric .-Holder,     , .. . ..  . :.f:.:+ .... -\"::1 _, ' -~'-:;,.\n\n ~~  . - , ' <' , _ ;~J ~ : .. :: ~n ''h~~ ~; /_:: ~;,., ~ ,\"'' ~ .. ', ~ -~~: .;~:Hv,f~\n\" ' '' . . , . .  .' ... '&\":1'  .. ,f'. \"\"r-. ,_. 1'1 ~ 'li: ... I\n\n :.!\\.- ,;:. -.;  ...-., ~ .... loS! r-. . . 'f -~- . : .... 1 ~~ .... . hI,.:~:-~-: , ~' 'I ,. :;~~~ ' -~11 ~ ~ fT- ~. :.:::.\n:,1: (Ul~1rooo> ,'s~me :o\"-'all -'-'Of:'':ihe . documents .accesieq -bY.' ,.,. :.   ~ .. ':,f,-;:r..--, : Y .:.\n\n... . \" ,1  ' ' ' -n  .,. .. :-.  ..  ~ ........ ),~ .. ~ 7'1 r   ,,., ':--: ~ ;' ~ ~ \":;: -..~~ 1 r I'\n\n~Xp:l'~i t.i,~g t~e . sec~ri ty. ~lnerability.:,_co~tai~~~ 'ttr~-..~~-~l~'o;~~J\\g_' <, .. : . ,.:\"';:; .. banner    ....  '\"  .., ...  :  ,~,.\n\n. .  . ~~:. .. ~}:.. : :r : :~.:: , .. ..\n\n:: ~: :. (~  . . .... . !'\" ,.~,;.;.:. ~;: .'::.. . l: .... ::.i'\nlUf./Fr:JUa;, :: ... rhls: da~s:i~;fed.  dqciJ.lll~nt wiJ~ , P~e~~ed :pi. tfi~~;_;cu;  :<: ,_:.;,;  ::-?:;;/.;  -.. .~\nDi_J;ec.tpr'~ .'~e;y:i_ew _Group f(;>r: - ll~J,t'ion ,, l:?.eteriticm,:: :~11#'!: Inte.tr~ga .di:m .\n(DR~RJ?.I): :tr;~ . PRG-,Rpi:~-~- J;n~~itial! discuspipn p~1PQ~~s.;:4z:l~~ $1l9.uiCl. .( npt  : , be useq,:tor :any otljer .p_lirpqs~, ~or ~Y it b~>c#stf_il?~j.ic(J!JM91!~.. ..\n~xpress l1pemiss.lon  frQID DRG.~RDI or; CIA's Of'f,!ce/'o.f ~nera1 :counse,l.   .,, '.:.  ;  ,\n\n.~.\"...,\"'~ , '  .~-:.:,  ; ' ' t   ,;1  t  rl;- '--.:. L, . ..,,~,.O)'(\",'\",' I ,\"!', :: 1 _r'\n\n. Thi.,s\"doc;~nt contains .. classified, 1nforma tion derive(:P :t-rcim':. ' .. ''\"':: ': '\"i .. : . ..':.\"'..  '' . ' _\n (8.en~/t~Yii'. 8our,q~~:, ~pq .. ziietl}q9~:~ ~Jlifh ~JDay  1n~ude; .p~~:~:V;in.#,\\~;'~~',~- ::0!~i~~(~\\~:. . :_:')~~;;y :i\n\n.l.~it,ef!< ~(),' . HQ11_rpr, s~~~T, t~')!ntel'J1.9~nr;fi! .~s~ets(. otfi~.r qs, :'.-,;::, ._.:,; ~: ...  .. . ,,.  .,.;~ \"'.,.~;,;,~1.?\nGa.~~~~ent'~g~~cies{ an~(bi  foreign governments: afi4, '=.li'a~so.~ .,; :   . ; . . :: :,~; ~   , ;i. serv;f C:!\"'~ . ?Jn~ .must b,t:~ h,a~cUed accor.ding.).;y. This _. d09J.U1!6.!'t a,l$o . . .. .,::::r. pqnta.fPs mateiial prote.cted by the attor.ney .. client,\\and:: ~t;tqr.pey  ,..:  ',.\n~rk..,p.f,~uc~ p~i'l(ileges. : FurtlJezmore, this dq~e~t e:oP.st~:tutes   ... , .. / .. .' .. :':\\ , de.l~ez:atlve work pre>.<;iuctj. 'protectl!d by the .d~l!P~z:dtl,y~-;:P.~ope~~ i'  .:;;>''.:\nprivilege~;- and is. not -a finai;; conclusive, comp~ete, ;:9r .  .. .:'   '/. c,.o~f~heilS:$-ve a~alysis.. ot DRG~JWI or CIA . , Rathe~,  .f,~.wa:S :,cre~t~d. . :. .\n\n ::to ~u~t tile .ne.6;d!s of ._ DRG-iwi, .. in ,_ suppQrt of infQPDi!i,g seni'or Agency  \\ <: \\J:it(::\no:t~:f.cer~-r..abQ_ut-- broad policy .. issu.es. . While everY-~ ~ffort  ;Jir~s:mai;i~t.:t~ ,.< . ?:. ,. en~iJ~~CiJ~tf:do_c~en.t ~s.)~c~ura~,:} t maY 9on.ta~11 . !n~dve~~~- .. ~~t~~~~;:~, . . : :. .-, ::.-:-:,;;t~ .' : .. Fq_r.<c} t;!}!.'f; .;rea.sop,_ ,:~aJ]d b~C:~ u~e th4~ dpc_pmen.t : :~?~ec:ti ~f~~}s~~f~e,r~:~ .:.;:~;:'.~~~ .;:,lt1.' ... , .'\ndr4 ws:ll1ilferences from  . or ., ami ts : information :\"fr01JI the,'sources ;_~:i!:t '  .,. :t-. . . .>1'~>- ,._\n\n '' j \" _ .... \\ .. ,\"'  ' , ; ' , p, , . l'  ' ' :I   '', ' ' ' ...  ~\"\"-,\"1: ' 1' ;1   ' ,.'~~''[~:':~~~~  1, ;' .:,;:.;, ,,Jf!!i.' '\ncites,. 'J.,t .shaulq not per. ,r-elied upon by 'perso~s .:Qut~~~f!! - . .D~~.\"7!UJ~ ... ~ . ;: :< :',<''/'\".\n\n. . -, . \"' . , ~- .\n\n(U/~ At the re_quest .o.f > the Dir~cto,t : sf . t he:]t:IA, .:'!;he; . : . :.w)&;:., CIA Iri.-sp~ctor, Geperai  . (_IG) open:eq . ~ . r.e:vi~w .:into. tJ:l~;~~'t~on~r :_of. ::  . -.. \"' , CIA employees' who discove:r:ed  tp~ . above informat1o_n>. 0.~ <30. .  . ' .\n\n. January .20.lh  r~p.res.en:tat;ves . of the .r<; discussec;i:.~~wi'tfn'th~~- - :' ,. : .\n Cririri.nai Division ' s Computer .cr:iJDes and Intel :l,ectu~l,  .~.r;9J?erty . _ .. . ...\n\nSecti .on {.CCiPS) r  information . concerning . p~~s~b.le  ,y,;\\,9i~~4:~ris, , pf.: :,.:.'. .:\nTitle .- le_-tu: .. s .. ~c:! _.  l03o.:_anc;i '25}3: by ciA emplpy~es:~;,c/~9-iiL.-~: ... >.' '-~~~-  ':. ~:~ ~\n\n. 3. Febr.uary.,12 .Q.a;:~ ,, ;, the CxA jrGf a off-ice 'i $s.ued . crfue,s ~r~~~~t;~1. -~&;+):~. ':.; -1ili~:\n'  .,  '  ' '  ' 11  ' \"'J '>lli .. i'' ' , ,.... '< ''\"\"\"\"~):    ,(, ~I ,A\n\n2014-:117~K.:t.g ; q::J:SP based. i.nt.iP.ar .t  on those . ~U~c.~s~d;oQ~ 'i~:Y T1;f9,>~:rq ~?_. .. ,: .. ... d;t.d : not inc'lude  iri his .crime ~,~efertal  any informa.tj,.~p: . : r~g~;t,:g.'~li~f  ;,!.~..  , the pot~nt . .:i,a l crimina~ . viol~~<ion t;Jy the :ni:ll):.:.:einploY.~i~:-i~ :de~r~:i!lg ' . , y; .. \"'\n to . the. :Agenpy . t~. deteimi~e ~ wni;!.tber . ~~e info~tiop:~f~~-~:l~~E: :met . . the stande1rd to .l:S~Ue a c'Cil.IlleS repor-t OJ} . t~e nsn-~J,:oyees ~: ,. :\n\n .. - ~ ):~.\n\n(U//Fo~r As the. Acting General counsel; . t.h~t_,' . . determi:n?tion was my respons;i.l:Lii,ity ~:pder tbe  MQti ~ : !~(bs~~,note. j_:.,~'  . above,. I have . .determined there fs a re\"~onable:. 'bas','j;~-< .. t:9~-con'9:1.ua~ .. . , .\n\n. ~.. .  ... :. ::.:/~:~ .;~: .:; ~. : r.:. . . ~ ~ .\n\n3 : .. , . . ;\n\n!.\n\n UNCLASS:I-fiED!l'OOO-_\n I-, , .\n\n0.~): ... ;~~i~~''-'.~/ .\n. .. , . ' ~.\n\n-::\n. : ~ ~ j.; ;. .. . . ' . . .\n\n:.,\n.  . .: :' . :_,.fi>'': . ..\n\n\n\nC06274838\n\nONCLASSIFD;D/ lrooo_\n\nThe Honorable Eric Holder,\n\n!APPROVED FOR RELEASE DATE:\n14-Jan-2.015\n\nt~t a violation ' oflB u : s.c~ S  l030(a) (2) (B), a ~pedi:fiect Fe~~ral crimiha'.i.  law,  has Qccurr~d.\n\n4\n\nUNcyASSl.FIED/~\n\n\n\nC0 6274838\n\n~' .\n\n. ... . . , .. t E.<.,' ..\n\n-~ .\n~ ._ . r ....\n\n1\n\n!., .;\n. ,\n\n. ,\n\n... ......\n; .\n\n..\n, -:. .\n\n. ~PP~OV.ED. f OR\n. RELI::-ASS,DAT!:::\n\n'  1'4~Jan-201:'5: :\n:-. . . .. _, ........  ~: ... ~\\\n\n-:'-..\n\n.. ~ >, ~<=<+: . d-'\"<. :~ . JJN,GLA~SffdJED/URAF:f :. _ _ . r '.  . ., ~  ,., , . ::> .. :.;j';;;_~ : .. )!fui. :: .. .\n~:::.,  ..-i~'~t; 'AITQRNEM~CUENT PRIVILEGED:~.  ' i~'):'i'' .. ''   . or\n\n.;.__   ;,. r , .  , :~.::~ , ., , ~\n\n.. ;: .: ... ~:: ,_. .. :- :~- -~~ :.-.. :~~~;~~- -:.\n\n:;;';:~~15~27/29i~. . ,.: . -:: . . . . .. . . . ;:'':.::::~ ~:~:-,:.':. .. :;;~~~ .. .> :;;: .. : :''\\1:~;~--::t:\\., ~:.::::,\n. -:')15femor8Dchim~rodbe'Reto'ril .r.e{partiaftiineJhie:iof:events surto'UDdi:Dji'-discoyeiit.o't ::: ';i:. . ~:/ .. ~-.\n\n  ;:~~~:::,::~: .. ~p~rt:~.~~~; .~::;} ;~~:~~;~ .. :;,~ir/:: .r.; .\n:~Y!ap; 9,.20 1'4~ I luuf~ei~l9pe(l '~ea5on to :believe f:b.at tpe ssq.staffpeqqnnin~1!h 1Iq)}~ ,; ' . '\"'~\nre~~~~~ obtain~ .!iJUl~th~rized a~~s to:cl8S$ifiect;,.QM pre-decisi<?~-; ~~Vil~goo < .:;:, ',, :\" :, :.  .. :\n\n. a~~ents ~idept ~J.l;tJie ~gency ~tside~~ ~ofRDI Net. !'~!aware ofexplicit;iidinissi~rjS t .. .  ,., ' :,' ~\n>.:from ~staff.tfultlhe :;, . ' ; . me~~r .. abQqt ~ QOCQment,s (incl~:a:conime~t.~e : . : ..... ''. ' . qy;staff;m~  .tG~Une Kr~s ronf~tion 'he~g Jo fh~;C.ffect-.that:hi\n'.fbayejCen '[the Agc,:ncy'~].rea1 response\" to th~ SSCIRDI Study); ~,well .as public    .\n\n .. stat_~ents by mcniQers ofth~ SSCI to tlie effect that they had:~the doc'!iroents. ~  M(!_reo:ver~ Iwa5 ~ded by ~y s~that there .had qnce beeii a.\"hol~~ -or ~bin the . fiiewall.~vidipg t,he -~sq ~ide from.:th~ CIA side ofRDI Nel(disco-..;ered in2012). :1\\f.,: .. :,, .\n~t tiirie, _When. :oo~nteg \\v;tth ~ !JQ(!ijill~t !Qat shoUidnothave been intheii : , .     .\n\n. -. P,Ossessio~ SSCI staffweitibers had assured me that they did qof.mappropriately_ a~SS ...\n. any oiQer doc~ents ori the 'Agency side.  .By JanuarY 9, Ipystaffhruleonducted ~ -~heck of.ouro-Iog5;tha:t chrppicle ,4ocuwents -~~Agency had appropriately. prpvided _t9 .. th~ SSCJ.\n . an_~Jound :no SRI ~octpne;~ts referenced within them. As a result, l ha4 good n$0n to .. ,\n. belleve.that <::;onfinittee ~ 20I2 .~uraneewas a misrepresentati_on. ~ .. .- . :. - ::, ~:: :' : ..\n\n. .. . . . . . ' ' . . . ~ - ':~ ;' . . ..\n'I,\n\n-~.\n\n. l ;8md..  -~ly:r.~ns1 ibled(~r,~hsCurinfig ~l~ secund'ty ob. ~RlXNCetiAsy~ CIA:do'WP.ed    . <y;,: __ _:.\n1\ni .. _,'..N_,_:_.,._'.! .. , .\n\n. : an: .. o~~ .. .....u system, ~te . J.il a IA act 1ty an su ~ect to  ,  ~~,_.tions:.~ .. : ..\n. ;applicabl~ us 18W5 -~egarding.classified iliforniatio~d for mallitaUUDg:$.e.safety of  . ,\n, s~rislti:ve CIA' reco~ pfaced uix>n it.  As a c;qQSequepce,:l asked IT profe~jo~-:~thfn : ~ >,;:\n\n_ ... the Office ofPeta.WeeA:ff<Ws'(ODA):to ~et~~ whether die SRT documepts ~' :\np~t onthe'SSCI side ortne system. In so doing, I carefuUy consiqered what was' ' :. ,.:, :\n1aiown.to me reg~dmg. the. Agency's historical repre~tations to an.d ~~errts witli\n\n. the .. SSCI conCet:ning the general.ptinciple of refnrining from accessi.pg tQ.~ .SSCl side: of , tlie system~ Those representations i.J).cluded SI)expllcitreservarion ofauthopty for . . . Ag~cyJr :offic~ to ac.~ss t,lte:SSCI side to adcf.ress precisely these sOrts of situations. ,I was a\\Vare th.atSSCI staff had been briefed on the fact that the Agency Wouldrondtict  .\n\n secUrity. womtp~ o~the sy~rn ~ aiso was aware -~ ~gency IT officerS had -.'';_ _i;_ . ..\n:repeatedly utilized -~ a.uthqljty to confmi:t that documents had ~ apprQpfia!ely.\n-placed on tJre S~CI side .ofihe s.ystein~ a practice ~t SSClhad kriowledge of an~ fully.:     .\n:and.~peatedly :consented .to. I was -mindfi.JJ that Diref;tor: -Panetta, arid others, had.clearly : ::  ..\n-~teditO,'the SSCI 'that 0~-respect:fortheifsU~tive privacy Qil;i not mean~ vJ wer~\nabandQn4lg :olir ri&flt-to,.~strative a~s m: an audit cap!lPility to ens~ ihe ,~~:tY .  .. o the system 8n4 to protect .CIA.infonnation, the latter an obligation impos -by :~tatirtt(: . . :\nAs a!coqsequence, I did not inte,pret any representation -to SSCI as requit:ing that we trim a-blilia-eye.to possible violations of Agency regulations or federal law .. To the-~ntrazy,. . :' . :,,.:., ...\n. -:. ' . !\n\n:\n\n.\n1 SSCtrefe~ tO ~~ct\\tB.as. lh~ ~Pane~ Review;\" b~tthe .Agepcy has hmorieal~refe~~o .~~~'::.  . :\nas'WG~ (\"weekly case repOrts, ) or SRT (S~gic ReviewTeap1) docUments. .. . . . .  . .  :: . . . .~ ' . . . . . . .\n\n.. - :!\n\n: ~.-~. .: . . ~: ~ . .. ' . . .. ' . :>~ .. ~: ~~- ...\n..  ..\n\n:: ... \"\n\n:' .. j ..\n\n... . {~{; .\n\n. ~. '  ...\n: \"t : .\n\n. . - ~~;, .....\n\n\n\nC06274838\n\n. ' ,.,\n\nI ,.\n; .. t .\n\nI I\n\n-.\n\n~ , .\n\n; .\n\n: . ~ .. ,:. :\n\n.;\n\n.. ,  .... .,. .. . ,,~ .. . . _... ~'::~: =' ,,~QV.F,P,.g,pR. .. :: -~.\n,  ; .. , ' : iEfj~ASf?.Q~1:E: .... >:f .\n\n. . ' ' ,,, \":. :. , ... , ., . - . 1 .  . ~n~o~::.i:.i~i;~; :: : ~~;~~~1;. > .\n.  UNCLASSIEIEDIDRAFT ::~{I : :  t,1l~\\k .. l:\\l\"''\".' .. ~'~;;~;:;>;. :\n\n. . ATTORNEY CuENrPRI\\(.ILE6E1SY .. : ~ltJ,';~tJ~;, ';\">..~:. . .. ~~.;~ .. !\n1; :, ,' o ' ',: .. ,  0  - .. '.- ,' <~~ ::.-< :t!~<'~ ' '::,}:' :<~;~~~~,,;,.~~:i(~~~:~j;::'~-.,,~',:\n\n ,~~' und~dJ:ng :pum,m~\\first .days With the Ag~cy~ -WheP,- I..w~ PJP.;Y.!Q~,;~~tt!!~~!~br', '~'~, ,. \\~. .  : ' .r brJe~~ 9.n .. ~e S$CI ~ev~e\\Y.Pro~ss by Age~1<:y,~~cei:S; .i9.~1~,lg.~~~~f.>:~~~~/:: ... .. :;( ..  .. , . ., .\n. 1J?at l;,tiave.an ~Uv:e.obhgation to ~es~l\\J(ljn . Oh.~:SY.tew.-to..:' .~-~ : . -: ~-i'. :. . :,:' j,\n\n, '~ , '  ' 'n' , ' 0 ' '-  ' ' 0 o '\n0\n\n'\n0 0\n\n',' 0 ~; ' , '1 -] 'f ' ]1''<! . ' 1\\\"I'Jt'~\":'! ' . '~ ,,(~.~ *: 0 0 \"0 ,;\").,\n0\n\nensure\\the mtegricyofthat.syStem and-lo ;protectclaSsified'-materiiils' .  :   :~ :':_..,r. ::,;:::-,:; .. : :<';:y.::,:,.;. ...\n:  .....   . -.  ;.  \" .     .    .... - ---  ... : !~  -  _ ,.: ./(\"~~ ~ _ ~--~::t~:~~~::~;~,~r::~~~:.-:.:, .: .\n\n ~R~~~;~OStli.J#jx>rtant).){;,i~'W.8SI~Y,~under.stan~g:.of:agre~JtlcDt$~'*~~:e~ 1tl:le.;~,i., ~. . :. :, ',Y: : ~: . ... :\n\n 'lComniittee;aricfthe.:Agency:ihat .restrictions on .~gency~access :tc:>l'fbe ;ssct~iae;.W.l\"re.'f.~/;. ':~~~~-, ~:::: . ~' :;, iintenaeq .to _,p~lude 'th~. Agericy from -~nduc~gJsub'Sumtiv~ ~Views .o'ftli~\\G~\\1mn'i~is~~~~/ :::::: '\nworlc ,product, .not~ffom}conducting.,nomial adiriinistrativeranif securi~-:reiate<I ~tuDctions;:;::,_' .  . : ~ :: .\n\n,, i:eru;;~ -trult'ihls P.artic~ar :adJtiini$~tiY;e:actioi} wowa be :ex:treiD_e~Jl~~~~:Jllinit~'<i~io .:.'::;/  . /: :'\n :a:sin;lple i9entifiqniono'rtlie_,presence of,particuiar.CJ4 doeu~e.~s; . qot iSSGt;~ii1--~;:;.L~-:~.   ', ..  :_) ~ ~~\ne~plicitly d,irected :that:n9 content wasto .'be-rea4, altered, moveq; or exarmni~aqy::';'':  ' ;::. :; ''6  -~ . , . ; .. fruihion. J gave'explicit directio~ that the offiCers were to search only for~the.SRT _::: f..  ... ~\nqo~~en~: 'Then' were not to ~h 'for or acces~ ~y other. docum~~; .:nor' ~)~~t:-2,~;; : ::2::: .. , . . , ,. , .. revtew the SRT documents, butsJW.ply to de~flll!..Qe whether th~y,.w~ presettt.O.Il' th~,~ :.: ,, ;; ;,.\n\n system. n~ review was :PUre~Y inthe .manner Qf.ap..aucut; Wiili :i!~isub5tan~ve :fYieW'~.f~: .<:. :~ :\nl!lly.d.ocumentorCo~ttee .w()ikprodu~t  ...  : '    :,.:~./~~\\:: .. . ,, . ''\"\n\n. ~ter thal qay,lwas'inf~nil:eQ that o~ IT officers .. had dete~:th~~A:s~Ji~.y~s ... ,,;1;):~~~;::>: :.:';:d'.,;\\-.il:~;, ... : :::_.: .. :\ndocuments;weie.indeed resenron theSS l 'sideofthe system:)iiJtiti1edial1y:'iilfO.rl:P:9f?~;;~t::: .. ~ .-'<:(::: : :: .. ;\n\n'--<-:.-........-,....,...---.-- .....--;- ..,.., V{~ discUs~~.~;xf~~!:;~f~~~~t~~?~~:;;:,::>3:~:   <:~ ..\n~.......,.~.-.....n>L: ........,.....,.,.IW. .. L.L.-\"\"fto this matter one step :,~~.: ~y,.~~g .. 0._.:''    ......\n\n~~~--------------<= :cn.,hiw ~cb:...,. \"-'. iJ.n .....  .dei.th~iiQ~~-'': . :~;~;~ . .':~;~;:;~:::-'.::;';;~:~:~,:!'~::;\n\n arding wheth\"er. the doctiiiient:S .had oeen ~~\"< ~~~~~~~'\\: .. <~. '''\n. ' ''\" ' . ., .1 ,,. '.' J~ . :~. ~., ~\\r.f'l' ~~\\;:.xY,.~~~.-::0;\\:.i--. ~Vt~~;iit  ~; ' ' . !\n\n:  accth  .~ ~Y :ssq staffe~,  :.-.: e\n1\ny..-CQnc .. . fi ~?l~edtha. ODthA~!9.:ffi'~~~ .~~1-~i:''~il.~~~\"  , ... ' ::\n\n. . .~}~~ ~p_po~;  .. \"?'g,~)> gav~ ~~ 5 uu~u()D ,,} ; _}~~ .. ~~;~~~t ., .. ~~~ ,>'  :;n,.'\\lmf,:~~: .. : ;\" .... ptrcU!nsc,_l'lbed;and,shQulcJ _ m~olv~ Q~_y ,tlje 1d~nfi~ d9cw.n~n~. ~No,,~tP~,r.p.g;1.}Plct9: .'\"~'~'::. ::;,''';:- -::\nw~~:tQ'be~ed.or reviewedapd; ,~gain, rio. sub~~iy~review ot~i~B.~lia~. .. ''\\ .. ':.1!; . . , '\" , .\n\n.. ~!a o~ur.:'- T:bat BdinamtiorF\"~~ ~et1ve~d ~.a~~~~~r . ........ .. -' ':'(' ': : :.,_  ,,~) , ~)~;;~ii?f:,;i.' . . . : , . Onilie:Sa:me da informed me 'tha~' discussed this isshe,Witli~ilie >t:~  .::  :~:'  ...\n\n 0 r A   .. - ~ , ' '\n0 ~ ~. ~ ..... (-  ' ~ , ....  ~\"\"-::~.' ~Jo- ~ .. ~. .. \"\"\"tt.&~,'\"\"\\r ,..,.: .~ 7 .. ~:~\n\nDJ.reCtor,, SD:d. f:lle J:?tiector .. ~ mstructed that wen . ~ t_o ~ ':~cqJYple~:w~;~t!*t~~~ix~ .. _:,.:.  -~;~\".;; . . doeument5 otfthe SSCI.si4e.of<e _sy&t~ w~ ac~ly-the SRT:q~~ents:\\1 as~~~x\\;!.s~/-;,,f1:.~.: . ,. _\ncolleagu o a.rtexnpt to verify the nature ofth~. doc\\imep.~~~  .c~y~7a~;}!/r'~~'::\nreporteq . l oo w 'af~t: frrst ~g~ of a ~dful 'of the ~~ciunehts'.ci?d):~.~t\\d~~~.;-;;;;;,: }}~'~. '\nthat -~y. were eprivilege&. draft docwnepts .in question, the-d~Uitients SS9.~ l,la4:not:=lfft.; ;,: .:.~:\" : ,';\\ :. , been authorized to reeeive. onned m~ :thatQ 4id ilotir.ad .!!P.Y. .9f.,1P~-:;;;,~:';.: :.  ~ ..... i. ~\n\n. documents, bu~ merely lo~.. . llf ;e ' o~t page.fonpat ~fa fe\\\\' .19 s~:ir~et~~wt~;;2;: ;:' ... ; ...\n the sail?e WIUillQ banner,-draft designation, fo~t,. etc., ~the SRT d~~p.u,rg~ts ; 1;:-.. '.:: ;;.. . . .. . ' ,. imo~ ofthis.: ~nfimiatioii. . .   .. . . :.  . ~: ~;:;:c,,::   '  .  ..::;\n\n.  :' . ~;;._.. . .. .~>:~- ;_ . . t' . . :\n\n~t~ ip.~ ~moon of ,an. io~  20l4, I receive4 a :reportQffinafugs\"fiQ~CJ .. ~i_-_;::: .. '::.: : ~ ... md1cating that five SSCI Staff members had accessed the documents~\"~.;m~the.fall ~-  . .. f .. ;,l           .~ \"h 1.\" ;  .u .:. -'D .~IlN\"-: '' .,.,. '. .: ..   ,-.. ~: '\n\no 20l0 ~u .. ~nc~uding m:.th.f&:!Lof2012, abom the time the . .o e . m .~;.~. ~\\ .,.~~  < ~:;,.\";;;:~ ;.;> !i<\nfirewall ~ ~.Qiscov~re& ,J\".9~ staff.me~bers ,~ accessed the d~.~~~~:.thO~}M'}~;~i,i 1~~~;, \"} :::-.... :. >\n\n. . . . . . '\" ~- :}.:}:.:<:. v~,;>\n~ - ... .. .. ~~..:,::-::; . t~f' ~~ 1: ...\n\n: .. ; . .,.:.;_,i,\\>.: .  :....~ .. '. _:_;;~:.: .,:. ; .. -~~ } :'\"'' . .. :.\" '\n\n. '  ~. l\n\n\n\nCQ6274838~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~- ~~-~~~=:: =~~~~: ~~~~. ~~~~f~:~~p~~~~~c:~~-.. ~~:;~\n   ~14-Ji:in'-20 1. 5  -.\n\nUNCLASSIFIED/DMET A ITOJUSEY :CLIENf :P,~ILEGED\n\n_of times.  I J:ePOited. this.findmg: aiui th~ DCIA ..  t ildvised the.:o~t,~of'\n$,1~ ,imp<?~~-,,pfdet~g th~. _.. _,.'\",f~ surr,o~~-Jhi~ ~:~f.o~ <!!.~~~.}(\n~th the C9~tfee or-the )Yij. -~_ tie .~~e9~e.to p~u~ all av8Jl~.l~ oP,tiP~ ,~-~~h- ... q~Jermine_ ho~Jh,e d~~t$. ~e to~ o.n;the. SSCI si4.~ ofthe .~y~ asA~~\npredi_~. :~~Y .Ixo~er di~~!!ions. :I n()te4Jor him '~- I did not.~ .. ~ i:Qy,~~#i~:, Qfi~!'J,!ptio~.~.ut.tl_l~ l coul~fi;\\Sk the ODA -~-to try llh.d. ~~0~ 'ho.'~\\~_sc;.rc.<J.IY~::h!l:Y.e .: .\n~hie:v~ acce~,.to the ~cuments.\n\nS~y ~~~n, ~an.ll' l wok a ~u atboDJ.e from.t~e Piiu.t.9r:wllo info~e~:t]n~\n~t p~~~ di~_'?Ssed the. ~ssi~le SCf\\ltity ~~with .WJ;l CPS.;p~(~~p~~~i~ ..\n'11\\~.,Ptre.cto.x;re*~ hi~. d~1111.to infonn the Hill of.~,breac~ .~.-~~;~.;~~1~!~4~~ . emphasize(i;tluit.I was to JJS~.'~~ver meSAS necessary to answer th~.quf;stion of.hP.W '\nUte documen~ Q.Itive;d oA ~e~S~CI side ofthe syst~ so that his comm~~tion .~ih. Ule Hill coul~ ~ur. I vie\"'ed.those inst;ructions .. ~: au~~g m~ to .. ~er~.the n~s~\nAger;tcy P,ei;s:(lel_and comp.q.nen~ who would nofll1!llly be invot:v!:id .~:~9,~~f!gp.;,~f He,ci.lso tasked .ri1~ .to gene~t~ . a set of draft. talking points for that mee$g with Comniittee;_ leaq~p. J -calitioned that discUssing this ~tter with the. WH, at this _st{lge,. wliS piobl~c. -~  it ooul4 later be vi~wed ~ WlJ ipterfen~nce in.a pqteritial c,rinuru!l:. e-, iny~i~on. Hb thanked ~e for my effortS,.and reitera1~ that he ~.!lJ:lt~, ~~~~:::~, :\ns~1,1 ~ pgsib!~~ .. ~m~g~~ay~, JtQt weeb. . , .. ''\"[. . .. ~  ,\n\n0Q the momfug ,~f Jan. i3~ 2014, after informing.elements of Agency lad~b(.of. the . i~, I WJJS called to a meeting chaired: th::J! Also in attendJ:w.~\nq----~---:-,.....--.-.,...,..,........,...---~ qc.f D/OP A, D/0~4~:,ifid,9,~: L...-.~---'\n. ~ --\"  L);t~ . y .. p~g ~e m~tulg HI5Cribed the eveh~~t? ,gilt~}~~~ :tlle'_ii:-,t~!l.h~:\n\n........ \"!rec~.-... .-;'tor's: ~l;tions. ri.I)dica~ .that neiilier I nor OPA had any capability to t;:an~lict .\n'the sort offorensic work necessary to answer the DCIA 's. uestion concemmg the.. . prov~ce. <?.(the SRT doc~ents.l'ciC explaiped ho, . ~uid,_9.~ abie ,~ . _,,~~.  ..\n~~~Jh.Y.,W.o~ No one .. ~:.attep~e voiced.any obj~c.tion to ~go~;.~e .. ass~~~; . iiiP.~ thi:rew~: ~milinous e~ressioilS of;support f.<>r-;~,~9-pes.i~?f~~\nthe.~en~r. n<;ede.ci to de~e .. wlletQ~{ ~e do~ume11ts ~- beCJ;t, m.te~Qpal~y -~~- ori1f\n~eie wa,s ~me !JlPre innocent explanation for their.pre~ce on the .ss.q _sj_9e,,pxj9r.,tp: .. :_\ndis~W.siitg .th~ ~rier Wjth lhe SSCI. I adyi~ that .tb.e matter ~hould ~4_P.4tced tin~~;~e\n\n.~ntrol-ofthe Office of Security. i also stressed thatthis work shoultLbe donewithoutf  . referenc~: tp .the'~ntrnt of~y _docUlll~ts on the SSCI si9e; that no~~~s~ti~e :~~J~~~~f\n8.11),' :do~~ent ~ ~ eiforiiled, .shoulq not be __ perfo~ed. and need not -~ perfon:n~<h .. m oroer.to COQQUCt thi _tivity.- ._;,\n\n,  '  . . . . : . . ;. .~: ... ~j, .....  .. /;~}~~~. Later that evening, the aforem~ntioned group met with the Director to: !cuss sta!Q$:or , , ... efforts .to, d~~rmi!l~ the prp~ega.n~ of the docum~nts. Before wc:- cowd.Jx!gin .~ .  , su~~tive di$cu5sion, iliet.>lrector expressed irritation ~~CIC Wa.s mv,o,_V.e<i' (IJ:,~~\neff~it, stai}ng.~ the ''optic\" of C Cnerformiri11 th. :o.rk.wBs.nooi'   '\n\nc:~ tQ expl~that\n.. or .. m . VI.e~u:e~1o~~:i~~~~~t~I1 ~~~d0~ ;~~~~~d~#~:. .. . .P~_ -.;~~~:'.\n\nAgency48Seg solely on .i~ ~urrerif unde~dlng, that l;ll)aUthorized :~um!m~ ~~: : .\n\n\n\nC06274838\n\nUNCLASSIFIED/DRAFf A TIORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGED\n\n~PPROVED FOR RELEASE DATE:\n14-Jan-2015\n\non the SSCI side of the system and had been repeatedly acces~-had an obligation to answer the question of whether there had been a security violation or a potential violation of law that should be referred to the Department of Justice. Nevertheless, he ordered a\n\"pause\" in th ork being' conducted' b d stated that it was necessary fu consult with the'WH on J:lext steps. Moreover, e expressed his intention to discuss the matter with Committee leadership the next day.\n\nI repeatedly counseled the Director, as well d D/OCA, that it was unwise to ask the WH for direction as to a possi e c mvestigation. If the WH were to order the inquiry stopped, it could constitute an act in furtherance of obstruction of justice. At the least, it could be interpreted that way by Congressional critics and the press. Merely consulting with the WH would place the Director in a bad light, making it appear that he was politicizing a potential criminal matter. 'I also repeatedly counseled that informing Committee leadership of the potential breach at this stage would result in the potential targets ofthe investigation-SSCI staff-being informed.ofthe investigation, and would permit them to .. get their story straight\" prior to being interviewed by Agency security officers or law enforcement, a practice that would not be viewed as appropriate by criininaJ investigators. I again recommended that the matter be placed under the auspices of the Office of Security and tbQs determine next steps, . be they to continue the review or to refer the matter to the Department of Justice.\n\nFollowing these events, I received an e-mail on AIN fro nusmg my work, and asking me to come see the Director so he could tell me how much he appreciated my efforts. I attempted to decline, noting that it wasn't necessary, but!\ninsisted. c___ _ _J\n\nAt 5:.30 on January 16, I was asked to come to the Director's office. The Director said he understood I was concerned about events relating to this matter. Referencing the meeting on the evening of January 13, he said he could come off as \"brusque\" but that -he hoped he hadn't offended me. He went on to say this was a difficult matter, but he was the Director and had to make a decision about the proper way to proceed. He said he appreciated my advice, fully supported all my actions in this matter, and urged me to be proactive in coming to him with future concerns-directly if necessary, rather than through staff. I thanked him for his consideration in bringing me in, but noted that an~\ndiscomfort I had concerning this matter was not related to his demeanor at the January' l3\nmeeting, but rather stemmed from a concern that I had not adequately or with sufficient force conveyed what I perceived as the legal risks iriherent in his chosen course of action.\n\nHe asked me what he should do going forward and I made three recommendations:\nPI:ovid S with written instructions to cariy out a review of this matter using all available means at her disposal; and to arrive at a recommendation ''without fear or favor''; to refrain from further discussions with the WH until such time as the facts were knowri; and tO contact FBI to let them know of the potential breach-noting that the facts are incomplete and that it could tum out to be a matter oflittle consequence-but to inform the Bureau of the actions that had been taken and to accept help in conducting the forensic work if offered. The Director thanked me and noted that these all seemed to be\n\n\n\nC06274838\n\nUNCLASSIFIED/DRAFT ATTORNEY -CLIENT PRIVILEGED\n\nAPPROVED FOR RELEASE DATE:\n14-Jan-2015\n\ngood ideas, and that he would pursue them. I again thanked him for his thoughtfulness. The CQnversation was cordial throughout.\n\nAddendum re Feinstein letter of January 23, 2014\n\nI share a few thoughts about Sen. Feinstein's ietter-in particular, it's most imJ)ortant implicit assertion, that the Agency is not.permitted to access the SSCI side of the CIA system for purposes of security monitoring and to ensure the safety of classified mareri~.\n\nThat assertion is simply incorrect. Throughout the life of the SSCI review CIA has in fact performed security monitoring and exerted compliance control over RDI Net,\n\n. including on the SSCI side of the system. The Agency monitors the entire system .as it does all CIA systems, and SSCI awareness of this fact is reflected in the security warnings and disclaimers that SSCI staffers see as they access their side of the system. The security Qriefing provided to SSCI staffers makes it clear that such monitoring I to be expected.\n\nOf course, it must be so. After all, SSCI has neve~ attempted to exert any sort of security protocols or monitoring over the system. To my knowledge, no SSCI security officer has ever accessed the system or requested permission to do so. If SSCI is right in claiming that CIA lacks the authority to maintain security of the system and its compliance with Agency regulations and applicable law, then we have created a system in which no one has that responsibility: Even the DireCtor lacks the authority to establish a system for maintaining extremely sensitive, c~sified doc~ents and exempt it from all security monitoring and compliance. .\n\n. I\n\nIn point offact, of course, DCIA Panetta did not purport to do so here. While SSCI asserted the right to complete hegemony over its side of the system, the Agency did not accept that demand. The Committee cannot establish otherwise by repeatedly citing its unacknowledged and unapproved assertion of complete control. I am told that like many issues of contention between the Agency and the Committee (such as the ultimate ownership of the documents being provided to the SSCI, which the Commitree still claims should be given over for permanent storage on the Hill following conclusion of the Review) Agency leadership at the time chose to defer \"open warfare\" over the issue of security by not making it an explicit provjsion in letter exchanges between the Agency and Sen. Feinstein. But at no point did the Agency abdicate its responsibility to maintain security over the system-and my own view is that, in any event, it could not have lawfully done so.\n\nFinally, and per~s of grearest significance, the \"stand alone\" nature of the system was only important, as the letter from Sen. Feinstein explicitly admits, \"because it was recognized to contain SSCI work product.\" The preliminary audit conducted in this instance, which took place because there was a reasonable ba.Sis to believe that a violation Qf regulation or law had occurred, did not involve the review of any work product. It was\n\n\n\nC06274838\n\nUNCLASSIFIED/DRAFT ATTORNEY -CLIENT PRIVILEGED\n\nAPPROVED FOR RELEASE DATE:\n14-Jan-2015\n\nsolely focused on determining whether CIA documents-resident on a CIA owned and operated .system, housed in a CIA facility and entrusted to CIA officers for management and security-which had not been authorized for passage to the Committee had been accessed by the SSCI staff. No substance was reviewed, no documents were moved or altered, and no substantive ~ormiltion was gained.\n\n\n\nC06274838\n\nSECAETffNOFORN j\n\nSI!!CRET/INOFORN\n\n!APPROVED FOR RELEASE DATE:\n14-Jan-2015"
    },
    {
        "text": "Biological Sciences Experts Group CONCEPT PAPER\n\nI.\n\n(U) TITLE\n\n(U) Biological Sciences Experts Group\n\nII.\n\n(U) PURPOSE\n\n(U//FOUO) The National Counterproliferation Center (NCPC) within the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) has identified a series of significant scientific and technical issues that are of common concern to several Intelligence Community (IC) elements and relate to potential biological threats and biological weapons of mass destruction (B-WMD).  To effectively and expeditiously address these issues, expertise that lies outside of the United States (U.S.) government (USG) must be enlisted and applied on an integrated and strategic basis.    To do this, NCPC will retain a cadre of life-sciences experts to provide technical advice and counsel on specific scientific and technical issues relevant to the IC's mission to counter the threat posed by the potential proliferation of biological weapons and related technologies.   This program will be known as the NCPC Biological Sciences Experts Group (BSEG).\n\nIII.\n\n(U) AUTHORITY\n\n(U//FOUO) BSEG experts will provide technical advice to the Director of the National Counterproliferation Center (D/NCPC) on life-science issues that are of importance and concern to elements of the IC.\n\n(U//FOUO) The BSEG supports The Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction's recommendation in Chapter Thirteen: The Changing Proliferation Threat and the Intelligence Response: \"Working with the Biological Sciences Community.\"  The BSEG will reach outside of the Federal government to our nation's leading life-science experts to develop a more robust and mutually beneficial relationship with the IC in order to counter better the threats posed by biological agents.\n\n\nIV.\n\n(U) FUNCTION\n\n(U//FOUO) The purpose of the BSEG program is to leverage and apply specialized scientific and technical life-science expertise that is predominantly resident outside of the USG, to specific technical and scientific issues of significant common concern to the IC, relating to the threat posed by existing or potential biological threats agents.\n\n(U//FOUO) Its purview extends to work done by the IC relevant to: known and emerging biological threat agents (BTA), or materiel; existing state BT programs and the potential threats from BT materiel or expertise available to/from state programs and/or terrorists, including B-WMD.\n\n(U//FOUO) Any element of the Intelligence Community may suggest to the D/NCPC specific topics or issues for research or analysis by BSEG experts.   The D/NCPC, through the NCPC Senior Bio Advisor, shall then designate specific topics or issues for tasking to specific BSEG contractors.   The D/NCPC may task these projects to be undertaken by individual BSEG contractors, or by groups of individual BSEG contractors, as appropriate.  The D/NCPC, or their designee, shall establish the terms and conditions for each contracted assignment.\n\nV.\n\n(U) DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES\n\n(U//FOUO) To strengthen the integration of the life-science and intelligence communities and facilitate access of the IC to life-science experts outside of the Federal government, the types of issues that the Director of NCPC may assign to the BSEG are:\n1. (U//FOUO) Supporting the IC customers in the design of scientific/technical experimental protocols, intelligence analyses, or collection methodologies against BTA, biological warfare (BW) agents, and/or state and non-state actors which do, or may pose a threat to the U.S.;\n\n2. (U//FOUO) Advising on strategies to improve the execution, or interpretation of results of experimental protocols, analysis, and collection against the aforementioned agents and or actors;\n\n3. (U//FOUO) Undertaking technical assessments/performance review of the IC's scientific/technical programs, analytical products, and collection methodologies against the aforementioned agents and or actors;\n\n4. (U//FOUO) Address any other issues as requested by the D/NCPC or IC's departments or agencies. (U//FOUO) The BSEG shall neither produce analytical intelligence products nor engage in collection.\n\nVI.\n\n(U) STRUCTURE\n\nA.\n\nBSEG Membership:\n\n(U//FOUO) It is currently contemplated that initially approximately 12 non-USG\nindividuals will be retained to serve as experts/independent contractors for the BSEG program.  These experts will be selected by the D/NCPC.   They shall be retained under the auspices of the National Intelligence Council Associates program (NIC Associates).\n\n\n(U//FOUO) The work of the BSEG experts will be administered by the Senior Bio\nAdvisor to the D/NCPC, on behalf of the D/NCPC, and the BSEG Executive Secretariat.\n(U//FOUO) It is currently contemplated that, to the extent possible, the initial\nBSEG individuals will include contractors with expertise in the following areas:\n Microbiology (bacteriology/virology/genetics, et al.)\n Molecular Biology  Synthetic Biology (e.g. structural/functional genomics, proteomics)  Forensic Sciences (e.g. microbial forensics)  Biochemistry  Medicine\n Pharmacology  Pathology (human/animal/plant)  Immunology  Public Health/ Epidemiology  Veterinary Medicine  Food Safety/ Security/ Production  Agricultural Sciences  Pharmaceutical-, Biotechnology-manufacturing/production  Pharmaceutical/ Biotechnology business practices  Biosecurity (to include biosafety, biocontainment, bio-assurancy, et al.)\n Counterproliferation/counterterrorism issues  Former or current state bioweapons programs  Former or current BT terrorist programs\n\n(U//FOUO) Each contractor will be retained under a one-year contract, with an\noption for additional renewals, at the discretion of the D/NCPC.   It is anticipated, that contractors will be available to serve for at least 3-4 years. (U//FOUO) BSEG experts will be and retain the status of independent contractors for the\nU.S. Government and will be bound and obligated by all laws and regulations that pertain\nto that status.  At the discretion of the D/NCPC they may be tasked to undertake assignments individually or, as appropriate, in groups.\nB.\nBSEG Network Membership: (U//FOUO) The BSEG shall be supported through a network of non-USG subject\nmatter experts, hereafter referred to as the 'Network.'  The Network shall serve as\nconsultants to the BSEG members and IC representatives on an as-needed basis. (U//FOUO) The D/NCPC, BSEG members, or IC representatives may nominate\nindividuals to be added to the Network in order to accomplish requests for actions.\n\nAppointment: (U//FOUO) Each contractor will be retained under a one-year contract, with an\noption for additional renewals, at the discretion of the Director of NCPC.   It is anticipated, that contractors will be available to serve for at least 3-4 years.\n\nC.\nIntelligence Community Representatives:\n\n(U//FOUO) A steering group of IC representatives will be established to advise\nthe D/NCPC, through his Senior Advisor on Bio Issues, on the utilization of BSEG\ncontractors.   That steering group may include representatives from:\n\n Office of the Director of National Intelligence\n National Counterterrorism Center\n Central Intelligence Agency  Department of Defense  Department of Energy  Department of Homeland Security  Department of State  Department of the Treasury  Department of Justice/ Federal Bureau of Investigation  National Geospatial Intelligence Agency  National Reconnaissance Office  National Security Agency\n Others as appropriate\n\nD.\nBSEG Executive Secretariat:\n\n(U//FOUO) A BSEG Executive Secretariat will be established to support the\nmission of the BES.  The responsibilities of the Secretariat shall include supporting and managing the BSEG's day-to-day operations and serve as the point-of-contact for the BSEG issues with the Core and Network contractors and the IC representatives. (U//FOUO) The BSEG Executive Secretariat will be responsible for obtaining\ncontractor personnel and other administrative support necessary to support the mission of the BSEG. (U//FOUO) The BSEG Executive Secretariat will be responsible for managing the\ntaskings to and reports from the BSEG members.\nVII.\n(U) TASKING PROCEDURES\n\n(U//FOUO) Any agency of Intelligence Community may suggest to the Senior Bio\nAdvisor to the Director/NCPC with specific topics or issues for tasking to BSEG\ncontractor(s).  As noted above, in selecting issues and topics for assignment to BSEG contractors, the D/NCPC shall consider the significance of the issue in relation to the IC's\nmission to identify and help counter existing or potential biological threats to the U.S.;\nwhether the issue is significant primarily for one IC element, or whether it has broader implications across the IC; whether there are existing programs within the IC that are available for addressing the issue; the appropriateness of the issue for tasking to non- USG independent contractors; and, whether there are any contractors in the BSEG\nprogram that appear to have specialized expertise that is particularly relevant to the proposed problem or issue.   Intelligence Community elements may be called upon to work with specific BSEG contractors, to help them fulfill specific tasks or assignments.\n\n(U//FOUO) The IC members may submit request for action(s) to the BSEG chairs for prioritization of the project to the BSEG according to criteria in the aforementioned paragraph.  Submission of requests will be through a standardized template to be generated by the BSEG Executive Secretariat.\n\n(U//FOUO) The IC members shall be invited to all formal meetings of the BSEG.\n\n\n(U//FOUO) The IC members shall receive quarterly updates on the BSEG's activities.\n\n\nVIII. (U) MEETINGS\n\n(U//FOUO) Plenary BSEG meetings shall be held at least quarterly and may be convened on as-needed basis as requested by the D/NCPC, IC members, or the co-chairs.\n\nThe purpose of the meetings is to provide updated intelligence briefings to the members of the BSEG and obtain the members' comments on the work being done.\n\n(U//FOUO) Whenever possible, the Executive Secretariat will facilitate virtual meetings of the Core members, network members, or individuals, as needed, for a specific request for action through appropriately secure communications channels.\n\n\n(U//FOUO) BSEG Members may request intelligence briefings on subjects relevant to their research subject to discretion of the D/NCPC.\n\nIX.\n\n(U) COMPENSATION\n\n(U//FOUO) Members shall be paid at a rate of $_____, plus per diem and travel expenses as authorized by ____________.   Representatives who are officers or employees of the United States government shall not receive compensation for service.\n\nXI.\n\n(U) REPORTS\n\n(U//FOUO) The BSEG will author and provide to the D/NCPC an annual report of its actions and accomplishments.\n\n(U//FOUO) The IC members will be requested for an annual performance evaluation of the BSEG's activities and value to their mission. (U//FOUO) BSEG contractors may be required to provide the results of their work to the D/ NCPC or to selected IC elements at any time.  They may be asked to provide written reports and make themselves available for direct consultations, as determined by the D/NCPC.\n\nXI.\n\n(U) TERMINATION DATE\n\n(U//FOUO) It is currently contemplated that this program will be maintained for three years, from the date of the hiring of the first BSEG contractor.   Upon the completion of one year after the BSEG is stood up, the D/NCPC will consult with participating elements of the IC to solicit their views as to the utility of this initiative and whether it should be continued.  The D/NCPC will then make a recommendation to the DNI regarding the continuation of this program and the renewal of any charter.\n\nDefinitions:\n\nOffensive Biological warfare program: Offensive BW programs are those whose objective is to research, develop, produce, and weaponize biological agents for overt or covert delivery against civilian or military targets, including personnel and agricultural targets. Biological warfare agents: BW agents include such living pathogens as bacteria and viruses, as well as biological toxins, designed to incapacitate, injure, or kill humans, crops, or livestock. Biological weapons: A device fabricated for the purpose of delivering and disseminating a biological warfare agent.\n\n\nBio-defense:  The development and use of countermeasures (medical and non-medical) to predict, prepare for, protect against, and respond to attacks using biological threat agents. Biological warfare applicable: Material and nonmaterial resources which are capable of being exploited in the development of an offensive biological warfare capability. Dual-use technology: Research, equipment, materials, technology and expertise with legitimate scientific purpose that might be misused to pose a threat to public health, homeland and/or national security."
    },
    {
        "text": "# Sandia Report Sand2012-2427 Unlimited Release Printed March 2012\n\n\n\n## Cyber Threat Metrics\n\n\nMark Mateski, Cassandra M. Trevino, Cynthia K. Veitch, John Michalski, J. Mark Harris, Scott Maruoka, Jason Frye Prepared by Sandia National Laboratories Albuquerque, New Mexico 87185 Sandia National Laboratories is a multi-program laboratory managed and operated by Sandia Corporation, a wholly owned subsidiary of Lockheed Martin Corporation, for the U.S. Department of Energy's National Nuclear Security Administration under contract DE-AC04-94AL85000. Approved for public release; further dissemination unlimited\n\n\nIssued by Sandia National Laboratories, operated for the United States Department of Energy by Sandia Corporation.\n\n\nNOTICE: This report was prepared as an account of work sponsored by an agency of the United States Government. Neither the United States Government, nor any agency thereof, nor any of their employees, nor any of their contractors, subcontractors, or their employees, make any warranty, express or implied, or assume any legal liability or responsibility for the accuracy, completeness, or usefulness of any information, apparatus, product, or process disclosed, or represent that its use would not infringe privately owned rights. Reference herein to any specific commercial product, process, or service by trade name, trademark, manufacturer, or otherwise, does not necessarily constitute or imply its endorsement, recommendation, or favoring by the United States Government, any agency thereof, or any of their contractors or subcontractors. The views and opinions expressed herein do not necessarily state or reflect those of the United States Government, any agency thereof, or any of their contractors.\n\nPrinted in the United States of America. This report has been reproduced from the best available copy. Available to DOE and DOE contractors from U.S. Department of Energy\n\n\nOffice of Scientific and Technical Information\n\nP.O. Box 62\n\nOak Ridge, TN  37831\nTelephone: (865)576-8401\n\nFacsimile: (865)576-5728\n\nE-Mail: reports@adonis.osti.gov\n\nOnline ordering: http://www.osti.gov/bridge Available to the public from\nU.S. Department of Commerce\n\nNational Technical Information Service\n\n5285 Port Royal Rd\n\nSpringfield, VA  22161\nTelephone: (800)553-6847\n\nFacsimile: (703)605-6900\n\nE-Mail: orders@ntis.fedworld.gov\n\nOnline ordering: http://www.ntis.gov/help/ordermethods.asp?loc=7-4-0#online\n# Sand2012-2427 Unlimited Release Printed March 2012 Cyber Threat Metrics\n\n\nMark Mateski John Michalski, Cynthia Veitch Critical Systems Security, 05621\nSecurity Systems Analysis, 06612\n\n\nCassandra Trevino Jason Frye Analytics and Cryptography, 05635\nInformation Engineering, 09515\n\nMark Harris, Scott Maruoka Assurance Tech and Assessments, 05627\n\nSandia National Laboratories P.O. Box 5800\nAlbuquerque, New Mexico 87185-MS0671\n\n## Abstract\n\nThreats are generally much easier to list than to describe, and much easier to describe than to measure. As a result, many organizations list threats. Fewer describe them in useful terms, and still fewer measure them in meaningful ways. This is particularly true in the dynamic and nebulous domain of *cyber* threatsa domain that tends to resist easy measurement and, in some cases, appears to defy any measurement. We believe the problem is tractable. In this report we describe threat metrics and models for characterizing threats consistently and unambiguously.\n\nThis page intentionally blank\n\n\n## Acronyms And Abbreviations\n\n| APT     | Advanced Persistent Threat                   |\n|---------|----------------------------------------------|\n| C&C     | Command and Control                          |\n| CNO/CNE | Computer Network Operations and Exploitation |\n| DHS     | Department of Homeland Security              |\n| DOE     | Department of Energy                         |\n| FCEB    | Federal Civilian Executive Branch            |\n| FNS     | Federal Network Security                     |\n| HSB     | Human Studies Board                          |\n| OTA     | Operational Threat Assessment                |\n| RFP     | Request for Proposal                         |\n| RVA     | Risk and Vulnerability Assessment            |\n| VAP     | Vulnerability Assessment Program             |\n| VPN     | Virtual Private Network                      |\n| XSS     | Cross-site Scripting                         |\n\n\n## 1 Introduction\n\nFor the purposes of this report, a *threat* is a person or organization that intends to cause harm.\n\nThreats are generally much easier to list than to describe, and much easier to describe than to measure. As a result, many organizations list threats, but fewer describe them in useful terms and still fewer measure them in meaningful ways. Several advantages ensue from the ability to measure threats accurately and consistently. Good threat measurement, for example, can improve understanding and facilitate analysis. It can also reveal trends and anomalies, underscore the significance of specific vulnerabilities, and help associate threats with potential consequences. In short, good threat measurement supports good risk management.\n\nUnfortunately, the practice of defining and applying good threat metrics remains immature. This is particularly true in the dynamic and nebulous domain of *cyber* threatsa domain that tends to resist easy measurement and, in some cases, appears to defy any measurement. We believe the problem is tractable. In this report we describe threat metrics and models for characterizing threats consistently and unambiguously. We embed these metrics within a process and suggest ways in which the metrics and process can be applied and extended.\n\n## 1.1 Background\n\nThe Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Federal Network Security (FNS) program created the Risk and Vulnerability Assessment (RVA) program to assist Federal Civilian Executive Branch (FCEB) agencies with conducting risk and vulnerability assessments [1]. These assessments individually identify agency-specific vulnerabilities and combine to provide a view of cyber risk and vulnerability across the entire federal enterprise. The RVA program has worked with Sandia National Laboratories to develop a basis Operational Threat Assessment (OTA) methodology that will result in an unclassified estimate of current threats to an FCEB system to be shared with the system owner [2]. The goal of the OTA phase of a risk and vulnerability assessment is to provide an accurate appraisal of the threat levels faced by a given FCEB agency. Information is collected about the system being assessed through document review and targeted searches of both open source and classified data sets. The identified threats, vulnerabilities, mitigations, and controls may be confirmed or discounted during assessment activities. OTA is designed to provide an efficient threat estimate that is consistent from agency to agency and analyst to analyst. Given the scope of the RVA program, a large number of assessments will be conducted each year, addressing agencies with widely varying sizes and missions. The consistency and repeatability of each threat assessment is important to ensure similar treatment of all agencies and facilitate the combination of risk assessment results for all agencies. Toward this end, this report reviews cyber threat metrics and models that may potentially contribute to the OTA methodology.\n\n## 1.2 Scope And Purpose\n\nThe purpose of this report is to support the OTA phase of risk and vulnerability assessment. To this end, we focus on the task of characterizing cyber threats using consistent threat metrics and models. In particular, we address threat metrics and models for describing malicious cyber threats to US FCEB agencies and systems.\n\n## 1.3 Report Structure\n\nThis report is organized as follows:\n\n Chapter 1 provides background, scope, and purpose;\n Chapter 2 describes the nature and utility of threat metrics and models;  Chapter 3 introduces the generic threat matrix and discusses its application as a threat model;  Chapter 4 discusses several sources of possible threat metrics; and  Chapter 5 concludes the report by sketching a threat analysis process.\n\n## 2 Threat Metrics And Models\n\nIn order to define and apply good threat metrics, we must first understand the characteristics of a good metric and then understand how those metrics can be framed to establish a model to describe threat.\n\n## 2.1 Threat Metrics\n\nBefore we discuss our approach to threat metrics, it is useful to review the following four questions.\n\n| What is a metric?                                                             | A concise dictionary definition of metric is \"a standard of measurement\"    |\n|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------|\n| [3]. Similarly, a current security metrics guide describes a metric as \"a     |                                                                             |\n| consistent standard of measurement\" [4]. Metrics allow us to measure          |                                                                             |\n| attributes and behaviors of interest. A                                       |                                                                             |\n| meter                                                                         |                                                                             |\n| , for example, is a metric                                                    |                                                                             |\n| that allows us to measure length, while the                                   |                                                                             |\n| number of defects per                                                         |                                                                             |\n| shipment                                                                      |                                                                             |\n| is a metric that allows us to measure quality.                                |                                                                             |\n|                                                                               | Confusion between a                                                         |\n| metric                                                                        |                                                                             |\n| and a                                                                         |                                                                             |\n| measure                                                                       |                                                                             |\n| sometimes occurs. Bob                                                         |                                                                             |\n| Frost, a performance measurement authority, clarifies the terms by            |                                                                             |\n| noting that \"'metric' is the unit of measure, [while] 'measure' means a       |                                                                             |\n| specific observation characterizing performance\" [5]. Thus, if the            |                                                                             |\n| number of defects per hour is the metric, the measure is the observed         |                                                                             |\n| value of, for example, seven.                                                 |                                                                             |\n| Why do we use                                                                 |                                                                             |\n| metrics?                                                                      |                                                                             |\n| When we measure something using consistent metrics, we improve our            |                                                                             |\n| ability to understand it, control it, and, in the case of a threat, better    |                                                                             |\n| defend against it. According to the performance engineer H. James             |                                                                             |\n| Harrington, \"Measurement is the first step that leads to control and          |                                                                             |\n| eventually improvement. If you can't measure something, you can't             |                                                                             |\n| understand it. If you can't understand it, you can't control it. If you can't |                                                                             |\n| control it, you can't improve it.\" [6].                                       |                                                                             |\n| What makes a good                                                             |                                                                             |\n| metric?                                                                       |                                                                             |\n| A quality metric typically exhibits several conventional characteristics.     |                                                                             |\n| For example, a good metric is clear and unambiguous. It facilitates           |                                                                             |\n| inexpensive collection (that is, the cost of collecting measurement data      |                                                                             |\n| doesn't exceed the value of the data). A good metric also supports            |                                                                             |\n| decision making and precludes subjective interpretation.                      |                                                                             |\n|                                                                               | Many authors further suggest that good metrics implement quantitative       |\n| rather than qualitative scales. On this point, security professional          |                                                                             |\n| Andrew Jaquith states that \"good metrics should express results using         |                                                                             |\n| numbers rather than high-low-medium ratings, grades, traffic lights, or       |                                                                             |\n| other nonnumeric methods.\" He notes further that \"Ordinal numbers            |                                                                             |\n| created by assigning a series of subjective scores numeric equivalents       |                                                                             |\n| are functionally equivalent to ratings\" [4]. Although the goal of             |                                                                             |\n| implementing only quantitative scales is certainly a worthy one,              |                                                                             |\n| practitioners continue to debate precisely how to do this. For now, most      |                                                                             |\n| organizations continue to implement qualitative scales for measuring          |                                                                             |\n| \"intangible\" factors such as motivation and intent.                           |                                                                             |\n\n\nAn additional factor to consider here is that no single metricno matter how good it might beis likely to tell the whole story. Multiple metrics from multiple perspectives are usually needed. This, in fact, is one of the driving ideas behind the widely used Balanced Scorecard that Bob Frost\nrefers to as a \"measurement framework\" or a \"performance model.\" Not\nonly does a measurement framework help organize sets of metrics, Frost\nnotes that it also \"can tell you what types of variables to consider and\nwhere to look\" [7].\nWhat makes a good threat metric?\nA good threat metric is foremost a good metric. It is clear and efficient, and it supports decision making. An example of a good threat metric might be number of attacks per month. If we are able to define attacks clearly and count them economically, we will most likely have a good metric. Over time, the count of attackswhether high or lowgrants the defender insight into the attacker's intent and capability. Given this, the defender can better calculate risk and allocate resources.\n\n## 2.2 Threat Models\n\nAs we noted above, a stand-alone metric is usually insufficient to describe the characteristics or behavior of a complex system or actor. Much more useful is a \"measurement framework\" that combines metrics and their relationships into a complete and consistent whole. Although models can be much more than measurement frameworks, a measurement framework is certainly a model. In this section, we consider *threat models*. More specifically, we consider *cyber* threat models.\n\nWhat is a threat?\nWe informally describe a threat as \"a person or organization that intends to cause harm.\" More formally, a threat is \"a malevolent actor, whether an organization or an individual, with a specific political, social, or personal goal and some level of capability and intention to oppose an established government, a private organization, or an accepted social norm\" [8].\n\nThreats can be of different types, and they can pursue different goals. Depending on the environment in which an information system or network is located and the type of information it is designed to support, different classes of threats will have an interest in attempting to gain different types of information or access, based on their particular capabilities.\nWhat is a model?\nInformally, a model is a simplified representation of something else. A model ignores, masks, or abstracts unimportant or unnecessary details, thereby highlighting the details of interest. For example, a model of a real-world computer network will abstract away certain details and highlight others.\nWhat is a threat model?\nClearly, a threat model is a model of a threat. Per the definition of model above, a threat model highlights the details of interest regarding a threat, class of threat, or threats in general. A threat\nmodel will generally address both a threat's capabilities and its\nintent.1 Because our mandate is to address cyber threat metrics, the\nmodels we consider below emphasize the intent and capability of cyber threats.\nToday, cyber threat models are frequently little more than a progression of semi-descriptive labels: hackers, hacktivists,2 script kiddies,3 nation states, cyber terrorists,4 *organized crime*, or malicious insiders. These labels reinforce preconceived notions regarding motivation and resources. Unfortunately, this method undermines a clear understanding of capabilitiesan understanding that is particularly useful when attempting to establish protections for an information system or network. The model that follows is designed to address the limitations of current cyber threat models. Additionally, the model that follows is designed to promote consistency, even (or especially) when the analysis is performed by different analysts. Arming analysts with clearly defined, uniform threat models based on consistent metrics helps reduce the effects of personal bias and preconceived notions. Moreover, the value of consistency grows with time. Given a standardized threat model, an analyst can store consistent threat reports in a reference database accessible to other analysts. As new threats are encountered, these threats can be analyzed using the same process, allowing for up-to-date, accurate threat estimates that contribute to a consistent, repeatable, and reliable risk and vulnerability assessment process. In the remainder of the report, we present and describe a threat model based on the generic threat matrix. We then discuss a range of possible metrics sources. We close by bringing these elements together into a broader threat assessment process.\n\nThis page intentionally blank\n\n\n## 3 The Generic Threat Matrix5\n\nThe generic threat matrix (Table 1) is currently used in the OTA methodology. Sandia developed the matrix in order to characterize and differentiate threats against targets of interest. The purpose of the matrix is to identify attributes that could help the analyst characterize threats based on their overall capabilities. This characterization allows for the description of the full spectrum of threat without assigning a label (with its preconceived notions) to a specific threat. Although it is impossible to capture each distinct type of threat consistently, the generic threat matrix enables government entities and intelligence organizations to categorize threat into a common vocabulary. Additionally, the generic threat matrix allows analysts in the unclassified environment to (1) identify potential attack paths that could be supported by the asserted capability and (2) identify proper mitigation steps to thwart attacks.\n\n\nReproduced from Duggan et al. [8].\n\nAs presented in Table 1, the columns of the generic threat matrix describe possible attributes of a threat (described in further detail in the following sections), while the rows define the capability of a threat to act upon each attribute. A unique metric defines each attribute. Some of the metrics are quantitative (for example, the number of technical personnel), while others are qualitative (the level of cyber knowledge). From this perspective, the matrix is a framework or model for organizing a set of related metrics.\n\nTHREAT LEVEL 1 is the most capable of achieving an objective or goal, while LEVEL 8 is the least capable. In general, each threat level, from LEVEL 8 to LEVEL 1, represents a more dangerous threat than the previous level. Although a LEVEL 8 threat may be able to attain the same objective as a LEVEL 1 threat, it will be through an unprotected vulnerability of an asset, the fortuitous timing of an attack, or simple luck, rather than a capability characteristic possessed by the threat organization. It is possible, indeed likely, that at least one specific threatout of the full spectrum of threats\nwill not fit exactly into a specific threat level. In this case, the threat should be categorized into the level that has the most similar threat profile. This is the very reason that the generic threat matrix has been designed with levels-of-magnitude differences between subsequent threat levels: to ensure that a threat is not equally similar to two adjacent levels.\n\n## 3.1 Threat Attributes\n\nA threat attribute is a discrete characteristic or distinguishing property of a threat. The combined characteristics of a threat describe the threat's willingness and ability to pursue its goal.\n\nHowever, both willingness and ability are defined by multiple, separate attributes. The intent of this delineation of attributes is that each defines a distinctive characteristic of a threat and that no inherent dependencies exist between any two threat attributes. There are two families of threat attributes: *commitment* attributes that describe the threat's willingness and *resource* attributes that describe the threat's ability.\n\n## 3.1.1 Commitment Attribute Family\n\nCommitment attributes are the characteristics of a threat that describe the threat's willingness to pursue its goal. Characteristics of commitment are indicative of a threat's capability because they exemplify the drive of the threat to accomplish its goal. Those threats with the highest commitment will stop at nothing in pursuit of the goal, while those with lower overall commitment will not display such drive and ambition. There are three attributes in the commitment family:\n\n INTENSITY: The diligence or persevering determination of a threat in the pursuit of its\ngoal. This attribute also includes the passion felt by the threat for its goal. Intensity is a measure of how far a threat is willing to go and what a threat is willing to risk to accomplish its goal. Threats with higher intensity are, therefore, considered more dangerous because of their driving ambition in pursuit of a goal.\n STEALTH: The ability of the threat to maintain a necessary level of secrecy throughout the\npursuit of its goal. The maintenance of secrecy may require the ability to obscure any or all details about the threat organization, including its goal, its structure, or its internal\noperations. A higher level of stealth allows a threat to hide its intended activities, as well as its internal structure, from the outside world. This hinders intelligence gathering and pre-emptive measures to counter, or prevent, attacks by the threat.\n\n TIME: The period of time that a threat is capable of dedicating to planning, developing,\nand deploying methods to reach an objective. In the case of a cyber or kinetic attack, it includes any time necessary for all steps of implementation up to actual execution. The more time a threat is willing and able to commit to preparing an attack, the more potential the threat has for devastating impacts.\nAdditional details regarding the levels of each attribute can be found in Duggan et al. [8].\n\n## 3.1.2 Resource Attribute Family\n\nResource attributes are the characteristics of a threat that describe the people, knowledge, and access available to a threat for pursuing its goal. Characteristics of resources are indicative of a threat's capability because greater resources may allow a threat to accomplish an objective or goal more easily and with greater overall adaptability. There are three attributes in the resource family:\n\n TECHNICAL PERSONNEL: The number of group members that a threat is capable of\ndedicating to the building and deployment of the technical capability in pursuit of its\ngoal.6 Technical personnel includes only group members with specific types of\nknowledge or skills, such as kinetic or cyber, and those directly involved with the actual fabrication of the group's weapons. A threat with a higher level of technical personnel has greater potential for innovative design and development, allowing for the possibility of new methods of reaching a goal that may not have been available in the past. In addition, a higher level of technical personnel also expedites the design and development of a threat's plans for attack.\n KNOWLEDGE: The threat's level of theoretical and practical proficiency and the threat's\ncapability of employing that proficiency in pursuit of its goal. Knowledge also includes the ability of a threat to share information, acquire training in a necessary discipline, and maintain a research and development program. However, this attribute does not include any proficiency found or purchased outside the threat organization. This attribute includes knowledge pertaining to both an offensive and defensive capability within the category. The greater the knowledge of a threat as a whole, the more capability a threat has to pursue its goal with fewer resources and in less time. Also, a threat's knowledge provides a means to differentiate between threats that are cyber, kinetic, or hybrid-based. There are two basic categories of knowledge:\n CYBER KNOWLEDGE: The theoretical and practical proficiency relating to\ncomputers, information networks, or automated systems.\n KINETIC KNOWLEDGE: The theoretical and practical proficiency relating to\nphysical systems, the motion of physical bodies, and the forces associated with that movement.\n ACCESS: The threat's ability to place a group member within a restricted system\nwhether through cyber or kinetic meansin pursuit of the threat's goal. A restricted system is considered to be any system, whether cyber or physical, where access is granted based on privileges or credentials. The characteristic of access details a threat's ability to infiltrate a restricted system, whether through a privileged group member, the blackmail and coercion of an innocent bystander, or the corruption of an under-protected network or computer system. Infiltration by a threat can lead to a wide variety of effects: the need for\nfewer resources to achieve an objective, the implementation of a long-term scheme of\nproduct-tampering, or an increased level of intimate knowledge of a target.\nAdditional details regarding the levels of each attribute can be found in Duggan et al. [8].\n\n## 3.2 Profiles Of Threat Capability\n\nThere are several observations that can be made after review of the generic threat matrix. First, there are two boundary conditions necessary for establishing viable threat profiles:\n\n Threats with a LEVEL 1 profile will always have the highest capability within each\nattribute.\n Threats with the highest numbered level (LEVEL 8 in this matrix) will always have the\nlowest capability within each attribute.\nSecond, a threat's level of TECHNICAL PERSONNEL can aid in understanding a threat's other attributes:\n\n Threats with more TECHNICAL PERSONNEL will necessarily have greater INTENSITY,\nKNOWLEDGE, and ACCESS. This is based on the assumption that more personnel create more viable opportunities.\n Threats with a TECHNICAL PERSONNEL level of ONES will not have high KNOWLEDGE,\nbecause these threats have little capacity for information sharing or research and development programs.\n Threats with TECHNICAL PERSONNEL level of ONES will not have high INTENSITY because\nthese threats are not likely to be self-sacrificing.\nThe level of KNOWLEDGE possessed by a threat organization also follows an observable pattern:\n\n Threats with high CYBER KNOWLEDGE will not have low KINETIC KNOWLEDGEand\nvice-versabecause of the application of expert proficiency in both theoretical and practical domains.\nA final observation can be made regarding a threat organization's capability for ACCESS:\n\n Threats with high KNOWLEDGECYBER or KINETICwill have at least medium ACCESS\ndue to the assumption that it is easier to attain and harder to detect access achieved\nthrough expert proficiency.\n\n## 3.3 Mitre's Cyber Prep Methodology\n\nThe MITRE Corporation's Cyber Prep methodology [9] characterizes threats using an approach similar in many ways to the generic threat matrix [1].This is not surprising; the MITRE work cites two papers on the generic threat matrix papers as sources. The MITRE approach, for example, also defines threat as *the adversary*, and it characterizes threats using qualitative levels, in this case five: advanced, significant, moderate, limited, and unsophisticated.\n\nThe approach, however, differs in one major feature: It divides the threat attributes into three classes (capability, intent, and targeting)7 rather than two (commitment and resources). It does not decompose the three classes, but it does describe example threats in which the values of the three classes vary more than they do in the generic threat matrix levels. For example, the paper cited above describes adversaries of low capability and intent and moderate targeting, and adversaries of high capability and low intent and targeting. The eight levels shown in Table 1 do not include these sorts of high-low mixes. The generic threat matrix and the tabular threat characterization approach used in Cyber Prep are clearly cousins. Each has apparent strengths and weaknesses. The generic threat matrix offers the analyst a discrete set of adversary levels to consider. More can be generated, certainly, but the limited number will in many cases be an advantage. The analyst is not required to search a large space but instead looks for the closest approximationa much easier task that is likely to be adequate in most cases. The generic threat matrix also includes both qualitative (STEALTH, KNOWLEDGE) and quantitative (TIME, TECHNICAL PERSONNEL) metrics, while Cyber Prep's metrics are strictly qualitative. The Cyber Prep approach, on the other hand, does allow for differences in targeting. This can be useful, for example, when attempting to differentiate between (1) the adversary with low capability and intent but aggressive targeting and (2) the adversary with high capability, moderate intent, and low targeting. Advocates of the generic threat matrix can argue that \"intent\" addresses both capability and intent and that the two are correlated. Still, the Cyber Prep approach clearly allows for more granular descriptions of adversaries, at least at the level of capability, intent, and targeting.\n\nThis page intentionally blank\n\n\n## 4 Additional Sources Of Threat Metrics\n\nThe generic threat matrix is a useful threat model. It does not, however, capture all possible threat metrics. The following sections outline some additional sources of threat metrics. Some of these supplement and enhance the generic threat matrix, while others offer an independent perspective.\n\n## 4.1 Incident Data\n\nIn this section, we describe some of the categories of incident information that may be used to assess and measure the attributes of a threat. The variables of interest in a complex system may or may not be directly observable. For instance, a network-based cyber-attack on an information system is directly observable if the network data are collected, but the particular size and composition of the threat is not necessarily observable through the same means. The magnitude of a threat's attributes must often be estimated using some indirect method, such as statistical data analysis, expert opinion, or intelligence analysis. In Table 2, we present some example categories of information that may be gleaned from incident reports in order to contribute to the analysis of a threat's capabilities. Note in particular the final column, which specifies the expected relation of the information category to the threat attributes in the generic threat matrix.\n\n| Category                                                        |\n|-----------------------------------------------------------------|\n| Expected Relation to                                            |\n| Threat Attributes                                               |\n|                                                                |\n|                                                                 |\n| What type of incident occurred (e.g., website defacement,       |\n| Incident                                                        |\n| Characteristics                                                 |\n| denial of service, unauthorized access,                         |\n| reconnaissance/probing)?                                        |\n|                                                                |\n|                                                                 |\n| If malicious software (e.g., a virus or Trojan) was involved in |\n| T                                                               |\n| ECHNICAL                                                        |\n| P                                                               |\n| ERSONNEL                                                        |\n|                                                                 |\n| C                                                               |\n| YBER                                                            |\n| K                                                               |\n| NOWLEDGE                                                        |\n|                                                                 |\n|                                                                 |\n| the incident, was its purpose                                   |\n|                                                                |\n|                                                                 |\n| Command and control (C&C)?                                      |\n|                                                                |\n|                                                                 |\n| Remote access?                                                  |\n|                                                                |\n|                                                                 |\n| Data exfiltration?                                              |\n|                                                                |\n|                                                                 |\n| Data manipulation?                                              |\n|                                                                |\n|                                                                 |\n| Activity monitoring?                                            |\n|                                                                |\n|                                                                 |\n| Was the level of security protection on the target system       |\n| Target System                                                   |\n| Characteristics                                                 |\n|                                                                |\n|                                                                 |\n| Highfully protected using access control, file                 |\n| monitoring, up-to-date patches, etc.?                           |\n| T                                                               |\n| ECHNICAL                                                        |\n| P                                                               |\n| ERSONNEL                                                        |\n|                                                                 |\n| C                                                               |\n| YBER                                                            |\n| K                                                               |\n| NOWLEDGE                                                        |\n|                                                                 |\n| A                                                               |\n| CCESS                                                           |\n|                                                                 |\n|                                                                |\n|                                                                 |\n| Moderatesome protections implemented?                          |\n|                                                                |\n|                                                                 |\n| Lowvery limited protections implemented?                       |\n| Timeline                                                        |\n|                                                                |\n|                                                                 |\n| What is the date of initial activity related to incident?       |\n|                                                                |\n|                                                                 |\n| What is the most recent date of activity related to incident?   |\n| I                                                               |\n| NTENSITY                                                        |\n|                                                                 |\n| S                                                               |\n| TEALTH                                                          |\n|                                                                 |\n| T                                                               |\n| IME                                                             |\n|                                                                 |\n|                                                                |\n|                                                                 |\n| On what date was the incident detected?                         |\n| Category                                                          |\n|-------------------------------------------------------------------|\n| Expected Relation to                                              |\n| Threat Attributes                                                 |\n| Covert Activity                                                   |\n|                                                                  |\n|                                                                   |\n| Was activity related to the incident identified by                |\n|                                                                  |\n|                                                                   |\n| Network monitoring?                                               |\n|                                                                  |\n|                                                                   |\n| A monitoring application (e.g., intrusion detection               |\n| S                                                                 |\n| TEALTH                                                            |\n|                                                                   |\n| C                                                                 |\n| YBER                                                              |\n| K                                                                 |\n| NOWLEDGE                                                          |\n|                                                                   |\n| A                                                                 |\n| CCESS                                                             |\n|                                                                   |\n| system or anti-virus software)?                                   |\n|                                                                  |\n|                                                                   |\n| A system administrator?                                           |\n|                                                                  |\n|                                                                   |\n| A system user?                                                    |\n|                                                                  |\n|                                                                   |\n| Were identified activities immediately associated with the        |\n| incident? Or were identified activities originally dismissed as   |\n| false alarms?                                                     |\n|                                                                  |\n|                                                                   |\n| Were event logs or timestamps modified or deleted to obfuscate    |\n| activity associated with the incident?                            |\n|                                                                  |\n|                                                                   |\n| Were file/disk deletion tools involved in the incident?           |\n|                                                                  |\n|                                                                   |\n| Were incident activities related to reconnaissance, probing,      |\n| execution, or exploitation stages of attack?                      |\n| Attack Vector                                                     |\n|                                                                  |\n|                                                                   |\n| Was the incident facilitated by                                   |\n| S                                                                 |\n| TEALTH                                                            |\n|                                                                   |\n| T                                                                 |\n| IME                                                               |\n|                                                                   |\n| C                                                                 |\n| YBER                                                              |\n| K                                                                 |\n| NOWLEDGE                                                          |\n|                                                                   |\n| A                                                                 |\n| CCESS                                                             |\n|                                                                   |\n|                                                                  |\n|                                                                   |\n| Phishing?                                                         |\n|                                                                  |\n|                                                                   |\n| Social engineering (other than phishing)?                         |\n|                                                                  |\n|                                                                   |\n| Remote access (e.g., VPN or modem)?                               |\n|                                                                  |\n|                                                                   |\n| Inside access?                                                    |\n|                                                                  |\n|                                                                   |\n| If the attack was facilitated by any type of social engineering,  |\n| including phishing, was it a targeted, individual approach or a   |\n| broad blanketing approach?                                        |\n|                                                                  |\n|                                                                   |\n| Was more than one computer system affected by this incident?      |\n| Attack                                                            |\n| Sophistication                                                    |\n|                                                                  |\n|                                                                   |\n| Was the internal network accessed on multiple occasions during    |\n| this incident?                                                    |\n|                                                                  |\n|                                                                   |\n| Were activities associated with the incident novel in any way     |\n| S                                                                 |\n| TEALTH                                                            |\n|                                                                   |\n| T                                                                 |\n| IME                                                               |\n|                                                                   |\n| C                                                                 |\n| YBER                                                              |\n| K                                                                 |\n| NOWLEDGE                                                          |\n|                                                                   |\n| A                                                                 |\n| CCESS                                                             |\n|                                                                   |\n| (i.e., a zero-day attack) or common (i.e., easily acquired        |\n| toolsets)?                                                        |\n|                                                                  |\n|                                                                   |\n| Does an anti-virus signature (from any vendor) exist for any      |\n| Anti-virus                                                        |\n| Signature                                                         |\n| malicious software involved in the incident?                      |\n|                                                                  |\n|                                                                   |\n| If so, did the signature exist and was it widely available on the |\n| date of initial activity?                                         |\n| T                                                                 |\n| ECHNICAL                                                          |\n| P                                                                 |\n| ERSONNEL                                                          |\n|                                                                   |\n| C                                                                 |\n| YBER                                                              |\n| K                                                                 |\n| NOWLEDGE                                                          |\n|                                                                   |\n|                                                                   |\n|                                                                  |\n|                                                                   |\n| Was the system physically accessed as part of the incident?       |\n| Physical                                                          |\n| Interaction                                                       |\n|                                                                  |\n|                                                                   |\n| Was the incident facilitated via the introduction of a physical   |\n| medium (e.g., USB drive, CD, hardware)?                           |\n| T                                                                 |\n| ECHNICAL                                                          |\n| P                                                                 |\n| ERSONNEL                                                          |\n|                                                                   |\n| K                                                                 |\n| INETIC                                                            |\n| K                                                                 |\n| NOWLEDGE                                                          |\n|                                                                   |\n| A                                                                 |\n| CCESS                                                             |\n|                                                                   |\n|                                                                  |\n|                                                                   |\n| Did the incident result in any physical, real-world effects?      |\n| Obfuscation                                                       |\n|                                                                  |\n|                                                                   |\n| Was any involved malicious software encrypted or packed?          |\n|                                                                  |\n|                                                                   |\n| Was any activity, function, or script injected into another for   |\n| malicious purposes?                                               |\n| S                                                                 |\n| TEALTH                                                            |\n|                                                                   |\n| T                                                                 |\n| ECHNICAL                                                          |\n| P                                                                 |\n| ERSONNEL                                                          |\n|                                                                   |\n| C                                                                 |\n| YBER                                                              |\n| K                                                                 |\n| NOWLEDGE                                                          |\n|                                                                   |\n| Category                                                           |\n|--------------------------------------------------------------------|\n| Expected Relation to                                               |\n| Threat Attributes                                                  |\n| Data Compromise                                                    |\n|                                                                   |\n|                                                                    |\n| Was data compromised (e.g., manipulated, exposed, deleted) in      |\n| relation to the incident? If so,                                   |\n|                                                                   |\n|                                                                    |\n| What type of data (e.g., OUO, PII, SUI, UCNI) was                  |\n| compromised?                                                       |\n|                                                                   |\n|                                                                    |\n| Did compromised data affect system operation or                    |\n| mission?                                                           |\n| I                                                                  |\n| NTENSITY                                                           |\n|                                                                    |\n| S                                                                  |\n| TEALTH                                                             |\n|                                                                    |\n| T                                                                  |\n| IME                                                                |\n|                                                                    |\n| C                                                                  |\n| YBER                                                               |\n| K                                                                  |\n| NOWLEDGE                                                           |\n|                                                                    |\n| A                                                                  |\n| CCESS                                                              |\n|                                                                    |\n|                                                                    |\n|                                                                   |\n|                                                                    |\n| Was data exfiltrated as part of the incident? If so,               |\n|                                                                   |\n|                                                                    |\n| What type of data (e.g., password hashes, PII, OUO,                |\n| UCI, proprietary, military, security) was exfiltrated?             |\n|                                                                   |\n|                                                                    |\n| Was data exfiltrated on multiple occasions?                        |\n|                                                                   |\n|                                                                    |\n| Was data encrypted as part of the exfiltration process?            |\n| Attribution                                                        |\n|                                                                   |\n|                                                                    |\n| Is it possible to definitively attribute the activities associated |\n| with the incident to a specific actor?                             |\n|                                                                   |\n|                                                                    |\n| Has any group or individual claimed responsibility for the         |\n| incident?                                                          |\n|                                                                   |\n|                                                                    |\n| If so, was the statement public or private? Was the                |\n| statement a general, specific, or limited declaration?             |\n| I                                                                  |\n| NTENSITY                                                           |\n|                                                                    |\n| S                                                                  |\n| TEALTH                                                             |\n|                                                                    |\n| T                                                                  |\n| ECHNICAL                                                           |\n| P                                                                  |\n| ERSONNEL                                                           |\n|                                                                    |\n| C                                                                  |\n| YBER                                                               |\n| K                                                                  |\n| NOWLEDGE                                                           |\n|                                                                    |\n|                                                                    |\n|                                                                   |\n|                                                                    |\n| Has any group or individual made a targeted threat                 |\n| statement against the victim organization?                         |\n|                                                                   |\n|                                                                    |\n| Were hop-points used? If so, how many?                             |\n|                                                                   |\n|                                                                    |\n| Did the attack originate from a U.S. or foreign IP address? If     |\n| the source IP address is in another country, which country?        |\n\n\n## 4.2 Threat Multipliers\n\nAdditional properties of threat exist that, while not distinctive characteristics, can affect one or more threat attributes; they can enhance a threat's capabilities, but they do not affect the threat's profile level. Consider the following three multipliers, each of which can be quantified.\n\n FUNDING: The monetary support available to a threat has historically been used to define\nthe capability of threat groups; however, because the value of currency fluctuates over time, it is a difficult factor to translate into actual capability. As a multiplier, FUNDING can be used to enhance certain threat attributes, such as KNOWLEDGE or ACCESS. On the other hand, it can also reduce the level of a threat attribute such as STEALTHthe purchase of greater KNOWLEDGE or increased access may make an organization more detectable because it is using outside resources.\n ASSETS: A threat's ability to have, build, or acquire the equipment, tools, and material\nnecessary for the pursuit of its goal can be a difficult factor to translate into actual\ncapability. However, like funding, it can enhance a threat's ability to carry out its\nmission.\n TECHNOLOGY: The type of technology that a threat is capable of utilizing or targeting in\npursuit of its goal can be a limiting factor on certain threat attributes, such as TIME and KNOWLEDGE. The fast-paced, dynamic nature of some technology and its development requires up-to-date KNOWLEDGE and quick implementation or application.\n\n## 4.3 Attack Vectors\n\nAn attack vector is an avenue or tool that a threat uses in order to gain access to a device, system, or network in order to launch attacks, gather information, or deliver/leave a malicious item or items in those devices, systems, or networks. An analyst can associate specific attack vectors with specific threat levels in the generic threat matrix (that is, certain vectors may require more commitment and resources, limiting them to the more sophisticated threat levels). An analyst, for example, might associate a given attack vector with THREAT LEVEL 2 through THREAT LEVEL 8 while another vector might be associated with THREAT LEVEL 1 through THREAT LEVEL 3. When performing this sort of assessment, the analyst extends the basic threat model contained in the generic threat matrix. Further work is needed to integrate the model fully, but it should be clear from the description of these vectors below and the content of Table 2 and Table 3 that attack vectors represent a potentially rich source of threat metrics. In addition, each vector suggests a range of associated attack metrics. For instance, how much time does each vector take to plan, stage, and execute? How frequently does each level of threat execute each type of vector? Which vectors do attackers apply against which sorts of targets and vulnerabilities? Each of these questions corresponds to one or more metrics that the analyst can apply within the generic threat matrix or another threat model. Not surprisingly, the number and sophistication of attack vectors grows as technology advances. The popularity of mobile computing offers threats more avenues and tools that they can use to launch attacks, gather information, or deliver/leave malicious applications. Some general attack vectors include the following.\n\n *Phishing attacks* can use a network's applications against its own users. For example, a\ncompany-wide email may include maliciously crafted links to viruses or malware. Additionally, detailed information regarding a network's users can be gathered on the\nInternet via public archives and social networking sites. This information can be used to conduct targeted phishing attacks against individual users that can be very difficult to\ndetect.\n *Unsecured wireless networks* can be used as both a tool and an avenue for launching\ncertain attacks. If attackers are able to gain unauthorized access to a wireless network,\nthey can observe traffic, exfiltrated data, and deny services to legitimate users.\n *Removable media*, such as USB drives, can easily introduce malware into an information\nsystem. The threat doesn't need to be actively involved if an unsuspecting individual\nconnects a USB drive of unknown origin to his own or his organization's computer\nsystem.\n *Mobile devices (e.g., smartphones and tablets)* can be used both as a tool and an avenue\nfor launching attacks or gathering personal information. One example is when a threat\nmakes use of the location where mobile users purchase \"apps\" for their smartphones. If a\nthreat actor is able to create rogue apps or modify existing apps and an unsuspecting individual downloads such apps to her smartphone, the individual has opened up her mobile device to the threat. Mobile devices introduce potential vulnerabilities associated with physical loss and inconsistent configuration management (e.g., personally owned\ndevices vs. enterprise owned).\n *Malicious web components* can be used as a tool for a threat to be able to launch attacks\nby possibly using malicious web pages. If an unsuspecting individual visits a malicious web page, he can possibly make his systems or networks vulnerable. Malicious downloads may occur as a result of visiting web pages that contain malicious web components (downloads). Insufficiently secured web components offer attack surfaces\nsusceptible to SQL injection and cross-site scripting (XSS) attacks.\n *Viruses and malware* are tools that are used in order to launch certain types of attacks.\nMany of these tools are openly available on the Internet. Such attacks will have differing\ngoalsbased on the threat actor, environment, and target system/network.\nThe attack vectors listed above (and others not listed) can be used in conjunction to launch particular types of attacks. As threat actors become more sophisticated and attack methods become more portable, the list of attack vectors will continue to grow. Usually, attack or threat vectors are included in attack graphs or trees (see Section 4.5) to show where along an attack path they play a role.\n\n## 4.4 Target Characteristics\n\nTarget characteristics also offer the analyst a source of metrics to relate to the threat model. These characteristics, for example, suggest that some targets are more attractive than others, that some targets are more vulnerable than others, and that some targets are targeted more frequently than others. If the analyst uses the generic threat matrix as his primary threat model, then information about target characteristics can inform the threat levels and can, in addition, be aggregated and associated with the threat levels as shown in Section 0.\n\nSome characteristics of the target system can help an analyst to understand the existence or likelihood of threat action against that system. The following system characteristics are representative.\n\n The quantity or frequency of *unattributed cyber-attack incidents*, such as network probes,\nmalware discoveries, Web-based attacks, phishing emails, spear phishing incidents, and exfiltrated data.\n The *availability of agency information* discoverable through publicly accessible means:\n The quantity or percentage of agency personnel found on social sites and the\namount of sensitive information posted by those personnel.\n The inclusion of requests for proposal (RFPs), statements of work, design\ndocumentation, and configuration guidelines posted on public websites or\navailable in open archives.\n The *value of the agency*, determined by its visibility and profile.  The *security level of the system.*\n\n## 4.5 Attack Trees\n\nAttack trees offer another approach to characterizing and analyzing threats. An attack tree is a logical diagram similar to a fault tree. An attack tree, or its cousin the attack graph, can be used as a source of metrics or as a stand-alone attack model. In this report, we cite it primarily as a source of threat metrics. When building an attack tree, as illustrated in Figure 1, an analyst begins by defining the attacker's overarching goal. This goal serves as the top node in the tree. Subordinate nodes detail\n(1) the logical relationships among the actions an adversary might undertake to achieve the goal and (2) the actions themselves. Each unique path through the tree represents an attack scenario.\n\nThe example attack tree in Figure 1 shows an attack with three unique paths or scenarios. The attacker may pursue an attack comprising leaf node 1, leaf node 2, or a third attack that requires leaf node 3 and leaf node 4.\n\nThe threat analyst typically characterizes the attack scenarios using a variety of metrics. One metric, for example, might be the level of skill required to perform an attack. Another metric might be the time required to implement an attack. Still another might be the consequence generated by an attack. Once the analyst characterizes the scenarios using these metrics, she can rank the scenarios from the threat's perspective. Easy scenarios that yield an attractive consequence (again, from the threat's perspective) rise to the top. Difficult scenarios that yield weak or undesirable consequences sink to the bottom. The threat analyst can apply the threat levels enumerated in the generic threat matrix directly to attack tree analysis. Once each attack path or scenario is defined (along with the metrics and measures for the leaf nodes) the analyst can assess which attacks each level of threat can perform.8 For example, the analysis might yield the following tabulation (Table 4), which indicates that the ability to undertake the scenarios is distributed fairly evenly across the threat levels. (Note that the following tables and figures incorporate notional data.)\n\n| Threat Level    | Scenarios    |\n|-----------------|--------------|\n| Number          | Percent      |\n| 1               |              |\n| 9               | 90           |\n| 2               |              |\n| 8               | 80           |\n| 3               |              |\n| 8               | 80           |\n| 4               |              |\n| 8               | 80           |\n| 5               |              |\n| 8               | 80           |\n| 6               |              |\n| 7               | 70           |\n| 7               |              |\n| 6               | 60           |\n| 8               |              |\n| 3               | 30           |\n\nFigure 2 displays the Table 4 data as a distribution. It should be clear that, taken as a whole, this set of attacks is not limited to high-level attackers. Alternatively, the analysis might yield a result like that shown in Table 5 and Figure 3, which tell a very different story. In this case, the scenarios are limited to the higher-level attackers, with the exception of one scenario that an attacker of THREAT LEVEL 8 is able to perform. (This apparent anomaly can indeed occur, depending on the nature of the metrics applied.) It is also possible to assess the output of the attack tree analysis metric-by-metric and compare this analysis with the threat levels. This assessment can tell the analyst which metrics are potentially the most interesting or influential and, additionally, which combinations of metric and threat level are also most interesting.\n\n\n| Threat Level    | Scenarios    |\n|-----------------|--------------|\n| Number          | Percent      |\n| 1               |              |\n| 5               | 50           |\n| 2               |              |\n| 5               | 50           |\n| 3               |              |\n| 4               | 40           |\n| 4               |              |\n| 3               | 30           |\n| 5               |              |\n| 0               | 0            |\n| 6               |              |\n| 0               | 0            |\n| 7               |              |\n| 0               | 0            |\n| 8               |              |\n| 1               | 10           |\n\nIn sum, attack trees are useful in several ways. First, they allow the analyst to delineate attacks deductively. Second, they facilitate attack analysis by providing a transparent and relatively straightforward method of characterizing both attacks and attackers. Third, they are highly flexible and can be used to model just about any type of attack or threat. Finally, they generate data that can be used in concert with the generic threat model to learn more about which threats can undertake which attacks and which attacks are likely to be preferred by which threats. That said, attack trees represent only one way of thinking about attacks and threats. Not everyone prefers to approach the problem deductively, and some users no doubt find the logical structure of the tree to be more of a hindrance than a help.\n\n\n\n## 4.6 Attack Frequency\n\nAttack frequency can serve as another useful metric. It is particularly valuable because it can be coupled with a variety of related metrics. Attack frequency by level of difficulty is a potentially useful combination. Other possible combinations are attack frequency by target type and difficulty and attack frequency by vulnerability. Figure 4 illustrates a family of four charts that show the cumulative attack frequency by threat level and vulnerability for a given target type. The data are strictly notional. We can just as easily generate a series of charts for cumulative attack frequency by target type for a given vulnerability (see Figure 5). Again, the data are strictly notional. These kinds of charts complement the generic threat matrix and apply existing metrics in new and informative ways.\n\n## 4.7 Making Security MeasurableTM\n\nThe MITRE Corporation is currently leading an effort to improve \"the measurability of security through enumerating baseline security data, providing standardized languages as means for accurately communicating the information, and encouraging the sharing of the information with users by developing repositories\" [9]. Initiatives within this effort include those listed in Table 6. Additional enumerations, languages, and repositories are identified on the MITRE Web site.\n\n\n\nEnumerations\nCommon Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE)\n\nCommon Weakness Enumeration (CWETM)\n\nCommon Attack Pattern Enumeration and Classification (CAPECTM)\n\nCommon Configuration Enumeration (CCETM)\nLanguages\nOpen Vulnerability and Assessment Language (OVAL)\n\nCommon Event Expression (CEETM)\n\nMalware Attribute Enumeration and Characterization (MAECTM)\nRepositories\nOVAL Repository\n\nAt a high level, the effort appears to be designed to standardize the categorization and description of security-related incidents, threats, and vulnerabilities so these things can then be counted and analyzed. This is accomplished by using what are, in effect, nominal or categorical scales. Thus, if one set of enumerations identifies 10 classes of \"things,\" the analyst can then count how many of each \"thing\" occurs over a period of time. The descriptions are standardized using languages that yield \"tool-consumable\" data. This also facilitates automation. Finally, the \"tool-consumable\" data are held in shared repositories [10]. This initiative is potentially useful, and it becomes even more useful as more organizations join the effort. It is worth noting, however, that nominal scales tend to be more limited than ordinal, interval, and ratio scales or measurement. They are generally easier to define and easier to employ, but the resulting data cannot be (or should not be) used in as many quantitative operations.\n\nThis page intentionally blank\n\n\n## 5 Conclusion: Toward A Consistent Threat Assessment Process\n\nTo this point in our effort, we have used the generic threat matrix as our primary threat model. As such, the matrix serves as the framework for ordering a set of relevant threat metrics. These metrics vary in character from potentially quite subjective (the level of intensity) to relatively objective (the number of technical personnel). This is not surprising: Threat metrics can be difficult to identify, delimit, and quantify. In Section 4, we introduced a number of sources for additional threat metrics. Some of these metrics complement the generic threat matrix and others extend it.9\nRegardless of the model or metrics employed, however, we recognize that we must also apply a consistent threat analysis *process*. Consistency is a key requirement of this effort (as noted in Section 0).\n\nFigure 6 offers a functional view of the process employed to date. (We refer to this process as the\n\"as is\" processas opposed to the suggested \"to be\" process, which we introduce later in this section.) Although the boxes and lines suggest a rigid process, the process in practice is anything but rigid. Indeed, the analysis of threat remains grounded in each analyst's experience, background, and expert opinion.\n\n\nfunctional diagram where the main function (*assess threat*) is fed by two inputs (*threat analysis*\nand *threat reports*) and yields a single output (a threat ranking and statement). Process guidelines serve as a control, and the *threat analyst* and the *generic threat matrix* serve as resources.\n\nWhat does the \"as is\" process lack? The main deficit is any explicit accommodation for feedback and learning. If we assume that the threat analyst generates useful threat rankings and statements, we should also assume that these outputs can serve as useful inputs in future iterations. In other words, the more we learn, the more we should feed what we have learned back through the process. Figure 7 illustrates one possible variation. Here, three inputs inform the threat assessment: (1) relevant threats, (2) new threat information, and (3) catalogued threat information. The output, a threat report, becomes an input to future threat assessments. Basically, routine and ongoing FCEB threat assessment research would discover and track threats (including general, unattributed threat activity), recording information in a database using the metrics defined here. For each agency that the RVA program is assessing, a search is conducted to identify threats relevant to that agency, possibly adding new information as it is discovered. Then the threat characteristic contained in the database is provided to the Vulnerability Assessment Program (VAP) team as the estimate for that system. This will help in providing consistent estimates to multiple agencies. Despite our progress in this area, further study regarding how analysts assess threats is needed.\n\nWe propose a study involving human subjects that do not have a deep background in cyber threat analysis in order to observe their methodology for investigating threat (using open data sources) and applying the proposed OTA measurement system. The purpose of the study would be to observe and explore the investigations and assessments made by novice threat analysts in their process of categorizing threat in a cyber environment. Future studies would be necessary to compare this novice approach to that of subject matter experts, such as experienced intelligence analysts.\n\nThis page intentionally blank\n\n\n## 6 Works Cited\n\n[1] Bodeau, Deb, Jenn Fabius-Greene, and Rich Graubart. How Do You Assess Your\nOrganization's Cyber Threat Level? The MITRE Corporation, n.d.\n[2] RVA Program (Sandia National Laboratories). Operational Threat Assessment Project\nExecution Plan for a Single Threat Assessment (DRAFT). Federal Network Security, Compliance & Assurance Program, U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2010.\n[3] Merriam-Webster.com. *metric.* http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/metric\n(accessed September 15, 2011).\n[4] Jaquith, Andrew. *Security Metrics: Replacing Fear, Uncertainty, and Doubt.* Upper\nSaddle River, NJ: Addison-Wesley, 2007.\n[5] Frost, Bob. *Measuring Performance.* Dallas, TX: Measurement International, 2000. [6] Kaydos, Will. *Operational Performance Measurement: Increasing Total Productivity.*\nBoca Raton, FL: St. Lucie Press, 1999.\n[7] Frost, Bob. *Designing Metrics.* Dallas, TX: Measurement International, 2007. [8] Duggan, D. P., S. R. Thomas, C. K. K. Veitch, and L. Woodard. Categorizing Threat:\nBuilding and Using a Generic Threat Matrix. Albuquerque, NM: Sandia National Laboratories, 2007.\n[9] Martin, Robert A. *Making Security Measurable*. Bedford, MA: The MITRE Corporation.\nhttp://measurablesecurity.mitre.org/ (accessed October 13, 2011).\n[10] Martin, Robert A. \"Making Security Measurable and Manageable.\" CrossTalk: The\nJournal of Defense Software Engineering, September/October 2009: 26-32.\n[11] DHS Risk Steering Committee. *DHS Risk Lexicon.* Washington, DC: The Department of\nHomeland Security, 2010.\n\n\nThis page intentionally blank\n\n\n## Distribution\n\nMr. Robert Karas, Department of Homeland Security, 245 Murray Ln SW, Bldg. 410, Washington, DC  20528 1\nMS0671\nJ. Mark Harris\n0527\n1\nMS0899\nRIM-Reports Management, 9532 (electronic copy)\n\n\n##\n\n\n\n##"
    },
    {
        "text": "The attached analysis, entitled PROJECT MEGIDDO, is an FBI\nstrategic assessment of the potential for domestic terrorism in the United States undertaken in anticipation of or response to the arrival of the new millennium.\n\n## Project Megiddo Table Of Contents:\n\n| I.  EXECUTIVE SUMMARY                         | 3   |\n|-----------------------------------------------|-----|\n| II.  INTRODUCTION                             | 6   |\n| When Does the New Millennium Begin?           | 7   |\n| Blueprint for Action: The Turner Diaries      |     |\n| 8                                             |     |\n| Interpretations of The Bible                  |     |\n| Apocalyptic Religious Beliefs                 | 10  |\n| The New World Order Conspiracy Theory and the |     |\n| Year 2000 Computer Bug                        | 11  |\n| Gun Control Laws                              | 12  |\n| III.  CHRISTIAN IDENTITY                      | 14  |\n| IV.  WHITE SUPREMACY                          |     |\n| V.  MILITIAS                                  | 21  |\n| VI.  BLACK HEBREW ISRAELITES                  | 23  |\n| VII.  APOCALYPTIC CULTS                       | 26  |\n| VIII.  THE SIGNIFICANCE OF JERUSALEM          | 30  |\n| IX.  CONCLUSION                               | 32  |\n\nFor over four thousand years, MEGIDDO, a hill in northern Israel, has been the site of many battles.  Ancient cities were established there to serve as a fortress on the plain of Jezreel to guard a mountain pass.  As Megiddo was built and rebuilt, one city upon the other, a mound or hill was formed.  The Hebrew word \"Armageddon\" means \"hill of Megiddo.\"  In English, the word has come to represent battle itself. The last book in the New Testament of the Bible designates Armageddon as the assembly point in the apocalyptic setting of God's  final and conclusive battle against evil.  The name \"Megiddo\" is an apt title for a project that analyzes those who believe the year 2000 will usher in the end of the world and who are willing to perpetrate acts of violence to bring that end about.\n\n## I.  Executive Summary\n\nThe year 2000 is being discussed and debated at all levels of society.  Most of the discussions regarding this issue revolve around the topic of technology and our society's overwhelming dependence on the multitude of computers and computer chips which make our world run smoothly.  However, the upcoming millennium also holds important implications beyond the issue of computer technology.  Many extremist individuals and groups place some significance on the next millennium, and as such it will present challenges to law enforcement at many levels.  The significance is based primarily upon either religious beliefs relating to the Apocalypse or political beliefs relating to the New World Order (NWO) conspiracy theory.  The challenge is how well law enforcement will prepare and respond.\n\nThe following report, entitled \"Project Megiddo,\" is intended to analyze the potential for extremist criminal activity in the United States by individuals or domestic extremist groups who profess an apocalyptic view of the millennium or attach special significance to the year 2000.  The purpose behind this assessment is to provide law enforcement agencies with a clear picture of potential extremism motivated by the next millennium.  The report does not contain information on domestic terrorist groups whose actions are not influenced by the year 2000.\n\nThere are numerous difficulties involved in providing a thorough analysis of domestic security threats catalyzed by the new millennium.  Quite simply, the very nature of the current domestic terrorism threat places severe limitations on effective intelligence gathering and evaluation.  Ideological and philosophical belief systems which attach importance, and possibly violence, to the millennium have been well-articulated.  From a law enforcement perspective, the problem therefore is not a lack of understanding of motivating ideologies: The fundamental problem is that the traditional focal point for counterterrorism analysis -- the terrorist group -- is not always well-defined or relevant in the current environment.\nThe general trend in domestic extremism is the terrorist's disavowal of traditional, hierarchical, and structured terrorist organizations.  Even well-established militias, which tend to organize along military lines with central control, are characterized by factionalism and disunity.\n\nWhile several \"professional\" terrorist groups still exist and present a continued threat to domestic security, the overwhelming majority of extremist groups in the United States have adopted a fragmented, leaderless structure where individuals or small groups act with autonomy.  Clearly, the worst act of domestic terrorism in United States history was perpetrated by merely two individuals: Timothy McVeigh and Terry Nichols.  In many cases, extremists of this sort are extremely difficult to identify until after an incident has occurred.  Thus, analysis of domestic extremism in which the group serves as the focal point of evaluation has obvious limitations.\n\nThe Project Megiddo intelligence initiative has identified very few indications of specific threats to domestic security.  Given the present nature of domestic extremism, this is to be expected.  However, this is a function of the limitations of the group-oriented model of counterterrorism analysis  and should not be taken necessarily as reflective of a minor or trivial domestic threat.  Without question, this initiative has revealed indicators of potential violent activity on the part of extremists in this country.  Militias, adherents of racist belief systems such as Christian Identity and Odinism, and other radical domestic extremists are clearly focusing on the millennium as a time of action.  Certain individuals from these various perspectives are acquiring weapons, storing food and clothing, raising funds through fraudulent means, procuring safe houses, preparing compounds, surveying potential targets, and recruiting new converts. These and other indicators are not taking place in a vacuum, nor are they random or arbitrary.  In the final analysis, while making specific predictions is extremely difficult, acts of violence in commemoration of the millennium are just as likely to occur as not.  In the absence of  intelligence that the more established and organized terrorist groups are planning millennial violence as an organizational strategy, violence is most likely to be perpetrated by radical fringe members of established groups.  For example, while Aryan Nations leader Richard Butler publicly frowns on proactive violence, adherents of his religion or individual members of his organization may commit acts of violence autonomously.\nPotential cult-related violence presents additional challenges to law enforcement.  The potential for violence on behalf of members of biblically-driven cults is determined almost exclusively by the whims of the cult leader.  Therefore, effective intelligence and analysis of such cults requires an extensive understanding of the cult leader.  Cult members generally act to serve and please the cult leader rather than accomplish an ideological objective.  Almost universally, cult leaders are viewed as messianic in the eyes of  their followers.  Also, the cult leader's prophecies, preachings, orders, and objectives are subject to indiscriminate change.  Thus, while analysis of publicly stated goals and objectives of cults may provide hints about their behavior and intentions, it is just as likely to be uninformed or, at worst, misleading.  Much more valuable is a thorough examination of the cult leader, his position of power over his followers, and an awareness of the responding behavior and activity of the cult.  Sudden changes in activity - for example, less time spent on \"Bible study\" and more time spent on \"physical training\" - indicate that the cult may be preparing for some type of action.\n\nThe millennium holds special significance for many, and as this pivotal point in time approaches, the impetus for the initiation of violence becomes more acute.  Several religiously motivated groups envision a quick, fiery ending in an apocalyptic battle.  Others may initiate a sustained campaign of terrorism in the United States to prevent the NWO.  Armed with the urgency of the millennium as a motivating factor, new clandestine groups may conceivably form to engage in violence toward the U.S. Government or its citizens.\nMost importantly, this analysis clearly shows that perceptions matter.  The perceptions of the leaders and followers of extremist organizations will contribute much toward the ultimate course of action they choose.  For example, in-depth analysis of  Y2K  compliancy on the part of various key sectors that rely on computers has determined that, despite a generally positive outlook for overall compliance, there will be problem industries and minor difficulties and inconveniences.1  If they occur, these inconveniences are likely to cause varying responses by the extreme fringes.  Members of various militia groups, for example, have identified potentially massive power failures as an indication of a United Nations-directed NWO takeover.  While experts have indicated that only minor brownouts will occur, various militias are likely to perceive such minor brownouts as indicative of a larger conspiracy.2\nThe Senate Special Committee on the Year 2000 Technology Problem has stated that some state and local governments could be unprepared, including the inability to provide benefits payments.3  This could have a significant impact in major urban areas, resulting in the possibility for civil unrest.  Violent white supremacists are likely to view such unrest as an affirmation of a racist, hate-filled world view.  Likewise, militia members who predict the implementation of martial law in response to a Y2K computer failure would become all the more fearful.\n\n## Ii.  Introduction\n\nAre we already living on the precipice of the Apocalypse - the chaotic final period of warfare between the forces of good and evil signaling the second coming of Christ, as forecast in the New Testament's Book of Revelation?  Or, will life on earth continue for another 1,000 years, allowing humans to eliminate disease and solve the mysteries of the aging process so they can live as long as Methuselah, colonize space, commune with extraterrestrials, unravel the secrets of teleportation, and usher in a golden age of peace and productivity? 4 At first glance, some of the predictions compiled in Prophecies for the New Millennium that claim to foretell how the millennium will affect the United States seem benign.  In fact, those predictions capture some of the countless ways that domestic terrorists view how the millennium will affect the world.  The threat posed by extremists as a result of perceived events associated with the Year 2000 (Y2K) is very real.\n\n  Numerous religious extremists claim that a race war will soon begin, and have taken steps to become martyrs in their predicted battle between good and evil.  Three recent incidents committed by suspects who adhere to ideologies that emphasize millennial related violence illustrate those beliefs: Buford O. Furrow, Jr., the man charged in the August 1999 shootings at a Los Angeles area Jewish day care center, told authorities \"its time for America to wake and kill the jews\"; Ben Smith, who committed suicide after shooting at minorities in Indiana and Illinois, killing two and injuring ten, over the July 4, 1999 weekend, was found to have literature in his home that indicated the year 2000 would be the start of the killing of minorities; and John William King, the man convicted in the dragging death of  James Byrd, Jr., a black man in Jasper, Texas, believed that his actions would help to initiate a race war.  Each of these men believed in the imminence of a racial holy war.\n\n Meanwhile, for members of the militia movement the new millennium has a political overtone rather than a religious one.  It is their belief that the United Nations has created a secret plan, known as the New World Order (NWO), to conquer the world beginning in 2000.  The NWO will be set in motion by the Y2K computer crisis.\n\nReligious motivation and the NWO conspiracy theory are the two driving forces behind the potential for millennial violence.  As the end of the millennium draws near, biblical prophecy and political philosophy may merge into acts of violence by the more extreme members of domestic terrorist groups that are motivated, in part, by religion.  The volatile mix of apocalyptic religions and NWO conspiracy theories may produce violent acts aimed at precipitating the end of the world as prophesied in the Bible.\n\nWhen and how Christ's second coming will occur is a critical point in the ideology of those motivated by extremist religious beliefs about the millennium.  There is no consensus within Christianity regarding the specific date that the Apocalypse will occur.  However, within many right-wing religious groups there is a uniform belief that the Apocalypse is approaching.  Some of these same groups also point to a variety of non-religious indicators such as gun control, the Y2K computer problem, the NWO, the banking system, and a host of other \"signs\" that the Apocalypse is near.  Almost uniformly, the belief among right-wing religious extremists is that the federal government is an arm of Satan.  Therefore, the millennium will bring about a battle between Christian martyrs and the government.  At the core of this volatile mix is the belief of apocalyptic religions and cults that the battle against Satan, as prophesied in the Book of Revelation, will begin in 2000.\n\nAn example of the confrontational nature and belief system of religiously motivated suspects illustrates the unique challenges that law enforcement faces when dealing with a fatalist/martyr philosophy.  It also illustrates the domino effect that may occur after such a confrontation.  Gordon Kahl, an adherent to the anti-government/racist Christian Identity religion, escaped after a 1983 shootout with police that left two Deputy U.S. Marshals dead.  He was later killed during a subsequent shootout with the FBI and others that also left a county sheriff dead. In response to the killing of Kahl, Bob Mathews, a believer in the racist Odinist ideology, founded The Order.  After The Order committed numerous crimes, its members were eventually tracked down.  Mathews escaped after engaging in a gun battle and later wrote, \"Why are so many men so eager to destroy their own kind for the benefit of the Jews and the mongrels?  I see three FBI agents hiding behind some trees . . . I could have easily killed them . . . They look like good racial stock yet all their talents are given to a government which is openly trying to mongrelize the very race  these agents are part of . . . I have been a good soldier, a fearless warrior.  I will die with honor and join my brothers in [heaven].\"  Exemplifying his beliefs as a martyr, Mathews later burned to death in an armed standoff with the FBI.\n\nIn light of the enormous amount of  millennial rhetoric, the FBI sought to analyze a number of variables that have the potential to spark violent acts perpetrated by domestic terrorists.  Religious beliefs, the Y2K computer problem, and gun control laws all have the potential to become catalysts for such terrorism.  The following elements are essential to understanding the phenomenon of domestic terrorism related to the millennium:\n\n## When Does The New Millennium Begin?\n\nAs the nation and the world prepare to celebrate the arrival of the new millennium, a debate has arisen as to the correct date for its beginning.  Although the true starting point of the next millennium is January 1, 2001, as established by the U.S. Naval Observatory in Washington, D.C., our nation's official time keeper, many will celebrate January 1, 2000, as the start of the millennium.  The majority of domestic terrorists, like the general public, place a greater significance on January 1, 2000.\n\n## Blueprint For Action: The Turner Diaries\n\nMany right-wing extremists are inspired by The Turner Diaries, a book written by William Pierce (under the pseudonym Andrew Macdonald), the leader of the white supremacist group National Alliance.  The book details a violent overthrow of the federal government by white supremacists and also describes a brutal race war that is to take place simultaneously.  To date, several groups or individuals have been inspired by this book:\n\n\nAt the time of his arrest, Timothy McVeigh, the man responsible for the Oklahoma City bombing, had a copy of  The Turner Diaries in his possession.  McVeigh's action against the Murrah Federal Building was strikingly similar to an event described in the book where the fictional terrorist group blows up FBI Headquarters.\n\nThe Order, an early 1980s terrorist cell involved in murder, robberies, and counterfeiting, was motivated by the book's scenarios for a race war.  The group murdered Alan Berg, a\nJewish talk show host, and engaged in other acts of violence in order to hasten the race\nwar described in the book.  The Order's efforts later inspired another group, The New Order, which planned to commit similar crimes in an effort to start a race war that would lead to a violent revolution.5\n\nMost recently, The Turner Diaries provided inspiration to John William King, the man\nconvicted for dragging a black man to his death in Jasper, Texas.  As King shackled James Byrd's legs to the back of his truck he was reported to say, \"We're going to start the\nTurner Diaries early.\"6\nDuring the year 2000 and beyond, The Turner Diaries will be an inspiration for right-wing terrorist groups to act because it outlines both a revolutionary takeover of the government and a race war.  These elements of the book appeal to a majority of right-wing extremists because it is their belief that one or both events will coincide with Y2K.\n\n## Interpretations Of The Bible\n\nReligiously based domestic terrorists use the New Testament's Book of Revelation -- the prophecy of the endtime -- for the foundation of their belief in the Apocalypse.  Religious extremists interpret the symbolism portrayed in the Book of Revelation and mold it to predict that the endtime is now and that the Apocalypse is near.  To understand many religious extremists, it is crucial to know the origin of the Book of Revelation and the meanings of its words, numbers and characters.\n\nThe Book of Revelation was written by a man named \"John\" who was exiled by the Roman government to a penal colony - the island of Patmos - because of his beliefs in Christ.7\nWhile on the island, he experienced a series of visions, described in the Book of Revelation.  The writing in the Book of Revelation is addressed to churches who were at the time experiencing or were threatened by persecution from Rome because they were not following the government.  For this reason, some believe the Book of Revelation was written in code language, much of which was taken from other parts of the Bible.\nOne interpretation describing the essence of the message contained in Revelation is that God will overcome Christianity's enemies (Roman Government/Satan) and that the persecuted communities should persevere.8  For right-wing groups who believe they are being persecuted by the satanic government of the United States, the Book of Revelation's message fits perfectly into their world view.  This world view, in combination with a literal interpretation of the Book of Revelation, is reflected in extremist ideology, violent acts, and literature.  For this reason, it is imperative to know the meaning of some of the \"code words\" frequently used:\n\nC\nFour (4) signifies the world.\nC\nSix (6) signifies imperfection.\nC\nSeven (7) is the totality of perfection or fullness and completeness.\nC\nTwelve (12) represents the twelve tribes of Israel or the 12 apostles.\nC\nOne-thousand (1000) signifies immensity.\nC\nThe color white symbolizes power and can also represent victory, joy and resurrection.\nC\nThe color red symbolizes a bloody war.\nC\nThe color black symbolizes famine.\nC\nA rider on a pale green horse is a symbol of Death itself.\n\n\"Babylon\" is the satanic Roman Government, now used to describe the U.S. government.9\nBlack Hebrew Israelites, a black supremacist group, typify the use of numerology from the Book of Revelation.  They believe group members will comprise the 144,000 people who are saved by God in the second coming that is outlined in Revelation (7:1-17).   In the Book of Revelation, John is shown a vision of 144,000 martyrs who have survived and did not submit to Satan.  This number is derived from the assertion that the twelve tribes of Israel consisted of 12,000 people each.\n\nGroups not only use the Bible to interpret the endtimes, but use it to justify their ideology.\n\nPhineas Priests, an amorphous group of Christian Identity adherents, base their entire ideology on Chapter 25 of the Book of Numbers.  The passage depicts a scene where Phineas kills an Israelite who was having relations with a Midianite woman and God then granted Phineas and all of his descendants a pledge of everlasting priesthood.  Modern day followers of the Phineas Priest ideology believe themselves to be the linear descendants of Phineas and this passage gives them biblical justification to punish those who transgress God's laws.  Therefore, the group is ardently opposed to race mixing and strongly believes in racial separation.  The number 25 is often used as a symbol of the group.\n\n## Apocalyptic Religious Beliefs\n\nTo understand the mind set of why religious extremists would actively seek to engage in violent confrontations with law enforcement, the most common extremist ideologies must be understood.  Under these ideologies, many extremists view themselves as religious martyrs who have a duty to initiate or take part in the coming battles against Satan.  Domestic terrorist groups who place religious significance on the millennium believe the federal government will act as an arm of Satan in the final battle.  By extension, the FBI is viewed as acting on Satan's behalf.\n\nThe philosophy behind targeting the federal government or entities perceived to be associated with it is succinctly described by Kerry Noble, a former right-wing extremist.  He says the right-wing \"envision[s] a dark and gloomy endtime scenario, where some Antichrist makes war against Christians.\"10  The House of Yahweh, a Texas based religious group whose leaders are former members of the tax protesting Posse Comitatus, is typical:  Hawkins (the leader) has interpreted biblical scripture that the Israeli Peace Accord signed on October 13, 1993, has started a 7-year period of tribulation which will end on October 14, 2000, with the return of the Yeshua (the Messiah).11  He also has interpreted that the FBI will be the downfall of the House of Yahweh and that the Waco Branch Davidian raids in 1993 were a warning to The House of Yahweh from the federal government, which he terms \"the beast.\"12  Similarly, Richard Butler, leader of the white supremacist group Aryan Nations, said the following when asked what might have motivated the day care shooting by Buford O. Furrow, Jr., one of his group's followers: \"There's a war against the white race.  There's a war of extermination against the white male.\"13\n\n## The New World Order Conspiracy Theory And The Year 2000 Computer Bug\n\nUnlike religiously based terrorists, militia anxiety and paranoia specifically relating to the year 2000 are based mainly on a political ideology.  Some militia members read significance into 2000 as it relates to their conception of the NWO conspiracy.14  The NWO conspiracy theory holds that the United Nations (UN) will lead a military coup against the nations of the world to form a socialist or One World Government.  UN troops, consisting mostly of foreign armies, will commence a military takeover of America.  The UN will mainly use foreign troops on American soil because foreigners will have fewer reservations about killing American citizens.  U.S. armed forces will not attempt to stop this invasion by UN troops and, in fact, the U.S. military may be \"deputized\" as a branch of the UN armed forces.  The American military contingent overseas will also play a large part in this elaborate conspiracy theory, as they will be used to help conquer the rest of the world.  The rationale for this part of the theory is that American soldiers will also have less qualms about killing foreigners, as opposed to killing their own citizens.\nUnder this hypothetical NWO/One World Government, the following events are to take place:  1) private property rights and private gun ownership will be abolished; 2) all national, state and local elections will become meaningless, since they will be controlled by the UN; 3) the U.S. Constitution will be supplanted by the UN charter; 4) only *approved* churches and other places of worship will be permitted to operate and will become appendages of the One World Religion, which will be the only legitimate doctrine of religious beliefs and ethical values; 5) home schooling will be outlawed and all school curriculum will need to be approved by the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO); and 6) American military bases and other federal facilities will be used as concentration camps by the UN to confine those patriots, including the militias, who defy the NWO.  Other groups beside the UN that are often mentioned as being part of the NWO conspiracy theory are Jews, Communists, the Council on Foreign Relations, the Bilderbergers and the Trilateral Commission.  Law enforcement officials will probably notice different versions of this theory, depending upon the source.\n\nThe NWO conspiracy theory is particularly relevant to the millennium because the year\n2000 is considered to be a triggering device for the NWO due to the element of computer breakdown.  Many computers around the world are based on a numerical system in which the year is only registered by the last two digits.  A number of militia members accept the theory that on January 1, 2000, many computers will misinterpret this date as January 1, 1900, and malfunction and/or shut down completely.  They further believe that these major computer malfunctions will cause widespread chaos at all levels of society- economic, social and political. This chaos will theoretically create a situation in which American civilization will collapse, which will then produce an environment that the UN will exploit to forcibly take over the United States. Therefore, these militia members (as well as other groups) believe that the year 2000 will be the catalyst for the NWO.\nAccording to James Wickstrom, former leader of the defunct Posse Comitatus and\n\"Minister\" of the True Church of Israel, anyone who holds any powerful political influence knows that the Y2K crisis may be the final fuse that will lead to the NWO that \"David Rockefeller and the rest of his satanic jew seedline desire to usher in upon the earth.\"15  He claims that Jews have conspired to create the Y2K problem and that the prospect of impending computer failure is very real.  Similarly, The New American, an organ of the ultraconservative John Birch Society, speculates that the Y2K bug could be America's Reichstag fire, a reference to the 1933 arson attack on Germany's Parliament building that was used by Hitler as an excuse to enact police state laws.  Similar to this train of thought, Norm Olson, leader of the Northern Michigan Regional Militia, believes constitutional rights probably will be suspended before the real crisis hits.  He states: \"It will be the worst time for humanity since the Noahic flood.\"16\nHowever, there are some extremists who do not attach any major significance to the Y2K\nproblem.  In his article, *\"The Millennium Bug and 'Mainstreaming' the News,\"* William Pierce of the National Alliance tells his followers not to worry, or at least, not to worry very much about the Y2K issue.  Pierce predicts that the main event that will occur on New Year's Day 2000 is that crazed millennialists will go \"berserk when the Second Coming fails to occur.\"  Also, \"a few right-wing nuts may launch a premature attack on the government, figuring that without its computers the government won't be able to fight back.\"  Pierce claims that the lights will remain on, and that airplanes will not fall from the sky.  He says that he is able to make such a prediction with some degree of confidence because, \"contrary to what some cranks would have you believe, the computer professionals and the government have been working on the Y2K problem for some time.\"17\n\n## Gun Control Laws\n\nThe passage of the Brady Bill and assault weapons ban in 1994 were interpreted by those in the militia movement and among the right-wing as the first steps towards disarming citizens in preparation for the UN-led NWO takeover.  Some are convinced that the registration of gun owners is in preparation for a confiscation of firearms and eventually the arrest of the gun owners themselves.  An article by Larry Pratt, Executive Director for Gun Owners of America, interprets a 1995 UN study of small arms, done reportedly in cooperation with U.S. police, customs and military services, as part of the UN's plan to take over the U.S.  Pratt goes on to say that the \"UN is increasingly assuming the jurisdictional authority of a federal world government with the U.S. as just one of scores of member states.  And gun control -- meaning civilian disarmament -- is high up on the agenda of the UN.\"18  Speculation like this only serves to fuel the already existing paranoia of militia and patriot groups.\n\nThe right-wing believes that many of the restrictions being placed on the ownership of firearms today mirror events in The Turner Diaries.  In his book, Pierce writes about the United States government banning the private possession of firearms and staging gun raids in an effort to arrest gun owners.  The book discusses the government/police use of black men, assigned as \"special deputies\" to carry out the gun raids.  Many members of the right-wing movement view the book as prophetic, believing that it is only a matter of time before these events occur in real life.\n\nIn the aftermath of the school shootings in Littleton, Colorado, President Clinton, Congress, and Attorney General Reno acted swiftly to propose new laws aimed at restricting the sales of guns to juveniles and to close loopholes in existing laws.  In May 1999, the Senate passed a bill to ban the importation of high capacity ammunition magazines and require background checks for guns sold at gun shows.  In light of the enormous importance and prominent role that extremist groups place on the Second Amendment, it is probable that recent government actions aimed at controlling guns are perceived to be compelling signs of the UN-led NWO takeover.\n\n## Iii. Christian Identity\n\nChristian Identity is an ideology which asserts that the white Aryan race is God's chosen race and that whites comprise the ten lost tribes of Israel.19  There is no single document that expresses this belief system.  Adherents refer to the Bible to justify their racist ideals.  Interpreting the Book of Genesis, Christian Identity followers assert that Adam was preceded by other, lesser races, identified as \"the beasts of the field\" (Gen. 1:25).  Eve was seduced by the snake (Satan) and gave birth to two seed lines:  Cain, the direct descendent of Satan and Eve, and Able, who was of good Aryan stock through Adam.  Cain then became the progenitor of the Jews in his subsequent matings with the non-Adamic races.  Christian Identity adherents believe the Jews are predisposed to carry on a conspiracy against the Adamic seed line and today have achieved almost complete control of the earth.20  This is referred to as the two-seedline doctrine, which provides Christian Identity followers with a biblical justification for hatred.\nThe roots of the Christian Identity movement can be traced back to British-Israelism, the conviction that the British are the lineal descendants of the \"ten lost tribes\" of Israel.  It is a belief that existed for some time before it became a movement in the second half of the 19th century. The writings of John Wilson helped to extend the idea of British-Israelism to Anglo-Israelism, which included other Teutonic peoples -- mostly northern European peoples from Germany, Italy, France and Switzerland.  British-Israelism was brought to America in the early part of the 1920s, where it remained decentralized until the 1930s.  At that time, the movement underwent the final transformation to become what we know as Christian Identity, at which time its ties to the original English movement were cut and it became distinctly American.\n\nWesley Swift is considered the single most significant figure in the early years of the Christian Identity movement in the United States.  He popularized it in the right-wing by \"combining British-Israelism, a demonic anti-Semitism, and political extremism.\"21  He founded his own church in California in the mid 1940s where he could preach this ideology.  In addition, he had a daily radio broadcast in California during the 1950s and 60s, through which he was able to proclaim his ideology to a large audience.  With Swift's efforts, the message of his church spread, leading to the creation of similar churches throughout the country.  In 1957, the name of his church was changed to The Church of Jesus Christ Christian, which is used today by Aryan Nations (AN) churches.\n\nOne of Swift's associates, William Potter Gale, was far more militant than Swift and brought a new element to Christian Identity churches.  He became a leading figure in the anti-tax and paramilitary movements of the 1970s and 80s.  There are numerous Christian Identity churches that preach similar messages and some espouse more violent rhetoric than others, but all hold fast to the belief that Aryans are God's chosen race.\n\nChristian Identity also believes in the inevitability of the end of the world and the Second Coming of Christ.  It is believed that these events are part of a cleansing process that is needed before Christ's kingdom can be established on earth.  During this time, Jews and their allies will attempt to destroy the white race using any means available.  The result will be a violent and bloody struggle -- a war, in effect -- between God's forces, the white race, and the forces of evil, the Jews and nonwhites.  Significantly, many adherents believe that this will be tied into the coming of the new millennium.\n\nThe view of what Armageddon will be varies among Christian Identity believers.  Some contend there will be a race war in which millions will die; others believe that the United Nations, backed by Jewish representatives of the anti-Christ, will take over the country and promote a New World Order.  One Christian Identity interpretation is that white Christians have been chosen to watch for signs of the impending war in order to warn others.  They are to then physically struggle with the forces of evil against sin and other violations of God's law (i.e., race-mixing and internationalism); many will perish, and some of God's chosen will be forced to wear the Mark of the Beast to participate in business and commerce.  After the final battle is ended and God's kingdom is established on earth, only then will the Aryan people be recognized as the one and true Israel.\n\nChristian Identity adherents believe that God will use his chosen race as his weapons to battle the forces of evil.  Christian Identity followers believe they are among those chosen by God to wage this battle during Armageddon and they will be the last line of defense for the white race and Christian America.  To prepare for these events, they engage in survivalist and paramilitary training, storing foodstuffs and supplies, and caching weapons and ammunition.  They often reside on compounds located in remote areas.\nAs the millennium approaches, various right-wing groups pose a threat to American society.  The radical right encompasses a vast number and variety of groups, such as survivalists, militias, the Ku Klux Klan, neo-Nazis, Christian Identity churches, the AN and skinheads.  These groups are not mutually exclusive and within the subculture individuals easily migrate from one group to another.  This intermixing of organizations makes it difficult to discern a singular religious ideology or belief system that encompasses the right-wing.\n\nNevertheless, Christian Identity is the most unifying theology for a number of these diverse groups and one widely adhered to by white supremacists.  It is a belief system that provides its members with a religious basis for racism and an ideology that condones violence against non-Aryans.  This doctrine allows believers to fuse religion with hate, conspiracy theories, and apocalyptic fear of the future.  Christian Identity-inspired millennialism has a distinctly racist tinge in the belief that Armageddon will be a race war of Aryans against Jews and nonwhites.  The potential difficulty society may face due to the Y2K computer glitch is considered by a number of Christian Identity adherents to be the perfect event upon which to instigate a race war.\n\nThere are a number of issues concerning the Christian Identity belief system that create problems when determining the threat level of groups.  First, Christian Identity does not have a national organizational structure.  Rather, it is a grouping of churches throughout the country which follows its basic ideology.  Some of these churches can be as small as a dozen people, and some as large as the AN church, which claims membership in the thousands.  In addition, some groups take the belief to a higher extreme and believe violence is the means to achieve their goal. This lack of structure creates a greater potential for violent actions by lone offenders and/or leaderless cells.  It is important to note that only a small percentage of Christian Identity adherents believe that the new millennium will bring about a race war.  However, those that do have a high propensity for violence.\n\nSecondly, there are many factions of the right-wing, from Christian Identity to militias, all of which are intermingled in ideology and members.  In some cases it is easy for a person to be a member of more than one group or to move from one to another.  Often, if a member of one group believes the group is lax in its convictions, he or she will gravitate to a group that is more radical.\nThe third concern is the increased level of cooperation between the different groups.  This trend can be seen throughout the right-wing.  Christian Identity followers are pairing up with militias to receive paramilitary training and have also joined with members of the Ku Klux Klan and other right-wing groups.  This cohesiveness creates an environment in which ideology can easily spread and branch out.  However, it makes the job of law enforcement much more difficult as there are no distinctive borders between groups or ideology.\nLastly, the formation of splinter groups or state chapters from larger organizations presents an increased level of threat due to the likelihood that the leader has diminished control over the members and actions of the smaller groups.  The AN is a large group that adheres to the Christian Identity belief system.  The group espouses hatred toward Jews, the federal government, blacks and other minorities.   The ultimate goal of the AN is to forcibly take five northwestern states -- Oregon, Idaho, Wyoming, Washington and Montana -- from the United States government in order to establish an Aryan homeland.  It consists of a headquarters in Hayden Lake, Idaho, and a number of state chapters, which often act as their own entities.  While the leader may not support or encourage acts of violence, it is easy for small cells of members or splinter groups to take part in violent acts without the knowledge of the leader.  The individuals are associated with the group as a whole and carry the name of the group, but may perpetrate acts on their own.\n\nThese factors make a threat assessment concerning millennial violence difficult to determine.  There is a moderate possibility of small factions of right-wing groups, whether they be members of the same group, or members of different groups, acting in an overtly violent manner in order to initiate the Apocalypse.\n\nSeveral problems associated with the assessment for violence can be seen when looking at the structure and actions of the AN.  The AN has been headquartered at Hayden Lake since the late 1970s and remains a focal point for the group's activities.  Its annual World Congress attracts a number of different factions from the right-wing, including members and leaders of various right-wing groups.  The World Congress is often viewed as a sort of round table to discuss rightwing issues.  These meetings have led to an increased level of contact between AN members and members and leaders of other groups.  This degree of networking within the right-wing may further the AN's base of support and help advance its cause.\n\nOne of the greatest threats posed by the right-wing in terms of millennial violence is the formation of a conglomeration of individuals that will work together to commit criminal acts.\n\nThis has happened with some frequency in the past.  Bob Mathews formed a subgroup of the AN, called The Order, which committed a number of violent crimes, including murder.  Their mission was to bring about a race war and there are several groups that currently exist which hold these same beliefs.  Dennis McGiffen, who also had ties to the AN, formed a cell called The New Order, based on Mathews' group.  The members were arrested before they could follow through on their plans to try to start a race war.  Chevie Kehoe, who was convicted of three homicides, conspiracy and interstate transportation of stolen property also spent some time at the AN compound.  Most recently, Buford O. Furrow, Jr., the man accused of the August 10, 1999, shooting at the Jewish Community Center in Los Angeles, California, also spent some time at the AN compound working as a security guard.\n\nA relatively new tenet gaining popularity among Christian Identity believers justifies the use of violence if it is perpetrated in order to punish violators of God's law, as found in the Bible and interpreted by Christian Identity ministers and adherents.  This includes killing interracial couples, abortionists, prostitutes and homosexuals, burning pornography stores, and robbing banks and perpetrating frauds to undermine the \"usury system.\"  Christian Identity adherents engaging in such behavior are referred to as Phineas Priests or members of the Phineas Priesthood.  This is a very appealing concept to Christian Identity's extremist members who believe they are being persecuted by the Jewish-controlled U.S. government and society and/or are eagerly preparing for Armageddon.  Among adherents today, the Phineas Priesthood is viewed as a call to action or a badge of honor.\n\n## Iv.  White Supremacy\n\nThere are a number of white supremacy groups that do not necessarily adhere to Christian Identity or other religious doctrines.  White supremacy groups such as the National Alliance, the American Nazi Party and the National Socialist White People's Party are largely politically, rather than religiously, motivated.\nThe National Alliance is probably best known for its leader, William Pierce, who is one of the most recognized names in the radical right.  Pierce wrote The Turner Diaries and Hunter and hosts a weekly radio program, *American Dissident Voices*.  Via these outlets, Pierce is able to provide his followers with an ideological and practical framework for committing violent acts. The rhetoric of these groups largely shadows that of Adolf Hitler's in content and political ideology.  In 1997, Pierce stated that:\nUltimately we must separate ourselves from the Blacks and other nonwhites and keep ourselves separate, no matter what it takes to accomplish this.  We must do this not because we hate Blacks, but because we cannot survive if we remain mixed with them.  And we cannot survive if we permit the Jews and the traitors among us to remain among us and to repeat their treachery.  Eventually we must hunt them down and get rid of them.22\nThe end goal of National Socialist and Christian Identity devotees is the same:  an all white nation.  However, Christian Identity followers appear to be more of a threat concerning the millennium because of their religious beliefs.\nThere are also white supremacist groups which adhere to the general supremacist ideology, but are not political or religious in nature.  For example, the Ku Klux Klan (KKK) proposes racial segregation that is not generally based on religious ideals.  The KKK is one of the most recognized white supremacist groups in the United States.  Its history is expansive and its actions of cross burnings and rhetoric of hate are well known.  There is currently not a singular KKK group with a hierarchical structure, but many different KKK groups with a common ideology.\n\nThe KKK, as a whole, does not pose a significant threat with regard to the millennium.\n\nThat is not to say that a member of the KKK will not act on his own or in concert with members of another group.  Law enforcement has been very successful in infiltrating a number of these groups, thereby keeping abreast of their plans for action.  The KKK also draws the attention of many watchdog groups, and the Southern Poverty Law Center produces a quarterly publication entitled \"Klanwatch.\"  It would be difficult for any of the known KKK groups to participate in millennial violence without law enforcement knowing.\n\nAgain, there is a great deal of movement that is possible throughout the right-wing, regardless of prior beliefs.  If a member of a Christian Identity faction does not feel that his current group is taking enough violent action, it is possible for that member to move on to other ideologies or organizations such as Odinism, the World Church of the Creator (WCOTC) or the National Socialist movement.  Because of this movement, it is also likely that communication exists between various factions of the right-wing, from religious groups to skinheads.  Their end goals are similar.\n\nThe WCOTC presents a recent example of violence perpetrated by a white supremacist in order to bring about a race war.  The major creed upon which Ben Klassen founded the religion is that one's race is his religion.  Aside from this central belief, its ideology is similar to many Christian Identity groups in the conviction that there is a Jewish conspiracy in control of the federal government, international banking, and the media.  They also dictate that RAHOWA, a racial holy war, is destined to ensue to rid the world of Jews and \"mud races.\"  In the early 1990s, there was a dramatic increase in membership due to the growing belief in the Apocalypse and that RAHOWA was imminent.\n\nIn 1996, Matt Hale, who has come upon recent fame by being denied a license to practice law in Illinois, was appointed the new leader of the Church of the Creator.  Hale made a number of changes to the group, including changing the name of the organization to the World Church of the Creator, giving it the feel of a widespread movement.\n\nAs publicly reported, there is information to indicate that the WCOTC has violent plans for the millennium.  Officials who searched Benjamin Smith's apartment, the man who went on a racially motivated killing spree over the 4th of July weekend, found a loose-leaf binder of handwritings.  These writings described a holy war among the races and included a reference to the new millennium.  Passages included plans of how white supremacists would shoot at nonwhites from motor vehicles after the dawning of the new millennium.23  While the group's rhetoric does include the belief in a race war and the creation of an all white bastion within the United States, other than Smith's writings, there is no indication that it is linked to the millennium.\n\nIn addition, there have been recent incidents that have demonstrated the willingness of members to take part in violent action.  WCOTC members in Southern Florida are thought to be tied to several racially motivated beatings.  Within the last year, four Florida members were convicted for the pistol-whipping and robbery of a Jewish video store owner.  They were supposedly trying to raise money for \"the revolution.\"24\nFinally, Odinism is another white supremacist ideology that lends itself to violence and has the potential to inspire its followers to violence in connection to the millennium.  What makes Odinists dangerous is the fact that many believe in the necessity of becoming martyrs for their cause.  For example, Bob Mathews, the leader of The Order, died in a fiery confrontation with law enforcement.  Also, William King relished the fact that he would receive the death penalty for his act of dragging James Byrd, Jr. to his death.  Odinism has little to do with Christian Identity but there is one key similarity:  Odinism provides dualism -- as does Christian Identity -- with regard to the universe being made up of worlds of light (white people) and worlds of dark (nonwhite people).  The most fundamental difference between the two ideologies is that Odinists do not believe in Jesus Christ. However, there are enough similarities between the myths and legends of Odinism and the beliefs of Christian Identity to make a smooth transition from Christian Identity to Odinism for those racist individuals whose penchant for violence is not being satisfied.\n\n## V.  Militias\n\nThe majority of growth within the militia movement occurred during the 1990s.  There is not a simple definition of how a group qualifies as a militia.  However, the following general criteria can be used as a guideline:  (1) a militia is a domestic organization with two or more members; (2) the organization must possess and use firearms; and (3) the organization must conduct or encourage paramilitary training.  Other terms used to describe militias are Patriots and Minutemen.\n\nMost militias engage in a variety of anti-government rhetoric.  This discourse can range from the protesting of government policies to the advocating of violence and/or the overthrow of the federal government.  However, the majority of militia groups are non-violent and only a small segment of the militias actually commit acts of violence to advance their political goals and beliefs.  A number of militia leaders, such as Lynn Van Huizen of the Michigan Militia Corps -\nWolverines, have gone to some effort to actively rid their ranks of radical members who are inclined to carry out acts of violence and/or terrorism.25  Officials at the FBI Academy classify militia groups within four categories, ranging from moderate groups who do not engage in criminal activity to radical cells which commit violent acts of terrorism.26  It should be clearly stated that the FBI only focuses on *radical elements* of the militia movement capable and willing to commit violence against government, law enforcement, civilian, military and international targets.  In addition, any such investigation of these radical militia units must be conducted within strict legal parameters.\nMilitia anxiety and paranoia specifically relating to the year 2000 are based mainly on a political ideology, as opposed to religious beliefs.  Many militia members believe that the year 2000 will lead to political and personal repression enforced by the United Nations and countenanced by a compliant U.S. government.  This belief is commonly known as the New World Order (NWO) conspiracy theory (see Chapter I, Introduction).  Other issues which have served as motivating factors for the militia movement include gun control, the incidents at Ruby Ridge (1992) and Waco (1993), the Montana Freemen Standoff (1996) and the restriction of land use by federal agencies.\n\nOne component of the NWO conspiracy theory -- that of the use of American military bases by the UN -- is worth exploring in further detail.  Law enforcement officers, as well as military personnel, should be aware that the nation's armed forces have been the subject of a great deal of rumor and paranoia circulating among many militia groups.  One can find numerous references in militia literature to military bases to be used as concentration camps in the NWO and visiting foreign military personnel conspiring to attack Americans.  One example of this can be found on the website for the militia group United States Theatre Command (USTC).27  The USTC website prominently features the NWO theory as it portrays both Camp Grayling in Michigan and Fort Dix in New Jersey as detention centers to be used to house prisoners in an upcoming war.  Specifically in reference to a photograph of Camp Grayling, the USTC website states:  \"Note that the barbed wire is configured to keep people in,  not out, and also note in the middle of the guard towers, a platform for the mounting of a machine gun.\"  Specifically in reference to a photograph of Fort Dix, the USTC website states:  \"Actual photos of an 'Enemy Prisoner of War' camp in the United States of America!  (Fort Dix, New Jersey to be exact!) Is there going to be a war here?  Many more are suspected to be scattered throughout the United States.\"\nLaw enforcement personnel should be aware of the fact that the majority of militias are reactive, as opposed to proactive.  *Reactive* militia groups are generally not a threat to law enforcement or the public.  These militias may indeed believe that some type of NWO scenario may be imminent in the year 2000, but they are more inclined to sit back and wait for it to happen. They will stockpile their guns and ammunition and food, and wait for the government to curtail their liberties and take away their guns.  When the expected NWO tragedy does not take place, these *reactive* militias will simply continue their current activities, most of which are relatively harmless.  They will not overreact to minor disruptions of electricity, water and other public services.\n\nHowever, there is a small percentage of the militia movement which may be more proactive and commit acts of domestic terrorism.  As stated earlier, the main focus of the militias connected to the Y2K/millennium revolves around the NWO conspiracy theory.  While the NWO is a paranoid theory, there may be some real technological problems arising from the year 2000. Among these are malfunctioning computers, which control so many facets of our everyday lives. Any such computer malfunctions may adversely affect power stations and other critical infrastructure.  If such breakdowns do occur, these may be interpreted as a sign by some of the militias that electricity is being shut off on purpose in order to create an environment of confusion. In the paranoid rationalizations of these militia groups, this atmosphere of confusion can only be a prelude to the dreaded NWO/One World Government.  These groups may then follow through on their premeditated plans of action.\n\n## Vi.  Black Hebrew Israelites\n\nAs the millennium approaches, radical fringe members of the Black Hebrew Israelite\n(BHI) movement may pose a challenge for law enforcement.  As with the adherents of most apocalyptic philosophies, certain segments of the BHI movement have the potential to engage in violence at the turn of the century.  This movement has been associated with extreme acts of violence in the recent past, and current intelligence from a variety of sources indicates that extreme factions of BHI groups are preparing for a race war to close the millennium.\n\nViolent BHI followers can generally be described as proponents of an extreme form of black supremacy.  Drawing upon the teachings of earlier BHI adherents, such groups hold that blacks represent God's true \"chosen people,\" while condemning whites as incarnate manifestations of evil.  As God's \"authentic\" Jews, BHI adherents believe that mainstream Jews are actually imposters.  Such beliefs bear a striking resemblance to the Christian Identity theology practiced by many white supremacists.  In fact, Tom Metzger, renowned white supremacist, once remarked, \"They're the black counterpart of us.\"28  Like their Christian Identity counterparts, militant BHI followers tend to see themselves as divinely endowed by God with superior status. As a result, some followers of this belief system hold that violence, including murder, is justifiable in the eyes of God, provided that it helps to rid the world of evil.  Violent BHI groups are of particular concern as the millennium approaches because they believe in the inevitability of  a race war between blacks and whites.\n\nThe extreme elements of the BHI movement are prone to engage in violent activity.  As seen in previous convictions of BHI followers, adherents of this philosophy have a proven history of violence, and several indications point toward a continuation of this trend.  Some BHI followers have been observed in public donning primarily black clothing, with emblems and/or patches bearing the \"Star of David\" symbol.  Some BHI members practice paramilitary operations and wear web belts and shoulder holsters.  Some adherents have extensive criminal records for a variety of violations, including weapons charges, assault, drug trafficking, and fraud.\n\nIn law enforcement circles, BHI groups are typically associated with violence and criminal activity, largely as a result of the movement's popularization by Yahweh Ben Yahweh, formerly known as Hulon Mitchell, Jr., and the Miami-based Nation of Yahweh (NOY).  In reality, the origins of the BHI movement are non-violent.  While the BHI belief system may have roots in the United States as far back as the Civil War era, the movement became more recognized as a result of the teachings of an individual known as Ben Ami Ben Israel, a.k.a Ben Carter, from the south side of Chicago.  Ben Israel claims to have had a vision at the age of 27, hearing \"a voice tell me that the time had come for Africans in America, the descendants of the Biblical Israelites, to return to the land of our forefathers.\"29  Ben Israel persuaded a group of African-Americans to accompany him to Israel in 1967, teaching that African-Americans descended from the biblical tribe of Judah and, therefore, that Israel is the land of their birthright.  Ben Israel and his followers initially settled in Liberia for the purposes of cleansing themselves of bad habits.  In 1969, a small group of BHI followers left Liberia for Israel, with Ben Israel and the remaining original migrants arriving in Israel the following year.  Public source estimates of the BHI community in Israel number between 1500 and 3000.30  Despite promoting non-violence, members of Ben Israel's movement have shown a willingness to engage in criminal activity.31\nBHI in Israel are generally peaceful, if somewhat controversial.  The FBI has no information to indicate that Ben Israel's BHI community in Israel is planning any activity - terrorist, criminal, or otherwise - inspired by the coming millennium.  Ben Israel's claims to legitimate Judaism have at times caused consternation to the Israeli government.  BHI adherents in Israel have apparently espoused anti-Semitic remarks, labeling Israeli Jews as \"imposters.\"32\nNeither the Israeli government nor the Orthodox rabbinate recognize the legitimacy of BHI claims to Judaism.  According to Jewish law, an individual can be recognized as Jewish if he/she was born to a Jewish mother or if the individual agrees to convert to Judaism.33  At present, BHI in Israel have legal status as temporary residents, which gives them the right to work and live in Israel, but not to vote.  They are  not considered to be Israeli citizens.  While BHI claims to Judaism are disregarded by Israeli officials and religious leaders, the BHI community is tolerated and appears to be peaceful.34\nWhile the BHI community in Israel is peaceful, BHI adherents in the United States became associated with violence thanks to the rise of the NOY, which reached the height of its popularity in the 1980s.  The NOY was founded in 1979 and led by Yahweh Ben Yahweh.  Ben Yahweh's followers viewed him as the Messiah, and therefore demonstrated unrequited and unquestioned obedience.  Members of the organization engaged in numerous acts of violence in the 1980s, including several homicides, following direct orders from Ben Yahweh.  Seventeen NOY members were indicted by a federal grand jury in Miami in 1990-91 on charges of RICO, RICO\nconspiracy, and various racketeering acts.  Various members were convicted on RICO conspiracy charges and remain imprisoned.\n\nWhile the overwhelming majority of BHI followers are unlikely to engage in violence, there are elements of this movement with both the motivation and the capability to engage in millennial violence.  Some radical BHI adherents are clearly motivated by the conviction that the approach of the year 2000 brings society ever closer to a violent confrontation between blacks and whites.  While the rhetoric professed by various BHI groups is fiery and threatening, there are no indications of explicitly identified targets for violence, beyond a general condemnation and demonization of whites and \"imposter\" Jews.  Militant BHI groups tend to distrust the United States government; however, there are no specific indications of imminent violence toward the government.\n\n## Vii.  Apocalyptic Cults\n\nFor apocalyptic cults, especially biblically based ones, the millennium is viewed as the time that will signal a major transformation for the world.   Many apocalyptic cults share the belief that the battle against Satan, as prophesied in the Book of Revelation, will begin in the years surrounding the millennium and that the federal government is an arm of Satan.  Therefore, the millennium will bring about a battle between cult members --- religious martyrs --- and the government.\n\n In the broadest meaning, cults are composed of individuals who demonstrate \"great devotion to a person, idea, object or movement.\"35  However, using that definition, many domestic terrorist groups could be characterized as cults, including Christian Identity churches, Black Hebrew Israelites,  and some militias.  For law enforcement purposes, a narrower interpretation of groups that qualify as cults is needed.  A more useful definition of cults incorporates the term \"cultic relationships\" to describe the interactions within a cult.36\nSpecifically, a cultic relationship refers to \"one in which a person intentionally induces others to become totally or nearly totally dependent on him or her for almost all major life decisions, and inculcates in these followers a belief that he or she has some special talent, gift, or knowledge.\"37\nThis definition of cults provides important distinctions that are vital for analyzing a cult's predilection towards violence.\nThe origin of the cult, the role of its leader, and its uniqueness provide a framework for understanding what distinguishes cults from other domestic terrorist groups that otherwise share many similar characteristics.  These distinctions are: (1) cult leaders are self-appointed, persuasive persons who claim to have a special mission in life or have special knowledge; (2) a cult's ideas and dogma claim to be innovative and exclusive; and (3) cult leaders focus their members' love, devotion and allegiance on themselves.38  These characteristics culminate in a group structure that is frequently highly authoritarian in structure.  Such a structure is a sharp contrast to the rapidly emerging trend among domestic terrorist groups towards a leaderless, non-authoritarian structure.\n\nWhile predicting violence is extremely difficult and imprecise, there are certain characteristics that make some cults more prone to violence.  Law enforcement officials should be aware of the following factors:\n\n\nSequestered Groups:  Members of sequestered groups lose access to the outside world\nand information preventing critical evaluation of the ideas being espoused by the leader.\n\nLeader's History:  The fantasies, dreams, plans, and ideas of the leader are most likely to\nbecome the beliefs of the followers because of the totalitarian and authoritarian nature of cults.\n\nPsychopaths:  Control of a group by charismatic psychopaths or those with narcissistic\ncharacter disorders.\n\nChanges in the Leader:  Changes in a leader's personality caused by traumatic events\nsuch as death of a spouse or sickness.\n\nLanguage of the Ideology:  Groups that are violent use language in their ideology that\ncontains the seeds of violence.\n\nImplied Directive for Violence:  Most frequently, a leader's speeches, rhetoric, and\nlanguage does not explicitly call for violence, rather it is most often only implied.\n\nLength of Time:  The longer the leader's behavior has gone unchecked against outside\nauthority, the less vulnerable the leader feels.\n\nWho Is in the Inner Circle: Cults with violent tendencies often recruit people who are\neither familiar with weapons or who have military backgrounds to serve as enforcers.\nApocalyptic cults see their mission in two general ways:  They either want to accelerate the end of time or take action to ensure that they survive the millennium.  For example, Aum Shinrikyo wanted to take action to hasten the end of the world, while compounds in general are built to survive the endtime safely.  An analysis of millennial cults by the FBI's Behavioral Science Unit describes how rhetoric changes depending on whether the leader's ideology envisions the group as playing an active role in the coming Apocalypse or a passive survivalist role:\nA cult that predicts that \"God will punish\" or \"evil will be punished\" indicates a more passive and less threatening posture than the cult that predicts that \"God's chosen people will punish . . .\"  As another example, the members of a passive group might predict that God or another being will one day liberate their souls from their bodies or come to carry them away.  The followers of a more action-oriented group would, in contrast, predict that they themselves will one day shed their mortal bodies or transport themselves to another place.39\nA cult that displays these characteristics may then produce three social-psychological components, referred to as the \"Lethal Triad,\" that predispose a cult towards violence aimed at its members and/or outsiders.40  Cults in which members are heavily dependent on the leader for all decision making almost always physically and psychologically isolate their members from outsiders, the first component of the triad.41  The other two components interact in the following way:\n \"... **isolation** causes a reduction of critical thinking on the part of group members who become entrenched in the belief proposed by the group leadership.  As a result, group members relinquish all responsibility for group decision making to their leader and blame the cause of all group grievances on some outside entity or force, a process known as projection.  Finally, isolation and **projection** combine to produce pathological **anger**, the final component of the triad.\"42 Of the nearly 1000 cults operating in the United States, very few present credible threats for millennial violence.  Law enforcement officials should concentrate on those cults that advocate force or violence to achieve their goals concerning the endtime, as well as those cults which possess a substantial number of the distinguishing traits listed above.43  In particular, cults of greatest concern to law enforcement are those that: (1) believe they play a special, elite role in the endtime; (2) believe violent offensive action is needed to fulfill their endtime prophecy; (3) take steps to attain their beliefs.  Those factors may culminate in plans to initiate conflict with outsiders or law enforcement.\n\n  The violent tendencies of dangerous cults can be classified into two general categories--\ndefensive violence and offensive violence.  Defensive violence is utilized by cults to defend a role at the end time; (3) the cult has large numbers of firearms, explosives or weapons of mass destruction; (4) the cult  has prepared defensive structures; (5) the cult speaks of offensive action; (4) the cult is led by a single male charismatic leader; (5) the leader dominates the membership through physical, sexual and emotional control; (6) the cult is not an established denomination; (7) cult members live together in a community isolated from society; (8) extreme paranoia exists within the cult concerning monitoring by outsiders and government persecution; (9) and outsiders are distrusted, and disliked.  These factors are designed to leave out cults that have unique end-time beliefs, but whose ideology does not include the advocacy of  force or violence.\n\ncompound or enclave that was created specifically to eliminate most contact with the dominant culture.44  The 1993 clash in Waco, Texas at the Branch Davidian complex is an illustration of such defensive violence.  History has shown that groups that seek to withdraw from the dominant culture seldom act on their beliefs that the endtime has come unless provoked.45\nCults with an apocalyptic agenda, particularly those that appear ready to *initiate* rather than *anticipate* violent confrontations to bring about Armageddon or fulfill \"prophesy\" present unique challenges to law enforcement officials.  One example of this type of group is the Concerned Christians (CC).  Monte Kim Miller, the CC leader, claims to be one of the two witnesses or prophets described in the Book of Revelation who will die on the streets of Jerusalem prior to the second coming of Christ. To attain that result, members of the CC traveled to Israel in 1998 in the belief that Miller will be killed in a violent confrontation in the streets of Jerusalem in December 1999.  CC members believe that  Miller's death will set off an apocalyptic end to the millennium, at which time all of Miller's followers will be sent to Heaven.  Miller has convinced his followers that America is \"Babylon the Great\" referred to in the Book of Revelation. In early October 1998, CC members suddenly vanished from the United States, an apparent response to one of Miller's \"prophesies\" that Denver would be destroyed on October 10, 1998.  In January 1999, fourteen members of the group who had moved to Jerusalem were deported by the Israeli government on the grounds that they were preparing to hasten the fulfillment of Miller's prophecies by instigating violence.46\nAscertaining the intentions of such cults is a daunting endeavor, particularly since the agenda or plan of a cult is often at the whim of its leader.  Law enforcement personnel should become well acquainted with the previously mentioned indicators of potential cult violence in order to separate the violent from the non-violent.\n\n## Viii.  The Significance Of Jerusalem\n\nThe city of Jerusalem, cherished by Jews, Christians, and Muslims alike, faces many serious challenges as the year 2000 approaches.  As already evidenced by the deportation of various members of the religious cult known as the Concerned Christians, zealotry from all three major monotheistic religions is particularly acute in Israel, where holy shrines, temples, churches, and mosques are located.  While events surrounding the millennium in Jerusalem are much more problematic for the Israeli government than for the United States, the potential for violent acts in Jerusalem will cause reverberations around the world, including the United States.  The extreme terrorist fringes of Christianity, Judaism, and Islam are all present in the United States.  Thus, millennial violence in Jerusalem could conceivably lead to violence in the United States as well.\n\nWithin Jerusalem, the Temple Mount, or Haram al-Sharif, holds a special significance for both Muslims and Jews.47  The Temple Mount houses the third holiest of all Islamic sites, the Dome of the Rock.  Muslims believe that the prophet Muhammad ascended to Heaven from a slab of stone -- the \"Rock of Foundation\"-- located in the center of what is now the Dome of the Rock.  In addition, when Arab armies conquered Jerusalem in 638 A.D., the Caliph Omar built the al-Aqsa Mosque facing the Dome of the Rock on the opposite end of the Temple Mount.  The Western (or Wailing) Wall, the last remnant of the second Jewish temple that the Romans destroyed in 70 A.D., stands at the western base of the Temple Mount.   The Western Wall has long been a favorite pilgrimage site for Jews, and religious men and women pray there on a daily basis.  Thus, the Temple Mount is equally revered by Jews as the site upon which the first and second Jewish Temples stood.\nIsraeli officials are extremely concerned that the Temple Mount, an area already seething with tension and distrust among Jews and Muslims, will be the stage for violent encounters between religious zealots.  Most troubling is the fact that an act of terrorism need not be the catalyst that sparks widespread violence.  Indeed, a simple symbolic act of desecration, or even perceived desecration, of any of the holy sites on the Temple Mount is likely to trigger a violent reaction.  For example, the Islamic holy month of Ramadan is expected to coincide with the arrival of the year 2000.  Thus, even minor provocations on or near the Temple Mount may provide the impetus for a violent confrontation.\n\nThe implications of pilgrimages to Jerusalem by vast numbers of tourists are ominous, particularly since such pilgrimages are likely to include millennial or apocalyptic cults on a mission to hasten the arrival of the Messiah.  There is general concern among Israeli officials that Jewish and Islamic extremists may react violently to the influx of Christians, particularly near the Temple Mount.  The primary concern is that extreme millennial cults will engage in proactive violence designed to hasten the second coming of Christ.  Perhaps the most likely scenario involves an attack on the Al-Aqsa Mosque or the Dome of the Rock.  Some millennial cults hold that these structures must be destroyed so that the Jewish Temple can be rebuilt, which they see as a prerequisite for the return of the Messiah.  Additionally, several religious cults have already made inroads into Israel, apparently in preparation for what they believe to be the endtimes.\nIt is beyond the scope of this document to assess the potential repercussions from an attack on Jewish or Islamic holy sites in Jerusalem.  It goes without saying, however, that an attack on the Dome of the Rock or the Al-Aqsa Mosque would have serious implications.  In segments of the Islamic world, close political and cultural ties between Israel and the United States are often perceived as symbolic of anti-Islamic policies by the Western world.  Attacks on Islamic holy sites in Jerusalem, particularly by Christian or Jewish extremists, are likely to be perceived by Islamic extremists as attacks on Islam itself.  Finally, the possibility exists that Islamic extremist groups will capitalize upon the huge influx of foreigners into Jerusalem and engage in a symbolic attack.\n\n## Ix. Conclusion\n\nExtremists from various ideological perspectives attach significance to the arrival of the year 2000, and there are some signs of preparations for violence.  The significance of the new millennium is based primarily upon either religious beliefs relating to the Apocalypse/Armageddon, or political beliefs relating to the New World Order conspiracy theory. The challenge to law enforcement is to understand these extremist theories and, if any incidents do occur, be prepared to respond to the unique crises they will represent.\n\nLaw enforcement officials should be particularly aware that the new millennium may increase the odds that extremists may engage in proactive violence specifically targeting law enforcement officers.  Religiously motivated extremists may initiate violent conflicts with law enforcement officials in an attempt to facilitate the onset of Armageddon, or to help fulfill a\n\"prophesy.\"  For many on the extreme right-wing, the battle of Armageddon is interpreted as a race war to be fought between Aryans and the \"satanic\" Jews and their allies.  Likewise, extremists who are convinced that the millennium will lead to a One World Government may choose to engage in violence to prevent such a situation from occurring.  In either case, extremists motivated by the millennium could choose martyrdom when approached or confronted by law enforcement officers.  Thus, law enforcement officials should be alert for the following:  1) plans to initiate conflict with law enforcement; 2) the potential increase in the number of extremists willing to become martyrs; and 3) the potential for a quicker escalation of conflict during routine law enforcement activities (e.g. traffic stops, issuance of warrants, etc.)."
    },
    {
        "text": "## Unresolved Questions Regarding Us Government Attribution Of A Mobile Biological Production Capacity By Iraq Milton Leitenberg\n\nOn November 20, 2005, on April 11, 2006, and on June 25, 2006, three long stories appeared in the US press regarding the Iraqi informant codenamed \"Curveball\" and the information which contributed to the allegation of a mobile biological production capacity by Iraq.1  However, the largest and most detailed compendium of material regarding Curveball, the information that he provided, and its handling and interpretation by US intelligence officials appears in the Silberman- Robb Commission Report, The Report to the President of the United States by the Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction.2  A second lengthy official source, the US Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Report, is unfortunately marred by numerous and lengthy deletions.3\nDuring 2002, the very limited number of individuals in the US intelligence community who were privy to information about Curveball and his testimony were divided as to its credibility.  Expressions of doubt about his personal credibility were repeatedly prevented from reaching senior intelligence officials, and they were never disclosed to Secretary of State Powell.  Some officials doubted Curveball's stories, some believed them, and a critical few championed them with passion.  Eventually the question became a policy dispute rather than one of intelligence:  would reference to the supposed existence of an Iraqi mobile BW production capability be included in President Bush's State of the Union address early in January 2003, and then in Secretary of State Powell's presentation to the United Nations Security Council on February 4, 2003.  Some officials such as the CIA's European Operations Chief advised deletion, but the entry would nevertheless subsequently reappear, indication of either incredible incompetence or suggestive of the likelihood of the influence and channelling of raw intelligence through Vice President Cheney's office.\nThe June 20, 2006 PBS TV documentary, \"The Dark Side,\" alleged that I. Lewis (Scooter) Libby, US Vice President Cheney's chief-of-staff drafted Powell's presentation to the United Nations.  If correct, this may explain the nature of much of its contents.4\nIn the extensive discussion of \"Curveball\" in the Silberman-Robb Commission Report, one finds a very brief and cryptic reference to the supposed vehicles on page 98:  \"Confirmation/replication of the described design by U.S. contractors (it works).\"  The reference for this entry reads \"Electronic mail from EA/DDCI from DO\n(Proofread) (Dec. 20, 2002).\"  [EA refers to Executive Assistant, DDCI to Deputy Director Central Intelligence, and DO to Director of Operations.]5\nJohn E. McLaughlin, former Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, has now publicly released the information that \"the processes he [Curveball] described had been assessed by an independent laboratory as workable engineering designs.\"6  It is plausible that this comment parallels the sentence in the Commission's report written by the EA/DDCI.  Since one does not know what the words \"it works\" in the CIA email entail, this sentence could imply less, the same, or more, but that is unknowable from the few words alone.  Several questions are immediately apparent:\n\n What was the \"independent laboratory\" that carried out this work?\n What does \"workable engineering designs\" mean?  Was it no more than a\ncomputer simulation of equipment and process, or was it a hardware mockup? And if it was a hardware mockup, was an attempt made to produce an actual agent or simulant using the mockup to literally demonstrate that \"it works,\" as the two words imply?\nIt is possible that information from a separate group of press reports may be relevant  but that is not immediately clear or certain.  In July 2003, there were three press reports about a truck platform that Dr. Steven Hatfill arranged to have constructed towards the end of 2001 under government contract at A.F.W.\n\nFabrication, a metalworking plant in Frederick, Maryland.7  These reports describe this project as a contract to SAIC, the Science Applications International Corporation, by the Defense Threat Reduction Agency, US Department of Defense, for the US Special Forces Command at Fort Bragg, North Carolina.  It was supposedly intended for use in training members of the Delta Force.  The *New York Times* reported that Three years ago the United States began a secret project to train Special Operations units to detect and disarm mobile germ factories of the sort that Iraq and some other countries were suspected of building... the heart of the effort was a covert plan to construct a mobile germ plant, real in all its parts, but never actually 'plugged in' to make weapons.  In the months before the war against Iraq, American commandos trained on this factory. ...The secret trainer is similar to the mobile units that the Bush administration has accused Iraq of building to produce biological weapons.\nThe *Washington Post* report also described the platform as a \"replica of the mobile biological weapons production laboratories that the Pentagon believed troops might encounter in Iraq.\"  The *New York Times* reporters quote \"experts\" that they had interviewed as saying that \"The trainer's equipment includes a fermenter, a centrifuge, and a mill for grinding clumps of anthrax into the best size for penetrating human lungs.\"\n The SAIC/Hatfill vehicle was built on an \"18-wheel trailer\" truck.  It was reportedly under construction beginning in September 2001.  Dr. Hatfill reportedly was provided with information by William Patrick on US designs for mobile anthrax production that had been prepared in the early 1950s.  Patrick is a well-known researcher who had worked in the US offensive biological weapons program that existed prior to 1969.   The *New York Times* reporters wrote, rather remarkably, that\n\"Mr. Patrick described [to Dr. Hatfill] the old American plans in detail.... The collaboration, experts said, produced a novel design that demonstrated a number of ways to multiply viruses and bacteria, including the use of fermentation, chicken eggs, and tissue culture.  It was not meant to replicate Iraqi threats or American designs but instead to illustrate a range of mobile biological threats.\" 8  There are no publicly available photographs of the vehicle that was being constructed under the SAIC contract, but the inclusion of a capability for virus production, egg culture and tissue culture seems very improbable.  Military officers at Fort Bragg and at the headquarters of the US Special Operations Command interviewed for the three press reports as well as Mr. Patrick all claimed that the truck platform and the equipment that it carried was \"nonfunctional,\" that piping was not connected. Can this truck-trailer platform also have served for what the CIA refers to as the \"Confirmation/replication of the described design by U.S. contractors (it works)\"? One would not think that the truck platform would be referred to as \"an independent laboratory,\" but the possibility cannot be excluded that these words refer to the SAIC contractor.\nCurveball claimed that Iraq began production of BW agents in one of several mobile production units as early as 19979, although the Silberman-Robb report states that he had been released from his position at Iraq's Chemical Engineering and Design Center, the CEDC, in 1995.  This is explained in further detail below. CIA/WINPAC reporting became progressively wildly extravagant, stating that Iraq had a \"broad range of lethal and incapacitating agents,\" that the \"BW program is more robust than it was prior to the Gulf War,\" that Iraq \"maintains a wide range of...biological agents and delivery systems,\" that use might even take place against the continental US, and that Iraq might employ as many as 21 different biological agents, a list in all likelihood composed of a sizable portion of the US CDC Select Agent list.10  All these internal US intelligence reports would prove to be total fantasy.\n\nInformation obtained in interviews connects some of these questions, but alters the context of the vehicle's construction in an important way.  It suggests that:\n\n The SAIC/Hatfill truck platform was constructed using Curveball's drawings.  (As\nwill be explained in a moment, the public depiction of these was actually not\nCurveball's.)  This may or may not be consistent with the information provided to the press that the vehicle's design was more general, and/or based on old US conceptions dating from the 1950s.\n That the US government contractor may have been the CIA's WINPAC division.\nWhether this contradicts the earlier press description, whether it is consistent with them, or whether it implies two different efforts is one of the central questions.\n And that the truck also served as a \"concept design\" to support Secretary of State\nPowell's presentation to the United Nations on February 5, 2003.\nIf construction of the SAIC/Hatfill vehicle began in September 2001, the genesis, planning and arrangements for the contract would have taken place in the spring or summer of 2001.  That is before any notion of invading Iraq was an active consideration by the administration, as it became in the days immediately following September 2001.11  And of course it was also long before anyone could envision that Secretary of State Powell would be making a presentation to the UN Security Council and what the content of that presentation might include.  It is, however, consistent with the timeline of the information provided by Curveball, which was essentially in US hands by 2000.  This would suggest that the original purpose of the platform was to test or to replicate Curveball's designs, but that as the deployment of US Special Forces to Iraq became imminent, it may also have served the function of their training.12  Finally, once Secretary Powell's UN presentation and the special CIA intelligence report were produced, the vehicle platform may have served as the\n\"concept design\" also.\nWhere did the notion of the possibility of an Iraqi mobile BW production capability come from?  In 1995, Lt. General Amir al-Sa'adi told UNSCOM officials that in 1988 he had suggested that perhaps Iraq should develop its BW production on mobile platforms.  The suggestion was rejected as not being feasible, and some fixed facilities were converted from other uses, while others were constructed.\nDuring the war against Iran, General Sa'adi had been the head of the Iraq government's Special Office for Technical Industry (SOTI) and he later became the deputy to General Hussein Kammel, the head of all of Iraq's WMD programs, in the Ministry of Industry and Military Industrialization (MIMI).  General Sa'adi proposed only \"a concept.\"  He produced no specific drawings or plans.  Curveball could therefore not have seen any prior set of drawings.\n\nHowever, Curveball's drawings were reported to be very crude.  They bore no relation to General Sa'adi's \"concept,\" and they probably also bore little relation to the illustrations which eventually appeared in Secretary Powell's UN presentation on February 4, 2003,13 or to the US CIA/DIA report released on May 28, 2003\ndescribing what would prove to be imaginary Iraqi BW production vehicles.14  These illustrations of a three-platform set of vehicles and the components mounted on them were obviously substantially elaborated by CIA draughtsman.  Secretary Powell clearly indicates this in his UN presentation by saying that \"these drawings [are] based on their description,\" and by the preceding sentence that \"The description our sources gave us of the technical features *required* by such facilities are highly detailed and extremely accurate...we know what the fermenters look like, we know what the tanks, pumps, compressors and other parts look like.\"  It is important to note that in the days preceding Secretary Powell's UN presentation, he was never informed of doubts at the CIA and DIA concerning the credibility of information provided by Curveball.15    Not only was Secretary Powell's claim for the most part false, it indicated at the same time the \"value added\" input of the US intelligence agencies.  It should also be pointed out that a British government report also alleged the existence of such Iraqi vehicles, although it included no drawings.16\nThe most exhaustive, detailed and authoritative compendium of information on the two single vehicle platforms that Iraq did possess, and that US forces found in Iraq in April and May 2003, exists in the report of the Iraq Survey Group.  They were the *Mobile Hydrogen Field Production System*, \"...two trailers to produce hydrogen gas for meteorological station purposes.\"17  They produced hydrogen in a chemical reactor to fill balloons to test wind direction for artillery fire.\n\nBut it was the ISG report Annex immediately preceding the one which describes the two hydrogen-producing trailers that is of even greater value for understanding the information provided by Curveball.  It discusses a Seed Purification Project to produce \"agricultural seed sorting and fungicide treatment systems,\" presumably primarily for feed grains.18\n...The seed project began in 1994. ...The seed purification units were designed, fabricated, and installed by the CEDC.  The designer considered producing a mobile system, but decided on fixed plants in buildings.  The final plant design was based on the reverse engineering of a Germanmanufactured seed purification plant in Tikrit.19\nThe CEDC was responsible not only for the seed purification project but also the \"single cell protein project\" that was, together with the insecticide BT, one of the two \"covers\" for Iraq's dedicated Al Hakam BW production facility for biological weapons.  Curveball was a chemical engineer working at the CEDC until 1995, when he lost his position.  This may serve to explain two things.  It may explain why Curveball could describe some sort of mobile platform, and perhaps also how he could have offered the technical details that so impressed, and as is acutely described in the Silberman-Robb report, fooled the CIA/WINPAC analyst. Alternatively, as discussed below, Curveball's CEDC position may simply have provided the bona fide for his credibility, even if his narrative about mobile BW production vehicles was not based on his own CEDC experience with a proposed mobile seed purification vehicle.\n\nAfter Curveball lost his position at the CEDC in 1995 he apparently traveled in North Africa before reaching Germany.  No one knows exactly where he was between 1997 and 1999.  During the period from the end of 1999 on, during which Curveball was providing information to the German intelligence service (BND), he disappeared on several occasions.  Curveball's brother served as a low-level bodyguard for Ahmad Chalabi, the head of the Iraqi National Congress (INC).  The organization had been funded by the CIA and the DIA at different times, and it maintained an office in London at which Chalabi was often located.  If one looks at both Secretary Powell's UN presentation and the subsequent CIA/DIA report concerning the mobile vehicles, both refer to second, third and fourth sources that are described as corroborating Curveball's information.  If one reads the relevant lines carefully, the supposed \"corroborations\" are tenuous.  Secretary Powell's descriptions are by far the loosest and extended.  Two of these subsequent informants were supplied to US intelligence agencies by the INC.  The third approached the UK government, and apparently could only report hearsay.  It is conceivable that word of what Curveball was telling the BND reached INC\nheadquarters, possibly via meetings with his brother, enabling INC officials to prompt the two informants that they subsequently supplied at least as to the general framework of what they should say.  There are other ways in which interactions between the INC, Chalabi, and Curveball could have taken place, or in which relevant information could have reached Chalabi.\nCurveball's information was provided to the German intelligence services from late-1999 through 2001, and much of it had reached US intelligence agencies during 2000.  (The Silberman-Robb report states that \"Curveball began reporting in January\n2000\"; this however is apparently when the first reports reached US intelligence services.)  Construction of the SAIC Hatfill-contracted vehicle reportedly began in September 2001.  The date on the EA/DDCI email message quoted in the Silberman- Robb report is dated December 20, 2002, more than a full year later. This suggests the likelihood that the claim that \"it works,\" and the assessment \"by an independent laboratory as workable engineering designs\" was a separate endeavor. Where that took place, by which contractor it was carried out, and how far the evaluation of \"workable\" went, all remain unknown.\n\nTaken together the information provided here suggests two possibilities, perhaps all or in part contradictory, perhaps with overlapping particulars.  First, that the SAIC/Hatfill truck platform was based as much or more on the abstract conceptions of necessary components for such a vehicle, together with the CIA's elaborated illustrations, as it was on Curveball's possible drawings.  And that this platform is what is being referred to in the Silberman-Robb report, as well as in DDCI John McLaughlin's comment.  Additionally, that in some way it was used by the CIA to validate the information provided for President Bush's State-of-the-Union remarks as well as Secretary Powell's presentation to the United Nations.  Alternatively, it suggests that the quoted line in the Silberman-Robb Commission Report refers to a separate and as yet publicly unidentified effort.  All of these questions remain questions and they remain unresolved.\n\nhome phone: 301-340-3049\n\nWashington Post, April 12, 2006; and Joby Warrick, \"Warnings on WMD 'Fabricator' Were Ignored, Ex-CIA Aide Says,\" *Washington Post*, June 25, 2006.  See also David Barstow, \"Doubts on Source for Key Piece of Data Were Suppressed, Report Says,\" *New York Times*, April 1, 2005.\nA sizable number of shorter press reports concerned with the same subject matter appeared in 2003,\n2004 and 2005.  Bob Drogin and Greg Miller, \"Iraqi Defector's Tales Bolstered U.S. Case for War; Colin Powell presented the U.N. with details on mobile germ factories, which came from a nowdiscredited source known as 'Curveball',\" *Los Angeles Times*, March 28, 2004; Glenn Kessler, \"Powell Expresses Doubts About Basis for Iraqi Weapons Claim,\" *Washington Post*, April 3, 2004; Christopher Marquis, \"Powell Blames C.I.A. for Error on Iraq Mobile Labs,\" *New York Times*, April 3, 2004; Douglas Jehl, \"Agency Disputes View of Trailers as Labs,\" *New York Times*, June 26, 2003;\nDafna Linzer and Barton Gellman, \"Doubts on Weapons Were Dismissed, *Washington Post*, April 1,\n2005; Bob Drogin and Greg Miller, \"'Curveball' Debacle Reignites CIA Feud; The former agency chief and his top deputy deny reports that they were told a key source for Iraqi intelligence was deemed unreliable,\" *Los Angeles Times*, April 2, 2005; and Evelyn Pringle, \"About Iraq - Not So Fast Colin Powell,\" opednews.com, April 30, 2006.\n\n2 Released on March 31, 2005.  Chapter One, Biological Warfare, pp. 80-111; 214-225. 3 United States Senate, Select Committee on Intelligence, Report on the U.S. Intelligence Community's Prewar Intelligence Assessments on Iraq, Washington, DC, July 7, 2004, pp. 148-162.\n\n4 PBS/Frontline, The Dark Side, 2006, http://www,obs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/darkside/. 5 The endnote for the line quoted appears on page 221 of the report, #340. 6 \"Statement of John E. McLaughlin, Former Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, Sunday, June 25,\n2006; Delivered April 1, 2005 in Response to Final Report of the Silberman-Robb\n> Commission,\" http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2006/06/24/AR2006062401194.html?referrer=email.\n\nThe author has had a copy of this statement since April 2005.  The hope had been that several members of the press who also had the statement, or the critical line in it, for various periods of time in 2005 and 2006, might be able to get to the bottom of the unanswered questions reviewed here. But that has not happened.\n\n7 William J. Broad, David Johnston, and Judith Miller, \"After The War:  Biological Warfare.  Subject of Anthrax Inquiry Tied to Anti-Germ Training,\" *New York Times*, July 2, 2003; Scott Shane, \"Hatfill's Biowar Classes May Have Led to Scrutiny.  Training work that won commendation helped attract attention of FBI,\" *Baltimore Sun*, July 3, 2003; Maryland W. Thompson, \"Anthrax Suspect Trained U.S. Team on Bioweapons:  Hatfill Had Lost his Security Clearance,\" *Washington Post*, July 3, 2003.\n\nThe SAIC contract was reported as being in the name of \"Dr. Joseph Soukup, a vice president for biomedical science,\" and Dr. Steven Hatfill.\n\n8 Broad , Johnston and Miller, \"After the War,\" July 2, 2003. 9 Silberman-Robb, p. 83. 10 Silberman-Robb, p. 85.\n\n11 PBS/Frontline, The Dark Side, 2006, http://www,obs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/darkside/; Steven Coll. Ghost Wars: The Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan, and Bin Laden, from the Soviet Invasion to September 10, 2001, New York:  Penguin Books, 2004; and Ronald Suskind, The One Percent Doctrine: Deep Inside America's Pursuit of Its Enemies Since 9/11, New York: Simon &\nSchuster, 2006.  See also, James Mann, *Rise of the Vulcans: the History of Bush's War Cabinet*, New York:  Viking, 2004 and James Bamford, A Pretext for War:  9/11, Iraq, and the Abuse of America's Intelligence Agencies, New York:  Doubleday, 2004.\n\n12 There is always the outside possibility that the Special Forces training purpose may be spurious, a\n\"cover story,\" but that seems unlikely.\n\n\n15 See in particular, Silberman-Robb, and Warrick, \"Warnings on WMD 'Fabricator',\" June 25, 2006. 16 \"Iraq's Weapons of Mass Destruction:  The Assessment of the British Government,\" September 24,\n2002.\nInformally known as the \"Iraq Dossier,\" on page 22 it states \"UNSCOM established that Iraq considered the use of mobile biological agent production facilities.  In the past two years evidence from defectors has indicated the existence of such facilities.  Recent intelligence confirms that the Iraqi military have developed mobile facilities.  These would help Iraq conceal and protect biological agent production from military attack or UN inspection,\" published in *Comparative Strategy*, 22 (2003), pp. 63-108.\n\n17 *The Comprehensive Report of the Special Adviser to the DCI on Iraqi WMD*, September 30, 2004, Annex D. Trailers Suspected of Being Mobile BW Agent Production Units, pp. 79-98.\n\n18 *The Comprehensive Report of the Special Adviser to the DCI on Iraqi WMD*, September 30, 2004, Annex C.  ISG Investigation of Iraq's Reported Mobile Biological Warfare Agent Production Capability, pp. 73-78.\n\n19 *Ibid*., pp. 73-75."
    },
    {
        "text": "## Beyond Data\n\nBy Bob Gleichauf Beyond data there is information, then knowledge, and ultimately the wisdom to make the right decisions.\n\nAdvanced Analytics and Big Data are two of the most active areas of innovation in the Tech sector right now. But from an analyst's point of view the products and technology coming out of these sectors demand a level of technical expertise that is sometimes a barrier to adoption. What's more, successful deployment frequently requires adjustments to resources and organizational structures that are not always clearly understood. If we are to maximize our return on investment we can't just upgrade our hardware and software. We also need to make adjustments to our\n\"wetware\" - the people, their skillsets, corporate policies, and the organizational structures that define our analytic communities. As Apple has shown us, the hallmark of a good product is one that is immediately usable by even the most technically challenged consumers. While the latest advanced analytical tools are very powerful, they still require a fair amount of technical sophistication and have a long way to go before they match the ease of use of an iPhone or an iPad. We cannot afford to wait for our analytic tools to catch up to Apple. We need to find ways to reduce the usability gap and further empower analysts. A good first step is to help analysts automate their more burdensome and repetitive tasks so they have more time to develop new capabilities. Unfortunately, automating tasks is hard to do and requires its own unique skills. At a minimum, an analyst needs to be able to describe inputs-outputs, what to filter, data transforms, and so on - in effect creating a storyboard. More complex analyses frequently turn into a programming exercise. While the effort is non trivial, there are clear benefits to be had. For example, codifying workflows in this manner promotes reuse. It also makes it easier to pick out \"meta\" patterns in what an analyst, or a group of analysts is doing. This makes it easier to spot hidden trends that can serve as a foundation for development of system intelligence such as the recommendation services offered by Amazon and Netflix. But even when the right processes have been put in place, it is unclear whether analysts have the time or the wherewithal to properly describe what they do on a day-to-day basis. One way to bridge the skills gap is to provide analysts with access to technical experts who know how to cross the chasm. This can be accomplished in any number of ways: access to professional services, creating virtual teams, embedding experts within those teams, and so on.  What works best depends on the unique demands of each directorate or analyst community. For example, the military has a long track record of successfully embedding experts, such as a medic or a signals corpsman, into squads and platoons. Similar benefits may be realized when a tools expert is \"embedded\" with a group of analysts. This of course would also require a clear career path for a skill set that heretofore has not always been explicitly recognized. Another challenge with Advanced Analytics and Big Data is the fact that legacy infrastructures and government policies are increasingly at odds with the realities of the analytic landscape. There are good reasons why some of these restrictions exist; protecting the privacy of U.S. citizens is a cornerstone of our society.  This is also the law. Our adversaries do not operate under the same constraints, however, and they are becoming more creative and nimble by the day. As a consequence, we risk putting ourselves at a distinct disadvantage unless we become more creative in how we operate within our own constraints.\n\nthat require data to be encrypted, both while in transit and at rest, also introduce performance penalties that make it difficult if not impossible to process large data sets in an acceptable timeframe. As the volume of data increases we may be reaching a tipping point where the rate of effectiveness actually starts to decrease because of this processing overhead. In situations such as this we should be willing to entertain alternative approaches that remain compliant with policies but do not introduce these operational impediments. For example, what if we obscured query results (the \"output\") rather than the data the queries operate on (the \"input\")? While sensitive data within a result set still remains obscured, the analyst gets back a result set that otherwise might not be generated. It also may be more accurate. From there an analyst may have justification to request a deeper analysis by authorized staff. Such an approach would require data to be stored in an unencrypted form within a virtual data vault that provides one-way access (a data \"diode\"). While there are many technical and political issues that would need to be worked out, this type of novel data management could dramatically improve the impact of the latest and greatest products and technology.\n\nConnecting the dots - whether to understand the latest regional trends, proactively predict a threat, or find a proverbial needle in a haystack - more often than not requires access to multiple data sources. The challenge here is that over the years the collection and curation of data has created its own fiefdoms that are at odds with this data-sharing requirement. The rules of analytic engagement are further complicated by both security and privacy requirements, which mandate that sensitive data be obscured. This often translates into encrypted data that precludes some forms of analysis. As a result, analysts may miss important pieces of the puzzle and be unaware that vital facts even exist.\n\nThe challenge of course is not just beyond data, it also is beyond products and technology. Ultimately our success is tied to how good a job we do managing the risk of innovation, while at the same time operating within the constraints of our IT, regulatory, and organizational environments. By virtue of its unique mix of commercial and government experience, IQT is well positioned to help both our customers and portfolio companies strike this balance. IQT has most recently demonstrated this through investments in companies such as Digital Reasoning, Recorded Future, and SitScape. Going forward we are looking to do even more through experimentation and prototyping in close cooperation with our IC customers.\nWhile significant advances have been made in identifying patterns in encrypted and obscured data, the fact remains that certain forms of analysis are no longer possible within an encrypted environment. Rules Bob Gleichauf serves as IQT's Executive Vice President of Technology Transfer and Chief Scientist and oversees the transfer of innovative technology solutions to the U.S. Intelligence Community. In this role, he supports technology advancement programs and IQT's rapid prototyping capability, and is responsible for increasing customer awareness of IQT portfolio company capabilities. Bob joined IQT from Cisco Systems, where he spent more than a decade working on the development of secure network infrastructures across a variety of the company's products as the Chief Technology Officer for the Wireless and Security Technology Group. He is respected globally for his work in information security and has more than a dozen patents in network security."
    },
    {
        "text": "## Project Quantum Leap After Action Report V1.0 Draft 12 September 2012\n\nQUANTUM LEAP takes its name from a three-year series of exercises and technology experiments conducted by Naval Special Warfare Group ONE (NSWG-1) in the late 1990s to examine ways to make Naval Special Warfare relevant in the 21st Century.\n\nBuilding upon this successful heritage, the reincarnation of QUANTUM LEAP is intended to accomplish the same mission but this time for all Special Operations Forces. QUANTUM\nLEAP will do this by following the example set by the British Special Operations Executive (SOE) during World War II -\nleveraging cutting-edge technology to enhance the conduct of operations. In many respects, this is\n\" .. an old way to do new business.\" 1\nAdmiral William H. McRaven, \"The Plan,\" circa 2000.\n\n## Table Of Contents\n\nI. Introduction\nII. QUANTUM LEAP Operational Concept\nIII. Scenario\nIV. Experiments & Participants\nV. Conclusions\nVI. Summary and Thoughts on the Way Ahead\nAppendix A: Participants\nAppendix B: Charts and graphs from QL discussion\nAppendix C: Prospective Financial Information Sources (Spreadsheet)\nAppendix D. Prospective All-Source Information Sources (List)\n\n## L Introduction\n\nSpecial Operations Command National Capital Region (SOCOM NCR) is the interagency coordination center for USSOCOM in the W asbington DC area. Its stated mission is\n\" ... to shape, coordinate, and support the synchronization of global SOF activities with the Interagency, Law Enforcement, Intelligence Community, TSOCs, multinational and private sector partners in order to integrate operational strategies and plans to achieve national security objectives, primarily along indirect lines of *operations.* \"2 To this end, SOCOM NCR\nwill facilitate and enable non-traditional capabilities, technologies, tactics, techniques and procedures (TIP), improve interagency cooperation and coordination with Washington DC-area organizations and agencies, and support the SOCOM global special operations mission.\n\nQUANTUM LEAP will be crucial to these tasks.\n\nThe new QUANTUM LEAP is a planned six-part experiment sponsored by SOCOM\nNCR. The first iteration of QUANTUM LEAP (QL) was held at the OSD AT&L open-source development laboratory in Crystal City, Virginia from 08-17 August 2012. Approximately 50\ngovernment and industry representatives attended this experiment.\n\nThe first three days of the experiment (Wed-Fri, 08-10 August) were focused on definition of requirements and exploration ofthe experiment scenario. The following week\n(Mon-Fri, 13-17 August) was devoted to actual exploration of tools, and TIP to support the SOCOM NCR mission, in this first iteration concentrating on use of unclassified and open source tools and information to support the counter-threat finance (CTF) mission.\n\nThe experiment scenario was based on an actual Department of Homeland Security\n(DHS) Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) Homeland Security Investigations (HSI)\nBulk Cash Smuggling Center (BCSC) money laundering case. NDA's were signed among all participants to permit open sharing of proprietary and law enforcement sensitive information among the participants. The ICE/HSI Intelligence Analyst and case lead John Clifton provided background on the case, which included a wide range of examples and the tactics of advanced money laundering activity.\n\nAgainst this scenario, various technologies were employed to identify and exploit the human, commercial and information networks associated with the money laundering case. The majority of these approaches utilized commonly available open sources and tools, in some cases integrated with specialized tools made available by the QL participants. From the use of these tools, new TIP were developed and explored.\n\nSOCOM NCR Charter (Draft) 01 October 2012.\n\nThe most heavily used specialized tool employed in QL was Raptor X, a Government Off-the-shelf (GOTS) geospatial information system (GIS) developed by the Department of Energy (DOE) Special Technology Laboratory (STL) and operationally used by USSOCOM\ncomponents. Raptor X is an open architecture that relies on \"plug-ins\" to import, exploit and display heterogeneous data. One of the tools developed as a Raptor X plug-in for QL was \"Social Bubble,\" a tool which summons data via the Twitter API to display Twitter users, their geographic location, posted Tweets and related metadata in the Raptor X geospatial display. This tool was used heavily during QL to identify individuals and commercial entities associated with the money laundering network. Other participating tools and technologies included maritime and air surveillance networks, financial transaction analysis software, numerical analysis software and computer network monitoring and analysis tools and data visualization. None of the other third party tools were as heavily utilized as Raptor X (along with Social Bubble). This will be discussed at length in detail in section IV.\n\nOverall the experiment was successful in identifying strategies and techniques for exploiting open sources of information, particularly social media, in support of a counter threat finance mission. Major lessons learned were the pronounced utility of social media in exploiting human networks, including networks in which individual members actively seek to limit their exposure to the internet and social media; the need for a capability to collect, manage, and exploit \"big data\"; the importance of concentrating open-source collection on unique data sources vice unique exploitation tools; the need for specialized analytical expertise (\"Subject Matter Experts\" or SMEs) and the importance of developing a specific ontology of topics, terms and data types relevant to the specific threat model, in this case counter-threat finance.\n\n## Il Quantum Leap Operational Concept\n\nThe QUANTUM LEAP operational concept envisions six separate iterations of the experiment over approximately six months, each with a different theme or scenario. The planned themes include:\n\n-\nCounter-Threat Finance (CTF)\n-\nCounter-Human Trafficking (CHT)\n-\nCounter-Terrorism/Homemade Explosives (CTIHME)\n-\nCounter-Narcotics/Drug Interdiction (CN)\n-\nCounter-Prolife.mtion(CP)\n-\nCritical Infrastructure Protection (CIP)\nThe first theme, Counter Threat Finance (CTF), was explored in the first iteration of QL\nin August 2012. Subsequent themes are to be explored approximately monthly.\n\nThe themes of all of the planned QL experiments will be similar to the earlier Naval Special Warfare (NSW) *Trident Spectre* series, including *\"Think-Do-Innovate\"* and \"Evolving Threat - *Technology Driven.\"* Included among the goals for the initial experiment were an intent to leverage open-source, commercial, unclassified and law enforcement sources to gain increased insight into the scenario threat (moneylaundering) network and engage heavy use of social media sources to extrapolate, analyze and exploit the network. Additional goals were to evaluate network discovery processes and mechanisms and to capture and record the most effective technical applications and TIPs.\n\nEvaluation of the QL experiment process will be conducted in four principal areas:\ntechnology, process (e.g. TTPs), legal and policy. For example, against a given problem associated with the scenario, such as \"identify entities associated with the money laundering network in a given geographic area, \" a technology would be identified, TTPs associated with the use of that technology developed, and legal and policy issues, concerns or requirements would be addressed. This process was followed through multiple dimensions of the threat scenario and various use-cases were developed and demonstrated. This methodology led to identification of a significant amount of new and actionable information associated with an actual ICEIHSI CTF investigation during the first iteration.\n\nAs part of this technology discovery process, tools and technologies were evaluated for maturity, including usability, versatility and effectiveness; availability, including classification, IT AR restriction, etc; and practicality, including cost, license schema, etc. It was noted that adherence to traditional DOD software procurement models, including a procurement TRM/CMMI level, etc, can be an impediment to obtaining the most modern and effective tools available.\n\nTools and technologies were also evaluated for their applicability. The specific goal was to identify open, commercial, and unclassified sources relevant to counter threat finance (CTF)\nrequirements. Eight \"Categories of *Information\"* were identified as characteristic of the CTF\nnetwork exploitation problem. These are:\n\n-\nBusiness Networks\n-\nHuman Networks\n-\nCommunications\n-\nFinancial interactions\n-\nProperty/Real Estate\n-\nAssets\n-\nTransport and Logistics\n-\nValue Transfer/Movement of Goods\nIt was also noted that it was essential to systematically assess and understand the nature and structure of CFT networks in order to identify likely multiple high value sources of information. This type of analysis requires specialized knowledge and expertise on the part of analysts and subject matter experts (\"SME's\") as well as access to tools tailored to each of the 8\nmajor information categories listed above.\n\nOne of the major issues identified was the need for improved capabilities to acquire raw data from open sources for further reduction. One of the key types of data (under \"financial interactions\"#4 above) is banking secrecy data (BSA) obtained by law enforcement pursuant to a warrant. Transactional data obtained through other sources -law enforcement investigation and forensic exploitation of seized or otherwise obtained media - is also key to unraveling deliberately obfuscated transactions and relationships.\n\nSome data in other categories is available but not necessarily efficient to obtain unilaterally, such as real estate information (almost always public record) and transportation and logistics data. These types of data may be most efficiently obtained on a commercial or\n\"subscription\" basis from industry sectors that focus on the type of data in question.\n\nNetwork and communication data can be more complex to obtain and may require more sophisticated tools to exploit. On one hand, simply scraping the Internet can obtain a huge amount of data but the infrastructure required to perform the scraping is a highly complex effort Crowd-sourcing was also identified as another efficient way to obtain data. In the scenario of a money laundering network, various individuals around the world were identified with rich and highly specific knowledge of the network. Finding and leveraging such individuals can be a productive and effective strategy, but requires various forms of subject matter expertise to conduct.\n\nHuman entity resolution is a requirement that will be common to almost any of the scenario categories proposed for the QUANTUM LEAP (QL) experiment series. Fortunately, penetration of social media, preponderance of publicly available Personal Identifying Information (PII) databases and sources, and advancements in available analytical tools significantly improves the ability to rapidly and accurately do human entity resolution from open sources.\n\nVarious (over 300) other traditional and non-traditional open sources were identified with potential relevancy to the CTF mission. These include public sources such as the Patent Classification System, which has tremendous amounts of business information contained in patent applications, or subscription-based sources like Revere Data, who sell specialized financial and business data. Two sample lists of sources are included as Appendices C and D.\n\nAn important dimension of the QL experiment was the evaluation of the policy and strategic considerations associated with open-source discovery and analysis of CTF data as well as the larger implications ofthe applications oftechnologies and TIPs developed as part ofQL.\n\nThe discussion included consideration of the strategic goals of the emerging capability to be created by QL: What is it trying to accomplish? Who are the likely customers? Who are likely partners, collaborators, suppliers, and participants? Are there security or OPSEC considerations from advanced applications of open source collection and analysis capabilities? Although many ofthe types of issues were discussed, in general, no firm conclusions were drawn. Stated goals, however, were included to make the resultant capabilities applicable to and usable by the Theater Special Operations Commands (TSOC's, e.g. SOCCENT, SOCPAC, etc) and to make the technical capabilities interoperable with the proposed \"Digital Joint Task Forces\" (Digital JTFs)\nbeing created to support the transformed TSOC organizations. Another hypothesized goal is\n\"parallel discovery,\" whereby open-source and commercial capabilities are identified or developed in parallel with government-owned capabilities and systems, in order to capitalize on the sharing of tools and information with interagency and international partners.\n\n## Ill Scenario\n\nThe scenario for the first iteration of QUANTUM LEAP, Counter Threat Finance (CTF), involved an actual major money laundering case being investigated by the Department of Homeland (DHS) Security Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) Homeland Security Investigations Division (HSI) Bulk Cash Smuggling Center (BCSC). Details of the case are Law Enforcement Activity Sensitive (LEAS) and involve a wide range of real-world money laundering tactics, to include informal value transfer systems, unlicensed money services, conspiracy, wire fraud, layered transactions, masked ownership and beneficiary relationships, shell and shelf companies and the use of bank secrecy havens.\n\nThe scenario threat network included several multi-national and US-based corporate entities, shell and shelf companies, dozens of individuals, and millions to billions of USD in assets. The total identified scope of the money laundering activity thus far identified is approximately $2.5 billion USD in five separate law enforcement cases.\n\nThe purpose of the money laundering activity is to transfer and launder proceeds in the United States of illicit (and probably licit) activities in a country unfiiendly to the US. The funds are licitly or illicitly transferred to the US where they are then used in informal value transfer systems (IVTS), trade-based money laundering, fraudulent payments, wire fraud, bribes and kickbacks and possibly the black market peso exchange.\n\nThe money laundering network includes several major groups in the US, which are all connected to financial and wealthy commercial interests in their home country. They all share various characteristics, including intricate networks of shell and shelf companies, large numbers of suspect illicit wire transfers, and use of unwitting or semi-witting proxies (often US citizens)\nand a heavy reliance on family and personal relationships.\n\nThe various components of this scenario for this particular threat finance network operate globally, conducting large-scale business transactions in many different countries, relying on banking secrecy havens such as the British Virgin Islands, the Madeira Islands, Switzerland, and Bermuda.\n\nThe success of the scenario network is enabled by the unfiiendly relations between their home country and the US, as well as heavy reliance on layered transactions, large numbers of wire transfers, including to/from bank secrecy havens, masked ownership and beneficiary relationship of many transactions, close relationships with the home country's government, and common use of inflated-value transactions, often offshore, with institutions in the home country.\n\nFacilitators in the threat network include registered agents, attorneys and accountants, uncooperative banks, limited liability corporations (LLCs), shell and shelf companies, and family members and close friends of the key participants. To exploit this network, heavy use was made of open-source information and social media, including the exploitation of publicly available personal identifying information {PII), web log (blog) postings about the network and its members, as well as publicly reported data about companies, banks or other entities associated with the network.\n\nThe scenario investigation is a large interagency effort with participants from many non-\nDOD law enforcement and regulatory agencies, led by ICEIHSI. The main goals of the investigation includes the criminal prosecution of key leaders of the money laundering network, and possibly regulatory reform to make it more difficult for this type of activity to be conducted in the future.\n\n## W. Experiments And Participants\n\nSeveral industry representatives were invited to participate in QL to demonstrate their particular technologies or capabilities. Most of the industry participants were developers or providers of software tools, chosen for their potential applicability to the CTF scenario.\n\n## Raptor X!Creative Radicals\n\nThe backbone of the open source analytical effort was Raptor X, a GOTS GIS\narchitecture designed to incorporate a wide range of''plug-ins\" or software modules from third parties to enhance the ability to discover relationships, human networks, and geospatial features.\n\nThe key plug-in used with Raptor X in the first iteration of QL was called \"Social Bubble,\" developed by Creative Radicals, Inc. (http://creativeradicals.com/) Social Bubble enabled search via the Twitter API and display of Twitter-related content associated with the search query within Raptor X. This tool was heavily used to explore human networks associated with the CTF scenario and enabled identification of various entities: people, businesses and locations associated with the moneylaundering network.\n\n## Information Systems Worldwide (I_Sw)\n\ni_SW (http://www.iswcorp.cornD is one ofthe principal contractors building the \"Digital JTF'\nconcept on behalf of SOCOM NCR to support the \"TSOC transformation\". I_SW engineers and developers participated in QL to evaluate the process and tools developed for subsequent integration into the Digital JTF concept.\n\n## Cybertap\n\nThe Cybertap Corporation (http://www.cybertapllc.comt) produces a tool called\n\"Recon\"that can be used to recreate data streams from an Ethernet ''tap\" or packet capture file.\n\nThe tool is effective at recreating documents and pages from a raw TCPIIP packet stream.\n\nDocuments are re-created in their native format, .html, .pdf, etc. While there are many other tools, including many open source programs, that will recreate a TCPIIP stream, Rr tap to provide data for it to process.\n\n## Red Cell Intelligence Group\n\nRed Cell Intelligence Group ( http://www.redcellig.com/) is a financial intelligence company who specialize in characterizing global correspondent banking relationships. They collect data from several public or commercial sources, including comparatively expensive financial industry data subscriptions, to create a searchable database of international banking relationships. This data is potentially highly applicable to the CFT scenario although no sample data related to the scenario was introduced during QL.\n\n## Lockheed Martin Inc\n\nLockheed Martin (http://www.lockheedmartin.comD primarily participated by having representatives to observe and advise on organizational issues. They did not demonstrate any software tools.\n\n## Green Line\n\nGreen Line Systems (http://greenlinesystems.com/index.php) is a commercial maritime tracking and analysis company. Their \"MDA WatchK.eeper\" product delivers comprehensive global ship tracking and analytical services in a Software as a Service (SaaS) format. For QL\nthey demonstrated the ability to track a particular ship or ships associated with a named company or other commercial entity including transoceanic transits.\n\n## G. Intrusion, Inc.\n\nIntrusion, Inc. (http://www.intrusion.comD specializes in large scale open-source monitoring and analysis. They have a nearly unique capability (shared only with large search engines such as Google) to index the internet and establish network relationships, status, and topography over time, as well as collect large quantities of data from the \"deep web\", or sources which are accessible via the internet but not necessarily indexed or linked via a WorldWide Web\n(WWW) page. Intrusion's capabilities include several software tools:\n\n-\nSavant: the principal data accumulator or engine that indexes the internet on a constant\nbasis\n-\nResume Harvest: a tool to collect individual resumes posted on the internet\n-\nTrace Viewer: a tool to geolocate IP addresses and map the global IP space\n-\nGlobal Harvest: a large repository of WWW and web server data\n-\nGeoObjects: a tool to fuse multi-source locative data\n-\nTraceCop: monthly survey of internet topography\n-\nTrace Viewer: global IP space mapping via traceroute\nThey did not provide any sample data sets during the first iteration of QL but would\nprobably be able to provide some sample data for future iterations, if given some advance\nindication ofthe subjects of interest.\n\n## Numerica Corporation.\n\nNumerica Corporation (http://www.numerica.usl) produces computational software for compressing and evaluating geospatial data. Their tool is capable of real-time signal processing on networks and potential detection of anomalous behavior, but use of the Numerica tool against a digital file containing steganography might erase the steganographic payload, similar to other compression tools. During QL, the Numerica tool was not used significantly, likely due to the lack of a candidate dataset to process.\n\n## Semantic Research Inc (Sri)\n\nSemantic Research Inc. (SRI) (http://www.semanticresearch.comD produces the Semantica visual analytics tool. Semantica is capable of ingesting structured and semi-structured data and displaying it in a \"triplet\" format, e.g. two entities and a relationship, such as \"Acme Widgets is owned by Wile E. *Coyote.\"* Triplet datablocks can then be interrelated to identify and visualize networks. Semantica is capable of processing and visualizing live data, if the data is structured in a format that the tool can ingest.\n\nSRI provided a limited demonstration of the Semantica visual analytics tool. It was proposed that SRI develop a ''plug-in\" version of Semantica to interoperate with Raptor X for future iterations of QL.\n\n## Sherpa Analytics\n\nSherpa Analytics (htq>:/ /www .sherpaanalytics.comD specializes in the near real time and automated analysis of publicly available data in all media channels, especially the social media, in many languages, to extract indicators and assess insights that impact target audiences. Sherpa discussed but did not demonstrate their capabilities. It appears they mainly offer a consulting service using off-the-shelf tools, vice providing a tool of their own. Their capabilities, focusing on social media collection and analysis, appear to be a very good fit for QL requirements, however.\n\n## Cypherpath\n\nCypherpath (http://cyphemath.comD participated in QL principally by providing a financial crimes subject matter expert who was able to guide the open source data collection effort as well as providing a comprehensive overview of the mechanics of moneylaundering.\n\n## Basis Technology\n\nBasis Technology (http://www.basistech.com/) provides text analytics and digital forensics tools potentially useful for media exploitation or analytics particularly of foreign language text sources. They are supporting the Digital J1F effort and their capabilities are probably desirable for QL requirements as well, although they did not specifically demonstrate applicability of any of their tools to the QL scenario in this interation.\n\n## Actionable Intelligence Technologies (Ait)\n\nActionable Intelligence Technologies (http://www.aitfis.comD produces a financial analysis tool called \"FIS\" (for Financial Intelligence System). It is, in effect, an accounting software package similar to Quicken or Peachtree but modified and optimized for financial investigations. It is used by many financial crimes investigatory agencies, including IRS, FBI, Secret Service, etc, to reconstruct and analyze large-scale financial records. AIS advertises that an investigative agency can perform an entire investigation in FIS, including importing and managing documents, records analysis, intelligence data capture, and automated analytics. AIS\ndemonstrated FIS during QL and it appeared to be one of the most relevant and valuable tools to CTF requirements.\n\nMore than 200 additional open-source tools and sources were identified relevant to counter threat finance. Some were investigated or used during QL while others were identified as desirable **but** not available during the experiment. These additional sources are described in Appendices C and D.\n\n## V. Conclusions\n\nThe first iteration of QUANTUM LEAP 2012 (QL) successfully developed and identified technologies, sources, TIPs, policy and legal issues and strategies for developing a capability to support Counter Threat Finance (CTF) requirements and missions.\n\nWith over 50 participants in the initial experiment over the course of 8 days, there was a wealth of valuable input, resulting in development of a coherent methodology for approaching CTF missions.\n\nThis methodology is described as an iterative cycle, with an initial input of known and unknown indicators ofCTF-related activity. Subsequently a phase of mapping and discovery is initiated, identifying people, assets, money, criminal activity, etc. This is followed by forensic development of a movement and chronology narrative of transactions, goods exchanged, communications, and transportation. Subsequently the narrative is mapped against targeted outcomes, e.g. desired end game, etc, to inform specific actions to be taken. Every time a new entity is identified associated with the CTF network or activity, the cycle is repeated. This cycle is illustrated in Figure 8 of Appendix B.\n\nAlso identified as part of the initial QL effort were broad categories of functions needed for SOCOM NCR These include:\n\n-\nTraining\n- Processes\n- Protocols\n- Data\n-\nTechnology\n0\nDiscovery\n0\nMaturation\n0\nTransition\n- Cooperation between stakeholders\n-\nStrategy\n- Risk Mitigation\n- Liability - Counterintelligence\n-\nWork Processes\n-\nInteragency Collaboration\n-\nInformation Sharing\n-\nCommunications\n- Funding\n-\nFeedbackloop~sons~ed\n-\nResiliency, Robustness, and Repeatability\n-\nResearch and Development\nThese categories, described as \"nodes in the solution set\", were not completely developed during the first iteration but will be subjects for continued discussion at the next and subsequent QL experiments. Some additional requirements or needs identified for future QL iterations were also identified, including:\n\n-\nNeed to identify and prioritize target datasets within the 8 major categories (see Section II\nabove)\n-\nNeed to identify strategies for rapid large-scale data reduction, to \"zero in\" in on potential\ntargets in a timely way.\n-\nNeed to develop strategies for \"triage\" of targets, especially in CTF investigations, to\navoid inaccurate targeting and wasted effort.\n-\nA strategy is needed for development of measures of effectiveness (MOE). These may be\ndifferent depending on the mission (CTF vs CT, CP, etc) but the metrics should be clear,\nunambiguous, and agreed upon with interagency partners.\n-\nAlso needed are ontologies for technical and social media collection, to clearly enumerate\nwhat data is sought from what sources, relevant to the eight categories of CTF -related\ninformation and the CTF exploitation cycle.\nSome generalized additional conclusions:\n\n-\nIt would be highly desirable to recruit additional participants from the social\nmedia monitoring industry. Social media monitoring is a rapidly growing commercial\nsector, primarily focused on private sector marketing. But the same tools and\ntechnologies would apparently be highly applicable to QL requirements as well.\n-\nFuture participants in QL experiments should be ~ed\" with information about\nthe theme and scenario for the experiment and encouraged to develop or modify their\ntechnologies or capabilities for demonstration against the specific scenario for that\niteration. Ideally, participants should be provided in advance with some sample data as an\nexample or for use with tools that do not collect data organically.\n-\nWe are currently in a \"window .. of opportunity for exploitation of social media\nsources for application to CTF or other SOCOM NCR missions. 1bis window could be as\nnarrow as 18-24 months before the social media phenomenon transforms. This future\ntransformation is unknown and could offer additional opportunities, or existing\nopportunities could be closed, but the only thing that is certain is that there will continue\nto be rapid change.\n-\nLegal review of the appropriate use and application of social media data is in its\ninfancy. Social media is transforming notions of privacy and distinctions between\npersonally identifiable information (PII) and self-reported public information will have to\nbe established by precedent in case law.\n-\nAlmost all information relevant to the QL experiment has a locative context.\nLocation based services (LBS) are becoming integrated into every facet of our lives and\nare becoming much more accepted. There is a cultura1/generational component to\nacceptance of LBS in social media.\n-\nStrategies and tactics to protect operational security (OPSEC) in the open-source\nexploitation process are very important and can be very difficult But use of open sources\nis a \"double edged sword\" that can compromise OPSEC as readily as it can contribute to the mission.\n\nQUANTUM LEAP (QL) intends to use a secure workspace and collaboration capabilities in the performance of future advanced, cutting edge technology demonstrations. The SOCOM\nNCR Collaboration Portal (SNCP) will be specially tailored to provide a Secure Work Environment (SWE) to enhance the performance ofQL by offering government, industry, interagency and academic partners the capability to share information and work asynchronously from remote locations when required- all secured by the portal. There are three stages to this process of SWE integration:\n\n-\nStage one consists of mapping the integration methodology needed to ensure that the\ndeveloping Innovation can be readily transitioned to a secure work environment (SWE)\n-\nStage two is formatted as pre-deployment zone which mirrors portal hardware, software\nand network environment while only allowing access to limited users -to include original\ndevelopers and beta-testers as required\n-\nStage three is a fully-operational enclave that addresses the security concerns related to\nthe innovation product, allows remote web access, is part of a collaborative environment\nTo complete the creation of the SWE, an Innovations server will be connected to the Portal server enclave which will be accessible via a public-facing web address and/or the collaboration layer, as required. The work spaces will pull information into data groups which will be accessed by Innovations and also be able to export results in multiple formats. A risk assessment of each innovation package will be prepared and provided to the appropriate decision makers. The SWE will allow an Innovation to be held in the pre-deployment zone or cycled back to the QL for further development. Users can be segmented and all users on the network will have visibility as to who is on the network. A future enhancement will allow the creation of special classes of users, to enable secure yet limited access and functionality for trusted but unvetted foreign partners.\n\n## Vi. Summary And Thoughts On The Way Ahead\n\nIn summary, the August 2012 QUANTUM LEAP experiment yielded some vital insights into the process of exploiting social media and other open sources within a Counter Threat Finance (CTF) scenario, as well as highlighting many of the technical, organizational, legal, policy and procedural issues important to the development of the SOCOM NCR organization.\n\nThere were numerous \"Lessons Learned\" for future iterations of the QL which will inform and improve each successive experiment. As a result of this experience, the next QL iteration should be even more productive and effective in addressing SOCOM NCR's unique needs and requirements.\n\nWith regard to the way ahead, it would be prudent for SOCOM NCR and SOCOM writ large to take a hard look at the way C1F is currently conceptualized and executed within DoD\nand a wider interagency context. Terrorist, insurgent, weapons proliferation and Transnational Organized Crime (TOC) networks ali rely on irregular ways and illicit means to fund their activities, to include donations from non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and clandestine financial support from hostile foreign governments. As we witnessed in the QL scenario, sophisticated front companies-established by an adversary as part and parcel of an Irregular Warfare (lW) strategy-are another important financial source, generating self-sustaining streams of revenue, laundering illicit money, and providing covert means to penetrate economies, states and societies. Such legitimate looking companies can be used to cloak lesssophisticated, large-scale means of transferring illicit funds, such as bulk cash shipment and trade-based money laundering. Protecting or attacking these networks- including their financial bases of support, means of sustainment and lines of communication-has always played an important role in the history of warfare. Yet, in the 21st-century era of globalization and IW, the challenge of countering the financial and economic depth of our adversaries in conflict has become remarkably complex. Early on in the QL first iteration, a couple of points became apparent:\n\n-\nThere is a need to develop or identify USSOCOM policy relevant to Counter Threat\nFinance (CTF) missions. It was unclear to the QL participants if SOCOM has a\ncommand-wide policy or instruction governing CTF outside existing DOD instructions\nand directives.\n-\nA \"policy road.map\" for CTF in the USSOCOM claimancy is needed, which will\nprobably need to be coordinated or staffed with OSD USD(I) and ASD(SOLIC)\nGiven the complexity ofroqay's threat and IW financial networks, CTF as it currently exists may be too narrowly defined. From the current strategy, this is:\n\"CTF is defined as the means to detect, counter, contain, disrupt, deter or dismantle the transitional financing of state and non-state adversaries threatening US national security. Monitoring, assessing, analyzing and exploiting financial information are key support functions of *CTF activities.* \"3\nThe scope of DOD interests in preventing US adversaries access to resources to support their activities goes far beyond financing. We should also consider non-financial resources as targets for coordinated, \"whole of government\" action to include:\n\n-\nCounter trafficking- narcotics, illicit goods (e.g., counterfeited contraband, blood\ndiamonds, etc.), weapons transfers, human trafficking and weapons of mass destruction\nand subcomponents (the latter two are subjects of future QL experiments)\n-\nFacilitating US and allied law enforcement actions to undennine TOC networks (i.e.,\narrests, prosecutions, asset seizures)\n-\nEconomic activity and lines of communication (\"ratlines\") disruption\nDepartment of Defense Counter Threat Financing Strategy, p. vi.\n\n-\nDisrupting/undermining adversary critical infrastructure and economies (Economic\nWarfare)\n-\nSupport for economic development programs to undermine insurgencies (e.g. alternative\ncrop programs in Colombia and Afghanistan)\n-\nCounter transfer of dual-use technologies\nWhile strategy and policy formulations refer to most if not all of the above, there is no coherent DOD strategy that is all-encompassing, and provides the capability for DOD to provide\nsupport to counter IW adversaries in peacetime, as well as war. In the larger view, perhaps a better terminology is \"Countering Threat Resources (CTR)\" vice purely CTF. As such, CTR may be more broadly defined as follows:\n\"CTR is the strategy of undermining the economic activities that generate financial resources for adversary nation states, insurgent groups, terrorist organizations and individuals who are part of or supporting forces engaged in hostilities against the US, its collation partners and allies. This includes actions taken against persons who have committed a belligerent act or supported hostilities in the aid of enemy forces, to include criminal enterprises linked to these activities. \"\nGiven the seamless nature of adversary economic activities, it is also our view that the future design of CTF /CTR should take a global view, and not piecemeal the problem by limiting the spectrum of action or carving CTF/CTR up along Geographic Combatant Commander (GCC)\nlines. This will yield a system that will have too narrow a mission focus, will thus \"miss the bigger picture\" with regards to enemy economic activity, will not have the agility to act or coordinate action in response to disruption actions and will not be able to measure and assess the effects of disruption activities and their impact on adversary networks, not to mention on our collation partners and allies. Therefore it is the view of the QL participants that SOCOM should advocate for the following:\n\n-\nDevelop a more encompassing CTF/CTR strategy that incorporates a \"whole of\ngovernment\" or more broadly \"whole ofnation(s)\" that provides DOD the flexibility to\nsupport CTF *ICTR.* and Economic Warfare activities in both peace and war\n-\nClearly define DOD (and SOCOM's role) in CT, CN and CTF/CTR activities and the\nderivative authorities involved\n-\nCTF *ICTR.* should be a national priority and directed at the national level, with a national\ninteragency center directing the action worldwide (central planning/de-centralized\nexecution), supported by technology that can be brought to bear on the problem to\nprovide global situational awareness\n-\nExamine the JlA TF-South military - law enforcement - international cooperation model\nfor a combined interagency CTF /CTR operations center that would work in conjunction\nwith SOCOM NCR"
    },
    {
        "text": "# Espionage And Other Compromises Of National Security\n\nNovember 02, 2009\n\n                      Case Summaries from\n                            1975 to 2008\n\n\nESPIONAGE\n\n\nAnd Other Compromises of National Security Case Summaries from 1975 to 2008\n\nSince its first publication in 1985 as *Recent Espionage Cases,* this product has offered the security educator easy-to-find factual information about espionage-related cases for use in briefings, newsletters, and other educational media. This new edition, issued by the Defense Personnel Security Research Center (PERSEREC), supplements the collection of case summaries with 20 new entries, and updates and expands previous accounts for which we now have more complete information. With this July 2009 edition, we have changed the title to Espionage and Other Compromises of National Security: Case Summaries from 1975 to 2008 in order to more accurately reflect the range and type of events summarized here.\n\nPurpose: Education and Awareness\n\nThe principal objective of this publication is the enhancement of security awareness among cleared employees and military service members by showing that espionage and similar prosecutable offenses involve real people in workplace situations like their own, and that loyal and conscientious employees continue to be the target of attempts by agents of foreign intelligence services to recruit them as sources of sensitive defense and intelligence information. The reader will recognize that these case summaries bear little resemblance to the glamorized fictional accounts of spy novels; rather, they often tell mundane tales of human folly resulting in tragic personal consequences. Many of the disasters described in these summaries might have been avoided if concerned coworkers, recognizing danger signs and personal vulnerabilities, had been willing to intervene. Other lessons that can be shared with employee audiences are that most offenders were trusted insiders, not foreign agents; even \"friendly\" countries have been the recipients of stolen US\nclassified information; and these damaging betrayals can occur in either government or contractor organizations. In addition to serving the needs of the security educator, this publication through several editions since 1985 has been consistently in high demand as a reference source for security managers and policymakers and used in the training of counterintelligence and security professionals in government and industry. We hope that this latest release, Espionage and Other Compromises of National Security, will continue to meet these various needs.\n\n\nRationale for Including Cases The principal criterion for including an espionage case summary in this volume is that it involves the theft or compromise, or threat of compromise, of US national defense information. Normally this is interpreted as US classified information, but as a legal concept this may include controlled or critical technologies that have defense application. Every effort has been made to include at least every case, reported in the public media and in open-source government publications, in which a US citizen has been indicted or charged with espionage under the espionage code (generally, several sections of USC Title 18). However, there are a number of cases in this collection that have not been prosecuted under the espionage code. In these events, an insider or private sector business figure, under suspicion of espionage, was tried and often convicted of a lesser offense such as illegal export of militarily critical technology or for the unauthorized removal of classified documents to an unsecure location. These borderline cases should be discussed with cleared employees by security educators since they stand as examples of what can go wrong when sound personnel security policies and practices are not followed. While our major concern, and by far the cause of the greater number of cases, is insider betrayal, a few summaries included here result from the apprehension of foreign operatives. These agents of adversarial intelligence services have targeted US information or assets or have attempted to enlist the cooperation of a US citizen having legitimate access to classified information. Foreign agent cases are important for their educational value since they highlight the targeting of potentially vulnerable insiders and confirm the persistence of foreign services to infiltrate US government organizations and to recruit cleared employees for illegal activities. Admittedly, many foreign agent operations go unreported in the press. Many agents having diplomatic immunity have been sent home as *personae non gratae* (\"PNGed\") \"for engaging in activities incompatible with their diplomatic status.\" To assist the security educator in identifying foreign agent cases, we have marked these with an asterisk in each listing. The year 1975 was selected as the starting point for these case summaries as it marked the end of a 10-year period of relative quiet in the active prosecution of espionage cases. According to news reports, the government decided to resume aggressive prosecution of arrested spies in the mid- 1970s. Within each year of the decade that followed, the number of cases brought to court had risen to nearly a dozen. The high frequency of prosecutions in the 1980s and 1990s argued for changing the title of this publication since these cases, however instructive, are no longer recent.\nThe collection now includes 141 case summaries in which US information or assets have been targeted. New cases will be added in future updates. We have also attempted to provide assistance to the user by including three listings of cases in the introduction: (1) alphabetical by name of offender, (2) chronological by date of arrest or first public disclosure, and (3) by targeted or affected organization. Thus, the security educator can find a particular summary by referencing the name of the culprit, the most recent case events, or those cases involving a particular targeted organization. Each case summary identifies one or more offenders who were implicated in an effort to illegally provide US classified or other sensitive national defense information to a foreign interest or in an activity that seriously compromised national security information. Each summary is identified by the name of a person who was officially named or indicted on at least one count of espionage or espionage-related offenses. The authors offer selected citations at the end of case summaries should a reader wish to refer to original sources for more information.\n\n\nFurther Analysis of Espionage Data Espionage and Other Compromises of National Security is closely related to PERSEREC's longstanding study of espionage as one manifestation of betrayal of trust among members of the government and contractor workforce. Espionage is a rare crime; however, it is one that when undetected can have devastating consequences for national security. Security educators, who might be interested in a more detailed overview of espionage as a phenomenon in terms of frequency distributions on several key variables, can find this in a PERSEREC technical report, Changes in Espionage by Americans, 1947-2007. This and earlier reports on espionage trends can also be found on the PERSEREC website under Selected Reports. The 2007 report on espionage changes shows the number of espionage offenders who fall into various categories such as personal attributes, motivation, modus operandi, and consequences for the offender.\n\nDistribution and Access to this Product Consistent with our interest in developing innovative products to support security education, PERSEREC will continue to update and publish these case summaries in electronic format on the PERSEREC website (**http://www.dhra.mil/perserec**) to allow for easy downloading and printing should hard copy be desired for training or awareness programs. No permission is required; however, we like to hear how this product is being used and for what purpose. As always, we are interested in comments and feedback from the security community on how to make it more useful as a reference source and as an educational tool. Please forward your comments and questions to PERSEREC@osd.pentagon.mil.\n\n\n\n##\n\n\nThese case summaries or the public media articles on which they are based do not necessarily reflect the views of the Department of Defense, nor does this publication constitute an endorsement or confirmation of these facts by the Department of Defense.\n\n\n## Table Of Contents\n\n\nIntroduction\n\n\niii\n\nTable of Contents\n\n\nvii\n\nCase Summaries by Name of Principal Offender\n\n\nix\n\nCase Summaries by Year of Arrest or First Public Disclosure of\n\n\nxi\n    Involvement in Espionage\n\n\nEspionage Case Summaries by Targeted or Victimized Organization\n\nxiii\n\nCase Summaries\n\n\n1-64\n\n## Case Summaries By Name Of Principal Offender\n\n\n\nAbu-Jihaad, Hassan\n\n 1\nAllen, Michael Hahn\n\n 1\nAlonso, Alejandro\n\n 1\nAmes, Aldrich Hazen\n\n 2\nAmes, Maria Del Rosario Casas (see Ames)\n  2\nAnderson, Ryan Gibson\n\n 3\nAnzalone, Charles Lee Francis\n\n 3\nAquino, Michael Ray* (see Aragoncillo)\n  4\nAragoncillo, Leandro\n\n 4 Baba, Stephen Anthony\n\n\n  4\nBarnett, David Henry\n\n 5\nBaynes, Virginia Jean (see Joseph G. Brown)\n  6\nBell, William Holden\n\n 5\nBergersen, Gregg William (see Kuo)\n\n31\nBoone, David Sheldon\n\n 5\nBoyce, Christopher John\n\n 6\nBrown, Joseph Garfield\n\n 6\nBrown, Russell Paul (see Wilmoth)\n\n61\nBuchanan, Edward Owen\n\n 7 Carney, Jeffrey M.\n\n 7\nCavanagh, Thomas Patrick\n\n 8\nCharlton, John Douglas\n\n 8\nChernyayev, Rudolf* (see Enger)\n\n\n13\nChin, Larry Wu-Tai*\n\n 9\nClark, James Michael\n\n 9\nConrad, Clyde Lee\n\n\n10\nCooke, Christopher Michael\n\n\n11\nCordrey, Robert Ernest\n\n\n11 Davies, Allen John\n\n\n11\nDedeyan, Sadag K.\n\n\n12\nDesheng, Hou*\n\n\n12\nDiaz, Matthew M.\n\n\n12\nDolce, Thomas Joseph\n\n\n13\nDubberstein, Waldo H\n\n\n13 Ellis, Robert Wade\n\n\n13\nEnger, Valdik*\n\n\n13 Faget, Mariano\n\n\n14\nFleming, David\n\n\n14\nForbrich, Ernst*\n\n\n15\nFord, Kenneth Wayne\n\n\n15\nFranklin, Lawrence Anthony\n\n\n15 Garcia, Wilfredo\n\n\n16\nGilbert, Otto Attila*\n\n\n16\nGonzales, Fernando* (see Gerardo Hernandez) 21 Gonzales, Rene (see Gerardo Hernandez)*\n21\nGraf, Ronald Dean (see King)\n\n\n29\nGregory, Jeffery Eugene\n\n\n17\nGroat, Douglas Frederick\n\n\n\n17\nGuerrero, Antonio\n\n\n18 Haeger, John Joseph (see Schoof)\n\n\n50\nHaguewood, Robert Dean\n\n\n18\nHall, James III\n\n\n18\nHamilton, Frederick Christopher\n\n\n19\nHanssen, Robert Philip\n\n\n19\nHarper, James Durward\n\n\n20\nHawkins, Stephen Dwayne\n\n\n20\nHelmich, Joseph George\n\n\n21\nHernandez, Gerardo*\n\n\n21\nHernandez, Linda\n*\n\n\n22\nHernandez, Nilo* (see Linda Hernandez)\n22\nHerrmann, Rudolph Albert*\n\n\n22\nHoffman, Ronald\n\n\n23\nHorton, Brian Patrick\n\n\n23\nHoward, Edward Lee\n\n\n24\nHumphrey, Ronald\n\n\n24 Irene, Dale (see Michael Tobias)\n\n\n56\nIsmaylov, Vladimir M.*\n\n\n24 Jeffries, Randy Miles\n\n\n25\nJenott, Eric O.\n\n\n25\nJones, Geneva\n\n\n26 Kadish, Ben-Ami\n\n\n26\nKampiles, William\n\n\n27\nKao, Yen Men*\n\n\n27\nKang, Yu Xin* (see Kuo)\n\n\n31\nKarpov, Yevegeny P.* (see Rogalsky)\n\n48\nKearn, Bruce Leland\n\n\n28\nKercsik, Sandor (see Conrad)\n\n\n10\nKercsik, Imre (see Conrad)\n\n\n10\nKeyser, Donald Willis\n\n\n28\nKim, Robert Chaegun\n\n\n28\nKing, Donald Wayne\n\n\n29\nKoecher, Karl Frantisek*\n\n\n30\nKostadinov, Penyu B.*\n\n\n30\nKota, Subrahmanyam\n\n\n30\nKunkle, Craig Dee\n\n\n31\nKuo, Tai Shen*\n\n\n31 Labanino, Ramon* (see Gerardo Hernandez)\n21\nLalas, Steven John\n\n\n32\nLee, Andrew Daulton (see Boyce)\n\n 6\n|                                                   | Schuler, Ruby Louise (see Harper)    |     |     | 20    |\n|---------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------|-----|-----|-------|\n| Schwartz, Michael Stephen                         |                                      |     |     | 50    |\n| Scranage, Sharon Marie                            |                                      |     |     |       |\n| Seldon, Phillip Tyler                             |                                      |     |     |       |\n| Shaaban, Hafiz Ahmad Ali Shaaban*                 |                                      | 51  |     |       |\n| Shu, Quan-Sheng                                   |                                      |     |     |       |\n| Slatten, Charles Dale                             |                                      |     |     |       |\n| Slavens, Brian Everett                            |                                      |     |     |       |\n| Smith, James J.                                   |                                      |     |     |       |\n| Smith, Richard Craig                              |                                      |     |     |       |\n| Smith, Timothy Steven                             |                                      |     |     |       |\n| Sombolay, Albert T.                               |                                      |     |     |       |\n| Soussoudis, Michael* (see Scranage)               |                                      | 51  |     |       |\n| Souther, Glenn Michael                            |                                      |     |     |       |\n| Spade, Henry Otto                                 |                                      |     |     |       |\n| Squillacote, Therese Marie (see Stand)            |                                      | 56  |     |       |\n| Stand, Kurt Alan                                  |                                      |     |     |       |\n| Susemihl, Igor* (see Trofimoff)                   |                                      |     | 57  |       |\n| Szabo, Zoltan (see Conrad)                        |                                      |     |     | 10    |\n|                                                   |                                      |     |     |       |\n| Tobias, Bruce (see Michael Tobias)                |                                      | 56  |     |       |\n| Tobias, Michael Timothy                           |                                      |     |     | 56    |\n| Trofimoff, George                                 |                                      |     |     |       |\n| Truong, David* (see Humphrey)                     |                                      |     | 24  |       |\n| Tsou, Douglas                                     |                                      |     |     |       |\n| Tumanova, Svetlana                                |                                      |     |     |       |\n|                                                   |                                      |     |     |       |\n| Walker, Arthur James                              |                                      |     |     |       |\n| Walker, John Anthony                              |                                      |     |     |       |\n| Walker, Michael Lance (see John A. Walker)        | 58                                   |     |     |       |\n| Warren, Kelly Therese                             |                                      |     |     |       |\n| Weichu, Zang* (see Desheng)                       |                                      |     | 12  |       |\n| Weinmann, Ariel Jonathan                          |                                      |     |     | 60    |\n| Whitworth, Jerry Alfred                           |                                      |     |     |       |\n| Wilmoth, James R.                                 |                                      |     |     |       |\n| Wispelaere, Jean-Philippe                         |                                      |     |     | 61    |\n| Wold, Hans Palmer                                 |                                      |     |     |       |\n| Wolf, Ronald Craig                                |                                      |     |     |       |\n| Wolff, Jay Clyde                                  |                                      |     |     |       |\n|                                                   |                                      |     |     |       |\n| Yai, John Joungwoong                              |                                      |     |     |       |\n| Yildirim, Huseyin* (see Hall)                     |                                      |     | 18  |       |\n|                                                   |                                      |     |     |       |\n| Zacharski, Marian* (see Bell)                     |                                      |     | 5   |       |\n| Zakharov, Gennadiy F.*                            |                                      |     |     | 63    |\n| Zehe, Alfred*                                     |                                      |     |     |       |\n| Zinyakin, Vladimir* (see Enger)                   |                                      |     | 13  |       |\n|                                                   |                                      |     |     |       |\n| Lee, Peter H.                                     |                                      |     |     |       |\n| Leonov, Yuriy P.*                                 |                                      |     |     |       |\n| Lessenthien, Kurt G.                              |                                      |     |     |       |\n| Leung, Katrina M.* (see James J. Smith)           | 53                                   |     |     |       |\n| Lipka, Robert Stephan                             |                                      |     |     |       |\n| Lonetree, Clayton John                            |                                      |     |     |       |\n|                                                   |                                      |     |     |       |\n| Madsen, Lee Eugene                                |                                      |     |     |       |\n| Mak, Chi                                          |                                      |     |     |       |\n| Maynard, John Raymond                             |                                      |     |     | 36    |\n| Maziarz, Gary                                     |                                      |     |     |       |\n| Mehalba, Ahmed Fathy                              |                                      |     |     |       |\n| Michelson, Alice*                                 |                                      |     |     |       |\n| Miller, Richard W.                                |                                      |     |     |       |\n| Mira, Francisco de Assis                          |                                      |     |     | 38    |\n| Montaperto, Ronald N.                             |                                      |     |     |       |\n| Montes, Ana Belen                                 |                                      |     |     |       |\n| Moore, Edwin G. II                                |                                      |     |     |       |\n| Morison, Samuel Loring                            |                                      |     |     | 40    |\n| Mortati, Tommaso                                  |                                      |     |     |       |\n| Murphy, Michael Richard                           |                                      |     |     | 41    |\n|                                                   |                                      |     |     |       |\n| Nesbitt, Frank Arnold                             |                                      |     |     |       |\n| Nicholson, Harold James                           |                                      |     |     | 42    |\n| Nour, Almaliki                                    |                                      |     |     |       |\n| Ntube, Dominic* (see Jones)                       |                                      |     |     | 26    |\n|                                                   |                                      |     |     |       |\n| Oakley, Roy Lynn                                  |                                      |     |     |       |\n| Ogorodnikov, Nikolai* (see Miller)                |                                      | 37  |     |       |\n| Ogorodnikova, Svetlana* (see Miller)              |                                      | 37  |     |       |\n| Ott, Bruce Damian                                 |                                      |     |     |       |\n|                                                   |                                      |     |     |       |\n| Pakhtusov, Yuri N.*                               |                                      |     |     |       |\n| Paskalian, Sarkis O.* (see Dedeyan)               |                                      | 12  |     |       |\n| Pelton, Ronald William                            |                                      |     |     |       |\n| Peri, Michael A.                                  |                                      |     |     |       |\n| Pickering, Jeffery                                |                                      |     |     |       |\n| Pitts, Earl Edwin                                 |                                      |     |     |       |\n| Pizzo, Francis X. (see Michael Tobias)            |                                      | 56  |     |       |\n| Pollard, Anne H. (see Jonathan J. Pollard)        | 45                                   |     |     |       |\n| Pollard, Jonathan Jay                             |                                      |     |     |       |\n| Prasad, Aluru J.* (see Kota)                      |                                      |     |     | 30    |\n|                                                   |                                      |     |     |       |\n| Ramsay, Roderick James                            |                                      |     |     | 46    |\n| Ratkai, Stephen Joseph*                           |                                      |     |     | 47    |\n| Regan, Brian Patrick                              |                                      |     |     |       |\n| Richardson, Daniel Walter                         |                                      |     |     | 48    |\n| Rogalsky, Ivan N.*                                |                                      |     |     |       |\n| Rondeau, Jeffrey S.                               |                                      |     |     |       |\n| Roth, John Reece                                  |                                      |     |     |       |\n|                                                   |                                      |     |     |       |\n| Santos, Joseph                                    |                                      |     |     |       |\n| Santos, Amarylis Silverio (see Joseph Santos)  50 |                                      |     |     |       |\n| Schoof, Charles Edward                            |                                      |     |     | 50    |\n\n\nHoward, Edward Lee\n\nJeffries, Randy Miles\n\nPelton, Ronald William\n\nPollard, Jonathan Jay\n\nScranage, Sharon Marie\n\nTobias, Michael Timothy\n\nWalker, Arthur James\n\nWalker, John Anthony\n\nWhitworth, Jerry Alfred 1986\nAllen, Michael Hahn\n\nDavies, Allen John\n\nHaguewood, Robert Dean\n\nIsmaylov, Vladimir M.*\n\nLonetree, Clayton John\n\nOtt, Bruce Damian\n\nZakharov, Gennadiy F.*\n\n\n1987\nTumanova, Svetlana 1988\nConrad, Clyde Lee\n\nDesheng, Hou*\n\nDolce, Thomas Joseph\n\nFleming, David\n\nGarcia, Wilfredo\n\nHall, James III\n\nRatkai, Stephen Joseph*\n\nRichardson, Daniel Walter\n\nSouther, Glenn Michael\n\nSpade, Henry Otto\n\nTsou, Douglas 1989\nKing, Donald Wayne\n\nKunkle, Craig Dee\n\nMortati, Tommaso\n\nNesbitt, Frank Arnold\n\nPakhtusov, Yuri N.*\n\nPeri, Michael A.\n\nSchoof, Charles Edward\n\nWilmoth, James R.\n\nWolf, Ronald Craig 1990\nHoffman, Ronald\n\nRamsay, Roderick James 1991\nAnzalone, Charles Lee Francis\n\nCarney, Jeffrey M.\n\nSombolay, Albert T. 1992\nBrown, Joseph Garfield\n\nRondeau, Jeffrey Stephen\n1993\nGregory, Jeffery Eugene\nCase Summaries by Year of Arrest or First Public Disclosure of Involvement in Espionage\n\n1975\nDedeyan, Sadag K.\n\n\n1976\nMoore, Edwin G., II 1977\nBoyce, Christopher John\n\nRogalsky, Ivan N.*\n\n1978\nEnger, Valdik*\n\nHumphrey, Ronald\n\nKampiles, William\n\n\n1979\nMadsen, Lee Eugene 1980\nBarnett, David Henry\n\nHerrmann, Rudolph Albert* 1981\nBaba, Stephen Anthony\n\nBell, William Holden\n\nCooke, Christopher Michael\n\nHelmich, Joseph George\n\nMurphy, Michael Richard 1982\nGilbert, Otto Attila*\n\nHorton, Brian Patrick\n\nSlavens, Brian Everett 1983\nDubberstein, Waldo H.\n\nEllis, Robert Wade\n\nHarper, James Durward\n\nKostadinov, Penyu B.*\n\nLeonov, Yuriy P.*\n\nMaynard, John Raymond\n\nMira, Francisco de Assis\n\nPickering, Jeffery Loring\n\nWold, Hans Palmer\n\nZehe, Alfred* 1984\nCavanagh, Thomas Patrick\n\nCordrey, Robert Ernest\n\nForbrich, Ernst*\n\nKearn, Bruce Leland\n\nKoecher, Karl Frantisek*\n\nMichelson, Alice*\n\nMiller, Richard W.\n\nMorison, Samuel Loring\n\nSlatten, Charles Dale\n\nSmith, Richard Craig\n\nWolff, Jay Clyde 1985\nBuchanan, Edward Owen\n\nChin, Larry Wu-Tai*\n\nHawkins, Stephen Dwayne\n2000\nFaget, Mariano\n\nSmith, Timothy Steven\n\nTrofimoff, George\n\n\n2001\nHanssen, Robert Philip\n\nMontes, Ana Belen\n\nRegan, Brian Patrick 2003\nMehalba, Ahmed Fathy\nSmith, James J. Yai, John Joungwoong\n2004\nAnderson, Ryan Gibson\n\nFord, Kenneth Wayne, Jr.\n\nKeyser, Donald Willis\n\nMontaperto, Ronald N.\n\n2005\nAragoncillo, Leandro\nFranklin, Lawrence Anthony Mak, Chi Nour, Almaliki Shaaban, Hafiz Ahmed Ali Shaaban*\n2006\nDiaz, Matthew M.\nMaziarz, Gary Weinmann, Ariel Jonathan\n2007\nAbu-Jihaad, Hassan\n\nOakley, Roy L. 2008\nKadish, Ben-Ami\nKuo, Tai Shen* Roth, John Reece Shu, Quan-Sheng\n\nHamilton, Frederick Christopher\n\nJones, Geneva\n\nKao, Yen Men*\n\nLalas, Steven John\n\n\n1994\nAmes, Aldrich Hazen 1995\nCharlton, John Douglas\n\nKota, Subrahmanyam\n\nSchwartz, Michael Stephen\n\n\n1996\nJenott, Eric O.\n\nKim, Robert Chaegun\n\nLessenthien, Kurt G.\n\nLipka, Robert Stephan\n\nNicholson, Harold James\n\nPitts, Earl Edwin\n\nSeldon, Phillip Tyler 1997\nClark, James Michael\n\nLee, Peter H.\n\nStand, Kurt Alan\n\nWarren, Kelly Therese 1998\nAlonso, Alejandro\n\nBoone, David Sheldon\n\nGroat, Douglas Frederick\n\nGuerrero, Antonio (see also Hernandez,\nGerardo)\n\nHernandez, Gerardo*\n\nHernandez, Linda*\n\nSantos, Joseph 1999\nWispelaere, Jean-Philippe\n\nEspionage Case Summaries by Targeted or Victimized Organization\n (In some cases a specific US target organization cannot be identified)\n\n\nArmy 1981-1989\nConrad, Clyde Lee\n\n\n10\nDolce, Thomas Joseph\n\n\n13\nForbrich, Ernst*\n\n\n15\nGilbert, Otto Attila*\n\n\n16\nHall, James III\n\n\n18\nHelmich, Joseph George\n\n\n21\nMichelson, Alice*\n\n\n37\nMortati, Tommaso\n\n\n40\nPeri, Michael A.\n\n\n44\nRichardson, Daniel Walter\n\n\n48\nSlatten, Charles Dale\n\n\n52\nSmith, Richard Craig\n\n\n54\nTumanova, Svetlana\n\n\n58\nArmy 1990-2008\nAnderson, Ryan Gibson\n\n 3\nBoone, David Sheldon\n\n 5\nClark, James M.\n\n 9\nGregory, Jeffery Eugene\n\n\n17\nJenott, Eric O.\n\n\n25\nKadish, Ben-Ami\n\n\n26\nLalas, Steven John\n\n\n32\nLipka, Robert Stephan\n\n\n34\nNour, Almaliki\n\n\n42\nRamsay, Roderick James\n\n\n46\nRondeau, Jeffrey S.\n\n\n48\nSeldon, Phillip Tyler\n\n\n51\nSombolay, Albert T.\n\n\n55\nTrofimoff, George\n\n\n57\nWarren, Kelly Therese\n\n\n59\nNavy 1978-1984\nBaba, Stephen Anthony\n\n 4\nEllis, Robert Wade\n\n\n13\nEnger, Valdik*\n\n\n13\nHorton, Brian Patrick\n\n\n23\nKearn, Bruce Leland\n\n\n28\nMadsen, Lee Eugene\n\n\n35\nMaynard, John Raymond\n\n\n36\nMorison, Samuel Loring\n\n\n40\nMurphy, Michael Richard\n\n\n41\nPickering, Jeffery\n\n\n44\nWold, Hans Palmer\n\n\n61\nWolff, Jay Clyde\n\n\n62\nZehe, Alfred*\n\n\n63\n\nNavy 1985-1988\nAllen, Michael Hahn\n\n 1\nFleming, David\n\n\n14\nGarcia, Wilfredo\n\n\n16\nHaguewood, Robert Dean\n\n\n18\nHawkins, Stephen Dwayne\n\n\n20\nPollard, Jonathan Jay\n\n\n45\nRatkai, Stephen Joseph*\n\n\n47\nSouther, Glenn Michael\n\n\n55\nSpade, Henry Otto\n\n\n56\nTobias, Michael Timothy\n\n\n56\nWalker, Arthur James\n\n\n58\nWalker, John Anthony\n\n\n58\nWhitworth, Jerry Alfred\n\n\n60\n\nNavy 1989-2008\nDiaz, Matthew M.\n\n\n12\nGuerrero, Antonio\n\n\n18\nKao, Yen Men*\n\n\n27\nKim, Robert Chaegun\n\n\n28\nKing, Donald Wayne\n\n\n29\nKunkle, Craig Dee\n\n\n31\nLessenthien, Kurt G.\n\n\n33\nSchoof, Charles Edward\n\n\n50\nSchwartz, Michael Stephen\n\n\n50\nSmith, Timothy Steven\n\n\n54\nWilmoth, James R.\n\n\n61\nWeinmann, Ariel Jonathan\n\n\n60\n\nMarine Corps\nAnzalone, Charles Lee Francis\n\n 3\nCordrey, Robert Ernest\n\n\n11\nLonetree, Clayton John\n\n\n34\nMaziarz, Gary\n\n\n36\nNesbitt, Frank Arnold\n\n\n41\nSlavens, Brian Everett\n\n\n53\n\nAir Force\nBuchanan, Edward Owen\n\n 7\nCarney, Jeffrey M.\n\n 7\nCooke, Christopher Michael\n\n\n11\nDavies, Allen John\n\n\n11\nIsmaylov, Vladimir M.*\n\n\n24\nMira, Francisco de Assis\n\n\n38\nNesbitt, Frank Arnold\n\n\n41\nOtt, Bruce Damian\n\n\n43\nRoth, John Reece\n\n\n49\nWolf, Ronald Craig\n\n\n62\n\nFederal Bureau of Investigation\nAragoncillo, Leandro\n\n 4\nHanssen, Robert Philip\n\n\n19\nMiller, Richard W.\n\n\n37\nPitts, Earl Edwin\n\n\n45\nSmith, James J.\n\n\n53\nTsou, Douglas\n\n\n58\nOther Federal Agencies\nFaget, Mariano\n\n\n14\nLee, Peter H.\n\n\n33 National Industrial Security Program\nBell, William Holden\n\n 5\nBoyce, Christopher John\n\n 6\nCavanagh, Thomas Patrick\n\n 8\nCharlton, John Douglas\n\n 8\nClark, James Michael\n\n 9\nDedeyan, Sadag K.\n\n\n12\nHarper, James Durward\n\n\n20\nHoffman, Ronald\n\n\n23\nJeffries, Randy Miles\n\n\n25\nKostadinov, Penyu B.*\n\n\n30\nKota, Subrahmanyam\n\n\n30\nLee, Peter H.\n\n\n33\nLeonov, Yuriy P.*\n\n\n33\nMak, Chi\n\n\n35\nMehalba, Ahmed Fathy\n\n\n36\nOakley, Roy Lynn\n\n\n43\nPakhtusov, Yuri N.*\n\n\n43\nRegan, Brian Patrick\n\n\n47\nRogalsky, Ivan N.*\n\n\n48\nShu, Quan-Sheng\n\n\n52\nZakharov, Gennadiy F.*\n\n\n63\nOffice of the Secretary of Defense and Defense Intelligence Agency\nDubberstein, Waldo H.\n\n\n13\nFranklin, Lawrence Anthony\n\n\n15\nHamilton, Frederick Christopher\n\n\n19\nKuo, Tai Shen*\n\n\n31\nMontaperto, Ronald N.\n\n\n38\nMontes, Ana Belen\n\n\n39\nSeldon, Phillip Tyler\n\n\n51\nStand, Kurt Alan\n\n\n56\nNational Security Agency\nBoone, David Sheldon\n\n 5\nDesheng, Hou*\n\n\n12\nFord, Kenneth Wayne\n\n\n15\nLipka, Robert Stephan\n\n\n34\nPelton, Ronald William\n\n\n44\n\nDepartment of State\nHumphrey, Ronald\n\n\n24\nJones, Geneva\n\n\n26\nKeyser, Donald Willis\n\n\n28\nLalas, Steven John\n\n\n32\nLonetree, Clayton John\n\n\n34\nCentral Intelligence Agency\nAmes, Aldrich Hazen\n\n 2\nBarnett, David Henry\n\n 5\nBrown, Joseph Garfield\n\n 6\nChin, Larry Wu-Tai*\n\n 9\nGroat, Douglas Frederick\n\n\n17\nHoward, Edward Lee\n\n\n24\nKampiles, William\n\n\n27\nKoecher, Karl Frantisek*\n\n\n30\nMoore, Edwin G. II\n\n\n40\nNicholson, Harold James\n\n\n42\nScranage, Sharon Marie\n\n\n51\n\nABU-JIHAAD, HASSAN (formerly Paul R. Hall), a Navy signalman honorably discharged in 2002, was arrested on 27 March 2007, in Phoenix, Arizona, charged with providing classified information on ship movements to al-Qaida operatives in London. These operatives maintained a network of websites believed to be a conduit for money and weapons to al-Qaida. A search of the network operator's apartment by British law enforcement officers in December 2003 revealed a floppy disk with an email reportedly containing information about ship movements, armaments, vulnerabilities and the formation of a US naval battle group allegedly provided by the ex-seaman. As a signalman aboard the USS *Benfold*, Abu-Jihaad held a Secret security clearance and had access to all compromised information. He was accused of having informed his al-Qaida contact that the *Benfold* would be particularly vulnerable to rocket-propelled grenades from a small ship as it passed through the Strait of Hormuz. He pleaded not guilty to all charges of espionage. At his trial the presiding judge advised jurors that whoever provided the compromised information to al-Qaida did so with the intent to kill US citizens. Sentencing, originally set for May 2008, was delayed as defense attorneys petitioned the court for a new trial on the grounds that the evidence did not conclusively link their client with the compromised information. Abu-Jihaad was convicted of espionage on 6 March 2008. He had converted to Islam and changed his name in 1997. Eight months later he enlisted in the Navy. Following his discharge, he worked for the United Parcel Service. In March 2009, a federal judge dismissed his conviction for providing support to terrorists, but upheld his conviction for disclosing classified information. On 3 April 2009 Abu-Jihaad was sentenced to 10 years in prison.\n\nThe Courant, New Haven, CT 26 Feb 2008, \"Sailor's Terror Trial Opens with Story of Discovery\"\nThe Advocate, Stamford, CT\n28 Feb 2008, \"Prosecutors Try to Show Leaked Documents Matched Ship Movements\"\nNew York Times\n\n\n29 Feb 2008, \"Prosecutors Rest in Navy Terrorism Case\"\nDepartment of Justice,\n\n6 Mar 2008, \"Jury Finds Former Member of U.S. Navy Guilty of Terrorism and\nPress Release\n\n    Espionage Charges\"\nALLEN, MICHAEL HAHN, a retired Navy Senior Chief Radioman employed at the Cubi Point Naval Air Station in the Philippines, was arrested on suspicion of espionage by Navy security agents on 4 December 1986. Allen, who had been working as a civilian clerk, retired from the Navy in 1972. The employee confessed to passing classified US counterintelligence reports to Philippine intelligence officers after seeing a videotape of himself hiding documents in his pockets. When apprehended he had a photocopy of a Secret page on his person; six other classified documents were seized at his residence. The charges covered the period between July and December 1986 during which time he was accused of photocopying and removing classified material from the communication center. According to the Naval Investigative Service, Allen's activities may have resulted in the compromising of important Filipino intelligence sources. Prosecutors argued that Allen's main reason for providing secrets to the Filipinos was to promote his local business interests that included a used car dealership, a bar, and a cockfighting ring. On 14 August 1987, a court martial in San Diego found Allen guilty of 10 counts of espionage and sentenced him to eight years in prison. The six-officer panel also imposed a $10,000 fine on the former radioman.\n\nNew York Times\n\n12 Dec 1986, \"Navy Employee Held in Espionage-Related Case\"\nLos Angeles Times\n\n15 Aug 1987, \"Linked to Filipinos; Ex-Navy Man Found Guilty \"\n\n\nALONSO, ALEJANDRO, 39, a member of the \"La Red Avispa\" (the Red Wasp Network), a Cuban spy ring in south Florida, was arrested with nine other members of the ring on 12 September 12 1998 and charged with conspiracy to commit espionage. [See also Linda Hernandez, Gerardo Hernandez and Joseph Santos.] Alonso was born in Des Moines, Iowa, but returned to Cuba and was recruited there by the Cuban Intelligence Service. In 1994 he began trying to collect information on military installations in south Florida and on the activities of the Cuban-American exile community there. Alonso, a boat pilot, joined an exile group called the Democracy Movement to report on their plans from the inside, and he participated in boat flotillas held to protest Cuba's Communist government. He pleaded guilty in a plea bargain to being an unregistered agent of a foreign government, and was sentenced on 28 January 2000 in US District Court in Miami to seven years in prison. Associated Press\n\n\n19 Sep 1998, \"Bail Denied for Accused Cuban Spy\"\nMiami Herald\n\n29 Jan 2000, \"Confessed Cuban Spy Receives Seven Years\"\n\n\nAMES, ALDRICH HAZEN, CIA intelligence officer and his Colombian-born wife MARIA DEL\nROSARIO CASAS AMES, were arrested 21 February 1994, after various attempts since 1985 to identify a mole in the CIA. The arrests followed a 10-month investigation that focused on Rick Ames. He was charged with providing highly classified information to the Soviet KGB and later, to its successor, the Russian SVR, over a nine-year period. From 1983 to 1985, Ames had been assigned to the counterintelligence unit in the agency's Soviet/East European Division, where he was responsible for directing the analysis of Soviet intelligence operations. In this capacity he would have known about any penetration of the Soviet military or the KGB. According to press reports, the trail that led to the arrest of Ames and his wife began in 1987 after the unexplained disappearance or deaths of numerous US intelligence sources overseas. According to court documents, Ames' information allowed the Russians to close down at least 100 intelligence operations and led to the execution of the agents in Russia that he betrayed. Despite reports of alcohol abuse, sexual misconduct, and repeated security violations, Ames was promoted into positions at the CIA that allowed him to steal increasingly sensitive information while he was spying for the Soviets. Facing alimony payments and the financial demands of his new wife, Rosario, in April 1985 Ames decided to get money by volunteering to spy for the Russians. He first contacted the KGB by dropping a note at the Soviet Embassy. Over his nine years of espionage activity, he removed bags of documents from CIA facilities, without challenge, and deposited them at dead drops around Washington or met his handlers at meetings around the world. Ames reportedly received up to $2.5 million from the Russians over this period of time. Reports of the couple's high-rolling life style included the cash purchase of a half-million dollar home, credit card bills of $455,000, and a new Jaguar sports car. But despite his unexplained affluence, Ames' story that his wife had wealthy relatives in Colombia satisfied doubts about his income for years, until a CIA counterintelligence investigator finally checked the cover story with sources in Colombia. A search of Ames' office uncovered 144 classified intelligence reports not related to his current assignment in CIA's Counternarcotics Center. The Director of Central Intelligence reported to Congress that Ames' espionage caused \"severe, wide-ranging, and continuing damage to US national security interests,\" making Ames one of the most damaging spies in US history. He provided the Soviets, and later the Russians, with the identities of 10 US clandestine agents (at least nine of whom were executed), the identities of many US agents run against the Russians, methods of double agent operations and communications, details on US counterintelligence operations, identities of CIA and other intelligence personnel, technical collection activities, analytic techniques, and intelligence reports, arms control papers, and the cable traffic of several federal departments. On 28 April 1994, Aldrich Ames and his wife pleaded guilty to conspiring to commit espionage and to evading taxes.\n\nAmes was immediately sentenced to life imprisonment without parole. Under the plea agreement, Maria Rosario Ames was sentenced to five years and three months in prison for conspiring to commit espionage and evading taxes on $2.5 million obtained by her husband for his illegal activities.\n\n\n\nIts Implications for U.S. Intelligence\"\nWashington Post\n\n27 Dec 1994, \"Ames Says CIA Does Not Believe He Has Told All\"\nWashington Post\n\n11 Jun 1995, \"The Man Who Sold the Secrets\"\nLos Angeles Times\n\n22 Oct 1994, \"Wife of CIA Double Agent Sentenced to 5 Years in Prison\"\n\n\nANDERSON, RYAN GIBSON, 26, a Specialist and tank crewman in the Washington National Guard,\nwas arrested on February 12, 2004, and charged with five counts of attempting to provide aid and\ninformation to the enemy, Al Qaeda. Anderson converted from his Lutheran upbringing to Islam in\ncollege while attending Washington State University, where he studied Middle Eastern military history and graduated with a B.A. in 2002. In late 2003, as his National Guard unit was preparing to deploy to the\nwar in Iraq, Anderson went onto Internet chat rooms and sent emails trying to make contact with Al\nQaeda cells in the U.S. His emails were noticed by an amateur anti-terrorist Internet monitor, Shannen Rossmiller, a city judge in Montana who had begun monitoring Islamist Jihad websites in an effort to\ncontribute to homeland defense after the 9/11 attacks. After she identified him by tracing his Arab\npseudonym, Amir Abdul Rashid, Rossmiller passed along to the FBI her suspicions about Anderson. In a\njoint DOJ and FBI sting operation conducted in late January 2004, Anderson was videotaped offering to persons he thought were Al Qaeda operatives, sketches of M1A1 and M1A2 tanks, a computer disk with his identifying information and photo, and information about Army weapons systems, including \"the exact caliber of round needed to penetrate the windshield and kill the driver of an up-armored Humvee.\" At his Army court martial the defense argued that Anderson suffered from various mental conditions including bipolar disorder and a high-performing type of autism, which led to role playing, exaggeration of his abilities, and repeated attempts to gain social acceptance. The prosecution argued that what he did\nconstituted treason. The court-martial convicted Anderson on all five counts and on 3 September, 2004,\nand sentenced him to life in prison with possibility of parole, demotion to the rank of private, and a dishonorable discharge.\n\nNew York Times\n\n13 Feb 2004, \"Guardsman Taken Into Custody and Examine or Qaeda Tie\"\nNew York Post\n\n12 Jul 2004, \"Lady Who 'Nets Spies'\"\nSeattle Times\n\n31 Aug 2004, \"Guardsman Anderson Accused of 'Betrayal' as Court Martial\nBegins\"\nSeattle Post-\n\n2 Sep 2004, \"Accused GI Called Bipolar, 'Social Misfit'\"\n   Intelligencer New York Times\n\n\n4 Sep 2004, \"Guardsman Given Life in Prison for Trying to Help Al Qaeda\"\n\n\nANZALONE, CHARLES LEE FRANCIS, a 23-year old Marine corporal stationed in Yuma, Arizona,\nwas arrested 13 February 1991 after a four-month investigation and charged with suspicion of attempted\nespionage. In November 1990, Anzalone, a telephone lineman, called the Soviet Embassy in Washington\nto offer his services as a spy (under the pretext of asking about a college scholarship). An FBI agent\nposing as a KGB intelligence officer contacted Anzalone who passed him two technical manuals about cryptographic equipment, a security badge, and guard schedules. Anzalone, who is part Mohawk, told the\nagent that he hated capitalism, the American government, and held a grudge against the nation's treatment\nof native Americans. Anzalone testified that his offering to spy was a ruse to get money from the Soviets. On 3 May 1991, Anzalone was found guilty of attempted espionage. He was also convicted of adultery\nwith the wife of another Marine stationed in the Persian Gulf, and of possession and use of marijuana. He\nwas sentenced to 15 years in prison.\nSan Diego Union\n\n2 May 1991, \"Tape Shows Marine and Soviet Spy\"\nLos Angeles Times\n\n4 May 1991, \"Marine Guilty in Spying Case\"\n\nARAGONCILLO, LEANDRO, a naturalized US citizen of Filipino origin, was arrested on 10\nSeptember 2005, charged with passing classified intelligence reports regarding the Philippines to current and former officials of that country during a period when he worked at the White House and, later, in\n2005, from his FBI office. The material was passed to **MICHAEL RAY AQUINO**, a former deputy director of the Philippines National Police and a Philippine national who was then living in New York.\n\nAragoncillo passed documents to Aquino by way of cell phone text messages, email and CDs. The documents then were transferred to opposition politicians in the Philippines. Aragoncillo came to the US\nin 1982, and joined the Marine Corps in 1983, retiring in 2004 as a sergeant. He had been assigned (1999- 2002) to the White House as staff assistant to military advisors in the Office of the Vice President, serving under Vice Presidents Gore and Cheney. President Clinton introduced Aragoncillo to Philippine president, Joseph Estrada, at the White House during Estrada's official state visit to the US in 2000. Aragoncillo handed Estrada his card. Later he was approached by an Estrada associate and asked to pass along American intelligence that could be used to save Estrada's presidency. (Estrada was eventually removed from office through impeachment in 2001.) Thus, while working for Cheney, Aragoncillo began stealing information about Filipino politicians and American policy towards the Philippines. He would walk out of the White House on a fairly regular basis with disks of classified documents in his bag and even use the White House fax to send documents directly to the Philippines. When his White House assignment ended in 2002, Aragoncillo sought positions in other parts of government, eventually in 2004\nlanding a job as an intelligence analyst at the FBI's Information Technology Center. From there he resumed sending classified documents via his courier, Aquino, to Filipino opposition politicians, who were trying to overthrow Estrada's successor, President Gloria Arroyo. The FBI's investigation began after Aragoncillo intervened with US immigration officials on behalf of Aquino, who was facing deportation for overstaying his visa. Suspicious officials notified the FBI, who began an audit of Aragoncillo's computer activities at his FBI office. They discovered that he had been making unauthorized queries of FBI databases and printing or downloading classified documents related to the Philippines. Aragoncillo was sentenced on 16 July 2007 to 10 years in prison, Aquino to six years and four months. In February 2009 it was determined that Aquino's sentence was based on a mistaken interpretation of federal guidelines and that his new sentence would range from 36 to 46 months, to include time already served since September 2005.\n\n\ncicentre.com\n\n\nn.d., \"Espionage/Spy Case: Leandro Aragoncillo and Michael Ray Aquino\"\nFoxNews.com\n\n12 Sep 2005, \"FBI Analyst, Filipino Charged With Spying\"\nNew York Times\n\n\n13 Sep 2005, \"Two Men are Charged with Passing Secrets to Philippines\"\nReuters\n\n\n18 Jul 2007, \"Ex-Cheney Aide Gets 10 Years in Prison in Spy Case\"\nNewsday.com\n\n\n6 Feb 2009, \"Court Vacates Sentence of Filipino in Spy Case\"\n\n\nBABA, STEPHEN ANTHONY, an ensign in the US Navy, was arrested on 1 October 1981 for sending a classified electronic warfare document and two microfilm indices of key code words to the South African Embassy in Washington, DC. He reportedly asked for an initial payment of $50,000 for the material. Other charges against Baba at the time included armed robbery, extortion, and assault. Baba mailed the documents from his frigate, the USS *Lang*, in September 1981, while stationed at San Diego. The South African Embassy returned the unsolicited materials to US officials. In court testimony it was asserted that Baba had attempted to sell documents to raise money for his fiancee in the Philippines so that she could attend college. He pleaded guilty and was sentenced 20 January 1982 by court-martial to eight years of hard labor.\n\nNew York Times\n\n4 Dec 1981, \"Ensign is Accused in Navy Spy Case\"\nWashington Post\n\n21 Jan 1982, \"Ensign Sentenced to Hard Labor for Sending Data to S. Africa\"\n\n\nBARNETT, DAVID HENRY, a CIA officer, was indicted 24 October 1980 for having sold to the Soviet Union details of one of the CIA's most successful undercover operations, code-named \"Habrink.\"\nFollowing a tour of duty in Indonesia between 1967 and 1970, Barnett resigned from the CIA to enter private business. In late 1976, faced with failure and debts of $100,000, he offered to sell classified information to the KGB. Barnett handed over full details of Habrink to the KGB, including CIA information on the Soviet SA-2 surface-to-air missile and the Whiskey class diesel-powered submarine.\n\nHe also revealed the names of 30 CIA intelligence officers as well as the identities of informants recruited by the CIA. In all, Barnett was paid approximately $92,000 by the KGB for information supplied between 1976 and 1977. US agents reportedly spotted Barnett meeting the KGB in Vienna in April 1980; he was questioned by the FBI upon his return to the US. Barnett entered a plea of guilty and received an 18-year sentence. He was paroled in 1990.\n\nNew York Times\n\n23 Oct 1980, \"Alleged Spy Sought 2nd Post, Aides Say\"\nNew York Times\n\n30 Oct 1980, \"Ex-Agent of C.I.A. Pleads Guilty\"\nWashington Post\n\n30 Oct 1980, \"Ex-CIA Agent Pleads Guilty to Spying\"\n\n\nBELL, WILLIAM HOLDEN, project manager of the Radar Systems Group at Hughes Aircraft in El Segundo, California, and **MARIAN ZACHARSKI**, president of the Polish American Machinery Corporation (POLAMCO), were arraigned in June 1981 on espionage charges. Bell had been faced with financial difficulties; Zacharski in reality was an officer of the Polish intelligence service. Under the guise of business activities, and over a period of several months, Zacharski developed a relationship with Bell that resulted in the transfer of Secret documents for more than $150,000. As a result, the \"quiet radar\" and other sophisticated systems developed at Hughes Aircraft were seriously compromised. On 24 June, Bell was confronted by FBI agents with the fact of his involvement in espionage that had been independently established. He confessed and agreed to cooperate with the FBI in the effort to apprehend Zacharski. On 14 December, Zacharski was convicted of espionage and received a life sentence. Bell, who pleaded guilty, was sentenced to eight years. In June 1985 Zacharski was exchanged, along with three other Soviet Bloc spies, for 25 persons held in Eastern Europe. This case is seen as a classic example of recruitment of cleared US personnel for espionage by hostile intelligence operatives.\n\n\nChicago Tribune\n\n20 May 1984, \"Real-life Spy Tale Robbed of an Ending\"\nDoD Security Institute,\n\nNo. 3-83, June 1983, \"Caught Unawares: The Case of William Bell and Marian\n  Security Awareness Bulletin     Zacharski\"\n\n\nJohn Barron, *KGB Today: The Hidden Hand*, 1983\n\nBOONE, DAVID SHELDON, a former Army signals analyst for the National Security Agency, was arrested 10 October 1998, and charged with selling Top Secret documents to agents of the Soviet Union from 1988 to 1991. Compromised documents including a 600-page manual describing US reconnaissance programs and a listing of nuclear targets in Russia.  Boone was arrested at a suburban Virginia hotel after being lured from his home in Germany to the United States in a FBI sting operation. He had worked for NSA for three years before being reassigned to Augsburg, Germany, in 1988, and retired from the Army in 1991.  In October 1988, the same month that he separated from his wife and children, Boone walked into the Soviet Embassy in Washington and offered his services. According to an FBI counterintelligence agent's affidavit, Boone was under \"severe financial and personal difficulties\" when he began spying. His former wife had garnished his Army sergeant's pay, leaving him with only $250 a month. According to the Federal complaint, Boone met with his handler about four times a year from late 1988 until June 1990, when his access to classified information was suspended because of \"his lack of personal and professional responsibility.\" He held a Top Secret clearance from 1971 and gained access to SCI information in 1976. He is alleged to have received payments totaling more than $60,000 from the KGB.\nBoone was indicted on three counts: one for conspiracy to commit espionage and the other two related to his alleged passing of two Top Secret documents to his Soviet handler. On 18 December, Boon pleaded guilty to conspiracy, and on 26 February 1999 he was sentenced to 24 years and four months in prison.\nUnder a plea agreement Boone was also required to forfeit $52,000 and a hand-held scanner he used to copy documents.\n\nWashington Post\n\n6 Nov 1998, \"Ex-NSA Indicted for Spying\"\nWashington Post\n\n9 Nov 1998, \"Trial Set for Ex-NSA Analyst\"\nWashington Post\n\n27 Feb 1999, \"Ex-NSA Worker Gets 24 Years for Spying\"\n\n\nBOYCE, CHRISTOPHER JOHN, an employee of TRW Inc., a California-based defense contractor, and his friend, **ANDREW DAULTON LEE**, were arrested in January 1977 for selling classified information to the Soviets. Over a period of several months, Boyce, employed as a code clerk in a heavily guarded communications center at TRW, removed classified code material and passed it along to Lee who in turn delivered it to KGB agents in Mexico City. Boyce, son of a former FBI agent, and his childhood friend Lee had grown up in affluent Palos Verde, in southern California. Both were altar boys together and later played on the high school football team. Boyce claimed to have discovered while working in the vault that the US government was spying not only on the country's enemies but also on an ally, Australia. He decided to strike back by hatching a plan to sabotage the US intelligence network. He recruited Lee to help him sell classified information to the Russians. Boyce was probably motivated also by youthful rebelliousness and perhaps a craving for danger and excitement. This was likely accompanied by the need for money with which he and Lee could purchase drugs, a taste developed during their teenage years. The espionage activity, which netted the pair $70,000, was discovered only after Lee's arrest by Mexican police as he attempted to deliver yet another set of classified material at the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City. Film strips marked Top Secret found on Lee by Mexican authorities were turned over to American officials. Under questioning by Mexican security police and FBI representatives, Lee implicated Boyce, who was arrested on 16 January in California. The pair were reported to have seriously compromised the Ryolite surveillance satellite system developed at TRW. Lee was sentenced to life in prison, Boyce to 40\nyears. In 1980 Boyce escaped and spent 19 months as a fugitive. Following Boyce's second apprehension, his sentence was increased by 28 years. He was finally released from prison in March 2003 at the age of 50.\n\nNew York Times\n\n13 Apr 1977, \"Alleged Spy for Soviets Linked to C.I.A\"\nNew York Times\n\n27 Apr 1977, \"Man Said to Admit Spying for Soviets\"\nNew York Times\n\n22 May 1977, \"To Be Young, Richand a Spy\"\nLindsey, Robert, *The Falcon and the Snowman*, 1979 Testimony of Christopher J. Boyce before the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, April 1985\nBROWN, JOSEPH GARFIELD, former US airman and martial arts instructor, was arrested by FBI\nagents on 27 December 1992, and charged with spying for the Philippine government. Brown allegedly provided an official there with illegally obtained secret CIA documents on Iraqi terrorist activities during the Persian Gulf War and assassination plans by a Philippine insurgent group. The former US airman was arrested at Dulles International Airport after being lured to the US from the Philippines by undercover FBI agents with the promise of a job teaching self-defense tactics to CIA agents. On the following day he was indicted on three counts of espionage in Federal court in Alexandria, Virginia. Brown enlisted in the US Air Force in 1966 and served until 1968. He continued to reside in the Philippines, working as a martial arts instructor for the Department of Tourism until the time of his arrest. He is accused of obtaining classified documents in 1990 and 1991 in Manila from CIA secretary, VIRGINIA JEAN BAYNES, and passing them to a Philippine government official. An FBI spokesman stated that Baynes pleaded guilty to espionage in Federal court on 22 May 1992, and served a 41-month prison term. The FBI began its investigation in April 1991 after an internal CIA inquiry determined that Baynes, who joined the agency in 1987 and who was assigned two years later to the embassy in Manila, had passed two or three classified documents to Brown. Baynes had met Brown when she enrolled in a karate class which he taught at an embassy annex. According to Baynes, as the friendship between her and Brown grew in the late summer of 1990, he asked her to obtain CIA information on assassinations planned by an insurgent group that were to be carried out in the Philippines. In a wish to please Brown, Baynes, who held a Top Secret clearance, complied with his request by removing secret documents from the embassy. Brown, motivated by the hope of acquiring money for his espionage, pleaded guilty in April 1993 to a charge of conspiring to commit espionage by delivering secret CIA documents to a Philippine government official. He was sentenced to nearly six years in prison.\n\nLos Angeles Times\n\n29 Dec 1992, \"Ex-US Airman Charged With Espionage\"\nWashington Post\n\n6 Jan 1993, \"Spy Charge Played Down by Official\"\n\n\nBUCHANAN, EDWARD OWEN. In early May 1985, an Air Force Office of Special Investigations\n(AFOSI) human source provided information that Airman Edward O. Buchanan, in training at Lowry AFB, Colorado, had been phoning the East German Embassy in Washington, DC. He reportedly wanted to know if embassy officials had received a letter he had sent in April 1985. According to the source, the letter contained an offer by Buchanan to commit espionage for the East German Government.\n\nUnsuccessful at making an East German contact, Buchanan then mailed a letter to the Soviet Embassy in Washington, DC, fully identifying himself and stating that he had information of a scientific and technological nature that he wanted to sell to the Russian government. He indicated he would continue to conduct business with the Soviets if they liked his material. At this point AFOSI agents, posing as Soviet representatives, contacted Buchanan. Believing that he was doing business with Soviet intelligence officers, the Airman offered to commit espionage and sell classified documents. He then provided documents to the undercover AFOSI/FBI agents that he claimed were classified Secret and was paid\n$1,000. Buchanan was apprehended immediately. A later examination of the documents disclosed that they were copies of unclassified articles from an electronics magazine. During an interview following his arrest, Buchanan admitted contacting the East German Embassy and the Soviet Embassy for the purpose of committing espionage. Buchanan also admitted that, although he did not have access to classified information at that time (because of his student status), he planned to sell classified information once his clearance had been granted and he was assigned to a base in Germany. At the time he was being processed for a Top Secret - Special Compartmented Information clearance. His stated intention was to establish a business relationship with the Soviets by selling bogus material to \"get my foot in the door\" and then later sell classified information. He would then \"sell as much classified material as he could until he made enough money to live comfortably.\" Buchanan was court-martialed on 26 August 1985, and sentenced to 30 months' confinement, reduction to Airman Basic, forfeiture of all pay and allowances, and a dishonorable discharge.\n\nCARNEY, JEFFREY M., former intelligence specialist with the Air Force, was apprehended in 1991 in East Berlin on charges of espionage after the fall of the Berlin Wall. Carney entered the Air Force in December 1980. From April 1982 to April 1984 he was stationed at Tempelhof Central Airport in Berlin where he was a linguist and intelligence specialist. He was assigned to an electronics security group that worked for NSA and eavesdropped on communications of Eastern Bloc countries. While at Tempelhof, he began copying classified documents which he then provided to the East German Ministry for State Security (Stasi) by repeatedly crossing back and forth into East Berlin. In 1984 he was transferred to Goodfellow AFB in Texas where he worked as a language instructor while continuing to spy for East Germany. In 1985, perhaps fearing that he would be caught for his espionage activities, he deserted the Air Force and defected to East Germany. There he continued to aid the Communist government by intercepting and translating official telephone communications of US military commanders and embassy officials in Berlin. Carney had apparently become disillusioned with the Air Force. He later claimed to have been lonely, alienated, and under psychological stress, and he felt he had no one to talk to about his problems. He had intended to defect to East Germany on his first crossing, but he allowed himself to be drawn into espionage by East German agents who expertly manipulated him and claimed his complete loyalty. The break in the case came after the fall of the Berlin Wall in November 1989, when many Stasi records became available to foreign investigators. In April 1991 he was arrested by Air Force OSI agents at his residence in what used to be in the Soviet sector of Berlin. After being extensively debriefed, Carney pleaded guilty to charges of espionage, conspiracy, and desertion and was sentenced in December\n1991 to 38 years in prison. He was released in 2003, after serving 11 years of what eventually became a reduced sentence of 20 years.\n\nCincinnati Post\n\n21 Dec 1991, \"US Spy Gets 38 Years\"\nAir Force Times\n\n6 Jan 1992, \"Ex-Intelligence Specialist Guilty of Spying\"\nTelegraph (UK)\n\n7 Jul 2003, \"Nobody Wants the American Who Gave Secrets to the Stasi\"\n\n\nCAVANAGH, THOMAS PATRICK, an engineering specialist for Northrop Corporation's Advanced Systems Division holding a Secret clearance, was arrested on 18 December 1984 and charged with attempting to sell classified documents on Stealth aircraft technology to the Soviets. It is reported that Cavanagh's attempt to arrange a meeting with a Soviet official by contacting the Soviet Embassy from a pay phone was intercepted. In this call he proposed a meeting in a bar near Los Angeles International Airport where a deal could be negotiated. He was met by FBI undercover agents posing as Soviet representatives. Cavanagh told the agents that the documents and blueprints he had taken from the firm were of highest value to the United States and that \"once they were in the hands of the Soviets, they would save them billions.\" During a subsequent meeting, agents provided the $25,000 demanded for classified documents and made the arrest. Cavanagh, recently separated from his wife, faced mounting financial difficulties and feared that he was being denied a Top Secret clearance because of indebtedness.\n\nAgents found more than 30 past due notices from creditors at his residence showing a total indebtedness of over $25,000. Despite Cavanagh's efforts, it is reported that no serious compromise occurred.\n\nAccording to the prosecuting attorney, had Cavanagh been successful, he would have \"gutted\" the Stealth Bomber project. Cavanagh pleaded guilty to two counts of espionage and on 23 May 1985 was sentenced to two concurrent life terms in prison.\n\n\nNew York Times\n\n19 Dec 1984, \"Engineer is Held in Scheme to Sell Secrets\"\nWashington Post\n\n22 Dec 1984, \"Engineer in Secrets Case is Held Without Bail\"\nDoD Security Institute, *Security Awareness Bulletin*, Dec 1985, Number 1-86, \"Portrait of an Uneasy Spy\"\nSan Francisco Examiner\n21 Jun 1987, \"Traitor in our Midst\"\nCHARLTON, JOHN DOUGLAS, retired Lockheed Corporation engineer, was arrested on 25 May\n1995 for attempting to sell secret documents removed from the company at the time of his retirement. According to an Assistant US Attorney, the plans concerned the *Sea Shadow*, a Navy stealth project and the *Captor Project* related to mines that release anti-submarine torpedoes. According to the 10-point espionage indictment, Charlton tried to sell the information to an FBI agent posing as a foreign government representative. Five times between July and September 1993, Charlton attempted to sell the secrets for $100,000 to the undercover agent. Charlton joined Lockheed in Sunnyvale, California, in 1980\nas a research specialist and left the company under an early retirement program in 1989, but he apparently was disgruntled about the circumstances of his departure. At the time of his retirement he took with him several classified documents outlining US defense projects. A search of his Lancaster, California, residence turned up a cache of illegal guns and the classified documents. Following a plea agreement on 17 October, Charlton pleaded guilty to selling two classified schematic drawings related to the antisubmarine program. He admitted knowing that the *Captor Project* information that the former engineer attempted to sell to what he believed to be a French official was highly classified. According to the prosecuting attorney, \"The documents would have enabled any nation to discover some of the workings of the program.\" On 8 April 1996, Charlton was sentenced to two years in Federal prison and fined $50,000 for his guilty plea to two counts of attempted transfer of defense information. He will be placed on five years' probation after his release. He is not eligible for parole.\n\nLos Angeles Times\n\n26 May 1995, \"Ex-Aerospace Worker Indicted In Spy Case\"\nAntelope Valley Press\n\n18 Oct 1995, \"Valley Man Pleads Guilty To Attempted Espionage\"\nLos Angeles Times\n\n10 Apr 1996, \"Retired Engineer Gets 2 Years in Defense Espionage Case\"\n\n\nCHIN, LARRY WU-TAI, retired CIA employee, was arrested 22 November 1985 and accused of having carried out a 33-year career of espionage on behalf of the People's Republic of China. According to media reports, Chin, who retired in 1981 at 63, had been an intelligence officer in the CIA's Foreign Broadcast Information Service. During his career, he held a Top Secret clearance and had access to a wide range of intelligence information. Born in Peking, Chin was recruited by communist intelligence agents while a college student in the early 1940s. He worked for the US Army Liaison Office in China in 1943 and later became a naturalized US citizen, joining the CIA in 1952. It is believed that he provided the PRC with many of the CIA's Top Secret reports on the Far East written over 20 years. Chin reportedly smuggled classified documents from his office, and between 1976 and 1982 gave photographs of these materials to Chinese couriers at frequent meetings in Toronto, Hong Kong, and London. He met with Chinese agents in the Far East up to March 1985, prior to his arrest in November. Chin may have received as much as $1 million for his complicity. He was indicted on 17 counts of espionage-related and income tax violations.\n\nIt is reported that Chin was identified as a Chinese agent by a Chinese intelligence officer who defected to the US. At his trial which began on 4 February 1986, Chin admitted providing the Chinese with information over a period of 11 years, but he claimed he did so to further reconciliation between China and the US. On 8 February, Chin was convicted by a Federal jury on all counts. Sentencing had been set for 17 March; however, on 21 February the former CIA employee committed suicide in his cell.\n\nWashington Post\n\n24 Nov 1985, \"Ex-CIA Employee Held as 33-Year China Spy\"\nNew York Times\n\n30 Nov 1985, \"Huge Data Loss from China is Seen from Espionage\"\nWashington Post\n\n6 Dec 1985, \"Chin Believed Planted in US as Spy\"\nNew York Times\n\n\n11 Feb 1986, \"C.I.A.'s Security was Lax, According to Convicted Spy\"\n\n\nCLARK, JAMES MICHAEL, a private investigator, was arrested 4 October 1997 along with KURT\nALLEN STAND and **THERESE MARIE SQUILLACOTE**, and charged with spying for East Germany. Clark was recruited by his friend Kurt Stand in 1976 when both were members of the Young Workers Liberation League while attending the University of Wisconsin. Media sources state that a 1975\nFBI report describing Clark's participation in the youth arm of the Communist party was the basis on which his subsequent application to the CIA for employment was denied. However, in 1986 Clark received a Secret clearance for his work for a private firm doing contract work for the government. And in 1992, the Army renewed his access after hiring him as a civilian analyst.  According to news reports, as a defense contractor at the Rocky Mountain Arsenal in Boulder, Colorado, in the 1970s, Clark had access to classified information on chemical warfare. He was also accused of giving East Germany classified State and Commerce Department documents about the Soviet leadership, the Soviet's strategic nuclear doctrine, and problems in the military of Soviet bloc countries. He reportedly told an undercover agent that, under the guise of needing help with a research report, he obtained these classified documents\nincluding at least one classified as Top Secretfrom two State Department employees. Clark admittedly passed information to his German handlers in the form of microfiche. Law enforcement officials and court documents describe Clark as a radical who fell into spying from 1979 to 1989 as an extension of his Marxist ideology. He received at total of $17,500 from East Germany and spent much of it traveling to meet his handler in Germany, Mexico and Canada. Clark was convicted on 3 June 1998 on a charge of conspiracy to commit espionage and on 4 December was sentenced to 12 years and seven months in prison. This reduced sentence was a result of his testimony at the trial of Stand and Squillacote that aided in their conviction. [See also the case summary for Kurt Alan Stand.]\n\nWashington Post\n\n7 Oct 1997, \"Three Former Campus Leftists Held in VA on Espionage Charges\"\nWashington Post\n\n4 Jun 1998, \"Falls Church Man Pleads Guilty to Passing Secrets to East Germany\"\nNew York Times\n\n5 Dec 1998, \"Spy, in Plea Agreement, Is Given 12-Year Sentence\"\n\n\nCONRAD, CLYDE LEE, retired Army Sergeant First Class, was arrested on 23 August 1988 in West Germany and charged with copying and transmitting classified documents to the Hungarian intelligence service for nearly a decade. He was recruited in 1974 by a Hungarian-born immigrant, ZOLTAN SZABO, a veteran of Vietnam who served as an Army Captain in Germany. Szabo began working for Hungarian intelligence in 1967. (He was convicted of espionage by an Austrian court in 1989, but served no jail time because of his cooperation with authorities in the prosecution of Conrad.) Two Hungarianborn doctors arrested at the same time in Sweden are said to have acted as couriers in the espionage operation and Conrad is believed to have hired at least a dozen people in the US Army to supply classified informationone of the biggest spy rings since World War II. Conrad's recruits continued to work for him after returning to the US, illegally exporting hundreds of thousands of advanced computer chips to the East Bloc through a phony company in Canada. In June 1990, former Army sergeant RODERICK JAMES RAMSAY, 28, was arrested in Tampa, Florida, following a two-year investigation. Ramsay worked in West Germany from 1983 to 1985 directly under Conrad. He provided Conrad with sensitive documents on the use of tactical nuclear weapons by US forces and NATO allies and plans for the defense of Europe, and manuals on military communications technology. Conrad was granted a Top Secret security clearance in 1978 when assigned to the US 8th Infantry Division headquarters in Bad Kreuznach, Germany. Despite his administrative specialist's job which gave him access to extensive classified materials, Conrad had not been subject to a periodic reinvestigation before his retirement in 1985. Documents provided to Hungarian agents concerned NATO's plans for fighting a war against the Warsaw Pact: detailed descriptions of nuclear weapons and plans for movement of troops, tanks and aircraft. Conrad, in charge of a vault where all the 8th Infantry Division's secret documents were kept, took suitcases stuffed with classified papers out of the base. The former sergeant is reported to have received more than $1 million for selling secrets. The two Hungarian couriers, **SANDOR** and IMRE KERCSIK were sentenced by a Swedish court on 18 October to 18 months in prison. In 1989\nConrad was charged with treason under West German law. It took more than a year to charge him formally due to the complexity of the case, which initially was declared one of espionage and then broadened to include the more serious charge of treason. Tried in a West German court, Conrad was sentenced to life imprisonment on 6 June 1990. In January 1998, Conrad died in a German prison, of heart failure.\n\nWashington Post\n\n27 Aug 1988, \"US Ex-Sergeant Accused in Spy Case Not Given Mandatory\n\n\n\nSecurity Check\"\nSt. Louis Post-Dispatch\n\n2 Sep 1989, \"Former US Sergeant Accused of Treason\"\nRichmond Times-\n\n7 Jun 1990, \"Former GI Given Life for Spying\"\n  Dispatch Los Angeles Times\n\n9 Jun 1990, \"Alleged Spy Called Brilliant, Erratic\"\n\n\nCOOKE, CHRISTOPHER MICHAEL, deputy commander of an Air Force Titan missile crew, was arrested on 21 May 1981 and charged with passing classified information to the Soviets, which seriously compromised US strategic missile capabilities during the 1980-81 time frame. On his own volition, Cooke began to phone and visit the Soviet Embassy in late 1980 with offers to provide classified information. Cooke's motives were never fully established, but it is reported that he was attempting to establish his credentials with the Soviets for the purpose of academic research. It is also known that he sought employment with the CIA on at least two occasions. Believing that Cooke was part of a larger spy ring, Air Force prosecutors offered him immunity from prosecution for a full disclosure. After being given immunity, Cooke admitted to providing classified defense information to the Soviets. The US Court of Military Appeals ordered his release in February 1982 and Cooke resigned his commission.\n\n\nWashington Post\n\n\n4 Dec 1983, \"Spy Rings of One\"\n   Magazine\n\n\nCORDREY, ROBERT ERNEST, a Marine private, was convicted 13 August 1984 by court-martial of\n18 counts of attempting to contact representatives of communist countries for the purpose of selling classified information about nuclear, biological and chemical warfare. Cordrey had been an instructor at the Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Defense School at Camp Lejeune, North Carolina. The charges were not contested and the case was not disclosed to the public until January 1985 due to the extremely sensitive nature of the investigation. Apparently Cordrey attempted to contact Soviet, Czech, East German, and Polish agents. While his espionage efforts were thwarted, he attempted to sell classified information for the purpose of making money. He was sentenced to 12 years at hard labor by the military court; however, his pretrial agreement with prosecutors limited his jail term to two years.\n\nNew York Times\n\n10 Jan 1985, \"Marine Gets 12 Years At Spy Court-Martial\"\n\n\nDAVIES, ALLEN JOHN, former Air Force sergeant and, at the time of his arrest, a laboratory technician at a Silicon Valley defense contractor, was formally charged on 27 October 1986 with trying to pass classified information to the agents of the Soviet Union. Davies, a 10-year veteran who was separated from active service for poor job performance in 1984, had held a Secret clearance during his military service and worked as an avionic sensors system technician. According to the FBI, on 22\nSeptember 1986 Davies met with an FBI undercover agent posing as a Soviet official in San Francisco's Golden Gate Park. During the meeting Davies provided detailed verbal information and a hand drawing concerning US reconnaissance technology. At a second meeting in October he provided additional classified information. According to Davies's recorded statement, he was motivated \"out of revenge because of the unfair way he was treated while in the Air Force.\" He is also quoted as saying that he wanted to do something to embarrass the United States and to interfere with the effectiveness of its reconnaissance activities. Asked why he waited two years before providing the information, Davies said he waited \"just to make sure they couldn't link me with it if I told anybody, just sort of ... hide my trail.\" Davies, born in Eastleigh, England in 1953, became a naturalized US citizen at the age of 11. Since October 1984, he had been employed by Ford Aerospace and Communications Corporation in Palo Alto.\n\nFederal officials stated that the former airman did not currently hold a clearance and that no information from the contractor facility was involved in the case. Davies was released on $200,000 bail with the condition that he undergo psychological evaluation. But on 27 May 1987 he pleaded guilty to a reduced charge of attempting to communicate secrets to an unauthorized person. Davies was sentenced on 27\nAugust 1987 to five years in prison.\n\nWashington Post\n\n28 Oct 1986, \"FBI Arrests Ex-Airman on Espionage Charges\"\nLos Angeles Times\n\n28 Oct 1986, \"San Jose Man Angry at AF Is Arrested as Would-Be Spy\"\n\n\nDEDEYAN, SADAG K., an employee of the Johns Hopkins Applied Physics Laboratory who was cleared for access to classified information, and a relative, **SARKIS O. PASKALIAN**, were arrested in\n1975. Disregarding regulations, Dedeyan had brought home a Top Secret document on NATO defenses to work on. Paskalian, who unbeknownst to Dedeyan, had been recruited and trained by the KGB in 1962, surreptitiously photographed the document and allegedly sold the film to Soviet agents for a reported sum of $1,500. Dedeyan was charged with failing to report the illegal photographing of national defense information. Paskalian was charged with conspiring with Soviet agents to gather and transmit national defense information. Dedeyan was convicted and sentenced to three years. Paskalian pleaded guilty to espionage and was sentenced to 22 years.\n\nWashington Post\n\n28 Jun 1975, \"2 Arrested by FBI On Spying Charges \"\nWashington Post\n\n28 Jun 1975, \"Relative Duped Him on Spy Photographs, Accused Man Says\"\nWashington Post\n\n28 Jun 1975, \"Paskalian: Choreographer, Merchant\"\nNew York Times\n\n28 Jun 1975, \"2 Held in Plot to Spy for Soviets on NATO\"\nDESHENG, HOU, a military attache of the People's Republic of China, was detained by FBI agents on\n21 December 1987 while attempting to obtain Secret National Security Agency documents from a Federal employee. Desheng was taken into custody at a restaurant in Washington's Chinatown after accepting what he believed to be classified NSA documents. The Federal employee, a US citizen, had been working under FBI direction. Arrested at the same time was **ZANG WEICHU,** a PRC consular official in Chicago. Both diplomats were asked to leave the country as a result of \"activities incompatible with their diplomatic status\" - the first Chinese diplomats expelled since formal relations were established with the PRC in 1979.\n\nNew York Times\n\n31 Dec 1987, \"2 Chinese Depart in Espionage Case\"\nWashington Post\n\n31 Dec 1987, \"US Expels Two Chinese Diplomats as Spies\"\nDIAZ, MATTHEW M., a staff attorney with the US Navy Judge Advocate General's Corps, was charged in August 2006 with the unauthorized disclosure of the names of the 551 Guantanamo Bay detainees while stationed there as a Navy lawyer. After some two weeks of indecision, he had mailed\nbetween December 2004 and March 2005to a civil rights attorney in New York the classified names, months before the Department of Defense was eventually forced to release the same names as a result of Freedom of Information requests. The civil rights attorney in New York turned over the file to the FBI\nwhose agents tracked down Diaz and arrested him on charges of five felony counts, including the disclosure of classified information that could aid American foreign enemies. The Supreme Court had upheld the Guantanamo prisoners' rights to challenge their detention in habeas corpus proceedings, but six months later the government was still challenging the court's order, insisting the prisoners had no legal rights and certainly no right to counsel. Pentagon officials said they were keeping prisoners' names secret for the prisoners' own protection, but this made it difficult for potential defense attorneys to file petitions on their behalf. Tried by military court-martial in May 2007, Diaz was convicted of violating orders by passing classified information that could be used to harm the US to someone outside the government. He was sentenced on 17 May to six months' confinement and was later stripped of his license to practice military law.\n\n\nJurist Legal News & Research 30 Oct 2006, \"Navy Postpones Hearing for Gitmo Military Lawyer Accused of Leaking Detainee Names\"\nNew York Times\n\n\n21 Oct 2007, \"Naming Names at Gitmo\"\n\n\nDOLCE, THOMAS JOSEPH, civilian research analyst at Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland, admitted in Federal court on 11 October 1988 that he had supplied scores of Secret documents related to Soviet military equipment to the Republic of South Africa between 1979 and 1983. Dolce, who had been under investigation by the FBI since April, resigned from his position on 30 September \"for personal reasons.\" Dolce had held a Secret clearance at the Army Material Systems Analysis Activity at Aberdeen where he had been employed since 1973. In pleading guilty to a single count of espionage, he acknowledged passing documents on 40 or more occasions by mail or in person to military attaches at the South African Embassy in Washington and at South African Missions in London and Los Angeles. According to Dolce, he was motivated by ideological rather than financial reasons and had a long-term interest in the Republic of South Africa. He had in fact moved to South Africa in 1971, but later returned to the US because of better employment opportunities. Prior to 1971 Dolce had been a US Army clandestine warfare specialist. His contacts with South African representatives began when he sent them an unclassified paper on clandestine warfare that he had written. There is no evidence that Dolce received money in exchange for documents. On 20 April 1989, the former analyst was sentenced to 10 years in prison and fined $5,000.\n\nWashington Post\n\n12 Oct 1988, \"Md. Man Admits to Espionage for South Africa\"\nWashington Post\n\n13 Oct 1988, \"Spy for S. Africa Called Reserved\"\n\n\nDUBBERSTEIN, WALDO H., retired DIA employee and associate of convicted arms smuggler Edwin P. Wilson, was indicted on 28 April 1983 on charges of selling US military secrets to Libya. The following day Dubberstein was found dead; his death was later ruled a suicide. Had he been convicted of espionage and of other charges against him, including conspiracy and bribery, Dubberstein would have faced a possible sentence of 57 years and $80,000 in fines. Dubberstein had apparently begun his cooperation with Libya as an outgrowth of meetings with an old CIA friend, Edwin P. Wilson, who acted as a middleman for passage of information to Libya and receipt of payments to Dubberstein.\n\nWashington Post\n\n8 May 1983, \"The Last Battle of an Old War Horse\"\nTime\n\n9 May 1983, \"Beyond Justice: An Accused Spy is Dead\"\nELLIS, ROBERT WADE, Navy Petty Officer, stationed at the Naval Air Station, Moffett Field, California, reportedly contacted the Soviet Consulate in San Francisco, with an offer to sell classified documents for $2,000. Ellis, who had clearly wanted to make money by his espionage activities, was arrested in February 1983 while attempting to sell documents to an undercover FBI agent. He was convicted at a general court-martial for unauthorized disclosure of classified information and was sentenced to three years' confinement.\n\nENGER, VALDIK and **RUDOLF CHERNYAYEV**, both Soviet employees of the UN Secretariat, were arrested by the FBI in New Jersey in May 1978 for accepting classified information on antisubmarine warfare passed by a US Naval officer acting on instructions of the Naval Investigative Service and the FBI. The officer, Navy Lieutenant Commander Art Lindberg, acted as a double agent in a counterintelligence operation called Operation Lemonaid. In August 1977, LCDR Lindberg took a trip on the Soviet cruise ship *Kazakhstan*. Upon the ship's return to New York, he passed a note to one of the Soviet officers containing an offer to sell information. He was later contacted by telephone by a Soviet agent. During subsequent telephone calls, LCDR Lindberg was given contact instructions on the type of information to get and the locations of drop sites where that information could be left and payment money could be found. Naval Investigative Service and FBI agents kept the drop zones under surveillance and later identified the Soviet agents. On 20 May 1978, FBI agents moved into the drop zone and apprehended three Soviets, Enger, Chernyayev and another man, **VLADIMIR ZINYAKIN**, third secretary at the Soviet Mission to the United Nations. Zinyakin avoided arrest due to diplomatic immunity. Enger and Chernyayev, the first Soviet officials ever to stand trial for espionage in the US, were convicted and sentenced to 50 years in prison. Altogether they paid the Navy officer $16,000 for materials he provided. Enger and Chernyayev were later exchanged for the release of five Soviet dissidents.\n\nNew York Times\n\n21 May 1978, \"2 Russians Arrested by F.B.I. for Spying\"\nWashington Post\n\n24 Dec 1978, \"The Spy Who Came Into The Cold\"\nLos Angeles Times\n\n24 May 1979, \"Navy Officer 'Drafted' as Counterspy\"\nNaval Investigative Service Command, *Espionage*, 1989\n\n\nFAGET, MARIANO, a high-ranking Immigration and Naturalization Service official in Miami, Florida, was arrested on 17 February 2000 for providing classified information to the Cuban intelligence service. Faget is a naturalized citizen who had migrated to the US in 1959. At the time of his arrest he held a Secret security clearance and had access to sensitive INS files. He first became a suspect in 1999 when technical and physical surveillance indicated that he was making unauthorized contacts with known Cuban agents. His arrest the following year was based on an FBI sting operation in which Faget was shown (bogus) information that a Cuban diplomat was about to defect. A few minutes later, the INS official was recorded passing this information by phone to a business contact with ties to Cuban intelligence. A member of the Cuban mission, who had been a contact for Faget, was declared persona non grata and expelled. It is not known how much information Faget may have provided the Cuban intelligence service during his years with the INS. Following his arraignment on 3 March 2000, he pleaded not guilty to charges of disclosing classified information, converting it for his own gain, lying to the FBI about contact with a Cuban official, and failing to disclose foreign business ties on his security clearance application.  On 30 May 2000, Faget was convicted on all four counts. Prosecutors stated that Faget's motives were financial gain rather than political. He had expectations of engaging in a lucrative trading business with Cuba once the US embargo is lifted. The former INS official was sentenced on 29\nJune 2001 to five years in prison including the 16 months in custody at the time of sentencing. His 35 years of otherwise exemplary service to the INS were noted by the judge. Miami Herald\n\n\n12 Mar 2000, \"Faget: 'Spy' Talk Was Only Business\"\nNew York Times\n\n\n31 May 2000, \"I.N.S. Official Is Convicted on Charges of\n\n\nEspionage\"\nMiami Herald\n\n\n30 Jun 2001, \"INS Official Gets 5 Years in Spy Sting\"\nFLEMING, DAVID, Navy Chief Petty Officer, was convicted by a six-member military court on 4\nOctober 1988 for the theft of 16 Secret photographs and four classified training manuals that he had at his home. At the time of his arrest in October 1987, Fleming was chief photographer aboard the submarine La Jolla, based at San Diego, California. At that time Federal agents found classified material in Fleming's apartment. Fleming contended that cramped quarters aboard the ship led him to develop photographs at home. Concluding that he knew that the materials, if kept at home, could result in damage to national security, the court convicted Fleming under statutes which apply to acts of espionage. However, no evidence was presented to the court that the Chief Petty Officer had intended to provide classified materials to representatives of another country. Fleming was sentenced to four years' confinement and was given a bad conduct discharge from the Navy. In April 1989 a Navy parole board in San Diego recommended that the remainder of the four-year sentence be commuted. He was released on parole in 1990.\n\n\nLos Angeles Times\n\n5 Oct 1988, \"Sailor Gets Prison in Classified Data Case\"\nSan Diego Union\n\n15 Apr 1989, \"Early Release Backed for Sailor Convicted on Security Charges FORBRICH, ERNST, a West German automobile mechanic, was arrested 19 March 1984 in Clearwater Beach, Florida, after paying $550 for a classified military document supplied by an undercover agent posing as an Army intelligence officer. Forbrich was described as a conduit who passed US military secrets to East German intelligence and by his own admission had been selling documents to East German intelligence for a period of 17 years. Forbrich traveled frequently to the US, contacting former US\nmilitary personnel who had served in West Germany. Convicted in June on two counts of espionage, Forbrich was sentenced to 15 years.\n\nWashington Post\n\n21 Mar 1984, \"West German Accused of Spying for East\"\nNew York Times\n\n21 Mar 1984, \"German is Arrested on Spying Charge\"\nFORD, KENNETH WAYNE, JR., employed as a computer expert by the National Security Agency\n(NSA) from June 2001 until late 2003, was arrested on 12 January 2004 and accused of taking national security documents without authorization. On the last day of his employment at NSA, Ford packed cardboard boxes with highly classified documents, left through an unguarded exit, and loaded the boxes into his vehicle. Acting on his then-girlfriend's tip, FBI agents executed a search warrant for Ford's home in Waldorf, Maryland, and discovered sensitive classified information stashed throughout the house, including Top Secret documents in two boxes in the kitchen. Ford was arrested the same day. Prosecutors did not allege that Ford took the documents to give or sell to a foreign government, and Ford claimed that he stole the documents because he thought they would help him get a new job with Northrop Grumman.\n\nHowever, he did not get the job and a few months later, a federal judge told Ford that if he applied for any other job requiring a security clearance, he must divulge that he had been charged with unlawfully possessing national security documents. Ford did subsequently apply to Lockheed Martin but failed to disclose on the government clearance form the charges pending against him regarding the theft from NSA. Ford was convicted in December 2005 after a two-week trial for unlawful possession of classified information and making a false statement to a US government agency. On 26 March 2006, he was sentenced to six years in prison, followed by three years' supervised release.\n\nWashingtonpost.com\n30 Nov 2005, \"Md. Man on Trial Over NSA Documents\"\nU.S. Attorney's Office,\n\n\n        District of MD Press Blog\n30 Mar 2006, \"Former Maryland NSA Employee Sentenced for Wrongfully\nPossessing Classified Information\"\nFBI Headline Archives (fbi.gov)\n31 Mar 2006, \"You Can't Take It With You: Maryland Man Sentenced for Stealing Secret Documents\"\nFRANKLIN, LAWRENCE ANTHONY, an intelligence analyst in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, International Security Affairs, Iran desk, held a Top Secret clearance with access to sensitive compartmented information. The FBI filed criminal charges against Franklin 3 May 2005, accusing him of passing, from 2002 to 2004, classified military information about Iran and Iraq to two pro-Israel lobbyists, Steven Rosen and Keith Weissman, and to an Israeli diplomat. Rosen and Weissman were senior staff members of the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC), a pro-Israel lobbying organization. Their own prosecution in the same case was novel in that neither held security clearances that required them to protect U.S. classified information. Franklin pleaded guilty in October 2005 to three felony counts in exchange for his cooperation and the government's willingness to drop three other charges. He was sentenced in January 2006 to 12 years and seven months in prison and a $10,000 fine.\n\nThis relatively lenient sentence reflected the judge's impression that Franklin had been driven by a desire to help, not damage, the US. Franklin was not to begin his sentence until after legal proceedings against Rosen and Weissman were completed, at which time his sentence might be reduced. Meanwhile, Franklin remained free on bail. On 1 May 2009 prosecutors announced that they were abandoning the charges against Rosen and Weissman and then, on 12 June 2009, Franklin's sentence was reduced to probation, with 10 months of home confinement. BBCnews.com\n\n20 Jan 2006, \"Pentagon Man Jailed Over Spying\"\nNew York Times\n\n\n1 Dec 2006, \"Former Military Analyst Gets Prison Term for Passing Information\"\nFederation of American\n\n23 Jun 2008, \"Court Narrows Scope of Appeal in AIPAC Case\"\n\n     Scientists\n\nWashington Post\n\n\n1 May 2009, \"Charges to be Dropped Against Two Former AIPAC Lobbyists\"\nWashington Post\n\n\n12 Jun 2009, \"Sentence Reduced in Pentagon Case\"\nGARCIA, WILFREDO, Navy Master-at-Arms 1st Class, was found guilty of espionage on 22 January\n1988 following a two-year investigation by agents of the Naval Investigative Service and the FBI. In late\n1985, NIS and FBI officials received information that a civilian businessman in Vallejo, California, was attempting to sell classified Navy documents to representatives of a foreign government. A cooperating witness identified Garcia, who was then stationed at Mare Island Naval Shipyard, as the source. Confidential documents stolen by Garcia dealing with submarine activities were sold to the civilian for $800,000, with a promise of more money when they were resold to a foreign government. Evidence indicated that the final destination could have been an East-Bloc country. The espionage scheme resulted in a number of classified documents being taken to the Philippines for sale to a foreign power there.\n\nParticipants in the conspiracy couriered the documents on commercial aircraft and had gathered the material in a residence in Manila. NIS agents in Manila entered the home with a search warrant and recovered the documents before the planned sale. At a general court-martial convened in January 1988, Garcia was found guilty of espionage, conspiracy to commit espionage, larceny, conspiracy to commit larceny, sale of government property, and violations of military regulations. He was sentenced to 12 years' confinement, reduced in rank to E-1, forfeited all pay and allowances, and received a dishonorable discharge from the Navy. Garcia had served in the Navy for 15 years.\n\nNaval Investigative Service Command, *Espionage*, 1989\nSentry\n\nSpring/Summer 1988, \"MA1 Convicted of Espionage\"\n\n\nGILBERT, OTTO ATTILA, Hungarian-born US citizen, was arrested 17 April 1982 after paying\n$4,000 for classified documents provided by an Army officer who was working as a US Army double agent under Army control. The officer, CWO Janos Szmolka, had been approached in 1977 by agents of Hungarian military intelligence while on a visit to his mother in Hungary and had reported the contact to Army intelligence. While stationed in Europe, Szmolka agreed to work as a double agent. In 1981 he received $3,000 for 16 rolls of film of unclassified documents and was offered $100,000 for classified material on weapon and cryptographic systems. Szmolka was reassigned to Fort Gordon, Georgia, in 1980, but maintained his contacts with Hungarian intelligence, which led to the meeting with Gilbert. Gilbert was convicted of espionage and sentenced to 15 years in prison. This case is considered to be a classic example of recruitment based on a hostage situation since implied threats were made against the Hungarian relations of the US service member.\n\n\nWashington Post\n\n20 Apr 1982, \"Spying is Charged to New Yorker of Hungarian Origin\"\nNew York Times\n\n20 Apr 1982, \"Native of Hungary is Jailed in South on Spying Charges\"\n\n\nGREGORY, JEFFERY EUGENE, a US Army Staff Sergeant was arrested 29 April 1993 at Fort Richardson, Alaska, resulting from a joint investigation between the FBI and the US Army Intelligence and Security Command. Gregory was one of several members of a spy ring operating out of the 8th Infantry Division, Bad Kreuznach, Germany, in the mid-1980s that sold US and NATO military secrets to Hungary and Czechoslovakia when those countries were in the Soviet Bloc. German authorities convicted the ring-leader, former US Army sergeant **CLYDE LEE CONRAD**, of high treason in 1990 and sentenced him to life in prison. In 1991, another ring member **RODERICK JAMES RAMSAY**, also a former Army sergeant stationed in Bad Kreuznach, was sentenced to 36 years in prison by an American court for his involvement in the network. Clyde Conrad recruited Ramsay who is believed to have then recruited others, including Gregory.  According to the Federal complaint against Gregory, while assigned to the 8th Infantry Division in Germany from March 1984 to October 1986, \"he helped procure extremely sensitive, classified documents relating to national defense, for transmittal to one or more foreign powers.\" At that time, Gregory was a staff driver at Bad Kreuznach, West Germany, and helped maintain the commanding general's mobile command center. He was also in charge of updating maps showing military maneuvers and had access to classified messages and correspondence. According to an FBI\nofficial, Gregory once took a military flight bag stuffed with 20 pounds of classified documents. The documents included \"war plans\" for the US and NATO. On 28 March 1994, Gregory pleaded guilty to espionage charges. In June, 1994, Gregory, along with Sgt. **JEFFREY STEPHEN RONDEAU**, another member of the espionage ring, was sentenced by a military court to 18 years in prison.\n\n\nNew York Times\n\n2 May 1993, \"Fourth Army Sergeant Held in Espionage Case\"\nHuntsville Times\n\n2 May 1993, \"4th Army Sgt. Arrested in Alleged Espionage Ring in Germany\"\n\n\nGROAT, DOUGLAS FREDERICK, former CIA officer, was arrested on 3 April 1998 and charged with passing sensitive intelligence information to two foreign governments and attempting to extort over\n$500,000 from the CIA in return for not disclosing additional secrets. Groat had been placed on a threeyear paid administrative leave in the spring of 1993 after the agency felt he posed a security risk, reportedly involving a discipline or job performance issue. Apparently Groat first attempted to extort money from the CIA in May 1996 and was fired the following October. During a 16-year career at the CIA, Groat participated in intelligence operations aimed at penetrating the secret codes and communication systems employed by foreign governments. Groat, a cryptographic expert, was reported to have revealed classified information to two undisclosed governments regarding the targeting and compromise of their cryptographic systems in March and April 1997. For Groat, it was \"very much a case of pure revenge,\" said a Federal official, explaining that the former intelligence officer had long felt slighted and abused by the CIA because he had never been given the assignments he thought he deserved.\n\nGroat is reported to have not received any money from the foreign governments for the information passed. The former CIA employee pleaded guilty to one count of attempted extortion 27 July, and was sentenced 27 September to five years' confinement followed by three years' probation.  According to news reports, the sharp reduction from the original four-count espionage charge and the limited penalties reflected the government's desire to avoid a trial in which damaging classified information might have been disclosed.\n\nWashington Times\n\n4 Apr 1998, \"Former CIA Officer Charged With Spying; Pleads Not guilty in Extortion, Codes Case\"\nWashington Post\n\n28 Jul 1998, \"Ex-CIA Operative Pleads Guilty to Blackmail Attempt at Agency\"\nWashington Post\n\n26 Sep 1998, \"Ex-CIA Agent Given 5 Years in Extortion Case; Former Operative\n\n\nAdmitted Demanding $1 Million in Return for Not Disclosing Secrets\"\n\n\nGUERRERO, ANTONIO, part of the Cuban Red Wasp Network spy ring in south Florida, was born in Miami where his father, a professional baseball player, was working. [See also Linda Hernandez, Gerardo Hernandes, Joseph Santos, and Alejandro Alonso.] The family returned to Cuba where Antonio grew up and was recruited by the Cuban Intelligence Service. He began spying for Cuba in Panama in 1991, then was sent to the US in 1992 and tasked with collecting visual intelligence against the Boca Chica Naval Air Station in Key West, Florida. Guerrero, 43, got a job doing maintenance and construction work on the base. He passed coded reports on activities at the naval air station, such as plane counts, base remodeling, or changes of command, which could indicate an impending US invasion of Cuba. He passed his information to the head of the ring, **GERARDO HERNANDEZ**. Although he and two of his fellow agents in south Florida had no clearances and obtained no classified information, they were successfully prosecuted for conspiracy to commit espionage. On 27 December 2001, Guerrero was sentenced to life in prison for conspiracy to commit espionage and for acting as an unregistered agent of a foreign government.\n\n\nWashington Post\n\n\n15 Sep 1998, \"10 Arrested on Charges of Spying for Cuba\"\nSouth Florida Sun-\n\n31 Dec 2000, \"Exile's Dual Life Begets Federal Spying Charge\"\n   Sentinel Guardian (UK)\n\n6 Mar 2001, \"Carry on Spying\"\n\n\nHAGUEWOOD, ROBERT DEAN, Petty Officer 3rd Class, was arrested 4 March 1986 by agents of the Naval Investigative Service after allegedly selling part of a Confidential aviation ordinance manual to an undercover police officer. Haguewood, who was stationed at the Pacific Missile Test Center at Point Mugu Naval Air Station near Oxnard, California, reportedly asked around town for someone who would pay for secret information about Naval ordinance. He was placed under surveillance by agents of the Naval Investigative Service who, with the FBI and local police officials, made the arrest on 4 March after Haguewood received a payment of $360 for the classified document at a beach location. No contact was made with foreign representatives and no information is known to have been compromised. Haguewood was reported to have had serious financial problems. On 20 June, Haguewood pleaded guilty under a plea-bargain agreement and received a sentence of two years from a military court.\n\n\nWashington Post\n\n1 Mar 1986, \"Sailor Allegedly Tried to Sell Manual\"\nNew York Times\n\n11 Mar 1986, \"Navy Man Arrested in Spy Case\"\nWashington Post\n\n20 Jun 1986, \"Sale of 'Secrets' To Put Sailor Behind Bars\"\n\n\nHALL, JAMES III, Army Warrant Officer, was arrested on 21 December 1988 in Savannah, Georgia, after bragging to an undercover FBI agent that over a period of six years he had sold Top Secret intelligence data to East Germany and the Soviet Union. At the time, Hall believed that he was speaking to a Soviet contact. During this conversation he claimed that he had been motivated only by money. He told the FBI agent posing as a Soviet intelligence officer, \"I wasn't terribly short of money. I just decided I didn't ever want to worry where my next dollar was coming from. I'm not anti-American. I wave the flag as much as anybody else.\" Also arrested, in Bellaire, Florida, was **HUSEYIN YILDIRIM** (nicknamed\n\"the Meister\"), a Turkish national who served as a conduit between Hall and East German agents. He was working as a civilian mechanic at an Army auto shop in Germany at the time. According to FBI sources, Hall started passing documents to East German agents in 1982 while serving in West Berlin as a communications analyst monitoring East Bloc cable traffic. Later, Hall was transferred to Frankfurt where he continued to pass \"massive amounts\" of highly classified data on communications intelligence. Hall is believed to have received over $100,000 from agents of two countries during this period of time. In July 1987 he was reassigned to Ft. Stewart, near Savannah, Georgia. Hall had been under investigation by FBI and Army counterintelligence agents for several months before his arrest and had been observed meeting Yildirim three times in November and December. Hall's detection as an espionage source may have resulted from reports that Hall was living in a style far above what his pay scale would allow. According to US officials, the operation appears to have inflicted serious damage on US electronic intelligence collection activities in Europe. On 9 March 1989 Hall was sentenced to 40 years in prison, fined $50,000 and given a dishonorable discharge. Yildirim was convicted 20 July 1989 of scheming with Hall and sentenced to life. Prosecutors contended that from 1982 to 1988 Yildirim carried classified military intelligence from Hall to East Bloc agents and returned with money.\n\nNew York Times\n\n22 Dec 1988, \"Army Technician and a Civilian are Held as Spies for Soviet Bloc Washington Post\n\n23 Dec 1988, \"Spy Suspect Said to Act Prosperous\"\nNew York Times\n\n19 Jul 1989, \"Jury Hears Tale of Spy Who Did It Out of Greed\"\nNewsweek\n\n2 Jan 1989, \"Top Secrets for Sale?\"\nHAMILTON, FREDERICK CHRISTOPHER, a former Defense Intelligence Agency official, pleaded guilty on 5 February 1993 to the charge of passing to Ecuadorian officials classified US intelligence reports evaluating the military readiness of Peruvian security forces. At the time, Hamilton was a DIA\nresearch technician in the defense attache's office in Lima, Peru, a post which he held from 1989 to 1991. He apparently believed that the disclosures could help avert a possible conflict between the two countries.\n\nPeru and Ecuador have been disputing territory (sometimes violently) along their mutual border for the past 50 years. Hamilton holds advanced degrees in Spanish and Portuguese. At the time of his arrest, he was employed as a language instructor at a military academy in Virginia. His activities were uncovered by US intelligence agencies after they received information from a confidential source indicating secrets were being leaked. Hamilton, who held a Top Secret security clearance while with the DIA, met Ecuadorian representatives in their embassy in Lima on 13 February and 20 May of 1991. He passed extremely sensitive information that disclosed US intelligence operations and the identity of US sources in the region. \"He didn't get any money,\" said a US official. \"He was a very naive individual who was flattered by the [Ecuadorians].\" Hamilton's attorney stated that, \"What he thought he was trying to do was prevent a war... The purpose of disclosing the documents that he did was to show the country that was concerned about being attacked that the other country had neither the intent nor the ability to attack.\" Hamilton reportedly passed five Secret intelligence reports and orally disclosed the contents of four other classified reports. Under a court agreement, the former DIA employee pleaded guilty to two counts of unlawfully communicating classified information to a foreign country. The agreement specifies Hamilton may not appeal the sentence and the Justice Department will not prosecute him for espionage-related crimes. On 16 April, he was sentenced to 37 months in prison.\n\n\nWashington Post\n\n6 Feb 1993, \"Va. Man Pleads Guilty to Leaking US Secrets\"\nWashington Times\n\n6 Feb 1993, \"Ex-DIA Official Pleads Guilty in Document Leak\"\nHANSSEN, ROBERT PHILIP, an agent for the FBI for 27 years, was charged on 20 February 2001\nwith spying for Russia for more than 15 years. He was arrested in a park near his home in Vienna, Virginia, as he dropped off a bag containing seven Secret documents at a covert location. For most of his FBI career Hanssen had worked in counterintelligence, and he made use of what he learned in his own espionage career. He was charged with espionage and conspiracy to commit espionage. Specifically, Hanssen provided first the Soviets and then the Russian government over 6,000 pages of classified documents and the identities of three Russian agents working for the US. Two of these sources were tried in Russia and executed. According to court documents, the FBI employee provided information on \"some of the most sensitive and highly compartmented projects in the US intelligence community\" as well as details on US nuclear war defenses. In return, the Russians paid him $1.4 million over the period of his espionage activities, including over $600,000 in cash and diamonds and $800,000 deposited in a Russian bank account. Hanssen was identified after the US obtained his file from a covert source in the Russian intelligence service. However, the Russians never knew Hanssen's true name. To them, he was known only as \"Ramon\" or \"Garcia.\" It is believed that Hanssen was involved with the Soviets beginning in 1979, broke off the relationship in 1980, but again volunteered to engage in espionage in 1985 by sending an unsigned letter to a KGB officer in the Soviet Embassy in Washington. The letter included the names of the three Soviet double-agents working in the US. Although Hanssen's motives are unclear, they seem to have included ego gratification, disgruntlement with his job at the FBI, and a need for money. He and his wife struggled to provide for their large family on an agent's salary and by 1992 had incurred debts of over $275,000. Hanssen exploited the FBI's computer systems for classified information to sell and kept tabs on possible investigations of himself by accessing FBI computer files. Friends and coworkers were at a loss to explain how this supposedly deeply religious father of six and ardent anti-Communist could have been leading a double life. A large part of his illegal income is believed to have been used to buy expensive gifts and a car for a local stripper. In July 2001, a plea agreement was reached by which Hanssen would plead guilty to espionage, fully cooperate with investigators, but avoid the death penalty. On 11 May 2002, the former FBI agent was sentenced to life in prison.\n\nNew York Times\n\n\n21 Feb 2001, \"F.B.I. Agent Charged as Spy Who Aided Russia for 15 Years\"\nWashington Post\n\n\n25 Feb 2001, \"'A Question of Why,' Contradictory Portrait Emerges of Spying Suspect\"\nWashington Post\n\n\n6 Jan 2002, \"From Russia with Love\"\nLos Angeles Times\n\n\n7 May 2002, \"U.S. Authorities Question FBI Spy's Candor\"\nHARPER, JAMES DURWARD, a Silicon Valley freelance electrical engineer, was arrested 15 October\n1983 for selling large quantities of classified documents to Polish intelligence for a reported sum of\n$250,000. Harper, who did not hold a clearance, acquired classified material through his wife, RUBY SCHULER. Schuler was employed as secretary to the president of Systems Control, Inc. of Palo Alto, a defense contractor engaged in research on ballistic missiles. She allowed Harper to come into the Systems Control offices on weekends and at night to copy documents that were subsequently passed to Polish intelligence agents. Between July 1979 and November 1981, Harper conducted a total of a dozen meetings with Polish agents in Europe and Mexico at which he turned over documents related to the Minuteman ICBM and ballistic missile research. While Harper seems to have been motivated by money, Schuler passed along classified documents in an effort to please Harper. Less than three weeks before she died, Schuler told a close friend: \"There is a reason that Jim and I got married that only he and I know. I\ncan't tell you or anyone else and I never will.\" In September 1981 Harper, beginning to regret his behavior, attempted to bargain for immunity from prosecution by anonymously contacting the CIA through a lawyer. Schuler died in June 1983 of complications related to alcoholism. Harper, who eventually pleaded guilty to six counts of espionage, received a life sentence on 14 May 1984.\n\n\nWashington Post\n\n18 Oct 1983, \"KGB Intelligence 'Windfall'\"\nTime Magazine\n\n31 Oct 1983, \"For Love of Money and Adventure\"\nDoD Security Institute, *Security Awareness Bulletin,* No. 4-84, August 1984, \"Partners in Espionage: The Case of James Harper and Ruby Louise Schuler\"\n\n\nHAWKINS, STEPHEN DWAYNE, was serving in 1985 as a Quartermaster Third Class at the Commander Submarine Group 8 in Naples, Italy. A visitor to his home off base in June reported seeing a classified message there. Interviews with Hawkins by Naval Investigative Service agents and a series of polygraphs that showed deception resulted in Hawkins confessing that he had taken at least 17 Secret messages home with him and was considering selling them to a hostile intelligence service. He was convicted at general court-martial on 15 January 1986 of violating Article 92, wrongful removal of classified material and wrongful destruction of a classified message. He was sentenced to a dishonorable discharge, one year in prison, and reduction in grade to E-1. Naval Investigative Service Command, *Espionage*, 1989\n\n\nHELMICH, JOSEPH GEORGE, a former US Army Warrant Officer, was arrested on 15 July 1981 at his residence in Jacksonville, Florida, for the sale of US cryptography to the Soviet Union from 1963 to 1966. Helmich served as a crypto custodian in France and at Ft. Bragg, North Carolina. He initiated contact with USSR embassy officials in Paris after being faced with severe financial problems. In return for extremely sensitive information related to the KL-7 cryptographic system widely used by the US\nmilitary, Helmich received approximately $131,000. After being transferred to Ft. Bragg, Helmich continued to provide the Soviets with KL-7 key lists and traveled to both France and Mexico City to rendezvous with his handlers. Helmich came under suspicion in 1964 and was questioned because of his unexplained affluence. He was interviewed again in August 1980 and, although admitting he had received\n$20,000 from Soviet agents, denied he had compromised classified information. In early 1981 he was spotted with Soviet agents in Canada. Eventually Helmich recounted full details of his espionage involvement. On 16 October 1981, he was sentenced to life imprisonment.\n\nWashington Post\n\n16 Jul 1981, \"Ex-Army Cryptographer Indicted on Spy Charges\"\nNew York Times\n\n16 Jul 1981, \"Ex-Army Warrant Officer Accused of Being Soviet Spy\"\nNew York Times\n\n24 Sep 1981, \"Generals Testify in Espionage Case\"\nHERNANDEZ, GERARDO, a captain in the Cuban military intelligence, was also spymaster of an extensive ring of Cuban nationals and Cuban Americans collecting intelligence, attempting to commit espionage and disrupt Cuban exile groups in south Florida from 1992 until 1998. On 12 September 1998\nthe FBI arrested 10 people associated with the \"La Red Avispa,\" or the Red Wasp Network ring, including eight men and two women in their various south Florida residences. They were accused of spying on US military installations and anti-Castro exile groups in south Florida and transmitting this information to Cuba. Among the military installations the group attempted to infiltrate were the US\nSouthern Command Headquarters in Miami, MacDill Air Force Base near Tampa, and Boca Chica Naval Air Station in Key West. The group's goals included documenting activities, exercises, and trends at the installations; monitoring anti-Castro groups and disrupting their plans; and developing positions of vantage from which to warn Cuban intelligence of impending military strikes against Cuba. The group had been under investigation by the FBI counterintelligence squad in Miami since 1995.\n\nThree of the 10 arrested were identified as senior agents who communicated directly with Cuban intelligence officials and received their instructions from Cuba. The three senior agents were all Cuban nationals. They were **GERARDO HERNANDEZ**, 31 (alias Manuel Viramontes), the spymaster;\nFERNANDO GONZALEZ, 33 (alias Ruben Campa), and **RAMON LABANINO**, 30 (alias Luis Medina), another Cuban intelligence officer. The remaining seven were mid-level or junior agents who passed their reports to one of these three senior agents. Included were **ANTONIO GUERRERO**, 39, who observed aircraft landings at the Boca Chica Naval Air Station from his job as a sheet-metal worker there; **ALEJANDRO ALONSO**, 39, a boat pilot; and **RENE GONZALEZ**, 42, a skilled aircraft pilot and the only Cuban national among these seven. Both joined the Democracy Movement to report on its activities devoted to harassing the Castro government with demonstrations and threats. Two married couples, all American citizens, also worked in the spy network: **NILO** and **LINDA HERNANDEZ**, ages\n44 and 41 respectively, and **JOSEPH** and **AMARYLIS SANTOS**, both 39. Five defendants, Alonzo, the Hernandez's, and the Santos's, accepted a plea bargain and cooperated with the prosecutors, providing information about the others. The other five defendants eventually went to trial, which lasted six months.\n\nThe US government's espionage case also became enmeshed with an incident that happened in February 1996, in which Cuban air force jets shot down two of three Cessna aircraft flying toward Havana. Four pilots, members of the anti-Castro exile group, Brothers to the Rescue, were killed. Several of the Wasp network agents had infiltrated Brothers to the Rescue, including Rene Gonzalez, the pilot. In addition to charges related to information-gathering and the sending of \"nonpublic\" information to a foreign power, Gerardo Hernandez was charged with contributing to the deaths of the four pilots for passing along to Cuban intelligence information about the group's planned fly-over. Several other Cubans who were eventually indicted in the incident fled to Cuba before they could be arrested.\n\nThe trial of the five Wasp defendants who had not entered into plea bargains resulted in convictions on all counts on 8 June 2001. Three received life sentences in December 2001 for conspiracy to commit espionage, although they did not collect or compromise any classified information. Cuban nationals, Gerardo Hernandez and Ramon Labanino, and Antonio Guerrero, an American citizen, received life in prison. Fernando Gonzalez and Rene Gonzalez, also Cuban nationals, received sentences of 19 years and 10 years, respectively, for conspiracy and for acting as unregistered agents of a foreign power. The five American citizens who pled guilty to one count of acting as unregistered agents of a foreign power received lesser sentences: Alejandro Alonso, Nilo Hernandez, and Linda Hernandez got sentences of seven years' imprisonment, Joseph Santos received four years, and Amarylis Santos three and a half. Washington Post\n\n\n15 Sep 1998, \"10 Arrested on Charges of Spying for Cuba\"\nFort Lauderdale Sun-\n\n8 May 1999, \"Cuban Spies Linked to Shoot-down\"\n    Sentinel Miami Herald\n\n\n16 Aug 1999, \"Shadowing of Cubans a Classic Spy Tale\"\nGuardian (UK)\n\n\n6 Mar 2001, \"Carry on Spying\"\nMiami Times\n\n\n15 Mar 2001, \"What Spies Beneath\"\nAssociated Press\n\n\n30 Dec 2001, \"Cuban Parliament Declares Five Agents 'Heroes of Cuba'\"\nHERNANDEZ, LINDA 43, and her husband **NILO HERNANDEZ**, 46, were members of the Wasp Network, a Cuban spy ring in south Florida. Linda was born in New York but returned to Cuba where she grew up and married Nilo. In 1983 the couple returned to the US where he later became an American citizen. In 1992 they were \"activated\" as spies and ordered to move from New York to Miami. They were arrested on 12 September 1998 along with eight other members of the ring. [See also Gerardo Hernandez and Alejandro Alonso.] Linda was charged with attempting to collect information for the Cuban Intelligence Service by infiltrating a right-wing Cuban exile group called Alpha 66. Nilo counted aircraft at nearby Homestead Air Force Base and reported using a shortwave radio. Although the information they passed to Cuba was in the public domain, in a plea bargain, the pair pled guilty to acting as unregistered agents of a foreign government. Each was sentenced to seven years in prison in US District court in Miami on 23 February 2000. Miami Herald\n\n8 Feb 1998, \"Cuban Couple Pleads Guilty in Spying Case\"\nMiami Herald\n\n24 Feb 2000, \"Confessed Cuban Spies Sentenced to Seven Years\"\nHERRMANN, RUDOLPH ALBERT, KGB career officer, entered the US illegally with his family from Canada in 1968 and operated as a Soviet agent within the US under the guise of a free-lance photographer. His primary assignment was to gather political information. While Herrmann claimed not to have recruited Americans for espionage, he admitted to having transmitted sensitive information collected by other spies and to acting as a courier for the KGB. Apprehended by the FBI in 1977, he agreed to operate as a double agent until the operation was terminated in 1980. Herrmann and his family were granted asylum in the US have been resettled under a new identity.\n\nNew York Times\n\n4 Mar 1980, \"Double Agent Revealed by FBI\"\nWashington Post\n\n4 Mar 1980, \"Soviet Spy Became a 'Double Agent'\nJohn Barron, *The Inheritor: A Tale of KGB Espionage in America*, 1982\nHOFFMAN, RONALD, was working as a general manager at Science Applications International Corporation (SAIC), in Century City, California, when his dissatisfaction with his salary led him to create a sideline business called \"Plume Technology\" at home. Hoffman had worked on a software program called CONTAM, developed at SAIC under classified contract for the Air Force, which could classify rockets upon launch from their exhaust contrails and respond with appropriate countermeasures. The software also had application for the design of spacecraft, guided missiles, and launch vehicles. In 1986\nhe contacted Japanese companies working with Japan's space program and offered to sell them entire CONTAM modules\"data, components and systems, expertise in the field, and training for employees in use of the system.\" Four Japanese companies, including Nissan and Mitsubishi, bought the classified software from Hoffman for undercover payments that totaled over $750,000. He also tried to develop customers in Germany, Italy, Israel, and South Africa. Late in 1989, his secretary at SAIC noticed a fax addressed to Hoffman from Mitsubishi that asked for confirmation that their payment into his account had been received. Adding this to her knowledge of Hoffman's lavish lifestyle, she took her suspicions and a copy of the fax to SAIC's chief counsel. Confronted, Hoffman resigned on the spot and left, but returned to his office during the night when a security video camera captured him carrying out boxes of CONTAM documents. In a joint Customs and Air Force sting operation, investigators posed as South African buyers and documented Hoffman trying to sell them CONTAM modules without an export license. Hoffman was arrested 14 June 1990 and convicted early in 1992 of violations of the Arms Export Control Act and the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act. He was sentenced on 20 April 1992 to 30 months in prison and fined $250,000. Bosseler,  S.J.\n\n\nAffidavit, U.S. District Court, \"U.S. v. Ronald Hoffman,\" 15 June, 1990.\n\nU.S. v. Hoffman\n\n\n10 F 3d 808 (9th Cir. 1993).\n\nChicago Tribune\n\n\n22 Apr 1992, \"U.S. Scientist Faces Jail in Sale of Star Wars Software\"\nHORTON, BRIAN PATRICK, was a US Navy Intelligence Specialist Second Class, assigned to the Nuclear Strike Planning Branch at the Fleet Intelligence Center, Europe and Atlantic, located in Norfolk, Virginia. Between April and October 1982, Horton wrote one letter and made four telephone calls to the Soviet Embassy, offering to provide information on the Single Integrated Operations Plan (SIOP). Based upon evidence accumulated during the investigation, Horton chose to plead guilty under a pretrial agreement which included a posttrial grant of immunity. This allowed the Naval Investigative Service to question Horton after his conviction and sentencing for a period of up to six months to determine any damage to national security caused by his actions. (This technique of posttrial grant-of-immunity encourages the suspect to cooperate in an effort to reduce his sentence.) He was sentenced by a general court-martial on 12 January 1983 to six years' confinement at hard labor, forfeiture of all pay and allowances, a dishonorable discharge, and reduction in pay grade to E-1 for failing to report contacts with the Soviet Embassy in Washington, DC, and for attempting to sell classified information to the USSR. No classified information was actually exchanged and no money was received by Horton. His defense attorney argued that Horton was working on a novel and approached the Soviets to learn their modus operandi. The prosecution stated that he had attempted to get between $1,000 and $3,000 for classified information.\n\nWashington Post\n\n14 Jan 1983, \"Sailor Sentenced after Bid to Sell Plans to Soviets\"\nNaval Investigative Service Command, *Espionage*, 1989\n\n\nHOWARD, EDWARD LEE joined the CIA in 1981. In January 1982 he was assigned to the Soviet/East European Division for training as a case officer in Moscow. He had been given all the data needed to work in Moscow: names of agents, surveillance operations, and the identities of other CIA officers in the Soviet Union. Just as he was about to leave for Moscow in June 1983, he failed his polygraph tests on matters concerning marital relations, petty theft, drinking, and a pattern of past drug use. Asked to resign, he left bewildered and angry. He finally made contact with Soviet officials in Washington, DC, and arranged a meeting in Vienna. He met with KGB officers on three trips to Vienna between 1984 and 1985 and received payment for classified information. Meanwhile, he moved to New Mexico and began working for the New Mexico legislature as a budget analyst. According to news reports, Howard was one of several CIA employees identified by Soviet defector Vitaly Yurchenko as having sold classified information to the KGB. (Yurchenko also identified Ronald Pelton, former NSA employee, who later was arrested for espionage.) Although placed under surveillance by the FBI at his Albuquerque home, Howard, who had been trained by the CIA in surveillance and evasion tactics, eluded spotters and fled the country. He was followed by the FBI as he moved swiftly from country to country, traveling on his credit card and always ahead of the agents. On 7 August 1986, the Soviet news agency *Tass* announced that Howard had been granted political asylum in the USSR. He reportedly revealed to the KGB the identity of a valuable US intelligence source in Moscow. It is also reported that five American diplomats were expelled from the Soviet Union as *personae non gratae* as a result of information provided by Howard.\n\nHe was the first CIA officer to defect to the USSR. He died in 2002 after falling down the steps of his dacha outside Moscow.\n\nWashington Post\n\n3 Oct 1985, \"2 Ex-CIA Agents Sought by FBI as Possible Spies\"\nWashington Post\n\n5 Oct 1985, \"Affidavit Says Ex-CIA Agent Met High-Level KGB Officers\"\nWashington Post\n\n20 May 1986, \"The CIA Agent Who Sold Out\"\nWashington Post\n\n18 Jul 1986, \"5 American Diplomats Caught by KGB\"\nNewsday\n\n26 Oct 1986, \"Why Edward Lee Howard Sold Out for Money and Revenge\"\nNewsweek\n\n23 May 1988, \"The Spy Who Got Away\"\nNSI Advisory\n\n1 Aug 2002, \"CIA Defector Dies\"\nMinnick. W.L., *Spies and Provocateurs,* 1992\n\n\nHUMPHREY, RONALD, an employee of the US Information Agency, and **DAVID TRUONG**, a Vietnamese immigrant, were indicted in early 1978. A search of Truong's apartment at the time of his arrest in January uncovered two Top Secret State Department documents. Humphrey had turned over classified cables and documents to Truong who in turn sent them to the North Vietnamese delegation in Paris via a woman who was a Vietnamese double agent working for the FBI. Testimony indicated that Humphrey supplied documents to Truong in order to obtain the release of his common-law wife and her four children from communist Vietnam. Both Humphrey and Truong were convicted on six counts of espionage on 20 May, and on 15 July each received a 15-year sentence.\n\nWashington Post\n\n21 May 1978, \"FBI Continues Spy Case Investigation\"\nWashington Post\n\n24 May 1978, \"Cables in Spy Case Larded with Gossip\"\nISMAYLOV, VLADIMIR M., senior Soviet military attache, was arrested on 19 June 1986 at a remote site in Prince George's County, Maryland, after retrieving Secret documents left by a US Air Force officer who was working undercover with counterespionage agents of the AFOSI and the FBI. Until his expulsion for activities incompatible with his diplomatic role, Col. Ismaylov was the highest ranking air force officer at the Soviet Embassy. Ismaylov, apprehended as he buried a milk carton with $41,100 for the US officer, scuffled briefly with FBI agents. According to an FBI spokesman, the Soviet attache was after information about the Strategic Defense Initiative research program, and data on the cruise missile, stealth bomber, and a hypersonic passenger jet known as the Trans-Atmospheric Vehicle. The operation was run by the GRU. According to the US officer, the Soviets evaluated the USAF officer for nearly a year before asking him to photograph classified documents. All transactions and communications were to be carried out by the use of dead drops at remote locations.\n\nWashington Post\n\n21 Jun 1986, \"Soviet Attache Arrested, Expelled for Receiving Document\"\n\n\nJEFFRIES, RANDY MILES, messenger for a private stenographic firm in Washington, DC, was arrested on 14 December 1985 and charged with attempting to deliver national defense secrets to the Soviet Union. The firm, a cleared contractor facility, had transcribed closed hearings of the House Armed Services Committee. Jeffries allegedly provided Soviet military officials with at least 40 \"sample pages\" of Secret and Top Secret transcripts from congressional hearings, offering to hand over a complete package of three documents for $5,000. The investigation of Jeffries began after he was observed by US agents entering the Soviet Military Office in Washington. An FBI undercover agent posing as a Soviet representative contacted the messenger at his residence and arranged a meeting later in the day at a local hotel. Jeffries was arrested as he left the meeting. From 1978 to 1980, he was a support employee for the FBI and reportedly held an agency security clearance. In March 1983 he was convicted of possession of heroin and completed a program for rehabilitation from drug abuse in July 1985. Jeffries entered a plea of guilty on 23 January 1986. On 13 March, Jeffries was sentenced by a Federal judge to from three to nine years' imprisonment. As stated by the court at the time of sentencing, it was obvious that poor security practices at the cleared facility were major contributing factors leading to the loss of classified information.\n\n\nWashington Post\n\n22 Dec 1985, \"FBI Agent Says Suspected Spy Offered to Sell Him Document\"\nWashington Post\n\n24 Dec 1985, \"Transcripts Tied to Jeffries Had Strategic Data\"\nDoD Security Institute, *Security Awareness Bulletin,* No. 2-90, January 1990, \"The Case of Randy Miles Jeffries and Acme Reporting\"\n\n\nJENOTT, ERIC O., Army PFC Eric O. Jenott, 20, assigned to duty as a communication switch operator at the 35th Signal Brigade at Ft. Bragg, North Carolina, since 26 June 1996, was charged on 21August\n1996 with espionage, damaging military property, larceny, and unauthorized access to government computer systems. Specifically, Jenott was accused of providing a classified system password to a Chinese national located at Oak Ridge, Tennessee, who returned to China prior to the arrest. According to Jenott, the password was not in fact Secret and charges related to his penetration of defense computer systems stemmed from his attempt to be helpful when he discovered a weakness in an encoded Army computer system. However, he did admit to having been an active hacker for several years and to breaking into Navy, Air Force, and the Defense Secretary's systems before he joined the Army in 1994. While at Ft. Bragg, Jenott demonstrated to his superior officers that he was able to hack into a US Army system that was supposedly secure. On 3 January 1997, a court-martial found Jenott not guilty of espionage, but guilty of lesser offenses in his original charge. He was sentenced to three years in prison, less the six months already served awaiting trial.\n\nFayetteville Observer-Times\n21 Aug 1996, \"Army Accuses Fort Bragg Soldier of Computer Espionage\"\nCh*icago Tribune*\n\n\n22 Aug 1996, \"GI Hacker Is Charged with Spying.\"\nRaleigh News & Observer\n9 Dec 1996, \"Court-martial to Begin in Computer Spying Case\"\nJONES, GENEVA, a secretary with a Top-Secret clearance in the State Department's Bureau of Politico-\nMilitary Affairs, was arrested 3 August 1993 and indicted 31August for theft of government property and transmission of defense information to unauthorized persons. FBI agents say she smuggled classified documents for two years to her friend, West African journalist **DOMINIC NTUBE**, indicted at the same time. Jones was carrying classified government documents with her at the time of arrest. Agents who searched Ntube's Washington, DC, apartment after his arrest on 4 August found thousands of classified cables and 39 CIA documents marked Secret, including documents relating to US military operations in Somalia and Iraq. Some of the material apparently made its way to West African magazines, which had been publishing classified State Department cables for several months. Agents indicated they wire-tapped Jones' phone after several classified US documents were found 10 months earlier in the West African command post of Charles Taylor, leader of a violent movement to overthrow the Liberian government. Ntube reportedly faxed 14 documents he received from Jones to the Liberian rebels. The former State Department employee told the FBI she had been giving Ntube classified cables for about 18 months. In a preliminary hearing, the FBI testified that agents watched her on 16 occasions take documents from the department and hide them in newspapers or a grocery bag. During the month she was under surveillance, she allegedly took more than 130 classified documents from her office. On 31 August, Ntube was indicted with Jones for receiving stolen property and for transmitting national defense information to unauthorized persons. In June 1994, Jones pleaded guilty to 21 counts of theft and two counts relating to the unlawful communication of national defense information. In delivering a sentence of 37 months in prison (longer than what the prosecution had asked), US District Judge Harold H. Greene stated, \"Somebody would have to be a complete moron not to know that when you work for the State Department you can't take documents out and give them to anybody.\"\nWashington Post\n\n5 Aug 1993, \"FBI Arrests Two in Theft of State Dept. Documents\"\nWashington Post\n\n31 Aug 1993, \"Two Indicted in Theft of State Department Documents\"\nKADISH, BEN-AMI, 84, was arrested 22 April 2008 on four counts. Three were subsequently dropped, and in December 2008 he pleaded guilty to the one: conspiracy to act as an unregistered agent of the government of Israel. Kadish, a mechanical engineer, worked for the US Army's Armament Research, Development, and Engineering Center at the Picatinny Arsenal in Dover, New Jersey, from 1963 until 1990. On numerous occasions from 1980 to 1985, Kadish provided classified documents related to the US\nmilitary, including some relating to US missile defense systems, to an agent of Israel, Yossi Yagur.\n\nYagur, an Israeli citizen, was consul for science affairs at the Israeli Consulate General in Manhattan between 1980 and 1985. He was also Jonathan Pollard's handler. (Pollard is currently serving a life sentence for espionage on behalf of Israel.) Yagur would provide Kadish with shopping lists of classified documents for Kadish to obtain from the US Army library at Picatinny. The documentssome 50 to 100concerned nuclear weapons, the F-15 jet program and the Patriot missile system. Kadish stopped passing information to Yagur in 1985 but kept in contact with him over the years via telephone and email and visited him in Israel in 2004. There is no evidence in open sources that Kadish was acting for financial gain; rather, he acted out of a desire to help Israel. Kadish was born in Connecticut and is a US citizen. He grew up in Palestine and served in both the British and American military during World War II. At the time of his arrest he was living with his wife in a retirement community in New Jersey. The FBI\narrived on Kadish's doorstep in March 2008 to interview him. The following day, Kadish called Yagur, now also retired and living in Israel, and was instructed by Yagur to deny any involvement. (It is not clear from open sources what prompted the FBI visit to Kadish in 2008, 25 years after his activities for Israel, although it is speculated that there may be a connection between Kadish and the Pollard case and that there may have been a larger Israeli spy ring in the US in the mid-1980s than originally thought.) On 29 May 2009, he eventually was fined $50,000, but not given prison time. cicentre.com\n\nn.d., \"Counterintelligence - Espionage - Spy Case - Kadish, Ben-Ami\"\nWashington Post\n\n23 Apr 2008, \"Ex-Prosecutor: New Arrest Shows Reach of 1980s Spy Ring\"\nUS Attorney, Southern District  30 Dec 2008, \"Former U.S. Army Arsenal Employee Pleads Guilty to of New York, Press Release Conspiracy to Act as Unregistered Agent of Israel\"\nWashington Post\n\n31 Dec 2008, \"Retiree Pleads Guilty to Giving U.S. Secrets to Israel in the 1980s\"\nKAMPILES, WILLIAM, served as a watch officer at the CIA Operations Center from March to November 1977. He was arrested in August 1978 on charges he stole a Top Secret technical manual on the KH-11 (\"Big Bird\") reconnaissance satellite and later sold it for $3,000 to a Soviet agent in Athens, Greece. According to press reports, the satellite was used to monitor troop movements and missile installations in the Soviet Union. Kampiles had resigned from the CIA in November 1977, disappointed at having been told that he was not qualified for work as a field agent (he fervently wished to join the covert part of CIA operations). Before leaving the agency, he smuggled out of the building a copy of the KH-11\nmanual. He proceeded to Greece in February 1978 where he contacted a Soviet military attache. Kampiles was the son of Greek immigrants and had family connections in that country. He claimed to have conned the Russians out of a $3,000 advance for the promise of classified information and on his return to the US\nbragged to friends about his exploits. About this time the CIA was investigating possible leaks concerning the KH-11, since the Soviets were beginning to take countermeasures against the collection platform.\n\nKampiles' identification as a suspect in part followed receipt of a letter to a CIA employee from Kampiles in which he mentioned frequent meetings with a Soviet official in Athens. He hoped to be rehired by the CIA and admitted during a job interview that he had met with Soviet agents in Athens in what he intended as a disinformation exercise to prove his abilities as a first-rate agent. CIA counterintelligence was concerned by these reports and contacted the FBI, who questioned Kampiles until he confessed the theft of the manual and its sale to the Soviets. The former CIA employee maintained that his objective had been to become a double agent. He was sentenced on 22 December to 40 years in prison.\n\nWashington Post\n\n23 Aug 1978, \"CIA 'Big Bird' Satellite Manual Allegedly Sold to Soviets\"\nNew York Times\n\n12 Nov 1978 \"Spy Trial Focusing on Security in C.I.A.\"\nNew York Times\n\n\n23 Dec 1978, \"Ex-Clerk of C.I.A. Gets 40 Years in Sale of Space Secrets to Soviets\"\nWashington Post Magazine\n 4 Dec 1983, \"Spy Rings of One\"\n Minnick, W.L., *Spies and Provocateurs,* 1992\n\n\nKAO, YEN MEN, a Chinese national, residing in Charlotte, North Carolina, was arrested on 3 December\n1993, after a six-year investigation into a spy ring that sought secrets on advanced naval weapons and technology. According to an official statement, Kao \"and several other Chinese nationals\" conspired to illegally procure and export classified and embargoed high-technology military items. Kao was also charged with violating US immigration laws. Targeted for illegal export were the Navy's MK 48\nAdvanced Capability (ADCAP) Torpedo, two F 404-400 General Electric jet engines used to power the Navy's F/A-18 Hornet fighter, and fire-control radar for the F-16 Falcon jet. Although these systems were not delivered to China, Kao was able to transfer embargoed oscillators used in satellites for which Kao paid an FBI informant $24,000 as part of a sting operation. On 22 December, an immigration judge ordered Yen Men Kao's deportation to Hong Kong for overstaying his visa and for \"committing acts of espionage against the United States.\" A decision was made not to prosecute to avoid offending the Chinese government and to protect counterintelligence sources and methods that might have been disclosed in court. Kao, who reportedly owned two Chinese restaurants in Charlotte, had been under FBI\nsurveillance for several years. During this time he met and received instructions from Chinese intelligence agents who offered him $2 million to obtain US weapons technology. According to one Federal official, Kao had a gambling problem and lost money supplied by his Chinese handlers. Fearing reprisal from the Chinese as well as the US, he requested deportation to Hong Kong rather than mainland China. Kao left behind his wife, a naturalized US citizen, and two children.\n\nLos Angeles Times\n\n5 Dec 1993, \"FBI Arrests Chinese National in Spy Ring Investigation\"\nWashington Times\n\n22 Dec 1993, \"Spy Sting Gets Chinese Man Deported\"\n\n\nKEARN, BRUCE LELAND, a Navy operations specialist assigned as command secret control officer on board the USS *Tuscaloosa*, was arrested in March 1984 and convicted at a general court-martial for dereliction of duty, and willfully delivering, transmitting or communicating classified documents to unauthorized persons. No nation was named as having received any of the classified materials. While absent without leave, Kearn left behind a briefcase which was found to contain 147 classified microfiche (copies of nearly 15,000 pages of Secret documents), seven Confidential crypto publications, and child pornographic photographs and literature. He was sentenced to 18 months based on a plea bargain.\n\n\nProceedings, *Naval Review*, 1986, p. 14.\n\n\nKEYSER, DONALD WILLIS, who submitted his resignation from the State Department in July 2004, was arrested 15 September of the same year, charged with trying to conceal a 2003 trip to Taiwan where he met with two Taiwanese intelligence agents. Fluent in Mandarin, Keyser was an expert on China and had worked in the US Foreign Service since 1972. He had had postings in China and Japan and at the time of his resignation was Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State. In that position, he was involved in policy debates that were of concern to Taiwan. Because the US does not have formal relations with Taiwan, American diplomats are not allowed to travel to Taiwan on official business. Yet in August 2003, Keyser traveled to China on business and a few days later flew to Tokyo. From there he flew to Taiwan where he spent three days meeting with a young Taiwanese woman, Isabelle Cheng, at Taiwan's National Security Bureau. To conceal his Taiwan trip, Keyser claimed three days of leave for time purportedly spent in Tokyo. He was arrested on 15 September 2004. It was reported that Keyser had been removing classified documents from the State Department since 1992, and had 3,600 documents in his home, some of which were highly classified. After the arrest, Cheng agreed to cooperate with the FBI and handed over copies of Keyser's emails to her that showed he had shared sensitive information with her, Chang, and that indicated he was having an affair with her. In a 13 December 2005 plea-bargain, Keyser pleaded guilty to keeping numerous classified documents in his home and to concealing his relationship with the Taiwanese intelligence agent. He was scheduled to be sentenced 24 February 2006 but sentencing was repeatedly delayed. Finally, on 22 January 2007, Keyser, by then 63, was sentenced to one year in prison, payment of a $25,000 fine, and three years of supervised release for the unlawful removal of classified material from the State Department and for making false statements to the government. Washington Post\n\n\n13 Dec 2005, \"Guilty Plea in Classified-Document Case\"\nNew York Sun\n\n\n14 Jul 2006, \"A Novel-Like Tale of Cloak, Dagger Unfolds in Court\"\nWashington Post\n\n\n6 Aug 2006, \"UPDATE: Alleging Lack of Cooperation, Prosecutors Seek to Voice Plea in Classified-Document Case\"\nU.S. Department of State\n22 Jan 2007, \"Ex-Department of State Official Donald Keyser Sentenced in\n(www.state.com)\n\n     Classified Info Case\"\nKIM, ROBERT CHAEGUN, a Navy civilian computer specialist, working at the Office of Naval Intelligence in Suitland, Maryland, was charged on 25 September 1996 with passing classified information to a foreign country. He was arrested outside a diplomatic reception at Ft. Myer, Virginia, on\n24 September as he stood beside Capt. Baek Dong-Il, a Korean Embassy naval attache and the alleged recipient of the classified materials. Kim, a native of Korea, became a US citizen in 1974 and had lived in the United States for 30 years. He had access to classified information since 1979. According to investigators, over a five-month period, he passed dozens of classified documents (including some that were Top Secret) out of loyalty to his country of birth. An FBI affidavit states that Kim searched naval computer systems, made copies of sensitive classified intelligence reports, removed classified markings, printed them off, and mailed or passed them in manila envelopes to Baek. The documents included military assessments about North Korea and China and US intelligence assessments of South Korean government officials. In his official capacity, Kim operated a computer program that tracked global shipping movements. However, he had access to highly classified documents from other intelligence agencies. Kim came under surveillance by the Naval Investigative Service when it learned of his contact with Baek. A court-approved search of Kim's office produced a list of classified documents he had illegally passed to the naval attache. More than 40 documents sent to Baek were intercepted in the mail.\n\nCapt. Baek Dong-Il, who enjoyed diplomatic immunity, was subsequently recalled by his government.\n\nWhile there is no evidence that Kim received any payment for his illegal activities, according to one news source, he had requested assistance from the South Koreans in his efforts to find employment with a South Korean intelligence or customs agency after his retirement from his US Navy job. It is also reported that Kim had accumulated a credit card debt of approximately $100,000. On 7 May 1997, Kim pleaded guilty to one count of conspiracy to commit espionage.  On 11 July he was sentenced to nine years in prison.\n\nWashington Post\n\n26 Sep 1996, \"Navy Worker Is Accused Of Passing Secret; Papers\n\n\nAllegedly Went To S. Korean Officer\"\nWashington Post\n\n2 Oct 1996, \"Kim Allegedly Sought Job With S. Korea\"\nLos Angeles Times\n\n8 May 1997, \"Ex-Analyst Admits Spying For S. Korea In Plea Bargain\"\n\n\nKING, DONALD WAYNE, Navy Airman and **RONALD DEAN GRAF**, Navy Airman Apprentice, both assigned to the Naval Air Station in Belle Chasse, Louisiana, pleaded guilty to conspiracy to commit espionage and larceny of government property following their apprehension by special agents of the Naval Investigative Service. The pair were apprehended by the NIS at a motel in New Orleans after they delivered $150,000 worth of sensitive and classified aircraft parts and technical manuals to an undercover NIS agent they believed was a foreign government representative. The stolen government property and manuals (about 30 items in total) dealt with technology pertaining to the Navy's P-3 anti-submarine aircraft. The investigation was initiated in January 1989, after an informant notified the New Orleans NIS office that King and Graf were trying to sell aircraft parts they had stolen from the Naval Station at Belle Chasse. The airmen were also charged with the sale of cocaine. King was sentenced to 10 years, reduction in rank to E-1, forfeiture of all pay and a dishonorable discharge. Graft was sentenced to five years, reduction in rank to E-1, forfeiture of all pay and a dishonorable discharge. Their motivation for espionage is not known; however, Graf is quoted as claiming that he did it to pay off debts amounting to $1,000.\n\n\nNew Orleans Times-\n\n5 Mar 1989, \"2 Navy Clerks Accused of Spying\"\n   Picayune\n\nNew Orleans Times-\n\n7 Jul 1989, \"Jail Terms Given in Spy Case\"\n   Picayune\n\nCase summary provided by Albert E. DiFerderico, US Naval Criminal Investigative Service\n\n\nKOECHER, KARL FRANTISEK, a former CIA employee, and his wife, were arrested 27 November\n1984 as they were preparing to fly to Switzerland. At the time, he was believed to be the first foreign agent to have penetrated the CIA, having operated successfully as an \"illegal\" for Czech intelligence for\n19 years. In 1962 Koecher was trained as a foreign agent by Czech intelligence. He and his wife staged a phony defection to the US in 1965 and soon became known as an outspoken anti-Communist member of the academic community in New York City. Both became naturalized citizens in 1971 and Koecher obtained a translator job with the CIA two years later where he translated Top Secret materials until 1975. Koecher, who claimed that he was a double agent, was arrested after being observed making frequent contact with KGB operatives. According to Federal prosecutors, Mrs. Koecher operated as a paid courier for Czech intelligence until 1983. An FBI agent testified that from February 1973 to August 1983, Karl Koecher passed on to Czech agents highly classified materials including names of CIA personnel. However, the case never came to trial. On 11 February 1985, Koecher was exchanged in Berlin for Soviet dissident Anatoly Shcharansky. The Koechers' motivation was primarily loyalty to their country, but also included the prospect of money and perhaps even the thrill of being double agents.\n\n\nNew York Times\n\n28 Nov 1984, \"Man Charged with Passing State Secrets\"\nNew York Times\n\n5 Dec 1984, \"Wife is Held in Contempt of Court for Refusing to Testify \"\nNew York Times\n\n13 Jan 1985, \"Intrigue and Countercharges Mark Case of Purported Spies\"\nWashington Post\n\n17 Apr 1988, \"Moscow Mole in the CIA\"\nKOSTADINOV, PENYU B., a commercial counselor at the Bulgarian Commercial Office in New York, was arrested in December 1983 at a New York restaurant as he exchanged a sum of money for classified material. Kostadinov had attempted to recruit a graduate student who had access to documents related to nuclear energy. The unnamed American agreed to work under FBI control to apprehend the agent. One of Kostadinov's official functions was to arrange for exchange students between Bulgaria and the US. Although Kostadinov claimed diplomatic immunity at the time of his arrest, this was later denied by a Federal court. In June 1985, Kostadinov was swapped along with three other Soviet Bloc agents for 25 persons who had \"been helpful\" to the US.\n\nNew York Times\n\n24 Sep 1983, \"Bulgarian Charged as Spy\"\nWashington Post\n\n25 Sep 1983, \"Bulgarian Man Arraigned\"\nKOTA, SUBRAHMANYAM, and **ALURU J. PRASAD**. On 8 October 1995, Indian businessman, Aluru J. Prasad, and 10 days later, software engineer Subrahmanyan Kota, were arrested and detained for their involvement in a spy ring that sold highly sensitive defense technology to the KGB between 1985\nand 1990. Prasad, a wealthy Indian national who frequently visited the US, was alleged to have been an agent of the KGB. Kota, a naturalized US citizen, was president of the Boston Group computer consulting firm. According to an FBI affidavit, the pair met Russian agents in Bermuda, Portugal, Switzerland, and other foreign locations and at these meetings passed classified defense information. At the time of their indictment, it was revealed that Kota and another conspirator, Vemuri Reddy, had been arrested the previous December by FBI agents who were posing as Russian intelligence agents, to whom they had attempted to sell (for $300,000) micro-organisms used in the production of a high-tech drug. Beginning in 1989, Prasad plotted with Kota of Northborough, Massachusetts, and other unnamed persons to obtain classified technology from a network defense contractor employee. Prasad and Kota specifically sought information about mercury cadmium telluride missile detectors, radar-absorbing coating used on stealth fighters and bombers, and semiconductor components used in infrared missile-tracking systems.\n\nAccording to their indictment, the two received $100,000 for information about each project. On 29 October 1996, former KGB intelligence officer Vladimir Galkin was arrested as he attempted to enter the US at Kennedy Airport in New York. Galkin was alleged to have been Kota and Prasad's contact with the KGB and met with Kota in Cyprus beginning in late 1990. Although Galkin had not committed espionage on American soil, he was charged for his involvement in the conspiracy. In June 1996, under a plea agreement, Kota pleaded guilty to selling stolen biotech material and evasion of income taxes and agreed to testify against Prasad. He admitted that he was paid a total of $95,000 by Prasad and his alleged KGB\ncolleagues. Prasad's first trial ended in a mistrial; however, in a second trial in December 1996 he was convicted of espionage charges. Under a plea agreement Prasad was sentenced to the 15 months he had served awaiting his trial and agreed to return to India. On 13 November, accused KGB intelligence agent Vladimir Galkin was released.\n\nBoston Globe\n\n19 Oct 1995, \"Northborough Man Charged With Espionage\"\nBoston Globe\n\n12 Jun 1996, \"A Post-Cold War Spy Story Comes to Life\"\nWashington Times\n\n5 Nov 1996, Computer Check of Visa at Airport IDs Spy Suspect\"\n\n\nKUNKLE, CRAIG DEE, former Chief Petty Officer who specialized in antisubmarine warfare, was arrested on 10 January 1989 as he attempted to sell classified information for $5,000 to FBI agents posing as Soviet diplomats. The arrest took place at a Williamsburg, Virginia, motel. On 9 December Kunkle mailed a packet of diagrams, photographs and information related to antisubmarine warfare tactics to an Alexandria, Virginia, post office box he believed to be a Soviet drop point. The material was collected by Federal agents who had been in communication with Kunkle on six previous occasions. An investigation by the Naval Investigative Service and FBI began in early December 1988 when Kunkle's attempt to contact the Soviet Embassy in Washington was intercepted. Kunkle had served for 12 years in the Navy in antisubmarine squadrons in the Atlantic and Pacific fleets and was discharged in 1985 under less than honorable conditions, reportedly for multiple incidents including indecent exposure. Kunkle also had a history of alcohol and drug abuse in addition to marital and financial problems. During his period of active duty, he held a Secret clearance. The former Chief Petty Officer had since been employed as a security guard at a local hospital. At the time of arrest Kunkle stated that he offered to sell classified information because he was short of cash and angry with the Navy. Kunkle was indicted on one count of attempted espionage and ordered held without bond. He pleaded not guilty to the charge. On 4 May 1989 Kunkle changed his plea to guilty because, he said, he did not want to subject his family to a trial. He had faced a maximum sentence of life in prison and a $250,000 fine. The judge imposed a 12-year sentence (agreed upon by prosecutors and Kunkle's attorneys) and, noting Kunkle's money problems, fined him\n$550. He was not eligible for parole and was placed on three years' probation in addition to the sentence.\n\n\nNew York Times\n\n11 Jan 1989, \"Former Navy Man Is Charged As a Spy\"\nNew York Times\n\n19 Jan 1989, \"Ex-Navyman Denies Trying to Sell Secrets\"\nKUO, TAI SHEN, 58, a naturalized US citizen born in Taiwan, imported furniture from China and had a store in New Orleans at the time of his arrest on 11 February 2008 for spying for the People's Republic of China (PRC). A member of a prominent Taiwanese family, Kuo had immigrated to the US in 1972, attending college in Louisiana before building his own business in New Orleans, primarily involving furniture. He maintained an office in Beijing and took steps towards establishing two companies in the US to pursue contracts related to the US sale of defense technology to Taiwan. Masquerading as a Taiwanese agent when in fact he was working for the Beijing government, Kuo cultivated a relationship with **GREGG WILLIAM BERGERSEN**, a 51-year-old Pentagon weapons systems policy analyst in the Defense Security Cooperation Agency, the agency that implements DoD's foreign military sales program.\n\nFrom Bergersen Kuo obtained sensitive and classified national defense information regarding US military sales to Taiwan. The period of espionage was March 2007 until February 2008. An unidentified Chinese agent (referred to in the government's affidavit as \"PRC Official A\") gave Kuo instructions on what information and documents to collect. Kuo is believed to have received $50,000 from PRC Official A, who had lured Kuo into espionage with promises of helping him secure business deals in China. In turn, Kuo gave thousands of dollars in gambling money and trips to Las Vegas to Bergersen, who provided Kuo with the requested information. Bergersen passed classified documents to Kuo, believing that the information was to be given to Taiwan, an American ally, and also that Kuo would eventually give him a post-retirement job in Kuo's future defense consulting firm. A third person in the ring was YU XIN KANG, 33, a Chinese national resident alien who had met Kuo in Beijing years earlier and by 2007 was an employee in Kuo's New Orleans furniture company. Kang periodically acted as a go-between for Kuo and PRC Official A, carrying documents to Beijing where she had an apartment. Kuo was sentenced on 8 August 2008 to nearly 16 years in prison for being an unregistered agent of the PRC. Bergersen pleaded guilty in April 2008 and agreed to help federal authorities build their case against his co-conspirators; on\n11 July 2008 he was given a 57-month sentence, plus three years' supervised release. Kang was sentenced on 1 August 2008 to 18 months and three years of supervised release for aiding and abetting an unregistered agent of the PRC. In May 2009 another individual, a former Air Force Lieutenant Colonel, was charged with giving classified data to China via Kuo; he has pleaded not guilty. Times-Picayune\n\n\n1 Apr 2008, \"Arms Analyst Admits Role in Spy Ring\"\nNew York Times\n\n\n10 Jul 2008, \"Spy Cases Raise Concern on China's Intentions\"\nDepartment of Justice,\n\n1 Aug 2008, \"New Orleans Woman Sentenced to Prison for\n      Press Release\n\n\nAiding and Abetting Unregistered Agent of China\"\nNew York Times\n\n\n8 Aug 2008, \"US Man Who Spied for China Gets Nearly 16 Years\"\nLALAS, STEVEN JOHN, a former State Department communications officer stationed with the embassy in Athens, was arrested in Northern Virginia on 3 May 1993 and charged with passing sensitive military information to Greek officials. Although Lalas originally claimed that he had been recruited by a Greek military official in 1991 and feared for the welfare of relatives living in Greece were he not to cooperate, authorities later stated that he began spying for the Greek government in 1977 when he was with the US Army. It is estimated that he passed 700 highly classified documents, including papers dealing with plans and readiness for US military strategy in the Balkans and a US assessment of Greece's intentions toward the former Yugoslavia. Athens was Lalas' fourth communications posting with the State Department. He had previously served in Belgrade, Istanbul, and in Taiwan. During his espionage career he earned a steady income stealing, then selling, DIA reports about troop strength, political analyses and military discussions contained in cables between the US Embassy in Athens and the White House, FBI communications about counterterrorism efforts, and the names and job descriptions of CIA agents stationed overseas. Greek handlers allegedly paid him $20,000 to provide about 240 documents from 1991 to 1993. The government first learned of the espionage activities in February 1993, when an official of the Greek Embassy in Washington made a statement to a State Department officer indicating that he knew the contents of a Secret communication from the US Embassy in Athens to the State Department. Lalas was later identified (through a video monitoring system) stealing documents intended for destruction. In June 1993 Lalas pleaded guilty to one count of conspiracy to commit espionage and on 16 September was sentenced to 14 years in Federal prison without possibility of parole. Prosecutors had recommended the 14-year sentence in return for Lalas' promise to reveal what documents he turned over and to whom. The full extent of his espionage activity was revealed prior to sentencing only after he failed two FBI polygraph examinations. Lalas is of Greek descent, but was born in the US.\n\nWashington Post\n\n4 May 1993, \"Va. Arrest Made in a Spy Case From Greece\"\nNew York Times\n\n4 May 1993, \"Am. Employee at Embassy in Athens Arrested as Possible Spy\"\nNew York Times\n\n6 May 1993, \"US Embassy Employee Sold Secrets to Greeks, F.B.I. Says\"\nWashington Post\n\n16 Sep 1993, \"A 14-Year Sentence for Selling Secrets\"\nLEE, PETER H., a nuclear physicist who worked at key research facilities for more than 30 years, turned himself in to authorities and pleaded guilty on 8 December 1997 to two felony counts, one for passing national defense information and the other for providing false statements to the government. Dr.\n\nLee admitted that in 1985, while working as a research physicist at Los Alamos National Laboratory, he traveled to the People's Republic of China. During this visit Lee discussed with a group of approximately 30 Chinese scientists the construction of hohlraums, diagnostic devices used in conjunction with lasers to create microscopic nuclear detonations. Prosecutors stated Lee acknowledged that he knew the information was classified. The second charge against Lee concerned disclosures he failed to make in 1997 while he was working on classified research projects for TRW. Before he traveled to China on vacation, Lee was required to fill out a security form in which he stated he would not be giving lectures on his work. Upon his return, he had to fill out a second form in which he confirmed that he did not give any lectures of a technical nature. However, as Lee later confessed to the FBI, he lied on both forms because he intended to and did, in fact, deliver lectures to Chinese scientists that discussed his work on microwave backscattering from the sea surface. Dr. Lee told the FBI that he disclosed the information because he wanted to help his Chinese counterparts and he wanted to enhance his reputation in China.\nAccording to US government sources, Lee did receive compensation for the information he provided to the Chinese in the form of travel and hotel accommodations. The case resulted from an investigation by agents from the FBI's Foreign Counterintelligence Squad. On 26 March 1998, Dr. Lee was sentenced to one year in a community corrections facility, three years' probation, and ordered to perform 3,000 hours of community service and pay $20,000 in fines.\n\n\nLos Angeles Times\n\n9 Dec 1997, \"Physicist Admits Passing Laser Secrets to Chinese Scientists\"\nWashington Post\n\n\n12 Dec 1997, \"Taiwan Born Scientist Passes Defense Information\"\nCounterintelligence\n\nMar 1998, \"US Physicist Pleads Guilty\"\n   News Digest LEONOV, YURIY P., a lieutenant colonel in Soviet military intelligence (GRU), fronting as a Soviet air force attache, was apprehended on 18 August 1983 after receiving 60 pounds of government documents from an editor working under FBI control. The following day Leonov, who had diplomatic immunity, was declared *persona non grata* and expelled from the country. This ended a two-year recruitment attempt by Leonov against Armand B. Weiss, an editor of technical publications and former government consultant. Weiss had previously held a Top Secret clearance. In all, Leonov paid Weiss $1,800 for sensitive but unclassified publications on weapon systems. Ultimately, Leonov demanded a classified document. Under FBI direction, Weiss provided the item with a large number of highly technical publications for $500 cash. Leonov was arrested by agents waiting outside the office.\n\nWashington Post\n\n16 Sep 1983, \"Soviet Military Spy Caught in FBI Trap\"\nLESSENTHIEN, KURT G., a Navy petty officer, arrested in Orlando, Florida, on 3 April 1996, was charged with attempted espionage after offering information about nuclear submarine technology to a Russian government representative. Lessenthien was subsequently contacted by undercover agents of the FBI and Naval Criminal Investigative Service posing as Russian agents. At the time Lessenthien was an instructor at the Navy Nuclear Power School in Orlando and was very knowledgeable about the design and operation of submarine motors. It was reported that the petty officer, in a phone call to the Russian Embassy, offered Top Secret information about the movement of US submarines in exchange for thousands of dollars. According to one media source, Lessenthien accumulated nearly $25,000 in credit card debt on a \"relentless pursuit of women\" that he intended to marry. A Navy psychiatrist testified that he suffered personality flaws that drove him to ruin an excellent military record. However, a Navy prosecutor stated that Lessenthien decided to become a spy for money and excitement, not love, and that the petty officer had been storing classified materials since 1991. On 28 October, Lessenthien was sentenced by a military court to life imprisonment, but will serve 27 years under a plea agreement. He was also given a dishonorable discharge and ordered to forfeit all pay and benefits.\n\n\nWashington Post\n\n4 Apr 1996, \"Petty Officer Arrested on Spy Charges\"\nOrlando Sentinel\n\n24 Apr 1996, \"Orlando Sailor in Spy Arrest.\"\nVirginian-Pilot\n\n29 Oct 1996, \"Lessenthien Gets 27 Years in Espionage Case\"\n   (Norfolk)\n\nLIPKA, ROBERT STEPHAN, former National Security Agency staff member, was taken into custody on 23 February 1996 at his home in Millersville, Pennsylvania, and charged with committing espionage while working as a communications clerk from 1964 to 1967. An Army enlisted man between the age of 19 and 22, Lipka worked in the NSA central communications room and reportedly provided the KGB\nwith a constant stream of highly classified reports. He is believed to have caused extensive damage to US\nintelligence collection activities. According to James Bamford, writing in the *Los Angeles Times*, since Lipka provided Top Secret information to the KGB during the war in Vietnam, he may have been responsible for the loss of American lives. He is said to have used dead drops along the C&O Canal near the Potomac River in Washington and was paid between $500 and $1000 per delivery. Lipka left NSA in\n1967 and stopped meeting with his KGB handlers in 1974. He became a suspect in 1993 as a result of information believed to have been provided to the FBI by his ex-wife. His role in espionage was confirmed by FBI agents posing as Russian contacts. According to an FBI spokesman, while the government was aware of a major security breach in the 1960s, it had not been able to identify Lipka as a suspect until it had received the additional information. It is believed that Lipka is the young soldier described in the autobiography of former KGB major general Kalugin who tells of a walk-in in the mid-\n1960s who was interested in money. According to Kalugin, the documents that the soldier passed included Top Secret NSA reports to the White House and copies of communications on US troop movements around the world. The price reportedly paid by the Soviets during the period of his betrayal was $27,000. On 23 May 1997, Lipka pleaded guilty to one count of espionage in exchange for a jail term of no more than 18 years.  On 24 September, he was sentenced to serve a term of 18 years in Federal prison.\n\nWashington Post\n\n\n24 Feb 1996, \"FBI Arrests Ex-Soldier as Mysterious KGB Spy in Supersecret NSA\"\nLos Angeles Times\n\n3 Mar 1996, \"Has a 30-year Mystery Unraveled?\"\nWall Street Journal\n\n21 Nov 1996, \"How the FBI Broke Spy Case That Baffled Agency for 30 Years\"\nBaltimore Sun\n\n\n24 May 1997, \"Ex-clerk at NSA Is Guilty of Spying; Former Soldier Sold Secret Documents to Soviets in Mid-1960s\"\n\nLONETREE, CLAYTON JOHN, Marine Corps security guard at the US Embassy in Moscow from September 1984 to March 1986, and later in Vienna, was placed under detention on 31 December 1986 after he acknowledged his involvement with a female KGB officer, Violette Seina, who had previously been a telephone operator and translator at the US Embassy in Moscow. Soon after their relationship began, Seina introduced Lonetree to her \"Uncle Sasha\" who was later identified by US intelligence as being a KGB agent. It was alleged at the time that Sgt. Lonetree had a sexual liaison with Seina, and had in fact allowed Soviet agents after-hours access to the US Embassy. In December 1986, Lonetree turned himself in to authorities at the US Embassy in Vienna, Austria, where he was stationed. Also arrested and charged with collaboration with Lonetree was Corporal Arnold Bracy who was also alleged to have been romantically involved with Soviet women. As the investigation proceeded, five other Marine guards were detained on suspicion of espionage, lying to investigators, or for improper fraternization with foreign nationals. Lonetree was tried on 13 counts including espionage. Among these counts were charges that he conspired with Soviet agents to gather names and photographs of American intelligence agents, to provide personality data on American intelligence agents, and to provide information concerning the floor plans of the US Embassies in Moscow and Vienna. On 21 August 1987 Lonetree was convicted of espionage and 12 related counts by a military court. Three days later he was sentenced to 30 years'\nimprisonment, fined $5,000, loss of all pay and allowances, reduced to the rank of private, and given a dishonorable discharge. Espionage charges against Bracy and all of the other Marines have since been dropped. According to reports in late 1987, intensive investigations have led to the conclusion that the former guards did not, as earlier believed, allow Soviet agents to penetrate the US Embassy in Moscow. In May, 1988, Lonetree's sentence was reduced to 25 years, in 1992 to 20 years, and later to 15 years. In February 1996 he was released.\n\nWashington Post\n\n10 Feb 1987, \"'Success Story' Marine May Face Trial for His Life\"\nWashington Post\n\n30 Jul 1987, \"Envoy Blamed for Lax Security\"\nWashington Post\n\n17 Jan 1988, \"Spy Scandal Snowballed, Melted Away\"\nRichmond Times-\n\n25 Feb 1996, \"Lonetree May Find Stigma Lives On\"\n   Dispatch Naval Investigative Service Command*, Espionage*, 1989\nMADSEN, LEE EUGENE, a Navy Yeoman assigned to the Strategic Warning Staff at the Pentagon, was arrested 14 August 1979 for selling classified material to an FBI undercover agent for $700. None of\n22 highly classified documents taken by Madsen is known to have fallen into the hands of foreign agents; however, it is believed that he had intended to sell them to organized crime figures dealing in narcotics. Madsen, a homosexual, is quoted as saying that he stole Top Secret documents \"to prove...I could be a man and still be gay.\" On 26 October 1979 he was sentenced to eight years in prison.\n\nWashington Post\n\n27 Oct 1979, \"Sailor Receives 8 Years in Jail\"\nMAK, CHI, 68 at the time of sentencing and a former employee of Anaheim-based Power Paragon, Inc., was arrested on 28 October 2005. Mak, along with his wife (Rebecca Chiu), brother (Tai Mak), sister-inlaw (Fuk Li) and nephew (Billy), was charged with conspiring to steal sensitive military information as well as failing to register as an agent of a foreign government. As a lead project engineer at Power Paragon, a defense contractor, Mak aided the US Navy with its research project on a Quiet Electric Drive (QED) propulsion system that would reduce a vessel's sound signature. Mak was born in China in 1940 and moved to the US in 1978. He and his wife became citizens in 1985 and lived in a Los Angeles suburb. Mak held a steady job where he was regularly promoted and rewarded. His job gave him access to sensitive plans for Navy ships, submarines, and weapons, including details of the electrical power system in Virginia-class submarines that, if provided to the Chinese, would allow them to track the submarines. The five defendants were accused specifically of transferring data onto three encrypted disks that Tai Mak and Fuk Li attempted to transport to China in October 2005. One piece of evidence against the group was a to-do list of intelligence targets, written in Chinese and said to be instructions from Beijing on the kinds of technology Mak should try to acquire. While not all the materials sent to China over time may have been formally classified, Mak's conspiracy to pass them constituted a violation of US export control laws. Mak was arrested in Los Angeles after FBI agents stopped his brother and sister-in-law as they boarded a flight to China. The disks they carried contained information on a submarine propulsion system, a solidstate power switch for ships, and a PowerPoint presentation on the future of power electronics. Mak was convicted on 11 May 2007 of conspiracy to violate export control laws and failing to register as a foreign agent. He was sentenced on 25 March 2008 to 2412 years in prison and fined $50,000. His wife was sentenced to three years (plus an agreement to renounce her US citizenship and return to China on her release); Mak's brother Tai Mak received a 10-year sentence, Tai's wife three years' probation, and son Billy, 11 months (time already served in custody). Tai Mak and his family are not American citizens and will be deported after completing their sentences.\n\n\nWashington Post\n\n\n6 Jun 2007, \"Plea Deal Ends China Tech Export Case\"\nLos Angeles Times\n\n\n7 June 2007, \"5th Defendant in Spy Case Pleads Guilty\"\nWashington Times\n\n\n25 Mar 2008, \"Spy for China Gets 24 Years\"\nLos Angeles Times\n\n\n22 Apr 2008, \"Man Gets 10 Years in China Spy Case\"\nLos Angeles Times\n\n\n3 Oct 2008, \"3-Year Sentence in China Spy Case\"\nMAYNARD, JOHN RAYMOND, Navy Seaman, while on unauthorized absence, was found to have 51\nTop Secret documents in his personal locker. Until the time of his arrest in August 1983, Maynard was assigned to the staff of the Commander in Chief Pacific Fleet in Hawaii as an intelligence specialist. He was convicted at a general court-martial for wrongfully removing classified material and was sentenced to\n10 years' confinement.  Maynard's sentence was later reduced to three years.\n\nMAZIARZ, GARY, 37, a reserve gunnery sergeant in the Marine Corps, was arrested October 2006, accused of being part of a theft ring at Camp Pendleton, California. Documents stolen included classified computer files on potential terrorists that Mariarz shared with military reserve officers who worked with anti-terrorism units of police departments in Los Angeles County. One of the officers was a Marine reserve colonel and detective with the Los Angeles sheriff's department, a counterterrorism specialist and allegedly the instigator of the enterprise; he was also the founder of the Los Angeles Terrorism Early Warning Group, a task force of law enforcement agencies. Maziarz pleaded guilty in July 2007 to mishandling more than 100 classified documents. He also named three senior reserve officers at Camp Pendleton, along with two sergeants who were charged in June 2008. The officers are still under investigation. There was no indication that any information had been passed to foreign agents. Mariarz claimed at his court-martial he knew his group was violating security regulations. But he said that he had acted out of patriotism in attempting to break down the bureaucratic walls between military and civilian agencies that he felt were hampering intelligence sharing and coordination and thus making the nation more vulnerable to terrorists. Indeed, transferring classified information to uncleared persons, even if they were employed by US agencies, was a clear violation of security rules. In July 2007 Mariarz was convicted. In a plea agreement he agreed, in exchange for a short 26-month prison sentence, to testify against his alleged co-conspirators and not to speak with the media. In November 2008, he broke his agreement by telling the *San Diego Union-Tribune* that \"dozens of files\" that were passed were dossiers on Muslims and Arabs living in Southern California. The FBI denies it monitors such groups. It was purely by chance that the theft ring was exposed. In October 2006 a colonel at Camp Pendleton reported to Navy special agents that trophy weapons, brought from Iraq by the Marines, were missing. An internal investigation focused on Maziarz, who had worked in Iraq. He had stockpiled the stolen goods in his apartment and in storage units in California and Virginia. Since investigators not only found stashes of Iraqi weapons and war memorabilia, but also classified documents, the investigation broadened to include espionage. Washington Post\n\n\n5 Jan 2007, \"Theft Probe Leads to N. Va. Storage Site\"\nSecrecy News\n\n\n12 Oct 2007, \"Information Sharing, by Hook or by Crook\"\nSan Diego Union-Tribune\n18 Jul 2008, \"2 Marines Charged in Secrets Theft Ring\"\nSan Diego Union-Tribune\n17 Nov 2008, \"Former Marine Outlines Secret Dossiers; Muslims, Arabs Not Targeted, FBI Says\"\n\nMEHALBA, AHMED FATHY, a naturalized American of Egyptian descent, was arrested on 29\nSeptember 2003 at Boston's Logan International Airport after arriving from Cairo. He had taken emergency leave from his job at Guantanamo Bay with the Titan Corporation to visit his father in Egypt. (Titan is the defense contractor that supplies translators for Army interrogators at Guantanamo.) On his return, in a routine examination by Customs and Border Protection officers, he was found to have 132 computer disks in his baggage, one of which contained hundreds of separate documents labeled \"Secret,\"\nor \"Secret/Noforn.\" He was charged with making false statements to federal agents, since he repeatedly denied that he had any classified information from Guantanamo in his possession. He was indicted in November 2003 on charges of improperly gathering military information and lying to the FBI to which he pleaded not guilty. Born in Alexandria, Egypt, Mehalba immigrated to Salem, Massachusetts, in the early\n1990s. He filed for bankruptcy in 1997, owing creditors $27,000. In 2000 he joined the US Army, twice failed to pass an interrogator course at Fort Huachuca, and was discharged for medical reasons (obesity)\nin 2001. Despite his discharge and bankruptcy, he was able to get a job in 2003 with Titan and was granted a security clearance by the Army. The government could not prove that he had shared classified information with anyone while abroad. In January 2005, Mehalba agreed to plead guilty under an agreement with prosecutors. He was sentenced 18 February 2005 to 20 months in prison. With good behavior and time already served, he was released in 22 days. The light sentence reflected the judge's opinion that Mehalba was suffering from untreated bipolar disorder and depression when he took the documents. The judge said, \"I really do believe the agreed-upon sentence reflects a measured, wellcalibrated and in fact humane disposition.\" The case illustrates some of the vetting problems involved with hiring native-speaking linguists, so urgently needed in Iraq.\n\n\nNew York Times\n\n\n30 Sep 2003, \"Guantanamo Bay Aide is Arrested at Boston Airport\"\nBoston Globe\n\n1 Oct 2003, \"Guantanamo Translator Seized at Logan\"\nNew York Times\n\n\n1 Oct 2003, \"Guantanamo Inquiry Widens as Civilian Translator is Held\"\nBoston Globe\n\n8 Jan 2005, \"Plea Deal Signals Trouble with Case Against Translator\"\nBoston Globe\n\n19 Feb 2005, \"Translator Sentenced in Guantanamo Documents Case\"\n\n\nMICHELSON, ALICE, an East German national, was apprehended 1 October 1984 as she was boarding a flight in New York to Czechoslovakia with tape recordings hidden in a cigarette pack. Michelson, apparently acting as courier for Soviet intelligence, had been given the classified material by a US Army sergeant who was posing as a KGB collaborator. Michelson was indicted and held without bail; however, before coming to trial she was exchanged (June 1985), along with three other Soviet Bloc agents, for 25\npersons who had \"been helpful\" to the US. The FBI has described the case as \"a classic spy operation.\"\n\nWashington Post\n\n3 Oct 1984, \"East German Woman Charged with Spying\"\nWashington Post\n\n3 Oct 1984, \"FBI Agent, German, Analyst in Intelligence Cases\"\nNew York Times\n\n11 Oct 1984, \"East German Indicted in Spy Plot\"\n\n\nMILLER, RICHARD W., first member of the FBI to be indicted for espionage, was arrested with two accomplices, **SVETLANA** and **NIKOLAI OGORODNIKOV**, on 3 October 1984. According to news reports, Miller provided classified documents to the Ogorodnikovs, two pro-Soviet Russian emigres, and demanded $50,000 in gold and $15,000 cash in return. Miller, who was faced with financial difficulties, is alleged to have been sexually involved with Svetlana Ogorodnikov and was preparing to travel with her to Vienna at the time of his arrest. A search of Miller's residence uncovered several classified documents. At the time of their trial the Ogorodnikovs were accused of having been \"utility agents\" for the KGB since 1980. After a 10-week trial, and in an agreement with Federal prosecutors, each pleaded guilty to one count of conspiracy. Nikolai Ogorodnikov was immediately sentenced to eight years imprisonment. His wife later received a sentence of 18 years. Miller pleaded innocent and after 11 weeks of testimony, a mistrial was declared. Following a second trial which ended on 19 June 1986, Miller was found guilty of espionage and bribery. His claim that he was trying to infiltrate the KGB as a double agent was rejected by the jury. On 14 July 1986, Miller was sentenced to two consecutive life terms and 50 years on other charges. This conviction following his second trial was overturned in 1989 on the grounds that US\nDistrict Judge David Kenyon erred in admitting polygraph evidence. Miller was granted bail in October 1989 while awaiting a new trial on charges that he passed Top Secret FBI data to the Soviet woman who was his lover. Miller was forbidden to leave the Los Angeles area without special permission and underwent therapy as ordered by the Probation Department. On October 9, 1990, he was convicted on all counts of espionage for the second time and, on 4 February 1991, was sentenced to 20 years in Federal prison. On 28 January 1993, a Federal Appeals Court upheld his conviction. On 6 May 1994, Miller was released from prison following the reduction of his sentence to 13 years by a Federal judge.\n\nWashington Post\n\n4 Oct 1984, \"FBI Agent Charged in Espionage\"\nWashington Post\n\n5 Oct 1984, \"Accused Spies Portrayed as Incompetents\"\nTime Magazine\n\n15 Oct 1984, \"Spy vs. Spy Saga\"\nLos Angeles Times\n\n5 Feb 1991, \"Miller Gets 20-Year Term for Spying\"\n\n\nMIRA, FRANCISCO DE ASSIS, an Air Force computer specialist stationed in Germany, was charged in April 1983 with providing classified defense information to East Germany. Mira, a naturalized American born in Spain, and two West German accomplices sold information on American codes and radar to the East German State Security Service. In August 1982, while assigned to duties at a US air base at Birkenfeld, West Germany, Mira photographed the cover and random pages of code books and maintenance schedules of air defense radar installations. He processed the photos, with the help of his girlfriend, and asked two local minor drug dealers to carry the material to East Germany and attempt to make contact with the KGB. They made several trips between September 1982 and March 1983, each time passing information provided by Mira, and were paid between $1,136 and $1,515 per visit. Realizing he was in over his head and feeling used by his accomplices, Mira sought to extricate himself from a bad situation. In March 1983, Mira went to the AFOSI and related what he had done, not realizing how thorough the investigative process would be. Under questioning, Mira claimed that he wanted to become a double agent and that he \"wanted to show the Air Force I could do more with my intelligence.\" But in subsequent interviews he admitted he had originated the idea to commit espionage to make some money, and enlisted the two West Germans to assist him. He was disgruntled because he had not gotten the assignment he had wanted. In August 1984 Mira was dishonorably discharged and sentenced to 10 years'\nconfinement. Under a plea bargain he served only seven years of the sentence.\n\nStars and Stripes\n\n29 Aug 1984, \"Airman is Sentenced for Spy Activities\"\n\n\nMONTAPERTO, RONALD N., a former DIA intelligence analyst, in late 2003 admitted to FBI and Navy counterintelligence agents that he had verbally provided Secret and Top Secret information to Chinese intelligence officers over several years (1989 to 2001). Back in 1982 Dr. Montaperto had been one of six DIA analysts selected to participate in a CIA-sponsored pilot program to foster social and professional interactions between DIA's China experts and the Chinese military. After the program ended, Montaperto continued to maintain those close relationships as part of his official duties but did not always report these meetings to DIA, a violation of security rules. Montaperto began work for the DIA in 1981 as an intelligence analyst and went on in 1992 to become a research professor at the National Defense University. He later was dean of academics at the US Pacific Command's Asia Pacific Center for Security Studies until early 2004 when he was dismissed. Montaperto was first investigated by the FBI in the late 1980s after a Chinese defector told US intelligence that Beijing had developed a handful of clandestine sources, \"dear friends\" to China. The FBI suspected Montaperto but later cleared him. Then in early 1991, when the FBI was again interviewing him, he admitted to having verbally provided contacts with information but could not recall the specifics. Nor was the FBI itself able to identify the precise nature of classified information that Montaperto had passed. The case was dropped for lack of evidence. In August 2001 the FBI and Navy, still in pursuit, initiated a \"ruse\" operation against Montaperto offering him work on a China-related project, but this would involve his taking a CI polygraph. It was during that polygraph that Montaperto made his admissions. In February 2004, FBI agents searched his home and found six 1980s-era classified documents. Montaperto pleaded guilty on 22 June 2006 to one count of unlawful retention of classified national defense information andas a condition of the plea bargain\nadmitted to having provided Chinese military attaches considerable amounts of Secret and Top Secret information. Montaperto claimed that passing classified intelligence to China was unintentional and that he was only trying to gain intelligence that could be used in US policymaking. The plea bargain meant that Montaparto was not charged on more serious espionage counts. Instead he was sentenced on 8 September 2006 to three months in prison and three months' home detention, with five years' probation.\n\nLetters of support from current and former US senior intelligence and military officials persuaded the judge to grant the light sentence.\n\ncicentre.com\n\n\n6 Jul 2006, \"Counterintelligence Case: Dr. Ronald N. Montaperto\"\nWashington Times\n\n\n8 Sep 2006, \"Leak Cost U.S. Spy Links to Chinese Arms Sales\"\nWashington Times\n\n\n23 Feb 2007, \"Inside the Ring\"\n\n\nMONTES, ANA BELEN, a senior intelligence analyst at the Defense Intelligence Agency, transmitted sensitive and classified military and intelligence information to Cuba for at least 16 years before she was arrested on 21 September 2001. Surveillance on her activities was curtailed in response to the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 and concern that Cuba could pass on intelligence to other nations. Montes was 44, unmarried, and a US citizen of Puerto Rican descent. She was employed by the Justice Department when sometime before 1985 she began working with the Cuban Directorate of Intelligence. It has not been revealed whether she volunteered or was recruited by them. They encouraged her to seek a position with better access to information, and in 1985 she transferred to a job at DIA. From her office at Bolling AFB in Washington, DC, she focused on Latin American military intelligence. In 1992, she shifted from her initial work on Nicaragua and became the senior DIA analyst for Cuba. She passed at least one polygraph test while engaged in espionage. Montes met her Cuban handlers every three or four months either in the US or in Cuba to exchange encrypted disks of information or instructions. The Cubans also kept in contact through encrypted high-frequency radio bursts that she received on a short wave radio. She would enter the sequences of coded numbers coming from the radio into her laptop computer, and then apply a decryption disk to them to read the messages. She used pay phones on Washington street corners to send back encrypted number sequences to pager numbers answered by Cuban officials at the United Nations. By not following their strict instructions on how to remove all traces of the messages from her computer hard disk, Montes left behind evidence of her activities. Over her years of espionage, she gave the Cubans the names of four US military intelligence agents (they escaped harm), details on at least one special access program, defense contingency planning for Cuba, and aerial surveillance photos. She had access to Intelink and the information contributed to that network by 60 agencies and departments of the Federal government. Montes cooperated in debriefings by various intelligence agencies in a plea agreement to reduce her sentence. Her lawyers claimed she spied from sympathy toward Cuba and that she received no money for her espionage other than travel expenses and the cost of her laptop. She was sentenced on 16 October 2002 to 25 years in prison and five years' probation. At the sentencing hearing she made a defiantly unrepentant statement condemning US policy towards Cuba. The judge responded that she had betrayed her family and her country and told her \"If you cannot love your country, you should at least do it no harm.\"\n\nMiami Herald\n\n\n21 Mar 2001, \"To Catch a Spy\"\nMiami Herald\n\n\n28 Mar 2001, \"Cuban Spy Passed Polygraph at Least Once\"\nNew York Times\n\n\n30 Sep 2001, \"Intelligence Analyst Charged with Spying for Cuba\"\nMiami Herald\n\n\n16 Jun 2002, \"She Led Two LivesDutiful Analyst, and Spy for Cuba\"\nNew York Times\n\n\n17 Oct 2002, \"Ex-U.S. Aide Sentenced to 25 Years for Spying for Cuba\"\n\n\nMOORE, EDWIN G. II, a retired CIA employee, was arrested by the FBI in 1976 and charged with espionage after attempting to sell classified documents to Soviet officials. A day earlier, an employee at a residence for Soviet personnel in Washington, DC, had discovered a package on the grounds and turned it over to police, fearing it was a bomb. The package was found to contain classified CIA documents and a note requesting that $3,000 be dropped at a specified location. The note offered more documents in exchange for $197,000. Moore was arrested after picking up what he thought to be the payment at a drop site near his home. A search of his residence yielded 10 boxes of classified CIA documents. Moore retired from the CIA in 1973 and, although financial gain was a strong motivational factor leading to espionage, it is known that he was disgruntled with his former employer due to lack of promotion. Moore pleaded not guilty by reason of insanity, but was convicted and sentenced to 15 years in prison. He was granted parole in 1979.\n\n\nWashington Post\n\n13 Apr 1977, \"Thought He Was on Assignment for CIA\"\nWashington Post\n\n25 Apr 1977, \"Trial of Ex-Agent...\"\nWashington Post\n\n6 May 1977, \"Moore Guilty of Trying to Sell CIA Files\"\n\n\nMORISON, SAMUEL LORING, a civilian analyst with the Office of Naval Intelligence, was arrested 1\nOctober 1984 for supplying Jane's Publications with classified photography showing a Soviet nuclear powered carrier under construction. The photographs were subsequently published in Jane's Defence Weekly (July 1984). Morison, described as a heavy spender and unhappy with his Navy Department job, had been employed by Jane's as a part-time contributor. A search of his apartment turned up two portions of Navy documents marked Secret. On 17 October 1985, after a seven-day trial, Morison became the first individual convicted under the 1917 Espionage Code for unauthorized disclosure to the press. Also convicted of theft of government property, Morison was sentenced to two years' imprisonment on 4\nDecember 1985. The decision was appealed and in April 1988 the conviction was upheld by the 4th US\nCircuit Court of Appeals. In October 1988 the Supreme Court declined to hear the case, thus endorsing the use of the espionage code for prosecuting cases of unauthorized disclosure.\n\nWashington Post\n\n3 Oct 1984, \"Navy Analyst Arrested in Photo Sale\"\nNew York Times\n\n8 Oct 1984, \"Disclosing Secrets to the Press...\"\nWashington Post\n\n29 Oct 1984, \"Unlikely Espionage Suspect\"\nWashington Post\n\n18 Oct 1985, \"Morison Guilty of Spying, Stealing Documents\"\n\n\nMORTATI, TOMMASO, former US Army paratrooper, was arrested in Vincenza some time in 1989 by Italian authorities on charges of having passed Top Secret documents to Hungarian military intelligence services. According to European news reports, the former Army sergeant, who was born in Italy, confessed to disclosing secrets about American and NATO bases in Italy and claimed he belonged to a still-active espionage network. He is presumed to have been a member of the same network that included the Conrad spy ring in Bad Kreuznach, Germany. Conrad was arrested in August 1988 and has since been sentenced by a German court to life imprisonment. Mortati was born in Italy but later emigrated to the US\nwhere he obtained US citizenship. He left the army in 1987 but remained in Italy as his American wife continued to work for the US Army base in Vincenza. Mortati's arrest followed that of Hungarian-born naturalized American **ZOLTON SZABO** who recruited Mortati in 1981, sent him for two weeks of training in Budapest, and continued to be his contact. Mortati is said to have confessed to Italian authorities that he attempted to bribe several Italian officers in 1984 and 1985, offering money for information. Press reports state that Italy's military secret service was informed about Mortati's activities by German and Austrian counterintelligence authorities. A search of Mortati's home revealed a hidden two-way radio used to transmit his reports in code. Up until the time of his arrest, he had received $500 a month from the Hungarian Intelligence Service plus a payment for every report filed, based on its importance. Mortati was convicted in an Italian court and after a period of incarceration was released. This summary is based on European media items and an ABC Television News report.\n\nMURPHY, MICHAEL RICHARD, a Navy Seaman assigned to the USS *James K. Polk,* motivated by money, reportedly made several calls to the Soviet Mission to the United Nations in June 1981, offering to make a deal which he said \"would benefit both the Soviets and himself.\" He was offered immunity from prosecution in exchange for cooperation. A polygraph examination indicated that he had contacted the Soviets three times, but had not passed any information. In August, 1981 Murphy was discharged from the Navy.\n\n\nNESBITT, FRANK ARNOLD. The former Marine and Air Force communications officer was arrested by the FBI on 14 October 1989 and charged with delivering unauthorized information to the Soviet government. Nesbitt, a Memphis resident, left behind family and bewildered colleagues in June, appending a terse note to his weed trimmer (\"I'm gone. Don't look for me.\"), and flew to Belize in Central America. Plans to settle there did not work out, so he moved on to Guatemala City where he enrolled in Spanish classes. In August while sightseeing in Sucre, Bolivia, he happened to board a bus full of Russian ballet dancers. He attended the ballet that evening and the next day bumped into a Soviet official traveling with the group. This meeting set in motion his trip to Moscow. From Sucre he went to La Paz where a Soviet Embassy official arranged for his flight to Moscow. Nesbitt claims he stayed 11 days in Moscow in a safe house, wrote from memory 32 pages detailing US defense communications, was polygraphed, toured the city, and met important KGB personnel. However, he grew upset over the Soviets' failure to grant him citizenship and provide him with an apartment and job. He returned, in a circuitous route, to Guatemala where he contacted US authorities who then accompanied him to Washington, DC. He was met by the FBI and arrested 11 days later. He offered his services as a double agent to the FBI claiming he did not give the Soviets any useful information. The National Security Agency, however, determined that information Nesbitt said he provided is still classified. The former communications officer served in the military between 1963 and 1966, and 1969 to 1979. On 8 November, he was indicted on a charge of conspiring with a Soviet agent to pass sensitive national defense information to the Soviet Union. Nesbitt initially pleaded innocent to espionage and conspiracy charges. If convicted, he faced a possible life sentence and fines up to $500,000. According to his lawyer, Nesbitt \"wanted to have some excitement in his life,\" but it is likely that he was also motivated by money and also a sense of disgruntlement. A Soviet foreign ministry spokesman has said that Nesbitt was denied Soviet citizenship because a check of the autobiography he gave the Soviet parliament \"led to suspicion of his possible connections with the criminal underworld.\" On 1 February 1990 Nesbitt changed his plea to guilty in order to receive a substantially reduced sentence. On 27 April he was sentenced in US District Court to 10 years in a psychiatric treatment facility at a Federal prison. His psychiatric evaluation states that he suffers from severe personality disorders.\n\nWashington Post\n\n15 Oct 1989, \"Odyssey of a Suspected Spy; FBI Arrests Man in Va. After Moscow Trip\"\nWashington Post\n\n17 Oct 1989, \"No Bail for Alleged Spy\"\nWashington Post\n\n20 Oct 1989, \"Suspected Spy Sought to Defect, FBI Says\"\nWashington Post\n\n2 Feb 1990, \"Guilty Plea Entered in Secrets Case\"\nWashington Post\n\n27 Apr 1990, \"Ex-Officer Given 10 Years in Mental Hospital for Spying\"\n\n\nNICHOLSON, HAROLD JAMES, was arrested on 16 November 1996 at Dulles International Airport as he was about to board a flight to Switzerland. On his person were found rolls of film bearing images of Top Secret documents. Nicholson is the highest ranking Central Intelligence Agency officer (GS-15)\ncharged with espionage to date. Counterintelligence officials believe that he began spying for Russian intelligence in June 1994 as he was completing a tour of duty as deputy station chief in Malaysia. He joined the agency in 1980 after serving as a captain in the US Army. Nicholson was charged with passing a wide range of highly classified information to Moscow, including biographic information on every CIA case officer trained between 1994 and 1996. He is also suspected of having compromised the identities of US and foreign business people who have provided information to the CIA. According to investigators, for two and a half years he had been hacking into the agency's computer system and providing the Russians with every secret he could steal. It is alleged that Nicholson received approximately $120,000\nfrom the Russians over a two-year period. He came under suspicion in late 1995 when he failed a series of polygraph examinations. Further investigation revealed a pattern of extravagant spending, and an unusual pattern of foreign travel followed by large, unexplained bank deposits. Nicholson, who at the time was in the middle of a divorce and child custody battle, claimed that he did it for his children and to pay his bills. On 21 November 1996 he was indicted on one count of conspiracy to commit espionage. On 3 March 1997, Nicholson pleaded guilty under a plea agreement in which he admitted that he had been a Russian spy. On 6 June he was sentenced by a Federal judge to 23 years and seven months in prison. This reduced sentence reflected his extensive cooperation with government investigators.\n\nLos Angeles Times\n\n19 Nov 1996, \"Career CIA Officer Is Charged With Spying For Russia\"\nLos Angeles Times\n\n21 Nov 1996, \"Alleged Mole To Plead Not Guilty\"\nNew York Times\n\n4 Mar 1997, \"C.I.A. Officer Admits Spying For Russians\"\nWashington Post\n\n6 Jun 1997, \"Convicted Spy Says He Did It For His Family\"\nNOUR, ALMALIKI, in 1998 used a false identity on forms applying for US citizenship. In 2003 he used the same alias to get a position as an Arabic translator for the L-3 Titan Corporation, which provides translation services in Iraq for US military personnel. Once working for Titan, he was granted Secret and Top Secret security clearances based on the same false identity. Later, in 2004 during his second yearlong assignment as a translator and interpreter in an intelligence unit of the 82nd Airborne Division in Iraq in the Sunni Triangle, Nour took several classified documents from the US Army without authorization. These included the coordinates of insurgents' locations which the US Army was targeting and plans for protecting Sunnis on their pilgrimage to Mecca. He also photographed a classified battle map of a base near Najaf. In September 2005, and apparently in response to some security concern, the FBI and military investigators first interviewed Nour in Iraq. He was arrested the same month at his apartment in Brooklyn, New York, and was charged the next month with lying to federal officials on three occasions: on his naturalization application (he became naturalized February 2000), on his application for a security clearance (2003), and in interviews connected with the renewal of his clearance. It is unclear what specifically brought Nour to the investigators' attention, but he had originally claimed to have been a Lebanese born in 1960, that he had never married, and that his parents had been killed in Beirut, all untrue. After his arrest, Nour admitted that he was actually Moroccan, born in 1959 and married, and that his parents were alive and living in Morocco. A search of his apartment by the FBI's Joint Terrorism Task Force turned up a Moroccan power of attorney and other records showing that he had wired large sums of money (equal to a year's salary) to a woman in Morocco believed to be his wife. It was during this search that investigators found the classified documents taken from Iraq. An official for the New York FBI said: \"He lied to attain his U.S. citizenship. He lied to gain employment with a government contractor. And he lied to obtain security clearances. Through serial deception an eminently untrustworthy person inveigled his way into a position of trust, and he abused that trust.\" Nour was not charged with terrorism or espionage. He had first pleaded guilty in December 2005 to using a false identity to acquire US\ncitizenship. Later, on 14 February 2007, he pleaded guilty to being in unauthorized possession of classified documents. On 19 May 2008, he was sentenced to 10 years and one month in prison and was stripped of his citizenship.\n\n\nWashington Times\n\n\n22 Oct 2005, \"Linguist in Iraq Accused of Fraud\"\nWashington Post\n\n\n15 Feb 2007, \"Translator Who Faked Identity Pleads Guilty to Having Secret Data\"\nDepartment of Justice\n\n19 May 2008, \"U.S. Army Translator Sentenced to 121 Months' Imprisonment...\"\nOAKLEY, ROY LYNN, 67, was formerly employed as a laborer and security escort by Bechtel Jacobs at the East Tennessee Technology Park (ETTP) in Oakridge, Tennessee. The plant had previously been operated by the Department of Energy as a facility to produce highly enriched uranium. The plant was closed in 1987\nand turned over Bechtel Jacobs for cleanup. While employed at ETTP in 2006 and 2007, Oakley had a security clearance that permitted him access to classified and protected materials, including instruments, appliances and information related to the gaseous diffusion process for enriching uranium. Some of these items were classified as Restricted. For reasons unclear in open sources, the FBI initiated an undercover investigation against Oakley and, in January 2007, contacted him using an undercover agent assuming the role of an agent of a foreign government. In telephone calls and face-to-face meetings with the undercover agent, Oakley had stated that he had taken certain parts of uranium enrichment fuel rods or tubes and other associated hardware items from the ETTP and that he wanted to sell these materials for $200,000 to the foreign government. Once he had handed over the materials to the agent and had been given $200,000, Oakley was confronted by FBI agents and admitted to trying to sell these materials. He had no contact with actual foreign governments, terrorists or criminal groups and appeared to have been motivated solely by greed. Oakley was indicted in July 2007. On 26 January 2009, the day his trial was slated to begin, Oakley pleaded guilty to Count 1 of the indictment charging him with unlawful disclosure of Restricted Data under the Atomic Energy Act. On 18 June 2009, Oakley was sentenced to six years in prison, after which he will be on supervised release for three years.\n\nNew York Times\n20 Jul 2007, \"Worker Indicted on Charges of Trying to Sell Nuclear Equipment\"\nDepartment of Justice, News\n        Release\n26 Jan 2009, \"Former Oak Ridge Complex Employee Pleads Guilty to Unlawful Disclosure of Restricted Atomic Energy Data\"\n\n\nOTT, BRUCE DAMIAN, Airman 1st Class, assigned duties as an administrative clerk at Beale Air Force Base, was arrested 22 January 1986 by FBI and Air Force security agents at a Davis, California, motel as he attempted to sell classified information to undercover agents posing as Soviet representatives.\n\nOne of the documents cited is \"The SAC Tactical Doctrine for SR-71 Crews.\" At that time, Beale AFB was the home base of SR-71 \"Blackbird\" reconnaissance aircraft. It is reported that Ott tried to contact representatives at the Soviet Consulate in San Francisco during the month of January. His communication was intercepted and no classified information actually changed hands. Military prosecutors contended that Ott hoped to be paid up to $160,000 for his information. Following an eight-day court-martial proceeding, Ott was found guilty and on 7 August was sentenced to 25 years in prison.\n\n\nNew York Times\n\n29 Jan 1986, \"Airman in California Charged in New Spy Case\"\nNew York Times\n\n1 Feb 1986, \"Details are given on Spying Charge\"\nPAKHTUSOV, YURI N., a lieutenant colonel in the Soviet army, arrived in the US in June 1988, as assistant military attache with the Soviet Military Mission. Two months later he began approaching an American employee of a defense contractor to obtain documents dealing with how the US government protects classified and other sensitive information contained in its computer systems. What he did not know was that the American reported the approaches to US authorities. Pakhtusov, 35, was caught as part of a sting operation after he received classified documents from the American employee working under FBI control. On 9 March 1989, he was ordered out of the country and declared *persona non grata.*\n\nSt. Louis Post-Dispatch\n\n11 Mar 1989, \"Soviet Diplomat Ousted As Spy\"\nPELTON, RONALD WILLIAM, communications specialist with the National Security Agency for 14\nyears, was identified as a spy for the Soviet Union based on facts provided by a defector. He was arrested in Annapolis, MD, on 25 November 1985. During his employment at NSA, Pelton had access to information on a wide range of highly classified projects. He was said to be a highly skilled technician and fluent in the Russian language but a poor manager of his personal finances. Three months before resigning from his agency, Pelton declared personal bankruptcy, listing debts of over $65,000. While at NSA he expressed hostility toward the agency and dissatisfaction with his position. Failing at several subsequent jobs and with only a few hundred dollars in the bank, Pelton walked into the Soviet Embassy in January 1980 and offered his services to the KGB for money. He was debriefed at length and provided highly classified information about US intelligence collection locations. He also made several trips to Vienna, Austria, to speak with Soviet agents. According to reports in the media, no documents were passed by Pelton; however, former coworkers stated that he had an excellent memory and an encyclopedic knowledge of intelligence activities carried out by the agency. He allegedly received $35,000 from the Soviets between 1980 and 1983 for information about classified US intelligence collection programs targeting the Soviet Union. In July 1985, the KGB colonel who had initial contact with Pelton in Washington, DC, Vitaly Yurchenko, defected to the US and provided information that led to his prosecution. At the time of his arrest, Pelton admitted selling intelligence information to the Soviet Union. He was indicted 20 December 1985 on six counts related to espionage. Despite his statement at the time of arrest, Pelton pleaded not guilty. Following a highly publicized trial, he was convicted on 5 June 1986 on one count of conspiracy and two counts of espionage. On 6 December 1986 Pelton was sentenced to three concurrent life sentences.\n\nWashington Post\n\n26 Nov 1985, \"FBI Says Spy Suspect Admits Selling Data\"\nNew York Times\n\n28 Nov 1985, \"Ex-Security Agency Employee Said to Have Admitted Spying\"\nWashington Post\n\n7 Dec 1985, \"Accused Spy Ronald Pelton Was Preoccupied with Money\"\nWashington Post\n\n6 Jun 1986, \"Pelton Spy Case Chronology\"\n\n\nPERI, MICHAEL A., 22, an electronic warfare signals specialist for the Army, fled to East Germany with a laptop computer and military secrets 20 February 1989and voluntarily returned 4 March 1989 to plead guilty to espionage. He was sentenced to 30 years in a military prison. Even after his court-martial, authorities were at a loss to explain what happened. Peri said he made an impulsive mistake, that he felt overworked and unappreciated in his job for the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment in Fulda, West Germany. His work involved operating equipment that detects enemy radar and other signals. Peri had been described as \"a good, clean-cut soldier\" with a \"perfect record.\" During his tour of duty in Germany he had been promoted and twice was nominated for a soldier of the month award.\n\nSt. Louis Post-Dispatch\n\n25 Jun 1989, \"US Soldier Given 30 Years\"\nLos Angeles Times\n\n29 Jun 1989, \"From Soldier to Spy; A Baffling About-Face\"\nPICKERING, JEFFERY LORING. On 7 June 1983, an individual using the name Christopher Eric Loring entered the Naval Regional Medical Center, Seattle, Washington, acting very erratic and stating that he possessed a large quantity of \"secret documents vital to the security of our country.\" The individual was in possession of one plastic addressograph card imprinted with the address of the Soviet Embassy, Washington, DC. During permissive searches of his car and residence by Naval Investigative Service agents, four government-marked envelopes containing classified microfiche and 147 microfiche cards containing a variety of classified defense publications were located. Through investigation, the individual was identified as Jeffery Loring Pickering, who had previously served in the US Marine Corps.\n\nDuring his Marine enlistment, he was described as a thief, thrill seeker, and a perpetual liar. Pickering left the Marines in August 1973, but became dissatisfied with civilian life and began efforts to re-enlist in the military. Pickering assumed an alias, Christopher Eric Loring, hid the facts of his prior Marine Corps affiliation, and enlisted in the US Navy on 23 January 1979. During interrogation, Pickering admitted stealing the classified material from the ship's office of the USS *Fanning* between July and October 1982. Pickering likewise expressed an interest in the KGB, and said he fantasized about espionage. He ultimately admitted mailing a five-page Secret document to the Soviet Embassy, Washington, DC, along with a typed letter offering additional classified material to the Soviet Union. On 3 October 1983, Pickering pleaded guilty at a general court-martial to several violations including espionage. Pickering was convicted and sentenced to five years at hard labor, forfeiture of $400 per month for 60 months, reduction to E-1, and a bad conduct discharge.\n\nNaval Investigative Service Command, *Espionage*, 1989\nPITTS, EARL EDWIN, a senior FBI agent, was arrested on 18 December 1996 at the FBI Academy in Quantico, Virginia, and charged with providing classified information to the Russian intelligence services from 1987 until 1992. He is believed to have received $224,000 from Russian intelligence services for his activities. Pitts allegedly turned over Top Secret documents to the KGB (and after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the SVRR), including a list of FBI assets who were providing intelligence on Russia. Pitts' betrayal of trust began in July 1987 when, as a newly assigned agent to the New York City field office, he wrote to a Soviet representative assigned to the Soviet Mission at the United Nations and asked to meet a KGB officer. From 1988 to 1992 Pitts allegedly, on nine occasions, provided documents to his handler, KGB officer Aleksandr Karpov.  Each meeting was followed by an unexplained deposit in one of several bank accounts in the Washington area. After 1992 Pitts became inactive as a foreign agent. He was identified as a mole when Karpov himself became a double agent for the FBI. At this time the FBI set up a sting operation against Pitts and, using agents posing as Russians, easily gained his agreement to renew his espionage activities. Over a period of 15 months, Pitts made 22 drops of classified documents to undercover FBI agents and was paid $65,000. The FBI was also informed of Pitts' involvement by his wife, Mary Colombaro Pitts, who confided her suspicions about her husband's activities to another FBI agent. Earl Edwin Pitts pleaded guilty to two counts of espionage in February 1997 following the discovery of a computer disk with a letter to his supposed Russian handler. On 23 June, he was sentenced to 27 years in prison by a Federal judge who stated that the former agent was guilty of \"the most egregious abuse of trust.\" When asked why he spied, Pitts cited a number of grievances he had against the FBI and stated that he \"wanted to pay them back.\"\nWashington Post\n\n19 Dec 1996, \"Senior FBI Agent Charged With Spying for Russians\"\nWashington Post\n\n19 Dec 1996, \"Espionage Suspect Depicted as Eager to Sell His Loyalty\"\nWashington Post\n\n2 Mar 1997, \"Spy Case Sealed by 1990 Letter; Computer Disk Held Agent's\n\n\nMemo to KGB\"\nWashington Post\n\n24 Jun 1997, \"Ex-FBI Agent Gets 27 Years for Passing Secrets to Moscow\"\n\n\nPOLLARD, JONATHAN JAY, a civilian counterintelligence analyst at the Anti-Terrorist Alert Center at the Naval Investigative Service in Suitland, MD, and his wife, **ANNE HENDERSON-POLLARD**, were apprehended on 21 November 1985 outside the Israeli Embassy in Washington, DC, as they vainly sought political asylum with hope of fleeing the country. Both were charged under the espionage code for selling classified documents to an Israeli intelligence unit for $50,000. It is reported that Pollard's detection resulted from tips from fellow employees that the accused was seeking and copying more classified documents than his job required. His pattern of taking documents away from the office was noted by a supervisor. Confronted with evidence of his activities by the NCIS and the FBI on 15 November, Pollard admitted delivering classified documents to a foreign government agent. He was originally ideologically motivated to pass classified information, but that motivation was later clouded by monetary considerations. The couple had begun to lead a luxurious lifestyle based on their monthly retainer from Israel of $2,500. They visited Israel and Europe several times at the expense of the Israeli government and on one of these trips were married in Vienna, Austria. While at Stanford University in 1976, Pollard is reported to have boasted to friends about working for the Mossad, Israel's foreign intelligence agency. Pollard's claim to involvement with Israeli intelligence never emerged during the course a background investigation when he applied for a Top Secret security clearance. Anne Henderson-\nPollard was accused of intending to sell to representatives of the Peoples Republic of China documents related to the US analysis of China's intelligence operations in this country. A suitcase found in their residence was filled with Top Secret documents relating to military capabilities of foreign countries. On 4\nJune 1986, Pollard and his wife pleaded guilty to espionage and related charges under a plea agreement with Federal officials. Four Israeli nationals were later named as unindicted co-conspirators. On 4 March\n1987 Jonathan Pollard was sentenced to life imprisonment. Several attempts by special interest groups to obtain a parole for Pollard have failed. Anne Henderson-Pollard received a five-year term.\n\nNew York Times\n\n28 Nov 1985, \"F.B.I. Man Says Naval Analyst Told of Spying\"\nWashington Post\n\n4 Dec 1985, \"FBI Seeking Pollard Contact Identity\"\nWashington Post\n\n5 Jun 1986, \"Ex-Analyst Pollard Pleads Guilty to Spying\"\nNaval Investigative Service Command, *Espionage*, 1989\nRAMSAY, RODERICK JAMES, a former US Army sergeant, was arrested in Tampa, Florida, on 7\nJune 1990 and charged with conspiracy to commit espionage. Ramsay joined the Army in 1981 and was transferred to West Germany in June 1983 where he was recruited by then-Army Sgt. CLYDE LEE\nCONRAD. (Conrad was sentenced to life imprisonment in May 1990 for treason.) Ramsay received\n$20,000 for selling military secrets that could have caused the collapse of NATOTop Secret plans for the defense of Central Europe, location and use of NATO tactical nuclear weapons, and the ability of NATO's military communicationsthat were passed to Hungary and Czechoslovakia. An FBI official said, \"It's one of the most serious breaches everit's unprecedented what went over to the other side. The ability to defend ourselves is neutralized because they have all our plans.\" Ramsay initially used a 35-\nmillimeter camera to photograph classified documents, but then switched to more effective videotape. He reportedly recorded a total of about 45 hours of videotape. Ramsay is said to have a high IQ, is multilingual, and has the \"ability to recall minute details, facts and figures from hundreds of volumes of documents.\" The FBI described him as \"brilliant but erratic.\" In West Germany he worked as a clerktypist in the 8th Infantry Division. When arrested he was unemployed, living sometimes at his mother's house and sometimes in his car. In September 1991 he pleaded guilty and agreed to cooperate with prosecutors. On 28 August 1992 he was sentenced to 36 years in prison. The sentence reflects his cooperation with investigators. According to the FBI, this case was the most extensive espionage investigation in the history of the FBI and considered to be the largest US espionage conspiracy case in modern history.\n\nLos Angeles Times\n\n9 Jun 1990, \"Alleged Spy Called Brilliant, Erratic\"\nWashington Times\n\n29 Aug 1992, \"Spying Sergeant Gets 36 Years\"\nDoD Security Institute, *Security Awareness Bulletin*, No. 1-97, January 1997, \"Profile of a Spy\"\nRATKAI, STEPHEN JOSEPH, was arrested by Canadian authorities on 11 June 1988 and charged with attempting to obtain US classified military documents related to the operation of a US Navy installation at Argentia, Newfoundland.  Although born in Canada, Ratkai was brought up in Hungary, his father's native country, after the death of his Canadian mother. As an adult he returned to Canada to work as a short-order cook, but made frequent trips back to Hungary. Ratkai was seized as a result of a double agent operation begun two years earlier by the US Naval Investigative Service and Canadian intelligence: On 2 December 1986 Donna Geiger walked on board a Soviet scientific research vessel, the Akademik Boris Petrov, which was temporarily docked in the harbor of St. John's, Newfoundland. Geiger, a Navy lieutenant, was a double agent who had been recruited by the Naval Investigative Service. She was stationed at the US Naval Facility in Argentia. On board the Soviet ship, she portrayed herself as a \"disgruntled female naval officer ... working in a world dominated by men ... assigned to an isolated duty station.\" She brought classified material to prove her intentions. Two months later she received a letter indicating someone would meet with her. Finally in May 1987, acting on directions she received by mail, she met her contact, \"Michael,\" in the parking lot of the Hotel Newfoundland in St. John's. She was given money and some tasking to collect information. A week later Lt. Geiger met Michael in a restaurant. Classified information was exchanged for money. During this meeting she was tasked to provide information on the highly classified Sound Underwater Surveillance System, the Naval Facility Argentia's area of responsibility. After several more meetings, Michael was identified as Ratkai. At their last meeting in June 1988, Geiger steered Ratkai to a room at the Hotel Newfoundland which was outfitted with surveillance equipment. More money and classified information was exchanged. When Ratkai left the room, he was arrested. No damage is reported to have occurred. On 6 February 1989 Ratkai pleaded guilty to one general charge of spying on behalf of the Soviet Union from May 1987 to June 1988 and one charge of attempted espionage. On 9 March 1989 the Newfoundland Supreme Court sentenced Ratkai to two concurrent nine-year prison terms.\n\nNew York Times\n\n16 Jun 1988, \"Canada Holds Suspect in Spying on US Navy\"\nSt. Louis Post-Dispatch\n11 Mar 1989, \"Spy Gets 9 Years\"\nNaval Investigative Service Command, *Espionage*, 1989\n\n\nREGAN, BRIAN PATRICK, a former Air Force intelligence analyst, was arrested on 3 August 2001, at Dulles International Airport as he was boarding a flight for Switzerland. On his person he was carrying missile site information on Iraq and contact information for embassies in Switzerland. Regan, who had enlisted in the Air Force at 17, began working for the National Reconnaissance Office in 1995 where he administered the Intelink, a classified web network for the intelligence community. Following his retirement from the military as a Master Sergeant in 2001, he was employed by defense contractor TRW and resumed work at NRO where he was employed at the time of his arrest. Regan had held a Top Secret clearance since 1980. Computers searched in Regan's home led to the discovery of letters offering to sell secrets to Libya, Iraq, and China. In the Iraq case, he asked Saddam Hussein for $13 million. At his arraignment on November 5, 2001, he pleaded not guilty to three counts of attempting to market highly classified documents and one count of gathering national defense information. The documents, classified at the Top Secret SCI level, concerned the US satellite program, early warning systems, and communications intelligence information. Regan is thought to have been motivated not only by money\n(he had very heavy personal debts), but also by a sense of disgruntlement, complaining frequently to former coworkers and neighbors about his job and station in life. On 20 February 2003, Regan was convicted of all charges except attempting to sell secrets to Libya, and on 21 March, under a sentencing agreement, he was sentenced to life imprisonment without parole. Information provided by Regan after sentencing led FBI and NRO investigators to 19 sites in rural Virginia and Maryland where he had buried\n\nover 20,000 pages of classified documents, five CDs, and five videotapes that he had stashed presumably for future sales. Washington Post\n\n\n24 Aug 2001, \"Retired Air Force Sgt. Charged with Espionage\"\nWashington Post\n\n\n21 Feb 2003, \"Analyst Convicted in Spy Case; Regan Jury\nYet to Decide if Death Penalty Applies\"\nNew York Times\n\n\n21 Mar 2003, \"Life Sentence for Bid to Sell Secrets to Iraq\"\nLos Angeles Times\n\n\n31 Jul 2003, \"Arduous Dig to Find Spy's Buried Stash;\nAgents Search Virginia, Maryland Park Sites under Rough Conditions, Recover All Documents\"\n\n\nRICHARDSON, DANIEL WALTER, a US Army sergeant stationed at the Aberdeen Proving Ground,\nMaryland, was arrested on 7 January 1988 and charged with attempting to spy for the Soviet Union. Richardson reportedly intended to offer unspecified national defense information to Soviet representatives\nin exchange for money. No information is believed to have been compromised. Officials stated that\nRichardson was apprehended after electronic surveillance picked up his efforts to contact Soviet representatives. This led to his negotiation with an undercover government agent posing as a Soviet. He\nwas arrested at the Holiday Inn in Aberdeen (with an unclassified military manual and circuitry from the M-1 tank in his possession) as he attempted to meet with the undercover agent. An Army spokesman stated that Richardson had a Secret clearance but \"no ready access to classified materials.\" Although trained as an instructor, his job was to issue tools to students at the Ordinance Center School at Aberdeen. \"Money and revenge against the military\" have been identified by an administration official as Richardson's chief motivations for espionage. Described as a mediocre soldier, Richardson was demoted in August 1987 for repeated tardiness. He was charged at the time of arrest with espionage, failure to report contacts with a foreign government, theft, and unauthorized disposition of government property. On 26 August 1988 Richardson was sentenced by a military jury to 10 years in prison, fined $36,000, and\ndischarged with a bad conduct record.\nNew York Times\n\n15 Jan 1988, \"Army Sergeant is Arrested on Espionage Charges\"\nWashington Post\n\n16 Jan 1988, \"Soldier Had No Access to Army Secrets\"\nROGALSKY, IVAN N., a former Soviet merchant seaman admitted to the US as a political refugee, was\narrested in New Jersey on 7 January 1977 after receiving a classified document from a cleared employee of RCA Research Center. The employee, who worked on communications satellite and defense projects,\nagreed to work under FBI control after first being approached by Rogalsky. The ex-seaman had earlier asked the RCA employee for unclassified information about the space shuttle program. A second\nsecretary of the Soviet Mission to the United Nations, **YEVEGENY P. KARPOV**, was named as a coconspirator. Karpov had been suspected of being a KGB officer by the FBI. According to later press reports, Rogalsky was not tried due to questions regarding his sanity. He claimed to receive instructions from disembodied voices.\nNew York Times\n\n8 Jan 1977, \"Soviet Alien Arrested in Jersey on Spy Charges\"\nNew York Times\n\n9 Jan 1977, \"Accused Soviet Spy Known as a Drifter\"\nNew York Times\n\n16 Jan 1977, \"Spy Case Clouds a Russian Holiday\"\nRONDEAU, JEFFREY STEPHEN, a US Army sergeant stationed at Bangor, Maine, was arrested in\nTampa, Florida, on 22 October 1992, and charged with espionage for providing Army and NATO defense secrets, including tactical nuclear weapons plans, to intelligence agents of Hungary and Czechoslovakia\nfrom 1985 through 1988. Rondeau was allegedly part of the Conrad spy ring which operated out of the\n\n8th Infantry Division, Bad Kreuznach, Germany, in the mid-1980s. A German court convicted former US\nArmy sergeant **CLYDE LEE CONRAD** of high treason in 1990 and sentenced him to life in prison. The inquiry into Rondeau's involvement was aided by the cooperation of **RODERICK JAMES RAMSAY**.\n\nIn 1991, Ramsey, also a former Army sergeant stationed in Germany, was sentenced to 36 years in prison by an American court for his involvement in the ring. As a recognition signal, Ramsay reportedly gave Rondeau a torn dollar bill to use when dealing with others in the plot. The US Attorney for the Middle District of Florida said, \"The espionage charge in this case is especially serious because it related to the allied defense of Central Europe including the use of tactical nuclear weapons and military communications.\" The three-count indictment of Rondeau charged that he conspired with Conrad, Ramsay, and others to \"copy, steal, photograph, and videotape\" documents and sell them to Hungary and Czechoslovakia. The indictment did not specify what amount of money he may have received. On 28\nMarch 1994, Rondeau pleaded guilty to espionage. In June, 1994, Rondeau, along with Sgt. JEFFERY\nEUGENE GREGORY, another member of the espionage ring, was sentenced by a military court to 18\nyears in prison.\n\n\nHouston Chronicle\n\n23 Oct 1992, \"US Soldier is Charged with Spying\"\nAtlanta Constitution\n\n23 Oct 1992, \"Soldier Accused of Selling NATO Plans to Communists\"\nROTH, JOHN REECE, 70, a retired University of Tennessee (UT) professor and expert on plasma physics, was indicted in May 2008 for illegally exporting to China sensitive, restricted, military information related to plasma technology designed to be deployed on the wings of drones. Dr. Roth was accused of passing information to the Chinese research assistant working on the contract, a doctoral candidate at UT. Roth was also accused of taking reports and related studies in his laptop to China during a lecture tour in 2006 and having one restricted report emailed to him there through a Chinese professor's Internet connection. The indictment alleged, among other things, that Roth did not obtain permission to take the sensitive documents to China and lied to the Defense Department about his employment of a Chinese graduate student (he also employed graduate students from Iran and UK). All this activity was in violation of the Arms Export Control Act (AECA). In 2004, Roth became a subcontractor to Atmospheric Glow Technology, Inc. (AGT), a spin-off of UT to market commercial applications of UT's plasma sciences lab that Roth had previously headed. The company had been granted a US Air Force contract. Because of the sensitive nature of the program, the parties allegedly agreed that no foreign nationals would work on the project. And in fact Roth first hired an American student to handle the export control data and the Chinese student to work on nonsensitive materials in the lab. That plan fell apart, however, when the arrangement slowed down progress, and soon the two students began sharing information. Roth was told by university officials that he was violating the law in allowing foreign nationals to work on a military defense project. Roth, on the other hand, believed that a project only became export-controlled when the research had netted an actual product; and in this case, the work was not finished. A federal jury convicted Roth on 3 September 2008 on 18 counts of conspiracy, fraud, and violating the AECA. The former director of plasma science at AGT, **DANIEL SHERMAN**, and AGT itself, were also indicted and both have entered into plea bargains. Sherman pleaded guilty in June 2009 and will be sentenced 28 July 2009. UT cooperated in the investigation and was listed as a victim in one of the charges against Roth. This is one of the first cases in which the government has sought to punish an individual or organization for distributing scientific know-how (rather than equipment) to foreign graduate students working on military research contracts in violation of the AECA. Roth was sentenced on 1 July 2009 to 4 years in prison for passing sensitive defense information to two foreign national research assistants, one from Iran and another from China. cicentre.com\n\n\nn.d., \"Roth, J. Reece\"\nKnoxville News Sentinel\n\n26 Aug 2008, \"Roth was Warned, Lawyers Allege\"\nKnoxville News Sentinel\n\n3 Sep 2008, \"Roth's Mind-Set on Trial\"\nPhilosophy of Science Portal\n4 Sep 2008, \"J. Reece Roth Conviction\"\n   (philosophyofscenceportal. blogspot.com) Washington Post\n\n\n4 Sep 2008, \"Professor is Convicted of Sharing Technology\"\nWorldTribune.com\n\n16 Sep 2008, \"China Got Strategic Drone Tech From Grad Student in Tennessee Spy Case\"\nSANTOS, JOSEPH, 38, an American citizen, and his Cuban wife **AMARYLIS SILVERIO SANTOS**,\n37, were members of the Red Wasp Network, a spy ring operating for Cuba in south Florida from 1992 through 1998. [See also Alejandro Alonso, Linda Hernandez, and Gerardo Hernandez.] The couple was assigned by the Cuban Intelligence Service to get jobs with the US Southern Command in Miami in order to collect and pass along information and observations. They did not manage to get these jobs, although they submitted at least one report to Cuban intelligence based on observations from outside the military base. At the time of their arrest on 12 September 1998, Joseph worked as a maintenance man for a Miami sports stadium and Amarylis kept house and took care of their six-year-old daughter. On 4 February 2000\nin US District court in Miami, they pled guilty in a plea bargain to being unregistered agents of a foreign government. Joseph was sentenced to four years and Amarylis to three and a half years in prison.\n\nIndependent (UK)\n\n\n16 Sep 1998, \"Cuban Infiltrated US Military Base, Says FBI\"\nMiami Herald\n\n3 Feb 2000, \"Contrite Cuban Spy Couple Sentenced\"\nFort Lauderdale\n\n\n4 Feb 2000, \"Couple Guilty of Espionage Get Jail Sentence\"\n    Sun-Sentinel SCHOOF, CHARLES EDWARD, 20, and **JOHN JOSEPH HAEGER**, 19, both Navy Petty Officers\n3rd Class, were arrested aboard ship on 1 December 1989 on charges they conspired to commit espionage. The two sailors were stationed aboard the tank landing ship USS *Fairfax County* assigned to the Norfolk area. Both were operations specialists, trained in radar communications, electronic countermeasures, and navigational plotting. Although Schoof was reported to be the instigator of this scheme to make money, it was Haeger who had the combination to the document safe. Schoof called the Soviet Embassy in Washington, DC, to ask if someone would come down to pick up the classified material, but Norfolk is beyond the embassy's allowed travel radius. He then visited several bars looking for a ride to the embassy. A shipmate reported Schoof's activities to the ship's commanding officer. It is believed that no information was passed to the Soviets and that all documents were retrieved. On 24 April\n1990, Schoof was sentenced to 25 years' imprisonment, stripped of all rank, forfeited all pay and allowances, and received a dishonorable discharge. Haeger was sentenced to 19 years, also forfeited pay and allowances and received a dishonorable discharge. Under a 1987 regulation that revised parole guidelines, the two were expected to serve virtually all of their sentences.\n\nNorthern Virginia Sun\n\n11 Dec 1989, \"Two Radar Operators from Landing Ship Charged in Spying\n\n\nConspiracy\"\nFree Lance-Star\n\n26 Apr 1990, \"Navy Men Get Prison Terms for Attempted Espionage\"\n\n\nSCHWARTZ, MICHAEL STEPHEN, US Navy Lieutenant Commander, was charged with passing Department of Defense classified documents and computer diskettes to Saudi naval officers between November 1992 and September 1994 while assigned to a US military training mission in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. Schwartz, a naval surface warfare officer who served in the Gulf War, was charged with four counts of espionage on 23 May 1995. He is also charged with five counts of violating Federal regulations for allegedly removing classified material to his residence. The charges resulted from a Naval Criminal Investigative Service investigation which began in September 1994. The documents allegedly included classified messages to foreign countries, military intelligence digests, intelligence advisories, and tactical intelligence summaries classified up to the Secret (Noforn) level. There is no indication that Schwartz received any money for the materials; according to a media report, Schwartz was attempting to be helpful to the Saudis because of US-Saudi cooperation during the Gulf War. On 14 October, Schwartz agreed to a plea bargain that allowed him to avoid a court-martial and possible imprisonment. According to the agreement, in November 1995, Schwartz received an \"other than honorable\" discharge and lost all retirement benefits and other military privileges.\n\nVirginian-Pilot (Norfolk VA)  25 May 1995, \"Officer Spied for Saudis, Navy Says\" Washington Jewish Week\n1 Jun 1995, \"Navy Officer Arrested on Charges of Espionage\"\nWashington Post\n\n\n13 Sep 1995, \"Norfolk Naval Officer Faces Court-Martial in Espionage Case\"\nVirginian-Pilot\n\n\n14 Oct 1995, \"Navy Officer Accused of Spying Gives U Retirement Benefits\"\nSCRANAGE, SHARON MARIE, operations support assistant for the CIA stationed in Ghana and her Ghanaian boyfriend, **MICHAEL SOUSSOUDIS**, were charged on 11 July 1985 with turning over classified information, including the identities of CIA agents and informants, to Ghanaian intelligence officials. It is reported that a routine polygraph test given to Scranage on her return to the US aroused CIA suspicions. Following an internal investigation, Scranage agreed to cooperate with the FBI in order to arrest Soussoudis, a business consultant and permanent resident of the US. According to one report, damaging information on CIA intelligence collection activities is likely to have been passed on by pro- Marxist Kojo Tsikata, head of Ghanaian intelligence, to Cuba, Libya, East Germany and other Soviet Bloc nations. Scranage was likely encouraged to pass along these documents by Soussoudis with whom she was intimately friendly. Indicted on 18 counts of providing classified information to a foreign country, Scranage subsequently pleaded guilty to one count under the espionage code and two counts of violating the Intelligence Identities Protection Act. Fifteen remaining charges were dropped. On 26\nNovember Scranage was sentenced to five years in prison. (This was later reduced to two years.) At the same time Soussoudis, who had been charged with eight counts of espionage, pleaded *nolo contendere*\nand was sentenced to 20 years. His sentence was suspended on the condition that he leave the US within 24 hours.\n\nWashington Post\n\n12 Jul 1985, \"CIA Aide, Ghanaian Face Spy Counts\"\nWashington Post\n\n14 Jul 1985, \"Routine Polygraph Opened Ghanaian Espionage Probe\"\nWashington Post\n\n20 Jul 1985, \"FBI Says Spying Occurred After CIA Order on Ghanaian\"\nSELDON, PHILLIP TYLER, a former Pentagon civilian employee, pleaded guilty on 7 August 1996 in Alexandria, Virginia, to passing classified documents to a Salvadoran air force officer while on active military duty in El Salvador as a US Army captain. After leaving the Army, Seldon took a civilian job with the Department of Defense. According to court documents, Seldon gave the Salvadoran three packets of documents between November 1992 and July 1993. None of the material was reported to have exceeded the Secret level. Seldon claimed that he had met the Salvadoran officer while working as an intelligence advisor, and he believed that the officer had the appropriate clearance. This information came to light in the course of a polygraph examination as Seldon was applying for a position with the CIA. On 8 November, Seldon was sentenced by a US District court to two years in prison.\n\nWashington Post\n\n9 Nov 1996, \"Ex-Pentagon Worker Given 2 Years for Passing Secrets\"\n\n\nSHAABAN, HAFIZ AHMAD ALI SHAABAN, a 52-year-old a truck driver in Greenfield, Indiana, was arrested on 1 March 2005, accused of traveling to Iraq prior to the 2003 US invasion and offering to sell the names of US intelligence operatives in that country to agents of Saddam Hussein's Iraqi Intelligence Service. In a bugged hotel room in Baghdad he promised to acquire these names from a third party and demanded $3,000,000 as payment. (The deal fell apart after Shaaban returned to the US and could not produce the promised documents.) He also sought to gain Iraqi support to establish an Arabic TV station in the US that would broadcast pro-Iraqi material and he offered to organize volunteers to act as human shields to protect Iraqi infrastructure in the coming war. Shaaban, a Palestinian who was born in Jordan, became a naturalized US citizen by using fraudulent identification. He is believed to have been in the US since 1993. Earlier, in 1972, he had lived in Moscow where he married his first wife whose whereabouts are now unknown. The prosecution alleged that during his stay in Moscow Shaaban received training from Russian intelligence agents. One news report suggested that he had been a Soviet-trained mining engineer, another that he actually held Russian citizenship. The jury rejected Shaaban's claims that prosecutors had him confused with a dead twin brother and that the CIA had sent him to Iraq as part of a \"psychological war\" preceding the US invasion in 2003. Shaaban, who refused legal counsel and defended himself in court, was found guilty of conspiracy against the US, acting as a foreign agent without notification to the US Attorney General, violation of sanctions against Iraqi under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act, unlawful procurement of an identification document, fraudulently acquiring US naturalization, and tampering with a witness. Shaaban was sentenced 27 May 2006 to 13 years and four months in prison and is now incarcerated in the maximum-security prison in Colorado, far from his second wife and son who still live in Indiana. He has been stripped of his US\ncitizenship. US Department of Justice\n25 Jan 2006, \"Local Man Convicted of Working with Former Iraqi Intelligence Officers\"\nIndianapolis Star\n\n\n6 Nov 2006, \"Convicted in Spy Case, Locked Away in Secrecy\"\nSHU, QUAN-SHENG, 68, a Ph.D. physicist, a naturalized US citizen born in Shanghai, was president, secretary and treasurer of AMAC International, a high-tech company with offices in Beijing. The R&D\ncompany was based at the Applied Research Center in Newport News, Virginia. Shu was arrested in September 2008 and pleaded guilty 17 November 2008 to charges that he illegally exported sensitive space launch technical data and defense services to the People's Republic of China (PRC) and offered bribes to Chinese government officials. He admitted that from 2003 through October 2007 he violated the US arms export control law by providing the PRC with assistance in the design and development of a cryogenic fueling system for space launch vehicles. He also admitted that in 2003 he violated the same law by exporting to China military technical data from a document about designing and making a liquid hydrogen tank and various pumps, valves, filters and instruments. At the same time Shu pleaded guilty to offering bribes of nearly $190,000, on behalf of a French company that he represented, to Chinese government officials to win a $4 million contract for a hydrogen liquefier project. Shu was sentenced 7 April 2009 to 51 months in prison.\n\nDigitajournal.com\n\n25 Sep 2008, \"More Chinese Espionage Involving Rocket Plans\"\nDepartment of Justice, News\nRelease\n17 Nov 2008, \"Virginia Physicist Pleads Guilty To Illegally Exporting Space Launch Data to China and Offering Bribes to Chinese\"\nWashington Post\n9 Apr 2009, \"Physicist Sentenced to Prison for Helping China\"\n\n\nSLATTEN, CHARLES DALE, a US Army PFC in the 8th Signal Battalion of the 8th Infantry Division, was stationed at Bad Kreuznach, West Germany, in 1984. On April 14 he was arrested by the USACIDC\nfor stealing a cryptological device with intent to sell it to the USSR. Slatten worked as a telephone installer at the Rose Barracks where he had access to the device. Although he collaborated with two friends in a scheme to sell the equipment to the Russians for an offer of $1.8 million, Slatten was the only one convicted of espionage by a military court-martial on August 22, 1984. He was sentenced to nine years in prison and given a dishonorable discharge. His motive for committing espionage at the age of 19, two years into his Army career, was money. After serving eight years of his sentence for espionage in a military prison in Kansas, Slatten was released and eventually moved to St. Petersburg, Florida, where he and his wife, a cocaine addict and sometime prostitute, compiled a further criminal record. In July 1994, Slatten pleaded no contest to 11 counts of petty and grand theft for a series of thefts of pay phones from laundries, post offices, and convenience stores. He would break open the phones to get the change for his wife's cocaine habit. On probation six months later, the apartment manager at the complex where Slatten was living evicted him, and Slatten became enraged. Rather than retaliate against the manager, however, he decided to go after the manager's parents. On 25 February 1995, Slatten made a pipe bomb in his living room and convinced a friend to detonate it against the front door of the manager's parents' home. The explosion damaged the house but failed to injure the sleeping inhabitants. Slatten pleaded guilty to seven counts that included making, possessing, and conspiring to use a \"weapon of mass destruction.\" At the age of 31, in August 1996 he was sentenced to another 24 years in prison. U.P.I.\n\n\n\n19 Apr 1984, \"U.S. Air Force Sergeant Charged with Spying\"\nTampa [Florida] Tribune\n14 Apr 1995, \"Police: Angry Tenant Sought Revenge with Bomb\"\nSt. Petersburg Times\n\n5 Jul 1995, \"Teenager Gets Year in Jail in DUI-Manslaughter Case\"\nSt. Petersburg Times\n\n16 Aug 1996, \"Revenge Bomber Gets a 24-year Sentence\"\nSLAVENS, BRIAN EVERETT, Marine Corps PFC, reportedly deserted his sentry post at the Marine's Modified Advanced Undersea Weapons Command, Adak, Alaska. He advised his sister that he did not intend to return to the Marine Corps and that he had visited the Soviet Embassy in Washington, DC, during late August/early September 1982. Slavens's father alerted the Marine Corps of his son's intent to desert, and abruptly Slavens was arrested by Naval Investigative Service special agents on 4 September 1982. During interrogation, Slavens admitted entering the Soviet Embassy in Washington, DC, and offering to provide information concerning the military installation where he worked in Adak. Slavens denied transferring any classified material to the Soviets, but explained that his intent was to sell US military information for $500 to $1,000. According to Slavens, he was actually inside the Soviet Embassy less than 30 minutes, during which time he was asked to provide an autobiographical sketch and to reconsider his actions. Slavens subsequently requested legal counsel, and his lawyer later agreed for Slavens to undergo a polygraph examination. Slavens was administered a polygraph exam on 5 September 1982, the results of which indicated that he did not disclose any classified information to the Soviets. On 24 November 1982, Slavens pleaded guilty to a charge of attempted espionage at a general court-martial held at Marine Corps Base, Camp Lejeune, North Carolina. He was sentenced to two years' confinement and forfeiture of all pay and allowances, and given a dishonorable discharge.\n\nNaval Investigative Service Command, *Espionage*, 1989\nSMITH, JAMES J., an FBI agent, and KATRINA M. **LEUNG**, a Chinese-American business woman and Los Angeles socialite, were both arrested 9 April 2003 for illegal activities involving US classified information. Smith, 59, was charged with gross negligence in allowing Leung access to classified material, and Leung, 49, with illegally obtaining secret documents that would be an advantage to China. Leung was one of the FBI's most highly paid assets; she was paid $1.6 million for working as an informant from the early 1980s until 2002. However, it was alleged that for at least 10 years Leung was also spying for the People's Republic of China (PRC) against the US. Moreover, she had for 20 years been involved in an intimate relationship with Smith, her FBI handler. Smith routinely debriefed Leung and on occasion took classified documents to her home and left them unattended. Leung surreptitiously photocopied some of them; these same copies were later recovered from her home by the FBI. In 1991\nSmith learned from the FBI that Leung was suspected of providing classified information to PRC intelligence services without authorization from the FBI, yet he continued to vouch for her and allow her access to classified materials. On her arrest, Leung was not charged by federal prosecutors with espionage\n(because the government could not prove she passed information to China) but with illegally copying classified documents she took from Smith's briefcase. In May 2004 Smith plea-bargained, pleading guilty only to lying about the long-time sexual affair. Four additional felony charges were dropped, which spared him from prison, but he was also barred from contact with Leung's defense lawyers because of concerns over classified information being revealed in open court. In addition, he agreed to cooperate with the government in its investigation of Leung. However, in January 2005 the case against Leung was thrown out on the grounds that she would not be able to get a fair trial without access to Smith. She ultimately pleaded guilty to two minor charges: lying to the FBI and failing to report taxable income. She spent three months in jail and 18 months in home detention, served three years' probation and 100 hours of community service, and paid a $10,000 fine. At the same time that Leung had her affair with Smith, she was also having a sexual relationship with another FBI agent, then working in San Francisco, William Cleveland Jr. He was not arrested or charged alongside Smith and Leung, but two days after Leung's arrest in 2003, he resigned his security job at the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory. Washington Post\n\n\n13 May 2004, \"Ex-Handler of Alleged FBI Spy Cuts Deal\"\nNew York Times\n\n\n7 Jan 2005, \"All Charges are Dismissed in Spy Case Tied to F.B.I.\"\nLatimes.com\n\n\n5 Feb 2005, \"Judge Urged to Reverse Decision Ending FBI Espionage Case\"\nWashington Post\n\n\n25 May 2006, \"FBI Officials are Faulted in Chinese Spying Case\"\nSMITH, RICHARD CRAIG, former Army counterintelligence agent, was arrested on 4 April 1984 and indicted for selling information to Soviet agents regarding the identities of six double-agents in the US. Having failed in business after leaving government service and faced with severe financial difficulties, Smith reportedly met on three occasions with KGB officers in Tokyo and received $11,000 for classified information. Smith himself initiated contact with the FBI in the summer of 1983, claiming he had \"conned\" the Soviets out of $11,000. Later, Smith claimed that he had been working under the direction of CIA operatives in Honolulu. After months of pre-trial litigation over the admissibility of evidence, Smith was acquitted by a Federal jury on 11 April 1986.\n\nWashington Post\n\n9 Apr 1984, \"Unlikely Character for a Spy Story\"\nWashington Post\n\n11 Apr 1984, \"Spy-Case Suspect.....\"\nWashington Post\n\n13 Apr 1986, \"Smith Celebrates His Freedom\"\n\n\nSMITH, TIMOTHY STEVEN, 37, was a civilian serving as an ordinary seaman on the *USS Kilauea*, an ammunition and supply vessel attached to the Pacific Fleet. On 1 April 2000, while the ship was moored at the Bremerton Naval Station in Bremerton, Washington, Smith was surprised by an officer when removing computer disks from a desk drawer. After a scuffle, Smith was subdued and 17 disks were retrieved from his clothing. A search of his quarters found five stolen documents marked Confidential, including one describing the transfer of ammunition and handling of torpedoes on US Navy vessels. Charged initially in US District Court in Tacoma, Washington, with two counts of espionage and two counts of theft and resisting arrest, investigation showed that Smith needed mental treatment and had a severe alcohol problem. He told FBI agents that he \"wanted to get back at the crew\" for their mistreatment of him and that, in order to get revenge, he had tried to steal \"valuable classified materials\"\nbecause \"if I got something valuable, then I could turn my life around.\" To sell his cache, he thought he might \"go online and solicit buyers from terrorist groups.\" Smith pleaded guilty after prosecutors dropped espionage charges. In a plea agreement reached in August 2000, he pled guilty to one count of stealing government property and one count of assaulting an officer. He was sentenced in December 2000 to 260\ndays' confinement (to include time served) and was released on 22 December 2000. Seattle Post-Intelligencer\n14 Apr 2000, \"Seaman Admits Stealing Defense Secrets, FBI Says\"\nNational Counter-\n\n\nNews and Developments, Vol. 1, March 2001\n    intelligence Executive SOMBOLAY, ALBERT T., a specialist 4th class with the Army artillery, pleaded guilty in July 1991 to espionage and aiding the enemy. He was tried by military judge in Baumholder, Germany, and sentenced to confinement at hard labor for 34 years, reduction to E-1, forfeiture of all pay and allowances, and dishonorable discharge. Sombolay was born in Zaire, Africa. He became a US citizen in 1978 and entered the Army in 1985 as a cannon crewman. In December 1990, assigned to the 8th Infantry Division in Baumholder, Germany, he contacted the Iraqi and Jordanian embassies to volunteer his services in support of the \"Arab cause.\" To the Jordanian Embassy in Brussels he passed information on US troop readiness and promised more information to include videotapes of US equipment and positions in Saudi Arabia. He told the Jordanians that he would be deployed to Saudi Arabia and could provide them useful information. To the Iraqi Embassy in Bonn, Germany, he offered the same services, but the embassy did not respond. On 29 December, Sombolay's unit was deployed to Saudi Arabia, as part of Desert Shield, without him.  Still in Germany, Sombolay continued to contact the Iraqis and provided a Jordanian representative several items of chemical warfare equipment (chemical suit, boots, gloves, and decontamination gear). His activity was discovered by US Army military intelligence. After Sombolay's arrest in March 1991, he admitted to providing Desert Shield deployment information, military identification cards, and chemical protection equipment to Jordanian officials. His motivation was money.\n\n\nHuntsville Times\n\n4 Dec 1991, \"Army Spy Sentenced to 34 Years\"\nCincinnati Post\n\n7 Dec 1991, \"Anatomy of a Spy\"\n\n\nSOUTHER, GLENN MICHAEL. On 11 July 1988, Soviet newspaper *Izvestia* announced that Souther, a former navy photographic specialist who disappeared in May 1986, had been granted political asylum in the Soviet Union. Just before his disappearance, Souther, a recent graduate with a major in Russian Studies from Old Dominion University, was questioned by FBI counterintelligence agents. According to one source, investigators were acting \"on more than suspicions, but didn't catch him in the act of espionage, and thus couldn't hold Souther at the time he was questioned.\" While attending college, Souther had been assigned as an active reservist to the Navy Intelligence Center in Norfolk where he had access to classified information. Souther's sudden disappearance was of considerable concern to FBI and Navy officials since the former Navy enlisted man had held special security clearances while on active duty with the Sixth Fleet in the early 1980s. During that time he had access to highly classified photointelligence materials. Souther joined the Navy in 1975 and left active duty in 1982 with the position of photographers mate. According to the Soviets, the former Navy specialist had asked for asylum because \"he had to hide from the US special services which were pursuing him groundlessly.\" Described as a bright but undisciplined young man by former teachers and acquaintances, Souther reportedly had wanted to become a US Naval officer, but had been turned down as a Navy officer candidate. On 22 June 1989, at the age of 32, he reportedly committed suicide by asphyxiation after shutting himself in his garage and starting his car. Russian newspapers suggested he had been disappointed by aspects of Soviet life after defecting in 1986 and was prone to depression.\n\nWashington Post\n\n18 Jul 1988, \"Ex-Sailor Defects to Soviets\"\n\nSPADE, HENRY OTTO, a former Navy radio operator, was arrested in Mountain Home, Arkansas, on\n17 November 1988 for the unauthorized possession of two Top Secret documents. One of the documents was a cryptographic key card. Spade, who was discharged from the Navy in April 1988, stole the items while on active duty, but had reportedly made no attempt to sell them to any person or foreign government. While in the Navy, Spade served aboard the USS *Midway* and the USS *Bristol County*. Charged with one count of espionage, Spade pleaded innocent and was released on $25,000 bond. Spade faced up to 10 years in prison and a $250,000 fine when convicted, but on 14 March 1989 was sentenced to three months' probation.\n\nWashington Post\n\n18 Nov 1988, \"Ex-Sailor Charged in Secrets Case\"\nSTAND, KURT ALAN, a regional labor union representative along with his wife, THERESE MARIE\nSQUILLACOTE, a former senior staff lawyer in the Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense, and friend **JAMES MICHAEL CLARK**, a private investigator, were arrested 4 Oct 1997 on charges of spying for East Germany and Russia. Stand reportedly began his spying activities in 1972 after being recruited by East Germany to cultivate other spies in the Washington, DC, area. He was introduced to East German intelligence officers (the Stasi) through his father, Maxmillian Stand, a chemical engineer who fled Nazi Germany in the 1930s. Clark, Squillacote, and Stand attended the University of Wisconsin in the 1970s where they were affiliated with leftist groups, specifically the Progressive Student Forum and the Young Workers Liberation League, the youth arm of the Communist Party USA. Stand recruited Clark in 1976 and Squillacote about the time the couple was married in 1980. Before obtaining a position at the Pentagon, Therese Squillacote was employed by the National Labor Relations Board and, later, the House Armed Services Committee. She sent numerous photographs to her German handlers. Squillacote reportedly told an undercover FBI agent that she turned to spying to support the progressive antiimperialist movement. She first came to the attention of the FBI in 1995 when she offered to be a spy in a letter to a South African government official who was a leader of his country's Communist Party. Stand and Squillacote frequently traveled to Mexico, Germany, and Canada during which time Stand would meet with their East German handlers. When the two Germanys united in 1990, Stand's controllers tried to recruit him to spy for the Soviet Union and then for the Russian Federation. Although he never gained access to classified material, his role in the operation was to recruit agents and to provide information about the nongovernmental groups with which he worked. Stand allegedly received $24,650 for his recruiting and coordinating efforts. On 23 Oct 1998, he and Squillacote were convicted of conspiracy to commit espionage, attempted espionage, and illegally obtaining national defense documents. On 22 January 1999, a US District Judge sentenced Squillacote to 21 years and 10 months in prison and Stand to a sentence of 17 years and six months. [See also the case summary for James Michael Clark.]\nNew York Times\n\n7 Oct 1997, \"Three Onetime Radicals Held in Spy Case\"\nWashington Post\n\n2 Nov 1997, \"Cloak and Blabber; A Story of Espionage and Very Loose Lips\"\nWashington Post\n\n24 Oct 1998, \"Jury Rejects Entrapment Defense, Convicts DC Couple of Spying\"\n\n\nTOBIAS, MICHAEL TIMOTHY, Navy Petty Officer 3rd Class, along with his nephew, FRANCIS X.\n\nPIZZO, were arrested on 13 August 1985 and charged with stealing Top Secret cryptographic key cards from the USS *Peoria*, berthed at San Diego. The pair were also accused of attempting to sell the material to representatives of the Soviet Union for $100,000. Tobias and Pizzo drove to the Soviet Consulate in San Francisco, but arrived during the early morning before regular business hours. Having failed in their initial attempt to contact a \"foreign power,\" and obviously having second thoughts about committing espionage, the pair drove back to San Diego and called the US Secret Service offering to sell the cards back to the government for amnesty and money by claiming that they were prepared to sell the key material to the Soviets. Several calls were placed to the Secret Service by Pizzo, one of which was traced by the FBI. Also arrested in connection with the case were Tobias's brother, **BRUCE TOBIAS**, and DALE IRENE of San Diego. According to government prosecutors, Tobias took the classified cards from the ship instead of shredding them, as was his assignment with the intention of selling them. Pizzo pleaded guilty to five Federal charges and on 7 October was sentenced to 10 years in prison. Bruce Tobias and Dale Irene pleaded guilty to two counts of receiving stolen property. During the four-day trial of Michael Tobias, an NSA official testified that the cards would have provided sensitive information about the location and movement of US and foreign vessels. Two of the 12 pilfered cards have not been recovered. On 14 August Michael Tobias was found guilty of four counts of conspiracy and three counts of theft of government property. The US Attorney stated that Tobias had attempted to leave the country and that he and Pizzo had been seen near the Soviet Consulate in San Francisco before their arrests.  On\n12 November 1995, Michael Tobias was sentenced to 20 years' imprisonment; in January 1996, Bruce Tobias was sentenced to the prison time he served up to that date (159 days), and Dale Irene was sentenced to a two-year confinement.\n\n\nNew York Times\n\n15 Aug 1985, \"Sailor is Guilty of Conspiring to Sell Secret Data from Ship\"\nNew York Times\n\n13 Nov 1985, \"Sailor Sentenced to 20 Years for Trying to Sell 11 Navy Codes\"\nNaval Investigative Service Command, *Espionage*, 1989\n\n\nTROFIMOFF, GEORGE, retired US Army Reserve colonel, 73, was arrested on 14 June 2000 in Tampa, Florida, and charged with spying for Russia for 25 years. His arrest concluded a seven-year investigation by the FBI and German authorities. According to the FBI, Trofimoff provided classified information to the Russians while employed in a civilian job in Nuremburg, Germany, from 1959 to 1994, following his military retirement. He allegedly was paid $250,000 for documents provided to KGB, and later, to SVR agents. According the indictment, Trofimoff, who was raised in Germany by Russian emigre parents, was recruited by **IGOR SUSEMIHL**, a Russian Orthodox priest and Trofimoff's boyhood friend. Trofimoff enlisted in the US Army in 1948 after his family moved to the US, and he became a US citizen in 1951. He received a commission in the Army Reserve in 1953 and retired with the rank of colonel in 1987. During his military and civilian careers he held Secret or Top Secret security clearances, and in his civilian position, with the Army 66th Military Intelligence Group, he had access to a wide variety of classified materials including US intelligence needs and objectives. In or about 1969, Trofimoff was recruited into the service of the KGB by Susemihl, who at the time served as archbishop of Austria. Susemihl died in 1999. Trofimoff allegedly removed classified documents from the US Army Interrogation Center in Munich, photographed and returned the originals, and then passed the film to Susemihl or KGB agents during several meetings in Austria or southern Germany. It is believed that he turned over more than 50,000 pages of classified documents. Trofimoff and Susemihl had been arrested by German authorities for suspected espionage in 1994, but the case was dropped because the statute of limitations had expired. The investigation, however, was continued by US officials. In late 2000, Trofimoff, who had since retired to Florida, was approached by an FBI agent posing as a Russian officer who offered a \"special payment\" for additional information. Before his arrest at a Tampa hotel, Trofimoff met with undercover FBI agents several times and was videotaped fully admitting his past involvement in espionage. However, the retired Army employee pleaded not guilty on 26 June, 2001, claiming that he was a loyal American who was just trying to collect some money to cover his debts. Trofimoff, the highest ranking US officer ever accused of spying, was convicted in June for his role in the 25-year espionage conspiracy after a four-week trial.  He was sentenced to life imprisonment on 27 September 2001. Orlando Sentinel\n\n\n15 Jun 2000, \"Viera Retiree is Accused of Espionage\"\nStars and Stripes\n\n\n1 Jul 2000, \"Trofimoff Denies He Spied for Soviets\"\nWashington Post\n\n\n6 Jun 2001, \"Espionage Trial Begins for Retired Army Colonel\"\nMiami Herald\n\n\n25 Jun 2001, \"Historic Spy Trial in Tampa Nears End\"\nNew York Times\n\n\n27 Jun 2001, \"Retired Army Employee is Found Guilty of Spying\"\n\n\nTSOU, DOUGLAS, a Chinese-born former FBI employee, was indicted in 1988 on one count of espionage following his admission that in 1986 he had written a letter to a representative of the government of Taiwan in which he revealed the identity of an intelligence officer of the People's Republic of China. According to testimony at the trial (which was delayed until October 1991), the unidentified agent operating in Taiwan had unsuccessfully approached the FBI with an offer to work as a double agent. Although the information Tsou passed to a Taiwanese representative in Houston was classified as Secret, Tsou claimed that he considered the information to be declassified since the offer was not accepted. Motivation for his acts of espionage was likely loyalty to government of Taiwan. Tsou fled to Taiwan when the communists rose to power on the mainland in 1949 and moved to the US 20 years later where he became a naturalized citizen. He worked for the FBI from 1980 to 1986, first in San Francisco and later in Houston. On 4 October 1991, Tsou was found guilty as charged. However, prosecutors claimed that this represented only the tip of the iceberg of what Tsou gave to Taiwanese officials during his six years with the FBI. On 2 January 1992, Tsou was sentenced to a 10-year Federal prison term.\n\nHouston Chronicle\n\n22 Jan 1992, \"Ex-FBI Translator Sentenced for Passing Secrets to Taiwan\"\n\n\nTUMANOVA, SVETLANA, a naturalized US citizen born in Estonia, worked as a secretary at the US\nArmy Foreign Language Training Center in Munich. She married a Soviet emigre and her parents continued to live in the Soviet Union. In 1978 she was recruited by the Soviet foreign intelligence service to provide information through coercion based on threats against her parents. Arrested in 1987 by West German police, she was convicted of providing biographical information on personnel at the Language Center for nine years. She was sentenced to five years' probation.\n\nWALKER, ARTHUR JAMES, a retired Navy Lieutenant Commander, was arrested on 29 May 1985\nfor providing classified material to his brother in 1981 and 1982. Arthur Walker was employed with a defense contractor in Chesapeake, Virginia, where he reportedly sought work in early 1980 at the urging of his brother, John A. Walker, to gain access to classified documents. During the period of his employment, Arthur Walker provided his brother with several Confidential documents that related to ship construction and design. These were photocopied and returned to the firm's classified container. In all Arthur Walker received $12,000 for his collaboration, much of which he returned to his brother to repay a debt. His motive for participating in John Walker's scheme was both for money and to help this brother.\n\nOn 9 August 1985, he was found guilty of seven counts of espionage by a US District Court judge. On 12\nNovember, Arthur Walker was sentenced to life imprisonment and fined $250,000. At the time of sentencing it was revealed that polygraph tests indicated Walker may have been involved in espionage while on active duty with the Navy.\n\nWashington Post\n\n7 Aug 1985, \"Two Portraits of Arthur Walker: Subversive Plotter\"\nWashington Post\n\n10 Aug 1985, \"Walker Guilty of Espionage on 7 Counts\"\nTime Magazine\n\n19 Aug 1985, \"A Spy Ring Goes to Court\"\nNew York Times\n\n13 Nov 1985, \"Arthur Walker Sentenced to Life; Wider Spying Role\"\n\n\nWALKER, JOHN ANTHONY, and his son, **MICHAEL LANCE WALKER**, were indicted 28 May\n1985 by a Federal grand jury in Baltimore on six counts of espionage. The elder Walker, a retired Navy warrant officer who had held a Top Secret crypto clearance, was charged with having sold classified material to Soviet agents for the past 18 years. During his military career, Walker made some investments in which he lost money. To make up for his losses, in late 1968 at the age of 30, Walker went to the Soviet Embassy in Washington, DC, and offered his services for purposes of espionage. He compromised key cards used for enciphering messages and also provided information on the encryption devices themselves. At least a million classified messages of the military services and US intelligence agencies were compromised. A Soviet defector said the KGB considered this the most important operation in its history. Michael Walker, a petty officer assigned to the USS *Nimitz*, was accused of providing classified Navy documents to his father for sale to the Soviets. Fifteen pounds of classified material were in his possession at the time of arrest on the *Nimitz*. John Walker's arrest resulted from a tip to the FBI from his former wife. He was apprehended at a Maryland motel after depositing a number of documents at a roadside drop. Soviet Embassy official, Alexei Tkachenko, who was spotted in the area, returned to Moscow within days of Walker's arrest. It is also alleged that John Walker recruited his brother, ARTHUR JAMES WALKER, and former Navy friend, **JERRY ALFRED WHITWORTH**, as sources of classified information for Soviet intelligence (see separate summaries for these cases). On 28 October, both John and Michael Walker pleaded guilty to espionage charges under a plea agreement by which the senior Walker agreed to testify in the trial of Jerry Whitworth and to provide full information on what was given to the Soviets in exchange for a lesser sentence for his son. On 6 November 1986, John Walker was sentenced to two life terms plus 10 years to be served concurrently. Michael was sentenced to 25 years. A Federal grand jury has been convened to pursue some of the unresolved questions including the location of up to $1 million possibly hidden by John Walker, and the involvement of minor players in the espionage ring.\n\nNew York Times\n\n21 May 1985, \"Ex-Navy Officer Is Charged With Espionage\"\nWashington Post\n\n22 May 1985, \"Spy Suspect's Son Queried\"\nWashington Post\n\n16 Aug 1985, \"Lawyers Admit Walker Left Bag\"\nWashington Post\n\n29 Oct 1985, \"2 Walkers Plead Guilty to Spying\"\nWashington Post\n\n7 Nov 1986, \"Walker Gets Life Term; Judge to Oppose Parole\"\nNaval Investigative Service Command, *Espionage*, 1989\n\n\nWARREN, KELLY THERESE, a former US Army clerk, was arrested 10 June 1997 and named in a three-count indictment alleging her involvement in the passing of sensitive information to Hungary and Czechoslovakia in the mid-80's, as a part of the **CLYDE LEE CONRAD** spy ring. Warren was charged with conspiracy to aid a foreign government and gathering or delivering classified national defense information. From 1986 to 1988 she had been assigned as an administrative assistant in the section that handled war plans for the Army's 8th Infantry Division headquarters in Bad Kreuznach, Germany. In 1987\nshe was recruited into the Conrad ring by then-coworker **RODERICK JAMES RAMSAY**. Among documents Warren gave to Conrad to pass to Hungarian and Czech agents were secret US and NATO plans for the defense of Western Europe in the event of a Soviet bloc attack. The indictment said that Warren met with Conrad on base, at a bowling alley and in a church in Bad Kreuznach, to trade cash for secrets. She earned only $7,000 for her efforts with which she claimed to have paid off debts, money being her motive. Federal agents had suspected her involvement for almost 10 years. According to a plea agreement, Warren pled guilty to one count of conspiracy to commit espionage on 6 November 1998 and on 12 February she was sentenced to 25 years in prison. Warren is the seventh US service member to be charged with taking part in the Conrad spy ring since 1988.\n\nFlorida Times-Union\n\n11 Jun 1997, \"Former Soldier Arrested; Warner Robins Woman Charged in\nEspionage Case\"\nRaleigh News and Observer\n29 Jul 1997, \"Federal Agents Still Tracking Members of '80s Army Spy Ring\"\nWEINMANN, ARIEL JONATHAN, 22 at the time of his sentencing, joined the Navy in 2003, having recently graduated from high school in Salem, Oregon. That same year he had met a girl with whom he fell in love. However, her anti-war parents did not approve of her dating a sailor. In the Navy he became a fire control technician, which involved operating and maintaining submarine weapons systems.\n\nWeinmann deployed to the submarine, *Albuquerque*. He quickly became unhappy with life on the sub, describing it as \"morally corrupt.\" After his tour of duty he returned home to be informed by his girlfriend that her parents did not approve of the relationship and that she was being sent to college in Switzerland.\n\nThe next day he told her that if he did not hear from her by his October birthday, he would move on with his life. Following her departure, Weinmann moved to Austria to be near her. Before he left for Austria, he downloaded classified information from the ship's database that he hoped would gain him asylum in Austria. These documents included biographical information on 29 prominent Austrians that the US government had compiled and also technical manuals on the Tomahawk cruise missile system. With his\n$7,000 savings, he arrived in Vienna at the beginning of July 2005. The October deadline passed with no word from the girlfriend, and that same month he entered the Russian Embassy in Vienna, handing the official a binder full of classified documents on the Tomahawk system. He never heard back from the official. When he realized that he had given away his only leverage, Weinmann decided to go to Russia to seek asylum there. However, that meant returning to the US first. On 26 March 2006, he flew from Mexico City to Dallas Fort Worth where he was arrested by US Customs agents because his name appeared on a deserter watch list. However, apparently he had not given away all his classified documents; some were found in his backpack, which led to the espionage charges. Weinmann pleaded guilty at court-martial to espionage, desertion, theft, and destruction of military property. He was sentenced 10 December 2006 to 25 years in prison, a dishonorable discharge, a reduction in rank, and forfeiture of all pay and allowances. A plea agreement limited his prison sentence to 12 years and he will be eligible for parole after four.\n\n\nVirginian-Pilot\n10 Dec 2006, \"Why a Patriotic Teen Joined the Navy and Then Turned to Espionage\"\nStatesmanJournal.com (Salem, OR)\n11 Dec 2006, \"Jilted Love, Not Political Intrigue, Drove a Salem Man to Espionage\"\n\n\nWHITWORTH, JERRY ALFRED, collaborator with **JOHN A. WALKER**, surrendered to FBI agents on 3 June 1985 following the issue of a complaint charging him with conspiracy to commit espionage. Whitworth, a retired Naval communications specialist who had held a Top Secret clearance, is alleged to have received $332,000 through Walker for highly classified information related to Naval communications between 1975 and 1982. FBI sources state that Whitworth had attempted to arrange a meeting with them in 1984 in order to bargain for immunity from prosecution. According to one news item, of all the alleged participants in the Walker spy ring the damage attributed to Whitworth is thought to be the worst since he is reported to have provided the Soviets with key lists that would have enabled them to decode US Naval communications, and classified information about the design of cryptographic equipment. Whitworth pleaded innocent to a 13-count indictment, but during his subsequent trial, defense lawyers admitted that he had passed classified materials to John Walker. However, the argument that he did not know these highly classified cryptographic materials were ending up in Soviet hands was not accepted by the Federal jury. Following a highly publicized three-month trial, Whitworth was convicted on 12 counts of espionage and tax evasion. The former communications specialist received a sentence of\n365 years and a fine of $410,000 on 28 August 1986.\n\nWashington Post\n\n4 Jun 1985, \"4th Arrested in Spy Case\"\nWashington Post\n\n8 Jun 1985, \"Agent Believes Sailor Said He Passed Data\"\nWashington Post\n\n14 Jun 1985, \"Accused Spy 'A Quiet Man'\"\n\n\nWILMOTH, JAMES R., US Navy airman recruit, was a food service worker aboard the carrier USS\nMidway. He was arrested by Naval Investigative Service agents in Yokosuka in July 1989 for attempting to sell classified information to a Soviet agent in Japan, where the *Midway* is based. He was tried and convicted at a general military court-martial 24 September 1989. In addition to attempted espionage, Wilmoth was convicted of failure to report a contact with a citizen of the Soviet Union, conspiracy to unlawfully transfer classified material, and possession, use and distribution of hashish. He was sentenced to 35 years at hard labor; however, since he cooperated in the investigation, his sentence was reduced to 15 years. He also received a dishonorable discharge, and was ordered to forfeit all his pay. He had been in the Navy for over two years and had a history of disciplinary problems including unauthorized leave of absence. Wilmoth did not have a security clearance. Classified information was procured by Petty Officer Third Class **RUSSELL PAUL BROWN** also stationed aboard the *Midway*. Brown held a Secret security clearance and took classified documents obtained from the burn bag in the electronic warfare center of the Midway. He passed the documents to Wilmoth, who planned to exchange the documents for cash in an arrangement with a KGB operative in Japan. Brown was convicted in October 1989 of conspiracy to commit espionage and lying to Navy investigators. A military judge sentenced him to 10 years in prison, a dishonorable discharge, reduction in rank from E-3 to E-1, and forfeiture of all pay and allowances. Motivation for the attempted sale to the Soviets was money.\n\nLos Angeles Times\n\n5 Oct 1989, \"Sailor Sentenced to 35 Years After Attempted Espionage\"\nWashington Times\n\n5 Oct 1989, \"Navy Convicts Spy, Stalks Another\"\nWashington Times\n\n25 Oct 1989, \"2nd Midway Sailor Gets Jail Term for Spying\"\n\n\nWISPELAERE, JEAN-PHILIPPE, 28, while employed by the Australian Defense Intelligence Organization as an analyst, in 1999 downloaded hundreds of sensitive classified US military documents to his computer and removed the files from his office. He was cleared for access to Top Secret US information. These documents, reported to be related to US satellite reconnaissance, were provided to Australia under a defense sharing agreement. On 18 January, six days after his unexpected resignation from the Australian intelligence agency, Wispelaere, posing as a Canadian official, walked into the embassy of Singapore in Bangkok and offered to sell the classified documents. He left a sample classified document and his email address. The US was alerted about the contact and set up a sting operation.  At a later meeting at a Bangkok hotel with undercover FBI agents, Wispelaere turned over 713 classified US documents maps and photos for $70,000 and subsequently mailed more than 200 items to a post office box in Virginia set up by the FBI for another $50,000. At one point, Wispelaere told the agent that he was in \"dire financial need\" and that this \"involved females.\" He was lured to Virginia to accept another payment, and on 15 May 1999 was arrested at Dulles International Airport upon his arrival from London.\n\nHe initially pleaded not guilty, but later entered into a plea agreement by which he was required to reveal all of his illegal activities. Sentencing was delayed when Wispelaere was diagnosed with schizophrenia, and for a time he was declared unfit to stand trial. On June 9, 2001, he was sentenced to 15 years in prison after the government announced that he had lived up to the terms of the plea agreement.\n\nLos Angeles Times\n\n\n18 May 1999, \"Internet-savvy Australian Charged in Espionage Case\"\nCalgary Herald\n\n21 May 1999, \"Canadian Spy Was 'a Bit of a Bumbler'\"\nWashington Post\n\n\n9 Jun 2001, \"15-year Term in Espionage Case: Australian Stole U.S. Documents,\nTried to Sell Them\"\n\nWOLD, HANS PALMER was an Intelligence Specialist Third Class assigned to the USS *Ranger* when\nhe asked for and was given leave from 13 June through 2 July 1983. The leave was granted with the understanding that Wold would stay in the local San Diego area, but around 2 July Wold's command received a message from the American Red Cross, Subic Bay, Philippines, in which Wold requested an\nextension of leave. Wold's request was granted for five additional days of leave. However, he failed to report for duty on 7 July and was listed as an unauthorized absentee. Wold's command then asked the Naval Investigative Service to locate him and turn him over to US Naval Forces in the Philippines at Subic Bay for appropriate debriefing. On 19 July 1983 Wold was picked up by NIS special agents at his fiancee's residence in Olongapo City, in the Philippines, for being absent without leave. During Wold's apprehension, an undeveloped roll of film was seized. During his debriefing Wold told an intelligence specialist that the roll of film had photographs from a Top Secret publication. Wold admitted he had covertly photographed the publication, \"Navy Application of National Reconnaissance Systems (U),\"\nwhile onboard the USS *Ranger* during June 1983, and intended to contact the Soviets. While he never did contact the Soviets, his motivation was to sell the materials for money. On 5 October 1983, Wold pleaded guilty at a general court-martial to unauthorized absence, using marijuana onboard the USS *Ranger*, false swearing, and \"making photographs with intent or reason to believe information was to be used to the injury of the US or the advantage of a foreign nation.\" Wold was sentenced to four years at hard labor, a dishonorable discharge, forfeiture of all pay and allowances, and reduction in rate to E-1.\n\n\nNaval Investigative Service Command, *Espionage*, 1989\n\n\nWOLF, RONALD CRAIG, a former pilot in the Air Force from 1974 to 1981, was arrested 5 May 1989\nin Dallas, Texas, for selling classified information to an FBI undercover officer posing as a Soviet agent.\n\nDuring his career in the Air Force, Wolf was trained as a Russian voice-processing specialist and flew intelligence missions on reconnaissance aircraft in the Far East. He held a Top Secret clearance. Discharged from the military in 1981 because of his unsuitability for service \"due to financial irresponsibility,\" he worked as an automobile salesman for a while, but was unemployed at the time of his arrest. The FBI's investigation began in March 1989, when information was obtained indicating Wolf's desire to sell sensitive information to the Soviet Union. Wolf talked with FBI undercover agent \"Sergei Kitin\" on a number of occasions thinking he was a representative of the Soviet Union assigned to the Soviet Embassy. During these conversations Wolf talked about his military experience and his desire to defect and provide Air Force secrets \"for monetary gain and to get revenge for his treatment by the United States government.\" He was directed to mail letters to a post office box in Maryland detailing the type of information he was capable of providing. Wolf passed along classified documents concerning Top Secret signals intelligence. The FBI says they are \"confident there was no exchange of information (with foreign agents) in this case.\" On 28 February 1990, Wolf pleaded guilty in Federal court. In return for his guilty plea, the government reduced the severity of the charges from life imprisonment to up to 10 years in prison. In June, Wolf was sentenced to 10 years without parole.\n\nDallas Times Herald\n\n1 Mar 90, \"Ex-Air Force Pilot Pleads Guilty to Espionage\"\nWashington Post\n\n16 Jun 90, \"Ex-Airman Get 10 Years\"\n\n\nWOLFF, JAY CLYDE, 24-year-old auto painter and former Navy enlisted man, was arrested on 17\nDecember 1984 in Gallup, New Mexico, for offering to sell classified documents dealing with US weapons systems aboard a US Navy vessel. Wolff, who was discharged from the Navy in 1983, met with an undercover agent and offered to sell classified material for $5,000 to $6,000. According to the FBI, a tip led to the meeting with Wolff at a convenience store where he was apprehended. Wolff pleaded guilty to one count of attempting to sell classified documents and on 28 June 1985 the former service member was sentenced to five years in prison.\n\nYAI, JOHN JOUNGWOONG, a sandwich shop owner from Santa Monica, California, was arrested 4\nFebruary 2003 for failing to register as an agent of North Korea, failing to report bringing more than\n$10,000 cash into the country, and for making false statements to US Customs inspectors. Yai, 59, who came to the US from Seoul, Korea, in 1975 and became naturalized in 1981, was accused of operating within the US at the direction of North Korean intelligence. Between December 1997 and April 2000, he was paid for his services to the North Korean government that had tasked him to obtain classified information and identify and recruit other agents. Yai was not charged with espionage because the FBI\ncould not prove that he had been successful in collecting and passing along classified information to North Korea. He did not speak English well and did not have a job relating to the government or know anyone who did. Yet he confessed to having received over time some $40,000 from the North Koreans for passing along what amounted to publicly available documents. And he did try to recruit agents in the US. He communicated with North Korean agents through coded faxes and email messages and through meetings overseas; he traveled to North Korea, China, Austria and the Czech Republic to meet North Korean security officials. Yai had been under investigation by FBI Counterintelligence for seven years.\n\nThe investigation involved surveillance, FISA-authorized secret searches, wiretaps and other high-tech electronic monitoring. On 15 November 2004 Yai was sentenced to two years in prison and was ordered to pay a $20,000 fine. His wife, who accompanied him on some trips, was sentenced to one year probation and a $500 fine. US Department of Justice\n5 Feb 2003, \"Santa Monica Man Arrested for Field News Press Release\nFailing to Register as an Agent of a Foreign Government\"\nLos Angeles Times\n\n\n6 Feb 2003, \"FBI Watched Spy Suspect for 7 Years\"\nTelegraph (UK)\n\n\n16 Feb 2003, \"Blunders of the Snack Shop 'Spy'\nSan Jose Mercury News\n\n26 Apr 2003, \"Spy Case Worries Korean Emigres\"\nZAKHAROV, GENNADIY F., Soviet physicist employed at the United Nations Secretariat, was arrested on 23 August 1986 on a Queens, New York, subway platform as he gave $1,000 to an employee of a US defense contractor for three classified documents. Zakharov, who did not have diplomatic immunity, had attempted to recruit the employee over a period of three years. At the time of Zakharov's first approach, the individual, a Guyanese national and resident alien of the US, was in his junior year at Queens College, New York. Zakharov met with the student on numerous occasions and paid several thousand dollars for a wide range of technical but unclassified information about robotics, computers, and artificial intelligence. At the time of Zakharov's first approach in April 1983, the recruitment target, identified only by the code name \"Birg,\" informed the FBI and agreed to work under FBI control in order to apprehend the Soviet agent. Following his graduation in 1985, Birg obtained a position with a hightechnology firm. Under FBI direction, he agreed to sign a 10-year written contract with Zakharov to provide classified information. Money to be paid by the Soviets was to be determined by the quantity and quality of the information. On 30 September, Zakharov pleaded no contest to espionage charges and was ordered to leave the country within 24 hours. Zakharov's expulsion came less than 24 hours after the release of American correspondent, Nicholas Daniloff, who had been arrested in the Soviet Union for alleged espionage activities.\n\nNew York Times\n\n24 Aug 1986, \"A Soviet Official Assigned to U.N. is Seized as a Spy\"\nNew York Times\n\n25 Aug 1986, \"Russian's Arrest Called Example of Spy Threat\"\nNew York Times\n\n26 Aug 1986, \"US Investigating Further Spy Cases in New York Area\"\nZEHE, ALFRED, an East German physicist and operative for East German intelligence, was arrested on\n3 November 1983, the result of a successful sting operation. On 21 December 1981, Bill Tanner, a civilian engineer employed at the Naval Electronic Systems Engineering Center in Charleston, South Carolina, walked into the East German Embassy in Washington, DC, and offered to exchange classified information for money. Tanner was actually a double agent working under the control of the Naval Investigative Service and FBI. The FBI's target was the East German intelligence service, the Ministerium fuer Staatssicherheit (MfS): how it worked and what type of information it was looking for. Zehe was Tanner's primary contact. Zehe is reported to be the first East German operative apprehended in this country. In July 1984, Zehe was freed on $500,000 bail to await trial. He subsequently pleaded guilty and was sentenced on 4 April to eight years' imprisonment with a fine of $5,000. In June 1985, Zehe was traded with three other Eastern Bloc agents for 25 persons who had \"been helpful\" to the United States.\n\nNew York Times\n\n4 Nov 1983, \"East German Held in Espionage Case\"\nNew York Times\n\n5 Nov 1983, \"East German is Denied Bail\"\nNaval Investigative Service Command, *Espionage*, 1989"
    },
    {
        "text": "Defense Group Inc.\n\nCorporate Office: 307 Annandale Road - Suite 110 - Falls Church, VA 22042-2454\n703/532-0802 - 703/532-0806 (fax) - www.defensegroupinc.com\n\n## Corporate Office:\n\n307 Annandale Road Suite 110 Falls Church, VA 22042-2454 703/532-0802 703/532-0806 (fax)\nVice Admiral Robert B. Murrett, USN Director, National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency 4600 Sangamore Road Bethesda, MD 20816\n\n## Regional Offices:\n\nDr. Donald M. Kerr Director, National Reconnaissance Office 14675 Lee Rd.\n\nChantilly, VA 20151\n429 Santa Monica Blvd. Suite 460 Santa Monica, CA 90401-3455 310/394-8599 310/394-0034 (fax)\n\n## Dear Vice Admiral Murrett And Dr. Kerr\n\n19632 Club House Road Suite 520 Montgomery Village, MD 20886-3041 301/926-9050 301/926-8432 (fax)\nEnclosed is the final report entitled \" Independent Study of the Roles of Commercial Remote Sensing in the Future National System for Geospatial-Intelligence (NSG)\" that identifies and discusses viable business cases in support the US government's increased acquisition of commercial remote sensing satellites and ancillary support. The review panel had the full cooperation and invaluable support of Mr. Frank Calvelli (NRO), Mr. Jaan Loger (NGA), and Mr. David Svetz (ODNI).\n\n1140 Connecticut Ave., NW Suite 810 Washington, D.C. 20036-4010 202/223-8701 202/223-8706 (fax)\nTwo key requirements drove the analysis and the recommendations:\n2034 Eisenhower Ave. Suite 115 Alexandria, VA 22314-4678 703/535-8720 703/537-8723 (fax)\n\n\nData must be available when needed. The US government cannot rely on or be dependent on any external entity to responsively get needed data.\n\nFlexible, highly agile, and survivable remote sensing capabilities with sufficient capacity to respond to all needs in a timely manner. The capabilities must operate in a manner consistent with a defined architecture.\n\n## Satellite Offices:\n\nHonolulu, HI\nChapel Hill, NC Fallon, NV Las Vegas, NV\nAccounting Office:\nThe panel believes that the US government can commercially acquire robust commercial remote sensing capabilities to meet minimal acceptable requirements through the adoption of acquisition strategies that \"buy\" proven, complex technologies but are modularly designed so as to maximize flexibility to meet dynamic mission needs. The modular design has the possibility, with the use of \"commercial practices,\" to allow components such as buses and payloads to be acquired separately.\n\n2034 Eisenhower Ave. Suite 105 Alexandria, VA 22314-4678 703/535-8720 703/837-8157 (fax)\nThe panel concurs that the business case that mitigates the most risk is for the US government to competitively acquire satellites and supporting infrastructure to ensure maximum control and access to imagery data on demand. Business Case 3 or 4 are the optimum choices. In deference to the policy to support the CDPs when possible, recommended business case (Business Case 4) supports the US government offering the Commercial Data Providers (CDPs) the ability to buy satellites in a \"block\" with the US government absorbing the upfront costs in order to spread costs and increase the efficiency of the business model. However, the panel believes that regardless of whether the US government fully adopts the recommended business case that its other recommendations should be fully adopted. Some of the key recommendations are:\n\n\nExpand the definition of what constitutes \"commercial to reflect market realities that every vendor and supplier operates in the commercial marketplace,\n\nAdopt \"best practices\" including Firm Fixed Price contracts\",\n\nBuy in \"blocks\" in order to apply \"lean manufacturing\" techniques as well as ensure maximum flexibility\n\nCommercially developed ground infrastructure can be managed to meet mission\nrequirements. The panel recommends a highly distributed ground infrastructure to\nensure survivability.\n\nCompete all contracts at some point in the cycle (as appropriate).\nThe panel fully supports the findings and recommendations contained in the report. Although I have shared our findings and recommendations with each of you, I am happy to further discuss the report in more detail at your convenience. Sincerely, Peter Marino Chair, National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency Advisory Group\n\n## Independent Study Of The Roles Of Commercial Remote Sensing In The Future National System For Geospatial-Intelligence (Nsg) Final Report\n\nChair Mr. Peter Marino\nMembers\nMr. Evan Hineman Dr. Edward McMahon Assistant to the Chair Dr. Leslie Lewis\n\n## Acronyms\n\n| CAIV    | Cost As an Independent Variable                        |\n|---------|--------------------------------------------------------|\n| COCOMs  | Combatant Commanders                                   |\n| CDP     | Commercial Data Provider                               |\n| COTS    | Commercial-Off-The-Shelf                               |\n| D/NGA   | Director, National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency      |\n| DOD     | Department of Defense                                  |\n| EELV    | Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle                      |\n| EO      | Electro-Optical                                        |\n| EVM     | Earn Value Management                                  |\n| FFP     | Firm Fixed Price                                       |\n| GSD     | Ground Sample Distance                                 |\n| HSI     | Hyper-Spectral Imagery                                 |\n| IC      | Intelligence Community                                 |\n| ICA     | Integrated Collection Architecture                     |\n| ITAR    | International Traffic in Arms Regulations              |\n| LIDAR   | Light Detection And Ranging                            |\n| MSI     | Multi-Spectral Imagery                                 |\n| NAG     | National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency Advisory Group |\n| NGA     | National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency                |\n| NIIRS   | National Imagery Interpretability Rating Scale         |\n| NIMA    | National Imagery and Mapping Agency                    |\n| NOAA    | National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration        |\n| NRE     | Non-Recurring Engineering                              |\n| NRO     | National Reconnaissance Office                         |\n| NSG     | National System for Geospatial-Intelligence            |\n| NSP     | National Security Policy                               |\n| NTM     | National Technical Means                               |\n| ODNI    | Office of the Director of National Intelligence        |\n| PDD     | Presidential Decision Directive                        |\n| R & D   | Research and Development                               |\n| SAR           | Synthetic Aperture Radar                          |\n|---------------|---------------------------------------------------|\n| SLAs          | Service Level Agreements                          |\n| TCPED         | Tasking, Collection, Processing, Exploitation and |\n| Dissemination |                                                   |\n| TDL           | Theater Down Links                                |\n| US            | United States                                     |\n| USSTRATCOM    | US Strategic Command                              |\n\n## Executive Summary\n\nThe Directors of the National Geospatial Intelligence Agency (NGA) and the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) requested in mid-January 2007 that a small review team evaluate how commercial remote sensing capabilities might be incorporated into the National Technical Means (NTM).1  Several previous government-sponsored studies evaluated the technological capabilities of commercial remote sensing and more recently, the Phase 1 of the Integrated Collection Architecture (ICA) addressed the future roles of commercial vendors.  Therefore, the Directors requested that the panel define and evaluate viable business cases for how the U.S. government might formulate a commercial industry-government partnership to acquire commercial remote sensing capabilities to be incorporated into the NTM. Three time periods were to be examined now (2007-2009), mid-term (2010 - 2012), and beyond.  The requested review was in response to concerns/criticisms by Congress of how NGA and NRO have under-utilized commercial remote sensing capabilities.  A 2007 report from NGA and the NRO to Congress concluded that commercially acquired imagery data and products would continue in the near- to mid-term to provide augmentation to mission.  The recent Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI) language argues for increased use of commercial capabilities.  NGA's investments in the commercially acquired imagery data using the commercial data providers (CDPs) are coming to fruition in 2007 with the completion of the second-generation collection systems. This is the panel's report.  It contains general findings about the technical competency and business viability of commercial remote sensing vendors, suppliers, and CDPs in the United States.  Four business cases were identified and assessed.  Government representatives from NGA, NRO, and the Office, Director National Intelligence (ODNI)2\nsupported the panel and often collaborated with the panel in the development of many of the report's findings and recommendations.  The panel believes that all of its recommendations should be implemented to effectively integrate commercial remote sensing capabilities into the NTM.  Should the government choose not to fully implement the business case that mitigates the most risk, the panel supports adoption of the other recommendations to ensure that the government leverages its ability to cost effectively acquire leading edge commercial capabilities in the near- to mid-term. Given the breadth of the topic and its complexity the panel designed and followed a structured methodology.  The government representatives provided an unclassified set of minimally acceptable requirements for remote sensing (See Appendix D) in order to focus the discussions on specific technical and mission needs.  The panel requested that the various presenters discuss how they could meet or exceed the minimal acceptable requirements in their proposed business cases.  The panel disaggregated the remote sensing mission into three mission layers based on the complexity of functions and\n\ntechnologies employed to meet mission demands to better understand the various business cases and their risks.  The three mission layers are:\n1. **Mission Layer 1** consists of leading edge, advanced, complex technology with\nlong life spans.  It produces very high-resolution multi-functional remote sensing capabilities.  These capabilities meet requirements for agility, accuracy, and almost real-time access that are highly challenging.  Broad area imagery in a single over flight and agile revisit capabilities are essential.  The satellites in this layer cost upwards of $1 billion or more.\n2. **Mission Layer 2** utilizes proven high technology with mid-to-high level\nresolution.  The mission layer contains some new development focused on single functions to meet specific requirements in the architectural concept. The\ncapabilities in this layer use Commercial-Off-The-Shelf  (COTS) components and subsystems including hardware and software. The satellites in this layer are less\nagile then those in Mission Layer 1.  The satellites are modular in design so as to\nmaximize flexibility to meet mission needs. The modular design enables the use of \"commercial practices\" so that components such as buses and payloads can be acquired separately. These satellites cost between $300 million and less than $500 million.\n3. **Mission Layer 3** includes low mid-resolution that approaches medium.  The\nsatellites are designed to collect in narrow swath under limited conditions.  The layer uses COTS extensively and is dependent on proven technologies. The developers of capabilities in this layer rely on \"commercial practices\" to sustain their business viability. The satellites cost between $50 million and $250 million depending on their complexity.\nThe panel believes that there are two (2) overriding capabilities that must be achieved within the operational architecture.  First, is the government's ability to acquire data when it needs it.  The US government cannot rely on or be dependent on any external entity to responsively get needed data. Second, is the need for flexible, highly agile, and survivable remote sensing capabilities with sufficient capacity to respond to all needs in a timely manner.  These capabilities must operate in a manner consistent with the defined architecture.  The needs are the key drivers in the study. Based on these needs the panel identified risk categories that included technical, mission, and business. From these analyses four (4) business cases were defined and evaluated in terms of what mitigated the most risk and achieved the needed capabilities for the U.S. government (see Chapter 2).  The business cases were informed by several attributes that the commercial remote sensing industry representatives argued were key to a successful industry-U.S. government partnership - mission function specialization, adoption of acquisition strategies that used FFP contracts and well-defined schedule and performance metrics, and government oversight discipline.  Each of the business cases incorporates some or all of the attributes.  The four business cases are:\n1. M**ulti-Year Data Buys (Most risk)** in which the government commits to a predictable, multi-year data and products purchase using the CDPs.\n\n2. **Satellite Production - Service Level Agreements (SLAs) (Most risk)** in which the CDPs (a minimum of two) operate as the middleman between the government\n\nand satellite vendors and suppliers.  The U.S. government commits to a predictable multi-year data and products purchase and partially funds development costs in exchange for priority and accommodation of specialized requirements.  SLAs define the partnership and how the CDPs will provide value added.\n3. **Multi-Year Satellite Buy - U.S. Government Manages (Minimum risk)** has\nthe government procure medium satellites and ancillary support on a FFP basis drawing primarily from Mission Layer 2 technologies and \"commodity\" components (as appropriate) from Mission Layer 3.  The government uses \"commercial practices\" to have qualified vendors provide 2 to 4 satellites in \"blocks\" in order to eventually achieve \"lean manufacturing\".  Subsequent \"blocks\" incorporate proven technology upgrades on individual components such as buses and payloads.  The government owns the design to ensure the option to\ncompete future \"blocks\" in order to obtain the most capability at the lowest price.\nThis business case insures that the U.S. government owns and manages its satellites to guarantee the timely and responsive delivery of imagery data and products. The business case provides the government the maximum flexibility to acquire needed satellites using a modular (e.g., \"plug and play\") approach.  The business case and supporting acquisition strategy facilitates the US government's ability to choose the \"payload\" that meets mission needs \"at the last minute\".\n4. **Hybrid of Business Cases 2 and 3 (Minimum risk)** incorporates the best aspects\nof Business Case 2 with Business Case 3.  The government acquires the satellites, but grants access to two satellites worth of data, a minimum buy of four, or allows the CDPs to buy two satellites in a \"block\" with the government absorbing the non-recurring engineering (NRE) costs.  The SLA defines how the CDP data will be managed, paid for, and sold on the global market.  The government buys the first couple of systems in order to support moving to a \"block\" production.  The business case drives down costs to the CDPs, mitigates the government's risk of depending on the CDPs, while increasing the efficiency of the business model.\nFigure ES-1 summarizes the risks associated with each of the proposed business cases.\n\nThe panel has five general findings about commercial remote sensing and its integration\ninto the NTM:\n1. Current commercial remote sensing capabilities are sufficiently technically\nrobust, modular, and available to meet the government's minimal acceptable requirements. Using appropriate acquisition strategies the U.S. government can acquire and field sufficient capabilities within 3 to 5 years (mid-term).\n2. There is little potential for developing commercial competition for capabilities\nin Mission Layer 1.\n3. The term \"commercial\" encompasses more than the CDPs.  Everyone is\ncommercial.  \"Commercial\" are those goods and services developed or produced and delivered from industry or business from outside of the government.  A government \"buy\" of a product or service would be termed a commercial development or procurement. The NRO and NGA by acquisition directive \"buy\" all their capabilities to support the mission performance and operate within the architectural approach.\n4. The lack of common definitions across the DoD and IC hinders the ability of\nthe government to discuss and decide at an enterprise level on how to proceed concerning the use of commercial imagery, its acquisition, and integration into the existing architecture.  The lack of common and approved definitions for such terms as \"commercial\" imagery, \"best commercial practices\", \"lean manufacturing\", and even \"requirements\" confuse the debate and inhibit the ability of the government to decide on courses of action and their execution.\n- \"Best commercial practices\" (as used in this report) include core\nrequirements defined upfront, standardized modular design, and firm fixed price contracts.\n- Lean manufacturing (as used in this report) means a qualified vendor\ncan develop and produce a standard design spacecraft and ancillary support at a competitive price point due to repetitive procurement, and optimized manufacturing processes and application of labor.  The approach can also provide significant flexibility in what is acquired and how.\n5. The U.S. commercial remote sensing market is at risk without significant U.S.\ngovernment investments in imagery products and satellite development for\nMission Layers 2 and 3.  The panel's recommendations specifically focus on\nimproving the viability of Mission Layer 2, the most seriously threatened, and to a lesser degree in Mission Layer 3.\nThe panel's specific findings and recommendations are discussed below.  There are eight (8) findings:\n1. Define a minimal acceptable set of requirements; 2. Expand the concept of what constitutes \"commercial\" to reflect market\nrealities;\n3. Adopt \"best commercial practices\", including FFP contracts; 4. Buy in \"blocks\" in order to apply \"lean manufacturing\" techniques as well as\nflexibility;\n5. Business Case 4 provides the most flexibility, agility and survivability, and\nmitigates the most risk;\n6. Ground infrastructure can be managed to meet mission needs; 7. Compete all contracts (as appropriate); and 8. ITAR policies and regulations inhibit the global competitiveness of U.S.\nvendors.\n\n## Findings And Recommendations\n\n1. Define a minimal acceptable set of requirements.\n\nRecommendation #1:  Reassess the current requirements deck to delineate\nthe requirements among the three mission layers based on the concept of sufficiency.\n\nRecommendation #2: Ensure that the requirements analysis defines\noutcomes rather than focus solely on technical improvements to NTM.\n\nRecommendation #3: Determine first what commercial capabilities can\nsufficiently fill the mission gaps and architectural approach.\n\n## 2. Expand The Definition Of What Constitutes \"Commercial\" To Reflect Market Realities.\n\n\nRecommendation #1: Leverage on the commercially available technologies and\nthe \"commoditization\" of many components available in Mission Layers 2 and 3 to acquire needed capabilities.\n\nRecommendation #2: Update NSPD 23 and PDD 27 to reflect the changes in the\ncommercial remote sensing industry.\n3. Adopt \"best commercial practices,\" including FFP contracts.\n\nRecommendation #1:Develop commercial satellites that are single function in\norder to manage technical and business risks.\n\nRecommendation #2: Adopt an acquisition strategy using FFP contracts with\nwell-defined requirements and cost, schedule, and performance metrics.\n\nRecommendation #3:  Ensure that the government program manager is held\naccountable for executing the agreed to acquisition strategy through his\nperformance appraisal.\n4. Buy in \"blocks\" in order to apply \"lean manufacturing\" techniques, as well as ensure maximum flexibility.\n\nRecommendation #1: Ensure that the acquisition strategy for commercial\nsatellite buys incorporate a \"block\" approach that drives to \"lean manufacturing\".\n\nRecommendation #2: Develop multi-year procurement strategies and packages\nwhose goal is the creation of a \"warm base\" production pipeline to develop and sustain a proficient workforce.\n\nRecommendation #3: Ensure that the U.S. government owns the drawings and\ntechnical data to ensure that \"blocks\" can be competed (as appropriate) so that systems are acquired at a competitive FFP.\n5. Business Case 4 mitigates the most government risk.\n\nRecommendation #1: Adopt Business Case 4 because it provides flexibility and\nagility through the acquisition of \"plug and play\" remote sensing capabilities, while consistent with the architectural philosophy.\n\nRecommendation #2: Use SLA's to define the CDPs roles and responsibilities.\nThe incorporation of the CDPs allows the government to spread costs across the\nU.S. government and CDPs, while it leverages on the CDPs contacts with foreign governments and foreign-subsidized industries.\n\nRecommendation #3:  Compete the contract (as appropriate) and subsequent\n\"blocks\" in order to foster technical and cost competition among vendors and suppliers and enhance the market.\nFigure ES-2 summarizes how risk is mitigated if Business Case 4 is adopted.\n6. Commercially developed ground infrastructure can be managed to meet mission\n   **requirements**.\n\nRecommendation #1: Buy modular ground infrastructure consistent with \"best commercial practices\" and architectural philosophy.\n\nRecommendation #2: Buy highly distributed ground infrastructure to ensure\nsurvivability.\n7. Compete all contracts (as appropriate).\n\nRecommendation #1:  Compete all contracts (as appropriate) when acquiring\ncommercial remote sensing capabilities in order to ensure the competition of ideas and get the best value. The panel recognizes that there might be special \"plugs\" needed to meet mission requirements that do not lend themselves to competition or FFP contracts.\n8. ITAR policies and regulations inhibit the global competitiveness of U.S. vendors.\n\nRecommendation #1:  Restructure ITAR policies and regulations to ensure that\nMission Layer 2 vendors and suppliers have access to foreign markets so as they can remain a viable part of the U.S. industrial base.\n\nRecommendation #2: Share the findings and recommendations of this panel with\nthe ongoing reviews assessing current ITAR policies and regulations.\nThe panel determined that a significant amount of collection requirements (specifically in the broad area collection mission) could be satisfied by a constellation of multiple \"commercial\" Mission Layer 2 satellites.  The recommended approach is consistent with the existing architecture. Use of a \"block\" approach supports the need for flexible and agile procurement strategies responsive to mission needs.  The modular \"plug and play\" strategy facilitates the US government's ability to insert a wide array of new and proven components acquired separately.\n\n## 1.     Introduction\n\nBACKGROUND\n\nSignificant debate is occurring within the U.S. government concerning how space-based commercial remote sensing capabilities might be better integrated into the National System for Geospatial Intelligence (NSG).  The Office, Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) Phase 1 report on the Integrated Collection Architecture (ICA) addresses the future role of commercial vendors among a variety of issues.  The ODNI strategic and architectural studies are continuing through 2007.  The Congress directed that the National Geospatial Intelligence Agency (NGA) and the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) increase their utilization of commercial remote sensing across the Intelligence Community (IC).  In particular, Congress wanted commercial capabilities applied to the broad area collection mission and infrastructure improvements that improve integration of commercial data into the National Technical Means (NTM). Recently the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI) argued that, given the increased technical sophistication of commercial capabilities, the U.S. government should incorporate more commercial capabilities into its Imagery Intelligence (IMINT) architecture.\nIn January 2007, the Directors of the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency\n(D/NGA) (Vice Admiral Robert B. Murrett) and the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) (Dr. Don Kerr) requested that Mr. Peter Marino (Chair, NGA Advisory Group (NAG)) constitute a small panel to address how the United States government might increase its use of commercial remote sensing capabilities in support of the NSG.3  The panel was directed to:\n1. Evaluate how vendors in the commercial remote sensing marketplace contribute to the National Technical Means (NTM) (e.g. national) and Department of Defense (DoD) missions (e.g., tactical), with particular emphasis on the broad area collection mission;\n2. Assess the business viability of commercial satellite industrial base and imagery data providers in terms of their providing increased support to the national and tactical missions;\n3. Define infrastructure improvements that can utilize commercial data as easily as NTM sources; and\n4. Develop and evaluate viable business cases that the government might adopt that result in more efficient and effective use of commercial remote sensing capabilities.4\nThis study addresses how the U.S. government might mitigate its risks should it decide to increase its utilization of commercial remote sensing capabilities. Four business cases are defined and evaluated against government-industry identified risk categories.\n\n## Assumptions Six Assumptions Shaped The Analysis:\n\n1. NTM-obtained imagery and geospatial data is not a \"free good\" and more\ncost-effective means to obtain broad area search data are needed;\n2. More imagery and geospatial products are needed to meet national and tactical\nmission demands;\n3. Redundancy in the imagery architecture is highly desirable in order to\nmitigate potential mission gaps, provide a surge capability and ensure survivability;\n4. The persistence mission must be provided for; 5. Agility and robustness of U.S. capabilities are key attributes of the\narchitecture; and\n6. The US government must have direct access to imagery data at all times.\nKEY TERMS\nMuch of the terminology associated with commercial remote sensing is inconsistently used and/or not understood.  For the purposes of this study the following terms were defined as follows:\nCommercial Vendors and Suppliers, and Commercial Data Providers\n(CDPs): The U.S. government buys its spacecraft, all U.S. spacecraft developers and vendors are in the commercial marketplace. U.S. spacecraft developers provide spacecraft across the entire spectrum of mission capabilities - high-end technology, large spacecraft through the less sophisticated small satellites.  Almost all spacecraft developers, regardless of size, acquire and sell systems, sub-systems, and components in the U.S. and in global commercial markets. In this study the term \"vendor\" means commercial satellite developer, while, the term \"commercial data providers (CDP)\" means the providers of imagery and geospatial products who sell their products to the U.S., foreign governments, and commercial companies such as Google and Microsoft (Appendix B contains a list of the U.S. vendors and CDPs).  The suppliers to the vendors are the providers of components, sub-systems, and parts such as lens, buses, etc.  In addition to U.S. vendors there are many foreign governments and foreign government subsidized companies who build satellites and sell them in the global marketplace.  For suppliers also sell components and software on the global market and is often viewed by the US government as a security and availability issue.\nCommercial Practices:  This term is also often called \"best commercial practices.\"  It is predicated on the buyer - a company or the U.S. government - having a clear and precise understanding of the mission for the system and what system outcome is needed.  A principal objective of applying \"best commercial practices\" is to manage requirements creep so that once core requirements are agreed to between the buyer and the developer, they cannot be changed; trade spaces usually involve ancillary requirements and these issues are defined early in the negotiations.  In this model the buyer carefully prioritizes the mission performance needs and broad capability requirements that the system must possess to accomplish the mission.  The definition of requirements, with well-specified outcomes, is essential to commercial practices so that trade-spaces are identified upfront and can be performed intelligently between cost and system performance. The satellite system must also fit within a predefined architecture. When \"commercial practices\" are used correctly the buyer does not dictate specific or detailed technical and design solutions to the contractor, but rather the buyer defines the general system and performance requirements necessary to accomplish the mission.\nFoundational to the successful application of \"commercial practices\" is rigorous risk management; risk management includes technical, as well as, business risk.  In satellite development, commercial practices also include the extensive use of standardized and modular design. The management of the technical and business risks require rigorous configuration control, at least one level below the overall system level. Most often the application of \"best commercial practices\" necessitates that the developer use heritage and well-proven technologies and designs.  The approach necessitates managing risk as a trade variable.  The design can utilize hardware and technology from previous missions/programs to the maximum extent possible, and minimize areas requiring new research and development (R&D) that drives up costs and significantly increases risk.5  Strict use of only essential specifications facilitate the contractor's use of any technologies and components available in the global marketplace that will meet the mission requirements at the lowest possible cost.  Spacecraft developers who use \"Commercial Practices\" also invest significant effort in systems engineering in order to ensure a full end-to-end solution; the end-to-end trade off analyses are worked in parallel with ongoing requirements assessments done within the clearly-defined mission costs and schedule.\n\nIntegral to the execution of commercial practices is the use of cost as an independent variable or CAIV.  Cost is a priority that operates at a level at least equal to performance and schedule, and on occasion, is the key determinant.  For this reason core system performance requirements must be defined up front because they are key cost determinants, particularly in \"firm fixed priced\" (FFP) contracts.   Adoption of commercial practices can also specify how the buyer is involved in the acquisition once requirements and costs are determined; the contract vehicle specifically defines how the usual acquisition oversight mechanisms (cost, schedule, and performance) will be managed.6  Often key to risk management is that the buyer is continuously involved in the decisions within the trade spaces defined during the requirements determination negotiations.\nLean Manufacturing: Lean manufacturing is a systematic process employed in recurring production.  In our use, it means that a qualified vendor can develop and produce a standard design spacecraft (or vendors standardize buses and payloads) and ancillary support at a competitive price point due to repetitive procurement.  Lean manufacturing can only be achieved through the efficiencies gained by engineering and producing the same items multiple times in the same manner (block acquisition) thereby resulting in significant cost savings due to the attainment of key efficiencies - nonrecurring engineering, modern production equipment, and a stable proficient factory floor workforce.  Successful lean manufacturing necessitates a sufficient number of same buses and payload systems in production to develop and sustain a \"warm\" production line, and usually a state-of-the-art facility supported by a trained and knowledgeable workforce whose production proficiency is sustained by steady production lines. Examination of spacecraft productions suggests the number of spacecraft in a \"block\" to achieve lean manufacturing benefits is at least 2 or 3 and possibly as many as 6, depending on the complexities of the vehicle and support systems. The production of a minimum number of spacecraft before new technology upgrades are inserted into the subsequent \"blocks\" is a key attribute of lean manufacturing.  Attainment of lean manufacturing also requires a modernized facility that supports the modular manufacturing and integration of multiple spacecraft, mission payload integration, system environmental testing in a clean room environment, etc.  These state-of-the-art chambers and facilities enable low handling risk and saves time and cost.  Redundancy in key capabilities - chamber redundancy, precision tools and handling cranes, etc. - facilitates streamlining the manufacturing process while rapidly assessing performance.  Lean manufacturing utilizes earned value management (EVM) to inform managers on how the \"production line\" is operating and if the production is meeting well defined and understood production output and cost metrics that allow the constant push for efficiency.7  EVM data also provides an archived knowledge of how much subsequent \"blocks\" will require in production schedule, costs, and risks.  Evaluation of EVM data facilitates process improvements.  The use of abbreviated documentation, particularly in the procurement request process contributes to driving down development costs and focusing on affordability.\n\nOrganizations who use lean manufacturing can also employ \"best commercial practices,\" but it is not required.  The key to lean manufacturing in \"block\" spacecraft production is a flexible design that allows new technologies to easily be inserted in a manner that adheres to a rapid production schedule.  Therefore, there are intrinsic benefits in leveraging on proven existing technologies with sufficient design flexibility that allow their adoption and integration into the production line.  One lean manufacturer argues that after an initial development and launch schedule of approximately 36 months that subsequent spacecraft within a \"block\" could be produced on a compressed schedule of approximately 6 months.8  Often spacecraft produced using lean manufacturing techniques are accomplished using a FFP contract.\n\nCommodities.  The term commodity in the context of this report means the widespread availability of an item (e.g., buses, sensors, components, sub-systems, software, etc.) produced by vendors, whether they be in the U.S. or overseas, resulting in the product being readily available so that it can be acquired at competitive prices in the needed quantities.  The market dynamics to remain competitive fosters technological upgrades of the product while ensuring operational reliability and competitive costing. ANALYTIC APPROACH AND METHODOLOGY\nThe panel evaluated data from the U.S. government - Congress, Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI), DOD, NGA, and NRO commercial spacecraft developers and imagery data providers, as well as, recognized experts in the field of broad area collection and the commercial remote sensing industry.  Appendix C contains the list of individuals and organizational representatives interviewed. The panel reviewed policies, formal studies, as well as, contractor and government evaluations on commercial remote sensing capabilities in order to ascertain the technical and business viability of the commercial remote sensing industry and how vendors, suppliers, and CDPs operate in order to develop viable business cases.\n\nThe most difficult methodological problem the panel confronted was how to discuss and evaluate risks in such broad topics as requirements and mission.  Therefore, at the beginning of the study, the panel asked government to provide an unclassified set of minimally acceptable requirements for remote sensing (See Appendix D) in order to focus the discussions on specific technical and mission needs.  The panel requested that the various presenters discuss how they could meet or exceed the minimal acceptable requirements in their proposed business cases.  The panel disaggregated the remote sensing mission into three mission layers based on the complexity of functions and technologies employed to meet mission demands to better understand the various business cases and their risks.  Several different types of sensors are used in the various mission layers, depending on the mission requirements.  The mission layers are defined as follows:\n1.\n\nMission Layer 1 is composed of leading edge advanced technology that produces high-resolution remote sensing capabilities. The U.S. government is the principal owner and operator of U.S. remote sensing capabilities within this layer.  These National Technical Means (NTM) capabilities are developed specifically to support national and military tactical mission needs. The systems are challenging to develop because the requirements demand high resolution, a lot of agility, accuracy, and almost real-time access. They collect broad area imagery in a single over flight and provide selected target area revisit capability because they are highly agile.  Sophisticated, integrated ground stations support these systems. The NTM satellites weigh about 10,000 pounds or more to meet the high demands for resolution and a long lifespan of about 10 years depending on the orbit and use. Most of these systems are individually developed spacecraft meeting specific but highly demanding requirements given their incorporation of sophisticated technologies, needing complex integration and test.  The majority of NTM satellites are unique and subsequent follow-on spacecraft using similar designs are developed to meet even more demanding requirements and use more advanced technology.  Hence, the high costs and risks associated with advanced technology and complex integration of these spacecraft limit their development to only a very few highly skilled and experienced vendors working for the U.S. government. A satellite costs upwards of $1 billion, depending on its capabilities. To assure security and reduce risk, the spacecraft in this mission layer are launched only from U.S. government sites using proven launch vehicles developed specifically for the government.\n\n2.\nMission Layer 2 is composed of proven and high technology with mid- to\nhigh-level resolution remote sensing capabilities. These systems by their very nature use proven technology components with some new developments focused on single functions to meet specific requirements. They include a mix of commercially-off-the-shelf (COTS) components and subsystems including hardware and software and with mostly well-proven technologies.  Integration can be very demanding given the mix of high technology components and COTS, but the technologies are known and can be produced cost-effectively. This layer is comprised of medium satellites that weigh between 5000 and 9000 pounds. They cost, depending on their robustness, between $300 and less than $500 million. The spacecraft may be less agile than those found operating in Mission Layer 1.  The lifespan, depending on the size, complexity, and orbit is between 3 to 7 years. Satellites or payloads produced\nto operate in Mission Layer 2 could be highly amenable to lean manufacturing\npractices if a \"block\" acquisition approach was adopted. They can also use \"commercial practices\" depending on the requirements; they can also often be acquired using FFP contracts.  Spacecraft in this mission layer can be launched from both commercial and government sites using a variety of commercial launch vehicles.\n3.\nMission Layer 3 uses only well known and proven technology in small\nsatellites that yield low to mid-resolution, approaching that of medium spacecraft.  They collect data in narrow swaths under limited conditions - limited cloud cover, accurate focus, etc.  Many spacecraft are required to provide the coverage needed for foundational imagery data.  They are built almost exclusively using COTS.  Quality assurance of COTS parts is critical to the success of these systems. This mission layer is comprised primarily of small satellites whose imaging capabilities have a design life of approximately 3 to 7 years, depending on orbit. These satellites can be acquired for between $50 million and approximately $100 million or $250 million depending on their capacity and the numbers being produced.  Most satellite developers in this mission layer utilize \"best commercial practices\" and lean manufacturing\nshould the buyer want an ongoing production line.  Most of these satellites are\nelectro-optical.9  Most small satellite developers rely exclusively on\ncommercial launch capabilities and extensively buy commodity components on the global market. Integral to their \"commercial practices\" is extensive testing of any new parts in order to ensure success.\nThe panel identified several risk categories, many of which are those used by\nsatellite developers and the U.S. government. The risk categories are:\n\nRequirements and mission\n\nTechnology and integration\n\nSecurity\n\nPolicy, industrial base, and markets\n\nProgram and costs\nORGANIZATION OF REPORT\nThe report contains 3 chapters and 6 appendices.   Chapter 2 summarizes the baseline risk assessment and identifies and assesses four (4) viable business cases. Chapter 3 provides the findings and recommendations.  The report contains six appendices: Appendix A contains the study Terms of Reference (TOR).  Appendix B is a discussion of the commercial vendors and CDPs.  Appendix C lists the organizations and individuals interviewed by the panel.  Appendix D contains the unclassified minimal mission requirements provided by the U.S. government. Appendix E provides a historical overview of remote sensing and the risk assessment of the baseline capabilities. Finally, appendix F discusses the relevant U.S. legislation and policies on commercial remote sensing.\n\n2. BUSINESS CASES\n\nSUMMARY OF BASELINE RISK ASSESSMENT\nFigure 1 summarizes the baseline assessment by risk category. The analysis of the\nbaseline risk assessment provided the foundation for the definition of business cases. Appendix E contains the detailed risk assessment of the current baseline.\n\nFINDINGS\nThe key study findings from the baseline assessment are:\n- Legacy requirements continue to drive the characteristics of the U.S. remote\nsensing enterprise.  However, the most demanding requirements - timeliness, image quality, and agility - are the key attributes of Mission Layer 1 and must be satisfied as long as there are national security requirements for highresolution data.\n- The uncertain mission environment necessitates that the US government\nmust have direct access to imagery data at all times and the assurance that it\nhas sufficient capacity to be responsive at all times.\n- While much of the imagery data needed is and should be unclassified, the\nU.S. government must be assured that it obtains required data on demand when it is needed and that security issues can be managed.\n- **\"Commercial\" encompasses more then just the CDPs**; vendors, suppliers,\nand CDPs that support all three mission layers are commercial companies that develop, buy, and sell remote sensing capabilities in the U.S. and foreign markets.  U.S. policy must recognize and address the full spectrum of the\ncommercial remote sensing enterprise.\n- Satellite and ground station technologies that operate in Mission Layers 2\nand 3 are sufficiently sophisticated to provide needed quality remote sensing capabilities and imagery products. They can be fully integrated into the IMINT architecture.\n- The capabilities of U.S. and foreign commercial vendors and suppliers have\nimproved since the mid-1990s.  Foreign governments and foreigngovernment- subsidized commercial vendors and suppliers are increasing their global market share to the detriment of the U.S. remote sensing\nindustrial base.  The consolidation of the U.S industrial base and increased\nglobal demand has pushed some technology from Mission Layer 1 to Mission Layer 3 resulting in \"commoditization.\"  The Mission Layer 2 vendors and suppliers have been significantly impacted by these marketshrinking trends in this mission layer.\n- ITAR restrictions and complexities are hindering the health of Mission Layer\n2 remote sensing vendors and suppliers by limiting their ability to compete in the global market.  Many foreign buyers are not satisfied with the \"commodities\" technologies from Mission Layer 3; they seek the more sophisticated, proven technologies developed for Mission Layer 2.\n- The long-term survivability of the CDPs is in doubt due to the growth and\nmaturing of foreign remote sensing capabilities and the likely saturation of imagery products in the global market beginning around 2010.\n\nBUSINESS CASES\nThe detailed risk assessment (contained in Appendix E) drove out key attributes\nof successful commercial business cases. Although the commercial satellite industry and CDPs seek a business relationship with the U.S. government, most representatives argued that in order for a commercial industry-U.S. government partnership to succeed several attributes had to be present to manage their technical and business risks.  Four key\nattributes were identified:\n1. Utilization of proven technologies.  The vendors, suppliers, and CDPs noted\nthat they could meet almost all the minimal requirements provided by the government through the use of currently developed and proven electro-optical and radar technologies.\n2. Mission specialization is key to the success of buying commercial capabilities.\nUnlike Mission Layer 1 in which multi-purpose sophisticated, advanced technology satellites are developed, commercial vendors prefer less complex\nsingle function satellites be developed in order to better manage their technical and business risks.\n3. A successful acquisition strategy must have well-defined cost, schedule and\nperformance metrics that facilitates the use of FFP contracts.   These\nattributes, combined with 1 and 2 above, enable commercial developers to\nmanage technical and business risks.  The adoption of an acquisition strategy with multi-year \"block\" buys, with a sufficient number of systems per block (2-6), will further drive down costs using \"lean manufacturing techniques\".\n4. Government discipline and oversight in the acquisition of the programs is key\n\n## To A Successful Commercial Industry U.S. Government Partnership. The Government Must Adopt And Execute Consistent \"Best Commercial Practices\" - Definition Of Core Requirements, Agreement Upfront On The Trade Spaces In Cost, Schedule, Performance, And Management Of Requirements Creep To Provide The Needed Discipline And Oversight For Successful Partnerships. Four Business Cases Four Viable Business Cases Were Developed And Evaluated.  The Business Cases\n\nconcentrate on remote sensing capabilities for Mission Layers 2 and 3, given that these\nlayers provide commercial imagery capabilities and products either through satellite\nvendors or by the CDPs.  Each of the business cases is viable; each focuses on mitigation of the U.S. government's mission and financial risk, and each incorporates the attributes that industry describes as essential to a successful commercial industry-government partnership.  The four business cases are:\n1. Multi-Year Data Buys - CDPs 2. Satellite Production - Service Level Agreements (SLAs) 3. Multi-Year Satellite Buy - U.S. Government Manages 4. Hybrid of Business Cases 2 and 3\n\nBusiness Case 1: Multi-Year Data Buys - CDPs (Most Risky)\nDescription This is a known business case in that it emulates and continues the NGA\nNextView model.  To mitigate the government's risk it contracts with two CDPs.  The U.S. government commits to a predictable, multi-year data purchase of imagery and imagery products at a FFP.  This model supports the CDPs and is consistent with a pure commercial model.  It is managed the same way that commercial data sales occur.  The government manages the data collected based on the contractual arrangement with the CDPs.  Each CDP delivers the imagery to NGA at a given price per square kilometer, which varies regionally to account for commercial data regional capacities.  The government obtains priority on satellites by paying a higher price for the desired imagery.\n\nThe price is further adjusted to account for the size of the region being collected and also reflects the image's percent over cloud cover.  The archiving pricing is different from the price of new, government-directed tasking.\nThe government has little or no say in the constellation design for it is up to the CDP to negotiate the most cost-effective and efficient means to obtain the data.  The cost to the U.S. government is managed through volume pricing and the costs are spread across the entire customer base.  Flexible licensing requirements can be negotiated into the contract up front.  The government's agreement to purchase data facilitates the commercial data providers' ability to raise financial support from private financiers.  The surge capabilities can be negotiated into the contract as can pre-emptive priority terms. The multi-year data buy approach could also facilitate the use of leading-edge foreign capabilities because the government is buying data over a specified period of time, but not specifying the type or source of satellites that can be used to meet its requirements.\n\nPros:\n- The business case mitigates mission risk by providing some redundancy.\n- The CDPs buy spacecraft that meet the specified imagery requirements and use\nwell-proven technologies thereby minimizing technical and business risk to them\nand the U.S. government.\n- Supports the industrial base for Mission Layers 2 and 3, depending on the specific\nimagery requirements.\n- The approach can facilitate the use of leading-edge foreign capabilities unless\n\"buy\" American is specified in the contracts.\n- CDPs get paid for delivered imagery.\n- Large volumes of unclassified imagery can be collected. - Surge capabilities can be negotiated into the contract as can pre-emptive priority\nterms.\n- Meets the intent of NSPD 23 and PDD 27. - Integration with NTM collection can be managed through ground stations. - The U.S. government becoming the \"anchor tenant\" for the CDPs ensures their\nviability regardless of changes in the global market.\nCons:\n- Does not mitigate any of the key risk drivers for the US government - direct\naccess to data and sufficient architectural robustness and flexibility.\n- The CDPs do not like this model because it does not enable them to move to value\nadded products.\n- The pricing mechanisms are very complex and hard to manage by both the U.S.\ngovernment and CDPs since it is based on pixels rather than value added\nproducts.\n- No mechanism is defined to implement globally efficient collection strategies\nsuch as common countdown, where multiple collectors are tasked to collect a\ngiven area and keep attempting until the aggregate of all imagery collected by the collectors covers the areas.\n- The CDPs are paid for images that meet a given cloud cover specification in its\nentirety, leading to sub-optimal collection. A CDP may keep collecting imagery data for a given area multiple times, just to get cloud free portions of prior images (either from the same CDP or others) to achieve the requisite coverage.\n- Utilization of commercial launch capabilities - Risk of government deciding that it does not want to continue the partnership with\nCDPs.\nAssessment\nThis business case is sub-optimum in mitigating the government's overall risk\nbecause the CDPs are paid based on the amount of cloud free imagery data they deliver, so each CDP is given incentives to maximize the volume of its collections regardless of whether they are the areas of most interest to the U.S. government.  The tasking of each CDP is handled in \"stovepipes\" because in many instances the U.S. government's collection requirements (by area) are split up between the two CDPs.  When a CDP receives an order it proceeds linearly to collect it regardless of whether there is a continuing need because there is no mechanism for feedback to the end user about the status of collection.\n\nThe government's objective to keep the CDPs' operations entirely unclassified\n(because they provide only augmentation to mission) causes further sub-optimization.\nThe transfer of requirements of the national system to the CDPs is handled in a laborintensive fashion by the U.S. government acting as a go between.  Because each CDP only sees the targets it has been assigned there is no opportunity for \"bonusing\" because a CDP may already be collecting an area that is being tasked by another collector; however, this information is not shared, often resulting in wasted capacity. Because each CDP collects a given area in isolation, it takes longer then it would if multiple collectors could be brought to bear, and it also reduces the opportunities for synoptic coverage (i.e., all imagery is a given area collected within a narrow window).10 If the government adopted this business case it would focus on \"commodity buys\" and would be limited to operation at the higher-end of Mission Layer 3.\n\n\nBusiness Case 2: Satellite Production - Service Level Agreements (SLAs) (Very risky)\nDescription Foundational to this business case are SLAs that define collection or product based services. This business case supports the collection, processing, and delivery of individual scenes.  The CDPs support this business case because it ameliorates most of the problems identified in Business Case 1.  The SLA specifies the allocated regions of the world to be collected and refreshed on a scheduled basis.  It specifies mapping and imagery collection rather than the purchasing of just the pixels.  The business transformation is that the SLA's precisely describe the service required, the availability and reliability of the service, and the rewards (or penalties) for meeting the specifications for a single price.  Asset management and all of the operational controls move from the government and are placed with the CDPs; thereby redefining the business relationship between the U.S. government from one of pixels to total area collected and products.  In this business case, the commercial systems are integrated into the overall IMINT\narchitecture, and therefore, are no longer used as solely augmentation.  Like the NTM\nsystems the U.S. government does not worry about pricing, or fixed allocation of requirements to collectors, rather its focus is on maximizing requirements satisfaction across the constellation, given each collector's capacity. The U.S. government has preemptive priority on specific satellites (e.g., the NextView collectors), but usage is reimbursed by burning resource time (minutes) at a higher rate than normal.  The data is collected and managed through a highly distributed set of ground stations, some of which can manage classified data.  The increased integration between the CDPs and the NTM facilitates \"bonusing,\" common countdown, greater synoptic coverage, and overall greater collection efficiency.  The U.S. government adopts procedural protections to prevent needless use of preemption.  The satellites are built based on the government's requirements.  The U.S. government provides partial funding in exchange for accommodation of its requirements and priorities.\n\nPros\n- The CDPs commit to the U.S. government certain tasking capacity from the\nsatellite constellation, broken out by regions (to account for variations in capacity due to pre-existing agreements).\n- It integrates the CDPs into the NTM architecture.  The approach could also satisfy\nthe war-fighting imagery requirements by providing direct downlinks to theaters.\n- Capacity is measured by the satellite resource (time) used to satisfy the tasking.  If\nexhausted in a given period (e.g., month or quarter), this capacity can be increased\nby mutual agreement between the commercial data provider and the U.S. government.\n- Each CDP gives access to the U.S. government to all the data from its archive.\nThe annual price paid by the U.S. government enables it to request, at no\nadditional cost, imagery from a CDP archive.\n- The government's satisfaction is ensured because each CDP is evaluated on its\neffectiveness in satisfying U.S. government requirements using similar scoring to\nNTM, factoring in requirements satisfaction, delivery times, system availability, etc.\n- Meets the intent of NSDP 23 and PDD 27. - The multi-year SLA contracts would provide stable funding for the CDPs to\nprocure multiple satellites at affordable prices.  The satellites would meet over 95 percent of the minimal requirements deck with the exception of those few targets with a NIIRS of 6.5 or greater requirement.\n- Performance is tied to incentives for the CDPs.11\n- The support of the CDPs provides a mechanism by which the U.S. government\ncan ascertain insights into what foreign governments and foreign subsidized companies are doing in the commercial remote sensing arena.\nCons\n- Costs and security associated with each CDP operating a SCI-level collectionplanning cell with access to the U.S. government's requirements.\n- The designation of the CDPs as the \"middleman\" between the government and\nacquisition of the satellites, and ultimately, the constellation's tasking and management.\n- The viability of the CDPs after 2010 without additional U.S. government funding.\n- Absolute assurances that the U.S. government can get data when it needs it, given\nthe uncertainty of the CDP's continuing business viability.\n- The flexibility and survivability of the constellation.\nAssessment\nThe business case moves the CDPs from augmenting the NTM to full integration\ninto the national imagery architecture.  They provide \"value added\" that is based on clearly defined performance requirements and licensing agreements that include surge agreements.  The CDPs collaborate with the U.S. government in the collection planning, and could, merge the U.S. government's collection requirements with its own to produce an unclassified collection plan.  The CDPs could use this plan to task the constellation. Unclassified and classified data can be handled through a series of distributed ground stations some of which can input into the NTM systems.  The distributed ground stations would ensure redundancy.  This business case supports the sustainment of the data providers through the integration of the U.S. government's and CDPs' capabilities.  The CDPs already use this business case with several non-U.S. government clients.\nBusiness Case 2 is dependent on the government being an \"anchor tenant\"\nthrough the formation of a carefully structured government - CDP partnership. The government assists the CDPs in that it provides partial funding for acquisition of the spacecraft. The SLA defines all aspects of the business relationship including how the data providers will sell the excess data on the global market. The contractual arrangement between the government and commercial data providers is for the purchase of imagery and imagery products; therefore, the procurement would bypass DoD and IC system acquisition requirements.  The satellites could be developed and on-orbit within 3 to 5\nyears from award of contract. Depending on one's perspective the major issue associated with this business case is that the CDPs own the satellite constellations and not the U.S. government.  The inherent risk in this business case is whether the CDPs are viable in the mid-term (2012) without U.S. government support given projected global market changes.\n\nBusiness Case 3: Multi-Satellite Buy - U.S. Government Manages (Minimum risk)\nDescription The U.S. government partners with the commercial satellite industry to directly acquire assured imagery through the purchase of satellites.  The business case optimizes operational assurance through the U.S. government buying blocks of medium satellites from commercial satellite vendors.  In this model, the satellite developer is able to optimize production of a standard space vehicle and the needed support through the acquisition of a \"block\" of the same highly capable satellites. The business case focuses on using technologies from Mission Layers 2 and 3 - proven complex technologies from Mission Layer 2 and commodity components (where appropriate) from Mission Layer 3. The government contracts for the development of 2 to 4 medium sized on-orbit spacecraft.  The satellites are EO (pan and MSI) and can provide centralized tasking, management and command and control, archival and dissemination of specified unclassified and classified data. The ground stations are distributed to handle high amounts of unclassified data; they are modular in design and fit within the existing architecture.  The design accommodates the management of classified information when it is deemed necessary. The satellites and ancillary support are acquired on a FFP contract and can be fielded within 3 to 5 years.\n\nPros\n-\nThe government agrees to multi-year serial acquisitions of approximately 2 to 4 satellites per block prior to doing a block upgrade. The approach allows the spacecraft vendors to maintain a warm production base and proficient workforce (allowing use of lean manufacturing techniques) while assuring the government that subsequent blocks will have improved technological and COTS upgrades to\nsustain the U.S. commercial satellite industrial base particularly for the 2nd and 3rd\ntier component/sub-system developers and suppliers.\n-\nUsing appropriate technologies from Mission Layers 2 and 3 facilitates the adoption of \"commercial practices\" and could further contribute to lean\nmanufacturing.\n-\nSatellites can be bought in an architectural framework (lines of buses, lines of\npayloads) that support the \"plug and play\" construct.\n-\nCritical to ensuring flexibility and survivability.\n-\nThe U.S. government has a number of satellites on orbit, some in reserve to hedge\nagainst failure, and some in serial production in order to manage mission risk and\ncosts.  Contractual agreements would specify termination issues if the government\nslows its procurement and/or decides to terminate a block.\n-\nThe government owns the design to allow options to compete future \"blocks.\"\n-\nWith approved exemptions, the acquisition could be accomplished in approximately 3 to 5 years and use FFP contracts.\n-\nThe business case assures that the U.S. government will have access to data when\nit needs it and ensures a seamless insertion plan into the existing architecture.\nCons\n- There are concerns about requirements creep and too much government oversight\nthat would inhibit the ability to fully implement \"commercial practices, while assuring that the contractor operates within a firm fixed price basis.\n-\nThe U.S. government may not be able to sustain a \"block\" acquisition approach over multiple years in order to achieve \"lean manufacturing\" cost benefits.\n-\nGiven that there are few qualified vendors who have produced medium satellites using FFP contracts, the U.S. government may not be able to assure competition in the contracts.\n-\nThis approach challenges the intent of NSPD 23 and PDD 27\nAssessment\nBy drawing technologies from Mission Layers 2 and 3 to develop \"blocks\" of\nmedium spacecraft that meet all of the minimal requirements, the business case enables the market for the Mission Layers 2 and 3 vendors and suppliers thereby strengthening the U.S. industrial base.  If the acquisitions are competed it can facilitate increased competition between Mission Layer 1 and 2 vendors and redefine aspects of the current supply-chain.  If acquired in \"blocks\" the cost per spacecraft drops significantly. Some projections are that costs would run between $1.4 billion and $2 billion depending on the size of the constellation (2-4 satellites), number of ground stations (dispersed modular ground stations are preferred), and the use of the EELV launch vehicles.  Additionally, EELV costs will be driven down as more vehicles are launched based on existing United Launch Alliance contracts.\nThe business case requires that the U.S. government adopt \"commercial practices\" to achieve maximum cost savings.  This includes acquiring the spacecraft and support capabilities on a firm fixed price basis.  Success also necessitates that a \"block\" acquisition strategy be adopted that ultimately leads to lean manufacturing in order to gain further production and cost efficiencies.  The key to creating a broader industrial base is to compete the contract; this necessitates drawing vendors and suppliers from Mission Layers 2 and 3.  If the government decides that it wants to rely on its current set of contractors then it must ensure that it owns the technical data and drawings so that it might compete future \"blocks\" thereby ensuring access to the U.S. government markets by qualified Mission Layer 2 and 3 vendors and suppliers.\n\nBusiness Case 4: Hybrid of Business Cases 2 and 3 (Minimum risk)\nDescription The business case combines Business Case 3 and the best aspects of Business Case 2.  In this model the U.S. government facilitates the CDPs acquiring two satellites in a \"block\" buy of four spacecraft, but at a lower product buy.  The U.S. government provides up front funding non-recurring engineering costs (NRE) in order to assist CDP participation and to maximize cost benefits and attain lean manufacturing objectives. The SLA defines how the CDP's data will be managed, paid for, and sold on the global market. The hybrid case supports a seamless insertion plan and provides significant redundancy to the overall imagery architecture. Business Case 4 ensures that the U.S. government owns and manages its assets, but integral to the case is a mutually beneficial partnership with both commercial vendors and the CDPs.  The approach supports development of competition and the potential entry of new vendors and suppliers into all the mission layers.\n\nPros\n- All the pros of Business Case 2. - All the pros of Business Case 3. - Consistent with architectural philosophy. - Ensures that the U.S. government manages its constellation, but includes access to\nthe CDPs.\n- Increases U.S. commercial remote sensing capabilities significantly. - Spreads costs across the U.S. government and CDPs to foster the attainment of\ncommercial practices and lean manufacturing.\n- Increases the business viability of the CDPs in the post 2012 period. - Meets the intent of NSPD 23 and PDD 27.\nCons\n- Could create management issues between NGA and NRO concerning the\nacquisition of the spacecraft and the management of the CDPs\n- Involves another party, the CDPs, in the acquisition process, but this risk is some\nwhat mitigated in that the government is responsible for the overall acquisition.\n- Requires significant U.S. government discipline in both the acquisition of the\nspacecraft and the execution of the SLAs\n- Requires selection of the CDPs to benefit from this relation with the government.\nAssessment\nThe Hybrid Business Case mitigates significant risk in that it ensures that the U.S.\ngovernment has access to imagery data when it needs it, but also builds in additional\nredundancy through incorporation of the CDPs.  This business case mitigates the U.S. government's concerns about depending on the CDPs but also hedges risk in that it\nsupports the CDPs long-term access to imagery data.  The government purchase of the first couple of systems ensures that it can acquire the spacecraft using \"best commercial practices\" and possibly attain \"lean manufacturing\" because it will absorb the up front costs for the CDPs as well as for its own spacecraft.  The business case drives down costs for the CDPs but also increases the efficiency of the \"buys\" in that the spacecraft are\nacquired in \"blocks.\"  The U.S. government acquires all the capabilities - satellites and data products - on a firm fixed price basis.  A possible challenge to this model is the U.S. government management of an acquisition that might necessitate involving two government agencies in the acquisition and management of data. SUMMARY\n\nAll the business cases define a way in which the U.S. government can \"buy\" its imagery capabilities, achieve needed redundancy, improve survivability, surge, and acquire sufficient quantities of unclassified imagery data; all cases are viable to meet the U.S. government's needs in the near- to mid-term. The four (4) proposed business cases include the attributes of successful commercial business cases; however, Business Cases 2 through 4 are more encompassing of the attributes than is Business Case 1.  Although Business Case 1 is viable, the operational and costing complexities diminish its overall value as a \"way ahead.\"  It would be difficult to manage the actual data collection on using a FFP contract.  The CDPs do not like the current model because it inhibits their ability to achieve their desired business goal of providing \"value added\" products and integration into the existing architecture.  The CDPs have abandoned this business case with most of their other clients and moved to Business Case 2.  Business Case 1 also does little to mitigate technology, industrial base, integration, and security risks.\n\nBusiness Cases 2 through 4 include dispersed ground stations capable of handling all security levels.  All the industry representatives and CDPs concurred that modularly designed and dispersed ground infrastructure mitigates significant mission risk through redundancy and distribution of data.  The modular design enables the government to acquire the capabilities through \"commercial practices\", and if enough are acquired adoption of lean manufacturing.  The distributed ground infrastructure also satisfies USSTRATCOM's issues of providing direct downlinks to the COCOMs to meet their mission needs.\n\nTwo issues hinder the adoption of Business Case 2: (1) The business viability of the CDPs beyond 2010, given economic projections that the global imagery market will reach saturation as more foreign-own capabilities come on line.  The CDPs acknowledge these challenges and argue that their acquisition of airborne platforms expands their business viability.  They also argue that moving into the imagery products market will, at a minimum, lead to retaining their current market size.  Independent economic and business forecasts are less optimistic.  They argue that further industry consolidation will occur as the market becomes more product saturated, noting that probably by 2010 probably only one CDP will be in business. (2) Regardless of these outcomes, the U.S.\n\ngovernment must be assured of getting imagery data when it needs it.  It is doubtful that if the U.S. government decides to integrate commercial imagery into its NTM architecture, that it will rely on the CDPs to provide this capability and operate as a middleman between the government data users and the satellite sources.\n\n\nThe business case analyses revealed that the U.S. government could satisfy most of its needs for commercial imagery through the acquisition of satellites developed using the technologies available in Mission Layers 2 and 3.  This finding supports the government using \"commercial practices\" including FFP contracts to acquire the needed capabilities in a timely and cost effective manner.  Business Case 3 analysis also revealed that significant pressures on Mission Layer 2's industrial base could be eased through buying sophisticated commercial satellites that incorporate proven complex technologies.\n\nHowever, ITAR regulations that limit technology transfers to foreign governments and companies inhibits Mission Layer 2's market expansion, global competitiveness, and ultimately, economic viability.  Allowing vendors to incorporate selected commodities\n(e.g., components and software) from Mission Layer 3 can further reduce costs to the U.S. government.  Business Case 4 - a hybrid of Business Cases 2 and 3-- mitigates the most risk for the U.S. government.  It supports the U.S. government owning and managing from end-to-end the development and fielding of the satellites, while incorporating the CDPs' products and contacts with foreign countries.  In Business Case 4 a lower product buy may be necessary to accommodate the added satellites.\n\nFigure 2 below summarizes the potential for risk mitigation in each of the business cases.\n\nThe business case evaluation and assessment demonstrates that the government can competitively procure commercial satellites from vendors with Mission Layers 2 and 3 capabilities that meet the minimal requirements for large amounts of unclassified imagery data.  The acquisition strategy should be competitive and designed to procure end-to-end systems including modular, distributed ground infrastructure in blocks to enable lean manufacturing and attain greater cost savings.  The government must own the drawings in order to compete subsequent blocks to ensure competition in how best practices and costs.\n\nThe panel found that the most threatening challenge to the U.S. government's integration of commercial imagery into its defined architecture is its reluctance and lack of discipline in full adoption of \"commercial practices\" and following through with acquisition strategies that lead to \"lean manufacturing\".  The key issue is clearly defining the core requirements, trade spaces, and oversight mechanisms up front and then adhering to those rules throughout the acquisition.  The acquisition strategy needs to use FFP contracts to ensure that risks are shared and that vendors are held accountable to deliver a product within cost that meets the performance metrics.\n\n\n\n3.\nFINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS\n\nThe panel found that the U.S. government could acquire and integrate commercial\nimagery into the NTM architecture and fulfill most of its minimal mission requirements, mitigate significant mission risk, and attain the capabilities at a reasonable cost to support mission. The panel concurs that the U.S. government must be assured that it gets its data when it is needed; however, it concludes that many of the requirements can be met through the use and integration of commercial capabilities into the existing architecture. In order to ensure maximum mission flexibility and survivability the government needs to acquire multiple satellites from Mission Layers 2 and 3 that support a \"plug and play\" concept.  Components - buses and payloads - can be acquired separately providing the ability to choose payloads \"at the last minute\". The panel concluded the U.S. government\ncould have commercially acquired satellites and supporting ground infrastructure fielded\nwithin 3 to 5 years after contract award if it adopts many of the report's recommendations.  The panel's recommended approach necessitates strong government discipline in the management of acquisitions that are based on \"best commercial practices\" and attainment of lean manufacturing.  The recommended approach necessitates a pre-acquisition phase in which core requirements, performance metrics, trade spaces, cost and schedule, and government oversight mechanisms are defined, and then, adhered to throughout the acquisition.  The panel acknowledges that there is little\npotential for developing commercial competition for capabilities in Mission Layer 1. Four (4) general findings emerged from this assessment:\n1. The lack of common definitions across the DOD and IC hinders the ability of\nthe government to discuss and decide at an enterprise level on how to proceed concerning the use of commercial imagery, its acquisition, and integration into\nthe existing architecture.  The lack of common and approved definitions for such terms as \"commercial\" imagery, \"best commercial practices\", \"lean manufacturing\", and even \"requirements\" confuse the debate and inhibit the ability of the government to decide on courses of action and their execution. The panel defined \"commercial practices\" and \"lean manufacturing\" in order to provide a common tableau for its discussions, findings and recommendations.\n2. There is little potential for developing commercial competition for capabilities\nin Mission Layer 1.\n3. In today's world \"commercial remote sensing\" is broader than the CDPs; all\nvendors, suppliers, and the CDPs are commercial providers.\n4. The U.S. commercial remote sensing market is at risk without significant U.S.\ngovernment investments in imagery products and satellite development for\nMission Layers 2 and 3.  The panel's recommendations specifically focus on improving the viability of Mission Layer 2 capabilities, the most seriously threatened, and to a lesser degree on Mission Layer 3.\n\nThe panel has eight (8) key specific findings, including identification of the\nbusiness case that mitigates the most risk.  Each finding is supported by a set of recommendations:\n1. Define a minimal acceptable set of requirements;\n2. Expand the concept of what constitutes \"commercial\" to reflect market realities; 3. Adopt \"best commercial practices\", including FFP contracts; 4. Buy in \"blocks\" in order to apply \"lean manufacturing\" techniques as well as\nflexibility;\n5. Business Case 4 provides the most flexibility, agility and survivability, and\nmitigates the most risk;\n6. Ground infrastructure can be managed to meet mission needs, 7. Compete all contracts (as appropriate); and 8. ITAR policies and regulations inhibit the global competitiveness of U.S. vendors.\n\n\nFinding 1: Define a minimal acceptable set of requirements\nLegacy requirements continue to drive all remote sensing enterprise\ncharacteristics.  The panel agrees that there is a need to satisfy the most demanding\nrequirements - timeliness, image quality, agility, and the ability to share data - using Mission Layer 1 capabilities.  There are, however, large numbers of requirements that can be satisfied using proven technologies, COTS, and commodity components from Mission Layers 2 and 3 capabilities. The legacy requirements construct continues to drive technology advancement that limits the trade space for the adoption of available technologies to fill some of the needs.  The requirements deck operates as a decisionmaking paradigm that designates commercial imagery and imagery products as capable of providing only augmentation, for it defines mission needs primarily within the construct of technical improvements for NTM capabilities in Mission Layer 1.\nThe panel is aware that some Mission Layer 1 requirements have been somewhat\ndisaggregated, but believes an additional assessment and clarification is needed to further delineate among what needs can be fulfilled using new, leading edge technologies (Mission Layer 1) as opposed to what can be acquired from commercial capabilities available in Mission Layers 2 and 3.  The assessment should be driven by what\nconstitutes \"sufficiency\" to fill a capability gap rather than always pushing the technological envelop.\nRecommendation #1:  Reassess the current requirements deck to delineate the\nrequirements among the three mission layers based on the concept of sufficiency.  The\nassessment needs to clarify definitions and institute common community-wide definitions to \"get everyone on the same sheet of music.\"\n\nRecommendation #2: Ensure that the requirements analysis defines outcomes\nrather than focus solely on technical improvements to NTM.\nRecommendation #3: Determine first if commercial capabilities fill mission\ngaps and the architectural approach.  The approach could ensure that the most complex and demanding mission needs are met using \"exquisite\" technologies, while most others can be attained commercially.\n\nFinding 2: Expand the concept of what is \"commercial\" to reflect market realities\nThe concept of  \"commercial\" has changed considerably since NSPD 23 and PDD\n27 were written in the 1990s.  \"Commercial\" remote sensing encompasses more then just the CDPs; vendors and suppliers in all mission layers are commercial companies that buy and sell in the U.S. and foreign markets. Satellite and ground station technologies have\nbecome commercially available on a global scale because the technologies can be produced at a relative low price point thereby facilitating their \"commoditization.\"  The U.S. and foreign commercial vendors and suppliers have improved their capabilities since\nthe mid-1990s. The NRO and NGA by directive \"buy\" all of their capabilities.\nRecommendation #1: Leverage on the commercially available technologies and\nthe \"commoditization\" of many components available to support Mission Layers 2 and 3 to acquire needed capabilities.\n\nRecommendation #2: Update NSPD 23 and PDD 27 to reflect the changes in\nthe commercial remote sensing industry.  The D/NGA and D/NRO should urge the USD(I) and ODNI to undertake this activity to foster a community-wide dialogue on policy and better utilization of commercial remote sensing capabilities.\n\nFinding 3: Adopt \"best commercial practices,\" including FFP contracts\nThe government needs to adopt \"best commercial practices,\" including FFP\ncontracts to the maximum extent possible when acquiring capabilities for Mission Layers 2 and 3.  Key to this recommendation is the government incorporating proven and tested\ncomponents and subsystems in order to attain cost savings. A successful partnership\nbetween the U.S. government and commercial industry most often uses \"proven\" technologies applied to specific mission requirements.  Industries appetite for sharing cost and technical risk increases greatly when this attribute is present.\nRecommendation #1: Develop commercial satellites that are single function in\norder to manage technical and business risks.\nRecommendation #2: Adopt an acquisition strategy using FFP contracts with\nwell-defined requirements and cost, schedule, and performance metrics.\n\nRecommendation #3:  Ensure that the government program manager is held\naccountable for executing the agreed to acquisition strategy through his performance appraisal.\n\nFinding 4: Buy in \"blocks\" in order to apply \"lean manufacturing\" techniques and\nfor flexibility.\nLean manufacturing means that a qualified vendor can develop and procure a\nstandard space vehicle and ancillary support at a competitive price point due to\nconsolidated design and serial procurement.  Lean manufacturing can only be achieved through the efficiencies gained by engineering and producing the same items in the same manner (block acquisition) thereby resulting in significant cost savings due to the attainment of key efficiencies - non-recurring engineering, modern production\nequipment, and a stable, proficient factory workforce and through the employment of a\nwarm base production line.  Sufficient numbers of commercial satellites and support systems are needed that the acquisition strategy can achieve the benefits of  \"lean manufacturing.\"\nRecommendation #1:  Ensure that the acquisition strategy for commercial satellite buys incorporates a \"block\" approach that drives to \"lean manufacturing.\"\n\nRecommendation #2:  Develop multi-year procurement strategies and packages whose goal is the creation of a  \"warm base\" production pipeline to develop and sustain a proficient workforce.\n\nRecommendation #3: Ensure that the U.S. government owns the drawings and technical data to ensure that future \"blocks\" can be competed and that systems are acquired at a competitive FFP. Finding 5: Business Case 4 mitigates the most government risk and provides the most flexibility.\n\nBusiness Case 4 is a hybrid that combines Business Case 3 (Multi-Satellite Purchase - U.S. Government Manages) with the best attributes of Business Case 2 (Satellite Production - Service Level Agreement (SLA)).  The business case optimizes operational assurance through the U.S. government buying \"blocks\" of highly capable medium satellites using technologies associated with capabilities in Mission Layers 2 and 3.  The government contracts for the development of 2 to 4 medium sized on-orbit spacecraft that can provide centralized tasking, management, and command and control. Costs are spread through incorporation of the CDPs using SLAs as a way to define their roles.  The government provides up front funding cover engineering costs that provide an attractive price to the CDPs to acquire satellites.  A lower product buy can be defined in order to accommodate the additional imagery data and products provided by the CDPs. The SLA defines how the CDPs' data and products will be managed, paid for, and sold on the global market.  Figure 3 summarizes how Business Case 4 mitigates risk.\n\n\nBusiness Case 4 contains all of the attributes ascribed by industry as essential to a successful commercial industry-U.S. government partnership - utilization of proven technologies, mission function specialization, core requirements, well-defined acquisition strategy using FFP contracts, and the government's role and responsibilities well-defined and understood as part of the acquisition strategy.\n\nRecommendation #1: Adopt Business Case 4 because it mitigates the most risk for the U.S. government.\n\nRecommendation #2:  Use SLA's to define the CDPs roles and responsibilities.\nThe incorporation of the CDPs allows the government to spread costs across the U.S. government and CDPs, while leverages on the CDPs contacts with foreign governments and foreign-subsidized industries.\n\nRecommendation #3:  Compete the contract and subsequent \"blocks\" in order to foster competition among vendors and suppliers and enhance the market.\n\n\nFinding 6: Ground infrastructure can be managed to meet mission requirements The panel found that commercially developed ground stations are capable of handling most of the minimal requirements.  Since most of the data is unclassified, security issues are minimal and there are methods by which classified data can be handled.  Commercial ground stations can handle direct downlinks to meet the COCOMs tactical mission demands for large volumes of unclassified data.\n\nRecommendation #1:  Buy modular ground infrastructure consistent with \"best commercial practices\" and architectural philosophy. Recommendation #2:  Buy highly distributed ground infrastructure.  Commercial designs can accommodate the GIG B, and have the ability to meet classified demands and surge.  The designs can also handle COOP.  The panel prefers a distributed ground infrastructure, because it ensures higher survivability.  However, it is not necessary to meet mission.\n\nFinding 7: Compete all contracts (where appropriate)\n Open competition will support the expansion of the industrial base and eventually contribute to greater competition across all the mission layers.  In order for the government to ensure that it is getting the best value from industry in the acquisition of commercial capabilities it needs to compete all contracts.  By focusing structuring the acquisitions as FFP contracts the government can manage significant risks.  Some government representatives will argue that most Mission Layer 2 and 3 vendors and suppliers have little or no experience in the development of remote sensing satellites; however, the solicitations can be written in such a way to ascertain reasonable risk on the part of the government and foster partnerships among vendors and suppliers who have the requisite experience that the government needs.\n\nRecommendation #1:  Compete all contracts when acquiring commercial remote sensing capabilities in order ensure the competition of ideas and get the best value.\n\nFinding 8: ITAR policies and regulations inhibit the global competitiveness of U.S. vendors The panel is concerned that ITAR policies and regulations hinder the ability of U.S. vendors and suppliers operating in Mission Layer 2 to compete in the global market. Even if the U.S. government decides to acquire commercial capabilities from Mission Layers 2 and 3, these buys will not make Mission Layer 2 vendors and suppliers economically healthy.  Mission Layer 2 vendors and suppliers are the most affected by the ITAR prohibitions since most foreign countries and foreign companies want access to highly capable proven satellite technologies, rather than a lot of \"commodity\" capabilities available in Mission Layer 3.  ITAR limited technology transfers from U.S. companies to foreign governments and companies inhibits Mission Layer 2's market expansion, global competitiveness, and ultimately, economic viability.\n\nThe panel is aware that there are two initiatives underway in the U.S. government that are reassessing ITAR policies and regulations.  We strongly urge that the findings of this panel inform those activities.\n\nRecommendation #1:  Restructure ITAR policies and regulations to ensure that Mission Layer 2 vendors and suppliers have access to foreign markets so as they can remain a viable part of the U.S. industrial base.\n\nRecommendation #2: Share the findings and recommendations of this panel with the ongoing reviews assessing current ITAR policies and regulations.\n\nThe panel finds that one of the most significant hurdles to the U.S. government's acquisition and integration of commercial imagery into its defined architecture is its reluctance and lack of discipline in adopting \"commercial practices' and following through with acquisition strategies that lead to \"lean manufacturing.  The acquisition strategies for commercial remote sensing need to use FFP contracts to ensure that risks are shared and that vendors and suppliers are held accountable to deliver a product within costs, schedule and performance metrics.  On the other hand, the government needs to adhere to core requirements, well-understood oversight, work with the vendors on resolving the issues defined as trade spaces during the pre-acquisition phase, and compete the programs.\n\nBibliography\n\nCartwright, General James (USMC), Commander, United States Strategic Command,\ninterview, May 17, 2007.\nDigitalGlobe Memorandum, Simplifying the NGA-CDP Relationship, Moving to Service\nLevel Agreements, 6 June 2007. NGA Interviews, 11 June 2007.\nEuropean Association of Remote Sensing Companies, \"Commercial Remote Sensing\nSatellite Market Stabilizing,\" Briefing, May 2007.\nGeneral Dynamics Advanced Information Systems, Integrated Space Systems\n(Unclassified Briefing), NRO-NGA Commercial Remote Sensing Panel, April 23,\n2007.\nGeneral Dynamics,  Advanced Information Systems,  NRO-NGA Panel on Remote\nSensing, GD-AIS Follow Up Discussions, May 24, 2007\nGeoEye Memorandum, Service Level Agreements, Report to NGA-NRO Panel on\nCommercial Remote Sensing, March 15, 2007.\nLean Aerospace Initiative, Transformation of Air Force Lean Acquisition, January, 28\n2004.\nLean Aerospace Initiative, Lean Acquisition Initiatives Research Studies Applicable to\nAcquisition, November 2004.\nLorell, M., Kennedy, M., Howell, J., and Levaux, H., Cheaper, Faster, Better?\nCommercial Approaches to Weapon Acquisitions, RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, 2000, pp. 20-27.\nMacDonald, Dettwiler, and Associates, LTD. Corporation, MDA Operational Smallsats,\nProcess Description and Case Study (Briefing), Presentation to NGA Advisory Group, April 26, 2007.\nMassachusetts Institute of Technology, Lean Acquisition and Manufacturing Techniques,\n2004.\nMondello, C., \"10-Year Remote Sensing Industry Forecast\", Phase IV - Study\nDocumentation\", The Photogrammetric Engineering and Remote Sensing Society,\nSeptember 2006.\nNational Security Space Launch Report, The Congressionally Mandated National\nSecurity Space Launch Requirements Panel, RAND-MG-503-OSD, Santa Monica, CA, 2006.\nNIMA Commission, The Information Edge, Imagery Intelligence and GeoSpatial\nInformation in an Evolving National Security Environment, Report of the\nIndependent Commission on the National Imagery and Mapping Agency (NIMA), December 2000.\nO'Connell, K., Baker, J.C., Lachman, B.E., Berner, S., Frelinger, D., Gavin, K., U.S.\nCommercial Remote Sensing Satellite Industry: An Analysis of Risk, RAND MR-\n1469-DOC, Santa Monica, Ca. 2001.\nOldham,S., \"New Approaches To Commercial Earth Observation, Presentation to NGA\nAdvisory    Group, MDA, Inc., March 15, 2007 (Unclassified).\nPaquette, P., Commercial Remote Sensing, NGA Briefing 07-154 (date unknown).\nSarsfield, L., The Application of Best Practices to Unmanned Spacecraft Development,\nDocumented Briefing, DB-319-NRO, RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, California, 2000.\nZelnio, R., \"The Effects of Export Control On the Space Industry\", Space Review,\nJanuary 16, 2006.\nStoney, W.E., ASPRS Guide to Land Imaging Satellites, Key Trends and Challenges in\nthe Global Marketplace, 2006.\nStoney, W. E., ASPRS Guide to Land Imaging Satellites, NOAA Commercial Remote\nSensing Symposium: Key Trends and Challenges in the Global Marketplace, September 2006.\nUnited States, Department of Defense, National Imagery and Mapping Agency\nEstablished, News Release No. 563-96, October 1, 1996.\nUnited States, Secretary of Defense, Memorandum for the Assistant Secretary of Defense\nfor Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence, JROCM 190-02,\nNovember 14, 2002.\nAppendix A: Terms of Reference\n\nBackground The Intelligence Community (IC) is engaged in the development of the strategy and the definition of the Integrated Collection Architecture (ICA).  An important aspect of the ICA is the future role of commercial vendors.  In addition, the investments made in the U.S. commercial vendors by the IC, under the Next View Program, are planned to come to fruition in their second-generation collection systems in approximately 2007. These upcoming capabilities necessitate an assessment of their contribution and how they may evolve in the future.\n\nRecently the Office of Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) directed NGA, with its mission partner, NRO, to develop business cases on how to improve IC\nutilization of commercial remote sensing.  In particular, the guidance seeks to evaluate how additional capabilities might be obtained from commercial vendors - domestic and foreign - with particular emphasis given to broad area collection.  This guidance also directed NGA and its mission partner to plan and develop infrastructure improvements that utilize commercial data as easily as NTM sources and that enhance the ability to get imagery products and information to users.\n\nThe ODNI plans an interim report to Congress by 15 March 2007.  However, it has directed the strategic and architectural studies to continue throughout FY 2007.\n\nThe review will collect and evaluate relevant information from the government, contractors, interested elements of NGA and the mission partners, Congress, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, and Department of Defense (DOD) staffs concerning the capabilities and application of commercial remote sensing and its ability to meet the technical and operational requirements of the near-, mid-, and long-term. The Review Team will share its insights and findings with the DD/NGA, D/NGA and mission partner as they emerge.\n\nThe Review Team The Review Team consists of members from NGA's Advisory Group (NAG) and representatives from NGA and NRO:\n- Peter Marino (Chairperson)\n- Ed McMahon (NAG member) - Evan Hineman (NAG member) - Jaan Loger (NGA) - Frank Calvelli (NRO) - Leslie Lewis (Assistant to Chairperson)\n\nIssues To Be Reviewed  - TOR\nThe NAG with NGA and NRO advisors will address the following:\n1. Review the IC-DOD requirements to ensure that they are clearly articulated and clearly define needed capabilities and their timelines.\n\n2. Assess current approaches NGA and NRO are pursuing for satisfying requirements for near-term (2007-2009), mid-term (2010-2012), and longterm (beyond 2013).\n\n3. Evaluate ground architecture capabilities and plans to improve integration\nwith NTM TPED operations.\n4. Identify and review policies and directives that relate to acquiring and using\ncommercial imagery capabilities and products, both domestic and foreign.\n5. Define a business case that satisfies NGA and NRO requirements.\n6. Define and evaluate alternatives for how the business cases might be\nachieved.  Ensure the alternatives include:\na. Identify and assess U.S. and foreign developed commercial\ntechnologies and services that are currently available or will\npotentially be developed.\nb. Evaluate commercial industry's capacity to provide needed\ntechnologies, including timelines for availability of commercially developed capabilities; and financial viability of U.S. and foreign\nvendors.\nc. Address in the business case alternatives programmatic and\noperational attributes, and U.S. policies and directives that might\nencumber achieving the desired outcomes.\n7. Make recommendations on the alternatives.\n\nReview Outputs\n1.\nInterim briefings to senior leadership at NGA and NRO.\n2.\nFinal report to senior leadership at NGA and NRO.  A draft report will be developed for review and comment prior to the final publication.\n\nSchedule\n1. Initiate study in mid-January 2007 2. Complete study in six months, mid-July 2007\n\n## Appendix B: Commercial Data Providers And Vendors\n\n\n1. Digital Globe Founded in 1992 as an Earth Imaging and Information Company by Geographic Information System (GIS) and Mapping users, this privately-held company has established itself as the world's most prominent supplier of the highest resolution commercial satellite imagery.  Its competitive edge as the market leader comes from the technical superiority of its satellite imaging systems and its high standards of product quality.  With its successful launches of its satellites like the QuickBird-2, and scheduled launches of its next-generation of imaging systems like WorldView-1 (mid-2007) and WorldView-2 (anticipated in 2008), explains why Digital Globe has become the current industry leader by delivering the best available commercial images and information.\n\nAccording to Digital Globe's main website (www.digitalglobe.com), its QuickBird-2 satellite is the only commercial spacecraft able to offer \"sub-meter resolution imagery, industry-leading geo-locational accuracy, large on-board data storage, and an imaging footprint 2 to 10 times larger than any other commercial highresolution satellite.\"  It also states that Digital Globe's soon-to-be launch satellite, WorldView-1, will be recognized as \"the most agile satellite ever flown commercially and will have the capability of collecting up to 750,000 sq km per day of half-meter imagery\" but, not after the launch of the company's WorldView-2 satellite.  The WorldView-2 satellite will have the capability of \"collecting up to 975,000 sq km per day of half-meter imagery\" and have the ability to perform precise change detection and mapping with the addition of spectral diversity components.\n\n2. GeoEye\nAs of January 2006, GeoEye is the largest commercial remote sensing company in the world.  This newly combined company of ORBIMAGE and Space Imaging is headquartered in Dulles, Virginia with almost three-hundred employees.  It currently owns and operates a constellation of three earth imaging satellites: OrbView-2, IKONOS and OrbView-3 and has GeoEye-1 (previously known as OrbView-5) currently under development.\nIn August 1997, OrbView-2 satellite was launched successfully into orbit and continues to operate and provide low-resolution images with spatial resolution which is ideal for broad area global coverage.  Launched in September 1999, IKONOS satellite became the world's first high-resolution commercial remote sensing satellite with a ground resolution of .82 meters and continues to deliver imagery of any location on the Earth's surface.  Four years later in June 2003, OrbView-3 satellite was successfully launched and has the capability of providing 1-meter resolution panchromatic and the 4-\nmeter resolution multi-spectral imagery.  According to its website (www.geoeye.com), the one-meter imagery \"enables the viewing of houses, automobiles and aircrafts, and makes it possible to create highly precise digital maps and three-dimensional fly-through scenes.\" Also the four-meter imagery multi-spectral imagery \"provides color and infrared information to further characterize cities, rural areas and undeveloped land from space.\"\nIt covers the entire earth with revisits in less than three days.\nOverall, these three earth imaging satellites benefit GeoEye's commercial and governmental organization customers around the world.  For instance, GeoEye's single biggest customer, National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA), relies on GeoEye's high-resolution imagery to view, map, measure, monitor, and manage global activities.\nIn other words, these types of satellites allow end users to visualize and understand critical events happening on earth, in the air, and in space.\n\n3. Ball Aerospace & Technologies Corporation Headquartered in Boulder, Colorado, Ball Aerospace and Technologies Corporation, a subsidiary of Ball Corporation, employs approximately 3,300 talented engineers, scientists, technicians and support staff worldwide.  It maintains itself as an industry leader developing and providing advanced aerospace technology products and solutions for government and commercial customers.\nBall Aerospace continues to expand its knowledge and expertise in the fields of remote-sensing, astronomy, optics, laser communications, data exploitation and precision cameras.  The combination of its past, present and future work labels this company as a competitive leader within the commercial remote-sensing arena.  In 2001, Ball Aerospace was selected by AstroVision International to build its satellites and to integrate on-board instruments for the company's AVSTAR satellite system, which is to provide live, color coverage of the earth.  Ball Aerospace's current programs like the QuickBird-2 satellite, became the highest resolution commercial satellite in operation when launched in 2001;\nand its newly assembled and soon-to-be launched WorldView-1, the next-generation commercial remote sensing satellite, will provide unprecedented high resolution imaging capability for Digital Globe's customers.\n\n4. Space Systems/Loral (SS/L) - a subsidiary of Loral Space & Communications Headquartered in Palo Alto, California, the company is one of the world's premier designers, manufacturers, and integrators of powerful geostationary satellites and satellite systems.  It has manufactured more than 220 satellites, delivering in excess of 1200 years of on-orbit service, which was accomplished through the three-axis-stabilized 1300 series geostationary satellites.  These satellites have the capability of delivering a wide range of services from broadcast video distribution to satellite mobile radio and data broadcast to defense communications to air traffic control. Among the list of satellites developed by SS/L is the Spainsat satellite, a government-communication satellite for Hisdesat, which provides dedicated communications for the Spanish Ministry of Defense; as well as the XTAR-EUR for XTAR, a Loral/Hisdesat joint venture for defense satellite communications.  Space Systems/Loral was just awarded a contract to build a high-power satellite for SES NEW SKIES.  This new satellite will be called NSS-12 and will provide critical communications services for many years for telecommunications providers, broadcasters, corporations, and governments around the world.  These are just a few reasons of why SS/L is the world's leading provider of high-power commercial communications satellites.\n\n## 5. Itt - International Telephone & Telegraph - Space Systems Division Headquartered In Rochester, N.Y., Itt Corporation -- Space Systems Division (Ssd) Employs Over 2,600 People Worldwide With Its Core Mission To Provide The Best\n\nvalue remote sensing products, services, and key applications to its government and commercial customers.\nAmong these innovative products and solutions is the creation of its digital camera system that was incorporated on to Space Imaging's (now GeoEye's) IKONOS\ncommercial remote sensing satellite, which allowed the satellite camera to distinguish objects on the ground as small as one meter in size from 400 miles above the Earth.  Not to mention, ITT-SSD was selected by General Dynamics C4 Systems (in support of GeoEye and its sponsor NGA) to build the *imaging systems* for both WorldView and GeoEye Satellites, which captures high-resolution images smaller than one-half meter. With these types of products, it allows end users to visualize and understand critical events happening on earth, in the air, and in space.  It's essential to know what is going on in the world and the best way to safeguard the nation and its citizens.\n\n##\n\n6. AstroVision International Headquartered in Bethesda, Maryland, AstroVision International, a privately-held commercial space company is developing the world's first satellite system which is set to deliver live, continuous, true color, high-definition images of the earth.  The first satellite in this five geostationary satellite system (AVSTAR system) was launched in 2003, which provided coverage of the North America region and with subsequent satellite launches which started in mid-2006 will provide global coverage (North America and South America).  This satellite constellation will deliver real-time weather and environmental information to its customers.  It will capture and track catastrophic events live (hurricanes, volcanoes, forest fires, etc) and thus, help end-users be aware of events that are occurring around the world so that they can mitigate any potential risk and prevent any loss.\n\n##\n\n7. Lockheed Martin Space Systems Company a division of Lockheed Martin, headquartered in Denver, Colorado, designed and developed the IKONOS satellite, the first commercial satellite with the capability of imaging objects smaller than one meter in diameter. The IKONOS satellite provides high-resolution black and white imagery, as well as multispectral digital pictures, to a multitude of customers.  Images from the IKONOS and a variety of other commercial satellites are utilized in civil engineering and construction, land management, agriculture, mining, environmental monitoring, tax assessment, disaster relief, news gathering, infrastructure planning and management, as well as many other areas.\n\n8. Boeing The Space and Intelligence Systems (S&IS) division of Boeing Corporation in El Segundo, California serves as their headquarters for all intelligence and government/commercial space systems. The S&IS division provides \"end-to-end intelligence services such as collection, communication, exploitation, and the creation of fused knowledge products and has competency in large-scale systems integration; Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance systems; communication systems; network systems; and protection and security systems\" (www.boeing.com/defensespace/ic/sis/index.html). S&IS chief customers are the National Security Agency and the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency.\n\n9. Northrop Grumman Headquartered in Redondo Beach, CA, Northrup Grumman Space Technology\n(NGST) specializes in developing end-to-end systems: systems engineering, spacecraft management, ground stations, and space instrument design. Northrup Grumman provides a variety of capabilities to their commercial and government customers. For example, the Geostationary Operational Environmental Satellite (GOES-R) provides imagery of the environment (weather) and allows end-users to monitor climate and warn citizens of any potential danger (i.e. Hurricane Katrina,etc).  NGST is also developing the Milstar payloads, which are a series of advanced satellites linked to mobile ground terminals to provide assured command and control to U.S. forces worldwide.\n\n\n10. Raytheon Raytheon Intelligence and Information Systems, headquartered in Garland, Texas, has partnered with Ball Aerospace to produce the *Hudhud* satellite program, which offers high performance reconnaissance/surveillance capabilities, full integration with customer security operations, high reliability, maintainability and availability for its customers. The program offers two satellites the Hudhud-1 EO and the Hudhud-2 SAR. Raytheon offers a slightly different approach to commercial satellite procurement in that the customer owns the system once the satellite is delivered on-orbit; they have the ability to have full integration with classified systems and they offer commercial level documentation and customer reviews, as well as, commercial level satellite testing.\n\n\n11. General Dynamics\nAdvanced Information Systems, a division of General Dynamics, headquartered in northern Virginia designs, develops, manufactures, and integrates information solutions within five key areas for the defense, intelligence, space and homeland security communities. AIS provides solutions for maritime combat systems, integrated space systems, actionable intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance, information assurance and homeland security.   A General Dynamics recently acquired, Spectrum Astro Space Systems, headquartered in Gilbert, Arizona, with the most advanced satellite manufacturing facility in the U.S. and offers engineering and management processes ranging from space electronics manufacturing to the design, manufacture, integration, test and on-orbit support of high performance space systems for both the commercial sector and the United States Government.\n\n12. Oribtal Sciences Corporation Founded in 1982 and headquartered in Dulles, Virginia, Orbital Sciences Corporation has since become the leading provider of small to medium class satellites.  A little over one third of their revenue is generated from contracts with the Department of Defense and the Intelligence Community, 31% from commercial and international satellite operators, and the remainder is from contacts with NASA, other civilian agencies, and universities.\n\n## Appendix C: Interviews\n\n\nEXTERNAL\n\n\nName\nOrganization / Office\n\nDate Interviewed\n\nBastian, Joseph\n9-Mar-07\nBall Aerospace\nBerkowitz, Marc\n9-Mar-07\nLockheed Martin\nBehling, Tom\n14-May-07\nDepartment of Defense\nBlersch, Don\n12-Apr-07\nODNI\nBrehany, Chris\n12-Apr-07\nODNI/SAE\nCahill, Tim\n9-Mar-07\nLockheed Martin\nCartwright, General James\n17-May-07\nSTRATCOM\nCronin, Hilary\n3-May-07\nOpen Source\nCrumley, James\n24-May-07\nGeneral Dynamics\nDodd, Joseph\n9-Mar-07\nNorthrup Grumman\nDoyle, Fred\n9-Mar-07\nBall Aerospace\nDriscoll, Gerry\n24-May-07\nITT\nFitzgerald, Dennis\n24-May-07\nNRO\nGernhardt, Gary\n24-Mar-07\nITT\nGoddeke, Dale\n8-Mar-07\nRaytheon Corporation\nGrant, Jeffrey\n8-Mar-07\nNorthrup Grumman\nHall, Doug\n15-Mar-07\nMDA\nHanke, John\n24-May-07\nGoogle\nHarris, Jeffrey\n9-Mar-07\nLockheed Martin\nHolz, Brian\n9-Mar-07\nBall Aerospace\nHouck, Jody\n12-Apr-07\nHouse Permanent Select Committee on\nIntelligence\nHsiung, Shang\n23-Apr-07\nRaytheon Corporation\nHuybrechts, Steven\n\nOSD/NII\nJacobvits, Aaron\n12-Apr-07\nAerospace\nJilla, Cyrus\n12-Apr-07\nNRO/AS&T\nJones, Michael\n24-May-07\nGoogle\nKeller,man, Anne\n8-Mar-07\nRaytheon Corporation\nKlinger, Gil\n23-Feb-07\nODNI\nKnusten, Brian\n8-Mar-07\nBoeing\nLarson, Wade\n15-Mar-07\nMDA\nLederman, David\n24-May-07\nGoogle\nLewis, Lindon\n9-Mar-07\nBall Aerospace\nLudtke, Cary\n9-Mar-07\nBall Aerospace\nMarchetto, Carl\n24-May-07\nOrbital\nMcFarland, Scott\n12-Apr-07\nBoeing\nMcHane, Edward\n23-Apr-07\nAerospace\nMitchell, Roger\n15-Mar-07\nMDA\nMorrissey, Arthur\n9-Mar-07\nBall Aerospace\n| Penn, Brian                       | 12-Apr-07     | Boeing                                  |\n|-----------------------------------|---------------|-----------------------------------------|\n| Pollard, Matt                     | 12-Apr-07     | Senate Select Committee on Intelligence |\n| O'Connell, Matthew                | 15-Mar-07     | GeoEye                                  |\n| Oldham, Stephen                   | 15-Mar-07     | MDA                                     |\n| Owen, Ray                         | 4/23/2007 and |                                         |\n| 5/24/07                           |               |                                         |\n| Spectrum Astro / General Dynamics |               |                                         |\n| Rae, Doug                         | 15-Mar-07     | MDA                                     |\n| Scott, Walter                     | 8-Mar-07      | Digital Globe                           |\n| Shingledecker, David              | 23-Apr-07     | Spectrum Astro / General Dynamics       |\n| Sienicki, Dawn                    | 8-Mar-07      | Digital Globe                           |\n| Smith, Jill                       | 8-Mar-07      | Digital Globe                           |\n| Speckert, Glen                    | 24-May-07     | Google                                  |\n| Spruill, Yancey                   | 8-Mar-07      | Digital Globe                           |\n| Stopher, John                     | 24-May-07     | Omega Inc./GD                           |\n| Thomas, Darrell                   | 24-May-07     | General Dynamics                        |\n| Von Thayer, Lewis                 | 4/23/2007 and |                                         |\n| 5/24/07                           |               |                                         |\n| Spectrum Astro / General Dynamics |               |                                         |\n| Westbay, Joseph                   | 24-May-07     | ITT                                     |\n| Wills, Ann                        | 12-Apr-07     | ODNI/SAE                                |\n| Wolf, Richard                     | 24-May-07     | Orbital                                 |\n| Yeakel, Glenn                     | 4/23/2007 and |                                         |\n| 5/24/07                           |               |                                         |\n| Spectrum Astro / General Dynamics |               |                                         |\n\n## Appendix D: Minimal Requirements\n\n\nThe ability of commercial imagery to support the National Geospatial Intelligence\nAgency's (NGA) diverse mission needs is being evaluated by the Commercial Remote\nSensing Panel.   The following is a broadly stated list of fundamental capability needs to\na common reference point for contractor/vendor presentations to the panel on their technical capabilities. The needs are divided into three parts: (1) Area Needs, (2) Point Needs, and (3) Additional Considerations.  Again these broadly stated needs provide a framework for discussing your organization's technical capacity.\n\n1. AREA\n\n1. Foundation Data: Entire earth (~ 150M sq km) - refreshed every 2 years\n                (Electro optical)\n\n- Low Resolution - 10 - 30 meter GSD Multi-spectral, monoscopic\n\n\n- Medium Resolution - 3 - 5 meter GSD, Multi-spectral monoscopic\n\n\n- High Resolution - 0.5 meter GSD, panchromatic, monoscopic \" best\"\n\n geopositioning accuracy - Bulk ordering and delivery\n2. Elevation Data\n- 10m post-spacing world wide every 10 years\n\n- 3 - 5 meter post-spacing regionally (~ 250,000 sq km) within 120 days of\n               request.  Up to 10 regions/year.\n- 1 meter post-spacing focused areas (~2,500 sq km) within 120 days of\n               request.  Up to 25 areas/year\n- Bulk ordering and delivery 3. Feature Data Production Support\n- Stereo imagery, panchromic, .25 -.5 meter GSD, regionally (up to\n  250,000 sq km) within 120 days of request. Up to 25 regions/year.\n\n- Multispectral imagery, 3 - 5 meter, contemporaneous with panchromic\n  stereo imagery\n\n- \"Best\" geopositioning accuracy\n\n- Bulk ordering and delivery 4. Synoptic/Contiguous Area Coverage\n- 10,000 - 70,000 sq km/day, .5-1m, panchromatic with contemporaneous\n  3 - 5 meter multispectral imagery, 5-30 day duration\n\n- As many as three simultaneous events, globally dispersed\n\n- Up to 25 events per year\n2. POINT\n\n 1. Global Coverage\n- 500 - 2000 points/day, 5 km x 5 km, .25 - .5 meter GSD, panchromatic\n\n- Contemporaneous multi-spectral 3 - 5 meter beneficial\n\n- Distributed through the world\n\n- Sensitive bulk ordering and delivery 2. Focus Region Coverage\n\n- 25 - 100 points/day, 5 km x 5 km, .25 - .5 meter GSD, panchromatic,\n  within a 25,000 sq km region\n\n- Contemporaneous multi-spectral 3 - 5 meter beneficial\n\n- 1 - 5 regions distributed throughout the world\n\n- 5 - 30 day duration of event coverage\n\n- Sensitive priority ordering and expedited delivery 3. Urgent Coverage\n- 10 - 25 point/day, 5 km x 5 km, .25 - .5 meter GSD, panchromatic,\n  within a 25,000 sq km region\n\n- Contemporaneous multispectral 3 - 5 meter beneficial\n\n- 1 - 5 regions distributed throughout the world\n\n- 5 - 30 day duration of event coverage\n\n- Sensitive and priority ordering and expedited delivery\n\n3. ADDITIONAL CONSIDERATIONS\n1. Assurance of access 2. Assurance of longevity/continuity of sources\n3. Proprietary needs 4. Data Licensing 5. Surge Capacity\nAppendix E: Historical Overview and Baseline Assessment\n\nHistorical Overview Space-based imagery has been available since the mid-1960s beginning with U.S.' need for photographic data that was not vulnerable to ground and airborne attacks and could operate relatively free of constraints. The mission focused on the photographing of static areas of interest.  The U.S. was the leader in satellite development and use between the late 1960s and mid-1980s.  U.S. government-industry partnerships developed satellite systems that pushed the technological envelop in imagery and launch capabilities; the technologies were government proprietary.  Second and third tier providers manufactured the needed components - lens, buses, electronics, etc. - through contracts with the trusted development contractors or the government.  The governmentindustry partnerships were structured to push the technological capabilities of the satellite systems because the requirements were defined to push technical performance on a satellite-by-satellite basis; therefore, no two payloads were the same.   The payload/sensor technology drove all other aspects of the system - spacecraft, launch, and ground segments.  Space-based remote sensing consists of four inter-related elements, all of which need to successfully operate in order to achieve mission success: (1)\nPayload/Sensors12, (2) Spacecraft, (3) Launch, and (4) Ground Segments.\nA paradigm shift occurred in the mid-1990s with the collapse of the Soviet Union.\n\nThe mission moved from counting static things to one of persistence.  Concurrently, satellite technologies became commercially available on a global scale because the technologies could be produced at a relative low price point thereby facilitating their \"commoditization.\"  Although the capabilities were relatively coarse when compared to those developed by and for the U.S. government, many U.S.- and foreign-owned commercial companies saw a huge market potential to provide unclassified imagery data to a global market. The U.S. industry also believed a large and viable commercial market would emerge.  By the early 2000s the markets had not materialized, and the commercial vendors and imagery providers never attained the numbers of customers or revenue identified in the forecasts.13 Nonetheless, several U.S. satellite companies did emerge\n\n12 EO sensors provide black-and-white pictures and are the foundation of most commercial remote sensor companies.  Current EO sensors can have a resolution of  meter GSD or coarser; the technologies are well understood and generally present a low technology risk.  Optical systems can be divided into two broad resolution categories: Very high provides between .41 to 1m GSD resolution; high resolution is between 1.8 and 2.5m GSD.  High-medium resolution is between 4 to 8m GSD with medium between 10 and 20 m GSD, and low-medium is between 30 to 56 m GSD.  They all have differing coverage capabilities with very high resolution swaths covering between 8 to 28 kilometers, while nearly all medium swaths are between 60 and 180 km.  SAR sensors utilize a mature technology that produces data with resolutions between approximately 5m and 30 m GSD or coarser.  Hyper-spectral sensor technology is well known and derived from legacy ground and airborne hyper-spectral sensors.  Multi-spectral sensors have also entered into the commercial marketplace.  Recently, there has been an increased use of light detection and ranging sensors (LIDAR) in the commercial imagery market.  W.E. Stoney, ASPRS Guide to Land Imaging Satellites, Key Trends and Challenges in the Global Marketplace, 2006, p. 3.\n\n13  The business cases developed for a viable commercial imagery and telecommunications market drove several key U.S. government decisions concerning launch capabilities.  One critical area was U.S. launch; U.S. Air Force decided to consolidate and modernize U.S. government's launch capabilities through the commercial acquisition of the Evolved Extended Launch Vehicle (EELV).  The EELV could be acquired at during this period - DigitalGlobe, Space Imaging, and Orbital Imaging Group.14  The entire commercial satellite-manufacturing sector in 2004 had revenues of approximately $10.2 billion; single satellite development costs including launch, currently range between $200 and $600 million depending on system complexity and the size of the payload.\nBy the early 2000s several foreign governments had initiated satellite and launch development as knowledge of technologies proliferated.  Many of the nations now tie their national pride, geo-political security, and global stature to the development of spacebased capabilities.  Several of these nations also subsidize nationally owned companies to sell end-to-end space capabilities to other nations at a price point substantially below their development costs in order to be globally competitive.  This is done to foster global recognition and to influence potential allies.  Figures E-1 and E-2 show the current list of nations who have developed or are developing space-based imagery capabilities.\n\n\n\na relatively low cost through a government-industry partnership in which to government would be an anchor tenant providing upfront funding along with Lockheed Martin Corporation and Boeing Corporation.\n\nThe acquisition strategy was that most EELV costs would be reimbursed through the high commercial usage and the government would guarantee and pay for a percentage launch capability to support its national security needs.  The concept failed when the commercial market failed to materialize. See:\nNational Security Space Launch Report, The Congressionally Mandated National Security Space Launch Requirements Panel, RAND-MG-503-OSD, Santa Monica, CA, 2006.\n\nThe U.S. government has long debated utilization of commercially developed satellite capabilities, particularly in the area of imagery, in the performance of its National Technical Means (NTM) and DOD missions.  The NTM mission has traditionally focused on gathering imagery on geo-political and strategic areas determined to be key to U.S. national security while the DOD mission has concentrated on more real time data gathering for the war-fighting mission.  Since 2001, the differentiation between the NTM and DOD missions has narrowed.  Now, key to both is the ability of the United States to systemically gather global geospatial and imagery data, combined with persistent surveillance over key high value targets and the ability to target and revisit critical areas of interest in almost real time.  These high mission demands have increased requirements for geospatial and imagery data and suggest that both tailored and commercial assets need to be integrated in a manner that provides maximum coverage. The recent successful Chinese anti-satellite test in January 2007 further necessitates that the U.S. government manage mission risk by ensuring its ability to operate at will to collect needed imagery and geospatial information.  One option is to increase the use of commercial satellites to ensure redundancy at a relatively low price point.\n\n\n\nFigure E-2: Foreign Nations Involved In Satellite Development\n\nSince 1958, the U.S. government has passed legislation and enacted policies that define how space capabilities will be used and managed (See Appendix F), many of which have addressed commercial products. The 1988 Presidential Decision on National Space Policy (NSP) supported the utilization of commercially developed space products and services; it directed the government to \"purchase commercially available space goods and services to the fullest extent feasible.\"  Subsequent policies and acts underlined support for commercial entities providing products and value-added services in support of U.S. space capabilities.  The Land Remote Sensing Policy Act of 1992 defined the legal boundaries for U.S. private firms wanting to own and operate remote sensing satellite systems.  In January 1993 the Bush Administration issued the first license authorizing a U.S. commercial imaging satellite that could collect 3-meter resolution imagery.  In 1994, the Clinton Administration wrote Presidental Decision Directive 23 (PDD-23) outlining the U.S. government's guidelines for granting operating licenses to American companies interested in commercial remote sensing satellites; the policy enabled U.S. firms to get permission for relatively high-resolution imaging satellites for both domestic and foreign sales.  The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration\n(NOAA) was made responsible for the licensing of U.S. commercial remote sensing satellites for foreign sales.15  However, none of the policies or directives specify desired outcomes (metrics) for utilization of commercial products, rather they concentrate on identifying conditions for granting operating licenses, legal obligations of commercial firms that receive government licenses, and the bureaucracy responsible for overseeing commercial imaging activities.16\nGlobal competition, combined with the International Traffic in Arms Regulations\n(ITAR), has affected the U.S. commercial satellite-manufacturing sector as a whole.  In 2004, the U.S. commercial satellite-manufacturing field had declined to about 50 percent of the market, down from 83 percent in 1999. The market decline is attributable to both the cumbersome U.S. export policies, ITAR, as well as the increase in foreign suppliers.\nSeveral government-sponsored studies in the 1990s and early 2000s supported greater use of commercially developed satellites and imagery.  The memorandum announcing the establishment of the National Imagery and Mapping Agency (NIMA)\nnoted that one of its key thrusts is \"to promote the use of commercial solutions.\"17 A\n1996 evaluation of the proposed National Imagery and Mapping Agency (NIMA) endorsed the greater use of imaging satellites and urged the U.S. government to foster U.S. companies being allowed to move to higher resolution as required by the competition and demanded by the marketplace.18  The 2000 NIMA Commission Report endorsed this finding and went on to note that one of the key factors influencing the greater use of commercial imagery is that \"NIMA has been a captive customer for satellite imagery provided by the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO)\", whose primary function is to build and operate highly technical, tailored satellites.19  In November 2002, the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff issued a memorandum stating that a balance \"...should be maintained between satisfying the bulk of information needs that can be satisfied by spectral remote sensing and those high payoff information needs.\"20\nSince 2002, NGA initiated the use of commercial imagery as an augmentation to national assets with the award of ClearView (2002), NextView (2003), and NextView2 (2004) contracts.  Today commercial imagery purchases comprise only approximately 0.5 percent of NGA's overall budget.  NGA investment dollars have been relatively constant across NGA's program with a minor decrease anticipated in the Future Year (FY) 2009 2013 program.  NGA buys a spectrum of satellites with varying resolutions and capabilities.  ClearView (initiated in 2002) provides the government imagery and imagery services from three domestic satellites at 1 meter ground sample distance (GSD) spatial resolution.  NextView 1 and II are the follow-on contracts for imagery and imagery services from current and next generation domestic satellites; they provide up to\n.5 meter GSD resolution.  The spectral response bands include both visible and near infrared light.  The commercial satellite systems are designed to be operational in 2007 and are being built by DigitalGlobe and GeoEye through government assured funding.\n\nThe GeoEye 1 (NextView 1) sensor will collect imagery at a resolution of 0.41\nmeter GSD and multi-spectral imagery at 1.64 meter GSD at nadir. Worldview I (NextView II) will be launched in 2007/2008 and will acquire imagery and imageryderived products at a lower price point through broad licensing agreements (one license for all official business) with faster delivery times and a nominal delivery of panchromatic imagery per year, per satellite.  These capabilities allow increases in daily area collection of over 100,000 square km monoscopic and 40,000 square km stereoscopic imagery and 150 monoscopic/stereoscopic points.21 The Worldview system includes shorter tasking timelines, more efficient imagery processing systems, and multisatellite collection planning.  It facilitates an expanded network of remote ground terminals and added spectral diversity to perform precision change detection and mapping.22 This approach is considered a pure commercial buy for imagery and imagery products.   These capabilities are currently costing the U.S. government approximately about $300 million per year with the government receiving capacity on the equivalent of one satellite plus one surge.\n\nNGA also purchases imagery and imagery products from each of the following platforms: High resolution - GeoEye - IKONOS, GeoEye - Orbview 3, and DigitalGlobe - Quickbird.  The medium resolution capabilities include: ERS Spot 4 and 5, Indian Remote Sensing, Canadian Space Agency Radarsat, and NASA - Landsat 7 and Earth Observing.\nThe DOD continues to be frustrated by the inability to get direct theater down links (TDL) to the regional combatant commanders (COCOMs) who view current unclassified imagery information and products as critical to mission execution.  The DOD's demand for persistent surveillance also continues to grow.  U.S. Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM) argues that utilization of tailored and commercial capabilities are essential to the DOD performing its global defense missions.23 Many of these needs are for unclassified imagery data.\nIn January 2006, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) began the Integrated Collection Architecture (ICA) Study that was designed to assess future Intelligence Community (IC) collection needs, including the future role of commercial imagery vendors and data providers.  The Phase 1 report was completed in early 2007 and gave only a slight nod to increased utilization of commercial remote sensing.  In January 2007, Congress requested that the initial ICA Phase 2 work address how the Intelligence Community (IC) could increase its use of commercial remote sensing as part of a broader look at U.S. remote sensor capabilities.  An interim report was to be completed by ODNI by March 2007 in order to influence the FY2008 budget and FY2009 program.  The study's early findings (published in April 2007) determined that for the near- to mid-term, the U.S. government should continue its current course of relying primarily on NTM satellites while using commercial capabilities as augmentation. In the future, the government needs to assess how it can increase the integration of commercial imagery into the overall NTM architecture.  The Congress was not satisfied with the study's recommendations, arguing that the ODNI assessment supported the current acquisition strategy for the near- to mid-term but lacked identification of alternatives for how the U.S. government might increase its utilization of commercial capabilities.\n\nCOMMERICAL VENDORS, SUPPLIERS, AND COMMERCIAL DATA PROVIDERS\nThe commercial remote sensing industry consists of: (1) vendors (satellite developers), (2) suppliers - lens, buses, software, components, etc., and (3) the commercial data providers (CDPs) or companies that sell imagery or imagery products.\nIn the U.S., the commercial satellite vendors are comprised of approximately 6 to 8 large and medium size companies - Lockheed-Martin, Boeing, General Dynamics, Ball Aerospace, Raytheon Corporation, and Orbital Imaging - who are seeking to create financially viable businesses through the commercial development of small and medium satellites for the global market (See Appendix B).  Several of the companies seek to develop and sell end-to-end systems, while others concentrate solely on the development of payloads and spacecraft.  The key to the success of the commercial vendors is the development, successful launch, and initial operation of a reliable capability that meets a client's requirements at an acceptable price.  Most satellite contracts are firm-fixed price with final payment due when the satellite is in orbit and operational for a specified initial period of time.  Most developers insure the satellites against launch and on-orbit failure for a short period of time following launch.  The vendors use both U.S. and foreignowned companies to acquired needed parts, and commercial companies or foreign governments to launch their satellites at a competitive price.\nThere are two U.S. imagery data providers - DigitalGlobe and GeoEye - who compete in the global market to provide imagery data to governments for civil use and national security.  They also are the key providers to private companies such as Google and Microsoft in support of their \"paint the earth\" imagery data needs.  Sometimes the data provider owns a satellite(s) and negotiates rights to either lease part of the satellite to a customer or to provide specific imagery data at designated times to a customer.  They often rely on Service Level Agreements (SLAs) that specify the amount and timeliness of the data to be provided and agreements on how and when the imagery data can be sold on the open market.  Key to this business arrangement is the ability of the data provider to sell imagery data after a specified period of time on the second-hand-market.  Google and Microsoft obtain most of their foundational data through purchasing imagery on the second-hand market from the data providers.  In order for this business arrangement to succeed the data provider must have a sufficient number of satellites to meet customer needs and a large market in which to sell the imagery data.  If the data provider needs to acquire a satellite in order to meet its customer's requirements, it almost always necessitates some upfront funding from the customer to initiate the building of the satellite(s) and/or guarantees of incremental funding as the satellite is being built.  Once the satellite is on orbit, the data provider ensures that the imagery data or products are delivered to the customer according to the contractual agreements.  The data providers are also acquiring aerial and airborne imagery capabilities to augment their satellites in order to provide a broader array of remote sensing products at the lowest price point. Another challenge for the data providers is the evolution of the market from imagery data to geospatial products.\n\nThe key challenge for the commercial remote sensing satellite vendors, suppliers, and CDPs is to devise viable business plans that are attractive to both the U.S. government and commercial imagery users whether in the U.S. or foreign owned.\nSecond, the U.S. government must demonstrate a willingness to use commercial imagery in such volume that these businesses become an integral element of the U.S. national security.  Currently, the U.S. government is the major source of funding for the data providers; it funds approximately 45 to 48 percent of their business through various business arrangements. Commercial vendors and internal financing make up the other 52\nto 55 percent of their funding stream.  There are significant ambiguities about the business viability of the commercial remote sensor developers and data providers over the mid- (2010-2012) and long-term (beyond 2013).  Integral to this argument is who and what constitutes the U.S. commercial satellite industrial base. Uncertainty has increased in the U.S. commercial remote sensing satellite business because of the increase in foreign development and foreign-owned companies.24\nThe failure of the business forecasts of the 1990s to meet expectations combined with the potential for suppressed demand through foreign countries developing their own programs makes the future quite uncertain.  Therefore, the financial markets are uncertain and skeptical to provide financing to many vendors and data providers.  There is also significant uncertainty about the U.S. government and other customers wanting more imagery data and products.  In addition, companies must factor in the cost of capital, insurance, and contract cancellation potential into program costs from the outset.25\n\n\nBASELINE- RISK ASSESSMENT\n\nA risk assessment was performed in order to ascertain baseline knowledge of\nmission gaps, what commercial capabilities were available to close them, and challenges that the business cases had to address.  Figure E-3 is a notional depiction of the\noverlapping mission layers that were used in the assessment.  The size of the mission\nlayers (as depicted in the figure) shows the notional dimensions of where capabilities would be expected to operate and is not a depiction of the actual capabilities.\nAs noted earlier the risk categories are:\n. Requirements and mission\n\n. Technology and integration\n\n. Security\n\n. Policy, industrial base, and markets\n\n. Programmatics and costs.\nREQUIREMENTS AND MISSION\nThe government drives its needs for imagery from a requirements deck that has evolved over approximately 40 years.  Its focus is on refining existent sophisticated technologies or developing new ones in order to achieve improved mission performance.\nIn the initial years of satellite development this was the correct approach, for evolution in technological improvements was key to gaining and sustaining U.S. strategic advantage. Only the government and selected industry partners knew or understood the complex technologies involved and their integration; cost was not a major issue, for the technologies were new and risky, but mission needs were high.  The legacy requirements construct continues to drive technology advancement that limits the trade space for adoption of available technologies to fill some of the needs.  The requirements deck operates as a decision-making paradigm that designates commercial imagery and imagery products as capable of providing only augmentation, for it defines mission needs primarily within the construct of technical improvements for NTM.\n\n\nThe vertical axis of the figure shows level of requirements risk while the horizontal axis identifies level of mission risks from low to high respectively.  Mission Layer 1 illustrates the area where satellite developers provide capabilities to primarily the high-end tailored programs in which most of the capabilities are developed exclusively for the U.S. government in the form of NTM.  U.S. commercial vendors identified in the Mission Layer 2 are those companies who develop satellites for both the U.S. government and for the global commercial market.  They utilize high-end proven technologies and COTS.  Mission Layer 3 identifies the commercial vendors who utilize proven capabilities. The discussion points for each mission layer are color-coded.   The complexity and predominance of the current requirements deck drives the U.S. government to try and satisfy most of its requirements with Mission Layer 1 programs. The Mission Layer 2 U.S. vendors are often precluded from competing in the high-end arena due to their perceived lack of experience in the related technologies.  Mission Layer 2 and 3 vendors provide only augmentation for U.S. data needs.  The CDPs capabilities operate in the high-end of Mission Layer 3 (e.g., NextView Program).\nAnother dimension to the requirements and mission risk assessment is that the uncertainties of the current operational environment necessitate that flexibility and agility not only reside in satellites operating in Mission Layer 1, but that the entire architecture ensure flexibility and agility in terms of its operational capacity.  By this it means that redundancy and survivability are key elements that must be considered as part of the mission and requirements management.\n\nTECHNOLOGY AND INTEGRATION\nThe technology and integration assessment includes payload/sensors, spacecraft, launch, and ground segments.  The requirements review revealed that the pivotal issue is the complexity of the technologies needed to meet requirements in each of the three mission layers.   Each mission layer has different technology complexity requirements.\n\nAt the highest level, Level 1, the systems are significantly more complex in that they are developing and incorporating new and advanced technologies to meet unique operational requirements.   The technologies can span the entire satellite system given that advanced technology development and incorporation can have a domino effect requiring changes to and/or a new spacecraft and ground stations and modifications to the launch system. These high-end systems can use some COTS components but for the most part are uniquely tailored systems designed to perform unique missions and multiple complex functions.  Most of these systems are engineered from the sensor downward meaning that once the sensor/payload is designed the rest of the system follows including what launch vehicle will be used.  The integration and test of new and complex technologies and incorporating them into an end-to-end operational system is a major challenge and usually very costly.26 Launch risk is only medium given that they are launching most of these systems only on reliable government-owned Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle (EELV) that, although a relatively new system, has a good track record for putting sophisticated systems successfully into orbit. The U.S. government builds only a few Mission Layer 1 systems.\nMission Layer 2 is comprised of complex but mostly proven technologies that have evolved from the Mission Layer 1 programs. They incorporate more COTS than the Mission Layer 1 programs, and because they are evolved from Mission Layer 1 programs, they usually require less engineering and integration on the sensor/payload, spacecraft, launch vehicle, and ground segments. Nonetheless, Mission Layer 2 programs present some technological risk because the baseline technologies are complex, and even though COTS is included, incorporation of upgraded parts, new software, buses, or interfaces to accommodate the COTS can impact every segment of the system. Often the risks to these programs are underestimated because risk assessment and cost estimations do not account for all the complexities involved in integrating COTS into existing systems and the domino effects of any changes on the entire system.27  Today most satellite systems contain incremental technological improvements with each buy;\ntherefore, lean manufacturing is rarely achieved because, like Mission Layer 1, systems, the majority of these satellites are few.28  Some of these programs use NRO standards and are highly tailored to meet customer requirements.  Mission Layer 2 comprises a small percentage of the government's remote sensing capabilities; many Mission Layer 2 vendors lack the experience to operate in the Mission Layer 1 and therefore focus their business in the Mission Layers 2 and 3.\nThe Mission Layer 3 programs utilize well-known well-proven and reliable technologies that can be easily acquired.  These programs utilize mostly COTS products whose integration is relatively easy given that the functions are more basic and less technologically demanding. The software used in these systems is also well established and is used with little or no modification.  In order to manage technological and integration risk, often these systems are designed from the bottom-up beginning with the selection of the launch vehicle and concluding with the payload/sensor, and extensively apply \"best practices\" in order to manage technical risks.  Technological risk is managed through clearly specified mission and stable technical requirements, and the utilization of well understood, widely produced, and proven technologies. Design is driven to attain a capability at an affordable price. Technical and integration risk is further managed through extensive quality assurance procedures and parts testing (e.g., as part of commercial practices). Commercial vendors and CDPs fill Mission Layer 3. These capabilities provide augmentation to the Mission Layer 1 and 2 programs, and although Mission Layer 3 programs have increased based upon commercial demands for remote sensing data, they still provide only a small portion of imagery data to the U.S. government.  The technological capabilities of Mission Layer 3 are improving given the increased \"commoditization\" of satellites and supporting capabilities. Figure E-5 depicts the technology and integration risks in each of the mission layers.\n\n\n\nThe vertical axis in Figure E-5 shows technology risks. The greater use of unproven and advanced technologies increase programmatic risks (discussed later in this chapter). The vertical axis (moving from the top to the bottom) shows that the more proven the technologies the less risk.  The horizontal axis displays the risk associated with the complexity of integration from very complex to basic.  The programs in Mission Layer 3 pose the least technological and integration risks while those in Mission Layer 2 are medium to high risk given that they use proven but complex technologies that are being integrated with COTS, and as expected, the Mission Layer 1 programs pose the most technological and integration risk.\n\nSECURITY\nMission Layer 1 programs operate exclusively in a classified environment. Much of the information collected can be unclassified; however, specific data requests drive security classification and require sensitive handling.  The Mission Layer 2 programs, depending on client and/or user, the technologies involved, and their Concept of Operations (CONOPS), can operate in both or either an unclassified or classified environment.  The combination of national security clients and proprietary data rights cause this layer to be at medium to high risk.  Most Mission Layer 3 programs provide large volumes of unclassified imagery data to a wide variety of clients, some government and many commercial users.  The Mission Layer 3 programs operate outside of the NTM\narchitecture as augmentation to the national and tactical missions; therefore, security is judged as a low risk. CDPs and vendors operating in this mission layer argue that they can readily handle all security requirements if embedded in the IMINT architecture.\n\nINDUSTRIAL BASE, MARKETS, AND COMMERCIAL REMORE SENSING POLICIES\n\nKey to the viability of 2nd and 3rd tier vendors and CDPs are the current-, mid-, and future demands for commercial remote sensing. On the other hand, for the U.S. government to increase it reliance on commercial developers and the CDPs it must be assured that they can provide the capabilities - data - when needed. There are inconsistent perspectives on this issue among the U.S. government, aerospace companies, commercial vendors, and the CDPs.  Currently a few large contractors predominate in Mission Layer 1. The government argues that these select few contractors understand the complex technologies, maintain domain knowledge, and have had long-term collaborations with the government in developing successful NTM capabilities.  Some decision-makers in the U.S. government argue that departures from these trusted government-industry collaborations to promote competition have most often resulted in significant program cost overruns, schedule delays, and some program failures.  The Mission Layer 1 programs employ a small number of 2nd and 3rd tier contractors to provide unique or proven sub-systems - lens, control systems, electronics, software, etc.\nFewer and fewer highly complex, multi-function satellites are being built given their complexity and high costs, and therefore, the 2nd and 3rd tier contractors, many of whom also supply the commercial vendors, are finding it increasingly more difficult to survive in a shrinking market. The survivability of many Mission Layer 2 vendors and suppliers is further challenged given that the Mission Layer 1 vendors have acquired their own suppliers thereby limiting access to the Mission Layer 1.  The 2nd and 3rd tier vendors and suppliers often cannot attain production and cost efficiencies because an insufficient number of satellites are purchased in blocks to sustain a \"warm production\" base.  The\n2nd and 3rd vendors and suppliers access to markets is further hindered by ITAR\nregulations combined with the expansion of foreign capabilities at competitive price points.  The cumbersome and complex U.S. bureaucracy discourages technology transfers to foreign countries, who most often want components from Mission Layer 2 vendors and suppliers and not the commodities from Mission Layer 3 that they view as lesser technology.\nVendors in Mission Layers 2 and 3 contend that unless there are substantial changes to the U.S. market driven largely by investment by the U.S. government and/or changes to U.S. commercial satellite policies that facilitate their ability to compete on the global market, their long-term survivable is questionable.29 These policies are largely driven to protect the Mission Layer 1 national security programs while also supporting the regulatory development of U.S. commercial remote sensing industry but without providing the requisite guidance and resources to ensure their financial viability.  Often these two goals are in conflict while the global capabilities of foreign competitors continue to expand.  While Congress has encouraged the commercialization of remote sensing, it has also legislated restrictions on U.S. commercial remote sensing satellite firms.30  U.S. policies impact commercial remote sensing vendors and data providers in three ways:\n-\nPerformance restrictions that limit imaging capabilities allowed to be provided to foreign users\n-\nOperational restrictions that constrain how U.S. commercial remote sensing firms can collect and/or disseminate imagery data to their customers\n-\nPolicymaking uncertainties in the length of time required to reach U.S. licensing and export decisions, as well as, how company proprietary data is handled.31 The U.S. industrial base and market survivability of the CDPs is uncertain at best.\nOne cannot conclude that the increased demand for imagery and imagery products will lead to further expansion of the production of satellites and data providers.  The global ability to produce more capable satellites at lower costs, combined with the increase in foreign providers has resulted in the increased availability of imagery data and imagery products.  Market forecasts indicate that between 2006 and 2010 data providers will see a higher demand for their products based on the overall increase in the global demand for imagery.  Many market forecasts indicate that the consolidation of the U.S. CDPs into two principal companies - DigitalGlobe and GeoEye - has narrowed the competition and stabilized the industrial base.  There are differing views on how long this stability will last.  It is projected that between 2006 and 2016, approximately $16.1 billion will be spent on imagery capabilities.  It is estimated after 2012, the market will be relatively flat due to market saturation and more mature technologies.  Therefore, few new players are seen as entering the remote sensing market either from the vendor or data provider industry.  Some industry projections are that the CDPs will have significant business viability problems as the field becomes saturated and moves to sophisticated geospatial products.32\n\n\nFigure E-6: Future Launch Projections of Commercial Remote Sensing Systems33\n\nFigure E-6 is one depiction of the future demand for commercial remote sensing capabilities through an evaluation of proposed launches between 2007 and 2013.  It is impossible to project launches beyond 2012 given that most future system requirements are defined within 2 to 3 years of launch dates.  One can assume based on historical data that many scheduled launches in the near- and mid-term will be delayed to later years for a variety of reasons - funding, technical requirements changes, development problems, etc.; nonetheless, the proposed launch manifest for the mid- to long-term suggests that the business viability of the data providers and 2nd and 3rd tier U.S. commercial vendors is questionable. The CDPs argue that the future market for imagery data is strong and will remain that way for the foreseeable future (at least the next decade).  The data providers also argue that recent equity funding provides a financial basis to augment existing spacebased capabilities - airborne and aerial - so as to expand their global competitiveness even if they do not get U.S. government business. They argue that the foreign markets and the large imagery data consumers such as Google will continue to demand global broad area coverage that in turn builds a compelling set of commercial capabilities that the U.S. government can use.34  The data providers also argue that current programs -\nClearView, NextView and WorldView - demonstrate that they can support U.S.\n\ngovernment requirements.  The future planned constellations provide more than sufficient capacity and assured access for the U.S. government.35 Another issue for the CDPs is their ability to evolve their product lines as the demand for types of imagery products GeoEye, changes from imagery data to refined imagery products. This said, in the early 2000s they have successfully moved from geospatial data providers to information services, so there is strong evidence that they will evolve their businesses in response to changing market demands. Figure E-7 summarizes the risk assessments for the industrial base, markets, and policies in each of the three notional remote sensing mission layers.\n\n\n\nPROGRAM AND COSTS\n\nProgram risk primarily addresses program management.  Program management is included because of the need for highly experienced and competent program managers in both the government and industry to manage complex integration and technology programs.  The ability to manage requirements and perform meaningful tradeoffs among cost, schedule and performance against true risk is imperative for both the government and industry.  Other key factors in program risk assessment are understanding and managing requirements volatility and the use of commercial products to meet system requirements.  Figure E-8 notionally depicts this risk assessment for each mission layer. Cost risk factors are largely driven by the level of technology and complexity of integration, for the more new, unproven, and complex technologies, the higher the costs. Other cost issues are related to the availability of resources, the established record of successful performance, and the uniqueness or serial production of the satellite.  The production of a single unique satellite system generally costs more than a serial production of 2 to 3 per year; which is more cost efficient in terms of workforce proficiency and use of manufacturing facilities.  Similarly, the complexity of integration also drives costs.  The vendors and suppliers in Mission Layer 2 often are hindered in achieving lean manufacturing objectives because most government-commercial satellite systems in Mission Layer 2 are unique or \"one-off\" from the prior system even though their functionality may be the same or similar.  The government-funded CDP programs have only marginally assisted the 2nd and 3rd Mission Layer vendors in keeping a warm satellite production base because the \"buys\" have been low in numbers and produced over several years.  The availability of funding for new vendors without a history of success is scarce and very high risk to their sources of capital.  Commercial vendors with diversified product lines and broad customer markets are able to cover risks of failure of their remote sensing satellites while the smaller firms with only remote sensing business must assure they preclude failure through the use of only proven technology and also guard against failure by having costly insurance.  All these factors drive program and cost risks.  Mission Layer 1 has the most risk in both program and cost largely due to complexity of new technology and changing requirements, and Mission Layer 3 is forced to operate in an area of reduced risk in both areas in order to remain viable.\n\n\nRISK SUMMARY\n\nThe risk assessment is summarized in Figure E-9 below.  The principal insight from this summary is that there remain in both Mission Layer 2 and 3, where commercial remote sensing is to be expected and fostered, several high risk areas that limit entry to those few U.S. companies that can meet these demanding challenges.  Further, analysis of these risk areas strongly suggests that there is considerable latitude for the U.S. government to operate to reduce these risks and promote more commercialization without negatively impacting capabilities that support national security needs that by necessity operate in the higher risk domain of Mission Layer 1.  Chapter 2 poses several business cases for how the U.S. government might attain greater use of commercial remote sensing capabilities while managing risk.\n\nAPPENDIX F: U.S. LEGISLATION AND POLICIES ON COMMERCIAL\nREMOTE SENSING\n\n1958 - Nation Aeronautics and Space Act:  Establishes the National Aeronautics and Space Administration.\n\n1967 - Outer Space Treaty:  Established to contribute to the broad international cooperation in the scientific as well as the legal aspects of the exploration and use of outer space for peaceful reasons.\n\n1979 - Presidential Directive/NSC 54:  Assigns NOAA management responsibility for civil operational land remote sensing and sets a goal for \"...eventual operation by the private sector of our civil land remote sensing activities.\n\n\n1982 - National Security Decision Directive (NSDD) 42, National Space Policy:\nUnited States cooperation in international civil activities will \"Support the public, nondiscriminatory direct readout of data from Federal civil system to foreign ground stations and provision of data to foreign users under specified conditions.\"\n\n1988 - Presidential Decision on National Space Policy: Directs governmental space sectors to purchase commercially available space goods and services to the fullest extent feasible and to avoid conducting activities with potential commercial applications that preclude or deter commercial sector space activities except for national security or public safety reasons.\n\n1992 - Land Remote Sensing Policy Act (P.L. 102-555):  Suspends Landsat commercialization strategy, assigns construction of Landsat 7 to DoD and NASA, and states a preference for a future private sector solution while mandating that value-added services and products be provided solely by commercial entities.  Establishes DOI\nresponsibility for a National Satellite Land Remote Sensing Data Archive.\n\n1994 Presidential Decision Directive/NSTC-3: A critical enabling document in that it specified the U.S. government's conditions for granting operating licenses to U.S. firms interested in commercial remote sensing satellites, including relatively high resolution imaging satellites. It also clarified roles and responsibilities among government organizations and sought to ensure continuity of Landsat-type and quality of data while reducing the risk of data gap arising from the 1993 launch failure of Landsat 6.36\n\n1998 - Commercial Space Act:  Directs NASA and other Federal agencies and scientific researchers to acquire, where cost-effective, space-based and airborne earth remote sensing data, services, distribution, and applications from a commercial provider.\n\n2000 - Amendment to Presidential Decision Directive 23:  Transfers Landsat Program Management responsibilities to NASA and DOI/USGS, with NASA developing and launching Landsat 7 and Department of Interior (DOI)/USGS operating the satellite and ground system in addition to longstanding responsibility for data management.\n\n2003 - NSPD 27 -Commercial Remote Sensing Satellite Policy:  Declares that the U.S.\n\ngovernment will rely to the maximum practical extent on U.S. commercial remote sensing space capabilities for filing imagery and geospatial needs for military, intelligence, foreign policy, homeland security, and civil users. The policy directive supports the creation of a robust U.S. commercial remote sensing industry that enhances the international competitiveness of industry, and discouraging the proliferation of foreign remote sensing space capabilities by fostering foreign reliance on U.S. remote sensing space capabilities\n2005 Memorandum from Director, Office of Science and Technology Policy/EOP:\nDirects NASA, DOI/USGS, and other agencies and EOP offices \"...develop a long-term plan to achieve technical, financial, and managerial stability for operational land imaging in accord with the goals and objectives of the U.S. Integrated Earth Observation System.\"\n2006 - National Space Policy:  Outlines roles of U.S. civil space agencies and establishes land remote sensing leadership role for DOI.\n\n2006 - NSPD -29- Intelligence Community Focal Point For Implementing National Space Policy: Directs the ODNI, jointly with the Secretary of Defense and in consultation, as appropriate, with the Secretary of State and other departments and agencies, to undertake broad activities to strengthen the nation's advantage in space.  The DDNI/CO(R) is appointed the staff focal point to coordinate the endeavor."
    },
    {
        "text": "Link Analysis Workbench\n\n\n\nAFRL-IF-RS-TR-2004-247\nFinal Technical Report September 2004\n\n\n\nLINK ANALYSIS WORKBENCH\n\nSRI International\n\n\n\nAPPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE; DISTRIBUTION UNLIMITED.\n\n\n\nAIR FORCE RESEARCH LABORATORY INFORMATION DIRECTORATE\n\nROME RESEARCH SITE ROME, NEW YORK\n\n\n\n STINFO FINAL REPORT\n\n\n This report has been reviewed by the Air Force Research Laboratory, Information Directorate, Public Affairs Office (IFOIPA) and is releasable to the National Technical Information Service (NTIS).  At NTIS it will be releasable to the general public, including foreign nations.\n\n\n AFRL-IF-RS-TR-2004-247 has been reviewed and is approved for publication\n\n\n\nAPPROVED:   /s/\n   ROBERT L. HAWKINS\n   Project Engineer\n\n\n\n FOR THE DIRECTOR:   /s/\n     JOSEPH CAMERA, Chief\n     Information & Intelligence Exploitation Division\n     Information Directorate\n\n\n\nREPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE Form Approved\n\nOMB No. 074-0188\nPublic reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing this collection of information.  Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden to Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA  22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project (0704-0188), Washington, DC 20503\n1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank)\n\n\n2. REPORT DATE September 2004\n\n3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED FINAL              Sep 01  Mar 04\n\n4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE\n\nLINK ANALYSIS WORKBENCH\n\n6. AUTHOR(S)\nPauline M. Berry, Ian Harrison, John D. Lowrance, Andres C. Rodriguez, Enrique H. Ruspini, Jerome M. Thomere, Michael J. Wolverton\n\n\n5.  FUNDING NUMBERS C     - F30602-01-C-0193\nPE   - 62301E PR   - EELD TA   -  01\nWU  - 16\n\n\n7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)\n\nSRI International\n333 Ravenswood Avenue Menlo Park CA 94025\n\n8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION\n    REPORT NUMBER\n\n\nN/A\n\n9.  SPONSORING / MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)\n\nAFRL/IFEA\n525 Brooks Road Rome NY 13441-4505\n\n10. SPONSORING / MONITORING\n      AGENCY REPORT NUMBER\n\nAFRL-IF-RS-TR-2004-247\n\n\n11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES\n\nAFRL Project Engineer:  Robert L. Hawkins/IFEA/(315) 330-2243                Robert. Hawkins@rl.af.mil\n\n12a. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT\n\n\nAPPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE; DISTRIBUTION UNLIMITED.\n\n12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE\n\n\n\n13. ABSTRACT (Maximum 200 Words)\nIn the wake of the 9/11 terrorist attacks on the United States, many questions have been asked and investigations were conducted to determine how these attacks could have happened.  The consensus is information was available to warn U.S. intelligence organizations of the impending attacks but were not able to \"connect the dots\", that is bring the vital pieces of information together to paint a clear picture of what is about to happen.  An important role of the intelligence organizations is to identify and track situations of interest  terrorist and criminal activity, signs of impending political upheaval abroad.  The problem is the analyst is overwhelmed with intelligence reports from many sources that may provide them with incomplete or misleading information.  There is a need for information technology to help the analyst with identification of threat cases, tracking and analysis of the data to confirm the emerging threat.  The approach taken here is one of link discovery by matching transactional data stored in a relational database to a well-defined scenario describing a threat situation.  The Link Analysis Workbench (LAW) is designed to find patterns (scenarios) buried within vast quantities of large and noisy datasets helping analysts find evidence to support the threat described in the pattern.\n\n\n15. NUMBER OF PAGES14. SUBJECT TERMS Link analysis, pattern matching, graphs, graph-edit distance, ontologies, relational data, situational awareness, situational assessment 16. PRICE CODE\n\n17. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION\n     OF REPORT\n\n\nUNCLASSIFIED\n\n18. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION\n     OF THIS PAGE\n\n\nUNCLASSIFIED\n\n19. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION\n     OF ABSTRACT\n\n\nUNCLASSIFIED\n\n20. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT\n\n\nUL\n\nNSN 7540-01-280-5500   Standard Form 298 (Rev. 2-89)\nPrescribed by ANSI Std. Z39-18\n298-102\n\n87\n\n\n\nTable of Contents\n\n1 Introduction 1\n\n2 Patterns and Matching 4\n2.1 Pattern Representation . . . . . . . . 5\n2.2 Pattern Comparison Metric . . . . . . . . 6\n2.3 Matcher Implementation . . . . . . . . 8\n\n2.3.1 Pattern Representation Language: GEM . . . . . . . . 8\n2.3.2 Matching Algorithm . . . . . . . . 9\n\n2.4 Experimental Results . . . . . . . . 11\n2.4.1 Scalability . . . . . . . . 12\n2.4.2 Cardinality Results . . . . . . . . 14\n2.4.3 Caching Results . . . . . . . . 16\n\n2.5 Metrics for Approximate Pattern Matching . . . . . . . . 18\n\n3 Example and Interface 21\n3.1 Interface Design . . . . . . . . 22\n\n3.1.1 Visualization . . . . . . . . 22\n3.1.2 Pattern Editing . . . . . . . . 25\n3.1.3 Pattern Match Visualization . . . . . . . . 26\n\n4 Architecture 26\n4.1 High-level Architecture . . . . . . . . 27\n4.2 SOAP . . . . . . . . 30\n\n5 Integration with Other Pattern-matching Components: TIEs 31\n5.1 XML Schema . . . . . . . . 31\n5.2 TIE Implementations . . . . . . . . 32\n\n5.2.1 2002: TIE1 . . . . . . . . 32\n5.2.2 2002: TIE3 . . . . . . . . 33\n5.2.3 2003: oddTIE . . . . . . . . 34\n\n6 Control 36\n6.1 Research Challenges . . . . . . . . 37\n6.2 Search Control: exploiting knowledge about the pattern . . . . . . 37\n6.3 Embedded Control Information . . . . . . . . 38\n6.4 Strategies to Exploit Structure of a Pattern . . . . . . . . 38\n6.5 Tasking . . . . . . . . 39\n\ni\n\n\n\nA Appendix: Metrics for Approximate Pattern Matching 41\nA.1 Introduction to Theory . . . . . . . . 41\n\nA.1.1 Approximate Pattern Matching . . . . . . . . 41\nA.1.2 Abstract Data Representations . . . . . . . . 43\nA.1.3 Data-modeling Approaches . . . . . . . . 44\nA.1.4 Logic-based Representations . . . . . . . . 47\nA.1.5 Graph Editing . . . . . . . . 48\nA.1.6 Similarity . . . . . . . . 51\nA.1.7 Similarity Measures . . . . . . . . 51\n\nA.2 Pattern Matching and Data Transformations . . . . . . . . 59\nA.2.1 Predicates, Objects, Attributes, and Values . . . . . . . . 59\nA.2.2 Databases . . . . . . . . 60\nA.2.3 Similarities between Predicate Instances . . . . . . . . 62\nA.2.4 Database Editing . . . . . . . . 65\n\nA.3 Imprecision, Uncertainty, Vagueness . . . . . . . . 68\nA.3.1 Imprecise Objects, Values, and Relations . . . . . . . . 69\n\nii\n\n\n\nList of Figures\n\n1 Hierarchical pattern from EELD Y2 challenge problem domain . . 6\n2 GEM data structure . . . . . . . . 8\n3 Example of hierarchical patterns . . . . . . . . 9\n4 Effects of heuristics in pattern search . . . . . . . . 11\n5 Growth of match time with data set size . . . . . . . . 12\n6 Growth of match time with data set size, extrapolated to very large data sets . . . . . . . . 13\n7 Improved efficiency from hierarchy and cardinality on \"Group\n\nGets Resources for Mode\" pattern, measured by (a) amount of search space explored and (b) match time . . . . . . . . 15\n\n8 Improved efficiency from hierarchy and cardinality on \"Hub-and Spoke\" pattern, measured by (a) the amount of search space ex plored and (b) match time . . . . . . . . 16\n\n9 \"Two Related Groups Acquiring Threat Resources\" pattern . . . . 17\n10 Effect of caching as data set size grows on \"Two Related Groups\n\nAcquiring Threat Resources\" pattern . . . . . . . . 17\n11 Effect of caching as data set size grows on \"Group Gets Resources for Mode\" pattern . . . . . . . . 18\n12 Summary of caching results: benefit of caching on largest data set for (a) \"Group Gets Resources for Mode\", (b) \"Hub-and-spoke Communication\", and (c) \"Two Related Groups Acquiring Threat Resources\" patterns . . . . . . . . 19\n\n13 LAW's display of the Murder-for-Hire pattern . . . . . . . . 23\n14 Ontology browsing . . . . . . . . 24\n15 SHAKEN interface . . . . . . . . 25\n16 Results list page . . . . . . . . 27\n17 LAW architecture . . . . . . . . 29\n18 LAW's role in TIE1 . . . . . . . . 32\n19 TIE3 architecture . . . . . . . . 34\n20 oddTIE architecture . . . . . . . . 36\n\niii\n\n\n\n1 Introduction\n\nSRI International (SRI) is pleased to submit this final report to the Defense Ad vanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) on SRI Project 11590, \"The Link Analysis Workbench.\"\n\nImmediately after the 9/11 attacks, questions arose regarding why the the U.S. government had been unable to \"connect the dots\" that would have provided warn ing of the impending attacks. An important role of intelligence organizations is to identify and track situations of interestterrorist and other criminal activity, signs of impending political upheaval abroad, and so onin a sea of noisy and in complete information. This requires that they find and understand the significance of links between new and previously acquired information. The amount of such information available to these agencies far exceeds the human capacity to analyze it. Therefore, information technology is needed to assist these analysts if they are to succeed.\n\nThis situation is not unique to federal intelligence agencies. Essentially the same technical problem confronts forensic accountants, insurance fraud investiga tors, bank examiners, criminal investigators, computer security analysts, market researchers, medical researchers, and others. The common need is to find patterns within vast quantities of data that reveals what has happened or is about to hap pen. A large amount of such data is in relational form (i.e., stored in relational databases), and we can expect the amount to increase dramatically in the near fu ture. There is a critical need for technology that helps analysts find and elaborate evidence in relational data.\n\nThere are at least three different technical approaches to this problem: (1)\nfind matches in the data for known patterns of interest, (2) find anomalies where known patterns are violated in the data, and (3) discover new patterns of interest. Although the first of these might not seem all that difficult, it is difficult when the amount of data is vast, when the data contains errors of omission and commission because of faulty collection or handling, and when entities are actively attempting to deceive and/or conceal their actions. For example, uncovering known forms of money laundering might be addressed by this method. The second of these is based on the idea that by identifying those things that do not fit the norm, we can discover the true nature of things, despite attempts to conceal them. In general, attempts to do this are exacerbated by the same issues that thwart finding matches from known patterns. An example where these techniques might be successfully applied is a criminal investigation where unusually large purchases or holdings by an individual might suggest a payoff for having engaged in criminal activities.\n\n1\n\n\n\nThe third approach, discovering new patterns, can take at least two forms. Social network analysis analyzes the types and frequencies of interactions among people to discern which are acting as groups in pursuit of common goals. Data mining seeks to discover new patterns of indicators that identify events of interest when they cannot be directly observed. These techniques might be used to uncover clandestine organizations or new forms of insurance fraud.\n\nOur approach is based upon finding matches for known patterns of interest. Although some of these patterns might have been defined through the use of data mining techniques, we assume that the vast majority will have been directly de fined by analysts, that is, subject matter experts in the field of interest. Specif ically, we want to develop tools that help analysts define and match patterns in relational data, where the notion of \"match\" is very broad and gives the ana lyst a large amount of flexibility. By broad we mean to encompass both exact and close matches, where close matches might include incomplete matches where some components of the pattern could not be matched, and inexact matches where the precise type of component specified by the pattern was not found, but a seman tically similar component was. A key aspect of this approach is that a numeric quality of match is calculated, based upon the absences of and substitutions for components specified in the pattern, indicating the closeness of a match.\n\nFor most domains of interest, defining good patterns is difficult. The objec tive is to define patterns that identify all examples of a target activity without misidentifying any examples. To this end, we endeavor to support the analyst in a generate, test, and refinement cycle, where patterns are defined and matched against the data, the results are analyzed, and modifications are made to the pat tern in hopes of improving its accuracy and precision. We expect this cycle to be repeated frequently in the early phases of a pattern's development. Once it ma tures, we expect the cycle to slow, but typically not stop, since the actions and methods employed by those being analyzed will evolve over time. Thus, we ex pect a continuous cycle of pattern refinement and spawning of variants. As the actions and methods employed by those being analyzed evolve, we anticipate that the broad notion of match that we support will aid the analysts in tracking these changes. Supporting close matches reduces brittleness; as a method evolves we anticipate that the quality of match for a given pattern will tend to erode slowly, giving the analysts an opportunity to spot these variations by examining the lesser matches. Once spotted, variants on the original pattern can be developed to raise the system's ability to find high quality matches for these new methods. As such, this technique attempts to exploit the identification of anomalies with respect to the original pattern.\n\n2\n\n\n\nOur approach is semi-automated, where analysts remain in the loop, constantly looking to improve the patterns being used. This helps to make our approach ag ile in the face of evolving threats and/or opportunities. It is our hope that analysts will leverage patterns developed by others. This can take several forms. One form that we support is the hierarchical specification of a pattern that makes use of one or more patterns as subpatterns. As such, higher-level patterns can be developed by assembling lower-level patterns. We also support the use of disjunctive com ponents within a pattern. These are used when there are multiple ways for a given aspect of a pattern to be manifest. It is our intent to foster communities of ana lysts sharing patterns and results, with appropriate access control, to allow them to leverage each other's successes and failures.\n\nFor our approach to succeed, it is essential that the patterns and matches be represented in a form that is intuitive to the analysts, yet rigorous enough to sup port automated searches for matches. Since analysts performing link analysis often explain their patterns and results through graphical drawings, we adopted a graphical representation. Entities are captured as nodes and relationships as di rected connections. These graphical structures are developed by analysts through a tool that allows them to directly \"draw\" these structures. Matches are depicted through use of the same graphical structures that represent patterns, color coded to indicate the quality of match achieved for each aspect of the pattern. Using graphs in this way eases communication between humans and machines.\n\nIf communities of analysts are to work collaboratively in the development of patterns and the exploitation of pattern matching results, it is essential that all po tential participants have ready access to the system that we are building to support this. To this end, our approach was to architect the Link Analysis Workbench\n(LAW) as a Web server with lightweight browser clients. The only requirement for the client machines is that they have an industry-standard Web browser in stalled and are on a common network with the LAW server. Since Web browsers are now ubiquitous across all personal computers, no matter the specific choice of hardware or operating system, no additional software needs to be installed to give an analyst access to LAW. The LAW system administrator must provide the analyst with only a user name and password to gain access.\n\nWhile we believe that our approach has the potential to significantly aid an alysts in finding patterns within relational data, we do not believe that our ap proach should be pursued at the exclusion of others. Instead, we imagine that our approach should be used in concert with other techniques based on anomaly de tection, social network analysis, data mining, and other link analysis techniques, to collectively pursue the difficult task of identifying and tracking situations of\n\n3\n\n\n\ninterest within the changing seas of noisy and incomplete relational data. This report describes the Link Analysis Workbench (LAW) [49, 45], a system designed to help meet these needs. LAW is designed to allow a domain expert user to build and refine patterns quickly, to search for matches from a large data set, and to understand and compare the matches it finds easily. Because the in telligence domain involves missing data and even imprecise user understanding of what the right pattern should be, LAW is specifically focused on approximate pattern matchessituations in the data that are similar to, but not exactly the same as, the situation represented in the pattern. LAW is also designed as a user-centric system, where the pattern representation and matching criteria are understandable by an intelligence expert user, and where the user can play an important, hands-on role in the system's cycle of authoring, matching, and revising patterns.\n\nWe begin by describing LAW's pattern representation and pattern matching approach. Then we give an example of LAW's pattern matching behavior and describe LAW's user interface. After that, we describe the architecture and com mon pattern language on which LAW is based. Next, we discuss our experience with integrating LAW with other link analysis tools in Technology Integration Ex periments (TIEs). Finally, we describe some issues explored in our work on an intelligence control component for LAW.\n\n2 Patterns and Matching\n\nThe goal of the LAW pattern matching component is to help intelligence analysts1\n\nfind instances in the world of generic scenarios comprising combinations of events and facts about players involved in those events. This problem requires more than a simple database querying capability because of several sources of ambiguity and uncertainty within the process. There may be noise or missing information within the data. The same or similar situations may be represented in multiple different ways. And, most important, the analyst may be able to describe the situation of interest only at a high level or with a limited amount of precision.\n\nThe model of patterns LAW uses for this problem of approximate matching is to have each pattern represent two things: (1) a prototype of the situation of interest, and (2) allowable deviations from the prototype, along with the impact these deviations have on the assessed quality of the match. To fill this model and\n\n1Here and throughout the remainder of this report, we use the term \"analyst\" as shorthand to describe the intended end-user of LAW. In practice, LAW is more broadly intended for any intelli gence professional, from low-level analysts to high-level managers in the intelligence community.\n\n4\n\n\n\nto meet the additional requirement of understandability, we have chosen a pattern representation based on graphs, and a match metric based on graph edit distance.\n\n2.1 Pattern Representation\n\nA LAW pattern consists of two parts: a graph, representing the prototype situation described above, and a collection of edit distance parameters, representing the allowable deviations described above. We describe the former here, and describe the latter below in Section 2.2.\n\nThe graph portion of the pattern representation (called the pattern graph) is a collection of typed vertices (nodes), and a collection of labeled edges (links)\nrelating the vertices. Each node in the graph is a generic concept [43] of a type, or a literal. The types are organized in an ontology; to access the ontology in LAW, we are using OCELOT [30], an OKBC-compliant [10] knowledge representation system. Labels on edges are also typed with the types organized in the ontology. Specific instances can be approximated in the pattern using literals. For example, the person Michael Wolverton can be represented by attaching a PERSON node to a node containing the string \"Michael Wolverton\" via a NAME relation.2\n\nOur design goal for the pattern graph representation is to give to the analyst a representational capability that is powerful, but still understandable to a lay-user and reasonably efficient to match. In particular, we want a pattern language that stops well short of the representational power and inferential capabilities of first order logic or conceptual graphs [43], but still goes beyond the capabilities of simple flat typed graphs. Toward this end, we extended the design of the pattern graph representation to include notions of hierarchy, disjunction, and cardinality.3\n\nFor example, Figure 1 shows a hierarchical pattern representing a murder-for-hire. The pattern hierarchically includes two subpatterns, one of which itself includes a nested subpattern. In this figure, the circles represent interface nodes, nodes that connect a subpattern to its parent pattern. We upgraded the pattern compari son metric and the matching algorithm to handle the more advanced pattern graph representation, and extended LAW's pattern matcher to match graphs hierarchi cally.\n\n2This encoding represents any person named Michael Wolverton, which is often sufficient for the purposes of pattern matching. If the user needs to identify the person of interest more narrowly, additional qualifiers (e.g., birthdate) can be used.\n\n3By cardinality, we mean specifying information about the number of links, nodes, or sub graphs, e.g. \"three or more meetings.\"\n\n5\n\n\n\nFigure 1: Hierarchical pattern from EELD Y2 challenge problem domain\n\n2.2 Pattern Comparison Metric\n\nThe term \"graph edit distance\" covers a class of metrics that measure the degree of match between two graphs. Variants have been studied theoretically [8, 9] as well as applied in domains as diverse as image understanding [41] and reasoning by analogy [48]. In its simplest form, the graph edit distance between two labeled graphs G1 and G2 is the smallest number of editing operations it would take to transform G1 into G2. Allowable editing operations are node addition, node dele tion, edge addition, edge deletion, node label replacement (i.e., changing the label attached to a node from one term to another), and edge label replacement. This simple model can be extended by adding costs to the various editing operations, perhaps as a function of the labels on nodes or edges, and measuring the edit dis tance between two graphs as the minimum cost of a sequence of operations that converts one into the other.\n\nLAW uses the more complex model of associating costs with operations. The current LAW model uses only three of the six aforementioned editing operations:\nnode deletion, edge deletion, and node replacement.4 Each node and edge in a\n\n4Node addition and edge addition are not relevant in pattern matching (unlike, for example,\n\n6\n\n\n\nLAW pattern graph has an associated cost for deleting it (see below). For node label replacement, LAW uses the ontological distance between the types of the pattern node and the mapped data node.\n\nThe collection of edit distance parameters contained within a LAW pattern specify the allowable deviations from the prototype that will still be considered a valid match, and the cost that various deviations have on the overall quality of the match. These parameters control the calculation of the edit distance between the pattern and the data. They include\n\n a deletion cost on each node and link in the pattern. Each of these can be a number, which roughly reflects the node's or link's level of importance in the pattern. They can also be set to a symbol representing infinite cost, which indicates that the node or link must be matched by a node or link in the data.\n\n a maximum ontological distance on each node in the pattern. This specifies the allowable distance between the type of a pattern node and the type of a node in the data that matches it. Setting this to 0 indicates that the pattern node must be matched exactly, e.g,, a PHONE-CALL node in the pattern can only match a PHONE-CALL node in the data. Setting it to a number greater than 0 indicates that the node can be matched to a node of another type, e.g., a PHONE-CALL node in the pattern can be matched to other subtypes of COMMUNICATION.\n\n an ontological distance multiplier, which specifies the cost of mapping a node of a given type in the pattern to a node of another type in the data. This factor specifies how much penalty the match will pay, for example, for matching a PHONE-CALL node in the pattern to an EMAIL node in the data.\n\n a maximum total edit distance for allowable matches. No matches that are above this threshold will be returned, and any partial matches that exceed this threshold will be pruned from the system's search.\n\n the maximum number of matches for the system to return. analogical reasoning), because of the asymmetry between pattern and data: we are not trying to make the pattern look like the entire data set, only a small portion of it. And while edge replacement could be a useful construct in pattern matching, we have not yet found a need for it in practice in our use of the system.\n\n7\n\n\n\nFigure 2: GEM data structure\n\n2.3 Matcher Implementation\n\n2.3.1 Pattern Representation Language: GEM\n\nTo represent patterns and data to be used by the matcher, we use a direct graph rep resentation: GEM (Graph-Edit Model). Figure 2 graphically depicts the structure of the GEM language.\n\nThe graph (Graph) is a collection of typed vertices (Node), and a collection of labeled edges (Edge) relating the vertices. Each node in the graph is an instance of a class in the ontology, or a value (e.g., a string or a number). Labels on edges are also typed with the slots present in the ontology.\n\nThe main intent behind that representation is efficiency. It is achieved specifi cally by the redundancy between linking nodes and edges together. Similarly, the\n\"Nodes\" field of a graph is implemented with a hash table.\n\nThe API to access the GEM structures allows basic operations, such as adding and removing nodes and edges. It also permits efficient access from a node to all the edges pointing to it or coming out it, and efficient access from an edge to its adjacent nodes.\n\nIn addition, GEM can represent hierarchical graphs with the fields \"Subgraphs\"\nand \"Interface-nodes\" of the Graph element. Figure 3 is an example of the use of GEM to represent subgraphs.\n\nRelations to other LAW representations The GEM representation is intimately linked with other representations that exist in LAW, not only PatternML but also the ontological representation and EDB.\n\n8\n\n\n\nFigure 3: Example of hierarchical patterns\n\nWith respect to the ontology, nodes correspond to instances of classes. It is worth noting that each node has the complete hierarchy of classes of the instances represented in the \"Classes\" field of the node. Edges represent slots; more pre cisely each edge represents one particular slot value of an instance. Since we are representing relationships, most of the values are instances themselves, but they can also be numerical values, or strings. In these latter cases, they are still represented by nodes in GEM.\n\nWith respect to the EDB schema, basically, entities are represented as nodes and links as edges. There are few attributes in the EDB schema. They are repre sented as edges, and their values are represented as nodes of the class \"Value.\" It allows a good homogeneity of the structures that compose the graph. One draw back of the approach is that it can lead to huge graphs that would be difficult to manage.\n\nData representation Since the principal aim of GEM is to match pattern and data, the representation of data is almost identical.\n\nThe representation of data is also based on GEM. The main addition is that the\n\"Value\" field will always be filled by the instance of the node in the data.\n\n2.3.2 Matching Algorithm\n\nLAW's current approach to finding the closest matches to the pattern in the data is based on A* search [22]. A state in the search is a partial matcha mapping be tween a subset of the pattern nodes and data nodes, a mapping between a subset of the pattern links and data links, a set of unmapped nodes, a set of unmapped links, and a cost of the mappings so far. The cost is the sum of the delete costs of the\n\n9\n\n\n\nunmapped nodes and link, and replacement cost of the node and link mappings, as described above.\n\nLAW generates start states for the search by selecting the node in the pattern with the fewest legal mappings in the data and creating a partial match for those mappings. It expands a partial match by selecting an unexplored node mapping\n(PatternNode,DataNode) and generating new mappings for each link adjacent to PatternNode to every mappable link adjacent to DataNode. When a pair of links is mapped, the nodes on the other ends of those links are mapped as well.\n\nThe search selects as the next state to expand the one with the minimum worst case costthat is, the cost of the mappings so far plus the cost of deleting all un explored nodes and links in the pattern. Since the cost of deleting all unexplored nodes is guaranteed to be an upper bound on the eventual cost of any extension to that partial mapping, this selection heuristic meets A*'s admissibility criterion, and the search is guaranteed to find the lowest-cost solution. The search prunes any partial match that cannot possibly have a lower cost than the best n matches found so far, where n is the maximum number of matches the user wants to see, as well as any that cannot possibly have a lower cost than the pattern's maximum al lowable cost. In addition, at the end of the process LAW prunes any mappings that are subsumed by other discovered mappings. A mapping A subsumes a mapping B if MappedEntities(A)  MappedEntities(B), that is, if they differ only in that B has more node and link deletions than A.\n\nThe search process is designed to find a good set of pattern matches quickly, and then use those existing matches to prune the remainder of the search. One key asset of the approach is that it is an anytime algorithm: at any point during the process the algorithm can return the set of matches it has found already, and that set of matches will monotonically improve as the process continues.\n\nFigure 4 shows the benefit of different aspects of the approach. The top line shows the amount of effort it takes to match data sets of varying size with rela tively little search control. The middle line shows the performance of branch-and boundthat is, pruning the search as described above, but selecting the next state to explore in depth-first order rather than a heuristic evaluation function. The bot tom line adds the evaluation function selection to convert the branch-and-bound approach to A*. One thing the graph demonstrates is that the match time is not completely determined by data set size; both the heuristic approaches were slower in the mid-size data set than they were in the largest one. The match time will be dependent on a large number of factors in addition to data set size, including the size of the pattern, the number of good partial matches in the data, and the pattern defined maximum allowable cost of a match.\n\n10\n\n\n\n0\n\n5\n\n10\n\n15\n\n20\n\n25\n\n30\n\n35\n\n250 450 650 850 1050 1250\n\nData set size (# edges)\n\nS ta te s\n\n(p ar tia l m at ch es\n)\n\nex am in ed\n\n (m ill io n s)\nModified A* (LAW)\n\nBranch-and-bound\n\n(Virtually) No Space Reduction\n\nFigure 4: Effects of heuristics in pattern search\n\n2.4 Experimental Results\n\nOne of the key challenges for a useful intelligence tool is to scale to problems of realistic size. For LAW, that means finding partial matches to graphical pat terns representing realistic scenarios in large collections of relational data. Here,\n\"large\" may mean ten million relations or more. Since subgraph isomorphisma simpler version of the problem that LAW's matcher is solvingis known to be NP-complete, it is important to evaluate LAW's ability to process patterns and\n(especially) data sets of realistic size.\n\nTo evaluate LAW's scalability, we ran a set of experiments measuring the ef fect of data set size on LAW's match time, and the effect of various advanced features of LAWspecifically, hierarchy and cardinalityon LAW's match time. The results of these experiments showed encouraging progress toward the goal of solving realistic problems in a reasonable amount of time, and at the same time they indicate areas of needed improvement in future work.\n\nThe experiments were designed to measure how LAW's match time changed as various problem characteristics were varied. We used IET's data set generator to create data sets of various sizes, where size is measured by number of relations in the data. We kept the other settings of the data set generatorobservability, noise, and so onconstant and on the \"easy\" settings. We ran the set of experi ments on a small suite of patterns of various characteristics. Individual experiment descriptions below will describe the specific patterns used. The dependent vari\n11\n\n\n\nFigure 5: Growth of match time with data set size ables we measured were (1) CPU time elapsed during the matching process, and\n(2) the number of A* search space states examined during the matching process. Our goal was to measure (in separate runs) both the overall impact of data set size on LAW's match time, and to measure the contribution of individual features of LAW and its pattern language toward LAW's scalability.\n\n2.4.1 Scalability\n\nThe first experiment was designed to measure LAW's ability to scale to data sets of realistic size. We used LAW to match a pattern representing two cooperating threat groupstwo groups that share a member in common, each carrying out threat activitiesagainst data sets of sizes ranging from approximately 12,000\nlinks to more than 240,000 links. This pattern is not the largest in our pattern library, but it is one that we feel represents realistic computational challenges for LAW's algorithm.\n\nThe match time results are shown in Figure 5. LAW's match time ranged from just over a second for the smallest data set tested to just under three minutes for the largest data set. While the graph is not a perfectly straight line, it does not give us any reason to think that LAW's match time is super-linear in the size of the data set.\n\nIf we assume that the match time is linear in the size of the data set, we can extrapolate from these results the time it would take LAW to match this pattern\n\n12\n\n\n\nFigure 6: Growth of match time with data set size, extrapolated to very large data sets against a very large data set that could be encountered in actual intelligence work. Figure 6 shows the rate of growth shown in Figure 5 extended to a data set with\n7,000,000 links. The number 7,000,000 was chosen based on the size of the largest data set used in the TIA experiments for which statistics were made publicthe\n\"AVRS with GDB Extensions data set.\"5\n\nIf the linearity assumption holds, Figure 6 shows that LAW would take about an hour and forty minutes to match this pattern in a very large, realistic data set. Despite the fact that we envision that LAW will often be run in modes where im mediate response is not required (e.g., matching a set of patterns in an overnight run), our belief is that this is too long for an information gathering tool for real world intelligence analysis. Our experience leads us to estimate that widespread user acceptance would be possible only if the matching time on large data sets is around one-tenth the estimated time shown in that graphthat is, around ten minutes rather than one hundred. Thus, this experiment identifies a critical imme diate goal for our ongoing work on LAW: a further order-of-magnitude speedup on matching realistic patterns in large data sets.\n\n5Statistics for this data set indicated that it had only 152,000 links, but also 7.1 million at tributes. We base our extrapolation on the assumption that attributes would be converted to links for matching in LAW.\n\n13\n\n\n\n2.4.2 Cardinality Results\n\nThe second experiment was designed to measure the extra efficiency achieved by adding cardinality to the pattern language and matching capability. The cardinal ity constuct in the pattern language allows the pattern designer to impose numer ical constraints on the number of matches of a subgraphfor example, \"three or more meetings.\" More important for efficiency, it also provides a way of grouping results of a subgraph match and thereby controlling the combinatorial explosion of possible matches. That is, instead of creating a separate new parent graph match for each subgraph match, the cardinality construct allows LAW to group all matches to a subgraph under a single parent graph match.\n\nIn these experiments, we compared the resources usedmeasured by search space size and time consumedby the LAW matcher in matching two patterns:\n(1) a hierarchical graph with cardinality constraints on its subgraphs, and (2) the best \"flat\" approximation of graph (1). The best flat approximation was deter mined by inserting N copies of each subgraph into the parent graph, where N is the value of the cardinality constraint on that subgraph.\n\nIt is important to note that the flat approximation (2) is truly an approximation to the hierarchical graph (1), and is not equivalent, either semantically or com putationally. In other words, the fact that we achieved efficiency gains by using hierarchical graphs is not unexpected, and does not represent a breakthrough in complexity theory. Rather, these experiments measure the scalability benefit of giving the user the extra expressive power to represent what he wants. Situation descriptions that include \"N or more\" occurrences of an event are common, both in the EELD Challenge Problem domains and in the real world. By giving the user the ability to represent such situations, and by giving the matcher the capability of matching those situations efficiently, we expect to see improved efficiency com pared to matching inexact approximations.\n\nFigure 7 shows the efficiency gain from hierarchy and cardinality on one pat tern, representing a threat group with two or more members each acquiring a threatening resource. The hierarchical pattern contained a single subgraph with a \"2 or more\" cardinality constraint. The graphs show the change in search effi ciency as the data set size grows, with the smallest data set size containing around\n15,000 links and the largest containing around 75,000. Figure 7a) measures the number of search states explored, which was reduced by a factor of more than three using hierarchical graphs on the largest data set. Even more encouraging is the amount of time saved by hierarchical patterns, shown in Figure 7b. Hi erarchical patterns with cardinality improved match time by over two orders of\n\n14\n\n\n\n(a) (b)\n\nFigure 7: Improved efficiency from hierarchy and cardinality on \"Group Gets Resources for Mode\" pattern, measured by (a) amount of search space explored and (b) match time magnitudefrom 630 seconds to six. Figure 8 shows the same measurements for another pattern (and its flat approx imation). This pattern represents hub-and-spoke communicationtwo or more phone calls from members of a threat group to another \"hub\" group member. Like the \"Group Gets Resources for Mode\" pattern of Figure 7, the hierarchical version of the hub-and-spoke pattern contains a single subgraph with a \"2 or more\" car dinality constraint. The efficiency gain with this pattern was even more dramatic than that shown in Figure 7. Figure 8(a) shows a search space reduction on this pattern of over an order of magnitudefrom 180,000 states to 16,000and Fig ure 8(b) shows a match time reduction of almost three orders of magnitudefrom over 1,700 seconds to less than three.\n\nThe dramatic difference between the search space reduction and the search time reductionthe (a) and (b) graphs in each figureis an interesting phe nomenon, and one for which we do not have a definitive explanation. Our current hypothesis is as follows. State expansion in LAW's A* search involves copying the parent state. When the patterns are hierarchical, the pattern representation is more compactsince each subgraph is represented in a parent graph as only a pointer, rather than a complete list of all nodes and links in the subgraphand therefore the copying operations per state expanded are smaller.\n\n15\n\n\n\n(a) (b)\n\nFigure 8: Improved efficiency from hierarchy and cardinality on \"Hub-and Spoke\" pattern, measured by (a) the amount of search space explored and (b)\nmatch time\n\n2.4.3 Caching Results\n\nThe final set of experiments measures the value of caching subgraph matches in hierarchical pattern matching. We designed a mechanism in the LAW matcher that caches subgraph match results during a match of a parent graph. Subgraph matches are cached indexed by\n\n The subgraph being matched, and\n\n The mappings of the subgraph's interface nodes (see Section 2.1).\n\nOnce a subgraph S with a given set of interface node mappings < m1, . . . ,mn >\nis matched, the results for any future attempts to match S with < m1, . . . ,mn >\nwill be retrieved and returned from the cache.\n\nOur hypothesis was that caching would be especially useful for patterns that contain multiple copies of the same subpattern. Such a pattern is shown in Figure\n9. This pattern represents two different Threat Groups, related through a common member, each acquiring a threatening resource. Matching this graph will require multiple attempts to match the AcquiringThreateningResource subgraph for each Person, and caching will eliminate all but one of those attempts.\n\n16\n\n\n\nFigure 9: \"Two Related Groups Acquiring Threat Resources\" pattern\n\nFigure 10: Effect of caching as data set size grows on \"Two Related Groups Ac quiring Threat Resources\" pattern\n\n17\n\n\n\nFigure 11: Effect of caching as data set size grows on \"Group Gets Resources for Mode\" pattern\n\nAs we expected, Figure 10 reduces match time dramatically for Figure 9's pattern. For the largest data set tested, caching reduced match time by an order of magnitude, from 1,800 seconds to 180, and the time savings were even greater for some smaller data sets.\n\nHowever, we did not expect the results shown in Figure 11. The pattern that generated those results\"Group Gets Resources For Mode\"is a pattern with a single subpattern, and one for which we expected little or no repetition. Our hypothesis was that caching would have little impact; in fact, we thought it would be possible that the overhead associated with caching could cause the runs with caching to be slower than the ones without. Instead, Figure 11 shows that caching did have a significant positive effect even for this pattern, cutting match time roughly in half for all data set sizes tested.\n\nFigure 12 summarizes the caching results, showing the benefit of caching for all three patterns tested on the largest data set tested.\n\n2.5 Metrics for Approximate Pattern Matching\n\nMuch of the pattern-matching work within the LAW implementation is grounded in a theoretical model of approximate pattern matching. This model is described in detail in the Appendix, and we provide an overview of it here.\n\n18\n\n\n\n(a) (b) (c)\n\nFigure 12: Summary of caching results: benefit of caching on largest data set for\n(a) \"Group Gets Resources for Mode\", (b) \"Hub-and-spoke Communication\", and\n(c) \"Two Related Groups Acquiring Threat Resources\" patterns\n\n19\n\n\n\nThe complex patterns considered by the matching techniques discussed in this report may be regarded, from a logical perspective, as axioms that specify a theory while the objects being sought are models of that theory. Informally, the database may be thought of as a collection of objects that are linked by various predefined relations. At a more formal level, facts describing the existence of these objects and their relationships are expressed as the conjunction of the members of a set of instantiated logical predicates. Patterns may also be conceived in terms of logic constructs, requiring the existence within the database of certain instances of objects and that of links, or relationships, between them.\n\nIn the theory's treatment of patterns, we generalize the notion of a pattern by regarding them as specification of elastic constraints on potential models. This type of specification, which is familiar in information-retrieval applications, per mits ranking of instances of data structures by their degree of matching with the ideal conditions. For example, a requirement to match the pattern \"Person P is a Southern European who breeds attack dogs\" might be matched, albeit not per fectly, by an object of the type Person who was born in Central France (which is close to and overlaps Southern Europe) and who keeps (but it is unclear whether or not he breeds) wolves.\n\nIn this extended view, patterns do not express strict requirements that are either met or not met. Rather, patterns should be regarded as procedures that rank the adequacy of alternative variable-to-object assignments as potential solutions of a database-retrieval problem. Correspondingly, the values of properties of objects in databases (e.g., Southern European) and the nature of the properties themselves\n(e.g., breeds) should be regarded as elastic descriptions that may be met to var ious degrees. Each possible instantiation matches the pattern to some degree, expressed by a number between 0 and 1 that measures the extent to which such an instance matches the pattern specification. Pattern instances that strictly match, in the logical sense, the pattern specifications have a degree of matching equal to 1, while semantically unrelated instantiations\"unrelated\" in a sense that we will formalize in the Appendixhave a degree of matching equal to zero.\n\nPatterns may be regarded, therefore, as mechanisms to measure the distance, similarity, or resemblance of potential solutions of a matching problem to a pro totypical set of ideal or perfect matches. This similarity function, which reflects the semantics of the specific problem being considered, is the basis for the defini tion of numerical measures of degree of matching. This conceptualization of the pattern-matching problem suggests that it may be treated as a generalized logical program, that is, as a procedure to search a space of potential solutions and to rank their suitability [36, 18], which extends the theorem-proving approaches of\n\n20\n\n\n\nlogical programming [13]. The theory defines a degree-of-matching function in terms of the degree of admissibility, or adequacy, of the modifications required to transform a database into a modified counterpart that strictly matches the pattern. Such a best match may be informally described as having the largest admissibility value (i.e., lower transformation cost) among all transformations leading to transformed databases that match the pattern from a classical-logic viewpoint. Database transformations are defined as the composition of a sequence of certain basic edit operations. Each edit operation is associated with a numerical value gauging its admissibility. The admissibility of a particular transformation is then defined as a function of the admissibility of its component edits.\n\nThe theory's metrics determine the extent to which a database matches the specifications of a pattern, and are based on semantics provided by knowledge structures such as ontologies. These metrics are intended to be employed in connection with graph-based approaches [41, 8, 48] to database representation. Graph-editing techniques provide a useful framework to describe a variety of com plex objects while permitting their comparison in terms of the extent (or cost) of the modifications that are required to transform a graph-based representation of one object into another. These techniques have considerable generality and may be applied to a wide variety of problems. In each application, however, it is nec essary that the functions employed to estimate the admissibility of graph trans formations reflect the particular meaning attached to each editing operation. The model detailed in the Appendix is devoted to the derivation, from the perspective provided by a combination of logical and metric perspectives, of specific admis sibility measures, called database-editing metrics, applicable to pattern matching in databases.\n\n3 Example and Interface\n\nThis section has two purposes. First, it provides an example of the user's interac tion with LAWand especially the LAW pattern matcher described in the previ ous sectionthrough screen shots of the system. Second, it discusses the design of LAW's user interface, which is based on the common pattern framework and Web services architecture described in Section 4.\n\n21\n\n\n\n3.1 Interface Design\n\nLAW's interface runs primarily through the Web. The Web-based implementation offers two main advantages. First, any connected computer with a browser can access it without the need for an error prone installation cycle. Second, it cuts to zero the time from release to deployment, and it allows concerns of the users to be answered, implemented, and delivered much more quickly. On the other hand, the disadvantage of a browser-based interface is that there is only so much that can be done using HTML and JavaScript. Highly interactive HTML inter faces are either kludgy and inefficient or impossibly slow. For that reason, certain highly interactive pieces of the LAW interfacethe pattern editor in particular are implemented as local applications that connect to the original server using Web services.\n\nGiven the pattern-matching task described above, a user interface must provide a way to make sense of the structure and amount of the information available. It must also provide a pattern editor that permits the creation of patterns in terms of the data. The most important component, the pattern matcher has limited user interface. When matches are extracted, they must be shown in a drillable way that is consistent both with the views of the data and the pattern construction.\n\n3.1.1 Visualization\n\nVisualization in LAW can be divided into three areas: patterns, the data to which the patterns are matched, and the ontological concepts of which the patterns and the data are composed.\n\nAs described earlier, patterns contain two elements: a graph that represents the prototype situation, and the edit distance parameters that represent the allow able deviations from the prototype. LAW's presentation of patterns displays both elements. Figure 13 shows LAW's display of a pattern. The display shows the ob jects and relations of the pattern (the nodes and links) as well as the edit distance parameters (encoded in colors of the nodes and links).\n\nOntology management is a well-studied problem [30]. Since ontologies are not a primary focus of LAW, its ontology exploration and editing capabilities are limited. Figure 14 shows the user exploring the ontology via LAW's hierarchical browser. Although the range of things that can be done to the ontology is re stricted, our tool can import DAML [23] or CycL [15] ontologies, so modification of these is permitted by any tool that is able to export in those formats.\n\nThe last area, visualization of primary data, did not play an important role in\n\n22\n\n\n\nFigure 13: LAW's display of the Murder-for-Hire pattern\n\n23\n\n\n\nFigure 14: Ontology browsing\n\n24\n\n\n\nFigure 15: SHAKEN interface our work on this project.\n\n3.1.2 Pattern Editing\n\nLAW's development has been guided by our view that pattern matching should be an interactive task, where patterns will be continuously refined during an iterative matching process. Some patterns will even have to be created either from scratch\n(i.e., directly from concepts in the ontology) or from other patterns.\n\nThe interactive nature of the pattern-matching process requires that the user be able to revise his thinking quickly, which in turn requires the ability to make fast modifications to the graph. A browser is ill-suited for this type of interaction. In the current version of LAW, we are using a knowledge acquisition tool called Shaken [46] for the construction of patterns. Figure 15 shows the user editing a pattern in Shaken.\n\nThe requirements for a pattern editor include (1) the ability to edit and/or in corporate existing patterns coming from other sources, (2) the ability to build patterns from concepts in the ontology, and (3) the ability to handle a wide range of pattern sizes, ranging up to thousands of nodes. The pattern editor is basi\n25\n\n\n\ncally a graph editor, but with a constrained set of possible operations. It is also component-based, which means that patterns can be made of other patterns. The main operations that can be performed on a pattern are the addition of a node, the connection of two nodes, and the merging of two nodes.\n\n3.1.3 Pattern Match Visualization\n\nThe final piece of the interface is the pattern match (result) visualization. Just as we emphasized how important it is that we can observe the data and the patterns under the same framework, the same is true for the results. This is important so that the relationship between the pattern and the results instantiating it is self evident. If a mental mapping between one and the other is difficult, then the ability to modify the pattern as we look at the results is diminished.\n\nWhen a request for matches is initiated, the server will asynchronously start the search and inform the user of it. When the results are available, the ones that meet the user's criteria are presented, ordered best to worst. The images of the results are small replicas of the graph used to describe the pattern. The nodes of the result image are colored to display the degree of accuracy obtained in the match. Figure 16 shows the results of the match of Figure 13's pattern.\n\nAlthough not implemented currently, the idea is that these matches can be reentered into the system as data, so that they can be revisited later. This scenario makes sense in the case of streaming data, where the system does not yet know if more evidence is going to become available. There must be a big portion of the system devoted to what we call \"hypothesis management\"that is, storing, revising and comparing past results. The current system offers a good explanation of why a match coincides with the pattern offered, by assigning scores to all the nodes and relationships.\n\n4 Architecture\n\nWhile the LAW pattern matcher described in the previous sections provides a powerful and flexible mechanism for finding partial matches to patterns, it cannot possibly cover all the pattern-matching criteria an analyst could have. There are many tools under development, general and specialized, that support the many complementary data exploration requirements of the intelligence community. In a given search session, an analyst may want to combine results from an approx imate match to a general scenario (as retrieved, e.g., by the LAW matcher just\n\n26\n\n\n\nFigure 16: Results list page described), a general probabilistic reasoning engine (e.g., [44]), and a specialized tool for determining group membership (e.g., [24]).\n\nWe have developed and implemented an architecture for LAW that supports integration of multiple pattern-matching tools. It includes a language for sharing patterns, and a Web services architecture that makes integration straightforward. The LAW user interface allows a user to interact with these tools through a com mon framework. Right now, the user must select and task the tools manually, but our aim for the future is to have the system provide support for tasking of tools through LAW's Control component.\n\n4.1 High-level Architecture\n\nLAW is architected as a Web application, made up of a number of Web service components. At the heart of LAW is a knowledge base server, with an in-built Web server. Data for this knowledge base server can reside in either a database or a flat file. The client side of LAW is ephemerally generated Web pages, encoded in HTML, Javascript and embedded Java applets, with the client being any standard\n\n27\n\n\n\nmodern Web browser. This thin client, Web server architecture had previously been used for a suc cessfully fielded collaborative structured argumentation application, SEAS [25]. The adoption of a Web browser as the client, removed the need to install and main tain client software in end-user organizations. For LAW, we decided to enhance this architecture, using a Web service model. Our driver for this was that part ner companies were simultaneously developing applications, which we wanted to make available to the LAW user through its GUI. Likewise, several of the LAW components were of general value to external partners, outside of the LAW frame work. Given that we were not able to state at the outset all the different ways in which we and other partners would integrate the various components into larger systems, Web services offered an ideal way of providing a lightweight, flexible means of integration. The idea was that during the development of the various components, and as our understanding of the domain was refined, we would be able to experiment with different configurations of Web services to provide differ ent, complementary, end-user solutions.\n\nFrom a user's perspective, the configuration/location of the underlying ser vices, such as pattern matching, are not visible. Instead the user is presented with an interface, which can hide all the integration details.\n\nFigure 17 depicts the current LAW architecture. In the current architecture, LAW can be viewed as having three internal components:\n\n the control component that is responsible for coordinating the tasks between the user input (via UI) and the other (internal and external) components.\n\n the UI component, that is the user interfaces that are presented to a user to request pattern matches and to view the results of matches\n\n the Pattern Match component\n\nLAW itself contains a Web server, which is used to communicate between the different internal components, as well as external components, with the mes sages being encoded in XML, conforming to defined schema (PatternML, Hy pothesisML and ControlML). External components are all intended to be tasked using SOAP, although currently some components are still tasked through custom interfaces.\n\nThe LAW server sits on top of SRI's knowledge base server, with communi cation between LAW and the server via OKBC. The knowledge base server con tains the domain ontologies used by the evidence data sets that are to be matched against.\n\n28\n\n\n\nFigure 17: LAW architecture\n\n29\n\n\n\nInitially, LAW was implemented with the evidence data sets to be matched also contained within LAW's knowledge base server. This was done mainly for efficiency, as a placeholder while the EELD program was developing a database schema for evidence (the EDB schema). Since the EDB schema was developed, LAW now interfaces directly via SQL with EELD evidence databases, stored in a separate mySQL relational database.\n\nThe LAW pattern editor is still a separate application from LAW. Originally developed using SRI's Shaken editor [46], LAW's current pattern editor was rewrit ten as a pure Java application. The pattern editor uses the DAML form of the EELD ontology as input, and produces patterns as output in two formatsPatternML and ePSL (the program-wide pattern specification language developed in 2003).\n\n4.2 SOAP\n\nWe chose to adopt SOAP (Simple Object Access Protocolwww.w3.org/TR/SOAP\n) as the standard communication protocol between LAW's internal and external Web services. SOAP is a lightweight protocol for exchange of information in a decentralized, distributed environment. It is an XML based protocol, which is neutral about the actual transport mechanism. This means that HTTP, SMTP, raw TCP, an instant messaging protocol like Jabber, and so on, could potentially be used for message transport. For LAW we decided to adopt HTTP as the commu nication protocol. LAW uses SOAP to enable remote procedure calling (RPC), where an RPC call maps naturally to an HTTP request and an RPC response maps to an HTTP response. SOAP was also attractive from an architectural standpoint in that it does not require that a message be sent from a client to a server in a sin gle \"hop.\" The SOAP specification defines the notion of intermediariesnodes that a message passes through on its way to its final destination. Intermediaries can be used to \"virtualize\" physical network topology so that messages can be sent to Web services using whatever path and whatever combination of transport protocols is most appropriate. This last capability facilitates our vision for the LAW architecture as a federated collection of services that communicate via net works to coordinate their search for pattern matches over distributed data sources, in service of a community of intelligence analysts.\n\n30\n\n\n\n5 Integration with Other Pattern-matching Compo nents: TIEs\n\nA series of technology integration experiments (TIEs) was conducted over the course of the EELD program, with the aim of evaluating how an integrated EELD system performs on a challenge problem data set. SRI's LAW tool took part as a component in several of these experiments. Details of these experiments are given below. The common element in all the experiments was the adoption of a lightweight integration model, using Web services and XML schemas to commu nicate between the different components. The schemas used in these experiments are first described, followed by the details of the experiments.\n\n5.1 XML Schema\n\nTo allow communication between various components internal to LAW and ex ternal component Web services, there was a need to design XML schemas for the content of the SOAP messages, so that all components could understand the syntax of the content, and map the content to their internal representations.\n\nWe adopted a layered approach to schema design, where the core is Pat ternML, a schema to describe template domain patterns [21]. PatternML was designed to have two main uses: as an interchange language between pattern edi tors/visualizers, and as an input format to pattern-matching components. Patterns defined using PatternML make reference to existing ontologies for domain con cepts.\n\nLayered on top of PatternML is the HypothesisML schema, which was de signed to be a common output format for pattern match components and as an in put format for hypothesis visualizer or hypothesis management components [20]. HypothesisML describes the match between a PatternML pattern and a particular evidence data set.\n\nLayered on top of both of these schemas was the ControlML schema [19], which was designed to describe intended task control information. ControlML allows one component to describe what it wants other components to do, to gether with various control parameters, and allows PatternML or HypothesisML as content (to describe pattern templates or hypothesized pattern match(es), re spectively).\n\n31\n\n\n\nFigure 18: LAW's role in TIE1\n\n5.2 TIE Implementations\n\n5.2.1 2002: TIE1\n\nThe LAW server provided visualization services for the TIE1 experiment led by Alphatech. The visualizations were of patterns and hypotheses. Alphatech's CADRE system interoperated with SRI's LAW server via defined APIs. Fig ure 18 shows the experiment architecture. The goal of the experiment was to demonstrate how a Web service architecture could support the rapid integration of components from different contractors, to provide services currently unavailable in a tool (in this case visualization services). By defining and agreeing on XML schema for patterns and hypotheses, and using standards-based communication protocols (http in this case), a service was quickly developed. ControlML and SOAP services were not developed in time for the experiment, so we used http POST to communicate between CADRE and LAW.\n\nThe experiment consisted of two parts:\n\n1. CADRE sent an http message to LAW to display a PatternML file (pattern file sent along with http message). LAW returned an HTML page displaying a graphical representation of the pattern.\n\n32\n\n\n\n2. CADRE sent an http message to LAW to display a HypothesisML file (hy pothesis file sent along with http message). LAW returned an HTML page displaying a graphical representation of the hypothesis.\n\nThe experiment required CADRE to provide a translator to translate from its own internal pattern and hypothesis representations to the common pattern rep resentations PatternML and HypothesisML. CADRE also required the ability to send requests, using agreed control messages for the experiment. LAW, too, re quired a translator from PatternML and HypothesisML into LAW's own internal pattern and hypothesis representations. LAW already possessed the API to pro duce HTML pages that visually displayed the content of the PatternML and Hy pothesisML files. The experiment was a success, in that Alphatech was able to demonstrate accessing the LAW server to provide visualization services.\n\n5.2.2 2002: TIE3\n\nThe domain for the 2002 challenge problem was Russian Contract Killing (RCK). A series of artificially generated data sets were provided by IET, which contained fictitious data from different data sources, such as newspapers, police reports, direct observations, telephone records, and bank records. The goal of the eval uation was to identify those murders that were contract killings, and to identify the people involved and the details of the murder (communication events, money transferred, location, and business involved). The output from the TIE was scored against ground truth to evaluate performance.\n\nThe architecture of TIE3 is given in Figure 19. LAW acted as the hub of the TIE, providing user interaction, control (component tasking) pattern matching and hypothesis management services. Other contractor components provided services such as pattern matching (Alphatech, CMU, CHI) and accessing external data sources (USC/Fetch).\n\nLike in TIE1, XML schemas were used as the interfaces between the different components. Again, due to time constraints, all participants did not use SOAP and ControlML. CMU's group detection algorithm (GDA) was called directly from LAW's pattern matcher, using GDA's C-based API. USC/Fetch's city location service was called from LAW's pattern matcher using its HTTP POST interface. Alphatech and CHI's pattern matchers were called using SOAP and ControlML messages. To ease integration, the PatternML version of the RCK pattern was not actually sent from LAW to the pattern matchers. Instead, an agreed pattern name was passed, and each individual pattern matcher component used its own internal\n\n33\n\n\n\nFigure 19: TIE3 architecture representation of the RCK pattern for the matching. However, both Alphatech and CHI did return HypothesisML hypotheses back to SRI, which required them to develop translators from their internal hypothesis representations to Hypothe sisML. SRI's LAW component provided the client interface, allowing a user to choose a data set to match against and the particular pattern match component the user wanted to make the match (including LAW's own pattern matcher).\n\nHypothesis merging was not attempted in TIE3. Instead, TIE3 returned mul tiple results for each data set, for those cases where the different pattern matchers were able to find some matches. Before returning results for TIE3 to the eval uation team for scoring, LAW translated the results from HypothesisML to the evaluation team's own XML-based result schema.\n\nThe integration experiment was a success, in that it demonstrated how using a standards-based XML schema and communication protocols allowed diverse components to integrate in a short time.\n\n5.2.3 2003: oddTIE\n\nThe domain for the 2003 challenge problem was changed to be an abstract threat scenario domain, where members of threat groups apply capabilities and acquire\n\n34\n\n\n\nresources necessary to carry out threat events. As for the 2002 challenge problem, a series of artificially generated data sets was provided by IET, which contained fictitious data from different data sources, primarily telephone and purchase trans action data. The data sets varied along several different domain dimensions, like size, data observability, corruption of data, and connectivity. The goal of the eval uation was to identify the threat groups in the data set, their members, and the threat events that they carried out. The output from the TIE was scored against ground truth to evaluate performance.\n\nSRI's LAW system was part of the oddTIE, which was an outgrowth of TIE3, expanded to contain pattern learning (PL) technologies, since the 2003 evaluation was to be of combined link discovery (LD) and PL technologies. OddTIE was characterized through its use of specialized LD components for group and event detection/refinement, and by its use of multiple threads to exploit the strengths of different components. The results were then merged using hypothesis man agement algorithms to perform smart merging, hence improving what any single approach could have achieved by itself. As in TIE3, Web-based integration of components was used, and SRI's LAW provided the component tasking/process control that made the integration threads work. PL technologies were used in three different ways: 1) to perform traditional offline pattern learning, which was then utilized (either directly or indirectly) by LD components; 2) to provide specialized online matching; and 3) to provide online hypothesis ratings.\n\nThe overall architecture for oddTIE is given in Figure 20. This diagram does not show the finer detail of the pattern matching or hypothesis management tasks. ISI/USC, UMass, NYU and Stanford all contributed to the group detec tion/refinement part of pattern matching. Alphatech, SRI, and CHI all contributed to the event detection/refinement part of pattern matching. NRL provided the rat ing and selection functions of hypothesis management.\n\nThe oddTIE results were mixed. Overall in the EELD program, oddTIE pro duced the best group detection (as measured by evaluation score) of any TIE, with precision and recall scores of 99% and 74%, respectively. However, the results were to us modest, but we were pleased that the technologies did do best on the harder data sets. In general we believe we were too parsimonious in our use of secondary data, and data observability affected group detection much more than perhaps was intended by the evaluation team. OddTIE's event detection was not particularly effective, and our subsequent analysis has shown that we over-filtered hypotheses and requested too little data to actually detect many of the relevant threat events. Again, we erred on high precision for events (97%) but had poor recall (57%). Insufficient time prior to the evaluation to test out the integrated\n\n35\n\n\n\nFigure 20: oddTIE architecture architecture led to this situation. Post-evaluation performance boundary testing demonstrated that loosening the secondary data access restraints significantly im proved recall, though naturally precision decreased as a consequence.\n\nAnother consequence of the compressed timescales for testing was that multi ple passes through the architecture, utilizing SRI's process control infrastructure, were not attempted. It is felt that multiple passes would have significantly im proved results.\n\nOne surprising result was how little value PL added to the results. This oc curred partly because pattern learning was able to identify useful subpatterns in the evaluation data set answer keys, but this did not extend to discovering very useful patterns in the actual data sets themselves. The issue of whether this was a feature of the technologies involved or a characteristic of the evaluation data sets used is still unresolved.\n\n6 Control\n\nLAW is a mixed-initiative, multi-user system. The objective is to allow the ana lyst to work effectively within the context of a particular scenario of interest. Our original vision of LAW included a central role for a control component that had the ability to exploit structural, semantic, domain, and user-specified information\n\n36\n\n\n\nwithin a pattern to control the search process, and would task a variety of link discovery (LD) tools and algorithms, exploiting their strengths and compensating for their weaknesses. Our control vision places an emphasis on enabling alter nate modes of operation, supporting a user as he develops a pattern for a new scenario or alerting the user to the results of ongoing recurrent queries. During the course of development, we found that the control technology was less critical for the program's and project's goals than other needs, so LAW's current control component is much simpler than the one we proposed, and the more sophisticated control work remains for the future. Nevertheless, we present here several of the most important issues we have identified in the design of a sophisticated control component for link analysis.\n\n6.1 Research Challenges\n\nThe search control problem is combinatorially complex. The complexity will de pend upon the size of the pattern, the degree of connectedness of the pattern, and the number of disjunctions within the pattern, to name but a few of the relevant dimensions. Exploiting knowledge about a pattern to direct the search is a possi ble approach. What knowledge is useful, how we represent it, and finally when we apply it are all outstanding questions. Modeling and understanding the ca pabilities and performance characteristics of the variety of algorithms and tools available for matching patterns and providing secondary source information is nontrivial. Finally, there exists a complex process management problem with the control flow being driven both by user requests (goal-driven) and by intermediate results or derived requests for additional information, perhaps from a secondary source (data-driven).\n\nThe LAW team has focused its effort initially on the first two challenges, and this report describes the approaches taken so far and future directions.\n\n6.2 Search Control: exploiting knowledge about the pattern\n\nConsider the search control problem for one complex pattern. It is possible to use an LD tool, for example the LAW Matcher, to match the complete pattern. However, if the pattern is particularly large or has areas of sparsely connected nodes it may be inefficient or ineffective. LD tools will have different strengths;\nperhaps one excels at matching temporally rich patterns and another at matching small tightly connected patterns. Finally, the search process may be recursive\n\n37\n\n\n\neither because leaf nodes in a pattern may be expandable, or because a partial result may spawn further information gathering.\n\nThese observations have implications in the flow of information during search. For example, the search control component may be faced with a variety of choices:\n\n To send a whole pattern to one or more tools and compare the results\n\n To send the pattern to one tool and pass its results in the form of partial matches to a second tool and so on\n\n To decompose the pattern and send portions to different tools depending on the capability of the tool, and merging results, perhaps recursively\n\nThe selection of the appropriate tool is discussed in Section 6.3. Here we discuss technologies necessary to facilitate these control options.\n\n6.3 Embedded Control Information\n\nOur initial work in this area has been to allow the user to specify node and link ne cessity or desirability to guide an individual matcher's algorithm. We will extend this notion to allow a user to tag hierarchical subpatterns or clusters with infor mation about its importance and thus value as an alert, or the sequence in which the pattern should be matched. For example, portions of a pattern may be seen as early indicators for the more complex scenario. This work is supported by our development of a pattern formalism that supports hierarchy and disjunction.\n\n6.4 Strategies to Exploit Structure of a Pattern\n\nThe next step is to exploit the hierarchical nature of the pattern formalism auto matically, and to identify subpattern types that can be paired with LD tools that can match them effectively. Similarly, the automated clustering of patterns may eventually prove useful. Clusters of tightly connected graphs can be matched, and then specialized tools could be used to search for the connections between the resulting disjointed hypotheses.\n\nThe LAW approach combines the highly reactive techniques employed in in telligent process control domains with the more accountable and systematic ap proach to business management provided by the field of workflow management systems. Structured management of search strategies can provide benefits in several ways. Articulation of explicit search strategies can help to standardize\n\n38\n\n\n\nmethodology, thus reducing the likelihood of introduced errors. Explicitly rep resented search strategies can be tuned to improve efficiency and effectiveness. Automated tools for process management, and thus search control, hold promise for deeper insight into current and planned operations, through the provision of timely updates on progress and status. Such enriched understanding of operating processes will lead to better-informed and more principled decision making by analysts.\n\nAt the heart of the SRI controller lies a library of templates that encode explicit strategies for controlling the matching of patterns over data sources, [27]. These templates are represented as explicit sets of tasks or activities to be undertaken, or more abstractly as collections of constraints on allowed activity. This work is built on reactive control and process management technologies [5, 28, 29].\n\nAlthough much of this work has still to be implemented, we now have a pattern representation format to support these ideas and the underlying process manage ment tools in place. Initial experiments will allow the information professional to specify clusters, hierarchical subpatterns, and semantic control strategies to drive the search.\n\n6.5 Tasking\n\nThe tasking of LD tools requires two main technical components: (1) the mod elling and representation of capability, and (2) the mechanisms to support Web based tasking.\n\nWe apply work on matching the requirements of some service with the tools to provide that service [12, 1]. LAW takes a semantic-based approach to the pro vision of Web services and tasking of those services.\n\n\"..software agents should be able to discover, invoke, compose and monitor Web resources offering particular services and having partic ular properties.\" [2]\n\nIn order to take this approach it is necessary to understand and model the ca pabilities and properties of a particular tool. LAW provides the semantic tasking necessary to support this approach. As LD tools become available we will model the individual services they provide by using a methodology developed for the workflow management system SWIM [5]. The characteristics to be modeled in clude the service itself, data over which the service is applicable, strengths and weaknesses according to pattern structure and pattern semantics, performance, and response time.\n\n39\n\n\n\nIt is crucial that any system to coordinate and control multiple pattern match ing for link discovery be flexible and reactive, and provide the accountability and proactive aids to decision making required by the analysts. The current imple mentation supports the underlying process control. A user can specify a query to match a pattern and the controller will select and task an appropriate tool to perform the match. LAW can handle multiple queries and multiple users, and it can initiate repetitive queries and manage the hypothesized results.\n\n40\n\n\n\nA Appendix: Metrics for Approximate Pattern Match ing\n\nA.1 Introduction to Theory\n\nA.1.1 Approximate Pattern Matching\n\nThe complex patterns considered by the matching techniques discussed in this report may be regarded, from a logical perspective, as axioms that specify a theory while the objects being sought are models of that theory. Informally, the database may be thought of as a collection of objects that are linked by various predefined relations. At a more formal level, facts describing the existence of these objects and their relationships are expressed as the conjunction of the members of a set of instantiated logical predicates such as\n\nPerson(Person-1), Event(Event-3), Participated(Person-1, Event-3), Employment(Person-1, Company-2, Position-9).\n\nCorrespondingly, patterns may also be conceived in terms of logic constructs, requiring the existence within the database of certain instances of objects and that of links, or relationships, between them. Typically, a pattern will correspond to a closed first-order-logic expression, such as\n\n x, y, z, . . . Person(x)  Person(y)  Event(z)  . . .\n. . . Participated(x, y)  Participated(x, z)  . . .\n\nFrom such a logical perspective, the pattern-matching problem may be regarded as that of finding a correspondence between the variables x, y, z, . . . and selected database objects (i.e., variable bindings) such that the resulting instantiated pat tern predicates are, indeed, among the assertions contained in the database. We may also think of the specification of this correspondence between variables and objects as a constructive proof that the database implies the pattern. This perspec tive is the basis for a number of logical programming languages and of logical approaches to database representation and manipulation [13].\n\nIn our treatment of patterns, we generalize this notion of pattern by regarding them as specification of elastic constraints on potential models. This type of spec ification, which is familiar in information-retrieval applications, permits ranking\n\n41\n\n\n\ninstances of data structures by their degree of matching with the ideal conditions. For example, a requirement to match the pattern \"Person P is a Southern Euro pean who breeds attack dogs\" might be matched, albeit not perfectly, by an object of the type Person who was born in Central France (which is close to and over laps Southern Europe) and who keeps (but it is unclear whether or not he breeds)\nwolves.\n\nIn this extended view, patterns do not express strict requirements that are either met or not met. Rather, patterns should be regarded as procedures that rank the adequacy of alternative variable-to-object assignments as potential solutions of a database-retrieval problem. Correspondingly, the values of properties of objects in databases (e.g., Southern European) and the nature of the properties themselves\n(e.g., breeds), should be regarded as elastic descriptions that may be met to var ious degrees. Each possible instantiation matches the pattern to some degree, expressed by a number between 0 and 1 that measures the extent to which such an instance matches the pattern specification. Pattern instances that strictly match, in the logical sense, the pattern specifications have a degree of matching equal to 1, while semantically unrelated instantiationsin a sense to be formalized below have a degree of matching equal to zero.\n\nPatterns may be regarded, therefore, as mechanisms to measure the distance, similarity, or resemblance of potential solutions of a matching problem to a pro totypical set of ideal or perfect matches. This similarity function, which reflects the semantics of the specific problem being considered, is the basis for the def inition of numerical measures of degree of matching. This conceptualization of the pattern-matching problem suggests that the pattern-matching problem may be treated as a generalized logical program, that is, as a procedure to search a space of potential solutions and to rank their suitability [36, 18], which extends the theorem-proving approaches of logical programming [13].\n\nIn our subsequent discussion, we will define a degree-of-matching function in terms of the degree of admissibility, or adequacy, of the modifications required to transform a database into a modified counterpart that strictly matches the pattern. Such a best match may be informally described as having the largest admissi bility value (i.e., lower transformation cost) among all transformations leading to transformed databases that match the pattern from a classical-logic viewpoint. Database transformations are defined as the composition of a sequence of certain basic edit operations. Each edit operation is associated with a numerical value gauging its admissibility. The admissibility of a particular transformation is then defined as a function of the admissibility of its component edits.\n\n42\n\n\n\nThe metrics introduced below determine the extent to which a database matches the specifications of a pattern, and are based on semantics provided by knowl edge structures such as ontologies. These metrics are intended to be employed in connection with graph-based approaches [41, 8, 48] to database representa tion. Graph-editing techniques provide a useful framework to describe a variety of complex objects while permitting their comparison in terms of the extent (or cost) of the modifications that are required to transform a graph-based representa tion of one object into another. These techniques have considerable generality and may be applied to a wide variety of problems. In each application, however, it is necessary that the functions employed to estimate the admissibility of graph trans formations reflect the particular meaning attached to each editing operation. This section is devoted to the derivation, from the perspective provided by a combina tion of logical and metric perspectives, of specific admissibility measures, called database-editing metrics, applicable to pattern matching in databases.\n\nA.1.2 Abstract Data Representations\n\nTo establish a rational foundation for the definition of semantic measures of simi larity, cost, or admissibility, we describe first a representation of the content of var ious databasesexpressed through commonly used data-modeling techniques in terms of a common description framework based on the notion of triple. Each database may be represented either in graph-based terms or as a collection of triples and, correspondingly, graph-based editing operations may be regarded as the modification of some of those triples. This modification leads to a transformed database with a new meaning. The metrics capture, by means of a number between\n0 and 1, relevant differences in meaning between the original and transformed database.\n\nWe start our discussion by considering several current data modeling approaches and their major conceptual tools. In particular, we describe how the underlying data representation structures of those approaches may be themselves modeled, at a more primitive level, as the conjunction of triples that assert that a property or attribute of an object has a certain value, or that an object has a specific relation ship to another object. For example, a triple such as\n\n(Age, U33, 25yrs), indicates that the value of the property Age of the object U33 is \"25yrs\" while the triple\n\n43\n\n\n\n(Son, U33, U323), indicates that the object U33 has the directed relationship Son to the object U323. While formally equivalent from a purely logical point of view, these two types of triples, called attribute predicates and object predicates, respectively, require a somewhat different computational treatment, which is discussed in Section A.2.2.\n\nWe proceed now to review the key elements of a number of major approaches to data modeling. We show that it is always possible to represent data models produced by application of these approaches as a set of triples that specify values of properties of objects and relations. Basic database editing operations are trans formations, having different degrees of admissibility, that add, delete, or modify these triples.\n\nAlthough our approach has been developed to deal with databases contain ing imprecise, uncertain, or vague information, our discussion will first focus mainly to facilitate understandingon databases where all asserted properties and relations are precisely defined, that is, each property value is a well-defined ele ment of a value domain (e.g., a number, a string) and each relationitself belong ing to a set of ground predicatesrelates two unambiguously specified objects. In this initial treatment. it will be possible, nonetheless, for the information to be incomplete, in the sense that the value of an attribute of an object may not be spec ified as when, for example, the age of a person is unknown. It will also be possible that, in a similar fashion, certain instances of relationships between objects may not be specified as, for example, when it is not known who is the Father of ob ject P12 of type Person. We will not consider now, however, situations where there is partial information about the value of some attribute (e.g., \"the Age is more than 20 years\"), when there is ambiguity as to the nature of objects linked by a relationship (e.g., \"the father of P12 is either P23 or P34\"), or when the relation itself is ambiguous (e.g., \"P12 is either the brother or the cousin of P99\").\n\nA.1.3 Data-modeling Approaches\n\nWe will examine several data-modeling approaches identifying abstract mathe matical and logical structures that capture the essential aspects of linked data structures that are germane to the pattern-matching problem. The purpose of this exercise is to show that data models constructed with these computational tools might also be represented as collections of triples that describe the values of at\n44\n\n\n\ntributes of specific database objects.6\n\nRelational models The relational database model [16] is perhaps the formula tion that is most readily amenable to conceptual abstraction by means of logical and mathematical structures. In spite of its simplicity, however, some details of the underlying representationsuch as the concept of keyare often the source of confusion.\n\nThe relational model is based on the representation of various objects by tables listing the values of the properties or attributes of objects. For example, a relation of the type Transaction may be represented by a table of event-instances de scribing the event characteristics:\n\nDate Paid by Payee Transaction Type Amount\n\nOctober 1, 1888 David Copperfield Oliver Twist Check $500.00\nSeptember 23, 1786 Robinson Crusoe V. Friday Cash $45.56\nSeptember 6, 1830 C. Ahab M. Dick Stock Transfer $2100.00\n\nOther tables are employed, as is well known, to describe attributes of other objects such as, in the example above, persons and transaction types. The resulting collection of interrelated tables provides required descriptions of various objects and entities and their relations.\n\nAmong alternative formulations, the relational model affords the best com promise between the requirements implicit in the representation of complex links between real-world entities and the need to rely on a simple abstract structure capable of being captured by labeled graphs. In particular, we may note that re lational tables, beyond identifying values of properties and attributes, identify, as part of the database schema, the properties and attributes themselves (e.g., Date, Payee). Furthermore, it is clear that individual entries may point to instances of other represented objects (e.g., \"C. Ahab\") or to particular elements of certain primitive sets of values (e.g., a particular date).\n\nThe relational model, however, was conceived in the context of classical ap plications where the characteristics of entities (i.e., specific \"rows\" in a relational\n\n6The representation of data by triples and the derivation of equivalent graph representations are well-known [3, 17]. The nature of the calculus of binary relations, from a historical perspective, has been discussed by Pratt [31].\n\n45\n\n\n\ntable) are uniquely identified, within the data model, by the values of a subset of some attributes (i.e., the key),7 In applications where the attributes are not precisely known, the information contained in the key may not be sufficient to uniquely identify the relational entry by means of the functional mapping that is implicit in the key-to-attribute mapping. For example, the name of a person may be only partially known, and other identification characteristics might be unknown or unreliable. Furthermore, it is possible that two different entries in a relational table correspond to the same object in the real world (e.g., a person is represented using two entries with different aliases or identity documents). Conversely, two identical imprecise entries might correspond to different objects in the real world.\n\nTo be able to refer, under such conditions, to each specific tabular entry (hence forth called a relationship) we need to be able to uniquely identify it. In our previous example, after identifying specific \"person\" entries in the relation Per sons describing attributes of individuals (some of which may describe the same individual) and providing a unique identifier to each relationship in the relation Transaction, we have the new relation8:\n\nTrans-ID Date Paid by Payee Transaction Type Amount\n\nT-1 Oct. 1, 1888 P-5 P-9 Check $500.00\nT-2 Sep. 23, 1786 P-78 P-97 Cash $45.56\nT-3 Sep. 6, 1830 P-112 P-323 Stock Transfer $2100.00\n\nFrom this representation, we may readily describe the relationships of the data model by triples such as\n\n(Payee, T-2, P-97),\n(Amount, T-2, $45.56), which identifies how links, such as Payee or Amount, relate a specific instance of an object (e.g., T-2) with an instance of another object (e.g., P-97), or with\n\n7Our discussion of the relational model and other data-modeling approaches has been simpli fied, focusing solely on major issues related to graph-based modeling of data structures.\n\n8The identifiers are prefixed by a letter intended to identify the type of object being identified or linked. This choice was motivated by the desire to preserve some understandability of the example. In general, identifiers are introduced to uniquely identify a relationship between data entities.\n\n46\n\n\n\na value (e.g., $45.56, respectively). This is a binary relation between object instances or between object-instances and values of the type identified by the name of a particular attribute or property.\n\nA.1.4 Logic-based Representations\n\nApproaches based on logical representations such as those inspired in the LISP and PROLOG programming languages [26, 13] are based on symbolic represen tations of data, such as p(O1), q(O2, O3), r(O11, O12, . . . , O1n), interpreted as knowledge about the properties of various instances of objects.\n\nAlthough there have been important extensions of these languages that permit explicit representation of semantic knowledge [4] (e.g., the meaning of the argu ments in n-ary predicates), in general, the interpretation of symbolic expressions is usually not made clear or is hidden in the program itself.\n\nThere is a simple conceptual mapping, however, between relational entries and collections of logical representations of instantiated predicates. For example, a fact represented as r(O11, O12, . . . , O1n) may be represented in a relational setting as an entry O11, O12, . . . , O1n) in the relation r. Since there may be multiple instances of known validity of the relation r and since the values of the related variables may not be precisely known, it is necessary again to provide a unique system identifier permitting differentiation between two known instances r(O11, O12, . . . , O1n) and r(O21, O22, . . . , O2n) , of validity of the predicate r, by assigning a unique identifier rID to each instance. From such a conceptual mapping, it is easy to see that symbolic representa tions such as q(O2, O3) may be alternatively represented as triples of the form\n\n(Arg1, qID, O2), (Arg2, qID, O3)\n\nwhere qID identifies the particular instantiation of the predicate q being represented using knowledge about its properties or attributes Argi.\n\n9\n\nFrames, logical records, and similar structures Data-based structures relying on representation of properties of entities by the values of their properties are\n\n9The semantics of both relational identifiers and that of the related variables (or arguments) is sometimes made explicit through structures that play the role of a database schema.\n\n47\n\n\n\nconceptually similar to instances of relations.10\n\nLogical records describe the values and attributes of data objects while identi fying related object instances and the nature of such relationships. These descrip tions (i.e., fields, slots), play the same role as column headers in relational tables. From this observation, it should be clear that any such structure may be repre sented as a collection of triples of the type (Field, RecordID, Value)\nwhere RecordID is the identifier of a particular record (or frame), Field identi fies a particular field or slot, and Value is the value of the corresponding property or attribute associated with Field.\n\nEntity-relation models Models based on the entity-relationship (ER) model of Chen [11] rely on the two basic structures defining properties of real-world entities\n(i.e., entities) and their relations to other entities. In either case it is clear that specification of values of properties or attributes of entities\n\n(Attribute, EntityID, Value) , or statements of relations between instances of entities\n\n(Role, EntityID1, EntityID2) , where Role identifies the nature of a link in a n-ary relation, by means of triples provide a description of entities, their links, and the nature of their links that fully captures the information described by ER structures.\n\nA.1.5 Graph Editing\n\nWe now briefly recall the basic characteristics of the graph editing approach of LAW, seeking to relate it with the database metrics.\n\nThe conceptual structures underlying most data representation methods as well as their instantiation by population with specific objects and relationships lend themselves to graph-based representations [42]. Graphs provide an effective way to visualize database structures and contents while facilitating the specifica tion of patterns. From a pattern-matching viewpoint, graph-based structures also provide insights into the nature of the sequences of editing operations leading from a given database to a transformed prototype of the pattern (i.e., it meets the\n\n10This comment reflects solely concern with graph-based representation of basic links between data objects. Frames and similar formalisms also provide tools for the specification of complex constraints beyond the current scope of this report.\n\n48\n\n\n\npattern constraints as a classical-logic restriction). The extent of the modifica tions required to attain such a transformation may then be employed as the basis to measure the degree of matching between original and prototype.\n\nGraph-editing approaches rely, however, on notions of cost or adequacy of graph transformations, which are highly dependent on the meaning of such trans formations in the context of the problem under consideration. In the case of pat tern matching in large databases, each basic editing operation, such as an edge addition, corresponds to one or more basic database operations, that is, addi tion, modification, or deletion of triples in the triple-based representation of the database. Each such triple-based operation changes the meaning of the database to some extent that is commensurate with the nature of the modification. Corre spondingly, any measure of admissibility must reflect the importance of the mod ifications to the information contained in the original database.\n\nWe derive rational bases for the measurement of the admissibility of graph editing operations in pattern matching by considering measures of semantic simi larity between original and transformed databases. The latter measures are derived from knowledge structures, such as ontologies, that permit determination of the extent of resemblance between objects from various viewpoints.\n\nWe start our discussion by recalling, for convenience, the basic concepts un derlying graph editing without regard for the nature of the problem being ad dressed. Our subsequent discussion, however, focuses on the derivation of mea sures of cost and admissibility that are germane to pattern matching.\n\nGraph transformations We sketch now the essentials of a theory of graph editing transformations.\n\nA graph is a 4-tuple G = (V,E, , ) where\n\n(i) V is a finite set of vertices or nodes.\n\n(ii) E, the set of edges, is a subset of V  V .\n\n(iii)  : V  LV is a function assigning labels to the vertices.\n\n(iv)  : E  LE is a function assigning labels to the edges.\n\nA graph mapping between two graphsG = (V,E, , ) andG = (V , E , ,  )\nis a pair M = (, ) where\n\n(i)  : V0  V\n0 is a one-to-one mapping between a subset of vertices V0 of V and a subset of vertices V\n0 of V .\n\n49\n\n\n\n(ii)  : E0  E\n0 is a one-to-one mapping between a subset E0 of the edges E of V and a subset E\n0 of the edges E  of V . such that if two edges are mapped by , then the nodes connected by those edges are mapped by .\n\nIn graph-editing approaches, graph transformations are constructed as the com position of a finite number of basic graph-editing operations. Graph-editing op erations include mappings between graphs that result in additions, deletions, and replacements of individual nodes and edges. A transformation T between two graphs G and G is the composition of a se quence of edits (0, . . . ,m).\n\nDegree of matching The notion of admissibility, of a transformation is intended to capture, by means of a suitable metric that reflects the semantics of the domain being modeled, the significance of its effects. Transformations involving editing operations that highly distort the nature of the original object are assigned a low admissibility value, while those involving minor modifications have a high admis sibility value. An admissibility measure Ad is a function that assigns a number between 0 and 1 to every transformation T between graphs.\n\nA transformation may be thought of as a path in graph-space connecting a graph with its transformed version with each edit operation being a step on that path. From such a perspective, it makes sense to define the admissibility of a transformation in terms of some function that aggregates the admissibility of each of its component edits.\n\nSeveral functions, known as triangular, or T-norms [35], can be shown to have desirable properties that accomplish such aggregation:\n\nDefinition 1: The admissibility of a transformation is the aggregation of the admissibility of its edits by means of a triangular norm , that is,\n\nAd(T ) = eT Ad(e) .\n\nSeveral transformations may be consistent with a mapping between two graphs. It makes sense, therefore, to measure the admissibility of the mapping between two graphs in terms of the transformation having maximum admissibility:\n\nThe degree of matching between two graphs G and G is the admissibility of the transformation T changing G into G that has the largest admissibility value among all such transformations.\n\n50\n\n\n\nA.1.6 Similarity\n\nThe notion of similarity or resemblance is central to the approach presented in this report. Similarity measures provide the bases for the determination of the admissibility of certain transformations of a database into another that meets the logical conditions expressed by a pattern. The notion of admissibility, which may be thought of as being dual to the concept of cost,11 is introduced to indicate that certain database modifications are more permissible than others. The basic idea is that transformations resulting in a similar database are more admissible\n(i.e., less costly) than those resulting in substantial difference between the original and transformed data. The degree of admissibility of a database transformation is defined in terms of the numerical measures of similarity, which are themselves the counterpart of the notion of distance. Similarity measures, mapping pairs of objects into a numeric value between 0 and 1, provide a desirable foundation for the development of a rational theory of database editing, not only because they are related to notions of cost, utility, and admissibilty but also because they provide the basis to extend classical logical relations of inference to approximate, multivalued, counterparts [33].\n\nA.1.7 Similarity Measures\n\nSimilarity functions are measures of indistinguishability that may be thought of as being the dual of the notion of bounded distance (i.e., a distance function taking values between 0 and 1). A similarity measure assigns a value between 0 and 1 to every pair of objects o and o in some space X . Typically, similarity measures d may be obtained from knowledge of distance functions d by simple relations [35]\nsuch as S = 1  d . The similarity of an object o to itself is always equal to 1\n(corresponding to a distance equal to zero), while the minimum possible value for a similarity function is 0.\n\nThe advantage of the use of similarities in lieu of distances lies on their ad vantages as the foundations of logics of utility [36], which provide the bases to combine on a rational basis, measures defining utility, admissibility, and cost from various perspectives. A detailed discussion of the notion of similarity is beyond the scope of this report. We limit ourselves to pointing out the important proper ties of similarity (or generalized equivalence) functions:\n\n11The numerical degree of admissibility of a database transformation is the complement of the notion of cost in the sense that low costs correspond to high admissibility values while high costs correspond to low admissibility values.\n\n51\n\n\n\nReflexivity: S(x, x) = 1, for all x in X ,\n\nSymmetry: S(x, y) = S(y, x), for all x, y in X .\n\nTransitivity: S(x, y)  S(x, z) S(y, z), for all x, y, z in X , where  is one of a family of numerical binary operators called triangular norms or T-norms.\n\nThe transitivity property is of particular importance as it extends the transitive properties of classical deductive methods (i.e., the transitvity of the inferential procedure known as modus ponens) into multivalued-logic schemes capable of modeling numeric measures of implication and compatibility [36].\n\nSimilarity and utility The metric notion of similarity is closely related to utili tarian notions such as cost, admissibility, and utility [34].\n\nUtility functions defined on a domain DomO assign to every object O of that domain a number u(O) between 0 and 1, which measures the extent to which the situation represented by that object is good or desirable.\n\nIn robotics problems, for example, the position of a mobile autonomous robot may be said to be good because it is \"not in danger of hitting an obstacle,\" or\n\"because it is in communication with other robot\" [39]. In a control-systems or decision problem, different actions may be good or bad, from various viewpoints, depending on their outcome (i.e., the state of the system being regulated).\n\nIn pattern-matching problems, utility functions provide a convenient proce dure to define generalized predicates that measure the extent to which an object meets some elastic constraint from the perspective of the usefulness of that ob ject as part of the instantiation of a pattern. For example, if a pattern requires that the amount of a Transaction should be \"large,\" then the definition of the term \"large\" provides a procedure to measure the adequacy of any possible amount as part of a pattern requiring that an object of the type Transaction has a large value. In the case of predicates involving various arguments, such as NearlyOneHourLater(time1, time2), the corresponding utility function gauges the adequacy of a pair of time values as arguments satisfying the relation NearlyOneHourLater.12\n\nUtility functions provide, therefore, a convenient way to rank the desirability of events, situations, and objects in a numerical scale. As such, they have been a central concept in modern decision theory [32].\n\n12This characterization is the basis for the utility-based interpretation of fuzzy sets and fuzzy relations [36].\n\n52\n\n\n\nIf several utility functions u1, u2, . . . , un are considered when comparing pairs of objects in a domainO, then a similarity function may be defined by composition of criteria defined for each similarity [47]:\n\nS(O,O) = min i\n\n[ |ui(O) ui(O\n)| ] , where is the pseudoinverse of the triangular norm , and where |ab| stands for min(ab, ba). Basically, the above result, known as Valverde's Representation Theorem states that two objects, events, or situations are similar if, from every important viewpoint, they have similar utility values.\n\nThe notion of utility is also the basis for certain multivalued logics [18] and, more important, for the derivation of proof procedures that are directly applica ble to problems such as pattern matching (i.e., as this problem is equivalent to proving that the data implies the pattern). Recent results indicate that these logics are closely related to the similarity-based logics underlying our approach to pat tern matching [36]. Conversely, similarity measures may be employed to derive measures of cost and admissibility.\n\nNumerical measures of admissibility We discuss now approaches to the defi nition of similarity and admissibility measures in the context of pattern-matching problems.\n\nSemantic distance, similarity, and ontologies Our simplest scheme for numer ical assessment of the admissibility of edit operations is based on the similarity measures between leaves of an ontological directed acyclical graph (DAG) that measure the extent to which leaf nodes share ancestors in the ontology [36]. This scheme, first proposed by Ruspini and Lowrance in the context of the development of the SRI's SEAS system [38], is also similar, in spirit, to approaches to defining semantic distance between concepts on the basis of the knowledge provided by a generalized thesaurus [7].\n\nThese ontology-based measures of similarity permit only, however, gauging the resemblance between different types of unlinked objects. Pattern-matching problems, however, require the consideration of similarity between complex linked structures where the similarity between two such structures depends on the nature of the links and that of the attributes of the related objects. To address this prob lem, we discuss mechanisms for the derivation of complex similarity measures in terms of simpler constructs.\n\n53\n\n\n\nIn our discussions, we will, mainly for the sake of simplicity, assume that every node in an ontology is relevant to the measurement of similarity between classes of objects. In general, however, the measurement of similarity between types is made on the basis of a connected subgraph of the ontology as many properties might be irrelevant to certain types of comparison (e.g., certain items of furniture and cows both have four legs but this shared property is generally irrelevant to the characterization of similarity between these rather different objects).\n\nBeing closely related to the notion of distance, several measures of similar ity have been proposed to address problems ranging in nature from sociology and psychology to pattern recognition [41, 6]. Our approach to the description of simi larities between basic model objects exploits the availability of domain knowledge in the form of ontologies of various object domains and ontologies of relations.\n\nOntologies provide semantic bases for the definition of notions of distance, re semblance, and similarity between concepts. In most applications of knowledge based concepts, objects belong to certain classes, or types. Ontologies, through class subsumption structures, corresponding to a DAG, permit the definition of a distance function between elements of the ontology, as done by Wolverton [48], on the basis of the length of the paths linking two elements of the ontology.\n\nWhile this type of approach provides a simple mechanism to gauge conceptual proximity on the basis of domain semantics provided by ontologies, the identifi cation of a framework to measure the extent by which a representation of data objects and their relations match a reference pattern requires development of a more sophisticated methodology. Several considerations support this conclusion:\n\n The process of pattern matching is inherently nonsymmetric, since the edit ing operations required to transform one pattern into another are different from those accomplishing the inverse mapping.\n\nFor example, the admissibility of the operation replacing an object of the type Italian by another of the type European, in order to satisfy a pattern requirement, (identifying a set of Nationalities) should be 1\n(i.e., the associated cost should be 0), as the data is more specific than the requirement expressed by the pattern, since every possible instance of an Italian is an instance of an European. The replacement of a value node of the type European by another with a value of Italian to match a pattern requirement, should, in general, have a measure of admissibility that is strictly smaller than 1 since it assumes additional knowledge.\n\n In general, the admissibility of editing operations replacing a value set with\n\n54\n\n\n\nanother value set cannot be uniquely determined. For example, computing the costs associated with replacing the label SouthernEuropean of a value set node (describing the set where the attribute Nationality of an instance of Person is known to be) with the label WesternEuropean might very well have a potential admissibility of 1 (i.e., a cost of zero), as there are some nationalities (e.g., Spanish) in the intersection of the value sets. On the other hand, the different nature and extension of the classes in dicates that there may be a potential cost (corresponding to an admissibility value strictly smaller than 1) associated with that replacement (e.g., addi tional information may reveal that the person was Bulgarian). This range of possibilities suggests that, in many cases, the editing cost may be better represented by an interval of possible values rather than by a single number.\n\n The measurement scheme should reflect the extent to which different classes of objects share important common properties. Ontologies, identifying var ious relations of set inclusion among the classes represented by ontology types, provide a solid foundation for the measurement of resemblance on a semantic basis. Path lengths on the ontological graph, however, do not accurately reflect, in most instances, this semantic knowledge.13\n\nWe propose next a scheme to measure costs by subintervals of the [0,1] interval of the real line representing, on the basis of knowledge provided by ontologies, the possible costs associated with basic editing operations.\n\nSimilarity between leaf nodes The relations of set inclusion between nodes in an ontology may be represented in a number of ways by vectors describ ing whether a node of some type is the ancestor of another node. Ruspini and Lowrance [38] suggested a representation of the j-th node in terms of a vector having the length n of the cardinality of the ontology with the k-th component of that vector, representing whether or not the k-th node is an ancestor of the j-th node, that is, vk(Nj) =\n\n{\n1, if node k is an ancestor of node j.\n0, otherwise\n\n13In an ontology of Animals, for example, the distance between the classes Dog and Cat is strictly smaller than that between any particular breed of dog and any particular breed of cat.\n\n55\n\n\n\nOn the basis of this representation the degree of similarity between the leaf nodes Ni and Nj may be defined by\n\nS(Ni, Nj ) =\n< v(Ni), v(Nj) > 1\n\n(||v(Ni)||2  1) (||v(Nj)||2  1)\n, where v(Ni) and v(Nj) are the just-introduced binary vector representations, of the nodes Ni and Nj .14\n\nThis similarity measure is a symmetric function taking values between 0 and\n1, such that the similarity of a leaf node to itself is always equal to 1.\n\nOn the basis of this measure of similarity, it is possibleas will be shown when discussing extensions of the notion of similarity between objects to similar ity between classes of objectsto derive interval measures that gauge the neces sary and possible admissibility of graph-editing transformations.\n\nComplex similarity measures While ontologies permit the construction of semantic based similarity functions between basic objects (e.g., Countries by Type of Economy) and between values of attributes (e.g., , Age), it is often the case that many of the structures found in a typical pattern-matching problem, involving complex links between primitive objects, may not be amenable to this type of treatment.\n\nConsider, for example, the set of linked objects characterizing an illegal trans action such as Money Laundering. Unless this type of object has been sub ject to some form of ontological characterization, it should be clear that any mea sure of similarity between objects of this type needs to be based on the similarity of attributes of corresponding objects in each structure.15\n\nThese complex structures may be characterized, however, through logical ex pressions, such as\n\nPerson(x)  Person(y)  Money-Transfer(z)\n Depositor(x, z)  Payee(x, z)  . . . Money-Laundering(x, y, z. . . .) ,\n\n14The definition assumes that the root node is not itself a leaf node.\n15In this regard, it is important to note that ontologies, if available, already summarize the important distinctions between objects in terms of their significant attributes. The characterization of an object, such as a Person in terms of its ontological lineage as opposed to a vector of attributes is a matter of choice. In the case of complex, domain-specific, structures, however, it is reasonable to assume that ontologies will not be readily available, thus requiring a different similarity-measurement approach.\n\n56\n\n\n\nwhich can be employed as the basis for the definition of a similarity measure between money-laundering events as a function of the similarities between the various basic ground predicates and the logical operators that interconnect them\n[37].\n\nIn general, the computation of these complex measures is straightforward. In some cases, however, as when trying to measure similarity between say, people, by the type of company they keep, application of the above approach results in a def inition that depends on other values of the measure being defined, as the similar ities between associates depend on the nature of the very people being compared\n(since human association is a symmetric relation and the people being compared are themselves associates of their associates). While the required measure may be usually derived by iteration,16 it is important to reduce the complexity of the definition as the underlying computational problem may be intractable. In these cases, common when considering transitive relations, it may be required to limit the extent of the structures being compared to reduce such computations.\n\nGeneralized similarity measures In order to determine, on a sound formal ba sis, the admissibility of each editing operation in terms of the nature of the objects and links involved it is necessary to derive a general metric characterizing the acceptability of the outcome of an editing operation from the viewpoint of the reference pattern being matched.\n\nRuspini [33, 37] proposed, in the context of studies about interpretations of fuzzy-logic concepts, the measurement of the similarity between two sets by ex tension to a logical framework of concepts, notably the well-known notion of Hausdorff distance, from the theory of metric spaces. The connection between these concepts and utilitarian interpretations of certain possibilistic constructs has been studied recently to a considerable extent [36].\n\nThe basic construct of this theory is the function\n\nI(A | B) = min oB max oA\n\nS(o, o) , defined also over pairs of subsets of X , which measures the degree of inclusion of B in A with respect to S, that is, the extent of the minimal metric neighborhood of B that encloses A (in the sense of set inclusion).\n\n16The definition of similarity in these cases is equivalent in character to the \"fixed point\" defi nitions of classical logic. To use another analogy, we may say that the similarity measure is being defined through an implicit equation.\n\n57\n\n\n\nThe nonsymmetric metric I will be useful in the definition of costs of basic editing operations as it measures the extent by which the concept represented by the class A needs to be extended (or \"stretched\") to encompass that described by the class B. The metric I is a measure of set inclusion since a value of I(A | B)\nequal to one indicates that every member of B is also a member of A, that is, that B is included in A.\n\nThe dual of the degree of inclusion measure is that of degree of intersection, defined by\n\n(A,B) = max oA max oB\n\nS(o, o) . measuring the extent to which either set has to be extended to intersect the other. When this number is 1, then the sets have at least one point in common. On the other hand, a large value of the possibility measure (A,B) indicates that all points of A are far apart from all points of B.\n\nIt is clear from the definitions of I and of  that it is always I(A | B)\n(A,B) . The numerical interval [I(A | B),(A,B)] represents the potential values of the degree of similarity between an object o in B and its closest object o in A.\n\nThe function I has a number of useful properties that are the foundation of our approach to the estimation of the degree of matching between a pattern and a database in terms of the -aggregation of the admissibilities of a sequence of simpler editing operations. The following properties are of particular importance to pattern matching. If A, B, and C are subsets of a domain X, then\n\n1. If B  A, then I(A | B) = 1 ,\n\n2. I(A | B)  I(A | C)  I(C | B) ,\n\n3. I(A | B) = max C\n\n[I(A | C)  I(C | B)] .\n\nIn what follows, we will need to consider situations where single objects are either added or deleted to an existing set A to produce a transformed set A. In such cases, we will need to compute the degree of implication I(A | A) as the measure of the admissibility of the simple operation changing A into A. In those cases, it is straightforward to see that\n\n1. If a member o of A is deleted to produce A, that is if A = A  {o}, then I(A | A) = 1 .\n\n58\n\nThe nonsymmetric metric I will be useful in the definition of costs of basic editing operations as it measures the extent by which the concept represented by the class A needs to be extended (or \"stretched\") to encompass that described by the class B. The metric I is a measure of set inclusion since a value of I(A | B)\nequal to one indicates that every member of B is also a member of A, that is, that B is included in A.\n\nThe dual of the degree of inclusion measure is that of degree of intersection, defined by\n\nI1(A, B) = max max S(0,0'). ocA o'eB measuring the extent to which either set has to be extended to intersect the other. When this number is 1, then the sets have at least one point in common. On the other hand, a large value of the possibility measure I1(A, B) indicates that all points of A are far apart from all points of B.\n\nIt is clear from the definitions of I and of IT that it is always I(A | B) <\nII(A, B) . The numerical interval [I(A | B),II(A, B)] represents the potential values of the degree of similarity between an object o' in B and its closest object oin A.\n\nThe function I has a number of useful properties that are the foundation of our approach to the estimation of the degree of matching between a pattern and a database in terms of the -aggregation of the admissibilities of a sequence of simpler editing operations. The following properties are of particular importance to pattern matching.\n\nIf A, B, and C are subsets of a domain X, then\n\n1. IfBC A, thenI(A| B) =1,\n22IA|B)>I(A| C)I(C | B),\n3. I(A|B):mgx[I(A|C)I(C'|B)].\n\nIn what follows, we will need to consider situations where single objects are either added or deleted to an existing set A to produce a transformed set A'. In such cases, we will need to compute the degree of implication I(A | A') as the measure of the admissibility of the simple operation changing A into A'. In those cases, it is straightforward to see that\n\n1. If a member o of A is deleted to produce A', that is if A = A' U {o}, then I(A|A)=1.\n\n58\n\n\n\n2. If a member o of X is added toA to produceA, that is, ifA = A{o}, then I(A | A) = max oA S(o, o) , where S is the similarity function underlying I.\n\nA.2 Pattern Matching and Data Transformations\n\nWe present the basic elements that permit the estimation of the degree of matching between a pattern and a database.\n\nWe start our discussion by characterizing the basic data constructs permitting the characterization of a database as a collection of assertions about binary rela tions between objects or between objects and their properties. On the basis of that characterization, we present a formal definition of a Database as a set of instances of binary predicates. The database may be interpreted, in logical terms, as the conjunction of that set of predicate instances.\n\nWe proceed then to sketch the general characteristics of our editing approach by means of definitions of the degree of admissibility of sequences of basic database editing operations and that of degree of matching. Finally, we present results char acterizing the degree of admissibility of basic database-editing operations in terms of related similarity functions.\n\nA.2.1 Predicates, Objects, Attributes, and Values\n\nOur brief review of major data modeling approaches in Section A.1.3 showed that their underlying representation mechanisms may be mapped into an equivalent collection of triples describing the nature of a relation between a pair of objects, or between an object and one of its attributes or properties.\n\nFollowing OpenCyc [14] nomenclature, we will refer to these classes of struc tures as being either binary object predicates or binary attribute predicates, re spectively (or object predicates and attribute predicates, for short).17\n\nInstances of object predicates such as (isFather, P12, P34), some times called relationships in the database literature, state that the two object in stances are related by the specified relation. Instances of attribute predicates, such\n\n17It is important to note that the qualifier \"binary\" correctly describes the arity of logical pred icates defining a relation between two objects or the relation between an object and one of its at tributes, respectively. The use of the term triple is justified, however, as three components need to be specified to unambiguously identify an instance of a binary predicate (i.e., (predicate-instance object-instance object-instance) or (predicate-instance object-instance attribute-value), respec tively).\n\n59\n\n\n\nas (hasAge, P12, 55yrs), specify the value of a property of an object in stance. In what follows, and in deference to terminology employed in the graph theoretical and database literature, we will also refer to specific instances of object predicates and attribute predicates as links.\n\nA.2.2 Databases\n\nAfter presenting the basic constructs underlying our approach and reviewing the important logical, metric, and utilitarian structures that relate them, we are now in a position to make a formal definition of a general data model for the representa tion of precise data and knowledge.18\n\nAbstract Data Model We start our discussion with a characterization of the various knowledge and data components of a data repository.\n\nDefinition 2: A data model is a 4-tuple\n\nD = ( Obj,Vals,Pred,Data) , where\n\n(i) Objects: Obj is a nonempty set, called the set of objects.\n\nIt is often the case that objects are structured by means of knowledge struc tures, such as ontologies, describing set-inclusion and subsumption rela tions between objects as well as the conditions upon object properties that make possible the differentiation of subclasses (e.g., the property of Animals that makes Vertebrates different from Invertebrates.\n\n(ii) Values: Values are nonempty sets in a collection of basic primitive types Vals, such as numbers, strings, or members of predefined discrete sets such as\n\nBalkanCountries = { Albania, Bosnia, . . . , Yugoslavia }\n\nthat permit specification of the values of properties and attributes of objects.\n\n18As previously noted, our model allows representation of ignorance about the values of at tributes or about the possible existence of relations between database objects.\n\n60\n\n\n\n(iii) Predicates: Pred is a nonempty set, called the set of predicates, or the set of links.\n\nLinks may also be thought of as being relations defined between objects in some domain and the set of possible values of some property or attribute. Members (in the set-theoretic sense) of such a relation are predicate, or link, instances, being sometimes also called relationships. As we have already pointed out, there is considerable latitude in data modeling as to what con stitutes an entity (related to values of its attributes) and what is a relation\n(related to other objects). In the context of our model, predicates are differ ent from objects in that the latter are instantiated and identified as a specific data object of a certain class (its domain), while the former are generic and are not instantiated.\n\nSince predicates are typically members of some domain that is structured by knowledge constructs such as ontologies, we will assume that, in gen eral, there exists a similarity function SimL\n\nP defined between pairs of predi cates.19\n\n(iv) Predicate Classes and Instances: As discussed earlier, we will need to con sider two classes of predicates, called binary object predicates and binary attributes predicates, respectively.\n\nInstances of object predicates expressed by triples such as\n\n(predicate, object-instance, object-instances)\n\nstate that two object instances are related by a specific object predicate, as, for example, in (isAncestor, P123, P234).\n\nInstances of attribute predicates, expressed by triples such as\n\n(predicate, object-instance, attribute-value)\n\nspecify the value (that is, a unique element of some primitive set in the col lection Vals) of an attribute of the specified object instance, as, for example, in (hasCityAddress, P543, ''Palo Alto'').\n\n19This function defined between predicates should not be confused with similar metrics, dis cussed below, between pairs of predicate instances.\n\n61\n\n\n\nWe will assume that the sets PO and PA of predicate instances have a metric structure defined by means of similarity functions SimO\n\nP and SimA P , respec tively. We discuss below an approach to the definition of such similarity measures.\n\n(v) Data: The data Data is a tuple (DataO,DataA), where DataO is a set of object-predicate instances and DataA is a nonempty set of attribute predicate instances.\n\nThis formal definition simply says that the database is a collection of triples relating objects and a nonempty collection of triples specifying the values of properties and attributes of objects. We require the latter collection to be nonempty to assure that the information represented in the database is grounded on objects that are described, to some extent, by their properties.\n\nA.2.3 Similarities between Predicate Instances\n\nThe definition of a metric structure in the sets PO and PA of predicate instances is an essential element of our approach since it permits definition, on a rational semantic basis, of the admissibility functions AdO\n\nP and AdA P that measure the ade quacy of basic database editing transformations. We have shown that knowledge structures such as ontologies permit the def inition of similarity measures in various domains. Our approach will not place any constraints on the nature of the similarity measures SimO\n\nP and SimA P between predicate instances other than assuming that there are similarity functions defined within object-instances (on the basis of their relationships and values of their prop erties) and between specific property values.20\n\nAmong the many possibilities open for such definitions, however, there is a simple choice that defines similarity between triples as the composition of the similarities between each of the triple components. A straightforward definition of the similarity between triples in terms of simpler measures defined over their three components, however, is not possible as, usually, these measures depend on the nature of the predicate being considered. A similarity function defined over the set of integer numbers may be employed to compare person ages (measured\n\n20To keep the scheme as general as possible, we will assume that it is possible to define a func tion between any two members of some set in the collection Vals (e.g., between a number and a string). In practice, however, many of these comparisons will be meaningless and the correspond ingly similarity values will be equal to zero.\n\n62\n\n\n\nin years), while a different metric may be required to compare their weights (ex pressed in kilograms). Although both similarity functions compare elements of the same primitive set (i.e., integers), it is clear that their definition is strongly de pendent on the nature of the predicates involved (i.e., hasAge and hasWeight, respectively).\n\nTo arrive at a simple suitable formulation that properly addresses this prob lem, consider first the problem of defining the similarity of two attribute-predicate instances (l, o, v) and (l, o, v) having the same first component, that is, the same attribute predicate.\n\nAssuming that, for every attribute predicate l, there exists\n\n1. a similarity function Siml O defined between pairs of objects in Obj (i.e., a way to compare possible replacements of the second component of the tuple)\n\n2. a similarity function Siml A defined between pairs of attributes each lying in some (usually, but not necessarily, the same) primitive value set contained in the collection Vals (i.e., a way to compare possible replacements of the third component of the tuple)\n\nwe can now define a similarity function in the setP l A = {(l, o, v): o is an object, , v is a value}\n\nSimA P( (l, o, v), (l, o, v)) = Siml\n\nO(o, o) Siml A(v, v) , where  is a T-norm such that Siml O, and Siml\n\nA are -transitive for all links l in Pred.\n\nTrying to extend this definition to the case where it is necessary to measure the resemblance between attribute-predicate instances (l, o, v) and (lo, v), involving different predicates l and l, we resort to the -transitive similarity function SimL\n\nP , introduced earlier, which is defined between pairs of attribute-predicates in Pred. Although this function provides the bases for the required extension, the depen dence of metrics measuring resemblance between objects and between attribute values on the nature of the attribute predicate l demands that, when comparing\n(l, o, v) and (lo, v), we define whether we employ metrics that measure such similitudes either from the viewpoint of l or from that of l.\n\nWhile several choices are possible, our preferred approach is to require that, in order for (l, o, v) to be similar to (lo, v), the following conditions must be met:\n\n1. The predicates l and l should be similar.\n\n63\n\nin years), while a different metric may be required to compare their weights (ex pressed in kilograms). Although both similarity functions compare elements of the same primitive set (i.e., integers), it is clear that their definition is strongly de pendent on the nature of the predicates involved (i.e., hasAge and hasWeight, respectively).\n\nTo arrive at a simple suitable formulation that properly addresses this prob lem, consider first the problem of defining the similarity of two attribute-predicate instances (I, 0,v) and ([, o', v\") having the same first component, that is, the same attribute predicate.\n\nAssuming that, for every attribute predicate [, there exists\n\n1. a similarity function Simfig defined between pairs of objects in Obj (i.e., a way to compare possible replacements of the second component of the tuple)\n\n2. a similarity function SimlA defined between pairs of attributes each lying in some (usually, but not necessarily, the same) primitive value set contained in the collection Vals (i.e., a way to compare possible replacements of the third component of the tuple)\n\nwe can now define a similarity function in the set Py = {(I, 0,v): 0 is an object, , v is a value}\nSima((1,0,v), (1,0,v\")) = Sim (0, 0')  Sim, (v, v') , where @ is a T-norm such that Sim},, and Simit are -transitive for all links [ in Pred.\n\nTrying to extend this definition to the case where it is necessary to measure the resemblance between attribute-predicate instances ([, 0, v) and (I'0', V'), involving different predicates [ and [', we resort to the -transitive similarity function Sime, introduced earlier, which is defined between pairs of attribute-predicates in Pred. Although this function provides the bases for the required extension, the depen dence of metrics measuring resemblance between objects and between attribute values on the nature of the attribute predicate [ demands that, when comparing\n(I,0,v) and (I'0',v\"), we define whether we employ metrics that measure such similitudes either from the viewpoint of / or from that of /'.\n\nWhile several choices are possible, our preferred approach is to require that, in order for (I, 0,v) to be similar to (I'0', v\"), the following conditions must be met:\n\n1. The predicates [ and I' should be similar.\n\n63\n\n\n\n2. The objects o and o should be similar from the viewpoint of the predicate l and from the viewpoint of the predicate l.\n\n3. The attribute values v and v should be similar from the viewpoint of the predicate l and from the viewpoint of the predicate l.\n\nTo meet the desired requirement that the objects o and o be similar from the viewpoint of the predicates l and l (similarly with the attribute values v and v), we need to define a function that combines the numeric distinctions made both by Siml\n\nO and Siml\n\nO (similarly, Siml A and Siml\n\nA). The following result, stated without proof, permits to define the required similarity function:\nTheorem: Let S1 and S2 be -transitive similarity functions between objects in a domain X. The function S12 = min (S1, S2) , , is the largest -transitive similarity function such that S12  S1 and S12  S2. This result allows us to define a similarity function that measures the required distinctions from the criteria imposed by both attribute predicates l and l:\n\nSim(l,l)\nA = min (Siml\n\nA,Siml\n\nA) ,\n\nSim(l,l)\nO = min (Siml\n\nO,Siml\n\nO) .\n\nFrom these definitions we can now define a metric between pairs of attribute predicate instances as\n\nSimA P( (l, o, v), (l, o, v)) = SimL\n\nP(l, l) Sim(l,l)\nO (o, o) Sim(l,l)\n\nA (v, v) ,\n\nThe definition of a similarity function between object predicate-instances (l, o1, o2)\nand (l, o1, o\n\n\n2) on the basis of\n\n1. a -similarity function SimL P defined between pairs of object-predicates in\n\nPred\n\n2. a - similarity function Siml O defined, for every object-predicate l in Pred, between pairs of objects in Obj (i.e., a way to compare possible replace ments of the second component of the tuple)\n\n3. a - similarity function Sim l\n\nO defined, for every object-predicate l in Pred, between pairs of objects in Obj (i.e., a way to compare possible replace ments of the third component of the tuple)\n\n64\n\n2. The objects o and o' should be similar from the viewpoint of the predicate [\nand from the viewpoint of the predicate /.\n\n3. The attribute values v and v\" should be similar from the viewpoint of the predicate [ and from the viewpoint of the predicate ['.\n\nTo meet the desired requirement that the objects o and o' be similar from the viewpoint of the predicates [ and !' (similarly with the attribute values v and v'), we need to define a function that combines the numeric distinctions made both by Simlo and Siml(; (similarly, SimlA and Simf;). The following result, stated without proof, permits to define the required similarity function:\n\nTheorem: Let Sy and Sy be -transitive similarity functions between objects in a domain X. The function S15 = min (S1,Ss) , , is the largest -transitive similarity function such that S15 < Sy and S15 < Ss.\n\nThis result allows us to define a similarity function that measures the required distinctions from the criteria imposed by both attribute predicates [ and '\n\nSim%\" = min (Sim',, Sim%) |\nSim$\"\" = min (Sim), Sim%).\n\nFrom these definitions we can now define a metric between pairs of attribute predicate instances as\n\nSima((1,0,v), (I,0',v')) = SimE(1, 1)  Sim&\" (0, 0') @ SIm\") (v, 0) |\n\nThe definition of a similarity function between object predicate-instances (I, 01, 07)\nand (I, 0/, 0},) on the basis of\n\n1. a -similarity function Simf) defined between pairs of object-predicates in Pred\n\n2. a - similarity function Simlo defined, for every object-predicate [ in Pred, between pairs of objects in Obj (i.e., a way to compare possible replace ments of the second component of the tuple)\n\n 1\n3. a - similarity function Sim,, defined, for every object-predicate [ in Pred, between pairs of objects in Obj (i.e., a way to compare possible replace ments of the third component of the tuple)\n\n64\n\n\n\nis given by\n\nSimO P( (l, o1, o2), (l, o1, o\n\n\n2)) = SimL\n\nP(l, l) Sim(l,l)\nO (o1, o\n\n\n1)  Sim\n\n(l,l)\n\nO (o2, o\n\n2) , where\n\nSim(l,l)\nO = min (Siml\n\nO,Siml\n\nO) ,\n\nSim\n(l,l)\n\nO = min (Sim l\n\nO, Sim l\n\nO) .\n\nTo complete our definition of similarity between predicate instances, we will assume that, having usually rather different meanings, the similarity between any object-predicate instance and any attribute-predicate instance is zero.\n\nA.2.4 Database Editing\n\nWe are now in a condition to propose a database-editing methodology to compute the degree of matching between a database and an instantiation of a pattern. Each basic database editing operation, which may include\n\n1. Deletion of binary-predicate instances\n\n2. Addition of binary-predicate instances\n\n3. Modification of binary-predicate instances transforms a database D into a modified database D. If, as discussed earlier, databases are thought of as sets of predicate instances, it is reasonable to measure the degree of adequacy of any transformation employing a measure, based on the underlying metric structures, that gauges the extent to which the knowledge ex pressed by D is consistent with that expressed by D. Such a measure is provided by the degree of implication I:\n\nDefinition 3: The degree of admissibility of a basic transformation changing a database D into a database D is the degree of inclusion of D in D, that is, I(D|D).\n\nWe will consider sequences of transformations of the triples in a database that progressively transform the database into a modified, edited, database that matches the pattern. The degree of admissibility of a sequence of basic database editing transformations\n\nT = (E1, E2, . . . , En) ,\n\n65\n\nis given by\n\nSIm2( (1, 01,09), (I, 0}, 0)) = Simp (1, ')  Simg'l/)(ol, 0])  S/Ifi'lgl )(02, 0h), where\n\nSim\") = min (Sim, Sim%)\n (L  :\nSim(o \" = min (Simg,, Sim,) .\n\n\n\nTo complete our definition of similarity between predicate instances, we will assume that, having usually rather different meanings, the similarity between any object-predicate instance and any attribute-predicate instance is zero.\n\nA.2.4 Database Editing\n\nWe are now in a condition to propose a database-editing methodology to compute the degree of matching between a database and an instantiation of a pattern. Each basic database editing operation, which may include\n\n1. Deletion of binary-predicate instances\n2. Addition of binary-predicate instances\n3. Modification of binary-predicate instances transforms a database D into a modified database D'. If, as discussed earlier, databases are thought of as sets of predicate instances, it is reasonable to measure the degree of adequacy of any transformation employing a measure, based on the underlying metric structures, that gauges the extent to which the knowledge ex pressed by D' is consistent with that expressed by D. Such a measure is provided by the degree of implication I:\n\nDefinition 3:  The degree of admissibility of a basic transformation changing a database D into a database D' is the degree of inclusion of D' in D, that is, I(D|D).\n\nWe will consider sequences of transformations of the triples in a database that progressively transform the database into a modified, edited, database that matches the pattern. The degree of admissibility of a sequence of basic database editing transformations\n\nT=(E,E... . E,),\n\n65\n\n\n\nis defined as the composition of the degrees of admissibilities of the component editing transformations, that is,\n\nAd(T ) = Ad(E1) Ad(E2)  . . . Ad(En) .\n\nThe validity of this aggregation is assured by the transitivity of the degee of inclu sion I [33].\n\nDegree of matching Several transformations, or sequences of database edit ing operations, may result in the transformation of a database D into the same transformed database D. We may think of each such sequence as a path in a database space between the original and the transformed database. Each path ac complishing the same transformation has an associated admissibility measure that is a function of the admissibility of individual edits. From this perspective, it makes sense to measure the admissibility of a transformation in terms of the path having maximum admissibility.\n\nDefinition 4: The degree of matching between two databases D and D is the admissibility of the sequence of transformations T mapping D into D having maximum admissibility.\n\nIt is important to note that, unlike classical similarity and distance metrics, the degree of matching function defined above will not be, in general, a symmetric function of its two arguments. The major reason for this lack of symmetry lies on the different cost associated with editing operations that are the inverse of each other (e.g., the cost of adding a predicate-instance to a database D is not the same as that of deleting a database from D).\n\nAdmissibility of basic edit operations In our formulation, the value of admis sibility measures for basic database-editing operations depends on the nature of predicate-instances being modified. Whenever needed to introduce new triples, however, new unlinked objects will be added to the database at no cost (i.e., addi tion of new, unrelated, internal object representations does not entail introduction of unavailable knowledge).\n\nAddition of binary-predicate instances The addition of triples of the form\n\n( predicate,object1,object2 ) ,\n\n66\n\n\n\nresults in the replacement of a databaseD by the modified databaseD = D{t}. As we have already seen, the degree of admissibility of this editing transformation E is given by\n\nAd(E) = I(D|D  {t}) = max tD\n\nSimO P (t, t) .\n\nA similar argument leads to the definition of the admissibility Ad2\nP(T ) of the transformation that adds an attribute-predicate instance t to the database D as\n\nAd(E) = I(D|D  {t}) = max tD\n\nSimA P (t, t) .\n\nDeletion of binary-predicate instances The deletion of a predicate instance from a database D results in a database D that is a subset of the transformed database.\n\nThese transformations are fully admissible, that is,\n\nAd(E) = I(D  {t}|D) = 1 , since there should not be any cost associated with disregarding information that facilitates the matching between database and pattern. On the other hand, the inverse operationadding a predicate instance to the databaseentails, as we have seen above, the introduction of information that is not supported by prior evidence and its admissibility is measured by the extent to which the assumed information resembles that in the database.\n\nReplacement of binary-predicate instances It is straightforward to prove that the admissibility of a basic editing transformationE of replacing an object-predicate instance t by another object-predicate instance t is given by the expression\n\nAd(E) = max D\n\nSimO P (t, ) .\n\nThis result, which is consistent with our previous estimates of the admissibility of addition and deletion of triples, shows that the cost associated with the replace ment of a triple t by a triple t is equivalent to the cost of adding t composed with the cost of deleting t. Since, as we have seen, there is no cost associated with deletions, the cost of replacement is, therefore, simply that of adding the new triple.\n\nA similar result holds for replacement of attribute-predicate instances, that is,\n\nAd(E) = max tD\n\nSimA P (t, t) .\n\n67\n\nresults in the replacement of a database D by the modified database D' = DU{t}. As we have already seen, the degree of admissibility of this editing transformation E'is given by\n\nAd(E) = [(D|D U {t}) = max Sim$ (t, 1) .\n\nA similar argument leads to the definition of the admissibility Ad%(T) of the transformation that adds an attribute-predicate instance  to the database D as\n\nAd(E) = [(D|D U {t}) = max Simi (t, 1) .\n\nDeletion of binary-predicate instances The deletion of a predicate instance from a database D results in a database D' that is a subset of the transformed database.\n\nThese transformations are fully admissible, that is,\n\nAd(E) = (D' U {t}|D) =1, since there should not be any cost associated with disregarding information that facilitates the matching between database and pattern. On the other hand, the inverse operationadding a predicate instance to the databaseentails, as we have seen above, the introduction of information that is not supported by prior evidence and its admissibility is measured by the extent to which the assumed information resembles that in the database.\n\nReplacement of binary-predicate instances It is straightforward to prove that the admissibility of a basic editing transformation E of replacing an object-predicate instance  by another object-predicate instance ' is given by the expression\n\n. s O g Ad(E) = max Simg ().\n\nThis result, which is consistent with our previous estimates of the admissibility of addition and deletion of triples, shows that the cost associated with the replace ment of a triple  by a triple ' is equivalent to the cost of adding ' composed with the cost of deleting . Since, as we have seen, there is no cost associated with deletions, the cost of replacement is, therefore, simply that of adding the new triple.\n\nA similar result holds for replacement of attribute-predicate instances, that is, o s A g Ad(FE) = max Simy (',t\") .\n\n67\n\n\n\nA.3 Imprecision, Uncertainty, Vagueness\n\nOur discussion has focused, so far, on the nature of databases that are conventional in the sense that, whenever the value of the attribute of an object is specified, such a value is a unique element of the range of possible values of the attribute. Similarly, if two objects are related, or linked, there is no ambiguity as to their identity.21 We start our exposition by briefly sketching the sense in which terms such as \"imprecise,\" \"uncertain,\" or \"vague\" are used in our exposition.\n\nAlthough a convention is yet to be reached among practitioners as to the proper usage of the terms imprecision and uncertainty, throughout this discussion we will describe imprecision as the inconvenient characteristic of information that does not allow identification of the value of an attribute or does not permit unique identification of objects having a relationship. Rather, it will be assumed that im precise information permits us to identify a set of possible attribute values or a set of objects where the actual attribute value or the related object lies, respectively.\n\nThe following assertions exemplify imprecise knowledge:\n\n\"The age of person P-3 is at least 20 years,\"\n\"The father of person P-99 is either person P-100, or person P-102.\"\n\nThe key feature of imprecision is the inability to specify actual values of at tributes or to permit unique identification of objects, allowing, rather, identifica tion of a subset of the range of a particular attribute or relation.\n\nWe also discuss possible imprecision about the nature of the links that define the property being described or the nature of the relation between two objects. It may only be known, for example, that\n\n\"Person P-46 is a Relative of Person P-3 ,\"\n\nwhile better knowledge may reveal that P-46 is the Father of P-3 , that is, a more precise characterization of the link between persons.\n\nThe term uncertainty is usually employed in the literature to describe proba bilistic knowledge about the value of an attribute or about the identity of linked objects as exemplified by\n\n\"The probability that the total-rainfall will be 50in is 50%.\"\n\"The probability that the father of P-90 is P-3 is 90%.\"\n\n21As we have noted, however, our previous treatment is general enough to be applicable to incomplete databases, where values of certain properties may not be specified, or where, similarly, certain relation instances may be missing.\n\n68\n\n\n\nessentially defining elements of a probability distribution in the range of a prop erty or relation (i.e., the conditional probability that a property has a value, or the conditional probability that an object is related to another object, given avail able evidence). The basic difference between imprecise and uncertain knowledge is that the former simply specifies a subset of possible values or related objects22\n\nwhile the latter fully specifies a probability distribution over the range of the prop erty or relation [50].\n\nIn this report, primarily for the sake of clarity, we confine our attention to pattern-matching problems involving imprecise information. While the extension to uncertain information is relatively straightforward, it involves the introduction of functions defining distances and similarity between probability distributions, resulting in the consideration of issues that are not central to the problem being addressed. For the same reason, we also avoid discussion of generalized schemes, such as the Dempster-Shafer calculus of evidence [40] (which relies on a combi nation of imprecise and uncertain representations of partial knowledge) nor do we deal with extensions to the fuzzy domain (which are concerned with the represen tation of vague information).\n\nA.3.1 Imprecise Objects, Values, and Relations\n\nThe introduction of imprecision in data models adds considerable complexity to the nature of the problems that must be considered in the context of a pattern matching application. The lack of accepted methodologies for the representation of imprecise knowledge is a major obstacle to straightforward theoretical exten sions. Reliance on conventional mechanisms for identification of objects on the basis of the values of their attributes, such as keys, can no longer be employed, since imprecision on the values of properties or in the identity of related objects in troduces ambiguities on the nature of the objects being modeled. Furthermore, as we will examine in some detail, the metric structures required for determination of the degree of admissibility of a transformation are no longer symmetricproperly reflecting the different costs associated with a transformation and its inverse (e.g., replacing Animal by Cow introduces new knowledge while the converse trans formation does not).\n\n22This specification may be thought of as stating that the probability that the value of a related attribute or object lies on some subset is 1, i.e., a partial specification of a probability distribution.\n\n69\n\n\n\nImprecise databases Our previous database model will now be extended to per mit the representation of imprecise knowledge about the nature of links, related objects, and attribute values.\n\nDefinition 5: A data model is a 4-tuple\n\nD = ( Obj,Vals,Pred,Data) , where\n\n(i) Objects: Obj is a nonempty set, called the set of objects.\n\nWhile we will not introduce any substantive changes to our previous char acterization of the set Obj, we will assume, however, that it is possible to describe a finite set of objects simply by defining its members, i.e.,\n\nObject-Set = {Object1, . . . , Objectn } .\n\nThis capability permits the representation of imprecise knowledge about the nature of objects related to some object instance, such as\n\n(Father, P12, {P23, P34}), representing knowledge that the Father of person P12 is either P23 or P34.\n\n(ii) Values: Values are nonempty sets in a collection of basic primitive types.\n\nOnce again, we will assume that it is possible to represent finite sets of property values, i.e.,\n\nValue-Set = {Value1, . . . , Valuen } .\n\nThis capability permits the representation of imprecise knowledge about the values of an attribute of an object instance, such as\n\n(hasCityAddress, P12, { \"Menlo Park\", \"Palo Alto\"\n}), representing knowledge that person P12 lives either in Palo Alto or in Menlo Park.\n\nIn the case of sets in the collection Vals, however, we will assume that there usually exist domain-dependent, taxonomical structures, defined in those\n\n70\n\n\n\nsets that permit characterization, for example, that the Nationality of a Person is European (i.e., as opposed to specifying a particular country)\nor that the Age of a Person is between 20 and 30 years.\n\nWe will denote by LeafV the collection of all leaf nodes of all taxonomi cal structures defined in sets belonging to Vals. This set will contain, for example, all atomic strings, integer numbers, and members of sets such as European that do not have any successors (e.g., Italian).\n\nWe will further assume that any taxonomical entry in Vals is equivalent, in a set-theoretical sense, to the set of its descendant leaf nodes. For exam ple, the value European is equivalent to the set of all specific European nationalities, i.e., {Spanish,Italian,French, . . .}\n\n(iii) Predicates: Pred is a nonempty set, called the set of predicates, or the set of links. Again, we assume that there exists a similarity function SL defined between pairs of predicates.\n\nWe will now assume, however, that there exists a hierarchical order between links defining, as was the case with values, a generalized taxonomical struc ture between links. While in our previous treatment, all predicates were dis tinct members of the set Pred, we now allow the possibility that predicates may be related by the notion of logical implication. For example\n\nSon Child Relative , exemplifies predicates that define different levels of imprecision, or granu larity, of relations between persons.\n\nAs was also the case with values, we will denote by LeafL the set of all leaf nodes of Pred, i.e., the set of all atomic, or ground, predicates. Similarly, we will equate each predicate Predicate in Pred with the set of its de scendant leaf nodes, that is, the set of all atomic predicates predicate that imply Predicate.\n\n(iv) Predicate Instances: We will need to consider again two classes of predi cates, called binary object predicates and binary attributes predicates, re spectively.\n\nHere, however, we will introduce substantive generalizations by permitting the expression of ambiguity about the nature of the links, about the objects that are related to a uniquely identified object-instance, or about the value of the attribute of an object-instance.\n\n71\n\n\n\nInstances of generalized object predicates will now be expressed by triples such as\n\n(Predicate, object-instance, Object-Set)\n\nwhich state that a uniquely specified object instance is related, by a possi bly ambiguous object predicate, to some member of Object-set. It is important to note that it is not necessary to permit ambiguity in the speci fication of the second component since, as is well known, a many-to-many relation may be specified as a collection of one-to-many relations.\n\nInstances of generalized attribute predicates are now expressed by triples such as\n\n(Predicate, object-instance, Value-Set)\n\nwhich specify that the value of a possibly ambiguous attribute of the speci fied object instance lies in the set Value-Set.\n\nWe will assume again that certain functions, defined in the sets PO and PA of predicate instances, provide the rational bases to measure the admissi bility of database editing operations. As we will see below, however, these functions are no longer similarity measures but, rather, nonsymmetric gen eralized order functions.\n\n(v) Data: The data Data is a tuple (DataO,DataA), where DataO is a set of generalized object-predicate instances and DataA is a nonempty generalized attribute-predicate instances. The only difference, albeit significant, with our previous formulation lies in the ability to accommodate imprecision, ei ther as ambiguous related objects or as ambiguous property values, provided by generalized object-predicate instances and attribute-predicate instances, respectively. Furthermore, the first triple component, i.e., Predicate, may itself be ambiguous.23\n\nGeneralized metrics Consideration of imprecision introduces significant dif ferences in the numeric structures employed to measure semantic differences be tween databases. Once again, it will be necessary to define, on a rational semantic\n\n23We have chosen to capitalize the first letter of the term Predicate to indicate that now links may be ambiguous.\n\n72\n\n\n\nbasis, the admissibility functions AdO P and AdA\n\nP that measure the adequacy of ba sic database editing transformations. This definition will also be based on metric structures defined now in the sets PO and PA of generalized object and attribute predicate instances.\n\nTo facilitate understanding of the basic issues, we discuss first extensions to the editing of generalized attribute predicates. We will assume now that there exists a similarity function SimL\n\nP defined between pairs of attribute-predicates in LeafL. This similarity function generalizes our previous metric that, in the case of precise databases, was defined between any pair of predicates in Pred.\n\nWe will assume now that for every leaf attribute-predicate l in LeafL, there exists\n\n1. A similarity function Siml O defined between pairs of objects in Obj (i.e., a way to compare possible replacements of the second component of the tuple)\n\n2. A similarity function Siml A defined between pairs of leaf values in the set\n\nLeafV (i.e., a way to compare possible replacements of the third component of the tuple)\n\nAs we have previously noted, these metric structures provide the bases to de fine a similarity function between triples representing attribute-predicate instances as\n\nSimA P( (l, o, v), (l, o, v)) = SimL\n\nP(l, l) Sim(l,l)\nO (o, o) Sim(l,l)\n\nA (v, v) .\n\nThis definition, however, must now be generalized to provide a basis to de termine the admissibility of replacing a generalized attribute-predicate instance\n(L, o, V ) by another (L, o, V ), where V and V  are subsets of a values and where L and L are generalized predicates.\n\nClearly, the similarity function Siml A, defined between pairs of leaf, or atomic, values v and v must be extended to a metric over pairs of value sets V and V . Although it is possible to extend similarity structures defined over a set to metrics defined over its power set (i.e., the set of all its subsets) by means of the well known Hausdorff distance [33], with the formula\n\nSimH(V, V ) = min [ I(V |V ), I(V |V ) ] , where I is the degree of inclusion function associated with the similarity function Sim, it is important to remember that our objective is to characterize the extent\n\n73\n\nbasis, the admissibility functions Adg and Ade that measure the adequacy of ba sic database editing transformations. This definition will also be based on metric structures defined now in the sets Pp and P4 of generalized object and attribute predicate instances.\n\nTo facilitate understanding of the basic issues, we discuss first extensions to the editing of generalized attribute predicates. We will assume now that there exists a similarity function Sime defined between pairs of attribute-predicates in Leaf,. This similarity function generalizes our previous metric that, in the case of precise databases, was defined between any pair of predicates in Pred.\n\nWe will assume now that for every leaf attribute-predicate [ in Leaf,, there exists\n\n1. A similarity function Simlo defined between pairs of objects in Obj (i.e., a way to compare possible replacements of the second component of the tuple)\n\n2. A similarity function Simi' defined between pairs of leaf values in the set Leafy (i.e., a way to compare possible replacements of the third component of the tuple)\n\nAs we have previously noted, these metric structures provide the bases to de fine a similarity function between triples representing attribute-predicate instances as\n\nSima((1,0,v), (I,0,v')) = Simk(1, 1)  Sim&\" (0, 0') @ SIm&\") (v, 0) .\n\nThis definition, however, must now be generalized to provide a basis to de termine the admissibility of replacing a generalized attribute-predicate instance\n(L,0,V) by another (L', o', V'), where V and V\" are subsets of a values and where L and L' are generalized predicates.\n\nClearly, the similarity function SimlA, defined between pairs of leaf, or atomic, values v and v\" must be extended to a metric over pairs of value sets V' and V. Although it is possible to extend similarity structures defined over a set to metrics defined over its power set (i.e., the set of all its subsets) by means of the well known Hausdorff distance [33], with the formula\n\nSimy (V, V') = min [I(V|V\"), I(V'|V)], where I is the degree of inclusion function associated with the similarity function Sim, it is important to remember that our objective is to characterize the extent\n\n73\n\n\n\nto which it is admissible to replace, in a database D, a triple (L, o, V ) by another triple (L, o, V ).\n\nAs we will see below, this is a non-symmetric transformationsince, gener ally, the admissibility of replacing (L, o, V ) by (L, o, V ) is not the same as that of replacing (L, o, V ) by (L, o, V ). As it turns out, we will only need to resort, again, to degree-of-inclusion measures I to derive the required admissibility costs.\n\nWe focus now, for the sake of explanation, on the simpler problem of replacing only an imprecise value V by another imprecise value V  in a triple of the form\n(l, o, V ), where l is a precise predicate and o is a specific object (i.e., determining the admissibility of replacing the triple (l, o, V ) by the triple (l, o, V )). To esti mate the extent to which it is acceptable to replace the third component V by V , we need to remember that the value-set V represents the best evidence as to the nature of the actual value v of the attribute l of an object O. Assuming now that the \"true value\" of that attribute is the element (i.e. the leaf value) v of V , the extent to which V  is a proper description of the nature of v is max vV\n\nSiml A(v, v) .\n\nIn other words, if v were to lie actually in V , then it should be acceptable from a strictly truth-oriented perspective,24 despite a possible loss of information to say that the attribute l of object O lies in V . On the other hand, when every v in V  is very different from v, then all the values Siml\n\nA(v, v) are small and, accordingly, the admissibility of representing the location of v by V  is low.\n\nOn the basis of these considerations, since, in fact, we only know that the true value v lies in V , it is clear that the minimum possible degree of admissibility of replacing V by V , is given by min vV max vV\n\nSiml A(v, v) = Il\n\nA(V |V ) .\n\nNote, in particular, that this expression indicates that it is admissible to replace V by another set V  that includes it although the opposite is not true. This lack of symmetry is consistent with the meaning of the transformation (i.e., there is no loss of \"truth\" in saying that a city lies in the United States when it is known that it is in California but the converse statement is obviously false).\n\n24It is important to remember that our editing transformations are not intended to eliminate ambiguity but, rather, to produce a transformed database that matches the conditions imposed by the pattern.\n\n74\n\nto which it is admissible to replace, in a database D, a triple (L, o, V') by another triple (L', o', V).\n\nAs we will see below, this is a non-symmetric transformationsince, gener ally, the admissibility of replacing (L, 0, V') by (L', 0, V') is not the same as that of replacing (L', o', V') by (L, 0, V). As it turns out, we will only need to resort, again, to degree-of-inclusion measures I to derive the required admissibility costs.\n\nWe focus now, for the sake of explanation, on the simpler problem of replacing only an imprecise value V' by another imprecise value V' in a triple of the form\n(I,0,V), where [ is a precise predicate and o is a specific object (i.e., determining the admissibility of replacing the triple (1,0, V') by the triple (I, 0,V\")). To esti mate the extent to which it is acceptable to replace the third component V' by V\", we need to remember that the value-set V' represents the best evidence as to the nature of the actual value v of the attribute [ of an object O. Assuming now that the \"true value\" of that attribute is the element (i.e. the leaf value) v of V, the extent to which V\" is a proper description of the nature of v is max Sim', (v, ).\n\nIn other words, if v were to lie actually in V\", then it should be acceptable from a strictly truth-oriented perspective,?* despite a possible loss of information to say that the attribute [ of object O lies in /. On the other hand, when every v in V' is very different from v, then all the values Sim',(v, v') are small and, accordingly, the admissibility of representing the location of v by V\" is low.\n\nOn the basis of these considerations, since, in fact, we only know that the true value v lies in V/, it is clear that the minimum possible degree of admissibility of replacing V by V', is given by\n\n{)nei'r/l max Sim' (v, v\") = 1, (V'|V). Note, in particular, that this expression indicates that it is admissible to replace V'\nby another set 1' that includes it although the opposite is not true. This lack of symmetry is consistent with the meaning of the transformation (i.e., there is no loss of \"truth\" in saying that a city lies in the United States when it is known that it is in California but the converse statement is obviously false).\n\n241t is important to remember that our editing transformations are not intended to eliminate ambiguity but, rather, to produce a transformed database that matches the conditions imposed by the pattern.\n\n74\n\n\n\nWe can now, generalize our characterization of the degree of similarity be tween instances of attribute predicates by the function\n\nIA P( (L, o, V ) | (L, o, V )) = min lL max lL\n\n[\nSimL\n\nP(l, l) Sim(l,l)\nO (o, o)  I(l,l)\n\nA (V |V )\n]\n, where I(l,l)\nA is the degree of inclusion function associated with the similarity func tion Sim(l,l)\nA . The function IA\n\nP , not being symmetric, is not a similarity measure but actually a generalized order function, that is, a reflexive and -transitive func tion.\n\nTurning our attention now to generalization, we will again assume that there exists a similarity function SimL\n\nP defined between pairs of object-predicates in LeafL and that, for every leaf object-predicate l in LeafL, there exists\n\n1. A similarity function Siml O defined between pairs of objects in Obj (i.e., a way to compare possible replacements of the second component of the tuple)\n\n2. A similarity function Sim l\n\nO defined between pairs of objects in Obj (i.e., a way to compare possible replacements of the third component of the tuple)\n\nBy an argument identical to that employed above in the case of generalized attribute-predicate instances we can now define the required order function as\n\nIO P ( (L, o1, O2) | (L, o1, O2)) = min lL max lL\n\n[\nSimL\n\nP(l, l) Sim(l,l)\nO (o1, o\n\n\n1)  I\n\n(l,l)\n\nO (O2|O2) ,\n]\n, where I\n(l,l)\n\nO is the degree of inclusion function associated with the object-similarity measure Sim\n(l,l)\n\nO . To complete our definition of similarity between predicate instances, we will assume, as before, that, having rather different meanings, the similarity between any generalized object-predicate instance and any generalized attribute-predicate instance is zero.\n\nAdmissibility of basic editing operations We can now state formulas for the admissibility of basic editing operations. The arguments leading to these expres sions are identical to that given earlier for precise predicate instances and will not be repeated here.\n\n75\n\nWe can now, generalize our characterization of the degree of similarity be tween instances of attribute predicates by the function\n\nL3 ((L,0,V)|(L',d, V\")) = min max [ Simp(L,1')  SimG\" (0,0') & 13\" (V'[V) ] |\n\nI=L U'=L where Ifi'l/) is the degree of inclusion function associated with the similarity func tion Simg\"l/). The function Ie, not being symmetric, is not a similarity measure but actually a generalized order function, that is, a reflexive and -transitive func tion.\n\nTurning our attention now to generalization, we will again assume that there exists a similarity function Sim7L; defined between pairs of object-predicates in Leaf, and that, for every leaf object-predicate [ in Leaf,, there exists\n\n1. A similarity function Simlo defined between pairs of objects in Obj (i.e., a way to compare possible replacements of the second component of the tuple)\n\n 1\n2. A similarity function Sim,, defined between pairs of objects in Obj (i.e., a way to compare possible replacements of the third component of the tuple)\n\nBy an argument identical to that employed above in the case of generalized attribute-predicate instances we can now define the required order function as\n\n12 ((L,01,05)| (L', d},04)) = min max |Sim& (i, ') @ Sim&\" (01, o) @ 15\" (04]05) | |\n\n=L U'=L/\n\n(L\") . . . . . . . D where IE) ) is the degree of inclusion function associated with the object-similarity\n<= (1)\nmeasure Simy, To complete our definition of similarity between predicate instances, we will assume, as before, that, having rather different meanings, the similarity between any generalized object-predicate instance and any generalized attribute-predicate instance is zero.\n\nAdmissibility of basic editing operations We can now state formulas for the admissibility of basic editing operations. The arguments leading to these expres sions are identical to that given earlier for precise predicate instances and will not be repeated here.\n\n75\n\n\n\nAddition of binary-predicate instances The admissibility of the basic editing transformationE consisting of the addition of a generalized object-predicate triple T of the form\n\nT = ( Predicate,object1,Object-set2 ) , resulting in the replacement of a database D by the modified database D = D\n{T} is given by\n\nAd(E) = max T D\n\nIO P(T |T ) .\n\nCorrespondingly, the admissibility of the basic editing transformation E con sisting of the addition of a generalized attribute-predicate triple T of the form\n\nT = ( Predicate,object,Value-set ) , resulting in the replacement of a database D by the modified database D = D\n{T} is given by\n\nAd(E) = max T D\n\nIA P(T |T )\n\nDeletion of binary-predicate instances The deletion of a predicate instance from a database D results in a database D that is a subset of the transformed database. These transformations are, as was previously the case, fully admissible, that is,\n\nAd(E) = 1 , since there should not be any cost associated with disregarding information that facilitates the matching between database and pattern.\n\nReplacement of binary-predicate instances On the basis of arguments that are identical to those given when discussing the replacement of an object-predicate instance t by another object-predicate instance t, the admissibility of the database transformation E replacing a generalized object-predicate instance T by another object-predicate instance T  is given by\n\nAd(E) = max T D\n\nIO P(T |T ) .\n\nSimilarly, when replacing a generalized attribute-predicate instance T by a generalized attribute-predicate instance T , the admissibility of the corresponding database transformation E is given by\n\nAd(E) = max T D\n\nIA P(T |T ) .\n\n76\n\nAddition of binary-predicate instances The admissibility of the basic editing transformation  consisting of the addition of a generalized object-predicate triple T of the form\n\nT = (Predicate,object;,Object-set,), resulting in the replacement of a database D by the modified database D' = D U\n{T'} is given by\n_ O /\nAd(E) = max I(T|T\").\n\nCorrespondingly, the admissibility of the basic editing transformation F con sisting of the addition of a generalized attribute-predicate triple 7\" of the form\n\nT = (Predicate,object,Value-set), resulting in the replacement of a database D by the modified database D' = D U\n{T'} is given by Ad(E) = max I5(T|T\")\n\nT'eD\n\nDeletion of binary-predicate instances The deletion of a predicate instance from a database D results in a database D' that is a subset of the transformed database. These transformations are, as was previously the case, fully admissible, that is,\n\nAd(E) =1, since there should not be any cost associated with disregarding information that facilitates the matching between database and pattern.\n\nReplacement of binary-predicate instances On the basis of arguments that are identical to those given when discussing the replacement of an object-predicate instance  by another object-predicate instance ', the admissibility of the database transformation F replacing a generalized object-predicate instance 7' by another object-predicate instance 7\" is given by\n\n_ O (it it Ad(E) = Imax I (T\"T\"). Similarly, when replacing a generalized attribute-predicate instance 7' by a generalized attribute-predicate instance 77, the admissibility of the corresponding database transformation  is given by\n\nAd(E) = max I5(T\"|T).\n\n76\n\n\n\nReferences\n\n[1] D. Allsopp, P. Beautement, J. Carson, and M. Kirton. Toward semantic interoperability in agent-based coalition command systems. In Proceedings of the International Semantic Web Working Symposium, 2002.\n\n[2] Anupriya Ankolenkar, Mark Burstein, Jerry R. Hobbs, Ora Lassila, David L. Martin, Drew McDermott, Sheila A. McIlraith, Srini Narayanan, Massimo Paolucci, Terry R. Payne, and Katia Sycara. DAML-S: Web service descrip tion for the semantic web. In Proceedings of the First International Semantic Web Conference (ISWC), Sardinia, Italy, 2002.\n\n[3] Roland Backhouse and Paul Hoogendijk. Elements of a relational theory of datatypes. In Bernhard Moeller, Helmut Partsch, and Steve Schuman, editors, Formal Program Development, volume 755, pages 742. Springer Verlag, New York, N.Y., 1993.\n\n[4] Chitta Baral and Michael Gelfond. Logic programming and knowledge rep resentation. Journal of Logic Programming, 19/20:73148, 1994.\n\n[5] P.M. Berry and B. Drabble. SWIM: An AI-based system for workflow en abled reactive control. 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Academic Press, 1988.\n\n[19] I. A. Harrison. ControlML schema design, 2002. http://www.ai.sri.com/law/schemas/2002/07/controlML.htm.\n\n[20] I. A. Harrison. HypothesisML schema design, 2002. http://www.ai.sri.com/law/schemas/2002/07/hypothesisML.htm.\n\n[21] I. A. Harrison. PatternML schema design, 2002. http://www.ai.sri.com/law/schemas/2002/07/patternML.htm.\n\n[22] P. E. Hart, N. J. Nilsson, and B. Raphael. A formal basis for the heuristic de termination of minimum cost paths. IEEE Transactions on Systems Science and Cybernetics, SSC-4(2):100107, 1968.\n\n[23] J. Hendler and D. L. McGuinness. The DARPA agent markup language. IEEE Intelligent Systems, pages 6773, November 2000.\n\n[24] J. Kubica, A. Moore, J. Schneider, and Y. Yang. Stochastic link and group detection. In Proceedings of the Eighteenth National Conference on Artifi cial Intelligence, 2002.\n\n78\n\n\n\n[25] J. D. Lowrance, I. W. Harrison, and A. C. Rodriguez. Capturing analytic thought. In Proceedings of the First International Conference on Knowledge Capture, pages 8491, October 2001.\n\n[26] John McCarthy. LISP 1 programmer's manual. Technical report, Com putation Center and Research Laboratory of Electronics, MIT, Cambridge, Mass., 1960.\n\n[27] Karen L. Myers. The ACT Editor User's Guide. Artificial Intelligence Cen ter, SRI International, Menlo Park, CA, 1993.\n\n[28] Karen L. Myers. User's Guide for the Procedural Reasoning System. Arti ficial Intelligence Center, SRI International, Menlo Park, CA, 1993.\n\n[29] K.L. Myers and David.N. Morley. Adjustable Autonomy, chapter Policy based Agent Directability. MIT Press, 2002.\n\n[30] S. M. Paley, J. D. Lowrance, and P. D. Karp. A generic knowledge-base browser and editor. In Proceedings of the 1997 National Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 1997.\n\n[31] Vaughan R. Pratt. Origins of the calculus of binary relations. In Logic in Computer Science, pages 248254, 1992.\n\n[32] H. Raiffa. Decision Analysis. Addison-Wesley, 1968.\n\n[33] E. H. Ruspini. On the semantics of fuzzy logic. Int. J. of Approximate Reasoning, 5:4588, 1991.\n\n[34] E. H. Ruspini. Truth as utility: A conceptual synthesis. In Proceedings of the Conference on Uncertainty in Artificial Intelligence, pages 316322, Los Angeles, CA, 1991.\n\n[35] E. H. Ruspini, P. P. Bonissone, and W. Pedrycz, editors. The Handbook of Fuzzy Computation. Institute of Physics, 1998.\n\n[36] E H. Ruspini and F. Esteva. Interpretations of fuzzy sets. In E. H. Ruspini, P. P. Bonissone, and W. Pedrycz, editors, The Handbook of Fuzzy Computa tion. Institute of Physics, 1998.\n\n79\n\n\n\n[37] Enrique H. Ruspini. On truth and utility. In Rudolf Kruse and Pierre Siegel, editors, Symbolic and Quantitative Approaches for Uncertainty: Pro ceedings of the European Conference ECSQAU, Marseille, France, October\n1991, pages 297304. Springer-Verlag, Berlin, 1991.\n\n[38] Enrique H. Ruspini and John Lowrance. Semantic indexing and relevance measures in SEAS. Working Paper (DARPA GENOA Project, 2002.\n\n[39] A. Saffiotti, K. Konolige, and E.H. Ruspini. A multivalued logic approach to integrating planning and control. Artificial Intelligence, 76:481526, 1995.\n\n[40] Glenn Shafer. A Mathematical Theory of Evidence. Princeton University Press, 1976.\n\n[41] L. Shapiro and R. Haralick. Structural descriptions and inexact matching. IEEE Transactions on Pattern Analysis and Machine Intelligence, 3:504\n519, 1981.\n\n[42] J. F. Sowa. Conceptual Structures: Information Processing in Mind and Machine. Addison-Wesley, 1983.\n\n[43] J. F. Sowa. Conceptual Structures: Information Processing in Mind and Machine. Addison-Wesley, 1984.\n\n[44] B. Taskar, P. Abbeel, and D. Koller. Discriminative probabilistic models for relational data. In Eighteenth Conference on Uncertainty in Artificial Intelligence, Edmonton, Canada, 2002.\n\n[45] J. Thomere, I. Harrison, J. Lowrance, A. Rodriguez, E. Ruspini, and M. Wolverton. Helping intelligence analysts detect threats in overflowing, changing, and incomplete information. In IEEE International Conference on Computational Intelligence for Homeland Security and Personal Safety\n(CIHSPS2004), 2004.\n\n[46] J. Thomere, A. Rodriguez, V. Chaudhri, S. Mishra, M. Eriksen, P. Clark, K. Barker, and B. Porter. A web-based ontology browsing and editing sys tem. In Conference on Innovative Applications of Artificial Intelligence. AAAI, Jul 2002.\n\n[47] L. Valverde. On the structure of F-indistinguishability operators. Fuzzy Sets and Systems, 17(3):313328, 1985.\n\n80\n\n\n\n[48] M. Wolverton. Retrieving Semantically Distant Analogies. PhD thesis, Stan ford University, 1994.\n\n[49] M. Wolverton, P. Berry, I. Harrison, J. Lowrance, D. Morley, A. Rodriguez, E. Ruspini, and J. Thomere. LAW: A workbench for approximate pattern matching in relational data. 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    },
    {
        "text": "Office of the Director of National Intelligence Washington, DC 20511\nSEP 2 9 2015\nSteven Aftergood Federation of American Scientists\n1725 De Sales Street NW, Suite 600\nWashington, DC 20036\nRe: ODNI FOIA Request DF-2011-00039\nDear Mr. Aftergood:\nThis is in response to your 3 February 2010 email to the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) (Enclosure 1 ), in which you requested, under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), a copy of the releasable portions of the report resulting from a review of intelligence lessons learned from the Fort Hood shooting, the Christmas Day bombing attempt, and other incidents.\n\nYour request was processed in accordance with the FOIA, 5 U.S.C.  552, as amended.\n\nA thorough search of our records and databases located material responsive to your request\n(Enclosure 2).\n\nUpon thorough review, the material was found to contain information that is currently and properly classified under Executive Order 13526, Section 1.4(c), and is therefore withheld pursuant to FOIA exemption (b)(1). Information was also withheld pursuant to the following FOIA exemptions:\n\n-\n(b)(3), which applies to information exempt from disclosure by statute, specifically:\no the National Security Act of 1947, as amended, 50 U.S.C.  3024(m)(1), which\nprotects, among other things, the names and identifying information of ODNI\npersonnel, and\no the National Security Act of 1947, as amended, 50 U.S.C.  3024(i)(l), which\nprotects information pertaining to intelligence sources and methods.\nIf you wish to appeal our determination on this request, please explain the basis of your appeal and forward to the address below within 45 days of the date ofthis letter.\n\nOffice of the Director of National Intelligence Information Management Office Washington, DC 20511\nThe document was also coordinated with other agencies-their redactions are noted in the document.\n\nIf you have any questions, email our Requester Service Center at DNI-FOIA@,dni.gov or call us at (703) 874-8500.\n\nSincerely, I J/ . /;~'hhL<rx4( 7 (\n\"\\_6\\-\nJennifer Hudson C\nDirector, Information Management Division Enclosures FBI\n\n15 April 2010\nReport to the Director of\nNational Intelligence on the\nFort Hood and Northwest\nFlight 253 Incidents (U)\n\nIntelligence Community Review Panel\n\nCLBY:\n              l<b)(3) I\n\nCL REASON: 1.4 (b), (c), (d)\nDECL ON: 25X1-human\nDRV FROM: Multiple\nSources\n\nTOP SECRET/{i IGSISJNORCONINOFORN.\n\nl<b)(7)(E) I\n\n## Report To The Director Of National Intelligence On The Fort Hood And Northwest Fligltt 253 Incidents (U) Executive Summary (U)\n\n(b )(1)\n(b)(3)\n(b)(?)(E)\nFBI\n\n\"In a way, I think this Christmas Day bomber did 118 a favor. \"\n\n-Gov. Thomas H. Kean, 25 Jatlfl01J' 2010. 1\n\nThe Director of National Intelligence (DNI) asked a panel of four senior\ncurrent and fonner national security officials in January to examine the\nintelligence aspects of two recent events: the shooting attack on personnel\nat Fort Hood by Army Major Nidal Hasan on 5 November and the\nattempted bombing of Northwest Airlines Flight 253 on Christmas day by\na Nigerian citizen, Urnar Farouk Abdulrnutallab. a (U)\n\nThe panel's mandate was three-fold: To document the facts of these two\nevents, to add recommendations to what the Intelligence Community is\ndoing in response to them. and to add any further thoughts on what the\nIntelligence Community might do to deal with existing terrorist threats or\nwhat fonn new terrorist threats might take. (U)\n\nTo carry out this assignment, the panel read all of the relevant intelligence\nreporting and carried out roughly 70 interviews, meetings, and roundtable\ndiscussions with approximately 300 key decision makers, program\nmanagers, officers, and agents from components in the Office of the\nDirector ofNational Intelligence (ODNI), the National Counterterrorism\nCenter (NCTC), the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), including its\nCounterterrorism Center (CTC), the Defense Intelligence Agency's (DIA)\n\nLiberties Protection Officer in the Office of the Director ofNational Intelligence. (U)\nJoint Intelligence Task Force-Counterterrorism (JfrF-cn, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the National Security Agency (NSA), the Department ofHomd~ Security (DHS), the Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Intelljgence, and the NatiQoal Security Council. It also asked a panel of experts from outside the Intelligence Community to offer ideas on future threats and called on four extemal readers-a scholar, the head of a major research institution. a two fonner senior intelligena officials-to critiqtre the study. (U)\nBefore~\nthe findings, SQme preliminary observations are in order regarding the context in which the pimel encourages readers to evaluate its findings. (U)\nFirst, the panel was s1ruck by the enormous complexity of these issues and the challenges facing intelligence and law enforcement officers who must wrestle with them. The panel tried to evaluate these events dispassionately and clinically and, although it judges many actions critically, it is fully aware that whatever shortcomings it found.are not typical of the Intelligence Community's overall performance on counterterrorism.\n\n- We saw our work as roughly akin to an FAA assessment of an airline\naccident in which a single plane crash is seldom seen as emblematic of an\nindustrywide problem--5o it is with these events and the Intelligence\nCommunity.\n- Our simple aim was to develop a clear-eyed view ofhow the Intelligence\nCommunity's counterterrorism performance can become even better and\nhow the adversary's task can be made harder. (U)\nSecond, it is important to understand the context for the Intelligence Community at the time of these events. During our review, we were consistently impressed by the pace, scope, breadth, and depth of US\ncounterterrorism efforts throughout 2009, many of which produced notable successes. Intelligence and law enforcement officers were tracking threats or supporting operations to counter them in Pakistan, neJt<liiig multiple requests for briefings; coordinating action with collectors, policymak:ers, and the law enforcement comm\\Ulity; and providing analysis and support following the June shootings at a US military recruiting center in Little Rock, Arkansas.\n\nj(b)(7)(E) I\nThird, based partly on this surfeit of data, the panel concluded early on that it is too simple to call the challenge in these cases a \"connect the dots\"\nproblem-a metaphor that strips away context and trivializes the challenge counterterrorism officers face in dealing with truly massive volumes of infonnation. The 25 December case in particular is more akin to what scholar Roberta Wohlstetter in her classic study of Pearl Harbor called the\n\"signals to noise\" problem. In short, the fragmentary clues about Abdulmutallab-the \"signals\"-were deeply submerged in a vast pool of intelligence reporting-thousands of messages a day, the \"noise.\"\n\n- The task then, and the North Star guiding this panel's efforts, has been\nthe question of bow to raise such alanning \"signals\" from a body of noise\nthat is growing rapidly as technology enables both the creation of more\ndata and the Intelligence Community's ability to collect it. (U)\nFourth, while petfection should be the goal for counterterrorism. there is really no formula to achieve it. Terrorists are \"learning\" enemies; they go to school on every one of our successes, play by no rules, do not respond to traditional deterrence techniques, and are prepared to die to achieve their aims~ So while the recommendations we offer and the steps the Community has ab:eady taken will redUce the odds of terrorist success, no one can g'Uanmtee that terrorists will not penetrate our defenses on some occasjon. (U)\nFinally, in considering any set of recommendations on counterterrorism, it is important to remain aware that major\n\n\non various airline watchlists will produce a surge of false positives; using partial names to increase the likelihood of detecting terrorist travel risks\n\nthe Community\n(S/INFt-\n\n## What Happened? (U)\n\nThe ftrst task the DNI gave the panel was to determine the facts in these two cases. This is elaborately laid out in the first section of the report, in which we document chronologically what occurred. what advance intelligence reporting was available, and what intelligence and law enforcement officers did or did not do with it. There and throughout our report, we focus in more detail on the 25 December attempted bombing than on the Fort Hood shooting. Because ongoing legal proceedings limited our access to personnel and data associated with the Fort Hood case, we relied heavily on the joint preliminary review conducted by the Department of Defense (DoD), FBI, and ODNI. and a separate DoD\ninquiry. Moreover, as we undertook this assignment, another group led by former CIA and FBI Director William Webster began an in-depth study focused on FBI's role in the Fort Hood case. (U)\nTo summarize what we learned about the nature of the intelligence reporting:\nCounterterrorism officers were up against some tough challenges in assessing the implications of this reporting. Regarding the 25 December event, the panel nonetheless believes that analysts and collectors could have pursued strategies that would have raised Abdulmutallab out of the\n\"noise\" or possibly even pointed to his target and timing. (U)\nreporting the concerns of Abdulmutallab's fatherofficers would have assembled Abdulmutallab's full name, his biographic data. and his association with Aulaqi. This would have put him on officers' screens for more follow-up.\n\nthat linked him to Aulaqi. Meanwhile, name\n-message. As a result, no one connected Abdulmutallab to Aulaqi and his hostile aims toward the US.\n\nTOP SECRETJ;HCSIStHORCONINOFORN/1-\nThe panel recognizes that laying things out 1ihis way makes counterterrorism sound easier than it is in the real world of burgeoning volume, competing priorities, aud the attendant increase in \"noise.\" We would be irresponsible, though, to simply conclude that detection in this case was impossible, unlikely, or that these cases were below the threshold.\n\nOUt key point is simply ;that.it w~ possible to find the connections; the recommendations we summarize below and elaborate in the report are\n\n## What Needs To Be Done? (U) (B)( 1) (B)(3) (B)(7)(E) Fbi\n\nAlluring as it is to think the problems can be solved with such mundane procedural steps, the panel concluded that reducing the chances of reoccurretlCes requires much more. The panel was heartened to discover that the Community has indeed \"gone to school\" on these two cases; we counted over a hundred separate proposals for improvements in various stages of study or implementation. (U)\nSo in formulating our recommendations, the panel is aware that we are dealing with a moving target. We are convinced, however, that in most areas our diagnosis of problems and our recommendations go beyond or build on what the Community is doing or planning. We believe these must be pursued with the urgency they would have ifNW 253 had blown up in the sky above Detroit on Christmas. Nothing the US Government did prevented that from happening. (U)\nA full list of our recommendations follows in Appendix A. Our recommendaliomfaO into four broad. categories. (U)\nFirst, the Community needs more efficient internal processes for locating, retrieving. ami disseminating terrorism-related intelligence that may be submerged in \"noise \"-and some new business practices for how the Community uses that intelligence once it has been *identified.* Agency heads have already embarked on much of this-directing, for example, changes that require more rapid sharing of reports, updating of dissemination lists, more rigorous visa checks, and all-source approaches to name tracing. (U)\nA.closely related part of this is the equally important issue of watchlisting-how analysts use and collate raw reporting to identify a potential terrorist and prevent him from entering the United States.\n\nWatchlisting has improved ~tically since 9/ll, but the panel nonetheless believes there are still some important gaps to close. (U)\nThe essence of the problem is that the process is too segmented and that no single individual or entity has full end-to-end responsibility for a particular nomination. Everyone works very hard at it, but we found considerable confusion among the agencies about roles, responsibilities, and procedures.\n\nAs a result, few participants have a fully infonned substantive grasp from I\n'fOP SEORETHI **les/st/IORGONINOF9RN..** (b )(?)(E)\nstart to finish. At each step of a multi-layered process, someone assumes that someone else took the hard substantive look or did the thorough diggiBg dun is required in watchlisting cases. (U)\nWe saw this glaringly in the Abdulmutallab case; it is only a matter of time before similar instances occur. (U)\nOur report adcitresses in some detail the question of whether Abdulmutallab could have been kept off Flight 253 by designation for the \"No Fly'' list.\n\nWe encountered strongly competing views on this, with data that can be marshaled on both sides. Our bottom line is that the intelligence was present to nominate him for the \"No Fly\" list; we are less certain that the nomination would have been approved, given differing interpretations of the criteria at the time. Our :fuller view of this is described in the textbox on page 19. (U)\nRelated to all of this is what we found to be ambiguity surrounding the Terrorist Identities Datamart Environment (fiDE)-the database that is commonly thought to be the broadest repository for data on people of possible terrorist concern. The panel concluded, however, that in practice TIDE is really a compilation of individuals who have been considered for watchlisting; people who fall below that threshold but who nonetheless merit concern are not necessarily included. This limits TIDE's utility as a tool that analysts populate with fragmentary data to build, identify, and shape a dossier on a suspected terrorist. (U)\nTo slUnttulrite *our* 1't!co~ns in this tll'ea, the CommlUfity should:\n\n- Clarify the criterillfor Wtltehlisting in a way that does not become\nexcessively specific, onerous, and legalistic;\n- EsttiJJiish a trllining program dud will proWde greater clarity on the\nroles and responsibilities of every agency in the watchlisting process;\n- Instruct tl1Uilysts to poplllate TIDE with partial derogatory\ninformatJon....-maldng TIDE \"tht! place to build a dossier\" -rather\nthan treating it as a library of completed watchlist nominations. (U)\nThe second major set of recommendations concerns the need for an information architecture that reduces the \"signals to noise\" ratio for analysts rather *than magnifying it.* This has been seen as a problem for years but the Community is still far away from uniform or broad application of the search and correlation capabilities available in the private sector or in the average US home; (U)\nSlow progress on this is always attributed to the tensions between the need to share information versus the need to PI'9tect it. Many of these problems are understandable, 'but if the Community does not push through these barriers it guarantees that we will have more surprises like Abdulmutallab's attempted attack. (U)\nThe absence of adequate information technology runs through both the Fort Hood and Flight 253 narratives, particularly the inability of infonnation systems to help analysts locate relevant reporting in a sea of fragmentary data or to correct for seemingly minor human errors. This.\n\ndespite the existence throughout the Community of several excellent systems run by specific agencies or focused on a specific problem-but either not broadly available or broadly applied. (U)\nOur recommendations call for actions in the near tenn, the medium tenn, and the longer tenn-in an effort to put infonnation technology objectives into a strategic context. (U)\nIn the near tenn, the priority should be on a problem we saw in both cases-that many officers do not know what data exist and how to access it or use it. Examples of things that. could be. done include: greatly increasing online documentation on what is available, how to get access, who has access, and tips from experienced users; embedding information specialists in fast-moving analytic or operational groups to handle support requests immediately; ensuring that all systems default to .. fuzzy logic\" to help correct for imprecision or errors in searches; implementing the DNI's decision to support near-tenn enhancements to a particularly sophisticated CIA analytic tool to enable National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) and CIA officers to use its unique capabilities with limited technical assistance.\n\n(U)\nIn the medium term, but sooner rather than later, the Community must enable persistent search, attach analytic insights to data, and bridge the divides that separate datasets. For example, intelligence officers need usercontrolled alerting services that can flag incoming traffic and correlate it with existing reporting--a capability that could have linked communications between Aulaqi and Hasan as they arrived. Officers need to be able to see who else has looked at a report, attach comments electronically, and see what others think-a capability that would have enabled broader discussion among analysts interested in an unnamed Nigerian affiliated with Aulaqi And it is critical to incorporate into all programs tools that enable officers to access multiple databases across multiple networks through a single software interface. (U)\nOver the longer term, the Community needs to push completion of state-ofthe-art search and correlation capabilities, including techniques that would provide a single point of entry to query databases for which officers have authorized access. We endorse the joint efforts of various agencies to build toward a common infonnation infrastructure with common data services, such as those for collaboration, access, discovery, audit processing, and storage. (U)\nA critical step would be to establish the virtual equivalent of the nowcommon Community badge-that is, a uniform way across the Community of identifying logged-in individuals and their access permissions, together with tagging of data to descnbe the rights needed to access it. This is probably the key step needed to break through the barriers to sharing that result from legitimate concerns for protection of sensitive data. (U)\nIntelligence Community Directive 501, which codifies procedures for discovery and sharing of data, effectively lays the policy groundwork for implementing our recommendations on information technology. (U)\nTo summtJTize our recommendations in this area:\n\n- In the near term, tllke steps to ensure that counterterrorism officers\nunderstand all of the dlltll avtlilable to them and have the tools simply\nto ticcesS eflicieirtly what already exists-when they need it and where\nthey need it.\n- In the medium term, augment capabilities to get more ollt of\ninj'omuztion with tools that allow officers to team more from the dlltll\nthan what it presents on the surface-who luzs seen it, what others\nthink of it or have done with it, what related data are available, and\nhow it reltites to historictd reporting.\n- In the longer term, move beyond an architectllre that relies so heavily\ntin human initiative to one in which \"data can talk to dllta\"-so that\nrelationships embediled in complex dtttasets are brought to the surface\nin ways that IIIOve the analyst's starting point further down the field\nand closer to discovery of an adversary's plans and intentions.\n- Plli'sue these objectives on 11 \"crash\" IHlsis. The panel is convinced that\ndelay will flSSIIre that more Umar FtmJIIks get through US defenses.\n(U)\nThe panel's third set of concerns and recommendations has to do with closing or bridging the structural seams in the caunterterrorism mission.\n\nThe \"seams\" are visible in nmnerous ways--in the blurred distinctions between the NCTC and CIA missions, uncertainty about primary responsibility for homeland-related issues, and an underdeveloped appreciation for the benefits ofjointness\" in some mission areas. (U)\nWe began this stt,ldy thinking that the redundancies in the Community's counterterrorism efforts represent healthy competition and that \"lanes-inthe-road\" issues in no way directly contributed to the Fort Hood or 25\nDecember incidents. Officers we interviewed consistently said that turf considerations and bureaUCiatic overlap did not play a direct role in either incident (U}\nThere is no way for the panel to produce a definitive assessment on that point, but there are groundS for skepticism. Generally, the panel thought the competition for primacy on many issues between CIA's Counterterrorism Center (CTC) and NCTC, for example, needlessly diverts the creative energy and resources of both organizations. Both organizations are staffed by highly dedicated officers and both have enjoyed impressive successes. But the panel thinks this competitive climate contributes to the \"signals to noise\" problem-given that finding the \"signals\" is highly labor and detail intensive-and could hamper the Community's ability to detect and prevent the next Abdulmutallab-like attack. (U)\nManaging this competition bas been a perennial problem since the creation ofNCfC in 2004 and flows from the overlap in the analytic responsibilities of the two organizations and their need to draw mainly on the same talent pool. The panel discussed the merits of merging the two organizations' analytic functions, but concluded that important distinctions in areas ranging from legal authorities to data access argue against that.\n\n(U)\nNCTC's unique access to homeland data, its legislative authorities, and its relationship to the FBI make it the natural lead on all threats with potential to reach US soil. CIA/CTC on other hand is the natural lead on terrorist operations abroad, particularly involving support to operators and collectors. We cannot improve on a recent DNI directive that captures these distinctions and embodies many of the views the panel bas expressed in its meetings with NCTC, CTC, and the DNI (See Appendix D). (U)\nThere have been numerous such efforts to clarify the \"lanes in the road\"\nover the years, however, and in the end it will be a leadership and management responsibility to ensure that .each organization plays to its comparative advantage. (U)\nRelated to that, the panel sees a need to dramatically increase the focus on threats to the homeland. We believe that the segmented nature of the counterterrorism community and the fragmentary quality of the data require a singular focus by some unit on unearthing such plots. In our view, this should be the primary mission ofNCTC's new \"pursuit\" effort, which is focused on more fully developing fragmentary data that raise concerns about terrorism but lack specificity. We applaud this effort, which must avoid the temptation to put the bulk of its energy into the more familiar task of tracking threats overseas. (U)\nTo Sllmllll'ize Olll' recommemkztionsin this area:\n\n- *Orgtmiztltionlll* respm~Sibilities should play to the clear strengths of\neach orgtmizlltion. NCTC's rellltionship with FBI, its legislative\nauthorities, and its tie-in to the homelantl make it the llllrallead on\nall threats with the potentittl to reoch US soiL CTC's natural strength\nis in focliSing on terrorist operations abroad, particularly involving\nSllpJ10rt to operators and collectors.\n- Counterterrorism organizations must each maintain both a tactical and\nstrategic focus. They are mutllally reinforcing emphases in\ncounterterroris111.\n- Wherever Intelligence COIIUIIunity leaders draw the \"lanes in the\nroat4\" SDme ctHnpOnent MIIStfocllS relentlessly and exclusively on\ndeveloping allletuls that can point to the US homeland.\n- To increase Sellllflessness throughollt the inteUigence and law\nenforcement commllnities, agencies should increase the rotation of\nofficers among these organkations. (U)\nAfourtharea isolated by the panel and requiring urgent attention is the confUsion that exists in the Community around how to handle US Persons data. This aecounted for numerous missed opportunities relating to Aulaqi and Hasail'--'both US Persons-and for these types of cases represents a problem approximating in seriomness the shortfalls we document on information technology. (U)\nWe saw a surprising level of disagreement, even among experienced experts, on whether current authorities allow intelligence collectors, analys~ and law enforcement pet'sODllel to seamlessly track terrorists who communicate with US Persons or who land on US soil and thus acquire US\nPerson status. Officers in varioiJ& agencies expressed everything from unease to worry about inadvertent mistakes to fear of professional rebuke if they strayed outside existing guidelines. In many cases, the panel sensed that officers bad the authority they needed but were erring on the side of caution-a subtle form of risk aversion. (U)\nGiven the increased threats to the US homeland in the last year, including an increasing number originating here or involving US Persons, it takes little imagination to grasp how the next terrorist surprise could be the result of confusion or excessive caution about how to manage this issue. (U)\nTo sUitUIUZI'ize our recommendatitms in this area:\n\n- The ODNI and the Department of Justice must come together to help\nthe Community updllte, hai'IJtonize, simplib, t:UUl, where necessary,\nmodih procedures for dealing with US Pe1'S011S data.\n- The ODNJ, working closely with the Department of Justice, mllSI meet\na need for Slllntlartlized, continual, Com11111nity-wide training on how to\naddress US Pei\"Som issllt!$, ltl.lilldng swe that agencies are aware of,\n(lltd~ thilr liSe *ofiexis61;g* ~rlties that are deaigned to\nbotll *pnJtect* p~\nimd ctnltibel'tkN wf;ile emzblin.g coHection.\nxiv TOP SEGRET!lt!GS.'Sfi.'ORGONINer~ ~ l<b )(?)(E) I\n\n- Such training lliUI guidtmce must focus on working-leveliUUilysts and\ncollectors-those who have to make decisions rapidly on the front\nlines-where delay or confusion can open up vulnerabilities or lead to\nlost oppm111nities.\n- The Commllllity should engage key foreign liaison partners to develop\nplans to ensure collection in a way that is aggressive and timely but\nconsistent with any protections for US Persons. (U)\n\n## What More?\n\nThe recommendations in the above four areas cover most of what the DNI\nasked the panel to address in its first two tasks. Most of this can be accomplished .within individual agencies or under existing DNI authorities.\n\nIn thjnkmg about the tJiirtt task-what might the Community do beyond theSe things and what migtft hew terrorist threats look like-the panel considered sevenu .. :blue sky\" ideas and tried to probe beyond current wisdom about the ilatnr\"e of the threat (U)\nBrietlyldeveloped .in the text are some ideas along those lines, including how we might accelerate the development of improved information teclmology through a \"Manhattan Project\" approach; how we might make increased use of''matrix\" management techniques to erase some of the seams in the ~rism community~ how we might build a \"Name Trace Centtat\" to work that problem end to. end; how the Intelligence Community's role in the visa issuance process could be expanded; and how the Community might further leverage the expertise of organizations such as State's Bureau of Intelligence and Research and Homeland Security's Office Intelligence and Analysis. (U)\nAccomplishing most of these in a direct and efficient manner would involve substantial disruptions and probably would strain DNI authorities as currently formulated and exercised. (U)\nLooking to the issue of how terrorism is evolving, the panel absorbed some sobering messages from the experts it separately convened from inside and outside the Intelligence Community. The key ideas that emerged strengthened the panel's conviction that the Community must prepare for more challenging days ahead. According to these experts, among the things the United States must anticipate are:\n\n-\n- A growing need to focus more intently on the people and networks that\nenable disaffected individuals such as Abdubnutallab or Aulaqi to\nbecome operational.\n- The need for a well-developed model of the radicalization process from\nwhich the Community can derive indicators of an individual's propensity\nto adopt violent tactics. We have a strategic template for understanding\nforeign-based threats. We do not have a widely understood one for the\nhomeland. (SIIN)\nWhile we have concentrated our review on the Intelligence Community, the panel comes away convinced that preventing the next Abdulmutallablike attempt~ any counterterrorism effort more broadly-requires focusing on more than just the Intelligence Conununity: law enforcement, airport security, the policy community, foreign partners, and even 1he private sector need to address the systemic weaknesses that made Fort Hood and the 25 December incidents possible. At 1he risk of falling back on a cliche, we are reminded of the axiom that a chain is only as strong as its weakest link. Improved collection will not matter without sound analysis. Sound analysis will not matter without a robust watchlisting system. A robust watchlisting system will not matter without effective airport screening technology. Better screening technology will not matter without skilled screeners. There are multiple variations one could make on this chain of events, such as the vital role of foreign screeners at airports abroad-but all would reinforce 1he same point: the Intelligence Community is only one of several layers of our homeland security defense.\n\n(U)\nTo finally defeat terrorism requires at least three things: destroying the leadership, denying it safehaven, and changing the myriad conditions that give rise to the phenomenon. The Intelligence Community can carry much of the burden on the fust two-but very little on the *third.* (U)\nFinally, constancy of support for, and policy regarding, the Intelligence Community is crucial. While intelligence stands apart from politics, policy\n(b){?)(E)\ntoWard. it is forged. in a political environment We cannot emphasize\nenough that the pendalwn swings and ebbing and flowing of support is an obstacle tO mission perforrnanOe. NCTC, for example, was slated to lose roughly 35 positio~ prior to Christmas. The post-Christmas reaction to Flight253 has ea$ed tlleDUJber ofwatchlisting nominations to skyrocket; warning bas beCome so common that the Community risks creating its own \"sigiiaJs-to-noise\" problem. We have seen the same pendulum swings on the collection side, where agencies-acutely aware of past controversies--have erred on the side of caution, sometimes unnecessarily slowing the dissemination of valuable intelligence. The Community's Congressional overseers have a vital role to play in helping to stabilize counterterrorism policies and keep them on a steady course.\n\n(U)\n\n## Contents\n\npage\nExecutive Summary (U)\nScope Note (U)\nxix\nWhat Happened? (U)\n1\nThe Shootings at Fort Hood, Texas, 5 November 2009 (U)\n1\nAnwar al-Aulaqi's Dual Roles-Inspiring and Planning 3\nHomeland Attacks\"(St~W)\nFort Hood: Red Herrings and Conventional Wisdom (U) 5\nThe Attempted Bombing ofNW 253, 25 December 2009 (U)\n6\nStrategic Warning and Threats to the Homeland (U)\n8\nNW 253: Red Herrings and Conventional Wisdom (U)\n10\nSome Preliminary Thoughts on Learning from These Incidents (U)\n11\nMissed Opportunities: The Context and the Consequences (U)\n12\nShould Abdulmutallab Have Been Prevented From Boarding\n19\nNorthwest Flight 253? (U)\nAnalysis and Recommendations on the Way Ahead (U)\n20\nInternal Processes that Help Find Terrorists in the Data (U)\nIT Could Do It: An Opportunity to Revolutionize the\nCommunity's Watchlisting Practices (U)\nInformation Technology: Managing the Signals-to-Noise Volume (U) 25\nIs Information Sharing a Problem? (U)\n29\nClearing the Way for Properly Sharing US Person Information (U)\n32\nAbdulmutallab, Hasan, and Radicalization (U)\n36\nBlue Sky Ideas (U)\n37\nExpert Perspectives: The View from \"Insiders\" and \"Outsiders\" (U)\n38\nSome Closing Thoughts (U)\n39\nAppendix\nA.\nConsolidated List ofintelligence Community Review Panel\n40\nRecommendations (U)\nB.\nSuccesses: Creating New Challenges for the Intelligence Community 46\nC.\nMethodological Recommendations for Information Technology (U)\n47\nD.\nAnalytic Responsibilities for Counterterrorism Analysis (U)\n48\nE.\nWhite House Directives for Corrective Actions (U)\n51\nF.\nThe Community Response to the Fort Hood and NW 253 Incidents (U) 55\nG.\nAcronyms and Abbreviations (U)\n57\n20\n23\nScope Note (U)\nOn 15 January2010, Dennis C. Blair, Director ofNational Intelligence,\nestablished the Intelligence Community Review Panel (ICRP) to explore\nthe role and performance of the Intelligence Community leading up to and\nimmediately following the November. 2009 shootings at Fort Hood, Texas,\nand the attempted bombiiig ofNorthwest Flight 253 on 25 December.\nSpecifically, the DNI charged the review group with three tasks:\n\n- providing a detailed factual recotmting of those events, to include what\ninformation was available to the Community and what was done with it;\n- providing a review of what went wrong in the Intelligence Community's\nperformance and assessing the various recommendations and corrective\nactions that other review groups have already put forward for discussion/\n- and offering an assessment of improvements that other review groups\nmay have overlooked and that we judge could reduce the likelihood of\nfuture incidents such as Fort Hood and Flight 253. (U//FOUO)\nBetween 15 January 2010 and 15 April2010, panel members and staff revi,ewed hundreds of documents related to the incidents, ranging from raw intelligence to finished intelligence production and postmortem assessments conducted by multiple organizations. Members and staff conducted roughly 70 interviews, meetings, and roundtable discussions with approximately 300 key decision makers, program managers, officers, and agents from components in the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI), the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC), the Centr<tl Intelligence Agency.(CIA), including its Counterterrorism Center\n(CTC), the Defense Intelligence Agency's (DIA) Joint Intelligence Task Force-Counterterrorism (JITF-CT), the Federal Bureau of Investigation\n(FBI), the National Security Agency (NSA), the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), the Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Intelligence, and the National Security Council. We do not identify officers by name or title in this report unless it is essential to the credibility of our judgments. Many of the meetings included follow-up requests for information.\n\n- We shared our draft of the factual recounting of events leading up to Fort\nHood and 25 December with senior officers at CTC, NCTC, FBI, and\n\nNSA, and solicited reactions and factual corrections. Any remaining errors are our own.\n\n- To refine and challenge our thinking, we consulted two groups of\ncxperts.--<>ne internal and one external to the Intelligence Communityto speculate on what terrorists might consider next, and how the\nintelligence and law enforcement communities can anticipate those\nchallenges. We incorporated some of their ideas in formulating our\nrecommendations.\n- Finally, we brought in four external experts to review the draft and offer\ncomments on its logic, clarity, and recommendations. (U)\nDespite our best efforts, our work remains incomplete: new information continues to arrive that refines, clarifies, or challenges our understanding of both events. We had limited access to some materials related to the Fort Hood incident, some of which undoubtedly would affect our judgments;\nagencies and departments varied highly in the level of detail they provided;\nand we had only 90 days to research and draft this report.\n\n- W c focused more on the 25 December incident because the implications\nand responsibilities ofthe Intelligence Community were greater than in\nthe case of Fort Hood and because both the Department of Defense\n(DoD) and the FBI had commissioned outside reviews concerning Fort\nHood. Where possible, we relied on information gathered for these and\nother studies, such as the ODNI 30-day review.\n- FBI Headquarters asked us not to interview field agents because the\nArmy team responsible for prosecuting Hasan indicated that these agents\nare possible witnesses in the military prosecution.\n- Similarly, we were unable to obtain the restricted annex of the DoD\nIndependent Review Group's report on the Fort Hood Incident,\nreferenced in media reports discussing derogatory information on Hasan\nthat was not included in his official DoD personnel filcs.3 (UHFOUO?\nIt is very important to note that what follows is written in the spirit of critical, objective self-evaluation that has characterized the Intelligence Community. Our posture is one of assessing these events dispassionately and clinically, fully aware that the shortcomings are not typical of the Intelligence Community's counterterrorism performance. Our aim is simple: to develop a clear-eyed, independent understanding of what we need to improve in order to make the Community's performance even l<b)(?)(E) I\nbetter. And the ultimate objective we must all share is to make the adversary's task harder. (U)\nPanel members were the Honorable John McLaughlin, former Deputy Director of Central Intelligence; Mr. Dale Watson, former Executive Assistant Director for Counterterrorism and Counterintellligence at the FBI, and the first FBI deputy director at the CIA's Counterterrorism Center; Dr. Peter Weinberger, a senior scientist at Google and a member of NSA's external advisory board; and Mr. Alexander Joel, an attorney serving as Civil Liberties Protection Officer in the Office of the Director of National Intelligence.\n\n- Staff members were four senior officers with experience in the CIA's\nNational Clandestine Service (NCS), Directorate of Intelligence, and\nCounterterrorism Center; the National Counterterrorism Center; and the\nOffice of the Director ofNational Intelligence. (U)\nReport to the Director ofNJttio,nal InteBigence on tke Fort HoOd and Northwest Fligbt 253 Inddents On 5 November 2009, Army Major N'ldal ,f1asaD\nopened fire at Fort Hood, killing 13 military personnel and wounding Or ilijuri.ng 43 militaty ~\ncivilian pe1'SODDel before being incapacita1ed by police and taken into militaiy custody.4 Seven weeks later, Nigerian Umar Farouk Abdulmutanab boaided Northwest Airlines Flight 253 departing Amsterdam bound for DetrOit, Mi~gan. Abdmmntallab tried to ignite an explosive device as the plane neared Detroit, but did not fully detonate the explt>sive. ~lte was quickly subdued by fellow passengers and taken into custody upon landing. (U)\nWhat. foll()WS .aze tactual account$ OfWlaatthe intelligence and law enforcem.ent ~ties aid in the nmup to these events~ These are not~\nto be exhaustive. These accounts highlight, based~\n. available data, what the Community knew; when and how it knew it, and where the Community night have bad an opportuni~ to affect the coo.tse of.CVQ~ts. {U)\nThis assessment was prepared for the Director . .QfNational Intelligence by the Intelligence Community Review Panel. (U)\n.\n\nb For additional detail on the facts and circumStances leadiitg up to the shootings at Fort Hood. see the DoD, FBI. and ODNI Preliminary Review of Intelligence Olll!i Intelligence.~ on Niddl Malik HfJStlliPrlor ftJ lhe Fort Hood *Shoot.,* submitted to tbe White House on\n30 November 2009, the DoD West-Clark report..\n\nProtecting the, Force. *Lessons from P:ortllood,* and the forthcoming Iq)01't by Judge Webster~ who~ kading an independent reView oftbe FBI's acti.tins With respect to\n\n## Top Seoretj/Fig&Iswjorcon/T40Forn.. L<B)(?)(E) I Top Seorel'Iihcs/Sift'Oftcohinofofltn.. J(B)(7)(E) I\n\nOn 27 May, the W~n Field Qffice replied to SanDiego'sJanuaryEC. 10 WFO'sreviewof~\nsource, FBI, and DoD d.atabases.bad prodUced no derogatory information on :ffirsan. In fact, they discovered that Hasan bad been promoted to ougor ten days preViously and was conducting .msead ~\nIslamic beliefs' impact on views of mititaty servke in Iraq and Afghanistan-research thadlasan's supervisors had praised as having \"extraordinary potential to inform natic,mal policy and military strategy.\"\nTOPSEORETI/tiGS/S~OONINOFORt'~ l<b)(7)(E) I\nTOP **RCI'ti!Ti/HCS#St/IORCON/t40FORN** ~~\n\n(b)( 1)\n(b)(3)\n(b )(7)(E)\nFBI\nentire\npage\n\nTOP SECRET!JHGSAiii~RGONINOFORN/-\nj(b)(7)(E) I\n~\n~e father said that he was concerned his son .. bad fallen under the influence ofUDSpecified religious extremists;\"' had become\n\"active in the college mosque\" while studying in London; and that his son planned to \"commit his life to *dawa,\"* or proselytizing. Abdulmutallab's family also assessed that Umar Farouk was .. a victim of inexperience and naivety and influenced to join groups who would be willing to engage in illegal acts in the name of religion.  (SIMeS 1'0CINF)\nThe father did not explicitly associate his son with terrorism and provided no names of the religious extremists. 28 The father noted that intelligence l<b )(?)(E) I\n\n- As we discuss elsewhere, the draft intelligence\nreport was not disseminated until after the incident\non 25 December. (lii lfoWCSIIOCMF)\nplace a 'look out' for Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab in the State Department Consular Class System,\" the State Department's visa database.33 The Embassy, in tum, sent a Visas Viper cable addressed to State!INR, NCTC, FBI, and DHS-notifying them about Abdulmutallab's possible ties to extremists.\n\n- State Department's Visas Viper cable prompted\nNCTC to create a record for Abdulmutallab in\nNCTC's Terrorist Information Datamart\nEnvironment (TIDE).\n-\nsearched the State\nDepartment's visa and immigration databases, but\nbecause the State officer misspelled\n\"Abdulmutallab,\" did not use a name variant search\niool, and did not search on his passport number, the\nsearch did not flag that Abdulmutallab held an\n. active-US visa,.which could-have~sed ofticers.to\nfocus more on him. 34\n- Recognition that Abdulmutallab held a US visa\nwould not, however, have automatically triggered a\nspecific procedural step, such as placement on the\nNo Fly or Selectee list.\n,...,.,,(b-,...)(=7,...,)(E\"\"\"'\")--,I\n\n## Top S&Gre'F.'Irs6#8Llforoon#Nofarniiii (B )(?)(E)\n\nScbiphol Airport in Amsterdam. Dutch authorities pulled him aside for secondary screening because of immigration concerns; TSA officers whom we interviewed *said* that Abdulmutallab revealed no signs of nervousness during the screening; ailport screeners x-rayed his carry-on luggage and directed him tbrough a standard metal detector without incident. Passengers seated near Abdulmutallab later\n\"FOP **SEeR1'1/HeSISif/ORCONJMOPORN** ~ l<b )(?)(E) I\ntold US inv~gators that he demonstrated no unusual behavior until the incident.\n\n- As the :fijgbt ~\nlanding. Abdul.mutallab tried to\nignite a ~ly\ndetonated explosive; the device\ndid not ignite PIQPetly, and Umar Farouk was\nsubdued by other~ The ~ligence\nComnnmity learned during subsequent debriefmgs\nthat Abdulmutallab had received unspecified\ntraiJ;1ing from explosives ~\nJlnahim }Iasan\n~.Who bad been connected to the attempted\nass~ination ofSaudi Minister oflnteritit Pririee\nMobamined bin Nayif. Asiri bad provided\nAbdulmutallab with modified pants and sYringes,\nwith the goal of taking down an aircraft over us~..,..,..,.-,\n54 m,'~\n- The Stale Deportment's *miBBpel/mgQj\"* ~lab.,;~~~a~\nAbdnlmntaDabreceiveda~USvislinJtme~W-..\n~1:0.\n.   .\ni1\n,,\n'\n- Abdulmutollab sailed through airpf1 *scretm:ing.* 58 Abl~~\nauthorities in~.\nW'Do WCIII'eeoDec:Rl1~1tJ\ndetector and lBs cmy--on blgage W8S X~\nstatc-of-tho-artaixpott~.~'IWllld Jlae ec.:lekld\non Abduhnut:aDab's body~\n- TheUS~.dfdriot~IIRJI~~.\nAmsterdam. ~\n9 CusbDS andDosder ~\n(CsP)\ncompared it againSt a~lookiug:lbr.~ -\nincluded Abdulinutallab .. Fatthef~oft:t..\non the State ~s\nva. VtpircQ~e, wltkh is\nto interview Abdukm:nallab 11p0n am\\'al\n\n(b)(1) (b)(3)\n(b)(?)(E)\nFBI\n(b )(1)\n(b)(3)\nNSA\n(b )(1)\n(b)(3)\nNSA\n(b)( 1)\n(b)(3)\nCIA\n\n## Some Preliminary Thoughts On Learning From These Incidents (U)\n\nIn assessing the events recounted above, the panel believes it is important to keep in mind the following three points. (U)\nFirst, there is no recipe for *perfection.* Terrorists will not stop trying to penetrate our defenses, and some are going to get through. The American public, elected leaders, and Intelligence Community officers are understandably uncomfortable with that idea, but it is an unavoidable reality-one that should be communicated to the American people. The task of identifYing and screening terrorists who may seek to travel to the United States is a daunting one, and illustrates the signals-to-noise challenge. More than\n1.2 million travelers try to enter the United States by air, land, and sea every day. Consider the scope of the air travel problem: passengers enter from 245\nairports on more than 1 ,600 flights each day; TSA\nofficers screen 1.8 million travelers entering and departing US airports across the country each day. 64\nNo amount of collection, no aggregation of data, and no level of information technology will guarantee the government detects and prevents all terrorists from making it onto US-bound aircraft or into the United States.\n\n- Worse yet, the United States is dealing with a\nnimble adversary that constantly adjusts to exploit\nany weak link in the homeland security system.\nBetter US collection capabilities prompt terrorists to\nadopt newer and more exotic forms of\ncommunications; more invasive airport screening\ntechnologies prompt terrorist to seek new ways to\nevade screening-such as entering through\ncountries where patdowns are taboo-or alternative\nmodes of entry, such as by sea or by land. Every\nUS success is a learning opportunity for terrorists.\n- Individuals already inside the United States, who\ndecide to use violence to pursue the aims of foreign\nterrorist groups, pose another threat with unique\nchallenges to detection and preventionparticularly if they limit travel abroad and\ncommunication with known terrorist groups. If we\nare to identifY .. homegrown extremists,\" we must develop new methods to detect threats in the homeland, consistent with our laws and respect for civil liberties, and enlist the support of all Americans. Here, too, there are no guarantees.\n\n(CI~\nSecond, information overload has made the signal-tonoise challenge even harder in recent years. The intelligence, homeland security, and law enforcement communities are swimming in data and often armed with outdated information technology; more analysts are needed to cover some of the nation's most critical national security challenges. Our recommendations address these areas, together with changes in work processes that must accompany them. The Community must recognize, however, that additional resources and better technology-while necessary and welcome--are no panacea. More information will always be available to be analyzed and correlated. These changes can only reduce--not eliminate--risk. (U)\nThird, in assessing the events leading up to both incidents, and in considering any set of changes to the counterterrorism community, it is important to remember that choices will entail tradeojJs-ftScal, bureaucratic, and *so on.* Ultimately, where to draw the line on those issues is a political decision, but the entire Washington community should understand that choices will have potentially unpopular-and almost certainly unintended-consequences.\n\n- Surging analysts to cover an emerging threat means\nmoving analysts off other !>Nnnnt\"\n- Easing standards to place more suspected terrorists\non the No Fly/Selectee lists carries clear tradeoffs,\nsuch as a likely surge in false positives. Allowing\ncollectors to nominate suspected terrorists on partial\nnames-increasing the likelihood of detecting their\ntravel-risks compromising collection programs\nwhen individuals are linked with aliases used only in their covert communications, while better information sharing with foreign governments or the airline industry inCt'eases the risk of compromising sensitive information.\n\n- Requiring the airline industry to do more to support\nthe Intelligence Community-such as sharing\npassenger lists earlier than 30 minutes before\ntakeotf-cottld require earlier check-in times for\ntravelers, undoubtedly an unpopular move. 65\nRequiring that airline companies tilfonn the US\nGovernment whenever an individual on the No-Fly\nList tries to purchase a ticket probably would meet\nwith complaints that.the US Government is\nimposing eostly additional bmdens on the industry.\n- Instituting a minimum waiting period to acquire a\nUS visa, which would give State Department and\nthe Community more time to research suspicious\napplicants, would undoubtedly prompt complaints\nand perhaps even in-kind retaliation from some\nforeign governments. (S/INF)\n\n## Missed Opportunities: The Context Ud The Cousequeoces (U)\n\nAs the panel reflected on these events; we wete acutely a'Wal\"e that hindsight always brings greater clarity. We also readily concede tbatourjudgments are in some ways provisional, because new information wi11 probably emerge in the coming months. We learned this lesson in\n(b )(1)\n(b)(3)\nNSA\n\n- These events did not occur in a vacuum; the\noperational tempo and workflow for the Intelligence\nCommunity were heavy and sustained throughout\n2009 and in the lead-up to both incidents. Both\ncases had novel aspects not previously seen by the\nIntelligence Gommunity; the 25 December incident\nwas the first attack against the homeland by an al-\nQa'ida affiliate.\n\n- Nonetheless, the intelligence reporting that could\nhave led the Community to identifY Umar Farou.k as\na potential terrorist threat before 25 December\nmerited greater scrutiny-although Intelligence\nCommunity follow-up actions would not have\nnecessarily have kept him off the ajrplane.\n- Causes of these \"missed opportunities\" ranged :from\nhuman error to poor decisionmaking; heavy work\nvolume; an occasional lack of individual\ninquisitiveness or understanding about who was\nresponsible for driving an issue through to its\nresolution; ambiguous roles and responsibilities; a\nlack of understanding of key databases; and\ninformation technology systems that do little to help\nofficers and agents find and correlate key bits of\nreporting amidst a sea of data. (TSNSI/~)\n\nDuring our review, Ml' were consistently impressed\nby the pttce, scope, breadth, and depth of the\nCommunity's counte'*\"orism efforts throughout\n21HJ9, IIIIJY of which produced 1llllhle SllCCesses. -\nDuring ~period, analysts were tracking\n\nnet<nng nrultiple requests for briefings; producing a steady stream of current production; participating in daily teleconferences with collectors, policymakers, and the law enforcement community; and providing analysis and support following the June shootings at a US military h NCTC's Homeland Year in *Review for 2009* noted,\n\"SuccessfuJ attacks, disrupted plots, and arrests ofSwmi extremists in the US in 2009 reached their most significant level since 2001.\" (St/N.F)\nrecruiting center in Little Rock, Arkansas.fm We discuss further some of the successes we encountered in the course of our review, and ways in which success can create new challenges for the Community, in Appendix B. (Tlilt/WCS.LSJm.W)\nIn addition to these other pressures, counterterrorism d officers were working with enonnous data flows:\n\ncompressed timeframe, unlike the methods of\n~~;:-~~~g~;~ bv tQa'ida ~~~?}(E)\nIt is thus too simple to call this a \"connect the dots\"\nproblem-a metaphor that strips away context and trivializes the challenge counterterrorism officers face in dealing with massive volumes of data The 25\nDecember case in particular is more akin to what scholar Roberta Wohlstetter in her classic study of Pearl Harbor called the \"signals to noise\" problem. 68\nIn short, the fragmentary clues about Umar Farouk's plans--the \"signals\"-were deeply submerged in a vast pool of intelligence reporting-thousands of messages a day, the ''noise.\" The task then, and the North Star guiding this panel's efforts, has been the question of how to raise such alanning \"signals\" from a body of noise that is growing rapidly as technology enables both the creation of more data and the Intelligence Community's ability to collect it.\n\n(S//NF)\nBut even allowing for a challenging \"signals to noise\" ratio, the panel could not avoitlconcluding that the body of reporting related to the 25\nDecember case deserw!il greater attention than it received. To be sure, hindsight separates the\n\"\nfro re\n-\n\"\n..\n\nf...\n\n-\n~.\n\n..\n\nwas not surprising given that Nigeria is the world's eighth most populous country. That context is essential. ff'sf/Sf/INF)\nWhat moved the panel to the view that this case should have stood out priorities, information overload; cun1bersome technical tools-all were factors that help explain why many of these reports were not actively pursued.\n\n''Stovepiping\" of accounts, however, was not-these reports were sufficient to raise red flags for analysts covering AQAP operatives, AQAP use of foreigners, AQAP travel plans, or *AQAP* threats against the homeland. We highlight below the opportunities for this case to_ surfuce:\n\n##\n\n- Sorting out reasons why these reports did not\nreceive more attention led us to conclude that either\nthey were submerged in a heavy volume of\nreporting or simply reinforced analysts' concerns\nabout the threat posed by Aulaqi and AQAP to\ntargets inside Yemell--\"-a danger to which the\nIntelligence Community already was alert and\nacting on.\nThe panel identified one report that should have prompted roiJltst pursuit by the Jnte/ligence Comlltll1lity and cotdd have led to identifiCation of Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab as a potential threat before 25 December. But-emblematic of the challenges facing counterterrorism officers-this report included no biographic data for the unnamed associate who, in retrospect, almost certainly is identifiable with Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab .\n\n- We cannot rule out that there were efforts to pursue\nthis thread that the panel did not uncover. But we\nwere unable to document any follow-up. Short of a\nscrub of known AQAP operatives or an intensive\nl<b)(?)(E) I\nThe panel reecqgaizes that these recitatiOns aion&-in which we isolate reports and lay them out seriallymakes detection and warning of terrorism sound easier than it is. We have no illusion that this neat overview approximates in any way the real world of the Community's counterterrorism analysts and law enforcement counterparts. But we do think it was possible to make these connections. In much of what we recommend, we discuss strategies intended to make that more *likely* to occur in the world of heavy reporting voli:unes, competing demands, and high operational tempo that terrorism analysts actually occupy. (U/t.FQUOJ\nThere were several missed opporllmities'that coldd have increosed the odds of detecting AITdulmliiiZilab or *Hasan.* The causes of the missteps ranged from human error to inadequate information technology, inefficient processes, unclear roles and responsibilities, and an occasional lack of individual inquisitiveness.\n\nDecember, prevented officers\nfrom piecing together two key reports.\n\n- State Department's errant name trace did not\nreveal thst Ahdulmutallab had an active US visa,\nwhich could have raised the Community's attention.\nMoreqver, no one apparently noticed that\n~lab's\npassport from several years earlier\nindieamd that he had a pending visa ~on\nin\n2008.\n.\nIn both Cfl#S, the intzdeqllllCY ojinjonntllion technology for aggregating lllul correkiilng the t'fikmnt.,..,mtg wa *strlldng.* To be sure. much of the ~tlmt.~\nbal'e causedUmar Farouk and Hasan ttl riSe above the t1rousands of pieces of raw in~\nwas available in one da.ta'set or tmotlier; ~focused seare~tes-such as o1r #U~\nFarouk\"mid \"NlgCria\"-would have'~\n1ihe\n~to a manapble number. Bt;ttef,\n~teehaology could have helped\n~fur liuman errors, time,pressufes.lteavy WWoad.l)rmmtcooUngs.\n\ninCTC andNCTC~1he\npro~ofdatabases and the tim~g\nriafm:e oi~\nand searching eacll one.; JITF\npCrStmnel~in WFO, for example, baa to worlc: with\nnearly two dozen separate databases-iooluding\none using an antiquated DOS-based system.\n- This prompted CIA to change how it disseminates\nintelligence, which we detail later in this report.\n- We found that counterterrorism offtcerS from\nmultiple agencies had widely varying degrees of\nfamiliarity with watchlisting terminology and\nprocesses in their own agency, let alone the greater\nenterprise, which translated into uncertainty over\nwho had responsibility for ensuring that a suspected\nterrorist was placed on a watchlist .\n# ,....,(B-)-(7-)( __ E_)_,,\n\n(b)(7)(E)\nTo sa~\no11Tcq11dllsiom tmlldssetl\nopporlltwitin.in *t-e* ~\ncQSf!S:\n\n- The pace, scope, depth, tmd Intensity of the\nComnnmity's wtirkloild in ~~ ran-ap tD both\nevents pliqed a rtJie iii olficerS not tretdihg the\nreportbtg with the sense of lll'gency it ilesNved;\n- Jnadeqatlie info1\"11Ultion teclmology did not help\nanlllpls iltltl *agents.* ~'and\nCOI'I'fllate\nreleMnt~eltherfleCallsetlle~\nwas liariell.in a!ietl tl/dtztaor sprellll among a\nnmze of ,mc9nnecteil titltiiJmses;\n- A.se(iesof~.~;/i'fnt,,._,~ ltJ\nuncktzrIJilllleir~1llill~n\n~.liretmttlttlt:kej~w~n\ndiil1$treabh people who migllt hawpieced them together or t1d8d on them;\n\n(b )(1)\n(b)(3)\nODNI\nCIA\nNSA\n\n(b )(1)\n(b)(3)\nODNI\nCIA\n\n## . An~Is Add, Jleeommeadatifts'Oa Li .. (W8,F ~(U)\n\nAs part of the panel's secolld tasJr. *:~asked to OOJD.'flt'eDt.ontnewrieus ~\ntml.tthe Jntelligem;e ~~\niseoftsi~\nd as wen as those~lirtbeseDate~~\non Intdligence(SSq)andvarious ~t organimions--mid fu ofter~\n~ofonr.own.. We$) soful.}y itwa:re thattherewillalwaysberi~o'f~~\nsuch as those at FortHOod arid threiatS to a~\n.\n\nsecurily; no set.of~OBS,:~iffufly\n.iDlplememed, will.el~ SUCh ~::$ill.\n\n.\n\n:We bel~~many.ofdtese'~ will\nincrease theatlds that us and foreign~\ncan stop similar .incidents. 90\n.\n.\nWe found tbat~~ bave \"gone1nsehoof\" on\nthese ~and areitnpiemenllittg~ ~igned\ntolimit~k~- Weare~\naware. that SS'Webave studieathe~ ~\neoilsidet'ed~ a test Of ..\nagencies ana~\"()l)Nl-~tbe ~tling .\nsimultaneoU$11 . We thUs eQJle1tidetf.tfiaf QUI'\noompamtiveali~._inl~~Y\nacross these im\"tiatiVes and ~Which\nO'Jies'descne addcd~s 8n4~no~ ~\nthere may be gaps.\n'We thetef~m~~ soolyasmall\nsegmeatofthe~tm:ditec;~~s\ncurrently under~.\nmrevlewiug~after:-\n. acti0n J;epOrt,s ofimli'VidUal ~et~ihnu, we\niEJcntiiied m.ore:thim IQ(;} separate pro~\nCommuhlty-wide, Some ~ifictO mdividiuil\norganizations--so~ comment~ on~\nthat.\nstruck us as mi:)st J'Slevmtt Weals<) flag~ .\nproposa~s that struck l1s as. UnwiSe mmtmeois of\ntime, energy, and~\n- Some ofaur reool'il!J)et!'dat~ are~\nand IOng-\ntenn-enchmy~~'~~\n .others areimtt'~~ teChnicat~lllftl~~!c;\nbut struck us as important enough to merit attention.\n We a:re~on moving targets; scme\n~are\nalready Ullderwty.\n- We also nWiZe that some of our xecommen4atiol!IS\nare nottle\\ilr. In part,~ flag those issues for that\nvery~: yearsofinteragency discussiensand\n~~not\nproduced ac,tion, evon es ~\n ~.~continues. (U#.FOU~\nl)isti11iag ijJe ~\nmetors OOIJlPlieat:ini ~\nped'~ t&aDmageable11Wllber, we'J()Cl:med our\n~~ibm'\nkey arc., ailofwhich\nw~\nat ..\nto one degree or an.otber m the cases of\n.~~\nor).bdwnmtallab:.\n.~:'More dlidelltilltermtl,pnJeeSSeS tbat,}lelp\n'.analysts locate, retrieve, -~~lml\n~iutel~\nanewbusines&~s\nroc how the Conummity uses 1bat intelligence once\nit has been~\n~Aa~Udlnology~that\n~~than\ncootributesto.tbe.~\nnois'c~,welmVt~y~.\nA~~oflabortbat~\n~~-tiW~~tllteS'()n\nl:lm:ets te a:~tasi;amd Plays to the\n~~eofvari(msommmiity\npat1:nelS;\n. ~~~~\n~euftlm)Uiidi'QgUS\n~-.\nraagfugftottl eollectingto ~\nstoring. and Sharing this intelligence. (ti/IFOOO)\n~~\ntltat Help Fm'dT~FJriStsttn tile Dafa Barty mom: reVi~ We identified Several problems\ntbat.~the Commtmity'sabilitytotmd the\n\ntenOiis'tj~m the: available data. There are $VO\n~tothisprobtem: ~-~c\n~.that adfeet the Con:.nmul'ity's.~ to\n~.c~ibfohmtion,aml~\nmtefti~ ts pmtedtogetber to support 'the\nwatchlistiag process. The. ftll\"Illel' changes are\n~lt\" ..\nIe; the 1titCr requfre cba:ngiDg how\nintelligence officers conceptualize and leverage the watchlisting process. (U)\nMany of the problems we identified early were similar to those other review groups have no1ed.\n\nAmong the earliest judgments we reached:\n\n## (B )(1) (B)(3) Cia ~Lligence~ -Must Be Disseminated More Rapidly,\n\n- NSA field dissemination lists need to be updated;\n- State Department visa searches must be more\nrigorous and technologically sophisticated;\n- NCS names traces must be conducted in all-source\ndatabases. (Uf!FOUO)\nWe were heartened to learn that agencies have already made headway on virtually all of these issues.\n\n- The Director of CIA has already ordered that all\nNCS countertetrorism-related field reports be\ndisseminated within 48 hours of receipt, and NSA\n\n## Lissejmimltion Lists (B)(1) (B)(3) Nsa ~Es -----91\n\n- State Department has addressed processes for\nconducting name traces. State Department oould\nhave searched on Abdulmutallab's passport number, which would have been more precise than a tnmsli:teration of a foreign name, and could have used a \"fuzzy logic .. function that could haVe corrected for the typographical error, but. did not.\n\nIn response, State Department has instructed its o:ffieers to search the Consular Consolidated Database using the \"fuzzy logic\" function, include all CUIIent and past visa information on the Visas Viper cable, and conduct searches Q.n passport numbers. If implemented, these:measmes will increase the odds that known or suspected terrorists will be detected earlier in the visa application\n9'....,.,., process. - v:;;,_/i ... i1\n..... ,\"--\nWe offer several additional recommendations as the Community moves forward in improving the seacch for terrorist identities. 93\n\n- Some of the steps outlined above should be\nexpanded furougbout the ~unity. All agencies\nshould promptly diSseminate counterte:r\"lorism\nreporting, update their dissemination lists on a\nregular basis, and conduct name traces against all of\ntheir holdings. Dissemination lists for\ncounterterrorism-related intelligence and. State\nDepartment Visas Viper cables also should be\nupdated on a regular basis to ensure that collectors\nin the field receive reports germane to their area of\nrespons1bility .\n- We recommend 1bat agencies examine whether\ncomplicated dissenii'llation codes can be\nstan.da:rdiized or simplified. The roliting error of the\n~a\npredictable COllseCpie:llce of\nhaving such detailed dissemination codes.\n- ~\nsearch for terrorist identities should be\nconducted against all holdings available to that\nagency.\n- A ''fuzzy logic\" tool that automatically formats and\nsearches variant spellings and renderings of foreign\nnames, should be available and used in name traces.\n- \"Discoverability\" should be part of the process. In\npractiCe, this means that if an all-source search\nagainst a name or identity leads to information\n(such as a phone number) to which the searohing officer does not have normal access, a notation will direct the officer to a point of contact who can grant access to that information.\n\n- Officers performing identity searches should be\ntrained to look for partial names, along with salient\npoints such as the person's location, affiliations,\npassport~ schooling. or travel,.....,-details that\ncan further narrow the search and identity an\nindividual. -tG',LNP)\nThe second half of improving the search for terrorist identities centers on the equally important issue of watchlisting-how analysts use and collate the raw reporting to identity a potential terrorist and prevent him from entering the United States. Watchlisting procedures clearly have improved over the years.\n\nPrior to 9/11, the US Government maintained 13\nseparate watchlists; today there is one. Since 9/11, multiple agencies transferred information from their systems into TIDE. In no way do we mean to detract from the progress to date. (U/7POU6)-\nStill, the panel believes that *the* watchl~ing process needs. *adjustment.* The Comnnmity's understanding of watchlisdng is inconsistent, between and often within organizations. The natui'e of watehlisting-an end-to-end process spanning multiple units and organizations-has led to a segmentation and redundancy to an extent that ensures that no single individual or entity has full responSibility for a particular nomination. We saw this dynamic .\n\nglaringly in the case of Abdulmut:aliab. It is Only a matter of time before similar instances occur.\n\n(U,t,'F~\nIn short, *indivl* ~~even when performing their tasks efficiently and energetically, take a fairly narrow view of *their roles.* Evecyone works vt:cy bard at it, but we were struck by the uncertainty about roles, responsibilities,. and procedures. Within the NCS, we found uncertainty among officers dealing with the Abdulmutallab case about. the steps in the watchlisting process, limited awareness of what analytic efforts were required to search and tie together information to fonnulate a watchlist request, and what CTC Watchlistii.tg officers would do with the request; CTC Watchlisting officers assume area division officers have already searched for derogatoiy information and made pertinent associations before submitting the nomination, and that the job of ere Watchlisting was to format nomination packages for passage to NcrC\nWatchlisting. NCTC Watchlisting officers, in tum.\n\nstressed that their primaty role is entering data into TIDE and forwarding nominations from the feeder oiganizations, because they relied on nominating agencies to have done the all-source analysis. TSC\nofficers rely mainly on the strength of the nominations as they receive them. (U//FOUO)\nClosely related is the ambiguity surrounding TIDE.\n\nTIDE is the US Government's central repositocy of identities for known and suspected international terrorists; ImDY in the Intelligence Community-and, based on press reporting, in Congress-believe that TIDE is the place where the intelligence and law enforcement communities can easily search for and piece together bits of terrorism-related information.\n\nIn practice, however, TIDE is not that database.\n\nTIDE as it currently exists ~s largely a eompilation of individuais who have been considered for watchlisting; individuals who fall below that threshold but who may nonetheless merit concern are not necessarily included. TIDE is not uaed as a dynamic tool that analysts populate with fragmentary intelligence to build, identity, and shape a dossier on a sUSpeCted terrorist. (UI/FOUO)\nWith that in mind. we offer several recommendations.\n\n- The criteria and threshold for watchlisting need\ngreater *clarity.* Throughout our interviews we\nheard thatdiffefrent agenciesuse differing\nint~\nof the criteria forwatchl,istiihg\nn~.\n94 Regardless of~,~~hold\nfor derogatory information eventually settles, the Intelligence Community needs a single set of transparent guidelines that enables analysts to determine whether and when they may nominate a suspected terrorist. We agree with SSCI that TIDE\nadministrators should accept nominations based on\n\n- We. endorse the White House recommendation that\npartial names; terrorists rarely use full, true names in their clandestine connnunications.\n\n- We also caution agai!Jst criteria that become too\nNCTC develop a records enhancement capability\nthat can build, locate, and track derogatory\ninformation on all *intlividuals* in Tll)E~:process\nalready,rmderway.\n- W atchlisting efforts should be streamlined and the\nspecifiC and *caveat-laden.* If past experience is any\nguide, attempts to lend greater precision and add\nnuance only open the door to greater~\nwhen inherently subjectivejudgments me at plJ~.y. 95\nr.Mngs *redirected* Agencies sucll as CIA\nhaw:e large .staffs whose primary duties are\n\n| (b)(    |\n|---------|\n| (b)(3)  |\n| NSA     |\n\n-\nAs SSCI recently observed, the staQdalds ta place\nan individual on a watcblist are simply too\ncomplicated. 96\ndata entry;and processing before fol'W8I'ding the nomination to 1he NCfC Wa~ting staft Similarly, the primacy dUties of the }'fCTC'\nWawhiisting staff are to enmr ~~'~be data\n\n- The Community needs to establish greater clority\n.Deiore ~the\nnomination to TSC. oar\ninterviews showed that such ~has given\n\non roles and *responsibilities,* making clear that the\nnominating agency should see the nomination\nthrough from start to finish. Ncrc plays a\nparticularly important role tracking suspected\nterrorists who fall into. the amorphous categocy that\ncrosses between foreign and domestic jurisdictions.\neach organization a sense. that otheiS;~ doing\nmore than they actually did. Reducing $0me of tbis\nduplication couid make availahle resources that\ncould be redirected to other important watchlisting\nwti~wroa:sr~~.IT\nimprovements can simplify this process.\noar mterlocutom often told us tDat: the ~~Wen Jl9tpliirii'Yaml'f~ ~*\npresent state ofU in the relevaafparts oftlhe~Co\n.. unumtJ>-~emhtJt~l!ftisietH~~tT\ncould be doing:.....tb.is is true . But ooosider 'Miat woUld ja.ve~~if~l'f'~~~-cU')\n1he Community to assist with nominations fer watddisting:\n\n\n\n- A system with the sophistieated entity resolution capabilities oouldautomatieany .build'8m\\i~TmE\ndossiers based on data available to NCTC.\n\n\n- An algorithm could give these dossiers p.relimiuaey\"score~t~tlle~'of~~\ncriteria, taking into account presence ofdle necessay~(iil'l~ dllteo~ ete:hatf~cOf\nassociated derogatory (i.e . membership in a temmst ~).\n' \"'\n- These computer-generated doSsiers would flow to the watchtisting aoaiysts for processing. with the relevmt\nbiographic and probable derogatory data bigb1igbted. AB new infOmlation came in, the~\nwould\nhighlight it in the dossiers pushed to the analysts.\n- While we cannot be sur:e without expetimentation, we think it likely that ovm time the algorithms also could\nbe trailled to identitY the probable watchtisting criteria. tbst the dt:Jssier fits. {S#NF)\n...,..,(b-)( __\n7,...,.,)(E\"\"'\")--,j\n\n- Analysts need to use 11DE as a primary repository\nof intelligence rather than merely as a step in the\nwatchlisting process. In focusing on placing\nsuspected terrorists on the No Fly list, the\nCommunity appears to have missed opportunities to\nuse TIDE as a powerful tool for aggregating all\nderogatory and identity reporting on suspeered\nterrorists; we recommend that NCTC take ~lead\nin a Community-wide training progi'8Jn to help 'all\nagencies understand the purpose of TIDE,\nbeen fed into other watchliSt databases. The fragmentary nature of counterterrorism reporting makes it imperative that analysts lean forward in populating TIDE with derogatory and partial identity intelligence rather than waiting to assemble a comprehensive intelligence package that meets all of the criteria for No Fly status.\n\n- The Community needs a standardized training\nprogram on the specif:cs of *watchlisting.* We have\nseen some. review groups claill1 that the 25\nDecember incident proves a need for centralized\nanalytic tradecraft training, but in our view a more\npressing n~e\nclearly related to the Flight 253\nincident-is a common and~\nunderstanding of the watchlisting process. IfTSC\nremains the final voice in the No Fly/Selectee\ndecision, it should be the lead agency to direct such\na training effort. so that its standards are clear to all\nnominators. (:!1/M')\nTo Slllfl1tftlriz. tlll1' recommentlotiom, the Commtmity shollhl:\n\n)-\nUse 1111-soiii'Ce hol4ings for searcltes on terrorist\nidentities; let1ert1tfe techMiogy such flS \"fu;::zy\nlogk\" fOr lfll1tfe wuilmts, *and* ~disctwertibillt\"\ntllwtlUltVes when there is relevant information\nin lllltJtlrerlocation; train oflkers to use all the\nSil&nt details tltllt Cllllfii17'0W IM search and\nidentih im lndividllaL\n)-\nClarify the criterillfor waichlisting in a way tlult\ndoes not become excessivezy specific, OltDOilS,\nand legalistic.\n};;>\nEsttdJJish a t1'tlining program that will J1\"ff\"itk\ngreater cltnity on the purpose of TIDE, the roks\nand respun.sibiliti of agencies that may\npopu/Gte it, and how TIDE }its into the larger\nwatchlisting process.\n};;>\nInstruct analysts to populate TIDE with partial\nderogatory information---mtJking TIDE \"the\nplace to build a dossier\" -rather tlum tl'eflting it\nflS a library of completed watc11/ist nomintdions.\n(CtiNF)\n\n## Information Technology: Managing The Signalsto-Noise Volome\n\nInadequate information technology runs through both the Fort Hood and the NW Flight 253 narratives, particularly the inability of IT systems to he)p analysts locate relevant reporting in a sea of fragmentary data or to correct for seemingly uWro:r human errors. The Intelligenee Community's IT\ntools-wbicb generally lag several years behind those of private industry, and even f.artherbebind tDosc available to home users-did not help io1e1Ji8ence officers and agents correlate data that could have increased the probability of Abdulnmttalab and Hasan rising above the noise. Indeed, the incidents highlighted what we assess are the two main technological problems facing counterterrorism offiCers:\n\n- Limited visibility and accessibility of\ncounterterrorism data that are distributed across\nmultiple, discrete databases and *systems.* NCfC\nanalysts, for example, have access to more than 28\nseparate databases and systems, each of whicho for\nthe most part, has a separate log-on. This means\nanalysts have to search. each.~ separarely\nbefore trying to identify connections among their\nresults.\n- Search capabilities do not allow foil exploitation of\nexisting data. In most cases, users must know in advance what to look for using Boolean searches to find terms in individual reports as they are received by the Community. This approach is intolerant of even simple mistakes in the queries and does not enable questions like: list everyone that is potentially affiliated with AQAP and bas a passport or visa that would permit entty to the United States or UK. (SI/1'W)\nIn our view, these shortcomings are the result of a fundamental problem in the Community's approach to IT -there is no accepted and comprehensive, Community-wide strategy. The Intelligence Community lacks a common vision of a desired end state, a common understanding of the potential benefits, and a coherent Community-wide strategy for development and acquisition.\n\n- Continuing the CUJT\\mt course willbecome even\nmore problematic as tbe amount of data increases\nand almost certainly ensures additional incidents in\nwhiclt.~~Con.ummity~\n..\naftel~ &1 it\\bad access f()cfaf.a~.have\nenabled detection and PotentiallY dist:UI)tion of an\nattack.\n- As the preparations for attacks are concealed more\nand more effectively, the planning periods decrease,\nand terrorists adopt new modes of attack improved\ninformation technology will be vital. The existing\nprocesses, policies, and operations will not suffice.\n~)..\nWe propose three sets of recommendations-near;., mid-, and long-term-that seek to enable fuster adoption throughout the Community ofiT solutions that will reduce our reliance on human beings'\ninherently limited ability to sift and correlate vast amounts of data in their heads. Our recommendations range from incrementally upgrading existing applications to fundamentally reimagining the Intelligence Community's IT infrastructure; many can be accomplished in parallel.\n\n- These recommendations are intended to serve only\nas a starting point. IT is a moving target, but\nwaiting and debating in search of a comprehensive,\nperfect solution is dangerous; the importa[lt thing is\nto get started.\n- When implementing these recommendations or\ntaking any other steps to enhance the Community's\nIT infrastructure, it will be important to adhere to\nfour key methodological principles: invest in\ncomputing capacity ahead of need, embed\ndevelopers with users, adopt a modular approach\nbased on separation of applications, data, and\ninfrastructure, and experiment. Details of our\nproposed methodology for implementing these\nrecommendations are found in Appendix C. (S/INF}\nWe assess agencies' desire and need to protect some of their information will be the primary obstacle to implementing these recommendations, but this barrier is surmountable if policy, tecluiology, and operations can co-evolve. Technologists need to demonstrate capabilities that instill confidence that access can be limited to authorized users, thereby addressing the concerns underpinning current information rna\n..\n\n(b)( 1)\n(b)(3)\nCIA\nshows that assessments of this tradeoff can change as new technologies are introduced.\n\n- Many of the people we interviewed assessed that\npolicy on handling US Persons data,97 1aw\nenforcement data, and sensitive source data was\nlimiting the Intelligence Community's ability to\naggregate and exploit available data, especially\ninformation pertaining to critical domestic-foreign\nnexus issues.\n- There is no perfect solution to the risk/benefit\ntradeoff on enabling correlation of data from the\n\n## J(B)(?)(E) I\n\nCommunity's most sensitive sources, but the counterintelligence calculus on terrorism data should be looked at through the prism of risk entailed in the event a terrorist act is not detected.\n\n(S/~W)\nMoving Forward on *Information Technology.* Our recommendations fall into three categories: near-term changes with limited resource implications, intermediate changes that require more time or resources, and longer-term efforts that we view as essential for the Intelligence Community to at least match capabilities already widely available outside the Community.\n\n- Many of our recommendations are not novel.\nSeveral have been discussed for decades, and some\nalready are underway.~M We emphasize them here\nbecause we view them as essential for the\nCommunity to increase the likelihood that the right\n\"signals\" emerge from the \"noise.\"\n- For our recommendations to be effective, they need\nto be followed with particular urgency and fidelity\nby the four Intelligence Community entities with\nthe broadest responsibilities for counterterrorism-\nCIA, FBI, NCTC, and NSA. There are no\norganizational barriers to these four agencies to\ncollaborate to improve their ability to exploit data\nthat they already share. (U/fFOUO)\nIn the near term, the Intelligence Community must address the problem-as evidenced in both incidents-that many officers do not know what data they are accessing, what other relevant data exists, or how to exploit it.\n\n- Greatly increase online documentation related to\ndatasets by, for example, tagging and registering\nthem. This information should be easily accessible\nand include what data are available, how to get\naccess, who has access, and tips from experienced\nusers.\n- Enable authorized users to access and use all-source\ndata and applications from anywhere and at\nanytime, except when reasonably prohibited by\nsecurity concerns. The 25 December incident\nhighlighted that officers in the field sometimes are best positioned to separate signal from noise.\n\n- Search capabilities should default to the use of\nfuzzy logic. Had this been the case in November,\nthe State Department's Visas Viper cable, despite\nthe misspelling, would have prompted discovery of\nAbdulmutallab's active US visa.\n- Embed IT specialists in fast-moving analytic and\noperational groups to handie simple support\nrequests immediately_ The Community should not\ncontinue to allow mundane IT problems to interfere\nwith its mission.\n\n## - (B)(1) (B)(3) Cia\n\nIn the midterm, but sooner rather than *later,* the Intelligence Community must enable persistent search, exploit query logs, attach analytic insights to data, facilitate continuous IT improvements, and bridge the data divide-while building toward the long-term vision: To do this, the Community must:\n\n- Augment current search capabilities with usercontrolled alerting services that would flag\nincoming traffic\n- Enable officers across the Community to see who\nelse has looked at a given intelligence report and to\nelectronically attach informal insights and view comments by others. This may have enabled broader discussion among analysts interested in a Nigerian affiliated with AQAP or in Hasan and Aulaqi.\n\n- Embed developers with users to provide continuous\nimprovements to mission applications. This would\nfoster innovation by giving developers-who can\nimagine what technology can deliver-a better\nunderstanding of end-users' requirements.\n- Incorporate application programming interfaces\n(APis) into all existing programs so that they can be\naccessed, as appropriate, through other programs.\nThis would, policy permitting, enable officers to\naccess multiple databases, across multiple\nnetworks, through a single software interface.\n- Incorporate into new and existing programs the\ncapability\n\n## Odni\n\nIn the long term, we make three recommendations to help ensure the Intelligence Community provides its counterterrorism officers with state-of-the-art capabilities for search and correlation. Several technical leaders in the Community are working on ideas similar to or consistent with these; we offer our perspective to encourage and help shape these efforts.\n\n(U)\nFirst, enable a federated and cross-domain search.\n\nThis would be a minimal step toward modernizing the Community's search capabilities and ameliorating some of the problems posed by the proliferation of databases across networks. Developers would place a thin layer over existing databases that would provide a single point of entry to query-through an API-\neach database to which they are authorized access.\n\nThis would minimize the extent to which officers must remember where to search for what data and simplifY officers' synthesis of the results. (U)\nSecond, separate applications from data and infrastructure. This would enable authorized intelligence officers to access and use any data, anytime, from any workplace, with any tool, except as policy prohibits it. The most important initial step is to establish the virtual equivalent of the nowcommon Community badge: a common way of identifying individuals and their access permissions together with tagging of the data to deseribe the rights needed to access it.\n\n- We endorse the joint effort of various. agencies,\n-\nworking through their chief infonnation.ofijcers, to\nbuild toward a common IT infrastructure and\nidentify common data services, such u those for\ncollaboration, access, discovery, audit, processing,\nand storage;\n- A common infrastructure for all data would have\nmany advantages, including enabling the use of\nsophisticated search algorithms such as those used\non the Internet, instead of the outdated Boolean\nsearches currently used on most Intelligence\nCommunity systems. Another benefit would. be the\ncapability to allow. a user to file all relevant data on\none interface. rather than on a. system-by-system\nbasis. (U/IF()U()}\nThitd, build computing clouds and data centerswhich will enable dispersed, enterprise data sharing and processing-as the basis for the Community's IT\ninfrastructure. The resultant computing capacity will allow \"data to .talk to data,\" identify relationships, produce results that analysts now have to put together by hand, and do it before an officer has even thought to make an inquiry: Routine use of this kind of processing almost certainly would have helped identify Abdulmutallab for watchlisting.\n\n- Additional advantages of a cloud-based approach\ninclude lower overall costs, greater tlexibility in the\nuse of resources, ease of maintemmce, and easier\nportability ofinnovations. Private-sector\ntechnology leaders such as.Microsoft, Amazon, and\nGoogle build their systems using clouds.\n- As the Intelligence Community moves toward the\ncloud, it will need to adopt-at the Commllllity\nlevel-hardware, operating systems, and networks.\nAll new systems shoUld be expected to use this\ncommon base. (S/~)\nl<b )(?)(E) I\nWe also endorse two current initiatives that are necessary precursors for the Intelligence Community to move toward cloud computing:\n\n- We believe investment in the U Cloud Pilot, which\nwill facilitate enterprise data processing and\nstorage. is critical to modernizing the Community's\nuse of information technologies.\n\n## Our R~ In This Llretiiite Lfftldi Llld1'E Coiilplextht:Melsewhere Tmd *11Es1St* ~ Norteiltekss, .18 $Llltt1Lfll'Rize:\n\n-\nIn *the* lrelfrtenn, tllke the stqs dettzilelllliHJ:ve to\nmslll't! tlud cormterterrorism o.flicers\nunderstand all of the data llVIIilllble to lhe11111nd\nhave the tools to access what alrelldy existswhen they need it and where they need it.\n-\nIn the mitltenn, augment capabilities to get\nnrore out of the tlatll with tools thllt allow\nojJicers to leam llfOI\"e from the data thml what it\npresents on *the* surf~who has seen it, what\nothers think of it or have done with it, what\n11elated tlatll is avaihlble, and how it rellltes to\nhistorical reporting.\n)-\nIn the ..\ntmn,.111f1Ve beyond an II1'Cititectwe\ntlutt ~\n *lletnily* on human~\ntoone\nin which \"datil can talk to dattJ--sg.t/iat\nrelationships embedded ;, coltiJile:x datasets are\nbrtlught to the sll1'j(lce in ways that IIUJW! the\ntmlllyst's starting point further down the field\nand closer to discovery of an adversary's plans\nand intentions.\n)-\n~t/JeseolljectiPeson a \"CTQShIHisi& The\npattelis eo~\ntlrtit tlehsy will assui'e that\nllliJre lJ1(ulr Fal'tntlcs get throlig/1:; (UI!PfRJ(JJ\nVarious review groups and agency-specific lDCil1DS have concludal tkat isfuJ:mation sbafili&. was neta\nsignificant factor contributing to the incidems. at Fort Hood aad oo 25 ~we aereewahtbat<bmad\nconclusion .. Some issues that sucf8Gcd, ~\n~\ntiedtodle'hm'flueU~!S ~ilreiideat.merit follow-up to detmmine~theseisfraes. impede the ~orism:mWon:\n\n\n- FAA officers said that analysts there 'have~ aecess to FIB ttm:at ~\nlind'JRJ8eceai&11'DB .\nbecause FAA is not part9f'lhe JnteHigeseeCb'unmmlty.w\n\n.\n.\n- TSA officials nok!d that a Jaokof~\nstiaringwith C()QI;lfepatts.,_may limit~Hb~\ncannot share threat~ to ll1ab its Gase fof implementiDg~ ob custly-\n\ncountermeasures. QI~\nGoing forward, the Community must *make* ~hs on inj\"ormadon sltoringptilicy ani/its implementation to reap the benefits ofiltjomtQiion *technology* . . Polity must be. ~tot!II!IIWe~\nusers to access and use all-sourcedatam4~oos ftom ~audat~~\nreasonably prohibited by security oo.eems.\n\n- Intelligence Community Directive SOl, Discovery and~\nor Retrieval ~:Milia\nthe\nIntelligence Community, codifies~ for discovery aad shariaa ofdata. 'Iltese~l!ll~\nauthorized Comm'UDityusers to ~reilemmtdata inotiet.~~~~~-\nabead:y have access-find a p001t oftoatadierequest ~~ ~it~\nl&yathe~\n~ .\ngroundwork for implementing ourlbCt*ti&M!Jdatkms on~~\n\n- The Community should develop an integrated approach to~\nsharing with US pCmmcateadties.\noutside the Intelligence Community, i.e., \"non. Title SO organizatioBs. n :atbts sJready are~,\nbut 1D1\nintegrated approach would help clarify what information the CoQunonitY- aca$S fromn.oa'r6 so\norganizations, and wbat fhose~'ed in return trom theQwnummty.\n\n\n- Procedures for sharing information on US Pwaons must be clarfJied !J1I(l *better* quia~. We~.~\nat length in a separate section. The Community cannot rea1i7e the~\normt0Jlfl'ilion.~tb\nassist the cotmterter:rorism :rirlssion~c~ these issues. (UJff'E)YO}\n\n    .\nl<b )(?)(E) I\nClosing the Structural Seams in tbe lntelligeaee CommoDity's Counterterrorism Mission We ob~ed a third set of problems related to the roles and responsibilities of the Conummity's counterterrorism efforts. We began this review with the view that the redundancies in the Community's counterterrorism efforts represent healthy competition and that \"lanes in the road\"\nissues in no way directly contributed to the Fort Hood or 25 December incidents. Officers we interviewed consistently said that turf considerations and bureaucratic overlap did not play a direct role either incident. (UHfOOO+-\nThere is no way for the panel to produce a definitive assessment on that point, but there are grounds for skepticism. The panel is concerned that the overlap between CTC and NCTC extends beyond healthy competition and that the turf battles, duplications, and clashes are a drain on the resources and creative energy of both organizations. This is concerning in part because both organizations stressed to the panel that they did not have enough resources to cover all issues at the level they deserve. Moreover, given the labor intensive nature of counterterrorism work. any wasted energy only exacerbates the \"signals to noise\" problem-which could hamper the Community's ability to detect and prevent the next Abdulmutallab-like attack. The panel believes, therefore, that there is still wOik to be done in sorting out the mission ofthese two. important organizations. (U/IFO~\nCreate a formal division oflabor that plays to the dear strengths of each organization. From the moment NCTC was codified m the 2004\nlntelligenee Reform and ~errorism Prevention Act\n(IRTP A}--:tran:sfonning the threat orientatim of its predecessor, the Terrorist Threat Integration Center, into the primary responsibility for the analysis of terrorism-it was inevitable that there would be problems of deconfliction between it and CIA's CTC. given that the analytic portions of the two organizations have so much overlap in their missions and draw to a large extent on the same limited talent pool. The panel discussed the implications of merging the analytic function of these two entities but concluded each has distinct, essential missions that require emphasisdetecting and identifYing threats to the homeland and supporting counterterrorism operations abroad.\n\n(U/ff'OUO)\nOver the years, much effort has gone into formally codifying the .. lanes in the road\" for each to follow, and we cannot improve on the DNI\ndirective of 7 April2Q 10 (see Appendix D), which embodies many of the views we expressed in the course of our discussions with NCTC, CIA, and the DNI. Clarifying these roles and responsibilities will. we think, improve mission performance, reduce bureaucratic conflict, and avoid reforms that could be counterproductive. In the end, it must fall to leadership and management to marshal the talents of their people and the mandates of their organizations in ways that are mutually reinforcing and that close whatever gaps open up in our counterterrorism coverage.\n\n- NCTC's relationships with FBI and DHS,\nlegislative authorities, and tie-in to the homeland\nmake it the natural lead for tracking and warning\nof all foreign threats with the potential to reach\nUS soil.\n- CTC, on the other hand. is the natural lead on\nterrorist operations abroad. particularly involving\nsupport for operators and collectors. {&'~\nIt appears that much of the tension between the two organizations centers on issues related to the President's Daily Brief (PDB)-everything from who takes the lead to what is said in the articles.\n\nThe panel believes it is not necessary to implement the cbqe proposed in the ODNI's\n\"Counterterrorism Review Master Action Plan: 6\nMonth~-\" This reeommendstbat \"NCTC\nleads PDB plamling process\" on counterterrorismrelated stories. The PDB is already a Communitywide publication, and ODNI officers on the PDB\nleadership team already have the authority to task agencies to track and write about specific issues.\n\nWe think that exercising current authorities could achieve the same goal-integrated analytic coverage-with considerably less disruption and bureaucratic layering. {SIINF)\nWe are skeptical of any division of labor that divides counterterrorism responsibilities exclusively along \"tactical\" and \"strategic\" lines.\n\nTerrorist organizations do not function that way, nor do analysis and collection. It is impossible to perform tactical analysis without an understanding of strategic goals, and it is impossible to understand an organization's strategy without a grasp of how and why it conducts specific operations. (Sf~lF)\nDramatically increase the focus on threats to the homeland. As we observed the segmented nature of following terrorists bound for the homeland-and the associated problem with bureaucratic handoff as the threat moves from the foreign to domestic realm-we became firmly convinced of the need for a unit that would lead the Community in tracking all threat reporting that hinted at an attack against the homeland. While all agencies should focus on threats to the homeland as their greatest priority, one organization needs to have sole responsibility for tracking, warning, and coordinating the Community's response to an threats with the potential to reach US soil. We think NCTC is a natural fit for this role.\n\n(UHFOUO)\nFor this reason, we strongly endorse NCTC's concept of a \"pursuit group.\" The goal ofthis group, as we understand it based on the DNI's recent memo,\n101 would be to provide analytic and analysis-driven insight and tasking for follow-on collection to establish the underlying basis and provide additional information useful to thwarting the plot. As that group develops its concept of operations, we offer five recommendations:\n\n- It must emphasize primarily threats with the\npotential to reach the homeland, avoiding the\nnatural temptation to fall back into the\ntraditional, more familiar terrain offocusing mainly on threats overseas;\n- The organization must place a particularly heavy\nemphasis on areas where we have limited or\nemerging coverage;\n- It must deconflict and coordinate its pursuit of\ntargets with other Community components so that multiple units are not duplicating the efforts\nof another;\nl<b)(?)(E) I\n\n- It should develop a coherent set of indicators that\nwill help identify when terrorist groups\n- Its metric of success should be tapping the full\nrange of US government capabilities to identify\nand disrupt plots--not traditional metrics such as\nproduction of finished intelligence. (Cf/Nf')\nIncrease \"jointness\" within the\ncounterterrorism community. No mission in the\nIntelligence Community is more important than\npreventing terrorist attacks inside the United\nStates; it requires seamless collaboration, from\ncollectors in the field to consular sections, airport\nscreeners, law enforcement and intelligence\nofficers, and policymakers. (U)\nYet the process is still too fragmented and segregated. In our review of the Abdulmutallab and Hasan cases, we noted that contacts and information flow between agencies were often uncertain, frequently based on personal connections and individual initiative rather than institutional arrangements. To cite only a few examples, CTC, NCTC and NSA officers often commented on the central role of TSC.\n\nWatchlisting officers explained that the normal process required time to move a nomination through to a TSC decision, but when the situation required rapid action, telephone calls to personal contacts at TSC could expedite the process, taking hours rather than days. Embeddedness ofNSA\nand CIA officers at TSC, and vice versa, has been uneven. Similarly, embedding more TSA officers in those agencies could facilitate the process of delivering downgraded tearlines pertaining to aviation threats.\n\n- Increase the nwnber and frequency of personnel\nrotations between CTC and NCTC-not just\namong line analysts, but among senior managers,\nas well. These should be mandatory and take\nplace with regular periodicity. We suspect these\nmoves would foster collaboration as each side\nviews the lanes in the road issue while driving on\nthe opposite side of the road.\n\n## L(B )(?)(E) I\n\n- We agree with the West-Clark review of the Fort\nHood incident, which noted the need for greater\ncollaboration betWeen FBI and DoD; there also\nwere no counterintelligence officers from the\nDepartment of the Army, CIA's\nCounterintelligence Center, or the DNI's\nNational Counterintelligence Center supporting\neither the Washington or the San Diego J1TF. 102\n- \"Jointness\" can also be pursued as a performance\nobjective at the individual level. As a small step\ntoward developing a culture of collaboration. an\nexplicit performance objective for all CTC and\nNCTC analysts shonld be to conduct one joint\nproject per reporting cycle with their primary\ncounterparts from the other organization.\nOfficers should be evaluated specifically on\nwhether they meet that objective. '(O'~W)\nTo summarize our recommendations:\n\n);>\nOrganizatiqna/ responsibilities should *play* to .\nthe compartllive lldvantage of etlCh\notganiz.ation. In practice, this mesns thllt\nNCTC's relatlunships with FBI and JJHS, its\nlegislative alilkorilies, and its, tie-in to the\nhomeltmd make it the 1Ullllrtd lead on 1111\nthrems with the potential to reach US soiL\nCTC, on the other hand, is the lfllllrtlllefld\non terrorist operations abroad, jJarlicularly\ninvolving sUpport for operators anti\ncollectors. Focusing on this approach would,\nwe suspect, reduce the time-consuming tilT,{\ndisputes over PDB authorship.\n~ Wherever InteHigence Community ktzders\ndraw the \"lanes in the 1'0ild,., some\ncomponent must focus tirelessly and\nexclusively on folltnving 1111 repOrting that\ninvolves threats to *the* us~\nTltis\nneeds to be a primary focus of NCTC,s new\npursuit groilp, as it deve/opsfragmenklry\ndata that raise concerns abolit tem iSm but\nlack specijiclly.\n~ To improve seamlessness thT'OIIghout the\nintelligence and law enforcement\ncommunide$, agencies should increase the\nrotation of offrcers among these\norganizations. (CifNil).\nClearing the Way for Properly Sharing US\nPerson Information Throughout our interviews, we were impressed with the great care taken by the Community to protect inferma.tion about US Persons. m toJ We noted. however. that US Persons issues manifested themselves in several ways in these cases.\n\n- Sharing US Person information with foreign\npartners, and tasking them to\n- Intelligence officers in both the 25 December\nand the Hasan cases worked hard to stay within\nauthorized guic:ielilll~\nIn general, we noticed a strong belief among collectors and analysts that restrictions on collecting, disseminating, accessing. and analyzing data on US Persons impede, mission performance.\n\nA high-level NCTC official listed enhanced authorities related to US Persons as the nn11nher-\nWe also saw a surprising level of disagreementeven among experienced practitioners-on whether current US Person authorities allow intelligence officers to accomplish their missions, or whether new legal authorities are needed.\n\n(b)( 1) (b)(3)\nNSA\nTOJI ecRI!'ffiHCSIS~~OONINOFORtt **...** j(b)(7)(E) I\n\n- Similarly, NSA officers noted that if they were\nswveiling a suspected terrorist overseas whom\nthey thought to be a non-US Person. and they\nlater learned that he was a US Person. they had\nto cease coliection while they sought separate\ncourt authorimtion to re-ini.tiate collection,\nresnlting in another collection gap.\nPanel members with deep experience on FISA and related matters provided a different perspective.\n\nThey believe that current authorities, when clarified and fully leveraged, should enable the government to accomplish its counterterrorism mission.\n\n- For example, they believe that the Community's\ncurrent authorities enabled the government to\nadequately swveil US Persons globally and\nsuspected terrorists inside the United Statesand to share lawfully collected telephone\nnumbers in shared databases--'-while also\nprotecting privacy and civillibexties.\n- The experience of these panel members leads us\nto believe that the government must develop\nmore efficient processes to make effective use of\nexisting authorities, especially ones that focus on\n- In general, the law and the Community's\ngoverning Executive Order (EO 12333) provide\nthe government with the operating room to be\neffective; most of the burdensome steps appear\nto be internal to the government's implementing\nprocedures-which could cause the collection\ngaps and other issues described to us.\n- Fixing these procedures is not solely the\nresponsibility of any single agency or of the\nDNI. This requires the Department of Justice\ncontinuously to engage with the DNI, both to\ncalibrate on an ongoing basis how to craft the\nprocedures so that they clearly and\nstraightforwardly implement the Community's\ngoverning legal requirements, and to provide\nassurance that when the Community complies\nwith those procedures, it is following the law.\n~'INfL\nWe believe that the Community's culture of carefully protecting US Person infonnation is vital for earning and maintaining the trust of the American people and of oversight bodies. The Community must have that trust so that it can make the most of existing authorities-and obtain new ones as needed-to counter a rapidly evolving terrorist threat.\n\n- Indeed, we believe that in that light, it is all the\nmore important to streamline and clarify policies\nand procedures-to ensure they are being used to\nprotect privacy and civil liberties interests and\nimplement legal requirements, rather than to\nserve other purposes.\n- To be an effective part of the intelligence\nmission--and not be an \"impediment\"-policies\nand procedures must be focused, clear, easy-tounderstand, and consistent across agencies where\nfeasible. We believe much work lies ahead to\nachieve that tsHN*-)\nCallectively, these US Persans issues can and must be addressed *in the near term.* Some involve closing the breach between the perceptions and realities of current US authorities; others entail changing internal procedures of individual agencies. All involve focused leadership frem the DNI, in concert with the Department *:of* Justice.\n\nWe understand that this important work has already begun (see Appendix B). (U)\nWe see a need to simplify, harmonize, update, and modify the Community's procedures tela:ting to US Persons. We also see a clear need for standardized, continual Community-wide training and guidance on how to address US Person issues.\n\n- The goal of such efforts is twofold: First, to\nmake use of the Intelligence Community's\nauthorities to the full extent intended, so that the\nCommunity can more efficiently manage the\ninformation in its possession and correlate data\nas envisioned by the IT recommendations.\nSecond, to help intelligence officers better\nunderstand what they need to do to collect and\nshare inforination with confidence that their\nactions are consistent with legal and privacy\nrequirements.\n- It is especially important that these efforts focus\non working-level analysts and collectors who are\nmost directly affected by US Persons\nconsiderations, to dispel any misperceptions, and\nto elicit areas where training, guidance, and\nupdated procedures could facilitate intelligence\noperations while still protecting privacy and civil\nliberties interests. For example, working-level\nofficers should be provided a consistent, clear,\nauthoritative-and preferably online-:gu.ide,\nwith the assurance that following it provides a\n\"safe harbor\" on US Persons issues. (U)\nWe also recommend that the DNI establish a Community-wide, inter-disciplinary process for determining whether new authorities may be needed, on emerging issues, such as radicalization, new technological developments, and new fonns of terrorist communication. The goal would be to provide clarity and confidence to operators and analysts so that they know how conduct their missions in a way that properly protects privacy\n\n## To~:\n\nand legal interests, clearing the way for decisive action.\n\n- If, as we suspect, terrorist means of\n);;>\nProtecting US Person injormtztion is vital for\nIICCOiflp/iShJng the intelligena ltli8slon; t/u!\nraks ftJI' doing so IIUISt - foctiSell, dear,\neflSY-to-lllltlerstimll, *and* ~IICI'Oss\nagencies wMre feaible.\ncommunication increase in sophistication and\nself-radicalization inside the United States\nbecomes a more pressing concern, it will be\nincreasingly urgent to regularly bring together\nanalysts, collectors, and attorneys to discuss\nwhether current authorities and guidance are\nkeeping pace with the evolving nature of the\nterrorist threat\n);;>\nThe DNIIIUISt, in concert with DOJ, IIJad a\nCUIIUIUUiity-wide effort to pro11i4e Wining\nand gllitlance on 1JS Person polldes and\nprocedures, and to sbnplib, strl!llllne,\nupdote, tmd haTIIIOnize them where feasible,\nwith t1U! gOIII of providing Co,munity\noper1110rS and amdysts the confidence they\nneed to do tbei7 jobs knowing tlult they are\nproperly protecting privacy and complying\nwith the lllw.\n);;>\nThe Commlmity should engage with liaison\nservices to cltlri,h and stret1mline its\nprocethiTeS *for* pr~\ncoiJecting tllnd\nsharing US Person infomuzlion.\n- Regarding working with liaison partners, we\nrecommend all agencies actively engage key\nliaison partners to develop plans to ensure\ncollection in a way that is consistent with any\nprotections for US Persons. The Community\nwill benefit from a review of procedures for\nsharing with liaison services when it has\nauthority to collect on US Persons and is ~\nliaison assistance in such cooperation.\n- Our recommendation in this area is an expansion\nof sscrs sensible guidance that NSA should\nconduct such an effort with its foreign partners.\n(S!,N)-\n);;>\nThe DNI should establish tm interdisciplinllry process for providing guidance\ntmd clarity on emerging issues rehzting to US\nPersons, sach a radictll4otUJn, new\nteclmologies, and new forms of\ncommutriclltion. fS.{LNPJ\n\n## A~Jrdw~Bi .. Llab,Baao, And~ (U)\n\nDespite the IJl8DY dif'fCnmces ~\n~.~ ineKkmts,\n104 a common thread through both of them was what the Inte~ COdrnnm1ty~~~~n During ournwicW, we came away 'With four recommendations related to ttns is&Oe. (U#F()GO)\nFirst, the Community shoutdaeedemteits eftDrts to Ul1derstand ~.~\nThis is a~:MDgthe areas from wbicll intenigence SU1:ptise CWspriag in tbe abseaee of a template to iDfmm the. ~s collection and~\na point~ byeutside exports. While the,Conmiunity basi~\nmitiAWves to study radicalization overseas. its <:flbrts to understand homegrowa, ra6:aliDtion are more nascent.\n\nDeveloping a. grasp. of the iSsue may.~.., types ofex:pertiseand ~.~the Community. as the Un.i=d .s.t;es piOVides a.~\naotf.'~cavironmeut for ~iDtion. It will also requite.ll robust understanding o( and~\nft>r. ~~and liberties. \"(C'INF)\nSeeoud, we agree witA tllie ~-ctm8Ulied who recomnteBded that the Community.$hatpcn itsfeeus on reeruiters'and~~ how~~\nmdicalize(tbttJugh gtOups, in prisons, aD tbC\\'IDtemet). :and\n\nhowtiley'~a'~~~to~Opemtional. Assame.amftyst5pointedoattt>~\"Sdf\"\n!1ldicalization maybe a misnOmer.~- AbdlUtm:rtaUab ~\n~\nbyradit:als-Aulraqi\"inbeth\ncases. but to differing exn:ms-e.nd:by the IntCmet..wbich will ptqan ~role\nmradi~'<Ol.ae\nfuture.\n\n- The Community also must cleve1op methods: for detectmg~lized individuals or \"lone wolve$'\" who may\nnot have attended tefrorist trammg camps t>r Dlay be ~Outside the di1ect comtDaDd and eontroi' of\norganized groups. The Community,~ faces a signals-to-noise chellenge with such individuals\noverseas, and must find ways tO~\nsuch indMduals inside the United States while respecting civil\nrights andlibcrtiC$-t!lld ~-eDiiSting the support of'loeaJ COJDBtU11it:ies. ~\nThird, the lessonS leatadtrotn ~damdWal~ andsel~efUS~\nHasan-shotildbe ~-~into~\nand US Govemmtmt persoDIJCII<:potieies, which are typieal)y ~To~'~state-~spying.\n\n- When government employees are involved. bri1lging co~\npl!Ofessionals into the investigative\nprocess early can signifiamtly inorease the probabitity ofdemcting at-risk individuals.\"\n- As in other counterintelligcmee cases (Ames, Hanssen).. the Hasan episode underscores the importance of\ndocumenting and maintaining in an individual's permanent record\"all relevant information about his or her\nperformance. 1o5 {1/Nf)\nFinally, we believe it is vital to properly align orgaaizational responsibilities rolated to radicalization with each agency's strengths and authorities. Ncrc. FBI, and DHS must play their respective parts in close collaboration with one another. FBI's unique stnmgtbs include robust legal authorities and direct experience investigating domestic and intemationalterrorism inside the United States; those ofNCTC include a.aalyzing radicalization. bridging the foreign/domestic divilk; and aceessing intelligence ftom across the Commuu.ity.\n\nDHS is uniquely positioned to focus on aualysis zelevant to~\nvulnmabitities and domestic protective measures; aggregating data uniquely available to DHS for use by the counterterrorism community;\nand working with state, local, trihal, and private-sector customers. We recommend that the Community reassess its assignment of radicalizatmn..~ ~\namoag these key orga:aimtions to ensure that they are bringing to bear their Ullique stlcDgtbs and authorities onlhis critical issue. (S{/Nf)\n\n## Blue Sky Ideas (U)\n\nThe foregoing recommendations cover much of what the panel was asked to address. We have focused on recommendations that, wbile difficult. are still achievable within an individual agency or with DNI\nlead authority. Consistent with the third task assigned to the Review Panel, we offer several additional \"blue sky\" recommendations-ideas that we have not seen surfaced by other review groups and that would entail more radical changes. These ideas are deliberately provocative, and more disruptive to personnel resources and organizational structures, requiring more study before attempting.\n\n- A Manhattan Project for *information* techn~~Jogy\nand *sharing.* To break the gridlock and the everelusive search for the perfect IT architecture, we propose the chief information officers from the key intelligence agencies-along with their budgetsbe pulled together into one unit with the goal of implementing a common infrastucture across the Intelligence Community. The Commmtity has been wrestling with data-sharing adjustments for years with scant progress.\n\none way to lev1~re\n\n| (b     |\n|--------|\n| (b)(3) |\n| CIA    |\n\nstrengths of CTC and NCfC while reducing redundancy. A matrixed group can consist of analysts from CIA, NCfC, DIA, FBI, and NSA, who sit side-by-side with collectors and operators from the NCS, DoD, and NGA, all worlcing under a This model works best targeting specific issues involving a blmry line between domestic and foreign components and where there are relatively few analysts in relation to the workload. Using the matrix model also reduces redundancies related to dual publications, representation at interagency meetings, and responses to taskings.\n\nj(b )(?)(E)\n\n- ~the\ne;xpertise of INR *antli)HS/I&A.* In\nour discussions of the Intelligence CQmmunity' s\ncounterterrorism efforts, we heard only few\nrefemtees to the State Department's Bunlall of\nIntelligence and Research and DHS's Office of\nIntelligence and Analysis as key playem. An\ninstitutional division of labor, in whi-. INR. and\nDHSII&A have lead responsibility on some regil)D\nor aspect of terrorism. could tap their expertise and\nincrease efficiency in the Intelligence Community.\nDHSII&A, for example, is uniquely positioned to\nassess US vulnerabilities-infrastructure,\ntelecommunications and energy grids, and\ninformation-sharing gaps between national and\nlocal law enforcement.\n- ExpmuJ the Intelligence Community's role in the\nvisa is~t~tmce *proce8$.* DHS could play~\nesgecially important role in the visa issuance\nprocess. Prev'enting terrorists from entering the us\nho~\nis a top national security C0l1tem, so it\nmakes little sense to place the visa issUaDoe process in the bands only offoreign service oflit;em. This responsibility should belong in the homeland security apparatus. If the suggestion is too burdensome for DHS, then consideration ought to be given to ensuring that all visa issuances reqUire Community concurrence or are passed~ the Community for ex.amination.\n\n- Bllildaco~\n*\"~'hace\nCmtml. \" Identity information is currently pocketed across the Intelligence Cotnmunjty in various databases, meaning ll() ooe QftieeE in any agency can successfully access it. To remedy this, create a single unit, staffed by coontedeuerism\n~s,from thro~ut the ~ty cleared for access to an relevant SOlli'CCS, responsible for countertefrorlsm-related name traces. Names traces would be conducted against holdings of all intelligence and law enforcement databases.\n\n(S/tm)\n\n## Expert Perspectives: The View From \"Insiders\" And \"'Utsiders\" (U)\n\nWe convened two expert roundtable sessions, one internal and ~ne external, to stimulate our tbinlcing about the Intelligence Community's postme to address issues beyond those surfaced during our review. The internal group of experts focused on threats that could sutprise the Commumty and threats ofwhich it is cognizant but not prepared to address.\n\nAmong their key concerns were:\n\n-\n\n## (B)( 1)\n\npane~s thiltking by driving hoe several key points.\n\nAIIWng the111:\nWe asked the external group to address how the terrorist threat to the United States is changing; what terrorists could do to surprise the Intelligence Community or elude US colDltermeasures; what more the United States could do to protect itself; and to identify aspects of the terrorist problem that the United States is not focusing on, but should\n(U/~~\nThose experts emphasized the following issues:\n\n- The terrorist threat is heterogeneous-there is no\nlonger a single \"they,\" if there ever was;\n- There are inherent difficulties in obtaining the key,\nplot-\"specific information that would allow the Intelligence Comomnity to pull a thread that would Ul100Ver a plot. As a result, the Community will not always succeed-a terrorist will eventually get through US defenses;\n\n- Tradeoffs must be made-within and outside the\nCommunity-that have real consequences, such as\nthose between civil liberties and increasmg the\nnumber of people on watchlists;\n- Ahnost ~foreign threat to the homeland that\nthe United States has thwartedwas uncovered\nbecause of foreign travel or communication; we are\ntoo dependent on these and need to develop and\nrefine new detection strategies;\n- The Intelligence Community shoUld focus more on\nthe key people and networks that enable disaffected\nindividuals such as Hasan or Abdulmuta.llab to\nbecome operational, i.e., Aulaqi-like figures that\ninspire, enable, or recruit;\n- The Community requires a well-developed model\nof~ tadiclllization process fi'om which it can\nded\\.te.~.~individuaJ.s~ity to\nadoptevrhlent~ We have Jl-e~'tlte\nfor~~~'tllt-~ We d'onot\nbave one fur thehoD1eland. (U/JFOUO)\nTo siiiiUITize, these two gTOIIJIS adtkd to the\n\n- The increasing rugeney of homelllnd-reltded\nthreats--and the need for a more sustrdned, crossagency focus on this set of issues.\n- The increasing heterogeneity of the terrorist\nphenomenon, and therefore the growing clulllenge\nof detectiQn and disruption.\n- The fragility of many ofthe collection techniques\nthat help account for the Community's success so\nfar.\n- The lilcelihood that terrorists will continue to\nbehave in \"learning\" nrode-ad}IISting their\nmethods of operation, whethu successful or not,\nin response to what they see us doing. (SfiNF)\n\n## Some Closing Thoughts (U)\n\nConstancy of support for the Intelligence Community is *crucial.* Intelligence stands apart from politics, but policy toward intelligence is formulated in a political environment We cannot emphasize enough that the pendulum swings and ebbing and flowing of support is an obstacle to mission performance. NCTC, for example, was slated to lose roughly 35 positions prior to 25 December. The post-Christmas reaction to Flight 253 has caused watchlisting nominations to skyrocket; warning has become so common that the Community risks creating its own signals-to-noise problem. We have seen the same pendulum swings on the collection side, where agencies---acutely aware of controversies since 9/11-have erred on the side of caution, sometimes unnecessarily, slowing the dissemination of valuable intelligence. The Community's Congressional overseers have a vital role to play in helping to stabilize counterterrorism policies and keep them on a steady course. (U)\nWhile we have limited our review to the Intelligence Community, we come away convinced that strengthening the United States' ability to prevent the next Fort Hood or 25 December-like attempt requires focusing on more than just the Intelligence Community: law enforcement, airport security, the policy community, foreign. partners, and even the private sector need to address the systemic issues that made the Fort Hood and 25 December incidents possible. At the risk of falling back on a cliche, we are reminded of the axiom that a chain is only as strong as its weakest link. Improved collection will not matter without sound analysis. Sound analysis will not matter without a robust watchlisting system.\n\nA robnst watchlisting system will not matter without effective airport screening technology. Better screening technology will not matter without skilled screeners. There are multiple variations one could make on this chain of events, such as the vital role of foreign screeners at airports abroad-but all would reinforce the same point: the Intelligence Community is only one of several layers ofhomeland defense.\n\n(U)\nTo fmally defeat terrorism requires at least three things: destroying the leadership, denying it safehaven, and changing the myriad conditions that give rise to the phenomenon. The Intelligence Community can carry much of the burden on the first two-but very little on *the third.* (U)\n\n## Appendix A Consolidated List Of Intelligence Community Review Panel Recommendations (U) Build Internal Processes That Help Find Terrorists In The Data (U)\n\nAll agencies should .\n\n- Disseminate counterterrorism reporting promptly. - Update, standardize, and simplifY their dissemination lists and codes on a regular basis.\n- Search for terrorist identities against all of their available data holdings.\n- Use technology such as \"fuzzy logic\" for name variants and incorporate \"discoverability\" that advises when\nthere is relevant information in another location.\n- Train officers performing identity searches to look for partial names, along with salient points such as the\nperson's location, affiliations, passport numbers, schooling, or travel--details that can further narrow the\nsearch and identifY an individual:fS/~\nThe DNI should .\n\n- ClarifY the criteria and threshold for watchlisting. The Community needs a single set of transparent\nguidelines that enables analysts to determine whether and when they may nominate a suspected terrorist. We\ncaution against criteria that become too specific and caveat-laden.\n- Establish greater clarity on watchlisting roles and responsibilities. Delineate roles that play to each agency's\nparticular strengths and authorities, and make clear that the nominating agency should see a nomination\nthrough from start to finish.\n- Streamline watchlisting efforts and redirect the resulting savings. Reduce the duplication resulting from\nmultiple agencies processing nominations and redirect the resources toward other pressing duties such as\nrecords enhancement. IT improvements can help simplifY this process.\n- Ensure analysts use TIDE as a primary repository of intelligence rather than as a step in the watchlisting\nprocess. The Community appears to be missing an opportunity to populate TIDE with fragmentary\nintelligence to build, identify, and shape dossiers on suspected terrorists. NCTC should lead a Community-\nwide training program to help agencies understand the pmpose of TIDE, its holdings, and criteaa for entry into TIDE.\n\n- Institute a Community-wide training program. to ensure a common and transparent understanding of the\nwatchlisting process. If TSC remains the final voice in the No Fly/Selectee decision, it should lead ~h a\ntraining effort, so that its standards are clear to all nominators ~Sl!blE)\nWe also emklrse\n\n- SSCI's recommendation that TIDE administrators accept nominations based on partial names. Terrorists\nrarely use full, true names in their clandestine communications.\n- The White House's recommendation that NCfC develop a records-enhancement capability to build, locate,\nand track derogatory information on all individuals in TIDE: (S/INF)\n\n## Develop Information Technology That Helps Separate Signals From Noise (U)\n\nIn tlu! near term, all agencies should\n\n- Greatly increase online documentation related to datasets to show what data are available, how to get access,\nwho has access, and to provide tips from experienced users.\n- Enable authorized users to access and use all-source data and applications from any workplace and at any\ntime, except when reasonably prohibited by security concerns. The 25 December incident highlighted that\nofficers in the field sometimes are best positioned to separate signal from noise.\n- Ensure that search capabilities default to the use of fuzzy logic. This would include the automatic\nincorporation of variant spellings and renderings of foreign names.\n- Embed IT specialists in fast-moving analytic and operational groups to handle simp~ support requests\nimmediately. The Community should not continue to allow mundane IT problems to interfere with its\nmission.iCh'J'Wj\nIn tlte midterm, all agencies should .\n\n- Augment current search capabilities with user-controlled alerting services that flag incoming traffic. and\nautomatically correlate it with existing reporting.\n- Enable officers to see who else has looked at a given intelligence report and to el~nically attach informal\ninsights and view comments by others. Such a capability may have enabled bro&der discussion among\nofficers interested in a Nigerian affiliated with AQAP or in Hasan and Aulaqi.\nl<b)(?)(E) I\n\n- Embed developers with users to provide continual improvements to mission applications and give developers\na better understanding of end-users' requirements.\n- Incorporate application programming interfaces (APis) into all existing programs so that they can be\naccessed, as appropriate, through other programs. This would. policy permitting, enable officers to access\nmultiple databases, across multiple networks, through a single software interface.\n- Incorporate into new and existing programs the capability\nIn the long term, the DNI should\n\n- Enable a federated and cross-domain ~hacross all of the Comnnmity's holdings. Developers would\nplace a thin layer over existing databases that would provide users a single point of entry to query each\ndatabase they are authorized to access.\n- Establish the virtual equivalent ofthe Community identification badge: a common way of identifYing\nindividuals and their access pennissions together with tagging of the data to descdbe the rights needed to\naccess it. This is a key step toward building a shared network: and common approach to sharing data and\ntoward enabling authorized intelligence officers to access and use any data, anytime, from any workplace,\nwith any tool, except as prohibited by policy.\n- Build computing clouds and data centers as the basis for the Intelligence Community's information\ntechnology infrastructure. As the Conummity moves toward the cloud, it will need to adopt-at the\nCommunity level-hardware, operating systems, and networks. All new systems should be expected to use\nthis common base.\n- Adhere to fow- key methodological principles-invest in computing capacity ahead of need; embed\ndevelopers with users; adopt a modular approach based on separation of applications, data, and\ninfrastructure; and experiment-when implementing any changes to the Community's information\ntechnology. (See Appendix C.) (S-/INF)\nWe endorse\n\n- The I2 Cloud Pilot, which will facilitate entetprise data processing and storage and is critical to modernizing\nthe Community's use of information technologies.\n-\n- The joint effort of various agencies, working through their chief information officers, to buildtoward a\ncommon IT infrastructure and identifY common data services, such as those for collaboration, access,\ndiscovery, audit, processing, and storage.\n\n## Close The Structural Seams In The Counterterrorism Mission (U)\n\nThe DNI should\n\n- Dramatically increase the focus on threats to the homeland While all agencies should focus on threats to the\nhomeland as their greatest priority, one organizAtion needs to have sole responsibility for tracking, warning,\nand coordinating the Community's response to all threats with the potential to reach US soil We think\nNCTC is a natural fit for this role. (U)\nNCTC's Pursuit Group should ..\n\n- Focus primarily on threats with the potential to reach the homeland, avoiding the natural temptation to fall\nback into the traditional, more familiar terrain of focusing mainly on threats overseas.\n- Coordinate and deconflict its pursuit of targets with other Community components so that multiple units are\nnot duplicating the efforts of one another.\n- Emphasize areas where the Intelligence Community has limited or emerging coverage.\n- Measure success as tapping the full range of US government capabilities to identifY and disrupt plots-not\nby tracking traditional metrics such as production of finished intelligence. '(/fN*1\nCIA and NCTC should\n\n- Increase the number and frequency of personnel rotations between CTC and NCTC-not just among line\nanalysts, but among senior managers, as well. These should be mandatory and take place with regular\nperiodicity.\n- Institute, for all officers, explicit individual performance objectives.geared towardjointness and\ncollaboration with the other organization. (U)\nAll agencies should\n\n- Encourage rotations and embed their officers in other agencies to improve seamlessness operations\nthroughout the counterterrorism community. (U)\nWe endorse\n\n- The DNI's directive on 7 April to formally assign responsibility for the counterterrorism mission, which\nembodies many of the views we have expressed in the course of our review. In the end, it must fall to\nleadership and management to marshal the talents of their people and the mandates of their organizations in\nways that are mutually reinforcing and that close whatever gaps open up in our COWlterterrorism coverage.\n- The West-Clark panel's recommendations that seek to increase collaboration between FBI and DoD and\nbetween FBI and the counterintelligence community. (S//NP)\nWe do not endorse\n\n- Structural changes suggested by other groups that do not address the root causes of the tension between\norganizations and may actually complicate the relationship. These include ODNI's recommendation that\nNCTC lead the PDB planning process on counterterrorism-related stories. We think that exercising current\nauthorities could achieve the same goal-integrated analytic coverage-with less disruption and bureaucratic\nlayering.\n- Any division of labor that divides counterterrorism responsibilities exclusively along \"tactical\" and\n\"strategic\" lines. Terrorist organizations do not function that way, nor do analysis and collection. (SffNF)\n\n## Clearing Tbe Way For Properly Sharing Us Person Information (U)\n\nThe DNI should worlc with the Deptutment of Justice to ...\n\n- Simplify, harmonize, update, and modify the Community's procedures relating to US Persons.\n- Establish a Community-wide, interdisciplinary process for developing guidance and training related to US\nPersons authorities and procedures and for determining whether new authorities may be needed on emerging\nissues, such as radicalization, new technological developments, and new forms of terrorist communication.\nThe goal would be to provide clarity and confidence to operators and analysts so that they know how\nconduct their missions in a way that properly protects privacy and legal interests.\n- Institute standardized, continual Community-wide training and guidance on handling US Persons issues. It\nis especially important that this training and guidance focus on worlcing-level analysts and collectors who are\nmost directly affected by US Persons considerations. (StiNE)\nThe DNJ should work with the Ccnnmunity to\n\n- Accelerate the Intelligence Community's efforts to understand homegrown radicalixAtion. This is among the\nareas from which intelligence surprise could spring in the absence of a template to inform the Community's\ncollection and analysis.\n- Slwpen the Community's focus on recruiters and enablers, how disaffected individuals radicalize, and how\nthey influence an individual's efforts to become operational.\n- Develop methods for aetecting radicalized individuals or \"lone wolves\" who may not have attended terrorist\ntraining camps or may be operating outside the direct command and control of organized groups.\n- Incorporate into counterintelligence and US Government personnel policies-which are typically designed to\ndetect traditional state-versus-state spying-the lessons learned from studying the radicalization and selfradicalization of US Persons, such as Hasan. (Sifl~\nAU agencies should\n\n- Engage key liaison partners to review procedures and develop plans to ensure collection in a way that is\nconsistent with protections for US Persons. (G1/Nf)\n\n## We Endorse\n\n- SSCrs recommendation that NSA should actively engage key liaison partners to develop plans to ensure\ncollection in a way that is consistent with any protections for US Persons. (1/N.lY-\n\n## Appendixb Successes: Creating New Challenges For Tbe Intelligence Community (U)\n\nIn the comse of our work, we came acress many examples of intelligence success OCC1nTing contemporaneously with the two events we assess-in collection, sharing, analysis, integration, technology, and innovation. Examples include:\n\n- The counterterrorism community was disrupting\nplots at home while putting unprecedented\npressure on al-Qa'ida abroad.\n- The Intelligence Community bad collected key\nintelligence in both incidents. We also found\nthat the Community is sharing infonnation\nbroadly. Indeed, despite concerns about sharing\nsensitive data. sevexal closely held databases are\navailable to counterterrorism analysts at NCTC.\nMore work remains to be done-such as\nimplementing the \"discovery\" principles\nembodied in Intelligence Community Directive\n501. These accomplishments in collection,\nsharing, and access created opportunities for key\nanalysts to bring together the critical pieces of\nintelligence in each case.\n- In the Hasan case, the San Diego JITF\nrecognized the significance of two e-mail\ncommunications out of many others-they\npicked a signal out from the noise--and engaged\nin an individualized analysis following retrieval\nof available DoD records. In the Flight 253 case,\nanalysts provided strategic warning about the\nthreat AQAP posed to the homeland, as well as\nabout the type of explosive used by\nAbdulmutallab.\n- There are promising IT tools and data\nrepositories at various-ncies\nthat have wide-\nranging capabilities.\n\n(b )(1)\n(b)(3)\nCIA\nAt least ooe of these is deployed at NCTC and works across multiple datasets using a common access control standard. Moreover, the ODNI's U Pilot models aspects of these capabilities and demonstrates several of the qualities we describe in our recommendations.\n\n- As exemplified by this study and by similar\nefforts undertaken by others, the Intelligence\nCommunity is a learning organization that is\nunafraid to look at itself with a self-critical eye,\nand to take corrective actions. Reviews of this\ntype should, we believe, be a routine part of\nintelligence work, particularly when surprises\noccur. The Community must remember that as it\nlearns from the past, so too, do the terrorists.\niSI.mJ\nWhile the Community should reward-and learn from-these successes, it must also recognize that these successes create new challenges for the Community. Collection successes can increase the amount of data to be reviewed by analysts, as can increased information sharing, leading to more\n\"noise\" in the system. Moreover, sustained success against existing terrorist groups-attacking their safe havens, leadership structures, known operational methods--can lead counterterrorism elements to redouble efforts on successful strategies, constraining resources and time devoted to new threats. From an IT perspective, analysts who have experienced success using familiar tools may be reluctant to adopt new ones. And successful technology within one agency must now be rapidly shared across the Community-it is not enough to have \"pockets of excellence.\" (U)\n\n## Appendixc Methodological Recommendations For Information Technology (U)\n\nWe recommend that any Intelligence Community efforts to improve its information technology capabilities adhere to the following four methodological tenets. (U)\nFirst, invest in computing capacity ahead of need The Intelligence Community needs an environment to experiment and pilot innovations using real data, without ~rificing current capabilities. We judge the opportunity cost of not investing in capacity greatly outweighs the direct cost. The panel encountered ageneral belief that computing is expensive. It is not-particularly when examined through the risk management optic of the costs associated with a successful terrorist attack in the United States. (U)\nSecond, embed developers to enable continuous improvements to *applicatiom.* The most successful developments result from a loop where competent developers get continuous feedback from users and frequently improve the system.\n\nThis also provides informed input for improvements to the ''back-end\" systems, which process the data before the users sublnit a query.\n\nThe usual approach of building systems using contracts with up-front requirements has a mediocre record-intelligence officers do not know what is technologically feasible and the technologists lack exposure to the work practices and problem sets that would enable them to offer up innovative solutions. (U)\nThird, adopt a modular approach based on separating applications, data, and infrastructure.\n\nThe Intelligence Community's fragmented approach to IT has enabled. each fiefdom to build end-to-end systems without reference to any common elements--i.e., infrastructure, such as access control or filing applications. This is antithetical to implementing one unit's innovation throughout the enterprise.\n\n- Instead, applications and services should be built\non top of common components such as user\nidentification, authentication, and access control,\nor widgets for froat-ends.\n- The Intelligence Community nmst separate data,\nsecurity. and other basic services from analytic\ntools and frombackend processing tQ enable\nsharing of innovation within and between\nCommunity elements. (U)\nFourth, experiment, and enable experiments with both technology and *policy.* Getting to common infrastructure services requires making decisions among plausible alternatives. One approach is to pick alternatives and try them. In short, the Community needs to be able to test, toss out, and deploy new capabilities and policies at a pace far closer to that of the private sector. This would be one of the greateSt benefits of investing now to expand raw computing power.\n\n- This is consistent with the goals of the I2 Cloud\nPilo~ which will facilitate enterprise data\nprocessing and storage.\n- In general, innovation needs experimentation,\nand improvements in handling large amounts of\ndata need flexible computing resources for\nexperimenting and evaluating.\n- Pilots and experimentation ought to be applied to\npalicies as well, enabling exploration of the\nunintended consequences of introducing both\nnew policies and technologies. (U)\nAppeadixD Analytic Responsibilltles for Counterterrorism Aaalysis (U)\nMEMORANDUMFOR:\nEXCOM\nSUBJECT: (U) Analytic Responsibilities for Counterterrorism Analysis in the U.S. IDtelligence Community REFERENCE: DNI Approved Lanes in the Road: Guiding Principles and Terms of Reference for Counterterrorism Analysis, I 5 March 2006\n(U/IFOU~ Background and **purpose:** Multiple organizations in the US IC have responsibilities for a wide range of counterterrorism analysis, including strategic assessments, tactical pursuit of leads, targeting analysis for direct support to operations., and warning of tactical and strategic terrorism threats and trends. The analysis and published products of these organizations sometimes overlap. This redundancy is appropriate for important subjects, but without direetion it can lead to gaps in coverage at key points. This memorandum establishes the responsibilities and accountability of leaders of major organizations with counterterrorism analytic missions. Leaders of those organizations identified in this memo are accountable for the performance of the missions below.\n\n## (U/Jfoy~ Definitions:\n\na.\n\nStrategic analysis and warning: General descriptions of terrorist organi.zatioDS, including leadership, capabilities, intentions, and relationships. Analysis of emerging or changing terrorist.\n\nmovements, capabilities, and trends. Warning to the operational departments and agencies of the standing threats these organizations pose to American interests at home and abroad.\n\nb. Tactical warning: Notification to the appropriate operational departments and agencies that planning of a terrorist plot is underway. To the extent possible. this warning should identify which organization is planning the attack, what the range of targets might be, and give as precise timeline as is possible given the available reporting. Tactical warning will J8I'Cly be specific but should be more than a recitation of general intent, and will include both available details and assessment.\n\nc. Pursuit: Following tactical warning, analytic and analysis.:.driven insight and tasking for followon collection to establish the underlying basis and provide additional information useful to thwarting the plot.\n\n(U/f.FOUO) **ResponsibHities:** Each organization within the IC with a significant counterterrorism analytic effort is expected to work seamlessly with its counterparts. drawing on the specific strengths and advantages of partners, but is also expected to place particular emphasis on those missions they are uniquely positioned to conduct. Those unique strengths include NCTC's ability to span domestic and foreign developments and its broad information accesses. CIA/OTA's collocation with the operational elements of CIA and HUMINT expertise, FBI's domestic authorities and accesses, DIA 's integrated support to DoD decision makers and deployed forces for offensive and defensive operations, DHS's responsibilities to support state and local organizations, NSA's SIGINT and NGA's geospatial analytical expertise are all key contributors to strategic and tactical warning. All analytical organizations will contribute to the full range of terrorism analysis, but the assignments below ensure that prinmy responsibilities are identified.\n\n\n(U) The following responsibUities for analysis are specifically assigned:\n\n## ! Sj/Nf) Nctc\n\n-\nResponsible for strategic analysis and tactical warning of the full range of terrorist organizations with an\noverseas nexus, with a special focus on homeland threat.\n-\nResponsible for tracking all tactical warnings issued by the IC, and for ensuring that one analytical\norganization is assigned primary responsibility for pursuit of each warning until action is completed or the\nwarning is cancelled.\n-\nResponsible for conducting pursuit of specitic~ ~-\n\n## Fs#Nf) Cia\n\n-\nResponsible for strategic analysis and tactical warning of the full range of overseas terrorist organizations\nwith a particular emphasis on supporting departmental covert action and other overseas counterterrorism\noperations.\n0\n\n-\nResponsible for targeting and pursuit activities capitalizing on its unique HUMINT- and HUMINT-\nderived collection access, in full collaboration with NCTC's pursuit effort and as coordinated by NCTC.\n\n## (S/&!Bdia\n\n-\nResponsible for strategic analysis and tactical warning to support DoD principals and deployed units, with\na focus on threats to DoD forces, installation. and personnel worldwide and support to DoD operations.\n-\nResponsible for pursuit activities to enable tactical warning of plots against military forces, as coordinated\nbyNCTC.\nmust coordinate operations with NCfC. Rather, it refers to NCTC's mandate to ensure that one analytical organization is assigned primary responsibility for pursuit of each warning until action is completed or the warning is cancelled. (U)\n\n## Fs/Fnf) Fbi\n\n-\nResponsible for strategic analysis and tactical warning of terrorist activities with a domestic nexus and\nhomegrown and domestic extremism, and supporting FBI operational activities.\n-\nResponsible for pursuit activities with a domestic nexus, as coordinated by NCTC.\n\n## (S#Nf)Dhs\n\n-\nResponsible for strategic analysis and tactical warning of terrorist activities with a domestic nexus, and\nhomegrown and domestic extremism, and for analysis relevant to infrastructure protection, domestic\nprotective measures, and support to state and local, tribal, and private sector entities.\n\n## (8/Inf) Nsa - (B)( 1 ) (B)(3) Nsa Fsiinanga\n\n-\nResponsible for supporting all overseas (and, as appropriate, domestic) terrorism analysis and operations\nwith all available Geospatial Intelligence.\nDennis C. Blair, signed 7 April2010\n\n## Appendhe White House Directives For Corrective Actions (U)\n\nThis appendix lists corrective actions compiled from two key memoranda issued by the White House:\n\n- Attempted Terrorist Attack on December 25, 2009: Intelligence, Screening, and Watchlisting System\nCorrective Actions, 7 January 2010\n- Inventory of Files Related to Fort Hood *Shooting,* 26 January 2010 (U)\n\n## Directives Regardibg The Attempted Bombing Ofnw 253 (U)\n\nDepartment of State Review visa issuance and revocation criteria and processes, with special emphasis on counterterrorism concerns; detennine bow technology enhancements can facilitate and strengthen visa-related busifless processes. (U)\nDepartment of Homelond Security Aggressively pursue enhanced screening teclmology, protocols, and procedures, especially in regar4 to aviation and other transportation sectors, consistent with privacy rights and civil liberties; strengthen international partnerships and coordination on aviation security issues. (U)\nDevelop recommendations on long-term law enforeement requirements for aviation security in coordination with the Department of Jastice. (U)\nDirector of Nfllionallntelligence Immediately reaffirm and clarify roles and responsibilities of the counterterrorism analytic components of the Intelligence Community in synchronizing, correlating, and analyzing .all somces of intelligence related to terrorism. (U)\nAccelerate information technology enhancements, to include knowledge disc{)very, database integration, crossdatabase searches, and the ability to correlate biographic infonnation with terrorism-related intelligence. (U)\nTake further steps to enhance the rigor and raise the standard of tradecraft of intelligence analysis, especially analysis designed to uncover and prevent terrorist plots. (U)\nEnsure resources are properly aligned with issues highlighted in strategic warning analysis. (U)\nCentrtlllnteiiJgence Agency Issue guidance aimed at ensuring the timely distribution of intelligence reports. (U)\nStrengthen procedures related to how watchlisting information is entered. reviewed, searched, analyzed, and acted upon. (U)\nFederal Bureau of lnvestiglltion/Terrorist Screening Center Conduct a thorough review of Terrorist Screening Database holdings and ascertain current visa status of all\n\"known and suspected terrorists,\" beginning with the No Fly list. (U)\nDevelop recommendations on whether adjustments are needed to the watchlisting Nominations Guidance, including bi.bgrapbic and derogatory criteria for inclusion in the Terrorist Identities Datamart Environment and Terrorist Screening Database, as well as the subset Selectee and No Fly lists. (U)\nNatiotud Coullterlerrorism Center Establish and resource appropriately a process to prioritize and to pursue thoroughly and exhaustively terrorism threat threads, to include the identification of appropriate follow-up action by the intelligence, law enforcement, and homeland security communities. (U)\nEstablish a dedicated capability responsible for enhancing record infonnation on possible terrorists in the Terrorist Identities Datamart Environment for watchlisting purposes. (U)\nNatiotud Security Agency Develop and being implementation of a training course to enhance analysts' awareness ofwatchlisting processes and procedures in partnership with National Counterterrorism Center and the Terrorist Screening Center. (U)\nNatlollll Security Staff Initiate an interagency policy process to review the systemic failures leading to the attempted terror attack on December 25, 2009, in order to rnalre needed policy adjustments and to clarify roles and responsibilities within the counterterrorism community. (U)\nInitiate an interagency review of the watchlisting process, including business processes, procedures, and criteria for watchlisting, and the interoperability and sufficiency of supporting information technology systems.\n\n(U)\n\n## Direetives Regarding Tile Shootiags At Fort Hood (U)\n\nFederal Blll't!au of Investigation and Depanment of Defense Institute refined information sharing procedures to ensure that FBI-developed. counterterrorism mvestigations or assessments involving military members, DoD civilian personnel. or others known to have access to military installations are provided to the Defense Intelligence Agency's Defense Counterintelligence and HUMINT Center in Washington; DC. (U)\nInitiate a single new agreement to subsume and update the separate Memoranda of Understanding governing information sharing between DoD and the FBI. (U)\nDeptlrtment of Defense Survey all DoD detailees serving in FBI JTfFs to determine their awarenessof, training for, and aecess to relevant FBI FISA-related databases. (U)\nReview policies and procedures concerning assignment of detailees to FBI organizations., to include professional qualifications and placement, in relation to DoD and FBI needs. (U)\nFedend Bure~~u oflnveatigalion Develop a policy requiring communications between persons known to be in law enforcement, DoD personnel, and individuals holding security clearances and certain designated agents of foreign powers to be evaluated at the FBI Headquarters level to determine whether such information constitutes foreign intelligence that canrand-,\"'7---==:-:----, shouldbedisseminatedtotheemployerofthecommunicant (U)\note: per FBI, paragraphs are classified RET\n\n## (B)( 1) (B)(3) (B)(7)(E) Fbi\n\nEnhance training of the FBI workforce to ensure that: (I), all and al d\n!, II\n:_\nt U\nI\nI\nJ\nioj.,;. .t:\nI t t -\n! fi~\"'J~ ~! I C and can apply the policy\n\" d (2) all agents and analysts on task forces, particularly those on detail from other agencies, understand and, if appropriate, have access to all FBI databases that contain data needed to successfully accomplish their assigned mission.~\n\n## (B)( 1) (B)(3) (B )(7)(E) Fbi\n\nDirector of National Intelligence Lead an interagency review of information systems in the Intelligence Community to ensure that they provide adequate community-wide access to optimize information sharing. (U)\nLead an intemgency evaluation of whether expertise and training pertaining to dissemination of intelligence is sufficient across the Intelligence Community. (U)\n\n## Fort Hood: Additional Reviews Ordered (U)\n\nDepartment of Defense Drawing upon the lessons learned from this study, as well as the recently completed review by former Army Secretary Togo West and former Admiral Vernon Clark, assess and determine whether additional revisions to policies and regulations governing the identification and reporting of suspicious behavior are appropriate. (U)\nNatiollll Collllterterrorism Center Lead an interagency review of the FBI's recommendation to designate center intelligence collection platforms as .. strategic\" to trigger additional levels of review, including by other agencies such as the National Security Agency and the Central Intelligence Agency. In the course of this review, NCTC and FBI acknowledged that further discussions would be required to determine how this should be done, and the President requests that these discussions commence as soon as possible. (U)\nLead an interagency review ofFBI's recommendation to ensure that all agents and analysts conducting counterterrorism investigations are sensitive to the signs that a person is, or may be, using the Internet to become self-radicalized. The President believes additional study is required to identify the potential signs of violent radicalization before training prograzm are designed and implemented pursuant to this recommendation. This review should also look at whether other government agencies, outside of the IC and law enforcement, could benefit from such training if it can be developed. (U)\nDirector of Nfltiollllnte/ligence Conduct a broader study of the approach by the IC to analyze and exploit FISA-derived information to identify any impediments or gaps in the current approach. assess the appropriateness of resource allocations~ and propose any necessary solntions to ensure the t:nOSt clfective analysis of that information. Where we operate under a \"division oflabot\" approach in reviewing. analyzing, and exploiting raw FISA-derived information that is lawfully shared with more than one agency 1.JD,der existing '!lrt orders, we must ensure that the dissemination standards used' by those agencies are appropriately tailOred to meet the needs of others. .\n\nTherefore, the dissemination policies of agencies responsible for analyzing raw FISA inf'Ormlttion shotild also be reviewed to ensure that they adequately serve the needs of other components of the IC and the US\nGovernment (U)\n\n## Appendixf Tke Community Response To The Fort Hood And Nw 253 Incidents (U)\n\nThe Community responded quicldy to .both incidents. Our general impression is that the Community has taken seriously the need to learn lessons from these incidents, and to institute significant corrections, although we did note that perspectives and approaches varied across the Conmnmity.P Although further actions are needed, as outlined in our recommendations, the Community does have important steps underway. Some of these corrective measures include:\n\n- Clarification, Realignment, and Deconjlictwn of Counterterrorism Roles and *Responsibilities.* The DNI bas\nreassigned analytic counterterrorism responsibilities, which, as we discuss elsewhere, is an important step\nforward. He also established and hosts biweekly counterterrorism meetings among the top leaders ofDHS,\nCIA. FBI, NCTC and NSA to ensure proper' alignment of counterterrorism resources. We suggest further\nsteps in our recommendations.\n- The Pursuit *Group.* NCTC bas established the \"Pursuit Group\" to pursue terrorism threat threads and\nidentify appropriate follow-up action by the intelligence, law enforcement, and homeland security\ncommunities. This is a promising initiative.\n- NCTC, TIDE and *Watchlisting.* NCTC bas surged resources to address data and systems issues with TIDE\nand NCTC watchlisting support, including creating a record enhancement capability for TIDE records,\nincreasing the pace of watchlisting nominations, and implementing technical enhancements. Moreover, the\nCommunity bas worked with TSC to revise watchlisting protocols. We make additional recommendations\nfor TIDE and watchlisting.\n- Information Technology and *Data.* Near-term enhancements and integration initiatives have been proposed\nthat will address significant tactical needs. The 12 pilot will also till important gaps we have identified.\nMore work needs to be done, as outlined by our IT recommendations.\n- *US Persons Issues.* The ODNI is leading an effort to identify and address issues relating to treatment of\ninformation about US Persons, and will consult with the Department of Justice. We discuss these issues in\nour recommendations.\n- Information Sharing and !CD *501.* The ODNI is in the initial phases of implementing lCD 50 I to accelerate\ninformation sharing within the Intelligence Community. Much work lies ahead on this important initiative.\nP We were not able to conduct detailed assessments-we bad difficulty collating infonnation across agencies, and the information we collected Showed that measures were evolving during our review, were in planning stages, or called for future work. (U)\n\n- *Radicalization.* NCTC, FBI, and DHS are at various stages of addressing different aspects of\n.. radicalization,\" focusing on homegrown violent extremism (in its nascent stages).\n- *Agency-Specific Actions.* Agencies have implemented various measures to address problems they identified. (b )(3)\n~\nnote: per FBI, this paragraph is classified SECRET\nTOP SECRET//UCS/S~ONJNeFORNJIIII j(b)(?)(E) I\n\nDefense Criminal Investigative Service\nDepartment of Homeland Security\nDHS Office of Intelligence and Analysis\nDefense Intelligence Agency\n\nDCIS\nDHS DHS/IA\nDIA DoD\nDoJ\nDSD\nDWS\nEC\nFAA\nFBI\nFISA\nGCHQ\nHUMINT\nICRP\nITR\nINR\nIT\nJTIF\nNCIS\nNCS\nNCTC\nNGA\nN1E\nNSA\nNW253\nOTA\n\n~t\nof Justice\nAustralia Defence Signals Directorate\nFBI Data Warehouse System\nFBI Electronic Communication\nFederal Aviation Administration\nFederal Bureau of Investigation\nForeign Intelligence Surveillance Act\nUK Government Communications Headquarters\nHuman Intelligence\nIntelligence Community Review Panel\nIntelligence Information Report\nDepartment of State Bureau of Intelligence and Research\nInformation Technology\nJoint Terrorism Task Force\nNaval Criminal Investigative Service\nNational Clandestine Service\nNational Counterterrorism Center\nNational Geospatial Intelligence Agency\nNational Intelligence Estimate\nNational Security Agency\nNorthwest Airlines Flight 253\nCIA Office of Terrorism Analysis\nPresident's Daily Briefing\n\n# (B )(7)(E)\n\nFBI Terrorist Screening Center United Arab Emirates United Kingdom United States FBI Washington Field Office (U)\n1 Rob Margetta, \"Former 9/11 Commissiotren;:,.Qbatha Mu5t Back DNI,\" CQ.com, 26 Januacy201:(). \"(u) ',\n2 Consistent with the mandate of the RevieW Palrel~ we do not focus our roriclusions and, rero:mmendati011s on specific individuals. For that reason, we use the , pronoun \"he\" throu~out the report. ~avoid;si'Qgf~g out specific individuals, and do not name itic\nofficers who may .at some point be witn~ina criminal trial against Major Hasan. We alSo trY to strike a balance between not identifying specific individUals who spoke frankly while still providing the~ a.\n\nsense of the organization that providedi ~\n6l:fil~i>n or had action on a specific issue. (U)\n\n\n3 Protecting the Force: Lessons from *FoJ\"'* HOO!i~rt\n~fthe DoD Independent_R~~iew, t.O.~'~}. (U)\n..\nMegan McCloskey, \"CiVIhan pohce officer acted quickly to help subdue alleged gunman,\" Stars and Stripes (Mideast Edition), 8 November 2009. (U)\n5 [Open Source I WASHINGTON POST ctRAS\nID:OW5666743l I 200802271 (U) I CIRAS ID:\nOW56667431)\n6 Hasan raised the same issues he pr-esented in his emails to Aulaqi in a June 2007 research paper, \"lbe Koranic World View as it Relates to Muslims m the US\nMilitary,\" on file with the panel. Hasan cited the example of Sergeant Hasan Akbar's killing of fellow US\nsoldiers to underscore the internal conflict faced by Muslim soldiers serving in the US military and that Hasan's paper goes on to say that Muslim soldiers who perceive the US military to be advancing the cause of\n''American hegemony\" rather than justice have \"turned against fellow troops\" and argued for the US mj]jtary to assign Muslim soldiers to religiously acceptable positions to avoid ''the potential for adverse events.\"\nTOP SEORE'fHHOSfSI~~OONINOFORN.-\nj(b )(?)(E) I\n10 The agent bad been assigned the lead by his supervisor on 27 Februacy, but because of his workload he did not work on the case until27 May. Discretionary leads are generally required to be completed within 90\ndays of assignment. (S/INF)\nt I [FBIS I GMP20090610479002120090810 I\n(U/~ I CIRAS ID: FB5941323]\n12 According to the FBI, neither they nor their UK\ncounterparts were able to corrobomte these claims.\n\n(TS/fSIIfP'W). (S/,~W)\n39 [Other 1 National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, The 9111 Commission Report. I\n20041 (U) I CIRAS ID:]\n4 Countmerrorism Mission Management, FY201 0\nCounterterrorism Production Guidance, January 2010.\n\nfSffNi7 The publication date was January 2010\nalthough the contents had been drafted befOre th~ 25\nDecember incident (U)\n41 \"Top Frontbumerintelligence Issl1eS.\" September\n2009. TOP 8~itE'fh'HCSISi\nGfFK!feROOl't/N()F{)ffit. (SIMF3\n42 NIE MI'I2007-02HC. Memorandum to the Halders of NIE 2007-02HC, The Terrorist Threat to the US\n\n## (B)(7)(E) Fbi (B)( 1) (B)(3) Cia (B)(3) Nsa (B)(7)(E) Fbi (B)(3) Nsa\n\nneeds fewer dots,\" Washington Post, p. A21. (0)\n49 Russell Goldman and Huma Khan, ''TimelinC of terror: Clues in Bomber Umar Faroo.k Abduhnutallab's Past,\" ABCNews.com, 3'0 December 2009. (U}.  .\n\nso DJ~. Grady, Politics: Why HeadS ~\nR.<iJtll TheAt'tantic.oom, 8 January 2010. (U)\n\n51 Eric L~\nE* Schmitt,~ .Mart~~\n\"Review of Jet l30mb Shows Mote Mis$1'Jd.~~~\nNew York Times; 18 January201~p. At.~\n52 Mike Allen, \"CIA also knew about suspect,\"\nPolitico.com, 29 Decenmer 2009. (U)\n.\n\n53 Similarly, the State Department V1$8S Vtpet cabte of\n20 November noted only \"lnfonnation at post soggersts subject may be involved with Y emeni-based extremists.\" (U/~\n54 Jordy Yager, \"Lawmakers press forwani with n:views of intel failures after Christmas attack,\" TheHill.com, 24\nJanuary 2010. (U)\n55 Joseph Curl, \"Counterterrorism chief: Officials 'didn't unclerstand' intel,\" Washington Times, 9 Jmru.ary2010, p. A l; \"Bight Years later,\" New Y ode TtmeS, 8 Jammry\n2010,. P. A26; and Greg Miller, \"Costly eti01S in probe of failedjet airliner blast detailed.\" Los Angeles Times,\n21 JaAuary 2010, p. AI; Brian Ross and Kirit R.adia,\n\"Northwest 253: Obama Blasts Intelligenee Failures as Evidence ofMissed Signals Mounts.\" ABQiews.com.\n\n29 December 20Q9; and Jennifer Sims and Bob Gallucci,\n\"Why . . . - .\n\nsharing cp't aiwasllll!f=lll5~.\n\nw .\n:~~aJanuary20lO,p. At9 .. tt1)\n~ In any event, the Intelligence~ typieally does not mcoitor purchases of airline tickets worldwide.\n\nWfim Starks, \"Malc:iaithem talk,\" CQ..com; II January\n2010. (U)\n.\n\n58 Gregory Tn:verton, ''T~wiH.~~oa again.\" Los Angek!s.'Times, 19 Januat! 211:t~ pi Al3.\n\nT~\nWrites:l~Jat \"Siitlply sinifiltghUn ..\n\nmigbt have d~ne $e job.\" . (ll)\n59 Sebli~Stian~ \"U:s~ lea:mett - tel'l'    on ahiine\n' - .. . .\n\n.\n\n. .\n\n.\n\n. . .. . Ill tgellGC.\n\n.\n\nattack~wltie heW8sen route.'\" Los .tm&e{es\nTimes, 7 *]8llU8JY* 2010. (U)\n- ..\n\n60 Frances Townsend, \"No one connected flie. dots. on terror plot;'~ (;NN.com, )(J I>eceJnQer WlO; ,(U)\n61 \"Yement :flWU,US.Yemerti CitiZenTamgMore Operational ROle in Al-Qa'ida Groupt\"(~NCTC\nOnline. 5 May~\n'('f'Dp-\nSeuit:ti~JhmFO'R:N1- ~\n62 Mimi Hall; 'Ubama.orders security~\nT~. 8 ~\n2DfO, P AI. (U)\n63 NIEMa200'1-02HC. ~trifie~\n\nNIE 2007-02HC, The Terrorist Threaf.lli ...\n\nHomeland tfSMiCSI/Si'-6Jf'OfKJ1Rf(\n'\n(stfl'~f)\n64 TSA interviewees noted that the number '*''rise above 300 depend~ on the season ami the.~ is even higher once priVate airstrips arc included. (MNFT\n65 We note that $ome legislators arc alrea4y~g at the idea that unspecified post-Detroit regulations could cause inconveniences that represent a \"disservice to the traveling public. See Kara Rowland 8lld Nicholas K.ralev, \"Obama pledges changes on security?\"\nWashington *Times.* 6 January 2010, p. A.L..!,U).\n\n66 CTC and NCTC produced mon: than ~B\narticles\n\nin2000 in.additronJo~-~-.~ .. -...~>'h.\n     . .,\n          \":.'\n                . ''\n                      ,\n                        '\n                          '\n                           ,.~:o&~a._pu.t ..\n                                      ' .. ,-~,\n\n8lld ~\n~1'15.\n\n-(&1.~\nofficership with respect to the alleged perpetrator.\n\nThese individuals failed to demonstrate that officership is the essence of being a member of the military Erofession, regardless of the officer's specialty.\" (U)\n6 Other officers in the FBI WFO, including the WFO\nsupervisor, did know about the database, but the supervisor did not recommend to the DCIS agent that he\n88 Terrorist Screening Center, \"Protocol Regarding Terrorist Nominations: Guidance Regarding Application of the Minimum Substantive Derogatory Criteria for Accepting Nominations to the Terrorist Screening Database,\" February 2009. (U/~\n89 For example, during this approximate timeframe, TSC rejected a broad range ofNCTC \"No Fly\" requests even those\n(S7'J'Nft-\n90 We focus more on the 25 December incident because the implications and responsibilities of the Intelligence Community are greater than in the case of Fort Hood.\n\n(U)\n91 Memorandum from CIA Director Panetta to DNl Blair, \"Readdressal of teporting in the Wake of j(b)(?)(E) I\n92 Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, \"Report on the Attempted Terrorist Attack on Northwest Airlines Flight 253,\" t.'T~tmcst~Iitoe\n'fHF), 16 March\n94 For example, not provide enough derogatory information on Abdulmutallab's extremist links to justifY submitting the information to TIDE. Using the exact same information with the same level of derogatory reporting, however, Department of State officers prepared a Visas Viper report that ensured that the information on Abdulmutallab was entered into CLASS, thereby creating a record in TIDE.-tSh'NI<t\n95 To take a few examples, Homeland Security Presidential Directive-6 notes that watchlisting is appropriate for \"known or appropriately suspected\"\nterrorists to be watchlisted, while TSC guidelines justifY\nwatchlisting if the intelligence supports a ''rationale inference.\" NCTC guidelines notes that watchlisting requires \"reasonable suspicion\" and that the individual be \"operationally capable.\" In our view, language such as this gives the appearance of making the criteria ostensibly more schematic and asceptic, but \"Mlich actually make it more subjective. ~\n96 Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, \"Report on the Attempted Terrorist Attack on Northwest Airlines Flight 253,\" (T~t/t'ICS\"/5J:OC/\nt*}, 16 March\n\n(b )(1)\n(b)(3)\n(b)(7)(E)\nFBI\n\n20 lO. (SI'J'MP)\n97 US Persons issues are discussed in detail beginning on\nt':ge32. (U)\n8 The FBI, for example, is working toward its Next\nGeneration Analytic Environment (NGAE). The NGAE\ninitiative represents the FBI's vision for utilizing\ntechnology to further the FBI's ability to correlate and\nshare terrorism-related intelligence. As a first step, the\nFBI has identified the principal repositories of data\nwithin the FBI and is in the process of developing a\ncross-database search capability. The long-term\n\nobjective is to develop an architectural fiamework that one day might permit the FBI to ingest and share information across the Intelligence Community. (U)\n99 \"FAA Intelligence Review for NW 253 Bombing Attempt and Subsequent AQAP 1'hreaa,\"\n\n## (B)( 1) (B)(3) Cia\n\n\"Analytic Responsibilities for Colll'lterterrorism Analysis in the US Intelligence Cotnmunity\". EIS\n00284. 1 Aprii2010.~/Mf)-\n102 The lack of FBI-DOD collab<mrtion-i)Srticularly the shortfalls on Serviee 1epr.esentation to the ITIF-was noted in Protectihg the Force: Lessons from Fort Hood\n(Report of the DoD Independent Review, 2010). (U)\n103 The Commlll'lity's rolesfor coHecting. reta:ining, and disseminating US Person infonnation are laid out in Executive Order 12333 and in procedures that implement that Order for each Intelligence Community element, as approved by the Attorney General and the head of the Community element. in consultation with the DNI. (U)\n104 A primary difference is the role Aulaqi, who directed Abdulmutallab's attack but appears to have mainly played an\n\nfor Hasan.\n\n## (B)( 1) (B)(3) (B)(7){E) Fbi\n\nThe publicly released version of the DOD\nindependent review group's report assessed that the relevant DoD personnel policies wer:e aenerany adequate and attrilmtea the omissioos to Hasan's supervisors, who \"failed to apply appropriatejudgmmt and standards of offieership.\" The det:aiied findings and recommendations related to this matter can be fOlll'ld in the restricted annex of the report, which DoD declined to share with us. (U)"
    },
    {
        "text": "## The Comprehensive National Cybersecurity Initiative\n\nPresident Obama has identified cybersecurity as one of the most serious economic and national security challenges we face as a nation, but one that we as a government or as a country are not adequately prepared to counter. Shortly after taking office, the President therefore ordered a thorough review of federal efforts to defend the U.S. information and communications infrastructure and the development of a comprehensive approach to securing America's digital infrastructure.\n\nIn May 2009, the President accepted the recommendations of the resulting Cyberspace Policy Review, including the selection of an Executive Branch Cybersecurity Coordinator who will have regular access to the President. The Executive Branch was also directed to work closely with all key players in U.S. cybersecurity, including state and local governments and the private sector, to ensure an organized and unified response to future cyber incidents; strengthen public/private partnerships to find technology solutions that ensure U.S. security and prosperity; invest in the cutting-edge research and development necessary for the innovation and discovery to meet the digital challenges of our time; and begin a campaign to promote cybersecurity awareness and digital literacy from our boardrooms to our classrooms and begin to build the digital workforce of the 21st century. Finally, the President directed that these activities be conducted in a way that is consistent with ensuring the privacy rights and civil liberties guaranteed in the Constitution and cherished by all Americans.\n\nThe activities under way to implement the recommendations of the Cyberspace Policy Review build on the Comprehensive National Cybersecurity Initiative (CNCI) launched by President George W. Bush in National Security Presidential Directive 54/Homeland Security Presidential Directive 23 (NSPD-54/\nHSPD-23) in January 2008. President Obama determined that the CNCI and its associated activities should evolve to become key elements of a broader, updated national U.S. cybersecurity strategy. These CNCI initiatives will play a key role in supporting the achievement of many of the key recommendations of President Obama's Cyberspace Policy Review. The CNCI consists of a number of mutually reinforcing initiatives with the following major goals designed to help secure the United States in cyberspace:\n\n\nToestablishafrontlineofdefenseagainsttoday'simmediatethreatsby creating or\nenhancing shared situational awareness of network vulnerabilities, threats, and events within the Federal Governmentand ultimately with state, local, and tribal governments and private sector partnersand the ability to act quickly to reduce our current vulnerabilities and prevent intrusions.\n\nTodefendagainstthefullspectrumofthreatsby enhancing U.S. counterintelligence capabilities and increasing the security of the supply chain for key information technologies.\n\n\nTostrengthenthefuturecybersecurityenvironmentby expanding cyber education; coordinating and redirecting research and development efforts across the Federal Government; and working to define and develop strategies to deter hostile or malicious activity in cyberspace.\nIn building the plans for the CNCI, it was quickly realized that these goals could not be achieved without also strengthening certain key strategic foundational capabilities within the Government. Therefore, the CNCI includes funding within the federal law enforcement, intelligence, and defense communities to enhance such key functions as criminal investigation; intelligence collection, processing, and analysis; and information assurance critical to enabling national cybersecurity efforts. The CNCI was developed with great care and attention to privacy and civil liberties concerns in close consultation with privacy experts across the government. Protecting civil liberties and privacy rights remain fundamental objectives in the implementation of the CNCI.\n\nIn accord with President Obama's declared intent to make transparency a touchstone of his presidency, the Cyberspace Policy Review identified enhanced information sharing as a key component of effective cybersecurity. To improve public understanding of Federal efforts, the Cybersecurity Coordinator has directed the release of the following summary description of the CNCI.\n\n## CnciInitiativeDetails\n\nInitiative#1.ManagetheFederalEnterpriseNetworkasasinglenetworkenterprisewithTrusted InternetConnections.The Trusted Internet Connections (TIC) initiative, headed by the Office of Management and Budget and the Department of Homeland Security, covers the consolidation of the Federal Government's external access points (including those to the Internet). This consolidation will result in a common security solution which includes: facilitating the reduction of external access points, establishing baseline security capabilities; and, validating agency adherence to those security capabilities. Agencies participate in the TIC initiative either as TIC Access Providers (a limited number of agencies that operate their own capabilities) or by contracting with commercial Managed Trusted IP\nService (MTIPS) providers through the GSA-managed NETWORX contract vehicle.\n\nInitiative#2.DeployanintrusiondetectionsystemofsensorsacrosstheFederalenterprise.\nIntrusion Detection Systems using passive sensors form a vital part of U.S. Government network defenses by identifying when unauthorized users attempt to gain access to those networks. DHS is deploying, as part of its EINSTEIN 2 activities, signature-based sensors capable of inspecting Internet traffic entering Federal systems for unauthorized accesses and malicious content. The EINSTEIN 2 capability enables analysis of network flow information to identify potential malicious activity while conducting automatic full packet inspection of traffic entering or exiting U.S. Government networks for malicious activity using signature-based intrusion detection technology. Associated with this investment in technology is a parallel investment in manpower with the expertise required to accomplish DHS's expanded network security mission. EINSTEIN 2 is capable of alerting US-CERT in real time to the presence of malicious or potentially harmful activity in federal network traffic and provides correlation and visualization of the derived data. Due to the capabilities within EINSTEIN 2, US-CERT analysts have a greatly improved understanding of the network environment and an increased ability to address the weaknesses and vulnerabilities in Federal network security. As a result, US-CERT has greater situational awareness and can more effectively develop and more readily share security relevant information with network defenders across the U.S. Government, as well as with security professionals in the private sector and the American public. The Department of Homeland Security's Privacy Office has conducted and published a Privacy Impact Assessment for the EINSTEIN 2 program.\n\nInitiative#3.PursuedeploymentofintrusionpreventionsystemsacrosstheFederalenterprise.\nThis Initiative represents the next evolution of protection for civilian Departments and Agencies of the Federal Executive Branch. This approach, called EINSTEIN 3, will draw on commercial technology and specialized government technology to conduct real-time full packet inspection and threat-based decision-making on network traffic entering or leaving these Executive Branch networks. The goal of EINSTEIN 3 is to identify and characterize malicious network traffic to enhance cybersecurity analysis, situational awareness and security response. It will have the ability to automatically detect and respond appropriately to cyber threats before harm is done, providing an intrusion prevention system supporting dynamic defense. EINSTEIN 3 will assist DHS US-CERT in defending, protecting and reducing vulnerabilities on Federal Executive Branch networks and systems. The EINSTEIN 3 system will also support enhanced information sharing by US-CERT with Federal Departments and Agencies by giving DHS the ability to automate alerting of detected network intrusion attempts and, when deemed necessary by DHS, to send alerts that do not contain the content of communications to the National Security Agency\n(NSA) so that DHS efforts may be supported by NSA exercising its lawfully authorized missions. This initiative makes substantial and long-term investments to increase national intelligence capabilities to discover critical information about foreign cyber threats and use this insight to inform EINSTEIN 3\nsystems in real time. DHS will be able to adapt threat signatures determined by NSA in the course of its foreign intelligence and DoD information assurance missions for use in the EINSTEIN 3 system in support of DHS's federal system security mission. Information sharing on cyber intrusions will be conducted in accordance with the laws and oversight for activities related to homeland security, intelligence, and defense in order to protect the privacy and rights of U.S. citizens.\n\nDHS is currently conducting a exercise to pilot the EINSTEIN 3 capabilities described in this initiative based on technology developed by NSA and to solidify processes for managing and protecting information gleaned from observed cyber intrusions against civilian Executive Branch systems. Government civil liberties and privacy officials are working closely with DHS and US-CERT to build appropriate and necessary privacy protections into the design and operational deployment of EINSTEIN 3.\n\nInitiative#4:Coordinateandredirectresearchanddevelopment(R&D)efforts.No single individual or organization is aware of all of the cyber-related R&D activities being funded by the Government. This initiative is developing strategies and structures for coordinating all cyber R&D sponsored or conducted by the U.S. government, both classified and unclassified, and to redirect that R&D where needed. This Initiative is critical to eliminate redundancies in federally funded cybersecurity research, and to identify research gaps, prioritize R&D efforts, and ensure the taxpayers are getting full value for their money as we shape our strategic investments.\n\nInitiative#5.Connectcurrentcyberopscenterstoenhancesituationalawareness. There is a pressing need to ensure that government information security offices and strategic operations centers share data regarding malicious activities against federal systems, consistent with privacy protections for personally identifiable and other protected information and as legally appropriate, in order to have a better understanding of the entire threat to government systems and to take maximum advantage of each organization's unique capabilities to produce the best overall national cyber defense possible. This initiative provides the key means necessary to enable and support shared situational awareness and collaboration across six centers that are responsible for carrying out U.S. cyber activities. This effort focuses on key aspects necessary to enable practical mission bridging across the elements of U.S. cyber activities: foundational capabilities and investments such as upgraded infrastructure, increased bandwidth, and integrated operational capabilities; enhanced collaboration, including common technology, tools, and procedures; and enhanced shared situational awareness through shared analytic and collaborative technologies. The National Cybersecurity Center (NCSC) within the Department of Homeland Security will play a key role in securing U.S. Government networks and systems under this initiative by coordinating and integrating information from the six centers to provide cross-domain situational awareness, analyzing and reporting on the state of U.S. networks and systems, and fostering interagency collaboration and coordination.\n\nInitiative#6.Developandimplementagovernment-widecybercounterintelligence(CI)plan.A\ngovernment-wide cyber counterintelligence plan is necessary to coordinate activities across all Federal Agencies to detect, deter, and mitigate the foreign-sponsored cyber intelligence threat to U.S. and private sector information systems. To accomplish these goals, the plan establishes and expands cyber CI education and awareness programs and workforce development to integrate CI into all cyber operations and analysis, increase employee awareness of the cyber CI threat, and increase counterintelligence collaboration across the government. The Cyber CI Plan is aligned with the National Counterintelligence Strategy of the United States of America (2007) and supports the other programmatic elements of the CNCI.\n\nInitiative#7.Increasethesecurityofourclassifiednetworks.Classified networks house the Federal Government's most sensitive information and enable crucial war-fighting, diplomatic, counterterrorism, law enforcement, intelligence, and homeland security operations. Successful penetration or disruption of these networks could cause exceptionally grave damage to our national security. We need to exercise due diligence in ensuring the integrity of these networks and the data they contain.\n\nInitiative#8.Expandcybereducation. While billions of dollars are being spent on new technologies to secure the U.S. Government in cyberspace, it is the people with the right knowledge, skills, and abilities to implement those technologies who will determine success.  However there are not enough cybersecurity experts within the Federal Government or private sector to implement the CNCI, nor is there an adequately established Federal cybersecurity career field. Existing cybersecurity training and personnel development programs, while good, are limited in focus and lack unity of effort. In order to effectively ensure our continued technical advantage and future cybersecurity, we must develop a technologically-skilled and cyber-savvy workforce and an effective pipeline of future employees. It will take a national strategy, similar to the effort to upgrade science and mathematics education in the 1950's, to meet this challenge.\n\nInitiative#9.Defineanddevelopenduring\"leap-ahead\"technology,strategies,andprograms.\nOne goal of the CNCI is to develop technologies that provide increases in cybersecurity by orders of magnitude above current systems and which can be deployed within 5 to 10 years. This initiative seeks to develop strategies and programs to enhance the component of the government R&D portfolio that pursues high-risk/high-payoff solutions to critical cybersecurity problems. The Federal Government has begun to outline Grand Challenges for the research community to help solve these difficult problems that require 'out of the box' thinking. In dealing with the private sector, the government is identifying and communicating common needs that should drive mutual investment in key research areas.\n\nInitiative#10.Defineanddevelopenduringdeterrencestrategiesandprograms.Our Nation's senior policymakers must think through the long-range strategic options available to the United States in a world that depends on assuring the use of cyberspace. To date, the U.S. Government has been implementing traditional approaches to the cybersecurity problemand these measures have not achieved the level of security needed. This Initiative is aimed at building an approach to cyber defense strategy that deters interference and attack in cyberspace by improving warning capabilities, articulating roles for private sector and international partners, and developing appropriate responses by both state and non-state actors.\n\nInitiative#11.Developamulti-prongedapproachforglobalsupplychainriskmanagement.\n\nGlobalization of the commercial information and communications technology marketplace provides increased opportunities for those intent on harming the United States by penetrating the supply chain to gain unauthorized access to data, alter data, or interrupt communications.  Risks stemming from both the domestic and globalized supply chain must be managed in a strategic and comprehensive way over the entire lifecycle of products, systems and services. Managing this risk will require a greater awareness of the threats, vulnerabilities, and consequences associated with acquisition decisions; the development and employment of tools and resources to technically and operationally mitigate risk across the lifecycle of products (from design through retirement); the development of new acquisition policies and practices that reflect the complex global marketplace; and partnership with industry to develop and adopt supply chain and risk management standards and best practices. This initiative will enhance Federal Government skills, policies, and processes to provide departments and agencies with a robust toolset to better manage and mitigate supply chain risk at levels commensurate with the criticality of, and risks to, their systems and networks.\n\nInitiative#12.DefinetheFederalroleforextendingcybersecurityintocriticalinfrastructure\ndomains.The U.S. Government depends on a variety of privately owned and operated critical infrastructures to carry out the public's business. In turn, these critical infrastructures rely on the efficient operation of information systems and networks that are vulnerable to malicious cyber threats. This Initiative builds on the existing and ongoing partnership between the Federal Government and the public and private sector owners and operators of Critical Infrastructure and Key Resources (CIKR). The Department of Homeland Security and its private-sector partners have developed a plan of shared action with an aggressive series of milestones and activities. It includes both short-term and long-term recommendations, specifically incorporating and leveraging previous accomplishments and activities that are already underway. It addresses security and information assurance efforts across the cyber infrastructure to increase resiliency and operational capabilities throughout the CIKR sectors. It includes a focus on public-private sharing of information regarding cyber threats and incidents in both government and CIKR."
    },
    {
        "text": "# Federal Bureau Of Investigation Department Of Homeland Security\n\n# Strategic Intelligence Assessment And Data On Domestic Terrorism\n\n\nSubmitted to the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, the Committee on Homeland Security, and the Committee of the Judiciary of the United States House of Representatives, and the Select Committee on Intelligence, the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, and the Committee of the Judiciary of the United States Senate May 2021\n\n\n## Table Of Contents\n\n\nI.\nOverview of Reporting Requirement ........ 2\nII.\nExecutive Summary ........ 2\nIII.\nIntroduction........ 2\nIV.\nStrategic Intelligence Assessment ........ 5\nV.\nDiscussion and Comparison of Investigative Activities ........ 9\nVI.\nFBI Data on Domestic Terrorism ........ 19\nVII.\nRecommendations ........ 27\nAppendix ........ 29\n\n\nI. Overview of Reporting Requirement The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2020 (the Act) requires the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and the Secretary of Homeland Security, in consultation with the Director of National Intelligence (DNI), to jointly produce a report containing a strategic intelligence assessment and data on domestic terrorism (DT).1 The Act requires the report to contain a strategic intelligence assessment, a discussion of activities, certain data on DT matters, and recommendations.\n\nII. Executive Summary Preventing terrorist attacks remains a top priority for both the FBI and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). The threat posed by international and domestic threat actors has evolved significantly since 9/11. The greatest terrorism threat to the Homeland we face today is posed by lone offenders,2 often radicalized online, who look to attack soft targets with easily accessible weapons. Many of these violent extremists are motivated and inspired by a mix of socio-political goals and personal grievances against their targets. With this report, we are providing our strategic intelligence assessments on DT, a detailed discussion of our procedures and methods to address DT threats, as well as data on DT incidents and our investigations.\n\nIII. Introduction The FBI and DHS are both charged with preventing terrorist attacks in the United States, including those conducted by Domestic Violent Extremists (DVEs).3 This goal drives the FBI's mission to proactively lead law enforcement and domestic intelligence efforts to defeat terrorist attacks against US citizens and US interests through an integrated strategy to detect, penetrate,\n\ndisrupt, and dismantle criminal DT plots, and the FBI and DHS missions to provide strategic analysis of the DVE landscape.\n\nDT for the FBI's purposes is referenced in US Code at 18 U.S.C.  2331(5), and is defined as activities:\n\n\n- Involving acts dangerous to human life that are a violation of the criminal laws of the United\nStates or of any State;\n- Appearing to be intended to:\n\no Intimidate or coerce a civilian population; o Influence the policy of government by intimidation or coercion; or o Affect the conduct of a government by mass destruction, assassination or\nkidnapping; and\n\n- Occurring primarily within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States. In comparison, international terrorism (IT) for the FBI's purposes is referenced in U.S. Code at 18 U.S.C.  2331(1), and is defined as activities:\n\n- Involving violent acts or acts dangerous to human life that are a violation of the criminal\nlaws of the United States or of any State, or that would be a criminal violation if committed with the jurisdiction of the United States or of any State;\n- Appearing to be intended to:\n\no Intimidate or coerce a civilian population; o Influence the policy of government by intimidation or coercion; or o Affect the conduct of a government by mass destruction, assassination or\nkidnapping; and\n\n- Occurring primarily outside the territorial jurisdiction of the United States, or transcend\nnational boundaries in terms of the means by which they are accomplished, the persons they appear intended to intimidate or coerce, or the locale in which their perpetrators operate or seek asylum.4\n\nThe DHS derives its definition of DT from the Homeland Security Act definition of terrorism, 6 U.S.C. 101(18), which is similar to, but not identical, to the 18 U.S.C. 2331(5) definition.\nUnder the Homeland Security Act, terrorism:\n\n\n\n- Involves an act that:\n\no Is dangerous to human life or potentially destructive of critical infrastructure or\nkey resources; and\no Is a violation of the criminal laws of the United States or any State or other\nsubdivision of the United States, and\n- Appears to be intended to:\n\no Intimidate or coerce a civilian population; o Influence the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion; or o Affect the conduct of a government by mass destruction, assassination, or\nkidnapping.\n\nIn our discussion of DT threats, we use the words \"violent extremism\" to define DT threats because mere advocacy of political or social positions, political activism, use of strong rhetoric, or generalized philosophic embrace of violent tactics may not constitute violent extremism, and may be constitutionally protected. Under FBI policy and federal law, no investigative activity may be based solely on First Amendment activity, or the apparent or actual race, ethnicity, national origin, religion, gender, sexual orientation, or gender identity of the individual or group. The FBI does not investigate, collect, or maintain information on US persons solely for the purpose of monitoring activities protected by the First Amendment. While the majority of DVEs fall into one threat category, some draw upon or are inspired by ideological themes found in other threat categories, as depicted in the following graphic.\n\n\nIV. Strategic Intelligence Assessment The Act calls for a strategic intelligence assessment of DT in the United States during 2017, 2018, and 2019. Since 2017, while the FBI successfully investigated and disrupted DVE activities, plots, and threats, and the FBI and DHS continued to provide strategic warnings and analysis of the heightened DVE threat, DVE lone offenders acting independently and without direction from specific groups have been the primary actor in DT lethal attacks. The FBI and DHS assessed lone offenders would continue to be the primary actor in these attacks, and would continue to pose significant mitigation challenges due to their capacity for independent radicalization and mobilization and preference for easily accessible weapons. The FBI and DHS assessed multiple factors, including perceptions of or responses to political and social conditions and law enforcement and government overreach, would also almost certainly continue to contribute to DVE radicalization, target selection, and mobilization in violation of federal, state, and local law and hate crime5 statutes. Strategic Intelligence Assessment for 2017 In 2017, DVEs remained a persistent source of violence, with Racially or Ethnically Motivated Violent Extremists (RMVEs)6 advocating for the superiority of the white race and Anti- Government or Anti-Authority Violent Extremists (AGAAVEs) - primarily Anarchist Violent Extremists (AVEs),7 Militia Violent Extremists (MVEs),8 and Sovereign Citizen Violent Extremists (SCVEs)9 - presenting the greatest threats of violence. RMVEs were the primary sources of lethal and significant violence, with lone offenders conducting lethal attacks against targets of opportunity, using non-complex tactics and accessible weapons. The FBI and DHS\nassessed broad drivers of domestic violent extremism, including perceptions of or responses to government activity, and social, political, and economic conditions, continued to feed a consistent level of domestic violent extremism, although trends within individual extremist movements remained dynamic. DVE violence in 2017 consisted primarily of attacks or threatening behavior against accessible targets or individuals, using weapons acquired with relative ease, including firearms and bladed weapons, or unsophisticated tactics such as physical assaults. Law enforcement and racial minorities were the prevalent DVE targets in 2017, with race providing a principal focus for RMVEs espousing the superiority of the white race, and law enforcement and government continuing to represent key targets of interest for AGAAVEs, specifically MVEs and SCVEs. Numerous violent encounters also took place between perceived ideological opponents.\n\nactivities. 7 As defined by the FBI and DHS, anarchist violent extremism encompasses the potentially unlawful use or threat of force or violence in furtherance of an anti-government or anti-authority violent extremist ideology that considers capitalism and centralized government to be unnecessary and oppressive. 8 As defined by the FBI and DHS, militia violent extremism encompasses the potentially unlawful use or threat of force or violence in furtherance of an anti-government or anti-authority violent extremist ideology in response to perceived abuses of power by the government, especially in regard to suspected infringements on gun rights; excessive use of force by law enforcement; or bureaucratic incompetence in attending to critical tasks. 9 As defined by the FBI and DHS, sovereign citizen violent extremism encompasses the potentially unlawful use or threat of force or violence in furtherance of anti-government or anti-authority violent extremist ideological agendas by those who identify as sovereign citizens. Sovereign citizens are US citizens who claim to have special knowledge or heritage that renders them immune from government authority and laws.\n\nAbortion-Related Violent Extremists10 and Animal Rights/Environmental Violent Extremists11 also remained sources of harm or economic damage through criminal acts of destruction, sabotage, or arson. In 2017, DVEs conducted five lethal attacks using bladed weapons, firearms, and a vehicular ramming that resulted in the deaths of eight individuals. Of those lethal incidents, RMVEs were responsible for four attacks resulting in seven deaths, and MVEs, a subset of the AGAAVE threat category, conducted one attack resulting in one death. Of the four attacks conducted by RMVEs, RMVEs espousing the superiority of the white race conducted two attacks resulting in two deaths, and RMVEs who used racism or injustice in American society to justify their use of violence conducted the other two attacks resulting in five deaths. Both the FBI and DHS continued to work with state and local law enforcement partners in matters related to domestic violent extremism, including through provision of strategic analysis of the threat, and enhanced both independent and joint collaborative reporting, collection, and targeting efforts via human source and technical means.\n\nStrategic Intelligence Assessment for 2018 In 2018, the FBI and DHS assessed DVEs posed a persistent and evolving threat of violence, with RMVEs advocating for the superiority of the white race and AGAAVEs, specifically SCVEs, engaging in lethal attacks. Abortion-Related Violent Extremists, Animal Rights/Environmental Violent Extremists, and Puerto Rican National Violent Extremists,12 which is a subset of the AGAAVE threat category, also caused harm and economic damage through criminal acts of property destruction and arson. The six fatal DVE attacks in 2018 underscored how DVEs acting as lone offenders continued to advance their extremist ideologies by engaging in lethal attacks and acts of violence against targets of opportunity, using rudimentary tactics and readily accessible weapons. DVEs were primarily enabled by their use of the Internet, including social media platforms, which has increasingly enabled individuals to radicalize online and engage other DVEs without having to join organized groups.\n\nIn 2018, DVE lone offenders conducted six lethal attacks using bladed weapons, firearms, and violent assaults that resulted in the deaths of 17 individuals. Of those lethal incidents, RMVEs advocating for the superiority of the white race were responsible for five attacks resulting in 16\n\n10 As defined by the FBI and DHS, abortion-related violent extremism encompasses the potentially unlawful use or deaths, and an SCVE, a subset of the AGAAVE threat category, was responsible for one attack resulting in one death.\n\nMVEs, a subset of the AGAAVE threat category, continued to espouse violent rhetoric, often lacking intent or credibility, to engage in violence against Muslims, political activists, and protestors to protect their vision of public safety, such as border-related issues. In addition to the previously mentioned 2018 lethal attack conducted by an SCVE in response to law enforcement actions, SCVEs also engaged in non-lethal criminal activity in response to law enforcement actions and criminal activity motivated by perceptions that the US Government is illegitimate, including identity and financial fraud, property theft, and attempts to institute sovereign citizen \"common law.\" AVEs, another subset of the AGAAVE threat category, conducted criminal acts and may have used improvised incendiary devices to target law enforcement and others during confrontations.\n\nAn expansive set of factors, including responses to government activity, in addition to social, economic, and political conditions, was assessed to very likely contribute to inspire DVE radicalization, target selection, and mobilization in violation of federal law. As DVE attacks, plot disruptions, and other criminal acts reflected persistent aspirations for large-scale or masscasualty acts of violence by lone offenders, the FBI continued to work with state and local law enforcement partners to sustain and enhance collaborative efforts to mitigate the DVE threat. Both the FBI and DHS continued efforts to publish joint analytic products to our shared stakeholders in this field.\n\nStrategic Intelligence Assessment for 2019 In 2019, the FBI and DHS assessed RMVEs, primarily those advocating for the superiority of the white race, likely would continue to be the most lethal DVE threat to the Homeland. Our agencies had high confidence in this assessment based on the demonstrated capability of RMVEs in 2019 to select weapons and targets to conduct attacks, and the effectiveness of online RMVE messaging calling for increased violence. Additionally, other DVEs likely would continue to engage in non-lethal violence and other criminal activity, and DVE reactions to socio-political events and conditions could increase attacks. The year 2019 represented the most lethal year for DVE attacks since 1995, with five separate DVE attacks resulting in 32 deaths, 24 of which occurred during attacks conducted by RMVEs advocating for the superiority of the white race.\n\nThemes like \"gamification\" and \"accelerationism\" partly inspired some of the attacks in 2019\nand likely will continue to inspire future plots. Gamification is a term where fatality counts in attacks are referred to as \"scores,\" as the actor desires to accomplish \"achievements\" or high kill counts.13 Messaging from RMVEs espousing the superiority of the white race has furthered this narrative by framing previous attacks as resulting in a \"score.\" Additionally, widely disseminated propaganda on online forums and encrypted chat applications that espouse similar themes regarding kill counts could inspire future attackers to mobilize faster or attempt increasingly lethal and more sophisticated attacks. These online forums and chat applications also reference accelerationism, a belief amongst some neo-Nazi and/or fascist RMVEs that the current system is irreparable, without apparent political solutions, and hence violent action is needed to precipitate societal collapse to start a race war.\n\nOther DVE criminal activity, such as vandalism and threats of violence, as a perceived means of achieving social and political goals likely would continue to impact public safety and critical infrastructure in 2020. In 2019, non-lethal DVE criminal activity was similar to what had been observed in previous years. The activity was motivated by traditional drivers and targets, including changes to abortion or environmental laws. However, changes to the political environment could result in an increase in the frequency of criminal activity or could inspire some DVEs to attempt to engage in lethal activity. Both the FBI and DHS assessed DVEs likely would continue to focus on attacking soft targets and use gamification to encourage higher fatality attacks. The propagation of accelerationism almost certainly would perpetuate the threat from RMVEs who espouse the superiority of the white race. Political disagreements within the United States could present opportunities for DVEs to engage in violence against individuals perceived to have opposing ideologies, prominent political or public figures, or members of the media covering these events.\n\nV. Discussion and Comparison of Investigative Activities The Act calls for a discussion and comparison of the following activities:\n\n\n- The criteria for opening, managing, and closing DT and IT investigations.\n\n- Standards and procedures for the FBI with respect to the review, prioritization, and\nmitigation of DT and IT threats in the United States.\n\n- The planning, development, production, analysis, and evaluation of intelligence and\nintelligence products relating to terrorism, noting any differences with respect to DT and IT.\n\n- The sharing of information relating to DT and IT by and between the federal government;\nstate, local, tribal, territorial, and foreign governments; the appropriate congressional committees; nongovernmental organizations; and the private sector.\n\n- The criteria and methodology used by the FBI to identify or assign terrorism classifications\nto DT investigations.\n\n- Compliance with privacy, civil rights, and civil liberties policies and protections, including\nprotections against the public release of names or other personally identifiable information of individuals involved in incidents, investigations, indictments, prosecutions, or convictions for which data is reported under the Act.\n\n- Information regarding any training or resources provided to assist federal, state, local, and\ntribal law enforcement agencies in understanding, detecting, deterring, and investigating acts of DT, including the date, type, subject, and recipient agencies of such training or resources.\n\n\nCriteria for Opening, Managing, and Closing DT and IT Investigations\n\nOpening: The FBI opens a full investigation14 predicated on an \"articulable factual basis\" that reasonably indicates the existence of federal criminal activity or a threat to national security, or to protect against such activity or threat. The opening of a full investigation must be approved by a Supervisory Special Agent, and notice to the responsible Headquarters unit must be provided within 15 days of opening. The FBI may open a preliminary investigation15 on the basis of any\n\"allegation or information\" indicative of possible criminal activity or threats to the national security.16 The opening of a preliminary investigation by a Field Office requires the approval of a Supervisory Special Agent, but does not require notice to the Department of Justice (DOJ), unless it involves a sensitive investigative matter (SIM).17 For a national security full investigation of a US person, Headquarters must notify the DOJ/National Security Division within 30 days. The opening of an investigation involving a SIM\nmust be reviewed by the Field Office's Chief Division Counsel (CDC), approved by the Special Agent in Charge, and provided to the responsible Headquarters Unit Chief within 15 days of opening as notice. The Field Office must notify the US Attorney's Office within 30 days unless inappropriate, and in that case, Headquarters must notify and provide an explanation to DOJ within 30 days. No investigation may be opened based solely on activities protected by the First Amendment or the lawful exercise of rights secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States. The opening of a preliminary or full investigation classified as a DT matter must be approved by the Field Office's CDC; however, the opening of a full investigation classified as an IT matter does not have the same requirement.\n\nManaging: The Attorney General's Guidelines for Domestic FBI Operations (*AGG-Dom*)\nauthorize all lawful investigative methods in the conduct of a full investigation. The FBI requires file reviews of full investigations every 90 days. Some of the investigative methods the FBI is\n\n14 A full investigation may be opened if there is an \"articulable factual basis\" for the investigation that reasonably indicates one of the following circumstances exists: an activity constituting a federal crime or a threat to the national security has or may have occurred, is or may be occurring, or will or may occur, and the investigation may obtain information relating to the activity or the involvement or role of an individual, group, or organization in such activity. 15 A preliminary investigation is a type of predicated investigation that may be opened (predicated) on the basis of any \"allegation or information\" indicative of possible criminal activity or threats to the national security. Preliminary investigations may be opened to detect, obtain information about, or prevent or protect against federal crimes or threats to the national security. 16 The significance of the distinction between the full and preliminary investigation is in the availability of investigative tools. A preliminary investigation, which is based on the lesser factual predicate, limits the investigative tools and methods available, while the full investigation, which is based on the more robust factual predicate, permits the full range of legally available investigative tools and methods. In some instances, cases opened as preliminary investigations may be converted to full investigations based on the development of additional facts during the course of the investigation. 17 A sensitive investigative matter (SIM) involves the activities of a domestic public official or political candidate (involving corruption or a threat to the national security), religious or political organization or individual prominent in such an organization, or news media, or any other matter which, in the judgment of the official authorizing an investigation, should be brought to the attention of FBI Headquarters and other DOJ officials.\n\nauthorized to use differ between DT and IT investigations. For example, a full investigation of a DT matter may conduct electronic surveillance pursuant to Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, but a full investigation of an IT matter may conduct electronic surveillance pursuant to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, as amended. Additionally, investigations of DT matters may make use of federal grand jury subpoenas to compel the disclosure of records and other relevant information, but investigations of IT matters may also use a National Security Letter18 to compel such records. Finally, investigations of DT matters must be periodically reviewed by the Field Office's CDC, and investigations of IT matters do not have the same requirement.\n\nClosing: A Supervisory Special Agent must approve the closure of both full and preliminary investigations. A preliminary investigation must be closed within six months of its opening but may be extended for an additional six months. At the conclusion of either type of investigation, each of the following items must be documented:\n\n\n- A summary of the results of the investigation.\n\n- Whether logical and reasonable investigation was completed.\n\n- Whether all investigative methods/techniques initiated have been completed and/or\ndiscontinued.\n\n- Whether all leads set have been completed and/or discontinued.\n\n- Whether all evidence has been returned, destroyed, or retained in accordance with evidence\npolicy.\n\n- A summary statement of the reason the full investigation will be closed. At the conclusion of a full investigation, the Field Office must also document whether sufficient personnel and financial resources were expended on the investigation, or an explanation/justification for not expending sufficient resources. There are no substantive differences in how the FBI closes full investigations of DT or IT matters. The following chart presents a comparison of FBI policies for both DT and IT preliminary and full investigations.\n\n|                                           | Preliminary Investigation            | Full Investigation                      |\n|-------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------|\n| Predication                               |                                      | Information or an allegation indicating |\n| the existence of federal criminal         |                                      |                                         |\n| activity or a threat to national security |                                      |                                         |\n| (or to protect against such activity or   |                                      |                                         |\n| threat)                                   |                                      |                                         |\n| Approval to Open                          |                                      |                                         |\n| -                                         |                                      |                                         |\n|                                           |                                      |                                         |\n| Supervisory Special Agent                 |                                      |                                         |\n| -                                         |                                      |                                         |\n|                                           |                                      |                                         |\n| If a Domestic Terrorism (DT)              |                                      |                                         |\n| matter, Field Office (FO) Chief           |                                      |                                         |\n| Division Counsel (CDC)                    |                                      |                                         |\n| -                                         |                                      |                                         |\n|                                           |                                      |                                         |\n| FO CDC                                    |                                      |                                         |\n| -                                         |                                      |                                         |\n|                                           |                                      |                                         |\n| FO Special Agent in Charge (SAC)          |                                      |                                         |\n| Approval to Open:                         |                                      |                                         |\n| Sensitive                                 |                                      |                                         |\n| Investigative                             |                                      |                                         |\n| Matter (SIM)                              |                                      |                                         |\n| -                                         |                                      |                                         |\n|                                           |                                      |                                         |\n| Notice to responsible HQ Unit             |                                      |                                         |\n| Chief within 15 days of opening.          |                                      |                                         |\n| -                                         |                                      |                                         |\n|                                           |                                      |                                         |\n| Notice to the US Attorney's Office        |                                      |                                         |\n| (USAO) within 30 days unless              |                                      |                                         |\n| inappropriate, and in that case,          |                                      |                                         |\n| HQ must notify and provide an             |                                      |                                         |\n| explanation to DOJ within 30 days         |                                      |                                         |\n| File Review                               | Every 90 calendar days               | Every 90 calendar days                  |\n| In a DT Matter:                           |                                      |                                         |\n| -                                         |                                      |                                         |\n|                                           |                                      |                                         |\n| Obtain public information                 |                                      |                                         |\n| -                                         |                                      |                                         |\n|                                           |                                      |                                         |\n| Physical surveillance                     |                                      |                                         |\n| Examples of                               |                                      |                                         |\n| Authorized                                |                                      |                                         |\n| Investigative                             |                                      |                                         |\n| Methods                                   |                                      |                                         |\n| -                                         |                                      |                                         |\n|                                           |                                      |                                         |\n| Federal grand jury subpoenas              |                                      |                                         |\n|                                           |                                      |                                         |\n| In an International Terrorism (IT)        |                                      |                                         |\n| Matter:                                   |                                      |                                         |\n| -                                         |                                      |                                         |\n|                                           |                                      |                                         |\n| Obtain public information                 |                                      |                                         |\n| -                                         |                                      |                                         |\n|                                           |                                      |                                         |\n| Physical Surveillance                     |                                      |                                         |\n| -                                         |                                      |                                         |\n|                                           |                                      |                                         |\n| Federal grand jury subpoenas and          |                                      |                                         |\n| National Security Letters (NSLs)          |                                      |                                         |\n| Closure                                   | Must be closed within six months but |                                         |\n| may be extend for an additional six       |                                      |                                         |\n| months                                    |                                      |                                         |\n| Approval to Close                         | Supervisory Special Agent            | Supervisory Special Agent               |\n| Approval to Close:                        |                                      |                                         |\n| SIM                                       |                                      |                                         |\n| Supervisory Special Agent, with SAC       |                                      |                                         |\n| approval                                  |                                      |                                         |\n|                                           |                                      |                                         |\nArticulable factual basis that reasonably indicates the existence of federal criminal activity or a threat to national security (or to protect against such activity or threat)\n-\nSupervisory Special Agent\n-\nNotice to the responsible Headquarters (HQ) unit must be provided within 15 days of opening\n-\nIf a DT matter, FO CDC\n-\nFO CDC\n-\nFO SAC\n-\nNotice to responsible HQ Unit Chief within 15 days of opening\n-\nNotice to the USAO within 30 days unless inappropriate, and in that case, HQ must notify and provide an explanation to DOJ within 30 days\nIn a DT Matter:\n-\nObtain public information\n-\nPhysical surveillance\n-\nFederal grand jury subpoenas\n-\nElectronic surveillance pursuant to Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 In an IT Matter:\n-\nObtain public information\n-\nPhysical Surveillance\n-\nFederal grand jury subpoenas and NSLs\n-\nElectronic surveillance pursuant to Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, as amended\nNo duration limit Supervisory Special Agent, with SAC approval\n\nStandards and Procedures for Reviewing, Prioritizing, and Mitigating DT and IT Threats The FBI uses the Threat Review and Prioritization (TRP) process as a standardized method for reviewing and prioritizing threats within operational programs to inform threat strategies, mitigation plans, and resource allocation. Headquarters operational divisions use the TRP process to uniformly define threat issues for the organization, determine their prioritization at the national level, establish FBI National Threat Priorities (NTPs), and cascade those threat issues and the national threat strategies for the NTPs to the FBI enterprise. Field Offices then use the TRP process to prioritize threat issues for their specific areas of responsibility (AORs) and create threat strategies to mitigate threats. The FBI conducts the TRP process on a biennial basis, but it may be conducted annually at the discretion of the Field Office or Headquarters operational division head.\n\nThe TRP process is consensus-based and includes applicable US Attorney's Office(s) and stakeholders to determine prioritization (banding) and to develop threat strategies for mitigation of threat issues. Headquarters operational divisions develop national threat strategies for each threat issue to guide enterprise-wide mitigation efforts. Field Offices develop threat strategies annually for all threat issues they band, and they detail the particular steps their Field Office plans to take to mitigate each banded threat issue in their AOR. These threat strategies must be used to guide mitigation of each threat issue for the upcoming fiscal year, unless a change in threat banding or threat strategies occurs during midyear negotiations. The TRP of the FBI is classified as it incorporates sources and methods as a basis of strategic alignment of national security resources. There are no differences in how the FBI reviews and prioritizes DT and IT threats; however, the threat band dictates priorities within these programs. Investigative methods the FBI is authorized to use differ between DT and IT investigations, and DT investigations may be subject to additional legal review.\n\nPlanning, Development, Production, Analysis, and Evaluation of Intelligence and Intelligence Products Relating to DT and IT The FBI intelligence cycle for both DT and IT matters consists of planning intelligence efforts around priorities based on national or Field Office threat strategies, collecting raw intelligence information, processing and synthesizing data, analyzing and crafting assessments into analytic intelligence products, disseminating those products, briefing analysis to decision makers, and evaluating disseminated products and the production process to inform future efforts. Similarly, the DHS began Intelligence Threat Banding in 2019, a process in which DHS intelligence leadership, as part of the Homeland Security Intelligence Council (HSIC), prioritizes threat topics. Using the Homeland Security Intelligence Priorities Framework as a foundation, the HSIC prioritizes threats within multiple mission areas. The process is informed by DHS' execution of the intelligence cycle - the development of requirements, collection through field operations or open source collectors, and analysis to produce finished intelligence in the DT space.\n\nDHS implements Intelligence Threat Banding across its mission areas. The results drive analytic production through the program of analysis process and informs intelligence resource allocation through Intelligence Guidance in the Secretary's Resource Planning Guidance - DHS' Planning, Programming, Budgeting & Execution (PPBE) process. During the planning phase of the intelligence cycle, both the FBI and DHS consider the National Intelligence Priorities Framework, which documents the Intelligence Community's priorities; and the FBI also considers its own standing intelligence and investigative responsibilities, which are addressed and prioritized in the TRP process. During the TRP process, the FBI identifies the intelligence needs related to the threat priorities, and those intelligence needs drive the subsequent stages of the intelligence cycle. During the collection and processing phases of the intelligence cycle, both the FBI and DHS\nobtain raw intelligence from lawful collection methods consistent with their respective authorities and then synthesize this data into a form intelligence personnel can use. In the analysis and evaluation phases, analysts examine and evaluate all source intelligence, including collected information; add context, as needed; and integrate the information into complete assessments. The analysts make assessments about the implications of the information for the United States and document the assessments in analytic intelligence products. Legal review is required for any FBI intelligence product, such as an Intelligence Information Report (IIR),19 related to a potential SIM or other sensitive information, in accordance with the guidelines in the FBI's Domestic Investigations and Operations Guide (DIOG) and identified \"legal review triggers.\" One such legal review trigger is information related to DT. DHS finished intelligence products that involve US persons, Constitutionally-protected activity, and matters with significant oversight equities also undergo a process of legal and intelligence oversight. Finally, intelligence analysis is disseminated in either a written intelligence product or a verbal briefing during the production phase. Intelligence analysis customers include FBI leadership, policymakers, military leaders, other government officials, private sector partners, and operational counterparts who then make decisions based on the information. DHS finished intelligence products are disseminated to customers through various information portals; on the unclassified networks, the Homeland Security Information Network-Intelligence is the primary means for disseminating both DHS raw and finished intelligence reporting.\n\nSharing of Information Relating to DT and IT The FBI's *National Strategy for Information Sharing and Safeguarding* provides the common vision, goals, and framework needed to guide information sharing initiatives with our federal, state, local, and tribal agency partners, foreign government counterparts, and private sector stake holders. The FBI shares information consistent with the Privacy Act, FBI policy, and any other applicable laws and memoranda of understanding or agreement with other agencies.\n\nThe FBI works closely with our federal, state, local, tribal, and territorial law enforcement partners to investigate and disrupt both DT and IT. The front line of the counterterrorism mission in the United States is the FBI-led Joint Terrorism Task Forces (JTTFs). The FBI maintains about 200 JTTFs nationwide across all 56 FBI Field Offices and in many of our satellite Resident Agencies, with the participation of over 50 federal and over 500 state, local, tribal, and territorial agencies. These relationships are critical to effective information sharing and the leveraging of local expertise and experience in FBI investigations. The FBI, in coordination with the DHS and/or the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC), produces Joint Intelligence Bulletins (JIBs) that communicate updated threat information and assessments to our federal, state, local, and tribal partners at the Unclassified // Law Enforcement Sensitive level. JIBs alert our partners to significant arrests - including those accomplished through collaboration among different law enforcement entities - and trends we have observed in both the DT and IT arenas. As previously discussed, legal review is required for FBI intelligence products related to a potential SIM or other sensitive information, to include information related to DT. This would include raw reporting, such as IIRs. As mentioned above, DHS products within the DT and IT spaces are shared with Homeland Security stakeholders, including the National Network of Fusion Centers, private sector security officials, and other customers operating at primarily the Unclassified level, via the Homeland Security Information Network. Criteria and Methodology to Identify or Assign Terrorism Classifications to FBI DT Investigations While classifications, or categories, help the FBI better understand the criminal actors we pursue, we recognize actors' motivations vary, are nuanced, and sometimes are derived from a blend of socio-political goals or personal grievances. Currently, the US Government broadly divides the DT threat among the following threat categories:\n\n\n- **Racially or Ethnically Motivated Violent Extremism**: This threat encompasses the\npotentially unlawful use or threat of force or violence in furtherance of ideological agendas derived from bias, often related to race or ethnicity, held by the actor against others or a given population group. RMVEs purport to use both political and religious justifications to support their racially- or ethnically-based ideological objectives and criminal activities.\n- **Anti-Government or Anti-Authority Violent Extremism**: This threat encompasses the\npotentially unlawful use or threat of force or violence in furtherance of ideological agendas, derived from anti-government or anti-authority sentiment, including opposition to perceived economic, social, or racial hierarchies, or perceived government overreach, negligence, or illegitimacy. This threat category includes the subcategories of SCVEs, MVEs, AVEs, and Puerto Rican National Violent Extremists.\n\n\n- **Animal Rights/Environmental Violent Extremism**: This threat encompasses the\npotentially unlawful use or threat of force or violence in furtherance of ideological agendas by those seeking to end or mitigate perceived cruelty, harm, or exploitation of animals\nand/or the perceived exploitation or destruction of natural resources and the environment.\n\n- **Abortion-Related Violent Extremism**: This threat encompasses the potentially unlawful\nuse or threat of force or violence in furtherance of ideological agendas relating to abortion, including individuals who advocate for violence in support of either pro-life or pro-choice beliefs.\n\n\n- **All Other Domestic Terrorism Threats**: This category encompasses threats involving the\npotentially unlawful use or threat of force or violence in furtherance of ideological agendas which are not otherwise defined under or primarily motivated by one of the other DT threat\ncategories. Such agendas could flow from, but are not limited to, a combination of personal\ngrievances and beliefs, including those described in the other DT threat categories. Some\nactors in this category may also carry bias related to religion, gender, or sexual orientation.\n\n\nCompliance with Privacy, Civil Rights, and Civil Liberties Policies and Protections The FBI is responsible for protecting the security of our nation and its people from crime and terrorism while maintaining rigorous obedience to the Constitution and compliance with all applicable statutes, regulations, and policies. The *AGG-Dom* establishes a set of basic principles that serve as the foundation for all FBI mission-related activities. When these principles are applied, they demonstrate respect for civil liberties and privacy as well as adherence to the Constitution and laws of the United States. The *AGG-Dom* authorizes all lawful investigative methods in the conduct of a full investigation. Considering the effect on the privacy and civil liberties of individuals and the potential to cause harm to, or otherwise damage the reputation of individuals, some of these investigative methods are more intrusive than others. The least intrusive method is to be used, based upon the circumstances of the investigation, but the FBI must not hesitate to use any lawful method consistent with the *AGG-Dom*. A more intrusive method may be warranted in light of the seriousness of a criminal or national security threat or the importance of a foreign intelligence requirement. By emphasizing the use of the least intrusive means to obtain intelligence or evidence, FBI employees can effectively execute their duties while mitigating the potential negative impact on the privacy and civil liberties of all people encompassed within the investigation, including targets, witnesses, and victims. This principle is not intended to discourage FBI employees from seeking relevant and necessary intelligence, information, or evidence, but rather is intended to encourage FBI employees to choose the least intrusive method, that is still reasonable based upon the circumstances of the investigation, from the available options to obtain the intelligence, information, or evidence.\n\nAs a matter of FBI policy, law enforcement activities within the scope of DT investigations are particularly subject to heightened internal legal review and supervisory approvals to ensure Constitutional rights, privacy, and civil liberties are protected at each juncture. DT investigations receive more scrutiny through such legal reviews due to the greater likelihood these investigations may need to navigate First Amendment-protected activities. There are no other differences in how the FBI complies with policy, civil rights, and civil liberties policies and protections relating to DT or IT. The DHS is steadfastly committed to the highest standards of conduct across the Department, especially when it comes to the equitable and transparent enforcement of our laws. Countering domestic violent extremism is vital to preserving civil rights and civil liberties and can be accomplished while protecting the rights of all persons and communities. Consistent with the DHS mission to secure the nation from threats, the DHS recognizes the mission only succeeds if the Department respects and protects the values of the nation. Since its inception, the DHS has prioritized civil rights, civil liberties, and individual privacy protections in its efforts. These rights must be rigorously guarded. In confronting the threat of domestic violent extremism, the DHS must take care to avoid stigmatizing populations and infringing on Constitutional rights. To that end, the DHS does not profile, target, or discriminate against any individual for exercising their First Amendment rights.\nThe DHS' prevention, intelligence, and law enforcement work is never based solely on First Amendment-protected activity. DHS policy also prohibits the consideration of race or ethnicity in our intelligence, investigation, screening, and law enforcement activities in all but the most exceptional instances. Further, how the DHS identifies and detects DT requires faithful adherence to fair information practice principles and privacy-focused Departmental policies. The DHS always incorporates privacy protections in information technology systems, technologies, rulemakings, programs, pilot projects, and other activities that involve the planned use of personally identifiable information. The Office for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties and the DHS Privacy Office are involved in every aspect of our counterterrorism and prevention missions. These offices continue to help oversee and train DHS law enforcement and intelligence personnel on how to respect the privacy, civil rights, and civil liberties of all people and communities. The NCTC ensures its analytic work in support of the FBI and DHS as the lead domestic counterterrorism agencies is fully consistent with the NCTC's statutory authorities and undertaken in accordance with Attorney General-approved guidelines for the protection of US person information, in consultation with agency legal counsel and privacy and civil liberties officers. The NCTC's domestic counterterrorism support to the FBI and DHS focuses on trends, threats, and actors who have committed or attempted to commit crimes determined by these partners to come within the pertinent definition of DT, following the same spectrum of threats as FBI and DHS partners. Analysts work closely with the NCTC's Legal and Civil Liberties and Privacy officers to ensure appropriate scoping of analysis and all DT-related products undergo legal review prior to publication. NCTC officers who support the FBI and DHS in the DT mission space receive specialized training to conduct their mission while adhering to the Constitution, other applicable laws, Executive Order 12333, and ODNI Attorney Generalapproved guidelines, and must be designated by a supervisor to work on DT-related projects. The NCTC is not authorized to and does not collect, access, obtain, or maintain information concerning US persons solely for the purpose of monitoring activities protected by the First Amendment or the lawful exercise of other Constitutional rights.\n\nTraining or Resources Provided to Federal, State, Local, and Tribal Law Enforcement Agencies The FBI takes a leadership role in identifying and addressing emerging threats, and as such, actively engages with its federal, state, local, tribal, and territorial law enforcement partners through the JTTFs. The FBI shares and encourages the sharing of intelligence and participates in multi-agency command posts to ensure maximum coordination. In order to proactively address threats, especially during ongoing incidents, the FBI has developed and shared best practices that are implemented across the nation. The FBI's Behavioral Threat Assessment Center (BTAC), housed within the FBI's Critical Incident Response Group, supports JTTFs as well as state and local law enforcement partners by providing operational support in the form of tailored threat management strategies. In addition to operational support for pending threat investigations, the BTAC also trains on lessons learned from operational experience and research to better aid in prevention efforts. The BTAC is leading an unfunded national Threat Assessment and Threat Management initiative, which endeavors to build and develop stronger partnerships between law enforcement and across all levels of government, in an effort to prevent acts of terrorism and targeted violence. The FBI, in coordination with the DHS and/or the NCTC, produces JIBs that communicate updated threat information and assessments to our federal, state, local, and tribal partners at the Unclassified // Law Enforcement Sensitive level. JIBs alert our partners to significant arrests - including those accomplished through collaboration among different law enforcement entities - and trends we have observed in both the DT and IT arenas. In 2019, the FBI produced approximately 15 DT-related JIBs, which highlighted the DVE threat, including RMVE and AGAAVE threats.\n\n\nIn 2019, the FBI, the DHS, and the NCTC jointly produced the booklet, Homegrown Violent Extremist Mobilization Indicators, which contains a broad list of behavioral indicators that might demonstrate an individual's likelihood of engaging in terrorist activity.20 The booklet was published to help law enforcement partners and the public at large recognize potentially dangerous behaviors to identify terrorists before they conduct deadly attacks. It is important to note some behavioral indicators may have a lawful or Constitutionally-protected explanation, and the FBI considers the totality of the circumstances in determining whether there is a lawful basis for investigative activity. The FBI also maintains the eGuardian system as a resource to facilitate sharing suspicious activity reports and other terrorism-related information by federal, state, local, tribal, and territorial law enforcement agencies, local and state fusion centers, and the Department of\n\nDefense. Currently, eGuardian is used by agencies in all 50 states and the District of Columbia, including 78 state-level fusion centers and the JTTFs.\n\nSpecific to formalized training, the FBI offers the Counterterrorism Baseline Operational Learning Tool (CT BOLT) course to all new counterterrorism employees, including Task Force Officers supporting the JTTFs. In addition to operational training and instruction, the course provides training on applicable privacy and civil liberties law and policy and the fundamentals of protecting First Amendment rights during the course of FBI investigations. The FBI conducts the CT BOLT course on a monthly basis, and in 2019, more than 240 students completed the course.\n\nThe DHS' National Threat Evaluation and Reporting Program (NTER), established in 2019, serves as a joint collaborative effort by the DHS and federal, state, local, tribal, and territorial partners that builds on the success of the Nationwide Suspicious Activity Reporting Program. It provides law enforcement and homeland security partners with additional resources and training to help identify and prevent targeted violence and mass casualty incidents implicating homeland security, including those associated with terrorism, as well as facilitating a national capacity for identifying, evaluating, and reporting, and sharing tips and leads related to those threats. The NTER's Master Trainer Program trains homeland security partners to assist their local communities in adapting to an evolving threat landscape. Master Trainers teach behavioral threat assessment techniques and best practices to local partners, and are equipped to empower state, local, tribal, and territorial partners to identify and assess risk and warning signs, and manage potential threats of future, targeted violence regardless of motive.\n\nVI. FBI Data on Domestic Terrorism\nThe Act calls for the following data and information for the period 1 January 2009 to 20 December 2019, the date of Act's enactment:\n\n\n- For each completed or attempted DT incident that has occurred in the United States: a\ndescription of such incident; the date and location of such incident; the number and type of completed and attempted federal nonviolent crimes committed during such incident; the number and type of federal and state property crimes committed during such incident, including an estimate of economic damages resulting from such crimes; and the number and type of complete and attempted federal violent crimes committed during such incident, including the number of people killed or injured as a result of such crimes.\n- An identification of each assessment,21 preliminary investigation, full investigation, and\nenterprise investigation22 with a nexus to DT opened, pending, or closed by the FBI; and the\n\nnumber of assessments, preliminary investigations, full investigations, and enterprise investigations associated with each DT investigative classification.\n\n\n\n- The number of assessments, preliminary investigations, full investigations, and enterprise\ninvestigations with a nexus to DT initiated as a result of a referral or investigation by a federal, state, local, tribal, territorial, or foreign government of a hate crime.\n\n- The number of federal criminal charges with a nexus to DT, including the number of\nindictments and complaints associated with each DT investigative classification; a summary of the allegations in each such indictment; the disposition of the prosecution; and, if applicable, the sentence imposed as a result of a conviction on such charges.\n\n- Referrals of DT incidents by or to state, local, tribal, territorial, or foreign governments, to\nor by departments or agencies of the federal government, for investigation or prosecution,\nincluding the number of such referrals associated with each DT investigative classification, and a summary of each such referral that includes the rationale for such referral and the disposition of the applicable federal investigation or prosecution.\n\n-\nThe number of intelligence products associated with each DT investigative classification.\n\n-\nWith respect to the FBI, the number of staff working on DT matters and a summary of time utilization by and recordkeeping data for personnel working on such matters, including the number or percentage of such personnel associated with each DT investigative classification in the FBI's Headquarters Operational Divisions and Field Divisions.\n- With respect to the DHS Office of Intelligence and Analysis (I&A), the number of staff\nworking on DT matters.\n\n- With respect to the NCTC, the number of staff working on DT matters and the applicable\nlegal authorities relating to the activities of such staff.\n The FBI is providing data for the years 2015 through 2019 to provide the most accurate and consistent information available for terrorism investigations and assessments. During 2014, the FBI moved from a primarily paper-based case management system to an electronic record system, and therefore, information for 2015 and beyond will be the most useful and relevant to the data requirements of the Act. Completed or Attempted DT Incidents in the United States The FBI defines a \"DT incident\" as a criminal act, including threats or acts of violence made to specific victims, made in furtherance of a domestic socio-political goal, which has occurred and can be confirmed. The FBI defines a \"DT plot\" as a combination of criminal activity and planning that collectively reflect steps toward criminal action in furtherance of a domestic political or social goal. Disrupted DT plots are plots which, in the FBI's assessment, absent law enforcement intervention could have resulted in a DT incident.\n\nThe FBI makes every effort to proactively document lethal and non-lethal DT incidents, but it is important to note there is no incident reporting requirement that mandates state and local law enforcement agencies report criminal activity that appears to be motivated by a socio-political goal consistent with the DT threat categories. As such, some DT incidents will likely go unreported by other law enforcement agencies, and those agencies will likely arrest the individual on state or local charges. These factors make it difficult for the FBI to be aware of every DT incident that has occurred in the United States. Therefore, the appendix provides information that represents significant DT incidents and disrupted plots that have occurred in the United States, of which the FBI has knowledge, but not a comprehensive listing of all incidents.\n\nIdentification and Number of Each FBI DT Investigation\n\nThe FBI was conducting approximately 1,000 pending DT investigations each year for fiscal year (FY) 2017 through 2019. The classified annex to this report provides additional data on the number and threat classification of FBI's DT investigations.\n\nIdentification of FBI DT Assessments and Investigations as a Result of a Hate Crime Hate crimes and DT incidents are often not mutually exclusive. A hate crime is targeted violence motivated by the offender's bias against a person's actual or perceived characteristics, while a DT incident as a criminal act, including threats or acts of violence made to specific victims, made in furtherance of a domestic socio-political goal. Sentencing in a hate crime case or a DT case can be similar when there is a loss of life. To address the intersection of the FBI counterterrorism and criminal investigative missions to combat DT and provide justice to those who are victims of hate crimes, the FBI formally created the Domestic Terrorism-Hate Crimes Fusion Cell in April 2019.\n\nThe Hate Crime Statistics Program of the FBI's Uniform Crime Reporting (UCR) Program collects data regarding criminal offenses that were motivated, in whole or in part, by the offender's bias against a person's actual or perceived race/ethnicity/ancestry, national origin, gender, gender identity, religion, disability, or sexual orientation, and were committed against persons, property, or society. The FBI publishes an annual report of hate crime statistics, and in 2019, law enforcement agencies participating in the UCR Program reported 7,314 hate crime incidents.23 While the FBI collects and reports hate crime statistics, there is no mandatory reporting requirement to identify hate crime incidents that would also be considered criminal activity that appears to be motivated by a socio-political goal consistent with the DT threat categories. Therefore, the FBI does not have the data to be able to determine numbers of DT assessments and investigations that were opened as a result of a hate crime.\n\n\nNumber of Federal Charges with a DT Nexus A litany of federal and state charges are used to charge DT subjects for applicable criminal violations. Federal charges include those related to weapons, explosives, threats, attacks on federal officials or facilities, hate crimes, arson, violence against animal enterprises, and material support to terrorists. Under 18 U.S.C.  2339A, it is a crime to provide material support or resources to another knowing or intending they will be used in preparation for or carrying out certain terrorism-related offenses. Unlike a violation of 18 U.S.C.  2339B, the recipient of the material support need not be a designated foreign terrorist organization. From FY 2015 through FY 2019, approximately 846 DT subjects were arrested by or in coordination with the FBI, as follows:\n\n\n- In FY 2015, approximately 211 DT subjects were arrested, with 130 subjects charged\nfederally and 81 subjects charged with state/local charges.\n- In FY 2016, approximately 229 DT subjects were arrested, with 169 subjects charged\nfederally and 60 subjects charged with state/local charges.\n- In FY 2017, approximately 186 DT subjects were arrested, with 109 subjects charged\nfederally and 77 subjects charged with state/local charges.\n- In FY 2018, approximately 113 DT subjects were arrested, with 54 subjects charged\nfederally, 52 subjects charged with state/local charges, and seven subjects charged with both federal and state/local charges.\n- In FY 2019, approximately 107 DT subjects were arrested, with 63 subjects charged\nfederally, 42 subjects charged with state/local charges, and two subjects charged with both federal and state/local charges.\n The number of federal criminal charges with a nexus to DT (and the corresponding details of those matters) is not currently maintained by the FBI or DOJ in a comprehensive manner. Individuals whose conduct involves DT or a threat thereof may be prosecuted by any US\nAttorney's Office under a wide range of criminal statutes, some of which on their face relate to DT, and others of which do not.24 While the criminal code includes a definition of DT, see 18 U.S.C.  2331(5), there is no federal DT statute. For example, the DOJ has prosecuted cases against such individuals using weapons charges, e.g., 18 U.S.C.  922, 924; charges relating to use or possession of explosives, e.g., 26 U.S.C.  5845, 5861; threat, hoax, or riot charges, e.g., 18 U.S.C.  871, 875, 876, 1038, 2101; and charges proscribing attacks on federal officials or facilities, e.g., id.  111, 115, 351, 844, 930, 1114, 1361, 1751. Hate crimes charges, e.g., id.  249, may be appropriate where individuals engage in DT that is motivated by biases against a race, religion, ethnicity, or other specified factors. However, not all hate crimes cases involve DT. Arson, id.  844, or specific charges relating to violence against animal enterprises, id.  43, may apply to Animal Rights/Environmental Violent Extremists. In some cases, drug trafficking, tax, or state and local charges could also provide a lawful basis to disrupt an individual believed to be planning or pursuing acts of DT. The DOJ recognizes the need for coordination and consistency in our efforts to hold accountable DVEs who engage in criminal conduct. An important part of achieving those goals is to have the ability to identify and internally track investigations and prosecutions involving conduct related to domestic violent extremism, and the Department is implementing changes that will allow us to better identify and track such cases. All federal prosecutors have been provided guidance not only highlighting the need for effective coordination, but also implementing a plan for better tracking of the important DVE-related work being done by federal investigators and prosecutors around the country. Until such changes are institutionalized, the Department can provide illustrative examples of cases from 2015 through 2019. Our US Attorney's Offices, the National Security Division, the Criminal Division, and the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms have worked together in recent cases to bring charges under a variety of statutes, including terrorism-related statutes. In several cases, we have disrupted, prosecuted, and convicted individuals before violence occurred, as follows:\n\n\n- David Ansberry was arrested in October 2016 after placing an improvised explosive\ndevice (IED) in the parking lot of the Nederland, Colorado Police Department, believing that law enforcement had murdered a member of a 1960s-1970s counterculture group of which he had also been a member. He was indicted for use and attempted use of a weapon of mass destruction, in violation of 18 U.S.C.  2332a. Ansberry pleaded guilty and, in January 2019, was sentenced to serve 27 years in prison.\n- Jerry Varnell was arrested in August 2017 after trying to detonate an inoperable vehicle\nborne explosive device at the BancFirst building in downtown Oklahoma City to send an anti-government message. He was indicted for attempting to use a weapon of mass destruction, in violation of 18 U.S.C.  2332a, and attempting to destroy by fire or explosive a property used in interstate commerce, in violation of 18 U.S.C.  844(i). Varnell was convicted on both counts in February 2019, and in March 2020, was sentenced to serve 25 years in prison, followed by a lifetime term of supervised release.\n- Cesar Sayoc was arrested in October 2018 for mailing 16 IEDs to 13 victims throughout the\nUnited States, including Democratic politicians and a media outlet. He was charged in the Southern District of New York with use of a weapon of mass destruction, in violation of 18 U.S.C.  2332a; interstate transportation of explosives, in violation of 18 U.S.C.  844(d); threatening interstate communications, in violation of 18 U.S.C.  875(c); illegal mailing of explosives, in violation of 18 U.S.C.  1716(j)(2); and use of explosives to commit a felony, in violation of 18 U.S.C.  844(h). Sayoc pleaded guilty in March 2019 and, in August 2019, was sentenced to serve 20 years in prison.\n- Christopher Hasson was arrested in February 2019 based on a criminal complaint for\nfirearm and drug charges. In January 2020, he was sentenced to 160 months in federal prison, followed by four years of supervised release, on four federal charges, including\nunlawful possession of unregistered silencers, unlawful possession of firearm silencers unidentified by serial number, possession of firearms by an addict to and unlawful user of a controlled substance, and possession of a controlled substance. According to his plea agreement, Hasson was a Lieutenant in the United States Coast Guard. As detailed in the government's sentencing memo, Hasson self-identified as a \"White Nationalist\" for over 30 years and in writings advocated for \"focused violence\" in order to establish a white homeland. Review of Hasson's e-mail accounts, saved documents, text messages, and Internet searches show that he was inspired by racist murderers, stockpiled assault weapons, studied violence, and intended to exact retribution on minorities and those he considered traitors.\n\n- Jarrett Smith was arrested in September 2019 for distributing explosives information and\nthreatening interstate communication after providing bombmaking instructions online and conducting potential target selection. In February 2020, he pleaded guilty to unlawfully distributing instructions for making explosive devices over social media while he was a member of the US Army. Smith pleaded guilty to two counts of distributing information related to explosives, destructive devices, and weapons of mass destruction. The FBI received information that Smith gave out guidance to others on how to construct IEDs. He spoke to others on social media about wanting to travel to Ukraine to fight with a violent, far-right military group. In August 2020, Smith was sentenced to 30 months in prison. Similarly, the Department's Civil Rights Division, in partnership with US Attorney's Offices, Criminal Division, and National Security Division, has also prosecuted RMVEs in some of the most serious plots and attacks in recent years:\n- In June 2015, Dylann Roof killed nine Black parishioners engaged in religious worship and\nBible study at Emanuel African Methodist Episcopal Church in Charleston, South Carolina. In December 2016, Roof was convicted of 33 counts of federal hate crimes, and firearms charges, including nine capital counts of obstruction of free exercise of religious beliefs resulting in death, in violation of 18 U.S.C.  247, and nine capital counts of use of a firearm to commit murder during and in relation to a federal crime of violence, in violation of 18 U.S.C.  924. In January 2017, Roof was sentenced to death on all 18 capital counts. The sentence of death has been imposed by the court but not yet carried out.\n- In 2016, Curtis Allen, Patrick Stein, and Gavin Wright were arrested for plotting to attack an\napartment complex and mosque used by Somali immigrants in Kansas. In April 2018, they were convicted of conspiracy to use a weapon of mass destruction, in violation of 18 U.S.C.  2332aa terrorism-related offenseas well as conspiracy to violate the housing rights of their victims, in violation of 18 U.S.C.  241. They received sentences to serve between 25 and 30 years in prison.\n\n- In August 2017, James Fields Jr. intentionally drove a car into a diverse crowd of counterprotestors at the Unite the Right rally in Charlottesville, Virginia, killing one woman and\n\ninjuring dozens. In March 2019, he pleaded guilty to one count of a hate crime act that resulted in death and 28 other hate crimes charges, all in violation of 18 U.S.C.  249. In June 2019, he was sentenced to life imprisonment.\n\n\n- In November 2019, Richard Holzer was arrested for plotting to blow up the Temple\nEmanuel Synagogue in Pueblo, Colorado, conduct that constituted an act of DT. Holzer told undercover FBI agents he wanted the bombing to send a message to Jewish people that they must leave his town, \"otherwise people will die.\" He pleaded guilty to federal hate crime and explosives charges, and in February 2021, he was sentenced to over 19 years in prison, followed by 15 years of supervised release.\n\nThe Department also supports efforts to prosecute DVEs under state and local laws. For example, in 2013, the Department secured the first conviction under the District of Columbia's Anti-Terrorism Act. Floyd Corkins was charged for an attempted shooting at the Family Research Council. He was motivated based on disagreement with the organization's stance against gay marriage. He was sentenced to 25 years in prison.\n\nReferrals of DT Incidents to the FBI\n\nThe eGuardian system is the FBI's case management system for handling initial threat information of counterterrorism, counterintelligence, cyber incidents, criminal complaints, events, and suspicious activities received from federal, state, local, tribal, and territorial law enforcement agencies, and the Department of Defense. Threat information is then migrated to the FBI's internal Guardian system where it is evaluated to determine whether the information meets the criteria for an assessment, already exists in FBI holdings, or is for situational awareness only. Starting in 2019, the FBI implemented a process to \"tag\" reports of possible DT incidents to enhance program management and operational oversight. It is important to note the tagging process has only been in effect since 2019 and is manual and user-dependent. Therefore, eGuardian reports of incidents referred by our partners that have DT tags may not capture all DT referrals and may inaccurately label some referrals as DT. The FBI received approximately 675 referrals of possible DT incidents in 2019. Although reports are not available within the eGuardian system to identify the disposition of each referral, as of 2019, approximately 20 percent of the FBI's DT investigations were opened based on information and referrals from our partners. The FBI does not refer DT incidents where there is an indication of federal criminal activity to other partners, as the FBI would be the lead investigative agency for those matters.\n\nDT Intelligence Products From 2015 through 2019, the FBI produced more than 4,000 DT-related intelligence products. The FBI does not have the data to determine the number of intelligence products associated with each DT investigative classification because the FBI tracks intelligence production by program and not by investigative classification. Additionally, a single intelligence product may contain threat reporting or case information from subjects associated with multiple investigative classifications. From 2016 to 2019, DHS produced 67 DT-related intelligence products and 1,068 DT-related raw intelligence reports. The DHS does not have reliable data dating back prior to 2016 on this topic.\n\nNumber of Staff Working DT Matters Since the bombing of the Oklahoma City Federal Building in 1995, the FBI's Counterterrorism Division has maintained dedicated resources to detect, disrupt, and mitigate instances of violence and criminal activity associated with DVEs. One of the FBI's most vital assets in the counterterrorism fight is our ability to remain agile in combatting the threats we face. Staffing for the FBI's counterterrorism mission is aligned based on threat priorities and, as is true across the FBI, can and does realign on a moment's notice. The front line of the counterterrorism mission in the United States is represented by the FBI-led JTTFs, which investigate both DT and IT matters. The FBI established the first JTTF in 1980 in the New York Field Office, applying the task force concept to the counterterrorism mission. Today, the FBI leads approximately 200 JTTFs nationwide across all 56 Field Offices and in many of our satellite Resident Agencies, with participation of over 50 federal and over 500 state, local, tribal, and territorial agencies. The JTTFs are comprised of approximately 4,400 investigators, including FBI Special Agents and Task Force Officers, and additional analysts and professional staff who support these JTTF members and the investigations they lead. The JTTF partnerships at the federal, state, local, tribal, and territorial levels are force multipliers as they leverage local expertise, experience, and resources in FBI counterterrorism investigations. In FBI Field Offices, squads are dedicated to the counterterrorism mission and not necessarily assigned specifically to investigate DT or IT matters. This is significant because the motivation behind an alleged threat or act of terrorism may not be immediately apparent. Additionally, when an incident occurs, Field Office personnel from all operational programs - for example, criminal or counterintelligence - may respond. Similar to our posture against the IT threat, the FBI's Counterterrorism Division at Headquarters has a dedicated Domestic Terrorism Operations Section (DTOS), comprised of Special Agents, analysts, and professional staff. The FBI's DTOS oversees and provides operational support to all 56 Field Offices and their Resident Agencies in investigating the use of violence by individuals to further socio-political goals in violation of federal criminal statutes. The Counterterrorism Division also has intelligence and targeting units that work to combat DT specifically, as well as additional units that provide support across our counterterrorism mission, not exclusive to DT or IT matters. Further, all FBI counterterrorism investigations are led by the same Deputy Assistant Director for Operations, who has a unique vantage point from which to\n\nassess the terrorism threat around the globe and prioritize investigations and operations across the country.\n\nAn additional asset in the counterterrorism fight is the Domestic Terrorism-Hate Crimes Fusion Cell, created in April 2019. This Fusion Cell creates more opportunities for investigative creativity, provides multi-program coordination, helps ensure seamless information sharing, and enhances investigative resources to combat the DT threat. Analysis of DT issues within the DHS I&A occurs in the Counterterrorism Mission Center (CTMC). The CTMC provides intelligence support and analysis that focuses on domestic threat actors, including DVEs, consistent with the Department's statutory charges to protect critical infrastructure and screening and vetting in support of border security operations. Within the I&A's CTMC, there is a Domestic Terrorism Branch of analysts dedicated to working within the domestic threat landscape. These analysts often engage with counterparts at the FBI and NCTC\nto jointly author strategic intelligence products on the threat. Additionally, I&A maintains a presence at state and local fusion centers through its Field Operations Division, and I&A analysts at DHS Headquarters routinely work with those individuals to author joint products on issues relevant to their regions, including domestic violent extremism or threats to critical infrastructure. The DHS Field Operations Division has approximately 120 personnel deployed to field locations across the United States, primarily in state and local fusion centers. These officers work across a range of threat issues and actors, including the DVE mission space. Field Operations Division officers collect and report intelligence information in serialized raw intelligence reports and provide regionally-focused analysis, which may include DVE topics. The NCTC serves as the primary US government organization for analyzing and integrating all intelligence pertaining to terrorism and counterterrorism outside of scenarios in which the threat pertains exclusively to domestic terrorists and domestic counterterrorism. While the National Security Act specifies the NCTC has the authority to receive and retain counterterrorism information that is exclusively domestic, the FBI and DHS are the primary organizations countering domestic terrorism. The NCTC identifies and monitors international and transnational trends across a range of violent extremist actors. Domestically, the NCTC can provide appropriate support to the FBI and DHS consistent with its legal authorities and Attorney General-approved guidelines for protecting the privacy, civil rights, and civil liberties of US persons.\n\nVII. Recommendations The Act requires the Director of the FBI and the Secretary of Homeland Security, in consultation with the DNI, to jointly submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report on DT containing recommendations with respect to needing to change authorities, roles, resources, or responsibilities within the federal government to more effectively prevent and counter DT activities, and measures necessary to ensure the protection of privacy and civil liberties.\n\n\nThe Biden Administration has announced a comprehensive review of domestic violent extremism, to include a review of resources, and policies within the federal government. The FBI, DHS, NCTC, and DOJ are actively participating in this review. Pending completion of this review and further consultation with DOJ leadership, the FBI has no recommendations at this time. The DHS is continuing to review authorities, expertise, and resources at its disposal to identify, prevent, and mitigate threats to the Homeland from DVEs. The DHS is committed to expanding its ability to collect DVE and DT information that is publicly available through social media and other platforms, while simultaneously safeguarding privacy, civil rights, and civil liberties of all persons, in order to enhance the Department's ability to rapidly analyze and communicate DVE and DT threats so that policy makers and our homeland security partners are enabled to take appropriate action.\n\n\n## Fbi-Designated Significant Domestic Terrorism Incidents In The United States From 2015 Through 201925\n\n| Date and Location                                         |\n|-----------------------------------------------------------|\n| 26                                                        |\n|                                                           |\n| 22 January 2015                                           |\n| Atlanta, Georgia                                          |\n| An individual was arrested and federally charged with     |\n| tax evasion. The cumulative estimated losses totaled      |\n| $1.5 million. In March 2016, the subject was sentenced    |\n| to one year and one day.                                  |\n| 6 February 2015                                           |\n| Chicago, Illinois                                         |\n| An unidentified individual(s) allegedly set fire to and   |\n| vandalized an occupied building containing horse          |\n| carriages. The economic damages were estimated at         |\n| $130,000.                                                 |\n| 9 February 2015                                           |\n| Orange County,                                            |\n| Florida                                                   |\n| An individual shot and injured two law enforcement        |\n| officers in an ambush as the officers responded to a      |\n| domestic incident. The subject died as a result of        |\n| engagement with law enforcement.                          |\n| 14 February 2015                                          |\n| Elkins, West                                              |\n| Virginia                                                  |\n| An individual was arrested and federally charged with     |\n| knowing possession of stolen explosives in interstate     |\n| commerce. In April 2015, the subject pleaded guilty, and  |\n| in July 2015, was sentenced to eight months.              |\n| 17 March 2015                                             |\n| Stover, Missouri                                          |\n| An individual was arrested and federally charged for      |\n| making threats against the President of the United        |\n| States.                                                   |\n| 25 March 2015                                             |\n| St. Louis, Missouri                                       |\n| An individual was arrested and federally charged with     |\n| knowing possession of a machinegun. In                    |\n| November 2015, the subject pleaded guilty, and in         |\n| February 2016, was sentenced to one year and one day.     |\n| 25 March 2015                                             |\n| Livingston,                                               |\n| Montana                                                   |\n| An individual was arrested and federally charged with     |\n| knowing possession of a machinegun and possession of      |\n| a firearm that is not registered in the National Firearms |\n| Registration and Transfer Record. In November 2015,       |\n| the subject was convicted, and in March 2016, was         |\n| sentenced to six years.                                   |\n\nAnti-Government or Anti-Authority Violent Extremism (AGAAVE), specifically Sovereign Citizen Violent Extremism (SCVE) Animal Rights/Environmental Violent Extremism AGAAVE, specifically SCVE AGAAVE, specifically Anarchist Violent Extremism (AVE) Racially or Ethnically Motivated Violent Extremism (RMVE) AGAAVE, specifically AVE AGAAVE, specifically Militia Violent Extremism (MVE)\n| Date and Location                                           |\n|-------------------------------------------------------------|\n| 26                                                          |\n|                                                             |\n| 2 April 2015                                                |\n| Tallahassee,                                                |\n| Florida                                                     |\n| Three individuals were arrested on state charges of         |\n| conspiracy to commit murder of a Black person. In           |\n| March 2017, one subject pleaded guilty, and in              |\n| April 2017, was sentenced to four years. In August 2017,    |\n| the other two subjects were convicted and sentenced to      |\n| 12 years.                                                   |\n| 10 April 2015                                               |\n| Signal Mountain,                                            |\n| Tennessee                                                   |\n| An individual was arrested and federally charged with       |\n| solicitation to commit a crime of violence; intentionally   |\n| defacing, damaging, or destroying any religious real        |\n| property, because of the religious character of that        |\n| property, or attempting to do so; and transmitting in       |\n| interstate or foreign commerce any communication            |\n| containing any threat to injure the person of another. In   |\n| February 2017, the subject was convicted. In September      |\n| 2020, after going through a lengthy appellate process,      |\n| the defendant was resentenced to 10 years.                  |\n| 17 June 2015                                                |\n| Charleston, South                                           |\n| Carolina                                                    |\n| An individual shot and killed nine Black people at the      |\n| Emanuel AME Church. The subject was arrested on state       |\n| charges of murder and was federally charged with hate       |\n| crime acts resulting in death; hate crime act involving an  |\n| attempt to kill; obstruction of free exercise of religious  |\n| beliefs resulting in death; obstruction of free exercise of |\n| religious beliefs involving an attempt to kill and use of a |\n| dangerous weapon; and use of a firearm to commit            |\n| murder during and in relation to a crime of violence. In    |\n| December 2016, the subject was convicted, and in            |\n| January 2017, was sentenced to death.                       |\n| 9 July 2015                                                 |\n| Yavapai, Arizona                                            |\n| Two individuals were arrested on state charges for          |\n| allegedly shooting and injuring a law enforcement           |\n| officer during a routine traffic violation inquiry.         |\n| 31 July 2015                                                |\n| Vestavia Hills,                                             |\n| Alabama                                                     |\n| An individual was arrested on state charges for             |\n| assaulting a Black convenience store clerk, and in          |\n| May 2016, the subject pleaded guilty and received a         |\n| 12 month suspended sentence.                                |\n| 1 August 2015                                               |\n| Clover, South                                               |\n| Carolina                                                    |\n| Three individuals were arrested and federally charged       |\n| with conspiracy to violate laws governing firearms and      |\n| explosive devices. In September 2015, two subjects          |\n| pleaded guilty, and in January 2016, were each              |\n| sentenced to 21 months. In December 2015, the third         |\n| subject pleaded guilty, and in June 2016, was sentenced     |\n| to 22 months.                                               |\n| 16 September                                                |\n| 2015                                                        |\n| Lawrence County,                                            |\n| South Dakota                                                |\n| An individual stole a vehicle and shot at law               |\n| enforcement officers during their pursuit of the subject.   |\n| The subject died as a result of engagement with law         |\n| enforcement.                                                |\nRMVE AGAAVE, specifically MVE RMVE AGAAVE, specifically SCVE RMVE AGAAVE, specifically MVE Animal Rights/Environmental Violent Extremism\n| Date and Location                                          |\n|------------------------------------------------------------|\n| 26                                                         |\n|                                                            |\n| 23 September                                               |\n| 2015                                                       |\n| Wood County,                                               |\n| West Virginia                                              |\n| An individual was arrested and convicted on state          |\n| charges of threatening to commit a terrorist act after     |\n| advocating to overthrow the government of West             |\n| Virginia.                                                  |\n| 7 October 2015                                             |\n| Richmond,                                                  |\n| Virginia                                                   |\n| Three individuals were arrested and federally charged      |\n| with conspiracy to commit robbery affecting commerce,      |\n| felon in possession, and conspiracy to commit robbery      |\n| affecting commerce for plotting to attack synagogues       |\n| and Black churches. Each subject pleaded guilty and        |\n| were later sentenced to 17.5 years, 8.75 years, and 7      |\n| years, respectively.                                       |\n| 27 November                                                |\n| 2015                                                       |\n| Colorado Springs,                                          |\n| Colorado                                                   |\n| An individual was arrested on state charges of first-      |\n| degree murder for allegedly attacking a reproductive       |\n| health care facility, shooting and killing three people    |\n| and injuring others. The subject was later federally       |\n| charged with violating the Freedom of Access to Clinic     |\n| Entrances Act and use of a firearm during a crime of       |\n| violence resulting in death where the killing is a murder. |\n| In total, three people were killed, including one law      |\n| enforcement officer, and eight people were injured,        |\n| including four law enforcement officers. The case is       |\n| currently pending.                                         |\n| 2 January 2016                                             |\n| Harney County,                                             |\n| Oregon                                                     |\n| Multiple individuals seized and occupied the Malheur       |\n| National Wildlife Refuge. In total, 18 subjects were       |\n| sentenced to crimes associated with the occupation.        |\n| 19 February 2016                                           |\n| Nashville, Indiana                                         |\n| An individual was arrested by local authorities for        |\n| allegedly attacking a Chinese student with a hatchet. In   |\n| April 2016, a judge ruled the subject was not competent    |\n| to stand trial.                                            |\n| 4 March 2016                                               |\n| Los Angeles,                                               |\n| California                                                 |\n| Three individuals were arrested on state charges of        |\n| assault with a deadly weapon with special allegations of   |\n| a hate crime for allegedly assaulting five Hispanic        |\n| people.                                                    |\n| 1 May 2016                                                 |\n| Seattle,                                                   |\n| Washington                                                 |\n| An individual was arrested and federally charged with      |\n| unlawful possession of destructive devices for throwing    |\n| an improvised incendiary device at law enforcement         |\n| officers, injuring one officer, at a May Day protest. In   |\n| February 2018, the subject pleaded guilty, and in June     |\n| 2018, was sentenced to 37 months.                          |\n\nAGAAVE, specifically SCVE RMVE Abortion-Related Violent Extremism AGAAVE, specifically MVE and SCVE RMVE RMVE AGAAVE, specifically AVE\n| Date and Location                                         |\n|-----------------------------------------------------------|\n| 26                                                        |\n|                                                           |\n| 18 June 2016                                              |\n| Salinas, Puerto                                           |\n| Rico                                                      |\n| An individual was arrested and federally charged with     |\n| maliciously damaging or destroying, and attempting to     |\n| damage or destroy, property by means of fire and          |\n| explosives of a building and vehicle used in interstate   |\n| commerce, for allegedly using incendiary devices to       |\n| damage an agricultural business and targeting first       |\n| responders, including law enforcements officers. In       |\n| November 2016, the subject pleaded guilty, and in         |\n| March 2017, was sentenced to three years.                 |\n| 22 June 2016                                              |\n| Mount Trumbull,                                           |\n| Arizona                                                   |\n| An individual was arrested and federally charged with     |\n| attempted destruction of federal property by use of an    |\n| explosive for plotting to destroy a Bureau of Land        |\n| Management cabin. In April 2018, the subject pleaded      |\n| guilty, and in July 2018, was sentenced to time served.   |\n| 7 July 2016                                               |\n| Dallas, Texas                                             |\n| An individual shot at law enforcement officers during a   |\n| protest. The subject shot and killed five law             |\n| enforcement officers, injured six other officers, and     |\n| injured two other people. The subject died as a result of |\n| engagement with law enforcement.                          |\n| 7 July 2016                                               |\n| Bristol, Tennessee                                        |\n| An individual was arrested on state charges for shooting  |\n| at passing cars on a highway and then at law              |\n| enforcement officers who responded. The subject killed    |\n| one person and injured one law enforcement officer. In    |\n| December 2016, the subject pleaded guilty to state        |\n| charges of first-degree murder and attempted first-       |\n| degree murder and was sentenced to life.                  |\n| 10 July 2016                                              |\n| Evansville, Indiana                                       |\n| An individual was arrested on state charges for the       |\n| attempted murder of a transgender person. In February     |\n| 2018, the subject pleaded guilty, and in May 2018, was    |\n| sentenced to 36 years.                                    |\n| 17 July 2016                                              |\n| Baton Rouge,                                              |\n| Louisiana                                                 |\n| An individual shot at law enforcement officers, killing   |\n| three officers and wounding six others. The subject died  |\n| as a result of law enforcement engagement.                |\n| 1 August 2016                                             |\n| Randallstown,                                             |\n| Maryland                                                  |\n| An individual barricaded herself and her child in her     |\n| residence when law enforcement officers attempted to      |\n| serve a bench warrant for her failure to appear in court. |\n| The subject died as a result of law enforcement           |\n| engagement.                                               |\n| 1 August 2016                                             |\n| Mahaska and                                               |\n| Jasper Counties,                                          |\n| Iowa                                                      |\n| Individuals allegedly set fire to seven large vehicles    |\n| used in the construction of the Dakota Access pipeline.   |\n| Economic losses were estimated at approximately $3        |\n| million.                                                  |\nAnimal Rights/Environmental Violent Extremism AGAAVE, specifically MVE RMVE RMVE RMVE RMVE AGAAVE, specifically SVCE Animal Rights/Environmental Violent Extremism\n| Date and Location                                           | Description                                           |\n|-------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------|\n| 26                                                          |                                                       |\n|                                                             |                                                       |\n| RMVE                                                        | 16 August 2016                                        |\n| Olympia,                                                    |                                                       |\n| Washington                                                  |                                                       |\n| An individual was arrested on state charges of assault in   |                                                       |\n| the second degree and malicious harassment for              |                                                       |\n| stabbing a Black member of an interracial couple. In        |                                                       |\n| October 2017, the subject pleaded guilty and was            |                                                       |\n| sentenced to 50 months.                                     |                                                       |\n| RMVE                                                        | 21 August 2016                                        |\n| Fort Wayne,                                                 |                                                       |\n| Indiana                                                     |                                                       |\n| An individual was arrested on state murder charges for      |                                                       |\n| murdering a Black person. In July 2017, the subject         |                                                       |\n| pleaded guilty but mentally ill and was sentenced to 65     |                                                       |\n| years.                                                      |                                                       |\n| RMVE                                                        | 13 September                                          |\n| 2016                                                        |                                                       |\n| Phoenix, Arizona                                            |                                                       |\n| An individual was arrested on state charges of attempt      |                                                       |\n| to commit murder in the first degree, aggravated            |                                                       |\n| assault with a deadly weapon, endangerment, resisting       |                                                       |\n| arrest, and criminal damage for driving a vehicle into      |                                                       |\n| three white law enforcement officers, injuring two          |                                                       |\n| officers. In April 2019, the subject pleaded guilty, and in |                                                       |\n| June 2019, was sentenced to 35 years.                       |                                                       |\n| RMVE                                                        | 28 September                                          |\n| 2016                                                        |                                                       |\n| Zionsville, Indiana                                         |                                                       |\n| An individual was arrested on state charges of murder       |                                                       |\n| for shooting at law enforcement officers when they          |                                                       |\n| attempted to serve the arrest warrant for the murder of     |                                                       |\n| a white person. In February 2019, the subject was found     |                                                       |\n| guilty, and in April 2019, was sentenced to 65 years.       |                                                       |\n| AGAAVE, specifically                                        |                                                       |\n| SCVE                                                        | An individual fled a routine traffic stop and led law |\n| enforcement officers on a high speed chase. The subject     |                                                       |\n| died as result of law enforcement engagement.               |                                                       |\n| 30 September                                                |                                                       |\n| 2016                                                        |                                                       |\n| Van Buren                                                   |                                                       |\n| Township,                                                   |                                                       |\n| Michigan                                                    |                                                       |\n| RMVE                                                        | 7 October 2016                                        |\n| Hilliard, Ohio                                              |                                                       |\n| An individual was arrested on state charges of              |                                                       |\n| conspiracy to commit murder for plotting to conduct a       |                                                       |\n| shooting at a high school. In January 2018, the subject     |                                                       |\n| plead no contest, and in February 2018, was sentenced       |                                                       |\n| to four years.                                              |                                                       |\n| AGAAVE, specifically                                        |                                                       |\n| MVE                                                         |                                                       |\n| 4 October 2016                                              |                                                       |\n| Garden City,                                                |                                                       |\n| Kansas                                                      |                                                       |\n| Three individuals were arrested for plotting a mass         |                                                       |\n| casualty attack using explosives against an apartment       |                                                       |\n| building where multiple Somali immigrants lived and         |                                                       |\n| worshipped. In January 2019, two subjects were found        |                                                       |\n| guilty of federal charges of conspiracy to use a weapon     |                                                       |\n| of mass destruction and conspiracy against civil rights,    |                                                       |\n| and the third subject was found guilty of knowingly and     |                                                       |\n| willingly making false statements. The subjects were        |                                                       |\n| sentenced to 30 years, 26 years, and 25 years,              |                                                       |\n| respectively.                                               |                                                       |\n| 16 October 2016                                             |                                                       |\n| Jasper County,                                              |                                                       |\n| Iowa                                                        |                                                       |\n| Animal                                                      |                                                       |\n| Rights/Environmental                                        |                                                       |\n| Violent Extremism                                           |                                                       |\n| Individuals allegedly set fire to four pieces of equipment  |                                                       |\n| used in the construction of the Dakota Access pipeline.     |                                                       |\n| Economic losses were estimated at approximately $2          |                                                       |\n| million.                                                    |                                                       |\n| Date and Location                                          |\n|------------------------------------------------------------|\n| 26                                                         |\n|                                                            |\n| 22 October 2016                                            |\n| La Pine, Oregon                                            |\n| An individual was arrested on state charges of reckless    |\n| driving, third-degree escape, fourth-degree assault,       |\n| resisting arrest, unlawful use of a weapon and reckless    |\n| endangerment for assaulting a law enforcement officer,     |\n| attempting to take the officer's weapon, and escaping      |\n| custody during a vehicle pursuit. In October 2018, the     |\n| subject pleaded guilty and was sentenced to 60 days.       |\n| 27 October 2016                                            |\n| Morton County,                                             |\n| North Dakota                                               |\n| Individuals allegedly participated in civil disorder,      |\n| trespassing, and setting property on fire during a Dakota  |\n| Access Pipeline protest. One subject was arrested and      |\n| federally charged with civil disorder and use of fire to   |\n| commit a federal felony crime. The subject later plead     |\n| guilty to civil disorder, and in May 2018, was sentenced   |\n| to three years.                                            |\n| 8 November 2016                                            |\n| Buena Vista                                                |\n| County, Iowa                                               |\n| Individuals allegedly set fire to four pieces of equipment |\n| used in the construction of the Dakota Access pipeline.    |\n| Economic losses were estimated at approximately $2.5       |\n| million.                                                   |\n| 3 December 2016                                            |\n| Yanceyville, North                                         |\n| Carolina                                                   |\n| Two individuals were arrested on state charges of          |\n| assault with a deadly weapon for allegedly stabbing and    |\n| injuring their associate.                                  |\n| 1 February 2017                                            |\n| Berkeley,                                                  |\n| California                                                 |\n| Individuals allegedly damaged property and assaulted       |\n| law enforcement officers and attendees at an event         |\n| featuring a political commentator.                         |\n| 15 February 2017                                           |\n| Myrtle Beach,                                              |\n| South Carolina                                             |\n| An individual was arrested and federally charged with      |\n| illegal possession of a firearm by a felon. In February    |\n| 2018, the subject pleaded guilty, and in July 2018, was    |\n| sentenced to 33 months.                                    |\n| 15 February 2017                                           |\n| Tipton County,                                             |\n| Tennessee                                                  |\n| Three individuals were arrested for conspiring to break    |\n| an associate out of jail and kidnap a law enforcement      |\n| officer and a judge. One subject was arrested by           |\n| Canadian authorities in April 2017. The second subject     |\n| pleaded guilty to federal charges of conspiracy to         |\n| commit an act of violence, to wit, kidnapping, and in      |\n| August 2017, was sentenced to 5 years. In December         |\n| 2017, the third subject pleaded guilty to a federal        |\n| charge of misprision of a felony and entered into a pre-   |\n| trial diversion agreement.                                 |\n| 20 March 2017                                              |\n| New York City,                                             |\n| New York                                                   |\n| An individual was arrested on state charges of first-      |\n| degree murder in furtherance of an act of terrorism,       |\n| second-degree murder as a crime of terrorism, second-      |\n| degree murder as a hate crime, and fourth-degree           |\n| criminal possession of a weapon, for killing a Black       |\n| person with a sword. In January 2019, the subject          |\n| pleaded guilty, and in February 2019, was sentenced to     |\n| life in prison.                                            |\nAGAAVE, specifically SCVE Animal Rights/Environmental Violent Extremism Animal Rights/Environmental Violent Extremism RMVE AGAAVE, specifically AVE RMVE AGAAVE, specifically SCVE RMVE\n| Date and Location                                        | Description     | Category   |\n|----------------------------------------------------------|-----------------|------------|\n| 26                                                       |                 |            |\n|                                                          |                 |            |\n| 28 March 2017                                            |                 |            |\n| Ada County, Idaho                                        |                 |            |\n| An individual allegedly shot at law enforcement officers |                 |            |\n| during the arrest of his father for alleged sovereign    |                 |            |\n| citizen fraudulent filings. The subject was injured as a |                 |            |\n| result of law enforcement engagement.                    |                 |            |\n| 13 April 2017                                            |                 |            |\n| Austin, Texas                                            |                 |            |\n| An individual believed to be plotting a mass shooting    |                 |            |\n| was arrested on federal charges of illegal possession of |                 |            |\n| a firearm. In September 2017, the subject pleaded guilty |                 |            |\n| and was sentenced to five years of probation.            |                 |            |\n| 18 April 2017                                            |                 |            |\n| Fresno, California                                       |                 |            |\n| An individual was arrested on state charges of homicide, |                 |            |\n| attempted homicide, discharging a firearm into an        |                 |            |\n| inhabited dwelling, and possession of a firearm by a     |                 |            |\n| felon for shooting and killing three white people.       |                 |            |\n| 5 May 2017                                               |                 |            |\n| Washington, DC                                           |                 |            |\n| An individual allegedly purchased a fully automatic AK-  |                 |            |\n| 47 and made statements about carrying out violence       |                 |            |\n| against law enforcement officers. The subject was        |                 |            |\n| arrested and federally charged with firearms offenses.   |                 |            |\n| In October 2018, the subject pleaded guilty; the case is |                 |            |\n| pending.                                                 |                 |            |\n| 16 May 2017                                              |                 |            |\n| Three Forks,                                             |                 |            |\n| Montana                                                  |                 |            |\n| Two individuals allegedly shot and killed a law          |                 |            |\n| enforcement officer during a traffic stop and then led   |                 |            |\n| officers on a high speed chase and shootout. One         |                 |            |\n| subject was arrested on state charges of deliberate      |                 |            |\n| homicide, and the other died as a result of engagement   |                 |            |\n| with law enforcement.                                    |                 |            |\n| 14 June 2017                                             |                 |            |\n| Alexandria,                                              |                 |            |\n| Virginia                                                 |                 |            |\n| An individual with a personalized violent ideology       |                 |            |\n| targeted and shot Republican members of Congress at a    |                 |            |\n| baseball field and wounded five people. The subject      |                 |            |\n| died as a result of engagement with law enforcement.     |                 |            |\n| 5 August 2017                                            |                 |            |\n| Bloomington,                                             |                 |            |\n| Minnesota                                                |                 |            |\n| Three individuals were arrested and federally charged    |                 |            |\n| with unlawful possession of a machine gun, conspiracy    |                 |            |\n| to interfere with commerce by threats and violence, and  |                 |            |\n| attempted arson                                          |                 | for        |\n| women's health clinic. In January 2019, two of the three |                 |            |\n| subjects pleaded guilty. In December 2020, the third     |                 |            |\n| defendant was convicted of destruction of religious      |                 |            |\n| property, obstruction of religious beliefs, using a      |                 |            |\n| destructive device in relation to crimes of violence,    |                 |            |\n| possession of an unregistered destructive device, and    |                 |            |\n| conspiracy charges. The case is pending.                 |                 |            |\n| 7 August 2017                                            |                 |            |\n| Indianapolis,                                            |                 |            |\n| Indiana                                                  |                 |            |\n| An individual was arrested on state charges of           |                 |            |\n| attempted murder and criminal recklessness after         |                 |            |\n| allegedly barricading himself in his residence and       |                 |            |\n| shooting at law enforcement officers attempting to       |                 |            |\n| serve him an eviction notice.                            |                 |            |\nAGAAVE, specifically SCVE AGAAVE, specifically SCVE RMVE RMVE AGAAVE, specifically MVE Domestic Violent Extremist (DVE) AGAAVE, specifically MVE AGAAVE, specifically SCVE\n| Date and Location                                         |\n|-----------------------------------------------------------|\n| 26                                                        |\n|                                                           |\n| 12 August 2017                                            |\n| Charlottesville,                                          |\n| Virginia                                                  |\n| An individual was arrested and federally charged with a   |\n| hate crime resulting in death, hate crime acts involving  |\n| attempt to kill, and bias-motivated interference with     |\n| federally protected activity resulting in death on state  |\n| charges for driving a vehicle into a crowd of protestors, |\n| killing one person and injuring at least 19 others. In    |\n| December 2018, the subject pleaded guilty and was         |\n| subsequently sentenced to life in prison.                 |\n| 12 August 2017                                            |\n| Charlottesville,                                          |\n| Virginia                                                  |\n| An individual was arrested on state charges of            |\n| discharging a firearm within one thousand feet of a       |\n| school for shooting at a Black person at a protest. In    |\n| May 2018, the subject pleaded no contest, and in          |\n| August 2018, was sentenced to eight years.                |\n| 12 August 2017                                            |\n| Oklahoma City,                                            |\n| Oklahoma                                                  |\n| An individual was arrested and federally charged with     |\n| malicious attempted destruction of a building used in     |\n| and affecting interstate commerce by means of an          |\n| explosive and attempted use of a weapon of mass           |\n| destruction for plotting to detonate what he believed     |\n| was a vehicle borne improvised explosive devise at a      |\n| bank headquarters. In February 2019, the subject was      |\n| found guilty. In March 2020, the subject was sentenced    |\n| to 25 years.                                              |\n| 18 August 2017                                            |\n| Kissimmee,                                                |\n| Florida                                                   |\n| An individual was arrested on state charges of            |\n| premeditated murder for shooting and killing two law      |\n| enforcement officers. In December 2019, the subject       |\n| was convicted and was sentenced to death.                 |\n| 20 August 2017                                            |\n| Livonia, Louisiana                                        |\n| An individual was arrested on a state charge of using,    |\n| carrying, and/or possessing a firearm during a crime of   |\n| violence and federally charged with carjacking for taking |\n| a hostage at gun point, discharging a firearm at the      |\n| hostage and a convenience store clerk, robbing the        |\n| convenience store, and attempting to rape two women.      |\n| In September 2019, the subject pleaded guilty, and in     |\n| February 2020, was sentenced to 20 years.                 |\n| 20 October 2017                                           |\n| Gainesville,                                              |\n| Florida                                                   |\n| Three individuals were arrested on state charges of       |\n| attempted homicide for shooting at a group of             |\n| protesters at a speaking event. In August 2018, one       |\n| subject pleaded guilty to a state charge of accessory     |\n| after the fact to attempted first degree murder, and in   |\n| March 2019, was sentenced to 5 years. In February         |\n| 2019, the second subject pleaded guilty to state charges  |\n| of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon and            |\n| possession of a firearm by a felon, and was sentenced to  |\n| 15 years. In October 2019, the third subject pleaded      |\n| guilty to assault and was sentenced to 5 years.           |\nRMVE RMVE AGAAVE, specifically MVE RMVE AGAAVE, specifically MVE RMVE\n| Date and Location                                          |\n|------------------------------------------------------------|\n| 26                                                         |\n|                                                            |\n| 3 December 2017                                            |\n| Somerset,                                                  |\n| Pennsylvania                                               |\n| An incarcerated individual allegedly attempted to kill a   |\n| corrections officer because the officer was friendly with  |\n| Black prisoners. The subject had an extensive criminal     |\n| history and was serving multiple life sentences.           |\n| 2 January 2018                                             |\n| Orange County,                                             |\n| California                                                 |\n| An individual was arrested on state charges of murder      |\n| with a hate crime enhancement for allegedly killing a      |\n| homosexual Jewish college student.                         |\n| 9 February 2018                                            |\n| Locust Grove,                                              |\n| Georgia                                                    |\n| An individual shot at three law enforcement officers,      |\n| killing one and injuring two, who were attempting to       |\n| arrest him. The subject died as a result of engagement     |\n| with law enforcement.                                      |\n| 17 March 2018                                              |\n| Murfreesboro,                                              |\n| Tennessee                                                  |\n| An individual was arrested on state charges of homicide    |\n| for killing his Black housemate by setting the victim on   |\n| fire. In July 2019, the subject pleaded guilty and was     |\n| sentenced to life.                                         |\n| 19 August 2018                                             |\n| Pittsburgh,                                                |\n| Pennsylvania                                               |\n| An individual was arrested on state charges of homicide    |\n| for allegedly stabbing and killing a Black person outside  |\n| of a bar.                                                  |\n| 1 October 2018                                             |\n| Oklahoma                                                   |\n| Law enforcement officers attempted to arrest an            |\n| individual with a personalized violent ideology on state   |\n| charges related to allegedly making online threats to kill |\n| law enforcement. During the arrest, the subject            |\n| allegedly engaged in gunfire with law enforcement and      |\n| was injured before being taken into custody.               |\n| 23 October 2018                                            |\n| San Juan, Puerto                                           |\n| Rico                                                       |\n| Individuals were arrested for allegedly throwing rocks     |\n| and other objects toward law enforcement officers and      |\n| vandalizing property.                                      |\n| 24 October 2018                                            |\n| Jeffersontown,                                             |\n| Kentucky                                                   |\n| An individual was arrested on state charges of murder,     |\n| wanton endangerment, and attempted murder for              |\n| allegedly shooting and killing two Black people in a       |\n| grocery store. The subject was later federally charged     |\n| with a hate crime resulting in death, use and discharge    |\n| of a firearm to commit murder during and in relation to    |\n| a crime of violence, and a hate crime with attempt to      |\n| kill. In March 2021, the subject pleaded guilty to hate    |\n| crimes and firearms offenses; the case is pending.         |\nRMVE RMVE AGAAVE, specifically SCVE RMVE RMVE DVE AGAAVE, specifically Puerto Rican National Violent Extremism RMVE\n| Date and Location                                             | Description     |\n|---------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------|\n| 26                                                            |                 |\n|                                                               |                 |\n| RMVE                                                          | 27 October 2018 |\n| Pittsburgh,                                                   |                 |\n| Pennsylvania                                                  |                 |\n| An individual was arrested and federally charged with         |                 |\n| obstruction of exercise of free religious beliefs resulting   |                 |\n| in death, use of a firearm to commit murder during and        |                 |\n| in relation to a crime of violence, obstruction of free       |                 |\n| exercise of religious beliefs resulting in bodily injury to a |                 |\n| public safety officer, and use and discharge of a firearm     |                 |\n| during and in relation to a crime of violence for             |                 |\n| allegedly shooting and killing multiple people at a           |                 |\n| synagogue during a religious service. In January 2019,        |                 |\n| the subject was charged with additional hate crimes and       |                 |\n| firearms offenses. In total, 11 people were killed, and at    |                 |\n| least six others were injured. The case is pending.           |                 |\n| DVE                                                           | 26 October 2018 |\n| Plantation, Florida                                           |                 |\n| An individual with a personalized violent ideology was        |                 |\n| arrested and federally charged with use of weapons of         |                 |\n| mass destruction; transport or receive, in interstate or      |                 |\n| foreign commerce any explosive with the knowledge or          |                 |\n| intent that it will be used to kill, injure, or intimidate;   |                 |\n| transmit in interstate or foreign commerce any                |                 |\n| communication containing any threat to injure;                |                 |\n| knowingly deposits for mailing or delivery, or knowingly      |                 |\n| causes to be delivered by mail, anything declared non-        |                 |\n| mailable, with intent to kill or injure; uses/carries an      |                 |\n| explosive to commit or during the commission of any           |                 |\n| felony, for mailing possible improvised explosive devices     |                 |\n| to US representatives, former US government officials,        |                 |\n| private citizens, and national media figures. In March        |                 |\n| 2019, the subject pleaded guilty, and in August 2019,         |                 |\n| was sentenced to 20 years.                                    |                 |\n| AGAAVE, specifically                                          |                 |\n| AVE                                                           |                 |\n| 10 December                                                   |                 |\n| 2018                                                          |                 |\n| Toledo, Ohio                                                  |                 |\n| Two individuals were arrested and federally charged for       |                 |\n| their involvement in planning terrorist attacks against a     |                 |\n| local bar and an interstate pipeline. The subjects            |                 |\n| pleaded guilty and in November and December 2019,             |                 |\n| they were sentenced to 15 years and 6 years,                  |                 |\n| respectively.                                                 |                 |\n| RMVE                                                          | 18 January 2019 |\n| Islamberg, New                                                |                 |\n| York                                                          |                 |\n| Three individuals were arrested on state charge for           |                 |\n| plotting to attack Muslim residents of Islamberg, New         |                 |\n| York. In June 2019, one subject pleaded guilty to             |                 |\n| attempted illegal possession of a weapon, and in              |                 |\n| September 2019, was sentenced to seven years. In June         |                 |\n| 2019, the other two subjects pleaded guilty to                |                 |\n| conspiracy in support of terrorism, and in August 2019,       |                 |\n| were sentenced to four to 12 years.                           |                 |\n| Date and Location                                          |\n|------------------------------------------------------------|\n| 26                                                         |\n|                                                            |\n| 15 February 2019                                           |\n| Silver Spring,                                             |\n| Maryland                                                   |\n| An individual was arrested and federally charged with      |\n| unlawful possession of unregistered firearm silencers,     |\n| unlawful possession of a firearm, and possession of a      |\n| controlled substance. In October 2019, the subject         |\n| pleaded guilty, and in January 2020, was sentenced to      |\n| 160 months.                                                |\n| 25 March 2019                                              |\n| and 4 April 2019                                           |\n| New York and                                               |\n| Missouri                                                   |\n| Two individuals were arrested and federally charged        |\n| with making a material false statement to the FBI in       |\n| connection with their alleged plot to attack a mosque or   |\n| synagogue. In July 2019, one subject pleaded guilty and    |\n| was sentenced to time served. In August 2019, the          |\n| other subject pleaded guilty, and in December 2019 was     |\n| sentenced to probation.                                    |\n| 24 April 2019                                              |\n| San Diego,                                                 |\n| California                                                 |\n| An individual was arrested and federally charged with      |\n| malicious destruction of a building by means of fire for   |\n| driving a vehicle into a building occupied by a cleared    |\n| defense contractor and then setting the vehicle on fire.   |\n| In June 2019, the subject pleaded guilty, and in           |\n| November 2019, was sentenced to seven years. The           |\n| subject was also ordered to pay $93,633 to the victim.     |\n| 27 April 2019                                              |\n| Poway, California                                          |\n| An individual was arrested on state charges of murder      |\n| and attempted murder for allegedly conducting a            |\n| shooting at a synagogue, killing one person and injuring   |\n| three others. The subject was later federally charged      |\n| with obstruction of free exercise of religious beliefs     |\n| resulting in death and bodily injury, involving attempt to |\n| kill, use of a deadly weapon; hate crime acts, and         |\n| damage to real religious property involved the use of a    |\n| dangerous weapon or fire.                                  |\n| 6 June 2019                                                |\n| Brownsville, Texas                                         |\n| An individual was arrested on state charges of making      |\n| terroristic threats on social media toward a synagogue,    |\n| mosque, and a federal building. The subject was later      |\n| federally charged with making a threat with explosive      |\n| materials and false information and hoaxes. In August      |\n| 2020, the subject pleaded guilty, and in November          |\n| 2020, was sentenced to two years.                          |\n| 17 June 2019                                               |\n| Dallas, Texas                                              |\n| An individual shot at people and buildings, including a    |\n| US Federal Courthouse. The subject died as a result of     |\n| engagement with armed security officers.                   |\n| An individual was arrested for allegedly planning to       |\n| conduct a mass shooting targeting synagogues.              |\n| 18 June 2019                                               |\n| Jacksonville,                                              |\n| North Carolina                                             |\nRMVE RMVE AGAAVE, specifically AVE RMVE RMVE AGAAVE RMVE\n| Date and Location                                           |\n|-------------------------------------------------------------|\n| 26                                                          |\n|                                                             |\n| 13 July 2019                                                |\n| Takoma,                                                     |\n| Washington                                                  |\n| An individual threw incendiary devices at vehicles and      |\n| outbuildings at a federal detention center and engaged      |\n| responding law enforcement officers with an AR-style        |\n| rifle. The subject died as a result of engagement with      |\n| law enforcement.                                            |\n| 28 July 2019                                                |\n| Gilroy, California                                          |\n| An individual with a personalized violent ideology          |\n| attacked a festival, shooting and killing three people and  |\n| injuring 16 others. The subject died as a result of         |\n| engagement with law enforcement.                            |\n| 3 August 2019                                               |\n| El Paso, Texas                                              |\n| An individual was arrested on state charges of capital      |\n| murder for allegedly attacking a retail store, shooting     |\n| and killing 22 people and injuring 25 others.               |\n| 8 August 2019                                               |\n| Las Vegas, Nevada                                           |\n| An individual was arrested and charged federally with       |\n| possession of an unregistered firearm or explosive          |\n| device after discussing threats against multiple targets    |\n| including a synagogue and an LGBTQ nightclub. In            |\n| February 2020, the subject pleaded guilty, and in           |\n| November 2020, was sentenced to two years.                  |\n| 21 September                                                |\n| 2019                                                        |\n| Fort Riley, Kansas                                          |\n| An individual was arrested and federally charged with       |\n| distributing explosives information and threatening         |\n| interstate communication after providing bombmaking         |\n| instructions online and conducting potential target         |\n| selection. In February 2020, the subject pleaded guilty,    |\n| and in August 2020, was sentenced to 30 months.             |\n| 10 December                                                 |\n| 2019                                                        |\n| Jersey City, New                                            |\n| Jersey                                                      |\n| Two individuals shot and killed one law enforcement         |\n| officer, and then attacked a kosher supermarket,            |\n| shooting and killing three people and injuring three        |\n| others, including two responding officers. The subjects     |\n| died as a result of engagement with law enforcement.        |\n| 28 December                                                 |\n| 2019                                                        |\n| Monsey, New                                                 |\n| York                                                        |\n| An individual was arrested and charged federally with a     |\n| hate crime act involving an attempt to kill, and            |\n| obstruction of free exercise of religious beliefs involving |\n| an attempt to kill and use of a dangerous weapon, and       |\n| resulting in bodily injury, for allegedly attacking the     |\n| home of a Hasidic rabbi with a machete during a             |\n| Hanukkah celebration, killing one person and injuring       |\n| four others. The case is pending.                           |\nAGAAVE, specifically AVE DVE RMVE RMVE RMVE RMVE RMVE"
    },
    {
        "text": "## Reliable And Relevant National Communications System By\n\nLieutenant Colonel Timothy L. Lake United States Army National Guard COL James H. Thomas Project Advisor This SRP is submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements of the Master of Strategic Studies Degree.  The views expressed in this student academic research paper are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of the Army, Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government.\n\nU.S. Army War College CARLISLE BARRACKS, PENNSYLVANIA 17013\n\n## Report Documentation Page Omb No. 0704-0188\n\nPublic reporting burden for the collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to a penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number.\n\n1. REPORT DATE\n03 MAY 2004\n2. REPORT TYPE\n3. DATES COVERED\n  -\n5a. CONTRACT NUMBER\n4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE\nReliable and Relevant National Communications System\n5b. GRANT NUMBER 5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER 5d. PROJECT NUMBER\n6. AUTHOR(S)\nTimothy Lake\n5e. TASK NUMBER 5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER\n8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION\nREPORT NUMBER\n\n## 7. Performing Organization Name(S) And Address(Es) U.S. Army War College,Carlisle Barracks,Carlisle,Pa,17013-5050\n\n9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)\n10. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S ACRONYM(S)\n11. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S REPORT\nNUMBER(S)\n\n## 12. Distribution/Availability Statement Approved For Public Release; Distribution Unlimited 13. Supplementary Notes 14. Abstract See Attached File. 15. Subject Terms\n\n16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF:\n17. LIMITATION OF\nABSTRACT\n18. NUMBER\nOF PAGES\n26\n19a. NAME OF\nRESPONSIBLE PERSON\na. REPORT\nunclassified\nb. ABSTRACT\nunclassified\nc. THIS PAGE\nunclassified\n\n## Abstract\n\nAUTHOR:\nLieutenant Colonel Timothy L. Lake\nTITLE:\nReliable and Relevant National Communications System\nFORMAT:\nStrategy Research Project\nDATE:\n19 March 2004\nPAGES: 26\nCLASSIFICATION:  Unclassified\nThe National Communications System is a federal government command and control emergency communications system that requires a complete, comprehensive review and emerging technological overhaul to ensure its reliability and relevance.  Since its establishment in the early 1960s, the system has gone through several organizational restructurings and System upgrades.  With our nation under increased terrorist threats within our borders, the reliability of the National Communications System is under extreme scrutiny.  In 2002, a Presidential Directive transferred oversight of the organization from the Department of Defense to the newly established Department of Homeland Security.\n\nThis paper will analyze the current National Communications System, review its origins and recommend emerging technological improvements to support the National Security Council. It also will review the needs of federal, state and local governments, and then recommend implementation of emerging technological capabilities to enhance system reliability and relevance.  Today, more than ever before, the commercial telecommunications infrastructure provides critical communications connectivity for our government's daily operations as well as emergency communications.  The roles of civilian communications companies and their infrastructure also will be analyzed as it applies to emergency national communications support.\n\n## Reliable And Relevant National Communications System The National Communications System\n\nThe National Communications System (NCS) is a federal government command and control emergency communications system that requires a complete, comprehensive review and emerging technological overhaul.  The NCS was established to unify control of federal, state and commercial communication systems to better serve the Office of the President, the National Security Council, the Department of Defense and other federal, state and local governmental agencies during times of peace, emergencies or periods of operational concerns. Over the past three years, the NCS critical infrastructure has failed to provide uninterrupted communications support at all levels of the government during critical times of need.  The terrorist events of September 11, 2001, and the northeastern states power grid failure in August 2003 are recent national events that reaffirm the requirement to leverage emerging technologies to streamline and integrate our nation's communications system at all levels of government as well as to improve our critical civilian telecommunications infrastructure.\n\nThis paper analyzes the current National Communications System, reviews its origins, and recommends emerging technological improvements to support the National Security Council and the National Homeland Security Council, both of which advise the President on Homeland Defense.  It will define the issues that government and the private sector must address in order to ensure that National Security and Emergency Preparedness telecommunication services will be available in times of crisis for the President, other national leaders, state governors, and the emergency preparedness and response community.  This paper will review the needs of federal, state and local governments, and then recommend implementation of emerging technological capabilities to enhance system reliability and relevance.\n\n## Telecommunications\n\n\"The largest Interconnected machine in the world is the telephone system. Every country on the face of this planet has a telecommunications infrastructure. Most businesses depend heavily on their use of telecommunications, not just for sales, but also for the entire operation. A poor or non-existent telecommunications system, even for a short period of time can often generate significant revenue lost, and do immeasurable damage to your reputation.\"1\nOver the past 150 plus years telecommunications have played an intricate role in our nation's industrial and governmental growth?  Today, telecommunications remain at the core of our nation's domestic growth and support to our global influence.  Telecommunications is the infrastructure that supports our national elements of power on a daily basis.  That is the support of our diplomacy negotiations, economic maneuvers, information dissemination, and the command and control of our military.\n\nTelecommunication is defined as any transmission, emission, or reception of signs, signals, writing, images and sounds or information of any nature by wire, radio, optical or other electromagnetic system.2  Commercial telecommunication networks provide today approximately 95 percent of the communication requirements critical to the support of our national security.  Communications have played a vital role in Presidential decision-making since the development of the telegraph in 1843.  President Abraham Lincoln walked across the White House lawn to visit the War Department Army Signal Corps telegraph office almost daily during the major campaigns of the Civil War.  He spent hours reading messages and sending orders to his generals.3  During the Spanish-American War, President William McKinley established the first War Room in the White House, and equipped it with telegraphic instruments, telephones, and war maps so that he could follow the progress of American troops and the American fleet in and around Cuba.  On the eve of World War II, President Franklin D. Roosevelt and British Prime Minister Winston Churchill installed a direct telephone link between their offices to enable the two leaders to have direct communications.4\n\n## Why A National Communications System\n\nThe need for a reliable communication system came to the attention of our national leaders when President John F. Kennedy and his National Security Council experienced procedural and technical delays in communicating critical information to federal agencies, and Soviet Union leadership during the Cuban Missile Crisis.  The United States was hours away from an authorized decision to execute air strikes, and a land invasion of Cuba.  After a 12-hour delay, communication between President Kennedy and Soviet Premier Khrushchev finally lowered tensions and established the foundation for an agreement to avert a possible nuclear catastrophe.5\nPresident John F. Kennedy directed his National Security Adviser, McGeorge Bundy, to establish a communications capability that would support Presidential decision-making.  The Presidential mandate was for the communications system to focus on national and international interconnectivity and survivability. 6  On August 21, 1963, a National Security Action Memorandum was published establishing the National Communications System.7\n\n## Brief History Of The National Communications System\n\nThe rapid technological development of telecommunications and our reliance on its infrastructure to meet our daily needs have resulted in both organizational and technological system changes over the past 43 years.  The NCS is responsible for ensuring that national security and emergency preparedness communications function successfully, including interconnectivity and survivability during times of congestion or when the networks have been damaged or destroyed.\n\nThe world events during the Reagan Administration inspired major improvements in national security and emergency telecommunications.  The pace of technological change provided a growth opportunity for system improvements and new opportunities for diversity and deregulation.  Due to the growing number of commercial telecommunication companies and the break-up of the Bell Telephone Company, Congress, the courts and the regulatory agencies began instituting new telecommunication requirements.  To ensure compliance as well as availability of emerging technology and its support to the NCS, President Ronald Reagan in 1982 created the National Security Telecommunications Advisory Committee (NSTAC) with Executive Order 12383.  The NSTAC was established as the executive agent to oversee the NCS and to provide industry-based analyses and recommendations to the President and the executive branch regarding policy and enhancements to national security and emergency preparedness telecommunications.8\nThe NSTAC provides analyses and recommendations on policy and technical issues related to telecommunications, information systems, information assurance, information protection, and national security and emergency preparedness concerns. NSTAC is comprised of up to 30 Presidential appointed telecommunication and industry leaders.  Table 1 depicts the current NSTAC organization.\n\n     LOCKHEED MARTIN  (Chair)      BELLSOUTH  (Vice Chair)\nAT&T\nBANK OF AMERICA\nBOEING\nCISCO SYSTEMS\nCSC\nDELL\nEDS\nLUCENT\nMICROSOFT\nMOTOROLA\nNORTEL\nORACLE\nRAYTHEON\nROCKWELL\nQWEST\nNORTHROP GRUMMAN\nSAIC\nSBC\nSPRINT\nTELEDESIC\nTRW\nUNISYS\nUSTA\nVERISIGN\nVERIZON\nWORLDCOM\nPresident Ronald Reagan signed Executive Order (E.O.) 12472 in April 1984, which superceded President Kennedy's Memorandum on the NCS.  This executive order assigned the NCS with the support of 23 Federal departments and agencies (see table 2) the mission to assist the President; the NSC; the Director of the Office of Science and Technology Policy; and the Director, Office of Management and Budget in coordinating the planning for and the assurance of systems capability.  The NSC was directed to have the capability to support national security and emergency preparedness communications for the Federal Government under all circumstances, including crisis or emergency, attacks, recovery and reconstruction. The executive order also assigned the NCS the responsibility of ensuring the national telecommunications infrastructure is developed and capable of meeting the needs of our nation. This remains the core responsibility of the NCS.9\n\n| Department of State                 | Department of Treasure                 |\n|-------------------------------------|----------------------------------------|\n| Department of Defense               | Department of Justice                  |\n| Department of Interior              | US Department of Agriculture           |\n| Department of Commerce              | Health and Human Services              |\n| Department of Transportation        | Department of Energy                   |\n| Department of Veteran Affairs       | Central Intelligence Agency            |\n| Federal Emergency Management Agency | The Joint Staff                        |\n| General Services Administration     | NASA                                   |\n| Nuclear Regulatory Commission       | National Telecom and Information admin |\n| National Security Agency            | US Postal Services                     |\n| Federal Communications Commission   | Federal Reserve Board                  |\n\nThe numerous executive orders and presidential memorandums reinforce the significant roles the NCS performs for our national security and homeland defense.  The NCS has enhanced its capabilities throughout its 43-year history to meet the demands of our changing environment and to continue providing proactive solutions to our current and future communication requirements (see table 3).\n\nAs a result of September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, President George W. Bush issued Executive Orders 13228 and 13231 redefining the role of the NCS in national and homeland security.  Executive Order 13228 established the White House Office of Homeland Security and tasked the Office of Homeland Security to coordinate efforts to protect critical public and private owned information systems within the United States for terrorist attacks.  The Office of Homeland Security is also mandated to coordinate the efforts that would ensure the rapid restoration of telecommunications and critical information systems after disruption by a terrorist threat or attack.10\nThe establishment of the President's Critical Infrastructure Protection Board with Executive Order 13231 renamed the NCS Committee of Principals as the Committee for National Security and Emergency Preparedness Communications and assigned the group as a permanent standing committee in the Office of Homeland Security.  Executive Order 13231 reiterated the reporting functions and responsibilities established in Executive Order 12472.11\n\n| 1962                                  | Executive Order 10995   | Establishment of the Director of          |\n|---------------------------------------|-------------------------|-------------------------------------------|\n| Telecommunications Manager            |                         |                                           |\n| 1963                                  | Presidential Memorandum |                                           |\n| NSAM 252                              |                         |                                           |\n| Establishment of the NCS              |                         |                                           |\n| 1970                                  | Executive Order 11556   | Establishment of Office OTP (of           |\n| Telecommunications Policy)            |                         |                                           |\n| 1982                                  | Executive Order 12382   | Establishment of NSTAC (National Security |\n| Telecommunications advisory Committee |                         |                                           |\n| 1984                                  | Executive Order 12472   | Establishment of NS/EP Telecom            |\n| 1998                                  | Exec. Order 12656       | Primary guidance for the NS/EP            |\n| 2001                                  | Exec. Order 13228       | Establishment of OHS                      |\n| 2001                                  | Exec. Order 13231       | Establishment of CIP                      |\n\nIn 2003, The Office of the President published three National Security Presidential Directives (NSPD), also referred to as Homeland Security Presidential Directives (HSPD). NSPD-5, Management of Domestic Incidents; NSPD-7, Critical Infrastructure Identification, Prioritization, and Protection; and NSPD-8, National Preparedness are directives establishing policies to strengthen the preparedness of the United States to prevent and respond to threats or actual domestic terrorist attacks, major disasters, and other emergencies.\n\n## Current Systems\n\nThe NCS became part of the Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection Directorate of the Department of Homeland Security in March 2003.12  The NCS currently provides national security and emergency preparedness priority telecommunications service to Federal, State, and local governments, industry and other authorized national security and emergency preparedness organizations.  The NCS Critical Infrastructure Protection Division provides the following priority telecommunications services:\nGovernment Emergency Telecommunications Service (GETS) is a government managed program that utilizes the commercial communication infrastructure to provide emergency phone service to federal, state and local governments, as well as industry, and non-governmental organization personnel in performing national security and emergency preparedness missions. It provides users with emergency access and priority call processing in the public switch telephone network.  It is an emergency telecommunication capability to be used during periods of natural or man made emergency or crisis that causes congestion on the public switch telephone network.  GETS telephone service is designed to be used when national security and emergency preparedness personnel are unable to complete emergency calls through normal telecommunication means.13\nGETS is necessary because of the increasing reliance on telecommunications.  The economic viability and technical feasibility of such advances as nationwide fiber optic networks, high-speed digital switching, and intelligent features have revolutionized the way we communicate.  This growth has been accompanied by an increased vulnerability to system failures.  Although backup systems are in place, disruptions in service can still occur.  Recent events have shown that natural disasters, power outages, fiber cable cuts, and software problems can have catastrophic impact on the telephone services of entire regions. Additionally, congestion in the public switched telephone network, such as the well-documented \"Mother's Day phenomenon,\" can prevent access to circuits.  However, during times of emergency, crisis, or war, personnel with national security and emergency preparedness missions need to know that their calls will be processed and completed more often than routine calls.\n\nGETS addresses this basic requirement.  Using regulatory enhancements on existing commercial technology, GETS allows the national security and emergency preparedness community to communicate over existing public switched telephone network infrastructure with a high likelihood of call completion during the most severe conditions or high-traffic congestion and disruption. The result is a cost effective, easy to use telephone service that is accessed through a simple dialing plan and Personal Identification Number card verification methodology, similar to a commercial calling card.  GETS is maintained in a constant state of readiness and provides a cost-effective means to overcome network outages through such methods as enhanced routing and priority treatment.14\nWireless Priority Service (WPS) is a White House directed service in response to the events of September 11, 2001, to be used by key leaders during emergency situations.  The WPS provides an end-to-end nationwide wireless priority communications capability to key national security and emergency preparedness personnel during natural or man-made disasters or emergencies that cause congestion or network outages in the public switch telephone network.  The WPS is complementary to, and is expected to be used in conjunction with the GETS to ensure a high probability of call completion in both the wire line and wireless portions of the public switch telephone network.15\nTelecommunication Service Priority (TSP) system is the regulatory, administrative, and operational system authorizing and providing for priority provisioning and restoration of critical national security and emergency preparedness telecommunications circuits.  Critical circuits are defined as those that are critical to maintaining a state of readiness for, responding to, or managing telecommunications during an event or crisis that could cause harm to the population, damage to property, or threaten the security of the United States.  As a result of natural or manmade disasters, telecommunications service vendors may become overwhelmed with requests for new telecommunications services and requirements to restore existing telecommunications services.  The TSP Program provides service vendors with a Federal Communications Commission mandate for prioritizing service requests by identifying those services critical to national security and emergency preparedness.  A telecommunications service with a TSP assignment is assured of receiving full attention by the service vendor before a non-TSP service.16\nEmergency Notification Service (ENS) Pilot is designed to provide alternative emergency notification and information to critical national security and emergency preparedness decision makers and other Federal, State and local governmental officials, including public health and safety personnel, and emergency command centers using multiple communication channels. Emergency notification is distinguished from emergency alerting in that notification targets specific individuals or groups of individuals and may require confirmation for specific communications.17\nSHAred RESource (SHARES) High Frequency (HF) Radio Program  provides a single, interagency emergency message handling system by bringing together existing HF radio resources of federal, state and industry organizations when normal communications are destroyed or unavailable for the transmission of national security and emergency preparedness information.18  SHARES is one of the first national emergency systems managed by the NCS.  It provides both data and voice, however it uses dated technology and network architectures.\n\n## Information Sharing And Homeland Security\n\nOur nation's communication infrastructure contributes to every aspect of homeland security and is a vital foundation for the homeland security information gathering efforts.  Every government official performing homeland security missions depends upon information and information technology.\n\nAlthough American information technology is the most advanced in the world, our country's information systems do not adequately support the homeland security mission. Today, there is no single agency or computer network that integrates all homeland security information nationwide.  Instead, much of the information exists in databases scattered among federal, state and local agencies.  Databases used for law enforcement, immigration, intelligence, and public health surveillance have not been connected in ways that allow us to recognize information gaps.  As a result, government agencies storing terrorism information have not been able to systematically share that information with other agencies.19\nWe need a communication system that enables the sharing of essential homeland security information to national security and emergency preparedness responder.  This information must be shared \"horizontally\" across each level of government, and \"vertically\" among federal, state, and local governments, as well as private industry.  As the NCS transitions to a more robust next generation voice and data network, it must be prepared to support the expanded daily requirements foreseen by homeland security network requirements and emergency responders.\n\n## Primary Oversight\n\nToday federal, state, and local governments are attempting to develop survivable, interoperable communication infrastructures to support national security and emergency preparedness.  Throughout the history of this great nation, the strategic management of the National Communications System became the responsibility of the federal government coupled with emerging technological recommendations from the NSTAC and the commercial telecommunications community.  However, the operational requirements and capabilities placed upon the state and local emergency responders are not always interoperable with their federal counterparts.\n\nThroughout the history of the NCS, the national communications requirements and capabilities have been transferred among the War Department, Office of the President, Department of Defense, and now transferred to the Department of Homeland Security.  As primary responsibility of the NCS has transferred between federal departments, the Department of Defense was always required to execute managerial oversight of the National Communications System day-to-day operations.  The director of the Defense Communications Agency is dual-hatted as Manager, National Communications System.20  The Director, Defense Communications Agency now Defense Information System Agency, focuses on both international command and control as well as national.  Very rarely did the Defense Information System Agency focus on state and local emergency preparedness communications capabilities or requirements.\n\nToday, management responsibility of the NCS has been transferred to the newly established Department of Homeland Security. 21  With this transfer, federal, state and local governments now have a domestic focused communications requirement management team that will focus on assisting federal as well as state and local emergency responders interoperable communication concerns.\n\n## Enhance The System\n\nThe events of September 11, 2001 reaffirmed the requirement for enhanced technological improvements in the National Communications System because of public switch telephone network saturation.  Two years later, the August 2003 northeastern states' power grid failure highlighted a system failure based on the infrastructure power requirements.  Both events limited communications service to critical national security and emergency preparedness personnel.\n\nAlthough some improvements were made as a result of lessons learned from these events, federal, state, and local governments are again requesting that the National Communications System enhance its capabilities to ensure reliable connectivity during emergencies.  The telecommunication services that support national security and emergency preparedness depend on a national telecommunications infrastructure that provides timely, continuous, assured, robust and reliable communications between the President, his security councils, and the federal departments and agencies during a national security emergency, as defined in Executive Order 12656.  Our national infrastructure has to support and enable national security and emergency preparedness telecommunications by wire, radio, fiber optic, or other electromagnetic means provided by commercial, government, and privately owned telecommunications provides.  The required capabilities must assure flexibility, adaptability, interoperability, and seamless connectivity at any location either fixed or mobile. The government emergency telecommunications system must be expanded to include mobile state and local governmental emergency responders, as well as critical private business responders.\n\n National security and emergency preparedness telecommunication services must help support a continuous telecommunications readiness.  We must poses the ability to respond, and manage any event or crisis that degrades or threatens the national security and emergency preparedness of the United States or which could cause harm to the population or loss of property.  We must prepare to minimize the damage and recover from any future terrorist attacks that occur despite our best efforts at prevention.  Past experience has shown that preparedness efforts are key to providing an effective response to major terrorist incidents and natural disasters.  Therefore, we need a comprehensive national system to bring together and command all necessary response assets quickly and effectively.\n\n## Leveraging Emerging Technology\n\nOver the past decade the government has transitioned from its dependency on government controlled, dedicated communication support provide by various federal agencies to a more cost effective, dynamic architecture that uses shared commercial telecommunication infrastructures.  As technological advancements continue to evolve, the convergence of today's voice and data networks will fundamentally change the technology and security environment in which national security and emergency preparedness telecommunication services are provided. Today, the public switch network is beginning to support next generation interconnection for fixed and mobile voice communications, as well as both fixed and mobile internet-data communications.  As more mobile data and voice users communicate over the commercial network with these current and emerging communications devices, the current types of communication equipment and service provided to national security and emergency preparedness responders will also require replacement if reliable services are to be available in the foreseeable future.  New services and capabilities are being developed that may be useful or desired by the President, other national and state leaders as well as private industry.  With the next generation networks, these new communication services will be streamlined into a converged seamless data and voice architectural network.  Pat Gelsinger, Senior Vice President and Chief Technology Officer Intel Corporation, commented about the future of Communications:\n\"The convergence of computing and communications will bring a new level of productivity to business, reducing costs and extending the reach of communications across the globe, opening up new opportunities on a scale we can't imagine today.  Intel is committed to accelerating towards this future, through continued technology advancements and close collaboration with industry and governments worldwide.\"22\nThe technological developments that are driving the convergence of today's voice and data networks are largely positive.  These developments are enabling capabilities and services that were not considered a decade ago and are driving innovation.  The developments of the emerging next generation network technologies for which these services will be provided are currently outpacing the current advancements in national security and emergency preparedness telecommunication services.  Telecommunications convergence refers to the merging of traditional circuit switched networks with packet-based networks as they, along with wireless, cable, satellite, and other networks, evolve into the next generation network.  The next generation network will transport voice, data and video information over a common packetbased transmission medium.23  This transformation to package switching and IP technology will be accompanied by numerous new applications and services.  To pioneer this transformation, Homeland Security Secretary Tom Ridge appointed the Department's Assistant Secretary for Infrastructure Protection, Robert Liscouski as Manager of the National Communications System.\n\nAs the new manager, Mr. Liscouski was also granted $141 million dollars from the President's fiscal year 2004 budget to support development and deployment of emerging next generation network communication capabilities.24\n\n## Transformation Challenges With Next Generation Network\n\nThe migration of voice traffic from the conventional circuit-switched network to packetswitched networks has begun.  The large-scale shift in network structure from circuit switched to packet switched networks using Internet Protocol (IP) technology will have a wide range impact on national security and emergency preparedness telecommunications services. Telecommunications services such as the Government Emergency Telecommunication Service and the Telecommunication Service Priority were developed based on the public switch telephone network architecture.  The Federal Emergency Management Agency and the state and local emergency management agencies' all have developed emergency response activities that rely heavily on the public switch telephone network.  The challenge facing the National Communication System and the national security and emergency preparedness community is the continued support of their missions through the transition into the next generation network. Today's missions are accomplished through primarily voice services, and the transition to package technology is requiring the development of new applications and services.25\nStandards development will be critical as industry and the President's National Security Telecommunications Advisory Committee ensures that national security and emergency preparedness protocols and priorities are integrated into the next generation network architecture.  Table 4 depicts perceived national security and emergency preparedness functional requirements in the next generation network.\n\nNS/EP Telecommunication Services\nFunctional Requirements\nDescription\nEnhanced Priority Treatment\nServices supporting NS/EP missions must be provided priority treatment over other traffic.\nSecure Networks\nNetworks must have protection against corruption of, or unauthorized access to, traffic and control, including expanded encryption techniques and user authentication, as appropriate.\nNon-Traceability\nSelected users must be able to use NS/EP services without risk of usage being traced (i.e., without risk of user or location being identified).\nRestorability\nShould a disruption occur, services must be capable of being reprovisioned, repaired, or restored to required service levels on a priority basis.\nInternational Connectivity\nServices must provide access to and egress from international carriers.\nInteroperability\nServices must interconnect and interoperate with other selected government or private facilities, systems, and networks.\nMobility\nThe communications infrastructure must support transportable, redeployable, or fully mobile communications (e.g., personal communications service, cellular, satellite, high frequency radio).\nUbiquitous Coverage\nServices must be readily accessible to support the national security leadership and inter- and intra-agency emergency operations, wherever they are located.\nSurvivability / Endurability\nServices must be robust to support surviving users under a broad range of circumstances, from the widespread damage of a natural or man-made disaster up to and including nuclear war.\nVoice Band Service\nThe service must provide voice band service in support of presidential and other communications.\nBroadband1 Service\nThe service must provide broadband service in support of NS/EP missions (e.g., video, imaging, web access, multimedia).\nScaleable Bandwidth\nNS/EP users must be able to manage the capacity of the communications services to support variable bandwidth requirements.\nAffordability\nServices must leverage network capabilities to minimize cost (e.g., use of existing infrastructure, commercial off-the-shelf technologies, services).\nReliability / Availability\nServices must perform consistently and precisely according to their design requirements and specifications, and must be usable with high confidence.\n\nFor the foreseeable future the current voice and data networks will coexist and operate with tomorrow's emerging architecture.  The converging networks will provide an expanded set of existing and new telecommunication services that will benefit national security and emergency preparedness personnel.  However, the process of convergence will impact the provision of national security and emergency preparedness telecommunication services traditionally provided by the public switched telephone network.\n\n## Recommendations\n\nTo assure reliability of the next generation network and to mitigate challenges, the Office of Manager, National Communication System should:\n\n-\nIdentify a dual use multipurpose mobile phone or PDA that can support our national security and emergency preparedness community with both voice and date communications.  The instrument must be capably of using the emerging terrestrial base public switch communication network via IP packet switch, and have the capability to utilize satellite technology to facilitate assured connectivity.\n-\nContinue working with national standards organizations to ensure required telecommunications functional requirements are integrated in the developing next generation wireless standards.\n-\nExpand the technical expertise currently on the staff to include greater representation of Internet technology specialist.  This will assist in future system development,\ndeployment, and management.  The expansion of technical expertise should also reduce the overarching dependence, and influence of independent telecommunication contractors that are profit base.\n-\nEncourage the telecommunication industry and Internet provides to continue evaluating the Internet interoperability with the public switch telephone and the evolving next generation network technologies.  We must ensure that appropriate protocols and software enhancements are in the public switch networks to provide priority services to our national security and emergency preparedness community.\n-\nAssess the interoperability between circuit switching, packet switching and the next generation network architecture to minimize or eliminate future risk with system reliability and availability during support to the national security and emergency preparedness community.\n-\nReplace SHARES, the current terrestrial means of communications for emergency response with a mobile satellite capability.\n-\nIntegrate emerging High Altitude Airship technology as well as commercial and Department of Defense satellites into its national emergency preparedness\narchitecture.  Space based transmissions support stations can argument the ground mobile and fixed telecommunication infrastructure, which is subject to regional incident or system malfunctions.\n\n## Conclusion\n\nIn times of crisis, the national leadership depends on assured national security and emergency preparedness telecommunication services, but the unprecedented scope and pace of changes unfolding in the telecommunications sector of the nation's critical information infrastructure places such assured services at risk.  The transformation of voice communication over traditional circuit switched networks to packet switched networks using Internet Protocol (IP) has begun.  This shift in network structure will impact our current national security and emergency preparedness telecommunication services.  National security and emergency preparedness telecommunication services such as the Government Emergency Telecommunication Service and the Telecommunication Service Priority program were all developed to work on the public switch telephone network architecture.  The Federal Emergency Management Agency, as well as state and local governments emergency management agencies' response activities depend heavily on the public switch telephone network.  The current challenge facing the National Communication System and our national security and emergency preparedness community is the assurance of continued priority support by the commercial infrastructure during the convergence and transformation into the next generation package switch network IP architecture.\n\nWORD COUNT=4636\n\n## Endnotes\n\n1 Global Enterprise Network Limited, Global Telecommunications System and Support\n\"The Largest Interconnected Machine in the World,\" 6 January 2004; available from <http://www.gentelecom.net/home.htm>; Internet; accessed 6 January 2004.\n\n2 American National Standards, Telecom Glossary 2000, \"Telecommunication,\" 6\nJanuary 2004; available from <http://www.atis.org/tg2k/>; Internet; accessed 6 January 2004.\n\n3 Richard T. Loomis, A History of the National Communications System: The First 25\nYears, 1963-1988 (Arlington: the MITRE Corporation, 1990), IV.\n\n4 Office of the Manager, National Communications System, Leadership Excellence in Technology, 1963-1998 (Arlington: National Communications System, 1998), 2.\n\n5 McGeorge Bundy, *Danger and Survival: Cuban Missile Crisis* (New York: Random House, 1998), 438-445.\n\n6 Loomis, 2.\n\n7 Office of the Manager, National Communications System, \"Background and History,\" 1\nMarch 2003; available from <http://www.ncs.gov/ncs/html/NCSHistoryBkgrd.html>; Internet; accessed 25 January 2004.\n\n8 Office of the Manager, National Communications System, NSTAC, \"Fact Sheet,\" 12\nOctober 2003; available from <http://www.ncs.gov/nstac/nstac.htm>; Internet; accessed 25 January 2004.\n\n9 Executive Order 12472, \"Assignment of National Security and Emergency Prepared Telecommunications Functions,\" 28 February 2003; available from <http://www.ncs.gov/NCS/HTML/EO-12472%20with%20EO-13286%20changes.htm>; Internet; accessed 25 January 2004.\n\n10 Office of the Manager, National Communications System, Ensuring Essential Communications for the Homeland, (Arlington: Office of the Manager, National Communications System), FY2002, 3.\n\n11 Ibid., 3. 12 DefenseLINK News, \"National Communications System Joins Homeland Security Department,\" 10 March 2003; available from < http:/www.defence,ink.mil/news/mar2003 >; Internet; accessed 25 January 2004.\n\n13 Office of the Manager, National Communications System, GETS Program Information,\n\"The GETS Concept,\" 29 December 2003; available from\n<http://www.gets.ncs.gov/program_info.html>; Internet; accessed 25 January 2004.\n\n14 Ibid.\n\n15 Office of the Manager, National Communications System, \"Wireless Priority Service,\"\n24 November 2003; available from <http://wps.ncs.gov/index_body.html>; Internet; accessed 25 January 2004.\n\n16 Office of the Manager, National Communications System, \"Telecommunication Service Priority,\" 4 December 2003; available from <http://www.tsp.ncs.gov/index_body.html>; Internet; accessed 25 January 2004.\n\n17 Office of the Manager, National Communications System, \"Emergency Notification Service,\" June 2003; available from <http://www.ens.ncs.gov>; Internet; accessed 25 January 2004.\n\n18 Office of the Manager, National Communications System, \"Overview, SHARES HF\nRadio Program,\" June 2003; available from <http://www.ncs.gov/shares/overview.htp>; Internet; accessed 25 January 2004.\n\n19 Office of Homeland Security, National Strategy for Homeland Security, \"Information Sharing and Systems\" (Washington, D.C.: Office of Homeland Security, July 2002), 55.\n\n20 Loomis, 5. 21 John Graves, Project Manager, National Communications System; Interview by author, 10 October 2003.\n\n22 Pat Gelsinger, Senior Vice President and Chief Technology Officer Intel Corporation,\n\"The future of Communications,\" 3 February 2004; available from <http://www.intel.com/technology>; Internet; accessed 3 Feb 2004.\n\n23 Business Communications Review, Next Generation Networks, \"Convergence & IP\",3\nFeb 2004; available from <http://www.bcr.com/ngn/tracks/convergence asp>; Internet; accessed 3 February 2004.\n\n24 Telecom News, \"*National Security and Emergency Preparedness\"* Office of the Manager, National Communication System, Issue 1, 2004, 1, 2.\n\n25 Graves. 26 Contract Data Requirements List B001, *Future Service Plan VIII, Volume III*, 20 June\n2003, 13.\n\n## Bibliography\n\nAmerican National Standards. Telecom Glossary 2000, \"Telecommunication.\"\n<http://www.atis.org/tg2k/>. Internet. Accessed 6 January 2004.\n\nBundy, McGeorge. *Danger and Survival: Cuban Missile Crisis*. New York: Random House,\n1998.\n\nBusiness Communications Review. Next Generation Networks. \"Convergence & IP.\" 3 February\n2004. Available from <http://www.bcr.com/ngn/tracks/convergence.asp>. Internet. Accessed 3 February 2004.\n\nCampen, Alan D. *The First Information War*. Fairfax, VA: AFCEA International Press, 1992. Contract Data Requirements List B001. *Future Service Plan VIII, Volume III*, 20 June 2003.\n\nDefenseLINK News. \"National Communications System Joins Homeland Security Department.\"\n10 March 2003. Available from <http:/www.defenselink.mil/news/mar2003>. Internet. Accessed 25 January 2004.\nExecutive Order 12472. \"Assignment of National Security and Emergency Prepared\nTelecommunications Functions.\" 28 February 2003. Available from <http://www.ncs.gov/ NCS/HTML/EO-12472%20with%20EO-13286%20changes.htm>. Internet. Accessed 25 January 2004.\nGelsigner, Pat, Senior Vice President and Chief Technology Officer Intel Corporation, \"The\nFuture of Communications.\" 3 February 2003. Available from <http://www.intel.com/technology>. Internet. Accessed 3 February 2004.\nGlobal Enterprise Network Limited. Global Telecommunications System and Support. \"The\nLarges Interconnected Machine in the World.\" Available from <http://www.gentelecom.net/home>. Internet. Accessed 6 January 2004.\nGraves, John, Project Manager, National Communications System. Interview by Author, 10\nOctober 2003.\nLoomis, Richard T.  A History of the National Communications System: The First 25 Years,\n1963-1988. Arlington: the MITRE Corporation, 1990.\n\nOffice of Manager, National Communications System. Government Emergency\nTelecommunication Services Program Information. \"The GETS Concept.\" 29 December 2003. Available from <http://www.gets.ncs.gov/program_info.html>. Internet. Accessed 25 January 2004.\nOffice of the Manager. National Communications System. \"Background and History.\" 1 March\n2003. Available from <http://www.ncs.gov/ncs/html/NCSHistoryBkgrd.html>. Internet. Accessed 25 January 2004.\n\nOffice of the Manager. National Communications System. \"Overview, SHARES HF Radio\nProgram.\" June 2003. Available from <http://www.ncs.gov/shares/overview.htm>. Internet. Accessed 25 January 2004.\nOffice of the Manager. National Communications System. \"Telecommunication Service Priority.\"\n4 December 2003. Available from <http://www.tsp.ncs.gov/index_body.html>. Internet. Accessed 25 January 2004.\nOffice of the Manager. National Communications System. \"Wireless Priority Service.\" 24\nNovember 2003. Available from <http://wps.ncs.gov/index_body.html>. Internet. Accessed 25 January 2004.\nOffice of the Manager. National Communications System. Ensuring Essential Communications\nfor the Homeland. Arlington: Office of the Manager, National Communications System, 2002.\nOffice of the Manager. National Communications System. Leadership Excellence in\nTechnology, 1963-1998. Arlington: Office of the Manager, National Communications System, 1998.\nOffice of the Manager. National Communications System. NSTAC \"Fact Sheet.\" 12 October\n2003. Available from <http://www.ncs.gov/nstac/nstac.htm>. Internet. Access 25 January 2004.\nTelecom News. \"*National Security and Emergency Preparedness\"* Office of the Manager, National Communication System, Issue 1, 2004.\n\nU.S. Office of Homeland security. National Strategy for Homeland Security. Information Sharing\nand Systems. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Office of Homeland Security, July 2002."
    },
    {
        "text": "# Report Of The Special Task Force On Interrogation And Transfer Policies\n\n## Introduction And Summary\n\nExecutive Order 13491 directed the Special Task Force on Interrogation and Transfer Policies to undertake two missions: (1) \"to study and evaluate whether the interrogation practices and techniques in Army Field Manual 2-22.3, when employed by departments and agencies outside the military, provide an appropriate means of acquiring the intelligence necessary to protect the Nation, and, if warranted, to recommend any additional or different guidance for other departments or agencies\"; and (2) \"to study and evaluate the practices of transferring individuals to other nations in order to ensure that such practices comply with the domestic laws, international obligations, and policies of the United States and do not result in the transfer of individuals to other nations to face torture or otherwise for the purpose, or with the effect, of undermining or circumventing the commitments or obligations of the United States to ensure the humane treatment of individuals in its custody and control.\" 1\nThe Task Force established an Interrogation Working Group to address the first mission, and a Transfer Working Group to address the second mission. After meeting with agencies of the United States government, foreign officials, and representatives of non-governmental organizations, the Task Force reached a series of conclusions and formulated a set of recommendations relating to interrogation and transfer policy. These recommendations should be coordinated and integrated with those ofthe Detention Policy Task Force.\n\n## Interrogation: General Conclusions\n\nThe Task Force's mission was to determine whether any agency other than the military should be authorized to use any interrogation practice or technique not listed in Army Field Manual 2-22.3 (the \"Army Field Manual\" or \"Manual\") in order to protect national security. The Task Force could not undertake that task in a vacuum, however, and therefore asked federal law enforcement and Intelligence Community agencies to nominate interrogation practices and techniques for consideration. No federal agency informed the Task Force that it believed that it was necessary or appropriate to national security to use any interrogation practice or technique not listed in the Army Field Manual or currently used by law enforcement. ill particular, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) informed the Task Force that it did not seek to use the enhanced interrogation techniques it had developed after September 11, 2001, to question highvalue detainees. The President has also announced that the United States would no longer use those techniques. Accordingly, although there may be some lawful and effective interrogation practices and techniques that are not listed in the Army Field Manual or currently used by law enforcement agencies, the Task Force did not consider whether it was appropriate or legal for any agency of the federal government to use any specific technique not contained in the Army Field Manual.\n\nNevertheless, the Task Force studied U.S. interrogation practices as extensively as time would allow. Based on that study, it reached the following conclusions:\n\n-  The Army Field Manual's description ofpermissible interrogation\npractices and techniques provides appropriate guidance to both\ninexperienced and experienced military interrogators.\n-  Experienced intelligence and law enforcement interrogators do not rely\nsolely on particular interrogation techniques but instead develop lawful\ninterrogation strategies based on extensive knowledge of the detainee and\nhis organization, guile and deception, the use of incentives, and other\nfactors.\n-  Experienced interrogators believe that the separation of a high-value\ndetainee from other detainees is often essential to effective interrogation\nand that the U.S. government should maintain a detention capability that\nallows control of the detention environment to support intelligence\ncollection. The legal, policy, and oversight questions raised by the\nestablishment of a detention facility in the U.S. or abroad are beyond the\nTask Force's mandate, however, and are currently under consideration by\nthe Detention Policy Task Force.\n-  To train effective interrogators, the United States must give its\ninterrogators opportunities and incentives to gain experience in\ninterrogation, not simply train them in interrogation techniques.\n-  The Army Field Manual imposes appropriate limits on interrogation.\nAmong other things, the Manual bans cruel, inhuman, or degrading\ntreatment, outlaws several specific interrogation practices, and bars\ninterrogators from using any interrogation technique that they would not\nwish to see used on a United States citizen.\n-  Additional research is needed on the science of interrogation and the\npotential to develop new and more effective lawful interrogation practices,\napproaches, and strategies, particularly interrogation techniques that have\nthe potential to obtain information as efficiently as possible in situations\nposing the greatest threats to national security.\n\n## Recommendations\n\nThe Task Force also formulated four specific recommendations:\n1.\n\nCreate a High-Value Detainee Interrogation Group (HIG): The Task Force recommends the creation of an interagency group that would deploy interrogation teams composed of interrogators, subject matter experts, analysts, behavioral specialists, and linguists to conduct interrogations of high-value terrorist detainees. The HIG's primary goal would be the collection of intelligence to protect national security. Where possible and consistent with this objective, it should collect intelligence in a manner that allows it to be used as evidence in a criminal prosecution.\n\n2.\n\nIncrease Intelligence Community and Law Enforcement Cooperation: Determining whether any given interrogation should seek only the collection of intelligence or a statement that could potentially be used against the detainee in a criminal prosecution should be a pragmatic decision based on the needs of national security, and not the interests or goals of a particular agency.\n\nOne purpose of the HIG would be to ensure that that decision is made pursuant to settled, consistently applied criteria. Those criteria would make clear that an interrogation of a high-value detainee would be primarily to collect intelligence necessary to protect national security and, where possible and consistent with this objective, to gather information to be used in a criminal prosecution. Of course, those goals are not mutually exclusive and should be pursued in tandem whenever possible.\n\n3.\n\nEstablish and Disseminate Best Practices: If created, a High-Value Detainee Interrogation Group will develop a set of best practices for interrogation.\n\nThe HIG should identify and disseminate those best practices and use them to conduct training for other agencies engaged in interrogation.\n\n4.\n\nEstablish a Scientific Research Program for *Interrogation:* Prior to the September 11 attacks, the United States had not engaged in a systematic effort to study and improve interrogation techniques in nearly 50 years. Although some resources have been devoted to studying interrogation since September 11, the United States should engage in a concerted effort to study the effectiveness and propriety of existing interrogation practices, techniques, and strategies and should try to develop new ones that meet the requirements of domestic law and the United States obligations under international law. Resources should be devoted both within the U.S. government and in academic and research institutions to further this goal.\n\nTransfer:\n\n## General Conclusions\n\nThe Task Force identified and considered seven types of transfers conducted by the U.S. government: 2 (1) extradition, (2) transfers pursuant to immigration proceedings,\n(3) transfers pursuant to the Geneva Conventions, ( 4) transfers from the Guantanamo Bay detention facility, (5) military transfers within or from Afghanistan, (6) military transfers within or from Iraq, and (7) transfers pursuant to intelligence authorities. The Task Force did not consider transfers into U.S. custody or transfers within U.S. custody to be part of its mandate under the Executive Order.\n\nThe Task Force began by identifying the legal and policy framework within which the seven categories oftransfers take place. As a legal matter, the United States has taken the view that it is barred from transferring an individual from its territory where it is more likely than not that the person will be tortured by the country to which he is transferred. As a policy matter, the United States has applied the same standard to wholly extraterritorial transfers. The Task Force also examined U.S. policies and practices with respect to obtaining and evaluating assurances from other countries that they will not torture a person transferred from the United States.\n\nThe Task Force carefully considered the key criticisms of U.S. transfer practices, as well as the operational and policy interests that are served by existing practices. The Task Force concluded that, while the seven identified transfer scenarios present strikingly different considerations, important U.S. national security interests are at stake in all of them. Particularly (but not exclusively) in the area of counterterrorism, transfers are an important tool for the United States in situations where U.S. prosecution or detention is not available, but where an individual may present a real danger or have significant intelligence value. Accordingly, proposed changes to existing practice must be developed in a manner that permits the continued use oftransfers consistent with relevant humanitarian considerations. Operating within the framework ofthis general conclusion, the Task Force considered what steps could be taken to better ensure that U.S. transfer practices comply with all relevant domestic laws and policies and all relevant international obligations.\n\n## Recommendations\n\nThe Task Force formulated a number of recommendations, some ofwhich apply to all of the transfer scenarios and some of which are specific to particular transfer scenarios:\n2 In this report, the Task Force has used the term \"transfer\" to describe a variety of different scenarios in\n\n1.\nImproving Assurances: The Task Force makes several\nrecommendations aimed at clarifying and strengthening U.S. procedures for\nobtaining and evaluating assurances and increasing the use of monitoring\nmechanisms to implement assurances.\n2.\n\nImproving partner nation detention facilities and capabilities: In considering recommendations on correctional assistance, the Detention Policy Task Force should take into account that the potential for transfers is increased by better facilities in partner nations, particularly in the Middle East and South and Southeast Asia.\n\n3.\n\nAmending Department of*Homeland Security regulations:* The Task Force recommends changes to the applicable regulations to reflect the shift in responsibility for evaluating diplomatic assurances from the Immigration and Naturalization Service under the Department of Justice to the Department of Homeland Security.\n\n4.\n\nMonitoring ISAF detainees in Afghanistan: The Task Force recommends that the U.S. Embassy in Kabul should develop a risk mitigation plan to improve monitoring of the treatment of detainees transferred by U.S.\n\nmembers of the International Security Assistance Force to the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, taking into account resource and other practical concerns.\n\n5.\n\nProviding comprehensive assistance to develop detention facilities in areas where large numbers of*detainee transfers are expected:* The Task Force recommends using certain aspects of the U.S. experience with the Afghan National Detention Facility as a model in current and future conflicts where the United States expects to capture a significant number of detainees, and plans eventually to transfer them to the host government.\n\n6.\n\nNegotiating assurances with host governments in future conflicts:\nThe Task Force recommends that, in the future, where it appears likely that the Department of Defense will hold and ultimately seek to transfer significant numbers of detainees to a host state, the Department of Defense, in cooperation with the Department of State, should negotiate assurances with the host government to govern the treatment of transferred detainees at as early a stage in the process as possible.\n\n7.\n\nEstablishing Department of*Defense policies or directives:* The Task Force recommends that the Department of Defense should adopt policies or directives governing transfers consistent with the policy statement in section\n2242(a) of the Foreign Affairs Reform and Restructuring Act of 1998 (codified at\n8 U.S.C.  1231 note) (\"FARRA\").\n\n8.\n\nEstablishing Intelligence Community policies or directives: The Task Force recommends that elements of the Intelligence Community that may be called upon to conduct or participate in transfers should adopt policies or directives governing transfers consistent with the policy statement in section\n2242(a) of the FARRA.\n\n9. Additional recommendations applicable to the Intelligence Community:\nThe Task Force formulated three additional recommendations applicable to potential transfers conducted pursuant to intelligence authorities that are contained in a classified annex to the Task Force's report.\n\n## Interrogation\n\nIn light of the President's decision to prohibit the use of enhanced or coercive\ninterrogation techniques used by the CIA, the Task Force broadened its mission to focus\non ways to improve the United States' ability to interrogate high-value detainees. The\nTask Force's recommendations are as follows:\n\n## 1. Establish A High-Value Detainee Interrogation Group\n\nThe United States government should establish and maintain a High-Value Detainee Interrogation Group for intelligence collection, bringing together the best interrogators and support personnel from the Intelligence Community, the Department of Defense, and law enforcement.\n\nTo ensure that the best available interrogation resources are directed against the nation's most high-value counterterrorism detainees, the Task Force proposes establishing a multi-agency High-Value Detainee Interrogation Group (RIG) that would use the best capabilities of intelligence and law enforcement, as well as allied military and civilian interrogation operations, with a focus on those interrogation practices and procedures that produce timely, reliable, and actionable results. The RIG would be a joint intelligence and law enforcement entity under the administrative control of the FBI.\n\nSubject to guidance from the Counterterrorism Security Group and based on pre-existing criteria, as well as information obtained from the Intelligence Community, the RIG\nwould prepare to conduct interrogations by identifying individuals who should be the subjects of a specialized interrogation capability if detained by the U.S. government or otherwise become available for interrogation. Using the same process, the RIG would prepare to interrogate currently unknown members of specific terrorist organizations if they become available for interrogation. The RIG would coordinate the creation, and supervise the training, of Mobile Interrogation Teams (MITs) to conduct interrogations of the identified individuals, members of terrorist groups, or others who met its deployment criteria. The MITs would consist of experienced interrogators, subject matter experts, analysts, behavioral specialists, linguists, and others. The MITs would ordinarily deploy\n. when the U.S. government detained or otherwise obtained the ability to interrogate a person who met the HIG's deployment criteria, subject to limitations described in the classified annex to this report. The deployment of a MIT would be subject to the approval of the Chief of Mission for the country in which the MIT would deploy and, when the detainee is in Department of Defense custody, the approval of the responsible geographic combatant commander. The RIG would also supervise the development of new methodologies for effective interrogation.\n\nThe HIG's priority would be intelligence collection to prevent terrorist attacks on the United States and its allies and otherwise protect national security. Evidence collection for prosecution (which may also protect national security) would remain an important consideration, and steps should be taken to ensure that intelligence collection proceeds in a manner that does not limit future law enforcement options. In cases where the interests of intelligence collection and preservation of evidence diverge, collecting intelligence,to prevent a future attack would take precedence. Accordingly, use ofthe MITs would not carry a presumption that the detainee should be prosecuted in a criminal court in the United States or that *Miranda* warnings should be given during the interrogation.\n\nOrganization: The Task Force considered three organizational models for the HIG: ( 1) a free-standing interrogation capability; (2) a \"federated\" model in which the HIG would be organized with resources from across the U.S. government on a case-bycase basis; and (3) a \"hybrid\" model involving a small permanent nucleus of people modeled on the Foreign Emergency Support Team (FEST) and augmented on a case-bycase basis for individual deployments. The Task Force recommends the third, or hybrid, model. This small group would be drawn from agencies in the Intelligence Community and would be responsible for maintaining training and exercise programs, the administrative aspects of deployments, and managing an overall research program. This approach should provide greater stability and clarity of operational authority than the federated model, while maintaining flexibility by keeping resources in individual agencies.\n\nUnder the hybrid model, individual agencies would be expected to establish and maintain minimum standards of training for individuals who are serving in the HIG or who are identified to deploy in a MIT. Agencies would also be expected to participate fully in the development and implementation of the HIG concept. The HIG\nadministrative office would be responsible for the following activities with guidance and direction from the National Security Council's Counterterrorism Security Group:\n\n-  Managing the MIT interrogation program;\n-  Establishing interrogation priorities for the MITs;\n-  Developing policy, doctrine, and procedures for interrogations of high-value\ndetainees;\n-  Based on information obtained from the Intelligence Community, identifying\nhigh-value detainees subject to interrogation if detained by the U.S.\ngovernment or otherwise available for interrogation;\n-  Deploying MITs to interrogate high-value detainees who are on the HIG list\nor meet the HIG's criteria;\n-  Ensuring that a participant in the interrogation is prepared to testify if a\ndetermination is made that United States prosecution is a possible objective\nfor disposition ofthe detainee;\n-  Setting and enforcing interrogation and training standards for the MITs;\n-  Conducting exercises to strengthen HIG collaboration and cooperation and\nensure smooth support to future operations;\n-  Sponsoring and coordinating interrogation research activities; and\n-  Disseminating research results to the U.S. government interrogation\ncommunity.\nWhile the HIG would provide the strategic and administrative backbone for the effort, other Intelligence Community and law enforcement agencies would provide operational capability, training, and research support.\n\nGovernance: The Task Force recommends that the HIG be subject to the administrative supervision and control of a single agency. After evaluating potential agencies, the Task Force recommends that the FBI serve as the administrative headquarters for this multi-agency effort. Although other agencies also have existing interrogation capabilities, logistical support for communications and transportation, or operational and analytical programs focused on terrorism, the Task Force concluded that putting the HIG within the FBI will strengthen the public perception of legal oversight of the activity and dovetail with the FBI's existing intelligence and law enforcement programs focused on terrorism suspects. The recommendation is intended to align the HIG with the FBI's intelligence functions; it is not intended to make the FBI's law enforcement function the primary purpose of the HIG. As set forth above, the HI G's priority would be intelligence collection to prevent terrorist attacks on the United States and its allies and otherwise to protect national security.\n\nAs an entity within the FBI, the HIG would have a chief drawn from that agency who would have over-all command of the HIG and supervision of the composition, training, and deployment of the MITs. To ensure input into the governance of the HIG\nfrom other components of the Intelligence Community, the Task Force recommends that its deputy should be drawn from another Intelligence Community agency. In addition, the HIG would be subject to oversight, as discussed below.\n\nOversight: The Task Force agreed that the HIG should be subject to oversight to ensure appropriate policy guidance, effective interagency coordination, and compliance with the rule oflaw. The Task Force recommends that this policy and coordination oversight should be exercised by the Counterterrorism Security Group (CSG) of the National Security Council and by the NSC Deputies and Principals Committees, as necessary and appropriate. Legal issues that arise concerning compliance with U.S.\n\ndomestic law and international legal obligations regarding the interrogation and treatment of detainees will be evaluated by the Department of Justice, in coordination with attorneys at the relevant agencies and the NSC/White House.\n\nMobile Interrogation Teams: A key element ofthe HIG is the establishment of Mobile Interrogation Teams (MITs) that would deploy to conduct interrogations ofhighvalue detainees. A presumption would exist that the MITs would deploy to conduct the interrogation of a high-value detainee previously identified by the HIG, or who met the RIG's criteria, if the U.S. government detained or obtained the ability to interrogate the individual. The MITs would consist of interrogators, subject matter experts, analysts, behavioral specialists, and linguists drawn from existing programs, as needed. MIT\ninterrogators would be U.S. government employees, would have specific expertise in interrogation, and would train to hone these skills and maintain current knowledge of terrorist groups, geographic regions, and relevant intelligence requirements. MIT subject matter experts, including law enforcement case agents and intelligence analysts with the greatest knowledge of a specific detainee or a specific subject matter, and others as needed, would provide detainee-specific and group-specific knowledge to the MIT during interrogation. The HIG would determine MIT membership for individual deployments based on available personnel from Intelligence Community and law enforcement agencies.\n\nIndividual agencies participating in high-value detainee interrogation operations would be required to:\n\n-  Establish and maintain current capabilities for interrogation;\n-  Train to standards set by the RIG; -  Maintain readiness to respond to RIG deployments;\n-  Participate fully in exercises, both operationally and administratively, as\nnecessary;\n-  Provide onsite command and control where required; and\n-  Deploy and operate in accordance with guidance and objectives set by the\nHIG and the CSG consistent with existing laws, executive orders, directives,\nand interagency agreements that govern deployment and activities of the\ngovernment executive branch employees overseas.\nThe Task Force concluded that the MITs must train and exercise together frequently to be effective. Several experienced interrogators told the Task Force that interrogation is less likely to succeed when an interrogator meets a supporting analyst or the interpreter immediately before an interrogation. Training should facilitate long-term working relationships and allow a MIT to develop interrogators who can work effectively with an interpreter and who know they can rely on the supporting subject-matter experts and analysts. In addition, by training and deploying together, MITs would develop the most effective approaches to interrogation and be in the best position to provide input to researchers studying ways to improve interrogation.\n\nThe Task Force also considered whether the HIG could operate domestically by, for example, deploying an MIT to interrogate a high-value detainee or terrorism suspect captured in-the United States. In the end, the Task Force concluded that the question whether the HIG would operate domestically was outside its mission, although it believes the question of domestic deployment warrants further consideration.\n\nLogistical and Administrative Issues: The Task Force discussed several other administrative and logistical issues relating to the creation of the HIG and deployment ofMITs. The Task Force determined, however, that these details were more appropriately addressed in an implementation plan.\n\n## 2. Increase Intelligence Community And Law Enforcement Cooperation And Collaboration Against High-Value Detainees.\n\nLeverage relevant authorities and capabilities to maximize both intelligence collection and potential criminal prosecution.\n\nWhen the U.S. government detains or obtains access to a high-value detainee, it must often decide whether or not an interrogation ofthat detainee will have as an objective eliciting a statement that can be used against the detainee in a criminal prosecution in the United States or another country. The objectives of an interrogation may affect the course of the interrogation and the identity ofthe interrogator. Creating a consolidated team of interrogators with a variety of interrogation styles and experiences under unified leadership would make it possible to employ the most effective interrogation strategy for individual high-value detainees. Ideally, the MITs will know, in advance of deployment, the desired disposition of the detainee developed in the interagency planning process - U.S. or foreign prosecution, release, long-term detention, or deportation - and develop an interrogation plan that is tailored to the particular detainee and the desired disposition. By evaluating the potential for and possible interest in criminal prosecution prior to an interrogation, the HIG, with policy guidance from the CSG, can make appropriate decisions regarding the composition of the team, the strategy and sequence ofthe interrogation, and other issues that may affect the ability to prosecute the detainee. All planning and training should retain a significant degree of flexibility to account for the possibility of unforeseen developments in any capture and interrogation of a high-value detainee.\n\n## 3. Establish Best Practices And Disseminate Them To The Interrogation Community\n\nThe HIG should continue to develop concepts ofbest practices and disseminate these to agencies that conduct interrogations.\n\nThe MITs will develop a set of best practices for interrogation. Those practices will include improved interrogation strategies, training regimes, and methods of organizing interrogation teams. In particular, because the MITs will be on the front lines of interrogation and will confront some ofthe most hardened and resistant terrorist suspects, they will be in the best position to develop new and effective interrogation practices as necessary.\n\nFor these reasons, the Task Force recommends that the HIG create a process for identifying and cataloging best practices. In addition, processes should be established for disseminating the fruits ofthe HIG's experience to other agencies that conduct interrogation. For example, the HIG could conduct regular training for other agencies.\n\nThat kind of training would also allow for a healthy exchange ofideas between the HIG\nand other agencies, including law enforcement agencies.\n\n## 4. Establish A Scientific Research Program To Develop Improved Techniques And Methodologies For Interrogation\n\nEstablish a program and corresponding budget to oversee a comprehensive scientific study to research and develop more effective interrogation methodologies.\n\nThere is little existing scientific research assessing current interrogation approaches, including those listed in the Army Field Manual. Although some research has addressed the effectiveness of interviewing and interrogation techniques used by law enforcement agencies, the conclusions of those studies are not necessarily applicable to the interrogation of high-value detainees. Nor does the United States have a systematic mechanism to capture lessons learned and develop case studies on interrogation.\n\nTo remedy these deficiencies, a long-term research program should be established to develop and oversee research on interrogation. Most Task Force members agree that the HIG would be the most effective entity to manage such a program, as the HIG would have the most significant substantive experience. It would house experts dedicated to ensuring that research is relevant and applicable to real-world interrogation. The research itself would be conducted by Intelligence Community members and academic and research institutions. The HIG should manage the study of foreign civilian and military intelligence and law enforcement methodologies to learn from the experience of foreign governments. The HIG should also ensure that the research would focus on the most difficult cases and issues.\n\nAny such program would adhere to all applicable U.S. government guidelines for scientific experimentation and research. Topics of research could include the following:\n\n-  The standards and assumptions inherent in the Anny Field Manual and law\nenforcement communities;\n-  The comparative effectiveness of interrogation approaches and techniques, with\nthe goal of identifying the existing techniques that are most effective and\ndeveloping new lawful techniques to improve intelligence interrogations; and\n-  Identification of additional lawful methods of obtaining information from an\nindividual in the truncated timeframe that the United States may face in a crisis.\nResearch methods could involve the following:\n\n-  Substantive exchanges between practitioners on what worked and what did not, to\ndocument lessons learned and capture actual interrogation experiences. Research\nshould study both successes and failures;\n-  Developing case studies and teaching tools for continuing education of current\ninterrogators, as well as to train new interrogators; and\n-  Applying social science theories to interrogation. Studies ofrelevant subjects\nsuch as persuasion, sources ofpower, interests and identities, stress, resistances,\nand memory were identified by the Intelligence Science Board as being extremely\nrelevant to interrogation.\nDeveloping a research program and its corresponding budget would require significant resources. The Task Force recommends that as part of the creation ofthe HIG, funding for such a research program should be included for future budget requests.\n\n## Transfer\n\nTransfers ofpeople from U.S. custody to the custody of another government arise in a variety of contexts. Some of these transfers arise in contexts in which the international and domestic legal framework is well-established - such as extradition.\n\nOther transfers, though lawful, take place in contexts in which the legal framework is less well-defined. All ofthese transfers can raise important legal and policy issues. These issues relate primarily to the treatment of the person who is being transferred, but in some situations also include other issues such as whether the sovereignty of the country from which or through which a transfer takes place has been respected. Furthermore, U.S.\n\npolicies on transfers must be developed in conjunction with U.S. policies on apprehension and detention, as these are inter-related elements of our counterterrorism efforts.\n\nCritics of U.S. transfer practices have expressed a number of concerns. Some of these concerns have been focused primarily on transfers reportedly conducted or facilitated by elements of the Intelligence Community. For example, some have argued that the apparent lack ofprocedural protections involved in any secret transfer inevitably leads to cases ofmistaken identity, resulting in the transfer of innocent people against their will. Others have expressed concerns about the lack of legal process for the individuals in the host or receiving state and about the implications for the sovereign rights of countries from which or through which secret transfers may take place.3\nOne concern that has been expressed about U.S. transfer practices across the full range of scenarios is whether the United States has taken adequate steps to protect against torture or other forms of mistreatment after the transfer has taken place. In particular, one aspect of U.S. transfer practice that has come under particular scrutiny is the use of assurances obtained from the receiving country as a safeguard against post-transfer mistreatment. Many groups have argued that assurances should never be used for this purpose. Others have adv_ocated the imposition of controls on the use of assurances to make them more reliable. The groups that have taken these positions have expressed a number of concerns about the use of assurances to prevent mistreatment after transfer.\n\nFirst, critics of assurances point to a number of cases in which assurances appear to have failed to protect individuals who have been transferred. The Maher Arar case is frequently cited by critics of U.S. transfer practices, as are a handful of Guantanamo transfer cases involving Tunisia and Russia. Such critics argue that neither the transferring nor the receiving state has an incentive to report publicly that the receiving state has failed to respect the assurances it provided.\n\nSecond, some argue that assurances are inherently untrustworthy, because a transferring state would only seek assurances in cases in which it had some concern that the receiving state would engage in torture. A related point is that many of the countries where torture is a problem may be sincere in making a commitment not to torture but may lack the ability to follow through on the assurance. Third, torture is inherently difficult to discover because it is almost always done in secret. Those who engage in torture may be skilled at using techniques that do not leave visible marks, and a victim of torture may be afraid to report it, even if there is some monitoring of his or her case.\n\nAssurances, it is argued, do nothing to alleviate these problems, even if they include some kind of monitoring mechanism.\n\nThese criticisms about U.S. transfer practices, and in particular about the use of assurances, raise a number of significant concerns that need to be taken into account in shaping U.S. policy. However, they should be considered in light of several additional important points. First, while concerns about assurances not being respected must be taken seriously, the Task Force is unaware of any comprehensive study on state practice regarding implementation of and compliance with assurances. There have also been cases where assurances have been used successfully. For example, ofthe more than 550\ndetainees transferred or released from Guantanamo, there have been only a very few complaints about treatment that violated the assurances obtained by the USG. Thus the Task Force believes that the facts point toward the need for careful case-by-case assessments of assurances, rather than a blanket rejection of the practice.4\nSecond, the criticism that countries willing to violate their binding obligations not to torture will by definition be willing to violate any non-binding bilateral assurances assumes that a generalized multilateral commitment is no different than a case-specific bilateral commitment. This assumption does not hold true in all cases. Particularly in context of a multi-faceted bilateral relationship, a country may have a far greater incentive to live up to a specific bilateral assurance than to its obligations under the CAT\ngenerally. This is particularly true where a case-specific monitoring mechanism is part of the assurance.\n\nSome have argued that the United States should never transfer someone who alleges any kind of fear ofmistreatment in the receiving state. The Task Force concluded that this position was unworkable. Without undermining credible concerns about torture and United States' legal obligations with respect to transfers, transfers and assurances must be considered in the context of the practical reality in which transfers take place.\n\nMany ofthe detainees held by the United States would pose a significant threat if released into the United States, and many would be considered dangerous even if released into other countries. Moreover, for a variety of reasons, only a small percentage of these detainees held by the United States in recent years have been or can be prosecuted.\n\nThe United States also has a strong interest in transferring people in other circumstances, such as in the traditional extradition or deportation contexts. These types of transfers can raise many of the same issues as transfers that take place in the context of armed conflicts. Furthermore, even where U.S. prosecution is an available option, this only serves to delay the issue of transfer in many situations, rather than removing the need to consider it altogether. Unless prosecution results in the death penalty or life in prison, there is a strong chance that the United States will have an interest in transferring the person after he has completed his sentence (or if found not guilty, after trial) in order to avoid releasing a dangerous person into the United States. In fact, maintaining a robust transfer option may actually facilitate prosecutions in the sense that the USG may otherwise be reluctant to take custody of a person for prosecution if the expected result is that the United States will be unable to remove the person from the country after completion of his sentence.\n\nGiven the importance of transfers to the national security interests of the United States, while the use of assurances raises difficult questions, it will often be an important tool available to help balance competing considerations. In other words, transfers facilitated by credible assurances may be preferable to the other options available to the United States - releasing potentially dangerous people (or declining to capture them in the first place), returning people to foreign governments without assurances against mistreatment, or trying to detain them indefinitely. In this context, the Task Force has concluded that assurances are a tool that needs to be retained to facilitate necessary transfers while minimizing the chances of mistreatment.\n\n## I. General Recommendations Applicable To All Types Of Transfers\n\nA.\nStrengthening U.S. procedures for preventing transfers where torture is\nmore likely than not\n\n## 1. Clarify And Strengthen Procedures For Obtaining Assurances.\n\nRecommendation: In situations where the appropriate entity within the USG\ndecides that assurances should be obtained prior to conducting a transfer, the Task Force recommends that U.S. practice should at a minimum include the following requirements,:\n-- The Executive Branch should seek a specific commitment from the receiving state that it will not torture the individual.\n\n-- The assurances should refer to the receiving state's obligations under the Convention Against Torture (CAT) or comparable international obligations and, where appropriate, to the receiving state's domestic law (including relevant provisions criminalizing torture).\n\n-- If an individual has raised a particularized, reasonable, and credible concern about torture (by a specific agency in the receiving state, for example), assurances should address that concern (for example, by having the receiving state agree that the individual will not be held by the agency of concern).\n\n## 2. Improve Usg Capabilities To Evaluate Assurances Recommendations:\n\n-- Ifthe agency responsible for making the transfer decision is not the Department of State, it should be required to consult with the Department of State or the Chief of Mission at an appropriate embassy in assessing the reliability and credibility of all assurances obtained, regardless of which agency obtained the assurances. (The only exception to this rule would be for military-to-military agreements for the transfer of detainees under the laws of war pursuant to coalition and bilateral operations.) While this evaluation may slow the process in some cases, the Task Force believes that the costs of such a delay are outweighed by the benefit of bringing the Department of State's expertise into the process of evaluating posttransfer treatment. The Department of State's involvement has a number of potential advantages. First, the Department has the most expertise within the USG on human rights conditions in other countries. Second, the Department has the broadest perspective on U.S. relations with other countries, which is useful in evaluating the context in which assurances may be given. Third, having one government agency evaluate all assurances would be beneficial insofar as the agency would develop a body of experience relevant to the evaluation of future assurances.\n\n-- While the Task Force recognizes that using diplomatic channels to obtain assurances is not always the most effective approach and should not be used in every case (except in extradition cases), it has concluded that the State Department should be involved in evaluating assurances in all cases.\n\n-- The Department of State should provide adequate guidance to Chiefs of Mission to ensure that they coordinate their involvement in these issues with Department of State headquarters. State also should ensure that it can provide rapid assistance to other agencies when it receives an urgent request to evaluate assurances.\n\n-- The Executive Branch should strengthen its internal structures for evaluating assurances by developing effective interagency information-sharing mechanisms, in order to ensure that all relevant agencies have timely access to available information about U.S. transfer experiences with the receiving states, including any available information on the implementation and monitoring of assurances.\n\n-- The final decision on whether to transfer someone in reliance on an assurance provided by the receiving state should be made by the head or deputy head of the agency responsible for the transfer or an appropriately senior designee or a Deputies Committee or Principals Committee.\n\n-- Factors that the United States should consider in evaluating the credibility and reliability of assurances include: (1) information concerning the judicial and penal conditions and practices of the country providing assurances; (2) U.S. relations with the receiving country, including diplomatic relations as well as military, intelligence, or law enforcement relations as appropriate; (3) the receiving state's capacity and incentives to fulfill its assurances; ( 4) political or legal developments in that country that would provide context for the assurances; ( 5) that country's record in complying with similar assurances previously provided to the United States or another country; (6) any information on the identity, position, or other relevant facts concerning the person providing the assurances that bear on the reliability of those assurances; and (7) the relationship between that person and the entity that will detain the person or otherwise monitor his activity.\n\n-- The Inspectors General of the Department of State, the Department of Defense, and the Department of Homeland Security should prepare annually a coordinated report on transfers conducted by each of their agencies in reliance on assurances.\n\nThe report should, with due regard for confidentiality and classification of information, address the process for obtaining the assurances, the content of the assurances, the implementation and monitoring of the assurances, and the posttransfer treatment of the person transferred.\n\n3.\nIncreased use of monitoring mechanisms to implement assurances.\n\n## Recommendations:\n\n-- In all cases in which the United States obtains assurances, the agency or department obtaining the assurances should insist on the inclusion of a monitoring mechanism in the assurances it seeks or otherwise establish a monitoring mechanism, unless there is a compelling reason not to do so. In general, such monitoring mechanisms should provide for consistent, private access to the individual who has been transferred, with minimal advance notice to the detaining government.\n\n-- The specific form of monitoring may depend on the circumstances. For example, in some cases, monitoring may be more appropriately done by the USG, although the appropriate agency to conduct the monitoring may vary based on the circumstances. In other cases, monitoring by an outside group may be more effective. Where appropriate, the agency obtaining the assurances should consider whether other countries have monitoring mechanisms in place that the USG could employ or use as a model. In some cases, it may be possible to work with another country to jointly use the same monitoring mechanism. The possibility of seeking intelligence to assist in monitoring should also be considered.\n\n-- Agencies involved in obtaining and evaluating assurances should work together to develop guidelines for how to deal with countries that have failed to live up to their assurances, including when and how changes in circumstance should affect the USG's view ofpast failures to abide by assurances. This process should be coordinated by the National Security Council as necessary.\n\nThe three sets ofrecommendations set forth above related to Executive Branch processes for obtaining, evaluating and monitoring assurances are particularly important in light of the fact that, in some contexts, assurances have been held to not be subject to judicial review. See Ahmad v. *Wigen,* 910 F.2d 1063 (2d Cir. 1990), and Kiyemba v.\n\nObama 561 F.3d 509 (D.C. Cir. 2009). But see Khouzam v. *Attorney General,* 549 F.3d\n235 (3d Cir. 2008).\n\n## B. Maintain The Standard For Evaluating Transfers\n\nRecommendation: The United States should maintain its current legal and policy restrictions on transferring anyone from U.S. custody where it is more likely than not that the person will be tortured.\n\nStates traditionally have had broad latitude to craft their immigration policies, but they have accepted certain legal limitations regarding when they may deport or expel people from their territories. In particular, states such as the United States that are parties to the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees or its Protocol generally may not forcibly return a refugee to a place where his life or freedom would be threatened because of his race, religion, or political opinions, among other reasons. Similarly, the United States is a party to the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (the \"CAT\"). Article 3 ofthe CAT states:\n\n\"l. No State Party shall expel, return ('refouler') or extradite a person to another\nState where there are substantial grounds for believing that he would be in danger\nof being subjected to torture.\n2. For the purpose of determining whether there are such grounds, the competent\nauthorities shall take into account all relevant considerations including, where\napplicable, the existence in the State concerned of a consistent pattern of gross,\nflagrant or mass violations ofhuman rights.\"5\nPursuant to the treaty understanding approved by the U.S. Senate and included in the U.S. instrument of ratification, the United States interprets the phrase \"where there are substantial grounds for believing that he would be in danger ofbeing subject to torture,\" as used in Article 3 of the CAT, to mean \"if it is more likely than not that he would be tortured.\"6 The Article 3 prohibition is absolute. Unlike non-refoulement in the refugee context, a potential transferee, no matter how dangerous, cannot be sent from the United States to another country if it is more likely than not that he or she will face torture there. These prohibitions on transferring a person to a foreign country based on the likelihood that the person would be subject to a specific harm in that country often are referred to collectively as the principle of \"non-refoulement.\"\nThe United States has previously interpreted Article 3 to impose legal obligations on the U.S. only with respect to individuals who are transferred from the territory of the United States. 7 In light of the United States' stated policy commitment not to send any person, no matter where located, to a country in which it is more likely than not that the person would be subject to torture, this report does not address the legal question whether the negotiating history, and the U.S. record of ratification, as well as the U.S. Supreme Court's interpretation of similar language in the Refugee Convention. See Sale v. *Haitian Ctrs. Council,* 509 U.S.\n\n153 (1993). Other states and international bodies, however, assert that Article 3 of the CAT applies to wholly extraterritorial transfers. Some take a broad view of the situations in which non-refoulement obligations legally attach - not just to expulsions, returns, or extraditions, but to any transfers of people from the custody of one state to another, wherever located. Yet others argue that, as a matter of customary law or by operation of Article 7 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, nonrefoulement obligations extend to situations in which the sending state believes that the person may face cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or an unfair trial. (Article 7 of the ICCPR states, in part, that '[n]o one shall be subject to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.\" The U.S. has not agreed with the view that this text contains an implicit non-refoulement obligation nor with the view that the covenant applies extraterritorially.)\nArticle 3 applies to transfers conducted by the United States that are initiated outside of U.S. territory.\n\nThe Task Force considered whether, as a policy matter, the United States should adopt a different standard than the \"more likely than not to be tortured\" standard in evaluating potential transfers. In particular, the Task Force considered whether to recommend that the United States adopt a \"cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment\" or\n\"humane treatment\" standard. However, the Task Force ultimately decided against recommending such a change in standard for several reasons. First, changing the standard would not respond to the criticism that the U.S. has failed effectively to enforce the existing standard. Second, such a change would create significant complications.in at least some areas of U.S. transfer practice, such as extradition and immigration removal cases, where U.S. practice is subject to a complex and long-standing framework of international and domestic law and practice. _Third, the Task Force concluded that the adoption of a new standard could have uncertain operational consequences. Accordingly, and in light of the other recommendations in this report and the understanding of the Task Force that agencies that conduct transfers have a practice of looking beyond the narrow, legal definition of torture in evaluating whether to transfer a person or in obtaining assurances, the Task Force concluded that a change of standard or practice is not warranted.\n\n## C. Improve Partner Nation Detention Facilities And Capabilities Recommendations:\n\n-- In considering recommendations on correctional assistance, the Detention Policy Task Force should take into account that the potential ability to transfer is increased by better facilities in partner nations, particularly in the Middle East and South and Southeast Asia. In considering additional assistance in this area, the United States should consider whether other partner states are engaged in similar activities and ensure, to the greatest extent possible, that it works cooperatively with those states to avoid duplication of effort.\n\nPerhaps the most important way to minimize U.S. concerns about transfers to foreign states is for those states of concern to develop safe and humane detention or prison facilities and a work force for these facilities that is well trained, adequately paid, and subject to appropriate oversight. Helping foreign governments - particularly in countries where it is reasonably likely that the United States will wish to transfer individuals in the future - improve their detention capabilities consistent with their human rights obligations is a worthwhile, albeit long-term, goal. Current U.S. law imposes certain limitations on the USG's ability to provide foreign assistance to support foreign police and prisons, but such assistance is not barred.\n\n## D. Create A List Of Countries To Which Transfers Are Barred\n\nRecommendation: The United States should not create a list of countries to which transfers will be barred.\n\nThe Task Force also considered whether the USG should create a list of countries with the worst records on treatment of detainees or a history of failing to honor assurances that the United States or other governments have obtained. Transfers to countries on this list would be barred. Such an approach would respond directly to the criticism that some countries' human rights records render their assurances inherently untrustworthy. It would also be a way to demonstrate that the United States takes the assurances process seriously and establish consequences for countries that violate assurances they have given.\n\nHowever, this \"black-listing\" approach also has a number of disadvantages. First, the credibility and reliability of assurances is inherently context-specific. The person to be transferred, the government entity to which he is to be transferred, the prevailing political circumstances, and other factors all play critical roles in determining likely treatment after transfer. A black list is not well-suited to making such context-specific judgments. In addition, such a list may be difficult to alter and may not reflect the most up-to-date assessment by the USG of the likelihood that the country will live up to its assurances in future cases. For example, a change in the government of a country could increase confidence in that country's willingness to adhere to its assurances, but it may be politically impossible to remove the country from the list - thereby unnecessarily hampering the USG's ability to transfer to that country.\n\nEven without such a blacklist approach, as a practical matter, if a country is found to have violated assurances it has given in connection with transfers, and no change in circumstance intervenes, the USG is unlikely to be able to rely on assurances to transfer anyone to that country again.\n\n## Ii. Specific Recommendation For Immigration Proceedings A. Update Applicable Regulations\n\nRecommendation: Current regulations pertaining to the treatment of aliens entitled to protection under the CAT were implemented in 1999, before the Department of Homeland Security was created. 8 The Task Force recommends changes to the applicable regulations to reflect the shift in responsibility for evaluating diplomatic assurances from the Immigration and Naturalization Service under the Department of Justice to Immigration and Customs Enforcement and U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services under the Department of Homeland Security. The Department of Justice continues to adjudicate claims for CAT protection in formal removal proceedings through the Executive Office for Immigration Review (EOIR), a Department of Justice entity.\n\nClarifying the decision-making roles ofthe different agencies is important to maintaining an open and transparent process.\n\n## Iii. Specific Recommendations For Military Transfer Scenarios\n\nA.\nImproved monitoring of detainees transferred from ISAF to the Islamic\nRepublic ofAfghanistan.\nRecommendation: The U.S. Embassy in Kabul should develop a risk mitigation plan to improve monitoring of the treatment of detainees transferred by U.S.\n\nforces acting under International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) to the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (IROA), taking into account resource and other practical concerns.\n\nThe United States and ISAF partners concluded an agreement with the IROA that gives extensive access to detainees whom ISAF forces have transferred to the IROA.\n\nHowever, the U.S. government has yet to implement processes as robust as those the USG's ISAF partners have implemented with respect to the access provided by this agreement. The Task Force notes that in other military situations, the Department of Defense may be better situated to undertake monitoring in future conflicts.\n\nB.\nConsider comprehensive training and infrastructure assistance projects to\ndevelop adequate detention facilities in areas where large numbers of\ndetainee transfers are expected.\nRecommendation: The Task Force recommends using elements ofthe USG\nexperience with the Afghan National Detention Facility (\"ANDF\") as a model in current and future conflicts where the United States expects to capture significant numbers of detainees and eventually to transfer them to the host government.\n\nIn April 2007, the ANDF began operating near Kabul. The facility was renovated by the United States to assist Afghanistan in holding and prosecuting former Guantanamo and Bagram detainees. The USG also trained the guard force, and maintains a presence at the facility. On the whole, the Task Force believes that this facility has been quite successful in handling detainees without serious allegations of abusive treatment.9 A\nsimilar approach, particularly with respect to the training of the guard force and the U.S.\n\npresence at the facility intended to prevent abusive treatment, may facilitate transfers in other conflicts.\n\n## C. Negotiate Assurances With Host Governments As Early As Possible In Future Conflicts.\n\nRecommendation: The Task Force recommends that, in the future, where it appears likely that the Department of Defense will hold and ultimately seek to transfer a significant numbers of detainees in a situation where no other specific legal framework governing transfers applies (such as applicable provisions of the Geneva Conventions or a United Nations Security Council Resolution), the Department of Defense, in cooperation with the State Department, should negotiate assurances with the host government, ifpossible, at an early stage in the process to govern treatment of transferred detainees.\n\nWhile concerns about torture usually arise in individualized contexts, there are situations in which the U.S. government may have serious concerns about whether a group of detainees captured during an armed conflict be tortured, treated inhumanely, or otherwise mistreated if transferred to a particular government's detention system. In these situations, there may be a tension between the limitations imposed on the U.S. military presence in another country where that presence depends on the country's consent (including consent to detain), and the U.S. commitment to avoid transfers where it is more likely than not that the person to be transferred will be tortured.\n\nTo address this problem, the Task Force believes that the issue of transfers should be confronted at an early stage in the military deployment.\n\n## D. Department Of Defense Policies Or Directives\n\nRecommendation: The Department of Defense should promulgate policies or directives consistent with the policy statement in Section 2242(a) of the 1998\nForeign Affairs Reform and Restructuring Act. Such policies or directives should include an express statement that the Department of Defense may not transfer any person to a foreign entity where it is more likely than not that the person will be tortured.\n\nAs a matter of U.S. domestic law, Section 2242(b) of the 1998 Foreign Affairs Reform and Restructuring Act directed the heads ofthe appropriate agencies to prescribe regulations to implement the U.S. obligations under CAT Article 3. 10 The Justice and State Departments promulgated regulations to implement these obligations in the immigration and extradition contexts, respectively. 11 Immigration and extradition are the two contexts in which the U.S. obligations under the CAT are engaged directly, as they involve transfers from U.S. territory to another state. Section 2242 also contains a policy\n10 8 U.S.C.  1231 note.\n\nstatement that asserts, \"[I]t shall be the policy of the United States not to expel, extradite, or otherwise effect the involuntary return of any person to a country in which there are substantial grounds for believing the person would be in danger of being subjected to torture, regardless of whether the person is physically present in the United States.\" This recommendation is to implement this policy directive.\n\n## Iv. Specific Recommendations For Any Transfers That May Take Place By Or With The Support Of Elements Of The Intelligence Community\n\nThe Task Force formulated a number ofrecommendations that would apply to transfers conducted pursuant to intelligence authorities. With the exception ofthe recommendation that follows immediately below, these recommendations are found in the classified annex.\n\n## A. Intelligence Community Policies Or Directives Recommendations:\n\n-- The Director ofNational Intelligence, in consultation with the relevant elements of the Intelligence Community, and subject to the direction and approval of the National Security Adviser, should draft and promulgate general policy guidance to the Intelligence Community concerning transfers. This guidance should be public and should be consistent with Section 2242(a) of the 1998 Foreign Affairs Reform and Restructuring Act.\n\n-- Elements ofthe Intelligence Community that may be called upon to conduct or participate in transfers should adopt implementing regulations or directives for their conduct, including standards for secure and humane treatment of detainees.\n\nduring transportation, and an express statement that the Intelligence Community element may not transfer any person to a foreign entity where it is more likely than not that the person will be tortured and a requirement that the element will take appropriate steps to investigate any credible allegations that a transferred person has been subjected to torture by a foreign entity. The regulations or directives should make clear that these considerations are an express part of the review process required before approving a transfer conducted or facilitated by an element of the Intelligence Community.\n\n## Appendix A\n\nExecutive Order 13491\nTHE WHITE HOUSE\nOff ice of the Press Secretary For Immediate Release January 22,\n2009\n\n## Executive Order Ensuring Lawful Interrogations\n\nBy the authority vested in me by the Constitution and the laws of the United States of America, in order to improve the effectiveness of human intelligence-gathering, to promote the safe, lawful, and humane treatment of individuals in United States custody and of United States personnel who are detained in armed conflicts, to ensure compliance with the treaty obligations of the United States, including the Geneva Conventions, and to take care that the laws of the United States are faithfully executed, I hereby order as follows:\nSection 1.\n\nRevocation.\n\nExecutive Order 13440 of July 20, 2007, is revoked.\n\nAll executive directives, orders, and regulations with this order, including but not limited to those issued to or by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) from September 11, 2001, to January 20, 2009, concerning detention or the interrogation of detained individuals, are revoked to the extent of their inconsistency with this order.\n\nHeads of departments and agencies shall take all necessary steps to ensure that all directives, orders, and regulations of their respective departments or agencies are consistent with this order.\n\nUpon request, the.Attorney General shall provide guidance about which directives, orders, and regulations are inconsistent with this order.\n\nSec. 2.\n\nDefinitions.\n\nAs used in this order:\n(a)\n\"Army Field Manual 2-22. 3\" means FM 2-22. 3, Human Intelligence Collector Operations, issued by the Department of the Army on September 6, 2006.\n\n(b)\n\"Army Field Manual 34-52\" means FM 34-52, Intelligence Interrogation, issued by the Department of the Army on May 8, 1987.\n\n(c)\n\"Common Article 3 11 means Article 3 of each of the Geneva Conventions.\n\n(d)\n\"Convention Against Torture\" means the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, December 10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S.\n\n85, s.Treaty Doc. No. 100-20 (1988).\n\n(e)\n\"Geneva Conventions\" means:\n(i)\nthe Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, August 12, 1949 (6 UST 3114);\n(ii)\nthe Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, August 12, 1949\n(6 UST 3217);\n(iii)\nthe Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, August 12, 1949 (6 UST\n3316); and\n(iv)\nthe Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, August 12,\n1949 (6 UST 3516).\n\n(f)\n\"Treated humanely,\" \"violence to life and person,\" \"murder of all kinds,\" \"mutilation,\" \"cruel treatment,\" \"torture,\" \"outrages upon personal dignity,\"\nand \"humiliating and degrading treatment\" refer to, and have the same meaning as, those same terms in Common Article 3.\n\n(g)\nThe terms \"detention facilities\" and\n11 detention facility\" in section 4(a) of this order do not refer to facilities used only to hold people on a short-term, transitory basis.\n\n## Sec. 3. Standards And Practices For Interrogation Of Individuals In The Custody Or Control Of The United States In Armed Conflicts.\n\n(a)\nCommon Article 3 Standards as a Minimum Baseline.\n\nConsistent with the requirements of the Federal torture statute, 18 U.S.C. 2340-2340A, section 1003 of the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, 42 U.S.C. 2000dd, the Convention Against Torture, Common Article 3, and other laws regulating the treatment and interrogation of individuals detained in any armed conflict, such persons shall in all circumstances be treated humanely and shall not be subjected to violence to life and person (including murder of all kinds, mutilation, cruel treatment, and torture), nor to outrages upon personal dignity (including humiliating and degrading treatment), whenever such individuals are in the custody or under the effective control of an officer, employee, or other agent of the United States Government or detained within a facility owned, operated, or controlled by a department or agency of the United States.\n\n(b)\nInterrogation Techniques and Interrogation-\nRelated Treatment.\n\nEffective immediately, an individual in the custody or under the effective control of an officer, employee, or other agent of the United States Government, or detained within a facility owned, operated, or controlled by a department or agency of the United States, in any armed conflict, shall not be subjected to any interrogation technique or approach, or any treatment related to interrogation, that is not authorized by and listed in Army Field Manual 2-22.3 (Manual).\n\nInterrogation techniques, approaches, and treatments described in the shall be implemented strictly in accord with the principles, processes, conditions, and limitations the Manual prescribes.\n\nWhere processes required by the Manual, such as a requirement of approval by specified Department of Defense officials, are inapposite to a department or an agency other than the Department of Defense, such a department or agency shall use processes that are substantially equivalent to the processes the Manual prescribes for the Department of Defense.\n\nNothing in this section shall preclude the Federal Bureau of Investigation, or other Federal law enforcement agencies, from continuing to use authorized, non-coercive techniques of interrogation that are designed to elicit voluntary statements and do not involve the use of force, threats, or promises.\n\n(c)\nInterpretations of Common Article 3 and the Army Field Manual.\n\nFrom this day forward, unless the Attorney General with appropriate consultation provides further guidance, officers, employees, and other agents of the United States Government may, in conducting interrogations, act in reliance upon Army Field Manual 2-22.3, but may not, in conducting interrogations, rely upon any interpretation of the law governing interrogation -- including interpretations of Federal criminal laws, the Convention Against Torture, Common Article 3, Army Field Manual 2-22.3, and its predecessor document, Army Field Manual 34-52 -- issued by the Department of Justice between September 11, 2001, and January 20, 2009.\n\n## Sec. 4. Prohibition Of Certain Detention Facilities, And Red Cross Access To Detained Individuals.\n\n(a)\nCIA Detention.\n\nThe CIA shall close as expeditiously as possible any detention facilities that it currently operates and shall not operate any such detention facility in the future.\n\n(b)\nInternational Committee of the Red Cross Access to Detained Individuals.\n\nAll departments and agencies of the Federal Government shall provide the International Committee of the Red Cross with notification of, and timely access to, any individual detained in any armed conflict in the custody or under the effective control of an officer, employee, or other agent of the United States Government or detained within a facility owned, operated, or controlled by a department or agency of the United States Government, consistent with Department of Defense regulations and policies.\n\n## Sec. 5. Special Interagency Task Force On Interrogation And Transfer Policies.\n\n(a)\nEstablishment of Special Interagency Task Force.\n\nThere shall be established a Special Task Force on Interrogation and Transfer Policies (Special Task Force) to review interrogation and transfer policies.\n\n(b)\nMembership.\n\nThe Special Task Force shall consist of the following members, or their designees:\n(i)\nthe Attorney General, who shall serve as Chair;\n(ii)\nthe Director of National Intelligence, who shall serve as Co-Vice-Chair;\n(iii)\nthe Secretary of Defense, who shall serve as Co-Vice-Chair;\n(iv)\nthe Secretary of State;\n(v)\nthe Secretary of Homeland Security;\n(vi)\nthe Director of the Central Intelligence Agency;\n(vii)\nthe Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; and\n(viii)\nother officers or full-time or permanent part-time employees of the United States, as determined by the Chair, with the concurrence of the head of the department or agency concerned.\n\n(c)\nStaff.\n\nThe Chair may designate officers and employees within the Department of Justice to serve as staff to support the Special Task Force.\n\nAt the request of the Chair, officers and employees from other departments or agencies may serve on the Special Task Force with the concurrence of the head of the department or agency that employ such individuals.\n\nSuch staff must be officers or full-time or permanent part-time employees of the United States.\n\nThe Chair shall designate an officer or employee of the Department of Justice to serve as the Executive Secretary of the Special Task Force.\n\n(d)\nOperation.\n\nThe Chair shall convene meetings of the Special Task Force, determine its agenda, and direct its work.\n\nThe Chair may establish and direct subgroups of the Special Task Force, consisting exclusively of members of the Special Task Force, to deal with particular subjects.\n\n(e)\nMission.\n\nThe mission of the Special Task Force shall be:\n(i)\nto study and evaluate whether the interrogation practices and techniques in Army Field Manual 2-22.3, when employed by departments or agencies outside the military, provide an appropriate means of acquiring the intelligence necessary to protect the Nation, and, if warranted, to recommend any additional or different guidance for other departments or agencies; and\n(ii)\nto study and evaluate the practices of transferring individuals to other nations in order to ensure that such practices comply with the domestic laws, international obligations, and policies of the United States and do not result in the transfer of individuals to other nations to face torture or otherwise for the purpose, or with the effect, of undermining or circumventing the commitments or obligations of the United States to ensure the humane treatment of individuals in its custody or control.\n\n(f)\nAdministration.\n\nThe Special Task Force shall be established for administrative purposes within the Department of Justice and the Department of Justice shall, to the extent permitted by law and subject to the availability of appropriations, provide administrative support and funding for the Special Task Force.\n\n(g)\nRecommendations.\n\nThe Special Task Force shall provide a report to the President, through the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs and the Counsel to the President, on the matters set forth in subsection (d) within 180 days of the date of this order, unless the Chair determines that an extension is necessary.\n\n(h)\nTermination.\n\nThe Chair shall terminate the Special Task Force upon the completion of its duties.\n\nSec. 6.\n\nConstruction with Other Laws.\n\nNothing in this order shall be construed to affect the obligations of officers, employees, and other agents of the United States Government to comply with all pertinent laws and treaties of the United States governing detention and interrogation, including but not limited to:\nthe Fifth and Eighth Amendments to the United States Constitution; the Federal torture statute, 18 U.S.C. 2340-2340A; the War Crimes Act,\n18 U.S.C. 2441; the Federal assault statute, 18 U.S.C. 113;\nthe Federal maiming statute, 18 U.S.C. 114; the Federal\n\"stalking\" statute, 18 U.S.C. 2261A; articles 93, 124, 128, and 134 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 U.S.C.\n\n893, 924, 928, and 934; section 1003 of the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, 42 U.S.C. 2000dd; section 6(c) of the Military Commissions Act of 2006, Public Law 109-366; the Geneva Conventions; and the Convention Against Torture.\n\nNothing in this order shall be construed to diminish any rights that any individual may have under these or other laws and treaties.\n\nThis order is not intended to, and does not, create any right or benefit, substantive or procedural, enforceable at law or in equity against the United States, its departments, agencies, or other entities, its officers or employees, or any other person.\n\nTHE  WHITE HOUSE, January 22, 2009.\n\n# # #Appendix B Transfer Scenarios Considered by the Task Force 1. Extradition\nIn the extradition process, the Secretary of State is the U.S. official responsible for determining whether to surrender a fugitive to a foreign country to face prosecution or to serve a sentence. Decisions on extradition where there is a potential issue oftorture are presented to the Secretary (or by delegation, to the Deputy Secretary) pursuant to regulations at 22 C.F.R. Part 95.\n\nIn making the determination whether to surrender, the Secretary or Deputy Secretary considers whether a person facing extradition from the United States is \"more likely than not\" to be tortured in the state requesting extradition. Where allegations relating to torture are made or the issue is otherwise brought to the Department's attention, appropriate policy and legal offices review and analyze information relevant to the case in preparing a recommendation to the Secretary or Deputy Secretary on whether to sign the surrender warrant. The regulations provide that the Secretary or Deputy Secretary's decision is not subject to judicial review. This regulatory bar currently is being challenged in litigation in Califomia. 12\nSurrender may be conditioned on the requesting state's provision of specific assurances relating to torture or to aspects of the requesting state's criminal justice system that protect against mistreatment. Assurances of the latter kind may include, for example, commitments that the fugitive will have regular access to counsel and the full protections afforded under that State's constitution or laws.\n\nAssurances against torture have been sought in only a small number of extradition cases. These assurances are generally in writing, explicit as to protection against torture, include a monitoring mechanism, and are from a ministerial level official or above. Ifthat official is the Minister of Foreign Affairs -- the normal channel for extradition -- they generally will not be acted upon until it has been directly confirmed with the officials who will be responsible for the individual while in custody that they are aware of the assurances provided and committed to complying with them.\n\nPrior to negotiating a new extradition treaty, the United States undertakes a review ofthe potential treaty partner's human rights record to determine if it will respect both the rule oflaw and an extradited individual's human rights, including protections against torture. (It is in the U.S. Government's interest to do so, as most of its modem extradition treaties envision that the United States will extradite U.S. nationals pursuant to appropriate extradition requests.) Although some extradition treaties predate this practice, in most cases there is thus a built-in screening mechanism in place in the extradition context that reduces the likelihood that questions about torture in the requesting country will arise in the extradition context.\n\nThe Executive Branch acknowledges that it occasionally seeks assurances in extradition cases but typically declines to disclose whether it has sought assurances in specific cases and rarely reveals the contents of any assurances in the extradition context.\n\nUnder the rule ofnon-inquiry, courts will generally not examine the fairness of the system to which the person will be extradited, and the United States has taken the position that its decisions in extradition cases involving torture allegations, including the existence and nature of assurances, are similarly non-justiciable.\n\n## 2. Immigration Proceedings\n\nAs with extradition, the CAT is the primary source on the limitation of removals where it is more likely than not that the transferee will face torture. In the immigration context, regulations codified at 8 C.F.R.  208.18(c) and 1208.18(c) specifically contemplate that the United States may use diplomatic assurances where the person subject to removal raises a claim under the CAT. Those regulations provide that the Secretary of State may forward to the Secretary of Homeland Security assurances that the Secretary of State has obtained from the government of a specific country that an alien would not be tortured there if the alien were removed to that country.\n\nIn practice, the Department of State seeks assurances upon the request of the Department of Homeland Security (\"DHS\") and exercises discretion in deciding in particular cases whether to seek assurances upon receiving such a request. Ifthe Secretary of State obtains and forwards such assurances to the Secretary of DHS, the Secretary of DHS determines, in consultation with the Secretary of State, whether the assurances are sufficiently reliable to allow the alien's removal to that country consistent with Article 3 of the CAT. Under the regulation, if the assurances are determined to be sufficiently reliable, the Secretary of DHS may then terminate any deferral of removal the alien had been granted as to that country and the alien's torture claim may not be considered further by an immigration judge, the Board of Immigration Appeals, or an asylum officer.\n\nSince implementation of the regulations in 1999, the Immigration and Naturalization Service and DHS have relied on diplomatic assurances to remove only three people. In contrast, approximately five thousand individuals have enjoyed protection in immigration proceedings through the withholding or deferral of removal on grounds that it was more likely than not that they would be tortured.\n\nWhile assurances are tailored to the specific case, in general in the immigration context, they are in writing from the official or officials at the ministerial level (or above)\nwho will be directly responsible for the individual while in the custody of that country, explicit as to protection against torture, and include a monitoring mechanism.\n\nA recent case involving the removal of an Egyptian is worth noting. In this case,\n13 The Third Circuit declined rehearing *en bane;* the U.S.\n\na Third Circuit panel held that due process under the Fifth Amendment requires that, to terminate an alien's deferral of removal on the basis of assurances, the alien must be given (1) notice and an opportunity to test the reliability ofthe assurances; (2) an opportunity to present before a neutral and impartial decision-maker evidence and an argument to make his case; and (3} an individual determination based on the record disclosed to the alien.\n\nGovernment decided against seeking certioriari.\n\nAnother high profile removal case is the case of Maher Arar. The Office of the Inspector General of DHS issued a report in March 2008 on the removal of Arar from the United States to Syria, where Arar claims to have been tortured. A brief discussion of this report is included in the classified annex.\n\n## 3. Transfers Pursuant To The Geneva Conventions\n\nArmed conflicts present another scenario in which the United States may find itself in a position ofwanting to transfer or repatriate people to other states. In international armed conflicts in which the 1949 Geneva Conventions apply, those treaties contain rules governing the transfer ofparticular categories ofpeople between states.\n\nThe Third Geneva Convention contains two provisions relevant to transfers of prisoners of war (\"POW s\"). Article 118 provides, \"Prisoners of war shall be released and repatriated without delay after the cessation of active hostilities.\" The article is silent about what should happen to a POW who genuinely fears repatriation. During the Convention's negotiations, no state condemned the notion of forced repatriation. 14\nNevertheless, state practice related to Article 118 suggests a policy evolution in the meaning of the provision. After the Korean War, North Korea, China, and the USSR\ncontended that the obligation to repatriate prisoners under Article 118 was absolute. In contrast, the UN Command (led by the United States) argued that forcible repatriation\n\"was inconsistent with the ... spirit of the Geneva Conventions.\"15 The issue also arose in the first Gulf War, where the United States and Saudi Arabia granted refugee status to some Iraqi POWs who opted not to return to Iraq. States thus appear increasingly willing to respect the concerns of POW s who fear returning to their states ofnationality, though the issue has not arisen in about twenty years. 16\nArticle 12 of the Third Geneva Convention also is relevant to transfers. That article states, \"Prisoners of war may only be transferred by the Detaining Power to a Power which is a party to the Convention and after the Detaining Power has satisfied itself of the willingness and ability of such transferee Power to apply the Convention.\"\nWhen pursuing resettlement or transfer options to third countries, the United States has sometimes concluded POW agreements pursuant to Article 12. These agreements often set forth the type of treatment the transferred POW will receive (i.e., treatment consistent with the Third Geneva Convention); grant the transferring state and the International Committee of the Red Cross (\"ICRC\") access to the transferred detainee; and contain provisions governing the detainee's repatriation or further transfer.\n\nThe Fourth Geneva Convention offers greater specific protections against \"nonrefoulement.\" For individual \"protected persons\" in the territory of a party to the conflict, the Convention states, \"In no circumstances shall a protected person be transferred to a country where he or she may have reason to fear persecution for his or her political opinions or religious beliefs. \" 17\nIn the cases of U.S. transfers under the Third and Fourth Geneva Conventions, the United States transfer policies to date have, to the Task Force's knowledge, met or exceeded the relevant U.S. treaty obligations.\n\n## 4. Transfers From The Guantanamo Bay Detention Facility\n\nTo date, the United States has transferred more than 500 detainees from Guantanamo to their states ofnationality or to third states. U.S. policy has been to seek humane treatment assurances with respect to all Guantanamo transfers in which it foresees that the receiving government will take post-transfer security measures to mitigate the threat a detainee poses. 18 In situations in which the United States expects the detainee to be released after his transfer, fewer issues arise with respect to humane treatment. Accordingly, the United States has not always sought assurances in those cases.\n\nThe USG's practice with regard to Guantanamo assurances has evolved over the years. The current practice is wherever possible to negotiate a \"framework\" document with each country that has a national at Guantanamo, and then to seek specific assurances prior to each individual transfer to which the framework will apply. The USG has negotiated framework assurances with every major country that has a detainee remaining at Guantanamo and where repatriation is seen as a possibility. Therefore, at this time, there is no expectation that new framework assurance negotiations will be required.\n\nAlthough the content ofthose assurances varies somewhat, to take into account the particular circumstances of the receiving countries (such as variable treaty obligations, or the absence or existence of ICRC access arrangements to detention facilities), they generally include: (1) an assurance that the transferee will be treated humanely and in accordance with the receiving country's obligations under the CAT (or under comparable international obligations when the receiving country is not a party to the CAT); and (2) an assurance that either the USG or a mutually-agreed third party will enjoy post-transfer access to the transferees to monitor their treatment. While the USG\nrequests humane treatment and access assurances as a general rule, it insists on lessextensive assurances in cases where it determines that the risk of inhumane treatment, with or without assurances, is negligible.\n\nThe Department of State has taken the lead in bilateral negotiations to obtain assurances for Guantanamo transfers and in evaluating the sufficiency of the assurances obtained. In many cases, the United States has obtained assurances by means of an exchange of diplomatic notes or letters between senior government officials, but in other circumstances, the State Department has found to be adequate when stated orally and reported by the receiving U.S. Embassy in an official cable or reduced to writing in the form of an agreed minutes of a conversation between meeting participants.\n\nIn addition, the ICRC has the opportunity to conduct exit interviews with detainees being transferred from Guantanamo. This process provides a further opportunity to explore possible concerns about post-transfer treatment.\n\nThere have been few complaints about mistreatment of Guantanamo detainees who have been transferred to their home states or third states. However, hum.an rights groups have alleged that a few Guantanamo transferees sustained abuse after being transferred. 19\nAs in extradition and (to date) im.migration cases, the U.S. policy has been that the United States will not unilaterally make public the contents of the assurances it has sought in the Guantanamo context. As explained in several sworn declarations filed in various federal courts, this policy is designed to help \"avoid the chilling effects of making such discussions public and the possible damage to our ability to conduct foreign relations ... There also m.ay be circumstances where it may be important to protect sources of information (such as sources within a foreign government) about a government's willingness or capability to abide by assurances concerning humane treatment or relevant international obligations. \"20\n\n## 5. Military Transfers Within Or From Afghanistan\n\nDuring the conflict in Afghanistan, the United States - as part of both Operation Enduring Freedom (\"OEF\") and the International Security Assistance Force (\"ISAF\"}-\nhas detained large numbers ofpeople. It has released some quickly; has held others in its detention facilities in Afghanistan; has transferred some to Guantanamo Bay; has transferred some to the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (\"IROA\"); and has transferred some to their states ofnationality.\n\nTransfers within Afghanistan: In 2005, the USG negotiated a transfer framework with the IROA for transfers of detainees to the IROA for continued detention and prosecution. As part of this framework, the USG obtained humane treatment assurances, assurances against the use of torture, and assurances of U.S. or third party access. The USG considers the 2005 assurances to apply both to the transfer of individuals detained by U.S. forces as part of OEF and to the transfer of individuals detained by U.S. forces operating within the ISAF coalition. In 2007, the United States, with other ISAF\npartners, concluded a subsequent arrangement with the IROA that gives ISAF even greater access to detainees whom ISAF has transferred.21 The 2007 arrangement provides that officials from each signatory government will \"enjoy access to Afghan detention facilities to the extent necessary to ascertain the location and treatment of any detainee transferred by that government tothe Government of Afghanistan.\" It also gives ISAF governments the opportunity to conduct private interviews with transferred detainees, and permits the ICRC and the Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission to gain access to IROA facilities. However, as a practical matter, USG monitoring of ISAF detainees transferred to the IROA has been far less robust than USG monitoring of OEF detainees transferred to the IROA because of the regular U.S. presence in the facilities to which OEF detainees are transferred.\n\nTransfers from Afghanistan. Where the U.S. military detains third country nationals in the Afghanistan conflict and seeks to transfer those individuals to their home states, it applies the same non-refoulement policy that it applies to Guantanamo transfers, and where appropriate seeks third-country assurances prior to such transfers.\n\n## 6. Military Transfers Within Or From Iraq\n\nThe USG has not sought assurances from the Government of Iraq (\"GOI\")\nconcerning release within Iraq or transfer to Iraqi custody of Iraqi nationals detained by the multinational force in Iraq (\"MNF-I\"). In December 2008, the United States concluded a new framework arrangement with the GOI pursuant to which the United States now conducts detentions in Iraq.\n\nTransfers within Iraq. U.S. forces in Iraq currently operate under a Security Agreement (\"SA\") that the USG concluded with the GOI in late 2008. The SA provides that \"[i]n the event the United States Forces detain or arrest persons as authorized by this Agreement or Iraqi law, such persons must be handed over to competent Iraqi authorities within 24 hours from the time of their detention or arrest.\" With regard to detainees who were being held by U.S. Forces on the date the SA entered into force, January 1, 2009, the SA provides: \"Competent Iraqi authorities shall issue arrest warrants for [such]\npersons who are wanted by them. The United States Forces shall act in full and effective coordination with the Government of Iraq to tum over custody of such wanted detainees to Iraqi authorities pursuant to a valid Iraqi arrest warrant and shall release all ofthe remaining detainees in a safe and orderly manner, unless otherwise requested by the Government of Iraq and in accordance with Article 4 of this agreement.\"\nAlthough it would be politically difficult to refuse an Iraqi request for transfer, if the USG were to conclude that there was reason to believe that such a detainee was more likely than not to be tortured if he or she were transferred to Iraq, the matter could raised with the GOI at the diplomatic level. Moreover, the Solicitor General in the USG's Muna/and *Omar* briefs to the Supreme Court stated (prior to entry into force of the SA, but nevertheless still relevant to the above discussion), \"The United States would object to the MNF-I's transfer of Omar or Munafto Iraqi custody if it believed they would likely be tortured.\" Although the Supreme Court in *Muna/held* that it would not block the decision to transfer, the decision in *Munaf*reserved the \"more extreme case in which the Executive has determined that a detainee is likely to be tortured but decides to transfer him anyway.\"22\nTransfers from Iraq. To date, MNF-I has not released or transferred large numbers of third country national detainees. Third country nationals detained by MNF-I\nwere provided an opportunity (by way of a questionnaire) to express to the USG fears of persecution or mistreatment if transferred. An interagency group, including the U.S.\n\nEmbassy and the Department of Defense, evaluated the detainees' responses and made a recommendation to the Commander, who decided whether to transfer each individual. If appropriate, relevant assurances would be sought from the receiving country, although the Task Force is not aware of a case to date where this happened. Additionally, MNF-I\nnotified the ICRC ofthe potential transfer and offered the ICRC the opportunity to conduct an exit interview in which the ICRC could explore the detainee' s possible fears of torture or persecution. However, the ICRC did not always avail itself of this opportunity to conduct exit interviews. Lack of an ICRC exit interview did not preclude the transfer of these detainees to the GOI or other states.\n\nThese types of transfers were suspended at the request of the GOI, which expressed a desire to prosecute all such third country nationals. Recently, the GOI has issued arrest warrants for all third country nationals in MNF-I custody. MNF-I has started turning these third-country nationals over to the Iraqi Ministry of Justice pursuant to the SA.\n\n## 7. Transfers Of Individuals From One Country To Another Under Intelligence Authorities\n\nThere has been much public speculation regarding alleged transfers by elements ofthe Intelligence Community pursuant to intelligence authorities. The Joint Inquiry Into Intelligence Community Activities Before and After the Terrorist Attacks of September\n11, 2001 (hereinafter the \"Joint Inquiry\") found that such transfers, also referred to as\n\"renditions,\" were an important tool against terrorism.23 In a 2002 written statement to the Joint Inquiry, then-CIA Director George Tenet reported that, prior to September 11,\n2001, the \"CIA (in many cases with the FBI) had rendered 70 terrorists to justice around the world.\"\nA transfer under intelligence authorities would occur under Section 503 of the National Security Act of 1947, as amended, which provides that the President may authorize \"covert action\" when \"necessary to support identifiable policy objectives ofthe United States\" and when \"important to the national security of the United States.\"24 A\ncritical aspect of these covert action activities is that the role of the United States will not be apparent or acknowledged publicly. Because, by definition, covert action is not subject to public scrutiny, the National Security Act contains requirements for congressional notification. Furthermore, section 503(a)(5) specifies that the President\n\"may not authorize any action that would violate the Constitution or any statute of the United States. \"25\ncontrolling source of authority for its activities.\" To do otherwise would restrict \"intelligence activities that are otherwise entirely consistent with U.S. law and policy.\")."
    },
    {
        "text": "## Report Documentation Page\n\nPublic reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing this collection of information.  Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden to Department of Defense, Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports (0704-0188), 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA  22202-4302.  Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to any penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number.  PLEASE DO NOT RETURN\nYOUR FORM TO THE ABOVE ADDRESS.\n\n09-02-2004\n              FINAL\n\n## Intelligence, Surveillance And Reconnaissance In Support Of\n\nOPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM: CHALLENGES FOR\nRAPID MANEUVERS AND JOINT C4ISR INTEGRATION AND INTEROPERABILITY\n\n6. AUTHOR(S)\n\nCarl M. Bradley Paper Advisor (if Any):  CDR Alan Wall\n\n## 7. Performing Organization Name(S) And Address(Es)\n\n           Joint Military Operations Department Naval War College\n           686 Cushing Road Newport, RI 02841-1207\n\n## 9. Sponsoring/Monitoring Agency Name(S) And Address(Es)\n\nNUMBER(S)\n\n## 12. Distribution / Availability Statement Distribution Statement A: Approved For Public Release; Distribution Is Unlimited.\n\n13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES   A paper submitted to the faculty of the NWC in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the JMO\nDepartment.  The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the NWC or the Department of the Navy.\n\n14. ABSTRACT\n                 While aircraft, Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) and C4I systems played a critical role in the coalition's success against the Iraqi regime during *Operation Iraqi Freedom*, at the operational level of war, the C4I and airborne ISR assets experienced significant seams in their ability to provide timely, accurate, fused, and actionable intelligence to Strategic, Operational and Tactical users.  The key factors affecting the ability of ISR assets to support rapid maneuvers during OIF included compressed engagement times, incompatible and inadequate C4ISR systems, eleventh hour TTP and planning considerations, a lack of intelligence analysis tools, and Service unfamiliarity with the other Service ISR capabilities.\n\n\n The operational commander can take several steps to stem the tide in significant ISR seams during OIF.  Foremost among them is to engage JFCOM (Joint Forces Command) in its role as the DoD's executive agent for joint interoperability and integration to support and sponsor joint exercises that focus on C4ISR training requirements in a joint environment.  Services must receive guidance through JFCOM to ensure future C4ISR systems are not procured in such a way to field stovepipe systems unable to function in a joint environment.  Finally, joint doctrine for ISR must be updated to discuss decision making tools necessary to support ISR operations during rapid maneuvers.\n\n## 15. Subject Terms Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance, Isr, Oif, Operation Iraqi Freedom\n\n| 16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF:   |\n|-----------------------------------|\n| OF ABSTRACT                       |\n| 18. NUMBER                        |\n| OF PAGES                          |\n| 19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON   |\n| Chairman, JMO Dept                |\n| a. REPORT                         |\n| UNCLASSIFIED                      |\n| b. ABSTRACT                       |\n| UNCLASSIFIED                      |\n| c. THIS PAGE                      |\n| UNCLASSIFIED                      |\n| 22                                |\n| 19b. TELEPHONE NUMBER             |\n| (include area                     |\n| code)                             |\n| 401-841-3556                      |\n| Standard Form 298 (Rev. 8-98)     |\n\n# Naval War College Newport, R.I. Intelligence, Surveillance And Reconnaissance In Support Of Operation Iraqi Freedom: Challenges For Rapid Maneuvers And Joint C4Isr Integration And Interoperability By\n\nCarl M. Bradley Lieutenant Commander, USN\nA paper submitted to the Faculty of the Naval War College in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the Department of Joint Military Operations. The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy.\n\n                                       Signature: _____________________________\n9 February 2004\n\n## Abstract\n\n\nWhile aircraft, Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) and C4I systems played a critical role in the coalition's success against the Iraqi regime during *Operation Iraqi Freedom*, at the operational level of war, the C4I and airborne ISR assets experienced significant seams in their ability to provide timely, accurate, fused, and actionable intelligence to Strategic, Operational and Tactical users.  The key factors affecting the ability of ISR assets to support rapid maneuvers during OIF included compressed engagement times, incompatible and inadequate C4ISR systems, eleventh hour TTP and planning considerations, a lack of intelligence analysis tools, and Service unfamiliarity with the other Service ISR capabilities.  .\n\n\n The operational commander can take several steps to stem the tide of significant ISR\nseams experienced during OIF.  Foremost among them is to engage JFCOM (Joint Forces Command) in its role as the DoD's executive agent for joint interoperability and integration to support and sponsor joint exercises that focus on C4ISR training requirements in a joint environment.  Services must receive guidance through JFCOM to ensure future C4ISR systems are not procured in such a way to field stovepipe systems unable to function in a joint war fighting environment.  Finally, joint doctrine for ISR must be updated to discuss decision making tools necessary to support ISR operations during rapid maneuvers.\n\n\n\n## Introduction\n\nOperation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) was arguably the finest example of the U.S.\n\nmilitary's ability to wage joint coalition air, ground, and naval operations to support the nation's National Security Strategy.  Marines and the Army rapidly maneuvered toward Baghdad from the Iraqi southern border in a coordinated land campaign against the Iraqi military that covered ground in one quarter the time it took to do so in the first Gulf War.\n\nSpecial Operations Forces (SOF) performed Combat Search and Rescue and destroyed missile systems capable of deploying Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD).  Coalition air forces supported ground operations and carried out precision strikes against a vast array of targets in record time while ensuring air superiority over the country.  These US and coalition operations all have one common thread; Each of these missions and the forces performing them were supported by Command, Control, and Communications, Computers (C4), Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) assets, and the professionals who manage them within the Combined Forces Commander (CFC).\n\nWhile these aircraft, Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) and C4I systems played a critical role in the coalition's success against the Iraqi regime, at the operational level of war, the C4I and airborne ISR assets experienced significant gaps or seams with regard to their ability to provide timely, accurate, fused, and actionable intelligence to Strategic, Operational and Tactical users.1 These C4ISR challenges resulted from the extreme speed of maneuvers, incompatible and Service-unique C4ISR systems, distributed command structures, and the chasm between the huge amounts of raw information being collected by sensors and the OIF intelligence effort's ability to direct, collect, exploit, analyze, and disseminate fused intelligence products.\n\n## Background\n\nIn just 21 days, the coalition removed Saddam Hussein and the ruling Ba'ath Party from power and decisively defeated Iraqi military forces.  Assigned ISR assets were capable of providing 24 hour intelligence collection coverage to support the CFC's operational and strategic objectives as outlined below:2\n\n- Defeat or compel capitulation of Iraqi forces - Neutralize regime leadership - Neutralize Iraqi TBM/WMD delivery systems - Control WMD infrastructure - Ensure the territorial integrity of Iraq - Deploy and posture CFC forces for post-hostility operations, initiating\nhumanitarian assistance operations for the Iraqi people, within capabilities\n- Set military conditions for provisional/permanent government to assume power\n- Maintain international and regional support - Neutralize Iraq regime's C2 and security forces - Gain and maintain air, maritime and space supremacy\n\nThe coalition planned for and waged war emphasizing mobility and speed, precision, and information dominance.  These characteristics were exhibited by the ISR assets employed by the U.S. and coalition forces and the amount of data collected.  Of the 1,801 aircraft used during OIF, 80 aircraft were dedicated to the ISR mission.  They included RQ-1 Predator and RQ-4 Global Hawk UAVs, EP-3, P-3C \"Orion\", U-2, E-8C Joint Surveillance Target and Radar System (JSTARS), and RC-135 \"Rivet Joint\" (collecting signals intelligence) aircraft, to name a few.3  They flew approximately 1,000 sorties and collected 3,200 hours of streaming video, 2,400 hours of SIGINT, and 42,000 battlefield images.4  The ISR effort was managed from the Combined Air Operations Center located at Prince Sultan Air Base (PSAB), Saudi Arabia, under the command of the Combined Forces Air Component Commander (CFACC), Lt. General T. Michael \"Buzz\" Moseley, USAF.\n\nInformation alone does not constitute intelligence.  Prior to information being of use to commanders it must first undergo the basic intelligence cycle, which is accomplished in five phases: Planning and Direction, Collection, Processing and Exploitation, Production, and *Dissemination*.  While this review may seem elementary, the intelligence cycle is critical if intelligence professionals are expected to provide fused, timely, accurate, and actionable intelligence to commanders.  Knowledge of the intelligence cycle is also seminal to understanding the reason for those intelligence seams experienced during *OIF.*  All too often ISR collection activities in OIF were truncated from the full intelligence cycle, either by necessity or design, to support the rapid scheme of maneuver on the ground and in the air. This oftentimes resulted in perishable, inaccurate, incomplete, and untimely intelligence products.\n\n## Speed And Time - C4I\n\n\nEffective C4I systems ensure joint intelligence and total battlespace information awareness is provided to the warfighter through the use of common tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs).  These systems should also provide the warfighter with the flexibility to support any mission, at anytime, anywhere.  In OIF, C4I systems experienced significant seams while attempting to address these challenges.\n\n\nAdmiral E. P. Giambastiani, Commander, U.S. Joint Forces Command, said it best:\n\n \"Where we fall short is when we're in a high-speed, fast-moving campaign,\nlike this one was, where our forces are moving very rapidly.  The ability to be able to do effects assessments or battle damage in a rapid fashion lacks (sic)\nseriously behind the movement of our forces.\"5\n\n His comment directly reflects the significantly compressed sensor to shooter timelines experienced during OIF, which ironically stems from our tremendously enhanced C4ISR capabilities since the first Gulf War.  The available intelligence assets brought to bear against the Iraqi regime and its military provided persistent around-the-clock surveillance of targets of interest, collecting information from the ground, air, and space.  For example, operational commanders at the Combined Air Operations Center (CAOC) often employed UAVs to cue other assets to find, fix, track, target, engage and assess time sensitive targets (TSTs) with speed and precision, thereby increasing the probability of kill while minimizing collateral damage and risk to manned aircraft.6  As the war started, SOF, Army, and Marine forces maneuvered towards Baghdad at a record pace.  By the commencement of air operations at A-hour on March 21, 2003, coalition air forces commenced air strike operations and flew over 1,700 sorties, and launched 504 Tactical Land Attack Cruise Missiles (TLAM) and Conventional Air Launched Cruise Missiles (CALCM) in a 24 hour period.7\nThese strikes were aimed to destroy hundreds of targets.  One immediate effect these compressed engagement times had on operational commanders was to create a demand for a faster, more streamlined capability to deliver effects-based battle damage assessments (BDA) to decision makers for potential re-strike recommendations and Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace (JIPB) updates.  The immense number of targets, limited ISR assets, and insufficient personnel with BDA expertise, analytical tools, and sensor capabilities created a tremendous strain on the intelligence support architecture and prevented a thorough assessment of damage to the majority of targets.\n\nMethods for reviewing tactical aircraft weapon system video (WSV), for example, lacked the C4I systems and personnel expertise necessary to forward the WSV to the CENTCOM Joint Intelligence Center ( JICCENT) in Tampa, FL, for timely analysis and use by commanders. The WSV often arrived for analysis at JICCENT eight to ten hours after the aircraft completed its mission.  Once there, JICCENT lacked the requisite subject matter experts to quickly exploit the large number of WSV, thereby exacerbating the time delay of\n\n6  The CAOC identified 3 types of targets as TSTs: Leadership, WMD and terrorists.  Dynamic targets were fused BDA reports.8  Fusion of the thousands of aircrew Mission Reports (MISREPS)\naccompanying the WSV was also delayed.  As a result, the updates to the Common Operating Picture and Common Intelligence Picture (COP/CIP),9 necessary to provide decision makers with updated enemy and blue force dispositions, were behind schedule or did not occur. The exploitation and production, analysis, and dissemination processes were unresponsive to the operational speed of maneuver.\n\nThe speed of maneuver had some negative impact on direction and collection efforts by CFACC collection managers as well.  As more targets of opportunity (those not scheduled for surveillance and reconnaissance) were rapidly re-tasked to airborne UAVs and other aircraft such as the U-2, collection managers had difficulty with the complex effort of tracking, prioritizing and synchronizing the collection of targets and known areas of interest.\n\nThis huge effort required a collaborative tool to de-conflict asset tasking, priorities, and targets.  Analysts were often relegated to using spreadsheets as the speed of operations continued.  To add to these difficulties, targeteers worked without a master target database to track targets.10  Performing the required tasking, production, exploitation and distribution\n(TPED) tasks at a wartime pace without sufficient analytical tools resulted in imperfect such as Navy aircraft carriers at sea, for example. The FTP method mitigated bandwidth limitations aboard ship. The slow dissemination process was well documented prior to OIF and was never thoroughly addressed by intelligence and operational planners.\n\nanalysis that had a domino effect on subsequent collection and targeting plans.11  Collection and targeting efforts were bogged down with overlapping and duplicative requirements and analysis.  One target, for example, could be tasked and imaged with 3 different ISR assets one day even though the previous day's imagery of the same target had yet to be exploited by imagery analysts and might already have satisfied the requirement.12\nWhile the commander's Priority Intelligence Requirements (PIRs) should drive the collection process as described in joint doctrine, it appears this was not always the case.  The collection effort was responding to the speed of maneuver on the battlefield. Notwithstanding this fact, the direction and collection process became deferential to tactical or time sensitive events as opposed to executing a synchronized and prioritized collection plan based on PIRs.  Statistics of ISR collection missions tasked against PIRs during OIF were not available. Yet CFACC ISR cell collection managers reported that reconnaissance requirements did not always align with operational needs because of the fast paced dynamic tasking necessary to support operations and the lack of collaboration tools required to track targets and collection efforts.13  Those \"needs\" are outlined in the PIRs.\n\nInterestingly, the highest percentage of apportioned CFACC missions, 50.7 percent, supported the Combined Force Land Component Commander (CFLCC) to defeat Iraqi ground forces and conduct security and stabilization operations.  Missions supporting the Combined Force Special Operations Component Commander (CFSOCC) were second with\n12.5 percent.  The CFLCC and CFSOCC mission percentages correlate with the military objectives as outlined above.  Unfortunately, the CFACC did not count apportionment percentages by mission for ISR assets, referring to ISR as \"the cost of doing business.\" 14\nThose numbers would enable observers to match the missions with existing PIRs and better determine if assets were focused on the commander's intelligence guidance.\n\n\nIronically, many of the events discussed are a direct consequence of advances in C4I\nsystems that have increased the distances, network centric access, and obviously the speed through which information is transmitted and managed by commanders across all levels of war.  Video teleconferencing, satellite (Iridium) telephones, streaming video, the Internet, and multiple high speed data links all contributed to a more joint operation than coalition forces executed during the first Gulf War.  This connectivity was all the more critical when key OIF commanders and their supporting communications centers were separated by more than 7,000 miles, roughly the distances from CENTCOM's theater to the U.S. east coast.  Basing rights and political sensitivities within the theater also generated geographically distributed JFC component commanders.  The CAOC/CFACC operated out of Saudi Arabia while the CFLCC was headquartered in Kuwait.  CFSOCC and CFC commanded operations from within Qatar as the JFMCC coordinated maritime assets from Bahrain.  All needed to reachback to CENTCOM and Washington, DC during operations.\n\n\nThese distributed command structures necessitated an increase in available bandwidth and enabled the high degree of decentralized C2.  Total bandwidth prior to OIF increased by\n\n596%, up to 783 Mb from 113 Mb, and the demand continued to far exceed available capacity in the AOR.  Commanders were demanding more bandwidth to manage the large amounts of data available to them. According to CAOC commanders, restricted bandwidth and communications capabilities limited the number of targets warfighters were able to engage during compressed engagement timelines.15\n\nIn order to support remote TPED of Predator, Global Hawk, and U-2 ISR operations, the Defense Information System Agency activated circuits at a cost of over 3 million dollars.\n\nRemote sites in Nevada, California, and Virginia were used to process information from these sensors near real time while providing immediate feedback to the CAOC and other theater commanders.  The process was reasonably effective as ground stations were instrumental in warning commanders of Iraqi mobile missile threats identified through U-2\nand UAV imaging sensors. 16\n\nThe distributed command structure of intelligence analysts and operations during OIF\ncreated a demand for bandwidth that could not be met. Some intelligence elements were dissatisfied with having to synchronize daily Battle Rhythms with analysts working 7,000 miles away.  Some analysts preferred face-to-face coordination as opposed to VTCs.  Poor data transmission, poor weather, and scheduling conflicts oftentimes prohibited successful VTCs.\n\n\nWhile there is certainly a need for more bandwidth, C4I network users and planners need to better create resourceful C4I systems that limit the need for ever increasing bandwidth.  Bandwidth efficient C4I systems coupled with inventive TTPs can achieve that goal.  Elevated bandwidth is a double edged sword.  More and faster does not always equate to better.17  More information and intelligence reaches customers and decision makers in quicker time but this is effective only when TTPs and C4ISR systems are in place to support compressed decision cycles.\n\n## Joint Operations\n\nWhile it would appear that ISR assets in OIF performed in an ideal joint manner based upon the scale of operations and obvious demand for their capabilities, the Services continued to stovepipe information and subject matter expertise to their individual services.\n\nThe 1st MEF, for example, deployed a MEF ISR command element to Camp Commando in Kuwait to support 1 MEF maneuvers.  This element performed invaluable JIPB in concert with the other Services, JICCENT, the National Intelligence Community (NIC) and a United Kingdom signals battalion, and provided timely targeting to support MEF operations.18 While this effort confirms the U.S. military's commitment to developing fused intelligence products across Services, agencies, and coalition partners, the point is moot to Navy Carrier Air Wings.  Lessons learned from the Navy's aircraft carrier-based Intelligence Centers (CVICs) reported a significant shortfall in ground intelligence products and IPB analysts necessary for Navy tactical aircraft to conduct combat air support for SOF forces in the north and ongoing operations in southern Iraq.19  As a temporary fix, some CVICs received augmentation in the form of Marine intelligence analysts.20  To fully integrate the ISR effort, JFC J2s and subordinate J2s need to ensure fused intelligence products and analysis are made available across all levels of war through a common network centric architecture that maximizes manpower and level of effort.\n\nMany ISR assets were successfully employed by the Services with minimal integration problems.  Available UAVs operated closely with SOF to find, fix, track, target, engage and assess C2 and SCUD missile threats in western Iraq.  Streaming video was sent to AC-130 \"Spectre\" aircraft to provide detailed targeting information in the engagement phase.\n\nThe 1st MARDIV enjoyed tremendous C4I integration with the JSTARS, which provided near real time reporting on enemy ground unit locations and \"no go\" terrain thereby enabling units to maneuver deep into the enemy's battlespace.21  Marines also operated with Navy P-\n3C maritime patrol aircraft. The P-3Cs provided Marines with indications and warning surveillance of engaged friendly forces, and disposition of enemy forces ahead of them. Seams still existed between the Navy and Marine units, however.  Differences in communications suite capabilities required a Marine liaison officer (LNO) aboard the aircraft and intensive concept of operations planning.22  The inability to train with other units prior to the war was a common theme reiterated in many of the Service's lessons learned documents.\n\n## C4I Integration\n\n\"The integrated common operating picture [COP] was a very powerful tool.\n\nTracking systems were previously Service unique.  Workarounds were developed for OIF, but there is a need to develop one integrated, user friendly, C4I architecture that captures blue and red air, ground and maritime forces.\"23\nThe workarounds General Franks alluded to above were the short term planning for the creation and maintenance of the COP/CIP that occurred just prior to commencement of the war.  Last minute planning resulted in inaccurate and absent threat Order of Battle (OOB) during the first phases of the war.  According to one CENTAF report, the CFACC began tracking enemy air, defensive missile, and long range surface-to-surface missile OOB just prior to the war without sufficient and mature TTPs to perform the mission. 24  Upon shifting to that mission during the eleventh hour, CFACC analysts discovered that the four C4I systems employed to create and update OOBs for the COP/CIP were incapable of providing interoperable interfaces for data transfer into the COP/CIP system.  As a result, the CFACC was forced to coordinate with JICCENT in Tampa, FL for JICCENT to receive a spreadsheet 2004].\n\ndetails shortfalls in imagery analysts necessary to exploit P-3C imagery for dissemination to operational and tactical units.\n\n23  Statement of General Tommy R. Franks, Former Commander US Central Command, Before the Senate Armed Services Committee, July 9, 2003.\n\n24 \"CFACC ACCE Intelligence Preparation,\" Joint Universal Lessons Learned System No. 41436-94678, 13\nApril 2003, [13 January 2004].\n\nevery six hours that contained the necessary OOB information. The data was then manually entered by JICCENT into the master database to update the COP/CIP.  The issue produced confusion amongst other intelligence elements that were not informed of the changes in production and OOB responsibilities.  This last minute workaround is surprising when one considers that US and coalition intelligence elements had 12 years to develop TTPs and C2 relationships to ensure unity of effort. While military personnel were often transferred from the CAOC after a 6 month rotation, the existing CAOC and JFC intelligence organizations are codified in Joint doctrine and are not new.\n\nFrom the intelligence cycle perspective one thing seems certain, not all ISR assets arrived in theater with a TPED plan in hand to input information and intelligence into one COP/CIP in a time sensitive manner.  The existing MASINT (Measurement and Signals Intelligence) C4I structure, required production times, and necessary expert analysis, that did not support suitable COP/CIP input and display for MASINT data.   To address the shortfall, some individual analysts, many who enjoyed a personal or professional familiarity with one another prior to the operation, coordinated face to face or over secure communications circuits to pass data across components.  This TPED workaround was often referred to as the\n\"Bubbas Network.\"25  These actions, while noble in effort, truncated the intelligence cycle and prevented proper intelligence dissemination to the proper units and decision makers. This was not the case for all intelligence disciplines.  The ELINT (Electronic Intelligence) TPED seems to have been the model to follow.  The ELINT data had a well formulated and mature TPED that allowed national, theater, and tactical ELINT information to flow into common displays in a timely fashion.\n\n## Recommendations\n\n\nThe operational commander can take several steps to bridge the gaps resulting from the critical factors that limited their ability to provide timely, accurate, fused, and actionable intelligence to Strategic, Operational and Tactical users.  Foremost among them is to engage JFCOM (Joint Forces Command) in its role as the DoD's executive agent for joint interoperability and integration.  This role places JFCOM at center stage as a source for solutions to ensure C4ISR integration and training throughout the DoD.\n\n\nJoint exercises go far toward providing integration and training opportunities in a joint and coalition environment.  Unfortunately C4ISR has not received the attention necessary to contend with the challenges presented during joint operations.  Previous joint exercises have neglected C4ISR; treating it more as a support function to operations. Participating intelligence personnel were often culled from disparate units without regard to real-world training benefits, joint integration, and interoperability issues normally addressed to support ongoing or future operations.  Future exercises sponsored by JFCOM, such as Unified Endeavor, which concentrate on training future JTF commanders and their component intelligence staffs on C4ISR, can make certain the right force mix participates and trains for integrated operations in a joint environment.\n\n\nAlthough a significant step, joint exercises and training will benefit operational commanders more if the exercises are inculcated into the routine turnaround training cycles the Services use to manage unit deployment schedules.  An often heard phrase within military circles is *they train like they fight*.  In reality, the Services have few opportunities during normal training cycles to train and operate in a JTF or CJTF battlespace environment. Incorporating joint exercises and training into their routine training schedules will enable all Services to become more familiar with ISR capabilities and limitations.\n\n\nIn concert with its joint exercise mission, JFCOM can also play a larger role in assuring interoperability and integration of DoD C4ISR systems by tracking the research and development (R&D) and procurement efforts Services pursue to design and purchase these systems.  As the central clearinghouse for Service C4ISR requirements, JFCOM can unite the Services so they work towards the same ends and no longer develop and purchase stovepipe systems that fail to pass the joint, integrated, and interoperable tests.  These steps will enable JFCOM to lay the foundation for a solid C4ISR roadmap that all Services, regardless of mission, can follow.\n\n\n Current joint doctrine addresses the collection phase of ISR on the periphery only,\nwith a cursory overview of how these assets support other TTPs or TST events.  Apart from\nexisting classified documents,26 the most current dedicated ISR Joint Publication, JP-3-55, is\nover ten years old and provides only basic descriptions of the intelligence cycle.27  Future ISR\njoint doctrine can mature and develop through the implementation of previous operational lessons learned, and by exercising C4ISR TTPs and C4ISR systems during JFCOM\nsponsored joint exercises.  The resulting doctrine ought to include checklists, analytical and decision making tools, and C2 structures for JFCs to use as a template to support future fast paced ISR operations.  The development of updated ISR joint doctrine can provide JFCs with critical capabilities necessary to train forces and avoid the repetition of negative lessons learned discussed here.\n\n## Conclusions\n\n\nThe C4ISR assets and systems employed during OIF were a crucial ingredient to the coalition's success.  Nevertheless, key factors impaired C4ISR assets and their systems from providing *OIF* commanders, across all levels of war, with timely, accurate, and actionable intelligence.\n\n\nThe key factors affecting the ability of ISR assets to support rapid maneuvers during\nOIF included compressed engagement times, incompatible and inadequate C4ISR systems, eleventh hour TTP and planning considerations, a lack of intelligence analysis tools, and Service unfamiliarity with the other Service ISR capabilities.  A lack of interoperability between Service-unique C4ISR systems prevented the uninterrupted flow of information and intelligence across the intelligence cycle to warfighters.\n\nSpeed of maneuver by air and ground forces, accompanied by compressed\nengagement times and persistent ISR assets, placed a significant strain on the ISR architecture.  Speed forced intelligence support components to streamline TPED methods.\nThe inability of supporting intelligence elements to quickly respond to demanding\n\noperational requirements and rapid maneuvers was exacerbated by a lack of intelligence analysis tools to swiftly track and correlate large amounts of data.\n\n\nEleventh hour TTPs and planning for C4ISR architectures created confusion and misunderstanding among JFC and subordinate intelligence components.  A shortage of experienced intelligence analysts delayed intelligence production, analysis and dissemination of time critical intelligence products.  Consequently, incomplete, inaccurate, and delayed OOB and COP/CIP products were forwarded to commanders for use as decision making tools. Joint operations, now, more than ever, rely on effective C4ISR systems and TTPs that can provide timely, accurate, and actionable intelligence to support rapid maneuvers across Service lines.\n\n\n\n Bibliography\n\n Baldwin, Al.  \"I MEF ISR in OIF,\" Headquarters, U.S. Marine Intelligence Department\nIntelligence Community Newsletter, (June 2003): 9.\n\n Biesecker, Calvin.  \"Intelligence Network at Beale Demonstrates Advances in Battle Space\nAnalysis,\" Defense Daily, 21 August 2003.  UMI-Proquest.  [16 January 2004].\n\n ________.  \"U-2 Spy Planes Were Crucial in Hunt for Iraqi Mobile Missile Launchers,\" C4I\nNews, 21 August 2003.  UMI-Proquest.  [16 January 2004].\n\n Boyne, Walter J.  Operation Iraqi Freedom: What Went Right, What Went Wrong, and Why,\nNew York:  Tom Doherty Associates, 2003.\n\n\"Carrier Intelligence Center (CVIC) Analytical Capabilities Against Ground Forces,\" Lessons\nLearned No. LLCC0-02988, 15 April, 2003.  Navy Lessons Learned Database. [13 January, 2004].\nCENTAF A2, \"CENTAF A2 Warfighter Takeaways Brief ,\" OIF Lessons Learned\nConference, 9th Air Force, 31 July 2003.  [13 January 2004].\n\"CFACC ACCE Intelligence Preparation,\" Joint Universal Lessons Learned System No.\n41436-94678. April 13 2003.  [22 January 2004].\n Coakley, Thomas P.  C3I: Issues of Command and Control.  Washington, DC: National\nDefense University Press, 1991.\n\n Cook, Nick.  \"ISR - Manned or Unmanned? Going Solo?\" Jane's Defense Weekly, 19\nNovember 2003.  UMI Proquest.  [15 January 2004].\n\n Cordesman, Anthony H.  The Lessons of the Iraq War: Main Report.  Eleventh Working\nDraft: July 21, 2003. July 2003.  <http://www.csis.org/features/iraq_instantlessons.pdf> [12 January 2004].\n\n\"Dissemination of MPR ISR Products to Land and Sea Forces,\" Lessons Learned No.\nLLCC0-03270,  22 September 2003.  Navy Lessons Learned Database. [13 January,\n2004].\n Garamone, Jim.  \"Joint Ops Key to Lessons Learned From Iraq,\" Defense Link,  9 July 2003.\n<http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Jul2003/n07092003_200307095.html> [20 January 2004].\n\n Haag, Jason L.  \"OIF Veterans Discuss Lessons,\" Air Force Print News, 31 July 2003.\n<http://www.af.mil/news/story.asp?storyID=123005347>  [15 January 2004].\n\n Hewish, Mark.  \"Out of CAOCs Comes Order,\" Jane's International Defense Review, no. 36\n(2003): 22-27.\n\n \"Intelligence Database Management,\" Joint Universal Lessons Learned No. 41434-62689, 13\nApril 2003. [22 January 2003].\n\n \"Intelligence Network at Beale Demonstrates Advances in Battlespace Awareness,\" Defense\nDaily, 219 (August 21, 2003): 1.\n\n\"The Joint Common Operational and Common Intelligence Pictures (COP/CIP),\" Lessons\nLearned No. LLCC0-03291.  5 May, 2003.  Navy Lessons Learned Database. [13\nJanuary, 2004].\n Knights, Michael.  \"Iraqi Freedom' Displays the Transformation of US Air Power,\" Jane's\nIntelligence Review, v. 15, no. 5 (2003): 16-19.\n\n Krepinevich, Andrew F.  Operation Iraqi Freedom: a First-Blush Assessment.   Washington,\nD.C., Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, 2003.\nMoseley, Michael T.  \"Operation Iraqi FreedomBy the Numbers,\" USCENTAF (United\nStates Central Command Air Forces), Assessment and Analysis Division, April 30,\n2003. <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/2003/uscentaf_oif_report_30ap\nr2003.pdf> [12 January 2004].\n\n Murray, Williamson and Robert H. Scales. Jr.  The Iraq War: a Military History.  Cambridge:\nThe Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2003.\n\n Myers, Richard B.  \"The New American Way of War,\" Military Technology,  June 2003.\nUMI-Proquest.  [16 January 2004].\n\nOIF Lessons Learned Conference, 9th Air Force, 31 July 2003.  [13 January 2004]\n\n \"Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) Lessons Learned.\" 1st Marine Division. May 2003.   <\n<http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/2003/1mardiv_oif_lessons_lear ned.doc>  [14 January 2004].\n\n \"Operations in Iraq: Lesson for the Future.\" December 2003.\n<http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/2003/iraqops_lessons_ukmod_dec03_index.htm>  [20 January 2004]\n\n Paone, Chuck.  \"AFMC, ACC Commanders to Mark CAOC-X Achievements.\"  8 June 2001.\n\n<http://www.hanscom.af.mil/hansconian/Articles/2001Arts/06082001-5.htm>  [25\n\nJanuary 2004].\n\n Sadler, Stephen R.  \"Task Force ISR: Sea Power 21 in Action.\"  Unpublished paper, CNO\nNaval Intelligence Bulletin, 23 January 2004.\n\n \"Time Critical Targeting and Procedures.\" JULLS No. 41435035131, CENTAF-HQ USAF.\n13 April 2003.  [16 January 2004].\n\nU.S. Congress.  House.  \"Statement by Admiral Edmund P. Giambastiani, Jr. Commander,\nUnited States Joint Forces Command and Supreme Allied Commander Transformation (NATO), Before the House Armed Services Committee, United\nStates House of Representatives, October 2, 2003\"  2 October 2003.\n<http://www.jfcom.mil/newslink/storyarchive/2003/pa100203.htm> [12 January\n2004].\n\nU.S. Congress. Senate.  \"Statement of General Tommy R. Franks, Former Commander US\nCentral Command, Before the Senate Armed Services Committee, July 9, 2003.\"  9\nJuly 2003.  <www.senate.gov/~armed_services/ statemnt/2003/July/Franks.pdf>  [12 January 2004].\n U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff.  Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Joint Intelligence\nPreparation of the Battlespace, Joint Pub. 2-01.3.  Washington, DC: 24 May 2002.\n\n ________.  Doctrine for Joint Operations, Joint Pub 3-0.  Washington, DC: 10 September\n2001.\n\n ________.  Doctrine for Intelligence Support to Joint Operations, Joint Pub 2-0.\nWashington, DC: 10 September 2001.\n\n ________. National Intelligence Support to Joint Operations, Joint Pub 2-02. Washington,\nDC:  28 September 1998.\n\n ________.  Joint Intelligence Support to Military Operations.  Joint Pub. 2-01. Washington,\nDC: 20 November 1996.\n\n ________. Doctrine for Reconnaissance, Surveillance, and Target Acquisition Support for\nJoint Operations (RSTA), Joint Pub 3-55.  Washington, DC: 14 April 1993.\n\n Vego, Milan.  Operational Warfare.  Unpublished paper, U.S. Naval War College, Newport,\nRI, 2000."
    },
    {
        "text": "RepoRt of the NatioNal CommissioN\nfoR the Review of the ReseaRCh aNd developmeNt pRogRams of the UNited states iNtelligeNCe CommUNity SPECIAL TOPIC WHITE PAPER:\nTHE IC'S ROLE WITHIN U.S. CYBER R&D\n\n## Preface Co-Chairs:\n\nSince Congress created the modern Intelligence Community Mr. Maurice Sonnenberg Samantha Ravich, PhD COMMISSIONERS: Sen. Dan Coats Rep. Mike Conaway Rep. Rush Holt\n(IC) with the passage of the National Security Act of 1947, the IC has existed to serve one overarching goalto provide timely and accurate intelligence to inform, warn, and act on behalf of U.S. decisionmakers to ensure our continued national security. The National Commission for the Review of the Research and Development Programs of the United States Intelligence Community was established by Public Law 107-306, as amended by Public Law 111-259, to review the R&D programs of the IC and to ensure that this goal is being, and will continue to be, met.\n\nHon. Shirley Ann Jackson, PhD\nIn the legislation establishing the Commission, Congress Mr. Gilman Louie Mr. Kevin Meiners Hon. Stephanie O'Sullivan Mr. Troy Wade Sen. Mark Warner Hon. John J. Young, Jr. EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR: David A. Bray, PhD\n\nnoted that for the foreseeable future, the IC \"must operate in a dynamic, highly-challenging environment against a growing number of hostile, technically-sophisticated threats.\" Aided by their growing national commitments to R&D, current and potential adversaries of U.S. interests have easy access to advanced sensors, social media tools, a variety of communication networks, precision weapons and home-made devices, analytical software, and many other capabilities for undermining our national advantage. IC R&D programs are critical to ensure that the United States advances and maintains \"technological capabilities to detect, characterize, assess, and ultimately counter the full range of threats to the national security of the United States.\"\nThe Commission conducted a thorough review of the IC\nR&D enterprise, including its relationship with the broader U.S. R&D base and the U.S. R&D talent pool. The Commission held individual sessions with R&D leaders and national security experts from the IC, Department of Defense, Executive Office of the President, academia, and private industry and also reviewed policies and programs aimed at enhancing the nation's science, technology, engineering, and mathematics (STEM) workforce. Several IC-wide data calls were conducted to gain information about current IC R&D budgets as well as R&D priorities. The Commission also reviewed five IC R&D topics to consider illustrative areas of high interest in more detail.\n\nThere are two key challenges that Congress and the IC must address to ensure U.S. national security. First, the global diffusion of R&D efforts is accelerating, posing increasing risk to the essential capabilities of the IC and to national security. Second, the ever-increasing sophistication of our adversariescoupled with the growing volume and complexity of the data collectedis testing the ability of the IC R&D enterprise to succeed in its mission absent greater Community-wide integration and leadership. To address these challenges, Congress and IC\nleadership must ensure that R&D is recognized as a critical and strategic component of the IC's missionsand empower the IC R&D enterprise to act accordingly.\n\nWe echo previous congressional commissions and prominent studies as we stress that complementing our above concerns is the need for Congress to better protect and prepare the broader U.S. industrial base through legislation focused on improving STEM education, creating skills-based immigration policies, securing the supply chains of critical materials and technologies, and countering cyber theft and foreign espionage.\nLike traditional national security issues, these R&D issues transcend partisanship, and, for the good of our nation, Congress should act to address these concerns.\n\n\n\n## Summary Of Main Report Findings And Recommendations Broaden Scientific And Technical Intelligence\n\nFinding 1: The Commission found a limited effort by the IC to discern and exploit the strategic R&Despecially non-military R&Dintentions and capabilities of our adversaries, and to counter our adversaries' theft or purchase of U.S. technology. Recommendation 1: Conduct comprehensive strategic collection and analysis of scientific and technical intelligence (S&TI); use it for IC R&D planning and resource allocation.\n\n## Enhance Integrated Intelligence\n\nFinding 2: The Commission found that while the traditional ways and means of collecting and analyzing intelligence remain useful and necessary, emerging and future threats cannot be addressed without Enhanced Integrated Intelligence capabilities that enable shared, discoverable data for analysis and shared, discoverable information for decisionmakers. Recommendation 2: Focus advanced IC R&D on Enhanced Integrated Intelligence approaches methods that integrate diverse sources and expertise and that employ automated capabilities to tag, discover, access, and aggregate both data and analyzed information.\n\n## Empower R&D Leadership\n\nFinding 3: The Commission found that there is inadequate IC R&D strategic planning and inadequate awareness of IC R&D investment plans and programs. Recommendation 3: Empower IC R&D leadership to develop a comprehensive R&D strategy and oversee R&D resource allocation.\n\n## Leverage People/Talent\n\nFinding 4: The Commission found substantial interest within the IC to take advantage of talent and innovation in both the domestic and international private sectors, as well as within the IC itself, but the IC must evolve its business and personnel practices to leverage and exploit the STEM personnel marketplace. Recommendation 4: Assess longer-term workforce needs within the context of a more competitive private sector and global marketplace and develop procedures to recruit and keep needed talent. Increase and augment IC R&D talent by emphasizing approaches to innovation sharing within the public and private sectors, universities, and research and national labs, and by developing an IC strategy and approach for creating R&D opportunities for non-U.S. citizens.\n\n\n\n## Special Topic: The Ic's Role Within U.S. Cyber R&D The Growing Cyber Threat\n\nThe national security of the United States requires that our public and private enterprises be safe from cyber exploitation and cyber espionage. The United States is witnessing a dramatic increase in cyber-related risks as both the numbers and the magnitude of attacks rise, affecting critical infrastructure, public and private institutions, financial and communication systems, national defense elements, and the economic security of every citizen. Both U.S. companies and individual Americans must do more to protect themselves than simply practicing good cyber hygiene and best information technology (IT) practices.\n\nThe most worrisome cyber attacks are believed to be state-sponsored, and some of them may include the use of proxies. Cyber attacks can be designed to deny access to critical services, reduce the reliability and trust of U.S.-based institutions, cause failure in the nation's critical infrastructure, or steal intellectual property, financial resources, and identities. Other attacks are intended to extort, blackmail, or probe for vulnerabilities in preparation for a larger attack.\nDistributed denial of service (DDoS) attacks may target entire industries, as demonstrated by recent attacks against U.S. financial institutions. In milliseconds, DDoS cyber attackswith loads measured in hundreds of gigabits per secondcan overwhelm the bandwidth of Internetbased services of even large enterprises. When DDoS attacks overwhelm the defenses of a target, they can degrade quality of service, cause localized outages, or mask other attacks.\n\nAttacks more sophisticated than DDoS also have been observed. These attacks modify their behavior in near real time in response to the defenses they encounter. Furthermore, attacks of types not yet known may have been executed, or may be ready to be launched at a future time.\n\nThe Intelligence Community and the Department of Defense, because of both their capabilities and their missions, are at the forefront of understanding, assessing, and countering this growing threat.\n\n## The Need For A New Approach For U.S. Cyber R&D\n\nOn the basis of information provided to the Commission, we conclude that there are several urgent needs regarding U.S. cyber R&D investment. The nation must carefully examine and clarify the roles of individual government agencies with respect to cyber R&D. The government also should design a process for collaborating that makes private enterprises more comfortable about cooperating with government agencies and each other. The United States must leverage cyber expertise in private industry and academiaand look to parts of the IC that are already investing successfully in the people and technology to confront these growing threatswhen considering how to align cyber R&D resources.\nImportant R&D focus areas include, but are not limited to, the following:\n\n Deterring, detecting, defeating, and attributing cyber attacks during their planning,\ndeployment, or operations phases, using cyber and other means\n Identifying behavioral signatures of different human actors or groups  Modeling the behaviors, decisions, and strategy of human actors involved in a cyber\nattack\n Improving IC analytical capabilities to characterize, stop, or mitigate major classes of\ncoordinated attacks against U.S. interests in real time, using cyber and other means\n Collaborating with industry on capabilities to exchange real-time information relevant to\nIC interests, while also protecting privacy\n Developing trusted devices and software  Developing new techniques and mathematics to replace public-key infrastructure (PKI)\n Creating transparent and multifactor authentication  Establishing methods to use Big Data analytics for threat correlation and threat\ncontainment\n\n## Framework For U.S. Cyber R&D Investment\n\nThree principles should guide U.S. investment in cyber R&D.\n\nCyber R&D must be informed by full threat and vulnerability assessments.\n\nComprehensive knowledge of the threats and vulnerabilities of both our systems and those of our adversaries is fundamental to formulating a national cyber R&D strategy. This is why scientific and technological intelligence is important, and why threat and vulnerability knowledge today possessed by the IC must be part of the cyber R&D strategy.\n\nA cyber R&D framework must respect privacy and civil liberties. A cyber R&D\nframework must develop capabilities that protect U.S. systems, while adhering to U.S. policies and laws governing privacy, security, and liability.\n\nCyber R&D must be informed by information exchange. The federal government should partner with governments, industry, and academia to exchange knowledge of cyber exploitation mechanisms and successful defense tactics.\n\n## Recommended Cyber R&D Actions I. Establish A National Cyber R&D Agenda\n\nAdversaries already employ a full range of social, technical, and economic capabilities against U.S. computing and communications resources. Increasingly, cyber means are used to access, influence, or disrupt not just computer networks but also more traditional targets. Future cyber R&D must incorporate work from numerous disciplinesfor example, biological sciences, behavioral sciences, social network science, and quantum science. New approaches might include economic intelligence, motivation-based modeling, and predictive models characterizing the attacker, not just the attack. At the same time, cyber R&D should inform cyber policymakers about what is possible and its cost.\n\nII.  Determine what cyber R&D is being done now\nCurrent U.S. government cyber R&D activities are spread over a large number of agencies with little apparent coordination. There needs to be a comprehensive accounting of cyber R&D programs and budgets. This evaluation should included assessments of cyber R&D also being pursued by other nations and industries.\n\nIII. Examine and evaluate approaches to publicprivate partnerships for cyber R&D\n(i) At present, no one knows the ideal form that cyber security cooperation and sharing within and between the government and the private sector should take. To determine appropriate cyber R&D approaches for partnerships and real-time information exchange within the government and with the private sector, there must be experimentation and pilot programs incorporating the concepts discussed above and other examples. (ii) Key to addressing the vulnerability of important private-sector systems is the adoption of security standards that raise the cost of attacking critical systems. In partnership with industry, the U.S. government must develop such standards, practices, and requirements.\n\n## Possible Models For U.S. Cyber R&D Investment Activity\n\nThere are a number of examples on which we can draw in organizing collaborative R&D and information exchange beyond just a government-led effort, including the following:\n\n\nEnduring Security Framework (ESF). The National Security Agency (NSA) serves as the executive agent for a groundbreaking publicprivate cyber R&D effort. The NSA, partnering with the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), brings together leading private-sector actors across the IT industry and the defense industrial base to reduce U.S. exposure to\nimportant classes of threats. The ESF incorporates activities across the full range of leadership and staff, from periodic strategic discussions at the level of CEOs and government agency heads to continuous, detailed planning and concrete action at the level of technical experts. Other countries are pursuing similar arrangements. For example, the Australian National Cyber Center plans to start up at the end of 2013, and in the United Kingdom, GCHQ (Government Communications Headquarters) and the Security Service (MI-5) have a publicprivate partnership with industry for the exchange of information on cyber threats.\n\nCyber business clusters. There are several cyber business clusters developing in the United States in regions including the San Francisco Bay Area, Boston, Raleigh/Durham, Austin, and Northern Virginia. Such clusters are centers of excellence that typically grow up around leading universities with strong engineering, mathematics, and computer science departments; worldclass research labs (public and private); and interconnected technology businesses, suppliers, and service providers. A sizable population of technical talent, skilled labor, and entrepreneurs\nnaturally assembles in this environment. Such clusters exhibit positive feedback: commercial contributions enable universities to strengthen their computing programs, a development that leads to an even stronger research program and generates the high-caliber talent needed to strengthen the industrial base.\n\n\nSector-specific consortia including industry and academiasuch as for banking, energy, financial services, telecommunications, and defensewhich exchange information and set research directions\n\n(i) In 1987, 14 U.S.-based semiconductor manufacturers and the U.S. government came together to solve common manufacturing problems by leveraging resources and sharing risks as part of the SEMATECH (Semiconductor Manufacturing Technology) consortium. SEMATECH focuses on improving industry infrastructure and working with a wide variety of actors to improve\ncapabilities, foster technology innovation, and accelerate the commercialization of new materials and nanostructures. SEMATECH also supports applied research in universities.\n\n(ii) The In-Q-Tel Lab 41 program involves teams from industry and academia who collaborate to solve complex problems involving Big Data. A similar kind of effort could be effective in addressing certain classes of cyber security problems.\n\nFinTech Innovation Lab. FinTech Innovation Lab is an annual program run by the New York City Investment Fund and Accenture for early- and growth-stage companies that have developed cutting-edge technology products targeted at financial services customers. Through a competitive process, the chief technology officers of the world's leading financial services firms determine which proposals are accepted for further development and deployment. Winners get the chance to refine and beta test their financial technology products in New York City in partnership with these firms.\n\nThe Oak Ridge National Laboratory. The Oak Ridge National Laboratory is partnering with the National Nuclear Security Administration to establish a cyber test range at the Nevada National Security Site (formerly the Nevada Test Site). The range involves two major substations in area 25 at NNSS, the site that now houses the now-defunct Yucca Mountain project. The Extreme Cyber Test Range would utilize these two substations, with independent power supplies, to do\noffensive and defensive testing of network designs coming from Oak Ridge National Laboratory.\n\n##"
    },
    {
        "text": "RepoRt of the NatioNal CommissioN\nfoR the Review of the ReseaRCh aNd developmeNt pRogRams of the UNited states iNtelligeNCe CommUNity UNCLASSIFIED VERSION\nA variety of terms pertaining to scientific and technical research and development are employed by the Intelligence Community (IC) and in this report. Key concepts in this report are: Enhanced Integrated Intelligence (EII) - EII is the rearchitecturing of collection and analysis processes enabled by automated collection, analysis, integration, and discovery of relevant intelligence data and information from classified and open sources. The goal is to achieve a better contextual understanding of the world. EII extends the integration of intelligence capabilitiesbegun under the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (IRTPA) and continued by the unification of collection and analysis under a single Deputy Director of National Intelligenceto include the research and development activities that support collection and analysis. Scientific and Technical Intelligence (also Science and Technology Intelligence or Scientific and Technological Intelligence; abbreviated S&TI) - S&TI is the systematic study and analysis of foreign capabilities in basic and applied research and applied engineering. S&TI products are used to warn of foreign technical developments and capabilities and to guide the development of future capabilities, which are often provided through R&D. In this report, S&TI is understood more broadly: it includes not only the efforts described above but also aspects of counterintelligence and open-source intelligence used to provide a comprehensive picture of global scientific and technological advancements. Each of the following terms, though sometimes used interchangeably, has a distinct meaning: Research and Technology (R&T or RT) - RT is an expenditure center within the National Intelligence Program (NIP) budget that funds many of the activities within the IC R&D enterprise. Research and Development (R&D) - As used in the IC, R&D is a broad term encompassing all of the intelligence and intelligence-related work systematically undertaken to develop new scientific and technical knowledge and to apply such knowledge in developing or improving existing applications (sensors, devices, analytical tools, and so on). Acquisition is not typically part of development. Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation (RDT&E) - RDT&E is a Department of Defense (DOD) budget appropriation that covers the entire development cycle, from basic research through final operational test. At the conclusion of RDT&E, the system is ready for procurement and fielding to the operators. Science and Technology (S&T) - S&T is a broad term for the entire range of scientific and technical disciplines used to codify, increase, or apply knowledge. In the IC, S&T generally describes the knowledge that is developed and applied to IC mission needs. In the DOD, S&T refers specifically to basic research, applied research, and the advanced development of knowledge and of system prototypes.\n\n## Failure To Properly Appraise The Extent Of Scientific Developments In Enemy Countries May Have More Immediate And Catastrophic Consequences Than Failure In Any Other Field Of Intelligence.\n\n\nTask Force Report on National Security Organization (the Eberstadt Report) (1948)\n\n\n## Failure To Properly Resource And Use Our Own R&D To Appraise, Exploit, And Counter The Scientific And Technical Developments Of Our AdversariesIncluding Both State And Non-State Actors May Have More Immediate And Catastrophic Consequences Than Failure In Any Other Field Of Intelligence.\n\n\nNational Commission for the Review of the Research and Development Programs of the United States Intelligence Community (2013)\nThis page intentionally left blank.\n\nThis page intentionally left blank.\n\n\n\n## Preface Co-Chairs:\n\nSince Congress created the modern Intelligence Community Mr. Maurice Sonnenberg Samantha Ravich, PhD COMMISSIONERS: Sen. Dan Coats Rep. Mike Conaway Rep. Rush Holt Hon. Shirley Ann Jackson, PhD\n(IC) with the passage of the National Security Act of 1947, the IC has existed to serve one overarching goalto provide timely and accurate intelligence to inform, warn, and act on behalf of U.S. decisionmakers to ensure our continued national security. The National Commission for the Review of the Research and Development Programs of the United States Intelligence Community was established by Public Law 107-306, as amended by Public Law 111-259, to review the R&D programs of the IC and to ensure that this goal is being, and will continue to be, met.\n\nMr. Gilman Louie In the legislation establishing the Commission, Congress Mr. Kevin Meiners Hon. Stephanie O'Sullivan Mr. Troy Wade Sen. Mark Warner Hon. John J. Young, Jr.\n\n## Executive Director:\n\nDavid A. Bray, PhD\n\nnoted that for the foreseeable future, the IC must operate in a dynamic, highly-challenging environment against a growing number of hostile, technically-sophisticated threats. Aided by their growing national commitments to R&D, current and potential adversaries of U.S. interests have easy access to advanced sensors, social media tools, a variety of communication networks, precision weapons and home-made devices, analytical software, and many other capabilities for undermining our national advantage. IC R&D programs are critical to ensure that the United States advances and maintains technological capabilities to detect, characterize, assess, and ultimately counter the full range of threats to the national security of the United States.\nThe Commission conducted a thorough review of the IC\nR&D enterprise, including its relationship with the broader U.S. R&D base and the U.S. R&D talent pool. The Commission held individual sessions with R&D leaders and national security experts from the IC, Department of Defense, Executive Office of the President, academia, and private industry and also reviewed policies and programs aimed at enhancing the nation's science, technology, engineering, and mathematics (STEM) workforce. Several IC-wide data calls were conducted to gain information about current IC R&D budgets as well as R&D priorities. The Commission also reviewed five IC R&D topics to consider illustrative areas of high interest in more detail.\n\nThere are two key challenges that Congress and the IC must address to ensure U.S. national security. First, the global diffusion of R&D efforts is accelerating, posing increasing risk to the essential capabilities of the IC and to national security. Second, the ever-increasing sophistication of our adversariescoupled with the growing volume and complexity of the data collectedis testing the ability of the IC R&D enterprise to succeed in its mission absent greater Community-wide integration and leadership. To address these challenges, Congress and IC leadership must ensure that R&D is recognized as a critical and strategic component of the IC's missionsand empower the IC R&D enterprise to act accordingly.\n\nWe echo previous congressional commissions and prominent studies as we stress that complementing our above concerns is the need for Congress to better protect and prepare the broader U.S. industrial base through legislation focused on improving STEM education, creating skills-based immigration policies, securing the supply chains of critical materials and technologies, and countering cyber theft and foreign espionage.\nLike traditional national security issues, these R&D issues transcend partisanship, and, for the good of our nation, Congress should act to address these concerns.\n\n## Summary Of Findings And Recommendations\n\nThe global spread of scientific and technical knowledge challenges U.S. national security. It threatens to erode essential capabilities of the U.S. Intelligence Community (IC) and the strength of the U.S. R&D base.\n\nThe IC has played a vital role in maintaining the United States' global preeminence. Over the years, its successes have been underpinned by R&D achievements in the private and public sectors, some of which were directly supported by research programs sponsored by the federal government. From the first mass data storage and retrieval systems to satellites to the mathematics of modern cryptography, public- and private-sector R&D has been crucial to the ability of the IC to perform and succeed in its missions.\n\nBut today U.S. technological superiority is diminishing in important areas, and our adversaries' investments in S&Talong with their theft of our intellectual property, made possible in part by insufficient cyber protection and policiesare giving them new, asymmetric advantages. The United States faces increasing risk from threats against which the IC could have severely limited warning, deterrence, or agility to develop effective countermeasures.\n\n## The Threat From Global Scientific And Technical Knowledge\n\n Our adversaries' use of S&T increasingly challenges IC capabilities in critical areas, including:\n\n *Cryptography.* The availability and strength of high-grade encryption schemes continue\nto expand.\n *Assured Space Access.* Foreign countries continue to develop new technologies and\nmethods for disrupting our space assets, necessitating the development of resilient approaches.\n *Cyber Attack and Defense.* As cyber attacks grow in scale and scope, we struggle to\ndefend against this rising threat.\n *Nuclear Technology and Forensics*. The proliferation of nuclear materials and\ntechnology will remain a high-priority national security threat.\n *Global Supply Chains*. Production and distribution chains are increasingly vulnerable to\na variety of actions, including intentional disruptions.\n *All-Source Data Analytics*. The volume of data is challenging our ability to process and\nuse it.\nExacerbating these challenges are U.S. policies that weaken the U.S. R&D talent base. As scientific and technical knowledge and the resulting economic growth spread around the world, the competition for R&D talent is increasingly global. Other countries have committed significant resources to pursue R&D in areas such as quantum computing, physics, materials, energy, all-source data analytics, biomedical sciences, and pharmaceuticals. The United States is increasingly losing talent as foreign students and professors who have been educated and employed in the United States return to their home countries or move overseas to pursue their research in places where they find modern equipment and laboratories, less bureaucracy and administrative red tape, and more attractive compensation. These trends are further complicated by the diminished support for R&D by the U.S. government.\nGiven the scope and accelerating pace of global R&D activities, the IC must change and broaden its strategy for how it pursues innovative ideas. First, for areas in which it is essential that the United States maintain superiority (e.g., cryptography), the IC must maintain its R&D\nbase. Second, when needed innovations may be obtained from the broader U.S. R&D base, the IC must encourage more participantsparticularly small, innovative firms. Such firms currently are often discouraged or precluded from contributing by the time and cost imposed by the IC's security and procurement requirements, not to mention the onerous restrictions placed on them as subcontractors of some of the larger contracting organizations.1 A tiered approach that allows more direct contracting with small firms for important R&D areas should be examined, with the goal of applying it broadly across the IC R&D enterprise. Finally, for areas of basic research that is, research that is often unclassifiedthe IC must aggressively leverage the global talent pool.\n\n## Strategic Objectives And Challenges\n\nTo ensure that the United States prevails in a global environment in which our adversaries have access to advanced scientific and technical knowledge at a level approaching, and sometimes higher than, that possessed by the United States, the Commission finds that the IC must (1) uncover global threats more completely and at an early stage, and (2) be more agile, more aggressive, and faster in how it develops innovative, new capabilities.\n\nThe Commission underscores four challenges to achieving the principal objectives of uncovering global threats more completely and being more agile in developing new capabilities: the IC must broaden scientific and technical intelligence, *enhance integrated intelligence,* empower R&D leadership, and *leverage expertise and talent wherever it resides*.\n\n\n\n## Summary Of Findings And Recommendations Broaden Scientific And Technical Intelligence\n\nFinding 1: The Commission found a limited effort by the IC to discern and exploit the strategic R&Despecially non-military R&Dintentions and capabilities of our adversaries, and to counter our adversaries' theft or purchase of U.S. technology. Recommendation 1: Conduct comprehensive strategic scientific and technical intelligence (S&TI); use it for IC R&D planning and resource allocation.\n\n## Enhance Integrated Intelligence\n\nFinding 2: The Commission found that while the traditional ways and means of collecting and analyzing intelligence remain useful and necessary, emerging and future threats cannot be addressed without Enhanced Integrated Intelligence capabilities that enable shared, discoverable data for analysis and shared, discoverable information for decisionmakers. Recommendation 2: Focus advanced IC R&D on Enhanced Integrated Intelligence approaches methods that integrate diverse sources and expertise and that employ automated capabilities to tag, discover, access, and aggregate both data and analyzed information.\n\n## Empower R&D Leadership\n\nFinding 3: The Commission found that there is inadequate IC R&D strategic planning and inadequate awareness of IC R&D investment plans and programs. Recommendation 3: Empower IC R&D leadership to develop a comprehensive R&D strategy and oversee R&D resource allocation.\n\n## Leverage People/Talent\n\nFinding 4: The Commission found substantial interest within the IC to take advantage of talent and innovation in both the domestic and international private sectors, as well as within the IC itself, but the IC must evolve its business and personnel practices to leverage and exploit the STEM personnel marketplace. Recommendation 4: Assess longer-term workforce needs within the context of a more competitive private sector and global marketplace and develop procedures to recruit and keep needed talent. Increase and augment IC R&D talent by emphasizing approaches to innovation sharing within the public and private sectors, universities, and research and national labs, and by developing an IC strategy and approach for creating R&D opportunities for non-U.S. citizens.\n\n\n## Broaden Scientific And Technical Intelligence\n\n The increasing pace and adoption of global scientific and technological discovery heighten the risk of strategic or tactical surprise and, over time, reduce the advantages of our intelligence capabilities. To counter these effects, the strategy of the IC first must be to seek global knowledge ofas well as influence over and access toR&D developments. The Commission's first finding is that the IC is not adequately assessing the strategic R&D intentions and capabilities of our adversaries. The recommendation is therefore to expand the effort devoted to scientific and technical intelligence (S&TI), and to use the insights thereby gained to develop new capabilities and understand the strategic intent of these actors' S&T investments.\n\n## Finding 1: Limited Effort To Discern And Exploit Adversaries' Strategic R&D Intentions\n\nInvestment in, and development of, sophisticated technology by other nations and the private sector, as well as access to technology developed by others, is increasing. Scientific breakthroughs outside the United States, often accomplished with U.S. talent or technology, are enabling rapid innovation in a number of strategic sectors.2 Inadequate IC awareness of and access to global R&D likely will make the nation more vulnerable to the loss of vital and unique national security capabilities, as well as vulnerable to new adversary capabilities.\n\n Rapid growth of global R&D exceeds the IC's ability to understand, access, and develop countering technologies. The limited ability of the IC to know, understand, and evaluate global R&D and its effects on the national and economic security of the United States was a theme often discussed in Commission meetings with leaders, managers, and experts on the IC and R&D. Yet it is difficult to discern significant changes in plans or programs made in response to the globalization of R&D. Such urgency was seen in the aftermath of the 1948 Task Force Report on National Security Organization (the Eberstadt Report), which noted the critical importance of understanding scientific advancements outside the United States.3\n In the mid-20th century, the United States relied on groundbreaking R&D to confront a grave threat. The development and deployment of the strategic reconnaissance satellites of the CORONA program gave the United States the ability, for the first time, to regularly see into the Soviet Union on a grand scale. CORONA provided the foundation for nearly all space-based mapping technologies developed over the past 50 yearsfrom the street maps available on the personal devices we use in our daily lives to weather maps that enable us to compare changes in global climate.4 None of this would have been possible without a solid R&D base, strategic focus, and vision. Without continuing dedication to R&D, and to the men and women who work in R&D, the United States will not develop the CORONAs of the future.5\nCurrently, the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) organizes responsibilities for collection and analysis across 15 National Intelligence Managers, each of whom produces a Unifying Intelligence Strategy. The office of the National Intelligence Manager for S&T (NIM- S&T) has the mission of appraising the extent of scientific developments throughout the world\nbut does not focus sufficiently on global private industry, where many of the advances are being made. The limitations on assessing global S&T are largely due to the rapid increase in the globalization of R&D and to the NIM-S&T's not stressing these types of foreign activities.\n Foreign governments are developing policies to foster technological innovation as a key mechanism for stimulating sustainable economic growth and enhancing securitythe fruits of which will present both challenges to and opportunities for U.S. interests. The globalization of R&D capabilities is becoming an increasingly important component of the business strategies of multinational corporations, not only because they wish to boost competitiveness by enhancing local customization, gaining access to new markets, and placing technical staff close to manufacturing and design centers, but also because the accelerating pace of S&T-based innovation and its potential for high-margin products drive successful firms to seek out the best S&T talent, regardless of where it resides.\n\nForeign economic espionage is helping both adversaries and allies.6 The U.S. government must act to stem the economic and national security risks posed by large-scale espionage, which often is state-sponsored.\n Foreign countries' growing expertise and proficiency in a number of emerging or potentially disruptive technologies and industriesgained either by improving their own capabilities, by using surreptitious methods, or by taking advantage of an erosion of U.S. capabilities and U.S. control over critical supply chainshave the potential to cause great harm to the national security of the United States and its allies. Of equal concern, foreign nations can acquire early-stage U.S. technology and start-up companies, through venture capital investment or acquisitionin areas whose future national security and economic implications may not yet be appropriately and fully recognized. Current U.S. policies on, and mechanisms to review, foreign ownership and control of U.S. companies or U.S.-affiliated companies (most prominently, the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States, or CFIUS) have not kept pace with the evolution of business practices in the high-technology market.\n\n## Recommendation 1: Conduct Comprehensive Strategic Scientific And Technical Intelligence (S&Ti); Use It For Ic R&D Planning And Resource Allocation\n\nImprove the IC's comprehension of foreign strategies for science and technology developments through scientific and technical intelligence, and use this knowledge to help construct IC requirements, programs, and threat assessments. Ensure that S&TI requirements inform the development and integration of multidisciplinary tools and functions throughout the IC R&D enterprise, including allocations of IC R&D resources.\n\n## Actions For Recommendation 1\n\n1.1 IC R&D budget requests to Congress must include annual S&TI assessments for major areas of investment.\n\n1.2 The Office of the Director of National Intelligence must identify IC S&TI priorities.\n\nODNI will incorporate this input when creating applicable Unifying Intelligence Strategy (UIS) documents.\n\n1.3 When relevant, IC assessments provided to Congress should include S&TI\nassessmentsincluding assessments of counterintelligence (CI) against IC R&Dalong with comparisons to IC R&D priorities. These serve as justification for future IC R&D requirements and activities, and help inform IC engagement with the industrial base.\n\n After one year the Commission expects the IC to have at least:\n\n Created an appropriately sized S&TI cellincreasing the emphasis on open-source\ninformation in the assessment of foreign S&T, and augmenting, training, and recruiting expertise in science, engineering, and business\n Established S&TI requirements based on intelligence gaps and incorporated these\nrequirements into the applicable Unifying Intelligence Strategies\n Developed and implemented the process for ensuring that S&TI is utilized by the IC\nR&D enterprise\n\n## Enhance Integrated Intelligence\n\n The speed with which an adversary can acquire and exploit scientific and technical knowledge continues to increase. In addition to posing new threats that are fast-forming or that have low signatures, adversaries have learned to conceal their operations from the IC and have developed an awareness of U.S. capabilities. It is imperative that the Intelligence Community develop ways to gain and exploit insights earlier and faster.\n\n The key finding is that the current method of producing IC intelligencecollecting information and integrating it afterwardloses valuable time and information. The collection and analysis process is becoming at once more difficult, given the increase in the scale and diversity of information sources, and more essential, given the intelligence significance of the explosive growth in access to and operations in cyberspace. The recommendation focuses on how to realize Enhanced Integrated Intelligencecomprising the automated collection, analysis, integration, and discovery of relevant data and informationin which decision cycles can occur in near real time.\n\n## Finding 2: Enhanced Integrated Intelligence Needed For Emerging And Future Threats\n\nThe global environment in which the IC must operate and dominate is changing. Fast-forming and low-signal threats, including \"do-it-yourself\" capabilities and economic espionage, are becoming the norm along with rising state challengers and super-empowered non-state actors. The IC must make the coordinated tasking, aggregation, and integrated processing and sharing of data from multiple sources a priority to provide collated signals of adversary actions and intentions that would be missed if the single-source threads of intelligence were reviewed individually.\n\n To meet the challenge of scalable Enhanced Integrated Intelligence, the IC must, for example, develop or expand capabilities for agile, synchronized tasking, collection, and analysis across intelligence disciplines (signals intelligence [SIGINT], human intelligence [HUMINT], etc.) and across collection domains (space, air, ground, subsurface). Approaches to analysis must be developed that use all available information, thereby enabling the IC to better anticipate developments or detect troubling trends at the earliest feasible time. Doing more integrated analysis will require new techniques for data aggregation, tagging, discovery, access, and organization; greater use of cognitive computing; high-performance computation; and the leveraging of open-source analysis and multidisciplinary approaches.\n There are several barriers to achieving Enhanced Integrated Intelligence. New sources of intelligence-rich data are proliferating worldwide, often driven by commercial and consumer trends. IC practices traditionally have kept the various INTs separatethereby allowing various IC agencies to develop expertise in specific INTs at the expense of developing strong cross-INT integration. The lack of a strategic R&D approach within the IC limits the investment in longterm research that produces such innovations in intelligence processes.\n\n## Recommendation 2: Enhance Integrated Intelligence\n\nFocus advanced IC R&D on Enhanced Integrated Intelligence approaches methods that integrate diverse sources and expertise and that employ automated\n\n## Capabilities To Tag, Discover, Access, And Aggregate Both Data And Analyzed Information. Actions For Recommendation 2\n\n2.1 The Office of the Director of National Intelligence must create a new joint program plan between the Director of Science and Technology (DS&T) and the Deputy Director of National Intelligence for Intelligence Integration (DDII) for Enhanced Integrated Intelligence, which it will use to track, prioritize, and coordinate Enhanced Integrated Intelligence R&D across the IC. These priorities will guide multidisciplinary and multi-intelligence R&D efforts.\n\n2.2 ODNI must emphasize R&D for analytical methods to produce warnings that follow from advances in data aggregation, data analytics, the processing of large volumes of data, and predictive analytics.\n2.3 ODNI must broaden IC R&D's existing focus so that it also pursues R&D for Enhanced Integrated Intelligence. The Commission recommends an initial pilot program to experiment with emerging capabilities.\n\nAfter one year the Commission expects the IC to have at least:\n\n Generated a comprehensive list of intelligence problems and key investment areas for\nEnhanced Integrated Intelligence R&D initiatives of the IC; initial priority projects are to define data tagging standards, and to create and implement rules for multilevel data discovery and access\n Established a plan for devoting a baseline percentage of agencies' R&D budgets to\npursue Enhanced Integrated Intelligence programs (after a one-year pilot period, ODNI and the heads of the respective agencies should revisit this number on an agency-byagency basis)\n Created the framework for a dynamic directory of R&D activities and subject matter\nexperts within the IC to better achieve Enhanced Integrated Intelligence objectives\n\n## Empower R&D Leadership\n\nThe Intelligence Community needs to become more agile, more aggressive, and faster in collecting, analyzing, and developing new offensive and defensive capabilities. Strong R&D leadership is needed to help create new R&D business practices, coordination, planning, and oversight.\n\nThe findings detail several factors that hinder the efforts of the R&D enterprise to create a unified plan, among them a set of disparate budgeting schemes and priorities across those IC agencies performing R&D. The ODNI DS&T needs to serve as the lead executive of IC R&D\nand provide strategic guidance and coordination to the IC R&D enterprise while valuing the individual agencies' abilities to develop and pursue their own innovative solutions.\n\n## Finding 3: Lack Of Unified R&D Emphasis\n\nThe IC has spent a decade supporting immediate military necessities that demand near-term R&D and incremental improvements for specific ends, rather than undertaking strategic endeavors. Strategic R&D goals for the IC\nenterprise are not jointly established or adopted.7 With few exceptions, the IC\nR&D does not adapt rapidly to a changing technology environment.\n\nIC agencies had difficulty providing the Commission with a financial accounting of their existing and planned R&D projects and budgets. This is a problem rooted in how the IC tracks expenditures (e.g., the practice of incorporating some R&D funding into mission-related efforts).\n\nThe Commission recognizes that IC research activities should be classified in a way that appropriately limits the disclosure of sensitive information while ensuring the sharing of innovations. However, the DS&T must have a comprehensive view of the IC R&D enterprise in its entirety.\n\nThe Commission identified several challenges that should be addressed. The roles and authorities of the Director of National Intelligence Science and Technology Committee (NISTC)\nand the ODNI DS&T are not clearly defined in the legislation that created them.8 The process of coordinating and setting priorities for IC R&D activities has developed slowly. Several IC agencies have their respective areas of expertise and authorities for different types of intelligence, though the coordination of R&D between these agencies can be improved.\n\n## Recommendation 3: Empower R&D Leadership\n\nEmpower IC R&D leadership to develop a comprehensive R&D strategy and oversee R&D resource allocation.\n\n## Actions For Recommendation 3\n\n3.1 Consolidate the positions of Assistant Deputy Director of National Intelligence for S&T\n(ADDNI/S&T) and DS&T into the DS&T only. Annually, the DS&T will brief the members of the relevant congressional oversight committees on all relevant issues of R&D, S&T, and R&D acquisition programs. The DNI should establish a budget at a level set by Congress under the control of the DS&T to facilitate investment in emerging, disruptive, and joint technology projects and in Enhanced Integrated Intelligence.\n\n3.2 Empower the DNI with the authority to annually reprogram R&D project funds, up to a level agreed to by Congress, into existing or new R&D projects without prior notification to Congress for approval.\n3.3 Establish a science and technology advisory group for the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (HPSCI)and reaffirm the value of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI) Technical Advisory Groupto provide independent advice on strategic R&D initiatives, including those that require multiyear funding.\n\nAfter one year the Commission expects the IC to have at least:\n\n Developed an improved IC-wide method of tracking research and development efforts\nand implemented it in time for the FY16 budget build\n Created a unified plan for the IC R&D program that incorporates relevant S&TI and\nincludes a demonstrated means of better aligning IC R&D investments, industry's independent R&D (IRAD), corporate R&D (CRAD), and R&D in academic institutions with U.S. national security objectives\n Established performance metrics for evaluating R&D investments  Obtained congressional approval for below-threshold reprogramming authority to\nenable agile R&D investment by the IC\n\n## Leverage People/Talent\n\nThe continued success of the Intelligence Community depends on a strong, talented scientific and technical workforce. The IC needs innovative approaches to ensure its access to their expertise in the categories and quantities required.\n\nThe IC needs to improve how it manages talent so that it keeps workforce skills current, brings in new thinking, and gains the perspectives of experts outside the IC. The IC's R&D workforce historically has concentrated its specialized talent within tightly closed circles. It must change its approach, taking advantage of the opportunities afforded by the expanding global environment to become more adaptable and flexible. The United States must not risk losing our technological lead in a growing number of R&D domains that are critical to our national security.\n\n## Finding 4: Limited Leveraging Of The Stem Personnel Marketplace\n\nFacing increasing competition, the IC can do more to access a larger pool of talent and to leverage the best expertise available in our industries, start-ups,\n\nuniversities, national labs, and federally funded research and development centers (FFRDCs) as well as the S&T/R&D workforce of our allies.\n\nThe IC must better compete for scientific talent in an environment increasingly dominated by globalization. It is expected that this trend in competition will continue, although on a national level the U.S. workforce remains the world's R&D powerhouse. It accounted for about\n31 percent of the estimated $1.4 trillion expended on R&D globally in 2012.9\nThe United States' growing reliance on foreign R&D talent must be balanced by increasing the domestic R&D talent base, strengthening STEM education at all levels, and attracting more American STEM undergraduates and graduate students.10\nDespite its need to draw on outside researchers and research, the IC's ability to leverage, attract, and retain the world's brightest R&D talent continues to be limited by a number of challengesespecially contracting requirements, the need to possess U.S. citizenship to obtain security clearances, the difficulties in obtaining appropriate U.S. visas, and opportunities abroad for U.S. talent.\n\n## Recommendation 4: Increase And Augment Ic R&D Talent\n\nAssess longer-term workforce needs within the context of a more competitive private sector and global marketplace and develop procedures to recruit and keep needed talent. Increase and augment IC R&D talent by emphasizing approaches to innovation sharing within the public and private sectors, universities, and research and national labs, and by developing an IC strategy and approach for creating R&D opportunities for non-U.S. citizens.\n\n## Actions For Recommendation 4\n\n4.1 Increase the number of industry rotations for talented IC R&D government personnel, covering a broad range of types and sizes of businesses and a range of capabilities of particular interest to the IC. These partnerships should focus on broadening the experiences and deepening the knowledge and insights of both mid- and senior-level government personnel. Improve interaction with small firms by lowering the barriers to entry and by expanding competitions and opportunities for nontraditional providers and innovators to participate in programs.\n\nMathematics (Washington, DC: Georgetown University, Center on Education and the Workforce, 2012), pp. 6\n\n\n4.2 Establish an IC R&D Corps composed primarily of part-time researchers, technologists, scientists, engineers, and entrepreneursfrom the private sector and academiaas well as IC retirees.\n\n4.3 The DNI must identify categories of interest to the IC to aid scientists, researchers, engineers, technologists, S&T analysts, and entrepreneurs seeking fast-track U.S. visas. For select individuals, if clearance procedures allow, such visas should be granted immediately. Create such a fast-track system for both private and government workers. The U.S. government must then determine a process for issuing fast-track visas for S&T and R&D personnel of interest, as is currently done to satisfy business and other needs.\n\nAfter one year the Commission expects the IC to have at least:\n\n Created a Strategic Workforce Net Assessment to document the critical scientific and\ntechnical skill sets for the IC, and created within the IC human capital system a method of tracking these skill sets\n Increase the flexibility of term-limited appointments to bring in talented outside experts\nwho will transfer skills and know-how to the IC R&D workforce\n Established connections with the Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP), the\nDepartment of Homeland Security, the Department of State, and the Department of Energy, which will work together in identifying special visa needs of critical importance to the IC while ensuring that counterintelligence and security considerations and investigative procedures remain central to the review process\n\n## Importance Of R&DBuilding The Future\n\nIn the past, the United States has thrived when both our nation and our national security policy have adapted to shape change instead of being shaped by it.\n\n2010 National Security Strategy In the face of the challenges and opportunities presented by globalization, Congress and IC\nleadership must ensure that R&D is recognized as a critical and strategic component of the IC's missionsand must empower the IC R&D enterprise to act accordingly.\nIn its review of IC R&D activities, the Commission found that the IC should engage with numerous problems and areas to ensure superiority in the future. The following list illustrates the breadth of R&D that must be undertaken to ensure that the IC's capabilities remain preeminent:\n\n Quantum information processing  Advances in high-performance computing  Real-time sensor data fusion  Anticipatory analytics from Big Data  Assured continued nuclear design analysis competency  Advanced manufacturing  Creation, maintenance, and detection of cover  Persistent, agile, and resilient overhead capability  Artificial intelligence for autonomous system and robotics  Assured trusted communications  Detecting and countering foreign media influence  Understanding human dynamics and complex adaptive systems\nThis Commission report makes four broad recommendations that must be implemented immediately to protect our future national security by transforming how the IC creates strategic advantage and mitigates the impact of unforeseeable global events.\n\nJust as the 80th U.S. Congress and the Truman administration showed great foresight in passing the National Security Act of 1947, so too the 113th U.S. Congress should promptly make needed reforms to the IC's R&D enterprise and its broader S&TI efforts. It is therefore advised that Congress hold hearings no later than one year after the conclusion of the Commission to ensure that these recommendations are being aggressively pursued and implemented.\n\nThis page intentionally left blank.\n\n\n## Appendices\n\n\nThis page intentionally left blank.\n\n\n## Abbreviations\n\n| DNI     | Director of National Intelligence                        |\n|---------|----------------------------------------------------------|\n| DOD     | Department of Defense                                    |\n| DS&T    | Director of Science and Technology                       |\n| EII     | Enhanced Integrated Intelligence                         |\n| HUMINT  | human intelligence                                       |\n| IC      | Intelligence Community                                   |\n| INT     | intelligence                                             |\n| JIEDDO  | Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization    |\n| NIM-S&T | National Intelligence Manager for Science and Technology |\n| ODNI    | Office of the Director of National Intelligence          |\n| R&D     | research and development                                 |\n| R&T     | research and technology                                  |\n| RDT&E   | research, development, test, and evaluation              |\n| S&E     | science and engineering                                  |\n| S&T     | science and technology                                   |\n| S&TI    | scientific and technical intelligence                    |\n| STEM    | science, technology, engineering, and mathematics        |\n|         |                                                          |\n\n## Legislation Pertinent To The Commission 1. Legislation Establishing The Commission From Title 50 Of The United States Code\n\nNATIONAL COMMISSION FOR REVIEW OF RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMS OF THE UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY\nPub. L. 111-259, title VII,  701(a)(3), Oct. 7, 2010, 124 Stat. 2745, provided that: The membership of the National Commission for the Review of the Research and Development Programs of the United States Intelligence Community established under subsection (a) of section 1002 of such Act (Public Law 107-306; 50 U.S.C. 401 note) [set out below] (referred to in this section [enacting and amending provisions set out below] as the  Commission') shall be considered vacant and new members shall be appointed in accordance with such section 1002, as amended by this section. Pub. L. 107-306, title X, Nov. 27, 2002, 116 Stat. 2437, as amended by Pub. L. 108-177, title III,  315(a), Dec. 13, 2003, 117 Stat. 2610; Pub. L. 111-259, title VII,  701(a)(1), (4), (b)(3), (c), Oct. 7, 2010, 124 Stat. 2744, 2745, provided that:\nSEC. 1001. FINDINGS.\n\nCongress makes the following findings: (1) Research and development efforts under the purview of the intelligence community are vitally important to the national security of the United States. (2) The intelligence community must operate in a dynamic, highly-challenging environment, characterized by rapid technological growth, against a growing number of hostile, technicallysophisticated threats. Research and development programs under the purview of the intelligence community are critical to ensuring that intelligence agencies, and their personnel, are provided with important technological capabilities to detect, characterize, assess, and ultimately counter the full range of threats to the national security of the United States. (3) There is a need to review the full range of current research and development programs under the purview of the intelligence community, evaluate such programs against the scientific and technological fields judged to be of most importance, and articulate program and resource priorities for future research and development activities to ensure a unified and coherent research and development program across the entire intelligence community.\n\nSEC. 1002. NATIONAL COMMISSION FOR THE REVIEW OF THE RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMS OF THE UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY.\n\n(a) ESTABLISHMENT.There is established a commission to be known as the National Commission for the Review of the Research and Development Programs of the United States Intelligence Community (in this title referred to as the Commission).\n\n(b) COMPOSITION.\nThe Commission shall be composed of 12 members, as follows: (1) The Principal Deputy Director of National Intelligence. (2) A senior intelligence official of the Office of the Secretary of Defense, as designated by the Secretary of Defense.\n\n(3) Three members appointed by the majority leader of the Senate, in consultation with the Chairman of the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate, one from Members of the Senate and two from private life. (4) Two members appointed by the minority leader of the Senate, in consultation with the Vice Chairman of the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate, one from Members of the Senate and one from private life. (5) Three members appointed by the Speaker of the House of Representatives, in consultation with the Chairman of the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives, one from Members of the House of Representatives and two from private life. (6) Two members appointed by the minority leader of the House of Representatives, in consultation with the ranking member of the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives, one from Members of the House of Representatives and one from private life.\n\n(c) MEMBERSHIP.\n(1) The individuals appointed from private life as members of the Commission shall be individuals who are nationally recognized for expertise, knowledge, or experience in (A) research and development programs; (B) technology discovery and insertion; (C) use of intelligence information by national policymakers and military leaders; or (D) the implementation, funding, or oversight of the national security policies of the United States. (2) An official who appoints members of the Commission may not appoint an individual as a member of the Commission if, in the judgment of the official, such individual possesses any personal or financial interest in the discharge of any of the duties of the Commission. (3) All members of the Commission appointed from private life shall possess an appropriate security clearance in accordance with applicable laws and regulations concerning the handling of classified information.\n\n(d) CO-CHAIRS.\n(1) The Commission shall have two co-chairs, selected from among the members of the Commission. (2) One co-chair of the Commission shall be a member of the Democratic Party, and one cochair shall be a member of the Republican Party.\n\n(3) The individuals who serve as the co-chairs of the Commission shall be jointly agreed upon by the President, the majority leader of the Senate, the minority leader of the Senate, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, and the minority leader of the House of Representatives.\n\n(e) APPOINTMENT; INITIAL MEETING.\n(1) Members of the Commission shall be appointed not later than 45 days after the date of the enactment of this Act [Nov. 27, 2002]. (2) The Commission shall hold its initial meeting on the date that is 60 days after the date of the enactment of this Act.\n\n(f) MEETINGS; QUORUM; VACANCIES.\n(1) After its initial meeting, the Commission shall meet upon the call of the co-chairs of the Commission. (2) Six members of the Commission shall constitute a quorum for purposes of conducting business, except that two members of the Commission shall constitute a quorum for purposes of receiving testimony.\n\n(3) Any vacancy in the Commission shall not affect its powers, but shall be filled in the same manner in which the original appointment was made. (4) If vacancies in the Commission occur on any day after 45 days after the date of the enactment of this Act [Nov. 27, 2002], a quorum shall consist of a majority of the members of the Commission as of such day.\n\n(g) ACTIONS OF COMMISSION.\n(1) The Commission shall act by resolution agreed to by a majority of the members of the Commission voting and present. (2) The Commission may establish panels composed of less than the full membership of the Commission for purposes of carrying out the duties of the Commission under this title. The actions of any such panel shall be subject to the review and control of the Commission. Any findings and determinations made by such a panel shall not be considered the findings and determinations of the Commission unless approved by the Commission.\n\n(3) Any member, agent, or staff of the Commission may, if authorized by the co-chairs of the Commission, take any action which the Commission is authorized to take pursuant to this title.\n\n(h) DUTIES.\nThe duties of the Commission shall be (1) to conduct, until not later than the date on which the Commission submits the report under section 1007(a), the review described in subsection (i); and (2) to submit to the congressional intelligence committees, the Director of National Intelligence, and the Secretary of Defense a final report on the results of the review.\n\n(i) REVIEW.\nThe Commission shall review the status of research and development programs and activities within the intelligence community, including advanced research and development programs and activities. Such review shall include (1) an assessment of the advisability of modifying the scope of research and development for purposes of such programs and activities; (2) a review of the particular individual research and development activities under such programs; (3) an evaluation of the current allocation of resources for research and development, including whether the allocation of such resources for that purpose should be modified;\n(4) an identification of the scientific and technological fields judged to be of most importance to the intelligence community; (5) an evaluation of the relationship between the research and development programs and activities of the intelligence community and the research and development programs and activities of other departments and agencies of the Federal Government; and (6) an evaluation of the relationship between the research and development programs and activities of the intelligence community and the research and development programs and activities of the private sector.\n\nSEC. 1003. POWERS OF COMMISSION. (a) IN GENERAL.\n(1) The Commission or, on the authorization of the Commission, any subcommittee or member thereof, may, for the purpose of carrying out the provisions of this title\n\n (A) hold such hearings and sit and act at such times and places, take such testimony, receive such evidence, and administer such oaths; and (B) require, by subpoena or otherwise, the attendance and testimony of such witnesses and the production of such books, records, correspondence, memoranda, papers, and documents, as the Commission or such designated subcommittee or designated member considers necessary. (2) Subpoenas may be issued under subparagraph (1)(B) under the signature of the co-chairs of the Commission, and may be served by any person designated by such co-chairs. (3) The provisions of sections 102 through 104 of the Revised Statutes of the United States (2 U.S.C. 192194) shall apply in the case of any failure of a witness to comply with any subpoena or to testify when summoned under authority of this section.\n\n(b) CONTRACTING.\nThe Commission may, to such extent and in such amounts as are provided in advance in appropriation Acts, enter into contracts to enable the Commission to discharge its duties under this title.\n\n(c) INFORMATION FROM FEDERAL AGENCIES.\nThe Commission may secure directly from any executive department, agency, bureau, board, commission, office, independent establishment, or instrumentality of the Government information, suggestions, estimates, and statistics for the purposes of this title. Each such department, agency, bureau, board, commission, office, establishment, or instrumentality shall, to the extent authorized by law, furnish such information, suggestions, estimates, and statistics directly to the Commission, upon request of the co-chairs of the Commission. The Commission shall handle and protect all classified information provided to it under this section in accordance with applicable statutes and regulations.\n\n(d) ASSISTANCE FROM FEDERAL AGENCIES.\n(1) The Director of National Intelligence shall provide to the Commission, on a nonreimbursable basis, such administrative services, funds, staff, facilities, and other support services as are necessary for the performance of the Commission's duties under this title. (2) The Secretary of Defense may provide the Commission, on a nonreimbursable basis, with such administrative services, staff, and other support services as the Commission may request. (3) In addition to the assistance set forth in paragraphs (1) and (2), other departments and agencies of the United States may provide the Commission such services, funds, facilities, staff, and other support as such departments and agencies consider advisable and as may be authorized by law. (4) The Commission shall receive the full and timely cooperation of any official, department, or agency of the United States Government whose assistance is necessary for the fulfillment of the duties of the Commission under this title, including the provision of full and current briefings and analyses.\n\n(e) PROHIBITION ON WITHHOLDING INFORMATION.\nNo department or agency of the Government may withhold information from the Commission on the grounds that providing the information to the Commission would constitute the unauthorized disclosure of classified information or information relating to intelligence sources or methods.\n\n(f) POSTAL SERVICES.\nThe Commission may use the United States mails in the same manner and under the same conditions as the departments and agencies of the United States.\n\n(g) GIFTS.\nThe Commission may accept, use, and dispose of gifts or donations of services or property in carrying out its duties under this title.\n\n\nSEC. 1004. STAFF OF COMMISSION. (a) IN GENERAL.\n(1) The co-chairs of the Commission, in accordance with rules agreed upon by the Commission, shall appoint and fix the compensation of a staff director and such other personnel as may be necessary to enable the Commission to carry out its duties, without regard to the provisions of title 5, United States Code, governing appointments in the competitive service, and without regard to the provisions of chapter 51 and subchapter III of chapter 53 of such title relating to classification and General Schedule pay rates, except that no rate of pay fixed under this subsection may exceed the equivalent of that payable to a person occupying a position at level V of the Executive Schedule under section 5316 of such title.\n\n(2) Any Federal Government employee may be detailed to the Commission without reimbursement from the Commission, and such detailee shall retain the rights, status, and privileges of his or her regular employment without interruption. (3) All staff of the Commission shall possess a security clearance in accordance with applicable laws and regulations concerning the handling of classified information.\n\n(b) CONSULTANT SERVICES.\n(1) The Commission may procure the services of experts and consultants in accordance with section 3109 of title 5, United States Code, but at rates not to exceed the daily rate paid a person occupying a position at level IV of the Executive Schedule under section 5315 of such title. (2) All experts and consultants employed by the Commission shall possess a security clearance in accordance with applicable laws and regulations concerning the handling of classified information.\n\nSEC. 1005. COMPENSATION AND TRAVEL EXPENSES. (a) COMPENSATION.\n(1) Except as provided in paragraph (2), each member of the Commission may be compensated at not to exceed the daily equivalent of the annual rate of basic pay in effect for a position at level IV of the Executive Schedule under section 5315 of title 5, United States Code, for each day during which that member is engaged in the actual performance of the duties of the Commission under this title. (2) Members of the Commission who are officers or employees of the United States or Members of Congress shall receive no additional pay by reason of their service on the Commission.\n\n(b) TRAVEL EXPENSES.\nWhile away from their homes or regular places of business in the performance of services for the Commission, members of the Commission may be allowed travel expenses, including per diem in lieu of subsistence, in the same manner as persons employed intermittently in the Government service are allowed expenses under section 5703 of title 5, United States Code.\n\nSEC. 1006. TREATMENT OF INFORMATION RELATING TO NATIONAL SECURITY. (a) IN GENERAL.\n(1) The Director of National Intelligence shall assume responsibility for the handling and disposition of any information related to the national security of the United States that is received, considered, or used by the Commission under this title. (2) Any information related to the national security of the United States that is provided to the Commission by a congressional intelligence committee may not be further provided or released without the approval of the chairman of such committee.\n\n(b) ACCESS AFTER TERMINATION OF COMMISSION.\nNotwithstanding any other provision of law, after the termination of the Commission under section 1007, only the Members and designated staff of the congressional intelligence committees, the Director of National Intelligence (and the designees of the Director), and such other officials of the executive branch as the President may designate shall have access to information related to the national security of the United States that is received, considered, or used by the Commission.\n\n\nSEC. 1007. FINAL REPORT; TERMINATION.\n\n(a) FINAL REPORT.\nNot later than one year after the date on which all members of the Commission are appointed pursuant to section 701(a)(3) of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010 [Pub. L. 111-259, set out above], the Commission shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees, the Director of National Intelligence, and the Secretary of Defense a final report as required by section 1002(h)(2).\n\n(b) TERMINATION.\n(1) The Commission, and all the authorities of this title, shall terminate at the end of the 120-day period beginning on the date on which the final report under subsection (a) is transmitted to the congressional intelligence committees. (2) The Commission may use the 120-day period referred to in paragraph (1) for the purposes of concluding its activities, including providing testimony to Congress concerning the final report referred to in that paragraph and disseminating the report.\n\nSEC. 1008. ASSESSMENTS OF FINAL REPORT.\n\nNot later than 60 days after receipt of the final report under section 1007(a), the Director of National Intelligence and the Secretary of Defense shall each submit to the congressional intelligence committees an assessment by the Director or the Secretary, as the case may be, of the final report. Each assessment shall include such comments on the findings and recommendations contained in the final report as the Director or Secretary, as the case may be, considers appropriate.\n\nSEC. 1009. INAPPLICABILITY OF CERTAIN ADMINISTRATIVE PROVISIONS. (a) FEDERAL ADVISORY COMMITTEE ACT.\nThe provisions of the Federal Advisory Committee Act (5 U.S.C. App.) shall not apply to the activities of the Commission under this title.\n\n(b) FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT.\nThe provisions of section 552 of title 5, United States Code (commonly referred to as the Freedom of Information Act), shall not apply to the activities, records, and proceedings of the Commission under this title.\n\n[**SEC. 1010. Repealed**. Pub. L. 111-259, title VII,  701(b)(3), Oct. 7, 2010, 124 Stat. 2745.]\n\nSEC. 1011. DEFINITIONS.\n\nIn this title:\n(1) CONGRESSIONAL INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEES. The term congressional intelligence committees means (A) the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate; and (B) the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives. (2) INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY. The term intelligence community has the meaning given that term in section 3(4) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401a(4)).\n\n2. Legislation establishing the Director of Science and Technology within the Office of the\n\n## Director Of National Intelligence (50 *U.S.C.*  403-3E)\n\n\n 403-3e. Director of Science and Technology\n(a) Director of Science and Technology There is a Director of Science and Technology within the Office of the Director of National Intelligence who shall be appointed by the Director of National Intelligence. Page 107 TITLE 50WAR AND NATIONAL DEFENSE  403-3g\n(b) Requirement relating to appointment An individual appointed as Director of Science and Technology shall have a professional background and experience appropriate for the duties of the Director of Science and Technology.\n\n(c) Duties The Director of Science and Technology shall (1) act as the chief representative of the Director of National Intelligence for science and technology; (2) chair the Director of National Intelligence Science and Technology Committee under subsection (d) of this section; (3) assist the Director in formulating a long-term strategy for scientific advances in the field of intelligence; (4) assist the Director on the science and technology elements of the budget of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence; and\n(5) perform other such duties as may be prescribed by the Director of National Intelligence or specified by law.\n\n(d) Director of National Intelligence Science and Technology Committee\n(1) There is within the Office of the Director of Science and Technology a Director of National Intelligence Science and Technology Committee. (2) The Committee shall be composed of the principal science officers of the National Intelligence Program. (3) The Committee shall (A) coordinate advances in research and development related to intelligence; and (B) perform such other functions as the Director of Science and Technology shall prescribe.\n\n3. Legislation extending the Commission Pub. L. 112-277 (Jan. 24, 2013; 126 Stat. 2466)\n\n\n 502. EXTENSION OF NATIONAL COMMISSION FOR THE REVIEW OF THE RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMS OF THE UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY.\n\n   Section 1007(a) of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003 (Public Law 107\n306; 50 U.S.C. 401 note) is amended by striking Not later than one year after the date on which all members of the Commission are appointed pursuant to section 701(a)(3) of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010, and inserting Not later than March 31, 2013,.\n\n\n\n## List Of Briefings\n\n The Commissioners and staff of the National Commission for the Review of Research and Development Programs of the United States Intelligence Community would like to express our sincere gratitude to the individuals that met with us, and the individuals that participated in the numerous groups/panels listed below. Their flexibility, willingness to share important insights, and candid responses were of utmost importance to the creation of this report. This report would not be possible without their support, insightful analysis, and willingness to provide information.\n\n\n\n29 February 2012\n\n-\nOffice of the Director of National Intelligence\n\n\n5 March 2012\n\n-\nDefense Intelligence Agency\n\n\n6 March 2012\n\n-\nIntelligence Advanced Research Projects Activity\n\n\n7 March 2012\n\n-\nNational Geospatial-Intelligence Agency\n\n\n10 April 2012\n\n-\nIn-Q-Tel\n\n\n11 April 2012\n\n-\nCentral Intelligence Agency\n\n\n3 May 2012\n\n-\nCollaboration Panel\n\n\n4 May 2012\n\n-\nCentral Intelligence Agency\n\n\n11 May 2012\n\n-\nFirst Cyber Panel\n\n\n14 May 2012\n\n-\nNational Security Agency\n\n\n16 May 2012\n\n-\nDefense Advanced Research Projects Agency\n\n29 May 2012\n\n-\nNational Reconnaissance Office\n\n\n30 May 2012\n\n-\n *Department of Defense Research and Engineering Enterprise*\n\n\n31 May 2012\n\n-\nNational Nuclear Security Administration\n\n\n6 June 2012\n\n-\nDefense Intelligence Agency\n\n\n12 June 2012\n\n-\nFederal Bureau of Investigation\n\n13 June 2012\n\n-\nOffice of Director of National Intelligence/Systems & Resources Analysis, Intelligence,\nPlanning, Programming, Budgeting & Evaluation\n\n\n14 June 2012\n\n-\nDepartment of Homeland Security\n\n\n26 June 2012\n\n-\nOffice of the Director of National Intelligence/Acquisition, Technology & Facilities\n\n\n27 June 2012\n\n-\nPacific Northwest National Laboratory\n-\nLawrence Livermore National Laboratory\n\n\n12 July 2012\n\n-\nSandia National Laboratory\n-\nLos Alamos National Laboratory\n\n\n17 July 2012\n\n-\nExecutive Office of the President, Office of Science & Technology Policy\n-\nGovernment Accountability Office\n-\nNational Academies of Science\n-\nMITRE\n\n\n19 July 2012\n\n-\nMerck, Inc.\n\n\n26 July 2012\n\n-\nAT&T\n\n\n30 July 2012\n\n-\nIBM\n\n\n7 August 2012\n\n-\nS&TI Panel\n\n\n8 August 2012\n\n-\nWireless Panel\n-\nFormer S&T Experts Panel\n-\nHouse Armed Services Committee\n-\nDepartment of Energy\n\n16 August 2012\n\n-\nAcademic Panel\n\n22 August 2012\n\n-\nNew York City Police Commissioner's Office\n-\nNew York City District Attorney's Office\n\n\n27 August 2012\n\n-\nI2WD & JIEDDO Panel\n-\nExecutive Office of the President, Homeland Security Advisor\n-\nHouse Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence\n-\nSenate Select Committee on Intelligence\n\n29 August 2012\n\n-\nIndependent Research and Development (IRAD) Panel\n\n\n10 September 2012\n\n-\nO'Reilly Publishing\n-\nFormer S&T Experts Panel\n\n\n11 September 2012\n\n-\nCloud Computing Panel\n\n\n12 September 2012\n\n-\nIC Science Advisory Body Experts Panel\n\n1415 September 2012\n\n-\nOak Ridge National Laboratory\n\n\n19 September 2012\n\n-\nUniversity of Maryland (former NSF representative)\n\n\n2 October 2012\n\n-\nCentral Intelligence Agency\n\n\n3 October 2012\n\n-\nNational Academies of Science\n\n\n11 October 2012\n\n-\nCentral Intelligence Agency, Lessons Learned Office\n\n\n25 October 2012\n\n-\nJASON scientists\n\n\n26 October 2012\n\n-\nIntelligence Science Board Task Force Study\n\n\n7 November 2012\n\n-\nMITRE\n\n1314 November 2012\n\n-\nSandia National Laboratory\n\n15 November 2012\n\n-\nSRI International\n-\nKleiner Perkins Kaufman Byers\n-\nLockheed Martin Applied Technology Center\n\n\n16 November 2012\n\n-\nGoogle\n\n\n28 November 2012\n\n-\nIntelligence Advanced Research Projects Activity\n-\nInnovative Solutions Consortium\n\n\n4 December 2012\n\n-\nExecutive Office of the President, Office of Management & Budget\n\n13 December 2012\n\n-\nNational Security Agency\n-\nOffice of the Director of National Intelligence\n\n\n19 December 2012\n\n-\nB612 Foundation\n-\nNational Critical Systems and Technology Joint Task Force\n\n\n9 January 2013\n\n-\nDefense Intelligence Agency\n\n\n15 January 2013\n\n-\nSecond Cyber Panel\n\n\n28 January 2013\n\n-\nIC S&T Professionals\n\n\n31 January 2013\n\n-\nExecutive Office of the President, National Security Staff\n\n\n5 February 2013\n\n-\nIdentity Intelligence Panel\n\n\n12 February 2013\n\n-\nDisruptive Technologies Panel\n\n25 February 2013\n\n-\nNational Geospatial-Intelligence Agency\n\n\n26 February 2013\n\n-\nDirector of DARPA\n\n\n8 March 2013\n\n-\nDeputy Secretary of Defense\n\n\n18 March 2013\n\n-\nNational Security Agency\n\n19 March 2013\n\n-\nGeorgia Tech Research Institute\n-\nNational Security Agency, Cyberlaw Brief\n\n\n## 11 April 2013\n\n-\nDirector of the Center for Intelligence Research and Analysis\n\n\n## 16 April 2013\n\n-\nManaging Director of Cybersecurity for JP Morgan Chase\n-\nIndependent Consultant for Cyber Security\n\n## Commissioner Biographies\n\nMaurice Sonnenberg, Commission Co-Chair, is the Senior International Advisor at J. P.\n\nMorgan. He has advised five presidential administrations in the fields of foreign policy, international trade, finance, and intelligence. He is currently a member of the Special Navy Advisory Panel to the Secretary of the Navy.\n\nSome past governmental positions he has held in the fields of intelligence are member of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (eight years), Vice Chairman of the National Commission on Terrorism, member of the U.S. Commission on Reducing and Protecting Government Secrecy, the Senior Advisor to the U.S. Commission on the Roles and Capabilities of the U.S. Intelligence Community, and member of the Private Sector Senior Advisory Committee and the Southwest Border Task Force of the Homeland Security Advisory Council. He is a member of the Council on Foreign Relations, where he served on the Council's Independent Task Force on Terrorist Financing, and is on the Advisory Board of the Council's magazine, *Foreign Affairs*.\n\nSamantha Ravich, Ph.D., Commission Co-Chair, consults with both private industry and federal and state governments on international security, financial risk, and political risk. She is a Senior Advisor to the Chertoff Group. From 2009 to 2011, Ravich was Senior Vice President at IPS, a software and global analysis firm.\n\nRavich was previously Principal Deputy National Security Advisor to Vice President Cheney and served in the White House for 512 years. She received a Ph.D. in policy analysis from the RAND Graduate School, an M.C.P. from the University of Pennsylvania, and a B.S.E.\n\nin finance from the Wharton School. In 2000, Cambridge University Press published Ravich's book, *Marketization and Democracy: East Asian Experiences*, which is used as a basic textbook in international economics, political science, and Asian studies courses in colleges throughout the country.\n\n\nSenator Dan Coats is the senior senator for Indiana. Coats began his service to our nation in the U.S. Army, and has served Hoosiers in both the U.S. House of Representatives and U.S. Senate. In 2001, he was named Ambassador to Germany, arriving in the country only a few days before the tragic events of 9/11. Coats returned to the U.S. Senate in 2011. He serves on four Senate committees: Appropriations, Intelligence, Commerce, and the Joint Economic Committee, where he is the senior Senate Republican. Dan and Marsha Coats met in college and have three adult children and eight grandchildren.\n\nCongressman K. Michael Conaway is a member of both the House Armed Services Committee and the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence. Congressman Conaway served as both the Chairman of the Panel on Defense Financial Management and Auditability Reform in the 112th Congress and the Ranking Member of the Committee's Panel on Defense Acquisition Reform in the 111th Congress. In addition, he has served on various subcommittees within the Armed Services Committee and currently sits on both the Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and Capabilities and the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations. On the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, Congressman Conaway currently serves on the Subcommittee on Terrorism, HUMINT, Analysis, and Counterintelligence. In 2012,\n\n\nCongressman Conaway was appointed to the Board of Visitors of the U.S. Military Academy at West Point.\n\nRepresentative Rush Holt has represented central New Jersey in the U.S. House of Representatives since 1999. From 2007 to 2010, he was Chair of the Select Intelligence Oversight Panel, which worked to strengthen oversight of the Intelligence Community. He was also a senior member of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence from 2003 to 2011 and previously served as an intelligence analyst at the Department of State in the 1980s. Holt holds a B.A. in physics from Carleton College and M.A. and Ph.D. degrees, also in physics, from New York University. He served on the faculty of Swarthmore College and from 1989 until his 1998 congressional campaign served as Assistant Director of the Princeton Plasma Physics Laboratory, the largest research facility of Princeton University and the largest center for alternative energy research in New Jersey. He is a resident of Hopewell Township, New Jersey.\n\nThe Honorable Shirley Ann Jackson, Ph.D., is President of Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute\n(RPI), and has held senior leadership positions in government, industry, research, and academe. From 1995 to 1999, Dr. Jackson served as Chairman of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission. She serves on the President's Council of Advisors on Science and Technology (PCAST) and the International Security Advisory Board (ISAB) to the United States Department of State. Dr. Jackson is an International Fellow of the Royal Academy of Engineering and a member of the National Academy of Engineering and a number of other professional societies. She is a Regent of the Smithsonian Institution, a member of the boards of the Council on Foreign Relations and the Brookings Institution, and a member of the Board of Directors of IBM, FedEx, and other global companies. Dr. Jackson holds an S.B. degree in physics and a Ph.D. in theoretical physics, both from MIT.\n\nGilman Louie is a partner of Alsop Louie Partners, a venture capital fund focused on helping entrepreneurs start companies, and the founder and first CEO of In-Q-Tel, a private nonprofit venture capital firm that invests in private companies on behalf of a wide range of U.S. intelligence agencies. Before founding In-Q-Tel, he ran a publicly traded company called Spectrum HoloByte; it ultimately was acquired by Hasbro Corporation, where he served as chief creative officer of Hasbro Interactive and general manager of Games.com. He serves a member of the Board of Directors of the Markle Foundation and of Digital Promise, and is Chairman of the Board of the Federation of American Scientists. Gilman is also an advisor to the Defense Intelligence Agency, Central Intelligence Agency, and National Security Agency, and is a member of the Technical Advisory Group to the United States Senate Select Committee on Intelligence.\n\nKevin P. Meiners is the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence for Strategy, Programs, and Resources, where he is responsible for all matters related to Intelligence, Surveillance & Reconnaissance, and Environmental system capabilities. Mr. Meiners began his government service in 1984, working in various engineering, aviation, and program managementrelated positions before joining the Office of the Secretary of Defense in 1994 as a member of the newly formed Defense Airborne Reconnaissance Office (DARO); in 2000 he became a member of the Senior Executive Service. He has a BSEE from Virginia Tech\n\nUniversity and holds two Master of Science degrees; he is also a graduate of the Federal Executive Institute.\n\nThe Honorable Stephanie O'Sullivan, as the Principal Deputy Director of National Intelligence\n(PDDNI) since 28 February 2011, serves the Intelligence Community in a role similar to that of a chief operating officer, focusing on ODNI operations; managing IC coordination, information sharing, and resource challenges; and reinforcing the DNI's intelligence integration initiatives. Beginning in 2005, Ms. O'Sullivan led the CIA's Directorate of Science and Technology\n(DS&T), the part of the Agency responsible for developing and deploying innovative technology in support of intelligence collection and analysis, and she served as Associate Deputy Director of the CIA from December 2009 through February 2011. Previously, as an engineer and team leader with the CIA, the Office of Naval Intelligence, and TRW, she fielded systems in areas ranging from power sources to biotechnology. She holds a Bachelor of Science degree in civil engineering from the Missouri University of Science and Technology.\n\nTroy E. Wade II is chairman emeritus of the Nevada Alliance for Defense, Energy and Business, a group of more than 35 technology companies that support the Nevada Test Site and help bring new science and technolgy programs to Nevada, and president and chairman of the Nevada Test Site Historical Foundation. He is also president of Wade Associates, a Las Vegas based management consulting firm. Mr. Wade is a member of the Board of Directors of WSI, Inc.; a member of the Advisory Board of TSC, Inc.; a member of the Advisory Board of Longenecker & Associates; and a member of the Advisory Board of the Howard R. Hughes School of Engineering at the University of Nevada, Las Vegas.\nMr. Wade has 31 years of service with the U.S. Department of Energy, having served as Assistant Secretary of Energy for Defense Programs after holding a succession of key positions associated with the nation's nuclear programs.\n\nSenator Mark Warner was elected to the U.S. Senate in November 2008; he serves on the Senate Banking, Budget, Commerce, and Intelligence committees. After more than four years in the Senate, Senator Warner has established himself as a national leader in efforts to find bipartisan consensus to create balanced solutions to reduce the federal debt and deficit. He also has been a champion for military men and women, their families, and our military veterans.\n\nSenator Warner also is a leader in Congress in efforts to promote private-sector innovation and to help our nation's small businesses and start-up companies succeed.\n\nFrom 2002 to 2006, Senator Warner served as Governor of Virginia, where he worked in a bipartisan way to turn record budget deficits into a surplus. Governor Warner also focused on improving public education and expanding economic opportunity in every region of the state. Before entering public office, Senator Warner was an early investor in the cellular telephone business. He co-founded the company that became Nextel, and ultimately made early investments in hundreds of start-up technology companies that have created tens of thousands of private-sector jobs.\n\nThe Honorable John J. Young, Jr., served as the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics, with responsibility for all research, development, procurement, and logistics programs in the Department of Defense. During his tenure, he drove DOD initiatives on competitive prototyping, revision of the DOD 5000 instruction, and collaborative program\n\n\nmanagement. Previously, Mr. Young oversaw DOD's research enterprise as the Director of Defense Research and Engineering and led the Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) Vehicle Task Force, which delivered more than 15,000 MRAPs to protect soldiers from improvised explosive devices (IEDs).\n\nMr. Young also served as the Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research, Development and Acquisition and worked for ten years as a professional staff member of the Senate Defense Appropriations Subcommittee. He currently serves as a board member, advisor, and consultant to a number of companies.\n\n\n\n## Acknowledgments\n\n\nThis Commission depended on and would like to thank the extraordinary staff that dedicated themselves to the yearlong venture. Staff members demonstrated exemplary interagency collaboration in performing their assessments on behalf of the Commission, supporting the Commissioners' vision for improving research across the entire national intelligence enterprise, and bringing to fruition the final report.\n\nThe Commission is profoundly grateful to all of the staff and to all individuals who enabled the completion of its report."
    },
    {
        "text": "# Regulation Of Artificial Intelligence In Selected Jurisdictions\n\nJanuary 2019\nThe Law Library of Congress, Global Legal Research Directorate\n(202) 707-5080 (phone) - (866) 550-0442 (fax) - law@loc.gov - http://www.law.gov This report is provided for reference purposes only.\n\nIt does not constitute legal advice and does not represent the official opinion of the United States Government. The information provided reflects research undertaken as of the date of writing.\nIt has not been updated.\n\n## Contents\n\n| Comparative Summary                   |  1    |\n|---------------------------------------|-------|\n| Jenny Gesley                          |       |\n| International and Regional Approaches | 6     |\n| Tariq Ahmad & Jenny Gesley            |       |\n| The Americas and the Caribbean        | 16    |\n| Brazil 16                             |       |\n| Eduardo Soares                        |       |\n| Canada 18                             |       |\n| Tariq Ahmad                           |       |\n| Jamaica 24                            |       |\n| Ruth Levush                           |       |\n| Mexico 25                             |       |\n| Gustavo Guerra                        |       |\n| United States 27                      |       |\n| James Martin                          |       |\n| East/South Asia and the Pacific       | 31    |\n| Australia 31                          |       |\n| Kelly Buchanan                        |       |\n| China 36                              |       |\n| Laney Zhang                           |       |\n| India 40                              |       |\n| Tariq Ahmad                           |       |\n| Indonesia 47                          |       |\n| Kelly Buchanan                        |       |\n| Japan 47                              |       |\n| Sayuri Umeda                          |       |\n| Malaysia 49                           |       |\n| Kelly Buchanan                        |       |\n| New Zealand 50                        |       |\n| Kelly Buchanan                        |       |\n| Pakistan 55                           |       |\n| Tariq Ahmad                           |       |\n| Singapore 55                          |       |\n| Laney Zhang                           |       |\n| South Korea 59                        |       |\n| Sayuri Umeda                          |       |\n\n## Comparative Summary\n\nThis report examines the emerging regulatory and policy landscape surrounding artificial intelligence (AI) in jurisdictions around the world and in the European Union (EU).  In addition, a survey of international organizations describes the approach that United Nations (UN) agencies and regional organizations have taken towards AI.  As the regulation of AI is still in its infancy, guidelines, ethics codes, and actions by and statements from governments and their agencies on AI are also addressed. While the country surveys look at various legal issues, including data protection and privacy, transparency, human oversight, surveillance, public administration and services, autonomous vehicles, and lethal autonomous weapons systems, the most advanced regulations were found in the area of autonomous vehicles, in particular for the testing of such vehicles.\nThe Oxford Dictionary defines AI as \"the theory and development of computer systems able to perform tasks normally requiring human intelligence, such as visual perception, speech recognition, decision-making, and translation between languages.\" The majority of surveyed jurisdictions see AI in a positive light and aspire to become leaders in the field. Many countries have therefore developed or are in the process of developing national AI or digital strategies and action plans. Canada was the first country to launch such a national AI strategy in 2017. The strategies and action plans highlight, among others things, the need to develop ethical and legal frameworks to ensure that AI is developed and applied based on the country's values and fundamental rights. Many countries have established specific commissions to look into these issues. However, with the exception of the EU, no jurisdiction has yet published such specific ethical or legal frameworks for AI. In December 2018, an expert group of the European Commission released draft AI ethics guidelines that set out a framework for designing trustworthy AI. South Korea in 2008 enacted a general law on the \"intelligent robot industry\" that, among other things, authorized the government to enact and promulgate a charter on intelligent robot ethics. However, it appears that no such charter has yet been enacted.\n\nSome countries have taken the first steps to use AI in the area of justice. In Portugal, a legal assistance tool will be launched that conducts research on the requests made and learns from them. In the future, it might be used to predict the probability of success of a judicial process. Likewise, in France the Courts of Appeals of Rennes and Douai tested predictive justice software on various appeals cases in 2017.\n\nMany of the surveyed countries are contracting parties to the 1968 Vienna Convention on Road Traffic, an international agreement with the objective to \"facilitate international road traffic and to increase road safety through the adoption of uniform traffic rules.\" A 2016 amendment to the Convention on Road Traffic removed legal obstacles for the contracting parties to allow transferring driving tasks to automated technologies. Countries that have enacted regulations to allow for the testing of autonomous vehicles on public roads generally require that a human driver be present in the car who can take over the driving functions if necessary. As an exception, the Netherlands and Lithuania have passed legislation that allows the experimental use of self-driving vehicles without a human driver present in the car on public roads. Israel passed a regulation and a directive for experimentation in autonomous vehicles. Authorization to conduct experiments in autonomous vehicles requires, among others, a review by a professional committee. Spain, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates authorize the testing without a human driver present on a case-bycase basis, but have not enacted specific legislation. New Zealand, unlike other countries, has no specific legal requirement for vehicles to have drivers. However, the government has not received any formal requests to test autonomous vehicles on public roads. In Singapore and the Province of Ontario, Canada, it is up to the discretion of the responsible authority to approve driverless testing. Other testing requirements for autonomous vehicles may include insurance, the transmission of certain data to the government, or accident recorders in the vehicle. Finland allows the testing of autonomous vehicles, but one political party has suggested forbidding nonautonomous vehicles as a long-term goal. With regard to lethal autonomous weapons systems (LAWS), countries regularly meet in the Governmental Group of Experts (GGE) of the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW) to discuss the applicability of international humanitarian law norms to LAWS. The majority of countries agree that meaningful human control is necessary for LAWS. Countries either support the adoption of a new, legally-binding treaty to ban the use of LAWS; support the adoption of a political declaration as a middle ground to develop a shared understanding of the challenges posed by LAWS; oppose the adoption of a treaty as basic principles remain ill-defined;\nor think that no action is necessary at this point.\n\nThe following visuals give an overview of the different positions and actions that countries have taken with regard to national AI strategies and actions plans, autonomous vehicles, and LAWS.\n\n## International And Regional Approaches\n\n\nI.  International Measures\n\nA.  United Nations Law and Policy\n1.  UNICRI and Centre for Artificial Intelligence and Robotics In early 2015, the United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute (UNICRI) established a center on AI and robotics to \"help focus expertise on Artificial Intelligence (AI)\nthroughout the UN in a single agency.\"1  With the support of the Municipality of the Hague and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands, UNICRI \"signed the host country agreement for the opening of its Centre for Artificial Intelligence and Robotics in The Hague, the Netherlands, in September 2017.\"2 This Centre is focused on \"understanding and addressing the risks and benefits of AI and robotics from the perspective of crime and security through awareness-raising, education, exchange of information, and harmonization of stakeholders.\"3 UNICRI has developed a \"large international network of stakeholders with whom it collaborates, including the International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL), the International Telecommunications Union (ITU), the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE), the Foundation for Responsible Robotics, the World Economic Forum, Centre for Future Intelligence, and many more.\"4 According to the UNICRI website,\n\n[d]uring the 71st session of the United Nations General Assembly, on 29 September 2016, the Director of UNICRI, Ms. Cindy J. Smith, announced that UNICRI was in the process of opening of the first Centre on Artificial Intelligence and Robotics within the United Nations system. She explained that \"The aim of the Centre is to enhance understanding of the risk-benefit duality of Artificial Intelligence and Robotics through improved coordination, knowledge collection and dissemination, awareness-raising and outreach activities. The Centre will open in The Hague, The Netherlands. The main outcome of the above initiative will be that all stakeholders, including policy makers and governmental officials, possess improved knowledge and understanding of both the risks and benefits of such technologies and that they commence discussion on these risks and potential solutions in an appropriate and balanced manner.\"5\n\n\n\nIn October 2015, during the 70th Session of the UN General Assembly, UNICRI held a side event titled \"Rising to the Challenges of International Security and the Emergence of Artificial Intelligence\" that took place in United Nations Headquarters, New York.6\n\n2.  International Telecommunication Union The ITU is a specialized agency of the UN for information and communication technologies, and\n\"has become one of the key UN platforms for exploring the impact of AI.\"7 The ITU website states that it \"will provide a neutral platform for government, industry and academia to build a common understanding of the capabilities of emerging AI technologies and consequent needs for technical standardization and policy guidance.\"8 The Future of Life Institute (FLI) notes that\n\nITU organized the event, \"AI for Good Global Summit\" in 2017 and 2018, which was billed as \"the leading United Nations platform for dialogue on AI.\" The Summits have focused on strategies to ensure trusted, safe and inclusive development of AI technologies and equitable access to their benefits. Teams at the Summits highlighted the ability of AI to help to achieve the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) through abilities such as mapping poverty and aid with natural disasters using satellite imagery, and helping achieve Universal Health Coverage.\n\n\nITU also has a Focus Group on Machine Learning for Future Networks including 5G intended to draft technical reports and specifications for machine learning for future networks.9\n\n## B. Convention On Certain Conventional Weapons And Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems\n\n\n1.  CCW Informal Meeting of Experts (20132016) The Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects (usually referred to as the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, CCW) with three annexed Protocols was adopted on October 10, 1980, and entered into force on December 2, 1983.10\nAccording to the UN Office at Geneva (UNOG),\n[t]he purpose of the Convention is to ban or restrict the use of specific types of weapons that are considered to cause unnecessary or unjustifiable suffering to combatants or to affect civilians indiscriminately. The structure of the CCW - a chapeau Convention and\n\n\nannexed Protocols - was adopted in this manner to ensure future flexibility. The Convention itself contains only general provisions. All prohibitions or restrictions on the use of specific weapons or weapon systems are the object of the Protocols annexed to the Convention.11 In the last few years, the CCW Meeting of High Contracting Parties has held meetings to discuss LAWS. In 2013, the CCW Meeting of State Parties decided that the \"Chairperson will convene in 2014 an informal Meeting of Experts to discuss the questions related to emerging technologies in the area of [LAWS].\"12 The first informal Meeting of Experts was held in 2014 and it included sessions on the technical, ethical and sociological, legal, and operational and military aspects of LAWS.13 According to one journal article,\n\n[i]n the session on legal aspects, States examined whether LAWS could, at the current state of technology (or people's lay understanding of technology), comply with existing international law, in particular international humanitarian law (IHL), including the 1949 Geneva Conventions, the Martens Clause, and customary international law. States and legal experts stressed that any development and use of LAWS would need to comply with IHL and there were divergent views regarding whether it would be possible for LAWS to comply with the rules, especially given the current state of technology.14\n\nTwo informal Meetings of Experts were also held in 2015 15 and 2016. 16 The 2015 Meeting\n\"intended to build upon the work from the previous year by delving deeper into the issues surrounding the legal, technical, ethical, and operational and military aspects of LAWS. The legal weapons review process was discussed in the session devoted to challenges to IHL due to increasing degrees of autonomy.\"17 Approximately eighty countries attended the three informal CCW meetings on LAWS at the UN in Geneva, \"together with key UN agencies, the International Committee of the Red Cross, and the Campaign to Stop Killer Robots. These meetings helped increase awareness and understanding\n\n11 Id.\n12 *Background on Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems in the CCW*, UNOG, https://www.unog.ch/80256\nof the ethical, human rights, legal, operational, proliferation, technical, and other challenges posed by these weapons.\"18\n\n2.  CCW Group of Governmental Experts Meetings (20172018) Building on the three informal sessions, at the 2016 Fifth CCW Review Conference, presided over by Ambassador Tehmina Janjua of Pakistan, the High Contracting Parties decided to establish a Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) on LAWS to meet in 2017 with a \"mandate to assess questions related to emerging technologies in the area of lethal autonomous weapons systems. The GGE was chaired by Ambassador Amandeep Singh Gill of India.\"19\n\nAt their 2017 Meeting,20 the High Contracting Parties to the CCW agreed that the GGE on LAWS would meet again in 201821 for a duration of ten days in Geneva, and that meeting took place April\n913, 2018. A second meeting was held August 2731, 2018. Ambassador Amandeep Singh Gill of India chaired both meetings. The following \"overarching issues\" were discussed during the 2018 meetings:\n\n1. Characterization of the systems under consideration in order to promote a common\nunderstanding on concepts and characteristics relevant to the objectives and purposes of the CCW;\n2. Further consideration of the human element in the use of lethal force; aspects of\nhuman-machine interaction in the development, deployment and use of emerging technologies in the area of lethal autonomous weapons systems;\n3. Review of potential military applications of related technologies in the context of the\nGroup's work;\n4. Possible options for addressing the humanitarian and international security challenges\nposed by emerging technologies in the area of LAWS in the context of the objectives and purposes of the Convention without prejudging policy outcomes and taking into account past, present and future proposals.22\n Certain states and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) have expressed frustration that, despite five years of work on AWS and calls for urgent action on this issue, there has been little progress.\n\nHowever, it appears momentum has been growing for \"negotiations on a legally binding\n\ninstrument to prevent the development and use of LAWS.\"23 According to Amnesty International,\n\"[t]he majority of states at the last CCW meeting in April 2018 emphasized the importance of retaining human control over weapons systems and the use of force, and expressed support for developing new international law on lethal autonomous weapons systems.\"24 Twenty-six of these states called for a total ban (including Austria, Brazil, and Egypt) and China has also called for a\n\"new CCW protocol to prohibit the use of fully autonomous weapons systems.\"25 However, a number of states \"oppose creating legally binding prohibitions, including governments who are already known to be developing autonomous weapons systems, such as France, Israel, Russia, South Korea, the US, and the UK.\"26 According to the NGO Reaching Critical Will, \"[t]he Non-Aligned Movement,[27] the largest bloc of states operating in the UN, has called for a legally binding instrument stipulating prohibitions and regulations of AWS. Austria, Brazil, and Chile collectively tabled a recommendation for a new CCW mandate 'to negotiate a legally-binding instrument to ensure meaningful human control over the critical functions' of weapon systems.\"28\nIn a September 2018 report Reaching Critical Will notes that\n[a] few others, mostly European states, expressed their interest in other mechanisms, such as a political declaration proposed by France and Germany. They envision a declaration to be a good vehicle to outline principles for the development and use of AWS, such as the necessity of human control in the use of force and the importance of human accountability. Some also suggested the development of a code of conduct on the development and use of AWS could be useful in this context.29\nThe August 2018 meeting ended with states agreeing on the conclusions and recommendations from the meeting rather than a decision on starting to negotiate a treaty.30 These included possible guiding principles, characterization of the systems under consideration, the human element in the use of lethal force, a review of potential military applications of related technologies, and the possible options for addressing the humanitarian and international security challenges related to\n\nhttp://reachingcriticalwill.org/disarmament-fora/ccw/2018/laws/ccwreport/12930-ccw-report-vol-6-no-11, archived at https://perma.cc/4CNZ-YQZR.\n\n2018), https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2018/08/un-decisive-action-needed-to-ban-killer-robots-before-itstoo-late/, *archived at* https://perma.cc/78XB-CFHK. 25 Id. 26 Id.\nhttp://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/disarmament-fora/ccw/2018/laws/ccwreport/12927-ccw-report-vol-6-no-9, archived at https://perma.cc/GG5X-VKLU. 30 Id.\nLAWS.31 A decision was made to continue the GGE's work in 2019, and at the CCW's Annual Meeting it was decided to meet on March 2529, 2019, and August 2021, 2019.32\nC.  General Assembly The First Committee of the General Assembly \"deals with disarmament, global challenges and threats to peace that affect the international community and seeks out solutions to the challenges in the international security regime.\"33 On October 26, 2018, the First Committee held a meeting where delegates weighed \"potential risks to international security posed by such new technologies as militarized drones\" and \"exchanged views today on ways to control these lethal autonomous weapons.\"34 Moreover, \"[d]uring the debate, many delegates expressed support for the Group of Governmental Experts on lethal autonomous weapons systems.  Some called on the Group to find ways towards a common understanding and precise definitions of such weapons.\"35\n\nIn October 2017, the UN held a joint meeting of the UN Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) and the Economic and Financial Committee (Second Committee) to \"consider the role and impact of AI on sustainable development.\"36\n\nD.  International Human Rights\n1.  Human Rights Council\n\nIn 2017, two reports were submitted to the UN Human Rights Council (UNHRC) that discussed the implications of AI technologies on human rights.37 On May 5, 2017, a report38 from the Office\n\nhttps://perma.cc/229P-QNYV. 33 *Disarmament and International Security (First Committee)*, GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF THE UNITED NATIONS, http://www.un.org/en/ga/first/ (last visited Dec. 17, 2018), *archived at* https://perma.cc/46RZ-DJ4U.\n34 First Committee Weighs Potential Risks of New Technologies as Members Exchange Views on How to Control Lethal Autonomous Weapons, Cyberattacks, UNITED NATIONS (Oct. 26, 2018), https://www.un.org/press/en/\n2018/gadis3611.doc.htm, *archived at* https://perma.cc/R5AR-ZLKY. 35 Id.\n\nInequalities, UNITED NATIONS (Oct. 9, 2017),  https://www.un.org/sustainabledevelopment/blog/2017/10/lookingto-future-un-to-consider-how-artificial-intelligence-could-help-achieve-economic-growth-and-reduce-inequalities/, archived at https://perma.cc/9WGH-TSVT. archived at https://perma.cc/V84G-ABVH.\nof the High Commissioner for Human Rights on the topic of \"ways to bridge the gender digital divide from a human rights perspective\" made reference to \"algorithmic discrimination and bias, and the potential for AI to drive improvements in women's health.\" 39  A report from the Independent Expert on the rights of older persons40 \"addressed the opportunities and challenges of robotics, artificial intelligence and automation in the care of older persons.\"41\n\n2. Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of the Right to Freedom of Opinion\n\n## And Expression\n\n\nOn October 2018, David Kaye, the UN Special Rapporteur for the promotion and protection of the right to freedom of opinion and expression, released his report on the implications of AI\ntechnologies for human rights.42 The report43 was submitted to the UN General Assembly on August 29, 2018,44 and presented to the Social, Humanitarian and Cultural Committee at the UN\nGeneral Assembly on October 22, 2018.45 According to European Digital Rights,\n\n[t]he text focuses in particular on freedom of expression and opinion, privacy and nondiscrimination. In the report, the UN Special Rapporteur David Kaye first clarifies what he understands by artificial intelligence and what using AI entails for the current digital environment, debunking several myths. He then provides an overview of all potential human rights affected by relevant technological developments, before laying down a framework for a human rights-based approach to these new technologies.46 The report examines the impact of AI on the \"information environment, and proposes a human rights framework for the design and use of technologies comprising AI by states and private actors.\"47\n\n41 Cullen, *supra* note 37.\n\n2018), https://edri.org/un-special-rapporteur-report-artificial-intelligence-impact-human-rights/, *archived at*\nhttps://perma.cc/PX7A-Q5G4.\n\nof the Right to Freedom of Opinion and Expression, U.N. Doc. A/73/348 (Aug. 29, 2018), https://freedex.org/wp-\n2018), https://www.law.uci.edu/news/in-the-news/2018/Kaye-UN-AI.html, *archived at* https://perma.cc/M7RH-\nTRQT. rapporteur-report-artificial-intelligence-impact-human-rights/, *archived at* https://perma.cc/PX7A-Q5G4.\n\nE.  Amendments to the 1968 Vienna Convention on Road Traffic On March 23, 2016, amendments to the 1968 Vienna Convention on Road Traffic entered into force that removed legal obstacles for the contracting parties to allow transferring driving tasks to the vehicle itself, provided that the technologies used are in conformity with UN vehicle regulations or can be overridden or switched off by the driver.48 The Vienna Convention on Road Traffic is an international agreement currently with seventy-eight contracting parties, among them the major car-manufacturing countries.49 Two of the major world powers, the United States and China, are not parties to the agreement.50 According to its Preamble, the Convention \"desires to facilitate international road traffic and to increase road safety through the adoption of uniform traffic rules.\" Originally, article 8 of the Convention required that \"[e]very driver shall at all times be able to control his vehicle.\" In addition, on October 9, 2018, the UN Economic Commission for Europe's Global Forum on Road Traffic Safety adopted a \"non-binding legal resolution serving as a guide for the contracting parties to the 1949 and 1968 Conventions on Road Traffic in relation to the safe deployment of highly and fully automated vehicles in road traffic.\"51\n\nII.  Regional Measures\n\nA.  Organization of American States In a 2018 report, the Organization of American States (OAS) called on the banking sector in Latin America and the Caribbean to \"[p]rioritize the development of capacities using emerging digital technologies, such as Big Data, Artificial Intelligence and related (such as cognitive computing and Machine Learning), which have an important potential in the optimization of resources destined for detection and prevention.\" 52 It found that \"49% of banking entities are still not implementing tools, controls or processes using Emerging Digital Technologies, such as Big Data, Machine Learning or Artificial Intelligence. These are all very important for prevention of cyberattacks or defining suspect patterns associated with fraud, among other detection capabilities.\"53\ntrans/conventn/Conv_road_traffic_EN.pdf, *archived at* http://perma.cc/JNG9-ZJNE; U.N. ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COUNCIL, ECONOMIC COMMISSION FOR EUROPE (UNECE), INLAND TRANSPORT COMMITTEE, WORKING PARTY ON\nROAD TRAFFIC SAFETY, Report of the Sixty-Eighth Session of the Working Party on Road Traffic Safety 5, 9 (Apr.\n\n17, 2014), http://www.unece.org/fileadmin/DAM/trans/doc/2014/wp1/ECE-TRANS-WP1-145e.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/P4LT-YW5N. 49 *UN Transport Agreements and Conventions. Convention on Road Traffic, of 8 November 8, 1968*, UNECE, http://www.unece.org/trans/maps/un-transport-agreements-and-conventions-08.html (last visited Dec. 21, 2018), archived at http://perma.cc/3A6G-SXM2. 50 Id. 51 Press Release, UNECE, UNECE Adopts Resolution on the Deployment of Highly and Fully Automated Vehicles in Road Traffic (Oct. 9, 2018), http://www.unece.org/info/media/presscurrent-press-h/transport/2018/unece-adoptsresolution-on-the-deployment-of-highly-and-fully-automated-vehicles-in-road-traffic/doc.html, archived at http://perma.cc/V8WP-VZKP. 52 OAS, STATE OF CYBERSECURITY IN THE BANKING SECTOR IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN 146 (2018),\n\nB.  Council of Europe On December 4, 2018, the European Commission for the Efficiency of Justice of the Council of Europe (CoE)an international organization focused on human rights and comprised of fortyseven European countriesadopted the European Ethical Charter on the Use of Artificial Intelligence in Judicial Systems and Their Environment (European Ethical Charter). 54 The European Ethical Charter sets out five ethical principles and is intended to serve as a guideline for policy makers, legislators, and justice professionals when dealing with AI. In addition, the document provides a comprehensive overview of the current use of AI in judicial systems in CoE Member States, with a focus on processing judicial decisions and data, as well as a review of the different uses of AI in European judicial systems in light of the principles set out in the European Ethical Charter. The principles that should be observed are as follows:\n\n- Respect for fundamental rights during the design and implementation of AI\n\n- Nondiscrimination - Quality and security when processing judicial decisions and data - Transparency, impartiality, and fairness\n-  \"Under user control\"55 In addition, the Committee of Experts on Human Rights Dimensions of Automated Data Processing and Different Forms of Artificial Intelligence (MSI-AUT) of the CoE has published several draft documents on the implications of the use of AI for human rights. The studies and recommendations provide guidance for future standard-setting and encourage CoE Member States to implement the guidance when dealing with legislative issues in this field and to take all necessary measures to ensure that private actors respect human rights when designing and developing AI. So far, the MSI-AUT has made the following documents available:\n\n\n- A Study of the Implications of Advanced Digital Technologies (Including AI Systems) for the\nConcept of Responsibility Within a Human Rights Framework56\n- Draft Recommendation of the Committee of Ministers to Member States on Human Rights\nImpacts of Algorithmic Systems57\n- Draft Declaration of the Committee of Ministers on the Manipulative Capabilities of\nAlgorithmic Processes58\n\n\n## The Americas And The Caribbean Brazil During The 2018 Discussions Of The Gge On Laws That Was Established In 2016 During The Fifth Review Of The Un Conference Of The High Contracting Parties To The Convention On Certain Conventional Weapons, Brazil Issued A Joint Statement Along With Austria And Chile, Which Proposed To Establish An Open-Ended Gge To Negotiate A Legally Binding Instrument To Ensure Meaningful Human Control Over Critical Functions In Laws.1 I.  Data Protection Law\n\n\nOn August 14, 2018, Brazil enacted Law No. 13,709, the General Data Protection Law (Lei Geral de Protecao de Dados), which aims to give more security to consumers of technology.2  Article 1\nof the Law provides for the processing of personal data, including digital media, by either a natural person or a public or private legal entity, for the purpose of protecting a person's fundamental rights of freedom, privacy, and free development of personality.3 The protection of personal data is based on respect for privacy; informational self-determination; freedom of expression, information, communication, and opinion; the inviolability of intimacy, honor, and image; economic and technological development and innovation; free enterprise, free competition, and consumer protection; and human rights, free development of personality, dignity, and the exercise of citizenship by natural persons.4\n\nII.  Trade Negotiations The Brazilian arm of the International Chamber of Commerce and the UN Conference on Trade and Development signed an agreement to work together to harness the power of cutting-edge technologies such as AI and blockchain to enhance and improve trade. 5  With the growing\n\ncomplexity of international trade agreements, the purpose of the use of AI is to reduce such complexity and help representatives of less favored nations achieve better results.6\n\nIII.  Fraud Detection The impossibility of inspecting all customs operations and identifying all fraud led the Brazilian Federal Revenue Service to establish partnerships with Brazilian universities to start making use of AI to detect such practices.7  The idea is to develop a system to help customs officers identify suspicious customs operations, and to develop a product and foreign exporter information system to help importers in the registration and classification of their products and corresponding exporters.8\n\nIV.  Corruption Fight\n\nThe Ministry of Transparency and Controller General's Office (Ministerio da Transparencia e Controladoria-Geral da Uniao, CGU) implemented a system to find evidence of deviations in the performance of public servants. The software uses machine-learning features, an AI technique that feeds data, presents criteria, and checks if the results of the analyses performed by the machine are within the expected range. 9  Another system created by the CGU to combat irregularities is intended to oversee contracts and suppliers. The tool analyzes the risks, including not only corruption, but also other problems such as failures to comply with an agreement.10\n\nV.  Criminal Investigation The Public Prosecutor's Office of the State of Rio de Janeiro has decided to invest in advanced technologies to expedite investigations and prevent crimes from going unpunished. 11   The investment is geared towards data science and AI to collect, store, and analyze large volumes of\n\nPROCEEDINGS OF THE 9TH ANNUAL INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON DIGITAL GOVERNMENT RESEARCH, PARTNERSHIPS FOR PUBLIC INNOVATION 18187, DG.O 2008 (Montreal, Canada, May 1821, 2008), https://www. researchgate.net/publication/220268016_Uses_of_artificial_intelligence_in_the_Brazilian_customs_fraud_detection_syste m, *archived at* https://perma.cc/U3V3-4NXR. 8 Id. 9 *Orgaos Publicos Usam Inteligencia Artificial para Combater Corrupcao*, TECNOLOGIA - IG (Aug. 3, 2018), https://tecnologia.ig.com.br/2018-08-03/inteligencia-artificial-contra-a-corrupcao.html, *archived at*\nhttps://perma.cc/V9KQ-K6AF. 10 Id. 11 *MPRJ Aposta em Inteligencia Artificial para Agilizar Investigacoes no Rio*, G1 (Oct. 1, 2018), https://g1.globo. com/rj/rio-de-janeiro/noticia/2018/10/01/mp-aposta-em-inteligencia-artificial-para-agilizar-investigacoes-norj.ghtml, *archived at* https://perma.cc/MYB5-99TW.\ninformation.12  The system allows information from different sources and bodies to be collected and also allows a series of real-time data to be collected from suspected criminals.13\nCanada I.  Background Canada's approach to AI appears to be focused on funding research as opposed to developing regulations and governance structures.14 Canada has the \"second largest tech sector outside Silicon Valley\" and is considered a global leader in the field of AI.15 In 2017, estimates indicated that funding raised by Canadian AI companies would \"exceed US$250 million, representing an almost two-fold increase from the previous record historical high of US$143 million in 2015.\"16\n\nDeloitte's AI practice published a recent report that raised the concern that Canada is falling behind in respect to demand and actually adopting the technology, stating, \"[w]hile Canada's AI startup environment and talent pool is relatively strong, it's the other component of a leading AI\neconomythe need for robust demandthat is of greatest concern.\"17 One report by *The Logic*\nfound that Canadian firms have been filing fewer AI patents each year since 2016 despite large government investment.18\n\nII.  Pan-Canadian AI Strategy In the 2017 Budget, the Canadian federal government provided CA$125 million (about US$93.3\nmillion) to launch the Pan-Canadian Artificial Intelligence Strategy.19 This made Canada the first country to release a national strategy for AI, although the strategy is primarily focused on research\n\n12 Id.\n\nintelligence (last updated Nov. 13, 2018), *archived at* https://perma.cc/5FDM-VNVV. https://perma.cc/4GE6-7LBW. 16 Id.\n\nand talent.20 The strategy is being led by the Canadian Institute for Advanced Research (CIFAR), a nonprofit, private institute of advanced study that is partly government funded, in collaboration with \"three newly established AI institutes\"the Alberta Machine Intelligence Institute (Amii) in Edmonton, Mila in Montreal, and the Vector Institute in Toronto.21 The strategy is intended to further build on Canada's AI research-based ecosystem22 by pursuing four major goals:\n\n\n- To increase the number of outstanding artificial intelligence researchers and skilled\ngraduates in Canada.\n- To establish interconnected nodes of scientific excellence in Canada's three major\ncentres for artificial intelligence in Edmonton, Montreal and Toronto.\n- To develop global thought leadership on the economic, ethical, policy and legal\nimplications of advances in artificial intelligence.\n- To support a national research community on artificial intelligence.23\n\nThe CIFAR AI and Society Program \"examines the policy and ethical implications of AI.\"24\n\nIII.  Regulatory Framework and Proposed Changes A.  Automated Vehicles In Canada, motor vehicle transportation is a \"shared responsibility between federal, provincial and territorial governments.\" 25  Provinces and territories have jurisdiction over \"approving and overseeing trials of automated vehicles that take place within their jurisdiction.\"26 Two provinces have enacted changes to allow testing for automated vehicles. On January 1, 2016, Ontario's Ministry of Transportation launched a pilot to allow the testing of automated vehicles though the promulgation of a regulation under Ontario's Highway Traffic Act.27 The Ontario government\n\n22 *Pan-Canadian Artificial Intelligence Strategy*, INVEST IN CANADA, https://www.investcanada.ca/why-invest/pancanadian-artificial-intelligence-strategy (last visited Nov. 16, 2018), *archived at* https://perma.cc/X9KM-BQ6X. 23 *Pan-Canadian Artificial Intelligence Strategy*, CANADIAN INSTITUTE FOR ADVANCED RESEARCH (CIFAR), https://www.cifar.ca/ai/pan-canadian-artificial-intelligence-strategy, *archived at* https://perma.cc/E5PF-LDL2.\n24 Tim Dutton, *Artificial Intelligence Strategies*, MEDIUM (June 28, 2018), https://medium.com/politics-ai/anoverview-of-national-ai-strategies-2a70ec6edfd, *archived at* https://perma.cc/5Z4W-45UB. See also *AI & Society*, CIFAR, https://www.cifar.ca/ai/ai-society, *archived at* https://perma.cc/J53B-ZAEN. seats/testing-highly-automated-vehicles-canada.html, *archived at* https://perma.cc/DK3X-HG7B. 26 Id.\n\"requires prior approval to test vehicles under the pilot project.\"28 One of the requirements of the Ontario's Automated Vehicle Pilot Program is that \"[t]he driver must remain in the driver's seat of the vehicle at all times and monitor the vehicle's operation, unless approved for driverless testing.\"29 On April 18, 2018, assent was granted to Bill No. 165, amending the Quebec Highway Safety Code to similarly allow a testing pilot for automated vehicles.30  The first pilot project for autonomous buses and minibuses was authorized by an order of the Minister of Transport, Sustainable Mobility and Transport Electrification.31 The order requires that \"A driver must be able to immediately take over the driving of the vehicle should the need arise.\"32 The federal Senate Committee on Transport and Communications released a report in January\n2018, which found that \"Canada is ill-prepared for the fast-approaching future of transportation.\"33\nThe report set out sixteen recommendations, including developing a coordinated national strategy. The strategy would \"allow the government to prevent potential harms. Strong cybersecurity measures will be necessary to maintain public safety and confidence, and rigorous oversight is required to ensure personal information gleaned from connected and automated vehicles is securely held and not exploited.\"34\n\nB.  Privacy and Transparency Challenges\n\nThere are a number of laws at the federal and provincial levels in Canada that relate to the protection of personal information. The Personal Information Protection and Electronic\n\n28 MCCARTHY TETRAULT, FROM CHATBOTS TO SELF-DRIVING CARS: THE LEGAL RISKS OF ADOPTING ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE IN YOUR BUSINESS 14 (Sept. 2018), https://www.mccarthy.ca/sites/default/files/2018-09/McT_ The%20Art_of_Artificial_Intelligence_WHITEPAPER_EN_SEPT2018.pdf, *archived at* https://perma.cc/X88N- N7G5; *Automated Vehicles - Driving Innovation in Ontario*, ONTARIO'S MINISTRY OF TRANSPORTATION, http://www.mto.gov.on.ca/english/vehicles/automated-vehicles.shtml, *archived at* https://perma.cc/UA8P-VNN3. 29 *Automated Vehicles - Driving Innovation in Ontario*, ONTARIO'S MINISTRY OF TRANSPORTATION, http://www.mto.gov.on.ca/english/vehicles/automated-vehicles.shtml, *archived at* https://perma.cc/UA8P-VNN3;\nAccording to Ontario's Ministry of Transportation, for driverless testing, \"full human oversight of the vehicle's functionality is required while it is operating on a public roadway. The overseer can be a passenger onboard the vehicle or someone monitoring the vehicle remotely, and must be capable of intervening during the vehicle's operation to bring it to a safe stop if necessary.\"\n30 Bill 165 (2018, chapter 7) An Act to Amend the Highway Safety Code and Other Provisions, http://www2.public ationsduquebec.gouv.qc.ca/dynamicSearch/telecharge.php?type=1&file=103461.pdf, *archived at* https://perma.cc/2FA2-A34F; *Quebec to Recognize and Regulate Autonomous Vehicles*, GOWLING WLG (Apr. 30, 2018), https://gowlingwlg.com/en/insights-resources/articles/2018/quebec-to-recognize-regulate-autonomousvehicles/, *archived at* https://perma.cc/2GW2-EZVE. 31 Autonomous Bus and Minibus Pilot Project, CQLR c C-24.2, r 37.01, https://www.canlii.org/en/qc/ laws/regu/cqlr-c-c-24.2-r-37.01/latest/cqlr-c-c-24.2-r-37.01.html, *archived at* https://perma.cc/7Q6S-2HML.\nDocuments Act (PIPEDA) is a federal privacy law that is applicable to the private sector.35 At a February 2017 appearance before the House of Commons Standing Committee on Access to Information, Privacy and Ethics, the Privacy Commissioner of Canada stated that\n[c]onsent has always been considered a foundational element of PIPEDA. Legally, organizations must obtain consent to collect, use and disclose an individual's personal information, subject to a list of specific exceptions. But obtaining meaningful consent has become increasingly challenging in the age of big data, the Internet of Things, artificial intelligence and robotics.36 The Standing Committee released a report on February 28, 2018, that included recommendations to update PIPEDA.37  The report is said to be \"heavily influenced by the direction set in the European Union General Data Protection Regulation.\"38 It expressed concerns over transparency of AI decision-making (\"users have little information about how they work, the data they collect and how they are used\"39), and the risk of algorithms using personal information to \"perpetuate prejudices or discriminatory practices.\"40 One of the key recommendations of the report was that\n\"the Government of Canada consider implementing measures to improve algorithmic transparency.\"41 On May 24, 2018, the Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada published two guidance documents, one on obtaining meaningful consent and the other on inappropriate data practices, to help organizations ensure they comply with their privacy obligations in the digital age. On announcing the publications, the Commissioner stated that, \"[d]uring an extensive public consultation, we heard very clearly that the increasingly complex digital environmentwith\n\nthe Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act (PIPEDA), OFFICE OF THE PRIVACY\nCOMMISSIONER OF CANADA (Feb. 16, 2017), https://www.priv.gc.ca/en/opc-actions-and-decisions/advice-toparliament/2017/parl_20170216/, *archived at* https://perma.cc/6VQX-Y6LW.\nhttp://www.ourcommons.ca/Content/Committee/421/ETHI/Reports/RP9690701/ethirp12/ethirp12-e.pdf, archived at https://perma.cc/WVL5-5TPT. 38 Charles S. Morgan et al., Parliamentary Committee Recommends Substantial Revisions to PIPEDA - Part 2 -\nConsent, MCCARTHY TETRAULT (Mar. 28, 2018), https://www.mccarthy.ca/en/insights/blogs/cyberlex/\nparliamentary-committee-recommends-substantial-revisions-pipeda-part-2-consent, *archived at* https://perma.cc/8SUR-DNR8. 40 Id. 41 *Id.* at 25. The report defines \"algorithmic transparency\" as \"when users have complete information about the workings of the artificial intelligence programs behind the websites they visit, the data they collect and how they are used.\"\ntechnological innovations such as big data, the Internet of Things and artificial intelligenceis posing challenges for privacy protection and the consent model.\"42\n\nC.  Directive on Automated Decision-Making for Federal Institutions According to the government of Canada, it is \"increasingly looking to utilize technology and automated systems to make, or assist in making, administrative decisions to improve service delivery.\" 43 Under the authority of the Financial Administration Act, the Treasury Board of Canada issued a Directive on Automated Decision-Making, which took effect on November 26,\n2018.44 According to the Cyberjustice Laboratory of the University of Montreal,\n\n[the Directive] outlines the responsibilities of federal institutions using AI-automated decision systems. Supporting a host of policies in the federal public administration, the Directive aims at helping to better understand and better ensure an ethical and responsible implementation of AI. Compliance with its requirements is expected from all federal institutions by no later than April 1, 2020.45\n\nThe Directive applies to the use of automated decision systems that \"provide external services and recommendations about a particular client, or whether an application should be approved or denied.\"46 The Directive provides for a questionnaire, called an Algorithmic Impact Assessment,\n\"designed to help [federal institutions] assess and mitigate the risks associated with deploying an automated decision system,\" 47 which should be \"completed prior to the production of any Automated Decision System to be used in federal administration.\"48\n\n\n\n## Iv.  International Cooperation A.  G7 Discussions A 2018 Report By Innovation, Science And Economic Development Canada States That, In The Context Of 2018 G7 Presidency,\n\n[i]n March 2018, Innovation Ministers expressed a shared vision of human-centric artificial intelligence for innovation and economic growth, and released a statement that confirms the need to safeguard privacy. This vision was also expressed by Leaders in their Common Vision Statement on Artificial Intelligence, and the G7 Leaders' Statement released in June 2018.49\n\nOn June 7, 2018, the governments of Canada and France released a joint statement on AI calling for \"the creation of an international study group that can become a global point of reference for understanding and sharing research results on artificial intelligence issues and best practices.\"50\nThe statement stated that Canada and France \"wish to promote a vision of human-centric artificial intelligence grounded in human rights, inclusion, diversity, innovation and economic growth.\"51\nThe two countries established a task force \"in order to make recommendations on the scope, governance and implementation of the international study group. By the end of the year, the task force will submit a report on the implementation of the international study group, whose results will be shared within the G7.\"52 On October 17, 2018, the Minister of Innovation, Science and Economic Development announced that he would host a G7 Multi-stakeholder Conference on Artificial Intelligence on December 6,\n2018.53 During the conference, Prime Minister Justin Trudeau further discussed the International Panel on Artificial Intelligence and also announced an \"investment of up to nearly [Can]$230\nmillion for the AI-Powered Supply Chains Supercluster (SCALE.AI) based in Quebec.\"54\n\n\nB.  Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems At the 2017 meeting of the GGE on LAWS, Canada stated that it was \"committed to maintaining appropriate human involvement in use of military capabilities that can exert lethal force.\"55  At the\n2018 GGE meeting Canada was \"supportive of developing key Transparency and Confidence-\nBuilding Measures and looks forward to exploring these and other such ideas here.\"56\n\nJamaica The Jamaican Government has reportedly been \"looking to position Jamaica to take advantage of the benefits of artificial intelligence (AI) in boosting economic growth and job creation.\" 57\nAccording to Science, Energy and Technology Minister Andrew Wheatley, there have been ongoing discussion involving the Ministry, the Jamaica Information Technology and Services Alliance, the Jamaica Computer Society, and the Business Process Industry Association of Jamaica on how AI can best be utilized to benefit the country. In Minister Wheatley's opinion, \"while AI poses a potential threat to traditional call center operations in the business process outsourcing\n(BPO) sector, it presents opportunities in the high-skill areas of programming and development.\"58\nHe therefore called for increasing the number of computer science graduates from Jamaican educational institutions, so that Jamaica \"can take advantage of the clear opportunities that will come from the new demand for highly skilled programmers.\"59 No specific regulations related to aspects of AI technology applications were located.\n\n\n\nMexico\n\nI.  National AI Strategy and Directorate\n\nIn March 2018, the Mexican government announced the adoption of a strategy on AI.60 The strategy provided for the creation of a Directorate on Artificial Intelligence tasked with the development of a framework aimed at fostering a multi-sector dialogue on AI.61 The Directorate was created in April 2018, within Mexico's Commission for the Development of Electronic Government, which \"seeks to support Federal Public Administration agencies in the development, adoption and use of Artificial Intelligence for the design, implementation and evaluation of public programs, policies and services.\"62\n\nIn November 2018, the Mexican government published a document that includes general principles for the development and use of systems based on AI in Mexico's federal government.63\nSome of the most salient principles are as follows:\n\n- Monitor and evaluate the impacts of AI systems in order to ensure that they achieve the expected results\n\n- Promote transparency, by explaining to the users that interact with AI systems the decision\nprocess taken by such systems, the expected benefits as well as the potential risks derived from using such systems\n- Protect privacy, by incorporating mechanisms of control and consent for the use of personal\ndata during the design of AI systems\n- Foster equality, by reducing risks of discriminatory biases derived from the utilized data\n- Due process, by allowing individuals to dispute decisions made by AI systems64\n\npresidencia/prensa/the-government-has-promoted-the-digitalization-of-services-to-offer-a-simple-efficient-andinexpensive-service-eduardo-sanchez-hernandez?idiom=en, *archived at* https://perma.cc/NMT8-PRRG. 63 INNOVA MX,  COMPILADO DE COMENTARIOS DE LA CONSULTA PUBLICA REFERENTE A LOS PRINCIPIOS Y GUIA DE\nANALISIS DE IMPACTO PARA EL DESARROLLO Y USO DE SISTEMAS BASADAS EN INTELIGENCIA ARTIFICIAL EN LA\nADMINISTRACION PUBLICA FEDERAL [COMPILED COMMENTS FROM THE PUBLIC CONSULTATION REGARDING PRINCIPLES AND IMPACT ANALYSIS GUIDE FOR THE DEVELOPMENT AND USE OF SYSTEMS BASED ON ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE IN THE FEDERAL PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION] (Nov. 2018), https://www.gob.mx/cms/uploads/ attachment/file/415644/Consolidado_Comentarios_Consulta_IA__1_.pdf, *archived at* https://perma.cc/SP6W- QDGT. 64 Id.\n\nThe presidential administration that adopted this strategy and its guiding principles ended on November 30, 2018. No information could be located on whether the new administration (which commenced on December 1, 2018) will continue with this strategy and its principles, or initiate a similar effort.\n\nII.  Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems According to information provided by the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs, the Mexican government has expressed its opposition to LAWS, as follows:\nOn 16 October 2017, the Permanent Mission to the United Nations of Mexico partnered with the International Committee for Robot Arms Control, Human Rights Watch, Seguridad Humana en Latinoamerica y el Caribe and the Campaign to Stop Killer Robots to host a panel discussion entitled \"Pathways to Banning Fully Autonomous Weapons\" as part of the First Committee side event series for the 72nd Session General Assembly.\n\nAmbassador Juan Sandoval Mendiolea, Deputy Permanent Representative of Mexico to the United Nations, introduced the discussion by noting that Mexico has joined other states in calling for a ban on lethal autonomous weapons systems, also known as fully autonomous weapons. . . . Ambassador Mendiolea stressed the importance of continued research and education on these weapons systems and their possible dangers.65\n\n## Iii.  Autonomous Vehicles A Recent Study On Autonomous Vehicles (Av) Readiness States That, As Of 2018, Mexico Has A Number Of Obstacles To Adopting This Technology:\n\nAV adoption in Mexico currently faces a range of barriers, with a lack of specific regulations, no active tests and little industrial activity. . . . On policy and legislation, it scores low on both AV-specific and general variables, with no apparent regulations on AV\ntesting on public roads and very limited testing so far. The country's current economic and political condition creates barriers for taking actions in order to adopt AV in the near future.\n\nIt gets the lowest scores on industry partnerships, research and development AV hubs, patents and investments and the research has found no AV technology company headquarters . . . . On infrastructure, Mexico's roads receive a slightly below average rating for road quality, but lower scores on other variables. There are no active AV tests, contributing to its low rating on consumer acceptance.66\n\n\nUnited States United States lawmakers and regulators have mainly pursued AI in the area of autonomous or selfdriving vehicles. The Department of Transportation is investigating what elements must be considered in drafting regulations for the use of such vehicles, including multi-vehicle convoys, and several states have adopted legislation and regulations allowing for the testing of autonomous vehicles. In addition, recent federal legislation has tasked part of the Department of Defense with the responsibility of crafting policies for the development and deployment of AI\nsystems as they concern national defense.\n\nI.  Federal Legislation and Regulatory Action In the 115th Congress, thirty-nine bills have been introduced that have the phrase \"artificial intelligence\" in the text of the bill.67 Four of these bills have been enacted into law.  Section 238\nof the John S. McCain National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019 directs the Department of Defense to undertake several activities regarding AI.68  Subsection (b) requires the Secretary of Defense to appoint a coordinator who will oversee and direct the activities of the Department \"relating to the development and demonstration of artificial intelligence and machine learning.\"  Subsection (g) provides the following definition of AI:\n\n(g) ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE DEFINEDIn this section, the term \"artificial intelligence\" includes the following:\n\n(1) Any artificial system that performs tasks under varying and\nunpredictable circumstance without significant human oversight, or that can learn from experience and improve performance when exposed to data sets.\n(2) An artificial system developed in computer software, physical\nhardware, or other context that solves tasks requiring human-like perception,\ncognition,\nplanning,\nlearning,\ncommunication,\nor\nphysical action.\n(3) An artificial system designed to think or act like a human, Including cognitive architectures and neural networks. (4) A set of techniques, including machine learning, that is designed\nto approximate a cognitive task.\n(5) An artificial system designed to act rationally, including an\nintelligent software agent or embodied robot that achieves goals using perception, planning, reasoning, learning, communicating, decision making, and acting.\n\nSubsection (f) instructs the Secretary of Defense to \"delineate a definition of the term 'artificial intelligence' for use within the Department\" no later than one year after the law's enactment.\nIn 2018, Congress also advised the Federal Aviation Administration, in language inserted into the FAA Reauthorization Act of 2018, to periodically review, with industry and academic experts, the state of AI in aviation and take steps, as needed, to address new developments.69\n\nIn 2015, Congress included language in the Fixing America's Surface Transportation Act (FAST ACT) directing the Department of Transportation to fund research on the application of autonomous vehicles in developing and improving traffic patterns on highways.70 The United States Department of Transportation has solicited requests for comments for proposed studies of automated driving systems. One such request, issued by the Federal Highway Administration, asked for comments on \"a range of issues related to assessing the infrastructure requirements and standards that may be necessary for enabling safe and efficient operations of ADS [Automated Driving Systems].\"71\n\nAnother request for comment, issued by the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, concerned possible barriers created by existing Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards to the testing of autonomous vehicles, especially those with nontraditional interior design elements such as vehicles that do not have steering wheels.72\n\nII.  State Legislation and Regulatory Action\n\nIn 2011, Nevada adopted the first legislation concerning the testing of autonomous vehicles.73  The specific law defines autonomous vehicle as restricted to the operation of \"the motor vehicle without active control or monitoring of a human operator.\"74  The law also sets forth requirements for the testing of such vehicles,75 and directs that regulations be issued governing their operation.76\n\n18/pdf/2018-00784.pdf, *archived at* https://perma.cc/GC38-GY7H.\nIn 2012, Florida adopted similar legislation providing for the testing and operation of autonomous vehicles.77 California also adopted legislation on the subject in 2012.78 According to the National Conference of State Legislatures, roughly 60% of states have adopted some form of legislation concerning autonomous vehicles.79 In some states, provisions for testing autonomous vehicles have been adopted through executive order or administrative regulation.  In Arizona, the governor issued executive orders directing state agencies to devise regulations for the testing of autonomous vehicles.80 This order was modified in 2018 after a pedestrian was fatally injured by an autonomous vehicle.81 In this incident the National Transportation Safety Board found that a combination of the disabling of the vehicle's automatic braking system and a failure to warn the on-board human operator of the presence of an unknown object led to the crash.82\n\nNevada began to issue regulations for the operation of autonomous vehicles in 2012.83  California adopted regulations for the testing of autonomous vehicles in 2014.84 The Division of Motor Vehicles adopted regulations for deployment of autonomous vehicles in 2018.85\n\n\nLEGISLATURES (Nov. 7, 2018), http://www.ncsl.org/research/transportation/autonomous-vehicles-self-drivingvehicles-enacted-legislation.aspx, *archived at* https://perma.cc/42XZ-GD6B. 80 Exec. Order No. 2015-09, Aug. 25, 2015, 22 Ariz. Admin. Reg. 87 (Jan. 15, 2016), https://apps.azsos. gov/public_services/register/2016/3/26_governor_EO.pdf, *archived at* https://perma.cc/RQ7Z-FDNR.\n81 *See* Ryan Randazzo, *Arizona Governor Doug Ducey Suspends Testing of Uber Self-Driving Cars*, AZCENTRAL\n(Mar. 26, 2016), https://www.azcentral.com/story/news/local/tempe-breaking/2018/03/26/doug-ducey-uber-selfdriving-cars-program-suspended-arizona/460915002/, *archived at* https://perma.cc/25GJ-XDY8. 82 NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD, PRELIMINARY REPORT: HIGHWAY HWY18MH010 (undated;\nreleased May 24, 2018), https://www.ntsb.gov/investigations/AccidentReports/Reports/HWY18MH010-prelim.pdf, archived at https://perma.cc/K7NL-R9SX. 83 NAC 482A (rev. Dec. 2017), https://www.leg.state.nv.us/NAC/NAC-482A.html, *archived at* https://perma.cc/BB42-AFTN. 84 CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 13, art. 3.7, https://govt.westlaw.com/calregs/Browse/Home/California/California CodeofRegulations?guid=I2C7E6D928F844151A40CEAA8D7BC189E&originationContext=documenttoc&transiti onType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default), *archived at* https://perma.cc/BYH3-256R. 85 CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 13, art. 3.8, https://govt.westlaw.com/calregs/Browse/Home/California/CaliforniaCodeofRegulations?guid=IC2F61D9B8C8742\nF78925B5494B4C57B1&originationContext=documenttoc&transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default), archived at https://perma.cc/FT5M-3G32.\n\nAccording to the National Conference of State Legislatures, as of April 2017, twenty-eight states\nhad introduced some form of regulations for autonomous vehicles.86\n\nIII.  Other Government Actions Related to AI\n\nA.  Government Reports The following are high-level federal government reports related to AI prepared by the current and previous administrations:\n- EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, NATIONAL SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY COUNCIL,\nCOMMITTEE ON ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE, PREPARING FOR THE FUTURE OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE (2016), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/whitehouse_\nfiles/microsites/ostp/NSTC/preparing_for_the_future_of_ai.pdf, *archived at* https://perma.cc/\n4RCY-PUS4. This report summarizes the status of AI in American society, economy, and government.  It looks at specific applications, such as transportation and war fighting, and makes nonbinding recommendations.\n- WHITE HOUSE OFFICE OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY POLICY, SUMMARY OF THE WHITE HOUSE\nSUMMIT\nON\nARTIFICIAL\nINTELLIGENCE\nFOR\nAMERICAN\nINDUSTRY\n(2018),\nhttps://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2018/05/Summary-Report-of-White- House-AI-Summit.pdf, *archived at* https://perma.cc/Z7N7-24JE. This report reviews the Trump administration's regulatory and policy approach to AI.\nB.  Position on Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems At the 2018 meeting of the GGE on LAWS, established under the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, the representatives of the United States argued that at this point it is too early for LAWS to be banned under the Convention. The delegation also presented its position that at this time it is not necessary to create a definition of LAWS, and that such systems should not be stigmatized, but instead their use should be viewed within the framework of the current laws of war.87\n\n\n## East/South Asia And The Pacific\n\nAustralia\n\nI.  Use of Artificial Intelligence in Australia According to a news article published in January 2018, a survey of Australian senior executives and IT decision-makers found that \"almost nine in 10 business leaders at large Australian businesses having deployed artificial intelligence (AI) technologies within their organisations in some form,\" with \"[f]ifty-one percent of Australian organisations . . . deploying AI in the context of machine learning, 48 percent . . . looking at automated reasoning, 47 percent at robotics, 44\npercent at knowledge representation, and 39 percent Natural Language Processing.\"1 In terms of the public sector, the Australian government signed a deal with IBM in July 2018 for the company to \"provide a $1 billion five-year technology service to accelerate the uptake of blockchain, artificial intelligence (AI) and quantum computing in the public sector.\"2 The deal was led by the Digital Transformation Agency, which was formally established as a separate agency in October 2016 to \"guide, oversee and drive the Government's ambitious digital and ICT agendas.\"3\nThe federal government aims to be one of the top three digital governments in the world by 2025.4\n\nII.  Federal Government Investment and AI Framework Development The 201819 Australian federal government budget included an AU$29.9 million (about US$21.7 million) funding package over four years \"to develop the artificial intelligence and machine learning capabilities of Australian businesses and workers.\"5 The package is comprised of four elements:6 development of AI skills through the funding of postgraduate scholarships and the\n\n\"development of online resources to engage students and support teachers to deliver AI content in the Australian curriculum\"; 7 development of a Technology Roadmap to \"inform government investment in artificial intelligence by identifying global opportunities in both artificial intelligence and machine learning, and any barriers to adoption in Australia\";8 development of a national AI Ethics Framework and Standards Framework to address ethics for adopting such technologies in Australia;9 and AU$25 million in funding for a Cooperative Research Centers Program project area, which will focus specifically on AI.10 In the area of ethics and human rights implications of AI, the Office of the Australian Information Commissioner published the *Guide to Data Analytics and the Australian Privacy Principles* in March 2018.11 In addition, the Australian Human Rights Commission discussed AI in a July 2018\nissues paper on human rights and technology12 that asks \"how Australian law should protect human rights in the development and use of new technologies.\"13 The issues paper was published at the commencement of a major three-year project on this topic, which will see a discussion paper published in early 2019 and final recommendations delivered in late 2019. A website has been established in order to provide information on the project and engage the public through consultation processes.14\nau/funding-and-incentives/manufacturing/industry-40 (last updated Aug. 14, 2018), *archived at* https://perma.cc/SGF5-A8UP. https://www.business.gov.au/-/media/Business/CRC/Cooperative-research-centres-projects-factsheet-artificialintelligence-PDF.pdf?la=en&hash=087AD41AFC84DDA6AA8996C60E38C03F38491A67 (last visited Nov. 8, 2018), *archived at* https://perma.cc/P2R5-RF3J. *See generally Cooperative Research Centres (CRC) Program*, BUSINESS.GOV.AU, https://www.business.gov.au/assistance/cooperative-research-centres-programme (last updated Oct. 8, 2018), *archived at* https://perma.cc/M2ZA-HJ5T; *Cooperative Research Centres Projects (CRC-P) Grants*, BUSINESS.GOV.AU, https://www.business.gov.au/assistance/cooperative-research-centres-programme/cooperativeresearch-centres-projects-crc-ps (last updated Sept. 13, 2018), *archived at* https://perma.cc/HKA7-HPF3.\nIII.  Government Actions in Particular Areas A.  Autonomous Vehicles\n\nIn May 2017, the National Transport Commission (NTC) published the Guidelines for Trials of Automated Vehicles in Australia.15 It subsequently also developed national enforcement guidelines to clarify how the concepts, contained in the Australian Road Rules, of \"control\" and \"proper control\" should apply to vehicles with automated functions.16 To date, three Australian states have enacted legislation related to enabling trials of autonomous vehicles.17 Although each of the laws differ in approach, they include approval processes and insurance requirements related to conducting trials, as well as covering safety management plans and data collection.18 Other jurisdictions also have projects or initiatives associated with testing cooperative and automated vehicles.19 In May 2018, the NTC published a policy paper that recommended national legislative reform to\n\nMENT ACT 2016_10/2016.10.UN.PDF, *archived at* https://perma.cc/3BCM-82DN; Transport Legislation Amendment (Automated Vehicle Trials and Innovation) Act 2017 (NSW), https://legislation.nsw.gov.au/~/pdf/ view/act/2017/41/whole, *archived at* https://perma.cc/4ZLT-CQM7; Road Safety (Automated Vehicles) Act 2018 (Vic), http://www.legislation.vic.gov.au/Domino/Web_Notes/LDMS/PubStatbook.nsf/51dea49770555ea6 ca256da4001b90cd/6EADABCAD6531AB7CA2582410010E08A/$FILE/18-008aa%20authorised.pdf, archived at https://perma.cc/XD8V-6PBY. cars.aspx, *archived at* https://perma.cc/KF6Z-ZJ2M; *CANdrive - Automated Vehicle Trial*, ACT GOVERNMENT, https://www.business.act.gov.au/resources_and_networks/candrive-automated-vehicle-trial (last updated July 30, 2018), *archived at* https://perma.cc/LUL2-TAZ5.\n\n-\nprovide clarity about the situations when an automated driving system (ADS), rather\nthan a human driver, may drive a vehicle[;]\n-\nensure there is a legal entity that can be held responsible for the ADS when it is operating[; and]\n-\nestablish any new legal obligations that may be required for users of\nautomated vehicles[.]20\n\nThe reforms are part of a broader national reform program that \"aims to put end-to-end regulation in place by 2020 to support the safe commercial deployment and operation of automated vehicles at all levels of automation.\"21 As part of this work, in 2018 the NTC also published a Regulation Impact Statement (RIS) that \"details the legislative options to underpin the safety assurance system to support the safe, commercial deployment and operation of automated vehicles at all levels of automation.\"22 It has also released discussion papers on regulating government access to C-ITS\n(Cooperative Intelligent Transport Systems) and automated vehicle data, and on motor accident injury insurance and automated vehicles.23\n\nB.  Autonomous Weapons Systems A 2015 inquiry by the Senate Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Committee on the potential use by the Australian Defence Force of unmanned air, maritime, and land platforms resulted in recommendations that included\n\nthat the Australian Defence Force acquire armed unmanned platforms when the capability requirement exists and the Australian Government make a policy statement regarding their use. This policy statement will:\n-\naffirm that armed unmanned platforms will be used in accordance with international law;\n-\ncommit that armed unmanned platforms will only be operated by the Australian\nDefence Force personnel; and\n-\ninclude appropriate transparency measures governing the use of armed\nunmanned platforms.24\n\n\nhttps://perma.cc/3BU8-B4RC.\nThe government's response to this recommendation included a statement that,\n[i]f the Government decides to acquire armed unmanned systems, Defence will develop policy and doctrine concerning their use. All Australian Defence capabilities, including unmanned platforms, will continue to be operated in accordance with Australian domestic law and consistent with Australia's international legal obligations (in particular the provisions of the law of armed conflict).25 At the international level, Australia's statements at meetings of the GGE on LAWS have included the following:\n\nAs a party to Additional Protocol I, Australia fully supports and adheres to the obligation to undertake a review of any new weapon, means or method of warfare to determine whether its employment would, in some or all circumstances, be prohibited by International Humanitarian Law or other international law by which Australia is bound. We recognise the potential complexity of reviewing weapons systems that include increasingly automated functions and look forward to discussing this further. The complexity of weapons reviews is destined to increase as artificial intelligence and machine learning evolves. However, Australia remains committed to the existing legal framework for reviewing new weapons under Article 36 of Additional Protocol I.26 [November 2017]\n\n\nWe recognise the potential value which autonomy brings to military and civilian technologies. Systems with advanced artificial intelligence and enhanced autonomous functions are becoming increasingly more prevalent in both contexts. In particular, we understand that militaries throughout the world are incorporating ever more automation into their systems. This is not new or surprising. We welcome discussions on how such technological advances in weapon systems will comply with International Humanitarian Law (IHL), increase precision, and support commanders fulfil their obligations to IHL on the battlefield.27 [April 2018] In March 2018, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, in a letter to a group of AI experts who had called on the government to take a \"firm global stand\" against LAWS that remove meaningful human control,28 stated that the government \"considers it would be premature to support a pre-emptive ban on autonomous weapons systems\" and that it \"will continue to develop its policies on artificial\n\nintelligence and LAWS within the framework of [its] international obligations, especially international law.\"29\nChina I.  National AI Strategies A.  Long-Term AI Development Plan On July 20, 2017, China's State Council released the Next Generation Artificial Intelligence Development Plan (Development Plan).30 The Development Plan sets forth long-term strategic goals for AI development in China, concluding in 2030. It contains \"guarantee measures,\" such as developing a regulatory system and strengthening intellectual property protection, in promoting AI development. The Development Plan is comprised of three stages, concluding in 2020, 2025, and 2030, respectively, and sets forth goals concerning building a regulatory framework and ethics framework for each stage, as follows:\n- By 2020, China's overall technology and application of AI would catch up with the globally\n\nadvanced levels. AI ethical norms, policies, and laws and regulations would be initially established in some areas.\n- By 2025, China would achieve major breakthroughs in basic AI theories, and become worldleading in some technologies and applications. AI legal, ethical, and policy systems would be initially established, and AI security assessment and control capabilities would be achieved.\n- By 2030, China's AI theories, technologies, and applications would achieve world-leading\nlevels, making China the world's primary AI innovation center. AI legal, ethical, and policy\nsystems would be further improved.31\n\nThe Development Plan proposes to \"form an institutional arrangement to adapt to the development of AI, build an open and inclusive international environment, and reinforce the social foundation of AI development.\"32 The specific guarantee measures in this regard include the following:\n\n\n\n- Developing regulatory and ethical frameworks: This measure aims to strengthen research on\nlegal, ethical, and social issues related to AI, and establish regulatory and ethical frameworks to ensure the healthy development of AI. Specifically, China would conduct research on legal\nissues related to AI applications, including confirmation of civil and criminal responsibility,\nprotection of privacy and property, and information security utilization.33\n- Providing tax incentives for AI enterprises: The aim of this key policy is to support the\ndevelopment of AI enterprises by providing tax incentives and research and development\ndeductions to high-tech enterprises.34\n- Formulating technical standards: This would see the formulation of technical standards\nconcerning, for example, network security and privacy protection. Chinese AI enterprises\nwould be encouraged to participate in or lead the development of international AI standards.35\n- Strengthening the protection of intellectual property (IP): This would promote the IP protection\nof AI innovations and promote usage of new AI technology by establishing AI public\npatent pools.36\n- Establishing the AI security supervision and evaluation system: the intent is to build an early\nwarning mechanism of AI security monitoring and an open and transparent AI supervision system. China would promote self-discipline of the AI industry and enterprises, and increase punishments for data abuse, violations of personal privacy, and unethical activities in\nthis regard.37\nB.  Three-Year Action Plan (20182020) To implement the first stage of the Development Plan, in December 2017, China's Ministry of Industry and Information Technology (MIIT) issued the Three-Year Action Plan for Promoting Development of a New Generation Artificial Intelligence Industry (Action Plan).38 According to the Action Plan, China would focus on the following seven fields in the three years from 20182020:\n- Intelligent network vehicles\n\n- Intelligent service robots\n- Intelligent unmanned aerial vehicles\n- Medical imaging diagnosis systems - Video image identification systems\n- Intelligent voice interactive systems\n- Intelligent translation systems39 The Action Plan also proposes carrying out research on AI-relevant policies, laws, and regulations as a method for creating a good environment for the healthy development of the AI industry, although it does not elaborate any specific measures.40\n\nII.  Autonomous Vehicles\n\nOn April 11, 2018, the MIIT, the Ministry of Public Security (MPS), and the Ministry of Transport (MOT) jointly issued a set of trial rules that pave the way for road testing of autonomous vehicles in China (National Rules).41 The National Rules, which took effect on May 1, 2018, contain requirements for test vehicles and test drivers.42 The Rules also specify the testing procedures. For example, a test driver must always sit in the driver's seat of the test vehicle during the test, monitor the status of the test vehicle and the driving environment, and get ready to take over the vehicle anytime.43 Local authorities at the provincial level will formulate implementation rules applicable in their own areas.44 According to the National Rules, a temporary license plate is required for road testing of autonomous vehicles.45 As of October 2018, at least eight cities, including Beijing, Shanghai, Shenzhen, and Chongqing, had published their local rules and started issuing temporary license plates for the road testing of autonomous vehicles in their areas.46\n\n\nIII.  Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems (LAWS) On April 13, 2018, China's delegation to the UN  GGE on LAWS reportedly announced China's desire to negotiate and conclude a new protocol for the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons to ban the use of fully autonomous lethal weapons systems.47 China's latest position paper for the GGE, dated April 11, 2018, indicates China believes that, at present, LAWS still lacks a clear and agreed definition and many countries believe such weapon systems do not exist.48 China therefore supports reaching an agreement on the specific definition of LAWS. It called on \"all countries to exercise precaution, and to refrain, in particular, from any indiscriminate use against civilians.\"49 The position paper also states that it is necessary, \"when exploring LAWS-related legal issues, to have full consideration of the applicability of general legal norms to LAWS.\" 50 Concerning emerging technologies such as AI, China \"believes that the impact of emerging technologies deserve objective, impartial and full discussion.\"51 It states that\n\"[u]ntil such discussions have been done, there should not be any pre-set premises or prejudged outcome which may impede the development of AI technology.\"52\n\nIV.  Facial Recognition China is reportedly building a video surveillance system with cutting-edge technologies such as facial recognition. According to the 2018 annual report of the United States Congressional- Executive Commission on China, as of 2017, the system consisted of twenty million cameras with many having facial recognition capabilities. In addition to fighting crime, a primary function of the system is to maintain social stability, such as preventing protests and demonstrations.53 The country aims to complete a nationwide facial recognition and surveillance network by 2020 with \"100 percent surveillance and facial recognition coverage and total unification of its existing databases across the country.\"54\n\n\nDuring 2018, the MPS was reportedly developing a facial recognition database \"with the power to identify any one of its 1.3 billion citizens within three seconds,\" in conjunction with a security company based in Shanghai.55 According to the news report, the database can be connected to surveillance camera networks and will use cloud facilities to connect with data storage and processing centers distributed across the country.56 In cities such as Shenzhen, in Guangdong Province, the traffic police have introduced facial recognition technology and LED screens to shame and deter jaywalkers.  Cameras on the streets capture images of people illegally crossing the road and the facial recognition software then identifies the citizens by comparing their images against a database. Photos of those people alongside their family names and part of their ID numbers are displayed on screens.57 In addition, in early 2018 it was reported that police officers in Zhengzhou, Henan Province, were using glasses with facial-recognition software to help search for wanted criminals.58\n\n\nIndia\n\nI.  Background According to a report published by the Brookings Institution, the Indian AI industry \"has seen growth in this period [20122017], with a total of $150 million invested in more than 400 companies over the past five years. Most of these investments have come in the last two years, when investment nearly doubled from $44 million in 2016 to $77 million in 2017.\"59 India currently has no laws or government-issued guidelines regulating AI. Instead, the government developed a number of national strategies or road maps related to AI in 2018.60\n\n\nRZRR. 56 Id. 57 Christina Zhao, *Jaywalking in China: Facial Recognition Surveillance Will Soon Fine Citizens via Text Message*, NEWSWEEK (Mar. 27, 2018), https://www.newsweek.com/jaywalking-china-facial-recognition-surveillance-willsoon-fine-citizens-text-861401, *archived at* https://perma.cc/S5BU-5KK6. 58 Kinling Lo, *In China, These Facial-Recognition Glasses Are Helping Police to Catch Criminals*, SOUTH CHINA MORNING POST (Feb. 7, 2018), https://www.scmp.com/news/china/society/article/2132395/chinese-police-scansuspects-using-facial-recognition-glasses, *archived at* https://perma.cc/7C6S-UNXP.\nII.  National Initiatives A.  Report of the Artificial Intelligence Task Force\n\nOn August 24, 2017, the Ministry of Industry and Commerce constituted an eighteen-member Task Force on AI for India's Economic Transformation,61 which is made up of experts, academics, and researchers/industry leaders, with the participation of governmental bodies/ministries (such as the National Institution for Transforming India (NITI Aayog), Ministry of Electronics and Information Technology, Department of Science and Technology, Unique Identification Authority of India, and Defence Research and Development Organization).62 The task force completed its report in January 2018.63 The task force's report looked at the \"use of AI along with its major challenges, and possible solutions for each sector.\"64 It examined ten sectors, referred to as \"domains of relevance to India.\"\nThese sectors were: Manufacturing, FinTech, Agriculture, Healthcare, Technology for the Differently-abled, National Security, Environment, Public Utility Services, Retail and Customer Relationship, and Education.65  The task force made several recommendations to the government:\n\nNoting that 'AI should be seen as a scalable problem solver in India rather than only as a booster of economic growth', the Task Force recommends: (a) the creation of an interministerial National AI mission to coordinate AI-related activities in India; (b) enabling the setting up of digital data banks, marketplaces and exchanges to ensure availability of cross-industry data and information; (c) participating in the elaboration of operation standards for AI-based systems; (d) putting in place enabling policies to encourage and facilitate the development and deployment of AI-based products (such as data policies regarding ownership, sharing rights and usage, as well as tax incentives to support innovation); (e) elaborating an AI education strategy to develop human resources with necessary skills; (f) supporting reskilling of the current workforce; (g) participating in the international policy discussion on the governance of AI technologies; and (h) leveraging\n\n61 Press Release, Ministry of Commerce and Industry, Commerce and Industry Minister Sets Up Task Force on bilateral partnership on the development of AI solutions for social and economic problems and for sharing best practices in regulation.66\n\nB.  NITI Aayog Discussion Paper on a National AI Strategy\n\nOn February 1, 2018, Finance Minister Arun Jaitley stated that the government think-tank NITI\nAayog \"would lead the national programme on AI\" and that \"[the government is set to support startups and centres of excellence with respect to AI training and research activities.\"67 The Committee of Secretaries held a meeting on February, 8, 2018, and tasked NITI Aayog with formulating a National Strategy Plan for AI \"in consultation with Ministries and Departments concerned, academia and private sector.\"68 On June 4, 2018, NITI Aayog published a discussion paper on a National Strategy on Artificial Intelligence.69 The discussion paper states that \"[t]he strategy should strive to leverage AI for economic growth, social development and inclusive growth.\"70 It identified five sectors that could have the most social impact and which should be focused on: Healthcare, Agriculture, Education, Smart Cities/Infrastructure, Smart Mobility, and Transportation.71 Experts have noted that the proposed strategy stands out due to its \"focus on the social sector.\"72\n\nThe discussion paper provides over thirty policy recommendations, including to \"invest in scientific research, encourage reskilling and training, accelerate the adoption of AI across the value chain, and promote ethics, privacy, and security in AI.\"73 Tim Dutton, an AI policy researcher, provides a summary of some of these policy recommendations:\nIts flagship initiative is a two-tiered integrated strategy to boost research in AI. First, new Centres of Research Excellence in AI (COREs) will focus on fundamental research. Second, the COREs will act as technology feeders for the International Centres for Transformational AI (ICTAIs), which will focus on creating AI-based applications in domains of societal importance. In the report, NITI Aayong identifies healthcare, agriculture, education, smart cities, and smart mobility as the priority sectors that will\n\n\nbenefit the most socially from applying AI. The report also recommends setting up a consortium of Ethics Councils at each CORE and ICTAI, developing sector specific guidelines on privacy, security, and ethics, creating a National AI Marketplace to increase market discovery and reduce time and cost of collecting data, and a number of initiatives to help the overall workforce acquire skills. Strategically, the government wants to establish India as an \"AI Garage,\" meaning that if a company can deploy an AI in India, it will then be applicable to the rest of the developing world.74\n\n## C.  Ministry Of Electronics And Information Technology Committees\n\nThe Ministry of Electronics and Information Technology has established four committees to help encourage research in AI. They are headed by \"directors of Indian Institutes of Technology (IITs), Nasscom and eminent researchers\"75 and include the following:\n\ni.\nCommittee on platforms and data for AI,\nii. Committee on leveraging AI for identifying National Missions in key sectors,\niii. Committee on mapping technological capabilities, key policy enablers, skilling, reskilling and R&D\niv. Committee on cybersecurity, safety, legal and ethical issues.76\nThe four committees are \"presently studying AI in context of citizen centric services; data platforms; skilling, reskilling and R&D; and legal, regulatory and cybersecurity perspectives.\"77\n\nD.   AI and Defense\nIn February 2018, the government of India established a multi-stakeholder task force (\"comprising the Government, Services, Academia, Industry, Professionals and Start-ups\") to study the strategic and national security implications of AI for India. The task force submitted its report to the Minister of Defense on June 30, 2018. The report is said to include\nrecommendations relating to making India a significant power of AI in defence, specifically in the area of aviation, naval, land systems, cyber, nuclear and biological warfare including both defensive and offensive needs including counter AI needs; recommendations for policy and institutional interventions required to regulate and encourage robust AI based technologies for defence sector; working with start-\n\nups/commercial industry and recommendations for appropriate strategies of working with start ups.78\nAmbassador Amandeep Singh Gill of India was chair of both the 2017 and 2018 meetings of the GGE on LAWS. India's position on LAWS79 is that the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons is the \"relevant forum to address the issue of the possible expansion of the autonomous dimension of lethal weapons systems,\" 80 and it \"advised for balancing the lethality of these weapons with military necessityadopting a wait-and-watch approach to how the conversation evolves.\"81\nIII.  Regulatory Framework and Proposed Changes\n\nA.  Privacy Challenges\n\nIndia currently does not have a comprehensive legal framework for data protection. On July 27, 2018, the government of India's Committee of Experts (also known as the Justice B.N. Srikrishna Committee) released a Draft Protection of Personal Data Bill82 along with an accompanying report titled *A Free and Fair Digital Economy Protecting Privacy, Empowering Indians*.83 The Bill, like the EU's General Data Protection Regulation, establishes a set of rights but does not appear to include rights to protect against automated decision-making.84 According to an analysis by the Centre for Internet and Society, \"the Bill creates a framework to address harms arising out of AI, but does not empower the individual to decide how their data is processed and remains silent on\n\nInternational Peace, June 2016), https://carnegieendowment.org/files/CEIP_CP275_Reddy_final.pdf, archived at https://perma.cc/4R3L-ANUX. 80 Statement by Commodore Nishant Kumar, Director (Military Affairs), Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India During the First Session of the Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) on Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems (LAWS) Held in Geneva on April 9, 2018, PERMANENT MISSION OF INDIA TO CONFERENCE ON\nDISARMAMENT, http://meaindia.nic.in/cdgeneva/?6850?003, *archived at* https://perma.cc/DPS9-QLW4. 81 Bedavyasa Mohanty, *Amidst Calls for a Ban, India Leads the Debate on Lethal Autonomous Weapons,* OBSERVER RESEARCHER FOUNDATION (ORF) (Nov. 29, 2017), https://www.orfonline.org/research/amidst-calls-ban-indialeads-debate-lethal-autonomous-weapons/, *archived at* https://perma.cc/ND39-SG79. 82 Personal Data Protection Bill, 2018, http://meity.gov.in/writereaddata/files/Personal_Data_Protection_Bill,2018.pdf, *archived at* https://perma.cc/GN5K-\nNJNG. ECONOMY PROTECTING PRIVACY, EMPOWERING INDIANS (2018), http://meity.gov.in/writereaddata/files/Data_ Protection_Committee_Report.pdf, *archived at* https://perma.cc/URX5-YQF6.\nIndia, CIS (Sept. 3, 2018), https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/the-srikrishna-committee-data-protectionthe issue of 'black box' algorithms\" and is \"focused on placing the responsibility on companies to prevent harm.\"85 The Committee's report states that\n\n[t]he second group of rights relate to the right to object to automated decision-making and to access the logic behind it. In our view, these rights, again a response by the EU to emerging challenges from Big Data and AI, have a legitimate rationale. They are aimed at curbing harms due to prejudice and discrimination in output data owing to evaluative determinations without human review. The solution provided by this right is to simply involve a step of human review, which is not per se immune from prejudice. This is a change pertaining to the operational structure of an organisation. Such a change may be necessitated, provided it is carefully tailored to specific organisations and the nature of their processing activity. This, in our view, is better achieved through an accountability framework which requires certain data fiduciaries, which may be making evaluative decisions through automated means, to set up processes that weed out discrimination. This is a constituent element of privacy by design which should be implemented by entities proactively, audited periodically and monitored by the DPA in case there are examples of unlawful processing. At the same time, such a model does not entirely denude the individual of agency. If discrimination has ensued as a result of per se lawful, yet discriminatory automated processing, individuals are always at liberty to go to courts for breach of fiduciary duties. Thus, the interests underlying such rights, can be more efficaciously achieved by an ex ante accountability model.86 B.  Automated Vehicles\n\nThe Seventh Schedule of the Constitution of India lists legislative subjects that are in the exclusive or concurrent jurisdiction of the central government or state governments. The regulation of motor vehicles in India appears to be under the concurrent jurisdiction of both the central and state governments.87 Motor vehicle road safety is regulated by the central level by the Motor Vehicles Act88 and the Central Motor Vehicle Rules.89 State governments have their own laws and policies.\n\nThe current Motor Vehicle Act does not appear to allow for automated vehicles (AVs) or AV testing. However, amending legislation, which was passed in the Lok Sabha (lower house of Parliament) on April 10, 2017, but is still pending before the upper house chamber, the Rajya Sabha, includes an exemption that may allow testing of AVs:\nNotwithstanding anything contained in this Act and subject to such conditions as may be prescribed by the Central Government, in order to promote innovation and research and development in the fields of vehicular engineering, mechanically propelled vehicles and transportation in general, the Central Government may exempt certain types of mechanically propelled vehicles from the application of the provisions of this Act.90\n\nAt the end of July 2018, the Minister of Road Transport and Highways was reported to have said that \"[w]e won't allow driverless cars in India. I am very clear on this. We won't allow any technology that takes away jobs. In a country where you have unemployment, you can't have a technology that ends up taking people's jobs.\"91\n\nIV.  AI and Facial Recognition State police forces across India are working with private companies to deploy AI-assisted facial or image recognition algorithms and predictive policing tools to detect and prevent crimes.92\n\n(Working Draft), https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/ai-and-governance-case-study-pdf (last visited Nov. 21,\n2018), *archived at* https://perma.cc/RZ35-PFCJ; Abhishek Baxi, Law Enforcement Agencies in India Are Using Artificial Intelligence to Nab Criminals - Here's How, FORBES (Sept. 28, 2018), https://www.forbes.com/sites/ baxiabhishek/2018/09/28/law-enforcement-agencies-in-india-are-using-artificial-intelligence-to-nab-criminalsheres-how/#fce76d241d31, *archived at* https://perma.cc/93LW-TDEG; John R. Quain, Crime-predicting A.I. Isn't Science Fiction. It's About to Roll Out in India, DIGITAL TRENDS (Apr. 11, 2018), https://www.digitaltrends.com/ cool-tech/could-ai-based-surveillance-predict-crime-before-it-happens/, *archived at* https://perma.cc/R76Z-AHPU; Smita Sinha, *How Staqu's AI-Powered Smart Glasses Can Help Cops Identify Criminals in a Crowd*, ANALYTICS INDIA MAGAZINE (May 31, 2018), https://www.analyticsindiamag.com/how-staqus-ai-powered-smart-glasses-canhelp-cops-identify-criminals-in-a-crowd/, *archived at* https://perma.cc/B27C-XZHC.\n\nIndonesia Indonesian entities are reportedly leaders in the adoption of AI in the ASEAN region, with a recent survey showing that nearly 25% of organizations have done so.93 In October 2018, Indonesia's first AI research center was launched.94 The government itself is using AI, such as in its approach to combatting hoaxes and false information online.95 The government reportedly produced a digital strategy in 2017, with a focus on supporting small and medium enterprises to be \"digitally empowered.\"96 In August 2018, the President of Indonesia stated that the country's automotive sector needed to take note of developments in the global automotive industry, including the challenges arising from the disruption of technology such as autonomous vehicles and online transportation applications.\n\nWith reference to autonomous vehicles, he stated that \"we might have to redefine a car.\"97 There are currently no specific laws or regulations related to autonomous vehicles in Indonesia.98\nJapan The Strategic Council for AI Technology was established in April 2016 at the behest of Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, to develop research and development goals and a roadmap for the industrialization of AI.  Comprised of representatives from academia, industry, and government,99\nread/news/2018/10/27/310922922/Joint-Effort-Drives-Indonesias-First-AI-Research-Center, *archived at* https://perma.cc/Z24L-EB3S. 95 *Government Deploys Artificial Intelligence to Combat Internet Hoaxes*, JAKARTA POST (Jan. 31, 2018), http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2018/01/31/govt-deploys-artificial-intelligence-to-combat-internethoaxes.html, *archived at* https://perma.cc/4H8A-62R5. 96 Lis Sutjiati, *Indonesia's Digital Economy Will Thrive as Small Business Come Online, Says Gov't*, TECHINASIA\n(Nov. 3, 2017), https://www.techinasia.com/indonesias-digital-economy-thrive-small-businesses-online-govt-plan, archived at https://perma.cc/4XHC-XTD2; *Transformation Towards Indonesia's Digital-Savvy MSMEs*, ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS, https://asean.org/transformation-towards-indonesias-digital-savvymsmes/ (last visited Nov. 19, 2018), *archived at* https://perma.cc/3HHS-NHCW. 97 *We Must Follow the Development of Global Automotive Industry*, SEKRETARIAT KABINET REPUBLIC INDONESIA\n(Aug. 2, 2018), http://setkab.go.id/en/we-must-follow-the-development-of-global-automotive-industry/, archived at https://perma.cc/9V8P-787A.\nthe Strategic Council released its Artificial Intelligence Technology Strategy in March 2017.100\nAccording to the Strategy, the Council acts as a control tower and manages five national research and development institutions that are under the jurisdictions of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications (MIC); the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology\n(MEXT); and the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI) in order to promote research and development of AI technology.  In addition to the three ministries, the Council coordinates with ministries that possess big data and have jurisdiction over industries that utilize AI, such as the Cross-ministerial Strategic Innovation Promotion Program of the Cabinet Office; the Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare; the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism; and the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries, to promote the utilization and application of AI technology. 101  The Council has also formulated industrialization roadmaps for the three prioritized areas of \"productivity,\" \"health, medical care, and welfare,\" and \"mobility.\"102  The Strategy also states that national institutions would develop infrastructure technology, foster skilled human resources, maintain public data, and support start-ups.103  In August 2018, the Council issued an implementation plan for the strategy.104 According to a news article, the government is drafting a comprehensive rule on medical devices that utilize AI.  The rule would prescribe that the ultimate responsibility for diagnosis remains with medical doctors and set safety standards for approval by the government.105 As a reference for private businesses, METI has formulated Contract Guidance on Utilization of AI and Data to summarize the issues and factors to be considered when businesses draft a contract on the development and utilization of AI-based software.106  The Guidance suggests a new contract model that recognizes the importance of AI-related developers' expertise and compensates them for it.107\n\n\n100 STRATEGIC COUNCIL FOR AI TECHNOLOGY, ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE TECHNOLOGY STRATEGY (Mar. 31, 2017), http://www.nedo.go.jp/content/100865202.pdf, *archived at* https://perma.cc/Z59H-ZR3M.\n101 Id. at 3. 102 Id. at 4.\n\nHealthcare, Prescribe \"Medical Doctor Ultimately Responsible\"], NIKKEI (June 26, 2018), https://www.nikkei.\n\ncom/article/DGXMZO32207330V20C18A6MM8000/ (registration required).\n\nRegarding the regulation of self-driving cars, the government has discussed changes to various laws to prepare for their utilization by 2020.108  Testing of self-driving cars has been allowed in certain conditions.109  In June 2017, the National Police Agency issued circular that allowed testing of remote control autonomous driving system upon permission.110  The MLIT issued a report on an existing law concerning civil responsibility for traffic accidents involving self-driving cars in March 2018.111\n\nMalaysia In October 2017, the Malaysian government announced plans to develop a National AI Framework as an expansion of the existing National Big Data Analytics Framework.112 The development of the framework will be led by the Malaysia Digital Economy Corporation. The government also stated that it would establish the Digital Transformation Acceleration Programme (D-TAP) and introduce a \"Cloud First\" strategy, in addition to its existing Malaysia Tech Entrepreneur Programme (M-TEP).113 In March 2018, the \"Deputy Minister of International Trade and Industry (MITI) officiated the Towards Autonomous Technologies Conference 2018, a collaborative efforts [sic] between MIDA (Malaysian Investment Development Authority), CREST (Collaborative Research in Engineering, Science and Technology) and DRB-HICOM University held at the MIDA headquarters.\"114 The Deputy Minister stated Malaysia has \"notable local companies and universities that have initiated\n109 National Police Agency,  [Guidelines for Testing for Automated Driving System on Public Roads] (May 2016), https://www.npa.go.jp/koutsuu/kikaku/gaideline.pdf, *archived at* https://perma.cc/RLP5-BJBA.\n110 National Police Agency,\n            [Standards of Handling Application for Permission of Road Usage for Testing of Remote Control Autonomous Driving System on Public Roads] (June 2017), http://www.autonomouscar.pref.aichi.jp/application/files/6615/2179/2604/74390936afeef469e578a07d14ec99b5.pdf, *archived at* https://perma.cc/T7E5-UMK5. 111 MLIT,   [STUDY GROUP CONCERNING COMPENSATION FOR DAMAGES CAUSED BY SELF-DRIVING CARS REPORT (Mar. 2018), http://www. mlit.go.jp/common/001226365.pdf, *archived at* https://perma.cc/9TF6-ZR5W. 112 Priyankar Bhunia, Plans for Cloud-First Strategy and National AI Framework Revealed at 29th MSC Malaysia Implementation Council Meeting, OPENGOV ASIA (Oct. 28, 2017), https://www.opengovasia.com/plans-for-cloudfirst-strategy-and-national-ai-framework-revealed-at-29th-msc-malaysia-implementation-council-meeting/, archived at https://perma.cc/4T3J-MLJ7. 113 Azura Abas, *Najib Unveils Malaysia's Digital 'To-Do-List' to Propel Digital Initiatives*, NEW STRAITS TIMES\n(Oct. 19, 2017), https://www.nst.com.my/news/nation/2017/10/292784/najib-unveils-malaysias-digital-do-listpropel-digital-initiatives, *archived at* https://perma.cc/VV7Q-HGHP. 114 Press Release, Malaysian Investment Development Authority, Embracing Future Innovations: Companies Need to Align with the Dynamic Ecosystem of the Automotive Industry (Mar. 21, 2018), http://www.mida.gov.my/home/\n5977/news/embracing-future-innovations-/, *archived at* https://perma.cc/U92R-2D6N.\nseveral development projects related to autonomous vehicles and its related technologies.\"115 There are currently no specific laws or regulations related to autonomous vehicles in Malaysia.116 In November 2018, it was reported that the Malaysian government \"will seek Japan's assistance on investment in the artificial intelligence (AI) industry in the quest to take its technologies to a more advanced level.\"117\nNew Zealand\n\nI.  Use of Artificial Intelligence in New Zealand\n\nA number of businesses and other organizations in New Zealand are currently using and developing AI in different sectors, including agriculture,118 legal services, and retail, according to one website that examines the use of artificial intelligence (AI) in the country.119 Within government, the Ministry of Primary Industries has worked with Customs New Zealand; the Inland Revenue Department; and the Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment, as well as a private IT company, \"to find out whether AI has the potential to make it easier for businesses to interact with government in a multi-agency context.\"120 The AI Proof of Concept was partly inspired by the \"opportunities presented by the Better Rules Initiative,\" which\n\nshowcased \"Human and Machine-consumable Rules\" as a key component for the digital\ntransformation of government. Better Rules worked across several government agencies to explore the ideas and practice of turning legislation into machine-consumable 'digital\n\nmail.com/s/1690988/malaysia-hopes-to-tap-japans-expertise-in-ai-investment, *archived at* https://perma.cc/XA5G-\nX6TD.\n\nrules'. This process found opportunities for government in machine consumable legislation to capture benefits from new technologies - such as artificial intelligence.121 The use of AI to assist digital navigation across government websites was demonstrated among other initiatives at a digital showcase in November 2018.122\n\nII.  Government Initiatives Related to AI In 2013, the New Zealand government established Callaghan Innovation, a government entity that supports businesses through the provision of innovation and research and development services, and that seeks to \"enhance the operation of New Zealand's innovation ecosystem.\"123 In March 2018, it published a white paper on AI,124 which \"predicts how AI will affect [New Zealand's]\nagriculture, digital, energy and health sectors within the next few years. It details how different AI\ntechnologies will disrupt each sector in waves and showcases local examples of AI-\npowered businesses.\"125 Subsequently, in May 2018, a report commissioned by the AI Forum New Zealand was launched by the New Zealand government.126 The report provides the \"first current-state snapshot of New Zealand's AI landscape, touching on the emerging uses of AI.\"127 Established in 2017, the AI\nForum is a nonprofit, nongovernmental organization funded by its members that \"brings together New Zealand's community of artificial intelligence technology innovators, end users, investor groups, regulators, researchers, educators, entrepreneurs and interested public to work together to find ways to use AI to help enable a prosperous, inclusive and thriving future for our nation.\"128 Upon launching the report, the government stated that it would develop an action plan and ethical framework regarding AI. As a first step, it would formalize the government's relationship with the interdisciplinary Centre for Law and Policy in Emerging Technologies, which is a collaboration\n\n121 Id. thanks-to-government-working-collaboratively, *archived at* https://perma.cc/EW2C-43JA.\n2018), *archived at* https://perma.cc/C6Q7-SW6J. https://perma.cc/7G8G-BEDK.\nbetween Otago University and the New Zealand Law Foundation.129 In early 2017, the Centre commenced a three-year project \"to evaluate legal and policy implications of artificial intelligence\n(AI) for New Zealand.\"130 This project will investigate two key topics: predictive AI technologies in the criminal justice system and AI and employment.131 In the area of data analysis and technology, the government announced in May 2018 that it would undertake a project to \"assess how government agencies use algorithms to analyse people's data, to ensure transparency and fairness in decisions that affect citizens.\"132 It further stated that New Zealand \"is leading the work with the UK, Israel, Estonia, South Korea, Canada and Uruguay working together to consider how digital technology impacts fundamental human rights and to share best practice about ways to tackle challenges.\"133 The government has also appointed and funded a Data Futures Partnership, which aims to \"[c]reate a competitive advantage by positioning New Zealand as a high-value, strongly inclusive, hightrust, and high-control data-sharing ecosystem.\"134 The group has published a draft document, A\nPath to Social Licence: Guidelines for Trusted Data Use,135 as part of its \"wider work programme to maximise the benefits of data for the public, companies, government agencies, and nongovernmental organisations.\"136 Other initiatives include the *Principles for Safe and Effective Use of Data and Analytics*, published in 2018 by the Privacy Commissioner and Government Chief Data Steward (who is the chief executive of Stats NZ), which are \"intended to help agencies, and guide our thinking to data analytics activities, including algorithmic decision-making.\"137 Individual government agencies\n2018), https://www.odt.co.nz/news/dunedin/campus/university-of-otago/chance-lead-ethical-use-ai, *archived at* https://perma.cc/YZB8-ZTFC. 130 *Artificial Intelligence and Law in New Zealand*, UNIVERSITY OF OTAGO, http://www.cs.otago.ac.nz/research/ ai/AI-Law/ (last visited Nov. 15, 2018), *archived at* https://perma.cc/FCF3-XFQF. 131 Id. *See also Major New Otago Study to Tackle Artificial Intelligence Law and Policy*, UNIVERSITY OF OTAGO\n(Jan. 19, 2017), https://www.otago.ac.nz/news/news/otago633498.html, *archived at* https://perma.cc/3UMM-9H88.\n132 Press Release, Clare Curran & James Shaw, Government to Undertake Urgent Algorithm Stocktake (May 23,\n2018), https://www.beehive.govt.nz/release/government-undertake-urgent-algorithm-stocktake, archived at https://perma.cc/N4WZ-NHCC. *See also* Claire Lord, Algorithm Review Underway to Increase Transparency and Accountability, Data.GOVT.NZ (July 18, 2018), https://www.data.govt.nz/blog/algorithm-review-underway-toincrease-transparency-and-accountability/. 133 Press Release, Government to Undertake Urgent Algorithm Stocktake, *supra* note 132. 134 *Research*, TRUSTED DATA, https://trusteddata.co.nz/research/ (last visited Nov. 14, 2018), archived at https://perma.cc/2JCS-C5Q6. 135 DATA FUTURES PARTNERSHIP, A PATH TO SOCIAL LICENCE: GUIDELINES FOR TRUSTED DATA USE (Aug. 2017), have also developed, or are in the process of developing, resources and policies related to privacy, human rights, and ethical impacts of using personal information and digital data tools, including the Ministry of Social Development138 and the Social Investment Agency.139\n\nIII.  Government Statements on Particular Technologies A.  Autonomous Vehicles The government has not received any formal requests to test autonomous vehicles on public roads; however it states that\n[t]here are no obvious legal barriers to the deployment of autonomous vehicles for testing in New Zealand. Unlike some countries, NZ law has no explicit requirement for a driver to be present. However, autonomous vehicles could raise issues about who is at fault if they were to crash.140 The government's *Intelligent Transport Systems Technology Action Plan 201418* includes the following action:\n\n\nThe Ministry of Transport, in conjunction with the NZ Transport Agency, will review transport legislation to clarify the legality of testing driverless cars in New Zealand. This will specifically consider the issues of liability associated with testing, but will not consider\nliability for general use.141\n\nIt further states as follows:\n\nInternationally there is a great deal of thought being given to what laws will be necessary for the general operation of driverless vehicles. Their widespread operation will pose complex legal challenges, especially to determine liability in the event of any accident. It is not proposed that the New Zealand government will explicitly look at these legal issues at this time. Rather, the government will continue to monitor international developments\n\neffective-use-of-data-and-analytics-guidance/, *archived at* https://perma.cc/A3FU-CMKV?type=image. *See also* Data Leadership, STATS NZ (May 16, 2018), https://www.stats.govt.nz/about-us/data-leadership/, archived at https://perma.cc/2HW2-BPX3. 138 *Using Personal Data Responsibly*, MINISTRY OF SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT, https://www.msd.govt.nz/about-msdand draw on this knowledge once international thinking has developed further and it is clearer if or when these vehicles will be commercially available.142 B.  Autonomous Weapons Systems\n\nThe New Zealand government participates in the GGE on LAWS, which was established in 2016 at a conference of High Contracting Parties to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons.143 At the April 2018 meeting of the GGE, New Zealand made various statements, including that\n\n[i]n New Zealand's case, and in accordance with our AP1 [Additional Protocol (I) to the Geneva Conventions] obligations, each emerging capability will be reviewed by New Zealand Defence Force using a multi-disciplinary approach and a determination by the Director of Defence Legal Services to ensure it is compliant with IHL [international humanitarian law]. Meaningful human control will be a contextual part of that assessment, alongside the cardinal points of IHL. We are looking at our framework for weapons reviews through the lens of emerging technologies and are interested in similar work being undertaken by others.144 It further stated that, in its view, the ability to exercise human control is critical to whether a weapon would be able to comply with International Humanitarian Law as well as other requirements, such as Rules of Engagement. As articulated by the ICRC [International Committee of the Red Cross] and others, the challenge before us now is to determine the kind of human control that is considered necessary for partially autonomous weapons systems.145 Separate from the government, the AI Forum signed the Lethal Autonomous Weapons Pledge in mid-2018.146 This Pledge calls \"upon governments and government leaders to create a future with strong international norms, regulations and laws against lethal autonomous weapons\" and states D7B5?OpenDocument (last visited Nov. 14, 2018), *archived at* https://perma.cc/PY2C-XVMW; 2018 Group of Governmental Experts on Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems (Laws), UNITED NATIONS OFFICE AT GENEVA, https://unog.ch/80256EE600585943/(httpPages)/7C335E71DFCB29D1C1258243003E8724?OpenDocument (last visited Nov. 14, 2018), *archived at* https://perma.cc/9NSH-AD77. 144 GGE on LAWS, Agenda Item 6(d), Statement by Katy Donnelly, Deputy Permanent Representative (New Zealand) to the Conference on Disarmament, Geneva, at 2 (Apr. 13, 2018), https://unog.ch/80256EDD006B8954/(httpAssets)/1180CDB066905100C125827200586183/$file/2018_ LAWS6d_New+Zealand.pdf, *archived at* https://perma.cc/XP5S-FCRR.\nZealand) to the Conference on Disarmament, Geneva, at 1, Apr. 11, 2018, https://unog.ch/80256EDD006B8954/(httpAssets)/4A54EE38E2F8223AC12582720057E761/$file/2018_ LAWS6b_New+Zealand.pdf, *archived at* https://perma.cc/4CUE-ZAS3.\nthat signatories will not participate in or support the development, manufacture, trade, or use of such weapons.147\nPakistan\n\nIn April 2018, the government of Pakistan allocated 1.1 billion rupees (about US$7.9 million) for a period of three years for artificial intelligence projects in six universities, under the supervision of the Higher Education Commission (HEC).148 According to one news report, \"[s]ix public sector universities have been picked out for setting up nine labs to carry out research in the field of AI.\"149 During the 2017 and 2018 meetings of the GGE on LAWS, Pakistan was part of a group of countries that expressed their support for a \"prohibition on the development, production, and use of AWS\"150 and for a \"legally binding instrument on LAWS.\"151 During the 2018 GGE meeting, Pakistan stated that, \"[p]ending the negotiation and conclusion of a legally binding Protocol, the states currently developing such weapons should place a moratorium on their production.\"152\nSingapore\n\nI.  AI Singapore Program In May 2017, Singapore established a national AI program, \"AI Singapore,\" with funding of SG$150 million (about US$109 million) to catalyze, synergize, and boost Singapore's AI capabilities. According to the website of AI Singapore, archived at https://perma.cc/8L9M-BEY2; Statement by Pakistan, Second Session of the CCW GGE on LAWS 80256EDD006B8954/(httpAssets)/8D3985AC41854006C1258272005837D9/$file/2018_LAWS6b_Pakistan.pdf, archived at https://perma.cc/DW3E-WA75.\nAI Singapore will bring together all Singapore-based research institutions and the vibrant ecosystem of AI start-ups and companies developing AI products, to grow the knowledge, create the tools and develop the talent to power Singapore's AI efforts. It is driven by a government-wide partnership comprising National Research Foundation (NRF), the Smart Nation and Digital Government Office, the Economic Development Board, the Infocomm Media Development Authority, SGInnovate, and the Integrated Health Information Systems. NRF will invest up to $150 million over five years in AI Singapore.153\n\nII.  Discussion Paper on AI and Personal Data On June 5, 2018, Singapore's Personal Data Protection Commission (PDPC) published the Discussion Paper on Artificial Intelligence (AI) and Personal Data - Fostering Responsible Development and Adoption of AI (Discussion Paper). 154 The Discussion Paper presents the PDPC's \"preliminary analysis of some of the issues pertinent to the commercial development and adoption of AI solutions.\"155 According to the PDPC, the objective of the Discussion Paper is to propose an accountability-based framework for discussing ethical, governance, and consumerprotection issues related to the commercial deployment of AI in a systematic and structured manner.156 The Discussion Paper sets forth the following two principles for responsible AI:\n\n(i)  Decisions made by or with the assistance of AI should be explainable, transparent and fair so that affected individuals will have trust and confidence in these decisions.\n. . .\n(ii)  AI systems, robots and decisions made using AI should be human-centric.157\n The Discussion Paper is intended to spark discussion on promoting the responsible development and adoption of AI solutions and mitigating potential risks and negative impacts. The PDPC invited organizations in Singapore to adapt the document for their internal use, and encouraged trade associations and chambers, professional bodies and societies, and interest groups to adapt the proposed framework for their sectors in the form of voluntary codes of practice.158\n\n\n153 *AI Singapore*, NATIONAL RESEARCH FOUNDATION, https://www.nrf.gov.sg/programmes/artificial-intelligence-r-\nIII.  Advisory Council on the Ethical Use of AI and Data On August 30, 2018, Singapore announced the full composition of the Advisory Council on the Ethical Use of AI and Data, to advise and work with the relevant government authority on the responsible development and deployment of AI.159 The Advisory Council is comprised of eleven members from diverse backgrounds, including international leaders in AI such as Google, Microsoft, and Alibaba; advocates of social and consumer interests; and leaders of local companies who are keen to make use of AI.160 According to the official government statement on the composition of the Advisory Council, the Council will assist the Infocomm Media Development Authority (IMDA) in engaging the following stakeholders on issues that support the development of AI governance capabilities and frameworks:\n\n- Ethics boards of commercial enterprises on ethical and related issues arising from private sector use of AI and data\n\n- Consumer representatives on consumer expectations and acceptance of the use of AI\n- Members of the private capital community on the need to incorporate ethical considerations in\ntheir investment decisions into businesses which develop or adopt AI161\n\nThe Advisory Council is tasked with assisting the government in developing ethics standards and reference governance frameworks, and publishing advisory guidelines, practical guides, and codes of practice for voluntary adoption by the industry.162\n\nIV.  Government-Funded Research Program on Governance of AI and Data Use In June 2018, the Singaporean government awarded SG$4.5 million (about US$3.27 million) to the Singapore Management University (SMU) School of Law to set up a five-year research program on the governance of AI and data use. This program seeks to advance discourse in ethical, legal, policy, and governance issues arising from AI and data use.163 According to the speech of Singapore's Minister for Communications and Information announcing the award, the research program\n\nwill enable Singapore to drive thought leadership on these issues and serve as a center for knowledge exchange with international experts. The program will adopt an international perspective and track international developments in these specific research areas.164\n\nIn September 2018, the SMU launched a new Centre for AI and Data Governance with the SG$4.5\nmillion in funding.165\n\nV.  Autonomous Vehicles To regulate trials of autonomous motor vehicles and pave the way for the development of automated vehicle technology in Singapore, an amendment to the Road Traffic Act was passed on February 7, 2017, and assented to by the President on March 13, 2017.166\nThe revised Road Traffic Act includes definitions of \"automated vehicle technology,\"\n\"autonomous motor vehicle,\" and \"autonomous system,\" as follows:\n\"automated vehicle technology\" means any particular technology that - (a) relates to the design, construction or use of autonomous motor vehicles; or (b) otherwise relates to advances in the design or construction of autonomous motor vehicles; \"autonomous motor vehicle\" means a motor vehicle equipped wholly or substantially with an autonomous system (also commonly known as a driverless vehicle), and includes a trailer drawn by such a motor vehicle; \"autonomous system\", for a motor vehicle, means a system that enables the operation of the motor vehicle without the active physical control of, or monitoring by, a human operator[.]167\nThe revised Act confers powers on the Minister for Transport to make rules concerning trials and use of autonomous vehicles.168 Among other things, persons authorized to undertake such trials or carry out such use will be required to obtain liability insurance for the entire duration of the trial or use, or to deposit a security with the Land Transport Authority.169 Such persons will also be data-governance, *archived at* https://perma.cc/NR68-39AA.\n48a5-91ff-9a59817ac955, *archived at* https://perma.cc/E8HG-4536.\nrequired to publish a notice about the trial or use, before the trial or use starts, in a manner that will secure adequate publicity.170\nUnder the Road Traffic (Autonomous Motor Vehicles) Rules 2017, in granting an authorization for trials or use of autonomous vehicles, the Land Transport Authority may impose conditions as it thinks fit, including requiring a qualified safety driver to be seated in an autonomous motor vehicle to monitor the operation of the vehicle and to take over operation of the vehicle if necessary.171\nSouth Korea South Korea has an advanced robotics industry.  In 2008, the National Assembly enacted the Intelligent Robot Development and Promotion Act to establish and promote a policy on the sustainable development of the intelligent robot industry.172  An intelligent robot is defined by the Act as \"a mechanical device that perceives the external environment for itself, discerns circumstances, and moves voluntarily.\"173  The government formulated national plans for the development and distribution of intelligent robots in 2009 and 2014 based on the law.174 The Act states that the government \"may enact and promulgate the charter on intelligent robot ethics.\"175  The Act defines the \"charter on intelligent robot ethics\" as\n\na code of conduct established for persons involved in the development, manufacture, and use of intelligent robots in order to prevent various kinds of harmful or adverse effects, such as destruction of social order, that may arise from the development of functions and intelligence of intelligent robots, and to ensure intelligent robots contribute to enhancing the quality of life of human beings.176\n\nIt appears that the code has not yet been enacted.177\nResponsible?], BUSINESS WATCH (July 30, 2018), http://news.bizwatch.co.kr/article/industry/2018/07/24/0029 (in Korean), *archived at* https://perma.cc/4396-DFGT.\nI.  Robotics and AI In 2016, the South Korean government planned to put 500 billion won (US$440 million) toward expanding the country's robotics industry, 178  including the promotion of research and development into autonomous vehicles and social robots for healthcare.179 In February 2018, the government released a new development strategy for the intelligent robot industry along with four action plans. The action plans call for accelerating market expansion with collaborative robots and service robots while enhancing the industry's supply and demand capabilities.  The government provides a training program for postgraduate-level AI and robot convergence experts in cooperation with colleges.180\n\nII.  AI Promotion Policy\n\nThe South Korean governments funds many efforts toward the development of the AI industry. In 2016, the MSIP released a report titled Mid- to Long-term Plan in Preparation for the Intelligent Information Society.181  The plan called for large-scale government investment to strengthen the country's research and development in AI and for legal and ethical reforms for the intelligent information society, among other things.182 In January 2018, the South Korean government issued a report prepared jointly by six governmental entities outlining policies to promote technological development.  AI is one of the targeted areas in the report.  According to the report, the government plans to support early commercialization of self-driving vehicles and intelligent robots, among other things.183\n\n\n180 Sang-mo Kim, *Policy Directions for S. Korea's Robot Industry*, BUSINESS KOREA (Aug. 17, 2018), http://www.businesskorea.co.kr/news/articleView.html?idxno=24394, *archived at* https://perma.cc/545Y-NVVH;\nJin-young Cho, *S. Korea to Promote Collaborative Robotics for Manufacturing Field*, BUSINESS KOREA (Feb. 8,\n2018), http://www.businesskorea.co.kr/news/articleView.html?idxno=20497, *archived at* https://perma.cc/473R-\n24FR. https://perma.cc/93VV-6P74. 182 Id. at 56. 183 Hee Woong Yoon et al., *South Korean Government Launches a New Strategy to Promote Innovative Growth*, LUS LABORIS (Feb. 12, 2018), https://theword.iuslaboris.com/hrlaw/insights/south-korean-government-launches-anew-strategy-to-promote-innovative-growth/, *archived at* https://perma.cc/SRR7-WHUR.\nOn May 15, 2018, the Presidential Committee on the Fourth Industrial Revolution (PCFIR)184\nfinalized a research and development strategy to support the plan to invest 2.2 trillion won (about US$1.95 billion) in public-sector AI projects over the next five years, to develop AI technology and nurture 5,000 AI specialists.185\n\nIII.  Autonomous Car Development South Korea has developed K-City, an unpopulated city for autonomous vehicle testing based on\n5G mobile networks.  Testing of autonomous vehicles has been conducted at K-City.186\nTaiwan\n\nI.  Taiwan AI Action Plan\n\nOn January 18, 2018, Taiwan announced a four-year \"Taiwan AI Action Plan\" (20182021).187\nUnder the Plan, Taiwan's Executive Yuan will allocate an annual budget of up to 10 billion New Taiwan dollar (about US$324 million) to develop Taiwan's AI industry.188 The Plan outlines five initiatives: cultivating talent, developing Taiwan's niche AI, incubating local AI start-ups, reconciling laws for AI development, and introducing AI technologies to industries. 189  Aiming to allow more flexibility for AI development in Taiwan, legislation encouraging innovation in financial technology and easing employment restrictions on foreign skilled workers has been passed, and more bills are under consideration, including on information security and government procurement.190\n\n\nINSIGHTS (Dec. 12, 2018), https://enterpriseiotinsights.com/20181212/connected-cars-2/south-korea-completesworks-kcity-autonomous-driving-testing-zone, *archived at* https://perma.cc/73MB-LSZL.\nJianduan Zhihui Guojia [Executive Yuan Passed \"AI Taiwan Action Plan,\" Taiwan Moves to Cutting-Edge Smart Country] (Jan. 18, 2018), https://www.ey.gov.tw/File/52E248317FCF71AD?A=C, *archived at*\nhttps://perma.cc/SH8N-4329. 188 Id.; *Cabinet Plans to Develop the Nation's AI Industry*, AI TAIWAN, https://ai.taiwan.gov.tw/news/cabinet-plansto-develop-the-nations-ai-industry/ (last visited Nov. 30, 2018), *archived at* https://perma.cc/M2N8-BKNA. 189 Id. 190 *Test Fields and Regulatory Co-creation*, AI TAIWAN, https://ai.taiwan.gov.tw/actionplan/test-fields-andregulatory-co-creation/ (last visited Nov. 30, 2018), *archived at* https://perma.cc/9BCY-4FU9.\nII.  Autonomous Vehicles On November 30, 2018, the Legislative Yuan passed the Act for Unmanned Vehicle Technology Innovative Experiments, which was enacted by the President on December 19, 2018.191 The Act has not yet entered into force; the date of enforcement will be decided by the Executive Yuan.192 The Act exempts developers from certain legal restrictions when testing unmanned vehicles for a prescribed period of time. \"Unmanned vehicles\" governed by the Act include land vehicles, aircraft, ships, or any combination thereof, that are remotely controlled or capable of autonomous operations by surveying their surroundings, determining their position, and determining the best route.193\n\n## Europe And Central Asia\n\nEuropean Union I.  General Data Protection Regulation\n\nOn May 25, 2018, the EU's General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) took effect.1 It applies directly in all EU Member States without any implementing legislation needed.2 Among other rights, the GDPR guarantees individuals the right to have a decision based solely on automated processing (an algorithm) be made or reviewed by a natural person instead of a computer.3\n\nII.  European Parliament's Resolution on Civil Law Rules on Robotics On February 16, 2017, the European Parliament adopted a legislative initiative resolution in which it recommended a range of legislative and nonlegislative initiatives in the field of robotics and AI\nto the European Commission.4 Among other things, it called on the European Commission to adopt a proposal for a legislative instrument providing civil law rules on the liability of robots and AI, \"to propose common Union definitions of cyber physical systems, autonomous systems, smart autonomous robots and their subcategories,\" establish criteria for the classification of robots that would need to be registered, establish a designated EU Agency for Robotics and Artificial Intelligence, and propose a charter consisting of a code of conduct for robotics engineers, a code for research ethics committees when reviewing robotics protocols, and model licenses for designers.5 It also asked the Commission to consider \"creating a specific legal status for robots in the long run, so that at least the most sophisticated autonomous robots could be established as having the status of electronic persons responsible for making good any damage they may cause, and possibly applying electronic personality to cases where robots make autonomous decisions or otherwise interact with third parties independently.\"6\n\nThe European Commission in its follow-up to the resolution agreed that it was necessary to \"examine whether and how to adapt civil law liability rules to the needs of the digital economy\"\n\nand stated that it intended to work with the European Parliament and the EU Member States on an EU response. 7 Among other things, it plans to evaluate the Product Liability Directive 8 and explore risk-based liability regimes.9 It stated that more examination is necessary in order to decide whether and what kind of definitions are needed for regulatory purposes. 10  It rejected the recommendation by the European Parliament to establish a new European Agency for Robotics and AI and proposed expert group discussions with EU Member States, industry, and standardizers instead.11\n\nIII.  European Commission Actions In April 2018, the European Commission published its communication \"Artificial Intelligence for Europe\" (Communication) in which it outlined the EU's approach to taking advantage of the opportunities offered by AI and addressing the challenges posed by it.12 From 20142017, the EU\ninvested 1.1 billion (about US$1.26 billion) in AI-related research and innovation under the Horizon 2020 research and innovation program. 13 Among other things, the Communication emphasizes that the EU has to ensure that no one is left behind in the digital transformation and that AI is developed and applied based on the EU's values and fundamental rights.14 It is also reviewing existing rules on safety and civil law liability.15 The Commission published a followup communication and a coordinated plan that built on the original Communication in December 2018.16\n\nlex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:31985L0374&from=EN, *archived at* http://perma.cc/ VT8M-RUCK. 9 Follow up to the European Parliament Resolution of 16 February 2017 on Civil Law Rules on Robotics, supra note 7, at 2.\n\n10 Id. at 3.\n\n52018DC0237&from=EN, *archived at* http://perma.cc/FB52-HPK3. 13 Id. at 6.\nOn December 18, 2018, the High-Level Expert Group on Artificial Intelligence (AI HLEG)\nfifty-two experts from academia, civil society, and industry appointed by the Commission17 released draft AI ethics guidelines, which set out a framework for designing trustworthy AI.18\nAccording to the guidelines, trustworthy AI must \"respect fundamental rights, applicable regulation and core principles and values, ensuring an \"ethical purpose,\" and \"be technically robust and reliable since, even with good intentions, a lack of technological mastery can cause unintentional harm.\"19  Stakeholders were allowed to submit comments until January 18, 2019.20\nA final version is slated to be published in March 2019.21\n\nThe AI HLEG also proposed an updated definition of AI,22 defining it as follows:\n\nArtificial intelligence (AI) refers to systems designed by humans that, given a complex goal, act in the physical or digital world by perceiving their environment, interpreting the collected structured or unstructured data, reasoning on the knowledge derived from this data and deciding the best action(s) to take (according to pre-defined parameters) to achieve the given goal. AI systems can also be designed to learn to adapt their behaviour by analysing how the environment is affected by their previous actions. As a scientific discipline, AI includes several approaches and techniques, such as machine learning (of which deep learning and reinforcement learning are specific examples), machine reasoning (which includes planning, scheduling, knowledge representation and reasoning, search, and optimization), and robotics (which includes control, perception, sensors and actuators, as well as the integration of all other techniques into cyberphysical systems).23\n\n Furthermore, the European Commission established a Robotics and Artificial Intelligence Unit whose mission is the\ndevelopment of a competitive industry in robotics and Artificial Intelligence in Europe including industrial and service robots as well as the growing field of autonomous systems spanning from drones and driverless vehicles to cognitive vision and computing. The Unit\n\nmarket/en/high-level-expert-group-artificial-intelligence (last updated Oct. 29, 2018), *archived at*\nsupports also the wide uptake and best use of robotics and Artificial Intelligence in all industrial and societal fields.24 Furthermore, it \"follows the Ethical and Legal issues related to robots and autonomous systems such as liability and . . . the aspects related to the impact of automation and robotics on jobs and work environment.\"25 On June 18, 2018, the European Economic and Social Committee (EESC) and the European Commission held a stakeholder summit on AI with a wide range of participants.26 They discussed legal and ethical challenges, the socioeconomic impact, and the industrial competitiveness of AI.\n\nIV.  Declaration of Cooperation on Artificial Intelligence On April 10, 2018, twenty-four EU Member States 27 and Norway signed the Declaration of Cooperation on Artificial Intelligence to develop a European approach to AI.28 Romania, Greece, and Cyprus joined the initiative in May 2018, and Croatia in July 2018.29 In the Declaration, the signatories agreed to cooperate on\n\n-\n[b]oosting Europe's technology and industrial capacity in AI and its uptake, including better access to public sector data; these are essential conditions to influence AI development, fuelling innovative business models and creating economic growth and new qualified jobs;\n-\n[a]ddressing socio-economic challenges, such as the transformation of the labour\nmarkets and modernising Europe's education and training systems, including upskilling & reskilling EU citizens; [and]\n-\n[e]nsuring an adequate legal and ethical framework, building on EU fundamental rights and values, including privacy and protection of personal data, as well as principles such\nas transparency and accountability.30\n\n\nevents/ ai-europe-stakeholder-summit?_cldee=Y2NqbXVsbGVyQGtwbm1haWwubmw%3d&recipientid=contact- 418703e1eed3e511bb64005056a05070-be6e28a0f92045fd8a0c34cea92a9638&esid=f7a166c8-965d-e811-8113- 005056a043ea&urlid=4, *archived at* http://perma.cc/T6JC-XXWU. 27 The countries are Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom.\n\naideclarationatdigitaldaydocxpdf.pdf, *archived at* http://perma.cc/F6U4-NV4C.\nV.  European Supervisory Authorities' Report\n\nOn September 5, 2018, the European Supervisory Authorities (ESAs)31 published a joint report on the results of the monitoring exercise on \"automation in financial advice.\"32 The report concluded that no immediate action is necessary, because there are currently only a limited number of firms involved in automation in financial advice and the identified risks have not materialized. The ESAs plan to carry out a new monitoring exercise if development of the market and market risks warrant it.33\n\nVI.  Connected and Automated Vehicles\n\nIn 2016, the European Commission published a communication on intelligent transport systems.34\nIt proposed, inter alia, the adoption of a legal framework at the EU level by 2018 developed through learning by experience.35  In 2018, the Commission published another communication that outlined the EU strategy to enable the EU and its Member States to \"be a leader in delivering safe, efficient, socially responsible and environmentally friendly driverless mobility for EU\ncitizens.\"36 The 2018 Communication is accompanied by two legislative proposals to implement that objective, one for a revision of the General Safety Regulation,37 and one for a proposal for amendments to the directive on road infrastructure safety.38 With regard to intelligent transport European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions. A European Strategy on Cooperative Intelligent Transport Systems, a Milestone Towards Cooperative, Connected and Automated Mobility, COM (2016)\n766 final (Nov. 30, 2016), https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52016DC0\n766&from=EN, *archived at* http://perma.cc/6HY6-4SST.\n35 Id. at 11, para. 3.7. 36 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the European Council, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions. Europe on the Move. Sustainable Mobility for Europe: Safe, Connected, and Clean, COM (2018) 293 final (May 17, 2018), at 17, https://eurlex.europa.eu/resource.html?uri=cellar:0e8b694e-59b5-11e8-ab41-01aa75ed71a1.0003.02/DOC_1&format=PDF, archived at http://perma.cc/QBZ9-EMPD. 37 Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on Type-Approval Requirements for Motor Vehicles and Their Trailers, and Systems, Components and Separate Technical Units Intended for Such Vehicles, as Regards Their General Safety and the Protection of Vehicle Occupants and Vulnerable Road Users, Amending Regulation (EU) 2018/... and Repealing Regulations (EC) No 78/2009, (EC) No 79/2009 and (EC) No\n661/2009 (General Safety Regulation), COM (2018) 286 final (May 17, 2018), https://eurlex.europa.eu/resource.html?uri=cellar:f7e29905-59b7-11e8-ab41-01aa75ed71a1.0003.02/DOC_1&format=PDF, systems, the Commission published a decision in December 2018 which sets out an updated working program to achieve the objectives of the 2010 Directive on Intelligent Transport Systems.39\n\nVII.  Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems In the August 2018 meeting of the GGE LAWS, the EU stated that it \"considers it worthwhile to review more regularly and systematically the fast-paced developments in the area of emerging technologies, including artificial intelligence (AI), providing an opportunity to technical experts to share information on autonomous technologies relevant for our work.\"40 The EU emphasized that it is necessary that \"humans remain in control of the development, deployment and use with regard to possible military applications of emerging technologies, including AI, and prevent the creation and use of harmful applications.\"41\n\n\nAustria\n\nI. Government Statements and Actions The Austrian government in its 20172022 government program stated that \"new digital technologies like AI, robotics, and blockchain will have unforeseeable effects on our society.\"42 It envisages the use of AI in public administration and therefore wants to establish a legal framework in order to \"use innovative, new business models and technologies for the development of society while simultaneously safeguarding the data autonomy/sovereignty of citizens and consumers.\"43 In 2017, the Austrian Federal Ministry for Transport, Innovation, and Technology (BMVIT) established the Austrian Council for Robotics and Artificial Intelligence (Osterreichischer Rat fur c20188264_en.pdf, *archived at* http://perma.cc/H7S5-6HNE; Directive 2010/40/EU on the Framework for the Deployment of Intelligent Transport Systems, 2010 O.J. (L 207) 1, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/ EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32010L0040&from=EN, *archived at* http://perma.cc/Q6XT-X4YP. 40 European External Action Service (EEAS), Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons - Group of Governmental Experts - Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems. EU Statement Group of Governmental Experts Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons Geneva, 2731 August 2018, https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/49763/convention-certain-conventional-weapons-groupgovernmental-experts-lethal-autonomous-weapons_en, *archived at* http://perma.cc/H7FL-W7DZ. 41 Id. 42 Zusammen. Fur unser Osterreich. Regierungsprogramm 20172022 [Together. For Our Austria. Government Program 20172022], at 75, https://www.bundeskanzleramt.gv.at/documents/131008/569203/Regierungs programm_20172022.pdf/b2fe3f65-5a04-47b6-913d-2fe512ff4ce6, *archived at* http://perma.cc/K8AQ-VM4Z (translation by author). 43 Id. at 81 (translation by author).\n\nRobotik und kunstliche Intelligenz). 44  The Council consists of nine experts from research, academia, and business. The inaugural meeting took place on October 24, 2017. Its primary mandate is to assist the BMVIT in developing an AI and robotics strategy, but it is also authorized to independently address essential technological, economic, social, and legal questions in this area, and issue recommendations.45 The process for developing a federal AI strategy under the auspices of the BMVIT with participation from the Federal Ministry for Digital and Economic Affairs\n(BMDW) is slated to be concluded in the third quarter of 2019.46 The full strategy will be based on the White Paper published by the Austrian Council for Robotics and Artificial Intelligence47 and the Artificial Intelligence Mission Austria 2030.48\n\nII. Autonomous Vehicles In 2016, Austria amended its Motor Vehicles Act to allow the use of automated or networked vehicle systems. 49 These systems may be used if they are either permitted or fulfill certain conditions established by regulation for test purposes. However, the law provides that the driver must remain responsible to take over the driving functions if necessary.50 Autonomous vehicles Bundesminister fur Verkehr, Innovation und Technologie betreffend \"AI Strategie und neue Datenpolitik fur Osterreich\" [Answer from the Federal Minister for Transport, Innovation, and Technology Engineer Nobert Hofer to the Written Request (1101/J) of the Representative Stephanie COX, BA, Colleagues to the Federal Minister for Transport, Innovation, and Technology re \"AI Strategy and New Data Policy for Austria\"], no. 1087/AB (Aug. 21,\n2018), at 4, https://www.parlament.gv.at/PAKT/VHG/XXVI/AB/AB_01087/imfname_707510.pdf, *archived at*\nhttp://perma.cc/T6SJ-AFCE. 47 OSTERREICHISCHER RAT FUR ROBOTIK UND KUNSTLICHE INTELLIGENZ [AUSTRIAN COUNCIL FOR ROBOTICS AND ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE], DIE ZUKUNFT OSTERREICHS MIT ROBOTIK UND KUNSTLICHER INTELLIGENZ POSITIV\nGESTALTEN. WHITE PAPER DES OSTERREICHISCHEN RATS FUR ROBOTIK UND KUNSTLICHE INTELLIGENZ [CREATING A\nPOSITIVE FUTURE FOR AUSTRIA WITH ROBOTICS AND ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE. WHITE PAPER OF THE [AUSTRIAN COUNCIL FOR ROBOTICS AND ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE (Nov. 2018), https://www.acrai.at/images/download/ ACRAI_whitebook_online_2018.pdf, *archived at* http://perma.cc/TF56-NX38. 48 BMVIT & BMDV, AIM AT 2030. ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE MISSION AUSTRIA 2030, https://www.bmvit.gv.at/\nmay only be tested on the road if they have car insurance and transmit certain data to the BMVIT.51\nTest drives on public roads may only be conducted after the vehicles have been tested sufficiently in advance.52 The results of the tests must be transmitted to the BMVIT after the end of the trial period.53 Information on critical situations, accidents, and their causes must be reported without undue delay.54 In addition, all test vehicles with automated or networked systems must be equipped with an accident data recorder that must be activated during all test drives.55\n\nIII. Lethal Autonomous Weapon Systems At the April 2018 meeting of the GGE of the High Contracting Parties to the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW), Austria stated it believes that LAWS require a clear regulation and that it is in favor of \"establishing a legally binding instrument in order to prohibit lethal autonomous weapon systems that are not under meaningful human control.\"56 Austria emphasized that \"meaningful human control over critical functions\" of LAWS must be maintained.57 In August 2018, Austria, together with Brazil and Chile, submitted a proposal to the GGE for a new CCW mandate to \"negotiate a legally-binding instrument to ensure meaningful human control over the critical functions\" of weapons systems.58\n\n\nBelarus\n\nI.  High Technologies Park The government of Belarus has adopted the State Program for the Development of the Digital Economy and the Information Society for 20162020.59 The goal of the program is to \"improve conditions that facilitate the transformation of human activities under the influence of ICT, including the formation of a digital economy, the development of an information society and the improvement of e-government.\" In line with the priorities of the Program, the President issued a Decree on the Development of the Digital Economythe main legislation governing AI in Belarus.60 The Decree specifies the functions and the areas of activities for the High Technologies Park (HTP). In particular, point 1 of the Decree specifies that the Park must conduct activities in the area of AI and engage in the creation of autonomous vehicles.\n\nThe HTP was established by the government of Belarus to stimulate development of high-tech, IT-intensive technologies. The Park operates under special tax and legal regimes, and allows foreign entities to be registered in Belarus in order to obtain tax benefits. Since 2015, HTP-resident companies have been allowed to become involved in new science-intensive activities. Presently, any company engaged in IT and related industries (micro-, opto- and nanoelectronics;\nmechatronics; telecommunications; radar ranging; radio navigation; and wireless communication), information protection, and establishment of data processing centers may apply for residency within the HTP and benefit from the tax incentives and other advantages it provides. HTP-resident companies may work and provide services in the field of information system analysis, designing, and software development (IT consulting, audit, national information networks maintenance, database development, and corporate information systems implementation and support).61\n\nII.  Autonomous Vehicles According to the state news agency Belarusian Telegraph Agency, President Lukashenko has expressed his support for the development of driverless vehicles in Belarus. 62 On February 2018\n\nit was announced that a high-tech company, a resident of the HTP, will set a site for autonomous vehicle test driving on the territory of the Park.63 Belgium I.  Introduction\n\nOverall, with the exception of autonomous vehicles and lethal autonomous weapons systems, the Belgian government has not been very active on issues related to AI so far. This may change in the near future, however, as both chambers of the Belgian Parliament currently have working groups studying AI questions.  Members of the Chamber of Representatives proposed the creation of an \"inclusive and sustainable robo-digital agenda\" in July 2017,64 and the working group to design this agenda started meeting in January 2018.65  Similarly, the Senate created a working group to write a report on \"the fallout, opportunities, potentialities and risks of a digital 'intelligent society'.\"66  This working group has been meeting and conducting hearings since July 2018.67 Additionally, Belgium is an observing member of the International Organization for Standardization's technical committee on AI.68 II.  Autonomous Vehicles The Belgian government has adopted policies to encourage the development of autonomous vehicles.  In 2016, it published a \"Code of Good Practices\" to guide companies and institutions\n\n2643/54k2643001.pdf, *archived at* https://perma.cc/E98J-R4NA. 65 Gilles Vanden Burre, Premiere reunion du groupe de travail sur l'agenda robonumerique au Parlement [First Meeting of the Working Group on a Robo-Digital Agenda in Parliament], GILLESVANDENBURRE.BE (Jan. 18, 2018), https://gillesvandenburre.be/2018/01/18/premiere-reunion-groupe-de-travail-lagenda-robonumerique-parlement/, archived at https://perma.cc/H4JQ-CA6R. 66 Senat de Belgique [Belgian Senate], Demande d'etablissement d'un rapport d'information relatif a la necessaire collaboration entre l'Etat federal et les entites federees en ce qui concerne les retombees, les opportunites, les potentialites et les risques de la  societe intelligente  numerique [Request for the Drafting of an Information Report on the Necessary Collaboration Between the Federal Government and the Federated Entities With Regards to the Fallout, Opportunities, Potentialities and Risks of a Digital \"Intelligent Society\"], S. 6-413, May 24, 2018, https://www.senate.be/www/webdriver?MItabObj=pdf&MIcolObj=pdf&MInamObj=pdfid&MItypeObj=application /pdf&MIvalObj=100663911, *archived at* https://perma.cc/VJ62-PZYV. 67 Senat de Belgique [Belgian Senate], Fiche du Dossier [Case File], S. 6-413, http://www.senate.be/www/?MIval that wish to test autonomous vehicles in Belgium, particularly with respect to security standards.69\nThis document was directly inspired by the British document, The Pathway to Driverless Cars: A\nCode of Practice for Testing, published the previous year.70  In March 2018, the Traffic Code was amended to allow autonomous vehicles to be tested on Belgian roads, subject to government approval.71\n\nIII.  Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems In July 2018, the Belgian Parliament adopted a resolution to prohibit the use of LAWS by Belgian armed forces.72  This measure was criticized by some opposition parties as not going far enough, as it allows Belgium to continue research into LAWS.73  At the international level, Belgium has expressed opposition to the idea of creating a new international treaty on LAWS.74\nCzech Republic The Czech Republic introduced amendments to the Act on Surface Communication aimed at the regulation of autonomous vehicles. According to the amendments autonomous vehicles will be allowed on the roads of Czech Republic provided a capable driver is present in the car.75 The draft bill enhanced the definition of \"driver\" to include a stand-by driver in an autonomous vehicle and also introduced safety standards for operating autonomous vehicles.76\n\n\nRegarding Tests of Automatized Vehicles], http://www.ejustice.just.fgov.be/cgi/article_body.pl?language=fr&\ncaller=summary&pub_date=18-04-19&numac=2018011160, *archived at* https://perma.cc/BP5U-EB4S.\n72 Chambre des representants de Belgique [Belgian Chamber of Representatives], Resolution visant a interdire l'utilisation, par la Defense belge, de robots tueurs et de drones armes [Resolution for the Purpose of Prohibiting the Use, by the Belgian Defense, of Killer Robots and Armed Drones], July 19, 2018, http://www.lachambre.be/FLWB/\npdf/54/3203/54K3203005.pdf, *archived at* https://perma.cc/N77D-SVMF.\nRobots], LA LIBRE (July 4, 2018), http://www.lalibre.be/actu/belgique/la-defense-ne-pourra-pas-utiliser-de-robotstueurs-5b3c96bc5532692547e326b4, *archived at* https://perma.cc/5HYT-SQ6S. archived at https://perma.cc/2M7K-SLGD. 75 Mezi Poslance Miri Prvni Zakon, Ktery Resi Provoz Samoriditelnych Aut [Among the MPs, the First Law, Which Deals With the Operation of Self-Driving Cars Is Introduced], ZDOPRAVY.CZ, https://zdopravy.cz/mezi-poslancemiri-prvni-zakon-ktery-resi-provoz-samoriditelnych-aut-12269/, *archived at* https://perma.cc/YMP2-2HUF\n76 Id.\nDenmark\n\nI.  National Strategy\n\nDenmark announced a digital strategy in 2018.77 It includes spending on a National Center for Research in Digital Technologies (Nationalt Center for Forskning i Digitale Teknologier).78 The following six areas were specifically mentioned as priorities:\n\n1.  Digital hub for a strengthened growing environment,\n2.  Digital lift for small and medium sized businesses 3.  Digital fluency for all [focusing on primary education]\n4.  Data that drives growth of the businesses 5.  Agile regulation of businesses\n6.  Increased IT-security for business79\n Denmark invested DKK 750 million (about US$115 million) in 2018, and will invest DKK 125\nmillion (about US$19 million) annually until 2025 to fund initiatives connected to these goals.80\nThe initial sum includes an extra start-up amount, aimed at establishing a number of new initiatives.81 Possible initiatives include changed tax provisions to allow for greater deductions for investment in technology.82 Examples of changes to regulations include rules that enable new business models.83 According to the government the purpose behind the new business models is to test new areas, as is done today in the fields of driverless transport and within FinTech.84 The success of the initiatives also relies on other factors such as increased spending on small businesses in general, enabled by the guarantee agreement with the European Investment Fund and Vkstfonden (Danish Growth Fund) of DKK 1.6 million (about US$245,000). 85 In addition Denmark is increasing its spending on research.  In 2018 it will spend DKK 80 million (about US$12 million) on \"digital technologies such as artificial intelligence (AI), big data, Internet of Things, IT-security, etc.\" 86 Danish efforts to use AI in the welfare sectorfor example, in\n\n77 ERHVERVSMINISTERIET, STRATEGI FOR DANMARKS DIGITALE VKST [STRATEGY FOR DIGITAL GROWTH] (Jan.\n\ntargeting child welfare benefits fraudhas been criticized as potentially threatening to privacy and other important values.87 The Nordic countries have also joined together in a number of collaborative responses to AI, including together with the Baltic States.88\n\nII.  Autonomous Vehicles\n\nDanish law provides for testing of driverless cars.89 The current trial term is from 2017 to 2020.90 The Vejdirektoratet (Danish Road Directorate) has issued a binding Guide on driverless cars.91 Applications for testing are determined by the Frdselsstyrelsen (Danish Road Safety Agency).92 Denmark has also tested driverless buses.93 Denmark has tested autonomous vehicles in perfect weather and in rainy weather.94 While the results were positive for operation in clear weather, the autonomous vehicles tested in rainy weather had a success rate of 6992%.95 A majority of Danes believe autonomous vehicles will be driving on the roads by 2030.96\n\n\nRegeringskansliet, Sverige ska leda AI-samarbete i Norden och Baltikum (May 14, 2018), https://www.regeringen. se/pressmeddelanden/2018/05/sverige-ska-leda-ai-samarbete-i-norden-och-baltikum/, *archived at* https://perma.cc/ 6FPK-DSSB. 89  92f BEKENDTGRELSE AF FRDSELSLOVEN [VEHICLES ACT] (LBK nr 1324 af 21/11/2018), https://www.rets information.dk/forms/R0710.aspx?id=204976, *archived at* https://perma.cc/2DDJ-2BAT; BEKENDTGRELSE OM ASSESSORER I FORBINDELSE MED FORSG MED SELVKRENDE MOTORKRETJER (BEK 789 af 16/06/2017), https://www.retsinformation.dk/Forms/R0710.aspx?id=192104, *archived at* https://perma.cc/9A2H-F5NM.\n90 Id. 91 Vejdirektoratet, Vejledning til ansgning om forsg med selvkrende motorkretjer [Guidelines for Application for Testing of Self-driving Vehicles] (June 29, 2017), http://www.vejdirektoratet.dk/DA/viden_og_data/temaer/\nSelvkoerendebiler/Documents/Vejledning til ansgning om forsg med selvkrende biler.pdf, *archived at* https://perma.cc/SZ9F-HET6. 92 Id. at 2. presse/presse-og-nyheder/danmarks-foerste-foererloese-bus-i-rute-var-en-passagersucces, *archived at*\nhttps://perma.cc/HR8B-RVTY.\nSelvkoerendebiler/Sider/default.aspx, *archived at* https://perma.cc/26MR-8LG5. 95 Id. 96 Id.\n\nIII.  Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems Denmark has not passed any legislation banning LAWS. The Danish Defense has published a report that addresses the issues connected to autonomous weapons and international law.97 It concluded that current developments have increased the demand for lawyers within the military.98\n\nDenmark participated in the United Nations Office at Geneva meetings on LAWS in 2015.99 The Danish Ambassador for Disarmament announced at the meeting that \"all use of forceincluding lethal autonomous weapons systemsmust be in compliance with international humanitarian law, i.e. the fundamental rules of distinction, proportionality, and precaution in attack. And all use of force must remain under 'meaningful human control'.\"100 Human Rights Watch has criticized Denmark for not doing more on the issue.101 Estonia\n\nI.  AI Strategy On March 27, 2018, the government of Estonia announced its intention to formulate an AI\nstrategy.102  It stated that it would assemble a cross-sectoral group of experts to develop the strategy. The group would also prepare a bill that will allow the use of \"kratts,\" i.e., fully autonomous information systems, in all areas of life and ensure legal clarity as well as the required supervision.  It is expected that the bill will be ready to be presented in Parliament during 2019. The following challenging legal issues with respect to AI are among the questions being considered by the group of experts:\n\n- The cause and effect relations with regard to algorithms. Marten Kaevats, Adviser of the Strategy Unit of the Government Office, stated, \"[f]rom a legal perspective, this is a\n98 Id. at 214. C5B8B0A4AD379822C1257E26005D7D20/$file/2015_LAWS_MX_Denmark.pdf (last visited Dec. 21, 2018), archived at https://perma.cc/Z58Z-9HVX.\ncomplicated area, as the algorithms of an AI act as a 'black box'even the creator of the artificial intelligence is not always sure why the algorithm made a certain decision.\"103\n\n\n- Responsibilities and liabilities in the implementation of the systems without human\ninterference. In a more recent article, Kaevats stated, \"[a] year into the public debate over\nalgorithmic-liability law (a.k.a. the Kratt law), opinion leans toward avoiding sector-based regulation, opting for general algorithmic liability instead. The biggest conversation starter is\nthe idea of giving algorithms a separate legal status, similar to companies.\"104\n\nIn addition to the ethical, moral, and philosophical debate over AI liability, the group of experts is also working on enforcement issues.105\n\nII.  Autonomous Vehicles\n\nOn August 16, 2016, the government of Estonia created an expert group on self-driving vehicles aiming at developing policies, studies, and a legal framework for autonomous vehicles. In February 2017 the group recommended test driving of autonomous vehicles on Estonian roads. On March 2, 2017, the Ministry of Economic Affairs and Communications announced that testing of autonomous vehicles is allowed on the roads of Estonia, provided the driver is present in the car to take control of the vehicle if needed. The testing right for Estonia's public roads applies to selfdriving vehicles classified as level SAE 2 or SAE 3 vehicles according to the classification of the International Society of Automotive Engineers. The main requirement regarding these vehicles is that they should have either a driver present in the car or controlling the car remotely. The expert group is working towards developing liability, insurance, privacy, and ethics regulations concerning autonomous vehicles. It is also envisaged that the government will allow testing of vehicles with a higher degree of autonomy (SAE 4 or SAE 5) in the near future.106\n\n\nFinland\n\nI.  National Agenda\n\nFinland wants to become a leading country in AI.107 To that end the Ministry of Economic Affairs and Employment has declared that \"[l]egislation should naturally also support the change.\"108 Finland has yet to adopt ethical rules on the use of AI.  Finnish Kela (the Finnish Insurance System) is involved in creating ethical rules for AI based on the ethics challenge of Finland's AI\nprogram.109 Ethical guidelines are part of the national program for AI.110 AI Finland also provides a draft ethical guideline on its webpage.111 In addition, Kela is taking part in Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) Standards Association's Ethics Certification Program for Autonomous and Intelligent Systems (ECPAIS).112\n\nAs noted above, the Nordic countries have also joined together in a number of collaborative responses to AI, including together with the Baltic States.113\n\n\nhttps://www.kela.fi/web/en/press-releases/-/asset_publisher/LgL2IQBbkg98/content/ethical-principles-for-ai-arebeing-defined-with-kela-in-central-role, *archived at* https://perma.cc/82YB-AMCS. 110 Id.; see also *Ethics Challenge*, AI FINLAND, https://www.tekoalyaika.fi/en/background/ethics/ (last visited Dec.\n\n18, 2018), *archived at* https://perma.cc/S5QZ-LYRX. 111 AI FINLAND, EXAMPLES OF THE ETHICAL PRINCIPLES OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE, https://www.tekoalyaika.fi/ wp-content/uploads/2018/09/esimerkkeja_tekoalyn_eettisista_periaatteista_en-1.pdf (last visited Dec. 18, 2018), archived at https://perma.cc/NT9T-HHC6. 112 Id.; see *also* Press Release, IEEE, IEEE Launches Ethics Certification Program for Autonomous and Intelligent Systems (Oct. 2, 2018), https://standards.ieee.org/news/2018/ieee-launches-ecpais.html, *archived* at https://perma.cc/3WBR-VJ6U. 113 Declaration, Nordic Council of Ministers & Government of Sweden, AI in the Nordic-Baltic Region, May 14,\n2018, https://www.regeringen.se/49a602/globalassets/regeringen/dokument/naringsdepartementet/20180514_nmr_\ndeklaration-slutlig-webb.pdf, *archived at* https://perma.cc/RT92-BWN7; Declaration, Nordic Council of Ministers for Digitalization, The Nordic-Baltic Region: A Digital Frontrunner (Apr. 25, 2017), https://www.norden.org/ en/declaration/nordic-baltic-region-digital-frontrunner, *archived at* https://perma.cc/SUL2-XZT4; Press Release, Regeringskansliet, Sverige ska leda AI-samarbete i Norden och Baltikum (May 14, 2018), https://www.regeringen. se/pressmeddelanden/2018/05/sverige-ska-leda-ai-samarbete-i-norden-och-baltikum/, archived at https://perma.cc/6FPK-DSSB.\n\nII.  Autonomous Vehicles Finland allows for testing of driverless cars. Scania is testing semi-autonomous technology in its trucks in Finland with a driver in the car.114 Finland is part of the Artic Challenge testing of driverless cars under wintery conditions.115 The Political Party SFP in Finland has proposed the adoption of policies that would make Finland the first country in the world not only to welcome autonomous cars, but also to forbid nonautonomous cars.116\n\nIII.  Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems Finland has not issued an official position on lethal autonomous weapons. Finland took part in the 2015 UNOG expert panel on LAWS, where they welcomed more work on whether LAWS is compatible with the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons framework.117\n\n\nFrance\n\nI.  Introduction According to technology commentators, France has some of the world's best mathematics and engineering schools, and some of the world's leading data scientists and AI researchers come from the country.118  While many of these French-trained researchers and engineers go on to work in the United States and elsewhere, France is nevertheless said to have one of the strongest AI ecosystems in Europe, alongside Germany and the United Kingdom.119  Indeed, \"AI companies from these top three countries make up more than half of the European AI company total.\"120\n\n\nhttps://www.liikennevirasto.fi/web/sv/-/hur-halls-en-forarlos-bil-pa-en-snoig-vag-de-forsta-mellanresultaten-franprojektet-som-undersoker-automatiseringen-av-vagtrafiken-i-vinterforhallande, *archived at* https://perma.cc/FA9U- DVSJ. 116 *Motion 19 - Automatiserad trafik och sjalvkorande bilar*, SFP (Nov. 27, 2018), https://sfp.fi/politik/beslutpolitiska-program/partidagsbeslut/partidagen-2016-i-abo/motion-19-automatiserad-trafik-och-sjalvkorande-bilar/, archived at https://perma.cc/5XTR-4BSW. F9C1257F0F00383E96/$file/finland.pdf, *archived at* https://perma.cc/BN6R-HD2A.\nFrench President Emmanuel Macron has made it one of his government's priorities to build on these assets and make France a world leader in AI.  In this spirit, he has promised to allocate 1.5 billion (approximately US$1.7 billion) in public funding to AI by 2022 \"in a bid to reverse a brain drain and catch up with the dominant US and Chinese tech giants.\"121  In parallel, the French government has deployed some efforts towards anticipating the regulatory challenges related to AI. Additionally, the French government has been experimenting with using AI for certain aspects of governance.  In particular, the Courts of Appeals of Rennes and Douai tested predictive justice software on various appeals cases in 2017.122\nFrance is a participating member of the International Organization for Standardization's technical committee on AI.123\n\nII.  CNIL Report A 2016 law tasked the Commission Nationale de l'Informatique et des Libertes (National Commission on Computer Technology and Civil Liberties, CNIL) with studying the societal and ethical stakes related to new digital technologies.124  As part of this mission, the CNIL produced a report on \"the ethical stakes of algorithms and artificial intelligence\" in December 2017.125  This report points to six broad ethical issues surrounding AI:\n- Will human free-will and responsibility be eroded if decision-making is increasingly delegated to machines and software?\n\n- The voluntary or accidental inclusion of bias and discrimination in AI. - As AI fosters the segmentation of solutions (customized for each unique individual profiles),\nhow does that affect the collective logic of certain essential features of our society, such as democratic pluralism and the idea of risk mutualization?\n\nu-s-china-idUSKBN1H51XP, *archived at* https://perma.cc/5VNR-KE5D.\ndecember-2018/16808f699c, *archived at* https://perma.cc/7XP4-SWK6; Philippe Rozec & Louise Thiebaut, Intelligence artificielle : les limites de la justice predictive [*Artificial Intelligence: The Limits of Predictive Justice*], LES ECHOS (Nov. 2, 2017), https://www.lesechos.fr/idees-debats/cercle/030810043202-intelligence-artificielle-leslimites-de-la-justice-predictive-2126908.php, *archived at* https://perma.cc/K2WM-3399. 123 *Participation: ISO/IEC JTC 1/SC 42 Artificial Intelligence*, INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION FOR STANDARDIZATION, https://www.iso.org/committee/6794475.html?view=participation (last visited Nov. 23, 2018), archived at https://perma.cc/4W7M-SZDY. 124 Loi No. 2016-1321 du 7 octobre 2016 pour une Republique numerique [Law No. 2016-1321 of 7 October 2016\nfor a Digital Republic], art. 59, https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichTexte.do?cidTexte=JORFTEXT000033202746\n&dateTexte=&categorieLien=id, *archived at* https://perma.cc/A82Q-2M7W.\n\n- How to balance the benefits of big data with the necessity of protecting individual privacy. - How to select the data used to feed AI machine learning, balancing quality, quantity, and\npertinence to the purpose being pursued.\n- How the development of autonomous AI, as well as the blurring of the line between humans\nand machines, put into question the very meaning of human identity.126\n To deal with these challenges, the CNIL report suggests two general principles and six concrete recommendations.  The two principles are that of loyalty (*loyaute*, which can also be translated as\n\"faithfulness\") and vigilance/reflexivity.127  The first principle refers to the idea that algorithms should not betray the interests of its usersnot just as consumers but more broadly as citizens and members of communities or other groups whose interests may be affected by the algorithm.128\nThe second principle refers to the idea that the constant evolution and unpredictability of AI\nrequires methodical, deliberative, and regular re-examination by all stakeholders.129  The CNIL's six concrete recommendations include the following:\n- The ethical education of all involved in the development and use of AI\n\n- Further efforts to make algorithms understandable by their users - To design algorithms to serve human freedom and to counteract the \"black box\" effect - To create a national body to audit algorithms - To encourage research on ethical AI and launch great national research project geared towards\nthe general interest\n- To reinforce ethics compliance bodies within corporations130\n\nIII.  Other Government Reports In 2017, the government established a task force to develop strategies to boost France's leadership in the field of AI, including two working groups on how to manage the economic, social, ethical, national sovereignty, and national security implications of AI.131  The resulting report covered several themes, including the importance of AI serving \"autonomous individual development, necessary for a functioning democratic society,\" improving transparency, and giving individuals more control over their private data.132\nAnother government mission, commissioned by the French prime minister and led by member of Parliament and mathematician Cedric Villani, worked from September 2017 to March 2018 to study policy options for AI in France. This mission presented its findings in a March 2018 conference entitled \"AI for Humanity,\" which was held at the College de France, one of France's premier research institutions.133  President Macron made a speech during this conference, in which he outlined France's ambition and strategy with regard to AI.134  The President's speech, and the Villani Mission's report, included considerations on aspects of AI that may need a legislative or regulatory framework.  Among other considerations, the Villani Mission's report discussed the necessity of \"opening the Black Box\" (better understanding why an algorithm comes to a certain conclusion), implementing ethics by design, considering collective rights to data, continued human control over AI, promoting equality, and ensuring that everyone can benefit from AI.135 At the international level, France recently joined Canada to create an expert International Panel on Artificial Intelligence to \"support and guide the responsible adoption of artificial intelligence, centered on the respect for human rights, inclusion, diversity, innovation and economic growth.\"136\n\nIV.  Autonomous Vehicles France has expressed the ambition of taking a major role in the development of autonomous vehicles, with an emphasis on safety.  According to a policy paper published in May 2018, the French government's strategy includes a progressive approach to experimenting with autonomous vehicles, special attention to road security and cybersecurity risks, close cooperation between public authorities and the car industry to develop a regulatory framework, and European cooperation.137  In the spirit of the latter point, France entered into a joint endeavor with Germany and Luxembourg to create a cross-border, digital test bed for automated and connected driving.138\n\n134 Id.; Speech, Emmanuel Macron, AI for Humanity (College of France, Paris, Mar. 29, 2018), http://www.elysee. fr/declarations/article/transcription-du-discours-du-president-de-la-republique-emmanuel-macron-sur-l-intelligenceartificielle/ (in French), *archived at* https://perma.cc/T2B9-YPMA. *See also* CEDRIC VILLANI, DONNER UN SENS A\nL'INTELLIGENCE ARTIFICIELLE [FOR A MEANINGFUL ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE] (Mar. 2018), https://www.aifor humanity.fr/pdfs/9782111457089_Rapport_Villani_accessible.pdf, *archived at* https://perma.cc/QTC5-DPW6, English version *available at* https://www.aiforhumanity.fr/pdfs/MissionVillani_ Report_ENG-VF.pdf, *archived at* https://perma.cc/G9YS-DCXH. 135 VILLANI, *supra* note 134, at 1517 & 112147. 136 *France and Canada Create New Expert International Panel on Artificial Intelligence*, GOUVERNEMENT.FR\n(French government website) (Dec. 7, 2018), https://www.gouvernement.fr/en/france-and-canada-create-newexpert-international-panel-on-artificial-intelligence, *archived at* https://perma.cc/J95F-C9PR. 137 REPUBLIQUE FRANCAISE [FRENCH REPUBLIC], DEVELOPPEMENT DES VEHICULES AUTONOMES, ORIENTATIONS\nSTRATEGIQUES POUR L'ACTION PUBLIQUE [DEVELOPMENT OF AUTONOMOUS VEHICLES, STRATEGIC ORIENTATIONS\nFOR PUBLIC ACTION] 8 (May 2018), https://www.ecologique-solidaire.gouv.fr/sites/default/files/90p%20VDEF.pdf, archived at https://perma.cc/8GHC-6TCZ. 138 FRANCO-GERMAN-LUXEMBURGISH COOPERATION ON AUTOMATED AND CONNECTED DRIVING: CONCEPT FOR THE CROSS-BORDER DIGITAL TEST BED (May 8, 2018), https://www.ecologique-solidaire.gouv.fr/sites/default/files/2018- 05-08 Concept Digital Test Bed GER FRA LUX.pdf, *archived at* https://perma.cc/BK6Y-9HQT.\nFurthermore, beginning January 1, 2019, the French government has been able to authorize level\n4 autonomous vehicles on public roads for testing purposes.139\n\nV.  Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems A 2013 French initiative has led to annual international discussions on LAWS within the framework of the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons.140 President Macron declared in an interview that he is \"dead against\" the deployment of LAWS. 141  However, the French government has only proposed the adoption of a nonbinding declaration to curtail LAWS, and is opposed to the idea of a new international treaty on the issue.142\nGermany\n\nThe German Federal Government aims to make Germany \"a leading centre for AI . . . through pursuit of a speedy and comprehensive transfer of research findings to applications and the modernisation of administration,\" and aspires to make \"AI made in Germany\" a globally recognized quality mark.143 Its priorities are to expand AI research, transfer research findings and AI methods to businesses, support innovation competitions, create incentives for start-ups, develop international and European frameworks for AI in the labor market, fund and attract international scientists and talent, use AI in public administration, make data available and usable, revise the regulatory framework to ensure legal certainty if necessary, set standards, network on a national and international level, and engage in dialogue with different stakeholders.\n\n\nDESARMEMENT A GENEVE [PERMANENT REPRESENTATION OF FRANCE TO THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT IN\nGENEVA] (Aug. 3, 2016), https://cd-geneve.delegfrance.org/Presentation-and-position-of-France-1160, *archived at* https://perma.cc/6XD3-U82R. 141 Nicholas Thompson, *Emmanuel Macron Talks to Wired About France's AI Strategy*, WIRED.COM (Mar. 31,\n2018), https://www.wired.com/story/emmanuel-macron-talks-to-wired-about-frances-ai-strategy/, archived at https://perma.cc/DA6U-J2F8. 142 Armes : Il faut negocier un traite d'interdiction des armes letales autonomes [Weapons: We Must Negotiate a Treaty to Ban Lethal Autonomous Weapons], HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (Aug. 27, 2018), https://www.hrw.org/fr/\nnews/2018/08/27/armes-il-faut-negocier-un-traite-dinterdiction-des-armes-letales-autonomes, *archived at* https://perma.cc/JC23-3BFB; CAMPAIGN TO STOP KILLER ROBOTS, REPORT ON ACTIVITIES, *supra* note 74, at 8. 143 Bundesregierung [Federal Government], Eckpunkte der Bundesregierung fur eine Strategie Kunstliche Intelligenz [Key Points for a Federal Government Strategy on Artificial Intelligence] (July 18, 2018), at 1, no. 1a, https://www. bmbf.de/files/180718 Eckpunkte_KI-Strategie final Layout.pdf, *archived at* http://perma.cc/8PFK-\nHP2Z, English translation available at https://www.bmwi.de/Redaktion/EN/Downloads/E/key-points-for-federalgovernment-strategy-on-artificial-intelligence.pdf?__blob=publicationFile&v=4, *archived at* http://perma.cc/5MSP- 5NPF.\nI. National Agendas and Strategies In August 2014 and 2016 respectively, the German government published its Digital Agenda 20142017, which sets out guiding principles for its digital policy and highlights a number of key fields of action, and the Digital Strategy 2025.144 Among other things, two big data competence centers were established. In the implementation report, the government points out that artificial intelligence (AI) and machine learning provide the essential tools to deal with big data.145 Since 2016, Germany has organized an annual digital summit, which brings together representatives from business, academia, and society and serves as a \"central platform for cooperation on shaping a forward-looking policy framework for the digital transformation.\"146 The Digital Summit 2018 will focus on AI as one of the \"hot topics\" of digitalization. According to the website, the Digital Summit 2018 aims to \"help Germany to take advantage of the great opportunities offered by artificial intelligence whilst correctly assessing the risks and helping to ensure that human beings stay at the heart of a technically and legally secure and ethically responsible use of AI.\"147 In July 2018, the German government published key points for an Artificial Intelligence Strategy\n(AI Strategy) (Strategie Kunstliche Intelligenz).148  The complete AI Strategy was published at the end of November 2018 and publicly presented at the Digital Summit 2018 in December.149 It forms part of the overall digital strategy and the digital agenda. The AI Strategy states that AI technology must be build \"upon the basis of European values, such as the inviolability of human dignity, respect for privacy and the principle of equality.\"150 Among other things, the government strives to \"raise awareness among developers and users of AI technology about the ethical and legal limits publicationFile&v=3, *archived at* http://perma.cc/6ZAA-DDM3; FEDERAL MINISTRY FOR ECONOMIC AFFAIRS AND ENERGY, DIGITAL STRATEGY 2025 (Apr. 2016), https://www.de.digital/DIGITAL/Redaktion/EN/Publikation/ digital-strategy-2025.pdf?__blob=publicationFile&v=9, *archived at* http://perma.cc/93XR-GZJJ. 145 Bundesregierung [Federal Government], Legislaturbericht. Digitale Agenda 20142017 [Legislative Report.\n\nDigital Agenda 20142017] at 32 (May 2017), http://www.bmi.bund.de/SharedDocs/downloads/DE/publikationen/\nthemen/moderne-verwaltung/legislaturbericht-digitale-agenda-2014-2017.pdf?__blob=publicationFile&v=4, archived at http://perma.cc/EQD9-XLJW. 146 *Digital Summit: Shaping the Digital Transformation Together*, BUNDESMINISTERIUM FUR WIRTSCHAFT UND ENERGIE [FEDERAL MINISTRY FOR ECONOMIC AFFAIRS AND ENERGY], https://www.de.digital/DIGITAL/ Navigation/EN/Digital-Summit/digital-summit.html (last visited Nov. 15, 2018), *archived at* http://perma.cc/A8SG- EBUV.\nFederal Government] (Nov. 2018), https://www.ki-strategieof the use of artificial intelligence and to examine whether the regulatory framework needs to be further developed in order for it to guarantee a high level of legal certainty.\"151\n\nII. Data Ethics Commission On September 5, 2018, the newly created German Data Ethics Commission held its inaugural meeting. 152 The Data Ethics Commission is composed of sixteen experts from the fields of medicine, law, computer science, statistics, economics, theology, ethics, and journalism. It is independent, but receives organizational support from the Federal Ministry of the Interior, Building and Community (BMI) and the Federal Ministry of Justice and Consumer Protection (BMJV). The Commission is tasked with proposing ethical guidelines for data policy, algorithms, artificial intelligence, and digital innovation, and providing recommendations and regulatory proposals to the German government.153\n\nWith regard to the German government's AI Strategy, the Data Ethics Commission recommended adding one additional objective and one additional area of action. 154 It suggested including\n\"upholding the ethical and legal principles based on our liberal democracy throughout the entire process of developing and applying artificial intelligence\" and \"promoting the ability of individuals and society as a whole to understand and reflect critically in the information society.\"155\n\nIII. Autonomous Vehicles On December 13, 2016, an act implementing an amendment to the Vienna Convention on Road Traffic, an international treaty, entered into force in Germany, which allowed the transfer of driving tasks to vehicles themselves. 156 This amendment to the Vienna Convention concerns technical requirements for automated driving systems. Furthermore, in June 2017, Germany amended its Road Traffic Act to allow drivers to transfer control of the vehicle to highly or fully\n\nautomated driving systems and for those vehicles to be used on public roads.157 The driver remains obligated to take over the driving functions from the automated driving system without undue delay if the driving system tells him to do so or if the driver realizes or should have realized that the conditions for using an automated driving system are no longer fulfilled.158 In addition, a\n\"black box\" in the car must record whether the vehicle is controlled by the driver or by the driving system.159 The amendment also raised the maximum amount that a victim is allowed to recover for driving accidents involving such automated driving systems to 10 million (about US$11.3 million) for personal injury or death and to 2 million (about US$2.3 million) for property damage.160 In addition, an Ethics Commission on Automated and Connected Driving was set up by the German Federal Minister of Transport and Digital Infrastructure.161 The Ethics Commission is made up of fourteen academics and experts from ethics, law, and technology. In August 2017, it published its report, which sets out twenty ethical guidelines for the programming of automated driving systems with a focus on safety, human dignity, personal freedom of choice, and data autonomy.162 Guideline number 4, for example, states that\n\n[t]he purpose of all governmental and political regulatory decisions is thus to promote the free development and the protection of individuals. In a free society, the way in which technology is statutorily fleshed out is such that a balance is struck between maximum personal freedom of choice in a general regime of development and the freedom of others and their safety.163\n\n## Iv. Lethal Autonomous Weapon Systems The German Government In Its Coalition Agreement Stated That It \"Rejects Autonomous Weapon Systems Devoid Of Human Control\" And Called For A Global Ban.164 At The Meeting Of The Gge On\n\n\nLAWS it proposed, together with France, to adopt a political declaration to \"affirm that State parties share the conviction that humans should continue to be able to make ultimate decisions with regard to the use of lethal force and should continue to exert sufficient control over lethal weapons systems they use.\"165\nHungary\n\nI.  AI Coalition The Hungary Ministry of Information and Technology announced the establishment of the Artificial Intelligence Coalition on October 9, 2018.166 The Coalition is comprised of seventy membersrepresentatives of Hungarian and international companies, universities, scientific workshops, and professional and administrative organizations. The goals of the coalition are to\n\n- create the framework for cooperation in the AI area;\n\n- serve as a reference point for the international AI community; and\n- define the directions and the framework for AI-based development.167 The Coalition also aims to contribute to the development of an AI strategy, including assessing the socioeconomic impacts of AI.168 Hungary has not yet enacted any AI-related regulations.\n\nII.  Autonomous Vehicles On October 31, 2018, Hungary's Minister of Transportation announced that Hungary was a leader in research and development of infrastructure for autonomous driving cars in Europe. The Minister also mentioned that Hungary is developing a \"globally unique\" test environment, which includes a self-driving vehicle test track in Zalaegerszeg, in western Hungary.169\nIceland I.  General The Icelandic Prime Minister addressed the issue of AI at the Global Positive Forum in 2018, stating that it is important that AI serve all and not just the few.170 Iceland is also the home to an independent institute that focuses on AI, the Icelandic Institute for Intelligent Machines\n(IIIM/Vitvelastofnun Islands).171 The Institute has issued a recommended ethics policy to be used when conducting research and development on AI.172 As noted above, the Nordic countries have also joined together in a number of collaborative responses to AI, including together with the Baltic States.173\n\nII.  Autonomous Vehicles\n\nIn 2016, the Icelandic Road and Coastal Administration (Vegagerin) issued a report on selfdriving cars in Iceland.174 It concluded that the greatest variable risk in connection with selfdriving cars in Iceland is the Icelandic weather.175 At the time of publication there had been no convincing technological solutions to the risks associated with the weather.176 Iceland's readiness to adopt autonomous vehicles has also been reviewed by the European Commission,177 which concluded that Icelandic weather was a problem and that the Icelandic infrastructure might need\n173 Declaration, Nordic Council of Ministers & Government of Sweden, AI in the Nordic-Baltic Region, May 14,\n2018, https://www.regeringen.se/49a602/globalassets/regeringen/dokument/naringsdepartementet/20180514_nmr_\ndeklaration-slutlig-webb.pdf, *archived at* https://perma.cc/RT92-BWN7; Declaration, Nordic Council of Ministers for Digitalization, The Nordic-Baltic Region: A Digital Frontrunner (Apr. 25, 2017), https://www.norden.org/ en/declaration/nordic-baltic-region-digital-frontrunner, *archived at* https://perma.cc/SUL2-XZT4; Press Release, Regeringskansliet, Sverige ska leda AI-samarbete i Norden och Baltikum (May 14, 2018), https://www.regeringen. se/pressmeddelanden/2018/05/sverige-ska-leda-ai-samarbete-i-norden-och-baltikum/, archived at https://perma.cc/6FPK-DSSB. 174 SJALFAKANDI BILAR, RYNI ASTNA A ISLANDI, VEGAGERIN (Jan. 2016), https://trimis.ec.europa.eu/sites/ default/files/project/documents/Sj%C3%A1lfakandi%20b%C3%ADlar.pdf, *archived at* https://perma.cc/7S5S- HXQV.\nto be altered to accommodate autonomous vehicles.178 It was further suggested that autonomous testing by Volvo conducted in Gothenburg should be followed closely.179\n\nIII.  Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems Iceland does not have an active military. The Icelandic Parliament passed a resolution in 2016 to work towards the ban of LAWS.180\nIreland\n\nIreland has been referred to multiple times in news reports as the \"AI Island.\" 181   The emergence of Ireland as a hub for the development of AI technology appears to be a natural evolution of the booming technology industry that is already established in the country, where several major technology businesses have their headquarters.  Reports have noted that \"much of Ireland's prowess in AI in recent years is down to the maturing and upskilling of tech companies in Ireland,\"182 rather than to the development of a strategy aiming to encourage the development of the AI industry. Ireland signed the EU Declaration on Artificial Intelligence on April 10, 2018.  While there is currently no strategy solely dedicated to AI, Ireland notes that the Enterprise Strategy will cover developments in AI, and it revised its ICT Research Priority Areas for the period 20182023 to include AI.183\n\nItaly\n\nI.  AI in Italy While other developed countries have a large number of startups exploring AI projects (e.g. as of April 2018, the US had 1,393, EU 769, China 383, and Israel 362), Italy reportedly has only twenty-two such initiatives.184 At the EU level, AI projects are being developed in the energy, automotive, construction, agriculture, public administration, and infrastructure areas, among others. In this context, AI experts in Italy have highlighted the need for the country to deepen its commitment to pan-European AI initiatives by creating or diversifying government, social, and investment programs that would allow access to the larger EU market for Italy-based AI\nprojects.185 Also, experts note that Italy should put into place stronger conditions to attract foreign AI researchers and entrepreneurs.186\n\nIn July 2018, a group of higher education institutions created the Artificial Intelligence and Intelligent Systems Lab, with the aim of strengthening the country's \"basic and applied research in AI, support the country's ICT industry by promoting technology transfer from research to entrepreneurship, and promote the adoption of AI solutions in the public administration.\"187 In addition, the Italian Association for Artificial Intelligence, established in 1988, has about nine hundred members from academia, the government, and private companies, and holds an annual conference. 188 The Association's areas of work are knowledge representation and reasoning, machine learning, deep learning, optimization, planning, ontologies, robotics, natural language processing, and multi-agent systems.189 In particular, the Association has favored projects aimed at\n\n- promoting innovative procurement to integrate AI solutions in public services,\n\n- creating pilot projects for the use of AI in the public sector, - fostering research and education, and\n- creating synergies with research institutions to promote the development of AI solutions for\nthe public administration.190\n\n\nII.  White Book on AI In March 2018, the Agency for Digital Italy published a White Book on Artificial Intelligence that describes the current status of AI in Italy, calls on all stakeholders to improve access to AI in Europe and Italy, proposes a new common culture for innovation in public services, and sets forth challenges related to AI for the Three-Year Plan for Information Technology in the Public Administration, published in 2017.191  These challenges include\n\n- potential areas of application of AI initiatives;\n\n- ethical and technological challenges; - AI competency of government agencies;\n- data storage and sharing; - development of an appropriate legal framework for AI; and - promotion of key principles for advancing AI initiatives, including human dignity\nand equality.192\n In particular, the White Book states the government's interest in facilitating the adoption of AI strategies and approaches at public agencies in order to provide the general public with faster and more efficient services in, among others, the areas of public health, education, the judicial system, and public security.193 The White Book recognizes the need to update the legal and regulatory framework for AI in Italy, balancing public and private interests, as well as abiding by the principle of transparency of administrative acts, protection of privacy and copyright, fostering accountability, and establishing an effective system of social control for the protection of the fundamental rights of the person.194 The White Book includes ten recommendations for consideration by the government, including the creation of a \"National Competence Center and a Trans-disciplinary Center on AI,\" a national platform to promote the collection of annotated data, and measures to disseminate AI-related skills through the public administration.195\n\n\nIII.  Development of a National AI Strategy On September 13, 2018, the Italian government published a call for expressions of interest to become part of a group of high-level experts that will prepare a National Strategy on AI (the Group).196 The Group will be entrusted with the preparation of the National Strategy, with the aim of \"developing policies and tools on the various issues related to the development and adoption of IA [AI] systems,\" focusing on the following objectives:\n- Improving research and coordination in the field of AI\n\n- Encouraging public and private investment in AI\n- Attracting talent and entrepreneurial initiatives in the field of AI\n- Encouraging the development of the data-economy, with particular focus on the circulation of\nnon-personal data according to the highest standards of interoperability and cybersecurity\n- Reviewing the existing legislative and regulatory framework applicable to products and\nservices related to AI\n- Analyzing and evaluating the socioeconomic impacts likely to be caused by the widespread\nadoption of AI-based systems, and elaborating on the tools to mitigate these impacts197\n The call for expressions of interest in becoming a member of the Group states that the National Strategy will be the subject of public consultation.198\n\nIV.  Autonomous Vehicles\n\nConcerning self-driving cars in Italy, a Ministerial Decree of 2018 199  provides that the experimentation or testing of autonomous vehicles on a protected site or public streets must be performed by a human driver (supervisor) possessing certain specific qualifications, including among others, having possessed a driver's license for at least five years concerning the specific vehicle under testing, and other requirements related to accreditation in another EU country and\n\n197 Id. 198 Ministero dello Sviluppo Economico, Avviso Pubblico per la Manifestazione d'Interesse per la Selezione di 30\nComponenti del Gruppo di Esperti di Alto Livello per l'Elaborazione della Strategia Nazionale sull'Intelligenza Artificiale [Public Call for the Expression of Interest for the Selection of 30 Members of the Group of High-Level Experts for the Preparation of the National Strategy of Artificial Intelligence] (Sept. 13, 2018), http://www.sviluppo economico.gov.it/images/stories/documenti/Avviso-manifestazione-interesse-ia-2018-ultima-versione.pdf, archived at https://perma.cc/H4WF-NEFZ. 199 Decreto 28 Febbraio 2018 Ministero delle Infrastrutture e dei Trasporti, Modalita' Attuative e Strumenti Operativi della Sperimentazione su Strada delle Soluzioni di Smart Road e di Guida Connessa e Automatica [Decree of February 28, 2018, Ministry of Infrastructure and Transportation, Implementing Modalities and Operative Tools of Road Testing of Solutions on Smart Road and of Connected and Automatic Guide], GAZZETTA UFFICIALE [G.U.]\n[OFFICIAL GAZETTE] No. 90 (Apr. 18, 2018), http://www.gazzettaufficiale.it/eli/id/2018/04/18/18A02619/sg, archived at https://perma.cc/GZ7H-7GEQ.\ntraining in a third country where such vehicles operate for a specified minimum number of miles.200  In particular, the regulations require that the human driver be in a condition to promptly switch between the automatic and manual operation of the vehicle, and vice versa.201\nJersey The government of Jersey has stated that AI poses both a threat and opportunity to its jurisdiction, particularly with regard to its significant financial sector.  Responsibility for digital matters lies with the Economic Development Minister, and the government has stated that it is \"providing increased focus on the tech industry.\"202 Jersey has not issued a large volume of reports regarding the use of AI within its boundaries.  The Strategic Review by Jersey Finance considered the use of AI within the financial services sector, but did not cover developments in depth.203\nKazakhstan\n\nOn January 31, 2017, the President of Kazakhstan announced five priority points for the third stage of the country's modernization. 204  The first point of the program envisages accelerated technological modernization. The following steps are planned under this point:\n\n- Cultivate new industries created with the use of digital technologies and develop the country's prospective sectors such as 3D-printing, e-commerce, mobile banking, and digital services\n\n- Significantly increase the productivity of labor through widespread introduction of automation,\nrobotics, AI, and exchange of \"big data\"205\n The realization of this agenda will be aided by the implementation of the following projects in the AI sector:\n\n- Creation of an international technopark of IT start-ups (Astana Hub)\n- Creation of model factories based on Industry 4.0 technologies - Development of open platforms (Open API), Big Data, and AI\n- Development of telecommunications infrastructure, including broadband internet access\n- Implementation of Smart City components206\n\nIt is envisaged that the following IT and research centers will be the flagships for the development of AI in Kazakhstan:\n- Nazarbayev University\n- Astana International Financial Centre\n- Astana International Technology Park of IT Startups\n\nAdditionally, Alatau Park of Innovative Technologies will undergo substantial reforms.207\nLatvia Following the successful implementation of an AI-powered virtual assistant pilot project by the Latvian Enterprise Register, in June 2018 the government of Latvia announced plans to enhance the integration of AI in the e-services provided by government agencies. According to the Ministry of Environment and Regional Development, the government intends to develop a uniform AI\nplatform for the provision of e-services in the public administration sector.208\nLithuania\n\nI.  Innovation Program Lithuania does not have stand-alone AI strategy or legislation. However, some of the elements of AI can be found in the Resolution of the Government of 2013 on the Lithuanian Innovation Development Program for 20142020.209 The goal of the Program is to \"[mobilize] the state resources for the improvement of Lithuania's innovativeness and development of competitive economy based on high level knowledge, high technologies, qualified human resources and smart specialisation.\"\n\nII.  Autonomous Vehicles On December 7, 2017, Lithuania adopted a law that allows operation of self-driving cars without a driver being present. According to the Minister of Economy, \"[t]he main goal of the law is to allow such a vehicle to come to Lithuania and be tested in Lithuania.\"210\nLuxembourg\n\nLuxembourg aims to fully participate in the development of AI, as illustrated by the Grand Duchy's cooperation with France and Germany for testing autonomous vehicles,211 and its partnership with the technology firm Nvidia for training and education in AI.212  Luxembourg also participates in the International Organization for Standardization's technical committee on AI.213\nMalta Malta recently established a task force to create a national strategy for AI, aiming to push Malta forward as a leading nation in the development of this technology. According to the Maltese Parliamentary Secretary for Financial Services, Digital Economy and Innovation, the country's objectives are\n\nto dialogue with stakeholders, to build awareness of the key topics and issues that will inform a national AI Framework, consult on a policy that considers for ethically aligned, transparent and socially responsible AI, identify regulatory and fiscal measures to\n\n05-08 Concept Digital Test Bed GER FRA LUX.pdf, *archived at* https://perma.cc/BK6Y-9HQT. 212 Jonas Mercier, Le Luxembourg s'allie a Nvidia autour de l'IA [*Luxembourg Allies Itself with Nvidia on AI*], PAPERJAM (July 4, 2018), http://paperjam.lu/news/le-luxembourg-sallie-a-nvidia-autour-de-lia, archived at https://perma.cc/G5J7-4833. 213 Le Luxembourg rejoint la communaute internationale des experts en intelligence artificielle [Luxembourg Joins the International Community of Experts on Artificial Intelligence], PORTAIL-QUALITE.LU (Jan. 11, 2018), https://portail-qualite.public.lu/fr/actualites/normes-normalisation/2018/lux-experts-intelligence-artificielle.html, archived at https://perma.cc/SWX8-QCDN; *Participation: ISO/IEC JTC 1/SC 42 Artificial Intelligence*, INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION FOR STANDARDIZATION,  https://www.iso.org/committee/6794475.html?view= participation (last visited Nov. 23, 2018), *archived at* https://perma.cc/4W7M-SZDY.\nstrengthen Malta's appeal as a hub for foreign investment in this sector, and identify the underlying skill base and infrastructure needed to support AI.214 The task force is under the responsibility of the Malta Digital Innovation Authority.  In addition to developing a national strategy, the task force will also draft regulations to govern the development of AI, and is establishing a pilot program to consider a citizenship test for robots.215\nNetherlands216\n\nI.  Government Statements and Actions Following proposals from several ministers, the Dutch government decided to \"commission more research into the societal effects of technological developments and to establish an inter-ministerial working group to study this issue.\"217 Dutch Minister of the Interior and Kingdom Relations Kajsa Ollongren has also requested a legal study into how the use of algorithms may affect human rights.218 A group of experts will evaluate the results and propose possible solutions. Furthermore, the Dutch government plans to study decision-making algorithms in general and how existing legal frameworks apply to them.219 The Dutch government also plans to request an advisory opinion from the Scientific Council for Government Policy (WRR) on the impact of AI on public values.220 Finally, the Council for Public Administration (ROB) was instructed to \"investigate the opportunities and threats presented by digitalization for the functioning of modern democratic societies and to set out a framework for action for public administration.\"221\n\nII.  Dutch Financial Market Authority On March 15, 2018, the Dutch Financial Market Authority (*Autoriteit Financiele Markten*, AFM)\nreleased two publications, one on automated advisory services for various financial products\n\n215 *Homepage*, MALTA.AI, https://malta.ai/ (last visited Nov. 14, 2018), *archived at* https://perma.cc/8PWK-FKQJ. 218 Id. 219 Id. 220 Id. 221 Id.\n\n(\"robo advice\")222 and the other on automated and semi-automated portfolio management.223 The two publications clarify how current financial laws and regulations apply to these fields. They point out that the laws do not make a distinction between automated and human financial advice/portfolio management and that the same duty of care standards apply; they are technology neutral. However, the publications highlight a few points that need special attention, in particular the areas of data protection and privacy laws. The AFM also supervises the degree of process, IT\ncontrol, and quality of the algorithms.224 Algorithms must be designed in a way to prevent personal preferences and take the client's interests into account.225 Systems must be tested and monitored on a regular basis.226\n\nIII.  Dutch Police In August 2018, the police of the East Netherlands announced that it was developing a chatbot named \"Wout\" to offer people more possibilities to report cases to the police.227 At the beginning, Wout will only be available on Facebook Messenger and later expand to all kinds of social media services. The chatbot will start out with a selected set of questions and answers, but will be trained to learn from conversations and handle any type of question in the future. It is slated to be launched in the third quarter of 2019.228\n\nIV.  Autonomous Vehicles In October 2018, an amendment to the Dutch Road Traffic Act was published in the Official Gazette that allows the experimental use of self-driving vehicles without a human driver present in the car on public roads.229 Companies must apply for a permit with the Dutch Vehicle Authority\n(Dienst Wegverkeer, RDW). A permit is issued for three years.230\nhttp://perma.cc/23T9-HCP5. 223 AFM, GUIDANCE ON THE DUTY OF CARE IN (SEMI)AUTOMATED PORTFOLIO MANAGEMENT (Mar. 15, 2018), https://www.afm.nl/~/profmedia/files/onderwerpen/roboadvies-sav/guidance-duty-care.pdf, *archived at*\nhttp://perma.cc/L5X8-HY2X.\n\n224 AFM, THE AFM'S VIEW ON ROBO ADVICE, *supra* note 222, at 23, para. 5.2. 225 AFM, GUIDANCE, *supra* note 223, at 12, para. 2.1.1. 226 Id. at 13, paras. 2.1.3, 2.1.4. 227 Pim Lindemann, Politie Oost-Nederland krijgt hulp van chat-robot Wout [The East-Netherlands Police Are Getting Help From Chatbot Wout], DE GELDERLANDER (Aug. 4, 2018), https://www.gelderlander.nl/home/politieoost-nederland-krijgt-hulp-van-chat-robot-wout~a3de02a5/, *archived at* http://perma.cc/3TWM-Z7MM. 228 Id. 229 Wet tot wijziging van de Wegenverkeerswet 1994 in verband met mogelijk maken van experimenten met geautomatiseerde systemen in motorrijtuigen [Act to Amend the Road Traffic Act 1994 in Connection With Making the Experimental Use of Automated Motor Vehicle Systems Possible], Sept. 26, 2018, STAATSBLAD VAN HET\nKONINKRIJK DER NEDERLANDEN [STB.] [OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF THE KINGDOM OF THE NETHERLANDS] 2018, no. 347, https://zoek.officielebekendmakingen.nl/stb-2018-347.html, *archived at* http://perma.cc/7DT5-B4J9. The Road Traffic Act has not yet been updated.\n\nV.  Lethal Autonomous Weapon Systems In April 2015, the Dutch Ministers of Foreign Affairs and Defense requested an advisory report on legal, ethical, and policy issues with regard to LAWS from the Advisory Council on International Affairs (AIV) and the Advisory Committee on Issues of Public International Law\n(CAVV).231 The report, which was published in October 2015, concluded that meaningful human control is required in the deployment of autonomous weapon systems. The Dutch government concurs with this view.232 It therefore proposed, among other things, to establish a GGE at the\n2015 annual meeting of the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW) to study this issue.233 The Dutch government emphasizes that it rejects the development of fully autonomous weapon systems without any human control.234\nNorway\n\nI.  National Agenda\n\nNorway has adopted a national digital agenda, which includes a focus on AI investments.235 In the agenda the government presents how Norway can best utilize the possibilities of AI and modern technology.236 In addition Norway signed onto the EU collaboration on AI as part of Digital Day\n2018.237 Norwegian government agencies also use AI in their operations.238\n\n233 Id.\n\n234 Id. 235 Meldinger til Stortignet [Meld. St.] 27 (20152016) Digital Agenda for Norge - IKT for en enklere hverdag og kt produktivitet (Report from Government to Parliament), https://www.regjeringen.no/contentassets/fe3e34\nb866034b82b9c623c5cec39823/no/pdfs/stm201520160027000dddpdfs.pdf, *archived at* https://perma.cc/6S55- 72GZ; see *also* the Norwegian Board of Technology's (Parliamentary Advisor) report on AI and its possible uses in Norway, TEKNOLOGIRADET, KUNSTIG INTELLIGENS - MULIGHETER, UTFODRINGER O GEN PLAN FOR NORGE (Sept.\n\n2018), https://teknologiradet.no/wp-content/uploads/sites/105/2018/09/Rapport-Kunstig-intelligens-ogmaskinlaering-til-nett.pdf, *archived at* https://perma.cc/6DMR-HT93. 237 Randi Bjrhei, *Europeisk erklring om kunstig intelligens*, LOVDATA (Apr. 11, 2018), https://lovdata.no/ artikkel/europeisk_erklaering_om_kunstig_intelligens/2117, *archived at* https://perma.cc/XSN4-GFPX. contentassets/e166b6e0a392456a9f0e84eecea2472f/no/pdfs/prp201820190001hoddddpdfs.pdf, *archived at* https://perma.cc/E6V4-G3QS.\nAs noted above, the Nordic countries have also joined together in a number of collaborative responses to AI, including together with the Baltic States.239\n\nII.  Autonomous Vehicles\n\nThe testing of self-driving cars in Norway is regulated by law.240 The purpose of the law is to enable the testing of self-driving technology while also factoring in traffic safety and privacy protection.241\n\nIII.  Lethal Autonomous Weapons System\n\nNorway has issued a number of statements on LAWS, but has yet to adopt an outright policy.242\nSpeaking more generally on LAWS at the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons meeting in 2016, the Norwegian representative declared that it \"is necessary to ensure that the basic rules and principles of international law are upheld.\"243\n\n\nPoland\n\nI.  AI Strategy Poland's Ministry of Infrastructure and Transport has presented the Operational Program for Digital Poland 20142020. 244The aim of the Program is to strengthen digital foundations for national development, including common \"access to a high-speed Internet, effective and userfriendly public e-services and a continuously rising level of digital competences of the society.\"245\nThe Polish government initiated the development of an AI strategy in 2018 in line with the priorities outlined in the Operational Program for Digital Poland. In addition, a roundtable\n\nRegeringskansliet, Sverige ska leda AI-samarbete i Norden och Baltikum (May 14, 2018), https://www.regeringen. se/pressmeddelanden/2018/05/sverige-ska-leda-ai-samarbete-i-norden-och-baltikum/, archived at https://perma.cc/6FPK-DSSB. 240 LOV OM UTPRVING AV SELVKJRENDE KJRETY [ACT ON TESTING OF SELF-DRIVING VEHICLES] (LOV 2017-\n12-15-112), https://lovdata.no/dokument/NL/lov/2017-12-15-112, *archived* at https://perma.cc/8CB3-LYBZ.\n241 Id. 1 . 242 UNOG, CCW Meeting of Experts on Lethal Autonomous Weapons, 1316 May 2014, General Statement by Norway, http://www.unog.ch/80256EDD006B8954/(httpAssets)/D47349EE647EB6BBC1257CD7005DA52D/$file/\nNorway_MX_LAWS_2014.pdf (last visited Dec. 21, 2018), *archived* at https://perma.cc/TP8W-UYTT. 243 Id. at 2. 244 OPERATIONAL PROGRAMME, DIGITAL POLAND 20142020, https://www.polskacyfrowa.gov.pl/media/10410/\nPOPC_eng_1632015.pdf, *archived at* https://perma.cc/Y56B-ZFJ5.\n\n245 Id.\n\ndiscussion regarding AI and the strategy was held with the participation of the Vice-President of the Council of Ministers, the Minister of Science and Higher Education, the Deputy Minister of Digital Affairs, and representatives of the scientific community and supporting institutions, including the director of the National Center for Research and Development.246 It is anticipated that once the strategy is developed, Polish businesses will be better placed to obtain state and EU funding.247 Poland has not yet developed specific legislation to address AI.\n\nII.  Autonomous Vehicles On January 11, 2018, the Polish Sejm adopted the Law on Electromobility and Alternative Fuels.248 Article 65K of the Law defines autonomous vehicle as \"a vehicle, equipped with systems that control the movement of the vehicle and enables its motion without driver intervention, which can take control of the vehicle at any time\"249 The Law also stipulates that conducting research of autonomous vehicles for transit of transportation purposes is allowed, provided that the safety conditions are met and mandatory permits are obtained. 250  A designated stand-by driver must be present in the vehicle during the test drive.251\n\n\nPortugal\n\nI.  New General Regulation on Data Protection As noted in the European Union survey, the European Parliament and the Council of the European Union approved a new general regulation on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data on April 27, 2016.252  The regulation was created to protect citizens from the processing of personal data on a large scale by\n\ninvest-in-artificial-intelligence, *archived at* https://perma.cc/P7V6-WKZJ.\n\nAlternative Fuels], http://prawo.sejm.gov.pl/isap.nsf/download.xsp/WDU20180000317/T/D20180317L.pdf, archived at https://perma.cc/98YP-3WJU.\n\nlarge companies and information society services.253  It entered into force in the European Union on May 25, 2018.254 Portugal has yet to transpose the new regulation into its domestic legal system.255 Portuguese news sources have noted that the new rules should boost consumer and business confidence.256  With the new general regulation, it becomes possible to ask a company to reveal all the data it has about a person, erase this data, and review some decisions made by software.257 Concerns over the protection of digital data and the impact of AI on workers are among the main concerns of several Portuguese companies who would otherwise invest in the area.258\n\nII.  AI and the Law\n\nPortugal is taking the first steps to use AI in the area of justice.259  A legal assistance tool adapted to the Portuguese reality that conducts research on the requests made and learns from them will soon be launched in the country.260  Some have speculated that, in the future, with the use of the same technology, it will be possible to launch a tool that predicts the probability of success of a judicial process with the use of AI for the analysis of a repository of judgments issued by the EU\nwith more than three hundred thousand decisions of the Portuguese High Courts.261\n\nIII.  Health, Urban Mobility, Education, and Land Use Portugal is using more AI in several projects to analyze data from the public administration in order to find hidden information and create solutions in the areas of health, education, urban mobility, and land use and planning.262  All initiatives result from cooperation between scientific\n254 Id. 255 *Perguntas Frequentes* (FAQs), COMISSAO NACIONAL DE PROTECCAO DE DADOS, https://www.cnpd.pt/bin/faqs/ faqs.htm. 256 Id.\n\n257 Karla Pequenino, *Investigadores Receiam Impacto de Regras de Privacidade na Inteligencia Artificial*, PUBLICO\n(May 24, 2018), https://www.publico.pt/2018/05/24/tecnologia/noticia/academicos-receiam-que-novas-regras-deprivacidade-europeias-atrasem-a-inteligencia-artificial-1830138, *archived at* https://perma.cc/FWC2-2WRY. 258 Karla Pequenino, *Proteccao de Dados Preocupa Empresas Portuguesas a Investir em Inteligencia Artificial*, PUBLICO (Oct. 9, 2018), https://www.publico.pt/2018/10/09/tecnologia/noticia/portugal-relatorio-inteligenciaartificial-abaixo-media-europeia-1846720, *archived at* https://perma.cc/CZ87-WQAB. 259 Mariana Oliveira, *Como a Tecnologia Esta a Revolucionar o Mundo do Direito*, PUBLICO (Nov. 1, 2018), https://www.publico.pt/2018/11/01/sociedade/noticia/justica-artificial-tecnologia-revolucionar-mundo-direito- 1849618, *archived at* https://perma.cc/447S-WX6K. 260 Id. 261 Id. 262 Karla Pequenino, *Governo Financia Inteligencia Artificial na Saude, Mobilidade e Educacao*, PUBLICO (Oct. 24, institutions and entities of the public administration that are being developed under the innovation axis of the National Digital Competencies Initiative, which the government established in 2017 to increase digital skills in the country.263\n\n\nRussia In 2017, President Putin expressed his opinion that the country that masters AI first will become the \"ruler of the world.\"264  Russia's efforts in the development of AI infrastructure focus on upgrading the country's capabilities in the area of defense.\n\nI.  Action Plan\n\nIn March 2018, the Russian Ministry of Defense, Ministry of Education and Science and Russian Academy of Sciences hosted a conference titled Artificial IntelligenceProblems and Their Solutions. The outcome of the conference was a ten-point action plan for the development of AI\ntechnologies in Russia265 that included the following:\n\n1. Establishing a Big Data Consortium with the aim of unifying the efforts of leading scientific, educational, and industrial organizations in creating and implementing AI technologies.\n\n2. Gaining automation expertise: The Academy of Sciences, in conjunction with the Ministry of\nDefense, Ministry of Education and Science, and the Ministry of Industry and Trade, \"should intensify efforts to establish a Fund for Analytical Algorithms and Programs to provide\nexpertise on automated systems\" for different purposes.266\n\n3. Creating a state system for AI training and education: The Ministry of Education and Science,\njointly with the Academy of Sciences and Ministry of Defense, should prepare proposals for the creation of a state system of education and re-education of specialists in the area of AI.\n4. Building an AI laboratory at the Era science, technology, and research campus: The Ministry\nof Defense, jointly with the Federal Agency for Scientific Organizations, Moscow State University, and the Informatics and Development research center, should create a laboratory for AI advanced software and technical solutions at the Era campus in the City of Anapa, where\nthe \"military and the private sector can work together on breakthrough technologies such as\nAI, robotics, automation and other fields.\"267  The campus is scheduled to be completed in\n2020.  The Russian military is already sending personnel from its science and technology detachments to start work there.268\n\n\n5. Establishing a National Center for Artificial Intelligence: The Academy of Sciences, jointly\nwith the Foundation for Advanced Research, should prepare a proposal for the creation of the National Center for Artificial Intelligence. The Center would assist in the development of scientific potential, development of innovative infrastructure in the area of AI technologies, and realization of the results of theoretical research and feasible projects in the area of AI.\n\n6. Monitoring global AI development: The Ministry of Defense, jointly with the Ministry of\nEducation and Science, should monitor and assess recent developments and engage in allencompassing studies in the area of AI.\n\n7. Holding AI war games: The Ministry of Defense should organize and carry out a series of war\ngames with a broad spectrum of scenarios, defining the influence of AI models on the changing character of military operations at different levelstactical, operational, and strategic.\n\n8. Checking for AI Compliance: The Foundation for Advanced Research, jointly with the\nAcademy of Science, Ministry of Defense, and Federal Agency of Scientific Organizations, should prepare a proposal for creating on the territory of the Russian Federation a system for evaluating the compliance of AI technologies with standards.\n9. Discussing AI proposals at domestic military forums: The above-mentioned proposals should\nbe considered by \"interested federal executive bodies\" during the international militarytechnical forum \"Army2018\" and National Security Week, held in August 2018.\n\n10. Holding an annual AI conference: The Academy of Sciences, Ministry of Defense, and\nMinistry of Education and Science should hold an annual AI conference.269\n\n\n## Ii.  Institutional Arrangements\n\nThe Russian Federation has not yet enacted legislation or regulations governing AI. At present, the Ministry of Defense is the main government agency coordinating or setting policy priorities for issues concerning AI. Other relevant government agencies are the Ministry of Education and Science and the Ministry of Industry and Trade. The Academy of Sciences and Moscow State University are the institutional partners of the government in the development of AI technologies.\n\nIn 2012, the government enacted a law that created the Foundation for Advanced Research,270 with the aim of promoting the development and creation of innovative technologies and producing hightech military products for special and dual use. The Foundation operates under the auspices of the Russian Military-Industrial Commission, which is overseen by the President of the Russian Federation.271 According the Action Plan, the Foundation acts as a clearing and incubation house for innovative technologies, including those relating to AI.\n\nIII.  Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems In line with the government's approach of strengthening the military through the development of AI technologies, Russia expressed an ambition to develop lethal autonomous weapons. The Head of General Staff of the Russian Army has stated, \"[c]ertainly, every military conflict has its own distinctive features. The main features of future conflicts will be the widespread use of highprecision and other types of weapons, including robotic ones. The objects of the economy and the government system of the enemy will be destroyed first.\"272 Additionally, Russia, along with the United States, blocked a proposed treaty banning LAWS at a meeting of parties to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons.273 Russia has previously expressed in a written statement its opinion that the following grounds support not having such a ban:\n- There is currently no clear definition of LAWS, and \"the lack of working samples of such weapons systems remains the main problem in the discussion on LAWS.\"274\n\n- The difficulty of making a clear distinction between civilian and military developments of\nautonomous systems based on the same technologies.275\n\nConsequently, Russia sees the future discussions being focused on harmonization of the basic principles of LAWS along with defining certain concepts with regard to LAWS: \"Further work on key aspects of such weapons which relate to the notions of 'autonomy,' 'critical functions,'\n'meaningful human control,' 'predictability,' etc., will depend on the definition of LAWS.\"276\n\nabout/documents/federalyniy_zakon_ot_16_oktyabrya_2012_g_n_174_fz_o_fonde_perspektivnih_issledovaniy, archived at https://perma.cc/RW7B-EXY8. 271 Osnovnaja Informacija [*General Information*], FOND PERSPECITVNIX ISSLEDOVANIJ [FOUNDATION FOR ADVANCED RESEARCH], https://fpi.gov.ru/about/obshtaya_informatsiya (last visited Dec. 11, 2018), *archived at*\nhttps://perma.cc/NX5F-7KNH.\n\n272 Ispol'zovanie Robotov i Shirokoe Primenenie Vysokotochnogo Oruzhija Stanut Osnovnymi Osobennostjami Vojn Budushhego - Nachal'nik Genshtaba Rossijskoj Armii [The Use of Robots and the Widespread Use of Precision Weapons Will Be the Main Features of Future Wars - Chief of the General Staff of the Russian Army], INTERFAKS, ABN, AGENSTVO BOENNIX NOVOSTEJ [INTERFAX, MNA, MILITARY NEWS AGENCY] (Mar. 24, 2018), http://www.militarynews.ru/ story.asp?rid=1&nid=476975, *archived at* https://perma.cc/B2VZ-D5EE. 273 *Handful of Countries - Including the US and Russia - Hamper Discussions to Ban Killer Robots at UN*, FUTURE\nOF LIFE INSTITUTE (Nov. 26, 2018), https://futureoflife.org/2018/11/26/handful-of-countries-including-the-us-andrussia-hamper-discussions-to-ban-killer-robots-at-un/, *archived at* https://perma.cc/4X4A-JVLD.\n\nIV.  Autonomous Vehicles Driverless cars have been produced in Russia since 2016 by the largest national internet company Yandex and several startups.  State-owned car manufacturers, known for the poor quality of their cars, are practically absent from the autonomous vehicle market.  Major foreign car manufacturers, such as Scania, Volvo, Toyota, and Audi, have expressed interest in testing their autonomous vehicles in traditionally difficult Russian driving conditions.277 Industry experts predict that by the year 2025 there will be around 20,000 driverless cars on Russian roads.278  However, the production and use of autonomous vehicles is not regulated. The State Duma (Russian legislature) did not include laws regulating driverless cars in its legislative agenda, and in September 2018 one of the Duma leaders stated that parliamentarians are going to legislate on \"other problems of the transportation infrastructure and highway construction, which are more important.\"279 The first nationwide regulation in this field was issued by the Cabinet of Ministers of the Russian Federation in November 2018 and only addresses testing.280  Specifically, the regulation requires experiments in the test use of highly automated vehicles on public roads in two Russian regions between December 1, 2018, and March 1, 2022.  The government has designated a national research laboratory to review test applications from the owners of driverless cars and coordinate testing. Reports for the government summarizing the test results and proposing further developments, including recommendations for technical requirements and standards for the practical use of autonomous vehicles, must be submitted by March 2020 and again in 2022.281\n\n\nSlovenia Some of the elements of an AI development strategy and priorities can be found in Digital Transformation of Slovenia, a report prepared by the Ministry of Public Administration.282 The report proposes the creation of a machine-readable National Open Data Portal, which would be a clearinghouse for government data.283\n\nIn the Digital Transformation report, the government also indicated its support for connected automated driving (CAD) and stated that it has started preparatory activities relating to cooperative systems.284 *C-Roads Slovenia* is a pilot project involving the introduction of cooperative systems to transfer vehicle-to-vehicle, vehicle-to-infrastructure, and infrastructure-to-vehicle information in real time. According to the government, these systems can significantly improve the efficiency of the transportation system, the safety of all road users, and the comfort of mobility.\n\nIn early October 2016, the C-Roads platform became operational. The platform integrates state institutions and road operators from eleven EU Member States. The platform coordinates activities for the implementation of cooperative intelligent transport systems (C-ITS) in Europe.285 Spain\n\nI.  Artificial Intelligence Activities Spain has a number of AI research organizations, hosted in computer science programs run by universities and other academic institutions.286 Leading AI research entities include the Asociacion Espanola de Inteligencia Artificial (Spanish AI Association, AEPIA) and the Instituto de Investigacion en Inteligencia Artificial (Artificial Intelligence Research Institute, IIIA) hosted in the Autonomous University of Barcelona (Universitat Autonoma de Barcelona).  These entities are active participants in both national and international efforts to support and promote research and development in AI.287\n\nbrosura/Slovenian_Digital_Transformation_January_2018.pdf, *archived at* https://perma.cc/2X3A-GP8P.\n\nII.  Government Initiatives As part of the Digital Strategy for a Smart Spain 2025, in November 2017 the Secretary of State for the Information Technology Society and the Digital Agenda created a working group of experts to develop official guidelines on AI. 288 The group includes businesspeople, professors, and government officials who are reputable and well-known experts in their respective areas of knowledge.289 The findings of the working group will be published in the *Libro Blanco de Inteligencia Artificial* (*White Book on Artificial Intelligence*, WBAI), which is aimed at addressing the social, legal, and ethical implications of the use of AI and big data in the private and public sectors as well as the Spanish society in general.290\n\nThe WBAI working group was expected to have a draft completed by May 2018.291 The WBAI\nrecommendations will be the basis for a code of ethics and a legal framework on the use of AI data in the public administration as well as a related code of good practices for companies, to be prepared by the government.292 In August 2018, the working group submitted a draft of the WBAI to the new Spanish government headed by Pedro Sanchez. 293 Although the working group, created by the previous Spanish government, has not been dissolved, the deadline for the WBAI publication is not clear, as there has been no official announcement in this regard.294 In addition, Spain signed the EU Cooperation Agreement on Artificial Intelligence on April 10,\n2018. 295 The agreement aims to promote Europe's technology and industrial capacity in AI, address the challenge that AI poses to the labor market and education and training systems in the\n\n289 Id. 290 Id. 291 Id. 292 Id. 293 El Gobierno de Sanchez Retrasa Estrategia Espanola de Inteligencia Artificial [The Government of Sanchez Delays the Spanish Strategy on AI], EL ESPANOL (Oct. 25, 2018), https://www.elespanol.com/economia/\n20181025/gobierno-sanchez-retrasa-estrategia-espanola-inteligencia-artificial/347966537_0.html, *archived at* https://perma.cc/9CBA-HMEC. 294 Id. 295 Espana Firma un Acuerdo de Cooperacion en Inteligencia Artificial Junto a Otros 24 Estados de la Union Europea [*Spain Signs a Cooperation Agreement on AI with Other 24 European Union Countries*], ESMARTCITY.ES (Apr. 11, 2018), https://www.esmartcity.es/2018/04/11/espana-acuerdo-cooperacion-inteligenciaartificial-junto-24-estados-union-europea, *archived at* https://perma.cc/R65K-2ALK.\nEU, and devise the appropriate AI legal and ethical framework, taking into consideration the EU\nfundamental rights of privacy and the protection of personal data.296\n\nIII.  Autonomous Vehicles Although Spain has not enacted any legislation or regulations on autonomous vehicles, the General Directorate of Traffic has authorized the testing of autonomous vehicles since 2015.297 IV.  Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems The government of Spain has declared that its armed forces do not have and are not planning to develop LAWS or weapons based on AI. 298 The Spanish government is not financing any research project on LAWS. It shares the concerns of other countries about the development of robotic weapons that would operate without human intervention.299 This concern is mainly based on the consequences to human rights and international humanitarian laws. The government further supports the adoption of a general international legal framework aimed at preventing an arms race with respect to LAWS. 300  The Spanish government supports the issuance of the Political Declaration and politically binding Code of Conduct that would include transparency measures to monitor this process as well as the establishment of a Committee of Experts who will be responsible of the evaluation of new developments in the technology involving these weapons.301\n\n\nVEHICLES ON OPEN TRACKS] (Nov. 16, 2015), http://www.dgt.es/Galerias/prensa/2015/11/NP-pruebas-vehiculosconduccion-automatizada.pdf, *archived at* https://perma.cc/LDH9-27QT. 298 Las Fuerzas Armadas Espanolas No Tendran Su Propio Robot Asesino [The Spanish Armed Forces Will Not Have Their Own Killer Robot], ABC (Aug. 31, 2015), https://www.abc.es/espana/20150831/abci-robots-asesinosespana-201508301912.html, *archived at* https://perma.cc/AAQ7-2SJL. 299 Respuesta del Gobierno [Government Answer], Pregunta Escrita Senado [Written Question Senate] 684/77289, June 17, 2015, http://www.senado.es/web/expedientdocblobservlet?legis=10&id=190036, archived at https://perma.cc/Z4UU-N92H. 300 Id. 301 Convencion sobre Ciertas Armas Convencionales, Grupo de Expertos Gubernamentales sobre Sistemas de Armas Autonomas Letales, Intervencion del Embajador de Espana, Julio Herraiz, Delegado ante la Conferencia de Desarme, Geneva, Apr. 9, 2018 [Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, Group of Government Experts on LAWS, Statement by the Spanish Ambassador, Julio Herraiz, Delegate to the Disarmament Conference, Apr. 9,\n2018], https://www.unog.ch/80256EDD006B8954/(httpAssets)/072ED40378F79CFBC125827200575723/$file/\nSweden\n\nI.  General Sweden is a member of the European Union and therefore the General Data Protection Regulation\n(GDPR) on privacy has applied directly since May 2018.302 Regulation of AI has also been viewed as a task for the entire EU to address jointly, which is why Sweden has supported a position that the European Commission should consider this.303 Sweden has also signed on to the Declaration on Cooperation on AI as part of Digital Day in 2018.304 Despite arguing for an EU approach to AI, the Swedish government and Swedish universities as well as philanthropist are investing in AI.305\n\nII.  National Strategy\n\nSweden has developed a National Strategy for Artificial Intelligence.306 The goal is to become a leader in new digital opportunities.307 This means creating \"the enabling conditions\" for such digital advances to aid Swedish competitiveness and welfare.308 According to the government, as presented in the National Strategy, this includes investing in research and higher education.309 The government also recommends joint projects between the private and public sectors.310 Moreover, a number of Swedish agencies are looking to use AI to advance their missions. For example, the Swedish Bolagsverket (Swedish Companies Registration Office) wants to use AI to focus on companies that are more likely to be used for criminal activities.311\n\nAs noted above, the Nordic countries have also joined together in a number of collaborative responses to AI, including together with the Baltic States.312\n\nIII.  Local Authorities' Use of Artificial Intelligence A number of local authorities are looking to use AI to advance their missions. Sveriges Kommuner och Landsting (SKL) (the Swedish municipality and county council agency) has issued a report on the potential use of AI in health and well care settings.313 Other examples of AI use include its use in educational settings314 and in digital sobriety tests by Kontigocare.315 SKL also predicts that the use of robots and AI technology could be helpful for the county councils and regions in their goal to provide their residents with *valfard* services (collective name for health services, public transportation, education, elder care, child care, water, roads, and other public utilities) in the near future.316 Studies have also been completed to review the usefulness of AI technology in Swedish industry and enterprise.317\n\nIV.  Self-driving Vehicles The Swedish government has issued a government report on self-driving cars in order to \"analyze what rule changes are needed for an introduction of driver-supported technology and wholly or\n\nRegeringskansliet, Sverige ska leda AI-samarbete i Norden och Baltikum (May 14, 2018), https://www.regeringen. se/pressmeddelanden/2018/05/sverige-ska-leda-ai-samarbete-i-norden-och-baltikum/, archived at https://perma.cc/6FPK-DSSB. 313 SVERIGES KOMMUNER OCH LANDSTING, ARTIFICIELL INTELLIGENS: MOJLIGHETER FOR VALFARDEN (2017), https://skl.se/download/18.1284479015a26d3e16d5373/1486739509125/Artificiell+intelligens.pdf, archived at https://perma.cc/JJ3Y-LRBC. 314 Mark Scott, *Sweden Tries to Make Digital Lightning Strike Twice*, POLITICO (Oct. 9, 2018), https://www.politico. eu/article/sweden-education-system-digital-revamp-coding-stockholm-school/, *archived at* https://perma.cc/9RZP- VSWN. 315 KONTIGOCARE, https://www.kontigocare.com/ (last visited Jan. 7, 2019), *archived at* https://perma.cc/3EYP- CRXK. 316 *Automation, robotar och AI i valfarden*, SVERIGES KOMMUNER OCH LANDSTING, https://skl.se/naringslivar betedigitalisering/digitalisering/nationellsamverkanstyrning/automationrobotarochartificiellintelligensai.15924.html (last visited Jan. 7, 2019), *archived at* https://perma.cc/SLL5-DGJ4; SVERIGES KOMMUNER OCH LANDSTING, AUTOMATISERING AV ARBETE - MOJLIGHETER OCH UTMANINGAR FOR KOMMUNCER, LANDSTING, OCH REGIONER (June 2018), https://webbutik.skl.se/bilder/artiklar/pdf/5408.pdf?issuusl=ignore, *archived at* https://perma.cc/Y64S- VZCS. 317 VINNOVA , ARTIFICIELL INTELLIGENS I SVENSKT NARINGSLIV OCH SAMHALLE - ANALYS AV UTVECKLING OCH\nPOTENTIAL (VR 2018:08) (May 2018), https://www.vinnova.se/contentassets/55b18cf1169a4a4f8340a5\n960b32fa82/vr_18_08.pdf, *archived at* https://perma.cc/K4ZR-KMWD.\npartially self-driving vehicles on the road.\" 318  One of the issues will be for producers of autonomous vehicles to prove how safe the technology is to justify putting it on the roads.319 Current legislation allows for the testing of self-driving cars following a permission system.320 A\nphysical driver must be present inside or outside the car. 321  Permits are awarded by the Transportstyrelsen (Swedish Transport Agency).322 In addition, Transportstyrelsen has issued its own rules.323 The rules include the information that must be contained in an application.324 It also provides that the results of the test must be reported to the Transportstyrelsen when completed.325\nIn addition, if tests are run for more than a year, annual reports must be submitted.326 According to media reports, a total of three companies have been approved to test self-driving technology in Sweden: Nobina Technology AB, Amobility AB, and Volvo Cars. 327  An additional four companies have applications pending.328\n\nV.  Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems\n\nSweden has not publicly called for a ban on the use of LAWS. However, it addressed the issue in the United Nations both in 2016 and 2018.329 Swedish-based think tank Sipri published a report forordning-2017309-om-forsoksverksamhet-med_sfs-2017-309, *archived* at https://perma.cc/ZWC4-BJZE. 321 Id. at  7. 322 Id. 5 .\n[Regulations and Public Advisory on Permits to Commit Trials with Autnomous Vehicles] (TSFS 2017:92), https://www.transportstyrelsen.se/sv/Regler/ts-foreskrifter-i-nummerordning/2017/?RuleNumber=2017:\n92&RulePrefix=TSFS, *archived* at https://perma.cc/AVL5-FNAH. 324 Id. 4 . 325 Id. 9 . sjalvkorande-bilar-i-sverige/, *archived at* https://perma.cc/VM5A-RWBV. Exchange_Statements_Sweden.pdf, *archived at* https://perma.cc/S2CE-TXXV; General Statement by Sweden at the CCW GGE on LAWS, UNOG, https://www.unog.ch/80256EDD006B8954/(httpAssets)/12706C2B73502F 13C125827400536FA9/$file/2018_LAWSGeneralExchange_Sweden.pdf (last visited Dec. 21, 2018), archived at https://perma.cc/AE32-9EVJ.\non LAWS, which found that Sweden uses Active Protection Systems (APSs) technology, including on armored vehicles.330 Members of Parliament have also presented motions (the first effort in passing a parliamentary bill) against LAWS and the military use of AI.331\nSwitzerland\n\nI. Strategy Digital Switzerland In September 2018, Switzerland published its \"Strategy Digital Switzerland,\" which sets out goals for the coming two years.332 With regard to artificial intelligence (AI), the Federal Council, the Swiss government, plans to support initiatives in the cantons, cities, and municipalities in relation to smart cities333 and establish a working group on the subject of AI.334 The working group will facilitate knowledge and opinion sharing and represent Switzerland in international bodies. Furthermore, it is tasked with developing \"recommendations for a transparent and responsible use of AI\" by the middle of 2019.335\n\nII. Parliamentary Interpellations and Motions In Switzerland, several parliamentarians have submitted interpellations (formal requests) to the government to inquire what actions have been taken in the area of AI or to propose new initiatives. Among other things, they have requested the establishment of a Competence Center for AI in the Department of the Interior336 to develop a framework to use AI for public administration and have asked if the government was considering formulating a catalog of values for the digital world av Carl Schlyter (MP) (Oct. 13, 2017), http://www.riksdagen.se/sv/dokument-lagar/dokument/motion/forbjudautonoma-dodliga-vapensystem-och-reglera_H5022655, *archived* at https://perma.cc/Y5MW-HTSR.\n332 Bundesamt fur Kommunikation [BAKOM] [Federal Office of Communications] [OFCOM], Strategie Digitale Schweiz [Strategy Digital Switzerland] (Sept. 2018), https://www.bakom.admin.ch/dam/bakom/de/bilder/bakom/\ndigitale_schweiz_und_internet/strategie_digitale_schweiz/strategie/Strategie digitale Schweiz.pdf.download. pdf/Strategie_DS_Digital_2-DE.pdf, *archived at* http://perma.cc/YG3K-Q3L7. 333 Id. at 28. 334 Schweizerische Eidgenossenschaft [Swiss Confederation], Aktionsplan Digitale Schweiz [Action Plan Digital Switzerland], Sept. 5, 2018, at 26, para. 7.5, https://www.bakom.admin.ch/dam/bakom/de/dokumente/\ninformationsgesellschaft/strategie2018/AktionsplanDigitaleSchweiz.pdf.download.pdf/AktionsplanDigitaleSchweiz _DE.pdf, *archived at* http://perma.cc/CS26-A6KH. The Action Plans lists various measures to implement the Strategy Digital Switzerland. 335 Id. 336 Interpellation no. 18.4037, Kompetenzzentrum fur kunstliche Intelligenz in der Bundesverwaltung [Competence\n(goodwill, tolerance, patience, balance, discretion, community spirit, willingness to help, and nondiscrimination), and if Switzerland was participating in international regulatory efforts of the digital world.337\n\nSeveral other interpellations and motions have raised the issue of autonomous vehicles and liability, asking when Switzerland would amend its laws to allow their use. Three of the motions were adopted by the Swiss Federal Council.338 The revision of the Road Traffic Act is currently ongoing and the proposal is expected to be submitted to the Federal Council in the spring of 2019.339\n\nIII. Lethal Autonomous Weapon Systems At the meeting of the GGE on LAWS in April 2018, Switzerland proposed to adopt a political declaration to develop a shared understanding of the challenges posed by LAWS.340 Switzerland sees such a political declaration as a middle ground and proposes to address the following issues:\n\n-\nthe applicability and the centrality of ensuring respect for IHL [international humanitarian law] under all circumstances;\n-\nstates remain responsible for wrongful acts and that individual responsibility must be guaranteed;\n-\ncapture the emerging consensus around the fact that no weapon should be used without appropriate human control; and\n\nPave the Way for Automated and Self-driving Vehicles], Mar. 2, 2017, https://www.parlament.ch/de/ratsbetrieb/\nsuche-curia-vista/geschaeft?AffairId=20173049, *archived at* http://perma.cc/NDV5-L7QC; Motion no. 17.3191. Automatisierte Fahrzeuge. Moglichst schnell den rechtlichen Rahmen festlegen [Automated Vehicles. Establish a Legal Framework Fast], Mar. 16, 2017, https://www.parlament.ch/de/ratsbetrieb/suche-curia-vista/geschaeft?\n\nAffairId=20173191, *archived at* http://perma.cc/FDB8-PCB3; Motion no. 17.4039. Gesetzliche Hurden zur Einfuhrung von autonomen Fahrzeugen abschaffen [Abolish the Legal Obstacles to the Introduction of Autonomous Vehicles], Dec. 7, 2017, https://www.parlament.ch/de/ratsbetrieb/suche-curia-vista/geschaeft?AffairId=20174039, archived at http://perma.cc/H9NM-APZK. 339 17.4039. Motion grunliberale Fraktion. Gesetzliche Hurden zur Einfuhrung von autonomen Fahrzeugen abschaffen [17.4039. Motion of the Green-liberal Parliamentary Group. Abolish Legal Obstacles to the Introduction of Autonomous Vehicles], Sept. 27, 2018, AMTLICHES BULLETIN [AB] [OFFICIAL BULLETIN] 2018 at 783, https://www.parlament.ch/de/ratsbetrieb/amtliches-bulletin/amtliches-bulletin-die-verhandlungen?SubjectId=44422, archived at http://perma.cc/4YTJ-9XFX. 340 Swiss Confederation, GGE on LAWS 2018, Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, Exchange of General Views, Apr. 9, 2018, at 2, https://www.unog.ch/80256EDD006B8954/(httpAssets)/CDA07B933C0B\n0143C125827200572F23/$file/2018_LAWSGeneralExchange_Switzerland+(EN).pdf, *archived at* http://perma.cc/M3TP-FYNT.\n\n-\nspell out a number of measures such as transparency, legal reviews, best practices,\ntechnical standards or other policy measures.341\n\nUnited Kingdom\n\nI.  Introduction The government of the United Kingdom has stated that the country is \"currently in the foothills of a new technological revolution. Artificial intelligence has the potential to be as transformative in our lifetimes as the steam-powered economy of the 19th century.\" 342  The government has described AI as \"a set of advanced general purpose digital technologies that enable machines to do highly complex tasks effectively.\"343   The government has actively been encouraging, and funding, the development of the AI industry, and has produced a number of reports that consider the application and development of this technology.  The discussion that follows provides a highlevel overview of some of the developments the UK is consulting on, and providing funding to, that involve AI. In early 2017, Prime Minister Theresa May launched a consultation for the \"Modern Industrial Strategy,\"344  which lead to the publication of a White Paper detailing the government's policy on developing AI, including investments in science, research, and innovation in AI and robotics as one of its four grand challenges.345  The White Paper also announced an \"Artificial Intelligence Sector Deal to boost the UK's global position as a leader in developing AI technologies.\"346  The government hopes to be able to capitalize on predictions that the GDP of the UK will increase by 10.3%, the equivalent of 232 billion (approximately US$300 billion), as a result of the\n\nhttp://perma.cc/NJG3-YXFK.\n342 GOVERNMENT OFFICE FOR SCIENCE, ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE: OPPORTUNITIES AND IMPLICATIONS FOR THE FUTURE OF DECISION MAKING (2015), https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/ uploads/attachment_data/file/566075/gs-16-19-artificial-intelligence-ai-report.pdf, *archived at* https://perma.cc/HU7T-Y544. 343 WENDY HALL & JEROME PESENTI, GROWING THE ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE INDUSTRY IN THE UK (Oct. 2017), https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/652097/Growing_ the_artificial_intelligence_industry_in_the_UK.pdf, *archived at* https://perma.cc/LYW8-G9A8. 344 Press Release, Prime Minister's Office, PM Unveils Plans for a Modern Industrial Strategy Fit for Global Britain\n(Jan. 22, 2017), https://www.gov.uk/government/news/pm-unveils-plans-for-a-modern-industrial-strategy-fit-forglobal-britain, *archived at* https://perma.cc/77T7-X9B5. 345 HM GOVERNMENT, INDUSTRIAL STRATEGY: BUILDING A BRITAIN FIT FOR THE FUTURE (Cm. 9528, Nov. 2017), https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/730048/industrialstrategy-white-paper-web-ready-a4-version.pdf, *archived at* https://perma.cc/PQW7-2EKP.\ndevelopment of AI. 347  The 2017 budget provided funding to \"industries of the future,\" and included 75 million (approximately US$96 million) for AI.348 The Department for Digital, Culture, Media and Sports is the lead government department for the development of AI policy, with the Department for Business, Enterprise and Industrial Strategy also playing a significant role.  In June 2017, the House of Lords established a select committee\n\"to consider the economic, ethical and social implications of advances in artificial intelligence,\"349\nand shortly afterwards, in November 2017, the House of Commons conducted an inquiry to consider the use of algorithms in public business and decision making.350  The report concluded, and the government agreed, that the use of algorithms in decision making is a significant opportunity, but that the impact of such technology must be carefully monitored.351\n\nII.  Current Application of Artificial Intelligence\n\nThe UK is currently embracing the use of AI across public services in a variety of ways.  It recently enacted laws to extend compulsory vehicle insurance to cover vehicles operated in automatic mode, making the insurer liable for any accidents caused by the vehicle when operated in this mode.  It also enables the Secretary of State to make regulations to provide a uniform method to access electrical vehicle charging points.352  While enacted, the law has not yet been brought into force. The following list is a highlight of certain areas where AI is currently being used, or where its development is underway:\n- Google DeepMind is currently collaborating with the National Health Service (NHS), the universal health service provider in the UK, on the development of tools to analyze eye scans.353\n\n348 *Autumn Budget 2017*, HM TREASURY (Nov. 22, 2017), https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/autumnbudget-2017-documents/autumn-budget-2017, *archived at* https://perma.cc/UE5R-ECUY. 9261-4ab4-82e8-92f1c0758a87/LordsChamber, *archived at* https://perma.cc/7NMC-TXQN. 5VAX.\n\n- Development of military equipment that uses AI to scan the battlefield for enemy movements\nand flag dangers to soldiers.354\n- Smart traffic lights are being used in some towns to aid in traffic management.355\n- 30 million (approximately US$38 million) of funding has been allocated to test the use of AI\nin online digital skills courses.356\n- Monetary grants have been provided to further education in the area of AI.357\n- 84 million (approximately US$108 million) will be invested over the next four years in\ndevelopments to make industry and public services safer and more productive.358\n The government has created and funded the Centre for Data Ethics and Innovation as an advisory body to work with the government, regulators, and industry to lay the ethical foundations for the adoption of AI across the UK, 359 and \"secure a framework which facilitates and encourages innovation but which also maintains vital public trust and confidence.\"360  The government is also specifically reviewing the regulatory structure to allow driverless vehicles on the road by 2021.361\n\n\nNovember_061118_WEB-1.pdf, *archived at* https://perma.cc/9GB4-CXL6.\n\n## Iii.  Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems The Ministry Of Defence Has Stated That\n\nthe UK does not possess armed autonomous aircraft systems and it has no intention to develop them. The UK Government's policy is clear that the operation of UK weapons will always be under human control as an absolute guarantee of human oversight, authority and accountability. Whilst weapon systems may operate in automatic modes there is always a person involved in setting appropriate parameters.362 While the policy statement makes it clear that the UK does not possess such systems, nor intends to develop these systems, concerns have been raised about the UK's definition of \"lethal automated weapons.\"363  A House of Lords report on AI noted that,\n\n[w]ithout agreed definitions we could easily find ourselves stumbling through a semantic haze into dangerous territory. The Government's definition of an autonomous system used by the military as one where it \"is capable of understanding higher-level intent and direction\" is clearly out of step with the definitions used by most other governments. This position limits both the extent to which the UK can meaningfully participate in international debates on autonomous weapons and its ability to take an active role as a moral and ethical leader on the global stage in this area. Fundamentally, it also hamstrings attempts to arrive at an internationally agreed definition.364 The committee recommended that the government realign the definition of autonomous weapons to a similar form as used by the rest of the world. 365   The government considered the recommendation, but stated that the Ministry of Defence has no plans to change the definition.366\n\n\n363 The UK defines an Autonomous System as: \"capable of understanding higher-level intent and direction. From this understanding and its perception of its environment, such a system is able to take appropriate action to bring about a desired state. It is capable of deciding a course of action, from a number of alternatives, without depending on human oversight and control, although these may still be present. Although the overall activity of an autonomous unmanned aircraft will be predictable, individual actions may not be.\"  *Id.* table 2.3.\nA UK newspaper has recently reported that \"the MoD and defence contractors are funding dozens of artificial intelligence programmes for use in conflict.\"367  The Ministry of Defence responded to the report with a denial of the accusations: \"There is no intent within the MOD to develop weapon systems that operate entirely without human input. Our weapons will always be under human control as an absolute guarantee of oversight, authority and accountability.\"368 At the international level, the UK's interpretation of what constitutes lethal automated weapons does not align with the definition of many other western nations and does not support a pre-emptive ban on such weapons systems.  Instead, the UK wishes for further discussions on the development of these systems, and emphasizes that any such development requires the need for a human element to be present in its operation.369\n\n## Middle East And North Africa\n\n\nBahrain In October 2018, Microsoft Bahrain noted how vital AI is in the establishment of smart societies, mirroring the ambitions exhibited in the country's planning document, *Bahrain Vision 2030*, at an event held in the Kingdom. Bahrain's Information and Government Authority (IGA) organized the two-day event. The IGA operates under the patronage of Shaikh Mohammed bin Mubarak Al Khalifa, who is both the Deputy Prime Minister and Chairperson of the Supreme Committee for Information and Communication Technology.1\n\n\nEgypt In May 2018, the Egyptian National Telecom Authority hosted a forum exploring the potential interconnectivity of AI technologies with the Internet of Things (IoT).2  In December 2017, the Egyptian Authority of Financial Control announced that it would regulate the use of the AI\ntechnology to control financial transactions.3\n\n\nIsrael\n\nI. Civilian Use of AI Technologies\n\nA. Technology Development According to a global study released in May 2018 by Asgard, a Berlin-based venture capital firm focused on AI, by far the country with the largest AI industry is the US (40%), followed by China\n(11%), Israel (11%), and the UK (7%). 4 Described as a \"startup nation\" with more start-up companies on a per capita basis than leading economies in the world,5 Israel's AI economy has been rapidly developing.\n\negypt-employs-artificial-intelligence (in Arabic), *archived at* https://perma.cc/5GR8-BNK2.\nAccording to the founder of one Israeli AI startup, Israel's Artificial Intelligence (AI) startup ecosystem has raised over $7.5 billion cumulatively and is undergoing explosive growth, characterized by a major influx of establishments and talent, forming what could be considered the global leader of AI over the next five years. Notwithstanding their absent national agenda and budget, Israel has already earmarked the largest AI exit to date (Mobileye  15.3B) and boasts a substantial and growing cluster of startups utilizing and developing AI technologies.6\n\nB. Policy Considerations The preparedness of the Israeli government for AI was the subject of a June 2018 hearing before the Knesset (Israel's parliament) Science Committee. Summarizing the views expressed at the hearing, Committee Chairman and Knesset Member (KM) Uri Maklev called upon the government to start reviewing various regulatory aspects of AI, including privacy and legal liability. He also urged the government to set deadlines for the development and use of AI systems in government offices to improve public service. Warning that without careful preparation Israel might face increased unemployment, he proposed that the government should develop educational training to enable more people to engage in the new technology.7 Possible AI technology applications in areas such as education, review of trademarks, reduction of vehicle accidents, etc., were further discussed at a November 2018 conference organized by the Knesset Parliamentary Oversight Coordination Unit.8\n\nC. Autonomous Vehicles\n\nIsraeli law has not yet adopted a comprehensive regulation of autonomous vehicles. It has been suggested that such regulation might require extensive legislative changes in multiple areas of law, including safety requirements, licensing, payment to victims of car accidents, etc.9\n\n\nThe Ministry of Transportation, however, has expressed its support for\n[a]dvancing new technologies and development of vehicle systems based on strategic vision for advancement of the Israeli industry and its transformation to a global development center and an object of attraction to entrepreneurs from all over the world.10 The Ministry specifically noted that,\n[it] sees also importance in development of technologies and systems that are designed for autonomous vehicles in view of the great potential they [might] offer for improvement of road safety and minimizing casualties.11 The Ministry's 2017 directive regulates licensing of experiments in:\n\n[v]ehicles Systems and features to be installed in vehicles that may interfere or influence on vehicle systems and performance with respect to control, safety, fuel consumption and air pollution including a form of connection to the communication interfaces of the vehicles.12\n\nA flowchart 13 included in the directive illustrates the steps required to obtain a license for experimentation in autonomous vehicle in Israel, which includes examination of companies applications by a professional committee established for this purpose by the Ministry.14 A regulation issued in May 2018 by the Ministry of Transport and Road Safety further authorizes the National Traffic Controller to grant an exemption from requirements that apply to drivers under the Transportation Regulations15 for purpose of conducting an experiment in new technologies. A\ndecision to grant an exemption from the regulations, accordingly, requires consultation with the licensing authority and with a police officer. It further requires evaluation of\n\nthe possible effects of the experiment on traffic, including the following considerations: (1) ensuring the safety of users on the way during the experiment, including experiment participants;\n\n\n\n(2) reducing the disturbance to the flow of traffic in ways that may be caused as a result of the experiment;\n\n(3) responding to emergency events that may occur during the course of the experiment.16\n Media reports indicate that authorization for experimenting autonomous cars has been granted to the Israeli company Mobileye and to the Russian company Yandex.17\n\nII. Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems Israel is reportedly one of several countries, including the US, China, South Korea, Russia, and the UK, that currently use and develop LAWS with decreasing levels of human control.18\n\nIsrael has developed and utilized various AI technologies for LAWS. Its Iron Dome defensive system has been successfully used in intercepting \"incoming missiles or torpedoes faster than a human could react.\"19 Israel has further developed a fully autonomous loitering munition (suicide drone) called the Harop, \"which can dive-bomb radar signals without human direction . . . with lethal results on the battlefield.\"20 A statement submitted by the Israeli mission to the GGE on LAWS of the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW) on July 29, 2018, clarifies the Israeli position. Israel supports further in-depth discussions in consideration of any possible regulation of LAWS. Such\n\nhttps://perma.cc/6LXB-PTQX.\n\n18 Campaign to Stop Killer Robots, Briefing Note for the Convention on Conventional Weapons Group of Governmental Experts Meeting on Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems, Retaining Human Control of Weapons Systems (Apr. 913, 2018), https://www.stopkillerrobots.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/KRC_Briefing_\nCCWApr2018.pdf, *archived at* https://perma.cc/RCZ2-3UCC. 19 Ted Piccone, *How Can International Law Regulate Autonomous Weapons?*, BROOKINGS (Apr. 10, 2018), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2018/04/10/how-can-international-law-regulate-autonomousweapons/, *archived at* https://perma.cc/4JMG-PTKE; see also *Iron Dome Weapon System*, RAYTHEON, https://www.raytheon.com/capabilities/products/irondome (last visited Nov. 19, 2018), archived at https://perma.cc/S8BG-VVNR; *Iron Dome Air Defence Missile System*, ARMY TECHNOLOGY, https://www.armytechnology.com/projects/irondomeairdefencemi/ (last visited Nov. 19, 2018), *archived at* https://perma.cc/D868- PEL5. 20 Billy Perrigo, *A Global Arms Race for Killer Robots Is Transforming the Battlefield*, TIME (updated Apr. 9, 2018), http://time.com/5230567/killer-robots/, *archived at* https://perma.cc/Y5TH-YFHV; see also Harop Loitering Munitions UCAV System, AIR FORCE TECHNOLOGY, https://www.airforce-technology.com/projects/harop loiteringmuniti/ (last visited Nov. 19, 2018), *archived at* https://perma.cc/AA2X-BLLA.\n\ndiscussions, according to the statement, should not hamper progress in civilian research, development and use of autonomous technologies.21 The statement acknowledges that there are differences of opinion on the \"definition or characterization of LAWS . . . and the appropriate type and level of human judgment throughout the various phases of the weapon's life cycle, as well as the suitable terminology.\" 22 Such differences, it suggests, may stem from \"[t]he futuristic nature of the subject and its broad scope\nat this stage more is unknown than known and a prudent approach is necessary.\"23 The statement calls for recognizing LAWS' potential military and humanitarian advantages, including \"better precision of targeting which would minimize collateral damage and reduce risk to combatants and non-combatants.\"24\n\nClarifying the Israeli position that human judgment will always be an integral part of any process regarding LAWS throughout their life cycle, the statement also referenced Israel's domestic process for legal review of new weapons. The statement called for further in-depth discussions, specifically on the various phases of human-machine interaction.25\nOman According to a December 2017 news report, the Omani Information Technology Authority announced that it had hosted a forum on AI and its impact on Omani society.26 In August 2018, the Authority organized a second forum on methods to develop, integrate, and regulate AI\ntechnology. The forum was sponsored by the Ministry of Transport and Communication.27\nQatar\n\nIn May 2018, Qatar Computing Research Institute (QCRI), part of Hamad Bin Khalifa University, launched the QCRI Center for Artificial Intelligence. The Center's main responsibility is to\n\nintegrate AI technology into all fields. The Center will also develop policy guidelines and regulations for the citizens of Qatar to use AI in a manner consistent with local cultural norms.28 In addition, a 2017 news report indicated that a French corporation, Navya, has joined the Smart Transport Company located in Doha, Qatar to introduce driverless electric vehicles for commercial use.29\nSaudi Arabia\n\nI. Official Strategy\n\nThe Kingdom of Saudi Arabia has no official AI strategy. However, it has announced that AI will be employed in efforts to achieve the goals outlined in *KSA Vision 2030*,30 the Kingdom's strategic planning document.31\n\nII. AI Potential Investment In October 2017, the Public Investment Fund (PIF) announced that the Kingdom would invest US$100 billion in the field of AI; it also sponsored a conference on Artificial Intelligence and Robotics. Sophia, a \"sentient\" robot developed by Hanson Robotics of Hong Kong, attended the conference where she demonstrated her ability to track and recognize faces, and hold natural conversations with humans. 32  In October 2017, a former advisor of the Saudi Royal Court announced on his Twitter account that Sophia was being granted Saudi Arabian citizenship33 as \"a symbolic gesture\" to celebrate the beginning of work on NEOM, a US$500 billion  \"smart city\"\nindustrial zone sponsored by Crown Prince Mohamed bin Salaman.34\n\n30 *Why the UAE and Saudi See Artificial Intelligence as an Investment in the Future*, ARABIAN BUSINESS (Feb. 8,\n2018), https://www.arabianbusiness.com/technology/389533-why-the-uae-saudi-see-artificial-intelligence-as-aninvestment-in-the-future, *archived at* https://perma.cc/3HCL-8FTR. 31 *Vision 2030*, KINGDOM OF SAUDI ARABIA, https://vision2030.gov.sa/en (last visited Nov. 20, 2018), archived at https://perma.cc/KB2L-94D5.\n\n32 Press Release, Saudi Press Agency, The Future Investment Initiative Will Drive Global Thinking on the Future of Technology, Robotics and Artificial Intelligence (Oct. 3, 2017), https://www.spa.gov.sa/viewstory.php?lang=en\n&newsid=1673447, *archived at* https://perma.cc/3TT3-DN3D. 33 National Center for Communication of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (@CICSaudi), TWITTER (Oct. 25, 2017, 8:38\nAM), https://twitter.com/CICSaudi/status/923212096552218624/photo/1, *archived at* https://perma.cc/W452-\nAYSU.\nThe Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is currently cooperating with foreign companies that specialize in the field of AI. During his visit to Riyadh, SAP CEO Bill McDermott welcomed the Kingdom's plans to use AI to achieve *Saudi Vision 2030* national development goals. He noted that the government of Saudi Arabia will use AI as a foundation for NEOM, the new industrial city project.\n\nIn collaboration with SAP, the Kingdom announced that it would invest 285 million Saudi Riyal\n(about US$76 million) to develop modern technologies in the field of AI.35\n\nIII.  Practical Implementation of AI: Religious Rituals In an attempt to use AI in different fields, including religious rituals, the Saudi Ministry of Haj and Umrah has published on its YouTube channel a video giving an insight into how pilgrims to Mecca will use AI in 2030. According to the Ministry, Muslims from around the world who intend to undertake Haj (the pilgrimage to Mecca) will have to apply through a mobile application, and within a few days, they will receive a box that contains an electronic card, a bracelet, and an earphone.36\nTunisia\n\nIn April 2018, in collaboration with UNESCO, the Tunisian government convened a workshop titled \"National AI Strategy: Unlocking Tunisia's Capabilities.\"37 During the event, the Tunisian Minister of Higher Education and Scientific Research announced the creation of a task force to develop a national AI strategy. The strategy is scheduled to be launched during the first quarter of 2019.38 According to news reports the Tunisian representative at UNESCO has declared that the goal of the national AI strategy is to integrate AI into multiple industries and introduce AI in the services field as well. He added that an array of Tunisian scientists would contribute to the development of the national strategy. Furthermore, Tunisian investors and ministries will fund and facilitate the process.39\n\n\nThe Minister of Higher Education and Scientific Research stated that AI will play a vital part in the future of Tunisia and will be integrated into the field of information technology. He asserted the commitment of the Ministry of Higher Education and Scientific Research to fund and support projects related to AI, including the development of the national strategy. He also stated that the development of the strategy would facilitate the establishment of new labs for AI.40 In November 2018, the Tunisian Ministry of Higher Education and Scientific Research announced that it would collaborate with the Moroccan Ministry of Scientific Research to launch a joint scientific research lab. The lab will conduct scientific research in various areas, including AI, and will begin working in June 2019. Both governments stated that they would allocate the appropriate funding for the lab to operate for four years.41\nUnited Arab Emirates\n\nI. Official Strategy In October 2017, the government of the United Arab Emirates (UAE) established the UAE Strategy for Artificial Intelligence. Such strategy is the first of its kind among Arab countries. It encompasses the following objectives: (1) enhance government performance at all levels by employing a smart digital system that can overcome challenges; and (2) make the UAE the first country to use AI in the fields of transportation, health, renewable energy, water, education, the environment, and traffic.42\n\nII. Establishment of a Ministry\n\nThe UAE has also created a new ministry in the Cabinet called the Ministry for Artificial Intelligence. In October 2017, the President of the Union selected Omar bin Sultan Al-Olama as the first Minister of State for Artificial Intelligence. Al-Olama is in charge of using the latest AI technologies to enhance governmental performance. The cabinet has also established the Council of Artificial Intelligence, which will oversee the integration of AI into various governmental departments.  The Council includes representatives from all nine emirates.43\n\n\n40 Id.\n\nIII. National Council of AI In March 2018, the Council of Artificial Intelligence met for the first time. The meeting focused on the best methods to integrate AI systems into the daily tasks of government. One of the main responsibilities of the Council is to promote the exchange of knowledge and experience related to AI with other countries as well as promote public awareness about AI. Additionally, the Council's members discussed seven main objectives to achieve the UAE's AI Strategy. Those objectives include the following:\n\n- Transforming the UAE into a leading global destination for AI\n\n- Developing AI technology in both the private and government sectors - Attracting prominent international AI scientists to work in the UAE\n- Creating the appropriate infrastructure to transform the UAE into a global AI laboratory\n- Forming policies and legislation for AI-based technologies and innovations44\n\nIV. Practical Implementations of AI\n\n## A. Traffic\n\nIn its effort to implement AI technology in a variety of fields, including traffic and security, the Roads and Transport Authority (RTA) of the Emirate of Dubai announced that it would begin using an autonomous vehicle system by February 2018. The system will be operated in the Al Qudra Road District. Such an initiative is the first step to support the government of the Emirate of Dubai's strategy to convert 25% of public transportation to driverless by 2030.45  In August\n2018, the Federal Authority for Standardization and Metrology announced that it would begin drafting safety regulations for the country's autonomous vehicle system.46  The UAE recently embarked on Phase 4 of the Driverless Vehicles Project within the Sustainable City at Dubailand over a track extending 1250m, according to the Sustainable City's website.47  The *Khaleej Times*\nhas reported that the RTA of Dubai will examine an electric driverless taxi at a residential area in\n\nthe Dubai Silicon Oasis in December 2018. After a three-month trial phase, the RTA will decide in what areas such driverless taxis may operate.48\n\n## B. Security\n\nIn addition, the Dubai Police Department has announced that a new system to identify wanted suspects was powered by the AI technology being used by the Department. The spokesperson for the Department stated that the new system assisted in catching 550 suspects in 2018.49\n\n\n## Sub-Saharan Africa\n\n\nGhana During the April 2018 meeting of the UN Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW) GGE on LAWS, Ghana reportedly expressed \"a desire to negotiate a new international lawa new treaty or CCW protocolto address concerns over\" LAWS.1  Ghana is also in favor of a ban on fully autonomous weapons. 2  It expressed this view at the 2015 CCW meeting, stating as follows:\n\nGhana is very much concerned about the possible use of lethal autonomous weapon systems at any time in the future, for the many reasons and fears that these Systems present to us by their very nature. It is obvious that proponents of these systems believe that they\nwill not be the victims but others will. We need to avoid moving in this direction of self perfection to the promotion and preservation of human dignity for humanity as a whole. History confirms that today's victim can become tomorrow's perpetrator, especially, when we take into consideration the ever increasing development and spread of technology. Won't we be heading towards a potential quagmire in the near future. In our view fully automated lethal systems must be proscribed before they are fully developed because of the concerns aforesaid and shared by a larger number of delegations\nrepresented here in this meeting.3\n\n\nKenya In February 2018, the Kenya government announced that it had formed an eleven-member blockchain and AI task force, comprised of representatives from academia, research institutions, and the local technology sector, and directly accountable to the Cabinet Secretary for Information, Communications and Technology.4 The task force \"will provide the roadmap to contextualize on the application of these emerging technologies in the areas of financial inclusion, cybersecurity, land tilting [sic], election process, single digital identity and overall public service delivery.\"5 The immediate goal of the task force is to \"make recommendations on how the government can\n\n1 CAMPAIGN TO STOP KILLER ROBOTS, REPORT ON ACTIVITIES: CONVENTION ON CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS GROUP\nOF GOVERNMENTAL EXPERTS MEETING ON LETHAL AUTONOMOUS WEAPONS SYSTEMS 7 (Apr. 2018), leverage on the emerging technologies in the next five years, with other key milestones in 2027\nand 2032.\"6\n\n\nNigeria Nigeria reportedly approved a robotics and AI agency in August 2018.7  Sources at the country's Ministry of Science and Technology stated that the new agency \"would leverage collaborations with international research bodies on robotics and AI\" and enable \"research and teachings in more complex technology skills to thousands of young people.\"8  During the official inauguration of an inter-ministerial committee tasked with the establishment of the agency, Christopher Ogbonnaya Onu, the Minister of Science and Technology, noted that \"there is no way Nigeria can achieve effective industrialization without investment in Robotics and Artificial Intelligence because it is critical to manufacturing, health care delivery and transportation.\"9 A source from the office of the country's president stated that \"[t]he ultimate goal is to have an agency mandated solely on advancing our knowledge and usability of robots and AI across sectors in Nigeria. The idea is to leapfrog our growth.\"10 Recent reporting indicates that investment in AI will be directed through the National Agency for Science and Engineering Infrastructure (NASENI), an organization whose mission is to \"establish and nurture appropriate and dynamic Science and Engineering Infrastructure-base for achieving home-initiated and home-sustained industrialization through the development of relevant processes, capital goods and equipment necessary for job creation, national economic well-being and progress.\"11\n\n\nSierra Leone During the April 2018 meeting of the UN Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW)\nGGE on LAWS, Sierra Leone was reportedly among thirty-two countries that expressed \"a desire to negotiate a new international lawa new treaty or CCW protocolto address concerns over\" LAWS.12\nSouth Africa\n\nSouth Africa was one of thirty-two countries that expressed interest in negotiating a treaty to address concerns regarding LAWS during the April 2018 meeting of the UN CCW GGE\non LAWS.13\n\n\nUganda As it indicated during the April 2018 meeting of the UN CCW GGE on LAWS), Uganda is interested in negotiating a treaty on and in favor of an absolute ban on LAWS.14\n\n\nZambia Zambia is in favor of negotiating \"a new international lawa new treaty or CCW protocolto address concerns over\" LAWS.15\n\n\nZimbabwe Zimbabwe supports negotiating \"a new international lawa new treaty or CCW protocolto address concerns over\" LAWS and is in favor of banning LAWS.16 The government of Zimbabwe reportedly recently signed a strategic partnership framework agreement with a Chinese company, CloudWalk (with the agreement backed by the Chinese government's Belt and Road Initiative), to deploy facial recognition software in the capital Harrare, and to build a national facial database.17  The benefits sought by China and Zimbabwe from this deal were characterized by one source as follows: \"Chinese AI companies get to train their algorithms on Africans to diversify their datasets and Zimbabwe gets to use cutting edge tech to monitor its population.\"18 Yao Zhiqiang, CloudWalk's CEO, explained the importance of places like Zimbabwe for the improvement of his company's products as follows: \"The differences between technologies tailored to an Asian face and those to a black one are relatively large, not only in terms of color, but also facial bones and features . . . . The machine learning needed to expand the technology's capability would require sufficient data.\"19"
    },
    {
        "text": "## Zawahiri Tries To Clear Name, Explain Strategy\n\nFor the past two months, Al-Qaida's number two, Ayman Al- Zawahiri, has engaged in an ideological counter offensive against his detractors.  First, in early March 2008, he published a 188-page Arabic book online titled The Exoneration: A\nTreatise Exonerating the Community of the Pen and the Sword from the Debilitating Accusation of Fatigue and Weakness.1  In it, he responds to the November 2007 criticisms of his former mentor, Sayid Imam Abdel-Aziz Al-Sharif (Abdel-Aziz), who lambasted him for misapplying the doctrine of jihad and for bringing harm to the Muslim world.  Then in late March, Zawahiri released part one of his response to questions he solicited online from other militants.2  Around the same time, he also released a statement on the plight of the Palestinians.3  Many of the themes and arguments in the book, the Q&A, and the statement overlap, suggesting a campaign to repair the ideological and public relations damage done to Al-Qaida over the past year.4  The broad thrust of the campaign is to defend the religious legitimacy and political efficacy of attacks that affect civilians.  It is also to explain why Al-Qaida's strategic focus has been on Iraq, Afghanistan, and Algeria instead of the Palestinian Territories and Egypt or responding to European insults to the Prophet Mohammed.  The number of his statements which have been released and their detailed nature suggest that Al-Qaida's senior leadership is concerned that it is losing its relevance among its base. Zawahiri gives four indications as to Al-Qaida's current strategic orientation.  First, he wants Al-Qaida in Iraq to shift its violence away from Shi'a civilians and towards Shi'a militias.  Second, Zawahiri calls for militants to increase attacks against Jewish targets abroad in the near term and against Israeli targets in Israel and the Palestinian Territories in the long term.  Third, he calls for the death of those associated with the cartoons of the Prophet in Europe.  Fourth, Zawahiri wants militants in Egypt to ready themselves to seize the opportunity when Hosni Mubarak dies.  By focusing on Israel, ending sectarian violence against civilians in Iraq, punishing Europeans who have insulted Mohammed, and overthrowing the unpopular Mubarak, Al-Qaida may be trying to increase its diminished popularity by highlighting issues that resonate with popular Muslim resentment.\n\n## Zawahiri's Strategic Thinking\n\nOne reason for the negative popular response is Al-\nQaida's tactics, which have been criticized for harming Muslim civilians and for failing to further the organzation's stated goals of driving the U.S. from the Middle East and creating Islamic states.5  The most pointed criticism has come from Zawahiri's former mentor and previous head of the Egyptian Islamic Jihad (EIJ) organization, Abdel-Aziz.  In November 2007, Imam serially published a short book in which he criticized Al-Qaida and other Sunni militant organizations for attacking civilians because they were too weak to attack the government directly.  He argued that the weakness of these groups should prompt them to abandon violent jihad and adopt nonviolent means of coping with un-Islamic regimes.  Imam's criticisms came at the end of a year of similar criticism from prominent hard-line clerics who had previously supported Al-Qaida.6\nIn the Exoneration, Zawahiri retorts that Imam and other hard-liners eviscerate jihad by arguing that noncombatants should not be harmed or that militants should have parity with their enemies.7  \"If Muslims wait until they have full parity with their enemies,\"\nZawahiri asks rhetorically, \"then how will they ever be able to defeat an oppressive ruler or powerful foreign nation who has invaded their lands?\"8  \"If a Muslim's family is threatened by an oppressive regime or foreign power, why would he adopt nonviolence to protect them?\"9  \"If a Muslim never attacks the enemy for fear of killing fellow believers or innocent people, how can he put pressure on a much more powerful enemy?\"10  In short, the overwhelming power of local \"apostate\" regimes and their foreign supporters means that violence is not voided; rather, it is the only way to defeat the enemy.  Thus, whereas Imam maintains that asymmetry in power means militants should lay down arms, Zawahiri believes that asymmetry means that Muslims have no choice but to use violence.\n\n\nZawahiri's strategic thinking and understanding of asymmetrical warfare and revolutionary violence is heavily indebted to vanguardism, a Leninist theory of revolution which posits that a small, revolutionary elite uses violence to rouse the people to fight against the government.  The inevitable government crackdown will further fuel popular discontent and increase support for the vanguard.  \"[This method] was our means of raising the awareness of the *Ummah* (Islamic nation) and awakening it,\" Zawahiri says.11  He adds that by attacking Americans and Jews, their allies in the Middle East will be forced to defend them, which will further demonstrate their subservience to foreign powers.12\nAlthough revolutionary vanguardism does not necessarily imply terrorism, or violence against civilians for political ends, this has been Zawahiri's primary method in countries where guerilla campaigns are impossible.  Thus, in his Q&A, Zawahiri explains that Algerian militants use guerilla tactics because they have great freedom to maneuver. Conversly, in Egypt militants can only prepare for terror attacks because their activities are so circumscribed.13\nThe potential problem with Zawahiri's application of the theory of vanguardism in countries that are inhospitable to guerilla campaigns is that terrorism, in the sense of violence against civilians for political ends, usually diminishes the support of both the government (because of its harsh reprisals) as well the terrorist organization.  This was the result of the terrorist campaign initiated by Zawahiri in the 1990s in Egypt during his tenure as head of the EIJ.  Zawahiri acknowledges that his organization was completely discredited because of these attacks, but he does not reconsider his application of vanguardism.  Rather, he posits that the true reason his organization did not gain popularity is because the U.S. supported Mubarak's regime and prevented its collapse. This was the reason, he concludes, that the revolutionary vanguard had to focus on the U.S. before trying to topple local regimes.14  In Zawahiri's analysis, applying the principles of revolutionary vanguardism and fighting the U.S. resulted in an increase of Muslim support for Al-Qaida after the inevitable U.S. reprisals:\nBy attacking America and Israel and then goading them into two jihadi wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, the Jihadi Movement gained the love, support, and affection of the vast majority of the Muslim community.  It became a symbol of popular resistance against the Zionist-Crusader campaign against the Muslim community.15\nthe Pen and the Sword from the Debilitating Accusation of Fatigue and Weakness).\" Ekhlaas January 2008, Ibid. 172.\n\nmore involved once the U.S. has left Iraq.48\nMoreover, he takes special care to call for attacking Jewish interests abroad, perhaps indicating a renewed focus on Jewish and Israeli targets outside Israel.49\nOne other issue is mentioned repeatedly by Zawahiri: the cartoons of Mohammed printed in Denmark.  In the Exoneration, he argues that those who insult the Prophet should be put to death.50  Zawahiri even hypothetically talks about the assassination of offensive cartoonists in Europe.51  This dovetails with bin Laden's latest statement calling for attacks on the cartoonists and may indicate Al-Qaida's active involvement in an attack on the cartoonists.52  The recent arrest of a Moroccon Dane and two Tunisians plotting to kill one of the cartoonists indicates that something is afoot.53  At the very least, it plays to popular Muslim resentment of the cartoons. It is unclear from Zawahiri's statements if his treatment of the political situation in Egypt, the plight of the Palestinians, and the offending cartoonists in Europe are just public relations ploys, current operational concerns, or long-term interests.  He is coy about active operations to deal with these issues while being upfront about operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.  But presumably, Zawahiri's coyness does not equal disintrest; he can afford to be candid about operations in open theaters of conflict because doing so does not have significant operational security consequences, in contrast to operations elsewhere.  If Zawahiri's statements are operationally significant, Al-Qaida may be targeting Jewish interests abroad, individuals and agencies associated with the cartoon controversy, and planning operations in Egypt around the time of Hosni Mubarak's death.  At the very least, his public relations counteroffensive demonstrates that Al- Qaida is feeling the heat of the criticisms coming from former supporters.  The intricacy of Zawahiri's responses, their number, and their rapid release are all indicative of an organization that is trying to burnish its reputation."
    },
    {
        "text": "Reprinted from INTELLIGENCER:\nJournal of U.S. Intelligence Studies.\nWinter/Spring 2003, Vol. 13, no. 2, pp. 13-18.\nCopyright (c) 2003\nAssociation ofFormer Intelligence Officers.\n\n## Some-Time, Part-Time And One-Time Terrorism\n\nerrorism is an ancient weapon, but one with many faces. In our lifetimes we've seen terrorism perpetrated by nations at\n\nMr. Bowman currently serves in the Senior\nExecutive Service of the Federal Bureau of\nInvestigation. The thoughts expressed here\ndo not necessarily represent those of the FBI.\nHowever, some of the matters discussed herein\nare grafted from public testimony of the author\npresented on behalf of the FBI on July 31, 2002\nbefore the Senate Select Committee on Intel-\nligence. For the underlying facts presented in\nthat testimony, the superb group of Intelligence\nOperations Specialists at the FBI are to be\ncredited.\n T\n\nwar. We've seen it generated by environmental, animal and human rights activists. Terrorism is commonly used as a coercive tactic by so-called freedom fighters, and we've seen nations use remotely controlled terrorist surrogates to cause anonymous mayhem in other nations.1 Today, al Qaeda is probably the most visible face of terrorism. This is a face that represents yet another facet of the terrorist threatone more lethal than we've seen in the past, one that operates at a distance, and, importantly, one less homogenous than that which we've seen before.\n\nAll that suggests a threat difficult to counter, and indeed it is, but not an impossible one. Despite their successes in the past few years, there have also been significant defeats.2 We may fear the ability of terrorist to operate at large and at will, but terrorists operate at one inherent and significant disadvantage. When they attack, they emerge and are exposed to attack, potential capture and/or intelligence and law enforcement investigation. Accordingly, the threat al Qaeda poses will be eliminated in due course as its members continue to be tracked down one-by-one.3 Usama bin Laden (UBL) is not ten feet tall, he's a mere mortal and al Qaeda members are relatively few in number. Still, the Western world should take care not to think that the disruption, or even the demise of al Qaeda will eliminate the terrorist threat that al Qaeda brought to American shores. It won't, and the reasons are vexingly simple. Since the 9/11 attacks it has become increasingly evident that many are willing to commit acts of anti-Western terrorism whether sponsored by a terrorist group or acting alone.\n\nThe world today hosts a very large number of malcontents who dislike the West in general and the United States in particular. Radical Muslims have taken great care to de-legitimize the West, portraying Westerners as infidels who corrupt their culture and invade their lands. By portraying the United States and westerners in general as illegitimate interlopers and infidels, they assume the role of the down-trodden and imbue themselves with a righteousness that legitimizes their violent behavior.4 Of course, enmity of an underclass toward a powerful elite is a repetitive fact of history, but the reaction of this underclass transcends historical experience.\n\nWhat renders terrorism a crisis in the twentyfirst century is the fact that never before have so few possessed such an unpredictable capability to cause catastrophic harm on a global scale. In large measure, that capability stems from the technological progress that we've all witnessed in our lifetimes. How many of us today do not have cell phones and e-mail accounts?5 Who of us has not transferred money electronically? How easy is it quickly to transit multiple time zones, crossing borders with but a cursory inspection of travel documents?6 Never had demolitions or chemical/biological warfare training? Not to worry, the Internet has all the information you need to know. However, technology does not explain all; another era and events in another part of the world are key to understanding both the phenomenon and the complexity of fighting the brand of terrorism that al Qaeda brought to our shores.\n\n## Afghanistan\n\nDuring the decade-long Soviet/Afghan conflict, anywhere from 10,000 to 25,000 Muslim fighters representing some forty-three countries put aside substantial cultural differences to fight alongside each other in Afghanistan. The force drawing them together was the Islamic concept of \"umma\" or Muslim community. In this concept, nationalism is secondary to the Muslim community as a whole. As a result, Muslims from disparate cultures trained together, formed relationships, sometimes assembled in groups that otherwise would have been at odds with one another and acquired common ideologies. They were also influenced by radical spiritual and temporal leaders, one of whom has gained prominence on a global scaleUsama Bin Laden.\n\nFollowing the withdrawal of the Soviet forces Afghan war in large measure for his logistical support to the resistance. He financed recruitment, transportation and training of Arab nationals who volunteered to fight alongside the Afghan mujahedin. The Afghan war was clearly a defining experience in his life. In a May, 1996 interview with Time Magazine, UBL stated: \"in our religion there is a special place in the hereafter for those who participate in jihad. One day in Afghanistan was like 1,000 days in an ordinary mosque.\"7 many during the Soviet-Afghan conflict, he was a wealthy Saudi who fought alongside the mujahedin. In consequence, his stature with the fighters was high during the war and he continued to rise in prominence such that, by 1998, he was able to announce a \"fatwa\" (religious ruling) that would be respected by far-flung Islamic radicals. In short, his fatwa stated that it is the duty of all Muslims to kill Americans: \"[I]n compliance with God's order, we issue the following fatwa to all Muslims: the ruling to kill the Americans and their allies, including civilians and military, is the individual duty for every Muslim who can do it in any country in which it is possible to do it.\"\nfrom Afghanistan, many of these fighters returned to their homelands, but they returned with new skills and dangerous ideas. They now had newly-acquired terrorist training because guerrilla warfare had been the only way they could combat the more advanced Soviet forces. They also returned with new concepts of community that had little to do with, and perhaps even denied nationalism. Those concepts of community fed naturally into a fierce opposition to the adoption, or even the toleration of western culture. As a result, many of the Arab-Afghan returnees united, or reunited, with indigenous radical Islamic groups they had left behind when they went to Afghanistan. These Arab- Afghan mujahedin, equipped with extensive weapons and explosives training, infused radicals and already established terrorist groups, resulting in the creation of significantly better trained and more highly motivated cells dedicated to jihad.\n\nFeeding the radical element was the social fact that was signed as well by a coalition of leading Islamic militants to include Ayman Al-Zawahiri (at the time the leader of the Egyptian Islamic Jihad and later UBL's deputy), Abu Yasr Rifa'i Ahmad Taha (Islamic Group leader) and Sheikh Fazl Ur Rahman (Harakat Ul Ansar leader). The fatwa was issued under the name of the International Islamic Front for Jihad on the Jews and Christians. This fatwa was significant as it was the first public call for attacks on Americans, both civilian and military, and because it reflected a unified position among recognized leaders in the radical Sunni Islamic community. In essence, the fatwa reflected the globalization of radical Islam and revealed the fact of a terrorist network of extremists that has been evolving in the murky terrain of Southwest Asia. Those extremists use radical views of Islam to justify terrorism. Al Qaeda is but one facet of this network.\n\nthis occurred in nations where there was widespread poverty, unemployment and little popular control of government. The success of the Arab intervention in Afghanistan was readily apparent, so when the Afghan fighters returned home they discovered populations of young Muslims who increasingly were ready and even eager to view radical Islam as the only viable means of improving conditions in their countries. Seizing on widespread dissatisfaction with regimes that were brimming with un-Islamic ways, regimes that hosted foreign business and foreign military, many young Muslim males became eager to adopt the successful terrorist-related activities that had been successfully used in Afghanistan in the name of Islam. It was only a matter of time before these young Muslim males began to seek out the military and explosives training that the Arab-Afghan returnees possessed. In turn, the incipient fanaticism bred in Afghanistan provided a platform for a charismatic leader to step into a patriarchal role to urge terrorism against the West.\n\nother terrorist organizations, it also functions through some of the terrorist organizations that operate under\n\n## Usama Bin Laden\n\nUsama bin Laden gained prominence during the Although bin Laden was merely one leader among Bin Laden was not alone in issuing this fatwa. It\n\n## Al Qaeda\n\nAlthough Al-Qaeda functions independently of its umbrella or with its support, including: the Al-Jihad, the Al-Gamma Al-Islamiyya (Islamic Groupled by Sheik Omar Abdel Rahman, better known as the \"Blind Sheik\" and later by Ahmed Refai Taha, a/k/a \"Abu Yasser al Masri\"), Egyptian Islamic Jihad, and a number of jihad groups in other countries, including the Sudan, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Somalia, Eritrea, Djibouti, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Bosnia, Croatia, Albania, Algeria, Tunisia, Lebanon, the Philippines, Tajikistan, Azerbaijan, the Kashmiri region of India, and the Chechen region of Russia. Al-Qaeda also maintained cells and personnel in a number of countries to facilitate its activities, including in Kenya, Tanzania, the United Kingdom, Canada and the United States.\n\nBy networking with other groups, Al-Qaeda proposed to work together against the perceived common enemies in the Westparticularly the United States which Al-Qaeda regards as an \"infidel\" state that provides essential support for other \"infidel\" governments. Al-Qaeda responded to the presence of United States armed forces in the Gulf and the arrest, conviction and imprisonment in the United States of persons belonging to Al-Qaeda by issuing fatwas indicating that attacks against U.S. interests, domestic and foreign, civilian and military, were both proper and necessary. Those fatwas resulted in attacks against U.S. nationals in locations around the world including Somalia, Kenya, Tanzania, Yemen, and now in the United States. Since 1993, thousands of people have died in those attacks.\n\n## The Training Camps\n\nWith the globalization of radical Islam well begun, the next task was to gain adherents and promote international jihad. A major tool selected for this purpose was the promotion of terrorism training camps that had long been established in Afghanistan. It is important to note, that while terrorist adherents to what we have come to know as al Qaeda trained in the camps, many others did as well. For example, according to the convicted terrorist Ahmed Ressam, representatives of the Algerian Armed Islamic Group (GIA) and its offshoot the Salafi Groups for Call and Combat (GSPC), HAMAS, Hizballah, the Egyptian Islamic Jihad (EIJ) and various other terrorists trained at the camps.\n\nRessam, who was not a member of al Qaeda and, therefore, may not have fully accurate knowledge, also reports that cells were formed, dependent, in part, on the timing of the arrival of the trainees, rather than on any cohesive or pre-existing organizational structure. As part of the training, clerics and other authority figures advised the cells of the targets that are deemed valid and proper. The training they received included placing bombs in airports, attacks against U.S. military installations, U.S. warships, embassies and business interests of the United States and Israel. Specifically included were hotels holding conferences of VIPs, military barracks, petroleum targets and information/technology centers. As part of the training, scenarios were developed that included all of these targets.\n\nRessam, who, again, was not a member of al Qaeda, has stated that the cells were independent, but were given lists of the types of targets that were approved and were initiated into the doctrine of the international Jihad. Ressam explicitly noted that his own planned terrorism attack did not have bin Laden's blessing or his money, but he believed he would have received UBL's support had he asked for it. He did state that UBL urged more operations within the United States.\n\n## The International Jihad\n\nIn the 1970s, and even in the 1980s, terrorism centered on hierarchical organization with chains of command. Many had identifiable leaders who personified the group. For example, the German Red Army was more commonly known as the Baader-Meinhof group, so called for their leaders, Andreas Baader and Ulrike Meinhof. Today's terrorist tends to be networked, but not necessarily grouped. Formal ties are increasingly less common, and that is a logical outgrowth of the evolution of terrorism from being primarily motivated by politics to being primarily motivated by religion or ideology. Networking has proved to be an extremely effective experiment in cooperation by Islamic extremists.8 Especially when using the Internet, it permits a degree of anonymity, diffused command and control, a small footprint and even support for terrorism on a part-time basis if desired.\n\ndestroy America, her agents, and her allies! Cast them into their own traps, and cover the White House with black.9 Ali Khameine'i, in 1998, said \"The American regime is the enemy of [Iran's] Islamic government and our revolution.\" There are many other examples, but the lesson to be drawn is that al Qaeda is but one faction of a larger and very amorphous radical antiwestern network that uses al Qaeda members as well as others sympathetic to al Qaeda's ideas or that share common hatreds.\n\nIt seems reasonable to conclude that the suicide carries the theme from Islamic radicals that expresses the opinion that we just don't get it. Terrorists worldwide speak of jihad and wonder why the western world is focused on groups rather than on the concepts that make them a community. One place to look at the phenomenon of the \"international jihad\" is the web. Like\n\n## ... Al Qaeda ...Militants Are Linked By Ideas And Goals, Not By Organizational Structure. The Intent Is Establishment Of States Ruled By Islamic Law And Free Of Western Influence...\n\nhijackers of September 11, 2001 took advantage of networking, staying below the radar screen and merging with American society. One even reported a theft to the police. What we know of them today does not support a theory centered on a traditional terrorist organization, but it does support a theory of networked radicals supported by al Qaeda. It is also reasonable to conclude that they acted in support of the 1998 fatwa which, in turn has proved to be eloquent evidence of the international jihad. During 1997 UBL described the \"international jihad\" as follows:\n\"The influence of the Afghan jihad on Azzam.com, offers primers including \"How Can I Train Myself for Jihad,\" which is available in more than a dozen languages. Traffic on this site,increased 10-fold following the attacks, according to a spokesman for the site. Founded in 1996, Azzam Publications was named for a mentor to Osama bin Laden. The \"flavor\" of the site is evident from the spokesperson's description of its goal to provide news of jihad and stories about martyrs.10\n\nthe Islamic world was so great and it neces-\nsitates that people should rise above many of\ntheir differences and unite their efforts against\ntheir enemy. Today, the nation is interacting well\nby uniting their efforts through jihad against\nthe U.S. which has in collaboration with the\nIsraeli government led the ferocious campaign\nagainst the Islamic world in occupying the holy\nsites of the Muslims...[A]ny act of aggression\nagainst any of this land of a span of the hand\nmeasure makes it a duty for Muslims to send a\nsufficient number of their sons to fight off that\naggression.\"\n\nIn May of 1996, UBL gave an interview in\n\nis far less a large organization than a facilitator, some-\ntimes orchestrator, of Islamic militants around the\nglobe. These militants are linked by ideas and goals,\nnot by organizational structure. The intent, taken at\nface-value, is establishment of a state, or states ruled\nby Islamic law and free of western influence. Bin\nLaden's contribution to the Islamic jihad is a creature\nof the modern world. He has spawned a global net-\nwork of individuals with common, radical ideas, kept\nalive through modern communications and sustained\nthrough forged documents and money laundering\n\nwhich he stated \"God willing, you will see our work on the news...\" The following August the East African embassy bombings occurred. That was bin Laden speaking, but it should be remembered that the call to harm America is not limited to al Qaeda. Shortly after September 11 Mullah Omar said \"the plan [to destroy America] is going ahead and God willing it is being implemented...\" Sheikh Ikrama Sabri, a Palestinian Mufti, said in a radio sermon in 1997, \"Oh Allah, Information from a variety of sources repeatedly many other groups, Muslim extremists have found the Internet to be a convenient tool for spreading propaganda and helpful hints for their followers around the world. Web sites calling for jihad, or holy war, against the West are not uncommon.\n\nOne of the larger jihad-related Internet sites, The lesson to be taken from this is that al Qaeda activities on a global scale. While some may consider extremist Islam to be in retreat at the moment, its roots run deep and exceedingly wide.\n\nIn the final analysis, the International Jihad move-\n\n## ...The Challenge To Prevent Terrorism From The Unaligned Terrorist Is Perhaps The Greatest Challenge Gven To Law Enforcement And Intelligence...\n\nment is comprised of dedicated individuals committed to establishing the umma through terrorist means. Many of these are persons who attended university together, trained in the camps together, traveled together, but whose relationships to each other are premised on individual commitment rather than on bureaucracy or hierarchy. The result is that not only Al Qaeda, but international terrorists without affiliation as well, remain focused on the United States as their primary target. The United States and its allies, to include law enforcement and intelligence components worldwide have had an impact on the terrorists, but they are adapting to changing circumstances. Investigation of individuals who have no clear connection to organized terrorism, or tenuous ties to multiple organizations, is increasingly difficult. At least when one searches for a needle in a haystack, the location of the haystack is a given. Not being associated with an organization that generates a larger footprint, the lone individual can effectively disappear, utilizing today's technology to maintain necessary contacts. The magnitude of the threat then multiplies with the number of \"needles.\" In Israel, we see the difficulty of meeting terrorist threats even in a confined area. When the area we have to be concerned with is the entire world, the difficulty of countering the threat becomes incalculable, but counter it we must.\n\n## Meeting The Threat\n\nMany view the events of 9/11 as an intelligence failure. There have been reasonable and unreasonable arguments on both sides of that issue, but that is not a focus of this article. Nonetheless, those who criticize the intelligence community commonly proceed from the assumption that the Government should have been able to penetrate the terrorist organization that carried out those acts of destruction, or at least to have been able to analyze current events to predict the events. That sort of criticism turns a blind eye to the nature of the threat. The 9/11 hijackers were not an organization. Nor did they associate themselves overtly with al Qaeda, which sponsored them. And this proves the point! The larger threat is not al Qaeda, but the person who, while otherwise leading a normal life somewhere in the world, decides to become a terrorist. That is the proverbial needle in a haystack. That is the occasional, or the part-time, or the one-time terrorist on whom we have limited ability to focus intelligence efforts. The fundamental truth is that more than just haystacks will have to be sifted if we are to intercept the one-time terrorist who decides to become active. To detect and prevent individuals like the 19 hijackers presupposes a capability that may be developed, but one that must also include luck to be successful.\n\nVulnerabilities are obvious; we are an open society with porous borders and uncountable rich targets to attract terrorists. We also have far-flung equities; military and diplomatic personnel, foreign-based businesses, missionaries and tourists all represent external vulnerabilities. Whether internal or external, the ability to guard and fortify these vulnerabilities is de minimis; therefore, this is a threat that must be countered, not one we can be satisfied to punish after a terrorist success. To counter the terrorist threat, we need to learn of terrorist plans, disrupt terrorist cells, take known terrorists off the street and attack terrorist strongholds. To be effective in any of these requires a robust flow of information. We have to collect, analyze, disseminate and use information effectively, which is even more difficult than it is trite.\n\nFor example, if the purpose is to gather information on Hizballah there is a focus for the effort. If the purpose is to gather information on UBL, there is a focus for that effort. If, however, the purpose is to gather information to guard against the type of terrorism we now see to have developed since the end of the Soviet-Afghan War, there is, at best, an attenuated focus. We have learned, belatedly, that not all terrorism is organized and not all terrorists are members of terrorist organizations. Rather, there are terrorists leaders, terrorist facilitators, terrorist financiers and many, many disaffected individuals willing to commit acts of terrorism. While terrorist leaders will be associated in groups, the others may have no special affiliation to any terrorists organization - or they may have contacts with many.\n\nIn Israel we've seen unaligned Muslims, including powers correctly understand the reasons for the limitations. Neither is incorrect, but both camps need to understand that we can, and will, accomplish what is needed within legal and social limits. Neither cry of \"wolf\" is appropriate. i\n\n1. The number of states sponsoring terrorism has diminished in 2. In a wide-ranging interview with CNN, FBI Director Mueller 3. Recently several significantly important al Qaeda members have\npromising youth with a future, both male and female, conduct suicide bombings on their own initiative with no more than logistical support from terrorist organizations. The 9/11 hijackers apparently enjoyed the fiscal and perhaps logistical support of al Qaeda,11 but there is no clear indication that they were other than a group of radicals who came together for a single terrorist event. This is the problem of the International Jihad. Terrorism today still bears elements of traditionalism, but it also is decidedly untraditional. The International Jihad signals the advent of the occasional, some-time or even the one-time terrorist. The contemporary terrorism threat, spawned largely out of Afghanistan, effectively seeded large areas of the world with potential terrorists. The training camps prepared the student, the merchant, and perhaps even the government official for terror-on-demand. Any of those who were trained, and any who might want to emulate might, at any time, decide to seek out an opportunity for martyrdom.\n\nThe challenge to prevent terrorism from the\n\n4. Radical Islamists and Islamic movements have succeeded over 5. Like many other groups, Muslim extremists have found the\nunaligned terrorist is perhaps the greatest challenge ever given to the law enforcement (LE) and intelligence communities (IC). LE and IC are now required to look world-wide, including within the United States, for any number of those \"needles.\" That will require more than just a collection effort, it will require that every agency of the U.S. Government perform its job with a view towards terrorism. More than that, it will require the Government to bring more \"eyes on target\" than ever before. The experience of a customs agent may be vital to understanding the information collected by the FBI. The analysis of Homeland Security may provide meaning to information collected by INS. Enforcement of laws unrelated to terrorism already have proved to be a necessary element of prevention.\n\nSharing information will become vital for the\n\n6. Kathy Gannon,\"Smugglers, Politicians And Spies Move Al- 7. Time \"The Paladin of Jihad,\" May 06, 1996 8. See generally, Michael Whine, \"The New Terrorism,\" from 9. See at www.io.com/~jewishwb/iris/archives/990.html 10. Karmon, supra, n.1. 11. Although there is no evidence to support the thesis, it seems\nfuture, but this is a task that will challenge more than collection and analysis. It will also challenge legal and social values, both domestic and international. There is no doubt but that this must be done and there is no doubt but that it can be done properly. Still, we need to be mindful of the domestic social values of this nation that brought about the Privacy Act, Freedom of Information Act and Executive Orders regulating the IC. We need to remember the terribly disruptive nature of the Church Committee and strive to avoid improprieties that could occasion another such debacle. Those who call for increased surveillance powers correctly understand the limitations placed, decades ago, on LE and IC organizations. Those who disapprove those increased\n\n## E  N  D  N  O  T  E  S\n\nrecent years, primarily as a result of the \"fall of the wall,\" and a firm U.S. stand against rogue states. See, Ely Karmon, \"Intelligence and the Challenge of Terrorism in the 21st Century,\" a paper presented at the conference \"A Counter-Terrorism Strategy for the 21st Century: The Role of Intelligence\" at the Morris E. Curiel Center for International Studies of Tel Aviv University, November 1-2, 1998. stated, on December 14, 2002, that \"tens of attacks, probably close to a hundred around the world\" have been thwarted in\nthe previous fifteen months. http://www.cnn.com/2002/ US/12/14/mueller.ap/index.html.\nbeen captured. Among those captured are Abu Zubaidah, al Qaeda's overall operational planner, Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri, chief of operations in the Persian Gulf region and a key planner in the October, 2000 bombing of the USS Cole, and Ramzi bin al-Shibh, widely believed to have been an intended twentieth hijacker. See, e.g., Jerry Seper, \"Senior al Qaeda chief in custody of U.S.,\" The Washington Times, November 21, 2002 (http://www.washtimes.com/upi-breaking/200221121- 035030-7529r.htm); \"Pakistan say investigation into Bin al-\nShibh arrest complete,\" http://www.usatoday/news/world/ 2002-09-16-bin-al-shibh x.htm; \"Ramzi bin al-shibh,\" http:\n//www.infoplease.com/ipa/A0905807.html\n\nthe past few decades in posing the idea that there is a global conspiracy ongoing against Islam as a religion, culture and way of life. Where this message succeeds, it is a short step to view terrorism and political violence as religious duties. See, e.g., Reuven Paz, \"Radical Islamist Terrorism: Points for Pondering,\"\nInternet to be a convenient tool for spreading propaganda and communicating at a distance. See, Stephanie Gruner and Gautam Naik, \"Extremist sites under heightened scrutiny,\" The Wall Street Journal Online, October 7, 2001.\n\nQaida, Taliban Fugitives In And Out Of Afghanistan,\" Associated Press, November 27, 2002. \"If you have money you can go anywhere, without any problem,\" quoting Fazul Rabi Said Rahman, a former Taliban corps commander. the annual report of the Stephen Roth Institute for the Study of Contemporary Anti-Semitism and Racism at Tel Aviv University: Antisemitism Worldwide 2000/1.\nlikely that they must also have had some support from a rogue state in order to gain experience on large commercial aircraft."
    },
    {
        "text": "# Targeted Killing As An Element Of U.S. Foreign Policy In The War On Terror\n\n\nA Monograph by MAJ Matthew J. Machon U.S. Army\n\nSchool of Advanced Military Studies United States Army Command and General Staff College Fort Leavenworth, Kansas\n\nAY 05-06\nThe public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions.\n\nsearching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing the burden, to Department of Defense. Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports (0704-0188), 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that not  withstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to any  penalty for failing to comply with a collection of  information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number.\n\nMONOGRAPH\n4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE\nTargeted Killing as an Element of the U.S. War on Terror\n\n## 7. Performing Organization Name(S) And Address(Es) 8. Performing Organization\n\nSchool of Advanced Military Studies 250 Gibbon Ave Ft. Leavenworth, KS  66027\n10. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S ACRONYM(S)\nCGSC, SAMS\n9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) Command and General Staff College\n11. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S REPORT\n1 Reynolds Ave\nNUMBER(S)\nFt. Leavenworth, KS  66027\n\n12. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT\nAPPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE; DISTRIBUTION IS UNLIMITED\n\n\n## 13. Supplementary Notes\n\n14. ABSTRACT\nThis monograph examines the prohibition on assassination embodied within Executive Order 12333 and its effect on a U.S.\n\npolicy of targeted killing of transnational terrorist leadership.  Next this monograph will examine the numerous interpretations of applicable international law regarding terrorism and the states response.  This examination will contrast the law enforcement model proposed by adherents of international humanitarian law, with international humanitarian law and the law of war model advocated by those who see the current \"war on terror' as an armed conflict between states and trans-national terrorists.\n\n\n## 15. Subject Terms War On Terror, Targeted Killing, Assassination, Extra-Judicial Killing\n\n18. NUMBER\nOF\n16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF:\n19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON\n\n       PAGES\n17 LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT\nREPORT\nb. ABSTRACT\n19B. TELEPHONE. NUMBER *(Include area code)*\nc. THIS PAGE\n\n(U)\n(U)\n(U)\n (U)\n(913) 758-3300\n68\n\n\n## School Of Advanced Military Studies Monograph Approval\n\nMAJ Matthew J. Machon Title of Monograph: Targeted Killing as an Element of U.S. Foreign Policy in the War on Terror Approved by: __________________________________\nMonograph Director Michael Warburton, COL, SF ___________________________________\nDirector, Kevin C.M. Benson, COL, AR\nSchool of Advanced\n\nMilitary Studies\n___________________________________\nDirector, Robert F. Baumann, Ph.D.\n\nGraduate Degree\n\nPrograms\n\n\n## Abstract\n\nTargeted Killing as an Element of U.S. Foreign Policy in the War on Terror by MAJ Matthew J. Machon, U.S. Army, 64 pages.\n\n\nOn 5 November 2002, an armed Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) operated Predator Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) launched a lethal missile strike, killing Qaed Salim Sinan al- Harethi, a high ranking al-Qaeda member and suspected architect of the USS Cole bombing, in an isolated and sparsely populated region within Yemen.  This missile strike appears to have initiated a new and highly controversial phase in the Global War on Terror; moving \"the Bush administration away from the law enforcement-based tactics of arrests and detentions of al-Qaeda suspects that it had employed outside Afghanistan in the months since the fighting there had ended.\"  Since the 2002 Yemen strike US officials have acknowledged \"at least 19 occasions since September 11th on which Predators have successfully fired Hellfire missiles on terrorist suspects overseas.\"  While it is uncertain how many unacknowledged strikes the US has conducted, \"now that al-Qaeda has decentralized its operations around the globe, it's likely that the war against the network will assume an increasingly covert nature, involving intelligence cooperation and targeted strikes against al-Qaeda suspects rather than major conventional military offensives.\"\nThis monograph examines the prohibition on assassination embodied within Executive Order 12333 and its effect on a U.S. policy of targeted killing of transnational terrorist leadership.\nNext this monograph will examine the numerous interpretations of applicable international law regarding terrorism and the states response.  This examination will contrast the law enforcement model proposed by adherents of international humanitarian law, with international humanitarian law and the law of war model advocated by those who see the current \"war on terror' as an armed conflict between states and trans-national terrorists.\n\nGiven the level of secrecy and lack of transparency involved in this policy and its implementation, how can we judge the moral and legal implications of the Bush administration's policy of 'targeted killing' of al-Qaeda members or other suspected terrorists.  Is this policy of 'targeted killing' morally justifiable and legal under both US domestic and international law? Can the United States maintain international legitimacy while implementing a policy of targeted killing of suspected trans-national terrorists?  This monograph examines Executive Order 12333, International Human Rights Law and International Humanitarian Law to determine the legality of a policy of targeted killing.\n\n\n## Introduction\n\n[A]ssassination, poison, perjury...All these were considered legitimate principles in the dark ages which intervened between ancient and modern civilizations, but exploded and held in just horror in the 18th Century.1\n\n\n\nThomas Jefferson\n One hopes each time you get a success like that, not only to have gotten rid of somebody dangerous, but to have imposed changes on their tactics and operations.2\n\n\n\nPaul Wolfowicz\n\nThe proportionality doctrine of international law supports a conclusion that it is wrong to allow the slaughter of 10,000 relatively innocent soldiers and civilians if the underlying aggression can be brought to an end by the elimination of one guilty individual.3\n\n\n\nThomas C. Wingfield\n\nOn 5 November 2002, an armed Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) operated Predator Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) launched a lethal missile strike, killing Qaed Salim Sinan al- Harethi, a high ranking al-Qaeda member and suspected architect of the USS Cole bombing, in an isolated and sparsely populated region within Yemen.  This missile strike appears to have initiated a new and highly controversial phase in the Global War on Terror; moving \"the Bush administration away from the law enforcement-based tactics of arrests and detentions of al-Qaeda suspects that it had employed outside Afghanistan in the months since the fighting there had ended.\"4  Since the 2002 Yemen strike US officials have acknowledged \"at least 19 occasions since September 11th on which Predators have successfully fired Hellfire missiles on terrorist suspects overseas.\"5  While it is uncertain how many unacknowledged strikes the US has conducted, \"now that al-Qaeda has decentralized its operations around the globe, it's likely that the war against the network will assume an increasingly covert nature, involving intelligence cooperation and targeted strikes against al-Qaeda suspects rather than major conventional military offensives.\"6  Given the level of secrecy and lack of transparency involved in this policy and its implementation, how can we judge the efficacy of the Bush administration's policy of 'targeted killing' of al-Qaeda members or other suspected terrorists, or, and perhaps more importantly, is this policy of 'targeted killing' morally justifiable and legal under US and international law?\n\nPolitical and military pundits, journalists, and scholars alike have alternately referred to the Yemen strike and subsequent actions as 'assassinations,' 'targeted killings', or 'extra-judicial executions.'  The manner in which these terms are utilized in describing one single event appears to indicate the terms are synonymous and therefore mutually interchangeable.  The truth, however, is each term has a precise and specific definition, the use of which defines the manner in which the individual speaker or author justifies or condemns the US policy.  This monograph will explore each of the respective terms, attempt to provide clear definitions of each, and answer the question: is the Bush administration's policy of targeted killing legally justifiable under US and international law?\nThe Yemen strike not only eliminated a high-ranking al-Qaeda suspect and ushered in a new policy shift in the US war on terror, it also unleashed a firestorm of controversy surrounding the legality of the 'targeted killing' policy.  In the immediate aftermath of the strike Amnesty International issued a press release stating \"If this was the deliberate killing of suspects in lieu of arrest, in circumstances in which they did not pose an immediate threat, the killings would be extra-judicial executions in violation of international human rights law.\"7  Anna Lindh, the Swedish Foreign Minister referred to the strike as \"a summary execution that violates human rights.  Even terrorists must be treated according to international law. Otherwise, any country can start executing those whom they consider terrorists.\"8  The most ardent opponents of the policy of\n'targeted killing' of suspected terrorists, specifically those who categorize it as extra-judicial execution or assassination, are those who view the ongoing struggle against trans-national terrorists as \"a pernicious form of criminal activity that should be managed according to the law enforcement model.\"9  Adherents of the law enforcement model adhere to the international human rights regime under which \"the intentional use of lethal force by state authorities can be justified only in strictly limited conditions.  The state is obliged to respect and ensure the rights of every person to life and due process of law.\"10\nAdvocates supporting a policy of 'targeted killing' directed against terrorist organizations and their leadership often fall into the *realist* school of moral and political philosophy.  \"Here men and women do what they must to save themselves and their communities, and morality and law have no place.  *Inter arma silent leges*: in time of war the law is silent.\"11  Unlike critics who believe targeted killing is a violation of international human rights law, advocates contend that the United States is in a state of war with international terrorists and a targeted killing policy is a \"legitimate means of fighting the 'war on terror' whose legality must be judged on the basis of the laws of armed conflict.\"12  Thus, according to its supporters, 'targeted killings,' are justifiable military actions taken against legal combatants, and therefore legal according to the law of war. One legal analyst, immediately following the Yemen strike, asserted the operation should be \"viewed as a military action against enemy combatants which would take it out of the realm of assassination.  It does seem to me this was characterized as a military operation in the war on terrorism - no rhetorical war - and that these are enemy combatants.  You shoot to kill enemy combatants.\"13\nTo maintain international legitimacy the United States Government must clarify its policy on the targeted killing of terrorist leaders.  Although controversial, a policy of targeting and killing suspected terrorist leaders is not expressly forbidden according to U.S. domestic law nor international law.  This monograph will demonstrate that the United States' policy of targeted killing of al-Qaeda and other terrorist leadership is legal under US domestic law, and, lacking any clear consensus, is subject to interpretation according to international law.  The historical context leading to the adoption of a 'targeted killing' policy by the United Sates will briefly be examined.\nNext, key definitions and terms relevant to and employed throughout the body of this study will be defined and the organization of this study framed.  The framing of these terms and the classifying of specific definitions will assist in focusing the analysis of the policy by providing a common frame of reference in order to assess the arguments of both proponents and critics.  The body of the study will examine domestic law and international law, their impacts upon a 'targeted killing' policy, and the moral implications such a policy entails.  Finally, the conclusions and recommendations will suggest changes in international law to clarify and assist nations in the conduct of the war on terror, and recommend clarifications on the US policy of 'targeted killing.'\n\n## Background And Methodology\n\nThe events of September 11 were a horrendous atrocity, probably the most devastating instant human toll of any crime in history outside of war.14\n\n\nNoam Chomsky September 11, 2001 will be remembered not only as the cruelest act of terrorism ever launched on US soil but also as the day the free world declared war against terror.  The attacks on New York and Washington D.C. were vicious reminders of the danger terrorism poses to mankind.15\n\n\nEmmanuel Gross\n\n## Background\n\nThe terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 were perhaps the most pernicious and catastrophic event of American history.  In the aftermath of the attacks nearly 3000 American civilians lay dead, the Twin Towers of the World Trade Center lay smoking in ruins, and part of the Pentagon had been severely damaged.  That evening, with much of the nation still in a state of shock, congressional leaders, gathered on Capitol Hill, declared the attacks an act of war.  Senator John McCain stated \"this is obviously an act of war that has been committed on the United States,\" while Senator John Kerry called the attacks \"a declaration of war that demands a forceful response.\"16  The national consensus in the wake of the attacks was the United States was at war, but with whom?\n\nThe Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, the closest historical parallel to 9/11, offered little in the way of guidance or perspective.  Pearl Harbor was an act of war committed by the state of Japan against the United States.  Congress immediately responded, declaring war on Japan the next day and entering United States into the Second World War.  The 9/11 attacks, however offered no immediate or clearly defined solution.  Almost immediately Osama bin Laden and his al-Qaeda network became the primary focus of the investigation to assess responsibility for the attacks.  Within weeks \"the clear conclusions reached by the government are: Osama bin Laden and al-Qaeda, the terrorist network which he heads, planned and carried out the atrocities on 11 September 2001; Osama bin Laden and al-Qaeda retain the will and resources to carry out further atrocities.\"17  As one analyst illustrates \"had this attack on the World Trade Center and Pentagon been perpetrated by a state, it would constitute an act of aggression.\"18  A clear act of war had been committed against the United States, but the act had not been committed by a sovereign state, but instead by a known terrorist organization, or non-state actor.  What policy options, therefore, lay available to the Bush administration in the immediate aftermath of the 9/11 terrorist attacks?\n\nDespite widespread recognition of terrorism as a form of warfare, the United States and the international community, Israel excepted, had largely chosen, prior to 9/11, to regard terrorist acts as individual crimes.19  This practice continued through the Clinton administration despite the 1998 declaration of the World Islamic Front; within which bin Laden and his al-Qaeda associates clearly state that: \"to kill the American and their allies - civilian and military - is an individual duty incumbent upon every Muslim who can do it in any country in which it is possible to do it.\"20  Despite this formal declaration of war upon the United States and alleged al-\nQaeda complicity in the terrorist bombings of the Tanzanian and Kenyan embassies in 1998, in addition to the USS Cole bombing in 1999, US policy was to treat terrorism \"as a legal matter to\n\n'depoliticize' and 'delegitimize' it by defining it as criminal activity instead of warfare. Resorting to indictments, extraditions, and trials, it was argued, was the best course.\"21\nAlthough the Cold War essentially ended with the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, United States foreign policy failed to adapt to the new and more challenging international political environment.  The end of the Cold War resulted in a dramatic weakening of the Westphalian political model - within which the state is recognized as an autonomous and monolithic political entity, ruled by a government with a monopoly on violence and a mandate to represent its citizens internationally.22  Within this model states are the preeminent actors within the international political environment.  Powerful states, such as the United States, are reluctant to acknowledge the erosion of state sovereignty and provide additional strength and legitimacy to these non-state actors.  In other words, states attempt to uphold the principle that states deal only with other states.  To do otherwise would confer power and legitimacy to non-state actors and organizations such as al-Qaeda.  Upholding this principle provides a logical explanation for the maintenance of the terrorism as criminal act policy the United States continued to uphold despite the escalating violence committed against United States interests and its citizens.  The challenge posed by transnational terrorist organizations with global reach such as al-Qaeda:\nto this traditional means of categorizing conflict is their ability to project state like violence beyond the borders of a single state.  As a result conflict between states and private actors, which is traditionally viewed as an international affair is now being played out on an international scale.23\n\nThe challenge facing the United States and the Bush administration in the wake of 9/11 is determining the nature of the current conflict and the status of al-Qaeda members and other terrorists under international law and/or the law of armed conflict.\n\nIn his address to the nation the evening of 9/11 President Bush clearly stated \"we will make no distinction between the terrorists who committed these acts and those who harbor them.\"24  With a preponderance of evidence implicating Osama bin Laden and al-Qaeda as responsible for the terrorist attacks of 9/11, the refusal of the Taliban, the dominant political regime in control of Afghanistan, to turn bin Laden over to US authorities provided the pretext for the initiation of Operation Enduring Freedom.  Invoking Article 51 of the United Nations Charter, a state's inherent right to self defense, the United States took action against the Taliban and bin Laden applying the interpretation that this right to self defense \"includes the right to use force to destroy terrorist bases from which further attacks may be planned organized, supported, or launched, wherever located, if the state in which they are located does not take effective measures to eliminate them as required to do by international law.\"25\nThe removal of the Taliban, the dispersion of al-Qaeda and the loss of Afghanistan as a safe base of operation for terrorists achieved through Operation Enduring Freedom was not the end state sought by the Bush administration.  The magnitude of the 9/11 attacks brought about the realization that \"there can be no doubt, if there ever was before, that the terrorist threat against the United States is real substantial and ongoing.\"26  The recognition of this persistent and credible threat presented by al-Qaeda and other trans-national terrorist organizations capable of projecting violence across international borders, resulted in a broad and dynamic reassessment of US national security policy by the Bush administration.  The result of this strategic reassessment was the publication of the National Security Strategy of 2002, a document historian John Lewis Gaddis referred to as:\nan historic shift for American foreign policy because it really is the first serious American grand strategy since containment in the early days of the Cold War.\n\nWe went through the Cold War, the Cold War ended, and we got into a new situation without a grand strategy. We didn't really devise a grand strategy in the early '90s in the immediate aftermath of the Cold War. And I would argue that the Bush grand strategy is the most fundamental reshaping of American grand strategy that we've seen since containment, which was articulated back in\n1947.\"27 The primary objectives of the 2002 National Security Strategy rest upon three pillars:\ndefending the peace by combating terrorists and tyrants, preserving the peace through the strengthening of alliances and maintaining solid relations among the great powers, and extending the peace through the promotion of democracy and freedom worldwide.  The most provocative and controversial aspect of the Strategy is the expansion of the doctrine of pre-emptive selfdefense.  As stated within the Strategy:\nGiven the goals of rogue states and terrorists, the United States can no longer rely solely on a reactive posture as we have in the past. The inability to deter a potential attacker, the immediacy of today's threats, and the magnitude of potential harm that could be caused by our adversaries\" choice of weapons, do not permit that option. We cannot let our enemies strike first...\nWe must adapt the concept of imminent threat to the capabilities and objectives of today's adversaries.  Rogue states and terrorists do not seek to attack us using conventional means....\n\n\nThe United States has long maintained the option of preemptive actions to counter a sufficient threat to our national security.  The greater the threat, the greater is the risk of inaction - and the more compelling the case for taking anticipatory action to defend ourselves, even if uncertainty remains as to the time and place of the enemy's attack.  To forestall or prevent such hostile acts by our adversaries, the United States will, if necessary, act preemptively.28 The paragraphs listed above represent the single most dynamic and controversial aspect of the National Security Strategy and what has since become known as the Bush Doctrine.  The United States, to prevent future catastrophes and tragedies will pre-empt emerging threats before they have a chance to develop.  The doctrine is clearly predicated upon the concept of American hegemony, and provides a clear warning to Saddam Hussein and Iraq.  In fact, many analysts\n\nclaim the strategy exists as a justification for a pre-emptive war aimed at the removal of Saddam Hussein from power.  Iraq aside, the National Security Strategy, or Bush doctrine, establishes the precedent and policy directive for the conduct of a policy of 'targeted killing' of al-Qaeda and other terrorist leadership.\n\nThe National Strategy for Combating Terrorism, released in February 2003, provides even greater detail about US policy in the conduct of the war on terror.  In establishing the 4D strategy (Defeat, Deny, Diminish, and Defend) the document clearly articulates that \"the United States and its partners will target individuals, state sponsors, and transnational networks that enable terrorism to flourish.\"29  The National Strategy for Combating Terrorism adopts an even more aggressive tone than the National Security Strategy: \"the Defeat goal is an aggressive, offensive strategy to eliminate capabilities that allow terrorists to exist and operate - attacking their sanctuaries; leadership; command, control and communications; material support and finances.\"30\nThe language and tone of both the National Security Strategy and the National Strategy for Combating Terrorism indicate the Bush administration's recognition that the existing and persistent threat posed by international terrorism constitutes a state of war.  The Bush administration recognizes the existence of a state of war between the United States and terrorist organizations of global reach that present a credible and persistent threat to the security of the United States and its citizens.\n\nThe November 2002 Yemen missile strike outlined in the introduction was the initial transition from the battlefields of Afghanistan to a policy of 'targeted killing,' striking terrorist leaders in their safe havens.  Commenting on the strike, then National Security Advisor Condoleeza Rice insisted President Bush acted within the accepted practice of past precedent and within his constitutional authority when authorizing such attacks.  \"The president has given broad authority to a variety of people to do what they have to do to protect this country,\" she said.  \"It's a new kind of war. We're fighting on a lot of different fronts.\"31\n\n## Methodology Defining Assassination\n\nIn his article recommending the repeal of Executive Order 12333 MAJ Tyler Harder indicates: \"assassination can be defined very broadly or very narrowly...assassination could define any intentional killing, or it could define only murders of state leaders in the narrowest of circumstances.\"32  Colonel Daniel Reisner, the head of the International Law Section of the Israeli Legal Division purports \"assassination is not a legal term, at least not in international law.\"33   This assessment appears factual given \"the word assassination does not appear in the United Nations Charter, the Geneva Conventions, the Hague Conventions, international case law or the Statute of the International Criminal Court.\"34  Given a wide and varying range of definitions for assassination, it is necessary to provide a coherent and acceptable definition of assassination.  Such a definition will provide a common frame of reference upon which to base moral and legal arguments and to differentiate the current US policy of 'targeted killing' from assassination.  In this attempt \"defining what is not assassination is as important as defining what is assassination.\"35\nThe origins of word *assassin* itself are nearly as elusive as the definition of its modern derivative, assassination, is contentious.  One valid and logical argument claims the word is derived from *assassiyun*, Arabic for fundamentalists, from the root *assass*, or foundation.36  The Assassins of the Middle Ages were a radical sect of Ismaili Shia, fundamentalists, who sought to restore true Islam and spread the true faith to the ends of the earth by targeting and killing the rulers and leaders of the existing order monarchs, generals, ministers, and major religious functionaries.37  Another possible explaination for the source of the word assassin has been attributed to Silvestre de Sacy, who, in the early 19th century, alleges to conclusively show the word is derived from the Arabic *hashish.*   De Sacy explains the name as the product of the use of the drug by leaders of the sect to provide their agents with a preconception of the paradise that awaits them.38  Regardless of the root derivative of the Arabic word, this radical sect of Ismaili Muslims in the Middle Ages introduced the word 'assassin' into most modern European languages.  In general, \"it means a murderer, more particularly one who kills by stealth and treachery, whose victim is a public figure and whose motive is fanaticism or greed.\"39\nThe most commonly applied approach to defining assassination is to contemplate two definitions, one having a peacetime application, the other a wartime application.  Although all assassinations are illegal, requiring an illegal killing or murder, it is still beneficial to examine the criteria specifying the essential characteristics differentiating peacetime and wartime assassination.\n\nWhen a state of war does not exist, COL W. Hays Parks contends \"peacetime assassination, then, would seem to encompass the murder of a private individual or public figure for political purposes.\"40  Many scholars categorize assassination as a subset of murder where the target is chosen based on his identity, prominence, public position and the killing motivated to achieve some political objective.41  Colonel Parks rationalizes that a peacetime killing, in order to constitute assassination, may also require the act to constitute a covert activity.42  This monograph adopts the analysis of Major Tyler Harder, in which he summarizes most definitions of peacetime assassination and establishes the requirement for the following three elements to be present: (1) a murder, (2) of a specific individual, (3) for political purposes.43  For a killing in peacetime to qualify as an assassination, all three of these criteria must be met.\nSeveral conclusions can be drawn from an analysis of this definition.  A lawful homicide is never an assassination.  An unlawful homicide may be an assassination, but if it lacks a political purpose, it would not be an assassination.  Finally, a political killing may be a murder, but if it lacks the specific targeting of a select figure it would not be an assassination.44\nWithin a state of war, assassination acquires a different meaning.45  The principle of assassination as political activity is also no longer applicable once war begins.\nAs Carl von Clausewitz suggested: \"war is a continuation of political activity by other means\"a theory that leads one to believe that in war, every killing is a political one.  A strict application of the peacetime political requirement would then render every wartime death an assassination, a conclusion not reflected either by the laws of war or the common understanding of the word.46\nAssassination in wartime, according to Professor Michael Schmitt, one of the leading scholars on the legal aspects of targeted killing and assassination, comprises two elements: (1) the specific targeting of a particular individual and (2) the use of treacherous or perfidious means.47\nTreachery and perfidy are not to be confused with surprise and deception, which are legal in\n\n44 Ibid., 5.\n45 Parks, 2.\n46 Canastaro, 12. 47 Harder, 4.\naccordance with the law of war.  Treacherous or perfidious acts can be classified as \"acts inviting confidence of an adversary to lead them to believe that they are entitled to, or are obliged to accord, protection under the rules of international law applicable in armed conflict, with the intent to betray that confidence.\"48  In order for a wartime killing to constitute an assassination, the act would require the targeting of a specific individual accomplished through treachery (a violation of the law of war).  Therefore, if the law of war is not violated, an assassination has not taken place.49\nTherefore, in order for an assassination to take place there must be a politically motivated murder of a specific individual in peacetime, or a treacherous killing of a specific individual during armed conflict.50  In summary, the following definitions distinguishing peacetime and wartime assassination will be utilized throughout this monograph.\n\nAssassination:\nPeacetime Assassination: the murder of a specifically targeted individual for a political purpose.\n\nWartime Assassination: the murder of a specifically targeted individual by treacherous or perfidious means. Given these definitions it is important to note that other forms of extra-judicial execution, targeted killing, or elimination are not synonymous with assassination.  Assassination, whether in peacetime or wartime, constitutes an illegal killing, while other modes of killing may or may not be legal according to international law or the laws of armed conflict.  For the purpose of this monograph, other modes of state sponsored killing that do not constitute assassination will be referred to as 'targeted killings.'  The definition to be utilized throughout this monograph for targeted killing is:\nTargeted Killing: the intentional slaying of a specific individual or group of individuals undertaken with explicit governmental approval.51\n\n## Structure Of The Study\n\nVocal critics of 'targeted killing' generally classify the policy as synonymous with assassination and subscribe to one or more of the following criticisms.  First, the policy is criticized as an ineffective means of combating terror since it incites additional violence, creating still more terrorists and continuing the cycle of violence.  Second, assassination of terrorist leaders is illegal under both domestic and international law.  Finally, it is an immoral policy constituting state sponsored extra-judicial killing without due process of law.  Those critics supportive of the final argument tend to support to the 'law-enforcement model' for combating terrorism.  This model requires terrorists to be captured and brought to trial under the criminal justice system rather than subject to the use of state directed force according to the law of war. The first criticism is beyond the scope of this study.  While the efficacy of the U.S. policy is certainly a subject worthy of further attention and study, the intent of this monograph is to examine the moral and legal legitimacy of a U.S. policy of 'targeted killing' of trans-national terrorists under both U.S. domestic and international law.\n\nThe first section of this study will examine the effect of the assassination ban of Executive Order 12333 and its impact upon a policy of 'targeted killing.'  Many opponents of the policy of 'targeted killing' assert the policy is a violation of this executive order and therefore in contravention of domestic law.  This section will examine the historical background leading to the creation of Executive Order 12333; the reason for its development, the intent behind it, and its overall impact on U.S. foreign policy.  The historical implementation of the executive order will be examined through the use of two case studies; the Libya bombings of 1986, and the cruise missile strikes against Afghanistan and Sudan in 1998, which will illustrate the application of the executive order and its impact upon presidential policy decisions.\nThe following section of the study will investigate the legality of assassination and\n'targeted killing' under international law.  First, the positions held by early theorists of international law on the legality and morality of assassination and 'targeted killing' will be examined.  Next, the question of which legal regime is applicable in dealing with the problem of trans-national terrorism.  Trans-national terrorism will be examined according to international human rights law, strongly supported by advocates of the law enforcement model.  The applicability of international humanitarian law and the law of war, the model most strongly supported by advocates of the 'targeted killing' policy who view the ongoing struggle with transnational terrorists as an armed conflict, will be examined as well.  Can the struggle against transnational terrorists constitute an armed conflict according to international law, and what is the status of these trans-national terrorists under the law?\n\n\n## I. Executive Order 12333\n\nOpponents of a policy of 'targeted killing' often claim that such a policy is in direct violation of articles 2.11 and 2.12 of Executive Order 12333 (hereafter EO 12333) prohibiting assassination.  These arguments, however, fail to accurately examine the context of the executive order, and once again tend to utilize an improper and inaccurate definition for the term assassination.  EO 12333 is the most recent in a series of three executive orders to have included presidential bans on assassinations.  The first of the series was Executive Order 11905 issued by President Ford in 1976 in response to congressional criticism of alleged abuses committed by US\nintelligence agencies.  \"The true effect of the executive order is neither to restrict in any legally meaningful way the President's ability to direct measures he determines necessary to national security, nor to create a legal impediment to United States action.\"52  The purpose of EO 12333\nwas to preempt more restrictive congressional legislation, preclude individual agents or agencies from taking unilateral actions against selected foreign officials, and to unequivocally certify that the United States does not condone assassination as an instrument of national policy.53  This section will examine the historical context behind EO 12333, the presidential motivations behind the issuance of EO 12333, and finally provide historical vignettes analyzing the application of EO 12333.\n\n## Church Commission\n\nIn November of 1975 the Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities, better known as the Church Commission, issued an interim report on Alleged Assassination Plots Involving Foreign Leaders.  The Committee focused its investigation on alleged CIA involvement in five assassinations or attempted assassinations against the leaders of foreign governments since 1960.  Although the Committee concluded that no foreign leaders had been killed as a result of assassination plots initiated by U.S. government officials, the Committee did determine that the U.S. government had initiated two failed plots and had encouraged other successful ones.54\nIn their report the Church Commission harshly condemned a policy of assassination stating: \"we condemn assassination and reject it as an instrument of American policy.\"55 The Commission further condemned assassination believing that; \"short of war, assassination is incompatible with American principles, international order, and legitimacy.\"56  It also mentioned some of the dangers involved in utilizing assassination to remove a foreign leader.  First, citing the removal of Diem in Vietnam as an example, the Committee highlighted the uncertainty and instability likely to ensue following the assassination of a leader, questioning whether the situation might not have been better before than after.  Second, they highlight the difficulties in maintaining secrecy within an open and free society where the revelation of U.S. involvement in an assassination of a foreign leader would do tremendous harm to the nation's image.  Thirdly, the problem of reciprocity arises.  If the U.S. participates in assassination it might invite reciprocal action from foreign governments, thereby increasing the danger to both U.S. security and international stability.57 Finally, the Committee was repeatedly critical of the lack of oversight between the executive branch and the intelligence services:\nIt believed that efforts to maintain 'plausible deniability' within the government itself, the deliberate use of ambiguous and circumlocuitous language when discussing highly sensitive subjects, and imprecision in describing precisely what sorts of action were intended to be included in broad authorizations for covert operations, produced a breakdown of accountability by elected government and created a situation in which momentous action might be undertaken by the United States without ever having been fully considered and authorized by the president.58\n\nIn their conclusions the Committee recommended a statute making it a criminal offense for persons subject to the jurisdiction of the United States to conspire to assassinate, attempt to assassinate, or assassinate a foreign official of a country with which the United States is not at war, or against which United States Armed Forces have not been introduced into hostilities.59\nDespite initiation of three different legislative proposals, congress failed to produce a statute banning assassination as a political tool of US policy.  It is important to note, however, that the implied definition of assassination utilized by the Church Committee appears consistent with the peacetime definition of assassination developed earlier.  The focus of the Committee and its concerns appear focused on the use of assassination in peacetime against the political leadership of foreign governments.\n\n## Presidential Motivations\n\nPresident Ford issued Executive Order 11905 on 18 February 1976, which in Section 5\nSubparagraph (g) reads: \"Prohibition on Assassination.  No employee of the United States Government shall engage in, or conspire to engage in political assassination.\"60  The order contained no definitions section to clarify what constitutes assassination, as would typically be expected in an act of legislation.  Nor was the legitimacy of other types of lethal actions, such as US support for coup attempts or paramilitary operations, discussed.61   \"Despite these deficiencies the executive order was widely interpreted as prohibiting the types of activities revealed by the Church reportspecifically, peacetime efforts by U.S. intelligence agency officials to cause the deaths of foreign heads of states whose activities were considered detrimental to the interests of the United States.\"62\nNumerous analysts and critics suggest the Executive Order was issued primarily to preempt pending congressional legislation banning political assassination.  Once the order was issued, Ford administration officials quickly adopted the position that adequate action had been taken to remedy the perceived problems in order to preempt the perceived need for an immediate statutory ban on assassination.63  The order, as one author speculates, \"responded to intense political pressure to 'do something' while maintaining the flexibility in interpreting what exactly had been done.\"64\nThe order, therefore, is the executive office's attempt to preempt more specific and restrictive congressional legislation that might prove harmful to the military and intelligence capabilities of the United States.65  In addition to appeasing Congress and an outraged public, the executive order alleviates the perceived lack of accountability between the intelligence services and the government by ensuring that \"authority to direct attacks that might be considered assassination rests with the president alone.  It prohibits subordinate officials from engaging on their own initiative in these activities.\"66\nEvery presidential administration since the Ford administration has reissued, with some minor modifications, the prohibition against assassination.  The current document known as Executive Order 12333, was issued by President Reagan in 1981 and has been reaffirmed by all following presidential administrations.  The pertinent sections read:\n2.11 Prohibition on Assassination. No person employed by or acting on behalf of the United States government shall engage in or conspire to engage in, assassination.\n\n\n2.12 Indirect Participation. No agency of the Intelligence Community shall participate in or request any person to undertake activities forbidden by this order.67 \"The true effect of the executive order is neither to restrict in any meaningful way the President's ability to direct measures he determines to be necessary to national security.\"68  The advantage of an executive order over congressional legislation banning assassination is its inherent flexibility.  Issuing an executive order can usually be accomplish in far less time than enacting legislation, and if a president wishes to rescind or modify the executive order at any time, he has the authority.69  \"Additionally, the President may designate any of these changes as classified if he considers them 'intelligence activities . . . or intelligence sources and methods,'\neffectively preventing them from ever reaching public view.\"70\nAs revealed in the sections above the executive order banning assassination allows the President a significant amount of flexibility in policy-making given the ambiguity presented by the failure to define assassination.  The assassination ban, loose as that ban might be, may also be circumvented through a number of executive actions.  The President may request a declaration of war, under which foreign leaders could possibly be classified as combatants and therefore legally targeted.  The President might invoke the United States' rights under Article 51 of the United Nation's Charter, the right of self-defense, which authorizes the state's use of force equivalent to a declaration of war.71  According to Colonel Parks, acting consistent with the Charter of the United Nations, a decision by the President to employ clandestine, low visibility or overt military force would not constitute assassination if the U.S. military forces were employed against the combatant forces of another nation, a guerrilla force, or a terrorist or other organization whose actions pose a threat to the security of the United States.72\n\nAs indicated in the preceding sections, Executive Order 12333 and its predecessors have proven to be largely a symbolic measure with little restrictive impact upon the President's decision to employ force.  Critics of Presidential policy decisions tend to condemn any military action in which the U.S. appears to target a specific individual, citing EO 12333 in defense of their arguments.  A more effective means of assessing the use of force directed against specific individuals is to examine the actions legality under international law.  If an act does not meet one of the two definitions of assassination provided in the first chapter and is not illegal under international law, it is not a violation of EO 12333.\nApplication of the definition of assassination provided in the opening sections coupled with specific examples of the self-defensive application of military force by the United States may amplify why the assassination ban of EO 12333 is so easily misunderstood.  Examining the\n1986 Libyan bombing and the 1998 cruise missile strikes in Afghanistan, and the may help provide a measure of insight and understanding of how the EO is often improperly applied, and many of the controversies surrounding it.\n\n## Vignettes El Dorado Canyon\n\nOn 15 April 1986 the United States conducted Operation El Dorado Canyon, launching an air attack on Libya with both carrier based aircraft and Air Force aircraft based in England. These attacks simultaneously struck five military installations and facilities in Tripoli and\n72 Parks, 8.\n\nBenghazi including Colonel Muammar Qaddafi's headquarters in the Al-Azzizya Barracks.73\nColonel Qaddafi was uninjured in the attack, having taken shelter in an underground bunker.\n\nLibyan officials alleged 36 civilians and one soldier had been killed in the raid, although other reports suggest the deceased were military personnel.74  Other reports estimated the actual casualty total to be somewhere between 50 and one hundred personnel, primarily military.75\nThe use of force was prompted by what President Reagan referred to as irrefutable evidence that now confirms \"the terrorist bombing of [the] La Belle discotheque was planned and executed under the direct orders of the Libyan regime.\"76  The bombing resulted in the death of one American soldier, and wounded over 200 people including 50 Americans.  In addition, the United States possessed intelligence exposing \"an orchestrated, worldwide, centrally directed campaign of terror directed through Libyan diplomatic channels and missions specifically targeting Americans.\"77\nReporting the raid to the United Nations Security Council pursuant to Article 51 of the United Nation's Charter, the United Stated argued the attack was an act of self-defense in response to \"an ongoing pattern of attacks by the government of Libya.\"78  Article 51, which will be covered in greater detail in subsequent chapters, exhibits the United Nations' recognition of a state's inherent right to self-defense.  The United States generally recognizes three forms of selfdefense: \"(a) Against an actual use of force, or hostile act. (b) Preemptive self-defense against an imminent use of force. (c) Self-defense against a continuing threat.\"79\n\n##\n\nMessage,\" *Washington Post*, 16 April 1986, at A 24.\n\nThe United States government cited self-defense, deterrence, and the desire to diminish Libya's terrorist supporting infrastructure as the primary justifications for the strike.  President Reagan, in his address to the nation, issued just as U.S. combat aircraft had reentered international airspace, stated:\nWhen our citizens are abused or attacked anywhere in the world on the direct orders of a hostile regime, we will respond so long as I'm in this Oval Office. Self-defense is not only our right, it is our duty. It is the purpose behind the mission undertaken tonight, a mission fully consistent with Article 51 of the United Nations Charter.\n\n\nWe believe that this preemptive action against his terrorist installations will not only diminish Colonel Qadhafi's capacity to export terror, it will provide him with incentives and reasons to alter his criminal behavior. I have no illusion that tonight's action will ring down the curtain on Qadhafi's reign of terror. But this mission, violent though it was, can bring closer a safer and more secure world for decent men and women.80 Legal scholars have classified the Libyan strike as a violation of EO 12333.  Investigative journalist Seymour Hersh has even alleged that \"the primary goal of the attack, however, was Qadhafi's assassination, and the pilots who flew the mission were so briefed.\"81  Neither criticism, however, is particularly valid and tends to illustrate the misinterpretation and misrepresentation of the EO by legal scholars and the general public at large.\n\nFirst, the Libyan air strikes exclusively involved the use of military assets, it was not an operation conducted by the intelligence services.  The assassination ban of EO 12333 relates specifically to the activities of the intelligence services and arguably has no direct application restricting the use of military force.  The attack on Libya was a direct response to Libya's pattern of behavior which \"constituted an ongoing and persistent attack on American citizens, against which the United States was legally entitled to defend itself\"82 in accordance with Article 51 of the United Nations' Charter.\n\nSecond, even if the United States had specifically targeted Colonel Qaddafi, which has been denied by multiple sources including Colonel Parks who provided legal counsel during the planning phase of the operation,83 the action would not constitute assassination according to the provided definition.  By invoking Article 51, the U.S. should be assessed under wartime rather than peacetime conditions under which Colonel Qaddafi clearly qualifies as a legitimate target. As the military commander of the Libyan Armed Forces and intelligence services and therefore;\nis personally responsible for Libya's policy of training, assisting, and utilizing terrorists in attacks on U.S. citizens, diplomats, troops, and facilities.  His position as head of state provided him no legal immunity from being attacked when present at a proper military target.84\n\n The air strike conducted against Libya on 15 April 1986 involved overt military force by uniformed members of the United States military, thus the action is neither treacherous nor perfidious.\n\n\nThe Libyan bombings of April 1986 provide an overview of the complexities and misconceptions in the application of EO 12333.  Even legal scholars, journalists, and congressmen85 easily misconstrue what EO 12333 permits and restricts and its legal applications.\nClearly the EO does not even apply in this instance since the incident involves military action as opposed to intelligence activities.  In addition, Qaddafi qualifies as a legal combatant and may be targeted regardless if his death was an intended consequence of the strike.  Had he been killed in the strike his death would neither constituted assassination, nor been illegal under international law.  The above vignette provided an example of the misapplication of EO 12333 in state-to-state relations; the following example involves the complexities and ambiguities involving non-state actors.\n\n## Infinite Reach\n\nOn 20 August 1998 the United States conducted Operation Infinite Reach, launching more than 70 Tomahawk cruise missiles at the Zawar Kili al-Badr terrorist training camp located in the Paktia Province of Eastern Afghanistan, approximately 90 miles south of Kabul.86  Nearly simultaneous to the missile strikes in Afghanistan, six additional cruise missiles struck the El Shifa Pharmaceutical plant, a suspected chemical weapons production facility located in Khartoum, Sudan.87  The Afghanistan strikes allegedly killed 24 people, while the Sudanese missiles killed the night watchman at the factory.88 Osama bin Laden, however, who was possibly the primary target of the strike, which took place at the time of an expected meeting of key members of his al-Qaeda organization, survived the attack.\n These missile strikes were an immediate response to the 7 August 1998 bombings of the U.S. Embassies in Nairobi, Kenya and Dar es Salaam Tanzania.  These terrorist bombings left\n257 dead and more than 5,000 wounded.89  As in the previous vignette, the U.S. government invoked Article 51 of the United Nations' Charter as justification for the use of force.  What is especially significant about the Afghanistan missile strike is the fact that the chosen targets were not directly connected to any nation-state, but at terrorist training camps \"operated by groups affiliated with Osama bin Laden, a network not sponsored by any state, but as dangerous as any we face.\"90  President Clinton in his address provided four specific reasons for the strike:\nFirst, because we have convincing evidence these groups played the key role in the embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania. Second, because these groups have executed terrorist attacks against Americans in the past.\n\n Third, because we have compelling information that they were planning\nadditional terrorist attacks against our citizens and others with the inevitable\ncollateral casualties we saw so tragically in Africa.\nAnd, fourth, because they are seeking to acquire chemical weapons and other\ndangerous weapons.91\n\nAnother significant aspect of the August missile strike is the shift in U.S. policy the action indicated.  In the past the U.S. tended to adopt a law enforcement position regarding terrorist attacks, relying upon the Federal Bureau of Investigation to uncover whoever was responsible for the attacks and bring them to justice through the U.S. criminal justice system.\nThe terrorist attack on the African embassies, however, was regarded as an act of war against the United States rather than a criminal offense and a military response was deemed the appropriate response.  In a second address to the nation President Clinton specified that there would be times when \"law enforcement and diplomatic tools would not be enough.  When our very national security is challenged and we must take extraordinary action to protect the safety of our citizens.\"92\nThe legality or illegality of specifically targeting a specific individual in an the ambiguous environment within which transnational terrorists operate, an environment to steal a phrase from Roger Spiller can be classified as 'not war but like war,\"93 will be discussed in greater detail in the next chapter.  For now the focus is upon the legality of such actions under U.S. domestic law, specifically the assassination ban of EO 12333.  On 4 September, two weeks after the strikes in Afghanistan and Sudan, members of the Senate Judiciary Committee asked FBI director Louis Freeh to research the legality of assassinating terrorist leaders.  \"Specifically, the Senators sought clarification whether the prohibition on assassinations of heads of state embodied in the ban of EO12333 applies to terrorist groups and their leaders.94  Once again, however, the raising of these concerns displays a misguided interpretation of EO 12333.\n\nThe United States, through the invocation of its Article 51, indicated the attacks were made in self-defense in response to an on-going pattern of attacks by terrorists affiliated with Osama bin Laden and his al-Qaeda organization.  Bin Laden and al-Qaeda present a consistent and credible threat to the security of the United States and its citizens.  Therefore, the use of force against this organization and its leadership within Afghanistan is justified, virtually the same justification as was used in the Libya air strikes.  The issue in this instance is more complex, however, because bin Laden is and al-Qaeda do not exercise sovereignty over any state or territory.  The strikes, therefore, although directed against bin Laden and al-Qaeda, are a violation of another state's sovereignty, specifically Afghanistan and Sudan in this instance.  Operation Infinite Reach serves as an overt statement and warning of a dynamic change in U.S. foreign policy.  The Clinton administration has repeatedly warned countries that sponsor terrorism that they are not exempt from punitive measures; the use military force in Afghanistan and Sudan demonstrate that a country that knowingly gives sanctuary to terrorists, whether or not directly involved in planning or executing terrorist activity could find itself on the receiving end of U.S.\n\nmilitary force.  This policy is consistent with the writings of Vattel, who in his 1758 work Law of Nations appears to imply that states that threaten other states may themselves be targeted:\nIf, then, there is anywhere a nation of restless and mischievous disposition, ever ready to injure others, to traverse their designs, and to excite domestic disturbances in their dominions . . . it is not doubted that all the others have a right to form a coalition in order to repress and chastise that nation, and to put it for ever after out of her power to injure them.95\n\nOperation Infinite Reach was once again a military operation, undertaken under the Article 51 invocation and not an intelligence operation.  Considerable controversy, however,\n\nsurrounds the issue of whether or not terrorist actions meet the \"armed attack\" requirement required by Article 51.  In the case of Nicaragua v. United States of America the International Court determined that terrorist attacks do not amount to an 'armed attack.'\"96  Advocates of a broader view counter that a limited interpretation of Article 51 does not adequately reflect the nature of modern warfare and the threat posed by international terrorism.  They insist this narrow view of Article 51 ignores the pragmatic reality that no state will accept being forced to wait until it is attacked before taking adequate measures to protect itself and its citizens.97  Legally, the\n\"purposes of attacks on terrorists may include immediate prevention, long-term prevention, and punishment following past acts.\"98  The inherent danger of such an interpretation of Article 51 is the risk that aggressor states will claim self-defense for their hostile actions.  Any invocation of self-defense, therefore, should be the subject of close scrutiny.\n\nIn both of the historical examples provided above the United States justified its actions through the invocation of the right of self defense provided under Article 51 of the U.N. Charter. The missile strikes against Afghanistan and the Sudan, just like the air strikes against Libya constitute directly applied military force rather than intelligence operations.  The use of overt military force therefore, negates the vaguely defined prohibition of EO 12333.  In addition, because the strike involved the overt application of military force by uniformed members of the United States military the action is considered neither treacherous nor perfidious.  The actions taken by the United States in each example constitute a legitimate response to a persistent and credible threat against what the U.S. government contends to be legitimate targets.\nSince the attacks on the African embassies both the Clinton and Bush administrations have declared the existence of a state of conflict between the United States and al-Qaeda.  This assessment has gained additional momentum in the wake of the 9/11 terrorist attacks.  One critical question to be asked, however, is; \"can armed conflict exist between a victim state and an international terrorist group?\"99  The legitimate targeting of terrorists and their leaders requires adoption of one of two concepts: (1) the original armed attack against the victim state has created a state of international armed conflict between the victim state and the state harboring the responsible terrorists.  Within the context of this conflict the terrorists and their leadership may be legitimately targeted. (2) Regardless of a state of conflict between the victim state and the harboring state an armed conflict has been established between the victim state and the terrorists responsible for the armed attack.  Within this framework the terrorists and their leadership are legitimate targets against whom the victim state may use force.100  The following chapter will explore the applicability of the law of war to trans-national terrorist organizations, as well as explore the question of the combatant or non-combatant status of Osama bin Laden and other non-uniformed members of terrorist organizations such as al Qaeda.  The determination of status is pivotal to determining whether or not the peacetime or wartime definition of assassination is applicable in this instance.\n\n## Ii. International Law Roots Of International Law\n\nMankind has morally and legally justified the taking of human life throughout the course of human history.101  The acceptability of assassination as a tactic of war has persisted for centuries.  It wasn't until it became a prominent subject among moral philosophers and legal scholars throughout the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, however, that the foundations of a body of law began to take form.102  Within their respective bodies of work none of these scholars considered that the leaders of opposing armies should be afforded absolute protection. Consequently, each perceived these leaders to qualify as a legitimate target of attack within certain requirements and restrictions.103  The primary concern of these philosophers and scholars rested upon the means and circumstances by which a person might be targeted and killed.\nConcerned that the \"honor of arms be preserved, and that public order and safety of sovereigns and generals not be unduly threatened,\"104 most authors emphasized a prohibition against the employment of treacherous means.\nAlberico Gentili, an early just war theorist, writing in the late sixteenth century, strongly opposed any form of assassination as a valid and acceptable tactic of just war.  Gentili clearly objected to the observation \"it makes no difference at all whether you kill an enemy on the field of battle or in his camp.  An enemy is justly killed anywhere.\"105  While he acknowledges the benefit of killing the enemy's leadership on the field of battle, he maintains an aversion to the use of assassination, especially the use of treachery.  Gentili describes and denounces three particular forms of assassination: \"(1) the incitement of subjects to kill a sovereign; (2) a secret or treacherous attack upon an individual enemy; and (3) an open attack on an unarmed enemy not on the field of battle.106  Gentili's opposition to assassination of leaders was predicated upon his fear that approval of such methods, whether open or tacit, would lead to the eventual degeneration of civil order and obedience:\nSuch conduct is a danger to the public and therefore is not to be ignored... since a criminal war is directed not merely against one life but against the safety of all men.  For if these corrupt practices should be approved by an authority as great as that of the law of nations, there is no longer anything left to protect our safety. If we wish to confound and confuse all these things we shall make all life dangerous, and expose it to treachery and plots.  This is a common evil, a common cause of fear, a common peril.107\n\nThe absence of honor and valor in assassination proved particularly galling to Gentili's notion of justice:\nPrudent courage sees victory not in death, but in accomplishment.  And this accomplishment consists of the acknowledgement of defeat by the enemy, and the admission that one is conquered by the same honorable means, which give the other the victory.108\n\nGentili openly rejected the utilitarian arguments of Sir Thomas More, which approved of assassination as a means to save lives by avoiding death and destruction among the innocent, and placing blame and punishment upon those responsible for war.  Gentili criticized this approach for judging actions based upon utility, but disregarding both praise and glory, and justice and honor.109  Gentili, however, not only criticizes the utilitarian disregard of valor and justice but questions the utility of assassination as well.  Like the Church Committee members over three hundred years later, Gentili questioned the net result of a successful assassination.  Surely a new leader would emerge and his citizens and soldiers would \"throw themselves into war with more energy because of that new wrong...roused to frenzy when their leader is slain by illegitimate\n\n106 Zengel, 126. 107 Gentili, 168-169. 108 Ibid., 171-172. 109 Ibid., 167.\nmeans.\"110  In summary, Gentili staunchly opposed the use of assassination, namely the employment of treacherous means, against an adversary.  Although enemy leaders constitute legitimate targets upon the field of battle, covert assassination plots should be condemned.\n\nHugo Grotius, a contemporary of Gentili, writing in the early seventeenth century and considered the father of international law,111 contemplated \"whether, according to the law of nations, it is permissible to kill an enemy by sending an assassin against him.\"112  Grotius differentiates between assassins who violate the \"their Faith, given expressly or tacitly; as Subjects to their Prince, Vassals to their Lord, Soldiers to their General\"113 and an impersonal attack conducted by those who \"owe no Faith to him against whom he is employed.\"114  Unlike Gentili, who limited legitimate targeting of leaders to the field of battle, Grotius maintains that\n\"to kill an Enemy any where is allowed, both by the Law of Nature and of Nations.\"115  Grotius, however, specifically condemns assassins who act treacherously.  Assassination by treacherous means, according to Grotius, is a violation of the Law of Nature and the Law of Nations by both the assassin and those who employ them.116\nGrotius' reasoning against the use of treachery in regard to assassination was that the rule prevented dangers to persons of particular eminence from becoming excessive.\"117  Grotius recognized one of the basic principles of sovereignty as the right to declare and wage war, and that the prohibition upon treacherous assassination applied only within a 'public war' waged against a sovereign enemy.118  Treacherous means employed against enemies who were not\n\nInternational Law,\" *The Georgia Journal of International and Comparative Law*, Vol. 30 No. 1 (Fall 2001): 15.\n118 Zengel, 127.\nsovereign, such as \"robbers and pirates, though it be not altogether blameless, yet is not punished amongst nations, in detestation of those against whom it is committed.\"119\nOver a century later Cornelius van Bynkershoek, writing in 1737, provides a slightly a more contemporary approach to the determination of what force might be permissible in war:\nEvery force is lawful in war.  So true is this that we may destroy an enemy though he be unarmed, and for this purpose we may employ poison, an assassin or incendiary bombs, though he is not provided with such things: in short everything is legitimate against an enemy.  I know Grotius is opposed to the use of poison, and lays down various distinctions regarding the employment of assassins...  But if we follow reason, who is the teacher of the laws of nations, we must grant that everything is lawful against enemies as such.  We make war because we think that our enemy, by the injury done us, has merited the destruction of himself and his people.  As this is the object of our welfare, does it matter what means we employ to accomplish it?120 Bynkershoek continues by observing that it is immaterial whether we employ strategy or courage against the enemy.  He believes that all forms of deceit and deception are permissible except perfidy.  He claims that opposition to the employment of deceit against the enemy is based upon confusion between justice and generosity.121\nJustice is indispensable in war, while generosity is wholly voluntary.  The former permits the destruction of the enemy by whatsoever means, the latter grants to the enemy whatever we should like to claim for ourselves in our own misfortune, and it requires wars be waged according to the rules of the duel.122\n\nUnlike the other scholars, Bynkershoek does not find the virtues of courage and honor compelling enough to weaken his position on the use of treacherous means to target the enemy.  Perhaps his exposure to modern state warfare allowed him to recognize the necessity of such conduct where the security and survival of the state are at stake.\n\nThe general consensus among these early international law theorists and scholars was that an intentional attack to kill an enemy leader was typically permissible, provided the attack did not\n\nemploy treacherous or perfidious means.123  Bynkershoek, clearly the most permissive of the three scholars, considered any means of force employed against an enemy to be legitimate.  The only obligation owed to an enemy was that of abiding by any agreements made between the two parties.  Grotius, on the other hand, considered the enemy to be a legitimate target provided treachery, was not employed.  \"Treachery was defined as betrayal by one owing an obligation of good faith to the intended target.\"124  Gentili, on the other hand, was even more restrictive, limiting legitimate attacks on enemy leaders to those upon or near the battlefield itself.  Grotius and Gentili, however, were in agreement against the emplacement of bounties upon the heads of enemy leaders, believing such actions would be likely to incite or promote treacherous activity among the enemy's subjects.\n\nThese scholars sought to restrict the methods employed in the conduct of war and the targeting of enemy leaders through both a sense of honor and to protect sovereigns from\n\"unpredictable assaults against which they would find it difficult to defend themselves.\"125  They considered the possibility of frequent attacks against sovereigns as a destabilizing influence weakening the order and stability provided within the state and reducing life to what Hobbes later referred to as a \"state of nature.\"  Both these theorists operated on the premise that \"both the right of a sovereign to wage war, and on the belief that assassination was treacherous and immoral.\"126\nThese early scholars focused their efforts upon the legality of targeting a heads of state and other important government officials.  Of course the one inherent weakness of these early international law theorists as well as to contemporary forms of international law regarding the use of force is the state centric nature of existing laws and conventions.  Historically, the application of international human rights law has applied to the internal domestic situation of a state in both times of peace and times of war,127 while in times of war, international humanitarian law and the law of war has served as the arbiter of justice and legality for actions among states.  This distinction has, in recent years, been somewhat clouded.  Some scholars maintain, \"the prevailing theory is that even in the conduct of hostilities the international human rights regime applies.\"128\nThe increasing complexities provided by trans-national actors and international terrorist organizations such as al-Qaeda have blurred the distinctions even further.  The next sections will briefly detail the relevant aspects of international human rights law and international humanitarian law and their ability and inability to address the issue of non-state sponsored terrorism.\n\n## Human Rights Law And The Law Enforcement Model\n\nHuman rights activists and advocacy groups such as Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch, generally promote the law enforcement model as the preferred method of responding to terrorist attacks and mitigating the threat posed by international terrorism.  Through adherence to this model \"the intentional use of force by state authorities can be justified only in strictly limited conditions.  The state is obliged to respect and ensure the rights of every person to life and due process of law.\"129   Thus, state actions are scrutinized according to international human rights law in order to assess the legality and justification for the action.  Amnesty International, in its report criticizing the Israeli policy of targeted killing, defined an extra-judicial execution as:\nan unlawful and deliberate killing carried out by order of a government or with its acquiescence.  Extra judicial killings are killings which can reasonably be assumed to be the result of a policy at any level of government to eliminate specific individuals as an alternative to arresting them and them and bringing them to justice.  These killings take place outside of any judicial framework.130\n  For the purposes of this monograph, the use of the term extra-judicial killing will be considered as synonymous with assassination, since by the definition provided by Amnesty International in the above paragraph, extra judicial killing is in fact a murder of a specifically targeted individual for political reasons.\n\nThe rise of human rights as an important international concern can be traced to the end of World War II and the horrific nature of the Holocaust.  More recently, international nongovernmental organizations such as Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch among others have sought to pressure state government's policies through the mobilization of civil society worldwide.  States themselves have implemented important aspects of the human rights agenda through commitment to a various array of international institutions and conventions.131\nAll of the major international human rights conventions are predicated upon the protection of \"every human being's inherent right to life.\"132  All human rights conventions recognize the right to life as a non-derogable right, meaning one which cannot be put aside during times of emergency and crisis.  Despite this recognition, however, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCR), the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,133 the American Convention on Human Rights (ACHR)134 and the African Charter on Human and People's Rights\n(AFCHPR)135 do not frame the right to life in absolute terms.136 Instead, each of these conventions prohibits only the *arbitrary*137 deprivation of life.  Therefore, just as the lack of a specific definition for assassination in EO 12333 leaves considerable flexibility in interpretation,\n\nentered into force 21 October 1986, Article 4.\nthe \"intentional killing of a specific individual will violate the inherent right to life only if arbitrariness can be inferred.\"138  Lacking a specific and definitive definition of the term arbitrary leaves the evaluation of the legality of a state's action subject to interpretation and based upon legal precedent.\n\n## The European Convention For The Protection Of Human Rights And Fundamental\n\nFreedoms (ECPHR) takes a somewhat different and more specific approach, stressing the obligation of the state to protect an individual's right to life.  Article 2 of the ECHR establishes a proportionality test to determine the required conditions necessary to justify the state's use of lethal force, reading:\nDeprivation of life shall not be regarded as inflicted in contravention of this article when it results from the use of force, which is no more than absolutely necessary:\na) in defence of any person from unlawful violence; b) in order to effect a lawful arrest or to prevent the escape of a person lawfully detained;\nc) in action lawfully taken for the purpose of quelling a riot or insurrection.139 The use of lethal force by the state, according to the model provided by the ECHR, requires what amounts to an examination of the necessity of the action and the proportionality of the use of force.  Kretzmer provides two key questions that succinctly establish the requirements for the state's employment of lethal force:\n\n1. Is the use of *force* absolutely required, or could other measures be employed\nto protect the threatened persons?\n2. Assuming no other measures are available, is it absolutely necessary to use\nlethal force, or could some other lesser degree of force be employed?140\n Exceptions to the prohibition on states intentionally depriving a person of his fundamental right to life must be \"interpreted in light of the fundamental assumption that international human rights law adopts a law-enforcement model based upon the principles of due process.\"141  According to Kretzmer, the reliance upon a law enforcement model requires that all measures taken by the state must be compatible with the following principles:\n\n1. every individual benefits from the presumption of innocence 2. persons suspected of perpetrating or planning serious criminal acts should be\narrested, detained, and interrogated with due process of law\n3. if there is credible evidence that such persons were indeed involved in\nplanning, promoting, aiding and abetting or carrying out terrorist acts they should be afforded a fair trial before a competent and independent court and\nif convicted, sentenced by the court to a punishment provided by law.142\n\nOne of the inherent flaws with the law enforcement model in relation to its application to trans-national terror is that one of the fundamental premises is invalid: that the suspected terrorists are within the jurisdiction of the law-enforcement authorities of the victimized state.143\nThe law enforcement model is often resisted by the military based upon the realization that attempting to arrest terrorists can prove prohibitively costly in terms of human life.  The 3 October 1993 raid to apprehend Somali warlord Mohammed Farrah Aidid in Mogadishu, chronicled in the book and portrayed in the movie *Black Hawk Down*, illustrates some of the potential dangers inherent with the application of the law enforcement model.  The intent of the operation was, in accordance with U.N. Resolution 837, to \"use all necessary measures to arrest and detain\" Aidid and others responsible for the deadly ambush of Pakistani peacekeepers of 5\nJune 1993, and present them for \"prosecution, trial, and punishment.\"144  In the aftermath of the raid 18 Americans lost their lives while Somali losses numbered 5001,000 killed, with total casualties probably running over 5,000.145  Attempting to execute the arrest of a suspect in hostile territory may, as in this instance, lead to tremendous collateral damage and loss of life that might have been avoided through the application of a precision strike.  The dilemma of course is that while such a strike may potentially spare the lives of others, the target is clearly deprived of his right to life.\n\nOther potential difficulties with the law enforcement model include the \"unusual, and at times insurmountable obstacle to indicting them.\"146  The ability to build an overwhelming case against a suspected terrorist capable of proving guilt beyond a reasonable doubt is particularly arduous.  Proving a suspects identity, affiliation with a particular organization, and direct responsibility for specific actions in accordance with the strict legal procedures of the criminal justice system remain particularly uncertain.  Suspects in custody pose additional problems for the states holding them.  Juries and witnesses may be intimidated by the terrorist organization, making trial and conviction still more problematic.147  The detention of terrorist suspects may also lead to further terrorist attacks or the seizure of hostages as a means to obtain their release.\nWhat recourse is available to victim states when suspected terrorists are in the territory of another sovereign state and that state is either unwilling or incapable of detaining these suspected terrorists?  In \"Targeted Killing\" Daniel Statman claims that the United States is entitled to classify operations against al-Qaeda as war,\nwith the loosening of various moral prohibitions implied by such a definition, rather than a police-enforcement action aimed at bringing a group of criminals to justice based upon two specific criteria: (a) the gravity of the threat posed by al Qaeda and (b) the impracticality of coping with this threat by conventional lawenforcing institutions and methods.148 The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights *Report on Terrorism and Human Rights* in 2002 appears to agree with the assessment of Statman.  The text of the report accepted the use of lethal force by state agents \"in situations where a state's population is threatened by violence, the state has the right and obligation to protect the population against such threats and in so doing may use lethal force in certain situations.\"149\nOnce again, the interpretation of the various human rights conventions and examination of case law provides no clear consensus concerning a state's use of lethal force.  Kretzmer acknowledges there are three possible approaches to determining when a state may employ lethal force against suspected terrorists:\n\n1. To thwart an imminent attack.  Absent imminency, pre-emptive targeting of\nsuspected a terrorist will be regarded as not being absolutely necessary, or as\nan arbitrary deprivation of life, no matter how strong the evidence he is\nplanning further terrorist attacks and how high the probability that there may not be another opportunity to prevent such attacks.\n2. Allowing the targeting in very narrow circumstances in which apprehending\nor arresting the suspected terrorist is not feasible, provided there is extremely strong evidence that the suspected terrorist is involved in executing or planning a terrorist attack.\n3. Positing that the law-enforcement model...does not provide an adequate\nanswer to the issue of trans-national terror.  When the terror is intense, organized and protracted, the appropriate model should be the armed conflict\nmodel.150\n\n##\n\nOne popular argument among scholars is that \"when terrorists operate outside the scope of an armed conflict, then they are not combatants that can be killed on sight, but criminals that should be arrested and brought to justice.\"151  The United States, however, has generally adhered to the third approach, resorting to the application of proportional military force in response to threats to its citizens and security.  Throughout history \"the United States has employed military force whenever another nation has failed to discharge its international responsibilities in protecting U.S. citizens from acts of violence originating in or launched from its sovereign territory.\"152  Through the early 1990's the United States attempted to apply the law enforcement model against terrorists, bringing to trial those accused of perpetrating the 1993 World Trade Center bombing.  These measures, however, were met with an increasing frequency and severity of attacks directed upon U.S. citizens and government installations worldwide.  These methods have only led to the arrest and conviction of the lowly foot soldiers directly responsible for the attacks.  Meanwhile, those principally responsible for motivating, resourcing, and training, bin Laden and other terrorist leaders for example, free to continue planning future attacks.\nIn the wake of the 9/11 attacks, the Bush administration reassessed the security situation of the United States and determined that more proactive and aggressive measures are warranted to protect the United States and its citizens.  The Bush Doctrine, established by the 2002 National Security Strategy, is an attempt to provide a bridge between customary international law, within which it is \"possible to adopt the tactic of a pre-emptive war which forestalls the anticipated evil, as an act of self defense permitted in the face of aggression\"153 and international treaty law which permits self-defense only in instances of armed attack.  The next section will examine if the current policy outlined within the National Security Strategy of 2002 is valid within the framework provided by international humanitarian law and the law of war.  Does the U.S.\n\ndeclaration of a global war on terror exceed the state's authority to use of force in self-defense authorized under Article 51 of the U.N. Charter?\n\n## The Armed Conflict Model\n\nThe fundamental doctrine of international law, the doctrine of positivism \"teaches that international law is the sum of the rules by which the states have consented to be bound, and nothing can be law to which they have not consented.  In the absence of a legal norm restricting a particular behavior, sovereign states may act as they choose.\"154  Barring an accepted prohibition against a policy of targeted killing of terrorist leaders under international law, states are permitted to pursue such policies according to the widely accepted theory of positivism.  Although there is not a single treaty, which explicitly prohibits one state from assassinating the sovereign of another state, there is a significant body of international law regulating the use of force within the sovereign territory of another state.155\nSince its inception in the United Nations Charter has become the dominant international institution for regulating international armed conflict and the use of force.  Article 103 of the U.N. Charter explicitly establishes that it supercedes all other international commitments or obligations.  It reads: \"In the event of a conflict between the obligations of the Members of the United Nations under the present Charter and their obligations under any other international agreement, their obligations under the present Charter shall prevail.\"156 A state's use of force against another state, therefore, to remain legitimate and legal must not do so in violation of the U.N. Charter.\n\nArticle 2(4) of the Charter provides a general prohibition on a state's use of force: \"All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.\"157  The Charter provides two explicit exceptions to the Article 2(4) prohibition on the use of force: (1) military action sanctioned by the Security Council in accordance with Chapter VII of the Charter, and/or (2) when a state utilizes force in selfdefense under Article 51 of the Charter.\n\n## Article 51 And The Inherent Right Of Self Defense\n\nA state's inherent right to self-defense is established by Article 51 of the U.N. Charter which reads:\nNothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to maintain international peace and security.  Measures taken by Members in the exercise of this right of self-defense shall be immediately reported to the Security Council and shall not in any way affect the authority and responsibility of the Security Council under the present charter to take at any time such action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace and security.158\n\nThe intended scope of the self-defense exception is unclear.  Frequently a tremendous amount of controversy surrounds what is considered a legitimate act of self-defense in response to a persistent and credible threat and one that constitutes an illegal retaliation for previous acts of aggression.  The inherent right of a state to use force in response to a terrorist attack depends upon the responsibility of the state harboring the terrorists, and possibly on its willingness or capability to apprehend the terrorists to prevent further attacks.  The purpose of a state's employment of force, however, must always be preventative rather than punitive.  The intention of the force employed is to halt or prevent future aggression directed against the state, not as a form of retaliation or retribution for past attacks. 159  If the use of force \"is carried out for reasons other than preventive ones, the operation will not be a preemptive one, but one...which would appear to be prohibited.\"160\nOne common interpretation of the doctrine of self-defense is based upon the necessity and proportionality test established in customary international law by the Caroline Doctrine.  This doctrine is based upon a precedent established in 1837 when Daniel Webster, then the U.S. Secretary of State argued that the use of self-defense should be confined to situations in which a government can show the necessity of that self-defense is instant, overwhelming, and leaving no choice of means, and no moment for deliberation.161  Proponents claim that under this doctrine states possess a right of anticipatory self-defense and that no armed attack need occur before a state may resort to force to counter a threat.  Of course the threat must remain 'instant and overwhelming' and alternative means remain inadequate or unavailable.\n\nCritics of this doctrine, however, contend that Article 51 has superceded the concepts of the Caroline Doctrine and customary international law. Some observers \"insist that the Article's requirement of an \"armed attack\" should be interpreted to mean that a state could only respond to a threat in the case of an actual physical invasion by one state into the territory of another.162  In a recent Advisory Opinion the International Criminal Court pronounced, \"only an attack by a state can constitute the type of armed attack contemplated by Article 51 of the U.N. Charter.\"163  The Court has also endorsed the view that a state may be required to \"absorb a severe attack before that state will be permitted, under Article 51, to rise and defend itself.\"164  This interpretation does not allow states to preemptively respond to persistent and credible threats to their security until an actual attack has been committed.  Some scholars, such as Professor Louis Beres, however, repudiate this view asserting; \"international law cannot reasonably compel a state to wait until it absorbs a devastating or even lethal first strike before acting to protect itself.\"165  An additional stipulation emplaced upon by the self-defense justification by legal scholars and critics of U.S. policy is the requirement for the use of force to \"be immediately subsequent to and proportional to the armed attack to which it was in answer.  If excessively delayed or excessively severe, it ceases to be self-defense and becomes a reprisal.\"166\nThe specter of international terrorism poses the most serious challenge to the narrow interpretation of the Article 51.  George Schultz, Secretary of State during the Reagan administration, asserted the United States government would need to implement \"an 'active defense' to counter the rise in terrorism the future would bring.\"167  Recognizing the growing trend of terrorism worldwide, Schultz proposed a policy of 'active defense:'\nWe must reach a consensus in this country that our responses should go beyond passive defense to consider means of active prevention, pre-emption, and retaliation. Our goal must be to prevent and deter future terrorist acts, and experience has taught us over the years that one of the best deterrents of terrorism is the certainty that swift and sure measures will be taken against those who engage in it. We should take steps towards carrying out those measures. There should be no moral confusion on the issue. Our aim is not to seek revenge but to put an end to violent attacks against innocent people, to make the world a safer place to live for all of us. Clearly the democracies have a moral right, indeed a duty, to defend themselves.168\n\nWell before the9/11 terrorist attacks, the United States adopted a policy position reflective of Schultz's doctrine of 'active defense' and more in agreement with Professor Beres' assessment; rejecting \"the notion that the U.N. Charter supersedes customary international law on the right of self-defense\"169 As a result, the U.S. generally recognizes three forms of self-defense permitted within Article 51: (a) against an actual use of force, or hostile act, (b) preemptive selfdefense against an imminent use of force, and (c) self-defense against a continuing threat.  The United States has employed this broader interpretation of Article 51 to justify the use of force (Libya in 1986 and Afghanistan 1998 for example) and this interpretation provides the primary justification for the policy of targeting killing; to include the lethal strike executed against Qaed Salim Sinan al-Harethi in Yemen in 2002.\nNot all members of the United Nations, however, have accepted this broader, more expansive interpretation of Article 51.  The Libya bombings in 1986 resulted in a Security Council draft resolution condemning the U.S. action and a subsequent condemnation from the General Assembly.  \"Nevertheless, despite the unpopularity of its interpretation of self-defense under Article 51, the United States is able to act as it deems appropriate without U.N. censure\n\nsince the United States is a permanent member of the Security Council and any resolution requires its approval.\"170  Although still accountable to the General Assembly, their decisions are not binding, and cooperation by member states is purely voluntary.171\nIf a state can justify the targeted killing of a terrorist under Article 51, then it is legal under both U.S. domestic and international law.  Emmanuel Gross provides four factors that are especially appropriate in determining the plausibility of a perceived threat:\n\n(1)\nPast Practices: Past practices of the terrorist organization must be\nreviewed to determine the extent to which a possible attack is consistent with\nthose practices.\n(2)\nMotives: Does the group have particular goals?  If so, then the extent to\nwhich those goals have or have not been fulfilled will bear on the likelihood\nof future attacks.\n(3)\nCurrent Context: Have contemporary events caused tensions between the\nstate and the terrorists to become exacerbated or relaxed?  Similarly, what is the current state of relations between the target state and those sponsoring the terrorist group? Further, to what extent is the target state currently vulnerable\nfrom either a security or political perspective?\n(4)\nPreparatory Actions: Even though no intelligence is available indicating\na planned attack, are activities underway that suggest that an operation is being planned?...The more consistent the particular activities that the group conducts are with prior operations, the more likely a response is to be\ndeemed necessary.172\n\nEach of these factors can assist a government in assessing conditions and identifying whether preemptive action, to include targeted killing, is justified.\n\nAlthough the debate surrounding the legitimacy of the use of force against trans-national terrorists under the concept of the inherent right of self-defense authorized within Article 51 of the U.N. Charter may never be completely resolved, the U.S. has, and will continue, to combat al- Qaeda and other trans-national terrorist organizations under the context of the law of war.\nSpecifically:\n when a nation employs Article 51 to justify a use of force in its own defense, or the defense of another state, the laws of war control as they would in any formally declared conflict. Therefore, under an Article 51 action, any state-\n\n\nsanctioned killing by a victim state would not be an assassination so long as it is not accomplished by treachery or outlawry, as described earlier.173 Despite criticism and uncertainty surrounding the invocation of Article 51, the U.S., by acting under it's broad interpretation of Article 51, has made the war on terror the equivalent of an armed conflict.  The U.S. policy of targeted killing of specific terrorists must therefore be assessed within the jurisdiction of the law of war.  Is Osama bin Laden and other terrorist leaders legitimate targets according to the law of war?  Does the law of war adequately address the combatant or noncombatant status of terrorists?\n\n## Targeting And Distinction\n\nInternational Humanitarian Law recognizes two distinct categories: (a) international armed conflict defined as a conflict between two or more states, and (b) non-international armed conflict defined as a conflict between the authorities of a state and insurgents within its territory.174  Where do trans-national terrorist organizations fit within the scope of these definitions and what are the principles of distinction and targeting dealing with members of these organizations.\nUnder the law of international armed conflict the actors must distinguish between combatants and civilians; between legitimate military targets and protected non-military targets.\nCivilians are defined negatively; individuals that do not meet the definition of combatants are therefore classified as civilians.  \"Article 50(1) First Additional Protocol (FAP) specifies that civilians are those persons that do not belong to one of the different categories of combatants.\"175\nIndividuals regarded as combatants must fit into one of two categories:\n\n(1) they are part of the armed forces of a state participating in the conflict (2) they are part of another armed group belonging to a state participating in the\nconflict and fit one of the following four categories prescribed in Article 4(A)(2) of Geneva Convention III\na. being under responsible command;\nb. wearing a fixed distinctive sign c. carrying arms openly; and\nd. conducting operations in accordance with the laws and customs of\nwar.176\nTerrorist organizations such as al-Qaeda and other trans-national actors are obviously not operating as members of the armed forces of a state, and even if they meet some of the conditions of Article 4(A)(2) of the Geneva Convention, the nature of their operations indicate they would fail to meet the obligation of category d listed above.  Failing to meet the conditions required to qualify as a combatant, they must, by definition be regarded as civilians.  As such they are immune from attack \"unless and for such time as they take a direct part in hostilities.\"177  Literal interpretation of this article has led to the following determinations: \"(1) civilians can be targeted when they carry out military operations; (2) a civilian, who after carrying out military operations, is in his house or going to a private home or to a market may not be the object of an attack.\"178\nConcern has long been expressed over this 'revolving door' of protection allowing groups to take advantage of the shield provided by Additional Protocol I.179 This revolving door of protection allows terrorists the ability to \"enjoy the best of both worlds-they can remain civilians most of the time and only endanger their protection as civilians while actually in the process of carrying out terrorist attacks.\"180\nMany experts argue that the classification of civilian status should be based on their inoffensive nature rather than their failure to satisfy the criteria required to qualify for combatant status.  \"The argument that civilians are protected unless engaged in overtly aggressive acts like carrying weapons may be particularly difficult to maintain where armed groups are technically afforded civilian status by virtue of not being considered lawful combatants.\"181  When the mode of conflict is between a state and a non-state terrorist group such as al-Qaeda, the notion that the terrorists are non-combatants entitled to the full protection afforded to civilians is simply unfathomable.  Professor Michael N. Schmitt argues \"states should not be prevented from acting in self-defense by targeting terrorists simply because the mode of conflict exists at a different level.\"182  Watkin suggests that an individual's membership in an armed group directly participating, whether continuously or sporadically, in acts of aggression should be acceptable grounds for loss of non-combatant immunity.183\nGiven the difficulties and controversies surrounding the treatment of a conflict between a state and a trans-national organization as an international armed conflict, it has been argued that such a conflict be classified as a non-international armed conflict.  One of the major difficulties in adopting such an approach, of course, is the recognized definition of a non-international armed conflict.  Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions defines a non-international armed conflict as one taking place within the territory of a state.  Thus, in a conflict between a state and a trans-national terrorist organization operating outside the territory of the state the code of law pertaining to noninternational armed conflicts is not inherently applicable.\n\nHistorically, the general assumption has always been that violence involving non-state entities is the domain of domestic law.  \"States were reluctant to internationalize internal conflicts, under the assumption that doing so might lend a degree of legitimacy to insurgents and might also unduly hinder their own freedom of action in dealing with civil strife.\"184  Within a non-international conflict the state is able to deny insurgents and other non-state actors the status\n\nOccasional Paper Series (Winter 2005): 27.\n184 Kretzmer, 195.\nof combatants.  This denial prevents these non-state actors from obtaining immunity from criminal liability and denies them prisoner of war status upon capture.\nThe definition of a non-international armed conflict, therefore, is a conflict between the armed forces of a state and an organized armed group, of whom the member of both parties are combatants.  Although these combatants do not enjoy the privileges of combatants afforded by the law of international armed conflict, they may be legitimately targeted and attacked by the other party to the conflict.185  According to this definition, if an armed conflict exists between the United States and al-Qaeda, as many experts claim, members of al-Qaeda are combatants subject to targeting by the U.S. armed forces.  Conversely, within the scope of this conflict, members of the U.S. armed forces are legitimate targets of al-Qaeda members.  Of course, the prohibition against treacherous and perfidious means apply to both sides as well.\n\nRecognition of individuals actively participating in the operations and activities of an international terrorist organization as combatants in a non-international armed conflict appears to overcome the 'revolving door' protections provided to the same individuals within an international armed conflict.  Of course while terrorists seemed to possess unlimited advantages within an international armed conflict, states in a non-international armed conflict appear to reap all the benefits.  States are not required to provided prisoner of war status to captured belligerents, nor are captured belligerents immune to prosecution for their actions.  In addition, the terrorists and belligerents in a non-international armed conflict are legitimate targets subject to attack by the armed forces of the state at any time and in any location.\n\n\"The events of September 11 have focused attention on the potential overlap between international conflict, non-international conflict and law enforcement.\"186  A significant amount of debate has emerged among scholars, academics and diplomats surrounding the status of transnational terrorist organizations and the applicable legal model for the conduct of the war on terror.  One of the inherent problems is that each model presents its own inherent strengths and weaknesses in addressing the current situation.  The law enforcement model appears insufficient when the disturbing level of violence that non-state actors can inflict has caused significant uncertainty about the suitability of situating criminal acts related to terrorism within the purview of law enforcement and the terrorists operate within the territory of states either unwilling or incapable of cooperating.187  An armed conflict between a state and a trans-national terrorist organization does not qualify as an international armed conflict since the conflict involves only one state.  The conflict, however, exists beyond the borders of the state involved in the conflict and thus fails to fit within the model of a non-international armed conflict.\n\n## Iii. Conclusions And Recommendations\n\nThrough the examination of both U.S. domestic and international law it becomes evident that little direct evidence exists conclusively supporting the argument that the targeted killing of suspected trans-national terrorists is an illegal act.  This examination, however, reveals the overall lack of consensus among academics, scholars, and politicians concerning the proper interpretation of existing international law.  In fact, the debate not only focuses on the proper interpretation of the law, but on exactly which aspect of international law is applicable to the current situation regarding states and trans-national terrorists.  The analysis in the previous sections indicates that a clear and definitive answer to the question of whether the specific targeting of a suspected terrorist qualifies as an assassination, legitimate act of war, or a breach of international humanitarian law is inconclusive.  The answer largely depends upon individual interpretation of vaguely defined terms within the existing law, determination of the applicable legal regime (again subject to interpretation), and the status of the targeted individual or group.\n\nExecutive Order 12333 presumably prohibits political assassination, although the order never defines or clarifies what is or is not assassination.  The intent of the E.O. is to prevent the peacetime efforts of intelligence officials to assassinate foreign heads of state whose policy or conduct are considered detrimental to the U.S.188  E.O. 12333 does not apply to the application of military force directed against legitimate targets, whether they constitute individual terrorists or heads of state.  The E.O., as a presidential directive, is subject to revocation or modification by the president at any time were the change deemed necessary to justify a particular policy or action.  The targeted killing of trans-national terrorists is not a violation of E.O.12333 since the policy constitutes the direct application of military force rather than intelligence activities and because targeted killing itself does not constitute an assassination.\nGiven the inadequacies of the international law demonstrated in the second chapter, what recourse is available to nations that are victims of trans-national terrorism?  According to Professor Beres:\nour world legal order lacks an international criminal court with jurisdiction over individuals. Only the courts of individual countries can provide the judicial context for trials of terrorists. It follows that where nations harbor such criminals and refuse to honor extradition requests, the only decent remedies for justice available to victim societies may lie in unilateral enforcement action. Here, extrajudicial execution may be essential to justice.189\nBecause no overarching political authority capable of intervening to resolve issues between states exists, states, acting within this self-help system will continue to take those actions they deem necessary to protect their own citizens and interests.  Daniel Pickard goes so far as to claim:\ninternational law is the sum of the rules by which states have consented to be bound, and that nothing can be law to which they have not consented...In the absence of a legal norm restricting a particular state behavior, sovereign states may act as they choose.  In other words, unless the existence of a rule prohibiting a specific action can be established, states are permitted to engage in that action. For example, a state's use of armed force against alleged terrorists' bases in response to a prior armed attack would be permissible unless it could be proven that states had earlier consented to a rule prohibiting such a forcible action.190\nAlthough numerous scholars and critics vehemently disagree with the concept established within the Pickard statement, many states, powerful ones in particular, continue to act in a manner very similar to this description.  In the absence of an authority capable of compelling states to refrain from pursuing particular actions, states will continue to pursue those policies perceived to be in their own best interests.\n\nThe United States, throughout its history, has frequently resorted to the use of military force beyond the realm of international armed conflict whenever \"another nation has failed to discharge its international responsibilities in protecting U.S. citizens from acts of violence originating in or launched from its sovereign territory, or has been culpable in aiding and abetting\n\ninternational criminal activities.\"191  These actions have often been conducted against non-state actors and individuals across international boundaries and without a formal declaration of war.\nSome of these actions include:\n1801-1805: Naval actions and expedition conducted against Barbary Pirates along the North African coast.192\n1916-1917: General Pershing's punitive expedition into Mexico in pursuit of Pancho Villa.193\n1926-1933: U.S. Marines conduct campaign in Nicaragua to kill or capture Augusto Cesar Sandino.194\n1986: U.S. aircraft conduct airstrikes against terrorist related infrastructure within Libya in response to Libya's support of terrorist operations directed against U.S.\n\ninterests.\n\n1988-1993: U.S. provides support to Columbian government in the attempt to kill or capture the drug lord Pablo Escobar.195\n1998: U.S. launches cruise missiles against al-Qaeda training facilities in Afghanistan and a suspected chemical/biological weapons factory in Sudan.\nThus, historical precedent exists for the use of military force by the U.S. government to kill or capture individuals whose actions constitute a direct, credible, and ongoing threat to U.S. citizens, interests, or national security.196  The U.S., regardless of international perception or protestation, has consistently invoked its inherent right to self-defense provided by Article 51 of the U.N.\n\nCharter to justify the application of military force as a defensive response to hostile actions taken against U.S. citizens or national security interests.\n\nOne of the defensive measures available to states in the war on terror is the specific targeting of suspected terrorists before they can carry out further attacks.  According to Statman the policy of targeted killing, therefore:\nEmerges as the most natural manifestation of jus in bello in wars on terror, for under jus in bello, even if a war is unjust, it should be directed only at combatants.  This implies that wars against terror should be directed only against terrorists....\n\nThe moral legitimacy of targeted killing becomes even clearer when compared to the alternative means of fighting terrorthat is, the massive invasion of the community that shelters and supports the terrorists in an attempt to catch or kill the terrorists and destroy their infrastructure....Hence, targeted killing is the preferable method not only because, on a utilitarian calculation, it saves lives but also because it is more commensurate with a fundamental condition of justified self defense, namely that those killed are responsible for the threat posed.197\nCurrent operations within both Afghanistan and Iraq qualify as non-international armed conflict.  Both nations have recognized governments combating insurgents and terrorists within their sovereign territory.  United States military operations and actions are conducted within their territorial boundaries and in direct support of these governments.  The relevant aspects of international law regarding non-international armed conflict recognizes that individuals and organizations targeted within the borders of these states qualify as combatants, legally subject to targeting and the lethal application of force, but are not subject to the 'privileges' afforded combatants according to the law of international armed conflict.  Insurgents and terrorists within both nations are subject to legitimate targeting in all circumstances and are subject to the criminal prosecution under national law rather than afforded prisoner of war status and protected from prosecution.\n\nThe 2002 Yemen strike and the 13 January 2006 strike targeting Ayman al-Zawahiri bring the issue of targeted killing of terrorists beyond the scope of the non-international armed conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan and into the forefront of U.S. policy for taking the fight to al- Qaeda and other trans-national terrorists.  Although extremely controversial, the targeted killing of al-Harethi and the attempt on Zawahiri are not expressly illegal according to U.S. domestic or international law.\nIn assessing the legality of these operations it is essential to determine whether or not an armed conflict exists between the United States and al-Qaeda at the time of these attacks.198\nAlthough there is no clear consensus on the issue, and although numerous scholars would disagree, the United States clearly recognizes the existence of a state of armed conflict between itself and al-Qaeda.  The United States, therefore, through this acknowledgement is able to classify al-Qaeda members and other trans-national terrorists as combatants subject to legal and legitimate targeting.\n\n\nTo maintain international legitimacy and retain the moral high ground within the war on terror, the U.S. should clarify its policy regarding the specific targeting of suspected terrorists outside the ongoing conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq.  The current policy remains shrouded underneath a veil of secrecy, its full extent unknown to the general public and mostly a subject of outright speculation.  To allay the fears of human rights advocates who fear the policy may constitute an abuse of power and constitute an arbitrary deprivation of an individual's right to life, the policy must be made public, which can be done without revealing classified information.\n\nThe U.S. should make it abundantly clear that apprehension of the suspect is the primary objective.  The intelligence value of detained terrorist suspects and the potential information they possess makes their capture and detention far preferable to outright elimination.  The use of targeted killing should be a policy of last resort intended to eliminate a direct threat to the security of the United States when other means are unavailable or the risk of inaction is too great to await or attempt other methods.  A clear review process needs to be established and publicized to provide a sense of transparency, and show these targeted killings are not randomly selected actions.  While the details of each case should remain classified to prevent compromise of sources or sensitive information, awareness of a codified procedure for review prior to execution of any targeted killing would mollify some of the disparagement from critics of the policy.  The policy should be used sparingly and selectively, which appears to be the case thus far in the war on terror.\n\n## Bibliography\n\nAloi, Liz.  \"Harvard Professor's Proposed Legislation Would Authorize Targeted Killings.\"\nAmerican Constitution Society Weblog, 20 April 2005.  Accessed online at\nhttp://www.acsblog.org/international-affairs-1234-harvard-professors-proposedlegislation-would-authorize-targeted-killings.html 26 January 2006.\nAmerican Israeli Cooperative Enterprise.  \"Fact Sheet #34: Targeting Hamas.\"  Jewish Virtual\nLibrary.  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Accessed online at\nhttp://www.hoover.org/publications/epp/94/94c.html 14 February 2006.\nHosmer, Steven.  *Operations Against Enemy Leaders*.  Rand Corporation Monograph/Report,\n2003.  Accessed online at\nhttp://www.rand.org/pubs/monograph_reports/MR1385/index.html 1 February 2006.\nKaplan, Eben.  \"Targeted Killing.\"  *Council on Foreign Relations*, 20 Jan 2006.  Accessed online\nat http://www.cfr.org/publication/9627/targeted_killings.html 26 Jan 2006.\nKaufman, Whit.  \"The Ethics of Assassination.\"  Accessed online at\nhttp://www.usafa.af.mil/jscope/JSCOPE04/Kaufman04.html 15 January 06.\nKlabbers, Jan.  \"Rebel with a Cause? Terrorists and Humanitarian Law.\"  The European Journal\nof International Law(2003), Vol. 14 No. 2: 299-312.\nKrauthammer, Charles.  \"In Defense of Assassination.\"  *Time*, 27 August 2001.  Accessed online\nat http://www.aijac.org.au/updates/Aug-01/290801.html 26 January 2001.\nKretzmer, David.  \"Targeted Killing of Suspected Terrorists: Extra-Judicial Executions or\nLegitimate Means of Defence?\"  *The European Journal of International Law* (2005),\nVol. 16 No. 2: 171-212.\nLatrionte, Catherine.  \"When to Target Leaders.\"  *The Washington Quarterly, 23:6* (Summer\n2003): 73-86.\nLawrence, Bruce.  *Messages to the World: The Statements of Osama Bin Laden*.  New York:\nVerso Books, 2005.\nLewis, Bernard.  *The Assassins*.  New York: Basic Books, 2003. Lowe, Dr. Scott R.  \"Terrorism and Just War Theory.\"  Perspectives on Evil and Human\nWickedness Vol. 1, No. 2(2003): 46-52.  Accessed online at\nhttp://www.wickedness.net/ejv1n2/ejv1n2_lowe.pdf 7 February 2006.\nLowry, Rich.  \"A View to a Kill.\"  *National Review*, 11 March 2002.  Accessed online at\nhttp://www.national review.com/lowry/lowry032103.asp 26 Jan 2006.\nLuft, Gal.  \"The Logic of Israel's Targeted Killing.\"  *Middle East Quarterly*.  Vol. 10:\nno.1(Winter 2003).  Accessed online at http://www.meforum.org/article/515 15 January\n06.\nMay, Larry, Eric Rovie and Steve Viner.  The Morality of War: Classical and Contemporary\nReadings.  Upper Saddle River, New Jersey: Pearson Education Inc., 2006.\nMcDonnell, Thomas Michael.  \"Assassination/Targeted Killing of Suspected Terrorists - A\nViolation of International Law?\"  *Jus In Bello; an Online Weblog from Pace Law School*.\nAccessed online at\nhttp://library.law.pace.edu/blogs/jib/2005/12/assassinationtargeted_killing.html 21\nJanuary 2006.\nMeisels, Tamar.  \"Targeting Terror.\"  *Social Theory and Practice, Vol. 30, No. 3* (July 2004),\n297-326.\nMelman, Yossi.  \"Targeted Killings - a retro fashion very much in vogue.\"  *Haaretz*, 24 March\n2004.  Accessed online at\nhttp://www.haaretz.com/hasen/pages/ShArt.jhtml?itemNo=407999&contrassID=2 15\nJanuary 06.\n\nMilgrom, Rabbi Jeremy.  \"Israeli Exceptionalism?\"  Carnegie Council on Ethics and\nInternational Affairs, 2006.  Accessed online at\nhttp://www.carnegiecouncil.org/viewMedia.php/prmID/805 26 January 2006.\nMoore, Molly.  \"Israel's Lethal Weapon of Choice.\"  *Washington Post*, 29 June 2003.  Accessed\nonline at http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wpdyn?pagename=article&node=&contentId=A45924-2003Jun28&notFound=true 18\nJanuary 2006.\nMorgan, David.  \"US targeted killings of Al Qaeda suspects rising.\"  *Reuters*, 18 January 2006.\nAccessed online at http://www.alertnet.org/thenews/newsdesk/N17365135.htm 26\nJanuary 2006.\nMuravchik, Joshua.  \"EU vs. Hamas (the legality of targeted killing)\"  National Review Online,\n27 April 2004.  Accessed online at\nhttp://www.nationalreview.com/comment/muravchik200404270843.asp 26 January 2006.\nNichols, Benjamin.  \"The Politics of Assassination: Case Studies and Analysis.\"  Redereed Paper\nPresented to the Australian Political Studies Association Conference, University of Tasmania, Hobart, 29 September - 01 October 2003.\nParks, Colonel W. Hays.  \"Memorandum on Executive Order 12333 and Assassination.\" Patel, Mayur.  \"Israel's Killing of Hamas Leaders.\"  *The Daily Star*, 30 May 2004.  Accessed\nonline at http://www.thedailystar.net/law/2004/05/04/human.htm 20 January 2006.\nPhillips, Melanie.  \"The Hard Lessons of Terror.\"  *Jewish World Review*, 22 April 2004.\nAccessed online at\nhttp://www.jewishworldreview.com/0404/phillips_lessons_of_terror.php3 15 Jan 2006.\nPickard, Daniel B.  \"Legalizing Assassination?  Terrorism, the Central Intelligence Agency and\nInternational Law.\"  *The Georgia Journal of Comparative Law, Fall 2001*, 30 Ga. J. Int'l & Comp. L. 1.\n__________.  \"When Does Crime Become a Threat to International Peace and Security?\"  Florida\nJournal of International Law Vol. 12 (Spring 1998): 1-21.\nPregent, MAJ Richard.  \"Presidential Authority to Displace Customary International Law.\"\nMilitary Law Review Vol. 129 (Summer 1990): 77-106.\nRindskopf-Parker, Elizabeth and Timothy E. Naccarato.  \"Targeting Saddam and Sons: U.S.\nPolicy Against Assassination.\"\nRock, John C.  \"The New Millennia: Just War Outdated Theory.\" Rona, Gabor.  \"Interesting Times for International Humanitarian Law: Challenges from the 'War\non Terror.'\"  *The Fletcher Forum of World Affairs*, Vol. 27:2, Summer/Fall 2003.\nRuys, Tom.  \"License to Kill? State Sponsored Assassination Under International Law.\"  Institute\nfor International Law: Working Paper No. 76, May 2005.  Accessed online at\nhttp://www.law.kuleuven.ac.be/iir/nl/wp/WP/WP76e.pdf 14 February 2006.\nSalhani, Claude.  \"Analysis: Does Assassination Work?\"  *The Washington Times*, 21 April 2004.\nAccessed online at http://washingtontimes.com/upi-breaking/20040420-053959-\n1709r.htm 17 Jan 2006.\nSchmitt, Michael N.  \"State Sponsored Assassination in International and Domestic Law.\"  Yale\nJournal of International Law Vol. 17 (1992): 609-685.\nSilverstein, David.  \"Reviving the Assassination Option.\"  *The American Enterpr*ise, December\n2001.  Accessed online at\nhttp://www.taemag.com/issues/articleid.15451/article_detail.asp 15 January 2006.\nSnow, Jonathan L.  \"The Targeted Killing of Sheikh Ahmed Yassin.\"  Foundation for the\nDefense of Democracy, 26 March 2006.  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Accessed online at\nhttp://www.btselem.org/Download/200101_Extrajudicial_Killings_Eng.doc 26 January\n2006.\n_________.  \"Response to Israel's Policy of Targeted Killing: By any Name Illegal and\nImmoral.\" *Ethics and International Affairs Vol 17, No. 1* (2003), 127-137.\nThomas, Ward.  \"The New Age of Assassination.\"  *SAIS Review*; Vol. XXV, No. 1 (Winter-\nSpring 2005): 27-39.\nToesing, Chris and Ian Urbina.  \"Israel, the US and Targeted Killings.\"  *Middle East Report*, 17\nFebruary 2003.  Accessed online at http://www.merip.org/mero/mero021703.html 17\nJanuary 2006.\nTucker, Jonathan B.  \"Strategies for Countering Terrorism: Lesson's from the Israeli\nExperience.\"  *Homeland Security Journal*, March 2003.  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Combatants, Unprivileged Belligerents, and the Struggle\nOver Legitimacy.\"  Harvard University: Humanitarian Policy and Conflict Research Occasional Paper Series, Winter 2005.\nWingfield, Thomas C.  \"Taking Aim at Regime Elites: Assassination, Tyrannicide, and the\nClancy Doctrine,\"  *The Maryland Journal of International Law and Trade*, Fall\n1998/Winter 1999; 287-317.\nZengel, Lieutenant Commander Patricia.  \"Assassination and the Law of Armed Conflict.\"\nMilitary Law Review, Vol. 134 (Fall 1991), 123-166.\nZunes, Stephen.  \"An Affront to International Law and Israeli Security: Defense of Israeli\nAssassination Policy by the Bush Administration and Democratic Leaders.\"  Foreign Policy in Focus commentary, 2 April 2004.  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    },
    {
        "text": "# The Expanding Spectrum Of Espionage By Americans, 1947 - 2015\n\nKatherine L. Herbig, Ph.D.\n\nNorthrop Grumman Technology Services Approved for Public Distribution Defense Personnel and Security Research Center Office of People Analytics NOTE: For correspondence about this report, please contact PERSEREC@mail.mil\n\n# Technical Report 17-10 August 2017 The Expanding Spectrum Of Espionage By Americans, 1947 - 2015\n\nKatherine L. Herbig, Ph.D.Northrop Grumman Technology Services Released by - Eric L. Lang, Ph.D.\n\nDefense Personnel and Security Research Center Office of People Analytics\n400 Gigling Rd.\n\nSeaside, CA 93955\n\n## Report Documentation Page Report Documentation Page Form Approved Omb No. 0704-0188\n\nThe public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing the burden, to Department of Defense, Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports (0704-0188), 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to any penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number.\n\n1.\nREPORT DATE:\n2.\nREPORT TYPE Technical Report\n3.\nDATES COVERED: Sept. 2014 - Mar. 2017\n5a. CONTRACT NUMBER:\n\n5b. GRANT NUMBER:\n4.\nThe Expanding Spectrum of Espionage by Americans, 1947 - 2015\n5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER: 5d. PROJECT NUMBER: 5e. TASK NUMBER:\n6.\nAUTHOR(S): Katherine L. Herbig, Ph.D.\n\n5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER:\n8.\nPERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER PERSEREC-TR-17-10\n7.\nPERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) Defense Personnel and Security Research Center Defense Office of People Analytics 400 Gigling Road Seaside, CA 93955\n10. SPONSORING/MONITOR'S ACRONYM(S)\n9.\nSPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)\n11. SPONSORING/MONITOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S):\n12. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT: (A) Distribution Unlimited 13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES:\nABSTRACT: The report describes characteristics of 209 Americans who committed espionage-related offenses against the United States since 1947. Three cohorts are compared based on when the individual began espionage: 1947- 1979, 1980-1989, and 1990-2015. Using data coded from open published sources, analyses are reported on personal attributes of persons across the three cohorts, the employment and levels of clearance, how they committed espionage, the consequences they suffered, and their motivations. The second part of the report explores each of the five types of espionage committed by the 209 persons under study. These include: classic espionage, leaks, acting as an agent of a foreign government, violations of export control laws, and economic espionage. The statutes governing each type are discussed and compared. Classification of national security information is discussed as one element in espionage. In Part 3, revisions to the Espionage statutes are recommended in light of findings presented in the report.\n\n## 14. Subject Terms:\n\n19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON: Eric L. Lang, Director\n15. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF: UNCLASSIFIED\n16. LIMITATION\nOF ABSTRACT:\n17. NUMBER\nOF PAGES:\n260\na.  REPORT: UNCLASSIFIED\nb. ABSTRACT: UNCLASSIFIED\nc. THIS PAGE: UNCLASSIFIED\n19b. TELEPHONE NUMBER (Include area code): 831- 583-2846\nStandard Form 298 (Rev. 8/98)\nPrescribed by ANSI td. Z39.18\n\n\n\n## Preface\n\nThe Defense Personnel and Security Research Center (PERSEREC) dates from 1986. It was founded because of the espionage of John Walker and his ring of spies. Part of a record year for spies in 1985, when eleven Americans were arrested for espionage, Walker's capture and the revelation that for 20 years he had betrayed the trust the U.S. Navy placed in him as a cryptographic radioman, provoked outrage. A commission to investigate security practices then formed under General Richard G. Stilwell. Among its recommendations for improvement was the creation of an organization to perform behavioral science research on personnel security policies and practices, so the Department of Defense (DoD) established PERSEREC a year later to ground those practices in objective research. For 30 years, PERSEREC has been working to improve the effectiveness, efficiency, and fairness of the DoD personnel and industrial security systems. One consistent research focus has been the phenomenon of trust betrayal in crimes such as espionage. This report is the fourth in a series of unclassified reports on espionage based on information collected in a database maintained by PERSEREC.1 Materials on espionage and espionage-related offenses, including attempted espionage, conspiracy to commit espionage, and theft or illegal collection of closely held national defense information with the intent to commit espionage, have been coded into the database. These reports are based on open sources in order to facilitate public access to them. A founding goal of PERSEREC's is to improve security education and awareness; broad public distribution of unclassified analytical products about espionage furthers that goal.\n\n\nEric L. Lang, Ph.D.\n\nDirector\n\n\n## Executive Summary\n\nThis report is the fourth in the series on espionage by Americans that the Defense Personnel and Security Research Center (PERSEREC) began publishing in 1992. The current report updates the scope of earlier work by including recent cases, and it extends the scope by exploring related types of espionage in addition to the classic type. There are three parts to this report. Part 1 presents findings on characteristics of Americans who committed espionage-related offenses since 1947. The findings are based on analyses of data collected from open sources. Part 2\nexplores the five types of espionage committed by the 209 individuals in this study: classic espionage, leaks, acting as an agent of a foreign government, violations of export control laws, and economic espionage. Each type is described by its legal bases; examples of cases and comparisons with the other types of espionage are provided. Part 3 of the report considers the impact of the context in which espionage takes place, and discusses two important developments: (1) information and communications technologies (ICT), and (2) globalization. Recommendations are offered for revisions of the Espionage Statutes in response to the acceleration in the changes of context for espionage.\n\nPart 1 compares data across three cohorts of persons by when the individual began espionage: 1947-1979 (the early Cold War), 1980-1989 (the later Cold War), and 1990-2015 (the post-Soviet period). As the Cold War recedes in time, the recent cohort offers the most applicable data for the present. This executive summary focuses on findings for the recent cohort. Among the characteristics of the 67\nAmericans who committed espionage-related offenses since 1990, we find that\n They have usually been male and middle-aged. Half were married, half not.  Reflecting changes in the population as a whole, they were more diverse in\nracial and ethnic composition and more highly educated than earlier cohorts.\n Three-quarters have been civil servants, one-quarter military, and compared to\nthe previous two cohorts increasing proportions have been contractors, or have held jobs not related to espionage, and or have not held security clearances.\n Three-quarters succeeded in passing information, while one-quarter were\nintercepted before they could pass anything; 60% were volunteers, and 40% were recruited. Among recruits, 60% were recruited by a foreign intelligence service, 40% by family or friends; contacting a foreign embassy was the most common way to begin as a volunteer.\n Compared to earlier cohorts, in which the Soviet Union and Russia\npredominated as the recipient of American espionage, recent espionageoffenders have transmitted information to a greater variety of recipients.\n Sixty-eight percent received no payment. Shorter prison sentences than earlier\ncohorts have been the norm in the recent past.\n Money is the most common motive for committing espionage-related offenses,\nbut it is less dominant than in the past, since in the recent cohort money was a\nmotive for 28%, down from 41% in the first and 45% in the second of the two earlier cohorts. Divided loyalties is the second most common motive at 22%. Disgruntlement and ingratiation are nearly tied for third place, and more people seek recognition as a motive for espionage.\n\nThe majority of these 209 individuals committed traditional, classic espionage, in which controlled national security information, usually classified, was transmitted to a foreign government. Classic espionage predominates in each cohort under study, but in the first cohort 94% committed classic espionage, in the second cohort it was 95%, while in the most recent cohort classic espionage declined to\n78%. This reflects authorities' recent increasing treatment as espionage of the four additional types that are discussed in Part 2. They include (1) leaks; (2) acting as an agent of a foreign government; (3) violations of export control laws; and (4) economic espionage. Understanding all five types requires describing their backgrounds. Each of the four additional types is prosecuted under its own subset of statutes, which differs from those used in cases of classic espionage. The various types are usually handled by different agencies of the federal government. They also differ in how involved the information of private companies and corporations is alongside government agencies. The five types of espionage are not mutually exclusive, and a person may be charged with and convicted of more than one type. The assumption that espionage consists simply of classic espionage should be reexamined in light of how these four additional crimes are similar to or even charged as identical to classic espionage. They also impose losses of national defense information, intellectual property, and advanced technologies that cause grave damage to the security and economy of the nation. In the detailed discussions in Part 2 of each of the five types of espionage, four elements frame the analysis. First, the legal statutes that define the crimes are identified and described. Prosecutorial choices as to which statues to use are considered, alternate statutes that have been used in similar circumstances are identified, and reasons for the choices suggested. Second, examples of individual cases of each type of espionage are presented: instructive cases where rich details have been published are developed into more substantial case studies. Third, issues resulting from classification of information are identified and discussed for each type if they apply. And fourth, the numbers of individuals among the 209 under study here are presented in tables for each of the five types, along with descriptive statistics to indicate trends over time. Part 3 discusses these trends by recognizing two central dimensions of the current context: information and communications technology (ICT) and globalization. The ubiquitous use of ICT is shaping the context in which espionage takes place. Spies have moved with the times, and they employ all the technological sophistication and Internet advantages they can access. Implications from this changing context are discussed, including how American espionage-offenders gather, store, and transmit intelligence to a foreign government in the ICT context, and how a foreign government may now steal controlled information directly across interconnected networks, threatening to make spies obsolete. Globalization affects many dimensions of life, but is especially apparent in areas relevant to espionage, such as in political and military affairs, development of defense technologies, and international finance. It can influence the recruitment of spies and the likelihood that people will volunteer to commit espionage as part of a trend toward a global culture, with its easy international transmission of ideas, civic ideals, and loosening allegiances of citizenship. This report concludes by recommending revisions of the Espionage statutes (Title 18 U.S.C. sections 792 through 798). Revision is needed in order to address the inconsistencies and ambiguities in them. Based on provisions enacted in 1917 and updated in 1950before computers or networks were conceivedthey are outdated. Three approaches to revision are outlined: (1) try to eliminate inconsistencies among the Espionage statutes themselves; (2) consider how to update the Espionage statutes to reflect the current context of cyber capabilities, the Internet, and globalization; and (3) consider how to reconcile the statutes that apply to all five types of espionage discussed in this report to reconcile inequities, eliminate gaps or overlaps between them, and create more consistency in the legal response to activities that are similar, even though they take place in different spheres. In an appendix, this report examines how espionage fits into the broader study of insider threat, and it considers three insights from insider threat studies that may illuminate espionage: personal crises and triggers, indicators of insider threat, and analyzing organizational culture.\n\n## Table Of Contents\n\nINTRODUCTION ____________________________________________________________ 1\nBACKGROUND _____________________________________________________________ 1\nORGANIZATION OF THE REPORT ___________________________________________ 4\nMETHODOLOGY ___________________________________________________________ 7 PART 1 CHARACTERISTICS OF ESPIONAGE BY AMERICANS ______________ 8\nPERSONAL ATTRIBUTES ____________________________________________________ 9 EMPLOYMENT AND CLEARANCE __________________________________________ 14\nEspionage Offenders without Security Clearances ________________________ 16\nELEMENTS OF THE ACT OF ESPIONAGE __________________________________ 29\nHow Information Has Been Transmitted __________________________________ 38\nCONSEQUENCES OF ESPIONAGE _________________________________________ 41\nMOTIVATIONS _____________________________________________________________ 44\nStrong Motivations for Espionage ________________________________________ 44\nMotivations through Time _______________________________________________ 47\nExamples of Spying for Money ___________________________________________ 49\nExamples of Spying from Divided Loyalties _______________________________ 54\nIngratiation, Coercion, Thrills, and Recognition ___________________________ 58\nHelping and Ingratiation _________________________________________________ 59\nPART 2 TYPES OF ESPIONAGE BY AMERICANS _________________________ 63 FIVE TYPES OF ESPIONAGE _______________________________________________ 64 ELEMENTS OF CLASSIC ESPIONAGE ______________________________________ 69\nClassification and Legal Dimensions of Classic Espionage _________________ 76\nLEAKS AS A TYPE OF ESPIONAGE _________________________________________ 83\nShamai Leibowitz _______________________________________________________ 88\nStephen Jin-Woo Kim ___________________________________________________ 89\nJohn Kiriakou ___________________________________________________________ 91\nDonald Sachtleben ______________________________________________________ 94\nBradley Manning ________________________________________________________ 96\nMatthew Diaz _________________________________________________________ 100\nLawrence Franklin ____________________________________________________ 102\nEdward Snowden ______________________________________________________ 106\nACTING AS AN AGENT OF A FOREIGN GOVERNMENT AS A TYPE OF\nESPIONAGE __________________________________________________________ 110\nIndividuals Charged as Agents of a Foreign Government ________________ 112\nClassic Spies Who Were Also Convicted as Foreign Agents ______________ 115\nEmployees of Foreign Intelligence Services______________________________ 117\nPersons Not Convicted of Classic Espionage, but Convicted of Acting as\nAgents of Foreign Governments, Solely or with Other Charges _______ 118\nVIOLATIONS OF EXPORT CONTROL LAWS AS A TYPE OF ESPIONAGE ____ 128\nThree Export Control Statutes _________________________________________ 129 Enforcement of Export Control _________________________________________ 132\nECONOMIC ESPIONAGE _________________________________________________ 146\nTrade Secrets _________________________________________________________ 146 The Economic Espionage Act of 1996 __________________________________ 149\nPART 3 CONTEXT AND RECOMMENDATIONS __________________________ 161 CHANGES IN CONTEXT THAT SHAPE CURRENT ESPIONAGE _____________ 162\nInformation and Communications Technology (ICT) _____________________ 162 Globalization __________________________________________________________ 170\nIMPLICATIONS OF THIS CONTEXT FOR REVISIONS TO THE ESPIONAGE\nSTATUTES ___________________________________________________________ 175\nRevise Title 18 U.S.C. sections 792 through 798 ________________________ 175\nRevise Espionage-related Statutes to Reflect Cyber Capabilities,\nGlobalization, and the Internet _____________________________________ 178\nReconcile Statutes that Apply to the Five Types of Espionage ____________ 180\n\nREFERENCES ___________________________________________________________ 183\n\n## Appendix A :   Espionage As An Insider Threat ___________________ A-1 Appendix B :   List Of The 209 Individuals In This Study And Selected Characteristics ______________________________________ B-1\n\nLIST OF TABLES\nTable 1  Personal Attributes _________________________________________________ 9\nTable 2  Employment and Clearance _______________________________________ 14 Table 3  Miscellaneous Occupations of Espionage Offenders ________________ 16\nTable 4  Espionage Offenders with No Security Clearance When Espionage\nBegan ________________________________________________________________ 17\nTable 5  Frequency of Methods of Access for Espionage Offenders with No\nCurrent Security Clearance ___________________________________________ 20\nTable 6  Elements of the Act of Espionage __________________________________ 30 Table 7  What, How, and Where Information Was Transmitted ______________ 39 Table 8  Consequences of Espionage _______________________________________ 41 Table 9  Strong Motivations for Espionage _________________________________ 45\nTable 10  Motivations for Espionage through Time__________________________ 48 Table 11  Divided Loyalties Motivation, Citizenship, and Foreign Preference _ 57 Table 12  Types of Espionage by Americans ________________________________ 67\nTable 13  Percentages of Classic Espionage Cases __________________________ 67 Table 14  Security Clearance Status at Start of Classic Espionage ___________ 77 Table 15  Leaks ___________________________________________________________ 87 Table 16  Individuals Convicted as Agents of a Foreign Government ________ 113\nTable 17  Individuals Convicted Both of Classic Espionage and as Agents of a\nForeign Government _________________________________________________ 115\nTable 18  Individuals Working for a Foreign Intelligence Service (FIS) and\nConvicted as Agents of a Foreign Government _________________________ 117\nTable 19  Individuals Not Convicted of Classic Espionage but Convicted as\nAgents of a Foreign Government ______________________________________ 119\nTable 20  Individuals Convicted of Export Control Violations _______________ 135\nTable 21  Use of Information and Communications Technology by Decade\nEspionage Began ____________________________________________________ 164\nLIST OF FIGURES\nFigure 1  Number of Attempts and Transmissions of Information to\nRecipients, by Region _________________________________________________ 37\nFigure 2  Sole, or Strong, Motivations ______________________________________ 47\nFigure 3  All Motivations __________________________________________________ 49\nFigure 4  A Model of Espionage Elements Based on Classic Espionage ______ 66 Figure 5  Leaks in a Model of Espionage Elements __________________________ 83\nFigure 6  Acting as an Agent of a Foreign Government in a Model of\nEspionage Elements _________________________________________________ 127\nFigure 7  Export Control Violations in a Model of Elements of Espionage ___ 133 Figure 8  Economic Espionage in a Model of Elements of Espionage ________ 160\nLIST OF TABLES IN APPENDICES\nTable A-1  Precipitating Personal Crises and Triggers as Contextual Factors\nin 209 Espionage-related Offenders ___________________________________ A-8\nTable B-1  List of the 209 Individuals in this Study and Selected\nCharacteristics ______________________________________________________ B-3\nLIST OF FIGURES IN APPENDICES\nFigure A-1  The Government Accountability Office's Summary of Key\nElements in Insider Threat Programs __________________________________ A-6\n\n## Introduction\n\nThis is the fourth technical report in the series on espionage published by the Defense Personnel Security and Research Center (PERSEREC). The reports have been based on a For Official Use Only (FOUO) database collected by PERSEREC for\n30 years. In its approach, this report shares with the three earlier reports many of the database variables discussed, yet it also differs from them in that it reflects the concerns of this time, and thus it takes up the issues and challenges of the early\n21st century.\n\n## Background\n\nThe first PERSEREC espionage report, published in 1992, looked at 117 American citizens who had committed espionage during the Cold War. In it findings were compared by trait. So, for example, the authors looked at civilian versus military spies, volunteers versus recruited spies, successful versus unsuccessful spies. They then applied these results to issues such as improving the personnel security system, the changing motivations for espionage, and explaining the sudden increase of espionage by Americans in the 1980s (Wood & Wiskoff, 1992).\n\nThe second report in the series was published a decade later, in 2002. By then the number of Americans convicted of espionage or espionage-related2 offenses had grown to 150. The report followed the analytical scheme of the first by comparing across traits, but it discussed in some depth new issues that were shaping the context of espionage, including the history of Soviet espionage in the United States and the impact of the Soviet Union's collapse after 1991; shifting policies on the prosecution of espionage, technological advances that were reshaping information storage and communications, and globalization's effects on national allegiances (Herbig & Wiskoff, 2002). The third PERSEREC report on espionage was published in 2008, when there were\n173 Americans to consider. This report shifted the analytical focus from the traits of the earlier reports to emphasize changes over time. Instead of looking at the whole group of individuals by military versus civilian or volunteer versus recruited spy, the whole group was divided into three subgroups based on when the person began espionage, and all analyses were structured across the three subgroups. For example, the number of volunteers versus the number of recruits was compared across the three subgroups: those who began between 1947 and 1979 (the early Cold War), those who began between 1980 and 1989 (the later Cold War), and those who began between 1990 and 2015 (the post-Soviet period). Because so many Americans began attempting espionage during the 1980sand demographically they were a distinctive cohortthe 1980s were called out separately.\n\n## Introduction\n\nComparing across subgroups produced findings about how traits among spies had changed over time, and so it helped to identify trends. Since the violent terrorist attacks of 9/11 shaped so many aspects of life in the United States, including espionage, this report highlighted the 11 persons who had then spied since 9/11 in short case studies. New issues discussed in the third report reflected 9/11's impact: the context of global terrorism, homegrown terrorists, the impact of terrorism on espionage; the application of the expanding capabilities of the Internet for espionage; and the strain placed on American espionage statutes by prosecuting non-state groups or their supporters using laws from 1917 (Herbig, 2008). As of 2015, 209 American citizens were convicted of espionage or espionage-related crimes. While 36 individuals have been entered into the database since the third report was published in 2008, not all of those 36 began espionage or even were arrested between 2008 and 2015. Some earlier spies only came to light since 2008, such as Marta Velazquez; a few earlier spies have been added as materials became available. This fourth report follows the analytical conventions of the third in that it divides the whole group into three subgroups based on when they began espionage: between 1947 and 1979, between 1980 and 1989, and between 1990 and 2015. The goals of this report are to understand espionage by Americans, to discern changes over time, to explore the five types of espionage these individuals represent, and to suggest trends that may guide successful countermeasures.\n\nSome issues raised in earlier reports have expanded or deepened since 2008; others are new. Domestic terrorist attacks or sabotage have come to be framed as \"insider threats,\" reflecting the attacks on fellow U.S. citizens at Ft Hood, Texas, and the Washington Navy Yard; espionage is often folded in with other crimes by insiders into this more encompassing description. With the information the Internet provides us have also come attacks of enemies in cyberspace and an evolving sophistication of cyber espionage. Economic espionage, merely mentioned as a threat in 2008, has grown wildly and now among analysts challenges \"classic\" espionage (that is, seeking national defense information) as a serious threat to national security. The People's Republic of China continues to perfect its unique approach to espionage and continues to profit from it. And the phenomenon of leaks, that is, providing secrets to the press or the public who then provides them to everyone, has exploded onto the scene with the actions of Bradley (Chelsea) Manning and Edward Snowden and the unprecedented prosecution of leaks since 2009. These issues help form the current context for espionage that will be considered here. The PERSEREC Espionage program has three elements. The PERSEREC Espionage Database (FOUO) currently holds electronic data on 209 individuals whose activities span the 67 years from 1947 to 2015. Secondly, PERSEREC has built a collection of files on each individual in the database from press accounts, scholarly articles, and books documenting these cases. Thirdly, PERSEREC publishes unclassified reports based on the database and files, which allows wider distribution of findings on American espionage to any government agency and to the public interested in following specific cases or learning more about espionage in general. The 209 individuals in the espionage database were convicted or initially prosecuted for espionage, conspiracy to commit espionage, attempting to commit espionage, or for whom evidence of espionage or intent to commit espionage exists, even though for various reasons the person was not or, in a few cases, has not yet been convicted of those crimes. This latter category includes people who defected before they were prosecuted, who died or committed suicide before they could be prosecuted, who were given immunity from prosecution, or who plea-bargained for lesser charges. Prosecutors often agree to plea bargains in espionage cases in exchange for information, because evidence required by some espionage statutes is lacking, or to protect counterintelligence methods or classified information from being discussed in open court. Lesser charges in plea bargains typically include conspiracy to communicate national defense information to a foreign government, acting as an agent of a foreign government, theft of government property, conspiracy to gather information knowing it would be useful to a foreign government, or even simple mishandling or improper storage of classified documents. Outcomes of espionage cases are influenced not only by the charges against the offender and the plea-bargaining undertaken on his or her behalf, but also by choices and policies on prosecution of espionage-related offenses. The 2002 PERSEREC report on espionage discussed trends in prosecution policies in some depth (Herbig & Wiskoff, 2002). A noticeable trend in the prosecution of recent cases has been the increasing number of offenders who are not charged with espionage, but with acting as unregistered agents of a foreign power. The Espionage statutes demand more stringent evidence of mental states and intentions for conviction than does acting as an agent of a foreign power, which may explain why since 2001, twice as many individuals have been charged with acting as an agent of a foreign power as in any earlier decade. Current criteria for inclusion as a case in the PERSEREC Espionage Database are:\n\n(1)   Individuals convicted of espionage or conspiracy to commit espionage, or for\nattempting espionage, or for admitting that they intended to commit espionage,\n(2)   Individuals prosecuted for espionage but who committed suicide before the\ntrial or sentencing could be completed,\n(3)   Individuals for whom clear evidence of espionage (actual or attempted)\nexisted, even though they were not prosecuted. This category included cases involving defections, deaths at early stages in an investigation, and those administratively processed (e.g., allowed to retire, given immunity, exchanged, or discharged from the military),\n\n## Introduction\n\n(4)   Individuals for whom clear evidence of actual or attempted espionage existed,\nwho were initially charged with espionage-related crimes, but who were prosecuted for an offense other than espionage, such as mishandling classified information, as a result of plea bargaining,\n(5)   Individuals who were charged with acting as unregistered agents of a foreign\npower, and for whom evidence exists that they collected and intended, attempted, or succeeded in passing information to that foreign power.\n\n## Organization Of The Report\n\nThis report is structured in three parts. Part 1, Characteristics of Espionage by Americans, reports findings based on analyses of 209 individuals who committed espionage-related crimes. Part 2, Types of Espionage, explores in detail the five types of espionage these 209 individuals committed, providing examples and analyses from data collected on them. The five types are classic espionage, leaks, acting as an agent of a foreign government, violations of export control laws, and economic espionage. Part 3, Context and Recommendations, considers changes in the context of espionage, how those changes shape espionage, and how they require revisions in the statutes that govern it. Part 1 first compares across time periods (1947-1979, 1980-1989, and 1990-2015) based on when people began espionage-related activities, and then explores selected traits and how they apply to contemporary issues. An assumption underlies the decision to focus on when a person began espionage, which is that in important ways, an individual's choice of action is influenced by the context of the time and place in which the person lives. On the one hand, the ways in which it was possible to commit espionage in 1955 differed quite dramatically from the ways espionage could be committed in 1985, and it was different again in 2015. On the other hand, basic elements of the crime of espionage persist across any period. The basic and necessary elements for committing espionage include opportunity, conception, motive, lack of internal constraints, and ineffective external constraints (Herbig, 1994). It is because such basic elements can be found in any act of espionage that one instance can be compared with other instances to derive analytic categories and patterns that will be instructive across cases from any period. Yet it is equally important in an analysis of espionage to capture the very real changes over time. Two events mark the time periods in which espionage has been analyzed in this study. One event is the collapse of the Soviet Union at the beginning of the 1990s. The collapse was in slow-motion, from the fall of the Berlin Wall in November 1989 to the dissolution of the Soviet Union as a government in December 1991; here 1990 serves as the turning point within that time. The second event that marks an abrupt shift in context is the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon by Al Qaeda on 9/11. Since then, implications from those attacks have been and still are unfolding. Before the Soviet Union fell apart, it competed with the United States for more than four decades as our main Cold War adversary, and it was the foremost customer for espionage by Americans. Having one main adversary and customer for American intelligence, and having it be the Soviet Union, shaped the context for espionage in the first two time periods studied here. After the 9/11 attacks focused the nation's attention on the growing threat from global terrorism, it became apparent that Islamic terrorists that were organized internationally in networked cells posed a new, transnational intelligence threat. It is a threat whose challenges can be quite different from the Cold War parameters of two competing superpowers. Changes since 9/11 in the context of espionagein the collection of intelligence, the creation of new agencies to respond, and the new challenges from cyberspacehave reshaped the espionage game. The individuals studied in this report are categorized into three time periods by when they began their espionage-related activities, not by when they were uncovered or arrested. This allows for consideration of what impact the historical issues and pressures in a given period may have had on the person's decision to spy, along with the personal context of what went into his or her decision at that time. This report attempts to identify and highlight the counterintelligence implications of the cases of espionage discussed. If it was available, information was collected on personal traits that could serve as triggers for espionage, on personnel security concerns as defined by the Uniform Adjudicative Guidelines for access to classified information, on indicators that espionage was in progress such as unexplained affluence, and on details about motivations, methods of transmission, and how people were caught (Berger, 1997). Open sources are often deliberately vague about counterintelligence details and on the fine points of more obscure spies' lives, but all available open-source information was sought and collected to offer a starting point for counterintelligence analysis. In the analyses in Part 1, results are usually first reported in tables. The text accompanying the tables draws attention to highlights of the results and does not try to describe all of the results. Discussion is integrated into each topical section and includes implications, examples of cases, and other observations. Examples and illustrations are drawn from the information collected in PEREREC's files of articles on individuals who committed espionage-related offenses. Most of the examples come from the third cohort, individuals who began their activities since 1990, and especially those who began since the last technical report was published in 2008. Persons in this most recent group are new to this series and have not been discussed before. Some of the examples have been developed into brief thumbnail sketches to illustrate a trait or to provide materials for increased public awareness of espionage.\n\n## Introduction\n\nPart 2 examines the five types of espionage that comprise the expanding spectrum of espionage by Americans: classic espionage, leaks, acting as an agent of a foreign government, violations of export control laws, and economic espionage. Each type is discussed in terms of the statutes that apply to it, explored in terms of how it is similar to and different from the classic type, and illustrated with example cases. Each type is summarized using a common figure drawn from classic espionage to highlight commonalities among the types of espionage. Part 3 describes the current context of espionage by Americans by focusing on two developments: information and communications technology (ICT) and globalization. These shape the environment in which spying takes place now. This section concludes by considering how, in light of the earlier sections on recent espionage, the Espionage statues need to be revised. Three approaches to revision are suggested. A discussion of how the study of espionage may be enriched by studying selected works on insider threat appears in Appendix A. For a list of the names and selected characteristics of the 209 individuals included in this study, see Appendix B.\n\n\n## Methodology\n\nInformation was compiled from newspaper and magazine accounts, biographies, general published works on espionage, and collections of case histories compiled by other researchers. On-line research tools were consulted, such as Google Scholar and CICentre.com, an Internet application that provided additional leads on information about the more obscure cases. Missing information was sought in the classified investigative files of several federal agencies that could confirm what was known, but except for a proportion of information that had been designated FOUO, unclassified information has been maintained in the database. As in the earlier iterations of PERSEREC's Espionage Database, five categories of information were gathered on individuals identified for inclusion: biographical, employment and security clearance, characteristics of espionage, motivation, and consequences. Within these categories, variables were selected that would be available largely from open sources and that would provide a rich array of background data on spies. Included were personal and demographic information, aspects of the job environment, access to classified information, how people first got involved with espionage, how their careers as spies evolved, how they operated as spies, and how their spying careers ended. Information was collected on whether they volunteered or were recruited, and if recruited, by whom; on their motivations for committing espionage; and details on their indictment, conviction, and sentence. Some variables were included for identification and documentary purposes only and were not used for analysis. Some were qualifying descriptors for other variables, e.g., *foreign relative qualifier* provides details about the previous variable, *foreign relative*, which is coded Yes, No, or Unknown.3\nData were coded into variables in the database by several coders over time. A detailed codebook was used to guide decisions and judgments during the coding. The 209 individuals discussed here constitute a very small number of instances of any phenomena on which to apply statistical analysis. Descriptive statistics, with a comparison of frequencies, are the simple analytical tools used here on such small numbers that do not support more sophisticated techniques. While undoubtedly there are more instances of espionage by Americans that have not been made public, and still more that have not been uncovered, these 209 represent the known instances described in open sources that meet the criteria for inclusion defined here.\n\n\n\n## Part 1 Characteristics Of Espionage By Americans Personal Attributes\n\nThe first dimension to consider in how espionage by Americans may have changed over time since 1947 is the personal attributes of the individuals, their gender, race, age when they began espionage, level of education, marital status, and sexual orientation. Table 1 reports findings on these characteristics.\n\n## Personal Attributes\n\n|                     |      |        | Characteristics    | 1947-1979    | 1980-1989    | 1990-2015    |\n|---------------------|------|--------|--------------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|\n|                     | n=68 | %      | n=74               | %            | n=67         | %            |\n| Gender              |      |        |                    |              |              |              |\n| Male                | 65   | 95     | 65                 | 88           | 61           | 91           |\n| Female              | 3    | 5      | 9                  | 12           | 6            | 9            |\n|                     |      |        |                    |              |              |              |\n| Race/Ethnicity      |      |        |                    |              |              |              |\n| 4                   |      |        |                    |              |              |              |\n|                     |      |        |                    |              |              |              |\n|                     |      |        |                    |              |              |              |\n|                     |      |        |                    |              |              |              |\n|                     |      |        |                    |              |              |              |\n| White               | 58   | 85     | 60                 | 81           | 37           | 55           |\n| Black               | 5    | 7      | 2                  | 3            | 4            | 6            |\n| Arab                | 2    | 3      | 2                  | 3            | 6            | 9            |\n| Asian               | 2    | 3      | 4                  | 5            | 10           | 15           |\n| Hispanic            | 1    | 2      | 5                  | 7            | 10           | 15           |\n| Native American     | 0    | 0      | 1                  | 1            | 0            | 0            |\n|                     |      |        |                    |              |              |              |\n| Age when espionage  |      |        |                    |              |              |              |\n| began               |      |        |                    |              |              |              |\n|                     |      |        |                    |              |              |              |\n|                     |      |        |                    |              |              |              |\n|                     |      |        |                    |              |              |              |\n| Less than 20        | 3    | 4      | 7                  | 10           | 0            | 0            |\n| 20 to 29            | 23   | 34     | 34                 | 46           | 11           | 16           |\n| 30 to 39            | 26   | 38     | 15                 | 20           | 22           | 33           |\n| 40 or more          | 16   | 24     | 18                 | 24           | 34           | 51           |\n|                     |      |        |                    |              |              |              |\n| Education, in years |      |        |                    |              |              |              |\n| 5                   |      |        |                    |              |              |              |\n|                     |      |        |                    |              |              |              |\n| (n=66)              |      | (n=68) |                    | (n=40)       |              |              |\n| 10 years            | 4    | 6      | 5                  | 7            | 0            | 0            |\n| 12 years            | 23   | 35     | 25                 | 37           | 12           | 30           |\n| 14 years            | 13   | 20     | 13                 | 19           | 4            | 10           |\n| 16 years            | 17   | 26     | 10                 | 15           | 10           | 25           |\n| 18 or more years    | 9    | 13     | 15                 | 22           | 14           | 35           |\n| Marital status when |      |        |                    |              |              |              |\n| espionage began     |      |        |                    |              |              |              |\n| 6                   |      |        |                    |              |              |              |\n|                     |      |        |                    |              |              |              |\n|                     |      | (n=69) |                    |              | (n=58)       |              |\n\n\n4 These are categories based on descriptions from open sources. They do not reflect a person's self-identification and they do not use the latest categories from the U.S. Census. White, African- American or Black, Asian, and Native American are commonly used racial categories. Arab and Hispanic may be ethnic, cultural, or linguistic categories for people of various races. For a discussion of these issues, see Cohn & Caumont, 2016.\n\n5 There is more missing data for education than for many variables, especially in the third cohort, which makes conclusions about that cohort more tentative. Of the 27 persons in the third cohort whose level of education is unknown, 13 are naturalized citizens, who may have been educated abroad, and the difficulty in tracking that information may account for some of the missing education data.\n\n|                    |        |    |    |        | Characteristics    | 1947-1979    | 1980-1989    | 1990-2015    |\n|--------------------|--------|----|----|--------|--------------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|\n| Married            | 48     | 70 | 35 |        | 51                 | 33           |              | 57           |\n| Single             | 16     | 24 | 26 | 38     | 16                 | 28           |              |              |\n| Separated or       |        |    |    |        |                    |              |              |              |\n| divorced           | 4      | 6  | 8  | 11     | 9                  | 15           |              |              |\n|                    |        |    |    |        |                    |              |              |              |\n| Sexual orientation | (n=61) |    |    | (n=55) |                    |              | (n=57)       |              |\n| Heterosexual       | 57     |    | 93 | 53     |                    | 96           | 56           |              |\n| Homosexual         | 4      | 7  | 2  | 4      | 1                  | 2            |              |              |\n|                    |        |    |    |        |                    |              |              |              |\n\nAmerican spies continue to be overwhelmingly male. In the recent cohort, 91% were men and 98% were heterosexual, but other personal attributes have changed with time. As the population of the United States has become more diverse, so have spies. Whites are no longer so predominate at 55% of the total; since 1990, American citizens of Arab background first appear as 9% of spies, and more Asians and Hispanics have attempted espionage. Asian Americans were 13% of the recent cohort and Hispanic Americans were 15%. The 60% of recent spies for whom the level of education is known mirrors a trend in the general population toward more education. Recent spies appear to be better educated than the previous two cohorts, with 35% having education beyond high school and another 35% holding postgraduate degrees. By comparison in 2010, the most recent census data, in the general population of the United States, 89% of native-born citizens 25 years or older held a high school degree or higher including 28% with bachelor's degrees. Among the foreign-born naturalized citizens in 2010, 68% were high school graduates or higher, including 27% with bachelor's degrees\n(Grieco et al, 2012). The trend in Table 1 over the decades since the late 1940s show a rising level of education among spies, which was interrupted during the 1980s by an influx of young military wannabe spies who often were unsuccessful at espionage. Most of the wannabes were only high school graduates. The most recent cohort appears to be the best-educated yet. Marital status echoes this pattern. The general trend in American society over the past 60 years has been toward more divorce. Divorce rates doubled among people over 35 between 1990 and 2008, although they leveled off during the same period among younger people (Kennedy & Ruggles, 2014). Spies reflect that trend, with a rising rate of divorce that was interrupted during the 1980s when there were more young and single military spies. In the earlier two cohorts 6% and 11% were divorced, while 15% of the recent group of spies was divorced. Only 18 of 209 American spies across all three time periods were women. There were more women spies during the 1980s than in the earlier or more recent cohorts; from a peak of 12% female spies in the 1980s, the recent group has dropped to 9%. Espionage remains a man's crime. Like many crimes, espionage entails taking risks, and if we extrapolate from crime in general and other risky behaviors, we can expect that espionage would likewise have a skewed gender ratio. More men than women commit crimes of all kinds. More men than women engage in risk-taking, such as interpersonal violence, dangerous sexual behaviors, risky sports, gambling, or risky maneuvers on the highways that result in accidents (Harris, Jenkins, & Glaser, 2006; Heuer, Jr., 1992). Men are also typically placed in jobs that have access to information to commit espionage than are women. Four times as many men than women are in government and in military jobs that grant access to national defense information and to highly classified secrets; men have more opportunity to betray secrets (ClearanceJobs, 2012). More men than women are expert in computer hacking or cyber security, which gives them access to classified or sensitive electronic information (Landivar, 2013). More men than women are highly placed in corporations, where their access to corporate information means that economic espionage could be tempting and lucrative (Warner, 2014). Marta Rita Velazquez, a successful female spy for decades for Cuba, was an exception to the preponderance of male spies. Her espionage only became publicly known in 2013, but by then she had been an agent and source for Cuba for 30 years. Her case is not well known because of the long hiatus in making its outlines public. Starting in 1989, she worked as an attorney advisor for a series of government agencies, including the Department of Transportation (DOT), the U.S. Agency of International Development (USAID), and the Department of State (DoS). The Cuban Intelligence Service (CIS) had recruited Velazquez to be an agent in 1983, early in her graduate studies at the Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies. In 1984 she met Ana Belen Montes, who was studying there part time for an international career. They became friends, and Velazquez spotted, assessed, and recruited Montes for the CIS (United States District Court for the District of Columbia, 2004). In March 1985, Velazquez and Montes traveled to Cuba for intelligence training. First they flew to Madrid, where they met Cuban agents and picked up false passports to use for a flight to Prague. More agents met them in Prague and provided two more false passports and clothing in which they flew to Cuba. It was illegal then for Americans to travel to Cuba under the embargo, requiring this subterfuge. The CIS training in Cuba covered communications using highfrequency radio broadcast encrypted messages, operational security measures, and practice polygraphs to inoculate the two agents against revealing themselves. They retraced their steps via Prague and Madrid using their false passports, and once back in the United States, took up careers as successful civil servants and Cuban spies. During the 1990s, Velazquez sent Top Secret information and the identities of at least two American intelligence agents to the CIS using her radio, and continued to spot potential agents (United States District Court for the District of Columbia, 2004). Her real success as a spy, however, was in recruiting Montes, since Montes went on to become the top intelligence official on Cuba in the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA). Her reports to Cuba over 17 years seriously damaged American intelligence. Montes was arrested on September 21, 2001 in a reaction rushed by the 9/11 attacks and concern that Montes would pass on plans for the American response. In March 2002, she pled guilty to espionage and, in a plea bargain, began to cooperate with authorities. Three months later Velazquez resigned her government position in the U.S. Embassy in Guatemala and abruptly moved to Sweden, where she continues to live secure from extradition. The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) learned of Velazquez from Montes in its debriefings of her in 2002 and Velazquez was indicted in 2004, but the FBI only notified her that she is under suspicion of espionage in 2010, and publicly unsealed her indictment in April 2013 (United States District Court for the District of Columbia, 2004; Venteicher, 2013;\nPopkin, 2013). Recently, American spies have also been older when they began their espionage activities. In the first cohort that began spying between 1947 and 1979, 38% were under 29 years old, while in the second cohort with the influx of young military spies that began during the 1980s, 56% were under 29. The recent cohort that started between 1990 and 2013 shows decided aging: no one was under 20, only 16% were between 20 and 29, and over half were 40 or older. Benjamin Pierce Bishop is an example of the greying American spy. He was 59 in June 2011 when he met a Chinese graduate student at an international defense conference in Hawaii. She was 27. They became friends, then lovers. She asked him for advice and sources for her research, and he began to bring classified documents home so he could review them before answering her questions. Eventually he emailed answers to her that included classified national defense information and orally discussed other issues with her, including details of a meeting classified Secret between the United States and South Korea, nuclear war plans and strategies, early warning radar systems, missile defense systems, and strategic resources and resource locations (United States Attorney's Office District of Hawaii,\n2014). Bishop had recently retired as a Lieutenant Colonel in the U.S. Army and was working as a contractor at the U.S. Pacific Command at Camp H.M. Smith on the island of Hawaii. He held a Top Secret SCI (TS-SCI) security clearance and served as a planner and specialist in cyber defense. His wife and daughter had remained in Utah while he worked on assignment in Hawaii, but in 2012 he asked for a divorce, explaining that he had met someone else. The requirements of his clearance specified that he disclose all of his contacts with foreign nationals and any travel he undertook that included such contacts; Bishop changed the name of his lover on his disclosure forms to a masculine variation to hide their affair and her identity (Zimmerman, 2014). He was arrested on March 15, 2013 and charged with two counts of espionage, willfully disclosing classified national defense information to someone not authorized to receive it and illegally retaining classified national defense information at home. He pled guilty and was sentenced on September 17, 2014, to 87 months (7 years and 3 months) in prison plus 3 years of supervised release (Former U.S. Officer, 2014). The press pronounced that Bishop had fallen into a\n\"honey trap,\" a snare set by a young woman seeking to lure an older man into a romance from which she could profit and use his access to classified information.\n\nThe Chinese national was not charged and her name was not revealed by the prosecution. At his sentencing, Bishop's lawyer blamed his reckless actions on love, saying \"There was no intent to harm the United States. He made an error, a serious error in judgment for the love of a woman.\" (Semko, 2013; Zimmerman, 2014). In general, recent persons convicted of espionage-related offenses have been male, middle-aged, well-educated, and of a variety of racial and ethnic backgrounds that mirrors the increasing level of education and diversity of American society.\n\n## Employment And Clearance\n\nThe jobs individuals perform and the level of security clearance they hold in those jobs largely determine whether they will have the opportunity to commit espionage. Table 2 reports trends across the three cohorts in the proportions of civil servants, contractors, and uniformed military, ranks of military, types and fields of employment, and levels of security clearance.\n\n## Employment And Clearance\n\n|                                     |      |    | Characteristics    | 1947-1979    | 1980-1989    | 1990-2015    |\n|-------------------------------------|------|----|--------------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|\n|                                     | n=68 | %  | n=74               | %            | n=67         | %            |\n| Civilian or uniformed military      |      |    |                    |              |              |              |\n| Civilian (civil servants and        |      |    |                    |              |              |              |\n| contractors)                        | 34   | 50 | 39                 | 53           | 51           | 76           |\n| Uniformed military                  | 34   | 50 | 35                 | 47           | 16           | 24           |\n|                                     |      |    |                    |              |              |              |\n| Rank of uniformed military          |      |    |                    |              |              |              |\n| E1 - E3                             | 3    | 9  | 10                 | 28           | 3            | 19           |\n| E4 - E6                             | 16   | 47 | 18                 | 51           | 4            | 25           |\n| E7 - WO                             | 10   | 29 | 3                  | 9            | 3            | 19           |\n| Officer                             | 4    | 12 | 2                  | 6            | 4            | 25           |\n| Unknown                             | 1    | 3  | 2                  | 6            | 2            | 12           |\n|                                     |      |    |                    |              |              |              |\n| Type of employment during espionage |      |    |                    |              |              |              |\n| Uniformed military                  | 34   | 50 | 35                 | 47           | 16           | 24           |\n| Civil servant                       | 15   | 22 | 16                 | 22           | 15           | 22           |\n| Government contractor               | 8    | 12 | 8                  | 11           | 14           | 21           |\n| Job unrelated to espionage          | 11   | 16 | 15                 | 20           | 20           | 30           |\n| Unknown                             | 0    |    | 0                  |              | 2            | 3            |\n|                                     |      |    |                    |              |              |              |\n| Occupational field when espionage   |      |    |                    |              |              |              |\n| began                               |      |    |                    |              |              |              |\n|                                     |      |    |                    |              |              |              |\n| Communications/intelligence         | 25   | 37 | 23                 | 31           | 12           | 18           |\n| General/technical                   | 10   | 15 | 22                 | 30           | 11           | 16           |\n| Scientific/professional             | 18   | 26 | 12                 | 16           | 18           | 27           |\n| Functional                          |      |    |                    |              |              |              |\n| support/administrative              | 12   | 18 | 10                 | 14           | 9            | 14           |\n| Miscellaneous                       | 3    | 4  | 7                  | 9            | 17           | 25           |\n|                                     |      |    |                    |              |              |              |\n| Security clearance when espionage   |      |    |                    |              |              |              |\n| began                               |      |    |                    |              |              |              |\n|                                     |      |    |                    |              |              |              |\n| Top secret SCI                      | 10   | 15 | 11                 | 15           | 14           | 21           |\n| Top secret                          | 28   | 41 | 20                 | 27           | 12           | 18           |\n| Secret                              | 12   | 18 | 16                 | 22           | 11           | 17           |\n| Confidential                        | 1    | 1  | 3                  | 4            | 0            | 0            |\n| None held during espionage          | 12   | 18 | 21                 | 28           | 29           | 43           |\n| Unknown                             | 5    | 7  | 3                  | 4            | 1            | 1            |\n\nTable 2 shows us that occupations we would expect to present opportunities to commit espionage, such as communications and intelligence, actually declined by half after 1990, from 37% and 31% in the two earlier cohorts to 18% in the most recent one. The number of spies in functional support or administrative occupations stayed about the same across time, while the influx of young military spies in the 1980s caused the proportion of general or technical occupations to spike up for the second cohort. The proportion of scientific or professional occupations decreased in the 1980s, and then returned to 27% of the total, to a level similar to the first cohort. In the recent past, espionage has become a crime of civilians. The proportion of civilians increased from half uniformed military and half civilian in the first cohort, and from almost half and half during the 1980s, to 76% civilian in the most recent cohort. Among the uniformed military, there was also a shift in the recent past toward equal opportunity across ranks. From a predominance of the lower enlisted ranks in the first two cohorts, the recent cohort has a higher proportion of senior enlisted and more officers at 25%. The greater proportion of civilians coincides with two other trends in the type of occupations held during espionage. One is an increase in the number of spies who were government contractors: from 12% and 11% contractors in the first two cohorts, the proportion of recent spies since 1990 has doubled to 21% contractors. This increase likely reflects the expanded hiring of contractors after 9/11 by the federal government responding to the terrorist threat, and the consequent increase in the proportion of clearances held by contractors in intelligence and defense roles (Sanger & Peters, 2013; Security from Within, 2013). The second related trend is an increase in the number of spies in jobs apparently unrelated to espionage; there has been a doubling in frequencies between the first cohort and the third. This is reflected in a notable increase in spies with miscellaneous occupations that would seem to have little to do with espionage and, on the surface, would not provide an opportunity to commit such a crime. From 4% and 9% in the two earlier cohorts, miscellaneous types of employment increased among recent spies to one-fourth of the total, 25%. Table 3 lists the miscellaneous occupations in the three cohorts.\n\n| 1947-1979                            | 1980-1989           | 1990-2015                |\n|--------------------------------------|---------------------|--------------------------|\n| 1. unemployed                        | 1. unemployed       | 1. boat pilot            |\n| 2. drug dealer                       | 2. public relations | 2. housewife and student |\n| 3. retired                           | 3. shoe salesman    | 3. Taekwondo instructor  |\n|                                      |                     | 4. retired               |\n|                                      |                     |                          |\n|                                      |                     |                          |\n|                                      |                     |                          |\n|                                      |                     |                          |\n| 6. go-between, entrepreneur and      |                     |                          |\n| organizer                            |                     |                          |\n|                                      |                     |                          |\n|                                      |                     |                          |\n|                                      |                     |                          |\n|                                      |                     |                          |\n|                                      |                     |                          |\n|                                      |                     |                          |\n|                                      |                     |                          |\n|                                      |                     |                          |\n| 12. trader and importer of Middle    |                     |                          |\n| Eastern foodstuffs                   |                     |                          |\n|                                      |                     |                          |\n|                                      |                     |                          |\n|                                      |                     |                          |\n|                                      |                     |                          |\n| 14. unemployed broker of military    |                     |                          |\n| equipment                            |                     |                          |\n|                                      |                     |                          |\n|                                      |                     |                          |\n|                                      |                     |                          |\n|                                      |                     |                          |\n| 16. supervisor at aluminum door and  |                     |                          |\n| window frame company                 |                     |                          |\n|                                      |                     |                          |\n|                                      |                     |                          |\n|                                      |                     |                          |\n| 17. menial jobs allowing observation |                     |                          |\n| of military installations            |                     |                          |\n\n Changes in the level of security clearance held by espionage-related offenders show a trend toward unclassified but sensitive information. (These data are reported in Table 2.) Persons with a clearance level of TS-SCI comprised 15% in the first two cohorts, and this increased slightly to 21% in the recent cohort. The proportion of those holding TS level clearances declined with each cohort: from 41% to 27% to 18% in the most recent cohort. Secret level clearances remained similar across time at 18%, 22%, and 17%. There were few Confidential clearances among espionage offenders, and this disused clearance level disappears from the recent cohort. However, the proportion of persons who held no security clearance while committing an espionage-related offense increased over time from 18% to 28% to 43% in the recent cohort, approaching half of the total.\n\n## Espionage Offenders Without Security Clearances\n\nThe expectation about spies is that they have betrayed classified information. This is not consistently the case. Table 4 lists by name the 62 espionage-related offenders who did not hold security clearances or have access to classified information when they began committing an espionage-related offense. It also reports the methods they used to access information or the type of information they offered, and the outcome or sentence the person received.\n\n## Espionage Offenders With No Security Clearance When Espionage Began\n\nDecade Began Espionage\nName\nMethod of Access or Type\nof Information in the Case\nOutcome or Sentence\n1940s\nRees, Norman\nPassed unclassified\ninformation7\nSuicide\n1950s\nBorger, Harold\nHad accomplice with\nclassified access\n2.5 years in prison\n\nCascio, Guiseppe\nHad accomplice with\nclassified access\n20 years in prison\n1960s\nHarris, Ulysses\nHad accomplice with\nclassified access\n7 years in prison\n\nSattler, James\nPassed unclassified\ninformation\nDefection\n1970s\nLee, Andrew\nHad accomplice with\nclassified access\nLife in prison\n\nHarper, James\nHad accomplice with\nclassified access\nLife in prison\n\nClark, James\nHad accomplice with\nclassified access\n12 years 8 months in prison\n\nStand, Kurt\nHad accomplice with\nclassified access\n17 years and 6 months in prison\n\nTumanova, Svetlana\nPassed unclassified\ninformation\n1.5 years in prison\n\nAlvarez, Carlos\nPassed unclassified\ninformation\n5 years in prison and 3 years of probation\n\nBarnett, David\nRelied on his memory of\nclassified information\n18 years in prison\n1980s\nPickering, Jeffrey\nStole classified information\n5 years in prison\n\nJeffries, Randy\nStole classified information\n3 years in prison\n\nKota,\nSubrahmanyam\nStole classified information\n1 year in prison and 3\nyears of probation\n\nWilmoth, James\nHad accomplice with\nclassified access\n35 years in prison, reduced to 15 years\n\nWolff, Jay\nStole classified information\n5 years in prison\n\nDavies, Allen\nRelied on his memory of\nclassified information\n5 years in prison\n\nSlavens, Brian\nRelied on his memory of\nclassified information\n2 years in prison\n\n\n7 It is not necessary to transmit classified information to be convicted of espionage under\n\nDecade Began Espionage\nName\nMethod of Access or Type\nof Information in the Case\nOutcome or Sentence\n\nHoward, Edward\nRelied on his memory of\nclassified information\nDefection\n\nSmith, Richard\nRelied on his memory of\nclassified information\nReleased\n\nPelton, Ronald\nRelied on his memory of\nclassified information\nLife in prison\n\nBuchanan, Edward\nClaimed access to classified\ninformation\n2 years and 6 months in prison\n\nIrene, Dale\nHad accomplice with\nclassified access\n2 years in prison\n\nKing, Donald\nHad accomplice with\nclassified access\n30 years in prison\n\nTobias, Bruce\nHad accomplice with\nclassified access\n5 months in prison\n\nChiu, Rebecca\nHad accomplice with\nclassified access\n3 years in prison, renounce U.S. citizenship and deportation\n\nPizzo, Francis\nHad accomplice with\nclassified access\n10 years in prison\n\nPollard, Anne\nHad accomplice with\nclassified access\n5 years in prison\n\nMortati, Thomas\nHad accomplice with\nclassified access\n1 year and 8 months in prison\n\nAlvarez, Elsa\nPassed unclassified\ninformation\n3 years in prison and 1 year of probation\n\nAli, Amen\nHad accomplice with\nclassified access\n5 years in prison and 3 year probation\n\nMyers, Gwendolyn\nHad accomplice with\nclassified access\n7 years in prison and forfeiture of spouse's government salary and their sailboat\n1990s\nAmes, Rosario\nHad accomplice with\nclassified access\n5 years in prison\n\nBrown, Joseph\nHad accomplice with\nclassified access\n6 years in prison\n\nLeung, Katrina\nHad accomplice with\nclassified access\nReleased as a result of prosecutorial misconduct\n\nYai, John\nPassed unclassified\ninformation\n2 years in prison and $20,000 fine\n\nGuerrero, Antonio\nPassed unclassified\ninformation\nLife in prison\nDecade Began Espionage\nName\nMethod of Access or Type\nof Information in the Case\nOutcome or Sentence\n\nHernandez, Linda\nPassed unclassified\ninformation\n7 years in prison\n\nHernandez, Nilo\nPassed unclassified\ninformation\n7 years in prison\n\nSantos, Joseph\nPassed unclassified\ninformation\n4 years in prison\n\nAlonso, Alejandro\nPassed unclassified\ninformation\n7 years in prison\n\nGroat, Douglas\nRelied on his memory of\nclassified information\n5 years in prison and 3 years of probation\n\nSombolay, Albert\nPassed restricted, but not\nclassified information\n34 years in prison\n\nCharlton, Jeffrey\nRetained classified\ninformation to sell after he lost his access\n2 years in prison, 5 years of probation, and $50,000 fine\n\nLatchin, Sami\nPassed unclassified\ninformation\n4 years in prison\n\nGari, George\nPassed unclassified\ninformation\n7 years in prison\n2000s\nShaaban, Shaaban\nClaimed access to classified\ninformation\n13 years in prison\n\nSmith, Timothy\nStole classified information\n3 years and 10 months\nin prison\n\nKuo, Tai-Shen\nHas accomplice with\nclassified access\n15 years and 6 months in prison\n\nNicholson, Nathaniel\nRelied on accomplice's\nmemory of classified information\n5 years of probation and 100 hours of community service\n\nRoth, John\nPassed restricted, but not\nclassified information\n4 years in prison and two years of probation\n\nSherman, Daniel\nPassed restricted, but not\nclassified information\n1 year and 2 months in prison\n\nShemami, Najeb\nPassed unclassified\ninformation\n3 years and 10 months in prison\n\nShu, Quan-Sheng\nPassed restricted, but not\nclassified information\n4 years and 3 months in prison and $387,000 fine\n\nShriver, Glenn\nPassed unclassified\ninformation\n4 years in prison\n\nKnapp, Marc\nPassed restricted, but not\nclassified information\n3 years and 10 months in prison\n\nNozette, Stephen\nRelied on his memory of\nclassified information\n13 years in prison\nDecade Began Espionage\nName\nMethod of Access or Type\nof Information in the Case\nOutcome or Sentence\n\nSoueid, M\nPassed unclassified\ninformation\n1 year and 6 months in prison\n\nHoffman, II, Richard\nRelied on his memory of\nclassified information\n30 years in prison\n\nKiriakou, James\nRelied on his memory of\nclassified information\n2 years and 6 months in prison\n\nOrr, Brian\nRetained classified\ninformation to sell after he lost his access\n3 years and 1 month in prison, 3 years of probation, and $10,000 fine\n\nThere are eight methods of access listed in Table 4, two more than were reported in the 2008 version of this report. Table 5 summarizes the frequencies of these eight methods.\n\nFrequency of Methods of Access for Espionage\nOffenders with No Current Security Clearance\nMethod of Access or Type of Information in the Case\nn=62\n%\nHad accomplice with classified access\n21\n34\nPassed unclassified information\n16\n26\nRelied on memory of classified information\n10\n16\nStole classified information\n5\n8\nPassed restricted, but unclassified information\n5\n8\nClaimed access to classified information\n2\n3\nRetained classified information to sell after losing access\n2\n3\nRelied on accomplice's memory of classified information\n1\n2\n\nThe most frequent method of obtaining information for attempting espionage by persons who did not have access themselves was to rely on an accomplice who did have current access to classified information. More than one-third of offenders, 34%, were accomplices of someone with active access to classified information. One additional person served as an accomplice to someone who relied on his memories of past access in order to pass classified information. For example, Gwendolyn Myers was an accomplice and active participant in the espionage career of her husband, Walter Kendall Myers. Starting in 1978, these two spied for Cuba for 30 years. They met in mid-life after matching failed marriages, a car accident in which Kendall Myers had killed a teenage girl, a disillusion with American politics, and a taste for radicalism that led them to grow marijuana in their basement and take illegal trips to Cuba. A Cuban intelligence official recruited them to serve as clandestine agents, and directed Kendall to seek employment in the Washington, DC, area that would provide classified access, such as at the CIA\nor the Department of State. Spying was to be a glorious adventure and a new joint chapter in life for them to share. In 1985, he moved from contract teaching at the State Department and at Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studiesthe same school Marta Velazquez and Ana Montes were then attending to become a State Department professor and European analyst with Secret and later Top Secret clearances and SCI access. Gwendolyn worked in various jobs, at a bookstore and as an administrative assistant in a Washington, DC, bank, and never had classified access (Chaddock, 2009; Harnden, 2009). The Myers spy team was discreet, careful, and effective as agents for Cuba for 3 decades. He would memorize information at work or take notes to bring home overnight. Occasionally he brought home classified documents, but would return them the next morning. Gwen would transcribe the notes or documents. They received encrypted radio broadcasts over a shortwave radiothe same model the Cubans also provided to Monteswith directions, codes, and requests from their handlers. The Myerses preferred to hand papers directly to Cuban agents. Gwen would leave papers in her shopping cart and exchange the cart with an agent in the local Giant supermarket, but over the years they also met Cubans in various foreign locations including Mexico, Trinidad and Tobago, Argentina, Brazil, Ecuador, and Jamaica. Later their handlers trained them in the sending and receiving of encrypted email from Internet cafes (United States District Court for the District of Columbia, 2009; Clark, 2010; Gentile, 2009). The FBI began searching for a spy at State in 2006, and after Kendall made some intemperate public remarks that earned him criticism in the State Department, he retired under a cloud in 2007. Focusing on the Myerses first by monitoring their emails and phone calls, the FBI set up a sting in which an undercover agent posed as a Cuban sent to reengage the Myerses in more active espionage. \"I was actually thinking it would be fun to get back in to it,\" Kendall told the undercover agent in one of their meetings. Kendall and Gwendolyn Myers were arrested in June 4, 2009, and pled guilty in November of that year to acting as Cuban agents, conspiring to and actually collecting and transmitting national defense information to a foreign power, and wire fraud. Kendall was sentenced to life in prison without parole on July 16, 2010, and negotiated a lighter sentence for his wife in exchange for cooperating with extensive debriefings by the FBI. Gwendolyn received only 6 and 12 years in prison, minus the time served since their arrest, which reduced her sentence to 5 and 12 years. He was 73 and she was 72 when they entered prison (United States Department of Justice, 2010; Hsu, 2010). The judge noted at their sentencing that the Myerses were unrepentant and seemed serenely resigned. Kendall came from wealth and status in American society: he was the great-grandson of Alexander Graham Bell, and had attended exclusive private schools all his life. The couple lived in a luxury co-op on Cathedral Avenue in Northwest Washington, DC. They could afford to buy a small yacht and learned to sail in hopes that someday they could sail it to Cuba. Early in their marriage, they fell in love with the Cuban revolution and with Fidel Castro. Castro granted them a personal audience with him in 1995 while they were visiting in Cuba, and for one unforgettable evening they chatted with their hero and received a medal from him for their espionage. They took no payment for their activities, motivated by their ideological commitment to Communism and Castro, but also by the mutual adventure of being spies. \"We share the ideals and dreams of the Cuban revolution,\" they declared as they were sentenced to prison (Thompson, 2009; Harnden, 2009). Nathaniel (Nathan) Nicholson is the one person who became an accomplice to espionage by relying on the memories of classified information recalled long after access had ended. This source was his father, Harold James (Jim) Nicholson. Jim Nicholson was already serving a prison sentence for his own espionage for the Soviets. He had been a career Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) officer starting in the 1980s; he became a station chief and a valued trainer of young CIA agents. Blaming a bitter and costly divorce, he began selling classified information to the Russians in June 1994, and continued until his unmasking and arrest in November 1996. He gave the Russians the names and assignments of all the CIA trainees he had ever worked with, compromising and endangering them. He did not pass a routine polygraph test in October 1995, which prompted surveillance and an investigation into his travel and finances (Joint CIA-FBI press release, 1996). Convicted of conspiracy to commit espionage in 1997, for which he received over $300,000, Jim Nicholson began serving a 23 and 12 year prison sentence at the Federal Correctional Institution in Sheridan, Oregon, not far from where his three children were to live with his parents during his incarceration. His youngest son, Nathan, was 12. (United States Department of Justice, 2009). Jim Nicholson did not give up. Though the authorities monitored his communications in prison, the FBI noted in 2002 that Nicholson was trying to manipulate fellow inmates into contacting the Russians for him. When Nathan returned to Portland from serving as a paratrooper in the Army Rangers in 2006 with an injury that put him out of the Army, Jim began grooming Nathan to be his go-between with the Russians. Jim claimed the Russians owed him a \"pension\" that they had promised him, and he wanted them to pay him before any information he still had in his head went stale (Lichtblau, 2009). Nathan, then 22, visited his father regularly in prison during 2006, receiving training and advice on how to contact the Russians and establish a connection, how to travel to meeting places without attracting attention, how to carry cash payments into the country, and how to bank the money surreptitiously. Jim wrote out notes and questions for the Russians that Nathan smuggled out of the prison on crumpled paper. Nathan began a 2-year odyssey meeting Russian handlers in various world cities, including San Francisco, Mexico City, Lima, Peru, and Nicosia, Cyprus. The Russians proved interested in renewing this contact, and pressed Jim Nicholson for details from the mid-1990s about how he thought he might have been caught. They hoped to do their own damage assessment to find a possible mole in Russian intelligence that could have betrayed Nicholson. Jim passed on through Nathan details of his last months as a Russian agent, including his suspicion that a contact in Malaysia had been tainted, the name of the CIA polygrapher who failed him, descriptions of federal agents who interrogated him after his arrest, concerns that he had been tailed while working as deputy station chief in Malaysia, and suspicion that his computer at the CIA training facility had been tapped (Denson, 2010). Nathan collected $47,000 in installments from the Russians, which at Jim's direction, he disbursed among his family members. Nathan was exhilarated by this secret adventure, but in fact it was no secret. The FBI got court approval to tap Nathan's cellphone, intercept his email, search and surveil his apartment, and track his vehicle. FBI agents followed him on all his travels and, when he returned from Cyprus, detained him while they searched his luggage and photocopied his spy notebook with the codes, addresses, questions, and notes he used, plus a $7,000 payment hidden in a video game case (Pincus, 2010). Nathan was arrested in January 2009, pled guilty to acting as a foreign agent and to money laundering and, after his father also pled guilty so that his son would not have to testify against him, they appeared at a joint sentencing hearing in January 2011. Nathan was sentenced to 100 hours of community service with his fellow military veterans and 5 years of probation; Jim Nicholson received 8 years in prison added onto his existing sentence. He will be in his early 70's upon his release in 2024 from a federal prison in Terre Haute, IN, far from his family in Oregon (Pincus, 2010;\nDenson, 2011). Gwendolyn Myers and Nathaniel Nicholson are examples of persons who became accomplices of other people who had active access to classified information or, in Nicholson's case, relied on the memories of another's past access. Combined, these two categories based on the role of accomplices account for 36% of methods used by persons with no clearance themselves, and makes being an accomplice the most frequent among non-clearance holders. The second most frequent method of committing an espionage-related offense without having a security clearance is to pass unclassified information. This may seem counterintuitive: how does the transmittal of unclassified information result in an espionage-related conviction? Yet United States Espionage statutes do not consistently require the information involved in espionage to be classified. The laws have built on one another over time, becoming complex and contradictory. Early major statutes specify \"national defense\" information because they were written before classification was even developed early in the Second World War. Later statutes starting in 1950 do specify classified information (Edgar & Schmidt, Jr., 1973; Elsea, 2013). This and several other inconsistencies have led to ambiguity and variability in prosecutions and, some would argue, occasionally to unjust results. John Joungwoong Yai is an example of someone who had no access to classified information himself, but who passed unclassified information to a foreign nation and was convicted of an espionage-related offense. A naturalized citizen since 1981, Yai was a successful businessman who owned and operated various small businesses in Los Angeles. He was arrested early in 2003 after a 7-year FBI investigation that used wiretaps, electronic surveillance, and secret searches. For at least 3 years, Yai sent to his contact in North Korea publicly available information about trends in government intentions toward North Korea. He also plotted to get access to classified information for himself by getting a government job, and worked to plant other young Koreans in jobs that would have access to classified information so they could serve as his collectors. Yai communicated with and took taskings from his North Korean handlers in coded messages by fax, email, and in meetings with them in Europe, China, and North Korea, where they paid him at least $18,000 for his efforts. He pled guilty to acting as an agent of a foreign power and to several counts of customs violations for his failure to declare his earnings over $10,000 upon reentry into the United States after meetings with his handlers. Yai's wife, Susan Younja Yai, accompanied him on trips to meet with North Korean handlers; she received a year of probation and $500 fine for her role. In February 2003, Yai was sentenced to 2 years in prison (Krikorian, 2003; Federal Bureau of Investigation, Affidavit, 2003; United States District Court for the Central District of California, Indictment, 2002). The third-most frequent method of committing an espionage-related offense without having personal access to classified information was to rely on one's memory of classified information after losing access to it. Ten individuals called up information from their memories and sold or gave it to persons unauthorized to receive it. Robert Hoffman II is a recent example. After 20 years in the U.S. Navy, Hoffman retired in November 2011 as a Petty Officer First Class (E-6) rated as a Cryptologic Technician-Technical. His work with electronic sensors used in submarine surveillance and tactical guidance to the sub's commander meant that he had held access to highly classified information while serving in the Navy. A few months before his retirement, he had treated himself to a fling by traveling to the Republic of Belarus, ostensibly in search of several Byelorussian women he had enjoyed meeting earlier during a port call in Bahrain. He posted descriptions of his 3-week trip on social media, including the unlikely boast that he had dropped in on the President of Belarus. The FBI began to follow this submariner with the highly classified access who traveled to a former Russian state and was not following security guidelines. A female undercover FBI agent answered Hoffman's Craigslist ad seeking companionship. She conducted a\n5-month courtship over the Internet, and met him for several dates (United States Attorney's Office Eastern District of Virginia, 2014; Daugherty, 2013a; Daugherty, 2014). Then the FBI raised the stakes and sent Hoffman a letter, apparently from \"Vladimir\" in Russia, inviting him to help with technical expertise for which he would be well compensated. Within hours Hoffman agreed to this proposal and volunteered his help. In his diary and later statements he said he needed money but that he also liked the thrills that espionage promised. Over several months, he delivered three collections of classified information on thumb drives to a hollow at the base of a tree in nearby First Landings State Park in Virginia Beach, the dead drop site suggested by the FBI. The information Hoffman left in the tree covered naval capabilities and equipment, specific missions, and data about adversaries and intelligence. It would have allowed the Russians to track American submarines while avoiding detection. According to the Assistant U.S. Attorney speaking at Hoffman's trial, \"He did not pass official government documents but instead created his own documents of secret information from memory (McGlone, 2012).\" His FBI contacts arrested Hoffman early in December 2012. He was convicted of attempted espionage at trial in August 2013, and sentenced on February 10, 2014, to 30 years in prison (Federal Bureau of Investigation, 2014; Daugherty, 2013b). Five of the persons convicted of espionage-related offenses who did not hold security clearances or access to classified information passed information or technology that was restricted because, as a military defense or dual military and commercial use, it was subject to export control laws. The DoS administers the United States Munitions List that details in 20 categories the technologies, equipment, and information that are restricted from export to foreign personsthat is, non-U.S. citizens. Export in this context includes the sharing of information (U.S. Code Title 22, chapter 39, 2778). Marc Knapp is a recent example of someone in this group who tried to export restricted military technology to a hostile foreign power now under a trade embargo, Iran.8\nStarting in December 2009, for 7 months Knapp negotiated with a person he thought was a buyer for Iranians seeking restricted American military equipment and manuals that were export controlled. Knapp was a collector of military hardware, so he had connections into the world of buying and selling such articles, and since 2007 he had been unemployed after he lost his human resources job at a biotechnology company (Associated Press, 2011; O'Sullivan, 2011). He needed money. An acquaintance of Knapp's, who was already being investigated for illegal technology export, pointed investigators to Knapp as one of the sources of the equipment he had sold, and cut a deal for a light sentence for himself in exchange for cooperating with them against Knapp. The buyer was actually an undercover agent from the U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) Homeland Security Investigations (Department of Justice, 2011). Knapp promised the undercover agent he could deliver multiple anti-gravity flight suits, an F-14 NATOPS emergency procedures manual for use in flight emergencies in various U.S. military aircraft, multiple electronic versions of this manual, four AN/PRC-149 survival radioswhich were hand-held search and rescue radios typically used by U.S. Navy pilots as emergency locator beacons, two F-14 aircraft pilot ejection seats and, most dramatically, an F-5B Tiger II fighter jet aircraft offered at $3.25 million (Department of Justice, 2011). The agent documented Knapp explaining to him that prohibited customers for such sensitive U.S. military hardware, including Iran and, he hoped, China and Russia, could benefit by reverse engineering these technologies, or they could choose to \"just listen in\" to emergency beacon signals coming from downed American pilots (Immigration and Customs Enforcement, 2011). He saw himself \"leveling the playing field\" for his customers vis-a-vis the more advanced position of the United States (United States District Court for the District of Delaware, 2010). Knapp insisted he and the agent use code words and false names to discuss their plans; he opened an offshore bank account to store his commission; he used only encrypted email. He grasped the complicated procedures and paperwork required to export something as sensitive and obvious as a jet fighter plane, and realized how to lie at the right places to proceed with it. He delivered several shipments of the smaller equipment to Hungary, his transshipment point to Iran; once on the ground in Hungary they were swiftly collected by ICE. Knapp was making his final arrangements to have the fighter jet flown to the east coast for crating when DHS arrested him on July 20, 2010. He pled guilty the following July and was sentenced in September 2011 to 46 months (3 years and 10 months) in prison (Immigration and Customs Enforcement, 2011). Another five individuals without access to classified information themselves simply stole classified information. One of the \"year of the spy\" offenders from 1985, Randy Jeffries, took advantage of his employer's lax security routines to take classified materials and try to sell them to the Soviets. Jeffries worked as a messenger for the Acme Reporting Company in Washington, DC. Acme was a stenographic reporting service contracting with federal agencies and Congressional committees. Minutes, notes, documents, and testimony, all on paper and some of it classified Secret or Top Secret, would be picked up by messenger and brought to Acme to be transcribed, photocopied, and routed for publication or storage. Jeffries had worked in his low paid, routine job 2 months. He had no security clearance, since he was coming back from several years of drug rehabilitation after he lost an FBI clerk's job, where he had held a clearance (Department of Defense Security Institute, 1990). Instead, Jeffries set aside a stack of classified pages of testimony while he was working on destroying piles of papers by tearing them into four pieces and stuffing them into plastic bags and then into a dumpster available to all in an alley. (Part of the impact of this case came from learning about the egregious security environment the Acme Reporting Company had maintained by lying about its procedures as a cleared industrial security facility to Defense Investigative Service (DIS) auditors. DIS revised its audit procedures as a result of these revelations.) Jeffries took a pile of classified pages home with him and called the Soviet Military Office saying he was coming to speak with them. The FBI noted his arrival and his visit, then a second visit, and they called Jeffries while they posed as Soviets offering to meet in a hotel to discuss an arrangement. Jeffries told the FBI undercover agents that he had already given over 40 pages of samples and had not yet been paid, and asked for $5000. The FBI arrested him. He pled guilty to passing national defense information to a person not entitled to receive it and was sentenced in March 1986 to between 3 and 9 years in prison (Department of Defense Security Institute, 1990; Dolan, 1986). The last two of the eight categories of persons convicted of espionage-related offenses without holding a security clearance or access to classified information each have only two instances. Edward Buchanan and Shabaan Shabaan claimed to potential buyers of information that they had access to classified information that they wished to sell, but in fact neither one did. While still a student in Air Force training in 1985, Buchanan offered the East Germans and the Soviets classified information for sale. Air Force Office of Special Investigations agents conducted a sting, and learned that as a student Buchanan had no classified documents, but he did have plans to commit espionage as soon as his TS-SCI clearance, then in process, came through.\n\nHe was court-martialed and sentenced to 30 months of confinement (Crawford, 1998). Shabaan, a naturalized U.S citizen originally from Palestine, traveled to Iraq before the U.S. invasion there in 2003 and offered to provide Iraqi intelligence with the names of all the American spies operating in Iraq, which he falsely claimed he could procure from his classified sources. He also offered them a band of sympathizers he claimed he could organize as human shields against the coming invaders (Federal Bureau of Investigation, 2006). He was convicted at trial of acting as an agent of a foreign power without notifying the U.S Attorney General as required by law, violating the economic sanctions against Iraq, fraudulently procuring U.S. citizenship, and tampering with a witness (he threatened to behead the person, his brother). In May 2006, Shabaan was sentenced to 160 months (13 years and 4 months) in prison (United States Department of Justice Southern District of Indiana, 2006; Corcoran, 2006). Jeffrey Charlton and Brian Orr worked in jobs that required access to classified information and they held security clearances, but each saw they would be losing that access. They put aside classified documents to save for sale later after they lost their access, and when they did lose it, they made offers to sell their stockpiled documents. Charlton was an engineer at Lockheed Corporation in the 1980s and retired early in 1989, but he was disgruntled over the retirement terms offered and took with him a cache of classified documents relating to U.S. Navy stealth and anti-submarine programs. In an FBI sting, on five occasions Charlton offered to sell these for $100,000. He was arrested, pled guilty, and was sentenced in April 1996 in 2 years in prison, 5 years of supervised release, and fined $50,000 (Chu, 1996). Brian Scott Orr worked as a civilian computer engineer at the U.S. Air Force Research Laboratory in Rome, NY, between 2009 and 2011. He held Top Secret clearances in order to work on the Air Force Satellite Control Network, the computer network that controls military satellites. Orr's access was withdrawn in 2011 and he reacted by retiring, taking with him training course materials for the computer network, and sensitive technical data that could have allowed someone to seriously disrupt or destroy the military satellite system. Orr negotiated a deal with an FBI undercover agent that he thought was a representative of the People's Republic of China, and sold him two thumb drives' worth of data for $5000. He was arrested and pled guilty in a plea bargain in March 2014 to retention of stolen government property. He was sentenced in September 2014 to 37 months in prison (3 years and 1 month), 3 years of supervised release, and fined $10,000 (Federal Bureau of Investigation Los Angeles Division, 2014). The proportion of espionage-related offenders who did not hold current security clearances increased to almost half of the recent cohort44%in part because the variety of available espionage activities is proliferating.9 It is more inaccurate than ever to assume that espionage-related offenses have been or only can be committed by security clearance holders, or that the information at issue would necessarily have been classified. The examples underline the fact that some persons who held no security clearance and had no current access to classified information have been convicted of espionage-related offenses because they relied on accomplices, memory, theft, lies, or retention to collect and transmit classified information. The examples also illustrate that it is quite possible to be convicted of espionagerelated offenses for collecting and passing unclassified information. As illustrated in the Shemami and Soueid cases, foreign agents are recruited and sustained in the United States by countries interested in surreptitiously collecting publicly available information and spying on immigrant communities. As observers have noted, the scattered and partially overlapping and contradictory statutes governing espionage activities cry out for reorganization and revision by Congress itself or a Congressional commission (Epstein, 2007; Barandes, 2007).\n\n## Elements Of The Act Of Espionage\n\nOf the five sections in Part 1 of this study, four of them capture information about the 209 individuals themselvestheir demographic characteristics, employment and clearance status, the consequences they suffered for their crimes, and their motivations. The focus of this section is different in that it reports details of what these individuals did to commit espionage and what kind of spies they were, i.e., did they volunteer, were they intercepted, and which country did they try to contact. By collecting data on basic dimensions of their acts of espionage, it may be possible to discern trends in how espionage has been conducted by Americans over time. Table 6 presents some of the basic dimensions of espionage committed by the persons in the three cohorts used in this study, defined by when a person began to commit an espionage-related crime.\n\n## Elements Of The Act Of Espionage\n\n|                           |        |      | Characteristics    | 1947-1979    | 1980-1989    | 1990-2015    |\n|---------------------------|--------|------|--------------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|\n|                           | n=68   | %    | n=74               | %            | n=67         | %            |\n| Intercepted or passed     |        |      |                    |              |              |              |\n| information               |        |      |                    |              |              |              |\n|                           |        |      |                    |              |              |              |\n|                           |        |      |                    |              |              |              |\n|                           |        |      |                    |              |              |              |\n| Intercepted               | 6      | 9    | 29                 | 39           | 19           | 28           |\n| Passed information        | 62     | 91   | 45                 | 61           | 48           | 72           |\n| Duration                  |        |      |                    |              |              |              |\n| Intercepted               | 6      | 9    | 29                 | 39           | 19           | 28           |\n| Less than 1 year          | 14     | 20   | 10                 | 13           | 14           | 21           |\n| 1 to 4.9 years            | 23     | 34   | 16                 | 22           | 22           | 33           |\n| 5 or more years           | 25     | 37   | 19                 | 26           | 12           | 18           |\n| Volunteer or recruit      |        |      |                    |              |              |              |\n| n=67                      |        |      |                    |              |              |              |\n|                           |        |      |                    |              |              |              |\n|                           |        | n=66 |                    |              |              |              |\n| Volunteer                 | 34     | 51   | 47                 | 64           | 39           | 59           |\n| Recruited                 | 33     | 49   | 27                 | 36           | 27           | 41           |\n| Recruited by              | n=33   |      |                    | n=27         |              |              |\n| Family                    | 2      |      | 6                  | 3            | 11           | 3            |\n| Foreign Intelligence      | 26     | 79   | 15                 | 56           | 16           | 59           |\n| Friend                    | 5      | 15   | 9                  | 33           | 8            | 30           |\n| Method used to begin      |        |      |                    |              |              |              |\n| espionage                 | n=66   |      | n=72               |              |              |              |\n|                           |        |      |                    |              |              |              |\n| n=56                      |        |      |                    |              |              |              |\n|                           |        |      |                    |              |              |              |\n| Contact foreign agent     | 9      | 14   | 10                 | 14           | 1            | 2            |\n| Contact foreign           |        |      |                    |              |              |              |\n| embassy                   |        |      |                    |              |              |              |\n| 17                        | 26     | 28   | 39                 | 13           | 23           |              |\n| Go-between                | 5      | 7    | 3                  | 4            | 1            | 2            |\n| Other methods             | 2      | 3    | 3                  | 4            | 8            | 14           |\n| Internet                  | 0      | 0    | 1                  | 1            | 6            | 11           |\n| Recruited                 | 33     | 50   | 27                 | 38           | 27           | 48           |\n| Location where espionage  |        |      |                    |              |              |              |\n| began                     | n=66   |      |                    | n=73         |              |              |\n| Outside U.S.              | 27     |      | 41                 | 16           |              | 22           |\n| U.S. east coast           | 28     | 42   | 27                 | 37           | 32           | 48           |\n| U.S. west coast           | 6      | 9    | 19                 | 26           | 12           | 18           |\n| Other locations in U.S.   | 5      | 8    | 11                 | 15           | 11           | 16           |\n| Location where espionage  |        |      |                    |              |              |              |\n| began outside the U.S.    | n=27   |      |                    | n=16         |              |              |\n| Western Europe            | 20     |      | 74                 | 11           |              | 69           |\n| Asia and Southeast        |        |      |                    |              |              |              |\n| Asia                      | 4      | 15   | 3                  | 19           | 5            | 42           |\n| Eastern Bloc/Soviet       |        |      |                    |              |              |              |\n| Union                     |        |      |                    |              |              |              |\n| 3                         | 11     | 1    | 6                  | 0            | 0            |              |\n| Africa                    | 0      | 0    | 1                  | 6            | 0            | 0            |\n| Middle East               | 0      | 0    | 0                  | 0            | 3            | 25           |\n| Central and South         |        |      |                    |              |              |              |\n| America                   |        |      |                    |              |              |              |\n| 0                         | 0      | 0    | 0                  | 3            | 25           |              |\n| Attempts and              |        |      |                    |              |              |              |\n| transmissions of          |        |      |                    |              |              |              |\n| information to recipients |        |      |                    |              |              |              |\n| by region*                | n=69** |      |                    | n=80**       |              |              |\n| Western Europe            | 2      |      | 3                  | 1            |              | 1            |\n| Soviet Union/Russia       | 42     | 61   | 39                 | 49           | 9            | 12           |\n| Eastern Bloc              | 15     | 22   | 14                 | 17           | 1            | 1            |\n| Characteristics    |   1947-1979  |   1980-1989  |   1990-2015  |\n|--------------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|\n| Asia and Southeast |              |              |              |\n| Asia               |              |              |              |\n| 4                  |           6  |          10  |          13  |\n| Africa             |           1  |           1  |           2  |\n| Middle East        |           3  |           5  |           3  |\n| Central or South   |              |              |              |\n| America            |              |              |              |\n| 1                  |           1  |           5  |           6  |\n| Al Qaeda           |           0  |           0  |           1  |\n| USA (information   |              |              |              |\n| revealed publicly) |              |              |              |\n| 0                  |           0  |           0  |           0  |\n| Recipient unknown  |           1  |           1  |           5  |\n\n* For several individuals, it has not been revealed whether they contacted government officials or private businessmen in some of the countries they dealt with. In one instance, Noshir Gowadia, court documents show that he named multiple countries he had contacted and attempted or did pass information to, but the documents only list 6 countries by name, so 2 of the 4 attempts reported in the third cohort listed as \"recipient unknown\" are Gowadia's.\n\n** Some individuals transmitted information to two or more recipients, so the number of instances of actual or attempted passing of information in this section of the table is greater than the number of individuals in each of the three groups.\n\nTable 6 demonstrates that during the 3 decades of the first cohort of espionage offenders considered here, almost all91%transmitted information to a recipient. This success rate among American spies fell sharply during the 1980s when younger, enlisted military volunteers attempted and usually failed at espionage while trying to make themselves some money (Herbig, 2008). The recent cohort of offenders, acting since 1990, has passed their information more often than the second but less often than the first cohort. Seventy-two percent of espionage offenders since 1990 have transmitted information, less than the 91% of the first cohort, but more than the 61% of the second cohort. The duration of espionage careers reinforces the finding that the 1980s were an anomaly in the patterns of American espionage. Looking at the first two categories, that is, intercepted before passing information and passing information for less than a year, shows that in the 1980s, 52% of American spies never got their spying started or were quickly caught. In the first cohort, less than one-third of offenders had such short careers. The most recent cohort shows fewer interceptions than during the 1980s (28% rather than 39%) but 21% offenders were quickly caught within 1 year. The pattern for offenders who spied between 1 year and 4.9 years echoes the impact of the 1980s: one-third of the first cohort had these mid-length espionage careers, while only 22% of the 1980s cohort did so, and again one-third of the recent cohort spied between 1 year and 4.9 years. In a heartening finding for counterespionage, the trend among long duration espionage careers is consistently downward. Among the first cohort, 37% spied for 5 or more years. In the second cohort this fell to 26%, and in the most recent cohort since 1990, long duration espionage is down to 18%, half that of the early cohort who spied between 1947 and 1979.\n\nThere have always been more volunteers to commit espionage than recruits among American spies, but the proportions have varied over time. The early cohort was roughly half volunteers and half recruits. During the 1980s, volunteers increased to 64% of the total. Fifty-nine percent of offenders since 1990 volunteered to commit espionage while 41% were recruited, making this cohort more volunteers than the first but less than the second cohort. Recruitment of American spies by a foreign intelligence service predominated among recruits in the first cohort during the early Cold War, with 79% of those recruited, followed by 15% recruited by a friend and only 6% by a family member. This proportion changed during the 1980s and has remained so since 1990. In the second cohort, foreign intelligence services recruited 56% of recruits while the percentages recruited by family or friends each doubled when compared with the first group. The third cohort mirrors the second, with 59% recruited by a foreign intelligence service, 11% by a family member, and 30% by a friend. Among the methods of first contact to a recipient typically used by volunteer American spies, contacting the potential recipient's embassy is the most common. One-quarter of offenders telephoned or walked into embassies to volunteer as spies in the first cohort, while 39% of volunteers in the 1980s approached an embassy as did one-fourth of volunteers in the most recent cohort, even though it has been widely reported in the press that the FBI watches the entrances of embassies that would be likely recipients of information, such as that of the Soviet Union, and also attempts to place taps on their telephones and communications. Despite this, Another common method to try to begin espionage was contacting a foreign agent, which usually meant a nation's military intelligence officials or an attache. A few offenders in each cohort worked through a go-between to an intelligence service. As the Internet has become increasingly useful and convenient since 2000, more volunteer spies have turned to the Internet as a means to approach prospective recipients. In the most recent cohort since 1990, 8 individuals used the Internet to make contact with recipients. Paul Hall, who took the name Hassan Abujihaad, is one example. Paul Hall grew up in San Bernardino, CA, and joined the U.S. Navy in 1995 when he was 19. He converted to Islam, changed his name to Hassan Abujihaad (Abujihaad means \"father of holy war\" in Arabic) and, around the time of the Al Qaeda bombing of the *U.S.S. Cole* in October 2000, began an email correspondence with an English language Islamist website run by Azzam Publications and based in London. Six years later, in March 2007, having been honorably discharged, he was arrested and charged with materially aiding terrorism with intent to kill U.S. citizens and with transmitting classified information to those not authorized to receive it (Medina, 2007). In February 2008, Abujihaad stood trial and on March 6 he was convicted on both charges (\"Former sailor,\" 2008).\n\nAbujihaad allegedly contacted the Azzam Publications website late in 2000 to order videos that encouraged violent jihad. From his military duty station as a signalman on the destroyer *U.S.S. Benfield*, he ordered several videos and corresponded by email about payment and shipment options. He also reached out for personal contact with the anonymous jihadists at the website, expressing his enthusiasm for his adopted faith and for terrorist tactics. Referring to the Islamist fighters in one of his videos, he wrote with their only mission in life to make Allah's name and mission supreme all over the world, I want to let it be known that I have been in the middle east [sic] for almost a total of 3 months [that is, while onboard *the U.S.S. Benfield*]. For those 3 months you can truly see the effect of this psychological warfare [from the attack on the *U.S.S. Cole*]\ntaking a toll on junior and high ranking officers...[they were] running around like headless chickens very afraid (United States District Court for the District of Connecticut, Warrant, 2007).\n\nAuthorities stumbled on Abujihaad by following links from two other terrorism arrests. One link led to him from London, UK. In 2004, the founder of the Azzam Publications website, Babar Ahmad, a British national of Pakistani descent, and his colleague, Syed Talha Ahsan, were indicted in the United States and arrested in London for allegedly providing material support to Chechen terrorist groups and the Taliban by running a network of fundraising websites that served as a \"recruitment and propaganda tool for al Qaeda and the mujahedeen\" (Thomas, Ryan & Date, 2007). The indictments against Ahmad and Ahsan had been filed in U.S. District Court in Hartford, Connecticut, because that was where one of the website's Internet service providers was located. The two website owners fought extradition to the United States in the British courts starting in 2004 (Whitlock, 2005; Associated Press, 2012). Shortly before their arrest, a raid on Ahmad's house turned up a password-protected floppy disk with the plan for a U.S. Navy battle group (including the U.S.S. Benfield) to transit from California to the Persian Gulf in the spring of 2001.10 The material on the disk also pointed out vulnerabilities in the\n\n10 The case of Babar Ahmad, which is outside the scope of this study since Ahmad is a British citizen, nevertheless illustrates the potential for linkages between espionage and terrorism. Ahmad founded Azzam.com in 1996 as the first English language jihadist website, setting the standard for all subsequent global sites that sought to communicate in English, and for the first time linking to established sites in Arabic, making them accessible to a larger audience. He featured sophisticated graphics on his site, and he advanced a radical agenda in a tone of moderation, luring in the curious and gullible. \"It taught an entire generation about jihad,\" one terrorism researcher noted, \"Even in its nascency, it was professional.\" Since his arrest in 2004, Ahmad worked from prison to publicize his plight and to advance the Islamist cause to a wider audience. Working with relatives and friends outside who put his material onto his new website, Ahmad argued that if he were extradited to Connecticut (because a server for his website had been located there), he would end up a casualty of the U.S. war on terror, and would be imprisoned in Guantanamo Bay. British public figures, antiwar activists, Muslim support groups, and entertainment notables came out in support of Ahmad in his claim of innocence; 10,000 people signed an online petition calling on the British government to block the extradition;\n\nships' defenses and the best locations from which to attack the fleet. Prosecutors alleged this classified information was sent by Abujihaad, who held a Secret clearance, who was passing it along to his friends at Azzam Publications (United States District Court for the District of Connecticut, Warrant, 2007; United States Attorney's Office District of Connecticut, 2007). The second link led to Abujihaad from a terrorism arrest in the greater Chicago area. Abujihaad left the Navy in 2002 with an honorable discharge. In the fall of 2004, he was in Phoenix, AZ, rooming with a fellow would-be jihadist, Derrick Shareef, when news broke that Babar Ahmad had been arrested in London and the Azzam website had been shut down. Shareef, in turn, was arrested early in December 2006 in Genoa, IL, where he was accused of planning a terror attack on holiday shoppers at the CherryVale shopping mall. He had bartered his stereo speakers for hand grenades (actually duds) from FBI agents in a sting operation (White, 2007). While under arrest Shareef reported to investigators that 2 years earlier, his roommate, Abujihaad, had been upset when he learned about Ahmad's arrest: he had blurted out, \"I think this is about me!\" started to cry, and soon set about destroying his videos and deleting his emails from Azzam Publications. This information, added to the evidence of the classified fleet transit plan and the emails that had been exchanged with Azzam personnel, led to Abujihaad's arrest in Phoenix in March 2007. At the time, Abujihaad was working for United Parcel Service as a deliveryman and supporting two small children (White, 2007). Abujihaad was convicted on March 6, 2008, of providing material support to terrorists and of disclosing classified information related to the national defense to those unauthorized to receive it. A year later, a judge granted a defense motion for his acquittal on the charge of providing material support to terrorists based on the judge's application of the law's language. On April 3, 2009, Abujihaad was sentenced to 120 months (10 years) in prison on the remaining charge of disclosing classified information about the battle group plan of transit to the publishers at the Azzam website, Ahmad and Ahsan (U.S. Department of Justice Press Release, 2009; Mahony, 2009). The remaining 6 persons in the most recent cohort used various methods to contact recipients, including meetings in person, sending offers through the mail, and in one instance, granting foreign nationals access to export-restricted materials in a\n\n140,000 people signed another in 2012. In 2005, Ahmad ran for Parliament from his cell, garnering 2% of the vote in his district (Whitlock, 2005). He won 60,000 in damages for injuries he received from the police during their raid on his apartment and his initial arrest. Extradited to the United States in 2012, he pled guilty in December 2013 in a plea bargain to providing material support to terrorists, and was sentenced in July 2014 to 12 and 12 years in prison. Since he had already been held in 10 different jails and prisons either in the U.K. or in the U.S. for over 11 years, many in solitary confinement, he spent just another 13 months in prison and was released to return to the UK in July 2015. He maintains that although the classified battle plan was found in his apartment, he never did anything with it or passed it to anyone else (Kundnani & Theoharis, 2014; Ratcliffe, 2015).\n\nlaboratory working on U.S. Air Force weapons contract developing drones. John Reece Roth, a 72-year old emeritus physics professor at the University of Tennessee and expert in plasma technology, headed a lab researching plasma actuators for drones as a subcontractor for Atmospheric Glow Technology, Inc., the company that held the Air Force contract. Despite being warned that he was violating the law, Roth insisted on including promising foreign graduate students, one from China and the other from Iran, on the research, even though the contract specified that any technology to be developed was export controlled and could not be shared with foreign nationals. Roth also sent documents based on the research via email to professional contacts in China, and took other documents with him to China to present their findings in person. He was charged with conspiring with the company to defraud the Air Force, 15 counts of violating the Arms Control Export Act, and one count of wire fraud. Convicted on all counts on September 3, 2008, Roth was sentenced in July, 2009, to 48 months in prison (4 years) followed by 2 years of supervised release (Satterfield, 2008; United States Department of Justice, 2008; United States Department of Justice, 2009). Offenders in the first cohort in Table 6 were most likely to begin their espionage either overseas (41%) or on the East Coast of the United States, where government agencies and intelligence headquarters are concentrated. There has been a steady decline over time in the proportion of espionage cases begun overseas, such that in the recent cohort since 1990 only 18% began outside the United States, while roughly half originated on the East Coast. The remainder was divided between the West Coast and other U.S. locations. Looking specifically at the small numbers of individuals who began espionage overseas and in what region of the world these persons were physically located when they first acted, there is a large shift between the first two cohorts and third cohort of offenders. In the first two cohorts, most overseas cases began in Western Europe, in the Eastern Bloc, or in Soviet Union. In a few cases, they began in Asia or Southeast Asia.11 In the most recent cohort since 1990, only one case has been initiated in Western Europe, 5 have started in Asia or Southeast Asia, and 3 each have started in the Middle East or in Central or South America. Americans looking to commit espionage appear to have spread around the globe as customers for their information have expanded. The shift in recipients of espionage-related offenses by Americans coincided with the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. Eighty-three percent of the attempts or actual transmissions by individuals in the early Cold War cohort went to the Soviet Union or to the Eastern Bloc countries, which sent them as a matter of course to\n\n## Elements Of The Act Of Espionage\n\nthe Soviets. Soviet predominance as the recipient for American espionage also remained high in the later Cold War decade of the 1980s, with 66% attempts or transmissions to the Soviet Union or to the Eastern Bloc. In the third cohort since 1990, the Soviet Union or Russia and the Eastern Bloc nations declined as recipients to 13% of attempts or transmissions. Only a few Western European nations received the fruits of American espionage in each of the three cohorts; the most recent cohort since 1990 is the largest with four Western European recipients. Countries in Asia and Southeast Asia, predominantly China, have been more common recipients of American espionage since 1990, with the percentages of attempts or transmissions to the Far East increasing from 6% in the first cohort to 13% in the second to 29% since 1990. The Middle East and the countries of Central and South America likewise grew in popularity as recipients: from 5% and 4% in the first two cohorts the Middle East increased to 20% of attempts or transmissions, while Central and South America increased from 1% and 6% to 14% since 1990. Finally, Al Qaeda served as the recipient of information from Americans in four instances since 1990, and in seven instances Americans attempted or transmitted information to other Americans, usually journalists or public news sources, which then resent the information out into the world. A chart of these data on recipients of espionage by Americans in Figure 1 illustrates the prevalence of the Soviet Union and their Eastern European allies during the first two periods, and the shift to a greater variety of recipients in the recent cohort.\n\n\nThe more equal-opportunity competition for American secrets among recipients since 1990 implies more challenges for American counterespionage, since there are different strong foreign intelligence services to counteract and more foreign interests to watch. The Russians continue their traditional espionage activities, China invests heavily in its distinctive information gathering efforts, and Cuba fields effective intelligence service activities inside the United States. The three largest recipient countries for American espionage in the recent cohort since 1990 are China with 15 attempts or transmissions of information, the Soviet Union or Russia with 9, and Cuba with 7. However, there are also a larger number of recipients of even one or two instances of offers from Americans, including Cambodia, Iraq, Iran, Israel, Syria, Taiwan, Venezuela, France, South Korea, and Saudi Arabia. Approaches to these countries were not uniformly welcomed or accepted.\n\n## How Information Has Been Transmitted\n\nTable 7 reports on three variables that capture details about the transmittal of information during espionage-related acts: (1) the media in which the information was prepared for transmittal; (2) the method that was used to transmit it; and (3) the location of the spy when the information was transmitted. These variables sometimes reflect knowledge that was gained by counterintelligence or law enforcement officers in the course of their investigations, and since they may reveal the sources or methods that were used, such information is often withheld or vaguely described in open sources. As such, there are much missing data in these variables. Even if an entry is coded \"no,\" that is, there is no mention in open sources of its use in the case, one cannot be certain that it was not used, only that it was not revealed publicly. Therefore, these variables are not reported for each individual; we cannot know for sure that additional methods were not also used, and an individual may have used more than one medium, method, or location. Instead, all the entries in each variable that were mentioned are reported in the three cohorts as choices, and the sum of those reported methods is then used to derive the percentages listed by entry within a cohort.\n\n## What, How, And Where Information Was Transmitted\n\n| Characteristics          | 1947-1979    | 1980-1989    | 1990-2015    |\n|--------------------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|\n| Media transmittal        |              |              |              |\n| choices                  |              |              |              |\n| n= 73                    |              |              |              |\n| choices                  |              | % of  73     |              |\n| n= 91                    |              |              |              |\n| choices                  |              | % of  91     |              |\n| n= 106                   |              |              |              |\n| choices                  |              | % of  106    |              |\n| Original documents or    |              |              |              |\n| photos                   | 37           | 51           | 39           |\n| Photos, films, or videos |              |              |              |\n| of originals             | 16           | 22           | 13           |\n| Photocopies              | 8            | 11           | 9            |\n| Parts or equipment       | 0            | 0            | 4            |\n| Microfiche or via short  |              |              |              |\n| wave radio               |              |              |              |\n| 6                        |              |              |              |\n|                          | 8            | 5            | 5            |\n| Memory                   | 4            | 5            | 11           |\n| Electronic files         | 2            | 3            | 10           |\n| Method transmittal       |              |              |              |\n| choices                  |              |              |              |\n| n= 73                    |              |              |              |\n| choices                  |              | % of  73     |              |\n| n= 102                   |              |              |              |\n| choices                  |              |              |              |\n| % of                     |              |              |              |\n| 102                      |              |              |              |\n| n= 77                    |              |              |              |\n| choices                  |              | % of  77     |              |\n| Meeting in person        | 46           | 63           | 35           |\n| Courier                  | 10           | 14           | 13           |\n| Telephone                | 2            | 2            | 11           |\n| Dead drop                | 7            | 10           | 5            |\n| Mail or telegram         | 7            | 10           | 11           |\n| Not attempted            | 1            | 1            | 27           |\n| Location transmittal     |              |              |              |\n| choices                  |              |              |              |\n| n= 49                    |              |              |              |\n| choices                  |              | % of  49     |              |\n| n= 76                    |              |              |              |\n| choices                  |              | % of  76     |              |\n| n= 80                    |              |              |              |\n| choices                  |              | % of  80     |              |\n| Out of country           | 25           | 51           | 22           |\n| Out of town from         |              |              |              |\n| residence                | 6            | 12           | 9            |\n| Hotel or motel room      | 0            | 0            | 0            |\n| P.O. Box                 | 0            | 0            | 1            |\n| Embassy                  | 7            | 15           | 8            |\n| Parking lot              | 2            | 4            | 1            |\n| Not attempted            | 6            | 12           | 27           |\n| Other                    | 3            | 6            | 8            |\n|                          |              |              |              |\n\nAmong the types of media transmitted by the persons in the first cohort, those active between 1947 and 1979, half of the media types were original documents. This declined in the second cohort to 43% and to 30% in the third cohort as photocopying and electronic transmission grew common starting in the 1980s. Taking photographs or filming original documents comprised almost one-quarter of the media transmitted in the first cohort, but this declined to 13% in the second and then to only 5% in the third. The incidence of sending photocopies (13% for the third cohort), actual parts or equipment (3% for the third cohort, and microfiche or shortwave radio transmissions (7% for the third cohort) remained roughly same across the three time periods. Reliance on one's memory doubled from the first to the second cohort and almost tripled in the third to 14%. Not surprisingly, since 1990, the transmission of information by electronic files increased dramatically in the most recent cohort to 28%. Meeting a recipient in person has been by far the most common method of transmission. More than three-fifths (63%) of methods chosen by those in the first cohort were meetings, and in the most recent cohort, meetings were the choice of 57% as well. In the second cohort, active during the 1980s, at a time when more young amateur spies tried their hands at espionage, the predominance of using meetings declined to 35%, but the proportion of instances with no attempt to transmit informationbecause the person had been prevented or intercepted before the attemptincreased to one-quarter of the total. Use of the telephone to transmit information increased over time, while the use of a courier, dead drops, and the mail or telegrams all declined. Locations chosen for transmission, usually during meetings, have most commonly been outside the United States, either because the spy was already located abroad or in order to evade the monitoring and counterespionage activities undertaken by authorities in this country. Half of the locations for transmittal in the first cohort were outside the country, while in the second and third cohorts this decreased to roughly one-third of the locations, but they remained the most common choices. A location out of town from where the spy lived or worked was the second most popular choice for transmitting information by the first cohort with 12%, and remained the choice of 12% and 14% in the second and third cohorts. Post office boxes and parking lots have not been common choices in any cohort. Going to a foreign embassy has been the location for 15% of instances in the first cohort, 11% in the second, and 10 % in the third. Hotel or motel rooms were no spy's choice of location in the first two cohorts, but since the FBI has honed its sting techniques to collect evidence by recording conversations in hotel rooms, these locations were used by at least 10 individuals in the recent cohort, to their regret. As in the previous variable on methods of transmission, there were more instances of interceptions before transmittal was attempted in the second cohort during the 1980s; this increased to 35% of the total for the second cohort. There has also been a steady increase in other locations of transmittal and this became one-quarter of the total for the most recent cohort, including transmission while in restaurants, in grocery stores, in cars, and by downloading over the Internet from classified networks while at places of work or by sending emails from home.13\n\n## Consequences Of Espionage\n\nThe consequences American espionage-offenders suffer for their crimes vary from light punishments to life in prison. Occasionally, the rewards for espionage have been generous, but most often they have been disappointing. Table 8 reports available data on how espionage-offenders were detected, and then on trends in payment, initial prison sentences, and outcomes other than prison.\n\n## Consequences Of Espionage\n\n| Characteristics                   | 1947-1979    | 1980-1989    | 1990-2015    |\n|-----------------------------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|\n|                                   |              |              |              |\n| (n = 66                           |              |              |              |\n| methods)                          |              |              |              |\n| %                                 |              |              |              |\n| (n = 85                           |              |              |              |\n| methods)                          |              |              |              |\n| %                                 |              |              |              |\n| (n = 107                          |              |              |              |\n| methods)                          |              |              |              |\n|                                   | %            |              |              |\n| Known methods of detection        |              |              |              |\n| 14                                |              |              |              |\n|                                   |              |              |              |\n|                                   |              |              |              |\n| Surveillance                      | 21           | 32           | 24           |\n| Tip                               |              | 22           | 33           |\n| Confession                        |              | 4            | 6            |\n| Offer for sale                    | 2            | 3            | 8            |\n| Telephone tap                     |              | 2            | 3            |\n| Other                             |              |              | 15           |\n|                                   |              |              |              |\n| n=54                              |              |              |              |\n| persons                           |              |              |              |\n| %                                 |              |              |              |\n| n=68                              |              |              |              |\n| persons                           |              |              |              |\n| %                                 |              |              |              |\n| n=50                              |              |              |              |\n| persons                           |              |              |              |\n| %                                 |              |              |              |\n| Payment                           |              |              |              |\n| none                              | 19           | 35           | 41           |\n| $50 - $999                        | 3            | 5            | 7            |\n| $1,000 - $9,999                   | 7            | 13           | 7            |\n| $10,000 - $99,999                 | 15           | 28           | 8            |\n| $100,000 - $999,999               | 7            | 13           | 4            |\n| $1 million or more                | 3            | 5            | 1            |\n|                                   |              |              |              |\n|                                   |              |              |              |\n| n=67                              |              |              |              |\n| persons                           | %            |              |              |\n| n=72                              |              |              |              |\n| persons                           |              |              |              |\n| %                                 |              |              |              |\n| n=66                              |              |              |              |\n| persons                           |              |              |              |\n| %                                 |              |              |              |\n| Initial prison sentence, in years |              |              |              |\n| None                              | 15           | 22           | 6            |\n| .1 - 4.9 years                    | 8            | 12           | 15           |\n| 5 - 9.9 years                     | 10           | 15           | 14           |\n| 10 - 19.9 years                   | 13           | 19           | 14           |\n\n\nrecognize during this period the import of the shift to reliance on information technology, and the large impact it would have on espionage. The shift happened gradually.\n\n14 This variable shows the number of known methods of detection, not the number of individuals as in the subsequent variables in this table. All methods of detection mentioned for each individual are coded, and an individual may have used more than one method. So, for example, among the first cohort of 68 individuals, there were 21 instances of surveillance leading to detection. There were 22 tips, 4 confessions, 2 offers to sell information, 2 wire taps, and 15 other methods of detection described in open sources for these 68 persons, for a total of 66 methods mentioned for the persons in this cohort. To get a percentage, each method is divided by the number of that type of method for the cohort, i.e., for surveillance in the first cohort: 21 / 66 = 32% of the methods mentioned for the first cohort included surveillance.\n\n|                              |      |    | Characteristics    | 1947-1979    | 1980-1989    | 1990-2015    |\n|------------------------------|------|----|--------------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|\n| 20 - 29.9 years              | 4    | 6  | 10                 | 14           | 2            | 3            |\n| 30 - 39.9 years              | 4    | 6  | 6                  | 8            | 5            | 8            |\n| 40 years                     | 2    | 3  | 1                  | 1            | 0            | 0            |\n| life in prison               | 11   | 17 | 6                  | 8            | 4            | 6            |\n|                              |      |    |                    |              |              |              |\n|                              | n=14 |    | %                  | n=5          |              | %            |\n| Outcomes other than being    |      |    |                    |              |              |              |\n| sentenced to prison at trial |      |    |                    |              |              |              |\n|                              |      |    |                    |              |              |              |\n| Discharged                   | 2    |    | 14                 | 0            |              | 0            |\n| Defected                     | 5    | 36 | 3                  | 60           | 0            | 0            |\n| Granted immunity             | 1    | 7  | 2                  | 40           | 0            | 0            |\n| Suicide                      | 4    | 29 | 0                  | 0            | 0            | 0            |\n| Died                         | 1    | 7  | 0                  | 0            | 0            | 0            |\n| Exchanged                    | 1    | 7  | 0                  | 0            | 0            | 0            |\n\nThe first variable in Table 8 reports on known methods of detection rather than on numbers of individuals as the remaining variables in this table do. How a person who was planning or committing espionage was detected is a sensitive piece of information that usually is withheld from the public by counterintelligence and law enforcement authorities in order to protect the sources and methods they use. What does appear in open sources may be vague, implied, or even doctored by those authorities. There are much missing data for this variable. Since in each cohort more methods were mentioned for roughly similar numbers of spies, and persons may have been detected by the use of more than one method, these data reveal little about changes over time. For each cohort, roughly three-fifths of the known methods of detection were either surveillance or getting a tip. The other methods coded here, confession to the crime, making an offer for sale, and use of a telephone tap, were less common. A variety of methods of detection were coded as \"other,\" including discovery by various kinds of monitoring (video, Internet, and counterintelligence monitoring), physical search by police in the course of responding to another crime, captured documents from the Iraq War, suspicious polygraph results, financial analysis of a person under suspicion, discovery in the course of committing another crime, or as part of the investigation of a crime by an accomplice, and a recipient of information who turns the person into the authorities. Espionage-related crimes by Americans are a loser's game. The proportion of spies who received no payment at all increased over time from 35% of the first cohort, to 60% of the second cohort during the 1980s, to 68% of the recent cohort starting in 1990. Across all three cohorts, one-half of those who received no payment were intercepted before they could transmit information and receive payment for it (46 of\n94 individuals)15. Another one-fourth of persons who were not paid acted from an ideological commitment or from divided loyalties to another country or cause, and these 24 offenders did not seek payment for their activities. The amounts of money paid to offenders who did get paid has also uniformly decreased for those in the most recent cohort compared to the first cohort when, for example, 22 individuals made between $10,000 and $100,000. Since 1990 only 12 persons have made that much money. Three spies in the first cohort, who began between 1947 and 1979, became millionaires from their crimes (Larry Wu-Tai Chin, John Walker, and Clyde Conrad) and one did so who began in the 1980s (Aldrich Ames), but no one has received that much money for espionage-related crimes who began since 1990. On the other hand, while it is poorly paid, espionage by Americans usually ends in prison. Individuals who received no prison sentence have declined across time from 22% of the first cohort to 8% of the second and 4% of the third. The two lowest categories of prison time, 1 to 5 years and 5 to 10 years, both show increased numbers of persons over time, especially the 1 to 5 category where 12% of the first cohort increased to 21% of the second and 42% of the third. The next four categories of between 10 to 40 years in prison generally declined over time as espionage drew somewhat lighter sentences and the types of laws used in prosecutions grew more varied. Eleven spies in the first cohort received life sentences, six did so in the second, but only four in the third. In the decades of the first cohort, outcomes for espionage other than a prison sentence were more common, but these have declined starting in the 1980s. The numbers in this variable are very small. Two individuals in the first and two in the third cohort have been discharged, usually for prosecutorial misconduct or failure. Five persons in the first and three in the second cohort defected to the country to which they sent information before they could be prosecuted. One person in the first and two in the second cohort were granted immunity from prosecution. Four persons committed suicide before they could be prosecuted; all of them were in the first cohort. One person, Ruby Schuler, died from alcoholism during the investigation into her crime as an accomplice of James Harper. One person in the first cohort was exchanged for another prisoner.\n\n## Motivations Motivations\n\nIt is challenging to distill into a limited number of categories a person's motivations for taking such a risky and consequential action as to commit espionage against one's country. Even when the categories appear to fit a crime as closely as possible, the nuances, the flavor, the idiosyncratic elements that a person brings to motive are unique. Therefore, the analyses here try to capture two related dimensions of motivations: first, the main thrust of the espionage offenders' motives in \"strong motivations,\" which are either the person's only motive or the primary motive; and second, the wider picture of all motivations over time, including secondary and minor motives, held by the 209 persons under study here.\n\n## Strong Motivations For Espionage\n\nThe strong motivations of individuals to commit espionage-related crimes over the three time periods are reported in Table 9. This table differentiates between the number of persons who had a sole motive, which presumably would also be the strong one, and the number of persons with multiple motives among which has been identified the primary motive for each variable. Where evidence suggested it, multiple motives were coded as primary, secondary, or tertiary. This was necessarily a subjective judgment since it was based on written open sources and not on personal interviews. If possible, it is most historically accurate to determine motivation from evidence available while the crime was being committed, rather than from the self-justifications of the offender after the fact. Once caught, spies tend to justify their actions to themselves and to others. They see their own past intentions and the pressures that may have affected their behavior in a changed and often generous light. For some individuals however, their retrospective justifications are the only available evidence about their motives. Since each person who had more than one motive has had one of them designated as primary by coders, Table 9 depicts the strong motives of all 209 persons in the database. It does not, however, present secondary or tertiary motives, and so it is not the complete picture. Secondary and tertiary motives are accounted for in Table 10.\n\n## Strong Motivations For Espionage\n\n|                                   |      |    | Characteristics    | 1947-1979    | 1980-1989    | 1990-2015    |\n|-----------------------------------|------|----|--------------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|\n| Persons in each cohort            | n=68 |    | n=74               |              | n=67         |              |\n| Number persons with a sole motive | 44   |    | 34                 |              | 22           |              |\n| Number persons with multiple      |      |    |                    |              |              |              |\n| motives                           | 24   |    | 40                 |              | 45           |              |\n|                                   |      |    |                    |              |              |              |\n|                                   | n    | %  | n                  | %            | n            | %            |\n| Money                             |      |    |                    |              |              |              |\n| Sole motive                       | 20   | 29 | 26                 | 35           | 7            | 10           |\n| Primary among multiple motives    | 10   | 15 | 21                 | 28           | 18           | 27           |\n|                                   |      |    |                    |              |              |              |\n| 30                                | 44   | 47 | 63                 | 25           | 37           |              |\n|                                   |      |    |                    |              |              |              |\n|                                   |      |    |                    |              |              |              |\n|                                   |      |    |                    |              |              |              |\n| Divided loyalties                 |      |    |                    |              |              |              |\n| Sole motive                       | 8    | 12 | 3                  | 4            | 9            | 13           |\n| Primary among multiple motives    | 7    | 10 | 10                 | 14           | 15           | 22           |\n|                                   | 15   | 22 | 13                 | 18           | 24           | 35           |\n|                                   |      |    |                    |              |              |              |\n|                                   |      |    |                    |              |              |              |\n| Disgruntlement                    |      |    |                    |              |              |              |\n| Sole motive                       | 7    | 10 | 2                  | 3            | 2            | 3            |\n| Primary among multiple motives    | 5    | 7  | 3                  | 4            | 8            | 12           |\n|                                   |      |    |                    |              |              |              |\n| 12                                | 17   | 5  | 7                  | 10           | 15           |              |\n|                                   |      |    |                    |              |              |              |\n|                                   |      |    |                    |              |              |              |\n| Ingratiation                      |      |    |                    |              |              |              |\n| Sole motive                       | 4    | 6  | 1                  | 1            | 3            | 4            |\n| Primary among multiple motives    | 1    | 1  | 6                  | 8            | 4            | 6            |\n|                                   | 5    | 7  | 7                  | 9            | 7            | 10           |\n|                                   |      |    |                    |              |              |              |\n|                                   |      |    |                    |              |              |              |\n| Coercion                          |      |    |                    |              |              |              |\n| Sole motive                       | 4    | 6  | 0                  | 0            | 0            | 0            |\n| Primary among multiple motives    | 1    | 1  | 0                  | 0            | 0            | 0            |\n|                                   | 5    | 7  | 0                  | 0            | 0            | 0            |\n|                                   |      |    |                    |              |              |              |\n|                                   |      |    |                    |              |              |              |\n| Thrills                           |      |    |                    |              |              |              |\n| Sole motive                       | 1    |    | 1                  |              | 1            |              |\n| Primary among multiple motives    | 0    | 0  | 0                  | 0            | 0            | 0            |\n|                                   | 1    | 1  | 1                  | 1            | 0            | 0            |\n|                                   |      |    |                    |              |              |              |\n|                                   |      |    |                    |              |              |              |\n| Recognition or ego                |      |    |                    |              |              |              |\n| Sole motive                       | 0    | 0  | 1                  | 1            | 1            | 1            |\n| Primary among multiple motives    | 0    | 0  | 0                  | 0            | 0            | 0            |\n|                                   | 0    | 0  | 1                  | 1            | 1            | 1            |\n\n## Motivations\n\nMoney has been the strongest motive for espionage by Americans. In the first cohort, 44% of persons had a strong motive to spy for money. This predominance increased during the 1980s when 63% of persons in the cohort held money as their strong motive. The 1980s earned the label \"decade of the spy,\" because of the apparent flood of cases of espionage by Americans who were spying for money (Lentz, 1985; Molotsky, 1985; Brock, 1987). Commentators expressed concern about a decline in American values when, during a Cold War, so many more young people were willing to betray their country's secrets for money (Lentz, 1985). However, in the recent cohort that began espionage-related crime since 1990, money as a strong motive has declined somewhat, to 37%. This decline mirrors an increase in divided loyalties as a motive. Divided loyalties is defined here as a commitment by American citizens to another country or cause that they put before the United States. This would include supporting terrorist groups or ideological systems such as Communism, as well as helping other nation states. While spying from divided loyalties was a less important motive in the first two cohorts, in which it was 22% of the first and 18% of the second cohort, it grew in importance among those in the most recent cohort. It rivaled money: among those who began espionage since 1990, a total of 35% spied from divided loyalties (combining sole and primary motives), compared to 37% for money. Why are there more divided loyalties among those who began since 1990? In part, the increase would seem to reflect (1) the knitting together of the peoples of the world with improved transportation, communications, and the Internet, all of which helps to foster and maintain foreign ties, (2) an increase in the proportion of persons with ties to foreign nations in jobs with access to sensitive or classified information, and (3) the broadening of the categories of espionage in this analysis to include not just national security but also other types of espionage-related offences including leaks, economic espionage, foreign agent prosecutions, and export control cases. Disgruntlement is the third most common motive for American espionage, although it is often mixed with other motives where it is a secondary or tertiary motive. It is defined as feelings of betrayal, disappointment, or resentment, at treatment usually experienced in a job or professional setting. Only 11 individuals across the three time periods committed espionage-related crimes solely from disgruntlement, but 16 others did so primarily from disgruntlement mixed with additional motives such as money or thrills. The remaining variables show smaller numbers of individuals whose strong motive, sole or primary, was ingratiation, coercion by someone else (such as blackmail), thrills, or recognition. Ingratiation strongly motivated 10% or less in each cohort; coercion was a strong motive only in the first cohort with 7%, and thrills and recognition only served as strong motives for 1% of individuals in two of the three cohorts. Figure 2 illustrates the pattern of strong motivations for espionage across the three cohorts. Here strong motivations are defined as having only one motive. The predominance of money in the first two cohorts is apparent.\n\n\n\n## Figure 2  Sole, Or Strong, Motivations Motivations Through Time\n\nTable 10 presents the data on motivations in a different way. Whereas Table 9 looked at the numbers of persons who held strong motivations (defined as sole motives or primary motives), Table 10 depicts motivation of any strength across cohorts. It answers the question, for example: \"how many persons were motivated by money in the first cohort, no matter how exclusively or how strongly they held this motive?\" This approach combines the persons with sole motivations with those who had multiple motivations, and so it accounts for motives that usually appear as secondary or tertiary in the coding of relative importance. It recognizes that inferring the relative importance of motives in a person's action, no matter how carefully researched the available sources and how discerning the judgment, is subjective and inexact. For completeness, it is important to include all the motives spies have presented. In Table 10, the unit reported is motivations, not persons. The number of motivations held by each cohort is reported at the top of the table, and within that total is shown the number and percentage of each motive held in each of the three cohorts. Since some persons had multiple motives, those persons are counted for each of their motives and thus more than once.\n\nMotivations for Espionage through Time\n|                                  |       |    | Characteristics    | 1947-1979    | 1980-1989    | 1990-2015    |\n|----------------------------------|-------|----|--------------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|\n| Total motivations in each cohort | n=100 | %  | n=129              | %            | n=134        | %            |\n|                                  |       |    |                    |              |              |              |\n| Money                            | 41    | 41 | 58                 | 45           | 37           | 28           |\n|                                  |       |    |                    |              |              |              |\n| Divided loyalties                | 17    | 17 | 18                 | 14           | 30           | 22           |\n|                                  |       |    |                    |              |              |              |\n| Disgruntlement                   | 17    | 17 | 22                 | 17           | 20           | 15           |\n|                                  |       |    |                    |              |              |              |\n| Ingratiation                     | 6     | 6  | 12                 | 9            | 22           | 16           |\n|                                  |       |    |                    |              |              |              |\n| Coercion                         | 7     | 7  | 2                  | 2            | 2            | 2            |\n|                                  |       |    |                    |              |              |              |\n| Thrills                          | 10    | 10 | 10                 | 8            | 5            | 4            |\n|                                  |       |    |                    |              |              |              |\n| Recognition or ego               | 2     | 2  | 7                  | 5            | 18           | 13           |\n\nThe findings in Table 10 reinforce those reported in Table 9. Money remains the predominant motive for Americans to commit espionage-related offenses, but in the recent cohort since 1990, it has declined in predominance from 41% in the first cohorts and 45% in the second to 28% in the third, with divided loyalties in the recent cohort a close second, disgruntlement and ingratiation almost tied for third, and recognition growing in importance. Figure 3 depicts these data for all motivations, not differentiated by strength or primacy, in graphic form.\n\n## Examples Of Spying For Money\n\nBecause there are numerous motives in the espionage case of Tai Shen Kuo and his accomplicesingratiation, recognition, divided loyalties, thrillsit provides a good example of multiple motives, but the primary motive in the case was money. Kuo came to the United States in 1972 from his native Taiwan on a tennis scholarship to attend college in Louisiana. After he graduated he stayed in New Orleans, where he opened a tennis club, a restaurant and then an import furniture store and became a naturalized citizen. Starting in the late 1980s, Kuo capitalized on his natural ability to make friends and develop useful contacts by expanding his business to China. Eventually he established an office in Beijing, becoming a \"matchmaker\" who could put American businessmen in touch with powerful Chinese officials (Arrillaga, 2011). He marketed American products and services to China for other friends. A mutual friend put him in touch with a contact in China, \"a good person to know,\" who worked with one of the government-backed \"friendship associations\" that promote stronger ties with foreign nations while collecting intelligence by hosting visits to China. This contact worked for the Chinese government, and he became Kuo's backer and handler. He encouraged Kuo to find out from friends with government jobs about the U.S. government's attitudes toward the People's Republic of China (PRC) and about its plans and intentions toward Taiwan (Klopott, 2009; Arrillaga,\n\n## Motivations\n\n2011; U.S. Attorney's Office Eastern District of Virginia, 2008).16 Kuo gradually developed government sources that could provide him with such information, as well as with the answers to his contact's specific questions. One such source was his neighbor, James Fondren Jr. Kuo met Fondren in the late 1990s at the country club in Houma, LA, where they both lived and belonged to the club. Fondren had recently retired from the Air Force as a Lieutenant Colonel and was trying to start a consulting business. Kuo proposed to Fondren that he try writing opinion papers for his Chinese contact, who he described as a friend in Hong Kong who worked in academia (Arrillaga, 2011). Fondren began writing papers based on his expertise on Asia, and Kuo would pass along payment for these papers, ranging from $800 to $1500. Fondren wrote 30 reports between 1997 and 2008 which prosecutors later characterized as \"thinly disguised regurgitations of classified military reports.\" Soon after he started producing opinion pieces, Kuo invited Fondren to be his guest on a trip to China, where they met Kuo's contact, and all three played golf together and enjoyed a scenic boat trip. Fondren's consulting business continued to boast only his first client, Tai-shen Kuo. For several years after that trip, Fondren and the Chinese contact exchanged dozens of emails on specific topics of interest to the People's Republic of China (PRC) (Barakat, 2009). In 2001, Fondren returned to work for the federal government as deputy director of the Washington liaison office of United States Pacific Command. In that role he regained his Top Secret security clearance. He stopped corresponding with the contact by email and worked only through Kuo. Kuo's contact in China demanded that Kuo send him more and better sensitive information. Fondren wrote about topics that included official reactions to visits by Chinese military, joint Chinese- United States military exercises, intentions and plans for Taiwan, and insights into official American attitudes toward China. Some of these papers incorporated information classified Confidential or Secret. To assuage concern, Kuo told Fondren that his papers were being sent to government officials in Taiwan, but it is unlikely Fondren fell for that given his own relationship with the contact in China (United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, Indictment, 2009; \"Pentagon officials charged,\" 2009). Kuo next developed Gregg Bergersen as a second source. Bergersen was introduced to Kuo in 2006 at a party during one of Kuo's regular visits to northern Virginia. Bergersen, a Navy veteran, worked in the Pentagon as a weapons analyst for the Defense Security Cooperation Agency, which oversees foreign military equipment sales and tracks global weaponry. He and Kuo found each other mutually promising: Bergersen was thinking about retiring from the government and hoped his next step would be into a lucrative consulting job, while Kuo told him he was just setting up a defense consulting firm in Taiwan that would need partners like Bergersen. Kuo wanted another government source with a Top Secret security clearance and access to information on weapons policies and Taiwan; Bergersen fitted his needs perfectly. Bergersen believed Kuo's story that his information would be sent to Taiwan, and was thus taken in by Kuo's \"false flag\" operation against him (Montlake, 2008; Markon & Johnson, 2008). Kuo cultivated Bergersen's friendship by taking him out to restaurants, on outings to various cities, and paying for their trips to Las Vegas, where he underwrote Bergersen's gambling habit. Soon Kuo asked his friend to show him open source reports and plans from his office, and then asked for more restricted or even classified documents. In an infamous video taken in a rental car by a hidden camera, Bergersen and Kuo discuss the classified report for which Kuo pays by putting a bundle of folded bills into Bergersen's shirt pocket. In the video Bergersen is conflicted, claiming he will go to jail if anyone finds out he has shared this report, and Kuo assures him he will only take notes from it. Kuo then takes the report into a restaurant and copies out large sections from it while Bergersen sat waiting for him in the car.17 Among other documents, Bergersen passed Secret information to Kuo about Taiwan's upgrades to its C4ISR systems and about the United States' 5- year plan for military sales to Taiwan (Lewis, 2008; \"Caught on Tape: Selling America's Secrets,\" CBS News, 2010). Although he used email and phone calls to communicate with his Chinese contact, Kuo also sent his reports and documents to China using a \"cut out,\" a young Chinese woman, Yu Xin Kang, who was also his employee at the furniture store and his lover. A cut out, as the name implies, is used to create a gap between the supplier of information and the recipient in an espionage transaction. Kang was a Chinese national, an intelligence officer, and a legal permanent resident alien in the United States. At Kuo's request, in 2007, she came to New Orleans to help him and serve as a courier for his information, traveling back and forth between New Orleans and her apartment in Beijing, where she would meet Kuo's contact to hand over materials (Morris, 2008). The FBI learned of the espionage operation by Kuo, Bergersen, and Kang in 2007 in the course of investigating another Chinese espionage operation, this one in southern California, which focused on Chi Mak, an electrical engineer at a defense contracting company who had been passing information as a Chinese sleeper agent\n\n## Motivations\n\nfor decades.18 The FBI secretly searched Chi Mak's home and found names in his address books that included Tai-Shen Kuo and Kuo's Chinese contact. They began to run surveillance on Kuo during 2007 and 2008, following him to his meetings with Bergersen, tapping his phone and tapping his email, and tailing Kangduring this time they bugged Kuo's rental cars to get the incriminating videos of his meetings (Markon, 2008). The FBI arrested Tai-Shen Kuo, Gregg Bergersen, and Yu Xin Kang on February 11, 2008. Ironically, Kuo's arrest took place at the home of James Fondren Jr., the friend whom Kuo had come to visit. This prompted the FBI to look into Fondren, who was arrested in turn in May 2009. Kuo pled guilty to conspiracy to deliver national defense information to a foreign government and was sentenced to 188 months in prison (15 years and 7 months) and forfeited $40,000. In 2010 his sentence was reduced to 5 years based on his \"complete cooperation\" in the prosecution of Fondren, his good behavior in prison, and the relative seriousness of the information he betrayed. Bergersen pled guilty to conspiracy to disclose national defense information and was sentenced to 57 months in prison (4 years and 9 months) and 3 years supervised release; Kang pled guilty to aiding an unregistered agent of a foreign government (Kuo) and was sentenced to 18 months in prison and 3 years supervised release (Associated Press, 2010). Fondren was indicted in May 2009, went to trial in September, and was convicted of unlawful communication of classified information to an agent of a foreign government and lying to the FBI. He was sentenced in February 2010 to 36 months (3 years) in prison and 3 years supervised release (U.S. Attorney's Office Eastern District of Virginia, \"New Orleans Man Sentenced,\" 2008 [Kuo]; U.S. Department of Justice, 2008; \"Former Defense Department Official Sentenced,\" 2008 [Bergersen]; U.S Department of Justice, \"Jury Convicts Defense Department Official,\" 2009 [Fondren]; U.S Department of Justice, \"New Orleans Woman Sentenced,\" 2008 [Kang]). Kuo's motivations were first money, then divided loyalties to China, and finally the thrills he got from balancing the precarious and complicated parts in his life as both an American entrepreneur and a spy for China. Bergersen's motivations were also first money, although he denied this at trial and blamed his alcohol and gambling addictions, then ingratiation with his generous friend Kuo, and perhaps equally important, the recognition and career boost he expected from Kuo's offer to make him a partner in the projected defense contracting business in Taiwan. Money seems to have been Fondren's motivation, perhaps mixed with recognition. Kang's motivation was professional, and also a desire to ingratiate herself with Kuo, on whom she had an emotional dependence. As an intelligence agent for China, her loyalties were not divided.19\nWanting money may be the most common motive for espionage, but in turn, it can express some underlying need or unacknowledged motive, as was played out by most of the individuals in the Kuo case. Wanting money can express various psychological forces that were preying on the spy. While this study does not take a psychological approach and does not reflect access to conversations or clinical interviews with convicted spies, other studies do report on insights that were gained from this type of access, and this type of study may usefully expand on the basic motives discussed here. Based on clinical interviews with three spies who wanted money, Earl Pitts, Robert Hanssen, and Brian Regan, one psychiatrist finds that while money may be the usual superficial motive, the underlying motive for espionage is most often fear of failure, which he ascribes particularly to men. He explains that \"The only meaningful fact is whether the prospective insider spy feels like a failure to the point of it being intolerable for him....\" This author goes on to describe ten stages he sees in the evolution a spy from initial motive to acting on that motive in an act of espionage (Charney, 2010). Another student of espionage emphasizes that as it applies to money, \"Espionage is a crime with complex, multi-faceted motivational factors that do not lend themselves to easy explanations,\" and the factors reflect \"intersecting psychosocial forces\" (Thompson, 2014). His interviews with convicted spies suggest that the personal and cultural meanings of money may be as motivating as the typical categories of financial need, greed, or debt. The study notes that explaining a money motive may require understanding what not having the trappings of moneysuccess, social status, and powerimplies to the individual. For example, the ostensible motive of Aldrich Ames to commit espionage was to get $50,000 to pay off his debts, but in interviews later he was more self-aware: \"I did it for the money...not because of what it could buy but because of what it said about me... It said Rick Ames was not a failure\" [Thompson, quoting Earley, 1997).Thompson goes on to discuss other psychological dimensions of espionage, but comes back to money to make the point that some spies act from a simple pressing need for money coupled with an inability to delay gratification or to plan their future in a way that addresses this need without crime. Espionage can solve such a problem almost immediately, for a while (Thompson, 2014). A third study elaborates on the typical motives for espionage, such as money, by exploring how they may be intertwined with deeper human impulses. It applies\n\n## Motivations\n\nRobert Cialdini's six principles of interaction to how case officers successfully recruit agents to be spies by playing on their motives.20 Cialdini's principles are described as \"patterns of behavior that occur in the same order and sequence every time a given stimulus is introduced,\" so they apply to any human interaction (Burkett, 2013). The discussion applies each of six principles to the task facing a recruiter of spies. For example, one can see the principle of reciprocation at work as a recruiter begins an approach to a potential agent because he or she typically will try to do a small favor or provide a service for the potential new friend. Once the person has been helped, he or she feels obligated to reciprocate and help the recruiter in turn, which may lead to a series of exchanges that escalate into the sharing of ever more sensitive information. Cialdini argues that responses to the initial stimulusthe favorgenerate reciprocal assistance, and this cycle of helping is automatic and built into the structure of human interactions21. The responses would operate beneath the new spy's conscious awareness; these impulses to help would be motives operating beneath other conscious motives that would be typical, such as a need for money or wanting revenge at work (Burkett, 2013).\n\n## Examples Of Spying From Divided Loyalties\n\nTable 10 shows that divided loyalties has been the second most important motive in two of the three cohorts, the first and the third, but by including secondary and tertiary motives in this table, disgruntlement emerges for the first two cohorts as equally predominant with divided loyalties. Individuals are often both disgruntled and moved to act by another, stronger motive. Instances of divided loyalties that have motivated espionage-related offenses by Americans have almost doubled between the second and the most recent cohort. Gwendolyn and Walter Kendall Myers, discussed earlier as examples of espionage by a spy who had access to classified information and an accomplice with no access, were also examples of divided loyalties. Taking no money, they spied for Cuba for 3 decades from an ideological commitment to the Cuban revolution and the Communist regime that sustained it (Clark, 2010). Another example of divided loyalties is the puzzling case of Ben-Ami Kadish and his arrest for espionage in 2008. Kadish was born in 1923 in Connecticut, but at the age of 4 he was taken to British Palestine and grew up there. He fought for Israeli independence and served in both the British and the American militaries in World War II (Newman, 2008). He returned to the United States and became a mechanical engineer. Starting in 1963, Kadish worked at the U.S. Army Armament Research, Development, and Engineering Center at the Picatinny Arsenal in Dover, New Jersey, where he held a Secret security clearance (Department of Justice, \"Man arrested,\" 2008). In 1990, Kadish retired and moved with his wife to a New Jersey retirement community, \"The Ponds,\" where he participated in veterans' activities and support groups, organized religious events, delivered Meals on Wheels, and joined in sports and community activities with his retiree neighbors (Newman & Fahim, 2008). Eighteen peaceful years after he left his Army job, the FBI came to his home and arrested Kadish, charging him with committing espionage for Israel between 1979 and 1985 while he worked at the Picatinny Arsenal (Johnson, 2008). Kadish eventually admitted the essential outlines of the case the FBI made against him, and he pled guilty to one count of participating in a conspiracy to act as an unregistered agent for Israel. From 1979 through 1985 he had worked with Yosef Yagur, then a science advisor at the Israeli consulate in New York, who would telephone Kadish asking him for specific titles of classified documents and reports that Yagur wished to collect. Kadish would remove the requested documents from the classified library at the Arsenal and take them home. Yagur would come to Kadish's home and photograph the documents in Kadish's basement, then return to his own home in the Bronx (Cowan & Chan, 2008; Department of Justice, \"Man arrested,\" 2008). Among the roughly 150 documents Kadish shared with Yagur were materials on nuclear weapons classified \"Restricted Data,\" information on the modified F-15 fighter jet with the caveat NOFORN, and a Secret document regarding the U.S. Patriot missile air defense system (Department of Justice, \"Man arrested,\" 2008). While Yagur was working with Kadish in the mid-1980s, he was also one of several handlers working with Jonathan Pollard, whose work as an analyst at the Naval Intelligence Command gave him access to highly classified naval intelligence. In the same method Yagur used with Kadish, but on a much larger scale, Pollard carried boxes of classified documents from his office for his handler to photocopy at Pollard's apartment (Neumeister, 2008). This flow of information from both Pollard and Kadish ended abruptly in late November 1985, when Pollard and his wife, Anne, were arrested and charged with espionage, and Yagur fled from the United States to Israel. The Pollards' attempt to evade capture by claiming asylum in the Israeli Embassy, only to be turned away by the guards at the Embassy gate, is one of the iconic espionage images of 1985 from the \"year of the spy\" (Olive, 2006). Thereafter, Yagur lived in Israel and Kadish lived in New Jersey, but they maintained their relationship long distance, and Kadish visited Yagur in Israel in 2004. After his arrest in 2008, Kadish telephoned Yagur, who told him to lie to the FBI and say he did not remember events so long ago. Kadish did initially lie, and he was charged with lying to the FBI, though this charge was later dropped along with several others. Having pled guilty to the one count, in May 2009, a judge sentenced Kadish, then 85 years old, to no prison time and no probation but to pay a fine of $50,000, to which at his hearing Kadish replied, \"No problem\" (Neumeister, 2009; Neumeister, 2008). He returned to his wife and his retired life at The Ponds.\n\n## Motivations\n\nThe puzzling aspects of Kadish's arrest and prosecution were the timing and the motive of the authorities for pursuing him after so long. The case set off considerable speculation in the press about whether there had been or continued to be more sources working for Israel in the United States, including a \"super mole,\" long after the Pollards' arrest (Stein, 2008); whether Kadish's trip in 2004 to Israel to see Yagur had set off this investigation into his actions decades earlier; whether the timing reflected political issues then-current in 2008 between the United States and Israel; or possibly if the timing was meant to affect the upcoming leak trial of two lobbyists, Steven Rosen and Keith Weissman, who worked for the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC). (In May 2009, prosecutors withdrew charges against Rosen and Weissman after a series of unfavorable judicial rulings (Lewis and Johnston, 2009). Since Jonathan Pollard's supporters and the state of Israel itself have waged a vigorous effort to get his life sentence for espionage reduced and to obtain his release from prison, others speculated that prosecuting Kadish had something to do with preventing Pollard's release22 (Meiman, 2008;\nNeumeister, 2008). These speculations were not satisfied and the mysteries about Kadish's prosecution remain. Kadish provided classified documents to his Israeli handler over the course of 6 years from divided loyalties. He did not take money, although there are hints that after he retired and during his prosecution he was quietly taken care of. At his sentencing hearing he is quoted as explaining to the judge that \"It was a mistake. It was a misjudgment. I thought I was helping the state of Israel without harming the United States\" (Neumeister, 2009). having native or naturalized citizenship, and three variables on foreign preference.\n\n|                           |      |    | Characteristics    | 1947-1979    | 1980-1989    | 1990-2015    |\n|---------------------------|------|----|--------------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|\n|                           | n=68 | %  | n=74               | %            | n=67         | %            |\n| Citizenship               |      |    |                    |              |              |              |\n| Born in U.S.              | 53   | 79 | 62                 | 84           | 44           | 66           |\n| Naturalized               | 15   | 21 | 12                 | 16           | 23           | 34           |\n| Persons with a divided    |      |    |                    |              |              |              |\n| loyalties motivation      |      |    |                    |              |              |              |\n|                           |      |    |                    |              |              |              |\n| Born in U.S.              | 8    | 12 | 10                 | 13           | 13           | 20           |\n| Naturalized               | 9    | 13 | 8                  | 11           | 17           | 25           |\n|                           | 17   | 25 | 18                 | 24           | 30           | 45           |\n| Persons without a divided |      |    |                    |              |              |              |\n| loyalties motivation      | 51   | 75 | 56                 | 76           | 37           | 55           |\n| Person had foreign        |      |    |                    |              |              |              |\n| relatives                 |      |    |                    |              |              |              |\n|                           |      |    |                    |              |              |              |\n| Born in U.S.              | 21   | 31 | 8                  | 11           | 9            | 13           |\n| Naturalized               | 15   | 22 | 10                 | 13           | 22           | 33           |\n| No or unknown             | 32   | 47 | 56                 | 76           | 36           | 54           |\n| Person had foreign        |      |    |                    |              |              |              |\n| connections               |      |    |                    |              |              |              |\n| 24                        |      |    |                    |              |              |              |\n|                           |      |    |                    |              |              |              |\n|                           |      |    |                    |              |              |              |\n| Born in U.S.              | 6    | 9  | 6                  | 8            | 19           | 28           |\n| Naturalized               | 6    | 9  | 8                  | 11           | 20           | 30           |\n| No or unknown             | 56   | 82 | 60                 | 81           | 28           | 42           |\n| Person had foreign        |      |    |                    |              |              |              |\n| cultural ties             |      |    |                    |              |              |              |\n|                           |      |    |                    |              |              |              |\n| Born in U.S.              | 1    | 2  | 6                  | 8            | 14           | 21           |\n| Naturalized               | 5    | 7  | 5                  | 7            | 20           | 30           |\n| No or unknown             | 62   | 91 | 63                 | 85           | 33           | 49           |\n\nAs discussed in earlier tables, in the most recent cohort both the incidence of naturalized citizens and the incidence of divided loyalties as a motive almost doubled compared to each of the previous two cohorts. Naturalized citizens by definition would have ties to their country of origin, so it is not surprising that most\n\n23 The variables report the number and percentage of persons with foreign relatives, connections, or cultural ties within the two categories of 1) those born in the U.S., or 2) those who were naturalized citizens. A person may have more than one of these three ties, or may have none of them. Most persons in the database did not have these ties, or it was unknown whether they had them. Since by definition naturalized citizens come from a different country of origin that would lead to such ties, the interesting data in these variables are any similarities between the native born and the naturalized citizens.\n\n24 Foreign connections are defined as business or professional relationships or acquaintances.\n\nForeign cultural ties are defined as the person speaks the language of origin at home, maintains memberships in groups with a focus on the country of origin, or takes political or educational activities in the country of origin.\n\nnaturalized citizens do have foreign relatives, foreign connections, or foreign cultural ties. More revealing in Table 11 are the notable percentages of native born American citizens who had these ties. In most instances, the proportion of those with these three types of foreign ties, no matter whether they were native or naturalized citizens, increased in the recent cohort since 1990. These data suggest that while there has been an increase in naturalized citizens in the recent cohort of spies, the increase in divided loyalties should not be attributed only to them. When people have divided loyalties, they feel allegiance to more than one entity, usually to two nation states, but it may also be to two ideologies, two causes, or two non-state groupsor even to one or more of each. Ben-Ami Kadish was an example of someone who seemed to effortlessly hold allegiances to two nations, the United States and Israel. Walter and Gwendolyn Myers held two allegiances, one openly to the United States, and the other secretly to Fidel Castro and the Cuban revolution. As a nation of immigrants, the United States has long experience with welcoming immigrants and turning them into new citizens, while recognizing that ties of sentiment, financial support, and personal involvement with their countries of origin will persist (Spiro, 2008). In some periods of American history, recognition of those continuing ties has been generous, and at other times it has been grudging, with demands that the ties to the homeland be weakened in order to prove the new allegiance to the United States (Herbig, 2008). Individuals whose divided loyalties motivated them to commit espionage-related offenses often said they just wanted to help the other country or cause, while they downplayed or dismissed the harm their actions would do to the United States. Ben-Ami Kadish stated as much at his sentencing hearing.\n\n## Ingratiation, Coercion, Thrills, And Recognition\n\nThe findings on ingratiation strengthen when Tables 9 and 10 on motivations are compared. Although not important as a strong motive in Table 9, when secondary and tertiary motives are included in Table 10 along with sole and primary motives, ingratiation increases as a motive across the three time periods. From 6% in the first and 9% in the second cohort, ingratiation was a factor in 16% of motives in the recent cohort, with 22 individuals motivated to some degree by trying to ingratiate themselves with a family member, a friend, or a handler. Coercion has declined in frequency as a motive over time from seven persons in the first cohort to just two persons in the second and third cohorts who were motivated at all by coercion, and no one had coercion as a sole or primary motive in the second or third cohorts. The two most common pressures that had been used to coerce someone into espionage largely disappeared starting in the 1990s. First, the Berlin Wall fell after November 1989, and thereupon the Soviets abandoned the Iron Curtain that had kept people trapped in Eastern Europe from which their relatives in the West could be blackmailed. Secondly, the legal and social acceptance of homosexuality began to accelerate in the United States. Threatening to harm a person's relatives living under Communist control in Eastern Europe, or threatening through blackmail to publicly reveal one's sexual orientation, have not been effective coercion strategies to make people commit espionage among persons in the last two cohorts. Given the new configuration of transnational terrorism, with its potential and ambition to reach into the United States, different kinds of coercion involving the threat of violence are conceivable. Spying for the thrill of it has not been a strong motive, nor has it increased over time, yet it has persisted as a secondary or tertiary motive in the mix of various individuals' motives. Some spies enjoyed an emotional rush from the danger they faced while spying, and some, Robert Hanssen for example, thrived on beating the system for as long as that lasted, until they were caught (Vise, 2002). The increase in recognition as a motive for espionage in the recent cohort since 1990 is telling. Recognition refers here to a desire to be recognized and rewarded for one's accomplishments or talents. This may be public recognition, experienced in benefits such as awards, promotions, or gaining a better job, or it may be private recognitionsatisfactionfrom playing the role of an expert, source, or advisor to an admired or powerful person. Recognition does have elements of a motive labeled in typical discussions of espionage as \"ego,\" since recognition involves gratifying the sense of self, but recognition is a more specific idea and better captures how this motive plays out in recent espionage-related offenses: as ambition for advancement in job or career, or striving to exert more influence and make more of a mark in the world.\n\n## Helping And Ingratiation\n\nHelping is a common theme in the explanations of espionage-offenders' actions. \"We weren't motivated by 'anti-Americanism,'\" Walter Kendall Myers said at the sentencing hearing for him and his wife, \"our objective was to help the Cuban people defend their revolution\" (Perez, 2010). \"I thought I was helping the state of Israel without harming the United States,\" Ben-Ami Kadish said about his actions (Neumeister, 2009). \"I believe our government's policy towards Cuba is cruel and unfair,\" Ana Montes explained at her sentencing in 2002, noting that \"I felt morally obligated to help the island defend itself from our efforts to impose our values and political system on it\" (Golden, 2002). Individuals acting on divided loyalties reject the exclusive commitment of allegiance, and often claim they were above the petty demands of allegiance to a single nation. By helping another country, they imagined they were climbing onto a higher moral plane of international cooperation.\n\n\"I'm Chinese, I'm American,\" Dongfan Chung's wife25 told a journalist after her\n\n## Motivations\n\nhusband's sentencing for economic espionage, \"How beautiful is that! Why make it a confrontation?\" (Bhattacharjee, 2014). However, a desire to help is not limited only to those whose divided loyalties led them to commit espionage-related offenses. As noted earlier, Table 10 shows that ingratiation as a motive for espionage has gradually increased with time, from 6% and 9 % of the first two cohorts to 16% of the most recent cohort who began since\n1990. To ingratiate is to establish oneself in another person's good graces or favor, usually through deliberate effort. The individuals who spied to ingratiate themselves with someone else usually claimed that they were trying to help the other person. Rosario Ames, Virginia Baynes, and Marjorie Mascheroni were helping their husbands or their lovers to spy (Miller & Pincus, 1994 [Rosario Ames]; O'Harrow, Jr., 1992 [Baynes]; Department of Justice, 2013 [Marjorie Mascheroni]). Frederick Hamilton, Michael Schwartz, and Lawrence Franklin were, they thought, sharing information with confidants to assist a close ally of the United States or even prevent a possible war (Hamilton in a confrontation between Ecuador and Peru; Schwartz by helping Saudi Arabia, an ally of the United States during the recent Gulf War; Franklin by heading off a war he thought was coming between Israel and Iran) (Gertz, 1993 [Hamilton]; \"Norfolk Naval officer,\" 1995 [Schwartz]; Gertz, 2009 [Franklin]). Nathaniel Nicholson was helping his imprisoned father (Denson, 2001 [Nathaniel Nicholson]). Donald Keyser was helping his lover with her graduate researchunfortunately she was also a Chinese intelligence agent (Gerstein, 2006 [Keyser]). Ryan Anderson and Hassan Abujihaad were trying to help people in Al Qaeda to advance the group's goals by sharing classified military intelligence (Kershaw, 2004 [Anderson]; United States Department of Justice, 2009 [Abujihaad]). Gary Maziarz was helping the Los Angeles County Terrorist Early Warning Center by sharing classified intelligence with uncleared task force members (Rogers, 2008 [Maziarz]). John Kiriakou was helping journalists by acting as an expert source, but he got carried away with the role and shared the names of CIA officers and other classified information with the press (Coll, 2013 [Kiriakou]). In the eyes of others and in ones' own eyes, seeing an act of espionage, the giving away of secrets, as helping is a lot more comfortable than seeing it as betrayal. In addition to the theme of spying to help another country or cause from divided loyalties, and spying to help in order to ingratiate oneself with someone, there is often a personal exchange of helping in an espionage case. When a spy offers or is recruited to supply information, typically the recruiter becomes the spy's first handler and serves as his or her link to the consumer of the information. The role of handler is a demanding and delicate one, requiring management of the spy's anxieties, responding to crises that may interrupt the smooth course of the espionage, and encouraging the spy to continue in a perilous activity. Because he or she is in a vulnerable position, the spy becomes dependent on the handler and may want to help him or her in return for care and protection.26 One CIA study of the psychological dimensions of espionage describes the intimate relationship that can develop between spy and handler as follows:\nAdept professional handlers depict themselves not only as willing to reward espionage but also as capable of safeguarding their agent. Good professional \"handling\" is designed not only to collect classified information but also to stabilize and reassure the spy in the interest of sustaining his or her capacity to commit espionage for as long as possible. As a result, the relationship between an agent and a handler is frequently highly personal, intense, and emotional, at least from the perspective of the spy, and the nature of this relationship is often a powerful force behind an individual's choice to spy (\"The psychology of espionage,\" n.d.).\n\nFor example, Robert Hanssen developed an emotional relationship with his various Russian handlers over the 15 years, off and on, that he passed them highly classified documents from several government agencies. Cautious to the point of obsession and insistent that everyone should follow the contact procedures he had specified to ensure his security, Hanssen would be upset when a mistake or an unexpected event caused a missed communication. In March 2000, less than a year before his arrest, he wrote to his handler and left the letter at a drop site in his neighborhood park:\n.... I have come about as close as I ever want to come to sacrificing myself to help you, and I get silence. I hate silence... Please, at least say goodbye. It's been a long time my dear friends, a long and lonely time... (United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, United States of America v. Robert Philip Hanssen, Affidavit, 2001).\n\nAnd in November of that year, he explained his anxiety to his handler in more detail, in words that sound like a lover who fears rejection:\n.... (For me breaks in communication are most difficult and stressful.)\nRecent changes in U.S. law now attach the death penalty to my help to you as you know, so I do take some risk.... I had no regular way of communicating [with you]. This needs to be rectified if I am to be as effective as I can be. No one answered my signal [at the drop site]. Perhaps you\n\n\n## Motivations\n\noccasionally give up on me. Giving up on me would be a mistake. I have proven inveterately loyal and willing to take grave risks which could even cause my death.... (United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, United States of America v. Robert Philip Hanssen, Affidavit, 2001).\n\nAn overview of research on fraud, a crime that is often similar to espionage, notes that \"We like to help each other, especially people we identify with. And when we are helping people, we really don't see what we are doing as unethical\" (Joffe-Walt & Spiegel, 2012). In frauds, as in espionage, the long term consequences tend to be distant and abstract, while the immediate benefits of the activities are much clearer. A spy contemplating the consequences of committing espionage knows at some level that these would be drastic, but also that they are in the future and they well may not even happen, while the reinforcement from helping a close friend is immediate (Thompson, 2014). Ironically, winding through espionage, which is one of the most serious crimes and usually means that one is betraying one's country, are themes of helping out, sacrificing oneself to benefit another, and taking comfort from seeing one's actions in an altruistic light.\n\n## Part 2 Types Of Espionage By Americans Five Types Of Espionage\n\nThere used to be just one type of espionage. It was the type described in spy novels like those written by John le Carre or Graham Greene. It was the type reported in newspapers when someone with a security clearance like Aldrich Ames or John Walker stole a classified report or a cryptographic key card and handed it over for cash to an agent working for a foreign nation. It was the type everyone understood as what was meant by the term \"espionage.\" It was classic espionage.\n\nThis report distinguishes among five current types of espionage by Americans. One of them, the most numerous and best documented by cases in the data collected here, is classic espionage. The other four types share basic elements with the classic typeand thus are recognizably espionagebut they differ from the classic in obvious ways, and they also differ from one another. These types have proliferated during last several decades.\n\nThe five types of espionage that will be explored here are:\n Classic espionage;  Leaks of classified information;  Acting as an agent of a foreign government;  Violations of export control laws; and  Economic espionage.\nThe type most recently recognized in law, economic espionage, gradually became a federal crime prosecuted as its own type of espionage based on the passage in 1996 of the Economic Espionage Act (EEA). Congress acted to protect industrial and commercial information that forms the economic base of the nation from theft by other nations in the same way that the espionage statutes protect national defense information that forms the civic and military defense base. The act criminalizes the misappropriation of trade secrets; one section applies to thefts done with knowledge or intent to benefit a foreign nation, and a second section applies to thefts done with knowledge or intent to injure the owner of the secret. The definition of a trade secret was based on the Uniform Trade Secrets Act (as amended 1985), and specifies that such a secret can be many things:\nthe term \"trade secret\" means all forms and types of financial, business, scientific, technical, economic, or engineering information, including patterns, plans, compilations, program devices, formulas, designs, prototypes, methods, techniques, processes, procedures, programs, or codes, whether tangible or intangible, and whether or how stored, compiled, or memorialized physically, electronically, graphically, photographically, or in writing if(A) the owner thereof has taken reasonable measures to keep such information secret; and (B) the information derives independent economic value, actual or potential, from not being generally known to, and not being readily ascertainable through proper means by the public (Title 18 U.S.C. section 1831)\nThe other three types of espionage are not based on such recent legislation, but instead are based on new, different, or more rigorous applications of older laws. Individuals who surreptitiously collect information in the United States, or who advocate on behalf of and at the behest of a foreign power, have been legally required to register with the Attorney General of the United States since 1938 under the Foreign Agent Registration Act (18 U.S.C. section 1951). The act exempts persons acting openly; the concern is with those acting secretly for the interests of other nations. Information need not be classified. Some classic espionage cases were prosecuted in the past under both the Espionage Act statutes and under the Foreign Agent Registration Act, but as this study suggests, in the recent past, the number of persons who were collecting information and sending it abroad and who were prosecuted simply as foreign agents has noticeably increased. In part, intelligence documents recovered during the Iraq War have fueled this development. The type of espionage defined by export control laws can be even more complicated than foreign agent espionage. An example of one of the main statutes protecting defense articles and technology dates from 1976 in the International Traffic in Arms Regulation, or ITAR. It authorizes publication of a United States Munitions List on controlled technologies that includes 20 categories including specific weapons systems, aircraft and vessels, military electronics, nuclear weapons, space technology, satellites, and related technologies. This information also need not be classified. Over the past 15 years, prosecution decisions have applied the export control laws to various cases that involved selling systems that were on the Munitions List to foreign powers, in effect, espionage. The fifth type of espionage discussed here, leaks, also reflects trends in prosecution. There were only a few leak cases, in which controlled official information, almost always classified, is shared with the press or others not authorized to receive it, in the decades before 2009 and the start of the administration of Barack Obama. Under President Obama's Attorney General, at least a dozen prosecutions of leaks have been brought, not always successfully. All of the prosecutions have applied the Espionage statutes to American citizens who leaked information to other American citizens, who in turn published the information more broadly in the media or passed it to others. These five types of espionage share elements that are intrinsic to an act of classic espionage. These elements and their sequence can be modeled as:\n\nto a proscribed recipient,\nA perpetrator\nconveys information or items that the owner of it or them legally controls and wants withheld\nIf apprehended, an investigation is initiated, and a prosecution may follow.\nwith a proscribed intent.\n\nThe elements in this model will be discussed in each of the five types of espionage considered in order to discern what they have in common and how they are distinctive. In addition to this model, cases that exemplify each of the five types will be explored, and for some of these examples, a standard checklist of elements, based on classic espionage, will be applied to them in order to highlight how the classic espionage elements have played out in the four other types as well. Each of the five types of espionage discussed is presented in more detail later in this report to make an argument for seeing the current field of espionage by Americans in these terms. This five-part structure is not the only way to understand current espionage, its activities, its laws, and its prosecutions. One could choose to lop off one or more of the types, on the grounds that one or another type is too distinctive and thus too different from the other types to fit. Only this structure, however, describes current American espionage whole, with all its interrelationships, its contradictions, and its gaps. Table 12 summarizes the types of espionage by the 209 Americans that are the focus of this report, in the three cohorts by the time period in which they began their activities. It would be convenient if each of the five types could be cleanly differentiated from the others, but this is not the case. Each offender's charges and conviction determined into which type or types of espionage he or she was coded. Descriptions of what the person is reported to have actually done, even if evidence to prove it in court was lacking, was also considered. Since classic espionage was the first and predominant type over the time period of study, the majority of cases here are classic. Increasingly in the recent past, however, prosecutors have charged individuals using both the Espionage statutes and charges of a second type. Therefore cases are reported by whether they seem to fall into just one type or whether they are two types.\n\n## Types Of Espionage By Americans\n\n|                                                  | Characteristics                                   | 1947-1979    | 1980-1989    | 1990-2015    |\n|--------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|\n|                                                  | n=68                                              | n=74         |              | n=67         |\n|                                                  |                                                   |              |              |              |\n| Number of Persons Coded as One Type of Espionage |                                                   |              |              |              |\n| Classic                                          | 56                                                |              | 68           |              |\n| Foreign Agent                                    | 3                                                 |              | 1            |              |\n| Export Control                                   | 0                                                 |              | 1            |              |\n|                                                  | Number of Persons Coded as Two Types of Espionage |              |              |              |\n|                                                  |                                                   |              |              |              |\n| Classic + Leak                                   | 0                                                 |              |              |              |\n|                                                  |                                                   |              |              |              |\n| 0                                                |                                                   |              |              |              |\n| 7 + Snowden                                      |                                                   |              |              |              |\n| 27                                               |                                                   |              |              |              |\n|                                                  |                                                   |              |              |              |\n| Classic + Foreign Agent                          | 8                                                 |              | 2            |              |\n| Classic + Export Control                         | 0                                                 |              | 0            |              |\n| Economic + Foreign Agent                         | 1                                                 |              | 0            |              |\n| Export Control + Foreign                         |                                                   |              |              |              |\n| Agent                                            | 0                                                 |              | 2            |              |\n\nThe predominance of classic espionage in the 209 cases is apparent in Table 12, as are the ways classic espionage has been combined with prosecutions for other related types of espionage. Table 13 presents the percentages of the classic cases, and the classic cases combined with other types of espionage, across time, which shows the predominance of classic espionage even more dramatically:\n\n## Percentages Of Classic Espionage Cases\n\n| Characteristics          | 1947-1979    |\n|--------------------------|--------------|\n|                          |              |\n| 1980-1989                |              |\n|                          | 1990-        |\n| 2015                     |              |\n|                          |              |\n|                          |              |\n| n=68                     |              |\n|                          |              |\n|                          |              |\n| Classic                  | 56           |\n| Classic + Foreign Agent  | 8            |\n| Classic + Export Control | 0            |\n| Classic + Leak           | 0            |\n| Snowden                  |              |\n|                          |              |\n|                          |              |\n| Totals of Classic cases  | 64           |\n| 78                       |              |\n\n\nIt is not surprising that in Table 13 almost all of the cases, 94% and 95%, in the first two cohorts were classic espionage cases, some of which were combined with another type, because espionage involving national defense information, most of it classified, was the expectation before 2000. If people were prosecuted for espionage, they were usually prosecuted under the Espionage Act statutes, Title 18 U.S.C. sections 792 through 798, which are the core legal definition of classic espionage. Only in recent decades have different types of espionage been recognized, not always by that name, defined by other statutes that have come into greater use, or existing statutes have been applied to other crimes that reflect evolving technologies and communications that are seen to be more like espionage. The most recent cohort, those individuals who began between 1990 and 2015, demonstrates the proliferation of types of espionage in the recent past. From 94% and 95% classic cases in the first two cohorts, classic cases drop in the recent cohort to 78% of the total. Exploring why this has happened requires comparing these various types of espionage in more detail, which will be the focus of the following sections. In January 2008, J. Patrick Rowan, the Deputy Assistant Attorney General in the National Security Division of the Department of Justice, testified before a United States House of Representatives subcommittee. He began his remarks on the enforcement of federal espionage laws in a way that neatly introduces the comparison of types of espionage that follows:\nIt is my pleasure to appear before you today to discuss the National Security Division's enforcement of Federal espionage laws. As you know, the clandestine intelligence collection activities of foreign nations include not only traditional Cold War style efforts to obtain military secrets, but, increasingly, sophisticated operations to obtain trade secrets, intellectual property, and technologies controlled for export for national security reasons. Accordingly, these activities and others implicate a wide array of Federal criminal statutes. But no matter what form of espionage is being used, or which statutes are implicated, there is one common denominator: our national security is always at stake (United States House of Representatives Committee on the Judiciary, 2008).\n\n\n## Elements Of Classic Espionage\n\nThere are many compelling studies of classic espionage and no need to attempt to add to them. The goal here is simply to identify basic elements in an act of classic espionage, so that as other types of espionage are discussed it will be possible to recognize many of these classic elements in them. Typically, classic espionage is defined as activities (1) done for national government \"A,\" which (2) acts through an agent, who (3) clandestinely collects secrets, (4) from national government \"B\" that wants to control those secrets, and who (5) turns them over to national government \"A.\" Espionage is a subset of intelligence gathering; it is the illegal subset from the point of view of the government whose secret information is covertly being collected. Gathering information about potential adversaries involves some aspects that are legal and open, but usually these just support the other, clandestine aspects. Put together, the legal and the illegal may become useful intelligence. The United States, like many advanced nations, deploys a technologically sophisticated global intelligence gathering effort with the goal of ensuring American national security and, as one part of that effort, it sends identified but also unidentified agents to various places to collect information that the host would prefer remain under its control. These American agents, and their sources that provide information to them, are working for the United States and its interests; they are our spies (Sulick, 2013; Volkman, 1994). This intelligence is not the classic espionage being considered in this report and in this section, because all of the persons discussed here were American citizens who conveyed to another country or cause information the American government wanted to remain under its control. They were not American agents working for their government; indeed, they were Americans working against their government. So while these cases share basic elements of typical espionage being performed on behalf of the nation, they also differ from that espionage in a crucial way: to their fellow Americans and to the American government, these individuals are criminals whose activities are a betrayal of America and American interests. These are the spies that counterintelligence officers seek to counter by tracking and deterring foreign intelligence activities and identifying these Americans who are working as their agents (Van Cleave, 2013). In a broad sense, this is classic espionage done by insiders, that is, by American citizens. Typically, the term \"insider\" refers to a restricted type of membership in a group that provides special, privileged knowledge or access. Simply being an American citizen produces an awfully large group of potential insiders, although legally, only American citizens are eligible for access to classified information. Classified information is the major target of espionage against the United States, so some studies of espionage reflect that fact by focusing only on those with eligibility for access to classified information. This seems too narrow, however, since espionage, even classic espionage, does not exclusively involve information that has been classified. Because espionage is serious and may damage the well-being of the nation, when\n\n## Elements Of Classic Espionage\n\ndone by American citizens against the United States it is treated as a crime of betrayal of the allegiance they owe to their country of birth or adoption. The context of classic espionage is a competition, a contest, or a struggle (CI\nGlossary, 2012; Manual for Courts-Martial, 2012)28. At its most extreme, the context is international warfare. This means that espionage takes place in a context of \"us vs. them,\" and an action that is reprehensible and illegal to those on one side of the contest will be judged admirable or even heroic by those on the other side. For example, the United States imprisoned CIA officer Aldrich Ames for life for his crime of espionage. In gratitude for his valuable spying services to them, the Soviet Union funded a generous reward for Ames of $2 million, which is now held for him in Russian banks (Earley, 2001). Classic espionage is secret, and it is secret in two senses: (1) in what it collects and (2) in how the collection is done. On the one hand, collecting information is done clandestinely and secretly because in order to obtain information the other side wants to keep under its control, an agent must not let the adversary know what he or she is trying to do. An assumption underlies this interaction, which is that governments protect and most strenuously control information they value most and which makes them most vulnerable in the contest. It follows that, secondly, the information to be collected is itself a secret. To find out what is really going on with the competitor or adversary, what their plans, intentions, and capabilities are, the assumption is that it is necessary to penetrate layers of security and denial created by the adversary to pluck out the secrets kept within. The secrets in classic espionage are political or military in nature. Classic espionage has an ancient pedigree; examples can be found in the Bible and in ancient Greek and Chinese warfare and then throughout history in the wars and struggles between peoples up to the present. Consistently across that long history, the secrets sought through espionage are about military capabilities, new technologies or organizational structures, and foreign policies dealing with intentions, goals, and relative strengths and weaknesses. In the serious competition between nations, this is the type of information that could tip the balance of national life or death. In recent decades since the end of World War II, governments have realized that economic health is also so vital to a nation's future that they treat economic information as the third kind of secret which, along with political and military secrets, needs to be protected from covert collection by adversaries. It was a short step from that recognition to seeing the need to keep from adversaries' awareness a nation's technological advances, improved manufacturing methods, scientific breakthroughs, innovations in weaponry, space, and aviation, and the many thousands of other developments in a vibrant national economy that would be advantageous in international competition. From the triad of secrets in classic espionagepolitical, military, and economicthe need to protect additional kinds of secrets would grow. Classic espionage usually involves theft. Stealing the secrets is an obvious and time-honored method for taking control of them and sending or transporting them to a recipient. Physically stealing secret documents or objects has recently been supplemented by electronically stealing secret files, plans, or communications such as email. Other elements of classic espionage include surveillance and indirect theft. Observing, watching, and collating patterns of activities can often yield useful information, as can listening in by planting electronic devices or performing computer sweeps where the adversary communicates unguardedly. Subterfuge is commonly a part of classic espionage, which is to be expected given that it is both illegal and clandestine. The need to disguise and deceive plays out in many ways in the lives of espionage agents. They will be busy creating and enacting cover stories and false identities, protecting the true purpose of their activities from observers and their targets, perhaps deceiving their sources about who will actually receive the information being supplied, and many other ploys. Whether individuals volunteered to spy or were recruited by a foreign intelligence service,29 when they became spies they took up lives of double-dealing and its burdens. Because classic espionage is illegal and reviled by society as betrayal, the effort to maintain a false persona and to stay vigilant against possible discovery and arrest takes a psychological toll. What might at first seem like a romantic or thrilling adventure to become a spyseldom remains so as time passes. Christopher Boyce, for example, spied for the Soviets for almost 2 years starting in\n1975 at the age of 22. He stole highly classified documents from the Sensitive Compartmented Information Facility (SCIF) where he worked for the defense contractor TRW and handed them to his friend, Andrew Daulton Lee. Lee traveled to embassies abroad and sold them to the Soviets. In August 1977, Boyce was convicted of espionage and sentenced to 40 years in prison. In April 1985, an invitation broke his prison monotony when he was asked to testify before a Senate subcommittee investigating federal government security clearance programs\n(Lindsey, 1979; Serrano, 2003). Boyce detailed for the subcommittee the numerous security flaws and violations in his workplace and his recommendations for improvements. He then told the Senators what it was like for him to already be a spy for the KGB while he sat in his company's security briefings:\n[The briefer] stood there entertaining all those naive, impressionable youngsters around me with tales of secret adventure, intrigue, huge payoffs, exotic weaponry, seduction, poisons, hair-raising risks, deadly gadgetry. It was a whole potpourri of James Bond lunacy, when, in\n\n## Elements Of Classic Espionage\n\nfact, almost everything he said was totally foreign to what was actually happening to me. Where was the despair? Where were the sweaty palms and shaky hands? This man said nothing about having to wake up in the morning with the gutgripping fear before steeling yourself once again for the ordeal of going back into that vault... None of them knew, as I did, that there was no excitement; there was no thrill. There was only depression and a hopeless enslavement to an inhuman, uncaring foreign bureaucracy. I hadn't made myself count for something. I had made my freedom count for nothing (United States Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, 1985).\n\nYet after Boyce made his public statement in 1985, at least 97 additional Americans attempted espionage or espionage-related crimes against the United States. One who tried it was Glenn Duffie Shriver. Shriver attracted the attention of Chinese intelligence agents seeking to recruit Americans who could be groomed to access classified information in the United States. Their approach and cultivation of Shriver illustrates a common element of classic espionage, recruiting the agent. Shriver was interested in China. He spent parts of his college years at various Chinese study abroad programs in Shanghai, and after he graduated in 2004 he returned to China, proficient in Mandarin, to look for work. In October of that year he answered an English-language advertisement looking for people to write \"political papers.\" (This was the same innocuous-sounding gambit used by Tai- Shen Kuo at the beginning of his efforts to recruit James Fondren, Jr.). Shriver submitted a paper on relations between China, North Korea, and Taiwan to a woman named Amanda, who told him the paper was good. She asked if he would like to meet some other Chinese friends. These turned out to be Mr. Wu and Mr. Tang, and the four of them met many times to get acquainted. The two men were curious about Shriver's career planshad he considered applying for a job with the federal government, perhaps in law enforcement or diplomacy? Although he recognized a subtext of recruitment, one day Shriver asked them bluntly what they wanted, and he received an equally forthright answer: \"If it's possible, we want you to get us some secrets or classified information,\" the friendly Chinese men replied (United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, \"Statement of Facts\", 2010; Wise, 2012). Shriver agreed to try to get a job that would provide him with access to the kind of information the Chinese wanted. He applied to the Department of State (DoS) and took the Foreign Service examination twice, but failed it in 2005 and again in 2006. Each time he took the test, the Chinese paid him for his trouble: $10,000 the first time, and $20,000 the second. In 2007, he applied online to work for the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in their clandestine unitto become a CIA spyand he requested payment from the Chinese. Later that year he visited China again, and his friends gave him the additional $40,000 in cash he asked for. While he waited on the CIA's processing for several years, he worked other jobs, including supplying tattoo shops in Los Angeles and teaching English in South Korea. At some point during this period, he began to use the email codename \"Du Fei,\" a play on his middle name \"Duffie,\" indicating with this bit of subterfuge that he was well aware that he was slipping into the orbit of espionage. In late 2009, the CIA did invite him to Washington, DC for interviews and the supposedly final job processing. These took place in early May and June 2010 (Wise, 2012). On June 21, 2010, as he boarded a plane to fly back to his job in South Korea, Shriver was arrested and charged with 5 counts of making false statements. In his CIA application he had lied about having had any contact with foreign representatives during the previous 7 years, and about his travel to China in 2007 and, of course, about the $70,000 he had taken from them so far (United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, \"Statement of Facts,\" 2010; Wise,\n2012). In October 2010, after interviews with the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), Shriver was charged in a plea bargain with one count of willfully conspiring with others, known and unknown, to obtain lawful possession of, access to, and control over documents and information relating to the national defense, which information the defendant would have reason to believe could be used to the injury of the United States and to the advantage of a foreign power, and thereafter to communicate, deliver, and transmit said documents and information to a person not entitled to receive it.30 He pled guilty, agreed to cooperate in debriefings, and was sentenced to 48 months (4 years) in prison (United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, \"Plea Agreement,\" 2010). He never saw a classified document or gained access to any classified information, and although not acknowledged, it is likely that the CIA saw through his lies well before the interviews and the polygraph exam (Wise, 2012). Shriver was naive, but he was also greedy, and with his eyes open he allowed himself to be recruited as an agent of China, expecting that he would be able to send the Chinese \"some secrets\" as soon as he could get a job with access.\n\nShriver's case was an attempt at classic espionage. It was also an unusually bold effort by China's Ministry of State Security, the foreign intelligence agency, to groom and plant an American agent in the CIA to work for them. It illustrates many of the elements of classic espionage that were outlined earlier, including:\n A context of competition. The United States and the People's Republic of China\nare in a vigorous if not always open international, economic, and geopolitical contest.\n Secret, clandestine actions. Shriver lied on federal application forms, smuggled\ncash payments back into the United States from China, and agreed to collect and transmit information to a foreign power in exchange for payment.\n Secrets. The Chinese intelligence service agents he met with were open with\nShriver about their goal that he should collect secrets for them, and he was open with them about his attempts to get a job with classified access to obtain secrets.\n Political, military, or economic secrets. By encouraging Shriver to apply to the\nDepartment of State and to the CIA, the Chinese agents demonstrated that they wanted diplomatic or intelligence insights.\n Theft. Shriver was prevented from the theft of secrets that he intended by being\ncaught before he gained access to them.\n Subterfuge and surveillance. By being apprehended, Shriver was also prevented\nfrom exercising his tradecraft.\n Illegality. Shriver was convicted under two subsections of Title 18 U.S.C 793,\none of the two most commonly applied Espionage statutes.\n Psychological toll. Although he was not yet in a position to damage American\ninterests, Shriver felt he had suffered from the attempt. At his sentencing he said: \"By the time I came to realize I was in this situation, it was too late... I cannot tell you what it's like to carry a dark secret like this for so many years\" (Baracat, 2011).\nAbout the same time that Glenn Shriver was taking and failing the Foreign Service examination in 2004 and 2005, a young U.S. Navy enlisted man was similarly embarking on a quixotic career as a spy. As Ariel Weinmann had approached his high school graduation in 2003, he had a steady girlfriend whom he wished to marry, but her parents opposed a possible son-in-law who intended to join the military. Leaving his girl behind but secretly engaged to her, he did join the Navy in 2003. He explained he was \"looking for an adventure and I guess a degree of honor, something to make my life meaningful.\" He applied for a linguist rating but failed the tests, and became a submariner instead. He deployed as a Fire Control Technician 3rd Class on his first submarine in 2004 (McGlone, 2006).\n\nWeinmann soon found that he disliked many aspects of life on the sub, such as the fierce competition, the corruption in the petty bribery and favoritism he observed, and the inefficiency in the simplest activities. Slights and setbacks upset him and they built into a simmering resentment against the Navy. His setbacks were real enough: when the sub returned to port, he drew orders to stand guard on the deck and thus missed his first homecoming port celebration, which he bitterly resented. The first time he and his fiancee met once he got home to Salem, OR, she handed back his engagement ring, broke off their relationship, and announced that her parents were sending her to college in Switzerland so she would be far away from him (Amos, 2006).\n\nHis response demonstrated the immaturity of a 22-year-old, but also his impulsiveness. On the spot, he began to think about how to desert the Navy and move to Austria, where he could use his fluent German, to be close to his girlfriend in Switzerland and try to win her back. Before he left the sub to desert, on July 1, 2005, he stole a laptop and downloaded classified files onto it, including biographical compilations about 29 Austrians and technical manuals for the sub's Tomahawk cruise missile system. He intended to barter this information for expedited asylum in Austria. He took his passport, his life savings, and a one-way ticket and boarded a plane for a series of flights that would take him to Vienna. (Amos, 2006). When Austrian officials at the airport would not consider his request for expedited asylum, Weinmann settled into Vienna, drifting around waiting to hear from his girl, who did not call. He took up with a group of young Socialists meeting in a park, including some Russians, and they became friends. Dropping the girl along with the notion of asylum in Austria, he decided to move to Russia, and in order to do that, he entered the Russian embassy in Vienna with a print-out of one of the manuals he had stolen. He handed the manual to the embassy officer, but then left with only his promise that the embassy would be in touchwithout securing the quid pro quo he sought: Russian citizenship, a train ticket, and admission to a Russian university in trade for his information. Realizing after he left that he had given away his only leverage, he next decided that instead of just moving there, he would defect to Russia and live there permanently. He prepared to leave Vienna by smashing the hard drive of the laptop to destroy the evidence of what he had downloaded (McGlone, 2006). On a series of flights on his way to Russia, Weinmann first flew to Mexico City. Sources are ambiguous as to whether he may have tried to sell classified information there. He also tried to arrange to be smuggled across the border into the United States, but he did not have enough money to pay a coyote (a smuggler of people) to take him. When a customs officer noticed his name on a warrant for military deserters, he was arrested as he landed at the Dallas-Fort Worth airport. After an international counterintelligence investigation that took months, he pled guilty to desertion, failure to obey a general order, espionage, copying classified information, larceny, and destruction of military property (Wiltrout, 2006b). Two additional counts of espionage were dropped. The military court sentenced Weinmann to 25 years in prison, reduction in rank to E-1, forfeiture of all pay and allowances, and a dishonorable discharge, but in a plea bargain, he would be serving only 12 years, and would be eligible for parole in 4 (White, 2006; Amos, 2006). Weinmann was not a very savvy spy. In 2005 and 2006, he was still young and inept. Yet he was persistent and audacious, and he managed to steal classified information on a current weapons system and turn it over to a rival foreign power without being identified or stopped. Compared to the long-running espionage activities with major consequence of John Walker, Robert Hanssen, or Aldrich\n\nAmes, Weinmann's case was probably minor, yet it demonstrates the elements of classic espionage:\n A context of competition. The United States and Russia have been major\nadversaries first in the Cold War and since then in a geopolitical and military contest that has waxed and waned for several decades.\n Secret, clandestine actions. Weinmann surreptitiously downloaded classified\nfiles from the Secure Internet Protocol Network while on his submarine. He planned to desert the Navy and use the information to his advantage by trading it to the Russians.\n Secrets. The manuals for the Tomahawk missile system and the biographies\nthat he downloaded were classified Secret.\n Political, military, or economic secrets. Weinmann downloaded the manuals\nbecause they could be attractive to an adversary in a confrontation, when they could provide a military advantage to a foreign power. He meant the classified biographies of Austrians to be useful as a bargaining chip for expedited asylum in his original scheme to settle in Austria.\n Theft. Weinmann stole a laptop computer from the sub, onto which he\ndownloaded Secret files that he also stole.\n Subterfuge and surveillance. Weinmann had to be covert as he stole the laptop,\nand he tried to be unobtrusive in his international movements by taking a series of flights on his way to his actual destinations. He flew to Chicago and then to Warsaw, Poland, before he landed in Vienna, and when he decided to defect to Russia, he first flew to Mexico City and then attempted to travel to Vancouver, Canada through Dallas.\n Illegality. Weinmann was charged and pled guilty to Articles 85 (desertion), 92\n(failure to obey an order or regulation), 106a (espionage), and 134 (general activity that prejudices good order and discipline of the service) of the Uniform Code of Military Justice (U.S. Fleet Forces Command, 2006).\n Psychological toll. After his arrest, the Navy held Weinmann for 4 months\nduring his investigation, and he was not in contact with anyone who could report publicly on his state of mind (Wiltrout, 2006a). He is not reported to have made a statement at his sentencing, so his psychological status as he left for prison is undocumented.\n\n## Classification And Legal Dimensions Of Classic Espionage\n\nMost classic espionage cases involve classified information, since by definition this is supposed to be the most sensitive, valuable, and important of a nation's information. If it were compromised, classified information by definition would damage the United States to various degrees: the loss of Confidential information is defined as causing damage to national security; Secret information is defined as causing grave damage to national security; and Top Secret information is defined as causing exceptionally grave damage (Executive Order 13526). Of the 209 individuals under consideration in this report, 186 persons, or 89% of the total, are coded as committing classic espionage, either because what they did was in the classic pattern alone or because it is described as classic plus one other type. Table 14 reports the clearance status at the start of their classic espionage of the 186 individuals in this study who held security clearances. It shows that 88% of the persons committing classic espionage had access to classified information.31 This includes the 134 persons who held clearances at the start of their espionage, plus the 10 who used their former clearances in their espionage, and the 20 who used an accomplice's access to classified information.\n\n## Security Clearance Status At Start Of Classic Espionage\n\n| Security Clearance                                             | n    | %    |\n|----------------------------------------------------------------|------|------|\n| Total persons in this study                                    | 209  | 100  |\n|                                                                |      |      |\n| Persons coded as committing classic espionage                  | 186  | 89   |\n|                                                                |      |      |\n|                                                                |      |      |\n| Of 186 persons who committed classic espionage,                |      |      |\n|                                                                |      |      |\n| Number holding security clearances at start of espionage       | 134  | 72   |\n|                                                                |      |      |\n| Number using their former security clearances at start         | 10   | 5    |\n|                                                                |      |      |\n| Number using the access of an accomplice                       | 20   | 11   |\n|                                                                |      |      |\n| Total classic spies with access to classified information      | 164  | 88   |\n|                                                                |      |      |\n| Number who held no security clearance, e.g., stole information | 13   | 7    |\n|                                                                |      |      |\n| Number for whom security clearance status is unknown           | 9    | 5    |\n\nAccess to classified information is a grant of legal as well as moral trust. Three elements are required in order to grant eligibility for a security clearance and to receive access to classified information: (1) a person must demonstrate eligibility in a personnel security process that includes a background investigation and an adjudicative decision based on that investigation performed under the authority of a government agency head, who then becomes the sponsor of that clearance; (2) the person must sign a nondisclosure agreement that legally binds the clearance holder in a contract to uphold the security requirements that apply to the information to which he or she has access; and (3) a person must have a need to know specific classified information, as determined by the local agency holding that information\n\n(Executive Order 13526). The 144 individuals being considered here who held or previously held access to classified information but betrayed the trust invested in them broke the legal contract they signed in their nondisclosure agreements. For persons who held clearances, many criminal complaints for espionage begin by referring to their signature on this legal promise not to disclose the information. It becomes one of the bases for prosecution. Table 14 shows that 20 individuals in classic espionage cases who did not themselves hold security clearances were accomplices of someone else who did have access to classified information. Most of these 20 accomplices were discussed in Table 4 (several other accomplices in Table 4 were not part of a classic espionage case and therefore are not included here). The clearance status for another 9\nindividuals in the classic espionage group is unknown. Another 13 persons did not hold security clearances or access to classified information, and these constitute only 7% of the classic espionage cases. Several of those without clearances or former clearances stole information; others attempted classic espionage without current access (several were applying for or planning to secure clearances); and some passed information that was not classified but was based on surveillance. Classification of information has not always been a requirement of espionage. The laws on espionage date from the early 20th century and they have evolved in a process more like accretion than revision, with new layers laid upon existing layers. The statutes governing espionage date from 1911 with passage of the Defense Secrets Act, which was the first law aimed at protecting the government's secrets. As the United States entered World War I, Congress enacted the Espionage Act in June 1917. This adopted the approach that had been taken in 1911 and incorporated many of its key phraseswhich means that the statutes based on the 1917 act that are now in use and little revised are more than 100 years old (Elsea, 2013). The series of provisions based on the Espionage Act are found in Title 18 U.S.C. section 792 through 798. Two of the sections most frequently used in espionage prosecutions are section 793, \"Gathering, transmitting, or losing defense information,\" and section 794, \"Gathering or delivering defense information to aid foreign governments.\" Section 793 makes it a crime to disclose or attempt to disclose to \"unauthorized persons\" \"national defense information\" \"with intent or reason to believe that the information is to be used to the injury of the United States or to the advantage of any foreign nation.\" It does not mention classified information, since classification of information did not exist in 1917 and was not introduced and standardized until World War II, starting with an executive order in 1940. It also criminalizes gathering or losing national defense information, terms that add to the broad yet vague problem with the statute. Penalties under section 793 include a fine and imprisonment for no more than 10 years (Elsea, 2006)32.\nSection 794 proscribes passing national defense information to a foreign nation, or to any group within a foreign nation, \"with intent or reason to believe that it is to be used to the injury of the United States or to the advantage of a foreign nation.\" Since it was written decades before transnational groups appeared on the international scene inflicting terrorism and other crimes, it does not specifically provide for such a contingency as the recipient of espionage being a transnational group. It treats conspirators who participate in the crime as equal to the actors who actually commit it. This provision is more serious than the previous section 793 because it involves passing national defense information \"to aid foreign governments,\" and so authorizes prison sentences of any length including life in prison or, if the crime resulted in the deaths of American covert agents or the compromise of major weapons systems including nuclear weapons, with a death sentence (Elsea, 2006)33.\n\nAs the early Cold War intensified during the late 1940s, and concerns about Soviet espionage grew, Congress passed a large and complicated piece of legislation, the Internal Security Act of 1950, which gave the espionage statues the most thorough revision they have received. Three elements of the Act are important in this discussion. (1) This legislation added another section to the Espionage statutes inherited from the 1917 act. This became section 798, titled \"Disclosure of Classified Information,\" which was added to the existing series of statutes in Title 18. Section 798 does specifically refer to information that has been classified, but the section applies only to information relating to codes, ciphers, and intelligence communications systems. (2) The Internal Security Act also introduced in Title 50 of the U.S.C., a new section 783, titled \"Communication of Classified Information by Government Officer or Employee,\" which defined it a crime for \"government officers or employees who, without proper authority, communicate classified information to a person whom the employee has reason to suspect is an agent or representative of a foreign government.\" This provided a second section that protects classified information by name, but again, its scope is limited in both the type of information protected and the category of persons to whom it applies (Elsea, 2013). (3) The Act incorporated its third important revision to the espionage statutes by separating one subsection of 793 that dated from 1917 into two subsections, introducing new ambiguities in the process. The new subsections, (d) and (e), are, according to the most careful students of espionage law, \"undoubtedly the most confusing and complex of all the federal espionage statutes\" (Edgar & Schmidt, Jr., 1973). In trying to distinguish between persons with lawful possession (subsection d) and those with unauthorized possession (subsection e) the revisers introduced differences in wording that required courts in subsequent cases to parse them word by word, often reaching differing results (Barandes, 2007).\n\nThese four laws, Title 18 U.S.C. sections 793, 794, and 798 and Title 50 U.S.C. section 783 are the four that are most frequently used to prosecute classic espionage. However, there are many other statutes that may also be applied, depending on the circumstances of the crime and the nature of the evidence available. Other statues commonly used include:\n 18 U.S.C. section 952, which punishes employees of the United States who,\nwithout authorization, willfully publish or furnish to another any official diplomatic code or material prepared in such a code, or coded materials in\ntransmission between a foreign government and a United States diplomatic mission, with a fine or a prison sentence of up to 10 years, or both.\n 18 U.S.C. section 1030(a)(1) punishes the willful retention, communication, or\ntransmission, of classified information retrieved by means of knowingly accessing a computer without (or in excess of) authorization), with reason to believe that such information could be used to injure the United Sates or aid a foreign government. This provision also imposes a fine or imprisonment for not more than 10 years, or both.\n 18 U.S.C. section 1924 prohibits the unauthorized removal of classified\nmaterial. It applies to government officers or employees who \"knowingly take\nmaterial classified pursuant to government regulations with the intent of retaining the materials at an unauthorized location,\" and it imposes a fine of up to $1,000 and a prison term of up to 1 year.\n 18 U.S.C. section 641 punishes the theft or conversion of government property\nor records for one's own use or the use of another. It does not explicitly prohibit disclosure of classified information, yet it has been used in such cases. Violators may be fined or imprisoned for not more than 10 years, or both.\n 42 U.S.C. section 2274 punishes the unauthorized communication by anyone of\n\"Restricted Data,\" that is, data dealing with nuclear weapons or systems, or an attempt or conspiracy to communicate such data. If done with the intent of injuring the United States or in order to secure an advantage to a foreign nation, it calls for a fine of not more than $500,000, a maximum sentence of life in prison, or both. Other provisions punish with lesser sentences attempts or conspiracies to disclose such data.\n 50 U.S.C. section 421 protects information concerning the identity of covert\nintelligence agents. Intentional disclosure, learning the identity through exposure to classified information and revealing it, or learning the identity\nthrough a \"pattern of activities intended to identify and expose covert agents\" is subject to prison sentences of varying lengths from 3 to 10 years, and fines. \"To be convicted, a violator must have knowledge that the information identifies a covert agent whose identity the United States is taking affirmative measures to conceal. An agent is not punishable under this provision for revealing his or her own identity, and it is a defense to prosecution if the United States has already publicly disclosed the identity of the agent\" (Elsea, 2006).\n\nCritics argue that the current espionage statutes are both too sweeping and general in scope, yet at the same time apply too specifically to technologies of the past, so that they cannot cover the new permutations to espionage that have developed in recent decades. They urge reforms (Vladeck, 2010). It is a real legal challenge to prosecute someone for espionage in the United States because of the inconsistencies and gaps in the statutes that are available (Bowman, 1995; Roth, 2001). Illustrating that challenge, the Counterespionage Section of the Department of Justice describes itself on its website as \"providing legal advice on all matters within its area of responsibility, which includes 88 federal statutes affecting national security\" (United States Department of Justice, Counterespionage/Counter Proliferation, 2015). Of the 186 individuals described in Table 14 as committing classic espionage, 140\nwere charged, among other offenses, with one of the four main espionage statutes discussed earlier, that is, U.S.C. Title 18 sections 793, 794, and 798 and Title 50 section 783. Another 21 persons were charged under the Uniform Code of Military Justice either under article 106a (espionage), or article 106 (spies). The remaining 25 individuals were charged under an array of statutesoften more than onethat are related to the activities of espionage, including34: Title 18 section\n2071 (concealing, mutilating, or destroying government records); section 1001(a) (making false statements to a government official); section 1030 (willful retention, communication, or transmission of protected information obtained by accessing a government computer); section 1924 (unauthorized removal of classified information by government employees, contractors, or consultants); section 641 (theft or conversion of government property for one's own use or the use of another); under Title 50, section 421(a) (disclosing information that identifies a covert agent); and under the Uniform Code of Military Justice, article 81 (conspiracy, in this case, conspiracy to communicate classified information to a foreign agent); article 92 (failure to obey lawful orders or regulations); article 85 (desertion); article 134 (general provisions, in this case, copying and attempting to deliver classified information to a person not authorized to receive it); article 108 (selling government property); and under the Atomic Energy Act, Title 42, section 2274 (communication of Restricted Data) (Elsea, 2013; United States Department of Justice, Criminal\n\n## Elements Of Classic Espionage\n\nResource Manual, 2015; United States Department of Justice, Counterespionage/Counter Proliferation, 2015; Uniform Code of Military Justice, 2015). Of course, being charged with various crimes is only an early step toward being convicted of them. The 209 individuals under study in this report, and specifically the 186 persons in classic espionage cases, were convicted of one or more espionage-related crimes, though sometimes they were not convicted of the core espionage statutes. Plea bargains, good defenses, and the lack of robust evidence to prove the most severe charges have often led to convictions and sentences that were reduced from the initial charges.\n\n## Leaks As A Type Of Espionage\n\nLeaks are disclosures of classified information to the public. They are usually accomplished through the press or by publication in books or other print media, and recently, also in blogs and social media. The form of a leak follows the form of classic espionage except that the recipient is different. Instead of being given to an agent of a foreign power or transnational adversary, leaks go out to the American public and then, through modern communication channels, immediately out to the rest of the world as the information is re-published, translated, and the fact of the leak is explored in further press coverage. Both the content of the information and the fact that this particular information is no longer controlled are made available to anyone, including adversaries who systematically monitor the American press for insights35.\n\nThe general model of espionage elements that was introduced earlier in the discussion of classic espionage applies to leaks as well.\n\n\n\nto a proscribed recipient, usually the press\nIf apprehended, an investigation is begun, and a prosecution may follow.\nA leaker\nconveys classified information or items that the federal government legally controls and wants withheld\nwith a proscribed intent, to make the info public.\n\n\nThe proscribed recipient of a leak, the person \"not authorized to receive it\" in the language of the Espionage statutes, is anyone who does not have the eligibility for a security clearance, the grant of access, and the need to know the classified information in the leak. Often the proscribed intent of the leaker is to make the information public in order to achieve a policy outcome or a personal goal the\n\nto unauthorized disclosures are differentiated: 1) Infractions, defined as a failure to comply with requirements that does not result in loss or compromise; 2) Violations: security incidents that indicate knowing, willful, and negligent action that does or could result in loss or compromise; and 3) Compromise: security violation in which there is an unauthorized disclosure of classified information (where the recipient does not have a valid clearance, authorized access, or need to know). Loss is defined as a condition in which classified information cannot be physically located or accounted for. (Summarized in Bruce & Jameson, 2013). The federal government considers classified information that has been made public to continue to be classified.\n\nperpetrator wants and cannot get while the information remains controlled. However, there are a variety of motivations for recent leaks and it is instructive to compare them. Leaks are a controversial phenomenon. Since the releases of classified information by Bradley (Chelsea) Manning in 2010 and Edward Snowden in 2013, the impact and implications of those leaks and of all leaks has been widely debated36. Leaks are quite common, and trying to plug leaks has also been common. For example, between 2005 and 2009, 153 cases were referred to the Department of Justice (DoJ), which opened 26 cases and identified 14 suspects, yet not one led to an indictment (LaFraniere, 2013; Harris, 2010). Starting in the administration of President Barack Obama, who personally expressed a hatred for leaks, the U.S. Attorney General has prosecuted roughly a dozen individuals, thus prosecuting more leaks than in all the previous decades since 1945. This stepped-up prosecution, and the aggressive use of mining electronic records that has enabled them, makes this Administration's new legal approach controversial (Lichtblau & Risen, 2009; Harris, 2010). Some argue these prosecutions can be unfair because leaks of classified information are a common currency in the relationship between reporters and government officials. They point to quantifications showing that annually there are hundreds of leaks from the government, many of them originating with the government, so why should a few individuals be singled out for punishment while most go free. Some of these \"normal\" leaks may be trial balloons of policies or efforts to shape public perceptions before a competing policy becomes known. Others may serve the personal aggrandizement of the leaker, or simply reflect carelessness or callous disregard for security regulations (Caplan, 2013; Benkler, 2014). The point of such arguments often is that on balance, leaks can serve democratic governance, in their way, by preventing absolute government secrecy, which can wander astray without the corrective of debate among various points of view. The prosecutions and prison sentences for recent leaks seem to persons who argue in this way to endanger the mechanism of leaking itself, which to them is necessary to check government overreach. In this view, leakers are often whistleblowers who show courage and initiative by revealing information they decide needs to be made public (Prepared statement of Gabriel Schoenfeld, 2010).\n\nOn the other hand, others support prosecution for leaks of classified information and hope it will lead to drying up leaks because, by definition, classified information was classified for a reason that involves national security, and releasing it without authorization by the classifying authority endangers that national security. The foreign policies of the nation and its relationships with other nations, the weapons systems the nation depends on for its defense, the intelligence collected on other nations and the people who collect it, the strategies and plans the nation holds for the futureelements of all these and many others vital to national life have been leaked away. People who argue for the strict prosecution of leaks emphasize the harm they have done and can do. To these commentators, leakers put their personal moral judgment above their legal responsibilities to comply with the rules on classified information that they agreed to, and therefore are more like miscreants, or even traitors, than they are whistleblowers (Bruce, 2002; Wittes, 2014). The problems of over classification, that is, classifying information at a higher level than warranted, and the classification of too much information, buttress those who argue for value from leaks and against criminalizing the acts of leakers. If what is claimed to be highly sensitive information that requires control using all the safeguards of the classification system turns out in fact to be readily available open source information, or agency gossip, or self-serving protection for poor agency decisions, then faith in the system is undermined and leaks look more justifiable. \"When everything is classified,\" Justice Potter Stewart wrote in the Pentagon Papers decision in 1971, \"then nothing is classified, and the system becomes one to be disregarded by the cynical or the careless, and to be manipulated by those intent on self-protection or self-promotion\" (Quoted in Statement of Thomas Blanton, 2010). This is a thorny issue in the prosecution of leaks, since if the classified information leaked was not actually sensitive, the leaker may try to argue it was improperly classified. Deciding in a court case what was properly classified and what was not is another contentious dimension of leaks (Smith, 2010; Caplan, 2015). A further element in the controversy over leaks is the tension between the need for government secrets and the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution's protection of freedom of the press. Not all leaks go to the press, but many do. The first action in a leak is that of the person with access to classified information who transmits it to someone not authorized to receive it, likely the press; usually, the second act is the publication of that information in public media. Defenders of the rights of the press argue passionately for minimal restrictions and maximal trust in the judgment of the press not to release information that is truly damaging. Those who wish to curtail leaks argue instead that the press also should come under legal sanctions when, ignoring its classification, they publish sensitive information that does do damageeven if they do not realize it (Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press, in Bruce, 2002).\n\n## Leaks As A Type Of Espionage\n\nThis brief overview demonstrates that the issues fueling controversy over leaks of classified information express deeply held legal and political differences that will not be completely resolved, but could be rebalanced, especially if calls for a reform of the Espionage statutes bear fruit. Many commentators point to ambiguities in the laws as foundational to the argument about leaks. Among the 209 cases under study here there are seven individuals prosecuted for leaks. Edward Snowden is also discussed here briefly, although he is not included in the study since he has not been tried or convicted of a crime. A summary of their cases is presented in Table 15.\n\n## Table 15 Leaks\n\n\nName/Age\nArrest\nDate\nEmployed by\nInfo\n Transmitted to\nType of Information\nSteven Rosen and Keith Weissman,\nlobbyists for AIPAC\n1\nLawrence Franklin\nAge 52\n2005\nDoD OSD, International Security Affairs, civilian\nemployee\n2\nMatthew\nDiaz Age 41\n2006\nU.S. Navy,\nJudge Adjutant General Corps\nBarbara Olshansky, attorney with the Center for Constitutional Rights, a NYC nonprofit for legal rights\n2009\nFBI, as a\ncontractor\nRichard Silverstein, an Internet blogger\n3\nShamai\nLeibowitz Age 39\n2010\nU.S. Army\nJulian Assange\nand the Wikileaks website\n4\nPfc.\nBradley (Chelsea) Manning Age 22\nJames Rosen, a Fox News reporter\nIntelligence reports, analysis on N. Korean nuclear plans\n5\nSteven Kim\nAge 42\n2010\nU.S. State\nDept., as a contractor\nScott Shane, a NYT reporter, and two other reporters\n2012\nFormer CIA\ncivilian employee\n6\nJohn\nKiriakou Age 42\n7\nDonald\nSachtleben\nAge 51\n2013\nFBI, as a\ncontractor\nAn Associated Press reporter\nDetails on explosives used by the \"underwear bomber;\" and FBI analysis of related bombings\n8\nEdward\nSnowden37\nAge 29\n2013\nNSA, as a\ncontractor\nGlenn Greenwald, a reporter for The Guardian, and Laura Poitras, a documentary filmmaker\n\n\nreport because he remains in Russia and, although he has been charged, he has not been tried or convicted of a crime. He is listed in this table as a sort of placeholder. He is discussed only briefly in this report because he has talked openly about his actions, they are already widely reported and studied, and they have had an important impact on information security and the prosecution of leaks.\n\nClassified information on Iran\nand Iraq\nNames of all the detainees at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, detention center FBI embassy transcripts on U.S. intelligence on Israel U.S. State Dept. cables; U.S. Army reports and videos from Iraq and Afghanistan wars Identities of CIA intelligence officers; interrogation methods in use against terrorist suspects\nDetails of NSA domestic surveillance of communications, and U.K. and Israeli programs that were cooperating with NSA; ongoing revelations are continuing\n\n## Leaks As A Type Of Espionage\n\nFive of the seven instances of leaks included in this study involved giving classified information to a member of the press, one person gave classified information to two lobbyists for the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC), and one person sent the names of detainees held at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba to a legal rights firm in New York City. Each of these cases illustrates distinctive aspects of the motives and circumstances that lead to a leak and each will be considered here in some depth.\n\n## Shamai Leibowitz\n\nShamai Leibowitz, a lawyer with dual American and Israeli citizenship, moved to Silver Spring, MD, in 2004. He worked for the Department of State teaching Israeli law and culture to diplomats for several years, and also for the Department of Defense Language Institute. From January to August 2009, he worked as a contract Hebrew linguist for the FBI, where he held a Top Secret security clearance. A blogger himself on topics of political activism and moral and religious issues, in April 2009, Leibowitz shared with another blogger and friend, Richard Silverstein, some 200 pages of classified transcripts from FBI wiretaps of conversations that took place inside the Israeli Embassy in Washington, DC. While not a surprise that the FBI monitors communications of Israel, a close American ally, as it does other embassies, it is a sensitive practice that the FBI would prefer not be discussed in the press. Silverstein then used some of the material from Leibowitz in his own online publication. The FBI began investigating Leibowitz soon after the leak in the summer of 2009, and on December 17, 2009, he pled guilty to one count of violating Title 18 U.S.C section 798, providing communications intelligence to a person not authorized to receive it. In May 2010, he was sentenced to 20 months in prison, but the court granted him 60 days to prepare to leave his dependent family (Kredo, 2010; Glod, 2010; Shane, 2011b). Leibowitz admitted that several concerns motivated his leak of the embassy transcripts to a fellow-blogger. One was his uneasiness with Israel's determined efforts to shape American public opinion and to lobby Congress, which he thought overreached. The second was his fear that, as reflected in the press of the time, Israel would attack Iran's nuclear facilities, thereby escalating an international crisis for the United States as well as for Israel. Based on the transcripts, Silverstein described in his blog telephone interactions between Israeli embassy officials and Jewish activists, members of Congress, and Administration officials that could have embarrassed them. When he realized the FBI was investigating Leibowitz in 2009, Silverstein burned the secret transcripts in his backyard and took the reports off his website, but he came forward publicly in 2011 to argue that Leibowitz had acted from a noble motive by trying to stop a rash attack on Iran. \"I see him as an American patriot and a whistle blower, and I'd like his actions to be seen in that context,\" Silverstein told a reporter (Shane, 2011b). Leibowitz, on the other hand, wrote to the judge in May 2010\nWhile working for the FBI, I came across information that troubled me very much and caused me to make a bad decision. I allowed my idealism and misguided patriotism to get ahead of me... I made a mistake but only because I believed it was in the best interests of the American people (Kredo, 2010).\n\n## Stephen Jin-Woo Kim\n\nLike Shamai Leibowitz, Stephen Jin-Woo Kim, a nuclear proliferation specialist, was also working in 2009 as a federal contractor. Starting in 2008, he had been detailed to the DoS's Bureau of Verification, Compliance, and Implementation from his job at the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory. Kim was a respected senior intelligence analyst. He had served as an adviser to various federal agencies on strategic nuclear deterrence, specializing in North Korea. Born in Seoul, South Korea, Kim immigrated to the United States with his family at the age of 8 and thrived, earning degrees from Georgetown, Harvard, and Yale. He became a naturalized American citizen. Ironically, he tended to avoid the press and expressed concern about press leaks to colleagues, but when a State Department public affairs officer asked Kim in March 2009 to talk about North Korea with James Rosen, a reporter for Fox News, the two struck up an acquaintance (Apuzzo, 2010; Hsu, 2010; Marimow, 2013). On June 11, 2009, the same day a Central Intelligence Agency's (CIA) analysis on North Korea that was classified Top Secret-Sensitive Compartmented Information (TS-SCI) was released to only 95 specified analysts, including Kim, James Rosen reported in an Internet article that \"the Central Intelligence Agency has learned, through sources inside North Korea,\" that the North Koreans would respond to a United Nations Security Council resolution condemning North Korea for its nuclear and ballistic missile tests by launching another nuclear test, reprocessing their spent fuel, speeding up their uranium enrichment, and launching an intercontinental ballistic missile (Shane, 2011b; Pincus, 2013). The leak's reference to CIA sources and methods that had been used to obtain intelligence inside North Korea incensed the CIA. Kim was investigated, questioned by the FBI, and indicted late in August 2010, when he was charged with Title 18 section 793(d), disclosing national defense information to a person not authorized to receive it, and Title 18, section 1001(a)(2), lying to federal officials, the FBI (Apuzzo, 2010; Hsu, 2010; Marimow, 2013). An affidavit supporting a request for a search warrant of May 28, 2010, demonstrates that the DoJ investigators had already pulled together electronic and communications records to startling effect. Rosen was working from a press office in the DoS building where Kim also worked in a secured section. The investigators correlated security badge access and egress records with Kim's office desk telephone calls, office computer files, and emails to Rosen's cell phone and office desk phone, emails of all Rosen's interactions with Kim, and finally, a late-night search of Kim's office. From these data, they reconstructed a detailed timeline of a developing relationship between the reporter and the analyst over the months between March and June, 2009 (Marimow, 2013; United States District Court for the District of Columbia, Affidavit, 2010). The affidavit documented the dates, times, and durations of calls between Kim and Rosen and who initiated the call, dates and times for when each man left the building and when he returned, and incriminating emails illustrating how Rosen made Kim a source. Both men showed they were aware their interaction was potentially sensitive. At Rosen's suggestion, Kim agreed to refer to Rosen in emails with the codename \"Alex,\" and to respond to the codename \"Leo Grace\" in return. They emailed one another using coded signals on Rosen's Google account: one asterisk meant proceed with a communication plan, two meant hold off (Marimow, 2013; United States District Court for the District of Columbia, Affidavit, 2010.)38\nThis affidavit quotes an email from Rosen to Kim on May 22, 2009, which gives insight into Rosen's persuasiveness and his goals, including\n\"Thanks, Leo. What I am interested in, as you might expect, is breaking news ahead of my competitors. I want to report authoritatively, and ahead of my competitors, on new initiatives or shifts in U.S. policy, events on the ground in [North Korea], *what intelligence is picking up,*\netc. ...I'd love to see some *internal State Department analyses* about the state of [North Korea].... In short: Let's break some news, and expose some muddle-headed policy when we see itor force the administration's hand to go in the right direction, if possible. The only way to do this is to EXPOSE the policy, *or what [North Korea] is up to,*\nand the only way to do that authoritatively is with *EVIDENCE\"* (United States District Court for the District of Columbia, Affidavit, 2010.) [Capitals are in the original and italics are in the original where they were meant to denote potentially classified information, now declassified.]\n\nlimit searching or seizing a reporter's work, but not when there is evidence that the journalist broke the law against unauthorized leaks. [In the Kim case], a federal judge signed off on the search warrant\" after the FBI claimed that the evidence suggested that Rosen had also broken the law, \"at the very least, either as an aider, abettor and/or co-conspirator\" (Marimow, 2013). The DOJ later admitted they had never intended to prosecute Rosenbut had only claimed as much to portray him as a potential co-conspirator in order to get the search warrant and access to his emails with Kim. In July 2013, the U.S. Attorney General published new guidelines on leak investigations. \"The new rules forbid the portraying of a reporter as a co-conspirator in a criminal leak as a way to get around the legal bar on search warrants for reporting materials\" (Savage, 2013a; Savage, 2014). The possibility of prosecuting a reporter (Rosen) for receiving a leak of classified information (from Kim), which has never been done, caused an outcry from defenders of the freedom of the press, who argued that in order to gather information in the course of their doing their jobs as national security reporters, they need to be able to discuss issues and receive information from officials in grey areas of classification and attribution. Lawyers for Kim argued that the Department should drop the case or the judge should dismiss it, since Rosen's email records could not have been accessed under the new guidelines, but the DOJ refused and the judge refused to dismiss it on grounds the guidelines were only advisory and discretion remained (Marimow & Leonnig, 2013).\n\nOn March 29, 2010, in a second interview with the FBI, Kim tried to explain himself to the FBI as they laid out their timeline to him; he also tried to claim that he did not have an ongoing relationship with Rosen, nor was he the source of the leak. In FBI notes of the interview, Kim is quoted as saying\n\"I did not purposely discuss the [Intelligence Report], but might have discussed [some of the topics discussed in the Report].\" \"Maybe I inadvertently confirmed something...too stubborn to not...[I] just don't know...someone values my views, listens up...maybe I felt flattered. [The Reporter] is a very affable, very convincing, persistent person. [The Reporter] would tell me I was brilliant and it is possible I succumbed to flattery without knowing it. Maybe it was my vanity. [The Reporter] considers me an expert and would tell me...could use my insight....The IC is a big macho game but I would never say I'm read in to this and you are not. I would never pass [the Reporter] classified.\" \"[The Reporter] exploited my vanity.\" \"My personal and professional training told me not to meet people like [the Reporter]. I felt like while on the phone I was only confirming what he already knew. I was exploited like a rag doll. [The Reporter] asked me a lot of questions and got me to talk to him and have phone conversations with him. [The reporter] asked me a lot, not just specific questions. [The Reporter] asked me how nuclear weapons worked.\"... [United States District Court for the District of Columbia, Affidavit, 2010.) [Bracketed elements are in the original transcript of notes.]\nEarly in February 2014, Kim pled guilty to leaking classified information to James Rosen and to lying about it to the FBI. He signed a statement saying he was not a whistle blower. In early April, he was sentenced to 13 months in prison. At the sentencing hearing, his defense argued that his interactions with Rosen were the normal conversations between government officials with reporters, and \"many of those conversations include the disclosure of classified information.\" The prosecutor countered that the \"everyone-does-it argument\" was not an excuse, and instead, Kim \"was motivated not by an altruistic purpose but by his own ego and desire for professional advancement\" (Marimow, 2014).\n\n## John Kiriakou\n\nActions in 2008 and 2009 (which was the time frame for both Leibowitz's and Kim's leaks) also led to John Kiriakou's eventual prosecution for leaking classified information. Kiriakou had served with the CIA as a case officer and counterterrorism specialist from 1990 through 2004, at which point he retired. His CIA career had been eventfulhe published a memoir of his experiencesand it included recruiting agents in Athens while dodging assassination attempts there, and assisting in the capture of Abu Zubaydah in Pakistan. He moved from the Agency to working for Deloitte in corporate intelligence, and he also consulted on movies that had intelligence or terrorism themes (Coll, 2013). In December 2007, Kiriakou agreed to give a taped television interview with an ABC reporter on interrogation methods being used on terrorism suspects, a controversy then gathering strength in the news. Although Kiriakou had not himself participated in interrogations, based on what he had heard from others in the Agency, he confirmed that waterboarding was being used and that it had been used against Abu Zubaydah. ABC claimed the interview made him the first CIA officer to confirm that the Agency used waterboarding, which had been a classified technique. In the interview, Kiriakou both defended the CIA and the technique as having been fruitful for gaining valuable intelligence, and also admitted that he thought waterboarding was torture and probably should be discontinued (Coll, 2013; Shane, 2013a). From this interview Kiriakou's troubles unfolded over the next several years, but it took time to recognize them as trouble. After his interview late in 2007, he instantly became a favorite of news reporters who were looking for background on intelligence stories, confirmation of story lines, and names of others who could help develop stories. It was a heady position for someone developing a career as a consultant, to be sought after as an expert, and he appeared to enjoy the attention. Among the contacts he fielded from the press, several of his conversations would turn out to include his having passed along classified information or the names of covert agents who were still under cover. The CIA appears not to have been forgiving of slips by Kiriakou, if they were slips, since this was the former CIA employee who had confirmed the Agency's reliance on waterboarding in interrogations, a technique that was soon being widely denounced in public as torture (Coll, 2013; Shane, 2013a). The incident that led to Kiriakou's prosecution for leaking illustrates a web of relationships between reporters, defense lawyers, and investigators hired by them. A reporter asked Kiriakou a question about who at the CIA had led a program for the rendition of terrorism suspects to secret locations. At first he could not recall, but a few weeks later, Kiriakou sent the reporter an email in which he passed along the name he had just remembered. When asked, the reporter in turn passed the name to an investigator working for defense lawyers representing detainees at Guantanamo Bay. The investigator was collecting names and photos of CIA personnel who might have participated in interrogations of detainees. The lawyers he worked for wanted those names as potential witnesses who could be called at future military trials of their clients, where the lawyers hoped to develop the argument that the detainees had been subjected to torture during their interrogations and therefore any admissions by them were illegal and the detainees should be released. Defense lawyers submitted a classified filing in January 2009 as a motion to compel discovery that asked for CIA documents to be used by the defense. The filing included classified information that they did not get from the government, including the 81 names of CIA personnel the investigator had compiled\n(Coll; 2013). Some of those names were openly available, others not. Detainees themselves were found to have lists of names and accompanying photos of CIA personnel, which were being passed around for them to see by their lawyers to determine whether they could recognize their interrogators (Shane, 2013a; Federal Bureau of Investigation Eastern District of Virginia, 2012). The CIA and the DoJ reacted to finding these lists in Guantanamo Bay with considerable concern, since covert agents could be in danger from retaliation from Al Qaeda if their identities were revealed. The FBI worked to trace how these names and photos had ended up in the cells of the detention facility. The lawyers and their investigator explained their actions and methods, and convinced the FBI that they had been respectful, careful, and had kept within the scope of their role as the legal defense. The investigator pointed to the reporter as a source, and after the FBI got a search warrant for Kiriakou's email accounts, it became apparent that he had sent the name to the reporter in his email (Shane, 2013a; Coll, 2013). After the FBI traced various other contacts the press had had with Kiriakou, he was initially charged in January 2012 with three unauthorized disclosures of classified information, disclosing the name of a covert agent, and lying to the CIA and to federal officials. On October 23, 2012, Kiriakou pled guilty in a plea bargain to one count of violating the Intelligence Identities Protection Act, and the other counts were dropped. He agreed to serve 30 months in prison. At his sentencing, the judge noted that she found the sentence \"way too light\" (Coll, 2013; Associated Press, 2012).\n\nThe flash points of American experience in the early 21st century run through John Kiriakou's leak of classified information, including the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, the interrogation of suspected terrorists and their detention at Guantanamo Bay and other sites, and the legality of interrogation techniques that had been created in the frantic years after 9/11. Initially he became a favorite press resource after he talked openly, if ambivalently, about waterboarding as torture. From that minor fame came more opportunities to help the press and to serve as an expert, and more opportunities for a garrulous person not always in control in the moment of what he said to cross a line by revealing classified information. While Kiriakou seemed ambivalent about waterboarding in 2007, when his case was adopted by protestors objecting to torture, Kiriakou shifted his views and became a strong advocate for his supporters' position against the use of torture by the government. From being a retired intelligence officer and press consultant who talked too freely, he transmuted himself into a whistle-blower on torture and a martyr who was being punished by the government for it. \"After I blew the whistle on the CIA's waterboarding torture program in 2007,\" Kiriakou wrote to the Los Angeles Times from prison in 2014, \"I was the subject of a years-long FBI investigation,\" which, he argued, considering all the highly placed officials who reveal classified information without penalty, had been unfair and discriminatory (Kiriakou, 2014).\n\n## Donald Sachtleben\n\nA fourth recent instance in which classified information was leaked to a reporter developed in May 2012. Its antecedents had begun several years earlier in 2009 with the thwarted Christmas Day bombing attempt in an airliner approaching Detroit. A fight broke out onboard when a bomb in one of the passenger's clothing malfunctioned, allowing passengers to overpower the bomber. The bomb came from Yemen and had been built into the man's underwear, so it became known as the \"underwear bomb.\" In late April 2012, the CIA intervened in a similar plot in Yemen by the Al Qaeda of the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) group, which intended to bring down a plane using a new and improved underwear bomb designed without metal. Before the hapless bomber could buy plane tickets, the CIA seized the bomb and ended the plot. The bomb, full of technical and intelligence value, was flown to the FBI Laboratory in Quantico, VA, for forensic analysis, arriving on May 1 (Associated Press, 2012; United States District Court Southern District of Indiana, Indianapolis Division, 2013). Donald Sachtleben, an FBI special agent bomb technician who had retired in 2008 after a 25-year career and returned to the FBI as a contractor, entered the lab on the morning of May 2 using his FBI access badge. He signed onto the computer system using his Top Secret access, and then walked across the hall from his workstation into the lab room where the bomb was being examined. At 10:25 a.m. he called a friend, an Associated Press reporter, who had been texting Sachtleben asking for any details on activities at the lab involving bombs from the Middle East. Sachtleben told the reporter that there had been an interception of a plot in Yemen, a bomb had been recovered, and the FBI at the lab was now busy with \"an ongoing, secretive, and sensitive analysis of the bomb\" that involved other U.S. government agencies besides the FBI (United States District Court Southern District of Indiana, Indianapolis Division, 2013). The fact of the foiled bomb plot and the fact of the FBI analysis of a bomb from Yemen on May 2 were classified information. After the government argued that sensitive issues in Yemen needed time to be resolved, the Associated Press agreed to hold off publishing the story it had developed until May 7, the day before an official announcement about the incident was made. The FBI then began to investigate who leaked the classified information to the Associated Press. A year later, they had interviewed 550 people, but still did not have the evidence to identify the leaker (Gerstein, 2013). DoJ quietly asked a federal judge to subpoena the telephone companies for their records of 20 phone lines (cell, office, and home phones) of AP reporters and the Associated Press (AP)\nitself. By comparing these records with other information, the investigators found conversations between the AP reporter and Donald Sachtleben, the FBI technician, and thus were able to support their request for search warrants for his computer files, cellphone records, and his other electronic media (Savage, 2013c). Investigators then discovered that the FBI already had custody of Sachtleben's computer. Nine days after he leaked the information from the FBI lab on May 2, the FBI in Indiana had arrested him for possession and distribution of child pornography, and had seized his electronics as evidence. Sachtleben lived in Carmel, Indiana, and commuted periodically to work in the Washington, DC area. The two FBI investigations, one in Indianapolis, IN, for child pornography and the other in Washington, DC, for national security crimes, evolved separately; the investigators only became aware of each other because of the impounded computer, which had been searched for pornography-related evidence but not for anything related to national security, since that had not been relevant to the Indiana case. The two cases swiftly merged together, and Sachtleben pled guilty on September 23, 2013, to unauthorized disclosure of classified information and to retaining classified information at his home, and to one count each of possession and distribution of child pornography. In a plea bargain, he was sentenced to a combined 140 months (11 years 8 months) in prison, which included 43 months for the leak (Horwitz, 2013; United States District Court Southern District of Indiana, Indianapolis Division, 2013). Sachtleben had enjoyed a notable career in the FBI as a senior bomb technician. It had put him at the scene and working on many of the recent terrorist attacks in and against the United States. He had worked on FBI investigations into \"the Oklahoma City bombing, the first World Trade Center bombing, the Unabomber attacks, the United States Embassy bombings in East Africa, the U.S.S. Cole bombing, and the attacks of September 11, 2001\" (United States District Court Southern District of Indiana, Indianapolis Division, 2013). He seems to have relished the role of an expert who was consulted by the press for details and developments for their news stories. In addition to the immediate impact from revealing an ongoing terrorist investigation in Yemen, the Sachtleben leak had several other serious consequences. The subpoena for the 20 AP phone lines exacerbated public criticism building over the Stephen Kim case (discussed earlier), in which the FBI had seized a reporter's email records using a search warrant. Criticism of these two leak episodes from vocal supporters of the Constitutional guarantee of freedom of the press combined to successfully put pressure on the Attorney General, who issued new guidelines in July 2013 that made such records more difficult for prosecutors to obtain (Savage, 2013a; Gerstein, 2013). Also, further elaboration in the press on the disrupted AQAP plot in Yemen suggested that actually there had been a Western mole planted in that terrorist group, he was the person designated to carry the bomb, and because the leak had prematurely revealed the plan, he had needed to be hurriedly extracted. Thus the rare benefits of having planted an informer in such a group were lost (Barrett, 2013; Gerstein, 2013).\n\n## Bradley Manning\n\nU.S. Army Pfc. Bradley Manning, age 22, deployed to the Iraq War with the 10th Mountain Division 2nd Brigade late in October 2009, and was stationed at Contingency Operating Station Hammer39, east of Baghdad. He had trained as an intelligence specialist and was granted a TS-SCI security clearance. The base was still in the combat zone. There he would spend 14-hour shifts in a windowless Sensitive Compartmented Information Facility (SCIF), sifting local intelligence reports and working with computer databases, trying to improve the security of local military operations (Barnes & Hodges, 2010; Nakashima, 2011). During 4 months of increasingly erratic and disturbed behavior at the base, from November 2009 through February 2010, Manning explored online how he could contact Wikileaks, an Internet leak site that was run by Julian Assange, which billed itself as a secure, anonymous place to download secrets and see them published without fear of being traced. Assange cultivated Manning and helped him with technical aspects of his evolving ideas. In mid-February 2010, Manning began downloading large data files and whole archives of data onto writable CDs that he carried into the SCIF disguised as music CDs. He installed forbidden software on his work computers to assist search and identification of data and explored available contents widely (Dishneau & Jelinek, 2011). He stole some 150,000 Department of State diplomatic cables sent from embassies around the world, Army field logs from the Afghanistan War, an embarrassing video of a U.S. Army helicopter apparently shooting at civilians on the ground, and hundreds of thousands of documents related to the Iraq War, over 700,000 documents in total, all of them classified. The scale of the data stolen dwarfed all previous leaks (Nakashima, 2011; Shanker, 2010; Pilkington, 2013). Manning's transfer of data to the Wikileaks site continued in bursts during March and April and into May of 2010. So did his outbursts of emotion and barely contained violence. Wikileaks published the helicopter video on April 5, 2010, to instant notoriety, and began putting more of the leaked information online in batches. It did not publish all the information Manning sent to the site. Manning was arrested on May 26, and held in pre-trial confinement as the potential source of the leaks, while an investigation began that lasted 7 months. After a psychological evaluation and a long, well-publicized trial, Bradley Manning was convicted on July 30, 2013, on 17 charges in their entirety of the 22 charges against him, and of amended versions of four additional charges. These convictions included six of the eight counts brought under Espionage Act statutes (Title 18\nU.S.C section 793) for unauthorized disclosure of the Afghan and Iraq War logs, embassy cables, and files from Guantanamo Bay detention facility, \"with reason to believe such information could be used to the injury of the US or the advantage of any foreign nation.\" He was also convicted of \"wrongfully and wantonly\" causing the publication on the Internet of intelligence belonging to the United States \"having knowledge that intelligence published on the internet is accessible to the enemy.\" He was reduced in rank to E1, the lowest possible rank. He would forfeit all pay and would be dishonorably discharged. He was acquitted of the most serious charge, that of aiding the enemy by causing classified information to be published where the enemy would see it (Pilkington, 2013; Savage & Huetteman, 2013). On August 21, 2013, he was sentenced to 35 years in prison (Tate, 2013; Nakashima, 2011). Manning's massive leak of classified information to Wikileaks, a site dedicated to facilitating disclosures of sensitive information that would be published to a world readership, was a shockboth due to the scale of the leak and from the impunity with which Wikileaks published the information40. The repercussions of this action became clearer with time as the leaked documents were digested by the various stakeholders. One implication drawn from them was about how persons with broad access to automated systems and electronic files inside an organization could do serious damage to it. Manning's leak became a watershed in the history of leaks. What had been trickles from previous leaks, compromising several or several hundred documents, now had become the torrent of gigabytes Manning released. He became \"the first mass digital leaker in history,\" according to one account (Pilkington, 2013). His leak shook largely unexamined assumptions that had evolved alongside automated technology, assumptions about trusting the employees who worked on an organization's systems (Shanker, 2010). The federal government responded to the illustration provided by Manning and Wikileaks of what an employee with a press outlet could do by requiring each federal agency to develop an insider threat program to audit, monitor, and evaluate the use of government computer systems by their personnel (Walker, 2013; Executive Order 13587, 2011; Department of Defense Directive, 2014; The White House, Near-term measures, 2014).\n\n\n40 Wikileaks did at first attempt to screen the classified information by working with three international newspapers (The New York Times, *The Guardian* in Britain, and *Der Spiegel* in Germany). These newspapers surveyed the documents Assange provided to them in order to develop their own stories, but while doing so their staff readers tried to filter out information such as names that could endanger persons or betray particularly sensitive operations (Nakashima, 2010). This process of decrypting, screening, and publishing in segments went on for some months until a password itself was leaked, and Assange quickly released most of the remaining materials all at once without filtering them. Wikileaks itself evolved over the course of handling Manning's information and the backlash the leak provoked. From a countercultural scapegrace reveling in telling secrets, Wikileaks was soon claiming that it was a legitimate publisherwhich could claim all the protections of the freedom of the pressand was trying to act the part (Nakashima, 2010; Bumiller, 2010).\n\nBecause Manning took leaking classified information to a new level, his act has attracted the publication of hundreds of articles, character studies, government reports, legal treatments, and books.41 Here only two aspects, seen in hindsight, of the many that can be studied in this episode are discussed. They were chosen because they suggest how and why he was able to accomplish the leak at the time, and they offer clues for mitigating vulnerabilities to leaks from troubled individuals in the future. First, the information security practiced at Contingency Operating Station Hammer in Iraq was inadequate, even lackadaisical. Admittedly, a combat environment makes special demands on typical security procedures, but the base received a wide variety of classified and sensitive information over its Secret Internet Protocol Router network (SIPRnet) that nonetheless should have received more careful attention. With lax supervision, Manning was able to install proscribed software on his computer to access additional data he was not authorized to see, to bring removable devicesCDs labeled as musicinto a SCIF and brazenly download archives of data while pretending to hum along to the tunes, then encrypt and upload the files to the Internet and Wikileaks. Better information security and management of personnel assigned to the SCIF would have prevented his theft (Nakashima, 2011; Jaffe & Nakashima, 2011). Second, Manning's experience in the Army calls into question the approaches that were then in place to respond to troubled military personnel. Manning did not fit well in the military. He was short, slight, not athletic but very smart, and mercurial, shifting rapidly from glum introvert to outspoken smart-aleck. During his whole military career he was struggling with his sexual identity, during the very time when the military services locked down the whole topic of sexual orientation under the \"Don't Ask Don't Tell\" policy. While in the Army, he moved from being closeted to being more openly homosexual with friends and on Facebook; for the first time he fell in love with a man and then suffered a break-up from him. Eventually, he decided to live as a woman. He had a lot going on besides learning to be a soldier, and he complained repeatedly that he had no one to talk to about it. Not surprisingly, between periods of cheerful insouciance, he suffered from mood swings, depression, outbursts of aggression when frustrated, and threats of violence toward others and himself. Despite numerous short-term interventions in response to his angry infractions, officers overlooked the larger pattern in his episodes that suggested a seriously troubled individual and, because they desperately needed capable intelligence analysts, sent him to Iraq despite their qualms (Youssef, 2011; Nakashima & Tate, 2011; Savage, 2013b; United States v. Manning, Defense request, 2011).\n\nWith his gender identity crisis in the background, in the foreground of Manning's motivation for the leak was a swirl of current interests and reactions to events in his life. They included (1) the legal fight then taking place for gay rights at the state and federal levels and (2) his introduction, through his boyfriend, to the hacker culture in Boston and its proclamation that information is like a free spirit, which demands to be free of constraints like classification. Once he arrived in Iraq, his disillusionment with the American war effort became acutefor example, not over discovering corruption in the local Iraqi police, but over his Army supervisor's utter disinterest in doing anything about it (Fishman, 2011). He knit these threads into a plan of action for himself: first he should show the world the video that had so shocked him when he had watched it in the SCIF, that of the helicopter shooting from the air at Iraqi civilians on the ground. Two Reuters journalists and some 12 Iraqi civilians had been killed in the incident in 2007. Then, so the world would know what was really going on in the wars, he would add to that revelation the logs of military operations over years of the Iraq and Afghanistan wars and thousands of diplomatic cables that revealed American foreign policy in candid detail. His disclosures would have implications of \"global scope, and breath-taking depth,\" he told a hacker confidant, who later turned him over to the authorities (Nicks, 2010). Manning claimed he was acting as a whistle blower, but he had no specific government misconduct in mind. What he was blowing about was so grandiose and so unfocusedAmerican missteps in military interventions and foreign policies over last decadethat it is hard not to see a very young man's ego, idealism, and lack of judgment as underlying explanations for his actions (Fishman, 2011). Manning had time to consider the actions he took as a 22-year-old, since he was sentenced to prison for at least 8 years before becoming eligible for parole (Tate, 2013). On January 17, 2017, President Obama commuted all but 4 remaining months of Manning's sentence and he was freed on May 17, 2017 (Savage, 2017). These five cases involved persons with access to classified information who transmitted some of it to an American member of the pressa journalist or reporter, a blogger, an online websitein order to facilitate (or at least with an awareness that the outcome would be) a release to the public. The last two cases discussed here each differ somewhat from the five press leak cases, as well as from each other42. In 2006, Matthew Diaz sent the names, classified Secret, of all 551\nterrorist detainees who were then being held at Joint Task Force-Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, to a civil rights lawyer in New York City. From 1999 through 2004, Lawrence Franklin surreptitiously met with and orally conveyed classified information about Iran (which was his academic specialty and the focus of his DoD position as a strategy analyst), to two American lobbyists for the American Israel Public Action Committee (AIPAC). In the short term, neither Diaz nor Franklin seems to have intended to see their information published, yet with their own purposes in mind, they deliberately made unauthorized disclosures to fellow Americans knowing that they violated the law.43\n\n## Matthew Diaz\n\nIn 1995, Matthew Diaz joined the U.S. Navy's Judge Advocate General (JAG) Corps as a staff attorney. In June 2004, the Navy sent him to the Guantanamo Bay detention facility for a 6-month tour as the Deputy Staff Judge Advocate. A week before he arrived in Cuba to begin his job overseeing the coordination of all detainees' potential legal contacts, the Supreme Court ruled in *Rasul v. Bush* that detainees held at Guantanamo did have a Constitutional right to challenge their detentions in U.S. federal court (Wiltrout, 2006; Wiltrout, 2007; United States Department of the Navy General Court-Martial, Defense response, 2007).\n\nAccording to his defense lawyers, \"LCDR Diaz's billet placed him directly in the middle of the legal and logistical fallout from the Supreme Court's decision in Rasul\" (United States Department of the Navy General Court-Martial, Defense response, 2007). Later in 2004, lawyers offering to defend detainees based on the recent Supreme Court decision tried to learn their names and countries of origin, but they found the Navy, the Pentagon, and the Bush administration unwilling to divulge the information. A DoD lawyer testified at Diaz's court martial that the Pentagon had no intention of making this information public by turning it over to lawyers who were requesting it as potential defense counsellors. This assertion was based on a policy that \"We do not publish lists of people captured in armed conflict\" (Rosenberg, 2007a). Early in January 2005, as Diaz's tour in Cuba was about to end, he saw himself in a \"moral dilemma\" (Scutro, 2007). He felt that what he characterized as the government's \"stonewalling\" of potential defense lawyers for detainees was wrong and illegal, since in the United States everyone has a right to legal representation,\n\n43 It could be argued that other individuals could be included as leak cases. The criteria used to determine inclusion here, or the timing of the case, prevented these others from being considered. Daniel Ellsberg and Anthony Russo leaked a classified history of American involvement in Vietnam to the press in 1971, but they were not prosecuted after the Supreme Court ruled that the government could not enjoin publication in advance. Samuel Morison sent two classified photographs to the British journal *Jane's Defense Weekly* in 1984, and was convicted of espionage; he sent classified information to British recipients, not to Americans, and is coded here as espionage, not a leak. Thomas Drake, an NSA contractor, was investigated for taking classified documents home and leaking some of them to a reporter for the *Baltimore Sun.* The documents concerned an National Security Agency (NSA) program that Drake claimed wasted public money and was ineffectual. Although he was indicted under the Espionage Act in 2010, the charges were dropped in June 2011 and he pled guilty to one misdemeanor, misuse of an NSA computer. Jeffrey Sterling, CIA employee, was convicted in January 2015 of leaking classified information to James Risen, a *New York Times* journalist and author, but his conviction occurred after the cutoff date for entering new cases for this report (Currier, 2013).\n\nand the Supreme Court had just affirmed that right specifically for detainees. Given his own father's incarceration, Diaz felt this issue strongly and personally.44 He was about to lose his access to the information about the detainees that was being denied. Diaz acted on his dilemma by printing out the database of names of 551 detainees from a file on the SIPRnet, the classified DoD network. His printouts listed the names, countries of origin, and various codes that reflected what if any intelligence had been gleaned and which interrogation team had been assigned to the individual (Scutro, 2007). He reduced the pages to index card size, cut the printout into 39 pages, wrapped them in a valentine hoping to disguise the package as it passed through the base Post Office, and on his last day in Cuba, sent them anonymously to Barbara Olshansky, a lawyer for the Center for Constitutional Rights in New York City (Golden, 2007). The center is a nonprofit legal rights organization. Olshansky had been one of the lawyers who brought suit in the *Rasul* case, and she was then suing for the detainees' names in federal court. Although the pages Diaz sent to her were not marked Secret, when Olshansky looked at them, she inferred she might not have a legal right to see them. Mystified about why they had come to her and who had sent them, she turned them over to the federal court in which her suit had been filed. The judge, in turn, notified the FBI that potentially classified information had been disclosed. The FBI used computer forensics, fingerprinting, and a national security letter that requested Diaz's emails to determine who had sent the pages of names (Wiltrout, 2007; Rosenberg, 2007b; \"Navy lawyer,\" 2007). Charges against Diaz were made public late in August 2006. During the subsequent investigation, he continued to work as a Navy lawyer in Jacksonville, FL. He was charged under the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) with violating the Navy's information security program by mailing a classified document through the first class mail; with conduct unbecoming an officer by transmitting a classified document to someone who was not authorized to receive it, and three counts of violating the Espionage Act: (1) making a printout of a classified document relating to the national defense with intent or reason to believe it would be used to injure the United States or for the advantage of a foreign nation; (2) knowingly and willfully communicating that information to someone not authorized to receive it, and (3) removing the information without authority with intent to store it in an unauthorized location (United States Department of the Navy General Court-Martial, Defense response, 2007). The court martial began in May 2007, in Norfolk, VA. Diaz's defense argued that the printout was not really classifiedit was not marked as such, and all the information on it already been made public in April 2006 in response to a Freedom of Information suit (Wiltrout, 2006). The prosecution argued that the printout had been classified when Diaz mailed itit had come from the SIPRnet, a classified information system, and the Judge Advocate's office was a \"classified environment,\" of which Diaz was well aware (Scutro, 2007; Rosenberg, 2007a). Others testified that the information in the codes on the printout involved \"sources and methods\" of intelligence, and the names of countries that did not want to be publicly identified (Rosenberg, 2007b). The court martial found Diaz guilty of four of the charges, which could have meant 24 years in prison. He was sentenced on May 18, 2007, to 6 months in prison and a discharge from the Navy, with the likelihood that his military pension would be forfeited due to the espionage-related conviction (Wiltrout, 2007).\n\n\"We think this will send a clear message that you can't just release classified information, no matter how good an intention you think you have,\" the prosecution commented during the trial (Wiltrout, 2007c). Diaz spoke at his sentencing and defended his belief that the detainees were being treated unfairly and illegally, but he admitted that as a naval officer, his choice about how he acted on his belief was wrong. He admitted that other avenues had been available to him to register his disapproval of his government's policies, and he expressed shame that by sending the printout anonymously, he had not acted with the courage of his convictions (Wiltrout, 2007).\n\n## Lawrence Franklin\n\nLawrence Franklin was a South Asia specialist who worked the Iran desk in the DoD Office of the Secretary of Defense, International Security Affairs Office. He had earned a Ph.D. in Asian Studies, held a TS-SCI security clearance for 3 decades, and, in addition to his academic and policy roles in the federal government, served as a Colonel in the Air Force Reserve. During the 1990s, he developed a strong disagreement with the trend of American foreign policy toward Iran. He complained that the National Security Council (NSC) was not taking the Iranian threat seriously enough, and fought an interagency battle between DoD, the DoS, and the CIA over the evolving policies toward Iraq (Gertz, 2009). Starting in April 1999, and continuing until August 2004, Franklin tried to influence foreign policy by sharing classified information with various Israeli contacts, including Israeli Embassy officials who were friends of his, and two lobbyists for the AIPAC, Steven Rosen and Keith Weissman.45\nThe information he passed along verbally to these individuals in furtive meetings, which were held in Washington coffee shops, restaurants, and even at the Pentagon Athletic Club, usually consisted of insights into the secret internal deliberations among U.S. policymakers, but it also included intelligence on military plans and potential attacks on American forces in Iraq (\"Pentagon man,\" 2006; United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, Criminal complaint, 2005; United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, Superseding indictment,\n2005). Franklin worried that as an attack on Iraq approached, the foreign policy community was not properly considering the preparations by and the likely reactions of Iran (Gertz, 2009). Israel, a close American ally, denied conducting espionage against the United States through its Embassy officials and American lobbyists, but starting in June 2003, when the FBI became aware of Franklin's activities, agents began monitoring his movements and communications, collecting evidence against the three men. A year later in June 2004, the FBI confronted Franklin and threatened him with a long prison term unless he \"wore a wire\" for them in a series of sting operations against the other suspects. Franklin's wife was then confined to a wheelchair with multiple sclerosis and they had five children. Realizing that his actions had already clouded his family's future, Franklin agreed to cooperate in FBI stings against Rosen, Weissman, and others to whom they, in turn, had passed the information. This included the political advisor to Ahmed Chalabi, a prominent exiled Iraqi politician who was then angling to become prime minister of Iraq (Markon, 2005b; Black, 2004). Franklin was arrested in May 2005. At first, the press portrayed him as a cooperating player in the investigation, but by the fall the FBI had decided that he was withholding information from them, and they sought a superseding indictment. He pled guilty in early October 2005 to two counts of conspiracy to communicate national defense information to individuals not entitled to receive it (that is, to Rosen and Weissman, both private American citizens, but he did not plead guilty to leaking to an Israeli embassy official who had also been identified), and one count of unlawful retention of national defense information, after a search revealed 83 classified documents stored in his home. (United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, Criminal complaint, 2005; Markon, 2005a). Franklin was sentenced on January 20, 2006, to 151 months (12 years and 7 months) in prison and fined $10,000 (Johnston, 2006). However, in 2009, after the related case against the two AIPAC lobbyists was dropped, the judge reduced Franklin's sentence to probation with 10 months of community confinement and 100 hours of community service, specifying that the hours should be spent giving talks to audiences of young people on the rule of law (Markon, 2009; United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, Motions hearing, 2009). In 2005, the government had also indicted Steven Rosen and Keith Weissman and charged them with espionage on the grounds that they had conspired with Franklin to receive classified information from him, and then had passed it on to various members of the press and foreign officials. This was an unusual prosecution, since they were not government employees and they had no clearances with which to access classified information. A key point in trial preparations was whether the information Franklin passed to them was national defense information (the language specified in the statutes), and whether it was actually classified or not, since it had been delivered orally. It was the first time civilians who were not working for and had never worked for the government were prosecuted under the Espionage statutes (Pincus, 2009). The complex case against Rosen and Weissman dragged on for years, with the defense threatening to call prominent government officials as witnesses, and the government repeatedly filing motions to clarify the parameters of the trial. A reporter following the case noted that \"U.S. District Judge T.S. Ellis III presided over 40 hearings on the matter, and he delivered 12 published decisions. Seven separate trial dates were set and postponed [over] 3 12 years....\"(Pincus, 2009). Judge Ellis ruled that the prosecution would need to prove both that the defendants had acted \"willfully,\" and that they had acted \"with reason to believe it could be used to the injury of the United States or to the advantage of any foreign nation.\" Since the case involved i*nformation* delivered orally rather than actual documents, according to Judge Ellis, the case would come under 18 U.S.C. section 793(e), the subsection added in 1950 to raise the burden of proof on the communication of *intangible* information [italics added.] (United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, Memorandum opinion, 2006). The government dropped the case against Rosen and Weissman in May 2009, citing its concerns that classified information would be disclosed at trial and that the elements of proof required by the court made successful conviction unlikely (Markon, 2009). Franklin's case suggests various motives for his actions. His clandestine contacts with Rosen and Weissman took place over 5 years and involved a steady sharing of current policy positions and government intentions, a considerable and prolonged leak, suggesting that these meetings met a professional and personal need for Franklin, perhaps for like-minded colleagues with whom he could exchange views, that went beyond immediate concerns he may have had about Iranian reactions. He showed self-importance by taking American foreign policy into his own hands in leaking classified information to AIPAC lobbyists who were likely to pass it on to the Israelis, in the hope that the Israelis, in turn, would influence the NSC in the directions Franklin thought best. This was bolstered by his ambition to get a job with the NSC. He asked Rosen to \"put in a good word for him\" at the NSC when Rosen would lobby them to take the actions Franklin was recommending (United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, Superseding indictment,\n2005). The seven individuals discussed here as leakers of classified information were diverse. They ranged in age from 22 to 52 years of age: one person was 22, four persons were in their middle years (their 30s or 40s), and two persons were in their early 50s. They worked in various agencies: two were members of the military, (U.S. Navy and U.S. Army); two were civilian federal employees, current or former, (DoD Office of the Secretary of Defense and CIA); and three were contractors to federal agencies, (two to the FBI, and one to the DoS). They had reached different stages in their careers, from a precocious Army Pfc. to people striving to make a name and a place for themselves at mid-career to a respected senior Defense policy specialist.\n\nThe earlier case summaries describe various motives for their actions (and\nultimately each person's mix of motives is unique), but three common motives run through the seven cases.\n The leakers strongly objected to something they saw being done in the course of\ntheir work. Franklin, Diaz, Leibowitz, Kiriakou, and Manning each objected to policies or actions by the federal government that they observed, and they chose to intervene, usually by making their objections public by releasing classified information.\n The leakers enjoyed playing the role of expert. Franklin, Leibowitz, Kim,\nKiriakou, and Sachtleben each sought out opportunities (or responded eagerly to overtures by others needing their information) to share their expertise with journalists.\n The leakers wanted to help and saw themselves as helping. Diaz, Kim, and\nManning, were, in their view, trying to help people whom they had befriended or with whom they sympathized.\nTo illustrate how leaks are a form of espionage in most ways, but not in every way, the elements of classic espionage that were discussed earlier are here applied to the actions of Lawrence Franklin. The details are from the \"Superseding Indictment\" of Franklin (United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, 2005)\n A context of competition. Franklin's job was to monitor the hostile international\nrelationship between the United States and Iran after its Islamic revolution in 1979. After 9/11, a debate simmered in his agency over preparations for the invasion of Iraq. Franklin argued that Iran's likely response would be hostile; his contacts with the two AIPAC lobbyists spanned the years of the run-up to the Iraq War.\n Secret means. Franklin conveyed highly classified information to the recipients\norally in meeting held in public places where they were less likely to be\nobserved.\n Goal is secrets. Rosen and Weissman sought out a well-placed contact in OSD\nwho could provide them information. They were delighted to be receiving\nclassified information. Rosen is quoted as saying on the telephone \"that he was excited to meet with a 'Pentagon guy' [Franklin] because this person was a 'real insider.'\"\n\n Political, military, economic secrets. The classified information Franklin leaked\nto Rosen and Weissman included CIA internal reports on Middle Eastern countries, internal deliberations by federal officials, policy documents, and national intelligence concerning Al Qaeda and Iraq.\n Theft. Franklin was not accused of passing stolen documents to the recipients,\nonly oral information based on them. He was accused of stealing and taking home classified documents that were found stored at his residence.\n Subterfuge and surveillance. Franklin, Rosen, and Weissman held their\nmeetings at various restaurants, coffee shops, sports facilities, baseball games, and landmarks in the Washington, DC area. They tried to remain unobtrusive. In one instance, they met at Union Station, moved to a restaurant, then moved to a second restaurant, and ended their conversation in a third.\n Illegality. Franklin was convicted of Title 18 U.S.C section 793(d) and (e).  Psychological toll. In July 2004, after the FBI explained their evidence and the\nlikely consequences of a prison term on his family, Franklin took the FBI's bargain for leniency if he would \"wear a wire\" during his subsequent conversations with Rosen and Weissman. This proved a harrowing bargain for Franklin.\nFranklin's case tracks with most of the elements of classic espionage. Only some of the recipients, the two AIPAC lobbyists who were the focus of his case, differ in that they were American citizens, and even then, other of Franklin's contacts appear to have been Israelis. Applying these elements to the other six leak cases discussed earlier reinforces this conclusion: leaks differ from classic espionage mostly in that the initial recipients typically are Americans, rather than foreign nations or their agents.\n\n## Edward Snowden\n\nBecause so much attention in the intelligence community and the press has already been paid to Edward Snowden's actions, it is appropriate to conclude this discussion of leaks with Snowden. As a fugitive, he has not been tried or convicted of crimes related to his leak, and so his case has not yet been coded into the data on which this report is based. Snowden claims to have been inspired by what Bradley Manning did before him. Then, watching what happened to Manning and to Thomas Drake (prosecuted for leaking NSA information until the case was dropped), he admits that he saw what the likely consequences of leaking would be and fled to avoid them. Also like Manning, Snowden received considerable support from Julian Assange at Wikileaks (Pincus, 2013; LaFraniere, 2013; Wilentz, 2014).\nAs a young man, Snowden parlayed his talent with computers into trusted information systems positions in the Intelligence Communityfirst with the CIA, and then with the NSA as an employee of the NSA contractor Dell. The more he saw of the expanded surveillance and foreign intelligence gathering secretly taking place in these agencies after 9/11, the more disillusioned he became. The use of torture in interrogations, and later the drone strikes against targeted individuals, offended him. In this as well, his path resembled Manning's (Miller, 2013).46 Snowden's access as a trusted systems administrator to a wide variety of programs, his use of \"web crawler\" software to extend his search for more documents, and his claim47\nthat he needed to use the passwords of others to do his job, allowed him to download an estimated 1.7 million documents onto hard disks, echoing Manning's massive data theft (Wilentz, 2014; Bamford, 2014; Sanger & Schmitt, 2014; Hosenball & Strobel, 2013). Snowden stole this archive gradually, apparently beginning in April 2012; he imagined releasing information from it nugget by nugget to the press and from them, inevitably, to adversaries of the United States and to the world public. Starting in January 2013, he contacted several people with offers to leak information to them, including Glenn Greenwald, a commentator previously with The Guardian newspaper in London, and Laura Poitras, a documentary filmmaker.\n\nThe three of them carefully planned how to store and transfer the classified data, assuming NSA's surveillance capabilities would be trained on them. Julian Assange agreed to pay for Snowden's travel and lodging outside the country, and provided legal counsel. On May 20, 2013, Snowden fled from Hawaii where he worked at an NSA facility, taking his hard disks to Hong Kong, accompanied by a Wikileaks editor (Wilentz, 2014). Snowden publicly announced his actions on July 9 in an interview with Greenwald in a video that was published in *The Guardian* (Reitman, 2013). He portrayed himself as a whistle blower bent on warning the American public about the government's surreptitious theft of their civil liberties granted in the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution, which guarantees the right to be secure from against unreasonable searches and seizures, and includes the right to privacy. He claimed he leaked classified information so the public could know about and insist on reform of the intelligence surveillance programs being carried on out of its sight. He was quoted as explaining that My sole motive is to inform the public as to that which is done in their name and that which is done against them... I'm willing to sacrifice all of that [his previous life] because I can't in good conscience allow the US government to destroy privacy, internet freedom and basic liberties\n\n## Leaks As A Type Of Espionage\n\nfor people around the world with this massive surveillance machine they're secretly building (Greenwald, MacAskill & Poitras, 2013).\n\nFor the next 6 weeks, Snowden lurked in hotels, avoiding authorities and the press, seeking asylum in any of several South American countries. From Hong Kong he flew to Moscow on June 23, but was stalled in the Sheremetyevo International airport transit zone when the United States withdrew his passport (Osborn & Anishchuk, 2013). On August 1, 2013, Russia offered Snowden 1 year of temporary political asylum, and he left the airport for living quarters provided for him. His asylum extended to 3 years and was then renewed. He has continued to live outside Moscow, a propaganda plum for the government of Vladimir Putin and a vexation for the United States, where he gives occasional interviews, writes opinion pieces for newspapers, lives with his girlfriend, and appears to be negotiating over his next steps (Myers, 2013). Working from his archive secreted outside Russia through his supporters who are less constrained than he is since he lives in Moscow, for 2 years Snowden leaked bombshell after bombshell in stories published by various press and Internet sites. His stolen documents show wide-ranging programs that the NSA secretly put in place after 9/11 in the name of tracking potential terrorists. The NSA had been collecting and storing the bulk domestic phone records of American citizens, cooperating with Internet providers to collect in bulk customers' email records, and surveilling the communications of foreign governments. For years the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) court had been serially approving these activities in secret, following the legal procedure set up to handle classified requests for authorization. Other documents from Australian and British sources reveal the extent of allied cooperation in NSA's surveillance programs (Bamford, 2014; Shane, 2013b). Initially, the government reacted to Snowden's leaks with consternation and outrage. He has been charged with theft of government property and two counts of espionage (Shane, 2013b). The audit of what Snowden took with him lasted for months; the intermittent and on-going release of additional documents keeps the leak alive; and it has taken time to work out the ramifications and reactions flowing from their publication (Ignatius, 2014). Three NSA employees had their security clearances suspended and were investigated for security violations for allowing Snowden to use their public key infrastructure certificates; one person resigned from the NSA (Nakashima, 2014). Critics of Snowden bitterly point out that terrorist groups such as Al Qaeda, and other nations in contention with the United States, quickly changed their communications protocols in response to his leaks, losing an intelligence capability the United States had built over years using millions of dollars (Tsukayama, 2014). One critic blamed a Snowden leak for contributing to the rise of the Islamic State in Syria (ISIS) by warning its leaders off unencrypted email, which they stopped using, thereby losing the NSA's insight into their plans (Harris, 2015). Other information leaked by Snowden demonstrated that for years Chinese hackers had been deeply penetrating various defense programs such as the Joint Strike Fighter through cyber espionage, but ironically, it also showed that the NSA was detecting and tracking this penetration, and was planning electronic countermeasuresuntil the leak tipped off the Chinese (Gertz, 2015). Evaluation of Snowden continues to evolve. He remains a wanted fugitive. His actions suggest he hopes that with hindsight, and as the public reacts to the substance of his revelations, authorities will soften, the political climate will shift, and he will be able to strike a plea bargain and return home (Gertz, 2014). To some extent this shift has begun to happen. There has been vigorous public protest against the secret programs Snowden revealed. In May 2015, a federal appeals court declared that NSA's collection of Americans' bulk telephone records was illegal, and Congress later voted to discontinue the program of government collection and storage, instead proposing to keep these records accessible but in the hands of the telephone companies (Savage, 2015). It is unclear what form a revised program may take. In response to Snowden's leak, there have been efforts to temper or discontinue other controversial programs, and a campaign has begun to demonstrate more transparency about activities by the Intelligence Community. \"The intelligence community is by design focused on keeping secrets rather than disclosing them,\" the Civil Liberties Protection Officer for the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) is quoted as saying. \"We have to figure out how we can work with our very dedicated work force to be transparent while they're keeping secrets\" (Gerstein, 2015). An international conference of intelligence officials reported agreement among themselves that \"Snowdenlove him or hate himhas changed the landscape,\" and that going forward, there should be no secret laws, there should stronger external controls over agencies, and those agencies should abjure techniques such as interrupting data flows or hacking into other agencies' internal networks. The officials mused about whether Snowden had provided a necessary counterbalance to the excesses of intelligence collection put in place after 9/11, even though they uniformly considered his disclosures to have been \"hugely damaging\" (Campbell, 2015).\n\n## Acting As An Agent Of A Foreign Government As A Type Of Espionage\n\nAn agent is someone who is authorized to act on another's behalf, according to the first definition in an online dictionary; the sixth definition narrows that to someone \"who acts in an official capacity for a government or private agency, as a guard, detective, or spy\" (Dictionary.com, 2015). Federal law has required registration by anyone acting within the United States as an agent of a foreign government since shortly before the Second World War. Congress passed the Foreign Agents Registration Act (FARA, 22 U.S.C. section 611) in 1938 in response to concern about foreign governments surreptitiously spreading propaganda to advance their interests, while the American government and the public could not tell who was really behind it. The immediate provocation for the law came from agents for Nazi Germany, who were arguing in the press that the steps Germany was taking toward rearmament in the late 1930s were a positive development for America because they were the best way to block the \"Communist peril\" (Koerner, 2003). At first, registrations of foreign agents went to the Department of State, but in 1942 this responsibility was shifted to the Attorney General of the United States, where it remains (Executive Order 9176, 1942). FARA focuses on political actions by agents of foreign governments, including lobbying, advertising, public relations, and fund raising for \"foreign principals\"; it excludes specified commercial activities and actions by acknowledged foreign officials and embassy personnel (Department of Justice, \"Criminal Resource Manual,\" 2015). According to the FARA Registration Unit in DoJ that takes in these registrations, FARA requires \"periodic public disclosure [by agents] of their relationship with the foreign principal, as well as activities, receipts, and disbursements in support of those activities\" (Department of Justice, National Security Division, 2015). The unit tracks all registrations it receives, and reports on them semi-annually to Congress, also making its reports available to the public at its website.48 The reports are revealing of the scale of influences on the federal government because they are organized by country, from Afghanistan to Vietnam, and they list the names, addresses, and professions of each agent, the foreign government for which they do work, the activities they undertake, the total monies they received for their services in the past 6 months, and a description of any information they disseminated. The entire report is nearly 300 pages long; just the single-spaced list of names and organizations runs to 31 pages, and includes lobbying firms, tourism promoters, public relations companies, legal practices, and policy consultants (Department of Justice, Report of the Attorney General, 2014).\n\nWhile the FARA serves as the foundation for efforts to track agents of foreign governments, it is the related criminal statute, which focuses on the non-political and illegal activities, that concerns students of espionage. This is the Agents of Foreign Governments Act (AGFA) (Title 18, U.S.C. section 951), also enacted in 1938. It specifies the penalties for not complying with the FARA. It is the statute most often used to prosecute intelligence-gathering and other crimes by individuals acting in secret at the behest of or in support of a foreign government or official, although there are other laws that may be used as well.49 The AGFA is deceptively simple: it requires that anyone acting as an agent of a foreign government who does not register with the Attorney General shall be fined, or imprisoned not more than 10 years, or both. The Act defines an agent of a foreign government as \"an individual who agrees to operate within the United States subject to the direction or control of a foreign government or official,\" but it specifies several exceptions to its requirements for various acknowledged foreign personnel (Title 18, U.S.C. section 951). Because it is so open-ended, it can be used by itself to prosecute a wide variety of activities that may be undertaken by an agent of a foreign government, or, as circumstances warrant, section 951 can be prosecuted along with other statutes that criminalize conspiracy, aiding and abetting, and a range of substantive crimes, including many that are espionage-related.50 Although section 951 does not specify\n\n##\n\nThey include:  \"As used in this subchapter:\n(a) \"Foreign power\" means\n(1) a foreign government or any component thereof, whether or not recognized by the United States; (2) a faction of a foreign nation or nations, not substantially composed of United States persons; (3) an entity that is openly acknowledged by a foreign government or governments to be directed and controlled by such foreign government or governments; (4) a group engaged in international terrorism or activities in preparation thereof; (5) a foreign-based political organization, not substantially composed of United States persons; (6) an entity that is directed and controlled by a foreign government or governments; or (7) an entity not substantially composed of United States persons that is engaged in the international proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.\n\n(b) \"Agent of a foreign power\" means (1) any person other than a United States person, who\n(A) acts in the United States as an officer or employee of a foreign power, or as a member of a foreign power as defined in subsection (a)(4) of this section; (B) acts for or on behalf of a foreign power which engages in clandestine intelligence activities in the United States contrary to the interests of the United States, when the circumstances of such person's presence in the United States indicate that such person may engage in such activities in the United States, or when such person knowingly aids or abets any person in the conduct of such activities or knowingly conspires with any person to engage in such activities;\nthe types of acts themselves, they are better described in 50 U.S.C. section 1801, Definitions, under the chapter on Foreign Intelligence Surveillance that are reproduced in footnote 44 on these pages. The elements of such acts include clandestine operation, intelligence gathering, illegality, sabotage, terrorism, false identity, and the international proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.\n\n## Individuals Charged As Agents Of A Foreign Government\n\nAn analysis of the 30 individuals among the 209 under study in this report who were charged and convicted under the AFGA demonstrates the flexible interpretation available in these prosecutions. Table 16 lists the 30 persons convicted under section 951, sorts them by the cohort in which they began espionage, and provides some related information about them to help sort them into categories.\n\n\n(C) engages in international terrorism or activities in preparation thereof; (D) engages in the international proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, or activities in preparation thereof; or (E) engages in the international proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, or activities in preparation thereof for or on behalf of a foreign power; or\n\n(2) any person who\n(A) knowingly engages in clandestine intelligence gathering activities for or on behalf of a foreign power, which activities involve or may involve a violation of the criminal statutes of the United States; (B) pursuant to the direction of an intelligence service or network of a foreign power, knowingly engages in any other clandestine intelligence activities for or on behalf of such foreign power, which activities involve or are about to involve a violation of the criminal statutes of the United States; (C) knowingly engages in sabotage or international terrorism, or activities that are in preparation thereof, for or on behalf of a foreign power; (D) knowingly enters the United States under a false or fraudulent identity for or on behalf of a foreign power or, while in the United States, knowingly assumes a false or fraudulent identity for or on behalf of a foreign power; or (E) knowingly aids or abets any person in the conduct of activities described in subparagraph (A), (B), or (C) or knowingly conspires with any person to engage in activities described in subparagraph (A), (B), or (C).\"\n\n\nIndividuals Convicted as Agents of a Foreign Government\nCoded as\nBoth\nClassic\nEspionage\nand as a\nForeign\nAgent\nForeign\nIntelligence\nService\n(FIS)\nmember\nVolunteer\nor\nRecruit\nRecruit\n-ed by\nName\nCitizenship\nLevel of\nClearance\nBegan 1947-1979   12 individuals\n\n\nAlvarez, Carlos,\nnaturalized\nnone\nrecruit\nFIS\n\n\nBoyce, Christopher\nnative\nTS/SCI\nvolunteer\n\n\nboth\nButenko, John\nnative\nTS\nrecruit\nFIS\n\nboth\nChung, Dongfan\nnaturalized\nS\nrecruit\nFIS\n\n\nHumphrey, Ronald\nnative\nTS\nvolunteer\n\n\nboth\nJohnson, Robert\nnative\nTS\nvolunteer\n\n\nboth\nKadish, Ben-Ami\nnative\nS\nrecruit\nFIS\n\n\nLee, Andrew\nnative\nnone\nvolunteer\n\n\nboth\nRees, Norman\nnaturalized\nnone\nvolunteer\n\n\nsuicide\nSzabo, Zoltan\nnaturalized\nTS\nrecruit\nFIS\n    yes\nboth\nThompson, Robert\nnative\nS\nvolunteer\n\n\nboth\nWhalen, William\nnative\nTS\nrecruit\nFIS\n\nboth\n\n\nBegan 1980-1989   5 individuals\n\n\nAli, Amen\nnaturalized\nnone\nvolunteer\n\n\nAlvarez, Elsa\nnaturalized\nnone\nrecruit\nFIS\n\n\nChiu, Rebecca\nnaturalized\nnone\nrecruit\nFIS\n\n\nHall, James\nnative\nTS/SCI\nvolunteer\n\n\nboth\nMak, Chi\nnaturalized\nS\nrecruit\nFIS\n    yes\n\n\nBegan 1990-2015    13 individuals\n\nAlonso, Alejandro\nnative\nnone\nvolunteer\n\n    yes\n\nGari, George\nnative\nnone\nrecruit\nFIS\n    yes\n\nGuerrero,Antonio\nnative\nnone\nrecruit\nFIS\n    yes\nboth\nHernandez, Linda  native\nnone\nrecruit\nFIS\n   yes\n\nHernandez, Nilo\nnaturalized\nnone\nrecruit\nFIS\n   yes\n\nLatchin, Sami\nnaturalized\nnone\nrecruit\nFIS\n   yes\n\nNicholson, Harold\nnative\nTS/SCI\nvolunteer\n\n\nboth\nCoded as\nBoth\nClassic\nEspionage\nand as a\nForeign\nAgent\nForeign\nIntelligence\nService\n(FIS)\nmember\nVolunteer\nor\nRecruit\nRecruit\n-ed by\nName\nCitizenship\nLevel of\nClearance\nNicholson, Nathaniel\nnative\nnone\nrecruit\nfamily\n\n\nSantos, Joseph\nnaturalized\nnone\nrecruit\nFIS\n   yes\n\nShaaban, Shaaban\nnaturalized\nnone\nvolunteer\n\n\nShemami, Najeb\nnaturalized\nnone\nrecruit\nFIS\n\n\nSoueid, Mohamad\nnaturalized\nnone\nrecruit\nFIS\n   yes\n\nYai, John\nnaturalized\nnone\nrecruit\nFIS\n   yes\n\nAn initial look at Table 16 suggests that categorizing espionage-related offenders by whether they were prosecuted and convicted of AFGA, Title 18 U.S.C. section 951 is not a very revealing strategy. Some individuals listed in this table were native-born, some were naturalized citizens. Some held security clearances and had access to classified information, many did not. Many were recruited, but 40% were volunteers. A common thread does run among recruits, however, in that all but one was recruited by a foreign intelligence service. Many of the 30 were convicted both of classic espionage, under the various espionage statutes (and so were already counted in the section on classic espionage earlier in this report), but two-thirds were convicted of being an agent of a foreign government and not for classic espionage, some of those for being a foreign agent alone, others combined with other charges besides classic espionage. This hodgepodge suggests that there are different categories of individuals embedded in this list, and they need to be sorted out before any patterns in prosecutions of agents can be discerned. Using Table 16 as a starting point, the three tables that follow reorganize the entries in Table 16 by filtering on several of the fields. This filtering allows us to distinguish and sort out three groups that are mixed together in Table 16. Each of the next three tables depicts one of these groups: (1) Table 17 presents the classic spies who were also convicted as foreign agents; (2) Table 18 presents employees of foreign intelligence services who were convicted as foreign agents; and (3) Table 19 presents persons who were not convicted of classic espionage but who were convicted of being agents of foreign governments. For some in this third group, acting as a foreign agent was their only conviction, while for others it was one of several offenses.\n\n## Classic Spies Who Were Also Convicted As Foreign Agents\n\nTable 17 lists those convicted of both classic espionage and of acting as an agent of a foreign government. Most of them began their espionage in the period before\n1979.\n\nIndividuals Convicted Both of Classic Espionage and as Agents of a Foreign\nGovernment\nForeign\nIntelligence\nService (FIS)\nmember\nName\nCitizenship\nLevel of\nClearance\nVolunteer\nor Recruit\nRecruited\nby\nBegan 1947-1979    8 individuals\n\n\nBoyce, Christopher\nnative\nTS/SCI\nvolunteer\n\n\nButenko, John\nnative\nTS\nrecruit\nFIS\n\nHumphrey, Ronald\nnative\nTS\nvolunteer\n\n\nJohnson, Robert\nnative\nTS\nvolunteer\n\n\nLee, Andrew\nnative\nnone\nvolunteer\n\n\nSzabo, Zoltan\nnaturalized\nTS\nrecruit\nFIS\nyes\nThompson, Robert\nnative\nS\nvolunteer\n\n\nWhalen, William\nnative\nTS\nrecruit\nFIS\n\n\nBegan 1980-1989   1  individual\n\n\nHall, James\nnative\nTS/SCI\nvolunteer\n\n\nBegan 1990-2014    2 individuals\n\n\nGuerrero, Antonio\nnative\nnone\nrecruit\nFIS\nyes\nNicholson, Harold native\nTS/SCI\nvolunteer\n\nTen of these eleven individuals committed serious espionage crimes involving classified information and were convicted under the espionage statutes along with being convicted as foreign agents. These include Christopher Boyce, Robert Johnson, and Harold James Nicholson, who is discussed earlier as having lured his son Nathaniel into espionage. In this table, only Antonio Guerrero had no access to classified information. He was one of a group doing surveillance and intelligence gathering for the Cuban intelligence service operating in south Florida during the 1990s. They were known as the La Red Avispa network (\"avispa\" means wasp in Spanish). Ten of them were rolled up starting in 1998. Most chose to plead guilty to being foreign agents, and received prison terms of 3 to 7 years, while espionage charges against them were dropped. Guerrero, who had been born in Miami but was taken to Cuba as an infant, chose to go to trial. It was held in Miami, where anti-Castro feeling ran high. In 2001, he was convicted of espionage as well as of being a foreign agent, and was sentenced to life in prison. His sentence was reduced to 21 years and 10 months in 2009 (Weaver, 2009). Recently, he was one of the five Cubans and Cuban- Americans released to Cuba as part of the warming of diplomatic relations between the United States and Cuba (Robles & Davis, 2014; Freeman, 2014). Except for Guerrero, all those who were convicted of classic espionage and of acting as foreign agents had security clearances and access to classified information, or in the case of Andrew Lee, was the accomplice of someone who did. Ten of the eleven individuals were native-born citizens. Seven of the eleven volunteered to commit espionage. Guerrero was one of the four recruits in this group, all of whom were recruited by a foreign intelligence service. Two actually worked for an intelligence service as employees. Guerrero was one of these, and the second was Zoltan Szabo. Szabo had served in the U.S. Army during the Vietnam War, and began working for the Hungarian intelligence service in 1967. He recruited Clyde Conrad, a retired American Army sergeant working in at a military archives in Germany, into performing espionage for the Hungarians. Conrad, in his turn, recruited at least five of his Army confederates to be spies in his own espionage ring, first in West Germany and then continuing in the United States. The Conrad ring betrayed damaging intelligence on CIA sources and methods in Germany and nuclear secrets, including American plans in the event nuclear war with the Soviets broke out in the 1980s. Szabo cooperated with investigators against Conrad to receive a light sentence. He was tried in Austria rather than in the United States and received no prison time (Gerth, 1989; Rafalko, n.d.). His conviction codes here are based on descriptions of his espionage activities themselves. It would appear there is a trend away from the practice of prosecuting persons who commit classic espionage under both the espionage statutes and as foreign agents, since 8 of the 11 instances here date from the earliest cohort that began espionage, before 1979. The individuals in Table 17 were spies who committed classic espionage, and whom prosecutors chose to also charge with acting as an agent of a foreign government. Given the difficulties that were discussed earlier in successfully bringing espionage charges, it would not be surprising if prosecutors chose to add the foreign agent charge, which carries less prison time but under which it is easier to achieve a conviction, in order to ensure that the offender is convicted of some level of crime as a sort of back-up or consolation prize for the prosecution if the jury does not find espionage itself.\n\n## Employees Of Foreign Intelligence Services\n\nA second group that can be identified within the hodgepodge in Table 16 is the foreign intelligence service employees. Table 18 lists those who worked directly for an intelligence service and who were convicted of acting as an agent of a foreign government.\n\n## Individuals Working For A Foreign Intelligence Service (Fis) And Convicted As Agents Of A Foreign Government\n\nCoded as\nBoth\nClassic\nEspionage\nand as a\nForeign\nAgent\nForeign\nIntelligence\nService (FIS)\nmember\nVolunteer\nor\nRecruit\nRecruit\n-ed by\nLevel of\nClearance\nName\nCitizenship\nBegan 1947-1979    1 individual\n\n\nSzabo, Zoltan\nnaturalized\nTS\nrecruit\nFIS\nyes\nboth\n(imputed)\n\n\nBegan 1980-1989    1 individual\n\n\nMak, Chi\nnaturalized\nS\nrecruit\nFIS\nyes\n\nBegan 1990-2015    9 individuals\n\n\nAlonso, Alejandro\nnative\nnone\nvolunteer\n\nyes\n\nGari, George\nnative\nnone\nrecruit\nFIS\nyes\n\nGuerrero, Antonio\nnative\nnone\nrecruit\nFIS\nyes\nboth\nHernandez, Linda\nnative\nnone\nrecruit\nFIS\nyes\n\nHernandez, Nilo\nnaturalized\nnone\nrecruit\nFIS\nyes\n\nLatchin, Sami\nnaturalized\nnone\nrecruit\nFIS\nyes\n\nSantos, Joseph\nnaturalized\nnone\nrecruit\nFIS\nyes\n\nSoueid, Mohamad\nnaturalized\nnone\nrecruit\nFIS\nyes\n\nYai, John\nnaturalized\nnone\nrecruit\nFIS\nyes\n\n\nThe individuals in Table 18 differ from those discussed as classic spies in Table 17\nbecause these all worked for foreign intelligence services. Seven of the eleven were naturalized citizens, and ten of the eleven were recruited by their foreign intelligence service; only one volunteered. The two individuals who began espionage before 1990, one in each of the two earlier cohorts, held security clearances, but the nine who began after 1990 held none. John Yai, who was one of these without access to classified information, worked for the North Korean intelligence service and was discussed earlier. Only one person in this group of eleven persons is coded as both an instance of classic espionage and an agent of a foreign government, and that is Zoltan Szabo. If there is a trend in Table 18, it is the reverse of the one noted in Table 17, since here nine of the eleven persons, 82% of them, began their espionage in the latest cohort since 1990, in contrast to the classic spies in Table\n17 who most frequently began in the earliest cohort. Since 1990, several things could be happening to cause this trend. Perhaps there are more employees of foreign intelligence services spying in the United States than there have been in the earlier periods. A former head of the House Intelligence Committee, Mike Rogers, suggested this when he publicly claimed in April 2016 that \"There are more spies in the United States today from foreign nation states than at any time in our history including the Cold War, and they're stealing everything. If it's not bolted down, it's gone\" (Hattem, 2016). Then again, perhaps more of them are being caught and prosecuted, or more frequently than in the past, they are being convicted on the charge of serving as agents of a foreign government.\n\n## Persons Not Convicted Of Classic Espionage, But Convicted Of Acting As Agents Of Foreign Governments, Solely Or With Other Charges\n\nThe third group extracted here from Table 16 is composed of those who were not convicted of classic espionage but were convicted of acting as agents of a foreign government, some solely for that offense, and others for that offense combined with other charges. Table 19 lists these nineteen individuals.\n\n## Individuals Not Convicted Of Classic Espionage But Convicted As Agents Of A Foreign Government\n\nConvicted\nOnly as\nActing as a\nForeign\nAgent (FA)\nForeign\nIntelligence\nService (FIS)\nmember\nVolunteer\nor\nRecruit\nRecruit\n-ed by\nLevel of\nClearance\nName\nCitizenship\n\nBegan 1947-1979    4 individuals\n\n\nAlvarez, Carlos,\nnaturalized\nnone\nrecruit\nFIS\n\nOnly FA\nChung, Dongfan\nnaturalized\nS\nrecruit\nFIS\n\n\nKadish, Ben-Ami\nnative\nS\nrecruit\nFIS\n\nOnly FA\nRees, Norman\nnaturalized\nnone\nvolunteer\n\n\nSuicide,\nnot tried Began 1980-1989    4 individuals\n\n\nAli, Amen\nnaturalized\nnone\nvolunteer\n\n\nAlvarez, Elsa\nnaturalized\nnone\nrecruit\nFIS\n\nOnly FA\nChiu, Rebecca\nnaturalized\nnone\nrecruit\nFIS\n\nOnly FA\nMak, Chi\nnaturalized\nS\nrecruit\nFIS\nyes\n\nBegan 1990-2015   11 individuals\n\n\nAlonso, Alejandro\nnative\nnone\nvolunteer\n\nyes\nOnly FA\nGari, George\nnative\nnone\nrecruit\nFIS\nyes\nOnly FA\nHernandez, Linda\nnative\nnone\nrecruit\nFIS\nyes\nOnly FA\nHernandez, Nilo\nnaturalized\nnone\nrecruit\nFIS\nyes\nOnly FA\nLatchin, Sami\nnaturalized\nnone\nrecruit\nFIS\nyes\n\nNicholson, Nathaniel\nnative\nnone\nrecruit\nfamily\n\n\nSantos, Joseph\nnaturalized\nnone\nrecruit\nFIS\nyes\nOnly FA\nShaaban, Shaaban\nnaturalized\nnone\nvolunteer\n\n\nShemami, Najeb\nnaturalized\nnone\nrecruit\nFIS\n\n\nSoueid, Mohamad\nnaturalized\nnone\nrecruit\nFIS\nyes\n\nYai, John\nnaturalized\nnone\nrecruit\nFIS\nyes\nOnly FA\n\n\nNine of the eleven employees of foreign intelligence services appear both in Table 18 and in Table 19 because they were nine of the eleven persons who were convicted solely of acting as agents of a foreign government (they are noted as \"only FA,\" that is, only foreign agent, in Table 19). Persons sent from abroad to become naturalized citizens of the United States, and thereby to become eligible to gain positions with access to classified information, as employees of foreign intelligence services typically are, obviously are acting as agents of the government that sent them. A trend seems to be strengthening to use the AGFA alone to prosecute American citizens who work for foreign intelligence services; in the recent past, there have been more successful prosecutions using this statute than there were in past cohorts. However, not all the individuals solely charged and convicted of serving as agents of a foreign government fit this pattern. Ben-Ami Kadish, discussed earlier, was a longtime resident who was born in the United States but grew up in Palestine and had close ties to Israel; he cooperated with an Israeli intelligence operative to provide classified documents and yet was only charged as a foreign agent.\n\nAlso, not all of the known employees of foreign intelligence services who committed espionage, and that are included in this study, were charged with acting as a foreign agent, although obviously they did so. At least three such employees were\ncharged and convicted only of classic espionage. This underlines the discretion\nprosecutors must exercise and the impact of circumstances and context in each case of espionage, which results in various approaches. The three foreign intelligence service employees charged only with classic espionage include the following:\n Larry Wu-tai Chin, who joined the intelligence service in China in the 1940s and\ncame to the United States tasked with collecting intelligence. He became an American citizen, an analyst, and a translator for the CIA, all the while spying for China for the next 30 years. He earned a salary from China that may have approached $1 million, and grew wealthier still by buying investment properties around Washington, DC. He supported a gambling habit that was so flagrant that several Las Vegas casinos cut off his access to their tables. Chin transmitted closely held secrets on American Far Eastern policy for decades, starting with reports on American interrogations of Chinese prisoners during the Korean War. After his conviction in February 1986 on all seventeen counts of espionage with which he had been charged, he was reported to have\ncommitted suicide in his cell51 (Engelberg, 1986).\n Karl Koecher, who joined the Czechoslovak foreign intelligence service in 1963\nand spent 2 years in intelligence training, was sent to the United States with his\nwife and fellow agent, Hana Koecher52. They became naturalized citizens, and\nKarl taught philosophy at a Staten Island college for 4 years. In 1973, he\nobtained a security clearance and took a job as a contract translator for the CIA.\n\nFrom 1975 to 1977, he worked as an employee at the CIA while he continued to spy for the Czechs, but in 1977 he lost his CIA job and had to revert to teaching. Hana got a job in the diamond trade in New York City, and she continued working as a courier, moving information to the Czechs until, in November 1984, the Koechers were arrested. Two years later, they were exchanged for Anatoly Shcharansky, a famous Russian dissident. They returned to Czechoslovakia, where the government welcomed them as heroes and granted them use of a villa outside Prague and a new Volvo (Raab, 1984; Stein, 2010).\n\n Ali Mohamed, a former Egyptian military officer, was an enigmatic figure. He enlisted in the U.S. Army in 1986, became an American citizen by marrying an American woman, and served as a cultural and military advisor for the Army during the late 1980s and then for the FBI during in the 1990s. It was a period in when American officials needed urgently to better understand evolving transnational terrorist groups like Al Qaeda, and Mohamed credibly filled that need. He became a unique combination of terrorist and spy. While playing the role of cultural asset for the United States, however, Ali was actually a committed Islamic extremist working for Ayman al-Zawahiri. During his enlistment in the U.S. Army, he took leave in 1988 and spent several weeks fighting with the Mujahedeen in Afghanistan. Despite reports from his superior officers criticizing this, there was no response to this glaring infraction from the Army or the Intelligence Community. In 1989, Mohamed began traveling from his Army base to New York City where he advised Islamic radicals meeting in mosques there, including the group that would bomb the World Trade Center the first time in 1993. He also used Army manuals that were classified Secret to produce a textbook for Al Qaeda trainees on collecting intelligence, doing surveillance, and planning terror attacks. Mohamed resigned from the Army in 1989 with an honorable discharge in 1991. Zawahiri then asked him to coordinate the move of the Bin Laden family and its supporters from Afghanistan to Sudan and during these months he developed close ties with Osama bin Laden. During the late 1990s, Mohamed worked directly for Bin Laden and Al Qaeda. His tasks included providing military traininglearned from the U.S. Army to Al Qaeda recruits, and scouting the U.S. Embassy in Nairobi, which was one of the two American embassies in East Africa that Al Qaeda bombed. Mohamed was an audacious double agent working simultaneously for Islamic extremists and either the Army or the FBI. He was arrested in September 1998, after the East Africa bombings, and pled guilty to five charges of terrorism and falsification. The seriousness of his espionage pales in comparison with his other activities. He then remained in prison for months without being sentenced, and eventually he dropped out of public view and disappeared, putting the final touch to his chimerical career (Weiser & Risen, 1998; Williams & McCormick, 2001; Poole, 2010).\n\nThere are some commonalities among the persons listed in Table 19. Fourteen of the nineteen were naturalized citizens. Of the eleven persons who began activities in the recent cohort since 1990, none held a security clearance, and in the previous two cohorts only three had clearances. Fourteen were recruited, while only four were volunteers. Of the recruits, only Nathaniel Nicholson was not recruited by a foreign intelligence service, since it was his father who convinced him to contact the Russians.\nNorman Rees,53 listed in Table 19 as having committed suicide before he could be convicted, was unusual in the longevity of his espionage case. He began sharing unclassified information with the Soviets in 1942 about the oil industry where he worked as a petroleum engineer, while the United States and the Soviet Union were allies. Sympathetic toward Communism, as World War II ended and the Cold War began and intensified, Rees continued to collect and pass on American industrial information and techniques to the Soviets until 1971, when the FBI interviewed him. At that time Rees agreed to work for them as a double agent. In 1976, he learned that a Dallas newspaper was about to publish his story and name him, and Rees promptly committed suicide (Blau, 1976). His information had been so valuable to the Soviets that they paid him $30,000 and a $5000 annual pension. He received a medal for the valuable catalytic cracking converter equipment he passed to the Soviets in 1950, which set the subsequent course of Soviet oil industry development (Associated Press, 1976). Since his death prevented his being tried or convicted, what he apparently would have been charged with has been imputed here. Of the ten persons in Table 19 who were convicted solely of being foreign agents, seven of them were working with the Cuban Intelligence Service, all in south Florida. Carlos and Elsa Alvarez, both naturalized American citizens, had been working separately for the Cubans when they met and married in the early 1980s and began to work together. Carlos Alvarez taught psychology as a professor at Florida International University (FIU). He began passing information to the Cubans in 1977 and continued until 2005; Elsa Alvarez also worked at the University as a counselor and began spying in 1982. They were arrested in 2006 and convicted in a plea bargain in March 2007 of conspiracy to act as agents of a foreign governmentthe conspiracy statute, Title 18 U.S.C section 371, carries lesser prison sentences than does section 951 itself (United States District Court Southern District of Florida, 2007; Weaver, 2007).\n\nThe Alvarezes wrote reports that they encrypted onto computer disks and sent to post office boxes in New York City to the Cuban intelligence service. They used code names, a short wave radio, messages on water-soluble paper, coded pager messages, and personal meetings in Cuba to receive instructions for their surveillance and collection. Cuban intelligence wanted information on any prominent people the Alvarezes knew or could find out about, attitudes in the south Florida community, political developments as they might affect Cuba, and current events of concern to the Cuban government. Carlos was sentenced to 5 years in prison, while Elsa received 21 months (1 year and 9 months) in prison for her role in supporting and contributing to her husband's activities. Professor Alvarez had made repeated trips to Cuba with his FIU students to introduce them to the island and to foster friendly attitudes between the two countries (United States District Court Southern District of Florida, 2007). The other five individuals who were convicted solely of being foreign agents for Cuba were part of the La Red Avispa network in southern Florida, and worked alongside Antonio Guerrero, who was discussed earlier. Alejandro Alonso, George Gari, Linda and Nilo Hernandez, and Joseph Santos all pleaded guilty in 1999 and 2000 to acting as agents of a foreign government and served various prison terms of between 4 and 7 years. Others in the network who were not American citizens are not included here. The network's agents infiltrated anti-Castro immigrant groups to report on their plans, and took jobs at military bases in south Florida where they surveilled and reported on activities there and hoped to gain access to classified information, but did not (Pressley, 1998; \"Miami Spy-hunting, 2000). Five of the persons listed in Table 19 were supplying information or equipment to Middle Eastern countries. Two were volunteers: Amen Ali and Shabaan Shabaan.\n\nThe other three were recruits by foreign intelligence services: Sami Latchin and Najib Shemami were recruited to work for Iraq, and Mohamad Anas Haitham Soueid was a recruit for Syria. All five were convicted of export control or trade embargo offenses along with convictions for serving as an agent of a foreign power. Ali tried to ship dual use military equipment to Yemen (Kotowski, 2011). Shabaan worked with the Iraqi intelligence service collecting intelligence from open sources on American intentions during the run-up to the Iraq War (Corcoran, 2006). Latchin came to the United States in 1993 on orders from Saddam Hussein to fit in, become a citizen, and collect information on Iraqi opposition groups. While he \"slept,\" until he could emerge as an agent, Latchin slowly spent his way into bankruptcy and was working as a gate agent at O'Hare airport when he was arrested. Identified in 2004 in documents captured in Iraq, Latchin was convicted in 2007 of being a foreign agent, violating the trade embargo against Iraq, and various falsifications (Coen, 2007). Like Latchin, Shemami and Soueid are examples of foreign agents who had no access to classified or restricted information, but who instead focused on surveilling immigrant communities and sending reports to foreign governments that were worried about the threat these communities could pose to their regimes.\n\nNajib Shemami was a naturalized citizen who had lived in the Detroit, Michigan area for some 40 years when he was arrested in 2007 and initially charged with four espionage-related offenses, including acting as a foreign agent. His indictment was based on Iraqi intelligence records captured during the Iraq War in 2003 (\"Community members spied for Iraq,\" 2007). Starting in September 2002, and continuing through January 2003, Shemami worked for the Iraqi Intelligence Service (IIS) collecting and reporting observations and information he gathered from his community in Detroit and during three trips he made to Iraq and Turkey. As a merchant and importer of delicacies from the Middle East, Shemami had traveled there frequently since 1996 for his work. While the United States prepared for a likely invasion of Iraq in 2002, the IIS recruited him as their agent by making him a deal: he could continue importing foodstuffs some observers describe what he was doing as smuggling goods and medicine back into Iraq as wellto the United States unhindered by the Iraqi authorities, in exchange for information the IIS requested (Associated Press, 2009). The captured IIS records documented Shemami's contributions to Saddam Hussein's regime, including naming Iraqi natives living in the United States whom Shemami judged would be asked to guide American troops during an invasion of Iraq, names of expatriates who could become potential political candidates in Iraq, observations he made of military preparations in Turkey such as the locations of 200 tanks and of tents made ready for refugees, and the name of an Iraqi expatriate interviewed by, and possibly cooperating with, the FBI (United States District Court Eastern District of Michigan, 2007; Ashenfelter, 2007). Shemami would be among the first of a dozen Iraqis in the United States, some naturalized citizens, some permanent residents, prosecuted in the late 2000s for acting as agents of Saddam Hussein's government based on captured records. Hussein had maintained an extensive operation watching for threats to his regime in the United States and gathering intelligence among Iraqis here, including sending in \"sleeper\" agents who were directed to live quietly and blend into American society until instructed by the IIS to collect specific information (Leinwand, 2008). Shemami was charged with conspiracy to act as an unregistered agent of a foreign government, acting as such an agent, providing services to Iraqan act which violated the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA), violating the Executive Orders that had declared Iraq a threat to the national security of the United States since 1990 and established a trade embargo, and lying to the FBI (United States District Court Eastern District of Michigan, 2007). His defense argued at trial that the IIS had coerced him into becoming their agent by threatening him with torture. One Detroit FBI agent commenting on that claim is quoted as saying that help was available to Americans to resist such pressure.\n\n\"We're here to help them... There are ways we can help them. They also have to say 'Hey, we need help'\" (Egan, 2009). Shemami pled guilty early in 2009 and was sentenced to 46 months (3 years and 10 months) in prison, leaving behind a wife and nine children (Schmitt, 2009). The regime of Bashar al-Assad, President of Syria, was also declared a threat to the national security of the United States under IEEPA based on its state support for terrorism. Similar to the practice of Saddam Hussein, Assad has been running American agents to serve as observers and reporters of the names and threatening activities among disaffected Syrian expatriates in the United States. Mohamad Anas Haitham Soueid, a Syrian-born naturalized American citizen living in Leesburg, Virginia, was arrested on October 11, 2011, and charged with conspiring to and actually acting as an agent of a foreign government (Syria) and with four counts of lying on firearms forms and to federal agents (United States Department of Justice, 2011). As the protest movement in Syria against Assad escalated in 2011, Soueid helped him monitor protestors among the Syrian immigrant communities in the United States. Soueid recruited others to record audio and video at anti-Assad public protests and to make recordings of conversations with participants that could be used later by the Syrian intelligence service to identify them. He passed along phone numbers and email addresses of protest leaders, details about individuals who were financing the protests, logistics of meetings, internal conflicts developing within the movement, and its future plans, along with dozens of the audio and video recordings. He traveled to Syria several times between March and October 2011 where he met personally with Assad (United States Department of Justice, 2012; United States Department of Justice, 2011; Goodman, 2011). He used a laptop computer provided by Syrian intelligence to communicate securely with his contacts in the Syrian embassy in New York and in Syria. He destroyed the laptop and burned documents in his backyard after an interview with the FBI implied his imminent arrest. Soueid was convicted in March 2012 of acting as an unregistered government agent of Syria and of falsification, and was sentenced the following July to 18 months in prison and 3 years of probation. Prophetically, he claimed at his trial that he was acting to prevent Islamic extremists from taking over in Syria and creating a larger national security threat to the United States than Assad ever had (Associated Press, 2012). \"By illegally acting as an agent of Syria, Mr. Soueid deceived his adopted country of the United States in support of a violent and repressive despotic regime,\" the FBI Assistant Director said at his sentencing. \"Through today's sentencing, he will now be held accountable for his actions\" (United States Department of Justice, 2012). Acting as an agent of a foreign government is, in a large sense, the essence of espionage. Applying the categories from the discussion of classic espionage earlier to the example of Mohamad Soueid's actions helps to demonstrate how being a foreign agent is like, but not completely like, the classic pattern:\n\n A context of competition. Syria has been designated a state sponsor of\ninternational terrorism by the Department of State since 1979, and various punitive economic, financial, and trade sanctions have been imposed on Syria by the United States based on that designation (sources for these entries follow entry 8).\n Secret means. Soueid and his co-conspirators secretly made audio and video\nrecordings of opponents of the Assad government in the United States and emailed the recordings to the Syrian intelligence service so its agents could identify and take punitive action against them in defense of the regime.\n Goal is secrets. No classified or restricted information was involved in Soueid's\ncase. Instead, he collected the identities, (information such as names, addresses, and email addresses) of Syrian opponents of Assad, and documented their political expressions in recordings to pass along to Syrian intelligence. The information was sensitive to the individuals being spied on, and perhaps it was even life-threatening information to those betrayed to the brutal regime, which is known for harassing, intimidating, and murdering its opponents in Syria and the relatives.\n Political, military, economic secrets. The secrets that Soueid collected were the\npolitical opinions of individual protesters and the political plans that groups made to protest and act against the regime. Soueid was sued in a civil action by several people, whose lives had been damaged as a result of his surveillance, including one woman whose father had been murdered in Syria and whose daughter had been kidnapped.\n Theft. The theft done by Soueid and his co-conspirators was theft of the privacy\nand security of the Syrian legal residents in the United States who were lawfully assembling and expressing their views in peaceful protest.\n Subterfuge and surveillance. Soueid and his co-conspirators clandestinely\nattended protest rallies and planning meetings of groups opposed to Assad, secretly made recordings there, and lied to the FBI about their actions.\n Illegality. Soueid was charged with Title 18 U.S.C. section 371, conspiracy to act\nas an agent of a foreign government, Title 18 U.S.C. section 951, acting as an agent of a foreign government, Title 18 U.S.C. section 922(a)(6), material false statement on a firearms purchase application, Title 18 U.S.C. section 924(a)(1)(A), false statement on a firearms application, and Title 18 U.S.C. section 1001, false statements to the FBI. He was convicted of conspiracy to act and of actually acting as an agent of a foreign government and of various falsifications.\n Psychological toll. After the FBI interviewed him but before he was arrested,\nSoueid burned some of his documents in his backyard and destroyed the laptop computer given to him by Syrian intelligence, suggesting that he was anxious about the legal consequences of being caught in his surveillance for Syria, but during his trial he continued to be defiant in his support for the Assad regime\n(United States Department of State, 2015; United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, Alexandria Division, Indictment, 2011; Department of Justice, Office of Public Affairs, 2012).\n\nAs the examples of Soueid and the others discussed in this section illustrate, the statutes that define acting as an agent of a foreign government are general and do not name espionage itself, yet the acts of such agents, even when they do not have access to classified or controlled information, play out an espionage scenario.\n\nto a proscribed recipient, a foreign gov't\nIf apprehended, an investigation is begun, and a prosecution may follow.\nAn agent\nconveys either classified information that the federal government legally controls, or sensitive information protected by law, that the owner wants withheld\nwith a proscribed intent, to aid that gov't.\n\n\nIn the United States, such agents collect information and clandestinely pass the information to a foreign government, thereby causing damage to the United States in some instances, damage to the interests or people of expatriate communities, in others by meddling in American foreign policies, economic developments, or international military actions (Koerner, 2003). In the cases of Shemami and Soueid, they brought the divisions and dangers of the wars in Iraq and in Syria directly into their immigrant communities at home. They served as agents for foreign governments, but they were also American citizens who owed their first allegiance to the United States and betrayed that trust.\n\n## Violations Of Export Control Laws As A Type Of Espionage\n\nThe United States considers the sale, export, or re-transfer of various American defense articles and knowledge to be potential threats to its national security, its economic security, and its foreign policy goals. These defense articles include military technology, dual use technologies and software, defense services, conventional weapons, missile technology, satellites, nuclear, chemical, or biological materials or weapons. They constitute millions of items (United States Department of State, Directorate of Defense Trade Controls, 2015a). Legislation to meet these threats to national security by controlling exports of these sensitive items originated in times when the United States was facing war, in laws such as the Trading with the Enemy Act of 1917 and the Neutrality Act of 1935.\n\nCongress considered these laws necessary to prevent \"giving aid and comfort to the nation's enemies\" when, as war approached, it was clear who those enemies would be (Fergusson, 2009). In the late 1940s, as the Cold War with the Soviet Union took hold, controlling defense exports shifted from its initial wartime focus to one of preventing the Soviets and their allies from procuring articles, knowledge, or materials that would help them if an actual war with the West broke out. Export control grew to become an extensive and complex federal enterprise, designed to be carried on indefinitely (Fergusson, 2009; Fergusson & Kerr, 2014). The mechanisms of export control available to regulators in the 1950s, i.e., lists of proscribed items and procedures to license approved exports and deny licenses to those that are disapproved, shaped the export control system that persists today. The assumptions from the context of the 1950sthat of a bi-polar face-off between two super powersalso shaped the system. Yet since then, the world has become a different place, one that is more globalized, more internationally interconnected in transportation, communications, and economic cooperation, and one in which the United States faces multiple competitors and potential adversaries. For years, people have argued that the export control system needs large-scale revision to bring it into line with these changes. Critics do not agree, however, on how it should be revised. Some argue for loosening controls to boost trade and economic profit and thereby benefit the American economy; others argue for tightening export controls to hold on to the technological advantages the United States has in the face of accelerating international competition. Two main federal agencies handle licensing of controlled exports: the DoS and the Department of Commerce (DoC)54. Due to inadequate coordination between them, disputes over their respective jurisdictions, and vexing delays for applicants, in 2007 the GAO declared export control to be a high risk area that required strategic reexamination. The Obama administration began a major revision of the system in 2009, working to simplify and unite it under goals that include designating one licensing agency (instead of the two main and many subsidiary agencies that currently manage parts of it); one list of items that require an export license (instead of the two overlapping lists now in place); one enforcement structure; and one information technology system that all users could access (Levine, 2012; Fergusson & Kerr, 2014). As of 2015, reformers were making slow but appreciable progress, starting with steps to cross-reference and reconcile the two lists.\n\n## Three Export Control Statutes\n\nThe three main statutes governing export control all date from the late 1970s. Their authors made use of the procedures then available to them that had built up since the First World War. These three statutes now define the current export control system, with some later revisions.\n\nThe Export Administration Act (EAA) of 197955 controls dual use technologies, that\nis, technologies that may have both commercial and military uses. It is implemented by the Department of Commerce (DoC) through the Export\nAdministration Regulations (EAR)56. The list of specific items tracked under the\nEAR, which require export licenses from the DoC, is called the Commerce Control List (CCL). There are ten broad categories on the CCL:\n Nuclear materials, facilities, and equipment;  Materials, chemicals, microorganisms, and toxins;  Materials processing;  Electronics design development and production;  Computers;\n Telecommunications and information security;  Lasers and sensors;  Navigation and avionics;  Marine; and\n\nDepartment of Defense plays an important role in defining military weapons, articles, and technology of all types and overseeing their global availability. The Bureau of Industry and Security, which administers export control in the Department of Commerce, lists sections of nine federal agencies that have responsibilities for export control. In addition to those already mentioned here, they also include the Department of the Interior, the Drug Enforcement Administration, the Food and Drug Administration, the Patent and Trademark Office, and the Environmental Protection Agency. (See http://www.bis.doc.gov/index/php/about-bis/resourcelinks)\n\n Aerospace, propulsion systems, space vehicles, and related equipment\n(Fergusson, 2014).\nAccording to a Congressional Research Service (CRS) report of 2014, \"Each of these categories [that are listed on the CCL] is further divided into functional groups: equipment, assemblies, and components; test, inspection, and production equipment; materials; software; and technology. Each controlled item has an export control classification number (ECCN) based on the earlier categories and functional groups. Each ECCN is accompanied by a description of the item and the reason for control. In addition to discrete items on the CCL, nearly all U.S.-origin items are \"subject to the EAR.\" This means that any item \"subject to the EAR\" may be restricted to a destination based on the end-use or end-user of the product. For example, a commodity that is not on the CCL may be denied [a license to export] if the good is destined for a military end-use or an entity known to be engaged in weapons proliferation\" (Fergusson, 2014). An oddity about the 1979 EAA is that Congress has repeatedly allowed it to expire, and then turned around and renewed it for a further specified period of time. During periods when it is expired (as it was in 2015), successive Presidents have declared that all of its powers and requirements will continue under the authority granted to the President under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act, discussed further.\n\nThe second major statute is the Arms Export Control Act (AECA) of 1976,57 which regulates military technology. It requires the President to control the import and export of defense articles and defense services, which include consulting, advising, and sharing information. This sharing is one of the activities that can lead to charges of espionage. The AECA requires that governments that receive or buy weapons and other military items from the United States use them for internal security and legitimate self-defense, and not for aggression or escalation of a conflict. Elements that are considered in determining the legitimacy of an export include whether the exports contribute to an arms race, if they aid in the development of weapons of mass destruction, or if they support international terrorism, increase the possibility of outbreak or escalation of conflict, or prejudice the development of bilateral or multilateral arms control or nonproliferation agreements (Fergusson & Kerr, 2014). The Act is implemented by the DoS through the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR).58 The list of specific items tracked under the ITAR, which requires export licenses from the DoS, is called the United States Munitions List (USML). There are 21 broad categories on the USML, including:\n\n Firearms, Close Assault Weapons and Combat Shotguns  Guns and Armament  Ammunition/Ordnance  Launch Vehicles, Guided Missiles, Ballistic Missiles, Rockets, Torpedoes,\nBombs, and Mines\n Explosives and Energetic Materials, Propellants, Incendiary Agents, and Their\nConstituents\n Surface Vessels of War and Special Naval Equipment  Ground Vehicles  Aircraft and Related Articles  Military Training Equipment and Training  Personal Protective Equipment  Military Electronics  Fire Control, Range Finder, Optical and Guidance and Control Equipment  Materials and Miscellaneous Articles  Toxicological Agents, Including Chemical Agents, Biological Agents, and\nAssociated Equipment\n Spacecraft and Related Articles  Nuclear Weapons Related Articles  Classified Articles, Technical Data, and Defense Services Not Otherwise\nEnumerated\n Directed Energy Weapons  Gas Turbine Engines and Associated Equipment  Submersible Vessels and Related Articles\n Articles, Technical Data, and Defense Services Not Otherwise Enumerated\n(Department of State, Directorate of Defense Trade Controls, 2015b).\nA glance through the categories on the DoC's list, the CCL, followed by DoS's list, the USML, each reproduced earlier, will suggest the potential for disagreement between the two agencies, and the likely confusion for those applicants dealing with the DoC who might also be dealing with the DoS. The lists overlap, they use different terms for the same or similar items, and their categories do not match one another. This is why the export control reform effort decided that the first project it would take on was trying to reconcile the categories on the two lists. The third major export control statute is the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) of 1977.59 It grants the President the ability to declare an emergency when the United States is under unusual and extraordinary threat from abroad, short of war. Under such an emergency, the President may block financial transactions or freeze assets of belligerent foreign governments or specific foreign nationals. President Carter first declared an IEEPA emergency in 1979 in response to the Iran hostage crisis, and Iranian assets continued to be frozen by sanctions until early in 2016 when a nuclear deal was reached (Pearce, 2016). When the DoS declared Syria to be a state sponsor of terrorism in 2004, the United States froze its assets under IEEPA. Emergencies such as the attacks on 9/11 caused a similar blocking of Al Qaeda's assets and freezing of its finances in the United States (Fergusson & Kerr, 2014). Americans who have tried to illegally trade with countries or transnational groups that are designated under IEEPA, EAA, or the AECA, or who have provided information, which is considered an export, to such governments, break the export control laws and arguably, commit a type of espionage (Michigan Technological University, 2015). These statutes from the 1970s are sometimes insufficient for the changed demands of national and economic security in the context of the 21st century. Among these changes are the facts that: (1) a larger proportion of sensitive technology is now dual use, and thus it requires a difficult assessment by export control regulators of the risk that what is bought as a commercial application might be diverted to a military end use; (2) more countries, alongside the United States and Russia, are exporting sensitive dual-use technologies, including newer arms suppliers like China, Israel, Turkey, and Ukraine; (3) globalized methods of manufacturing now result in sensitive dual-use technologies becoming internationale.g., a defense article can be financed in one country, designed in a second, and assembled in a third [anyone using an Apple device is familiar with this sort of international collaboration]; (4) sensitive technologies have spread around the globe and are no longer the special province of just a few advanced countries, so it becomes complicated to track and \"maintain sovereignty\" over those technologies; (5) with more competition between international arms suppliers, it becomes difficult to exert discipline on exporters to deny them business, since if an international customer is blocked from buying what it wants from the United States, it can turn around and buy it from another country instead; and(6) the health of the economy may now be more intertwined with national security than it ever has been, making access to international markets not simply a commercial goal, but one that has direct implications for the security of the United States (Beck, 2000).\n\n## Enforcement Of Export Control\n\nEnforcement of export control statutes is in large part the responsibility of the Counterintelligence and Export Control Section (CES) in the Department of Justice's National Security Division (NSD). This is the same legal section that handles enforcement of the FARA, which was discussed earlier in the Acting as a Foreign Agent chapter. According to its website,\nthe CES supervises the investigation and prosecution of cases affecting national security, foreign relations, and the export of military and strategic commodities and technology. The Section has executive responsibility for authorizing the prosecution of cases under criminal statutes relating to espionage, sabotage, neutrality, and atomic energy (United States Department of Justice, \"Counterproliferation overview,\" 2015).\n\nPutting the response to export control violations in the counterintelligence section of DoJ's National Security Division demonstrates the federal government's appreciation that these violations endanger the national security as well as the economic advantages of the United States. When a person illegally exports a military technology, a dual use article, or information that falls under export control, in effect they commit espionage, in impact if not currently in name. The model that illustrated classic espionage earlier in this report also can illustrate the basic elements of export control violations.\n\nto a proscribed recipient, a foreign gov't\nIf apprehended, an investigation is begun, and a prosecution may follow.\nA perpetrator\nconveys information or technologies that a company or the federal government legally controls and wants withheld\nwith a proscribed intent.\n\n\n\n## Figure 7  Export Control Violations In A Model Of Elements Of Espionage\n\nIn Figure 7, proscribed recipients of controlled exports would include countries specified by name under declared IEEPA emergencies since 1979 that continue in place, including Syria, North Korea, and Lebanon. Other proscribed countries are listed by the various regulatory agencies that publish lists of specific denied exports or that fall under general trade sanctions. Lists include the DoS's \"U.S Embargo Reference Chart\" and the DoC's \"Denied Persons List\" and \"Entity List.\" China, Iraq, Libya, Syria, Sudan, and many others are found on these lists. Some defense items are proscribed for export to virtually any foreign government. Proscribed intent is specified in the three statutes governing export control under discussion here, which criminalize transferring controlled items or information without the evaluation of regulators and their grant of authorization with an export license (United States Department of State, 2015; United States Department of Commerce, 2015a; Department of Commerce, 2015b). The DoD agency tasked with documenting the foreign collection threat to American industries also considers export control violations to be a type of espionage. To pursue its mission to \"secure the nation's technological base,\" the Defense Security Service (DSS) oversees and monitors the thousands of contractor companies that have been granted facilities clearances by the federal government to handle classified or sensitive information. DSS collects reports from these cleared contractors on attempts by foreign individuals or governments to acquire controlled information or technologies. DSS analyzes and compiles these reports in an annual publication that documents trends in foreign collection efforts, in order to raise awareness of this threat and improve countermeasures. The 2014 version of this report, titled \"Targeting U.S. Technologies: A Trend Analysis of Cleared Industry Reporting,\" notes that \"Cleared contractor reporting provides information concerning actual, probable, or possible espionage, sabotage, terrorism, or subversion activities,\" and where warranted, DSS refers such reports to counterintelligence and law enforcement authorities for prosecution (United States Department of Defense, Defense Security Service, 2013). DSS sponsors the Center for Development of Security Excellence (CDSE), a security education and training organization, which provides courses for professional advancement and certification of security personnel and the larger security community. One of CDSE's website pages, titled \"Understanding Espionage and National Security Crimes,\" explains that U.S. defense information comprises more than just classified information. Targeting of defense information has included dual-use technology, military critical technology, sensitive company documents, proprietary information, and Export Administration Regulation (EAR) or International Traffic in Arms Regulation (ITAR) controlled technology....ITAR and EAR are export control laws whose broad scope extends to products, software, technical details, and services, and includes both military and commercial items (United States Department of Defense, Defense Security Service, Center for Development of Security Excellence, 2015).\n\nThe Center goes on to explain that \"along with traditional espionage and economic or trade secret espionage, ITAR and EAR violations must be reported to DSS by DOD security personnel for follow-up actions\" (Department of Defense, Defense Security Service, Center for Development of Security Excellence, 2015). Nine persons among the 209 individuals under study in this report violated export control laws because they transmitted restricted defense technologies or information. Table 20 lists them by cohort, shows the information they compromised or attempted to compromise, their citizenship and level of clearance, and lists the countries that benefitted from their espionage.\n\n## Individuals Convicted Of Export Control Violations\n\nName/Yr Began Espionage\nCitizen\n-ship\nClearance\nRecipient\nType of Information Passed\nBegan 1947-1979   0 individuals\n\n\nBegan 1980-1989   4 individuals\n\n\nAli, A. 1987\nnatural -ized\nnone\nYemen\nNight vision goggles, chemical\nweapons suits, body armor, plus classified documents\n\n\nHoffman, R. 1986\nnative\nTS\nJapan\nSoftware used to track missiles\nor rockets using exhaust plumes.\n\n\nKota, S. 1985\nnatural -ized\nnone\nSoviet Union\nMercury cadmium telluride\nmissile detectors; radar absorbing paint for stealth technology; biotechnology used to produce a synthetic hormone.\nMak, C. 1983\nnatural -ized\nS\nChina\nElectric-powered propulsion\nsystem; solid-state power switch for warships and submarines.\nBegan 1990-2015  5 individuals\n\n\nExhaust systems for B-2 bomber; stealth avoidance using infrared sensors; radar-evading stealth exhaust nozzle for cruise missiles.\nGowadia, N. 1999\nnatural -ized\nTS/SCI\nChina, Israel,\nGermany, Switzerland; attempted to Austria, Lichtenstein, 2 others unidentified\nKnapp, M. 2009\nnative\nnone\nAttempted to\nIran, Russia\nAnti-gravity flight suits; survival radios; F-14 fighter pilot ejection\nseats; an F-5B Tiger II fighter jet airplane\nRoth, J. 2004\nnative\nnone\nChina\nPlasma actuators for flight\ncontrols in automated weapons systems (drones).\nSherman, D. 2004\nnative\nnone\nChina\nPlasma actuators for flight\ncontrols in automated weapons systems (drones).\nShu, Q. 2003\nnatural -ized\nnone\nChina\nCryogenic fueling system for\nspace launch vehicles used in launch of satellites or space stations.\n\nEight of the nine individuals listed in Table 20 were convicted of violating, attempting, or conspiring to violate the AECA, the EAA, or the IEEPA. Further convictions for money laundering, income tax evasion, filing false tax returns, falsification, wire fraud, lying, and bribery of foreign officials piled up against them. Two were also charged as agents of a foreign government, Amen Ali and Chi Mak. One was convicted of classic espionage as well as of export control violations, Noshir Gowadia, and another, Subrahmanyam Kota, was initially charged with classic espionage but later saw his charges reduced. Kota had founded a software development company in Boston. Starting in 1985, he also developed a network of friends that worked in defense industries and were willing to collect information for him. Since he had no access himself, these friends could access for him sensitive or classified defense technologies, which he in turn sold to the Soviets. He sold missile detection technology and stealth radar coatings for thousands of dollars. Kota was caught in an FBI sting in 1994 while he was attempting to sell an international biotechnological breakthrough consisting of specialized cells from bioengineered hamster ovaries used to make an expensive drug that would stimulate human red blood cell production. In exchange for Kota's cooperation against an accomplice, prosecutors dropped the two espionage charges against him, and allowed him to plead guilty only to selling stolen biotechnology and income tax evasion (Still, a jury later acquitted the accomplice, while the KGB agent whom the FBI had identified as the waiting buyer, returned unhindered to the Soviet Union). While many of the technologies Kota compromised were clearly sensitive or classified and defense-related, through these maneuverings he avoided prosecution on espionage or export control charges (Apodaca, 1995; Rakowsky, 1995). The nine individuals listed in Table 20 were similar in some ways but not in others. Citizenship did not define them: four were native-born, five were naturalized citizens. Their levels of security clearance varied: three held clearances (Hoffman a Top Secret, Mak a Secret, and Gowadia a TS/SCI at various stages of his career), but the other six had no security clearances. Information and technologies can be designated \"restricted\" on the CCL or the USML and thus require an export license, yet not be classified. With dual use technologies, a designation could depend on whether a commercial or military source was sponsoring and funding the research and development, as well as on the stage of the item's development when it was compromised. Recipient countries from these nine persons included several avid collectors of American military technologies, such as China (recipient in five of the nine cases), the Soviet Union or Russia in two cases, and Iran in one. However, other recipients were neutral or allied with the United States, including Israel, Yemen, Japan, and various close allies of the United States that Gowadia approached. Seven of the nine individuals were contractors to the federal government; only Ali, who ran a cigarette store and Knapp, who was unemployed after losing a job in human resources, were not. All seven of the contractors were scientists or other highly trained professionals: Hoffman was a proverbial rocket scientist and a physicist who worked on propulsion; Kota was a computer software engineer; Mak was an electrical engineer; Gowadia was an aeronautical design engineer; Roth, and his former student and protege Sherman, were electrical engineers and plasma scientists; and Shu was an internationally recognized physicist working with cryogenics. All nine individuals acted primarily for money. In addition, two were motivated by divided loyalties (Ali and Makboth of whom worked directly for the intelligence services of their foreign government sponsors); two were motivated by disgruntlement (Hoffman and Knapp); and four of the scientists sought recognition and career advancement as well as money (Gowadia, Roth, Sherman, and Shu). Marc Knapp was discussed earlier as an example of someone who held no security clearance and who attempted to transmit restricted but unclassified information and equipment. He was also an example of someone who was prosecuted for violating export control statutes. Working with an FBI undercover agent whom Knapp thought was an arms broker, for 8 months in 2009 and 2010 Knapp procured restricted military hardware and evaded export control regulations, trying to make money by selling it to Iran or Russia. Among other gear, he offered pilot ejector seats, emergency survival locator radios, anti-gravity flight suits, and an F-\n5B Tiger II fighter jet. He pled guilty to violating the IEEPA,60 Executive Order\n13222 that continues the EAA in force, and the AECA. Convicted, he was sentenced to 46 months (3 years and 10 months) in prison (Department of Justice, 2011; United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement, 2011). Noshir Gowadia committed both export control violations and classic espionage at the end of what had been a productive and successful career in aeronautical engineering. Born in India, Gowadia came to the United States in the 1960s for postgraduate studies having already, he claimed, earned a Ph.D. at the age of fifteen. He began working for Northrop Corporation in 1968 and became a naturalized American citizen a few years later. Northrop was then developing the highly classified B-2 Spirit \"stealth\" bomber that combined various technologies to make it virtually undetectable to an adversary's radar and heat sensors. Gowadia focused on what became his area of specialization, the problem of hiding the infrared signature from the B-2 bomber's jet propulsion. As the company merged to become Northrop Grumman, he continued on there, staying for 18 years and becoming the acknowledged expert on nozzle design until he left in 1986 (United States District Court for the District of Hawaii, 2007). For the 16 years following his retirement from Northrop Grumman, Gowadia joined the ranks of professionals hustling to piece together an income. His consulting company served as the base from which he marketed his expertise in aeronautics and stealth design. His past experience allowed him to win contracts with DARPA and several other government agencies and military services, work a stint at Los Alamos National Laboratory in New Mexico, serve as an adjunct professor at three different universities, and persistently seek and sometimes win international contacts (United States District Court for the District of Hawaii, 2007). In the 1990s, Gowadia deepened his international presence by setting up two overseas companies, one in Lichtenstein, a tax-friendly place from which to solicit contracts in Europe and to stash the earnings from them, and one in Canberra, which he opened with a former Australian Navy lieutenant-commander. The Australian venture began from an initial nibble, an invitation from the Australian Defence Force (ADF) to Gowadia to give a two-day seminar on stealth design. Pleased with his talk, officials encouraged Gowadia to set up a local company, and then took a large bite by paying him $1M (Australian) between 1999 and 2003 for his services, which included studies, training, and consulting on tests that applied his designs to the Australian C-130 transport plane. In 2003, however, negotiations over expanding Gowadia's work to other Australian aircraft failed because he demanded 100% ownership of any intellectual property that would be developed from such a venture (McKenna, 2010). In 1999, as he had begun to spend more time in Australia, Gowadia bought oceanfront land on Maui. In 2002, he finished building a lavish home there that sported a roofline shaped like a B-2. Months later, when the contract with the ADF collapsed, he faced a nearly $15,000 monthly mortgage on his new house without commanding some of the income he had expected would pay for it. As he had been doing for decades, he fell back on selling his expertise, but this time he focused on the Chinese (McKenna, 2010; Boylan, 2005). His initial tentative contacts with them had already begun in January 2002 through a \"Chinese access agent\" named Henry Nyoo; these led to conversations with an official from the Chinese State Bureau of Foreign Exports, Tommy Wong.\n\nWong and Nyoo worked the aeronautical research centers in the PRC to market Gowadia's offer to provide the Chinese with information and consulting services on how to develop their stealth capability for the Chinese air force. On July 29, 2003, Gowadia, Nyoo, and Wong flew to Hong Kong and then to Chengdu, the center of research and development in China for fighter aircraft and cruise missiles. Gowadia spoke and made a PowerPoint presentation proposing to work with them on \"low observable\" propulsion systemsa presentation that included U.S. national defense information restricted from export and classified at the Secret level (McKenna,\n2010; United States District Court for the District of Hawaii, 2007). Over the next 2 years, he made at least five more trips to the People's Republic of China (PRC). Between trips, he emailed classified data to the Chinese engineers he worked with, evaluated and corrected their test results, advised them on how to improve their testing and measurement facilities, oversaw the design of a nozzle for a cruise missile that would make it difficult to detect by radar, and provided the Chinese with classified flight test data that helped them modify their cruise missiles by showing them what \"the exact 'lock on range' of a new Chinese missile would look like 'from a pursuing U.S. air-to-air missile'\" (Gordon, 2005). According to Dean Wilkening, director of a science program at Stanford University's Center for International Security and Cooperation, \"The reason foreign governments would like this [stealth] technology is if they reverse engineer it, they can apply this to their fighter aircraft [and] if you do that, our air-to-air missiles don't work very well. They can't find the target.\" (United States Department of Justice, United States Attorney Edward H. Kubo, 2006; Gertz, 2006; Gordon, 2005). Gowadia was arrested on October 26, 2005 after spending 10 days in voluntary interviews with the FBI. His house was searched, where many classified documents and reports were found (Macavoy, 2008). He signed statements admitting to having willfully conveyed national defense information to a person not entitled to receive it (Boylan & Perez, 2005; Dooley, 2009b). From the initial sole charge, the investigation into Gowadia's activities mushroomed over the next 5 years, generating thousands of pages of classified evidence, during which time he remained in jail without bail as a flight risk. After the first charge was filed, increasingly more serious indictments were handed down later in 2005, in 2006, and again in 2007 as the investigations expanded around the world (United States Department of Justice District of Hawaii, 2010). While he remained in jail, his defense lawyers requested an evaluation for mental problems that could have made him incompetent to stand trial. The report on his psychological evaluation determined that he did suffer from a \"narcissistic personality disorder,\" but a judge ruled in February 2010 that his grandiosity would not make him incompetent to stand trial, and it began on April 13, 2010 (Sample, 2009; Associated Press, 2010). Prosecutors announced during Gowadia's trial that the Chinese government had paid him $15,000 on his first trip there, and later sent payments that brought the total to $110,000 to his secret Swiss bank accounts. These he had set up from Lichtenstein in the name of his fake charitable foundation for children. Gowadia distributed no money from his charity to any actual children. While he was working for the Chinese in 2002 and 2004, he had also sent classified information to the Swiss government and to businessmen in Israel and Germany with marketing offers suggesting he could apply stealth technology to various aircraft in those countries.\n\nHe made other offers and disclosures to additional unspecified countriesGowadia had approached eight countries in all (United States District Court for the District of Hawaii, 2007; Department of Justice, 2011). Although his defense attempted to prove that the information and services he had admittedly shared with the PRC had not been classified but were instead publically available, Gowadia's initial confession was difficult to overcome in court (Dooley, 2010; \"Accused spy sold nothing secret,\" 2010). He had signed a statement admitting that he had disclosed classified information and material both verbally and in papers, computer presentations, letters, and other methods to individuals in foreign countries with the knowledge that information was classified... The reason I disclosed this classified information was to establish the technological credibility with the potential customers for future business. I wanted to help these countries to further their self aircraft systems. My personal gain would be business (Gertz, 2006).\n\nHe was convicted on fourteen counts, including two counts of willfully communicating classified national defense information to the PRC with the intent that it be used to the advantage of the PRC or to the injury of the United States; three counts of willfully communicating classified national defense information to persons not entitled to receive it in the PRC and elsewhere; one count of illegally retaining defense systems information at his Maui residence; four counts of exporting technical data related to a defense article without an export license in violation of the AECA; one count of conspiracy to violate the AECA; one count of money laundering based on proceeds from the AECA violations; and two counts of filing false tax returns for the years 2001 and 2002. Testimony revealed that he had not paid any federal income tax in the years between 1997 and 2005, and although it was difficult to sort out the laundered money, his private consulting firm had earned at least $750,000 between 1999 and 2003 (Department of Justice, 2011; Boylan, 2005). On January 24, 2011, Gowadia was sentenced to 384 months (32 years) in prison and was initially sent to the supermax penitentiary in Florence, CO. In that same month, the existence of a new Chengdu J-20 Chinese stealth fighter plane was announced to the public (Dsouza, 2012). At Gowadia's sentencing hearing the prosecutor, Assistant U.S. Attorney Ken Sorenson, said\nThis case was unique in that we litigated know-how, the very concept of exporting your knowledge base that you derive, in whole or in part, from your activities working in United States classified programs. If you can take that and go sell it or market yourself on an international stage in secrecy to other governments and not suffer criminal sanctions for it, then we're in trouble (Niesse, 2010).\n\nGowadia was an example of someone who both illegally exported defense information and services and, at the same time, knowingly transmitted classified national defense information to a foreign government for its advantage. Thus he is coded as both a case of classic espionage and a case of export control violations. He also provides an example of someone who worked on important government technologies and sought to sell his expertise through espionage. He saw what he was doing as helping the Chinese. \"On reflection,\" he wrote in a statement written after his arrest, \"what I did was wrong to help [the] PRC make a cruise missile. What I did was espionage and treason\" (Dooley, 2009a).\n\nQuan-sheng Shu, on the other hand, also was trying to help the Chinese and enrich himself in the process, but the information he transmitted was not classified national defense information, rather it was only restricted from export by the export control laws. Between January 2003 and October 2007, Shu attempted to broker a three-way deal worth $4 million between the Beijing Special Engineering Design Research Institute (BSEDRI) in the PRC, an unnamed French company in Paris, and Shu's sole-proprietor company, AMAC International, Inc., in Newport News, Virginia. He did not realize that for most of that time he was being watched, tracked, and listened in on by the FBI, Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), and DoC's Office of Export Enforcement (United States Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Redacted affidavit, 2008). Shu was born in Shanghai, attended college in Beijing, and earned a Ph.D. in physics in 1970 at the Institute of Low Temperature in Hangzhou, China. He launched his professional career in cryogenics (i.e., low temperature physics) in China, working at the Institute itself for 7 years, then becoming an Assistant Professor and in 1985, a full Professor of Physics at Zhejiang University in Hangzhou. Starting in 1983, he began to divide his time between his academic duties in Hangzhou and various research positions in the United States, first at the University of Washington in Seattle, then at the Fermi National Accelerator Laboratory near Chicago. In 1998, Shu became a naturalized American citizen and in that same year he incorporated his company in Virginia. AMAC competed for small business research grants to do specialized research in cryogenics for government agencies including the Department of Energy and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration. AMAC maintained a second office in Beijing (United States Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Redacted affidavit, 2008). One research grant allowed Shu to hone his company's expertise in the cryogenic transfer and storage technology of liquid propellants that were used in aerospace applications. AMAC developed an energy-efficient cryogenic transfer line with magnetic suspension for National Aeronautics and Space Administration's (NASA)\nKennedy Space Center that promised to extend space missions, save cryogenic fuel, and reduce overall launch mass. Projects like this enhanced AMAC's international reputation (United States Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Redacted affidavit, 2008). As part of its extensive modernization effort, in the early 2000s the PRC began to plan its fourth and newest space launch facility on the island of Hainan. This would house heavy payload launch vehicles designed to send space stations and satellites into orbit. The facility would also provide support for manned space flight and future lunar missions. When Chinese astronauts walk on the moon, they will be launched from Hainan (United States Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Redacted affidavit, 2008).\n\nSuch space vehicles use a combination of liquid hydrogen and liquid oxygen as their fuel, and these require very low temperatures to produce, store, and use them. Shu offered to assist in China's systematic expansion of their space program at Hainan by providing his technical expertise in cryogenics and his knowledge of where and how to acquire foreign technology for cryogenic pumps, valves, transfer lines, and refrigeration equipmentall of the components that would be necessary to produce liquefied hydrogen and oxygen at the launch facility. Shu relied on emails and phone calls to court high-ranking BSEDRI officials and officers of the 101 Institute, which was tasked with implementing the project, from his offices in Beijing and Newport News. He also helped to arrange for PRC officials to visit various European space launch facilities and hydrogen production and storage facilities, so they could see the best examples of such facilities for themselves (United States Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Redacted affidavit, 2008). Starting in January 2003, every few months Shu began shuttling between the PRC, the AMAC office in Newport News, and Paris. By August, he had Chinese approval to provide technical design work, and by November he had entered the bidding on the project, proposing that AMAC would be the broker between the Chinese and the unnamed French company that would actually provide the equipment and test it. He would provide the expertise in cryogenics along with the Chinese language and cultural awareness needed in the role of international broker. Through 2004 and 2005, Shu followed the evolving project and kept the French apprised of changes and new opportunities. Between December 2005 and January 2007, he actively negotiated a deal in which the PRC would buy liquid hydrogen tanks and associated equipment from the French company, and for its services AMAC would receive a commission from the French. On January 15, 2007, the contract was finalized, and soon thereafter Shu received the first two wire transfers from Paris totaling $253,962. Eventually he would receive $386,740 (United States Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigation, \"Redacted affidavit,\" 2008; United States Department of Justice Eastern District of Virginia, Press release, 2008). The negotiations had been delicate. Shu directed his employees to make up the names of end-users to be entered on export paperwork, rather than admitting that the Chinese military would be using the technology, because there was a U.S. embargo on exporting such data and articles to the PRC. To one of his employees in Beijing, he explained that the Chinese would not be telling the French company everything, because the actual use for the product would \"involve the military aspect,\" and this fact would not be released to outsiders. He warned the French not to include too much detail in their specifications, lest the Chinese be able to reverse engineer the equipment and manufacture it for themselves, cutting AMAC and the French out of the deal. Kickbacks were an expected part of the transaction. Shu offered to three key PRC officials 3% of the estimated $4 million the deal would represent, but there was haggling: Chinese officials suggested that German and Russian bidders were offering 5%, while the senior Chinese official passed the word that he would require an additional 2%, along with Shu's assurances to him that no other Chinese officials would know about this additional 2% sweetenera suggestion having been passed along to Shu from the very Chinese officials that were not supposed to know about it (United States Department of Justice , Federal Bureau of Investigation, Redacted affidavit, 2008)61.\n\nAs Shu was pulling these threads together into a deal, on July 21, 2006, two Special Agents from the DoC's Office of Export Enforcement walked into the AMAC offices in Newport News and announced that they were there to give Shu an \"outreach briefing.\" They explained to Shu that brokering an export deal between an embargoed country (China) and a foreign nation (France) itself counted as an American export. This briefing was to serve as a refresher on the export control regulations and, one would assume, also as a warning that the potential exporter was being watched. Shu responded by simply trying to be a more careful dissembler. He told an employee to make up end-users and uses entries on reports because\n...if we said that was for launching satellites, we wouldn't be able to get that 101 [Institute] deal that's worth three million...Everyone hides it....In the end, the manufacturers also help to hide it. The French, also. If you said you wanted to launch, eh, rockets or something, then France won't be able to sell to you...France belongs to NATO....Let me tell you, that's how the military industry buys things. Right, we've done military industry business (United States Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Redacted affidavit, 2008).\n\nShu was arrested on September 24, 2008, and charged with (1) unlawfully and willfully exporting a defense service [cryogenics expertise, advice, and brokering services] to the People's Republic of China without a license, in violation of the AECA (22 U.S.C.  2778), as implemented by the ITAR, (22 C.F.R. Chapter 1, Subchapter M, Parts 120-130); (2) unlawfully and willfully exporting a defense article [technical data in a document he sent to the Chinese] in violation of the AECA (22 U.S.C.  2778), as implemented by the ITAR, (22 C.F.R. Chapter 1, Subchapter M, Parts 120-130); and (3) willfully bribing, offering a bribe, and attempting to bribe, a foreign government official, in violation of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (15 U.S.C.  78dd-l and 78dd-2). (United States Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Redacted affidavit, 2008).\n\n\nAfter 2 months, he pled guilty to all three charges, and on April 2, 2009, he was sentenced to 51 months (4 years and 3 months) on each count, to be served concurrently. He also paid back some $387,000 in restitution to the federal government. \"America has provided me with such a wonderful working environment and opportunity,\" Shu said at his sentencing hearing, \"I would never deliberately harm the country I love\" (Potter, 2008).\n\nWhat Shu did was a type of espionage; his offenses can be described in terms of the classic espionage categories that previously have been applied in this report to other types of espionage, and were discussed earlier. These are:\n A context of competition. The United States and the PRC are engaged in\neconomic, military, and ideological competition for international advantage. Counterintelligence officials and China experts point to the PRC as one of the most effective and persistent collectors of American economic and technological information and a growing threat (Hannas, Mulvenon, & Puglisi, 2013).\n Secret means. Shu tailored the information he shared with each player in his\ndeal, keeping some aspects secret from the other and warning them not to be too transparent with each other. However, he used typical electronic means of communicationemail, fax, and phone callsto make and keep in contact with his clients (United States Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigation, \"Redacted Affidavit,\" 2008).\n Goal is secrets. The data and the expertise Shu gave to the Chinese were not\nclassified national defense information, but were restricted on the USML. In addition, the United States has had a trade embargo against the PRC since 1989 because of the Tiananmen Square massacre, making brokering any trade deal with the PRC another clandestine activity (McGlone, 2008b).\n Political, military, economic secrets. The data and expertise Shu offered related\nto essential elements of a technology needed to launch heavy payload space vehicles such as satellites, space stations, and rockets heading for the moon or distant planets. The Chinese are developing their capabilities in space technologies and thereby challenging the United States' supremacy in space, which has political, military, and economic implications for the American programs (United States Department of Justice, The Eastern District of Virginia, 2008).\n Theft. Shu is not reported to have committed theft in the course of his other\ncrimes.\n Subterfuge. Shu repeatedly advised each of his two clients to withhold\ninformation from the other. He asked his employees in Beijing to use only fax to communicate with him because he did not want to let his American employees know all the details of his deals. He asked to communicate directly with Chinese officials rather than go through his employees in Beijing because he did not\nwant them know all the details. He directed his employees to falsify export control forms with fake end-user names and uses for articles in order to evade\nexport control regulations. When AMAC drafted a letter of invitation to go from the French company to officials at Institute 101, to facilitate the PRC officials getting a visa to visit France, AMAC explained that since this was confidential, the Institute 101 (a military agency) would not be named on the application, and the fictitious name of \"China Great Wall Industry Corporation\" would be issuing the invitation instead. In a phone conversation with an AMAC employee, Shu explained that \"Everyone hides it [the military end use]\" (United States Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Redacted Affidavit, 2008).\n\n Surveillance. Shu is not reported to have gathered information through\nsurveillance, although he did engineer visits to similar space installations for his clients.\n Psychological toll. Shu appeared shocked when he was arrested and charged\nwith serious export control violations. He seems to have regarded his activities as typical business dealings and, despite receiving explicit warnings in person, did not recognize that American authorities would see what he was doing as a crime. Observers reported that he appeared \"shaking and bewildered\" at his initial court appearance. (McGlone, 2008a).\n Illegal. Shu was convicted of two counts of export control violations and one\ncount of attempting and actually bribing foreign officials, and was sentenced to prison and required to pay restitution (Potter, 2008).\n\n## Economic Espionage\n\nGiven its name, it would seem obvious that economic espionage is indeed espionage. It may be necessary, however, to explain how economic espionage can be committed against the United States by Americans. Economic espionage shares the basic categories and is intertwined with other types of espionage, yet there are unique elements in economic espionage that make it a fifth type and distinct from the four other types previously discussed in this report, which were classic espionage, leaks, foreign agent activities, and violations of export controls. The phrase \"economic espionage\" is often not exact. One may see it used interchangeably with \"industrial\" or \"corporate\" espionage. Most often, economic espionage refers to theft of information by or for a foreign government, a loss which could have implications for the whole economy of a nation, while \"industrial\" or \"corporate\" espionage typically refers to theft from one company by another. Although domestic, such thefts may also have far-reaching impacts on the economy.\n\nTrade Secrets One of its unique elements is that the target of economic espionage is a trade secret and not, as in classic espionage, controlled government or military secrets about intentions, capabilities, plans, or technologies. Usually the secrets in classic espionage are controlled by classification. A trade secret, on the other hand, is intellectual property that was created by a business, which takes steps to keep it a secret, and from which the business derives value because it is not publicly known. A trade secret is not classified by the government, because the government does not own it. The varieties of trade secrets are vast. They include all forms and types of financial, business, scientific, technical, economic, or engineering information, including patterns, plans, compilations, program devices, formulas, designs, prototypes, methods, techniques, processes, procedures, programs, or codes, whether tangible or intangible, and whether or how stored, compiled, or memorialized physically, electronically, graphically, photographically, or in writing if (A) the owner thereof has taken reasonable measures to keep such information secret; and (B) the information derives independent economic value, actual or potential, from not being generally known to, and not being readily ascertainable through proper means by, the public (Economic Espionage Act, 1996).\n\nAny enterprise can create, declare, and control its own trade secrets. It defines the secret, and determines the value to itself of the intellectual property it has created. A government agency does not determine its value or its legitimacy, as is the case with patents or licenses to export. So, why does the government get involved in helping to secure the secrets of businesses, which typically have their own corporate security programs? As democratic capitalism has evolved in the United States, the government assumed the role of the neutral arbiter to foster a fair and open marketplace, subject to the rule of law. To that end, it provides rules through laws and regulationfor the conduct of business, and it provides sanctions for not following the rules (Heskett, 2009). Until 1996, the only choice for prosecuting unlawful misappropriation of trade secrets was under state laws, and because state laws varied, inconsistencies developed. Gradually, starting in the 1980s, all but four states adopted the Uniform Trade Secrets Act (UTSA), in which Congress provided a model law with uniform definitions and approaches that could apply across states, and these inconsistencies were reduced (United States House of Representatives, Committee on the Judiciary, \"Trade Secrets\" 1996). By the mid-1990s, however, as (1) more and more intellectual products came to be created and stored electronically on information technology, and (2) globalization knit together the markets of the world and made competition global, alarm over the increasing theft of trade secrets led Congress to focus on this issue, and consider the Economic Espionage Act of 1996. It was the first federal statute to address economic espionage. The legislation acknowledged an emerging reality: the success of private enterprise in the United States was becoming so important to national security that the federal government needed to protect it. If competitors, and especially if foreign governments, could steal American trade secrets with impunity, the advantages for national security that economic strength conferred could be lost (United States House of Representatives, Committee on the Judiciary, \"Trade Secrets\" 1996). This is a second element of economic espionage that makes it unique among the various types of espionage: the federal government takes some responsibility for protecting secrets that were created and are owned by private companies. The United State House of Representatives Committee on the Judiciary debated the legislation that became the Economic Espionage Act (EEA). In its report to the House in September 1996, it recommended quick passage of the proposed law and explained in urgent terms the concerns that had prompted them to act:\nAs the nation moves into the high-technology, information age, the value of these intangible assets [i.e., trade secrets] will only continue to grow. Ironically, the very conditions that make this proprietary information so much more valuable make it easier to steal. Computer technology enables rapid and surreptitious duplications of the\n\n## Economic Espionage\n\ninformation. Hundreds of pages of information can be loaded onto a small computer diskette, placed into a coat pocket, and taken from the legal owner. This material is a prime target for theft precisely because it costs so much to develop independently, because it is so valuable, and because there are virtually no penalties for its theft. The information is pilfered by a variety of people and organizations for a variety of reasons. A great deal of the theft is committed by disgruntled individuals or employees who hope to harm their former companies or line their own pockets. In other instances, outsiders target a company, systematically infiltrate it, and then steal its vital information. More disturbingly, there is considerable evidence that foreign governments are using their espionage capabilities against American companies. The term economic or industrial espionage [the terms are used interchangeably here] is appropriate in these circumstances. Espionage is typically an organized effort by one country's government to obtain the vital national security secrets of another country. Typically, espionage has focused on military secrets. But as the cold war has drawn to a close, this classic form of espionage has evolved. Economic superiority is increasingly as important as military superiority. And the espionage industry is being retooled with this in mind. It is important, however, to remember that the nature and purpose of industrial espionage are sharply different from those of classic political or military espionage. The phrase industrial espionage includes a variety of behavior--from the foreign government that uses its classic espionage apparatus to spy on a company [This concern would be addressed in Section 1831 of the Act], to the two American companies that are attempting to uncover each other's bid proposals, or to the disgruntled former employee who walks out of his former company with a computer diskette full of engineering schematics [These concerns would be the focus of Section 1832 of the Act]. All of these forms of industrial espionage are problems. Each will be punished under this bill.\n\nOther countries treat the relationship between their national governments and their national economies differently than does the United States, and this difference fuels some of the most aggressive economic espionage against the United States. There is a spectrum across nations of how closely states' economies and governments are aligned. In the former Soviet Union and the early People's Republic of China, with their Communist ideologies, the economy and the state were essentially the same. Both of those nations have moved away from their strict Communist polities, and they have incorporated versions of capitalism, but they continue to operate under economic nationalism, in which the central Party tries to control and direct the private enterprise that it does allow. American allies also fall in various places along this spectrum, and not all of them resemble the United States. For example, the French government controls over half of the industrial base in France, and it can be an assertive collector of economic intelligence. Such nations may gather intelligence from foreign companies to convey advantages to their own nation's companies, and they see this as a legitimate role for their governments (Lotrionte, 2015). On the other hand, the United States espouses a position at the other end of the spectrum, which emphasizes a separation from and minimal interference with private enterprise by government. This has led the United States to declare that it will not use the intelligence apparatus of the federal government to conduct economic espionage against other nations for the benefit of American companies. In 2013, then Secretary of Defense Robert Gates reaffirmed this approach, saying that he refused to slide into what he called \"the moral and legal swamp\" of economic espionage (Lotrionte, 2015)62. The EEA was intended, in part, to protect American trade secrets from the ever more sophisticated theft of trade secrets by the intelligence-gathering operations of other nations (Foreign Press Center Briefing Transcript, Woolsey, 2000)63.\n\n## The Economic Espionage Act Of 1996\n\nThe EEA criminalizes two related activities: economic espionage in Title 18 section 1831, and the theft of trade secrets in Title 18 section 1832. Section 1831, economic espionage, is the statute most directly relevant for this study since it implies foreign involvement, although in practice, the two sections are sometimes related to one another64.\n\nSection 1831 provides:\n\ninternational law,\" *North Carolina Journal of International Law*, 40(2), Winter 2015, 443-541.\n\n63 James Woolsey's statement to the foreign press in 2000 gives the American position that the government does not engage in economic espionage, except in three instances: potential nuclear proliferation, monitoring sanctioned nations that hide their activities, and uncovering bribery that distorts competition unfairly. See Foreign Press Center Briefing Transcript, \"Intelligence gathering and democracies: The issue of economic and industrial espionage,\" briefing by James Woolsey, March 7, 2000. This paragraph only skates across the surface of the broad topics of economic and political change before and since the fall of the Soviet Union, and the impact of increasing globalization since then. It is intended only to mention some relevant topics as starting points for understanding the context of economic espionage. The discussion in Robert Gilpin with Jean Millis Gilpin, *The challenge of global capitalism, (*Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2000), discusses that context.\n\n64 Here the elements in the federal law on economic espionage are taken as the definition and scope of economic espionage. However, other authors define the term economic espionage differently or more broadly.\n\n''(a) IN GENERAL.Whoever, intending or knowing that the offense will benefit any foreign government, foreign instrumentality, or foreign agent, knowingly(1) steals, or without authorization appropriates, takes, carries away, or conceals, or by fraud, artifice, or deception obtains a trade secret; [or] (2) without authorization copies, duplicates, sketches, draws, photographs, downloads, uploads, alters, destroys, photocopies, replicates, transmits, delivers, sends, mails, communicates, or conveys a trade secret; [or] (3) receives, buys, or possesses a trade secret, knowing the same to have been stolen or appropriated, obtained, or converted without authorization; [or] (4) attempts to commit any offense described in any of paragraphs (1) through (3); or (5) conspires with one or more other persons to commit any offense described in any of paragraphs (1) through (3), and one or more of such persons do any act to effect the object of the conspiracy, shall, except as provided in subsection (b), be fined not more than $5,000,000 or imprisoned not more than 15 years, or both. (b) ORGANIZATIONS.Any organization that commits any offense described in subsection (a) shall be fined the greater of $10,000,000 or three times the value of the trade secret to the organization\" (Economic Espionage Act, as amended, 1996; White & Case Technology Newsflash, 2013).\n\nThe designation of a \"foreign instrumentality\" as one of the proscribed recipients of economic espionage, in addition to a foreign government or a foreign agent, is meant to cover entities that are directed by a foreign government but may not be publicly linked to it. As defined in the Act, a foreign instrumentality would include \"any agency, bureau, ...component, institution, association, or any legal commercial, or business organization, firm, or entity that is substantially owned, controlled, sponsored, commanded, managed, or dominated by a foreign government (Economic Espionage Act, 1996; Reilly, 2009). For example, a careful description of the many types of \"instrumentalities\" that operate in the PRC in shades and mixtures of academic, research, corporate, military, and government auspices is found in a collection of essays titled *Chinese Industrial Espionage*, which demonstrates why it was necessary to include this category of recipient that may be deliberately obscuring its affiliations (Hannas, Mulvenon, and Puglisi, 2013). Section 1832, on the other hand, deals with domestic trade secret theft. It resembles Section 1831 in that it criminalizes the misappropriation of trade secrets, but in 1832 there is no nexus required to a foreign government, and instead there are several additional provisions. Section 1832 deals with corporate or industrial espionage, carried on between American companies. It is the theft of trade secrets from one company by another company, or by employees of that company. A complication not addressed by the EEA in either of these two main sections is that of the American company which maintains offices overseas. Unless an overseas theft was committed by an American citizen, it is not protected under the Act (Simon, 1998).\n\nSection 1832 provides that: ''(a) Whoever, with intent to convert a trade secret, that is related to a product or service used in or intended for use in interstate or foreign commerce, to the economic benefit of anyone other than the owner thereof, and intending or knowing that the offense will, injure any owner of that trade secret, knowingly (1) steals, or without authorization appropriates, takes, carries away, or conceals, or by fraud, artifice, or deception obtains such information; (2) without authorization copies, duplicates, sketches, draws, photographs, downloads, uploads, alters, destroys, photocopies, replicates, transmits, delivers, sends, mails, communicates, or conveys such information; '(3) receives, buys, or possesses such information, knowing the same to have been stolen or appropriated, obtained, or converted without authorization; (4) attempts to commit any offense described in paragraphs (1) through (3); or (5) conspires with one or more other persons to commit any offense described in paragraphs (1) through (3), and one or more of such persons do any act to effect the object of the conspiracy, shall, except as provided in subsection (b), be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 10 years, or both. (b) Any organization that commits any offense described in subsection (a) shall be fined not more than $5,000,000\" (Economic Espionage Act, 1996).\n\nWhile the two sections share a focus on protecting trade secrets, they differ in several important ways. One difference is in how they specify what the intent of the perpetrator must be. Section 1831 requires only that a person \"intending or knowing that the offense will benefit any foreign government, foreign instrumentality, or foreign agent, knowingly steals...\" while Section 1832 requires two different intentions: (1) a person must have an \"intent to convert a trade secret...to the economic benefit of anyone other than the owner thereof,\" and (2) he or she must be \"intending or knowing that the offense will injure any owner of that trade secret.\" The thief may be but does not have to be the one who benefits from the theft, and while the beneficiary does not need to be a foreign government as in\n\n## Economic Espionage\n\n1831, in 1832 the beneficiary also could be a foreign governmentfor example, one to whom an American thief planned to convey a stolen secret as a part of expatriating to that country, even if that country's government had not initiated the theft (\"Spotlight on the Economic Espionage Act,\" 2012). A second difference between Sections 1831 and 1832 is in how the potential benefit is specified. According to the report of the House committee that drafted the legislation, in Section 1831 the benefit to a foreign government should be broadly framed. It \"means not only economic benefit but also reputational, strategic, or tactical benefit (United States House of Representatives Committee on the Judiciary, \"Report,\" 1996). In Section 1832, however, the benefit is specifically economic. A third difference is that since the emphasis in Section 1832 is on domestic crimes, in order to come under federal jurisdiction it must be about interstate commerce. Therefore, Section 1832 specifies that the trade secret must be \"related to or a product or service used in or intended for use in interstate or foreign commerce\" (\"Spotlight on the Economic Espionage Act,\" 2012; Simon, 1998).\n\nA potential confusion lurks because a person convicted of offenses under Section 1832 is accurately said to be convicted under the Economic Espionage Act, yet it is actually only Section 1831, with its requirement of a foreign nexus, that is labeled \"foreign economic espionage.\" Section 1832, as described earlier, punishes the theft of trade secrets. It would have been clearer if Congress had named its law \"Economic Espionage and the Theft of Trade Secrets,\" which while closely related, yet in the terms of the Act, are not both economic espionage. Since 1996, federal authorities have investigated and prosecuted cases under the EEA, and so have built up experience and case law. By 2009, over 100 cases of trade secret misappropriation (Section 1832) had been prosecuted, but only six cases of economic espionage (Section 1831) (Krotoski, 2009). As a guide for his fellow prosecutors, one federal prosecutor listed some common case scenarios that had emerged by that time, including the following:\n State-sponsored targeting of trade secrets and technology misappropriated with the intent to benefit a foreign government or an instrumentality of a foreign government.\n\n A trusted employee with access to valuable company information who, after\nbecoming disgruntled, downloads and transmits the information to others outside the company who offer it to the \"highest bidder.\"\n An employee, who after learning how a new prototype is made, decides to form\nhis own company and use the trade secret and other proprietary information to launch his own competing product.\n A competitor who devises a scheme to gain access to company information for\nuse in fulfilling an international contract.\n Employees who execute a plan to steal proprietary information and take it to\nanother country and are stopped at the airport.\n After being offered a senior position with a direct competitor, and before\ntendering his resignation, an employee uses his supervisory position to request and obtain proprietary information he would not normally be entitled to access. After taking as much proprietary information as he can, he submits his resignation and takes the materials of his former employer to his new position and employer (Krotoski, 2009).\nOne can discern in these scenarios the legal task of sorting out which section of the Act would best apply, economic espionage or theft of trade secrets. It may depend on the evidence that is available. One legal authority suggests that deciding whether what a company claims to be a trade secret is actually a trade secret may also be a job for the jury. He explains that \"among the factors in assessing whether certain subject matter is a trade secret are the:\n extent to which the information is known outside of the company;  extent to which it is known by employees and others involved in the company;  extent of measures taken by the company to guard the secrecy of the\ninformation;\n value of the information to the company and to its competitors;  amount of effort or money expended by the company in developing the\ninformation; and\n ease or difficulty with which the information could be properly acquired or\nduplicated by others\" (Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition 40 (1994), quoted in Thomas, 2014).\nSometimes investigators of trade secret theft have had the luxury of investigating an ongoing crime, developing their case by running an undercover agent, and collecting evidence over a period of time before arresting the suspect. But often, such cases are recognized as a theft at the last minute, and reaction by law enforcement becomes an urgent scramble to reach the airport in time to prevent the thief from getting on a plane for a foreign conference or a foreign country, where he or she plans to sell or convey the trade secret, thereby ruining its value for the owner. A trade secret has no expiration time limit, but once it is made public, its status as a trade secret is gone and that status cannot be recovered (Krotoski, 2009). The paucity of economic espionage cases prosecuted since 1996, despite the urgency Congress expressed then and subsequently about how the draining away of American innovations needs to be staunched, has prompted critics to argue that the economic espionage section of the Act needs to be redrafted. Critics of the EEA argue that based on the Congressional debates held during consideration of the legislation, the courts have so far interpreted Section 1831 more narrowly than\n\n## Economic Espionage\n\nCongress intended, and this has made convictions harder to get and discouraged DoJ from bringing more cases (Kuntz, 2013). Others explain the small number of cases by arguing that economic espionage cases are especially complex; that DoJ chooses to focus its resources on cases it is most likely to win and economic espionage does not have that track record; that there are potential diplomatic repercussions in economic espionage cases that make prosecutors cautious; and that even though the Act authorizes a trial court to issue protective orders to prevent a trade secret from being revealed during a trial, plaintiffs are still leery of a public trial where, with one slip of the tongue, their secrets could be lost (Thomas, 2014; Doyle, 2014; \"Recent cases,\" 2012). However, starting in 2010, DoJ shifted its priorities and has started prosecuting more economic espionage cases, while the FBI recently created an Economic Espionage Unit in its Counterintelligence Section to focus on such investigations (Coleman, 2014) The increasing attention paid by federal authorities to protecting trade secrets reflects the ongoing evolution of the United States from its 20th century manufacturing base to a \"knowledge-and-service\" based economy. This shift was already recognized in 1996 and could be seen in the Congressional debate on the Act quoted earlier. Efforts by the government, and American companies themselves, to keep control over their intellectual property (IP), their innovations, their investments in new processes, their creative insights, their \"intangible assets,\" are not just advisable; control over them is essential for them to stay in business. One author notes that \"In 1975, 16.8% of the total value of the S&P 500 reportedly consisted of intangible assets. In 2005, intangible assets reportedly constituted 79.7% of the total value of these firms\" (Thomas, 2014). Economic espionage conducted by and benefitting foreign countries is not just about whether particular companies succeed or fail; it is about how the nation fares in international economic competition. When other nations steal American trade secrets to advantage their own domestic companies, in the process they disadvantage American companies and the United States itself. A student of espionage explains that IP theft results in the loss of revenue for those who made the invention as well as the jobs associated with those losses. It also undermines the means and the incentive to innovate, slowing the development of new inventions and industries that would otherwise expand the economy and raise the prosperity and quality of life for everyone. The negative impact from IP theft on core values is global and staggering (Lotrionte, 2015).\n\nSince 1996, when Congress thought in terms of spies pocketing \"diskettes,\" our widespread reliance on enhanced technologies has only grown: on computers, smart cell phones with cameras and computers, email and the Internet, flash drives and other electronic storage devicesall the appurtenances of the digital culture and modern communicationsand the ease of capture, storage, and movement of data has made controlling those valuable intangible assets ever more difficult. Thus, discussions of economic espionage usually raise two other related topics: cyber espionage (discussed further), and the possibility of insider threat (discussed in an essay in Appendix A). Employees stealing trade secrets by misusing information technology is a common waythough not the only wayin which the secrets are lost (Thomas, 2014; Office of the National Counterintelligence Executive, 2011; \"Economic impact of trade secret theft,\" 2014). In what is the current total in 2015 of ten cases prosecuted under Section 1831 since 1996, some of which have involved multiple defendants, various outcomes have been reached. In six cases, defendants were convicted under Section 1831 of economic espionage; in two other cases, individuals who had been charged under Section 1831 were acquitted of that charge, but convicted of the related Section 1832 offenses. One case led to an acquittal, and in several others the defendants fled. At least five of the principal defendants were American citizens,65 and of those, four were convicted under Section 1831. One of these, Walter Liew, was sentenced in July 2014, too late to be included in the data for this study of American citizens. Two others, Fei Ye (who pled guilty in 2006) and Elliott Doxer (who pled guilty in 2011), were not included in this study but will be considered for inclusion in the future.66 The only individual convicted of economic espionage who is included in the data for this study is Dongfan Chung, who spied for the Chinese for at least 25 years (Krotoski & Harrison, 2015). Dongfan (Greg) Chung was born in China in 1936, and immigrated with his family to Taiwan as the Chinese Communists came to power after World War II. He married there, moved with his wife to the United States for graduate school, and that a large proportion of these persons could be citizens of other nations, but summaries do not reliably report this fact, and sometimes they report incorrect information on the issue of citizenship. Such cases do not attract the attention of the press to the same degree that classic espionage cases do. An otherwise excellent compilation of case summaries that is published periodically by the Department of Justice, National Security Division, titled \"Summary of major U.S. export enforcement, economic espionage, trade secret and embargo-related criminal cases,\" the latest of which is dated August 2015, does not consistently report on the citizenship of the individuals who are discussed in its cases.\n\n66 Fei Ye, a naturalized American citizen, along with an accomplice who was a Chinese national, pled guilty to two counts of economic espionage and one count of possessing stolen trade secrets dealing with the design and manufacturing of computer microprocessors in December 2006. They admitted they intended to use the trade secrets in a company they were setting up in the PRC, a project that was sponsored and funded by provincial Chinese authorities in the region where their company would be located. Elliott Doxer, a Jewish American citizen, sent an email to the Israeli consulate in Boston in June 2006 offering to help Israel by passing along his employer's trade secrets. Doxer worked for Akamai Technologies, which delivered content over the Internet handling between 15% and 30% of global internet traffic. In an FBI undercover sting, Doxer passed along to the agent he thought was an Israeli Akamai's contractual papers, customer lists, and employee lists. In August 2011 Doxer pled guilty to one count of economic espionage. Both Fei Ye and Doxer received sentences of 1 year (Krotoski & Harrison, 2015).\n\n## Economic Espionage\n\nbecame a naturalized American citizen in 1972. He worked as an employee for a series of defense contractors including McDonnell Douglas, Rockwell, and Boeing. Starting in the 1960s, he served as a structural engineer on various defense projects, and eventually focused on the NASA space shuttle. For most of his later career, he did stress analysis on the forward fuselage section of the Space Shuttle, and held a Secret security clearance. In 2002, the Boeing facility where he was working relocated, and Chung retired rather than move from Orange, California, where he and his wife had built a house. However, the next year, at age 70, he was rehired as a subcontractor at Boeing to help with the analysis of the Columbia shuttle crash (United States District Court Central District of California, Indictment, 2008; Bhattacharjee, 2014). Like many expatriate Chinese who grew up in Taiwan, Chung and his wife evolved from their initial resolute anti-Communism to curiosity about China. After Mao Zedong's death in 1976, the country began rapidly modernizing and its economy began to accelerate. The Chungs were active in a Taiwanese immigrant association, but they began to feel constrained by the strident nationalism the group expected toward Taiwan. They wanted to understand what they had missed out on because their families had left China when they were young. During the late 1970s, it became possible to meet visiting Chinese scientists at conferences in the United States, and Chung made such contacts. The Chinese government encouraged Chinese visitors to gather any technological knowledge they could from the West (Bhattacharjee, 2014). In 1979, Chung met a visitor from the Harbin Institute of Technology. When the visitor expressed interest in problems of stress analysis, Chung generously responded by sending copies of his own graduate course notes on stress analysis via sea freight. In an incriminating letter to this contact, found later during the investigation, Chung wrote \"I don't know what I can do for the country. Being proud of the achievements by the people's efforts in the Motherland, I am regretful for not contributing anything\" (Bhattacharjee, 2014). Opportunities to contribute to China's achievements were regularly presented to Chung in a coordinated Chinese intelligence gathering operation starting in the 1980s, and continuing until 2003. He received invitations to meet with Chinese officials at gatherings in California, and in 1985, he was asked to visit China to lecture on his expertise in aerospace, one of the areas China had identified as critical to its technological advancement. He corresponded with Chinese engineers he met, and he took pains to impress them with his knowledge and his eagerness to assist them. After the Chung family's visit to China in 1985, which lasted for several months, he came home with eight pages of questions from engineers at one of their stops, the Nanchang Aircraft Manufacturing Company. He pulled together his answers and sent along 27 volumes of engineering manuals for the design of the B-1 Bomber via diplomatic pouch from the Chinese consulate in San Francisco. For the next 20 years, Chung brought materials home from his workplace at Boeing Corporationpilferage amounting to 300,000 pagesto save for or to send to his Chinese friends (\"Ex-Boeing engineer, 2009; Flaccus, 2010). Chung came to the attention of the FBI in the same way that Tai-Shen Kuo (discussed earlier) did: because Chi Mak, their handler, had written both names and contact information in Mak's address books, and the FBI found them in October 2005 when they surreptitiously searched his home. A second search yielded a letter between Chung and Gu Weihao that Mak had kept. Gu was a Chinese official with the China Aviation Industry Corporation, and he asked Chung for information about airplanes and the space shuttle and thanked him for technical information he had previously sent. For at least a decade, Mak had served as the local handler for both Kuo and Chung, sending taskings from China to them, and collecting information from them to send back. After the FBI conducted several interviews with Chung, performed secret searches of his trash, and executed a search warrant for his house, which revealed the thousands of Boeing documents stockpiled in basement rooms and crawl spaces, the FBI arrested Chung on February 11, 2008. The indictment outlined evidence of his regular interactions with Chinese officials: their discussion with Chung of cover stories for his visits to China; the advisability of sending information through Chi Mak because it was \"faster and safer\"; Chung's repeated and earnest expressions of his desire to help China; his technical responses to their questions and requests; his removal from Boeing for the Chinese of books, reports, and hundreds of documents downloaded and printed out from Boeing databases; and his travel to present lectures in China which, although it was a condition of his security clearance that all foreign travel be reported, were not reported to Boeing security managers (United States District Court Central District of California, Indictment, 2008). Despite the volume and nature of the information he removed from Boeing facilities, including 2 decades' worth of trade secrets on the Space Shuttle, specifications on a fueling system for the Delta IV booster rocket, and the technical details on the C-17 military transport aircraft, prosecution of Chung moved slowly because although the materials were proprietary to Boeing and had been developed in its work for the federal government, they were not designated as national defense information and were not marked as classified (Flaccus, 2009, United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, 2011). Prosecutors shifted from their intention to charge Chung with espionage and instead charged him with economic espionage. To prove that the Boeing information he had stolen included Boeing trade secrets, they presented testimony from Chung's Boeing colleagues about the restricted and export-controlled nature of the information, and about the proprietary agreements employees at Boeing signed, along with the nondisclosure agreements everyone signed to obtain a Secret security clearance and have access to such information. All of these promises and legal agreements Chung had violated.\n\n## Economic Espionage\n\nHe requested a bench trial, in which only a judge hears the evidence and reaches a verdict. Chung became the first person convicted at trial under the Economic Espionage Act of 1996 (Flaccus, 2009). He was convicted in July 2009 of six counts of economic espionage, one count of lying to the FBI, one count of acting as an agent of a foreign power, and one count of entering into a conspiracy with Mak (Ex- Boeing engineer, 2009). He was sentenced on February 8, 2010, to 188 months in prison (15 years and 7 months) for betraying Boeing's proprietary information to China, information developed over 5 years at a cost estimated to have been at least $50 million (Flaccus, 2010). In one of the letters found in Chi Mak's house, a Chinese official had written to Chung that \"It is your honor and China's fortune that you are able to realize your wish of dedicating [yourself] to the service of your country,\" that is, to China (United States District Court Central District of California Southern Division, Memorandum of Decision, 2009).\n\nEconomic espionage is a distinct type of espionage, one that is similar to classic espionage in many respects, but different in others. Applying the characteristics of classic espionage discussed in the chapter earlier to this economic variant demonstrates this.\n A context of competition. The competition for Chung was less that between the\ndefense contracting companies he worked for, and more the international competition between the PRC and his adopted nation, the United States.\n Secret means. Chung conspired with his handler, Chi Mak, to pass information\nto the PRC surreptitiously. Chung's contacts in China rehearsed cover stories he could use to explain why he and his family were spending 2 months traveling in China in 1985. As the FBI was starting to explore Chung's involvement with China they repeatedly searched his trash: each time they found Boeing proprietary documents interleaved into Chinese language newspapers in attempts to secretly dispose of them (United States District Court Central district of California, Southern Division, \"Memorandum,\" 2009) This \"Memorandum of Decision\" written by the judge in Chung's trial is the source for the remaining entries in this list, unless otherwise noted.\n Goal is secrets. The goal in economic espionage is trade secrets. The FBI found\ndetailed tasking lists from the Chinese in Chung's home that specified the information they most wanted. Included on these lists were: aircraft design manuals, fatigue design manuals, materials manuals, S-N curve manuals,\nmilitary specifications user manuals, fighter jet structural details design manuals, Space Shuttle design manuals and information on the Space Shuttle's environmental conditions, the Space Shuttle's airtight cabin, the Space Shuttle's heat resistant tile design and materials composition process, the lifespan extension/reliability analysis of U.S. fighter planes and airborne equipment, and S-N curves for fighter plane cabin Plexiglas and cabin canopies. The intense interest in what Chung could provide about space technologies reflects efforts by the PRC to \"catch up\" as latecomers to space who are determined to build on the technologies already designed by others (Elmhirst,\n2009). At various periods of time, this type of information was designated as restricted from export, proprietary to the companies working on defense contracts, and eventually could have been classified. Work on elements of technology within a large government program proceeds in stages, and the type and degree of control over information varies over those stages. One student of espionage noted that \"The Chinese...are good at positioning agents who can obtain advanced technology in the developmental stage, before it is classified\" (United States District Court Central district of California, Southern Division, \"Memorandum,\" 2009; Gertz, 2006).\n\n Political, military, economic secrets. The information Chung stole from Boeing\nand sent to the PRC related to military technologies of the United States and its space program. As Boeing's trade secrets, they were economic, but because Boeing is a defense contractor and was working on defense projects, many of them were also restricted military information.\n Theft. Chung exfiltrated from the company that employed him over 300,000\npages of Boeing documents, manuals, and reports over the years he worked for the company.\n Subterfuge. Chung stored these stolen documents all over his house, some in\nhidden places, but others in plain sight. These storage places included the crawl spaces and a specially constructed camouflaged storeroom hidden under the house, as well as under the stairs, in the fireplace, in stacks on tables in the dining room, and under the bed. In his exchanges with his Chinese contacts, Chung demonstrated his awareness that what he was doing required subterfugeusing a secure channel such as Chi Mak offered, and traveling to China in the guise of a family vacation to meetings where he could present information \"in a small setting, which is very safe.\"\n Surveillance. Chung sought out opportunities at Boeing and in the course of his\nwork interacting with other companies to collect specific information requested by his Chinese contacts, if he himself was not working on a particular technology.\n Acted as an Agent of a Foreign Government. In his close and ongoing\nrelationships with contacts in the PRC and in the Chinese consulates in California, Chung took direction from the Chinese and acted in their interests. He was convicted of one count of Acting as an Agent of a Foreign Power, Title 18 U.S.C, Section 1951.\n Psychological toll. During his long espionage career, Chung is described as\nserene in his workplace and personal life. He wrote to his contacts expressing his pleasure to be contributing to the modernization of China. When the FBI came to interview him, search his home, and arrest him, Chung was noticeably rattled, as if surprised at this response to his activities.\n Illegal. Chung was convicted of six counts of economic espionage, that is,\npossessing trade secrets for the benefit of China (Title 18 U.S.C, Section 1831);\n\n## Economic Espionage\n\none count of lying to the FBI (Title 18 U.S.C, Section 1001); one count of acting as an agent of a foreign government (Title 18 U.S.C. Section 951); and one count of entering into a conspiracy with Mak (Title 18 U.S.C., Section 371).\n\nLike the other types already discussed, economic espionage can be described in the general terms of the model of espionage derived from classic espionage.\n\n##\n\nto a proscribed recipient, a foreign gov't\nIf apprehended, an investigation is begun, and a prosecution may follow.\nA perpetrator\nconveys information or technologies that a company has created as a trade secret; the company legally controls it and wants it withheld\nwith a proscribed intent, to benefit that foreign gov't\n\n\n\n## Figure 8  Economic Espionage In A Model Of Elements Of Espionage\n\nIn Figure 8, an individual who commits economic espionage conveys a trade secret to an agent of or a foreign government itself with the proscribed intent to benefit that government, thereby disadvantaging the company that owns the secret and the United States itself.\n\n## Part 3 Context And Recommendations Changes In Context That Shape Current Espionage\n\nSweeping changes in context are shaping how espionage is conducted now and how it will be conducted in the future. Two of these changes that should be considered in any analysis of current espionage are information and communications technology (ICT) and globalization. Examples discussed thus far have illustrated how recent spies have incorporated ICT in their activities and how the worldwide market for American technologies has spurred the theft of export controlled and trade secret information.\n\n## Information And Communications Technology (Ict)\n\nDuring the past 2 decades, information technology and networked communications have quickly become so ubiquitous that it can be difficult to step back from this new normal context and recognize some of the implications of these advancesin this report specifically, implications for espionage committed by American citizens against the United States. Cyberspace and cyber security have many dimensions, only some of which are relevant here. Setting the scene for this context are statements from several officials, security professionals, and observers:\n The ubiquitous digitalization of information and pervasive connectivity of\nelectronic networks have facilitated espionage as well as productivity.... Joel Brenner, former National Counterintelligence Executive and former Inspector General of the National Security Agency (Brenner, 2014).\n According to the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the theft of intellectual\nproperty (IP)67products of human intelligence and creativityis a growing\nthreat which is heightened by the rise of the use of digital technologies68 The\nincreasing dependency upon information technology (IT) systems and networked operations pervades nearly every aspect of our society. In particular, increasing\ncomputer interconnectivitymost notably growth in the use of the Internet has revolutionized the way that our government, our nation, and much of the world communicate and conduct business. Gregory C. Wilshusen, Director\nInformation Security Issues, General Accountability Organization (GAO) (Wilshusen, 2012).\n Can the government still keep a secret? In an age of Wikileaks, flash drives and\ninstant Web postings, leaks have begun to seem unstoppable... Still, there's been a change. Traditional watchdog journalism, which has long accepted leaked information in dribs and drabs, has been joined by a new counterculture of information vigilantism that now promises disclosures by the terabyte. A bureaucrat can hide a library's worth of documents on a key fob, and scatter\nthem over the Internet to a dozen countries during a cigarette break. Scott Shane, reporter for the New York Times (Shane, 2010).\n\n Cybercrime and cyber espionage, both political and economic,... are here and\nwill remain the biggest cyber risks in the future. Myriam Dunn Cavelty, Center for Security Studies, Swiss Federal Institute of Technology. (Cavelty, 2012).\n ...Those conducting cyber espionage are targeting US government, military, and\ncommercial networks on a daily basis. James R. Clapper, Director of National\nIntelligence. (Clapper, 2015).\nIn this report various characteristics of espionage against the United States by Americans have been explored, and the various types of espionage they undertake. This chapter briefly considers the impact of what the expert observers quoted earlier describe as \"ubiquitous,\" \"pervasive,\" and \"unstoppable\" trends in information and communications that have \"revolutionized\" the way we \"communicate and conduct business.\" The technologies we experience in daily life are moving toward the worldwide use of ICT, which is shaping the current context and will shape the future espionage threat.\n\nThe activities of cyber criminals69 vary widely in scale, ranging from a lone hacker who opportunistically goes online to steal or sell another individual's personal information, to a foreign government attacking its adversaries' networks to disrupt critical infrastructures, take control of financial systems, overwhelm network functioning, or attack IT assets used for decision-making by military or government leaders. Along this spectrum of cyber activities, two dimensions are relevant for understanding espionage by Americans in the ICT era: (1) how an agent of an adversary, such as an American spy, currently gathers, stores, and transmits intelligence to a foreign government; and (2) how a foreign government steals controlled information directly across interconnected networks, usually in unacknowledged ways, with or without the connivance of an agent. Reliance on computers and their related information technology (IT) and electronic files began to spread from the original users in select military and academic settings into more general use during the 1980s. IT became increasingly common during the 1990s, and after 2000, it was essential in business and professional settings. As these technical improvements became available, American spies adopted them into their activities, to the extent that the spy's own technical proclivities and opportunities to make use of IT allowed. Table 21 summarizes by decade, starting from 1970, the numbers and percentages of the 209 American espionage offenders in this study who used ICT in espionage.70\n\n## Use Of Information And Communications Technology By Decade Espionage Began\n\nDecade Espionage Began\nNumber Who\nBegan Espionage\nin Each Decade\nNumber of ICT\nUsers Coded71\n% of ICT Users by\nDecade\n1970-1979\n30\n4\n13\n1980-1989\n72\n11\n15\n1990-1999\n28\n10\n36\n2000-2009\n32\n21\n66\n2010-2015\n7\n6\n86\n\n\nFrom the paper documents, microfiche strips, and film canisters of photographs that made up the media of a spy's information before the late 1970s, espionage offenders moved with the times into using floppy disks, then CDs, flash drives, and encrypted email attachments sent over the Internet. With the accelerating pace of technological innovation, the time lag has rapidly shrunk between when citizens of one country make a technological advance and when the rest of the world learns about and adopts it, and there is now a global technological race to keep up with the latest innovations as they appear (Limbago, 2014). Spies simply join in this race.\n\n## Advantages And Disadvantages Of Ict For Spies\n\nICT offers a mixed bag of advantages and disadvantages to espionage agents. Its advantages are apparent to anyone who owns a computer and accesses the Internet. If they have insider access to the information they want, spies can install viruses that quickly copy large electronic files or download files from network servers onto USB drives that are inconspicuous to carry and store. Such viruses can also exfiltrate information directly to the recipients whom a spy works for. Spies can send information over the Internet by email attachment to a recipient anywhere in the world, eliminating the risk of meeting the recipient to hand over information, and the risk of leaving information in a dead drop to be picked up by the recipient later, unless the authorities find it first. They can also add encryption to the data being transmitted to enhance its security in transit (\"Electronic spycraft,\" 2015). Among American espionage offenders since 2000 coded in the PERSEREC Espionage database, 20 of the 27 known ICT users copied information\n\nfrom computers or downloaded it from networks; 12 are reported to have sent their information by email attachment, 2 sent theirs by fax, the rest sent their information on CDs by old-fashioned postal mail or in shipping containers. The 209 American espionage offenders under study in this report do not include anyone with the most sophisticated ICT skills, (the closest example would be Edward Snowden), but such a person is hardly unlikely to be operating as a spy in the near future. Already in early 2016, the FBI announced an American citizen, Charles Eccleston, has pled guilty on February 2 to attempted unauthorized access and intentional damage to a protected computer system.72 This charge was a plea bargain; Eccleston's scheme planned to send spear-phishing emails to federal employees in nuclear laboratories to plant a virus that could damage the government computer systems and allow a foreign government to exfiltrate classified nuclear-related information from them. He sought revenge against the Nuclear Regulatory Commission that laid him off and money for his proposition from a foreign embassy, speculated to have been the Chinese. Eccleston collected email addresses, drafted emails that would announce an innocent-seeming conference with a registration link that he thought would install the virus. However, Eccleston was working with undercover FBI agents, so this link did not do any damage and sent off no classified nuclear information (Department of Justice, 2016; Hsu, 2016; United States District Court for the District of Columbia, Indictment, 2015) An agent like Eccleston who used hacking expertise to capitalize on fellow employees' vulnerability to phishing attacks, or someone who works with a group that brings these skills and resources to the task, can gain the ability to directly access the computers or networks of a target remotely, which adds another layer to the advantages ICT offers to espionage. Hacking into a target's computer or network can be an inexpensive way to collect informationit might be done for the cost of a computer and a network connection. It also offers the advantage of anonymity, since it is difficult to identify with certainty who was responsible for an intrusion (Schneier, 2015). With even more determination, an agent can hack into a target computer system and install the sort of malicious software that takes over a network and removes data, silently sending the desired information off the target's network and onto a destination designated by the agent (Schneier, 2015). Other means useful for espionage that are now available include software for harvesting communications that focuses on \"end-point vulnerabilities,\" such as keyboards and computer screens, which allow what is written or searched to be collected at the point of the target's keystrokes themselves, often evading the best encryption. It is also possible to intercept wireless network signals, and then to read what is sent by a target or potential asset in their emails or text messages (\"Electronic spycraft,\" 2015). However, ICT also inflicts disadvantages on an espionage agent, because it provides counterintelligence and law enforcement officials with new tools and electronic resources that can work against the spy, while helping the authorities to identify espionage activities. Cell phones, now so common, generate metadata that can be traced to show the location of the user at a particular time, thus potentially placing a person at the scene of an information pick-up or a meeting with a recipient. The times at which a cell phone user makes calls and to whom can be analyzed, for they indicate when the person is awake and active, and when he or she usually sleeps, and thus tells the analyst which time zone the person probably lives in. If an agency can track one's movements, it becomes difficult to clandestinely meet assets or conduct surveillance. Cell phones can also be used as bugging devices, potentially allowing the authorities to listen in on conversations taking place in their vicinity (Murphy, 2015; \"Electronic spycraft,\"2015). The same ICT means that can be used by spies are used by the authorities to apprehend the spies. The description in the leaks chapter of the investigation of Stephen Kim, the nuclear proliferation expert and contractor for the State Department and James Rosen, a Fox News reporter, illustrates this double-edged impact. Kim and Rosen temporarily worked in the same State Department building. They used their email accounts and their cell phones to communicate with each other to set up times and places to meet, although they were cautious enough to use a simple code to try to hide their activities. In order to conduct surveillance on Kim, the FBI investigators gained legal access to his and Rosen's electronic badge records at the entrance to their building, as well as to Kim's desk telephone records, and to all of his office computer files, as well as to records of emails to Rosen's cell phone, to his office desk phone, and to all of Rosen's email interactions with Kim. From these, the investigators could construct a damning time line of plans, contacts, meetings, and shared files that led to the conviction of Kim for espionage by leak to the press (United States District Court for the District of Columbia, Affidavit, 2010). Some American espionage offenders entered the United States with the intention of building a career that would give them access to classified information that they could send back to the foreign governments sponsoring them. Larry Wu-tai Chin, Karl Koecher, and Chi Mak, all discussed earlier, are three examples of spies who came to this country as sleeper agents. Each left their previous lives at the border and either assumed new identities or shaded inconvenient elements of their pasts. This would be more difficult now that biometric scanners scan travelers at international airports and guard entry to many offices and government buildings. These scanners record a person's biometric characteristics, such as fingerprints, iris scans, and facial patterns, and the electronic records of these scans can be kept indefinitely. This makes changing one's identity or assuming an identity in which some parts have changedas Chin, Koecher, and Mak didmore difficult than it was. Once their biometrics have been collected, some speculate that in the future, spies may have to become \"single-use operatives\" who can only operate in the one country that has the biometrics that defines their identities, unless that nation is not sharing biometrics with another one, in which case, the spy could use a different identity in each of those nations. Even then, the spy could not rest easy, since it is quite possible someone in one of those nations could be selling sensitive biometric data to an adversary (Murphy, 2015). The photos and personal news that people post on social media persist on the Internet indefinitely, and this trail of personal data can haunt espionage agents just as it does anyone else who tries to change careers or take a new direction in life. If a foreign agent is also a social media user, and seeks an insider position in a government agency to gain access to classified information, his or her posted photos are forever available online to be compared against, again making it difficult to assume a new identity or a covert role. On the other hand, if a young person has no online social media presence at all, potential employers may infer that this person is trying to hide or cover something up, but suddenly discontinuing an established social media presence by \"going dark\" can be equally suspicious (Murphy, 2015). Social media offers agents valuable insight into potential sources for recruitment, but it also ties them to their own identities and hinders them from assuming another one. Thus, most of the advantages ICT offers for espionage come with related disadvantages. One observer notes that \"A much bigger worry for spies is that the very vulnerabilities which make it easy for them to steal other people's secrets also make it hard for them to hold on to their own\" (\"Electronic spycraft,\" 2015).\n\n## Cyber Espionage By Governments\n\nThe second dimension of the evolution of cyber activities to be considered here is how a foreign government now can steal controlled information directly across interconnected networks, with or often without the cooperation of an agent. The focus of this report is on the activities of American agents working against the interests of the United States, rather than on the activities of the foreign governments themselves, yet because this dimension of the cyber context is developing rapidly in scope and sophistication, it will soon change the role of espionage agent. Before the spread of the Internet, governments typically spied directly on one another either by observation or by intercepting and listening in to various signals the adversary emitted. Governments still use those methods, but new cyber methods offer relatively cheap, easy, and anonymous entry into the networks where a target's information usually resides, rather than in the safes or locked drawers used in previous decades. Cyber intelligence tools are supplementing and may be overtaking physical surveillance and signals intelligence gathering in importance.\n\nObservers report that over thirty governments around the world have already formed cyberwarfare divisions within their militaries to develop the means to infiltrate computers remotely and steal information (Schneier, 2015; Limbago, 2014). Cyber intelligencecollecting, analyzing, and disseminating intelligence on the intentions, capabilities, and operational activities of foreign cyber actorsis one of the core objectives in the National Intelligence Strategy that the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) produced last year to guide the activities of the Intelligence Community (Clapper, 2015). Since 2010, government agencies including the Department of Defense (DoD), the Department of Justice (DoJ), the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), the National Security Agency (NSA), the Department of Homeland Security, and the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) have reorganized to include cyber capabilities of intelligence gathering, countering digital impacts, and if necessary, conducting cyber offense (Viswanatha, 2014; Elkus, 2015; Bennet, 2015; 'New intelligence agency,\" 2014; Clark, 2015). Cyber offense takes the form of illegally hacking into a target government's or military's networkssurreptitiouslyto learn the networks' structures and explore the information contained therein, and then perhaps planting malware in the networks that silently extracts data for days or months, taking the information directly and electronically that spies on the ground would have to maneuver and plot to obtain. Once inside a network, cyber offense can plant false information to mislead or disrupt the target, or it could even insert destructive malware, which on a remote signal from the intruders, damages the network or brings it down, denying the target its information and its coordination capabilities (Schneier, 2015; Office of the National Counterintelligence Executive, 2011). These scenarios are not the stuff of movie plots or projections far into the future. All the major world powers with advanced ICT systems have been conducting cyber offense against one another and sharpening their skills with it for at least a decade or more, but they were usually discrete about it (Cavelty, 2012). In September 2010, however, the impact of the Stuxnet worm on Iranian nuclear programs was revealed, marking a turning point toward more openness about these governmental cyber operations. Gradually over some months, the public learned that apparently (although the federal government declined to acknowledge it) the United States and Israel had engineered a specialized computer worm called Stuxnet and inserted it into the control software for Iran's nuclear fuel centrifuges, destroying some of them and deceiving the operations of others, and setting back Iran's nuclear program by several years (Broad, Markoff, & Sanger, 2011; Denning, 2012). Other milestones of hacking revelations soon followed, which were openly acknowledged, such as Google's admission in January 2010 that it had been hacked by elements of the Chinese government, despite a certain embarrassment that such a prominent IT systems innovator as Google could itself have been broken into (Harris, 2014b). In October 2014, commercial investigators announced that the Google hack had been but one of a massive international espionage operation linked to the Chinese government that over the previous 6 years had broken into nearly 1,000 organizations, planting various types of malware and stealing data from servers across Asia, Europe, and the United States (Gertz, 2014). China and Russia are leading cyber adversaries of the United States, but many other nations are also players in the game. One analyst describes recent instances that have been inferred and attributed to certain actors nations rarely admit cyberespionagethis way:\nIn 2009, Canadian security researchers discovered a piece of malware called GhostNet on the Dalai Lama's computers. It was a sophisticated surveillance network, controlled by a computer in China. Further research found it installed on computers of political, economic, and media organizations in 103 countriesbasically a who's who of Chinese espionage targets. Flame is a surveillance tool that researchers detected on Iranian networks in 2012; these experts believe the United States and Israel put it there and elsewhere. Red October, which hacked and spied on computers worldwide for five years before it was discovered in 2013, is believed to be a Russian surveillance system. So is Turla, which targeted Western government computers and was ferreted out in 2014. The Mask, also discovered in 2014, is believed to be Spanish. Iranian hackers have specifically targeted U.S. officials. There are many more known surveillance tools like these, and presumably others still undiscovered (Schneier, 2015).\n\nIn May 2014, the new Counter Intelligence and Export Controls Section in the National Security Division of the United States Department of Justice raised the stakes in the international cyber competition by indicting by name (in absentia) five Chinese military officers who were working in a Chinese Army cyberespionage unit. The five were accused of computer hacking, economic espionage, and conspiracy for hacking into six American companies and a labor union and stealing their controlled trade secrets, passwords, emails and other company correspondence, financial statements, cost projections, and research plans (Federal Bureau of Investigation, 2014; Viswanatha, 2014; \"Cyber-Espionage Nightmare,\" 2015). The contrasting positions taken by China, which openly supports its industries with government intelligence operations, and the United States, which argues that it does not do so (this controversy was discussed earlier in the economic espionage chapter) clashed publicly as American companies like these six bitterly protested that Chinese cyberespionage was robbing them of their innovations and business models, and damaging their international competitiveness (Brenner, 2014). In a further milestone of acknowledged international hacking, in August 2014 the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) admitted that several months earlier, the Chinese had broken into its poorly defended networks and stolen the personnel and security clearance application records of 21.5 million Americans. This serious loss offers a foreign intelligence operation potential insight into personal details about individuals, their interests and weaknesses, their careers, and their families and friends that could be exploited for recruitment or blackmail (Gault, 2015; Peterson, 2015). In September 2015, the prospect of an escalation in cyberespionageor more damaging international cyberattacksled to discussions during the state visit to the United States of the Chinese president, Xi Jinping, where he pledged that China would no longer pursue the kind of hacking of which the five Chinese officers stood indicted. In November 2015, at the Group of 20 Conference, China, Russia, the United States, and most of the other world economic powers negotiated an agreement stipulating that they would follow specified \"global rules of responsible behavior in cyberspace,\" for now (Nakashima, 2015). In these instances of cyberespionage, the information sought and stolen was controlled. Often it was classified, but not in every instance, since sometimes it was a trade secret held by a company, or it was an unclassified but sensitive piece of information, such as some of the personal and professional details of many cleared federal employees and contractors. The information was meant to be secret and kept safe from adversaries, yet those adversaries hacked into a computer network and stole the secret, and after the fact it was usually impossible to determine for sure who did it. Before the era of reliance on ICT, adversaries were positioned at a physical distance from one another. To gain and maintain the competitive advantage, more and better information about the unseen adversary needed to be collected. This prompted the need for and reliance on intercepting signals and on spies, who lived in or could enter the camp of the other and bring back accurate information. Cyberespionage overcomes the physical separation between adversaries, as it links them together in the global information and communications network of the Internet. It electronically eliminates that earlier distance, and clandestinely puts an adversary into the secret heart of the other. This prompts some speculations: if secrets are now kept in electronic storehouses, and the adversary is successfully rifling them, does this not threaten the control over these secrets, and if so, can there still be espionage as it has been discussed here? Will there be no need for spies if governments can clandestinely reach into their adversaries' information storerooms from a distance and take what they want? When adversaries have developed their cyber abilities well enough to reach into even the most strongly defended systems of the other and pluck out the secrets kept there, why will they need spies?\n\n## Globalization\n\nBefore 1989 ushered in the beginning of the Soviet Union's collapse, the United States had faced that one main nation-state adversary for 4 decades in the Cold War. In 2015, there were many adversaries: Russia and China and three or four more rising nation-states including Iran contest the predominance the United States has enjoyed. These were joined by various non-state actors that are capable wielders of ICT and social media, including terrorist groups, in asymmetric attacks against the more powerful United States. Therefore, the current geopolitical context presents a multiplicity of economic competitors and potential military adversaries, and new challenges for countering espionage by them. Adversaries issue these challenges within the current meta-context of globalization, the move toward integration of markets and interdependence of peoples that is taking place across many dimensions. This move has been accelerating for several decades, fueled by economic trends and the advances in ICT and in cheaper transportation. (National Intelligence Council, 2008; World Trade Organization, 2008; Steger & James, 2010).\n\n## Economic Globalization\n\nAs globalization has widened the field of economic interrelationships to include more peoples and more nations, the value of creative and innovative ideas on technologies has increased, especially if they can be protected in trade secrets. The pace and reach of economic competition increases with globalization. For some nations that are trying to catch up to the world's economic leaders, the increasing value of other nations' intellectual property has made it worthwhile for them to invest more effort and resources into stealing those secrets through espionage, as a shortcut in their own development (Hannas, Mulvenon & Puglisi, 2015).73\nOne characteristic of economic globalization is an increase in multinational corporations and worldwide patterns of manufacturing. Corporations routinely plan large-scale projects, such as aircraft development, to include companies from multiple nations, each contributing a specific part or system, while the lead company coordinates the assembly of these parts into a whole. In such projects, sharing design details and materials specifications with foreign partners is essential, yet if they might have military uses, American export control laws often prohibit the release of such advanced materials and technical concepts to non- U.S. companies. It can be difficult for an American company to both comply with export control requirements and collaborate effectively with their international partners (Beck, 2000). For example, in 2006 Boeing Corporation planned to produce the composite plastic fuselage and wings of its new 787 aircraft in Italy and Japan, but these plans were abruptly delayed when Boeing's own engineers argued that the techniques and composite materials that were to be used had originated in secret military research on the B-2 bomber in the 1980s (The B-2 was the plane Noshir Gowdia had worked on). In order to avoid violating ITAR restrictions on the release of technologies that could have military applications, Boeing reanalyzed each part to be used in the aircraft to determine if it had had a military origin, and if did so, Boeing tried to find an analogous part with a commercial origin to replace it. For months, Boeing delayed production while this replacement was done, despite their having provided evidence to regulators of other commercial uses for composites that had not been derived from the B-2. Dual use technologies are a thorny area, subject to judgment calls. Some argue that export control laws are dangerously outdated, that they no longer prevent the global spread of technologies that could be used against the United States, and that they should be brought into the 21st century context of globalization because they \"reflect a control system designed for the Cold War rather than the new reality of economic globalization\" (Gates, 2006). Other aspects of globalized economic activity that factor into the potential for economic espionage are global supply chains that pass through uncontrolled countries, the exposure of proprietary plans and methods to more people and places that adds to the risk of trade secret theft, and the opportunities that global businesses offer to foreign intelligence services to recruit Americans, who may be exposed to their enticements in international business settings (Figliuzzi, 2012). Because modern global business must use ICT networks to exchange its sensitive information, it is as vulnerable as any intelligence or government agency to being hacked and having its information stolen (Brenner, 2014). As discussed earlier in the section on export control violations, the AECA, IEEPA, and ITAR laws were written in the 1970s, when the sharp distinction these laws draw between U.S. persons and foreign persons made sense. At that time, most manufacturing of American products took place in the United States and was performed by American citizens. With globalization advancing, this is no longer as true, and policies in these laws that require excluding non-U.S. persons from knowing about or participating in the development of American technologies sharply clash with current expectations for collaboration and cooperation across national boundaries, as people work in multinational corporations or perform research in universities among multinational students, and as companies take advantage of joint ventures in which they pool scarce resources and expertise from various countries to manufacture a complex product (Brown, 2009). Professor John Reece's conviction for espionage based on having hired Chinese and Iranian students to work on sensitive technology in his university lab is an example of this issue.\n\n## Cultural Globalization\n\nOne of the important impacts of economic globalization is the elimination of trade barriers such as tariffs, to encourage free trade across national boundaries. Like the falling of trade barriers, the whole thrust of globalization is to deemphasize the importance of national boundaries. It is a short step from global trade across boundaries to deemphasizing the importance of a single national allegiance in favor of a global perspective. As the globalization of cultures has advanced with exposure and interaction in languages, in music, literature, and art, in political aspirations, in shared concerns for the environmentit has invigorated the notion some have proposed since the end of the Cold War, that everyone should first of all be \"global citizens...who have certain rights and responsibilities towards each other by the mere fact of being human on Earth\" (Altinay, 2010). In contrast to the economic dimensions of globalization that increase competition, cultural globalization implies diminished competition between nations, and since espionage presupposes a context of competition, such \"one-world-ism\" is likely to have an impact on it. Global citizenship assumes an ethical and political stance in which the social, political, economic, and environmental realities of the world demand that individuals, communities, and nation states make decisions based first on global considerations. It emphasizes the fundamental interconnectedness of all things and the reduction of cultural distinctions, sees the political and geographical boundaries of nations as increasingly irrelevant, and defines global challenges, such as climate change, as beyond the abilities of national interests to solve, requiring global solutions. A \"global citizen\" subsumes his or her identity as a citizen of a particular place beneath an identity in the global community. Organizations, conferences, educational curricula, and spokespersons devote themselves to encouraging global citizenship.74 One advocate writes that \"as a result of living in a globalized world, we understand that we have an added layer of responsibility [in addition to national identities and allegiances]; we also are responsible for being members of a world-wide community of people who share the same global identity that we have (Israel, 2012). Individuals who, while betraying their nation's secrets, conceived of their actions as taking place on a higher moral plane, more admirable than loyalty to one nation, are not only a result of modern globalization. Some earlier spies also felt this way. For example, Theodore Hall, a precocious American physicist working on the Manhattan project and thereafter briefly spying for the Soviets, gave American nuclear secrets to them at the end of World War II. He explained that he acted from a higher responsibility, as a citizen of the world, to even-up the sides in the Cold\n\nWar. By helping the Soviets develop their nuclear bomb, he thought he would reduce the danger of nuclear war. He fled prosecution in the United States and lived out his life in England (Cowell, 1999). The claims for a global citizenship highlight how much the crime of espionage, as it has been conducted in the era of national sovereignty, depends on the existence of competing nation states, and how much countering espionage depends on those states commanding the exclusive allegiance of their citizens. As globalization continues apparently indefinitely, will the knitting together of peoples in interconnected and overlapping configurations, as global citizens no longer defined exclusively by national boundaries, diminish the resort to espionage and the attempt to enlist agents to work against their countries, or would it simply redefine the players who will undertake it in different competing configurations?\n\n## Impact Of The Internet\n\nThe Internet has been both a product of globalization and a catalyst for it. It connects computer users around the world simultaneously in business transactions, consumer searches, spreading the breaking news, enabling electoral politics from near and far, and allowing participation in sports, entertainment, and public tragedies or triumphs taking place in distant countries. It allows people to move from their homelands to live in another nation, and yet to stay so connected to family, friends, and life back home that they feel as if they are living in two places at once. Access to the Internet softens the wrenching break in ties with the past life that immigrants and migrants faced, and provides another step toward becoming a global citizen (Herbig, 2008a). The growth of international Internet and communications use is astonishing. Some statistics to illustrate the trends include: from 2000 to 2010, the number of global Internet users rose from 413 million to 2.03 billion. By January 2015, that number had risen to more than 3 billion users and the rate of increase was accelerating. Already in 2010, almost 30 percent of the world's population had access to computers; there were 1 billion Google searches performed every day, and 2 billion videos were viewed daily on YouTube. By January 2015, 40% of the world's population had Internet access, 51% used mobile communications devices such as cell phones, and 29% had active social media accounts (Kemp, 2015; Internet Live Stats, 2015). This is the emerging context in which espionage is taking place: information and communication technologies, globalization, and increasing reliance on the Internet. As an FBI counterintelligence official noted during a 2014 Congressional hearing, \"Long gone are the days when a spy needed physical access to a document to steal it, copy it, or photograph it, where modern technology now enables global access and transmission instantaneously\" (Coleman, 2014). \"Cyber is now part of every mission,\" an intelligence official explained, \"It's not a specialized, boutique thing\" (Miller, 2015).\n\n\n## Implications Of This Context For Revisions To The Espionage Statutes\n\nThe first part of this report described characteristics of recent American espionage offenders and trends in their activities, based on analyses of the 209 individuals under study. The second part explored the five types of espionage those 209 people committed. These five types of espionage are related to one another, but they are not identical. The intent in describing the five types in some detail is to make a case that espionage no longer only occurs in the classic type that the term \"espionage\" has usually described, but also in leaks, foreign agent activities, violations of export control laws, and economic espionage. Considering what the individuals that were convicted of these offenses actually did, the laws that frame each of the five types, and how the types interact, suggests that to understand the current field of espionage one must expand one's mental categories to encompass the activities of these additional four types and place them alongside classic espionage. Not only in classic espionage but in these other types as well, the United States is losing its invaluable controlled information, ideas, technologies, and plans, and is seeing its economic advantages and national security diminished. Given this proliferation of types of espionage, along with the transformations in context that ICT and globalization are causing, the need to re-think and revise the legal statutes that apply to espionage in the United States becomes even more compelling. This report concludes with an overview of possible approaches to revising the Espionage statutes.\n\n## Revise Title 18 U.S.C. Sections 792 Through 798\n\nThe most narrowly focused revision would consider the recommendations of legal scholars and judges75 to fix the inconsistencies and ambiguities in the espionage statutes Title 18 U.S.C. sections 792 through 798. Given that these important provisions are based on laws from 1917 and were updated most completely in\n1950, at a minimum they need further updating. They present other issues as well. For example, Harold Edgar and Benno C. Schmidt, Jr., writing in their seminal essay on espionage law in 1973, pointed to subsections (d) and (e) of Section 793 as especially problematic and crying out for revision. These subsections are:\n\n(d) Whoever, lawfully having possession of, access to, control over, or\nbeing entrusted with any document, writing, code book, signal book, sketch, photograph, photographic negative, blueprint, plan, map, model, instrument, appliance, or note relating to the national defense,\nor information relating to the national defense which information the possessor has reason to believe could be used to the injury of the United States or to the advantage of any foreign nation, willfully communicates, delivers, transmits or causes to be communicated, delivered, or transmitted or attempts to communicate, deliver, transmit or cause to be communicated, delivered or transmitted the same to any person not entitled to receive it, or willfully retains the same and fails to deliver it on demand to the officer or employee of the United States entitled to receive it~ or (e) Whoever having unauthorized possession of, access to, or control over any document, writing, code book, signal book, sketch, photograph, photographic negative, blueprint, plan, map, model, instrument, appliance, or note relating to the national defense, or information relating to the national defense which information the possessor has reason to believe could be used to the injury of the United States or to the advantage of any foreign nation, willfully communicates, delivers, transmits or causes to be communicated, delivered, or transmitted, or attempts to communicate, deliver, transmit or cause to be communicated, delivered, or transmitted the same to any person not entitled to receive it, or willfully retains the same and fails to deliver it to the officer or employee of the United States entitled to receive it; .... shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than ten years or both.\n\nEdgar and Benno, Jr. closely read the legislative record for the Congressional debates that produced the original Espionage Act in 1917, and then studied the debates in Congress during the last major update in 1950. The authors were moved to exasperation by the \"hopeless imprecision\" of these two subsections. \"There is an additional, fundamental problem,\" they wrote, \"the legislation is in many respects incomprehensible.\" The two legal scholars outlined five serious problems in this pair of subsections that cause inconsistency and confusion for those who are trying to apply them. The five problems they identified include the following:\n\n(1)   Is publication a \"communication\" within the meaning of the subsections, and\nare communications or retentions incident to publication criminal?\n(2)   What degree of culpability is required by the term \"willfully?\" Can the word be\ngiven a meaning narrow enough to sustain the constitutionality of the prohibitions on communication or retention in light of the vagueness of the phrase \"related to the national defense?\"\n(3)   What constitutes protected \"information\" under the subsections, and what\nculpability is required before its transfer is criminal?\n(4)   What makes a piece of paper containing defense information a \"document\" or\nother enumerated item for purposes of the subsections?\n(5)   What does \"not entitled to receive it\" mean for purposes of the communication\nand retention offenses? (Edgar & Schmidt, Jr., 1973)\nApplication of various interpretations of these questions have produced many of the legal issues illustrated by cases discussed in this report, including whether leaks to the press constitute acts of espionage or something else, how to demonstrate that a person's motivation to act was \"willful,\" or how classification of information relates to these provisionse.g., does it define who is \"not entitled to receive it,\" despite the fact that these statutes do not even mention classification? Sorting out and clarifying the issues raised just in these two often-used subsections of section 793 could greatly improve the espionage statutes. Judge T. S. Ellis III, who presided over the convoluted prosecution of Steven Rosen and Keith Weissman for their having received oral classified information from Lawrence Franklin, wrote that The conclusion that the statute [referring to Section 793] is constitutionally permissible [as his opinion does so conclude,] does not reflect a judgment about whether Congress could strike a more appropriate balance between these competing interests, or whether a more carefully drawn statute could better serve both the national security and the value of public debate. Indeed, the basic terms and structure of this statute have remained largely unchanged since the administration of William Howard Taft. The intervening years have witnessed dramatic changes in the position of the United States in world affairs and the nature of threats to our national security. The increasing importance of the United States in world affairs has caused a significant increase in the size and complexity of the United States' military and foreign policy establishments, and in the importance of our nation's foreign policy decision making. Finally, in the nearly one hundred years since the passage of the Defense Secrets Act [passed in 1911, it was the forerunner of the Espionage Act of 1917] mankind has made great technological advances affecting not only the nature and potential devastation of modern warfare, but also the very nature of information and communication. These changes should suggest to even the most casual observer that the time is ripe for Congress to engage in a thorough review and revision of these provisions to ensure that they reflect both these changes, and contemporary views about the appropriate balance between our nation's security and our citizens' ability to engage in public debate about the United States' conduct in the society of nations (United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, Memorandum opinion, 2006).\n\n## Revise Espionage-Related Statutes To Reflect Cyber Capabilities, Globalization, And The Internet\n\nBy taking Judge Ellis's observation to heart, broader and more ambitious revisions to the most commonly applied espionage statutes could be undertaken that would consider them together76 to eliminate inconsistencies and frame better laws that reflect the current context of cyber capabilities, the Internet, and globalization. For example, Stephen I. Vladeck, a professor of law, suggested to a House Committee at a hearing about Wikileaks in 2010, that the Espionage Act causes \"problematic uncertainty\" in at least five ways that could and should be addressed by reformers. These include:\n\n(1)   Although intended to deal with classic espionage, that is, \"using spies to\ncollect information about what another government or company is doing or intends to do,\" the language of the act does not require either \"a specific intent to harm the national security of the United States, or to benefit a foreign power.\" In its vagueness, three crimes end up being prosecuted under the one statute: \"classic espionage, leaking, and the retention or redistribution of national defense information by private citizens.\"\n(2)   The Espionage Act does not focus only on the initial offender's action, but\ncriminalizes each subsequent person who \"knowingly disseminates,\ndistributes, or even retains [a piece of] national defense information.\" This overly broad application complicates sorting out how leaks to the press should be considered.\n(3)   The mental state specified in the Espionage Act to find that the action was\nintentional, is that the person acted \"willfully,\" but various courts that have struggled with the ambiguities of the previous two points have ruled that other mental states not specified in the Act can be required as well, including a \"bad faith purpose,\" which adds more complexity to an already complex statute.\n(4)   The Act may interfere with the current Federal Whistleblower Protection Act,\nwhich does not address the potential conflict with the Espionage Act for those to whom a whistleblower discloses classified information.\n(5)   The Act does not acknowledge the possibility that information may be\nimproperly deemed classified or otherwise sensitive by the government, despite the common understanding that this can occur (Vladeck, 2010).\nProfessor Vladeck's suggestions, in part, reflect those of many commentators on the need for a specific law that applies to leaks of classified information to the press in this era of global and instantaneous communication. The Espionage statutes are a crude fit for leaks, a disjuncture that has prompted charges of unfairness from persons who see themselves as acting as whistleblowers (Epstein, 2007; United States Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 2010; Barandes, 2008). Another issue for revision that reflects the globalization underway is the disappearing ability to apply the distinction between section 793, in which the recipient is specified to be \"anyone not authorized to receive\" the information, whether he or she is an American citizen or a foreign citizen, and section 794, which specifies that the recipient must be any foreign government, or an agent or group of such a government. Proving a nexus in the ICT environment to a foreign entity as the recipient of information, however, becomes ever more difficult in an Internet era of multinational corporations and global manufacturing, which offer many legitimate reasons for transmitting sensitive information around the world. Automated transmission over the Internet and electronic file transfers can occur without leaving a trace as to who has received the information. In these circumstances, investigators often cannot prove, or even discern, that there was a disclosure of controlled information to a foreign recipient, a nexus required to justify prosecuting the transmission under section 794. A similar effect is seen in prosecuting trade secret theft: section 1831 requires a foreign nexus, while section 1832 does not, and cases often end up being prosecuted under section 1832 because the foreign nexus cannot be proven (Brenner, 2014; Cavelty, 2012; Clapper, 2015; Coleman, 2014). Not surprisingly, given that the latest major update to the espionage statutes dates from 1950, it did not anticipate the impact on espionage of the now-rapidly evolving cyber capabilities to create, store, and transmit information electronically and instantaneously. Taking account of the impact of ICT on current espionage, as well as its impact on developments that may be expected in the future, would be another angle for revision that would improve the Espionage statutes and make them more relevant and useful in the 21st century.\nTo cite just one example that was unimaginable in 1950, Shane Harris investigated the cooperation in cyber counterespionage between United States government intelligence agencies and American communications companies, and detailed the assistance and links between them in 2014.77 In an excerpt of his book, he discussed the Google hacking by the Chinese in 2009, and how Google itself had then traced the hackers to a server in Taiwan controlled by the Chinese army (Harris, 2014a). When Google chose to make the fact of the hacking and its investigation into it public, it opened the possibility for the American government to publically protest the Chinese government's cyber espionage program without having to discuss sensitive sources and methods of its own it might employ. \"China plays a longer game,\" Harris writes, \"Its leaders want the country to become a first-tier economic and industrial power in a single generation, and they are prepared to steal the knowledge they need to do it, U.S. officials say.\" Defending against such a concerted program, according to Harris, involves the NSA, the major communications companies, prominent American corporations, and private security companies in a sharing arrangement both multi-layered and wide-ranging across sectors of the economy. Americans who could support such an international cyberespionage effort by becoming spies for the Chinese would face only the antique Espionage statutes that were framed a century ago (Harris, 2014a).\n\n## Reconcile Statutes That Apply To The Five Types Of Espionage\n\nThe broadest approach that could be taken to revising the Espionage statutes would be to consider the statues that currently are used to prosecute all the five types of espionage, as they have been discussed here, and undertake an effort to reconcile inequities, eliminate gaps or overlaps between them, and create more consistency in the legal response to activities that are similar, even though they take place in different spheres. The DoJ's National Security Division has been investigating and assisting with prosecutions of cases across an array of types of espionage for a decade, as the Assistant Director explained to Congress in 2008: \"the clandestine intelligence collection activities of foreign nations include not only traditional Cold War style efforts to obtain military secrets, but increasingly, sophisticated operations to obtain trade secrets, intellectual property, and technologies controlled for export for national security reasons\" (United States House of Representatives Committee on the Judiciary, 2008). Testifying at the same Congressional hearing but speaking specifically about Chinese espionage activities, Larry Wortzel, chairman of the United States-China Economic and Security Review Commission, made a similar point:\nIndeed, my own view is that today it is often difficult to distinguish between what we define as espionage related to the national defense under the Espionage Act (18 USC 792-8), and economic espionage or the theft of proprietary information and trade secrets covered by the Economic Espionage Act (18 USC 1831-9). Indeed, for American companies and for the national defense of the United States, the impact of espionage can be the same, robbing U.S. companies of the costs of their research, giving technology with military application to China's armed forces, and undermining the security of American military personnel and our nation (United States House of Representatives Committee on the Judiciary. 2008).\n\nThe laws that govern each of the five types are usually different and are focused on the distinctive aspects of the crimes. The professionals working in each areacase officers, lawyers, investigators, judgesoften specialize in one particular type of espionage crime, mastering its own complexities. The communities of interest that have the most at stake when an American citizen gives away or sells information in an act of one of the five types of espionage are distinct: the intelligence community, with its reliance on classification of information and clandestine sources and methods for obtaining information from and countering espionage by foreign powers, differs considerably from the corporate community with its focus on economic advantage, innovation, and ownership of its intellectual property. The people who leak government information to the press and from the press to the rest of the world, including adversaries and competitors, often differ dramatically in motive from those who agree to serve as agents of a foreign power by collecting information clandestinely in the United States, and differ yet again from those who try to profit for themselves by selling American export controlled technologies. 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Miami,\nFL: *The Miami Herald*, p. 1 [Alvarez].\nWeaver, J. (2009, October 13). Convicted Cuban spy's life sentence reduced to 22\nyears. Miami, FL: *The Miami Herald*, p. 2 [Guerrero].\nWeiser, B. & Risen, J. (1998, December 1). The masking of a militant: A special\nreport.; A soldier's shadowy trail in U.S. and in the Mideast. New York, NY:\nThe New York Times, p. A18 [Mohamed].\nWhite & Case Technology Newsflash. (2013, January 15). Amendments to the\nEconomic Espionage Act broaden trade secret protection. New York, NY: White & Case LLP. Retrieved on August 28, 2015 from http://www.whitecase.com/publications/article/amendments\nWhite House. FOUO. (2014, February 11). Near-term measures to reduce the risk of\nhigh-impact unauthorized disclosures. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office.\nWhite, J. (2006, August 10). Sailor from Oregon charged with espionage.\nWashington, DC: *The Washington Post,* p. 6 [Weinmann].\nWhite, J. (2007, March 8). 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Information security: Cyber threats facilitate\nability to commit economic espionage. Testimony before the Subcommittee on Counterterrorism and Intelligence, Committee on Homeland Security, House of Representatives. Washington, DC: General Accountability Office.\nWiltrout, K. (2006, August 29). Navy lawyer once posted at Cuba base is charged.\nNorfolk, VA: *The Norfolk Virginian-Pilot,* Retrieved on\nhttp://home.hamptonroads.com/stories [Diaz].\nWiltrout, K. (2006a, August 12). Accused spy carried cash, secret files, agents say.\nNorfolk, VA: *Norfolk Virginian-Pilot,* p. 2 [Weinmann].\nWiltrout, K. (2006b, August 10). Father dismisses \"speculation' on espionage\ncharges against sailor. Norfolk, VA: *Norfolk Virginian-Pilot,* p. 2 [Weinmann].\nWiltrout, K. (2007, May 19). Naval officer sentenced to six months in prison,\ndischarge. Norfolk VA: *The Norfolk Virginian-Pilot,* p. 3 [Diaz].\nWise, D. (2012, June 7). Mole-in-training: How China tried to infiltrate the CIA.\nWashington, DC: *The Washingtonian*, p. 3 [Shriver].\nWittes, B. (2014, May 29). Thoughts on the Edward Snowden interview. Lawfare:\nHard national security choices. Retrieved on June 9, 2014 from http://www.lawfareblog.com/2014/05/thoughts-on-edward-snowdensinterview/ [Snowden].\nWood, S. (2001, October). Public opinion of selected national security issues: 1994-\n2000. Monterey, CA: Defense Personnel Security Research Center.\nWood, S., Crawford, K. S., Lang, E. L. (2005, May). Reporting of counterintelligence\nand security indicators by supervisors and coworkers. Monterey, CA: Defense Personnel Security Research Center.\n Wood, S. & Marshall-Mies, J. C. (2003, January). Improving supervisor and\ncoworker reporting of information of security concern. Monterey, CA: Defense Personnel Security Research Center.\nWood, S. & Wiskoff, M. F. (1992). Americans who spied against their country since\nWorld War II. Monterey, CA: Defense Personnel Security Research Center.\nWorld Trade Organization. (2008). Trends in Globalization. Retrieved December 10,\n2015 from https://www.wto.org/.../res.../wtr08-2b_e.pdf\nYoussef, N. A. (2011, January 28). Probe: Army ignored warnings over soldier.\nMiami, FL: *Miami Herald*, p. 1 [Manning].\nZimmerman, M. (2014, September 19). Oahu defense contractor sentenced on\nespionage charges. *Watchdog.org.* Retrieved September 29, 2014 from http://watchdog.org/171751/espionage-related charges/ [Bishop].\n\n## Appendix A: Espionage As An Insider Threat\n\n\nThe essay that follows is the result of a viewpoint exercise, a way of seeing familiar material anew. Typically, in the literature on insider threat, espionage is considered as one example among several threats from insiders. These various insider threats, espionage among them, are usually compared and contrasted in order to tease out commonalities that can then become the basis for observations about insider threat as a phenomenon. Unlike that approach, this exercise started from the viewpoint of espionage and considered how selected studies of insider threat could improve and enlarge on our understanding of espionage. Therefore, the studies included here are not representative of insider threat literature, but instead were included because they offer particular help in explicating espionage itself. The concept of insider threat has changed significantly since the terrorist attacks of 9/11. The term was being applied during the 1990s to employees and other persons who had insider access to computers and who misused them and the information on them. As computers became standard office equipment and people increasingly stored and accessed sensitive or classified information on them, the threat of information loss or theft, sabotage of information systems, and even cyberespionage by foreign entities became thinkable. Often, early work on insider threat focused on systems security, survivable architectures, auditing and monitoring of system users, and the modeling of likely threats and responses to plan effective countermeasures (Anderson et al., 2000). The 9/11 attacks changed the understanding of insider threat by demonstrating the global reach and potential attractiveness of transnational terrorist organizations such as Al Qaeda and its offshoots. The nineteen 9/11 hijackers were not Americans, but their example soon attracted adherents, copycats, and wannabes among American citizens. As Americans, more of these in turn attempted or actually performed acts of domestic terrorism. Some domestic terrorism in the United States has been linked to international Islamist extremism, but there are also many American causes that provoke terrorism, such as animal rights, racism, anti-abortion, neo-Nazism, or anarchism. From the initial focus on computer misuse and crimes, the nature of insider threat expanded in the 2000s to include domestic and transnational terrorism, and this threat increased over time. A 2011 study of domestic jihadist terrorism reported that there had been 6 cases in 2002, but year by year, instances grew until in 2010 there were 20 cases. A 2015 study of jihadist and domestic terrorism reported that a foiled or completed terrorist attempt happened every 34 days in the United States (Jenkins, 2011; Southern Poverty Law Center, 2015). As Americans read in the press about dramatic bombings, murders, and arson by domestic terrorists, the potential physical threat from fellow-citizens, though statistically small, became real. A series of shocks, starting in 2009, amplified concern about threat from Americans with inside accesses, and further expanded the focus of insider threat. Some of the major events included:\n\n The Ft. Hood attack by Army psychiatrist Maj. Nidal Hasan, on November 5,\n2009. Hasan killed thirteen persons and wounded 43 more by gunfire on a U.S. Army base in Texas (\"Protecting the Force,\" 2010; Kenber, 2013).\n Wikileaks, an online publisher of purloined information, published thousands of\nclassified reports and documents on the Iraq War and sensitive American diplomacy leaked to it by Bradley, now Chelsea, Manning, starting on February 28 and continuing through July 25, 2010 (Shane, 2011); Secretary of Defense, 2012; Executive Order 13587, 2011).\n Various newspapers published excerpts from thousands of documents detailing\nclassified intelligence programs and NSA surveillance leaked to them by Edward Snowden, an NSA contractor, starting in June 2013, and ongoing in 2015 (Shane, 2013b; Sanger & Schmitt, 2014; Wilentz, 2014; Bamford, 2014).\n Aaron Alexis, an employee of a Department of Defense (DoD) contractor,\nattacked co-workers at the Washington Navy Yard on September 16, 2013. Alexis fatally shot 12 persons and himself, and wounded 3 additional people (\"Internal Review, 2013; Associated Press, 2014; Department of Defense Directive, 2014)\n A second attack at the Ft. Hood Army Base by Army Specialist Ivan Lopez\noccurred on April 2, 2014. Lopez shot 3 people and then himself, and wounded\n16 others (Lamothe, 2014; Whitlock & Jaffe, 2014).78\nThese incidents dramatized additional threats, on top of computer misuse, sabotage, and domestic or international terrorism, including mass shootings in workplaces and schools, the leaking of unheard-of amounts of classified materials, and shootings of military personnel on U.S. military bases. Workplace violence, normally a small but potential threat in any employment setting, was heightened in Nidal Hasan's case by his self-radicalization to jihadist terrorism. Bradley Manning and Edward Snowden, both of whom were information systems and intelligence insiders with high-level security clearances, transmitted massive amounts of classified information to recipients who they knew intended to publish it to the world. Aaron Alexis passed repeated background investigations to maintain his security clearance and consulted medical and security personnel about his mental health complaints within a month of taking his guns to his place of employment. Ivan Lopez struggled as a soldier, lied and deceived his officers and friends, and reacted to a series of personal losses and frustrations by suddenly starting to shoot his fellow soldiers. The blows to trust in systems of vetting, monitoring, and managing one's fellow workers and citizens, and the loss of faith in technical security systems protecting sensitive information have come quickly though these incidents, and they have created new categories of insider threat.\n\nReactions to these developments have been wide-ranging, and they are continuing. The federal government extensively studied the attacks at federal facilities and the loss of classified materials (for example, \"Protecting the Force, 2010; \"Predicting Violent Behavior, 2012; \"Internal Review,\" 2013). Based on those studies, the government has issued a series of new policies addressing insider threat. It has set up task forces and new agency groups charged with mitigating threats in comprehensive ways. It has mandated that all federal agencies and the military services take steps to reduce the likelihood, to detect, and to respond to such threats (Executive Order 13587, 2011; \"Countering Espionage,\" 2012; \"Congressional Notification, 2013; Department of Defense Directive, 2014; Monaco, 2014; \" Management of Serious Security Incidents,\" 2014; \"Predicting Violent Behavior, 2012). Whole new fields of academic study and analysis, consulting services, and conference circuits have grown up around problems of and solutions to insider threat. It is impossible now to think about workplace violence, fraud, domestic or jihadist terrorism, leaking of controlled information, sabotage, and computer misuse and systems hacking without conceiving of it as insider threat. Since early in this evolving concept of insider threat, espionage by Americans has been included in the list of such threats. For decades, people who betrayed their privileged access to classified or sensitive information by selling or giving it to other nations or causes have been described as examples of betrayal by insiders, although less often by the term \"insider threat\" until recently, so including spies among these categories was to be expected. In some ways, the study of espionage is not much advanced by this appropriation into the universe of insider threat. In order to frame analytical categories that fit each of the various phenomena included in an insider threat studyand there is no consistent definition from study to study of which concerns should be included inevitably these analytical categories become general and somewhat abstract. The categories do raise awareness of the dimensions found across the range of insider actions, and they do allow one to compare and contrast various insider threats. They can be applied to the particulars of espionage, but they can also be applied to the particulars of any of the other crimes or mischief that people with access to organizations and information systems can commit. Many findings of current insider threat studies are at such a level of abstraction and generalization that they do not really advance an understanding of espionage itself, or they are obvious and predictable. For example, the GAO's 2015 report to the House of Representatives Armed Service Committee on DoD insider threat programs assessed these programs using a broad definition of insider threat, because that is how the programs themselves approach the issue. Figure 7 reproduces one of the GAO's figures from its report. It is not shown here because it is deficient but because it is typical. It is a summary of the populations that might be insider threats; the steps taken by successful programs against insider threats, including deterrence, prevention, detection, and taking action; examples of types of insider threats; and authorities that should be coordinated. Espionage is one of the threats. The others that are included here are exfiltration, sabotage (cyber and physical), unintentional, and active shooter. To encompass the breadth of these selected types of threat, ranging from an employee sitting at his or her desk carelessly attaching a classified document to an email to an active shooter who is stalking the hallways, the categories are necessarily openended and generalizable (United States Government Accountability Office, 2015). Were one trying to learn how best to respond to the threat of espionage, one would do better to consult the literature on espionage itself than insider threat studies at these higher levels of abstraction.\n\n## Gao's Framework Of Key Elements To Incorporate At Each Phase Of Dod's Insider-Threat Programs\n\nIn some ways, however, studies of insider threat do offer valuable insights that can be applied specifically to espionage. Contributions from several areas of insider threat research that are helpful for understanding and responding to espionage are considered here: (1) personal crises that provoke acts of espionage; (2) indicators of insider threat as a means of recognizing impending adverse acts; and (3) analyzing organizational culture.\n\n## Personal Crises And Triggers\n\nThe data on which this report is based include variables coded for personal crises and for triggers of espionage. Although there are much data not reported for these variables, what is available suggests some typical issues and themes. A\nconsideration of these data for espionage-related offenses will be followed by a look at how insider threat studies expand the categories. Descriptions of how people begin to commit an espionage-related offense usually point to preconditions that are common for most crimes: motive, opportunity, lack of countervailing internal or external constraints, means, and often, a triggerthat is, something that happens to propel the person into acting on the intention (Herbig, 1994). Thompson provides insight into this notion of a trigger. He writes:\nA trigger is an event, usually negative, which serves as the \"straw that breaks the camel's back\" and pushes the spy over the edge to espionage. The prospective spy tends to struggle with a crisis for a period of time, during which tension builds up and pushes him/her toward the act.\nThen something in the near term triggers the act of espionage that the person has thought about and resisted for some timeit now becomes the solution to the immediate problem. \"A trigger merely taps into an existing cauldron of tension and spurs action,\" Thompson describes. An apt example is a person in the middle of a divorce, facing the financial and emotional upheavals divorce brings, until just one more lawyer's bill arrives in the mail, and the bill serves as a trigger. Suddenly the person who was holding on cannot cope any more, and puts the espionage plan in motion (Thompson, 2014). Many instances of espionage support the notion of a twostage buildup to an act of espionage: first, a personal problem develops over some months into an impending crisis that becomes the context for planning an act of espionage; and second, some event serves as the final straw that precipitates the person to try to solve the problem by beginning espionage, which has come to seem the only course left. Table A-1 reports on personal crises and more immediate trigger events from the data collected by PERSEREC.\n\n\n## Precipitating Personal Crises And Triggers As Contextual Factors In 209 Espionage-Related Offenders\n\n| Characteristics                                        | n                          |\n|--------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------|\n| 79                                                     |                            |\n|                                                        |                            |\n| % of 209                                               |                            |\n| individuals                                            |                            |\n| Precipitating triggers that seem to have caused the    |                            |\n| beginning of espionage                                 |                            |\n|                                                        |                            |\n|                                                        |                            |\n|                                                        |                            |\n|                                                        |                            |\n| Separation or divorce from significant other           | 5                          |\n| Immediate financial crisis                             | 16                         |\n| Facing a threat to self or family                      | 2                          |\n| Conflict (interpersonal or job-related)                | 16                         |\n|                                                        |                            |\n| Contextual personal problems or evolving crises        |                            |\n| within 6 months before date of beginning espionage     |                            |\n|                                                        |                            |\n|                                                        |                            |\n|                                                        |                            |\n|                                                        |                            |\n|                                                        |                            |\n|                                                        | Before beginning espionage |\n| Separation or divorce from significant other (includes |                            |\n| the 5 above for whom this was a trigger)               |                            |\n| 19                                                     |                            |\n|                                                        |                            |\n| 9                                                      |                            |\n| Death of family member or close friend                 | 7                          |\n| Diagnosis of terminal illness                          | 5                          |\n| Physical separation from significant other             | 8                          |\n| Marital problems                                       | 20                         |\n| New engagement or marriage                             | 11                         |\n| New significant other                                  | 10                         |\n| Began extramarital affair                              | 20                         |\n| Physically relocated                                   | 13                         |\n| Reported to have shown financial irresponsibility      | 22                         |\n| Reported to be having trouble with debt                | 68                         |\n| Reported to have wanted money, been greedy             | 36                         |\n| Reported to have shown radically different behavior    |                            |\n| (from his or her norm) prior to espionage only         |                            |\n| 7                                                      |                            |\n|                                                        |                            |\n|                                                        | During espionage           |\n| Reported to have shown radically different behavior    |                            |\n| (from his or her norm) prior to and during espionage   |                            |\n| 9                                                      |                            |\n|                                                        |                            |\n| 4                                                      |                            |\n| Reported to have shown radically different behavior    |                            |\n| (from his or her norm) during espionage only           |                            |\n| 13                                                     |                            |\n|                                                        |                            |\n| 6                                                      |                            |\n\n\n79 A person may have more than one entry.\n\n| Characteristics                                     | n                                               |\n|-----------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------|\n| 79                                                  |                                                 |\n|                                                     |                                                 |\n| % of 209                                            |                                                 |\n| individuals                                         |                                                 |\n| Reported to have shown unexplained affluence during |                                                 |\n| espionage                                           |                                                 |\n| 44                                                  |                                                 |\n|                                                     |                                                 |\n| 21                                                  |                                                 |\n|                                                     | Spending beyond means was reported by others    |\n|                                                     | Bought a new house                              |\n|                                                     | Bought a new vehicle                            |\n|                                                     | Spending reported and a new house               |\n|                                                     | Spending reported and a new vehicle             |\n|                                                     | Spending reported, a new house, + a new vehicle |\n\nThe preferred research method to explore nuances of timing and motive in an individual's decision to take an irrevocable action, such as beginning to commit espionage, would be to interview the person and ask questions from a validated protocol to be used with each subject. The sources available that went into making Appendix Table 1 were not interviews with espionage-related offenders, but instead, were in large part open source print materials written after the events. What is lost by using these materialsdeeper insights into each person's issuesmay be gained in breadth of coverage across 209 instances and 7 decades. Not surprisingly, the themes cluster on basic human issues that can become crises in a person's life: marriage and family, making a home, procuring a livelihood, advancing a career, interacting with co-workers and bosses in a workplace, maintaining financial stability, and ensuring physical health are common issues. In addition, six of the variables in Appendix Table 1 rely on the reports of other people, despite the known fact that people resist making such reports (Wood & Marshall-Mies, 2003). The person seemed financially irresponsible, was struggling with debt, was noticeably greedy, was acting very differently than normal just before espionage began, was acting very differently during espionage, or showed unexplained affluence during espionage. The first four of these reinforce the finding that money, the need for it and the desire for it, is the predominant motive for espionage-related offenses among Americans. The variables here that involve money are the highest numbers among these incomplete data, including 11% of the 209 cases who demonstrated financial irresponsibility, 33% who struggled with debt, 17% who seemed greedy to their coworkers or friends, and 21% who displayed unexplained affluence while spying. Typically, insider threat studies that generalize from a variety of crimes report personal crises and triggers drawn from cases. Findings from studies with a broader insider threat focus alert students of espionage to additional factors and patterns they should try to apply specifically to espionage to see if they fit. Since there are thousands of relevant studiestyping the phrase \"scholarly articles insider threat\" into the Google search engine, for example, returns 37,600 entries in early April 2015for the sake of keeping this report focused on espionage, this discussion only describes a few of the relevant insider threat studies. An Insider Threat team at the Software Engineering Institute (SEI) at Carnegie Mellon University has published a series of studies looking at insider threat through different lenses, often applying modeling techniques. The 2006 study that compares Information Technology (IT) sabotage with espionage illustrates their approach (Band, et al, 2006). Using cases from sabotage and from espionage by Americans, their comparison yielded six observations common to both types of insider threat: Observation #1: Most saboteurs and spies had common personal predispositions that contributed to their risk of committing malicious acts. Observation #2: In most cases, stressful events, including organizational sanctions, contributed to the likelihood of insider IT sabotage and espionage. Observation #3: Concerning behaviors were often observable before and during insider IT sabotage and espionage. Observation #4: Technical actions by many insiders could have alerted the organization to planned or ongoing malicious acts. Observation #5: In many cases, organizations ignored or failed to detect rule violations. Observation #6: Lack of physical and electronic access controls facilitated both insider IT sabotage and espionage (Band, et al, 2006). It is Observation #2 on \"stressful events\" that most directly relates to the personal crises and triggers under discussion here. Band and his colleagues analyze some of the tensions in workplaces that can escalate into crises that provoke people to commit sabotage or espionage. They provide a useful discussion of the interactions between the \"personal predispositions\" in the first bullet with the \"stressful events\"\nof the second. The study defines personal predispositions as \"relating directly to maladaptive reactions to stress, financial and personal needs leading to personal conflicts and rule violations, chronic disgruntlement, strong reactions to organizational sanctions, concealment of rule violations, and a propensity for escalation during work-related conflicts.\" These interact with \"stressful events,\" which are not experienced in the same way by everyone: the researchers note that \"what insiders perceived as stressful, how they contributed to the occurrence of stress, and how they reacted to stress were viewed as influenced directly by personal predispositions\" (Band et al, 2006). Shaw and colleagues applied some of the insights from the SEI research to a particular insider threat issue: recognizing anger in employees and evaluating that anger as a potential insider threat (Shaw, et al, 2013). Their study reported on the development of two observational scales, one for measuring levels of negative\n\nsentiment and the other for measuring insider risk, which they applied to archived emails in order to perform sentiment analysis. While the results of their sentiment analysis are useful, they are not especially relevant to this discussion, but the components of their \"Scale of Insider Risk in Digital Communication\" helps to extend the categories of personal crises and triggers that may be applicable to espionage. The seven components in their scale are:\n *Process*: variables that indicate the extent to which subject behavior that could\nbe directly associated with, or contribute to, the accomplishment of insider\nactions is present [or] increasing (i.e., preparations, rehearsals, [acquisition of weapons] etc.);\n *Psychological State:* variables that indicate the extent that subject attitudes,\nbeliefs, and feelings are consistent with individuals who have committed insider acts;\n *Personal Predisposition*: variables that indicate the extent to which the subject's\nobserved history, experiences, personal characteristics, and contacts mirror those of previous insider subjects;\n Personal *Stressors*: variables defined as changes in personal or social\nresponsibilities or conditions requiring significant energy for adaptation and do not involve direct workplace or financial issues;\n Professional *Stressors*: variables that include changes in professional, school,\nand/or work conditions or responsibilities that require significant energy for adaptation, exclusive of financial and personal implications;\n *Concerning Behaviors*: include variables such as violations of workplace or other\nrules, traditions, laws, policies, or procedures that indicate the extent to which the subject has had difficulty controlling his behavior consistent with expectations, in a manner similar to other insiders; and\n *Mitigating factors*: variables indicating that the subject's level of insider risk may\nbe modified by personal or other characteristics that reduce the level of risk\n(Shaw, et al, 2013).\nShaw argued that individuals contemplating an insider crime may follow a \"critical pathway\" that can be described in general terms to apply to variety of crimes. In this conception, one or more of the personal \"stressors,\" such as \"death of a family member, marriage, divorce, births, [or] moves\" could become the personal crisis that might move the person along the critical pathway toward espionage or other types of insider actions. The professional \"stressors\" here include \"graduation, attending a new institution or taking a new job, demotion, termination, promotion, transfer, retirement, consulting jobs, [or] taking side jobs\" (Shaw, et al, 2006). Note that stressors can be positive as well as negative conditions that may temporarily de-center a person.80\n\n## Indicators Of Insider Threat\n\nFrom the recent dramatic and usually violent instances of insider threat bombings, mass shootings, leaks of large collections of classified informationhas come an urgency to identify and interrupt these threats. This has caused the field of insider threat studies to focus on ways to recognize and interrupt such events by studying \"indicators\" in the life and behavior of an insider. These may be general attributes, such as having relatives in a foreign country, or more specific \"behavioral indicators,\" which another person (co-workers, supervisors, or family members) would be able to notice in the behavior of the individual. Many insider threat studies provide lists of indicators, usually drawn from cases and described in generalized terms so that they apply to various insider threats. Two examples among the many hundreds available are noted here. In 2008, a study by PERSEREC titled \"Potential Counterintelligence Risk Indicators\" presented indicators from a counterintelligence officer's perspective. These include 1) indicators that a person may be an attractive target for recruitment by a foreign intelligence service, 2) indicators that a person may be susceptible to espionage or terrorism, and 3) indicators that a person may actually be engaging in espionage, terrorism, or subversive activity (Heuer, Jr., 2008). A second example dates from 2010. In response to the recent series of incidents described as insider threats, the U.S. Army revised and reissued its Army Regulation 381-12 as the Military Intelligence: Threat Awareness and Reporting Program, or TARP. The regulation includes lists of indicators of espionage, potential international terrorism, and extremist activity that may pose a threat to DoD or U.S. military operations. These are framed in behavioral terms and assume that an observer will report them. For example, espionage indicators include \"Unreported contact with foreign government officials outside the scope of one's official duties,\" \"attempts to obtain information for which the person has no authorized access or need to know,\" and \"unexplained or undue affluence without logical income source.\" Examples of indicators of terrorism-related insider threats in the TARP regulation include \"advocating support for terrorist organizations or objectives,\" or \"purchasing bomb-making materials.\" Among the indicators listed as potential extremist activity is \"expressing a political, religious, or ideological obligation to engage in unlawful violence directed against U.S. military operations or foreign policy\" (Department of the Army, 2010).\nProviding these lists of indicators presupposes that someone who observes these behaviors will recognize them as indicators and then report them to a supervisor, security officer, or counterintelligence agent. Yet there is a general resistance in American culture to reporting the potential misbehavior of others to an authority, reflecting the feeling that this would be \"turning them in.\" PERSEREC sponsored research about national security in a national public opinion poll in 1994 and reported that The public was asked...about what people should do if they saw a person violating security rules. Would they be loyal to their employer the governmentor to their coworker? Respondents were evenly split between those who would immediately report the violation and those who would try to intervene, before reporting, by advising the person to stop the behavior. In other words, they would give the person a chance to change his/her behavior. This is significant, given the fact that cleared individuals are required by regulation to report to authorities any behavior observed among colleagues that may be of security relevance. Presently, the rate of such reporting is extremely low.\n\nA 2003 PERSEREC technical report documented research that followed up on the issue of reporting security violations or behavioral indicators. It found this resistance and discussed the explanations people gave for the low rate of reporting by co-workers and supervisors (Wood & Marshall-Mies, 2003). One claim by people in focus groups stood out: if they recognized that what the person was doing was a serious threat and it was clearly related to security, they would overcome their reluctance and go ahead and report it. This finding led to a second PERSEREC study in 2005, which researched available official lists of indicators that observers were directed to report, and from them in focus groups framed a core list of the most serious reportable behaviors (Wood, Crawford, & Lang, 2005). An example of a reportable indicator of recruitment by a foreign intelligence service, for example, would be \"you become aware of a colleague having contact with an individual who is known to be, or suspected of being, associated with a foreign intelligence, security, or terrorist organization.\" A behavior indicating information collection would be \"you find out that a colleague has been keeping classified material at home or may other unauthorized location.\" Such behaviors demonstrate a clearer nexus with security violations than personal behaviors such as alcoholism, absenteeism, or marital problems, and focus groups assured the researchers they could understand the reason to report these security concerns and would do so (Wood, Crawford, & Lang, 2005). The researching and compiling of lists of insider threat indicators offers students of espionage a shorthand source for re-thinking and possibly expanding the usual espionage indicators to include more that reflect information technology, domestic or international terrorism mixed with espionage, and the other evolving species of insider threats.\n\n## Analyzing Organizational Culture\n\nIn addition to a broader exploration of the role of personal crises and triggers as precursors to beginning espionage as one of many insider threats, and an exhaustive compilation of indicators, a third contribution from insider threat research to better understanding espionage is its focus on organizations. Insiders, by definition, work and operate inside organizations or institutions. Threats such as workplace violence, fraud, sabotage of IT systems, or the theft of proprietary data from IT storage and systems take place in organizations. Analyzing how organizational structures and cultures encourage or inhibit insider threats has been a major focus and contribution of the research. A PERSEREC technical report from 2009 published an audit tool with which organizations could evaluate their risk of insider threats and take action to reduce those risks. It described the contextual elements of organizations that may magnify the incidence of malicious insider actions, including economic and social pressures, sector-specific forces such as technological change, and disruptive forces such as increased competition or declining resources (Shaw, Fischer, & Rose, 2009). It then pulled together research literature on the most effective approaches organizations can take to frame their policies, such as employee screening, or monitoring IT systems, critical users, and staff, and termination procedures. The report discusses seventeen policy issues that carry potential insider threat risk. It provides research findings and approaches to improve organizational actions, including recruitment of employees or contractors, reemployment screening, training, education, program effectiveness, continuing evaluation, and management interventions such as demotion or termination. Evidence suggests that when an insider leaves an organization, especially if it is a forced leave-taking, but even when it is voluntary, the person often chooses that time to damage, steal, undermine, or otherwise act against an organization, so firings and retirements are identified as critical security milestones (Shaw, Fischer, & Rose, 2009). SEI has published a series of similar studies focused on various insider threats to organizations and how organizations should more effectively respond. Their Common Sense Guide to Mitigating Insider Threats 4th *edition* focuses on threats of intellectual property theft, IT sabotage, and fraud. The report advances nineteen best practices based on case studies, and it divides its advice by the part of the organization most responsible for the issue, including human resources, legal, physical security, data owners, information technology (and information assurance), and software engineering (Silowash, et al, 2012). Although espionage itself is not discussed in this report, an example relevant to espionage is Practice 8: \"Enforce separation of duties and least privileges,\" which encourages organizations to divide functions between employees and encourage cooperation among them on tasks to minimize solo misuse or abuse of access to systems. Reading case studies on insider crimes like these, which are related to but not actually espionage, and applying the suggestions for responding to other insider threats to espionage examples is a useful mind-expanding exercise that encourages fresh ideas and insights (Silowash, et al, 2012). Students of espionage could benefit from systematically analyzing the organizational context in which acts of espionage have occurred. This is not a typical approach in the field because data on the organizations in which espionagerelated offenders operated is usually sparse, if not missing entirely. Those who investigate such crimes, usually law enforcement or counterintelligence officials, would like to collect evidence beyond what is relevant for prosecuting the offender from co-workers, supervisors, and organizational policy documentation. Sometimes such evidence is available, sometimes not. Studies that include this focus are especially valuable, since having insight into how an organization may have nurtured or hindered a spy, and how it responded to espionage as it was carried out in its offices and hallways, is important for framing effective countermeasures. A final example presented hereamong the many that are availableof insider threat research that contributes to organizational analysis is an article published in 2014 titled *A Worst Practices Guide to Insider Threat: Lessons from Past Mistakes* (Bunn & Sagan, 2014). The focus in this article is on nuclear facilities, and its intended audience is nuclear security managers, but it draws examples and cases not only from nuclear accidents and security incidents, but from the experiences of intelligence agencies, the military, bodyguards of political figures, banking and finance, gambling, and the pharmaceutical industry. This results in a lively discussion that can usefully be applied to espionage cases as well as common glitches in organizations where espionage occurs. One example of a \"worst practice\" is Lesson #1: \"Don't Assume that Serious Insider Problems are NIMO (Not In My Organization).\" The authors point out that some businesses, such as diamond mining or gambling, just assume their employees are thieves and act accordingly toward them, but many other organizations consider their employees to be part of a carefully screened elite, and such organizations emphasize loyalty and staff morale to encourage the devotion and commitment they need from them. The authors suggest intelligence agencies and nuclear organizations usually fall into this category, with their highly educated and trained staffs. The stress on loyalty, and comparing \"our\" loyalty favorably to other organizations with presumably less staff loyalty, can lead managers \"to falsely assume that insider threats may exist in other institutions, but not in their organizations\" (Bunn & Sagan, 2014). The counter example given is of the assassination of President Indira Gandhi in 1984 by the very Sikh bodyguards she most trusted and had insisted should be the only ones to guard her. A second example that would apply as well to numerous instances of espionage is Lesson #8: \"Don't Assume that Security Rules are Followed.\" This section points out that security procedures and personnel screening policies are often in tension with other goals of an organization, such as maintaining production, meeting deadlines, or generating collegial relationships among employees. Sometimes this tension results in a bending or breaking of a security rule in the name of a higher goal. Often this would be done by employees, but sometimes even managers do so. The management practice of resting on the unexamined assumption that employees are in fact following the existing rules can be dangerous, as the examples of security guards at nuclear facilities asleep at their desks or propping open the doors illustrate. Advice to think about what are an organization's incentives for its employees and then aligning them to elicit good security practices, rather than eliciting the evasion of security rules, applies equally well to organizations in which espionage takes place (Bunn & Sagan, 2014).\n\n## Appendix B: List Of The 209 Individuals In This Study And Selected Characteristics\n\nList of the 209 Individuals in this Study and Selected Characteristics\nDate of\nArrest\nVolunteer\nor Recruit\nSurname\nGiven Name\nAffiliation Date Began81\nActual or\nAttempted\nRecipient82\nAbouelaila\nGladys Ferris\nCivilian\n67/00/00\n69/00/00\nV\nEgypt\nAbujihaad\nHassan\nNavy\n01/07/19\n07/03/07\nV\nAl Qaeda\nAli\nAmen Ahmed\nCivilian\n87/00/00\n06/09/07\nV\nYemen\nAllen\nMichael Hahn\nCivilian\n86/00/00\n86/12/04\nV\nPhilippines\nAlonso\nAlejandro M.\nCivilian\n94/00/00\n98/09/10\nV\nCuba\nAlvarez\nCarlos\nCivilian\n77/00/00\n06/01/09\nR\nCuba\nAlvarez\nElsa\nCivilian\n82/00/00\n06/01/09\nR\nCuba\nAmes\nAldrich Hazen\nCivilian\n85/04/00\n94/02/21\nV\nSoviet Union\nAmes\nMaria del Rosario\nCivilian\n92/00/00\n94/02/21\nR\nSoviet Union\nAnderson\nRyan Gilbert\nArmy\n04/01/00\n04/02/12\nV\nAl Qaeda\nAnzalone\nCharles Lee Francis Marines\n90/11/00\n91/02/13\nV\nSoviet Union\nAragoncillo\nLeandro\nMarines\n00/08/00\n05/09/10\nR\nPhilippines\nBaba\nStephen Anthony\nNavy\n81/09/01\n81/10/09\nV\nSouth Africa\nBarnett\nDavid Henry\nCivilian\n76/10/00\n80/03/18\nV\nSoviet Union\nBaynes\nVirginia Jean\nCivilian\n90/00/00\n92/00/00\nR\nPhilippines\nBell\nWilliam Holden\nCivilian\n78/10/00\n81/06/24\nR\nPoland\nBergersen\nGregg William\nCivilian\n07/03/00\n08/02/11\nR\nChina\nBishop\nBenjamin Pierce\nCivilian\n12/15/14\n13/03/15\nV\nChina\nBoeckenhaupt\nHerbert William\nAir Force\n65/06/00\n66/10/24\nV\nSoviet Union\nBoone\nDavid Sheldon\nArmy\n88/00/00\n98/10/10\nV\nSoviet Union\nBorger\nHarold Noah\nCivilian\n59/10/00\n61/03/03\nR\nEast Germany\nBoyce\nChristopher John\nCivilian\n75/05/10\n77/01/16\nV\nSoviet Union\nBrandon\nCharles Frederick\nAir Force\n77/10/00\n78/00/00\nV\nSoviet Union\nBrown\nJoseph Garfield\nCivilian\n90/00/00\n92/12/27\nR\nP**hilippines**\nBrown\nRussell Paul\nNavy\n89/04/00\n89/07/25\nV\nSoviet Union\n\n##\n\nDate of\nArrest\nVolunteer\nor Recruit\nSurname\nGiven Name\nAffiliation Date Began81\nActual or\nAttempted\nRecipient82\nBuchanan\nEdward Owen\nAir Force\n85/05/06\n85/05/17\nV\nEast Germany\nButenko\nJohn William\nCivilian\n63/04/21\n63/10/29\nR\nSoviet Union\nCarney\nJeffrey Martin\nAir Force\n83/04/00\n91/04/22\nV\nEast Germany\nCascio\nGuiseppe\nAir Force\n52/00/00\n52/09/21\nV\nNorth Korea\nCavanagh\nThomas Patrick\nCivilian\n84/12/00\n84/12/18\nV\nSoviet Union\nCharlton\nJohn Douglas\nCivilian\n93/07/00\n95/05/00\nV\nFrance\nChin\nLarry Wu-Tai\nCivilian\n52/00/00\n85/11/22\nR\nChina\nChiu\nRebecca Laiwah\nCivilian\n83/00/00\n05/10/28\nR\nChina\nChung\nDongfan\nCivilian\n79/00/00\n06/09/11\nR\nChina\nClark\nJames\nCivilian\n76/00/00\n97/10/04\nR\nEast Germany\nConrad\nClyde Lee\nArmy\n74/00/00\n88/08/23\nR\nHungary,Czechoslovakia\nAir Force\n80/12/23\n81/05/05\nV\nSoviet Union\nCooke\nChristopher Michael\nCordrey\nRobert Ernest\nMarines\n84/04/12\n84/05/16\nV\nSoviet Union\nDavies\nAllen John\nCivilian\n86/09/22\n86/10/27\nV\nSoviet Union\nDeChamplain\nRaymond George\nAir Force\n71/06/05\n71/07/02\nR\nSoviet Union\nDedeyan\nSahag Katcher\nCivilian\n73/03/00\n75/06/27\nR\nSoviet Union\nDiaz\nMatthew\nNavy\n05/01/15\n07/01/08\nV\nUnited States\nDolce\nThomas Joseph\nCivilian\n79/00/00\n88/04/16\nV\nSouth Africa\nDrummond\nNelson Cornelious Navy\n58/00/00\n62/09/28\nR\nSoviet Union\nDubberstein\nWaldo Herman\nCivilian\n77/00/00\n79/00/00\nR\nLibya\nDunlap\nJack Edward\nArmy\n60/06/00\n63/00/00\nV\nSoviet Union\nEllis\nRobert Wade\nNavy\n83/02/09\n83/02/09\nV\nSoviet Union\nFaget\nMariano\nCivilian\n98/12/12\n00/02/17\nR\nCuba\nFondren, Jr.\nJames Wilbur\nCivilian\n04/11/00\n09/05/13\nR\nChina\nFord, Jr.\nKenneth W.\nCivilian\n04/01/00\n04/01/12\nV\nunknown\nFranklin\nLawrence Anthony Civilian\n03/06/26\n05/05/04\nV\nIsrael\nFrench\nGeorge Holmes\nAir Force\n57/04/05\n57/04/06\nV\nSoviet Union\nGarcia\nWilfredo\nNavy\n85/00/00\n87/00/00\nR\nPhilippines\nGari\nGeorge\nCivilian\n91/00/00\n01/08/31\nR\nCuba\nGessner\nGeorge John\nArmy\n60/12/07\n61/01/00\nV\nSoviet Union\nDate of\nArrest\nVolunteer\nor Recruit\nSurname\nGiven Name\nAffiliation Date Began81\nActual or\nAttempted\nRecipient82\nGilbert\nOtto Attila\nCivilian\n82/04/17\n82/04/17\nR\nHungary\nGowadia\nNoshir\nCivilian\n99/12/12\n05/10/25\nV\nChina, Israel, Germany, Switzerland, Austria, Lichtenstein, 2 others\nGraf\nRonald Dean\nNavy\n89/00/00\n89/03/03\nV\nunknown\nGregory\nJeffrey Eugene\nArmy\n84/03/00\n93/04/29\nR\nHungary,Czechoslovakia\nGroat\nDouglas\nCivilian\n97/03/24\n98/04/01\nV\nunknown\nGrunden\nOliver Everett\nAir Force\n73/09/28\n73/11/02\nV\nSoviet Union\nGuerrero\nAntonio\nCivilian\n91/00/00\n98/09/12\nR\nCuba\nHaeger\nJohn Joseph\nNavy\n89/10/00\n89/12/01\nR\nSoviet Union\nHaguewood\nRobert Dean\nNavy\n86/02/00\n86/03/04\nV\nunknown\nHall, III\nJames William\nArmy\n82/12/00\n88/12/21\nV\nEast Germany, Soviet Union\nCivilian\n91/02/00\n92/00/00\nV\nEcuador\nHamilton\nFrederick Christopher\nHamilton\nVictor Norris\nCivilian\n62/00/00\n63/00/00\nV\nSoviet Union\nHanssen\nRobert Philip\nCivilian\n79/00/00\n01/02/18\nV\nSoviet Union\nHarper, Jr.\nJames Durward\nCivilian\n75/00/00\n83/10/15\nR\nPoland\nHarris\nUlysses Leonard\nArmy\n67/02/08\n67/08/25\nV\nSoviet Union\nHawkins\nStephen Dwayne\nNavy\n85/00/00\n85/08/07\nV\nunknown\nHelmich, Jr.\nJoseph George\nArmy\n63/00/00\n81/07/15\nV\nSoviet Union\nHernandez\nLinda\nCivilian\n94/00/00\n98/09/10\nR\nCuba\nHernandez\nNilo\nCivilian\n92/00/00\n98/09/12\nR\nCuba\nHoffman, II\nRobert Patrick\nCivilian\n12/10/21\n12/12/06\nR\nRussia\nHoffman\nRonald Joshua\nCivilian\n86/09/09\n90/06/15\nV\nJapan\nHorton\nBrian Patrick\nNavy\n82/06/00\n82/09/30\nV\nSoviet Union\nHoward\nEdward Lee\nCivilian\n84/09/00\n85/00/00\nV\nSoviet Union\nHumphrey\nRonald Louis\nCivilian\n76/00/00\n78/01/31\nV\nVietnam\nInson\nSeivirak\nArmy\n09/00/00\n12/06/00\nV\nCambodia\nIrene\nDale Vern\nCivilian\n84/08/12\n84/08/23\nR\nSoviet Union\nDate of\nArrest\nVolunteer\nor Recruit\nSurname\nGiven Name\nAffiliation Date Began81\nActual or\nAttempted\nRecipient82\nJeffries\nRandy Miles\nCivilian\n85/12/14\n85/12/20\nV\nSoviet Union\nJenott\nEric O.\nArmy\n96/00/00\n96/06/26\nV\nChina\nJohnson\nRobert Lee\nArmy\n53/02/00\n65/04/05\nV\nSoviet Union\nJones\nGeneva\nCivilian\n91/00/00\n93/08/03\nV\nLiberia\nKadish\nBen-Ami\nCivilian\n79/06/05\n08/04/22\nR\nIsrael\nKampiles\nWilliam Peter\nCivilian\n78/02/00\n78/08/17\nV\nSoviet Union\nKauffman\nJoseph Patrick\nAir Force\n60/09/00\n61/12/00\nR\nEast Germany\nKeyser\nDonald Willis\nCivilian\n95/00/00\n04/09/15\nR\nTaiwan\nKim\nRobert Chaegon\nCivilian\n96/04/00\n96/09/24\nV\nSouth Korea\nKim\nStephen Jin-Woo\nCivilian\n09/03/00\n10/08/27\nV\nUnited States\nKing\nDonald Wayne\nNavy\n89/10/00\n80/30/3\nV\nunknown\nKiriakou\nJohn C.\nCivilian\n07/12/08\n12/01/23\nV\nUnited States\nKnapp\nMarc\nCivilian\n09/12/24\n10/07/20\nV\nIran, Russia\nKoecher\nKarel Frantisek\nCivilian\n73/02/00\n84/11/27\nR\nCzechoslovakia\nKota\nSubrahmanyam\nCivilian\n85/00/00\n95/10/18\nR\nSoviet Union\nKunkle\nCraig Dee\nCivilian\n88/12/00\n89/01/10\nV\nSoviet Union\nKuo\nTai Shen\nCivilian\n07/03/00\n08/02/11\nR\nChina\nLalas\nSteven J.\nArmy\n77/00/00\n93/05/03\n9\nGreece\nLatchin\nSami Khoshaba\nCivilian\n93/00/00\n04/08/31\nR\nIraq\nLedbetter\nGary Lee\nNavy\n67/04/00\n67/05/00\nR\nSoviet Union\nLee\nAndrew Daulton\nCivilian\n75/05/18\n77/01/17\nV\nSoviet Union\nLee\nPeter H.\nCivilian\n85/00/00\n97/00/00\nV\nChina\nLeibowitz\nShemai Kedem\nCivilian\n09/04/00\n09/08/00\nV\nUnited States\nLessenthien\nKurt G.\nNavy\n96/00/00\n96/04/22\nV\nRussia\nLeung\nKatrina M.\nCivilian\n90/04/00\n03/04/09\nR\nChina\nLipka\nRobert Stephan\nArmy\n65/09/00\n96/02/23\nV\nSoviet Union\nLonetree\nClayton John\nMarines\n86/01/00\n86/12/00\nR\nSoviet Union\nMadsen\nLee Eugene\nNavy\n79/07/26\n79/08/14\nV\nunknown\nMak\nChi\nCivilian\n83/00/00\n05/10/28\nR\nChina\nManning\nBradley E.\nArmy\n09/11/19\n10/05/26\nV\nUnited States\nMartin\nBryan Minkyu\nNavy\n10/11/15\n10/12/01\nV\nChina\nDate of\nArrest\nVolunteer\nor Recruit\nSurname\nGiven Name\nAffiliation Date Began81\nActual or\nAttempted\nRecipient82\nMartin\nWilliam Hamilton\nCivilian\n60/08/00\n61/0000\nV\nSoviet Union\nMascheroni\nMarjorie Roxby\nCivilian\n07/09/00\n10/09/17\nR\nVenezuela\nMascheroni\nPedro Leonardo\nCivilian\n07/09/00\n10/09/17\nV\nVenezuela\nMaziarz\nGary\nMarines\n04/00/00\n06/10/00\nR\nUnited States\nMehalba\nAhmed\nCivilian\n03/00/00\n03/09/29\nR\nEgypt\nMillay\nWilliam Colton\nArmy\n11/06/00\n11/10/28\nV\nRussia\nMiller\nRichard William\nCivilian\n84/05/00\n84/10/03\nR\nSoviet Union\nMintkenbaugh\nJames Allen\nArmy\n53/06/00\n65/04/05\nR\nSoviet Union\nMira, F.\nFrancisco de Asis\nAir Force\n82/05/00\n83/03/25\nV\nSoviet Union\nMitchell\nBernon Ferguson\nCivilian\n60/08/00\n61/00/00\nV\nSoviet Union\nMohamed\nAli Abdelseoud\nArmy\n89/00/00\n98/09/10\nV\nAl Qaeda\nMontaperto\nRonald N.\nCivilian\n83/00/00\n04/02/04\nR\nChina\nMontes\nAna Belen\nCivilian\n80/00/00\n01/09/21\nR\nCuba\nMoore, II\nEdwin Gibbons\nCivilian\n76/12/22\n76/12/22\nV\nSoviet Union\nMorison\nSamuel Loring\nCivilian\n84/07/00\n84/10/01\nV\nUnited Kingdom\nMortati\nThomas\nCivilian\n81/00/00\n89/12/01\nR\nHungary\nMueller\nGustav Adolph\nAir Force\n49/10/00\n49/10/00\nV\nSoviet Union\nMurphy\nMichael Richard\nNavy\n81/06/00\n81/00/00\nV\nSoviet Union\nMyers\nGwendolyn S.\nCivilian\n80/00/00\n09/06/04\nR\nCuba\nMyers\nWalter Kendall\nCivilian\n80/00/00\n09/06/04\nR\nCuba\nNesbitt\nFrank Arnold\nCivilian\n89/09/00\n89/10/14\nR\nSoviet Union\nNicholson\nHarold James\nCivilian\n94/06/27\n96/11/16\nV\nSoviet Union\nNicholson\nNathaniel James\nCivilian\n06/06/00\n09/01/29\nR\nRussia\nNour\nAlmaliki\nCivilian\n03/00/00\n06/10/00\nV\nAl Qaeda\nNozette\nStewart David\nCivilian\n09/09/03\n09/10/19\nR\nIsrael\nOakley\nRoy Lynn\nCivilian\n06/10/17\n07/08/02\nV\nFrance\nOrr\nBrian Scott\nCivilian\n13/09/00\n13/11/15\nV\nChina\nOtt\nBruce Damian\nAir Force\n86/01/09\n86/02/22\nV\nSoviet Union\nPayne\nLeslie Joseph\nArmy\n74/00/00\n74/10/00\nV\nEast Germany\nPelton\nRonald William\nCivilian\n80/01/15\n85/11/25\nV\nSoviet Union\nPeri\nMichael Anthony\nArmy\n89/02/20\n89/03/04\nV\nEast Germany\nDate of\nArrest\nVolunteer\nor Recruit\nSurname\nGiven Name\nAffiliation Date Began81\nActual or\nAttempted\nRecipient82\nPerkins\nWalter Thomas\nAir Force\n68/12/00\n71/10/21\nR\nSoviet Union\nPetersen, Jr.\nJoseph Sidney\nCivilian\n48/03/01\n54/10/09\nV\nNetherlands\nPickering\nJeffrey Loring\nNavy\n82/00/00\n83/00/00\nV\nSoviet Union\nPitts\nEarl Edwin\nCivilian\n87/07/00\n96/12/18\nV\nSoviet Union\nPizzo, II\nFrancis Xavier\nCivilian\n85/08/11\n85/08/13\nV\nSoviet Union\nPollard\nAnne Henderson\nCivilian\n85/11/00\n85/11/22\nR\nIsrael, China\nPollard\nJonathan Jay\nCivilian\n84/06/00\n85/11/21\nR\nIsrael, China\nPonger\nKurt Leopold\nCivilian\n49/06/15\n53/01/14\nR\nSoviet Union\nRamsay\nRoderick James\nArmy\n83/09/00\n90/06/07\nR\nHungary,Czechoslovakia\nRees\nNorman john\nCivilian\n42/00/00\n71/0000\nV\nSoviet Union\nRegan\nBrian Patrick\nAir Force\n99/00/00\n01/08/21\nV\nLibya, Iraq, China\nRhodes\nRoy Adair\nArmy\n51/12/00\n57/06/00\nR\nSoviet Union\nRichardson\nDaniel Walter\nArmy\n88/01/00\n88/01/14\nV\nSoviet Union\nRohrer, G.\nGlenn Roy\nArmy\n58/00/00\n65/0000\nR\nCzechoslovakia\nRondeau\nJeffrey Stephen\nArmy\n85/00/00\n92/10/22\nR\nHungary,Czechoslovakia\nRoth\nJohn Reece\nCivilian\n04/01/00\n08/05/21\nV\nChina\nSachtleben\nDonald John\nCivilian\n09/00/00\n12/05/11\nV\nUnited States\nSafford\nLeonard Jenkins\nArmy\n67/02/08\n67/08/25\nV\nSoviet Union\nSantos\nJoseph\nCivilian\n95/00/00\n98/09/10\nR\nCuba\nSattler\nJames Frederick\nCivilian\n67/00/00\n74/0000\nR\nEast Germany\nScarbeck\nIrvin Chambers\nCivilian\n60/12/22\n61/06/13\nR\nPoland\nSchoof\nCharles Edward\nNavy\n89/10/00\n89/12/01\nV\nSoviet Union\nSchuler\nRuby Louise\nCivilian\n79/05/01\n83/00/00\nR\nPoland\nSchwartz\nMichael Stephen\nNavy\n92/11/00\n96/00/00\n9\nSaudi Arabia\nScranage\nSharon Marie\nCivilian\n83/12/00\n85/07/11\nR\nGhana\nSeldon\nPhillip Tyler\nCivilian\n92/11/00\n96/00/00\nR\nEl Salvador\nShaaban\nShaaban Hafed\nCivilian\n02/11/00\n05/03/03\nV\nIraq\nShemami\nNajeb Elias\nCivilian\n02/00/00\n07/04/17\nR\nIraq\nSherman\nDaniel Max\nCivilian\n04/01/00\n08/04/15\nV\nChina\nShriver\nGlenn Duffie\nCivilian\n04/10/00\n10/06/24\nR\nChina\nDate of\nArrest\nVolunteer\nor Recruit\nSurname\nGiven Name\nAffiliation Date Began81\nActual or\nAttempted\nRecipient82\nShu\nQuan-Sheng\nCivilian\n03/01/00\n08/09/24\nV\nChina\nSlatten\nCharles Dale\nArmy\n84/02/00\n84/04/14\nV\nSoviet Union\nSlavens\nBrian Everett\nMarines\n82/08/31\n82/09/04\nV\nSoviet Union\nSmith\nRichard Craig\nCivilian\n81/00/00\n84/05/04\nV\nSoviet Union\nSmith\nTimothy Steven\nCivilian\n00/04/07\n00/04/07\nV\nAl Qaeda\nSombolay\nAlbert T.\nArmy\n90/12/00\n91/03/29\nV\nJordan, Iraq\nSoueid\nMohamad\nCivilian\n11/03/00\n11/10/11\nR\nSyria\nSouther\nGlenn Michael\nCivilian\n80/00/00\n86/00/00\nV\nSoviet Union\nSquillacote\nTheresa M.\nCivilian\n80/00/00\n97/10/07\nR\nEast Germany\nStand\nKurt Allen\nCivilian\n72/00/00\n97/10/04\nR\nEast Germany\nSzabo\nZoltan\nArmy\n67/00/00\n89/05/21\nR\nHungary\nThompson\nRobert Glenn\nAir Force\n57/06/00\n65/00/00\nV\nSoviet Union\nTobias\nBruce Edward\nCivilian\n85/08/12\n85/08/23\nV\nSoviet Union\nTobias\nMichael Timothy\nNavy\n85/08/11\n85/08/13\nV\nSoviet Union\nTrofimoff\nGeorge\nCivilian\n69/00/00\n00/06/14\nR\nSoviet Union\nTsou\nDouglas S.\nCivilian\n86/03/00\n88/02/09\nV\nTaiwan\nTumanova\nSvetlana\nCivilian\n78/00/00\n87/09/28\nR\nSoviet Union\nUnderwood\nBryan\nCivilian\n11/03/01\n11/09/01\nV\nChina\nVelazquez\nMarta Rita\nCivilian\n83/00/00\n02/06/00\nR\nCuba\nVerber\nOtto\nCivilian\n49/06/15\n53/01/14\nR\nSoviet Union\nWalker\nArthur James\nCivilian\n81/00/00\n85/05/29\nR\nSoviet Union\nWalker, Jr.\nJohn Anthony\nNavy\n68/01/00\n85/05/20\nV\nSoviet Union\nWalker\nMichael Lance\nNavy\n83/09/00\n85/05/22\nR\nSoviet Union\nWaring\nJames Earnest\nAir Force\n60/00/00\n63/00/00\nR\nSoviet Union\nWarren\nKelly Therese\nArmy\n86/00/00\n97/07/10\nR\nEast Germany\nWeinmann\nAriel Jonathan\nNavy\n05/07/00\n06/03/26\nV\nRussia\nWhalen\nWilliam Henry\nArmy\n59/12/00\n66/07/12\nR\nSoviet Union\nWhitworth\nJerry Alfred\nNavy\n75/02/00\n85/06/03\nR\nSoviet Union\nWilliams\nHerman Carleton\nAir Force\n64/00/00\n72/00/00\nV\nSoviet Union\nWilmoth\nJames Rodney\nNavy\n89/02/00\n89/07/25\nV\nSoviet Union\nWine\nEdward Hilledon\nNavy\n68/08/21\n68/09/29\nV\nSoviet Union\n\n## Appendix B: List Of The 209 Individuals In This Study And Selected Characteristics\n\nDate of\nArrest\nVolunteer\nor Recruit\nSurname\nGiven Name\nAffiliation Date Began81\nActual or\nAttempted\nRecipient82\nWold\nHans Palmer\nNavy\n83/05/00\n83/07/21\nV\nSoviet Union\nWolf\nRonald Craig\nCivilian\n89/03/00\n89/05/05\nV\nSoviet Union\nWolff\nJay Clyde\nCivilian\n84/12/15\n84/12/15\nV\nunknown\nWood\nJames David\nAir Force\n73/03/07\n73/07/21\nV\nSoviet Union\nYai\nJohn Joungwoong Civilian\n97/12/00\n03/02/04\nR\nNorth Korea"
    },
    {
        "text": "Searchable database of DNA profiles from detainees and\nSearchable database of DNA profiles from detainees and\nknown or suspected terrorists\nknown or suspected terrorists\n Partnership with defense, intelligence, and law enforcement\nPartnership with defense, intelligence, and law enforcement\n\n## Joint Federal Agencies Intelligence Dna Database Joint Federal Agencies Intelligence Dna Database Joint Federal Agencies Intelligence Dna Database"
    },
    {
        "text": "U.S. Intelligence Organization Profiles Program Managers\n\nOffice of the Director of National Intelligence........    1\n\n\n|                                                                  | Central Intelligence Agency........    4      |\n|------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------|\n|                                                                  | Defense Intelligence Agency........ ........    5    |\n|                                                                  | Department of Justice                                    |\n|                                                                  |                                                          |\n|                                                                  | National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency........    9 |\n|                                                                  | National Reconnaissance Office........  11      |\n|                                                                  | National Security Agency........  12         |\n|                                                                  |                                                          |\n| Departmental Components                                          |                                                          |\n|                                                                  |                                                          |\n|                                                                  | Department of Justice                                    |\n|                                                                  |                                                          |\n|                                                                  |                                                          |\n|                                                                  | Department of Energy                                     |\n|                                                                  |                                                          |\n| Department of Homeland Security                                  |                                                          |\n|                                                                  | Office of Intelligence & Analysis........  15     |\n|                                                                  | Department of State                                      |\n|                                                                  |                                                          |\n|                                                                  | Department of the Treasury                               |\n|                                                                  |                                                          |\n|                                                                  |                                                          |\n| Service Components                                               |                                                          |\n|                                                                  |                                                          |\n|                                                                  | United States Army........  19           |\n|                                                                  | United States Navy........  21             |\n|                                                                  | United States Air Force........  22         |\n|                                                                  | United States Marine Corps........  23        |\n|                                                                  | United States Coast Guard........ 24           |\n|                                                                  |                                                          |\n| Directory of IC Legislative Affairs Offices ........  26 |                                                          |\n|                                                                  |                                                          |\n|                                                                  |                                                          |\n\n##\n\n\n\nOffice of the Director of National Intelligence\n\nThe Director of National Intelligence (DNI) serves as the head of the Intelligence Community (IC) and is the principal advisor to the President, the National Security Council, and the Homeland Security Council (HSC) for intelligence matters related to national security.  Also, the Director oversees and directs the implementation of the National Intelligence Program.  The President appoints the DNI and the Principal Deputy Director with the advice and consent of the Senate. The DNI's responsibilities, among others, are to lead the IC; oversee the coordination of foreign relationships between elements of the IC and intelligence services of foreign governments; establish requirements and priorities for collection, analysis, production, and dissemination of national intelligence; coordinate reform of security clearance and acquisition processes; achieve auditable financial statements; support legislative, legal and administrative requirements; ensure compliance with statutory and Presidentially-mandated responsibilities; and transform the IC into a unified, collaborative and coordinated enterprise.\n\nThe DNI Organization is composed of the DNI Staff and Intelligence Community Mission and Support Activities (MSAs).  The DNI Staff is primarily responsible for IC policy and oversight and the preparation of the National Intelligence Program Budget.  The MSAs are directly responsible for providing IC-wide substantive intelligence, counterintelligence strategy and strategic analysis, research and development, and training and education.  The Director of the Intelligence Staff is responsible for synchronizing and integrating efforts across the DNI Organization. There are four Deputy Directors of National Intelligence:\n\nOffice of the Deputy Director for Policy, Plans and Requirements\n(DDNI/PPR) drives vital intelligence reform by coordinating IC-wide policy and strategy, plans, and requirements; modernizing security processes; and strengthening relationships with Federal, State, Local, foreign, and private sector partners.\n\nOffice of the Deputy Director for Collection (DDNI/C) coordinates collection throughout the IC under the authorities of the DNI. The DDNI/C ensures that the President's and the DNI's priorities are appropriately reflected in future programming and systems acquisition decisions and puts into context for the DNI the way in which actions affect the total collection mission.\n\nOffice of the Deputy Director for Analysis (DDNI/A) has responsibility for enhancing the quality, timeliness, and utility of analytic support to intelligence\n\nconsumers. DDNI/A's approach for achieving this goal is to increase expertise and improve analytic tradecraft at individual, agency, and Community levels through specialization, collaboration, and cross-fertilization. The DDNI/A serves concurrently as the Chairman of the National Intelligence Council (NIC) and manages the production of the President's Daily Brief.\nOffice of the Deputy Director for Future Capabilities (DDNI/FC) is the Intelligence Community's catalyst for technical innovation, responsive stewardship, and acquisition excellence.  Its approach is to address these key intelligence challenges by: leading advanced research and development focusing on disruptive technology leaps; acting as the DNI's Science &\nTechnology advisor and integrating the Intelligence Community Science &\nTechnology enterprise; developing and evaluating an IC-wide, end-to-end collection architecture to promote innovation and responsible financial stewardship; and establishing and maintaining an agile and transparent bestpractice environment that promotes IC acquisition success.\n\nOther elements of the DNI Staff include a **Civil Liberties Protection Office**, and an Office **of Equal Opportunity and Diversity** both of which drive IC-wide policies and programs in their respective areas. Three Mission Managers integrate IC-wide collection and analysis on North Korea, Iran and Cuba/Venezuela.\n\nIC Mission Support Activities\n\nThe DNI organization includes ten functional mission support activities:\n\nNational Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) serves as the primary\norganization in the United States Government for integrating and analyzing all\nintelligence pertaining to terrorism possessed or acquired by the United\nStates Government (except purely domestic terrorism).\nNational Counterintelligence Executive (NCIX) is staffed by senior\ncounterintelligence and other specialists from across the national intelligence and security communities. The NCIX mission is to exploit and defeat adversarial intelligence activities directed against U.S. interests; protect the integrity of the U.S. intelligence system; provide incisive, actionable intelligence to decision-makers at all levels; protect vital national assets from adversarial intelligence activities; and neutralize and exploit adversarial intelligence activities targeting the armed forces.\nNational Counterproliferation Center **(NCPC)** is responsible for\ncoordinating strategic planning within the IC to enhance intelligence support to United States efforts to stem the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and related delivery systems.\nThe Special Security Center's (SSC) mission is to assist the DNI in protecting and sharing national intelligence information throughout the IC, the U.S. Government, U.S. contractors, state, local, tribal governments, and our foreign partners by conducting assessments of the security of sensitive compartmented information and other intelligence information under the DNI's authority; document overall IC security compliance for the DNI; monitor, coordinate and advise on significant unauthorized disclosures and compromises of classified national intelligence information; and provide feedback to support policy formulation and training initiatives.\n\nThe National Intelligence University (NIU) operates under the DNI's authority to establish an integrated framework that brings together the educational components of the IC in order to promote a more effective and productive Intelligence Community through cross-disciplinary education and joint training.  The NIU is made up of the existing IC schools and universities, the Office of the Chancellor of the NIU, and the staff and curriculum that support the goals and authority of the DNI.\n\nIntelligence Advanced Research Projects Activity **(IARPA)** invests in highrisk/high payoff research that has the potential to provide the U.S. with an overwhelming intelligence advantage over our future adversaries.\n\nThe Center for Security Evaluation's **(CSE)** mission is to strengthen overseas security standards, provide for inter-agency, life-cycle inspections, and aggressively pursue emerging security technologies with security solutions that are risk-based and realistic.  CSE is the organization that synchronizes IC emergency preparedness activities for the DNI and National leadership.\n\nThe National Intelligence Council **(NIC)** is the IC's center for mid-term and long-term strategic analysis.  The NIC supports the DNI in his roles as head of the IC and principal advisor for intelligence matters to the President and the National Security and Homeland Security Councils, and serves as the senior intelligence advisor representing the IC's views within the U.S. Government.\nThe NIC also provides key products and services, such as the National Intelligence Estimates assessing future trends on a wide range of global issues.\n\nThe National Intelligence Coordination Center (NIC-C) was established in October 2007 in collaboration with the Department of Defense and several domestic agencies to provide a mechanism to coordinate intelligence activities across the entire U.S. Government. The NIC-C works to efficiently coordinate, collaborate, assess, and deploy our Nation's total array of intelligence collection capabilities.\n\nThe Mission Support Center provides support services to all DNI Staff and Mission Support Activity components.\n\n## Central Intelligence Agency\n\n\nThe Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) is the largest producer of all-source national security intelligence to senior U.S. policymakers.  The CIA's intelligence analysis on overseas developments informs decisions by policymakers and other senior decision-makers in the national security and defense arenas.  CIA does not make foreign policy.\n\n\nThe Director of the CIA is the **National Human Intelligence (HUMINT) Manager**\nand serves as the national authority for coordination, de-confliction, and evaluation of clandestine HUMINT operations across the IC, consistent with existing laws, Executive Orders, and interagency agreements.\n\nThe National Clandestine Service **(NCS)** has responsibility for the clandestine collection (primarily HUMINT) of foreign intelligence that is not obtainable through other means.  The NCS engages in counterintelligence activities by protecting classified U.S. activities and institutions from penetration by hostile foreign organizations and individuals.  NCS also carries out covert action in support of U.S. policy goals when legally and properly directed and authorized by the President.\n\n\nThe Directorate of Intelligence (DI) analyzes all-source intelligence and produces reports, briefings, and papers on key foreign intelligence issues.  This information comes from a variety of sources and methods, including U.S. personnel overseas, human intelligence reports, satellite photography, open source information, and sophisticated sensors.\n\n\nThe Directorate of Science and Technology (DS&T) accesses, collects, and exploits information to facilitate the execution of the CIA's mission by applying innovative scientific, engineering, and technical solutions to the most critical intelligence problems.\n\nThe Directorate of Support (DS) delivers a full range of support, including acquisitions, communications, facilities services, financial management, information technology, medical services, logistics, and the security of Agency personnel, information, facilities, and technology.  DS services are both domestic and international in focus and are offered on a 24 hours a day/7 days a week basis.\n\n## Defense Intelligence Agency\n\n\nThe Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) is a major producer and manager of foreign military intelligence for the Department of Defense and is a principal member of the United States Intelligence Community. Established on October 1, 1961, and designated a combat support agency in 1986, DIA's mission is to provide timely, objective, all-source military intelligence to policymakers, to U.S. armed forces around the world, and to the U.S. acquisition community and force planners to counter a variety of threats and challenges across the spectrum of conflict. The Director of DIA is a three-star military officer who serves as the principal advisor on substantive military intelligence matters to the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Additionally, he or she is the Program Manager for the General Defense Intelligence Program which funds a variety of military intelligence programs at and above the corps level.  The Director also serves as Program Manager for the Department's Foreign Counterintelligence Program and is the Chairman of the Military Intelligence Board which examines key intelligence issues such as information technology architectures, program and budget issues, and defense intelligence inputs to National Intelligence Estimates. With headquarters in the Pentagon, DIA's more than 15,000 highly skilled civilian and military personnel are located around the world with major activities at the Defense Intelligence Analysis Center on Bolling Air Force Base in Washington, D.C.; the **Missile and Space Intelligence Center** at Redstone Arsenal in Huntsville, Alabama; and the **National Center for Medical Intelligence** at Fort Detrick, Maryland.  DIA also deploys military and civilian personnel worldwide during crises or conflicts to better support military forces.\n\nIn December 2007, DIA established the Defense Intelligence Operations Coordination Center (DIOCC) to seamlessly integrate all defense intelligence resources on the transnational threats to U.S. national security and to enhance defense intelligence collaboration. The DIOCC collaborates with DoD and national intelligence resources to manage risk and resource requirements.  It integrates and synchronizes all-source military and national-level intelligence capabilities in support of the warfighters. Working closely with the DIOCC to help manage risk and intelligence resources is the Joint Functional Component Command for Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (JFCC-ISR).  The DIA Director is the commander of this U.S.\n\nStrategic Command organization.  The JFCC-ISR monitors Combatant Command intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) information needs; serves as the Intelligence Community's entry point into the DoD ISR system; works to maximize efficient use of ISR assets and identifies gaps in ISR coverage.\n\nThrough the **Joint Staff J2**, DIA operates the intelligence component within the National Military Command Center, providing real-time indications and warning of breaking situations and serving as the national focal point for crisis intelligence support to military operations.  During a crisis or contingency, DIA establishes intelligence task forces, working groups or dedicated cells to closely monitor unfolding events.\nIn an effort to strengthen management, synchronization and deconfliction of HUMINT and counterintelligence capabilities across the Department of Defense, including the military services and Combatant Commands, DIA established the Defense Counterintelligence and HUMINT Center (DCHC) in August 2008. DIA's **Directorate for Human Intelligence (DH)**, conducts human intelligence operations worldwide to obtain critical intelligence often not available from technical collection means.  DH operations provide in-depth and actionable intelligence to policymakers and military forces in the field.  It manages the Defense Attache System, which has military attaches assigned to more than 137 U.S. embassies.\nTo support DoD efforts in the global war on terrorism, DIA established the Joint Intelligence Task Force for Combating Terrorism to consolidate and produce allsource terrorism-related intelligence.\nAs more countries move their critical facilities underground, DIA's Underground Facility Analysis Center leverages the Nation's intelligence and other technical resources to coordinate the Intelligence Community's efforts to detect, identify, characterize, and assess for defeat hardened and deeply buried underground facilities and their associated programs worldwide.\nThe DIA **Missile and Space Intelligence Center** is the DoD authority on manportable air defense systems and develops scientific and technical intelligence on foreign missile systems such as: short-range ballistic missile systems; surface-to-air missile systems; antitank guided missile systems; antiballistic missile systems; ground-based anti-satellite systems; and associated command and control systems.\n\nDIA's **National Center for Medical Intelligence** provides medical profiles of foreign countries and assesses real and potential health hazards to support U.S. Armed Forces worldwide operations to include humanitarian operations.\nDIA operates the **National Defense Intelligence College**, a fully accredited educational institution, to satisfy the growing need for trained intelligence professionals to help safeguard the Nation's interests.\n\n\n## Department Of Justice\n\nFederal Bureau of Investigation\n\nThe Federal Bureau of Investigation **(FBI)** is a threat-based, intelligence driven, national security organization that protects the United States from critical threats while safeguarding civil liberties.  As both a component of the Department of Justice and a full member of the U.S. Intelligence Community, the FBI serves as a vital link between intelligence and law enforcement communities.  The FBI brings the discipline of the criminal justice system to its domestic intelligence activities in a manner that is consistent with American expectations and protections for privacy and civil liberties, and thus is uniquely situated to be effective against today's complex adversaries. The FBI's top priorities are combating the threat of terrorism, counterintelligence and cyber crime.  As to counterterrorism, the FBI gives particular attention to terrorist efforts to acquire and use weapons of mass destruction.  While numerous plots have been disrupted, the threat continues to evolve; the need for constant vigilance has not diminished.  The FBI must continuously adapt to trends in terrorist recruitment, financing and training, as well as terrorists' development of new explosive devices, biological and chemical agents. As to counterintelligence, foreign intelligence services continue their attempts to infiltrate the U.S. Government; we also face a growing presence of foreign businesspersons, students and scientists seeking to steal technology on behalf of foreign governments or commercial interests. Investigations of economic espionage, financial crimes, export control violations, cyber intrusions and the compromise of U.S. strategic intellectual property, such as innovations and patented inventions, are on the rise. Cyber threats cross all investigative categories, are borderless, and have the potential for disruption.  Of greatest concern are terrorists or foreign statesponsored elements targeting national information infrastructure, and criminal enterprises and individuals who illegally access computer systems or spread malicious code. There is also growing and evolving forms of identity theft, and use of the Internet to perpetrate fraud, child pornography and solicitation of children online.\n\n\nPublic corruption and civil rights violations from hate crimes, abuse of power by law enforcement, and human trafficking including the exploitation of children, remain the FBI's top criminal priorities because of unique jurisdiction and the potential impact of these crimes on our democracy.  Other areas receiving priority focus are crimes that undermine the health of the economy, including large-scale financial institution frauds, securities and commodities or bank fraud, environmental crimes, health care fraud and telemarketing fraud. In the area of violent crimes, the FBI focuses on increasingly sophisticated national and transnational gangs, dangerous fugitives, and kidnappings.  We leverage our partnerships with over 800,000 state, local and tribal law enforcement agencies though task forces and fusion centers to collect and disseminate intelligence, serving as a unique link between the intelligence and law enforcement communities.\n\nFederal law, Attorney General authorities and Executive Orders give the FBI jurisdiction to investigate all federal crimes not assigned exclusively to another federal agency (28 U.S.C. Section 533) and to investigate threats to the national security (EO 12333; 50 U.S.C. Section 401 et seq; 50 U.S.C. Section 1801 et seq). Additionally, there are other laws that give the FBI responsibility to investigate specific crimes.  This combination of authorities gives the FBI the unique ability to address national security and criminal threats that are increasingly intertwined, and to shift between the use of intelligence tools such as surveillance or recruiting sources, and law enforcement tools of arrest and prosecution.  Regardless of which tools are employed, law and policy require that the FBI's information gathering activities use the least intrusive techniques possible to accomplish the objective and cannot be based solely on activities protected by the First Amendment.\n\n\n\n## National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency\n\n\nThe National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA) is a Department of Defense combat support agency and a member of the national Intelligence Community (IC). NGA develops imagery and map-based intelligence solutions for U.S. national defense, homeland security and safety of navigation. Headquartered in Bethesda, Maryland, NGA has major facilities in the Washington, D.C., Northern Virginia and St. Louis, Missouri, areas.  NGA also provides global support to IC mission partners through NGA representatives stationed around the world.\n\nMission NGA provides timely, relevant and accurate geospatial intelligence in support of national security.\n\nGEOINT\nGeospatial intelligence (GEOINT) is the exploitation and analysis of imagery and geospatial information to describe, assess and visually depict physical features and geographically referenced activities on the Earth. GEOINT answers the questions \"When?\" and \"Where?\" It uses imagery to make sense of volumes of data and information. GEOINT builds the bridge from information to intelligencefrom decision to action.\n\nNGA's Role in the Intelligence Community NGA is the IC's principal producer of and adviser for GEOINT.  During the 20th century, NGA took a leadership role in collaborating with mission partners.  In the\n21st century, NGA is building on that tradition as it develops more efficient ways to exchange information and broaden access to all GEOINT sources and data to enable the production of high-quality intelligence throughout the IC. Know the Earth...Show the Way NGA supports the vision \"Know the Earth...Show the Way\" by developing and disseminating GEOINT in all its formsincluding imagery, imagery intelligence and geospatial informationto policymakers, decision-makers and warfighters, and by working alongside them to ensure their effective use of the specific GEOINT they need to carry out their missions.\n\n## Combat And Humanitarian Support\n\nAs a Department of Defense combat support agency, NGA provides the warfighter with precise, timely GEOINT data, information and products. Accessibility and usability are the watchwords as NGA continues to focus on moving data to people, instead of moving people to data. In addition to supporting combat operations, NGA also supports disaster relief and homeland defense operations by providing GEOINT data, products and analyses to lead federal agencies and first responders.\n\nNational System for Geospatial Intelligence The National System for Geospatial Intelligence is a unified community of GEOINT\nexperts, producers and users organized around the goal of integrating technology, policies, capabilities and doctrine to produce GEOINT in a multi-intelligence environment. NGA, as the Functional Manager for the National System for Geospatial Intelligence, provides strategic thinking, guidance and direction to the IC concerning all aspects of GEOINT, from its acquisition to its utilization. NGA collaborates with mission partners to ensure that accurate and timely GEOINT is a part of decision making and operations where it is needed and when it is needed.\n\nThe Future NGA is developing new partnerships, strengthening existing collaborations and advancing the agency's mission within the context of the larger IC to meet the challenges of the post-9/11 world. As part of that effort, NGA continues to advance from a hardcopy orientation to a data-centric digital environment in which mission partners will have ready access to GEOINT databases through an open architecture of interoperable systems.\n\n## National Reconnaissance Office\n\n\nThe National Reconnaissance Office **(NRO)** was established in September 1961\nas a classified agency of the Department of Defense.  The existence of the NRO and its mission of overhead reconnaissance were declassified in September 1992.  The NRO is the \"nation's eyes and ears in space.\"  Headquartered in Chantilly, Virginia, the NRO is a joint organization engaged in the research and development, acquisition, launch, and operation of overhead reconnaissance systems necessary to meet the needs of the IC and the Department of Defense.  The NRO conducts other activities as directed by the Secretary of Defense and/or the DNI.  The Director of the National Reconnaissance Office is selected by the Secretary of Defense with the concurrence of the DNI and also serves as the Assistant to the Secretary of the Air Force (Intelligence Space Technology). The NRO's workforce includes personnel assigned to the NRO primarily from the Air Force, the CIA, and the Navy.  However, the other uniformed services and other elements of the Department of Defense and the IC are also represented.  Another important part of the NRO team includes some of this country's leading aerospace corporations and research centers. NRO's organizational goals are to:\n\n- Be a foundation for global situational awareness; and\n- Provide intelligence on timelines that are responsive to user needs. The NRO collaborates closely with its mission partners: NSA, NGA, CIA, U.S. Strategic Forces Command, U.S. Air Force, U.S. Army, and the Department of the Navy, as well as other intelligence and defense organizations. Information collected using NRO satellites is used for intelligence and analysis for a variety of tasks, such as warning of potential foreign military aggression, monitoring weapons of mass destruction programs, enforcing arms control and environmental treaties, and assessing the impact of natural and manmade disasters.\n\n## National Security Agency\n\n\nThe National Security Agency **(NSA)** is the U.S.'s cryptologic organization, with responsibility for protecting U.S. National Security information systems and collecting and disseminating foreign signals intelligence.  Areas of expertise include cryptanalysis, cryptography, mathematics, computer science, and foreign language analysis.  NSA is part of the Department of Defense, and is staffed by a combination of civilian and military personnel.\n\nNSA has an extensive customer outreach system, with representatives in many intelligence customer organizations in the Washington, DC, area, in other parts of the U.S., and around the world.  NSA's headquarters is at Fort Meade, Maryland.\n\nThe **Signals Intelligence Directorate** is responsible for understanding customers'\nintelligence information needs, and for the collection, analysis and production, and dissemination of Signals Intelligence (SIGINT).\n\nOperating under the authority of the Secretary of Defense, the Information Assurance Directorate ensures the availability, integrity, authentication, confidentiality, and non-repudiation of national security and telecommunications and information systems (national security systems).\n\nThe Central Security Service **(CSS)** oversees the function of the military cryptologic system, develops policy and guidance on the contributions of military cryptology to the Signals Intelligence / Information Security (SIGINT/INFOSEC) enterprise, and manages the partnership of NSA and the Service Cryptologic Components.  NSA as a whole is known as \"NSA/CSS.\"\nThe **NSA/CSS Threat Operations Center** monitors the operations of the global network to identify network-based threats and protect U.S. and allied networks.\n\nThe **National Security Operations Center** is a 24 hours a day/7 days a week operations center that, on behalf of the NSA/CSS, provides total situational awareness across the NSA/CSS enterprise for both foreign Signals Intelligence and Information Assurance, maintains cognizance of national security information needs, and monitors unfolding world events.\n\nThe **Research Directorate** conducts research on signals intelligence and on information assurance for the U.S. Government.\n\n\n\nDepartment of Justice Drug Enforcement Administration Office of National Security Intelligence\n\nThe Drug Enforcement Administration **(DEA)** is responsible for enforcing the controlled substance laws and regulations of the U.S.  It brings to the criminal and civil justice system of the U.S., or any other competent jurisdiction, those organizations and the principal members of those organizations, involved in the growing, manufacturing, or distribution of controlled substances appearing in or destined for illicit traffic in the U.S.  In addition, DEA recommends and supports nonenforcement programs aimed at reducing the availability of illicit controlled substances on the domestic and international markets. DEA has 21 field divisions in the U.S. and more than 80 offices in over 60 countries worldwide.\n\nDEA's Office of National Security Intelligence **(ONSI)** became a member of the IC\nin 2006.  Located at DEA Headquarters in Arlington, Virginia, ONSI facilitates full and appropriate intelligence coordination and information sharing with other members of the U.S. Intelligence Community and homeland security elements. ONSI leverages the global law enforcement drug intelligence assets of DEA to report on matters relating to national security.  Its goal is to enhance U.S. efforts to protect national security, and combat global terrorism, as well as facilitate IC support to DEA's law enforcement mission.\n\n## Department Of Energy Office Of Intelligence And Counterintelligence\n\nThe Department of Energy's (DoE) Office of Intelligence is the Intelligence Community's premier technical intelligence resource in four core areas: nuclear weapons and nonproliferation; energy security; science and technology; and nuclear energy, safety, and waste.  Tapping the broad technology base of DoE's national laboratories and the international reach of the DoE complex as a whole, the Office of Intelligence accomplishes a three-part mission:\n- To provide DoE, other U.S. Government policymakers, and the Intelligence Community with timely, accurate, high-impact foreign intelligence analyses.\n\n- To ensure that DoE's technical, analytical, and research expertise is made\navailable to the intelligence, law enforcement, and special operations\ncommunities.\n- To provide quick-turnaround, specialized technology applications and\noperational support based on DoE technological expertise to the intelligence, law enforcement, and special operations communities.\nDoE's intelligence program traces its origins to the days of the Manhattan Project, when the former Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) was tasked to provide specialized analysis of the nascent atomic weapons program of the Soviet Union.\nSince then, that program--like the functions of the old AEChas come to reside within DoE.  It continues to evolve in close concert with changing policy needs and the strengths of DoE's unique scientific and technological base, from the world energy crisis of the 1970s, and consequent demand for intelligence expertise in international energy supply and demand issues, to growing concerns over nuclear proliferation and energy security in this decade.\n\n## Department Of Homeland Security\n\nOffice of Intelligence & Analysis\n\nThe Department of Homeland Security **(DHS)** is responsible for leading the unified national effort to secure the United States by preventing and deterring terrorist attacks and responding to threats and hazards.\n\n\nThe **Office of Intelligence and Analysis (I&A)** is DHS's headquarters intelligence element and is led by the Under Secretary for Intelligence and Analysis, with guidance from the Homeland Security Council and Homeland Security Intelligence Council.  As a member of the IC, I&A is responsible for using information and intelligence from multiple sources to identify and assess current and future threats to the United States.  The Office of Intelligence and Analysis provides actionable intelligence to support national and DHS decision-makers while working closely with state, local, tribal, and private sector partners.  The Office of Intelligence and Analysis focuses on threats related to border security; chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear issues, to include explosives and infectious diseases; critical infrastructure protection; extremists within the homeland; and travelers entering the homeland. Although they are not part of the Intelligence Community, several of DHS's other subcomponents have extensive interactions with the Intelligence Community, including U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, Customs and Border Protection, Transportation Security Administration, Secret Service, and Citizenship and Immigration Services.\n\n\n## Department Of State\n\nBureau of Intelligence and Research\n\nThe Bureau **of Intelligence and Research (INR)** provides expert intelligence analysis to the Secretary of State and senior policymakers, giving them \"decision advantage\" as they seek to protect and advance American interests around the world.  INR serves as the focal point within the Department of State for all policy issues and activities involving the Intelligence Community.  The INR Assistant Secretary reports directly to the Secretary of State and serves as the Secretary's principal adviser on all intelligence matters. INR's expert, independent foreign affairs analysts draw on all-source intelligence, diplomatic reporting, INR's public opinion polling, and interaction with U.S. and foreign scholars.  Their strong regional and functional backgrounds allow them to respond rapidly to changing policy priorities and to provide early warning and indepth analysis of events and trends that affect U.S. foreign policy and national security interests. INR analysts - a combination of Foreign Service officers often with extensive in-country experience and Civil Service specialists with in-depth expertise - cover all countries and regional or transnational issues. The Bureau provides daily briefings, reports, and memoranda to the Secretary and other Department principals.  INR also briefs members of Congress and their staffs as appropriate.  INR products cover the globe on foreign relations issues such as political/military developments, terrorism, narcotics, and trade.  INR contributes to the Community's National Intelligence Estimates, the Presidential Daily Brief and other analyses, offering its particular focus on relevance to policy.  In support of the statutory authority of the Secretary of State and Chiefs of Mission for the conduct of foreign policy and oversight of U.S. Government activities overseas, INR coordinates on behalf of the Department on issues concerning intelligence, counterintelligence, and special operations. INR participates in a wide variety of Intelligence Community working groups and policymaking committees, including those involving visa denial, intelligence sharing, analytic production, requirements and evaluation for collection in all intelligence disciplines. INR develops intelligence policy for the Department of State and works to harmonize all agencies' intelligence activities abroad with U.S. policy.   Acting to ensure that collection resources and priorities accord with U.S. diplomatic interests and requirements, INR engages Chiefs of Mission, Department resource managers, and the Intelligence Community for this purpose. In addition to all-source analysis and intelligence policy coordination, INR's third core activity is to serve as the DNI's recently named Executive Agent for Outreach.  In this role, INR leverages community resources to tap into the expertise of academia,\n\nthink tanks, research councils, non-governmental organizations, and the private sector to expand the universe of knowledge available to policymakers and the intelligence community.  INR also analyzes geographical and international boundary issues.   Its **Humanitarian Information Unit (HIU)** serves as a nucleus for unclassified information related to complex emergencies and provides a coordinating mechanism for data sharing among the U.S. Government, the UN, nongovernmental organizations, and foreign governments. The Bureau also administers the Title VIII Grant Program, an initiative funded by Congress for senior level academic research in Russian, Eurasian and East European studies.\n\n\n\n## Department Of The Treasury\n\nOffice of Intelligence and Analysis\n\nThe Office of Intelligence and Analysis (OIA) was established by the Intelligence Authorization Act for fiscal year 2004.  The Act specifies that OIA shall be responsible for the receipt, analysis, collation, and dissemination of foreign intelligence and foreign counterintelligence information related to the operation and responsibilities of the **Department of the Treasury**. OIA's strategic priorities:\n\n- *Terrorist Financing*: Over the past several years, the terrorist threat has\nbecome far more decentralized in nature, and many terrorist groups affiliated\nwith al Qa'ida now pose a serious threat to U.S. national security.\n- *Insurgency Financing*: OIA will continue to improve its understanding of the\ninsurgency financing, primarily through the Baghdad-based Iraq Threat Finance Cell (ITFC) for which Treasury serves as co-lead with the Department of Defense.\n- *Rogue Regimes/Proliferation Financing*: OIA has assumed an increasingly\nimportant role in Treasury's effort to combat other national security threats, including rogue regimes involved in WMD proliferation.  OIA will continue to build on its efforts in these critical areas.\n\n## United States Army\n\n\nThe Department of the Army's IC component is Army Military Intelligence\n(Army MI).  The **Deputy Chief of Staff (DCS),** G-2 is the Army Staff Principal responsible for Army MI.  The mission of the DCS G-2 is to formulate Army intelligence policy, plans, programs, and budgets and is responsible for Army-level oversight of multidisciplined intelligence operations, intelligence support to Computer Network Operations, MI personnel, training, readiness and equipping (with the DCS, G-8), security, foreign liaison and future threats.  The DCS G-2 plans and executes the Army Intelligence Campaign Plan in support of Army transformation, enabling effective all-source intelligence at Brigade Combat Team, Battalion, and Company levels, as well as other tactical Army organizations and activities.\n\n\nThe **vision of the DCS** G-2 is to transform Army intelligence capabilities to enable decisive action by Army and Joint Commanders in an era of persistent conflict, complex environments, and asymmetric challenges; integrate advanced fusion and\n\"find, fix, finish, exploit, analyze and disseminate\" capabilities into Battle Command processes; and holistically adapt how we equip, train, share information, grow leaders and improve reasoning skills to generate actionable intelligence at the lowest possible level.\n\nThe Army's operational-level intelligence organization is the U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command (INSCOM) located at Fort Belvoir, Virginia.\n\nThe Army's principal intelligence training organization is the U.S. Army Intelligence Center (USAIC) located at Fort Huachuca, Arizona. The USAIC reports to the U.S.\n\nArmy Training and Doctrine Command.\n\nThe Army's **Military Intelligence Readiness Command (MIRC)** is responsible for overseeing Army Reserve intelligence activities and is co-located with INSCOM at Fort Belvoir, Virginia. The MIRC reports to the U.S. Army Reserve Command.\n\n\nThe National Ground Intelligence Center (NGIC) provides the Army with military, scientific and technical intelligence. The NGIC is located in Charlottesville, Virginia, and reports to INSCOM.\n\n\nArmy MI efforts are fully integrated with the Army Campaign Plan and focused on six key initiatives:\n- Increasing MI Capacity and Advanced Skills Readiness\n\n- Growing Army Human Intelligence (HUMINT) Capabilities\n- Force-wide Employment of Distributed Common Ground System-Army - Increasing Capacity of Army Cyberspace Operations - Expanding Persistent Surveillance & Exploitation Capabilities - Changing the Culture.\n\n\n## United States Navy\n\n Naval Intelligence is the oldest continuous serving U.S. intelligence service, established on March 23, 1882.  Its mission today is to enable decision superiority for Navy commanders and operational forces by harmonizing intelligence and information operations efforts, and by achieving a penetrating knowledge of adversaries and a profound understanding of the maritime environment.\n\nThe Director of Naval Intelligence, located in the Pentagon, is responsible for the oversight, planning, programming, strategy and policy of all Navy Intelligence organizations and activities.  The Navy's lead intelligence center, the Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI), is headquartered at the National Maritime Intelligence Center (NMIC) in Suitland, Maryland.  ONI is a major IC production center for maritime intelligence, analyzing and producing assessments of foreign naval capabilities, trends, operations and tactics, global civil maritime activity, and an extensive array of all-source analytical products. Naval Intelligence supports Joint Military Operations through embedded personnel in operational units or Expeditionary Intelligence teams.  Naval Intelligence also provides a maritime intelligence reach-back capability from ONI and an emerging network of Fleet intelligence centers, as well as Joint Task Force and Combatant Command Joint Intelligence Operations Centers.\n\n\n\n## United States Air Force\n\n\nThe Headquarters Air Force A2 is the Deputy Chief of Staff of the Air Force for Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR).  He or she provides policy, oversight, and guidance to all Air Force intelligence organizations.\n\nThe Air Force Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance Agency (AF ISR\nAgency), with headquarters at Lackland Air Force Base, Texas, was activated on June 8, 2007.  Formerly, the Air Intelligence Agency, the Air Force ISR Agency is aligned under the Air Force Deputy Chief of Staff for ISR as a Field Operating Agency. The Agency's mission is to organize, train, equip and present assigned forces and capabilities to conduct ISR for Combatant Commanders and the Nation.  It implements and oversees the execution of Air Force headquarters policy and guidance to expand Air Force ISR capabilities to meet current and future challenges. The Agency's 14,500 assigned personnel serve at 70 locations worldwide including the **70th Intelligence Wing** at Ft. Meade, Maryland, and the National Air and Space Intelligence Center (NASIC) at Wright-Patterson AFB, Ohio.  The AF ISR Agency commander serves as the Service Cryptologic Component under NSA, and oversees Air Force Signals Intelligence activities.\n\n## United States Marine Corps\n\n The U.S. Marine Corps (USMC) produces tactical and operational intelligence for tactical and operational commanders and their staffs, as well as for other customers.\n\nIts IC component is comprised of all intelligence professionals in the Marine Corps.\n\nMost Marine Corps intelligence professionals are integrated into operating forces at all echelons of command from battalion/squadron to Marine Expeditionary Force.\n\nThe Marine Corps' **Director of Intelligence (DIRINT)** is its principal intelligence staff officer and is the service's functional manager for intelligence, counterintelligence, and cryptologic matters.\n\nMarine Corps Intelligence Activity (MCIA), Quantico, Virginia, is the Marine Corps'\nservice production center. In addition, MCIA supports other services and government organizations as appropriate.  It provides the Marine Corps with intelligence for planning, training, operations, systems development, and exercises.\n\nMCIA can be tasked to provide expeditionary warfare intelligence to support any national, theater, or operational command in the U.S. Armed Forces.  MCIA's analysis and production supports not only the Marine Corps, but also the national decisionmaker, theater commander, and tactical warfighter.\n\n## Department Of Homeland Security\n\nUnited States Coast Guard\n\nThe United States Coast Guard is a military, multi-mission, maritime service within the Department of Homeland Security.  The Coast Guard is one of the Nation's five armed services.  A unique blend of humanitarian, law enforcement, regulatory, diplomatic, Intelligence Community, and military capabilities encompasses the five fundamental Coast Guard roles:  maritime security, maritime safety, protection of natural resources, maritime mobility and national defense.  It performs those missions in any maritime region in which those interests may be at risk, including international waters and America's coasts, ports, and inland waterways.  To assist in accomplishing the many diverse missions of the Coast Guard, senior leadership and operational commanders rely on the Coast Guard Intelligence and Criminal Investigations Program. Because the Coast Guard employs unique expertise and capabilities in the maritime environment - in domestic ports, coastal waters, offshore regions, and even in foreign ports - where other U.S. Government agencies typically are not present, there exists the opportunity to collect intelligence that supports not only Coast Guard missions, but other national security objectives, as well.\n\nThe Coast Guard's **Intelligence and Criminal Investigations Program** includes its National Intelligence Element, the Criminal Investigations Service, the Counterintelligence Service, the Intelligence Coordination Center (the Coast Guard's production center) and the Cryptologic Service.  Its mission is to direct, coordinate, and oversee intelligence and investigative operations and activities that support all Coast Guard objectives by providing actionable (timely, accurate, and relevant) intelligence to strategic decision-makers, as well as operational and tactical commanders.  The Coast Guard Intelligence and Criminal Investigations Enterprise also supports the National Strategy for Homeland Security and applicable National Security objectives. The Coast Guard has fully implemented rigorous policies and procedures to ensure compliance with the mandatory information sharing provisions of Section 905(a) of the USA PATRIOT Act and Section 202 of the Homeland Security Act.  It continues to capture and share law enforcement information that is relevant to homeland security and national security with the Department of Homeland Security, Intelligence and Analysis Directorate and the Intelligence Community, where appropriate.\n\n\nSupport to Coast Guard operations are also bolstered with the following intelligence and law enforcement activities:\n- Coast Guard Area Maritime Intelligence Fusion Centers (Pacific and Atlantic);\n\n- Sector Intelligence Officers at 26 Coast Guard Sectors;\n- Field Intelligence Support Offices at Coast Guard Sectors;\n- COASTWATCH and Targeting Programs at the ICC; - Global Maritime Intelligence Integration capability (partnering with the U.S.\nNavy and other key Intelligence Community members);\n- Permanent presence on the FBI's National Joint Terrorism Task Force\n(JTTFs) Offices and ad hoc JTTFs providing a maritime nexus and expertise;\n- Expanded participation in the Defense Attache System that provides unique\naccess to non-traditional foreign partners;\n- National Tactical Integration Office - a TENCAP-like program that has\nincreased the Coast Guard's maritime awareness in areas including fusion, identification of ships with imagery, anomaly detection and information sharing;\n- Operation Drydock, an interagency operation reviewing personnel holding\nCoast Guard-issued merchant mariner licenses and documents; and\n- Project Scorpion, a national-level collaborative effort with the Departments of\nJustice, Defense and Homeland Security to identify, track and intercept aliens of interest with possible terrorist or affiliate ties before they arrive in the United States via maritime means.\n\nIntelligence Community Legislative Affairs\nPoints of Contact\n\n\nTelephone\nFax\nOffice of the Director of National Intelligence\nOffice of Legislative Affairs\n(703) 275-2474\n(703) 275-1279 Central Intelligence Agency\n\n\nOffice of Congressional Affairs\n(703) 482-4151\n(703) 482-0672 Defense Intelligence Agency Congressional Affairs Staff\n(703) 697-0012\n(703) 697-3687 Federal Bureau of Investigation\n\nCongressional Affairs\n(202) 324-4510\n(202) 324-6490\n\nNational Geospatial-Intelligence Agency\nCongressional Affairs Office\n(301) 227-7392\n(301) 227-7638 National Reconnaissance Office Congressional and Public Affairs\n(703) 808-1105\n(703) 808-1109 National Security Agency\n\nLegislative Affairs Office\n(301) 688-7246\n(443) 479-2888 Drug Enforcement Administration Congressional Affairs\n(202) 307-7423\n(202) 307-5512 Department of Energy Office of Congressional and Intergovernmental Affairs\n(202) 586-5450\n(202) 586-4891 Department of Homeland Security Intelligence and Analysis Legislative Affairs\n(202) 447-5439\n(202) 772-9734 Department of State Bureau of Intelligence and Research\n(202) 647-2921\n(202) 647-2285\n\nDepartment of the Treasury\nIntelligence Support\n(202) 622-1900\n(202) 622-0534 U.S. Army Intelligence\n\nLegislative Liaison\n(703) 695-3918\n(703) 614-7599 U.S. Navy Intelligence Legislative Liaison\n(703) 695-4156\n(703) 693-0656 U.S. Air Force Intelligence Legislative Liaison\n(703) 693-9125\n(703) 697-8623 U.S. Marine Corps Intelligence Legislative Liaison\n(703) 614-2522\n(703) 614-5888 U.S. Coast Guard Intelligence\n\nLegislative Liaison\n(202) 372-2700\n(202) 372-2973"
    },
    {
        "text": "# Aerospace Data Facility-Colorado/ Denver Security Operations Center Buckley Afb, Colorado Version Of 2011-11-28\n\nAdditional material for this sourcebook  would be welcome.\n\nPlease send it to thomsona@flash.net\n\n## U.S. Air Force Fact Sheet Major Tenant Organizations\n\n[Retrieved 2009-05-23]\n\n## Aerospace Data Facility-Colorado The Aerospace Data Facility-Colorado Is A Multi-Mission Ground Station Responsible For Supporting Worldwide Defense Operations And Multi-Agency Collection, Analysis, Reporting, And Dissemination Of Intelligence Information. It Provides Data To Defense, Intelligence, And Civil Agencies Supporting The U.S. Government And Its Allies.\n\n566th Intelligence Squadron The history of the 566th Intelligence Squadron (IS) begins in the midst of World War II, when the 16th Photographic Technical Unit was activated on Nov. 5, 1944, at Charleroi, Belgium. Subordinate to the 67th Tactical Reconnaissance Group, the 16th Photographic Technical Unit was assigned at several bases throughout Europe, including Vogelsang, Limburg, and Eschwege, Germany, as well as in France. Following World War II, the unit moved to MacDill Field, Fla., where it was decommissioned on Dec. 21, 1945. The unit remained inactive until Sept. 7, 1993, when the 16th Intelligence Squadron was activated at Buckley Air National Guard Base, Colo. The unit was re-designated the 566th Operations Support Squadron (OSS) on Oct. 1, 1995. Renamed later as the 566th Information Operations Squadron (IOS) on Aug. 1, 2000, this unit aided Buckley in its transition from an Air National Guard base to an active duty Air Force base.\n\n## The Primary Mission Of The 566Th Is Is Force Provider To The Aerospace Data Facility-Colorado, Providing Leading-Edge Information Superiority And Technical Support In The Performance Of Joint National System Missions.\n\nJoint Force Headquarters - Colorado Joint Force Headquarters - Colorado, consisting of the JFHQ-CO Commander (The Adjutant General of Colorado), Director of Joint Staff, Ground Forces Component Commander, Air Forces Component Commander, Space Forces Component Commander, and their respective subordinate staffs, commands and controls all assigned Colorado Army and Air National Guard units and other assigned forces. JFHQ-CO provides trained and equipped forces that are combat ready, relevant, reliable and accessible to accomplish the full spectrum of federal and state missions. On order of the president and/or the governor, as appropriate, JFHQ-CO executes assigned missions and provides support and/or command and control for other forces, such as DoD elements and agencies. JFHQ-CO coordinates and conducts training with civil authorities on a regular basis to ensure processes are in place when terrorism or disaster strikes. Within 72 hours after Hurricane Katrina laid her trail of destruction, JFHQ-CO had troops arriving in the first military aircraft to land at Gulfport, Miss., since the storm passed. Colorado Soldiers and Airmen continued to support the hardest hit areas of Mississippi and Louisiana throughout the relief efforts, while maintaining readiness to support global war operations and domestic emergencies. 140th Wing More than 75 years ago, the 140th Wing's subordinate unit, the 120th Fighter Squadron, mustered into the Colorado Army National Guard as the 120th Observation Squadron, 45th Division - Aviation. The unit initially flew Curtis JNSEs (better known as Jennies) - an aircraft which eventually proved unsuitable for Denver's high elevations. Nonetheless, the 120th persevered, flying just before sunrise and after sunset, when air is less turbulent. Mobilization for World War II took place on January 6, 1941, 11 months prior to the bombing of Pearl Harbor. The unit then moved to Biggs Field, Texas and remained intact until the war when the 120th disbanded and its members dispersed to share their knowledge and experience in the nation's rapidly growing Air Corps. In 1946, the 120th reorganized to become a separate entity. That year the unit became the first Air National Guard unit to be federally recognized. Reactivated as the 120th Tactical Fighter Squadron, the squadron began flying the P-51 Mustang. Also formed was the 140th Fighter Group - later to become the 120th Fighter Squadron and 140th Wing, respectively. Shortly after World War II, in 1947, during the days of the \"barnstormers,\" the 120th TFS organized an aerial demonstration team called the \"Minute Men.\" This team was federally recognition in 1956, making it the first and only Air National Guard aerial demonstration team, recognized at the same level as the Thunderbirds. The Minute Men performed before more than three million people in 47 states and five foreign countries before losing funding in 1959. The team traveled an estimated 1,135,000 miles - equivalent to six and a half times around the planet. This highly decorated unit has been mobilized for World War II, the Korean War, the Berlin Crisis, the Cuban Missile Crisis, the Pueblo Crisis and Vietnam, in addition to many domestic efforts. During the Pueblo Crisis the 120th spent 15 months on active duty, including a year at Phan Rang Air Base, Vietnam. More recently, the Wing has been called upon for service in Operation Desert Storm, Operations Northern and Southern Watch, Operation Noble Eagle, Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom. Hours after the planes hit the World Trade Center, on Sep. 11, 2001, dedicated aircrews had jets patrolling Colorado skies ready to challenge any who would threaten freedom. That mission became the Air Sovereignty Alert mission and continues today. Colorado Army National Guard The Colorado Army National Guard maintains 23 armories, and is present in 20 communities. The major units of the Colorado Army National Guard are:\n\n    * Joint Force Headquarters - Colorado * 89th Troop Command * 100 Ground Missile Defense Brigade * 169th Field Artillery Brigade\nThe Colorado Army National Guard has nearly 3,000 men and women spread across more than 49 units. The mission of the Colorado Army National Guard is to, at the federal level, provide combat ready Citizen- Soldiers, leaders and units in support of the National Security Strategy, and to, at the state level, provide Citizen- Soldiers, leaders and units to serve and protect Colorado citizens during natural disasters and civil emergencies. The history of the Colorado National Guard begins in January 1860, when the first General Assembly of the Jefferson Territory authorized the formation of two military companies -- the \"Jefferson Rangers\" and the \"Denver Guards.\" Feb. 26, 1861, Colorado became a territory of the Union and William Gilpin, the first Governor, organized the \"Colorado Volunteers\" for the defense of the territory and to oppose the invasion of Confederate forces during the Civil War, already under way. April 27, 1898, the Colorado Guard was mobilized for service in the Spanish-American War and June 14, 1898, sailed for the Philippines. Colorado units participated in numerous battles and played a large role in the capture of Manila. It was on the battlefields of the Philippines that Colorado's only Medal of Honor recipient, Lt. Col. William R. Grove, fought bravely for his country. The Colorado National Guard was recalled for Federal service in 1950 for the Korean Conflict, 1961 during the Berlin Crisis, 1968 for service in Vietnam and during the Persian Gulf in 1990-1991 during Operation Desert Shield/Storm (the 1157th Transportation Company of the Colorado Army National Guard was the first National Guard unit on the ground in Saudi Arabia). In 1999 the Colorado Army National Guard supported approximately 234 counter-drug missions on behalf of the Joint Support Office. In addition to spotting a downed aircraft near Pagosa Springs, aviation assets assisted in various Search and Rescue missions including the rescue of hunters in Summit and Eagle Counties and a downed aircraft at Wolf Creek Pass. COARNG units were also called up for state contingencies in support of flood victims in La Junta. In response to the September 11, 2001 attack on U.S. soil, the COARNG mobilized more than 2,600 Guard members to provide forces in Afghanistan and Iraq. Many Guard members served on military bases during Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom. In August and September 2005, Task Force Colorado I and II mobilized nearly 1,000 Army Guard members to provide search and rescue, humanitarian support and provide security for the citizens of New Orleans, La., following the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina. The mission required rapid mobilization - the Colorado Army Guard met the challenge and provided immediate coordination within hours of being notified. Our Citizen- Soldiers have proven themselves in the past and will continue to provide responsive, coordinated and steeled support in the future. 743rd Military Intelligence Battalion The 743rd Military Intelligence Battalion supports a multitude of DoD information processing and analysis operations. The battalion strives to be the foremost military intelligence battalion in the U. S. Army, providing leading-edge information superiority and technical support to Combatant Commands, the U.S. Government and its allies. The Battalion is comprised of three companies: Headquarters Operations, Alpha, Bravo, and one overseas detachment. The battalion has supported every U. S. contingency operation since 1989. The unit traces its lineage back to 1954 when the Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment, Army Security Agency Troop Command, and 7200th Administrative Area Unit organized at Fort George G. Meade, Md. On Nov. 8, 1963, the Army Security Agency Troop Command was redesignated the Army Security Agency Support Group. With the redesignation of the Army Security Agency as the U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command in 1977, the Army Security Agency Support Group became the Continental United States Military Intelligence Group on Nov. 1, 1977. In March 1980, the Army redesignated the group as the 704th Military Intelligence Brigade. On Oct. 3, 1989, the 743rd Military Intelligence Battalion was provisionally activated at Fort Meade, and the Department of the Army formally approved it in 1990 as a subordinate unit of the 704th Military Intelligence Brigade. The 743rd Military Intelligence Battalion was organized to provide improved command, control and support to the 704th Military Intelligence Brigade detachments located at other Services' and National-level sites around the world. In July 1998, the battalion underwent major reorganization as the headquarters moved to Colorado. With the move came a marked change in mission: to support the joint activity at Buckley Air Force Base. The unit's official page can be viewed at http://www.carson.army.mil/UNITS/743dMIBn/743Homepage/Main_Frame.htm. Army Aviation Support Facility (AASF) The mission of the AASF is to train Colorado Army National Guard aircrew members to support their wartime and state missions, maintain mission-ready aircraft, and to rapidly respond to state emergencies. The AASF supports a general support aviation battalion (GSAB), a MEDEVAC detachment, a security and support (S&S) company, and an operational support airlift detachment including over 430 soldiers and 24 aircraft. Marine Air Control Squadron 23, Marine Air Control Group 48, 4th Marine Aircraft Wing Marine Air Control Squadron 23 trains to provide surveillance and control of aircraft, and surface-to-air weapons for anti-air warfare, airspace management, and surface-to-air missile fire in defense against theater missile attack. Quebec Battery, 5th Battalion, 14th Marines, 4th Marine Division Quebec Battery trains to furnish close and continuous fire support by neutralizing, destroying or suppressing targets that threaten the success of the supported unit. This is accomplished through the combined use of Forward Observers, the Fire Direction Center and the Gun Crews manning the M198 155MM Towed Howitzer.\n\n## Company A, Marine Cryptologic Support Battalion Company A'S Mission Is To Provide Trained, Deployable Marines To Support Operations At The Aerospace Data Facility. The Company Maintains Personnel Readiness To Augment Radio Battalions Or Other Operational Deployments As Required. Bravo Company, Intelligence Support Battalion, Marine Forces Reserve Bravo Company Provides Task-Organized Detachments Of Intelligence Personnel To Augment Active Component Elements, Joint Commands, And National Agencies In Time Of Crisis, Contingency, And War.\n\nHeadquarters, 169th Field Artillery Brigade The Field Artillery units in the state of Colorado are the largest and the oldest of the Army National Guard, fighting in the War with Spain, the Philippine Insurrection, and both World War I and World War II. These artillery units, known as the \"King of Battle,\" bring a lethal arsenal to the battlefield. Currently, their main weapon is the MLRS (Multiple Launch Rocket System). These fast-moving missile launching platforms fire a fast and deadly arsenal at the enemy, destroying entire enemy grid zones.\n\n## United States Coast Guard Cryptologic Unit - Colorado The United States Coast Guard Cryptologic Unit -- Colorado Was Commissioned At Buckley Air Force Base On Oct. 3, 2007. Coast Guard Men And Women Assigned To Buckley Conduct Technical Training And Analysis Of The Maritime Domain In Support Of Tactical And Operational Fleet Commands, The Coast Guard Intelligence Enterprise, Combatant Commanders And National Policymakers.\n\nIn conjunction with their daily analytical duties, members of the unit simultaneously develop, train and refine their cryptologic skills to support future afloat operations in the Coast Guard. Contacting the CGCU-Colorado CGCU-Colorado (Attn: US Coast Guard) 17950 E. Steamboat Ave Stop 6, Building 26 Aurora, CO 80011 Phone: 720-847-5356/5357 Contact Information 460th Space Wing Public Affairs 510 S. Aspen St. (Stop 88) Buckley AFB, CO 80011 Ph: 720-847-9431\nSourcebook note: DCEETA is the Defense Communications Electronics Evaluation and Testing Activity at Fort Belvoir, Virgina. DCEETA was renamed the Aerospace Data Facility East sometime in 2007 or 2008. JDFPG is the Joint Defense Facility Pine Gap near Alice Springs, Australia.\n\nhttp://www.airforcetimes.com/news/2011/11/air-force-one-star-generals-nominated-112811/\nAir Force announces 1-star nominations Staff report Posted : Monday Nov 28, 2011 15:46:10 EST\n\n## [Excerpts]\n\nThe president has approved the nomination of 39 colonels for promotion to the rank of brigadier general. These promotions take effect upon Senate confirmation.\n\n## - Col. Ronald L. Huntley, Commander, Space Operations Wing, Aerospace Data Facility-Colorado, National Reconnaissance Office, Aurora, Colo.\n\nhttp://www.airforcetimes.com/news/2010/12/ap-colonel-at-buckley-nominated-for-general-121510/\nColonel at Buckley nominated for general The Associated Press Posted : Wednesday Dec 15, 2010 9:21:53 EST BUCKLEY AIR FORCE BASE, Colo. - An Air Force colonel stationed at Buckley Air Force Base has been nominated for promotion to general. The Defense Department said Tuesday that Stephen T. Denker has been nominated for brigadier general.\n\n## Denker Is Commander Of The Space Operations Wing, Aerospace Data Facility-Colorado, National Reconnaissance Office.\n\nBuckley is in the Denver suburb of Aurora.\n\nhttp://www.bizjournals.com/denver/stories/2010/07/12/focus2.html Buckley Air Force Base continues to grow, keep its secrets Premium content from Denver Business Journal - by Greg Avery Date: Monday, July 12, 2010, 12:00am MDT - Last Modified: Thursday, July 8, 2010, 11:30am MDT Buckley transformed from a National Guard air base into a full Air Force base a decade ago. The government has been expanding the base from 2.5 million square feet of offices in 2005 to more than 4.8 million today. Buckley Air Force Base in Aurora is one of the region's biggest economic drivers in aerospace. About 12,100 people in military and civilian aerospace work at Buckley, with another 6,000 working off base in the offices of major contracting companies. That's about 18,000 people out of the state's estimated 100,000 military or commercial aerospace employees. The Air Force's 460th Space Wing, based at Buckley, estimates the base drove $1.04 billion in economic activity in Aurora in 2009. But its economic impact probably is far larger. That's because classified spy satellite work done at Buckley is believed to rival in scale the acknowledged military work at the base. \"When you consider that, its impact has got to be considered enormous,\" said Dick Hinson, senior vice president of the Aurora Economic Development Council. The federal government has never disclosed everything that goes on at Buckley. Hinson is an 18-year veteran of economic development in Aurora. But his first time inside Buckley happened just last year. The National Reconnaissance Office (NRO), which manages satellite contracts for military and civilian space agencies, officially declassified its presence at Buckley in 2008. Buckley transformed from a National Guard air base into a full Air Force base a decade ago. The government has been expanding the base from 2.5 million square feet of offices in 2005 to more than 4.8 million today.\n\n## The Main Tenant At Buckley Is The Air Force's Aerospace Data Facility, The Nation's Major Domestic Downlink Site For Military Spy Satellites. The Nro, The National Security Agency And The National Geo-Spatial Agency Also Work There.\n\nThe 460th Space Wing said the local economic impact of its construction at Buckley in 2009 was $35 million. The office of the Director of National Intelligence has budgeted to build permanent office buildings at Buckley to replace modular ones where 500 intelligence staffers work. It's unclear what they're doing and which agencies they work for. \"What has been known is that Buckley's been the fastest-growing military base in the U.S.,\" said Elliot Pulham, executive director of the Space Foundation, a Colorado Springs-based industry group. \"They've poured millions into that base in recent years.\" It's only been in the past year that some of the agencies have publicly admitted their presence at Buckley. \"Everyone always knew that Aurora was fairly large militarily,\" Hinson said. \"Nobody, except the people who actually worked in the facilities, had any idea what was going in there or the real scale of the intelligence operations.\" That made economic development chats - conversations usually reliant on dropping names of respected major employers - awkwardly vague when people connected to Buckley were involved, Hinson said. \"If you wanted to get people all goosey about things in a hurry, just mention the NRO,\" Hinson said, chuckling. The base's primacy in the Aurora economy is being challenged today. About 15,000 people work a few miles north of Buckley at the Fitzsimons Life Science District. The growing hospital and medical research site is expected to surpass the Air Force base in economic importance to Aurora as a new Veterans Administration hospital opens, and both the University of Colorado and Children's hospitals build major expansions. Hinson senses the openness by military and spy agency officials, however slight, was meant to strengthen its public support as the recession crimps budgets in Washington, D.C. \"I think they just recognized that they've got to be more open about it to get more support,\" Hinson said.\n\nRaytheon lands $887 million Air Force contract By Ann Schrader The Denver Post Posted: 02/26/2010 01:00:00 AM MST Raytheon Co. has been awarded a U.S. Air Force GPS-related contract worth about $886.5 million - a contract officials say will mean more than 300 new high-paying jobs in Colorado. The six-year contract, announced Thursday, is to modernize ground- control support for the nation's current and future Global Positioning System satellites. [deletia]\n\n## For Raytheon, The Contract Means Adding About 100 New Employees This Year To Its 2,200-Employee Aurora Campus, Where Work Focuses Primarily On Software Development. Another 200 Workers Will Be Phased In Next Year. Boeing Co., Which Is On Raytheon's Team That Has Been Pursuing The Contract, Also Could Add 50 To 60 Jobs At Its Aurora Facility.\n\nTeams led by Raytheon and Northrop Grumman have been competing for the contract, which involves GPS command and control of satellites and mission support. Although Northrop Grumman also has operations in the state, the win by Raytheon means more jobs will come to Colorado than would have under Northrop Grumman's plan. [deletia]\n\n## Boeing Has About 300 Employees In Aurora, And Raytheon Is The Eastern Suburb's Largest Employer.\n\n[deletia] Tom Clark, executive vice president of the Metro Denver Economic Development Corp., said he knew the contract was in play. \"But my word,\" he said, \"after seeing a little dip in aerospace employment, this is welcome, welcome news.\" Clark credited the award on the clustering of all the major defense and aerospace contractors in Colorado. \"They end up partnering when they are all in one place,\" he said. Colorado has slipped to No. 3 in aerospace employment, losing the No. 2 spot to Texas last year. Nearly 50,000 people work in aerospace in Colorado, with about 20,000 employed by private firms and another 28,000 in the military. [deletia]\nBUCKLEY AIR FORCE BASE, Colo. -- Standing at attention during the Aerospace Data Facility - Colorado assumption of command are (from left to right) Maj. Gen. Ellen Pawlikowski, National Reconnaissance Office Air Force Space Command Element commander, Senior Master Sgt. William Couret, ADF-C, and Col. Stephen Denker, the incoming ADF-C commander. (U.S. Air Force photo) Colonel Stephen Denker assumes command of Aerospace Data Facility-Colorado Posted 7/31/2009   Updated 7/31/2009 by Sharlene Fairbanks-Kyte Aerospace Data Facility-Colorado Public Affairs 7/31/2009 - BUCKLEY AIR FORCE BASE, Colo.  -- Col. Stephen Denker assumed command of the Aerospace Data Facility-Colorado July 15. Maj. Gen. Ellen Pawlikowski, National Reconnaissance Office Air Force Space Command Element commander, presided over the ceremony. Colonel Denker brings a wealth of experience to ADF-C. He is an accomplished leader and military officer who has held command at the Combined Test Force and Space Operations Group levels. In his previous assignment, he served as the commander of the Air Force Element and the chief of mission engineering at Royal Air Force Menwith Hill in the United Kingdom. Prior to his assignment at Menwith Hill, Colonel Denker served in several spacecraft engineering, test and evaluation, operations, and acquisitions positions. These assignments included positions as the deputy director of ADF-C's Mission Operations Group and as the director of ADF-C's Engineering and Support Group. Colonel Denker looks forward to continuing ADF-C's reputation for collaborative leadership and enhancing support to the intelligence community and especially deployed warfighters around the world. Colonel Denker's predecessor, Col. David Thompson, relinquished command May 21 before deploying to become the Director of Space Forces for United States Central Command.\n\nhttp://www.techbastard.com/afb/co/buckley.php May 1969: Construction begins on the Aerospace Data Facility http://www.losangeles.af.mil/SMC/HO/af%20org%20exc%20awards%20and%20a....\n\n  Air Force Organizational Excellence Awards and Air Force Outstanding Unit Awards to Headquarters Elements of SMC and Its Predecessors [Abbreviations: AFMCSO = Air Force Materiel Command Special Order; AFSCSO = Air Force Systems Command Special Order; AFSPCSO = Air Force Space Command Special Order; DAFSO = Department of the Air Force Special Order; PO = Program Office; SPO = System Program Office]\n\n## Aerospace Data Facility (Space And Missile Systems Organization, Detachment 3) Air Force Organizational Excellence Award (Dafso Gb-410, 1973) For The Period 1 July 1971 - 30 June 1972 Aerospace Data Facility (Space Division, Detachment 3) Air Force Organizational Excellence Award (Dafso Gb-060, 1981) For The Period 1 January 1977 - 19 January 1981\n\nAccession Number : ADA413181 Title :   Environmental Impact Analysis Process. Environmental Assessment Additions to and Operations of Aerospace Data Facility Corporate Author : SPACE AND MISSILE SYSTEMS CENTER LOS ANGELES AFB CA Handle / proxy Url : http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA413181 Check NTIS Availability... Report Date : NOV 1992 Pagination or Media Count : 87 Abstract : The United States Air Force (USAF) operates the Aerospace Data Facility (ADF) at Buckley Air National Guard Base (ANGB), located in Aurora, Colorado. USAF proposes to modify the ADF to provide additional secure, permanent office and computer operations space. Modification is needed to provide response capability to USAF directives requiring the expansion of ADF's mission and to provide permanent work space for staff currently located in temporary trailers. ADF is a space tracking and data processing center completely contained  within the perimeter fence of Buckley ANGB and located approximately 12 miles east of Denver, Colorado. Main features of the ADF include an operations building (Building 401), radomes housing receiving antennae, a chiller plant, a power plant housing emergency power diesel generators, temporary office trailers, warehouses and other storage facilities, and a recreation complex. USAF is proposing to add approximately 150,000 square feet to Building 401. This expansion would provide permanent office space for approximately 500 employees, currently located in trailers adjacent to Building 401, and additional computer operations space. Utility modifications proposed to support the addition include adding two 2,500- kilowatt emergency generators to the existing power plant; two 1,000-ton-capacity chillers to the existing chiller plant; tree cooling tower cells adjacent to existing cooling towers; and miscellaneous additions and modifications to integrate additions with existing facilities. Construction, scheduled to begin in late spring 1993, would last approximately 18 months. Cost for the Proposed Action has been estimated at $40,000,000. Descriptors : *ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT, *AIR FORCE FACILITIES, *ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT, NATIONAL GUARD, AIR FORCE, UNITED STATES, MODIFICATION, FACILITIES, COSTS, AEROSPACE SYSTEMS, CONSTRUCTION, INFORMATION CENTERS, RESOURCES, AIRPORTS, CIVIL ENGINEERING, COLORADO, HOUSING(DWELLINGS), OFFICE BUILDINGS.\n\nSubject Categories : LOGISTICS, MILITARY FACILITIES AND SUPPLIES NOISE POLLUTION AND CONTROL SOLID WASTES POLLUTION AND CONTROL WATER POLLUTION AND CONTROL\nDistribution Statement : APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE\nhttp://www.computersiteengineering.com/experts-docs/Hank_Seader_resum...\n\n## [Excerpt]\n\nFrom 1991 to 1996, Hank Seader was the Director of Facilities Engineering at the Aerospace Data Facility in the Department of  Defense.  Here he directed the operation, design, and construction of a $1.3 billion space systems facility.  He also renovated and built a 750,000 square foot campus with over 400,000 feet of raised floor, 25-megawatt power plant, 15-megawatt uninterruptible power system, 8000 tons cooling.  During this period, Mr. Seader created a 5-year acquisition strategy and a 10-year facility and infrastructure operations plan.  Additionally, Mr. Seader executed a five year $104 million construction and redevelopment program while managing $12 million annually in engineering and maintenance contracts.  He was responsible for 120 managers, professional engineering staff, technicians and craftsmen.  He also implemented industrial safety, regulatory compliance, community \"right to know\" programs and managed competition and selection of support contractors and strategic suppliers. Aerospace Data Facility Buckley Air National Guard Aurora, Colorado\n\n## Description Of Work:\n\n  The 5KV service originates at the existing utility plant and  feeds six (6) 5KV double ended unit substations. The 100,000  SF secured area includes an intense RFI grounding system which consists of a continuous silver solder 4-inch by 4-inch copper  mesh mat. Other electrical systems within the facility include  public address, emergency power distribution and lightning  protection. Name and Address of Owner: Aerospace Data Facility 18500 E. 6th Avenue Aurora CO 80011 Captain Nathan Jones (303) 341-3474 Contract Number and Type: Lump Sum Bid Period of Performance: Project Duration: 730 days Finish Date: October 1995\n\n## References:\n\n  Army Corps of Engineers P.O. Box 473390 Aurora, CO 80047-3390 Eric Peterson (303) 367-0335 M.A. Mortenson 1875 Lawrence Street, Suite 600 Denver, CO 80202 Leon Nelson (303)295-2511 Percentage of Work by Ludvik Electric Co.'s own forces: 100%\n\n## 2.2.3  Operations\n\nOperations that would be integrated by SBIRS are currently located in Building 430 inside the security fence.  After construction of the MCS, the new building would be occupied by approximately 150 additional personnel in FY99 as operations are transitioned to the MCS.  After six to nine months, operations in Building 430 would be shut down and the personnel requirements would return to the same level as before.  Therefore, there would be no permanent increase in personnel at Buckley ANGB as a consequence of the proposed action.  Existing antennas would be used for communication on an interim basis, and these antennas would be replaced in the future.  The replacement antennas will be addressed in future EIAP actions when the location and operating parameters have been established.\n\n## Buckley Afb Wastewater System\n\n  Buckley AFB is located on the east side of the City of Aurora,  Colorado, approximately 10 miles southwest of the Denver  International Airport. Aurora is the second largest city inthe Denver metropolitan area, and the third largest city in the State of Colorado. The Base is the largest single employer in the City of Aurora.  In 2000 it is estimated that Buckley  AFB contributed over $500 million to the regional economies. The 460th Air Base Wing, activated October 1, 2001, is the host unit at Buckley AFB.  The airfield is operated and maintained by the 140th Wing of the Colorado Air National Guard.  The 11,000-foot runway also supports transient aircraft of all commands and services.  Major tenants at  Buckley AFB include:\n\n  2nd Space Warning Squadron Detachment 45 Air Force Technical Applications Center 566th Information Operation Squadron Detachment 4 Air Force Operational Test and Evaluation Center Detachment 801 Air Force Office of Special Investigations Department of Defense Aerospace Data Facility Army 743rd Military Intelligence Battalion Naval Security Group Activity Denver Company A, Marine Support Battalion\n  Colorado National Guard organizations including;\n\n  Department of Military  Affairs, Headquarters Colorado Air National Guard, 140th Wing of the Colorado Air National Guard, 240th Civil Engineering Flight, United States Property and Fiscal Office, 169th Field Artillery Brigade, 1st Battalion 89th Troop Command, 2nd Battalion 135th Aviation, 101st Army Band, Detachment 5 Headquarters State Area Command, Detachment 1 1022 Medical Company, and 1/128 Mobile Public Affairs Detachment.\n  Air Force Reserve 8th Space Warning Squadron  Naval and Marine Corps Reserve Center Denver Marine Corps Reserve Air Control Squadron 23  Headquarters, Colorado Wing, Civil Air Patrol U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Resident Office Buckley AFB occupies approximately 3,313 acres and contains 175 buildings with approximately 2.3 million gross square feet of floor space. These include buildings used for aircraft operations, aircraft maintenance, industrial operations, administration and support services. The Base has a total resident and non-resident population of approximately 25,358.  This includes:\n\n  232 Active Duty Living On-Base 2,755 Active Duty Living Off-Base 1,561 Air National Guard/Air Force Reserve 2,171 Army/Navy/Marine Reserve 1,117 Appropriated and Non-Appropriated Civilians 1,396 Contract Employees 16,126 Military Dependents Living Off-Base\n  On October 1, 2001 Buckley AFB was converted from an Air National Guard Base to an active-duty Base.  This brings about the need for significant construction. The Base has already completed considerable construction over the past several years, including a dormitory, a commissary and base exchange complex, and numerous infrastructure improvements.   This will be followed by significant additional construction over the next five years. During the past two years Buckley completed the construction of Phase II of the Installation Infrastructure Project. This project included upgrading the main utility lines (water,  sanitary sewer, electrical, gas, and storm water drainage) on  the Installation, along with some road widening and realignment work.  Future plans also include a third phase to this project which includes improvements to side streets and  secondary utility lines.  Phase III is scheduled to begin in FY 2003. [deletia] Solicitation Number:  W9128F-05-R-0025 Restrictions:  Full and Open Competition Title:  Operations Building Expansion, AE Design, Solicitation packages will NOT be issued Location:  Buckley Air Force Base, Aurora, Colorado Issue Date:  6/10/2005 Closing Date:  Canceled Price Range: Media:  Web Contracting POC:  Sharon Spohn  Phone:  402-221-4102 Synopsis Project Title: Operations Building Expansion, Buckley Air Force Base, Aurora, Colorado. Contracting Office Address: U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Omaha, 106 South 15th Street, Omaha, NE 68102-1618. [EXCERPTS] Description: This project will be completed with a single FY07 appropriation of approximately $50-75M with an anticipated scope of 189,000 square feet. 2. PROJECT INFORMATION: This project will be located in the Aerospace Data Facility Compound at Buckley AFB, CO. The project includes computer operations centers on raised floors, sensitive compartmented information facility areas, soundproof rooms, special purpose areas, administrative offices, loading dock, mail receiving and distribution center, storage space, an integral full-service cafeteria and banquet facility, a conference center, and communications, mechanical, and electrical support rooms for high-reliability utility support. Other features are intrusion detection systems, fire protection and alarm systems, connection to an existing communications backbone, and connection to an existing utility infrastructure and energy monitoring and control system. Supporting facilities include all associated utilities, parking areas, walks, storm drainage, communications duct banks, and other site improvements. All required antiterrorism and force protection measures will be provided and may include structural hardening. The design team shall incorporate the Leadership in Energy and Environmental Design Green Building criteria to the maximum practical extent. All design work will be performed in compliance with the Department of Defense Unified Facilities Criteria documents. Construction cost estimates will be prepared using the US Army Corps of Engineers' Computer Aided Cost Estimating System, software provided by Government. Access for the handicapped will be provided. Comprehensive Interior Design services are required. Specifications will be produced in SPECSINTACT using Unified Facilities Guide Specifications. Design review comments and their responses will be performed on US Army Corps of Engineers Review Management System ProjNet/Dr-Checks. 3. SELECTION CRITERIA: The selection criteria are listed below in descending order of importance, first by major criterion and then by each sub-criterion. Criteria a-f are primary. Criteria g and h are secondary and will only be used as tiebreakers between technically equal firms. a. Understanding of the mission, operations, and organizations comprising the Aerospace Data Facility and the interfaces these organizations have with external organizations. Ability to conduct discussions with key personnel in a Secret/Secure Compartmented Information environment. Ability to store and transmit drawings and e-mail correspondence on a secure network acceptable to the ADF is a plus. SF 330, Part I, Section H, Item 1. b. Specialized experience and technical competence of the firm and consultants in the following areas. Only experience that has occurred in the last five years should be included in the proposal. All projects cited shall identify design start/complete dates as well as the project size, cost and scope. Specialized experience and technical competence with the current host of the Aerospace Data Facility will be considered more favorably.\n\n## Sf 330, Part I, Section F.\n\n1. Experience in the design of sensitive compartmented information facilities.\n2. Experience in the design of innovative and architecturally complex computer facilities with requirements for highly reliable, redundant utility systems of a size equivalent to this facility. 3. Experience with the design and integration of extensive, robust, internal communication networks into building systems architecture. 4. Experience in the design of facilities with highly complex and innovative audio-visual and graphic display components integrated to support intelligence mission execution.\n\n5. Familiarity with, and experience implementing, the DoD UFC Documentation. 6. Familiarity with Department of Defense anti-terrorism/force protection design criteria and construction standards. 7. Experience with Life Safety and fire protection design of computer facilities.\n8. Experience with Sustainable Design or Green Building design concepts including energy efficiency, use of recovered materials, waste reduction, and pollution prevention using the LEED evaluation and certification methodology. 9. Knowledge of the locality of the project including geologic features, environmental conditions, climatic conditions, local construction methods, and obtaining permits. c. Past performance on DOD and Intelligence Community IC contracts with respect to quality of work, cost control maintaining the project construction cost below the Programmed Amount, and compliance with performance schedules. In addition to past performance with Intelligence Community contracts, past performance on similar DoD contracts will be considered. Will be evaluated from ACASS information obtained by the Omaha District Office. d. Professional personnel qualifications and specialized experience in facilities similar to the Operations Building Expansion for key design disciplines. Key disciplines that are required to be performed by registered and licensed professionals are: project management, SCIF facility planning, architecture, interior design, landscape architecture, mechanical, electrical, fire protection, structural, civil, environmental, water and wastewater, communications engineering, security, force protection, cost estimating, geotechnical, and land surveyor. Evaluation of these disciplines will consider education, training, relevant experience in design of similar facilities, and longevity with the firm. The availability of an adequate number of personnel in the key disciplines shall be presented to insure that the firm can meet the required schedule. SF 330, Part I, Sections E & G. f. Mailing address for submission: US Army Corps of Engineers, 106 South 15th Street, Omaha, NE, 68102, ATTN: Kevin McElroy, Solicitation Number:W9128F-05-R-0025. Mr. McElroy can be reached at 402-221-4108 and via email at Kevin.P.McEl...@usace.army.mil. All technical questions should be directed to Mr. Larry Sand, 402-221-4595 or via email at larry.d.s...@usace.army.mil. Submittals must be received no later than 1400 central time, 6 July 2005. Personal visits for the purpose of discussing this announcement will not be scheduled. Please check for updates to this announcement on our web site http://ebs-nwo.wes.army.mil.\n\nFederal Business Council, Inc. 8975 Henkels Lane, Suite 700 Annapolis Junction, MD  20701 (800)878-2940 fax:(301)206-2950 FBC Event Description Event: Buckley Air Force Base Date: November 16, 2006 Location: Building 606 Aurora, Colorado Exhibitor fee: $749.00 General Information Buckley AFB is an Air Force Space Command base. Buckley AFB defends America through its air operations, space-based missile warning capabilities, space surveillance operations, space communications operations and support functions. Buckley AFB is unique in that it supports 38 tenant units located on and off base.\n\n## This Expo Is Hosted By The 460Th Space Communications Squadron. The Mission Of The 460Th Space Wing Is To Provide Combatant Commanders With Superior Global Surveillance, Worldwide Missile Warning, Homeland Defense And Expeditionary Forces.\n\nThe 460th Communications Squadron manages, operates and maintains control, communications, and information systems in support of the 460th Space Wing and tenant units at Buckley AFB.\n\n## One Of The Largest On-Base Tenants Is The Aerospace Data Facility. The Aerospace Data Facility Has Become The Major U.S.-Based Technical Downlink For Intelligence Satellites Operated By The Military, The National Security Agency And The National Reconnaissance Office.\n\nAnother tenant, the Defense Finance and Accounting Service (DFAS), located on the Buckley Annex in Denver, Colo., is also one of the largest tenants supported by the 460th Space Wing. DFAS provides responsive, professional finance and accounting services for the people who defend America and currently supports a workforce of more than 1,400 personnel. The Air Reserve Personnel Center (ARPC), located on the Buckley Annex, is another tenant supported by the 460 Space Wing. The center, comprised of more than 490 personnel, plays a major role in ensuring the nation always has a warrior bank of mission-ready air Guardsmen and Reservists for mobilization and United States Air Force augmentation by providing personnel management and services for its customers. Other tenants at Buckley also include: Headquarters, Colorado Air National Guard, 566th Information Operations Squadron, Detachment 45, Air Force Technical Applications Center, Detachment 105, AFROTC at University of Colorado, Detachment 801, Air Force Office of Special Investigations, Aerospace Data Facility, Navy Marine Corps Reserve Center, and Combined Task Force.\n\n## Requested Technologies All Technologies Are Applicable For This Expo. Subj:  Overhead Conference 2008 Message\n\nATTN: SSO'S, COMMANDERS, G2/S2'S\n\n## Subj:  Overhead Conference 2008 Message\n\n 1.  MISSION:  THE 704TH MILITARY INTELLIGENCE BRIGADE INVITES YOU TO ATTEND THE 10TH ANNUAL OPERATION OVERHEAD CONFERENCE IN DENVER ON 28-31 JANUARY 2008.  THE 743RD MILITARY INTELLIGENCE BATTALION HOSTS THIS ANNUAL EVENT AT THE AEROSPACE DATA FACILITY (ADF) LOCATED ON BUCKLEY AFB, COLORADO.  THE CONFERENCE WILL PROVIDE MI COMMANDERS, TECHNICAL ADVISORS, CORPS G2S, DIVISION G2S, ACE CHIEFS, BRIGADE COMBAT TEAM (BCT) S2S, AND THOSE INVOLVED IN THE OVERHEAD REQUIREMENTS PROCESS A BETTER UNDERSTANDING OF NATIONAL OVERHEAD CAPABILITIES.  IN PARTICULAR, WE WISH TO ENCOURAGE RECENTLY REDEPLOYED OR PERPEARING TO DEPLOY MICO, BCT, S2/G2, MNF-I, AND CJTF-76 PERSONNEL TO ATTEND AND SHARE THEIR EXPERIENCES WITH AND LEARN FROM THIS COMMUNITY. 2.  PURPOSE:  TO EDUCATE AND INFORM GROUND COMPONENT LEADERS ON THE EXPANDED OPERATIONAL CAPABILITIES AND HOW TO BETTER LEVERAGE OUR NATIONAL SYSTEMS TO ANSWER COMMANDERS PIR.  MANY OF YOU REMAIN FULLY ENGAGED WITH CURRENT OPERATIONS AROUND THE WORLD.  HOWEVER, NOW MORETHAN EVER, IT IS IMPERATIVE TO FULLY UNDERSTAND HOW OUR NATIONAL SYSTEMS ARE ABLE TO SUPPORT Y OUR EFFORTS. 3. TASK:  THE CONFERENCE WILL PROVIDE A FORUM FOR THE NATIONAL OVERHEAD COMMUNITY AND THE TACTICAL COMMUNITY (BCT'S, DIVISIONS, AND CORPS) TO EXCHANGE EXPERIENCES, TACTICS, TECHNIQUES, AND PROCEDURES WITH REGARD TO THE USEFULNESS OF NATIONAL OVERHEAD CAPABILITIES.   YOU WILL BE BRIEFED ON HOW OUR NATIONAL ASSETS CAPTURE, PROCESS, ANALYZE AND FORWARD INFORMATION FOR EARLY WARNING AND SITUATIONAL AWARENESS.  YOU WILL ALSO LEARN HOW TO PROCESS AND INCORPORATE THIS INFORMATION TO HELP IMPROVE SUPPORT TO THE TACTICAL COMMANDER FOR THE TARGETING PROCESS. WE ALSO ARE LOOKING FORWARD TO AN OPEN FORUM/DISCUSSION OF REQUIREMENTS AND YOUR PERSPECTIVES TO ENSURE WE ARE MEETING YOUR NEEDS. 4.  THE THEME FOR THIS YEAR'S OPERATIONAL OVERHEAD CONFERENCE WILL FOCUS ON THE ROLE OF OVERHEAD IN WORLDWIDE OPERATIONS.  THE CONFERENCE WILL ADDRESS OVERHEAD RELATED ACTIVITIES IN EACH OF THE COCOM'S, SEEKING OPERATIONAL INPUT ACROSS THE NATIONAL TO TACTICAL SPECTRUM.  THE CONFERENCE WILL ALSO ADDRESS KEY TRAINING ISSUES RELATED TO OVERHEAD OPERATIONS. 5.  THE CONFERENCE TARGET AUDIENCE IS MI COMMANDERS, TECHNICAL ADVISORS, CORPS G2S, DIVISION G2S, ACE CHIEFS, COLLECGTION MANAGERS, BCT S2S, AND THOSE FROM ECHELONS ABOVE CORPS INVOLVED IN THE OVERHEAD REQUIREMENTS PROCESS.  THESE PERSONNEL HAVE PRIORITY AS WE CAN ONLY ACCOMMODATE 185 ATTENDEES.  A LIST OF CONFIRMED ATTENDEES AND THE CONFERENCE AGENDA (AS IT DEVELOPS) WILL BE MAINTAINED ON THE CONFERENCE WEBSITE. HTTP://DENVER.IC.GOV 6.  A CONFERENCE FEE OF APPROXIMATELY $45 WILL PAY FOR CONTINENTAL BREAKFAST EVERY MORNING, LUNCH EVER AFTERNOON AS WELL AS DRINKS DURING THE LENGTH OF THE CONFERENCE. 7.  CLEARANCE INFORMATION:  SEND SCURITY CLEARANCE MESSAGE VIA CRITICOM OR OFFICIAL MESSAGE TRAFFIC TO SSO ADF AND SSO 743 MI BN OR SECURE FAX (303) 677-4949.  ALL ATTENDEES MUST HAVE A FINAL TS/SCI CLEARANCE.  SUBJECT LINE SHOULD READ OOC 2008 ATTENDEE VISIT CERT.  JPAS ALONE IS NOT ACCEPTED BY THE SITE.  POC THISTA FOR THE CONFERENCE IS SGT BRADLEY, AND SFC DACARUS, DSN:  877-3668 COMM:  (303) 677-3668/  NSTS:  830-3312.  PLEASE INCLUDE ALL SCI TICKETS, THIS LOCATION WILL DISREGARD ANY TICKETS NOT REQUIRED.  THE 743RD MI BN SSO IS SGT RITTER DSN: 877-4915, COMM:  (303) 677-4915, NSTS 830-4899. 8.  IF YOUR ORGANIZATION DESIRES TO BRIEF, PLEASE NOTIFY CPT HANDLER, SFC DACARUS OR SGT BRADLEY NLT 1 DEC.  WE WILL PUBLISH ADDITIONAL LOGISTICS INFORMATION IN FOLLOW-ON MESSAGES. 9.  PLEASE RSVP TO CPT HANDLER, (HHOC COMMANDER), SFC ERIC DACARUS (S3 NCOIC), OR SGT JOHN BRADLEY (CONFERENCE COORDINATOR) NLT 5 JANUARY 2008. ALTERNATE RSVP POCS ARE:  THE 743RD MI BN CDR, S1, XO, OR S3 (PHONE #'S AND E- MAIL ADDRESSES BELOW).  IF WE CAN PROVIDE ANY ASSISTANCE, PLEASE DO NOT HESITATE TO ASK. 10.  POINTS OF CONCATCT ARE AS FOLLOWS: COMMANDER:  LTC LAURA POTTER, PHONES:  DSN: 847-3668/  NSTS:  830-3144, E-MAIL (UNCLASSIFIED)  LAURA.POTTER@BUCKLEY.AF.MIL S3:  MAJ STEVEN CALHOUN, PHONES:  DSN:  877-3668/  COMMERCIAL (303) 677-3668, E- MAIL (UNCLASSIFIED) STEVEN.CALHOUN@BUCKLEY.AF.MIL XO:  MAJ DANA RUCINSKI, PHONES:  DSN:  847-6829/  COMMERCIAL (303) 677-6829, E- MAIL (UNCLASSIFIED) DANA.RUCINSKI@BUCKLEY.AF.MIL S3 NCOIC:  SFC ERIC DACARUS, PHONES:  DSN:  877-3668/  NSTS:  830-3312/  STU III (303)\n50th Space Wing welcomes new commander by Staff Sgt. Don Branum 50th Space Wing Public Affairs 6/12/2008 - SCHRIEVER AIR FORCE BASE, Colo. -- The former executive officer to the commander of Air Force Space Command assumed command of the 50th Space Wing here today in an official ceremony held at the DeKok Building. Col. Cary Chun succeeds Col. Terry Djuric, who will assume command of the Holm Accession and Training Schools at Maxwell Air Force Base, Ala. Colonel Chun has extensive space operations experience through assignments at U.S. Space Command, AFSPC, 14th Air Force, the Special Technical Operations Community, the National Reconnaissance Office and Air Forces Central. Some of his previous assignments include commander of the Aerospace Data Facility's Space Operations Wing at Buckley AFB, Colo., the NRO Operations Group at Onizuka Air Force Station, Calif., and the 614th Space Operations Squadron at Vandenberg AFB, Calif. Colonel Chun supported the president and first lady as a White House social aide in 1995. He deployed as the director of space forces in 2007 for U.S. Central Command in Southwest Asia. Colonel Chun entered the Air Force through the Air Force Academy and received his commission May 29, 1985, with a bachelor's degree in operations research. His other degrees include a Master of Science in systems management from the University of Southern California, a Master of Science in space operations from the Air Force Institute of Technology at Wright-Patterson AFB, Ohio, and a Master of Strategic Studies degree from the Air War College at Maxwell AFB. He is a senior executive fellow of Harvard University's John F. Kennedy School of Government. He has also attended the Leadership Development Program at the Center for Creative Leadership in Greensboro, N.C., and the Enterprise Leadership Seminar at the University of North Carolina's Kenan- Flagler School of Business. Colonel Chun is a distinguished graduate of Squadron Officer School at Maxwell AFB and the Space Innovation and Development Center's Space Tactics School here. He was also a Top 25 Percent graduate from the Air Command and Staff College at Maxwell AFB. His professional military education also includes the Armed Forces Staff College at Norfolk Naval Air Station, Va., and Air War College at Maxwell AFB. Colonel Chun has received a Defense Superior Service Medal, a Legion of Merit medal, three Defense Meritorious Service Medals, two Air Force Meritorious Service Medals, a Defense Commendation Medal, two Air Force Commendation Medals, a Defense Achievement Medal and an Air Force Achievement Medal. He was named the California Air Force Association's Field Grade Officer of 2000. He received an NRO Leadership Award in 2005, an Office of the Secretary of the Air Force Leadership Award in 2006, and a National Security Agency Bronze Medallion and an NRO Gold Medal in 2007. Colonel Chun is a native of Cavite, the Philippines. He was born at Sangley Point NAS, the Philippines, while his father was on active duty in the U.S. Coast Guard. He is married to the former Angeline Montiero and has three children: Thomas, Mackenzie and Ian.\n\nhttp://www.upi.com/NewsTrack/Top_News/2008/05/05/big_buildup_at_space_base_in_colorado/8759\n\n## Big Buildup At Space Base In Colorado Published: May 5, 2008 At 1:59 Pm\n\nAURORA, Colo., May 5 (UPI) -- Space-based surveillance needs are making Buckley Air Force Base in Colorado one of the United States' fastest growing military installations, a spokesman said. Millions of dollars in construction projects are in the works at Buckley as the U.S. Air Force transforms it from a modest base used by reservists into a full-scale active-duty base that will be a hub of satellite surveillance and missile-warning activities. \"We are one of the fastest-growing Air Force bases in the country,\" base spokesman John Spann told the Rocky Mountain News. \"The missions here at Buckley are constantly changing.\" Located in Aurora, Colo., Buckley will add about 800 military, contractor and civilian jobs in the next three years and will be the home base of three additional F-16s from the Colorado Air National Guard, Spann told the Rocky Mountain News. Buckley is currently home to about 10,000 military personnel, including representatives of all branches of the service. It is home base to the 460th Space Wing.\n\n## 1/16/2008 11:30:00 Pm Buckley Growth Moves At Military Pace Mcgee's State Of The Base Address Speaks To Growth In Population, Projects By Boyd Fletcher The Aurora Sentinel\n\nAURORA | As Buckley Air Force base continues to grow both in the amount of soldiers and in the scope of their role as military support around the globe, it also gives a $1.08-billion boost to the local economy. \"We shape the way America fights its wars today, and we do it from right here in Aurora,\" said Col. Wayne McGee, base commander. \"We are here today to say that we are proud to serve you.\" Col. Wayne McGee presented the annual State of the Base address Wednesday, Jan. 16, to members of the Rotary Club of Aurora and the Aurora Chamber of Commerce at the Doubletree Hotel in Aurora. McGee touted newly completed construction on the base as a major economic boon for Aurora. He said roughly 1,000 people have moved into Buckley's new 351-unit, $90-million housing development that is comprised of single family, duplex and quad-plex homes. He said taking care of the soldiers and their families while they are on the base has been a major push for construction efforts in the past year - including a $6.1 million childcare center, a $1.1 million car wash facility and the $1.4 million outdoor recreation area where soldiers can rent equipment like skis and kayaks. McGee said the construction projects - most of which are privately contracted - brought an estimated nonmilitary 6,149 jobs to Aurora, creating more than $330 million in paychecks to the area. He noted that 2008 would see several additional construction projects, including an $11 million communications facility, a $6 million conference center and a $30 million, 150-unit temporary living facility for officers and soldiers who are sent to the base for an extended stay. He said the base was working to consolidate some of the services offered by the different tenants, as well as ways to work with existing space so the base doesn't encroach into the city. McGee also talked about the mission of Buckley as a strategic intelligence center for the military. Tucked away in what many people know as the \"Buckley Golf Balls\" are 15 satellite dishes that connect with a heat-sensing Legacy satellite in space that detects \"thermal activity,\" such as explosions and rocket launches worldwide. McGee touted the successful Nov. 10, 2007 launch of their 23rd and final Legacy Satellite. \"It is five times faster than our previous satellites and has four times the infrared detection technology,\" he said. \"We would never go to war without our infrared eyes in the sky.\" The unit will move on to a more advanced satellite that operates at a higher orbit later this year.\n\nhttp://www.odinjobs.com/Odin/jobs.jspx?s=Nsa&jr=Project+Manager&rvn=1\nSubject Matter Expert II\n(2009-05-21)\nClearedConnections    (Md, Annapolis Junction) The Subject Matter Expert will provide the bridge between Mission end users of the system to be delivered and those who are architecting, engineering and/or developing the system. Support the development, review, and analysis of Mission CONOPs, CDDs, requirements, scenarios, vignettes and use cases that accurately reflect end users needs. Assist in the development, organization, and articulation of Mission expectations to support test planning and operational evaluation activities. Facilitate interactions between system user groups and system developers. Assist Mission s development of operational business rules, process, and policies that have system design and technical development implications. Maintain cognizance of all operational requirements, ensuring that the spirit of the requirements is preserved across programmatic and acquisition activities. Support information management transformation. About KEYW Corporation:KEYW is an adaptable, powerfully capable company whose members have made many important, creative contributions to science, defense, space and the intelligence community. KEYW is building a total solutions company that will be more agile than larger competitors and will focus on solving the Shard problems . KEYW s operating philosophy is to be responsive, agile, and focused on solving customers difficult problems. KEYW s core capabilities include: hardware and software development, systems engineering and integration, test and evaluation, field support, computer and network operations, information security and specialized training, collaboration and workflow, service-oriented architectures and complex event processing and data acquisitions, embedded systems and network protocols.KEYW is an Equal Opportunity Employer EOE, M/F/D/V. Job Requirements: Required Skills: 8 years of demonstrated experience with SIGINT operations as a collector, processor, analyst or reporter of SIGINT Minimum of 5 years of demonstrated experience in the following subject areas: SIGINT Policies, Regulations, and United States Signals Intelligence Directives USSIDs Requirements Process Provide senior level support to the ELINT Modernization PMO, NSA Colorado system engineering, NSA Colorado operational elements, and CEMO. Act as communications bridge between these organizations. Requires in-depth knowledge of Global TechSIGINT operations to include TechELINT, OpELINT, PROFORMA, COMEX, EW, NSA centers, Service Production Centers, and military missions. This knowledge should include an understanding of workflow and data flow, system functionality, database use, and analytic tool use. Requires in-depth knowledge of NSA-C operations and ADF-C engineering policies and practices. Requires understanding of acquisition processes. Requires ability to develop plans of action that will focus leaders on paths to successful implementation of new systems, to include: architectures (cross agency and system level boundaries); test and evaluation (end-to-end threads); integration and sustainment; requirements documentation, including mission impacts and priorities; development of business cases; and reviewing documentation supporting modernization efforts and areas of dependency. Requires superb leadership skills to provide recommended courses of action and mentorship to junior engineers. Requires excellent oral and written skills and the ability to develop presentations and present information to large groups consisting of senior leaders and technical experts. Must be innovative and a self-starter. Must be able to think outside the box from a bigpicture perspective. Familiarity with CED is a plusDegree: BS or equivalent degree, preferably in the computer related field.Clearance: Positions require a Top Secret security clearance, based on current background investigation (SBI), as well as the favorable completion of full screening polygraph. Clearance and polygraph processing will be completed by the U.S. Government.\n\nhttp://denver.bizjournals.com/denver/stories/2007/06/11/daily34.html Military budget includes $529M for Colo. The Denver Business Journal 10:13 AM MDT Wednesday, June 13, 2007 The 2008 military spending bill includes more than a half-billion dollars for Colorado projects, Sen. Wayne Allard said Wednesday. Allard, a Republican, said the Military Construction Appropriations subcommittee on which he sits has approved the $529.6 million amount. The full committee will hear the funding bill on Thursday. The spending bill includes $61.3 million for a new Veterans Affairs hospital at Fitzsimons in Aurora. Plans call for the replacement of the VA hospital, which now sits near Ninth Avenue and Colorado Boulevard in Denver. Other items earmarked in the budget for Colorado include $53 million to build barracks at Fort Carson, $15 million for upgraded academic facilities at the U.S. Air Force Academy and $10.08 million for utility infrastructure improvements at Buckley Air Force Base.\n\n## Title : Nsa Capture Lead Company : Bae Systems Location : Aurora, Co 80012 Date Acquired : 10/18/2008 1:36:27 Am Date Updated : 12/16/2008 10:32:57 Pm\n\n[deletia] The qualified candidate will join the Information Management & Processing group within Intelligence Systems business area in Denver and San Diego. The successful candidate will serve as Capture Lead for follow-on M65X-related programs, serving in a technical marketing role in the SIGINT operational and systems area. This candidate should possess some knowledge and experience in the following areas:\n\n- Tactical and national SIGINT collection systems and payloads\n- End-to-end SIGINT production cycle, including collection planning, tasking, data collection, data processing, exploitation, analysis, dissemination and intelligence reporting\n\n- SIGINT data processing algorithms, including signal detection, formation, and geo-location - Fusion of SIGINT, ONIR, HUMINT and IMINT data\nThis position requires a broad understanding of and experience with SIGINT and SIGINT subdisciplines including Op and Tech ELINT, COMINT, COMMEXT, PROFORMA, FISINT, and SIW and applying those disciplines toward collection requirements, collection mission planning, collection management, helping translate user requirements into SIGINT tasking and collection strategies, user liaison with SIGINT and ONIR collection capabilities and SIGINT and ONIR tasking execution and reporting experience. Individual must have a broad understanding of currently relevant national mission needs and threads/scenarios (GWOT, WMD, SEAD/DEAD etc.) and in applying those to develop creative multi-int solutions. Experience with dynamic collection, collection assessment and retasking, execution and processing to perform time critical mission requirements. Candidates with solid technical marketing experience will be considered without much of the SIGINT knowledge and experience outlined above.\n\n- BS in Computer Science, engineering/technical field or equivalent years of experience - At least 15+ years of Systems Engineering and/or industry experience - Strong communication skills - Be a self-starter, able to work independently, often in a multitasking role - Significant SIGINT collection systems experience - Active TS/SCI with full scope polygraph - Technical marketing experience\n\n## Major Tenant Organizations [Excerpts] Aerospace Data Facility The Aerospace Data Facility Is A Dod Information Processing, Analysis, Relay, And Test Facility Supporting The U.S. Government And Its Allies. In Addition, It Provides An Operational Environment For Training Government And Civilian Personnel In The Execution Of Their Organizational Mission. 566Th Information Operations Squadron\n\nThe history of the 566th Information Operations Squadron (IOS) begins in the midst of World War II, when the 16th Photographic Technical Unit was activated on Nov. 5, 1944, at Charleroi, Belgium. Subordinate to the 67th Tactical Reconnaissance Group, the 16th Photographic Technical Unit was assigned at several bases throughout Europe, including Vogelsang, Limburg, and Eschwege, Germany, as well as in France. Following World War II, the unit moved to MacDill Field, Fla., where it was decommissioned on Dec. 21, 1945. The unit remained inactive until Sept. 7, 1993, when the 16th Intelligence Squadron was activated at Buckley Air National Guard Base, Colo. The unit was re-designated the 566th Operations Support Squadron (OSS) on Oct. 1, 1995. Renamed later as the 566th Information Operations Squadron (IOS) on Aug. 1, 2000, this unit aided Buckley in its transition from an Air National Guard base to an active duty Air Force base.\n\n## The Primary Mission Of The 566Th Ios Is Force Provider To The Aerospace Data Facility, Providing Leading-Edge Information Superiority And Technical Support In The Performance Of Joint National System Missions. 743Rd Military Intelligence Battalion\n\nThe 743rd Military Intelligence Battalion supports a multitude of DoD information processing and analysis operations. The battalion strives to be the foremost military intelligence battalion in the U. S. Army, providing leading-edge information superiority and technical support to Combatant Commands, the U.S. Government and its allies. The Battalion is comprised of three companies: Headquarters Operations, Alpha, Bravo, and one overseas detachment. The battalion has supported every U. S. contingency operation since 1989. The unit traces its lineage back to 1954 when the Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment, Army Security Agency Troop Command, and 7200th Administrative Area Unit organized at Fort George G. Meade, Md. On Nov. 8, 1963, the Army Security Agency Troop Command was redesignated the Army Security Agency Support Group. With the redesignation of the Army Security Agency as the U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command in 1977, the Army Security Agency Support Group became the Continental United States Military Intelligence Group on Nov. 1, 1977.\n\n## In March 1980, The Army Redesignated The Group As The 704Th Military Intelligence Brigade.\n\nOn Oct. 3, 1989, the 743rd Military Intelligence Battalion was provisionally activated at Fort Meade, and the Department of the Army formally approved it in 1990 as a subordinate unit of the 704th Military Intelligence Brigade. The 743rd Military Intelligence Battalion was organized to provide improved command, control and support to the 704th Military Intelligence Brigade detachments located at other Services' and National-level sites around the world.\n\n## In July 1998, The Battalion Underwent Major Reorganization As The Headquarters Moved To Colorado. With The Move Came A Marked Change In Mission: To Support The Joint Activity At Buckley Air Force Base.\n\nThe unit's official page can be viewed at http://www.carson.army.mil/UNITS/743dMIBn/743Homepage/Main_Frame.htm.\n\n## Company A, Marine Cryptologic Support Battalion\n\nCompany A's mission is to provide trained, deployable Marines to support operations at the Aerospace Data Facility. The Company maintains personnel readiness to augment Radio Battalions or other operational deployments as required.\n\n## Bravo Company, Intelligence Support Battalion, Marine Forces Reserve\n\nBravo Company provides task-organized detachments of intelligence personnel to augment active component elements, joint commands, and national agencies in time of crisis, contingency, and war. Contact Information 460th Space Wing Public Affairs 510 S. Aspen St. (Stop 88) Buckley AFB, CO 80011 Ph: 720-847-9431\n\n## 704Th Military Intelligence Brigade\n\nThe 704th Military Intelligence Brigade conducts signals intelligence, geospatial intelligence, computer network and information assurance operations in order to support Army, joint, combined, and national decision makers to shape future Army intelligence capabilities. With the motto of ''Here and Everywhere,\" the 704th MI Brigade provides cutting-edge signals intelligence, computer network operations, and geospatial intelligence in a merged digital environment. The brigade also supplies direct support to tactical forces, enabling Army units by delivering worldclass training, dynamically updated doctrine, materiel innovation, and tailored intelligence production. As subject matter experts, the 704th retains a strategic partnership with the National Security Agency, along with other intelligence organizations, to inform operational and strategic decision makers in order to shape intelligence transformation. The 704th is comprised of three subsidiary MI battalions found on Fort Meade and Buckley Air Force Base, Colo., with auxiliary elements assigned in support of Army and joint commands which include U.S. Central Command, U.S. Joint Forces Command, Army Special Operations Command and Army Forces Command. The 741st MI Battalion, stationed at Fort Meade, conducts information superiority operations within the National Security Agency and Central Security Service. The battalion also furnishes linguist support to the NSA, the intelligence community and other U.S. government agencies in addition to operating the Joint Training Center on behalf of the U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command, Air Intelligence Agency and Naval Security Group Command. The 742nd Military Intelligence Battalion, also on Fort Meade, conducts continuous signals intelligence and computer network operations and directly supports information assurance operations through the NSA to satisfy national, joint, combined, and Army information superiority requirements. Additionally, the 742nd conducts contributory analysis and reporting through the Army Technical Control and Analysis Element, carrying out information operations and supporting the Trojan satellite communications system. The 743rd Military Intelligence Battalion at Buckley Air Force Base, Colo., supports all strategic and national level operations with a high rate of success by providing technically qualified Soldiers in support of tactical commanders. Using strategic intelligence prowess to enhance the effectiveness of combat units, the 743rd deployed 28 Soldiers in 2007 in support of operations Enduring and Iraqi Freedom. As a team of well trained professionals, the 704th continues to set the example for all military intelligence brigades by exceeding the standards in mission requirements and molding the intelligence of the future.\n\nhttp://www.nnwc-ftmeade.navy.mil/mcsb/Companies.htm\n70TH INTELLIGENCE WING The 70th Intelligence Wing with headquarters at Fort George G. Meade, Md., falls under the Air Intelligence Agency, a primary subordinate unit of Air Combat Command. The wing was activated Aug. 16, 2000, and is the primary provider of information technology to air combat forces and combatant commands. The wing is a single-source intelligence agency, combining various intelligence disciplines providing current, accurate data to air component commanders and national decision-makers.\n\n## Mission\n\nThe wing mission is to provide multi-source, multi-service intelligence products for Department of Defense by gaining and exploiting information as a major component of the Air Force and DoD global intelligence mission. The wing integrates national intelligence into tactical operations and provides air component commanders, national decision makers and warfighters of all services with tailored, timely and actionable information. The wing plans and directs integration of its components into theater and local exercise, ensuring wartime capabilities are tested and validated. It provides applications, services and resources in the areas information warfare/command and control warfare, security acquisition, foreign weapons systems and technology, and treaty monitoring. It is the executive agent for Air Force-wide intelligence roles and functions.\n\n## Organization\n\nThe 70th Intelligence Wing has a rich history dating back to when it was first established as the 70th Observation Group. Since then, it has had many mission and name changes to include being named the 70th Reconnaissance Group, 70th Tactical Reconnaissance Group, 70th Strategic Reconnaissance Wing, 70th Bombardment Wing, to name a few. The wing has six groups, 21 squadrons, 10 detachments and more than 38 operating locations on four continents throughout the world, and includes about 7,000 people. It consists of the 70th Operations Group, 70th Mission Support Group 373rd Intelligence Group, 543rd Intelligence Group, 544th Information Operations Group, and the 692nd Intelligence Group. The 70th Operations Group, with headquarters at Fort George G. Meade, Md., conducts Air Force commandand-control warfare, electronic combat, security and information warfare operations, and systems research and development as an integral part of the National Security Agency. The group provides intelligence communications and logistics support for time-critical combat information for allied battle commanders, and U.S. unified and specified commands, and President and Secretary of Defense. Units under the group include: the 70th Operations Support Squadron, 22nd Intelligence Squadron, 29th Intelligence Squadron, 31st Intelligence Squadron, 32nd Intelligence Squadron, and the 94th Intelligence Squadron. The 70th Mission Support Group, with headquarters at Fort George G. Meade, Md., provides operational support capability to the 70th Intelligence Wing's global cryptologic battle space in support of the National Security Agency and DoD operations. The group is responsible for wartime preparedness and combat-ready contingency support operations and develops and sustains Airmen who conduct, enable, and integrate capabilities across the spectrum of national and tactical missions in signals intelligence and information assurance. Squadrons under the group include: 70th Communications Squadron, 70th Intelligence Support Squadron, 70th Mission Support Squadron, 485th Intelligence Squadron and the 690th Alteration and Installation Squadron. The 373rd Intelligence Group with headquarters at Misawa Air Base, Japan, provides intelligence communications support for time-critical combat information for the U.S. theater battle commanders, unified and specified commands, and the President and Secretary of Defense. It provides command direction and oversight for the 373rd Support Squadron and 301st Intelligence Squadron at Misawa and is the host unit for the multi-service Misawa Security Operations Center. The units under the group are: the 373rd Support Squadron, and the 301st Intelligence Squadron, both located at Misawa Air Base, Japan. The 543rd Intelligence Group, with headquarters at Medina Annex, Lackland Air Force Base, Texas provides command direction and oversight for the group's two squadrons: the Air Force components of the National Security Agency/Central Security Service Texas and the NSA/CSS Georgia. The 543rd also serves as the host unit for the multi-service NSA/CSS Texas. The units under the group are: the 93rd Intelligence Squadron and the 543rd Support Squadron, both located at Lackland AFB, Texas. The 692nd Intelligence Group, with headquarters at Hickam AFB, Hawaii, executes national cryptologic operations for more than 1,300 members in three units at four locations tailored to tactical, theater and national objectives as the Air Force Service Cryptologic Element within the Pacific Command area of responsibility. The 692nd is also responsible for information operations as the single staff point-of-presence for Air Intelligence Agency functions within the Asia-Pacific region. The units under the group are: the 303rd Intelligence Squadron at Osan Air Base, Korea; the 324th Intelligence Squadron at Kunia, Hawaii; and the 381st Intelligence Squadron at Elmendorf Air Force Base, Alaska. The 544th Information Operations Group, with headquarters at Peterson AFB, Colo., directs 11 selectively manned units around the globe including three squadrons. The group is comprised of more than 750 Airmen and 1.5 billion dollars in operating equipment. Its mission is to acquire and exploit the space-related data necessary to achieve information dominance for military operations and strategic decision making. The units under the group are: the 18th Intelligence Squadron *[Various, including Osan Air Base, South Korea]*, 451st Information Operations Squadron *[Menwith Hill, UK]* and the 566th Information Operations Squadron *[Buckley AFB, CO]*. (current as of July 2006)\nhttp://oai.dtic.mil/oai/oai?verb=getRecord&metadataPrefix=html&identifier=ADA457052\n Accession Number : ADA457052 Title :   Environmental Assessment for Capital Improvement Projects, Buckley Air Force Base, Colorado. Volume 1 of 2 Descriptive Note : Final rept. Corporate Author : AIR FORCE CENTER FOR ENVIRONMENTAL EXCELLENCE BROOKS AFB TX Personal Author(s) : Barndt, Eric ; DuWaldt, John ; Chitwood, Connie ; Zimmer, Robert ; Rigley, Joe Handle / proxy Url : http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA457052             Check NTIS Availability...\n\n## C -- Operations Building Expansion, Buckley Air Force Base, Colorado\n\nNotice Date 6/3/2005 Notice Type Solicitation Notice NAICS 541310 - Architectural Services Contracting Office US Army Corps of Engineer - Omaha District, 106 S. 15th Street, Omaha, NE 68102-1618 ZIP Code 68102-1618 Solicitation Number W9128F-05-R-0025 Response Due 7/6/2005 Archive Date 9/4/2005 Small Business Set-Aside N/A Description Solicitation Number: W9128F-05-R-0025. Project Title: Operations Building Expansion, Buckley Air Force Base, Aurora, Colorado. Contracting Office Address: U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Omaha, 106 South 15th Street, Omaha, NE 68102-1618. Description:\n\n1. CONTRACT INFORMATION: Architect-Engineer services are required for a Firm Fixed Price\ncontract for Design of the Operations Building Expansion, including charrette/concept designs, schematic designs, planning, programming, site investigations, surveying and geotechnical investigations, space planning, interior design, parametric and construction cost estimating, and other engineering services and construction phase services for the subject project. Construction phase services may include re view of contractor-prepared design documents, shop drawing and construction submittal reviews, site visits, technical assistance, commissioning support, and startup service assistance. This announcement is open to all businesses regardless of size. Final AE selection and award of the contract is anticipated in July 2005. If a large business is\nselected, a subcontracting planwith the final fee proposal will be required, consistent with Section 806 b of PL 100-180, 95-907, and 99-661. The subcontracting plan is not required with this submittal. This project will be completed with a single FY07 appropriation of approximately $50-75M with an anticipated scope of 189,000 square feet.\n\n2. PROJECT INFORMATION: This project will be located in the Aerospace Data Facility Compound at Buckley AFB, CO. The project includes computer operations centers on raised floors, sensitive compartmented information facility areas, soundproof rooms, special purpose areas, administrative offices, loading dock, mail receiving and distribution center, storage space, an integral full-service cafeteria and banquet facility, a conference center, and communications, mechanical, and electrical support rooms for high-reliability utility support. Other features are intrusion detection systems, fire protection and alarm systems, connection to an existing communications backbone, and connection to an existing utility infrastructure and energy monitoring and control system. Supporting facilities include all associated utilities, parking area s, walks, storm drainage, communications duct banks, and other site improvements. All required antiterrorism and force protection measures will be provided and may include structural hardening. The design team shall incorporate the Leadership in Energy and Environmental Design Green Building criteria to the maximum practical extent. All design work will be performed in compliance with the Department of Defense Unified Facilities Criteria documents. Construction cost estimates will be prepared using the US Army Corps of Engineers' Computer Aided Cost Estimating System, software provided by Government. Access for the handicapped will be provided. Comprehensive Interior Design services are required. Specifications will be produced in SPECSINTACT using Unified Facilities Guide Specifications. Design review comments and their responses will be performed on US Army Corps of Engineers Review Management System ProjNet/Dr-Checks. 3. SELECTION CRITERIA: The selection criteria are listed below in descending or der of importance, first by major criterion and then by each sub-criterion. Criteria a-f are primary. Criteria g and h are secondary and will only be used as tiebreakers between technically equal firms. a. Understanding of the mission, operations, and organizations comprising the Aerospace Data Facility and the interfaces these organizations have with external organizations. Ability to conduct discussions with key personnel in a Secret/Secure Compartmented Information environment. Ability to store and transmit drawings and email correspondence on a secure network acceptable to the ADF is a plus. SF 330, Part I, Section H, Item 1. b. Specialized experience and technical competence of the firm and consultants in the following areas. Only experience that has occurred in the last five years should be included in the proposal. All projects cited shall identify design start/complete dates as well as the project size, cost and scope. Specialized experience and technical competence with the current host of the Aerospace Data Facility will be considered more favorably. SF 330, Part I, Section F.\n\n## 1. Experience In The Design Of Sensitive Compartmented Information Facilities.\n\n2. Experience in the design of innovative and architecturally complex computer facilities with requirements for highly reliable, redundant utility systems of a size equivalent to this facility. 3. Experience with the design and integration of extensive, robust, internal communication networks into building systems architecture.\n\n## 4. Experience In The Design Of Facilities With Highly Complex And Innovative Audio-Visual And Graphic Display Components Integrated To Support Intelligence Mission Execution.\n\n5. Familiarity with, and experience implementing, the DoD UFC Documentation.\n6. Familiarity with Department of Defense anti-terrorism/force protection design criteria and construction standards.\n\n7. Experience with Life Safety and fire protection design of computer facilities.\n8. Experience with Sustainable Design or Green Building design concepts including energy efficiency, use of recovered materials, waste reduction, and pollution prevention using the LEED evaluation and certification methodology. 9. Knowledge of the locality of the project including geologic features, environmental conditions, climatic conditions, local construction methods, and obtaining permits. c. Past performance on DOD and Intelligence Community IC contracts with respect to quality of work, cost control maintaining the project construction cost below the Programmed Amount, and compliance with performance schedules. In addition to past performance with Intelligenc e Community contracts, past performance on similar DoD contracts will be considered. Will be evaluated from ACASS information obtained by the Omaha District Office. d. Professional personnel qualifications and specialized experience in facilities similar to the Operations Building Expansion for key design disciplines. Key disciplines that are required to be performed by registered and licensed professionals are: project management, SCIF facility planning, architecture, interior design, landscape architec ture, mechanical, electrical, fire protection, structural, civil, environmental, water and wastewater, communications engineering, security, force protection, cost estimating, geotechnical, and land surveyor. [deletia] Place of Performance Address: US Army Corps of Engineer - Omaha District 106 S. 15th Street, Omaha NE Zip Code: 68102-1618 Country: US\n\n## Department Of The Air Force Hq Air Intelligence Agency Air Intelligence Agency Mission Directive 1521 5  April 1999 Intelligence 566Th Operations Support Squadron\n\nNOTICE: This publication is available digitally on the AIA WWW site at: http://aiaweb.aia.af.mil/products. OPR: HQ AIA/XRMO (MSgt Lisa M. Dillard) Certified by: HQ AIA/XRM (Lt Col Annie M.McLeod) Supersedes AIAMD 1521, 15 April 1997. Distribution: Distribution F; X: HQ USAF/XPMO/XOIXX (1 each) HQ 544IG/CC (1), 566 OSS/CC(1)\n\n1. **Mission.** The 566th Operations Support Squadron (566 OSS) is located at Buckley Air National\nGuard Base, Aurora, Colorado. The squadron: 1.1. Provides Air Intelligence Agency (AIA) personnel to accomplish national tasking. 1.2. Provides direct support to a multi-agency organization responsible for supporting nationallevel communications, data processing, and high-speed data relay. Delivers essential information to national decision makers, commanders-in-chief, tactical commanders, and other military forces worldwide. Responds to tasking on multibillion-dollar national systems and provides instruction to more than 900 multiservice personnel.\n\n## 2. Command. The 566 Oss Is A Subordinate Unit To The 544Th Intelligence Group, Subordinate To Aia, Afield Operating Agency Subordinate To The Director Of Intelligence, Surveillance, And Reconnaissance (Af/Xoi).\n\n3. Responsibilities. The 566 OSS:\n    3.1.Leads, supports, and develops Air Force personnel in performance of military duties and\nresponsibilities while teaming with site and command management to meet the site's requirements for Air Force expertise. Teams with other service components, Colorado Air National Guard, and Air Force Space Command to meet executive agent support responsibilities such as: planning, finance and budgeting, personnel management, training, site integration, operations management, and service and infrastructure support.\n       3.2. Acts as facility host for Service Cryptologic Elements and liaison to 821st Support Group serving in a multiservice DoD facility hosted by Air Force Space Command on a Colorado Air\n      National Guard Base.\n\n.JAMES J. ROMANO, Colonel, USAF\nDirector of Plans and Requirements\n\n## Air Intelligence Agency\n\nTHIS IS AN EXCEPTED SERVICE POSITION VACANCY ANNOUNCEMENT NUMBER:   ADF06-006 POSITION TITLE, SERIES, GRADE:    Maintenance Mechanic, WG-4749-10\n\n## Organization, Location  And Duty Station:  Aerospace Data Facility (Adf)    Buckley Afb Co\n\nWHO MAY APPLY:       All qualified US citizens AREA OF CONSIDERATION:      Local Commuting Area (Note: Personal travel, moving expenses or other relocation costs incurred in accepting this position may not be authorized.) OPENING DATE:  01 March 2006  CLOSING DATE:  14 March 2006 POINT OF CONTACT:  Customer Service Desk, AIA/DPCS, 321 Hof Street, San Antonio, TX 78243-7129 at ( (210) 977-2716 or DSN 969-2716. SPECIAL REQUIREMENTS/CONDITIONS:  This position has been designated for drug testing.  If you are selected for this position you may be subject to urinalysis testing prior to appointment, and you will be subject to random urinalysis testing as a condition of employment.  Individual selected will be subject to a Single Scope Background Investigation (SSBI) and must be able to acquire and retain a Top Secret (TS) clearance with Sensitive Compartmented Information (SCI) access in order to fully perform the duties and responsibilities of this position.  Incumbent will be required to take a preemployment and periodic counter- intelligence polygraph examination as a condition of employment. Position requires occasional temporary duty travel (TDY), utilizing any or all modes of transportation, both commercial and military.  Air Force requires all employees to sign up for Direct Deposit (Sure Pay) with a Financial Organization.  Applicants in receipt of an annuity based on civilian employment in the Federal Service are subject to DoD policy on Employment of Annuitants. Incumbent may be required to work unusual or rotating shifts and is subject to emergency overtime.  Incumbent is subject to be recalled to duty.  Incumbent may be required to work other than normal duty hours, which may include evenings, weekends, and/or holidays.  Incumbent will be required to have the ability to discern colors, contrasts, and depth.  Work requires the employee to drive a motor vehicle and operate assigned equipment.  An appropriate, valid driver license is required for the position.   Incumbent must stand on hard surfaces for extended periods and stoop, bend, kneel and work in tiring and uncomfortable positions and climb ladders carrying tools and replacement parts.  Frequently lifts and carries parts and equipment that weigh up to 50 pounds.  Occasionally, lifts items that weigh over 50 pounds with the help of weight handling equipment or with assistance from other workers.  In addition, work involves frequent movement and maneuvering of large, heavy equipment using hoists, holders, and pulleys as required.  Incumbent typically works in well lighted, heated and ventilated areas.  Incumbent will be subject to cuts burns, chemical irritations, strains, electrical shock, and abrasions while repairing and handling equipment.  May be exposed to unpleasant conditions from dirt, solvents, fuel, fumes, oil and grease.   Incumbent must follow prescribe safety practices and use safety equipment such as ear plugs, face shields, gloves, hard hats, glasses, and safety shoes.     Incumbent must pass a physical examination. DUTIES: Incumbent performs facilities maintenance work primarily involving air conditioning equipment mechanic, masonry, sheet metal mechanic, carpentry, plumbing, electrical equipment repairer, and locksmith assignments to maintain and repair facilities such as buildings structures, support equipment/systems, grounds, and related fixtures and utilities.  Plan, lays out, installs and troubleshoots a variety of large commercial and industrial refrigeration and air conditioning systems and supporting equipment in warehouses, shops, and large office buildings.  Performs masonry tasks involved in maintenance, repair, alteration and construction of interior and exterior surfaces and structures.  Independently installs, modifies, troubleshoots, repair, maintains a variety of new and existing utility, supply, and disposal systems and equipment, such as a sewage, water, oil and gas distribution systems, and water closets, backflow prevention devices/assemblies, and fire sprinkler systems.  Performs diagnostic, modification, overhaul, repair and maintenance of a variety of electrical devices, equipment and component in support of the organization's operation.  Independently applies skilled methods, techniques and shop mathematics to construct, install, repair, and modify wood and wood substitutes to produce a wide variety of structures.  Performs routine maintenance, overhaul, and repair of standard types of mechanical locking devices such as mortise, rim, key-in-the-knob, deadbolt, safes and emergency exit locks.  Develops patterns, cuts, forms joints, assembles, and installs items and systems which combine straight and curved edges or irregular curves, angles, and planes.  Utilizes safety practices and procedures following established safety rules and regulations and maintains a safe and clean work area.\n\n## Air Intelligence Agency, Denver, Colorado Product Support Analyst (Psa) Sep 2001 To Dec 2003\n\nNational assets systems product support analyst during systems testing phase.\n\n## Duties Included Elint Signals Analysis, Systems Analysis, Problem Resolution, And Solution Execution.\n\nEnsured system's full operational capability and functional compatibility of programs running simultaneously.\n\n## Elint Conference\n\nThe Association of Old Crows (AOC), in cooperation with the Community ELINT Management Office (CEMO), will sponsor an ELINT Conference on 16 March 2005 at the Northrop Grumman Facility, Annapolis Junction, Maryland. The conference will be at the TS/SI/TK U.S. Only classification level. The chairman of the conference will be Mr. Morrie Levine, Director, CEMO. The theme of the conference is \"Future of ELINT Transformation and Horizontal Integration.\" The conference builds on the AOC ELINT conference hosted by CEMO in April 2003. Featured speakers include: Lt Gen Hayden, USAF, DIRNSA; Mr. Charlie Allen, Assistant Director of Central Intelligence for Collection; Lt Gen Clapper, USAF (Ret), Director, National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency; and Mr. Thomas Behling, Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Preparations and Warning. Other speakers include: Col Kim High, USAF (Director, BIG SAFARI); Mr. John Canavan, Chief, Denver Security Operations Center; Ms. Marian Cherry, ASD/NII, who will address Horizontal Fusion; Lt Col Hockaday, USAF, CEMO, who will address Non-Traditional ISR (NTISR); Lt Col Greg Burns, USAF, Chief of E-Space, NSA; and LCDR Doug Harbold, USN, NRO. This conference will address one of the most critical, high priority, high interest areas within our government and the Department of Defense. It is a not-tobe-missed forum. 18 May 2005 To:  Distribution From: Joseph M. Mazzafro\n\n## Subject: Naval - Nro Conference 2005: Space And Maritime Domain Awareness (Mda) --- The Sea Services' Perspective\n\nApproximately 375 military, civil service, and contractors attended the subject conference hosted by the Navy-NRO Coordinating Group (NNCG) under the guidance of Rear Admiral (select) Vic See at the National Reconnaissance Office's (NRO) Jimmie D. Hill Conference Center on 4/5 May. The conference was held at the Top Secret SI/TK classification level, but what follows is an unclassified summary of this most informative conference.\n\n## [Deletia]\n\nTom McCaffery (Deputy Director Denver Security Operations Center) observed that neither the collaboration nor the automated fusion tools are available to deal with the scale of the MDA challenge. He continued saying that analyst skill sets will need to be updated to take advantage of these tools when they become available.\n\nhttp://www.vandenberg.af.mil/14af/sr_leadership/bios/hamel_bio.doc\n\n## [Excerpts] Major General Michael A. Hamel\n\n  Maj. Gen. Michael A. Hamel is Commander, 14th Air Force, Air Force Space Command, and Commander, Space Air Forces, U.S. Strategic Command, Vandenberg Air Force Base, Calif.  The 14th Air Force, the historic \"Flying Tigers,\" encompasses all U.S. Air Force space forces, including missile warning, space  control, satellite control, space-based surveillance,  navigation and communications, and spacelift and range  capabilities.\n\n## Assignments:\n\n1. August 1972 - July 1975, staff development planner, Space  and Missile Systems Organization,\n Los Angeles AFB, Calif.\n2. August 1975 - July 1977, missile analyst, Foreign Technology Division, Lowry AFB, Colo. 3. August 1977 - July 1979, Mission Director, Aerospace Data  Facility, Buckley Air National\nGuard Base, Colo.\n\n## Brigadier General William N. Mccasland\n\nMaj. Gen. William N. McCasland is Director, Space Acquisition, Office of the Under Secretary of the Air Force, Washington, D.C. He directs development and purchasing on space and missile programs to Air Force major commands, product centers and laboratories dealing with acquisition programs. His responsibilities include crafting program strategies and options for representing Air Force positions to Headquarters U.S. Air Force, the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Congress and the White House. General McCasland was commissioned in 1979 after graduating from the U.S. Air Force Academy with a Bachelor of Science degree in astronautical engineering. He has served in a wide variety of space research, acquisition and operations roles within the Air Force and the National Reconnaissance Office. He served as Vice Commander of the Ogden Air Logistics Center at Hill Air Force Base, Utah, and commanded the Phillips site of Air Force Research Laboratory at Kirtland AFB, N.M. Prior to his current assignment, he was the Vice Commander, Space and Missile Systems Center, Los Angeles AFB, Calif. EDUCATION 1979 Bachelor of Science degree in astronautical engineering, U.S. Air Force Academy, Colorado Springs, Colo. 1980 Master of Science degree in aeronautical engineering, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge 1988 Doctor of Philosophy in astronautical engineering, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge 1995 Air War College, Maxwell AFB, Ala. 1999 Advanced Program Manager's Course, Defense Systems Management College, Fort Belvoir, Va. 2004 United States-Russia Security Program, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, Cambridge, Mass. ASSIGNMENTS 1. September 1979 - September 1980, graduate student, Air Force Institute of Technology, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge 2. October 1980 - March 1984, payload development engineer, Secretary of the Air Force Office of Special Projects-6, Los Angeles AFB, Calif. [Sourcebook note: the Air Force Office of Special Projects functioned as Program A of the National Reconnaissance Office.] 3. April 1984 - June 1985, Chief, Payload Systems Division, Secretary of the Air Force Office of Special Projects-8, Los Angeles AFB, Calif. 4. July 1985 - September 1988, doctoral student, Air Force Institute of Technology, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge 5. October 1988 - May 1992, assistant director, Systems Engineering, Secretary of the Air Force Office of Special Projects-13, Los Angeles AFB, Calif. 6. June 1992 - July 1994, Director, Mission Planning, Aerospace Data Facility, Buckley AFB, Colo. 7. August 1994 - May 1995, student, Air War College, Maxwell AFB, Ala. 8. June 1995 - August 1997, Commander, Operations Squadron, Aerospace Data Facility, Buckley AFB, Colo. 9. August 1997 - March 2000, Chief Engineer, Navstar GPS Joint Program Office, Los Angeles AFB, Calif. 10. April 2000 - September 2001, System Program Director, Space Based Laser Project Office, Los Angeles AFB, Calif. 11. October 2001- May 2004, Materiel Wing Director, Air Force Research Laboratory Space Vehicles Directorate, and Commander, Phillips Research Site, Kirtland AFB, N.M. 12. June 2004 - October 2005, Vice Commander, Ogden Air Logistics Center, Hill AFB, Utah 13. October 2005 - June 2007, Vice Commander, Space and Missile Systems Center, Los Angeles AFB, Calif. 14. June 2007 - present, Director, Space Acquisition, Office of the Under Secretary of the Air Force, Washington, D.C. MAJOR AWARDS AND DECORATIONS Defense Superior Service Medal Legion of Merit with oak leaf cluster Defense Meritorious Service Medal with two oak leaf clusters Meritorious Service Medal with oak leaf cluster\n\n## Professional Memberships And Associations Associate Fellow, American Institute Of Aeronautics And Astronautics\n\nEFFECTIVE DATES OF PROMOTION Second Lieutenant May 30, 1979 First Lieutenant May 30, 1981 Captain May 30, 1983 Major March 1, 1988 Lieutenant Colonel April 1, 1991 Colonel Aug. 1, 1998 Brigadier General July 1, 2005 Major General Dec. 3, 2007 (Current as of January 2008)\nhttp://www.research.ku.edu/kucr/roberts/index.shtml Dr. James A. Roberts was named Vice Provost for Research for  the University of Kansas Lawrence campus in May 2004. He  simultaneously was named President of the KU Center for Research, Inc., a nonprofit corporation charged with managing research administration for the campus. Roberts came to KU in 1990 following a successful career in industry in which he managed approximately $100 million in national security contracts involving satellite surveillance, telecommunications, and reconnaissance signal processing. From 1987 to 1990, he was the Manager of TRW-Denver Operations,  which grew to a $40 million per year high-tech engineering organization. He came to TRW-Denver in 1983 and led the turn-around of a troubled national security project at the Aerospace Data Facility, at the time one of the world's largest computer software systems. As a result, the ADF won the U.S. government's Most Outstanding Field Station Award in 1987. From 1969 to 1983, Roberts was with ESL Inc., a start-up company in California's Silicon Valley. After several promotions, he became Manager of the Communications and Radar Laboratory in 1980. During his tenure at ESL, he was an adjunct faculty member at Santa Clara University from 1978 to 1983. Prior to ESL, he was with RCA on Boston's Route 128, where he was an electronics engineer for the APOLLO mission to the Moon.\n\n## [Experience] Access/Collection Manager Cryptologic Services Group (Csg) (Military Industry) June 2007 - September 2008 (1 Year 4 Months)\n\nManaged the National SIGINT Requirements Process for United States Forces Korea. Provided Collection Management expertise on national and theater collection assets to senior military and civilian personnel which led to robust reporting provided to US decision and policy makers; extensive experience with Information Needs.\n\n## Senior Lead Reporter National Security Agency/Central Security Service Colorado (Military Industry) June 2004 - June 2007 (3 Years 1 Month)\n\nAnalyzed and reported on worldwide events of interest, focusing on multi-mission and multi-discipline efforts. Drafted and provided quality control for thousands of time-sensitive intelligence reports providing national agencies with concise analysis of real-time events. Operationally and administratively responsible for leading, managing and mentoring a 15 employee team tasked with fulfilling strategic intelligence requirements.\n\n## Communications Security Analyst National Security Agency/Central Security Service Pacific (Watercup) (Military Industry) January 2004 - June 2004 (6 Months)\n\nConducted Communications Security (COMSEC) monitoring (collection, analysis, and reporting) and operational force protection of United States government encrypted and unencrypted telecommunications, Automated Information Systems (AIS) and related non-communication signals as tasked by the Joint COMSEC Monitoring Activity Headquarters (NSA/I72). COMSEC monitoring process during Operation Enduring Freedom/Operation Iraqi Freedom saved lives of US employees by providing force protection during sensitive combat operations in theater.\n\n## Morse Operator/Product Reporter National Security Agency/Central Security Service Hawaii (Security And Investigations Industry) January 2000 - January 2004 (4 Years 1 Month)\n\nInterpreted and produced time-sensitive intelligence reports for theater and national customers. Used signal analysis techniques to exploit theater signals of interest. Critical decision-making abilities led to enhanced protection of US assets in times of crisis.\n\nhttp://www.isce.com/eyoung Rear Admiral (select) M. Elizabeth Young is the Program Manager, Low Earth Orbit System Program Office in the Signals Intelligence Directorate at the National Reconnaissance Office in Chantilly, VA and assigned to Space and Naval Warfare Systems Command Space Field Activity. She is responsible for cost, schedule, and performance of a satellite system which provides essential, actionable intelligence to ships at sea and is the engine for Maritime Domain Awareness. Rear Admiral Young is from New Mexico and graduated in 1984 from the United States Naval Academy with a BS degree in Chemistry. Her initial tour was at the Naval Space Surveillance Systems Command, Dahlgren, VA. In 1987 she attended the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, California where she graduated in 1990 with MS degrees in Physics and Space Operations. After graduation she reported to the Naval Research Laboratory in Washington, D.C. Her team developed biological warfare sensors which were deployed to the fighting forces during the first Gulf War and serve as the basis of many of today's detectors. While at the Naval Research Laboratory, she served additional duty to the Naval Space Technology Program. In 1992 she reported as the Officer in Charge, Naval Space Command Detachment at the Defense Support System Ground Station at Buckley Air National Guard Base in Aurora, CO. During this tour she qualified as Crew Commander and was promoted to Lieutenant Commander. In 1994 she reported to the Aerospace Data Facility at Buckley Air National Guard Base in Aurora. During this tour she developed and fielded a new ground processing upgrade at the Aerospace Data Facility and other facilities. Upon completing her tour, she attended and graduated from the Program Manager's Course at the Defense Systems Management College at Ft. Belvoir, VA. From 1997 to 1999 she served as the Assistant Program Manager for Systems & Engineering (Class Desk) on the Naval Tactical Unmanned Air Vehicle Program at the Naval Air Systems Command in Patuxent River, MD. In 1999 she reported to the SPAWAR Space Field Activity, National Reconnaissance Office, Chantilly, VA where she served as the Deputy Chief Systems Engineer of the Future Imagery Architecture Program in the Imagery Intelligence (IMINT) Directorate and was promoted to Commander. In 2001 she was reassigned as the Deputy Program Manager and Chief Systems Engineer of the Advanced Concepts Staff in the IMINT Directorate. During this tour she led a three-year Technology Readiness Assessment of advanced, special technologies. While in this tour she was promoted to Captain. Her military decorations include: Defense Meritorious Service Medal with Oak Leaf Cluster, Meritorious Service Medal, Joint Commendation Medal with Oak Leaf Cluster, Naval and Marine Corps Commendation Medal, Naval Achievement Medal. Her National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) awards include: Director's Circle, NRO Gold Medal for Distinguished Service, NRO Silver Medal for Superior Performance, IMINT Employee of the Year 2004, and NRO Employee of the Year 2005. She has been nominated for the Jimmie D. Hill National Military Intelligence Award and for the Women in Aerospace Lifetime Achievement Award. She is also the recipient of the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA) Director's Coin, NGA Medallion, and the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) Director's Award. BRIGADIER GENERAL KATHERINE E. ROBERTS [EXCERPTS] Selected for reassignment as Special Assistant to the Deputy Director, National Reconnaissance Office, Office of the Under Secretary of the Air Force, Chantilly, Va. Brig. Gen. Katherine E. Roberts is Principal Director for Forces Policy, Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Forces Policy, Washington, D.C. She is responsible for policy development and recommendations for senior Department of Defense officials concerning space, missile defense, offensive and defensive strategic capabilities as part of the new triad, and warfare based on new technologies. General Roberts entered the Air Force in 1977 through the ROTC program at Indiana University where she was a distinguished graduate. Her assignments include space operations, acquisition of space systems and staff work. She was a manned space flight engineer, the program manager of a major acquisition program, and has served on the staffs at major command and unified command headquarters, Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Space, and the Joint Staff. She served as the Vice Director of Operations at U.S. Space Command and the Vice Director for Space Operations at the new U.S. Strategic Command for the run-up and execution of Operation Iraqi Freedom. Prior to assuming her current position, General Roberts was Commander, Command and Control, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance Systems Wing at Hanscom Air Force Base, Mass. ASSIGNMENTS 1. January 1977 - August 1979, orbital analyst, Space Defense Center, Cheyenne Mountain Operations Center, Colo. 2. August 1979 - January 1982, trajectory orbital research analyst and Chief, Tracking Analysis Work Center, National Security Agency, Fort George G. Meade, Md. 3. January 1982 - April 1983, Chief, Data Recorder Division, Office of Special Projects, Office of the Secretary of the Air Force, Los Angeles AFB, Calif. [The USAF Office of Special Projects functioned as Program A of the National Reconnaissance Office] 4. May 1983 - April 1986, manned spaceflight engineer, Space Division, Air Force Systems Command, Los Angeles AFB, Calif. 5. April 1986 - October 1987, Chief, Spacecraft Integration and Flight Operations Division, Office of Special Projects, Office of the Secretary of the Air Force, Los Angeles AFB, Calif. 6. October 1987 - August 1988, Director, Spacecraft Division, Space and Missile Systems Division, Buckley Air National Guard Base, Colo. 7. September 1988 - May 1992, Deputy Director, Space Systems Integration, Office of Special Projects, Office of the Secretary of the Air Force, the Pentagon, Washington, D.C. 8. May 1992 - February 1994, Chief, Space System Division, Defense Landsat Program Office, Office of Special Projects, Office of the Secretary of the Air Force, the Pentagon, Washington, D.C. 9. February 1994 - August 1994, military assistant to the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Space, [Director of the NRO] Office of the Secretary of the Air Force, the Pentagon, Washington, D.C.\n\nhttp://www.buckley.af.mil/photos/media_search.asp?q=security+agency Staff Sgt. Jared Hershman, 566th Information Operations Squadron, was named the National Security Agency and Central Security Service Military Performer of the Year for 2005.\n\n## Chief Master Sergeant Michael J. Stephenson\n\n Chief Master Sergeant Michael J. Stephenson is Superintendent of the Air Force Information Operations Center, Lackland Air Force Base, Texas. He provides counsel to the commander on all matters related to morale, welfare, training and effective utilization of more than 1,000 uniformed, civilian and contractor personnel performing Information Operations threat analysis, architecture and solutions, tactics development, maintenance, testing, training, and aggressor operations across the three pillars of Information Operations: Network Operations, Electronic Warfare Operations and Influence Operations. Chief Stephenson assists the Operations Center in meeting mission requirements by facilitating cooperation across two directorates, as well as the 318th Information Operations Group and the Air Force Information Operations Battlelab. He also directs force management, professional development and career enhancement activities for more than 600 uniformed personnel. Chief Stephenson entered the Air Force in 1980 and has served in the intelligence career field, and as an acting first sergeant and noncommissioned officer in charge, Protocol Division. Prior to assuming his current position in April 2006, he was the Superintendent, Operations Plans Division, Air Intelligence Agency, Lackland AFB.\n\n## Education\n\n1982 NCO Preparatory Course, Fort George G. Meade, Md. 1983 Associate of Applied Science degree, interpreting and translating, Community College of the Air Force 1987 Associate of Arts degree in Soviet Studies, University of Maryland, United Kingdom 1988 Bachelor of Arts degree in Soviet Studies/Political Science, University of Maryland, United Kingdom 1988 NCO Leadership School, RAF Upwood, United Kingdom 1994 NCO Academy, Lackland AFB, Texas 1996 Postgraduate Intelligence Program, Strategic Intelligence, Joint Military Intelligence College, Wright-Patterson AFB, Ohio 2000 Senior NCO Academy, Maxwell AFB, Ala.\n\n## Assignments\n\n1. October 1980 - December 1980, trainee, Basic Military Training, Lackland AFB, Texas 2. December 1980 - February 1982, student, Basic Russian Language Course, Lackland AFB, Texas 3. February 1982 - June 1982, student, Voice Cryptologic Technical Training Course, Goodfellow AFB, Texas 4. June 1982 - April 1985, voice language analyst, 6941st Electronic Security Squadron, Headquarters National Security Agency, Fort George G. Meade, Md. 5. April 1985 - October 1992, language operations supervisor, 6950th Electronic Security Group, Menwith Hill Station, Harrogate, United Kingdom 6. October 1992 - July 1996, translations supervisor and noncommissioned officer in charge, Protocol Division, National Air Intelligence Center, Wright-Patterson AFB, Ohio 7. July 1996 - July 2000, senior operations controller and operations superintendent and first sergeant, 566th Operations Support Squadron, Buckley AFB, Denver, Colo. 8. July 2000- July 2002, Superintendent, Current Operations, and Superintendent, Mission Management, 303rd Intelligence Squadron, Osan Air Base, Republic of Korea 9. July 2002 - October 2004, senior enlisted leader, National Security Agency Pacific, Camp H.M. Smith, Hawaii 10. October 2004 - June 2005, Operations Superintendent, 324th Intelligence Squadron, Kunia Regional Security Operations Center, Hawaii 11. June 2005 - April 2006, Superintendent, Operations Plans Division, Headquarters Air Intelligence Agency, Lackland AFB, Texas 12. April 2006 - Present, Superintendent, Air Force Information Operations Center, Lackland AFB, Texas (May - Aug 2006, Operations Superintendent, 763rd Expeditionary Reconnaissance Squadron, Al Udeid Air Base, Qatar) MAJOR AWARDS AND DECORATIONS Defense Meritorious Service Medal with three oak leaf clusters Meritorious Service Medal with oak leaf cluster Air Force Commendation Medal Joint Service Achievement Medal with oak leaf cluster Joint Meritorious Unit Award with two oak leaf clusters Military Outstanding Volunteer Service Medal OTHER ACHIEVEMENTS 1988 Distinguished graduate, Noncommissioned Officer Leadership School 1994 Wright-Patterson AFB Base Noncommissioned Officer of the Year 1997 544th Intelligence Group Senior Noncommissioned Officer of the Year 2000 303rd Intelligence Squadron Senior Noncommissioned Officer of the Year EFFECTIVE DATES OF PROMOTION Sergeant Nov 1 1983 Staff Sergeant Jun 1 1984 Technical Sergeant Jan 1 1991 Master Sergeant Nov 1 1996 Senior Master Sergeant Mar 1 2000 Chief Master Sergeant Dec 1 2002\nhttp://www.calguard.ca.gov/casmr/bioTurosD.htm\n\n## Donald R. Turos, Jr Colonel Chief Information Officer (G6), California State Military Reserve Ltc 'Don' Turos Serves As The G6, California State Military Reserve And As The Deputy, Director J6, Joint Forces Headquarters California National Guard Providing A Wide Range Of Communications And Information Technology To Guard And Reserve Forces Statewide.\n\nBorn in Garfield Heights, Ohio, on 2 November 1954, he graduated from San Mateo High School in San Mateo California, in June 1973. He received his Bachelor of Science Degree in Computer Science/Basic Science with a minor in Atmospheric Science from the United States Air Force Academy in June 1977. He received his Master of Science Degree in Operations Research from the AF Institute of Technology in December 1981. He retired from active duty on 1 July 05 and on the same day accepted an appointment in the California State Military Reserve and was ordered to term State Active Duty. His Professional Military Education includes Squadron Officer School, Air Command and Staff College, Army Command and General Staff College, and Air War College; Computer Systems Staff Officer Course; and a certified Acquisition Professional by the Defense Acquisition University. He is a master Communications- Computer officer and a rated parachutist. Commissioned 1 June 1977, he began his career at Range Group, Nellis AFB, Nevada, as a software design engineer supporting the Combat Air Force's RED FLAG exercises and other range activities at the Tactical Fighter Weapons Center. Having earned a graduate studies slot, he attended the AFIT School of Engineering, Wright-Patterson AFB, Ohio writing his thesis on Systems Reliability. He attended SOS at Maxwell AFB, Alabama. His second assignment took him to Kelly AFB, Texas, and his first tour in Air Intelligence Agency (then Electronic Security Command). Assigned to Deputy Chief of Staff for Data Automation, he supported both the AF Electronic Warfare Center and Joint Electronic Warfare Center as the Chief of the Electronic Combat Requirements Division acquiring state-of-the-art technology. He deployed the agency's initial field unit office automation and network equipment world-wide as the Chief of the Standard Systems Requirements Division. His initial overseas tour took him to the 690 Electronic Security Wing at Tempelhof Central Airport Berlin, Germany. He served as the first AIA, unit-level Comm-Computer Systems staff officer in the field and deployed the $30M Tempelhof Automation System as a part of the Berlin Radar Program. His responsibility grew from a five-man software support team into a 45-man division supporting the Berlin Air Route Traffic Control Center, providing all AF record communications for Berlin, and widearea and local area networking the largest inventory of PCs in AIA at the time. Next, he attended the sister service Army CGSC at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. Overseas again at Hickam AFB, Hawaii, as the Deputy Commander for Comm-Computer Systems, 692 Intelligence Wing, AIA. His units, responsibility, and travels ranged from Australia, Thailand, the Philippines, Korea, Okinawa, and Japan to Alaska and Hawaii supporting both the National Security Agency and Pacific Air Forces. He led the consolidation of national and AF record communications resources theater-wide. Returning stateside, he served as both senior military member of the Commander's Action Staff, Aerospace Data Facility, and Support Flight Commander, 566 Operations Support Squadron, Buckley ANG Base, Colorado. He gained national systems experience, yet planned and built base services and support for the 1400 active duty joint-service members as BRAC closed the federal military installations in the Denver region to be reborn as Buckley AFB. Making a family decision to return to California, he volunteered as the Plans Flight Commander, 61 Comm Squadron, Space and Missile Systems Center, Los Angeles AFB, California. He managed the $15M support contract and led the planning, programming, and deployment of leading edge, ATM networked Information Technology for the 4500 users of the numbered AF-equivalent Center; home to 6 of the top 10 AF acquisition programs valued at $10B. Next, he served as the Senior Air Force Advisor to the 162 Combat Comm Group, California Air National Guard, North Highlands ANG Station, California. He led a team of 6 master sergeants advising the largest Guard combat comm group in the nation with 7 squadrons located throughout the state and deploying world-wide. In addition, post the events 9-11-01, he served as the Senior Intelligence Analyst and Briefer for Homeland Security and Operation Aerosafe to the Office of the Adjutant General and Commander of the California Air National Guard. Going remote, he served his third overseas tour on the US Forces Korea, J6 Staff and the Combined Forces Command, C6 Staff, Yongsan Army Garrison, Seoul, Republic of Korea as the J6 XO and staff director as well as the division chief for three theater level functional areas: the Joint Frequency Management Office, the Allied COMSEC Management Office, and the Information Assurance function. Returning back to California as the 12 Air Force Special Assistant to the Commander of the 162 Combat Communications Group, California Air National Guard and assigned to Operating Location B, 612 Air Comm Squadron, 12 Air Force. He was responsible for the smooth transition of traditional ANG units assuming missions side by side with active duty organizations in the functional areas of Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance. Promoted to LTC on 1 October 1993, his decorations include the Defense Meritorious and Meritorious Service Medals; the Air Force and Army commendation medals, the Air Force Achievement Medal, the California Medal of Merit and Commendation Medal, as well as the Bronze Order of Mercury from the US Army Signal Corps Regimental Association.\n\n## 743D Military Intelligence Battalion - Beyond All Boundaries\n\nThe distinctive unit insignia for the 743d MI Battalion is a silver-color metal and enamel device consisting of a medium blue oval gridlined silver delta flight symbol, enclosed in base by a black scroll inscribed with the unit motto in silver; overall, a diagonally crossed black dagger and yellow lightning flash. Oriental blue and silver gray (silver) are the traditional colors of the Military Intelligence Corps. Black and white/silver denote the day and night continuous operations conducted by elements of the unit, as well as the covert and overt nature of the battalion. The black dagger symbolizes stealth and military preparedness, as soldiers of the battalion are continually prepared for worldwide deployment with and for warfighters. The flash denotes speed and accuracy, as well as the battalion's ability to provide worldwide communications and intelligence support. The gridlined oval represents the global mission of the unit and its soldiers' widespread deployment. The delta flight symbol extending beyon d the boundaries of the globe symbolizes the unit's association with space and its mission to exploit space-based assets, and underscores the unit's motto, \"Beyond All Boundaries.\" The 743d MI Battalion traces its lineage back to 1954 when the Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment, Detachment Army Security Agency (ASA) Troop Command, and 7200th Administrative Area Unit organized at Fort George G. Meade, Maryland. On 8 November 1963, the ASA Troop Command redesignated the Army Security Agency Support Group. With the redesignation of the ASA as the United States Army Intelligence and Security Command (INSCOM) in 1977, the ASA Support Group became the Continental United States Military Intelligence Group on 1 November 1977. In March 1980, the Army redesignated the group as the 704th MI Brigade. On 3 October 1989, the 743d MI Battalion provisionally activated and the Department of the Army formally approved it in 1990 as a subordinate unit of the 704th MI Brigade. In July 1998, the Battalion underwent major reorganization as the Headquarters moved to Colorado. With the move came a marked change in mission. The 743d MI Battalion's mission is to support the joint military support activity at the Buckley Air National Guard Base. They provide continuous worldwide signals and technically derived intelligence operations to satisfy national, joint, combined, and Army information superiority requirements. The Battalion has supported every contingency operation in which the United States has participated since 1989. The unit achieved the award of two National Intelligence Meritorious Unit Citations and the National Security Agency-sponsored Travis Trophy in recognition of service sites and units making significant contributions to the national cryptologic effort. The 743d MI Battalion also earned the Cypher Wheel Award.\n\n## Field Training Exercise Tests Soldiers' Mettle By Thom Williams/The Scout\n\nFORT HUACHUCA, Ariz. (TRADOC News Service, Dec. 1, 2006) -- The Soldiers in the 96Y Signals Intelligence Collector/Analyst course had one obstacle standing between them and graduating from 11 weeks of Advanced Individual Training, a 72-hour Field Training Exercise that included tasks such as reacting to an enemy ambush and a grenade assault course. The Soldiers are assigned to Company C, 344th Military Intelligence Battalion. They are nicknamed \"The Coyotes\" and did phase one of their AIT at the Center for Information Dominance at Corry Station in Pensacola, Fla. before attending training at Fort Huachuca. \"We have some really good stuff out here,\" said 1st Sgt. Ken Segraves, Company C, 344th Military Intelligence Battalion. \"We have some raids that these guys go on and we are teaching them how dismount a vehicle properly which is not into the fire, but out of the fire and how to react to an Improvised Explosive Devices.\"\n\n## Segraves Went On To Say That Once They Graduate, Most Of The Soldiers Will Go On To Strategic Assignments Such As Working With The National Security Agency At Buckley Air Force Base, Colo.\n\n\"Our goal is at the end of the FTX when the Soldier graduates and they leave here, if they get deployed they will be ready to do the exact same thing that they did here but better,\" said Staff Sgt. Eric Raymon, noncommissioned officer in charge of the FTX. \"I've been to Ranger School and the first sergeant has been with Special Forces units. We try to incorporate a lot of the training fatigue and foster a teamwork oriented environment,\" said 2nd Lt. Paul Lushenko, executive officer. Lushenko said that the trainers want to teach the Soldier how to persevere and overcome hardship during the exercise. The 344th MI Bn headquarters and two of its companies are located at Goodfellow Air Force Base near San Angelo, Texas. The battalion's other two companies are located at Pensacola, Fla. and here at Fort Huachuca. The cadre who run the AIT joke that when people find out they belong to the 344th MI Bn they assume the unit is National Guard or Army Reserve because they are small and not very well know around Fort Huachuca.\n\n## Note From The 111Th Military Intelligence (Mi) Brigade Csm\n\nFirst of all let me introduce myself, I am CSM Gerardus Wykoff coming out of the 101st Airborne Division (AASLT) where I served as the G2 SGM for about five months and then as the 2-101 Brigade Troops Battalion CSM for the last 23 months. Now that I have given you a little background on myself I would like to talk about the great things the 111th MI Brigade is doing to ensure that our MI Warriors are trained and ready to leave the training base and move out to the theaters of operation. For the first time in history we are making changes to the Program of Instruction (POI) on a monthly basis. We are working with units that are down range, getting the latest tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) and trends to ensure we are training our MI Warriors to meet today's challenges. I want to break it down by battalion on how we are accomplishing this and the challenges we are facing in order to provide the field with the best trained MI Warriors. 304th MI Battalion Within the 304th MI Battalion numerous changes have been made and continue to be made to the POIs for the Officer courses: Basic Officer Leader Course (BOLC); MI Captains Career Course (MICCC): Areas of Concentration (AOCs) 35C, 35G; G2/S2X; Warrant Officer Basic Course (WOBC) and WO Advanced Course (WOAC); Sensitive Site Exploitation, Cultural Awareness, Intelligence Support to Counterinsurgency Operations; Warrior Tasks and Battle Drills; Urban Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield; Distributed Common Ground Station-Army (DCGS-A) training, and most noteworthy the Joint Intelligence Combat Training Center (JI-CTC). Not one course in the battalion is taught the same as the class before. Lessons learned and TTPs from the War on Terror (WOT) are incorporated during each course that effect change in the next iteration. Experienced captains and WOs attending class bring their lessons learned directly from the MI portion of the WOT battlefield and most are incorporated into the learning environment. After reflecting on the lessons learned from Operations Enduring Freedom (OEF) and Iraqi Freedom (OIF), the U.S. Army Intelligence Center and School at Fort Huachuca identified a need to train both officers and Soldiers to perform intelligence analysis and support operations against a contemporary enemy in a tactical environment using the same equipment and resources available in Afghanistan and Iraq. The JI-CTC was initially established in the officer training battalion to train and test these requirements. Today, the JI-CTC conducts over 20 rotations per year, preparing over 2,200 Soldiers to conduct their intelligence mission in a Joint, Interagency, Intergovernmental, and Multinational environment. During the intense week-long exercise Soldiers are challenged to meet three training objectives, all of which support the commander's visualization and understanding of the enemy and the operational environment. The first objective is to support situational understanding by establishing and maintaining the enemy common operating picture, conducting pattern and predictive analysis, and providing intelligence assessments. The second objective is to conduct intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR). Students will recommend priority intelligence requirements, develop ISR overlays and matrices, and manage ISR assets and their employment. The final objective is to provide intelligence support to effects by developing a high value individual list, preparing both lethal and nonlethal target packages, and conducting combat assessments. JI-CTC is the culminating event for intelligence personnel trained at Fort Huachuca. The exercise replicates the Intelligence Battle Staff from the Chief of the Division Analysis and Control Element all the way down to the junior analyst at the maneuver battalion. In order to integrate Soldiers from multiple military occupational specialties (MOSs) and training conducted at multiple locations, a scenario has been developed that is based on the current situation in Iraq. On Training Day Zero, the division ACE, brigade combat team, and supporting battalions all go through a relief in place briefing to prepare them for upcoming operations. As the students begin their Tactical Operations Center (TOC) set up, the enemy senses vulnerability due to the transition and insurgent activity increases. Students from Advanced Individual Training courses, noncommissioned officers (NCOs) from the ANCOC and BNCOC, warrant officers from WOBC, lieutenants from the BOLC, and captains from the MICCC must quickly identify and track the threat, analyze the data passed on from the unit they replaced, and then make recommendations to their leadership on what actions to take in order to protect U.S. personnel, to support the Iraqi government and the local community, and to target the insurgents. A digital operating environment links students training at Rowe Hall, Site Maverick, and Sites Uniform and Papa with Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) Soldiers training at Goodfellow Air Force Base in Texas. In addition, international officers are integrated into JI-CTC through their participation in the Coalition TOC. To ensure all students are well prepared intelligence specialists upon their arrival at their next duty station, the exercise at JI-CTC is fought using the latest computer based hardware and software. The scenario incorporates over 100,000 messages from all intelligence disciplines and the availability of the DCGS-A platform provides students with multiple resources to collect, process, analyze, and disseminate intelligence information. Prior to attending JI-CTC all students receive training on the DCGS system and its applications and are therefore expected to utilize all of their resources to keep the commander apprised of the enemy situation and able to make informed decisions. The JI-CTC is unique as it allows students from all ranks and intelligence specialties to work together in a (simulated) tactical environment. It provides many of them with their first taste of what to expect when they enter a battalion or brigade TOC for the first time. This capstone event will continue to evolve as new insurgent TTPs are incorporated into the scenario and Army Intelligence adapts based on lessons learned from those currently engaged with the enemy.\n\n## 305Th Mi Battalion\n\nThe 305th MI Battalion trains our MOSs 33W (MI Systems Maintainer/Integrator), 96B (Intelligence Analyst), 96D (Imagery Analyst) and 96H (Common Ground Station Operator). Soldiers and continues to expand the courses in depth but not time. It has initiated Every Soldier is a Sensor (ES2) and Cultural Awareness training into all classes. All Soldiers receive Drivers' Training and should arrive at the new unit with a DA 348, Equipment Operator's Qualification Record. We have included in all courses Military Operations in Urbanized Terrain (MOUNT) Training, Warrior Tasks and Drills (WTD), a Convoy Live Fire Exercise (with a new range opening in May), and Combatives training. For specific MOSs we are adding new skill sets to help ensure that students are being trained in the latest systems available in the school house. We continue to request and receive some of the latest devices that are being used down range. We are incorporating DCGS-A and a field training exercise (FTX) updated with battalion/brigade/division TOCs (currently an eight day FTX) into 96B training. For 96H we train moving target indicator forensic tools and for 96D skill level I we are adding a geospatial intelligence (GEOINT) program. On the 33W side of the house we are updating new systems training (TROJAN/PROPHET), are no longer training on outdated systems (i.e., TRQ/TLQ), and awaiting the new Critical Task List (Computer Network Operations), LANs, and Establishing Computer networks. 309th MI Battalion For all 309th MI Battalion courses there is an increase in WTD with ES2. WTD are integrated and trained deliberately as well as integrated into daily activity to increase muscle memory. Cadre question and test Soldiers on awareness of their surroundings such as \"What was different on the way to class?\". The battalion is also including cultural awareness training. It is taught formally as well as integrated into the POI and the company area (foreign language word of the day). We are integrating 96Bs into the 97E (Human Intelligence Collector) FTX and JI-CTC. The training includes Convoy Live Fire Exercise (CLFX) and Advanced Rifle Marksmanship (ARM). Students from the 304th (second lieutenants) are sometimes included in CLFX. We have added a rural block into the Source Operations Course (SOC). The block is approximately 10 days long and is designed to replicate Source Operations outside urban areas, like 95 percent of Afghanistan. We also updated the scenarios to replicate current U.S. Army Central Command (CENTCOM) operations. Due to the course classification; a location of the final phase is in Tucson. The U.S. Air Force assists us with space on Davis-Monthan Air Force Base for TOC operations. MOS 97B (Counterintelligence Agent (CI) changes from a skill level 10 level course to a 20/30 level. The course is no longer an enlistment option but is a reenlistment option. The goal is to produce a mature agent with some \"life experience.\" The course includes blocks on Terrorism, Cultural Awareness, Use of an Interpreter, Military Source Operations, Investigations, and Surveillance. The course is very intense so proper preparation and screening via the CI screening process is a must. MOS 97E has changed scenarios to replicate the CENTCOM area of responsibility (AOR). We teach a skill set that is applicable everywhere, however since the current push is CENTCOM, we use that AOR as a backbone. The student ratio is reduced to allow cadre to better evaluate Soldiers and provide increased feedback. The booth iterations increased from three to nine. That means a Soldier has at least 27 hours of interrogations training prior to completing the course. We introduce all 97E10s to source operations and they have a minimum of 18 source meets with cadre personnel. We have increased the FTX to ten days. During the FTX Soldiers replicate living on a forward operating base in the CENTCOM AOR. They are required to conduct source operations, screening, interrogations and walkin debriefs. The NCOs in the class are given the opportunity to run their teams for MI operations as well as troop leading procedures. To facilitate this, teams are rotated through a Traffic Control Point, a Forward Collection Point, and a small populated (cadre) village. There is heavy emphasis on the Laws of War. If a student gets a 100 percent on a practical exercise (PE) such as Interrogations and violates a Law of War, the Soldier fails that PE.\n\n## 344Th Mi Battalion\n\nThe 344th MI Battalion trains four diverse MOSs ranging from firefighters to intelligence Soldiers. This presents unique challenges when trying to ensure our graduates are both technically and tactically proficient. The goal of every member of this unit, whether they are a Drill Sergeant or instructor, is to ensure the Soldiers who graduate can be an immediate asset to their unit, regardless of whether that unit is at Buckley Air Force Base, Fort Stewart, or Fort Bragg. To achieve this goal, training throughout the battalion has to mirror the doctrine and current TTP. To accomplish this, command emphasis is placed within all levels of command to ensure all trainers are trained on the most up to date TTPs used by our units currently deployed to OEF/OIF as well as the methods used by our adversaries. The battalion accomplishes this through the use of one of its most important resourcesour combat veterans. Through the incorporation of first hand knowledge of all combat experienced members of the unit, our students receive the know-how needed to be an effective and productive member of a unit as soon as they arrive. As new cadre members, recently returning from missions around the world, arrive at the unit, we incorporate their experiences into our tactical and technical training. This continuous influx of experience and skills is probably the most important aspect of keeping our technical and technical training realistic and relevant. The battalion also changes its training to satisfy the needs of units receiving our Soldiers. A recent example is when feedback from units indicated a deficiency in our Soldier's ability to safely handle their weapons during deployments. In response, the Battalion initiated Weapons Immersion Training (WIT). This month long training having students keep and safeguard their personal weapons has led to increased awareness and weapons safety. It is hoped this program will mitigate negligent discharge incidents during deployments. Feedback from units since the training started indicates the training has proven very successful. Complementing the Battalion's efforts, each company leads its own initiatives to tailor training to meet MOS specific technical and tactical needs. These efforts, outlined below, reflect personal initiatives of the Soldiers of this command, and reflect greatly on their professionalism. * Alpha Company's current efforts center on preparing all its SIGINT Analyst Soldiers to be tactically and technically proficient through the incorporation of lessons learned from Special Operations veterans currently assigned to the unit. These lessons learned have been included into the FTX scenarios and small unit tactics. The Special Operations veterans have had excessive experience with patrols outside the wire and were involved in the planning of the training objectives used in the FTX scenarios. These veterans' experiences were also used to update OPFOR on cultural tendencies and behaviors to more closely mimic what realistically happens in theater. We have also incorporated a methodical Crawl-Walk-Run approach to Army Warrior Training to ensure that our trainers and potential trainers have a thorough understanding of the fundamentals and procedures of tactical maneuvers before they supervise training or take a leadership role in the training. Current efforts also include the standardization of TTPs taught within the company with extensive participation by combat experienced Drill Sergeants and cadre to ensure all students achieve a minimum level of tactical proficiency. * Bravo Company is a prime example where, regardless of MOS, all soldiers must be trained to the same standard. The company trains initial military training (IMT) Soldiers to be Firefighters and Voice Interceptors, two very diverse skills that we hold to the same standard of tactical training. Both groups of students participate in a combined FTX with Alpha Company. The company's technical training is constantly being updated to reflect any changes in order of battle, communications equipment and procedures, as well as weapons systems and tactics in numerous target languages to include standard Arabic as well as the Iraqi dialect. * Charlie Company is responsible for six different courses in three platoons: Manual Morse, 98Y (Signals Collector/Analyst) Phase II (IMT), 98C (Signals Intelligence Analyst) Transition, 98Y (formerly 98K) Transition, Prophet Analyst, and Prophet Operator courses. The company has initiated a successful effort to incorporating tactically oriented lessons learned from currently deployed or redeploying forces throughout the Middle East using scenario based training. The training focuses on familiarizing Soldiers on the methods currently being used during conventional patrolling operations, and imparts valuable cultural awareness considerations. Emulating the Joint Readiness Training Command and National Training Command and incorporating an array of training events (multiple obstacle courses, Engagement Skills Trainer 2000, Maneuver on Urban Training Complex), the field training exercises impart a greater ability to Soldiers to problem solve and rapidly advance in tactical understanding and skill. * Delta Company trains SIGINT Analysts to perform a highly technical world-wide, Joint analysis mission. Following the battalion's emphasis, the company currently conducts a week-end long FTX which is a culminating event used to evaluate each Soldier's level of tactical proficiency. Technical training for Soldiers has focused on increasing awareness as how Signals Analysts can best support the warfighter conducting real-world operations. The 344th MI Battalion is committed to producing the best SIGINT and Firefighting Soldiers in the world. While integrating recent veterans' experiences into the training we conduct here, we ask that units currently engaged provide us feedback so we can address them immediately. We have established a web page on NSA Net for that purpose. http://www.gdflw.f.nsa/344th_MI_BN/. Units can provide immediate feedback, TTPs, and material so that we may continually improve the training. 11/100th MI Battalion The 11/100th MI Battalion is a mobilized reserve battalion composed of a total volunteer staff and cadre from ten separate Army Reserve and National Guard units. The 11/100th was originally mobilized to Fort Huachuca in January 2004 as the 2/84th MI Battalion. Since their initial deployment the unit has graduated over 700 MI professionals in MOSs 97B10, 97E10, and MI NCOES courses. The 11/100th currently teaches a 10 week 97E10 course versus. the active component 18 week 97E10 course. The 11/100th was selected to re-write and transition to the 10 week course, which will eventually be utilized by all of the Army Reserve and National Guard MI schools. As you can see we are doing a lot of things to ensure you are getting the best trained MI Warriors the Army has ever produced.\n\n\"SOLDIERS ARE OUR CREDENTIALS\"\nALWAYS OUT FRONT!\n\nhttp://hometown.aol.com/hickmanmw/aahickmanresumefeb2004.doc Michael W. Hickman Professional Objective & Profile\n\n## Supervising Officer, Digital Analysis Branch U. S. Air Force, Aerospace Data Facility, Colorado, Jan. 1987 - May 1990 The Aerospace Data Facility Is A 24-Hour Data Center That Reports Time-Critical Technical Analyses To Military Command Centers Across The World.\n\nLead a 12-person, 24-hour data processing center and directed  a contract engineering team for system projects and maintenance.  Managed a major software acquisition. Significantly increased center reporting during a 10%  reduction in manpower. Completed the development of a workstation-based planning tool. Reduced unused resources by over 5% by establishing new planning procedures.\n\nhttp://www.ludvik.com/jobs/past/buckleyang.html Aerospace Data Facility Buckley Air National Guard Aurora, Colorado Description of Work: The 5KV service originates at the existing utility plant and  feeds six (6) 5KV double ended unit substations. The 100,000 SF secured area includes an intense RFI grounding system which consists of a continuous silver solder 4-inch by 4-inch copper mesh mat. Other electrical systems within the facility include public address, emergency power distribution and lightning protection. Name and Address of Owner: Aerospace Data Facility 18500 E. 6th Avenue Aurora CO 80011 Captain Nathan Jones (303) 341-3474 Contract Number and Type: Lump Sum Bid Period of Performance: Project Duration: 730 days Finish Date: October 1995 References: Army Corps of Engineers P.O. Box 473390 Aurora, CO 80047-3390 Eric Peterson (303) 367-0335 M.A. Mortenson 1875 Lawrence Street, Suite 600 Denver, CO 80202 Leon Nelson (303)295-2511 Percentage of Work by Ludvik Electric Co.'s own forces: 100% From: CMSgt Mike Bergman (berg...@afnews.pa.af.mil) Subject: DoD News 07/30/93 Newsgroups: soc.veterans Date: 1993-08-01 19:14:56 PST\n\n## Army\n\n  M. A. Mortenson Company, Federal Contracting Group, Colorado  Springs, Colorado, is being awarded a $19,351,000 firm fixed  price construction contract to construct an addition to the Aerospace Data Facility and the Operations Building.  Work  will be performed at Buckley Army National Guard, Colorado,  and is expected to be completed by November 25, 1995.\n\nhttp://www.fas.org/irp/agency/navsecgru/denver/index.html Denver Naval Security Group Activity The mission of NSGA Denver is to provide a trained, qualified, and mission-ready force to support the war-fighter, site activities, and military communities. NAVSECGRUACT Denver is located in the Joint Service Admin Facility (JSAF) on Buckley Air National Guard Base in Aurora Colorado. NSGA Denver stood up as an activity on 1 November 1995. Growing out of a small Navy Detachment with less than 30 Sailors, NAVSECGRUACT Denver currently has over 170 Officer and Enlisted personnel and is still growing.\n\n    DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY\nOFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS\n       2000 NAVY PENTAGON\n     WASHINGTON, DC 20350-2000\n\nCanc\n      frp:\n            Aug\n                  05\n\nOPNAVNOTE\n           5450\nSer DNS33/4U681877\nAugust\n        2,\n            2004\n\nOPNAV NOTICE\n               5450\n\nFrom:\n         Chief\n                 of Naval Operations\n\nSubj:\n         RELOCATION AND RENAMING\n                                         OF NAVAL SECURITY GROUP\n         DETACEMENT\n                        (NAVSECGRU\n                                      DET)\n                                             BAD AIBLING,\n                                                              GERMANY\n\nRef:\n          (a)\n               OPNAVINST\n                             5450.19D\n\n(b)\n       SNDL\n                 (OPNAVNOTE\n                                      5400\n                                                Series)\n\n1.\n       Purpose.\n                            To\n                                  implement\n                                                      name change\n                                                                               and relocation\n                                                                                                              for\n                                                                                                                      subject\nshore activity detachment assigned\n                                                                       to\n                                                                             the\n                                                                                      Chief\n                                                                                                  of Naval\nOperations\n                      for\n                              command per reference\n                                                                            (a).\n\n2.\n       Background.\n                                The relocation\n                                                              and renaming\n                                                                                        is necessitated\n                                                                                                                       by\nthe closing\n                       of\n                             the\n                                     U.\n                                           S.\n                                                Army Bad Aibling Station,\n                                                                                                    the\n                                                                                                            host\ncommand\n               for\n                       the NAVSECGRU\n                                                   DET.\n                                                              The detachment\n                                                                                            will\n                                                                                                      relocate\n                                                                                                                       to\n\nU.\n     S.\n           Army Kaserne Griesheim,\n                                                        Germany\n                                                                       and be renamed\n                                                                                                    U.\n                                                                                                         S.\nNAVSECGRU\n                   DET Griesheim.\n                                                 Detachment\n                                                                     will\n                                                                               now\n                                                                                      be\n                                                                                            subordinate\n                                                                                                                   to\nNaval\n           Security Group Activity,\n                                                          Denver,\n                                                                         CO.\n\n## [Deletia]\n\nhttp://www.navycthistory.com/NSGStationsHistory.txt NAVSECGRUACT Denver was located in the Joint Service Admin Facility (JSAF) on Buckley Air National Guard Base in Aurora, Colorado. NSGA Denver stood up as an activity on November 1, 1995, growing out of a small Navy Detachment with less than 30 Sailors. On September 30, 2005, NSGA Denver was administratively closed and was reestablished on October 1, 2005 as the Navy Information Operations Command (NIOC) Denver, Aurora, CO.\n\n## [Excerpts]\n\n  The Naval Cryptologic Veterans Association (NCVA) is pleased  and honored to announce the Navy and Marine Corps winners of  the 1996 \"On-the-Roof\" Gang (OTRG) Cryptologist of the Year competition and the NCVA Awards for Cryptologic Support  Excellence (NCVA ACSE). The following winners were selected  by the Commander, Naval Security Group Command, Rear Admiral Thomas F. Stevens: Marine Corps OTRG Cryptologist of the Year: Master Gunnery Sergeant [X], United States Marine Corps, Company H, Marine Support Battalion, Medina.\n\n## Ssgt [X] In 1995 He Assumed His Current Position As Company Administrative Chief For Sub Unit One, Alpha Company, Buckley Angb, Aurora,  Colorado.\n\nIn forwarding his nomination, CO, NSGA, Denver stated: \"Staff Sergeant [X]'s professionalism and devotion to duty clearly exemplifies the outstanding cryptologic support for which the Naval Cryptologic Veterans Association recognizes as vital to the accomplishment of the cryptologic mission.... MGySgt [X] worked diligently to ensure that Company A, Marine Support Battalion administrative requirements were taken care of, ensuring that the Marines of Company A could concentrate 100% of their efforts towards the accomplishment of their cryptologic mission.\"\n\n## [Excerpts]\n\nAll subordinate commands falling under the cognizance of Commander, Naval Network Warfare Command should follow policy and procedures for awards as set forth by the NNWC Awards Division (N03A2).  This includes the block by block instructions as posted on the awards webpages.\n\n## Reminder About Previous Personal Awards: Block #19\n\nRecently, the Awards Department has come across numerous errors in the reporting of Block #19, Previous Awards and Decorations, on the 1650/3 Awards Form. In addition, we are receiving more and more requests for correction of issued awards due to the number of award being wrong. If block #19 is incorrectly reported, then the number of the award issued from block #23 can be wrong. This leads to many other problems and additional work by the personnel of the Awards Department and additional letters from the Admiral to CNO and COMNAVPERSCOM to have official file copies replaced. To combat this problem, we need help from you in the field. Personnel who originate the OPNAV 1650/3 need to ensure that all personal awards are listed with dates (month/year to month/year). This information should come from the individual's service record, but as you all know, most Sailors' records are not kept up-to-date. If the service record does not match the awards being worn by the individual, then the individual should be questioned and asked to provide copies of all citations for missing awards not listed in the service record. All NNWC-IOD sites are required to provide the NNWC Awards Division a copy of every medal award citation/certificate for medals received but not issued by COMNAVNETWARCOM. This includes Joint Medals issued by our Joint Operational Centers at Misawa, Hawaii, Texas, Georgia, Colorado, Menwith Hill and Alice Springs. Joint Award Policy Change The Naval Security Group Awards Manual allows the issuance of Navy EOT awards in conjunction with Joint EOT awards to personnel at the Navy Information Operations Commands Hawaii, Misawa, Texas, Colorado, Georgia, Maryland, Menwith Hill and Alice Springs. The majority of these Navy awards were for in-depth Navy collateral duties that could not be included in a Joint award nomination. It has come to our attention by NSA that it is against DOD Award Regulations for two awards with the same period to be issued to a single individual, even though the accomplishments and subject of the award are different. In order not to jeopardize any issuance of a Joint award to our Sailors, NSA is allowing Joint award nominations from the above mentioned commands to include service related matters in the award nomination. No more than 20% of the Joint award nomination should contain service related matters. This change will be reflected in the upcoming new Awards Manual or in a large change to NAVSECGRUINST 1650.9D. Newsgroup alt.politics.org.nsa: [since disappeared from Google] From lwir...@aol.com (Loring Wirbel) Date: 24 Sep 1995 [deletia] On Sept. 24 [1995, presumably], the Denver Post carried large display recruitment ads from Lockheed-Martin in which the company called for DSP algorithm specialists to work at the \"Regional SIGINT Operations Center (Denver, Colo.)\" TECHNICAL REVIEW DOCUMENT for OPERATING PERMIT 95OPAR118 to be issued to: Buckley Air National Guard Buckley Air National Guard Base (ANGB) Arapahoe County Source ID 0050028 Michael E. Jensen May 1, 1997 Significant features of the Base include office buildings, recreational facilities, aircraft hangers, an engine test  cell, fuel storage and dispensing systems, and storage and  maintenance facilities for ground equipment. There are  approximately 150 buildings on the Base but there are no community facilities, housing or full-time dining or billeting capability. However, dormitories are currently scheduled for  construction in 1998. The Base population is approximately 2,957 during the week and 1,300 during the monthly training assemblies. There are on-going modernization programs to  remove, replace or re-model a significant number of the buildings at the Base. The closing of two major military installations in the Denver metropolitan area has increased   interest in planning for additional facilities at the Base for other military organizations. From westword.com Originally published by Westword 2000-11-16 2005 New Times, Inc. All rights reserved. Next Question What goes on at Buckley? It's up in the air. By Eileen Welsome After the protest at Buckley Air Force Base, Westword contacted the base's public-information office to request information about what, exactly, goes on out there -- and what taxpayers' money is paying for. Candrea Thomas, deputy director of public affairs, asked for a couple of days to research our questions. Four days later, the following response arrived on the Westword fax machine: [deletia]\n\n## Q: How Many People Are Assigned To The Aerospace Data Facility? A: About 2,900 Military, Government Civilians And Contractors. Q: What Is The Total Number Of People On Base, Including All Contractors, Civilians, And Military Members? A: Approximately 8,000.\n\n From: JobBank...@data.jobbankusa.com (JobBank...@data.jobbankusa.com) Subject: Resume: COMPUTER OPERATOR/NOC TECHNICIAN II Newsgroups: misc.jobs.resumes, us.jobs.resumes Date: 2000/08/06 [RESUME ANNOUNCEMENT] Info: ResumeId:          1000164294 Position:          COMPUTER OPERATOR/NOC TECHNICIAN II City/State/Zip:    AURORA, CO  80011 Resume:\n\n## July 98-June 00 Buckley Air National Guard Base, Aurora, Co Senior Reporter Of Reporting And Operations Center In  Aerospace Data Facility.  Responsible For Managing 10  Personnel As Well As Quality Control Of Issued Products From The Section.\n\n  Jan. 96-July 98 Augsburg, Germany Signals Intelligence Analyst (12/96 to 5/97)  Deployed to Bad  Aibling, Germany in support of Operation Joint Endeavor/Joint  Guard, Task Force Eagle and Task Force Able Sentry as senior reporter. (10/97 to 3/98)  Deployed to Dal Molin Air Base, Italy,  Assigned to United States National Intelligence Cell, Combined  Air Operations Center as manager of ground forces database and WARLORD system operator. June 92 - Jan. 95 Fort Hood, TX Intelligence Analyst/Operations Manager Mar. 92 - June 92 Fort Devens, MA Electronic Warfare Analyst Course Sept 91 - Mar. 92 Goodfellow Air Force Base, TX Electronic Warfare/Signal Intelligence Analyst Course,   Technical Training Wing http://www.space-careers.com/agency/cvview_58.html Date Submitted: 25-02-2005 Last Modified: 29-06-2006 (07:35) PERSONAL PROFILE An experienced Spacecraft Operations Analyst/Controller.  I am very results driven, detailed oriented and highly organized.  I have been involved in all phases of Spacecraft and Ground Operations, from pre-launch testing right through to on orbit operations. [deletia]\n\n## Additonal Professional Experience National Security Agency: (February 1967 - January 1994)\n\n        Camp Smith, Hawaii (Senior Cryptologic Staff Officer)         Aerospace Data Facility, Aurora, Colorado (Senior Collection Operations Officer)         Fort George G. Meade, Maryland (Senior Staff Officer)         Menwith Hill Station, Yorkshire, England (Collection Operations Technician/Officer. [deletia]\nhttp://www.stk.com/corporate/newsletters/enews/dec02/\nDefense and intelligence professionals have the opportunity to attend AGI's STK classified regional users' group meeting on Jan. 23, 2003 in the Denver, CO area. This free, one-day event will begin with a keynote address by Col. William Canda, Commander Aerospace Data Facility. Throughout the day, U.S.  government representatives and industry specialists will present user case studies that focus upon the integration of  COTS software technology within mission critical systems. For a detailed agenda and on-line registration, visit  www.stk.com/classified (U.S. citizens only with Top Secret SCI security level clearance required).\n\nhttp://www.uscg.mil/reserve/msg04/coast237_04.htm\n\n# R 131901Z May 04 Zui Asn-A00134002206 Zyb\n\nFM COMDT COGARD WASHINGTON DC//CG-2// TO ALCOAST ADF AURORA CO//DIR/MAST/CGLO// AMEMBASSY SANTO DOMINGO//DAO// DEFINTAGNCY WASHINGTON DC//JITF-CT// BT UNCLAS //N01650// ALCOAST 237/04 COMDTNOTE 1650 SUBJ: PEOPLE - INTELLIGENCE AWARD WINNERS FOR 2003 A. COMDT COGARD WASHINGTON DC 011554Z MAR 04/ALCOAST 094/04 B. COMDT COGARD WASHINGTON DC 011601Z MAR 04/ALCOAST 095/04 C. COMDT COGARD WASHINGTON DC 011607Z MAR 04/ALCOAST 096/04 1. THIS MESSAGE ANNOUNCES THE WINNERS OF THE 2003 CG-210, ADMIRAL FREDERICK C. BILLARD, AND LIEUTENANT CHARLES S. ROOT INTELLIGENCE AWARDS. [deletia] 4. LIEUTENANT TIMOTHY LAVIER OF THE AEROSPACE DATA FACILITY IS THE WINNER OF THE INAUGURAL LIEUTENANT CHARLES S. ROOT INTELLIGENCE AWARD FOR EXCEPTIONAL PERFORMANCE OF DUTY WHILE SERVING AS THE CHIEF, MARITIME ANALYSIS SUPPORT TEAM. DURING THIS PAST YEAR LIEUTENANT LAVIERS LEADERSHIP ROLE IN PROVIDING CONTINUOUS HOMELAND SECURITY INFORMATION TO THE DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, AND OUR ALLIES HAS BEEN EXCEPTIONAL. HIS EXEMPLARY PERFORMANCE HAS GIVEN THE COUNTRY AN EDGE IN PROVIDING SUPPORT TO A WIDE VARIETY OF CUSTOMERS. LIEUTENANT LAVIERS ACCOMPLISHMENTS HAVE GREATLY IMPROVED HOMELAND SECURITY, THE COAST GUARD MARITIME DOMAIN AWARENESS, AND RESULTED IN EXCEPTIONAL SUPPORT TO COAST GUARD AND NATIONAL OPERATIONS.\n\n## 2004 National Military Intelligence Association National Awards\n\n  The United States Coast Guard Lieutenant Charles S. Root Award presented to Lieutenant Timothy R. Lavier, USCG Lieutenant Timothy R. Lavier is presented the inaugural  Lieutenant Charles S. Root Award for exceptional performance   of duty while serving as the Chief, Maritime Analysis Support   Team, Aerospace Data Facility, Denver Colorado. During this past year, Lieutenant Lavier played a leadership role in   providing continuous homeland security information to the   Department of Homeland Security, Department of Defense, and   our allies. Although much of his duties are classified, his exemplary performance has given the United States an edge in   providing support to a wide variety of customers. Lieutenant   Lavier's accomplishments have greatly improved homeland security, the Coast Guard's maritime domain awareness, and   resulted in exceptional support to Coast Guard and National Operations. Aerospace Data Facility welcomes new vice commander By Ms. Marla Downer Aerospace Data Facility Col. John D. Wright became the newest vice commander of the Aerospace Data Facility, and Field Station Denver commander,  on Aug. 4 at a change of command ceremony attended by more  than 250 military and civilian professionals. Maj. Gen.  Richard J. Quirk officiated at the ceremony where Colonel  Wright assumed Command from Col. Gary W. Dieringer, who  retired after serving more than 25 years on Active Duty. In his new position, Colonel Wright will help lead over 3,000 personnel, comprised of military and civilians, and will direct sitewide operations to provide continuous global information for our nation and its allies to inform, warn and protect. Colonel Wright has spent many years as a Department of Defense visionary and leader of teams attaining information superiority over adversaries. As he took the podium, Colonel Wright first affirmed his dedication to the mission of the ADF. \"Our ADF at Buckley has a proud history starting more than 30 years ago in a period of conflict,\" he said. \"But we have evolved from single pipes to integration -- a  model of horizontal integration -- with unlimited opportunities to mission manage and to provide support even more effectively and efficiently in the near future. \"So, I am humbled and honored to be the vice commander of such a proud ADF and to be your field station commander at such a critical time in our nation's history, when we must be ever vigilant, ever present and ever aware of threatening situations both here and abroad. I look forward to hard work from each and every one of you. \"Work which will make our site even better- better than when we signed in. For that, I am going to ask of your time, your talents, your energy and your commitment to deal with the threats to America and her allies of peace and freedom,\" the colonel added. Colonel Wright comes to the ADF from the 67th Information Operations Group, where he commanded more than 700 personnel worldwide. He has also commanded at the squadron, center, detachment and flight levels. In addition, as a joint specialty officer, he held transformational joint positions in a combatant command, and on the Office of the Secretary of Defense Staff. He has served in multiple specialties as an intelligence, space and information operations officer in the field in Kosovo during Operations Joint Guardian, Enduring and Iraqi Freedom. He also served in other operational positions in the Air Intelligence Agency, Air Combat Command, United States Air Forces Europe, plus the Pentagon, and the National Security Agency. AIR INTELLIGENCE AGENCY THIS IS AN EXCEPTED SERVICE POSITION VACANCY ANNOUNCEMENT NUMBER:   ADF04-004E13 POSITION TITLE, SERIES, GRADE:    Logistics Management Specialist, GS-0346-12 ORGANIZATION, LOCATION              Aerospace Data Facility AND DUTY STATION:                           Buckley, CO WHO MAY APPLY:                                 All qualified US citizens AREA OF CONSIDERATION:                 Local Commuting Area (Note: Personal travel, moving expenses or other relocation costs incurred in accepting this position may not be  authorized.) OPENING DATE: 19 August 2004   CLOSING DATE: 25 August 2004 POINT OF CONTACT:  Customer Service Desk, AIA/DPCS, 321 Hof Street, San Antonio, TX 78243-7129 at ( (210) 977-2716 or DSN 969-2716. SPECIAL REQUIREMENTS/CONDITIONS:  This position has been  designated for drug testing.  If you are selected for this  position you may be subject to urinalysis testing prior to appointment, and you will be subject to random urinalysis  testing as a condition of employment.  Individual selected  will be subject to a Single Scope Background Investigation (SSBI) and must be able to acquire and retain a Top Secret  (TS) clearance with Sensitive Compartmented Information (SCI) access in order to fully perform the duties and responsibilities of this position.  Incumbent will be required to take a preemployment and periodic counter- intelligence polygraph examination as a condition of employment. Position requires occasional temporary duty travel (TDY), utilizing any or all modes of transportation, both commercial and military.  Air Force requires all employees to sign up for Direct Deposit  (Sure Pay) with a Financial Organization.  Incumbent must meet  appropriate certification requirements IAW the Defense Acquisition Workforce Improvement Act (DAWIA) no later than 18  months after accepting this position.\n\nhttp://security-clearance-jobs.techexpousa.com/show_display_posting.cfm?\n\nposting_id=31030&employer_id=10930\nSIGNALS ANALYST 3 for CACI Interview with us at TECHEXPO in Tysons Corner, VA on Wednesday November 01, 2006 Interview with us at TECHEXPO in Baltimore, MD on Thursday November 02, 2006 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Summary Information Position Title: SIGNALS ANALYST 3 Posted on: 06/06/2006 Short Description: SIGNALS ANALYST - TS/SCI with CI Poly Location:  City: Denver   State: CO Position Type: Terms: Permanent   Location: On-Site Only    Hours: Full Time Salary:  $70k + - Hourly Required Core Skills: SIGINT engineering - Required Experience: 5+ Years - Importance: Required SIGINT engineering - Required Experience: 5+ Years - Importance: Required Elint - Required Experience: 5+ Years - Importance: Required SIGINT Operations - Required Experience: 10+ Years - Importance: Required - Required Experience: N/A - Importance: Required Security clearance required:  Top Secret - SCI, Top Secret w/ CI Poly -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Full Description Please send resume to bshamblin@caci.com Responsible for assisting in the signal analyses and documentaton of radar and communication signals. May provide guidance and direction to signal studies team in overall conduct of projects. Conducts ongoing Signal Intelligence (SIGINT) analysis tasks, monitors on-going analysis efforts, provides results for review, ensures completion within time constraints, and writes, reviews and/or presents study results to the customer. Conducts SIGINT technical studies and writes reports documenting analytic results. Participates in briefings and technical meetings to obtain the latest technological information, exchange technical concepts and ideas, and increase the knowledge base of the program office. Provides test and evaluation support in the form of in-depth digital product analysis. Performs SIGINT system modeling and analysis to assist and advise in future capability studies. Creates and maintains ELINT and COMINT technical databases used to support operational analysis. Maintains multilevel communications with users, external agencies, and organizations to enhance program office understanding of real-world applications of system products. Traces user design/information requirements to ensure they will be satisfied. Requires a Bachelors degree in a related SIGINT technical discipline experience and 5-7 years of related experience. Communications: Strong technical writing skills and the ability to prepare technical analysis details and summaries. Demonstrated ability to develop and present technical briefings on completed analysis projects. Ability to effectively coordinate activities with other work centers and analysis efforts. Desired experience, a minimum of 7 years of SIGINT systems analysis experience with 5 years of operations experience. Strong MS Office skills to include Word, PowerPoint and Excel. Proficient in using Gale-Lite. Detailed knowledge of current national systems capabilities and their tactical applicability. Working knowledge of automated intelligence analysis tools and modeling. Travel required on a monthly basis.\nhttp://www.house.gov/beauprez/HTML_Newsletters/08272004.htm\n  On August 23rd, Congressman Beauprez, along with Chairman Duncan Hunter (Chairman of the House Armed Services Committee  and former Army Ranger), attended a briefing and tour of Buckley Air Force Base. The Congressmen then took a tour of the Aerospace Data  Facility which provides space-based warning capabilities. The  mission of the 460th Space Wing is to provide combatant commanders with superior global surveillance, worldwide  missile warning, expeditionary forces and support to homeland defense missions. Basically the first line of defense, able  spot missiles that have been launched. Congressman Beauprez and Chairman Hunter were very impressed  by the briefings and demonstrations, both strongly committed  to advancing our defense strategies in support of our troops abroad as well as our nation's security at home.\n\n## [Excerpts] Position/Title: Sr. Security Analyst -Background In Cyber Intelligence And Dod Reporting\n\n- Current Top Secret Sensitive Compartmented Information (SCI) clearance based on SSBI with CI poly (Updated in 2003). Read on to B/G/TK/HCS.\n\n## Experience 10-05 To Present Department Of The Army (Gg-13) Chief, Foreign Computer Network Operations\n\n-Manage team of 6 contract personnel analyzing cyber intrusions. -Responsible for the analysis and reporting of global hacking and cyber intrusion events. -Implement new collection strategies based on technological advances and ever-changing hacker methodologies.\n\n## 8-04 To 10-05 Sytex Inc. Ft. Belvoir, Va Computer Network Exploitation Analyst (Gg-13 Equivalent) Sigint Support To Computer Network Operations Branch - Target Development And Discovery\n\n- Provide detailed SIGINT analysis, open-source research, all-source compilation, and reporting of complex information networks in support of INSCOM and 1st Information Operations Command missions. - Reconstruct detailed network infrastructures based on intelligence, open-source research, and analytical methodology. - Produce SIGINT product reports and technical support packages in support of information needs, intelligence requirements, and requests for information.\n\n## 8-03 To 8-04 Sytex Inc., Ft. Belvoir Va Senior Intelligence Analyst - (Gg-12 Equivalent)\n\n-Intelligence analyst assigned to analyze numerous trans-national terrorist organizations, provided critical intelligence support to national agencies, regional commands, and joint operational commands.\n\n-Strong knowledge of international telecommunications infrastructures -Assisted in publishing Tactics, Techniques and Procedures (TTP).\n-Utilize numerous intelligence community databases and produce graphical solutions to complex networks via GOTS and COTS software suites including but not limited to Analyst Notebook 6, Microsoft Office XP, Renoir, and Arcview/ArcGIS. Regularly participate in cross-agency seminars keeping abreast of CT issues. Strong knowledge of communications systems, trend analysis, and all source fusion techniques.\n\n## 12-99 To 8-03 Company A, Marine Cryptologic Support Battalion, Aurora, Co Senior Operations Controller - Lead Reporter\n\n- Supervisor and manager of 17 member joint-service and DoD civilian team of intelligence analysts responsible for the analysis and reporting of highly perishable defense related events to worldwide strategic and tactical consumers. - Conducted and oversaw site's real-time fusion analysis and reporting mission. Responsible for coordinating over multiple communications channels with worldwide operational and strategic units ensuring national-level tasking requirements were fulfilled; translated ad-hoc tasking requirements into usable intelligence and disseminated to tactical and strategic customers. - Senior editor and release authority for all narrative product reports and technical reports that were published by the Reporting Operations Center.\n\n\nResponsible for the relay of high interest operational and global events affording timely nationallevel asset management in support of military/non-military operations and exercises.\nhttp://72.14.209.104/search?q=cache:lvvVKhEM37gJ:360.yahoo.com/profile-\nZAkjzp8zdKTJZ4B5kKzoOgMW+elint+aurora&hl=en&gl=us&ct=clnk&cd=10\n[Profile of Sgt. X]\nhttp://www.employmentguide.com/jobdetails.html?JobID=1154019\nUSMilitary.com JOB INFORMATION: Title: SIGNALS INTELLIGENCE/GROUND ELECTRONIC WARFARE Posted 16 days 21 hrs ago [accessed 2006-10-30T19:15Z] Location: Denver , CO CORPORATE INFORMATION: Company Name:USMilitary.com JOB DETAILS:\n\n## The Signals Intelligence/Ground Electronic Warfare Occfld Includes The Operation Of Signals Intelligence (Sigint) Collection And Communications Equipment.\n\n Marines in this field conduct collection, analysis, production, and dissemination of collected data. In addition, the Marines manage communication equipment and facilities. Marines entering the SIGINT/EW field will be required to set up and operate communications and/or electronic equipment, prepare reports, conduct preventive maintenance on assigned equipment, and assist in the operations control and management of SIGINT/EW equipment/facilities. Entry-level jobs include Communications Intelligence Intercept Operator, ELINT Intercept Operator, Special Intelligence Communicator, or Voice Intercept Operator. Marines can also enter the SIGINT field at the grade of corporal or sergeant. Duty assignments are made to Naval Security Group field stations, the operating forces Radio Marine Battalions, the Air Wing VMAQs, and the staff sections of the Marine divisions and wings. All personnel are expected to become familiar with marine tactical SIGINT/EW operations to include: electronic attack (EA), electronic protect (EP), electronic support (ES), and radio direction-finding functions. These skills may be obtained through formal training and should be acquired prior to obtaining the grade of gunnery sergeant.\n\n## Capabilities Overview\n\nImpact Science and Technology (IST) is a small business that was incorporated in the state of New Hampshire in February, 1995.  IST has offices in Nashua, New Hampshire; Annapolis Junction, Maryland; and Aurora, Colorado, as well as personnel assigned to work as integrated members at various customer facilities.  The company employs over 185 individuals, more than 90% of whom have full TS/SI clearances with compartmented accesses.  Each of IST's three offices has a TOP SECRET facility clearance with full CWAN connectivity, secure phones, and classified data/document processing capabilities.  In aggregate, IST has over 14,000 sq. ft. of fully accredited SCIF space.  IST prides itself on having a solutions-oriented workforce of skilled professionals who can work independently, in teams, or integrated with the customer staff.  IST's prevailing goal is to design and develop best-value solutions to real-world problems. [deletia]\n\n## 1.5   Elint And Ea Collection And Analysis Support\n\nIST has a cadre of recognized signals analysts who are able to address the entire spectra of signal collection system design, deployment, and operation issues, as well as signal reporting, analysis, and signal evaluation.  While specializing in ELINT and Electronic Attack (EA) signals, the analytic staff at IST also possesses collection and analysis capabilities in communication, FISINT, and data signals. This team routinely provides operations support to IST's customers, and the expertise of these analysts is routinely brought to bear on system design, development, and testing efforts to ensure that the objectives and concerns of the end-user are fully addressed in the delivered product.  At the customer's request, IST analysts provided crises support for military units and intelligence efforts during the Persian Gulf action and Desert Storm.  These analysts continue to provide support for Bosnia, Kosovo, and Operation Enduring Freedom as needed.  IST signals analysts identify intelligence gaps, obtain the requisite raw data, and perform the in-depth signal analysis to satisfy national intelligence requirements in support of the Warfighter and military planners.  IST analysts routinely interface with the national databases; government, contractor, and allied personnel; and national data collection systems in an effort to ensure that US intelligence is complete, up-to-date, and accurate. The depth and breadth of experience available via IST personnel is evident from the efforts these individuals have supported.  IST has provided continuous operational support to the National Technical ELINT Center (NTEC) since 1979.  IST analysts and programmers were instrumental in the development of the MARTES signals analysis suite and provided initial design inputs to the Advanced ELINT Signals Database (AESD).  The involvement of IST personnel in design and testing of Specific Emitter Identification (SEI) technology has furthered the implementation of the Matchlight SEI database.  IST signals analysts are routinely sought for advice and guidance in a wide range of signals analysis and evaluation efforts.\n\nhttp://www.computerjobs.com/job_display.aspx?\n\njobid=2150997&utm_source=simply_hired&utm_medium=organic&utm_campaign=simply_hired If you are working or aspiring to work in today's United States Intelligence Community... NOW is the time to join our growing team at L-3 Intelligence Solutions Division (ISD). L-3 is a rapidly growing public company (NYSE: LLL) with revenues estimated at $12.5 Billion, and over 60,000 dedicated employees. L-3 is a leading supplier of communications and specialized products and services to the US Department of Defense, intelligence agencies, federal civilian agencies, state and local governments, foreign governments, and major aerospace and defense prime contractors. L-3 Intelligence Solutions Division is an industry leader in Information Management and Sharing, with emphasis on serving the Intelligence and National Security Communities. 97% of our 2300 employees hold an active government security clearance in more than 28 sites worldwide. L-3 ISD provides a wide range of Intelligence Analyst support, software and systems design, development and integration to government intelligence customers and prime contractors.\n\n## Must Have A Current Top Secret Clearance And Must Meet The Requirements Of Dcid 6/4.\n\nThe DOLLYWAY contract provides ELINT Signal Analysis support to the National Technical ELINT Center (NTEC). The center's mission is to analyze and report technical ELINT in support of Weapons and Threat Assessments, Electronic Warefare and Acquisition, Crises Support, and Special Projects. The primary tasks to be performed under this contract require knowledge of analog and digital signal processing techniques, radar and threat weapons performance, the ability to draft and publish analytic working aids and the ability to provide a quick-reaction-capability (QRC) to analyze high priority signals in a timely manner to support war-fighting operations. Conducts independent research and analysis such as measuring and describing signal characteristics, and assists other contract personnel on all analytic duties. Teams with contractor, government analysts or both to satisfy analytical tasks as assigned. Coaches, teaches, mentors, and monitors lessexperienced analysts as necessary to improve the corporate knowledge and expertise level of the team. Required: 7+ years - Technical ELINT Signals Analyst 7+ years - In-depth knowledge of Technical ELINT products and reference data Desired: Good writing and oral communications skills. Start Date:\nASAP\nEmp. Type:  Full Time Travel:\nNo Travel\n# of Openings:\n1\nLocation:\nAurora, CO -\nOvertime Pay:\nNone Job Number:  000000000130492 Date Posted:  8/18/2008 https://cp-itsrmprd.saic.com/main/careerportal/Job_Profile.cfm?/3W00EM3W5VK834JJF1L3I70O722CMYY90T4 6XEJ0X9XEXYTBRKBYVGFXWH14YQ9UT7G8A14RXC2FJISN48DVZ17I3WI68K8SY8SU3QO SN71EZ165ILQQZN27U2X9B5B863I4U0BLO3Q6XSA5XY9NPDQR82G5QR82GTEFEVWG COMINT Signals Analyst (m)\n  Full Time    Regular\nposted 7/25/2008\nJob Category DEF - Defense/Intelligence/Geopoltcl Req ID\n123765\nAble to obtain security clearance?\n\nNone Currently possess security clearance?\n\nTop Secret/SCI w/ CI Polygraph Location Aurora, CO\n% Travel Relocation No Requirements The Intelligence and Information Solutions Business Unit currently has an opening for a COMINT Signals Analyst.\n\n## Job Description:\n\nSAIC seeks experience with SIGINT collection, analysis, and reporting. The employee will be responsible for the analysis of communications and non-communications signals over a wide RF range. Equally adept in the analysis of all analog and digital communications signals to include software analysis of high data rate TDM/PCM. Perform collection, identification and signals analysis of all communications activity in support of government projects. REQUIRED EDUCATION/SKILLS: THIS POSITION REQUIRES AN ACTIVE TOP SECRET/SCI WITH CI POLYGRAPH CLEARANCE. Bachelor's degree in Liberal Arts/Sciences (or related field) and/or equivalent formal military training and 6+ years of related experience. SIGINT collection and analysis experience. Candidate must have leadership and management experience. Candidate should also have experience in training other analysts. DESIRED SKILLS: Proficiency in operating systems: Windows 98; NT; 2000; SOLARIS. Hardware: Demodulators, Demultiplexers, Receivers, digitizers, Digital Signal Processors (DSP), and Analog/Digital Mixers and Recorders. R 031849Z FEB 06 FM CMC WASHINGTON DC(UC) TO AL MARADMIN(UC) UNCLASSIFIED// MARADMIN 053/06 MSGID/GENADMIN/CMC WASHINGTON DC I IOP// SUBJ/FY07 NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY (NSA) CRYPTOLOGIC INTERN PROGRAMS// POC/TOSCANO, K. A./MSGT/26XX OCCFLD SPEC I IOP/-/TEL:703-614-6561 /TEL:DSN 224-6561/TEL:FAX 703-614-1306/EMAIL:TOSCANOKA@HQMC.USMC.MIL// GENTEXT/REMARKS/ 1. THIS MESSAGE REQUESTS NOMINATIONS FOR NSA CRYPTOLOGIC INTERNSHIP PROGRAMS FOR FY07. PROGRAMS ARE OPEN TO ACTIVE DUTY OCCFLD 26 ENLISTED MARINES ONLY AND PROVIDE AN INTENSIVE THREE-YEAR INTERNSHIP WITHIN THE NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY ENTERPRISE. THESE PROGRAMS ARE DESIGNED TO GIVE PARTICIPANTS IN-DEPTH KNOWLEDGE AND SKILLS IN CRYPTOLOGIC ANALYSIS, INTELLIGENCE PRODUCTION DISCIPLINES, AND NATIONAL/TACTICAL SIGINT OPERATIONS. MARINES COMPLETING THE PROGRAM WILL HAVE INCREASED THEIR KNOWLEDGE IN MULTIPLE SIGINT DISCIPLINES, ENHANCED THEIR UNDERSTANDING OF HOW SIGINT SUPPORTS THE OVERALL INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY, AND AMASSED ESSENTIAL MOS SKILLS AND EXPERIENCE NOT NORMALLY GAINED IN OTHER CAREER DEVELOPMENTAL TRAINING VENUES. 2. PROGRAM SELECTEES WILL REPORT TO COMPANY B MARINE CRYPTOLOGIC SUPPORT BN (MCSB) (MCC: J39), FT GEORGE G. MEADE, MD, FOR DUTY DURING THE THIRD QTR CY-06 WITH TWO EXCEPTIONS. SELECTEES FOR THE MILITARY OPERATIONAL ELINT SIGNALS ANALYST PROGRAM (MOSAP) WILL REPORT TO COMPANY A MCSB, AURORA, COLORADO (MCC: JB9) AND SELECTEES FOR THE YONSEI UNIVERSITY PROGRAM WILL REPORT TO MARFOR KOREA. [deletia] 8. THE FOLLOWING CRYTPTOLOGIC PROGRAMS ARE AVAILABLE. (READ: PROGRAM/QUALIFYING MOS/INTENDED RANKS/AVAILABLE QUOTAS/ PROGRAM PURPOSE). [deletia] C. MOSAP - MILITARY OPERATIONAL ELINT SIGNALS ANALYST PROGRAM/2631/ SGT-SSGT/1/DESIGNED TO DEVELOP HIGHLY SKILLED OPERATIONAL ELINT ANALYSTS. [deletia]\nhttp://www.marines.mil/news/messages/Pages/2007/FY08%20NATIONAL%20SECURITY\n%20AGENCY%20(NSA)%20CRYPTOLOGIC%20INTERN%20PROGRAMS.aspx\n\n# Fy08 National Security Agency (Nsa) Cryptologic Intern Programs\n\nDate Signed: 2/13/2007 MARADMIN  Number: 100/07 UNCLAS 131453Z FEB 07 CMC WASHINGTON DC(UC) AL MARADMIN(UC) MARADMIN 100/07 MSGID/GENADMIN/CMC WASHINGTON DC IOP// SUBJ/FY08 NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY (NSA) CRYPTOLOGIC INTERN PROGRAMS // POC/TOSCANO, K.A . /MSGT/CMC WASHINGTON DC IOP/-/TEL:DSN 224-6561 /TEL:COM (703) 614-6561/TEL:FAX (703) 614-1306 /EMAIL:KARSTA.TOSCANO@USMC.MIL// GENTEXT/REMARKS/1. THIS MESSAGE REQUESTS NOMINATIONS FOR NSA CRYPTOLOGIC INTERNSHIP PROGRAMS FOR FY08. NOMINATIONS ARE DUE TO POC NO LATER THAN 30 MAR 07. PARAGRAPH 10 DETAILS PROPER PROCEDURES FOR SUBMISSION. 2. THE NSA CRYPTOLOGIC INTERN PROGRAM BRINGS NATIONAL LEVEL SIGINT EXPERTISE TO THE OPERATING FORCES OF THE MARINE CORPS BY PROVIDING IN-DEPTH TRAINING TO ACTIVE DUTY OCCFLD 26XX ENLISTED MARINES. PROGRAMS ARE OPEN TO ACTIVE DUTY OCCFLD 26 ENLISTED MARINES ONLY AND PROVIDE AN INTENSIVE THREE-YEAR INTERNSHIP WITHIN THE NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY ENTERPRISE. THESE PROGRAMS ARE DESIGNED TO GIVE PARTICIPANTS IN-DEPTH KNOWLEDGE AND SKILLS IN CRYPTOLOGIC ANALYSIS, INTELLIGENCE PRODUCTION DISCIPLINES, AND NATIONAL/TACTICAL SIGINT OPERATIONS. MARINES COMPLETING A PROGRAM WILL INCREASE THEIR KNOWLEDGE IN MULTIPLE SIGINT DISCIPLINES, ENHANCE THEIR UNDERSTANDING OF HOW SIGINT SUPPORTS THE OVERALL INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY, AND AMASS ESSENTIAL MOS SKILLS AND EXPERIENCE NOT NORMALLY GAINED IN OTHER CAREER DEVELOPMENTAL TRAINING VENUES. 3. PROGRAM SELECTEES WILL REPORT TO COMPANY B MARINE CRYPTOLOGIC SUPPORT BN (MCSB) (MCC: J39), FT GEORGE G. MEADE, MD, FOR DUTY DURING THE THIRD QTR CY-07 WITH TWO EXCEPTIONS. SELECTEES FOR THE MILITARY OPERATIONAL ELINT SIGNALS ANALYST PROGRAM (MOSAP) WILL REPORT TO COMPANY A MCSB, AURORA, COLORADO (MCC: JB9) AND SELECTEES FOR THE YONSEI UNIVERSITY PROGRAM WILL REPORT TO MARFOR KOREA (MCC: 836). 4. MARINES SELECTED FOR A PROGRAM (EXCEPT THE YONSEI UNIVERSITY PROGRAM) WILL INCUR AN OBLIGATION OF SIX YEARS (THREE YEARS IN THE INTERNSHIP AND A THREE YEAR FOLLOW-ON ASSIGNMENT). THE SIX-YEAR SERVICE OBLIGATION IS DESIGNED TO ALLOW AT LEAST ONE FOLLOW-ON TOUR TO THE OPERATING FORCES UPON COMPLETION OF A PROGRAM. ACCEPTANCE TO THE YONSEI UNIVERSITY PROGRAM INCURS A THREE-YEAR OCONUS OBLIGATION (ONE-YEAR AT YONSEI, TWO-YEARS AT SUSLAK). NOMINEES WILL BE REQUIRED TO PROVIDE A PAGE 11 ENTRY TO THE SELECTION BOARD STATING ACKNOWLEDGEMENT OF THE RESPECTIVE OBLIGATED SERVICE REQUIREMENT. 5. APPLICANTS MUST HAVE AT LEAST TWO YEARS ON STATION BY 1 JUL 07 FOR CONUS COMMANDS, AND THREE YEARS ON STATION BY 1 JUL 07 FOR OCONUS COMMANDS. APPLICANTS MAY NOT HAVE LESS THAN 5 YEARS OF SERVICE OR MORE THAN 14 YEARS OF SERVICE AS OF 1 JUL 07. 6. INDIVIDUALS ARE ENCOURAGED TO SUBMIT FOR MULTIPLE PROGRAMS IF THEY MEET THE REQUIREMENTS FOR MORE THAN ONE PROGRAM. WHEN SUBMITTING FOR MULTIPLE PROGRAMS, THE APPLICANT MUST PRIORITIZE THE PROGRAMS FOR WHICH THEY WISH TO BE CONSIDERED. PERSONNEL NOT SELECTED FOR THEIR FIRST PRIORITY WILL BE CONSIDERED FOR EACH ADDITIONAL PROGRAM FOR WHICH THEY APPLIED. 7. MARINES SELECTED WILL HAVE THE OPPORTUNITY TO ATTEND FORMAL SCHOOLS AND PERFORM INTERNSHIPS AT ORGANIZATIONS WITHIN THE NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY ENTERPRISE. MARINES WILL HAVE THE OPPORTUNITY TO LEARN NEW TECHNOLOGICAL ADVANCES AS THEY RELATE TO SIGINT AND ITS MISSION. UPON GRADUATION MARINES ARE CONSIDERED SUBJECT MATTER EXPERTS IN THEIR RESPECTIVE CRYPTOLOGIC SKILL PROGRAM. ALL MILITARY LANGUAGE ANALYST PROGRAMS ARE DESIGNED TO ENHANCE CRYPTOLINGUISTIC SKILLS THROUGH ADVANCED FORMAL TRAINING AND OPERATIONAL ASSIGNMENTS FOR EACHRESPECTIVE LANGUAGE. 8. APPLICATIONS SUBMITTED FOR ANY OF THE PROGRAMS MUST INCLUDE THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION: A. NAME, RANK, SSN, MOS(S) B. DATE OF BIRTH C. ARMED FORCES ACTIVE DUTY BASE DATE D. PFT, DATE TAKEN E. COMMAND E-MAIL ADDRESS F. PROGRAM(S) APPLYING FOR (IN PRIORITY ORDER) G. EDUCATIONAL BACKGROUND: 1. PME - A. NONRESIDENT - INCLUDE NAME OF COURSE/YEAR COMPLETED B. RESIDENT - INCLUDE NAME OF COURSE/YEAR COMPLETED/CLASS STANDING (IF KNOWN) 2. MILITARY/GOVERNMENTAL: A. GENERAL MILITARY TRAINING - INCLUDE NAME OF COURSE/GPA/YEAR COMPLETED/CLASS STANDING (IF KNOWN). B. CRYPTOLOGIC TRAINING - SAME INFO AS ABOVE. 3. CIVILIAN: A. HIGH SCHOOL - INCLUDE: PLACE, GPA, FINAL STANDING - IF KNOWN. B. UNDERGRADUATE CLASSES OR DEGREE - INCLUDE: INSTITUTION ATTENDED/COURSE NAME/COURSE ID/GRADE/CREDITS EARNED. IF A DEGREE WAS EARNED, SUBMISSION OF A COPY OF DIPLOMA/TRANSCRIPTS IS NOT REQUIRED. C. GRADUATE CLASSES OR DEGREE (SAME INFO AS ABOVE) H. DLPT SCORE AND DATE TAKEN (FOR ALL 267X MARINES APPLYING). I. CRYPTOLOGIC DUTIES. CHRONOLOGICALLY LISTED-INCLUDE 2 TO 3 LINES ON WHAT THOSE DUTIES ENTAILED - UNCLASSIFIED INFORMATION ONLY. J. FAVORABLE MATERIAL - INCLUDE PERSONAL AWARDS AND LETTERS OF RECOMMENDATION. K. A PHOTO IAW MCO P1070.12 PARA 2002 (PROMOTION PICTURE). L. PAGE 11 ENTRY WITH OBLIGATED SERVICE REQUIREMENT STATEMENT. 9. THE FOLLOWING CRYTPTOLOGIC PROGRAMS ARE AVAILABLE. (READ: PROGRAM/QUALIFYING MOS/INTENDED RANKS/PROGRAM PURPOSE). A. MINSAP - MILITARY INTERN SIGINT ANALYST PROGRAM/ANY 26XX WITH THE AMOS OF 2629/SGT-SSGT/DESIGNED TO DEVELOP OUTSTANDING SIGINT ANALYSTS AT THE MID-LEVEL RANK. B. MCSAP - MILITARY COMINT SIGNALS ANALYST PROGRAM/2621/SGT-SSGT/DESIGNED TO DEVELOP HIGHLY SKILLED COMINT ANALYSTS. C. MECCAP - MIDDLE ENLISTED CRYPTOLOGIC CAREER ADVANCEMENT PROGRAM/26XX/SGT-SSGT/DESIGNED TO PROVIDE CRYPTOLOGIC SPECIALISTS WITH INDIVIDUALLY TAILORED TRAINING BASED ON THE RESPECTIVE SERVICE NEEDS AND INDIVIDUAL BACKGROUNDS. D. MOSAP - MILITARY OPERATIONAL ELINT SIGNALS ANALYST PROGRAM/2631/SGT- SSGT/ DESIGNED TO DEVELOP HIGHLY SKILLED OPERATIONAL ELINT ANALYSTS. E. MCDNOP - MARINE CORPS DIGITAL NETWORK OPERATOR PROGRAM/2621, 2651/SGT-SSGT/DESIGNED TO DEVELOP HIGHLY SKILLED AND EXPERIENCED MARINES TO FILL DIGITAL NETWORK OPERATOR AND ANALYSIS POSITIONS. IT IS RECOMMENDED THAT APPLICANTS ARE GRADUATES OF THE BASIC DIGITAL NETWORK ANALYSIS (BDNA) COURSE. F. MLAP - MILITARY LANGUAGE ANALYST PROGRAM (ARABIC, CHINESE-MANDARIN, PERSIAN-FARSI, RUSSIAN, OR SPANISH)/2671, 2673, 2674, 2676/SGT-SSGT/DESIGNED TO PROVIDE ADVANCED CRYPTOLINGUISTIC TRAINING AND OPERATIONAL OPPORTUNITIES. G. YONSEI UNIVERSITY-KOREAN MILITARY LINGUIST PROGRAM; HELD AT YONSEI UNIVERSITY/2673/2741/SGT-SSGT/SELECTEE WILL ATTEND YONSEI UNIVERSITY IN SEOUL, WITH FOLLOW-ON ORDERS, ACCOMPANIED, FOR TWO YEARS IN SEOUL. ALL APPLICANTS FOR YONSEI MUST BE QUALIFIED FOR OVERSEAS ASSIGNMENTS. 10. NOMINATION PACKAGES MUST BE GENERATED IN LETTER FORMAT WITH COMMAND ENDORSEMENTS. NOMINATIONS PACKAGES MAY BE SUBMITTED ELECTRONICALLY BY THE UNITS FINAL ENDORSING AUTHORITY AS AN ADOBE ACROBAT (.PDF) FILE TO THE HQMC/IOP POC (KARSTA.TOSCANO@USMC.MIL). ELECTRONICALLY SUBMITTED PACKAGES MUST BE SUBMITTED NO LATER THAN 30 MAR 07. UNITS MAY ALSO SUBMIT HARD COPY PACKAGES TO THIS HQTRS (I/IOP) POSTMARKED NLT THAN 16 MAR 07 AND MUST ARRIVE BEFORE 30 MAR 07; MAILING ADDRESS AS FOLLOWS: COMMANDANT OF THE MARINE CORPS HEADQUARTERS, U.S. MARINE CORPS ATTN: I/IOP (RM: 3136, MSGT TOSCANO) 2 NAVY ANNEX WASHINGTON, DC 20380-1775 AN EXAMPLE NOMINATION PACKAGE CAN BE PROVIDED BY THE POC UPON REQUEST. 11. ALL APPLICANTS MUST NOTIFY THE MONITOR PRIOR TO SUBMITTING THEIR NOMINATION PACKAGES TO THIS HQTRS. 12. UPON RECEIPT OF A NOMINATION PACKAGE, AN E-MAIL WILL BE SENT TO THE ORIGINATING COMMAND BY HQMC/IOP ACKNOWLEDGING RECEIPT AND STATUS OF THE NOMINATION PACKAGE. 13. COMMANDS REQUESTING AN EXTENSION TO THE APPLICATION DEADLINE DUE TO OPERATIONAL COMMITMENTS, MUST DO SO PRIOR TO 9 MAR 07. PACKAGES RECEIVED AFTER 30 MAR 07 WILL NOT BE CONSIDERED EXCEPT IN THOSE CASES WHERE EXTENSIONS HAVE BEEN GRANTED. 14. PROGRAM SELECTEES WILL BE NOTIFIED BY MARADMIN.//\n\n## [Raytheon] Intelligence And Information Systems Product Lines\n\nTactical Intelligence Systems (TIS) Bill Jones runs TIS where our expertise includes airborne SIGINT sensors, multi-INT ground systems, remote controlled systems technology - we are the world leader for unmanned aerial vehicle ground stations. Strategic Imaging Systems (SIS) SIS is run by Jane Chappell in Garland, Texas.  SIS has primarily classified programs that support the intelligence community.  SIS' capabilities range from space imaging to building large-scale, data processing and exploitation storage architectures to high performance data handling and processing systems.  Very exciting stuff. Space Systems Our Space Systems product line, led by Chuck Enoch in Aurora, Colorado, has grown the most of any of our product lines last year.  Space Systems' business focus is on satellites and the command and control support required for satellites. Raytheon Information Solutions (RIS) Raytheon Information Solutions (RIS), led by Ron Ross, is the first in a new class of solutions providers - the Mission Integrator. As a Mission Integrator we work with the government as a partner in achieving mission success, not simply satisfying program requirements. As a strategic partner, we share the expertise, technologies, and approaches developed from a broad base of successful programs, many of them mission-critical, large-scale, and complex. Operational Technologies and Solutions (OTS) OTS, led by Guy DuBois in Reston, Virginia, is on the cutting edge when it comes to managing and disseminating mind-boggling volumes of data.  We are handling some of largest databases in the government and make a direct, real time contribution to the intelligence community and the other agencies of government. National Systems National Systems, led by Steve Hawkins in Garland, is responsible for: Mission and Resource Management -   systems integration and development of mission management, resource management, mission execution and the associated infrastructure for a high-performance, Ground Merged Architecture. Processing - developing, installing and supporting signal processing and analysis systems. Information Management and Knowledge Discovery - developing systems that provide the infrastructure and tools for effective information management and knowledge discovery. Operations, Maintenance, and Engineering Support - systems engineering, factory support and operations and maintenance support. FBC Event Description Event: Buckley Air Force Base Date: November 16, 2006 Location: Building 706 Aurora, Colorado Exhibitor fee: $749.00\n\n## General Information\n\nBuckley AFB is an Air Force Space Command base. Buckley AFB defends America through its air operations, space-based missile warning capabilities, space surveillance operations, space communications operations and support functions. Buckley AFB is unique in that it supports 38 tenant units located on and off base. This expo is hosted by the 460th Space Communications Squadron. The mission of the 460th Space Wing is to provide combatant commanders with superior global surveillance, worldwide missile warning, homeland defense and expeditionary forces. The 460th Communications Squadron manages, operates and maintains control, communications, and information systems in support of the 460th Space Wing and tenant units at Buckley AFB.\n\n## One Of The Largest On-Base Tenants Is The Aerospace Data Facility. The Aerospace Data Facility Has Become The Major U.S.-Based Technical Downlink For Intelligence Satellites Operated By The Military, The National Security Agency And The National Reconnaissance Office.\n\nAnother tenant, the Defense Finance and Accounting Service (DFAS), located on the Buckley Annex in Denver, Colo., is also one of the largest tenants supported by the 460th Space Wing. DFAS provides responsive, professional finance and accounting services for the people who defend America and currently supports a workforce of more than 1,400 personnel. The Air Reserve Personnel Center (ARPC), located on the Buckley Annex, is another tenant supported by the 460 Space Wing. The center, comprised of more than 490 personnel, plays a major role in ensuring the nation always has a warrior bank of mission-ready air Guardsmen and Reservists for mobilization and United States Air Force augmentation by providing personnel management and services for its customers. Other tenants at Buckley also include: Headquarters, Colorado Air National Guard,566th Information Operations Squadron, Detachment 45, Air Force Technical Applications Center, Detachment 105, AFROTC at University of Colorado, Detachment 801, Air Force Office of Special Investigations, Aerospace Data Facility, Navy Marine Corps Reserve Center, and Combined Task Force.\n\n## George Kochaniec Jr.  News/2005\n\nThe classified area of Buckley Air Force Base as seen looking west toward Aurora. There are\n13,000 military and civilian employees and contractors working at Buckley.\n\nBuckley: Our value to Aurora $1.1 billion By David Milstead, Rocky Mountain News January 17, 2007 Buckley Air Force Base estimates its economic impact on the city of Aurora at $1,090,906,789, an increase of $18 million.  The figure is for the fiscal year ended Sept. 30. Nearly 60 percent of that is for pay. The base's annual payroll is $409.41 million, and an additional $211.38 million was made by contractors and civilian workers at the base. There are 13,000 military and civilian employees and contractors working at Buckley. The base spent $79.48 million in construction, including the addition of a second child-development center and an Army aviation support facility. Buckley uses an economic model to estimate that it \"contributed to the creation\" of 6,137 jobs in the community, which added about $290.10 million. The base also estimated it spent $70 million on goods and services from local businesses, including $43.96 million in service contracts, $12.42 million in health care and $12.19 million by the commissary.\n\n## Finding Of No Significant Impact Additions To And Operations Of Aerospace Data Facilitybuckley Air National Guard Base Aurora, Colorado [Excerpts] 1. Proposed Action\n\nThe United States Air Force (USAF) operates the Aerospace Data Facility (ADF) at Buckley Air National Guard Base (ANGB), located in Aurora, Colorado. USAF proposes to modify the ADF to provide additional secure, permanent office and computer operations space. Modification is needed to provide response capability to USAF directives requiring the expansion of ADF's mission and to provide permanent work space for staff currently located in temporary trailers. ADF is a space tracking and data processing center completely contained within the perimeter fence of Buckley ANGB and located approximately 12 miles east of Denver, Colorado. Main features of the ADF include an operations building (Building 401), radomes housing receiving antennae, a chiller plant, a power plant housing emergency power diesel generators, temporary office trailers, warehouses and other storage facilities, and a recreation complex. USAF is proposing to add approximately 150,000 square feet to Building 401. This expansion would provide permanent office space for approximately 500 employees, currently located in trailers adjacent to Building 401, and additional computer operations space. Utility modifications proposed to support the addition include adding two 2,500-kilowatt emergency generators to the existing power plant; two 1,000-ton-capacity chillers to the existing chiller plant; tree cooling tower cells adjacent to existing cooling towers; and miscellaneous additions and modifications to integrate additions with existing facilities. Construction, scheduled to begin in late spring 1993, would last approximately 18 months. Cost for the Proposed Action has been estimated at $40,000,000. Alternatives to the Proposed Action that were analyzed were No Action and sitting elsewhere within the ADF complex, outside of the ADF complex but inside of Buckley ANGB, and outside of Buckley ANGB. The No-Action alternative would eliminate environmental impacts but would adversely affect national security since the ADF would not have computer space needed to meet expanding mission requirements. The sitting alternatives were found to result in operational deficiencies, primarily due to the need for additional construction to duplicate existing ADF support facilities. The additional construction would also result in environmental impacts at least as great as, or greater than, those associated with the Proposed Action.\n\n## 2. Summary Of Environmental Impacts\n\nSocioeconomic Resources - Construction activities are expected to cause minor impacts to local transportation resources because the activities would be temporary (18 months) and because the increase (worst-case peak estimate of 400 vehicles per day) would be a small percentage increase in a community population of more than 200,000. Operations would result in little permanent change because the existing staff level (1,300) would remain the same.\n\n## 3. Findings\n\nBased upon the above discussion and the supporting Environmental Assessment, a Finding of No Significant Impact is made. Copies of the Environmental Assessment of the Proposed Action, dated November 1992, can be obtained from the following: Department of the Air Force Headquarters, Air Force Material Command, SMC/CEV Post Office Box 92960 Los Angeles AFB, CA 90009-2960 Attn: Mr. Daniel Pilson APPROVED: HQ SMC Environmental Protection Committee http://www.denverpost.com/headlines/ci_14735509\nFederal government cancels plans for office building in Aurora By Margaret Jackson The Denver Post Posted: 03/23/2010 01:00:00 AM MDT Updated: 03/23/2010 12:32:16 PM MDT\n\n## The Federal Government Has Canceled Plans To Build A 350,000-Square-Foot Office Building At Gateway Park In Aurora. Known As Project Keystone, The High-Security Building Was Supposed To Be Occupied By Aerospace Data Facility Colorado, Now Housed At Buckley Air Force Base. The Facility, Operated By The U.S. Air Force, Provides Data To Defense And Intelligence Agencies.\n\n\"Headquarters decided that the money could be put to better use for other intelligence priorities,\" said Rick Oborn, a public-affairs officer with the National Reconnaissance Office, the executive agent for the project. Fairfax, Va.-based developer Peterson Cos. was about two weeks from breaking ground on the $125 million building when it was notified the project was canceled, said Bill Smith, senior vice president of the company. Peterson was planning to buy 64 acres at Gateway Park from the Pauls Corp. and lease the building to the government. \"Once they terminated the project, we had no interest in the land,\" Smith said. \"It was a crusher after spending well over a year at it. A lot of construction jobs would have been filled there.\" Dick Hinson, senior vice president of the Aurora Economic Development Council, said large projects such as Keystone are critical to getting the economy back on track. \"It's about creating employment centers and creating opportunities,\" he said. \"Every victory, whether it's a small or large project, is important because it's creating momentum to put us back on solid economic footing.\" Margaret Jackson: 303-954-1473 or mjackson@denverpost.com Read more: http://www.denverpost.com/headlines/ci_14735509#ixzz0j25zkAdh Aurora to get a new federal facility A 350,000-square-foot office will be built for the Aerospace Data Facility Colorado to handle intelligence work. By Margaret Jackson The Denver Post Posted: 09/11/2009 01:00:00 AM MDT Updated: 09/11/2009 09:54:43 AM MDT\n\n## A Virginia Company Is Developing A 350,000-Square-Foot Office Building On 64 Acres In Aurora For The Federal Government. The Peterson Cos. Is Expected To Break Ground In March On Project Keystone, Which Will Be Occupied By The Aerospace Data Facility Colorado, The Largest Tenant At Buckley Air Force Base.\n\n\"We're out of space at our facility,\" said Sharlene Fairbanks-Kyte, public- affairs officer for the agency. \"Project Keystone is to augment ADF Colorado.\"\n\n## The Site Within Gateway Park Is Bounded By North Walden Street, East 40Th Avenue And North Salida Street. [39.7670 N, 104.7743 W]\n\nThe Peterson Cos. purchased the ground from the Pauls Corp. Under an agreement reached in April, Peterson will lease the building to the Office of Director of National Intelligence. The National Reconnaissance Office will act as the executive agent for the project, which will be occupied by ADF Colorado. Fairbanks-Kyte declined to disclose how many employees will occupy the building or the type of work that will be performed there. \"The intelligence community just doesn't say anything,\" she said. When the federal government is involved, it's not uncommon to have sketchy details about a project, Aurora Mayor Ed Tauer said. But even private-sector companies working on federal contracts have been known to be secretive. \"I've done groundbreakings where I've said, 'Folks, I have absolutely no idea what you're doing here, but I'm glad you're doing it in the city of Aurora,' \" Tauer said. \"At a time when the whole economy is struggling, this looks to be additional jobs, and that's always a great thing for every community, and we think it's great for the whole region.\" The fastest-growing Air Force base in the nation, Buckley has an economic impact on the region of more than $1 billion a year, making Aurora a major driver in the state's aerospace industry, the Aurora Economic Development Council's website says. The industry employs about 18,000 people in Aurora. Raytheon Co. is the city's largest private employer, with more than 2,600 workers. Northrop Grumman, Lockheed Martin and the Boeing Co. also have major operations in Aurora.\n\nhttp://www.9news.com/seenon9news/article.aspx?storyid=124630&catid=509\nMetro Denver economy receives accolades Jennifer Ryan     20 hrs ago [2009-10-07] Developers will break ground next March on Project Keystone, a 350,000-square-foot office building in Aurora that will house the Aerospace Data Facility Colorado. The Data Facility collects intelligence information to support defense operations and has outgrown its current facility at Buckley Air Force Base. Federal officials would provide no further details about the facility or its potential staff count.\n\nArea 58 has a separate entrance from the main base, accessable from Telegraph Road near its intersection with Beulah Road. The site is wooded, and screened on three sides by hills. A satellite view is available showing the large building near two large radomes oriented on a north south axis.\n\nThis is Google's cache of http://www.afspc.af.mil/outstandingairmenoftheyear/index.asp. It is a snapshot of the page as it appeared on May 18, 2009 06:17:21 GMT\nhttp://www.niocmd.navy.mil/alicesprings/contacts.asp http://www.navycthistory.com/images/navdet_alice_springs.jpg http://www.navycthistory.com/NSGStationsHistory.txt The U.S. Naval Security Group Detachment, Alice Spring was established in October, 1998. On September 30, 2005, NSG Det Alice Springs was administratively closed and was re-established on October 1, 2005 as the Navy Information Operations Detachment (NIOD) Alice Springs, Australia. NIOD Alice Springs is subordinate to, and a detachment of, NIOC Ft. Meade, MD.\n\nhttp://www.niocmd.navy.mil/alicesprings/\nMenwith Hill, UK\nhttp://www.govtrack.us/congress/record.xpd?id=108-s20040209-21\n\n## Record Text **(Senate - February 09, 2004)**\n\nSen. Christopher Bond [R-MO]: Mr. President, I rise today with friends and family to recognize the efforts and dedication of CDR Russell H. Phelps III, an outstanding American. Commander Phelps began his military career in 1908 as an Arabic linguist assigned in Athens, Greece. Working in a national airborne reconnaissance program, he supported U.S. military missions to Lebanon, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia. Honorably discharged in 1985, he graduated Magna Cum Laude from the University of Northern Iowa in 1988 with a Bachelor of Arts in International Relations. He earned a Naval commission as a Special Duty Officer (Cryptology) upon completion of the Officer Candidate School in September 1988, whereupon he was assigned to the Naval Security Group Activity (NSGA) Rota, Spain. During that tour, he was assigned to the staff of the Commander, Middle East Force, Bahrain, and aboard USS O'Bannon (DD-987) and USS Aubrey Fitch (FFG-34) in support of Operation Earnest Will, the escort of re-flagged Kuwaiti oil tankers in the Arabian Gulf. Between 1989 and 1991, Commander Phelps was additionally assigned to the USS Wainwright (CG-28), USS Baton Rouge (SSN-689), USS Silversides (SSN-679), USS Providence (SSN-719), and to the USS Pittsburgh (SSN-720) during combat support operations throughout Operation Desert Storm. Commander Phelps next assignment was to the USS Oldendorf, where he served as the Cryptologic Officer, Tactical Action Officer, and for 6 months as the Operations Officer, culminating in his qualifications as a Surface Warfare Officer. Detaching in 1994, he reported to Menwith Hill Station, Harrogate, England, and served as a Deputy Division Chief and member of the Regional Security Operations Center (RSOC) transition team. A plank owner of NSGA Menwith Hill, he simultaneously served in operations and as its first Executive Officer from 1995 to 1996. Commander Phelps next served at the Tactical Training Group Pacific, San Diego, CA, where he provided training to Battle group and warfare commanders in Cryptology, Information Warfare, and space systems operations. [deletia]\n\n## Welcome To The Menwith Hill Homepage Mission Statement\n\n The Menwith Hill Military Intelligence Battalion, as a full partner in a joint, combined, and interagency activity, conducts cryptologic operations, providing resident Army Service Cryptologic Element (SCE) capability in support of Menwith Hill Station, JSSW Digby, and JAC Molesworth's National and Theater support missions For more information please view the Menwith Hill MI BN welcome letter.\n\n## Companies That Make Up The Menwith Hill Station\n\nThe Menwith Hill Station is made up of two companies: 404th Company and HHD Company. By visiting this section you will be introduced to the commanders and 1SG's of these two companies.\n\n## 501St Combat Support Wing 501St Combat Support Wing Mission\n\nThe 501st Combat Support Wing ensures four UK and Norway-based Air Base Groups are resourced, sustained, trained and equipped to exacting command standards in order to provide mission support that enables US and NATO war fighters to conduct full spectrum flying operations during expeditionary deployments, theater munitions movements, global command and control communications to forward deployed locations, support for theater intelligence operations and joint/combined training. The wing was reactivated May 12, 2005, at Royal Air Force Mildenhall, United Kingdom, to provide better support to seven geographically-separated units in the U.K. The 501st CSW relocated to Royal Air Force Alconbury, United Kingdom, May 1, 2007, to provide greater accessibility between the wing staff and its geographically-separated units.\n\n## Organization\n\n[deletia] 421st Air Base Group, Royal Air Force Menwith Hill, U.K. 421st Air Base Squadron 421st Civil Engineer Squadron 421st Security Forces Squadron [deletia] The 421st Air Base Group is comprised of three squadrons consisting of 680 US military/civilian and UK civilians. The 421 ABG ensures a full range of civil engineering, security, medical, logistical, community services, personnel, communications, legal, religious, and public affairs services for an installation populace of 4,500 military, civilians, contractors and dependents. The 421 ABG is committed to superior support through a professional work force dedicated to a positive mission-life balance.\n\n## 713Th Military Intelligence Group Distincitve Unit Insignia, 713Th Military Intelligence Group Distinctive Unit Insignia\n\nDistinctive Unit Insignia. Description: A silver color metal and enamel device 1 1/8 inches (2.86cm) in width consisting of a silver tower between two silver towers masoned and detailed black, superimposed in base by a green triangle charged with a silver lion rampant charged on the shoulder with a black star, all enclosed at bottom by an oriental blue scroll doubled and inscribed \"DE COLLE\" in silver. Symbolism: Oriental blue and silver/silver gray are the colors traditionally used by Military Intelligence units. The tower, or fortification, symbolizes strength and defense. The green triangle suggests a hill and, together with the lion, represent the unit's location in Great Britain at Menwith Hill Station near Harrogate. The black star symbolizes the military presence in the United Kingdom. The multiple towers highlight the organization's mission as executive agent for The Joint Combined Operations and Installation at Menwith Hall Station. The motto \"De Colle\" (From the Hills) refers to the unit's location. Background: The distinctive unit insignia was approved on 17 Jul 1997. 70th IW Det. 1 becomes 691st Intelligence Group by Tech. Sgt. Martin Jackson 70 IW Public Affairs 2/6/2008 - MENWITH HILL STATION, United Kingdom -- The 70th Intelligence Wing's Detachment 1, which was stood-up in 2002, became 691st Intelligence Group during an activation ceremony here on Feb. 1. This change from a detachment makes it the eighth group of the 70th IW, which is the second largest wing in the Air Force. \"Over the past two years our Air Force has undergone some pretty major transformation, and today's group activation is prime example of these changes,\" said Col. John Stauffer, 70th IW commander. \"We are realigning and restructuring to better present our forces to our international, joint and Air Force partners.\" Before the ceremonious encasing the Detachment 1 flag and unfurling of the new 691st IG flag, denoting Colonel Paul Laugesen as the first commander of this new group, Colonel Stauffer pointed out why creating this unit benefits Airmen stationed at Menwith Hill. \"Establishing the 691st IG helps us provide our Airmen and their families with better support,\" said Colonel Stauffer. \"As our Air Force gets smaller and more focused and our missions get increasingly more complex we need a system that supports them better.\" According to the wing commander, Colonel Laugesen is the right fit to lead this new group. \"When a new unit stands up we highlight the incoming commander's credentials and validations,\" said Colonel Stauffer. \"But today is unique as Colonel Laugesen has already been here and has already proven himself, and he brings an impressive resume with him.\" Following the formation of the 691st IG, the 451st Intelligence Squadron, commanded by Lt. Col. Robert Spitznagel, was resubordinated from under the 544th IG in Colorado to fall under the new group as well. \"Today is another milestone for Menwith Hill Station, as we properly align the 70th Intelligence wing and Air Force Intelligence Surveillance and Reconnaissance Agency Airmen that are assigned here,\" said Colonel Laugesen. \"This is a huge step forward for the Air Force cryptologic component here at Menwith Hill Station, as we have worked hard to integrate and make sure that we work as both a team and collaborative group of professionals; posturing us for future success as we go forward with a very challenging mission.\" Although structurally they have changed, it is business as usual for the more than 100 Airmen of the 691st IG, who have played an integral part in the global war on terror and are providing communication and intelligence support throughout the world. Col. Michael K. Gibson is the Vice Commander of the 70th Intelligence Surveillance and Reconnaissance Wing, headquartered at Fort George G. Meade, Md. As Vice Commander, Colonel Gibson oversees the wing as it integrates national intelligence assets into tactical foreign intelligence and information assurance operations, delivers tailored, timely, full-spectrum intelligence capabilities to national decision makers, theater commanders and war fighters of all services - anytime, anywhere. The wing is composed of the 373rd Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance Group at Misawa AB, Japan; the 543rd ISR Group at Medina Annex, Lackland AFB, Texas; the 544th ISR Group at Peterson AFB, Colo; the 691st ISR Group at Menwith Hill Station, United Kingdom; and the 70th Mission Support and 70th ISR groups, located at Fort George G. Meade, Md. Colonel Gibson, commissioned through the Reserve Officer Training Corps in 1982, is a master intelligence officer. In subsequent assignments, he was assigned in Greece, West Berlin, Germany and the United Kingdom, where he served in numerous operational, command and staff positions. Colonel Gibson has commanded three times at the Squadron and Group levels. His previous assignment was as the Commander, 609th Air Intelligence Group and the Director of Intelligence for the United States Central Command Air Forces, Shaw AFB, S.C. [deletia]\n\nASSIGNMENTS 1. November 1982 - January 1983, student, Air Intelligence Officer Course, Lowry AFB, Colo. 2. January 1983 - July 1983, student, Signals Intelligence Officer Course, Goodfellow AFB, Texas\n3. August 1983 - August 1985, Flight Commander, 6931st Electronic Security Squadron, Iraklion Air Station, Crete, Greece 4. August 1985 - August 1988, Assistant Operations Officer, 6912th Electronic Security Group, Templehof Central Airport, Berlin, Germany 5. August 1988 - June 1991, Chief, Plans and Policy, European Electronic Security Division, Ramstein AB, Germany 6. June 1991 - October 1992, Chief, Intelligence Officer Assignments, Air Force Intelligence Command, Kelly AFB, Texas 7. October 1992 - June 1994, Executive Officer to the Vice Commander, Air Force Intelligence Command, Kelly AFB, Texas 8. June 1994 - June 1996, Commander, 68th Intelligence Squadron, Brooks AFB, Texas 9. June 1996 - June 1997, student, Air Command and Staff College, Maxwell AFB, Ala. 10. July 1997 - May 1998, USAF Fellow, National Security Agency, Fort George G. Meade, Md. 11. May 1998 - July 2001, Deputy Chief, Congressional Inquiries Division, Office of the Secretary of the Air Force, Legislative Liaison, Washington, D.C. 12. July 2001- June 2003, Commander, 451st Information Operations Squadron, RAF Menwith Hill, United Kingdom 13. June 2003 - June 2004, student, Air War College, Maxwell AFB, Ala. 14. July 2004 - July 2005, Chief, Strategic Planning Division, Air Intelligence Agency, Lackland AFB, Texas 15. July 2005 to August 2007, Commander 609th Air Intelligence Group and United States Central Command Air Forces, Director of Intelligence (A2) 16. August 2007 to present, Vice Commander, 70th Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance Wing, Fort George G. Meade, Md. [deletia]\n\n# Inspector General\n\nDEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE\n400 ARMY NAVY DRIVE\nARLINGTON, VIRGINIA 22202-2884\n\n# Report No. 90-091 June 29, 1990 Memorandum For The Director, National Security Agency/ Chief, Central Security Service Chief, Menwith Hill Station\n\nSUBJECT: Report on the Audit of the Morale, Welfare, and Recreation Fund, Menwith Hill Station, United Kingdom (Project No. 0FA-5001)\n\n## Introduction\n\nThis is our final report on the Audit of the Morale, Welfare, and Recreation Fund (the Fund), Menwith Hill Station (the Station), United Kingdom. The objectives of the audit were to determine whether the financial statements presented fairly the financial condition and results of operations of the Fund, and to determine whether internal control deficiencies identified in our prior reports had been corrected. [deletia]\nhttp://www.navycthistory.com/images/marineCO_G_MenwithHill.gif R 121214Z MAY 04 FM CMC WASHINGTON DC(uc) TO AL MARADMIN(uc) MARADMIN BT UNCLASSIFIED MARADMIN 218/04 MSGID/GENADMIN/CMC WASHINGTON DC MRA MM// SUBJ/AWARDS UPDATE// REF/A/DOC/CMC MMMA/06NOV2003// REF/B/DOC/OSD/12SEP1996// NARR/REF A IS NAVMC 2922, MARINE CORPS UNIT AWARDS MANUAL.  REF B IS DOD 1348.33M, MANUAL OF MILITARY DECORATIONS & AWARDS.// POC/J. J. ULMER/SGT/HQMC MMMA/-/TEL:703-784-9206 /EMAIL:ULMERJJ@MANPOWER.USMC.MIL// GENTEXT/REMARKS/1.  THE PURPOSE OF THIS MARADMIN IS TO PROVIDE AN UPDATE OF AWARDS SINCE THE LAST QUARTERLY UPDATE, MARADMIN 516/03. 2.  THE FOLLOWING UNIT AWARDS ARE AUTHORIZED AND ARE ALREADY INCORPORATED IN REF A. [deletia]\n\nTHE NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY/CENTRAL SECURITY SERVICE (PARTICIPATING UNITS) MARINE CRYPTOLOGIC SUPPORT BATTALION NSA, FORT GEORGE G. MEADE, MD MCC 800 COMPANY A, MARINE CRYPTOLOGIC SUPPORT BATTALION BUCKLEY AFB, CO MCC 842 COMPANY B, MARINE CRYPTOLOGIC SUPPORT BATTALION NSA, FORT GEORGE G. MEADE, MD MCC 802 COMPANY D, MARINE CRYPTOLOGIC SUPPORT BATTALION GRSOC, FORT GORDON, GA MCC 817 COMPANY G, MARINE CRYPTOLOGIC SUPPORT BATTALION RAF MENWITH HILL, UK MCC 841 COMPANY H, MARINE CRYPTOLOGIC SUPPORT BATTALION MRSOC, LACKLAND AFB, TX MCC 818 COMPANY I, MARINE CRYPTOLOGIC SUPPORT BATTALION KRSOC, KUNIA, HI MCC 819 COMPANY L, MARINE CRYPTOLOGIC SUPPORT BATTALION SUITLAND, MD MCC 831 SU-1, COMPANY G, MARINE CRYPTOLOGIC SUPPORT BATTALION, PSC 819 BOX 13 FPO AE (ROTA SP) MCC 828 SU-1, COMPANY I, MARINE CRYPTOLOGIC SUPPORT BATTALION, NSGA KUNIA, SCHOFIELD BARRACKS, HI MCC TPT\n   SU-2, COMPANY I, MARINE CRYPTOLOGIC SUPPORT BATTALION MISAWA, JA MCC 844 SU-1, COMPANY L, MARINE CRYPTOLOGIC SUPPORT BATTALION PENSACOLA, FL MCC 805 NAVAL SECURITY GROUP DET, CINCLANT FLEET, NORFOLK, VA MCC 809 NSA/CSS REPRESENTATIVE, PACIFIC REPRESENTATIVE FPO AP MCC 836 CRYPTOLOGIC SUPPORT GROUP, 7115 SOUTH BOUNDARY BLVD, MACDILL, AFB, FL MCC TGM [deletia]\nhttp://www.fas.org/irp/nsa/menwith.gif\n\n# Aerospace Data Facility Southwest/ Tdrss Ground Station\n\nThis is Google's cache of http://www.jobcentral.com/jobs/Lockheed_Martin/NM/Systems_Engineer_Stf/010481234/job. It is a snapshot of the page as it appeared on May 18, 2009 05:12:30 GMT. Systems Engineer Stf Job in New Mexico Title : Systems Engineer Stf Company : Lockheed Martin Location : New Mexico Date Acquired : 4/22/2009 12:28:17 AM Date Updated : 5/11/2009 12:18:54 AM Req ID 121471BR Industry Job Title Systems Engineer Stf Standard Job Code/Title E1464:Systems Engineer Stf Required skills Current ADF-SW site experience In depth knowledge of site specific activities Established relationships with Ground and Systems Operation GPOCs Systems Integration experience Strong NRO experience Desired skills Team lead experience Full Spectrum Leadership attributes and ability Specific Job Description High visibility position where individual will be a member of the site System Integration team for Program 606 working directly at remote customer location. This position will support approximately 50% Ground and 50% System Operations support. This person will already be located in the southwest region, will have domain experience, and will have established relationships with site customers. The candidate will be a proven team player, have ability to adapt to rapidly changing work environments, possess strong negotiation skills, have proven project management skills, ability to coordinate across multi-int environment with diplomacy and tact, influential with customer as needed to defend the ultimate mission goals, along with being highly organized. Requires full life cycle engineering experience, including transition to operations, with strong analysis skills. Specific tasks include, but are not limited to: communication and collaboration with SI SO and GEI teams; document update and control; RFC assessment, analyze/assess schedules, requirements/specification development, integration, test and transition, readiness activities, ground processing, ground operations, CONOPS development, experience at the ADF-SW, knowledge/ experience with ICDs/specifications for the ADF-SW and ADF-E; coordination with RFC authors for requirements clarification; provide technical assessments for SOERB and GMM ERB; coordinate and conduct design reviews, technical reviews, program management reviews, and other technical forums as required; ability to coordinate across multiple customer domains and contractors; approximately 15% travel with customer to support reviews as needed. Applicants selected will be subject to a government security investigation and must meet eligibility requirements for access to classified information. Standard Job Description Performs technical planning, system integration, verification and validation, cost and risk, and supportability and effectiveness analyses for total systems. Analyses are performed at all levels of total system product to include: concept, design, fabrication, test, installation, operation, maintenance and disposal. Ensures the logical and systematic conversion of customer or product requirements into total systems solutions that acknowledge technical, schedule, and cost constraints. Performs functional analysis, timeline analysis, detail trade studies, requirements allocation and interface definition studies to translate customer requirements into hardware and software specifications.\n\n## Security Clearance Top Secret/Special Security Requirements\n\nTypical Minimums Bachelors degree from an accredited college in a related discipline, or equivalent experience/combined education, with 9 years of professional experience; or 7 years of professional experience with a related Masters degree. Considered an emerging authority. LMCareers Business Unit ESS9995 EI GROUP (S0807) Business Area Info Systems & Global Services Program P606 Department 8N3D:NPD_ISU-P606 Clin 5 Field_18 Job Class Systems Engineering: Other Job Category Experienced Professional State New Mexico Virtual No Relocation Available No Req Type Full-Time Direct/Indirect Direct Javier Gil's Experience * Principal Analyst EWA (Public Company; 501-1000 employees; Defense & Space industry) June 2008 - Present (1 year) Electronic Warfare Associates, Herndon, VA. Defense and technology solutions company, providing contractual intelligence support to government customer. Provides government lead course development updates. Remains abreast of current GEOINT node operations, evolving technolgy, assesses technology and training methods to tailor training to class population. Student base includes soldiers, sister service members, Federal Service civilians and contractors. Maintains equipment inventory and ensures readiness of collection sensors. Performs duties as a Training Developer and instructor for MOS specific training programs and courses in Measurement and Signature Intelligence (MASINT); trains Soldiers on/and integrates MASINT sensors and products into tactical, operational and strategic intelligence and force protection architectures; schedules students for MASINT and AGI courses. * Lead Imagery Analyst BAE Systems (Public Company; BA.L; Defense & Space industry) October 2005 - March 2008 (2 years 6 months) BAE Systems Information Techonolgy, Washington, D.C. Provide enterprise IT solutions and support to technical and program management activities for governmental agencies. Worked within the UFAC to support NGA and outside customers for all underground issues within our AOR. I am one of two subject matter experts in our country/region for all underground issues as well as nuclear sites. Worked hand in hand with UFAC 1 on Nuclear and Ballistics issues for targets in our country of interest. Producing numerous construction chronologies, baseline reports and facility assessments. Helped other members of our contract on exploiting and authoring reports for nuclear sites in their country of interest. Facilitate inter-agency and intra-agency group participation nationwide, provide technological support to personnel, and integrate new technology into current working environment. Manage project orders at multiple locations nationwide and systematically increased the customer base. * SAR MASINT Analyst L-3 Communications (Public Company; LLL; Defense & Space industry) October 2003 - June 2005 (1 year 9 months)\n\n## L-3 Communications Government Services Inc, Las Cruces, Nm Provide Advanced Geospatial Intelligence Support To Clients. Worked As A Sar Masint Analyst Exploiting And Disseminating Masint Products To The Dgs-1, Dgs-2, And Dgs-4. On A Daily Basis I Also Provided System Specific Products, Such As Color Multi- Views, Dynamic Images And Coherent Change Detection Products.\n\nBuilt up and trained the SAR AGI team; facilitated the transition between old and new programs. Served as a liaison between managers, GPOCs, course developers, instructors, system administrators, maintenance personnel, and system integrators. Supported SAR AGI instructor teams * Product Quality Engineer Boeing Satellite Systems (Public Company; BA; Defense & Space industry) December 2001 - October 2003 (1 year 11 months)\n\n## Boeing Space & Intelligence Systems, Las Cruces, Nm\n\nDefense and technology solutions company, providing contractual intelligence support to government customer.\n\n## Worked Within The Joint Processing Center (Jpc) Conducting Masint Product Processing And Quality Assessments. Additionally, Perform System/Software Integration And Testing To Ensure Proper Software And Tool Performance. I Provided On-Site Customer Support And Training And System Specific Products,Such As Color Multi- Views (2Cmv's, 3Cmv's), Dynamic Images (Di's) And Coherent Change Detection Products (Ccd's). As Well As Hi Res Dem's, Dem's, Tercat's, Polcat's, Glint Smear Reduction (Gsr's) And Real Site 3D Site Models To Requesting Clients Outside The Local Production Footprint.\n\nProvided subject matter expertise for the development and revision of SAR AGI courses. * Imagery Analyst US Army (Government Agency; USA; Military industry) July 1997 - June 2001 (4 years) United States Army, Ft Bragg, NC Provide imagery interpretation in support of national security. Managed daily exploitation including target assignment, edit, release, and archival of imagery reports. Applied advanced softcopy exploitation analysis techniques to imagery from national reconnaissance systems in a time sensitive, current intelligence environment. Initiated tasking and re tasking of national systems. Produced cables, reports, and comprehensive intelligence documents in support of national intelligence requirements and to the Department of the Army. Exploited and disseminated SPOT 1, SPOT 3 and SEARCH imagery. Processed, exploited, and disseminated raw imagery and finished intelligence products derived from the PREDATOR, GLOBALHAWK, U2, SYERS and ASARS platforms, as well as (EO), (IR), and (SAR) platforms.\n\n## \"Smackdown\": Bombing Through The Sandstorm\n\nV Corps Commander Wallace would later confide, \"Personally, the period during the dust storm was the low point of the entire campaign for me.TM'\nThe sandstorm grounded almost all UAVSs, blinded airborne and space-based electro-optical and infrared imagers, and prevented the use of laser guidance for precision munitions. Moreover, it made life miserable for the troops and infinitely more complicated for commanders and logisticians, especially as rainstorms combined with the shamal to \"turn the air into mud.\"*\n[deletia]\nThe effort relied on a range of airborne ISR platforms equipped with sensors capable of penetrating the sandstorm, such as SIGINT packages, SAR, and MT] radar. To make it possible to keep these aircraft on-station for prolonged periods of time, the Coalition air-component commander, Lieutenant General Moseley, moved the vulnerable tanker aircraft forward and to begin undertaking air-to-air refueling as far north as one hundred miles south of Baghdad. Even with the ongoing suppression of enemy air fields and air defenses, the move represented a risk, one which Moseley shared by riding on one of the first tankers to make the trip further north.\"\"\nThe Iraqi frontline divisions deployed in a crescent to the south of Baghdad thought that they were safe within the sandstorm; in fact, they were little safer than they would have been under open skies thanks to a massive increase since 1991 in the Coalition's ability to sense through bad weather.\n\nAlthough SIGINT satellites and aircraft (the U-2S, RC-135 Rivet Joint, and a host of smaller SIGINT aircraft) had been around in 1991, they were now able to locate emitters with far greater precision than before. Similarly, whereas the JSTARS contribution to Desert Storm had been the experimental fielding of two prototype aircraft, nine fully operational systems were deployed in Operation Iraqi Freedom that provided wide-area coverage of ground movement. JSTARS also contributed to Coalition SAR imaging capability, which was the key sensor type used in Smackdown. In addition to Lacrosse satellites, U-2S, and JSTARS, the Coalition made extensive use of a single long-loitering Global Hawk UAV for SAR imaging. The drone was kept aloft for twenty-six-hour missions on every other day, imaging two to three hundred sites per sortie.\"?\n\n[Sourcebook note: \"Langley\" may mean Langley AFB, VA, not CIA Headquarters in Langley, VA.] rmprd.saic.com/main/careerportal/Job_Profile.cfm?/1Y5MH31XYYO20MZHNRJ5CLJ7HITQB4VHI YY4VQTUUFVQMET1T815QEEACWFMX26PM9DG1E7KVOK9ICUANP15W9K1NQKXQHKM VGIVSCN4H5D4W9IL47TIN7G5SELOIZ9KGWMUSCMET5NFA7VRV65BNVTIQ0KVTIQ0L3H 7ATQ8 [Accessed 2009-05-25] Job Category  FAC - Facilities / Physical Security Req ID\n142634\nAble to obtain security clearance?\n\nTop Secret/SCI w/ CI Polygraph Currently possess security clearance?\n\nTop Secret SCI\nLocation Las Cruces, NM\n% Travel Relocation No Requirements SAIC seeks a highly qualified mid-level Information Security Engineer to perform as an Information Systems Security Officer (ISSO) supporting a high-priority real-time operational center that directly impacts US national security. The position is in the Las Cruces, NM area. An active and current Top Secret SCI clearance is required, with the ability to obtain a CI polygraph.\n\n## Job Description:\n\nThe position involves information security analysis and engineering; and participating in various information security activities required to ensure the integrity of the customer's networks, applications, and information. The selected candidate will assist in developing and maintaining the overall system security documentation in accordance with the DCID 6/3. In addition, the individual will work closely with certifiers to navigate the customer's certification & accreditation process and produce all appropriate accreditation documentation. Duties include ensuring systems are designed, operated, maintained and retired in accordance with established policies and procedures; that users are properly briefed on information security responsibilities and processes; initiating protective or corrective measures in response to security incidents; and conducting periodic reviews to ensure compliance. The candidate will interact with government and other contractor personnel on a regular basis to provide IT security consulting for other security documents such as security incident reports, equipment/software inventories, operating instructions, technical vulnerability reports, and contingency plans. Occasional travel to government and contractor facilities within the continental US may be required once or twice per year. EDUCATION: Bachelor's Degree required, preferably in a technical discipline. Candidate must possess at least 5 years of relevant information security experience associated with the certification and accreditation of classified systems. REQUIRED SKILLS: Current TOP SECRET SCI is required. Candidate must have expertise in securing networks and systems with a thorough understanding of network topologies and associated hardware and software; and operating systems (UNIX, Windows, and Linux). Knowledge of systems engineering and system development lifecycle is required. The ISSO shall possess strong communication and interpersonal skills as he/she operates as part of a multi-contractor team and directly engages in a customer-facing role. Must possess experience with DCID 6/3 standards along with computer security best practices. DESIRED SKILLS: Ideal candidate should have expertise with IDS-SourceFire, Trusted Guard, Firewalls and Solaris Log analysis; knowledge of Cisco and Juniper devices. A current Certified Information Systems Security Professional (CISSP) or similar security professional certification is highly desired.\n\nhttp://www.3001inc.com/GeoHome/careers.asp http://www.3001inc.com/GeoHome/careers.asp JOB DESCRIPTION National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency Job Announcement Number: 080473 Project Scientist SALARY RANGE: 36,030.00 - 59,895.00 USD per year Salary may vary depending on locality. Please refer to www.nga.mil/careers for additional salary information.OPEN PERIOD: Monday, March 10, 2008 to Friday, March 21, 2008 SERIES & GRADE: NI-0000-02/02POSITION INFORMATION: Full Time This is a permanent position. DUTY LOCATIONS: 1 vacancy - White Sands Missile Range, NM WHO MAY BE CONSIDERED: All Sources ONLY ELECTRONIC SUBMISSIONS WILL BE ACCEPTED. JOB SUMMARY: The National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA), the World Leader in Geospatial Intelligence. Imagine being able to identify anything on, above, or beneath the Earth's surface and display that information visually to provide a meaningful foundation for decision-making to ensure the safety of the world. That's the job of the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency. We analyze imagery and data from many sources and incorporate it into visual displays of essential information for use in national defense, homeland security, and safety of navigation. Central to the success of our mission are the extraordinary talents and skills of our teams of analysts and other professionals. We need the best minds to provide the information edge, continuing NGA's role as the premier provider of Geospatial Intelligence worldwide. NGA - Know the Earth . . .Show the Way. JOB DESCRIPTION: Project Scientists are responsible for the day-to-day execution and technical oversight of a variety of scientific activities. They develop project schedules, determine resource requirements, provide technical guidance and oversight, and report results. Project Scientists apply indepth expertise from a variety of scientific disciplines (e.g., Photogrammetry, Geodesy, Computer Science, Mathematics, Image Science) to develop, analyze, evaluate, and apply new technology; develop expertise and tradecraft for the Agency; and advise senior management on new and evolving technology. They participate in strategic planning, propose and defend program plans, and communicate and market results to customers and decision-makers. They may additionally serve as COR. KEY REQUIREMENTS: U.S. CitizenshipDrug TestingSecurity Investigation Send Mail to: NATIONAL GEOSPATIAL-INTELLIGENCE AGENCY 12310 Sunrise Valley Drive Reston, VA 20190 For questions about this job: Recruitment Phone: 703-755-5900 JOB REQUIREMENTS 080473 Project Scientist QUALIFICATIONS REQUIRED: MANDATORY QUALIFICATION CRITERIA: Experience that equipped the applicant with the particular knowledge, skills, and abilities to perform successfully the duties of this position, and that is typically in or related to the work of this position. For this particular job, applicants must have experience in the following: Customer Service; Interpersonal Relationship Development/Networking; Oral Communication; Briefing and Oral Presentation; Non-technical Writing; Leadership; Planning and Scheduling; Problem Identification, Analysis and Resolution.DESIRABLE QUALIFICATION CRITERIA: In addition to the mandatory qualifications, experience in the following is desired: a demonstrated knowledge of Intelligence Community (IC) membership, mission, goals, and priorities; Customer service principles; Decision-making processes; Civilian agencies (e.g., USGS, DOS); Technical writing; Testing and Evaluation. EDUCATION REQUIREMENTS: A. Education: Bachelor's degree in Engineering, Mathematics, Physical Science, or a related discipline that includes 24 semester (36 quarter) hours in Physical Science and/or a related Engineering Science. Such coursework includes, but is not limited to, Astronomy, Cartography, Chemistry, Computer Science, Dynamics, Electrical Engineering, Geodesy, Geology, Geophysics, Geospatial Information Systems, Mathematics, Orbital Mechanics, Photogrammetry, Physics, Remote Sensing, or Surveying. Although not mandatory, coursework in differential and integral calculus is preferred. -OR- B. Combination of Education and Experience: A minimum of 24 semester (36 quarter) hours of college education in any areas listed in option A plus experience that demonstrates the ability to successfully perform the duties associated with this work. As a rule, every 30 semester (45 quarter) hours of college work is equivalent to one year of experience. Candidates should show that their combination of education and experience totals to 4 years. SPECIAL INFO: - Direct Deposit Required - Two Year Probationary Period - U.S. Citizenship Required - Position Subject to Drug Testing - Security Clearance Required - Top Secret - Sensitive Compartmented Information - Polygraph Test Required SPECIAL REQUIREMENTS: You must be able to obtain and retain a Top Secret security clearance with access to Sensitive Compartmented Information. This process may take up to one year or more to be completed. In addition, you may be required to successfully complete a polygraph examination for the current position you applied for and/or for any future position(s). HOW YOU WILL BE EVALUATED: BackToTop(); APPLICANT EVALUATION PROCESS: Applicants will be evaluated for this job opportunity in three stages, 1) All applicants will be evaluated using the Mandatory Qualification Criteria, 2) Qualified applicants will then be evaluated by an expert or panel of experts using a combination of qualification criteria to determine the best-qualified candidates, 3) Best-qualified applicants may then be further evaluated through an interview process. Applicants are encouraged to carefully review the Assignment Description, Additional Information Provided By the Selecting Official, and the Qualification Requirements; and then construct their resumes to highlight their most relevant and significant experience and education for this job opportunity. This description should include examples that detail the level and complexity of the performed work. Applicants are encouraged to provide any education information referenced in the announcement. If education is listed as a mandatory requirement, only degrees obtained from an institution accredited by an accrediting organization recognized by the Secretary, US Department of Education will be accepted. Federal law requires that any former Federal employee who has retired under either the Civil Service Retirement System (CSRS) or the Federal Employees Retirement System (FERS) who is reemployed in the Department of Defense is entitled to full pay and full annuity. Such annuitants must, however, meet the employment criteria specified by DoD Policy Memorandum, Employment of Annuitants, March 18, 2004 (as amended). If you are receiving an annuity of any kind from the Civil Service Retirement and Disability Fund, you may not be eligible for employment with NGA, unless the criteria apply in your case. The DoD policy and employment criteria may be found at http://www.cpms.osd.mil/fas/staffing/pdf/rem_ann.pdf NARRATIVES REQUIRED: The following required narratives will supplement the information contained in the applicant's resume. Applicants are REQUIRED to submit a narrative on the following KSAs. Entire narrative CANNOT exceed the specific limits provided on the KSA field. Pages exceeding this limit will not be considered. FAILURE TO SUBMIT NARRATIVE RESPONSES TO THE KSA WILL DISQUALIFY AN APPLICANT FROM FURTHER CONSIDERATION. Applicants should place their narrative information in the appropriate field at the Job History and KSA Text Page. The KSAs are: 1. Demonstrate your ability to effectively manage multiple assignments within established time constraints. 2. Demonstrate your ability to communicate effectively both orally and in writing. JOB RESPONSIBILITIES,  DUTIES, TASKS 080473 Project Scientist Additional Duty Location Info:1 vacancy - White Sands Missile Range, NM MAJOR DUTIES: BackToTop(); ADDITIONAL INFORMATION: The employee selected for this position will have an important role in the Advanced Geospatial Intelligence (AGI) work being performed through the Geospatial Intelligence Advancement Testbed (GIAT) Portfolio (IIG) efforts to acquire and exploit advanced sources for geospatial intelligence and to integrate these sources into AGI analysis and problem solutions. Duties include analysis, test and evaluation of commercial software applications; scientific problem solving and development of prototype processes and applications for customers in the Integrated Operations Center - Southwest (IOC-SW), NGA, IC and DoD; investigation of potential new sources of AGI; the use of Multi-Intelligence data sources (SIGINT, MASINT) to develop future capabilities for IOC-SW intelligence initiatives; information visualization; and engaging in collaborative partnerships for rapid solution development. PERMANENT CHANGE IN STATION: Travel/Transportation expenses are not authorized. HOW TO APPLY JOB BENEFITS AND OTHER INFORMATION 080473 Project Scientist BENEFITS: Pay is only part of the compensation you will earn working for the Federal Government. We offer a broad array of benefits programs and family friendly flexibilities to meet the needs of you and your family. Here are some highlights. Look for additional information along with links to pages that spell out the details below. You may participate in the Federal Employees Health Benefits program, with costs shared with your employer. More info: http://www.usajobs.gov/jobextrainfo.asp#FEHB Life insurance coverage is provided. More info: http://www.usajobs.gov/jobextrainfo.asp#life Long-Term Care Insurance is offered and carries into your retirement. More info: http://www.usajobs.gov/jobextrainfo.asp#ltci New employees are automatically covered by the Federal Employees Retirement System (FERS). If you are transferring from another agency and covered by CSRS, you may continue in this program. More info: http://www.usajobs.gov/jobextrainfo.asp#retr You will earn annual vacation leave. More info: http://www.usajobs.gov/jobextrainfo.asp#VACA You will earn sick leave. More info: http://www.usajobs.gov/jobextrainfo.asp#SKLV You will be paid for federal holidays that fall within your regularly scheduled tour of duty. More info: http://www.usajobs.gov/jobextrainfo.asp#HOLI In addition to federal benefits, NGA employees are also eligible for a suite of benefits offered only to the Intelligence Community (IC). The Compass Rose Benefits Group (CRBG) offers insurance products and services to all IC civilian employees. Compass Rose benefits include: Term Life Insurance, Group Accident Plan, Income Replacement, and Long Term Care Insurance. For more information on this highly-restricted opportunity, please visit the Compass Rose website: http://www.compassrosebenefits.com\n\n## Ted Cope's Experience\n\n    * Special Functional Exec (FX) for NSG R&D NGA Currently holds this position * NGA Space Radar IPO Deputy Director for TPED National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency September 2003 - December 2007 (4 years 4 months) * Director, Integrated Operations Center Southwest National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency October 2005 - December 2006 (1 year 3 months) * Colonel US Air Force 1973 - 2005 (32 years) * Chief Science Advisor for RADAR National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency August 2002 - August 2003 (1 year 1 month) * CIO Deputy Director National Reconnaissance Office February 2000 - August 2002 (2 years 7 months) * Deputy Director, IMINT Systems Engineering National Reconnaissance Office September 1998 - February 2000 (1 year 6 months)\nSource Strategies Analyst Job Information Post Date:\nMay 22, 2009\nType:\nFull time Start Date:\n- n/a -\nSalary: - n/a -\nLocation:\nNew Mexico - White Sands Missile Range Job Reference: - n/a -\nJob Details Description Open date: 2009-02-09 Close date: 2009-02-20 The National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA), the World Leader in Geospatial Intelligence. Imagine being able to identify anything on, above, or beneath the Earth's surface and display that information visually to provide a meaningful foundation for decision-making to ensure the safety of the world. That's the job of the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency. We analyze imagery and data from many sources and incorporate it into visual displays of essential information for use in national defense, homeland security, and safety of navigation. Central to the success of our mission are the extraordinary talents and skills of our teams of analysts and other professionals. We need the best minds to provide the information edge, continuing NGA's role as the premier provider of Geospatial Intelligence worldwide. NGA - Know the Earth . . .Show the Way. ASSIGNMENT DESCRIPTION: Source Strategies Analysts collaborate with customers and source providers to develop comprehensive multi-INT, multi-source strategies to address intelligence problems. They create tasking and dissemination requirements, adjudicate requirements, analyze and investigate collection performance, assess and report on end-to-end GEOINT system performance data, and advise customers in support of the National System for Geospatial-Intelligence (NSG). ADDITIONAL INFORMATION: The Source Directorate, Source Strategies Office, Source Fusion Center Southwest is seeking a highly qualified and motivated individual to support a key element of its distributed Source Fusion Center \"Community Support\" operations team that will enable multi-intelligence collection initiatives with mission partners and the IC customer base. The selected individual will champion horizontal integration between a wide range of national technical means, maximizing the value of GEOINT as a mechanism to drive analytical and complementary intelligence efforts in a real time environment. The individual must have a fundamental understanding of all intelligence disciplines, with an emphasis on GEOINT, SIGINT, ONIR and other technical means and must be capable of operating in dynamic situations, and responding to stakeholders within and outside their direct supervisory chain. The selected individual will be required to exercise verbal and written communication skills in the preparation and presentation of technical analysis, position papers, operational briefings, and operational procedures. The selected individual will also be required to maintain a close working relationship with the NGA analytical elements at multiple physical locations and will be required to provide direct support for both the Integrated Operations Center South West (IOC-SW) and Integrated Operations Center Special Programs (IOC-SP) while maintaining a basic understanding of the architectures that support such activities.\n\nhttp://seeker.dice.com/jobsearch/servlet/JobSearch? op=101&dockey=xml/7/0/70622872baf700c759eda4f4b9eed913@endecaindex&c=1&source=21&cid =simplyhired Location: Las Cruces, NM Area Code: 505 Tax Term: FULLTIME Pay Rate: tbd Length: Position ID: HITS02091056 Dice ID: harrisme Travel Required: none Telecommute: no Title: Electrical Engineer - TS/SSBI Required Skills:Position requires a current Top Secret/SSBI Security Clearance Date:5-23-2009 Description: Job Responsibilities: * Responsible for designing, developing, modifying and evaluating electronic parts, components, or integrated circuitry for electronic equipment or other hardware systems * Determines design approaches and parameters. Analyzes electrical requirements to determine feasibility of design within time and cost constraints\n\n* Analyzes equipment to establish operating data, conducts experimental tests and evaluates results * Selects components and equipment based on analysis of specifications and reliability * May also review vendor capability to support development\nQualifications: * Requires a Bachelors degree and 5+ years of experience * Knowledge of basic AC and DC power and grounding principles. Knowledge of heat dissipation and cooling principles\n\n* Experience in hardware systems installation / integration * Experience in the use of Electronic Test equipment to include oscilloscopes and multi-meters * Experience in basic system evaluation, design, modification and repair * Computer skills to include basic administration for MS Windows, Linux and UNIX * Use of MS office for documentation generation/updates * Working experience of Autocad and Visio drawing programs\n* Applicants selected will be subject to a government security investigation and must meet eligibility requirements for access to classified information. Position requires a current Top Secret/SSBI Security Clearance By submitting your resume for this position, you understand and agree that Harris Corporation may share your resume, as well as any other related personal information or documentation you provide, with its subsidiaries and affiliated companies (including Harris Stratex Networks, Inc.) for the purpose of considering you for other available positions Harris MS D-11B Melbourne, FL 32919 Web: http://www.careers.harris.com Mgr Software Engineering 1 Company: N/A Location: White Sands, NM Pay: N/A Contact Information Name: n/a Phone: n/a Fax: n/a Apply Now Job Details This is a NASA contract, located in Las Cruces, New Mexico. Operating here are two functionally identical satellite ground terminals: the White Sands Ground Terminal Upgrade, and the second TDRSS Ground Terminal. These two terminals ensure uninterrupted communications between various ground stations, NASA's orbiting fleet of Tracking and Data Relay Satellites (TDRS), customer spacecraft (satellites), and the computer systems that support such spacecraft The WSC also serves as an interface for distributing satellite data to control centers and scientists who then use the daily influx of data to expand our ever growing knowledge of the Earth and the universe. The Software Engineering Department at the White Sands Complex has an opening for a senior Software Engineer to be the section lead of the NCCDS (Network Control Center Data System) and DAS (Demand Access System) group. The job duties will include technical oversight of group software development, day to day management of subordinate personnel (6-10 people), performance reviews and reporting to senior management.\n\n## Basic Qualifications:\n\n* Minimum 8 years experience with a high level language (at least four years of C or C++). MS in mathematics, engineering, computer science or other related field and 12 years of experience, BA/BS in related field and 14 years of related experience * Minimum two years experience managing medium sized groups (6-10 people). * Ability to obtain Secret security clearance\n\n## Additional Qualifications: Experience With\n\n* Large software projects (preferably C/C++ including database development, threading, and multiple operating systems on Unix, Windows and embedded systems * Multiple database including Oracle, Access and Ingres\n\n* Various communications protocols (TCP, UDP, RS-232/422, etc) * Technical project leadership, effort estimates and scheduling\n\nSoftware development in a CMM/CMMI Level 2/3 Environment\nhttp://www.simplyhired.com/job-id/rsc23cvttq/technical-writer-jobs/\n[Accessed 2009-05-29] * TECHNICAL WRITER 3 CACI International - New Mexico Duties and Responsibilities:Part-time (20 hours/week) technical writer/subject matter expert (SME) supporting the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency in White Sands, NM. TS/SCI clearance required. SME will assist IOC-SW Director and all elements of IOC-SW develop, propose, provide, advise, update, and maintain an active program of information sharing both within and external to IOC-SW, using a variety of media and formats. Must possess superior writing skills and have an advanced level of understanding of Advanced Geospatial-Intelligence sensors, tools, and techniques. These tasks include: * Must write, develop and deliver basic, intermediate and advanced levels of AGI correspondence, articles, policies, CONOPS Plan focusing on SAR for delivery to NGA and other geospatial intelligence community... This is Google's cache of http://federalgovernmentjobs.us/jobs/Senior-System-Engineer-1784639.html. It is a snapshot of the page as it appeared on Jan 19, 2010 18:19:40 GMT [deletia]\nhttp://www.ihireinformationtechnology.com/t-it-s-New-Mexico-c-Las-Cruces-jobs.html\n2/22/2010 - Las Cruces, NM - Network Engineer Harris Corporation Job Title: Network Engineer Job Code: HITS02101123 Job Description: Responsible for providing high quality and reliable voice and data communications services, including telephony systems, data terminals and networks Performs hardware and software moves, adds and changes Installs, tests, and repairs telecommunications and information technology hardware, software, and circuits Monitors and analyzes system and circuit performance, troubleshoots failures and signal degradation, determines the root cause, and ensures hardware and software maintenance actions are completed promptly Recommends improvements to operations, maintenance, inspection procedures and techniques to improve network performance Coordinates with network engineering and project managers in the planning, development and implementation of improvements to the telephony systems, data terminals and networks Qualifications: Bachelors degree (or the equivalent) Experience with Hardware Maintenance to include installing Cryptographic, Multiplexer, CSU/DSU and Router equipment Ability to install and configure Voice, Data and Video systems Knowledge of DHCP network scopes and ability to configure network settings of PC for proper VoIP configuration Experience installing and terminating copper telecommunications cable and fiber optic lines and support equipment Experience with MS Office Products and Services Express clear communications skills This position requires the candidate to already possess an active TS/SSBI clearance and to maintain the clearance By submitting your resume for this position, you understand and agree that Harris Corporation may share your resume, as well as any other related personal information or documentation you provide, with its subsidiaries and affiliated companies for the purpose of considering you for other available positions\nIPath=CJR&APath=2.21.0.0.0&job_did=J3H2WW5ZDVKV7FWJ27L\n  Date Posted: 3/10/2010 Company The Boeing Company Job Location US-NM-Las Cruces Status Full-Time Experience Level At least 5 year(s) Education 4 Year Degree Requisition Number 10-1002798 Image Analyst 3/4 - RROC Day Operations [OC = Operations/Operating Center??]\nLeads and provides intelligence/imagery analytic solutions to a wide range of difficult problems that require ingenuity and creativity across multiple image and intelligence disciplines and diverse platforms. Analyzes data collected by sensors on intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) platforms. Creates and distributes reports from imagery-derived products. Conducts analysis to support and extend the finished imagery reports. Analyzes data from remote sensing capabilities and related phenomenology. Provides intelligence/imagery analytic solutions to a wide range of difficult mission planning problems with conclusions or recommendations. Applies specialized experience and/or training in specific sensor types. Gathers and monitors imagery and related metadata to identify product quality concerns and recommends engineering investigation. Conducts imagery studies and develops operational scenarios. Develops, updates and presents technical imagery-based courses in such areas as object, target or signature characterization familiarity, multi-sensor interpretation and data collection.\n\n## Competencies  General\n\n [ + ] Communication Clarifies purpose and importance; stresses major points; follows a logical sequence. Keeps the audience engaged through use of techniques such as analogies, illustrations, humor, an appealing style, body language, and voice inflection. Frames the message in line with audience experience, background, and expectations; uses terms, examples, and analogies that are meaningful to the audience. Seeks input from audience; checks understanding; presents message in different ways to enhance understanding. Uses syntax, pace, volume, diction, and mechanics appropriate to the media being used. Accurately interprets messages from others and responds appropriately. [ + ] Customer Focus Makes customers and their needs a primary focus of one's actions; develops and sustains productive customer relationships; uses information to understand customers' circumstances, problems, expectations, and needs; periodically becomes involved in sharing information with customers to build their understanding of issues and capabilities; considers how actions or plans will affect customers; responds quickly to meet customer needs and resolve problems; assists higher graded employees and/or project team leaders in implementing ways to monitor and evaluate customer concerns, issues, and satisfaction and to anticipate customer needs. [ + ] Systems Thinking Evaluates job tasks and processes on how well they help meet team objective(s); identifies non-value-adding components and barriers. Formulates change strategies; seeks input from others to evaluate options for change and encourage buy-in. Makes appropriate changes to job/role structures and processes by communicating effectively and focusing on new skill development. Uses accurate measurement systems to monitor the implementation\n\n## . Technical\n\n [ + ] Analytical Skills\n\n\nSkill and ability to: collect, organize, synthesize, and analyze data; summarize findings; develop conclusions and recommendations from appropriate data sources at the department level. Preferred -Skill and ability to: collect, organize, synthesize, and analyze data; summarize findings; develop conclusions and recommendations from appropriate data sources with clients, customers and/or suppliers.\n\n [ + ] Ops Effective Analysis *Basic -* Complete knowledge of operational effectiveness analysis methodologies (e.g. mission and system effectiveness analysis) and tools (e.g., mission simulations; measure of effectiveness; human in the loop simulators, test facilities, and operational evaluations). *Preferred -*Extensive knowledge of operational effectiveness analysis methodologies (e.g. mission and system effectiveness analysis) and tools (e.g., mission simulations; measure of effectiveness; human in the loop simulators, test facilities, and operational evaluations).\n\n[ + ] Proj Sched & Resource Mgmt *Basic -* Complete ability to create comprehensive project schedules which identify time frames for key project milestones, direct and manage more complex project schedules, independently identify project resource requirements, collaborate with others on more complex projects assigned, and assist others in complex large scale projects. *Preferred -*Extensive, specialized ability to create comprehensive multi-tiered project schedules for significant Business Unit projects. Extensive, specialized ability to identify time\nframes for key project milestones, ensure alignment of sub tier activities for overall project\nvisibility, tracking and completion, direct and manage more complex project schedules requiring interfacing with multi regional or international activities, independently identify project resource requirements, and integrate and direct multi project elements into a single collective overall project plan. Extensive, specialized ability to collaborate with others on the very complex projects assigned.\n\n [ + ] Remote Sensing *Basic -* Complete understanding of the Imagery intelligence cycle as it applies to remote sensing systems, and ability to assess and determine best sensor to satisfy requirement. Complete understanding of hard- and soft-copy exploitation tools, equipment and software. *Preferred -*Extensive and specialized knowledge of the Imagery intelligence cycle as it applies to remote sensing systems, and ability to assess and determine best sensor to satisfy requirement. Complete understanding of hard- and soft-copy exploitation tools, equipment and software. Typical Education/Experience Level 3 - Technical bachelor's degree and typically 5 or more years' related work experience or a Master's degree with typically 3 or more years' or a PhD degree or an equivalent combination of education and experience. A technical degree is defined as any four year degree, or greater, in a mathematic, scientific or information\ntechnology field of study.Level 4 - Technical bachelor's degree and typically 9 or more years' related work experience or a Master's degree with typically 7 or more years' or a PhD degree with typically 4 or more years' related work experience or an equivalent combination of education and experience. A technical degree is defined as any four year degree, or greater, in a mathematic, scientific or information technology field of study.Other Job related information Security Clearance: Candidate must possess a current SSBI/Special Programs Access clearance. The position is contingent upon that successful contract award.\n\nThis is Google's cache of http://www.job-search-engine.com/keyword/ssbi/. It is a snapshot of the page as it appeared on Mar 20, 2010 22:18:53 GMT. Software Engineer - TS SSBI - Hits // Security Clearance Required Harris Corporation (Las Cruces, NM) ...Clearance: Top Secret with FSP/Full/Lifestyle polygraph Software Engineer - TS SSBI - HITS11091045 IntelligenceCareers.com (01/31/10)\n\n## From Monster  - 8 Days Ago  [Accessed 2010-03-27]\n\nCOMPANY Harris Corporation JOB TITLE Geo-Spatial Scientist Engineer - TS/SSBI Required CITY/STATE Las Cruces, NM POSITION TYPE Full Time Employee REFERENCE CODE HITS03101047 Job Description: * Perform research, maintain databases, contribute to the preparation of analytical and technical reports and publications, prepare graphics and provide presentations in support of mission requirements * Utilize Geographic Information Systems (GIS) to extract and/or access geospatial information, derivative information, and multi-intelligence data to provide requirements, currency, accuracy, readiness, responsiveness, data integrity, and relevancy recommendations that support the analysis and visualization of geospatial data available for use by the military, intelligence, and policy-making communities * Perform scientific analysis on a variety of remotely sensed data types * Present oral and written repots on the analysis * Effectively communicate remote sensing capabilities and related phenomenology Qualifications: * Requires a Bachelors of Science degree in remote sensing, Earth, or Physical Science * Minimum 5 years of in Geographic Information Systems (GIS) * Proficient with one or more tools: ERDAS Imagine, ESRI Arc suite (ArcGIS, ArcMap, ArcIMS, ArcSDE), SOCCET, GXP * Experience with modeling, spatial regression analysis, and/or human terrain analysis This is Google's cache of http://www.indeed.com/q-Lockheed-Martin-l-Las-Cruces,-NM-88007-jobs.html. It is a snapshot of the page as it appeared on Feb 12, 2010 10:04:55 GMT Heating Refrigeration & Air Conditioning Lockheed Martin - Las Cruces, NM Security Clearance: Top Secret with FSP/Full/Lifestyle polygraph JN ARBLMC3020-726515 p p From Intelligencecareers.com - 4 days ago http://www8.nationalacademies.org/cp/CommitteeView.aspx?key=48977\nCommittee Membership Information Project Title:\nReview of the Department of Homeland Security's Approach to Risk Analysis PIN:\nDELS-O-08-01-A\nMajor Unit: Division on Earth and Life Studies Division on Engineering and Physical Sciences RSO:\nParker, Stephen Committee Membership Date Posted:   10/17/2008 Ms. Katherine Hall BAE Systems Katherine Hall is Director of Strategy and Plans for Global Analysis at BAE Systems. Prior to joining BAE, she directed the analysis and production section of the National Geospatial-lntelligence Agency (NGA), which is responsible for the management and strategic direction of several thousand intelligence analysts. Ms. Hall led the NGA's Integrated Operations Center in Denver which was cited by the DNI as a model of interagency cooperation. Prior to moving to NGA, she was a Senior Intelligence Officer with the CIA. As part of CIA's Office of Military Support, she directed CIA's Representative to NORAD/USSPACECOM where she acted as a senior intelligence advisor to the Commander. Ms. Hall was also a national intelligence officer and head of the National Intelligence Council's Analytic Group, an organization of senior intelligence officers responsible for the production of national estimates. She personally drafted several national intelligence estimates and with others was the developer of the first US Government model to estimate the spread and impact of AIDS. She also served in several senior positions in CIA's Directorate of Intelligence such as Deputy Director of the CIA's Office of Asian Pacific and Latin American Analysis and Director of the Office of Africa and Latin America. She began her career as a military and weapons analyst. Ms. Hall received her BA in history and physics from Mount Holyoke College and her MA in international relations from George Washington University. Ms. Hall's inclusion on this committee will ensure that the committee has an understanding of the quality of inputs upon which DHS must base its counter-terrorism risk analyses.\n\nhttp://www.thesecretofhennybogan.com/aboutmark.html I rejoined government civilian service in April 2002, accepting an appointment with NIMA.  I served as a Branch Chief for Future Concepts and was given responsibility for NIMA's Persistent Surveillance portfolio, including Space Base Radar (SBR), the New Imaging System, Laser Imaging Detection and Ranging and Airborne Integration Program efforts, including Global Hawk, Predator, JSTARS and the U-2.  I was later assigned as the NIMA SBR Program Manager and helped establish the NIMA Persistent Surveillance Office.  I was promoted to the Executive Service (Defense Intelligence Senior Level) in November 2003.  I am currently the Deputy Director, Integrated Operations Center-Special Projects, Analysis & Production Directorate, National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, Bethesda, Maryland, with duty at the Washington Navy Yard."
    },
    {
        "text": "## Working Draft\n\nA Dossier on the NRO Aerospace Data Facility Southwest NGA Integrated Operations Center Southwest NASA White Sands Complex/TDRSS Ground Station Las Cruces, New Mexico Version of 2012-07-16\n\n## Working Draft\n\nTo support this constellation, the NRO depends on a network of ground stations.  This network includes the Aerospace Data FacilityEast at Ft. Belvoir, Virginia; the Aerospace Data FacilitySouthwest at the White Sands Missile Test Range, New Mexico; and the Aerospace Data FacilityColorado at Buckley Air Force Base, Colorado. Each is a multi-mission facility that supports worldwide defense operations and the collection, analysis, reporting, and dissemination of intelligence information for multiple agencies. The NRO also maintains a presence at several locations overseas. These include the Joint Defense Facility Pine Gap in Alice Springs, Australia and RAF Menwith Hill, in Harrogate, United Kingdom. The NRO supports joint missions at these locations through the provision of technical systems and shared research and development. The NRO's participation is achieved with the consent of the host governments and contributes to the national security of the countries involved. In addition to its intelligence collection systems, the NRO maintains an extensive global communications network that supports both NRO operators and other military and intelligence users. The NRO's communications infrastructure includes for example, its encrypted satellite data relay system and messaging systems essential for the organization to function, such as the Special Operations Communications (SOCOMM) system.\n\nhttps://www.fbo.gov/index?s=opportunity&mode=form&id=aaa465790b6d479b3e2ef935518ae88f&tab=core&_cview=0\n[EXCERPTS] Print Server Solicitation Number: HM0177-09-T-0067 Agency: Other Defense Agencies Office: National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency Location: Acquisition Technology (ACT) Original Synopsis Aug 19, 2009 7:38 am Solicitation Number: HM0177-09-T-0067 Synopsis: Added: Aug 19, 2009 7:38 am The National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA) has a requirement for an HP Print Server. Contracting Office Address: ACT Mail Stop P-158 12310 Sunrise Valley Road Reston, Virginia 20191-3449 Place of Performance: IOC-SW 12400 NASA Road Las Cruces, New Mexico 88012 United States http://documents.theblackvault.com/documents/spysatellites/RECON1.pdf http://www.icahst.org/docs/2010-06-10/Martin%20Feedback%20email%2011%20June%202010.pdf From: Fredrick T. Martin [mailto:ftmartin@topsecretnet.com] Sent: Friday, June 11, 2010 3:49 PM To: ICAHST Council Members (icahst@topsecretnet.com) Cc: Fredrick T. Martin (fredrick.martin@dhs.gov) Subject: Feedback from 10 June 2010 ICAHST Quarterly Meeting Feedback from 10 June 2010 ICAHST Quarterly Meeting [ICAHST: Interagency Council for Applied Homeland Security Technology ] [EXCERPT] ICAHST Working Group Status: Mr. Frank Toomer, ICAHST Outreach Director, NRO, presented an update on current outreach activities, including the ICAHST membership efforts; the Civil Applications Committee (CAC), chaired by the US Geological Survey; and the NRO Law Enforcement / Homeland Security Technology Exchange Working Group (TEWG). Mr. Toomer invited all ICAHST members to participate in TEWG activities. The next meeting of the TEWG will be held at FBI facilities at Quantico, VA from 10:00am to 12:00pm on Thursday 17 June. A SECRET Security clearance is required to enter the FBI grounds. If you are interested in attending, please contact Bob Hamburg at 703-808-3222. The TEWG is also planning a visit with TS/SCI briefings at US Air Force (ADF-SW), El Paso Intelligence Center (EPIC) and the DoD Joint Task Force-North (JTF-N) during 22-23 June 2010. For additional information, please contact Mr. Toomer at 703-808-2328 or Mr. Kevin Lewis at 703-808-2125.\n\nhttp://www.mors.org/UserFiles/file/MDA%20Briefs/NORAD%20Maritime%20Warning%20Mission%20-%20Salchert.pdf\n\n## Job Descriptions\n\nThis is Google's cache of http://www.americajob.com/job.asp? cid=0&tid=89473167&no=3918252&retPage=%2FNew-Mexico%2Fadmin-management-jobs-4.asp. It is a snapshot of the page as it appeared on Jun 5, 2010 08:01:36 GMT.\n\n## Duties:\n\nADDITIONAL INFORMATION: The Integrated Operations Center-Southwest (IOC-SW) is a diverse Geospatial Intelligence (GEOINT) Community spanning most of NGA's corporate and functional management responsibilities to include tasking; processing; exploitation; analysis and production; dissemination; national and international partnerships; GEOINT policy; training and outreach; research and development; acquisition; and technology insertion. Located in Las Cruces, New Mexico at the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) Aerospace Data Facility-Southwest (ADF-SW), the IOC-SW is not a traditional, hierarchical organization working a narrow NGA mission set under a single chain of command. Rather, it is a microcosm of NGA and includes elements of other GEOINT organizations as well responsible for 12 different core missions and a host of enabling activities. At present, this GEOINT Community consists of individuals representing 16 different NGA home offices from nine KC's and two military service components, with most members organizationally, programmatically, and operationally linked to those external offices/components. The Integrated Operations Center-Southwest (IOC-SW) is seeking a staff officer who is self-starting, energetic and able to handle multiple tasks. The selectee will report to the IOC-SW Chief of Staff (CoS), and will serve as the focal point of contact for the IOC-SW Business Continuity Plan (BCP) and Continuity of Operations Plan (COOP), policy development and implementation, various administrative duties such as task management and corporate communications. The selectee will represent the IOC-SW CoS in various forums and inform IOC-SW leadership of any relevant topics, issues or actions of interest to the IOC-SW community. They will also provide backup to other IOC-SW staff to ensure day-to-day administrative tasks are accomplished. This will require the selectee to obtain a working knowledge of other IOC-SW staff roles and responsibilities.\n\nThis is Google's cache of http://www.jobcentral.com/jobs/Lockheed_Martin/NM/Systems_Engineer_Stf/010481234/job.\n\n It is a snapshot of the page as it appeared on May 18, 2009 05:12:30 GMT.\n\nSystems Engineer Stf Job in New Mexico Title : Systems Engineer Stf Company : Lockheed Martin Location : New Mexico Date Acquired : 4/22/2009 12:28:17 AM Date Updated : 5/11/2009 12:18:54 AM Req ID 121471BR Industry Job Title Systems Engineer Stf Standard Job Code/Title E1464:Systems Engineer Stf Required skills Current ADF-SW site experience In depth knowledge of site specific activities Established relationships with Ground and Systems Operation GPOCs Systems Integration experience Strong NRO experience Desired skills Team lead experience Full Spectrum Leadership attributes and ability Specific Job Description High visibility position where individual will be a member of the site System Integration team for Program 606 working directly at remote customer location. This position will support approximately 50% Ground and 50% System Operations support. This person will already be located in the southwest region, will have domain experience, and will have established relationships with site customers. The candidate will be a proven team player, have ability to adapt to rapidly changing work environments, possess strong negotiation skills, have proven project management skills, ability to coordinate across multi-int environment with diplomacy and tact, influential with customer as needed to defend the ultimate mission goals, along with being highly organized. Requires full life cycle engineering experience, including transition to operations, with strong analysis skills. Specific tasks include, but are not limited to: communication and collaboration with SI SO and GEI teams; document update and control; RFC assessment, analyze/assess schedules, requirements/specification development, integration, test and transition, readiness activities, ground processing, ground operations, CONOPS development, experience at the ADF-SW, knowledge/ experience with ICDs/specifications for the ADF-SW and ADF-E; coordination with RFC authors for requirements clarification; provide technical assessments for SOERB and GMM ERB; coordinate and conduct design reviews, technical reviews, program management reviews, and other technical forums as required; ability to coordinate across multiple customer domains and contractors; approximately 15% travel with customer to support reviews as needed. Applicants selected will be subject to a government security investigation and must meet eligibility requirements for access to classified information. Standard Job Description Performs technical planning, system integration, verification and validation, cost and risk, and supportability and effectiveness analyses for total systems. Analyses are performed at all levels of total system product to include: concept, design, fabrication, test, installation, operation, maintenance and disposal. Ensures the logical and systematic conversion of customer or product requirements into total systems solutions that acknowledge technical, schedule, and cost constraints. Performs functional analysis, timeline analysis, detail trade studies, requirements allocation and interface definition studies to translate customer requirements into hardware and software specifications.\n\n## Security Clearance Top Secret/Special Security Requirements\n\nTypical Minimums Bachelors degree from an accredited college in a related discipline, or equivalent experience/combined education, with 9 years of professional experience; or 7 years of professional experience with a related Masters degree. Considered an emerging authority. LMCareers Business Unit ESS9995 EI GROUP (S0807) Business Area Info Systems & Global Services Program P606 Department 8N3D:NPD_ISU-P606 Clin 5 Field_18 Job Class Systems Engineering: Other Job Category Experienced Professional State New Mexico Virtual No Relocation Available No Req Type Full-Time Direct/Indirect Direct http://www.ihirelogistics.com/PremiumJobResponse.asp?\n\nPJobID=338058&campaigntype=SearchEngine&Campaign=IndeedOrganic\n[Accessed 2010-08-10]\n\n## Job Title:Supply Chain Mgr K At Adf-Sw Company:Boeing Location:Las Cruces, Nm\n\nJob Description: Manages and integrates employees activities across more than one area in materials management and transportation. Develops and executes project and process plans, implements policies and procedures and sets operational goals. Acquires resources for projects and processes, provides technical management of suppliers and leads process improvements. Develops and maintains relationships and partnerships with customers, stakeholders, peers, partners and direct reports. Provides oversight and approval of technical approaches, products and processes. Manages, develops and motivates employees. Supply Chain Logistics Manager is responsible for day-to-day management of all Supply Chain Management efforts, including but not limited to Transportation and Mail Processing, Property/Asset Management, Support Services which includes Conference Center Support, Cafeteria Services, Copier Maintenance, Fleet Services and other associated support services. Because of the critical mission being conducted by the customer, close coordination with customer stakeholders is required to maintain 100% mission critical infrastructure and minimal interruption to ancillary operations. This requires 24 X 7 attention to operations including daily teleconferences and meetings with customer and Site Manager and Staff to ensure continuity of mission. In this role, the Supply Chain Logistics Manager reports to Site Manager and has direct interface with multiple customers. The Supply Chain Logistics Manager will lead a management team and workforce of approximately XX personnel executing the logistics and support functions. Workforce consists of logisticians, transportation specialists and trades skills. The Supply Chain Logistics Manager will insure standard operating procedures are being followed and ad hoc events (site emergencies, system failures, delivery interruptions) are handled and to the customers satisfaction. The successful candidate will also work with other Supply Chain Logistics Managers to coordinate, develop, and implement common practices that will enhance operations by developing standard approaches across multiple sites. In addition, the successful candidate will develop processes and systems that allow for analyzing and forecasting for strategic warehouse utilization, strategic resource allocation, transportation network optimization and innovation. Manages and integrates employees activities across more than one area in materials management and transportation. Develops and executes project and process plans, implements policies and procedures and sets operational goals. Acquires resources for projects and processes, provides technical management of suppliers in support of strong supply chain methodology to include Just in Time Logistics, vendor managed stocking, and leads process improvements. Develops and maintains relationships and partnerships with customers, stakeholders, peers, partners and direct reports. Provides oversight and approval of technical approaches, products and processes. Manages, develops and motivates employees. Position is located in Las Cruces, New Mexico.\n\nhttp://manassas-virginia.olx.com/facilities-engineering-sr-mgr-iid-268393487\n[Accessed 2012-07-16]\nFacilities Engineering Sr Mgr - Manassas Location: Manassas, Virginia, United States Date Posted: October 23 [2011] Description Req ID 215968BR Industry Job Title Facilities Engineering Sr Mgr Standard Job Code/Title L1516:Facilities Engineering Sr Mgr Required skills * Visionary * Technial expert in facility engineering or related discipline * Proven Full Spectrum Leader * Excellent oral and written communication skills * Strong track record of success * Current, active TS/SCI clearance Desired skills * Licensed Professional engineer * Other related professional certification * Sustainability experience Specific Job Description CFOAM is a $25M/ YR CPAF contract covering 3 sites: ADF-E, ADF-SW and customer HQ. As a subcontractor, LMC provides the following services at ADF-E: facility operations and maintenance (including some continuous shift), construction services, construction project management, security systems O&M, vehicle management and maintenance, janitorial, registry, courier, waste destruct, grounds maintenance (including snow removal), Environmental Safety and Health, facility help line, work flow management, process improvement, video system installation and maintenance as well as some web design. -Technical: Responsible to the Boeing (Prime) site manager for the strategic direction of facility infrastructure maintenance, recapitalization and improvements. Develops and implements a long range plan to meet customer goals regarding Facility Condition Index. Thought leader on the continuous discussion and annual submittal of the recapitalization, site road map and preventive maintenance review CDRLs. Ensures recapitalization planning is in synch with customer priorities. Works closely with the customer and monitors mission plans and their impact on facility infrastructure requirements. Matches the site's power and cooling capacity with new and emerging requirements, including required reserves, and mitigates with sustainable solutions. Identifies and champions the implementation of equipment and facility related sustainability programs including construction materials and techniques, power and cooling solutions and maintenance practices. The successful candidate will have continuous interaction with the government customer and our industry partners. Strong communication, technical writing, presentation, team building and negotiating skills are keys to success in this challenging environment. -Functional: Full spectrum leaders for a team of 150 mission focused LMC service professionals with 8 subordinate managers as the major subcontractor on an enterprise facility O&M contract. CFOAM has adopted a \"one team\" approach that often blends working groups from multiple industry partners under the day to day direction of a Boeing or LMC leader. Additional duties in a program leadership role as assigned by the prime contractor. Standard Job Description: Manages the planning, design, and oversight of the reconfiguration, maintenance, and alteration of equipment, machinery, buildings, structures, and other facilities. Responsible for coordinating subordinate employee recruitment, selection and training, performance assessment, work assignments, salary, and recognition/disciplinary actions. Oversees the gathering and review of data concerning facility or equipment specifications, company or government restrictions, required completion date, and construction feasibility. Monitors the coordination with architecture/engineering firms in developing design criteria and preparing layout and detail drawings. Directs the preparation of bid sheets and contracts for construction and facilities acquisition. Oversees the review and estimation of design costs including equipment, installation, labor, materials, preparation, and other related costs. Directs the inspection of construction and installation progress to ensure conformance to established drawings, specifications, and schedules. Security Clearance: TS/SCI w/Poly Typical Minimums: Appropriate degree from an accredited college, or equivalent experience/combined education, with professional experience and specialized training commensurate with assignment. LMCareers Business Unit ESS0160 IS&GS-NATIONAL (S8200) Business Area Info Systems & Global Sol Program CFOAM Department 6351001:CFOAM_SI Job Class Facilities Job Category Experienced Professional State virginia Virtual No Relocation Available Negotiable Work Schedule STANDARD-Mon-Fri/8 hours a day Req Type Full-Time Direct/Indirect Direct Shift First\n\n## Training Instructor - Las Cruces, Nm - Hits06101035 Description:\n\nTraining Instructor Job Code:HITS06101035\n\nJob Description: - Work as part of a team of contract and government geospatial intelligence analysis instructors that will provide instruction in AGI, SAR,imagery analysis, Geographic Information Systems (GIS), Remote Sensing (RS) and sensors - Teach the application of AGI with a prime focus on SAR, analysis techniques and instruct on the theory, techniques, procedures and sensors used to produce digital and hardcopy AGI products from radar imagery - Development and revision of AGI (SAR) courses that are instructional systems design (ISD) compliant.  To include the integration of multi-media course instructional materials, equipment and non-traditional (NTM, commercial, advanced geospatial intelligence) data - Provide instruction in tailored intelligence analysis and production utilizing SAR to support customer requirements from offices in NGA/P and the rest of the intelligence community - Classroom management - Delivery and support of mobile training team, provide SAR training to external customers - Prepare for possible Mobile Training Team assignments Qualifications: - BS degree in image science, remote sensing, earth science, physics or related discipline, plus a minimum of 10 years related work experience - Demonstrated experience providing instructional materials in classroom setting - Experience with SAR AGI - Demonstrated skills and abilities necessary to provide SAR subject matter - Expertise to NGA and community customers - Knowledge of spectral imaging systems technology and collection parameters - Experience with applied image processing and analysis - Knowledge of process improvement techniques for improving customer support\n\n## Preferred Additional Skills: - Excellent Oral And Written Communication Skills This Position Requires The Candidate To Already Possess An Active Ts/Ssbi Clearance And To Maintain The Clearance.\n\nhttp://careers.northropgrumman.com/tasc/getJobPostDetail.do?sequenceNumber=206468\n[Accessed 2010-08-11]\nTitle:  Engineer Info Assurance 5 Category:  Security Location:  Las Cruces, NM / USA   |   Sector:  TASC Posting ID:  TA/116505 Description: General Description: TASC is seeking an Information System Security Engineer (ISSE) to join our team of qualified, diverse individuals. This position will be located in Las Cruces, NM. The qualified applicant will become part of TASC's Team, and with minimal supervision, design, develop, and implement specific Information Assurance (IA) countermeasures for network environments. An ISSE is a senior level security professional who provides consistent application of security best practices in the areas of information systems, network security, telecommunications security, and Technical Security Countermeasures (TSCM), product evaluations and other related security technology to the Intelligence Community (IC) and IC sponsored facilities. Represent the USG at federal and industrial sponsored meetings and symposiums, facility and systems security policy committees, and working groups. Have direct interaction with senior USG officials and various contractor personnel. Ensure that network system designs support the incorporation of IC and DoD-directed security guidelines, requirements matrices, and IA vulnerability solutions. Develop and implement security designs ensuring the design of hardware, operating systems, and software applications adequately address IA security requirements. Assess the effectiveness of information protection measures used. Develop approaches to mitigate vulnerabilities and recommend changes to network or network system components as needed. Review and write Certification and Accreditation (C&A) documentation to ensure compliance with security requirements. Review and provide comments on IA documents and instructions. Candidates with these desired skills will be given preferential consideration: Microsoft, Linux, or VMWare and Cisco certification with in-depth experience in security engineering. CISSP and other certifications a plus. Candidate must possess strong problem solving/analytical, communication, organizational and teambuilding skills; as well as the ability to write/review corresponding documentation using the MS Office Suite. Experience with the Information Assurance Technical Framework or ISSE Processes, DIACAP or NIST C&A processes & documentation a must. Must be a U.S. Citizen and possess an active TS/SCI security clearance with CI Polygraph. Some travel may be required. Start date contingent upon contract award estimated on 1 December 2010. Position Summary / Responsibilities Designs and implements information assurance and security engineering systems with requirements of business continuity, operations security, cryptography, forensics, regulatory compliance, internal counter-espionage (insider threat detection and mitigation), physical security analysis (including facilities analysis, and security management). Assesses and mitigates system security threats and risks throughout the program life cycle. Validates system security requirements definition and analysis. Establishes system security designs. Implements security designs in hardware, software, data, and procedures. Verifies security requirements; performs system certification and accreditation planning and testing and liaison activities. Supports secure systems operations and maintenance. Additional Requirements: Knowledge, Skills and Ability Apply advanced technical principles, theories, and concepts. Contributes to the development of new principles and concepts. Problem Solving Work on unusually complex technical problems and provide solutions which are highly innovative and ingenious. Discretion/Latitude Works under consultative direction toward predetermined long-range goals and objectives. Assignments are often self-initiated. Determine and pursue courses of action necessary to obtain desired results. Work checked through consultation and agreement with others rather than by formal review of superior. Impact Develops advanced technological ideas and guides their development into a final product. Erroneous decisions or recommendations would typically result in failure to achieve critical organizational objectives and effect the image of the organization technological capability. Liaison Serves as organization spokesperson on advanced projects and/or programs. Acts as advisor to management and customers on advanced technical research studies and applications. Typical Minimum Education / Experience 14 Years with Bachelors in Science; 12 Years with Masters; 9 Years with PhD. Security Clearance Required.\n\n## Software Engineer - Las Cruces Radiantblue Technologies Posted On: 7/30/10 Minimum Security Clearance Top Secret/Sci\n\nWe are seeking forward thinking technologists and software developers who apply cutting edge technologies to solve problems of national security. The software engineer will work in a prototyping environment to build and integrate COTS, open source, and proprietary technologies to deliver novel solutions to challenging problems. Will be responsible for choosing the right technologies to solve problems. Must be able to work independently and as part of a team to see a vision successfully implemented. Will work closely with users and stake-holders to help understand needs and shape requirements.\n\nPosition Requirements: - Java, C++, or C# programming expertise - Web services/Service oriented architectures (SOA) expertise - Familiarity with SQL database development - BS in Computer Science or related discipline - Selected applicants will be subject to a government security investigation and must meet eligibility requirements for access to classified information. An active TS/SCI clearance is required.\n\n## Preferred Experience/Knowledge: - Familiarity With The Intelligence Community - Experience With Highly-Scalable And Highly-Available Web Service Environments - Experience With Oracle\n\nAbout RadiantBlue Technologies: RadiantBlue is a specialized provider of information technology development, consulting, and program support services for the Defense Department and the Intelligence Community. We are focused on the rapid development, integration, and delivery of innovative technologies that provide value for our customers. As a RadiantBlue employee you will have the opportunity to apply your talent and ideas to solve challenging problems that are of importance to the nation's defense and security. Please visit our web site www.radiantblue.com to apply or to get more information about the company and employee benefits. RadiantBlue Technologies is an equal opportunity employer. Preferences 5+ yrs experience Employee Industry Category: IT Software-Prog YY4VQTUUFVQMET1T815QEEACWFMX26PM9DG1E7KVOK9ICUANP15W9K1NQKXQHKM\nVGIVSCN4H5D4W9IL47TIN7G5SELOIZ9KGWMUSCMET5NFA7VRV65BNVTIQ0KVTIQ0L3H\n7ATQ8\n[Accessed 2009-05-25]\nJob Category  FAC - Facilities / Physical Security Req ID 142634 Able to obtain security clearance?\n\nTop Secret/SCI w/ CI Polygraph Currently possess security clearance?\n\nTop Secret SCI\nLocation Las Cruces, NM\nRelocation No Requirements: SAIC seeks a highly qualified mid-level Information Security Engineer to perform as an Information Systems Security Officer (ISSO) supporting a high-priority real-time operational center that directly impacts US national security. The position is in the Las Cruces, NM area. An active and current Top Secret SCI clearance is required, with the ability to obtain a CI polygraph.\n\n## Job Description:\n\nThe position involves information security analysis and engineering; and participating in various information security activities required to ensure the integrity of the customer's networks, applications, and information. The selected candidate will assist in developing and maintaining the overall system security documentation in accordance with the DCID 6/3. In addition, the individual will work closely with certifiers to navigate the customer's certification & accreditation process and produce all appropriate accreditation documentation. Duties include ensuring systems are designed, operated, maintained and retired in accordance with established policies and procedures; that users are properly briefed on information security responsibilities and processes; initiating protective or corrective measures in response to security incidents; and conducting periodic reviews to ensure compliance. The candidate will interact with government and other contractor personnel on a regular basis to provide IT security consulting for other security documents such as security incident reports, equipment/software inventories, operating instructions, technical vulnerability reports, and contingency plans. Occasional travel to government and contractor facilities within the continental US may be required once or twice per year. EDUCATION: Bachelor's Degree required, preferably in a technical discipline. Candidate must possess at least 5 years of relevant information security experience associated with the certification and accreditation of classified systems. REQUIRED SKILLS: Current TOP SECRET SCI is required. Candidate must have expertise in securing networks and systems with a thorough understanding of network topologies and associated hardware and software; and operating systems (UNIX, Windows, and Linux). Knowledge of systems engineering and system development lifecycle is required. The ISSO shall possess strong communication and interpersonal skills as he/she operates as part of a multi-contractor team and directly engages in a customer-facing role. Must possess experience with DCID 6/3 standards along with computer security best practices. DESIRED SKILLS: Ideal candidate should have expertise with IDS-SourceFire, Trusted Guard, Firewalls and Solaris Log analysis; knowledge of Cisco and Juniper devices. A current Certified Information Systems Security Professional (CISSP) or similar security professional certification is highly desired.\n\nhttp://www.3001inc.com/GeoHome/careers.asp http://www.3001inc.com/GeoHome/careers.asp\n\n## Job Description National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency Job Announcement Number: 080473\n\nProject Scientist SALARY RANGE: 36,030.00 - 59,895.00 USD per year Salary may vary depending on locality. Please refer to www.nga.mil/careers for additional salary information.OPEN PERIOD: Monday, March 10, 2008 to Friday, March 21, 2008 SERIES & GRADE: NI-0000-02/02POSITION INFORMATION: Full Time This is a permanent position. DUTY LOCATIONS: 1 vacancy - White Sands Missile Range, NM WHO MAY BE CONSIDERED: All Sources ONLY ELECTRONIC SUBMISSIONS WILL BE ACCEPTED. JOB SUMMARY: The National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA), the World Leader in Geospatial Intelligence. Imagine being able to identify anything on, above, or beneath the Earth's surface and display that information visually to provide a meaningful foundation for decision-making to ensure the safety of the world. That's the job of the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency.  We analyze imagery and data from many sources and incorporate it into visual displays of essential information for use in national defense, homeland security, and safety of navigation.  Central to the success of our mission are the extraordinary talents and skills of our teams of analysts and other professionals. We need the best minds to provide the information edge, continuing NGA's role as the premier provider of Geospatial Intelligence worldwide. NGA - Know the Earth . . .Show the Way. JOB DESCRIPTION: Project Scientists are responsible for the day-to-day execution and technical oversight of a variety of scientific activities. They develop project schedules, determine resource requirements, provide technical guidance and oversight, and report results. Project Scientists apply in-depth expertise from a variety of scientific disciplines (e.g., Photogrammetry, Geodesy, Computer Science, Mathematics, Image Science) to develop, analyze, evaluate, and apply new technology; develop expertise and tradecraft for the Agency; and advise senior management on new and evolving technology. They participate in strategic planning, propose and defend program plans, and communicate and market results to customers and decision-makers. They may additionally serve as COR. KEY REQUIREMENTS: U.S. CitizenshipDrug TestingSecurity Investigation Send Mail to: NATIONAL GEOSPATIAL-INTELLIGENCE AGENCY 12310 Sunrise Valley Drive Reston, VA 20190 For questions about this job: Recruitment Phone: 703-755-5900 JOB REQUIREMENTS 080473\nProject Scientist QUALIFICATIONS REQUIRED: MANDATORY QUALIFICATION CRITERIA: Experience that equipped the applicant with the particular knowledge, skills, and abilities to perform successfully the duties of this position, and that is typically in or related to the work of this position. For this particular job, applicants must have experience in the following: Customer Service; Interpersonal Relationship Development/Networking; Oral Communication; Briefing and Oral Presentation; Non-technical Writing; Leadership; Planning and Scheduling; Problem Identification, Analysis and Resolution. DESIRABLE QUALIFICATION CRITERIA: In addition to the mandatory qualifications, experience in the following is desired: a demonstrated knowledge of Intelligence Community (IC) membership, mission, goals, and priorities; Customer service principles; Decision-making processes; Civilian agencies (e.g., USGS, DOS); Technical writing; Testing and Evaluation. EDUCATION REQUIREMENTS: A. Education: Bachelor's degree in Engineering, Mathematics, Physical Science, or a related discipline that includes 24 semester (36 quarter) hours in Physical Science and/or a related Engineering Science. Such coursework includes, but is not limited to, Astronomy, Cartography, Chemistry, Computer Science, Dynamics, Electrical Engineering, Geodesy, Geology, Geophysics, Geospatial Information Systems, Mathematics, Orbital Mechanics, Photogrammetry, Physics, Remote Sensing, or Surveying. Although not mandatory, coursework in differential and integral calculus is preferred. -OR- B. Combination of Education and Experience: A minimum of 24 semester (36 quarter) hours of college education in any areas listed in option A plus experience that demonstrates the ability to successfully perform the duties associated with this work. As a rule, every 30 semester (45 quarter) hours of college work is equivalent to one year of experience. Candidates should show that their combination of education and experience totals to 4 years.\n\nSPECIAL INFO: - Direct Deposit Required - Two Year Probationary Period - U.S. Citizenship Required - Position Subject to Drug Testing - Security Clearance Required - Top Secret - Sensitive Compartmented Information - Polygraph Test Required\nSPECIAL REQUIREMENTS: You must be able to obtain and retain a Top Secret security clearance with access to Sensitive Compartmented Information. This process may take up to one year or more to be completed. In addition, you may be required to successfully complete a polygraph examination for the current position you applied for and/or for any future position(s). NARRATIVES REQUIRED: The following required narratives will supplement the information contained in the applicant's resume. Applicants are REQUIRED to submit a narrative on the following KSAs. Entire narrative CANNOT exceed the specific limits provided on the KSA field. Pages exceeding this limit will not be considered. FAILURE TO SUBMIT NARRATIVE RESPONSES TO THE KSA WILL DISQUALIFY AN APPLICANT FROM FURTHER CONSIDERATION. Applicants should place their narrative information in the appropriate field at the Job History and KSA Text Page. The KSAs are: 1. Demonstrate your ability to effectively manage multiple assignments within established time constraints. 2. Demonstrate your ability to communicate effectively both orally and in writing. JOB RESPONSIBILITIES,  DUTIES, TASKS 080473 Project Scientist Additional Duty Location Info:1 vacancy - White Sands Missile Range, NM ADDITIONAL INFORMATION: The employee selected for this position will have an important role in the Advanced Geospatial Intelligence (AGI) work being performed through the Geospatial Intelligence Advancement Testbed (GIAT) Portfolio (IIG) efforts to acquire and exploit advanced sources for geospatial intelligence and to integrate these sources into AGI analysis and problem solutions. Duties include analysis, test and evaluation of commercial software applications; scientific problem solving and development of prototype processes and applications for customers in the Integrated Operations Center - Southwest (IOC-SW), NGA, IC and DoD; investigation of potential new sources of AGI; the use of Multi-Intelligence data sources (SIGINT, MASINT) to develop future capabilities for IOC-SW intelligence initiatives; information visualization; and engaging in collaborative partnerships for rapid solution development. PERMANENT CHANGE IN STATION: Travel/Transportation expenses are not authorized. HOW TO APPLY JOB BENEFITS AND OTHER INFORMATION 080473 Project Scientist BENEFITS: Pay is only part of the compensation you will earn working for the Federal Government. We offer a broad array of benefits programs and family friendly flexibilities to meet the needs of you and your family. Here are some highlights. Look for additional information along with links to pages that spell out the details below. You may participate in the Federal Employees Health Benefits program, with costs shared with your employer. More info: http://www.usajobs.gov/jobextrainfo.asp#FEHB Life insurance coverage is provided. More info: http://www.usajobs.gov/jobextrainfo.asp#life Long-Term Care Insurance is offered and carries into your retirement. More info: http://www.usajobs.gov/jobextrainfo.asp#ltci New employees are automatically covered by the Federal Employees Retirement System (FERS). If you are transferring from another agency and covered by CSRS, you may continue in this program. More info: http://www.usajobs.gov/jobextrainfo.asp#retr You will earn annual vacation leave. More info: http://www.usajobs.gov/jobextrainfo.asp#VACA You will earn sick leave. More info: http://www.usajobs.gov/jobextrainfo.asp#SKLV You will be paid for federal holidays that fall within your regularly scheduled tour of duty. More info: http://www.usajobs.gov/jobextrainfo.asp#HOLI In addition to federal benefits, NGA employees are also eligible for a suite of benefits offered only to the Intelligence Community (IC). The Compass Rose Benefits Group (CRBG) offers insurance products and services to all IC civilian employees. Compass Rose benefits include: Term Life Insurance, Group Accident Plan, Income Replacement, and Long Term Care Insurance. For more information on this highly-restricted opportunity, please visit the Compass Rose website: http://www.compassrosebenefits.com Source Strategies Analyst Job Information Post Date:\nMay 22, 2009\nType:\nFull time Start Date:\n- n/a -\nSalary: - n/a -\nLocation:\nNew Mexico - White Sands Missile Range Job Reference: - n/a -\nJob Details Description Open date: 2009-02-09 Close date: 2009-02-20 The National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA), the World Leader in Geospatial Intelligence. Imagine being able to identify anything on, above, or beneath the Earth's surface and display that information visually to provide a meaningful foundation for decision-making to ensure the safety of the world. That's the job of the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency. We analyze imagery and data from many sources and incorporate it into visual displays of essential information for use in national defense, homeland security, and safety of navigation. Central to the success of our mission are the extraordinary talents and skills of our teams of analysts and other professionals. We need the best minds to provide the information edge, continuing NGA's role as the premier provider of Geospatial Intelligence worldwide. NGA - Know the Earth . . .Show the Way. ASSIGNMENT DESCRIPTION: Source Strategies Analysts collaborate with customers and source providers to develop comprehensive multi-INT, multi-source strategies to address intelligence problems. They create tasking and dissemination requirements, adjudicate requirements, analyze and investigate collection performance, assess and report on end-to-end GEOINT system performance data, and advise customers in support of the National System for Geospatial-Intelligence (NSG). ADDITIONAL INFORMATION: The Source Directorate, Source Strategies Office, Source Fusion Center Southwest is seeking a highly qualified and motivated individual to support a key element of its distributed Source Fusion Center \"Community Support\" operations team that will enable multi-intelligence collection initiatives with mission partners and the IC customer base. The selected individual will champion horizontal integration between a wide range of national technical means, maximizing the value of GEOINT as a mechanism to drive analytical and complementary intelligence efforts in a real time environment. The individual must have a fundamental understanding of all intelligence disciplines, with an emphasis on GEOINT, SIGINT, ONIR and other technical means and must be capable of operating in dynamic situations, and responding to stakeholders within and outside their direct supervisory chain. The selected individual will be required to exercise verbal and written communication skills in the preparation and presentation of technical analysis, position papers, operational briefings, and operational procedures. The selected individual will also be required to maintain a close working relationship with the NGA analytical elements at multiple physical locations and will be required to provide direct support for both the Integrated Operations Center South West (IOC-SW) and Integrated Operations Center Special Programs (IOC-SP) while maintaining a basic understanding of the architectures that support such activities.\n\n[Accessed 2009-06-28]\nTechnical Writer-01076817 Description Key Role: Write, develop, and deliver Advanced Geospatial-Intelligence (AGI) correspondence, articles, policies, and a CONOPS plan for delivery to the geospatial intelligence community. Aid in content decisions on various media and staff responses thru various communication means. Create AGI graphics and materials that creatively portrays all programs to customers, both internal and external. Support the intelligence community director with AGI and other miscellaneous written materials, including draft and edit executive briefing materials, such as PowerPoint slides and notes for presentation to other directorates, IC partners, service schools, associations, and public industry. This position is located in Las Cruces, NM.\n\n## Qualifications\n\nBasic Qualifications: -2+ years of experience with technical writings and reports -Experience with reviewing and editing technical reports for formatting and accuracy -Experience with Microsoft Word, and PowerPoint -Experience with graphics design -TS/SCI clearance\n\n## Additional Qualifications:\n\n-Ability to show participation in or directing the activities of highly skilled technical and analytical teams with analytical and intelligence problems -Ability to work alone and share information with team members and customers in a timely manner -Possession of excellent oral and written communication skills -Possession of excellent customer support skills -BA or BS degree preferred\n\n## Clearance:\n\nApplicants selected will be subject to a security investigation and may need to meet eligibility requirements for access to classified information; TS/SCI clearance is required. Integrating the full range of consulting capabilities, Booz Allen is the one firm that helps clients solve their toughest problems, working by their side to help them achieve their missions. Booz Allen is committed to delivering results that endure. We are proud of our diverse environment, EOE, M/F/D/V. Job Writing Primary Location United States-New Mexico-Las Cruces http://www.simplyhired.com/job-id/kyuwtokka6/software-engineer-jobs/\n[Accessed 2009-06-29]\n\n## Software Engineer Saic - Las Cruces, Nm\n\nThe Space and Geospatial Intelligence Business Unit currently has an opening for a Software Engineer at White Sands Missile Range located in Las Cruces, NM. Candidates must have an active Top Secret/SCI security clearance and must be able to obtain a CI Polygraph. POSITION DUTIES: The Software Engineer will work with other SAIC Software Engineers analyzing requirements, developing and integrating appropriate technical solutions, and delivering and maintaining business support capabilities for a government customer. At a minimum, the Software Engineer will: 1) Work with the customer and developer staff to identify and prioritize tasks as well as provide analysis and recommendations for the appropriate technical solutions to customer requirements 2) Promote a collaborative work environment with... Location: Las Cruces, NM Area Code: 505 Tax Term: FULLTIME Pay Rate: tbd Length: Position ID: HITS06091008 Dice ID: harrisme Travel Required: none Telecommute: no Title:  Software Engineer Skills:Previous software development experience Date: 6-25-2009 Job Description: Responsible for research, design, and development of computer software systems, in conjunction with hardware product development Analyze software requirements to determine feasibility of design within time and cost contraints Consult with electrical and/or mechanical engineers and other engineering staff to evaluate interface between hardware and software, and operational performance requirements of the overall system Develop and direct software system testing procedures, programming and documentation\n\n## Qualifications:\n\nSuccessful candidates will have a Bachelors Degree (or the equivalent ) in Computer Science (or related technical field) as well as 5 years relevant professional experience Requires the application of the principles and techniques of computer science, engineering, and mathematical analysis Previous software development experience Experience working in a team environment with minimal direct supervision This position requires the candidate to be able to obtain a TS/SCI security clearance. In order to obtain a clearance you need to be a US Citizen and show proof of citizenship. By submitting your resume for this position, you understand and agree that Harris Corporation may share your resume, as well as any other related personal information or documentation you provide, with its subsidiaries and affiliated companies (including Harris Stratex Networks, Inc.) for the purpose of considering you for other available positions. Harris MS D-11B Melbourne, FL 32919 Web: http://www.careers.harris.com This is Google's cache of http://www.jobcentral.com/jobs/The_Boeing_Company/NM/Facilities_Mechanical_Engineer_3/010520541/job.\n\nIt is a snapshot of the page as it appeared on May 7, 2009 22:50:50 GMT.\n\nTitle : Facilities Mechanical Engineer 3 Company : The Boeing Company Location : Las Cruces, NM 88004 Date Acquired : 4/24/2009 11:32:58 PM Date Updated : 5/4/2009 1:23:48 AM\n\n## Facilities Mechanical Engineer 3\n\nRequisition Number: 09-1004080 Job Status: Activated - Posting Type: Posted Internally and Externally. - Posting Status: Available Location Las Cruces, NM Business Unit Integrated Defense Sys Division Global Services & Support Program Defense & Government Services Relocation Money Available? No Date Posted 04/24/2009 Closing Date (Things you should know about closing dates) 06/23/2009\n\n## Position Description\n\nDevelops moderately complex conceptual designs, final designs, cost estimates and provides maintenance support for the mechanical phases of buildings, equipment installations, utility systems and grounds. Reviews mechanical designs to assess compliance with customer requirements, building codes and applicable regulations by applying knowledge of construction principles, practices, and materials. Ensures accuracy of drawing archives/libraries by reviewing contractor redlines. Identifies errors and documents construction changes to comply with regulatory requirements, facility standards, and record retention requirements. Manages or supports construction projects by providing input on vendor selection; reviews contractor proposals; interfaces with government/regulatory agencies; monitors project progress and vendor/consultant performance. Prepares and presents project information to ensure compliance with applicable construction documents and jurisdictional requirements and to meet project objectives. Produces or procures detailed design documents. Uses appropriate resources to produce project drawings, specifications, and permit application packages in accordance with project parameters. Coordinates designs. Reviews and approves documents. Translates customer requirements into design options with documents and estimates. Identifies appropriate materials, equipment, and services by applying engineering principles and methodology. With limited supervision, develops and updates design standards and site-specific operating procedures in order to establish common practices. Provides input to strategic, short-term, and long-term infrastructure planning; completes studies; analyzes current conditions and future requirements; recommends capital improvements; gathers and analyzes data; and works with both internal and external customers in order to identify and assess alternatives and impacts. Translates customer requirements into conceptual design by analyzing intended use/occupancy and desired aesthetics, conducting code research, developing preliminary design elements, determining interdisciplinary engineering support requirements, estimating resource costs/requirements, identifying materials, equipment, and services, and developing initial project schedule in order to establish project scope in response to customer requirements. Plans, manages, and executes projects. Leads a team of stakeholders in the acquisition and modification of assets to enable the customer to achieve the defined business objectives in accordance with company and accounting policies. Manages project expenditures within authorized budgets. Creates, maintains, and communicates project management information. Assists in the creation of contract scope. Ensures suppliers comply with all contract obligations. Interprets and analyzes applicable regulations, standards, codes, and ordinances with respect to project requirements. Offers project alternatives in order to assure compliance. Provides support, as required, to secure permits.\n\n## Competencies General\n\n[deletia]\n\n## [ + ] Planning And Organizing\n\nIdentifies more critical and less critical activities and assignments; adjusts priorities when appropriate. Determines project or assignment requirements by breaking them down into tasks and identifying types of equipment, materials, and people needed. Allocates appropriate amounts of time for completing own work; avoids scheduling conflicts. Takes advantage of available resources (individuals, processes, departments, and tools) to complete work efficiently; coordinates with internal and external partners. Uses time effectively and prevents irrelevant issues or distractions from interfering with work completion. [deletia] Typical Education/Experience Degree and typical experience in engineering classification: Bachelor's and 5 or more years' experience, Master's degree with 3 or more years' experience or PhD degree with experience. Bachelor, Master or Doctorate of Science degree from an accredited course of study, in engineering, computer science, mathematics, physics or chemistry. ABET is the preferred, although not required, accreditation standard.\n\n## Other Job Related Information This Position Is Located In Las Cruces, Nm. Candidate Is Preferred To Have A Current Ts/Sci Clearance With Ci Polygraph, Or Must Have The Ability To Obtain These Clearance Requirements. Us Citizenship Is Required Of Candidate. Subsidiary Benefits. This Position Is Contingent Upon Contract Award.\n\n*** Please note that depending on the specific position, you may be required to pass additional medical tests, credit checks, and/or other requirements. These additional items are required for the Company to comply with various laws and regulatory rules.***\nhttp://www.jobsontheline.com/index.php?post_id=26445\nJAVA Programmer Analyst - Paragon Dynamics - Las Cruces, NM Posted date: 2009-Jun-07\n\n## Location: Las Cruces, Nm\n\nJAVA Programmer Analyst - Paragon Dynamics - Las Cruces, NM Date: Sat, 06 Jun 2009 21:40:30 GMT requires US Citizenship and a Top Secret\\SCI Security Clearance and ability to successfully pass a polygraph examination. Job Location: Las Cruces, New Mexico.\n\n## Paragon Dynamics, Inc\n\nJAVA Programmer Analyst Location:\nLas Cruces, NM\nJob Code:\n15830\n# of openings: 1\n\n## Description\n\nJAVA Programmer Analyst - Software engineer responsible for development, maintenance, and enhancements of existing proprietary collaboration software application. Candidate will be responsible for overall user requirements, system design and analysis, coding, test & integration, and general system administration. Application is a web enabled, sophisticated virtual collaboration environment developed using J2EE, JBOSS, MySQL, Eclipse, and CVS running on Windows servers with Unix and Windows clients. Candidate will perform software engineering and produce architecture and requirements documentation products. Qualified candidate will monitor system reliability, develop process improvements and ensure system interoperability across future systems development efforts as well as legacy systems. Technical writing skills are necessary to develop user and system administrator documentation. Must be able to interface daily with customers and users. Minimum requirements: Two years of specific experience in software engineering expertise to include analysis, design, and coding experience; experience developing JAVA applications using J2EE on a Windows based operating system using object oriented techniques; knowledge of application servers, web servers, data bases; ability to work in a team environment or independently to perform design, coding and unit test of software units of work; one year demonstrated Java software design and development experience; experience in developing Java applications and applets to monitor and control automated processing systems; and experience and ability to develop software using Java on Windows platforms. UNIX and Windows system administration skills are critical for success in this position. Education:\n\n## A Bachelor's Degree In Engineering Is Required With Two Years Experience, However, A Substitute Degree (Listed Below) With Equivalent Experience May Also Qualify. Typical Degrees Include: Computer Engineering, Computer Science, Information Systems, Information Technology, Computer Information Systems, Computer Systems Engineering. This Position Requires Us Citizenship And A Top Secret\\Sci Security Clearance And Ability To Successfully Pass A Polygraph Examination. Job Location: Las Cruces, New Mexico.\n\nFounded in 1997, Paragon Dynamics, Inc. (PDI) is a wholly owned subsidiary of KOR Electronics, Inc and is a small business with headquarters in Aurora, Colorado. PDI provides innovative systems, software and mission engineering solutions to a variety of Department of Defense and Aerospace clients. We specialize in system design, architecture and integration; software development and implementation; and mission operations, analysis and support. Our expertise is applied to government and aerospace National Systems Programs through the dedicated professionals at PDI who consist of highly qualified engineers with direct experience in government and commercial satellite, DoD Intelligence Community, and IT infrastructure programs. Our projects -- past and presentinclude: on-orbit space programs; ground based processing programs; C4ISR system development programs; and analysis, design and integration programs. Our engineers, scientists, and project managers possess extensive experience in all aspects of systems development and integration from conception to implementation of complex ground and satellite systems. Paragon Dynamics is strategically located in major defense and mission operational hubs - Colorado, California, and the Washington, DC metro area - to completely serve our customer segments.\n\n=simplyhired Location: Las Cruces, NM Area Code: 505 Tax Term: FULLTIME Pay Rate: tbd Length: Position ID: HITS02091056 Dice ID: harrisme Travel Required: none Telecommute: no Title: Electrical Engineer - TS/SSBI Required Skills:Position requires a current Top Secret/SSBI Security Clearance Date:5-23-2009 Description: Job Responsibilities: * Responsible for designing, developing, modifying and evaluating electronic parts, components, or integrated circuitry for electronic equipment or other hardware systems * Determines design approaches and parameters. Analyzes electrical requirements to determine feasibility of design within time and cost constraints * Analyzes equipment to establish operating data, conducts experimental tests and evaluates results * Selects components and equipment based on analysis of specifications and reliability * May also review vendor capability to support development Qualifications: * Requires a Bachelors degree and 5+ years of experience * Knowledge of basic AC and DC power and grounding principles. Knowledge of heat dissipation and cooling principles * Experience in hardware systems installation / integration * Experience in the use of Electronic Test equipment to include oscilloscopes and multi-meters * Experience in basic system evaluation, design, modification and repair * Computer skills to include basic administration for MS Windows, Linux and UNIX * Use of MS office for documentation generation/updates * Working experience of Autocad and Visio drawing programs * Applicants selected will be subject to a government security investigation and must meet eligibility requirements for access to classified information. Position requires a current Top Secret/SSBI Security Clearance By submitting your resume for this position, you understand and agree that Harris Corporation may share your resume, as well as any other related personal information or documentation you provide, with its subsidiaries and affiliated companies (including Harris Stratex Networks, Inc.) for the purpose of considering you for other available positions Harris MS D-11B Melbourne, FL 32919 Web: http://www.careers.harris.com http://www.simplyhired.com/job-id/rsc23cvttq/technical-writer-jobs/\n[Accessed 2009-05-29]\n    * TECHNICAL WRITER 3 CACI International - New Mexico Duties and Responsibilities:Part-time (20 hours/week) technical writer/subject matter expert (SME) supporting the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency in White Sands, NM. TS/SCI clearance required. SME will assist IOC-SW Director and all elements of IOC-SW develop, propose, provide, advise, update, and maintain an active program of information sharing both within and external to IOC-SW, using a variety of media and formats. Must possess superior writing skills and have an advanced level of understanding of Advanced Geospatial-Intelligence sensors, tools, and techniques. These tasks include: * Must write, develop and deliver basic, intermediate and advanced levels of AGI correspondence, articles, policies, CONOPS Plan focusing on SAR for delivery to NGA and other geospatial intelligence community... Systems Engineer I Raytheon Posted on: 8/9/10 Minimum Security Clearance: Top Secret/SCI Location: Las Cruces, New Mexico  88001 (map) Workplace: On-Site/Office Travel: 25% - defined as 25% of your time traveling Job Description: Raytheon is currently seeking a System Engineer who will support the Double Eagle Program, a program that is responsible for Mission Management and Command and Control functions for an operational system. Responsibilities include performing technical planning, system integration, verification and validation, cost and risk, and supportability and effectiveness analyses for total systems. Analyses are performed at all levels of total system product to include: concept, design, fabrication, test, installation, operation, maintenance and disposal. The individual selected for this position will also ensures the logical and systematic conversion of customer or product requirements into total systems solutions that acknowledge technical, schedule, and cost constraints, performs functional analysis, timeline analysis, detail trade studies, requirements allocation and interface definition studies to translate customer requirements into hardware and software specifications. This position is responsible for developing, integrating and verifying a conflict free resource schedule. This plan serves as the basis of daily communications and special applications testing. The position requires interactive responses to complex operational and engineering software as well as real time analysis of test results to obtain desired outcome. Internal and external segment coordination is required to generate recurring, unique and special test activities. The position is also responsible for the initiation of timely contingency planning activities as a result of system problems or abnormal circumstances. Specific responsibilities include but not limited to:\n\n    * Supporting operational procedure development to include identifying necessary cross-functional procedural requirements * Supporting the successful completion of major program milestones * Executing real-time control activities, and monitoring operational systems * Interacting with external personnel on technical matters often requiring coordination between organizations\n\n## Required Skills:\n\n    * Must have a B.S. degree in Engineering or related discipline or possess equivalent experience in lieu of a degree * Must have strong system engineering, analytical, and problem solving skills in a team environment * Must be able to work productively in a complex, multi-customer, contractor and technology environment * Must have basic computer skills sufficient for use of multiple proprietary software systems simultaneously * Must be able to work with general directions and determine and develop approaches to solutions * Must be able to frequently interact within the organization as well as have frequent outside customer contacts * Must be able to ensure that projects are completed on time * Must be able to complete training to comply with positional certification requirements * Must have strong analytical Skills\n * Must have strong communication and interpersonal skills * Must be available to work a Rotating Shift work schedule involving a variety of fluctuating schedules including work shifts, rotating through days, nights, weekends and holidays. Qualified applicants may be subject to a security investigation and must meet minimum qualifications for access to classified information. U.S. Citizenship with eligibility to satisfy requirements for a TS/SCI SSBI security clearance required . Geospatial Analyst Job Date: Sep 22, 2011 Location: Las Cruces, NM, US Geospatial Analyst-01112197\n\n## Description\n\nKey Role: Perform research, contribute to the preparation of analytical and technical reports and publications, prepare graphics, and maintain hard and soft copy files, including target folders, film files, collateral files, and other publications. Create and maintain databases, summary data, spreadsheets, and graphic documents and maintain Intelink Web sites. Use Geographic Information Systems (GIS) to extract or access geospatial information, derivative information, and multi-intelligence data to provide requirements, currency, accuracy, readiness, responsiveness, data integrity, and relevancy recommendations that support the analysis and visualization of geospatial data available for use by the military, intelligence, and policy-making communities. This position is located in Las Cruces, NM.\n\n## Qualifications\n\nBasic Qualifications: -18+ months of experience in working with Geographic Information Systems (GIS) -Experience with ERDAS Imagine, SOCCET, GXP, or ESRI Arc suite, including ArcGIS, ArcMap, ArcIMS, and ArcSDE -Experience with modeling, spatial regression analysis, or human terrain analysis -Top Secret clearance -BS degree in Remote Sensing, Earth Science, or Physical Science; or equivalent experience with the military Additional Qualifications: -Experience with NGA -TS/SCI clearance preferred\n\n## Clearance: Applicants Selected Will Be Subject To A Security Investigation And May Need To Meet Eligibility Requirements For Access To Classified Information; Top Secret Clearance Is Required.\n\nIntegrating the full range of consulting capabilities, Booz Allen is the one firm that helps clients solve their toughest problems, working by their side to help them achieve their missions. Booz Allen is committed to delivering results that endure. We are proud of our diverse environment, EOE, M/F/D/V. Job: Intelligence Analysis Primary Location: United States-New Mexico-Las Cruces Travel: Yes, 15% of the time http://www.job.com/my.job/jobdisplay/page=jobview/pt=2/key=101873444/\nConfiguration Analyst II Company: Raytheon Location: Las Cruces, New Mexico Salary: Not Specified Category: Administrative / Clerical Date Posted: 10/11/2011 Job Description: Raytheon is seeking a Configuration Analysts II that will be responsible for configuration control of the operational baseline, managing the Configuration Management database (CMDB) and performing the analysis of proposed product changes to determine effect on overall CMDB system. Ensures all configuration items (CI) are identified and controlled and that status accounting and audits are performed. Also responsible for providing advice and guidance on methods, procedures and requirements to individuals responsible for entering CI's into the CMDB. Position is located in Las Cruces, NM Required Skills: Must have a BS Degree in an IT related field or possess equivalent experience in lieu of a degree Must have a minimum of 2 years related experience in creating Change Requests and maintaining documentation for IT networks Must have experience in overseeing Change boards Must have experience in maintaining Interface Control Documentation Must be proficient in use of VISIO or similar drawing package Must have Security + certification Must become 8570 Certified within 6 months of start date! Qualified applicants may be subject to a security investigation and must meet minimum qualifications for access to classified information. U. S. Citizenship and an active TS/SCI security clearance with a CI Polygraph required. Qualified applicants may be subject to a security investigation and must meet minimum qualifications for access to classified information. U. S. Citizenship and an active TS/SCI security clearance with a CI Polygraph required. Job ID:  HITS09111223\n\nScientist - Las Cruces, NM - HITS09111223 Description: Job Title: Scientist Job Code:  HITS09111223 Job Description: Leads the assimilation of new algorithm processes into operations. Design the research approach and structure proof-of-concept demonstrations to determine operational feasibility of new algorithms. Possess experience and knowledge of basic SAR AGI systems and platforms, operations, phenomenology, the impact on SAR processing, analysis and exploitation. Possess knowledge of, and demonstrated ability to perform, SAR AGI analysis. Experience in conducting research and development activities. Act as a liaison between operators and the research and development scientists. Lead the refinement of algorithms and processes and in the migration of mature processes to automated mainstream systems. Independently seeks sources of knowledge to share with operations team. Assists engineers on maintenance with preliminary investigation of reported software and hardware anomalies. Assists operators as needed in performing manual product processing using new and mature algorithms. Provide Help Desk support. On-call will be required. Qualifications:\n\n    Requires a MS degree (or the equivalent) in a related field with a minimum of 6 years of related experience. Proficiency in Microsoft Office (Word, Excel, PowerPoint) required. Ability to solve complex problems.\nPreffered Additional Skills: Familiarity with various programming, UNIX, MatLab preferred, but not required\n\n## This Position Requires The Candidate To Already Possess An Active Ts/Sci Clearance And To Maintain The Clearance. Sar Scientist - Booz Allen Hamilton, Las Cruces, Nm Location: Las Cruces, Nm Date: 10/17/2011 Job Code: 985107 Job Details\n\nSAR Scientist-01108836 Description Key Role: Work in a team environment with other multidisciplinary remote sensing scientists and engineers supporting AGI processing and exploitation. Provide scientific analysis and products from the exploitation of SAR data from multiple sources for the customer, who will leverage the value-added support to sharpen their assessments of current issues. Use knowledge of SAR to direct and support research and development in support of SAR, use current TPED processes to task, process, exploit, and distribute data, and design new TPED processes for future sensors. Provide results to the customer in the requested format and content, such as Web dissemination, databases, or direct reporting to analysts and management. Provide ad-hoc informational briefings to educate analysts and managers about the capabilities of SAR and its benefits. Support and participate in community exploitation and technology forums on a limited ad-hoc basis, sometimes requiring presentation of technical information of case studies resulting from operational support requests. Monitor the community and industry for new near-term technologies that can be inserted for operational use. This position is located in Las Cruces, NM. Qualifications Basic Qualifications: -4 years of experience with using AGI processing and exploitation software -3 years of experience with radar science -3 years of experience with programming, including developing with C, C , IDL, or MATLAB executable code -2 years of experience with using software development tools, such as MATLAB -Knowledge of advanced radar AGI collection systems, operations, and phenomenology and their impact on radar AGI processing, analysis and exploitation -TS/SCI clearance Additional Qualifications: -Possession of excellent oral and written communication skills -PhD or MD degree in Remote Sensing, Earth Science, Physical Science, Eengineering, or Mathematics Clearance: Applicants selected will be subject to a security investigation and may need to meet eligibility requirements for access to classified information; TS/SCI clearance is required. Integrating the full range of consulting capabilities, Booz Allen is the one firm that helps clients solve their toughest problems, working by their side to help them achieve their missions. Booz Allen is committed to delivering results that endure. We are proud of our diverse environment, EOE, M/F/D/V. Job Imagery and Remote Sensing Primary Location United States-New Mexico-Las Cruces Travel Yes, 20% of the time http://www.jigsaw.com/scid49209218/tom_tijerina.xhtml\n[Retrieved 2012-07-16]\nhttp://www.linkedin.com/pub/dan-wright/12/b97/776\n[Accessed 2012-07-16]\nhttp://www.linkedin.com/pub/marcus-johnson/1b/65b/341\n[Accessed 2012-07-16]\nhttp://www.linkedin.com/pub/dir/Glen/Santos\n[Accessed 2012-07-16]\nJavier Gil's Experience * Principal Analyst EWA June 2008 - Present (1 year) Electronic Warfare Associates, Herndon, VA. Defense and technology solutions company, providing contractual intelligence support to government customer. Provides government lead course development updates. Remains abreast of current GEOINT node operations, evolving technolgy, assesses technology and training methods to tailor training to class population. Student base includes soldiers, sister service members, Federal Service civilians and contractors. Maintains equipment inventory and ensures readiness of collection sensors. Performs duties as a Training Developer and instructor for MOS specific training programs and courses in Measurement and Signature Intelligence (MASINT); trains Soldiers on/and integrates MASINT sensors and products into tactical, operational and strategic intelligence and force protection architectures; schedules students for MASINT and AGI courses.\n\n## *\n\nLead Imagery Analyst BAE Systems October 2005 - March 2008 (2 years 6 months) BAE Systems Information Techonolgy, Washington, D.C. Provide enterprise IT solutions and support to technical and program management activities for governmental agencies. Worked within the UFAC to support NGA and outside customers for all underground issues within our AOR. I am one of two subject matter experts in our country/region for all underground issues as well as nuclear sites. Worked hand in hand with UFAC 1 on Nuclear and Ballistics issues for targets in our country of interest. Producing numerous construction chronologies, baseline reports and facility assessments. Helped other members of our contract on exploiting and authoring reports for nuclear sites in their country of interest. Facilitate inter-agency and intra-agency group participation nationwide, provide technological support to personnel, and integrate new technology into current working environment. Manage project orders at multiple locations nationwide and systematically increased the customer base. * SAR MASINT Analyst L-3 Communications October 2003 - June 2005 (1 year 9 months)\n\n## L-3 Communications Government Services Inc, Las Cruces, Nm Provide Advanced Geospatial Intelligence Support To Clients. Worked As A Sar Masint Analyst Exploiting And Disseminating Masint Products To The Dgs-1, Dgs-2, And Dgs-4. On A Daily Basis I Also Provided System Specific Products, Such As Color Multi- Views, Dynamic Images And Coherent Change Detection Products.\n\nBuilt up and trained the SAR AGI team; facilitated the transition between old and new programs. Served as a liaison between managers, GPOCs, course developers, instructors, system administrators, maintenance personnel, and system integrators. Supported SAR AGI instructor teams [Note: SAR apparently means \"synthetic aperture radar\" here] * Product Quality Engineer Boeing Satellite Systems December 2001 - October 2003 (1 year 11 months)\n\n## Boeing Space & Intelligence Systems, Las Cruces, Nm\n\nDefense and technology solutions company, providing contractual intelligence support to government customer. Worked within the Joint Processing Center (JPC) conducting MASINT product processing and quality assessments. Additionally, perform system/software integration and testing to ensure proper software and tool performance.\n\n## I Provided On-Site Customer Support And Training And System Specific Products,Such As Color Multi- Views (2Cmv's, 3Cmv's), Dynamic Images (Di's) And Coherent Change Detection Products (Ccd's). As Well As Hi Res Dem's, Dem's, Tercat's, Polcat's, Glint Smear Reduction (Gsr's) And Real Site 3D Site Models To Requesting Clients Outside The Local Production Footprint. Provided Subject Matter Expertise For The Development And Revision Of Sar Agi Courses.\n\n    * Imagery Analyst US Army July 1997 - June 2001 (4 years) United States Army, Ft Bragg, NC Provide imagery interpretation in support of national security. Managed daily exploitation including target assignment, edit, release, and archival of imagery reports. Applied advanced softcopy exploitation analysis techniques to imagery from national reconnaissance systems in a time sensitive, current intelligence environment. Initiated tasking and re tasking of national systems. Produced cables, reports, and comprehensive intelligence documents in support of national intelligence requirements and to the Department of the Army. Exploited and disseminated SPOT 1, SPOT 3 and SEARCH imagery. Processed, exploited, and disseminated raw imagery and finished intelligence products derived from the PREDATOR, GLOBALHAWK, U2, SYERS and ASARS platforms, as well as (EO), (IR), and (SAR) platforms.\n\n## Michael Sanjume Squadron Commander, Adf-Sw/Oss At Us Air Force Las Cruces, New Mexico Area Current\n\n        * Squadron Commander, ADF-SW/OSS at US Air Force\n\n## Past\n\n        * Chief of Staff, SIGINT Directorate at US Air Force * Chief, Ground Integration Group at US Air Force * Program Element Monitor, MILSATCOM Programs at US Air Force * Squadron Operations Officer at National Reconnaissance Office * Chief, Program Management Division at National Reconnaissance Office\n\n## Education\n\n        * Joint Military Intelligence College * University of California, Davis\n\nUniversity of Southern California\n# Kenneth Zang - Current Ts/Sci Ssbi W/Cl Poly\n\n## Educational Experience\n\nProvo, Utah Brigham Young University Degree: Associate of Science Major: Genealogical Research Dates: 9/68 - 4/73\nLas Cruces, NM\nNGA College Degree: Certification Major: SAR 110 & SAR 210\nDates: November 2007\n\n## Ted Cope's Experience\n\n    * Special Functional Exec (FX) for NSG R&D NGA Currently holds this position * NGA Space Radar IPO Deputy Director for TPED National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency\n\n## September 2003 - December 2007 (4 Years 4 Months) * Director, Integrated Operations Center Southwest National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency\n\n      October 2005 - December 2006 (1 year 3 months) * Colonel US Air Force 1973 - 2005 (32 years) * Chief Science Advisor for RADAR National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency August 2002 - August 2003 (1 year 1 month) * CIO Deputy Director National Reconnaissance Office February 2000 - August 2002 (2 years 7 months) * Deputy Director, IMINT Systems Engineering National Reconnaissance Office September 1998 - February 2000 (1 year 6 months)\n\n## Additional Information\n\nhttp://www.simplyhired.com/job-id/cz5vm45dua/sr-systems-jobs/\nSr Systems Engineer - Collaboration Cell Manager with Security Clearance Apply Now Company: Raytheon Location: Springfield, VA Job Description: Raytheon is currently seeking a Collaboration Cell Manager who will represent the organization as the prime technical contact on contracts and projects in support of the Double Eagle Program. This is a shift position that is responsible for 24x7 operations as well as coordination with the on-duty Government Point of Contact (POC). The Collaboration Cell support the intelligence community (IC) and the war fighter (DOD) by assisting users in requesting the appropriate products to accomplish their mission from a variety of up to date intelligence products and services. The candidate is required to work a 12 hour rotating shift. 24x7 operations include the following; monitoring multi-security level chat and user group traffic, transform intelligence needs to the facilities... From ClearanceJobs.com - 17 days ago [Accessed 2010-08-10]\nhttp://www.simplyhired.com/job-id/txo3lpsrd4/systems-engineer-jobs/\nSystems Engineer Staff Company: Lockheed Martin Location: Lorton, VA Description: This position, called the Collaboration Operator, is a 12 hour shift position on the Double Eagle Program. It is part of a Collaboration Cell that supports the intelligence community (IC) and the warfighter (DOD) by assisting users in requesting the appropriate products to accomplish their mission from the sites most accurate and up-to-date geospacial intelligence products and services. The candidate will establish a collaborative relationship between intelligence users and the site's product and service providers. Personnel will operate in a 24x7 shift work environment, monitor multi-security level chat and user group traffic, translate intelligence needs to the site's available products and services, connect users (new customer) to service providers within the cell and... From Monster - 11 days ago [Accessed 2010-08-10] https://sjobs.brassring.com/1033/ASP/TG/cim_jobdetail.asp? SID=&jobId=171689&type=search&JobReqLang=1&recordstart=4001&JobSiteId=5010&JobSiteInfo=171689 _5010&GQId=0&partnerid=25037&siteid=5010 Lockheed Martin - Colorado Req ID 164437BR Industry Job Title Systems Engineer Standard Job Code/Title E1462:Systems Engineer\n\n## [Accessed 2010-08-10]\n\nRequired skills The ability to work in small groups is essential and occasional travel may be required. Attention to detail, self motivation and the ability to think outside the box are all required traits for the PA position. Desired skills Data analysis, processing and reporting, and Mission Planning. Familiarity with military functions, operations, and philosophies. Former military experience as 98J, CTT, or 1N5. Familiar with STK, or similar products. Experience with national-requirements-populated databases. [98J- -Electronic Intelligence Interceptor/Analyst CTT -- Cryptologic Technician (Technical) 1N5 - Imagery Interpretation STK -  Satellite Tool Kit] Specific Job Description This position is on the Double Eagle (Denver) program in the Enterprise Mission Optimization Group as part of the Planner Analyst (PA) team. The PA primarily defines and builds database products from tasking. The PA works closely with customer counterparts to assist in mentoring and training of their personnel, to strategize and to ultimately design sophisticated engineering solutions that satisfy national requirements. The PA also works closely with support staff, technical advisors and calibration experts to assist in developing strategies and optimizing products. Responsibility is shared for the scheduling of products, and as such, the PA works closely with Scheduling Branch, to advise and ensure scheduling of tasks. Performs functional analysis, timeline analysis, detailed trade studies, requirements allocation and interface definition studies to translate customer requirements into hardware and software specifications. Optimization studies, what if analyses and general performance assessment are performed to ensure optimal task satisfaction. A comprehensive OJT program is in place, as a thorough knowledge of capabilities; software and mission are required to perform the job. The PA may be called upon to support Mission Planning (MP) Staff. Frequent use and application of technical principles, theories and concepts in the field is required. Standard Job Description Performs technical planning, system integration, verification and validation, cost and risk, and supportability and effectiveness analyses for total systems. Analyses are performed at all levels of total system product to include: concept, design, fabrication, test, installation, operation, maintenance and disposal. Ensures the logical and systematic conversion of customer or product requirements into total systems solutions that acknowledge technical, schedule, and cost constraints. Performs functional analysis, timeline analysis, detail trade studies, requirements allocation and interface definition studies to translate customer requirements into hardware and software specifications.\n\n## Security Clearance Ts/Sci\n\nTypical Minimums Bachelors degree from an accredited college in a related discipline, or equivalent experience/combined education, with 2 years of professional experience; or no experience required with a related Masters degree. Considered experienced, but still a learner.\n\nhttp://www8.nationalacademies.org/cp/CommitteeView.aspx?key=48977\n\n## Committee Membership Information\n\nProject Title:\nReview of the Department of Homeland Security's Approach to Risk Analysis PIN:\nDELS-O-08-01-A\nMajor Unit: Division on Earth and Life Studies Division on Engineering and Physical Sciences RSO:\nParker, Stephen Committee Membership Date Posted:   10/17/2008 Ms. Katherine Hall BAE Systems Katherine Hall is Director of Strategy and Plans for Global Analysis at BAE Systems. Prior to joining BAE, she directed the analysis and production section of the National Geospatial-lntelligence Agency (NGA), which is responsible for the management and strategic direction of several thousand intelligence analysts. Ms. Hall led the NGA's Integrated Operations Center in Denver which was cited by the DNI as a model of interagency cooperation. Prior to moving to NGA, she was a Senior Intelligence Officer with the CIA. As part of CIA's Office of Military Support, she directed CIA's Representative to NORAD/USSPACECOM where she acted as a senior intelligence advisor to the Commander. Ms. Hall was also a national intelligence officer and head of the National Intelligence Council's Analytic Group, an organization of senior intelligence officers responsible for the production of national estimates. She personally drafted several national intelligence estimates and with others was the developer of the first US Government model to estimate the spread and impact of AIDS. She also served in several senior positions in CIA's Directorate of Intelligence such as Deputy Director of the CIA's Office of Asian Pacific and Latin American Analysis and Director of the Office of Africa and Latin America. She began her career as a military and weapons analyst. Ms. Hall received her BA in history and physics from Mount Holyoke College and her MA in international relations from George Washington University. Ms. Hall's inclusion on this committee will ensure that the committee has an understanding of the quality of inputs upon which DHS must base its counter-terrorism risk analyses.\n\nhttp://www.thesecretofhennybogan.com/aboutmark.html I rejoined government civilian service in April 2002, accepting an appointment with NIMA.  I served as a Branch Chief for Future Concepts and was given responsibility for NIMA's Persistent Surveillance portfolio, including Space Base Radar (SBR), the New Imaging System, Laser Imaging Detection and Ranging and Airborne Integration Program efforts, including Global Hawk, Predator, JSTARS and the U-2.  I was later assigned as the NIMA SBR Program Manager and helped establish the NIMA Persistent Surveillance Office.  I was promoted to the Executive Service (Defense Intelligence Senior Level) in November 2003.  I am currently the Deputy Director, Integrated Operations Center-Special Projects, Analysis & Production Directorate, National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, Bethesda, Maryland, with duty at the Washington Navy Yard. http://www.americasjobexchange.com/seeker/jobsearch/quick? action=JobSearchViewJob&JobSearch_JobId=536002977&source=juju&utm_source=juju&utm_medium=feed &utm_campaign=organic\n\n## [Accessed 2010-08-11] Senior Image Quality Systems Engineer\n\nLOCKHEED MARTIN HAS ANNOUNCED PLANS TO DIVEST MOST OF THE ENTERPRISE INTEGRATION GROUP (EIG) LINES OF BUSINESS. THIS JOB OPENING IS PART OF THE CURRENT EIG BUSINESS THAT WILL BE DIVESTED. IF YOU ARE A CURRENT LOCKHEED MARTIN EMPLOYEE, PLEASE CONTACT THE IS&GS STAFFING TEAM (FC-LMISS, LM CAREERS) MAILBOX TO DISCUSS THIS DEVELOPMENT. Provide technical product quality assurance operational support as a member of NGA's Image Quality and Utility (NIQU) Program resident within the NGA Integrated Operations Center-Special Projects (IOC-SP) analytical workspace at the Washington Navy Yard. Interface with IOC-SP analysts to provide technical understanding of key concerns and issues encountered with IOC-SP products. Support NIQU in assessing the image and product quality impacts of IOC-SP and NSG systems and processes used in the collection, processing, exploitation, storage, and dissemination of IOC-SP GEOINT data. Ensure that products produced by IOC-SP systems meet predefined standards and specifications. Coordinate the review of IOC-SP operational product quality issues with other IOC-SP NIQU members, IOC-SP analyst personnel, and IOC-SP Mission Partners. Support the planning, coordination, development, and execution of product quality IOC-SP system transition checkout activity, as well as the testing of IOC-SP segments and software. Applicants selected will be subject to a government security investigation and must meet eligibility requirements for access to classified information.- Bachelors degree in image science, physics, engineering, or related technical discipline\n\n- Basic technical understanding of image formation and processing techniques - Several years experience in Image Quality, Systems Engineering or an associated field - Proficiency in using the RemoteView Electronic light Table software package - Proficiency in using other Electronic Light Table software packages: SOCET GXP, ERDAS IMAGINE, ENVI - Familiarization of the NSG systems architecture and its dissemination, processing, storage, and exploitation of imagery and imagery products - Programming experience (C, C++, or scripting) - Proficiency with MS Office software - Ability to work with NGA Analysts in an operational environment - Strong writing skills with special proficiency in test plan and technical report writing - Presentation experience\nAs deputy director of the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, Lloyd Rowland assists the director in formulating policy and managing agency activities in order to accomplish NGA's mission. Before his appointment as NGA deputy director in October 2006, Rowland served in numerous leadership positions throughout NGA, including business executive, deputy director of the Office of Business Transformation, director of global operations, associate deputy director of operations, director of geospatial information, deputy director of the Central Imagery Tasking Office and associate director of assessments. He was appointed to the Defense Intelligence Senior Executive Service in 1996. During his 24 years in the Air Force, Rowland commanded a squadron in Operation Desert Storm and had various postings around the world. Most of his career involved reconnaissance force employment and imagery management. His awards include the Distinguished Flying Cross for combat operations, Presidential Meritorious Rank, Legion of Merit, Defense Superior Service Medal and the Air Medal. Rowland has degrees from Memphis State University and the University of Southern California. Rowland was interviewed by MGT Editor Harrison Donnelly. Q: What are some of the operational improvements you expect to gain once the agency is installed in its new headquarters? A: What's really important about the new campus is not the building, but it's about moving the mission to our facility in Springfield. The new facility will be a place where intelligence analysts from across the community can come together to accomplish the intelligence mission. We're on course and glide-slope to start moving our analysts in January 2011. We'll be fully operational there by September of that year. Right now we're located in seven or eight locations around the Washington, D.C., area. Admiral Murrett and I and other leaders in the agency spend a lot of our time every day moving from location to location. That will slow down certainly; but first and foremost, we're going to be able to bring together all of our analysts from around the Washington area to one central location, where they'll be able to work and collaborate together more easily. That's a huge benefitcollaboration on high-profile intelligence issues will be much easier. The NGA Integrated Operations Center, which is now dispersed among our operating locations, will be put together centrally and located within the same operational footprint. They will be surrounded by the regional and functional intelligence experts, and will be able to work together as a more cohesive team. Thirdly, the new Campus East allows us to consolidate our East Coast libraries and information repositories, thus providing analysts with faster and broader access to our entire collection of research holdings. Additionally, the large conference center that we'll have there will provide an opportunity for the entire community to come together at NGA to collaborate on intelligence problem sets and issues of mutual concern. So as you can see the new campus will provide us with many mission improvement opportunities.\n\n## Imagery\n\n32.50 N, 106.61 W\nAs of 27 May 2007\nThe White Sands Ground Terminal is at the bottom of the picture and the Second TDRSS Ground Terminal is at the top.\n\nWSGT as of Sunday, October 3, 1998\nWSGT as of Monday, October 11, 2004 (Columbus Day, a US federal holiday).\n\nThe appearance is essentially unchanged since the first available imagery of October 3, 1998.\n\n Note the large number of unused parking spaces in the parking lot at the center of the image.\n\nWhat appear to be construction materials are present to the left of the large building at the center of the image.\n\nWSGT as of Sunday, July 31, 2005 [This date may be in error.]\nConstruction has begun on a large addition on the central building.\n\nWSGT on Sunday, May 27, 2007.\n\nThe building addition appears complete, an extension has been added to the east side of  the existing parking lot and a new lot has appeared to the south of the old one.\n\nA new 20-meter dish antenna, perhaps WS-1, has been installed to the south of the existing three.\n\nWSGT on Sunday, April 17, 2010.\n\nSTGT as of July 4, 2005.\n\nThe appearance is essentially the same as in previous Google Earth images.\n\nSTGT as of May 27, 2007.\n\nA new area containing a 20-meter dish antenna and what appear to be the foundations for one or two more has appeared to the south of the existing antennas.\n\n These may be the antennas meant to support the Solar Dynamics Observer mission\n\n## Nasa Facilities Nasa Unveils New Antenna Network In White Sands, N.M. 11.08.07 Engineers From Nasa's Goddard Space Flight Center In Greenbelt, Md., Showcased The New 18-Meter Ka Band Antenna Network, The First Such System In Agency History, During A Ribbon-Cutting Ceremony At The White Sands Test Facility In New Mexico On November 8.\n\n\"Ka band\" refers to a section within the microwave portion of the electromagnetic spectrum. Much like how listeners can't pick up FM waves on AM radios and vice-versa, Ka band signals require special equipment to receive them. The three new dishes help meet the growing demand for ground stations to handle high volumes of science data generated by today's new satellites. The Ka band system allows satellites to transmit more data to the ground than ever before, in the area of 45 terabytes a month. That's about the equivalent of 1,152 fully loaded 40-gigabyte iPods, or 67,408 CDs! The dishes are 18.2 meters in diameter, and they need to be able to rotate quickly to acquire satellite signals. To make the dishes lighter they are largely held together with glue, rather than bolts and other fasteners. But this is no ordinary wood glue. The network makes use of a two-part epoxy developed at NASA's Jet Propulsion Laboratory in Pasadena, Calif. Tests have shown the glue and the dishes will last for decades, according to Raymond Pages, chief of Goddard's Ground System Development Office. The first missions to use the network will be the Solar Dynamics Observatory (SDO) and the Lunar Reconnaissance Orbiter (LRO). SDO will study solar variations that affect life on Earth. LRO will focus on selecting landing sites, identifying lunar resources and studying how the moon's environment will affect humans. Both probes are slated for launch in late 2008. \"The design, development, and delivery of three 18-meter Ka band antenna systems in just over two years is a major accomplishment for Goddard and NASA,\" Pages said. \"People will be munching on data [from these missions] for years to come.\" Once SDO and LRO conclude, the antenna network will be available for other missions. White Sands was chosen as the location for the new antennas because of the existing infrastructure available there, making it a cost-effective option. Weather was also a factor in the decision, because data must be able to reach the antennas with as little weather interference as possible for optimum quality. Datron Advanced Technologies in Simi Valley, Calif., built the antennas. Honeywell Technology Solutions Inc. in Columbia, Md., built and assembled the ground station. The Cospal Composites Srl in Ambivere, Italy, manufactured the primary reflectors. Honeywell, Datron and Goddard helped to design the antennas. Goddard manages the White Sands Complex for NASA. The total development cost of the new antenna system was $20 million."
    },
    {
        "text": "# Department Of Defense Cyberspace Policy Report A Report To Congress Pursuant To The National Defense Authorization Act For Fiscal Year 2011, Section 934\n\n\nNovember 2011\n\n## Contents\n\nINTRODUCTION........ 1\n\nSECTION I: DESCRIPTION OF POLICY AND LEGAL ISSUES ........ 1 SECTION II: DECISIONS OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE ........ 10 SECTION III: NATIONAL MILITARY STRATEGY FOR CYBERSPACE\nOPERATIONS ........ 10\nSECTION IV: CURRENT USE OF CYBER MODELING AND SIMULATION ........ 10 SECTION V: APPLICATION OF CYBER MODELING AND SIMULATION ........ 11 ANNEX A:  FULL TEXT OF SECTION 934 OF THE NATIONAL DEFENSE\nAUTHORIZATION ACE OF FISCAL YEAR 2011 ........ 11\n\nIntroduction\n\nThis report is submitted in accordance with the requirements of Section 934 of the Ike Skelton National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2011. Cyberspace is a critical enabler to Department of Defense (DoD) military, intelligence, business and, potentially, civil support operations.  While the development and integration of cyber technologies have created many high leverage opportunities for DoD, our increasing reliance upon cyberspace also creates vulnerabilities for both DoD and the Nation. To more holistically capture these dynamic challenges and opportunities, the Department published the *Department of Defense Strategy for Operating in Cyberspace* (available at www.defense.gov/news/d20110714cyber.pdf), which identifies five distinct, but interrelated strategic initiatives to support DoD's cyberspace operations and its national security mission:\n\n\n- Treat cyberspace as an operational domain to organize, train, and equip so that DoD can\ntake full advantage of cyberspace's potential in its military, intelligence, and business operations;\n- Employ new defense operating concepts, including active cyber defense, to protect DoD\nnetworks and systems;\n\n- Partner closely with other U.S. Government departments and agencies and the private\nsector to enable a whole-of-government strategy and a nationally integrated approach to\ncybersecurity;\n- Build robust relationships with U.S. Allies and international partners to enable\ninformation sharing and strengthen collective cybersecurity; and\n\n- Leverage the Nation's ingenuity by recruiting and retaining an exceptional cyber\nworkforce and enabling rapid technological innovation.\nSection I: Description of Policy and Legal Issues As described in the *Department of Defense Strategy for Operating in Cyberspace*, DoD is addressing the complex challenges and opportunities of cyberspace in an integrated manner.\nDoD is focused on the development and extension of all necessary policies and authorities for its cyberspace operations.  As with all of the activities that DoD pursues in the physical world, cyberspace operations are executed with a clear mission and under clear authorities, and they are governed by all applicable domestic and international legal frameworks, including the protection of civil liberties and the law of armed conflict. The Senate Report (S. Rept. 111-201) accompanying the Senate version of the Ike Skelton NDAA for Fiscal Year 2011 further identified thirteen specific questions on cyber policy for Department of Defense Cyber Policy Report\n\n         1\n\n\nboth DoD and the U.S. Government.  This report answers each of the thirteen questions posed in Senate Report 111-201.\n\n1. The development of a declaratory deterrence posture for cyberspace, including the relationship between military operations in cyberspace and kinetic operations.  The Committee believes that this deterrence posture needs to consider the current vulnerability of the U.S. economy and government institutions to attack, the relatively lower vulnerability of potential adversaries, and the advantage currently enjoyed by the offense in cyberwarfare. The President's May 2011 *International Strategy for Cyberspace* states that the United States will, along with other nations, encourage responsible behavior and oppose those who would seek to disrupt networks and systems, dissuading and deterring malicious actors, and reserving the right to defend these national security and vital national assets as necessary and appropriate.\nWhen warranted, we will respond to hostile acts in cyberspace as we would to any other threat to our country.  All states possess an inherent right to self-defense, and we reserve the right to use all necessary meansdiplomatic, informational, military, and economicto defend our Nation, our Allies, our partners, and our interests.  In doing so, we will exhaust all options prior to using force whenever we can; we will carefully weigh the costs and risks of action against the costs of inaction; and we will act in a way that reflects our values and strengthens our legitimacy, seeking broad international support wherever possible.  For its part, DoD will ensure that the U.S. military continues to have all necessary capabilities in cyberspace to defend the United States and its interests, as it does across all domains. Deterrence in cyberspace, as with other domains, relies on two principal mechanisms: denying an adversary's objectives and, if necessary, imposing costs on an adversary for aggression. Accordingly, DoD will continue to strengthen its defenses and support efforts to improve the cybersecurity of our government, critical infrastructure, and Nation.  By denying or minimizing the benefit of malicious activity in cyberspace, the United States will discourage adversaries from attacking or exploiting our networks.  DoD supports these efforts by enhancing our defenses, increasing our resiliency, and conducting military-to-military bilateral and multilateral discussions. In addition, the U.S. is working with like-minded nations to establish an environment of expectations, or norms of behavior, that increase understanding of cyber doctrine, and guide Allied policies and international partnerships.  At the same time, should the \"deny objectives\" element of deterrence not prove adequate, DoD maintains, and is further developing, the ability to respond militarily in cyberspace and in other domains.  Continuing to improve our ability to attribute attacks is a key to military response options. Defending the Homeland is an important element of deterrence.  DoD will use its significant capability and expertise in support of a whole-of-government approach to protect the Nation.\nThe policy and legal authorities governing DoD's domestic activities - such as Defense Support to Civil Authorities - extend to cyber operations, as they would in any other domain.  DoD will continue to work closely with its interagency partners, including the Departments of Justice and Homeland Security, to address threats to the United States from wherever they originate, through a whole-of-government approach.  The Department is dedicated to the protection of the Nation, and to the privacy and the civil liberties of its citizens. Deterrence is a whole-of-government proposition.  DoD supports the White House Cybersecurity legislative proposal to protect the American people, U.S. critical infrastructure, and our government's networks and systems more effectively.  DoD is working closely with its interagency partners, including the Department of Homeland Security, to increase the cybersecurity of our critical infrastructure.  Moreover, DoD continues to work with private sector partners through efforts like the Enduring Security Framework and the Defense Industrial Base Cybersecurity/Information Assurance programs to enhance cybersecurity, reduce vulnerabilities, and encourage the innovation necessary to protect and strengthen the U.S. economy.  DoD is working with the Department of State to strengthen ties with our Allies and international partners to enhance mutual security.\n\n2. The necessity of preserving the President's freedom of action in crises and confrontations involving nations which may pose a manageable conventional threat to the United States but which in theory could pose a serious threat to the U.S. economy, government, or military through cyber attacks. The Department recognizes that a nation possessing sophisticated and powerful cyber capabilities could attempt to affect the strategic calculus of the United States.  In this scenario, an adversary might act in ways antithetical to vital U.S. national interests and attempt to prevent the President from exercising traditional national security options by threatening or implying the launch of a crippling cyber attack against the United States. Any state attempting such a strategy would be taking a grave risk.  DoD recognizes the vital importance of maintaining the President's freedom of action.  The Department is working, with our interagency partners, to ensure no future adversaries are tempted to pursue such a strategy. Our efforts focus on the following three areas:\n\n- First, the Department, in conjunction with the Intelligence Community and Law\nEnforcement agencies, strives to secure the best possible intelligence about potential adversaries' cyber capabilities.  These efforts are crucial because the United States needs\nto understand other nations' cyber capabilities in order to defend against them and to\nimprove our ability to attribute any cyber attacks that may occur.  Forensic analysis is a part of attributing attacks, but foreign intelligence collection and international law enforcement cooperation play a key role.  In this regard, the co-location of the National Security Agency and United States Cyber Command (USCYBERCOM) provides\nbenefits and efficiencies to the Department for its cyber operations.  The National Security Agency's unique strengths and capabilities provide USCYBERCOM with critical cryptologic support for target and access development, enabling DoD cyberspace operations planning and execution.\n\n- Second, the Department recognizes that strong cyber defenses and resilient information\narchitectures, particularly those connected to critical infrastructure, mitigate the ability of\na future adversary to constrain the President's freedom of action.  If future adversaries are unable to cripple our centers of gravity, they will be more likely to understand that the President has the full menu of national security options available.\n\n\n- Finally, the President reserves the right to respond using all necessary means to defend\nour Nation, our Allies, our partners, and our interests from hostile acts in cyberspace. Hostile acts may include significant cyber attacks directed against the U.S. economy, government or military.  As directed by the President, response options may include using cyber and/or kinetic capabilities provided by DoD.\n\n3. How deterrence or effective retaliation can be achieved in light of attribution limitations. The same technical protocols of the Internet that have facilitated the explosive growth of cyberspace also provide some measure of anonymity.  Our potential adversaries, both nations and non-state actors, clearly understand this dynamic and seek to use the challenge of attribution to their strategic advantage. The Department recognizes that deterring malicious actors from conducting cyber attacks is complicated by the difficulty of verifying the location from which an attack was launched and by the need to identify the attacker among a wide variety and high number of potential actors. With this in mind, the Department actively seeks to limit the ability of such potential actors to exploit or attack the United States anonymously in three ways:\n\n\n- First, the Department seeks to increase our attribution capabilities by supporting\ninnovative research and development in both DoD and the private sector.  This research focuses on two primary areas: developing new ways to trace the physical source of an\nattack, and seeking to assess the identity of the attacker via behavior-based algorithms.\nIn the near future, the Department intends to expand and deploy applications that detect, track, and report malicious activities across all DoD networks and information systems on a near real-time basis.  The ability to detect malicious activities quickly allows forensics experts to recover evidence during important windows of opportunity for attribution.\n\n- Second, the Department has significantly improved its cyber forensics capabilities over\nthe past several years.  The Intelligence Community and U.S. Cyber Command continue\nto develop a highly skilled cadre of forensics experts.  Additionally, DoD has been the primary supporter of an innovative and effective center of excellence for forensics capabilities at the Defense Cyber Crime Center.  This unique organization provides an important nexus of support to both defense and law-enforcement communities, as well as to private sector companies who support DoD.\n\n- Third, in partnership with the Department of Homeland Security, DoD is expanding its\ninternational partnerships to increase shared situational awareness, warning capabilities\nand forensics efforts.  The ability to share timely indicators about cyber events, threat signatures of malicious code, and information about emerging actors enables advance\ndeterrence of malicious activity.  Equally important are efforts to work with international partners to bolster cyber forensics capabilities.\n\n4. To the extent that deterrence depends upon demonstrated capabilities or at least declarations about capabilities and retaliatory plans, how and when the Department intends to declassify information about U.S. cyber capabilities and plans or to demonstrate capabilities. Effective deterrence in cyberspace is founded upon both the security and resilience of U.S.\n\nnetworks and systems, and ensuring that the United States has the capability to respond to hostile acts with a proportional and justified response.  The *International Strategy for Cyberspace*\nprovides a clear statement that the United States reserves the right to use all necessary means diplomatic, informational, military, and economicto defend our Nation, our Allies, our partners, and our interests in cyberspace.\n\nThe dynamic and sensitive nature of cyberspace operations makes it difficult to declassify specific capabilities.  However, the Department has the capability to conduct offensive operations in cyberspace to defend our Nation, Allies and interests.  If directed by the President, DoD will conduct offensive cyber operations in a manner consistent with the policy principles and legal regimes that the Department follows for kinetic capabilities, including the law of armed conflict.\n\n5. How to maintain control of or manage escalation in cyberwarfare, through, for example, such measures as refraining from attacking certain targets (such as command and control and critical infrastructure). The unique characteristics of cyberspace can make the danger of escalation especially acute.  For instance, the speed of action and dynamism inherent in cyberspace, challenges of anonymity, and the widespread availability of malicious tools can compound communications and increase opportunities for misinterpretation.  As a result, DoD recognizes the clear importance of steps such as the development of transparency and confidence building measures, in addition to further development of international cyberspace norms, to avoid escalation and misperception in cyberspace.  DoD and the Department of State are actively engaged with Allies, partners, and other states to build transparency and confidence with traditional adversaries. The Department also seeks to prevent dangerous escalatory situations by following the same policy principles and legal regimes in its cyberspace operations that govern actions in the physical world, including the law of armed conflict.  DoD's cyberspace operations are subject to careful coordination and review, including the use of cyberspace for intelligence operations. Intelligence, military, and political implications are carefully considered for cyberspace operations as elsewhere. In collaboration with other U.S. Government agencies, Allies and partners, DoD pursues bilateral and multilateral engagements to develop further norms that increase openness, interoperability, security, and reliability.  International cyberspace norms will increase stability and predictability of state conduct in cyberspace, and these norms will enable international action to take any required corrective measures. Finally, the Department believes that increased transparency minimizes the likelihood that a cyber incident will escalate to a dangerous or unintended level.  DoD continues to pursue opportunities for the facilitation and expansion of transparency among key international actors with regard to their command and control, doctrine, and deployment of cyber capabilities.  DoD\nworks with international partners to develop confidence building and risk reduction measures to decrease the chance of miscommunication and escalation in cyberspace.\n\n6. The rules of engagement for commanders at various command echelons for responding to threats to operational missions and in normal peacetime operating environments, including for situations in which the immediate sources of an attack are computers based in the United States. DoD has implemented rules of engagement for the operation and defense of its networks.  In current operations that occur in designated Areas of Hostilities, specific rules of engagement have been approved to govern and guide DoD operations in all domains.  DoD's cyber capabilities are integrated into planning and operations under existing policy and legal regimes. As it continues to build and develop its cyber capabilities and organizational structures, the Department is addressing operational needs by modifying its standing rules of engagement for commanders to enable required decisions and take appropriate actions to defend critical information networks and systems. Due to the interconnectedness and speed that defines cyberspace, these standing rules of engagement will reflect: the implications of cyber threats; the operational demands of DoD's continuous, worldwide operations; and the need to minimize disruption from collateral effects on networked infrastructure. DoD recognizes the unique challenge presented by malicious activity coming from within the United States. The Department will support domestic agencies and departments, using its significant capability and expertise in support of a whole-of-government approach to protect the Nation.  The policy and legal authorities governing DoD's domestic activities - such as Defense Support to Civil Authorities - extend to cyber operations, as they would in any other domain. DoD will continue to work closely with its interagency partners, including the Departments of Justice and Homeland Security, to address threats to the United States from wherever they originate, through a whole-of-government approach.  The Department is dedicated to the protection of the Nation, and to the privacy and the civil liberties of its citizens.\n\n7.  How the administration will evaluate the risks and consequences attendant to penetrations of foreign networks for intelligence gathering in situations where the discovery of the penetration could cause the targeted nation to interpret the penetration as a serious hostile act.\n\nEspionage has a long history and is nearly always practiced in both directions.  For the U.S. and many other states, traditional espionage has been a state-sponsored intelligence-gathering function focused on national security, defense, and foreign policy issues.  The United States Government collects foreign intelligence via cyberspace, and does so in compliance with all applicable laws, policies, and procedures.  The conduct of all U.S. intelligence operations is governed by long-standing and well-established considerations, to include the possibility those operations could be interpreted as a hostile act. Classified material pertaining to this section is available in the separate Classified Annex.\n\n\n8. How DoD shall keep Congress fully informed of significant cyberspace accesses acquired for any purpose that could serve as preparation of the environment for military action. The Department has been working closely with Congress to improve the reporting schemes for cyberspace operations.  DoD will provide quarterly cyber briefings to appropriate Members of Congress and their congressional staff in fulfillment of notification requirements.  For sensitive operations that may require out-of-cycle reporting, DoD will ensure that appropriate Members of Congress and their congressional staff receive any necessary additional briefings.\n\n9. The potential benefit of engaging allies in common approaches to cyberspace deterrence, mutual and collective defense, and working to establish norms of acceptable behavior in cyberspace. The President's *International Strategy for* Cyberspace makes clear that hostile acts conducted through cyberspace could compel actions under the commitments we have with our military treaty partners, and DoD has been working actively to clarify those expectations within our alliances. To implement that vision, the *Department of Defense Strategy for Operating in Cyberspace* emphasizes the importance of building robust relationships with U.S. Allies and partners to strengthen the deterrence of malicious cyberspace activity and to build collective cyber defenses.\nThrough shared warning, capacity building, and joint training activities, international engagement provides opportunities for an exchange of information and new ideas to strengthen U.S. and allied cyber capabilities.  DoD continues to coordinate amendments to the National Disclosure Policy that will ensure detailed cyber operations discussions with Allies and international partners. DoD is actively deepening its engagement on cyber issues with its Allies and international partners.  The Department continues to have both senior-level and expert coordinating activities with Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom.  DoD has worked closely with its NATO Allies on cyber issues, including the revised NATO Cyber Policy and associated action plan approved at the June 2011 Ministerial.  In further development of our treaty relationships, DoD is strengthening its relationships with Japan and the Republic of Korea.  DoD and its Allies and international partners can maximize cyber capabilities, mitigate risk, and deter malicious activities in cyberspace. The United States is actively engaged in the continuing development of norms of responsible state behavior in cyberspace, making clear that as a matter of U.S. policy, long-standing\n\n\ninternational norms guiding state behavior also apply equally in cyberspace.  Among these, applying the tenets of the law of armed conflict are critical to this vision, although cyberspace's unique aspects may require clarifications in certain areas.\n\n10. The issue of third-party sovereignty to determine what to do when the U.S. military is attacked, or U.S. military operations and forces are at risk in some other respect, by actions taking place on or through computers or other infrastructure located in a neutral third country.\n\nThe nature of the DoD response to a hostile act or threat is based upon a multitude of factors, but always adheres to the principles of the law of armed conflict.  These responses include taking actions short of the use of force as understood in international law.\n\nDoD adheres to well-established processes for determining whether a third country is aware of malicious cyber activity originating from within its borders.  In doing so, DoD works closely with its interagency and international partners to determine:\n\n- The nature of the malicious cyber activity;\n\n- The role, if any, of the third country;\n\n- The ability and willingness of the third country to respond effectively to the malicious\ncyber activity; and\n- The appropriate course of action for the U.S. Government to address potential issues of\nthird-party sovereignty depending upon the particular circumstances.\n\n11.  The issue of the legality of transporting cyber \"weapons\" across the Internet through the infrastructure owned and/or located in neutral third countries without obtaining the equivalent of \"overflight rights.\" There is currently no international consensus regarding the definition of a \"cyber weapon.\"  The often low cost of developing malicious code and the high number and variety of actors in cyberspace make the discovery and tracking of malicious cyber tools difficult.  Most of the technology used in this context is inherently dual-use, and even software might be minimally repurposed for malicious action. The interconnected nature of cyberspace poses significant challenges for applying some of the legal frameworks developed for specific physical domains.  The law of armed conflict and customary international law, however, provide a strong basis to apply such norms to cyberspace governing responsible state behavior.  Significant multinational work remains to clarify the application of norms and principles of customary international law to cyberspace. As the President recognized in the *International Strategy for Cyberspace*, the development of norms for state conduct does not require a reinvention of customary international law nor render\n\nexisting norms obsolete.  Rather, the principled application of existing norms must be developed with our partners and Allies.  DoD, in conjunction with other U.S. Government departments and agencies, will continue to work with our partners and Allies to build consensus on the applicability of norms in cyberspace to develop customary international law further.\n\n\n12.  The definition or the parameters of what would constitute an act of war in cyberspace and how the laws of war should be applied to military operations in cyberspace. The phrase \"act of war\" is frequently used as shorthand to refer to an act that may permit a state to use force in self-defense, but more appropriately, it refers to an act that may lead to a state of ongoing hostilities or armed conflict.  Contemporary international law addresses the concept of \"act of war\" in terms of a \"threat or use of force,\" as that phrase is used in the United Nations\n(UN) Charter.  Article 2(4) of the UN Charter provides:  \"All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state.\"  International legal norms, such as those found in the UN Charter and the law of armed conflict, which apply to the physical domains (i.e., sea, air, land, and space), also apply to the cyberspace domain. As in the physical world, a determination of what is a \"threat or use of force\" in cyberspace must be made in the context in which the activity occurs, and it involves an analysis by the affected states of the effect and purpose of the actions in question. The particular attributes of cyberspace can make this determination especially difficult, including the detection of the activity, political and/or technical attribution, and a determination if the particular activity is part of a larger military operation, although these are challenges present in the \"real world\" as well. Without question, some activities conducted in cyberspace could constitute a use of force, and may as well invoke a state's inherent right to lawful self-defense.  In this context, determining defensive response to even presumptively illegal acts rests with the Commander-in-Chief.\n\n13.  What constitutes use of force in cyberspace for the purpose of complying with the War Powers Act (Public Law 93-148).\n\nThe requirements of the War Powers Resolution apply to \"the introduction of United States Armed Forces into hostilities or into situations where imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances, and to the continued use of such forces in hostilities or in such situations.\" Cyber operations might not include the introduction of armed forces personnel into the area of hostilities.  Cyber operations may, however, be a component of larger operations that could trigger notification and reporting in accordance with the War Powers Resolution.  The Department will continue to assess each of its actions in cyberspace to determine when the requirements of the War Powers Resolution may apply to those actions.\nSection II: Decisions of the Secretary of Defense By approving the *Department of Defense Strategy for Operating in Cyberspace*, the Secretary of Defense has set out comprehensive guidance for the Department's cyberspace activities in defense and support of U.S. national interests.  The strategy also provides clear objectives and policies for DoD to take advantage of cyberspace's potential, while recognizing the continued growth of both cyberspace threats and vulnerabilities. DoD has also worked closely with the Administration to develop its Cybersecurity Legislative Proposal.  DoD supports the Administration's efforts to improve cybersecurity for the American people, our critical infrastructure, and the U.S. Government's networks and systems.  DoD relies upon U.S. critical civilian infrastructure for its operations.  The theft of sensitive information and intellectual capital erodes DoD's effectiveness and the economic vitality upon which our military strength depends.\n\nSection III: National Military Strategy for Cyberspace Operations The Joint Staff does not intend to modify the National Military Strategy for Cyberspace Operations at this time.  To guide the Department's activities in cyberspace, the Secretary of Defense has approved the *Department of Defense Strategy for Operating in Cyberspace*.\n\nSection IV: Current Use of Cyber Modeling and Simulation Cyber modeling and simulation technologies are rapidly evolving in scope and sophistication. As the size and complexity of networks continue to grow, the need for capabilities to understand and study them has become increasingly apparent.  In DoD, the use of these tools and technologies varies greatly depending upon the unique requirements and mission sets of component organizations. Exploration and refinement of tactics, techniques, and procedures used to defend DoD networks are a key application of modeling and simulation.  The use of \"test ranges\" allows the military to increase awareness, adjust planning, improve resiliency of its networks and systems, and train personnel.  DoD's cyber workforce can use these capabilities to increase proficiency through realistic, practical application of techniques and procedures to hone skills for better identification of vulnerabilities and improved remediation response.  In addition to new technologies and their application, the use of ranges allows DoD to explore and develop new concepts for its operations in a contained but realistic environment. The Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) and several Combatant Commands are developing and using methodologies, analytic techniques, and tools to identify potential cyber vulnerabilities.\nModeling and simulation are some of the tools used, but they are still at early stages of development.  Including methodologies and modeling in structural analytic techniques provides DoD with a framework to test assumptions and explore the interaction between networks.  For instance, the Cyber Operations Research Environment (CORE) provides data necessary to perform predictive strategic analysis on the impact of potential cyber threats.  This work\n\nprovides the information necessary to prioritize mitigation efforts, increase network security, and preserve the ability of particular systems to perform military missions. DoD is also pursuing revolutionary approaches to modeling and simulation, such as the National Cyber Range (NCR).  The NCR will create a new state-of-the-art capability for large-scale cyber testing.  This ability to evaluate cyber technologies, policies, and procedures will be a critical asset to the development of future operations.  By enabling testing and analysis under real word conditions, DoD will be able to refine, research, and develop capabilities that can strengthen cyber defenses and revolutionize cybersecurity.  The NCR will allow testing of current cyber environments, and it will be the foundation of future modeling and simulation capabilities. Classified material pertaining to this section is available in the separate Classified Annex.\n\nSection V: Application of Cyber Modeling and Simulation The application of cyber modeling and simulation capabilities can improve current defense and future development activities.  These lessons will allow DoD to develop improved architectures and increase the sophistication of its cyber defenses.  New capabilities such as the NCR will provide vast improvements in DoD's ability to model and simulate a variety of networks quickly and at scale.  DoD continues to innovate and explore new initiatives that improve our cyberspace strategies and programs. As cyber technologies and their applications continue to evolve, DoD is exploring the use of modeling and simulation technologies to test and evaluate new cyberspace concepts, policies, and capabilities.  These efforts will enable DoD to develop new ideas and adapt to technological trends.  Improved modeling and simulation capabilities will further DoD's efforts to understand and integrate more effectively policy, legal, operational, and technical trends in cyberspace that will allow the Department to identify vulnerabilities, address them, and ensure that the U.S. military continues to have the capability to fulfill its national security mission in defense of the Nation. Classified material pertaining to this section is available in the separate Classified Annex.\n\n## Annex A:  Full Text Of Section 934 Of The National Defense Authorization Act Of Fiscal Year 2011 Sec. 934.  Report On The Cyber Warfare Policy Of The Department Of Defense.\n\n(a) REPORT REQUIRED.Not later than March 1, 2011, the Secretary of Defense shall submit to Congress a report on the cyber warfare policy of the Department of Defense.\n\n\n(b) ELEMENTS.The report required under this section shall include the following:\n(1) A description of the policy and legal issues investigated and evaluated by the Department in considering the range H. R. 6523203 of missions and activities that the Department may choose to conduct in cyberspace.\n\n\n(2) The decisions of the Secretary with respect to such issues, and the recommendations of the Secretary to the President for decisions on such of those issues as exceed the authority of the Secretary to resolve, together with the rationale and justification of the Secretary for such decisions and recommendations.\n\n(3) A description of the intentions of the Secretary with regard to modifying the National Military Strategy for Cyberspace Operations.\n\n\n(4) The current use of, and potential applications of, modeling and simulation tools to identify likely cybersecurity vulnerabilities, as well as new protective and remediation means, within the Department.\n\n\n(5) The application of modeling and simulation technology to develop strategies and programs to deter hostile or malicious activity intended to compromise Department information systems.\n\n(c) FORM.The report required under this section shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex."
    },
    {
        "text": "Office of the Director of National Intelligence Washington, DC 20511\nDEC 3 0 2011\nMr. Steven Aftergood Federation of American Scientists\n1725 DeSales Street NW, Suite 600\nWashington, DC 20036\nReference: ODNI Case# DF-2009-00035\nDear Mr. Aftergood:\nThis is in response to your email dated 26 February 2009, received in the lnformat~n Management Division of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) on 26 february 2009. Pursuant to the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), you are requesting, \"a copy of the filial report and other finished products (including a DVD) that resulted from a July 2008 ODNI SHARP (Summer Hard Problem) program on virtual worlds and their implications.\"\nYour request was processed in accordance with the FOIA, 5 U.S.C.  552, as amended. A\nthorough search of our records and databases located two documents (one report and one DVD)\nresponsive to your request. Upon review, it is determined that the report may be released in segregable form with deletions made pursuant to FOIA exemptions (b)(1) and (b)(3). The DVD is denied in full, pursuant to FOIA exemptions (b)(3) and (b)(6).\n\nExemption (b)(1) protects information which is currently and properly classified in accordance with Executive Order 13526. Exemption (b)(3) applies to information exempt from disclosure by statute. The relevant withholding statutes are the National Security Act of 1947, as amended, 50 U.S.C. ' 3024(m)(1), which protects, among other things, the names and identifying information of ODNI personnel.\n\nExemption (b )(6) applies to records which, if released, would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of the personal privacy of individuals.\n\nYou have the right to appeal this determination within 45 days of the date of this lt1tter to:\nOffice of the Director of National Intelligence Information Management Office Washington, DC 20511\nShould you decide to do this, please explain the basis of your appeal. If you have any ques~ons, please call the Requester Service Center at (703) 874-8500.\n\nl Director, Information M\ngement Divisrn Enclosure The content of this report. Including the opinions, concluslon1. -lysl1. and legallnt~\ndo not,.._.\n\nMnt those of the ODM.IC or 11111 other goftl'll-..1 entity and should not be attributed to those orpnlzatlolu.\n\nAll coprrighted 1-.s-pun:hasedfrom onlnewncbs.\n\nThe Flip 8oolc: Flip through the pages rapidly to see *the* transformation of a human *face* at the bottom, right-hand corner of the magazine.\n\n..\n\nrPttnr of National Intelligence Deputy Director of National Intelligence for Analysis Wa-;hington, DC 20511\n(U) On behalf ofthe Office of the Director ofNational Intelligence, I am pleased to introduce this report and accompanying CD titled, 3D Cyberspace Spillover: Where VIrtual Games Get Real, produced by our Summer Hard _Problem Program (SHARP). These deliverables are intended to stimulate discussion. They are not endorsed by the\n\nIntelligence or the Intelligence Community, nor do they represent the\n\nIntelligence or the Intelligence Community. The m ttorm..!J~\nDuring the deliver their pages of a l\"nnvPn accompanied by a _ .\n\nexample.\n\n(U) I hope you and discover, as I\nhave, the boundless\n come together in a pleasant venue with a common passion The Office of Analysis is pleased to engender such innovation,.\n\nDefense Uniyersity and iDS, a Central Intelligence Agency initiative, for providing session support. Finally, I greatly appreciate the contributions of the National Counter Intelligence Executive (NCIX) for its exemplary leadership as SHARP's first Topic Champion.\nSincerely, Thomas Fingar professionals from\ngather to study, problem. The so they can analysis.\n\nto publicly be lost in the\n\n## (U)Keyfindings\n\n(U) Immersive virtual and gaming environments can no longer be dismissed fad. More than 200 virtual worlds are either available or under development, and online games number in the thousands. These environments continue to seize the imagination and trigger creative and technological innovations that show no signs of slowing down.\n\n0 Virtual worlds enable rich, vivid, and compelling online interactions. This emphasis on the visual is a revolutionary improvement over more traditional two dimensional, text-based methods of interaction through such formats as e-mail, chat rooms, discussion groups, and web logs.\n\n(U) The standards, protocols, and infrastructure established and adopted for\n virtual worlds have the potential to directly and substantially affect the future of the internet. The nation that most influences this process will likely dominate the next-generation internet in the same way that the United States was able to dominate the first-generation internet.\n\n0 Once a pioneer in virtual world technologies, the United States is no longer leading the race to adopt next-generation internet technologies.\n\n0 Because virtual worlds may be a potent means of spreading values and ideoljlgies, the culture that seizes the technological high ground in these spaces will have the advantagf in spreading its\n-\nVirtual culture exposes nuanced\nof identity and personhood that lurk within rich, vivid, and\n3D online interactions. Real world identities of person, group, and nation can blur in digital spaces. In the powerful medium of virtual worlds, online experiences can influence and even alter offiine behavior. People will increasingly see their online, virtual identities as extensions of their real selves.\n\n0 {U) As online identities become extensions of real selves, increasing numbers of citizens may expect legal and law enforcement protections in virtual environments similar to those provided in the real world. This will create greater popular outcry for law enforcement and legal protections for virtual world identities that are similar to those of citizens.in the real world.\n\n{U) It is likely that adversaries increasingly will use virtual worlds to engage in.\n\npropaganda, recruitment, coordination, training, and information gathering.\n\nBecause of the immersive nature of the experience, virtual worlds are a particularly powerful medium to influence behavior, including offline behavior.\n\nThe online experiences that users carry back to the real world will be subject /.\n\nto manipulation and influence.\n\n## (U)Key .. D. N\n\n(U) The economic impact of virtual and gaming environments already rivals that of the mainstream film industry and is rapidly growing.\n\n0 Mainstream adoption.of immersive virtual world technology in the business sector\nwill likely reduce costs and substantially improve the quality of online education,\ntraining, collaboration, and other forms of work However, a real boost in productivity as a result of these technologies will not occur until the generation currendy in\nschool (the \"Millennia! Generation\") and actively using these technologies enters the\nworkplace in force.\n0\nSome currencies based in virtual worlds are gaining global recognition and are\nconvertible to real currency. Within the n~xt five to 1 0 years a virtual world-based\ncurrency could become widely tenderable and freely convertible.\n(U) As virtual and gaming worlds increasingly become part of every day experience, governance in those environments will assume greater importance.\n\nGovernance in virtual and gaming worlds now consists of a mix of corporate end-user licensing agreementS (EULAs) and community standards. But as virtual environments generate revenue streams for virtual inhabitants, governments will likely feel compelled to intervene to protect their interests and those of their citizens. Economic activity will also raise issues of virtual personhood or identity, of property and privacy.\n\n(U) Because virtual and gaming environments are global phenomena, the roles of two key players--China and South Korea-convey a warning about competitive challenges and an example of a highly adaptive model, respectively.\n\n(U) Chinese virtual and gaming environments reflect Beijing's authoritarian political practices. This means that restrictions against free speech and freedom of expression are built into the underlying rules that govern Chinese virtual and gaming environments. If exported, these authoritarian-fiiendly technologies may become available to other governments anddepending on how the marketplace evolves-could become the dominant standard.\n\n0 China's efforts to manage the emergence of its virtual worlds through regulatory pressure, incentives for domestic companies, and standards setting have enabled it to become a global leader in this critical technology. As a result, China may eventually control the software that runs the dominant virtual world used for global commerce, communication, entertainment, and education\n0 China's infrastructure and standards enable it to monitor and control domestic users, and Chinese dominance of the global industry may allow the Chinese government to extend this capability to international users, including those in the United States.\n\n(U) South Korea supports its highly competitive online gaming and virtual world industry with an advanced telecommunications infrastructure that serves as a model of adaptation to the changing environment. Because the United States faces similar challenges of adaptation, th~ utility of\"the South Korean model becomes a relevant future consideration. The South Korean model uses government-supported infrastructure to enable a free market industry with democratic values. A domestic industry of this type would be capable of setting intern.ational standards and leading the global industry.\n\n0 South Korea's global leadership in virtual world technologies is largely due to its government-industry partnerships, investments in domestic internet\n(for example, high bandwidth), and early adoption of virtual world platforms.\n\n(U) Not a fad.\n\n(U) technology and the convergence\n@f real and virtual worlds\n(U) Technology comprises the very foundation of every virtual and gaming environment, and without the capabilities provided by their technologies, virtual and gaming environments would not exist.\n\nParadoxically however, it is these capabilities that are the focus of interest, not the technologies themselves. Understanding the capabilities and exploring the possibilities that technology provides is important to assessing what happens when virtual 'worlds become real.\n\n## (U) Technological Innovations: Graphics And Social Networks\n\n(U) While computers are configured to work within text-based interfaces, humans process information more graphically, in three dimensions. Since the development of personal computers in the 1970s, computer-human interfaces have evolved to embrace the human brain's tendency to process spatially. The emergence of the internet was a communications innovation that presented humans with information in a spatially accessible manner.\n\n(U) With the development of computer interfaces to enable users to connect\n to a global network, the social aspect of computers has increased exponentially. Humans especially need three-dimensional context to process social information, whether in the real world or, increasingly, the virtual world.\n\nThe development of these applications drives virtual world technology and industries.\n\n(U) For example, innQvations in game graphics have driven the development of an American gaming industry, ~hich has produced more revenue in the United States than Hollywood film-makers since 2003.1 In 2007, movies that coincided with the release of Microsoft's Halo 3 suffered dramatically from low attendance. 2 Video games are the emerging venue for capturing the hearts, minds, and advertising dollars of a generation.\n\n(U) Another key innovation has been the use of computer technologies to enabie large numbers of people to pool their knowledge and creative ability. Social networking sites such as Wikipedia, You Tube, Facebook, and MySpace resulted from this innovation.\n\n(U) Virtual worlds take the rich social networks of the so-called Web 2.0 and add a visually rich, immersive environment. Immersion causes humans to act as though the environment were real. Users project themselves into the avatars and demonstrate very real emotional reactions and attachments.\n\nImmersion also improves learning efficiency and personal involvement.\n\n(U) For a more detailed discussion of the development of virtual worlds and\n3D interfaces, see Appendices 1 and 2.11\n\n## (U) Topical Technology Issues\n\n(U) Network Infrastructure.\n\nOnline infrastructure will likely drive the future of virtual worlds because it enables both the social and graphical elements of virtual worlds. Entertainment companies provide infrastructures, or central hubs, to which users connect before entering the game they wish to play.\n\nThis way, a user can play multiple games across the internet using a single alias or avatar (provided that the games are under one game provider's system), and rich presence information can be sent to a list of\n''buddies\" who can see whether the user is online, what s/he is doing, and whether s/he wantS to be joined within a certain game or activity.\n\nThey also provide rankings and worldwide scoreboards for players as well as various communication\n(voi~, video, text) options independent of the game being played.\n\n(U) As infrastructures grow, multiple worlds may begin to share a common architecture. An example of online infrastructure is Valve Software's Steam architecture, while in the console industry Microsoft and its Xbox Live service lead infrastructure development. These infrastructures are the building blocks of a Multiverse: a plurality of virtual worlds linked by a common infrastructure. Similar to the trajectory followed by the development of social networks, one or two of these virtual infrastructures may come to dominate the marketplace.\n\n(U) Network services have become a platform for content delivery. Users can directly purchase or obtain new games, videos, or music content that is downloaded straight to their device without the need for physical media.\n\nThis presents a lower cost of entry for developers to make their softWare available to a large audience. For example, the Xbox Live Arcade service allows users to download low-budget games at prices ranging from five to\n20 Dollars.\n\n(U)Established infrastructures can be attractive to software deyelopers because they provide a common framework around which to design the online portion of their game. They often include anti-piracy measures and also have an existing customer base toward which they can market their software. In addition, the communication already provided by the infrastructure lowers total development costs.\n\n(U) Com:munications.\n\nWithout communications, virtual worlds cannot function. Communication permeates the virtual landscape to enable social interaction.\n\nVIrtual worlds permit communication through multiple interlinked channels, including text, voice, images, video, and gesture.\n\ning a phone call. In the 3D open world, messages typed or spoken are often broadcast to any avatar in the local area or within a specific virtual radius-the user is often not able to directly control who else hears or sees these messages; they may not even know who else is connected into the local. area.\n\n(U) Communications can be embedded into the very fabric of the world itself. Billboards, posters, and advertisements can all be customized by marketing companies, or users, alloWing them to broadcast music or movies, or even to d.ispe~e objects when investigated.\n\n(U)Non-verbal communication methods are also avail-\n. able to users in virtual and gaming environments. Both Second Life and World of Warcraft offer a basic set of gestures built into the avatar, but Second Life goes further and offers users the ability to create their own gestures and animations.\n\n## (U) Security.\n\n(U) Second Life and other similar applications use a communication protocol called remote procedure call (RPC)\nas part of its way of improving performance. RPC has a long history of exploitable vulnerabilities, and thw is usually blocked by corporate and user firewalls. Because Second Life requires this protocol, for example, it opens the Second Life user to direct hacker attacks that might otherwise not be possible.\n\n(U) It is difficult enough to s6cure a corporate network from the constant and persistent threat of malicious\n_ - -\nexternal parties but, in an environment whe~ .emplor;es (b)( 1 )\ntravel widely or routinely work at h?.mtc:,-using perspnal\n(b )(3)\ncomputers, laptops, non-cqt.porn.fe'-owned machines, and personal digi~ _3.Sistafif8, security is even more difficult to maintain: -\n--\n(U) Many organizations are now moving their applications to the web and off-premises computers, which means that office-based workers and telecommuters alike have equal access to files and programs. This in turn requires location-independent security means. IPJ\n\n## (U) **Technological** ~R..V.11V\n\n(U) The Death of the Keyboard.\n\nDevelopments in human-computer interfaces (HCI) are critical to the a tactile response such as an explosion (a low rumble), or sword fight.\n\nFinely grained haptic technology can give the impression of touching cloth, or a stony surface. Full body haptic technology could even simulate the impact of bullets, immersing the player deeper within the virtual world.\n\nThese types of input devices can be combined with a new generation of haptic technology that provides uptake and utility of virtual world technology. .. Current technology relies chiefly on the traditional keyboard and mouse, or a proprietary controller (sometimes referred to as a \"gamepad\"). These have provided a barrier to mass market interaction with 3D environments as they are an inherently abstract method of HCI.\n\nA range of emergent technologies may be used in the future to interact with virtual worlds. Products such as the Emotiv EPOC, which uses an electroencephalograph to turn brain waves into computer inputs, are beginning to become commercially feasible.4\n0 (U) Touch.\n\n(U) Touch interfaces have existed since the 1980s, but will continue to be developed for future devices.\n\nNew breakthroughs are predominantly driven by recent advances in \"multi-touch\" panels (a touch surface where multiple points can be touched instead of just one). Apple's successful iPhone brand has utilized a multi touch surface on a cell phone to manipulate pictures, music, video, and traditional phone and e-mail functions which has driven consumer demand.\n\n0 (U) Motion Sensitive and Haptics. Motion sensitive controls have already revolutionized the home console market Motion sensitivity provides an immersive interaction with the virtual worlds, allowing the user to move his/her real-world hands or body to initiate virtual-world actions that reflect the user's real action. These platforms are growing in popularity. For example, the Nintendo *Wri,* which features a motion sensitive remote controller, has consistently outsold home console competitors in 2007\nand 2008.~\n(U) Microsoft has invested significantly in multi-touch technology, developing a new user interface for its Windows Vista platform. The new interface, Microsoft Surface, represents a new paradigm in human computer interaction that blends the virtual world seamlessly with the real world.\n\n(U) As proliferation of such technology increases it will profoundly affect the way humans interact with computers. Computers no longer need to be multi-component desk top devices or laptops. Instead, they can be flat panels located on any surface, able to interact with any device, including cell phones, cameras, music players, games COJlSOtes, agreed standards will ensure that future computers like these will lose none of the utility that modern computing provides. Inter-connectedness with every-day devices will create a parallel virtual world that can be geospatially referenced with reality, but which also provides the abstract concepts that are inherent to the current internet.\n\n-(U) The Death.of the *Disk.* Digital distribution is the replacement of traditional media delivery methods\n(CD, DVD) with a digital version usually transferred over the internet This phenomenon can be compared with the popularity of video sharing sites such as You Tube, which enables anyone to reach a worldwide audience from their. home. Content creators are no longer relegated to small or local releases of their art. They can now leverage new technology to speak to the world. The virtual world revolution will go hand in hand with digital distribution as each becomes a driver of the other.\n\n(U) As bandwidth and digital rights m~ment matures, the depth and breadth of digitally distributed content will increase exponentially. Traditional methods of delivery such as CDs and DVDs worked as filters to the mass market Content that was not considered palatable to a general mass audience was often discarded.\n\nYet the rise of digital distribution has diminished the effectiveness of those filters. Users are free to post whatever content they choose and are able to reach an audience that would otherwise be inaccessible. Viral videos created on sites such as You Tube are examples of this breakdown of barriers. Extremist propaganda posted online is another eXample of this worldwide phenomenon.~\n(U) The Birth of ArtificitJ *Intelligence.* In the context of games and virtual worlds, Artificial Intelligence (AI) refers to \"hots,\" which are avatars and objects that have roles and functions, but no human directly controls them. AI software and systems respond to in-game events according to rules that are set up by the AI designer. For example, a wolf in World of Warcraft has \"wolf rules\" and will often attack a nearby rat that also follows its own \"rat rules.\" For the majority of non-human objects in the game, rule sets are purposefully simple-a wolf only needs to wander, scratch, sniff things, and attack anything that seems to be alive (be it an avatar or that unfortunate nearby rat).\n\n(U) The AI community is becoming increasingly interested in applying AI technology to game and virtual world systems, since they provide real humans upon which to test new AI concepts and technologies. The ability of games and virtual worlds to communicate with the real world presents the opportunity for the application of highly complex rule sets like virtual personalities.\n\n(U) Bow Will Virtual Worlds Evolve?\n\n(U) How virtual world technology evolves will be crucial to fully unders~ding its potential impact on the world. Three dominant potential growth paths exist, as follows:\n(U) *Met.averse.* This path of development is similar to the growth and dominance of Microsoft and (to a much smaller extent) Google. A single company or organization creates a virtual world that is so useful and compelling that it aggregates a majority of the internet's users. Elements of this include: -\n\n[> 0 (U) Difaclo *standtzrds.* Standards\ndeveloped by the platform \"owner\"\nquickly become dominant.\ndown access to location specific data. layers through systems such\nas Google earth.\n0 Full virtual overlays on existing\nreality (mixed reality).\n0 (U) Concentrated *heneftls.* Every\ninnovation within the ecosystem\nconfers benefits on the platform\n\"owner.\"\n(U) he Emergence of International *Standards.* Standards bodies are developing inter-game, inter-world standards for communication, object transfer, account and identity transfer, scripting and other programming standards. These\nstandards would permit, for example, instant messaging between avatars in different virtual worlds or games, transfer of in-world currency and possessions, and most importantly for the user, the ability to carry one identity (name, avatar appearance, possessions, history) from world to world.\n\n(U) Interlinked *Multiverse.* In this path, existing site infrastructure is augmented through the addition of virtual world technology. A\nmultitude of sites will introduce and expand virtual spaces for their customers and users. Examples include an Amazon store or.a Facebook\n\"room.\" Eventually, due to business/ customer needs, new standards of interconnection are agreed upon by the major participantsto enable virtual spaces to interconnect. This growth path will be characterized by:\n0 A bewildering variety of technologies and vendors.\n\n0 Minimal standards of interconnection.\n\n0 Decentralized control, as it is currently with web sites.\n\n(U) There is a push to repeat history, in that virtual worlds are at the same\n''place\" that web browsing was in the very early 1990s when AOL's web browser was based on its own proprietary communications protocol and rendering techniques. AOL users could not access CompuServe data unless they also had a CompuServe account, and there was no crossing of those boundaries except via\n(U) *Reality+.* The Meta- or Multiverse may not be a completely virtual environment, but rather an extension of the real world. This growth path is the result of rapid development of methods that add computational layers to existing geographies (structures,objects, and people). This computational layer will create and consume data and allow rich interactions between people in close proximity as well as from remote locations. This growth path will see:\n0 Bottom-up interaction between locations and mobile devices moving up toward virtual world overlays on existing reality.\n\nemail and file transfer which are out of world techniques. That changed with the development of a standard for viewing content, called Hypertext Markup Language (HTML). The development of HTML, a simple text-based markup language that is the basis for all web pages, is a standard that allowed any vendor's browser to view any web site. The\n.result was that the \"walled gardens\"\nof CompuServe and AOL morphed into open areas accessible by anyone with a browser. The virtual worlds are similarly in the 1990s because they are walled gardens, and the development of stand<!l'ds for communications, rendering, and most importantly protection of intellectual property will allow users to move across virtual worlds the same way they move across web sites today.\n\n(U) However, there is ~ contrary argument that it is not in the best interests of industry providers such as Linden Lab (Second Life) and Blizzard Entertainment (Worldof Warcraft) to permit such crossing, and that the industry will not take this path. Standards are being developed, nonetheless, and some vendors will adopt them~'it is also likely that some will not. e1\n\n## (U) I.G .Las S E S S EE LntO ThE -Future . . ... ---\n\n.  (U) whe:q. int~grated With sub-~eter GPS 5ystems and\n. ~ IJMI)s, they would allow Reality-+ graphic overlayS\n~ ' enhancmg what peopie see t:Illough .the glasses in real-\n.\n'\n.\n'\ntime as they walk and traverse -the re;:~.l world. Mi-\n.:: Glasses personalized software. woUld then allow ~e~\n~. ersto a~gment reality'with their 0~ person,al touches .\n...\n' (0) This techn~logy woul<:f kn~w where it was as itS\n' i . ; wearer looked around, and. the device would' under- '\n.  stand -what it wa.S viewiJ:lg .. These capabilities would be\nenabled by GPSand a~celerometers .. Graphics would\noveday the real-world :setting if the we~er so desired.\n. ~orexample, a~vertiserS would be able to 9verlay ads\nonto public 'Oillboards that wearers pf iGlasses would ..\nView .. Ad .camp3.igns woUld thereby became:; personalized to ~dividt.ial .wearers of iGlasses.  .\n(U) Of course; this technology. could also be abused.: .\n Right-wing extrC<nlists, for ~tance neO.:Nazis, could_\ni:>verlay ~ial or ethnic slurs and slogans on buildings\nor individuals irt tlJ.e real world. Or jihadist &ympa$-iz- .\n. . ers _could:ga:ther:ori the-Capital Mail wearing iGlasses\n~ the:Lincolri Memorial. Their reality, thdr.world, their\n. hate-all reinforced ~th the blencfuig of the '. ' , .. .\nvirtu and'real wonds, with Reality+ oveda:y,s:. i .\n(U) One plausible future technologiCal developr_nent.is iGlass~s, wearable technology versions of classic eye\nglasses. The iGlasses would feature a. fully integrated cpmputer, PDA,. cellphone, ID tag, HMD (Head .\n\nMou:q.tedDisplay), ~d G~. Built-in inter~et access woiild comestandard'with.all niodcls.\n\n.\n\n~ they oonduct a virtual rrieetmg .that overlays an\n'avatar. of Usaffia bin Ladin on the real-world steps of.\n(U) Who are you?\n\n(U) vnJrfclUl<ml c1illRltmur<e\n(U) VIrtual worlds are Introducing an era where Ideas spread more rapidly than ever before, and have the potential to influence larger and larger global audiences. With the internet as a distribution\n\n## First Mover .Advantage: The Diffusion Of Memes In Virtual Worlds6\n\nmedium, any person can invest their time and skills into creating interesting content, attracting an audience, and forging virtual relationships. Take, for example, Matt Drudge, who in 1998 broke the Monica Lewinsky scandal on the internet. If the 2D internet communicates memes that cross cultural boundaries, the increasingly compelling and immersive virtual world will be even more effective.\n\n(U) Through virtual worlds people are increasingly able to spend significant amounts of time fully immersed in a foreign culture. This virtual presence could lead to the rapid adoption of memes via virtual diffusion.\n\nThe memes may be subde, such as fashion trends, mannerisms, slang, or entertainment preferences. But they could also be more significant, such as religious, ideological, sexual, or philosophical memes.\n\n(U) Because virtual worlds communicate ideas and emotions so well, they may be a potent method of spreading ideologies. For example, if virtual\n. world \"netizens\" adopt the Arrierican concepts of individual property rights, the ideas may then spread throughout the real world. This, in turn, co~d result in an increase in the global acceptance of individual liberty as. a universal norm, just as British dominance of the high seas two hundred years ago led to the enshrinement of British concepts of liberty in the international trade system. Taking advantage of opportunities for cultural diffusion via virtual worlds to create pro-Western\ninfluences could have important economic and political implications for the United States .\n\n. (U) Other countries appear to recognize this potential. China, by banning QQ Coins and forcing Blizzard to change certain aspects of its games to conform to Chinese values, is expl\"l!ssly protecting its nationalist message to its citizens. 7 This demonstrates that China understands what we in the United States yet do not: that virtual worlds reflect and communicate real world cultural values; that among those values most at risk are property and liberty, and as a result, democratic discmmse.\n\n## (U) .A Word On Identity\n\nences. This section examines\nthis emerging virtual culture\nin t;erms ofitlentity, ilkologies\nand their sociAl networks, and\ngroup behavior.\n\n(U) Virtual worlds provide a 3D platform for personal expression, enter-\ntainment, creative expression, and business activities. All of these activities leave traces that can be retrieved and interpreted to identifY a person.\nWhen this mosaic is combined it refines and defmes a person's anamaya, or\nvirtual identity. This may extrapolate to that person's real-world\nidentity. In the real world, issues of identity involve more than\nhow a\n                                    involve how s/he\n                                                                        what s/he\n\n~believes, with whom s/he interacts, and what s/he cares about. In fact, physical characteristics are very poor indicators of a person's true self.\n\n(U) Both have significant implications for identity. From one avatar to the next, and through the multiple expressions of self that the creator generates, deceit, whether or not nefarious, will likely enter into the process. This may be aspirational: I\nwish I looked better so I will make my avatar attractive; or deceitful: I\nwill create a false avatar to view adult content without revealing who I really am. Even in attempts to deceive, an individual reveals traces of his or her identity in the form of an anamaya.\n\nout by virtual individuals, virtual groups, and the larger virtual society. *Vrrtual* identity is the product of actions undertaken by virtual groups as they shape and reshape their self-definition and culture; moreover, virtual identity is constructed by inworld social and economic processes.\n\nOn the other hand, virtual identity is also influenced by real world environments. When people invest a vast amount of energy, material and ideas into virtual worlds they feel real pain and loss when their virtual beings are abused, harassed, and exploited.\n\nSymbolic interactions that occur in virtual worlds are no less real than the ones in the real world.m\n(U) A person's real world and virtual identities are defined by a number of elements, including both internal and external factors or concepts of\n\"self.\"8 As a person moves his or her identity into virtual space, s/he brings a number of the same senseof-self issues with them. However, the online world, with its anonymous element and its enabling technologies, also allows users to redefine their identity in a number of ways.\n\nVirtual worlds offer anonymity and the false perception of anonymity.\n\n(U) The construction of identity and culture in a virtual space is the result of structure and environment played\n\n## (U)The Key **Component:** S~Ciallnteraction\n\n(U) Virtual worlds, by combining 3D\nvirtual reality with social interactivity, bring a new element to global and internet communication. As these communication tools evolved, so did the behavior principles governing virtual social interaction. Though studies have shown that virtual social interaction follows patterns similar to real-world social interaction, virtual worlds and online games may also provide opportunities for role-play and fantasy realization. Some users may experiment with.illegal or immoral behaviors that they would not otherwise display in the real-world.\n\n(U) The implication of cross-over is that users are transferring their real-world socio-cultural motivations into virtual worlds. Because the expressive abilities of online entities are now so advanced, it is simple to code in behaviors that co-opt real human beings who interact with those worlds. At Stanford University, for example, an avatar mimicked the head nods and tilting of a human being, who then judged the avatar to be \"friendlier'' than one that did not move in synchrony.\n\n## I\n\n(U) Online to *Offline* B~liavior.\n\nPreliminary empirical research has indicated that virtual world interactions are subject to many of the same physical \"rules\" of human real~world communication, including notions of \"personal space\" and the role of non-verbal communication. While the specific manifestations of these rules may vary across cultures Gust as in the real world), these offline-toonline parallels may also translate within cultures.\n\n(U) Even more simply, imagine that a group of online griefers in Second Life might desecrate an online Ka 'ba created by an Islamic group, thereby inflaming Muslims in the real world, prompting them to take violent ac-\ntion, or encouraging recruitment for real world jihadist groups. 10 The subtleties of these new virtual world techrwlogies will likely aid and abet this sort of malfeasance.\n\n(U) *Benefi.cia.l* Eff~cts. At the intuitive level, it seems clear that computer-mediated games-from single-player to massive multiplayer-:can have beneficial effects in helping players to cope with work-related stress, overwhelming responsibilities, social contact and support, social anxiety, self-esteem and empowerment issues, and reallife trauma. 11\n(U) Virtual behaviors and experiences are crossing-into the real-world in multiple ways. Recent research indicates that a range of real-world nonverbal and visual influences indicative of human relations carries over into virtual world interactions. 9 Critically, not only do these visual mechanisms play out in virtual worlds, but they can translate their virtual world effects in~ real world scenarios.\n\n(U) More generally, the field of \"serious games\" focuses on games that are used for training,_a_dyer:t:ising;----\nsimulation,-or-edueation. 12\nThese include a broad spectrum of games that are intended to overdy influence u ...... vl,u,, most\n\nfor.\n\nE> some identified benefit-one that\n~ frequendy health-related-like\nquitting smoking, losing weight, or.\nincreasing exercise. 16\n(U) Increasingly, however, such games focus on social or political objectives, such as establishing rapport or empathy between otherwise alienated or at least non-communicative groups. A good eXample is Peacemaker, in which the game challenges the player to \"[e]xperience the joy of bringing peace to the Middle East or the agony of plunging the region into disaster.\" 17\nnity that recognizes the user's p_9wer--(b)( 1).\n\nand competence. Pl~y~'-efforts and (b)(3)\n(U) Ideological \"marketing\" games such as Special Force 2 and Amer-\nThe concept has been given a whole new life, however, with the arrival ica's Arrny are unabashed in their influence objectives. Yet how successful they are in achieving those objectives is unclear. Other games may be more circumspect about their manipulative intentions. This may be a particular issue in the massively multiplayer online role-playing game (MMORPG) venues, since they have a considerably greater potential for influencing via traditional social mechanisms. 18 Achievement in MMORPGs is seductive because\n~e goals and journey are well-defined and the rewards are social and persistent. In a MMORPG, a user embodies his or her achievements in achievem~~~.in MMORPGs take on j~.-realism that other games do not p~vide.\n\n19\n(U) In general, the insertion of political back stories in games--including manipulated--at least by non-state groups. State actors, though possessing the resources to experiment with inclinedto be the passive recipients of a set of divine game laws limiting their options and forcing them the development of MMORPGs as influence mechanisms, may likewise simply find it more efficient to use alreadyexisting games. The Chinese experience is perhaps the most instructive in this regard. 24\nof PC games and online multiplayer games, given their significantly more immersive and, therefore, more innately influential characteristics.\n\nThe primary concern from an influence perspective .is the prospect of political or ideological objectives hidden in game rule sets or play mechanics, where their effect can be less obvious. Just as cinematic spectacles enrapture audiences, game play captures the minds of users. Thus,\n\"games can. communicate doctrine by demonstration.21\n(U) Some examples of computer games with ideological objectives include:\n0 Under Ash (Syria, 2001)\n0 Ethnic Cleansing (US white supremacist, 2002)22\n(U) Though the discussion above may imply that game designers have an insurmountable advantage over players in terms of influence mechanisms, this is not necessarily the case.\n\nThe extent to which any putative ideological (or other manipulative agenda) game designers and operators may have will be counterbalanced by the players themselves.\n\n0 America's Army (US Army, 2002)\no Special Force I (Hizballah, 2003)\n0 Quest for Saddam (US, 2003)\n0 Kuma War (US, 2004)\n0 Under Siege (Syria, 2005)\n0 Night of Bush Capturing (AQ/\nGIMF, 2006)\n0 Special Force 2: Tale of the Truthful Pledge (Hizballah, 2007)\n0 Special Operation 85: Hostage\nRescue (Iran, 2007)23\n(U) None of the above is a MMOR-\nPG or social world; they are all single- or limited multi-player games.\n\nAs ideologically-driven parties experiment with large virtual worlds as influence vehicles, however, their practical utility for the purpose of obtaining influence will become clearer.\n\n(U) The idea behind this thinking is, broadly, that this increasingly sophisticated and astute game-playing audience will detect and either ignore or subvert such influence attempts.\n\nThe ~bility of some game players to identify, analy-t:e, and characterize seemingly unconnected or random aspects of a game and then infer a design agenda is well-known. This reflects a designer-player tension that has existed since the first generation of computer games--one that is clearly recognized by both contesting parties.25 The industry perception is that the advantage lies with the garners, who quickly probe, define, and then breach intended design boundaries. Although this category of gamer activity is self-interested (and sometimes has underlying criminal objectives) rather than altruistic, this proficiency ultimately benefits the entire gamer community.\n\n(U) MMORPGs, in general, have the further characteristic of presenting a values-neutral backdrop within which a nefarious group might conduct propaganda and recruitment activities. Given the design and operating costs, MMORPGs will likely not be developed so much as\n(U) Game and player sophistication are evolving together. Players are less\n\n## M\n\n(U} Real relationships develop between the real people behind the avatars, even though the individuals may never meet in real life.\n\nalong specific pathways of play. Rather, garners are increasingly re-defining the structure and intent of games in highly individualistic ways, and game operators who try too hard to limit this type of activity risk losing their playing audiences.\n\n(U) The trend toward \"open games\"\nand increasing player control can inform observers' understanding of the real \"threat\" from games as influence mechanisms. Their ultimate influence may be limited to two fundamental overt areas that have been discussed above: individual empowerment and a reduction of negative stereotyping.\n\n(U) Other more sophisticated and potentially more manipulative mechanisms may be unable to survive elite garners' scrutiny and ridicule.\n\nThe process may be roughly akin to what we have experienced in the realm of mass marketing: while the industry has some extremely sophisticated and effective tools at its disposal (most.famously, \"subliminal advertising\"), attempts to employ these techniques are high risk and have a strong tendency to backfire.\n\nTherefore, the advertising industry focuses on the use of \"accepted\"\ntechniques in the most original and entertaining way. It may well be that virtual world influence techniques will evolve similarly, but they have not yet done so.\n\nwho are unfamiliar with virtual worlds and online -\n\n~ games sometimes have difficulty\ngrasping the depth of relationships\nthat can develop in these communities. Real relationships develop\nbetween the real people behind the\nto be early adopters of new technologies, to improve them, and thereby to influence broader acceptances of the technology.28\n\nava~s, even though the individuals\nmay never meet in real life. Avatars\nin Second Life are often observed in\nchat saying things like \"I am not a\ncartoon. I am a real person.\"\n\nImprovements in technology will in turn make the experience even more realistic. The pornography industry is actually driving or adapting some of these uses-with significant economic consequences.\n\n(U) Friendships can lead to love.\n\nIn some cases, the individuals may agree to meet in real life, whereas in other cases the individuals agree to keep the relationships \"virtual.\" The unfolding drama in these relationships sometimes leads to jealousies and accusations of cheating by virtual lovers. Such scenarios may, in turn, translate into real world actions with reru legal consequences.\n\n(U) According to The Observer, the once 13 billion US Dollar adult entertainment industry is on the decline because of free sites like youporn.\n\ncom and Pornotube.com, which reportedly receive more internet hits than CNN.com. The availability of free pornography (either pirated or created by amateurs) is now widespread and this affecting the adult entertainment business the same way that Napster affected the music industry. A probable progression of this trend is that consumers will be looking for other expressions of\n\n## (U) There Are Also Numerous Stories Of Individuals Who Develop Such Strong Feelings For Their ~Irtuallover That They Are Willing To Divorce A Real-World Spouse In Order To Start A New Relationship With The Person That They Have Met Online.\n\n(U) In Second Life, one enterprising individual has set up a private investigator (PI) service for hire. If requested, the PI will go so far as to follow and attempt to entrap a virtual lover in order to test his or her fidelity.26 There are also numerous stories of individuals who develop such strong feelings for their virtual lover that they are willing to divorce a real-world spouse in order to start a new relationship with the person that they have met online.\n\npornography that they cannot get for free, such as virtual environments and adult social networks that offer more than a passive experience. 29\n(U) If the individuals behind the avatars are consenting adults, we are then left with the \"so what?\" question.\n\n(U) As is discussed in the section on Influence, the research on the effect of violence in video games bleeding over into real life violence is inconclusive.\n\nThus far the literature\n(U) Some key trendS in the pornography industry have been noted that have direct applicability to the virtual world, such as the rise in user-generated content, the tendency to seek greater levels of anonymity, and the desire for more realistic but safe experiences. 27 Analysts predict that virtual reality will host the next wave of the pornography busio\"ess. Actors in these underground economies tend ticipating in virtual activities that would be illegal in the real world (for example rape and child pornography) is similarly inconclusive.\n\n(U) The question of harm must be considered. What constitutes harm? If one partner behind the avatars is a minor, .and the other is an adult, does society judge this cybersexual activity as unacceptable?\n\n(U) What if the individuals behind the avatars are both consenting adults, but one is role-playing a child avatar (\"age play\")? German police investigated a case of age play in Second Life. In the United States, such cases are extremely difficult to prosecute.30 Further discussion of US laws regarding child pornography can be found in the section on Law Enforcement. In any case, virtual world communities have begun policing such behavior themselves, regardless of national laws. 31\n(U) In Brussels, an individual alleged that she had been virtually raped in Second Life.32 Does this constitute harm? The case was ultimately dismissed because the judge ruled that the woman had the option of turning off her computer, regardless of the mental anguish she suffered\nor the damage to the reputation of her virtual character. In the United States, might this type of action be prosecutable under obscenity laws?33\nLaws will need to catch up with the new behaviors tha~ are possible and the new norms that exist in these virtual worlds.l:l\n\n## (U) Group Behavior\n\nearlier virtual communities and artifacts in their new worlds. 34\n(U) Teclmology continues to enable new ways for individuals to connect and relate to each other. Many of the same driving forces that encourage people to group together in the real world also exist in the digital realm. These social groups are akin to tribes. They coalesce around a common interest or activity, or a shared set of knowledge or beliefs because of the opportunities, support, or protection that the tribe provides to the individual.\n\n(U) Griefers.\n\nMost tribes\ncome together for the entertainment and enjoyment of playing the game; they strive to gain their reputations and become legends by excelling at the competition L-...!....-. r::~a..;...=::.::\noffered within the experience. Others, however, are more interested in \"griefing,\" or creating trouble. Such groups strive\n(U) Some cohesive groups have already been moving between virtual worlds. A group of \"refugees\"\nmoved en masse from the game Uru into There.com and Second Life, when the servers in Uru closed d<?wn. The refugees recreated their\n(U) Reside~ts ofSe~bnd Life can customize'their.avatais to beass~~tedwithvarious ~.\n\n~rtual groups, a\"Uo.Wing members~oftho~ groups *tti* remain organizec(a!'ld providing.an\n~asily recognizable symbol for identifying like-mind.e~HndiViduals ~~tli~ the wo~d, Jt!is facet of SeCond l:.lfe.!)ecomes rele\\rantt9 us n~t19i:t~rseeiJ~cor.~~i~e~tions ll'!ben 9n:e\\\n,\n, ,\n. r..,.,\n . -\n\\\n , \"'+,\n,\n -\n-\n.\n\n4 *:4..'* :<.. i\n.\n\n-..\n\n4 .\n'f#:.? - ..\n-\n.\n\n-\n.....\n\nf1i .. ~sinto i!CGou~~\\theexisten~~;o.f~~~r.i!)l!SgroyP.~~il~l,llt!,y!i1':!.~1;~j<l!!~~*-IT!~i\"~;~f~r~\n~Lich groups are;Jt~~ly to take.:adv~vt~ge Ofthe:Qp~i:tti~it}ito ass9c;i~!e'themsel~s:~~~.\n\ntheir. group. whet!lefin obvious qrsubtle ways:  . ' :\n  .- \"\n ..   '\n_,\n. .\n\n.\n\n.\n\n..\n\n. .\n\n. .\n\n(!.:J) The mpst o~ious methoc:f r'esiden~s could use to'~ssociate th~~lves with a pa.rti~\nl,i!~~(ganization :~~ld .. ~\ntojo;r;~ t~~Jormal S~o.,tpft!~g\"?ui> if on!:~i~s CC?r ~r!!ate Ci.o~.\n\nlfitdoes not). -R~~~~ents can :be;'\"~ri)bers. 6f:4P. ~o:~~.-9~cwps, an~ ;~~tJi~.se -~~-~~~.P.!~Yit on~ group name_ alongside theira~atar'sname.' Ot~r.~sldeirtS Whi?~~E!iathe aliatar~i!f:'::r,:.\n\nworld would ~\ntha\"t the resident is a member of the gro1,1p. Belongil').g:to a group ean :: :-\nalso yield other benefits, such as accessing pints ofttie world ~perio.rily to certain groiip'.\n\nmembers. Tangible benefits such:as access ca11 help to reinforce group identity and the  :\n~anamayaofindivldual members.!;  . .\n\n ,  *:::* <\n_.\n *-.,';:.:_::* ...  :.:: :,,:\n.;:~ .. ; . . ).~i::-~~;\n~- ...  .:;.;J:~~ ... ;~: ... :~-.;:.~~5.~:~:<~ ~\\~~.;&'\":~(~~.:< :)~-.ffi.:;\nM_The.avatar ~s.tomizatlon feat\\Jies offered by Second Ufe;.hOWeV~r:!offer more sul)fle::\nmethods by whi~h !Jsers can ass.ociate themselves Wit~:! a particul!!irifr<?.up. Some resi-r\"'\ndents may not want to attract attention to themselves by having, fur example, ~e phrase\nHizballah Supp(>rter floating above 'their avatars. b4t co1.1ld as5ocia~~~tiemselves .witll:.\n\n~~~group by.cre!l_tJ!lg aod wea't~_g:~;.t-~hirtwlt~,tl:!_e j-fi~~llahi9!J~.<>PJ~ ,lfa t~hi~~iih1\nth~ log~~is St:ill,~~:~ra~en,grp~~i~em~eis,co_qlij:,~e.~oh~~~~eirtr~at~i's~~~~~~~f~t;\ns!\"t1rts With a mot_e.mn_Qcuous yet !itdl umque.logo,.o~,fhegrQup ~~Y.:qt:,tde;that w~a,n~;!\n\na particular piece of jewelry (again,~ unique item cf.lfted ~a group\\member and giVen, OJlly to other group members).i~entifies a i\"esiQen~:as a member of ~~at 9roup. Alth~nigh\nthese understated methods would not provide the technical benefits ofan officiill mem-:\nbership in a group (such as being .. ~bie to aceess gi-&oj:H,w~ea are~~Bf.the wartd),.they, '.\n\n~o~d.allow~.r~up:m:em~rsJo)~l!riti:tY:?ne~n~.~~~a.\":''i?~g;thgq.~~if~:p.tot~et:~ey%~~\nwithlll the virtual world. Again, these methods could stdl be .used.to ceme t the resi:!~.r dent's ana maya\" as part ofthe group and the virt~_al:world itseif - '\n . \"'\nII,\nto be a disruptive force, one that can cause chaos and frustration in others.\n\n(U) What is interesting to note is that griefers (whether individuals or tribes) tend to work inside the system by following the rules of the worlds they are disrupting. They then abuse and exploit either the design or an unintended flaw in the code to carry out their cJ:taotic actions. In short, although they may be considered\n\"digital rebels,\" they still accept the electronic, artificial reality of the world in which they operate. They are rule breakers, not system breakers.\n\n(U) Customs tnul *Values.* Obviously, a big element of any social network is its shared sense of values and morality. In virtual worlds such as Second Life, this can lead to tribal formation around both traditional interests, like religion and hobbies, and fringe pursuits, like fetishes and radicalism. In a virtual world, groups of disparate interests can live in close virtual proximity to each other.\n\n(U) What makes virtual worlds like Second Life unique is that both can exist in the same space and utilize the [>\n\n1> same tool to create and maintain a\ncommunity. Sometimes the more\nextreme tribes in these worlds go to\nvirtual war against each other, creating a new form of conflict based\non disruption of the experience and denial of access and service.\nSuch conflicts will often strengthen\nthe bonds of the digital tribes,\nsince they no~ have a sense of purpose and an identifiable \"enemy.\"\nindividuals continue to spend more time in virtual worlds interacting with their digital tribes, what is socially acceptable in those worlds may strain the bounds of traditional real-world norms. Community standards, and the concepts of shared values and understanding that conventional communities provide, may be reinforced, or they may be torn apart, but they will no longer be static.\n\n(lJJ Religious *Groups.* Some religious groups have already utilized the gaming trend to send a positive message about their religion. For instance, Digital Praise, a company specializing in Christian software, is releasing Guitar Praise, which is based on the same premise as the successful Guitar Hero and Rock Band games. 36\nTribulation Forces as an online multiplayer game based on the Left Behind book series. 37 Other games promote a particular religious-political point of view, such as Special Force 2, which recreates the 2006 war between Israel and Hizballah forces in Lebanon, as\n seen from Hizballah's point of view.38\nGames may also incorporate religions or pseudo-religions into the storyline in order to make a game more compelling. For example, in Halo 2, certain actions may lead to the destruction of life in the Halo universe, but provide access to the gods. 39\n(U) Based on this history, it is likely that religious groups will continue to expand into virtual worlds to spread their messages. Religious groups in Second life cover the spectrum.\n\n'-------------- LB Games has produced Left Behind:\n(U) The ultimate, larger implications of digital tribes remain to be seen, but they will likely continue to grow. Connectivity is the linchpin of this expansion; broadband penetration has lead historically to virtual world expansion. According to Gartner, \"worldwide,\n17 countries will have broadband penetration rates of 60 percent or more by 2012, up from five countries in 2007.\" Furthermore, \"with a projected 77 percent household penetration rate, the United States will be tied with Japan for the fifthhighest broadband-penetration rate in the world, trailing only South Korea (97 percent), the Netherlands (82 percent), Hong Kong (81 percent), and Canada.(79\npercent).\"35\nreligious sites in :OO..P<1'nntl1\nregular basis.40 J.ll\\.UVJLUU . .u.J\npray at virtual rntrlrtPll or mosques. Some IPaJrticipa.te religious rites such the Hajj. Second built detailed and churches, catnet:tra.l$\nsites.\n\n(U) Why have relig!p1ns in virtual worlds anlc:l_({amtes!'\nwith most_Q.ther\n!pjria.m1fy-inclined inclividu:al\n-seek to find other lijtc~-rruncjed viduals with whom activity provides for community cotte*on, the spread charity work, On the negative emnrcmn~en1ts also provide\n$us.ce):)btJole indihlnlnr:allllnufor extremist use of virtual\n(U) Please see AJ:PClnOJtx 3 for a detailed description different virtual\n\n## (U)Plausibl ( U)  Pat T E-Rn Recognition/ Systems Thinking And .Griefing\n\n-\n- *(U)* In ~e future, it is plausible that a\nma.Ss of\n-\n- people would be extremely good ~t re.-::owruzm~ pat- .. -\nterns and understanding complex\nbecause\n-\nthey are being trained by game\nfor this type of\n-\nthinking. People may even begin\nreality itself as\n -\na system ~o recognize and explore.\nM A digital game is a sy8tem of must manipuljite to accomplish s1 Jecit).c framed in a narrative. Becoming a quires an ability to \"game the one must be able to recognize ..., ........ '''~-'\nthe system rules in order to reach the ODlectJtves game .\n\n(U) 'Dte implicatio~ of this de\\ielppl'll.ent both' negative and positive. A rise in ....... .,..,r, ..\n\ncur, since \"griefers\" are individuals exploit system rules to disrupt ~e ,.YT, .. ..,,,.n,,..,.,.\n\nusers. Some griefers may then begin eXJllo:tUnlg in pursuit of nefariOUS political and TWlrSOinal On a more positive note, the .. , ........ ....\n\npeople with the skill of recog~ruzJmg p~.tter in complex\nsystems m\"'y mean that there will be larger pool of individuals from which to draw\nofficers and analysts.\n\n(U) Real impact in.th real w rid.\n\n(U) <eC<CDIDl mic\n(U) Economies are necessary In **virtual** w-tnrllll!!:\ners from leaving. Users lose interest if there is runaway JIUlatJton real world value of their virtual creations-which took\n\n## Discussion: Why Are There Virtual World Economies?\n\nration power, support specialization, encourage \". u~ ..\n\n~'-1\"\"'\"\nusers, and support economic role-playing. 41 In many I~tartce:s, economy is an extension of the publisher's business nies make money by selling and facilitating the\ndigital \"items\" so players can customize their avatars\n(U) Technological Implications Economics\n(U) Hiftiag to *Bv.siness.* Despite the current popularity gaming in virtual worlds, its future appears to be in business.\n\nin high-speed mobile devices, sensors, and distributed design and proc1uc1t~on will likely combine with Millennial Generation user experience to nomic aJfairs. When the Millennial Generation transt1tlorasl in l 0 years, virtual worlds are likely to play a larger role in\n(U) Fourth generation wireless sexvi.ces and devices will pear within the next five years. The high bandwidth deinajllde:d realistic virtual worlds and virtual overlays will need this technology in order for businesses to see the large-scale orck:lucti,ritv hancements necessary for widespread adoption.42\n\n## Resources\n\n(U) Some form of \"ubiquitous computing,\" where a day devices and objects (such as buildings and microwave capable of regularly and inexpensively transmitting and reaetvml!\n\nthe internet, is also likely within the next five to seven infrastructure is necessary to create realistic virtual worlds, people), and virtual objects at a level of detail where hn!~1n~\"-~\"\"\npeople who run them are comfortable basing decisions on tions.43\n(U) Mobile devices will likely become more bUlllDf~-lntmd reality glasses appropriate for everyday business use caJ:Iabl\nbetween the real, virtual, or \"mixed reality\" worlds ii:Lv<:wii:Lu~\nseven to I 0 years. Simple, user-friendly, open tions are likely to appear in five to seven years. 44\n(U) Advances in distributed design and distributed p.n;uu~~l'u amplify the impact of blurring the virtual and real worlds.\n\nin virtual worlds, jurisdic-\ntions with stable, balanced,\nand progressive legal and\nregu/4tory approaches to these\nwor/Js-specifo:ally ones that\ntake the. \"consent of the gov-\nerned\" into account-will\nlikely acquire a decisive ad-\nvantage in crafting the culture,\nform, and content of virtual\n\n## (U) A C\\>M~~:.:\n\nthan a\n~ (U) Collaborati Technology:\nA Tool for **Busi** *sses.* The unstructured info mation provided by social technolo  es is particularly useful in business rocesses that are not rigidly pre-de ned, but where people work toge er in an adaptive way to innovate s lutions. Business I\nprocesses often rely on access to structured data. This may be spread across many applifations, databases, and directories. Social technologies work to address s9ch complexities.\n\nI\n(U) Blogs and wiiqs are collaboration tools and useful mfuruy for sharing unstructured infor:mation associated with ad hoc or on$oing projects and processes, but not  or structured informational retri\n. Yet some companies, such as Sh 11, are converting their official docu entation to wikis because this enabl s the company to make documenta on updates available in real time a.rd enables non-editors to contribute fto the documentation. In this proc~s, they restructure tra.<lltiO~laJ, highly permislann-cln~lf'n intranet tool.\n\nanyone to edit information, no special nnVliPO\"Pl: Or knowledge If wiki pfllfessi,onal interests, previous posts contact informaatmosphere of familiarity arises, emllJO,rees will be\n\n- (U) Time Zone Issues with Business and 1el:hnolo!e)1.\ntrend of participants on projects collaborating across uut: 1~:u\nwork increasingly must be done asynchronously.\ntime zone related discrepancies by exchanging e-mails or\nmessages on\nphysical Post-it notes. This problem is even more cruille:ng~!ng in collaborative\nvirtual reality (VR) because VR is not particularly\nfor the display\nof text.\n(U) Tools, collectively referred to as teleimmersion, have create a virtual environment (VE) that supports asvncl:trom!nlS\nOne of the advantages of design or scientific visualization environment is the ability to have participants in different Ut'!l)OT'anlhir.\n\ntions share space with each other and objects. This allows engage in a physical dialogue-to point at specific objects the paran:teters within the simulation-as a way to clarify gives the users a common context for their discussions.\n\n(U) In asynchronous collaboration, the ability to hand off accurately is of great importance. A user arriving in an v~~v''\"~\ntion in the virtual environment needs to know what work during his or her absence and what work stillmay need to collaboratively, researchers at the University of Tokyo and Illinois have developed three VR-enabled tools for this ...... ..nr\"\"'\"\nVR-annotator, and VR-vcr. II\n(U) Currency\n(U) Virtual world currencies will likely continue to evolve to possess more and more cash-like properties.\n\nGaming companies have powerful incentives to make virtual world currencies more suitable for micro-transactions and easier to use, acquire and convert to or from real world currencies. These properties will open up virtual-worlds operators' markets, world. The ..... r~.-a allow for new game-play possibilities, expand their potential revenue models, and reduce their credit risks.\n\nVirtual world operators will want to reduce their exposure to fraud by currencies.\n\nmoving to more secure and reputable payment systems. The implications of these changes are that virtual world currencies will move more toward retail distribution by cards or other stored value mechanisms.\n\nAnother trend will be to improve security with stronger authentication for the transfer of monies, and pasself-authentication similar to the\n(U) QQ Coins, gained such wt\"411es:tl>re!ad use by March\n\n(> cards.are mostly simple magnetic\nstrips or printed cards, and as such\nare highly vulnerable to forgery and\nfraud.\nmodels, and also for players, because it will allow instant gratification and new types of rewards. Moreover, mobile-payment and virtual world integration will make it dramatically easier to use either in-world currency or seamless server-side conversion to purchase real world goods and services.\n\n(U) In the predominant mechanism, these cards simply store a code which links to a ledger entry on the game provider's service. It is likely that in some games these cards will move to more secure mechanisms which employ \"smart card\" technologies and stored value.\n\n(U) By using prepaid game cards, garners may be able to use virtual currency to ma,ke real-world transactions. 55 The \"Octopus card\" is one example of this; it is a mechanism by which Hong Kong residents can buy passage on mass tran_sit. The Octopus card became gener~y tenderable because it was broadly held, has cash-like properties, and is used to pay for a ubiquitous service; all of these characteristics also apply to\n\n-- -World of Warcrafi ... gold.\"\n(U) Virtual Cxrrency in the Future. It is likely that virtual world-based currency will become a widely tenderable and freely convertible currency within the next five to 10 years, and will function much like traditional state-issued currency.\n\nMarket forces are pushing game and virtual world operators to create products which have real world currency properties. Their implementations may serve as a substitute for real world currencies. In five to 1 0\nyears, virtual world currencies could rival those of small nation-states in stability, liquidity, and users' faith.\n\nVirtual world institutions may mirror real world institutions, which can provide depository services, credit, securities, financial guarantees, credit analysis, hedging mechanisms, and other services similar to those found in a robust real-world monetary system.\n\n(U) As virtual worlds become increasingly accessible via mobile devices, it is inevitable that they will become integrated with mobilebased payment systems. This will be hugely beneficial for game makers, as integration will allow new revenue see the emergence of significant virtual world currenaes as economic, political, and criminal threats. Like China, they may enact legislation or regulation to eliminate or control virtual world currencies. 56\nVirtual world int.lation;;trv pressure, or to sovereignty.\n\no;;Kuc:tu~~ is unlikely to be effective, except to limited degree in authoritarian like China with tight currency in those states, limited efficacy sures are taken.\n\nlikely to see the emte~~nce convertible and ..... n~...,'hl ..\n\nworld-based cuJrreJnc:b.,es\n(U) Virtual world ,. ........ n,.;.a~\nly continue to more cash-like ....... , ....... ,..;  ~\n(U) These ........ , ....... ,..;,.c.\n\nup virtual world ~ ....... .,..~ .. ~\nallow for new ....,,rn ... .Jnll<>u\n\n## (U) Money, Financial Markets, Sovereignty: Toward A New\"---\n\n~!!!!!!~~~~~;::::==:::::;:;:;:::~~ (U) Virtual worlds are implementing a system of value exc~r1ge that mirrors those in the real world. Nearly all vit:tual worlds have\nand inworld exchanges for goods or services, and some have and debt instruments. The currencies of today's major virtual worlds are\n\"iu~:~;;u\"!':,_,_;.J real, hard US Dollars either through intrinsic world-based gray-market third parties.\n\n(U) Real world spillover into virtual worlds continues. t;ntrd:Pia chartered banks operating in-world and issued its own matically converts in-world currency to US Dollars at a set qx~n<mJI:t:\nreal-world ATMs. Due to inflation concerns, the People's .... ~\n... u'\"\"\"\nis attempting to stop the trend of QQ Coins being traded rency.61 QQ Coins gained such widespread real world use that 14 Chinese government agencies were prompted to\nthe use of virtual world currencies in the real world. The\naTRMiict~~~ China subseque~tly asserted governance and enforcement operators' issuance, in-game use, and Renminbi (RMB)\n(U) Game operators are now accountable to financial crime world use of QQ Coins and *RMT* markets has not been nn,c.>n.mn.r\"\nThere also have not been any prosecutions despite there examples of clear violations of government guidelines.\n\nin virtual worlds in China have suggested that the lack of m1.ci.Il'WaJ crimes charges levied against virtual world operators violating guidelines is because enforcement is extremely difficult and worlds and their as gold farming, ecclnClmllal1~ important. 62\n\n## (U) Regula.Ory Framework\n\n(U) Countries that have stable and fair legal and regulatory frameworks for virtual worlds are likely advantage in crafting the culture, form, and content of virtual spaces. By nature, virtual worlds are ~ ........ ~ .... Y\nnational. It is likely that there will be a cycle of national regulatory attempts which may cause\nto shop for friendly locales. Early examples of this can already be seen with IGE, one of the largest currency exchanges, which has changed venue several times and is now domiciled in Vanuatu, a have been enacted to attract this kind of enterprise. 65\n(U) It is likely that market forces will drive virtual world creators and currency institutions to self-regulate and domicile in at least somewhat regulated venues because virtual world currency users will -\nrequire the liquidity and stability that arise from transparency and the rule of law. For a detailed discussion of market development drivers see Ap-\n4.11l\n\n## (U) Economic Threats\n\nvia stored value card, implemented as digital cash, and domiciled in secrecy-friendly venues.\n\n(U) *Sovereign.ty.* If the ability to issue currency and control conversion of currency is fundamental to sovereignty, virtual world currencies represent a significant threat. It is likely that a major virtual world will domicile in a venue which grants its operator effective control over its currency, much like a sovereign state, because the benefits to doing so could be very compelling to the game operator, and therefore to a small host nation. The successful sale of the control of internet toplevel domains by small countries to private companies demonstrates this phenomenon.\n\n(U) Money *Lauaderi.11g.* Trade in virtual currencies is likely to be a means of small-scale money laundering. There are numerous internet sites that offer to trade large blocks of virtual world currencies \"off exchange\" for rates considerably worse than those available at official sites.\n\nThe only advantage to accomplishing conversions in this manner is that they are not tracked or reported by the game operator.66 Several game operators and RMT sites, such as IGE, are operated. by alleged criminals. Some, like MindArk, have connections with suspicious investors.\n\nExisting digital currency systems like eGold are possible money laundering platforms, as they allow instant international transfers over foreign and domestic private networks without reporting requirements or oversight associated with the mainstream funds\n.transfer networks.\n\n(U) As virtual world currencies continue to. evolve and become more liquid, they will likely retain all of the properties of today's digital currencies with additional properties that make them desirable for money virtual worlds only a few countries addn~ssi.nm the issue at all. In April 2008, Swedish Tax Agency issued ing income earned broadly stating that game results in nnaqc::Iai eluding even is reportable and the currency is rnnvllrnlhl ..\n\nworld currency.\n\nnot state whether third party secondary cient to allow for coJrtw:rnm ing the definition in If this is the case, m-worJd all major virtual we1onr\"'\"\"\"n'\nbe subject t9 yahie income taX. 67\n-of virtual world or this situation is uu''\"''~\"\"u''\"'\nprompt companies tries with more mrrl.Pr;~\n\n## .(.- U) P *-(_* A.U .S- I B L .(U) Monte.Negro.. ' . ' -B-Ack In- 2010\n\n~- ---\n.\n\n'\n(U) The plausible future creatively inteipret_ed below dem\nstart: Othergames had''eoon~inies~\nbasicrilln:ither just back-fit onto qld-school\n.onstrates the pqtential for th~ gro~ of businesses in virtual\nworl~ and the illnma~ ilnpact t:hat virtual worlds could ..\n\nthinly veiled cyber-Pomi schemes, or wery fj.ltldamc:ntally\n. have o~ globai economics:\nof chance. . .\n\n\n.. /'\n-\n(U) It probably seems. obvious now, but back theri.people\n(U} Of cqurse,.we o~e a lot to some of the\n. thought I_ was CraZy. Maybe SOIJle still do, 'Qui.eve~.t)ley ~ .. \"before.)Js, so I would hasten to applaud Qfthe old \"econ-.\n\n'\n.\n\n'\n.\n\n'\n'\n. '\n..\n\n.\n\n.\n\n. .\n\n.\n\n,.\n\nusing the Montem;gro V~al Gold'piece.(Geeps); In ~ . - *omy'* games .. Unlike our predecessors, no,we~n:r . we. had a mix event, !low that a ve_cy fa5t ro yearshave gone by I thought it' of gaine d~gners, economists; engineers, bUsiness people wo,lli.d be useful to reflect a_ little,. as much for lriY own benefit e . WOrking together f~m the OUtseJ? a,nd ~t US elo~ the\n!15 for that of a,ny interestd readers.\n\n.\n\n.\n\ne .economics gaps. We deSigned our garrie so p~ayers woilld\n\n.\n\n.. .\n\n\n- w~t.to per.forn:i ~rVices for an~ trade With_\n_another, and ~o\n(U). Monteriegto's GDP has mcreased mo~ than 1.0-fold in - that i~ woulc;i be fun and sustainable too niuch interven-\n10 years, and we have gone from having one of the li>west .  - tion from us/ T~e re~ons we did this lire so obyious that stanchlrds of living in the w,estern .. world:.tc:~ one o.f th~ 'high-\n~Qple_ do:n?teven tliink aJ>out $em any\nbut at the time est. We are still~a:.small.country, .but we punch way;abo\\le our  it was a~P.re'tty ne\\V, wayconsider gapte-play\n weight: we still d~ not produce. m~ch iri the w~yof natural\nfollo~g ~ctors spu~d us t~ approach in-game economy\n~sources or tangible items, but we are.no~-the e~nter o_f tl_le' . in this way:'.\n\n' ..\n\nvirtual ~o.rld industr}r, a 50_billion-US.~uaci/ye~b~si.~~~\n'\n..\n\nThe Geep has becotJle a rese~ currencyas ~U, which 'puts\n~  (U) lnveslmimt ~ . *Spending:* When buy a ~e us_ .in th~t select club of e~onomi~ gi~~ with poptdations\n. they tliink a.b<?~;~t it in two wars: ~pending investing.. Bef?~ .\n\nthree orders of magnitude greater than outs, and in*es us a .. AitWorld eV~ryga,me (with few exceptions)\nreal player ori the world s~e. The.'':Monteneg;oMirad~,;- . spend money. With Alt\\:Vorl~, in contrast, is a phe~omenon that has J>een ~tten about.alot, 'and.it earn digital items thai: will alnios~-certainly has be~n attributed to a whole hosi:of causes, but we can.\n\n; ~ueih the_future. Moreover, some of\n. traee it back to one point in time, . .ind one. decision.\n\n crease'in ~ue. Wh~~ pe~ple invest they\n\n. 0 .(JJ) *Lol.Jer* Cos~ of *Entry:* Mf\\liOIRP<\n. .\n~\n~\n.\n.\n.\n. allowed users to play for free but re_qui~ed\n(U) As riearly .everyone now knows, in 2009 I launched Alt-\n'world with,same frierids ofniine. At _the time, it.l~oked ~e just MMORPG nding the tide.of the-late 'aughts venture capital-fueled MMORPG boom. Even though 'there w~re\na~ut 200 otht:r garries th_a:t ~e out that yea.J? o~rs was fun .\n\nirades were just begihn,i~g t~ take off back\nzero cost of ~ntry ~~ ~ great w~y to eritic,:~\n. prOdu~t. .Beyon~ that, if they know they\nat least partiaily, they. are much more ~ely\nen<~ugh.to-attm~t a few million players in shon oroer. ~de from being unbelievably fun, AltWorlq was di!ferent ~ecause it had a robust and .\n\nin-world\n'\nthe\n\nthei~ entry as the. net. r>\n' .\nsome resale\n\nitems might into. be lo'oser with\n'\n.\n\nthcir wallets ih~. ~h~n they ,sPend ..\n- 0 ~(U) Fainu~~~s': Before We introduced AltWorlcl, most\nonline ganies that used: an it~ril-sci.les meChanism tended to\nhave prices that were either created by the game operators\nor were thinly ~e<;l on small mafke~ and th~ were highly\nvolatile and subject to mariipulation. When we came out . .\nwith a large integrated_world.and economy wit\\1 g<>od mar~ .\n. _ ket and price discovery r_nechanisms, players responde<! with\nmore trade, and a viJ;tuous cycle ensued. Faii, transp~nt  .\npricing is a good basis Tor a currency, and vice ~ersa~\n.\n0 (UJ *Price Sf!'biliti)l:* Everybod)r expects virtual world econ9mies.to be stable now, bui: when we created AltWorld'it\n.\n\n.\n\n.\n\n.\n\nwas not obvious why that was so important Basically, when people invest a lot of time'or money in.something;they oo .\n\nnot want that investment .to.evaporate <>Ver ~e: AltWi>rld  has always had the most stable -price levels in online ga.nles.\n\n0 *(U)LiqNiditi)l.-aml Dep,th:* lfaving a large iri-world\nus whc:n we Ca.me out wi~ the Geep card.\n\neconomy ~Sa Cuqency m~re trustworthy b~use it playerSto.be able to pay for stuff on Alt:WC>tlcli\n:gives ~se-val~~ to it-if people always want to buy_~ new..\n\nnot.require t;hem ~o-jump through hOOPs pr set of armor in-tlte ~e, m_oney will always change hands, Of course we w~re also loo~g al usi11g a stolrea.-value The bi~r the ecoilo~y, the better _the:~urrency works.\n\ncard~ a way to r~uce:our credi~ ~d fraud pq)Osurc::s,\n\nLikewise, haVing a currency that is usefUl outside-of the\nthe re.al p~wer o( the model was n.otiu>JJar-enlt to i.Is when we\ngame as a. real currency makes the currency more reliable\n- decided t~_act on it for in-game~- _LiqUidity- anddepthmakefora good (and. -\nmanageable) velocity of money, which ~akes for a better ..  *(U)* So now I guess. the game reasons foi:\ngaine.\n\n.\n\n\n. ~m;l.' re~il~ish curr~ncy ~\npretty. clear, but\n\n. reaSons to gofi\"Qm real-ish to real, _and why .l\\tl<>Dtlmegrct?\n0 *(U)* lnteroper~Jbiliti)l: When we made.AltWorld Gold -\nuseable in 9ur second ia,me, Prrates vs; Ninjas, peq~le\n 0 {u) *Privti.CJI:* . Some of. our players live thought we. were crazy. We did it out of pure expedienc~\n-~.while others simply-do not want ''the Man\"\nwe ~anted a lot of people to begin playing PvN ~ soon as . -\n I).ess. We wanted to have laws to prote<;t\n\npossible, and we wanted a liqui4 currency an9liquid item .\n. ac;:tion .systems to ensure ~at 'nobody ;ntn,.nl .. l:iin\nmarkets. Of course, it turntd out that having a deeper .\n. . It is :a fair criticism ~t our country's\n. laws\" facilitate itmeta-economy made it a lot :easier to cross over in~tlie real  .licit activitY; b~t in .. Mo~tenegro we belieVe\nindividuallibeity\nworld wit!'t oilr currency f~r the reasons I descril)ed above. .\ntrumps ~e right of _the state in almost ~\nOf,\n course,. we _d_iay.;: the line at te~rism \"nf1 .. rnrl1r>P<\n ity, but that is a distinct line. The great ~de\nhaS been that. Mo~tenegro has become an m':eniac1onaJ\n arid.banJring center, and i:hat tho5e.indlustrie8\nworlds as th~ la_rgest contributor to o~r\n0 ( U) l'llllta'llt *Grilification:*  ~e11 il game rewards pl_ay~\ners with something tantamount to real money, right on the spot, they tend to respond betteri When it is not tantamou~t any more but is instead true exchangeable currency, the reward is that much better.\n\n.\n\n. 0 *(ll}* T~: fu:2008 Sweden said they v.rPTPI<rn;ra\nlevyingyalue\"aaded tax on jn-world u an:sactioins\nconvertible cu~ncies, which was pretty\ncount thiro party exch3J!ges (which you\nhave been an ind';IStr.y killer. When 'we were\nlaunch AiiWorld we were not confident that\n.\n.\n.. 0 _(U) *ConVBnience:* This one seems ridicUlously obvious now, but before the Geep c~\nf>eople had to use cash, .\nclumsy debit( credit cards, or services like Pay Pal. They _al59.\nhad touse the currency c;:o~~ding to their g{:ographjc\nlocation or th~ of a web merchant on the <:>ilier side of\nthe world. With Geeps peopl~. could do small (and large)\nplayers in Sweden, or.anywhere in the EU\nthat matter, and\n be safe from. thiS tax scheme: Wf? needed a where there were moqenite laws and where we coUld .be tonfit:ler1t: thai the\n~sactions an),where, with anyone, and ooUld be. confident that they woUld get a fair trllde. Non~ of this occurred to regulators understood and valued our industry. By the way, the United States did not meet those requirements at the\ntime. Bac!t tlien, the choices were China or Vanuatu, neither:\nof whi~ were good ideas for a lot of other reasons. So, we decided to start ta.I.king with countries that might be willing to negotiate.\n\n0 (U) Regulation & t1ue Rule of *Law:* Contrary to popular belief ba4 then, we did not move to Mo~tenegro and cr.:ift i:he laws that we did_ to escape re~tion. In fact, our intention was to be regulated with the force of law and international treaty.so that participants in our worlds could have confidence that our economic institutio.ns wauld report transparen~y, that we would enforce contracts among_ players, and that we would protect. their property, free speech, and free assembly rights.\n\n(U) Montenegro was a member of the IMF and the World Bank, which wa.S important to us, as was the country's.\n\nrelationship with Europe. Montenegro was friendly-~~ its\n~ontinental neighbors, but did not want to switch its cur- .\n\nrency to the ~uro or be subject to the ECB. The country .\n\nhad .a.lscJ applied for.membership in the WTO.\n\n- of their privacy and property rights, and\nauthoritarian\n(U) A happY side effect of the regulatory scheme we put\n- governments that might wish to infringe on\n rights of free\n. togethe.r was that people started using our worlds as a place - speech and free assembly. Of course, virtual citizenship to transact busineSs that had nothing todo.with the games\n- eclipsed what people normally thought of they thought we offered. Moreover, Montenegro ltttracted other virtual\n- about games, but we determined that-the we could satisfy world and game operators--we essentially becanle the DeJa- -  basic human needs, the better a bu5iness would have.\n\nware of cyber-space over~ght.\n\n:\no (U) *Sovereign* CtiTnmCJI.= *Cmr.vertibilili)1:* Having\n. the Geep become a reai~. state-issued currency made total sense to us. We wanted our players to have ~e confidence that comes from coin issued by a sovereign state as well as the ability to freely convert their money. We also wanted t~ have a diversified economy' that had anchors outside the game. Of course, it was not lost on us that there ~ould be second-order benefits of having control of a tenderable and freely convertible currency, issued by a country with robust privacy laws.\n\n. *(U)* So here we are today. My founding p pretty well off, and have cool Minister of When we come back 'to the United States\n0 (U) *Size* And *Eco110J'1'91:* Montenegro, back in 20 I 0, had a GDP that was only a few times our com~any's'.\n\nrevenues. Our company's _inarket cap exceeded the country;s foreign currency reserves, and the per capita GDP of Montenegro was about what a good gold farmer could make back then. Moreover, Montenegro lacks natural resources and did 'not have a signifi~t industrial base. What the country did have was great geopphy, an educated p<ipulace, good telecommunications infrastructure and internet ners and I are all\n and That titles.\n\nget to park wherever we want (diplomatic plates!). Our cou try has become a\n.model for economic development. We lead one of this cen-\n. tury's most important industriesand our lit e Montenegro. is able to set technology standards for the -rest f. the world. The people of Montenegro have become amon the most prosperous in Europe. Our little country on the A riatic,just 700,000\npeople, sitS Side by side with the United Sta , the EU, and Chinaon the world stage, with the Gee currency as good as the Dollar, Euro, or connectivity,' a forward-looking an.,..rnrrtf'n,tl industry, imd a supporting work culture.\n\nare important for servicing virtual worlds.\n\nusers the ability to create, a platform on which to a way to socialize and organize. Y!e felt that they feel protected in all of these \"rtivifiiP\n(U) Back in 20 I 0 we did not realize that ship would make Montenegro a global\nof ideas, that people would play our to be .citizens in acounti:y that protected their rights.. We1also did not think our sort of cyber-hippie statement would m e Montenegro a\nw~rld hub for commerce and trade in servi es. We just started out with the idea that we should make our mes a hospitable environment for our players. Another hap accident!\n\n## (U) Governing 3D Cybers Ace.\n\n(U) This section begins by outlining **the** ~~ui~n~1nt:~\npossible paths for virtual world development and \\..uJuu''''~''':.\n\ning existing governance structures within virtual and 5 -t .. \"'\"\"\ndetermine whether there is an appropriate space for anvl-rnnroPrtt vention. This is followed by an analysis of public exJ:IectjatlcJns government protections in the virtual world. Citizens tections in virtual environments similar to those found especially as their online identities become extensions Lastly, governance is considered against the evolution How might governance address challenges posed by the Multiverse, and the concept cO Reality+?\n\n## Technological Implications For\n\n(U) The path of technology will likely shape the n~n~m,,.t .. no:\nresponse. In the Metaverse, one company's virtual world nate with a proprietary network, and governments will consider their relationships with that company. In the applications would compete for spheres of influence. In form, augmented reality (or Reality+) would build a layer marion attached to real people, places, and spaces.\n\n(lJ) See Appendix 5 for implications for governance of world development paths.\n\n(U) The Big *Picture.* Existing participation in multi-user environments currently constitutes only a world's online behavior. However, the emergence of a COIJ1IT10n world interface has the potential to radically expand the n~:ut:L\nSigns that it has reached maturation may include:\n0 People spending the majority of total time on the ,\",.\"', .. 'F.\n\nenvironments.\n\n0 Total time on the internet increasing due to superior ap]plic:atllon tual environments to more areas of human activity (from work).\n\n0 Commercial revenues derived from virtual errvmomment$\ndwarf existing revenues from web-related sources of \"\"'v\"'l'-\n(lJ) Thus far, virtual worlds have been relegated to the '-VI, .. ~,.,.,\"'\nindustry. Despite that limitation, games based on these tracted a mass market measured in the tens of millions of billions of Dollars in revenue. Despite the early success of the marketplace, it is far from clear that they are a u dJII:>I1lJlll''\"'uuu. ....\n\nnology that will replace the web as the interface for the mrerrte[.\n\nunclear whether virtual worlds will rival the impact of web peer technologies, which have had a profound impact on music/film industries, respectively. However, if virtual become a transformational technology by developing into\n\n## 1> 0 Technological Improvemenls In The Ex-  (U) Existing Governance\n\n(U) The governance framework for vention where virtual worlds is somewhat different tures fail to from that which accompanies most inorrna1tio~1, social interaction. In addition to public law and potential regulatory schemes, virtual worlds are also governed by a combination of End User License Agreements (EUIA) and community standards. This gives rise to limited an inconsistent protection of identity, privacy, and property in virtual worlds. Governments can gain a competitive advantage by filling these protection gaps.\n\nperience. To reach a global audience, virtual worlds will need technological improvements that enable photo realistic detail. Participants could then become truly immersed in the environment by moving from flat screens to head mounted displays\n(full three dimensional displays, 360\ndegree panoramas, and first person visuals). Further, there may be a need for new interface controls that are better suited for virtual worlds and environments than mouse and keyboard combinations. Advances in these areas will likely be sudden and unexpected.\n\n(U) Good governance requires an evaluation of whether government intervention is necessary at all.\n\nVIrtual worlds ha~ strong self-regulation; it may simply not be worth a government's effort to intervene.\n\nThis section analyzes the existing governance structures within virtual worlds, outlines conflicts between those structures, and delineates a space for limited government inter-\n0 *Standards.* In order to spread rapidly and become truly universal, virtual world software will need standards that enable developers to build and interconnect these environments. Further, there willlikdy need to be common methods of user interactions or conventions of use (for example, how a link works on the web). Proprietary systems with patented conventions will face stiff resistan~e and slower rates of innovation, both of which are fatal for global adoption. VIrtual worlds and environments that set or adopt standards will grow faster than those that avoid or resist them.\n\n0 A *t/Werse* eco~stem. The development of a Metaverse platform that serves as a common environment for .\n\nth.e use of the internet will likdy be beyond the scope of any one company to build. Instead, a vibrant and diverse ecosystem of participants (companies and organizations)\nwould need to be enlisted to speed development. Measurements of the health (rates of innovation, number of participants, financial viability of participants, and diversity of focus)\nof Metaverse platforms is an excellent way to determine potential winners and losers in this competition.()\nproperty rights within virtual worlds.\n\nwhether the cor:tcerrn If virtual property is stolen, little people. For law enj:on:enrtertt, in the way of enforcement can be triger is generally\n~pected. The EUIA also permits or property. In\nif any, from the game creator. EU-\nLAs do not meet all of the potential governance needs of virtual world populations.\n\nthe company to gather personally may be threatened identifiable\n(U) In the upcoming battle information or log hearts and minds of virtual messages governance needs of their cit users send while in a likely reap a significant adva all instant ulations, those worlds that s information or theft of their online identity.\n\nvirtual world terms of population size and infl regardless of user preferences.\n\n(U) If virtual world citizens check their real-world rights at the door when they enter virtual spaces, there is no role for governance. However, even if they do not check those rights at the door, it is not clear that the triggers for governance are the same in virtual worlds as they are in real worlds. The IC is definitionally concerned with national security,\n(U) Connnuni9 *St11nd4rds* &\nthe Govern11nce *G11p.* In virtual worlds where EULAs do not cover the entire needs of a community, bottom-up governance develops when users band together to enforce their standards. Enforcement may include blacklisting transgressors from virtual property or expelling transgressors from basic social groups known as guilds. EULA terms often conflict with bottom-up social norms in protection of virtual personhood, privacy, and property. In EULAs, companies claim that the user-created avatar is actually owned by the company. This is akin to Microsoft claiming an intellectual property interest in all documents created using their word-processing software. Most virtual world creators do not enforce virtual property Similarly, threats are real, because have monetary\n(U) This creates a ed government 'nt.,; .... ,..nt-onn worlds. Where\n001.rPrtlmoP\"nt to act to protect citizens' i<:(entities, information, and property. A government that meets these for virtual world populations gain a com-.\n\npetitive advantage other governments that fail to so. Populations are likely to move from regimes that do not supply governance, and into worlds benefit from good governance. In I upcoming battle for the hearts and of virtual worlds that governments are e!nective in virtual\n.;.,..,.T1nm,plil;t~ that obtain the\n'\"\"'\"rr\"'n by providing\n, t;~o:uwt::; are likely\n~varttaJ~es in their worlds.\n\nregulation over the corporations maintaining these virtual worlds can take two forms.\n\n0 Such governance would hopefully enable the smooth, predictable functioning of corporations within the virtual world, and government organs-the courts and regulating oflicials-would.share an understanding of the complexities of virtual worlds. Corporations are likely to be attracted to these governance environments, creating a clustering effect.\n\n(U) Real Citizens, Real Experiences. Technology exists that enables individuals to create virtual worlds and games that challenge the question-is it digital or is it real?\n\nIf virtual world technology enters the mainstream, the number of US\ncitizens affected by the technology is likely to grow quickly, along with their demands for stability and law enforcement. This technology has the potential to be an agent for transformational change in our society, our economy, and our efforts to safeguard the homeland. The transitioning of these technologies into mainstream society, tliough, raises privacy, identity, and criminal, jurisdictional, and revenue questions.\n\n(U) Death and Taxes: The Inevitability of Government Involvement in *Revenue.* A second in-\n0 Alternatively, governance might be overbearing and impose overly restrictive regulations and excessive taxation on corporations operating in virtual worlds. The cost imposed on corporations would likely reach a tipping point and convince corporations to move their operations \"offshore.\" These corporations might be able to escape the legal restrictions and tax levies by incorporating and physically locating themselves to a locality under a government that would allow them to operate unregulated or less regulated.\n\n~entive for a government to assert its authority is the ability to levy taxes in the virtual world. The \"hands-off\"\napproach of the US Government to taxing internet commerce for the past decade is unlikely to survive the simultaneous decline of real world tax revenue and expansion of web commerce. Indeed, the Congressional joint Economic Commission and the Internal Revenue Service have both closely examined the issue of taxing real-Dollar economic gains from virtual worlds.\n\n(U) The Enfort;ement Gap.\n\nPolicies, regulations and laws have always lagged behind the development and use of new technologies.\n\nThe lag is the result of a model of top down governance and policy formulation and bottom up technology development. This relationship creates a gap. The lack of explicit relevance and applicability of the policies and laws and lack of willingness by governing bodies to enforce existing rules puts\n(U) Once a government begins collecting tax revenues, it may explore its role in defending the stability and continuity of operations in virtual worlds to ensure its uninterrupted revenue stream. Governments are likely to establish policies regulating the use of virtual worlds to enhance government services for citizens.\n\nThis government be required to this gap and pace of change technologies.\n\nwould be appliof technolcountries have de<:uj:l~~d harassment and punishable under and, as with other .,_-. .... v - .,.5.~..,, case law will be laws.68\nStill, in laws will not policies and laws logical innovation will require policy TTl\"' K,.,,.,.\n\nmaker to formulate statutes, which will and games worlds.\n\n(U) If virtual world ~\"._, ....... v 1:;y the mainstream, crijnirtals adversaries will this technology for behavior.\n\nwill need to \"\"''\"'\"'\"I-\nIDOI!)Il4iiUlll.lS and\n\n## (U) Rational Expectations Of Privacy In Virtual Worlds\n\n(U) US citizens in virtual worlds possess a rational expectation of privacy, such that a search of their virtual homes and property may be subject to the warra.Qt requirement of the Fourth Amendment. In the real world, street-comer conversations are public, and bedroom conversations are private. Virtual worlds are unique in that they recreate streets and bedrooms, and humans broadly treat these areas dilferendy. Virtual world technology has been intentionally designed to elicit responses from humans. Virtual objects and land are designed in order to make virtual\n~orld citizens act as if they were real.\n\nThe ability to\" buy or build virtual homes or spaces, and form attachments to them, is real.\n\nlose control of the personal information and credit card numbers of their customers. The amount of data that companies gather, combined with the common loss or theft of that information, creates a security threat to US citizens. For example, AOL collected information on users' searches.\n\nThat information was made available to researchers, but was also unintentionally made available to the general public. This leak gave adversaries the ability to find out what AOL users had searched for. Although the search profiles were not identified by name, most were personally identifiable because of users' tendency to search for information about themselves. Within hours of the data leak, real people were linkec;l to the search profiles. 72\n\n(U) In virtual worlds, the effect is magnified because citizens have moved significant portions of their private lives online. Every detail can be gathered and data-mined by the game controller, or by other private actors in the world.\n\n(U) Protecting US Citizens'\nPersonal Information. in. Virtual Worlds. The issue of privacy also presents an opportunity for government to protect US citizens against threats to and through their personal\ninformation. Congress has already begun to move against the threat of massive data collection on US\ncitizens by companies that do not carefully protect that data.69 Congress recognizes that the true threat to US citizens' personal information comes from private companies and individuals that record, track, and index the personal information of US citizens. 70 Spyware-computer programs intended i:o follow the user across the web or search the user's hard drive--are commonly used.\n\nCompanies routinely hide powerful programs (ostensibly with the consumers' consent to legal clauses that permit companies to search users'\ncomputers).71 Companies.also often\n(U) As more economic transactions move into virtual worlds, the yield from fraud will likely rise. And as values in virtual property and assets rises, the incentive to steal direcdy from players within the world will likely rise accordingly. Unrestrained collection and poor maintenance of US citizens' personal information is already a national security threat. 73 Hackers may subvert real world defenses by hacking passwords for virtual world currencies, then stealing the virtual rii11M\"P1nr .... ., converting them to world money.\n\nThe severity of the will likely intensify as US\nmove from using the internet as tool to storing more of their real in virtual worlds. Eventually and every gesture, and processed. A um1t>rnrn take the lead on the by extending enlorc~ment on data leaks to\n\n# ..( U). .. Fed 'E-Ra L . . In. F 0 R,M A RR'A :N. S. U P E ... R H.'I G H W **A Y**  Proje.Ct\n\n(U) One plausible: future would ~nclude a Federal fu-\n. formation Highway Acfto fund and\n.the best and\nfastest digital \"freew~ys\" in the worid.'\n\nmarion Higilway woUld spur .massive c<!Jrnmlerc:e;\n. up us military opera.tions, and create\n' benefits: Ameiicims .would becorne\n. netizens on Earth with: the fastest cor1ncti~11ty.\n.\n.\n..\n: .\n-\n-\n.(U) just like 'Ei8en:hower's Federal Aid .. \"'\"\"' ...... u\n: .. of 1956 (also rtfeqed to as theN.  .\n- . De~ense High~ays.Act ~f 1956), the .\ngovernment\n...\n- would use 'this n~w initiative. to' fund\ndigital infra-\n-\nst:n.icture with'its citizen.~ massive\nmatGng Amer-\n-\nica th.e. p~ace. to be w'hen ')acki~g\" into .\nworl(Js.  .'\n..\nEisenhowf!r understood the advantage\nand speed o( mov~ment\"for a soci~ty\nthat'Arm;rica needed a faster ro;td tran$J:>OrtatlOn\ntern to connect.th..e coQ.ntry.\n.\n\n.\n\n(U) By default,.this massive investment mation superhighway'initiati\\le' would\nStates to lead in vi$i'al world ,. ..... nu.ou.\n\nkeep America in the'.forefrontof p..r,nmmPrrP\nmilitary te~no1ogy, and free cmnrrmnlil:a.tions inform~tion exchange. for a brighter the phrase been truer, \"Xf you buil~ it,\n\n## (U) Stiff Foreign Competi On: (U) China And South\n\n(U) Though virtual worlds originated In **the** un,~U.d China and South Korea have capitalized on the emergent technology. They are current industry le~ders-with ginally ahead of China-and have reaped cultu~ u\"''''\"'l~\ntheir virtual world strategies over a decade ago. They cases to compare because they took two different ap]JIU>a.QIIes., case elements of industrial policy are coupled with stim~ate the industry. South Korea has taken the lead a reliable cyber infrastructure while minimizing ae~,reu>pl'l~eru restrictions. China, in contrast, has lagged in adopting primarily due to the size of its population, and has also '\"'\"~a.u,,..,.,, ......\n\nregUlations for industry. China has the potential to given China's potential user growth andfirm approach See Table 1 for a comparison of China's and South\n's virtual world policies.c\n(U) Internet Penetration and Dnnographics.\n\ntion and low but rapidly increasing broadband penetration t>rcMcle ground for growth. In june 2008, the total number of '\"' .. , .. 1 ... ,,...\n\ners had reached 253 million, 19 percent of its total ... v1\"U1'\"-~'\"\nChina achieved rriuch of this growth rate of 56.2 percent of 52.62 million rural Chinese to the population of,,.. ,,. .... n.-t parison, the United States has 220 million internet users, of its total population. Further, China has built a capable cplmnluiUC<ii.O<>ns inf~tructure to support this growth. Approximately 214\nChinese, or 85 percent of users, access the internet via broadband.\n\nto only l68 million broadband users at the end of 2007 .1'~\nusers accessing from notebook computers and mobile ae,lllct~s at 31 percent and 29 percent respectively. Home access to increased from 67 percent at the end of 2007 to 74 ni'IY\"PYttl\n(U) Currendy, Chinese females account for 46.4 percent of nese netizen population and males account for 57.2 percentf.\n\ndifference in the number of male and female netizens below 18 is the smallest, whjle the greatest gender disparity occurs beyond\n50 (see Chart\n2).\n\n(U) In general, young age, low education level, and low  ....... \"''&1''-\nprominent features of online garners in China. Sixty-nine 1-'\"''<-t:IIL\n30 or younger and those with a high school education or\nlargest demographic, at 39 percent.78 While the \"u'\"''-~u'-'~\ncent of online gan1e players is below the elementary percent are educated at or above a postgraduate level. 79\nare also poorer than other internet users. Only 6.8 u..<-<:;J, ..\n\nnetizens make over 500 Renminbi (RMB), or apJ>ro:omLateljy lars, per month.80 ~\n\n~ (U) State of the Industry and\nGovernar&ce. The Chinese online\ngame industry is large and growing\nrapidly. 51 By 2008, 60 percent of\nall content in Chinese online game\nthese restrictions as impediments to the Chinese gaming industry, some aspects of the regulatory regime promote and protect the domestic industry. Chinese authorities are tems.84\nleading game firms are Shanda, NetEase, and Giant.\n\nportfolio of 14 MMORPGs, a collection of casual games, chess and board games, games for mobile devices, and an online literature portal.88 Shanda continues to grow\n(U) Shanda, China's largest online game operator, is a Shanghai-based subscription-based l:)us;tne,ss models.\n\nZhengtu lowers the h<> - ..., .... ..., by allowing users to has implemented a paid cards, widely U~->U~u\n\n[> law gain traction in the courts, and\nShanda acquired a controlling interest in Actoz, the Korean firm that\nseiVed as the intermediary between\nWeMade and Shanda. Actoz also\nowned 40 percent of WeMade.\nShanda then emerged as the dominant partner.\nWarcraft and sudden seJVer outages.\n\nThe9 was slow to install updates, but was also dependent on Blizzard to solve technical problems.!M- Blizzard also hinted that it might tum to another Chinese partner for subsequent updates to World of Warcraft, which had an impact on The9's stock.\n\nThe9 remains Blizzard's partner, however, and in 2007 World of Warcraft was China's third most popular online game. 96\n(U) Blizzard, the American firm that developed World of Warcraft, has had similar problems with their Chinese partners, The9 Limited. In\n2006, Chinese users threatened a boycott in response to widespread hour wait-times to log onto World of\n(U) Replations arul Trade Barriers. Chinese authorities operate a dense and restrictive regulatory regime that both m f1pctses content controls offe~importanta~~aram1~s mestic media. The1uu:u-J.v.<e~u mercialization of u~Juu'\"\"\"'\nthe introduction of media such changed the system but state's control\n.u'!\"'\"''u, the Chinese government is ext:e~1dmg regulations to nese smte and '\"'\"u~-., ....\n\n\"\"''~ ... \"''-\"is a clear more serious issue is that success in markets may well Smtes, the the long term\n's domestic Chinese firms and Chinese mc1de~s--includirag stra~eg~c secto~ to or controlled by\n\"\"\"\"''\"'\"'''\"'.,. The governsu,;pend licenses nnWPIIlll incentive for all\n0 Extensive pretion censo~hip post-publicaprevents distrifacts and bution of many .rn.,..nrr<\npoints of view.\n\nand directives prohibit discussion of some topics and direct how to spin other topics. Various agencies including groups of retired cadres and actively recruited citizen volunteers screen media for controversial content and report \"offenders\" to authorities.\n\n0 Campaigns to develop and distribute \"regime-friendly\" media contents that ensure that media has a pro-government \"spin.\" The government has effectively fostered a climate of vigorous nationalism in which concern for human rights, among other issues, is understood as treachery.\n\n(U) In 2002, Beijing promulgated\n\"Regulations on the Administration of Business Sites of Access Services,\"\nwhich imposed restrictions on game content. The regulations banned content deemed obscene, harmful to state security or territorial integrity, inciting ethnic or religious divisions, or disturbing social order. More broadly, these regulations banned\n\"other content prohibited by laws or administrative regulations.\" Pursuant to these strictures, for example, World of Warcraft's launch of \"The Burning Crusade\" in China has gone through several modifications, inch,1ding excising nearly 10,000\nChinese words and replacing offending slang and profanities with blank spaces.\n\n(U) New technologies like the internet offer users new freedoms, but also offer the authorities new means of control. Chinese authorities maintain a firewall that prevents users in China from accessing designated foreign web pages, filters that block the transmission of any content that contains specified com:-\nbinations of key words, and extensive databases that track individual users.\n\n(U) Further complicating this regulatory environment is the fact that management of online gaming involves several government agencies whose responsibilities overlap.\n\nThe priorities of these bureaucracies vary--from sheltering domestic game producers from foreign comwork Development of young people\ninternet are online\n38 hours a week.98\nsurvey found nearly 14 n ... ..., ... ,t of teens in China are to !:>ecoming addicted to the According ftail.qemy of Social\n\nI) ies. 100 To combat these problems,\nthe Chinese Government launched\na nationwide campaign to stamp out\nwhat the Communist Youth League\ncalled a \"grave social problem that\nthreatens the nation.\"101\n\n## (U) ... Hyper-Nationalism Has Emerged As A Dominant Mode Of Thought O The Chinese Internet\n\n(U) The Chinese Government has joined South Korea, Thailand, and Vietnam in taking measures to try to limit the time teens spend online. For China, a five-hour limitation has been implemented on all online games. With the explosive growth in cyber addiction, the Shanghai Sunshine Commimity Youth Affairs Centre was the first shelter created for internet addicts. A particular onus has fallen on internet cafes, as these are often young people's point of access to online games, and campaigns to restrict or close internet cafes are now a regular feature of Chinese politics.\n\n(U) In the area of influencing the culture of online games and virtual worlds, the communist regime has followed its pattern of deliberately retreating from large sectors of social life that it had penetrated routinely a'nd pervasively in the Maoist era. It did so based on the prenrise that, to a significant degree, an active public sphere of social and civic life contributes to the economic progress of the country. At the same time, Beijing insisted--under the \"four basic principles\"-that such liberalized social and cultural activities not challenge the rule of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). This policy change authorized the spectacular resurgence civic, social, religio s, and cultural life. The \"zone of i difference\" also allows space for an w lucrative entertainment indus and the rise of popular culture. B th the freedom of entrepreneu hip and the ability to select a li style from the many choices o ered by Chinese popular culture offer a seductive illusion of eoli cal freedom.\n\ntime, the regime authority to intervene when activities in this public sphere c ss the bounds of political sensiti  ty. The government has ge erally favored promoting its v rsion of events in a firm decl tory approach together with i direct tactics in enforcing th e boundaries--such as p sorship throu internalization of acceptable n rms, fostering the appearance of omnipresent monitoring, an making examples of violator to deter others\n(\"killing the chi ken to scare the monkeys\"). C nese internet users enjoy less anonymity than they believe, a the government takes advantag of its citizens'\nperception of  onymity to monitor those ho criticize state policy and pro ote liberal or democratic val\n(U) Parts of the Ch nese industry further enable the vernment's controls. For example, HiPiHi, a virtual world akin to Seco d Life, maintains Chinese political s dards. The firm's CEO Xu H\nPiHi would design 'in-world policies and regulations ac ording to the Chinese culture\" and at the company Resistance War againstjapan, plays up the CCP's purportedly heroic role defending China againstjcq>anese\naggression in World War II. Stirring nationalistic sentiments is useful to\nthe regime only up to a point. In the real world, violent anti:Japanese demonstrations have embarrassed the Chinese government. In the virtual world, Chinese garners have ganged up to \"kill\" Korean players in Chinese online games and the Chinese government has banned some expressions of anti:Japanese nationalism.\n\n\"can make sure that pornography, gambling, violence, or politically sensitive material will be strictly forbidden.\"102 These restrictions do not limit the game's international prospects, however. The virtual world targets a Chinese audience first, but as Xu Hui explains, HiPiHi was designed to be \"an open platform with global expansion potential from day one.\" Cu~ntly the general user interface is available in Chinese, with limited English translation, and registration is available in both languages, with a 15 percent penetration of international users. 103 ffiM has announced a relationship with HiPiHi to optimize the technology platform and promote the virtual world business model. 104\n(U) Some Chinese may find ways to use virtual worlds and online games to subvert the state, but the Chinese government has demonstrated a strong record of using new media technologies to bolster its effectiveness, legitimacy, and ability to control new spaces. Virtual protests that are organized in the virtual world but take place in the real world will likely be at most episodic and intermittent, and will likely pose no serious challenge to the state.\n\n(U) *Military.* The Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA) employs 3D\nvirtual environments for both simulation training and for public opinion analysis relevant for political indoctrination of PIA troops. The PLA\nGeneral Political Department (GPD)\nis directed to track \"hot'~'\n~o~Q<-u:.:ouu\n(U) Chinese government policies also affect the tone of internet users and online garners. In part due to the regime's fostering of nationalism to replace Marxist ideology, hyper-nationalism has emerged as a dominant mode of thought on the Chinese internet. In recent years, the state has been more likely to find itself under pressure from hyper-nationalists critical of its dealings with other states than from democrats and human rights activists.  Online games have already been used to inspire patriotic sentiments among their participants. One such game, the Communist Youth League-sponsored topics and assist in Jr~.WUllllJrl.\n\nopinion. 105 To ac<:~n1p11sn PLA uses network cpr1ter1t tion technologies, used by corr1me1rcia\\\nmarketing nnrn,,..,..,1\nanalyze the do1me:st;\nronment in China egorize and detect in populations in counter those uu:::m,::::;.\n\nplatforms including virtual simulations.106 The PLA currently uses virtual environments to train traditional \"Red\"\nand \"Blue\" exercises.I07\ncent in\n40s, and 27.6\npercent in their 50s (See Chart 3). Seventyfour percent of internet users are male, while 62 percent are female.\n\nApproximately 70 percent of urban dwellers use the internet, compared to 46.2 percent in rural areas. 112\n(U) Approximately thirty-seven million netizens go online every day and 57 percent regularly visit gaming sites. 113 Six out of I 0 South Koreans aged nine to 39 consider themselves \"frequent online game players.\"\nmessaging service provider, createdQQ\nCoins to allow customers to pay for online services. Since then, QQ\nCoins have become very popular for a range of uses. In 2006, more than 22.4 million people used Tencent's QQmessaging service and also regard QQ Coins as a more convenient than RMB for online payments. QQ Coins appear more safe and practical because the Chinese do not commonly use credit cards. 110 Some internet formal founded a Culture Industry Bureau to promote and monitor game industry and culture in collaboration with the South Korean Ministries of Commerce, Industry and Energy, and Information and Communication.\n\n(U) MMORPG and Virtual World Industry *Leaders.* As a consequence of these policies, South Korea's game industry has seen the emergence of several major and a host of smaller companies, many of which have an extensive international presence. Among these are:\no NCSoft. Founded in 1997, NC-\nSoft pioneered MMORPGs in South Korea arid produced the country's first major success, Lineage and its follow-ons.\n\n0 Nexon. Offering its first game negotiations with\n1996, Nexon pioneered the freesoft for further dt!'~Jc)prneJnt to provide an institutional and legal framework to guide the industry in order to facilitate national economic competitiveness and to regulate the social impact of the industry. In\n1999, existing legislation governing the music and video industries was revised to incorporate online games. In the same year, the government also created the Korea Game Promotion Center ~ater renamed the Korea Game Development\nand Promotion Institute) to extend government and financial support, to promote game exports, and to enable new gaming company start-ups.\n\nThey later established the Game Culture Promotion Council to facilitate the gaming industry's goals and to foster a \"healthy\" online game culture in society, and developed a five year plan covering 2003-07 with the goal of keeping South Korea one of world's top three game producers through 2010. Finally, in April2006, the Ministry of Culture and Tourism to-play model that has extended subscribers.\n\nfree-to.-play model, found or bartered or purchased with Pay Pal account.\n\nfrom South Korea to 200 million US\nin 2006. Wizet MapleS tory to .. ,.,,~._,, ... v pleStory DS.\n\n- 0 WeMade Entertainment. Founded in 2000, WeMade Entertainment\nproduced the internationally popular\ngames Legend of Mir II and III.\n0 In August 2007, Shinsegae Department Store opened a \"virtual reality i-Fashion shop\" that offered shoppers the choice of trying on clothing without actually coming to\n\n0 Gravity.\n\n(U) Korea has invested in a\nfuture-ready infrastructure\nin order to have the advan-\ntage ...\n\nIn 2002, this\ncompany\nlaunched\nRagnarok\nOnline, which\nhas taken\n\n                                                   the shop. Custom-\n                                                   ers input their body\n                                                   measurements onto\n                                                   a smart card that\n                                                   enabled them to\n                                                   model clothes\n                                                   on personal-\n                                                   ized avatars\noff in several\ninternational markets.\n\nand then make decisions\nabout whether to buy\nthem.l 20\n\n0 SK Communications. SK pro-\nduced the massively popular social\nnetworking platform Cyworld.\n\n0 In September\n2007, the Office\nof the South Ko-\nrean President began\noffering a \"virtual reality\ntour\" of the Blue House, the\npresident's official residence and of-\nfice compound, via the internet.l21\n\nSouth Korea's pervasive broadband\ninfrastructure has also enabled an\nincreasmg array of virtual world\napplications. These include uses by\nthe South Korean government and\nmilitary, as well as adaptations in\nbroader society:\n\n0 In March 2008, Hana Bank\nbegan offering a Second Life-like\nvirtual world to teach basic economics to teenagers. By participating\nin economics classes on the bank's\ncourse is donated to a non-profit charity for needy children.l22\n\n0 In April 2005, the South Korean\nArmy opened its Korean Combat\nTraining Center, ~hich, modeled\nafter the US National Training\nCenter, uses virtual technology to\nsimulate combat. In \"simulating\nactual combat situations,\" the Center\nhas improved soldier performance in\nseveral areas, including reduction of\ninjuries from friendly fire, proficiency\nwith equipment, and dealing with\nthe stresses of real combat. 118\n(U) *Regulation.* Pressure to regulate on-line games in South Korea largely proceeds from economic concerns. The government faces two conundrums:\n0 In March 2007, the Won sect of Korean Buddhism set up a temple in Second Life and announced plans for a virtual ceremony to mark the Buddha's birthday. By such means, the group hoped to evang~lize among both Koreans and foreigners, describing its presence in Second Life as \"a good opportunity to reach out to people beyond the barrier of our own generation.\" 119\nho~ to regulate the gains made in the virtual economy through the trading of on-line game items, and whether to allow the exchange of virtual currency for its real-world counterpart. The dilemma for the South Korean government in responding to both issues has been to regulate the industry without bltlntiinl!\n\nand prospects for South Korea's motion Law, passed Assembly in 2006, latory foundation and virtual world plained, for example, that the game ratings standards are more tolerant of degrees of violence than are\n,...,.,., ....... ...,the trading game items for real-world currencie!l-:actiVitie!l that by 2006\nestimates, approach-\nUltimately,\n:.nnr,.,.,.,.n the trade prohibited their\n.... , .. _ .. ln..,ln currency.l23\nno1w~rer. have required Alrr>nn,.,. these have been the problem of hackers--allegedly Chinese-plundering on-line trading sites, and the spectacular growth of illegal online gambling and \"virtual black markets.\" 124\n(U) In the case of information technology, the Korean government has assumed the role of the proud parent, doing all in its power to foster and facilitate advancement\n\n## (U) South Korean Culture And Identity. The South Korean It In-\n\nagreements.\n\nlated it from the majority of its industrial resources.\n\n(U) The gaming scene has changed the standard of what is socially ac-\nKorea's ~\nceptable. When PC games ftrst entered South Korea, parhardened z ents did not approve of them because\n\nthey perceived\n, the activity to be\n.\n\na distraction that a vibrant culture z pulled students away pected and all are\n~\nthat reason, gaming was in a hurry to stand\n.\n\nvery much an underground out amongst their peers.\n\nactivity. With gaming mov-\nCompetition dominates the ing mainstream, however, some\n... and maintain its distinction of leading in the adoption of new technologies.\n\nculture. This is what drives parparents are ents to push their children to study encouraging hard to gain admittance to the best their children to schools and to gain advantages. This play games to is also what drives students to study promote social hard to honor the wishes of their interaction.\n\nparents. It is not enough to be sue-\nThe games are so widely played cessful; there is an enormous drive to that a child who does not play runs be the best.\n\nthe risk of being an outcast if _he or mr#h, ...... are actuonline children are in their children in partnerproducer.\n\n,.w\"'\"'u\"\" internships\n'\"'\".,'\"''trv as well\n(U) Use of virtual actiVity that-is u.:;~u 1u\"'l-l stream in South Linden Lab signed Korean company, to provide its\n\nlored for South fall of 2007, only users were openly .'+ ........ ....\n\nans. However, Korea's presence in\nincluding Second sharply, especially interfaces improve standards that the .. ~ .. 1v ... 1\nnese government.\n\nOn the first day of the site's existence, over 5,000 users visited and signed a virtual petition.\n\nIn the two days that followed, over\n250,000 users\nsigned the petition.\n\nThis sparked the duplication of the islands in Second Life. Shortly thereafter the South Korean flag that flew over the islands was mysteriously replaced with a Japanese flag, spurring Second Life to install a security monitoring system to regulate future changes to the islands. 126\ning garners a place to practice and an endless supply of competitors to challenge.\n\n(U) PC bangs have emerged as places to learn about new popular games.\n\nWeb sites keep track of what games, as well as which genre of games, PC\nbang patrons play the most. Generally, Role Playing Games (RPG)\nhave dominated as the most popular\n(U) PC Bangs.\n\nEven with a 90\npercent saturation of broadband accessibility, many South Koreans prefer to do their gaming in local internet cafes called\n\"PC bangs.\" Currently over 27,000\nseparate locations offer memberships or pay-by-the-hour service. PC\nbangs consist of dozens of computers pre-loaded with the most popular games, all connected to high-speed internet for lag free gaming. This provides customers with an environment where they can go meet friends both online and off, any time of ers report annualiifl<:on:tes the equivalent of so much South the game, premiered its first 4e1rnonstrat]on Starcraft II in to a crowd of 1\nwill likely tailor potential majority ~u~oluiucl South Koreans.\n\nculture would therefore likely affect consumers of States.\n\n(U) South Korea's homegrown gaming industry has also proven to be a force to be reckoned with in the realm of MMORPGs. Though World of Warcraft has outsold all other MMORPGs in history, NCSoft's Lineage series has achieved a strong second, outselling even Sony's Everquest series, with a peak of over three million global subscribers. 128\n(U) Were American households to gain access to broadband internet with speeds hundreds of times faster than present DSL connections' at a fraction of the cost, and were levels of such access to approach those of South Korea, America's future inay well resemble South Korea's present in significant respects. Though some of the effects are lost in translation, there may be profit in studying South Korea's example. For a brief discussion of other Asian states' virtual world development, see Appendix 7.EJ\n\n# (U) Intelligence, Counterintelligence, An.D Law Enforcement.\n\n(U) It Is likely that the growth of virtual and **gaming** en\"ironmenrs \\Vill have far-reaching cultural, social, economic, and perhaps even political implications. Some effects \"'~II be the result of intentionally nefarious actors; others may inadvertently result from technological developments having unanticipated effects on human social interaction and personal idemilicarion.\n\n(U) Virtual and gaming environments may have certain positive effects, but one cannot ignore the possibility that they may also pose novel and unpredictable security threats. One can already observe real-world actors transferring their existing loyalties, beliefs, agendas, prejudices and hatreds into virtual and gaming worlds.\n\n(U) The growing number of global users, in conjunction with ongoing\n\"' *%'' -\nrl'; \"B& z - a;  &ae\n-\ni'&EIBCC f i t~chnological changes, will likely increase the difficulty that the Intelligence Community (IC) will encounter in its efforts to monitor the vinual realm. Accordingly, outreach programs,that enlist users as educated observers and reporters \\Vill be required to survey current and emerging systems more. effective!)~ -\n-\n\n## (U) Scope Of The Virtual World Intelligence, Counterintelligence, And Law Enforcement **Security** Prohle~G. __ ------(B )(1) --- (B)(3)\n\n(U) l\\tl1en considering the human scope of the_potefifial security threats posed and the opportunities presem~~IJ>y\"\"Virttlal world platforms, one must first distinguish between rl}..r.eats-pO.~ed by intenrionally nefarious actors and inadvertent thr~<!,ts gene:(ared by technological developments in the virtual world:. Amttiig these nefarious actors are nation states and their inrelligence\n-seiVi~es, non-state actors of various t:)1>es, and individual criminal~.\n\n(U) Nation-states can be categorized as hostile, neutral, or friendly. Hostile states are openly hostile toward, or consistently pursue policies that directly challenge, the United States and its allies. Neutral states are not generally openly hostile toward the l)nited States, but nonetheless often pursue policies that negatively .impact the United States and its allies. Friendly states generally pursue policies that favor the United States, though they too may occasionally diverge and pursue oppositional policies. Non-state actors fall into several categories, including rhe follmvi.ng: i>\ne'\n\n## ~ 0 Organized Criminal Groups O Extren{Ist Political And Religions Groups\n\n0\nN<~tworks of hackers or griefers\n0 Non-governmental organizations\n(NGOs)\n(U) Each of these various nationstate and non-state:~ actors may attempt ro exploit virnml worlds dep~nding on their motivations, intentions, and objectives. The section bdow will focus ou extremist political and religious groups.\n\n(U) Extremist groups are organizations that embrace a raclical political or religious ideology that both advocates a fundamental transfor tion of existing political, social, or economic ~ratus quo, and demands that their proclaimed constituencies take action to initiate this transfor~\nmarion. An iclt)ology is a coherent, stmctured, and systematic workh~ew that purports to identify exactly what is ''w~ng'' with the existing world and to indicate precisely what must be done in order to right those perceived '''rong-s. Radical\n\nare normally characterized by moral absolutism, doctrinal rigidity and Puritanism, a l\\-fanichean division of the world into \"good\" and \"evil,\" and an insistence that those designated as \"evil\" be fought ruthless!)~\ndecisively defeated, or even completely eliminated.\n\n(\n.(U} In addition, new tecluiologies mav have unanticipated effects on par;erus of human social interaction.\n\nand persoual idcur.ificarion. Indeed, it is likelv that. virtual world technology will ~vcntuallv have far-reaching cultural, social, e~onomic, and perlu1ps t'ven political implications that havt' nothing to do with the nefarious intentions of enemy actors.\n\nFor example, rhe formation of \\irtual comnmnities in which people identif)'\nmore dosely ,.,.ith d1cir fictional avatars and in-world comm.uuitie,s than with their offiine selves or neighbors mav ,:vel! have the ellcct of weakening' overall social solidarity \\\\~thin existing nation-states, undermining their sovereigmy. Virtual world technology may have certain positive effecrs as wdl, but one cannot ig11ore the possibility that it may aho pose\n(U) From the perspective of extremisrs, human actors are vi.ewed through a dualistic black-and-white ideological and moral prism, one that ignores rhe multitude of shades of grey that actually characterize human life and beha,ior. Extremists perceive humans to exist on one of two sides of this divide, either with the forces of \"righteousness\" and\n\"progress\" on one side, or with the forces of \"darkness\" and \"reaction\"\non the other. Extremists tend to be h)ver-mor.ilistic \"tnte believers\" who are moral \"to a fault.\" They generally cannot tolerate human flaws\n\n(U) people identify\nmore closely with\ntheir fictional\navatars .,. than with\ntheir o~ ine selves\n\niwvd and\nunpredict-\nable security\nrhreats. Of\ncourse, it is\neven more\nlikdy that.\nn'al-world\n\nactors will simply transfer d1eir exist-\ning hatreds, prejudices, agendas,\n\nan~lmoral ambiguity of any kind.\nThe intelligence and law enforce-\nment communities should not ignore\nthe proclaimed ideological agendas\nof extremists or asstm1e that they\nare nothing more than superficial,\n\nbelief.~, and loyalties into the virtual\nworld, whid1 is already occurring. 0\n\n~'high-minded\" rationales des!gued\n\nto conceal selfish underlying motives\nor baser human instincts. Extremists\ntake their ideologies very seriously;\nthey are such groups' raison d'et.re.\n\n(U) Virtual Worlds: Havens\nJar Illicit Activity. Much of the\ninformation in the public domain\nabout the alieged terrorist exploi-\ntation of virtual worlds has been\nspeculative rather than based upon\nsubstantive eviclence. 129 Although'\nthere is reliable information available\n\nt-wmg\n             party\n                                     Le Pen,esta\n                                                      m\n\nDecember 2006 a virtual headquarters in Second Life on a shopping island\ncalled Porcupine. The FN issued a press release boasting that it was \"the first\npolii:ical party in France and in Europe tci open an official and permanent\nrepresentation in Second Life.\" 133\n                            lnitiall)~ resisrance ro rl1e FN's presence in\n\nSecond Life took the form of garden variety political protest. Leftist groups\nsuch as Anti-fN Second Life (antifi1-sl) and Second Life Left Unity assem-\nbkd, bore placards, wore t-shirts, and set up billboards on the lauds of sym-\npathetic neighbors to demand that the FN remove itself from Second Life.\nSoon after, both sides began shooting at each other and c.:urying out other\ntypes of attacks. By early January the headquarrers a,ul FN members had\ndisappeared entirely from Porcupine. However, real-world FN spokesmen\nclaimed that the group would tighten security and return to Second Life.\n\n(U) As of this report, there is little evidence that miJjtant Islamist andjihacl-\nist groups have begun cxtensivdy exploiting the opportuuities presented by\nvirtual worlds. So far. most of the commentaries in the media on this subject\nhave been speculative and largely devoid of hard evidence.\n                                                                 13~ However,\nSingaporean terrorism researcher Rohan Gttnaratna claimed that during the\nsummer of 2007 he monitorr.d the activities of 12 jihadists, most of whom\nwere based,in America and Europe, who had \"assumed identities'' in Second\n\nLife. Some of these individuals had\nselected innocuous monikers for their\navatars, whereas others used inten-\ntionally provocative names. 135\n\n(U) Indeed, as the illustrative exam-\nples above suggest, it is only a mat-\nter of time before numerous other\nradic-al political and religious groups\nset up shop within Second Life and\nother virtual world environments. As\na result, real-world political conflicts\nwiil undoubtedly continue to spill\nover into the virtual world, perhaps\nat times with unanticipated and\npotentially harmfhl consequences.\nIt remains to be seen whether these\nactivirjes end up having serious\nnational security implications. For\nmore examples of how extremist\ngroups have established a presence in\nvirtual worlds, see Appendi.x 8.\n\n(U) Emerging Environ-rnents\nand Nefarious lnte1ations, It\nhas already been noted that as yet\nmost extremist groups do not appear\nto have made extensive forays into\nthe virtual world. However, given\nthat the more sophisticated groups\nof this ryve, including al-Qa'ida,\nhave exploited the internet in very\nrefined \\\\rays, they will likely soon\nseek to exploit newer virtual world\ntechnologies for recruiting, raising\nand transferring funds, training new\nrecntit:s, conducting reconnaissance\nand surveillance, and planning at-\ntacks by using virtual representa-\ntions of prospective targets. A'>\nvirtual world tedmologies continue\nto improve and cliffuse to other parts\nof the world, it is very likely that the\nthreat posed by extremist groups in\nthe virtual world ,..,-jll substantially\nmcrease.\n\n(U) The question is how such groups\nmay use and exploit these platforms,\nand what the impact of\nthese developing technolo-\ngies will be. There are two .,\n\n## ~ Basic Views On This Mat:Rer. Th6Sc\n\nspt~cialists had predicted that terrorists and other nt>farious actors would\n. regularly carry out highly dismptive and perhaps clestmctive acts of cyber-terrorism, cyber-sabotage, or cyber-warfare against the network infrastmcture and tangible physical targets, they have instead used the internet much like other political organizations and businesses. 137\nTerrorists have used the internet primarily for commtmicating to three primary audiences-their supporters, the international communi!:); and their enemies--in order to \"present their case, disst~minate propaganda, and recruit followers and supporters\"\nin a \"direct and uncensored'' way. 138\nIn addition, they have employed the internet for several overlapping instnunental purposes, including:\n\n0 Information gathering and data\nllllg\n0 Networking\nwho focus on the technical aspects of '~rtual worlds generally believe that dtt' rapid dt~velopment of this teclmolog-y will be \"game-changing.\"\nIt could have revolutional'); t>tTects\non the formation of human identit)~\npatterns or\" social interaction, and ulrilllarely, ou c.ultnre and society. In short, their view is that the effects of virtual worlds are likely to he aualo-\n. gous to the social, political, cultural, and economic impact of the printing press. In contrast, dwse who focus on the human dimensions of virtual worlds tend to be more pragmatic.\n\nThey believe that humau beings will reinain more or less as they are, bur will simply seek to t>xploit these new technologies to do the things that they are already in dined to do. 136 In the end it is likely that the reality will fall somewhere between these two wntrast:ing perspectives.\n\nTo predict hmv extremists and terrorists may exploit evolving virtual world environments, it is best to consider how tht>y have long made ust' of th(~ internet. Although many\n\n## 0 Recmitment, Spotting, And Mobilization\n\n0 Posting detailed instructions and\nonline manuals\n0 Planning and coordinating specific\nattacks\n0 Fund-raising 0 Criticizing rival terrorist g~oups\nand breakaway k<ctions\n13~\n(U) Ironically extremist groups with .\n\nan ami-modernist ideology, ~ncludii1g globaljihadist networks, have often been the most adept at exploiting new technologies created by their thoroughly modernist \\Vesteruenemies.140 So far, cy1Jer-terrorism and cyber-warfare have been overrated threats, at least with respt>ct to terrorist groups. 141\n(lJ} The authors of a Canadian intelligence center report concluded that they could find no \"definitive\"\nevidence that :Mi\\tiORPGs or \"persistent virtual worlds\" had been used to facilitate real world terrorism or to communicate, propagandize, train,\n\n## (U) Lntejlfgence And The Virtual World / (U} **Lnformatio\"** Access.\n\n(U) Publicly posted information available through virtual worlds that provide for user-generated content is inclusive of iriformation about individuals, shared interests, commtmity-based organizations, academic institutions, corporate interests, and government. Virtual worlds that do not provide for user generated content continue to facilitate social interaction and comnmnication access. While this distinction between the t\\vo t)'ves of virtual worlds is important, both versions provide the IC with access , .\n\nto information that t not be otherwise available ...\ncan likely be attributed in part to the interactions that transpire between individual avatars. Hiding behind SCreen llalll{'S and avatars,\n\n- (U) ''Vithin these'! user-controlled\nareas, individuals create multi-dimensional renderings of homes and\nbusinesses. These virtual constmc.ts\n.frequently display items of personal\nsignificance, providing insight into\nindividual imeresrs and passions. In\nmany instances, these user-created\nol~jects provide h)verlink ac.cess to traditional web sires and blog sites,.\n\n providing detailed informiltion about a topic that the CTt~ator found to be\nof interest.\n\n\\~rt:nal world nsers demonstrate a willingnt\"ss to engage and discuss in manners that are rarely lound in non-intimate social situations. These interpersonal communications can take place in a number of venues and recreatt!d social settings, such a<;\nvirtual nightclubs, or in general areas of congregation.\n\n(U) A'> an example, within a Second LilcJewish-bast~d community called Ne.ssus, users have created billboards depicting child victims of armed couUicr.s. Visitors may access victim\n(lJ) Topics of discussion can be personal, controversial, and derailed. The perception of anon},niry can dec-.rease users' inhibitions and increase the likelihood that they\n(U) Community-based and non-governmental organizations are using tl1e virtual world to provide information about their purposes, their membership, and their efforts. Sites such as \"Camp Darfi.1r\" on Secon<l Life provide insight into organizaand sihmtional information through intt!raction with the user-created billl)oard. Homes\n(U) Hiding behind screen names and avatars, virtual world users demonstrate a willingness to engage and discuss in manners that are rarely found in non-intimate social situations.\n\nthat users may tour in tins neighborhood, as in other neighborhoods, conrain objects that the \"homeo,vner\" considered of sufficient interest to place in their\npersonal space. Ultimately, these personally \"owned,\" yet publicly accessible, artifacts provide background and contextual information about the individual in control of that particular portion of the virtual world.\n\ndivulge personal information. In rhe cyber extremism Dark 'Veb report, the authors stare that \"the virtual environment can help break clown inhibitions and make interactiou more realistic and lively.\" 145 \\Vhile somewhat si.Iuilar information can be found posted on traditional web and blog sites, the virtual world provides au immediate platform to question, explore, and expand upon the ideas presented through real time conversation, by voice or text chat.\n\n(U) The creation of topical areas of concern demonstrates shared interests in the virtual world among\n(U) 1-dversariu.l Anonytni9':\nFtltuJe *Challenges.* It is important to note the increasing likelihood that adversaries may build or control these c.onstmcts. In the Dark Web srudy titled \"Cyber Extremism in Web 2.0. An Exploratory Study of llllernationalJihadisr Groups,\"\nthe authors \"found examples of buildings owrwd b)' groups with au apparent extreme [sic] background.\n\nThose buildings (virtual headquarters) s<~em to indicate the groups' .\n\nwish for a long-term presence in the virtual world.'' 144\nlik~~-miuded individuals. Users have developed sires and member groups as a way to share common experiences and interests. These areas are ty]>ic.ally available to t.he public at large and offer relevant information servict\"s to the visitor. ln this vein, Second Lite areas devoted to such diverse areas as auto raci~1g, religion, and lireramre are easily located on the virtual world platform. \"Within\n(U) The possibility for users ro establish control witluu these virtual world these areas, detailed information about the topic or links to related web sites is commonplace and can provide a visitor a jmup-ofl:.point for locating additional resources or persons re-lated to the topic. area.\n\nSeveral of these sites and member groups include community organizations, academic instittitions, corporate environments, and government agenc1es.\n\ntiona! efforts, often times serving as a platform for fimclraising. These sites provide text, graphics, and videos that the creators feel are supportive of their positions, while allowing exrernallinks to similarly themed traditional web sites. These sites also serve as links to groups, agencies, or individuals that rhe site creators feel are compatible with their aims. Similarly, these sites frequer1dy offer the visitor the opportunity to engage with the .\n\norganization in some capacity outside of the virtual world.\n\n(U) Academic institutions in virtual world environments ciffer access to lecmres, presentations, faculty information, virtual smdent.\n\nsocial activ-\nviding connections to traditional web sites fore-commerce purposes.\n\nlibraries and school achuinisrrarive information. At present there are a number of rec~gnized colleges and universities rhat have established a presence in the virtttal world, but the:: number of institutions currently online appears 1'0 be relatively small.\n\nIn many instances only portions of the universitic.>s are represented in the virrual platform. In the case of San Jose Stale University, only the School of Library ami Information Sciences is represenred at this rime. This appears ro be a growing, yet: not fully developed, avenue for information dissemination and public iufon natiou outreach by stmlems and stalT\ninvolved in higher education.\n\nOfficial governmental postiugs, both US and foreign, currendy appear limitc.>d in scope and munber.\n\nThose government agencies that do maintain a virtual presence offer information of educational interest.\n\nFrequently this information includes updates on desrination information and legal requirements for rravdc.>rs.\n\nThe Estonian Embassy on Second Lile, for example, provided information about the easing of visa restrictions for travelers moving between Estonia and Turkey. 146 Other educational information alTorded in the virtual environmeur includes scientific data, as evidenced by the.> Second Life interactive site sponsored by the US Department of Commerce's National Oceanographic and Atmospheric Administratiou.\n\n (U) \\Vhen~ virl'ual worlds diller from standard web sites, however, is the ability to access people online and the interacrion that ensues in the virtual space. In each of the Second Life examples c.itcd pre\\iously, the virtual worlds created by users provide real-time access to persons dirt~cdy related to the subject matter.\n\nThis immediate access allows conversations that e::-..1Jand upon content, providing context and insight.\n\nPersonal interaction allows question and answer sessions, through text or voice\n-:hat. This significantly increases the ability to gather information beyond that of the\n(U) Corporate interc.>sts inunclare the virtual world, providing information abour products, straregic alliances, upcoming events, corporate l:il.n.Lcrure, and corporate governance.\n\nThe corporate world has provided an interactiw forum to afiord global customers information ami trainiug relative to a company's core competencies aud product lims. ~1any times, companies, both foreign and clomC\"stic, host: both public and private areas in order 10 allow access to information, while providing spaces lor peer-to-peer collaboration and business development outside of what is perceived ro be the public domain.\n\nUsing the Second Lift- sitt' of Sony B?v[G as an example, portions of the public space are used 1\"0\nmarker newer artists and product laum:hes while prowhere infonnation is pushed out to the rc.>cipient and there is a limited opportunity to question the material. Through[>\n\n~ these diswurses, infonnarioi1 can be\n developed f.:'lr beyond the interactive\nprocesses virrnal spaces previously\nolfered.\n\n## (U) Prese11T Day L11Telligence Considerations.\n\n(U) Future Intelligence *Consid-*\nerations. The evolution of the Internet and technical changes to virmal world\n,.,.-i}J be of\n(U) Upon examination, it appears .\n\nthat virtual spaces afford adversaries r.he oppornmity to disseminate propag-anda and to inculcate others to their ways of thinking. Users are able to contact others and to engage in private conversation, presenting text and video in support of their ideals. \\Vithin this venue an exchange of ideali c;;u1 transpire and indoctrination can occur.\n\nconcern. The inion nation available */(b)(* 1 )\nin myriad ways in the virtual work}/ (b)(3)\nmay be beyond the ability of thdC to address alone. The a-;silltanpe of persons online shonld be a consideration. As highlighted by r}i~ authors of rhe Dark \\Veb cvbcr extremism\n-\nI\nreport, \"as .the virtnaJlvorlcl pi~~-_---**(b)( 1** )\nforms contmue to ;~?l~t; ~ud-manm, (b )(3)\nthere -1:> also nmch\n.1-\n- unknown about how\n'nmdr automated collection and analysis can be performed in these environments.'' 147\n(U) Virtual \\Yorkls offer the opportunity to observe technical exjJertise in game play and creative uses of virtuar\"in-world\"\ntools. These observations may come in real time during gaming or in retrospect through analysis of artifacts lelt behind on virtual world platforms. Frequently the artifacts will ideuri(v the creator through associated metadata. Users ack~pt at strategy, team coordination, object creation, and use of these platforms may present themselves as technical resources or future employment candidates.\n\n(U) For a discus.<;ion of potential use of virtual geospatial modeling, see\n,.,., .. ,.,h .... 9. l'2\n\n## (U) The Technical Environment: .A Challenge And An Opportunity\n\n(U) Individuals or groups of individuals could use voice communica-\n. tion dients embedded within virtual world or online gaming environments ro make it difficult to monitor and track their communications. For\n. (U) Virtual worlds are inherently social comnmni ties. All cmmmmities, whether physical or \\~rtual, contain woman is facing dtargt$ of attempted kidnapping, burglary, and aggravated menacing.\n\nex<tmple, as of September 2007 over\n330,000 Second Life accounts were using an integrated voice service to acllons pl1ost:cultal)le under Title 18 (criminal) and Title\n26 (ta.\"\\) of United States Code, along wirh th:it which is commonly considered criminal under state st.atutes.\n\ntempted to kidnap her \"ex-virtual\"\nboyfriend. 101 The cour>le met in Second Life and began a virtual relationship, which ended shortly after they mer in the real world. The peer-to-peer inaccurate perception that their communication and file trading activity is more secure from law enforcement scm tiny when it does not pass rhrough a [>\n..\n\n~ .. -~\n\nI> third party server. For rhis reason,\nspecific. attention should be given in\nthe fntnre to those virhml chat platforms that are structured to provide\npeer-to-peer c.ommtmicarion.\nence is with peer pressure in Reel Light Center to try it, this act.nally gives them an experience that they can call on later as to whether they want to try it in the real-world, or uot, ralhtr than just being carried away by peer prc:~ssure .... \"::H\n(U) Virtual worlds are not wid1our illicit drug activity and use, another source of criminal activity with national security implications. Seclimiue, li)r example, is a virtual drug\n(U) Con-artistry in virtual worlds demonstrates another implication for law enforcement. Challeng~s of\n\n## (U) These Platforms Allow Groups To Justify Their Criminal Behaviors In A Community Of Like-Minded Individuals\n\navailable for salt~ in Second Lifi:~.\n\nThe web site advertising this and cther \\i.rt.ual drugs states rha.t, \"Sedi\nmine is a virtual pharmaceutic [sic]\nthat is designed 1.0 be fdt by tht' user ..\n\nIt i:; only lound on Sc<:oud Life and developed by Owner Maltese. Sedimiue comes in a variety of strengths and soon also in different forms.\" 152\nTwo virtual environments, recllightcenter.com and virtual-vancouver.\n\ncom, encourage users to engage in acti,iities that include the virtual use of illicit drngs.\n\n(U) Advertisernents for these virtltal worlds feature.the fact that rhc \\i.rtualuse of these real-world illicit dntgs is ''completely legal\" on these platl'orms. 153 It is important to note that. both sites provide links to a parent site, www:.ntherverse.\n\ncom, which allows users to exchange personal identifying information.\n\nThe three sites are interrelated such that iudividuals can eugage in acti\\'i.- ties via their avatars that ultimately lead ro the users dwosing to \"connect\" in the aeal-wc:HId. \\Vhen asked inn media inteniew if he thought anonymity involve bot-h the often inaccurate perception of anonymity by actual and intended victims and the real potential for anonymity for those perpetrating the acts. The ability of perpetrators to victimize an individual that is located in a diflerentjurisdiction or diflerent country in many instances poses an insurmountable challenge to la'v enforcement. The technology and imniersive nature of virtual \\Yorkls allow criminals to engage in traditional fraud schemes in innovative ways .. As an example, it is now possible to \"socially engineer\"\nvi.ctims with whom they would have needed ro meet in the real-world.\n\nOne can describe social eugi~1eeriug as a non-technical kind of intrusion that relies heavily on lmm:in interaction and ollen involves tricking other people to break normal security procedures. There are numerous examples of ,;ic.tims providing personal identifying and financial information in virtual worlds through social engineering redmiques that mirror real-world confidenct~ (con) fraud schemes. The evidentiary trail left by these virtual cons, while it may exist~\nis inarkeclly diffenmt from that. which is commonly encountered in these l)1X'S qf clines, making it dillicult for law enforcemem to monitor.\n\nthi~ would lt:ad to real lire drug use, Uthen-\"erse CEO, Brian Shuster, said, \"~ify response would be, that if someone ha\"' [norJ tried marijuana in the real-world, and their firsr experi-\n(UJ Fut11re Challeltges for Law Enforcem.ent i\" Virtual Worlds.\n\nPolicies, regulations and laws have always lagged behind the development and use of new technologies, the result. of a top-clown model of governance and policy lornmlation and bottom-up technology development.\n\nThe lack of explicit relevance and applicability of the policies anclla,vs and lack of willingness by governing bodies to enforce existing ntles .\n\nputs indivicluals and the security of the homeland at risk. A new model is necessary to address this gap and the rapid pace of change within the technologies. This model would be applicable to all forms of technology;\nnot just virtual worlds and gaming technologies.\n\n(U) The population of users remains geographically diverse within virmal worlds although heavily used by US\ncitizens. This creates an additional conn~ru rolaw enforcement because issues of jurisdictional boundaries and\n(U) There is significant potential for logisrical constraints on extradition can arise. Another concern is the gen-\norganized criminal activity in virera! lack of training for the domestic law enforcement community regarding tual wortds, particularly those with virtual property crinws. An individual reported the theft of Final Fantasy real-world economic equivalents and XI !VI.MORl'G virtual property w~th an equivalent value of about 4-,000 US\nconversions. An additional concern Dollars to the Blaine Police Department in Minnesota. Both law enforcelor law cntorc.ement is that the n.\"g1tment otlicers ;mel prosecutors told the victim that virtual irems \"are devoid latory e-nvironments for companies of monetary value,\" and thns no crimes had actually been committe-cl.\n\n1 ~\n5\ndesigning and implementing virtual This is not an example of misfeasance, bur rather of a lack of understandworlds and virtual ecouomies are ing on the part of local criminal justice authorities. \"While this example murky at best. As an example, like had a marerially insignificant monetary value for the national economy, it m~ny other virtual worlds, Linden is scalable when one considers the number of potential US victims that are Lab-the company with control over prc~jected to participate in fhrure virmal worlds.\n\nSecond i..ife---:maintains significant\n(U) This is also a national concern if US-ba:;ed online service providers are directly victimized. In january 2008, Tokyo police arrested ajapanese teenager for stealing virtual property from Nexon, a Koreau virtual world service provider.156 Initial estimates of the direcr theft equated to S340,000\nUSD, with the total value of this crime being much higher. In this instance, the 16 year-old snspect allegedly used his avatar in Nexon's Mabinogi virtual world to obtain tlw private login name and password of an employee of Nexou's Tokyo branch through social t~ngineering. He subsequently used this information to illegally access the company's servers and transfer the in-world currency of exchange to his account.\n\namounts of customer money in trust.\n\nThese are not monies paid to the compan}~ bm rather those that cusromers maintain in the company's inworld currency of exchange so that they can engage in virtual commerce.\n\nLinden L<b voluntary disclosures show that on August. 1, 2008, customers paid over 5,226,000,000 Linden Dollars in tmst. That equates to almost 20 million US Dollars. 157\n(U) Most other companies that have created virtual currencies with realworld exchange rates do not make similar disclosures. It is a reasonable pr~jection that several billion US Dollars are similarly hdd by the companies controlling virtual worlds.\n\nl'v[any of these companies are located outside the scope and authority of US la\\v enforcement. Those companies, such as Linden Lab and Blizzarcl, which are US companies, an~\nstructured such that their requiremems to comply \\~ith regulatory measures, such as the Bank Secrecy and Anti-Money Laundering Acrs, are ambiguous.\n\n(U) Companies have chosen to establish essentially unregulated virtual banks, loan companies, and other financial institutions \\-Vithin virtual worlds. These are third party emerprises that are neither contrac-.\n\nt.ors nor employees of the companies that own virtual worlds. '-\\'hen ..\n\nl> looking ~teross worlds, oue can find\nsuch companies accepting money in\ninrerest-bearing accounts and offering loans al. various rates of return\n in myriad virtual and real cnrrellctes. Some companies,\nsuch as Blizzard,\nwhich owns\nWorld of\n\\Varcraft,\ntake the\npositiou\nrhat.rhe\ncurrencies\nof exchange\n30 pen:ent for depositors. 1\" 8 Ginko Financial collapsed in early August and caused depositors to suffer an unknown amount of loss. 159 Numerous online forums and bulletin boards reported rhis loss as anecdotally significant. As a direct result, Linden Lab stopped allowing unregulated banks to accept money in interest bearing accounts. This move may have a negligible effect, because the global nature of virtual world activity means that these t_mregulated financial institutions now can charter in their pick of countries.\n\nf(;,r rhr.ir piatforms have no real-world value or legitimate ex-\n(U) fiJr law enforcement, money laundering is probably the largest anticipated concern, due to the known conditions in virtual worlds which make it possible. Some .\n\nchang:~. Unlortmwtd)~ since individuals find it valuable to own these currencies, such as \\Vorld of \\Varcraft Gold, there is a thriving black market in the trade and conversion of these currencies. This dimate produces an unprecedented challenge when law enforcemenr must investigate the allegations of unlawful financial activities either '\\ithin a .,.;rmal world or involving virtual currency.\n\ncompanie~ such as Linden Lab, have enacted voluntary internal measures w ensure that laundering significant smns becomes an impractical option in comparison with traditional online mon('y laundering techniques. One easily located Web 1.0 emi~) traceable to a residential stmerure in :Miami, Florida with .servers in Moscow, offers rhe exchange of large sums of various virtual and game currencies for varying rates. This entity offers r.o convert bet,,.reen US Dollars and\n(U) Ginko Fiuancial operated a virtual bank in Second Life until August\n2007. Avatars could deposit and withdraw Linden Dollars in int('reslbearing accounts at several virtual ATJ'vl locations. About 18,000 acccnuns are rt'porred ro have been established at Ginko Financial, which offered rates or retm:n in excess of Lind~n Dollar for 89 perceut of the value it rakes to exchange the Lin- -\ndex, which is the legitimate Second Life currency exchange. It seems that an individual would only US(' this conversion system to thwart internal controls established by Linden Lab or to obfuscate both the tme nature of the transaction and rhe source of the funds.\n\n(U) Tho:>c engaged in money laundering seek ways to easily convert the proceeds of unla,vii.u activity back into a usable form after their tnte nature has been concealed. Mind-\nArk, for example, offers a Projec-t Enrropia cash card rhat can be nsed at real-world ATMs worldwide (s('e Figure 2). The advertisement states that. \"D)Jy simply transferring your PE.D to the Cash Carclttsing the Transfer Center in the Entropia Universe, you can use the Cash Carel to pay for goods and services in retail outlets, or to ,.,.;thdraw real cash from millions of ATM machines around the world.',.60\n(U) A final concern for law enforcement is the law of unintended consequence. Gambling in virtual casinos has traditionally been a sig11ificant economic activity in Second Life. In July 2007 Lin<kn -Lab banned virtual casinos and gambling activities. 161\nThe effect was an immediate and material drop in user-to-user financial transactions from which Linden Lab has not yet fully recovered\n(Chart 4). 11'2\ncomes from this ac.tiou. Tt1e first was that users of Second Life foui1d ways to covertly continue gambling activities.\n\nFor example, numerous bars and mher cstablishments have begun holding \"dance contests\" rhar.\n\navarars pay to enter. Avatars dance with each other and winners are selected random!}~ with monetary prizes awarded. The second outcome was that those that chose to engage in virtual gambliug activities found other virtual world platforms whose Sf;rvers and business operations were located outside the reaches of United States criminal enfi:.>rct:ment. Since July 2007 sf;veral new virtual worlds have appeared specifically to fill tlw void created when Liudl;'n Lab decided to ban this activit}: The commonality among these new busim~sses is that they do not. h:we a brick-and-mortar location within US jurisdiction and that t'IOnt' of their serwrs are located OU\nUS soil. The challenge arises when the US law <:nforcemeut connnunity attempts to enforce criminal law it c,li:>l)laces its aerivitics ro virtual platforms that are more dillicnlt tor the US IC\nro monitor. This creates a scenano in which several challenges on US law enforcl;'ment. The global nature of virtual worlds means that state and local US law enforcement, which are desie,rned and equipped to deal with crimes located in geographically limited jurisdictions, must now navigate a multi-national geopolitical and regulatory environment in order to effeerively investigarC' complaints from the real-world citizens they seJVe.\n\nFederal an'cl state criminal codes leave police and prosecutors with few tools to deal with the emerging global nature of virtual crime.\n\nAs more US citizens choose to engage in commerce within virtual worlds, the United Statt:s law enforcement. and iurdliit is likely that traditional law gence comnmnities are at odds, with opposing\npriorities.\n\nenforcement agencies will increasingly find themselves ill-equipped to deal with the inevitable allegations of theti, fraud, and other criminal financial activity. a\n(U) In addition to ecouomic implications for law enforcement, the global expansion on virt11al worlds imposes\n\n## (U) Vrrtual\n\n. atiddetail~(J.fe~tures'.'&(ail.ii~tliiiaii:l:ieiilg.aiid~eer(:: : __. . .\n\n;,.\n-,.;;.~. ~_. .. . 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In efTect anyone -cotild l)ecomea %D AR\nR\nS\nv1rtual nnmornl and hve oni? cyber deCC forever S\n\n-0rtit<,tl tn~IJl(lrtalancl:li\"~\"~~?~i!:l~C:+lier.:~s]?ac.} /or~\\,_~r:\n''\ne\n.\n.\n.\n-\n'.\n.\n.\n-\n.\n\"\nK\n.\n-\n.o\n-\nv\nel\n.\ng\nN\n-\n.\n.\ne\n.\n.t\nfid\nri,\ns\n. \\\n. '. . : .. . . . :.\n. c' :: *:* ,_;:__~~_-.1-~.-._,_ .. :.:.;::. .'; . ~~:.><?,: , : <. .\n.. . .\n'\n\"\n.\nv\no,\nN\n-\nR\n-\n\\\n.\n-\ng\nR\nA\n'o\nB\n.\nLot\n&3\n>\n2\npor\n.\n'.\n.\n.\nToene\ne\nT,\n[\n.\n.\n.,\n. :_.:.,:. ''...:~.~ ... ~ ... .\n- ;,:\n<\n.\nAR\ns\n'\n\n>\n~\n.\n-\n-\n.\nv\n.\nM\n..,\n\"\n.\n-\n.\n-\n.\nR\nBN\n.\n-\nwe\nK\n...  ...\n;_ .. :\n]\n.\n.\nM\nX\nR\nL\nB\n.\n|                      | er.,rtrun.age,;~fi:lt,l.    | t:heiili~~t)ess\\v9t'iiCI;'liyeoii.forev.er\"m:    |\n|----------------------|------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------|\n| .                   |                            |  :                                                |\n| .                   | .                          | '                                                 |\n| ~4,                  | \"'!{~,                     | -.~~                                               |\n| ..                  |                            | .'                                                 |\n| ~-                   |                              |                                                    |\n| .:                 | .;;.                       |                                                    |\n| ~.                   |                              |                                                    |\n| .                   | -                            |                                                    |\n| :.                   |                              |                                                    |\n| ,\"                   | .                           | ,                                                 |\n| cpiti~;~:a~          | tli~                         | fid~JiiY:toF                                       |\n| -bf                  | ..                           |                                                    |\n| e,~tir~Iy            |                              |                                                    |\n|                     | .:                          | .                                               |\n| beli~\\j~J)J~;ai~tl. | ~~J~U-~at~cl~lll;            | riew).vay~:tq                                    |\n| Cl_lr:;:             | ;:::                        |                                                    |\n| -~                   |                              |                                                    |\n| .                   | :.:.                        |                                                    |\n| rei.it               |                              |                                                    |\n| 'and                 |                              |                                                    |\n| fresh.              | Ih:effect;:a'iworiecotild  |                                                    |\n| beconie              |                              |                                                    |\n| a                    |                              |                                                    |\n| ~3D                  |                              |                                                    |\n|  .                  | .                           | : .                                                |\n\n(U)You were easily beaten.\n\n(U)You have easily beaten me.\n\n(U)That was humorous~-~\n\n| :~             | :.-Ji~~:.~.:\\:~-.~~::~::.:'::;    |\n|--------------------|----------------------------------------|\n| .._..,..;c..~~:.   |                                        |\n| .                 | -                                      |\n| \\/\\./~             | IJJ~.                                  |\n| -,._'              | .                                      |\n| o~1:clifre;ent     |                                        |\n| coitti;mtilitsto: | .:_),.                              |\n| ~                  |                                        |\n| .:/.           |                                        |\n| !~;               | ::~.;                                  |\n| 0:                 |                                        |\n| :0                 |                                        |\n| ~                  |                                        |\n| ..                 | ...                                    |\n| :'                 |                                        |\n| -.-~-j~/          | ~~A~                                   |\n| 0                  |                                        |\n| 'I;                | ..                                     |\n| :                  |                                        |\n| .                  |                                        |\n| :                  |                                        |\n| .~               |                                        |\n| ..                 |                                        |\n\n .(UJ User-created *content.* The seale of lww much virtual worlds allow users to modify\nthc111 varit~s fmm garne to game. Ckmain games, such as Second Lite, permir nst~rs ro create\nconrt~nt for in-gamt~ use. In d1e micldlt~ of rhc;- spectnun, games likt~ There.com do not allow\nuser c.reated content. to be placed in-wolicl wirhout approval; tel create content, a There.com\nIISI!I' has to go through a rather kngrhy process invoh~ng rhe operators or that virnml world. At\nrhe far end of this continuum, \\Vorld of \\:Varcrafr represents a game that doe.<~ nor allow any user created content:\nrht:~ opcraror eompany, Blizzard Euterraiument, creates all comem.\n\n## , ,.\n\n(U) Therefore, virtual worlds range from Second Life, in which users create almosr all content, to There.com, a mix of user imd company cr<:ared content, all the way 1'0 eutirely c.ompaH}' COll(t'nt, as in cl1e case of ''\\'oriel of ''Varcrafr.\n\nThe ability ro create contenr appeals ro the hobbyisr builders of the world, while operator creared content gives a user less choice, bnt also eliminates the confusion and (ofren) paralysis associated with roo many choices. While the crearjon and modification of contellt b); users ar their own pace causes the constant updaring of applications like Second life, the game landscape of \\Vorld of \\Varcraft, however, never changes.\n\n(U) N~trnber of *players* .. Another statistic that one can gradate amongst virtual worlds is the number of players who participate. Games ca!l range from only requiring a single player, to millions of players online concmrendy:\n(U) Age of *players.* \\;irrual \\\\'l)rlds target players of evt~ry possible age, from children to adulls, or a mixture. The mechanisms for enforcing \"Children Only\" and '~\\dnlt Only\" ntles in games or game areas have met with reasonable suc:c.:':~ss, wid1 \\~olntions usually resulting iu cj<-c.tiou li-om the game. lnterestingls often the players ideutif} the \"odd\nman out\" in these environments and report the.m to the game operators. For example, an adult can easily get an account em the Tec-u section of Secoucl Life prohibited l:o adults (except employee-'i), aud the teens themselves detect and report: the unusual behaviorof an adult trying to masquerade as a teen. 174\n(U) *Price.* While some virtual worlds don't cost anything, others require subscriptions, or e-ven purchases in addition to ~~ subscription. Almost all of the subscription games have \"free to try\" limited subscriptions or free accounts that are somehow restricted. World of \\Varcraft has a ten dav free trial; Second Life has unlimited duration accounts that haw: slightiy limited capabilities.\n\n.\n\n.\n\n(U) Worlds versus *Garnes.* Some experts describe virtual world system:; as platforms for creativity. while some categorize them strictly as \"games'\". This label usually results from or the nature of the challenges presented to the user. The nnstructured world; li~e Second .Life, presents no challenges, or quests, for the user ro perform. The plattorm nature or the world, user created content, and user generated \"quests\" support all interest. For example, a user can create a dark, gothic environment thar. others use in order to play either vampires or humans, conduct vampire versus human hunting games, and fight battles. (fhis is an example or game created within a non-game). Inwntors dtsign qmst based ga1~1es likt \\Vorld of \\Varcraft with qmsting challenges for rhe player to experience.\n\n(U) *Persiste11ce.* Some worlds and games are \"persistent,\" which means that even in the absence or users, the enviroim1en1 exists. Second Lite at)d 'Vorld of \\Van..raft servers are always online, even if there no players connected to them; thus thc:- 30 environment worlds always exist. A console game, such as CounterStrike, is non-persistent since the game or world exis1s only when the user turns the consolt- ou and plays the game.\n\n.(U) Di-mensiotr.s. One can consider a game two dimensioi1al (2D) if it appears flat; board games such as Scrabble or 7VIouopoly fall inro this category. Flash games, su~~h as Yahoo's Scrabble, also fit into this category, even multiplay-\n. er ones. Some games give the illusion of three dimensions (3D), even thought they are in fact onl~; 11vo dimensions.\n\n(U) Virum) worlds. ho\\vt:wr. do uot imvitablv lllove in the direction of the three climensiona( for sevt:ral reasons.\n\n~\n.\n\n.\n\n.\n\n~\n.\n\nFir:r;t., as graphic$ approach photo realism, humans begin to be disturbed. Experts call this the \"uncanny valley\": r.he c.oncr.pt. rJtat: graphics can bb ''too real\" and that humaus begin to lee! revulsion when they encouutr.\"r somerhing thar l''okn human, but isn'r.m Even if verisimilitude cloesn'r canse the revulsion reaction, human~ view highly realistic St!t.tings ~1s )H,;s forgiving-people ure much lcs~ williug to maintain suspension of clisbdief when confronted wit:h thi.ng~ rlmt l(ok r<al. Second, from a game design perspective, many types of gameplay do not lend themselves to 3D. ln fal~t., IC.1r more abstract games like puzzles or geometry-based games, a 30 interface can get in the way;\ntuort~over, tlw simplcr the graphics, the greater the numb('r of computen that can operate the virtual world software.\n\nTo reach the largest possible audience, developers keep graphics to the simplest level possible that can still engage the target dc~mographic. Tlms, the developers of children's worlds generally do not use photorealistic: graphics technology-even if they had the choice, this medium would nor reach their target audience. Finally, phororealism consumes time and money. Producing high quality 3D art, and the technology to s11pport it, raises the costs of a game.\n\nvii:-.es, such as cdl phones, can contain games, and g-amers increasingly we them for two player or multiplayer games.\n\nM.any Asian nsers do not have the economic stat11s to afford a high-end PC:, so they preferentially choose mobile device::; (i)r g-.:tming. Augmented Reality Game:> comhiue virtual and rt'al objects and experiences together and often w;e Jll(lbile platforms such as I'DAs and cell phones. Iii\n1!.'!1_...._\n\n.\n                                  Q) umsies Hotwork Link.\n        &ffi\n                                                                                             e\n                                                                                                                                                      o NG\n\n'\"l!i6 -\n  IO!ii \"\"'....,.\"\"\"\"\"lin'\n. ,l;l!ijfiliJ:=z~:~:{~:?:.x .\n\ni:lC~IIo~ .. \"\n              ..\n\n:\n                                                 310 Ducovery Ketwons\n                                                 B1@ euivpesn\n                                                                                                                                                   Sasce agency\n\n* 5 Gigspoe Protos\n.\n[0 cgeoareens\n*. 3Q Googie Book Searen\n2@ BB ] Goegle\nEenh Comrunty\n\n          : QJ@ Googre News\n@ B masa\n     ROy\n                                  'Navonat Gesgrapnic Maga..,\n\n*\n                  ()\n                                              newvon 1wy\noy\n                                   q\n\n& % '3.1_\n            () Figure 9.5. A geo-tagged ph_oto of the Dolce Hayes'Mansion\n\n'\n!:i, ____ , q, MGJ J~p;~r.\n\n ~!i u_ - ..,,.,.,,.Ln, mi!:llafls&tili1llll\n~~)~1.\\ito.\"J.;;i, g,) a ._....,. \"\"''\"\na~S~\nC'fltT~ci vJW CW'J $tp;.Nlp l.!.!1l\n.\n\n                                                                             .\n                                                                                        .\n                                                                                                           .\ni\n                      _..;;?:m: ,u\" g vg\n                                                                                                                 :\n\n                                    )s\nfos(Lr a bGl]SG of commumty lhrough%\n\n-\n                                              data sharmg 'and stucleut conversa_'\n                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    L\n\n{- I fions. )pOrtumneaabound from\n\n                                                      rea.l and wlsoera | due.to t]le uso'of\n                      LTINS\n                                                     R Ry\n                                                                e .'.%\".\"-o.fiei?d%\\\"f e\n?lhc,Pouh and\n                           Gollaborduve: i \".,....:;,ar\n                                                   47'555:13)?&1?:9}3173\"-'@?-*\"'\"' 933(55'3':\n                     ]\n                                                 AT\n                                                           .t.\"'\\ Y\n                                                                        T\n                                                                                 ertes\n                                                                                       \"f' e\n                                                                                                 T\n                                                                                                           &\n                                                                                                                                                        W\n     fl'lrnered\"throngh engaglng n 3D\".,;.- -\n                                                            ':;:- W <?f' DL\n                                                                                        TRt\n                                                                                                o\n                                                                                                        O\n                                                                                                                                                 *\"\"*'3'-\"\" h\n                                                                                                                                                    \\'b\n\n23\n                                '\n                                                                           ' and its movement m rcnl ume across -\n                                                                                                                                                                                         -\n\n  N\n      \".' virtual eriviromnents. Two posmve\nT qa cfllcis mcludu the umo savcd bv~the\n\n.' :::,.eftecl:s i\n\net\n          Ty\n                                          T\n                                            ol\n                                                      AL\n                                                             X\n                                                                  .\ni\n   learner and'. JQ, reduet:o%'of cost,;'{firg\"'(U) Ee\\eiope 'Jbeco nein,%ore vflc&fi?r, ; Aflga-,-\"\n                                                            3\n                                                                 FEES\n\n;\n                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   4\n                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                              ARl\n                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         g\n\n,'\n-~:,,.., ....\n .... , .. - 'eat.ner\n .: : (fuel, .\ne\n(('ucl hotel; and mq)lanc_) Sonie 1\n\" stitutions.encounter chfficulnes whlle\n- _, stit.utions-ei~couni:er\n. .\n\n.w!iiie\n\n:\ney trvmg lo-\\o,r sunpl\\' loannot) pro-;-'::?\n\"..\n-\n..;::.:trYing to~( or .si1i:iphr (:a,):rio0. pr6-; :;?M.'\n\n mlerc;ted mn mtaroperabnhty mthm\n                                    ). e'scr-gcucratcd coritent, asthe;\n                           1\n                                  ,\n                                    e\n                                      ;\n                                                                   S\n                                                                      .\n                                                                       .,'-'\n vlrtual worlds since platforms emst\n                                    driver behinid'sich Web ?.O phenom e\n;_ w1th'mlmmal protocol standardua- 1Y as I'accbook and YouTube-.v- R \\'-.-'\n                       i g fl:,'.\"v\"\\';ifi':h\n                                                      ol\n                                                            o\n                                                                  i\n\nReY *t] 'x\"e@ s mteroporabl\n\n\\  ' -\\.;~t. .. <\n.  .\n;;.;~,'!.:!\n<::\\~'?f:..  '  -~~u;;,..;:. ''l<5i\\~~JI;~~~:.i,:m~~$~rt~!;i,i.~i~~[l)l;:~~;;~~.~\n. *.::* f:~~J~-(~~-.~~~-~~h~s~ or:~~~W:-iry ~~~~~?: .\n\"Hence, the v1rmal wofld  aliows f'ora .\n ::Hen~e, the virtual \\VQaid allows for.: ..\n.o\nI\noz\nthc mmunuauon of costs ST '__'\n'\n. _,~~ fl~c mini_ij?.izati~.i_1 or''c!)S~.\n-~~:' .. : ; ...... ,., ..... ,,,v-\"'\ni ke[v enable wmua.]'world-base' 2\ntechnology Technology usr\n_l_)enefits,from thls, andeavor By;e:r] W\n\n, : < -~.-..A-~:;.,~,,~ ...  _,:-.:_<~~-:;~ ... . ~~;:t:.:\n~~~~i~t:~r:~~~~~~~~~~~\n~\n.; r~J) !\\~_~uif~~~)l\\c~lipi~~~so~i;f6(~~: ,-11\nIc.armng m 3D vn'h.ml env1roumcnts'\n\n           %\n                ~\n\n                       '\\\nfactors would a.fTect mlcmpcrablhlv\nboth pre and post-amalgamatlon.\n                        mto v1r[ua| world pro_;ects to spur .\n\n                                                                                           iy \"-mnovaucn and collaboranon and to\n.'~\n\n~ According to a study by the Ameni }:h:,au chcrauon of Suenusts oxore\nth<111 70 wrtual w\\fodd-platforn-f\nA\nlem.'iungaH 3D VlrttJaleriVIrOilineilts:\n.\n.\n.. ::According- ~o a stud)' by the Ameri-: . .' boi:IJ pre- and po~t~~mialgaiu~~~>n.\nitito .virtual woiid 'pr~jec_ts to spm ... ~ ...\n. : ,~_.,_cau Fi:~dc~~ipn:or ~ct~t:i!:ists, mQr~.::> .. : .. ... *i.,* . ~ .. >~!f:l: ., __ .... :, ~.'~i\\,,_.., .. )u~).ovation.a\\<it:~nabox-~~R;i. ai1d tee.::. : .\n-:: ~ ._~;~ll{a; .. 7o: ~ij~ti1.af\\,;oi:!B;;~~il.ifor.p{~~~~r(\\~- ~(U}~~:i:~ri'd~~j'~~w.c?~P~If~rk:~fy :~~~S~~~(I~;~Jf*~~f:(or)~~~~~)::tli~~~,~~:~\n\n' Arnericati ~on1paities~ievdoped .~:.\nbe~i} ~ici ~urge':q~er=ti:me. A\"tlfiJ.S,  : q~fr~ilr tcchil<i>lb&ies as5~;>~iai.~d\\vifh%',_~_ v:,  '.\n*. Americati compames clevelopcd\n\"only a handful of these. C ollcges\n.\n .  only a h<.\\qdful of th~se. Colleges.'. .\nhappl!.t~s.; technological.imJoy~tion .\nyiitual \\vorld~. 'for exa1npl~, _Global: ~ . . .\n.\ng\no\nand uniy rfimee use thcse.,'?oD wriu;fl\n:, .. . .. : ' :u)d mii.~ri.t.ie$ ll!i~ ~h~$~3D viriliaf\n;:)-v.iiLalil!~tthe P,l~ifo~n.1s~oi) : .. 1g\n:.  KiBs.prg; a.!1~ri~jjrofit.~rg-a:'rli~atiot:i, ~!:;'~.: .. : :: ..\n\n\" fi'-.:.'-''By}\nr!\\'ng'_;' ae ot\n\"~-,. .-.. :~ ....  ... *....* \\1;,.~ *...* ~--\" *'\\'.:::* .. .~!~: . .\n\n~ . :~t1! -~:-~:~:,: .. ~  ..... ~ ... -....... ~ . ~ ..\n\n'~- ::.,t. -~t!;.~t: . .;.\n\n. ,: .:... ' , .. -~ ....... ~ ~:. .-\n-~.: .. :~to\\ .. ..; ,\n' ... *(:,i};;(:'--* *..* -, .. :~--\n .. r.-!':tt -: *...* ,;.'.\n\nbcgm\n    to merge ovor\n           tune. As flus . current tcchnologws assoc1aied \\\\1t1\nhappcns, l:eclmologu,al mnovatxon\n                      vu'tual worlds. 'For example, Global\n\\ull'ziflect the platforms operiting\n                     des org, a non-profit orgamzatlon ux 3\n                                          .,e\n   i'\"'the d}')e'li'zfi;d;closeafenvr, ron'fi's i)}@\"e's*'avardedfl}he 2007\\Mfi)rola &\n\ne'nvernma 105 fome'he'firfih, ted E'h'k'fft.\".\ni\n- n*leni's \"Tssues pe::tammg io 11 tenop-' Innovanon Generahon Grant and\n~. ~ ,: ~ ,  t:.twtroiu~tJll:s forte!;~.\na,~h, l:e~~J:.~~~t:.   _Widl!fl's;fl'e. op~!'itm1a:~lpse\n~.H~-;; ~-~~.saw~rdePi.' . .;,tih:e. 2007 ']\\'1:. C:i!(.:prqla.  ~-  .... ;_~~ .. ,.:\n.\n.._' -\n. ':,-.\n'\n. '\"J.....\n. '. _ ... - .. -\n.\n.. ... ~\n,-.~-~ .. ---f ,. ~ ....... ~~- , .. - ........ -- .. ~<1 ...\n-'\"'~.':Jlii.,_\n.. ~~~~\"' ... /.\"' ~-\\\"\"\"To-\n....... ~~--.\n. \".'. insh'uc6o11; and sbideti't collabora.:'  . .'\nn'f~J,lf~.-:,fssue's p~4\\il1ir1g~~{) 'iilt'r6_1)-\n-J:I'ii19\\~ati!)n~~j)(!r~tio.t~(Grai'lt,.:u'l0:'\"  ,_;;.: ': .  . ;\nrablhtv and its 1mpacts on sofuvarc uscd the money to, devclop a'new\n. RS\nmsnuci:on and student collabora-\n,\ntion. Universities (for, c\\amplc\n . : .. ~ tion. U r~iversities(fot 'example,\n-: .. :  .. erabilitv and its iilipacts oi~ ~ft,~are .   ~s~d. th~ n1on~y to. devd~p:-a' i1e~v\n, .\n2\no\n..H.uvu:gl Umvcrsnt,y vberOnc, oy and hardwart.. sg}(_?lnt}g op?:amonal :.cg}mmdum for a Broolenbasccl i\n3.?\n-\n'j \"and-the: K?msas U :,vemty \\/fechcal'f -7-'\n' a'se\"fi dfrhe 1\\7[,' averse-archifectute i;phlgh schaol -;r/}f\"dlrect telanonslnp_x;vg e tog\n. .<~-~:tl~tv~~liuJ)jy~rs.i.t.y:s\n7.~}~~erQp.ci.;:~ :\\. . an~~h~;a\n... wJtr{~ , tP,_t}i, qp_e .. --~ ~'t.al _;,:.::cct~~~~ilf.f;:a:B~9.kly)i~.P~!!~d .. _;.:~:\n, .\n ....... \"  ., ., ...\n~,., ....... .-.;,a'<\n..... r''l~'l .. l'>\"\"\n-~:..i .. l\"'\"'\"\n.J._...,,_._,.,.\n, ..  ..  ,--rLm.J, ..  .. h .. ~;;t;:.!J  lti, .... ,. .. ,, ..  -\"\"~\n''\n     ~; ai1c t lc;f ::Ra11sas U:tjtv~r~rty l'Y.~c J~~ ~ ::  \"e~e~:rioi'ii:tlt <'le , . . :e.r:ie':?i . . .\nc t\\.~t:e~~ ~:!ie;).~c  q.q~~-t!<.ttt;ec.~ .r~ ~.11'5'~1~ l;tp.;\\i,?,:~;'-'i, ~:\n.\n: : Cenft1r), businesses (B~IW and.~M),  . will;!:i:i ftn'ilin'ltfacfho\\v vitd\\itl \\Voi-Id\n~  e#st:S 'bet\\ve~t'J!~tl1e inc:re:ik~ it'l. cm1fi~~;,. .:: . *;::*\nCeutt'r), bllfimeascs (B\\'[\\'\\' and. IBNI\\\n.\n.and orgamflhons {the.Center for: -\n.: . ~nd.or~J1izations (th C~nter fo(:\nenvi~nments aff~ci:. society a~ci\n. :dence ~~d th~E\\-ft{nd~l'g of~D virtua!.<'\n. .\n8\nstoasc Qontrol) are justa number\n; . :, :. :-Disease Q~~'itroi) _irc.J'Cs~:~ .i~,H~l:!er ..... ::w~i'J.~;~_C.ot~o~llj~~~,. . .\n-,~-:;(.;~,:; . ... _ :~~~~JiO-~me~t~~by: a,c~qeJ~i~,. -:-:en~i.tre *:../* : ....\nwilli 1n \"farn- nnpaol\"how \\nrtual world\n'exists b(.twecn lhe mcrms'e in confienvironments affect socxely and\n'\ndence and rha fundmg of 3D wrtual\nworld cconolmes*\" ;\n'\ncnwromnents.by academxa. vc:uture\no s\\fi'{\n-\nv ,x\n'\na'n.-'\n,':fl.\n3\n1\nN\n- ;: \"of 'curretit paruolpafi&?m tlus space- '\n0\nln the Umte(l States nuhtar\\ senior\n'\n.'v.\"\\t %\nv\nMl\na\n\\\n3\nfU) Three dlsm:c.invc trends, as-out- NIomtormg these transe%uons wxll :\nlmcd:: _thc tcsumouy of Ncw I\\'chm prowde msxght and a deepcr un-\n_g_:_.f o\n.\nrcpru.cnt.mves have commultcd that\n,_  ~:c;r ctitreri(1:;1.:rt:lcip~ti!lii;tliis's~~~.1 :':,. _._,.._,~ipt: .:; ~ -~~~r '.: ,:\\.''*~};<~~:~~~?:;;i~ihili.St~;,art~ithe us gQ.\\ernn1e:r.~/.:.:. i; .\n\n. . . . . 'In t.he v;~H~d Stat~s .,;.IIi tar}~ seJii'Q):' . . . M'TJ~i-ee' disii.1fi~,~ t;el_ld,;;~s-~:i.~-. :. . 'Klf6Yiitri~~i(ifi~:~ t~b~~~J~ll~ ~,.ru_::' ,~(=: *...* ' <.:\n.. .-; ... rt1presen,t:;tnves have c..o~mucn~ed.tJ~t the\n_of N!!~V~1edia.\n\nmstght.and a\n::,\n,\n; .. :>:\\. e!~h~I~c~9~(~~:ision.\n\n\n,., .\n ...\n\n+ .0 enhanced: (;lQGISIOI'I -m\n B 'f }}'\\'oufd' b_\n                                                               't'\n                                                                    fr011\n\n.' ; : :t' ; \\\\ronkl I;'CJ'iefit 'trri.,1<t''li'P.';m:e.\n\n.  ._ 'rual\n                     ~...;'\n\n\nnetwor]\\s\n\n.-.\\.ould (U) Fundnmg\n                                             mm\n                                                       '\n                                                   '~ R\n\n (U) 2D Internet\n. (U) 'fhe trildit.ional \"Hilt'' \\Vcb p<tgc bnsecllnternet detiveclliOJn document fonnM pnges.\n\n(U) 3D virtual environment\n(U) A user inteditc.e nnd suppon infrasrmcttue th11t pn;seuts data in a 3D perspective ~o the user and often\nstores illld manipulnte:; cl<tt<t in 3 dimensions\n\n(U) 4G Wireless\n(U) 4G (<tlso known l'IS Beyond 3G), l'ln abbreviation for Fourth-Geuern6on, is :t term used to describe rhe next complete C\\'O-\nlurion in wirdeS~S c.omnmnic.Mions. A 4G system is intendt'<l ro pro\\-ide n solution where voice, data and streamed mulrime-\nclin can be given ro users on an \"11nytime, anywhere\" basis, nnd nt higher dntl'l rntes than previous generations. The intenta-\ntioilal telecommunications Ie~;lll:ltory :md standardizari)n bodies are wo1king for commercial deployment of 4G networks\nroughly in the 2012-2015 time scnle There is no tormnl definition for what 4G is; howevet; there are certain objectives rhM\n\n<'~re pr~jectcd for .4G. These ol:!jec.tives indncle: thnr 4G will be a fully IP-based intcgr:ned system. 4G will be capl'lble of\nproviding between 100 l'vfbir/s anrl I Gbit/s.\n\n(U) Active Subscription\n(U) An enrollment tq a V\\V or game thnt is re!,'ltlarly used by a playe1; ns opposed to one that is acJ:i,r.lted,\nthen abandoned, but still counted by the opermor as n subscription.\n\n(U) Anamaya\n(U) '~\\nimn'' is the Larin word for the Grel\"k psykhe (psyche) or soul (spirit) of rhe individual. \"Mnyn,\" in\nIndian religions, is the principnl deiry who cn,arcs, peq)etuntes nnd governs dunlity in both rhe spititn:ll\n\nnnd physit~.t Sj)l'ICP.. Bringing these two coucep[.~ together todescrihe n di~:,rital soul, :t common rhread that nms through\nmultiple t'Xpressious of self in the Virtual \\Vorld, produces the term \"annmaya\". The anamnya represems rhe underlying\npl.'rsonalit); morals, values i1tld belil:'fs rhat. users impose on the avatars they c.reate. The anamnya is the being and presence\nof self that.;, lL~e projects on his or her virtual activities and in virtual environments.\n\n (U) Arti.ficiallutelligence\n(l.i).John McCn11hy, who coined the term in 1956, defines it as\" ... the science l'lncl engineering of making intelligent mA-\nchine~, especially inrelligent compnrer progmm!:.\"\n(U) Alternat~ Realiry Game\n(U) An alternnte reality g-ilme (~L\\RG) is an intenoctiH~ narrative rhar uses thl:' real world as a platfonu, often involving multiplo: media nud game d~mems, I\"< tell n story that nmy he aiTected by parrit;ipants' ideas or nctions. The form is L')1)ified by int.ense plnyc.r involvement with l'l story rhat. takes pll'lc.e in real-rime nnd evolves according to p:trticipants' esponses, :tnd chamcrers rluu n1-e fictively controlled hy the game's designers, as opposed to being contwlled by artificial intelligf:nc.e ns in n computer or console video gnme.\n\n(U) Augmented Reality\n(l)) A field of contpute.r re~enrch whicll deals with the combination of real-world and compurer-genernted data. At ptesent., most. AR research is concerned with the use of live video imagery which is digitally processed and \"augmented'' by\nt.he nclditionof compntc-r-genemted gr<'~phics. Advanced resenrch includes the use of motion-tracking dat11, fidncinlmnrker\nrecognition using mnchine vision, nnd the consttuction of controlled environments containing nny nmnbe1 of sensors nncl\nnc.tuntors.\n(U) Authentication\n(U) Tl\\l\" means by which the authenticity of a user cnn be t'stablished.\n\n(U)Avatar\n(li) The re.pl'l~senrnrion of n person in digital fi)t'lll in nn inrerac.tive envimnmenr. Tht: \"chnmctet\" rhnr nppears on\nthe screen inn V\\V or gnme. An l'IV<'II\"fH' often has the nppeamnce of n lmmnn being, either renlistic or comic.\n(U) Bulletin Board System (BBS)\n(U) A Bulletin B(~<ud System, or UBS, is a computet systr.-m running software thnt nllows users to connect and login w the syste-m using a terininnl progrmu. Originally BBSes were accessed only over a phone line wsing a modo:~n, but by the early l990s some BBSes allowed access ,;a a Teh1et or packet radio n,mtc:-ction.\n\nOnce a tiller loggc:-d in, they could pet-fonit functions such as downloading or 11plo~tding software nnd data, reading news, and exchant,oing messages with other users. l\\1:my BBSC'S also offered on-tine games, in which ll!'ers c<llllcl compete with each othet; nnd BBSes \"ith,multiple phone lines often oiTer<'d IRC-like char t~)l)lll>'~, Allowing users to meet. each (other. ln recent vent-s. the term UBS is somerimes incorrectlv used to refer to RllV online fonmt or mess~ge bo:~n:l.\n\n-\n\n\n\n{U) Blog\n(U) An online dim~~ tllt-nnt 10 be read by uset-s of th~ lnrt-ntet.\n\n## (U) Botjjets (Bot Network)\n\n(l~ A group of computers that is cont.-olledi;Jy nnotltct computet; often witholll the owner's consent.\n\n## (U) Collectible Game\n\n(lJ) Collectible card games (CC:Gs), also c~lled trading card games, are played using speciillly designed sets of c:-trds. \\Vhile trading cm-ds h11ve been arcnnd for longe1; CCGs combine the appeal of colle-cting wirh strategic gameplay in different settings. For e.xmuple, the game Magic: The Gnthe-ting is based on the fanmsy genre, so many of the cards represent creatures ilnd magical spells from that setting. CCGs are-distinguished from other genres of games becRnse the Cl'lrd can dynamically reconfigure the rules dming ph~y.\n\n(U)Dark Web\n(U) The OJ1line Anonymity of the- web thatl'lllows extremists nnd criminnls to use it for content relotted to porenli:-tlly dnngen.)US or criminnl activity. Such web content is often pltl]>osefully difficult to find.\n\n{U) Digital Distribution\n(U) The distt-iburiou of cligital data by me<ms of downloads, as contrasted to the purchase of tnedia on a CD at a btick l'lnd mortar st01e.\n\n(U) Digital Tribe\n(U} Social groups that coalesce nround\" common intetesr or acth-it); or a shared ser of knowledge 9r beliefs because of the\n.opportunities, support, or prorec.tion that the collec-tive can provide to tl1e individual\n'\n(U) Distributed Computing\n(U) A genc-m) term to describe t11e nse of many computers, often geographicl'llly dispersed, openuing in uniwn to solve 11\nsingle or brollrlbascd problem.\n\n(U)e-Gold\n{U) A general term nsed to desnibe in-world cm-renq: It is oft'en specifically ref<'ning to the gold of \\Vorld\nof \\V;~rcmft, but can be used to de.scribe the cunency of other environments. AL~o a privare company.\n\n(U) Free-to-Play\n(U) A service tltllt makes g;~me play av;~ilable without chargr.-. Some free-to-play services charge for the progmm, oth<'t\"S chm-ge for game upgrades. This nsnally refi~rs to the lack of a periodic setvice chl'lrge.\n\n(U)GameGod\n(U) A cOJl>oration or person who c.rentes, uminr11ins, and controls the game world.\n\n(ll) God Game\n(l1) A t:onstnu:.ti(lll and manot~meut simulati<nl that' casts the player in the position of contl1)Uing the gmue ou a large scale, Ill! fill t.'tHity with divine/supernnt.ural powers, as n powerliilleader or with uu specified charActer :md plnces them iu charge of a g-mne $ettiug couminiug mnoucmou.~ chnmcters LO guard ai1d influeuct:O.\n\n\n(U} Gold Farmer\n(U) A plnye who engages in delibetate nctivities to ncquire (\"farm\") items of vnlue within n game by exploiting elements of rhr~ gmne's meclumics, usually for rhe purpose of selling these items for real.mone);:\n(U) GPS\n(U) Globnl Positioning System; a widely used aid to navigation worldwide rhar uses a constellation of between 24 and 32\nM!-\"dium E:mh Orbit s;etellites rhm mmsmit precise microw;eve sign:~ Is enilbling GPS receivers to determine locntion, speed, ditection, and rime.\n\n(U) Griefirr.g\n(U) A form of emergem game play where player-s engage in the act of harnssing other members of an online conununity in a manner that is coitsistenr with rJ1e c.ode of the system, bur which may violate the spirit or tenus of se.1vice of the system.\n\n{U) Haptic Device\n(lJ) A mr.chrmicnl device dtllt mediates physical conummicnrion brtween the user and the computt'J: Haptic devices :tllow users to touch, feel and manipulatf:' thrr.e-dimensional objects in vit1unl envimnments and telc-opemtf:'d systems.\n\n(U)IGE\n(u) A company based in rhe country of Vanuatu that deals in virtual currencies and e.xchnnging them for real c.m1encies.\n\n(U) lnsumt messaging; n ~e1vice that. aUows t\\vo usen ro ;'c.har\" with each odter using text; very common in vinunl '''tlrlds, though not limited to them.\n\n(U) Internet Ctife\n(U) Often found in developing conmries, it is usually\" concentrnrion of computen:; and online cnpnhiliries. that are rented to users by the hour.\n\n(U) lnteroperubility\n(U) The ability of one s~'Stem to work with anothet:\n (U) Killer App\n(ll) A term used ro describe n powed'nl and useful applicariou, one that is in high demllnd because of irs fenturf:'s ;end chives adoption of an enabling technology or pliltform.\n\n(U) Linden Dollar\n(l.i) The cmTency used in the vit1U:~l wmld, Second Life.\n\n(U) Massively Multiplayer\n(Li) A type of ~nile thar is cnpnble l)f s11pporting hundreds o thou~11nds of phtyers simulraneously.\n\n(U) Massively *Single* Plt~yer\n(U) A mMkcting h~rm coined torn n.::w gAlliC thilt nIJ~.,w~ indirect., nsyndll\"t)llOll~, online intcrnc.tion bNwcen plAyers.\n\n(U)Memes\n. (Li) Denotes fill}\" lcarnt~d fi~f.'ling, tlu;mght or ~ehnvior espt.>ci::tlly those that. ae eilsily pnssed fium person ro person.\n\n(U} Metaverse\n(U) A vinu:il.world, oi.gimtUy desc:Jibecl in Neal Srephenson's 1~192 science fiction novel Snow Cmsh, where. hmmms, 11s avarnrs, inrcrncr with each orher <mel softwilre agents, in 11 thn.~e-climensionill spt~ce thM uses the met11phor of the renl world.\n\n(U) Mirror-World\n(U) A rc!presentnrion of the rc.-.1 wolid in 1\\ virrunl f.1shion including accents nnd detnils thnt provide\" sheen of reality.\n\n(U) Mobile Devices\n(lD Po~ket size computer device, connected to a wirdess network, t~vically having a display screen with tottch input r.n mini.-.-\nture keyboard. The.-se de\\ti.ces can be telephony based.\n\n(U)MOO\n(Li) MUD OI~ject Oriented; a text-based online virtual reality system to which multiple users (players) are connected at the\n~~me rime. Tht- n:rm :MOO is used in t.wo distinct, but related, senses. One is to reter ro d}l)se programs descended from the original MOO serve; ~mel the other is to refer to any 1\\HID that uses ol~ject. oriented techniques to orh'<lnize its darabilse of\n.,bjects, p:n1kulady if it does so in a similar fashion to rhe original !VIOO or its detiwllives\n(U)MUCK\n(U) Mnlri Uset Cn>:flted Kingdom; is\" type of user-extendible onJjne text-b11sed role playing gnme, design~cl lot role pln)ing ancl socinl interaction. Similar ti>, a 1\\tfUD or l'viOO.\n\n(U)MUD\n(l.ry :Multi User Dungeon; A forum fi>r virtual role-plaring~ can be conceived of ns a thematically charl:,red chaL-mom with a li>cus 011 t\"Ole-pl\"l~ing. Cetuin ~l>es- so-called i\\100s- opemre with objects that the players/users can intemcr with (and sometimes niter/ crentc).\n\n(.U) Mrtltiverse\n(U) A 1\\ttttre cldincd as a plethora of virt.ual worlds. Multiple virtn11l geographies eilch of which mily be pmpriemry nnd not nt-eessmi.ly imewperable.\n\n(U)MUSH\n(li) :Multi-User Shnred Hack (or Hallucination); a text-based online social medium to which mtt.l.riple users are connected al the snme time. SimilAr to a :MUD or MOO.\n\n(U) Netizera\n(U) \"Net-citizen,'' a.pnrticipaut iu illl internet culture.\n\n(U) PMOG (PMsively Mult.ipbyC'r Online Gnme) is ::tn online g:'lllle which players \"pnssively' pmticipate while browsing weh pnges. Pl::ty~rs enrn dilt:'l points or l'lcquire digiffll \"'items\" by \\isiring unique domains, which they Cfln spend on various game irems that qm be at.tached to web pilges to t;igger event~ when ilnother player uexr visits tltCtt pRge.\n\n(U) Pay-to-Upgrade\n(li) Bu:::ine~s modl:'l lor ouline g:uui:'S in which phtp~r~ can play for frt.\"e, but llllst pay for upgntdes such as be-tter weapom o1\n(U) PC Bang\n(U) PC h;mg (;'bang'' approximately means ''room'\" in Korc:'ln) i!: R v:wiO\"ttion of Lo\\N gaming cenre1; where one can piny multi player computer g:mu:s with others. PC bangs arc extremely popular nmong young South Koreans. It bc:-camc extremely pc,pu11ll' when Starcraft came our in 1997. Although computers and hroadbnnd penetmtion per capim were very high, lllflllY young people went ro PC bangs 10 play LAN-basecl muhiplnyer g-<~mes, will1'others.\n\n(U) Persolla\n(U) A pcrsonn, in the word's f!\\'CI)'day ns:~gc, i:~~ n social n>le 01 a chnn'lctea played by nn nct~11: The word clcaives from the L111.in for \"mask\" or ''cllftrActer'', derived from the Euuscnn word \"phersu\", wirh the smne memiing. A person's tom I online prt::scnct~ induding t:mail, phone, chat, and web surfing.\n\n(U) Phishin.g\n(U) It is the caiminally Jimadulem process of Attempting lo ac:qnin~ sensitive infonnation such as usernames, passwords and credit card details, by umsquerncling as a trustworthy entity in an electronic communil~ation. C:onnnunicalions purporting t< be from Pay Pal, eBay, YouTube or online b<mks are c.ommonly used to lure the unsuspecting. Phishing is tn>ically caniecl om. by e-mail or insrant messaging, nnd ir. often direclS users w enter details nt a web sire. Phishing i;; an ex:nnple of social engineering techniques used to fool users. AtrC'mpts to cle:tl wirh rhe g.-owing mmbe-r of reported phishing incidents include legislation, user naining, public awme-ness, And technical Sl:'t:mity llli:'ASUI\"eS.\n\n(U) Pltreu.king\n(G) A sl:tng te-rm coined to clescaibe tlu~ activity of a subculture of people who study, c::q:ierimeul with, or t'!l.l'lon~ldeconuuu\nuicatiou systems, like equipment 11nd systems connected to public telephone- ne-tworks. The te-rm \"phreak\" is a portmanteau of the word:;; \"phone\" and \"fieflk.\" Ir may also refer ro the use- of various audio ti-equencics to mAnipulate a phone :;;yste.m.\n\n''Phmak,\" \"phreAket; ., or \"phone phreak'' an names used for And by individuals who pArticipAte in phreaking. Additionally, it is ofi.cn asscn;iarrd with compnte.r hacking. This i~ sometimes called the H/P culnm~ (with I-I' standing for H11cking and P\nsmncling fot Ph rea king).\n\n(U) Pseudo-Photograph\n(U) A pseudo-photcga~tph is.an image produced mammlly which is indistinguishable fi'Om a n:al phorogmph produced using a cnmcra. Although rhe term psenrlo-photogmph can be i'lpplied rcgarclless of what it depicts, in lrm' ir11 mei'lning is espccinlly rde\\'am regarding child ponwgrnphy. In rhe UK, the CriminAlJnsrice and Public Orde Act 1994 amcnclecl the Protection of Children Act 19i8 so as to define rhe concept of An \"indecent psC'uclo-phorogmph of A child.\"\n(U) Pu.blic Switched Telephone Network\n(U) Iris 1.he uetwork of d1e world's public cin:.uit-s\\\\itclu:d teleplwue networks, in much the S<tme way that the illlemet is the nt'I.Work of the- world's public IP-based packt't.-swirdted networks. Q,iginally a network of fixed-line mmlog telephonesystems, the PSTN is now 11lmos1 entirely dil:,..jlilJ, and now includes mobile as well as fixed telephones.\n\n(U) Q.Q. Coins\n(U) The QQ Coin iR a virtunl currency 1JSC'd b~ QQ Online, A popular set of cmline scrvil~es in China and South Af1icr, which users liSI:' ro \"purchase'' QQ relarecl items for 1hei1 ava111r and blog. QQ Coins a1e f.lbtAiued eirher by purclutse, one coin for one, for using the mobile phone- service, or via prepaid, debit, or credit cards. Due 10 the populm-ir.y of QQin C:hiuese )''Otmg popuhHiou, QQ Coins are uow accepted by more and more ouline stores and gaming sites in exchange for \"real\" merchandise such as smnll gifts, aud rai~t:d rhe concern ,,f replacing (and rims \"inAMing'') real currency in these transActions. TI1ey are also Acce('lted in some real w<rld cstablishmqnts.\n\n(U) Reality+\n(Ui Real-world geographif's euhmKecl by vimml elemems, dam, nud inte-ractivit}~\n(U) Real-Tim.e Strategy\n(U) Staaregy game in which rh~ action is pbyr.d out continuously without breAk~ (as opposed tl) turn-bA~ed strategy games).\n\n(U) Rhythm Games\n(U) Mt.t~ic based g:uues such as Guimr Hero and Rock Baml.\n\n(U) Real Momry Trade\n(U) The t~xdumge of virtunl items ;md CtiiTCilC)' for real world cmTency or vice venm.\n\n (U) Role-Pluying Game\n(U) A gnlut in which t.he prertic:ipnnts n~sume t.h, mi.:~ ,~r ficrinnnl chArnctcn; :mel collahorntivdy cn:nte or follow stories. PArticipants dttl!nnine rh~ nttkns of t.ht;ir dtantcres bn.sed on their c:hamcteti:tatiou, :mel tlle actions succeed or fitill'lccordiug to fl Ji:wumlized ~~sreru of rule~ and guidelines. \\Virhin rhe rules, pla~'ers ca11 improvi!>e lieely; rheir choices shnpt tlte diret:-\ntion 1end ctHC<Jnu: of rhe game!!.\n\n(U)RSS\n(Ui A fflmily of web feed formMs used ro publish lhqnently updilled content such as blog ennies, news hendlines, i'lncl podl'.asts in a st;mdnnlize~l formi'll.\n\n(U) Seclimine\n(li) A virrual dntg sold in Second Lfe.\n(U) Second Life Liberatima Army\n(U) An e:'l.verimcnt nm by Rodctickjones to see how tet'l'otist groups might fom1 i'lncl opemte in virnml\n\\\\'orlds. Jones was nble to recmir rei'! I people ro his t:i'luse and successfully demonstrated rhe possibilit-y of vi1tual world tiO'rrorism.\n\n(U) Simulat-ions\n(U) A s~t c)f rules, often embedded in a videognme or computer progtam designed 10 mimic i'lctions aucl opemtions in rhe\n\nI'IO':tl wodd. Gnmes, for exmnple, i'll1! often simull'lcicms of enllife :tctiviry. Nor :til games, howevet; are simulations and not 1'111\nsimul11tions ;ue gnmes.\n(U) Smart Card\n(U) A Cflrcl (u~u111ly the size of 11 CTedit card) which comains embeddt\"d processing nnd secure dnla sromge. They ill'e C)JJicaUy\nused fi:> authenticationnnd stored v11lue i'lpplications. Cunemly more rt\"sismnt ro forge'}', fraud and hacking than magnetic\nsnipe cards they are bt\"ing rt\".placed with RFID card~.\n(U) SpJ!Wan\n(U) Soft.wnre surreptitiously installed on n computer thl'lf rep01rs bl'lck to the cCJntrolling entity nbont the use of, i'lnd infornulticin on ancl::~cc.essecl b~; thi'lt computet:\n(U) Telepresence\n(T.J) A set. of teclmologies which allow a person to fe-d ns if they were present, ro give the appennmce rhar they wer~~ present, or ro luwe nn ell'ect, at a locarion other rhnn rheir true locnrimt. Telepresent:e requires rhm. the !>Cttses of rhe user; or user);, Are provided '~ith such ~timuli ns to give the tf.ding of being in thnt othc'r locntion. :\\clclitioni'lll); the usetN m::~y he given the nbility to 11ffect the remote locntion. In rhis case, the \\tser's position, movemenrs, ::~ctions, voice, ere. JUi'l}' be sensed, tnmsmittecl and cluplicMed in rhe remote locnti(jn to bring about chis effect. Thus information may be ttttvelling in both diret:tions between rhe \"ttse\nand the remote location.\n\n(U) Turn-Based Strategy\n(U) A ~ve of g<'lllle involving stmtegy where plnyers move sequenrinll~~ one nftet rhe ocher (sucl1 ns ches.-;); cmnpi'lre ro \"re<1l\n(U) Ubiquitous Computing\n(li) A t:ombinntion of widespread input ~tnd otU]>UC devic.e~ associmed with evel'}'di'l)' objects such rhat rhe ability ro make use of compmer capabilities is embedded in 1he envirl~muenr (rather than resnicred to spet:ific tools such as H PC or cell phone).\n\n## (U) Virtual 3D Rt!Alm (U) A Synonym Lor Virrunl World.\n\n(U) Virtual Currt!IICJ1\n(U) Cm-rency used in\" virttlill world. Can oli-et~ be exc:hRnged for \"real\" cuiTencies such as DoURrs or Emos. Exmuples nre QQ Coins :mel World of Warcmft gold.\n\n{U) Virtual Economy\n(U) The ccon(lllic mwi:mnwm crcnted wir.hin fl virtuAl world. Often hAs go~tls, such R$ ~me plAy balance, not \\lsnnlly Rtuihmcd to rl:'nl world economie~.\n\n{U) Virtual EnviroJJmellt\n(li) A syw:mym lc)r vil1.tlill w<Jrld.\n\n(U) Virtual Property\n(U) Property owned in A virtual world. The property is usu::.Uy corisiden:d inrdlccntRI property l'llthough there is n on-going discn~sion concerning the:' ownership of land nnd chnttel in virtual worlds (lor instance should rhe law of eal property or the lnws of inrcllecttlRI propc:'rty apply?).\n\ni\n(U) Vishit~g\n(U) The crimiual practice of using soci::.l engineering and Voice over IP (\\'oiP) to gain access to private personal and fiuaucial iufi:nmation liout the public for dte pmvose of fiunncial reward.\n\n(U) A common plmlorm thnr ~tllows for multiple use.-s to connect fot t'tllertRinment or business, <~llowing e<~ch 11$<!'1\" ro comnmnicnte ot collabomre with one another in real time over a network infmstrucrure. includes bod1 gnines <~nd non-game pl<~rfonns.\n\n(l.i) The endy internet, chnmcterized by static web pRge design nnrllimited interRcriviry.\n\n(U) Web2.0\n(U) A St'l of technologies and npplications thnt ar(~ intended ro enable efficient imcrncrion nnwng people, cotHem, ;md data in support of collectively fostering new bus:iuesses, technology oiTeriug:s, and socinl ~rruc:\nmres via the itHemer. The rt-nn is often used 10 de.sc:tibe the use of more dynamic and imemctive interuer technolot:,ric-s.\n\n(U) WiBro\n(U) Wireless hrondbAm:l; KoreA's v..-rsion of \\.Vil\\1ax.\n\n{U) Wiki\n(U) A collection of web pages designed co en<~ble ;myone who accesses it to contribute or modify comenl using a simplified mnrkup language.\n\n(U) WiMax\n(U) A wi t-.:-lcss brc:mrlbn ncl sranda n:l.\n\n(U) World of Warcrafl Gold\n(U) l'vl.oncy n!'<'d in the online g<;~me, World of \\VArcmli-. \\Vhile forbidden by the crenrors of rhc gAme, \\.Yodel of \\Vnrcrnft\n(.lold is freely rmdecl 011 a uumber of unregulated markets amll;uge munbers of Chinese ~tud other non-US muiouAls nmke a )j,,iug \"f.,tming .. gold and 5ellillg it to westerners. Tlus pmctice is called realmouey tmde.\n\n## (U) E.Ndnotes\n\ntU) lkb SinK>n, ''Sex, Lit~!'. ;mtl \\icl~o G:unc~~ CBS News,\n6 Augus1 200:~; R\\'Bibtble ti,>m http:/ 1\\\\'\\\\'\\,:cbsne,,s.c>ml srcries/:?002/ I::?/ 16/60II/mnin5SS!.H3.slum~ inrerne'l, ac:ces.w.t.i\n\n= Angus1 2008: for 2(l(H figm-es see Mnrrhew Yi, \"111~' Got Gmnc/' Snn FI'Bndsco Chronidt', W Deo:cmber 2C:HH, nvnilable M hnp:/ '\"\"\"'~.ffgntr.-.com/cgi-binlnJ1ide . .:-gi?f=ichronide/nrchive/20(14ll2/18/MNGUOAE:.~6ll.DTL. Iuremer.\n\n(U) Blnkt: Sn<.m; ''Film E.'tecs Blame Halo3 for Poor ~10\\ic &lies,\"\nGnmeProj 6 Ocrc~r 200i, nvnilnble nt hrrp:/ \"''''':gmur.pa\"O.com/\n~lt<Ws.dini'nl'fide_id= 14080H, imernr.r, accessed 5 AuS'lSr 200B.\n\n(U) For '' clefinirkn of du. tenn ,..umllA)'D,'' sf!'e ;:-\\ Word on Idemiry''\nin '\"Wh\\'l An You?: Vi111ml CuluuY:.\"\n\n## 3 4.\n\n!U) !\\lou: infornmrion on this prcxlucl u a\\ailabll\" at Em>tiv'~ web sire, help:/ hmorh:comlfNDS_3/intb1_3.html, intemt\"t, nccc:,:ced 5 :\\ugust\n2008.\n\n(U) ':o\\.iuti~'Sis: NPD Hnrdwll re Salt.\"5 :?0(17,  Edge Online, 21.Jnnu:try\n2008: r\"\"'lilllblc- ut hrtp:/ \"'\"\"':ec:l~-ouline.com/tennu-es/iml'llyllis\n\nnpd-hMdwarc:-AAI~~oo7?pa!orc=~:o2C:O, in1eme1, ncces5(:d 5 August\n200H.\n\n(li) Memf!': \"a ... ulmrnl ilf!'lll thnt is transmirr~d by re~tirion in 1'1\nmanner aunlogous ro thl' hiol>gical II'IIJL'flnissit)JI of gt\"nN'', Random House, R1111(lom HouS(' UnabJidged Pio:Jional'); (New \\'i:>rk: Random Housl:\", Inc., 2006). Set.\" also Richard Dawkins, Tit~ Selfish Gen~,\n{USA: Oxfiml Uuivt.\"rsity P~, 1990;.\n\n(li) QQ Coins are Jl ,imml cm-ency popnlnr iu C:hinl'l nnd Sonrh Afrit.a.\n\n(li,l lnremnl r.,cton include sdf l~l'Ception: physic-al rmirs, personnl\nirs l'lliOtionnl bond!, sexnalit}~ illld l~lie&. E.'l:teraml factors indude\n\nf:~milial nnd socinl bo1~ds, nnriounlism, cducariln, economic sJatus,\n:mel famco.\n\n(U) Smnli>rcl Uuivcr11i1y. \\<inual Human hiiC'raction LAb, m11ilable\n\nli'(>lll lur.p:/ /\\hil.~li1llfilrd.t\"du/pubs/, inrc-met. ac:ct\"ss<5 Augu:~t\n2003; Palo Alto ReS<'nrch Centt.\"J> 2002-200i, n\\'<liinblt.\" from llUp://\n\"\"'\"'J>nl'l::.com/, inrernt.\"r, ncceSSC'd 5 August 2008; Nicolns Duchenemll:ll Puhlic:;;Jit.~ll~, Pl-llet Abo Rcsean:h C('nh~lj 200.2-2007, n\\11ilnblt.'\nfmm Imp:// ww,,2 .pare .com/ csl/mt'mben/nkohu/ publicl'llious.\n\n!nml, intemc:t, acc~ut.\"d 5 AuS'tsr 2008.\n\n(UJ Gritfcr~ ill't~ players char hn1'8ll.'l C>lher members of Hll onlinr community iu a mnnner rhl'lt is inconsistC'iu ,,;th he. renm of v.l'\\ico:- cf thc-~stem.\n\n1U) Thempcuti.: Spncc:s, 11tcDaedalu~ Pt~jr.ct. 201.13-:!fiOG. a\\-ailable\n' from hrrp:/ h\\'\\'\"'~n.id .. :..ccm/ cgi/l\\IT /nn-conunenrs.cgi?enr'1'-\nid=516, internet: accessed 5 Aug11st 2008.\n\n## 11' 12\n\n(li'! Serio11s Gnmes Tnxoncmy Shnrtd, Se1ious Gnmes Inifinti,~, 19\n1;:bnmry 200fl, tw~tilnblt ficm1 hup:/ \"'\"'''~l!('J'iousgmn~::~.crg/indt:x2.\n\nhcml, iuiC'1111\"J. at:cl.\"s.~cd 5 Au!,.'11St 20118: \"Seti<lls gnme:\" \\\\ikipedia, Of!'cr.mber 2(1(1i, fl''llilttblC' from hup://en.wikipeclin.ol'gl\"iki/Seri-\n\"'\" .. -e;\"'\"\"' internet, nccessed .)\n2008.\n\n{U) RoSH l\\likf!'nl MaaJ~y andjennifer Sta\"l''lll\\'1'-Gnlles \"11u: Digital Dollhmtse: Content and Socinl Norm:~ iu the Simi' Onlinf>,\"' Games\n;md Culture: Ajonnm1 of lnteractiw Media .. 2. no. 4, (Octo~r\n2007): :314-334, a\\<tilable from Imp:// online.s.1~pub.rom. intemf!'t, accessed S Angtl$t 20~t\n\n(U} Thomns Chf.'Sn~~ Swee-Hoon CJntnh, and Robert Hollimmn,\n\"Virtual world experimentltliou: An r.xp1or<llory sruds'' 12 OeCf'mber :?007, :t\\'l\\ilablP.tiom http://,,..Mv.noctingham.ac.uk/-Jizecou/\nRePEc/pdf/2l.pdf, int~m~t. at:ce.ssed 5 Angusr 2008.\n\n15\n(Uj N. YcC\",j.N Unih.tl:'>n, M. Urhanck, F. C:hnng, l'lnd D. ~lcrg~,\n''Tlu. Uul>enJ'l\\bll~ Likcnc.-u of Ueing Digital: Thl!' l'c!t'sistntc.~ o)f Not ...\n\\'erbnl Socul Norms in Ouliu~ Virtunl En\\oiaonna~uts,\" The .Joumf\\1 of\nCyberl'sychology aucl ~hmior, 10 (2007): 115-121.\n16\n(U) ':\\nuouncing The FiBt Experimental Henlrh Game Jam at Uni\\'ersiry of Bahimort> October 18-19, 2008,\" Games for Henllh, Ocrober 2008, rwaibible at hrtp:/ \"'\"\"'''~gamf'sforhealrh.cit-g/indf!'X:i.\n\nhunl1 inlemet, accessed 5 August 2008.\n\n(U) Pr:accmnkt:a; 2006-2007, il\\llilRbk- liom hup://\"\"\"':pencemnkergrml:'.coml. iufl'l'llet, ncc:e.s~cl 5 Allgll$t 2008.\n\n17\n18\n(UJ .. The Psychology of !\\[Msin:ly Multi-User Onlutf!' Rolf!'-Playi11g:\nGames: Mom\"'ltions, Emorionnl ln\\-esmlelll', Relnrionships and I'I\"Obll'lllltic: Lisage,\" 2006, tt\\ailnble fi\"Omllllp:/ /\\hil.slaufon:lcdu/\npubs/201.1()/yt'e-psycbology-mmoJllg.pdf, inumct,nccl'sSf'd 5 Augu111\n2008; ''The Seducrion of :\\chiC'\\emtnt in MMORPGs,\" 2004, l'l\\-ailnble fa\"Om hnp://www.nickycc.cmn/ditcclalus/an:bin~/000780.php, intcmer: nccc!IS(\"d 5 August 2008.\n\n(ti) 'Thf!' Seduction of AchiC'\\emem in MMORPGs..\" 200'!, availahle from hrtp:/ hmw.nick~'\\'t!'.com/ da~.><lnlus/lln:hi\\'es/000780.php, inrc~a\nnet. acc:es5t'd 5 Angus! 2008.\n\n{U) \"'Dice Against J.hl' Nl'lzis/' BBC 1\\'t\"ws Magazine, 24 Augus1\n2007, n\\-ail.1blc fl\"Om hnp://ncws.bbc.co.uk/2/b.i/uk_ste\\\\\"S/nt.1gnzine/6958782.stm, internet, nccf!'ssed 5 .o\\ugusr 2008.\n\n(U) \"Free Pla);'' Rt-ason, .~ptil 2005, available f1T.m1 http:/ \"\"''\\',J?.nson.com/uc,,'S/show/29103.hnul, intc:l'tl~t, accessed 5 Augt.\\St 2008.\n\n(U) \"f.1huic Cleansing (2002) is a CQIIfi'O\\~t'siftl computer b\"ffmc dew:lop<'cl by Resist nne<' Recorcl-., nn undel'!,'l'Olmd auuMc In bel spr.-c:i.:dizing in Neo>-Nnzi and whir~ supremacist bnuds. In the ,game, the protagonist (the pL'l~rcr can choose \"ther n wnhead or a K.Jansnum) J'\\.1115 dtmugh a ghelto killing black Jx-cple nncl Luinns, hdc>1'~\ndescending inll> n subway !'~'Stem ret killJe\"\" Finally he rcadtf's the\njf!\",ish Control Center\", where Atiel Sharon, former Prim!.\" Minister or Israel, is directing plA115 fol' world dominntiou. The pbt~\"f!'l' IIIIlS{\nkill Sharon ro \"in the g\"Rmc .. , From Erlmit-. Cll~llnsing (video game), Wikipedin, April :?008, 1\\\\':Jilable from hrrp:/ /en.\\\\ikipedia.org/wiki/\nEdmic._Clennsing_0/o28computer-.\":la,une0/o291 intl'I'Jlet, ac:cf'ssec:l 1\nAugust 2008; ''GHm~\"ll Ele'\\att\" Hare to NI!'XI L.e\\el,'' Wite<l, :?0 Ft-bmil11' 2002, m-ailnble rrom hrtp://\"\"'\"~''irt:c.l.com/culturc/lif..-!liYld news/2002/02150523. imern~t, nccessed 5 August 21XJ8.\n\n(Ul ''Inn wngrs Virtual \\Var,~' ftl-jar.ct~l': 18July 200i, ant!lilhlc li\"C.nn lmp://english.n!jnzeem.uer/foc:us/iran/2007 /(17/20083251 {139:i693\n(l738.html, iureme.r, accessed 5 Augusr 20013.\n\n(li.l Tht\" nnin1dt on design side wns succinctly c.nprured iu Sl\"\\'l\"t'nl of\n~me designer Raph KOllrer's ''uws of Online World Design:'' ''No\nntnrrcr wluu ~'>II <k, plnyers \\\\ill dc:.:.c;lc: ~-e~ lht'lmda, sratisrk: mrd\n;tJ~otilhm in }~:till' WJ.ltirJ \\ill C.lCJ>t~litm.nf;Ui<lll,\" nnd ''N't~\\'f!l' Jllll anr rhin~r on tht.\" dil.\"ut. The client j, in the hands (If the ~netm: N'e\\-eor e\\'('1'\n'.\"'et~forger rhi!!.'' R~aph Ko.srer's Websire, 1998-2008, n\\';liinble from hup:/ h'w\":mphkoster.com/gamiug/law!l.shtml, iniC'rner . ;u:c~cl5\nAugust :?008.\n\n~UJJnmts \\\\'ngrwr t\\n, The :\\laL.ing of Scnncll..ilc: N(tl:!~ rm~n thc N1:\\\\' \\ Vorld, 2008.\n\ntli) GBN Rq.llll'l. ''Ncores faum rhc Unclc:rgrouncl: A snapshm \\~t\"W\nof trt.'nds, cnpabiliri~s. nnd rhrt.'nts ~merging fiom the uncle-a-ground\n,.c>n)lny\". 2005. Clcbal Rusines.~ N<twork: a member of the Monit<t' Gmup. This repot1 \\\\'l'IS an nppeni'lix ro a lm-ger n:potr ccmmissioned by ln-Q-Td: Fntmes Pl'Ojecr Report. March 2006.\n\n:U,i An 'amcle-grouuc:l economy'' is 0111.' wherl.\" thl\" \\'nlue is dt.'livcd from I} illt1-rnl !,>\"()(tds nrst:-t'\\iCt\"s, Qr *:!)* rhe pen:eh~d inunol'lll nnttu-e~\nof got.ICI.\" Cr s~J'\\ ices\n\n(UI Hl.'llll)re, Edwnrcl, ''Homr. Jorn Ghes Industry thl\" Blues'' iu Th~\n0~1'\\~t: 16 De-cembl.'r 2007, n\\niJabiP. fi'f.lm lurp:/ '\"'''w.guardilln.\n\n~co.ukhwl(!/~(107/ dcc./1 6/tilm.nsn, iuh.'t'ltt!l, ncO:t's.~~t'd 7 Ocrobet\n2008.\n\n{U.: C:nroline :\\leek-Prieto, ':Just Agt\" Plnying Aronnd? HO\\' St\"r.ond L.ili. .-\\ids mad Abtrs Child Poruogmphy,\" in No11h C:.twlinajoumal of Law nud Tedm(dc.'!,~~ I Junt 200f:S. http:/ 1\\,w\\,:ncjoh.org/mnrent/\n\\iew/139/107/J/6/, illlti'Jlll't, accessed 5 August2008.\n\niU).JomulumJ. Klin!;f~; Wnrld of \\Vurcrntl Erotic Guild Disbandmem Suggests VhTtml \\\\oriel~ May Become Vh'tnal Countries,\" in \\ir-\n\nmnll~ Blind, :!O.Juu 2007. Imp:/ /\\irnmllyblind.cmn/2007 /09/20/\n\\\\'01id of WHI'Cr:tft-guild-hnnning-itrtl\"t11<11ional-btw/\n, im~nwr,\n:u:c.es..~cd 5 Au~u~~ 2008.\n\n(ti,l.Rrginn Lynn, 'Vi!1ltal Rnpr is Trnunmti{', bur is It n Cl'ime~\nin Wired, 4 M:ty 200i. lurp:/ /'\"\"'':win:cl.r.om/cuhun~/liff!'st~ie/\ncomml.'llf:'ll'y/sexclrin/2007 /05/St>xrhin~~-0504-, imernf!'t. *ncct'sSc.-d* 5\nAugust 2003.\n{li) Mcrk-Pi~tl), 2008.\n\n33\n34\ni_U) Cdi~a l'f'~tat, c(lnummirit-s of Plar: nat Social CmiSimcrion of\nlclcntity in Per~iSII\"UI. Onlinr Gnmc. \\Voticb,\" iu SectJnd Perl'On, t-ds.\nNoah Wardrip-Fruin nnd Pnr Hanigan. MIT Prt.'Ss, 2006, n'-nilnble\nli\"cuu lutp://ww\\\\:lcc.g<llt:ch.tdn/-qxarce:l!PearceJlubs/Pc:anc.-SI'-\nFimal.p.ll: iuu:met, '\"'~cessed 3 August 200ft\n(U) Adam Rtmers. ''Gnmte-1 Stl'rs 80% Virtual world Penrrrntion by\n20 II'' (25 Aptil 2(107). n\\'~ilabl~ at http:/ heconctlife.t~uaers.com/\nsroriell/2007/04/25/ ga artter-sec.\"s-80-\\ iriUlll-worid-pcntrratiotJ\nby-2011/, inrernet, ncc~s.'lt\"<15 August 2008.\n\n!U) G111eHonJ< News St'nice, Rcligir.111 News: Video games go C:hristinn. Gillesbnrg.ct.'lm, 17 July 2008, :1\\C'IiJ.,bl~ li-om http://www.\n\ngnlr.-shurg.com/lifest)1P.s/ religi(a~/ :t544088:?35/Rdigion-News-Videogi\"'mes-!,.ro-Cin-isli;m, inttmr.t, accc::..'l!d 5 Augu~t 2008.\n\n(Uj lm1pir!\"d Ml':diil Eul!\"rlllinmenl, 2003, H\\'ailnhlc: from http://www.\n\nleftbt!'hiudgmn~.com/, iurerner, ncr.esst'tl 5 Augrtst 2008.\n\n{u) :\\nd} Chalk, ''Hezboll.1h \\idP.Ogllme Sparks Prorest in Baht'iu,\" Escapist l\\-lagazinc, 27 August 200i, :wailnblc: fiom Imp://\n\nwww.l\".scapi~rnmgazinc.com/newshicw/76362, imc:rul.'t, ilcctssc:t:l5\nAugust 2008.\n\n(Li} Pl11za, AmaclN, ':\\u Atgmut~m for Rdigion in Vidc:o Games,''\n.\\.:.,[PED News, 30July 2008, a\\'ailablc fromlltrp:/ /pla~~rm/wirc/\ndid:/2054795, int~met. ncce~l5 Angttst 200tl.\n\n(U) C:Mby L~1m Grossman, 'Fnithfid build a ~coud Lifll' for religion online,\" USA Today, 3 Aptil 2007.\n\n(ti) Z. B. Simpson, \"~lnssh-e Multi-Player Online Games\n(MMOGs), and \\-1\\~ H\"'-e Ecmaomir:!t fo1 l'i\\c Ptiuciplc Re11wns,\" nmil:rble from hup:/ /www.mine<ontroJ.c,.Jm/\nzack/uoecon/uotc:on.html: inrt\"lner, ncce*'d.Jnly :?008.\n\n0 R01tim power. New playcrs ~houldu't be nlmt-powe,rfhl.\n\nA well functioning rconom~ ,,;JIIimit accc:ss to powedill irr.-ms. This h~lps balance mulripla~-eor gam~.\n\n0 Support Spt'cinlizarion. An economy which limits \\\\itar n player may possess though pricing will forcf' playra'llto choose ahl\"ir itt'ltlS c;mftttl}: For eXHmple, il' tooLo;..of-lntde are f'XJ>ensi\\'~. then plA}\"P.t's nilln~ ro spr.dalize in only one trnde. This encourngt-s iudi\\idual pla}'CI'l' to find a niche 1111cl gi\\'cs pt11lJOSf' and dit-etthm rorheir nctiuns.\n\n0 Enccmrngtl' inrernctions. A wP.ll functioning econr:uny cnn mori\\C'Ile pll'l~'f.'t's to meet with t'ltCh orher for ti7J(Ir.- and work.\n\n0 i\\lori\\11tt n~rs. ntcn~ m-e mauy pos..,ihlf' gClal\"' in a Cl.'llllplex g:tmc,jusr as in t-enrtife. Acquiring wr.nlth ,,;n genr.-mlly help a playr.-r :rlong rhe rc>lld towards any goal rhey sdecr. In lact, acquiring wealrh cau sel'\\'e as a default goal when du gnme setting or 1he playr.-r's imagimttirm tt'mpor:tr\nilyf.1ils.\n\n0 Support economic. rolt'-pln~ing. Some players will :rlways f'l~joy raking on ~1>f'rifir. emnomic rcles such ns m'tisnn, mt'rchnnt. tr traclf'r. A wdl functioning cc>uomr j,.. t,llcinl ro supporting these nnnualroles.\n\n(.U) Aknrei-Lttct'nl, avail:,ble from hup:/ /wwwl.akntdlttCt'nt.com/ publicntions/ n bsrmcr Jbtml?repo!>itorylrem=rc m%3AI72-262211635, intemet, *:rccr.-s.wd* 5 Augusr 2008.\n\n(U) Adam Grec.-nficld, The Thl\\ming .~ of Ubiquitou~\nComputing, avli.ilnble nt http://\"\"\"\\:studies-o~t\"\\1'ttjons.\n43\nc:Ctn/e\\'el')'\\'al'c/sampln/c~t:l')'\\\\'are_inti'O.hlmf, imeruc.-t,\nncce-sst'd 5 August 2008.\n\n(l.I) hrtp:/ I citeseerx.ist .psu.c:dn/vir.wdcx/ do\\\\1tlo.1d;jl!Cll!lionid=5C5 i F ... \\DC:DEOB8i06090J)C:3E0275i9C:Aa?cloi= 10.1.1.61.7449&rcp=\n~pl&l)'J>C!:::pdr, iutr.-met, acr.:e5$tl'cl 5 August ~008.\n\n44\n(Uj Disuibuted design and d.isrrihnred prcoduction 1-efe-r to fnnctious that are pnrceled out ton wide \\'ariel) of liJ>ecialisr!> \\\\'ho at-e sptead our geographicllll)'\n\n(tij Tor Thonen, \"Study: 21)12 gmne l\"e\\'s to hit 68.3 billion US~.\"\nGmneSpor, 18June 2008, http:/ '\"''\"''.gam~.com/\npc I rpg/wolidol\\mrcraft/ n~ws.html?sid=6192719, internet, nccessed 5 August !!008.\n\n## T,U.L Lhid.\n\n!U) hnp://idnsh.r.trg/pi)>'\"mnil/mr-ci/2007-S~ptember/OOOSiS.\n\nhuul, intcmc.-t, OtCCI:'!'tc<:d;) :\\ug1.1sl 2008.\n\n(U) l~xdu(~lll:\\ Jll;rllfii'Y 111;11-ktt, itl'lll-hn:ttcllir'!I.Jl.1rty ~fllfs of digitAl gn(l(lll (f<\"ll' rXflluplt~ 1\\ l:rplc.' Sr~wr iwarar upgntflell lll~ld ditt('rly w the Jlht>-er br N~lCcm! th(' gnmt' publillhE\"r'): \"H(Iw Uig is th~ RMT\nMnrkt!'t!',\" Virtunl E((;tUf.lll~' RP.~tll\\:h No:twcn'k, rwnilnble 111 http://\n\\\\\"WW.\\\"il'lllfllt~Ct'IICtlll>~t'IJ'!;/bJo~/ho-bi,f!-is_tht!_l'lnf_IIJal'kel_:ury\\\\~\ninrcmer! ncc:t.'lllled 5 August 2008.\n\nI_Uj hup:/ /ouliu~-\"'~i-~~mlpnhlic:/artide/SI1117519G7011465:~518\nFR_svDHxRtxkvNrr(iw'1>0IIII-112g:_2008t1~29.1rnl?nrod=r'lls_\nfree%3C:br%20/%:JE, iutemer, accessed 5 Angusr 2008.\n\nil.!) CPP200707(149680i4 Hcug Kl'n.g :\\1<1' 'Chin~ Online GRmers mnkiug M'n~ \\'in Online Ccmunoxliries~ July 4, !?OOi.\n\ntU}Jnliiln Dibbell, \"The Lit\\- of the Chinese Gold Fm-m..-r,'\" I i June\n2007.\n\n(li,l Fr\"JX Ncwll \"Chinese 'Gold flll'lllt~l'll .. Play CC1111p11rer c~lnl('$ fcJI'\nCash~\" *'li* Seprt\"mber 200ti, n\\'nilable from Imp:/ /\\nndoxnews.\n\nccm/ps1mea~faiendly_swry/0,356t)~21581i0:00.html, internet, nccc:>std 5 August 2008.\n\n(U) Imp:/ I t\"nglish.emt\"ws.co.kr/news/dernil.html?id=20070 1220008, iuremt\"t, ;ccessed 5 August 2008.\n\nCU.1 n,e Oc1opus card was oigiually issued by::. 11011-pmfit nrg;inizarion lonncd by a conrortimn of public transit comp:mies tlmt lw\n\nl'l'f~;~nnecl into a for-prCifir quAsi-fimmcinl instiruti(lll. The cnrr.l is now accepted lor \"millliS rrm1Sc1ctious in Hong Kong. nnd ias u~ is expnndiu.g int('I\"IJMit>IIIIJy. [II :?007, ll'lHISIICciml \\'(IJume in Q~fOJliiS \\\\':tS }I)\nMilliou US Dc:ollnl's pea <h~: Mobile P~tym_ .. urs in Ari:1, KJ'MO, 20t)i.\n\n{U)Jinping- Xu, \"(~c:smucnl Rmubl~s, Chisu.'lll.\" Vircual?\\loney\n:Mnrkers Stable fCol' No,\\; Virum! Er.<momy Rese:111:h Nen\\'Ork: 19\nl[nrch 2007, ;n-:.il:tblt' at http:/ /\\irm;~l-econ~;~n~:org/blog/go\\'em\nntt:m_nmablts_<'hin('!lt\" _,ir: inttm~t, at:Ct'sSt'd 5 Angn!l 2008. ,\ntUj 0,} Cm:: R p,,ttet'$.011, *i\\1.* ThiebmL.,., \\ia\"tunl &-nliry 30 Jnrerfac~\n\n57\nSy$t~m f()l' Onm C:rt-nrion, Viewing :md Editing, in Rc.-f. T9ti l :~7:\nIU:s('arch nncl Technc))l.gy .MnnHgc.-menl OffKe, Unhcrsicy of Illinois\nnt Lirbann..Ch:mp;.~igu (UitiC), Ot-ctmber 5, 199i.\nill; Bill Hibh:1rd, ''VisAd'', 11\\'ail:tble frr.nn hup:/ /ww,~:ssec.,,oisc:.\n\nc:du/-hillh/,il'<d.hrml, intt'ru~c, ncr.e5sr:d 5 Angtllll 2008 ..\n\n!U) Bill Hibb;ll'd, ''\\in51Y', IWililablc AI llllp://''\"'''':sset.wiJo:.\n\ntdn/ .... billh/,'i!Ocl.html. inh~mea, A:ce~cl ~ Augtt$1 2008.\n\n## .59\n\n73\n(U; Olci Dominiou Uni,-et'si~:, ''Ciwe 50 Release 2.0'', :waimble at hrrp://mrw-unix.mcs.nnl.gO\\/-mickelso/CAVE2.0.hunl; ncc~l t'll. 5 Angusr :!I.IIJ8.\n\niU) G~tlfi-cy FtMlr.r :mdJuyiug Qin, \"QQ: Chiwas Nr\" Coin of the Renlm?''. The Wall SrreetJoumnl, 30 M:tn:h 200i, amilnble at lurp://online.wsj.com/public/artide/SBll7519670ll4653518-\nFR_s,DHxRtxkvNmGw\"1>0llq_ll2g_20080329.1tlnl?mcxl=n'l!_\nfhe%3Cba~lo,20/\"!t,..'m, incemt'l, acces5ed 5 August 2008 ..\n\n(lij Bctflz Rottenberg. Lili VC..hdonvia111 :mdJiaping Xu, \"GO\\ermnent Rumbles, Chint\"Se \\liJ\"tlml.i\\[t>n~ 1\\-t:ntctll St:ible li:tJ' *NO\\\"':* Virtual r._ ........ n ........ t.\"!' ........ qr.'\\.r ........ n/\\1\\i' ....... :t .. t ... t .. ----1'\n.a.AoJIIV1&.' .L\"'-.,,._\".,'-'1 '-''' 1\"\"1ftt ..,.., 41.&.t.A'-&1 **-v'-''** - ~aauA'- \"' \"''I\"' '\n\n,;,\"tual-ecQuom~:<rg/blog/gO\\'c.-nu~lent_runbles_chin~l'-'il; imernet.\n\n;u:c~!s~cl 5 Angusr 2008.\n\n## 63.\n\n(1Jj Ac.:Cirdins- to th~ Entea1niument 5c:lftwnre AssociaJion, computP.I'\n11nd ,ide.> gnme' wert\" n 9.5 biUion US O~;~llm b11siness in the United Stnws in 2007. The \\'A.~t majol'ity t>f thi~ mr.on-y (tl.(){ billion US 0(11-\nlarll) i~ spent <on ,-ideo games.\n\n(U) rkijing Cyber Rt~rt:lltil)ll De\\-clopnu.ut Cop, \"Vi1't11al wCJrlds Sp.\"tcr\", 11\\\"llilable nt hup://\"'\"':crd.go\\:t~l.tt\"n/crd_vw:~pace_ti(JI\nbanksp.1ce.asp, internet, accessed 5 August 21)1)8 ..\n\n## 64 65\n\n(U) Ad,:mced MMOG Cnnency Resenrch, \"The Ris~ and Fall of IGE'', 8 NO\\?.mber 2007, a\\':lilable at http://''\"'\"'':mmobu.\"'-com/\nartides/i60/r.hc--Jise-ancl-fall-of-ige; acces.'lt'd em .. llllcl Govt\"'mment of rhc Republic of v:\"nuarn, 'Ot-wloping V:umnru~ Iurem~t C'.apabilities\"_. <Wnil:tblc at http:/ /w''\"''.\\'l\\Unamgo\"emment.gO\\:nl/Itut\"'met.\n\nhunl, intes'llet, accessed 5 August 2008.\n\n(li) DFGAmcs, ;milable 11r IJUp:/ /dlgames.com/, inrt\"met, accesst'd 5\nAugust 2008.\n\n(U) Lili Vc-hdon,csta, 'Sw~en .Mc\\~s to T.1x In-Game Tmusactions\",\n16 April 2008. 11\\~tillllt\"' at http://\\il'lla:tl-ecrJn>m~:oa-g/hlog/swc-dcn_\nIIICI\\'cs_ao_t:.x_in....gamc_tt; inrc:met, nccess.~d 5 Augusr ZtXl8.\n\n(l'j f(,l'l'lln'l:nt la\\\\'8 llf\"Cdl1yne A. Hiu:hcoc.k'li w ... b~r..:-, ii\\-ajJahl~ frr..sn http://www.lwllabttSt\".org/re:lt:.uJ\"CI\"IIIhm'll/inck~x.shtml, iutc::mt:a, ac-\nr.essecl 5 August 2008:\n\n(U) Aaron Ricadela, \"Cong1-ess Take-s Aim ar Sp~\"''~~re;' Busiue~\n\\\\'eek, l8.Jmlt\" 2007.\n\n## 69 70\n\n(U.l Philip E. Agre and :Marc Roteubt'rg, Technology and Pln111cy:\nThe 1\\'t'W (..andscape {C.Iunbriclgr., MA: The Z\\liT rress, 1997); !Ct\"'\nalso Jerry Kang. \"Infornmrion Pli\\'a~ in Cyl>t\"rspm:e Transactions,''\nStanford L1w Re\\oiew 50 ( l998i: 1193, 1195-202.\n\n(ll} Ibid.\n\n!U) ?\\IichaC'l B:trbaro and Tom Zeller,Jr., ~-\\Fact\" is E..\"t>OSed for AOL\nSear\"Cher N'o. 441 ii49,'' New \\'Ort Timt\"S, 9 Ang 2006.\n\n(U) Fi)t' cxaunplc, set ;:\\Jmtjc:wdl. \"TJ. MNx..'i:Tilefi Bt.-liewd l..ugt>st Hl'lck E\\'er,'' MSNBC, 30 :\\Iardr 2007, availahle from hup:/ \"''\"\"':\nJnsubc.msn.('om/id/178i 1485/, internet, accessed 5 Augta~t 2008.\n\n(l') Cbina Internet Nen-ork In.lormarion Centel' (.June2003): nmilable\n:It hrrp://,\\W\\:r.nuic .. cn, intc-mer, accesSt'd 5 August 200tJ.\n\ntU1Ihid.\n\ntU) hrrp:/ /w''\"'':lm~J\"ll~tworld!ulls.c:cm (Ikcem~r 2007), imen1er, llc~es~cd 5 Allb'1tsr 2008.\n\n## 76.\n\n(U) 11li~ :rillS up wmorc thnn I 00 ptn:t:lll; tht:llc Me lhc stnli!ti~:s Jl''\"'idtd by CNNIC:, \\\\1tich is rhr mcost nutho1i1111iw: Ghintse snun:r.\n\n{U) C:him Internet Ne-twork Information C...-uter (Deceml~r 201)7), nwil:lbll\" nr Jmp://''\"''\"\"cnnic.cu, iutern..-r, accessed 5 Augusr 2008.\n\n(ti; This adds up to mote than 100 percem; rb~ :~re rhe $tnrisdcs pro\"iclcd hy CNNIC, which is rhe mostmuhctitnti\\'c Chinese ~ourcc.\n\n. (l.l) Jl,jt.J,\n!U} One- S<.lUJ'Ct' proje-cts thnt by :2011 the Chine$e nwrkct f(lr onliue gnmes will be c)wr 10 biUiou RMB (nbour S5. i hilliconj. Sec-\n''Jllricbt hre\\,ing pbm~ to enter >nlinc gmw:s marker; in C:ltinHT-\nc:-dlNt.\"ws (21 April 2003), n\\ctilable nr http:/ \"'\"'~\"'':chilmtt:>chncws.\n\nc:com /2{K)8/0l /21/6644-bftidu-brt:'\\\\ing-plnm-ro-t'nter-on1inc:--gnmesmA'ket/, intc.-mct, nCCt'H.~t!'d S August 2008.\n\n(U) Tim Allison,':-\\ Pt~th to W~stl!'m Online Games Succ~ss in Asin,\"\nin Gnmnsurrn (24june. 2008) .htrp:/ \"'\"'\"':gnmnsmrn.com/\\il\"w/\n\nti.ann,:/3i01/~-parb_w_wesrrtu_onliut.\"_games_.php, inre-met, :u:-\nc;esSt:cl 5 Augmt 2000.\n\n:U) \"Outlim of Natinnall\\lcdium-and-Long T1!l'lll Program lor Sdr.tiCl' itlld Techuokogy De\\T;Iopm<-nt 200G-2020.\" \"Stnte lnformnrizntiou Ltnding Group's c.~ntm~ms ou St~ugthetting Infonunrion\n5-nrity .EOons\" [Zhc111gb;mf.., No. 27], nnd \"Key Points of Natio11c11\nlith Five-\\i:nr Program lnfomtnri(lll SecmirTcc:hnol~\">gical Devdcpmcnr Plan.\" Funcl<~ are chnnnelccl through f\\\\'O liuanciug \\'C~hidl\"S, the\n8fi3 ancl9iS Programs.\n\niU) PRC S&.T: lith Fivc:-\\'C11r Prr:pmn Jnlrmuntiou Sec:mity Dl\"''l:l-\n':>pmenr Trends Smnmit Fomn&.\n\n!U) \"E.xt:lulli\\'1.':: Chinn's Gmnd Virru:1l Worlds Phm-;\\ Fir!il Hnnd Lx,k .. in Virrual Wcorld News (26 Nov~mber 2007).\n\n85\n\n(U) 'ROK Dailr: Chinn rt'CI\\'f!s both Poliwblc, Perilous'' in\n .JoongAng llbco (5 Mru 2005). n\\etilable at the O~n Source Center\nKl,I.,.2(KI50:i04000173 Scc.,ul.\n\n86\n87\n\nlli) Pekhi Ch\\lng. \"The Online- Onme Industry in C:hi11n: A Prt>-\nliminm'}' Ohllcl'\\'ntiNl>f the p~,,Jitic:;l f:.c:onomic S!ructut't,'' Pnp~r\nsuh1uitred w rhc: Sixrh Annual C:hinc!le lutr.-rn~l Rt:scnrrh C:onff.'Jeuc.e:\n\"C:hinn nnd rhe Int~met: Myths nud Renlities,\" 13-HJune 2008, TI1e\nOniwrsiry of Hong Kong. Hong Kong.\n(U; ''Chin: Daily Ul&.~ine$~ Weekly: Chinese C:ompnnic:-s at a Gl:mtc,\"\nm\"nilable at Open Soun-e (!e-ruea CPP'.?0080303968042 China Daily t.B11sim.!.S n~ldy Supplementj in English 01)09 G~-IT 03 :M1r 08.\n\ni,U) ln~emet &osc:-nrch in China, cited in Peichi Chung, op. dt., nv11ilablc 111 hup:// ~ngli~h.iresenrch.c:ttU.cn/htmll online _game I dl!'-\ntnil_news_id_87i7.Jmnl, illl~nu.t, accessed 5 Augusr 2008.\n\n~U) Jornnk Yu, \"Tite China Angle: ThC\" Ye-ar of tht:' Addit..'lrd Gnming Rnl/' in Ganul=tUII'R !_II Janllll11' *2008i:* a\\'llilablc a1 hup://ww'''\n~-nmasun'lt.com/php-bin/ne,,'S_index.php?story=lt\\875, im~rn~t.\n\n:~ccessed 5 August 2(108.\n\nil.i) Tim Allison,~ Path to \\\\'l.\"st~rn Online G:un~ Succ~ in Asia.\"\n\n(li) ''ROK Daily: China PrO\\'l\"S both Protitabl~. Petilous.\"\n{lJ; ''Chin~ World *rJf* W:tt'Cmi't Plnycl~ 11weattu ~'Cctt,''\nin Gamns\\ltl'n (6 Match 2006), 11\\etilnble at http:/\"'\"\"\"':\ng:un:=ISittra.c:om/php-biu/new~_index.php?story=M=, int~r\nnet, acce~secl 5 August 2008.\n\n(l.Jj Siam C:houdhu~~ ''i\\.linc!Ark: M:u'kering and bmnd\n11wmc:uess lu <lttntct 150 mifiiou users w Emmpi;~,'' iu The l\\{MO Gamer ( 11 Jun~ 2007)~ <Wailabl~ nt http://'''''\"'\nmmogamc:-r.com/06/111:?007/ minclm'k-nUlrk~ting-and\nbr'nd-nwareness-to-atn'ftC'r-150-million-uM\"rs-to-l'tlfmpiA, intl.'ntt!'l, acressed 5 August 2008.\n\n(U) \"The Chinn Angl~: Putting Tht.\" World of \"'a-cmft Back ln \\\\'odd of Warcraft,\" in Gmnasutro (2!1Augnsr 21107.1, a\\'ail-\nAble ill http:/ \"\"'\"':gnmni!Urt':'l.com/php-bin/news_index.\n\nphp?stcry=15299, internet, accessecl5 Augusr 2008.\n\n(li) Liu Changle is 1\\'iclely l~li.l\"\\'t.-d ro bt crnmccted to Chinn s secmity services.\n\n{l.ij :-\\dclicts Sr.-f:k Shelter Fmm the:- lnremet,\" in China Daily\n(31 August 2006). p. 14.\n\n{Ulluid.\n\n99\n\n(ti} AriHtUl Eut~jung C:ha, ''ln China, Stcm Trcatm~nt fcor \\oung\nJmemet .-\\ddic::a, in Washington Pclst {22 Febnuuy 2007;, AOI.\n\n100\n\n!U)Ibi.d.\n\n101\n102\n\n(U) \"V'utual Wol'lcls News Inrel'iew: Hui Xu, HiPiHi\nFounder nnd CEO\" VirrualWorlclNews (I AuguM\n2007), il\\7tilablc:- cHImp:/ hnm:,irtunJ:\\,(orlclsnews.\nct'm/2007/08/,,h'tttnk,'Orldsne.hrml: ultc:-rn~t, n~cl!'ssec:l\ncu, Vii1U:ll Wcwlds Nc:w~ ''Uiug_~ng Virll.:cl world~ Ntll: \\\"'ii1Uftl \\\\\"OJ\"lds in Chinn'' VinunJWol'ldNt-ws (10 Ocrobf.'r 200il. ~t' nlso Virlnlll\n\nWt)Jid! Nt-ws ''Q.ukk Nmni:W!I'S: l~No ~1r HiPiHi's u~ers Ill'(' Imemn\n103\n1 ilnnl'' Vit'lnttl\\\\'c)l'ldN~ws !~~I ..July 2008;.\n\n104\ntU) ViJuml Wol'ld!l Nt,,s \"lltM ltnrners ,,irh I-liPiHi lor Tt:'('hnology und lwcr(pr.t:cbilitr'' \\irm~tlWrnitlN~'''!I (4 t:r.lmaAry 201'18}. *Sc:t:* al11o\n\\ia'lll:tl \\\\(aids N~Wf ''lHM &cks lr. lnacgt\"Hit UOueNl'l ,,;,It Exi.~ling Virtunl 'Y.II'Ids Pl:uli:ol'll\\S: \\iirnmJWorlciN~ws (28.Jnnu:cry 2008).\n\n105\n(U) Chiun: l'LA Dc\\'t'lr)plllt~ll of fJ<,iitit:OII Wtll'k Jnl<rmationiz:clic)n:\ncxc:c:I'J>' of X in Shidai Budui D:mg\\\\'ti Gongzuo ~,, Shixi:m, [Mr.IClern\n:\\JjJirary Unit Pm1~ C:cmmirrer. \\\\i:ll'k nnd Prnctices], Ou Guczheng:\nZeug \\ctttl:~i. ~nd Zh:mg Dongdong. eds. (Long Mnrc:h Press, 2003),\n;l\\-:cil11blc iu tr:cn~latiou ns CPP2007tl 11 tl3200 14.\n\n(lii C:hinn: Disc::u!9!!ie;m ~n focnl Poin111 of China~ RMA\nC:PP'2008071656300 I O~partmenr of D~fetLIIC in English ll.i Jnl 03\nn,is mmslaricu i5 pt'CJVided by the Department of lleft'nSf\"; A11idt\n!elec:rt'd from 5-2008 \"National O~fr:onse <r \"Guof.11~.' wrinen b\\\nLi Pt'ngcong {STC:: 2621/i720/5115), and entillt'd ,;PI't'liminary.\n\nDiSttts!tiou >II tlu: f.ix;cl Poitlls of Our Am\\\"~ Rt'\\ohuion in MiliJal'\\\n\n.~n:,irs.''\n\n\n(U) PRC: Clu:ugclu .MR A\\ia1ion Di,ision Ack7111Ct\"~ lnforruatiza-\nJion Tr;msfonnntion. CPP'.20080ti(l6478009lkijing Kougjun Bao in C:hinf.'se (213 Aptil 2008), p. 2. [Repc>t1 by Zlm Q;:mli ;~nd special c:ontspondem Hu Xiaoyu: ''Suiviug To Adti~'t' Gre:1test Wnr-\n\\\\;inning C11p:chilit.y- An Ey~-\\-\\~tnl\"ll$ .-\\cc:cunl c.r EfforJS Made by A Chcngdu Miliun-y Rcgicm Air lvn.:r. J)i\"isivn lo Push l'C.tt'\\\"Ard Trnusti:rm:uicn Tcw:ll'l:l lnfcmlnliznrion\"].\n.(UJ Gc:ollhy A. J:Owlcr ancrju~iug Qin, ''QQ: Chiua'~ Nl'''' Cc)in uf r!}e Realm?'' in Th~ WaU Street Jomnal (30 M:m:h 2(1(17).\n\n(U} Sh:mn Rein, \"Chinn's 'irrual, e-Coriunence Cunene);\" in ~'-'king Alpho (16.J:mnlll'y 200i).\n\n)\n\n!U) \\\\'ttug Xiug Alld W1mg Shnn,;hnn, \"Viramtl Mont\"y Pc)!;Cs a Real Tht'eft~.:' in Chin;, Daily (:!li Dc.-ct':mhet' 2fJ06). St'l' nlc;o Gc:-oflicy A.\n\nh)\\\\'let nndjuying Qin ''QQ; Chin., 's Nl!'w CfJin of rhe Renlm?\"\n\n(Li) Kent Ewit.tg, ''Chii1a's ViJ1Ual Cln1-cr..:yThl-enJenslhl' Yuan,'' in Chinn 8\\\\Sine$$ (5 Decem~r 2006).\n\n\n\n(U) lntt'l'llet Woticl Stnts: Asin (Decembe1 200i), n\\'ail:~ble from blip:/ \"'\"V\\':Imetuct\\\\'~1Iid~lfii!I.COIIIhc:lin.hun, inlcntcl, ;t~::c:c!lst:d 5\nAugust 200a.\n\n(U} El.,nomist huellig1~nce Unit (Ianum~ 21!08), a\\'ftilnble at Imp://\n''\"''w.du.com/index.~o~sp?tf=O: inll\"t'lll't, a('ceucd 5 August 2008.\n\n113\n~li) Brnnds and Gnming, NO\\'t'mber 2(106.\n\n114\n115\n(U) TheAssocilll\"t'd Press, ''South Korea's redm>kgy exports rist' 10.5\n!U) luremca World S11u~: Asia (Decc:mb~r 2007;, ft\\'ailablc fi\"tlm l111p://,,w,v.lmeruel\\\\\"OJ1dstnrs.c:.cm/nsin.hnn, intenu~t. a('('essed :>\nAugust 2008.\n\n116\n(U}Ibid.\n\n117\n~U) 'ROK Sta!t'Run TV Speciitl Pt'>gJ1Uu JI~rnxluc:cs ROK Army Cnmb:u Training Center'' (I Octobc~ 20IIli), a\\'ailahk from the Oprn Sourc:t\" Center KPP200610020490{12.\n\n118\n(U.J Wohn Dong-Hee. \"Cyber World Draws Kon~an Groups.'' iujooug Ang Ilbc.l (21 Mn~ 2007), t't'primed in 'ROK Daily: C:ybt'r \\\\'otid Dt'l'l\\\\'S Kort>an Groups,'' nmilnble fi01u the Open Sonrct\" CoC\"mcr KPP'l00i0321971138.\n\niU) LeejctOn-Seung, \"ROK:s \\onhnp: S. Korea opens Vi11unl ~ali~~\n!-fashion Clot.hing Store,~ in \\cmhnp, :wailable from thl' Open SoUJ-ce CMllt\"l' KPP'l00708239il234.\n\n121\n(U) Lee Min-n, \"Blue House Impt'O\\-eslts Engli'llt''JoongAng llhc>\n(28 SeptemJxoa 21Xl7), l't'printt'd in \"ROK Daily: Pre&identilll Offic..~\nImprO\\'f.'S English Website~\" A\\'Oilable nr the Open S)urce Center KPP'2007092897 1112.\n\n(U) SeoJi-eun, \"Economic& Educ:arir ... u Gc~s Virn.~:~I''Joong:\\ng llbo\n\n122\n(~ Mnrch 2008), l't'pl'imed and trnuslnt~d in \"ROK Daily: Economir..s Educarion Goes Vi11ual ii1 ROK,'' ll\\\"ailablf' a1 the Optn S(ltJJ'C\"\nCenrer KPP200P...03049ill62.\n\n!ll) Kore:1 Time~, 27 March 2001:t\n\n123\n(ll) Chot:On Ilbo,-10 Oc1ober 2007; sP.e al~ Kort'a limes, !)jmu.\n2008.\n\n124\n(U)\"Liudeu Lnb Partners with T-Enrertninmem ro Send Second Life to Kcm~a Virtu11! worlds Nt.'\\\\'S ( 18 OcwbM 2007), m'llilahlP. m http://\n\n125\nww,,:,irlltalwc:ol'ldsnt\"W~.com/21)(17/1 0/linden-lnb-pnrt.hunl, inlt\"''mt, acce!l!ed 5 Angusr 2008.\n\n126\n~U} \"Netizf.'nsjoin Online Campnign., to Pmrecr Dokdo,\" Dong-A\nJlbo (17 July 2003), R\\\"'lilable 111 http://t\"nglish.dongn.c:om/st'\\'I:IC't'\\ic:f'.\n\nphp3?biid=200807J73J898&1Uilp;path_dir:2(M)8(1717: inl~l\"llet, OIC\ncessed 5 August :?008.\n\n(U) B11mclon \\\\~lll,ltl, \"Korean Ouline Gamt'5, No Longt'r Child's\nPlas'' Haukuk Uniwr.;ity of J:Oreign Studies.\n127\n128\n(U) Fot n visual'l\"presf.'ntatiou of \\IUbsetiption~ in South Ko1ea, .ser.\nChart prt.'pared by Btuce Str.-rlling \\\\'oodwck for MMOGCILo\\RT.\nCOM (2008); a\\\"'lilnble nt http://www.uunogchntt.ccm/C:lmn l.hunl,\ninremct: act:C!o.\"'ed 5 Augulif 2008.\n(U) See, ;'Economist C:L,ims Tf.'J't'OtUts in Sec;ot\\d Life,\" Vitulll\nwmlds News1 !:?July 2007, <mtilflble I'll llltp://ww,,:\\'irtualwo)rld-\n129\nsn~ws.com/!?007/0i /I.'Conomist-daim.html. imernec, ace:~ 5\nAugust 2(108; 'Wnshingron.Post *rJn* Termr [sk) in 'iatual ,,otid,\"'\nVirtual \\\\\"Odds Ne\"s , 6 ~bnmry 2008, n\\\"ailable 11t hup://\"\"'\"';\n\\~l'llliiiW:II'idSIIt'\\\\~t;l,tll1/200tJ/02/WHllhialgl>l1p0!11.hii1JI, illlt:l'111!1.\n\nnccessed 5 Aug\\t$t 2008: n l'tferenc~ t< Robtrr O'Hnrmw,.Jr., ''Spies'\nJJnul\\\"gtT.IUDd Turns Virlunl.\"' Wnshington Posr, G F~bnmry 2001.1,\n\"''ililnblc- ;u hup:/ '\"\"'''~'-a5hiugtonpo~t.comh,v-dyn/conl('nt/\nnrlid<:'/2008/02/05/Ak200802051)3144.1uml?snb=AR, imr.nut, nccc-~f:'d 5 Aug1.ur 2008.\n\n(U] S<!t, Clnis \\111auc~, *''U$* sc~t.\"k~ ltncoail't~ iu \\Ve,>J., \\\\'Oriel:~,'' BBC\nNew:., 3 Mnrrh :!008. il\\'nilnbl(' ilt Imp:/ /ncows.bhc.co.uk/ I /hi/\ncer.lmology/i2743i7.stm, inreruer. nc:cesst<l5 Augusr 2008: \"1-\\R.PA\nCousidcJing Vitrunl \"''~rids D:11a :\\n:tlysis,'' \\'irttml worltls Ntws\n\\\\'ch~itl\", 2 ~lny 2Uil8, i\\\\'llil;abl~ nllllp:/ ''''''''.\\\"iJ1nalwMiclsuew$.\n\ncona/!200ll/05/iarpn-cclllsidcri.html, inremer. ncC'esst:d 5 Augusr\n2008; nnd Ry:an Singe!, \"US Spies Wnnr to Find TeJ'I'I.lrists in World of Wan:mlt,'' \\\\~n.d, 22 Febr~u.ry 2008, m-ailhle at hetp:/ /blog.\n\nwired.com/2 7bsrrok~6/2003/02/ n:uions-spies-\\duml, imernet. :ac-\n('~ssed 5 August 2003, citing Office- of 1he Diaecror of Nntion:.l Intelligeuc:t, Dntn Mining Rrpc.r, 15 Febnmry 2008, n\\'liilable nt hup:/ I\nbl<g.\\\\irc:d.c:ona/2ibstrokcti/files/dJii_cl:ttnnJiniiJg_n:pcn_201.1fi.('DF, im~mtt, m:r.~~l5 Augu:.r !?008.\n\n(U) For a go(ttl 0\\'C\"il'w nf htw ll~tn)Jist grl)ups II>W:I(Iays \"\"l>loit\n1.he lmcnet, set Gnbrid \\\\'rimauu, Tcn'(J' o11the lmc-111t'l: The Nc~,,\nArellc'l, and New Ch:lllenges (Washingtc)n, DC: United Srnres Institute c>l' Penr.c, 2006); nnd Philip licib, c.'d., 'l~mlrism and lhC' ln1r-me1 (New\n\\'C:rk: l'ulgmw, fi>rthcQming); nndJialtut Qnn .:1 11l, ~\\na~'Zing tesTe\nrsic] ~amp11igns on the lnlemer. Tr.chnicnl sophilstication, content lichne$S, and Wt.-b inter:.cth'i~~ Hnnmn-Compnt~r Studit.-sr)5 (2007), pp. 71-li4. Forlslamist andjihadi:~t ~\"'Pioitnrio11 of thl' l11rt!J'lll'J, sc!, r(IJ' I!J.:tlllplc, Gm-r R. Utltll, lslrun ill the Dit,rital Age: E-:.Jihnds. Oulille Fat\\,'35: nncl CrbC!'t'lsl:unic: En,iromnenrs !New YCJrk nnd London:\nJ'luw, 2003): idem. Virtually lslnmie: Compm~a-Mec:linted C:onmmni-\n~nticll :nd Cylm ltlmnk 1-::mimnnienlll (C'.nrrliiT: Uui\\'c:l'sity of Wulc5,\n2(1{12): nnd the a't't.eut study ~.Jmne~ 8J\"nndon, Virtual Cnliphme:\nblnmk ExtJ't'IIUSts nnr.l th<:'i1 Websites (London: Centre for Social c:.~lu:si<nl, 21108). \\\\'hkh is fi)C:IISC\"(I 011 the llillulliCIII inth(' UK.\n\n!li} ''Tefi'OJism JU.senrch Roundup: Not Much in ~oru:l Liff:',''\nVirntnl ,,oriels News. 3 Ma~ 2000, R\\\"ailc'lble nr http:/ \"''\"'',\\'irtunl-\n\n'''QJidsJICWli.C'Otlt/2008/05/terrori.<~m-rf:'!it!U.hllttl: internet, ~cc:e!l!ll.'d\n5 :\\ugnj:f 2(1fltl. In t'r!IIJ>OII!If.' lo alleg:tti<tnll a hat lslnmist. renT.uists lul\\'f!'\nl:>ffu using SL tQ ''rec111ir nnd mimK.~ !'teal-life. t~rrolism: Lin~u L1bs\nCI~C> Philip Rt~clnlc~ ~irl rh:tr '\"[w]e ha\\'t' n<.'\\'t\"'' sc~u *:my* C\\idenc:~\nthnl I he.- is Hny linch acai\\ir~ gc:>ing on. Citro in Eric Rf:'lliCJ'l, \"RcSt\"-\ndnlf!' disclc)ses FJJI grid1ng probe. to Congress.\" Sewnd Life l'\\ews\nC:i.'ntet I April 2008, n\\'nil:~ble nr http:/ /~ondlife.t't'uters.cCtm/\n8r olic-li/2008/0oJ /0 1/ mst:rlall\"-di!ldo'~s.lhi-iticlittg-pmbt'-lfiC:OIIl,'l'C5.'1,\niJiremcr, :u:ccs.<led 5 Angns1 2008.\n(l1) See ''Fighting 'the!' Fron~; NC!>''' World Nctt$: 15Jnunnry 2007:\nil\\'nilllble :u hup:/IJt\\'ll.blc.gs.com/nwn/2007 /0 l/slongc!rjhnn_h.\n\nhtanl1 intf:'t'JJC.t, ac~~ssed 5 August 2008: for this CJUOte, ft$ \"'eU ns for other information in the pnmgrnph. Cf. al~.Jacqui Cheng, \"Politic:al group's in-gamt\" i,..cJencc- sp;u:ks \\it1nftl war:., Ars Tc:chnkn.\n\nI i.Janllnry 2(K17, 11\\':lilnhk~ at hup:/ hu-slr.chnic:~.com/new~.nrs/\nposJ/20070 I I i-8643.huul: nncl Olher Burkem:m, 'Explcw:ling pi~rs\nand \\'llll~-s of gunfire ns Le Pen opens HQ iu Vinunl world.'' (;unrd~\nim~ [l..ondon]. 20Jnnllarr 2007. According to this ccmtmJmicJI.C,\n,,hid w~t~ nc-mally is.~ncd >n 5 Der.cmber 2U06 by the Fl'tnt Nntiou.'ll CW. ln.Jem~sst (~Ji: rhe yomh ,,;ng c>f cl1e *FN:* tbt purpose of opening rhi~ FN CJnicr i11 SI.. \\\\1s to \"pmmo1~ the cnndiclto~ of je11u-M:uie\n[.t: l'cu iu the ~007 pl'r!'llidcntiid r.olecrions ... t:)nsritutc: ft permllll'lll\neprcsemarion of tb~ FN [in SL] ... g:.ther [or mlly] tht.' membea's\nand sympnthiz.-a's of the FN ... SC'I'\\'C!' as a p.'laty shO\\,cnse foa both the Fl'l:'nc:h 1111d li.n-M~uea.,; ... [nnd] prCimote the Jll\"t'sC'JK\"C of Fn~nch nnd F11~nda-spe:king org:111izalions 1111d C'Ompanit.\"S in Virtual worlds.\n\nwhich hii\\'C' up rill now been dominnted ~ rhe Anglo-S~:xCIIlS ... See\nhe French rr.~'t in ~-\\norher SL First? Frr.nch E.'\\:11-eme Righr Political Pany Opens Office in Set:(IJid tile,\" St~c:c.encll..ife Hernld. 9 Dcccmi)('J' 2006, :wailable nr \\\\Ww.~coudlilehernlcl.cclm/slh/20(N)/ 112/\nilllOiher_sl_firs.hnnl, internet~ ilccessed 5 August 2008. Accol'tliug to u bl<:;ge nnmcd An)nymous f.m'tpccn, howMcr, the FN Wll$ nor the finer. French political p:n1y ro r.nter SL, sin.:~ thl\" ~nriic~l J..iulr.Derm-\n\"ille Pa~jcoct, the HQ of il cnric:arurecl \\'er-sion of Sigol~ne Ro~11l, an official of the Pnrti Socinliste, was founded iu SL in mid-NO\\ -ember of 2006.\n\n(U) See, Clnis Gourrilr rmd Abul Tahc1; ''ViJ1ualjihac:l hil$ Sc-coml Lift \\\\'Cbsi1e,'' SundRy Times [London], 5 .o.\\ugust 2007, R\\-ail:tble nt Imp:/ '''\"''':rimc-54lnlint.co.uk/r()l/news/wodd/nliddle_enst/\n;u-tidc-:.?199193.e, inte111e1. acctssed 22 Sepceml>c.\"r 2008; nnd Natt:tlit' O'Brien, \"VirtnHI Tl\"nurisu,'' \"lle :\\nssrnlian. I i July\n200ti, fi\\\"Rilnbltt M hup:/ \"''\\-':tlu.anstmlinn.ne\\,'!l.com.au/\nstory/0.2519i,22161037-287S7,00.html, inlernet1 ac~s.~d 2:?\n\nS~ptem~r 2008. Cf. nlso Hsindmn Chen, Swn TI1onu . nnd T . .J. Fu,\n''C:ybet E:,.tremism iu Wt~h 2.0: r\\n Explomtoy Study of lntc~I1Jit\ntionni.Jibndist Gtuups,\" chapter for IEEE lntermuional Conferenceon lmeUigenc:e nnd Set:urity Inform~rics, fotthcQining.\n\n(U) Ciom1ny nnd Taht.-1; \"Virtualjihnd hits Stcoud Life\n\\Vd;,sire.'' One- of those \"pro\\\"CCCRti\\'e m1mes\" thar wns\n\nil,;tuaiJ~: listrd ns such w:ts ''1rhabi007\" !\"Te,>trorist 01)7''), the moniker of n mnjor aJ.(~'ida-linkccl jih:\\di~ opcrati\\'C\nin Britain. Howe\\'C'Jj in a subsequtnt intel'\\iew Gunamtn - ., cll,imeclthnt his app.1rcnt suggestion lhal \"lrlmbi007'' was also cpl\"t'llring in the. \\irtual \"'~llld, o tlml somt'l>llt' else with thar same monikf:'r wa~ doing so, wa.s che R\"Sulr of ilnerrur by The Time,. F01 skeprit:ism abom Gunarnmn 's daims nbour jihnc:lists opemring in SL, sc~ \\ \\:agnerjRlllt'll Au, \"Jihad and Second Life,\" New \\\\crld Not~oos, i :\\ugusl\n2007, n\\-ailable n1l111p:/ /ll\\\\1J.blogs.com1JJ\\,1t/200i /O.'J/\nsr.cond.Jife-tmd.html, inrenaet, accessed 22 Septe1i1~r 21Xl8.\n\n!U) DHS, Ollie(' of Intdligence and Anal~~is. \\irtunl wCtrld Eawironmenrs: Porenrial Exttemist Tools, 2i :May 2008, pp. 4-5. Compat-e nlso Rita Bush nnci Kennerl1 Killid.\n\nlnfoi'Jn:uion & Beha\\ior E~l>loitiltion in Vinunl worlds: .-\\11\n(:h-et,ie,,; Office of the Direcror of NntionnllmeUiv.nce report, 29 NO\\-eml~a 2(Xl7, \\\\'hich also emphnsizes (on pp.\n\n4-6) '\\irtnnlncti\\iai..-s'' such as collabc.lmtiw le11ming and rmining, socialnelworking. 1111d \"'\\il1nl'll economics,'' all of which could be canitd *()IJI* by te-rrorists. TI1e nurhor..\n\nrhcn gconr~ Iilii (p. 3} CO\\TJ\"t conuuunic;uiou, training/\nrchearsRI, money tmnsfcr/l:nmdering. inlormnticn wm1inT,\n:md Deninl of ~J'\\ice (DOSj Att~cks ns specific acri,-iries in which tenorim could engage. Note, howC'\\-er: rhnr np.'lrt ticm the ll!le of ,;nual p<\"Ople'' (p. 4/, i.e., 11\\\"Hiars-includiug ''hors''-ancst of the nh0\\'1:'-Iist~o-d ncti\\'itics nre idr.mic:nl to rhose rhnr rcoraoaists nb'l!'l'ldy e-ngage in tltl the lmemer. In that s\\\"nse, Web :?.0 offers them rhe ~mne l)l.\"ICS CJf OJ>pOrtuniries a-3 We-b 1.0.\n\niU) For morr alarmist peclicrions, w.e D:m Verton, Black lc~: The Imisible Th~Tnt of Cyher-Tcrro1i$m (New \\'Ork:\n\n~kGrw Hill, 200:lj.\n\n!.liJ Weimann. Tt'J1Uronlhc lnlc.-t'llcl, pp. ~9-110 (ontlu~ \"communicnth-e uses\" Qf rhe lnrentet), 49 (quore).\n\n(U} Ibid, pp. 111-4~. On the subjec1 of networking, Weinlilnn and others ha'-e \\\"mphasized how the Internet, gi\\'1!11 its reduction .,r rmnsmimc>n rime and cos1s. ill eS(>c.\"ci:lly wcll-suit('(J to 1hc \"new\" loose-, decf'nrt-:tlized, horizontal, segmenti.'d, :aud fle-xible l)l>C'S of terrotisl org:miznlion, such ns al-~1'idn, in which incitP.mem and inspimtion J\"Hther tlum dil't.'C't hicomrrhic;nl conti'CII is punmiCIIInt. St.-c ibid, pp. 114-17. FCtr n ~nse sn1d~; see Me~nn Lim, blnmi(\nRndicnlism nnd :\\mi-Amcrknnism in Indonesia: The Rolr.\n\nof 1he Itnctnct (Wnshinglon, DC: East-Wcosl *C:clllcJ:* 2005).\n\n(U) Sc:c, Gordon C:r)I'CI\"fl, ;~\\ w~b \\\\ise len-or (sic) ll(~lwork,'' nne\nNews, G Ocrcrber 2004, n\\ail.,ble 111 lmp://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/\nin_deprh/3i16908.sun. imemer, ncr.P.!~Se<i *:22* S.:.premlxr :?008. This is\n\\\\'lr\\'lht r.irlc (rf n r~cl.\"nl. book ll\\' ~lichAcl Maznrr. limm'ldern i\\len in\nIIIC!. M<dCI'II Wol'ld: Rnclir:nllllh;lll, Tem:lri:;m, ;md rhe \\\\in <in M<l(lr.rn.ity (New 'f.wk: C1unb1idgr Unh't.'I'Sit)~ 2007), i~ smnewhntmislencling\n-tim r:.rlf.l>lcl,iihncli:;t~ hnn: c;mbr\"Acr:o<llmc~xplidllr nnl irrc:d~mnhlr\nnmi-rllr)(lr:rui~r idc:olc:>g)~ b111 th~'}' nre lltil II~'Ct'-\":t.;Jy ''lllli'Jc'lcm.'~\nTuclfoed, mnuy of them fir <tuhe c;c)IUfc,n;~bly imo thP. moden wo1id.\n\n(t)} lbicl, p. ;)(), AIU.I PI) 14-7-il. Cf..Jr.r~hltlc Gret'll~ ''The My1h r)f\n\nC:~bc!I'IC!I'I'I.Ii~m,: Wmchinglt.lll ~ltilllhls Ntl\\'c:mhc!l' 2C:lfl2, 11\\'Hib,hlc~\n;u hup://ww\\\\:\\\\'AShiugrcmmonthl):com/fenru~s/200 l/0211.gret;>n.\n\nhun!, inlt!'aner. nccesst'd 22 Septembet 2008.\n\n(U) s~e lnt~grared Thrent .-\\sst'ssm~nr Centre [C:nnnd:~l, C:yb~r\nTet't\"Ori$m: T~t'l'r.rist Use of Online C:nming, 25.Jnue 2(11)8. p.li\"Key\nPoiurs-J :111(1 p:lSsim. CJ: the:- t'\\'c.n grwctcs skeptidllmc.-xpns~cd byJnnn\nC:C:.lr., 'Osmun bin l..ttclc:n'll 'Sc-.:-mad Lift~,\"' S11lrlU1 25 fi:lmtary 2CIOH,\na'-nilable ;u hup:/ \"'\"'\"':s.11on.com/opinion/fenru~/2000/02/25/ a\\nrnrs. iurernet. ncceSst'd 5 August 2008.\n1U} Sec, Rodc:rickJou~ 'Meralil'ror: ll1e Pot~tuinl Use of M~'IOR\nPCti by Tet't'()li~ts:'' Cottnlettearcrism Blog, I Mm-ch !?007, n\\'ailnble ar l111p: // :Ctmh:rtc:-cTmismhlo.g.ct-g/ZOO i /(13/metAI<'n'Jr _the_J)Oieutial_\n\ntl!Cc~<.php, iJllt\"t'UCI, n:cl's.~r.\"d 5 :\\u~mt 2008: t'esponses rcJoue$' Stl'\nride can b\\\" found ar \"Titr.\" Pott!'ttlil'll USt' Crf MMORPCs by Terrol'ists, Parr II,'' Coumenerrorism Blog, 12 March 2007, fl\\'ililnble a{ Imp://\n('CIIIIllt't1c:I'I\"OiillllbJ(tg~nrg/:_)('JQ7/1)3/p111't_ii_of_ntetlllCITfJl'_lhe_pt)IC.\n\nphp, inttm~. ac:ctssed 5 Augusr 2008. Fo1 n conl~'t'ncc: <rganized by rhnr samt' hlcog sirr.o Crll {his s:-cme tho:ine, *set:* Andrew Cochrane, \"'E,ent Trnnsc1ipr and 'Relnt~ Links: '.M~r:.-Ten'Or: Ten-orism and the Virtunl world,\"' Ccauntr.nenotism Blog, 7 ~Ias-ch 2008, nvaihcblt' at hnp://\n\nl\"Ollntertetroristnblog.org/2008/03/l'\\\"t'nt_rrnn~ripr_nttd_J\"l'lnrt'd_l.\nphp, illlt'l'llt'.f, nccessec15 Angusr 2008. See funhr-r.Ja)n~ and Mkhnr-1\nSdu-agl, ':Jihacliner.~, C.nlltc:c~c:rmtism Bios, 17 Dc-rcmhcr 200i,\n\"''nihthlc: :u bttp://cmnuenenorismblog.osg/2007/1 !Yjihndinets.php,\ninrt'aner, nccessed 5 .-\\ugusr 2008: madjont's. \"\\inu.1l Assnssinmion\nas n C:onnrenerorism Tool,., C:ounteneaTOrism Blog, 28 :Mny 2008, a\\nilablt at http://coutJrerrcrmti~mblog.org/2008/05/,ittual_assa~\ni!in:.fioau'ls_n_r:ou.php, imenu::i, ncce~scd 5 :\\ugu~t 2008.\n{U.l Hsindttlll Chen, S\\'en Thom~ '[j. Fn, Cyht'r Exm:mism in \\\\'t\"b\n2.0: Au E,.-plorarorr Study of luhTnati(mIJihncli.~r GtY.np~ (lEEE\nIurernMicn:-cl Conference ccnlnrelligence :111d Secmity lnloamnrics, fm1hcoming, 2(11)8), n\\-ail;~ble nr http://ni.ntizonn.eduh-esent'Ch/\nlt\"tTI>t'/puhlic:arions/ISI20tlr.-S\\'1.:iJ-WER2.p<lt: intc:t'llt\"t1 11C:l'l.'liSC:d 5\nAuguM 200a.\n\n(ti) Ibid.\n\n!U) Virtu:cl E11Wnin, 160, 140, 32 {PG;--E.\\IOniiln EmbR~~1 cn Se-cond Lif~.\n\n146\n147\n. !UI Fuiuchun Chcm, 8\\'P.Il Thoms, T.J. Fu. Cylxr .E.\"CtrenU5m in \\\\~b\n2.0: An E.'lllf)l'fiiOI')' Stud> or IIIIC1'11Rticut.11Jilucdit C:IT.111p5 (IEEE\nlut<'t'nllliouHI C:(tiJfcm:ncc on huc:llig~llce and Secmitr lnlormmics, f(rrthCclllling, 2008)1 11\\'ililable I'll http://ai.mizona.~u/rese:n'l:'b/\n\nrc-rror/publicnrions/1Sl2008-~,t'n-WEB2.pclf. imerner. :ICC'C'SSed 5\n:\\ugu!Ot 21'108.\n148\n(l.i,l.J:~son A\\'et~~ \"Decoding rlce Wol'ld .:. of Warcmfr,\"' Tipping Point, 28.Jnnt!' 200i, a\\-ailabl~ nr http://d,lnbs.tippingpoiut.com/\nblog/200i /06/:!8/ decocling-the-\"'C'Iid-of-\\\\71rcraft, imerner, accCl!St.'li\n5 August 200ll.\n\n149\n(U) Viru:cnr Poupard, \"\\\\hnmn J>n:rsritlllt\"ll Htrsdf on Worlt.l of\nWnn:mfr,\" Associnted Conrent. 10 .-\\pri12007, a\\'ililable at Imp://\n\"'''\"':nssodaredconrent .com/nnkl~/21 0451/womnn_pi'O$rillltt'5_h~r\ns .. u:_through_criligslist.hnnl, intemt-t, ncc:(.'S,;ed 22 &ptt\"lllber 2008.\n150\n(lJ) tbid. For n scnnnecl cot~ of dtr.o CL nd. sc:-e \"RL Pt'Ostirution lor\n5,000 gold in WORLD OF WARCRAFT.'' Chm'ilct~r Pltmc:l Jinnn.\n\n15 t\\pril 2007, il\\'Hilable:- nrlmp://dmJTICI~Illlancl.t'om/J(,nmJ!I/rl- .\n\nprostirmion-r 12:?.brml?s=73d9.J 7albee313fd39:>3955fl80a l7!?&nmp;s\n=73d94 7;~0)ee313fd39539515tm0a I i2&t= 1221 intl\"l1tt!'t, accessed\n22 Septcmber 2008.\n\n(U) C:BS S, ''' \\tcman Attl.'mprs to Kidnap [.,.. \\irtual Boytii~aKI, .. 22\nAugust 2008, :1\\'Hilable at lmp://cbs3.com/Jocal/ltimb~ti}~jemignn.\n\nscc:ct~cd.2.801089.hunl, intt'mer, :u:ccurd 5 August 2008.\n\n152 (U) htlp://ww\\\"!l<.'dimint'.com, in~mer, :u:r.esSt\"d 22 Sc:ptcml:w:r 2008.\n(U) hup:/ \"'\"'\"':p>mube.com/warch?,=QjHe\\L:?L';oc, imcrnl.'r, :.cc:esst'd :22 Seprember 2008.\n\n154\n(U) \"The New .-\\anstt't-dnm: .\\.n lmt't'\\iew ,,;,h Uthen't.'l'st' CEO, Brmn Slmslt:r,'' AppScout, 18 April :?OOi, a\\':cihcble nt hllp://\"\"'\"':nppscout.\n\ncom/2007/114/rhc_m:w_amsreadnm_An_inrenic...,,_l.php, i111emc:r, nccessed 22 September 201)8.\n\n(UJ Em'llNI Ca\\111li, .. l\\Jlice Rc:fi~ to Aic.l in Vittunl 'lltdi Case:,''\nWired, .J. Febnmry 2008. il\\-nilnble at lmp://blog.\\,il't.'d.com/\ngamt!'s/2008/02/police-r-ef~-r.hunl, im~mer, acres~ed :?2 Sep{emlx- 21108.\n\n(U} E.1t'lli.'Sf C:l\\\"aUi, :.Jnp.1nese Tt'en Steals l.ngin Info, Virmnl Cnsh\nfrom .MMO Firm,'' Wired, 25 Jnmlnl')' 200f}, A\\7lilnble ar htrp://blo~\nwi~cl.com/ gmnt\"S/2008/0 1/japallnc-tn-~html, iuternel. :u:cc!sed\n22 St1Jleml)('r 2008.\n\n(U) \"Eccuomic Srntisrics,'' Second Lift-, I Augu11t :l008, 11\\'ililable al\n)Uip;//~'CCIIKffifi'.COIII/Whatis/t'COJlOIU)'_~Iill!.php, iniC'I'II~I, iiCC~l\"fi I August 2008.\n\n(li} Sc:c:rmcl Lift\" Upcbtlcd, Ginko Fium~ci;cl has stoppt>d alltmdini: 9 August 20071 :1\\\"ailable fl'l)m 1\\ttp://\"\"'\"':secondlift'upcbJte.\n\ncom/2007/08/ ginkl)-fiuancial-hns-sropped-nll-trndiug/, iuternt~r, nccessc:d ;) Augusr 2008; Daniel Tenlimau, CN'c1 News, Rmtks Banned in \"Second Life,'' B.Jnnunry ZOOS, R\\'ililnble from hrrp://news.cnec.\n\ncom/\\\\'eb\\\\71~/?k~'\\rord=Second+Life, internC't, acces$e<l5 :\\ugtJSt\n21108.\n\n## 159 Iu) Ibid .\n\niU) http://\"\"'\"':entt'Opinunn\"t'rse.com/enlaich/5676.htnd, internee, acceSst'd !?!! Seprembt'r 2008.\n\n160\n(U) \"W:.gl!'ling in Sc:-cond Life: New PoliC)~\" Second Life, 25.July 200i,\n8\\'~tilnblt~ ar http://blog.S('(\"oncRili.-.com/200i /07/25/wagctiug-in-\nSI.\"COnd-life-new-policr/, imernet, accessed 22 Sept~ml:~ea 2008.\n\n161\n{U:: \"Econ>lllk St!tlistic's: Graph,'' Second Life, ;wailnblc: at http://\nSO\"Condlift.-.r.om/whllt~/cccononl)'grAphs.php. inteJ'Jtet, nccc-ssed 22\n$('ptc-ml;,e, 2008.\n\n163 .\n\ntU~ Richard Bnnle, Designing Vi11tml worlds (New Riders Pub., 2tXI3).\n\n(Ul Miclmd Mill~; A Hisl\\11'\\' ,,f HcJJJC Vidcc C:anu G:nso)lt.:s. In\nit.t:mn: :\\pt: I, 2005, mHilal~l(: ~~ lmp://\"\"'\"'~infi)l'mit.comhl;,ic:l~/\nartide.II$J)X?p=3ifll41, iuteml!'l, 11ccc-s:~ed 5 August 2001l.\n\n(tiJ Edwnrd C:asuonrJw, ''Vinunl worlds: A Fim-Hnnd :\\r.couur of\n1\\Jnrk\\\"t nnd S<cie1y ~lu the CybeJ'ilm Frcmtier, .. Ce-ute1 fct' Econcomic Sll!(lic!t HIJC.I Jfi) Jmuimll: lc:.r F.coJJomi~ Rcs<m-ch (D~t'CJUber 2001).\n\n(U) '\\\\;,rid of Wna-crnn Rc-nch'.'s 10 MiUic111 Snbscribe1-s,\" 22.Jnn~ary\n2000, avRilablt fmm \\11tp:/ \"''\\\\'l~blizi!ill'd.c:om/n~/p~~/1180 122.\n\nhnnl, iuttJ'IIf~l, ac:css('c.l 5 AuguSI 2008.\n\n(U; ''Vit1tml ,,orld Entmpi11 lini,ct~ Issues FiJ'lit E\\'t.'J' Vit'tUHI B:mkiug Lic~ulk\"s fcr 51001000,\"' Mlll'ket \\\\:\"'uc-, t1 ~Jny 200i, a\\-:U\\nble frCtnt http://w\"\":tnnrke\"'i~.:cma/press-release/Entrt>pin-lini\n\n167\n''Ct'$1;-7S:i~l6.1uml. iuremet, ncr.cm:d 5 Angusr ~01.18.\n\n(U) Se-c- ''\"'\"':wnrh:unmerouline.com, inrernet, nccesgc:d 5 Aug\\&r.t\n200H.\n\n168\n169\n:U.: Fur example, see the Amcric:f.'s Anny wcbsiu, 11\\-::tilnbl(: from hup://'n'\"':mtJeticasnrm):com/abctt.n/, inrernct, ncCl':l.'lcd 5 August\n2008. As the g:une 's popuiMity continued to grow with ead1 of its dozens vf new \\'<'rsion 1-eleases, the- Army h:ts c-xpAncll!'cl its lmmd tln,)JJf,\"h\" \\'llJic:ty f,f products including t'onsole and (:ell phone g:'llllet,\n:\\mcti('tt's :\\rmy rnerchandi5< such ast-shins, the ReHI Hcroes pro\ngram which teUs the stori('S of heroic Soldiers, training npplicarions fr)r tL~ within th(' militAry and go\\'emment sccrors, Rnd thr \\1rtual Army Expencnte.\n\n(li.l Gaming and Virmnl wc11ids han n combinntion of globnl nud mobile: Rcc:e$li to:o incli\\idtwl tf\"XI chnt, gronp tt~.xr dtnl, in:sumr mf.'s..agin~.\nindi\\idu:.l and grr:up \\'Oil'C: .'CIIIIJJJic~llionll, file t.r11usfcr. nlimw.sand\nnetwork buddy li:o~rs, p1esence nctificntion, n c>uunon \\irtunlmc-t.>ring\npla:e, rmd linkagl!' to <ther mrdin (Hlch ns wtb sites . tdephony netwr:n'ks. n1 SIJ~illlliug mc!(liai.\n~U).J;me Pinckm,:l. ''ls World of Wnrcmft the New Golf?.''\nFcb. 8. 2006, ll\\'llilitble from htrp://\\\\'\\\\'\\dnp.com/do/\n\"'''''SStl)t-y?dcl=314i826, inrcmet, nccessf.'d 5 Augnst 2<.108.\n\n(li) Vi11tlill E1wiMnmrut$ lnf( GJ'Ciup, The Con\\'cr~cnce of Virtual\n\n172\n\\WJtid~ a11d Soci11l N~twr:orking Siu~~. 2008, A\\'lliluhl<\" lhm Imp:/\"'\"''\\'~\n,;nttnletl\\'ircmmenrs.info/C'nti.'COJ'\\'/!I(I('i;l, inrerner, nccesscd 5 Au~tllt\n~-\n~ .\n\n.\n\n173\n{tJ) Hrynn Gnl'din~r. ;~u1mpt.ysici$t Rt'plrt~:('ll Superc>mput~ ,,;,h Eight Plnystntion 3s,\" Wire<~ I i October 2007, n\\';lilnblc- from http://\n\"\"'\"': \"i~.com/tl.\"chbiz/it/ news/2007/1 0/ ps3_supet'Computet:.\n\nintc:rnct, :IC'Ct.-:~Sc~d S AugltSt 2fiOR.\n\n(Uj Philip Rose-dnh:, ''Online Virtual world:~: t\\pplicatifms :mel Avntars in n USC'r-G\\\"net'llred Medium/' H~ilring before rhe HouSC\"\nSubconunittee on Telecommunicmions and the Imem~r, (\\Vashiu~;\nron, DC, 4 Aptil 2008). Trall:if.'Jipt 11\\oilablr frc1111 http://ene,.gycomnu.rcl\".houSt\".go\\'ll'llll<'_mtgs/IIO-ri-hrg.ll40108.Virrunl\\\\\"oJid<t.shtml, in remer; ncc~l 5 August 2008.\n\n(U} M11scthin:r ~II)Ji, \"On the Uncanny \\:'allc.~~\" Proc~dings of the Humanoids-2005 workshop: Vie\"\" of the liucauny \\'nlley {5 Deceml~t2f.l(t.;;.\n\n!U) ~it1 inducks China, MJ'en, Australia, Ne\"' Zenland . Singllpor~, Thailand, Mnlaysi.'l. nucl the ~gions of Tniwan, Hong Kong, and\n~Jncau.\n\nCU) Nid' \\t-c, ''World of Wmcl'e~ft Gl'nd~r U.mdiug,'' llu:\nDned.1lus Project: Thr.- l'syd1clc>~y of MMORPGs (2005}, n,ailnble fi\"Om http://\"\"'\"'':nicLyee.com/dat\"dalns/nr-\n<'hiw.s/001369.php, iuterner, accc-ssed 5 August 2008.\n\n(U) Dmini Williams, :Nick Ycoe, And Scott C~tpl~tu. '\"\\Vho plays, hcow much, nnd why? A behll'ioml pia~~ census of a Virtu~tl wcorld\" prepnblicnlion drnft pnper (20081.\n\n## 178 179 (U) Ibid.\n\n(U) :-\\ctive ttsets'' fii'C' defined a!i users wlw h;.t\\'t' logged in within the last 60 days. htq,:/ /.&econdlife.com/wharis/\neconomy_srnu.php, imeruet, nccessed 5 August 2008\n\n(U) Dean Tnknhn$hi, \\entul\"e' Bent, <~~A: Undeu lab CEO !\\lnaic Kingdon on s~oncl Life's latest E,olmion,\n18 &,,temher 2008, \"'nilAblefiom http://\\'enturebe-nl.\n\ncom/2008/09/18/ CJil-linclen-lab-cco-m~trk-kingc.l)ll-ou-~~ec\nond-life$-):lle~t-e\\'Oiutiou/, intem~t, ncc:~sed j Augtut :?Q08.\n\n{U) Sueh .~111risrics cnn b,t.- mi:deadiug, lls \" frw incli\\'idu~tlll cnn account for a disproporriountely large number cf hours.\n\n183\n(UJ Lost in Bannna,-erse, Sc-cond Life Usnge- D~mograph\nic!o, 7 ~L1r 2008, :wnilnble- from http://\"\"'\"d:mmmn,~rsc.\".\n\nce>nJ/2000/03/0i /scc.VJJcl-lifc-usage-de~nographicll/, huerner accessed 5 August 2008.\n\n184\n(U) Hnbbo Rraches JOO million registered n\\711111~\nwotidwide, 26 M11y 2008, hup:/ '\"\"'\"':sulake.com/pn~ss/\nrelt!'nses/2008-06-25-1 OO_million_Habbos.html, i.nt~ruet, nccc-ssed 5 Augtlllt 2008.\n\n(U) Wagnerjamt!'s Au, \"World of Warcr.ft No LcJilget \\Vorld's Bigg~sr..MMor Gigaom, 6 i\\1ny 200<3, a\\ailable from lmp://gigaom.\n\n~om/201)8/0G/26/warr.raft-nc ... tonger-worlcts-higge-s!-allmo/, it1tn\nnet, nr.o:sM:cl 5 A11gusr 2008.\n\n(Ul Ht!bbo Reaches I (l{t million t'egistered a\\ornrs ''\"'ndwidt.-, 26 May\n:WOO, Imp:// \"\"~w .. mlakl.'.com/ press/t't'lcast's/2008.06-25-1 00 _millittu_Hnbl~lnml, intemet, 11~-cessed 5 Augn~t 2008.\n\n187\n{UJ '\\irtnnl \\YodeLs 2003 - Mattei Keynote: Making il S:~f~ and\n:MO\\ing t.o Subsc1iption'' Vittual Wolicls Ne11-s, 3 Ap1il\n2008, nvailable fil)IU lutp:/ /II\"W\":viliualworldsuews.\n\nr.om/2008/04/vi&1tllll-worlds.html, imenJet, OlCCf.'!ls~d 5\nAugust 2008.\n\n(\\i,i \"\\\\thkim:, dub pcm.&JUin ;unon!o: tQp 10 2007 fiiSif'.St grt\\,ing G(IC\"~Ie ~Mch cenns..'' 4 ~cember 2007, a\\':lilnble 'i-om htt.p:/ /\\,,~,,:\n'irtunh,orldsntws.c<Ju/2007/12/wel)kim:-<lub-~.htiid. intemet.\n\n\"'~c;-,~ss~~cl ;) Angu~t 20118; Wchkiuz  P:ucnt~ :t\\'nilnbllrt:.m hup://\nwww.w:hkitlz.c:ons/u~_c&tll'lscl-l'-\"''''lltll.hrn,J, int,:rnc:t, !IC:C:M.<w.d 5\nAugust 20013; N'ehn Tiwnli .. CNet News, I fell in lo)\\\\\" \\\\ith n cybt>J' nU~\nc::H, 10 My 2007, available liom http:/ /ucws.lnr.-t.l'Oili/Wehkinz-\n1-fcll-in-lc)\\'t'-with-a-cybl.\"l';clh:y<HI/'1.100-1026_3-GI82~~34.huitl, imt-mer, ncc..-s.'lt'd 5 August 2003.\n\n(.U) Vim111l worlds News, Vimull \\\\'OI'Ids 2008 - ;\\lnr.td Kr.pwte: ;\\faking it S11fr. /tnll ~lo\\'ing to Suhscri)Jtion, 3 ;\\pil2008: ~wnilablr frmn\n\n## 189\n\nhttp://\\\\'\\\\'\\\\~virtitnh,'Orlclsnews.cr_.m/Z008/04-/,il'tnnl-'''Otids.hun.l, illlt-rnt't, nccess~d 5 August 2003.\n\ni,UJ PR Wt-b, Gnia On1int' Name-d to IDfE.com 50 Ekst Websitt-s of\n2003 Lisr . 17 Junt' 2008, nvlli1nble fi\"Om http:// mf.\"dinSC'tWr.prw~b.\n\nC:(lll/ pdli lmmll):ld/1 032514/6/ ))l:pdr, inremtr, ll('CI\"s:!('d 5 r\\ugust\n2008; D::m.T:kltlmshi, Gni::. Online rai.~c~ Sll million to fimuJC:t\nm:ts~irc-ly mulripl:.yt-r onlint' gnm..-, I ~July 2tX18n,t~ilnbl~ from hrrp:/ /\\~nrm~bent.com/2008/07/14/\ngain-olllint--l'nis~-Il-million\nt~-fi;t:mr.~-lllliSi\\'l!'ly-nmh.iplny~t-ortlist<'gllmc/, 'im..-ml!t, ncct~St.cl 5\n:\\ugu~ 2(108; G~itwnHnc:.com US Den\"l-'raphic.'l, n\\nilnblt' IH htrp://\n\\\\\"\\,,,.qmnucnst .~om/ g:.inonlint'.com, internet, ;u:c~II..Y.d 5 August\n:wua.\n\ntUl A\\'llilnblc- fir.n} http:/ h\"'\"':\\in<om.com/otu'brnuds/mc-dinnP.r-\n,,~'ks/mt\\'netwol'ks/Pages/neoJ)t'ts.nspx, interutt, ncCt.$Sed 5 August\n2001t\n\n(U) Cnp:om nnd NI!'Cipers Partner to lnhr.oc:h.tce New l\\;fulti-Plntfonn\n\n'192\nl'uz~le t\\clwntm-c Gmnc, :Jjuuc 2008, Imp: *I I\"''\"'':* ,incon'i.cc:un/n~ws/ png~/uewsreoxr .nspx?rid= 1161 t141, inrel'llc-t, ncc~~d 5 August 2008:\niU) Ncopetli.C:OIII dcmogl':tl,hks, hr.rp://\"'\"':quanrcflst.o:om/uccpcts.\n\ncom/ demogr:tphio:s, inrC\"rut't, ncc~sed 5 Augnsr 2008.\n\n\n\n193\n194\n(U} Bntct' Sterling Wooc:kock. '~\"n Annlysis of MMOG Subscriprion\nGmwth'', JON Gam<' C:onfereuo:t (St.nule, W:\\, 14 M\"y 2008), m'llilnblc Rl http:/ h'\"\"''.mrnogt:h: .. rt.com/, interuct, ncct'sSC\"d 5 ... \\ugttsr\n2(10;},\n195\n(U} Tot \"lltm's<n, GnnwSpot, Srudy: 20 .I 2 g:une *I'C\\o* ro hit 6H.3 billicn1\nUSD, 18JuJI(: 2lN)P,, wnilnhle fn)lll hrrp:/ 1\\,,,,,:gmncspot.com/pc/\nrpg;/wcrlclofwnrrrafr /news.hrml?sid=6192 71 ~\\ int~mer, :~r.ct'sv.d 5\nAugust 2008.\n196\n{li)Julimi Dib~ll,. Notes Townrd a Th~y of Ludocapiralism, 24\nSeprC\"mbet-2007, available tiwn\n\n197\nhtrp://idash.org/pipcrmail/my-r.i/2007-Scprcmbt-r/01')():~73.1uml.\niuscmet, ACCr.\"l>'ll!d .; August 2008.\n(U) Exduding ptimmy llll'kl.\"t, iu:m-h:'lsecl first pmry snlcs of digital\n\n198\ngood~(\\.~; 1\\hplc Stot~ 11\\'iii:U' upgmdes !KId directly t(o *lc* playl'J' by\nNexrm, rhe gt~mo.' publisherj. ''irtttal Economy Rl\"S~111d1 N~t\\,ork,\nHo:\\\\' big~ tht' R~IT mnrker nn~'\\\\'ny?, nvailuble from ltnp:/ \"''''':\n\\it'llll-c~cunopu-g/hlog/ltO\\\\'_big_i~_rllr._nnr_nm&'ktt_;,llp: inr.ernt!l, ru.o::~~d :; Au~'\\lr<C 20(18.\niU) Gr.offrey .-\\. Fowl~s nnd.Juying Q.in: ''QQ: Chinn's N't!:\\,. C)iu of llc RrHhu?,\" Thl' Wnll Sm:t>tJ>mnnl, :m ;\\hmh 200i, a\\-:1ilnhlr: tictll lmp://eonline.w~j.com/public/nrridt-/SBll 751~1670114653518-\n\nFR_~,I>HxRtxk\\NnG'\\''l'''''<J-h12g_20080S::!9.1Jintl?nll<l=n;s_\nfrcc%:K:hrO/o20/%3E iutermt, ncc:es.'ICd 5 August 20Q8.\n\n(ll) Rcbe1'1 O'Harrou;Jt:, Spit's Banlegi'Ound Tums Virtunl, Wnshington Post. 6 Ft-bl'tlnry 2008, pn~ DO I: :1\\'nilnble fi\"Oill http://\n''\"\"':'''llshingtonpo$r.com/wp-dyn/c(lntc-nt/:.rtidc-/'l008/02/05/\nAR20(1802050314'4_pf.hrm.l, intcrncr, aC\\'t'sScd 5 Augu.o:l 2008;\nRynn Singe!. U.S. Spi~ Want t~ find T..-&mlists in Wol'ld of W:ll'l:rnlt, 22 Feobntaay 2008, avnilable from http://blcg.wired.\n\nc:om/27bsrroke6/2008/02/umions-spit~~-'':hrml, huctuet, Hcct~o;cd 5\nAugust :!008.\n\n(li) AJ~xandt-r Sliwinski, ::Mosr Bizan?. Thing \\ou'JJ Read Todny:\n.Mass Effect's ,irtual orgar<rnk rapt', .I 4 Jmmary 2003, !1\\'llilablc: :tl Imp:/ /\\\\'\\\\'\\\\'Jc~'Stiq.com/2(1(}8/(11/14/most-hiz;lt'l\\:lhiug-youll-r<Ad\nrodlly-mnss-effe<\".ts-'\"irtunl_,>,-gl, imernt't: :-n:cell!lt'cl5 .o\\ugtl$t 2008;\nPhilip KoUnr, Alltbot Apologizes tot Fox News Mnss Effect Lies, I up l\\'ews, 8 Jmmary 2008, amilahlr. li'(lll http:/ h'\"'\"''.ll!PCI)Itl/ do/\nnt-wsStory?cld=316563S, imerneot, ncc~d 5 August 21)08.\n\n(U) Fi>r an ouline \\'el'$ion of Bentham's plans for the PanQpricou, SP.I.'\nllllp:/ /cnrtomc.ol'glpanopticon2.huu, imc:rut-r, ac:cessef15 Augusl\n2008.\n\n(U) \"Ca111e god\" is rhe \\'emaculnr for tht' ptivate- cf.lTporarion thm designs, mnintnins, nnd adniinisters a 'irtual wol'fcl. The- gmne god of World of \\\\'an:rnfr is Blizzm'd EnrM\"tMinmcnt, Ltd; rho: god >f Sec>ud Life is Lindt~t 1...1\\1>~~; l'IC.\n\n204\n(l') Ad11m RC\"ull!\"t\"S, Second Life, Gnt111C'I' Set's 80% Virtual world Pene-rsmion by 2011, 25 April :.?007, ;milnblc- from hup://.se-coudlift-.\n\nreuters.tom/stOiies/2007/04/25/ gm1ntr-se-~-8Q-\\irtunl-world-penc\ntmricon-by-20 11/, int~tne-1, accr.-5$ed 5 Angust 2008.\n\n(UJ for t'XI'Implr, Blizznrd i~nter1aimn<'nt relies ''II plnyer repcming nnd flngging ~ystems ro de-al ,,;,h unml!rotiS issu~ of brt-nc:h of rbe terms of llt't\"\\ ict'.\n\n205 206\n(lil For t'Xllmple. considn tht' Googlr.-labt'ling c-xpt-l'imenr, which usesluunnus to flag and la~l picnu?.S of photographs. See Googl~\nImagl' Labele; Ht lutp://imagt's.googl~.ccnu/imagelnbc:Jer/, iuteme, nccessed 5 August 2008.\n\n(U) K~tr-t ,: United StAres, 389 U.S. 34 7 (.1 91)7).\n\n207\n208\n\n{U) ~onclthe C::lll1't'llt scc;.pe of thi~ ann lysis i:c whether \\\\'lll'l'lllltle~\nwiteraps of hybaid US and li>a\"~eign con\\'t'n.'llions at't' ct.msrirutional and permitted by FISA ns am~ndt-d by rbl!' Pnrrior Act, and gnin in 2008. Alrh>ugh this is a scrimt!l quesrion, it i11 ... ,, c.uu. uuiqne tCJ\nVirrual woaids.\n\n(U) United Stares\" Millet; 425 U.S. 435 (1976).\n\n209\n\n{Uj Susan Freiwald, \"Online Smveillnncr.-: Rc-mi!'Tnbt'ting the US$01\\S\nof rhe \\ \\~J't'tap Act,'' 56 Ala. L:lw R.t:lit-w 9 (2004). ('~o\\s many ha\\'1~\nnoted, rhe r<\":~sonablr. expectnlion of pai\\ncy tt'st is c:ircular.'').\n\n(U) K.;ltZ, 31.19 U.S. at 351 ( 1967:-(''what [n person] seeks to presen~ as printlf', ~''l'n in ;m a t-ea iiCCe!$ihlt' to the public, 111ny bt> cotb!titllli.:.nnlly pmlt~:red.'').\n\n(lii Kyllc. \\: l.iuimd Stntc:s, 5:ts U.S. 2i (2001; (h,ldiug um~ cf tlwnmll imngiug a ,;r,,lnrir.lll of the Fc~ttrrh Amenclmem).\n\n(l..i) Indeed, enrly Supreme C:cmrr (pin.ioru ~S:\"umed thnr becnul!e rechnf.k~.c~trrit!!i inf~,rmilli(Jnc>Htsil'le nf the: h(llllt' rhnt tht inll:nnntion is nn lcn~:r pl'i\\'AIC:. SL\"(: Ohustettd ,., lJnittd Sttct~. *2Ti* U.S. 1~38 (1928)\n(holr.lin~ dun there wng no o:~ctntion of prh'll~' in tdeplwne cnlls}.\n\nOlntstend's focus <n the merht..c:l of 5111'\\'eill:mce mrhea than rhe n:cnue c)f the inli.lt'tmllitJII WfiS (I\\'Cl11JI(d by Kmz.\n\n(U) DMi'.'l Terdimnn, ''Lnying Po\\\\11 rht.- Virntnl **L'\"\"'\"** Wired Mngnziue. 13 Nr.t\\ember 2(103, ;wnil11ble 111 hrtp://ww,,:wir~d.com/\ngluuing/gmningl'c~\\it\\,.s/ne''\"/2003/ II /61181i, imer1ret, ncc:~ss<'d 5\n\nAugtL~t 2001t\n:.U) \\'ahvl ': 1 ... 1 l.iguc Co>ntrc L:1 R:ccisme et L'AntiSemitismc, 169 E\nSupp. 2d 1181 :N.D. Cnl. 2001).\n\nili) luiCI'IICr w~llid Slals, 0l\"Cc!Uibtr 2007. W\\\\'\\\\:inlt>rtlCIWOrldstats.\n\nc~\"'nt, int~mC't, a((('SS('d 5 August 2008.\n\n(lJ) (;;mmsmtn.Juuc 21Xt7, ,,ww.gmnAl'lltrn.t:om, imcmct, ;lccc$llr.d 5\nAugust 2001~.\n\n219\n!U} Virur.,l ,,orkls N(',,s, Wh(o's Nt>w to Virtual worlds, 29 Fc-bnuuy\n200(-1, ww,,:,irtunh,t'>Jiclsne,,'S.com, imemt<t, :t'=ce55~l 5 August 2008.\n220\n(U) Win:d.com, lkautilid Animc kids gf:t rheirO\\\\lt MMO, H April\n200.<s, hllp:/ /hl>g.wircd.com/.gnm'c:-:r/2li08/04/l4/inclcx.huul, imcr-\n\nnt.ol, ncc:-c-s.;ed 5 At.t~tsl 2001J.\n222\n!U) Virtn411 wc.rldll No~\\\\'~ ~letr.\\-et-sum Hin~ Onliru. ~l:ukcting ancl\nProduct Milnogc:omc:ont Hendslor T,,;nil)~ IS May 2008. btt)~://blog.\nwhc-cl.c<,m/gntnl.\"s/2008/0V 14/indcox.hrml, imC'ruet, ncc~ 5\n:\\ugu$1 200f.l.\n{U\\ \"\"\"'.fr.rrinct.c:>m, {April20<14'). inro:mer, acct'.ssed 5 Augtl$! 2008.\n223\ntU) '''''W.thail'yl>el'galllt~.com, {july 2008.1: intC!'I'Ilet, ncct'slled 5 AngtL~t\n2008.\n\n224\n225\n~U\\ Vil'lnnl ,,odds News, Thni Go\\'emrno:nt mrd Archirecrs Co-\nI..nundt Renlnncl Varmnl Building in Enrropia; uads ro MO\\ie Ikal,\n9 F.:lmmry 21:K'I8, \\1'\\\\'\\,:\\'irru:dworldsnews.com, illl<'l'llet, l'IC':es.sec.l5\n:\\ugu::l 20011.\n\nIU} ''''\"v.gmnnsurra.com, !JunC' 2007j, i.nt('rner, acc:~ssed 5 August\n:!(IOH.\n\n(U) A l~t cf tltt~: &.><:c111d Life left-wing grcllJ>$ has hc:c:n compiled hy Dalininn Bing, nnd ir was then suggntecl by rbe posrer thl'lt members of rhe g~)up Lng4Pt.once mny ,,anr ro \"coordinntl!' \\\\ilia or reach om rc'' thc~m. ': Nakamichi, Conml>nweahh Islands in Second Lift.- wd>-\nsite, At:ti\\'isr Groups nud 01ganizaricns in Se~ond Uft~, 29 NO\\'t!'lllbtr\n200i, :wniL\"Iblc:o ti\"Om Imp:/ /conm\\011\"-ealrhis.lnnd.nin.~.com/gr~.,up/\nlngci-peacdfomm/ ropic/shO\\,?id= I:! I 7464\"/n3.r\\Topic~';03Al 030, imerm:t, ncca<~t\"<.l5 Augn:~t 2008.\n\n(U} Note thnr SHARP Hkins are \\iolenrly oppcosed to 1\\t'(>-lasci8, but nor necessarily left-\\\\iug, skinhe-Ads. The smnc:- is tnll~ or m>sr so-r.alltd TmclitkJual Skins. Skinhea:h whc 11r~ geuuinely leftist, ideologicnlly spc:-:tking. m-e geneJ'lllly kn0\\\\11 as Rtc:lskins. Fbr ~cholal'ly introdt\\C:-\nriCins ro aspect~ of, and di\\isions wirhiu, rhe skinhead snbculturt>, ~\nTimorhy S. 8J'OW11. \"Snbculnrres, Pop Music nnd Politics: Slcinh~ads nnd 'Nnzi Rock' in England nnd Germans\" J)urnal of Soci:cl History ~~8:1 (2(11)4j,15i-i8;Jct1~ M. Rnlc, \"Skinltcad Fnsdsm/' in Wolid Fascism: A Hisrorical ~~m.')clupedin, eel.\n\nC~1>1inn Blnmia-es, (Sanrn Bnt'bnn1, CA: ABC-Clio, :?006).\n\n(U) Arc~n'ding w a quick llt.\"tn'Ch of ruw.r c::rcntc:d groups un rhe Second Lili- website!, W\\\\'\\\\\\SCl'o)lldliJ(o.com.\n\n(U) Ir may be possible to dmif) this siruati~lll furdu.r if one is willing ro spend more time ''iu-wol'ld\" monitCiring o-ganizaricns and tluir acri\\ities in SL.\n\n(li) i\\Im-k Lnncller andJchn Markoff, \"Digital Fena-s\nEmerge: After Dnrn Siegt~ in Esroni11,'' Ntw \\(ork 'limes,\n29 Mny 200i, nvnilnble from http:/ \"'\"'\"\\:1\\~'times.\ncom/2007/05/29/technolclgy/29estonin.hnnl, intcornc-t,\naccc~cl5 August 200R\n232\n(U) BBC News, ''Sw,.dt-n pL'lns Se~:ond Life emba~;\" 29\nJanuary !?007. tl\\'llilable from hup://ne\\\\-s,bbc.co.uk/2/\nhi/l':lii'OJ'lr.l6310915.stm, internet, accessed 5 Anb\"'ISI 2008;\nDunc;:m Riley, \"You're Not In The USSR Any Mot-e: Estonia Opten~ ,o\\n Embassy In Second Lil~,\" in Tech Crunch,\n5 Dec:embel' 2007, n\\'~ilable li'Cnn Imp:/ \"'\"'\":t~chcnmch.\ncoot/2007 I 12/05/youre-not-in-rhe-u . .._.:,-mly-m>t-e-t':!ltmia-\nopens-nn~mb.usy-in-sec:cmd-life/, inremt?'r. accessed 5\nAugust 2008; Ak~la Tnlnmn~a, \"\"The i\\Ialdi,es Vinunl\n~:moos~:'' in Second Lilt- Insider, 23 Mny 2007, a\\'nilablc.-\nfrom lmp://''\"''':sec:or1lUileinside-:com/200i /05/2:~/ .\n\nrbe-mnlclh-es-,irtttnl-embn$5)'/, interuet, accessffl5 Augttst\n2008.\n\n(U) Based 01.1 inteanariconnl govt>J'JUllent IT busines.~ c:nse submissions found in Tht' 2007 nnd 2006 edition of The\n\nJ.J~m'\\\"nle, (;(l\\'crnmcnt srltion, n,e Compntt'lwcticl Honors Prr.ogmm, a\\'llil~tble from Imp:/ \"'\"\"\"'l:whonors.c>rg; intemct,\n\nnc~eS!ed 5 Angusr 2008.\n234\n(Uj Mark Lamllcr nndJohn MarkoO: ''Oigi1al Fcan Emerge t\\licr\nD111a Sicg~ in f.t~ronin,\" in Nl'w Yo1-k Times, 29 M11y 2007, :1\\ailable\nli'Om hnp:/ '''\"'\"'~nyrimes.com/2007 /05/29/tt.-chnology/2~:)esronin.\nhun!, iutemel, ac:c:essed 5 August 20H8.\n235\n(U) ~Iolly Mcoore, \"French Politics iu 3-D on Fantasy Web Site, Presidential Hopefuls Build PJ\"eSenct' for Avntars on Second Life,''\nrhc Washingrou Post, 30 Man:h 200i, Section.-\\ p.'\\ge :i, l\\\\'3ilahle fi'Omlutp://w'\"''.Wnshingtmposr.com/wp-dyu/coutent/\n:trride/2007/0'3129/ AR20070329025oKl.html! intem~t. nc.ces.~ 5\nAugnsr 2008.\n\n(Ui Chmrinn Mackenzie, ''French NH\\')' Uses $e>cond Life to Rruil,\"\nin:\\Yi:uon Week's DTI, 10 December 2007, avnilable from hrrp://\nW\\'\"'':milirnry.com/feanu-es/0,15240,15 7945,00.html, inreruer, ac-\n\nCCll.'~t:~l 5 August 2008.\n\nt U) Conrad \\\\'alters, \"Cyber cold wnr th~nrens us all,\" in Compurer Ctime ~SCRt-ch Cenlet; 31 December 31 2007, availftble li'Om hup://''\"''\"'v.ctime-re$earch.ot-glm1icles/CotU\"ad07/, imernct, accessed 5 Angu11t 2008;Ja:;on Koutsoukis, \"Chinese waging online spy wnr, .. in The Age, 10 Febt\"lll'IJ1' 2008, a'l:niL'lble fromlurp://\n\"'ww.cltenge.catn.ntt/news/mtlional/chilte-se-wngitlgonline-s~\n'''\"r/2008/02/09/1202~3423201R.luml, illlt\"l'llet, occessed 5 Augusl\n2008: McAfee Vittunl Criminol~gy Report, a\\'ailable ftT.Jm http://\nw''\"'~mc11fee.com/ mlt'l!'llenrch/ criminologr.:..report/ dt..fnult.honl, iuu:rnct, Rt:ces.~ed 5 Angu~J 2008.\n\n## 238\n\n(U) BBC: News, Rnsainn NOO n:jl!'cts spy 'smenr', 23 .Jnnnnay 2006, nweiiAbl;:: li'tlm Jurp://uc:-ws.bbc.ro.uk/2/hi/europe/4h40632.stm, iaucrm!t, nt'C:r.lllled 5 Augu!lt2008: NCO Awnreucss In \\'it11ml worlds.\n\nDecember 6, 2006, htrp:/ '''\"''\"v.knowprose.('om/node/ 16977, interntt, nct:C\"ssecl5 Attgtll'r !l0n.8.\n\ntUJ lul~irllllion clnccwuing dw St:~onrl Lift' Lil~mrit:m Ariny wntl deri'~ from n presentntion by the- orgnnizntion's foundeli gn't\"n nt SHARf, .,n 17 jnlr 2008. a:s well a!l Ji'tlm :~uuSt~Jueau conwt'sittions.\n\n(U) BBC News, ~~ Virrual Crime llt't'd ~aljusrice-?, 29 Seprc:mbcr 2003, 11\\'ailnblc: ft'tm Imp:/ /nrws.bbc.cQ.uk/:?/hi/technology/31S8456.stm, imc:ntt\"t, acces.'ICd 5 August 2008.\n\n240\n\n(U) Hwrt-gyungyoo, \"Ten ~ousand Teenagrt's 'Game Ctiminall;'\", mltnwha-ilpo (South Korean Cultural Dnily), 2i Febnta.ry 2004.\n\n241\n242\n\n(U) Second Life lipdnted, Ginko Financial has stoppt'd all tmd-\niug, 9 August 2007, available. f1-om http:/ hm,tserondlifeupdatc:.\n\ncom/2007/081,ginko-fiunncial-hns-slcipped-nll-u\"Rding/, interne-t, accessed 5 August 2008; Daniel Tc:rdinmn, \"Banks Banned in &-c.ond Lifr.-,\" in C:Net News, B.Jmmnry 2008, m-ailable: fiomluq,:/ /news.\n\ncnct.com/wcbw;u~./?key''\"rd=Second+Life, internet, accessed 5\nAugust 2008.\n\n2 43 (U) n,id.\n\n{U) BBC News, Cash Card Tnps Vitnml Game Funds, 2 May 2006, il\\'ailnble fiomhttp://news.blx.co.uk/2/hi/te-chnclogy/4-953620.stm, iuternet, accessed 5 August 2008.\n\n244\n2 45 tV) lbid.\n\n1U} Wit'('r.nrd, \\Virecnrd Bt111k: Arst C:cmum b:utk in ~ond l..ife, li)\n\n246\n\n~lny 200i, a\\11ib1ble ftom httr:/ /www9.,,i~cnrd.C(om/siugle'liew/ar\ntiele/J3/ wirecard-btm-l.hunl?cHnsh=5b8d50b~l2c, internet, accessed\n5 August 2008.\n\n(U) Wirecard,. http:/ /r.lurl.com/~condlife/Wirl.\"c:ud/ 128/12610, interner, ac~essed 5 August 2008.\n\n(U) 'My Vimml Ufe,\" Business Week, I ~lay 2006, a\\ailable fi,)lll http:/\"'\"'''\\>/. busines)wcekcont/magazine/ conrent/06_18/b398200 I.\n\nhrm, imeruet, accessed 5 Augusr 2008.\n\n(U) Imp:/ 1\\nn':s<Juici(IO.com/entropiaunh~rse and hrrp:/ I\nwww.Spoinrcl.com/2007051 ~/ enlropia-news-mastrn:ard-dral-rl..bankmore/, inrt'met, accesst\"cl 5 August 2008.\n\n(U) I..aut~ncejohnwn, FDCH Technology *\\'tare,* I April 2008."
    },
    {
        "text": "in this book do not reflect your recent The charts and text used es not decision to fill the second deputy post at Defense, but this do affect our analysis.\n\n## Action Required\n\nI recommend that you call a meeting Review this Decision Book.\n\nof the NSC (including the Attorney Genera 1) soon after your return from Vail, to discuss this issue.\n\nApprove \"expanded\". NSC meeting Disapproved\n\n## Next Steps\n\nIf you meet with us upon retu i-ning from Vail to present your views on these intelligence issues, we will then present another final decision memorandum (in under a week).\n\nR\n)\nN\n.\n\n.\n\nAt that time, you may wish to meet again'with an \"\"expanded\" NSC\nand, perhaps, separately with others such as the Joint Chiefs.\n\nOnce you make your substantive decisions on the foreign intelligence matter, we will prepare a i'strategy' paper on the altermatives for presenting your positions to Congress and the public.\n\n## Principles And Policy\n\nThe purpose of this chapter is to assist you in developing goals and principles concerning the Intelligence Community.\n\nThey will provide direction for the Community and serve as\n\"guideposts\"\nas you make your decisions on the issues which follow.\n\nThis chapter focuses on:\n\n*\nThe need\nfor charters\nto increase\naccountability which\nis necessary\nto restore public confidence\nin the\nIntelligence Community.\nThe need to.clarify the relationship\nbetween\nthe Congress\nand the Executive.\n*\nThe need\nto clarify relationships\nwithin\nthe Executive Branch.\n\n## A, Introduction\n\nThe focus of all invesfigations of the Intelligence Community\n(principally by the House and Senate Select Committees)\nhas been on abuses, domestic and foreign.\n\nOn the other hand, other recent studies have addressed the problem of improving the organization ana management of the.Community.\n\nCertain consumers of intelligence have focused on the need to improve product quality and to meet emerging needs in non-Defense areas, such as economic intelligence.\n\nAnd, finally, critics outside the Administration and Community leaders have recog;\nnized the need to improve protection of secrecy and, at the same time, to provide for wider dissemination of intelligence product to those who have a need to know.\n\nThe -current attention focused on the Community p;ovides you with the opportunity to deal with these issues.\n\n1In reaching decisions on the more detailed issues, there are five goals which you maf wish to adopt:\n\n-~\nAbuses should be eliminated and this must be clearly\n. understood by the Congress\nand the public.\n-\nThe organization and management of\nthe Community\n'\nshould be improved.\n-\nThe quality of the intelligence product should be\n: improved.\n-\nSecrecz,\nincluding sources\nand methods, should be\nprotected,\nconsistent with necessary dissemination\nof\nthe Community's product\nto policy officials.\n-~\nEstablish more effective relations with Congress\ninvolving the Intelligence Community.\nTo achieve these five goals, you must restore public confidence in the Community, its legitimacy and its adherence to the law.\n\nUnless this confidence is restored, the soitndest decisions will never result.in achievement of these goals.\n\nThe decisions necessary to achieve these goals should, if possible, be taken comprehensively and at the same time.\n\nSteps to achieve one goal will necessarily have an impact on another.\n\nFor example, decisions on organization and manage--\nment will necessarily affect quality.\n\nPreventing abuses\n\n through excessive restriction\nof Community collection\nactivities\nmay lead\nto\na demoralized and ineffective Community,\nthus reducine the gquality\n&6f the product and of\nthe people\nattracted\nto\nthe Community.\nLack of concern\nfor protection\nof secrecy sources\nand methods\ncould severely damage\nthe\ncontinuing effectiveness\nof the Community.\n\n## Problems\n\nThe analysis of ways to achieve .these five goals has shown that there are three underlying problems which must be solved.\n\nThe first of these is the lack of adequate charters for the key agencies that make up the Community.\n\nThis lack has made it possible to criticize the Community for actions taken in the past that were consistent with the needs of the time, but that are not acceptable today.\n\nFurther, there have been ambiguities and imprecision in the role and functions of certain elements of the Community, as'\npointed out by the Rockefeller Commission.\n\nAnd lastly, because neither the National Security Agency nor the Defense Intelligence Agency has been created by statute, critics have been able to impugn their legitimacy.\n\nRestoration of public confidence in the Community may require a more explicit charter, and particularly a set of restrictions on the Community to eliminate and prevent abuses.\n\nThe second fundamental problem has been the relationship between Congress and the Executive.\n\nThis relationship has gone undefined throughout his;ory, and the recent House and Senate intelligence investigations have strained relations between Congress and the Ekecutive.\n\nCongress has asserted a need for more information to be able to judge our foreign policy, but that need must be balanced with the need of the Executive to conduct that foreign policy without necessary or damaging restrictions.\n\nThe third underlying problem is the ambiguous relationship among intelligence officials and agencies within the Executive Brahch, particularly between the bepartment of Defense and the Direcfior of Centrai Intelligence.\n\nIn 1971, the DCI\nwas designated the leadef ofbthe Community by Presidential Directive, but many argue that he was not given the tools to do that job.\n\nThe need to deal with the first two problems makes this a propitious time to take another look.at that relationship and to decide to what degree management and organizational changes are desirable.\n\nThis is an historic opportunity to make changes that probably would be impossible in normal times.\n\n## Strategy\n\nIn dealing with these three underlying problems, there are certain questions of strategy which must also be addressed.\n\nOne is the degree of public discussion and attention which you should give these issues and these changes.\n\nAnother is the appropriate strategy with respect to Congress and the form your decisions should take:\nne legislation, new Ekecutive Orders, classified instruetions to the Community, public statements, or combinations of all four.\n\nThese issues will be dealt with in more\n.\n\nmade detail after you haveflthe substantive decisions.\n\n## B. Athe Need For A Charte_R\n\nIn discussing the charter of the Intelligence Community, there is a need to distinguish between two very different activities, policy-making and providing information and services.\n\n~If one views the CIA and the Intelligence Community as primarily policy-making organizations, ways would have to be found to increase the participation by the heads of intelligence organizations in major policy decisions.\n\nHowever, this will probably be characterized by some members of Congress and the Press as having unfortunate consequences.\n\nHowever, the other side of this ergument is that the intelligence agencies are and should remain service agencies, and their role of providing intelligence should not be tainted or biased toward attempting to make their bosses!\n\npolicies come true.\n\nThe lack of a charter for specific components of the Intelligence Community\n(such as the NSA and the DIA)\nand the lack of a detailed charter for the CIA, have led to ambi-\n'guities and unclear guidelines.\n\nIn dealing with the broad question of the Community's charter, two subsidiary policy questions can be posed:\n\n## Issue: Should The Charter Of The Community Institute Greater Accountability?\n\nA key concept running through the analysis to date is the degree of accountability in the Community -\naccountability to the President, to statutes, to the Constitution.\n\nAccountability is at fihe heart of the\n: euestion of achieving the overriding objective of improving public confidence.\n\nThe most obvious aspect of accountability is raised by covert actions, but the concept applies to all functions of the Community and its management.\n\n## Options:\n\n1.\nVisibly increase\nthe accountability within\nthe\nExecutive by streamlining the chain of command\nto insure\nthat specifically identified individuels\nare responsible\nfor specifically defined Intelligence Community actions.\nThis will help prevent\nabuses\nand encourage efficiency and excellence\nin\nperformance.\n(For example,\ndecisions concerning\nelectronic surveillance are made throughout the Community and it is difficult to fix responsibility.)\n\n2.\nDo\nnot move toward greater accountability since\nthe existing mechanisms\n(ificluding NSC/40\nCommittee structure)\ncan be improved sufficiently.\nMuch of the criticism of the approval of covert actions hasAcente;ed on a few examples which were not in fact in any way the result of inadequate approval mechanism or staff work.\n\nEven if the present systefi were scrapped, something ;imilar would have to replace it., Some changes could and_should be made administratively, but they need not alter the present system and we should oppose attempts on the part of Congress to repeal the flexibility given under the National Security Act of\n1947.\n\nThe following charts demonstrate the complex relationships in the Intelligence Community and diffusion of accountability.\n\nISSUE:\nDo the Community's statutory and administrative charters adeguatelz deal with covert action?\n\nThis is currently one of the most controveisial aspects of the Community's operations.\n\nA great deal of.\n\ninformation has come to light on the Community's covert operations.\n\nYou have addressed several aspects of them as they have emerged through your creation of the Rockefeller Commission, your public response to its Report, comments on the Assassination Report, etc.\n\nYou have defined your position on this issue in public statements.'\nYou are following two principles concerning covert actions:\nFirst, they are necessary in the national interest afid therefore should not be prohibited across-the-board by statute or Executive action;\nand,\n.\n\nSecond, there have been abuses in the past\n(e.g., assassination planning)\nand you have stopped abuses and will prevent them from occurring in the future by Executive Order.\n\n## C. The Need To Clarify The Congress - Executive Relationship\n\nISSUE:\nShould any new charter for the Intelligence Community be primarily statutory or administrative?\n\nThe lack of a statutory charter for specific components of the Intelligence Community\n(such as the NSA\nand the DIA), except CIA's very &ague charter in the National Security Act of 1947, have led to difficulties between Congress and the'Executive.\n\nThe prime reason for\n.seeking a new charter for elements of the Community would be. to assist in eliminating and preventing abuses.\n\nMany argue that this is needed to rebuild public confidence in the Intelligence Community.\n\nThe present charter does not edequateiy deal with the reporting relationship to Congress.\n\nFurther, Congressional ovefsight is now an issue.\n\nThe effect of this has been a perceived lack of accountability to Congress.\n\n## Options:\n\n1.\nArguments why\nthe charter should be primarily\n.\nstatutory:\n-\nThe Constitution requires Executive action\nto be based on statute\nin most areas\nof\ngovernment.\n-\nCongress\nis bent on exercising its will\nand\ntherefore will want\nto write\nnew laws.\n-\nA statute\nis more permanent and thus\nthe\n.Community could better predict\nthe standards\nby which\nit will be judged.\n-\nIn\nthe nature\nof things Congressional attempts '\nto write\na charter will essentially\nfocus\non\npast abuses.\n-\nTIf you propose a statutory charter\nfor the\nCommunity,\nyou show initiative\nin dealing\nwith\nthe problemn.\n-\nIn writing legislation\n(as opposed\nEo\nthe\nSelect Committees'\ninvestigations)\nthe necessity\nfor\na \"general\" charter will be recognized.\n\n## Arguments Why The Charter Should Be Primarily\n\nadministrative\n(a series of Executive Orders and\nguidelines by agency heads, supplementing minimal modification of existing legislation).\n\nI\n\n-\n'Under\nthe Constitution,\nforeign policy and thus\nforeign intelligence,\nis\nan Executive responsibility.\n-\nThe Community has had\na mixed statutory\nand\nadministrative charter\nfor\nthe last\n30 years\nand\nit has worked well.\n-\nIt\nis impossible\n.to\nforesee\nall\nof\nthe actions\nthat will\nbe necessary,\nand relying on detailed\n. legislative authority\nfor authorization\nie risky:\nthe President must mainfain flexibility\nto operate\nin foreign affairs without detailed restrictions\nfrom Congress.\n-\nThe public will receive some assurance\nfrom the\nmixed charter,\nthough perhaps not\nas\ngreat\nas\nfrom\na statutory charter, depending\nin part on\nfhe\nfirmness and perceived intent of the\nPresidential statement.\n(If your'intent\nis.\nperceived\nto be\nto limit the Community's\no}\n-\n\n)\nactivities\nand\nto gain control over\nit,\nU\n\\\ne?\nVv\nthen the public will be less concerned by\nC.n\nY\n>\n=\nthe\nform of the charter.)\nISSUE:\nShould a new Congressionalexecutive'relationshig\n\n## Sh Cbu 7\n\n\nQ\\gg\nprovide\nfor greater Executive Branch aceountabilitz,\n\n## An 5\\ $ To Congress? ' (\\\" ) Options:\n\nv\nF<\n1.\nAll efforts\nof Congress\nto institute new forms\nof\nN\nN\naccountability should be opposed since foreign policy\n\n## 7 O3 \"\n\nand intelligence\nis essentially\nan Executive Branch\nmatter.\n-\nExclusive Presidential authority over intelligence\nis\na plausible though controversial interpretatiog\nof the Constitution.\n-\nWith increased accountability to Congress will\nnecessarily come greater Congressional control\nand interference.\n~\nWhatever merits of this position,\nit is doubtful\nthat it can be maintained for long,\ngiven the\ndegree of public and Congressional concern over\nCommunity abuses.\n2.\nThe Executive Branch should be more accountable\nto '\nCongress,  and this\nshould be defined through negotiations between\nthe Branches.\n(This may be the Hughes\nAmendment requiring reporting of covert actions,\nsupplemented by some approval on specific actions, budget approvals, etc.)\n\n-\nWe have already crossed the bridge of Congressional\ninvolvement\nin intelligence matters',\nand it will\nbe difficult\nto exclude Congress\nin\nthe future,\nparticularly on covert actions.\n-\nThe traditional oversight mechanisms\nare\nno\nlonger valid\n(because of the collapse of\nCongressional leadership)\nand the Executive\nmust take the lead in working out new arrangement\n-\nCongressional oversight\nis\nin fact not likely\nin\nthe\nlong run\nto prove onerous,\nsince attention\nof\nCongress will tend\nto flag as these things\nbecome more routine.\n-\nNonetheless,\nthere will always be\na countervailin\npressure of individual Congressmen\nto release\ninformation gathered,\nthus frustrating the\nintent\n6f the Executive.,\nAlso,\nthe\nleaks which\nhave occurred from the Select Commitfees.on\nIntelligence\nat the very least raise a strongi\npresumption that sensitive national security\ninformation\nis comprofiised once given\nto Congress\n-\nThe Angola matter demonstrates that\nthe present.\nsystem\nis\ninadeguate.\nYou do not have sufficient\nsupport to gain approval of your positions\nin\nCongress.\n\n## D. The Need To Clarify Relationships Within The Executive Branch\n\nMany of the key issues in the Organizetion and Management section of this book, and in other studies, turn on the relationship between the head of the Intelligence Community\n(now the DCI)\nand the Secretary of Defense.\n\nThis relationship is key because it affects:\n\n1)\nthe amount of \"competition\"\nin\nthe analysis which\nproduces intelligence;\n2)\nwhere\nthe balance is struck\nin allocating resources\nbetween\n\"national\" and\n\"tactical\" intelligence;\nand\n3)\n'the efficiency in collecting information\nand producing\nintelligence.\nThere are some subtle problems.which this relationship raises.\n\nFor example, to the extent the DCI\nis viewed as an adviser\n(and hence stripped of his menagerial and/or policymaking roles)\nhis intelligence product is more credible because he is not perceived as biased towards one institution.\n\nHowever,;\nonce he loses his institutional\n\"base\", he is likely to become less effective in bureaucratic struggles with the Defense and other Departments and eventually could end up with very little, if any, real control over the Intelligence Community.\n\nAnother management variable which greatly impacts the functioning of the Intelligence Community, is the process of presenting intelligence to you and your senior edvisers.\n\nHere the role of the NSC\nand its staff is critical.\n\nThe DCT\nhas direct access to you, but the NSC and its staff are involved in specifying requirements for studies and production, managing the consumer/producer dialogue, approving\n(through the\n40 Committee)\ncovert operations, and using the product as a basis for its own evaluations and assessments.\n\nThe Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs is a primary channel for intelligence to the President.\n\nIn making your Executive Branch organization and management decisions, you may wish to use the following as guideposts:\n\n(1)\nThere needs\nto\nbe\na strong and independent heaa of\nthe Intelligence Community who\nis\nnot\nso committed\nto one bureaucracy that he loses\nhis objectivity.\n(2)\nThe Community leader should have\nenough\nof\nan\ninstitutional\n\"base\"\nso\nas\nto maintain his independence vis-a-vis members\nof your Cabinet.\n(3)\nThere should be\n\"competition\"\nin\nthe production\nof intelligence,\nwith\ngood coordination between\nthe agencies.\n(4)\nYou should have direct access\nto\nan intelligence:\nofficial who does not have major foreign affairs\nor defense policy responeibilities.\n(5)\nAny organizational changes\nshould\nbe designed\nto promote technological creativity,\nsuch\nas\nthat which\nled to development of the U-2's\nand\nthe Glomar Explorar.\nTo assist you in placing the above in context, the following charts are presented as examples of how information flows through the Intelligence Community.\n\n## Oversighet And Restrictions\n\nThis chapter discusses the need to prevent\n-abuses by agencies involved in foreign intelligence.\n\nThe following issues are covered:\n\n*\nThe domestic\njurisdictions\nof the\nF3I\nand the\nCIA.\n*\nThe method\nof imposing restrictions\non\nthe intelligence activities\nof\nthe\nFBI.\n'\n|\n*\nSubstantive issues concerning your\n:\nproposed Executive Order imposing\nrestrictions\non the\nforeign intelligence agencies.\n\nThe need\nfor more effective oversight\nby\nthe Executive Branch.\n*\nThe nature of Congressional oversight\nand\nits relationship\nto prerogatives\nof 'the Executive.\n)\nthat some in the Congress have raised a gquestion eoncerning the foreign intelligence jurisdiction of the FBI.\n\n## Issue: Sshould The Jurisdictional Arrangements Between\n\nthe CIA and the FBI\nbe revised?\n\nDuring World War II, the FBT had certain o&erseas intelligence responsibilities in Latin America.\n\nWith the creation of the CIA, the FBI jurisdiction was limited te the Un;ted States, and the CIA was given certain domestic reeponsibilities only with reepect to protection of sources and methods\n(in fhe DCI).\n\nThe CIA, of course, gathers information overtly in this ccuntry through interviews with travele:s and businessmen, protects-the integrity of CIAVpremises and conducts security investigations of its employees.\n\n'The guestion has besn raised whether the CIA should have\n'the responsikbility for gathering foreign intelligence from any source, U.S.\n\nor Zorsign?\n\nOne argument for change is that agencies involved in law enforcement should have absolutely no foreign intelligence responsibilities or authority;\n[0}\nH\n[1]\n-h o H\nU]\not\n=3\n<\n[0]\no o}\not\n[ie]\n15\nhe CIA the foreign intelligence activities currently undertaken by the FBI\ndomestically.\n\n## Options:\n\n1.\nArguments\nfor maintaining existing jurisdictions.\n-\nNone\nof\nthe\nabuses which have been uncovered\nwould\nbe prevented\nby realigning jurisdictions.\n-\nThe geographic jurisdictional distinction\nis\nan\neasy one\nto maintain.\n-\nGiving\nthe CIA domestic responsibilities is\na\nmajor\nconcern\nthat many\nin Congress\nand\nthe\npublic have\n(although,\nparadoxically, the sue\ngestion\nthat the CIA sfiould\ndo\nforeign intelligence\nactivities here at home comes from liberal elements in the Senate Cdmmittee.)\nThis would probably lead to duplication of efforts since the FBI would not easily give up its own activities and responsibilities;\nit bwould certainly lead to staffing duplicatien;\nThe existing system has proved sufficient and adeq*ate to meet both foreign and domestic that the F3I\nhas proven to be no better at respecting individual rights and liberties, and perhaps even wo?se than, the CIA.\n\nA firm distinction can be drawn betweeh\n\"intelligence\"\" gathering and \"investigation for prosecution.\"\nThe difference is in the use to which the information is made.\n\nInforfiation being eathered for law enforcement purposes should be fhe eubject of stricter control than information being gathered for foreign intelligence purposes.\n\nThe distinction drawn in\n1947\nis an artificial one and assumes that geogrephy rather than purpose is the more important distinction.\n\nThe duplication would be minimized since the CIA\nalready has domestic offices and installations, the FBI overseas installations, attaches, and connections with foreign and international police n org nizations.\n\n## - . Methgls Roq %) Restricting Fbi Activities\n\nSIn The Att\n9]\no\n<\nzeneral has under study draft guidelines\n-\nimposing res Q\n0\ntricti on FBI activities.\n\nThe question arises as to wheths g H\nr the oper form for FBI restrictions is in a riment regulation, Executive Order or a statute.\n\nThis\nalternative\n1.\nJustice Department regulation.\nTeEoovs\nPeperlthient regulacion.\nleaves the most flexibility in terms of'subsequent amendments.\n\nAmendments to Justice regulations can be adopted with less bureaucratic and public co#\ntroversy.\n\nHowever, it is'exactly'for this reason that such a form for FBI restrictions mey give the least assurance to fhe'pfibliC'thet the FBI\nis in fact being placedbunder effective control.\n\nExecutive Qrder.\n\nThis form provides greater assurance to the public that the FBI\nis being controlled N\nSince restrictions on ehe rest of the Intelligence Community are beifig imposed, the FBI\nshould be treated similarlyvas to form.\n\nOn the other hand, an Exgcutive Order, as opposed to regulations issued by the autfiority of the Attorney General, a2y have ths appearance of.asserting direct pcwer over the FBI, circumvefiting ard perhaps diminishing the authority of the as ths Atterney General's judgmepts of wise solicy and discretion, but the judgments ef the highest legal officer, the Attorney General, ag to tfie FBI's legal authority and obligations.\n\nT\nthe purpose to be served by an Executive Order is to lend the weight of the President's authority to.the guidelines effort, it might better be accomplished by a clear expression of support to the Attorney General, directing him to issue detailed gui?elines.\n\nStatute.\n\nStatutory restrictions on FBI authority would give the greatest assurance to the public that there are legally binding limitations bn the Bureau's efforts -and thus protections against abuse.\n\nThey would, however, be inflexible after adoption, and could well contain unreasonable restrictions due tc\n\"anti-FBI\"\nforces in Congress.\n\nFurthermore, the Exscutive Branch would have much less control over\n\n4.\nMix\nof\nstatute,\nExecutive\nOrder\nand regulation.\nThe Attorney General has publicly suggested that the guidelines now being developed by the Justice Departvending on the guidelines'\nfunction and content.\n\nStatutory enactment may be most appropriate for defining clearly the FBI's functions and jurisdicfion -\n1)\nw i s atutory basis that is now ambiguous and deficient.\n\n14\n$\nk1\n:xecutive Order may be the most appropriate way of channeling and controlling White House-FBT\ncontacts while regulations may be the best way of establishing intsrnal Justice Department and Bureau procedures and investigation standards.\n\n## C. Restrictions On Foreign Intelligence Community\n\nISSUE:\nWhat Substantive Restrictions\nshould be\n2oF\noogsvahit\nVe nestrictions\nshould be\nplaced on Intelligence Activities other E-ome o s SPCNACR ACTIVIGies other than FBI?\n\nThe Rockefeller Commission recommended that certain restrictions be imposed on the activities of the CIA, primarily related to the domestic collection of foreign intelligence and the collection of information on the domestic activities of American citizens.\n\nIn early September you decided that v an Exscutive Order imposing such restrictions should be Jnt\n[\nbroadenad to cover all intelligence agencies ekcept the FBI.\n\n>\nH B\nA draft of such an Order and Press fact sheet are presented at Appendix\n2.\n\nThe proposad Executive Order prohibits or imposes following activities by foreign intelligence restrictions on agehcies other agency\n-\nexcept the FBI .-- when engaged\n-in intelligence\n.or counterintelligence activities):\nand analysis of information on the\n.\n\n.\n\ndomestic G United States citizens and permanent resident aliens.\n\n.\n2.\nZFhysical\nor electronic surveillance\nof United States\n'\n.\ns\n.\n.\n:\n.\ncitizens\nand permanent resident aliens within\nthe\nUnited States. g:g\n0\n3.\nOpening\nof United States mail\nin violation\nof law.\n.\n)\n4.\nIllegally obtaining federal\nincome\ntax returns\nor\n)\n]\ninformation.\n5.\nInfiltration\nof domestic groups\nfor the purpose\nof\nreporting\non\nthem.\n6.\nExperimentation with drugs\non humans without the\nsubject''s\ninformed consent.\n7. Operation of a proprietary company which competes with United States businesses more than the minimum amount H\n[oN\nnecessary to establish commercial credibility.\n\n8.\nCollection\nof inteiligence\nfrom United States\ncitizens and permanent resident aliens within the United States without discl true identity of the collecting agency.\n\n$.\nSharinc among agencies information\non\nthe domestic\nStates citizens or permanent resident activities of the iance with stringent safegquards.\n\naliens except in comz Strong substantive disagreements still exist among\n[0}\nthe various concerned ag ncies and your advisors with respect to some of its provisions.\n\nMost of the major disagreements concern eptions to the general prohibitions.\n\nThe major issues for your decision are:\n\nISSUE:\nWhether\nto include\nan exception which would allow\nthe collection,\nanalysis\nand dissemination\nof\ninformation\non the domestic activities\nof U.S.\n-c%tizens\nreasonably believed.\nto\nbe involved in\ninternational terrorist\nor narcotics activities\nor working\nin collaberation_with\na foreign nation\nor'exganization,\nbut only\nif collected abiroad or\nfrom foreign sources.\n(Section II(i):(l)).\ninvolved in international terrorist or narcotics activities have committed any crime but are working with crganizations or governments.\n\nThe\n\ninclude\nan American supplying nontion\nto\na foreign government,\nfor example,\nclassified\ninforxm\n- on the movement of civilian ships from\na U.S. port.\nsupport of the exception.\nion recognizes that international and narcotics activities are legitimate\ns of interest for foreign intelligence\n\ncans working\nfor foreign governments\nor\norganizations\nare\nof counterintelligence interest.\n-\nIt contains\nthe limitation that the excepted\ninformation must have'been collecfed abroad\nor\nfyxom foreign\nsources.\nOften foreign intelligence\nagencies\nare\nthe only elements\nof our government\nwho\ncan obtain information from these useful sources.\nArguments against the exception.\n\n-\nThe exception\n1is\ntoo broad.\nAny person who deals\nwith\nforeign corporations would be covered.\n-\nThe\nCIA,\nprohibited\nby\nstatute\nfrom having\n/\nany\n\"police,\nsubpoena,\n{or)\nlaw-enforcement\npowers, \"\nshouid\nnot\nbe\ninvolved\nin identifying\nAmer\nans participating\nin narcotics\nor\nt activities.\n[\n9]\n0 \"\ni\n]\n.\no adopt\nan exception which would permit\nshzring\nof information\non domestic activities\nof\nU.5.\ncitizens among intelligence agencies\nfederal agencies under guidelines\nof\nLttorney General.\npermit the CIR\nto obtain information from other federal agencies the domestic activities of U.S.\n\ncitizens which it would not otherwise be permifted to collect under this Order.\n\nThe provision cf the draft Order\n(Section Iv)\naliows sharing of information only when the information is of a type which the receiving agency wquid itself have been permitted to collect under this Order.\n\n## Arguments In Favor Of This Exception.\n\n-\nThis exception would give\nCIA and other foreign\nintelligence agencies access\nto data helpffil\nin\ndetermining whether various demestic groups have\ncontacts with foreign governments\nor organizations.\n-\nPossible abuses\nof this exception wouid be limited\nby\nthe Attorney General's guidelines.\nlaw enforcament agencies on o\n=3\n(]\noY\nQ\nmestic activities of U.S.\n\ncitizens which the intalligence agencies themselves would otherwise be prohibited from collecting under the Terms\nf this Order.\n\nt would permit reestablishment of Operation CHAOS.\n\n3\n{CZ208\nwas the program under which CIA collected information\n-- largely from the FBI\n\non domestic and U.S.\n\ncitizens.\n\nThe exposure of this\n\nram resulted\nin\nthe\nforming\nof\nthe Rockefeller\nsion and\nthe Congressional Intelligence\n'\nR\n.\n.\n=\nSuch\nan exception would likely undermine the\ncredibility of the Order.\n\nEXECUTIVE\nBRANCHE OVERSIGHT\nublic disclosure of intelligence abuses have raised the\n.\n\nquestion\nf the adequacy of Executive Branch oversight.\n\nIssuance\n+\nof guidelines on proper conduct of intelligence activities will go a long way toward preventing impropriety, but there will be a continued need for mechanisms which discover questionable activities and assure adequate deliberation and accountability among appropriate policy-makers.\n\nCongress will no doubt be playing a mers active role, encouraged by its successes of the recent oif reviewing CIA activities, blocking further aid to\n\n## Effactive?\n\nIn the past, the head of each operating component Community was held responsible for the propriety of its activities.\n\nInspectors General and General Counsals assistad each operating head.\n\nThe Rockefeller Commission found zoth the CIA's'Inspector General and its not have adequate access to details of though the DCI\nis charged with leadership Community, he has never been responsible lligence organizations other than the CIA.\n\n=]\nSo the questio\n:s, who should be accountable for oversight within the Ifitelligence Community?\n\nDirecter Colby sent to you on August\n30,\n1975, his proposed new regulations and managerial changes to implement Rockefeller Commission rec\n.\n\nA ommendations concerning the Inspector General and General Counsel.\n\nNo actions have, however, been taken with respect.\n\nto a more general Community-wide inspection responsibility.\n\n.\nEstablish\na Community Inspector Genmeral working\nfor the\nDCI\nas examined\nin the NSC/OMB\nstgay.\n{8uch\nan Inspector would\nnot,\nhowever,\ninspect\nthe\nFBI,\nas\nit\nis outside\nof\nthe\nforeign intelligence\nZstablishment of\nsuch an Inspector\nantagonism between\nthe\nDCT\nand other\nintsiligence organizations.\n Disputes could be\nexpected over\nthe authority and access\nof\nthe\nInspactor.\nDCZ,\n3\nthat he would be in a position to advise tiz Fresident on propriety throughout the Community.\n\nhowever, antagonism could develop if Inspector were asked to report outside of their parent agencies he other hand, neither alternative were chosen, no one person within the Community could be accountable for propriety throughout the Community.\n\n## Issue: Does Effective Oversight Call For Mechanism Outside The Intelligence Community To Advise The President On Propriety?\n\nThe question is, to what person or organization should responsibility be assigned for advising the President on propriety of oversight of'the.Intelligence Communityr In the past, there has been no esntral focus for consideration of propriety of intelligence activities outside the intelligence_\nCommunity.\n\n## Cptichs:\n\nThe NSC/02\nstudy sets forth fihree alternatives Zor Executive oversight:\n(1).the Atto?ney General;\n{2}\na Special Counsel to the President;\nand\n(3)\na Gevernment~wide Inspector General.\n\nA fofirth al~\nternative could be use of the NSC structure..\n\nEach\"\nI thes= cptions could have ite own inspection or cility, or rely on Inspectors within the Thaix prima;y purpoSe would be to providg indspendsnt advice to the President based on their\n\"EO'iedge of Community activities and consideration of legal and moral issues relevant to the activities.\n\nThe Attornsy General already has responsibilities as chief legal officer.\n\nThe NSC already has the statutory responeibility of integrating domestic and fcreign.pdlicies, but its lack of independence from.the White House might lessen its effectiveness.\n\nEu:ther, a poeential problem with any special White House adviser with\n\" oversight responsibility is the difficulty it could create for the President if the adviser approved actions which were subsequently found to be illegal by the Zttorney General..\n\nISSUE:\nShould public eonfidence\nin Executive oversight\nby enh\n2d\nby use\nof non-government overseers?\nShould\nan outside advisory board\nbe given intelligence oversight responsibilities, and,\nif\nso,\ne\nshould\nit\nbe\nthe PFIAB?\n[vi]\noth the Rockefeller\nand Murphy_Commissions\nrecommended that the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board\n(PFIAB)\nba given the new responsibility of overseeing intelligence activities to prevent abuses.\n\nAprointment of outside overseers could help reassure the public that intelligence activities are receiving adequate .\n\nscrutiny and consideration within the Executive Branch.\n\nThis would especially be true if the advisory board made periodic public reports.\n\nEowever, a group of part-time advisers, even with a full-time staff, might have difficulty learnlng all they needed to know to do an adequate over51ght Job.\n\nA particular problem arises with assignment of this responsibility to the PFIAB.\n\n.Oversight might dilute, and even conflict with, the Board's traditional role of bushing the Intelligence Community to greater intelligence collection efforts.\n\nAlso, PFIAB does not have a great deal of credibility ameng the\n\"foreign affairs community\"\nand some in Congress.\n\nAn alternative would be to establish an.indepefident\"\noversight board.\n\niThis will, howe&er, require duplicating the staff capability of PFIAB.\n\n'ISSUE:\nHow can adequate deliberation of covert action How can adeguatt CEL-DEratlof L. cove-r avro e proposals be assure@?\n\nOne type of Executive oversight\n-- approval df covert actidns\n-- has traditionelly been centralized in the White House.\n\nThe NSC's\n40 Committee has been criticized by the Murphy Commission and Congressional spokesmen for -\ninadeguate deliberation.\n\n## V Options\n\nGreater assurance of deliberation within the\n40 Cormittee could be afihieved through:\n\n-\nReinstituting formal Committee meetings on all\nsignificant covert proposals;\n-\nRedesignating the Attorny General\nae\na Committee\nmember\n(in\nfiis\nlegal adviger's\nrole)\nafid edding\nrepresentation\nfrom other_departments\nas.the\neubject demands;\nand\n-\nAdding\nN3C\nstaff\nto provide non-departmental\nanalysis\non need,\nrisk\nand potential benefits\nof\neach action.\nEach of these procedural changes would help to promote more deliberative decision-~making, but would also restrict flexibility and increase the number of persons involved in sensitive activities.\n\nA particular problem might.arise if.\n\nthe Attorney General were asked to serve both as policymaker on the\n40 Committee and as the President's chief intelligence\"\noverseer.\n\n## Z. Congressional Oversight\n\nThe Intelligence Community's old, comfortable relationship with a small number of senicr Congressmen who had been delegated responsibility for oversight and budget approval, no longer exists.\n\nEven after the conclusion of the current special inr2ss is likely to be interested, at a\n<\n\n0\no+\n.\n\n(e}\nO\n3\nVsl\n[Ve)\nV)\not\n-\nO\n]\nn minimum;\nin budgstary and financial_issfies, impact of intelligence agencies on the rights of Americans, covert_action, and the qualify of the Community's intelligence product.\n\n1In addition, Ccngresss will be demanding more substantive intelligence from the Community.\n\n## Issue:\n\nNew committee structures for oversight of the Intelligence Community are anticipated.\n\nThe concept of a Joint Intelliigence Committee in Congress is\n20 years old, and its time may hae>come.\n\nIt is almost inevitable that Congress will seek to remove some jurisdiction in the oversight area away from the Armed Services and,vperhaps,vapropriations Committees.\n\nOf course, we have no control over the internal rules and procedures of Congress but they have a critical effect on Executive efforts to safeguard classified ihformation.\n\nThis conflict with respect to jurisdiction may be especially troublesome in the area of authorization legislation for appropriations.\n\nAt'present,.appropriations for CIA.\n\n(and\n'most appropriations for other intelligence agencies)\ndo not require'periodic authorizatioch, Ho%ever, a requifement fof peiiodic or annual authorization may result from increased Congressional interest in controlling intelligence funding.\n\nIf so, the conflict between the Armed Services Committees and any new intelligence committee as to jurisdiction over this Congressicnal oversight is complicated by the need need to limit knowledge about sensitive intelrequires that both the quantity and quality of informaticn given to Congress be limited in order to reduce the potential for damaging disclosures.\n\nLimits on information b flow to Congresss, however, create difficulties for oversight Congreesmen.\n\nThe overseer can be credible only if he ls aware of the tctal spectrum of intelligence activities.\n\nSilence about  these activities, however, can be construed as ecquiescenc in their conduct, even though vigorous sfeps were taken privatel to oppose them.\n\nA second'and more difficult dilemma faces\n' Congressmen who may oppose the propriety or efficacy of a given activity.\n\nPublic opposition to a specific intelligence program will eertainiy cast the_activity-;n grave jeopardy.\n\n. Acceptable means are needed by which members can be assured of an adeguate\n.voice in the decieion-making process within the responsible committees.\n\nOne possibility would be to include a confidential the committee (perhaps to Congressional for such an\n\"appeal channel\" would require, for sffactiveness, new rules of each House which would provide for ewpulsion of any member who flagrantly reveals truly sensi information.\n\nSuch expulsions, however, might m be judicia iawable under the doctrine of Powell v.\n\nMcCormack.\n\nn sicnal oversight of intelligence activities is gre\n3]\nCo ultimately limited by the Constitutional doctrine of separation s President's Constitutional duties and powers of powers and in the arez of ZJzfense and foreign affairs.\n\n'That is, for ex~\nM\nample, a regui that specific intelligence operations receive priocr rization of a Congressional Committee would raise Const guestions.\n\nAlth\n; be inappropriate for. the Executive Branc to suggest praciselv how Congress conducts its oversight role, it should consider the principles which ought to be important t Congress.\n\nThese include:\n\n1.\nAvthorizing\na\nlimited number\nof Congressmen\nto\nact\nfortall.\n\n'The risk of disclosure of any information available to\n535 Congressmen and their staffs is too great to allow such wide disseminatien of sehsiti&e secrets.\n\nAlthough the old system which limited\n.\n\nkfiowledge to just a handful of Congressmen is no longer Viable, the principle of delegation of oversight responsibility to e limited number of Congressmen remains sound.\n\nBranch from a ceniralized perspective, Congress will understand the Community if it adopts the same perspective.\n\n## :Ng Access To Sensitive Intelligence Information 22 Rules And Strengthening Penalties For\n\ndisclosure.\n\nA persistent problem in the House has use Rule XI\n(2)(e)(a)bthat grants access of z1ll Congressmen to all committee materials.\n\n(There is no c:fl\"n\"able rule in the Senate.)\nIf the need final report, the Bolling Committee concluded that\n\"if the nighest officials of the executlve branch...belleve that sharlng\n[sensitive materiall w1th Congress will lead to its public disclosure, they will not make it available, even when committees go into executive session to receive such information\n\"Leaks\"\nout of the Select Committees on Intelligence have seri-\n.\n\nously undermined the argument that Congress can handle classified information in a responsible manner.\n\nUnder the Speech and Debate clause, as interpreted in the Gravel case, a member may disclosg seeurity information,\n-\nwithout fear qf prosecutien, if it is done in any manner oOr forum which can be reasonably construed as part of his legislative duties.\n\nSection\n[0]\n[}\n5\n[a 1)\nw Q\n<\n] @\n[0]\n[h Y\n:\netermine the Rules of its Proceedings, punish avior, and, with the Concurrence revised to provide for appropriate disciplinary actiocn\n-- including expulsion\n~-\nfor unauthorized ied information.\n\ndisclosuxe oI\n\n4,\n2Av\nthat\ncvarsl ght committees\nbe\n\"fully\nand currentl\nencourage too much day~to-day interference by Congress and its committee staffs in agency non-statuto understandings.\n\nStatutory Executive-Legislative relations is more tionships.\n\nCongress, too, should benefit from\n.\n\n6.\nSeparating foreign intelligence from law enforcement\noversight.\nIntermingling\nof these two areas\nis often\nconfusing.\nISSUE:\nWhat should be your substantive position concerning intelligence oversight committees?\n\nfrom both Houses, membership for limited terms, and jurisdiction telligence Community.\n\nThere is conover th giderable disagresement concerning the scope of its authority.\n\nd\n>4\nThe alterna\n(1)\noversight only;\n(2)\n. legislative and\n-oversight:\nand,\n(3)\noversight with legislative jurisdiction shared with pressant Cormittees.\n\nThe main arcument in favor of a JointVCOmmittee is that ation of ClaSSlfled information, thereby\n. The key arguments against are:\n(a)\nit\n.\n\n.\n\nviolates normal procedures 'and, by eliminating independent\n.\n\n.\n\n.\n\nHouse-Senats action, may lead to errors and abuses, and,\n(b)\n_\n-\nin the case of foreign affairs and\n-- arguably in foreign intelligence\n--\nthe Senate has a preeminent Constitutional role.E;g\n2.\n\nSupport efforts for new, but segarate, intelligence\n:\n.\n\ncommittees in each House.\n\n|\nThis will help control dissemination of classified\n+\ninformation without the problems of trying to create a Joim Committee.\n\n## Issue: In What Manner Should The Intelligence Budget O Be Displayed To Congress?\n\nThere have been many demands for wider distribution within Congress of Intelligence Community budget information.\n\nIn the past, intelligence budget details were'presented.only to\n\nhe\nsmall number\nof Co:~:es= men\non PDproorlatlons and Armed\nServices Subcommittess\ninveolvad\nin oversight and budget review.\n) This year dztzils were more widely released\nto\nall members of\n5\nthose committses.\nA propesal\nthis year\nby Representative Glamo\nto reveal\nthe totzl\namount of the CIA budget was soundly defeated.\nThe\nsizs\nof the\nintelligence budget remains. undisclosed\nThers\nis\nno guestion that intelligence oversight\nwngrs\ncommittees\nnue\nas\nthey did\nin the past year\nto re-~\nguire detailsd\ns\nof\nthe intelligence budget.\nThe major\nissue is what\n information should be presented to ali\n535 members of Cone:ess.\n\nThe NSC/CM2 study dlscussed the 90551b111ty of 1nclu51on of\n.a classifi=d annax in the President's Budget, which would be availablis ts\n=21l Congressmen, but which would inciude only general, big dollar infcrmation.\n\nThis clessified ennex would encompass the overaTI intelligence program.\n\nProvision of this amount of budgst informafiion attempts to comply with Congression needs without unduly rlsklng leaks of sensitive information.\n\n_\non the other hand,\nonce\nsuch information\nis provided,\nit may\nsimply\nlead\nto demands\nfor more\nand more details.\nISSUE:\nWhat substantive intelligence should be sent to Congress, and what official should be.resgonsible for making such determinations?\n\nquite interested in receiwving more telligence Community.\n\nIn icence producers have briefed Estimates ane many other Community publications have not as\n..\n\nFor the national intelligence structure, of infielligence is complicated by four considerations:\n\n1.\nSansitive information\nis unlikely\nto\nbe protected or\nkept out\nof the public domain\nif\nit\nis widely disseminated on\nCapitol #ill.\nSources\nand methods\ncan\nbe difficult\nto separate\nfrom substantive intelligence.\n2.\nIn many situations,\nthere are likely\nto\nbe\nsharp,\nprofound differences of opinion between a President and his senior subordinates and Cbngress over what members of Congress ara proper consumers of what intelligence products.\n\n3.\n\nNo President will be happy about ehy component of the Intelligence Community that furnishes information which is used to oppose his policies.\n\n4.\nThe\nIntelligence Community's\nability\nto\nbe objective\nand candid\ncan be threatened\nif\nits products\nare widely used\n.\nIt\nis desirable\nfor diver-\nIntelligence Communifiy;\nif,\nzicularly deserving of Congressional distribution. -\nAlthough some NIZT's represent general background information that would be zporopriate for distribution, others, because they deal w guastions such as\n\"what if a certain action were taken,\"\ninvolve wolicy considerations that would make distribut%gn unwise.\n\nte write into law a requirement that intellige particularly those in INR, DIA, and CIA, give systematic, forma attention fio Congrassional information needs.\n\nThe increasing chorus of iem;nds for sucH informatipn seems to require a centralized office for its dissemination.\n\nOnly with such an office can Administration positions be coordinated and some of the dangers pointed out abcve avoided.\n\nThe DCI, as leader of the Community, must be the focus of any such centralization.\n\nf how Congress or its\n-\no\n=]\no o\n\not T\n53\n\ng i o g formally decide to publish classified\n3\nrion provided by the Executive\n(this issue shed from the problem of\n\"leaks\"), i\nto consider the possibility of a\n\n\" . For example,\na joint Executivengrass board could assign security classifications\nintelligence information and then both\n2.\nA more promising alternative\nmay be\nto expand on\nAct\" approach.\nThis statute requires\nthe\n'Branch\nto submit certain international\nagresments\nto Congress,\nbut classified agreements\nare given only\nto the House International Relatiohs'-\nand Senate Fereign Affairs Committees under\nan\ninjuaction\nof secrecy.\nThe secrecy injunctien can\nonly be removed\nby\nthe President.\nThis procedure is almost identical to the ?ublication agfeemenfi worked out between yofi and the Pike Committee.\n\nWhile this approach has promise, its weakness was demonstrated last two cover:t action reports\n- Italian elections and Angola\n~--\nbut on ths varv same day, thalr contents were leaked to the Press.\n\n## F. Public\n\nTha sxtent to which the public and the Press can play a xole in tae oversight of the Intelligence Community, or even to be awzre of and appreciate its value is, of course,\n{n neral need for secrecy in intelligence activilimited by the Z\nties.\n\nTo a gieaz extent, however, public confidence in the Intelligence Community can be rebuilt through greater public understanding of ths responsibilities and activities of the Community.\n\n## Options:\n\nThers may be some actions you could take to improve public understanding of the community.\n\n7Possible examples are:\n\n1.\nRecuire\nthe reorganized PFIAB\nto\nissue\nan unclassified~\nannual repcrt\non the activities\nand effectiveness\nof\n)\nS\nthe Intelligenee Community.\n\nThis would require careful judgments on difficult classification questions but, on balance, would>probably be valuable in educatingthe public about ifitelligence activities and their importance.\n\nIt would alsc tend fo reassure the public that the PFIAB was keeping an eye on the Community.\n\n%)\ning from its expendian unclassified report would probably have to read much like a newspaper\n(or be sven less informative)\n;\non balance this might dama_ge perception of the Community{s effectivensss.\n\n| crasents     | the        | issue    | of     | how    |\n|--------------|------------|----------|--------|--------|\n| 2            |            |          |        |        |\n| Community    |            |          |        |        |\n| should       |            |          |        |        |\n| be           |            |          |        |        |\n| The          |            |          |        |        |\n| following    |            |          |        |        |\n| subjects     |            |          |        |        |\n| =            |            |          |        |        |\n| ich          |            |          |        |        |\n| were         |            |          |        |        |\n| analyzed     |            |          |        |        |\n| in           |            |          |        |        |\n| the          |            |          |        |        |\n| NSC/         |            |          |        |        |\n| --           | are        | covered: |        |        |\n| prcblem      |            |          |        |        |\n| of           |            |          |        |        |\n| leadership   |            |          |        |        |\n| in           |            |          |        |        |\n| the          |            |          |        |        |\n| elligence    |            |          |        |        |\n| Community.   |            |          |        |        |\n| ragement     | of         | the      | budget | of     |\n| 2lligence    | Community. |          |        |        |\n| nagement     |            |          |        |        |\n| of           |            |          |        |        |\n| resources    |            |          |        |        |\n| for          |            |          |        |        |\n| igence       |            |          |        |        |\n| collection.  |            |          |        |        |\n| s            |            |          |        |        |\n| of           |            |          |        |        |\n| improving    |            |          |        |        |\n| the          |            |          |        |        |\n| timeliness   |            |          |        |        |\n| ity          |            |          |        |        |\n| of           |            |          |        |        |\n| intelligence |            |          |        |        |\n| rcblem       |            |          |        |        |\n| of           |            |          |        |        |\n| covert       |            |          |        |        |\n| activities.  |            |          |        |        |\n\n## A. Overall Dipection\n\nISSUE:\nleadexrshi does the Intelligence\n=]\nI\nH\no o8\no] o\n=2\n=\n=]\n14\n(]\nH\n3\n] =\n=\no7}\n0\n%\not D\n]\n=]\n[V =\n=\nto efficiently provide quality intelligence on_a timely basis?\n\nWhich person, or persons, shall be held accountable for leadership of the Intelligence Community?\n\nThe CIA was established by statute to cperafe upder'\ndirection of the NSC, and questions are now being raised about the adegquacy of mechanisms to guide the Agency)\nQor more generally, the Intelligence Community.\n\nLeadership of the Community was assigned to the DCI\nby President Nixon's memorandum of November\n5,\n1971.\n\nIt charged the DCI with\n(1) planning and rsviewing all intelli-\n.\n\n<\nence activities;\n2}\nrplanning and reviewing allocation of all intelligence resources;\nand,\n(3)\npfcducing national intelligencs.\n\n=z exsrcises, however, line and resource control cnly over the CIA Program *******'\nResource and line contrel over more than **percent of intelligence assets is in the Defense Department and includes the Consolidated Crvoptelogic Program\n(CCP, which includes NSA\n.\n\nfula N\nand the Service Cryptologic Agencies), National Reconnaissance Program\n(NR2}\nane Genaral Defense Intelligence Program\n(GDIP).\n\nWithin Defense, intslligence expenditures are a small part of a\n$100 billion plus budget, but this is.la:.'ge relative components.\n\n'to other\n-\nThe DCI's isadership over the NRP\nis exercised through chairmanshis of the NR Executive Committee\n(ExCom), a twoman committee made up cf the Assistant Secrefiary of Defense for Intelligence and the DCI, although final resource decisions reached by the ExCom are subject to review and approval by\n+\nthe Secretary of Defense.\n\nThe DCI's influence over the'\nCCP\nand GDIP\nis solely advisory and is exercised through chairmanship of the Intelligence Resources Advisory Council\n(IPAC)\nand the U.S.\n\nIntelligence Board\n(USIB), which sets_'\ncollecticon requirements and priorities.\n\n1\nshow\n(1)\nThe Percentage cvernment Agenc ies, G\nJ\n1O\nH\n[\n14\nby\nTM\n1\n(=]\nH P\nnning, provision of intelligence izn systems\n(primarily satellites)\nto\n>xs, and integration of information azch of these areadas, the DCI must rely on cocoeration.\n\nBecause of the divided line and resource problems as they arise.\n\nrsaip of the Intelligence Community must start with the pclicy-makers outside the Community.\n\nAlthough committees could perform this function, the NSC already has ponsibility for integrating domestic, foreign\n2s.\n\nThe NSC represents the primary con-\n, Vice President and Secretaxies of Secretary of Treasury and other top represented in NSC committees, including officials the NSC Intelligence Committee, when their interests were s relevant.\n\n1.\nMake\nthe NSC more effective through assignment of\nou\n=\nresponsibility for guidance\nto the Community\nto a\nDCI more effective.\n\nWithin the Intelligence v, leadership is currently assigned to the DCI\nbut, in fact, is shared with other officials, the Secretary of Defense.\n\nThe DCI's role has been hampered by his dual role as Community lsader and head of one part of the Cormmunity, the CIA.\n\nThe Defense Department has long felt that the DCI\ncannot =2\nan independent leader as long as he is so\n9]\not cf tied with one part of the Community.\n\n[o]\nw\n[0 h v Suggesticns have thus been made that the DCI\nshould be separated from the CIA and moved into\n\"lte:fiatively, the DCI could be given direct line and resources control over all national intelligence progfams, aniuding the CIAP, CCP and NRP.\n\nThe latter alternative, however, separates Defense ntrol of assets on which it must depend from\n\nQ\ndirectly for tactical suppeort to wartime forces.\n\nDesignate a member of the White House staff as\n\"Special Assistant for Foreign Intelligence\".\n\nwing among the e proposad creating and giving it Cabinet rank.\n\nnade is that foreign intelligence slved in a broad spectrum of issues with emphasis on matters other than foreign affairs, such as economic and resource Thus intelligence leadership in 'the should not be controlled by the.\n\nOrn the cther hand, it would appear that this apcreach could be perceived as leading to greater abuses by\n\"politicizing\" intelligence and, in any czss, it is difficult to see how such an individual ective without any institutional base Under anv of the options, significant leadership responsibilities will continug to lie with the Secretary of Defense.\n\nHe should be egpected to examine the organization and management of intelligence assets within his Department.\n\nHe will need to focus on NSA\nand DIA because both the select and standing committees have raised gquestions concerfiing the authority, efficiency and funding of these agencies.\n\n## 3. Budget And Resqurces Contrcl\n\nwn\nin\nUZ:\n#What mechanism would best provide\nfor control\npidy\nmEeian oSl\nwoUoY ASST\nbrovide\nIor control\n)\nXA\nC\nv\nK\nintszllicence resources?\nThe Intelligence Community has approximately a budget that must be eificiently controlled if it is to make maximum use\nf scarce resources.\n\nThere is no single central e e reee controller now of intelligence resources, not even OMB.\n\n;..lIl-'.lQ........'l'..I......'.l-'l..-.'..l...llflll R\nT\nN\nN\nA\nR R\nR\nR\nR\nR\nR\nI\nTeetTttReeesreetttt A number of advisory committees, includifig IRAC.\n\nand USiB, attempt to coo;dinate resource allocatibn, but are limited bf their advisory nature..\n\nOMB reviews the intelligence Budget in getail but has had difficulty in making tradeoffs among collection, processing and pfoduction functions.\n\n-\nResources tend to be allocated because collection is -\ntechnologica possible, rather than because certain information is needed for intelligence reasons.\n\nThe charge to the DCI\nto review all resource allocation in the Community has proven unworkable, and fragmented budget allocation still remains a proElem five years after the Schlesinger OMB study.\n\n## Options:\n\nThree options have been advanced to cure this problem:\n\n1.\nCharge\nOMB with\na more active role\nin intelligence\n_\ne\ns\ns\n-\nresource allocation.\nOMB,\nas. the President's adviser\non\nthe budget,\nisbin the right position-to deal with\ncroblems-of intelligence o N\nIt could ssrve as the bridge between\n(a5\nrapraesented cn the NSC)\nand producers With reprogramming, transfer and av controls imposed\n(by the House Appropriation for the first time, OMB should be better atls to integrate the budget.\n\nSupport the DCI\nin a more active exercise of the the November\n1971\nletter.\n\nsolidate all national programs\n---\nthe CCP, NRP\n~-\nunder a single manager so that he has diract rasource control over the bulk of intelligenc rasources.\n\nSuch centralization would make the manage mest likelvy the DCI, accountable for resource trade-o The zllocation of resources among targets within the\n-National Foreign Intelligence Program is shown in the following chart.\n\n\no]\nrganizations be consolisimplify management vo greater cost effectiveness?\n\nColl sf intalligence requires significant given limited appropriations, must be o resources, efficightly s\n.\n\nConsolidation of intelligence collection organizaticns has been a perennial topic for siudy.\n\nThe possibility of resource savings from consolidations was a major thame of the\n1971 Schlesinger Reporf.\n\nTo some extent, such consolidation is no longer the central focus of attenticn because of tight Community budgets in In the cas=\nof collection\n--\nas opposed to the\n-~\nthere is\n\"general\"\nagreement thati 5c:petition is not a necessary objective. -\nThe centrzl challeange in collection management 1s efficient use of rasources:\ndupllcation of facilities is\n little valus.\n\nAt present, signal intelligence collection is conducted by NS3i, the Service Cryptological Agencies and CIA;\nphotc intelligefice by the NRO, which is in both CIA\nand the Air Force;\nand human intelligence by the CIa, armed ser&ices, State Department, and various other cabinet agencies.\n\ne et gence activities out of transfer cf a small amount of collection activities out of Defense.\n\ntotal consolidation of NSA and tha Service Cryptologic Agencies;\nand consolidapRes NRO activities in Defense.\n\nM2jor Consolidation\n-- consolidation into one agency of all the national collection programs --\n.\n\nthe CIAP, CCP:and;NRP.\n\ndation\n--\nThe current division of both NT\nznd NRO activities between CIA and Defense articular expertise in each agency\n3\nbe -lost in any.consolidations.\n\nIn any tion, bureaucratic infighting might lead\n)\n0\ni3\nw\n0\nb\no7t il of\n\na loss of quaiifiee personnel afid short-term ineZficiencv due to turmoil.\n\nConsoii&ation might also separate. certain colleetion'systgms from consumers, especially military cpmfianders, and Y\nthus reduce responsiveness.\n\nFY 1875 FundsrRequested for Intelligence Collection ars shown in the following chart.\n\nLligence must be timely,\n.of high ive to consumer needs.\n\nThe basic h uction responsibilities at present is O\n\"\ns}\n\"\nQ)\nol\n9\no s K\nW\n=\ng\n0]\n3\n\no1\nb that CIA, Defansse afid, to some degree, State produce defense-relatad intelligence;\nand CIA, State's Burean of Intelligence ane Research\n(INR)\nand, to some degree, Defense produce political intelligence;\nand CIA, State and Treasury produce economic intelligehce analysis.\n\nEach of 'these agencies serves both departmenfal'and national consumers.\n\nThe Intellicence Community has been publicly criticized for failing to prsdict a number of recent international crises;\nthe NSC/OMB\nst raported State and Treasury disappointment with the Commusity''s longer-term estimative capabilities in interpretation of collected information can provide valuable insight to policy-makers.,\n\n## Options:\n\nnments of existing production\n;\n%, o}\nmajor reali\n[{e]\nrespensipilities have been suggested:\n\n1.\nSpin off\nthe production components\nof the CIA\ninto\na new national analytic capability entirely\nindependent\nfrom any operational\nor collection\nof a naticnal production\n\nupgrade departmental intelligence\nCertain key intelligence products coule still be coordinated by the DCI\nor NSC\nin National Intelligende Estimates are new pr epared\n(NSC/OMB Study Option\n#33).\n\nThe firs:t alternative would free the national production -\nny taint it now has from being assoc1atea ctivities.\n\nIt would create an intelligence divorced from policy, thus providing also aerhaps lead to less responsiveness The second alternative could improve to policy-makers, but would eliminate indenendence asserted to exist in the CIA.\n\nmajor alternative is desireble, departmental\n;ntelligence producticn assets could be built up;\nproduction constitutes only\n10\nper cent of the intelligence budget, a reflection offthe absence of the expensive hardware which makes collection so costly.\n\nAs an example to bring the production process into focus, the proceess for producing the key National Estimate on Soviet Strategic Capabilities and for producing economic intelligence is shown in the following charts.,\n(Note:\nthe Soviet Estimate was unusually extensive.)\n\n## Cation Of Key Issues Z Substantive Resolution Of Key Issues Partigipating Offices And Agencies\n\nERDA\nUSIB Committees\nGaided Missile and Astronautics Intelligence Committee\nScientific and Technical inteiligence Committee\nJoint Atomic Energy Intelligence Committes\n\n## T Key Issues-Soviet Capabilities Tellibence P Ke Supporting Agengies And Contragtors\n\nLockheed Alrcraft Carp.\n\nHughes Aircraft Co.\n\nLawrence-Livermore Laboratary Stanford Research Iustitute Rand Corp.\n\nEtactro- Magnetic Systems Laboratory APR-IUNE\n\n## 2Es For Intercontinental Conflict Through The Mid-1980'S\n\nDECLASSIFIE\nE.O. 12555 Sec. 5.6\nMR V-3\nein (oin ife/qq\n& (F\nmama, patw_pjzemo\n\n## National Intelligence Officer For Economics And Energy\n\nCIA\nState\nDoD\nTreasury\nERDA\n\n## Key Intelligence Questions Identification Of Key Issues\n\nFuture demand for OPEC oil\nStability of the cartel\nOPEC revenues\nDevelopment of aflernafives\nenergy sources\nNew non-0PEC oil seurces\n\n## Feedback From Consumers On\n\nPetrodellars\n\n## Previous Publications\n\nNSC\nCEA\nCIEP\nTreasury\nFEA\nState\nDop\nERDA\nSTRTM\n\"Coancii of Econsmis Advisers\n\"*Presidont's Spacial Trade Rupresentaiive\n\n## Intelligence Sources .\n\nOpen sources {press, trade\n10D Preparation\ni\nublications, etc.)\nAnalysis\nCollection\n'\nX\ni\n.'\n.\nDissemination\n>\n)\nClandestine reporting\nDratting of articles\n& Requirements\nReview\nto Consumers\nf\ni\nOther government agencies\n.\nNSC\n9\n(State, DOD, ete)\nCGoordination\neEr\n&\nCommunications intelligence\nT\nCIEP\n5% 35\nContacts with US firms\nTreasury\n\n=3\nFEA\nS\ng\n]\nState\n\nES\npop\n|\n\n(8;\nERDA\n]\n]\nSTRTM\nandestine activity be separated pability has been included in the since its inception, but its action Intelligence Cormunity orientation has I\ne s e 88800 ENSsEssseesses0teeesNs0eTsLseRRSCESISIROORERIRALIOCEISIIOITRIOOL\naasesesesssscresscssssnsen es s s s sscesnssenessseccas s esssue R\nR\nR\nPR\nPR R\nPR EE R\nRS\nAR\nAR AL\nA\nLA\nA LA\nAL EES AN\n-------o....o--..-.-..---.--..--o-..ooo.----o.-o----..---....\n\neecsescsscscssecacscscscsaacsssnssassee s eesesseesscasssossnasree e\n8 8800608000400 06000sEEsseEsE0eEERllPNSSNOSOOICIEIEIPINRIOIRTRIISEOTTSITEY\nIR\nWA WY\nThe covert action capability in CIA has been strongly criticized in tie Press and Congress for inadequate control,\n'biasing of the independence of CIA analyticel judgmefits, and detrimentel effects on CIA recruitment of analysts.\n\nAlthough the arguments for separating covert action from the CIA have some merit, sarious practical problems arise.\n\nOPTICNS:\nits primarily overt status and be contrary to\n'international diplomatic practlce.\n\nm\"ansfe:\nto the Defense Degartment would raise\n1\npr-lc app*ehensxon over accountablllty given the size and scope of Defense's activities.\n\n (However, any resort to large scale covert paramilitary activities in the future could appropriately be.\n\nconducted through Defense.)\nmoving covert actlon and\n10T\nLDTO\n'would own_agenc ssparate covert overatives Ifrxom the supervision of offizials and encourage them to\nill slack Zor new covert actions, the only for their continued employment.\n\nThis crtion has support among the liberal wing of the foreign affailrs\n\"community\".\n\n## D. Organiz ] Options Analyzed In Nsc/Omb Study\n\n\nIn light of th five issues discussed above, the NSC/OMB\nstudy set forth fovr major options for reorganization of the Intelligence Community, the first three of which would require legislative action:\n\n1\ni\n[\nm\nT\ntion\nof\na\nnew expanded intelligence agency,\n@]\nhazded\nby\na Director\nof Ihtelligence,\nwith resource\nand line control over the national programs\n-- the\nCIA Program\n(CIAP),\nConsolidated Cryptologic Program\n(CC?),\nand the National Reconnaissance Program\n(NRP).\nThis option is based on the Premise that netional programs are best managed\n1f centrally funded and controlled, and that gains ffom centralization outweigh disadvantages resulting from separation of collectors from their primary consumers.\n\nand NRP, immediate staff.\n\nis pased on the premise that a central a> with regource control and without a vested srast in any one element of the Community'is nesezd, - Option\n22 would leave. line and resource con:rcl over CIA analysts with the DGI.\n\nCreztion of a Director of Foreign Intelligence\n(DFT)\nwith bread coordination powers but neither resource O\nSISO\nnor lina control over any part of the Intelligence Community.\n\nTfiis option is based on the premise that an intelligence leader, independent of any organization within the Community, would be best able to ccc:di:ete its activities, and that the Defense requires a major voice in resource and ccntrcl_of intelligence assets.\n\nOption\n3A would\n~brszk up CIA production elements and transfer them to other departments.\n\non of current Community relationships with the addition of a second full Deputy to the DCI with managemsnt rasponsibility for the CIA and perhaps with expanded or restructured Executive Committees and production responsibilities.\n\nThis option is based on the premise that major organizational changes\n=3\ntheir effects on leadership, on', and the budget are detailed in the S\nummary charts are diagrams of the four s.\n\nAnd finally, thexe is a chart H\neactions to the four options.\n\n## Option | From The Report To The President On The Foreign Intelligence Community\n\nDECLASSIFIED\nE.O. 12958\n25c. 3.6\nR a4-3 #|\n:\n18 bl tfof19\nBy_Lsk  MARA, Daw_2jasn\n\n## Option Ni - From The Report To The President On The Foreign Intelligence Community\n\n596195\nDECLASSIFIEL\nE.O. 12368 Bor. 3.3\nMR G4-3. %) ok bl ifuaf\n\n# Option Iil , From The Report To The President Cn The Foreign Intelligence Community\n\n## Option Ina\n\nDECLASSIFIED\nE.O. 12568 fuc. 3.6\n\n## Option Iv From The Report To The President On The Foreign Intelligence Community\n\n.\n\nOF DEFENSE\nOF. STATE\nOPERATIONAL CONTROL\n===\nDCI INFLUENCES RESOURCE\nDECISIONS\nMANAGEMENT RESPONSIBILITIES COORDINATION OF NIEs DE1 REFORTS TO PRESIDENT\nTHRAOUSH NSC\n.\n\n!\n\nDECLASSIFIED\nE.O. 12958 Sac. 3.6\nM gfz_'#l s Bl\n1) [2m0\nBy (o Naa, Dave_3/220\n\nAdditional Staff\nGovernment-wide\nEstablish New Group\nStrengthen Agency IG\nExpand PFIAB\nAttorney General Staff\nWithin the Irntel Community\nOutside the Intel. Community\nSpecial Counsel to President\n\nchapter is to present naintaining control over ed foreign intelligence activities tion.\n\nThe following issues are\n\nto protect cla551f1ed informaion more\neffectively.\n\n'f orm of statutory protection for ssified information.\n\n## A. Classification System\n\nISSUE:\nTg what ex tent should the existing classification\n\n## System Be Revised?\n\nThe current classification system\n(establlshed by Executive Ordsr XNo.\n\n11552\nissued by President Nixon on March\n10,\n1972}\nhas been the subject of much criticism, notwithstanding that it represented a comprehensive reform of the priocr system.\n\nThe criteria established for the various categories of information\n(e.g., TOP SECRET, SECRET)\n'are vague, leading to much over-classification.\n\nThere are provieions for automatic downgrading and eventual de-\nclessification, but the exceptions to them are frequently invoked, particularly in the Intelligence Community.\n\nV\nThe system of\n\"compartmentation;\n(special clearances giving access to information only on a need-to-know basis)\nhas kept valuahlz intelligence from policy-makers and analysts whe would have warned against improvident policies.\n\n235\nclsarly contemplate the existence of The currant Ror-Rokd icas a'classif Many cri that protection of classified information by statutes is unwise because the current classificztion system has resulted in great cverclassiz rassage of such legislation will be mich more\n&i if the classification system is not overhauled.\n\nIndsed,\n& revision of the classification:\nsystem could be viewsd as a necessary price to be paid fu for passage of legislation to protect classified information.\n\nISSUE:\nIf th rrent classification system is to e revised, should its revision be accom-\n\n## Plishad By Executive Order Or Statute? Classification System Design Has Historicallyibeen\n\na function of the Executive.\n\nThe President is in a better position than eongress to know what categories of information need protection, and to what extent.\n\nThe Administration's proposal.can be adoptee with precision in'\nan Executive Order while, of course, legislative proposals may be subject to significant amendment.\n\nHowever, Congress would probably\n\n## B, Protecticmn Cf Classified Information\n\nISSUE:\n_administration propose revised\n\n## Isgislztion To Protect Classified Information?\n\nPresent\n_utory.protection is inadequate.\n\nCurrent statutes prohizit the transm1531on of classified 1nformgtlon by e government swployee only if made to an agent of a foreign power law prohibits such transmission by a non-employee only if done w1th intent to injure the\n.United States cxr aid a foreign government.\n\nThere are only two types of classified information which receive special protection frcm madia publication.\n\nIt is a crime for any person to deliver\n(individually or by publication)\nto any unauthorized person any classified information relating to cryptolcgv or cgmmunications intelligence.\n\n(The comprehensive statute dealing with-fihese limited typee of information grew out of the publication by the Chicago Tribune of the fact that the U.S.\n\ncould read Japanesg codes.\n\nEven the information the defendant divulged to an unautherized person has not become public knowledge, a successful prosecution requires that it be made public at the trial.\n\nUnder present law, the govermment may obtain a remedy.\n\nThis, however, is not protection, Tutory protection of classified sourse, a politically controversial one.\n\nextremely critical of the provisions of the current cposad revision of the Federal criminal code s criminal sanctions on the unauthorized sified information.\n\nrotection should be accorded ISsUz:\n\nonl#\nzo _intelligence sources\nand methods\nor\nto\ntypes\nof classified information.\nBy the DCI\nis required fo protect\n\"intelligence ds\"\nwhich constitute one type of classified information.\n\nBRBasically, this term refers to sensitive information apout methods of collecting and analyzing foreign intelligence and sources of foreign intelligence, whether human or technical.\n\nThe disclosure of information of this type can, of course, be more or less damaging than that of other types of classified information, depending on many\n-factors.\n\n However, there is an exception to the autometic declassification requirement in the current Executive Order for information relating to intelligence sources. and methods.\n\nly exist within the Adminis-\nTwo draft statutes curr tration for the protection of classified information.\n\nA\nCIh-sponsorsed bill would only cover information related to intelligence sources and methods.\n\nThere is disagreement between CIA and Justice over certain of its provisions.\n\ns.\n\n1, a proposed revision of the Federal criminal code contains certain provisions which would protect classified information of all tybes.\n\nThe Administration has urged prompt action on S.\n\n1, although.it has not endorsed its particular provisions;\nS.\n\n1 has been referred to the Criminal Law Subcommittee of the Senate Judiciary Committee;\nas yet, no formal action has been taken by the Subcommittee.\n\nThe current proposed revision to the Federal criminal code\n(S.\n\n1)\nprovides protection for all types of classified information.\n\nIt may be that legislation which covers only sources and methods would stand a better chance of passage than a broader bill, since information related to sources and methods may be perceived by the Congress and the public as more worthy of protection;\nsuch information does not relate to polfcy formulation and is less likely to be classified for purely bureaucratic reasons.\n\nHowever, if the classification system is rationally designed, there seems telligence no legitimate reason to provide protection only for in sources and methods.\n\nISSUE:\nWhethex statutory protection for classified\n*'-_'__':_'.-*_---\nticn shenld cover only government.\n\nemrelated to classz:led information impose nc dire:\nQ\nrh icns on the recipients of leaks of such information However, if to harm the United States, the recipient may be criminally liable under statutes on conspiracy and alding and abetting.\n\nAs a practical matter, very few leak recipients could be successfully prosecuted undexr current law.\n\nBoth the CIA bill\n'U\nand S.\n\n1\nimpcsa sanctions only on government employees.\n\nIf they were extsndad to cover leak recipients, opposition would be even greatsr than it is now and First Amendment problems might be raised,\n\n## Agrainst Security Violations\n\nISSUZ:\nwhat form of statutory protection should be given to classified information\n(i.e., criminal S2lT\ns Togesller Jhiormation {i.e., criminal or civil, or both)?\n\nThe Il\n[]\nars two basic methods for discouraging disc;osureof classified information:\ncriminal sanctions to be imposed after an unauthorized diselosure, and a civil injunction ta be issued before a threatenedvaisclosure The CIA bill\n(but not\n.\n\n1.)\nprovi desf r both tynes of 'actions.\n\nIt would seem unwise te rely on the civil 1njuncL1ve remedy alone.\n\nAlthough in on2\nrespect it can be a more severe sanction\n(in that if one violates an injunction he may be punished for criminal contemdpt without a jury trial), it is generally\n-\noS\n(0]\ne i+\n[\n[]\n[]\nf J\n<\n1]\nn\n1+\n]\n(1]\nt Y\n(]\n(o]\n<t\n[0]\nB\no1\n5\n(D\nnt is usually unaware that W\ndisclosures are about to take place.\n\nIndeed, even in the the civil injunctive remedy is extent in the cases of employees who have signed sscracy oaths;\nit has not proved particularly effective, st ng alone.\n\nOne might argue that prqpoSed legislation sheounld not include the civil injunctive remedy ts lack of effectiveness and controversial\n\"orior restraint\", especially since the to some extent anyway if the employee It shoulZ\nke noted that neither type of remedy is likely the case of disclosures by members of Congress and their psrsonal and committee staffs either on ittee hearings, or in committee reports.\n\nStatements in such contexts are generally protected by the Speech and Debate clause of the Constitution.\n\nY\n\n## Appendix I - Index\n\n.\nNSC/OMB Study\n-\nAgency Comments (President's Copy Only)\n# Draft Report To The President On Organization And Management Of The Foreign Intelligence Community\n\nR\nDecember\n16,\n1975\n-\n~\n 1/R-75/S-665\n~MEMORANDUM FOR:\nSecretary of State\n)\nSecretary of Treasury Secretary of Defense Attorney General Director, Central Intelligence Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff FROM:\nJames T, Lynn\n66\n> %'\"\nSUBJECT:\nOptions Paper. for the President on Organization and Management of the Foreign Intelligence Community Transmitted herewith is the latest draft of the options and recommendations paper for the President concerning the organization and management of the foreign intelligence community.\n\nI understand that the text of the options paper has been reviewed by your working group representative.\n\nThe deadline for your comments and recommendations to the President with respect to the various policy options is Noon, Thursday, December 18, I appreciate the shortness of this deadline, but it is necessary in order to ensure that the President has the benefit of your views, Thanks, Attachment\n\n## Table Of Contents Executive Summary Introduction\n\nII.\nCurrent and Future Trends\nF\nFuture Trends\n10\nProblems\nin Intelligence\nIII.\nA.\nProper Safeguards Against Future Abuses\nB.\nQuality Intelligence\non\na Timely Basis\nC.\nWell-directed Intelligence Activities\n10\n12\n17\n22\nD.\nA Need\nfor Change?\n24\nIv.\nActions\nto Prevent Abuses\n24\nA,\nGuidelines\nfor Propriety\nand\nRestrictions\nB.\nOversight\nC.\nIntelligence Policy Coordination\n24 27\n29\nD.\nThe\n40 Committee\n30\nIntelligence Community Organization Opfions\n32\n36\n40\n41\n45 46 50\nOption\n#1 Centralized National Intelligence\nProgram\nOption\n#2 Centralized Resource Control\nOption\n#2A\nOption\n#3 Departmental Emphasis\nOption\n#3A\nOption\n#4 Modified Current Arrangements\nCovert Action Location\n53\nManagement Improvements\n53\n55 55\n56\n56\nA,\nBudgetary\nand Financial Controls\nB.\nCompartmentation\nC.\nConsumer Interaction with the\nIntelligence Community\nD.\nPerformance Evaluation System\n.\nE.\nCover\nand Clandestine Collection\n\n## Organization And Management Of The Foreign Intelligence Community Executive Summary\n\nThe prinmfy objective of the foreign intelligence community is to provide quality intelligence on a timely basis to both policy-makers and operational officials.\n\nAny organization and management of the Commun-\n\"\nity -- its collectors, processors, and producers -~ must be shaped to accomplish this objective.\n\nTo assure public confidence and support, organization and management must be structured to prevent potential abuses and to make maximum use of limited resources.\n\nDemands from Congress for information on intelligence operations and substantive intelligence will force the Intelligence Community to operate in a more public arena.\n\nDiffusion of political and economic power, proliferation of nuclear and sophisticated conventional weapons, and growth in terrorism are creating broader demands for timely integrated analysis.\n\nEver-increasing demands for high quality intelligence assessments, especially in crisis situations, will require increased use of advanced technological systems as well as the more traditional human intelligence sources.\n\nAny restructuring of the organization and management of the Community must i respond to these challenges.\n\nExecutive Branch safeguards are necessary to prevent potential abuses.\n\nOptions include:\n(1) guidelines defining the scope of permissible intelligence activity and (2) mechanisms to improve Executive Branch v over sight.'\nTo improve quelity and direction in the Intelligence Community, four major structural options -- three requiring legislative action -- are examined:\n\nCreation of a new expanded intelligence agency, headed by:\n#1:\na Director of Intelligence, with resource and line control over\nthe national programs\n-- the CIA Program' (CIAP), Consolidated\nCryptologic Program (CCP), and the National Reconnais sance\nProgram (NRP).\nThis option is based ;m the premise fhat\nnational programs are best managed if centrally fu.ndgd and\ncontrolled,\nand that gains from centralization outweigh disadvantages resulting from separation of collectors from their\nprima Ty consumers.\nCreation of a Director-General for Intelligence (DGI) with\n#2:\nresource control over the CIAP, CCP and NRP, but line control only\nover his immediate staff.\nThis option is based on the premise\nthat # central leader with resource control and without a vested\ninterest in any one element of the Community is needed.\nOption #2A\ndiffers frbm Option #2 by giving the DCI line coatrol over\npfesent CIA production elements,\nCreation of a Direetor of Foreign Intelligence (DFI) with\n#3:\nbroad coordination powers but neither resource nor line\ncontrol over any part of the Intelligence Community.\nThis\noption is based\non the premise that an intelligence leader,\nindependent of any organization within the Community, would\nbe best able.to coordinate its activities,\nand that the Defense\nDepartment requires 2 major voice in resource and line\n.\ncontrol' of intelligence assets.\nOption #3A differs from Option #3\nby decentralizing intelligence production responsibilities through\ntransfer of present CIA production elements to the relevant\ndepartments.\nRetention of current Community rela'tionships with the addition\n#4:\nof a second full Depl;lty to the DCI with management responsibility\nfor the CIA and perhaps with expanded or restructured Executive\nCommittees and production responsibilities.\nThis option is based\non the premise that major organizational changes may be\nundesirable, and that improved Community leadership structures\nare possible through administrative action.\nThe study also discusses moving the covert action capability out of CIA and placing it in a new, separate agency.\n\nFinally the study also discusses certain possible management improvements.\n\n## Organization And Management Of The Foreign Intelligence Community I, Introduction\n\nOn November 14,\n1975, the President initiated a study of the organization and management of the foreign intelligence community, including an examination of:\n\n-~\nthe basic structure of the Community,\n--\nkey problems of organization and management,\n--\ndefinition of requirements,\n--\n.systems design and selection,\n~-\nresource allocation,\n--\nguidance mechanisms,\n-~\nconsumer-producer relationships, and\n--\nrelevant recommendations of the Rockefeller and\nMurphy Commissions.\nBased upon the results of these reviews, the study was directed to:\n\n--\nevaluate the need for changes in the current orga.mzatmn\nof the foreign intelligence cormmunity,\n--\npresent options for a possible reorganization of the foreign\nintelligence community,\nand\n-~\nsubmit the recommendations of each addressee [the Secretaries\nof State, Treasury, and Defense, Attorney General, Directors\nof OMB and CIA, and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff] on\nthe options presented.\nThe study group determined that its charge did not include counterintelligence or assistance to law enforcement agencies, because these areas include components outside the foreign intelligence community, primarily the FBI.\n\ndeclassification exemption ached\n{1},\n(2},\n(3\nAutomaticgafy declassified on Date_Japossible 1o Doterm)\n\n## Saty I, Current And Future Trends\n\nThe foreign intelligence community serves a wide variety of consumers, not oniy at the national level but also in the field.\n\nThese include the members of the NSC\n-- the President, Vice President, and Secx:etaries of State and Defense -- the Secretary of Treasury, and, to a lesser extent, the Secretaries of Commerce and Agriculture and the other members of the economic policy community.\n\nAlso included are Ambassadors, trade negoti.ators, and military command authorities -- all stationed outside.of Washington.\n\nThese consumers use intelligence to guide policy decisions in the military, diplomatic, politic'al, and economic areas.\n\nAnalysts and producers of intelligence include parts of the CIA, the Defense Intelligence Agency (bIA), the State Department's Bureau of intelli\ngence and Research (INR), Treasury and elements in the armed services.\n\nCollectors of intelligence include the CIA, the National Security Ageficy (NSA)\nand military Service Cryptologic Agencies, the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO), members of the Foreign Service Officer corps, Treasury, Agriculture, Commerce and Defense attaches, and elements of the armed services intelligence staffs, The chart on the facing page displays relationships in the foreign intelligence community.\n\nThe Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) is currently charged by the President with leadership of the Intelligence Community.\n\nHis four major responsibilities are:\n\n--\nPlenning and reviewing all intelligence activities\nand the allocation of all intelligence resources, .\n.\n-~\nProducing national intelligence required by the President\nand other national consumers.,\n--\nChairing and staffing all Intelligence Community advisory\n)\nboards or committees..\n- Reconciling intel]igence requirements and priorities\nwithin budgetary constraints,\n'\n. The DCI exerceises both resource and line control ove;r the CIA, The Defense Department exercises resource and line contr61 over the Consolidated Ciypto].ogic Program (CCP), the National Reconnaissance Program (NRP), and the General Defense Inte]li\"g.ence Progra.zfi'(GDIP).\n\nThe DCI exercises the l;esponsibilifies outlined a}_::ove through his line con'cr_oi over CIA production and collection compo;ents, through chairmanship of Comfi:mity advisory committees on requirements, resources, and production, and through h:is authority to establish collec;._tion requirements and priorities.\n\nHe is also chairman of an Executi.ve. Committee (Equm)\nwhich sets budeefiry and operating policy for the NRP.\n\nFinally, the DCI\na.xlnually presents his recommendations on the to';al Intelligence Community\n)\nproeram to the President, Resources and personnel available to the Intelligence Community\n_reached a peak during the Vietnam War and have declined in rea'1 terms since.\n\nAn agency and functional picture -of the 1976 intelligence budget request is shown on the facing page.\n\nCIA has about :: percent of the total national intelligence resources with the bulk of its efforts concentrated in human intelligence collection, product-ion, and various support functions.\n\nAlmost all other intelligence resources are carried in the Defense budget,\n'with signals intelligence, photo intelligence, and intelligence-related resources dominating the picture, National intelligence resources can be described in three different ways:\n\ne\nBy function, about 85 pef cent are dedicated to collection\nand processing, about 10 per\ncent to analysis and production\nof intelligence and the balance to support,\n\nBy target area,\nover 75 per cent of foreign intelligence assets\nare directed at the communist world, primarily the USSR;\ne\nBy output c.ategory, about 85 per -cent relate to the size\nand statgs of foreign military forces (includine scientific and\ntechnical information),\nand the remaining\n15 per cent cover\npolitical and economic subjects.\n\n## Future Trends\n\nThe USSR and Communist China will remain our major intelligence targets.\n\nThere are, however, developing international trends and issues which will pose new challenges to the Intelligence Community over the coming years:\n\ne\nLargely bec;t;se of the spread of new t'echnolog}} and the\n:\ngrowth.of global interdependence, more nai;iens will acquire\nsome measure of leverage in world affairs,\n\nThe proliferation of nuclear and sophisticated conventional\n. weapons,\nthe. organization of cartels _such as OPEC, and the\ngrowing den;_a.hd for raw materials will make coercive poweiincreasingly available to- foreign governments and' non-governmental groups, including terrorist organizations.\n\nThe gap between the have and h;ve not nations wfil continue\nto widen,\nIssues such as mass starvation and overpopulation\nwill grow in importance.\nThe conflict between economic\nrealities ax;ld social welfare .a:sp'ira'tions will continue to create\nferfiile fields for communist subversign, 'political tizrbulence,\nand growth of terrorist threats (perhaps involving nficleafl;r weapons),\nI\nI\nI\nR\nR\nI\nN\nT\nI\nsescevae\n\nceccsesscccssccsassesesversssasesensusacane\n.\ncsseasae\nD\nI\nI\nA\nR A\nR\nA\nR\nR\nI\nR\nR\ne\nEEEX\nL\nI\nI R\nA\nN\nA\nN\nR\nR\nA\nI\nA\nA\nS\nR\nN\nY\nIn the coming years, additional challenges to the Intel.figence Community will be posed by the acceleration of international events requiring the cai:ability to assess and respond on a near real-time basis., New collection and da.ta systems will produce large amounts of information Tequiring a need for\n.\n\nimproved communications between agencies, better management and information handling capabilities, more advanced analytical methodoligies, and new types of product presentation, A great variety of demands, issues and opportunities face the Community's leadership:\n\ne\nNotwithstanding the increased sophistication of collection\nsystems, thereis a rising demand, pafticularly in crisis\nsituations, not only for the kind of intelligence available\nfrom technical sensors, but also for intelligence which can\nnormally be acquired only from human sources.\n.\n'\nThe need fer confidentlmonitoringv of Soviet compliance with\nSALT and other agreements and support of MBFR negotiations will require more detailed intelligence on Soviet and\nEastern European military targets.\n.\nCollection systems must be able.to survive and be useable\nin wartime to satisfy combat needs.\n\nCongress will demand more substantive intelligence.,\nPolicies\nwill have to be developed to determine what intelfigence should\nbe provided, how sensitive information is to be protected from\npubl?ic disclosure, and how to avoid inhibitions on the analytic independence of the Community.\n\n| Changes in the world at large, and in the means of perceiving and assessing their significance, have complicated the tasks and challenged the resourcefulness of the Community.\n\nThese challenges do not argue for any particular organization of the Community; they illustrate the diversity and scope of the demands upon the Community and euggest the Potentia.l significance of the way in which the Community is structured.\n\n## Ii. Problems In Intelligence\n\nThe Intelligence Community has made many vital contributions to the national security of the United States.\n\nThroughout its history efforts\n.ha.v;e been made to improve Community performance.\n\nIgevitably, in any\n.study of this typ'e, the_foc;ls must be oxr problems, rather than a_chievements, in intelligence.\n\nProblems in intelligence can be viewed in the context of three major objectives for management and org@zation of the Intelligence Community:\n\ne\nCreate proper safeguards against future abuses;\ne\nProvide customers with quality intelligence on a timely basis; and\ne\nEnsure that intelligence activities are well-directed.\n\n## A, Proper Safeguards Against Future Abuses\n\nThe current public focus on the Intelligence Community evolved from a concern over alleged abuses:\nsurveillanc.e of Americans, domestic electronic intercepts, mail openings, and assassination plots.\n\nThe Co'm.-\nmission on CIA Activities within the United States (the Rockefeller dom\n\" mission), the Murphy Commission and recent Congressional investigations\n'all concluded that existing safeguards against abuses, including gfiidelines, have been inadequate.\n\nThe Commissions made a number of recommendations aimed at (1) eensuring that top policy-makers were aware of possibly questionable activities, and (2) promoting deliberative cor{shidevrve.fic;n of)\nsuch activities, Inadequate safeguards were found within the Intelligence Community, the Executive Office of the President, and Congress.\n\nAlthough many Community-wide directives have existed for assignment of responsibilities\n' and other management purposes, directives on proper conduct have been\n. rare.\n\nThe DCI, the leader of the Community, has no clear authority to inspect activities except within the CIA.\n\nParticular problems within the CIA identified by the Rockefeller Commission include the limited role of the Inspector General and General Counsel, absence of written regulations on this subject, and over-compartmentation of some activities, Within the Executive Office, inadequate mechanisms exist to review the legality and propriety of ileltelligence activities, Responsibilities for propriety rest primarily with the head of _eaeh operating component.\n\nWithin the Cengress, oversight of the CIA and other com;ponents of the Intelligence Community was conducted until quite recently by a senior group of Senators and Congressmen, This small group of Congressmen reviewed Community activities and approved intelligence budgets.\n\nThe recurring the'rfie in oversight and safeguards against potential abuse at all three levels is the inadequacy of review mechanisms and insufficiency of attention to propriety.\n\nBecause attention was not focused\n'on this responsibility, certain activities were conducted without the top level attention they merited,\n\n## B. Quality Intelligence On A Timely Basis\n\nProduction of qualit',; intelligence on a ti;nely basis extends deeply into the management of the whole intelligence effort.\n\nIi.: includes the 'p;'ocess by which resources are allocated to collectors, processors and producers; the quality and organizational placement of collection and production functions; the nature of the research and development efforts;\n.\n\nand even the development of programs which provide necessary support\n)\nfor intelligence a&;tivities.\n\nWhile the leadership will continue tolbe challenged by the need to provide efficient management of Community resources, major attention must be devoted to iptelligence production.\n\nThe Intelligence Cbom.munity has been criticized for failing to predict major events and crisis situations such as the 1973 Middle East War.. .\n\nOver the years, however, the Com.mu.nitir has dealt successfully with many different crises such as the 1967 Middle Ee.st War, Success or failure jn forecasting events rests on the perceptiveness of the estimative judg-\n.\n\nmen'ts of the Commmunity as well as the sufficiency of timely, relevant and accurate intelligence from which judgments of intent could be derived, The Community's performance with respect to longer term estimates has also been mixed.\n\nThe production of such estimates is complicated by\n(a) the paucity of hard evidence and (b) the fact that judgmental accuracy hinges on .futu're decisions or actions of foreign governments, or on U.S, decisions or actions to which the estimators are not privy.\n\nAccuracy apart, the utility of estimates is also complicated by problems of dialogue and feedback between intelligence consumers and intelligence producers, While senior policy officers have often felt that intelligence asseesments ere not sharply ;ocused on-their real needs and concerns, these policy officials often do not clearly articulate their needs.\n\nThe estimates production process, however, does compel an orderly review of all new intelligence and analysis and forces old assumptions to he retested and discarded\n\nor revalidated.\n\nEstimates of concrete, factual subjects\n-- e.g., military capabilities\n--\nare generally well regarded and thought to be useful, In those addressing political and economic subjects, the judgment quotient is much higher, They elicit a more mixed receptien'and represent areas in whjch State and Treasury rely heavily on their own ana.lytieal resources., A number of problem areas in provision of quality intelligence have been identified:\nConsumer relations with the Intelligence Community.\n\nWhile intelligence produced for policy-makers in recent years has improved in quality and timeliness, certain problem areas remain that impact adversely on the intelligence product and on the efficiency of the intelligence proc'ess.\n\nThere is inadequate guidance and feedback fro'n senior policy officials, compounded by a traditional relectance to make certain sensitive policy_oi'\noperational information available to intelligence officials, When intelligence personnel are in close contact with policy and operational activities, their appreciation of the priority issues is vastly improved.\n\nThe present active participation of CIA, DIA, and INR in the SALT and MBFR delegations, for example, is. considered a useful model for intelligence working relations with policy elements.\n\nThe NSC Intelligence Co@ifiee (NSCIC) has been criticized for not performing the product review and consumer guidance fu.nctl:ions for which it was organized.\n\nHowever, the NSCIC working group now fneets regul;zu:ly, has provided some guidance on requirements, and has initiated a consumer survey.\n\nConsumers are often inadequately informed as to the resofirce'i.mplications o}:' their requirements.\n\nAlthough they need not be intimately involved or knowledgeable concerning the details of the intelligence resource alloca~-\ntion process, they should be informed when the cost of their intelligence requirements has significant cost or tradeoff implications.\n\nCrislis management, The consumer relationship becomes especially crucial dufing crises, It is ee;gential that intelligence analysis in critical circumstances proceed from an understanding of operational policy decisions so that the likely reactions of the other side can be assessed. The White fiouse, State, Defense and the DCI all have major roles to play in improving procedures to develop better intraagency, interagency and White House ties, In times of crisis, each Agency organizes itself to maximize support for its chief who participates in crisis management decision-neakine through the NSC's Washington Special Action Group or less formal arrangements, These generally work well; but, there is little overall coordination of agency activities, They often result in a large volume of unevaluated infor -\nmation at the top.\n\nTimeliness of intelligence reporting has taken precedence over careful analysis and interagency coordination.\n\nThe future challenge is to ensure adequate analysis and timely reporting and to provide for more interagency dialogue.\n\nNational collection National intelligence support to field commanders.\n\ncan provide information to military commanders at the level of systems detail needed for planning and conducting military operations, but their:\n'utility as wartime assets remains to be tested.\n\nMilitary. intelligence is an essential element of the combat commander's force.\n\nNational collection assets offer promise of contributing significantly to the commander's: intelli~\n..gence needs.\n\nIf the national assets cannot meet requirements for timeliness, accuracy, availability, dependability and survivability in a combat environment; however, combat commanders will remain under standably reluctant to become overly dependent on national collection systems.- An effort is.\n\ncurrently under way to provide processed information directly to -military commanders .at the theater level and below.\n\nAccess to some intelligence informa-\nSecrecy and compartmentation.\n\ntion at both the policy and operational levels requires: special clearances, which are. considered necessary to protect sources and methods of intelligence and other sensitive information from unauthorized disclosure.\n\nA classification system established by an Executive Order, reinforced by unusual employment termination authorities over employees of CIA and\n. NSA, and a series of less than airtight criminal statutes are used with\n. varying degrees of effectiveness to protect intelligence.\n\nFor many years, it has been recognized that these procedures and sanctions are. inadequate to accomplish their task and to allow the DCI to fulfill his .statutory respon'-\nsibility to protect sources and methods.\n\nIn part because of the inadequacy of classification and statutory sanctions, a number of special control systems for particular types of intelligence information have been developed.\n\nCompartmentation, properly applied, permits a broader dissemination of less sensitive material while protecting the most sensitive, However, procedures to remove classified information from control systems are usually elaborate and time consuming, A bontinuing problem is the difficulty of ensuring that consumers have access to the kinds of intelligence products they require.\n\nSeparate control systems also inhibit useful intelligence analysis and production.\n\nCompartmentation proceciures in 'some organizations artificially divide the intelligence data base and make it difficult -- in some cases impossible --\nto store and integrate informafim collected at great costs.\n\nMuch has been done to sanitize and decontrol intelligence to make it more widely available, More remains to be done.\n\nIn undertaking such changes, sensitive material must be protected.\n\n## C. Well-Directed Intelligence Activities\n\nConsideration of the third .objective -- ensuring well-directed mtelhgence activities -- starts with the National Security Act of 1947 which\n. gave CIA the responsibility to advise and make recommendat:ons to the NSC\nand to correlate and evaluate intelligence relating to the national secux:ity.\n\nExisting Presidential directives state that the DCI \"shall assume leadership of the Community in planning, reviewing, coordinating, ax;d'evaluating all intelligence programs and activities,' and in the production of national intelligence.''\nToday, the DCI has resource and li;le eontrol authority over only one part of the Intelligence Community -~ the CIA., His Community responsibility to set requirements and priorities for collection is established in NSC directives and is exercised through a variety of committees and ad hoc arrangements, The DCI must coordinate all national intelligence resources to assure f.fiat military, economic and political concerns receive appropriate emphasis.\n\nThe Secretary of Defense must ensure that his military intelligen_ce organization, as an integral.part .of the national intelligence community, provides informat;i.on to all echelons of command.\n\nThe increasing capability of national collection assets to provide inteliigence to field activities calls for closer interagency cooperation in a number of areas;\nPeacetime /wartime transition, In peacetime, centrally-managed technical collection systems such as the National Reconnaissance Program\n_\nand the Consolidated Cryptologic Program are controlled by a variety\n'\nof mechanisms in which the DCI's influence varies, In wartime, Defense intelligence requirements are paramount,\n. For transition to wartime, the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the DCI ilave concluded formal understandings governing military7 CIA command relationships at the theater level in war and contingency situations, There is, however, no peace/war transition agreement at the national level. Closely related is the q;lestion of whgther existing arrangements provide for an effective transition to crisis and hot war conditions, Formal agreements cc;ncg;-ning DCI and CIA support to Defense in time of war could enhance\n.\n\ncollaboration between the two organizations in time of peace.\n\nControl over Community resources.\n\nThe DCI has direct resource:\ncontrol over the CIA, less direct control but substantial influence over the National Reconnaissance Program, and influence through the requirements\n.\n\nprocess and the recommended program budget over the General Defense Intelligence Program and Consolidated Cryptologic Program.\n\nBudget development and execution occurs primarily within the departments.\n\nHowever, the National Reconnaissance Program budget developed by an Executive Committee (ExCom) made up of the DCI and the Assistant\n'Secretary of Defense for Intelligence.\n\nAlthough the budget is handled primarily within the departments, the DCI submits each yeaz; a set of program recommendations to the President for his consideration in preparing next year's budget., In this document the DCI discusses important aspects of the U. 5. Foreign Intelligence Program, presents his position on budget issues, and displays.a reeommended level of Community resources for the coming year.\n\nBecause it is superimposed\n.on the normal budgetary process, there have been problems of timing associated with this submission.\n\nIt must be formulated after the preliminary budgets are formed and the issues defined and debate&, buf before the President's budget is assembled.\n\nThe DCI also uses two interagency advisory review mechanisms:\n\ne\nThe United States Intelligence Board (USIB).\nThe USIB was\nestablished to advise the DCI and identify information needs\n'and requirements.\nWhen the information requirements can\nbe readily transla.'te& into resource requirements, they influence resource levels,\ne\nIntelligence Resources Advisory Committee (IRAC).\nThe IRAC\nwas established to advise the DCI on the preparation of the\nintelligence budget and the allocation of reeouces among programs,\nIt has as members the DCI and senior representatives from State,\nDefense,\nthe CIA and OMB,\nThere is no single central controller of intelligence resources.\n\nTrade-offs among collection, processing and production functions seldom are made, in part because of the diverse budget review process.\n\nIt is difficult to relate resource inputs to product outputs.\n\nWhile there is a tie between processe& intelligence input and finished analytical output, the relationship of product to processing and collection activities except in isolated circumstances is difficult to quantify, Further, decisions tend to be made in terms of particular sensor collection capabilities to the exclusion of consideration on an across-the-board basis among available resource options.\n\nClandestine collection and covert actions.\n\nCIA, and to a limited extent the military services, conduct clandestine collection abroad.\n\nThe importance of such collection remains high in learning about the secret activities, plans and intentions of foreign states.\n\nCover is essential to CIA's clandestine collection.\n\nFew foreign governments could tolerate an openly identified CIA contingent, As the size of the Arnerican official presence abroad has decreased in recent years, so has the opportunity for official cover for CIA ope;atives.\n\nCIA has made increasing use of non-official cover; but these arrangements are generally costly and inefficient and sometimes dangerous to the operative.\n\nThe CIA\nand State have been unable to resolve to their mutual satisfaction how much and what kind of State Department cover can be provided.\n\nClandestine collection by its nature is often extremely sensitive politically.\n\nBecause of the importance of secrecy in these matters, coordination of sensitive clandestine collection has tended to be worked out at the local level, between the Ambassador and the CIA Station Chief.\n\nPublic Law 93-495 expresses Congress' view that coordination is essential.\n\nWhile a limited amount of Washington-level coordination takes place at working levels between State and CIA, mutually acceptable procedures have not been achieved.\n\nCovert actions, including political 'and psychological projects and paramilitary warfare, have been carried out by the CIA a.Lmoet since its inception, Proposals. for moving covert action out of the CIA have been made many times but have always been rejected.\n\nReview, coordination, and approval of covert operations is the responsibility of an NSC subgroup, the 40 Committee, The Murphy Commission and congressional observers have criticized this committee for inadequate deliberation and staff support and for failure to represent a broad enough diversity of policymakers.'\nAt times in the pas'c, 40 Committee meetings have not been held; decisions were made by telephone or written correspondence.\n\nInadequate time for staff corsideration has been a criticism both within the government and outside.\n\nAlthough the 40 Committee charter calls for annual reviews of ongoing programs, this direction has not always been followed.\n\nThe Attorney General has served on the 40 Committee in the past, but served more as a trusted Presidential aide than as the government's chief legal adviser.\n\n## D. A Need For Change?\n\nSince 1947, major changes have occurred in the size and scope of the responsibilities and activities of the Intelligence Community.\n\nOver tfia period the DCI's Co;:mnunity leadership has remained basically constant;\nhowever, the intelligence leadership struch.ue with;in Defense has become increasingly centralized, A wide assortment of committee arrangements has been developed to advise the DCI, who has coordin_ating authority, and managers within the Community, who have resource and line authority.\n\n-\nIn the oversight area, new arrangements seem required.\n\n- Although the publicity of the last year was probably the most effective safeguard possible against potential impropriety, the preferred prescription for the future is not continued exposure, but rather sound oversight within the Community, at the Executive Office level and in Congress.\n\nWith respect to the management and control of Int_elligence Community resources, the 1971 Presidential Directive gave the DCI a resource review responsibility for the entire Intelligence Community but no statutory or fiscal authority to e.nfor'ce such a responsibility.\n\nArguments for centralization based upon the growing resource management task stress the DCI's lack of real authority and the Intelligence Community's increasing reliance on expensive collection systems which require central management to serve the full range of potential consumers., Counfer-arguments stressing the need for greater, or at least unimpaired, departmental authority point to the substantial influence that the DCI has exercised under present directives and arrangements, They also con.tend that major technological collection programs, such as the National Reconnaissance Program and vCon.s olidated Cryptologic Pr'ogfam have worke& well, are responsive to\n.na.tional requirements, and fepresent a form of Community management that while decentralized makes-effective use of scarce resources and expertise,\n. Proponents of major organizational change believe th.a.t new institutional arrangements at the top of the Community are necessary for effective consideration and solution of many complex problems.\n\nOpponents,on the other hand, believe major organizational change is not required and would be disruptive, reduce morale an& actually decrease efficiency, at least in the short run, As a final'point, it is generally agreed that the House and Senate Select Committees will make proposals for reorganization and that the President would be well _advised to set forth his own proposals which ceuld\"be useful as guides for Congress in its deliberations., On the other hand, while such proposals will be advanced, there is no certainty that Congress will act.\n\n## Iv. Actions To Prevent Abuses\n\nRecent events have demonstrated the need for improvement in existing control procedures over the Intelligence Community within the Executive\n'Branch and in Congress., Changes in both organization and procedures to provide additional control are examined below.\n\n## A, Guidelines For Propriety And Restrictions\n\nA code of standards for the conduct of i.ntelligent.:e activities is needed, A draft Executive Order has been prepe.red for intelligence agencies (excluding the F'BI) which sets restrictive guidelines for domestic activities (e.g., mail open'ing, infiltration of dissident groups, illegal electronic surveillance, inspection of tax returns;\ncollection of information on U.S. citizens and drug testing) and which limits activities which can be taken to protect intelligence sources and methods, Approval and dissemination of an Executive Order is a necessary first step toward providing the guidelines within which the Intelligence Community must operate.\n\n## B. Oversight\n\n' A'n.v.xnber of legislative proposals have alteady been introduced to enhance the congressional oversight role.\n\nTwo distinct possibilities are emerging:\n\n]\nEs#ablishxnent of a joint oversight committee with responsibility\nto review all intelligence activities; and\ne\n- Establishment of a wider General Accounting Office role in\nreview of intelligence.\nAgainst this backdrop, three tiers of potential options exist within the Executive Bl;anch:\n\n1.\nExecutive Branch oversight -- w1th1n the Intelligence Commufiii:x.\nThe DCI currently utilizes an Inspector General (IG) to review only CIA\n' ecfivities.\n\nEach agency is responsible for carrying out an inspection function of its own activities.\n\nSpecial clearances and sensitive aspects of inteiligence functions have inhibited deep scrutiny in the pa.st.\n\nTwo options can be considered:\n.\n\ne\n Strengthen the inspection function in each agency;\ne\nEstablish a Community IG under the DCI.\nEstablishment of a Community IG should reflect the planned future role of ';he DCI.\n\nConflicts may arise between a Commfin;tty IG and the intelligence aggficies regarding access and degree of authority.\n\nAlso relevant is the decisibn on the need for a Cquneel to the President, as addressed in the following section.\n\nThe arguments for either a Community IG or oversight at the Presidential level are fairly lear, but the functions of the two would\n_overlap.\n\nSome would question the need for both,\n\n2.\nExecutive vBra,nch oversight -- outside the Intelligence Community.\nA. decision in this area .shou.ld address the following:\n\no\nUsefulness to the President of an independent oversight officiai;\no\n Ability of this offic.ial to gather useful information; and\ne\nPublic perception of the change -- substantive or cosmetic.\nThree options have been identifieds\n\nThe Attorney General, who would advise the President through\n.\nuse of a staff established within Justice to monitor intelligence\n.\nactivities; or\ne\nA Special Counsel to the President, together with an appropriate\nstaff, who would be responsible for advising the President on the\nlegality and propnety of intelligence activities; .or\ne\nA government-wide Inspector General, who would also respond\nfor the President to improprieties in Federal activities beyond\nthe Intelligence Community.\nHis appointment would demonstrate\na willingness to address other Executive Branch improprieties.\n3,\nExecutive Branch oversight -- by outside Government ger'soimel.\n-goirernment group\nAnocther approach to oversight involves the use of a2 non\nto advise the President.\nTwo options are identified:\ne\nAdding an oversight responsibility to the President's Foreign\nIntelligence Advisory Board (PFIAB); or\ne\nEstablishing a new oversight group.\nThe Rockefeller and Murphy Commissions both strongly endorsed the concept of expa.ndmg the PFIAB charter, The key question to be resolved here is the extent to which an advisery group (even with a permanent and expanded staff), meeting on an occasional basis, could effectively oversee ongoing intelligence operations.\n\nExpansion of the PFIAB charter should probably be coupled with appointment of a more diversified membership.\n\nDetermination of whether to use the PFIAB or to establish a new group depends Eeavfly on consideration of the extent to which the PFIAB's 'prixnary role in the past --\nencouragement of the Intelligence Community to do the best job possible --\nwould be diluted By, and perhaps even conflict with, this new responsibility.\n\n## . C. Intelligence Policy Coordination\n\nA number of intelligence activities impact on policies\n-- domestic, diplomatic.\n\nand military -- outside the Community.\n\nThe NSC has the statutory duty of integrating domestic, foreign and military policies.\n\nThis duty is currently carried out through NSC directives and NSC committees, Coor-\n.\n\n)\n. dination o:\". ifitelligence activities, in large part due to their higlfly sensitive nature, remains a difficult problei'n.\n\nAd hoc arrangements have, with vary'inge'\neffectiveness, been used to integrate policy in intelligence-related areas such as surveillan;:e of Americans, official cover for clandestine operations'\nand communication intercepts.\n\nThe orga.nizationai focus within the Executive Office should address:\n\nThe ability to coordinate the efforts of foreign intelligence,\nL\n. counterintelligence,\nand dc;mestic intelligence on specific\nprojects; and\ne\nThe public and Congregsional perception of Executive Office\ncontrol over intelligence activities.\nThree options have been identified:\nExpanded Use of the NSC Structure.\n\nThe NSC structure could be better used to integrate policies involving domestic and foreign\n.\n\nintelligence.\n\nNSC Committees could be augmented to include Justice and Treasury, Other departments could be brought in as the subject demands.\n\nEither a new committee could be established, or the functions assigned to the NSC Intelligence Committee could be expanded.\n\nIntelligence Adviser to the President.\n\nOne person located in the\n\nExecutive Office could be assigned responsibility for integrating\nthose interagency policies affecting foreign and domestic intelli-\n.\ngence activities.\nA special adviser would have some authority\n-\nand high public visibility.\nAd hoc committees could work with the\nintelligence adviser and his staff on designated problems; over-\n-\nsight responsibility could also be assumed.\nConflicts with the\nNSC could occur, however, because the special adviser's\nresponsibilities would overlap those of the NSC.\nImproved DCI/Agency Coordination.\n\nForeign and domestic poiicy considerations involving foreign intelligence efforts could be handled through existing informal mechanisms directly between the DCI and involved agency heads without White House participation.\n\nThis would require re-examination of the current role of the DCI.\n\n## D. The 40 Committee\n\nThe NSC's 40 Committee provides policy approval for covert actions. The group is chaired by the Assistant to the President for National Se.curity Affairs and includes the DCI, State, Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff.\n\nThe Attorney General is formally a member but has not been an active participant in recent years.\n\nWhile formal review procedures have been established, there is a\n.\n\ngenerai perception by Congress and independent commissions that there has been an inadequai;e substantive review of proposed actions.\n\nIz'np_rovedb review might be a.ch.ieved by:\n\ne\nReinstituting formal committee meetings on all significant\ncovert and sensitive requests{\ne\nRedesignating the Attorney General as a committee member\nwith additional representation from other departments as the\nsubjeect demands (with attention paid to eos sibie conflict of\nroles for the Attorney General if he is designated as the\nPresident's intelligence inspector); and\n[\nv Adding staff to provide non-departmental substantive analytic\ninput on the need,\nrisk and potential benefits of each operation.\n\n## V. Intelligence Community Organization Options\n\nIn the context of addressing the probiems discussed in Section III, the study group examined a wide va.riet.;y of Community leadership alterna-\n:\n\"tives, ranging from total centralization of all intelligence resources and\n.programs to eliminafion qf any central intelligence coordinator.\nFour organizational options were analyzed in depth.\n\nThese options are intended to present a range of choices and need not be adopted in their entirety.\n\nKey e_lex;nen{;s of these options are:\n\n.\n Identification of the overall leader of the Intelligence Community and definition of his place within the hierarchy of the\nExecutive Branch and the Intelligence Community;\ne\nSpecification of operational responsibilities;\ne\nSpecification of analytic and production responsibilities;\n.\nSpecification of resource responsibilities; and\ne\n Definition of the jurisdictions and organizational inter-relationships\nof the major components of the Intelligence Community,\n-\nAll options would accommodate 'an intelligence leader who could either continue in his traditional role as afiviser to the NSC or himself become a\n.member of the NSC.\n\nFull NSC membership, by incr'easing the intelligence leader's stature, would strengthen his rolg within the Community, Conferral of Cabinet rank or statutory direct access to the President could serve the same purpose.\n\nRetention of the adviser role has the advantage of keeping intelligence separated from policy and precludes over-identification of the Government's chief intelligence officer with specific policy choices.\n\nOf the four options considered, legislation would be required to implefinent the first three.\n\nThe fourth could be accomplished through administrative action, Certain elements are common to all options, f'irst, all options would accommodate an Inspector General under the direction of t'he Communi.ty leader to ensure legality and propriety in the conduct of intelligence activities.\n\n-\nThe more control the leader of the Cor_r_)munity had, the more authority and access his Inspector General would have.\n\n.\n\nSecond,\nall options envisage the head of the Intelligence Community\nas Community spokesman in relations with Congress including the presenta-\n\"\ntion of an overall intelligence budget and provision of substantive intelligence.\nThe extent to which the DCI would speak for the Community is greater under\noptions envisaging incre#s_ed centralization than in those stressing departmental roles.\nThird, all options envisage continuance of departmental intelligence production to support departmental missions and to contribute to national\n'intelligence production.\n\nFinally, all options would relieve the DCI of responsibility for day-today management of CIA and for reviewing tactical intelligence resources.\n\n- Required\nCommittee\n8tructure\nLegislation\nCollection\nRegponsibilities\nProduction\nRespongibilities\nDI controls sll CIAP,\nCCP, NRP elements\nDI produces all\nnational intelligence\npresent CIA\nrequirements\n&\npriorities\nRetain existing or\nsimilar committees;\nOPTION #2A: Provides\nDGI line control over\nDGI produces national\nestimates; tasks other\nproduction elements\nDFI esteblishes\nrequirements\n&\npriorities\nRetain existing or\nsimilar committees\nOPTIOR #3A:\nTrensfers CIA\nproduction components\nto departments\nDF1 produces national\nestimates; tasks other\nproduction elements\nDCI esteblishes\nrequirements\n&\nDCI wu.onuoom national\nestimates; controls\nCIA production\nLeadership of\nCommuni\nOperational\nResponsibilities\nResource\nResponsibilities\n\" DGI establishes\nDGI controls CCP,\nNRP, CIAP resources\nIntelligence {DGI)\nIntelligence (DFI)\nDFI review only;\nChairman, NRP ExCcm\nDFI no line authority\nDCI delegates CIA line\nDCI controls CIAP;\nChairman RRP\n& SIGINT\nExComs\nReviews other resources\nanthority to\na 2nd Deputy\n\n## ' Centralized National Intelligence Program Rationale\n\nThis .option is based on the premise that the present intelligence system suffers from a division of responsibility and co.ntrol of resources and operations,. and that the best. approach to the problem is to centralize every element that reasonably can be centralized -- the CIA Program (CIAP), the Consolidated Cryptologic Program (CCP), and the National Reconnaissance Program (NRP), This option assumes that the gains in centralizing intelligence resources outweigh any disadvantages resulting from transferring some collection agencies from their primary customers.\n\nThis new agency woul& serve the Government's intelligence nev..eds much as the Justice Department serves its legal needs.\n\n## Summary Description\n\nThe major and most costly national intelligence activities, CIAP, NRP and CCP, would be combined into a-single agency, headed by a Director of Intelligence.\n\nDepartmental analysis and production centers v;ould be retained, permitting the presentation of contrasting points of view in national intelligence production, While this option creates the maximum centralization of intelligence of all the options presented, it does not encompass all intelligence, Thus, departmental intelligence components would remain basically unchanged.\n\n## Primary Changes And Effects \" Leadership Of Community\n\nThe Director of Intelligence would have line authority over-national foreign i.ntelligence activities, including the CCP, NRP and CIAP, This provides the maximum leadership authority of all the options.\n\n## Operational Responsibilities\n\n. The Director of Intelligence would be fully responsible for opera.tional and other aspects of national intelligence, including the CIAP, the CCP and the NRP.,\n\n## Resource Responsibilities\n\nThe new agency would include the budgets of the CCP, NRP and CIAP, which the Director of Intelligence would review and approve.\n\nThe Director\n'of Intelligence would develop and submit the overall intelligence budget to the President and Congress.\n\ni\n\n## Collection Responsibilities\n\nAll collection elements included within the CIAP, the CCP and the NRP would be contained in the new agency.\n\nTheir organization would be\n\"\nleft to the Director of Intelligence.\n\n## Production Responsibilities\n\nProducfion of national intelligence (national current intelligence production, national estimates, maintenance of national intelligence data, and specialized intelligence research) would be centralized in the new agency, but other depa'rtmenfs would continue to produce departmental intelligence.\n\nThe nucleuevfor the production component would be centralized in the new agency but other departments would continue to produce departmental int elligence.\n\nThe nucleus for the production component would be the production elements of what is now the CIA, possibly Qith. augmentation from analytical elements of other departments,\n\n## Committee Structure\n\nThe D_irectox; of Intelligence would have authority to settle disputes without recourse to the present committee structure; howe'ver, some form of committee structure would be required for interaction with other departments.\n\n## Effect On Intelligence Product\n\nCentralization of control over naticnal programs under the authority of one individual could result in improvements in overall product quality as collection, processing, and production resources are focused on highest priority problems, However, diversity and competition of views will be submerged to the extent that production is centralized at the expense of the depa rtments.\n\n## Effect On Intelligence Management\n\nCombining resource and management control in one agency could result in the most effective and efficient intelligence management system of all options by eliminating conflicts between responsibility and control.\n\nA short-coming is the possibility of _decreased responsiveness to the\n\" requirements of Defense which currently generates the preponderance of intelligence requi.remen'ts.\n\nAt the outsej:, realignment and reorgani-\n. zat;ion would be unsettling and would adversely affec'(_:_\"v_efficiency.\n\nThe proposal to establish a new intelligence agency would encounter congressional and departmental opposition.\n\nFinally, establishment of such an agency would focus attention on the intelligence budget and might increase demands for more open consideration of it.\n\n## Option #2 Centralized Resource Control Rationale\n\n'\n)\n'i'his option is based .on the premise that there is a need for a stronger\n.Community leader, but that Defense, with its military requirements, must retain a strong voice in the management of certain intelligence assets now under its direct control.\n\nThis option strengthens the'.leade.r by giving him resource control over the national intelligence programs\n-- the CIAP, NRP\nand CCP -- while leaving Defense's operational control over the NRP and CCP\nintact.\n\nThe leader is separated by statute from the CIA, reducing the conflict between his present roles as head of the Intelligence Community and head N\nof the CIA,\n. These changes are intended to strengthen the leader of the\n-\nCommunity and relieve him of vested interest in any one segment of the\n:\nCommunity.\n\n.\n\nSUMMARY DESCRIPTION\nThe DCI would be separated from CIA and renamed the Director Generalg for Intelligence (DGI).\n\nHe would have.no. operational responsibilifies but\n\"\nwould continue to be the President's chief intelligence adviser.\n\nHe would have\n\ncontrol over the national intelligence budget which inclfides the CIAP, CCP\nand NRP, Defense would continue to manage the NRP and CCP; and a newly created Director of CIA would manage the CIAP.\n\nThe Director of CIA would report to the NSC through the DGI.\n\nThe Director of CIA would be responsible for day-to-day management of CIA and for management of national intelligence production, drawing on other agencies, as now.\n\nA variant of this option discussed as Option #2A below would give\n'the DGI direct management responsibility for infelligence analysis and production,\n-\n\n## Primary Changes And Effects Leadership Of Community\n\nThe DGI would be charged with overall policy direction for the Intelligence Community, without direct line ma.nagerfient over any.of its operational elements, His leadership authority would rely on resource control and independence from agency ties,\n\n## Operational Responsibilities\n\nThe DGI would have a staff similar to the present DCI Staff, i.e., the N:;Ltional Intelligence Officers (fiIO's) and the Intelligence Community Staff (IC Staff), but no operational responsibilities, Operational control of the NRP, CCP and GDIP would 'be retained in Defense.\n\nOperational control of the CIAP would be 'vested in a Director of CIA,\n\n## Resource Responsibilities\n\nThe DGI would control budgets for the three major national intellig.ence vprograms.\n\nFunds for these programs. would be appropriated to the DGI for reallocation to program managers.\n\nThe DGI would develop and submit the overall intelligence budget to the President and Congress.\n\n## 'Collection Responsibilities -\n\nThe DGI would provide guidance concerning information requirements, review the adequacy of collection requirements developed by the Community,\n'and make recommendations for necessary improvemente.\n\nHe would use his control over the bu_dgetary process to insure adherence to his policy guidance.\"\n\n## Production Responsibilities\n\n. The DGI would be directly responsible through his NiO Staff for the production of national ini:elligence estimates.\n\nHe v'vould be responsible forproviding guidance to the Intelligence Community on peeds and priorities and for arranging for the provision of intelligence support to the Presgident, the NSC and Congress.\n\n## Committee Structure\n\nThe DGI would require USIB, IRAC, ExComs or similar bodies to insure effective coordination and integration of resource and operational matters.\n\nThis option presents an opportunity to streamline the committee structure,\n\n## Effect On Intelligence Product\n\nBy giving the DGI basic authority over the resource allocation process,\n~he' should be able to focus collection systems on high priority production requirements and to evaluate the performance of both 'collectors and producers in meeting consumer needs.\n\nDGI control over resource decisions concerning the CCP and NRP might provide insufficient assurance of adequate resources to meet the needs of military customers.\n\nDefense operational control over the CCP and NRP would be an offsetting factor.\n\n'\n|\nOver the longer term, development of a resource review process in which fundamental trade-offs can be considered, and cos}tsv a.nd benefitscan be evaluated, could have a positive effect upon overall product quality.\n\n## Effect On Intelligence Management\n\n The changes proposed would give one individual, the IDGI, effective authority to establish a comprehensive and integrated resource review process for the three major national intelligence programs, This arrangement allows the DGI to establish priorities and effect trade-offs in developing an optimal infelligence program.\n\nva leaving operational control over the CCP in fiefense, and by.maintaining existing NRP arrangements, Defense would continue to exercise significant control over these programs in order to satisfy essential military requirements.,\n-\nA potential problem with such an arrangement, most particularly in the case of the CCP, is whether a program manager could efficiently carry out his responsibilities while reporting to Defense on operational matters and to the DGI on resource matters, This could also create problems in ensuring that Defense planning was adequately related to resource decisions made by an independent DGI, However, analogous procedures, including the NRP ExCom, exist elsewhere in government,\n\n## Option #2A.\n\n.Tl'n's option is identical in all respects vto Option #2 except that, under this variant, in order to concentrate his efforts on improving the vna.tional intelligence product, the DGI would retain fullvresponsibility\n'for line management bf present C1A production components,\n\" The principal advantage of this variant is that it would give the DGI\nline ccmtrd over produetion resources to carry out the substantive responsibilities given to him under the option.\n\nAlse, it would disassociate present CiA production elements from operational ;:or::;ponents of CIA,\n'i'he principal disadvantage of this variant is that it gives the DGI line management resfonsibility for a sizeable\n: : :: : : production program, thereby reducing his ability to carry out an i:m?artial resource management role as established under the basic option.\n\n## Option #3 -Departmental Emph.Asis Rationale\n\nThis option ie based on the concept that the necessary independence\n'of the DCI within the Intelligence Community is co:hpromised by .his ties to the CIA, and that the responsibilities of the Deparfinent' of Defense require a major voice. for the Secretary of Defense in the developn;enf and management of intelligence assets.\n\nThis option attempts to increese the DCI's stature as an independent leader of the Community by divesting him .of his management responsibilities over the CIA, while retaining his role in major resource decisions.\n\nResource control would reside in the departments and agencies.\n\n## Summary Description\n\n'Under this option, the present DCI would be renamed the Director, Foreign Intelligence (DFI); and the DFI would be organizationally separated from the CIA.\n\nThe DFI would take the NIO structure and IC Staff from the DCI organization.\n\nThe CIA would be rechartered under a Director of CIA\n'reporting to the NSC through the DFI.\n\nMost present CIA SIGINT functions would be consolidated in the CCP in Defense.\n\nThe DFI would have the primary responsibility of providing substantive intelligence support to the President and the NSC.\n\nThe DFI would have a role in Communifi resource decisions concerning major national intelligence systems through his authority to establish requirements and priorities and through his chairmanship of the IRAC and the NRP, The DFI would provide independent assessments regarding national intelligence on both substantive a.nd' resource matters, and he would task elements. of the Community\n;o aid him.\n\n'\nUnder a vfiria.nt, Option #3A discussed below, CIlA prod\\iction elemt.ants would.,lbe- transferred to other departments; and tl;e DF1 would'\nbe cast in the role of \"coordinator'' of departmental'intelligence.\n\n## Primary Changes Afid Effects  Leadership Of Community\n\nThe DFI would be charged with overall p?)licy direction for the\n.\n\nInt'elligence Community, without direct line management or resource control over any of its operational elements.\n\n' His authority would be vested in him through appointment by the President as an independent leader.\n\n## Operational Respon Sibilities\n\nThe DFI would have a staff similar to the present DCI Staff, i.e., NIO's and the IC Staff, but no operational responsibilities, Control of the NRP, CCP and eeneral Defense Intelligence Programs would be continued\n@der the Secretary of Defense.\n\nExCom arrangements for the NRP would remain es.sentially uncha.nge_d;\nNSA would remain un&er Defense (the Secretary of Defense is the Government's executive agent for SIGINT) with SIGINT activities now conducted by CIA, except those in direct support of agent operations, included in the CCP.\n\nOperational control of the CIAP\nwould be vested in a Di;:ecter of CIA.\n\n## Reeource Resgonsibilifigs :\n\nA\nDeveiopment of program budgets woul;i. remain asa departmental or agency responsibility, The DFI, in an advisory role, would provide the President with an independent review of the entire i.nt'ellige-nce budget as at present, Funds for the CIAP, CCP and NRP would be'apprbpriated to operating departznet'lts and agencies for reallocation to program managers.\n\n## C;:Llection Responsibilities\n\nThe DFI would establish requirements and priorities and provide i'econimgndations regarding the national intelligence program, but would lack resource control, The Director of CIA would supervise all clandestine HUMINT collection activities, except those organic to combat units or in direct support of military activities.\n\nDefense would control all SIGINT\ncollection activities except those in close support of CIA agent of;eration's.\n\n## Production Responsibilities |\n\nThe DFI would have no production organization, but would be responsible for providine guidance to the Intelligence Commty on intelligence needs emd priorities, arranging for intelligence support to the President, the NSC\n\" and Congress, and for reviewing and evaluating the resulting national intelligence products.\n\nThe DFI, tfiro_ugh his NIO's, would coordinate and arrange with departmental elements for the production of National Intelligence Estimates.\n\nThe DFI would coordinate the integration of the intelligence production activities.\n\n## Comimittee Structure\n\nThe present .committee structure, or some similar structure, with the, DFI chairing appropriate committees, would be ngeded.\n\n## Effects On Intelligence Product .\n\nEmphasizing departmental responsibility for production could lead to improved responsiveness to departmental heads.\n\nAn inherent danger could be the dimunition of an independent capability to produce and critique intelligence asses_gments.\n\n## Effect On Intelligence Management\n\nThis approach effectively rem.oves the pr'eeent conflicts between the DCI's roles as. Com:pu.nity leader and as head of CIA, but. it lea;res h:u:n with neither budget nor operational a;xthority to shape the programs of the Intelligence Qom_muhity.\n\nHowever, tin' ough presentation of Aannual budget recommendations to the President and his chairmanship of USIB, the IRAC.\n\nand ExCom or similar committees, the DF'I would still have a role in Community resource decisions concerning major national intelligence systems.\n\n## . Option #3A\n\nThis option is identical in all respects to Option #3 except that, under this variant, present CIA production responsibilities and resources for\n'\nintelligence analysis would be transferred to the relevant departments.\n\nThe underlying assumption is that policy-makers would be better served by -departmental producers than by a central agency.\n\nThe principal advantage of this option is that it would place primary stress on the value of strong participation in the production process by the relevant departments, thereby bgtter linking prodicers and consumers of intelligence, The principal disadvantage is th'at it would eliminate an.independent analytical entity separate' from policy-makers and thus independent of their operational or policy biases.\n\nThere is also a question as to whether a DFI with only production coordination responsibilities could usefully serve as the senior intelligence adviser.\n\nThis coordinator role was contemplated for the DCI with passage of the 1947 Act, but early Agency experience strongly suggests that the coofdinator can only function effectively if he has direct access to a production capability which givees him an indeplendent basis for judgment.\n\n## Option #4 Modi_Lf'Ied Current Arrangements Rationale\n\nEach of the three prior options .would require basic changes in the National Security Act of_ 1947.\n\nIt is uncertain that such ch?.pges can be accomplished without a major controversy within the Executive Branch and wit}mu_t major legislative changes.\n\nA series of proposals which can largely be accomplished within existing legislation, or with only minor changes in existing statutes, ma& have appeal.\n\nThe three options discussed above, and the variants to them, all solve certain' perceived problems but may create others.\n\nFi'nally, it can be argued fhat Congressional legislative proposals are most likely tofocus on the question of control of past abuses and only secondarily on major, largely \\inrela.ted, management and organizational changes. ~Much of what may be needed to reduce the potential for future abuses can be accomplished without considering major organizational change.\n\n## Summary Description\n\nChanges addressed in this option invfilve the esta.blish:n.:nent of a second full Deputy for the DCI.\n\nThis would allow the use of cne Deputy for line n.la.nagement of the CIA and a second Deputy to carry out the presen.t Intelligence Community resp.onsibilities assigned under the President's November 1971 letter, Changes could also be made to the existing committee structures regarding resources and to delegations of responsibility for production without changing the basic organization of the Community.\n\n## Primary Changes And Effects . : Leadership' Of The Clom.Munity\n\n\nPresent arrangements Ifor policy direction of the NRP, including the Executive eom;mittee (ExCom) chaired by the DCI' with Defense participation, have. helped assure that these programs meet the neede of all major producers.\n\nThe CCP and the CIA collection program, however, serve national as well as departmental interests.\n\nWith increased dependence on technical collection, a similar ExCom arrangement could be established for the CCP to ensure.\n\nthat views of other producers are taken fully into account in tasking and processing.\n\nConseideration could also be given to an ExCom review of CIA\ncollection programs, Since principals will remain. essentially the same for consideration of NRP and CCP matters, consideration might also be given to co_ns&ida.ting the two review functions within one ExCom, perhaps with an expanded membership to reflect consumer, as well as pfoducer interests.\n\n## Operational Responsibilities\n\nThe DCI would continue to be legally responsible for the operation of CIA.\n\nHowever, a second Deputy with responsibility for CIA management would absorb substantial responsibilities in this area.\n\n## Resource Responsibilities\n\nNo basic change from present practice would occur, except that establishment of an ExCom chaired by the DCI and charged with the respon-\n- sibility of fiolicyy overview and resource review of the CCP and CIA SIGINT\nactivities could enhance the DCI's ability to influence the overall direction of these major programs.\n\n## Collection Responsibilities\n\nNo change would occur,\n\n## Production Responsibilities\n\nNo change would occur.\n\n## Committee Structure\n\nAdjustments in the responsibilities of committees might be necessary in recognition of an enlarged ExCom.\n\nEffect on Intelligence Product This option would largely continue present arrangements, The DCI woulfs retain unimpaired his Community-wide responsibility for production of nationag estimates, current intelligence, and crisis warning, and for evaluating the Community's performance.\n\nExisting independent and competing production capabilities in Defense, CIA, State and Treasury could be retained or aug-\n.mented. \"Structural changes at the leadership level in CIA should free the DCI to devote more of his attention to production issues.\n\n## Effect On Intelligence Ma.Nagement -\n\nAs discussed under the summary description above, this option would clarify management arrangements within CIA and modefately enhance the\n\n- DCI's abilify to carry out his Community management\nand resource review\nresponsibilities. This option would not, however, give the DCI new basic:\nauthority to deal with these responsibilities.\n\n## Covert Action Location\n\nOne last organiiati6m1 issue cuts across all four options:\nthe placement of a covert action capability.\n\nCovert action Wag originally pl'ac'ed within the 'CIA to accompany its clandestine collection capabilities.\n\n'i'ranafer to the Sfate Department would endanger the primary activities of this overt service and be contrary to international diplomatic p'ractices.\n\nTransfer to the Defense Ijepartnient would raise public appfehensioz; over accountability given the size and scope of. the Deparfinefit's activities.\n\nA\nnumber of observers have, howevgr, strongly prorImted placing the covert action capability in an entirely sepa;ra.te agency.directly under the control of the NSC, They have a.rgued:.\n\ne\nIf the covert action capability were isolated in a small agency,\n. oversight would be easier; fewer resources and persomnel would\nneed to be kept under close supervision,\n.\n'The independent analytic capabilities of the CIA are biased becauee\ncovert actions make it an operational agency.\nCovert actions\ncreate a departmental interest in the CIA which is contrary to its\nbasic natjonal functions.\ne\nThe CIA might be better able to attract analysts and scientists\nif it shed its \"dirty-tricks\" image which is closely connected to\nits covert action capability.\nOn the other hand, a number of strong arguments exist for retaining the covert action capability i;l the CIA:\n\ne\n Separation, rather than improving possibifities for effective\neversight, would cree.te greater overs_ighteroblems by isolating\nthis activity from conflicting agency deman.ds and from agency\nsupervision.\n.\n@\nDuring the brief period in the early 1950's when 'cla:'l.xdestine\ncollection and covert actions were in separate offices,\nthe two\noffices were in conflict for rgsources and a&ention, inevitable\nredundancy existed, and units worked at cross-purposes.\nThat\nexperience demonstrated the close connection in terms of\ncontacts, methods, goals and suppc;rt that is desirable between\nthe two activities. For exampie,\nthe covert action agent is\noften also an intelligence source,\nand clandestine tradecraft\nrequired to run a covert action agent is essentially the same\n-as that for an intelligence agent,\n.\nThe need for cover,\nalready a difficult problem, would be\nfurther aggravated by the requirement to increase the number\nof officials requiring cover status.\ne\n Merely shifting around within the Government of the covert\naction capability will neither assuage public fears nor reduce\nattack's on the CIA.\nOutsiders will never believe that ''dirty tricks\"\nhave been taken out,of the CIA, and indeed, their perceptions may be somewhat accurate as the new organization would inevitably have to work closely with CIA clandestine activities.\n\n## V1, Management Improvements\n\nAlthough'organiza.tional reforms can help solve many of the identified problems of the Intelligence Community, sustained management attention will filso' be reqfiired to resolve these problems.\n\nThe study group identified some possibilities for management improvements in areas of particular significance which should contribute both to a prevention of abuses and to a better intelligence product.\n\n## A. Budgetary And Financial Controls\n\nFinancial and budgetary procedures provide an effective discipline in government operations for the President, the Congress and the agencies..\n\nThe lack.of public perception of the budget a(nd finanecial controls over intelligence activities contributes to pubfic and Congressional opinion that no system of checks and balances exists on the intelligence agencies within the Executive Branch or, for that matter, within the Congress.\n\nIn the present situation, while fiscal information on the intelligence agencies is contained in the President's budget, it is not openly identified.\n\nCentralized control over the financial execution of intelligence budgets is not exercised, Two options by which the budget process could be strengthened are:\n\ne\nDProvision by.the President to Congress of a separate classified\nbudget appendix that contained information similar to that provided\nfor all other government activities; it would be prepared at the\nappropriate security level and would require special handling\nwithin the Congress.\n\nThis opfion.has the advantage of a formal Ezecutive Branch initiative (within-'acceptable security bounds) to the Congressional re;;uest for .more information.\n\nThe primary arguments against this proposal involve the precedent setting nature of a formal budget submission for intelligence and the inevitable congressional demand for more\n-detailed information.\n\ne\nImplementation of controls by OMB-on the apportionment,\n'reprogrmmg, transfer and outlay of intelligence funde, similar\nto those for other agencies.\nInitiation of these controls would\njincrease OMB's involvement in the execution phase of the\n.\nintelligence budget which is currently limited to the CIA reserves.\nCongreseional reports have already identified the need for imposition of reprogramming controls on intelligence programg.\n~\nArguing against this proposal is the appropriateness of relying\non budget control for effect%ive tfirection of an organization\nrather than estafilishing objectives and evaluating achievements\nagainst them.\nAlso, irhposition of reprogramming controls could\n\"adversely limit the fle:d.bility to respond to crisis situations.\nThese proposals for providing budgetary information to the Congress and enhancing the visibility of Presidential budgetary control may not be particularly effective in identifsring_ abuses, but they would enhance public end congressional confidence that the fntelligence Community is eubj ect to the same set of checks ahd balances as all other agencies,\n\n## B. Compartmentation\n\nPresent arrangements for compartmen';i:.lgv ensifive information ima.ve impeded the flow of information to consumers. The NSC'should assure itself that current Community studies of decompartmentation be _inteneified with an eye to improving consumer access to the intelligence product.\n\n## C. Consumer Interaction With The Intelligence Community\n\nA number of improvements are required in the interactions of policy officials with the Intelligence Community:\n\ne\nThe NSC should undertake a more activeprogram to improve\nconsumer in'cera.ctio'ns with the Intelligence Community.\nSurveys\nshould be undertakgn to ide.ntify the strengths and deficiencies that\nconsumers find in intelligence support (from the NIE's,\nfor\n|\nexample) and to determine what actions the.poli'.:y consumers\nand intelligence producers should take to ensure more useful\nintelligenc.e contributions to the decision-makers,\ne\nThe NSC should specifically address problems identified in this\nreport including the need for:\nguidance and feedback fi-om decisionmakers to the Intelligence Community; a better intelligence\nappreciation of those policy and negotiating issues which might\nbenefit from intelligence inputs; and arrangements within\nthe economic policy-making organizations required to promote a more effective interchange with the Intelligence Community.\n\nThe NSC Intelligence Committee should also address the special problem of the need for better dissemination of sensitive memoranda, reports and telegraphic traffic to officials with a need fo know,\n\n## D. Performance Evaluation System\n\nMeasures are needed, particularly in certain high cost areas, which will permit a comparison of the value of certain intelligence contributions with their anticipated cost.\n\nThe purpose of such measures is to ensure that intelligence collection and production are focused in a way which will achieve more effective expenditures in terms of cbnsm;xer needs, These measures would be an important criterion in evaluating intelligence performan The DCI should intensify efforts, including consultations with consumers, to strengthen arrangements for evaluating Community performance.\n\n## E. Cover And Clandestine Collection\n\nThe NSC could be tasked to conduct an interagency study addressing both the effectiveness of present cover arrangements and the adequacy of coordination of clandestine collection.\n\nwexfoxd TUI TBUOTGE\nPIZTTBIJUI)\n- T# uorid\nsyseydm\n- 4 uoysd\n)\nT0a3uo) adIN0S3\nPIZTTBIJUI)\n-\nz# uopid\nSHOTIIJO JIuSHZIvy\nALINNNNOD HONIDITTALY\n)\n.. I0Q aspufy -\nJ93U8) UuoT3onpod\n@3esasdag\ngqusawafuvaIy JuUaIIMm\n- f# uotyd\n\n{A}\nClosed by Executive Order 12356'governing access to national security information.\n\n(B}\nClosed by statute or by the agency which originated the document.\n\n{C)\nClosed in accordance with restrictions contained in the donor's deed of gift.\n\n## Memorandum For The Secretary Of Defense\n\nSubject:\nOrganization and Management of the Foreign\n-\n-\nIntelligence Community\n(U)\n:\n\n##\n\n-\n1.\n(S)\nThe Joint Chiefs\nof -Staff have reviewed\nthe report on .\n\"Organization and Management\nof\nthe Foreign Intelligence Community\"\nand have considered\nthe options\nfor reorganization\ncontained\nin\nthe report.\n1In selecting-a preferred optlon,\nit\nwas believed. that\nany solution\nto\nthe problems presented\nin\nthe report must consider that:\n'\na.\nIntelligence support\nto\nUS operating forces\nshould not\nbe degraded through organizational\nor management changes.\n.\nb. Whlle\nUS operating forces may receive 1mportant intel-\n.~\n7.\n-\nligence support from \"national systems,\"\nthey require\na\ndirectly responsive,\norganic intelligence capability in\n_order to meet full intelligence needs.\n:\nc.'Impfoved oversight, within the executive branch, of certain intelligence activities is needed. -\nd.\n\nMultlple,\n1ndependent, analytlcal capabllltles should be retained.\n\ne.\nCost effectiveness\nin peacetlme must not\nbe achleved\nat the expense\nof' responslveness\nin wartime.\n2.\n\n(U)\nThe Joint Chiefs of Staff have no fundamental criticism of the collection, analysis, and production performance of the foreign intelligence community.\n\nWhile improved production and performance must be primary goals in any intelligence restructuring, they are not in themselves sufficient justification for.-\nreorganization.\n\n.\n\nClassified by Director, J-5\nSUBJECT\nTO GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION\nSCHEDULE OF .EXECUTIVE\nORDER\n11652\nT CAUTOMATICALLY\nDO']NGPJ\\D\"'D AT\nTWO\n.\n\n.\n\nYEAR INTERVALS\n.\n\n.\n\nDECLASSIPIED\nON DECEMBER\n31,\n1983\ni A0\naniing pete\n\\,\n)\ne e\n3.\n\n(U)\nAny reorganization will-entail turbulence and uncertainties;\nthus, the full implications of change must be clearly understood prior to implementation.\n\nThe case for organizational change\n.\n\nrests primarily on the need for an improved ability ta prevent\n\" the improper use of intelligence assets and, -secondarily, on the need for fiscal savings by the elimination of unnecessary duplication.\n\nHowever, in determining the necessary realignment, it should be emphasized that military reconnaissance and intelligence forces are structured to support combat capability and cannot be judged solely on their contribution to the peacetime national intelligence-effort.\n\nIn this regard, it is essential that armed forces possess those intelligence resources which support their operational forces.\n\n4,\n(U)\nThe Joint Chiefs of Staff concur.\n\nin the need for improved management control in the areas identified in Section VI;\nhowever, that section has insufficient data for determining the specific option desired.\n\n:\nS5,\n(S).In reviewing the proposed alternatives, the Joint Chiefs of Staff are concerned over the emphasis on resource control as the primary means for management control.\n\nWhile the threat of withholding funds is an effective means of conveying general lirection, it is not a conceptually sound or efficient means of directing an organization on a daily basis.\n\nIt creates an adversary relationship between layers of leadership rather than the more desirable, effective attitude of cooperation that stems from a management by cbjective and evaluation process.\n\n6.\n\n(U)\nThe Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that Options\n1\nand\n2\nand variants\n2A and\n3A could adversely impact on the intelligence support to the Armed Forces.\n\nAt the same time, they consider that Option\n4\nfails to address adequately the problems noted in the report.\n\nDetailed discussion of these options is contained in Appendix B.\n\n7.\n\n(U)\nIn view of the considerations cited above, the Joint Chiefs of staff have concluded that Option\n3, with modifications as\n. specified in Appendix A, is the most viable option presented in the study.\n\nIt creates proper safeguards to preclude abuses and provides the basis for improving the management of national intelligence assets, while providing for retention within the Department of Defense of those intelligence assets which are essential for military planning and operations.\n\n1\n3 (S)\nWlth regard to covert actions, the Joint Chiefs of Staff favor retention of that responsibility in the restructured CIA--based on its close affinity to clandestine collection\n. and rcsponqlbilltleq for politicnl intelliqence.\n\n9,\n(U)\nOn\n14\nDecember\n1975, Mr.\n\nDonald Ogilvie, Associate Director\n-of OMB and Chairman of 'the Senior Steering Group directing the study, forwarded a letter requestlng agency positions on an attached matrix.\n\nAppendix C contains responses to the options contained in that matrix.\n\n10.\n\n(U)\nIn conclusion, given the ramifications on the security\n.\n\nof the United States,--the Joint Chiefs of Staff believe the reorganization of the intelligence communlty should be addressed by the National Security Council prior to decision.\n\n1l.\n\n(U)\nThe Joint Chiefs of Staff request that you take into account, in your response, the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and insure that their views are- approprlately forwarded to\n:\nthe President.\n\n'For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:\nJoint Chiefs of Staff Attachments\n\n## Option 3 O Study Provisions From Option 3\n\n Director,\nForeign Intelligence\n\n= Principal intelligence adviser\nto President and NSC'\n\"-\n- Oi'ganlzntionany separated\nfrom CIX\n~ Relieved\nof responsibility\nfor reviewing tactical\nintelligence\n\n- Chairman of USIB, IRAC, and NRP EXCOM\n- Provide assessments\non national intelligence both substantive\nand resource matters\n- NIO and intelligence community staffs wove with DFI\n- No operational or production responsibilities\n-\n,\n- Review entire intelligence community budget\n- Provir!e executive oversight through enhanced JInspector\n\nGeneral responsibilities\n- Respon;flble for NIEs\nT,\n.\n- Integrate intelligence production activities\n\n- CiA Qnuld\nbe rechartered under\na Director\n(D/CIA)\n- woule report\nto NSC through DFI\n- Most CIA SIGIN'f functions consolidated\nin CCP\nin DOD\n- Each department engage\nin intelligence production consistent\nwith its mission.\nAdditional JCS proposals\nfor Option\n#3\n.\n- Designate\na senior military GEEicer\nas Deputy Director\nForeign Intelligence.\n-\n- DFI appointed\nby President\nand confirmed by Senate\nfor\nfixed term of office.\nN\n- Defense responsible\nfor development and aperation\nof\nall\nscientific and technical intelligence collection system.\n\n- NIOs perform as\nDFI adviser/liaison\nto the .USIB\nin\nthe\npreparation of national estimates and other natioqel\nlevel\nw\nestimates requested\nby NSC and other Aqencies.\nClassified\nby\nbDirector,\nJ-5\nSUBJECT TO GENERAL DECLASSIFICATICN\nSCHEDULE OF EXECUTIVE ORDLR\n11652\nAUTOMATICALLY DOWNGRADED AT TWO\nYEAR INTERVALS\no\nDECLASSIFIED\nON DECEMBER\n31,. 1983\n1\n.\nAppendix\nA\n.\n)\n\n## Jcs )\\N.A'Lysis Of The Proposed Study Group Options Option 1L: Centralized Nationai Intelligence Program S\n\nThis alternaci;re is considered the least practical solution.\n\nT{xe creetion of a Secretary of Intelligence is an expensive over-\n.\n\nreaction to the community's alleg.ed improper activities-and would tend to isolate the intelligence producers and consumers.\n\nFurthermore, it would inappropriately place intelligence at the same level as the senior national policy decision makers., Such an arrangement {b'filld complica'te the national intelligence effort, the national departmental interface, and provision of responsive national inteiljgence support to the operating forces.\n\n. Additionally, such centxaiiza.tion of authority'c_ould heighten rather than diminish congressional concera., Creation of a new department\n\n. with its attendant expenditures would likely result in strong coflgr'essio;ia]_\nand public opposition.\n\n-\n\n\nOPTION\n2:\nCentralized\nResource Control\nThis option is undesirable from the JCS viewpoint because it is contrary to efficient and effective management.\n\nSeparat'ing.\n\nresource ffom line control causes conflict and leadership ambiguity: which wou_ld seriously detract from US national intelligence effort.\n\nIt is inappropriate to rely solely on b;xdget control for effective directicon of intelligence activities.\n\n1t is a check, but daily routine guidance and dizection should.\n\nstem from'establis.hing goals and evaluating the achievement of\n\"same 'and not from the inefficient approach of pericdically loosening or tightening thz; purse strings.\n\n## Option 3A: Deletion Of Cia Production\n\nThis variation of Option\n3 should be withdrawn from further consideration.\n\nThe Joint Chiefs of Scaff'support the retention of CIA as a separate organization disassociated with the present o\n2\n\n2\ns\n|3\n|\nDCI responsibilities.\n\n'\nClassifiod by.. RiTegtor, J=5 ...\n\nSUBJECT TO GENERAL DLCLAS.;!HCATlOH\nSCHEDULE OF FXCUTIVE ORDER 11652\nAUTOIATIG\nT\n COWNGRADED AT TWO\nYESR INTERVILS\n1983\n.\n\nECLAS\n 14\nJECEMPE]\nSECRET, s\n?\n\nR\n'\n3esmiA4\n2\n.\n\nAppendix B\n\n## Opt16N 4: Modified Status Quo\n\nrhis option is not supported because the preposal does not\n\nrespond to ccr;gtessional desire for a strengthened executive cognizance of the intelligence community.\n\nIt is also deficient in that it continues the DCI\nas pirector, CIA, with line authority\n[\nover one of the elements of the foreign intelligence community.\n\n## Comments On Letter From The Associate 3. Director Of Omb And The Chairman Of The '3 Senior Steering Group -\n\n1.\n(S)\non 14 December 1975, Mr. Donald Ogilvie, Associate\n4\nDirectox, OMB,\nand Chairman of the Senior Steering Group that\n3\ndirected the study on\nthe Organization and Management of\nthe\ns\n-!'oxeign Intelligence Community,\nrequested- agency recommendations\nA\n- on\na number of specific issues addressed in that study.\nDetailed\n8\nanswers\nto Mr. Ogilvie's letter are contained below.\n2\n2,\n(S)\nThe Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that:\n'\n10\na.\nAn executive order providing\nfor guidalines\nfor intelli-\n23\ngence agencies be approved and promulgated.\n12\n13\n-\n.b.\nA community-wide Inspector General under the DFI\n(as\n-\nR\ndefined in Option\n#3)\nbe established.\n4\nc. The Attorney General be assigned\na staff within the\n15\nDepe:tment of Justice\nto advise\nthe President on the legai\n'\n1s\naspects of intellieence activities.\n-\n-\nco\nd.\nThe PFIAB chartar be expanded\nto give\nit an oversight\n18\nVfunction but members net be approved by Congress\nas some have\nL\nl\n- recently suggested.\nn\nb\ne.\nIntelligence policy coordination be strengthened by\nan\na\nexpanded use\nof\nthe NSC structure.\nCx\nf.\nControl of\n40 Committee activities could be improved by\n2\nreinstituting\nf.orrial committee meetings\non all.significant\n'\nu\n.\n25\ncovert and sensitive recommendations\nand periodic review of\n| Classified    | by         | Director,    | J-5              |\n|---------------|------------|--------------|------------------|\n| SUBJECT       | TO         | GENERAL      | DECLASSIFICATION |\n| '             | SCHEDULE   | OF           | EXECUTIVE        |\n| AUTOMATICALLY | DOWHGRADED | AT           | TWO              |\n| YEAR          |            |              |                  |\n| INTERVALS     |            |              |                  |\n| DECLASSIFIED  | ON         | DECEMBER     | 31,              |\n\nongolng activities as recommen'det_:l by the Murphy Commission.\n\n'Questions on membership of the\n40 Committee and staff raquirements are more properly addressed by the President.\n\ng. Option\n#3,\nas modified by comments\nin the basic memorandum,\n-\n'\nbe considered'the only viable option deveioped.\nSpecific\nreasons for rejection\nof Options\n1,\n2,\n2A,\n3A,\nand\n4\nare\nalsc presented.\nh. Covert action remain within the CIA under any circum-\nstances, including any of the four options developed in the gtudy.\n\ni.\n\nNo decision be made on the two options presented to change the budget process since the Intelligence Organization Group\n\n'did not consider all possible optioms.\n-Furthezmre, neither\nP\nof the two options p:cpoeed\nis considered sufficiently\nEV\n-\n:\npromising nor adequately developed to warrant serious consideration without detailed study in the context of\nan effort\ndevoted to\na review of\nthe financial and budgetary aspects\nB\nBEEY\no\nof management of the foreiyn intelligence community.\nThis\nstudy addressed the subject\nin only an indirect and incompleee\nmanner.\nHowever,\nthe provision of\na classified intelligence\nbudget has\nsome merit.\nThe Honorable James T.\n\nLynn Director, Office of Management and Budget\n01d Executive Office Building\n\"\nWashington, D.C.\n\n20503\nDear Jim:\nThe following are my comments on the report prepared by Don Ogilvie and his colleagues.\n\nEach of us will have\n'his own personal views and his-own problems with the paper.\n\nIn stating my.own, I\ndo not want to detract from the effort and expertise that went into it, especially\n'against the deadlines imposed.\n\nWhat follows, however, must necessarily emphasize the problems rather than the strengths.,\n-\nIn responding to the outline that accompanied the report, I discuss the full range of topics covered by -\n-the Study Group\n(Attachment B).\n\nHere I wish to concentrate on organization and management, the most difficult and ultimately the most important of the issues we face..\n\nI believe the future structure for American intelligence should rest on the following principles:\n\n-~The\nDCI should have\nfull, .easy,\nand regular\naccess\nto\nthe President and National Security\nCouncil,\nbut should\nnot\nact\nas\na partisan\npolitical supporter\nof the Administration.\nTwo way communication between the DCI\nand\nthe President\nis essential.\nDECLASSIFIED\n .0. 12958 Sec. 3.8\n~He should\nbe able\nto provide the President\nWith PORTIONS EXEMPTED\n-\nand the NSC\nand,\nto\nthe extent feasible,\n-\nEO. 129588&.1.5(;)3.4@)(:)\nthe Congress with assessments of foreign events based on analysis under his control k-\n.\n\n\nLG Lt ) G)09\nand independent of the major government By_lit__NARA, Date 34&\"-\";\ndepartments.\n\nP\n11 7 S\n\n~~The system that supports\nhim should be\nshaped to provide\nthe best possible intelligence;\nresource allocations;, procedures,\nand organization should be driven by the\nsubstantive goals set by naticnal needs\nfor intelligence.\n-~The DCI should have\nan established relationship with the Secretaries of State and\nDefense that enables them to work efficiently\ntogether.\n| The Department of Defense should be assured\n_that the intelligence capabilities\nit needs\nin wartime will\nbe avilable.\n-That portion of the Defense budget allotted\nto national intelligence resources\nshould\nbe clearly identified and segregated from\nthe Defense budget proper.\n.\n-In assessing foreign events competition:\nin analysis should\nbe encouraged.\nIn\ncollection,\nduplication should\nbe aveided\nexcept where\nit greatly increases\nthe\nchances\nof acquiring vital intelligence.\n~~The Intelligence Community should be\nmanaged with due regard\nfor resource\nconstraints.\n(This point\nis put\nlast\nfor\na reason.\nToo many studies\nof intelligence\napproach\nit with\na total focus\non economy.\nEconomy\nis necessary,\nindeed\nit\nis\nincumbent\non all intelligence managers\nto make hard\nchoices\nto that end,\nbut\nit should not\nbe\n'an end\nin itself.\nThe primary purpose must\nbe\nto produce good intelligence).\nEffective management of an intelligence organization built on these principles will depend to a considerable extent on the way it structures the relationship between the DCI\nand the Secretary of Defense.\n\nMy basic difficulty with the Study Grouvp's report is that it deals with a number of separate aspects of this problem, but does not pull them together so as to focus attention on a.matter of such fundamental importance.\n\nIn simplest\n\" terms, the DCI\nis supposedly responsible for\n\"planning and reviewing all intelligence activities and the allo-~\ncation.\n\nof all intelligence resources.\"\"\nOf the total intelligence budget, however, the Secretary of Defense controls *\"*-*--+and the DCI.-.+ O the other hand, the CIAP, NRP, and CCP make up the bulk of the national intelligence budget, yet they are egqual to less than\n<ecesssvetof the Defense budget.\n\nThese two statistics mean that:\n\n--Defense has\na preponderant'voice\nin how\nintelligence money\nis spent.\n-\n-When faced with\na choice between primary\nand secondary goals, warfighting capabilities\nor intelligence capabilities,\nDefense\nwill tend\nto choose warfighting.\n- ==Intelligence money\nis\nso small\na part of\n' the total Defense picture that\nit cannot\nget the attention\nI think\nit deserves.\nTogether these facts mean thet, under present\n)\narrangements, unless a DCI and a Secretary of Defense see things the same way, the former is not going to be able to do his job.\n\nThere are several other topics which must be addressed in any study of Intelligence Community\n\"management that seem to me not fully treated in this report.\n\na.\nI have noted the importance\nto the DCI\n.\nof\nan independent. analytic capability.\nThis\nis crucial\nto\nan understanding\nof the DCI's role.\nWithout\nit,\nno matter what the DCI's paper independence,\nhe\nis\nthe prisoner\nof departmental\n_analysis.\nWith\nit,\nhe can challenge long-.\nstanding departmental positions\nand stimulate\n_new attacks\non stubborn problems.\nb.\nThe paper gives insufficient emphasis\nto the importance\nof an authoritative\nand informed\nfocus\nin the Executive\nfor preparing the intelligence program and defending the budget before\ncongress.\n\n.Congress is mbving aggressively toward assuming what are essentially management functicns\n\" over intelligence programs.\n\nThis trend can only be reversed if the congressional members of the oversight committees develop confidence in the Executive both with respect to the intelligence\n-\nprogram and the execution of its budget.\n\nC.\n\nThe document does not discuss the importance of maintaining an independent and innovative capability for developing technology and applying this technology to technical collection programs.\n\nthis background, my reaction to the options Against developed by the Study Group papex is that they get ahead of the problem by being too specific on complicated issues.\n\nThe fact is we are not yet ready to ask the president to make a definitive choice on a future intelligence structure.\n\nThere is no\n\"\"one\"\nsolution to the problems that face us, and every change in one\n:\nfunction has repercussions in others that may be impossible to foresee.\n\nThe Study Group's options will be extremely useful in illustrating for the pPresident the range of choice, but should not be used as a basis for decision.\n\nIn my view, we should use them to seek from the President a general indication of the direction in which he wants to move.\n\nOn that basis we can then set in motion detailed studies of the conseguences that will ensue from a given choice, and can present for him in some detail the choices he has in reaching that goal.\n\nptions themselves are derived My comments on the\n0]\nated above.\n\nby testing them against the principles st By that standard:\n:\n\n--Option\n1, which centralizes control of\nnational systems under\na DCI,\ncannot meet\nDefense's legitimate requirements.\n--Option\n3 effectively destroys\nthe DCI's\npresent limited authority,\nand thereby\nmakes\nit impossible\nfor him to be\nan\neffective advocate\nof independent intelligence positions\nat the NSC level.\n--Options\n2 and\n4 would appear compatible\n*\nwith the principles\nstated.\nOption\n2\nin\nits present form has serious workability\nproblems\nbut goes\nas\nfar\nas\nI think we\ncan\ngo\nin strengthening the DCI relative\nto\nDefense.\nOption\n4 does not have these\nproblems but,\nas\nit stands,\nleaves\nthe\nbasic problems\nof management and resource\nallocation about where they are now.\nThe first question that the President must decide is whether major change in intelligence organization is a goal to. be sought this year.\n\nCongress appears to be moving in this direction, but I doubt that the disruption of our effort that would result from major reorganization would be repaid by the results.\n\nI would\n- propose instead to take the initiative by moving to achieve better management of the Community in a way that will not regquire lengthy Congressional debate.\n\nOption\n4 provides a basis for such a move, but I\nbelieve it is somewhat too weak for the purpose.\n\n'For this reason I suggest a stronger modification.\n\nThis proposal, Attachment A, differs from Option\n4 more in intent than in substance.\n\nIt is specifically aimed at reaching the kind of DCI-SechDef relationship that I believe essential, but without the traumatic change in bureaucratic equities required by Option\n2.\n\n(bn the other hand, it gives no additional muscle to the DCI).\n\nIt provides a central mechanism for managing the Community, and it makes a clearer distinction between resource issues, where the DCI\nis at best first among egquals, and substantive issues, where he is and should be a great deal more.\n\nI think it offers promise for real progress with a minimum of disruption.\n\n.\n\nWhile it is true, as the Study Group emphasizes, -\nthat Option\n4\n(or the attached modification)\ncould be carried out by administrative rather than legislative action, I believe that strong confirmatory legislation will eventually be required if the recommended changes are to endure.\n\nThe authorities and responsibilities\n\nof our complex Intelligence Community should not be\nleft\nto bureaucratic conflict and changes\nin Administration.\n~\nExecutive\naction\ncould start\nus\non\nour way\nto\nthe\nchanges\nwe think essential,\nbut the ambiguities.\nof the existent\nstatutes must\nbe corrected\nif there\nis\nto be any degree\nof stability\nin\nthe new organizational arrangements,\nand\nif the Congress\nis\nto stand behind them.\nAll of the above is predicated on a decision by the President to avoid major change this year.\n\nIf, however, the President feels that a major reorganization is required, then I believe we should look to some form of Option\n2.\n\nI believe it provides a tentative basis for planning a proposal, primarily because it seeks a solution to the central DCI-SecDef problem.\n\nShould the President go that route I would recommend that he give the departments and agencies time to consider the detailed consequences of the Option\n2 approach before finally committing himself to it.\n\nSincerely, Attachments:\nAttachment A\nAttachment B\ntion\n4, Modified = \"Collective Mana 'ement\"\"\no\n\n## Rationale\n\nThis Option starts from the premise that stronger management of the Intelligence Community is highly des1rable, but that the balance of interests reflected in the present structure is a realistic one and should be maintained.\n\nIt presents a concept for achlev1ng a degree of collective management while preserving\n\n)\npresent organizational relationships.\nIt requires\na\n- minimum of leglslatlve change.\n'\n\n## Summary Description\n\n:\nThe DCI would continue\nto\nbe advisor\nto the\nPresident,\ncoordinator\nof\nthe Community,\nand Director\nof CIA.\nThe present structure\nof Committees\nand Boards:\nwould\nbe consolidated into\ntwo,\nboth chaired by the DCI:\nan Executive Committee\nof\nthe NSC\nfor Intelligence\nat\nthe deputy secretary level,\nresponsible\nfor all Community\nmanagement and policy matters,\nand\na National Intelligence\n\"Board\nat the present USIB Principals\nlevel,\nrespon51ble\nfor substantive production.\nTo enable the DCI to give\n. more attentiom\nto his Community respons;bllltles\nhe would\nbe provided with\na second deputy.\n\n## Primary Changes And Effects _The Dci's Respodsibilities\n\nThe DCI would be the pPresident's chief intelligence advisor, and would remain pirector of CIA.\n\nWith a view to raising thee stature of the job, consideration should He would be be given to granting him Cabinet rank.\n\nfor the coordination of\n- responsible, under the NSC, national intelligence policy and for the production of national intelligence.\n\nA clear distinction would be made, however, between his Community and CIA roles.\n\n\" 7To this end, he would be provided with an additional Deputy, appointed by the President and confirmed by Congress.\n\nThe present Deputy would be specifically responsible for managing the Agency under the DCI;\nthe other Deputy would be responsible under the DCI for\n'\ncoordination of the community.\n\nThe DCI would have an Agency office at Langley and a Community office downtown, where his Community Deputy would be located.\n\n## Coordination Of National Intelligehce\n\nThe present struct would be rationalized, ure of boards and committees on the basic principle that policy and resource matters requiring a balancing of departmental interests would be considered collectively by the senior officers controlling the assets and resources concerned.\n\nA separate forum would be provided for substantive intelligence issues, on the grounds\n- that these are inappropriate for policy officers to adjudicate and that departmental interests are protected by the right of dissent.\n\n## Policy And Resources\n\n. For the first of these purposes the DCI would chair an NSC Executive Committee for Intelligence, taries of State and Defense as members.\n\n. with Deputy Secre\nThe committee would have under control of its members all important intelligence assets, and would act as a board of directors for national intelligence.\n\nEXCOM(I)\n\n\"\nyould absorb\nthe functions\nof NSCIC,\nEXCOM\n(NRO plus\nfor NSA),\nIRAC,\nand USIB\nsevseevosssrevse\nequivalent responsibilities\n(except national intelligence production)\n.\n\n...... '------------.ooo.-o-o..---c...-on.-a--oo-.\n. 'e\n---_;-.----......---.-f..oo-..---.-..a.-...-.--..--o-'-.or-\nR\nR\nR\nR\nN\nAR\nR\nR\nR\nAN\nR AR\n@\n8\n6 8680000000800 0000080000000 00TRCCIRNTERERE\nRS M\nT\nssesesccsca\n\nThe DCI's Community Deputy would be his alternate in EXCOM(I)\nbut would not sexrve as Chairman in his absence.\n\nThe IC Staff would be the secretariat of EXCOM(I).\n\nThe DCI would carry out his existing responsi i NFIP\n(less its tactical and departmental components)\nwith the assistance of the Committee.\n\nEXCOM(I}\nwould have approval authority for the NFIP\n(CIAP, NRP, CCP,\n).\n\nand its decisions would\n.and some elements of the GDIP\nve administrative and resource be binding.\n\nThe DCI would ha authority only over CIA.\n\npresent administrative arrangements for the NRP and CCP would be preserved.\n\n## Production Of National Intelligence\n\nUSIB would be reconstituted as a National Intelligence Board, limited by charter to substantive matters, and advisory to the DCI.\n\nThe NIO's would act as the DCI's staff for the NIB.\n\nThe Board would be chaired by the DCI, with his Agency Deputy as CIA member.\n\nThe latter would serve as Chairman in his absence.\n\n## Coverfi Action\n\nThe DCI would be a me\n\" pot its Chairman, with his mber of the\n40 Committee, but Agency Deputy as alternate.\n\nt action would remain present arrangements.\n\nclandestine cellection and cover assigned to CIA, without change in\n\n## Oversight\n\n_.Without administrative authority over the Community, it would be inappropriate for the DCI\nto have an IG\n:esponsibility except over CIA.\n\nThis Option assumes Executive oversight at the NSC or White House level.\n\n## Congress\n\nhe Community spokesman The DCI would continue to be t\n.to Congress.\n\n## Nationel/Tactical Problems\n\nEXCOM(I)})\nwould ha ndle matters relating to the actical and national intelligence.\n\nresponsibility for the tactical\n the military services.\n\n~ relationship between\nt\nThe DCI would have\nno\nintelligence budgets\no\n\n## \"Abuses\" A, 1. Guidelines On Propriety\n\nAn Executive Order which promulgates a code of standards for the conduct of intelligence activities, as proposed, could serve constructive purposes, both internally and publicly.\n\n## .2. Executive Branch Oversight\n\na.\nI have already taken steps\nto strengthen\nthe CIA Inspector-General,\nin accordance with the\nRockefeller Commission recommendations.\nAs\nto\na Community-wide\nIG,\nthis should depend on the\n- degree\nof authority vested\nin the DCI.\nUnder\nOption\n1\nhe could exercise this responsibility.\nUnder Option\n2,\n3,\nand\n4\nhe clearly could not.\nb.\n\nI believe that the current efforts of.\n\nthe Congress and the changed attitudes of the Executive will provide more than enough oversight over the Community.\n\nThe. problem of the future may be to protect the Community from being so\n_over-overseen as to be hamstrung.\n\nIf, however,\n\" the President feels that an additional body is needed, then I would only urge that this be made a responsibility of the National Security Council Intelllgence Committee or of the PFIAB.\n\nMy preferred course is Option\n4 Modified, which would change markedly the character of NSCIC.\n\nMoreover, the missions of preventing abuses and improving product do not mix well.\n\nAs to PFIAB, I have the same problem of mixing imcompatible functions.\n\nDespite the findings of the Rockefeller and Murphy Commissions, it is doubtful that a part-time Board, even with a greatly expanded permanent staff, could effectlvely\n\"engage this problem.\n\n3.\nIntEliigence policy coordination\n.\nS\nIntelligence policy coordination should follow\n'\nthe same lines as Executive oversight, in view of integrating domestic, the NSC's statutory duty of int i i relating to national\n-\nforeign, and military policies be made through the i This suggests_that whatever new coordination\n+t be invo d if needed.\n\nA\nto the president for this jsable.\n\nOn the lyved in matters It is unfortunate that the Study Group's charter did not extend to counter=\n\"intelligence., because it is here that the problem of i i is thorniest.\n\nintelligence po\n\n4.\nThe\n40 committee\nI believe the\n40 Commitfiee\n\nand strengthened to provide policy approval for covert action.\n\nB.\nTntelligence Community T.eadership\no\n-\nA\ni ained in my basic e matters is cont i\n4 appended thereto.\n\nThe t only other comment I have is that I strongly suppor up's.recommen dation that the DCI be relieved ibili r the tactical intelligence\n1971, This is the DCI should pbe re budget assigne presidential Letter of an unworkable arrangement.\n\nI believe g the integration sponsible for ensurin of tactical and national systems* but that the armed services should proposer defend, and execute their own pudgets for their own tactical intelligence requirements.\n\n-\nIncluding the responsibility to avoid duplication of national capabilities jn tactical systems.\n\n## C. Covert Action\n\nI believe it essential that responsibility for covert., action remain in CIA and remain an integral function of A\nCIA's Clandestine Service.\n\nFor the reasons stated in the Study Group report, separation of clandestine collection and covert action is a recipe for operational disaster.\n\n## D. Management Imgrovements 1. Budgetary And Fiscal Controls\n\na.\nAs\nI have\nstated on numerous occasions,\nI\nam\nopposed\nto the publication of\nany U.S.\nintelligence\n.\nbudget figures.\nI recognize,\nhowever,\nthere\nis need\n. t0 improve the flow\nof budget information to those\nmembers\nthe Congress selects\nto review the intelli-\n~gence budget,\nunder appropriate security safeguards.\nb.\nI believe that additional controls by OMB,\nparticularly on reprogramming,\nwould\nserve no purpose\nwhatever\nin preventing\n\"szbuses\"\nor reassuring\n.the\npublic.\nRather,\nthey would further reduce the ability\n.\nof US intelligence\nto respond\nto new challenges.\nIf\nthe purpose\nis better intelligence,\nwe are already\n~going\nin\nthee wrong direction.\nIn the past flexibility\nin intelligence budget execution has been provided\nprimarily through informal understandings between\nthe Executive and key congressmen and senators.\nChanges\nin Congress have largely negated this\nflexibility and no adequate alternatives have\n.been developed.\nIt\nis particularly important that\nthe intelligence budget not be subjected\nto\nall\nDefense appropriation expenditure rules.\nThe FY-76\nAppropriation Bill contains language moving\nstrongly\nin that direction.\nI believe what\nis needed\nis\nlegislaticn establishing rules unigquely tailored\nto intelligence programs.\n\n## 2.  Miscellaneous\n\na.\n\nIn regard to compartmentation, I would note that there is no barrier to provision of any intelli-\n~gence to the senior consumer who really needs to know.\n\nThe problem is somewhat more complicated, and I have a study in progress on how to simplify and rationalize the present system.\n\n.\n\nb.\nThe Study's comments\non consumer interaction with the Intelligence Community and needed\nimprovements are valid.\nc.\nWith respect\nto\na Performance Evaluation\nSystem,\nwe are continuing\nto develop such\na\nsystem,\nwith the advice and cocperation\nof USIB\nand IRAC,\nthrough the mechanisms\nof\nthe Key Intelligence\nQuestion Evaluation Program.\nd.\nI would put rather more strongly the\nneed for\nthe NSC\nto address\nthe problem of\ncover\nfor CIA abroad.\nWithout adequate cover,'\npious affirmations\nof\nthe value of clandestine\ncollection have\nno meaning.\n- e..\nLastly,\nalthough\nit does not fall within\nthe -strict definition\nof the Study Group's respon-\n_ sibility,\nI would note yet again the necessity for\n_better legislation\nto protect intelligence\nsources\nand methodsq_\nTo:\nJames T.\n\nLynn\n:\nOMB\n-\n~ From:\nJoseph J.\n\nSisce%(p Subject:\nPreliminary Comments on Draft Report to the President on Organization and Management of the Foreign Intelligence Community We have reviewed the final draft of the Intelligence Organization Group's\n(IOG)\nstudy of possible future reor-\nS\nganization of the Intelligence Community.\n\nAs your staff\n(\n)\nknows, the State Department has commented in detall at\n-\n:\n'\neach stage in the study's development.\n\nSecretary Kissinger has been abroad and will have had no opportunity to review the report and familiarize himself with the issues it poses prior to the noon deadline December\n18.\n\nTherefore, I\nam sure you will understand why the Department's comments on each of the specific issues could only be tentative and preliminary at this stage.\n\nWe believe that this report does a good job in raising and presenting the fundamental issues that have to be faced in any consideration of the future organization of the US\nGovernment's intelligence effort..\n\nIt will provide a good basis for inter-Departmental discussion.\n\nHowever, because any decisions taken could set the shape of the Community for many years and would have potentially major foreign policy implications, we believe that time must now be allowed for discussion at an inter-\nDepartmental high level before the formulation of final Departmental views and specific recommendations for decision to the President.\n\nWe intend to suggest this approach to the Secretary.\n\nIt seems to us that handling of the report now that it has been completed could well be discussed in an appropriate Cabinet-level forum as soon as the report\n\" is turned over to it.\n\ne\n-\n)\n\n## Withdrawal Sheet (Presidential Libraries)\n\n{A)\nClosed by Executive Order 12356\" governing access to national security infarmation,\n{B)\nClosed by statute or by the agency which originated the document.\n\n(C)\nClosed in accordance with restrictions contained in the donor's deed of gift.\n\nRccqnuncminlr'on' (3)\nY\na. The functions of the President's Foreign Intellizence Advisory Board should be expanded fo include oversight of the CIA.\n\nThis expanded oversight board should be composed of distinguished citizens with varying backgrounds and experience.\n\nIt should be headed by a full-time chairman and should have a full-\n1iime sfafl appropriate fo its role. Its functions related to the CIA\nshould include:,\n\n1. Assessing compliance, by the CIA with\nits statutory\n\" authority.\n\n2, Assessing the quality of foreign intelligence collection.\n3.\nAssessing the quality of foreign intelligence estimates.\n4. Assessing\nthe qualily\nof the organization\nof the CIA.\n5. Assessing the quality\nof the management\nof the CIA.\nG. Making recommendations with respect to the above subjeets\n1o the President and ihe Direcior of Central\nIntelligence, and, where appropriate, the Aitoiney General.\nb. The Board should have access to all information in the CIA.\n\nIt should be authorized to audit and inv c<t:~1.e CIA expenditures and activities on its own initjative.\n\n*c. The Inspector General of tlie ClA should be 'mlhoxucd 1o report direcily to the Doard, after having notified the Director of Central Intelligence, in cases he deems appropriate.\n\n## \" Treasury Ccoents On Recomyendation (5)\n\nI think that it is very important thet the President's Foreign Intelligence Adnsory Board be strengthened by mcreasmg\n1ts responsibilities and assuring that its membership haes a 'broad base of public representation.\n\nAn Advisory Board consisting of citizens of great distinetion and leaders of demonstrated integrity can be very effective in assuring the President, the Congress, end the .public of the intggrity, as well as the quality, of our intelligence operations.\n\nIt is important. that all of the members of the Advisory Board have the personal trust and coni'iience of the President.\n\nThe Chairman of vthe Board should be a person of publicly demonstrated leadership-and integrlty vho should have i'ree and dlrect access to the H'es:.dent to\n(h.scuss the Board's work.\n\nA man who best exemplifies the oual:.'bles I\nwotild like to see in a Chairman is George Shultz, 'who is elready a member of the Board.\n\nT recommend that you appoint him Chairman of the Advisory Board.\n\nThe Board is already carrying out certain of the responsibilities noted in the Commission report\n(e.g., 2ssessing the quality of foreign intelligence est:.mates)\n\"\nIn view of the additional responsi'bilities proposed, particularly with respect to FIAB's role in \"assessing compliance by the CIA with statutory authority\", we would suggest that itwould be appropriate for the Board to meet more frequently than it has in the past.\n\n'More importantly, I believe thet it is essential thet the Board's\n' oversight'responsibilifies be perceived by the public as an ongoing and regulsr review process.\n\nThis can best be accomplished, in my view, by going a step further than is proposed in the Cormission's recommendation.\n\nSection\n\"C\" i;:oposes that the Inspector General of the CIA\nbe suthorized to report directly to the FIAB after notifying\n'the Director of Central Intelligence in cases he deems appropriete.\n\nI suggest that\n\nthe reporting relation between the Inspector General and the Board be\n\"strengthened and formalized.\n\nI also believe that an important working\n\nrelationship should be developed between the FIAB and the CIA General\nCounsel, as the latter position is proposed to be restructured (see Recommendation 10).\n\nThe . General Counsel and Inspector General would v_each appear per-\n\n-\nsonally, outside\nof the presence 'of other CIA officials, before the\nFIAB to report on the sufficiency\nof the agency's compliance efforts\nany CIA activities that either official viewed as beyond the agency's\ncharter.\nOf course,\nthe Board would conduct such other inquiries\nas\nit deemed appropriate to satisfy itself of the propriety and effective-\n-\npess\nof CIA operations.\nIf, after its review, the Poard had no reason to believe that the agehcy had violated its statutory authority, the Board would make public\n& written finding to that effect.\n\nAny shorteomings would be reported promptly to the President an4 the officials responsible for remedial action.\n\nThe Board should also establish procedures for effective follow-=up on the implementatiofi of its recommendations.\n\nA procedu.re such as that outlined above would serve to assure the\n_ public that adequate independent overs:.ght of CIA ectivities was tak:.ng\n:\n\"place, while limiting the risk tHat the agency's mission would be campromised through release of information about sensitive operations.\n\n\" Having the two senior CIA 6fficials responsible for monitori_.ng fihe agenc&\"s activities \\report to the FIAB would provide a us.eful external The fact that CIA\ncheck on Agency conduct that is not now availsble, operations would be subject to review by distinguished citizens who would be giving their public assu.rance' that\n'l_:iley were satisi'ied'a.s to tllne propr.iety of CIA activities would provide a significan;tv degree of accountability that is now absent.\n\nIn addition to providing an assurence to the American people that\n-\nthe CIA vas operating within the bounds of its authority, the Board would 'maintain its important role in reportingvto the President how effectively the CIA wfis carrying out its mission to render en assessment of the quality of the CIA's performance.\n\nAAs well as working through the Inspector General and General Counsel at CIA, the Board will have the res;mrces of other CIA components available to it and will continue to draw on the views .of othe;' depart-\n.\n\nThe Beard ments and agencies concerned with intelligence activities.\n\nwill also have the benefit of reports and recommendations mzde by the soint Congressional Comnittee.\n\nThus, it would be unnecessarily dupliperform investigatory functions, cative to build up & large staff to ould be nent staff or secretariat definitely wi altbough & small perme essential.\n\n# - Offire Of The Attomep Genrral Washington, B. . 20530 December 18, 1975\n\n## Memorandum For The President\n\nRe:\nOptions\nfor the President on Organization and Management\n.\nof the Foreign Intelligence Community\n.\nT\nam limiting my comments\nto those portions\nof the\noptions paper which are of principal concern\nto the Justice\nDepartment,\nnamely,\nthose relating\nto executive branch\noversight\nof intelligence operations\nand means\nof assuring\ncompliance with\nlaw.\nI may note,\nhowever,\nthat\nin deciding\nupon organizational issues affecting\nthe intelligence\ncommunity,\nyou should bear\nin mind that\nthe FBI, while\nengaged primarily\nin counterintelligence\nand\nlaw enforcement activities,\ndoes conduct certain foreign intelligence\n.\nactivities\n{e.g.; wiretapping within\nthe United States)\n. when specifically tasked to.do\nso by other agencies.\nI\nbelieve that\nall standardized wiretapping\nand other forms\nof electronic surveillance within the United States which.\nregularly require factual determinations bearing upon\nJawfulness under the Fourth Amendment should continue to\nbe performed by the FBI,\nunder the immediate supervision\nof &\nthe Attorney General,and that,as\nnew techniques\nare\n.\ndeveloped,\nthose that require similar factual determinations\nshould be treated\nin the\nsame fashion.\n.\nI, of course, support the proposal for detailed guidelines governing intelligence-gathering activities here and abroad, and governing the conduct of covert operations.\n\nI presume that the Attorney General would have a major part in the development of those guidelines.\n\nHe can only be assured, however, that they reach all aspects of activity which should be covered if the Department is proximately involved in the continuing oversight of the intelligence community, as discussed below.\n\nFor example, I think it important that the guidelines address each individual type of electronic surveillance now conducted and that they forbid the use of any new types until they are reviewed and included.\n\nBut there may be other issues and practices which should be looked. at.\n\nS\n. Concerning oversight arrangements:\nOn the basis of our experience and practice within the Department of Justice, I believe it would be desirable to establish B\n_ both agency. inspector generals and a similar official\n- for the entire community.\n\nThe latter would be responsible for reviewing practices of the agency-inspecting units, thereby assuring development of community-wide standards and practices without the necessity of creating a massive office.\n\nThe community-wide inspector -general would also-:\nconduct specific. investigations when it is believed an.\n\nagency unit is unable to act forcefully.\n\nI think it important that inspector generals at every level be required to consult with the Attorney General whenever they have information concerning impropriety which may rise to the level of criminal violations and whenever they have reason to believe that the guidelines for the conduct of intelligence gathering and covert action programs have been violated.\n\nL\nAs for oversight from outside the intelligence community:\nI think the concept of a special counsel to the President concerning intelligence community abuses is radically unsound.\n\nBoth the Attorney General and the S\nPresident would be placed in intolerable positions if action approved by the special counsel were subsequently found by the Attorney General to be in violation of law.\n\n\"\nA government-wide inspector general raises\nthe\nsame problem\nto\na certain degree,\nand\na special Justice Department\nstaff unit\nseems\nto me unnecessary\nand unrealistic.\nIf\nthe guidelines\nare developed\nas discussed above,\nand\na\ncommunity inspector general\nsystem which reports violations\nto the Attorney General\nis estahlished,\nit seems\nto me\nno\nmore\nis needed than the cross-check\nof Attorney General\nmembership\non the National Security Council\nand Justice\nDepartment participation\nin the appropriate NSC committees,\nincluding the Forty Committee.\n.\n\nThe Attorney Genqgal ought\nto be\nin\na position\n#5 sothat ho-cas raise\nam erewm& about practices which those\nintimately\nengaged;may not think\nto raise\nor which the\n,/\"\"IHESEEEBEXEEEg?givgight not raise.\nThus,\nwhile there are\n_Innegfirwg\nobvious arguments\nin favor\nof protecting\nthe Attorney\nLd%d%H\nGeneral,\nI\nthink\nit\nis\nimportant\nthat\nthe Attorney General\n\n.\nbe\na member\nof\nthe relevant committees which will indicate\nthe policy decisions\nand practices.\nA fairly good example\nwould\nbe\nthe\nuse\nof United States corporations\nin\nsuch\na\nway\nas\nto raise problems with domestic\nlaw where\nit may be\nimportant\nto\nfind appropriate legal solutions.\nThis\nwas something which should have been alerted.\n(Hindsight\ni\nis easy,\nof course.)\nBut there are other circumstances\nrecounted\nin\nthe Rockefeller Commission report.\nDTS\n\n## 5 1 Appendix 2 - Index\n\nSix Summary Legal\nIssue Papers\nDraft Executive Order Imposing Restrictions\npraft Restrictions Order Fact Sheet\nSummary of Agency Comments on Restrictions Order\n)\n\n## Legal Issues\n\nAttached are summaries of six legal issue papers relating to intelligence activities.\n\nThese papers do not represent the official views of the Justice Department nor of any other department.\n\nShould you desire more authoritative views on any of these issues, opinions of the Attorney General on desired subjects will be obtained.\n\nThe topics covered in these papers include:\n\n1.\nIntelligence Activities\nand Individual Rights\n2.\nStatutory Charters\nfor Intelligence Organizations\nand Functions\nSeparation\nof Powers\nand Congressional Oversight\nover Foreien Intelligence Functions\nThe Constitutional, Statutory and Legal Basis for Covert Action Secrecy and Protection of Intelligence Sources and Methods Legal Issues Related to Classified Intelligence Budgets\n\n## Intelligence Activities An'].Da].Ndiv'Ij.Dual Rights -- Summary\n\n'1..\nCc>'n\"s;ituti'ona1 and legal eirbblems p{fesented by ix-fi:elligex;xce;\ngafhering activities..\nA.vEle'ctronic surveillance\n-\nTitle IT of the Omnibus Crime\n. .Contr.ol ax;d Safe Streets Act e_s,teblishee\na defailed_ prqcedure for\ninter;:eption of wire and ora;.l coxm'.nunica-tions; within the_ Um\".ted States,\nihcluding:a judicial warrant requiremefit applicable,\nin general,\nto\ncriminal investigations.\nThe Title containsv'a proviso,' .howeve'r,\nstating\nthat it was not intended to limit the President's power in the national\nsecw;lrity, and foreign intelligence area.\n;I'flue sur.veillance in this area\nis go'verned only by constitutional restriction.\nThe present s'tate of the\nlaw is as follows:\n1. Under the Supreme Court's 1972 Keith-decision, domestic security\n.-\nsurveillances not involving the actifvities of foreign powers and their agents;\nrequire a judicial warrant.\n\n.2. 'Under two court of appeals decisiqns -- Brown and Butenko, glectronic surveillance for foreign intelligence and counterintelligence\n-\n.\n\npurposes is lawful under the Fourth Amendment, even.in the absence of\n-\n\n.\ne_ warrant,\na.t least .;Whez._'e the target bf the -surveilla.h_ce is an agent\nor collabo'rator 'of a foreign po&er.\n'\n\" Under a Decemb'er 1974, P.:_r:esidential mefilorandum,\n) the Attorney General is vested with authority to ap.p.rove warrantless Ielectr'onic\n. 'surveillance within the United States for forei_gp inf:elligence and couni;erv blinte]l_igenc':e purposes.\n\nBoth the Department of Defe_n_se and the CIA_\nconduct electronic $urveiliance for s@ch purboses abroad.\n\nThe surveillance oeerations of the NSA present somt; probleme @der the Brown and\n\nButenko decisions because it may be prat.:tica]ly impossible to limit intex:cepi:s to foreign intelligence inforxfiation.\n\nBroadly sp;aking, all of these operations are probably iegal under current law, but the special NSA 'probleme are now, at the Pr;sident's direction,' the subject of study by the Justice Department., B. Surreptitious Entrx;\n.Surrepl.:itious entries are pres@ably-\n.\n\n\" subject to the 'same 4th amendment rules e.s e;.ectronic su;'veillahce, incl'uding ffie Brown-Butenko exception to the warrant requirement, The Attorney Geheral presently.has authority, under Presidential directive, to authorize surreptitious -.e'ntry_ to inst_a].l electronic sfir\\%efllanfie for forei'gn intelligence .purposes; no Presidential directive authorizes surreptitious entry for any reason other than electronic surveillance,\n. C. Mail Covers and Openings. . Mail covers -~ the recording of\n.\n\n. infermation on the outside of mail -- is not subject to Fourth Amendment restrictions.\n\nIt is, however, governed byvposta.l regulations that do not clearly 'specify!.v;hich agencies may request covers and for what purposes.\n\nMail opening is 'irnpermi-ssible under the Fourth Amendment without warrant, but again this is probably subject to the Brown/Butenko\n.exception for foreign intelligence and cou.nferintelligence.\n\nStatutes, however, prohibit mail op'enings without warrant, and violations are\n\" subject to criminal penalty.\n\nD. Other investigative techniques, such as use of informers, secret agents, physical surveillance and interrogations do not violate the Fourth Amendment or any statute.\n\nIt is conceivable, however, that if they are not justified by legitimate governmental purposes they may, in some circumstances, violate First Amendment rights.\n\n## 2. :Constitutional And Legal Problems Relating To Information Dissemination And Use.\n\nDissemination of information obtained through intelligence investigations for partisan or otherwise illegitimate purposes could violate First Amendment or due process rights.\n\nThe recenfly enacted Privacy Act precludes all disclosure of agency records without o consent except under certain limited circuinstances.\n\n## S Etatutorz Charters For : Intelligence Organizations And Functions I. Identification Of Issues\n\nThenzlnajor organizations, responeibilities, a;.nd functions of the\n-IQtellieence Co@upity\n- with few exc'eptions - are not vderived from stetute; they z;re largely based on b.road 'execut:.ive authority of the President for the eondfict of foreign affairs and the command of the armed services, a.nd\n- to some extenff\n- on tl'_xe broad efithorities of the Direct.or of Central Intelh;..gence (DCI) and the Secretary of Defense to conduct th.e oper'at;lon of their agencies.\n\nOniy the correl,ation/eval.uation (or production) and coordination functions of the DCI/CIA are specifically recognized in statute;\nthere are no similar statutory provisions for the conduct of overhead reconnaissance, clandestine human source collection, courterintelligence, electronic intercept, or cove;t action.\n\nIn terms of organization, only\n.CIA has a specific statutorvy basis.\n\nThere are no specific statutes establishing the National Security 'Agency (NSA), the Defense Intelligence':-.\n\nAgency (DI;A), the National Reconnaissance Office .(NR.O), the FBI, the Service Cryptologic Agencies (SCAS), or ether Service military intelligence entities.\n\nSome of the functional ana o:rga.niza.tional arrangements are recognized in NSC intelligence directives, other Presidential directives, DCI directives, DOD directives, or Service or JCS directi;les; some\n- the\n. NRO, for example\n- rest.on ho formal directive, but on informal, written interagency agreements.\n\nAlmost all of these directives/memoranda\n)\nare, of course, elassifieci._\n- vThe absence of sl:;:utory_or ad:n';nistrafiive documents regarding these\n-\norganizations, their functions', and the reseon-sibi-lities gives rise to three major legal/policy issues:\n\n(1).Would specific or more expiicit public recognifion\n- in statute,\nexecutive order,\nor other docfiment\n- of the functions and\norganizations impreve their acti\\r.ities or 51: least make them.more.\nrespect'ablc.e in the public eye?\n(2) Should this official and public recogni-tion include prohibitions\n-\nor limijtations on the activities of these ;arganizati;xis that would\nprovide\na greater degree of public confidence in their lawfulness?\n(3)' Would a variety of critical funct_ions now performed by the\n_ Intelligence Community (such as covert action,\nelectronic\nintercept,\ncounterintelligence,\nprotection of sources and methods,\netc. ) be more defensible legally and politically, arouse less\nflsuspicion,\nand be more efi_'.ecbti. el.y performed if officially\nand publicly recognized?\nSince the more specific functions mentioned in #\n3 above are addressed in separate papers\n-in detail, no specific effort is made to cover them further in this paper.\n\n## Ii. Factual Background And Legal Discussion A, _Present System Of Organizational And Functional Assignments And Limitations - .\n\nThe spegific statufes dea}ing w1th the organiza:tion an& the functions of the Intelligence Com.rn_unity.are the 'N'atic.mal Security Act of 1947\nand the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949.\n\n.These statutes serve as th'e.orga.nic acts by which the CIA was established and is cuz;rently administered.\n\nThgre are no sinxilarbstatutes fof any o.ther intelligent;e ag.ency,. and the baeis for their creation and current .operations is heavily dependent on the broad executive responsibility of (1) the President, forthe condu;:t of foreign affa;re, as head of the National Security Council,\n5nd as Cornrnan'der in Chief; (2) the DCI, in his role .as.coordinator of intelligence activities; (3) the. Secretary\n('J.f Defense as head of the Department\n-_of Defensg'; and (4) the. seearate Military Departments, the Attorney General\n, and other department or agencfy heads.\n\n\"\nThe major current organizafional/functional'assign.r_nents and their legal bases are as follows:\n\n(1)\nDCI/CIA\n-\n. Tfie stat'utes noted above providve specifically for the\n'\n.CIA functions of advising the NSC on intelligence m;.tters,\ncoordinating. intelligence activities,\nand correlating end evaluafine\nIintelligence; in addition, these statutes provide that CIA will perform\n\"such' additional services of common concern! an& \"such other functions\nand duties related to inte].ligex.lce'.i.\nas the NSC directs.\nIn a series\nof'\n.\nspecific elassitfied ifisuances {NSC iu-';elligegce directives);- the I'\\ISC\ni1as directed DCI/CIA to assume,\namong other _dl;.ties,\ncertain\nresponsibilities for coordinating production,\nestaf)lishing requirements,\nconducting clandestine human source collection, interpreting photography\nand accomplishing some overt collection both overseas and in the U.S.\n Certain other current\nCIA functions\n- for example,\nsatellite collection,\ncommunication support operations,\nand covert action -'are not\nspecificelly covered in this series of directives,\nbut have been\n'estabfisiled and conducted by.CIA'.unde;' less formal Presidential/NSC\nissuances and the broad authorities implicit in the 1947 and 1949 acts.\nThe 1947 sAta'tute also pr'o{ride's'specific lfifiit#tion ovvq'the intelligence\n:\n) figtivitiesv 'of CIA,\nfiamel;vr that CIA has \"no eelice,\nsubpoena,\nlaw\nenfdrcement,\nor internal secui'ity functions, .\no\nSy\n)\n.\n2) E_e\n-\nNSA'S cu-ri:_ent intell_igenc.e functions\n- intercept and\npi'oc'ese'ing Sf for;'eign comxfihnicat;one\n- were .assigned by Presidential\nmemor.andun\"l in 1952 a.nd ieflected in an NSC intelligence directive\nat that time.\nAlthqugh'th'e use of NSC inte_lligen.c;e .directi\\}es (NSCIDS)\nhad ereviously been used prima:l;ily to assigfi functions to an existing\norganization (CIA), this NSCID directed the Sec;'etary of Defense to\na;:t as executive agent of the goveinment 'for the condfiet of ;:h:ese\nactivities and to gstablish NSA as\na separate agency to eonduct these\nfunctions.\n.The existence of NSA and the legitimacy of ifs activities\nhave apparently been recognized by Congress in certain statutes relating\nfo the protection of communication. intelligence information,\nthe\n)\nCo.nstitutional power of the President to conduct elecfronic; sur;reilla.nce\nfor foreign intelligence purposes,\nand the need to provide special\n- administrative powers to NSA relating to employment.\n(35 fiafional Pro'gra';r.l's. (NRQ)\n- The 'ffir.xcfion of this pj;'ogra'.m (satellite\n'vreconnvai.s'eance) and the existence of the NRO\" orgafiization are\nofficially cla'seified;. as a re;ult,\nneither the'functi_on nor the\norgah_ization h;;a specific statutory basis.\nThe NRO was e'st'ablis.hed\nas\ne 'se'pa:rate Defense agency r'eporting to the ASecretary -of Defense\nby DOD-CIA Iagreement in 1965. ..The Secrefary of Defense,\nof\n'co;u'se,\nfxas brea& authority under the N#tionel Security Act of 1947\nand the Defense Reorganization Act of 1958 to control and reorganize\n_ Defense activitie.s..\n(4) Ql_e\n-\nDIA was established in 1961 by direction; of the Secretary of\nDefense under the reorganization ep.thority granted by the Dgfense\n\nReorganization Act of 1953.\nThe Secretary'e plah was reported to the\nArmed Services Committee as reqfiired by statute and- DIA was\nsu'bsequently established.\n(5) FBI\n- There is no statute establishing the FBI.\nUnder provision\nof 28 U.S.C. 533,\nthe Attorney Gefieral may appoint officials\n\"(lj to detect and prosvecute cri;'nes against the United State's,\n(2) to\n~\nassist in the.p'rotection of the President,\nand (3) to condfict such\ninvestigations regarding official metters unde'r ie control of the\nDepartment of Justice\nand the Department of State as may be directed\nby the Attorney General. !\n\nOther statutes, such as the'COngressienal Aseassination, Kidnapping and Assault Act, vest in the Bureau special resbonsibilities, but its prixicipal investigatory authorities appear to o\n)\n.\n\n\nrest upon Executive Order and Presidential statements or directives plaeing these responsibilities on the Bureau.\n\n(6) Service Cryptologic Agencies\n(SCAs)/Military\nIntelligence\nAgencies\n- The SCAs predated the establishment of NSA and now -\n\" operate under the direction of NSA for their communications intercept missious..\n\nAll were established by the se;'vice chiefs of staff pursuant to the i)road functions' and duties assigned to the sgrvices by statute, The various military intelligence agencies, which perform a wide variety of intelligence functions, also were est#blish_ed pursuant to broad Service responsibilities.\n\n## B. Present State Of The Law\n\n(1)> Statutory Basis:\nExcept for the DCI/CIA,\nthere is\na notable\nabsence of specific stetutory bases for the organization of and functions. performed by the Infelligence Community, Almost all are derivative of broad executive authorities entrusted in the Pres.iczleri;:f;;\nthe DCI,\n>1v:;he Secfet_afy of D.efenge, van.d the miiitary services.\n\nIn almost ail cases, tfieee authorities\n-have been exercised through classified directives .and '_\nL\nPANY\n.\n\nmemo;'an&a.\n\nNonetheless,\n-a small group of senior Congressmen was privy to the besic orge'nization and function such that a budget process could be conducted.\n\nit is clear that the Congress did nof envision, either in. the establishment of CIA or in any specific subsequent legislation, the large, complex, and expensive-organizaticnal and functional arrangement that has come to pass.\n\nMore specifically, the aevelopment of CIA as a major element in.intelligence collection and covert action operations\n- as it nowis\n= does not-appear to\n-\nhave been contemplated by existing statutes, Similarly, the importance and growth of both communications intercept and satellite reconnaissance are reflected poorly or not at all in statute and have been treated so secretively that there is a subsfantial question that these organizations and functions are appropriately conducted,\n\n(2) Other Alfi:hofihes |\nThere ;appeara;. to .bveb.s.fifficientv\nAauthonty derivative from the constztutmna.l duties oi\nthe' President and the statutory responsibilities of the\nDCI, i:;xe Secretary of Defense, 'other department heads,\n_and the Services to prowde for a reasonable basis for\nthe current orgaxuzatmnal and functmna.l as. s1gmnents.\n.Clearly, the Congl.'ess - both by spec1f1c legislation\n.\nand through the annual appropriations process\n- has\nrecognized at least the major outlieee of cfirrent Inteuigence\nCommunity organizations and functions.\n(Only the NRO\nis devoid of any specific congressicnal recognition.)\nHowever, while certainly some key members of Congress were familiar with these aspects of intelligence activities, no continuing and explicit recognition is provided by an objective reading of congressional activities.\n\n(3) Limitations\n:\nWith the exceptien of specific limitations on\nCIA's internal security role contained in the National Security\nAct, there are no statutory restrictions or limitations\nspecifically\na.pplieabie' to the intelligence organizations and\n'the.ir ffinction;.\n\n;I'his lareely is tiae resfilt of the .al'us_ence of specific legislation covering these organizations an_d.\n\ntheil:,--f}mctions.\n\nNon-statutory limitations and restrictions are almost nbnexistent.excep!': in the form of internal agency\n.gm';delines.\n\n)\n\n(4j\nExceptions frofn Adminietratix;e Reguirements:\nMany\nstatutes\n- the CIA Act of 1949, the Classification Act, the CIA\nRetixement Act, and f':heb preyiously menfioned acts applicabie to NSA, for example\n- provide fqr spvecificv examptions. for intelligence agencies from otherwise standard administration procedures.\n\n## Loi. Options For Dealing With Intelligence Charters And Limitations\n\nThe options available for dealing with the absence of statutory charters for intelligence organizations and functions and of limitations on their activities are heavily dependent on political and policy considerations\n.as oppoeed to purely legal considerations.\n\n## A, Options For Charters/Functions -\n\n1.\nStatute-providing basic Qutline of intelligence agencies'\n' organization,: functions,\n'emd;activi'l':ies.\n-2,\nRevised stafite for CI.A with or Without 'Specific statutes\nfor,\nz);t least, NSA(an;i NRO,\n.\n3.\nSpecific, detailed stetfites for allbmajor elements\n- CIA,\nNSA, NRO,\nDIA, SCAs,\nBI,\nand some'}Service _entities.\n4.\nGeneric statute for basic functions and providi:zg-broad'\na.ufhority to President (or DCI or Secretary of Defense) to\nallocate functiofis subject to procedural approval.\n5.\nExecutive order(s),\nrather than statutes,\ncovering any\nof the above alternatives.\n6.\nStatus quo,\n\n## B Oe'Ti;O'N'S For Li;Nitations .\n\n1.\nGeneric statute providing for broad lirnitafions on\nforeign 'intelligence activities.\n2,\nSpecific stat?utes covering more sensitive aspects\n-\nelectronic intercept,\ndomestic activities,\ncovert action,\netc.\n'\n3,\nExecutive order(s),\nrather than statutes,\nproirid.ing for\nlimitations as above.\n4.\nRepealing some or all of existing statutory and/or\nadministrative exemptions.\n\n## Separation Of Powers And Congressional Oversight . Over Foreign Intelligence Functions\n\n\" The problem with 1egal-anaIysis in- this area is that the Constitutional text is not explicit, the court cases are few and far between, and the issues arise usually in o a political ragpgr than'leeal-context.\n\n.The most that legal ahalysis can hope for is to place pifameters around those areas within which political baftles'maf be~fought.\n\n'\n.\n\n\"Although the power of [Congress]\nto 1nvestlgate is\n-'broad, it is not unllmlted,\" Eastland v.\n\nUnited States Servicemen's Fund,\n421 US 491,\n504 n.15\n(1975).\n\n_As a practical matter,,hcwefier, Congrees can constitutionally'\n.infiestigafe intelligence agencies enq activities on a\n-\nvarIety of bases.\n\nPursuant to such an investigationCongress_\nma request or subpoena a v;riety of classified mateiial.\n\nWhile Congress may in its in?estigative role have a constitutional right to such material, the Executive hay\n.\n\nequell&bhave a constitutional rightftb'withhold it.\n\n- Milita;y and foreign affairs-sedrets have traditionally been among the materials for which executive privilege has been claimed, and substantial historical precedent supports the constitufiohality qf withhfilding fiuch information.\n\nIn Senate Select Committee v.\n\nNixon,\n498\nF.\n\n24\n729\n(D.C.\n\nCir.\n\n1974), a congressional demand for claimed executive material was denied by the court, .\n\nbut its decision cannot be read as much of a victory'for'\n- exeeutiwe privilege.\n\n.This is.epparehtly the ohly eourt eASe\n.tobdeal with a withholding from.bohgrees by the gxecutive.\n\nThus; while'executive.privilege may be.constitutionally based,\n1t is-unclear. what the content of that prlvilege 1s when confronted with another constltutlonal prerogative -~\nthat of Congress.\n\nto lnvestigate. Tradltlonally such constltutlonal confllcts between the Congress and the Executive have been polltlcally 'resolved, but the lncrea31ng use of the courts by Congress to enforce its percelved rlghts suggests that future confrontatlons over executive prlv1lege.may be put before the courts.\n\nThe resolution of suchO court test is uncertain, bgt wil; undoubtedly depend on the particular facts in the cases.\n\nv If a Congressiohalldemand for information is denied by the Executive and/or the courts, Congress still retains an extremely powerful lever for gaining that information\n-~\nnamely the threat not to legislate or appropriate as desired by the Executive.\n\nThis, of course, is totally a political\n'weapon.\n\nBeyond the questlon of merely gatherlng information is the substantial questlon of the limits, if any, to Congress'\npower to restrict forelgn intelligence procedures on activities by legisietion.\n\nAt the present time legislation only requires various reporting procedures, and does'not'otherwise limit\n'-foreign inteliigence activities outside the United States.\n\nTo an uncertain extent the President has inherent constitutional\n-'powers to gather forelgn 1ntelllgence which cannot be limited\n'by Congress.\n\n\" This would at the least 1nc1ude the President's and Ambassadors'\npersonal gatherlng of 1nformatlon.\n\nGenerally, however, lntelllgence gatherlng is done by agencies either created or funded by Congress or both.\n\n'Where Congress creates the agency, e.g., the CIA, there'is 1ittle cohstitutional basis.\n\nfor limiting Congress'\nablllty to restrict the m1551on, functlons, or procedures of that agency !\n\nOf course, Congress cannot act by unconstltutlonal means in maklng such restrictions, e.g., a one-house.veto.. Presumably, in the absence of statutory prohibiticns, the President may delegate to' subordinate officers of the Executive Branch his.inherent powers to gather foreign intelligence.\n\nBgcause these officers will usually have to operate through employees, however, whose existence arises through Congressional act rather than through Presidential appointment, llmltat;ons on the agency would\n'probably apply to those employees and bar activities incon-\n-\n:\nsistent Qith those limitations notwithstanding Presidential delegation.\n\nWhere Congress has not created an agency or place limita?\n\ntions on it, but rather only funds.the agency,\n.9., NSA, Congress. may limit'appropriations which have the effect of\n\" restricting intelligence activities..\n\nIn this area there is'\nno-constitutional requirement for Congress to appropriate at all, hence Congress may constitutionally limit its approprlatlons only to certaln act1v1ties and not to others.\n\n\"Congfess may, however, . instead of iimiting appfopriations,\n'condltlon their expendlture, e. g.r the Hughes Amendment,\n22\nUsC\n52422(a)\n' such a tactic mlght be able to expand Congre551ona1\npower beyond what could be achleved by p051t1ve leglslatlon.\n\nFor 1nstance, a statute requlrlng the President to turn over executlve privileged material to Congress would, in our estimation, be uncon;tltutlonal.\n\nIt is not so clear, however, that Congress could not condltlon the expendlture of certain funds upon belng 1nformed about why and how those funds were being\n.expended,\n1nclud1ng any perlleged material.\n\nHere rather than requlrlng Pre51dent1al compllance, the choice is left to the President whether to spend and disclose or not to spend and not to disclose.-\nNevertheless, there are llmlts, albeit  uncertain on what Congress can conditidn._\nSee, e.g., United States v.\n\nLovett,\n328\nUS\n303\n(1946).\n\nTo summarize, while the President.mey be the Nation's isoie organ in its external relations,\"\nimplying certain inherent powers in foreign intelligence activities, whendthe Eiecutive requires Congressienal action\n-- particularly apv_propriations, Congress has a concurrent power, and pursuant to this power may impose various and substantial limitations on hose foreign intelligence activities which requife Congressional funding.\n\nWhat Congress probably cannot do, nowever, consistently with the'constitutional separation of powers, is to require affirmafiive congressidnal or committee\n\" approval before the Executive can take an action that is\n-\nwithin the bounds of its constitutional and statutory authority,\n fundsalready'appropriafed.\n\nSuc'\"\n\n\"and involvesexfiefidituie o an affirmative approval would amount to congressional invasion of Executive functions;\nespecially since it would allow one House or committee to veto executive action, it is inconsistent with the Constipqtiofi's division of executive and legislative functions.\n\n## The Constitutional, Statutory, And Legal Basis For S Covert Action\n\nLegal autfiority_ for Ycovert' action in support of foreign policy objectives Fana\nis found in three sources:\n\n1, The constitutional authority of the President as the repository of\nnegxecutive'' power, primarily as it involves his responsibilities for foreignaffa'irs and as Commander-in-Chief,\n\n. 2. The National Security Act of 1947..\n3,\nIn the ratification by Congress of.the CIA's authority.\n\n## 1. Constitutional Power Of The President\n\nuExecutive!' power involves the responsibility and authority in matters of foreign relations.\n\nPrgsidential power in foreign affairs decision-making is variously described as nexclusive, ' V'plenary' or as sole organ. 't Historical practice, accepted as customary law, and the courts have confirmed in broad language the scope of Pre,sidential power, which\n.\n\nor agents, abroad.\n\nEven the War\n- includes the authority to send troops, Powers Resolution.states that it was ''not i_ntended to alter the constitutional authority of the Pfesident. 1\"\nThe practice of appointing agents to conduct covert actions abroad is deeply rooted in United States history.\n\n## [ National Segufitz Ag; 0F 1947\n\nThis sta.ttute is.brooted in, and_. v}aI,Sixl.tended to embody, the;\" expe.rience\n\"\nlearned undef earlier Presidential directives.\n\n.Specifica.]i&, the CIA was intended to have the -s.ame broad authority as previously held by the Central mtenigencl:Group.'\n|\n|\nCiA's responsibi;lities, \"in more &etail, were to be s.pecified by the National Security Council, 'ana Cong._ress recognized that the'CIA\nwould necessarily have a broad range of operational assignments.\n\n## I, Congres Siex;Xal Ratification Of Cia Authoritz' To Plan And Conduct Covert\n\n'Actions;\n)\n.\n\neince its beginning, the CIA has reported on its covert action programs to 'appropr'iate members of the oversight confinittees_ of both House and Senate.\n\nFurther.more,\" the legisla'l.:ive history of the CIA Act of 1949 reveals that the Director told the House Armefl Services Committee of the types\n.\n\nof covert actions contemplated by the agency.\n\n.\n\n|\nWith this kind c;f in.formatiog _and knowledge distributed in ways understood by Congress, approprietions were_consistently authorized and'\napproved, Such appropriations constitute ratification by Congress under the rule of Brooks vs Dewar which held that adJninistJ;Iative practices could be ratified by Congress through the appropriations practice.\n\n## . Secrecy And Protection Of Intelligence L * Sources And Methods : I. Secrecy And National Security\n\nSecrecy in i_ntel-ligenge activities.;s needed for two purposes.\n\nOne, intelligence afi_d the intellige.nce function are necessary to the'c;anduct of defense and -foreign relations, that is, for rea;ons of national security, In addition, in order to develop, inaintain and use sources and meth'o_ds'\nfor gathering intelligence it is-:.lecess.ary that they be protected from disclosure.\n\n|\n|\nPursua.nt to his constitutional and ifihergnfi authority in defense and foreign affairs, the President may provide for necessary secrecy and Protection. of national security information, which would include information in the intelligence area, and hgs done so by Executive Order.116v52.\n\n|\nCongress also h_asv authority and inte.rests concerning nationel security for which it needs information.\n\n' Pursuant to his authori.ty, the President may opt to provicie information to Congress under such conditj.ons_ asvto secrecy and protection as he may impose.\n\nCongress, of course, may\n\"resort to the courts to resolve any dis_bagreements( \"The recent agreement worked out .vv)ith the Pike Comnuttee, along those lines, would s;aem\n:\nthe workable and desirable basis fgr meet.ing the needs of both the\n|\nPresident and the Cofigress.'\n\n## C I Se;:Rec.X'An.D.So{Lrces And Metheds Infc;Rmafion\n\nIn \\vliew of file exclusive'afithority ot;'the President tfi-conduct the\n'intelligence activities of'the gqvernment; 'the Presidenf's autho.rity to withhold sources and methods inforzfiation would seem beyon'dbquestion.\n\nThe responsibility of the Director of Central I'nte]libgencg to erotect sfich information fr;:m 'disclosufe, -as provided by the Natic;nal Security Act 0f 1947, indeed recognizes and buttresses that principle.\n\n## Ii. Conclusion.\n\nThere is 'cdnstieutional and statutory authority foi' necessary secrecy for the intellig-ence function of the government.\n\nUnauthor.ized disciosure of sources and methods informat';ion should .be prohibited l?y criminal law, Additionally, a statutory basis for enjoining di;sclosure is needed.\n\n. The desired legislation is well advaneed and is e#pected to be agreed\namong the Executive Branch agep.cies\n- CIA, Justice and OMB -- in the\nnear future.\n\n## L Ideetification Of Issues\n\n)\n';A. Article I,\nSection\n9', Clal;se 7 ;)f the Conetimt;on provides:\nHNo money' shall\nbe drawn from the Treasu.ry but in consequence\n-.of appropriations made by Law; and a regular Statement and Account\nof the Receipts and Expenditures of all public money shall be\npublished from time to tu'ne \"\n.\nThe budgets of CIA, DIA, NSA, and some other defgnse and military service ihtelligence programs are not identified in'published federal budget documents.\n\nTherefore, a question has been raised as to whether\n'\nthis gurrent pra.ctice is consistent with the second half of fihe above qubted constitutional provision.\n\nB;\nA second relevant question relates to the mefhods whereby appropriations are made for certain intelli.genc.e agen_cies.'\nUnder the CIA Act of 1949, funds overtly appropriated to other agencies are secretly transferred to CIA.\n\nAppropriations for DIA, NSA, and certain service and defense intelligence programs are included in DOD appropriations, but are generafly not identified explicitly.\n\n The issue arises as to whether such indirect funding authorizations constitute \"appropriations made by law',\n\n## I Factual Background -And Legal Discussion- :\n\n\n'A,\nDPresent sttem of Funding and Extent of Public Disclosure.\nPublished government documents now reveal almost no significant information on the funding of United: States intelligence activities.\n\n## B Present State Of The Law (1) Statutory Background\n\nThe CIA Act of 1949 provides the basic authority for the Agency's unusual funding procedures..\n\nOne provision allows CIA to\n\n\"\nreceive f1_m&s transferred from any appropriation with the approval\nof OMB.\nCIA is also authorized to transfer funds to other agencies.'\nAnother provision of the 1949 Act allows the CIA to depart\n\n.\nfrom normal budget and accounting procedures\nin making confidential\nexpendfiures to be accounted for solely on the DCI's certificate.\nThe Economy Act of 1932 (31 U.S,C, 686) authorizes government agencies to provide services and equipment to each other {on a reimbursable basis) where that course would be in the best interest of the government,..\n\n.\n\n## (2) Constitutional Requirement For A \"Regular Statement And\n\n'\naccount of receipts and expenditures\nThe history of this provision, although certainly not ambiguous, indicates that at least some supporters of the \"from time to time e language may have felt thz.xt.the_a dc_at;ils. of some; expgnditufes s'hv.;ulc'l.\n\n\" not be .publi.cly dis';:losed, at least for 'some.pevriod'of ti.me.\n\n-\nA good arigume'nt can be made that the budget pree;entations'\nof the-intlellig'ence agencies other than. CIA are cbnsis.t.:jent \\;Vit};l the clafise, .in that their-funds:are included in appropriation accounte whose\n' title; wb_uld reasonably be expected to include inteuigenee activities of the types actually funded.\n\nHowever, the practice for funding CIA\npur.suant.'to the 1949 Act seems more diffi..cu.lt to defend finder c'laus>e 7.\n\n'The publicv'has (or had?) no reason to .asso_ciate the CIA with the appro-\n\" priation account in which its funds are included.\n\nvAlso, none of itsb\n_\nbudgets for past years have been revealed.\n\n## (3) Constitutional Requirement For \"Appropriations Made By Law'\n\n. The first half of clause. 1 represgnfs Congrese' 'power of the\n\" purse', The precedures for funding the intelligence ageneies other than\n' CIA do not seem to .rai'se serious questions of ;:omplia.nce with this provision.\n\nAs pointed out above,' each agency other than CIA is really\n\"\na part of a larger cabinet department to which its funds are appropriated.\n\nEVen below thj.s 'le';el, thveb invtielli.gencre egeficf funds are ipeluded_ in sfib;accounts whose titles r.n.ay i)e broad, but such that the_ intelligence activities could reasonably be seen as: a part of them, The constitfii:ional'ity of the section of the 1%}49 CIA Act\n\n\n.\nauthorizing unlimited transfers of funds to CIA fr.om_other agencies\ns'eems. open to- question,\nA good ;rgu.!nent can be made iha_t CbngreSS'\nviolated the intent of the constitutional appriopriiatior; requirement by',\nin effect,\ngiving the Executive a blank check to f}md the CIA out of any\nappropriation available to afiy other agency.\n\n## (4) Standing\n\nWl_'latever the merits of the constitutional issues discussed above, it seems unlikely that any constitutional requirements in this area will be enforced by the courts.\n\n. The Supreme Court recently held (5-4) that\n\n'a plaintiff lacked standing as\na taxpayer t b-ring an action to force\npublication of the CIA's expenditures,\n\n## Im. O-Etiens For Dea.Ling' With Constitutional ;'Krrii;Igx;If'Z_ -\n\nIn fiew of thexfa..ct tha.t_the exact requiren;ents of ciause\n7 are far from cvlieari and the apparenf lack of standing for judicial enforce-\n\n- ment of _these requ'.'i-:.r'%ements,\nthe-ques'_cio_nv of to what e;:tent inte]ligence\n- budgets_ shox_zla be reveaied and the presenfi system of transferring\nfunds to the CIA chang.ed,\ncannot be; answered By purely legai considerations.\n\n## A, Ogtion.S For Public Budget Disclgsure '\n\n1. Reveal total budget figfire for fii:e ihtelheence community.\n2. Reveal community total.plus some additionaide;tails;\nsuch\"\n:\n.as DdD and CI_A totale, 'to.tals by broad function and object\nclassification.\n.\n3. Reveal confi.munity total plus normal detail on non-sensitive\naspe;:ts only,\n4. Reveal total budget of CIA only; no additioz'm.xl disclosure of\nnon-;CIA budgets.\n.\n5. Reveal details of CIA budget;\nno additional disclosure with\nrespect to other agencies.\n6 Re'v:a;fl expenditufes by-intelli'gen(:e #gen.ci'es,\nin'epy one\n\"\nlof the lew're];s des'.cri.vbedvabove,\nbyt 6n1y seme' yeax\"s afte?r: the\nfjscal year involved.\n|\n\n## B. Ngions For Normalizing Cia'Aqeroeriation Process\n\n) 'Be.ca}us'e of the ';;\\bstantial constitutional doubts about the present etamtor'y scheme where.fiy funds are chan;t;e.led to CIA, and Congressional desire for g:re.at.er control ove; CIA funds, the Administration should consider possible changes in the current pr;ctice.\n\nOptions include:\n\n1.\nA single,\nover;'. appropriation for the. CIA:\n2.\nA single, overt'appropriation for the entire 'intelligenceb\ncofimmity.\n3,\nA single,\novert appropriation account,\npart of DOD appropriation\nbill,\nto fund NSA,\nDIA and CIA.\n\n## Executive Order Establishing Restrictions On Foreign Intelligence Activities\n\nPrevious guidance on the relationship between the intelligence agencies and United States citizens was unclear.\n\nThis orde:'clarifies that_relationship by detailing those activities which are prohibited.\n\nWith-'\nout setting forth all restrictions under which foreign inteliigence agencies are obliged to operate, nor\n. derogating from any other laws, rules, regulations, or directives ffirther restricting the activities of these agencies, it is hereby ordered as follows:\nSECTION\nI.\n\nDefinitions.\n\nAs used in this Order the following terms shall have the meanings ascribed to them belowe\n\n(a)\n\"Collection\" means\nthe gathering\nand storage\nor\nthe gathering and forwarding,bof information.\n(b)\n\"Domestic activitiesTM means activities within\nthe United States.\n(c)\n\"Foreign intelligence\" means information,\nother than foreign counterintelligence,\non the capabilities,\nintentions,\nand activities\nof foreign powers,\norganizations\nor\ntheir agents.\n(d)\n\"United States citizens\" means\nUnited States\ncitizens.and permanent resident aliens.\n(e)\n\"Fereign-counterintelligence\" means activities\nconducted\nto protect\nthe United States\nand United States\ncitizens\nfrom foreign espionage,\nsabotage,\nsubversion,\nassassination,\nor terrorism.\n()\n\"Incidental reception\"\nmeans\nthe\nreceipt of\ninformation, 'collection of which by\nan agency\nis otherwise\nprehibited by this order and which\nis collected\nin\nthe\ncourse of an agency's authorized foreign intelligence\nor\ncounterintelligence activities.\n(g)\n\"Foreign intelligence\nagency\"\"\nmeans\nany department\nor agency\nof the United States government,\nor component\nthereof,\nwhich\nis primarily engaged\nin foreign intelligence\nor foreign counterintelligence actiities.\nSECTIO&\nII.\n\nThe following activities shall not be conducted either by any foreign intelligenee agency or by any other department or agency in pursuit of foreign intelligence or foreign counterintelligence:\n\n.\n(a)\nPhysical surveillance\nof United States\ncitizens within\nthe United States except\nto the extent that\n.such surveillance is in accordance with iaw and is:\n\n(1)\nUpon w:itten approval\ngy\nthe\nhead of\nthe\nforeign intelligence department\nor agency;\nand\nis\nsurveillance\nof indi+iduals\ncurrently\nor formerly)emp;oyed\nor Such contractors'\nemployees, for the Purpoge of protectlng\n.\n\ndlsclosure, or forelgn 1ntelllgence SQurceg and Methodg from unauthorized regulations .\n\n()\nInfiltration\nor secret participation\nin any\norganization composed primarily of United States citizens\nfor\nthe purpose\nof reporting on its activities\nor\nfiembership.\n(g)\nExperimentation with drugs\non human subjects,\nexcept with\nthe informed consent of each such human subject\nand\nin accordance with\nthe guidelings\nof\nthe National Commission for the Protection of Human Subjects\nfor Biomedical\nand Behavorial Research.\n(h)\nOperatiofi of\na proprietary company\non\na\ncommercially competitive basis with United States businesses\nexcept\nto\nthe minimum extent necessary\nto establish commercial credibility.\n- No investments\nby\na proprietary\ncompany shall\nbe made\non\nthe basis\nof any substantive\nintelligence not available\nto the public.\n(i)\nCollection,\nevaluation,\ncorrelation\nor\nanalysis,\nof informatidn other tfian information\nfrom public\nsources\nor given voluntarily by\nits subject concerning\nthe\ndqmestic activities\nof United States\ncitizens except:\n(1)\nInformation about\na United States citizen\nwho\nie reasonably believed\nto\nbe involved\nin international\nterrorist\nor narcoqics activities\nor working\nin collaboration\nwith\na foreign nati#n\nor organization,\nbut only\nif the infor-\nmation is collectei abroad or from foreign sources in the United States in thg course of an authorized foreign intelligence or foreign counterintelligence activity.\n\n(2)\nInformation related\nto\nthe performance\nof agency contractors\nor prospective bidders,\nfor purposes\n)\nof contract administration.\n(3)\nInformation concerning criminal'activitiesv\nreceived through incidental\nreceptiofi,\nprovided\nit\nis only\ntransmitted\nto\nlaw enforcement agencies with appropriate\njurisdiction,\n\"SECTION\niII, Any federal agency seeking foreign intelligence within the United States from United States citizens shall aisclose to such citizens its true identity.\n\nWhen collection of foreign intelligence within tPe'\nUnited States results in the incidental reception of information from unknowing United States citizens, however, the receiving agency shall be permitted to make appropriate use of such information.\n\nSECTION\nIV.\n\nNo information on the domestic activities of United States citizens shall be transmitted to a foreign intelligence agency\n(or to any other federal agency to aid it in engaging in foreign intelligence or foreign counterintelligence)\nfrom any other federal agency unless:\n\n(a)\nThe information had been lawfully compiled\nby\nthe transmitting agency\nin furtherance\ncf its authorized\nmission;\n\n(b)\nThe information\nis\nof\na\ntype which\nthe\nreceiving agency would itself have been permitted to collect under the provisions of this order;\n\n(c)\nThe ipformation\nis provided\nin furtherance\nof the authorized mission and responsibilities\nof\nthe\n.\nreceiving agency;\nV\n.\n(d)\nThe information\nis provided in_good\nfaith\n'under\na reaeonable belief that'the information\nis relevant\nto the receiving agency;\nand\n(e)\nThe information\nis provided under guidelines\nand procedures issued by the Attorney General designed\nto\nensure the protection\nof the constitution;1 and statutory\nrights\nof United States\ncitizens.\n'\nSECTION\nV.\nNothing\nin this Order prohibits\nan agency\nfrom retaining information when retention\nis required by\nlaw,\nsfich\nas\nretention required\nto preserve evidence\nor\nother information\nfor possible court action.\n.\nSECTION\nVI:.\nNo foreign intelligence agency\nshall:\n(a)\nProvide services,\nequipment,\npersonnel\nor\nfacilities\nto\nthe Law Enforcement Assistance Administration\nor state\nor local police organizations\nof\nthe United States\nexcept\nas expressly authorized\nby\nlaw;\nor\n(b)\nParticipate\nin or fund any\nlaw enforcement\nactivity within\nthe United States-except\nas may be\nauthorized\nby law.\nProvided, thaf this prohibition'shall not\n'preclude:\n.\n\n.\n(1) Cooperation between\na\nforeign inEelligence\nagency and appropriate\nlaw enforcement agencies\nfor the\npurpose\nof protecting\nthe personnel\nand facilities\nof the\n- foreign intelligency agency or preventing espionage or\nother criminal activity related\nto foreign intelligence or\nforeign counterintelligence;\nor\n>(2)\nProvision\nof specialized equipment or\ntechnical knowledge\nfor\nuse\nby any other Federal depa;tment\nor agency.\n\nSECTION VII.\nForeign intelligence agency personnel\n~\nmay not be detailed elsewhere within\nthe Federal government except\nas\nconsistent with\nlaw.\nEmployees\nso detailed\nshall\nbe respensible\nto\nthe host.agency\nand shall\nnot report\n.\nto their pareflt agency on\nthe affairs\nof\nthe host agency\nexcept\nas may\nbe directed by\nthe host agency.\nThe head\nof\nthe\nhost agency\nand any subsequent successor shall be\ninformed of\nthe detailee's association with\nthe parent\nagency.\n.\nSECTION VIII.\n\nNothing in this Order shall prohibit any agency having law enforcement responsibilities from discharging such responsibilities pursuant to law.-\nNor shall this Order apply to any activities of the Federal Bureau of Investigation.\n\nT\n\n## Executive Order Imposing Restrictions On Foreign Intelligence Activities\n\n\" Today the President issued an executive order setting forth certain restrictions on the activities of foreign intelligence agencies and other agencies which may engage in intelligence activities.\n\nIt prohibits or severely restricts the following\n-activities:\n\n-~ Collection and analysis\nof information on the domestic\nactivities\nof United States citizens\nand permanent resident\naliens.\n-\nPhysical\nor electronic surveillance\nof United States\ncitizens\nand permanent resident aliens within the United States.\n-\nOpening\nof United States mail\nin violation\nof law.\n.-\n1Illegally obtaining federal income\ntax returns\nor\ninformation.\n\"\n-\nInfilfration of domestic groups\nfor the purpose\nof\nreporting on them.\n-\nExperimentation with drugs on humans without the\nsubject's informed consent;\n-\nOperation of a proprietary company which competes with\nUnited States businesses more than the minimum amount necessary\nto establish commercial credibility.\n~\n.Collection\nof intelligence from United States c1t1zr~~\nand permanent resident aliens within the United States w1thout disclosing the true identity of the collectlng agency.\n\n'\nSharing among agencies information\non the domestic\nactivities\nof United States citizens\nor permanent resident\naliens except\nin compliance with stringent safeguards.\n-\nProviding assistance\nto law-enforcement agencies\n'in\nviolation\nof\nlaw.\nCertain limited exceptlons are included to the generel prohibition of collectlon of\n- 1nformatlon on the domestic activities of United States c1tlzens.\n\nThese exceptions seek to recognize all leegitimate needs of foreign intelligence aeencies to collect information on the domestic activities of United States citizens.\n\nIn order to protect classified inforfiation, intelligence agenc1es must run securlty checks on appllcants for employment and employees..\n\nLike. any Government agency, these agenc1es must also cheok out employee backgrounds to ascertain their job suitability.\n\nEven after a person has left an 1ntelllgence agency, it has a. legitimate need to maintain\n1ts records on\n'that person should a security breach stemmlng from hlS employ\nment occur.\n\nSlmllerly, each 1nte111gence agency has an interest in the suitability and security worthiness of persons who contract with it or are employees of its contractors working on 'its projects and reguiring access to cldssified information.\n\nEach intel;igence agency fiust also maintain records on persons who, without necessarily being employed'by it, ere given access to its classified information.\n\nSuch persons would include employees of other Government agencies whb require access to its classified information\n-and private citizens who voluntarily agree to be cleared to receive classified information in order to aid in their voluntary reportingzgf foreign intelligenee information to the agency.\n\n_ Foreign intelliqence.agencies\nor other'foreign groups spend\nmany resources\nseeking\nto penetrate\n(i;e.,\nobtain information\nfrofi)\nUnited States intelligence agencies.\n\nThe United States agencies need to protect themselves from euch activities.\n\nSuch aetivities may involve aomestic activities of United States citizens.\n\nBecause United States ihtelligence egehcies have a need to undersfand fihe operating modes of foreign ihteiligence agencies, there is a legitimate need for-it to coileet and use such information.\n\nfioweVer, the intelligence agehcies are permitted to coliect this type of information only abroad or from foreign sources, since fihe FBI\nis fully capable of collectine such information from purely domestic sources.\n\nAlso, because of the unique contacts of our. foreign intelligenee agencies with information sources abroad and foreign sources within ehevUnited St&tes, these'egencies are also permitfed tocollect,'bfit only_frofi ehese'special sources, information.on United St;tesvcitizens.reasonably believed to.be involved in international'terrorist or\n.\n\nnarcotics activities.\n\nIn nqrmal d;ytoday.business, many'Amerieans work with intelligence agencies and tell its employeee about their dofiestic activities;\ni.e., other Govern@efit empleyeee meet with intelligence agency employees;\nacademics share informa\ntien with them; Americans who travel talk to thefi.\n\nIn ordef to allo# these agencies to maintain records of such dayfo\nd;y transactions, the order makes an appropfiate'exception.\n\nAmericans who_entef into such contact Wifh intelligence aeencies, however, should not therefore be subjecfied'to security investigations or chef scrutiny merely because they came into contact with an employee of an intelligence agency.\n\nTherefore, thie exception only allpws useof_that information\n~ voluntarily s;pplied by_fihe persons themSelves;\nThe Orderbrequires that the information collectea or stored under these exceptions be confified fo'a type appropriate to the pfirpose for which the corresponaing exception-was createdf For example,'an agency may not collect or store information on the political views of a United States citizen merely because he is a contractor employee working'on an agency project.\n\n'The order also allows intelligence agencies to transmit to lawenforcefient agencies information relating to cfiminal domesfie activities of United Statesbcitizens which it happens to obtain incidentally td its proper.foreigfi inteliigence activities.\n\nAll citizens and Government agencies have an obligation to turn information releted to criminal activity over to appropriate authorities.\n\n## Summary Of Agency Comments On Major Substantive Issues Relating To Executive Order Imposing Restrictions On Intelligence I. Department Of Defense\n\n. Basically, DoD would prefer a fundamentally aifferent\n:\nversion of this Order, which it has drafted.\n\nDoD\nfeels its draft \"\"presents\n~...'a more straightforward approach as compared with the somewhat complex and eleborate assembly of caveats in the current version.\"\nTfie primary substantive difference between the DoD versiofi and thg_current draft is that the DoD Ordef prohibits only the collection of the\n'\"lawful domestic activities\"\nof U/S.\n\ncitizens.\n\nWith respect to the two issues covered in the body of this paper, DoD's position is as follows: -\n\nA.\nException\nto allow collection,\nanalysis,\nand dissemination of information on the domestic activities of U.S. citizens\nreasonably believed\nto\nbe involved in international terrorist\nor narcotics activities\nor working\nin collaboration with\na\nforeign nation\nor organization,\nbut only\nif collected abroad,\nor from foreign sources.\n(Section II(i)(2))\nDoD supports\nthis exception and would eliminate\nthe requirement that\nthe\ninformation\nbe collected abroad or from foreign sources here.\nB.\nException which would permit sharing\nof information\non the domestic activities\nof\nU.S.\ncitizens\namong intelligence\nand other federal agencies,\nunder guidelines\nof\nthe Attorney\nGeneral, even if the receivihg agency would not otherwise be permitted to collect such a type of information under this Order\n(Section IV).\n\nDoD supports modified version under which sharing is permitted only for information which the receiving ageficy would otherwise be permitted to collect.\n\nC.\nDoD proposes certain other modifications related\nto\nNSA's acfivities.\n\nThey would remove NSA's communications\n\nsecurity activities from the Order's restrictions and also\ndistinguish between signal intelligence and other\nforme\nof\nelectronic surveillance.\nD.\nDoD would allow infiltration of organizations\nof\nU.S.\ncitizens\nabroad.\nIt claims\nto need such\nan exception\nto.allow gathering information\non U.S.\ngroups seeking to\nsfibvert U.S.\nmilitary personnel abroad.\n\n## Ii. Cia\n\nA.\nAs\nto\nthe exception for information\non citizens\nengaged\nin terrorist\nor narcotics activities,\nor working\nin\ncollaboration with foreign organizations, the CIA proposes to add the word \"secretly\"\nbefore the words\n\"in collaboration with a foreign nation or organization\".\n\nThis would exclude such persons as registered foreign lobbyists or those'epenly dealing with foreign corporatiohs.\n\nB.\nThe CIA would expand\nthe exception\nto\nthe prohibition\nagainst competition by proprietary\ncompanies with\nU.S.\nbus-\ninesses\n(Section TII(h)).\n\nAfter the CIA amendment, the pro vigion would read to pfohibit:\n_\"Operation of a proprietary company on a commercially competitive basis except to the minimum extent necessary to establish commercial credibility or to achieve clearly defined foreign intelligence objectives.\"\n(CIA language underlined.)\n.\n\n-\n-\nThis is intended to recognize'that in rare and exceptional instances a specific foreign intelligence objective may be achieved only through a successful venture.\n\n## Department Of Justice\n\nIII.\nJustice has no major problems with the 'current draft.\n\nDepartment of State\nIv.\nComments not yet received.\nOMB\nComments not yet received.\n\nVI.\n'NSC\nComments not yet received.\n\n## Summary Of .Views . Presented By Selected Outside Experts\n\nThe following are major points from discussions over the past several days with McGeorge Bundy, John McCone, Admiral Moorer, Paul Nitzg, David Packard and Ted Sorensen.\n\n## MccEorge Bundy\n\n~\nThe President, as Commander in Chief, sho;lld take the lead in reforming the Intelligence Community; there is'politi'(':a.l'merit in beating the Congressional committees to the punch.\n\nA good opportunity for Presidential action will be during the Congressional recess.\n\n)\n-\nMore intelligence of an open nature shouid be made available to Congress, .This will help Congress in its oversight role, although oversight will always be a difficult problem, particularly if Congress attempts to deal with prospective programs.\n\n-\nThe 40 Comumittee has never been effective.\nA \"President's man!\nis required to monitor seriously activities in this area.\n\nMoving clandestine c;perations to State would chan_ge the character of the department and pose difficulties for the conduct of its normal operations.\n\n-\nPFIAB has been a free-wheeling b<.>dy that has been hve:lpful\nfrom time to time,\nbut it has never l;xa.d an #dequate staff and would\nprobably be overburdened if given an oversight role..\nOn the other\nhand, the ACDA Advisory C,omxnittee,\nfor example,\nhas had substantial\niznpect and given the President access to the ADA that he would not\notherwise have had.\n|\n-\nA two.-ha_tted DCI will probably never work.\nAllocating budgets\nis a management problem and seems more appropriate\nfor OMRB, the\ninstru;fient created for these purposes.\n\"<\nThe national estimate process has never worked very well, k.eports tend to be done on given situations at times when one could care less, The national estimate is an extremely important product and it is necessary to improve its quality.\n\n-\nDIA has not provided the oversight to DOD intelligence activities\nwhich was intended.\n\n-\nTime spent in insuring \"plausible deniability\" was almost\nuniformly wasted.\n\nThe President can take rbesponsibility_for actions of his Administration.\n\nThe distinction between diplomatically-necessary deniability in such cases as the U-2 or the Glomar Explorer, and domestic .accountability, was drawn.\n\n## John Mccone\n\n-\nThe President must make up his mind how the Intelligence\nConmiu.nity should be organized,\ndo what he can to accomplish this\nby Executive Order, and propose legislation for the remainder.\n\nCongress will do nothing without Presidential initiative.\n\n-\nCIA has been tarnished and should be done away with.\nA new\nagency should be establish as part of the National Security Council.\nThe\ndirector of the agency would be responsible for all existing CIA operations',\n'would coordinate all intelligence agencies budget responsibility for all intelligence activities, He would be Chairman of USIB and have direct access to the Presidefit.\n\nrj'.'here should be two &eputy directors, one for intelligence matters and one for community affairs.\n\n-\nA permanent subcommittee of the NSC should be established to\nhave oversight responsibility for the new intelligence agency,\nIt would\nalso review 40 Committee actions.\n-\nIf CIA continues to exist,\nthree steps should be -tal;en:\n(1) The General Counsel should be made a Deputy Director with access to the entire agency;\n| (2) The Inspector General position should be given more status and strengthened;\n(3) There must be a regular program of review of ongoing activities.\n\n-\nA'ioint Congressional Coi'nmift_ee on Intelligence should be\nformed along the lipes of the Atomic Energy Committee.,\nThe Atomic\nEnergy Committee has never had a problem with secrecy.\n-~\nLegislation is necessary to irfipose penalties on government\nemployees who dis.clos'e secrets during or after their period of service\nin government.\n-\nThere have been problems with DIA's production, partly because\nit has been staffed by the Joint Services and the services keep the best\nofficers for themselves.\nFurther,\nintelligence is not a high priority\nwithin the Services.\n\n## Admiral Moorer\n\n-\nRadical change in the Intelligence Community should be avoided.\nThe primary prc;blem is not the organizational structure but people.\n\n-\nIt would be\na mistake to centralize intelligence gathering under\none person.\n'i'he DCI cannot control or schedule,\nfor example,\nthe real\ntime activities of submarines\nor other military collection agents, nor\ncan he defend them when the&- run into trouble.\nIn addition,\nthere is a\nneed for duplication and competition in intelligence as there is in R&D\nmatters.\n-\nNSA is\na valuable instrument,\nbut individual combat units\nshould have their own intercept teams.\nWartime activities cannot\nbe centralized and run from Washington.\n-\nThe open hearings in the House and Senate are\na \"'national\ndisaster'.\nThey are exposing secrets and telling the Soviets\na great\ndeal about the effectiveness of our intelligence activities,\nthus\npermitting the Soviets to develop countermeasures.\n-\nA Congressional oversight committee will pose severe operational\nproblems.\nLeaks will occur and intelligence information will be used\nfor political purposes,\nThe President needs to take action to deal with\nthe pressure from Congress, but it should not be drastic,\n\n## Paul Nitze\n\n-\nTo some degree, the problems the Intelligence Community now faces are cosmetic and any changes must be cosmetic as well, There is a danger, 'however, that we will not do what needs doing.\n\n-\nThe NRO works well under EXCOM as far as Defense and CIA\nare concerned but not, perhaps, from OMB's point of view,\nA perennial\nproblem is the allocation of costs to various programs, and making\ndecisions based on the allocations will always have a highly judgmental cha:;acter.\n\nThe equipment is very expensive in certain intelligence gathering systems and new tasks require new \"beasts', Decisions on new equipment require a great deal of familiarity with the programs and the technologies.\n\n-\nAs organizational changes are considered for the Intelligence\nCommunity, there is no point in further downgrading CIA, N<.>r should covert activities be separated from the rest of its operations.\n\nThe DCI\nshould have the National Estimating Staff.\n\nThe old Board of National Estimates worked better than the present NIO .system, where the National Intelligence Officers farm out estimates to the eepartments for writing.\n\n-=\nCrisis management is bett;er institutionalized than it was\na decade\n\" ago.\nThere are differences between mini crises which need not come\nto the President and can be handled on a coordinated basis by the appropriate government agencies, and the maxi crises which will probably always be handled on an ad hoc basis, depending on the needs and predilections of the President.\n\n-\nThere was much more systematic handling of 40 Committee matters\n10 years ago than there is today.\n\n-\nThe government has never adequately dealt with the problem\nof a' \"net assessments''.\nAt one time the initiative existed in State\nin th}e Policy Planning Staff under Acheson to perform net assessments,\nand under Eisenhower the NSC had the role.\nThe CIA is not and should\n-\nnot be in the net assessment business,\nnor should the NSC;\nState\nis his candidate.\n\n## David Packard\n\n- Consideration should be given to having the Attorney Gene.ral pa.rt.icipate in 40 Committee mieetings to focus on the legality of proposals.\n\nAttorneys General who have participated in the past did so as the President's personal representative and did not get _into.legal or moral issues.,\n\n-\nBoth national and tactical intelligence are necessary so that\n(1) we know what migl;lt happen and (2) what to do if it happens.\n\nThe military must know all about Soviet radars, not just where they are.\n\n-\nDIA's analysis has tended to be influenced by the military\nservices! interests,\nPerhaps DIA should report directly to the new\nDeputy Secretary of Defense for Intelligence, and not the Joint Chiefs."
    },
    {
        "text": "## Key Takeaways\n\nThe IC assesses that SARS-CoV-2, the virus that causes COVID-19, probably emerged and infected humans through an initial small-scale exposure that occurred no later than November 2019 with the first known cluster of COVID-19 cases arising in Wuhan, China in December 2019.  In addition, the IC was able to reach broad agreement on several other key issues.  We judge the virus was not developed as a biological weapon.  Most agencies also assess with low confidence that SARS-CoV-2 probably was not genetically engineered; however, two agencies believe there was not sufficient evidence to make an assessment either way.  Finally, the IC assesses China's officials did not have foreknowledge of the virus before the initial outbreak of COVID-19 emerged. After examining all available intelligence reporting and other information, though, the IC remains divided on the most likely origin of COVID-19.  All agencies assess that two hypotheses are plausible: natural exposure to an infected animal and a laboratory-associated incident.\n\n\nFour IC elements and the National Intelligence Council assess with low confidence that the initial SARS-CoV-2 infection was most likely caused by natural exposure to an animal infected with it or a close progenitor virusa virus that probably would be more than 99 percent similar to SARS-CoV-2.  These analysts give weight to China's officials' lack of foreknowledge, the numerous vectors for natural exposure, and other factors.\n\nOne IC element assesses with moderate confidence that the first human infection with SARS-CoV-2 most likely was the result of a laboratory-associated incident, probably involving experimentation, animal handling, or sampling by the Wuhan Institute of Virology.  These analysts give weight to the inherently risky nature of work on coronaviruses.\n Analysts at three IC elements remain unable to coalesce around either explanation\nwithout additional information, with some analysts favoring natural origin, others a laboratory origin, and some seeing the hypotheses as equally likely.\n\nVariations in analytic views largely stem from differences in how agencies weigh intelligence reporting and scientific publications, and intelligence and scientific gaps.\n\nThe IC judges they will be unable to provide a more definitive explanation for the origin of COVID-19 unless new information allows them to determine the specific pathway for initial natural contact with an animal or to determine that a laboratory in Wuhan was handling SARS- CoV-2 or a close progenitor virus before COVID-19 emerged.\n\n\nThe ICand the global scientific communitylacks clinical samples or a complete understanding of epidemiological data from the earliest COVID-19 cases.  If we obtain information on the earliest cases that identified a location of interest or occupational exposure, it may alter our evaluation of hypotheses.\n\nChina's cooperation most likely would be needed to reach a conclusive assessment of the origins of COVID-19.  Beijing, however, continues to hinder the global investigation, resist sharing information and blame other countries, including the United States.  These actions reflect, in part, China's government's own uncertainty about where an investigation could lead as well as its frustration the international community is using the issue to exert political pressure on China."
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        "text": "Office of the Inspector General U.S. Department of Justice\n\n# Report On The President's Surveillance Program\n\n## Volumes I - Iii\n\n\n(Some previously redacted information unreadacted)\n\n## Note\n\n\n\nIn connection with Freedom of Information Act litigation brought by The New York Times in the Southern District of New York, the OIG's July\n2009 \"Report on the President's Surveillance Program\" has been re-released with additional information declassified by agencies with the authority to do so.  The following pages in this version of the report contain information that was previously redacted:\n\n\nVolume\nPages\n\nI\n\n27\n\n\n53-54 II\n\n122 III\n\n220\n\n\n334\n\n\n342\n\n\n344\n\n\n346\n\n\n349\n\n\n357\n\n## Redacted - For Public Release\n\n\n\nThe Department of Justice Office of the Inspector General\n(DOJ OIG) is a statutorily created independent entity\nwhose mission is to detect and deter waste, fraud,\nabuse, and misconduct in the Department of Justice, and\nto promote economy and efficiency in the Department's\noperations. Information may be reported to the DOJ\nOIG's hotline at www.justice.gov/oig/hotline or\n(800) 869-4499.\n\n\nOffice of the Inspector General U.S. Department of Justice www.justice.gov/oig\n\n## Redacted - For Public Release"
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        "text": "17 May 2010\nOriginal: English\n\nHuman Rights Council\nFourteenth session\nAgenda item 3\nPromotion and protection of all human rights, civil,\npolitical, economic, social and cultural rights,\nincluding the right to development\n\n## Report Of The Special Rapporteur On The Promotion And Protection Of Human Rights And Fundamental Freedoms While Countering Terrorism, Martin Scheinin*\n\n\n\nCompilation of good practices on legal and institutional frameworks\nand measures that ensure respect for human rights by intelligence agencies while countering terrorism, including on their oversight**\n\n## Summary\n\n\nThe present document is a compilation of good practices on legal and institutional frameworks and measures that ensure respect for human rights by intelligence agencies while countering terrorism, including on their oversight, as requested by the Human Rights Council and prepared by the Special Rapporteur on the protection and promotion of human rights and fundamental freedoms while countering terrorism. The compilation is the outcome of a consultation process where Governments, experts and practitioners in various ways provided their input. In particular, written submissions received from Governments by a deadline of 1 May 2010 have been taken into account. The submissions will be reproduced in the form of an addendum (A/HRC/14/46/Add.1).\n\nThe outcome of the process is the identification of 35 elements of good practice.\n\nThe elements of good practice were distilled from existing and emerging practices in a broad range of States throughout the world. The compilation also draws upon international treaties, resolutions of international organizations and the jurisprudence of regional courts.\n\n\nThe substance of the elements of good practice is explained in the commentary, usually presented separately for each of the 35 elements. The sources of good practice are\n\n\n\nidentified in the footnotes to the commentary, which include references to individual States.\n\n\nThe notion of \"good practice\" refers to legal and institutional frameworks that serve\nto promote human rights and the respect for the rule of law in the work of intelligence\nservices. Good practice not only refers to what is required by international law, including\nhuman rights law, but goes beyond these legally-binding obligations.\n\nThe 35 areas of good practice included in the compilation are grouped into four\n\"baskets\", namely legal basis (practices 15), oversight and accountability (practices 610\nand 1418), substantive human rights compliance (practices 1113 and 1920) and issues related to specific functions of intelligence agencies (practices 2135).\n\n\n## Contents\n\n|     | Paragraphs    | Page                                                                |\n|-----|---------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------|\n|     |               |                                                                     |\n|     | I.            | Introduction                                                        |\n|     | II.           | Compilation of good practices on legal and institutional frameworks |\n|     |               | for intelligence services and their oversight                       |\n|     |               | A.                                                                  |\n|     |               | B.                                                                  |\n|     |               | C.                                                                  |\n|     |               | D.                                                                  |\n|     |               | E.                                                                  |\n|     |               | F.                                                                  |\n|     |               | G.                                                                  |\n|     |               | H.                                                                  |\n|     |               | I.                                                                  |\n|     |               | J.                                                                  |\n|     |               | K.                                                                  |\n|     |               | L.                                                                  |\n\n## Annex\n\n|     | Good practices on legal and institutional frameworks for intelligence services and their oversight .    | 30    |\n|-----|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------|\n\n## I. Introduction*\n\n1.\n\nThe present compilation of good practice on legal and institutional frameworks for intelligence services and their oversight is the outcome of a consultation process mandated by the Human Rights Council, which, in its resolution 10/15, called upon the Special Rapporteur to prepare, working in consultation with States and other relevant stakeholders, a compilation of good practices on legal and institutional frameworks and measures that ensure respect for human rights by intelligence agencies while countering terrorism, including on their oversight. 2.\n\nIntelligence services1 play a critical role in protecting the State and its population against threats to national security, including terrorism. They help to enable States to fulfil their positive obligation to safeguard the human rights of all individuals under their jurisdiction. Hence, effective performance and the protection of human rights can be mutually complementary goals for intelligence services. 3.\n\nThe compilation is distilled from existing and emerging practice from a broad range of States throughout the world. These practices are primarily derived from national laws, institutional models, as well as the jurisprudence and recommendations of national oversight institutions and a number of civil society organizations. The compilation also draws upon international treaties, resolutions of international organizations and the jurisprudence of regional courts. In this context, the notion of \"good practice\" refers to legal and institutional frameworks which serve to promote human rights and the respect for the rule of law in the work of intelligence services. \"Good practice\" not only refers to what is required by international law, including human rights law, but goes beyond these legally binding obligations. 4.\n\nVery few States have included all of the practices outlined below in their legal and institutional frameworks for intelligence services and their oversight. Some States will be able to identify themselves as following the majority of the 35 elements of good practice. Other States may start by committing themselves to a small number of these elements which they consider as essential to promoting human rights compliance by intelligence services and their oversight bodies. 5.\n\nIt is not the purpose of this compilation to promulgate a set of normative standards that should apply at all times and in all parts of the world. Hence, the elements of good practice presented in this report are formulated in descriptive, rather than normative, language. It is nevertheless possible to identify common practices that contribute to the respect for the rule of law and human rights by intelligence services. 6.\n\nThe Human Rights Council mandated the present compilation of good practices within the context of the role of intelligence services in counter-terrorism. However, it should be noted that the legal and institutional frameworks which apply to intelligence services' counter-terrorism activities cannot be separated from those which apply to their\n\n\nactivities more generally. While international terrorism has, since 2001, changed the landscape for the operation of intelligence agencies, the effects of that change go beyond the field of counter-terrorism.\n7.\n\nThe compilation highlights examples of good practice from numerous national laws and institutional models. It is, however, important to note that the citation of specific provisions from national laws or institutional models does not imply a general endorsement of these laws and institutions as good practice in protecting human rights in the context of counter-terrorism. Additionally, the Special Rapporteur wishes to emphasize that the existence of legal and institutional frameworks which represent good practice is essential, but not sufficient for ensuring that intelligence services respect human rights in their counter-terrorism activities. 8.\n\nThe 35 areas of good practice presented below are grouped into four different\n\"baskets\", namely legal basis (15), oversight and accountability (610 and 1418), substantive human rights compliance (1113 and 1920) and issues relating to specific functions of intelligence agencies (2135). For reasons of presentation, the elements are grouped under a somewhat higher number of subheadings.\n\n## Ii. Compilation Of Good Practices On Legal And Institutional Frameworks For Intelligence Services And Their Oversight A. Mandate And Legal Basis\n\nPractice 1. Intelligence services play an important role in protecting national security and upholding the rule of law. Their main purpose is to collect, analyse and disseminate information that assists policymakers and other public entities in taking measures to protect national security. This includes the protection of the population and their human rights.\n9.\n\nThe functions of intelligence services differ from one country to another; however, the collection, analysis and dissemination of information relevant to the protection of national security is the core task performed by most intelligence services:2 indeed, many States limit the role of their intelligence services to this task. This represents good practice, because it prevents intelligence services from undertaking additional security-related activities already performed by other public bodies and which may represent particular threats to human rights if performed by intelligence services. In addition to defining the types of activities their intelligence services may perform, many States also limit the rationale for these activities to the protection of national security. While the understanding of national security varies among States, it is good practice for national security and its constituent values to be clearly defined in legislation adopted by parliament.3 This is important for ensuring that intelligence services confine their activities to helping to safeguard values that are enshrined in a public definition of national security. In many areas, safeguarding national security necessarily includes the protection of the population and its human rights;4 indeed, a number of States explicitly include the protection of human rights as one of the core functions of their intelligence services.5\nPractice 2. The mandates of intelligence services are narrowly and precisely defined in a publicly available law. Mandates are strictly limited to protecting legitimate national security interests as outlined in publicly available legislation or national security policies, and identify the threats to national security that intelligence services are tasked to address. If terrorism is included among these threats, it is defined in narrow and precise terms.\n10.\n\nThe mandates of intelligence services are one of the primary instruments for ensuring that their activities (including in the context of counter-terrorism) serve the interests of the country and its population, and do not present a threat to the constitutional order and/or human rights. In the majority of States, intelligence services' mandates are clearly delineated in a publicly available law, promulgated by parliament.6 It is good practice for mandates to be narrowly and precisely formulated, and to enumerate all of the threats to national security that intelligence services are responsible for addressing.7 Clear and precise mandates facilitate accountability processes, enabling oversight and review bodies to hold intelligence services to account for their performance of specific functions. Finally, a clear definition of threats is particularly relevant in the context of counterterrorism; many States have adopted legislation that provides precise definitions of terrorism, as well as of terrorist groups and activities.8\nPractice 3. The powers and competences of intelligence services are clearly and exhaustively defined in national law. They are required to use these powers exclusively for the purposes for which they were given. In particular, any powers given to intelligence services for the purposes of counter-terrorism must be used exclusively for these purposes.\n\n11.\n\nIt is a fundamental tenet of the rule of law that all powers and competences of intelligence services are outlined in law.9 An exhaustive enumeration of the powers and competences of intelligence services promotes transparency and enables people to foresee\n\nGuidelines on human rights in the fight against terrorism, art. I.\n\n5 Croatia (footnote 2), art. 1.1; Switzerland, Loi federale instituant des mesures visant au maintien de la\nsurete interieure, art. 1; Brazil (footnote 2), art. 1(1).\n\n6 Norway, Act relating to the Norwegian Intelligence Service, sect. 8; Bosnia and Herzegovina, Law on\nthe Intelligence and Security Agency, arts. 56; Brazil (footnote 2), art. 4; Canada, Security Intelligence Service Act, sects. 1216; Australia (footnote 3), sect. 17. This practice was also recommended in Morocco, Instance equite et reconciliation, rapport final, Vol. I, Verite, equite et reconciliation, 2005, chapitre IV, 8-3 (hereafter Morocco - ER Report); European Commission for Democracy Through Law, Internal Security Services in Europe, CDL-INF(1998)006, I, B (b) and (c) (hereafter Venice Commission (1998)).\n\n7 Canada (footnote 6), sect. 2; Malaysia, report of the Royal Commission to enhance the operation and\nmanagement of the Royal Malaysia Police of 2005, (hereafter Malaysia - Royal Police Commission), 2.11.3 (p. 316); Croatia (footnote 2), art. 23(1); Australia (footnote 3), sect. 4; Germany (footnote 2), sects. 3(1) and 4; United States of America, Executive Order 12333, art. 1.4 (b).\n\n8 Romania, Law on Preventing and Countering Terrorism, art. 4; Norway, Criminal Code, sect. 147a;\nNew Zealand, Intelligence and Security Service Act, sect. 2.\n\n9 Croatia (footnote 2), Arts. 2537; Lithuania, Law on State Security Department, art. 3; Germany\n(footnote 2), sect. 8. See also: South African Ministerial Review Commission, p. 157; Canada,\nwhat powers may be used against them. This is particularly important given that many of the powers held by intelligence services have the potential to infringe upon human rights and fundamental freedoms.10 This practice is closely connected to practice 2, because the mandates of intelligence services serve to define the framework within which they can use the powers given by the legislature.11 A prohibition of *detournement de pouvoir* is implicit in the legislation of many States as intelligence services are only permitted to use their powers for very specific purposes. This is particularly in the context of counter-terrorism, because many intelligence services have been endowed with greater powers for these purposes.\n\nPractice 4. All intelligence services are constituted through, and operate under, publicly available laws that comply with the Constitution and international human rights law. Intelligence services can only undertake or be instructed to undertake activities that are prescribed by and in accordance with national law. The use of subsidiary regulations that are not publicly available is strictly limited, and such regulations are both authorized by and remain within the parameters of publicly available laws. Regulations that are not made public do not serve as the basis for any activities that restrict human rights.\n\nPractice 5. Intelligence services are explicitly prohibited from undertaking any action that contravenes the Constitution or international human rights law. These prohibitions extend not only to the conduct of intelligence services on their national territory but also to their activities abroad.\n12.\n\nIntelligence services are organs of the State and thus, in common with other executive bodies, are bound by relevant provisions of national and international law, and in particular human rights law.12 This implies that they are based upon and operate in accordance with publicly available laws that comply with the Constitution of the State, as well as, inter alia, the State's international human rights obligations. States cannot rely upon domestic law to justify violations of international human rights law or indeed any other international legal obligations.13 The rule of law requires that the activities of intelligence services and any instructions issued to them by the political executive comply with these bodies of law in all of their work.14 Accordingly, intelligence services are prohibited from undertaking, or being asked to undertake, any action that would violate national statutory law, the Constitution or the State's human rights obligations. In many States, these requirements are implicit; however, it is notably good practice for national legislation to make explicit reference to these broader legal obligations and, in particular, to the obligation to respect human rights.15 Subordinate regulations pertaining to the internal\n\n\nprocesses and activities of intelligence services are sometimes withheld from the public in order to protect their working methods. These types of regulations do not serve as the basis for activities that infringe human rights. It is good practice for any subordinate regulation to be based on and comply with applicable public legislation.16\n\n## B. Oversight Institutions\n\nPractice 6. Intelligence services are overseen by a combination of internal, executive, parliamentary, judicial and specialized oversight institutions whose mandates and powers are based on publicly available law. An effective system of intelligence oversight includes at least one civilian institution that is independent of both the intelligence services and the executive. The combined remit of oversight institutions covers all aspects of the work of intelligence services, including their compliance with the law; the effectiveness and efficiency of their activities; their finances; and their administrative practices.\n\n13.\n\nIn common with intelligence services, the institutions that oversee their activities are based on law and, in some cases, founded on the Constitution.17 There is no single model for the oversight intelligence services; however, the following components are commonly included in comprehensive systems of oversight:18 internal management and control mechanisms within intelligence services;19\nexecutive oversight;20\noversight by parliamentary bodies;21 as well as specialized and/or judicial oversight bodies.22 It is good\n\nBosnia and Herzegovina (footnote 6), art. 1; Brazil (footnote 2), art. 1(1); Croatia (footnote 2), art. 2(2); Ecuador, State and Public Safety Act, art. 3; Lithuania (footnote 9), art. 5; Romania, Law on the National Security of Romania, arts. 5, 16; Mexico (reply).\nCommission 2.11.3 (p. 316); Kenya, National Security Intelligence Act, art. 31; South Africa, Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa, report, vol. 5, chap. 8, p. 328. 209210.\n\n18 See S/2008/39, para. 6. While not included in the present compilation, it should be underlined that\ncivil society organizations also play an important role in the public oversight of intelligence services; see reply of Madagascar.\n\n19 For an elaboration on internal management and control mechanisms, see South African Ministerial\nReview Committee, p. 204; European Commission for Democracy through Law, report on the democratic oversight of the security services, CDL-AD(2007), point 131 (hereafter Venice Commission (2007)); OECD DAC handbook on security system reform: supporting security and justice; United Kingdom, Intelligence Security Committee, annual report 20012002, p. 46. See also The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (reply).\n\n20 On executive control of intelligence services, see Croatia (footnote 2), art. 15; United Kingdom,\nSecurity Services Act, sects. 2(1), 4(1); Argentina (footnote 2), art. 14; Netherlands, Intelligence and\nSecurity Services Act, art. 20(2); Sierra Leone (footnote 14), art. 24; Bulgaria (footnote 15), art. 131; Azerbaijan, Law on Intelligence and Counter-Intelligence Activities, art. 22.2.\n\n21 For legislation on parliamentary oversight of intelligence services, see Albania, Law on National\nIntelligence Service, art. 7; Brazil (footnote 2), art. 6; Romania (footnote 2), art. 1; Ecuador (footnote 14), art. 24; Botswana, Intelligence and Security Act, sect. 38; Croatia (footnote2), art. 104;\nSwitzerland (footnote 5), art. 25, Loi sur l'Assemblee federale, art. 53(2); Germany (footnote 17), art. 45d; Bulgaria (footnote 15), art. 132; The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (reply). See also Morocco, IER Report, p. 11. In Latvia, the National Security Committee of the parliament (*Saeima*) is\nresponsible for parliamentary oversight of the intelligence service (reply); Georgia, Law on Intelligence Activity, art. 16.\n\n22 For specialized intelligence oversight bodies, see Norway, Act on Monitoring of Intelligence,\npractice for this multilevel system of oversight to include at least one institution that is fully independent of both the intelligence services and the political executive. This approach ensures that there is a separation of powers in the oversight of intelligence services; the institutions that commission, undertake and receive the outputs of intelligence activities are not the only institutions that oversee these activities. All dimensions of the work of intelligence services are subject to the oversight of one or a combination of external institutions. One of the primary functions of a system of oversight is to scrutinize intelligence services' compliance with applicable law, including human rights. Oversight institutions are mandated to hold intelligence services and their employees to account for any violations of the law.23 In addition, oversight institutions assess the performance of intelligence services.24 This includes examining whether intelligence services make efficient and effective use of the public funds allocated to them.25 An effective system of oversight is particularly important in the field of intelligence because these services conduct much of their work in secret and hence cannot be easily overseen by the public. Intelligence oversight institutions serve to foster public trust and confidence in the work of intelligence services by ensuring that they perform their statutory functions in accordance with respect for the rule of law and human rights.26\nPractice 7. Oversight institutions have the power, resources and expertise to initiate and conduct their own investigations, as well as full and unhindered access to the information, officials and installations necessary to fulfil their mandates. Oversight institutions receive the full cooperation of intelligence services and law enforcement authorities in hearing witnesses, as well as obtaining documentation and other evidence.\n\n14.\n\nOversight institutions enjoy specific powers to enable them to perform their functions. In particular, they have the power to initiate their own investigations into areas of the intelligence service's work that fall under their mandates, and are granted access to all information necessary to do so. These powers of access to information encompass the legal authority to view all relevant files and documents,27 inspect the premises of intelligence services,28 and to summon any member of the intelligence services to give evidence under oath.29 These powers help to ensure that overseers can effectively scrutinize the activities of intelligence services and fully investigate possible contraventions of the law. A number of States have taken steps to reinforce the investigative competences of oversight institutions\n\nThreat Analysis, chapter 3.\n\n23 For mandates to oversee intelligence services' compliance with the law, see Lithuania, Law on\nOperational Activities, art. 23(2)12; Croatia (footnote 2), art. 112; Norway (footnote 22), sect. 2. In\nSouth Africa, the Inspector-General for intelligence examines intelligence services' compliance with\nthe law and Constitution; see South Africa, Intelligence Services Oversight Act, sect. 7(7) a-b.\n\n26 Commission of Inquiry into the Actions of Canadian Officials in Relation to Maher Arar, a new\nreview mechanism for the RMCP's national security activities (hereafter the Arar Commission), p. 469.\nby criminalizing any failure to cooperate with them.30 This implies that oversight institutions have recourse to law enforcement authorities in order to secure the cooperation of relevant individuals.31 While strong legal powers are essential for effective oversight, it is good practice for these to be accompanied by the human and financial resources needed to make use of these powers, and, thus, to fulfil their mandates. Accordingly, many oversight institutions have their own independent budget provided directly by parliament,32\nthe capacity to employ specialized staff,33 and to engage the services of external experts.34\nPractice 8. Oversight institutions take all necessary measures to protect classified information and personal data to which they have access during the course of their work. Penalties are provided for the breach of these requirements by members of oversight institutions.\n\n15.\n\nIntelligence oversight institutions have access to classified and sensitive information during the course of their work. Therefore, a variety of mechanisms are put in place to ensure that oversight institutions and their members do not disclose such information either inadvertently or deliberately. Firstly, in almost all cases, members and staffers of oversight institutions are prohibited from making unauthorized disclosure of information; failure to comply with these proscriptions is generally sanctioned through civil and/or criminal penalties.35 Secondly, many oversight institutions also subject members and staff to security clearance procedures before giving them access to classified information.36 An alternative to this approach, most commonly seen in parliamentary oversight institutions, is for members to be required to sign a non-disclosure agreement.37 Ultimately, the appropriate handling of classified information by oversight institutions also relies upon the professional behaviour of the members of the oversight institutions.\n\n## C. Complaints And Effective Remedy\n\nPractice 9. Any individual who believes that her or his rights have been infringed by an intelligence service is able to bring a complaint to a court or oversight institution, such as an ombudsman, human rights commissioner or national human rights institution. Individuals affected by the illegal actions of an intelligence service have recourse to an institution that can provide an effective remedy, including full reparation for the harm suffered.\n16.\n\nIt is widely acknowledged that any measure restricting human rights must be accompanied by adequate safeguards, including independent institutions, through which individuals can seek redress in the event that their rights are violated.38 Intelligence services possess a range of powers - including powers of surveillance, arrest and detention, which, if misused, may violate human rights. Accordingly, institutions exist to handle complaints raised by individuals who believe their rights have been violated by intelligence services and, where necessary, to provide victims of human rights violations with an effective remedy. Two broad approaches can be distinguished in this regard.39 First, States have established a range of non-judicial institutions to handle complaints pertaining to intelligence services. These include the ombudsman,40 the national human rights commission,41 the national audit office,42 the parliamentary oversight body,43 the inspector general,44 the specialized intelligence oversight body45 and the complaints commission for intelligence services.46 These institutions are empowered to receive and investigate complaints; however, since they cannot generally issue binding orders or provide remedies, victims of human rights violations have to seek remedies through the courts. Second, judicial institutions may receive complaints pertaining to intelligence services. These institutions may be judicial bodies set up exclusively for this purpose,47 or part of the general judicial system; they are usually empowered to order remedial action.\n\nPractice 10. The institutions responsible for addressing complaints and claims for effective remedy arising from the activities of intelligence services are independent of the intelligence services and the political executive. Such institutions have full and unhindered access to all relevant information, the necessary resources and expertise to conduct investigations, and the capacity to issue binding orders.\n17.\n\nIn order for an institution to provide effective remedies for human rights violations, it must be independent of the institutions involved in the impugned activities, able to ensure procedural fairness, have sufficient investigative capacity and expertise, and the capacity to issue binding decisions.48 For this reason, States have endowed such institutions with the requisite legal powers to investigate complaints and provide remedies to victims of human rights violations perpetrated by intelligence services. These powers include full and\n\n\nRights and Fundamental Freedoms, art. 13; International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 2.\n\n39 Hans Born and Ian Leigh, Making Intelligence Accountable: Legal Standards and Best Practice for\nOversight of Intelligence Agencies, Oslo, Publishing House of the Parliament of Norway, 2005, p. 105.\n\n40 Netherlands (footnote 20), art. 83; in Finland: with regard to data stored by the intelligence service,\nthe Data Protection Ombudsman (reply); Greece: Ombudsman (reply); Estonia: Legal Chancellor (reply).\n\n41 Jordan, Law on the National Centre for Human Rights.\n\n42 For control of the budget of the intelligence service: Costa Rica, Organic Act of the Republic's\nGeneral Audit.\n\n43 Romania (footnote 15), art. 16.\n\n44 South Africa (footnote 23), sect. 7(7).\n\n45 Norway (footnote 22), art. 3; Canada (footnote 6), sects. 41, 42, 46 and 50.\n\n46 Kenya (footnote 16), arts. 2426.\n\n47 United Kingdom, Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act, arts. 6570; Sierra Leone (footnote 14),\narts. 2425.\n\n48 Iain Cameron, National security and the European Convention on Human Rights: Trends and\npatterns, presented at the Stockholm international symposium on national security and the European Convention on Human Rights, p. 50.\nunhindered access to all relevant information, investigative powers to summon witnesses and to receive testimony under oath,49 the power to determine their own procedures in relation to any proceedings, and the capacity to issue binding orders.50\n\n## D. Impartiality And Non-Discrimination\n\nPractice 11. Intelligence services carry out their work in a manner that contributes to the promotion and protection of the human rights and fundamental freedoms of all individuals under the jurisdiction of the State. Intelligence services do not discriminate against individuals or groups on the grounds of their sex, race, colour, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, or other status.\n18.\n\nIntelligence services are an integral part of the State apparatus that contributes to safeguarding the human rights of all individuals under the jurisdiction of the State. They are bound by the well-established principle of international human rights law of nondiscrimination. This principle requires States to respect the rights and freedoms of individuals without discrimination on any prohibited ground.51 Many States have enshrined the principle in national law, requiring their intelligence services to fulfil their mandates in a manner that serves the interests of the State and society as a whole. Intelligence services are explicitly prohibited from acting or being used to further the interests of any ethnic, religious, political or other group.52 In addition, States ensure that the activities of their intelligence services (in particular in the context of counter-terrorism) are undertaken on the basis of individuals' behaviour, and not on the basis of their ethnicity, religion or other such criteria.53 Some States have also explicitly proscribed their intelligence services from establishing files on individuals on this basis.54\nPractice 12. National law prohibits intelligence services from engaging in any political activities or from acting to promote or protect the interests of any particular political, religious, linguistic, ethnic, social or economic group.\n19.\n\nIntelligence services are endowed with powers that have the potential to promote or damage the interest of particular political groups. In order to ensure that intelligence services remain politically neutral, national laws prohibit intelligence services from acting in the interest of any political group.55 This obligation is not only incumbent upon the intelligence services but also upon the political executives whom they serve. A number of States have also passed measures to prohibit or limit intelligence services' involvement in party politics. Examples of these measures include prohibitions on employees of intelligence services being members of political parties; accepting instructions or money from a political party;56 or from acting to further the interests of any political party.57 In addition, various States have taken measures to safeguard the neutrality of the directors of intelligence services. For example, the appointment of the director of intelligence services is open to scrutiny from outside the executive;58 there are legal provisions on the duration of tenure and specification of the grounds for the dismissal of directors, as well as safeguards against improper pressure being applied on directors of intelligence services.59\nPractice 13. Intelligence services are prohibited from using their powers to target lawful political activity or other lawful manifestations of the rights to freedom of association, peaceful assembly and expression.\n\n20.\n\nIntelligence services have recourse to information-collection measures that may interfere with legitimate political activities and other manifestations of the freedoms of expression, association and assembly.60 These rights are fundamental to the functioning of a free society, including political parties, the media and civil society. Therefore, States have taken measures to reduce the scope for their intelligence services to target (or to be asked to target) these individuals and groups engaged in these activities. Such measures include absolute prohibitions on targeting lawful activities, and strict limitations on both the use of intelligence collection measures (see practice 21) and the retention and use of personal data collected by intelligence services (see practice 23).61 In view of the fact that the media plays a crucial role in any society, some States have instituted specific measures to protect journalists from being targeted by intelligence services.62\n\n## E. State Responsibility For Intelligence Services\n\nPractice 14. States are internationally responsible for the activities of their intelligence services and agents, and any private contractors they engage, regardless of where these activities take place and who the victim of internationally wrongful conduct is. Therefore, the executive power takes measures to ensure and exercise overall control of and responsibility for their intelligence services.\n21.\n\nStates are responsible under international law for the activities of their intelligence services and agents wherever they operate in the world. This responsibility extends to any private contractors that States engage to undertake intelligence functions.63 States have a legal obligation to ensure that their intelligence services do not violate human rights and to\n\n17(3). Organizations having Committed Indiscriminate Mass Murder, art. 3(1) and (2); United Republic of\nTanzania, Intelligence and Security Act, art. 5 (2)b.\nprovide remedies to the individuals concerned if such violations occur.64 Accordingly, they take steps to regulate and manage their intelligence services in a manner that promotes respect for the rule of law and in particular, compliance with international human rights law.65 Executive control of intelligence services is essential for these purposes and is therefore enshrined in many national laws.66\n\n## F. Individual Responsibility And Accountability\n\nPractice 15. Constitutional, statutory and international criminal law applies to members of intelligence services as much as it does to any other public official. Any exceptions allowing intelligence officials to take actions that would normally violate national law are strictly limited and clearly prescribed by law. These exceptions never allow the violation of peremptory norms of international law or of the human rights obligations of the State.\n\n22.\n\nWhile great emphasis is placed on the institutional responsibilities of intelligence services, individual members of intelligence services are also responsible and held to account for their actions.67 As a general rule, constitutional, statutory and international criminal law applies to intelligence officers as much as it does to any other individual.68\nMany States have made it a cause for civil liability or a criminal offence for any member of an intelligence service to knowingly violate and/or order or request an action that would violate constitutional or statutory law.69 This practice promotes respect for the rule of law within intelligence services, and helps to prevent impunity. Many States give members of their intelligence services the authority to engage in activities which, if undertaken by ordinary citizens, would constitute criminal offences.70 It is good practice that any such authorizations be strictly limited, prescribed by law and subject to appropriate safeguards.71\nStatutory provisions that authorize intelligence officers to undertake acts that would normally be illegal under national law do not extend to any actions that would violate the Constitution or non-derogable international human rights standards. 72\nPractice 16. National laws provide for criminal, civil or other sanctions against any member, or individual acting on behalf of an intelligence service, who violates or\n\n\n\noperations and their intersect.s with criminal justice systems?\", *Revue international de droit penal* 78,\nno.1 (2007), pp. 5777; European Commission for Democracy through Law, opinion 363/2005 on the International Legal Obligations of Council of Europe Member States in Respect of Secret Detention Facilities and Inter-State Transport of Prisoners, p. 15.\nPanel on Terrorism, Counter-terrorism and Human Rights, pp. 8589 (hereafter ICJ-EJP report); Imtiaz Fazel, \"Who shall guard the guards?: civilian operational oversight and Inspector General of Intelligence\", in \"To spy or not to spy? Intelligence and Democracy in South Africa\", p. 31.\norders an action that would violate national law or international human rights law. These laws also establish procedures to hold individuals to account for such violations.\n\n23.\n\nStates ensure that employees of intelligence services are held to account for any violations of the law by providing and enforcing sanctions for particular offences. This serves to promote respect for the rule of law and human rights within intelligence services. Many national laws regulating intelligence services include specific sanctions for employees who violate these laws or other applicable provisions of national and international law.73 Given that many of the activities of intelligence services take place in secret, criminal offences (perpetrated by employees) may not be detected by the relevant prosecutorial authorities. Therefore, it is good practice for national law to require the management of intelligence services to refer cases of possible criminal wrongdoing to prosecutorial authorities.74 In cases of serious human rights violations, such as torture, States are under an international legal obligation to prosecute members of the intelligence services.75 The criminal responsibility of employees of intelligence services may be engaged not only through their direct participation in the given activities, but also if they order or are otherwise complicit in such activities..76\nPractice 17. Members of intelligence services are legally obliged to refuse superior orders that would violate national law or international human rights law. Appropriate protection is provided to members of intelligence services who refuse orders in such situations.\n24.\n\nIt is good practice for national laws to require members of intelligence services to refuse orders that they believe would violate national law or international human rights law.77 While this provision is more common in laws regulating armed forces, several States have included it in statutes regulating their intelligence services.78 A requirement for members of intelligence services to refuse illegal orders is an important safeguard against possible human rights abuses, as well as against incumbent Governments ordering intelligence services to take action to further or protect their own interests. It is a wellestablished principle of international law that individuals are not absolved of criminal responsibility for serious human rights violations by virtue of having been requested to undertake an action by a superior.79 Hence, to avoid individual criminal liability, members of intelligence services are required to refuse to carry out any orders that they should understand to be manifestly unlawful. This underlines the importance of human rights training for intelligence officers because they need to be aware of their rights and duties under international law (see practice 19). In order to promote an environment in which human rights abuses are not tolerated, States provide legal protections against reprisals for members of intelligence services who refuse to carry out illegal orders.80 The obligation to refuse illegal orders is closely linked to the availability of internal and external mechanisms through which intelligence service employees can voice their concerns about illegal orders (see practice 18 below).\nPractice 18. There are internal procedures in place for members of intelligence services to report wrongdoing. These are complemented by an independent body that has a mandate and access to the necessary information to fully investigate and take action to address wrongdoing when internal procedures have proved inadequate. Members of intelligence services who, acting in good faith, report wrongdoing are legally protected from any form of reprisal. These protections extend to disclosures made to the media or the public at large if they are made as a last resort and pertain to matters of significant public concern.\n25.\n\nEmployees of intelligence services are often first, and best, placed to identify wrongdoing within intelligence services, such as human rights violations, financial malpractice and other contraventions of statutory law. Accordingly, it is good practice for national law to outline specific procedures for members of intelligence services to disclose concerns about wrongdoing.81 These provisions aim to encourage members of intelligence services to report wrongdoing, while at the same time ensuring that disclosures of potentially sensitive information are made and investigated in a controlled manner. State practice demonstrates that there are several channels for such disclosures, including internal mechanisms to receive and investigate disclosures made by members of intelligence services,82 external institutions to receive and investigate disclosures, and members of intelligence services making disclosures directly to these institutions.83 In some systems, members of intelligence services may only approach the external institution if the internal body has failed to address adequately their concerns.84 In some States, members of intelligence services are permitted to make public disclosures as a last resort or when such disclosures concern particularly grave matters, such as a threat to life.85 Regardless of the precise nature of the channels for disclosure, it is good practice for national law to afford individuals who make disclosures authorized by law to protection against reprisals.86\n\nof America, Department of Justice, Whistleblower Protection for Federal Bureau of Investigation Employees, Federal Register, vol. 64, No. 210 (Inspector General and the Office of Professional Responsibility).\n\n83 Germany (footnote 36), sect. 8(1); New Zealand (footnote 81), sect. 12. It should be noted that, in\nNew Zealand, the Inspector-General is the only designated channel for protected disclosures.\n\n84 United States of America (footnote 35), title 50, sect. 403(q), 5; Canada (footnote 6), sect. 15 (5);\nAustralia, Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security Act 1986, sect.s 8 (1)a,(2)a,(3)a and 9(5).\n\n85 Canada (footnote 81), sect. 15; Germany, Criminal Code, sects. 93(2), 97a and 97b. The importance\nof public disclosures as a last resort was also highlighted in the report \"Whistleblower protection: a comprehensive scheme for the Commonwealth public sector\" House of Representatives Standing Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affaires on the inquiry into whistleblowing protection within\nthe Australian Government public sector, pp. 163164; see also National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, \"The 911 Commission Report\", chapter 3.\n\n86 Netherlands, Government Decree of 15 December 2009 Laying Down a Procedure for Reporting\nSuspected Abuses in the Police and Government Sectors, art. 2; United States of America, title 5, US Code, sect. 2303(a); Bosnia and Herzegovina (footnote 6), art. 42; Australia (footnote footnote 84), sect. 33; Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, Draft Resolution on the protection of whistleblowers, doc. 12006, paras. 6.2.2 and 6.2.5.\n\n## G. Professionalism\n\nPractice 19. Intelligence services and their oversight institutions take steps to foster an institutional culture of professionalism based on respect for the rule of law and human rights. In particular, intelligence services are responsible for training their members on relevant provisions of national and international law, including international human rights law.\n26.\n\nThe institutional culture of an intelligence service refers to widely shared or dominant values, attitudes and practices of employees. It is one of the main factors defining the attitude of intelligence officials towards the rule of law and human rights.87 Indeed, legal and institutional frameworks alone cannot ensure that members of intelligence services comply with human rights and the rule of law. A number of States and their intelligence services have formulated codes of ethics or principles of professionalism in order to promote an institutional culture that values and fosters respect for human rights and the rule of law.88 Codes of conduct typically include provisions on appropriate behaviour, discipline and ethical standards that apply to all members of intelligence services.89 In some States, the minister responsible for intelligence services promulgates such documents; this ensures political accountability for their content.90 It is good practice for codes of conduct\n(and similar documents) to be subject to the scrutiny of internal and external oversight institutions.91 Training is a second key instrument for the promotion of a professional institutional culture within intelligence services. Many intelligence services have initiated training programmes that emphasize professionalism and educate employees on relevant constitutional standards, statutory law and international human rights law.92 It is good practice for these training programmes to be both required and regulated by law, and to include all (prospective) members of intelligence services.93 Finally, a professional culture can be reinforced by internal personnel management policies that reward ethical and professional conduct.\n\n## H. Human Rights Safeguards\n\nPractice 20. Any measures by intelligence services that restrict human rights and fundamental freedoms comply with the following criteria:\n\n\n(a)\nThey are prescribed by publicly available law that complies with\ninternational human rights standards;\n\n(b)\nAll such measures must be strictly necessary for an intelligence\nservice to fulfil its legally prescribed mandate;\nsee also Bulgaria (footnote 15), art. 66 (with regard to application of the Ethical Code of Behaviour for Civil Servants to members of the intelligence services).\n\nservice professionalism, South African Intelligence Services.\n\n(c)\nMeasures taken must be proportionate to the objective. This requires\nthat intelligence services select the measure that least restricts human rights, and take special care to minimize the adverse impact of any measures on the rights of\nindividuals, including, in particular, persons who are not suspected of any\nwrongdoing;\n(d)\nNo measure taken by intelligence services may violate peremptory\nnorms of international law or the essence of any human right;\n(e)\nThere is a clear and comprehensive system for the authorization,\nmonitoring and oversight of the use of any measure that restricts human rights;\n(f)\nIndividuals whose rights may have been restricted by intelligence\nservices are able to address complaints to an independent institution and seek an\neffective remedy.\n27.\n\nUnder national law, most intelligence services are permitted to undertake activities that restrict human rights. These powers are primarily found in the area of intelligence collection but also include law enforcement measures, the use of personal data and the sharing of personal information. National laws contain human rights safeguards for two main reasons: to limit interference with the rights of individuals to what is permissible under international human rights law; and to prevent the arbitrary or unfettered use of these measures.94\n28.\n\nAny measure restricting human rights must be prescribed by a law that is compatible with international human rights standards and in force at the time the measure is taken.95\nSuch a law outlines these measures in narrow and precise terms, sets out strict conditions for their use and establishes that their use must be directly linked to the mandate of an intelligence service.96\n29.\n\nMany national laws also include the requirement that any intelligence measures restricting human rights must be necessary in a democratic society.97 Necessity entails that the use of any measures is clearly and rationally linked to the protection of legitimate national security interests as defined in national law.98\n30.\n\nThe principle of proportionality is enshrined in laws of many States and requires that any measures that restrict human rights must be proportionate to the specified (and legally permissible) aims.99 In order to ensure that measures taken by intelligence services are proportionate, many States require their intelligence services to use the least intrusive means possible for the achievement of a given objective.100\n31.\n\nIntelligence services are prohibited by national law from using any measures that would violate international human rights standards and/or peremptory norms of international law. Some States have included explicit prohibitions on serious human rights violations in their laws on intelligence services.101 While non-derogable human rights may be singled out as inviolable, every human right includes an essential core that is beyond the reach of permissible limitations.\n\n32.\n\nStates ensure that intelligence measures that restrict human rights are subject to a legally prescribed process of authorization, as well as ex post oversight and review (see practices 6, 7, 21, 22, 28 and 32). 33.\n\nIt is a fundamental requirement of international human rights law that victims of human rights violations be able to seek redress and remedy. Many States have procedures in place to ensure that individuals have access to an independent institution that can adjudicate on such claims (see practices 9 and 10 above).102\n\n## I. Intelligence Collection\n\nPractice 21. National law outlines the types of collection measures available to intelligence services; the permissible objectives of intelligence collection; the categories of persons and activities which may be subject to intelligence collection; the threshold of suspicion required to justify the use of collection measures; the limitations on the duration for which collection measures may be used; and the procedures for authorizing, overseeing and reviewing the use of intelligencecollection measures.\n\n34.\n\nIn most States, intelligence services have recourse to intrusive measures, such as covert surveillance and the interception of communications, in order to collect information necessary to fulfil their mandates. It is a fundamental requirement of the rule of law that individuals must be aware of measures that public authorities may use to restrict their rights and be able to foresee which activities may give rise to their use.103 National law outlines the categories of persons and activities that may be subject to intelligence collection,104 as well as the threshold of suspicion required for particular collection measures to be initiated.105 Some national laws also impose specific limitations on the use of intrusive collection measures against particular categories of individuals, notably journalists and lawyers.106 These measures are designed to protect professional privileges deemed to be essential to the functioning of a free society, such as the right of journalists not to disclose their sources, or lawyer-client privilege. Strict limitations on the use of intrusive collection methods help to ensure that intelligence collection is both necessary and limited to individuals and groups that are likely to be involved in activities posing a threat to national security. National law also includes guidelines on the permissible duration of the use of intrusive collection measures, after which time intelligence services are required to seek reauthorization in order to continue using them.107 Similarly, it is good practice for national law to require that intelligence collection measures are ceased as soon as the purpose for which they were used has been fulfilled or if it becomes clear that that purpose cannot be met.108 These provisions serve to minimize infringements on the rights of individuals concerned and help to ensure that intelligence-collection measures meet the requirement of proportionality.\n\nPractice 22. Intelligence-collection measures that impose significant limitations on human rights are authorized and overseen by at least one institution that is external to and independent of the intelligence services. This institution has the power to order the revision, suspension or termination of such collection measures. Intelligence-collection measures that impose significant limitations on human rights are subject to a multilevel process of authorization that includes approval within intelligence services, by the political executive and by an institution that is independent of the intelligence services and the executive.\n\n35.\n\nIt is common practice for national laws to include detailed provisions on the process for authorizing all intelligence collection measures that restrict human rights.109\nAuthorization processes require intelligence services to justify the proposed use of intelligence-collection measures in accordance with a clearly defined legal framework (see practices 20 and 21 above). This is a key mechanism for ensuring that collection measures are used in accordance with the law. It is good practice for intrusive collection measures to be authorized by an institution that is independent of the intelligence services, i.e., a politically accountable member of the executive110 or a (quasi) judicial body.111 Judicial bodies are independent of the intelligence process and therefore best placed to conduct an independent and impartial assessment of an application to use intrusive collection powers.112 Furthermore, it is notably good practice for the authorization of the most intrusive intelligence collection methods (e.g. the interception of the content of communications, the interception of mail and surreptitious entry into property) to include\n\n21(10); South Africa (footnote 23), sect. 11(3)a; Croatia (footnote 2), art. 37; Canada (footnote 6), sect. 21 (5); Hungary (footnote 77), sect. 58(4), sect. 60 (termination); European Court of Human Rights, *Weber & Saravia v. Germany*, para. 95.\n\n108  United Kingdom (footnote 47), sect. 9; Germany (footnote 106), sect. 11(2); Germany (footnote 2),\nsect. 9 (1); European Court of Human Rights, *Huvig v France*, para. 34.\n\n109 Germany (footnote 106), sects. 910; Canada (footnote 6), sect. 21; Netherlands (footnote 20), arts.\n20(4) and 25(4); Kenya (footnote 16), art. 22.\n\n110 Australia (footnote 3), arts. 25, 25a; Netherlands (footnote 20), arts. 19, 20(34), 22 (4), 25; United\nKingdom (footnote 47), sects. 57.\n\n111 Argentina (footnote 2), arts. 18 and 19; Kenya (footnote 16), art. 22; Sierra Leone (footnote 14), art.\n22; Croatia (footnote 2), arts. 3638; Romania (footnote 8), arts. 21 and 22; Canada (footnote 6), sect.\n21 (12); South Africa (footnote 23), sect. 11. See also European Court of Human Rights, Klass v. Germany (footnote 102), para. 56.\nsenior managers in intelligence services, the politically accountable executive and a (quasi)\njudicial body.113\n36.\n\nStates also ensure that intelligence collection is subject to ongoing oversight by an institution that is external to the intelligence services. It is good practice for intelligence services to be required to report on the use of collection measures on an ongoing basis and for the external oversight institution to have the power to order the termination of collection measures.114 In many States, external oversight bodies also conduct ex post oversight of the use of intelligence-collection measures to ascertain whether or not they are authorized and used in compliance with the law.115 This is particularly important in view of the fact that the individuals whose rights are affected by intelligence collection are unlikely to be aware of the fact and, thus, have limited opportunity to challenge its legality.\n\n## J. Management And Use Of Personal Data\n\nPractice 23. Publicly available law outlines the types of personal data that intelligence services may hold, and which criteria apply to the use, retention, deletion and disclosure of these data. Intelligence services are permitted to retain personal data that are strictly necessary for the purposes of fulfilling their mandate.\n\n37.\n\nThere is a number of general principles that apply to the protection of personal data that are commonly included in national laws116 as well as in international instruments.117\nThese include the following requirements: that personal data be collected and processed in a lawful and fair manner; that the use of personal data be limited and confined to its original specified purpose; that steps be taken to ensure that records of personal data are accurate; that personal data files be deleted when no longer required; and that individuals have the right to have access to and correct their personal data file.118 In the context of personal data use by intelligence services, the opening, retention and disposal of personal data files can have serious human rights implications; therefore, guidelines for the management and use of personal data by intelligence services are set out in public statutory law. This is a legal safeguard against giving the executive or the intelligence services unchecked powers over these matters.119 A second safeguard is that legal guidelines are established to specify and\n\nsect. 12 (6). See also Canada, MacDonald Commission, p. 522.\n\n115 United Kingdom (footnote 47), sect. 57(2); Norway, Parliamentary Intelligence Oversight\nCommittee; Netherlands (footnote 20), art. 64(2)(a).\n\n116  Japan, Act on the Protection of Personal Information held by Administrative organs; Switzerland, Loi\nfederale sur la protection des donnees.\n\n117  A/HRC/13/37, paras. 1113. For specific examples of international principles, see the Council of\nEurope Convention for the Protection of Individuals with regard to Automatic Processing of Personal Data (No. 108); the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, Guidelines on the Protection of Privacy and Transborder Data Flows of Personal Data (1980); The Guidelines for the Regulation of Computerized Personal data Files (General Assembly resolution 45/95 and E/CN.4/1990/72).\n\n118  It should be acknowledged that international agreements permit derogation from basic principles for\ndata protection when such derogation is provided for by law and constitutes a necessity in the interest\nof, inter alia, national security. See Council of Europe Convention for the Protection of Individuals with regard to Automatic Processing of Personal Data (No. 108), art. 9.\n\n119  European Court of Human Rights, *Weber and Saravia v. Germany*, no. 54934/00, 29 June 2006,\nparas. 9395.\nlimit the reasons for opening and keeping personal data files by intelligence services.120\nThird, it is established practice in various States that the intelligence services inform the general public about the type of personal data kept by an intelligence service; this includes information on the type and scope of personal data that may be retained, as well as permissible grounds for the retention of personal information by an intelligence service.121\nFourth, various States have made it a criminal offence for intelligence officers to disclose or use personal data outside the established legal framework.122 A final safeguard is that States have explicitly stipulated that intelligence services are not allowed to store personal data on discriminatory grounds.123\nPractice 24. Intelligence services conduct regular assessments of the relevance and accuracy of the personal data that they hold. They are legally required to delete or update any information that is assessed to be inaccurate or no longer relevant to their mandate, the work of oversight institutions or possible legal proceedings.\n38.\n\nStates have taken steps to ensure that intelligence services regularly check whether personal data files are accurate and relevant to their mandate.124 Safeguards on the relevance and accuracy of personal data help to ensure that any ongoing infringement of the right to privacy is minimized. In some States, the intelligence services have not only the legal obligation to destroy files that are no longer relevant125 but also files that are incorrect or have been processed incorrectly.126 While intelligence services are ordinarily obliged to delete data that are no longer relevant to their mandate, it is important that this is not to the detriment of the work of oversight bodies or possible legal proceedings. Information held by intelligence services may constitute evidence in legal proceedings with significant implications for the individuals concerned; the availability of such material may be important for guaranteeing due process rights. Therefore, it is good practice for intelligence services to be obliged to retain all records (including original transcripts and operational notes) in cases that may lead to legal proceedings, and that the deletion of any such information be supervised by an external institution (see practice 25 below).127\nPractice 25. An independent institution exists to oversee the use of personal data by intelligence services. This institution has access to all files held by the intelligence services and has the power to order the disclosure of information to individuals concerned, as well as the destruction of files or personal information contained therein.\n\n39.\n\nIn many States, the management of personal data files is subject to regular and continuous oversight by independent institutions.128 These institutions are mandated to conduct regular inspection visits and random checks of personal data files of current and\n\n\n\npast operations.129 States have also mandated independent oversight institutions to check whether the internal directives on file management comply with the law.130 States have acknowledged that oversight institutions need to be autonomous in their working and inspection methods, and have sufficient resources and capacities to conduct regular inspections of the management and use of personal data by intelligence services.131\nIntelligence services have a legal duty to cooperate fully with the oversight institution responsible for scrutinizing their management and use of personal data.132\nPractice 26. Individuals have the possibility to request access to their personal data held by intelligence services. Individuals may exercise this right by addressing a request to a relevant authority or through an independent data-protection or oversight institution. Individuals have the right to rectify inaccuracies in their personal data. Any exceptions to these general rules are prescribed by law and strictly limited, proportionate and necessary for the fulfilment of the mandate of the intelligence service. It is incumbent upon the intelligence service to justify, to an independent oversight institution, any decision not to release personal information.\n\n40.\n\nMany States have given individuals the right to have access to their personal data held by intelligence services. This right may be exercised by addressing a request to the intelligence service,133 a relevant minister,134 or an independent oversight institution.135 The right of individuals to have access to their personal data files should be understood in the context of safeguards for privacy rights and the freedom of access to information. This safeguard is important not only because it allows individuals to check whether their personal data file is accurate and lawful, but also because it is a safeguard against abuse, mismanagement and corruption. Indeed, an individual's right to have access to personal data held by intelligence services serves to enhance transparency and accountability of the decision-making processes of the intelligence services and, therefore, assists in developing citizens' trust in Government actions.136 States may restrict access to personal data files, for reasons such as safeguarding ongoing investigations and protecting sources and methods of the intelligence services. However, it is good practice for such restrictions to be outlined in law, and that they meet the requirements of proportionality and necessity.137\n\n\nNorway, Instructions for monitoring of intelligence, surveillance and security services, arts. 11.1 (c) and 11.2 (d).\n\n130  See Germany (footnote 2), sect. 14 (1), according to which the Federal Commissioner for Data\nProtection and Freedom of Information should be heard prior to issuing a directive on file management.\n\n131  Sweden, Ordinance containing Instructions for the Swedish Commission on Security and Integrity\nProtection, paras. 48 (on management and decision-making), 12 and 13 (on resources and support).\n\n132  Hungary (footnote 77), sect. 52.\n\n133  Croatia (footnote 2), art. 40 (1).\n\n134  Netherlands (footnote 20), art. 47.\n\n135  Sweden (footnote 27), art. 3; Switzerland (footnote 5), art. 18 (1).\n\n136  David Banisar, Public oversight and national security: Comparative approaches to freedom of\ninformation, Marina Caparini and Hans Born (eds.), Democratic control of intelligence services: Containing the rogue elephant, p. 217.\n\n137  Netherlands (footnote 20), arts. 5356; Croatia (footnote 2), art. 40 (2) (3); Germany (footnote 2),\nsect. 15(2).\n\n## K. The Use Of Powers Of Arrest And Detention\n\nPractice 27. Intelligence services are not permitted to use powers of arrest and detention if they do not have a mandate to perform law enforcement functions. They are not given powers of arrest and detention if this duplicates powers held by law enforcement agencies that are mandated to address the same activities.\n41.\n\nIt is widely accepted as good practice for intelligence services to be prohibited explicitly from exercising powers of arrest and detention if their legal mandate does not require them to exercise law enforcement functions in relation to national security offences, such as terrorism.138 Strong arguments have been made against combining intelligence and law enforcement functions.139 However, if national law provides intelligence services with powers of arrest and detention, it is good practice for this to be explicitly within the context of a mandate that gives them the responsibility for performing law enforcement functions pertaining to specified threats to national security, such as terrorism.140 If national or regional law enforcement bodies have a mandate to enforce criminal law in relation to national security offences, there is no legitimate reason for a separate intelligence service to be given powers of arrest and detention for the same activities. There is a risk of the development of a parallel enforcement system, whereby intelligence services exercise powers of arrest and detention in order to circumvent legal safeguards and oversight that apply to the law enforcement agencies.141\nPractice 28. If intelligence services have powers of arrest and detention, they are based on publicly available law. The exercise of these powers is restricted to cases in which there is reasonable suspicion that an individual has committed or is about to commit a specific criminal offence. Intelligence services are not permitted to deprive persons of their liberty simply for the purpose of intelligence collection. The use of any powers and arrest and detention by intelligence services is subject to the same degree of oversight as applies to their use by law enforcement authorities, including judicial review of the lawfulness of any deprivation of liberty.\n\n42.\n\nIf intelligence services are given powers of arrest and detention, national law outlines the purposes of such powers and circumstances under which they may be used.142 It is good practice for the use of these powers to be strictly limited to cases where there is reasonable suspicion that a crime (falling under the mandate of the intelligence services) has been, or is about to be, committed. It follows that intelligence services are not permitted to use these powers for the mere purpose of intelligence collection.143 The apprehension and detention of individuals when there is no reasonable suspicion that they have committed or are about to commit a criminal offence, or other internationally accepted ground for detention, is not permissible under international human rights law.144 If national law permits intelligence services to apprehend and detain individuals, it is good practice for the exercise of these powers to be subject to the same degree of oversight applying to the use of these powers by law enforcement authorities.145 Most importantly, international human rights law requires that individuals have the right to challenge the lawfulness of their detention before a court.146\nPractice 29. If intelligence services possess powers of arrest and detention, they comply with international human rights standards on the rights to liberty and fair trial, as well as the prohibition of torture and inhuman and degrading treatment. When exercising these powers, intelligence services comply with international standards set out in, inter alia, the Body of Principles for the Protection of All Persons under Any Form of Detention or Imprisonment, the Code of Conduct for Law Enforcement Officials and the Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials.\n43.\n\nIf intelligence services are given powers of arrest and detention, they are required to comply with international standards applying to the deprivation of liberty (see also practice\n28 above).147 These standards are further elaborated in several international and regional codes of conduct of law enforcement officials codifying a range of good practices that can be applied to intelligence services with powers of arrest and detention.148 In addition to the legal obligation (pertaining to the judicial review of detention) outlined in practice 28 above, there are three additional sets of standards that apply the use of powers of arrest and detention by intelligence services. First, intelligence services are bound by the absolute prohibition on the use of torture and inhuman and degrading treatment.149 Second, any use of force during arrest and detention must comply with international standards, including the requirements that any use of force be strictly necessary, proportionate to the perceived danger and properly reported.150 Third, it is good practice for intelligence services to comply with the following international standards on the apprehension and detention of individuals: that all arrests, detentions and interrogations are recorded from the moment of apprehension;151 that officers making an arrest identify themselves to the individual concerned and inform them of the reasons and legal basis for their\n\nreply.\n\n146  International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 9(4); OSCE-ODIHR, Countering Terrorism,\nProtecting Human Rights, pp. 158160; Arab Charter on Human Rights, art. 8; American Convention on Human Rights, art. 7(6); Council of Europe (footnote 4), arts. VII (3) and VIII; General Assembly resolution A/RES/43/173, annex, principle 4.\n\n147 Venice Commission (1998), sect. E.\n\n148 See Code of Conduct for Law Enforcement Officials in General Assembly resolution 34/169; Basic\nPrinciples on the Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials; General Assembly resolution 43/173, annex. See also Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe, European Code of Police Ethics, recommendation (2001)10 (hereafter, European Code of Police Ethics).\n\n149 Convention against Torture, art. 1; African Charter on Human and People's Rights, art. 5; Code of\nConduct for Law Enforcement Officials, art. 5; European Code of Police Ethics, arts. 35 and 36; Body of Principles for the Protection of All Persons under Any Form of Detention or Imprisonment, principle 6.\n\n150 Code of Conduct for Law Enforcement Officials, art. 3; European Code of Police Ethics, art. 37;\nCouncil of Europe (footnote 4), art. VI (2); Morocco, IER Report, vol. 1, chap. IV, 86.\n\n151 Bulgaria (footnote 15), art. 125 (8); OSCE Guidebook on Democratic Policing, 2008, arts 5564;\nBody of Principles for the Protection of All Persons under Any Form of Detention or Imprisonment, principle 12.\napprehension/detention;152 and that individuals detained by intelligence services have access to legal representation.153\nPractice 30. Intelligence services are not permitted to operate their own detention facilities or to make use of any unacknowledged detention facilities operated by third parties.\n\n44.\n\nIt is good practice for intelligence services to be explicitly prohibited in national law from operating their own detention facilities.154 If intelligence services are permitted to exercise powers of arrest and detention, the individuals concerned are remanded in regular detention centres administered by law enforcement agencies.155 Equally, intelligence services are not permitted to make use of unacknowledged detention facilities run by third parties, such as private contractors. These are essential safeguards against arbitrary detention by intelligence services and/or the possible development of a parallel detention regime in which individuals could be held in conditions that do not meet international standards of detention and due process.\n\n## L. Intelligence-Sharing And Cooperation\n\nPractice 31. Intelligence-sharing between intelligence agencies of the same State or with the authorities of a foreign State is based on national law that outlines clear parameters for intelligence exchange, including the conditions that must be met for information to be shared, the entities with which intelligence may be shared, and the safeguards that apply to exchanges of intelligence.\n45.\n\nIt is good practice for all forms of information-sharing between intelligence services and other domestic or foreign entities to have a clear basis in national law. National law includes criteria on the purposes for which intelligence may be shared, the entities with which it may be shared, and the procedural safeguards that apply to intelligence-sharing.156\nA legal basis for intelligence-sharing is an important requirement of the rule of law, and is particularly important when personal data are exchanged, because this directly infringes the right to privacy and may affect a range of other rights and fundamental freedoms. In addition to ensuring that intelligence-sharing is based on national law, it is widely accepted as good practice that intelligence-sharing be based on written agreements or memoranda between the parties, which comply with guidelines laid down in national law.157 The elements that are commonly included in such agreements include rules governing the use of shared information, a statement of the parties' compliance with human rights and data protection, and the provision that the sending service may request feedback on the use of\n\n\n152 American Convention on Human Rights, art. 7(4); European Convention on Human Rights, art. 5(2);\nthe shared information.158 Intelligence-sharing agreements help to establish mutually agreed standards and expectations about shared information, and reduce the scope for informal intelligence-sharing, which cannot be easily reviewed by oversight institutions.\nPractice 32. National law outlines the process for authorizing both the agreements upon which intelligence-sharing is based and the ad hoc sharing of intelligence. Executive approval is needed for any intelligence-sharing agreements with foreign entities, as well as for the sharing of intelligence that may have significant implications for human rights.\n\n46.\n\nIt is good practice for national law to set out guidelines for the authorization of the sending of information on an ad hoc basis, as well as for the establishment of agreements for intelligence-sharing.159 This serves to ensure that there are established channels of responsibility for intelligence-sharing and that relevant individuals can be held to account for any decisions they make in this regard. In many States, routine intelligence-sharing at the domestic level is authorized internally (within the intelligence services). However, when information shared by intelligence services may be used in court proceedings, it is good practice for executive authorization to be required; the use of intelligence in such proceedings may have profound implications for the rights of the individuals concerned, as well as for the activities of the intelligence services themselves.160 Additionally, many national laws require executive authorization for the sharing of intelligence or establishment of sharing agreements with foreign entities.161\nPractice 33. Before entering into an intelligence-sharing agreement or sharing intelligence on an ad hoc basis, intelligence services undertake an assessment of the counterpart's record on human rights and data protection, as well as the legal safeguards and institutional controls that govern the counterpart. Before handing over information, intelligence services make sure that any shared intelligence is relevant to the recipient's mandate, will be used in accordance with the conditions attached and will not be used for purposes that violate human rights.\n47.\n\nBoth the sending and receipt of intelligence can have important implications for human rights and fundamental freedoms. Information sent to a foreign Government or intelligence service may not only contribute to legal limitations on the rights of an individual, but could also serve as the basis for human rights violations. Similarly, intelligence received from a foreign entity may have been obtained in violation of international human rights law. Therefore, before entering into a sharing agreement or sharing any information, it is good practice for intelligence services to conduct a general assessment of a foreign counterpart's record on human rights and the protection of personal data, as well as the legal and institutional safeguards (such as oversight) that apply to those services.162 Before sharing information on specific individuals or groups, intelligence services take steps to assess the possible impact on the individuals concerned.163 It is good practice to maintain an absolute prohibition on the sharing of any information if there is a reasonable belief that sharing information could lead to the violation of the rights of the individual(s) concerned.164 In some circumstances, State responsibility may be triggered through the sharing of intelligence that contributes to the commission of grave human rights violations. Additionally, many national laws require States to evaluate the necessity of sharing particular information from the point of view of their own mandate and that of their counterparts.165 An assessment of whether information-sharing is necessary and relevant to the mandate of the recipient allows intelligence services to uphold the principle of minimization when sharing information, i.e., intelligence services minimize the amount of personal data shared to the greatest extent possible.166 These safeguards help to prevent excessive or arbitrary intelligence-sharing.\n48.\n\nIn view of the possible implications of intelligence-sharing for human rights, it is good practice for intelligence services to screen all outgoing information for accuracy and relevance before sending it to foreign entities.167 Where there are doubts about the reliability of outgoing intelligence, it is either withheld or accompanied by error estimates.168 Finally, it is good practice for all intelligence-sharing to take place in writing and to be recorded; this facilitates subsequent review by oversight institutions.169\nPractice 34. Independent oversight institutions are able to examine intelligencesharing arrangements and any information sent by intelligence services to foreign entities.\n\n49.\n\nIt is good practice for oversight institutions to be mandated to review the agreements upon which intelligence-sharing is based, as well as any arrangements based on such agreements.170 Independent oversight institutions can scrutinize the legal framework and procedural dimensions of intelligence-sharing agreements to ensure that they comply with national laws and relevant international legal standards. As a general rule, oversight institutions are authorized to have access to all information necessary to fulfil their mandate\n(see practice 7 above). However, within the context of international intelligence-sharing, the third party rule may entail restrictions on oversight institutions' access to incoming information provided by foreign entities. Oversight institutions are generally considered to be third parties; therefore, they cannot normally have access to information shared with intelligence services by foreign entities. Nevertheless, oversight institutions have a right to scrutinize information sent to foreign entities, and they exercise this right as part of a mandate to oversee all aspects of an intelligence service's activities (see practice 7 above). Within this context, it is good practice for national law to explicitly require intelligence services to report intelligence-sharing to an independent oversight institution.171 This\n\n\nprovides a check on the legality of intelligence-sharing practices, and is an important safeguard against the sharing of personal data that may have serious human rights implications for the individuals concerned.\nPractice 35. Intelligence services are explicitly prohibited from employing the assistance of foreign intelligence services in any way that results in the circumvention of national legal standards and institutional controls on their own activities. If States request foreign intelligence services to undertake activities on their behalf, they require these services to comply with the same legal standards that would apply if the activities were undertaken by their own intelligence services.\n\n50.\n\nNational laws regulating the activities of intelligence services provide legal and institutional safeguards to protect human rights and the constitutional legal order within the context of intelligence activities. In view of this, it would be contrary to the rule of law for States or their intelligence services to request a foreign entity to undertake activities in their jurisdiction that they could not lawfully undertake themselves. It would be good practice for national law to contain an absolute prohibition on intelligence services cooperating with foreign entities in order to evade legal obligations that apply to their own activities.172 In addition, it is important to recall that States have an international legal obligation to safeguard the rights of all individuals under their jurisdiction. This implies that they have a duty to ensure that foreign intelligence services do not engage in activities that violate human rights on their territory, as well as to refrain from participating in any such activities.173 Indeed, States are internationally responsible if they aid or assist another State to violate the human rights of individuals.174\n\nEuropean Convention on Human Rights on the question of secret detention and transport of detainees suspected of terrorist acts, notably by or at the instigation of foreign agencies, SG/Inf (2006) 5, paras. 23 and 101.\n\n## Annex Good Practices On Legal And Institutional Frameworks For Intelligence Services And Their Oversight\n\nPractice 1. Intelligence services play an important role in protecting national security and upholding the rule of law. Their main purpose is to collect, analyse and disseminate information that assists policymakers and other public entities in taking measures to protect national security. This includes the protection of the population and their human rights. Practice 2. The mandates of intelligence services are narrowly and precisely defined in a publicly available law. Mandates are strictly limited to protecting legitimate national security interests as outlined in publicly available legislation or national security policies, and identify the threats to national security that intelligence services are tasked to address. If terrorism is included among these threats, it is defined in narrow and precise terms. Practice 3. The powers and competences of intelligence services are clearly and exhaustively defined in national law. They are required to use these powers exclusively for the purposes for which they were given. In particular, any powers given to intelligence services for the purposes of counter-terrorism must be used exclusively for these purposes. Practice 4. All intelligence services are constituted through, and operate under, publicly available laws that comply with the Constitution and international human rights law. Intelligence services can only undertake or be instructed to undertake activities that are prescribed by and in accordance with national law. The use of subsidiary regulations that are not publicly available is strictly limited, and such regulations are both authorized by and remain within the parameters of publicly available laws. Regulations that are not made public do not serve as the basis for any activities that restrict human rights. Practice 5. Intelligence services are explicitly prohibited from undertaking any action that contravenes the Constitution or international human rights law. These prohibitions extend not only to the conduct of intelligence services on their national territory but also to their activities abroad. Practice 6. Intelligence services are overseen by a combination of internal, executive, parliamentary, judicial and specialized oversight institutions whose mandates and powers are based on publicly available law. An effective system of intelligence oversight includes at least one civilian institution that is independent of both the intelligence services and the executive. The combined remit of oversight institutions covers all aspects of the work of intelligence services, including their compliance with the law; the effectiveness and efficiency of their activities; their finances; and their administrative practices. Practice 7. Oversight institutions have the power, resources and expertise to initiate and conduct their own investigations, as well as full and unhindered access to the information, officials and installations necessary to fulfil their mandates. Oversight institutions receive the full cooperation of intelligence services and law enforcement authorities in hearing witnesses, as well as obtaining documentation and other evidence. Practice 8. Oversight institutions take all necessary measures to protect classified information and personal data to which they have access during the course of their work. Penalties are provided for the breach of these requirements by members of oversight institutions. Practice 9. Any individual who believes that her or his rights have been infringed by an intelligence service is able to bring a complaint to a court or oversight institution, such as an ombudsman, human rights commissioner or national human rights institution. Individuals affected by the illegal actions of an intelligence service have recourse to an institution that can provide an effective remedy, including full reparation for the harm suffered.\nPractice 10. The institutions responsible for addressing complaints and claims for effective remedy arising from the activities of intelligence services are independent of the intelligence services and the political executive. Such institutions have full and unhindered access to all relevant information, the necessary resources and expertise to conduct investigations, and the capacity to issue binding orders. Practice 11. Intelligence services carry out their work in a manner that contributes to the promotion and protection of the human rights and fundamental freedoms of all individuals under the jurisdiction of the State. Intelligence services do not discriminate against individuals or groups on the grounds of their sex, race, colour, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, or other status. Practice 12. National law prohibits intelligence services from engaging in any political activities or from acting to promote or protect the interests of any particular political, religious, linguistic, ethnic, social or economic group. Practice 13. Intelligence services are prohibited from using their powers to target lawful political activity or other lawful manifestations of the rights to freedom of association, peaceful assembly and expression. Practice 14. States are internationally responsible for the activities of their intelligence services and their agents, and any private contractors they engage, regardless of where these activities take place and who the victim of internationally wrongful conduct is. Therefore, the executive power takes measures to ensure and exercise overall control of and responsibility for their intelligence services. Practice 15. Constitutional, statutory and international criminal law applies to members of intelligence services as much as it does to any other public official. Any exceptions allowing intelligence officials to take actions that would normally violate national law are strictly limited and clearly prescribed by law. These exceptions never allow the violation of peremptory norms of international law or of the human rights obligations of the State. Practice 16. National laws provide for criminal, civil or other sanctions against any member, or individual acting on behalf of an intelligence service, who violates or orders an action that would violate national law or international human rights law. These laws also establish procedures to hold individuals to account for such violations.\n\nPractice 17. Members of intelligence services are legally obliged to refuse superior orders that would violate national law or international human rights law. Appropriate protection is provided to members of intelligence services who refuse orders in such situations. Practice 18. There are internal procedures in place for members of intelligence services to report wrongdoing. These are complemented by an independent body that has a mandate and access to the necessary information to fully investigate and take action to address wrongdoing when internal procedures have proved inadequate. Members of intelligence services who, acting in good faith, report wrongdoing are legally protected from any form of reprisal. These protections extend to disclosures made to the media or the public at large if they are made as a last resort and pertain to matters of significant public concern. Practice 19. Intelligence services and their oversight institutions take steps to foster an institutional culture of professionalism based on respect for the rule of law and human rights. In particular, intelligence services are responsible for training their members on relevant provisions of national and international law, including international human rights law.\nPractice 20: Any measures by intelligence services that restrict human rights and fundamental freedoms comply with the following criteria:\n(a)\nThey are prescribed by publicly available law that complies with international human rights standards;\n\n(b)\nAll such measures must be strictly necessary for an intelligence service to fulfil its legally prescribed mandate;\n(c)\nMeasures taken must be proportionate to the objective. This requires that intelligence services select the measure that least restricts human rights, and take special care to minimize the adverse impact of any measures on the rights of individuals, including, in particular, persons who are not suspected of any wrongdoing;\n(d)\nNo measure taken by intelligence services may violate peremptory norms of international law or the essence of any human right;\n(e)\nThere is a clear and comprehensive system for the authorization, monitoring and oversight of the use of any measure that restricts human rights;\n(f)\nIndividuals whose rights may have been restricted by intelligence services are able to address complaints to an independent institution and seek an effective remedy.\n\nPractice 21. National law outlines the types of collection measures available to intelligence services; the permissible objectives of intelligence collection; the categories of persons and activities which may be subject to intelligence collection; the threshold of suspicion required to justify the use of collection measures; the limitations on the duration for which collection measures may be used; and the procedures for authorizing, overseeing and reviewing the use of intelligence-collection measures. Practice 22. Intelligence-collection measures that impose significant limitations on human rights are authorized and overseen by at least one institution that is external to and independent of the intelligence services. This institution has the power to order the revision, suspension or termination of such collection measures. Intelligence collection measures that impose significant limitations on human rights are subject to a multilevel process of authorization that includes approval within intelligence services, by the political executive and by an institution that is independent of the intelligence services and the executive. Practice 23. Publicly available law outlines the types of personal data that intelligence services may hold, and which criteria apply to the use, retention, deletion and disclosure of these data. Intelligence services are permitted to retain personal data that are strictly necessary for the purposes of fulfilling their mandate. Practice 24. Intelligence services conduct regular assessments of the relevance and accuracy of the personal data that they hold. They are legally required to delete or update any information that is assessed to be inaccurate or no longer relevant to their mandate, the work of oversight institutions or possible legal proceedings. Practice 25. An independent institution exists to oversee the use of personal data by intelligence services. This institution has access to all files held by the intelligence services and has the power to order the disclosure of information to individuals concerned, as well as the destruction of files or personal information contained therein. Practice 26. Individuals have the possibility to request access to their personal data held by intelligence services. Individuals may exercise this right by addressing a request to a relevant authority or through an independent data-protection or oversight institution. Individuals have the right to rectify inaccuracies in their personal data. Any exceptions to these general rules are prescribed by law and strictly limited, proportionate and necessary for the fulfilment of the mandate of the intelligence service. It is incumbent upon the intelligence service to justify, to an independent oversight institution, any decision not to release personal information. Practice 27. Intelligence services are not permitted to use powers of arrest and detention if they do not have a mandate to perform law enforcement functions. They are not given powers of arrest and detention if this duplicates powers held by law enforcement agencies that are mandated to address the same activities. Practice 28. If intelligence services have powers of arrest and detention, they are based on publicly available law. The exercise of these powers is restricted to cases in which there is reasonable suspicion that an individual has committed or is about to commit a specific criminal offence. Intelligence services are not permitted to deprive persons of their liberty simply for the purpose of intelligence collection. The use of any powers and arrest and detention by intelligence services is subject to the same degree of oversight as applies to their use by law enforcement authorities, including judicial review of the lawfulness of any deprivation of liberty. Practice 29. If intelligence services possess powers of arrest and detention they comply with international human rights standards on the rights to liberty and fair trial, as well as the prohibition of torture and inhuman and degrading treatment. When exercising these powers, intelligence services comply with international standards set out in, inter alia, the Body of Principles for the Protection of All Persons under Any Form of Detention or Imprisonment, the Code of Conduct for Law Enforcement Officials and the Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials. Practice 30. Intelligence services are not permitted to operate their own detention facilities or to make use of any unacknowledged detention facilities operated by third parties. Practice 31. Intelligence-sharing between intelligence agencies of the same State or with the authorities of a foreign State is based on national law that outlines clear parameters for intelligence exchange, including the conditions that must be met for information to be shared, the entities with which intelligence may be shared, and the safeguards that apply to exchanges of intelligence. Practice 32. National law outlines the process for authorizing both the agreements upon which intelligence-sharing is based and the ad hoc sharing of intelligence. Executive approval is needed for any intelligence-sharing agreements with foreign entities, as well as for the sharing of intelligence that may have significant implications for human rights. Practice 33. Before entering into an intelligence-sharing agreement or sharing intelligence on an ad hoc basis, intelligence services undertake an assessment of the counterpart's record on human rights and data protection, as well as the legal safeguards and institutional controls that govern the counterpart. Before handing over information, intelligence services make sure that any shared intelligence is relevant to the recipient's mandate, will be used in accordance with the conditions attached and will not be used for purposes that violate human rights. Practice 34. Independent oversight institutions are able to examine intelligence-sharing arrangements and any information sent by intelligence services to foreign entities. Practice 35. Intelligence services are explicitly prohibited from employing the assistance of foreign intelligence services in any way that results in the circumvention of national legal standards and institutional controls on their own activities. If States request foreign intelligence services to undertake activities on their behalf, they require these services to comply with the same legal standards that would apply if the activities were undertaken by their own intelligence services.\n\n##"
    },
    {
        "text": ")\nGordon S Heddell Acdting Inspector General Department of Defense Glenn A.\n\nFine v Inspector General Department of Justice Inspector General National Security Agency Patricia A.\n\nLewis'\nActing Inspector General Central Intelligence Agency Mazer Rbslyng};', zer\n||\nInspector General Office of the Director of National Intelligence\n\n## (U) Table Of Contents (U) Introduction...Ccvc I\n\nraesessrisennia 1\nRS, 1\n\n(U) Scope OF TG REVISW eorrrmrrmrermnsssmsinssivessnsnnsessessansenses Tenensceasaress GEomEYBNRTNRRNRANY 2\n{U) MethodolOgY <t irmammemstinmsmmar e pesrennse s nnsanans\n\n## (L) Inception Of The President's Surveillange Program\n\n(U) National Security Agency Counterterrorism Efforts Prior te\n11 SEPLEIIDET 200 1ovvesetursresisessmsrssssrssssissss s\n(U) NSA Initially Used Existing Authorities to Enhance Signals\nIntelligence (SIGINT) Cellection After the September 2001\nTerrorist Attacks ... remsessieremsanrrnis eeriisissessarvasseseensbuBTERRsERSsaSRRRite\n(U)- NSA Explored Options to Improve SIGINT Collection and\nAddress Intelligence Gaps on Terrorist TargelS\ne\n(U) Impediments to SIGINT Collection Against Terrorist Targets\nWere Discussed With the White HoUSE .crviviinnscimscrmninann\n(U) Authorization of the President's Surveillance Programi........\n(U) SIGINT Activities Authorized Under the Program ...\n(U) Content of the Presidential Authorizations and\nDepartment of Justice Certification as to Form and Legality.\n........ 10\n(U) The Threat Assessment Memorandums Supporting\nPresidential Authorization of the Program ....... prirvesmsanebennaees\n'\n(U) Early Revisions to the Presidential Authorizations........\n(U) Dod Office of Legal Counsel Memocrandums Supporting\nLegality Of the Programt ... s\n\n## (U) Implementation Of The President''S Surveillance Program ..Cccocrmransersassesssessssnruvasanins\n\n(U) NSA implementation\n\nFSHSHINE) Telophore and Internet Comnrumcaiuons\nContent Collection and ARalysis v TP ST\nS\nSORPON .18\n\n(FSHSHNE) Telephony andl htemet Mefiadafi'a Collection ancfi\nAnalys&s vaerona canerisasrncases yeskirrvinseiesiavunnninareven TSRO\n|\n, U) NSA Pepomng] From the President's Surveillance Program i v S\nS\nTS TOPE\nPO 21\n(U) NSA Managerial Structure and Oversight of fhe President's SUVEIIANCE PrOGIaiTl v mmsirirersreesicssssecrmsescssrsssessaseessenmassssensssmeessssnes rne DL\n\n| (U)          | NSA                         | Managerent    | Controls         | to                | Ensure       | Compflnance    | With    |\n|--------------|-----------------------------|---------------|------------------|-------------------|--------------|----------------|---------|\n| Presidential | Autherizations...c..cueenn. | P             | A                | ~                 |              |                |         |\n| (1)          | NSA                         | Inspector     | General          | Oversight         | of           | the            | Program |\n| (U)          | Access                      | to            | the              | President's       | Surveillance | PFOGFam        | o       |\n| (U)          | Congressional               | Briefings     | on               | the               | Program      | ...            | 28      |\n| (U)          | Foreign                     | Intelligence  | Surveillance     | Court             | Brlefmgs     | on             | the     |\n| Program      | ceronne                     | yarsensn      | vevenanerenenenn | crveresraraaenens | S            | YN             | 27      |\n| (U)          | FBI                         | Participation | in               | the               | President's  | Surveillance   | Program |\n| (U)          | ClA                         | Participation | in               | the               | President's  | Surveillance   | Program |\n| (U)          | NCTC                        | Participation | in               | the               | President's  | Surveillance   | Program |\n\n(U) The President's Surveillance ngram and the Foreugn Intelligence SUrvaillance COUM\ni issreninasesresissiesssseseces 33\n\n|              | (U)      | Discovery    | lssues    | Asscciated    | W(th    | the    |   President's  |\n|--------------|----------|--------------|-----------|---------------|---------|--------|----------------|\n| SUrveillance | Program. | .            | oinicin   | s             | onesn   | e      |            38  |\n\n(U) LEGAL REASSESSMENT OF THE PRESIDENT'S SURVEILLANCE\nPROGRAM (2003 = 2004) ....oveviiiriceinmsinsssnin st ssssnasessessessmsnssessessesssessens 35\n(U) A New Legal Basis for the Program Is Adopted........ccvcrernirinisiinicsnnnas 37\n(U) Department of Justice Officials Convey Concerns About the\n'\nProgrami to the WHIte HOUSE ...iicriericrenrecstesmeesressressssvssssesaesssessnesses 39\n(U) Conflict Between the Department of Justice and the White House Qver the Program ....cccmcrsiriceiommmromeseees s eeisscsstsasaos 40\n\n## White House Counsel Certifies Presidential Aufchongafi;Mn Without: Depafiment Of Justnce Concuwence . E 7 . E 48 (U) Restrictions On Access To The Presacflent's Surveillance Program Impeded  Lepaxrfcmemt Of Justice Leg;Ai Review .O Esiinrssbiviacios Csnens B0 (W) Transition Of President S Supvehllance Program Activities To F@Reegn Lntell Igence Surveillangce Act Authority Vivvvvreriersessmmssisrasssiismsmsimsmsssomimmmussssirisisnssnnsssuss Bsos - 1\n\nSHESUE)\nInternel Metadata Collection Transition to Operation Under FISA AUhOALY woowrimscnmnninsees vensaresanmzeeshasEison S 50\n(u ) Department of Justice Notices of Compliance Incidents ... seaninse 53\nTelaphony Metadata Collection Transutmn o Dperauon Under FISA Authority 54\n.\n\nContent Collection Transition to Operation Under FISA AU couserrrersneesserssesmmssssmssmsssarsssessissssmassssemssssaness peessmtrenrameanss s BT\n\n## (W) Impact Of The President's Surveillance. Program On ' Intelligence Community Counterterrorish Efforts ..Ccimmrcrmeeension 80\n\n(U) Senior Intelligence Community Officials Believe That the\nPresident's Surveillance Program Filled an Intelligence Gap .o 60.\n\n(U) Difficulty in Assessing the Impact of the President's\n'\nSurveillance ngrama'fl\n\n(U) Impact of the President's Surveillance Program on FEI\n_\nCounterterrorism BfforiS. .o Viressskernsudassavanesian 61\n(U) EBI Efforts to Assess the Value of the Prograim..ee\n. 62\n(U) FBI Judgmental Assessments of the Program.....eme e, 52\n(U) Impact of the President's Surveillance Program on GIA\nCouriterterrorism OPerations .\nursommamms s 83\n(U) The CIA Did Not Systematically Assess the\nEffectiveness of the PrOgIal\ne\ni mismsmsmsmmaraesrcisssnisarmsses 83\n{U) Several Factors Hindered CIA Utilization of the Program ........ 64\n\n(U} Impact of the- Presndcm's Suwexflance ngmm on NCTC\nCounterterrorisim EifOrES i i siinnsanasssisssinsassinienssrises reeneeei 35\n(U) Counterterrorism Operations Suppor&eo} by the President's Surveillance Prograiml. cu e omiimsimnissin i s reenes 35\n(U) ATTORNEY GENERAL GONZALES'S TESTEM@NY ONTHE\nPhESiDENT 5 SURVEILLANCE- PROGRAM.\n\no msarimsssissanssinssinisansinaserines\n59\n(U)\nQONCLUSEQNQ.;.;\".\"....,'.7.,{..@.....\"..'..'..\".:.,;gn.q..';..'...'.s'.,v.'....'..,,,...,,'...;.;.-..-.....,a.....ag..;..;; 69\n\n## (U) The President's Surveillance Programm (U) Introduction\n\nFSAHSIHOCANEY. Tn response tothe terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001, on\n4 October 2001, President George W. Bush issued a. Top Secret authorization to the Secretary of Defense directing that the :s'_'ignals;_intellig@nce(SIG[NT)\",qapabilities of the National Security Agency (NSA) be used to detect and preverit further attacks in the United States, The Presidential Authiorization stated that an extraordinary emergency existed permitting the use of electronic surveillance within the.United States for counterterrorism puiposes, without a court order, under certain circumstances. For more than five years, the Presidential Authorization was renewed at 30- to 60-day intervals to authorize the highly classified NSA surveillanee program, which is referred to throughout this report as the President's Surveillance Program (PSP).!\n\nT\n- Under the Presidenitial Authorizations, the NSA intercepted the content of international felephong and Titernet communications of botl U.S. and non-U.8.\n\npersons, In-addition, the NSA collected telephone and Internet metadata\ncommunications sigraling jnformation showing contacts between and anong telephone numbers and ntemn icati ddresses;\nb I\nont fthe communications.\n\n,\n=\n\nThe conte\n:\nanalyzed by the NSA, working\n'\n;\nwitht other members of the Intelligence Community (IC), to senerate intelligence reports. These reports were sent to the Federal Bureau of Tnvestigation (FBI), the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), and other intelligence organizations.\n\n\n(U) The scope of collection permitted under the Presidernitial Authorizations varied oveer time. In stages between July 2004 and January. 2007, NSA ceased PSP collection activities under Presidential authorization and resumed them under four separate coutt ordersissued in accordance with the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 as amended (FISA).2\n\n## (U) Scope Of The Review\n\n(U) Title III of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act Amendments Act of 2008\n(FISA Amendments Act)signed into law on 10 July 2008required the inspectors general of the elements of the IC that participated in the PSP to conduct a comprehensive review of the program.} The Act required that the review examine:\n\n(A) all of the facts necessary to describe the establishment,\nimplementation, product, and use of the product of the Progran;\n(B) :access to. legal reviews of the Program and access to information abott the Program;\n\\\n\n(C) communications with, and participation of, individials\nand entities\nin the private sector related to the Program;\n'\n\n(D) interaction with the Foreign Intelligence Survelllance Court and.\n{ransition to court orders related to the Program; and\n(B) any other matters identified by any such Inspector General that would enable that Inspector General to complete a review of the Program, with respect to such Department or element.\n\n(U) The Inspectors General (IGs) of the Department of Defense (DoD), the Department of Justice (DoT), the CIA, the NSA, and the Office of the Director of National Infelligerice\n(ODNI) conducted the review required under the Act. This report summarizes the.collective results of the IGs' review. Conclusions and recommendations in this. report that are attributed to a particular IG should be understood to represent that IG's opinion. Individual reports detail the results of each IG's review and are annexes to this report. All of the reports have been classified in accordance with the program's classification guide, which was revised during our review and re-issued on 21 January 2009,\n(U) Title IIT of the FISA Amendments Act also required that the report of any investigation of matters relating to the PSP conducted by the DoJ, Office of Professional Responsibility (OPR) be provided to the DoJ IG, and that the findirigs and coviclusions of such investigation be included in the DoJ 1G's review. OPR intends to review whetherany standards of professional conduct wers violated in the preparation of the first series of legal memorandums supporting the PSP. OPR has not yet completed its review or provided its findings and conclusions to the DoJ IG.\n\n## (U) Methodology\n\n(U) During the course of this review, the participating IGs conducted approximately\n200 interviews. Among the individuals we interviewed were: former White House Counsel and Attorney General Alberto R. Gonzales; former Deputy Attorney General James B. Comey; FBI Director Robert S. Mueller, III; former Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rurhsfeld; former NSA Director, Principal Deputy Director of National Intelligence, and CIA Director Michael V. Hayden; former Director of Central Intelligencg\n(DCI) and CIA Director Porter J, Goss; NSA Director Lieutenant General Keith B. Alexander; former Directors of National Intelligence John D. Negroponte and.\n\nT. M. McConnell;, and former National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) Director Johti O, Brennan. Certain other persons who had significant inyolvenient in the PSP either declitied or did riot respond to our requests for an interview, including former Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul D. Wolfowitz; former Chief of Staff to President Bush Andrew. H. Card; David S. Addington, former Counsel to Vice President Richatd B. Cheney;\nformer Attomey General John D. Asheroft; former Deputy Assistant Attorney General Tohn Yoo; and former DCI George J. Tenet,\n1y}\ng analysts; senior officials from DoJ's Ciiminal and National Security Divisions; and current and former senior NCTC officials. We also interviewed DoJ officials and office of general counsel officials fror the participating organizations who were involved in legal reviews of the PSP and/or had access to the memorandums supporting the legality of the PSP.\n\n~(SHAF)-\nWe examined thousands of electronic and hardcopy documents, including the P'r'c@si'dential'Authorizations, terrorist threat assessments, legal memorandums, applicable regulations and policies, briefings, reports, correspondence, and notes. We obtained access to-an FBI database of PSP-derived leads that had been disseminated to FBI field offices.\n\nWe used the database to confirm information obtained through interviews and to assist in our analysis of FBI investigations that utilized PSP information, We evaluated the justifications included in the requests for information (RFIs) submiited by the CIA to the NSA (o determine whether they were in accordance with program guidelines. Reports of prior reviews and investigations of the PSP conducted by the NSA IG were also utilized in our\n\n## (U) Inception Of The President's 'Survenlange Progran (U} Mational Security Agency Counterterrorism Effarts Prior To 11 Sepiember 2001\n\nFor more than a decade before the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001, NSA was flpplymg its SIGINT capabilities against terrorist targets inresponse to IC\nrequirements! The NSA, SID, Counterterrorism: (CT) Product Line led these efforts. NSA was auihorized by Executive Order (B.0.) 12333, United States Intelligence Activities,\n4 December 1981, as amended, to collect, process, and disseminate SIGINT iriformation for foreign mte]hgence and counterintelligence purposes in aceordance with DCI guidance and to support the conduct ol mililary operations under the guidance of the Secretary of Defense. Itis the policy of U.S. Government entities that conduct SIGINT activities that they will collect, vetain, and disseminate only foreign communications. In September\n2001, NSA's compliance procedures defined foreign communications-as communications havmg af least one communicant-outside the United States, communications entirely among foreign powers, or communications between a foreign power and officers or employees.of a foreign power. All other communications were considered domestic\n-communications. NSA was not authorized under E.O. 12333 to collect communications from a wire in the United Stafes without a court order unless the communications originated and terminated outside the United States or met applicable exceptions to the requiremert of a court order under FISA.\n\n(U) FISA, S0U.S:C.  1801, et seq,, was enacted in 1978 o \"provide legislative authorization and regulation for all electronic surveillance conducted within the United States for foreign intelligence purposes.\" FISA authorizes the Federal Government to engage in electronic surveillance and physical searches; to use pen register and trap and trace devices, and to obtain business records to acquire foreign intelligence information by targeting foreign powers and agents of foreign powers inside the United States.* Asa general rule; the FISC must first approve an application for a warrant before the government may initiate elecironic surveillance.\n\n~(SHSHAMY Prior to the PSP, NSA authority to intercept foreign communicafions:\nincluded the Director, NSA's authority to approve the targeting of communications with one communicant within the United States if technical devices could be employed to limit collection to United State\n..\n\n.\n\nTftechnical devices ould not be used to lim1\ncollection, the collection required approval by the Attorney General. TheDirector; NSA\ncould exercise this-authority, except wlien the collection was otherwise regulated, for example, under FISA for communications collected from a wire in the United States.\n\n(U) NSA Initially Used Existing Authorities to Enhance Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) Collection After the September 2001 Terrorist Attacks\n;\nISHSHANFY On 14 September 2001, NSA Director uthority to approve a SID\nCT Product Line request to targ\n\"selectors, Hayd\n14 gpfembef 2001\napproval memorandum stated ma:e -'pS\"O-'l.\"\ntargeting was to facilitate \"dialing analysis/contact chaining.\"s NSA Office of General Counsel (0GC) persormel concurred with the proposed activity, but provided Handwritten note to Hayden stating that chaining was permitted only on foreign mumbers and no U.S. number could be chained without a cowt order. Collection of the content-\n-\nwas not addressed in the merorandum. However, other documentation indicates that NSA OGC and SID personnel understood that Hayden also lhad approved content collection and analysis, NSA OGC personnel told us that Hayden's.\n\naction was a lawful exercise of his authority under E.O. 12333. In addition, according to puty\n1. Hayden had decided by\n26 September\n2001 thatj\n.\n\n| wouldbep esumed to be of foreign 11tellig'eiice'value and could be provided io the FBI. Hayden told us that his actions were a \"tactical decision\" and that he was opetaling in a unique environment because it was widely believed that mere terrorist attacks on U.S. soil were imminent.\n\nIn late September, Hayden informed Tenet that he had expanded SIGINT\noperations under E.O. 12333 authority. According to Hayden, Tenet later said that he had explained the NSA's expanded SIGINT operations to Vice President Cheney during a meeting at the White House. On 2 October 2001, Hayden briefed the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence on his decision to expand operations under E.0. 12333\nand informed members of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence by telephone.\n\nis the process tarpeted entities:\n\n## {U). Nsa Explored Options To Improve Sigint Collection And Address Intelligence Gaps On Terrorist Targets\n\n~{8/A4) Hayden did not attend the meeting at the White House at which Tenet.\n\nexplained the NSA's expanded SIGINT operations to the Vice President. According to Hayden, Tenet told him that during the meeting the Vice President asked if the IC was:\ndoing everything possible to prevent another attack. The Vice President specifically asked Tenet if NSA could do more. Tenet then discussed the matter with Hayden Hayden told Tenetthat nothing more could be done within existing authorities. Ina follow-uptelephone conversation, Tenet asked Hayden what the NSA could do if it was provided additional authorities. 'To formulate a response, Hayden met with NSA personnel, who wete already working to fill intelligence gaps, to identily additional authorities to support SIGINT collection activities that would be operationally useful and technically fcasflale, In pafuculeu diseussioris focused on how NSA might bridge the \"international gap,\" i.e., collection of international communications in which one comniunicant was within the United States.\n\n(U) Inthe days immediately after 11 September 2001, the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence asked NSA for technical assistance in drafting a proposal to amend FISA to give the President anthority to conduct electronic surveillance without.a court order to obtain foreign intelligence information. On 20:September2001, the NSA\nGeneral Counsel wrote to White House Counsel Gonzales asking if the proposed amendment to FISA hiad merit. We found no record of a response to the NSA General Counsel's writing and cotrld not determine why the proposal to amend FISA was not pursued at that time.\n\n(U) Hayden said that, in his professional judgment, NSA could not address the\n1ntelhgencc gap using FISA. The process for obtaining FISC orders-was slow; it involved extensive coordination and separate legal and pohcy reviews by several agencies, Although FISA's emergenocy authorization provision permitted 72 hours of surveillance before obtaining a court order, it did not allow the government to underfake surveillance immediately, Rather, the Attomev General had to ensure that eme ency surveillance\n\n## (U) !Mpedumcnts To Sisint Collection 'Against Terrorist Targets Were Discussad 'With The Whnte House\n\nS/ANE)Hayden recalled that, after consultmt7 with NSA. personnel, he-discussed with the White House how FISA constrained NSA: collection of communications carried on a wire in the United States. Hayden explained that NSA cguld not collect from a wire in the United States, without a court order, content or metadata from communications that originated and/or terminated in the United States. Hayden also said that communications nietadata do not have the same level of constitutional protection as the content of commuications and that access to metadata concerning communications lmvmg one end in the United States would significanily enhance NSA's analytic capabflltles Uayden suggested that the ablhty to collect communications that originated or terminated in the United States without a court order would increase NSA's speed and agility. Aftertwo additional meetings with Vice President Cheney to discuss further how NSA collection capabilitics could be expanded along the lines described at the White House meeting, the Vice President told Hayden to work out a solution with Counsel to the Vice President David Addington.\n\n## (U) Authorization Of The President's Surveillance Program\n\nAccording to Hayden, Addington drafted the first Presidential Authoruallon of the PSP. Hayden characterized himself as the \"subject matter expert,'\nand he said that no other NSA personnel, including the General Counsel, participated in dmftmg the authorization. Hayden also said that DoJ personnel had not been involved in his diseussions with Addington concering Presidential authorization ofthe PSP. The PSP\ncamie into existence on 4 October 2001, when President Bush signed the Presidential Authorization drafied by Addington. The authorization was entitled: Presidential Authorization for Specified Electronic Surveillance Activities during a Limited Period to Detectand Prevent Acts of Terrorism within the United States. Between 4 October 2001\nand  December 2006, President Bush signed 43 authorizations, exclusive of modifications and other program-related memoranda to the Secretary of Defense.\n\n## (U) Sigint Activities Authorized Under The Program\n\nCESHSTEW/STHOEAN) The 4 October 2001 Presidential Authorization directed the Secretary of Defense to \"use the capabilities of the Department of Defense, including but not ljmited to the signals intelligence capabilities of the National Security Agency, to collect foreign intelligence by electronic surveillance,\" provided the surveillance was intended to;\n\"COMMUNICALIoN 1S & g up engaged inmternational terrorism, or:\nactivities in preparation therefor, oran agent of such a group; or\n(b) acquire, with respect to a communication, header/router/addressing-\n{type information, including telecommunications dialing-type data, but not the contents of the communication, when (i) at least one party to sucli communication is outside the United States or (ii) no party to such commutication is known to be a citizen of the United States, any commumcatmn mciudmur hose to, irom, or excimn (&3 y within the: U\nwherg probable cause eXlSted to believe one of the communicants was engaged in international terrorism, The authorization also allowed the NSA to acquire felephony and Internet metadata where one end of the communication was outside the United States-or neither communicant was known to be-a U.S. citizen. For telephone calls, metadata generally referred to \"\"dialing-type information\" (the originating and terminating telephone numbers, and tlie date, tinie, and duration of the call), but not the content of the call. For\nQS#SM%@WQ% The Secretmy of Defense duected NSA in Wntlng, on lorization to conduct specified electronic surveillance on\n&\n|international terrorism. Because the surveillance was conducted in the Umted States included ,b)(' ).\n\n\n| communications into or out of the United States, and a subset of these communications was to or from persons in the United States, the surveillance otherwise would have required a FISC order. NSA was also allowed to retain, process, analyze, and disseminate intelligence ffom comnimnications acquired under the Presidential Authorization.\n\n~FSHSTEWHSIHOCANE) In addition to allowing the interception of the content of communications into or out of the United States, paragraph (a)(ii) of the first Presidential Authorization allowed NSA to intercept the content of purely domestic communications.\n\nFlayden told us he did not realize this until Addington specifically raised the subject during ameeling to discuss renewing the authorization. According to II'tyden, he told Addington that NSA would not collect domestic communieations because NSA is.a foreign intelligenice agency, its infrastructure did not support domesuc collection, and he would require such-a high evidentiary standard to justify mterceptmg purely domestic communication that such cases miglit just as well go to-the FISC.\n\n## (U) Content Of The Presidential Authorizations And Department-Of Jusiice Ceriification As To-Form And Legahty\n\n~(S/NIF) Each of the Presidential Authomzatlous included a finding to the effect that terrorist groups of global reach possessed the intent and capability to attack the United States, that an exiv 1ord1mry emergency continued to cxist, and that these circumstances constifuted an urgent and compelling governmental interest permitting electronic surveillance within the United States for counterterrorism purposes, without judicial wartants.\n\nor court orders, The primary authiorities eited for the legality of the electronic surveillance and related activities were Article II of the Constitution and the\n18 September 2001 Authorization for Use of Military Force Joint Resolution (AUMEF).\n\nThe authorizations fiuther provided that any limitation in B.O. 12333 or any other Presidential divective inconsistent with the Presidential Authorizations shall not apply, to the extent of the inconsistency, to the electronic surveillance authorized under the PSP, Each authorization also included the President's determination that, ta assist in preservmg the secrecy necessary to \"detect and prevent acts of teirorism against the United States,\"\nthe Secretary of Defense was to defer notification of the authorizations and the activities carried out pursuant to them fo persons outside the Executive Branch. The President also noted his intention to inform appropriate members of the Senate and the House of Representatives of the program \"as soon as I judge that it can be done consistently with natioial defense needs.\"\n(54 Ashcroft certified the first Presidential Autherization as to \"form and legality\" on 4 October 2001. According to NSA records, this was the same day that Asheroft was read into the PSP. There was no legal requirement that the Presidential Authorizations of the PSP be certified by the Attorney General or other DoJ officials, Former senior DoJ official Patrick F. Philbin told us he thought one purpose of the the DoJ certifications served as official confirmation that DoJ had determined that the activities carried out under the program were lawful,\n5#Fy Gonzales told us that approval of the program as to form and legality was not required ag a matter of law, but he believed that it \"added value\" to the Presidential Anthorization for three reasons. First, NSA was being asked to do something it had not done before, and it was important to assure the NSA that the Attorney General had\n'thc progr m.would have value \"prospectwely\" in the event of Congrcssmnal or inspector general reviews of the prograni.\n\n(U) The Presidential Authorizations were issued at intervals of approximately 30 to\n60 days: Bradbmy said that the main reason for petiodically reauthorizing the program.\n\nwas to enstiwe that the Presidential Authetizations were reviewed fiequently to assess the program's value and effectiveness. As the period for each Presidential Authorization drew to a close, the DCI prepared a threat assessment memoraridum for the President describing the cuifrent state of potential terrorist threats to the United States.\n\n## (U) The Threat Assessment Memorandums Supporting Presidential Authorization Of The Program\n\n{S#?&FE} From October 2001 to May 2003, the CIA prepared the threat assessment memoranduras that supported Presidential authorization and periodic reauthorization of the PSP. The memorandums documented the current threat to the U.S. homeland and to U.S.\n\niniterests abroad from al-Qa'ida and affiliated terrorist organizations, The first threat assessment memorandum-The Continuing Near-Term Threat from. Usaima Bin Ladin\nwas SIgned by the DCT on 4 October 2001.7 Subsequent threat assessment memorandums:\nwere prepared every 30 to 60 days to correspond with the President's reauthorizations.\n\n{S#.NF}- The, DCI Chief of Staff John H. Moseman, was the CIA focal point for the threat asgess\n:\nik Accmdmg to Moseman, he directed the\n-\nto prepare objective appraisals of the edts to the homeland, and to document fhose: app1alsals in a memorandum.\n\nanalysts drew upon all sources of mtelhgence i preparing their threat assessments. Rach of the memorandums focused: pnmauly on the current threat situation and did notroutinely provide information concerning previously reported threats or an assessment of the PSP's utility in addressing previously reported threats.\n\n-(SHANEY After - completed its portion of the memorandums, Mosemen added a Pparagraph at the end of the memorandums stating that the individuals and organizations involved in global terrorism (and discussed in the memorandums) possessed the capability and intention to undertake further terrorist attacks within the United States. Moseman recalled that the paragraph was provided to him initially by either Gonzales or Addington.\n\nThe paragraph recommended that the President authorize the Secretary of Defense to employ within the United States the capabilities of DoD, including but not limited to NSA's SIGINT capabilities, to collect foreign intelligence by electronic surveillance. The paragraph described the types of communication and data that would be collected and the ciri;umst'ances, under which they could be collected. The draft threat assessment randums were reviewed by CIA Office of General Counsel attortieys assigned to and CIA Acting General Counsel (Principal Deputy General Counsel), John A. Rizzo.\n\nRizzo told us that the draft memorandums were acnmafly sufficient, but there were occasions when, based-on his-experience with previous memorandums; lie thought that\n-d1aPc memmandmns contained insufficient threat information or did not present a\n-con g case for reauthorization of the PSP. In such instances, Rizzo would request that provide additional available threat information or make revisions io the draft memorandums\n~S/NE) The threat assessment memorandums wete then signed by the DCI and forwarded to the Secvetary of Defense to be co-signed. Tenet signed most of the threat memorandums prepared during his tenure as DCI. There were no occasions when the DCI\nor Acting DCI witliheld their signature from the threat assessment memorandums, The threat assessment memorandums were reviewed by Dol's OLC to assess whether there was\n\"a sufficient factual basis-demonstrating a threat of terrorist attacks in the United States for it to continue to be reasonable under the standards of the Fourth Amendment for the President fo [continue] to authorize the warrantless searches involved\" in the program.\n\nOLC then advised the Attorney General whether the constitutional standard of reasonableness had been met and whether the Presidential Authorization could be certified as to form-and legality. After review and approval as to form and legality by the Attorney General, the threat assessment memorandums were delivered to the White House to be attached to thie PSP reauthorization memorandums signed by the President.\n\n(S#AMY Responsibility for drafting the threat assessment memorandums was transferred from|\nto the newly-established Terrorist Threal Integration Center in May\n2003, This responsibility was retained by TTIC's successor organization, NCTC. The DCI continued to sign the threat assessment memorandums through 15 April 2005, Subsequent memorandums were sigried by the Director of National Intelligence or his designee.\n\n## {U) Early Revisions To The Presidential Authorizations\n\nSHS-\nOn 2 November 2001, with the first authorization set to expire, President Bush signed a second Presidential Authorization of the PSP. The second authorization cited the same authorities in support of the President's actions, principally the Article II Commander-in-Chief powets and the AUMF. The second authorization also cited the same findings of a threat assessment concerning the magnitude of potential terrorist threats and the likelihood of their occurrence in the future. However, the scope of authorized content collection and metadata acquisition was redefined in the second Presidential Authorization,\n(TSHSTEW/H/SHOCANE) The language of the second Presidential Authorization changed in three respects the scope of collection and acquisition authorized under the PSP.\n\nFirst, the \"probable cause to believe\" standard for the collection of Internet communications and telephione content was replaced with \"based on the factual and pmotu,al considerations of everyday life on which reasonable and prudent persons act, there are reasonable grounds to believe . . ..\" DoJ, Counsel for Intelligence Policy, J ames A, Baker told us this change was made by Addington because he believedthe ternis\n\"probable cauge\" were \"too freighted\" with usage in judicial opinions, Baker-also said e believed the change to more colloquial language was made because the staridard was to-be applied by non-lawyers at the NSA. Second, the newly defined standard was to be applied to thie belief that the communication \"originated or terminated oniside the United States . . \"' The new language therefore eliminated the authority that existed in the first authorizatior to 111teiccpt the content of purely domestic communications.\n\n:\n) The third change in the:scope of PSP collection and acqmsluon contamcd in the second Presidential Authotization was the inclision of an additional (third) category of Internet and telephoriy metadata thiat could be acquired:\n(ii1) based on the factual and practical considerations of everyday life on which reasonable and prudent persons act, there are specific and articilable facts giving reason to believe that such communication relates to international terrorism, or activities in preparation therefor.\n\nThis. language represeited an expansion of collection authority to include metadata pettaining to certain communications even when both parties were U.S. persons, as long as there were facts giving reason to believe that the communication was related to international terrorism.\n\n%) On 30 November 2001, the President signed-a third\n9 January 2002 concerning scope of authorized collection and acquisition became tlie\n.\n\nY\ni\n#\ne L\n*\n\"\not i i\n:I\nby\n\n## (U) Daj Office Of Legal Counsel Memorandums Supporting Legality Of The Program\n\n{(S/AH) OLC Deputy Assistant Attorney General John Yoo was responsible for drafting the first series of legal memorandums supporting the PSP. Yoo was the only OLC\nofficial read into the PSP from the program's inception until he left DoJ in May 2003, Duri'ng Yoo's tenure at DoJ, he-was one of only three Dol officials read into the PSP, The otlier two were Asheroft and Baker, OLC Assistant Attorney General Jay S. Bybee, Yoo's.\n\ndirect _'Vup,erv.i_eor,, was never read into the program.\n\n{(SEEY\nBefore the President authorized the PSP on 4 October 2001, Yoo had prepared a memorandum evaluating the legality of a hypothetical electronic surveillance program within the United States to monitor commutiications of potential terrorists. His menioranduim, er 2001, was addressed toDe pu'ty'Wfite Houst Couusel Time\n'\nentitled Constitutional Standards on Randoim Electronic\n|\n*68#NF)-\nThe fi rst OLC memmandmn exphmtly addressing the legality of PSP was not drafted until after the program had been formally authorized by the Presiderit and after Asheroft had certified the program as to form and legality. The first OLC opinion directly supportmg the legality of the PSP was dated 2 November 2001, and was drafted by Yoo.\n\nYoo acknowledged at the outset of his 2 November memorandum that \"[blecause of the hwhly sensitive nature of this subject and the time pressures involved, this memorandiim has no undergone the usual editing and review process for opinions that issue from our\n~(5/AM) Yoo acknowledged in his 2 Novernber 2001 memorandum that the first Presidential Authorization was \"in tension with FISA.\" Yoo stated that FISA \"purports to be the exclusive statutory means for conducting electronic surveillance for foreign intelligence.\" But Yoo then opined that \"[sJuch a reading of FISA would be an uticonstitutional infiingement on the President's Article II authorities.\" Citing advice of OLC and Dol's position as presented to Congress during passage of the USA PATRIOT\nAct several weeks earlier, Yoo characterized FISA as merely providing a \"safe harbor for electronic surveillance,\" adding that it \"cannot restrict the President's ability to engage in warrantless searches that protect the national security.\"\n~5A/NEY- Regarding whether the activities conducted under the PSP could be conducted under FISA, Yoo described the same potential impediments that he had cited in his 4 Qctober memorandum. Noting that the Presidential Authorization could be viewed as a violation of FISA's civil and criminal sanctions in 50 U.S.C.  1809-10, Yoo opined that in this regard FISA represented an unconstitutional infringement on the President's Article Il powers. According to Yoo, the ultimate test of whether the government may engage in warrantless electronic surveillance activities is whether such conduct is\n'consistent with the Fourth Amendment, not whether it meets the standards of FISA.\n\nSHAEY Yoo wrote that reading FISA\nto restrict the President's inherent:authority to cdndUCt- foreign intelligence surveillance would raise grave cOnsti'tufional questions which, under the doctring of conistitutional ayoidance, would tequiire resolving the issue ina at preserves the President's (B\n.\n\nEE\n[Unless Congress mado a clear statement FISA\nthat it sought to restrict] esidential-authority to conduct warrantless-searches in the national security areawhich it has nothen the statute mustbe constried to avoid such areading.\"\n'\n(TSHSTNEY Yoo's 2 November2001 memorandum dismissed Fourth Amendmerit coriceins to the extent that the authorized Qollection'invelved non-U.S. persons outside the.\n\nUnited States, Regarding those aspects of the program that involved interception of the h1temationa'l, communications of U.S. persors within the United States, Y00 asserted that Fourth Amendment jurisprudence allowed for searches of persons crossing U.S.\n\niriternational borders and that interceptions of cominunications ifto or out of the United States fell within the \"horder crossing exception.\" Yoo further opined that electronic surveillance in \"ditect support of military operations\" did not trigger constitutiofial pto_t_(;sct_fii'on,agamstaillegal searches and seizures, in part because the Fourth Amendment 18\nprimarily aimed at curbing law enforcement abuses. Finally, Yoo wrote that the electronie surveillance deseribed in the Presidential Authorizations was \"reasonableTM under the Fousth Amerdiment and therefore did not require a warrant, i.e., in this situation the\n%\nAL\n\n## Pres!Dent 'S Surveillanc&: Program (U) Nsa Lmplementation Lfshshine)-Telephone And Internet Communications Content Collection And Analysis\n\n-\n{F5/SHA) Content collection and analysis under the PSP was conducted in the same manner as collection and analysis condusted previously by the NSA under\n]3 0. 12333 authonty NSA management applied standard minimization and specially designed procedures to.task domestic selectors such as telephone numbers and e-mail addresses. Selectors had to meet two criteria before being tasked under the PSP:\nthe purpose of the collection had to be to prevent and detect terrorist attacks in the United\n~{(FSHSHAE-NSA. collection managers were responsible for ensuring that lelephony and Internet communications selectors were appropriately added or removed from collection. Content collection for domestic selectors was sometimes approved for specific time periods.. Data collected under the PSP were stored in compartmented NSA databases, and.access to the databases was strictly controlled.\n\n(15\nA\nThe'majority of targets for content collection under the PSP were foreign telephone numbers and Internet communications addresses, 12008, NSA reported that foreign telephone numbers and in excess .df-fotei gn Internet ccmmunicaticjnsfaddl'e_ssesvhad been targeted from October 2001 through December 2006.\n\nNSA reported in 2008 tha domestictelephone numbers and domestic Internet communications addresses were targeted for PSP content collection from October 2001 to Jaruary 2007, Although targeted domestic telephone numbers and Intemmet communications addresses were located in the United States, they were not necessarily used by U.S. citizens.\n\n'\n~(SIIE). PSP program officials told us that the NSA did not seek to collect domestic communications under the PSP. However, NSA managers said that there are no readily available technical means within thegiEE\nto guaraiitee that no domestic calls will be collected. Issues of this kind imevitably arise from time to time in other SIGINT operations, and are not unigue to the PSP. Over the life of the program, the NSA reported jincidents of unintentional collection of domestic communications or non-targeted communications. In such cases, the NSA IG determined that personnel followed established procedures in reporting the incidents, adjusting collection, and purging unauthorized collection records from NSA databases.\n\n_NSA analysis of content collected under the PSP involved the same practices and techniques used in analyzing information from other SIGINT operations.\n\nTelephone content was made available to NSA analysts through a voice processing system;\nInternet communications content was available from the database in which it was stored.\n\nAnalysis involved more than listening to, or reading the confent of, a communication and transcribing and disseminating a transcript. Analysis also involved coordinating and collaborating with other IC analysts, applying previous knowledge of the target, and integrating other relevant intelligence,\n'\n-Telephony and Internst l\\fletadata Co!lection and Analyszs b\n1ol\n'\nhad the capabthty\n1o co]lect bullc telephony and Internet metadata befme the PSP, collection was limited becatise the NSA wasnot authorized to collect metadata from a wire inside the United States without a court .order when one end of the.\n\ncommunication was in the United States. NSA. could \"chain to, but not through, domestic.\n\nselectors. Access to large amounts of metadata is required for effective contact chainin, 2, and the PSP increased the data available to NSA. analysts and allowed-them to perform:\nmore thomugh contact chaining.\n\nAlthough NSA analysts could search bulk-collected metadata under the PSP the analysts' searches were limited to targets that were approved under the standards set forth in the Presidential Authorizations. As such, only a small fraction of the metadata collected under the PSP was ever accessed. In August 2006, the NSA estimated that 0.000025 percent of the telephone records in the PSP database (or ene of eyery fourmillion records) could be expected to be seen by NSA analysts through chaining telephone number or Internet communication addressin a specnahzed metadata analysis tool wluch searches the metadata aud 1denhfies contacts betwcen the selectm and other\n\nna\nby than two dcgrceq of sepalatlon from the target NSA analysts detennined that it was not\nanalytically useful to do so.\n~(FSHSEANE) An automated process was created to alert and automatically chain new and potentially reportable telephone numbers using what was called an \"alert list.\"\naph is TEHSHANE-When NSA persomnel identified erroneous metadata collectionusually caused by technical problems or inappropriate application of the authorizationthey were directed to report the violation or incident thidugh appropriate channels and to delete the Gollection froin all NSA databases. NSA reported three such violations early in the program and took measures to correct them,\n\n## (U) Nsa Reporting From The President's Surveillance Program\n\nPSP 'in,fonnatiou'wa.s-s'dissenfinatedlin-t'ypes of repotts;\nided m aaalanal' sis: content reports . which provided NSA analysis Tippers were sent to the FBlandihe UIA by e-Inail-Ona.\n\nk. Some tippers contained \"tear ling\" information that\n\n## (U) Nsa Managerial Structure And Oversight Of The President's Surveillance Program\n\n(5/F- Analysis and reporting associated with the PSP was conducted within SID at NSA's Fort Meads, Maryland headquarters. PSP activities were not conducted at NSA\nfield sites. The Director and Deputy Director of NSA exercised senior operational control and authority over the program. The individual who was SIGINT Director in 2001 told us that, aside from ensuring that the PSP had appropriate checks and balances, she left direct management of the program to the NSA Director, the Deputy Director, and the Office of General Courisel. She noted that Hayden took personal responsibility for the program and managed it carefully.\n\nSTy By 2004, specific managerial authorities concerning PSP collection, analysis, and reporting activities had been delegated to the SIGINT Director. The SIGINT Director further delegated managerial authority to the PSP program manager and mission execution responsibilities to the Chief of the CT Product Line. The PSP program manager position was restructured to provide the incumbent authority and responsibility for oversight of PSP\nact1v1ty a'CroSe SID, and the PSP program manager was provided additional staff, QOvyerthe life-of the programi, there were five PSP program managers, who reported directly to'the SIGINT Director or the Chief of the CT Product Line.\n\nIn thousands, personnel costs netincluded)\n(U) NSA Management Controls fo Ensure Gompliance With Presidential Authorizations\nGS#NF} The NSA General Counsel wWas: read mto the PSP on4 Octobm 2001, the day the first Presidential Authorization was signed, On 6 October 2001, the General Counsel provided Haycleu and his deputy'ralkmg points for use in briefing NSA personnel on: the new program's authorities; The talking points icluded the fact that Hayden had directed.\n\nthe NSA. Gerieral Counsel and the NSA Associate: Gcncwl Counsel for Operatioiis to review and oversee PSP activities. The NSA Associate General Counsel for Operatlous provxded most ofthe program:oversight before the NSA IG-wagvead into the PSP in August 2002. The Associate General Counsel for Operations oversaw program implementation, reviewed proposed tar get packages for compliance with the:\nauithorizations, and coordinated pLogLanlrelated issues'with-DoT,\n\n## (U) Nsa Inspector General Oversight Of The Program\n\n~8/AVE)-The NSA IG and other NSA Office of Inspector General pmsonnel were read into the PSP beginning in August 2002, Over the life of the program; the NSA 1G\nconducted;\n\no\nThree investigations in response to specific incidents and vielations of the\nPresidential Authorizations to determine the cause, effect, and remedy.\no\nTenteviews to deterhine the adequacy of management controls\nto ensure\ncomnpliance with the mthorization and related authorities, assess the.\nmitigation of risk associated with program activities, and identify\nimpediments to meeting the requirements of the authorizations.\nit IE}-Ten of the NSA IG reports included a total OfEI ecommendations to NSA ma.nagement to stLengthen internal controls and procedures overthe PSP. The NSA\nIG identified no intentional misuse of the PSP. Significant findings from NSA I reviews of the PSP include the following:\n\no\nIn 2005, the\nNSA IG found.errors when comparing records of domestic\ntelephone and communications selectors approved for PSP content\ncollection with selectors actually on collection. The errors included\nselectors that were not removed from collection after being detasked,\nselectors that were not put on collection when approved, and selectors that\nwere mistakenly put on collection due to typographical errors. NSA\nmanagement toak steps to correct the errors and establish procedures to\nreconcile approved selectors with selectors actually on collection.\no\nDuring a 2006 review, the NSA IG found that all items in a randomly\nselected sample of domestic selectors met Presidential Autharization\ncriteria. Using a statistically valid sampling methodology, the IG\nconcluded with 95 percent confidence that 95 percent or more of domestic\nselectors tasked for PSP content collection were linked to al-Qa'ida, its\n.\n\nassociates, or international terrorist threats inside the United States.\n\n(SN\nIn-addition to NSA. IG report recommendations, inMarch 2003, the NSA IG\nrecommended to Hayden that he report violations of the Presidential Authorizationsto the President, The NSA. IG propared ] Presidential notifications for the NSA Director concemning violations of the authorizations.\n\n(SHANE Beginningin J anuary 2007, violations inyolving collection activities conducted 'unde't'-PsP authority as well as yiolations related to foriner PSP actiyities that Wc'r'eoperath]g under FISA authority were reported qualiel__'ly to the President's Intelligence Oversight Board, through the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Intelligence Owersigh i\n\"2004; therefore, it was niot possible to determine the exact nature and extent o collection. NSA OIG will close 6ut this incident in its upcoming report to the President's Intelligence Oversight Board.\n\n~(ESHSHANF)On 15 January 2009, the DoJ reported to the FISC that the NSA had been using an \"alert list\" to compare FISA-authorized metadata against telephorie numbers associated with counterterrorism targets tasked by the NSA for SIGINT collection. The NSA. had reported to the FISC that the alert list consisted of telephone numbers for which\n=\ni\n)\nspicion that the numbers NSA had determined the existence of a reasonable, articulable susp were.related to a terrorist orga1fi'zation assoeiated withjg\n'\nTni fact, such a determination had not been made for the majority of the selectors on the alert list. The NSA IG reported.this incident to the President's Intelligence Oversight Board, and has provided updates as required. The alest listand a detailed NSA 60-day review of processes related to the business records FISC order were the subject of several recent submissions to the FISC and of NSA briefings to the Congressional oversight committees.\n\n## (U) Access To The President's Surveillance Program\n\n~(SHAEY-Kiiowledge of the PSP was strictly controlled and lnmtecl at the eXpress direction of the White House. Hayden eventually delegated his PSP clearance apploval authority for NSA, FBI, and CIA operational personnel to the NSA PSP PTOgrant manager, Hayden was required to obtain approval fromthe White House to clear members of Congress, FISC Judges, the NSA. IG, and othets.\n\nLSLAEY- The NSA IG was not read into the PSP until August 2002. Accor ding to the NSA General Counsel at the time, the President would not allow the IG to be biiefed prior to-that date, Although Hayden did not recall why the IG had not been cleared earlier, he tlought that it would have been inappropriate to clear him when the length off fhe program was unknown and before operations had stabilized. By August 2002, Hayden and the NSA General Counsel wanted to institutionalize PSP oversight W1t11 the involvenient of the NSA 1G. Hayden recalled having to \"make a case\" to the White House to have the NSA IG read in. The ODNI IG found that ODNT oversight of the PSP\nwas limited by ODNI oversight personnel not being provided timely access to the prograin.\n\n## (U) Congressional Briefings On The Program\n\nOn 25 October 2001, Hayden conducted a briefing on the PSP for the Chairman and the Ranking Member of the House Permanent Select Committes on Tntelligence, Nancy P. Pelosiand Porter J. Goss; and the Chairman and the Vice Chairman ofthe Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI), D, Robert Graham and Richard C. Shelby. Between 25 October 2001 and 17 January 2007, Hayden and current NSA Director-Alexander, sometimes supported by other NSA. personnel, conducted\n49 briefings to members of Congress and their staff. Hayden'told us that during the many PSP briefings to merhbers of Congress, 110 one eVer suggested that the NSA should stap the program. I\"_Iaydert.emphasized that he did more than just \"flip through slides\" during the briefings, which lasted as Jong as attendees had questions.\n\n-\n.\n\n## (U) Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court Briefings On The Program\n\nOn 31 January 2002, the FISC Presiding Judge Royce Lamberth er of the couft to be read into the PSP, He was briefed on the oy,\n11\nd.of DoJ's Office of Tntelligence Policy and Review amoerth''s\n\"Mueller, Yeo;_ and Baker.\n\nTSHSHHOEAN\nAsheroft provided Lamberth a brief:summary-of the President's decision to create the PSP, and Ashcrof} stated that he had determined, based upon-the advice of John Yoo, an attorney in Dol's Office of Legal Counsel (OLC); that the President's actions were lawful under the Constitution. Ashcroft also emphasized to I.ambetth that the FISC was not being asked to approve the program. Following Asheroft's summary, Hayden described for Lamberth how the program functioned opetationally, Yoo discussed legal aspects of the program, and Baker proposed procedures.\n\nfor handling international terrorism FISA applications that contained PSP-derived information, Fot the next four months, until the end of his term in May 2002, Lamberth was the only FISC judge vead into the PSP.\n\n(FSHSTHOCHAN 3-Judge Colleen Kollar-Kotelly succgeded Lamberth as the FISC\nPresiding Tudge and was briefed on the PSP on 17 May 2002, The brisfing was similar in form and substance to that provided to Lamberth.\n\nIn response to several questions from Kollat-Kotelly about the scope of the President's authority to conduct warrantless surveillance, Do prepared a letter to Kollar-Kotelly, signed by Yoo, that, according to Kollar-Kotelly, \"set out 4 broad overview of the legal authority for conducting [the PSP], but did not analyze the specifics of the [PSP] program.\" The letter, which Kollar-Kotelly feviewed at the White House but was not permitted to retain, essentially replicated Yoo's\n9 Wovember 2001 memorandum regarding the legality of the PSP. Kollar-Kotelly was the only sitting FISC judge read into the PSP until January 2006, when the other FISC judges were read in.\n\nBaker was read into the PSP only after he came upon \"stiange, unattributed\" language inadlise ication fhat susested the existence of a his successor; Kollar-Kotelly, were r\n\"I'he DoJ IG believes that not having OIPR\nofficials and menibers of the FISC read into the PSP, while program-derived information was being disseminated as investigative leads to the FBI and finding its way into FISA\n| Asoted, evenfually Lamberth, and (ater applications, put.at risk the DoJ's important relationship with the FISC, The DoJ IG agrees\n-with Baker's assessment that, as the goverinient's representative before the FISC, good relations between the DoJ and the FISC depend on candor and transparency.\n\n## (U) Fbi Participation In The President's Surveillance Program\n\n\"SHSHAE)-\nAs a user of PSP-derived information, the FBI disseminated leads\nt1ppers--to FBI field offices. Tippers primarily consisted of domestic telephone numbers and Internet communications addresses that NSA analysts had determined through metadata analysis were connected to individuals involved with al-Qa'ida or its affiliates.\n\nDomestic telephone munbers represented the: overwheliming majority of PSP-derived information contained in tippers. Tippers also provided information derived from.content collection undel the PSP.\n\n'\nfF7 The FBI's principal objective during the earliest months.of the PSP was to dlssemmate\n- program information to FBI field offices for 1nvest1gat10n while protecting the source of the information and the methods used to collect it. The FBI initially assigned responsibility for this toits Telephor ysis Unit (TAU), which developed procedures bL b3\nto:'dis'\"s_em_i;late information from gports in a 11011con1pa1'tmented Secret:level b7:E\n'\nformat. The result Electrotiie. Communications (ECs) included restrictions on how the information could be'used, i.e., FBI field offices were to use the information \"for lead purposes only\" and not use the information in legal or judicial proceedings.\n\n8/\nThe FBD's participation in the PSP evolved over time as the program became lessa temporaly response to the September 11 altacks and more a permanent surveillance rove.the cffectwe\n5\n, ficipation in the program, the FBI\nbl, b3, b7E\n(\n'\n:\nto manage its involvement in the PSP, InF\n03, the FBI\nassigned a team of FBI personnel\"Team 10\"to work full-time at the NSA to manage the bBI's participation in the prograni.\n\neam 10s primary responsibility was to-disseminate PSP information not required to investigate every tipper bl, b3, b7E\nA\n| ECs to FBI field offices for investigation or other purposes. However, gver ttme eam\n10 'began to participate in the PSP in other ways. For example, Team 10\nbl, b3, occasionally submitted telephone numbers and Internet communications addresses to the b7E\nNSA to be searched against the bulk metadata collected under the PSP. The NSA\nconducted independent analysis to determine whether telephone numbers or Internet communications addresses submitted by Team 10 met the standards established by the Presidential Authorizations. Tearn 10 also regularly contributed to NSA's PSP process by reviewing draft reports and providing relevant information from FBI databases.\n\n-5/ FBI fie by Team 10 vnder th EC assigned\"action, roject. Rather, the type of lead that the|\niseretionary,\" or \"for information\"drove the field officeTMs nyestigative activity related to PSP\ntelephone nuniber tippers that assigned response to a tipper.? The vast information involved responding action leads. Team 10 generally bl, ly assigned action leads for telephone numbers that were not.\n\nalready known to the FBI or telephone numbers that Teain 10 otherwise deemed a high priorit h 48 2 number that had a relation.\n\no-a major FBI investication.\n\nFrom\n,\n'\nvhen as-established; to action b3, b7E\ni\nleads instructed field offices to obtat subscriber information for the telephone numbers within its jurisdiction and to conduct any \"logical investigation to determine terrorist connections.\" Some agents complained that action leads lacked guidance about how to\n\nthe tippers, which was of particular concern because agents were not confident communications provided sufficient predication to open national security oes to FBI procedures in 2003 addressed some FBI agents'\nconcerns.k\n@\n=\n|\nBl Headquarters assumed responsibility from field offices bl, b3, b7E\nfor issuing national security letters (NSLs) to obtain subscriber information about PSP\ntipped telephone numbers and Internet communications addresses.\n\n|\ne Attoriney General issued new- guidelines for FBI national security investigations that created.anew category of investigative activity called a \"threat assessment.\" Under a threat assessment, FBI agents are authorized to investigate or collect information on individuals, groups; and organizations of possible investigatiye intere ithout opening a prelivninary ot tional security investigation. Beginning action leads assigned byi\n| metadata tippers instructed field offices to conduct threat assessments and a vised that FBI headquarters would issue NSLs to obtain subscriber information.\n\n~SHAY-\nIn general, an FBI thiveat assessment involved searching several FBI, public, and commercial databases for information about the tipped telephone number, and requesting that various state and local government entities conduct similar searches.\n\nSomietimes these searches identified the subscriber to the telephone number before FBI\nHeadquarters obtained the information with an NSL. In other cases, the threat assessments.\n\ncontinued after the field office received the NSL results.\n\nbl, b3, b7E\n{S#NF)- The eads frequently were closed after conducting a threat assessment interview with the subscriber and determining that there was 10 nexus to terrorism or threat to national security.\n\nIn other cases, the leads were closed based solely on the results of database checls.\n\n'BI field offices were required to report the\n{(5/HE)- Beginnin\n=\nheadquarters. FBI field offices typically reported b1, b3, b7E\nresults of their threat assessments to F\nall of the information that was obtained about the tipped telephone numbers, including the details of any subscriber interviews, and then stated that the office had determined that the telephonc number did not have a nexus to terrorism and considered the lead closed. Much less' fiequanfly, field offices reported that a preliminary' mvestlgatmn was opened.\n\nRegardless of whether any links to international terrorism were identified in a threat assessment, the results of the threat assessments and the information that was collected about subscribers generally were reported to FBI headquarters and uploaded to FBI\ndatabases.\n\n## Uy Cia Participationin The President's Surveillance Program\n\n2y The ODNI IG found that the ODNI's primary rolc in the PSP was the plepzuauou of the threat assessments that summarized the al-Qa'ida threat to the United States-and were used to support periodic reauthorization of the program. The ODNI IG\nfound that the tlireat assessments were drafted by experienced NCTC personnel who plepaled the documents in a memorandum style following an established DoJ format. The ODNIIG also determined that the ODNI threat assessments wete prepared using evaluated iritelligence iriformation chosen from a wide variety of IC sources. ODNI\npersonnel said that-during the period when the ODNI prepared the threat assessments, the.\n\nIC had-access to fully evaluated mtelhgence that readlly supported an assessment that\n'al-Qa ida remained a significant\n(5%~ The NCTC analysts said that they handle NSA surveillance information, including PSP information, consistent with the standard rules and procedures for handling NSA mtelhgence information including minimization of U.S. person identities. On those occasions when the NCTC analysts knew that a particular NSA intelligence product was derived from the PSP, the analysts told us they reviewed program information in the same manner as oflier incorning NSA intelligence products. If appropriate, NCTC analysts then incorporated the PSP information into analytical products being prepared for the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) and other senior intelligence officials. They identified the President's Terrorism Threat Report and the Senior Executive Terrorism Report ag examples of the types of finished intelligence products that would, at times, contain PSP\ninformation,\n\n## (U) The President's Surveillance Program And The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court\n\nTSHSHATR Dol, initially with the FISC's concurrence and later at the court's divection, developed and inlplemcnted:procedures-referred to as \"scrubbing?\"\nproceduresio dccount for and make the court aware-of instances when PSP-detived Triformation was:included in FISA applications. Lamberth required that all FISA.\n\napplications that contained PSP-derived information, or that wopld result in simultaneous collection against particular targets under both the PSP and a FISC order, be filed with him only. Baker told us that Lamberth wanted to be informed of applications that contained PSP information and of dual coverage situations. According to Baker, the scrubbing progedures were a means of meeting his efhical duty of candor to the FISC without disclosing the existence of the PSP to uncleared judges.\n\nS/ISTANRY-\nDoJ effectuated the scrubbing procedures by compiling lists of information contained in initial and renewal FISA applications that was attributed to the NSA and ofall facilities targeted fot electromnic surveillance in the applications. These lists were seit to the NSA to determine whether any of the NSA-attributed information was PSP-derived and whether any-of the facilities also were targeted under the PSP, The NSA.\n\ncommmunicated the results back to Dol, which then filed the applications with the FISC\nconsistent with. the scrubbing procedures.\n\nTSHSHATR-\nKollar-Kotelly continued the procedures that had been developed by Baker and agreed to by Lamberth for handling FISA applications that contained PSP-\nderived information. However; Kollar-Kotelly required Dol to excise from FISA\napplications any information. obtained or derived from the PSP. But Kollar-Kotelly also instructed Baker to alert her to any instances where an application's basis for the requisite probable cause showing under FISA was weakened by excising PSP information. Tn such cases, Kollar-Kotelly would then assess the application with the knowledge that additional relevant information had been excised.\n\nTSHSHOES\nKollar-Kotelly also instructed DoJ to discontinue the practi d under Lamberth of including in applications a descriptive phras\n\n## 25 @ Means Of Indicallng Mat Tachiles Targetea Vy E Applications\n\nalso targeted under the PSP. Baker told us that while Kollar-Kotelly understood that instances of dual coverage would occur, she did not want to appear to judicially sanction PSP coverage.\n\n/\nY-\nIn March 2004, Kollar-Kotelly was informed of operational changes imade to the PSP following a dispute between DoJ and the White House about the legal basis for eertain aspects of the program. Kollar-Kotelly responded by imposing an additional scrubbing requirement to further ensure, to the exteiit possible, that PSP-detived information was not included in FISA applications. The FBI, in coordination with Dol and NSA, was to determine whether a facility included in a FISA applicationuot just a targeted telephone number or Internet communication addressalso appeared in a PSP\nreport. Kollar-Kotelly permitted any such facility to remain in the application if it could be demonstrated that the FBT had developed, independent of the PSP, an investigative interest in the-facility; or that the FBI inevitably would have identifizd the facility in question through normal investigative steps. An OIPR official who was responsible for discussing such cases with Kollar-Kotelly told us that the judge generally accepted Dol's assessment that there was a non-PSP investigative basis for a facility in question, or that the facility inevitably would have been discovered even in the absence of PSP-derived leads-to the FBL\n-5\nTmplementing the scrubbing procedures, both under Lamberth and Kollar-\nKotelly, was-a complicated and time-consuming endeavor for OIPR staff, Baler, who until March 2004 was the only individual in OIPR read into the PSP, found himself having to ask OIPR attorneys to compile information about their cases, and sometimes to make changes to their FISA applications, without being able to provide.an explanation other than that he had spoken to the Attorney General and the F ISC about the situation. Baker reguilarly told attorneys that they did not have to sign applications that they were not comfortable with, and, in some instances, international teirorism cases had to be reassigned fOl' 'this 'Teason:\n5428 The situation was further complicated by the fact that, until August 2003, only one of the two Dol officials anthorized by statute to approve FISA applications\nAttorney General Asheroft and Deputy Attorney General Larry Thompsonwas read into the PSP. Thompson, who served as Deputy Attorney General from May 2001 to August\n2003, was never read into the PSP, despite Asheroft's request to the White House.\n\not\n3\n(TSHS\ny Similarly, Kollar-Kotelly, who by November 2004 was handling approximate percent of al] FISA applications as a result of her requirement that scrubbed applications be filed with her ouly, made unsuceessful requests foradditional FISC judges to. be cleared for the program. Kollar-Kotelly decided in November 2004 that inview of the sctubbing procedures that were in operation, international terrorism FISA.\n\napplications could be decided by other judges based on the information contained in the applications.\n\n~(ESHSHAEY Do, together with the FBI and the NSA, continue to apply the scrubbing procedures to international terrorism FISA applications. Since January 2006, all members of the FISC have been briefed on the PSP and all of the judges handie applications that involve the issue of PSP-derived information. Although compliance with the serubbing procedures has been burdensome, we did not find instances when the government was unable to obtain FISA surveillance coverage on a target because of the requirement, However, the DoJ IG concluded that once the PSP began to affect the functioning of the FISA process, OIPR and the FISC effectively became part of the PSP\"s operations, and more OIPR staff and FISC judges should have been read into the PSP to address the impact. Instead, access to the PSP was limited for years to a single OIPR\nofficial and one FISC judge.\n\n## Uy Discovery Issues Associated With The President's Surveillance Program\n\nLJOJ Was aware as catly asffiigiayithat information collected ipations itigation responsibilities under Rule 16 of bl,\n(S NEY. No DoJ atlortieys. with terrorism prosecution respoiisibilities were tead into the PSP until mid-2004, and asa result, DoJ did not have access to the advice of-a';tome;ys, who were best equipped to identify and examine discovery issues assoeiated Wfili-.the:;..\n\n'ThedJflI  believes that, since thep, Dol has taken steps to re:\n(1), (0)(3)\nmust re-examine past cases to see whether potentially discoverabie but undisclosed Riile 16 or Brady material was collected by the NSA, and take appropriate steps to ensure that it has complied with its discovery obligations in such cases. The DoJ IG also recommends that DoJ, in coordination with the NSA, implement a procedure to identify PSP-derived information that may be associated with international terrorism cases\n(b)), b3, b6, b7C, b7E\nbl, b3, b6, b7C b7E\nouiry ently pending or likely to be brought in the future and evaluate whether such information should be disclosed in light of the government's: discovery-obligations under Rule 16 and Brady.\n\n## (U) Legal Reassessment Of The President's Surveillance Program (2003~ 2004)\n\n:\nYoo was.the. sole OLC attomey who advised Asheroft and White House offi01als on the PSP from the program's inception in October 2001 through Yoo's remgnatlon from DoJ in May 2003. Upon Yoo's. departure, Patrick Philbin was selected by the. Wlnte House to-be: read into the PSP to assume Yoo's role as advisor to the Attorney General concerning the program.\n\nLTS\n2-Philbin told us that when he reviewed Yoo's legal memorandums about the: PSP he reahzed that Yoo had omitted from his analySLs any reference to the FISA\nprovision allowing the interceptior of electronic comt iinigations withotit a warrant for a peuod of+15 days following a Conglesswnal declaration of war. (See 50U.8.C. 1811.)\nPhilbin stated that Yoo' s OLC opiniens were p:remlsed on the assurnp on that FISA did analysis supporting the PSP but prob by not with the conclusions reached, an flj;e'tefor'e advised Aghcroft to continue to certify the pmg,ram\"\"asto form and legality.\"\nPhilbin also recommended that a new OLC memorandum assessing the legality of the PSP\nbe.drafted, and with Asheroft's concurrence he began drafting the memorandum.\n\n## (U) A New Legal Basis For The Program Is Adopted\n\n/NE)\nGoldsmith was sworn in as the Assistant Attomey General for OLC-on\n6.Qctober 2003, replacing Bybeg, who had left that position several monthsemlieft'o serve.\n\nas a judge on the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, Philbin told us:that'he p;e'sScd'liaxd to have Goldsmith read into the PSP, and that Addington told Philbin he would have to justify the request before Addington would take it to the President fora.\n\ndecjsion. Addington subsequently read Goldsmith into the progmn-on\n11 Noyember 2003.\n\ngy o Voo's memorandums and Philbin's new draft andlysis Jjudicial authorization, and did not fall within any of the exceptions to this requirement.\n\nGoldsmiith later wrote in a6 May 2004 legal memorandum reassessing the legality of the program thata proper analysis of the PSP \"must not consider FISA in isolation\" but rather must consider whether Congress, by authorizing the use of military force against al-Qa'ida, also \"effectively exempts\" such surveillance from FISA. Goldsmith believed that this reading of the AUMF was correct because the AUMF authorized the President to use \"all necessary and appropriate force\" against the enemy that attacked the United States on\n11 September 2001, and to \"prevent any future dcts of international terrorism against the United StatesTM by such enemy-authority that has long been recognized to include theuse of SIGINT\nas a military tool. Alternatively, Goldsmith reasoned that even if the AUMF\nd1d not exemipt-surveillance-under the program from the restrictions. imposed by FISA, the question was sufficiently ambiguous to warrant the application of the doctrine of\n)\n) In late 2003, Philbin and Goldsmith were the only two DoJ officials in &\nposition to brief the Attorney General and White House officials on the status of their legal reassessment and its potential ramifications for the operation-of the program. Goldsmith adyised Ashcroft that, despite concerns about the program, Ashcroft should certify the\n-9 December 2003 Presidential Authorization. Goldsmith later advised Asheroft to certify the 14 January 2004 authorization as well. Goldsmith told us that he made these recommendations o Ashoroft with the caveat that although he belisved.Y00's menorandums to be flawed, Goldsmith had not yet concluded that the program itself was illegal.\n\n## (U) Department Of Justice Officials Convey Concerns About The Program To The White House\n\nISUAEY- In December 2003, Goldsmith and Philbin met with Addington and Gonzales at the White House to express their growing concerns. about the legal underpinnings for the program. Goldsmith said he told them that OLC was not.sure the program could survive in its current form. According to Goldsmith's contemporaneous notes of these events, these discussions did not contemplate an interruption of the program, although the White House officials represented that they would \"agree to pull the plug\" if the problems with the program were found to be sufficiently serious. Goldsmith told us that the White Fousetypically throngh Addingtontold him \"several times\" that it would half the program if DoJ found that it could not be legally supported.\n\n(FSHSHAFY On 13 December 2003, Goldsmith met again with Addington-and Gonzales and wrote in his notes that during this meeting he conveyed with \"more force\"\nhis \"serious doubts and the need to get more help to resolve the issue [as soonas possible].\" Goldsmith told us that during this meeting he also asked to have Deputy Attorney Geileral Comey read info the program. According to Goldsmith's notes, Addington and Gonzales \"bristle[d]\" at that suggestion. Goldsmith told us that he requested that Comey be read in because he believed he would need Comiey's assistance to help \"make the case\" to the White House that the program was legally flawed. Inaddition, he said he wanted Comey read in because, as the Deputy Attorney General, Comey was Philbin's direct supervisor.\n\nGoldsmith's efforts to gain the White House's permission to have additional attorneys, and especially Comey, read into the program continued il rough January 2004. According to Goldsmith's notes, both Addington and Gonzales pressed Goldsmith on his reason for the request and continued to express doubt that additional Dol personnel were needed. However, in late Tanuary 2004 the White House agreed to allow Comey to be read in, and Comey was briefed into the PSP on 12 March 2004 by Hayden.\n\n~(5AE) After his briefing, Comey discussed the program with Goldsmith, Phllbm and other Dol officials, and agreed that the concerns with Y00's legal analysis were wellfounded.'2 Comey told us that of particular concemn to him and Goldsmith was the notion that Yoo''s legal analysis entailed ignoring an act of Congress, and doing so without full Congressional notification.\n\n## (U) Conflict Between The Department Of Justice And The White House Qver The Program\n\n(U) Comey told us that he met with Ashcroft for lunch-on 4 March 2004 to discuss the PSP, and that Ashcroft agreed with Comey and the-other DoJ officials' assessment of the potential legal problems with the program. Three hours.after their lunch meeting, Asheroft became ill and was admitted to the George Washington University Hospital.'' On\n5 Mareh 2004, Goldsmith advised Comey by memorandum that under the circumstances of Asheroft's niedical condition and hospitalization, a \"clear basis\" existed for Comey: to exercise the authorities-of the Attorney General allowed by law as Deputy Attorney General or Acting Attorney General. The \"cc\" line of Goldsmith's memorandum to Comey indicated that a copy of the memorandum was sent to- Gonzales..\n\n&S#SI#%@\nOn 5 Mawh 2004-31x days befom the Premdentlal Authorization then\n| Laterthat nzales called Goldsmith to FoUtCSL . ICLLCT L0 ULU Statng that Y 00's prior OLC opunon<; \"covered the program.\"\nPhilbin told us that Gonzales was riot requesting a new opinion that the program itself was legal, but only a letter stating that the prior opinions had concluded that it was.\n\nPSP while at the FBI. Comey also discussed Dol's conicerns about the legality of the program with FBI Director Mueller ot\n1 March 2004, Mueller told us that this was the firt time he-had been made aware of DoJ's:concems.\n\nI\n:\n(ESHSHATEY\nAs a result of Gonzales's request, Goldsmith, Philbin, and Comey tesxamined Yoo's memorandums with a view toward determining whether they adequiately deseribed the actual collection activities of the NSA under the Presidential Authorizations.\n\n'\noncluded that the memorandums did not. According to Goldsmith, the conclusion i Yoo's memorandums failed fo accurately describe, let alone provide a legal analysis o ICHOIGHOIGE\n| meant that OLC could not tell the White House that the\n'prograin could con 'mue under e authority of those legal memorandumns.\n\nT\n% On 6 March 2004, Goldsmith-and Philbin, with Comey's concurrence, i e to meet with Addi\n;\n5\nconvey their conclugions.\n\nAddington and Gonzales \"veacted calmly and said they would get back withus.\" On Sunday, 7 March 2004, Goldsmith and Philbin met again with Addington and Gonzales at the White House. According to Goldsmith, the White House officials informed Goldsmith and Philbin that they disagreed with their interpretation of Yoo's memorandums and on the need to change the scope of the NSA's collection under the PSP.\n\n~(S/A%8) On 9 March 2004, Gonzales called Goldsmith to the White House in an effort that his criticisms of Yoo's memorandums were i ect and that Yoo's to persuade him d sufficient legal support for the program.\n\n|\nAffer Goldstiiith 'stated that lie disagreed, Gonzale\n;\nget past the expiration of the current Presidential Authorization on 11 March\n.\n\nGonzales reasoned that Asheroft, who was still hospitalized, was not in any condition to sign arenewal of the authorization, and that a \"30~day bridge\" would move the situation to a point where Asheroft would be well enough to approve the program. Goldsmith told Gonzales he.could not agree fo recommend an extension because aspects of the program lacked legal support.\n\nPS//ST/ATEY-\nAt noon on 9 Mareh, another meeting was held atthe White House inl Card's office. According to Mueller's notes, Mueller, Card, Vice President Cheney, Deputy Director of Central Intelligence John E. McLaughlin, Hayden, Gonzales, and other\n1111Specified officials were present. Comey, Goldsmith, and Philbin were not nvited to this meeting. After a presentation on the value of the PSP by NSA and CIA officials, it was ey LIA) BIE)\nslained to the group that Comey \"has problems\" withiEas\n:\nMueller's notes state that the Vice President suggested that \"the President may have to reauthorize without [the] blessing of Dol,\" to which Mueller responded, \"I could have a problem with that,\" and fhat the FBI would \"have to review legality of continued participation in the program.\"\n'\n/\nA third meeting at the White House was held on 9 March, this time with Comey, Goldsmith, and Philbin present. Gonzales told us that the meeting was held to make sure that Comey understood what was at stake with the program and fo demonstrate its value. Comey said the Vice President stressed that the program was \"critically Lecertlfy it. 'Comey said he stated-at the mieeting that he, as Acting. Attomei Genma]l could Important\" and warned that Comey would risk \"thousands\" of lives if he did not agree to authorizinel (b)('\" . 'rowdcd the collection was ec we can't\n:\nHoweverv he told the oroup\n\"According to CmelWfi%E\ns saidithey could not. agwe to that modification.\n\n-\n-S/AF)-Gonzales told us that after President Bush was advised of the results of the\n9 March meetings, he instructed the Vice President on the morning of 10 March to call a meeting with Congressional leaders to advise them of' the impasse with DoJ.\n\n'I'hat aftetnoon, Gonzales and other White House and IC officials, including Vice President Cheney, Card, Hayden, McLaughlin, and Tenet, convened an \"einergency meeting\" with Congwssmnal leaders in the White House Situation Room. The Congressmnal leaders in aftendance were Senate Majority and Minority Leaders William FL. \"Bill\" Frist and\n'Thomas A. Daschle; Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Chairman Pat Roberts and Vice Chairman John D. Rockefeller, IV; Speaker of the House J. Dennis Hastert and House Minority Leader Nancy Pelosi; and House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence Chair Porter Goss and Ranking Member Jane Harman. No DoJ officials were asked to be presentat the: meeting.\n\n{SHNFY According to Gonzales's notes of the meeting, individual Congressional leaders expressed thoughts and concerns related to the program, Gonzales told us that the consensus was that the program should continue. Gonzales also said that following the meeting with Congressional leaders, President Bush instructed him and Card to go to the George Washmgton Univesity Hospital to speak to Asheroft, who was. in the intensive gare unit recovering from surgery.\n\n(U) According to notes from Ashcroft's FBI security detail, at 18:20 on\n10 March 2004, Card called the hospital and spoke with an agent in the security detail, advising the agent that President Bush would be calling shortly to spealk with Ashcroft.\n\nAshicroft's wife told the agent that Ashcroft would not accept the call. Ten minutes later, the agent called Ashcroft's Chief of Staff David Ayres at DoJ to request that Ayres speak with Card about the President's intention to call Ashcroft. The agent conveyed to Ayres Mrs. Ashcroft's desire that no calls be made to Ashcroft for another day or two. However, at 18:45, Card and the President called the hospital and, according to the agent's notes,\n\"insisted on speaking [with Attorney General Asheroft].\" According to the agent's notes, Mrs. Asheroft took the call from Card and the President and was informed that Gonzales and Card were coming to the hospital to see Ashcroft regarding a matter involving national security.\n\n(U) At approximately 19:00, Ayres was advised that-Gonzales and Card were on their way to the hospital. Ayres then called Comey, who at the time was being driven home by his security detail,-and told Comey that Gonzales and Card were on their way to the hogpital. Comeytold his driver to take him to the hospital, Accordingto his May 2007\ntestimony before the Senate Judiciary Committee, Comey then called his Chief of Staff, Chuck Rosenberg, and directed him to \"get as many of my people as possible to the hospital immediately.\" Comey next called Mueller and told him that Gonzales and Card were on their way to the hospital to see Ashcroft, and that Ashcroft was in no condition to receive visitors, much less make a decision about whether to recertify the PSP, According to Musller's notes, Comey asked Mueller to come to the hospital to \"witness [the]\ncondition of: AG.\" Mueller told Comey he would go to the hospital right away.\n\n(U) Comey arrived at the hospital between 19:10 and 19:3 0. Comey said he began speaking to Ashcroft, and tliat it was not clear that Ashcroft could focus and that he\n\"seemed pretty bad off.\" Goldsmith and Philbin also had been summoned to the hospital and attived within a few minutes of each other. Comey, Goldsmith, and Philbin met briefly in an FBI \"command post\" that had been set up in a room adjacent to Asheroft's roorn. Moments later, the command post was notified that Card and Gonzales had arrived at the hospital and were on their way upstairs to see Asheroft. Comey, Goldsmith, and Philbin entered Ashcroft's room and, according to Goldsmith's notes, Comey and the sthers advised Asheroft \"not to sign anything.\"\n(U) Gonzales and Card entered Ashcrof's hospital room at 19:35, Gonzales told us that he had with him in a manila envelope the 11 March 2004, Presidential Authorization for Asherofttosign. According to Philbin, Gonzales first asked Asheroft how he was feeling. Ashcroft replied, \"not well.\" Gonzales then said words to the effect, \"You know, there's a reauthorization that has to be renewed\n.\n\n: ..\n\nGonzales told us that he may also have told Ashcroft that White House officials had met with Congressional leaders \"to puisue a legislative fix.\"\n:\n\\JE)-Comey testified to the Senate Judiciary Committee that at this point Ashcroft told Gonzales and Card \"in very strong terms\" his objections to the PSP, which Comey testified Asheroft drew from his meeting with Comey about the program a week earlier. Goldsmith's notes indicate that Ashcroft complained in particular that NSA's collection activities exceeded the scope of the authorizations and the OLC memorandums..\n\nComey testified that Ashcroft next stated:\n\"But that doesn't matter, because I'm not the Attorney General. There is the Attorney General,\" and he pointed to me1I was just to his left. The two men [Gonzales and Card]\ndid not acknowledge me; they turned and walked from the room.\n\n(U) Moments after Gonzales and Card departed, Mueller arrived at the hospital.\n\nMueller met briefly with Ashcroft and later wrote in his notes, \"AG in chair; is feeble, barely articulate, clearly stressed.\"\n(U) Before leaving the hospital, Comey received a.call from Card: Comey testified that Card was very upset and demanded that Comcy coirie fo the White Houose immediately. Comey told Card thathe would meet with him, but not without a witness, and that he-intended that witness to be Solicitor General Theodore B. Olson.\n\n(U) Comey and the other DoJ officials left the Tiospital at 20: 10 and met at DoJ. They were joined there by Olson. During this meeting, a call came from the Vice Presidert for QOlson, which Olson took on a secure ling in. Comey s office while Comey waited outside, Comey told us he believes the Vice President effectwely read Olson into the progrant during that conversation. Comey and Olson then went tothe White House at about 23:00\nthat evening and met with Gonzales and Card. Gonzales told us that little: more was achieved at this meeting than a general acknowledgement that a \"situation\" continued to exist because of the disagreement between Dol and the White House regarding the prograin.\n\n-{5H#F) White House Geunsel Certifies Presidential Authorization Without Department of Justice Concurrence\n:\nOn the morning of 11 March 2004, with the Presidential Authouzatlon sel to U(pne President Bush signed a new authorization for the PSP. Ina departure from the past practice of having the Attorney General cmu['y the authorization as to form and legality, the 11 March anthorization was certified by White House Counsel Gonzales. The 11 March authorization also differed markedly from prior authorizations in three-other respects.\n\n{ESHSTEWHSIHOEANFY The first significant difference between the 11 March 2004\nPresidential Authorization and prior authorizations was the President's explicit assertion that the exercise of his Article II Commander-in-Chief authority \"displace[s] the provisions of law, including the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act. and chapter 119 of Tifle 18 of the United States Code (including 18 U.S.C. 2511(f) relating to exclusive means), to the extent of any conflict between the provisions and such exercises under Article IL\"\nSubscquent Plestdc.nnal Authorizations did not include this particular language.\n\n-\nNF) Second, to narrow the gap between the authority given on the face of pr101 authou/ahons and the actual operation of the program by the NSA, the terms governing the collection of telephony and Internet metadata were clarified. The underlying Ianguagc for \"acquiring\" both telephony and Internet metadata remajned as it had been, giving the NSA authority to \"acquire\" the metadata:\nwhen (i) at least oneparty to such communication is outside the United States, (ii) no party to such communication is kiown to be a citizen of the United States, or (iii) based on the factml;,and practical considerations of everyday life on which reasonable and prudent persons act, there are specific and articulable facts giving teason to believe that such communication relates to international terrorism, or activities in preparation therefor. [Pres idential Authorization,\n11 March 2004, para. 4(b).]\nHowever, this language was now qualified by the following two subparagraphs:\n(i) the Department of Defense may obtain and refain header/router/addressing-type mformatmn mcludmcr\n, telccommumcat1 ons:dialing-type:\nand. emeval type. information, mcludmcr telecomnmmcauom dldhncr~1ypc data, shall occur only in accordance with this authorization;\nand\n(ii) header/router/addressing-type information, including telecommunications dialing-type data, is \"acquired\" for purposes of subparagraph 4(b) above when, and only when, the Department of Defense has searched for and retrieved such header/router/addressing-type information, including telecommunications dialing-type data (and not when the Department obtains such header/router/addressing-type information; including telecommumcatxons dtalm o-type data, s\n(0)(1), (b)3\n:\n-\nfor retention).\n\n[Id. at p'ua 4([3)(1) &. (u} ]\nThe 11 Mawh .'ZOOL authorization for the first. tune sought to ANE}\nThe third departure from prior authorizations was the inclusion of a statement that \"fhe Attorney General 6f the United States Appmved ag to form and legality\n[all-prior Presidential Authorizations] authoriziiig the same activities as are extended by this authomzahon.\" (Id. at para. 10.)1#\nCavd informed Comey by telephone on the mommg of 11 March 2004\n'that the Premdent had signed the new authorization that moming. At approximately 12:00, Gonzales called Goldsmith:to inform himi that the President, in issuing the authorization, had made an interpretation of law concerning his anthorifies and that DoJ should not act in contradiction-of the President's determinations.\n\nLFSHE\nY\nAlso at 12:00 on 11 March, Mueller met with Card at the White House.\n\nAocmdmcr to Musller's notes, Card summoried Mueller to his office to bring Mueller upto-dafe on the events of the preceding 24 -hours, including the briefing of the Congressicnal leaders the prior afternoon and the President's issuance of the new authorization WIthout Dol's certification as to legality. In addition, Card told Mueller that if no \"]hglb]fltl\\'e fix'\ncould be found by 6 May 2004, when-the\n| 1 March authorization was set to expire, the program would be discontinued.\n\n)\nAccording to Mueller's notes, Card acknowledged to Mueller that Plemdent B'Llsh had sent him and Gonzales:to the hospital to seel Asherofi's certification for the 11 Marcli 2004 authorization, but that Ashcroft had said he was too ill to make the determination and that Comey was the Acting Atterney General. Mueller wrote that he told Card that the failure to have DoJ representation at the Congressional briefing and the atternpt to have Ashcroft certify the authorization witliout going through Comey \"gave the strong perception that the [White House] was trymrr to do-an end ran around the Acting\n[Attorney General] whom they knew to have serious concerns as to the legality of portmns\n-of the progran. \" (ard responded that he and Gonzales were unaware at the time of the hospital visit that Comey was the Acting Attorney Genetal, and that they\" had only been following the directions of the President.\n\n(S//MNE) Several senior Dol and FBI officials, including Comey, Goldsmith, and Mueller considered resigning after the 11 March 2004 Presidential Autliorization was signed without DoJ's conewrrence. These officials cited as reasons for considering resignation the.manner in which the White House had handled its dispute with DoJ and the treatment of Asheroft, among other reasons.\n\n,(S#NF} On 12 March 2004, Mueller drafted by hand a letter stating, in part: \"[Alfter reviewing the plain language of Lha FISA statute, and the order issued yesterday by the President\n. .\n\n. and in the absence of further clarification of the legality of the program from the Attorney General, ] am forced to withdraw the FBI from participation in the program.\n\nFuithet, should the President order the continuation of the FBI's participation inthe program, and in the absence of further legal advice from the AG, I would be constrained to:\nresign aSDirecctor'of'tI1'e FBI\" Mueller told us he planned.on having the letter typed and then tendering it, but that based on subsequent events his resignation was not necessary.\n\nCPSHSTANE\nMueller sent Comey a memorandum seeking, guidance on liow the FBI\nstiould proceed in light of developments related to the Presidential Authorizations. The m asked whether FBI agents detailed to the NSA\nto worl on the PSP should be whether the FBI should conte.to'rfiivc. and investigate tips based onfEEE\n(U) On'the moming of 12 Match, Comey and Mueller attended the regular daily threat briefing with the President in the Oval Office. Comey said that, following the briefing, President Bush called him into the President's private study for an \"unscheduled meeting.\" Comey told the President of Dol's legal concerns rcgarding the PSP.\n\nAccotding to.Comey, the President's response indicated that he had not been fully informed of these-concerns. Comey told the President that the President's staff had been advised of these issues \"for weeks,\" According to Comey, the President said that he just needed witil May 6 (the date of the next authorization), and that if he could not get Congress to fix FISA by then he would shut down the prograni. The President emphasized the importance of the program and that it \"saves lives.\"\nHSLAE) The President next met with Mueller. According to Mueller'snotes, Mueller told the President of his concerns regarding the FBI's continued participation ir the program witheut an opinion from the Attorney General as to its legality, and that he was considering resigning if the FBI were directed to continue to participate without the concurtence of the Attorney General. The President directed Mueller to meet with Comey and other PSP principals to address the legal concerns so that the FBI could continue paiticipating in the program \"as appropriate under the law.\" Comey decided not to direct\n{he FBI to cease cooperating with the NSA in conjunction with the PSP. Comey's decision is documented in a one-page memorandum from Goldsmith to Comniey in which Goldsmith explained that the President, as Comrmandet-in-Chief and Chief Executive with the constitutional duty to \"take care that the laws are faithfully executed,\" made a determination that the PSP, as practiced, was lawful. Goldsmith concluded that this determination was binding on the entire Executive Branch, including Comey in his exercise of the powers of the Attorney General.\n\n.\n\n:\no Y\\\n2\nThe same day, an interagency working group was convened to continue teanalyzing the legality of the PSP. In accordance with the President's directive to Mueller, officials from the FBI, NSA, and CIA were brought into the process, although the OLC maintained the lead role. On 16 March 2004, Comey drafted a memorandum to Gongzales setting out Comey's advice to the ident regardine the PSP. Comey advised hat the President may lawfull 'a(b)\"')\" oy\n\"ongoing coHectmnf b)), (b)E o ra1sed serious issues' about Congressional nohficatxon Hparticularly where the legal basis for the program is the President's decision to-assert his authority to overtide an otherwise applicable Act of Congress,\"\nL\n\n()] Gonzsles replied by letter on the evening of 16 March. The letter stated, in part:\nYour memorandum appears to have been based on a misunderstanding of the President's expectations regarding the conduct of the Departiment of Justice. While the President was, and remains, interested in any thoughts the Department of Justice may have on alternative ways to achieve effectively the goals of the activities authorized by the Presidential Authorization of March 11, 2004, the President has addressed definitively for the Executive Braneh in the Presidential Authorization the interpretation of the law.\n\nPresidential Aut'hori'zation.\n\nO 19 Marchi 2004, the President signed, and Gonzales certlfied ag to form and leuallty, a modification of the 11 March 2004 Presidential Authonzatlon The modlficatmn made two significant changes to the current authorization b)(1), (b)(3)\n{S/AVEY On 6 May 2004, Goldsmith and Philbin completed an OLC legal memorandum assessing the legality of the PSP as it was then operating. The memorandum stated that the AUMF passed by Congress shortly after the attacks of 11 September 2001\ngave the President authority to use both domestically and abroad \"all necessary and appropriate force,\" including SIGINT capabilities, to prevent future acts of intemational terrorism against the United States. According to the memorandum, the AUMEF was properly read as an express authorization to conduct targeted electronic surveillance against al-Qa'idaand its affiliates, the entities responsible for attacking the United States, thersby suppoiting the President's directives to conduct these activities under the PSP.\n\nMiuuch of the legal reasoning in the 6 May 2004 OLC memorandum was publicly released by Dol in a \"White PaperTM\"Legal Authorities Supporting the Activities of the National Security Agency Described by the President\"TMissued on 19 January 2006 after the content collection portion of the program was revealed in The New York Times and publicly confirtned by the President in December 2005,\n\n## (U) Restrictions On Access Fo The President's Survelllance Program Impeded Depariment Of Justice Legal Reeview\n\nA\n1. The DoJ IG found it extraordinary and inappropriate thata single DoJ' attorney, John Yoo, was relied upon to conduct tlie initial legal assessment of the PSP, and. that the lack of oversight and review of Yoo's work, wihich was contrary to the customary practice of OLC, contributed to a legal analysis of the PSP that, at a minimum, was factually flawed. Deficiencies in the legal memorandums became apparent once additional DoJ attorneys were read into the program in.2003 and those attorneys sought a greaterunderstanding of the PSP's operation. The White House's strict controls over access to the PSP undermined Dol's ability fo provide the President the bestavailable:\nadvice about the program. The Dol IG also concluded that the circurnstances plainly called for additional DoJ resources to be applied to the legal review of the program, and that it was the Attorney General's responsibility to be-aware of this need and to take steps to-address it. However, the DoJ OIG could not determine whether Ashcroft aggressively sought additional read-ins to assist with DoJ's legal review of the program prior to 2003\nbecause Ashcroft did not agree to be interviewed.\n\n## (U) Transition-Of President's Surveillance Program Activities To Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act Authority\n\n~{FSHSHNE}- Internet Metadata Collection Transitioh to Operation Under FISA Authority o)), ( )(u)\n-\n: The application package included:\n\no\nA proposed order authorizing the collection activity and secondary orders\nmandating carriers to cooperate.\no\nA declaration by Hayden explaining the technical aspects of the proposed\nInternet metadata collection and identifying the government official\nseakingv to use the pen register and trap and: WECC,(PR/TT) devices covered\nby the application for purposes of\n50 1U.8.C.  1842(c)(1):\no\n_A declaration by Tenet describing the threat posed by\nto the United States.\no.\nAbc;tificafio'n from Asheroft stating that the fiiformation likely to be\nobtained from the PR/TT devices wasrelevant-to an ongeing investigation:\nto protect against international terrorism, as vequired by\n501.S.C.  1842(c).\ns\nA memotandum of law and fact in support of the application.\nThe objective of the applicati secure authority under FISA\nbuilk Internet metadata\n~\n'\n-\nthis noyel use of PR/TT\nevices around traditional authorities pr v\n50 U.8:C.  1842(a)(1).) The government argued that the:NSA?s proposed collection of metadata wet the requirements of FISA by noting that the metadata sought C'Ompfiortedwifl1\nthe \"dialing, routing, addressing, or signaling information\" type-of data described in FISA'-s:=defifiitioms.ofPRjTT devices. (See:18 U.S.C.  3127(3) and (4).) The government nextapgucd;thatuthe information likely to be obtained from the PR/TT devices was relevant b1, b3, to afi-ongoing investigation to protect against international terrorism, as certified by the b7E\nAttorney General under 50 U.8.C.\n\n1842(c)._In suppott of this \"certification of relevance\"\nthe government stated that th Bl e e e\n-\nefgoehtalleo\"\ne the NSA needed to collect metadata I DUIK 10 eLiecuvely perform contact chainin\n(b }(.1 ) (b )(3)77\n. Zth'at would enable the NSA to discover enemy compmunications.\n\nESHIYASEY The ap \\licafion requested that the NSA be authorized to collect The application represented that for most ol the proposed COLECHON Uil it was \"overwhelmingly likely\" that at least one end of the transmiitted\n110\nor was destined for locations outside the United States,\n'databese. Tlie NSA analysts were to be briefed by NSA OGC _personnei_ cpnce;nng the base could be queried, and all queries would have to be approved by oiie of seven senior NSA officials. The application proposed that queries of thie.Internet imetadata archive would be performed when the Internet communication address met the following standard:\n[Blased on the factual and practical considerations of\n\"everyday life-on which reasonable-and prudent persons aot;\nthere are facts gwmg rise to a 1easonable altlculable suspicion The NSA estunated thai its queues of the database would gener ate apprmlmately 400 Upa to the FBI and CIA each year. Of these tips, the NSA. projected that 25 percent would include U.8. person information, amounting to leads including information on about \"fevur to five US. pelsons each month.\"\nOn 14 July 2004, Kollar-Kotelly signed a Pen Register and Trap and\n'Trace Opnuon and Order (PR/TT Order) based on her findings that the proposed.collection of nternet metadata and the governmeni's proposed coutrols. over and dissemination of this information satisfied the requirements of FISA. The PR/TT Order, which granted the governiment's application in all key respects, approved {or a period. of 90 daysthe I\ncollection filflun the United States of Internet metadatay\n-('PS#SM%F? The PR/TT Order also required the government to comply with certain additional restrictions and procedures either adapted from or not originally proposed in the application. The FISC amended the government's proposed querying standaid, consistent with 50T.5.C.  1842(c)(2), to include the proviso that the NSA may query the database based on its reasonable articulable suspicig T\njoular e\n.\n\ncommunication address is associated Wfl.h 1) b) (3)\n\"provided, however, that an[GUGEGHEEEE\nnot be regarded as associated with{LUEHE (b)( )\n'\nthe basis of activities that are protcted by the First Amendment to the Cons'ututlon Regarding the storing, accessing, and disseminating of the Internet metadata obtained by the NSA, the FISC ordered that the NSA store the information in a manner that ensures it is not commingled with other data, and \"generate a log of auditing information for each occasion when the information is accessed, to the\n... retrieval request.\"\nThe FIS\nservice provider:\nalso:issued separate orders tof to assist the NSA. with the installation and use of the PR/TT devices and to maintain the secrecy of the NSA's activities.\n\n(0)(1), (0)(3)\nI\n'Several officials told us that obtaining the PR/TT Order was seen as.a\n_ great success, and that there was general agreement that the government had secured all the\n,authm Lty it sought to- conduct the bulk Internet metadata collection.\n\nCESHSHATE) The FISC first renewed the PRJTT Otder ong\n(b\n:\nsequent orders at.appr\n:\n. In these rene Dol OIPR filed a Notice of Compliance Incidents\n1autho1 ized collecuo that had 1aken place foIIowmg\n&) Or \\% L\ne FISC 1ssued a Comphance OldBl statmg that the \"NSA v1olated its Gwn proposed limitations.\" The FISC stated fagtiias Lot st the duration of the violations, which extended from 14 July through g e\n2\nd that the Court was reluctant to issue a renewal of the PR/TT\nOrder as to WHOWGVGI Kollar-Kotelly signed a Renewal Order orjg the NSA to continue collecting Internet metadata under FISA on terms sim\n\n## +Fshehanf)-Telephony Metadata Gollection Transition To Operation Under Fisa Authority\n\n-Another part of the PSP, bulk collection of telephony metadata, was\n'blought undel FISA authority in May 2006, As with Intemnet metadata, the bulk nature of'\nsllection provided the NSA the ability to.conduct contact chaining\n-JGPSALS{%@)The transition of bulk telephony metadata: collection from Presidential authotity to FISA authority relied onia provision in FISA that authorized the FBI o seel an ordeer fiom the FISC compelling the production of \"any tangible things\" from any business, organization, or entity, provided the items are for an authorized nwesugduon to protect against infernational terrorism or clandestine intelligence activities. (See\n50U.8.C.  1861.) Orders under this provision are-commonly referred (o as \"Section 2157\norders ini reference to Section 215 of the USA PATRIOT Act, which-amended the\n\"husiniess records\" provision in Title V of FISA.'8 The-\"tangible things\" sought in this\n'Section 215 application were the telephone call detail records of certain telecommunications service providers.\n\n~CESHSEANE) The timing of the decision in May 2006 to seek a FISC order for the bulk collection of telephony metadata was driven: pumauly by external events. A\n16 December 2005 artlcle in T/ze New York Times enhtled \"Bush Lets U.s. Spy on Callers X\nitho ouirts\n(b)(1), (b)('%)\n.\n\nOn 17 Decembm '7005 in 1esponse o the icle, President Bush pubhcly confirmed that he had authorized the NSA to intercept the international communications of people with known links to al-Qa'ida and related terrorist organizations. On 19 January 2006, DoJ issued its White Paper\"Legal Authorities Supporting the Activities of the National Security Agency Described by the President\"TM\nthat addressed in an unclassified form the legal basis for the collection activities described in The New York Times atticle and confirmed by the President.\n\n## Coained In The White Paper I I\n\nqpte\n{84\n.\n\nTogd spect of the program in early'20006. Bradbury\n__ B\nnticipated that a US4 Today article would attract ficanit publie attention when published. As anticipated, on 11 May 2006, the US4\nToday published- {he results of its investigation in an article entitled, \"NSA Has Massive Database of American Phone Calls.\"\n:\nFSHSHAH-0n 23 May 2006, the FBI filed with the FISC\na Section 215 application seeking authority to collect telephon: metad assist the NSA\ni findine and identifying mernbers or agents o)), oe\n.\n\nB\n:\n-\nFBI investigations then pending and other IC operations. The application requested an order compelling certain telecommumications companies to produce (for the duration of the 90-day order) call detail records relating to all telephone communications maintained by the carriers. According to the application, the majority of the telephiony metadata provided to the NSA was expected to involve communications that were (1) between domestic and foreign locations, or (2) wholly within the United States, ncluding local telephone calls. The application estimated that the collection would involve the NSA\nreceiving approximately SISHE @ call detail records per day.!\n\n~(EBHSHATEY The application acknowledged that the vast collection would include comumunications xecords of U.S. persons located within the United States who were not the subject of any FBI investigation. However, relying oni the precedent established by the\n\" the application asserted that the collection was needed for the NSA to find Mt and to identify unknown operatives, somie of whom may be i the United States or in communication with U.S. persons, by using contact chaininglll\n1|\nAs was done tnder the PSP, the call detail records would be entered in an NSA database and analysts would query the data with particular telephone mumbers to identify connections with other numbersiG\n|The proposed query standard in the Section 215 application essentially was the same standard applied under the PSP in connection with telephony metadata, and the same standard the FISC\nauthorized in the PR/TT Order for Internet metadata. The Section 215 application also included in the proposed query standard the First Amendment proviso that the FISC added to the PR/TT query standard.\n\nCle dicl NOt (eSCrLDG\nIS ASPECL 0L the oLy\n% On 24 May 2006, the FISC approved the Section 215 application, ffindmg that there werereasonable grounds to believe that the telephony metadata records.\n\nsought were relevant to authorized investigations the FBI was conducting to protect against\n{nternational terrorism. The FISC Section 215 order incorporated each of the procedures proposed in the government's application relating to access to and use of the metadata,\n'Whlch were neafly identical to those included in the Intetnet metadata PR/TT QOrder.\n\n\" Throuoh March 2009, 1he FISC renewed the authoutles gtantud in the did c\")\"'t re\" re the NS Aton its use of the telephony metadata from an analyfical perspective. NSA analysts were authonzed to query the data ag they had under the PSP, conduct metadata analysis, and disseminate the results to the FBI, the CIA, and other customers..\n\nNP\nHowever, the FISC drastically changed the authority contained in its Maich 2009 Section 215 Order after it was notified in January 2009 that the NSA had been querying the metadata in a manner that was not authorized by the court's Section 215\nOrders. Specifically, the NSA, on a daily basis, was automatically querying the metadata WflhMtclcphone nuinbers from an alert list that had not been determined to satisfy the reasonable articulable suspicion standard required by the FISC to access the telephony metadata for search or analysis purposes.\n\n~(FSHSHASEY On 2 March 2009, the FISC issued an order that addressed the compliance incjderits that had been reported in January 2009, the government's explanation for their occurrence, and the remedial and prospective measures being taken i response. 'The FISC stated its concerns with the telephony metadata program and its lack of confidence \"that the government is doing its utmost to ensure that those responsible for implementation fully comply with the Court's orders.\" Nonetheless, the FISC authorized the govemment to continue collecting telephony metadata under the Section 215 Orders.\n\nThe FISC explained that in light of the government's repeated representations that the collection of the telephony metadata is vital to national security, taken together with the court's prior determination that the collection properly administered conforms with the FISA statute, that \"it would not be prudent\" to order the government to cease the bulk collection.\n\n{ESHS AT\nHowever, believing that \"more ismneeded to protect the privacy of U.S.\n\nperson information acquired and retained\" pursuant to-the Section 215 Orders, the FISC\n'pfolfibited the government from accessing the metadata collected \"until such time as tlie government {s able to restore the Court's confidence that the government can and will comply with previously approved prOGedUree for accessing such data.\" The government may, on-a case-by-case basis, request authority from the FISC\nto query the metadata with a specific telephone number to obtain foreign intelligence. The FISC also authorized the government to query the metadata without court approval to protect against an imminent threat to human life, provided the govermment notifies-the court within the Tiext business day.\n\n:\n'\n\n## Tshehmnf] Content Collection Transition To Operation Under Fisa Authority\n\n{TS/SHATEY-The last part of the PSP brought under FISA authority was telephone:\nand Tnternet communications content collection, As expldined below, the effort to accomplish this transition was legally and operationally complex and required an enormous efforton the part of the government and the FISC. The FISC judge who ruled on the initial application approved the unconyentional legal approach the goveriment proposed to fit PSP's content collection activities within FISA. However, the FISC judge responsible for considering the government's rencwal application rejected the legal approach. This resulted in significanit diminution i authorized surveillance activity invelving conteiit collection and hastened the enactment of legislation that significantly amended FISA and provided the government surveillance authorities broader than those.authorized under the PSP, on 13 December 2006. The application sougg yiie and electronic communications\n-\n'\n=\n(ho application sought to replace.the conventional practice under FISA L Ting maividual applications each time the government had probable cause to believe that a particular telephone number or Internet cominunication address was being used or about to be used py members or agents of a foreign power. In the place of the individualized process, the application proposed that the FISC establish broad parameters for the interception of commiunicationsthe groups that can be targeted and the locations where the surveillarice can be condnctedand that NSA officials, rather than F ISC judees, determine within these parameters the particular selectors to be collected against,\n&\ne W]th FISC\nView and supel vision. The govemment's '1pproach in thc E\npphcatlon rested-on a broad interpretation of the statutory term \"facility\" and the use of minimization procedures by NSA officials to make probable cause determinations\n-about individual selectors, rather than have a FISC judge make such deferminations.\n\nEES#SEB':'NF}- Ini shoit, the government's content application asked the FISC to find\n,-pmbable AUSE {0 beheva flnt\n-\n:\n:\n\"\niternational terrorism, and thatf\n' commumca{mnso, these numbets.and a ISt\n(\nfore g1 country, When probable cause findings were made, the NSA could direct the telecommunications\n'companies toprovids the content of coinmunications associated with those telephone numbers and Internet communications addresses.\n\nF\n!\n\n:\n3-0n 10 January 2007, Judge Malcolm J. Howard approved the govemment's 13 Dccember 2006 content apphcahon as it pertained to foreign selectorstelephone numbers and Internet communications addresses reasonably believed to be used by individuals outside the United States. The effort to implement the order was a massive undertaking for Dol and NSA. At the time of the order, the NSA was actively tasking for content collection approximately S\nlforeign seleotorsInternet communications addresses or telephone numbersunder authority of the PSP.\n\nApproxi; aLely- of these were filed with Howard on an approved schedule of rolling:\nsubmiissionis-over the 90-day duration of the order, Y\nHowever, Howard did not approve the government's 13 December 2006\ncontent apphcanon as it pertained to domestic selectorstelephone numbers and Intemnet communications addresses reasonably believed to be used by individuals in the United States. Howard advised DoJ to file a separate application for the international calls of domestic selectors that took a more traditional approach to FISA. A more traditional approach meant that the facilities targeted by the FISA application should be particular telephone numbers and Internet communication addresses and that the probable cause determination for a particular selector would reside with the FISC. DolJ did this in an application filed on 9 JTanuary 2007, which Howard approved the following day. The FISC\nselectors order approved by Howard for the final time in has since expired.\n\nTSHSH/ANEY Dol's first renewal application tor extend the foreign selectors authorities was filed on20 March 2007 with Judge Roger Vinsor, the FISC duty judge that week. On\n29 March 2007, Vinson otally advised DoJ that he could not approve the application and, on 3 April 2007, he issued an order and Memorandum Opinion explaining the reasoning for '11'iS'~0011_c1uSiOn. Vinson wrote that DoJ's foreign selectors renewal application concemns an \"extremely important issue\" regarding who may make probable cause findings that determine the individuals and the communications that can be subjected to electronic sutveillanice iinder FISA, In Vinson's view, the question was whether probable cause:\ndeterminations are required to be made by the FISC through procedures established by statute, or whether the NSA may make such determinations under an alternative:\nmechanism cast as \"minimization procedures.\" Vinson concluded, based.on past practice under TISA and the Congressional intent underlying the statute, that probable cause determinations must be made by the FISC.\n\n-\n__(IS#SI#ISDE)Vinson also wrote that he was mindful of the government's argument that the govemmeit's proposed approach to foreign selectors was necessary to provide or enhance the \"speed and flexibility\" with which the NSA responds to threats, and that foreign intelligence information may be lost in the time it takes to obtain Attorney Gerneral emergency authorizations. However, in Vinson's view, FISA's requirements reflected a balance struck by Congress between privacy interests and the need to obtain foreign intelligence inforntation, and until Congress took legislative action on FISA to respond to the government's concerns, the FISC must apply the statute's procedures. He concluded that the government's application sought to strike a different balance for the swiveillanice of foreign telephone numbers and Internet communications addresses. Vinson rejected this position, stating, \"the'[FISA] statute applies the same requirements to surveillance of facilities used overseasas it does to surveillance of facilities used in the United States.\"\nVinson suggested that, \"Congress should also consider clarifying or modifying the scope of FISA and of this Court's jurisdiction with regard to such facilities\n.\n\n. ..\" Vinson's suggestion was a spur to Congress to consider FISA modernization legislation in the surmmer of 2007.\n\n}\n,\n:\n:\n-\nIn May 2007, DoJ filed, and Vinson approved, a revised foreign selectors application that took a more traditional approach to FISA. Although the revised approach sought to preserve some of the \"speed and agility\" the government had under Howard's order, the comparatively laborious process for targeting foreign selectors under Vinson's order caused the government to place only a fraction of the desired foreign selectors under coverage. The number of foreign selectors on collection dropped from abou-under the January 2007 order to aboul-'under the May 2007 order. The situation accelerated the government's efforts to obtain legislation that would amend FISA\nto address the government's surveillance capabilities within the United States directed at persons located outside the United States. The Protect America Act, signed info law on\n5 August 2007, accomplished this objective by authorizing the NSA to intercept inside the United States any communications of non-U.S. persons reasonably believed to be located outside the United States, provided a significant purpose of the acquisition pertains to.\n\nforeign intelligence. The Protect America Act effectively superseded Vinson's foreign selectors order and the government therefore did not seek torenew the: order when it expired on 24 August 2007.\n\n@S#S-L%JP) The DOJ IG concluded that several considerations favored initiating PSP's trapsition from Presidential authority to FISA-authority edrlier than March 2004, especially as the program became less a temmporary response to the Septeniber 171 terrorist attacks and more a permanent surveillance tool. These considerations included PSP's substantial effect on privacy interests of U.S. persons, the instability of the legal reasoning or which the program rested for several years; and the substantial restrictions placed on FBI agents' and analysts' access to and use of program-derived information due to the highly classified status-of the PSP. The DOT IG also recommended that DoJ carefully monitorthe collection, use, and retention of the information that is now collected under FISA authority and, together with other ageneies, continue to examine its value to the goveriment's ongoing counterterrorism efforts.\n\n## (U) Impact Of The President''S Surveillance Progranm On Intelligence Community . Counterterrorism Efforts (U) Senior Intelligence Community Officials. Believe That The President's Surveillance Program Filled An Intelligence Gap\n\n~(TSHSHMNE)Hayden, Goss, McLaughlin, and other senior [C officials we interviewed told uts that the PSP addressed a gap in intelligence collection. The IC needed increased:-access to international communications that transited domestic U.S.\n\ncommunication wires, particularly international communications that originated or terminated within the United States. However, collection of such commurications: required authorization under FISA, and there was widespread belief among senior IC-officials that AL'Vhe September 2001 attaekvs, hu aclcer; Khalid Almihdhdr ar;d Nawaf .A]hazmi almost certainly would haye been identified and located.\n\n; H-ayden told us that he always felt the PSP was worthw hile-and successfil.\n\nd His expectatlon was that the CIA and the FBI would be customers of p Fopmation and {ntegiite it into their respective operations.\n\n\ntold us that the program helped to determine that terrorist cells were not emoedaed within the United States to the extent that had been feared.\n\n## (U) Difficulty In Assessing The Impact Of The President's Surveillance Program\n\n57\n)\nIt was difficult to assess the overall impact of PSP on IC counterterrorism efforts. Except for the FBI, IC organizations that participated in the PSP did not have ssteatic processes for tracking how PSP reporting was used.\n\n|\n'\nwere repeatedly told that the PSP was one of  number of intelligence SolTCEs ana analytic tools that were available to IC personnel, and that, because PSP reporting was used in conjunction with reporting from other intelligence sources, it was difficult to attribute the success of particular counterterrorisin operations exclusively to the PSP.\n\n## (U) Impact Of The President's Surveillance Program On Fbi Countertercorism Efforts\n\n(S#AEY-The Dol IG found if difficult to assess or quantify the impact of the PSP on FBI counterterrorism efforts. However, based on our interviews of FBI managers and agents and our review of documents, we concluded that, although PSP information had yalue in some counterterrorism investigations, the program generally played a limited role in the FBI's overall counterterrorism efforts. Several officials we interviewed suggested that the program provided an \"carly warning system\" to allow the IC to detect potential terrorist attacks, even if the program had not specifically uncovered evidence of preparations for-such attacks.\n\n## (U) Ebi Efforts To Assess The Value Of The Program\n\nNFY-The FBI made several attempts to.assess the value of the PSP to FBI\ncountertcrronsm efforts.\n\nTri 2004 and again in 2006, FBI's Office of General Counsel\n(OGC) attempted to assess the value to the FBI of PSP information. This first assessment relied on anecdotal information and informal feedback from FBI field offices. The 2006\nassessment was limited to the aspect of the PSP disclosed in The New York Times article and subsequently confitmed by the President, i.e., content collection.\n\nQS/:'N?') The FBI undertook two more efforts to study PSP's impact on FBI\noperations in early 2006. In both of these stat1stlc'11 studies, the FBI soughtto determine what percentage of PSP tippers resulted in \"significant conttibution[s] to. the identification of terrorist subjects or activity on U.S, soil.\" The.FBI considered a tipper significant if it led to any of three investigative resulis: the identification of a terrorist, the deportation ftom the United States of a suspected terrorist, or the development of an asset that can reeport about the actlvltms of terrorists.\n\n2007\nto Deceniber\n2005, Ehe study found th\"u': 12 percent of the leads made si gmficant contubunons as defined above. The study extlapolated tl is fignt\n&\ni lcwewed all of the leads the NSA prov1dec1 the FBI from August 2004 through January 2006, dentitied no instances of significant contribiitions to FBI counterterrorism efforts. The studies did not.include explicit conelusions on the program's usefulness. However, based in part on the results of the first study, FBI\nexecutive management, including Mueller and Deputy Director John Pistole, concluded that the PSP was \"of value.\"\n\n## (U) Fbljudgmental Assessments Of The Program\n\n(5/ANF)-We interviewed FBI headquarters and field office personnel who regularly handled PSP information for their assessments of the impact of program information on FBI counterterrorism efforts, The FBI personnel we interviewed were generally supportive of the PSP as \"one tool of many\" in the FBI's anti-terrorism efforts that \"could help move cases forward\". Even though most leads were determined not to have any connection to terrorism, many of the FBI officials believed the mere possibility of a terrorist connection made investigating the tips worthwhile.\n\n(/AT\nHowever, the exceptionally compartimented nature of the program created some frustration for FBI personnel. Some agents criticized PSP reports for providing insufficient details about the foreign individuals alleged]y involved in terrorism.. Others occasionally were fiustrated by the prohibition on usin information in judicial processes, such as'in FISA applications, although none of thy field office agents we interviewed could identify an investigation jn which the restrictions adversely affected the case. Agents:whovmanag'edfcoimterterrofism programs at the FBI field offices we visited were critical of the project for failing to adequately prioritize threat information and, because of the pro gram's special status, for limiting the managers' ability to prioritize tlie leads in the manner they felt was warranted by the mformation.\n\n{S/AE)- Mueller told us that the PSP was useful,\" He said the FBI must follow every lead it receives in order to prevent future tefrorist attacks and that to the extent such information can be gathered and used legally it must be exploited. He stated that he\n\"would not dismiss the potency of a program based on the percentage of hits.\" Mueller added that, as a general matter, it is very difficult to quantify the effectiveness of an\n'\nintelligence program without \"tagping\" the leads that are produced in order to evaluate the role the program information played in any investigation.\n\n## (U) Impact Of The President's Surveillance Program On Cia Counterterrorism Operations (U) The Cia Did Not Systematically Assess The Effectiveness Of The Pregram\n\n~(#p8-The CIA did not implement procedures to systematically assess the usefulness of the product of the PSP and did not routinely document whether particular PSP repotting had contributed to successful counterterrorism operations. CIA ofticials, including Hayden, told us that PSP reporting was used in conjunction with reporting from.\n\nother intelligence sources; consequently, it is difficult to attribute the success of particular ountel\n)\nfons exclusively to the PSP, In a May 2006 briefing to the SSCI, the Deputy Directo said that PSP reporting was rarely the sole basis for an intelligence success, but that it frequently played a supporting role. He went on to state that the program was an additional resource to enhance the CIA's under:\nding of terrorist networks and to help identify potential threats to the homeland. Othelf interviewed said that the PSP was one of many tools available to them, and that the tools in combination.\n\nonly limited information on how programn reporting contributed to successfil operations, and the CIA 1G-was unable to independently draw any conelusion on the overall usefulness\n\n## '(U) 'Several Factors Hindered Gia Utilization Of The Program\n\n{S/#BY- The CIA. IG concluded that several factors hindered the CIA in making firll use of the capabilities of the PSP, Many CTA officials told us that too few CIA personel he working level were read into the PS]?\n\nAtthe pr oormms 1nccpt1on, a dxsplopo ionate.\n\niiumbei f the CIA pers\n, parit n the nuniber of senior CIA managers e PSP and the number of wor]cmg-level CIA pelsonnel read into the program resulted in too few CIA personnel to iully utilize PSP information: for targeting and analysis;\n| working=level CIA analysts and targeting\n;\ntoo many-competing priorities; and too maz\n:\nother information sources and analytic tools available to them, to fully utilize PS\nofficials also told us that much of the PSP reperting was vague or without context, w hich led analysts and targeting officers to rely more heavily on othier information sources and analytic tools, which were more easily accessed and timely than the PSP.\n\nS#AE)-CIA officers said that the PSP would have been more fully utilized if analysts and targeting officers had obtained a better understanding of the program's capabilities. There was no formal training on the use of the PSP beyond the initial read in to the program. Many CIA officers we interviewed said that the instruction provided in the read-in briefing was not sufficient and that they were surprised and frustrated by the lack of additional guidance. Soms= officers told us that there was insufficient, legal gu'idencc on the use of PSP-derived information.\n\n~(S/AE)- The factors that hindered the CIA in making full use of the PSP might have been mitigated if the CIA had designated an individual at an appropriate level of mendgerial authority, who possessed knowledge of both the PSP and CIA counterterrorism activities, to be responsible and accountable for overseeing CIA participation in the\n-\nNCTC analysts characterized the as a useful Tie ed that the program was only one of several valuable sources of information available to them. In their view, PSP-derived information was not of greater value than other sources. of intelligence. Although NCTC analysts we interviewed could notrecall specific examples where PSP information provided what they considered actionable intelligence, they told us they remember attendirig meetings where the benefits of the PSP were regularly discussed.\n\n## ) C@Un'Terterrorism-'Dperations Supported By The President's Surveillance Program\n\nLAVHS\nv Our efforts to independently identify how PSP information impacted terrorism investigations and counterterrorism operations were hampered by the natire of these activities, which as previously stated, frequently are predicated on multiple sotirces of information. Many IC officials we interviewed had difficulty citing specific instances where PSP reporting contributed to 2 counterterrorism success. The same b1, b3, be, andful of case ded to be cited as PSP successes by personnel] we interviewed from b7C, b7E\nbl, b3, b6, b7C, b7E\nbl, b3, b6, b7C, b7E\nbl, b3, b6, b7C, b7E\n\n## On The President's Surveillance Prggram\n\n(U) As part of this review, the Dol IG examined whether Attorney General Gonzales made:false, inaceurate, or misleading statements to Congress related to the PSP. Aspects of the PSP were first disclosed publicly in a series of articles.in The New York Times in December 2005. In response, the President publicly confirmed a pertion of the PSP\nwhlc;h he called the terrorist surveillance programdescribing it as the interception of the content of international communications of people reasonably believed to have links to al-Qaeda and related organizations. Subsequently, Gonzales was quesfioned about NSA\nsu:ve111a1103 activities. in two hearings before the Senate Judiciary Comimittee:in February 2006 and. July 2007.\n\n{SHNEY- Through media accounts and Comey's Senate Judiciary Committes testimony i May 2007, it was publicly revealed that DoJ and the White House had a major disagreentent related to the PSP, which brought several senior DoJ and FBI officials to the brink of 1esighation in Match 2004. In his testimony before the Senate Judiciaty Commiiitee, Gonzales stated that the dispute at issue between Dol and the White House did notrelate-to the \"Terrorist Surveillance Program\" that the President had confirmed, but rather pertamcd to other intelligence activities. We believe this testimony created the misimpression that the dispute concerned activities entitely unrelated to the terrorist sllrvefllance program, wluoh was not accu1atc In adchuon, we believe Gonzales's\n\n## Tnese Concerns Had Been Conveyed To The W Hite House Over A Period Of Months Before The Issue Was Resolved.\n\n15744 The Dol IG recognizes that Gonzales was i the difficult position of testifying about a highly classified program in an open forum. However, Gonzales, as a p_ax_':tidipant in the March 2004 dispute between Dol and the White House and, more importantly, as the nation's chieflaw enforcement officer, had a duty to balance his obligation not to disclose classified information with the need not to be misleading in his testimony. Although we believe that Gonzales did not intend to mislead Congress, we believe his testimony was confising, inaccurate, and had the effect of misleading those who were not knowledgeable abouL the program.\n\n## (J) Congclusions .\n\n(U) Pursuant to Title IIT of the FISA Amendments Act of 2008, the Inspectors General of the DoD, the DoJ, the CIA, the NSA, and the ODNI coniducted reviews of the PSP. Inthis report and the accompanying individual reports-of the participating IGs, we describe how;\n-\nfollowing the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001, the President erthanced the NSA's SIGINT collection authorities in an effort to \"detect and prevent acts of terrorism against the:\nUnited States.\"\nTTSHSHANRY:\nPugsuant to this authority, the NSA{\n. .\n\n-\ncollected significant new information, such as it content of communications 'to and out of the United States, where one party to the commimnication was reasonably believed to be a member of al-Qa'ida, or its affiliates, or a group the President determined was in armed conflict with the United States. In addition, the President auithorized the collection of significant amounts of telephony.and Intetnet metadata, The NSA anatyzed this information for dissemination as leads to the IC, prinicipally the CIA and the FBL As described in the IG reports, the scope of this collection authority changed over the course of the PSP.\n\n'\n(U//FeEY The IG reports describe the role of each of the patticipating agencies in the PSP, including the NSA's management and oversight of the collection, analysis, and reporting process;\nthe CIA's and FBI's use of the PSP-derived intelligence in their cotnterterrorism efforts; the ODNI's support of the program by providing periodic threat assessments; and the DoJ's role in analyzing and cerlifying the legality of the PSP and managing use of PSP information in the judicial process.\n\n(U) The IG reports also describe the conflicting views surrounding the legality of aspects of the PSP during 2003 and 2004, the confrontation between officials from Dol and the White House about the legal basis for parts of the program and the reselution of that conflict. The ensuing transition of the PSP, in stages, from presidential autliority to statutory authority under FISA, is also described in the IG repotts.\n\n(U) The IGs also examined the inpact of PSP information on counterterrorism efforts. Many senior IC officials believe that the PSP filled 2 gap in intelligence collection thought to exist under FISA by increasing access to international communications that transited domestic U.S. cormmunication wires, particularly international communications that originated or terminated within the United States. Others within the IC Community, including FBI agents, CIA analysts and managers, and other officials had difficulty evaluating the precise contribution of the PSP to counterterrorism efforts because it was most often viewed as one source among many available analytic and intelligence-gathering tools in these efforts. The IG reports describe several examples of how PSP-derived iiformation factored into specific investigations and operations.\n\n(U) The collection activities pursued under the PSP, and under FISA following the activities! transition to operation under that authority, as described. in this report, resulted in.\n\nunprecedented collection of communications content and metadata. We believe the retention and use by IC organizations of information collected under the PSP and FISA, particularly information on U.S. persons, should be carefully monitored.\n\nThis page intentionally left blank.\n\n## (U) Table Of Contents\n\n(V) The Deparment of Defense Inspector General's Review of the President's Surveillance Program ...\n\n~SHNF)-\nThe Central Intelligence Agency Inspector General's Review of GIA Participation in the President's Surveillance Program........ eraressassaesseesErEsasRdaRa i Sinaed s nnnensenares\n(U) The National Security Agency, Gentral Security Service Inspector General's Review of the President's Surveillance Pr@g'ram-nn ------- Heumiiooanancand ETELLYEY) apGuEdcabuedceROUTUOBGEAAUNNAARGNUdEONDODORACAURAABADAT 4'5\n{SHNE) The Office of the Director of National Intelligence anp'egtor General's Review of the Participation of the ODNI\nin the President's Surveillance Program....mmssosiiness: 213\nThis page intentionally left blank.\n\nThis page intentionally left blark.\n\nINSPEGTOR GENERAL\nDEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE\n\" 400 ARMY NAVY DRIVE\nARLINGTON, VIRGINIA 22202-4704\nJune 26,2009\n\n## Memorandum For Secretary Of Defense Subject: (U) Report On Review Of The President's Surveillance Program Report No.: 09-Intel-08 (U)\n\n(U) We are providing this report for your information. This report fulfills the DoD Inspector General's fequirement pursuait to Section 301 of Public Law 110-\n261, the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance:\nAct\n(FISA) Amendments Act of 2008\n(the Act). This report, along with reports prepared by the Inspectors General of the Department of Justice (Dol), the Office of the Director of National Intelligence\n(DNI), Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), the National Security Agency (NSA), will be summarized in a comprehensive report as required by the Act.\n\n'WA%Y\n(ESHSTLW//SHOEHINE\nResults: The OSD role in the establishment and implementation of the PSP was limited, with the burden of program execution residing with the NSA.. We determined that there were six OSD officials with access to the PSP. These individuals had limited involvement, and did not make any additional tasking decisions beyond those directed for NSA implementation.\n\nWe are aware of no othsi OSD involvement in the PSP,\n(U) Background. The Act requires the IGs of the DoJ, DNI, NSA, the DoD, and any other element of the intelligence community that participated in the President's Surveillance Program (PSP)', to complete a comprehensive review of, with respect to the oversight authority and responsibility of each such 1G:\n\no\nAll facts necessary to describe establishment, implementation, product\nand use of the product in the program\no\nAccess to legal reviews and access to information about the Program\no\nCommunications and participation of individuals/entities related to the\nProgram\n! (U) The President's Surveillance Pragram is defined in the Act as the intelligence activity involving communications that was zuthorized by the President during the period beginning on September 11, 2001, and ending on January 17, 2007, including the program referred to by the President in a radio address on December 17, 2005 (commonly known as tie Terrorist Surveillance Program).\n\no\nInteraction with the F areign Intelligence Surveillance Court:and\no\nAny-othier matters identified by the IGs:\n:\nScope and Methodology. We conducted this review to exarmne the invo lvement of the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), Department of Defense (DoD), in the establishment and implementation of the President's Surveillance Program (PSP). We interviewed current and former officials within OSD that had access to the PSP, We withdrew ourrequest to mtervlew Secretary of Defense Gates because he was p10v1ded access to the PSP\nafter thc program cnded The iormel Deputy Secretary of Defense Dr WOlfOWltZ\nw1thm 08D andNSA related to OSD'S mvolvement in the PSP We also reviewed documentation at Do related to the PSP,\n(U) ThelGs of the DolJ, DD, DNI, NSA, and CIA issued an interim report.on September 10, 2008, In the interim report, the DoD IG stated that he would examine the involvemient of the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) in the establishment and implementation of the PSP.\n\nThe NSA, as-an agency within DoD: perfmmed the requirements of the PSP. Assuch; the NSA 1G'is conducting a review of NSA involvement with the PSP separate froth this metmoranduum repott.\n\nSHSTEWHHSTHOGHNE\nImplementatmn and ]Estabhshment of the PSP.\n\nThe OSD access to the PSP was limited to six individuals.\" Those md1v1duals arg Secretaty of Defense Robert Gates; former Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld; former Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz, Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence (USD(I)) James Clapper; former USD(I) Stephen Cambone; and Principal Deputy General Counsel Daniel Dell \"Orto.\n\nT)-The PSP was an extremely sensitive counterterrorisim program focused on detectmg and preventing terrorist attacks within the United States. The PSP was authorized by the President every 30 to 45 days and was initially directed against international terrorism after March 2004, the PSP\nfocused specifically against al-Qaeda and its affiliates.\n\nThe Director of Central Intelligence (DCI), and later the DNI, would prepare-a Threat Assessment\n-after the PSP was Lransferred to Foreign Tntelligence Surveillance Court supervision, Memorandum, which validated the current threat to the United States. The Secretary of Defense would review and ign the Threat Assessment Memorandum.\n\nOn three occasions, Dr. Wolfewitz, the former Deputy Secretary of Defense, sugned the Thredt Assessment Memorarida in the Secretary's.absence. On two occasions, Dr. Cambone, the former USD(Y), signed the Threat Assessment Memoranda when Secretary Rumsfeld and Dr. Wolfowitz were unavailable,\n\nHST\ny Once the Threat Assessment Memorandum was signed, T.he Presxdent would then sign a Presidential Authorization with the Threat Memorandum attached. The President would task the Secretaty of Defense to employ DoD resources to. execute the requirements set forth in the Presideritial Authorization, The Attorney General, or his designee, would cemty the Presidential Authorization for form and legality. The Secretary of Defense would then direct the actions authorized by the Presidential Authorization to the NSA. for implementation. On ene occasion, Dr. Wolfowitz, the former Deputy: Sectetary of Defense, directed the Director of NSA to:implement the Presidential Aunthorization, in the Secretary's absence. 'On a sepatate pccasion, Dr. Cambone, fhe former USD(Y), directed the Director of NSA to-implement the Presidential Aythorization.\n\n'(TS#S?#N'F} Interaction with the Foreign Intelhgence Surveillance Court. Dr..\n\nWolfowitz also.executed two deelarations fo the U.S.\n\nForei 'n Intelhgence Surveillance Court. The first, executed or Govcmment's Apph tion seeking renewal\n138\nd trap and trace devxces in order to obtdin: information\n1\n0L 1978 (bIbA) SUULS. C sections 1801-1811,\n18411846 as amended. The initial authority under FISA to install. and use pen fegister and trap and trace devices for that puUrpose was. rantedb\n- the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court.on July 14, 2004 8\nDr. Wolfowitz's second declaration was executed on\n.| That declaratip ade in response to the Foreign Intelligence\n'\nSurveillance Court's wwfder requiring the Government to submit a declaration from the Deputy Secretary of Defense discussing NSA' Vlolauous of the Court's July 14 Order authonzmg NSA to install and use circumstarnces unding unauthorized collection that occurred, the disposition of information collected without authorization, steps NSA took to remedy the violation, and measures NSA implemented to prevent recurrence of such violations.\n\n## Appendix (U) \" Report Distribution List (U) (U) Office Of The Secretary Of Defense\n\nSecretary of Defense Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence:\nDeputy General Counsel, Intelligence\n\n## Other Defense Organization\n\nTnspector General, National Security Agency\n\n## Non-Defense Federal Organizations\n\nInspector General, Director of National Intelligence Inspector General, Department of Justice.\n\nInispector General, Central Tntelligence Agency\n-\n\n## Congressional Committees\n\nSenate Judiciary Committee Senate Select Committee on Intelligence House Judiciary Committee House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence This page intentionally left blank.\n\nThis page intentionally left blank.\n\n# Central Intelligence Agency\n\noffice of Inspector General\n\n# {Shnf)-Cia Participation In The President's Surveillance Program Report No. 2008-0016-As\n\n30.June 2009\nTssuwee Dude.\n\n'I'iis page intentionally left blank:\n\n## (U) Table Of Contents\n\n| wewinn                                      | 1    |\n|---------------------------------------------|------|\n| (U)                                         |      |\n| EXECUTIVE                                   |      |\n| SUMMARY                                     |      |\n| ..rovornsssroes                             |      |\n| T                                           |      |\n| -                                           |      |\n| ivee                                        | D    |\n| (U)                                         |      |\n| BACKGROUND                                  |      |\n| vocvrevssemsossmrssssrsmessessssrnsenires |      |\n| S                                           |      |\n|                                             | 4    |\n| (U)                                         |      |\n| Origin                                      |      |\n| and                                         |      |\n| Scope                                       |      |\n| of                                          |      |\n| the                                         |      |\n| Review                                      |      |\n| ...                                         |      |\n| vepisnesainasnminsns                        |      |\n| cornenens                                   |      |\n| TP,                                         |      |\n| (U)                                         |      |\n| The                                         |      |\n| President's                                 |      |\n| Surveillance                                |      |\n| PrOGraM                                     |      |\n| ..t                                         |      |\n| .                                           |      |\n| anawnk                                      | 6    |\n\n(4) REVIEW RESULTS...ccovmeerminemnsemnsamnrrsiass erarrereridssasarnissaaransansaasans inrserirnseiii\n\n|                                   | 6    |\n|-----------------------------------|------|\n| {SHNF-CIA                        |      |\n| Participation                     |      |\n| in                                |      |\n| the                               |      |\n| Premdent's                        |      |\n| Survenllance                      |      |\n| Program                           |      |\n| ...t                              |      |\n| aiisvia                           |      |\n| DRSO                              |      |\n| SIP                               |      |\n| IR                                |      |\n| PPN                               |      |\n| TPOS                              |      |\n| SRR                               |      |\n| LY                                |      |\n| veeens                            | T    |\n| :                                 |      |\n| CIA                               |      |\n| Prepared                          |      |\n| the                               |      |\n| Threat                            |      |\n| Assessment                        |      |\n| Memorandums                       |      |\n| Supportmg                         |      |\n| Authorization                     |      |\n| of                                |      |\n| the                               |      |\n| Presment'                         |      |\n| Survelllance                      |      |\n| Programu...c                      |      |\n| i                                 |      |\n| ancsinininsa                      |      |\n| arbeseinann                       |      |\n|                                   | 9    |\n| (UIFSUL)                          |      |\n| CIA                               |      |\n| Tasked                            |      |\n| and                               |      |\n| Received                          |      |\n| Reporting                         |      |\n| From                              |      |\n| the                               |      |\n| President's                       |      |\n| Surveillance                      |      |\n| Program                           |      |\n| ...                               |      |\n| Seurnarnamsarniavae               |      |\n|                                   | 9    |\n| (U/FEUO)                          |      |\n| Procedures                        |      |\n| and                               |      |\n| Standards                         |      |\n| for                               |      |\n| Requesting                        |      |\n| Information                       |      |\n| ...t                              |      |\n| .                                 |      |\n| ...                               | 10   |\n| (U/IFOUO)                         |      |\n| Reporting                         |      |\n| Provided                          |      |\n| in                                |      |\n| Response                          |      |\n| to                                |      |\n| Requests                          |      |\n| for                               |      |\n| Information.c...csiveemnesn       |      |\n| rsvisiesns                        |      |\n| wervavhunearatunie                |      |\n| cerenresnen                       |      |\n| weevscasesianeiranss              |      |\n| (W//FOYQ)                         |      |\n| Primary                           |      |\n| CIA                               |      |\n| Users                             |      |\n| of                                |      |\n| the                               |      |\n| Presudent's                       |      |\n| Survelllance                      |      |\n| w11                               |      |\n| [JT20%                            |      |\n| |                                 |      |\n| :11;                             |      |\n| PR                                |      |\n| R                                 |      |\n| ERIIE                             |      |\n| RIS                               |      |\n| ...                               | 13   |\n| (UIIFEHO)                         |      |\n| CIA                               |      |\n| Requests                          |      |\n| for                               |      |\n| Information                       |      |\n| Were                              |      |\n| Adequately                        |      |\n| Justified                         |      |\n| ...cccnceirennnins                |      |\n| resverieservessirnansstnrrEAEnY   |      |\n| revetessiaseriesyRRREiRSER        |      |\n| SRR                               |      |\n| S S                               |      |\n| HE                                |      |\n| e                                 |      |\n| R                                 |      |\n| e                                 |      |\n| A                                 |      |\n| ERE                               |      |\n| (U/HFFOUD)                        |      |\n| Senior                            |      |\n| CIA                               |      |\n| Officials                         |      |\n| Believe                           |      |\n| That                              |      |\n| the                               |      |\n| President's                       |      |\n| Surveillance                      |      |\n| Program                           |      |\n| Filled                            |      |\n| an                                |      |\n| Intelligence                      |      |\n| (e                                |      |\n| 7:1                               |      |\n| o                                 |      |\n| JOUN                              |      |\n| RSP                               |      |\n| ISE                               |      |\n| (U/FFBY6)                         |      |\n| The                               |      |\n| CIA                               |      |\n| Did                               |      |\n| Not                               |      |\n| Assess                            |      |\n| the                               |      |\n| Effectiveness                     |      |\n| of                                |      |\n| the                               |      |\n| President's                       |      |\n| Surveillance                      |      |\n| Programi..                        |      |\n| et                                |      |\n| ...                               | 16   |\n| (U)                               |      |\n| Counterterrorism                  |      |\n| Successes                         |      |\n| Supported                         |      |\n| by                                |      |\n| the                               |      |\n| Presndent'                        |      |\n| Surveillance                      |      |\n| Program                           |      |\n| ...                               |      |\n| sssremsiresmineeste               |      |\n| resriasnssurraranthisaaRnRTRREnEa |      |\n| w17                               |      |\n| {&HMNF)-Several                  |      |\n| Factors                           |      |\n| Hindered                          |      |\n| C!A                               |      |\n| Utilization                       |      |\n| of                                |      |\n| the                               |      |\n| President's                       |      |\n| Surveillance                      |      |\n| Program..                         |      |\n| ...                               |      |\n\n(U) CIA Had Limited Access to Legal Reviews of the President's\n, SUWEI\"&\"CE Pr.ogram~;.,.....;.....;-.;...,.;,i;....;;;.;;..-........-..;..-.;.fl...l.;..,...'......;,'..'.,.._...;...,. 19\nSHNF) CIA Officials Sought to Delay Exposure of the President's Surveillarice Program by the New York Times ....... wrnseanrnsnanans 20\n\n(U) Methodology ........ sttt\ns\nssssaatssgaassssasesssses EXAIDIE A\n(U) Threat Assessment Memorandum Concluding Paragraph ........Exhibit B (U) Example of Link Diagram From August 2002 .......cccoervieerissrsersennn EXDIbIE G\n(U) Review Team T Y R\nAN\nT\n. e EXCHiDIE D\n\n## Shne Cia Participation In The President's Surveillance Program (1) Executive Summary\n\n{S/ANES- Title 1T of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) Amendments Act of 2008 requires the Inspectors General (IGs) of the elements of the Intelligerice Commmumity (IC) that participated in the President's Surveillance Program (PSP) to conduct a comprehensive review of the program. The results of our review of CIA\nparticipation in the PSP are presented in this report, and will be included in the comprehensive report required to be provided to the a_ppropriatc committees of Congress by 10 July 2009.\n\n, W\nSHHoeARr-The CIA prepared the threat assessment memorandums that were used to support Presidential authorization.and periodic reauthorizations of thc\n'SP, The. thre morandums were prepared by personnel fror the CIA\nh of the indums focused on the\n\nreat situation and did not provide an assessment of the PSP's utility inaddressing previously reported threats. The threat assessment memorandums were signed by the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI)\nand forwarded to fhe Secretary of Defense to be co=signed. Responsibi'lity for drafting the thireat assessment meinorandums was transferred to the-ncwly'established' Terrorist Threat Tntegration Center in May 2003 and retained by TTIC's successor organization, NCTC (the Natiorial Counterterrorisi Cenfer). The DCI continued to sign the threat assessment memorandunis through 15- April 2005. Siibsequent memorandums were signed by the Directorof Natjonal Intelligence.\n\nCIA analysts and targeters, as PSP consumers, tasked belief: among seriior IC and CIA offlcmls that thc process f01 obtammg FISA\nauthonzatton was too.cumbersome and time consuming to address the current threat.\n\nCutrent and for.tner CIA officials emphasized the increased timeliness, flexibility, and dccess provided by the PSP as compared to the process for obtaining a warrant under FISA.\n\n=W\nNE)-\nThe CIA did not implement procedures to assess the usefulness of the product of the PSP and. did not 1outmely document whether particular PSP repomng had contnbuted to successful counterterror ism operatLons CIA officials X\ni A\nPSP reporting. Consequently, there is no means to comprehensively track how PSP\ninformation was used. CIA officials were able to provide only limited information on how program reporting contributed to successful operations, and therefore, we were unable to independently draw any conclusion on the overall usefulness of the program to CIA.\n\nS/ Several factors hindered the CIA inmaking full use of the capabilities of\n=\nPSP.\n\nMany CI\ncials told us that too few CILA persornel at the working level wersread into the PSP\nofficials told vs that CIA analysts-and targeting officers who were read in had too many competing priorities. and too many other available information sources and analytic toolsmany: of which were more easily accessed and.\n\ntimelyto fully utilize the PSP. CIA officers also told us that the PSP would have been mots fiilly utilized if analysts and targeting officers had obtained a better understanditig of the program's capabilities. Many CTA officers noted that there was insufficient training and legal guidance concerning the program's capabilities and the use of PSP-derived information. The factors that hindered the CIA\nin making full use of the PSP might have been mitigated if the CIA had designated an individual at an appropriate level of managerial authority, who possessed knowlsdge of both the PSP\nand CIA counterterrorism activities, to be responsible and acountable for overseeing CIA participation in the program.\n\nFERASTEY\n-\nThere is no indication that 'persoml'el from the CTA\nOffice of General Counsel or other CTA components were involved in preparing the legal memorandums supporting the PSP that were praduced by the Department of Tustice, Office of Legal Counsel (OLE). CIA OGC persontiel had very limited access to these memorandums,\n{SATE)- Senior CIA officials participated in meetings with a New York Times editar and reporter and senior Administration officials concerning anarticle the newspaper was Preparmg concerning the PSP.\n\nThis page intentionally left blank.\n\n## (U) Background (U) Origin And Scope Of The Review\n\n(U) Title HI of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act Amendments Act of\n2008, which was sigred inte:law on 10 July 2008, requires the IGs of the. elements of the Intelligence Community that participated in the PSP to'conduct a comprehensive review of the program.} The review required to be conducted underthe Act isto examine:\n\n(A)\nall of the facts necessary to describe the establishment,\nimplementation, product, -and use of the product of the Program;\n(B) accessto legal reviews.of the program and access to information\nabout the Program;\n() communications with, and participation of, individuals and.\nentities\nin the private sector related to the Program;\n(D) interaction with the Foreign Tutelligence Surveillance Court and\ntransition to court orders related to the Program; and\n(E) any other matters identified by any such Inspector General that\nwould enable that Inspector General to complete a review of the\nProgram, with respect to such Department or element.\n:\nSO\nThe interim report required under the Act was submitted to. the committees of Congress prescribed in the Act on 10 September2008. That teport described the scope of the work to be conducted by each of the participating 1Gs, which include the Inspectors General of the Department of Justice, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, the National Security Agency, the Department of Defense, and the CIA. Our review of CIA participation in the PSP examined CIA's\n:\n\no Role in preparing the threat assessments and legal certifications\nsupporting periodic reauthorization of the PSP.\na Role in identifying targets for the PSP.\nreport dIld w111 be mclucled m the comprchenswe fiual report 1equ1red to. be proV1ded to thie appropriate commiittees of Congress by 10 July 2009,\n\n## (V) The President's Surveillance Program\n\n}\nAccording to former Director of the NSA and former D]recter of the CIA (DCIA) Michael V. Hayden, initial discussions:concering the activities that would become the PSP occurred less than two weeks after the:11 September 2001 terrorist attacks in a meeting between DCI George J. Tenet and Vice President Richard B. Cheney, Although Hayden did not attend the meeting, he was told by Tenet that Cheney asked if the Intelligence Community was doing\n;everythlng possfl:le to prevent another terrorlst attaclc In resnonse Tenet desm ibed -\nCheney then aslced if there was more that NSA could do\n'Tlns led to dlscuss',lo'ns between Cheney, Hayden, Cheney's legal counsel David S. Addington, and senior NSA officials.\n\nIt wasdetermined that the NSA. had the capability to collect additional wire communications that could enhance the IC's counterterrorism efforts, but that new authority was needed to employ the capability.\n\nThe determination led to the authorization of the PSP by President George W. Bush on 4 Qctober 2001.\n\nThe PSP was hitended to help preverit additional\n'lerroust attacks agamst the US Homeland. Although the authorized collection aclivities changcd over the life of the program, in general, the program authorized the NSA to-acquire content and/or metadata concerning telephorne-and e-mail communications for which there were reasonable grounds to believe that at least one of the participants in the communication was located outside the US and that a party to the corinunication was affiliated with a group engaged in infernational terrorism. The collection activities conducted under the PSP were brought under Foreign Intelligenice Surveillance Cotitt oversight in stages between July 2004 and January 2007.2\n{ISHSTE\nEANF)\nUnder the PSP, the NSA collected three sets of data.\n\nThe first set included the content of individually targeted telephone and e-mail commiinications. The-second set consisted of telephone dialing informationthie date, time, and duration of calls; the telephone numbe of the caller;\nand the number receiving the callcollected n bulk\n=\n:\ne g third data\n'gt eang\n-mail transactional dataf\n5\n\n## (U) Review Results {Shnf) Cla Participation'In The: Pr Sident's Surveillance Program Cia Prepared. The Threat Assessment Memorandums. Supportmg Authorization Of The President's Surveillance Program\n\nThe CIA initially prepared the threat assessment memorandums that were used to support Presidential authorization and penodw reauthorizations.of the PSP, The memorandums.dociimented the eurrent threat to the US homeland and to US interests abroad from 4l-Qa'ida and affiliated terrorist organizations, The first threat assessment memorandumThe Continuing Near-Teiin Thieat from Usama Bin Ladinwas signed by DCI Tenet on 4 October 2001.3\nSubsequent threat assessment memorandums were: prepaled every 30to 60 days to correspond with the President's reauthorizations:of the PSP.\n\n:\n=ANE) The DCI Chief of\" Staff IohnH Moseman, was the CIA\nfocal pomt for preparmg the threat assessmentmemoraudunw. According to Moseman, he directed thej\n-\n.\n\n|\ntoprepare objeclive hreats to the homeland,\n-appraisals of the current terronst threat, foc\n'\naiid to docurnent those appraisals in a memorandum Initjally, the analysts who prepared the threat assessments w\n- read into the PSP and did not know hew the threat assessments would be used.\n\nanalysts drew upon all sources of intelligence in preparing their threat assessments. Each of the memorandums focused on the current threat situation and did not provide an assessment of the PSP's utility in addressing previously reported threats.\n\nI{SANEy The title of the threat assessment memorandums was changed to The Global War Against Terrorism in Tune 2002.\n\nESHSTEWHSTOEMH\nAfficl_sompleted its portion of the memorandums;\ntlie DCI's Chief of Staff added a paragraph at the end of the memorandums stating that the individuals-and organizations involved in global terrorism (and discussed in the:\nmemorandums) possessed the capability and intention to undertake further terrorist attacks within the US. Moseman recalled that the paragraph was provided to him initially by either White House Counsel Alberto R. Gonzales or Addington, The paragraph recommended that the President authorize: the Secretary of Defense to employ within the US the capabilities of the Department of Defense, including but not limited to NSA's signals intelligence capabilities, to collect foreign intelligence by electronic surveillance, The paragraph also described the types of comnunication and data that would be collected and the circumstances under which they could be collected.# The draft threat assessmentine orandums were then reviewed by Office of General Counsel attorneys assigned tofiiiland Acting General Counsel (Senior Deputy General Counsel) John A. Rizzo. Rizzo told us that the draft memorandums were generally sufficient, but that there were occasions when, based on his experience with previous memorandums, he thought that draft memorandums contained insufficient threat information or did not present a comy elling case for reauthorization of the PSP. In such instances, Rizzo would request tha provide additional available threat information or make revisions to the draft memorandums.\n\nFSHSTEWH\n)\nThe threat assessment memorandums were then signed by DCI Tenet and forwarded to the Secretary of Defense to be co-signed. Tenet signed most of the threat memorandums prepared during his tenure as DCI. Onthe few occasions when he was unavailable, the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence\n(DDCL), John E. McLaughlin, signed the memorandums on behalf of Tenet.\n\nMcLaughlin also signed the memorandums in the capacity of Acting DCI in August and September 2004, In November 2004, Porter J. Goss became DCI and assumed responsibility for signing the memorandums. There were 1o occasions when the bCl or Acting DCI withheld his signature from the threat assessment memorandum, After they were signed by the Secretary of Defense, the memorandums were reviewed by the Attorney General and delivered to the White House to be attached to the PSP\nreauthorization memorandums signed by the President.\n\n:\n:\nRespgasibility for drafting the threat assessment memorandums was transferred fron .\n\n({0 the newly established Terrorist Threat Integration Center in May 2003. This responsibility was retained by TTIC's successor organization, NCTC. The DCI continued to sign the threat assessment memorandums toro\n1rec\n5.\n\nigence\n1\nigned by the D\nthrough 15 Apr i12005. Subsequent memorandums were s Nationial Intell\n(U/fFEHO) CIA Tasked and Rece Received Report ing s Sujve i llance Rrogram dent's i\n' 1.the Pres\n'From\n(UIFBHO) Senior CIA Officials Believe That the President's Surveillance Program Filled an Intelligence Gap NE)\nFormer Directors Hayden and Goss, former Acting Dlrector McLaughhn, and other senior CIA officials we interviewed told us that the PSP addressed a gap in intelligence collection. Following the terrorist attacks on officials that the process for obtaining FISA authorization was too cumbersome and time consuming to address the current threat.\n\n## (Uiipghq) The Cia Did Not Assess The Effectiveness Of The President's Surveillance Program\n\nThe CIA did not implement procedures to assess:the:\nusefulness of ths product of the PSP and did not routmely documeent whether particular\n'PSP repcrtmg had' contubuted to: successful c,or, rterromsm operatlons CIA officmls, reportmg from other mtelhgence sources consequently, 1t 18 dlfficult to atlnbute the:\nartloul'lr counterterrorlsm operatlons exoluswely to the PSP In a May prog1 am was an addltlonal resource fo enhance thc CIA'S understandm networks and to help 1dent1fy potcntlal thlcats to the homeland Other\n\n## (U) Counterterrarism Successes. Supported 'By The Pres:'Ident'_Sj-Surveillance Program\n\n(SHANE) Despite the fact that CIA officials we interviewed did not provide much.\n\nspecific information on PSP-derived counterterrorism successes; SO e ey\n|\ncountertertorism operations supported by the PSP were cited in briefings presented by CIA officials. Tn March 2004, the CIA provided a seies of three bricfings at the White House to senior Administration officials and Congressional leaders. These briefings included operational details coricerriing the PSP as well as examiples of prograrm successes: InMay 2006, the Deputy Director, briefed SSCI members and staff on the usefulness tol of the PSP,\n-\n\n## {Siinf) Several Factors Hindered Cia Utilization Of The President's Surveillance Program\n\n+S/HNE) Several factors hindered the CIA in making full use of the capabilities of the PSP. Maity CIA officials told us that too few CIA personnel at the working level were read into the PSP, At the program's inception, a disproportionate number of the\n, QS#N-E)\nofficials also told us that working-level CIA analysts and targeting officers who were read into the PSP had too many competing priorities, and too man other information sources arid analytic tools available to them, to fully utilize PSP\nfficialsalso told us that much of the PSP reporting was vague or\n'\nwithont context, which led.analysts and targeting officers to rely more heavily on other information sources and analytic tools, which were more easily aceessed and timely than the PSP.\n\n{SUNEY CIA officers also told us that the PSP would have been more fully utilized if analysts and targeting officers had obtained a better understanding of the program's capabilities. There wasno formal training on the use of the PSP beyond the initial read in to'the program. Many CIA officers we interviewed said that the\n&\ninst ontifovided in the read-in briefing was not sufficient and that they were\n-\n~S#AE). The factors that hindered the CIA in making full use of the PSP might have been mitigated if the CIA had designated an individual at an appropriate level of managerial authority, who possessed knowledge of both the PSP and CIA\n\n## (U) 'Cia Had Limited Accsss. To Legal Reviews Of The President's Surveillance Program\n\n/\nNFY There is no indication that persorinel from the CIA\nC)ffice of General Counsel or other CTA components were involved in preparing the legal memorandums supporting the PSP that were produced by the Department of Tistice, Office of Legal Counsel (OLC). At the time of the: initial authorization of the PSP (4 Octaber 2001), Robert M. McNamara, Jr. was: the CIA General Counsel. There:\nis 1i0 record that McNamara was ever read into PSP, and he retired from the CIA oni\n15 November 2001. Acting General Counsel John Rizzo was read into the program on\n21 December 2001, but, at that time, he was not provided access to the OLC legal opinions: Rizzo told us that by workmg through Addmgton, with whom Rizzo was.\n\nacquainted, he eventually was allowed to read the OLC legal memorandums at Addington's-office in July 2004, Scott W. Muiller becaime the CIA General Counsel on\n24 October 2002 Although NSA records do not indicate that Muller was read into PSP, during our interview with Muiller, he acknowledged having been read into the program and having read the OLC legal memorandums.supporting the prograny. After Jack L. Goldsmith became the Assistant Attorney General for the Office 6f Legal Couinsel in October 2003, the OLC undertook a reassessment of the legal rationale for the PSP Mullel recounted dlscussmns with Deputy Attomey General James B Corey managers we 'interviewed said that although theywere conemed that the PSP ope1 ate within legal authorities, they belieyed that it was important to continue CIA\n'\np,art;ic_j:ipation']i'n the program because CIA analysts and targeters had told them that the.\n\nprogram was a useful counterterrorism tool.\n\n## -{Shnf) Cia Officials Sought To Delay Exposure Of The President's Surveillance Program By The New York Times\n\n~(S/NE) In October 2004, James Risen, a reporter for The New York Times, contacted the CIA Office of Public Affairs seeking an interview with DCI Goss coneeming an article the newspaper was planning on the PSP, Senior officials from the CIA, NSA, Office of the Vice President, and the Office of the Secretary of Defense et to- discuiss a response. On 20 October 2004, DDCI McLaughlin-and DCI Chief of Staff Moseman met with the Washington, DC editor. of The New York Times, Philip Teubman, and Risen. According to a memorandum for the record prepared by Moseman, McLaughlin did not provide any details regarding the PSP or comment on.\n\nthe legal basis for the prograin, but he stressed that publication of the article would expoSej, and po ntially compromise, effective 'counterterrorism tools.\n\nRisen agreed to hold the article and publish it only when it became apparent that other news organizations were preparing their own stories on the PSP. On 16 December\n2005, The New York Times published its first article on the PSP: \"Bush Lets U.S. Spy ori Callers Without Courts.\" On 17 December 2005, President Bush publicly confirmed in a radio address the existence of the disclosed portion of the PSP.\n\nThis page intentionally left blank.\n\n## (U) Wethodology\n\n (U/FEBO) During our review, we conducted 50 interviews of current and former CTA personnel who had been involved with the President's Surveillance Program\n(PSP). Among the senior CIA officials we interviewed were former Director of the National Security Agency (NSA) and former Director of the CIA (DCIA)\nMichael V. Hayden, former Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) and former DCIA\nPorter J. Goss, and former Acting DCI John E. MeLaughlin. We contacted former DCI\nGeorge . Tenet for an 'interv,iew; Tenet suggested that we first }inte_ryiew his former Chief of Staff, Tohn H. Mosetman, and then contact him if we still had a need to interview himn. Following:our interview with Moseman, we contacted Tenet's office several times to request an interview, but he did not return our telephone calls.\n\n## (8) Threat Assessment Memorandum Concluding Paragraph\n\n[Excerpt from the Global War Against Terrovism memorandum dated 10 January 2005.]\nTSHSTEWHSHOCANE) Based on the information available to me from all sources, ineluding the information in this document, it is my estimate that those involved in global terrorism possess both the capability and the intention to-undertake Further tervorists.attacks.\n\n'within the. United States, that; if not detected and prevented, will cause mass:deaths, mass injuries, and massive destruction of property, and may place at risk the continuity of the United States. Government, Accordingly, I recommend that, in-accordance.\n\nwith the Constitution, you authorize the Secretary of Defense, for the purpose of detection and prevention of terrorist acts within the United States, to employ within the United States the capabilities of the Department of Defense, includidg but niot limited to the signals inteligence capabilities of the National Security Agency, to collect foreign intelligence by electronic surveillance, if such electronic surveillance\n1s iritended to:\n(a) acquire-a communication (including but not limited to a wire communication carried into or out of the United States by cable) for which, based on the factual and practical considerations of everyday life on which reasonable and prudent persons act, thiere-are reasonable grourids to beligve such communication originated or terminated outside the United States and a parly to such communication is 2 group engaged in international terrorism, or activities in preparation therefor, or any agent of such a group, provided that such group is-dl Qa'ida, is a group affiliated with al Q2'ida, or is another group that you determine for this purpose is in armed conilict with the United States and poses & threat of hostile action within the United States;\n(b) acquire; with respect to a telephony communication, telecommunications dialingtype data, but not the contenits of the commiunication, when (i) at least one party to such communication is outside the United States, (ii)\nno party to such communication is known to be a citizen of the United States, or (iii) based on the factual and practical considerations of everyday life on which reasonable and prudent persons act, there are specific and articulable facts giving reason to believe that such communication relates to international tefrorism, or activities in preparation therefor; or\n(c) collect, with respect to a non-telephony communication, header/ router/ addressingtype information, but not the contents of the communication, when, based on the factual and practical considerations of everyday life on which reasonable and prudent persons act, there are specific and articulable facts giving reason to believe that a party to such communication is a group engaged in international terrorism, or activities in preparation therefor, or any agent of such a group, provided that such group is al Qa'ida, is a group affiliated with al Qa'ida, or is another group that you determine for this purpose is in armed conflict with the United States and poses a threat of hostile action within the United States.\n\nThis page intentionally left blank.\n\n# 2002 ) Exampl Eofal Ink D J =I Gram From August\n\nThis page intentionally lett blank.\n\n## (U) Review Team\n\n(UIFOTO\nThis report was prepared by the Operations Division, Audit Staff, Office-of Inspector General.\n\nThis page intentionally left blank.\n\n## National Security Agency/Central Security\n\n# Service\n\n## Inspector General Report (U) Review Of The President's Surveillance Program\n\nST-09-0002\n29 June 2009\nTOP-SECREF/STEW/COMTINT/ORCON/NUFURN\n\n## (U) Office Of The Inspector General\n\n(U) Chartered by the Director, NSA/Chief,'CSS, the Office of the Inspector General (OIG)\nconducts inspections, audits, and investigations. Its mission is to ensure the integrity, efficiency, and effectiveness of NSA/CSS operatlons to provide intelligence oversight; to protect against fraud, waste, and mismanagement of resources; and to ensure that NS A/CSS activities are conducted in compliance with the Constitution, laws, executive orders, tegulations, and directives. The OIG also serves as ombudsman, assisting all NSA/CSS employees and affiliates, civilian and military.\n\n## (U) Inspections\n\n(U) The inspection function conducts management and program evaluations in the form of organizational and functional reviews; undertaken either.as part of the OIG's annual plan or by management request. The inspection team's findings are designed to yield accurate and up-todate information on the effectiveness and efficiency of entities-and programs, along with an assessment of compliance with laws and regulations; the recommendations for corrections or improvements are subject to followup. The inspection office also partners with the Inspectors General of the Service Cryptologic Elements to conduct joint inspections of the consolidated cryptologic facilities.\n\n## (U) Audits\n\n(U) The internal audit function is designed to provide an independent assessment of programs and organizations. Performance audits evaluate the economy and efficiency of an entity or program, as well as whether program objectives are being met and operations are in compliance with regulations, Financial audits determine the accuracy of an entity's financial statements. All gudits are conducted in accordance with standards established by the Compiroller General of the United States.\n\n## (U) Investigations And Special Inquiries\n\n(U) THE OIG administers a system for receiving and acting upon requests for assistance or complaints (including anonymous tips) about fraud, waste and mismanagement. Investigations and Special Inquiries may be undertaken as a result or irregularities that surface during an inspection or audit; or at the initiative of the Inspector General.\n\n## Oftice Of The Tnspector General National Securety Agency Centralsecurity Service\n\n24 June 2009\n[C-1 1051-09\ngl WSS\nTO: DISTRIBUTION\nSUE'UECT: {U} Review of President's Surveillance Program (ST-00-0002) -\nINFORMATION MEMORANDUINM\n1.\n\n[t/ AT This report summarizes our review of the Presidend's Surveiltance Program, as mandated by the Forefgn niteltigence Surveillanice Act Amernadiitents Act ol 2008,\n2.\n\n(U ARSHE) For additional information, please cantact my ollice on\n3(r1-688-6666.\n\n\\We appreclale the cowlesy snd cooperalion extended to our stalt throughout the review.\n\ny i A\nvonge (Y\ng gy et LA\nGEORGE ELLARD\n(nspecior Generat DISTRIBUTION\nSID\n0GC\nES/SH\n7\nFiFor over a decade before the terrorist attacks on 11 September 2001, NSA tised its SIGINT authorities to provide information in response to Intelligence Community reqiiirements on terrorism targets. In late September 2001, when the Vice President asked the Director:of Central Intelligence what more NSA could do with additional authority, NSA's Director identified impediments to\n'\nenhancing. SIGINT collection under existing authorities.\n\nHe said that in most instances NSA could not collect commurnications on a wire in the United States without a court order. Asaresult, NSA's ability to quickly collect and report on a large volume of communications from foreign countries to the United States was impeded by the timeconsuming court order approval process. Attempting to pbtain court orders 'fo\"fqreign telephone numbers and Internet addresses was impractical for collecting terrorist communications with speed and agility.\n\nHSTE\n:\nNF)\nCounsel to the Vice President drafted the 4 October 9001 Authorization that established the President's Surveillance Program (PSP), under which NSA\ncould routinely collect on a wire, for counterterrorism purposes, foreign communications originating or terminating in the United States. Under the PSP, NSA did not target commurnications with both ends in the United States,.\n\nalthough somie of these communications were incidentally collected.\n\n{TSHSTLW//SHHOE{NF) The PSP gave NSA a capability to Ty, s was. that this SIGINT coverage provide confidence that someone was looking at the seam between foreign and dorhestic intelligence domains to detect and prevent attacks i the United States.\n\n11::/ 1S TEW/ TSI /OC/NF) Knowledge of the Program was:\nstrictly limited at the express dirgction of the White House, and NSA's Director needed Whitee House approval to inform members of Congress about Program. activity. Between\n25 October 2001 and 17 January 2007, General Michael V.\n\nHayden anflgutenant General Keith B. Alexander condiicted SP briefings for members of Congress and staff.\n\n/\n'\nNSA activity conducted under the PSP Was authonzed by Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court. (FISC) orders by 17 J ariuary 2007, when NSA stopped operating under PSP authority. The NSA, Office of the.\n\nInspector General (O1G) detected no intentional misuse of Propram authonty\n\n## (U) Highlights () Psp Establishment, Implementation, And Product\n\n:\n;\n'\n>\n/NE) NSA began PSP operations ofl\n6 October 2001 Although the Director of NSA was\n\"comfortable\" exercising the new authority and believed that it -was lawful, he realized that itCWbe contreversial.\n\nUnder the PSP, NSA issued over reports. This included reports based on collected metadata, which was efined in the Authorization as \"header/router/addressingtype information including telecommunications dialing-type data, but not the contents of the communication.\"\nIt also Jncludedmeports based on domestic content collection, which includes words spoken ina telephone conversatzon or sent in an e-mail{{9JE\n'\n:\nST\nNF) NSA's PSP products, all of which.\n\nwere sent to CIA and FBI, were intended for intelligence purposes to develop investigative: Ieads arid were not fo be useed for judicial purposes. L\njand NSAhadno mechanism to track and assess the effectiveness of PSP\nreporting:\n\n## (U} Access To Legal Reviews And Program Information\n\n{E/4/20)-NSA's General Cournisel and Inspector General were not permitted to read the 2001 DoJ, Office of Legal Counsel opiriion on the PSP, but they were given access to draft 2004\nOffice of Legal Counsel opinions. Knowledge of the PSP was strietly controlled by the White House. Between 4 October\n2001 and 17 January 2007 ;!people were cleared for access to PSP information.\n\n## O (U) Nsa-Fisc Interaction And Transition To Court Orders\n\nSTSTEW\n&/NE-NSA's PSP-related interaction with the FISC was primarily briefings to presiding judges, beginning in January 2002, Interaction increased when NSA\nand the DoJ began to transition PSP activities to FISC orders.\n\nAfter parts of the program had been publicly revealed in December 2005, all members of the FISC were briefed. NSA's PSP authorized collection of bulk Internet metadata, telephony business records, and the content of corimunications transitioned to FISC orders on 14 July\n5004, 24 May 2006, and 10 January 2007, respectively.\n\n(U) Program oversight at NSA\nG/} NSA's Office of General Counsel and Signals Intelligence Directorate provided oversight of NSA PSP\nactivities from October 2001 to January 2007. NSA OIG\noversight began after the IG was cleared for PSP information in August 2002.\n\nN\n&\n<<\n2\no)) ?\n\nB\noW\nThis page interitionally left blank.\n\nTM\nT~\n>\nLY>]\n=) S\n-t This page intentionally left blank.\n\nThis page intentionally left blanik:\n(SHMNE) For years before the 11 September 2001 terrorist aftacks in the United States, NSA had been using its authorities to focus the United States Signals Intelligence (SIGINT)-System on foreign intelligence targets, including terrorism, in response to Intelligence Community requiroments. After the attacks, NSA adjusted SIGINT collection, in accordance with its authorities, to counter the terrorist threat within the United States.\n\nIn late September, the Vice President.asked the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) if NSA could do more to prevent another attack.\n\nNSA's Director responded by describing impediments to SIGINT collection of ferrorist-related communications to the Vice President.\n\nCounsel to the-\nVice President used the information about impediments to draft the Presidential Authorization that established the PSP.\n\n## (U) Sigint Efforts Against Terrorists Before 11 September 2001\n\nte//2F)-For over a decade before terrorists attacked the United States'in September 2001, NSA was 'applying SIGINT\nassets against terrorist targets in response to Intelligerice Comimunity requiremerits. The Signals Intelligenice Directorate (SID) Counterterroxisin {CT) Product Line led these efforts in accordance with SIGINT authorities, which defined what NSA could and could not do against SIGINT\ntargets.\n\n## (U) Authorized Sigint Activity In September 2001\n\n(U) NSA was authorized by Executive Order (E.O.) 12333, United States Intelligence Activities, 4 December 1981, as amended, to collect, process, and disseminate SIGINT\ninformation for foreign intelligence and counterintelligence purposes in accordance with DCI guidance and to support the conduct of military operations under the guidance of the Secretary of Defense. NSA and other Intelligence Community agencies were required by E.O, 12333 to conduct intelligence activities in accordance with U.S, law and other E.O. 12333\nprovisions.\n\n(U) Both DoD regulation and NSA/Central Security Service\n(CSS) policy implemented NSA's authorities under E.O.\n\n12333 and specified procedures governing activities that affect U. S. persons (DoD Regulation 5240.1-R, Decenmber\n1982, Frocediires Governing the Activities of DoD) Intelligence Components that Affect United States Persons and NSA/CSS\nPolicy 1-23, 11 March 2004, Procedures Governing NSA/CGSS Activiies that Affect U. S. Persons).\n\n~ASHSH-HH The policy of the U.S. SIGINT System is to\ncollect, retain, and disseminate only forelgn communications,\nwhich, in September 2001, were defined in NSA's legal\ncompliance procedures (described below) as' communications:\nhaving at least one communicant outside the United States\nor entu'ely among foreign powers or between a. foreign power\nand officers or employees of a foreign power.\nAll other\ncommunications were considered domestic.communications.\nNSA cotild not collect cornmunications from a wire in the\nUnited States without a court order unless they-originated\nand terminated outside the United States.\nHS/SLAANEL\nN 2001, NSA's authority to collect foreign\ncommunications included the Director of NSA's: authonty to\napprove targeting communications with one comm\nthe United States. if technical devices (such asfl\n| could be-employed to limit-acq\ncommunications to those in which the. ta:get is-a nonU S..\nperson located outsmle the: Umted States\n=\n-fs/-fS{\"HNF}-NSA's Director coulcl exercise\n. this. authouty,\nexcept when the collection was otherwise regulated, for\nexample under FISA for commuinications collected from a\nwire in the United: States.\n(U) NSA safeguards to protect U.S. persons' Constitutional rights\n'\n(U) The Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution protects all U.S. persons anywhere in the world and all persons within the United States from unreasonable searches and seizures by any person or agency acting on behalf of the U.S.\n\nGovernment.! United States Signals Intelligence Directive\n(USSID) SP0018, Legal Compliance and Minimization\n-eG#-}FP) USSID SP001S defines a 1).S. person as a citizen of the United States, an alien lavifully- admitted for penmaneit residence in the 'United States, unincorporated groups or associations a substantial number of the members of whith constitute cittier offhe first two groups, or corporations incorporated in the United States, ingluding U.S. flag non-governmental aireraft or-vessels, but not including those entities opeuly acknowledged by a foreign government to be directed and controiled by them.\n\nProcedures, 27-July 1993, prescribes policies and minimization procedures and assigns responsibilities to ensure that United States SIGINT Systemn missions arid activities are condtuicted in a manner that safeguards U.S.\n\npersons' Constitutional rights. (See Appendix G.)\n~{877817/FrDuring the course of normidl operations, NSA\npersonnel sometimes inadvertently encounter information to, fromm, or abot U.S. persons. When that happens, they must apply standard minimization procedures approved by the Attorney General in accordance with E.O. 12333 and defined in USSID SP0018.\n\nThese procedures implement the constitutional principle of reasonableness by giving different categories of individuals and entities different levels of protection. They ensure that U.S. person information is minimized during collection, processing, dissemination, and retention:of SIGINT by, for example, strictly controlling collection with a high risk of encountering U.S. persen jtiformation and focusing all reporting solely on the activities of foreign entities and persons and their agents.\n\n## (U) Nsa Director Used Existing Authorities To Enhance Sigint Collection After Terrorist Attacks (Shae)-In Oval Difice Meeting, Bcl Explained Nsa Director's Decision To Expand Operations Under Existing Sigint Authorities\n\n(U/ AFe86) General Hayden recalled that in late September\n2001, he told Mr. Tenet about NSA actions under E.O. 12333\nto counter the terrorist threat.\n\nMr. Tenet shared that information with the White House in an Oval Office meeting.\n\n(U/:/FOUS} We did not interview Mr. Tenet or White House s personnel during this review. We asked the White House to provide documentation of meetings at which General Hayden or NSA employees discussed the PSP or the Terrorist Surveillance Program with the President, Vice President, or White House personnel, but we did not receive a response before this report was published. Therefore, information about the sequence of events leading up to the establishment of the PSP comes from interviews of NSA personnel.\n\n## (U) Vice President Asked What Other Authorities Nsa Needed -F&E'Nfh\\!Sa Options To Improve Sigint Collection Could Not Fill Intelligence Gaps On Terrorist Targets\n\n~{S/4{NE}General Hayden said that, in his professional judgment, NSA could not get the needed collection using the FISA. The process for obtaining court orders was slow, and it involved extensive coordination and separate legal and policy reviews by several agencies. Although an emergency authorization provision permitted 72 hours of surveillance without a court order, it did not allow the government to undertake surveillance immediately. Rather, the Attormey General had to ensure that emergency surveillance would satisfy the standards articulated in the FISA and be SHASHAANE)S Under its authorities, NSA had no other options for the timely-collection of communications of suspected terrorists when one end of those communications was in the United States and the communications could only be collected from a wire or cable in the United States.\n\n## (U//Foub) Nsa Director Described To The Vice President The Impediments To Improved Sigint Collection Against. Terrorist Targets\n\nHESHIHANFY According to NSA OGC, Dol.has since agreed with NSA that simply processing commilinications metadata in this manner does not constitute electronic surveillance under the FISA.\n\n(U/ /FoHQ) After two additional meetings, the Vice President asked General Hayden to work with his Counsel, David Addington. Because early discussions: about expanding NSA\nauthority were not documented, we do not have records of attendees or: spec1fic topics discussed at General Hayden's meetings with White House represerntatives.\n\n## . (V) The Presidential Authorizations\n\n{F\n-\n} Between 4 October 2001 and\n8 December 2006 President George W. Bush signed\n43 Authp.r;z_atlons_ two modifications, and one document described as The authorizations were based on the President's determination that after the\n11:September 2001 terrorist attacks in the United States, an extraordinary emergency existed for national defense purposes. The Authorization documents contained the terms under which NSA executed special Presidential authority and were titled Presidential Authorization for Specified Electronic Survelllance Activities during a Limited Period to Detect and Prevent Acts of Terrorism withir the United States. They were addressed to the Secretary of Defense.\n\nhme firqt elumnatmg the possibility that the Authority could be interpreted to permit collection of communications with both ends in the United States and addifig an additional\n'gualification that metadata could be collected for TSI\nSHLOENF)-According to General Hayden, the Authorization, for the most part, did not change the communications that NSA could collect, but did change the locatiorni from which the Aeency could collect them by permitting collectic\n=\nW\nited\n:\n:\nthat authorization;\n\n## (V) Nsa Discussions About The Lawfulness Of The Authorization\n\n'\nNE} NSA leaders believed that they could lawfully carry out the President's authorizations. However, they also recognized that the Program would be controversial and politically sensitive. This section describes how key NSA\nleadersthe Director, the NSA General Counsel, Deputy General Counsel, and Associate General Counsel for Operanonsconcluded that the Prg ogram was legally defensible.\n\n## (U) Director Of Nsa\n\nGenerals. Hayden:and Alexander stated that they beheved the Authorization was lawful.\n\n## {U) General Hayden\n\n-(%SHSH/NF-) When asked how he:had decided to execute an;\nAuthorization that-some would consider legally and politically conhtroversial, General Hayden said that NSA's highest ranking lawyers had advised him, collectively and individually, that the Program was lawful under the President's Article Il powers. He said that three factors influenced his decision to 1mp1ernent the Authority. First, NSA would do exactly what the Authorization stated and \"not one electron or photon more.\"\n'Second, the Program was simply an expansion of existing NSA collection activities, Third, the periodic renewal-of the Authorization would ensure\n'that the threat contintied to Justhy the Program.\n\n;\nGeneral Hayder: said that as time passed, hedetermmed that the Prograim was-still needed. Specifically;\nheand NSA's Deputy Director reviewed the DCI threat meinorandum for each reauthorization and judged that the threats continued to justify the Program.\n\nP8/\nSEHHHHY General Hayden said that no-one at NSA\nexpressed concerns to him or the NSA 1G that the Authoerization was not lawful. Most importantly, General Hayden said that ho orie outside NSA asserted that he should stop the Program. He. occasionally heard concerns from meimbers. of Congress, but he sensed general support for the Prograrm from those he briefed outside NSA.\n\nHe emphasized that he did not just \"flip through slides\" during briefirigs. He wanted to ensure that attendees understood the Program;\nconsequently, briefings lasted as long as the attendees warnted.\n\n## (U) General Alexander\n\n'\nWhen Lieutenant General Keith B.\n\nAlexander becamnie NSA/ CSS Dlrector in m1d~2005 some. of reviewed its initial opinion and determined that the\n'\nremaining three types of collection were legally supportable,\n\n## (L)) Nsa Office Of General Counsel\n\nL ISEHHANE)\nAfter the Authorization was signed on\n4 October 2001, NSA's highest ranking attorneys, the NSA\nGeneral Counsel and Deputy General Counsel, as well as the Associate General Counsel for Operations, orally advised General Hayden that the Authorization was legal\n\n## (U):General Counsel\n\n{PS/+SH-NF) After having received the: Authorization ot\n4 October 2001, General Hayden asked NSA General Counsel Robert Deitz if it was lawful.\n\nMr, Deitz said that General Hayden understood that the Attorney General had already certified its legality by signing the Authorization, but General Hayden wanted Mr. Deitz's view. Mr. Deitz said that on\n5 Qctober he told General Hayden that he believed the.\n\nAuthorization to be lawful, He added that he emphasized to General Hayden that if this: issue were before the Supreme Court, it would likely rule, although not unanimously, that ttie' Authorization was legal.\n\n## (U) Associate General Counsel For Operations\n\n_\n+\nOn 5 October 2001, the General Counsel consulted the Associate Gerieral Counsel for Operations at his home by :secure telephone. The Associate General Counsel for Operations was responsible for all legal matters related to NSA SIGINT activities: According to the General Counsel, he had not yet been authorized to tell the Associate General Counsel about the PSP, so he \"talked around\"\nit and did not divulge details. The Associate General Counsel was given enough information to assess the lawfulness of the concept described, but records show that he was not officially cleared for the PSP until 11 Octaber 2001. On Tuesday,\n9 October, he told Mr. Deitz that he believed the Authorization was lawful, and he began planning for its implementation.\n\n## (U) Deputy General Counsel\n\n_\nThe Deputy General Caunsel was cleared for the PSP on 11 October 2001. He reviewed the Authorization with: Mr. Deitz and the Associate General Couinsel for Operations and also concluded that it was lawful.\n\n## (U) Discusslons On Legality\n\nF-0GC attorneys said that their discussions about the Program s lawfulness took inte account the severity\n'of the 11 September attacks and the fear that foreign persons were. iri the United States planning attacks. 'The NSA\nattorneys conelided that the Authorization wag lawful.\n\nGiven the following factors; the General Counsel said the Authorization was constitutional and-did not viclate FISA\n{S/;'N-F'} FISA was not 4 realistic means of addressing the terrorist threat inside the United States because the process lacked speed and agility.\n\no\n(U//EQOYS) The Authorization was a temporary 30-day\ngrant of authority..\no\n(U//EQYS) The statute allowed such an exception, or;.\nto the-extent that it did not, it was unconstitutional.\nThe NSA attorneys determined that the President could issue the Authorization through his authority under Article II of the Constitution to perform warrantless electronic surveillance for foreign intelligence purposes outside and inside the United States. This conclusion, they said, was supported by the concurring opinion in Youngstoiwn Sheet\n& Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.5. 579\n(1952), and appellate cases.?\n\n~ES//SL//NE) The Congressional Authorization of Use of Military Force and the canon- of constitutional avoidance, which requires a court to attempt to interpret issues so as to avoid constitutional questions, cemernted OGC's belief that the President's interpretation of Article Il authority had legal merit.\n\n{8t/\n11F) The Associate General Counsel for Operations described his position:\n\nATS/4SLE) Does Congress have the authority to\nlimit Presidential Article 11 authority in foreign\nintelligence collection? Given the threat, this was.a\nperfect storm of events3,000 people killed,\nairplanes\nand buildings destroyed by foreign\nterrorists; an attack\nin the United States by &\nforeign terrorist orgarization.\nNo one kriew where\ntHe terrorists:were\nor\nif there were.more terrorists;\nand NSA had a collection capability unable to\nfianction because with the FISA, you cannot get\n=\n| FISA orders needed to cover what you\n'needed covered at that time to look for the\n......\nterrorists. You go to the President and tell him\nthat there is a statute that prevents you from doing\nsomething from a collection standpoint that may\nprote_ct'the'United-States from a future attack and\nthat while the'country\nis in danger, I have to\n'adhere with a statute and can't get the amount of\nwarrants I need. Any president is going to say\nthere has got to be a way to da this a federal lawcari't let me stand here and watch the country go\ndown the tubes. Does the President have to abide\nby'a statute depriving him of his authority and\nwatch the country\ngo down the tubes? Given the\ncase law of five different circuits with the Supreme\nCourt denying certiorari in two cases, there was\ngoad basis for. deciding this.\n\n(ES/#SL//H)\nNSA OGC attorneys said that they did ot prepare a formal written legal opinion because it was not necessary.\n\nThe Attorney General had already certified the legality of the Program, and General Hayden had not asked for a written legal opinion. The attorneys also said that they did riot have time to prepare a written legal opinion given the pace of operations.\n\n.\n\nNF}.\n\nAfter having concluded that the Authorization was lawful, NSA attorneys believed it was important to ensure.that NSA's implementation of the Program complied with the Authorization, that processes were well documented, and that strict controls and due diligence were embedded into the execution of the Program.\n\nRecognizing that the legal basis of the Program might become controversial, they said that they wanted to ensure that NSA's execution of the Authority would withstand scrutiny.\n\nThis page intentionally left blank.\n\nSHSTEWHSIHOSANFINSA PSP operations began on 6 October 2001\nand ended.on\n17 January 2007 and involved the collection, analysis, and reporting of two types: of information; metadata and content. NSA\nassumed that the:PSP was temporary and did not immediately formalize processes-and procedures for operations, which were quickly set up fo provide SIGINT\non terrorist targets. As the Authorization continued to be renewed, NSA implemented special procedures to ensure that selectors used for metadata analysis and domestic selectors tasked for content collection were linked to al-Qa'ida, its associates, or international terrorism and that related decisions were documented.\n\nNSA did not target communications with both ends.in the United States under PSP authority, although some of these communications were incidentally collected, and the OIG found nosintentional violations of the Authorization. Over the life of the Program, NSA issued more than-products based on PSP\ndata. According fo senior NSA leaders, the vaiue of the PSP was that SIGINT coverage provided confidence that someone was looking at the seam between the foreign and domestic intelligence domains to detect and prevent attacks in the Unlted States.\n\n## (V) Nsa Begins Psp Operations\n\n/A3%F}\nOn 4 October 2001, General Hayden received the initial Authorizatien and informed the SIGINT Director and other key personnel.\n\noTMy oy\n[=) S\ncover ferny, STE LLARWIND\n, was assigned to Program information on\n= =\n\n## Cfshshanf Authorization Renewed\n\n{S//NF} NSA leaders assumed the PSP would be temporary, so they did not establish processes and procedures for a long-term program, and they had plans to cease operations if the Authorization was not renewed.\n\nHowever, the President continued to renew the Authorization, and General Hayden stated that the DCI threat memoranda accompanying each renewal continued to justify the Program.\n\n## (U) Fisa Authority Still Not An Option In 2002\n\n-In: January 2002, senior NSA leaders still\n1er the FISA court order process nor the\n\n## _Itshshnf):Nsa's First Attempt To Obtain Fisa Authority Or-~ Failed. '\n\n\" In September 2002 NSA atternpted to obtain\n} The request was prompted by a CT Product mber, who explained that technical problems FISC orders Line staff me delayed NSA's receipt of e-mail ollected throu hat the FBI had, obtained.\n\n[\n-\n.\n\n.\n\nIri ont case, an terrorist agents of interest to\n\n## (U) Nsa Structure For | Operation {Ui[Fel6) Nsa Organizational Structure For Psp Activity November 2004 (W) Chain Of Command\n\n(-SHNF-) NSA's Directorand Deputy Director exercised senior\noperational control and authority over the Program. According to NSA's Deputy Director, Generdl Hayden handled\n\"downtown\" and the Deputy Director managed everything\nwithin NSA. The SIGINT Director at the start of the Program\nstated that once she was confident that the Program had\nappropriate checks and halances, she left direct management\nto the Director, Deputy Director, and the OGC.\nShe noted\n'thet General Hayden took personal responsibility for the\nProgram and managed it carefully. By 2004, specific roles\nrelated to collection, analysis, and reporting had been\ndelegated to the SIGINT Director, who delegated management\nresponsibilities to the Program Manager and mission\nexecution responsibilities to the Chief of the CT Product Line\nand subordinate leaders.\n\n## (U) Coordination With Fbi\n\ng HSTEWSE\n/NT On 24 January 2003, NSA, SID, and the FBI agreed to detad FBI personnel working under NSA SIGINT authorities to SID*\nUnder the agreement, detailees assisted with terrorismrelated SIGINT metadata analysis, identified and disseminated terrorlsm*related SIGINT mforma'uon meeting\n\n## Fshshnfey Minimization Procedures And Additional Gontrols On Psp Operations'\n\n{PSHSTEW/1SHOE1NF) Management emphasized that the minimization rules required under non-PSP authorities also applied to PSP. The Authorization specifically directed NSA\nto \"minimize the information collected concerning American citizens, to the extent consistent with the effective accomplishment of the mission of detection and prevention of acts of terrorism within the United States.\" NSA c:omphed by applying USSID SP0018 minimization procedm es. For example, and as described in the following sections:\n\no\nWhen analysts encountered U.S. person information,\nthey handled it in accordance: with minimization\nguidance, which included reporting violations or\nincidents.\n\nDissemination of U.S. person information\nwas\nmirimized by requiring pre-release verification that the\ninformation was related to countertecforism and\nnecessary to understand the foreign intelligence or\nassess its importance:.\n&/LNE)\nIn addition,\nas PSP operations:stabilized and the\nAuthorization continued to be renewed, NSA management\ndesigned pracesses and pmcedures to implement the\nProgram effectively while ensuring compliance with the\nAuthorization and protecting U.S. 'person information. By\nApril 2004, formal procedures were in place, many of which\nwete more stringent than those used for non-PSP SIGINT\noperations. Ore analyst commented that the PSP \"had more\ndoeumentation than anything else [she] had ever been\ninvolved with,\" Examples of controls, some of which will be\nexplained in more detail in the following sections of this\nreport, include:\no\n(FS{SEEWS/SIOCINF ApprovalsShift\nCoordinators approved foreign and domestic target\nselectors for metadata analysis.\nThe Chief or Deputy\nof CT Product Line Chief or the Program Manager\napproved domestic selectors for content collection\nunder the PSP,\no\n(ESAASTLW//SH//OC/NE) DocumentationRFIs,\nleads, tasked domesuc selectors and tippers were\ntracked inthe g\n\nUustifications for\ncontact chammg were 1c,corded and justification packages and approvals for tasking domestic selectors\nfor content collection were formally documented.\n77\nMomtormngtatlstxcs on content taslnng and. reportv. were maintained and reviewed by\n'SID, Oversight and Compliance by 2003, ACT\nProduct Line employee stated: .\n\n. [Njowhere else did NSA have to report.on selectors ancl how many selectors were rolled off [detasked] and why.\"\n\no\n(U//FEHYE)0OGE involvementPersonnel working\nunder BSP authonty noted that they had a-continuous\ndialogue with the OGC on what was permissible tnder\nthe Authorization. The Associate General Counsel for\nOperatxons confirmed that the OGC \"was:involved with\nthe operations people day in and day out.\"\no\n(U / FFEBerDue Diligence MeetingsThe PSP Program.\nManager chaired due-diligence meetings attended by\noperational, OIG, and -OGC personnel. They discussed\n0IG and OGC reviews: and Program challenges,\nprocesses,. procedures, and dociimentation.\n\n## M) Psp Operations: Metadata\n\nfl.\n\n) The Authorization defines.\n\n' metadata\" as \"headcr/ router/ addressing type information, including telecommunications dialing:type data; 'but not the contents of the ommunication.\" For example, e-mail message metadata includes the sender'and recipient e=mail addresses,\n[ daes not include the subject line or the text of the e=mail, which are consuiered comtent. Telephony metadata includes such information as the calling and cailed telephonemumbers, but ni\n\n## ) Standards For Conducting Metadata Analysis\n\n-ANF) During an OIG review in 2006, the Associate\n'General Coimsel for Operations described OGC's standards for complying with the terms of the Authorization when conducting nietadata enalysis and contact chaining.\n\n?) To conduct contact chaining under the PSP, the Authorlzatmn required that NSA meet one of the following coniditions; 1)t least one party to the communication had to be outside the United States, 2) no party to the communication ould be known to be a U.S. citizen, or\n3)\nbased. on the factual and practical considerations of everyday life-on which reasonable and prudent persons act, there were specific and articulable facts giving reason to beheve that the comrnumcatlon relates to international terrorism or activities in preparatlon therefor. The Associate General Counsel for Operatmns said that OGC's guidance was more stringent than the Atithorization in that the OGC always required that the: third condition be met before:contact chaining began.\n\nAnalysts were required to establish a lirik with designated:\ngroups related to international terrorism, al-Qa'ida; or-al-\nO#'ida affiliates.1*\n{S/4/NB) The Assdciate General Counsel for Operations said that: estabhshmg a link to intermational terrorist groups or al-\n0a'ida and its affiliates met the Authorization's requirement that all activities conducted under the PSP be for the purpose of detecting and preventing terrorist acts within the United States. He explained that because the President had.\n\ndetermined that specified international terrorist groups and al-Qa'ida preserited a threat within the United States, regardless of where members were located, linking a target selector te such groups established that the collection was for and posed a threat-of hostile'action within the United States.\n\nthe purpose of detectior and prevention of terrorist acts within the United States..\n\n$8/-+SH/NE). In 2005 Program memorandum, NSA OGC:\ndefined the NSA standard for establishing a link to al-Qa'ida urnder the PSP, NSA could target selectors when \"based on the factual and practical considerations of everyday life on which reasonable and prudent persons act, there are reasonable grounds to believe a party to such communication\n-\nis an agent of al-Qa'ida, or a group affiliated with al-Qa'ida.\"\nB+\no M-Facts giving rise to\n\"reasonable grounds for belief\" means relisble facts in'NSA's possession, either derived from its signals intelligence activity, or facts provided to NSA by another governmerit departmerit or agency, or facts:\nreliably in the public record (e.g., & newspaper article). Whatever the source of information, the key is that NSA is basing its determination on articulable facts, not on bare assertions made by someone lse. We need evidence, rather than\nonclusions.\n\nThus:a mere statement that person X\ni amember of al Qaeda, without more information, will not suffice as a justification fog chaining or for content tasking. I[nstead we need to know what facts have led NSA, or another agency, or the press, etc., to that conclhasion. Focus on the facts and-determine whether they lead to a conclusion, rather than accepting someone else's conclusion.\n\nIf you dop't have enough facts to make a determination, ask for them.\n\nPSS\n85\nE) In addition, the standard does not require certain knowledge, or even necessarily a better than 50/50 chance that the user of a phorne or e-mail is a member of al Qaeeda or an affiliated organization.\n\nIt requires otily that a reasonable and prudent person exercising good judgment would conclude that there are grounds for believing the thing to be proved.\n\nIt is not mere hunch or mere suspicion, nor is it proof beyond a reasonable doubt or even &\npreponderance of the evidence; rather, the standard requires some degree of concrete and articulable evidence or information on which to base a conclusion.\n\n## (U):Approvals For Metadata Analysis\n\nprowded in the RET or lead, analysts could search NSA and Intelhgence Community databases.and chain under non-PSP\nauthorities to find additional facts to substantiate the link.\n\nall alert hst selectms that rmght have generate c chainiing. One individual, the equivalent of a shiit coordinator; managed and monitored the alert process.\n\nTS\n'When NSA personnel identified erroneous metadata collection; usually caused by technical collection system problems or inappropriate application of the Authorization, mirimization procedures required them to report the violation or incident through appropriate channels and to delete the collection from all NSA databases. Early in the Program, NSA reported three violations in which the Authorization was not properly applied and took measures to correct them.\n\nSTLW/SLL/OC/NE) In\n\" chamed on numbers assomated with Iri this- case the target was frelgn but there was rio link to terrorism.\n\nchained on a domestic.telephione pumbet.provided\nby\nthe FBI that 'was related to\n'\ninvestigation.\nTn this case, the target posed\na terrorist\nthreat inside the United States, butthere was no\nknown link to international terrorism.\no\nTS{/STLW SSHLOCINE) In - NSA chained\non.metadata based on\ni3\nprovided by FBI related\nWhile the\ngglec\nere associated\nwith international\nterrorism,\n'\ndid not pose a threat of terrorist\nattacks inside the\nUnited States,\n\n## -Fshsiine) Bulk Metadata Needed For Effective Contact Chaining\n\nobtained a daily average of approximatel telephony metadata records and an estimate Internet metadata records. Metadata obtained under PSP\nauthorities was stored in a protected database, to which only cleared and trained personnel were given access: NSA\nanalysts were able to access and chain through metadata records, but they could view only records associated with an approved foreign intelligence target. This was a small fraction of the metadata available.\n\nFor example, in August\n2006, NSA estimated that only 0.000025 percent or one in every four million archived bulk telephony records was expected to be viewed by trained SIGINT analysts.!>\n\n## ) 1+ R\n\nEffective contact chaining requires.\n\n## {Fshehme) Psp Operations: Content\n\ne\n...\n.\nPSrcontenl\n operations\ninvolved three separate activities: tasking selectors.\nfor content collection, collecting the contentof\ncommunications associated with tasked selectors, and\nanalyzing the content collected, To comply with the\nAuthorization, NSA management combined standard\nminimization procedures and specia'fly designed procedures\nto task domestic selectors, collect the resulting\ncommunications, and analyze and report the foreign\nintelligence\nthey contained. 'Over the life\nof the Program, NSA\ntasked approximately QI8 | foreign and domestic selectors\nfor content collection,\n\n## Fshshnf) Tasking Selectors For Content Collection\n\nPR/\nFSTEEWFSHHOCHNE) \"Taskin g\" is the direct levying of SIGINT callection requirements on designated collectors.\n\nAnalysts must task selectors to obtain a target's commurications.\n\n## Ts/ 8Tew//Shfoe7Nf) Under The Psp, B)), ,(B)(\".G) '\n\n\"Before NSA personnel tasked target selectors for PSP conterit\ncollection, the Authorization required that target selectors\ncomply with two criteria. First, they had to determine that\n\"hased on the factual and practical considerations of\neveryday life on which reasonable and prudent persons act,\nthere ate reasonable grounds to believe a party to sueh\ncommunication is an agent of al Qa'ida, or a group affiliated\nwith al-Qa'ida,\" as described in guidance issued\nby OGC iri\n2005. Second, the purpose of the collection'had to be the\nprevention and detection of terrorist attacks in the United\nStates. The OGC provided the same guidance for tasking\nselectors for content collection as it had for contact ehaining.\nSpecifically, because the President had determined that al-\nQa'ida presented a threat within the United States, regardless\n\nof where its members were located, linking a target selector to designated international terrorist groups or al-Qa'ida and its affiliates, established that the collection was for the purpose of detection and prevention of terrorist acts within the United States, techniques were used under the PSP, making this a reasonable comparison. This estimate was based on data available in-August 2006 and cannot be-feplicated\n\n## ~{Tshshnfy Approvals To Task Domestic Selectors For Content 'Collection:\n\n'S\nLLST\n7}\nNSA analysts determired whether foreign seleetors met the Authorization criteria and tasked them without further approval. However, because NSA leadership considered se_lfietors iocated in the United States to be extremely sensitive, the associated tasking process requived cextr menta reviews, and approvals than foreign:\nTM\nIn 2008, NSA reported to a\n, domestic telephone numbers and-domestic Internet addresses were tasked for PSP\ncontent collection from October 2001 to January 2007.\n\nDomestic selectors were located in the United States and associated with al-Qa'ida or international terrorism and were not necessarily used by U.S. citizens.\n\nIrpa 2008 Atforney General Certification, NSA reported Wforeign telephone numbers and in excess of foreign Internet addresses had been targeted from October 2001 through December 2006, which spasis all but one month of the Program. NSA could not precisely estimate the number of foreign Internet addresses targeted because the tools used by analysts before September 2005 did not accurately account forthe number of iridividual addresses targeted.\n\n~{TSHSHINF) In 2006, the OIG Found that Justifications for Tasking Domestic Selectors Met Authorization Criteria.\n\nSAHSTE\n_\n[E)}-During a 2006 review, the OIG\nfouind that all items in-a randomly selected sample of tasked domestic selectors met Authorization criteria. Based on a statistically valid sampling methodology, the OIG was able to conclude with 95 percent confidence that 95 percent or more of domestic selectors tasked for PSP content collection could\n'be linked to al-Qa'ida, its associates, or initernational terrorist threats inside the United States. Justification packages for all sample items tested were supported by one or more of the following types of information:\ns Information associated with or obtained 'through FBI\ninvestigations.\n\n;\nj7In 2005, the OIG found that the largely manual\nproccss to task and detask selectors for-confegt\ncollectiornt\nwas unrehable. Spe01fically, the OIG foun\nerrors when\ncomiparing trecords of domestic telephone numbers and\nInternet identifiers approved for PSP content collection as of\nNovember 2004 with those actually on collection. The errors\nonsisted of selectors that had net been removed from\ncollection after being detasked, had not been put on\ncollection after having been approved, had been put on\ncollection because of a typogra h1cal error, or had not been\naccurately recorded in thefl\n'\n.| In response\nto-the OIG finding, managemerit took immediate steps to\ncorrect tlhie errors and set up a process to reconcile approved tasked selectors with selectors actually on collection.\n\n## &) Collecting The Content Of Communications\n\nU/ }ECUG)\nCollection refers to the process of obtaining\neommunications after selectors associated with intelligence\ntargets are tasked for collection at designated sites. Data\ncollected under the PSP was stored in protected partitions in\nNSA databases. Access to the partitions was restricted to\nPSP-cleared personnel.\n{FS/fSHNE)The Authorization required that a collected communieation originate or tcrmlnate outside the United.\n\nStates.\n\nNSA did not intentionally.\n\nnesti ications-under the PSP, and the ' Product Line to ensure that collected data was as intended and authorized.\n\nAccording to PSP program officials N SA' SEL\n-\n\"Its purpose was to collect mternational communications.\n\nHowever, management stated that:\nThere are po re within the\n8\n.\n\ni guarantee that no\n:\n]\ncalls will be collected.\n\nIssues of this kind inevitably arise from time to time in other SIGINT operations, as foreseen by Executive Order 12333, and are thus not peculiar to [the PSP].\n\nSN 'The Program Management Office ideritified four ways that NSA might have unintentionally collected non-target data:\n\no\nAtarget.could have been correctly tasked using valid\nselectors, but, in addition to collecting the desired\ntarget communications, non-target communications:\n~were inadvertently collected.\no\n Avalid target selector could have generated targetspecific collection that ultimately proved the target not\nto be related to al-Qa'ida.\no\nAtechnical, human, or procedural error in the target\njdentification or tasking pr-oc'es's,cou'ld have resulted in\nunintentional collection of communications not related\nto al-Qa'ida.\no\nTechnical collection system problems could have\nresulted in uninteritional collection of non-al-Qafida\nrelated targets, even wheri all steps-in the target\nidentification and tasking process had been properly\nexecuted.\nNF-Over the life of the Program, NSA reported cidents of unintentiorial collection of domestic communications amn incidents in which the wrong selector had been tasked,\n- (See Appendix F for details.) In those cases, persoiinel followed USSID SP0018 procedures.\n\nand were given detailed instructions to report the violations or incidents, adjust tasking, and delete collection records from NSA and other databases.\n\n## ~(Fshshayf) Analyzing The Content Of Collected Communications\n\nTS\nSLAANE)-Analysis of content collected under the PSP\ninvolved the same practices and techniques used in non-PSP\noperations. One NSA manager des ribed the PSP as \"just one\n2\n_more tool in the analysts' tool kit.\"\nB\ncommuriications were then transcribed, if necessary, and processed to make them useful for intelligence analysis and reporting. Analysis included tiot only listening to or reading the contents of a communication, but drawing on target knowledge, coordinating and collaborating with other gnalysts; and integrating collateral information, metadata, and information from databases.and published intelligenice reports to determine whether the comminications included foreign intelligence that was timnely, unigue, actionable, and VST\ni NSA issuedliifadditional reports between 17 January 2007 and December 2008\nthat were bised on an'\\alyeie of data previously collected under PSP authority.\n\n## Matadata Analysis Reports (Tippers)\n\n-\n&\n-\nO\nSA retained documentation of\n'theanalysis, supporting customer request or lead\ninformation, and a description of the link to terrorism for\ntippers based on PSP collection. Documentation of analysis\nwas not retained nunless a tipper was written.\nCounterterrorism personnel updated information in a\ncomputer tracking systemn to reflect the disposition of all\nmetadata analysis requests. From October 2001 through\nJanuary 2007, NSA issued\ntippers to FBI and CIA:\no\ntippers were based on Internet metadata analysis.\no\n-'tippers were based on telephony metadata\nanalysis when telephone numbers had only direct\ncontact (one degree of separation) with a known\nterrorist as defined by the Authorization.\nbl,\nb3, b7E\nbl,\nb3, b7E\nbl, b3,\nb7E\n\no -tlppers were based on more detailed telephony\nb1, b3, b7E\nmeetadata analysis that included contacts with two\ndegrees of separation from known. terrorists.\n\nippers were based on telephony and Internet\nmetadata analysis.\n\n## {Fshshne) Content Reports (Uiif&Ug)Protectionlof U.S. Person Information In Reporting\n\n-(\"ES#SWNF) Before sending PSP reports to customiers, NSA\nremoved unnecessary U.S. person information, as required\nby minimization procedures in USSID SPG018. The CT\nProduct Line reviewed PSP reports to ensure that they had\nbeen written in accordance with these procedures. SID's\nOversight and Compliance office then reviewed PSP reports\ncontaininig U.S. person information.\nOversight and\nCompliance personnel reviewed U.S. person information in\nreports, determined if it was necessary to understarid the\nforeign intelligence in the reports, and submitted\nrecommendations for the inclusion of U.S, person\ninformation to SID, Chief of Information Sharing Services for\nfinal approval. For example, if an individual's name was not\nnecessary to understand the foreign intelligence in the report,\nthe name was deleted or changed to \"a U.S. person.\"\n\n{TS//SL/JNE)\nOversight and Compliarice did not review.\ntippers based\non metadata analysis.\nWhen NSA began to\nissue tippers based on the content.of 'comnmunications, SID\nadapted\nits procedures for the dissemination of U.S. person:\ninformation. Additional Oversight and. Compliance personnel\nwere cleared for the Program to assi t with reviews. They\ngave PSP and other terrorism reporting priority for review\nover other Agency reporting.\n\n## (U) Use Of Sigint Product\n\njudicial purposes..\n\n## Ue) Value Of The Psp\n\nFFEH-NF} Referring to portions of the PSP in 2005, General Hayden said there were probably no communications more important to NSA efforts to defend the nation than those involving al-Qa'ida; NSA collected communications when one end was inside the United States and one end was associated with al=Qa'ida or international terrorism in order to detect and prevent attacks inside the United States.\n\nGeneral Hayden stated that \"the program in this regard has been successful.\" During the May 2006 Senate hearing on his nomination to be CIA Director, General Hayden said that, had the PSP been in place before the September 2001\nattacks, hijackers Khalid Almihdhar and Nawaf Alhazmi almost certainly would have been identified and located.\n\n{ESHSEH-NF\nIn May 2009, General Hayden told us that the value of the Program was in knowing that NSA SIGINT\nactivities under the PSP covered an important \"quadrant\"\n(terrorist communications between foreign countries and the United States). This coverage provided confidence that there were \"not additional terrorist cells in the United States.\"\nNSA's Deputy Director, who was the SID Deputy Director for Analysis and Production on 11 September 2001, echoed General Hayden's.comment: \"The value of the PSP was in the confidence it provided that sereone was locking at the seam between the foreign and domestic intelligence domains.\"\n-('PSHSIH-NE)The former SID Deputy D1rector for Data Alecander cited 'SIGINT.re:portmg onk B\nas the most important. SIGINT success of the PSP\nbl, b3, b6, NSA analysis of PSP metadata o b7C, b7E\n.\n\n-\n=\nL\nGenersl Alexander said, \"probably saved more lives\" than any other\n) From an operational standpoint, the PSP\nenabled NSA to:\n\no\nSupport customers\no\nProvide SIGINT that contributed to customers'\ninvestigative work\nnumbers do not account for requests subnutted before NSA\nbegan to use an automated tracking system in April 2002.\n\nion _obtained under PSP\nand FBL\nIn the early days of the Program, the FBI said that the large number of tippers from NSA was causing therm uhtiecessary work because-agernts treated each tipperas a leead requiring action.\n\nGeneral Hayden said that NSA's intention was that SIGINT information be added to FBI's knowledge base, not that the FBI act on each piece of information. When NSA realized that it was sending too much data tothe FBI, the Agency made appropriate adjustments.\n\n## (U/Fol0) Psf Reporting Confributed To Cusfomers' Investigative Vwork.\n\nFBI briefing dated 4 May\n2\nstate continues to provide tirnely and carefully vetted ..intelliience Y\n]\nto support FBI's investigations in connection with operations].\"\nprovide feedback on N\nhad rio mechanismn tot\n)\nBI did not routinely SA reporting under the PSP, and NSA\nrack-and assess the effectiveness of SIGINT reporting in general or PSP reporting in particular.'\nTracking PSP contributions was also difficult because.\n\ncustomers did-not know that General Hayden noted that success stories decreased over time as intelligence became more integrated and it became more difficult to attribute success to any one activity.\n\nS\n-\nNE)\nThe Program Management Office provided the following examples of PSP re orting that helped redirect FBI resources\n'\nviewed as vulnerable to terrorism targeung. The\n\"examples also include cases in which NSA provided reporting that contributed to FBI investigations, FBI confidential human sources, FISA warrants, arrests, and convictions.\n\nb1, b3, be, b7C, b7E\ng D S\nD %\nB~\nw\n'\n'\nn 12 March, the President directed DoJ to contmue working on the legal issues, and on 15 March OLC\nissued a three page memorandum to the Deputy Attorney General stating that, while it had only begun to analyze the issues: and was not yet pre 'ared to issue a final opinion, it\n(1, (b)3)\ntypes of collection authonzed ufiSffS'B'@@Thc mmlmlzanon pwbablc cause standard states that the Agency may targer for collection, commiunications for which is probable cause\n\nhat on omm\n5.\n\nA TTE\nor agent o\n:\nL\n.\n\nB\nvnd lie communication is o or from a foreign counrry.\n\nThis page intentionally left blank.\n\n(U/ /FEH6) The OIG issued a report for each of the\n13 investigations and reviews described above. Ten reports on PSP activity resulted in 11 recommendations to management; 10 have been closed, and one remains open.\n\nThree reports on FISC-approved activity previously authorized by the PSP contained nine recommendations to management; three have been closed and six remain open.\n\n'\nBeginning in January 2007, violations that had occurred under the Authorization and violations related to PSP activity transitioned to court orders were reported quarterly to the President's Intelligence Oversight Board (through the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Intelligenice Oversight).\n\n## (U) Recently Reported Incidents\n\nriot po sible to- deterrnme the exact nature and extent of that\ncollection. The NSA. OIG will close out this incident in an upcoming: report to the President's Intelligence Oversight Board\n:\nSLAAE) On 15 January 2009, the Department of\nJustlce reported to the FISC that NSA had been using an\n\"alert list\" to compare incomirig business records FISA\nmetadata: against telephone: numbers assoc1ated with counterterrorism targets tasked by NSA for SIGINT collection.\n\nNSA had reported to the Court that the alert list consisted of numbers for which NSA had determined that a reasonable articulabl usp1c1on existed that the numbers were related tC\n- organization associated [\n.\n\nalert ist-had notbeen suhj ected to a reasonable artrculable\n'\nion determination.. The NSA OIG has reported this.\n\nincident to the President's. Intelhgence Oversight Board and has: filed updates as required. The alertlist and a detailed NSA 60-day review of processes related to the Business Records FISC order were the subject of several recent submissions to the FISC and of NSA briefings to Congres jonal oversight committees.\n\nHowever, the majority of selectors on- the\n(U//FOYO) Other IG Program concerns were documented in the 2003-2008 reports.\n\nPresidential Notifications are listed and described in Appendix F. The 2008 report described the adequacy of Program decompartmentation plans.'\n\n## (V) Acronyms And Abbreviations\n\n| Bits                | per            | Second     |\n|---------------------|----------------|------------|\n| Bps                 |                |            |\n| 'Business           | Records:       |            |\n| BR                  |                |            |\n| Call                | Detail         | Records.   |\n| Central             | Intelligence   | Agency     |\n| Communications      |                |            |\n| Intelligenice       |                |            |\n| CIA                 |                |            |\n| COMINT              |                |            |\n| _Cotinterterrorism. |                |            |\n| CT                  |                |            |\n| Director            | of             | Central    |\n| DCI                 |                |            |\n| Director            | of             | National   |\n| DNI                 |                |            |\n| Departmient         | of             | Defense    |\n| DoD:                |                |            |\n| Department          | of             | Justice    |\n| Dod                 |                |            |\n| Executive           | Order          |            |\n| FISA                | Arietidinients | Act        |\n| Federal             |                |            |\n| Bureau              |                |            |\n| of                  |                |            |\n| Investigation       |                |            |\n| Foreign             |                |            |\n| Inteiligence        |                |            |\n| Surveillance        |                |            |\n| Act                 |                |            |\n| Foreign             |                |            |\n| Intelligence        |                |            |\n| Surveillance        |                |            |\n| Court               |                |            |\n| @General            | Counsel        |            |\n| Gigabits.           | per            | Second     |\n| House               |                |            |\n| Perrianent          |                |            |\n| Select              |                |            |\n| Committee           |                |            |\n| on                  |                |            |\n| Intelligence        |                |            |\n| Inspector           | General        |            |\n| National            | Seeunty        | Agency     |\n| National            |                |            |\n| Security            |                |            |\n| Agency/Central      |                |            |\n| Security            |                |            |\n| Service             |                |            |\n| NSA/CSS             |                |            |\n| Oversight           | and            | Compliance |\n| 0&C                 |                |            |\n| Office              |                |            |\n| of                  |                |            |\n| the                 |                |            |\n| Director            |                |            |\n| of                  |                |            |\n| National            |                |            |\n| Intelligence        |                |            |\n| ODNI                |                |            |\n| Office              | of             | the        |\n| OGC                 |                |            |\n| Office              | of             | the        |\n| oIG                 |                |            |\n| OIPR                |                |            |\n| Office              |                |            |\n| of                  |                |            |\n| Intelligence        |                |            |\n| Policy              |                |            |\n| and                 |                |            |\n| Review              |                |            |\n| (now                |                |            |\n| the                 |                |            |\n| Office              |                |            |\n| of                  |                |            |\n| Intelligence,       |                |            |\n| National            |                |            |\n| Security            |                |            |\n| Division)           |                |            |\n| Office              | of             | Legal      |\n| oLC                 |                |            |\n|         |                            | PM            | Program     | Manager    |\n|---------|----------------------------|---------------|-------------|------------|\n| PR/TT   | Pen                        | Register/Trap | &           | Trace      |\n| PSP     | President's                | Surveillance  | Program     |            |\n| RFKI    | Request                    | for           | Information |            |\n| SID     | Sig_n'als.:llntellijgen(:e | Directorate-  |             |            |\n| SIGINT. | Sigqals                    | Inteiligence  | ,           |            |\n| SsCL    | Seriate                    | Select        | Comimittee  | on         |\n\nTS/SCI\n~\nTop Scret/'ensti\"ve COmartmented.vInformation\n~FSH S\n\n## (U) Glossary Of Terms\n\n(U).COMINT\n(U) E.0. 12333\n(U) FISA\nw(;'\"S-,L,LSI/-/-NE) Header, router, and\n\n## Rs Hsehne Metadata V G\n\n|                     |                |              | (U)        | SANITIZATION    |\n|---------------------|----------------|--------------|------------|-----------------|\n| (U)                 | Communications | Intelligence | -          | technical       |\n| and                 |                |              |            |                 |\n| mtelhgence          |                |              |            |                 |\n| information         |                |              |            |                 |\n| derived             |                |              |            |                 |\n| from                |                |              |            |                 |\n| foreign             |                |              |            |                 |\n| communications      |                |              |            |                 |\n| By                  |                |              |            |                 |\n| semeone             |                |              |            |                 |\n| other               |                |              |            |                 |\n| than                | the            | intended     | recipients |                 |\n| (U}                 |                |              |            |                 |\n| Executive           |                |              |            |                 |\n| Order               |                |              |            |                 |\n| 12333               |                |              |            |                 |\n| -                   |                |              |            |                 |\n| United              |                |              |            |                 |\n| States              |                |              |            |                 |\n| Intelhgence         |                |              |            |                 |\n| Activities          |                |              |            |                 |\n| -                   |                |              |            |                 |\n| provides            |                |              |            |                 |\n| goals,              |                |              |            |                 |\n| duties,             |                |              |            |                 |\n| and                 |                |              |            |                 |\n| responsibilities    |                |              |            |                 |\n| with                |                |              |            |                 |\n| respect             |                |              |            |                 |\n| to                  |                |              |            |                 |\n| the.                |                |              |            |                 |\n| national            |                |              |            |                 |\n| intelligence        |                |              |            |                 |\n| effort.             |                |              |            |                 |\n| It                  |                |              |            |                 |\n| mandates            |                |              |            |                 |\n| that                |                |              |            |                 |\n| certain             |                |              |            |                 |\n| activities.         |                |              |            |                 |\n| of                  |                |              |            |                 |\n| U.S.                |                |              |            |                 |\n| intelligence        |                |              |            |                 |\n| components          |                |              |            |                 |\n| are                 |                |              |            |                 |\n| to                  |                |              |            |                 |\n| be                  |                |              |            |                 |\n| governed            |                |              |            |                 |\n| by                  |                |              |            |                 |\n| procedures          |                |              |            |                 |\n| issued              |                |              |            |                 |\n| by                  |                |              |            |                 |\n| agency              |                |              |            |                 |\n| heads               |                |              |            |                 |\n| and                 |                |              |            |                 |\n| approved            |                |              |            |                 |\n| by                  |                |              |            |                 |\n| the                 |                |              |            |                 |\n| Attorney            |                |              |            |                 |\n| General.            |                |              |            |                 |\n| (U)                 |                |              |            |                 |\n| The                 |                |              |            |                 |\n| Foreign             |                |              |            |                 |\n| Intelligence        |                |              |            |                 |\n| Surveillance        |                |              |            |                 |\n| Act                 |                |              |            |                 |\n| of                  |                |              |            |                 |\n| 1978,               |                |              |            |                 |\n| as                  |                |              |            |                 |\n| amended,            |                |              |            |                 |\n| governs             |                |              |            |                 |\n| the                 |                |              |            |                 |\n| conduct             |                |              |            |                 |\n| of                  |                |              |            |                 |\n| certain             |                |              |            |                 |\n| electronic          |                |              |            |                 |\n| surveillance        |                |              |            |                 |\n| activities          |                |              |            |                 |\n| within              |                |              |            |                 |\n| the                 |                |              |            |                 |\n| United              |                |              |            |                 |\n| States              |                |              |            |                 |\n| to                  |                |              |            |                 |\n| collect             |                |              |            |                 |\n| foreign             |                |              |            |                 |\n| intelligence        |                |              |            |                 |\n| information.        |                |              |            |                 |\n| {S/SH-NF)           |                |              |            |                 |\n| Analytic            |                |              |            |                 |\n| tool                |                |              |            |                 |\n| for                 |                |              |            |                 |\n| contact             |                |              |            |                 |\n| chaining            |                |              |            |                 |\n| used                |                |              |            |                 |\n| by                  |                |              |            |                 |\n| analysts            |                |              |            |                 |\n| to                  |                |              |            |                 |\n| do                  |                |              |            |                 |\n| target              |                |              |            |                 |\n| discovery           |                |              |            |                 |\n| by                  |                |              |            |                 |\n| quickly             |                |              |            |                 |\n| and                 |                |              |            |                 |\n| easily              |                |              |            |                 |\n| navigating          |                |              |            |                 |\n| global              |                |              |            |                 |\n| communications      |                |              |            |                 |\n| metadata            |                |              |            |                 |\n| addressing:type     |                |              |            |                 |\n| information,        |                |              |            |                 |\n| including           |                |              |            |                 |\n| telecomimunications |                |              |            |                 |\n| dialing-type        |                |              |            |                 |\n| data,               |                |              |            |                 |\n| but                 |                |              |            |                 |\n| not                 |                |              |            |                 |\n| the                 |                |              |            |                 |\n| contents.           |                |              |            |                 |\n| of                  |                |              |            |                 |\n| the                 |                |              |            |                 |\n| communication       |                |              |            |                 |\n| {&//NF)             |                |              |            |                 |\n| NSA's               |                |              |            |                 |\n| primary             |                |              |            |                 |\n| storage,            |                |              |            |                 |\n| search,             |                |              |            |                 |\n| and                 |                |              |            |                 |\n| retrieval           |                |              |            |                 |\n| mechanism           |                |              |            |                 |\n| for                 |                |              |            |                 |\n| SIGINT              |                |              |            |                 |\n| text                |                |              |            |                 |\n| (U)                 |                |              |            |                 |\n| The                 |                |              |            |                 |\n| process             |                |              |            |                 |\n| of                  |                |              |            |                 |\n| disguising          |                |              |            |                 |\n| COMINT              |                |              |            |                 |\n| to                  |                |              |            |                 |\n| protect             |                |              |            |                 |\n| sensitive           |                |              |            |                 |\n| intelligence        |                |              |            |                 |\n| sources,            |                |              |            |                 |\n| methods,            |                |              |            |                 |\n| capabilities,       |                |              |            |                 |\n| and                 |                |              |            |                 |\n| analytical          |                |              |            |                 |\n| procedures          |                |              |            |                 |\n| in                  |                |              |            |                 |\n| order               |                |              |            |                 |\n| to                  |                |              |            |                 |\n| disseminate         |                |              |            |                 |\n| the                 |                |              |            |                 |\n| information         |                |              |            |                 |\n| outside             |                |              |            |                 |\n| COMINT              |                |              |            |                 |\n| channels.           |                |              |            |                 |\n(U) SIGNALS INTELLIGENCE.\n{U) A category of intelligence comprising\nindividually or in combination all\ncommunications intelligence (COMINT),\nelectronic intelligence (ELINT) and foreign\ninstrumeritation-intelligence (FISINT),\nhowever transmitted.\n(U) TEAR LINE REPORTS\n{U) Reports used to disseminate SIGINT-\nderived information and sanitized\ninformation in the same record. The\nsanitized tear line conveys the same facts as\n'the COMINT-controlled information, while\nhiding COMINT as the source.\n(U) TELEPHONY\n{U) The technology associated with the\nelectronic transmission of voice, fax, and\nother information between parties using\nystems historically associated with the\n\n(U) TIPPERS\n\n## Appendix A (V) About The Review\n\n)\nS\n0.\n\nS\n(=Y\n<\n=\n)\nThis page intentionally left blank.\n\n## (V) About The Review (U) Objectives\n\n(U) The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA)\nAmendments Act of 2008, which was signed into law or\n10 July 2008, requires that the Inspectors General of Intelligence Comimunity elements that participated in the President's Surveillance Program (PSP) conduct a comprehensive review of the Program. The NSA Office of the Inspector General (OIG) reviewed NSA's participation in the PSP. The specific review objectives were to examine:\n\no\n(U) The establishment and evolution\nof the PSP as it\naffected NSA\no\n(U) NSA implementation of the PSP, including\npreparation and dissemination of product under the\nPSP\no\n(U) NSA access to legal reviews of the PSP and access\nto information about the Program\no\n(U) NSA communications with and representations\nmade to private sector entities and private sector\nparticipation\no\n(U) NSA interaction with the Foreign Intelligence\nSurveillance Court (FISC) and transition of PSP~\nauthorized collection to court orders\no\n(U) Oversight of PSP activities at NSA.\n\n## (U) Scope And Methodology\n\n(U) This review was conducted in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards, as set forth by the Comptroller General of the United States and implemented by the audit manuals of the DoD and NSA/CSS Inspectors Gereral.\n\n{(U) The review was conducted from 10 July 2008 to 15 May\n2009 in coordination with the Inspectors General of the Department of Defense, Office of the Director of National Intelligence, CIA, and DoJ.\n\nu/ [EOU6) The scope of this review was limited to NSA's participation in the PSP from 4 October 2001 to 17 January\n2007, The review included NSA activities before and. after the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 that led to the Presidential Authorization ori 4 October 2001, Italso included the transition of PSP-authorized activity to FISC\norders;\nW'F') To satisfy review objectives, we interviewed\n_lcurrent and former NSA personnel who participated in the PSPiincluding NSA Directors and Deputy Director, General Counsels Deputy General Counsels, Associate General Counsels for Operatzons and the Inspector General responsfljle for Program overs1ght from A, a2t o eneral Counsel\n-\n.\n\n'\n.\n\n| were conducted with other G offices 1nv01ved in the Jomt PSP review.\n\n(U/ /FOHO) We requested White House documentation of meetings at which General Hayden or NSA employees.\n\ndiscuissed the PSP or the Terrorist Surveillance Program with the President, Vice President, or White House personnel, but did not receive a response before. pubhcatwn of thlS report\n(U/ [ESHO) We reviewed NSA records dated 27 July 1993 to\n10 July 2008 that pertained to review objectives. Records included NSA policies and regulations, correspondence, e-mail, briefings, notes, reports, calendars, and database reports.\n\n=S4ANE)- Numbers of selectors tasked and reports issued\nwere based on information provided by the PSP Program\nManagement Office and were not independently verified\nduring this review.\n(U//ReE6) Information abotit 1nd1v1duals cleared for access to Program information was based on records provided by the PSP Project Security Officer and were not independently verified during this review.\n\n## (U) Prior Coverage\n\n(u/ /F@-U-Q) The OIG began oversight of the PSP-and related\nactivities in August 2002 and issued twelve reports dated\n21 February 2003 through 30 June 2008 (Appendix E.) The\nOIG also issuted 14 Presidential notifications from\nMarch 2003 to October 2006 (Appendix F).\nDetailed\ndiscussion of the OIG's oversight of the PSP is included in\nSection VIII of this report.\n\n{TS/{/SL//NE). As portions of the Program were transitioned\nto FISC orders for the collection of internet metadata and\ntelephony business records, the OIG reviewed the execution\nand adequacy of controls in-ensuring compliance with the\norders. The OIG did not test the efficacy of controls for\n'metadata collected under the authority of the PSP or court\norders. Three reports summarized OIG investigations into\npossible misuse of the Authority or violations of FISC orders.\nOne report summearized the OIG's oversight of the PSP, and\n\nthe last report reviewed the adequacy of Program\ndecompartmentation plans.\n\no~\n=)\nThis page intentionally left blank.\n\n## Appendix B (U) The Presidential Authorizations\n\n.\n\nTh intention ally left blank,\n15 page\n\n## (U) The Presidential Autherizations\n\nR\ns oy e\n7\ne\n9) The Authorization documents that contained the terms under which NSA executed special Presidential authority were addressed to the Secretary of Defense and were-titled \"PrresidenfialAuthqfization for Specified Electronic Surveillance Activities during a Limited Period to Detect and Prevent Acts of Terrorism within the United States.\" The first Authorization consisted of eight paragraphs, and all but one subsequent Authorization consisted of nine. There B\n43\nA\ni ns, two modifications, and one document described as\n\n## Description Of Authorization Contents By Paragraph: (U) Paragraph 1 - The President's Conclusions\n\nST\nTWACA\n3\nThe first paragraph referred to the\n11 September 2001 terrorist attacks and the President's.\n\ndirections\n[to the Secretary of Defense] on employing U.S:\nArmed Forces. The first Authorization contained statements on the President's conclusions based.\n\non information:about terrorist capabilities; this statement became the second paragraph in subsequent Authorizations. After the first Authotization, paragraph one included references to.all previous versions of the Authorization and the dates they were signed by the President.\n\n'\n\n## (U) Paragraph 2 - Terrorism Threat\n\n.\n\n'\n2\nAfter the first Authorization, the second paragraph stated that the President based his conclusions about terrorist capabilities on information\n'proyided by the DCI, including an attached terrorism threat assessmernt, a document that consisted of five or more pages and was. signed by the DCI (later by the DNI) and the Secretary of Defense.\n\n## (U) Paragraph 3 - Considerations\n\nThe third paragraph contained the President's considerations in authorizing electronic surveillance, including the potential for deaths, injuries, and destruction from acts of terrorism, their probability, the need for action and secrecy, and intrusion into privacy, its reasonableness, and alternatives.\n\nIn the first Authorization the considerations were in paragraph two.\n\n.\n\n.\n\n, Paragraph three of the first Authorization stated the President's determination that an\n\"extragrdinary emergency\" existed made electronic surveillance without a court order a compelling Government:\ninterest:l\n\n## ~(Tshstewhshochne) Paragraph 4 - Authorized Electronic 'Surveillance:\n\nVS\n//STEW//SHHOE/ANE Paragraph four contains the President's statement of the basis for issuing the authority and the substantive description of the lectronic surveillance that he authorized and directed. The President states that he is acting pursuant to Article II of the Constitution, including the exeeutive power, his authority as Commander in Chief of the Armed. Forces, his duty to preserve, protect and defend tlie Constitutioni, and the Authorization for Use of Military\n'Force Joint Resolution (Public Law 107-40), with due regard for the Fourth Amendment. There were major and minor changes in that description, resulting in seven versions of paragraph four over approximately six years.\n\n## \"(Ts#S!#N'F) Changes To Authorization Language On Electronic Surveillance\n\n|                  |               |             | N             | WS        | :             |\n|------------------|---------------|-------------|---------------|-----------|---------------|\n| Version/Date     | 'Description  | of          | Chan_ges      | fo        | Authorization |\n| Language         |               |             |               |           |               |\n| First            | Authorization | Authorized  | NSA           | to        | acquire       |\n| 4-Qstober        | 2001          | associated  | mietadata     | of        | telephony     |\n| communications   | including     | wire        | aud           | cable     |               |\n| commniunications | carried       | into:or     | out           | of        | the           |\n| United           | States        | for         | which         | there     | was           |\n| cause            | to            | believe     | that          | one       | of            |\n| (L)1),           | (b)           | 3)          | _that         | one       | communicant   |\n| was              | tngaged       | iu1-0t-     | preparing     | for       | acts          |\n| international    | terrorism.?   | This        | was           | the       | only          |\n| version          | of            | the         | Authorization | to        | use           |\n| \"probable        | cause.\"       |             |               |           |               |\n| Version          | 1             | also        | authorized    | the       | acquisition   |\n| telephony        | and           | Internet    | metadata      | for       |               |\n| communications   | with          | at          | least         | one       |               |\n| communicant      | outside       | the         | United        | States    | or            |\n| which            | no            | communicant | was           | known     | to            |\n| citizen          | of            | the         | United        | States.   |               |\n| Paragraph        | four          | included    | the           | authority | to            |\n\n(U) The thiird paragraph was marked with the number three in two places until the error was corrected in the Scptcmber 2003 authorization.\n\n*(U) This parenthetical condition is present in all descriptions of content collection.\n\n| Description         | of         | Changes    | to        | Authorization    |\n|---------------------|------------|------------|-----------|------------------|\n| \\'_/ers'(onlpate:   |            |            |           |                  |\n| Language            |            |            |           |                  |\n| retain,             |            |            |           |                  |\n| process;            |            |            |           |                  |\n| analyre             |            |            |           |                  |\n| and                 |            |            |           |                  |\n| disseminate         |            |            |           |                  |\n| intelligence        |            |            |           |                  |\n| from                |            |            |           |                  |\n| the                 |            |            |           |                  |\n| communications      |            |            |           |                  |\n| acquired            |            |            |           |                  |\n| under               |            |            |           |                  |\n| the                 |            |            |           |                  |\n| auithority.         |            |            |           |                  |\n| Version             |            |            |           |                  |\n| 2                   |            |            |           |                  |\n| Authorized          |            |            |           |                  |\n| NSA                 |            |            |           |                  |\n| to                  |            |            |           |                  |\n| acquire             |            |            |           |                  |\n| the                 |            |            |           |                  |\n| content             |            |            |           |                  |\n| and                 |            |            |           |                  |\n| 2:November          | 2001       | and        |           |                  |\n| 30                  | Navember   | 2001       |           |                  |\n| 'associated         |            |            |           |                  |\n| metadata            |            |            |           |                  |\n| of                  |            |            |           |                  |\n| communications      |            |            |           |                  |\n| for                 |            |            |           |                  |\n| which               |            |            |           |                  |\n| there               |            |            |           |                  |\n| was                 |            |            |           |                  |\n| \"reasonable         |            |            |           |                  |\n| grounds             |            |            |           |                  |\n| o                   |            |            |           |                  |\n| believe\"            |            |            |           |                  |\n| that                |            |            |           |                  |\n| one                 |            |            |           |                  |\n| of                  |            |            |           |                  |\n| the                 |            |            |           |                  |\n| commmuricants       |            |            |           |                  |\n| was                 |            |            |           |                  |\n| BIEBRGEIEY          |            |            |           |                  |\n| |                   |            |            |           |                  |\n| L1at                |            |            |           |                  |\n| one                 |            |            |           |                  |\n| communicant         |            |            |           |                  |\n| was                 |            |            |           |                  |\n| \"outside            |            |            |           |                  |\n| the                 |            |            |           |                  |\n| United              |            |            |           |                  |\n| States              |            |            |           |                  |\n| and                 |            |            |           |                  |\n| was                 |            |            |           |                  |\n| engaged             |            |            |           |                  |\n| in                  |            |            |           |                  |\n| or                  |            |            |           |                  |\n| preparing           |            |            |           |                  |\n| for                 |            |            |           |                  |\n| acts                |            |            |           |                  |\n| of                  |            |            |           |                  |\n| international       |            |            |           |                  |\n| terrorism.3         |            |            |           |                  |\n| This                |            |            |           |                  |\n| change              |            |            |           |                  |\n| to                  |            |            |           |                  |\n| the                 |            |            |           |                  |\n| wording             |            |            |           |                  |\n| on                  |            |            |           |                  |\n| collecting          |            |            |           |                  |\n| content             |            |            |           |                  |\n| eliminated          |            |            |           |                  |\n| the                 |            |            |           |                  |\n| possibility         |            |            |           |                  |\n| of                  |            |            |           |                  |\n| interpreting        |            |            |           |                  |\n| the                 |            |            |           |                  |\n| authority           |            |            |           |                  |\n| to                  |            |            |           |                  |\n| permit              |            |            |           |                  |\n| collection          |            |            |           |                  |\n| witli'both          |            |            |           |                  |\n| ends                |            |            |           |                  |\n| in                  |            |            |           |                  |\n| the                 |            |            |           |                  |\n| United              |            |            |           |                  |\n| States.             |            |            |           |                  |\n| This                |            |            |           |                  |\n| version             |            |            |           |                  |\n| also                |            |            |           |                  |\n| authorized          |            |            |           |                  |\n| the                 |            |            |           |                  |\n| acquisition         |            |            |           |                  |\n| of'                 |            |            |           |                  |\n| telephony           |            |            |           |                  |\n| and                 |            |            |           |                  |\n| Internet            |            |            |           |                  |\n| metadata            |            |            |           |                  |\n| for                 |            |            |           |                  |\n| communications      |            |            |           |                  |\n| with                |            |            |           |                  |\n| at                  |            |            |           |                  |\n| least               |            |            |           |                  |\n| one                 |            |            |           |                  |\n| sommunicant.outside |            |            |           |                  |\n| the                 |            |            |           |                  |\n| United              |            |            |           |                  |\n| States,             |            |            |           |                  |\n| with                |            |            |           |                  |\n| no                  |            |            |           |                  |\n| comfuricant         |            |            |           |                  |\n| known               |            |            |           |                  |\n| to                  |            |            |           |                  |\n| be                  |            |            |           |                  |\n| a                   |            |            |           |                  |\n| citizen             |            |            |           |                  |\n| of                  |            |            |           |                  |\n| the                 |            |            |           |                  |\n| Uriited             |            |            |           |                  |\n| States,             |            |            |           |                  |\n| or                  |            |            |           |                  |\n| when                |            |            |           |                  |\n| there               |            |            |           |                  |\n| were                |            |            |           |                  |\n| reasonable          |            |            |           |                  |\n| grounds             |            |            |           |                  |\n| to                  |            |            |           |                  |\n| believe             |            |            |           |                  |\n| that                |            |            |           |                  |\n| the                 |            |            |           |                  |\n| communication       |            |            |           |                  |\n| related             |            |            |           |                  |\n| to                  |            |            |           |                  |\n| international       |            |            |           |                  |\n| terrorism           |            |            |           |                  |\n| or                  |            |            |           |                  |\n| activities          |            |            |           |                  |\n| in                  |            |            |           |                  |\n| preparation         |            |            |           |                  |\n| for                 |            |            |           |                  |\n| international       |            |            |           |                  |\n| terrorism.          |            |            |           |                  |\n| Version             |            |            |           |                  |\n| 2                   |            |            |           |                  |\n| was                 |            |            |           |                  |\n| used                |            |            |           |                  |\n| in                  |            |            |           |                  |\n| two                 |            |            |           |                  |\n| Authorization       |            |            |           |                  |\n| docuimerts,         |            |            |           |                  |\n| Version3            |            |            |           |                  |\n| Eliminated          |            |            |           |                  |\n| 9                   | January    | 2002       | to        |                  |\n| 14                  | January    | 2004       |           |                  |\n| prekus              | VEI'SIOI'I |            |           |                  |\n| This                |            |            |           |                  |\n| version             |            |            |           |                  |\n| of                  |            |            |           |                  |\n| the                 |            |            |           |                  |\n| authorizing         |            |            |           |                  |\n| provision           |            |            |           |                  |\n| was                 |            |            |           |                  |\n| used                |            |            |           |                  |\n| in                  |            |            |           |                  |\n| 19                  |            |            |           |                  |\n| of                  |            |            |           |                  |\n| the                 |            |            |           |                  |\n| documents.          |            |            |           |                  |\n| Stated              |            |            |           |                  |\n| that                |            |            |           |                  |\n| the                 |            |            |           |                  |\n| Department          |            |            |           |                  |\n| of                  |            |            |           |                  |\n| Defense             |            |            |           |                  |\n| may                 |            |            |           |                  |\n| Version             | 4          |            |           |                  |\n| 11                  | March      | 2004       |           |                  |\n| .                   | bn         | the        | condltxon | that             |\n| retneval            |            |            |           |                  |\n| of                  |            |            |           |                  |\n| that                |            |            |           |                  |\n| information         |            |            |           |                  |\n| was                 |            |            |           |                  |\n| conducted           |            |            |           |                  |\n| in                  |            |            |           |                  |\n| accordance          |            |            |           |                  |\n| with                |            |            |           |                  |\n| the                 |            |            |           |                  |\n| Authorization.      |            |            |           |                  |\n| The                 |            |            |           |                  |\n| term                |            |            |           |                  |\n| \"acquire            |            |            |           |                  |\n| was                 |            |            |           |                  |\n| defined             |            |            |           |                  |\n| with                |            |            |           |                  |\n| respect             |            |            |           |                  |\n| to                  |            |            |           |                  |\n| metadata            |            |            |           |                  |\n| .|                  | The        | provision  |           |                  |\n| contamed            |            |            |           |                  |\n| the                 |            |            |           |                  |\n| Presmlent           |            |            |           |                  |\n| s                   |            |            |           |                  |\n| statement           |            |            |           |                  |\n| that                |            |            |           |                  |\n| both                |            |            |           |                  |\n\n}(U) Qualified as \"based-on the factual and practical considerations of everyday life on which reasonable persons act,\"\n\nDescription of Changes to Authorization\nVersion/Date\nLEanguage\nthese clarifications were consistent with all\n| previous Authorizations and thus.approval for\n'actmg under-that defimtlon was retroactive.\nVersion 5\n_\nBecame effective in the middle of a previously\n19 March 2004\nauthorized period as the result of a\n'\nmodification.\nNSA's authority to collect content and\nassociated metadata was changed to specify\nthat the:terrorist groups for which there was\nauthority to-collect were al-Qa'ida, groups\naffiliated with al-Qa'ida, or another group that\n- the President determined was in armed conflict\nwith the United States.\nNSA's authority\ntof\n2\nb)), B3y\nVersion 8\n_\nAlso became effective in the middle of a\n2:April 2004 to 10\npreviously authorized period as the result of &\nSeptember:2005\nmodification.\n| NSA's authorityl\n(b)(1). (b)3)\nal-Onida, A group amhated With al-Qaiaa, or\nof another group that the President determined\nfas in-avmied conflict with the United States.\nVersion 6-'was used in 12 of the docurnents.\nVersion 7\nj\n'\naffiliated\n26 Qctober 200510 8\n-\n.\ne\nDecember 2006\nVersion 7 and was used in the final nine\ndocuments.\n\n## (Uifohoy Paragraph 5 - Detect And Prevent\n\nIn paragraph five, the President stated that the surveillance was essential and appropriate to detect and prevent future acts of terrorism in the United States.\n\n## (Unfeyo) Paragraph 6 - Minimization\n\n-1'1'817'3%*7&*7\"/617'7'667'1'1'?) Paragraph six directed that information concerning Americari citizens be minimized to the extent consistent with the mission and with the Authorization.\n\n## (Uiifouoy Paragraph 7 - Notifying Congress\n\n'\n) Paragraph seven stated that not1ficat10n of the Authonzatmn outside the executive branch would be deferred, but the President stated his intent to notify Congress when consistent with national defense. When select members of Congress were briefed on the Program, information on the briefings was contained in paragraph eight.\n\n## (U) Paragraph 8\"-'_O'Ther Notifications\n\nThe initial Authorization specified that collectlon would cease 30 days after signature and required reporting on changes in circumstances. underlying the Authorization.\n\nAfter the initial Authorization, paragraph eight coritained a statement on restricting notifications to U.S. Government officials outside the executive branch or it named individuals, by title, who had been informed since the previous Authorization period expired.\n\n## (U) Paragraph 9 - Expiration\n\n;\nAfter the initial Authorization, the exact date of expiration was specified in paragraph nine.\n\n## (U/Foyq) Paragraph 10 - \"The President's Ultimate Responsibility\"\n\nThe Authorization signed in March of 2004 - the only one not signed by the Attorney General or a Deputy Attorney General- is also the only Authorization that contains a paragraph ten. This paragraph contained a legal argument about the President's ultimate responsibility to interpret the law on behalf of the executive branch and his authority for issuing the Authorization.\n\n## (U/Ffobo) Signature Of President\n\n'\n:\n\"\nThe Authorizations were signed by the Presxdent fo]lowed by a place and date of signature.\n\nAll but one-authorization was signed in Washingten, D.C.\n\n## (U) Other Signatures\n\nUnder the phrase \"approved for form and legahty,\" the Attomey General signed all but one of the-Authorizations. The other authorization and the two modifications were signed by the-Counsel to the President.\n\n## (V):Handwritten Note:\n\n;\nNF)\nThe first 2 and thialas\n29 Authonza'aons 'both modifications, 4\nhave a handwrltten note signed by the: Secretary of Defense\n(or Deputy Secretary of Defense) directing the NSA or the Director of NSA to execute the document.\n\n## Appendix C (V) Timeline Of Key Events\n\nThis page intentionally Ieft blank.\n\n## (V) Timeline Of Key Events\n\n(U//#EY6) This timeline includes key events that occurred during NSA's implementation of the President's Surveillance Program (PSP).\n\nIn addition to issuances of the Authorization, the timeline includes selected communications\n'between NSA and Congress, the Foreign Intelligenice Surveillance Court (FISC),\n'\n.\n\n&\n| Because the timeline ds limited to documented events and communicati\n\n2001\n4-0c6t-01\n1st Presidential Autherization signed\n4-0Oct-01\nGeneral Hayden briefs White.House (President, Vice President [VP],\nVP Counsel,\nVP 'Chief of Staff, White House Counsel).\n55-0ct01\nNSA briefs Chalr and Ranking Member of House Permanent Select\nCominittee:on Intelligence (HPSGI), Chalrand Vice Chair of Senate Select\nCommittee on Intelligence (SSCI)\n2:Nov-01\n 2nd Presidential-Authorization signed:\n14-Nov-01\nNSA briefs Chairvend Ranking Member, HPSCI, Chair end Vice Chair,\nS3Cli\n30-Nov-01\n3rd Presidential Autharization sigried\n4-Dec-01\nNSA briefs 'Chair. 'Senate Defensa Appropriatioris 'Subcommittee, and\nRanking Member, Senate Defense Appropriations Subcommilitee\n5.Dec 01\nNSA briefs B Director: Muller\n2002\n9-Jan-02\nAth Presidentil Athorization sighed\n11-Jan-02\nNSA briefs Department of Justice, Office of Intelligence Policy and Review\n(DolJ, OIPR), James Baker\n_31-Jan-02\nNSA briefs FISC Presiding Judge Lamberth\n5-Mar-02\nNSA briefs Chair and Ranking Member, HPSCI, and Vice Chair, 8SCI\ne\n10-Apr-02\n NSA briefs Chair SSCI\n\n## Nsa Biiefs Chair, Hpsci, And Ranking Member Hpsci\n\n|             |        |              |               |           |                | Bth    | Prasidential    | Authorization    | sianed:    |\n|-------------|--------|--------------|---------------|-----------|----------------|--------|-----------------|------------------|------------|\n| NSA         | briefs | FISC         | Presiding     | Judge     | Kollar-Kotelly | at     | the             | White            | House      |\n| 13-Aug-02   | NSA    | Inspector    | General       | (IG)      | cleared        | for    | the             | PSP              |            |\n| 10-Sep-02   | 10th   | Presidential | Authorization | signed    |                |        |                 |                  |            |\n| 11-Sep:02.  | NSA    | GC;          | Deputy        | General   | Counsel        | (GC),  | Associate       | GC               | for        |\n| L           | .and   | IG.meetio    | discuss       | PSP       | versih         |        |                 |                  |            |\n| 18:5p-02   | 1st    | NSA          | Due           | Diligence | Meeting        |        |                 |                  |            |\n| Chair.HPSCl | visits | NSA          | for           | briefing  |                |        |                 |                  |            |\n| 16-Dec-02   | NSA    | IG           | advises       | General   | Hayden         | to     | issue           | \"Delegation      | of         |\n| to          | \"units | that         | administer    | the       | project\"       |        |                 |                  |            |\n\n## 2003\n\n8-Jan-03\n \"13th Presidential Authorization signed\n9g-Jai-03\n NSA briefs Chair and Ranking Member, HPSCI, Chairand Vice Chalir;\nsscl\n8-0t-03\nNSA-FBI-CIA conference at NSA to discuss PSP 'operations and customer\nneeds\n\n## 15-00T03 __20Th Presidential Authorization Signed\n\n|          |                   |               |           |            |        |        |     | 1-Dec-03.    | NSA-IG.'announce's'    | &            | review    | of    | N'SA'PSP'.operation    |\n|----------|-------------------|---------------|-----------|------------|--------|--------|-----|--------------|------------------------|--------------|-----------|-------|------------------------|\n| 8-Dec-03 | NSA               | 1G            | asks      | VP-Counsel | for    | access | to  | PSP          | legal                  | epinions-and | is        | told  | that                   |\n| &        | request           | shoild        | come:from | General    | Hayden |        |     |              |                        |              |           |       |                        |\n| 9-Dec-03 | 21st.Presidential | Authorization | signed    |            |        |        |     |              |                        |              |           |       |                        |\n| 9-Dec-03 | 'lG               | memo          | asks      | General    | Hayden | to     | ask | VP           | Counsel's              | permission   | for       | NSA   |                        |\n\n## 2004\n\n|                     |          |              |               |              |               | 8-Jan-04    | |            | mestto        | discuss    | the    | PSP         |\n|---------------------|----------|--------------|---------------|--------------|---------------|-------------|--------------|---------------|------------|--------|-------------|\n| 6-Jan-04            | NSA      | briefing     | to            | DoJ          | Mr..          | Philbin,    | Mr.          | Goldsmith     | for        | Mr.    | Geldsmith's |\n| orlentation         | to       | the'PSP      | and           | other        | NSA           | Signals     | Intelligence | efforts       | against    |        |             |\n| terrorism           |          |              |               |              |               |             |              |               |            |        |             |\n| NSAandFRI.          | =        | .            |               |              |               |             |              |               |            |        |             |\n| and-recent-changes: | at       | NSA          |               |              |               |             |              |               |            |        |             |\n| 14~Jan-04           |          |              |               |              |               |             |              |               |            |        |             |\n| 9-Mar-04            | General  | Hayden       | briefs        | Director     | of            | Central     | Intelligence | (DCI)         | on         | value  | of          |\n| the                 | PSP      |              |               |              |               |             |              |               |            |        |             |\n| 10-Mar-04           | General  | Hayden       | briefs        | White        | House:Counsel | and         | Chief        | of            | Staff,     | Deputy |             |\n| DCI,                | Deputy   | AG,          | &nd           | FBI          | Director      | onvalue-of  | the          | PSP           |            |        |             |\n| 10-Mar-04           | General  | Hayden       | briefs        | Speaker      | of            | the         | House,       | Senate        | Majority   | and    |             |\n| Minority            | leaders, | House        | Minority      | Leader,      | Chairman      | arid        | Ranking      | Member,       |            |        |             |\n| HPSCI,              | and      | Chair        | and           | Vice         | Chair,        | SSCI        |              |               |            |        |             |\n| 10-Mar-04           | General  | Hayden       | briefs        | Secretary    | of            | Defense,    | DoD          | Prinicipal    | Deputy     | GC     |             |\n| 11-Mar-04           | 23rd     | Presidential | Authorization | signed       |               |             |              |               |            |        |             |\n| 11-Mar-04.          | NSA      | IG           | and           | Acting       | GG            | discuss     | new          | Authorization | signed     | by     | President's |\n| Counsel             | rather   | than         | the           | AG           |               |             |              |               |            |        |             |\n| NSA                 | briefs   | House        | Majority      | Leader       |               |             |              |               |            |        |             |\n| 12:Mar-04           | General  | Hayden       | briefs        | House:       | Majority      | Leader      |              |               |            |        |             |\n| 19-Mar-04           | Revision | to           | 23rd          | Presidential | Authorization | signed      |              |               |            |        |             |\n\n## S5Ci\n\n25-Feb-05\n General Hayden briefs White House Counsel and Counsel to Deputy\nAG\n1-Mar05\n- 30thPresidential:Authorization signed\n)\n\"General Hayden briefs Director of National Intelligence (DNI)\n23:May-05.\n Two-level PSP clearance structure discontinued\n1-Jun-05\n Discussions to seek FISC orders to authorize content collection begin with\n'DoJOLC\n14-Jun-05 _ 32nd Presidential Authorization signed__\n\" 3-Aug-05\nPrincipal Deputy DNI Hayden briefs.new NSA/CSS Director General\nAlexander on the PSP\n10-Sep-05\n 34th.Presidential Authorization signed\n14-Sep-05\n NSAbriefs Chair and Ranking Member, HPSCI, Chair-and Vice Chair,\n13-Dec-05\n36th Presidential Authorization signed\n16-Dec-056\nNew York Times says that President secretly authorized NSA\n_\neavesdropping\non Americans\n20-Dec-05\nDoD1G rciVe'ieler,-s'igned by 39 Congressmen, requesting a review of\nthe PSP. DoD IG faxes the letter\nto the NSA IG on 10 Jan 06\n21-Dec-05\n NSA briefs DNI\n\n## 2006\n\n3-Jan-06\n'NSA 1G and 'DoD 1G discuss letter from 39 Congressmen requesting\n'DoD 16 review of tha PSP\nNSA briefs nine FISC judges and three FISC legal advisors\n9.Jan-06\n11-Jan-06\nNSA briefs Speaker of the House, Senate Majlority L eader, Chairof\nHPSCI, Chair-and-Vice Chair, SSCI\nNSA briefs Senate Minority\nLeader, House-Minority Leader, Chair SSCI,\n20-Jan-06\n37th Presidential Authorization signed'\n27-Jan-06:\n31'Jan~.0\nNSA briefs\nChair:\nNSA briefs Speaker of the House and Chair, HPSCI\nNSA briefs Chairand Ra nking Member, House Appropiiations\n9-Mar-06\nNSA briefs Chair and-Vice Chair, SSCI, afid Members of SSCI Terrorist\nSurveillance Program (TSP) Subcommiittee (Rgberts, Rockefeller, Hatch,\nDeWine, Felnstein, Levin, Bond) with-SSCI Minority and Majority Staff\nDirectors, Senior Director for Legislative Affairs, National Security\nCounsel, VP, AG, White House Counsel, and VP Chief of Staff\nNSA briefs Mr. Bond, Member, SSCI TSP Subcommittee\n10-Mar-06\n13-Mar-06\nNSA briefs. Chair, SSCI TSP Subcommittee, Members SSCI TSP\nSubcommittee:(Roberts, Feinstein, and Hatch), SSCI Majority and Minority\nStaff Directors, and SSCi Counsel atNSA\nNSA briefs Mr. DeWine, Member, SSCI TSP Subcommittee at NSA\n14-Mar-06\n38th Presidential Authorization signed\n21-Mar-06\nNSA briefs FISC Judge Bates\n21-Mar-06\nNSA briefs Mr. Levin, Member, SSCI TSP Subcommittee and Minority\n27-Mar-06\nStaff Director at NSA\n29-Mar-06\nNSA briefs Chairman and Ranking Member HPSCI TSP Subcommittee,\nTSP Subcommittee Members (Hoekstra, Harman, McHugh, Rogers,\nThornberry, Wilson, Davis, Holt, Gramer, Eshoo, and Boswell), Majority\n'General Counsel, Staff Member, and Minority General Counsel\n7-Apt-06\n'NSA briefs Chairman of the HPSCI TSP Subcompittee; HPSCI TSP\n'Subcommittee Members (Hoekstra, McHugh, Ragers; Tharberry, Wilson,\nand Holt), Majority General Counsel, Staff Member, and Minority General\nJounsel at NSA\n28-Apr-08\nNSA brrefs Ranking Member HPSCI TSP Subcommrttee Members of\nHPSCl TSP Subcommittee: (Harman Wllson, and Eshoo), Majority:\nUns\nG\neral Counsel at NSA\n11-May-06\n NSA briefs Chair and Ranking Member Housg Appropriations Committee\n'\nDefense Subcommittee\n16-May-06\n 39th Presidential Authorization signed\n17-May-06\n Chair SSCI, Members, SSCI(Roberts, Hagel; Mikuilski, Snowe DeWine,\nBayh, Chamb(rss Lott, Bond, Levin; Feingold, Feinstein, Wyden, Warner),\nSSCI Staff Member, SSCI Majority Staff Diractor, and SSCi Counssl\n17:May06\n HPSCI Chair, HRSCI Members (Hoekstra, Harman, Wilson, Eshoo,\nRogers, Thornberry, Holt, Boswell, Cramer, LaHood, Everett, Gal!egly,\nDavis, Tiahri, Reyes, Ruppe\nbe\ner,\nand Tisrnay) Majorlly General\n24-May-06\n FirstBusiness Record's Order approved by the:Fle\n5-Jun-08\nNSA briefs Ms. Feingold, SSCI Member at NSA\n74dun-06\nNSA briefs-Ranking Meember, Senate Defense Appropriations\nSubcommittes, and SSCI Staff Director\n7-dun-08\nNSA briefs President's Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board\n9:Jun-06\nNSA briefs.Chair, SSC1, SSCI Members (Mikulski, Wyden, and Hagel),\n$S0C! Minority Staff Director, SSGI Counsel, and SSCI Staff Directar\n15-Jun-06\nNSA briefs Chair, SSC! and SSCI Members (Roberts, 'Mikulski, Feingold;\nBayh, Snowe, Hatch, Lott, and Bond), and Minority Staff Director\n26-Jun-06\nNSA briefs Chair, Senate Defense Appropriations Subcommittee, and\nHouse Minority Leader\n30-Jun-06\nNSA briefs Mr. Bayh, SSC! Member at NSA\n6-Jul-06\n40th Presidential Authorization signed\nO-Jul-OG\n- NSA briefs Ms, Snowe, SSCI Member and S8CI Counsel at NSA\n18-Jul-06\nNSA briefs Mr. Chambliss, SSCI Member at NSA\n\n## _ 41St Presidential Authorization Signed 420D Presidentlal Authorization Signed\n\n20:Nov-06\n NSAbriefs Presidents Privacy and Givil Liberties Oversight Board\n8-Det-06\nrd\nand fifal Presidential Authorization signed\n2007\n10-Jan-07\n 'Content orders approved by the FISC\n{7-Jan-07\n AG letter to Congrsss: Presidential program brought under the FISC\n1-Feb-07\nNSA briefs President's Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board\n1-Feb-07\n -Presidential Authorization expires\n\nThis page intentionally left blank.\n\n## Appendix (U) Cumulative Number Of Clearances For The President's Surveillance Program\n\niy This page intentionally left blank.\n\n## {U) Cumulative Number Of Clearances For The President's Surveillance Program\n\nThis page intentionally left blank.\n\n## Appendix E\n\n(U) NSA Office of the Inspector General Reports on the President's Surveillance Program and Related Act ivities This page intentionally left blank:.\n\n## (V) Nsa Office Of The Inspector General Reports On The President's Surveillance Program And Related Activities\n\nESHSHEThis appendix lists and describes\nOIG investigation and review\nreports of activity conducted under the PSP, also referred to as the STELLARWIND\nProgram, and related activities such as the Pen Register Trap and Trace (PR/TT)\nOrder and the Business Records Order. These reports are limited to activity\n_conducted between 4 October 2001 and 17 January 2007.\n\n## (U) Oig Investigations - (U) Report Of Investigation Of Two Violations\n\n5N\nOr_:fllelOIG issued a report on what it believed to be the first'two violations of Authorization, both.of which were unintentional.\n\nBoth iricidents oeccurred, at least in part, because early in the Program the terms of the Authorization were so closely held that few, if any, operational personnel working under the Authority were permitted to see the Auithorization orits operative provisions.\n\nIt was unreasonable to hold persong accountable for violating an order that they had not seen, when the. order was too comiplex to be easily committed to memory: Accordmgly, the OIG did not recommend d15c1p11na1y action, but did recommend that thie NSA Director issue formal wntten delegations of authority to the Signals Intelligence Director and specified subordinates so that personnel working the Program would know the precise terms-of the Authorization. Management concurred with the recommendations and made appropriate notifications.\n\n(U//FOUO) This report was sent to SSCI on 31 May 2006\nand'HPSCI on 2 January 2008.\n\n## . Foreigninteliigence Surveillance:\n\nissued a report on an investigation of a management breakdown that had resulted in unintentional filtering violations of the FISC Order. The Order permitted NSA to collect Intemet metadata from cornmumcatlons involving\n.\n\n'\n, L owever, no violations resulted from the collection of domestic communications. An NSA collection manager discovered the:\nviolations or\n. The following day, the questiofiable collection was stopped and reported to the OIG\nand the OGC. With the exception o the OIG\nfound no reason to believe that any violations resulted in the collection of L8, judement person information. The OIG reserved onf e\n&'\nBl The OIG evaluation of responsibility for the incident led directly to the replacement of the Program Manager and to chanpges in Program management, leadership, and chain of commaid.\n\n(U/ /FOUS} This report was sent to SSCI on 31 May 2006\nand HPSCI on 2 January 2008 and was redacted at the request of the White House.\n\nNone\nof thef\nI messages had been intentionally\ncollected, none had been analyzed, and none had been\nreported outside NSA.\n\n(U/ /FOTO} This report was sent to SSCI on 31 May 2006\nand HPSCI on 2 January 2008.\n\n## {U) Oig Reviews\n\n14 May 2004\n (U) Need for Documentation and Development of Key\nProcesses (ST-04-0024)\n\n>\nhis OIG report concluded that a continuing deficiency in clear, written procedures governing the collection, processing, and dissemination of PSP material created undue risk of unintentional violations of the AutHorization. The report noted that Program officials had\n\nNSA OIG issueda ____\n| that\nthe OIG suspecte\nated outside the United.\n\nmade progress in addressing some of these deficiencies, but found that. processes had not been fully documented in the form of management directives, administrative policies; or\n'operating manuals. The NSA: O1G recommended that Program officials formally adopt rigorous, written operating procedures for the following key processes:\n\no\nApprovals for content collection by the appropriate\nnamed officials\no\nReporting of violations of the Authority, similar to\nprocedures for documenting violations of Legal\nCompliance and Minimization Procedures'\no\nEvaluation of dual FISA and PSP content collection.\n@\nSystematic identification and evaluation of telephone\nmumbers and Internet identifiers for detasking.\n(U/ HrEY6) Corrective action was taken in response to the four recommeindations.\n\n(U/ A=0Y0) This report was sent to SSCI on 31 May 06 and HPSCI on. 2 January 2008.\n\n## 13 Sep 2004 -Fs#Nf)-Need For Increased Attention To Security-Related Aspects Of The Stellarwind Program (St-04-0025)\n\n(U/ /FOUD) This OIG report disclosed weaknesses in Program secunty The Program was particularly vulnerable to exposure because it involved numerous organizations inside and outside NSA.\n\n(U/ /FOUYB) While the Program Manager placed a strong emphasis on personnel security, he did not take a proactive and strategic approach to physical and operational security.\n\nIn particular, better use of the Program Security Officer would have helped to improve special security practices for handling Program material and strengthen operations security (OPSEC).\n\n(U/ /F6Y) The Program Manager and the Associate Director for Security and Counterintelligence concurred with the findings and implemented corrective measures.\n\nIn particular, the Staff Security Officer was freed from other responsibilities and took a more active and effective role in Program security.\n\nManagement did not conduct a formal OPSEC survey as recommended; however, steps taken by mariagement to\n'implement OPSEC practices met' the intent of the original recommendation.\n\n(U/ /FEUO) This report was sent to SSCI 6n 31 May 2006\n.and HPSCI on 2 January 2008.\n\n## 21 Nov 2005 (Fshshine)-Review Of The Tasking Process For Stellarwind U.S. Content Collection (St-04-0026)\n\nTS//STLW\n/ST\n'\nThis report identified material wealcne_see's; in the tasking and deetasking process under the PSP.. The process to tasl and detask-telephone numbers for content collection under the Program was intherently fragile because:it was based on e-mail exchanges and was net automated or monitored.\n\nY TEF\nSR\n) The OIG,eXa.mined-telephone numbers and Internet idertifiers approved for content collection on the date in November 2004 when the audit began and identified the following types of errors:\ninvolved under-collection; identifiers were not put on collection quickly enough or were not put on collection until the OIG discovered the errors.\n\ninvolved unauthorized collection caused by a typographical error.\n\ninvolved over-collection; they were not removed from collection quickly enough.\n\n'}i record-keeping errors in the Program''s tracking database n thq of unauthorized collection caused by a typographical error, NSA\npersonnel did not review the collected information before destroying it, nor did NSA issue any report based on, or\n~rwise disseminate, any information from the i | of untimely detasking. However, without a o1fotw Y\nrobust and reliable collection and tracking process, NSA\nincreased its risk of unintentionally violating the Authorization. NSA also increased the risk of missing\n\n| valuable         | foreign    | intelligence        | by          | failing      | to           | task       | telephone    |\n|------------------|------------|---------------------|-------------|--------------|--------------|------------|--------------|\n| numbers          | and        | Internetidentifiers | in          | a            | timely       | manner,    |              |\n| (U/              | fPOEH)     | NSA                 | 0IG         | recommerided | that         | all        | errors       |\n| resolved,        | that       | specific            | procedures  | be-adopted   | to           | prevent    |              |\n| recurrences,     | and        | that                | identifiers | tasked       | for          | collection | be.          |\n| promptly:        | reconciled | with                | identifiers | approved     | for          | tasleing,  | and          |\n| repeated         | every      | 90                  | -days.      | Management   | 1mp1ementcc1 | the        |              |\n| recommendations. |            |                     |             |              |              |            |              |\n| (U/              | AeB0)      | This                | report      | was          | sent         | to         | SSCLon       |\n| and              | HPSCI      | on                  | 2           | January      | 2008         | and        | was          |\n| request          | of         | the                 | White       | House,       |              |            |              |\n\n## 31 May 2006 (Fsh#Shnf} Review Of Compliance With Authorization Requirements For Stellarwind U.S. Content Collection (St-04-0027)\n\n|             |             |                  |                 | This            | repoit      | determined    | that,       | based      |\n|-------------|-------------|------------------|-----------------|-----------------|-------------|---------------|-------------|------------|\n| ona         | sta'ustlcal | sample,          | Program         | officials       | were        | adhering      | to          | the        |\n| terfis      | of          | the              | Authorization   | and             | the         | Director's    | delegation  |            |\n| thereunder; | that        | tasking          | was             | appropriately   | approved    | and           |             |            |\n| duly        | recorded    | under            | the             | Authorization;  | and         | that          | tasking     | was        |\n| justified   | as          | linked           | to              | al-Qa'ida       | or          | affiliates    | of          | al-Qa'ida. |\n| report      | recommended | improvements     | in              | record-keeping  |             |               |             |            |\n| practices.  |             |                  |                 |                 |             |               |             |            |\n| ~S4HNF)-Due | to          | a                | lack            | of              | sufficient  | and           | reliable    | data,      |\n| OlG         | could       | not              | reach           | a               | conclusion  | on            | the         | tasking    |\n| process     | for         | two              | PSP-related     | collection      | programs,   | The           | OIG         |            |\n| recommended | that        | management       | responsible     | for             | the         | affected      |             |            |\n| programs,   | design      | and              | implement       | a               | tasking     | and           | tracking    |            |\n| process     | to          | allow            | managers        | to              | audit,      | assess        | timeliness, | and        |\n| validate    | the         | sequencing       | of              | tasking         | activities. | Management    |             |            |\n| agreed      | to          | install          | automated       | tracking        | of          | tasking       | and         |            |\n| detasking.  |             |                  |                 |                 |             |               |             |            |\n| TS//SH-NF- | Although    | the              | collection      | architecture    | was         |               |             |            |\n| designed    | to          | produce          | one-end-foreign | communications, |             |               |             |            |\n| inadvertent | collection  | of               | domestic        | communications  | occurred    |               |             |            |\n| and         | was         | addressed.       | The             | OIG             | recommended | changes       | in          |            |\n| management  | reporting   | to               | improve         | the             | tracking    | and           | resolution  |            |\n| of          | inadvertent | collection       | issues.         |                 |             |               |             |            |\n| (U/         | /EeH6)      | Corrective       | action          | has             | been        | completed     | for         | one        |\n| the         | two         | recommendations. |                 |                 |             |               |             |            |\n(U/ /FEBO) This report was sent to SSCI on 31 May 2006\nand HPSCI on 2 January 2008 and was redacted at the\nfequest of the White House.\n11 Jul 2006\n\n## Fi&?Sb%Fifiupplemental Report To Review Of Compliance With Authorization Requirements. Fors:Tellarwind_U.S; Content Collection (St-04-0027.01)\n\nS\nST\nS-S}\nAfter issuing the original report,\nthe NSA OIG conducted further research to determine\nwhether Program officials were approving content tasking\nrequests based solely\non metaddta analysis. Using the\nstatistical sample in the original audit, the OIG found no\ninstances of metadata analysis as the sole justification for\ncontent tasking.\nIn all cases tested, there was corroborating\nevidence\nto support the tasking decision.\n(U//'FO'B'G';*Thm report was sent to SSClon 13 February\n2007 and HPSCI on 2 January 2008.\n5 Sep 2006\n\n##  Hamf)-Report On The Assessment Of Management Controls For Implementing The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court Order: Telephony Business Records (St-06-0018)\n\nPSHBTEY\n]\nF\nOn 24 May 2006, the telephony metadata portion of the PSP was transferred to FISC Order BR:06-05, In re Application of the Federal Bureau of n Order Requiring the Production of Taggible\n-communications Providers] Relating tof\n| The Order authorized NSA to cole'c and\n\nretain telpfigny metadata to\nprotect &\n.\nOn 10 July 2006, in a memorandum with the\nsubject FISA Court Order: Telephony Business Records (ST-06-\n0018), the NSA OIG issued \"a report to the Director of NSA\n45 days after the initiation of the activity [permitted by the\nOrder] assessing the adequacy of the management controls\nfor the processing and dissemination of U.S. person\ninformation.\" This report was issued with the Office of the\nGeneral Counsel's concurrence as mandated by the Order.\n//NE)\nThe \"Report on the Assessnient of Managemernt\nControls for Implementing the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance\n\nCouirt Order: Telephony Business Records (ST-06-0018),\"\n5-September 2006, provided the details of the findings of the\n10.July memorandum and made formal recommendations to management\n-\n* Management controls: governing the processmg, dissemination, data security, and oversight of telephony metadata and U.S. person information obtamed under the Order were adequate and in several aspects exceeded the terms of the Order. However, due to the risk\n'associated with the collection and processing of telephony metadata involving U.S. person information, the NSA OIG\nrecommended three additional controls regarding collection procedures, reconciliation of audit logs, and segregation of duties.\n\n## (Tshshnfy-Collection Procedures:\n\n. Durmg an O1G review of collectlon procedu o data shotild have been suppressed from the incemirng data flow.. Immediately, management blocked the data from analysts' view.\n\nFurther, worklng with the providers, Program management completed suppression ofthe suspect data on 11 October 2006 and agreed to implement additional procedures to prevent the collection of unauthorized data.\n\n## Efshshnfy Reconciliation Of Audit'Logs\n\n(@Sf-/S%'-NF)Management controls were not in place to\nverify that telephone numbers approved for querying were the\nonly numbers queried. Although audit logs dociimented tle\nqueries of the archived metadata, the logs were not in a\nusable format, and Program management did not routinely\nuse them to audit telephone numbers queried. Management\nconcurred with the recommendation to conduct periodic\nreconciliations; however, action was contingent on the\napproval of a Program management request for two additional\ncomputer Programimers.\n\n## ~{Chmeh:Ack Of Segregation Of Duities\n\n~{E4/14F The severt individuals with the authority to approve\nqueries also had the ability to conduct gqueries under the\nOrder. Standard internal control practices require that key\nduties and responsibilities be divided among different people\nto reduce the risk of error and fraud. Althouigh Program\nmanagement corcurred with the finding, it could not\nimplement the recommendation due to staffing and\noperational rieeds.\nAs an alternative, Program management\nagreed to'develop a process.to monitor indeperidently the\nqueries of the seven individuals, This action plan was\ncontingent on the development of usable audit logs\nrecommended above.\n(U/ fFOYe) Corrective action has been completed for one of '\nthe three recorhmendations.\n(uy I/_FG\"&G);\\This report was sent to SSCI on 13 February\n2007 and HPSCI on 2 January 2008.\n\n## 20 Dec 2006 {(Sh#Nf)-Summary Of Oig Oversight 2001-2006 Stellarwind Program Activities (St-07-0011)\n\n{S//NF) On 20 December 2006, the OIG issued a report\nsummarizing OIG's oversight of the STELLARWIND Program\nafter five years of implementation.\n'\n(U/ JFE&E6) This report was sent to SSCILon 13 February\n2007 and HPSCI on 2 January 2008 and was redacted at the\nrequest of the White House.\n\n## St/ Assessment Of Fanagement Controls To Implement The Fisc Order Authorizing Nsa To Collect Information Using Pen Register And Trap And Trace Devices (St-06-0020)\n\nFSHSH-AE) O\nhe OIG reported that the\nmanagement contr\nv\n\"the collection,\ndissemination, and data security of electronic\ncommunications metadata and U.S. person information\nobtained under the FISC Order authorizing NSA to collect\nInternet metadata using PR/TT devices were adequate and in\nseveral aspects exceeded the terms of the Order. Due to the\nrisk associated with the processing of electronic\ncommunications metadata involving U.S. persont information;\nadditional controls were needed for processing and\nmoniitoring queries made agairist PR/TT data, documenting\n\novermght activities, and providing atinual refresher training on the terms of the Order.\n\nU/ /F@H@) Corrective action has been completed for two of the six, 'recommernidations, to SSCI.\n\n(U7 /FOUO}T\nand HPSCIL &\n\n## 5 Jul 2007 ~(Fs#Sh/Mfrdomestic Selector Tasking Justification Review (St-07-0017)\n\n(U7 /FEYO) The OIG conducted this review to determine whether tasking justification statements were supported with.\n\nintelligence information consistent with sources cited in the justifications.\n\nThe OIG.identified some justifications cotitaining errors, but there was no pattern of errors or exaggeration of facts or intentional misstatements.\n\n(U/ /FOYO) This report was sent to SSCI on 28 January 2008\nand HPSCI on 28 January 2008.\n\n## 30.Jurie 2008 Advisory Report On The Adequacy-Of Stellarwind Decompartmentation Plans (St-08-0018)\n\nAt the request of the SID Program Manager for CT Spemal Projects, the OIG assessed tlie adequacy of NSA's plans to remove data from the STELLARWIND comipartment, as duthorized by the Director of National Intelligence. On\n30 June 2008, the OIG reported that NSA management had a solid fouindation of plannmg for decompartmentation.\n\nIn particuilar, the content, \"communication, - and assignment of supporting plans were adequate to provide reasonable assurance of successfully removing data from the STELLARWIND compartmerit, while complying with laws and authorities. Management was also diligent in assessing the scope and complexity of this undertaking. Although the OIG\nmade no formal recommendations, it suggested improvements to develop more detailed plans, set firm milestones, and establish a feedback system to ensure that plans were successfully implemented.\n\n(U/ FoH6}-This report was not sent to SSCI or HPSCL\n\n## Appendix F (U) Presidential Notifications\n\no o=\nS\n<\n=) 2\nB~\noy This page intentionally left blank.\n\n## (U) Presidential Notifications\n\n4\nSTEY\n, Ry Executive Orders 12333 and 12863 require intelligence agernicies to report to the President, through the President's Intelligence Oversight Board; activities they have reason to believe may be unlawful or contrary to executive order or presidential directive: Knowing that Board members were not cleared, however, the NSA Director or Deputy Director reported the following violations. of the Presidential Authorization and related authorities to the President through his Counsel, rather than through the Board. Each rotification was approved if not actually drafted by OIG. Somee of the notifications werg not the subject of the OIG reviews or investigations discussed in Appendix E.\n\n(U) Date\nv Summ'ary of Notification\n\nThis page intentionally-left blank.\n\n## Appendix G\n\n(U) United States Signals Intelligence Directive\nSP0018, Legal Compliance and Minimization\nProcedures\nThis page intentionally left blank.\n\n# National Security Agengy Central Security Service\n\nFort George G. Meade, Maryland\n\n# Signals Intelligenge Directive 18 27 July 1993\n\n[NCLUDES CHANGES 1 and 2\nSee Latter of Pramulgation far instructions on reproductian or release of this documen:.\n\nThis page intentionally left blank.\n\n# National Segurity Agency Central Segurity Service\n\nFort George G. Meade, i\\flaryflflmd\n\n# O7 July 1993 United States Signals Intelligenge Directive (Ussid) 18 Legal Compliangce Amnd L*! Inimization Pf?.B Cedures - '\n\n## Letter Of Promulgation\n\n(Uy This USSID pre sCribes palicies and prageduras and assigns: responsiblliies to-enhsire that the missiong and functions of the. Uni ed Staias BIGINT Systam (USSH) are conductad s mannar that safsguzrda-the-constitutinna) rights ol U.S. persans,\n{Ly This USSID has oeen cemplataly rewritten to maka it shorer and sasier lo undsestand,.\n\nIt conEttutes A summary of tha laws and reguiations directiy affecting USSS5 operations, AllUSSE persannal wha collzst, progess, retain, o dissaminale marm*hmn ta, 1rom graboul U.S. peratns or persons in'the Uriiied Stalas must be familiar with hscontants.\n\n+FEHer This USSID supersades USSID\n18, dad USSID 18, Annax A {distributed separataly to sslected reciplents), both of which are dated 20 Cctober 1981, anrf must now be dgstroyad.\n\nlefy DlRNuNCHCSS (USEID Marizager if ihis edifion of USSI0 1874 dEalfQ{\"'fl hoeause of an gmgrgency asion;\notharvise, raquest approval fam DIRN ACHOSS bafare destroying ihis USSIO,\n~HESUGY Aeleass or akpasure of this dosumant o centractors and gonsutants vithoul approval rom the USSID Mumaghr is pruhumt.:d Instruchicns flpp'rc'dl:.lF to relaase oraxposure of USSID to contractars.and sonsutanty may be found in USSIDN 19, ning his fS!D shoutd ba addressed 10 the Cilics of the\n-92439'9}- Questions and cammsns Ganaral Counsel, MSACSS, NSTS 953=-3\nVice Admiral, U.S. Navy Diractor ik, i g  itentionaily lft\nThis\n\n## Change Register\n\n| ,              | CHANGE    | ENTERED    |\n|----------------|-----------|------------|\n| Na             |           |            |\n| Date           |           |            |\n| Authority      |           |            |\n| {Msg           |           |            |\n| Cite/          |           |            |\n| 3G,            |           |            |\n| Hard           |           |            |\n| Copy           |           |            |\n| {HCH           |           |            |\n| Date           |           |            |\n| By             |           |            |\n| {              |           |            |\n| 2800TE7]       |           |            |\n| HARDGOPY       |           |            |\n| CHANGE         |           |            |\n| 280CTaY        |           |            |\n| |              |           |            |\n| RS             |           |            |\n| 2              |           |            |\n| 1102088        |           |            |\n| ]              |           |            |\n| POZT-0307-88,  |           |            |\n| 1118007        |           |            |\n| Dec            |           |            |\n| 98             |           |            |\n| 11Decld        |           |            |\n| |              |           |            |\n| WF             |           |            |\n| 12             |           |            |\n| 1Decdd|        |           |            |\n| PO211-D306-98, |           |            |\n| 1118402        |           |            |\n| Deg            |           |            |\n| 98             |           |            |\n| {correction    |           |            |\n| lo             |           |            |\n| abave)         |           |            |\n| 11Dece8        |           |            |\n| |              |           |            |\n| WF             |           |            |\n|               |           |            |\n| i              |           |            |\n| 3              | )         | Lo         |\n| |              | |         |            |\n| |              |           |            |\n| ;              |           |            |\n| ;              |           |            |\n| ,,,,,,         |           |            |\n| -              |           |            |\n| -              |           |            |\n| :              |           |            |\n\nThis page intentionally left blank.\n\n## Table Of Contents\n\nSECTLO%\\HPHEFACE\n1\nSECTION 2= REFEAENCES\nL 1ot aeivnrrsdsrarrarnssmrasasiasreedncisns orsarisnesaos\n1\n[aY)\nSECTION B POUGY\n 1 pesavssevsserneennriieinsnssinsimesianimacassnsa i\nSECTION\n4 = COLLECTION\n. uuinrerreceamnnaesseasasasstianramssesmiasicns\not\n-\nB2\nTMm\na. Foraign ntedigance Suveillanse Court ARRIOVEE Lo vive s\ni\nceivanans\nb. Attornsy Gereral APBIOVE]\nuvv e\nv vttt i\ne e\n2\n, DIRMNSAICHESS APProval\n<, iveerriscemsaomesrnien\nooy irosranssas\n2\nd.\nEmisrgency SIUAHORS\nv vvs\ne rvvinsiemmimeians\ns\naat s,\n3.\n@\nANNUA] FBROMS\n4\na et rs e\ns\nu st\ne arrarivas it\n&\n4.2.F\nP\nT L L\nAT\n4\n4:3. Incidsalal Acquisition of U8, Perscn [Alormation\n. .viciimeevsniiiin o\n4\n4.4, Nonresident Alian Targats Entering the United States ...,\nvin v\n5\nin\n.5. U.S, Parsen Targels Entering the United States .o ooovirnno s Y\n4.8, Fequestato Targst UG, Persons ...voavvieianns e\ne\nA\n]\n37 DIreehOm FINGIG\n oo\nv i\ne\net\nv\ne\ney\ne\n5\n4.8 DISHESS BIENMAlE G\ne\ni\nke\ns\ns\ne\ne\ne\n5\n4.8, COMSES Monitoring and Security Tesling of Automated Infermation Systems\n..\ni\n\n## Section 5~ Progesshng + 1Ty Vt Iarrsiis Crstiaeomrriainsisesenaesnian\n\n@\n()]\nE.1. Usze of Selaction\nTerms Durng Frocassing\n- v ovrvirciiaiansarrasns\n5.2,\nAnnual Beviewby DDO ...\nfi\no\nn\"\nw2\nForvarding\nof Inlercapted Matsrial\n...\nciciiii i\nc\ne\n=l\nIu\n. Noniaraign Communications\n. oveve cive i ieomvieernanranees e\nom\na. Cornmunications between Parsons in the Uniled States\n..o\nv vin i\n7\nby, Communications batween U.S, Parsons ... e v d e\n7\nc. Communisations knvolving an Officer or Employes\not the U3, Govarnnmeant\noo\no .- S S\n7\nST\n= 2ere\" o111\n1 -\nD\nR\nL EE TP EERRR TR TR -\n7\nSECTION\nG =RETENTION ........ Creereian e\nd Ea\ne s\nek ee s\new ey S\ne\nh btk\nRy\ne\ng\n6.1, Qetention of Communications\nto, from, or About LS. PEISORS\n.+\nuvenyruan.- .\n8\na. WUnenciphgrad Communications; and Communications Necessary\nto Maintain Technical Data Bases far Cryptanalylic\nor\nTraflic-AnAYC PUFBOSES wecuriveciin\ni iucrsiinsersrsesvryassinnonsee\n8\nb, Bommurications\nWhilch Could be Disseminated bnder Section 7\n.. oivwiiies\n8\nB.2, ACCESS v.vvrnnns\n8\nSECTIQN 7 - DISSEMINATION .....ov\ne et  esmreenea O\ne teaeneas\n2]\n7.1, Foous of SIGINT Reparts\noo eennoviyennn- e\n&\n7.2, Disseminatien\nof U.S, Person identities . o.ovaennes,\n9\nA\nCONSEN,\net v aiEii v et\naehn\n9\nb,\nPatlicly Avallable Information ..o\ni e\niiee e b beniaane .\na\no,\nInformation Mecassary to Undarstand or ACEESS :v.vvr\nv vaarvervrsesaaaas\n9\n7.3,\nAaproval AUhOIZE ..\nraa e\ne R\n10\n3. DIRNSACHESE\nv iivieieirieannns e e R .\n10\nB, FialdUmiiS\nv oo\nieierevecvnare P\n,\n0\no DDO and Designess\no ooovenn. .- e i\nr e\ntas\nb\n74 Privileged Communications and Caminal Astivily .o\niiaenniiiincc\ne,\n10\n7.5, Imprager DISseminaiion\n...\nvieer e N\n10\nSECTION &\nRESPONSIBILITIES ... .o S Perbetberia\ne Cheaians\nH\n8.1 Insnector Genaral L. e SN\n11\nB2, Ganeral Counssl ov\ni verinienin. s R\n11\n8.3, Dapuly DiresorforOgerations ... ..o ieve\no en e Ceeian\ni2\n4.\nAl Elementzofthe USSS ..., e ey\n15 2\nSECTION\n9 - DEFIMITIONS\n. ... e et e\ne\ne\ne e\neas .\n12\n\n## Ammex A - Procedures Implementing The Foreign Intelligence Surveillange Act (U} Vnevieiinennns O E\n\n|     |            |               | APPENDIX    | 1       | -    | STAMDARIZED    | MINIMIZATION    | PROCEDURES    | FOR    |\n|-----|------------|---------------|-------------|---------|------|----------------|-----------------|---------------|--------|\n| M5A | ELECTRONIC | SURMEILLANGES | .,          | ...viv. | ..   | e              | e               | A-i           | N      |\n\nANMEX 8 - DPERATIONAL ASSISTANCE TO THE FEDERAL BUREAU\nD I\nT\nI\nR\nOF INVESTIGATION (U}\n.\n\nv ciivnniarmmens U8 AND ALLIED MILITARY\nANMER G M;SIGNALS}-lNTELLEGENGE'EUPP,@flT 70\nEXERCISE COMMANG AUTHORITIES (U\n... e iac i Vhamaeane P\nAMNEX B~ TESTING OF ELEGTHOMIC EQUIPMENT (W)\no vvoeoriiivivinna- e AMMEX E - SEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT OPERATIONS (U vuvsnnecevinnnnianeannss ANNEL F LLICIT COMMUNICATIONSAGY ... ..... S\nPG\nANNEX\nG ~ THAINING OF PERSONNEL IN THE OFERATIQN AND USE OF BIGINT\nCOLLECTION AND QTHER SURVEILLANGE EQUIPMENT () ..ovvniviorians e ANMEY H = CONSEMT FORMB{U) ..o vvnaenanass ANNEY\n| = FORM FOR CERTIFICATION OF OPENLY-ACKNOWLEDGED ENTITIES{3=0801\nSRR ER\n= PRGOEDURES\nFOR MONITORING RADID COMMUNICATIONS OF\nSUSPECTED INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS TRAFFICKERS f8~66ey iy to setented racigients)\nD\nT\nI\nR\nR\ndn\n(Issuad separate Lt leat cfally Lol 1 Tlanl 3\ni\n flg';'\nThiy T\nS\n\nAWK TRY\n%\nOV\no)\n.\n\nI ls\n\n## Legal Compliance And Minimization Procedures (V) Section 1 ~Prefage\n\n1.4,\n{U) The Fourth Amendinent to the Unitad States Constitution protecis afi U.S. persons anywhare in the world-and afl persons within the United States {ram unreasondble searches and seizlites by any passon or agercy acting on behall cf the U.S, Govarnment. The Suprame Court has rled thal the intercgpiion ot slagtronic communications is a ssarch and selzure within the mearing of the Foutth Amendment, It is thergiore mandatary that signzls intalligance (SIGIMT) operations be conduciad: pursuaEnt to prooeciuras whish meat (s reagonablaness requiramesnts of the Fuurh Amendment.\n\n1.2,\n(U} Ih daterntining whather United States SIGINT System (USSS) operations are \"rezsonetis,\"\nil {s necassary to batancs the U.8. Government's need for forgian intelligence Information and the privacy irmarests of parsons protected by the Fourth Amendment, Sbriking that balancs has conswngd much tima and effort By all branches of tha United States Governmant, The cesults of that &lfort are reflecied in tha referencas listad in Section 2 belaw. Together, thass taferences. requira the minimization of U.S. person Infeematian collasted, processed, ratained or dissemimated by the USSS. The purposa of this documant i to implameant thesa minimizalion renuiramants.\n\n1.3,\n(UJ) Severalthemas mn throughaout this USSID. The mostimportant is ihat intsifigence opersiions andthe protaction of constitutional rights are not Incompatitite, It1s not necessary to dany legitimate {oreign inteliipzace collection Of SUDPress leghimate farslgn inteliigence information to protact the Feunh Ameacinent rights of LS, parsons.\n\nv4,\n(J)\nFinally, thase minimizalen procedures implament the constitutionzl princigls of weaasgnablensss\" by giving ditersnt categorles of individuals and entities different lavals of protestion, These levels rangs from the stringent protection accorded U.S. citizans and 'permarent resident afiens in the United States to provisions relaling to foreign diplomats in ths U.S. Those diffierences raflzctyet anatier main theme of thesa procedures, thatis, that the focus ol all fareiqn inteligence operations iz oo foraign srities and DErSONS,\n\n## Segtion 2 - References 2.4, (U Raterences\n\n)\n01, et seq.. Forgign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISAY of 1978, Pulilic Law\n\n\n(33\n5\n-\n'(n .\nw\nNo, 95-511.\n\nb\nExeoutive Order 12333, \"United States intelligence Activities.\" datad\n3 Dscember 1931,\no Dal Directive 5240,1, \"Activities of Dol intelligencs bompanmm that Affect U8, Paraons;!\n\ndated 25 April 1938.\n\n d. NSA/CSS Dirsclive Mo. 10-30, \"Pradedures Governing Aclivities.\n\nof NGA/CSS that Atfest U8, Persons, dated 20 Septamber 1990,\n\n## Section 3 - Policy\n\n3.1,\n{U)yThe poligy of the USSS is to TARGET or COLL ECT only FOREIGN COMMUNICATIONS.\"\nThe USSS wilt not miem.ona)l;.' COLLECT cammunications to, from of about U.8. PERSONS or p2rscns or entities in the U.S, excagt as sel forth in tHis USSID.\n\nIf tha USSS inadvertently COLLECTS such communications, it will process, retdin and dissaminata tham anly in accardancs with this USSIO,\n\n## Section 4 - Collection\n\nil are Lno wi to beta, from or about 3\nPE'>SO\"\n.\n\n-\n.\n\n.\n\nilinotbe intentionally intafeeptad, or SclEChdmeUjb tha use U1 A oELEL T oM TEHM E\"(u-'pl L.\n\nt'm tolioving instances:\n&\nWith the approval of the United States Foreign Infelfigance Survellance Court under tha gongltiens oullingd in Xneex & of jiis USSID,\n\nb.\nWith the.approval of the Atierngy Ganaral of the Unlled Statas, if:\n{1}\nThz COLLECTIOMs directad against tha follawing:\n{3)\nCommuricatlions ta or from LS, PERSONS oulgida the UNITED STATES, ar\n(M\n__International cemmunications to, from,\noo\n\nCommunications which arz not to or Irerm but mefely about U.S. PERSONS\n(whergvar looatedy.\n\n{2}\n Thapersonls an AGENT OF A FOREIGH POWER, and\n{3}\nThe purposze of the COLLECTICN is to acquite signilisant FOREIGN INTELLIGE} IGE\nwhormigiian, c.\n\nWith tha approval of the Directar, Naticnal Securily Agercy/Chisf, Canleal Security Sarice\n{DIANSA/CHISS), 50 long as the COLLECTION nesd not be apgraved by the Forsign Intetligance Burveifanes Court or the Attamey Ganeral, and\n(1)\nThe person nas COMNSEMTED\nlo the COLLECTIOMN\nby exsculing onz of the GONSEMT torms containad inAnnsg H, or\n* Capitalized words in Sections 3 through 9 are defined tarms ir Baction 9.\n\n(2)\nThe person is reasonably believed ta ba held captive by & FOREIGN POWER or group angaded in INTERNATIONAL TERRORESM, or loor\n|\n14)\nThe COLLEGTION is dirested against EEEESEEEIIEEEREE\nbatween a U.5.\n\nPERSON in the UNITED STATES and a foreign entity outside the NITED STATES, the TARGET is tha foreign entity, and the DIBNSA/CHCSS\nhas approved the COLLECTION in accardance with Annax X, ar miployed o ific (arms of o ansd W\nand facshnlla.\n\nA\n{5)\n'Technical devices (s:0.50\nit acquisition by lhe US3SS\nto communicel sommunications used by the TARGET (sl he COLLECTION\nis dirscted against ]\n-\ncommunigations with one COMIUNIGANT\nIn- tha UNITED STATES, and fhe TARGET of the COLLECTION\nis\n:\n\n(a)\nA non-U.5. PERSDN igcated outsida the UNITED STATES=\n(b}\n-\n(6)\nCopies of approvals granted by the DIRNSA/CHEAS undar \\hase provisions will ba retzined in tha Office of General Counsel far raviaw by the Attornay General,\n\n## . Emargency Siualicns,\n\n(1)\nIn emergency siluations, DIRNSA/CHCSS may authorize the COLLECTHOM\nof Information to, feoim, ar aboul 2 U.S, PERSOM wha is oulsida the UNITED STATES when s2curing the priar approval of Ihe Alicrney General i5.not aractioat becauss:\n(a)\nThe tinte ranuirsd to obain such approval would result in the lass of sigaificant FOREIGH INTELLIGENGE and would cause substantial harm o the national securkiy\n(b)\nA parson's life or physical safety Is reasonably bafievad io be in immadiale danger.\n\n(}\nTha physical security of a dafense installation or goveenmant groparly Is reasonably belizvad to be in immediatz daager.\n\n{2)\nIn lhose cases 'whare the DIANSA/CHCSS authorizes emargancy COLLECTION, except for actions takan under paragraph d.{1}{b) zbave, CHRNSA/CHCSS shall find that thees is probable cause that the TSRGET mests one of the following critardas\n(z)\nA parson who, for or on behalf of 3 FOAEIGN POWER, is engagad in clandasting intaligenss activitizs (Including covert activitiss intended to afect the political or governmental prcess).\n\nsabotags; or INTERNATIONAL TERRORIST activitles, or aclivilies in greparation for INTERNATIONAL\nTERAQRIST aclivities; er who.canspires wilh, or knowirigly aids spd abets a parsod engading . sueh activities.\n\n(b)\nA person who is-2n officer or emplayse of a FOREIGN POWER,\n{o)\nA parson unlawlully acting for, or gursuant to the dirsction of, a' FOREIGH\nPOWER, The mera fact that\n@ person's activities. may henefit or furliter the aims of\n2 FOREIGN POWER is riot endugh ta bring that person Under this subaaction, abaent evidende that the person is taking direction trom, ar acting in knowing concar swiih, the FOREIGN POWER.\n\n()\nACORPORATION or othar entity that is ownad  sonfralled diractly or indiracily by\n& FOREIGN POWER.\n\n{e)\nA psrson in contact with, or asting Ir collaberation with, an intaliiganes or security gardce ul a jorgign pawer for tha purpose of prO\"iqu access fo information ar matarial ciassified by the Unit d Stawss 10 which such.persen has acoess.\n\n(3}\nIn alf casas where emergency collsetion le authorizad, the following sleps shail i laks\n(&\nThe Gzaacal Counsel will Se notiied Immadiately that the COLLEGTION has started.\n\n{b)\nThe Ganaral Counsel will {nitiate Immeadiate efons io obtain Attorngy General approval tocomtinte Ike eollection. If Aliorney Genaral approval [s not obtained within saventy bwo tours, the LGLLCuTID:J will b terminated, If the Attarngy General agproviss the COLLECTION, # WAy continu & tar live peiicd spacified In the ggoraval.\n\n.\n\nAnmyal rapors (o the Atomey Gensfal are required for COLLECTION conductad under parznraph'* 4.0.6.(3) and (4. Responsible anabytic oificas will provide such regorts throlgh the Deputy Wiracior for Operations (0OD) and the General Counse! 16 the DIRNSA/CHCSS far transmitial ta the Atte itey General by 31 Jarwary of each year,\n(U}\nIniarmation fa, from or about U.S.\n\nPERSONS acquired Incidentaly as a resull of COLLECTION directed against appropna( FOREIGHM\nIMTELLIGENCE TARGETS may be ratained and pracessed i accordance wilh Saction 4 and Sactiun 3 of s USSID.\n\n## 4.4, 6-6603 Nonresideat Alfiert Targets Enlering The United States.\n\na, If the communications of anoriresident afien located abroad ace peiig TARGETED and the USSS laarms that the individual has entered the UNITED STATES, COLLEGTION\nmay continue for a peried ot 72 hours provided that the DIENSACHESS Ts aduised immedialely and:\n\n()\nImmediate effcrls are nitfated to abtain Attorney General apgroval, ar\n2)\n& determination s made wilkiin the 72 hous pedod that ih\nb, I Atomey General approval is obtained, the COLLECTION may contintz for the fength of time spacifing In'the aporaval.\n\ng, W\niisdetermined thal\n'\n,: COLLEGTION\nmay continue at The digoration OHhe-qperafional:ramt. T\nv\n- LoriAllame \"eefai approval is ot obtained within 72\n1 Attorney Ganeral approval is hours, COLLECTION must ba rrvinated]\nDtabiad, or the Individual lsevas the UNITED STATES.\n\n'\n\n## 4.5 5-666) U.S, Person Targets Entering The United States.\n\n_\na. 1| communicatians 10, from or atiout 2 U.S. PERSON focated owside the UNITED STATES\nze being COLLEGTED\nunder Allomey Gengral approval desceibed. in- Settion 4.1.b. 200va, the COLLECTION muststop when e WSSS learns (hat the individual has eniered the UNITED STATES.\n\nb.\n\nWhile'the individual Ts in the UNITED STATES, COLLECTION may be casumed oniy wite Ing approval of the United States Forsion Inteligence Survailance Courtas descrivad in Annex A,\n;5 PERSONS.\n\nAll proposals for COLLEGTION against U.S.\n\n\nmust ba submitied througlh\n46,\n1o PERSONS, theDOO and ths General Counsel to the DIRNSAICHGS\nS 107 [oview.\n\n4.7, E-886r Direction Finding, Use of dirgstion finding solaly to daterming the. locatioh of a trarsmifter losated cutside of the UMITED. STATES does not genstituts ELEGTROMIC SU RYEILLANGE ar COLLECTION svah il dirzctad at rangmittas Leligwd 1o ba ussd by UW.5, PEABOMS, Unlzss COELEGTION\naftha communications is ofhanvise ay!lmrize-d undar thase procedures, the cantgnts of communizailons io vihich a U.S. PERSOM isa perly mpritored in the course af dirastion linding may ooly b uged to Idecify the wansmitier,\n48,\n{U)\nDisiress Signals. Distress signals may ba intzntionally collected, processed, retained, and dissaminated without regaed ta tha restrictions containad in tnis USSID.\n\nA48,\n(Uy COMSEC Wonitoring and Secutity Testing of Automated Information Systesss, Menitoring for communications security purposes must be conducted with the consent of the person bsing monitored and i accordance with {ha procedures established in National Telecammurications and Infgrmation Systems Sacurity Dirgctive 800, Commurications Secusity (COMSEG) Monitoring, dated 10 April 1990, Moaitoring far communications ecumy purposes s not goversed by this USSID, Infrushva secumy testing fo ass seerity vulnerabiftia s in automaiad information systems fikawise is not governed by this USSID,\n\n## Section 5 - Processing\n\n.3, 8-Ge0r Ustol Selection Terms During Processing, YWhen a SELEGTION TERM s Intanded to INTEACEPT a ommunication on:the-basisof the sortaiit of the:\ncommunication, ar because a communication ls erciphered, rather than on the basis of the ldantity of the CORMUNICANT -orthe factihat the communication mentions a particular individual, the following rules apply:\n\n## Intelligenge Will I Obzainm'I By Use Of Su-H Selection Tenm\n\nb. No SELECTIOM TERM that has resuttad in the INTERGEPTION of a signitican! numbiar of T comraunications 1o o frors such parsons or entities may ba used unlesy there is raascn o balisve tha FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE will ba obtained, SELECTION TERMS\nIhat hgve resolted or are reascnably: lkely to result in the lN'ERuFPTlQN of communications ta or from sush persons ar entities shafl be designed to defeat, 12 the graatest extent practicable-under 1hs aircumstances, the INTERCEPTION of those x:c:mmunicauons wihich o nat cantain FOREIEN INTELLIGENCE.\n\n## 1] 2, 48-568Y Annual Revigw By Deo.\n\na.\n\nAl SELECTION TER! WS that ard reasonably likely\n(o rasull in the INTERCEPTICH\nof communications o or frem & LS FERSON or lerms that hava resulted in tha INTERCEPTION\nof a sigaificant number of sich cammunicalf&ns shall be reviewed.annually by the DDO or a designas.\n\nb The purpose of the review shall bs to determine whather there s reason to belisve. (al FOREBKEM INTELLIGENGE vill ba oblainad, of will consirue\n1o b3 abtainad, by tha use of thasa SELEGTION\nTERKS.\n\n, Acopy of the results of the raviaw will ba providad to the Inspectar General and the Ganaral Gounsal,\n5.3. E-EE8) Farwarding of Intercepiad Material, FOREIGN COMMUNICATIONS callecied by the\n1S5S may be lovwarderd as intercepted to MSA, intarmeniate procassing facilities, smd collaberating centers,\n\n## 8.4, -Gsy Monfargfgn Communications\n\na2, Communications behween parsons I the UMITED STATES. Privala radic commusical ons solEly batwean persans in the UNITED STATES inadverienlly intarcepted during the COLLECTION\nof FOREIGN COMMUNICATIONS wiil be prompl[,' deslroyed unless thg Atiornay Genarsl determninas thal the contents indidate a threat of death ar serigus badiy harm io any person.\n\nb, Cammunications. betwaen U.3. PERSONS.\n\nCommunications solely batween\n.S, PERSONS wil be treated as follows:\n(U\nCommupications sofely betyean U.5, PERSONS inadvertently intercepted during the GOLLEGTION of FOREIGN COMMUNICATIONS\nwill be destroyed upon recognition, if technitally possible.\n\nexcepl as provided in paragraph 5.4.9. beiow.\n\n_\n{2}\nWotwithstanding the preceding provision, coyptolegic. data\n(e.g., signst and entipherment inforrmation) and tectinical communications data (e.q., circuit vsage) may be extracted and retained:\no thoss communicalions if necassary to:\n\n{aj\nEstablish of maintain intercept, or\n{by\nWinimize unwanted Intercept,\nof\n()\nSupport cryptologic operations refaled 16 FOREIGM COMMUNICATIONS.\n&\nCommunications Invplving an Ciiicer or Employes of the L8\nGoverrdmeril.\n\nCammunications io-or [rom any oliisar or employea of the'U.5. Govarmment, of any-state ar kgl governmient, will not be Imentinnally intercepted. Inadverient INTERCEFTIONS\nof such.communicaliens {including thase betwaen loreian TARGETS\nand U.S. officials) will ba reated as Indicated i paragraphs .4.a.and b, aneva.\n\n~d.\n\nExceplions!\n\nNaobwihstanging he provisions of paragraphs\n54b.\n\nand c., tha DIRNSAICHESS may walve the destruction requiremant for international communications. containing, Inter alia, tha-fotowing types of Information:\n\n(1)\nSignilicant FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE, or\n(&1\nFvidence of acrime or threal of death or gerious bodily harm to &ny p2raon, o\n(3]\nAnomalizs that reveal a potental viinaratility to 1.8, communications sacudby.\n\nCrrmeunications forwhich the Attarney Ganerat or DIRNSA/CHESS's wabeer is sought sheuld b2 fervarded to NSA/CSS, Attri: PO2.\n\n,\n\n## 5.5, -E-2E50) Aadio Communizations With Terminat In The United States,\n\na, A radio communicalions that pass aver channels with a terminatin thg UNITED STATES\nrmust ba procassed hraugh & computar scan dictionary or slmilar davica talays thase communications.gocur over channels uazd exclugively by a FOREIGN POWER, b.\n\nInternatiopat commn imunications that pass aver channals with a tarminal inthe UNITEDSTATESE =\n@\nlcommunications, may be processad without the use of a cornputer scan dictionary or similar device if necessary to determing whether\n@ channel cantaing communications of FOREIGM MTELLIGENCE interest which NSA may wish to collest, Such processing may nat sxceed two heurs without the speciic peor wiitten approval of tha DDO &nd, In any evant, shall be fimited to the minlmur aniount of tima necessary to datermine the natura of communicaiions on tha shannal and he gmount of such commupizations that ingluds FOREIGMN INTELLIGENGE. Cnaca & is determined that the channel contains sulficient communications of FOREIGN INTELLIGENGE interest to warrant COLLEQTION and exploitation to produce .FC}F?E[GN INTELLIGENCE, & computer scan dicticnary or simifar devica must be used for additional processing.\n\n\nCopies of 4l DCO wiitten approvals made purguant 1o 5.5.0. must be provided to the General Counszl and the Inspector General,\n\n## Section 6 ~Retention 6.1. 5-8661 Retantion Of Communicatlons To, From Or Aboutt, 8. Peasons.\n\na.\n\nExceptas atharviss providad in Annex &, Appendix 1, Seclion 4, communications tg, fram ar-about 4,5, PERSONS that arz interceptad by tha USSS may be retained tn their ariginal or transcribed farm-only as (allows:\n{1}\nUnenciphered communications not Naughs to contaln saciat meaning may be retaned iarfive years unigss the DDO determinas in writing What reterdion for a fongee period 1$ requinad to cespond to authorized FOREIGH INTELLIGEMGE requiramaris.\n\n(2)\nCommunications necessary to mainialn tachnical data'beses for eryptanalytic or traffic analytic purposes may be retained for a perlod sufticiant to aflow. a thorough exploitations ang fo permil access t daid tnal acs,. or are reasonably bslizved hksly to became, relavant to a current or fuiute FOREIGHN\nINTELLIGENCE fequirement. Sufficien! duration may vary with the nature f the exploitaticn and may consis:\nof any perind nf time dusirg which the teehinizal dala basa is subject to, orof Use in, cryptanalysis. [Fau.s.\n\nPEASONS idanmity Is not nagessary. (o maintaimng technicdl daa bases, it should be delated or refased by a gananis lermt when practicable.\n\nb.\n\nCommunications which:\ncould be disszminated undsr Ssction\n7, balow (&, withoul gifrnination-of references lo U.8. FERS0OMNS) may ba eslaingd n their original or transeribad form, B2, (8CCOr Access.\n\nAccess la raw lrallic storage sysiems which cantain ldentitfes of LS.\n\nPERSOMS must ba limitad to SIGINT groduction persannsl,\n\n## Section 7 - Dissemination\n\n7.1, E=86r Focus of SIGINT Reparis.\n\nAll SIGINT reports will be written so 23 o focus salaly on thi activities of fareigo entities and parsonsg and thelr agants. Except as provided In Section 7.2., FOREIGH\nINT ELLESENCE irdarmajion congarning U.S. PERSONS must be disseminzied in a manner which dees not idantily the ULS. PERSON, Generic or ganeral 12rms of phirases must be substituted for the identity (2.q.,\n\"5, fie\" for the specific namg of a U.S. CORPORATION or -U.S, PERSON\" lor the specific nama of a U, S, PERSOM), Filas conlaiiing the idenlities of U.S8. parsons dalated from SIGINT reports will bz maintained far a maximum perind of one yaar and any requasls from SIGINT customears for such identities should be referred o PO2.\n\n7.2, 5-660r Disseminatinn of L).S, PERSON\nIdentties.\n\nBIGINT reports may include the ideatification of a U8, PERSOM only-il one of the fallowing candiions s mat and a detarmination is made by the appropriate approvalaythadiy that tha recipient has a read for the iden ity for the pedarmanes of his officih duties:\na.\n\nThel.5. PERSON has CONSENTED ie the dissemination of communications of, or.abdut, him or har and has executed the CONSENT farm found I Annex H of this USSIO, or The information fs PUBLIGLY AVAILABLE (i.o., the information is. derlved from unclissifiad information aaz fabla fo the genaral public}, or\n.\n\nThaldentity of the U.S, PERSON Is necessary o understand the FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE\nmiormatmn or dssoss its imporlanca.\n\nThe folloving nonexclusiva list contains examples of the typa of infermation that meet this s andau'd\n(1]\nEOREIGN POWER or AGENT OF A FOREIGN POWER. Tha information indicates that the U.S. PERSON ls a2 FQBEIGM POWER or an AGENT OF A POREIGN POWER, R\nUnauthorized Disciosuce of Classifizd Infarmasion. Tha Infarmation indlcates that the U.S, PERSOMN may be-engaged in tha unaulherized disclosure of classified informiation:\n{%)\ntnlemational Narcotics Activity, The Information Indicates that the individual may engagedin international narcatics lrafficking agiivities, (Sea Annex J of this USSID for furthsr !nforma |o'1\ncancerning (ndividuals invalved in intarnational narcotics teafficking).\n\n{4}\nCriminal Activity. The information Is evidenca that {he individual may be involved ina erime thal has been, ie being. or Is abdut to be committed, prdvided that the dissemination is for Taw gnforcement PUrposas.\n\n'\n(&\nntelhigence TARGET. The infosmation indicates that tha U.8. PERSOM may Le ths TARGET of hostile in!ell.g&n activitize of a FOREIGN FOWER,\n{8)\nThreat ta Safaly. The information indicatas:that {ha idantity of the U.S. PERSOM is padinent to & possible threat to the salaly af any parson or organtzaltion, including those who are TARGETS, viclirmg of hostages of INTERMATIONAL TERACRIST organizations. Reporting units shall identiy to FO2\nany report containing the identity of a U S, PERSOM rparted under this subsection (6). Fleld reparing to P02 should be'in the foft of g C'RHFCOMh massage (D0 XA0) and includs {hs repon data-time-group\n{EYTG), praduct sarial number and fhe reason forirclusion of the U.S. PERSON'S idantity.\n\n{7}\nSenigr Executivd# Brarch Oificials. Tha idantity is that of a senior official of the Execulive Sranch of tha U.5. Government, [n this case only the official's title will b2 dissaminated. Domestic polil'sal or persanal informiation on such indivduals will b2 nelther disseminated moc retainad.\n\n7.3. {8-669 Approval Authorities. Approvat authorities for the releass of identities of U.S, persc under Section 7 are as follows;\ng, DIRNSACHCSS. DIRMSNCHCSS must approve dissemination of;\n1)\nThe identities of any sanator, congrassman, officar, or =m ICyan of tha LL.!\"\\!SL&[\"\"\n7\ng Brangh of the U.5. Governmenl.\n\n(2)\n Theidentity\naf &ny parson foe law enforcement purmoses.\nb.\n\nFfald Units and NSA Headquarters Elemenls.\n\nAll SIGINT pradustion arganizations are autnoszed lo disseminate the identities of U.S. PEASONS whan:\n\n{1}\nTheidenity is pertinant to the salely.of dny person or efganization.\n()\n Thaldentity\nIs that of 2 sanjorofficlal of the Exarutive. Branch,.\n{3\nThe.U.S. PERSOM has CONSEMTED under paragraph 7.2.a. sbova.\n\n## . Ddo And Designaes.\n\n(1} In alf other cases, U.S. PERSON identities may ba relesed anly willt the prior appraval of the: Deputy Birector for Operations, tha Assissant Dflput'l Dxrecfcr far Qperations, the Criel, POZ, the Dapuly Ghlel, P02, or, in their 2bsencs, the Seivor Operatfcna Qificer of tha National SIGINT Ogarations Sarter. The DBO orADDO shall ravizw all U3, Wentitias released by thase designees as soon aspraciinable aitsr e release is mada,\n(1}\nFor law enforcemant purposas invalving narcotics relatad information, DIRNSA has grartad ta the 0O asthority {o disseminate U8, identitizs.. This authority may not ba furthar delegated.\n\nCond Uy Privileged Communicalions dnd Criminal Activity.\n\n All praposed dissaminations of infarrmatian constituting U.S. PERSON privilegad communications {&.9., attorneyfellsnt, doctor/patiant) and ail nfarmtion concerning criminal activities or criminal or judicial procesdidgs in the UNITED STATES must ba reviewsd by ths Ofiice of Genaral Cotnse! prinr o dissemination.\n\n7.8,\n) Impeooer Digserningtlon.\n\n{1 tha:names of a-b).S. PERSON is Imoroperly disseminated, tha incident should he re 'porwd to PO2 within 24 hours of discovary of the arror.\n\n## Section 8 - Responsibilities\n\n&1, W) Inspector Gensral, The Inspector Genaral shall\n2, Condust regulae inspections and parform general pvarsight of NSAGSS aclivities to ensure comaliancs with this USSID.\n\nb.\n\nEslablizh prozadures for repacing by Key Companent and Fisld Chiefs of their activitios and practicss for eversight purpases,\n.\n\nRzportto the DIRNSACHCSS, annually by 31 Octabiar, consemning NSAGSS compliania with this USSID.\n\n3.\n\nReporl guariery with the DIRNSA/CHCSS and General Counzel to Ihe Presidzamts ntelligance Cversight Board through tha Assistant o the Secrslary of Deisnse (tntelligence Qwarsight).\n\n82,\n(U) Generat Goungel, The Gereral Coungel shall:\n;\na.\n\nProvide legal advics and assistance ta all elements of the USSS regarding SIGINT activilles.\n\nRequests for legal advice on any aspecs of thasa procedures shoukibe sent by CRITICOMHM ta DBIXD!, or by NSACSS secure: teiephcne%&fi??fl: Lo b, Prepareand process alf applications for Foreign Intalligence Surveiltance Court ordges and reoussis Jor Atorney General approvals raguirad by these procedures.\n\nc.\n\nAdvisa tha tnspector General in Inspections and oversight of USSS activities.\n\nd. Review and assess for legal implicalions as requested by the DIRNSA/CHCSS, Depuly Dirzctor, Inspactor Genaral ar Key Gomponents Cihisf, alt naw major requiremants and internally ganeratad USSS ectivities.\n\n&\nAdviza USSH personnel of new legislatian and asefaw that may alfect USES rissions, functions, opar atlons, activitizg,ar praclices.\n\nI, Aeport as raquirad to lhe Altormey General and the President's (ntelligence Ouersight Board and provida copies-of such reports fo the DIRNSA/CHCSS and affested agency afefents.\n\nN\ng.\n\nProcess requasis from any Dol intetllgence component for autharity i usz signals as daseribed in Progedure\n3, Part 5, of DoD 5240.1-8, for periods 1n excess of 90 days in tha devalopmeit, tast, or- calinration of ELECTROMIC SURVEILLANCE equipment and other equipmant that can Intarcept gammunications.\n\n3.3,\n(U) Dsputy Director for Cparations (BDQ).\n\nThe DDG shali:\na.\n\nErsure that alb SIGINT production parsorret understand and mairtain a Woh dagras of awareness and sensitivity Lo tha requirements of this U3sSID.\n\nb Apply the provisions of this USSIO fo alf SIGINT preduction activities. The DOQ staf facal goint for USSID 18 matters is P02 (use CRITICCMM DDI XAC).\n\no, Conducl necessary revigws of SIGINT produstion activities and gracticss t ensurg consistancy with this USSID.\n\n4.\n\nEnsure that all new malcr requirerents fevigd on the USSS or intarnalky genacatzd activities are.considated for reviaw by the General Counsal. Al activitles that raise questicns of faw o ths proper interpratation of this USSID must ba raviawsad by the Ganaral Counsel prior to accaptance or axecution.\n\n3.4,\n(U)\nAl Elemenis of the USSS.\nAl elaments of the LUSSS shall\na.\ntmplament this dicactive upon racaipl.\nb.\n\nFrepare new procedures or amend or supplement aisting procedurss as ranulrad ta ensura adhsranse to this USSID. A copy of such procadures shall 9 forwarded to NSASCSS, Afine POA.\n\ni3, Immadiataly Inform ha<DDCG of any tasking or insteuclipns thee appadr to requice actons at varance with this USSID.\n\nd.\n\nPromptiy raport Lo the NSA Inspector Ganeral and consult wilh the NSA Genaral Courdisal on sl activities that may raise 4 question of conplianca with this USSID,\n\n## 'Section 9 - Definitions\n\n9.1, ~{5-666) AGENT OF & FOREIGN POWER means:\n3, Anyperson, olhef than.a U.S, PERSON, who:\n{11\nAgls in the UMITED STATES as an afiicar of employse of a FOREIGN POWER, ar 43\na membes of 4 group engaged in INTERNATIOMAL TERRORAISK or activities in preparativmiberglor or\n{2)\n-Acisiaor oroa behalf of, a FOREIGM POWER that engages in clandasting Intelig ance zolivities in the UNITED STATES contrary 1o the interesls of the UNITED STATES, when the cireumstancas oF such p2eson's presance inthe UNITED STATES indicats that such 0er=on may engadein suctvactivities inthe UNITED:STATES, or whan such persen knowingly aids or abets. any pPrSOfl In the conduct.of such acfiviliza o knovdngly conspires with any person to-engage In such acthvities;\nb Any person, including & U.S. PERSON, who\n{1}\nKnowingly sngages in clandssting intelligance gathering activities-for, or on behaif of, a FOREIGN POWER, whish activitias inveive, or may lnvolva, a violation of the crimingl statutes o7 the UNITED STATES: er\n()\nPursuanrttothe ditection of an intalligance seivice of network.of 2 FOREIGM POWER\nkaawingly engages in any ather clandesting irteligencs activitlas for, of on behalf of, such r-OFIEEGI' POWER, which sctvities Involve o ara atiout to Invalvs, a violation of the crimingl statutas of the UNITED\nSTATES; r\n{13}\nKnowingly enganges in sabotaga or INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM, or agtivities ihat ara in preparation therefor, for or on berall of 2 FOREIGN FOWER: or\n(4\nKnawingly aids or sbets any persen in the condust of 2clivitizs described in paragraghs\n8.1.0.{1) through (3) or knowingly conspires with any person to engage in thoss activities,\n.\n\nFor alf purposes othier than thg conduct of ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE as defined by tha Fareign Inteliigence Suneilfance Act (see Annex A}, the phrass \"AGENT OF A FOREIGN POWER\" also meaans any persan, including U.S. PERSONS outside the UNITED STATES, who ara officers ar umptoyaas ol a FOREIGN POWER, ar who act unlawiully for or pursuant to the dicaction of a FQREIGN POWER\nwiho are in sortact with or acting in ouifaboration with an int=iiigence or security service ot a FORE GN\nPOWER for the purpose of praviding acsess to information ar materal classified by tha UNITED 5TATE\nGovernment and t9 which the parson has or has had access. The mers lact that a parsen's astivitlas may banefiv or fyrthar the alms of @ FOREIGN PCAWER is nat snough fo bring that parson under this provig e, abisent avidence that the parson is taking direction from or acting i knowing concart with. & FOREIGH\nPOWER;\n9.2\n~{6y COLLECTION means\n[nientional taskitg of SELECTION\nof identified nanpublic adrtmynicatians for subssquerit progagsing aimid st reporting or retention as  {ife record,\n9.3,\n(U) COMMUMICANT maans & sender of interded recipient of & communication.\n\n9.\n\n(U} COMMUNICATIONS ABOUT A LS, PERSON are these in which the UG, PERSCN i3\nIdentified it the communication. A U.S. PERSON is identifted when the person'a nams, unique titfe, address, or other persanal identifier s revealed in tha eommunication i the context af activitles gondueted by that pefson of zctivities conducted by ofhars and related to that parson, A mera raferenca to a product by rand nams of manufaclurers nama, 2.9.. \"Boeing 707\" is ot an identificatian of a U.S, parson.\n\n3.5.\n\n (Uy CONSENT, for SIGINT purposes, means an agreement by a pasgon.or arganization Yo p2rrrit the USES to fake particufar actions that affect tha parsen or organization. An agresment.by anorganization with {ha National Security Agercy to permit COLLECTION of Information shall be deemed valid CONGEMT\nit givan on benalf of such erganizatian by an etficial or goverming bedy. determinse by the General Counssl, Natioral Security Agancy, to have actual ar apparet autharity to make sucky an agreement.\n\n9.8,\n(U} CORPORATIOMS, for purposes af this USSID, ars ertities legally retognized as separdis from tha parsons who formed, ewn, or rua e, CORPORATIONS have the natlonality af the nalion state under whose Jaws thay were formed. Thus, CORPORATIONS incomporaied undar LINITED STATES federal or state law are U.S, PERSONS,\n8.7,\n(W) ELECTROMNIC SURVEILLANGE maans!\n\na.\n\nInths oasa of an elzctronic communisadion, tha acaulsifion of a nanpubliz communication oy stecironic means without the CONSENT of a parsen who is & pady to the communicatian.\n\nb, Intha.casa of a nonelectronic communication, ihe acquisition af a nonpubliz communicaticn by efectropic maans without tha CONSENT of a parson wha is visibly presant at the place of communication.\n\na.\n\nThe lerm ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANGE doas rol inglude the use of radia dicaction {inding saquiament solely to detantling the location of a fransmitter.\n\n9.8. ~S. FOREIGN COMMUNIGATION\nmeans a cemmunication that has at lsast cne COMMUNICANT oulside of the UNITED STATES, or that is anfirely among FOREIGM POWERS or bebwaen a FOREIGN POWER and cfiicials of a FOREIGH POWER, bul dess act Includs comimunications intarceotsd by ELEGTRQNIC SURVEILLANCE directed at premises in the UNITED STATES used peedominantty for residential purposss.\n\n9.9.\n\n(U} FOREIGM INTELLIGENCE maans infgsmiation relating to {he capabilities, Intaailens, and activities of EOREIGN POWERS, organizations, or persens, and for purposes af this USSIR incledes aoth positive FOREIGN IMTELLIGENGE and caumarintelligence.\n\n$,10.\n\n(U} FOREIGN POWER azans:\n\na.\nA lorelgn govemment or any componegal thareal, whether or not recegnized by ths UNITED\n~\nb, Aaction of a foreign naticn or fations, not substantially composad of UMITED STATES\nPERSOMS,.\n\nc.\n\nAn entity that Is openly acknowlsdged by a foreign gevernment or goveraments 1 be\n'diraeied and controllad by such (oreigr government or governments, d, A groug engaged in INTERNATIOMAL TERRORISM or activitles in preparation thecelar;\ne, A fareign-basad pofitical organization, not substantislly compesed of UNITED STATES\nPEASONS, or\n1.\n\nAnanlity that fs:directed and contralled by a lersign geveroment or governmants.\n\n911, Uy INTERCEPRTION means the gequisition by the USSS rrongh slectronic means of a nonpubiz cammunicalinn {o which it is net art Interdad party, and the processing of the contents of thay communication irto ae intelfigibie form, dut doss nat insluds tha display of signals on viseal gjsplay devites intendad to permit the axamination of the teshnical characteristics of the signals without rafaranca ts g infoemabon content carrizg iy the slgnal\n9,12,\n(U} INTERNATICNAL TERROSAISM means zctivities that\n.\n\nTnviive viglent acts or acts danderdus to human lifa that are & violation of tha crimingl faws of g LINET ED STATES or of any Siate, of that vauld be a criminat volation If committed withia tha jurisdiction o the UNITED STATES or any Sizta, ang\n\nb,\nAppearto bentande:\n(1)\n iointimidate orcosrea a clvilian gopulation,\n(2)\nteinfiuance\nthe policy of a govarnimeant by inlimidatlon or coarcion, or\n{3y\ntoaffect the cenduct of a gavernment by assassinatico or Kdnapping. and\n&, Cleeur totally oulside the UNITED STATES, or transtend nalicnal bountfarizs in terms of tha maans by which they ara accompiished, the pa .%cn; they appear intended lo cosrce ar Intimidate, or he lacate In which their perpetralors eperate or sesk agylum,\n913,\n{U) PUBLICLY AVAILABLE INFORMATION means informailon that has besen publishec or broadeast for ganeral public corumm,nnn Is available on requast to.a mamber of the general public, has baen sgen ar heard Dy 3 casual obsarver, or is made avdilable st 8 meeting open o the ganaral public,\n19, O SELECTON, e ool o st \"\"'Tllvlll\"m means e intentional :mer!!cn ofal\n:me's&aifir?g_ of ins\n918, {C) SELECTION TERM mgang the compasite of individual terms. usad to eifsct or defeat SELEGTION of particufar communicalions for the purpose of INTERCEPTION. It comprises the andlre tenm or serles of terms so-used, but not any segregablaterm contained therain.\n\nIt applies to Lath elzetronic and manual processing.\n\n## .16. (U) Target, Or Targeting: Sse Collection.\n\n9.f7.\n\n{U) UNITED STATES, when Used geographically, incttides ihe\n50 states and ke District of Columbla, Puerto Rico, Girarn, Amarican Samog. ha U.8. Virgin\n[ Slands, the Nefihern Manana Istands, aad any other temritery or possassion over which the URITED STATES exercisas sovareigily.\n\n## 9,18, 6}Funited States Person:\n\na.\nAcilizen of the UNITED.STATES,\nb\nAn atien lawully admittad for patmanent residence\nin the UNITED STATES,\n, Urincarporaiad groups and assceiaiions a substantial nurmber of the members-aof bl gonslitute a.0r\n0. abova, or d. GORPOAATIOMS\nircorporated In the WNITED\nSTATES, including WS, fiag nongavarnmantal aitcrall or vessels, bul not including those entties which ara opanly acknowlednes by a fareign govarnment or governments to be directed and sontrofled by them.\n\n5.\n\nThe following guldsines apply In determining whather a person is-a .8, BER3OM:\n(1}\nAperson known i be cureenily in the United Statas will b2 reated as a WS, PERSCM\nunless that pedson is reasonably Idartilied as an alizn who has not been admiied for parmansrk ragsidence of if the-nalure of the peeson's commuricalions or.cthar indicia in the sontenis or slreumstances of such connunications give rise toa reazonable hatial that such persan is nata .S, PERSOM.\n\n(8\nA persan known tg be cureantly outside the URITED'STATES, or whoge Iecation is ot knowr, wilh not b8 fredted 23 a U.S. PERSON unless such person 43 reasunably dantified as sush ar the nature of Ihe parson's communications or other indicia i e contents or eirsurnstances of such compiunications give rise to 2 reasonable beliel Ihat such pargen js a U.S, PERSON,\n(3y\n& person known to be an afian admittad for permanent rasidence may ba assuned 1o have lost stalus as 2 U.S. PERSCN if the parson leaves the UNITED STATES and it is known that tha parsen i3 not in compliance with the admimstrative formalities provided by law (8 U.S.C. Section 1203} trat anable sich parsons to reenter the UNITED STATES without regac] fo tive. provisions of lww that would otarwise reatint an alien's antey Inle the UNITED STATES. Tha faitue 10 fellove tha statutory procedures provides a raqsanable Dasis (o conciuds that such alies has abanconed any intention ol maintzining status as a permanent ragidant alien,\n{4}\nAn unincorporaled assosiation whoss headquacters.\n\nare located qutside the UNITED\nSTATES may be peesumed not toba 2 U3, PERSOMN unless the USSS has Information indicating that a stbsfartial numbee of members afs citkzens af tha UMITED STATES o aliens lawdully adrmitied for permarniant rasidencs,\n{5)\nCOHFORATIC'N'-: haye the nationaily of the natign- state I\nwhich\n{hey are incorperated, CORPORATIONS farmed under LLS. fadaral or state [dw are thus LS. parsans, aven-if the enrporate stosk is foreign-owned. Tha only exception set forth above is CORPORATIONS which arg opanly acflnovedged to be directzd and contralled by forsign govarsments, Corversely, CORPORAATIONS\nincorparated In-forgign couritries are not U.8. FERoONS aven if that CORPORATION Is a subsidiary ofa U.5. CORPORATIOH..\n\n{8)\nNongovemimsntal ships and aircralt are tagal entitiss and have the naticnallty of the country imwhich they are registerad. Ships and aircraft ty tha flag and are subjectto ths Taw of their place of registration, il\n-\nIR\nE\no o L\ni N\nNo. OP 2008-0009\n\n# Office, Of The Director Of National Intelligence Office Of The Inspector General ~S#Nf)Review Of The Participation Of The Office Of The Director Of National Intelligence In The President's Surveillance Program July 2, 2009\n\n-------\n.\n\nBY:\n2385885\nS5~06, P\nopenmn fomr oyt\n[\not/ LR oeohl JAXTatria Il w3\nA\nR\n7\nT\n7\nTS CANT IR IR\nThis 'page intentionally left blank.\n\n## (U) Table Of Contents\n\nPAGE\nN\n(U) EXECUTIVE SUMMARY\n(U) INTRODUCTION\n\nIl\n(U) SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY\nIIL\n(U) DISCUSSION\nOF FINDINGS\nv,\nA.\n(@)\nInitial Response by the President and Congress o\nthe Terrorist Attacks of September 11, 2001 (1)\n\nB. -(-ES#STEW'SHF@G#NF-) 'ODNI Role in Preparing Threat\nAssessments in Support of the Program\nPy NCTC Use of the Program to\n13\nE. (ESHSTLWHSHOEMNE NCTC Role in Identifying Program\nTargets or Tasking Collection -\n13\nT. <(S/NF)- ODNI Oversight of the Program\n16\n(U) CONCLUSION\n17\n\nVI.\n(U) APPENDIX - STRUCTURE OF THE ODNI\n- 2005\nThis page intentionally left blank.\n\n## ~S#E). Review Of The Participation Of The Office Of The Director Of National Intelligence In The President's Surveillance Program L (U) Executive Summary\n\n(TSHSTE\nA\nThe Office of [nspector General (OIG), Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI), was one of five Intelligence Community Tnspectors General that conducted a review of their agency's participation in the President's Surveillance Program (hereafter \"the ProgramTM), a top secret National Security Agency (NSA) electronic surveillance activity undertaken at the direction of the President, The Program became operational on October4, 2001, three-weeks after the deadly terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. The review examined the ODNI's involvement i the Program from the period beginning with the stand-up of the ODNI in April 2005 through the termination of the Program in January 2007.\n\n:\nv The ODNI's primary role in the Program was the preparation:of the threat assessments that summarized the al Qaeda terrorist threat to the.\n\nTUnited States and were used to support the periodic reauthorization of the Program. That tole began in April 2005, shortly after the ODNI stand-tip and contemporaneous with the:\narrival of General Michael Hayden as the first Principal Deputy Director of National Inteiligence (PDDNI). Prior to his ODNI appointiment, Hayden was Director of NSA, Tn April 2005, ODNI personnel in the National Counterterrorism Center: (NCTC) began to prepare the first of 12 Program threat assessments. In coordination with the Department of Justice (DOJ), then D irector of National Intelligence (DNT) John Negroponte or PDDNI Hayden approved 12 ODNI-prepared threat assessments over an\n18-month period. Once approved by the DNI or PDDNI, the Program threat assessments were reviewed and approved by the Secretary of Defense, and were subsequently used by DOIJ, NS4, and White House personnel in support of the Program reauthorization. In\n'\ntion of the threat assessments, we found that NCTC used Program\n:\nDuring the review, we made several related findings and observations. We learned that the ODNI usage of Program-detived information in ODNI intelligence products was consistent with the standard rules and procedures for handling NSA intelligence. We learned that ODNI personnel were not involved in nominating specific targets for c i qugh the Proeram. While ODNI personnel were identified as having contac\n'\nProgram, we found that those communications were limited in frequency and scope. We also found that the ODNI intelligence oversight components -- the Civil Liberties Protection Officer (CLPO), Office of General Counsel (OGC), and the OIG -- had little ivolvement in oversight of the Program and had limited opportunity to participate in Program oversight due to delays in ODNI oversight personnel being granted access to the S WA\nA% AN (AR\nR\nProgram and temporary resource limitations attendant to the stand-up of the ODNIL, Finally, we found that the 2008 amendmients to Executive Order 12333 and the-current\n'ODNI staffing levels provide the ODNT oversight components with sufficient resources and authority to fulfill their current oversight responsibilities, assuming timely tiotification.\n\n## I, (U) Introduction\n\n~(ESHSTEWHSHOERY\nThe Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act Amendments Aet of 2008, Pub L. No. 110-261, 122 Stat. 2438 (hereafter \"FISA Amendiments Act\")\nrequired the [Gs of the DOJ, ODNI, NSA, Department of Defenses (DOD), and any other clement of the intelligence.community that participated in the President's Surveillance Program to conduct a comprehensive review of the Program.' The FISA- Amendments Act defined the \"President's Surveillance Program\" as the \"intelligence activity involving communications authorized by the President during the period beginning.on September\n11,2001, and ending on January 17, 2007, including the program referred to by the P.ljcsident in a radio address on December 17, 2005.\" In response to this-tasking, the [Gs oF the following five agencies were identified as hiaving a role in Program review: DOJ,\n'ODNL NSA, DOD, and thie Central Intelligence Agency (CIA).\n\n(SHNE)- The participating IGs organized-the review in a manner where each o1G\nconducted a review of its own agency's involvement in the Program. CIA IG John Helgerson was initially designated by the IGs to coordinate the teview and oversee the preparation of an interim report due within 60 days after the enactment ofthe Act, and a later final report due not later than 1 year after the enactment of the Act? Because of IG\nHelgerson's.recent retirement, DOJ [G Glenn Fine was selected to coordinate the preparation of the final report. This report contains the results of the ODNI OIG review.\n\n## Iil (U) Scope And Methodology\n\n:\nWe sought to identify the role of the ODNI in implementing the Program beginning with the stand-up of the ODNI in April 2005\nthrough the Program's termination in January 2007. This review examined the:\n\nA.\nRole of the ODNI and its component the National Counterterrorisn Center\n(NCTC) in drafting and coordinating the threat assessments that supported the\nperiodic reauthorization of the Program;\nLW AN A AW\n\nB. NCTC's iise of Program information to. support counterterrofism analysis;\ndentifying Program targets and tasking Program collection;\n\n## F. Role-Of The Odni In Providing Compliance Oversight Of The Program.\n\nNE)-\nDuring the review, we interviewed 23 eurrent ot former ODNI officials and employees involved in the Program. The ODNI 'pe'rsonne'l we interviewed were cooperative and helpful. Our interviews included the following ODNI\nsenior offieials:\nJ th Negroponte, formepDireCtor of National Intelligence Michael McConnell, former Director of National Intelligence\n'\nMichael V. Hayden; foriner Principal Deputy Director of National Intelligence Ronald Burgess, former Acting Principal Deputy Director of National Intelligence David R. Shedd, Deputy Director of National Intelligence for Policy, Plans, and Requirements Alexander W. Joel, Civil Liberties Protection Officer Edward Maguire, former Tnspector General Benjamin Powell, former General Counsel Corin Stone, Deputy General Counsel and Acting General Counsel Joel Brenner, former 'National Counterintelligence Executive'\nJohn Scott Redd, former NCTC Director Michael Leiter, NCTC Director I5)-\nIn addition to the interviews noted above, we reviewed Program-telated.\n\ndocumefits m'ade' available by the NSA OIG, the DOJ OIG, and the ODNI OGC.\n\n## Iv. (U) Discussion Of Findings\n\n:\n\nNET\nThe following discussion contains our findings regarding the topics identified above.\n\nF irst, we briefly describe the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, and the initial government response to the attacks, including the authorization of the President's Surveillance Program. Next, we discuss the ODNI and NCTC role in implementing the Program.\n\nFinally, we set forth our conclusions and observations.\n\n## A. (U) Initial Response By The President And Congress To The Terrorist Attacks Of September 11, 2001\n\n(U) The devastating al Qaeda terrorist attacks against the United States quickly triggered an unprecedented military and intelligence community response to protect the o\n)\ncountry from additional attacks. The following quote describes the initial tervorist attacks and the intended al Qaeda goal to deliver a decapitating strike against our political institutions.\n\n(U) OnSeptember 11, 2001, the al Qaeda terrorist network launched a set.of coordinated attacks along the Fast Coast of the United States. Four commercial airliners; each-carefiilly-selected to be fully loaded with jet fuel for a transcontinental flight, were hijacked by al Qaeda operatives. Two of the jetliners were targeted at the Nation's financial center in New York and were deliberitely flown into the Twin Towers of the World Trade Center. The third was targeted at the-headquarters of the Nation's Armed Forces, the Pentagon. The fourth was apparently lieaded toward Washington, D.C., when passengers struggled with the hijackers and the plane crashed in Shankswlle Pennsylvania, The intended target of this fourth jetliner was evidently the White Hause or the Capitol, strongly suggesting that its intended mission was to strile a decapitation blow on the Government of the United States - to kill the President, the Vice President, or Members of Congress. The attacks of September 11\" resulted in approxnnately\n3,000 deaths - the highest single-day death toll from hostile foreign attacks in the Nation's history.*\n(U)\nOn September 14, 2001, in response to the attacks, the President issued a Declaration of National Emergency by Reason of Certain Terrorist Altacks stating that\n\"(a) national emergency exists by reason of the terrorist attacks at the World Trade Center; New York, New York, and the Pentagon, and continuing immediate threat of further attacks on the United States.\"TM\n(U)\nOn September 18, 2001, by an overwhelming majority in both the Senate and House of Representatives, a joint resolution was passed that authorized the use of United States military force against those responsible for the terrorist attacks launched\n-against the United States. Thc joint resolution, also known as the Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMEF), is often cited by White House and DOJ officials as one of the principal lea1 anthorities upon which the Program is based.\n\nIn relevant part, the AUMF\nprovides:\n(a) IN GENERAL -~ That the President is authorized to use all necessary and appropriate force against those nations, organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized, cominitted or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September\n11, 2001, or harbored such organization or persons, in order to prevent any future acts of international terrofisin against-the United States by such nations, organizations or persons.\n\nHSTE\nA~\nOn October 4, 2001, three days before the start of overt military action against the al Qaeda-and Taliban terrorist camps, the President authorized the Secretary of Defense to implement the President's Surveillance Program.\" The Program, a closely held top-secret NSA electronic surveillarice project, authorized the Secretary of Defense to employ within:the United States the capabilities of the DOD, including but not limited to the signals intelligence capabilities of the NSA, to collect international terrorism-related foreign intelligence information under certain specified circumstances. Bach Program reauthorization was supported by a written threat assessment, approved by a senior Intelligence Community official, that described the threat of a terrorist attack against the United States.\n\n'\n(U) On October 7, 2001, ina national television broadcast, the President annotnced the start of military operations against al Qaeda-and Taliban terrorist camps in Afghanvistan.3\n:\nOn April 22, 2005, the ODNI began operations as. the newest member of the Intelligence Community. The ODNI was created, in part, in response to the findings of the Independent National Commission-on Terrorist Anacks Upon the United States (hereafter 9/11 Commission) that recommended the creation of a national \"Director of National Intelligence\" to oversee and coordinate the planning, policy, and budgets of the Tritelligence Community.\" In late. April 2005, ODNI personnel began to prepare the threat assessments used in the periodic reauthorization of the Program.\n\nIn June 2005, ODNI officials began to approve the-fhreat assessments.\n\n## B. (Eshstewhsthoe/H) Odni Role In Preparing Threat Assessments In Support Of The Program Reauthorizations\n\nST\nPrior to the ODNI's involvement in the Program, the Program was periodically reauthorized approximately every 30 to 45 days pursuant io a reauthorization process overseen by DO, NSA, and White House personnel, Each reauthorization relied, in part, on a written threat assessment approved by a senior Intelligence Community official that described the current threat of a terrorist attack against the United States and contained the approving official's recommendation regarding the need to reauthorize the Program. Before the ODNT's involvement in the LCESHSTLWAHSHOEAHE) The NSA mateals we reviewed identified October 4, 2001, as the date of the tirst Program aulhorization.\n\nProgram; every threat assessment prepared by the Intelligence Community in support of the Program reauthorization identified the threat of a terrorist attack against the United States and recommended that the Program be reauthorized. Accordingly, the Program was regularly reauthorized during the approximately 3-year period prior to the involvement of the ODNI. During that penocl the Director of Central Intelligence or his designee approved 3 1 threat assessments in support of the reauthorization of the Program.\n\n(TSHSTEWHSHOEAE- In reviewing the circumstances that led to the decision to transfer responsibility for preparing the Program threat assessments to the ODNI, we found that the ODNI does not have identifiable records regarding that decision. Senior ODNI officials involved with the Progiam told us that after the merger of the Terrorist Threat Integration Center (TTIC) into the NCTC, and the later incorporation of NCTC\ninto the ODNI, it made sense for the ODNI to take responsibility for preparing the Program threat assessments as both TTIC and NCTC previously handled that task.\n\nFormer PDDNI Hayden told us that the primary reasort that the ODNI become involved in the Program was the statutory creation of the new DNI position as the senior Intelligence Community adviser to the President. When Ambassador Negroponte was confirmed as the first DNI, Hayden and other senior intelligence officials believed that DNI Negroponte, as the President's new senior intelligence advisor, should make the Intelligence Community's recomimendation to the President Legardmg the need to renew the Program. Hayden commented that the new DNI's involvement in this important intelligence program enhanced the DNI's role as the leader of the Intelligence\n'Community and gave immediate credibility to the ODNI as a new intelligence agency.\n\n(ESHSTEWHSHOEAT) Once the ODNI became involved in the Program, the:\npreparation and approval of the threat assessments became the ODNI's primary Program role.\" Beginning in Aprll 2005, and continuing at about 30 to 45 day intervals until the Program's termination in January 2007, ODNI personnel prepared and approved 12\nwritten threat assessments in support of the periodic reauthorization of the Program. We found that the ODNI threat assessments were drafted by experienced NCTC personnel who prepared the documents following an established DOJ format used in earlier Program reauthorizations. NCTC analysts prepaled the threat assessments in a memorandum format, usually 12 to 14 pages in length. Senior ODNI and NCTC officials told us that each threat assessment was intended to set forth the ODNT's view regarding\n_the cuirent threat of an al Qaeda attack against the United States and to provide the DNT's recommendation whether to continue the Program. NCTC personnel involved in preparing the threat assessments told us that the danger of a terrorist attack described in the threat assessments was sobering and \"scary,\" resulting in the threat assessments becoming known by ODNI and Intelligence Community personnel involved in the Program as the \"scary memos.\"\n(ESHSTEWASTHOGATEY- During interviews, ODNI personnel said they were aware that the threat assessments were relied upon by DOJ and tlie White House as the basis for continuing the Program and further understood that if a threat assessment identified a threat against the United States, the Program was likely to be reauthorized.\n\nNCTC analysts also said that on a less frequent basis they prepared a related document that set forth a list of al Qaeda-affiliated groups that they understood were targets ofthe Program. Both the threat assessments and the less frequent list of al Qaeda-affiliated groups underwent the same ODNI approval process.\n\n(ESHSTLWHSIHOC/NE). We examined the ODNI process for preparing the Program documents, particularly the threat assessments, and found that the documents were drafted by experienced NCTC analysts under the supervision of the NCTC Director and his management staff, who were ultimately responsible for the accuracy of the information in the documents. We determined that the ODNI thireat assessments were prepared using evaluated intelligence information chosen from a wide-variety of Intelligence Community sources. ODNI personnel told us that during the period when the ODNI prepared the threat assessments, the Intelligence Community had access to fully evaluated intelligence that readily supported the. ODNI assessments that al Qaeda terrorists remained a significant threat to the United States.\n\n|\n(TSYSTLW//SUIQCNE)- Once the ODNI threat assessients were approved within NCTC and by the NCTC Director, the documents were forwarded through an established approval chain to senior ODNI personnel who independently satisfied theniselves that the documents were accurate, properly prepared, and in the appropriate format. Throughout the ODNI preparation and approval process, the threat assessments were also subject to varying degrees of review and comment by DOJ and OGC attorneys, including then General Counsel Benjamin Powell and Deputy General Counsel Corin Stone. Powell said his review of the threat assessments was not a legal review, but was focused on spotting issues that might merit further review or analysis. Powell said he velied on DOJ to conduct the legal review. Once the draft threat assessments were subjected to this systematic and multi-layered management and legal review, the documents were provided to the DNI or PDDNI for consideration and, if appropriate, approval. Overall, we found the process used by the ODNI to prepare and obtain approval of the threat assessments was straightforward, reasonable, and consistent with the preparation of other documents requiring DNT or PDDNI approval.\n\n:\n.\n\nNegroponte told us that because of time-sensitive issues present in 2005 relating to the ongoing ODNT start-up as a new agency and other Intelligence Community matters requiring his attention, he tasked his deputy, then PDDNI Hayden, to oversee the ODNI approval of the threat assessments and related documents. Negroponte told us that when making this decision, he was aware of Hayden's prior experience with the Program during Hayden''s earlier assignment as Director of NSA.\n\nIn June 2003, shortly after his arrival at ODNI, Hayden received and approved the first ODNI threat assessment. Hayden later approved the next six ODNI\n{hreat assessments. After Hayden left the ODNI in May 2006 to become Director of CIA, Negroponle approved the next five ODNI threat assessments, including a December\n2006 threat:assessment used in the final reanthorization of the Program. In total,\n'Negroponte and Hayden approved 12 ODNI threat assessments prepared in support of the Program reauthornizations. h\n(ESASTEW/STHOCINEY In discussing the ODNI process used to prepare and\n.\n\napprove the threat assessments, Negroponte told us he was \"extremely satisfied\" with the.\n\nquality and content of the threat assessments provided for his approval. He did not recall any inaccuracies or problems relating to preparation of the ODNI threat assessments, Negioporite said the a1 Qaeda threat information described in the Program threat assessments was consistent with the terrorism threat information found in The President's Daily Briefing and other senior-level Intelligence Community products he had read.\n\nHayden had a similar view. Negroponte and Hayden separately told us that when they approved the threat assessments, credible intelligence was readily available to the Intelligence Community that demonstrated the ongoing and dangerous al Qaeda terrorist threat to the United States. Similarly, Negroponte and Hayden each told us that the nature and scope of the al Qaeda terrorist threat to the United States was well documented and easily supported the ODNI threat assessments used in the Program reauthorizations.\n\n(ESHSTEWASTHOCAIE). Because of questions raised in the media about the legal basis for the Program, we asked the ODNI personuiel involved in the preparation ot approval of the threat assessments about their concerns, if any, regarding the legal basis for the Program, We found that ODNI personnel involved in the Program generally understood that the Program had been in operation for several years and was approved by senjor Intelligence Community and DOJ officials. During our interviews, ODNI officials told us-they were satisfied with the legal basis for the Program, primarily because of their kriowledge that the Attomey General and senior DOJ attorneys had petsonally approved the Program-and remained directly involved in the Program reauthorization process, We did not identify any ODNI personnel who believed that the program was unlawful.\n\n~(ESHSTEWHSHOEATY Former ODNI General Counsel Powell told us that after his Program briefings in carly 2006, he had questions regarding the DOJ descr 1pt10n of the legal authorlty for the Program buit lacked the time to conduct his own legal review of the issue given the many time-sensitive ODNI legal issues that required his aftention.\n\nPowell said he understood the rationale of DOJ's legal opinion that the Program was lawful and described the DOJ opinion as a \"deeply complex issue\" with \"legal scholarship on both sides.\" Powell said he recoguized that he was a latecomer to a complex legal issue that was previously and continuously approved by DOJ, personally supported by the Attorney General, and was being transitioned to judicial oversight an idea he strongly supported. Powell said he relied on the DOJ legal opinion regarding the Program and directed his efforts to supporting the Program's transition to judicial oversight under traditional FISA, the 2007 Protect America Act, and the subsequent FISA\nAmendments Act of 2008.\n\n\" CrSHSTEWHSTHOCANE The DNIand PDDNI together approved 12 of the 43 threat assessments used in suppott of the Program reauthorizations. CIA. officials approved the other 31 threat assessments,\n;\n;\nB)\nNegroponte recalled having regular contact with senior NSA and DOJ fficials who raised no legal concerns to him about the Program. He said he remembered attending a Program-related meeting that included members of the FISA\nCourt who did not raise any legal concems to him about the authority for the Program\n-and seemed generally supportive of the Program. Negroponte also recalled attending meetings in which the Programwas briefed to congressional leadership who not did raise legal concerns to him. Overall, the direct involvement of DOJ and other senior Tntelligence Community officials in the Program resulted in Negroponte and other ODNI\npersonnel having few, if any, concemms about the legal basis for the Program.\n\n## C. (Fshstewhshheemati-Nctc Use Of Program Information To Support Counterterrorism Analysis\n\nST\nEAEY-\nThe Program information was closely held within the ODNI and was made available t no more than\n15 NCTC analysts for review and, if\n\n:\nIyt ductz.'?\n\nGenerally, tha NCTC analysts\n51\ns\n3\nhandling of NSA intelligence. They said they han led the NSA inteiligence, including Program information, consistent with the standard rules and procedures for handling NSA\nintelligence information, including the minimization of U.S. person identities;\nHayden told us that during his tenure as Director of y During our review, NCTC analysts told us they often ence-available to them was derived from the Program.\n\nknew that 4 particular' NSA mtelllgence product was derived fromi the Program, the\n-analysts: said they reviewed the Program information in the same manner as other NSA\nintelligence products and, if appropriate, incorporated tlie Program. information into analytical products being prepared for the DNI and cther senior intelligence officials.\n\nThey-identified the President s Terrorisim Threat Report and the Senior Executive Terrorism Report as examples of the types of finished intelligence products that would, at hmea., contain Program information.\n\nCESHSTEWHSHEOEAT)~ NCTC analysts with Program aecess said they had broad access to a- wide variety of high quality and fully evaluated terrorism related intelligence, Tn particular, NCTC analysts told us that by virtue of their NCTC\nassignments, they had access to some of the most sensitive and valuable terrorism intelligence available to the Intelligence Commiinity. NCTC analysts cliaracterized the Program information as being a useful tool, but also noted that the Program information was only one of several valuable sources of information available to them from numerous:\ncollection sources and methods. During llltCLVLGWb NCTC analysts and otlier ODNI\ngersonnel described the Program information as \"one tool in the tool box,\" \"one arrow in the quiver,\"\nor in other similar phrases to-connote that the Program information was not of greater value than other sources of intelligence. The NCTC analysts we interviewed.\n\nsaid: they could uot 1dent1fy prClfiC ewnples whew the Plogram mtmmatlon plowded the pBI'lOd. when NCTC pr epared the tlueat assessment memoranda, the: mtelllgence demonstrating the al Qaeda threat to the United States was overwhelming and readily available to the Intelligence Community.\n\nCESHSTLWASTHOC/NE). When asked about the value of the Program, Hayden said \"without the Program as a skimish line you wouldn't know what you don't know.\"\nHe explained that by using the Program to look at a \"quadrant of communications\" the Intelligeiice Community was able to assess the threat arising from those communications, which allowed Intelligerice Community leaders to make valuable judgments regarding the allocation of national security resources. He said looking at the terrorist threat in this manner was similar to soldiers on a combat patrol who look in all directions for the threat and assign resources based on what they learn. Hayden said that NSA General Counsel Vito Potenza often described the Program as an \"early waming system\" for terrorist threats, which Flayden thought was an acculate desurlptlon of the Program. Hayden told us the Program was extr terrorist attack. Hayden as examples where eratives.\"\n\n## E. (Lfs#Slph'Wswg&'Nf') Nn Nctc Rolein [Denhfymg Program Targets And Tasking Collection\n\n~FSHSTEWHSTHOEAFr We did not. identify any information that indicated that ODNI or NCTC personnel were involved in identifying or nominating targets for collection within the Program, ODNI personnel told us-that ODNI.and NCTCare noioperational elements of the Intelligence Community and wete-not involved in nominating targets-for Program collection.\n\n'\n\n## F.~5Ahh- Odni Oversight Of The Program\n\n~(ESHSFLW/STHOCINE). We examined the role of the ODNI oversight components -- CLPO, OIG; and OGC -~ in providing compliance oversight for the Program, We foiind that while the Program was subject to oversight by the NSA OIG, the-:ODNI oversight components had a limited role-in proyiding oversight for the Program During the review, we leamed that within the first year of the Program, then NSA Director Hayden obtained White House approval allowing the NSA IG and designated NSA OIG offic1als to be read into the Program to provide compliance oversight foi the Program.\n\nIn furtherance of the NSA oversight program, the NSA IG\nprovided compliance reports and briefings to the- NSA Director, NSA Gencrfll Counsel,\n:and cleared White House personnel, including the Counsel to the President.'\nLESHSTENWHSHOEAN In reviewing the ODNI oversight role regarding the Program, we found that the ODNT oversight components had limited invelvement in oversight of the Program. We found that the opportunity for the ODNT to participate in Program oversight was limited by the fact that ODNI oversight. personnel were not and staff weie not read into the Program and did not receive compliance reports from the: NSA LG\ngranted timely access to the Program by the White House personnel responsible for approving access.\n\nIn addition, we found that the newly formed ODNI oversight offices were in varying stages of agency stand-up and lacked the necessary.experienced staff and resources to effectively participate in oversight of the Program.\n\n, Torrs T\nE/NT)\nFor example, General Counsel Powell received Prograin access after his arrival in January 2006, but his predecessor, then Acting General Counsel Corin Store, was not read into the Program until a few days before Powell in January 2006, several months after the Program becamie operational within ODNI and only after she had read about the Program in a December 2005 newspaper article.'\" Similaily, CLPO Alexander Joel, who is responsible for reviewing the privacy\n'and civil liberties implications of intelligence activities, requested but did not receive Program access until Octaber 2006, shortly before the Program terminated.' Joeltold us that Negroponte and Hayden supported his request for Program access, but White House staff delayed approval for several months. Joel said that while waiting for approval of his Program access, Hayden gave him some insight about the Program that did not require the disclosure of compartmented information. Joel found this information helpful in planning his later review, Finally, then ODNI Inspector General Edward Maguire.and his oversight staff did not obtain Program access until 2008, long after the Program had terminated. '\n;\n;\nY-\nOnce read into the Program, Powell and Joel were provided with reasonable access to NSA compliance reports and briefings relating to the NSA OIG oversight program. Powell told us that he was satisfied that the NSA 1G\nprovided a reasonable degree of Program oversight. Similarly, Joel said he believed that he had received full disclosure regarding the NSA oversight program and found the NSA\noversight effort to be reasonable.\n\n'\n5]\nWe also learned that the members of the President's Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board (PCLOB) reviewed the Program, in part, inassociation with JToel? The PCLOB review was contemporaneous with Joel's review\n17 (U//FOHE) Powell was appointed General Counscl in January 2006 and served in that position as a recess appointment until his Senate confirmation in April 2006. Prior to his appointment, Powell was an Associate Counsel to the President and Special Assistant to the President where he worked on Initiatives related to the Intelligence Comununity.\n\nHowever, Powell was not read into the Program while serving at the White House.\n\nS (UJAFOTO) Joel is the Civil Libertics Protection Officer (CLPO) with the responsibility for ensuring that the pratection of privacy and civil liberties is incorporated in the policies and procedures of the Intelligence Community.\n\nThe CLPO responsibilities arc set forth in the Section 103d of Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of\n2004,\n{2 8/mI-While OIG personnel were not read into the Program until 2008, OIG officials were alerted ta the existence of the NSA collection prograim through a December 2005 newspaper report. Shortly after that report, the NSA G told ODNI OIG officials that the NSA OIG was conducting oversight of that NSA program. PDDNI Hayden also told IG\nMagyiire that the NSA. program was subject to NSA OIG oversight.\n\nu (U) ThePCLOB. was created by the fintelligence Reform and Terrorisn Prevention Act.of 2004 (IRTPA), which requires the Board to \"ensure that concerns with respect to privacy and civil liberties arc appropriately considered in the implementation of laws, regulations, and execulive branch policies related to efforts to protect the Nation against terrorism (P.L. 103-458, 2004).\n\n;and resulted in-an independent and generally favorable finding regarding the' NSA.\n\nimplementation of the Program. After the PCLOB review, a PCLOB board meniber published:an editorial article, in part, quoted below, that summarized his observations tegarding the NSA effort in implementing the Program.\n\nThere were times, including when the Board was \"read into\" and given complete access to the operation of the Terrorist Surveillance Program that I wondered whether the individuals doing,this difficult job on behalf of all of us were not being too careful, too concemed, about going over'the privacy and liberties lines - so-concerned, with so many interal checks and balances, that they could miss catching or preventing the bad guys from another attack. And I remember walking out ofthese briefing sessions in some dark and super-secret ageiicy with the thought: I wish the Amencan people could meet these people and observe what thiey are.\n\ndoing \"\nSANFY- In sum, the ODNI oversight components had limited and belated involvement in the oversight of the Program. However, once read into the Program, Powell and Joel deterrnined that the Program was subject to reasonable oversight by the NSA OIG. Moreover, the initial White House delay in granting ODNI oversight personnel access to the Program occurred prior to the 2008 revision to. Executive Otder\n(EO) 12333, which expressly.grantsODNI oversight components. broad access to any information necessary to performing their oversight duties.\n\nIn particular, EO 12333\nprovides in relevant part that:\nSection 1.6 Heads of Elements of the Intelligence Community, The heads of'elements of the Intelligencee Comniunity shall:\n\n(h) Ensure that the inspectors general, general counsels, and agency\nofficials responsible for privacy and civil liberties protection for their\nrespective organizations have access to any information or intelligence\nnecessary to perform their duties.\n(FSHSTEWAHSTHOCATF)\nEO 12333, as amended, clarifies and strengthens the ODNT's ability to provide compliance oversight.\n\nIn light of the recent change to EO\n12333, and with current staffing, we believe that ODNI's oversight components have sufficient resources and authority to perform their responsibilities to conduct oversight of clogely held intelligence activities, assuming timely notification.\n\n## V. (U)Yconclusion\n\nS\nIOEAF We found that the ODNIs primary role in the Program was the preparation of 12 ODNI threat assessments approved by the DNT or PDDNI for use in the Program reauthorizations. The ODNI-prepared threat-assessments set forth the ODNU's view regarding the existing threat of-an al'Qaeda terrorist attack agdinst the United States and provided the DNI's recommendation regarding the need to reauthorize the Program. We found that the ODNI threat assessments were drafted by gxperienced NCTC personnel under the supervision of knowledgeable NCTC supervisors. We.noted that the threat assessments were subject to review by OGC and DOJ attorneys before approval. Additionally, we found that the process used by the ODNI to prepare and obtdin approval of the threat agsessments was straightforward, reasonable, and consistent with the preparation of other documents requiring DN approval. Overall, we found the ODNI process for the preparation and approval of the threat assessmerts was responsible and effective.\n\n;\n_\nNEWe also found that the ODNI oversight components played.a limited role in oversight of the Program. The limited ODNI oversight role was due to delays in obtaining Program access for ODNI oversight persopnel and to femporary resouice limitations related to the stand-up of the agency. However, we believe that the 2008 amendments to EO 12333.and improved staffing levels provide the ODNT oversight components with sufficient resources and authority to fulfill their current oversight responsibilities, assuming timely notification.\n\nThis page intentionally left blank.\n\nU.S. Department of Justice:\nOffice of the Inispector General\n\n# A Review Of The Department Of Justice's Involvement With The President's Surveillance Program (U)\n\nDepartment of Justice Office of the Inspector General Oversight and Review Division July 2009\n\n## . Table Of Contents\n\nCHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION\n(U} i\ne ST ereeren\n1\nI.\nMethodology of OIG Review (U).iiviiiaiiimiommnennienneneniininisinise\n3\nII.\n Organization of this Report\n(U) ..., e 5\nCHAPTER TWO: LEGAL AUTHORITIES\n(U} cvveverreerreeieiniinniiee e seenaene. 7\nI.\nConstitutional, Statutory, and Executive Order Authorities\n(U)........7\nA.\nArticle II, Section 2. of the Constitution\n(U) ........ e e 7\nB.\nThe Fourth Amendment (U)...ooceiiiimmnrinnrrninm i 7\nC.\nThe Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA)\n(U)...cocovieinnen. 8\n1.\nOverview of FISA (U)..cooviviiiinnnn S UUPTSSURR\nP ROROR 8\n2.\nFISA Applications and Orders\n(U) coocovvvvinninninniiinnn 10\n3.\nFISA Court (U)eiuiiniiimiiiiniicecniinen, e T 11\nD.\nAuthorization for Use of Military Force\n(U)....ovvierenirinninniniann 12\nE.\n Executive Order 12333 (U).iiriiiriirimvimmnirineisini\ni 13\nII.\n Presidential Authorizations\n(U) ceeveerimmiiieiimiimnnreie\ne . 14\nA.\n Types of Collection Authorized 48/\nF ... 15\nB\nFindings and Primary Authorities (U) ...cooovoiiivvniicrionnn, 16\nC.\n The Reauthorization Process\n(U)....... PP S .16\nD\nApproval \"as to form and legality\"\n(U).....c.ccoooviniiiniinnnn 17\n\n## Chapter Three: Inception And Early Operation Of Stellar Wind (Sep'I'Ember 2001 Through April 2003) S+ Oovneee. 19\n\nL.\nInception of the Stellar Wind Program (U//FOHS) ..o 19\nA.\nThe National Security Agency\n(U) ....oooovvemmiieiiiinin, 19\nB.\nImplementation of the Program (September 2001 through\nNovember 2001) S/\noo v 20\n\n1.\nPre-Stellar Wind Office of Legal Counsel Legal\nMemoranda (U)......ovoiiimimmniieni\ns e 23\n2.\nPresidential Authorization of October 4 2001\n\nC.\nPresidential Authorization is Revised and the Office of Legal\nCounsel Issues Legal Memoranda in Support of the Program\n(N ovembcr 2001 through January 2002)\n\n|                          |               | 1.             | Pfesiden-tial    | Authorization           | of           | November    | 2,           | 2001       |\n|--------------------------|---------------|----------------|------------------|-------------------------|--------------|-------------|--------------|------------|\n| 2.                       | Yoo           | D1             | afts             | Office                  | of           | Legal       | Counsel      | Memorandum |\n| Addressmg                | Legality      | of             | Stellar          | Wmd                     |              |             |              |            |\n| .Addltlonal              | Pr<331dent1al | Aufllonzatlons | (U)              | ':3'8:                  |              |             |              |            |\n| 3.                       |               |                |                  |                         |              |             |              |            |\n| 4.                       | Subsequent    | Yoo            | Opinions         | (U) ccormmeomvuiamnsins | reen         | 39          |              |            |\n| D                        | Yoo's         | Communications | with             | the                     | Whlte        | IIouse      | (U)iiivinnsn | 40         |\n| 6.                       | Gonzales's    | View           | of               | the                     | Department's | Role        | in           |            |\n| Authorizing              | the           | Stellar        | Wind             | Program                 | SN           | =           | ..o,         | 41         |\n| II.                      |               |                |                  |                         |              |             |              |            |\n| NSA's                    |               |                |                  |                         |              |             |              |            |\n| Implementation           |               |                |                  |                         |              |             |              |            |\n| of                       |               |                |                  |                         |              |             |              |            |\n| the                      |               |                |                  |                         |              |             |              |            |\n| Stellar                  |               |                |                  |                         |              |             |              |            |\n| Wind                     |               |                |                  |                         |              |             |              |            |\n| Program                  |               |                |                  |                         |              |             |              |            |\n| (U//EQUOG)               |               |                |                  |                         |              |             |              |            |\n| 49                       |               |                |                  |                         |              |             |              |            |\n| A                        |               |                |                  |                         |              |             |              |            |\n| Implementation           |               |                |                  |                         |              |             |              |            |\n| of                       |               |                |                  |                         |              |             |              |            |\n| Stellar                  |               |                |                  |                         |              |             |              |            |\n| Wind                     |               |                |                  |                         |              |             |              |            |\n| (U/                      |               |                |                  |                         |              |             |              |            |\n| AEHE6;                   |               |                |                  |                         |              |             |              |            |\n| beensireivnnids          |               |                |                  |                         |              |             |              |            |\n| 42                       |               |                |                  |                         |              |             |              |            |\n| 1.                       | Basket        | 1              | -                | Telephone               | and          | E-Mail      | Content      | Collectlon |\n| GS#S?EW%%SH;LGG;'NF)   |               | 44             |                  |                         |              |             |              |            |\n| 2.                       | Basket        | 2        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              |                         |              |             |              |            |\n| B.                       |               |                |                  |                         |              |             |              |            |\n| NSA                      |               |                |                  |                         |              |             |              |            |\n| Process                  |               |                |                  |                         |              |             |              |            |\n| for                      |               |                |                  |                         |              |             |              |            |\n| Analyzing                |               |                |                  |                         |              |             |              |            |\n| Information              |               |                |               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          |             |              |            |\n| EPS%%S?H&%%SH%@G{-NF} |               |                |                  |                         |              |             |              |            |\n|                          |               |                |                  |                         |              |             |              |            |\n| 52                       |               |                |                  |                         |              |             |              |            |\n| 2.                       |               |                |                  |                         |              |             |              |            |\n| Baskets                  |               |                |                  |                         |              |             |              |            |\n| 2                        |               |                |                  |                         |              |             |              |            |\n| and                      |               |                |                  |                         |              |             |              |            |\n| 3:                       |               |                |                  |                         |              |             |              |            |\n| Telephony                |               |                |                  |                         |              |             |              |            |\n| and                      |               |                |                  |                         |              |             |              |            |\n| E-Mail                   |               |                |                  |                         |              |             |              |            |\n| Meta                     |               |                |                  |                         |              |             |              |            |\n| Data                     |               |                |                  |                         |              |             |              |            |\n| Queries,                 |               |                |                  |                         |              |             |              |            |\n| Analysis,                |               |                |                  |                         |              |             |              |            |\n| and                      |               |                |                  |                         |              |             |              |            |\n| Dissemination            |               |                |                  |                         |              |             |              |            |\n| 1%8775}&69778;779@;;4;'  |               | 5'             |                  |                         |              |             |              |            |\n| Ill.                     |               |                |                  |                         |              |             |              |            |\n| FBI's                    |               |                |                  |                         |              |             |              |            |\n| Early                    |               |                |                  |                         |              |             |              |            |\n| Participation            |               |                |                  |                         |              |             |              |            |\n| in                       |               |                |                  |                         |              |             |              |            |\n| the                      |               |                |                  |                         |              |             |              |            |\n| Stellar                  |               |                |                  |                         |              |             |              |            |\n| Wind                     |               |                |                  |                         |              |             |              |            |\n| Program                  |               |                |                  |                         |              |             |              |            |\n| +{S//N}                |               |                |                  |                         |              |             |              |            |\n| 58                       |               |                |                  |                         |              |             |              |            |\n| A                        |               |                |                  |                         |              |             |              |            |\n| FBI                      |               |                |                  |                         |              |             |              |            |\n| Director                 |               |                |                  |                         |              |             |              |            |\n| First                    |               |                |                  |                         |              |             |              |            |\n| Informed                 |               |                |                  |                         |              |             |              |            |\n| of                       |               |                |                  |                         |              |             |              |            |\n| Stellar                  |               |                |                  |                         |              |             |              |            |\n| Wind                     |               |                |                  |                         |              |             |              |            |\n| Program                  |               |                |                  |                         |              |             |              |            |\n\nC.\nFBI Begins to Receive and Disseminate Stellar Wind\n\"Tippers\" (S7NFR\n1.\nFBI Initiates\n2.\nFBI Field Offices' Respanise to\n3.\nFBI s Efforts to Track Stellar Wind Tippers anc\n4te Executive Management on Status of}\neadS'(S7'7\"N'F)~_\nNF\nibveieteneirrerians v agiren s v\n069\nIV.\nJustice Department Office of Intelligence Policy and Review's: (OIPR)\nand. FISA Coul t's Early Role in Stellar Wind\n\n37775\n29\neI\n:\n..\n70\nA.\nOVGTVleW OfOIPR\n(U),..'...,.....;;; ........ rers '-....-.'..n..-'-.......'.....-..71\nB.\nOIPR Counsel Learns of Stellar Wind Program (U/ [FOUO)...\nC.\nFISA Court is Informed of Stellar Wind {FSASH-AE}........ 7 4\nD.\nOIPR Implements \"Scrubbing\" Procedures for Stellar Wind\nInformatlon 111 Internatlonal Terrorism FISA Applications\n7\n=ta\n78\n1.\nInitial Scrubbing Procedures ESAASH/NEL (L. 79\n2.\nComphcatmns with Scrubbing Procedures\n:\n:\n'\n81\nE.\n1.\nJudge Kollar'-Kotelly Modifies OIPR Scrubbing\nProcedures FSAHSEAFT (i wenens 33\n2.\nOIPR implements Judge Kollar-Kotelly s Scrubblng-\nProcedure ESHSHHR e eriiienn 85\n\nV.\n FBI Initiates Measures to Improve the Management of\nStellar Wind Information S7F\nM\n.. ooeerviernniii e ....88\n\nA.\nCAU Acting Unit Chief Evaluates FBI Response to\nStellar Wind 877N, e e 89\nbl,\nB.\nFBI Increases Cooperation with NSA and Initiates\nPI'O_]eCt to Manage Stellar Wind Information\nb3, b7E\n(F&\n_\na0\nC.\nFBI Assigns CAU Personnel to NSA on Full-Time Basis\nSRR oot 93\n\nVI,\n OIG Analysis\n(U)...ooomriimmiiesnininiinnnsse\nst 94\n\n## Chapter Four: Legal Reassessment Of Stellar Wind (May 2003 Through May 2004) Afshashane) 99\n\n1.\nJustice Department Reassesses Legality of Stellar Wind Program\nABSHSHHAE.\nBSOS e a9\nA,\nOverview of Office of Legal Counsel\n(U) ... 99\n\nB.\n Personnel Changes within Office of Legal Counsel\n(U)........ . 100\n\n1.\n2.\n3.\n4\nYoo's Role in the Program (October 2001 through\nMay 2003) (U) ....... wensiesi ST e P PR i 100\nPhilbin Replaces Yoo (U) ........ cerenins breveerrvensivas SRR 103\nInitial Concerngw\no'\ne, 104\nProblems Wlth\n-\n-----------\n5.\n.Other Collectlon Concems\nS\nA\ne 108\nDecision to Draft New OLC Memorandum (U) ........ 108\n6.\n\nC.\n'ReaSsessment of Legal Rationale for the Program\n\n| 1.         | Goldsmith            | Becomes    | OLC     | Assistant    | Attorney    |\n|------------|----------------------|------------|---------|--------------|-------------|\n| General    | (Ui                  | iresans    | i       | 109          |             |\n| 2.         | NSA                  | Denied     | Access  | to           | OLC         |\n| 3.         | 'Goldsmith           | Joins      | Effort  | to           | Reassess    |\n| the        | Prograrn{@S#SfHNF} |            | I       | 112          |             |\n| 4.         | AUMF                 | Becqies    | the     | Primary      | Legal       |\n| Supporting | '                    | Jof        | the     | Stellar      | Wind        |\n| Program    | N                    | 113        |         |              |             |\n| 5.         | Office               | of Legal   | Counsel | Ralses       | its.        |\n| the        | Stellar              | Wind       | Program | (December    | 2003        |\n| Jariuary   | 2004)                | S8         | o       | Viien        | 115         |\n| 6.         | Deputy               | Attorney   | General | Comey        | is          |\n| Program    | L                    | TR         | P       | PP           | v           |\n\nD.\nOffice of Legal Counsel Preserits its Conclusions to the\nWhite House\n(U) .vevivevereenrerenn, RN ey 119\n\n1.\nMarch 4, 2004: Comey Meets with Ashcroft to\nDiscuss Problems with the Programn (U)......cccoevvevnnin, 120\n2.\nMarch 5, 2004: Comey Determines Ashcroft is\n\"Absent or Disabled\"\n(U).ccicerieeeereiiiriereeeeiearoeeeseennns 121\n3.\nMarch 5, 2004:\nGoldsmith and Philbin Seek\nClarification from White House on Presidential\nAuthorizations (U).....cooieiiiiniiiin\ne, 122\n\n4.\nMarch 6 to 8, 2004: The Department Concludes\nThat Yoo's Legal Memoranda Did Not Cover the\nProgram (U)o\ne 124\nS.\nMarch 9, 2004:\nWhite House Seeks to Persuade\nDepartment and FBI to Support Continuation of the\nProgram S/ ..o 126\n6.\nConflict Ensues between Department and Whltc\nHOUSE\n(U] oiiiiriiriii\ni i 129\nIT.\nWhite House Continues Program without Justice Department's\nCertification FSHAASHARF . . Ceevaerens 130\n\n## White House Counsel Gonzales Cerl1F1Es March 11,2004, P1Es1Dent1A1 Authorization 4S :\n\n1.\nMarch 10, 2004:\nOffice of Legal Counsel Presses for\nSolicitor General to be Read into Program\n(U} ....c...... 131\n2.\nMarch 10, 2004:\nCongressional Leaders Briefed on\nSHUAtion (U)..evieeemeeeneenmrrnins eeeer e 131\nMsarch 10, 2004:\nHospital Visit (U) reveiiiiarreeiriiniiinen. 184\ng @\nMarch 10, 2004: Olson is Read into the Program\n(U). 140\nMarch 11, 2004: Goldsmith Proposes Comprom1se\nSOLIHON (U] ieirninrrarermrresiiimnsssmimnimnsss\ns omissiniianinsi o 141\n6.\nMarch 11, 2004 White House Asserts that Comey s\nStatus as Acting Attorney General was Unclear\n(U).... 142\n7.\nMarch 11, 2004: Gonzales Certifies Presidential\nAuthorization as to Ferm and Legality -{BS/7SH7/NF)~ 144\nDepartment and FBI Officials React to [ssuance of\nMarch 11, 2004, Authorization {FS7SH\nA~ e 148\n1.\nInitial Responses of Department and FBI Officials\n(U) 149\n2.\nDepartment and FBI Officials Consider Resigning\n(U) 152\n3.\n Comey and Mueller Meet with President Bush (U)...... 155\n4,\nComey Directs Continued Cooperation with NSA\n(U).. 157\n5.\nDepartment Conducts Additional Legal Analysis\n(U)... 158\n0.\nComey Determines that Ashcroft Remains \"Absent or\nDISADIEA\"\n(U 1arviverreinmmmmiesrnrmirinrirnrrremrisii\ns 163\n7.\n Judge Kollar-Kotelly Brlefed on Lack of Attorney\nGeneral Certification\n(U) ..cvieveveennvivmsinniinsinnini. 164\n8.\nComey and Gonzales Exchange Documents\nAsserting Confl1ct1ng Posmons\nR\nT I PP 164\n\n## White House Agrees Tolf Il Il 0 D :\n\nbl, b3, b7E\n\n|     |    |    | 9.,    |   May  | 5    | 2004    | Pres1dent1a1      |   Authonzauon  |\n|-----|----|----|--------|--------|------|---------|-------------------|----------------|\n| .   | .  | \"  | =      |     1  | el   | PSP     | '..; , '.'.;.'..' |           181  |\n| 10. | '  | '  | '      |        |      |         |                   |                |\n\nA,\nDepartiient's Access to and Legal Review of Stellar Wind.\nProgram Through May 2004 FS/ASH-HH ... SO ... 186\nB.\n The Hospital VIsit (U).icoccoiimmiviiiiniiniieiinnrieii e rennene 197\nC.\nRecertification of the Presidential Authorization and\nModification of the Progratm (U). v vseieeeemeiiereniiioneriieenan. 199\n\n## Chapter Five: Stellar Wind Program's Transition To Fisa Authority (June 2004 Through August 2007) ..Covvenen. E 203\n\nL.\nE-Mail Meta Data Collection Under FISA {FS/ASH-ANF i 203\n\n| A.          |  Application    | and         | FISA           | Court    | Order               | (U)...coeviivvvenieveriennrnreen    | 203    |\n|-------------|-----------------|-------------|----------------|----------|---------------------|-------------------------------------|--------|\n| 2.          |                 |             |                |          |                     |                                     |        |\n| 3.          |                 |             |                |          |                     |                                     |        |\n| a4          |                 |             |                |          |                     |                                     |        |\n| 1.          | Decision        | to          | Seek           | a        | Pen                 | Register                            | and    |\n| (PR/TT)     | Order           | from        | the            | FISA     | Court               | {?S//SH/NF}                  | ..     |\n| Briefing    | for             | Judge       | KollarKotelly | (U       | coeeeiiiisiicinnane | 205                                 |        |\n| The         | PR/TT           | Application | -              | +NF      | '                   |                                     |        |\n| Judge       | Kollar-Kotelly  | Raises      | Questlons      | about    | PR/                 | T                                   |        |\n| Application | ~FS7            | NI          | e              | it       | 212                 |                                     |        |\n| .           | 213             |             |                |          |                     |                                     |        |\n| FISA        | Court           | Order       | (U).           |          |                     |                                     |        |\n| B.          | i               | '1ted       | U              |          |                     |                                     |        |\n| The         | President's     | August      | 9,             | 2004     | Memorandum          | to                                  | the    |\n| 'Sem        | ctary           | of          | Defense        | '        | .                   | 217                                 |        |\n| 2.          |                 |             |                |          |                     |                                     |        |\n| 218         |                 |             |                |          |                     |                                     |        |\n| C.          | Non-Compliance  | with        | PR/TT          | Order    | {-@SHS}//NF}   |                                     | 219    |\n| 1.          | Fllterlng       | V1olat10ns  | ~AFSHASH       | AN       | 219                 |                                     |        |\n| 2.          | 5              | der         | Bl             | 221      |                     |                                     |        |\n| 3.          |                 |             |                |          |                     |                                     |        |\n| D.          | Subsequent      | PR/TT       | Applications   | and      | Orders              | {ES//8H/NF),                        | 224    |\n\nII.\n Telephony Meta Data Collection Under FISA {FSH-SHANFY ... 225\nA,\nDecision to Seek Order Compellmg Production of Call\ndetail records {FS;\n,\nB\nSummary of Departmcnt's Appl1cat10n and Related FISA\nCourt Order 48/ ... veeenns 228\n.\n Non-Compliance with Section 215 Orders{ES/+SH-NS ..... 232\nIII.\nContent Collection under FISA (%187'%8{7'7@@) PSR\nPTOIIOL S 237\nA.\nDecision to Seek Content Order\n(FS/ASH\n'\n237\nB.\nSummary of Departments December 13, 2006, Content\nApplication {PS77/SH7/NF) ....cccve beneeenerensterssrnessnsbrainsiiinen 239\nC.\nJudge Howard Grants Application in Part (ESAHSH-AE ... 245\nD.\nDomestic Selectors Application and Order {FS//SHNF)..... 248\nE.\n Last Stellar Wind Presidential Authorization Expires\nAEEAFSHINE e 250\nF,\nFirst Domestic and Foreign Selectors FISA Renewal\nApplications {ESHFSHA o\nasinss 201\nG.\nRevised Renewal Application for Foreign Selectors and.\nOrder (ESFFSHNFY coivitiirrren\ne evrveninae 255\nIV,\nThe Protect America Act and the FISA Amendments Act of\nD008\n(U] 1rrseeeiiniissiesnns s 259\nA.\nThe Protect America Act\n(U) oorvievriiiiniiii, 260\nB.\n The FISA Amendments Act of 2008 (U)..cccvivvrerinieiniiennnne 264\nV.\n OIG ADAIYSiS\n(U)eeriimiriimiiiimimiinnesssins\ns\nst 267\nIV,\nImpact of Stellar Wind Information on FBI Counterterrorism\nEfforts 5//3)...\n...291\nA.\n:\n'\nB.\nC.\nb7E\n\nD.\nFBI Judgmental Assessments of Stellar Wind Information\nsy\n2 T OO\nPSSO\nP PR\nPO PPPPRIIE 161\nB\nExamples of FBI Counterterro1 ism Cases Involving\nStellar\nWind Information S5\n.\ni 310\n\n| ...    | -    | -    | -    | '.    |   311  |\n|--------|------|------|------|-------|--------|\n| bl,    | b3,  |      |      |       |        |\n| 2,     | B    | 313  |      |       |        |\n| 3.     |      |      |      |       |        |\n| b6,    | b7C, |      |      |       |        |\n| b7E    |      |      |      |       |        |\n|        | 315  |      |      |       |        |\n| 4      | g    | -    | _    | @     |   318  |\n| 5.,    | .    | .    | 322  |       |        |\n\nV.\nOIG ANALYSIS\n(U] coveirirrrriiriorieeosririssiseseneesseessesesasassesessssesessennenns 325\n\n## Chapter Seven: Discovery Issues Related To Stellar Wind Information ~Fs/Ash-Ane)-........ E B Prsp E 333\n\nI.\nRelevant Law (U)o\ns\net e 333\nII.\nCa'ses'Rai's_ej'Ql;lt:,StionS about Government's Compliance with\nv\nCibligati\nL0 e\nrsanissssnssnssssinanbmmneramsonanssereessenseasernnenn 335\n\n|     | b1,    | b3,    |\n|-----|--------|--------|\n|     | 335    | .      |\n| b6, | b7C,   |        |\n| b7E |        |        |\n|     | 336    |        |\n\nIII.\nCriminal Division Examines Discovery Issues\n(U)........cc.ccceveunennnn 340\nA.\nThe \"Informal Process\" for Treating Discovery Issues in\nInternational Terrorism Cases\n(U)......cocoiiiinniiinnnnene, 341\nB.\n-Memorandum Analyzing Discovery Issues Raised\nby the Stellar Wind Program FSAHSTEW/HSHOES/NF)...... 342\nC.\nOffice of Legal Counsel and Discovery Issue\n(U) ........ 346\n1IV.\n Use of the Classified Information Procedures Act (CIPA) to\nRespond to Discovery Requests (U) .....ocoovviiniiiiniinn e 347\nA.\nOverview of CIPA\n(U)..iviiiri i 348\n\n| B.      | Use    | of      | CIPA    | in           | International    |\n|---------|--------|---------|---------|--------------|------------------|\n| Alleged | to     | Involve | Stellar | Wind-Derived | Information      |\n\nb6, b7C, b7E\nV.\n\n## Chapter Eight: Public Statements About The Surveillance Program (Uj .Ciurirenrainirsnsiinimrrraeciin. 361\n\nI.\nSummary of the Dispute about the Program\n(U) .c.oooovevnniiniiinin 361\nII.\nThe New York Times Articlee. and President Bush's Confirmation\nRegarding NSA Activities\n(U)........ vteereereens\ne ivn e et\nane 363\n.\nOther Administration Statements (U).....corvvevns ettt 365\nIV.\nTestimony and Other Statements (U)..c.oocnriveimrcniiinininniinnnn.. 366\nA.\n Gongzales's February 6, 2006, Senate Judiciary Committee\nTestimony\n(U) civvvnnnee. v eeaereerana\ney e erirrnrrnenrenss\nBOT\nB.\nComey's May 15, 2007, Senate Judlclary Committee Testunony\n(U) cvieinereeemmmncrineeeerains renrerha e ereernvreresee i\nrean by ebd ;370\nC.\n Gonzales's June 5, 2007, Press Conference U) oo R 371\nD.\nGonzales's July 24, 2007, Senate Judlclary Committee\nTestimony (U) vivovcrieeiiiinereen e 371\nE.\nFBI Director Mueller's July 26, 2007, House Committee\non the Judiciary Testimony\n(U) coovovevimimnininriniienn .. 376\nF.\nGonzales's Follow-up Letter to the Senate Judiciary\nCommittee\n(U).verreiereriiiiriienirniin e 377\nV.\nOIG Analysis\n(U)eeeoveiiiieeieeiniiinneerneinin et e 378\n\n## Chapter Nine: Conclusions (U).Ieiiiinrrnirnenn S 387\n\nL.\nOperation of the Program (U//FOUO)......cocoivviiins 388\n1I.\nOffice of Legal Counsel's Analysis of the Stellar Wind Program\nAPS/ASHAT s T\nT\nTUU ORI P 389\n1.\nHospital Visit and White House Recertification of the Program\n(U) 394\nIV.\nTransition of Program to FISA Authority\n\n| Impact                |\n|-----------------------|\n| EHOTES                |\n| LSNEY                 |\n| oo                    |\n| overeoe               |\n| oo                    |\n| seesese               |\n| oo                    |\n| oeeososeeesse         |\n| oo                    |\n| 30T                   |\n| VI.                   |\n| Discovery             |\n| and.                  |\n| \"Scrubbing\"           |\n| Issues                |\n| ES/ASEAH              |\n| ..o                   |\n| 402                   |\n| VIL.                  |\n| Gonzales's            |\n| Statements            |\n| (U)                   |\n| R                     |\n| UUOPRUPOUURPT         |\n| 1                     |\n|                      |\n| -1                    |\n| VII.                  |\n| Conclusion            |\n| (U)o                  |\n| it                    |\n| errrareessenieeevsens |\n| e                     |\n| 406                   |\n\n## Chapter One Introduction (U)\n\nOn October 4, 2001, three weeks after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the President issued a Top Secret Presidential Authorization to the Secretary of Defense directing that the signals intelligence capabilitics of the National Security Agency (NSA) be used to detect and prevent further attacks in the United States. The Presidential Authorization stated that an extraordinary emergency existed permitting the use of electronic surveillance within the United States for counterterrorisim purposes, without a court order, under certain circumstances. For over 6\nyears, this Presidential Authorization was renewed at approximately 30 to\n45 day intervals to authorize the highly classified NSA surveillance program, which was given the cover term \"Stellar Wind.\"! {FS/STEW/HSHFOE\nUnder these Presidential Authorizations and subsequently obtained Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISA Court) orders, the NSA\nintercepted the content of international telephone and e-mail communications of both U.S. and non-U.S. persons when certain criteria were met.\n\nIn addition, the NSA collected vast amounts of telephony and\n-mail meta data - that is, communications signaling information showing cortacts between and among telephone numbers and o ail addresses, but not including the contents of the communications. B\n.\n\nWithin the Department of Justice (Department or Justice Department)\nand the Intelligence Community, the different types of information collected under the NSA program came to be referred to as three different \"baskets\" of informatior. The collection of the content of telephone and e-mail\n1 This program is also known as the President's Surveillance Program (PSP).\n\nIn Title III of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act Amendments Act of 2008 (FISA\nAmendments Act), the President's Surveillance Program is defined as the intelligence activity involving communications that was authorized by the President during the period beginning on September 11, 2001, and ending on January 17, 2007, including the program referred to by the President in a radio address on December 17, 2005 (commonly known as the Terrorist Surveillance Program).\n\nFISA Amendments Act, Title III, Sec. 301(a)(3).\n\n(U)\ncommunications was referred to as basket 1. The collection of telephone meta data including information on the date, time, and duration of the telephone call, the telephone riumber of the caller, and the number receiving the call was referred to as basket 2. The collection of g=mail meta data -\nincluding the \"to,\" \"from,\" \"ce,\" \"bee,\" and \"sent\" lines of an e-mail, but not the \"subject\" line or content of the e-mail - was referred to as basket 3.\n\n~\nThecontent and meta data information was used by the NSA, workin with other members of the Intelligence Community, to ger inf\n9%\ne-nail addresses had been \"tipped\" to the FBI as leads, the vast majority of which were disseminated to FBI field offices for investigation or other-action. Sorne Stellar Wind-derived iriformation also was disseminated to the larger Intelligence Community through traditional intelligence reporting channels.3\n-\nIn addition to the FBI's receipt of information from the program, the Justice Department was involved in the program in other ways. Most significantly, the Department's Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) provided advice to the White House and the Attorney General on the overall legality of the Stellar Wind program.\n\nIn addition, the Department's Office of Intelligence Policy and Review (now called the Office of Intelligence in the Department's National Security Division) worked with the FBI and NSA to justify the inclusion of Stellar Wind-derived information in applications seeking orders under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA), and when unable to do s, to exclude such information from the applications. The Department's National Security Division (NSD) also submitted classified ex parte legal filings in federal courts to address any Stellar Wind reporting concerning defendants during discovery in international terrorism prosecutions.\n\nTS/ STEW /ST O/ N\nBeginning in December 2005, aspects of the Stellar Wind program were publicly disclosed in media reports, originally in a series of articles by The New York Times.\n\nAfter these articles disclosed the telephone and e-mail content collection (basket 1), the President, Attorney General Alberto Gonzales, and other Administration officials publicly confirmed the existence of this part_offthe program. However, the other aspects of the program - the collection of\"tE'lephone. and e-mail meta data - have not been publicly confirmed, FSAHSTLW//SH/OC/NE\n~\nThe President and other Administration officials labeled the NSA\ncollection of information that was publicly disclosed as \"the Terrorist Surveillance Program,\" although this name was sometimes used within the Intelligence Community to refer to the entire Stellar Wind program. The program was also referred to by other names, such as the \"Warrantless Wiretapping Program\" or the \"NSA Surveillance Program.\" As discussed above, the technical name for the program, and the term we generally use throughout this report, is the Stellar Wind program.* {8//#\nThis report describes the Office of the Inspector General's (OIG) review of the Department's role in the Stellar Wind program.\n\nOur review discusses the evolution of the Stellar Wind program, including the changes ini the Department's legal analyses of the program, the operational changes to the program, and the eventual transition of the program from presidential authority to statutory authority under FISA. The report also assesses. the FBI's use of information derived from the Stellar Wind program, including the impact of the information in FBI counterterrorism investigations.\n\n## 1. Methodology Of Oig Review (U)\n\nDuring the course of this review, the OIG conducted approximately 80\ninterviews. Among the individuals we interviewed were former White House Counsel and Attorney General Gonzales; former Deputy Attorney General James Comey; former NSA Director Michael Hayden; FBI Director Robert Mueller, I1I; former Counsel for Intelligence Policy James Baker; former Assistant Attorneys General for OLC Jay Bybee and Jack Goldsmith; former Principal Deputy and Acting Assistant Attorney General for OLC Steven Bradbury: former Deputy Assistant Attorney General for OLC and Associate Deputy Attorney General Patrick Philbin; and former Assistant Attorneys General for the NSD Kenneth Wainstein and Patrick Rowan. We also interviewed senior FBI Counterterrorism Division officials, the FBI General Counsel and other FBI attorneys, FBI special agents and intelligence analysts, and senior officials in the Department's Criminal and National Security Divisions.\n(U)\nWe attempted to interview former Attorney General John Ashcroft, but he declined our request for an interview.\n\n(U)\nIn addition, we attempted to interview former Deputy Assistant Attorney General for OLC John Yoo, who drafted the early legal memoranda supporting the legality of the Stellar Wind program. Yoo, through his counsel, declinied our request for an interview. @%SH%N-F}\nWe also attempted to interview White House officials regarding the program, including Andrew Card, former Chief of Staff to President George W. Bush. We made our request for an interview of Card both directly to Card and through the Office of the Counsel to the President (White House Counsel's Office).\n\nCard did not grant our request for an interview.\n\nSimilarly, we attempted to interview David Addington, former Counsel to Vice President Richard B. Cheney. We contacted the Office of the Vice President, but that office did not respond to our request for an interview of Addington.\n\n(U)\nWe believe that we were able to obtain a full picture of the evolution of the program and the theories supporting its legality.\n\nHowever, the refusal by White House officials, former Attorney General Ashcroft, and former Deputy Assistant Attoriney General Yoo to be interviewed hampered our ahility to fully investigate the process by which the White House and the Justice Department arrived at the initial legal rationale to support the program.\n\nIn addition, becatise of our inability to interview Ashcroft, we could not fully determine what efforts the Department took to press the White House for additional Department attorneys to be read into Stellar Wind to work on the legal analysis of the program during its first two years of operation. ~FS/SHNE}\nIn our review, we also examined theusands of electronic and hard copy documents, including the Presidential Authorizations and threat assessments, OLC legal memoranda supporting the program, contemporaneous notes and e-mails of various senior Department and FBI\nofficials, and FISA Court pleadings and orders. We also reviewed NSA\nmaterials, including NSA OIG reports on the Stellar Wind program and correspondence between the NSA Office of General Counsel and the Department, {FS/SHAHY\nInn addition, we received from the FBI an electronic database of its collection of Electronic Communications (EC) that were used to disseminate distinction is especially relevant to our discussion of the number of Department personnel read into the Stellar Wind program, as distinguished from the number of FBI personnel read into the program. (U//EQYSY\nStellar Wind-derived leads to FBI field offices.\n\nThis database contained approximately ECs, including leads to the FBI's 56 field offices, and fre'sponses' from thosc.fieldoffices-, among other documents. The OIG used this database to confirm information it obtained through interviews and to assist in our analysis of FBL irivestigations that were based on Stellar Wind informatiomn.\n\n~\nS/\nLSHOEARH\n\n## Ii. Organization Of This Report (U)\n\nChapter Two of this report provides &n overview of the primary legal authorities that are relevant to the Stellar Wind program. This chapter-also discusses the Presidential Authorizations that were issued to approve the program. (U//ESUYS)\nChapter Three describes the inception and early implementation of the Stellar Wind program from September 2001 through April 2003. This chagter includes a description of the early OLC legal memoranda on the legality of Stellar Wind, how the program was technically implemented, the FBI's early participation in the program, and the FISA Court's first awareness of the programi. ATS/HSHFNF\nChapter Four covers the peried from May 2003 through May 2004\nwhen the legal rationale for the program was substantially reconsidered by the Justice Department. This chapter details in particular the events of March 2004 when the White House decided to continue the program without the Department's certification of a Presidential Authorization.\n\nDuring this time, Attorney General Asheroft was hospitalized and Deputy Attorriey General Comey temnporarily exercised the powers of the Attorney General in his capacity as Deputy Attorney General. Comey declined to recertify the Presidential Authorization approving the program based on legal advice he received from OLC Assistant Attorney General Jack Goldsmith, who questioned the adequacy of the Jegal support for aspects of the program.\n\nComey's decision prompted a significant dispute between the White House and the Justice Department, which resulted in White House Counsel Gonzales and White House Chief of Staff Card visiting Ashcroft in his hospital room in an unsuccessful attempt to have Ashcroft recertify the program. This chapter also describes the background to the dispute, the events related to the hospital visit, the threat by Department officials to resign over the dispute, and the eventual resolution of the dispute.\n\nPSS\n-\nChapter Five discusses the transition, in stages, from a program based on Presidential Authorizations to collection activities authorized under the FISA statute. This transition took place in stages between July\n2004 and January 2007. This chapter also summarizes legislation in 2007\nand 2008 designed to modernize certain provisions of FISA.\n\nChapter Six discusses the use of Stellar Wmd 1nformat1on by the FBI.\n\n1t describes the process by which the FBI disse llar Wind-derived leads to FBI field offices under a program calledf as well as the impact and effectiveness of the Stellar Wmd plogram Lo\n1\n'\ncounterterrorism efforts.\n\n7\n-\nChapter Seven examines the Department's handling of discovery issues related to Stellar Wind-derived information in inter national terrorism prosecutions. {FS/ASTEW//SH/OC/NE)\nChapter Eight analyzes testimony and public statements about aspects of the Stellar Wind program by Attorney General Gornizales. We assess whether the Attorney General's statements, particularly his testimony to the Senate Judiciary Committee in February 2006 and July\n2007, were false, inaccurate, or misleading: {S//NH\nChapter Nine contains our conclusions and recommendations,\n(U)\n\n## Chapter Two Legal Authorities (U)\n\nThis chapter summarizes the primary legal authorities referred to throughout this report concerning the Stellar Wind program.: These authorities include Article II, Section 2 of the Constitution; the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution; the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act;\nthe Authorization for Use of Military Force Joint Resolution (AUMF) passed by Congress after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001; Executive Order 12333; and the Presidential Authorizations specifically authorizing the Stellar Wind program. Other authorities, including relevant criminal statutes and judicial opinions, are discussed throughout the report.\n\n## I, Constitutional, Statutory, And Executive Order Authorities (U) A. Atrticle Ii, Section 2 Of The Constitution (U)\n\nArticle II, Section 2 of the Constitution, which was one of the primary authorities cited in the Presidential Authorizations in support of the legality of the Stellar Wind program, provides in relevant part:\nThe President shall be Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States, and of the. Militia of the several States, when called into the actual Service of the United States;\nhe may require the Opinion, in writing, of the priricipal Officer in each of the executive Departments, upon any Subject relating to the Duties of their reespective Offices\n.\n\n.\n\n.\n\n.\n\nL\n\n## B. The Fourth Amendment (U)\n\nThe Fourth Amendment to the Constitution, which also was raised as an important factor in the analysis of the legality of the Stellar Wind program, provides:\nThe right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Qath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the person or things to be seized. -{FS//8H-P5-\n\n## C. The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (Fisa)S (U)\n\nThe Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA), 50 U.S.C.  1801, et seq., was-enacted in 1978 to \"provide legislative authorization and regulation for all electronic survefllance conducted within the United States for foreign intelligence purposes.\"\n'S. Rep. No. 95-701, at 9 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.8.C.C.A.N. 3973, 3977. Three major FISA issues are covered in this report.\n\nFirst, as discussed in Chapter Four, FISA was central to a controversy that arose. in late 2003 and early 2004 when officials iri the Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) and others viewed FISA as potentially in conflict with the legal ratiohale for at least one aspect of the Stellar Wind program. OLC officials reasoned that if courts viewed FISA in isolation, they might conclude that Congress initended to regulate the President's power to conduict electronic surveillance during wartime, thereby raising questions about the legality of aspects of the program.\n\nSecond, after the FISA Court was informed about the Stellar Wind program in January 2002, it required the government to carefully scrutinize each FISA apphcatlon to ensme that no Stellar Wind-derived information was relied upon ini support of a' FISA application without the Court's knowledge, and later without its consent. This process, known as\n\"scrubbmg,\" is dlscussed in Chapters Three and Six.\n\nThird, begmnmg in July 2004, the Stellar Wind program was brought under FISA authorlty in stages, mth the entue program brought under FISA\nsidential authority to FI SA authorfl:y, as well as leglslatmn subsequently enacted to modernize FISA, is discussed in Chapter Five.\n\nIn the following sections, we summarize relevant provisions of FISA as they related to the Stellar Wind program. {FS//SHANE\n\n## 1. Overview Of Fisa (U)\n\nFISA authorizes the federal government to engage in electronic surveillance and physical searches, to use pen register and trap and trace devices, and to obtain business records to acquire inside the United States foreign intelligence information by, in some instances, targeting foreign powers and agents of foreign powers.\" FISA also permits the targeting of foreign powers and their a ents who are located outside the United States.\n\nAs a general rule, the FISA Court must first approve an application by the governmerit before the government initiates electronic surveillance. FISA\napplications must identify or describe the \"target\" of the surveillance, and must establish probable cause to believe that the target is a \"foreign power\"\nor \"agent of a foreign power\" and that \"each of the facilities or places at which the electronic surveillance is directed is being used, or is about to be used, by a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power.\"8\n50 U.S.C.\n\n 1804(a)(4)(A) & (B). {TS/7/SHFHNF\nFISA provides four exceptions to the requirement of obtaining judicial approval prior to conducting electronic surveillance:\n(1) for electronic surveillance directed at certain facilities where the Attorney General certifies that the electronic surveillance is solely directed at communications transrnitted by means used exclusively between or among foreign powers or from property under the open and exclusive control of a foreign power, 50\nU.S.C.  1802; (2) where the Attorney General determines an emergency exists and authorizes emergency surveillance until the information sought is obtained, the after-filed application for an order is denied, or the expiration of 72 Hours from the time of Attorney General authoerization, 50 U,S.C.\n\n 1805(f); (8) for training and testing purposes, 50 U.S.C.  1805(g); and (4)\nfor 15 days following a congressional declaration of war, 50 U.S.C.1811.9\n(V)\n-\nThe 15-day war declaration exception to FISA's warrant requirement was particularly relevant to the events of 2004, when OLC reassessed its prior opinions concerning the legality of the Stellar Wind program.\n\n8 The terms \"foreign power\" and \"agent of a foreign power\" are defined in FISA at 50\nU.S.C.' 1801(a) & (b).\n\n\"Foreign power\" is defined, inter alia, as \"a group engaged in international terrorism or activities in preparation therefor;\n. .. .\"\n50 U.S.C.  1801(a)(4).\n\nAri \"agent of a foreign power\" may be a U.S, person, defined at 50 U.S.C.  1801(i) to mean, inter alia, a United States citizen or permanent resident alien. The term \"facilities\" is not Another FISA provision prohibits persons from intentionally engaging in electronic surveillance \"under color of law except as authorized by statute[.]\" 50 U.S.C.  1809(a)(1). As discussed in Chapter Eight, in 2006\nthe Justice Department asserted in a publicly released legal analysis that this provision did not preclude certain warrantless electronic surveillance activities because such surveillance was \"authorized by\" subsequent legislative enactments - principally the AUMEF. The Department also asserted tflj.'a,t the AUMF \"confirms and supplements the President's constitutional authority\" to conduct warrantless electronic surveillance against the enemy during wartime,\n(U)\n\n## 2. Fisa Applications And Orders (U)\n\nFISA applications were presented to the FISA Court by the Department's Office of Intelligence Policy and Review (OIPR).10 Department and FBI officials familiar with the preparation and presentation of FISA\napplications described this process as extremiely time-consuming and labor intensive.\n\n(U)\nEach application must be approved and signed by the Attorney General (or Acting Attorney General) or Deputy Attorney General and must include the certification of a federal officer identifying or describing the target of the electronic surveillance; a \"statement of the facts and circumstances relied upon by the applicant to justify his belief\" that the target is a foreign power or agent of a foreign power and that the electronic surveillance is directed at the facilities or places used or to be used by the target; a statement of proposed minimization procedures; and a detailed description of the nature of the information sought and the type of communication or activities to be subjected to the surveillance.\n\n50 U.S.C.\n\n 1804(a)(1)-(6).1! The application must also include the certification of a high-ranking executive branch official or officials designated by the.\n\nPresident from among those executive officers employed in the area of national security or defense that the information soughtis deemed to be foreign intelligence information, that such information \"cannot reasonably be obtained by normal investigative techniques,\" and that a \"significant purpose\" of the surveillance is to obtain foreign intelligence information.1?\n\n1d. at  1804(2)(7). (U)\nFISA orders authorize electronic surveillance of U.S. persons for 90.\n\ndays. FISA orders may be renewed upon the same basis as the underlying order.\n\n50 U.S.C.  1805(e).\n\nAs noted, FISA also provides for the emergency use of electronic surveillance. When the Attorney General reasonably determines that an emergency situation exists, the use of electronic surveillance may be approved for a period of up to 72 hours (and under the FISA Amendments Act of 2008, up to 7 days) without a FISA order.\n\n50\nU.S.C.  1805(f).\n\n(U)\n\n## 3. Fisa Court (U)\n\nThe FISA statute established the FISA Court to review applications and issue orders. The FISA Court initially was composed of seven U.S.\n\nDistrict Court judges designated by the Chief Justice of the U.S. Supreme.\n\nCourt to serve staggered, non-renewable 7-year terms.13\n50 U.S.C.\n\nparticular siirveillance, to minimize the acquisition and: retention, and prohibit the dissemination, of nonpublicly available information concerning uncorisenting United States persons consistent with the need of the United States to obtain, produce, and disseminate {oreigri iritelligence information\n.\n\n. .\n\n.\n\n50 U.S.C.  1801(h)(1).\n\n(U)\n12 As.initially enacted, FISA required officials to certify that \"the purpose\" of the surveillance was to-obtain \"foreign intelligence: information.\" However, the Uniting and Strengthening Ameerica by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act (the USA PATRIOT Act) was nacted in October 2001 and amended this language in FISA to require only that officials certify that \"a significant purpose\" of the surveillance was to obtain foreign intelligence information.\n\n50 U.S.C.  1804(a)(7)(B).\n\nThis amendment, along with post-September 11 changes to Attorney General guidelines on intelligence sharing procedures and a ruling by the FISA Court of Review, removed the so-called \"wall\" that had existed between intelligence-gathering activities and criminal investigations.\n\nSee Memorandum from the Attorney General to Director of the FBI, et al., entitled \"Intelligence Sharing Procedures for Foreign Intelligence and Foreign Counterintelligence Investigations Conducted by the FBI\" (March 6, 2002); In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d 717, 727 (For. Int. Surv. Ct. Rev. 2002)(FISA did not \"preclude or limit the government's use.-or proposed use of foreign intelligence information, which included evidence of certain kinds of criminal activity, in a criminal prosecution.\").\n\n(U)\n 1803(a) & (d). The number of judges serving on the FISA Court was increased to 11 by the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001.\n\n(U)\n\n## D. Authorization For Use Of Military Force (U)\n\nOn September 18, 2001, in response to the terrorist attacks of September 11, Congress approved an Authorization for Use of Military Force Joint Resolutiont (AUMF).\n\nIn conjunction with the President's Commander-in-Chief authority under Article 11 of the Constitution, this legislation has been cited in support of the President's authority to conduct electronic surveillance without judicial\n- approval.\n\nSee, e.g., Legal Authorities Supporting the Activities of the National Security Agency Described by the President, January 19, 2006 (Justice Department White Paper), at 6-17.\n\nThe AUMF states, in pertinent part:\nTo authorize the use of the United States Armed Forces against those responsible for the recent attacks launched against the United States.\n\n'\nWhereas, on September 11, 2001, acts of treacherous violence were committed against the United States and its citizens; and Wheteas, such acts render it both necessary and appropriate that the United States exercise its rights to self-defense and to protect United States citizens both at home and abroad; and Whereas, in light of the threat to the national security and foreign policy of the United States posed by these grave acts of violence; and Whereas, such acts continue to pose an unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security and foreign policy of the Umnited States; and Whereas, the President has authoerity under the Constitution to take action to deter and prevent acts of international terrorism against the United States:\nNow, therefore, be it Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,\n\n## Sec. 2. Authorization For Use Of United States Armed Forces\n\n(a) IN GENERAL - That the President is authorized to use all necessary and appropriate force against those nations, organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, or harbored such organizations or persons, in order to prevent any future acts:-of international terrorism against the United States by such nations, organizations or persons.\n\n(U)\nPursuant to this authority, the President ordered the U.S. armed forces to invade Afghanistan to combat al Qaeda terrorists and overthrow the Taliban government that had given them refuge.\n\n(U)\nIn 2004, OLC took the position that the AUMF was \"expressly designed to authorize whatever military actions the Executive deems appropriate to safeguard the United States[,]\" including the use of electronic surveillance to detect and prevent further attacks.\n\nSee Office of Legal Counsel Memorandum, May 6, 2004, at 31, citing\n50 U.8.C.' 1811.\n\nIn addition, the Justice Department asserted in the 2006 White Paper that in enacting FISA Congress contemplated that a later legislative enactment could authorize electronic surveillance outside the procedures set forth in FISA itself, and cited the AUMF as such a legislative enactment. See Justice Department White Paper at 20-28, citing\n50 U.8.C.  1809(aj(1).\n\n## E. Executive Order 12333 (U)\n\nOn December 4, 1981, President Reagan signed Executive Order\n12333 as part of a series of legal reforms that followed abuses of intelligence-gathering authority documented by the Church Commission in the 1970s.14 Executive Order 12333 placed restrictions on intelligence collection activities engaged in by Executive:Branch agencies, including the NSA, while also seeking to foster \"full and free exchange of information\"\namong these agencies.!5 Executive Order 12333 at 1.1.\n\n(U)\nExecutive Order 12338 provides that the Attorney General is:\nauthorized \"to approve the use for intelligence purposes, within the United States or against a United States person abroad, of any technique for which a warrant would be required if undertaken for law enforcement purposes, provided that such techniques shall not be undertaken unless the Attorney General has determined in each case that there is probable cause to believe that the technique is directed against a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power.\"\n1d. at 2.5.\n\nExecutive Order 12333 also provides that electronic surveillance, as defined under FISA, must be conducted in accordance with FISA.16 (U)\nExecutive Order 12333 prohibits the collection of foreign intelligence information by \"authorized [agencies] of the Intelligence Community\n.\n\n.\n\n. for the purpose of acquiring information concerning the domestic activities of United States persons.\"\nId. at 2.3(b).\n\n(U)\nHowever, in authorizing the Stellar Wind program, previously; the legal rationale advanced for this exe: ption was that the Authorization for Use of Military Ferce and the President's Commander-in-Chief powers gave the President the authority to collect such information, notwithstanding the FISA statute.\n\n{5#; SPLWHASTH\nO\nCHNE\n\n## Ii. Presidential Authorizations (U)\n\nThe Stellar Wind program was first authorized by the President on October 4, 2001, and periodically reauthorized by the President through a series of documents issued to the Secretary of Defense erititled \"Presidential Authorization for Specified Electronic Surveillance Activities Duringa Limited Period to Detect and Prevent Acts of Terrorism Within the United States\" (Presidential Authorization or Authorization).\n\nA total of 43\nPresidential Authorizations, not including modifications and related presidential memoranda, were issued over the duration of the program from October 2001 through February 2007.17 Each Authorization directed the\n16 Prior to September 11, 2001, Executive Order 12333-and FISA were generally viewed #s the principal governing authorities for coriductinig electrotic surveillance. For example, in 2000 the NSA reported to Congress that\n(U) The applicable legal standards for the collection, retention, or dissemination of information concerning U.S. persons reflect a careful balancing between the needs of the government for such intelligence and the protection of the rights of U.S. persons, consistent with the reasonableness standard of the Fourth Amendment, as determined by factual circumstances,\n(U) In the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) and Executive Order\n(E.0.) 12333, Congress and the Executive have codified this balancing.\n\n(Citations omitted.)\n5002; May 22, 2002; June 24, 2002; July 30, 2002; September 10, 2002; October 15,\n2002; November 18, 2002; January 8, 2003; February 7, 2003; March 17, 2003; April 22,\n(Contd.)\nSecretary of Defense to \"use the capabilities of the Department of Deferise, including but not limited to the signals intelligence capabilities of the-\nNationial Security Agency, to collect foreign intelligence by electronic surveillance;\" provided the surveillance met certain criteria. The specific criteria are described in detail in Chapters Three and Four of this report.\n\n## A. Types Of Collection Authorized (S77Nf}\n\nThe scope of collection permitted under the Presidential Authorizations varied over time, but generally involved intercepting the content of certain telephone calls and e-mails, and the collection of bulk telephone and e-mail meta data. The term \"meta data\" has beery described as \"information about information.\" As used in the Stellar 'Wihnd program, for telephone calls, meta data generally refers to \"dialing-type information\"\n(the originating and terminating telephone numbers, and the date, time, and duration of the call), but not the content of the call.\n\nFor e-mails, meta data generally refers to the \"to,\" \"from,\" \"cc,\" \"bec,\" and \"s_en.t\"' lines of an e-mail, e but not the \"subject\" line or content.\n\n\nAL\nN\nThe information collected through the Stellar Wind program fell into three categories, often referred to as \"basketsTM\n\no\nBasket 1 (content of telephone and e-mail communications);\ns\nBasket 2 (telephony meta data); and\n2003; June 11, 2003; July 14, 2003; September 10, 2003; October 15, 2003; December 9,\n2003: January 14, 2004; March 11, 2004; May 5, 2004; June 23, 2004; August 9, 2004;\nSeptember 17, 2004; November 17, 2004; January 11, 2005; March 1, 2005; April 19,\n2005; June 14, 2005; July 26, 2005; September 10, 2005; October 26, 2005; December 13,\n2005; January 27, 2006; March 21, 2006; May 16, 2006; July 6, 2006; September 6, 2006;\nOctober 24, 2006; aind December 8, 2006. The last Presidential Authorization expired February 1, 2007. There were also two modifications of a Presidential Autherization and one Presidential memorandum to the Secretary of Defense issued in connection with the Stellar Wind program. (IS7/STLW//SH1O6/NE\n\n## B. Findingsand Primary Authogities {U)\n\n|\nIn this section, we describe certain features common to all the Presidential Authorizations. Each of the Presidential Authorizations included a finding to the effect that terrorist groups of global reach possessed the intent and capability to attack the United States, that an extraordinary emergency continued to exist, and that these circumstances.\n\n\"constitute an urgent and compelling governmental interest permitting electtonic surveillance within the United States for counterterrorism putposes; without a court order.\"\n@SHSTEWSHOE7NF)\nThe primary authoritigs ited for the legality of these electronic surveillance and related activities were Article II of the Constitution and the Authorization for Use of Military Force Joint Resolution. The Authorizations further provided that any limitation in Executive Order 12333 or any other Presidential directive inconsistent with the Presidential Authorizations shall not apply; to the extent of the inconsistency; to the :'electronig;surveiizlanc,s authorized under the Stellar Wind program. (FS/HSTLWHHSH-AOCHNPT\nEach Authorization also included the President's determination that to-assist in preserving the secrecy necessary to \"detect and prevent acts of tetroristh against the United States,\" the Secretary of Defense was to defer notification of the Authorizations outside of the Executive Branch and the activities carried out pursuant to them. The President also noted his intention to inform appropriate members of the Senate and the House of Representatives of the program \"as soon as I judge that it can be done consistently with national defense needs.\" Some Presidential Authorizations described briefings given to members of Congress and FISA Court judges.\n\n## C. The Reauthorization Process (U)\n\nThe Presidential Authorizations were issued at intervals of approximately 30 to 45 days. Department officials told the OIG that the intervals were designed to be somewhat flexible to assure the availability of the principals that had to sign the Authorizations and to reassess the reasonableness of the collection.\nSteven Bradbury, former Principal Deputy and Acting Assistant Attorney General for the Office of Legal Counsel (OLC), said that the main reason for periodically reauthorizing the program was to ensure that the Presidential Authorizations were. reviewed frequently to assess the continued need for the program and the program's\n.\n\nvalue. As the period for each Presidential Authorization drew to-a close, the.\n\nDirector of Central Intelligence (DCI), and as of June 3, 2005, the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) prepared a threat assessment memorandum for the President describing potential terrorist threats to the United States and outlining intelligence gathered through the Stellar Wind program and other rmeans during the previous Authorizatiori period. The DCI (and later the DNI) and the Secretary of Defense reviewed. these memoranda and signed a recommendation that the program be reauthorized.\n\nEach recommendation was then reviewed by the OLC to assess whether, based on the threat assessment and information gathered from other sources, there was \"a sufficient factual basis demonstrating a threat of terrorist attacks in the United States for it to continue to be reasonable under the standards of the Fourth Amendment for the President to\n[conitinue] to authorize the warrantless searches involved\" in the program.\n\nThe OLC then advised the Attorney General whether the constitutional staridard of reasonableness had been met and whether the Presidential Authorization could be certified \"as to form and legality.\"\nLt\n.\n\n## D. Approval \"As To Form And Legality\" (U)\n\nAs noted above, the Presidential Authorizations were \"[aJpproved as to forrn and legality\" by the Attorney General or other senior Departmc_nt'\nofficial, typically after the review and conecurrence of the OLC. The lone exception to this practice was the March 11, 2004, Authorization which we discuss in Chapter Four. {FS+/8H/\n3\n-\nHowever, there was no legal requirement that the Authorizations be.\n\ncertified by the Attorney General or other Department official. Former senior Department official Patrick Philbin told us he thiought one purpose for the certification was to give thg\n0\nse iti y that i not \"look like a rogue operatiors:\nBradbury told us that the Justice Department certifications.\n\nserved as official confirmation that the Department had determined that the activities carried out under the program were lawful.\n\nFormer Attorney General Gonzales told us that certification of the prograrn as to form and legality was not required as a matter of law, but he believed that it \"added value\" to the Authorization for three reasons.\n\nFirst,\n\n## | . Chapter Three . Inception And Early Operation Of Stellar Wind (September 2001 Through April 2003) Shnf}\n\nThis chapter describes the early operation of the Stellar Wind program. The five sections-of the chapter cover the time period from September 2001 to April 2003. (S NE\n'\nIn Section I, we provide a brief overview of the National Security Agency (NSA) and the inception of the Stellar Wind program, including a description of the legal authorities relied upon to support the: program.and the scope of collection authorized under the Presidential Authorizations. Tn spects of the NSA's implementation of the operation of the program, and the initial process for analyzing and disseminating the information collected.\n\nIn Sections III and IV, we describe the FBI's and the Office of Intelligence Policy and Review's early knowledge of and involvement in Stellar Wind.\n\nIn Section V, we describe medsures the FBI implemented to improve its management of information derived from the program that the FBI disseminated to its field offices.\n\n## L. Inception Of The Steliar Wind Program (U/ /Fot0O) A. The National Security Agency (U)\n\nThe NSA was established on October 24, 1952, by President Truman as a separate agency within the Department of Defense under the direction, authority, and control of the Secretary of Defense.\n\nSee Presidential Memorandum to the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense, October 24, 1952. By Executive Order 12333 (December 4, 1981), the NSA\nwas given responsibility within the U.S. Intelligence Community for all signals intelligence, including the \"collection of signals intelligence for national foreign intelligence purposes\" and the processing and dissemination of such intelligence for counterintelligence purposes.!?\n\n(U)\nThe NSA's two primary missions. are to protect U.S. government information systems. and to collect, Pprocess, and disseminate foreign signals intelligence information. This twofold mission is reflected in the NSA's organizational structure, which consists of two operational directorates:\nThe Information Assurance D1rectorate, which conducts-defensive information operations to protect information infrastructures critical to the United States' national security interests, and the Signals Intelligence Directorate (SID), which controls foreign intelligence collection and processing activities for the United 'States.\n\nL)\nThe SID\nis divided into three major components, two of which -\nAnalysis and Productlon- and Data Acquisition_- are relevant to the Stellar Wind program. The work of these components with respect to the Stellar Wind program is discussed in more detail in Section II. below.\n\nSR\n\n## B. Implementation Of The Program (September 2001 Through November 2001) {S//Nf}\n\nGeorge Tenet, the Director of Central Intelligence at the time, mentioned the modification of these NSA collection activities during a meeting with Vice President Cheney shortly after the September 11 attacks to discuss the intelligence community's response. According to Hayden, who did not attend the meeting but was told about it by Tenet, Cheney asked Tenet to inquire from the NSA whether there were additional steps that could be taken with respect to enhancing signals intelligence capabilities. Tenet related this message to Hayden, who responded that there was nothing further the NSA could do without additional authority.\n\nAccording to Hayden, Tenet asked him a short time later what the NSA\ncould do if additional authority was provided. {FS//SH/NF\nHayden consulted with experts from the N SA's SID and attorneys from the NSA's Office of General Counsel about how the N SA could.enhaince its collection capabilities consistent with considerations of operational usefulness, technical feasibility, and legality. Hayden said he then attended a meeting at the White House to discuss how NSA signals intelligence collection capabilities could be modified to respond to the September 11\nattacks, {FSHSHPH\nHayden told us he highlighted two issues at this meeting.\n\nFirst, Hayden stated at the meeting that the FISA statuite's applicability to evolving telecommunicationis technology had.the effect of constrainine th NSA's\n-abijlity to intercept commu ications v e Accordinig to Hayden\n\\\nintelligence collection activities|\n;\nwithout having to first obtain FISA Court authorization.2\nThe second issue Hayden highlighted at the meeting concerned the meta data associated with telephonic and e-mail communications. Hayden said that obtaining access to the meta data of communications to and from the United States, as well as communications within the United States would s1gn1flcant1y enhance the NSA's analytical capabilities. {(FS/SH-MH)\nHayden said he attended two additional meetings with Vice President Cheney to discuss further how NSA collection capabilities could be expanded along the lines described at the White House meeting. Vice President Cheney directed Hayden to meet with the Counsel to the Vice President, David Addingtori; to continue the discussion, which Hayden said he did. According to Hayden, Addmgton drafted the first Presidential Agthor,lz'eguon for the Stellar Wind program based on these meetings.?2\nThe Stellar Wind program officially came irito existence on October 4,\n2001, when President Bush signed the Presidential Authorization drafted by Addington. The Authorization directed the Secretary of Defense to employ the signals intelligence capabilities of the NSA to collect certain foreign intelligence by electronic surveillance in order to preverit acts of terrorism within the United States.2 The Presidential Authorization stated that an extraordinary emergency existed because of the September 11 attacks, consfitutmg an urgent and compelling governmental interest permitting electronic surveillance within the United States for counterterrorism purposes without judicial warrants or court orders.\n\nAccess to the Stellar Wind program was very tightly restricted.\n\nFormer White House Counsel and Attorney General Alberto Gonzales told the OIG that it was the President's decision to keep the program a \"close hold.\" Gonzales stated that the President made the decision on all requests to read in non-operational persons, incliding Justice Department officials, and that as far as he was aware this decision-making authority had not been delegated either within the White House or to other agencies concerning read-in decisions for operational personnel, such as NSA and\n22 Hayden told us he could not recall the Justice Department having any involvement in or presence at meetings he attended to discuss enhancing NSA collection capabilities. Hayden said this mildly surprised him but that he assumed someone was keeping the Department briefed on these discussions.\n\nGongzales, who was the White House Couunsel at the time, also told the OIG that he would be \"shocked\" if the Department was not represented at the White House mectings, and further stated that in the immediate aftermath of September 11, he met often with lawyers from the NSA, CIA, DOD, and the Justice Department with the objective of \"coordinating the legal thinking\" concerning the United States' response to the attacks, Because we were unable to interview Addington, former Attorney General Ashcroft, and John Yoo, we do not kriow what role if any the Department played in drafting or reviewing the first Presidential Authorization.\n\n23 The program was given the cover term -\not which time the cover term was changed to \"Stellar Wmd y -(-S{,LNF-)\nFBI employees.2* However, as indicated in the NSA Office of the Inspector General's report on the President's Surveillance Program (NSA OIG Report), decisions to read in NSA, CIA, and FBI operational personnel were made by the NSA. According to the NSA OIG Report, NSA Director Hayden needed White House approval to read in members of Congress, FISA Court judges, the NSA Inspector General, and others.\n\nSee NSA OIG Report at V. {8/}\n\n## 1. Pre-Stellar Wind Office Of Legal Counsel Legal Memoranda (U)\n\nIn this section, we summarize the initial legal memoranda from the Justice Department supporting the legal basis for the Stellar Wind program, and we describe the key aspects of the first Presidential Authorization for the program.\n\n%\n:\nFSHHOE\n\n## A. Hiring Of John Yoo (U)\n\nOLC Deputy Assistant Attorney General John Yoo was responsible for drafting the first series of legal memoranda supporting the program.25\nAs noted above, Yoo was the only OLC official \"read into\" the Stellar Wind program from the program's inception until he left the Department in May\n2003.26 The only other non-FBI Department officials read into the program until after Yoo's departure were Attorney General Asheroft, who was read in on October-4, 2001, and Counsel for Intelligence Policy James Baker, who was read in on January 11, 2002\n27 4FS//STEW/1SH1OENF}\n24 Gonzales testified before the Senate Judiciary Committee on July 18, 2006, that\n\"[a]s with all decisions that are non-operational in terms of wha'has access to the program, the: President-of the United States makes the decisions, because this:is such an important program[.]\"\n(U)\nand the Counsel to the President, usually on matters invelving significant legal issues or constitutional questions, and in response to legal questions raised by Executive Branch agencies.\n\nIn additien, all Executive Orders proposed to be issued by the President are reviewed by the Office of Legal Counsel as to form and legality, as are other matters that require the President's formal approval.\n\n(U)\nbeing approved for access to particularly sensitive and restricted information about a classified program, receiving a briefing about the program, and formally acknowledging the briefing, usually by signing a nondisclosure agreement describing restrictions on the handling and use of information concerning the program.\n\n(U)\n27\nDaniel Levin, who served as both Chief of Staff to FBI Director Robert Mueller and briefly as Ashcroft's national security counselor, also was read into the program along with Mueller in late September 2001 at the FBL According to Levin, White House Counsel Gonzales controlled who was read into the program, but Gonzales told him that the President had to personally approve each request. P/ ETEW\nBSOS NF-\nJay Bybee, the Assistant Attorney General for the Office of. Legal Counsel from November 2001 through March 2003, provided the OIG with background information on how Yoo came to be mvolved in national ecuuty issues on behalf of the OLC. Bybee's nomination to be the OLC\nAssistant Attorney General was announced by the White House in July\n2001, Bybee was not confirmed by the Senate as the Assistant Attorney General until late October 2001.28\nFor several weeks after the September 11,2001, terrorist attacks, Bybee remained a law professor at the University of Nevada-Las Vegas, and was sworn in as OLC Assistant Attorney General in late November 2001, {FS/+SH-/NE-\nBybee told us that he traveled to Washington, D.C., sometime in July\n2001 to interview applicants for Deputy Assistant A'Ltorney General slots in OLC.\n\nIn early July 2001, Kyle Sampson, at the time a Special Assistant to the President and Associate Director for Presidential Personnel assigned to handle presidential appointments to the Department of Justice, told Bybee that John Yoo was already under consideration for one of the OLC Deputy Assistant Attorney General slots. Bybee said Sampson asked him whether he would agree to have Yoo be one of his deputies. Bybee said that he knew Yoo orily by reputation but was \"enthusiastic\" about the prospect of having Yoo as a Deputy.\n\nBybee told the OIG that he regarded Yoo as a\n\"dlstlngulshed hire.\" Bybee said that after speaking with Sampson he called Yoo and asked him to work at OLC as a Deputy Assistant Attorney General.\n\n(U)\nIn addition to speaking with Yoo, Bybee interviewed other prospective OLC Depiities, and hired several individuals, including Patrick Philbin and Ed Whelan, for those positions.? The White House recommended, and Bybee agreed, that Whelan be designated Principal Deputy.\n\nBybee stated that he krew Yoo would be disappointed because Yoo had wanted that position, and Bybee said that Yoo \"didn't hide his disappointment.\" Bybee told us that Yoo asked him whether since he was not selected for the Principal Deputy slot he could be guaranteed the \"national security portfolio.\" Bybee agreed to Yoo's request.\n\nBybee told the OIG that this was an easy decision because Yoo had more national security experience than any of the other deputies.\n\n(U)\nBybee said that Yoo began working in OLC in July 2001 and that all of the Deputies'were in place before Bybee began serving as head of the OLC\nthat November:. (U)\nBybee told us he was never read into the Stellar Wind program and could shed no further light on how Yoo came to draft the OLC opinions on the program. However, he said that Yoo had responsibility for supervising the drafting of opinions related to-national security issues by the time the attacks of September 11 occurred.3 Bybee described Yoo as \"articulate and brilliant,\" and also said he had a \"golden resume\" and was \"very well conriected\" with officials in the White House. He said that from these connections; in addition to Yoo's scholarship in the area of executive authority during wartime, it was not surprising that Yoo \"became the White House's guy\" on national security matters.\n\n(U)\n\n## B. Yoo's Legal Analysis Of A Warrantless Domestic Electronic Surveillance Program {Fs/F8H-Nf)\n\nBefore the start of the Stellar Wind program under the October 4,\n2001, Presidential Authorization, Yoo drafted a memorandumi evaluating the legality of a \"hypothetical\" electronic surveillance program within the United States to monitor communications of potential terrorists.\n\nHis memorandum, dated September 17, 2001, was addressed to Timothy Flanigan, Deputy White House Counsel, and was entitled \"Constitutional Standards on Random Electronic Surveillance for Countetr-Terrorism Purposes.\"\n{38\nOt\n31 Ag discussed below, however, his description of how communications would be collected and used under the program differed in key respects from the actual operation of the Stellar Wind program.\n\nIn fact, in a January 23, 2006, address to the National Press Club, former NSA Director Hayden stated: {P3778H-HHE\nLet me talk for a few minutes also about what this program is not, Itis nota drift net over Dearborn or Lackawanna or Freemont grabbing conversations that we then sort out by these alleged keyword searches or data-mining tools\n, o }is an example of how the October 4 memorandum did not reflect the. Stellar Wind program as it was actually devised and operated by the NSA., The Stellar Wind program did not contemplate bulk collection of content communications. The only information collected in bulk under the program involved telephony and e-mail meta data.\n\nThis meta data was collected in bulk so that it could then be queried based on telephone numbers or e-mail addresses associated with communicants with known or suspected links to international terrorism. These telephone numbers and e-mail addresses Yoo's Septemnber 17 and October 4 memoranda were not addressed specifically to the Stellar Wind program, but rather to a \"hypothetical\"\nrandomized or broadly scoped domestic warrantless: surveillance program..\n\nAs discussed below, the first Office of Legal Counsel opinion explicitly addressing the legahty of the Stellar Wind program was not drafted until after the program had been formally authorized by President Bush on October\n4, 2001. (TS//SH/BE\nN -\nGon?ales told the OIG that he did not believe these first two memoranda fully addressed the White House's understanding of the Stellar Wind program. Rather, as described above, these mermmoranda addressed the legality of a \"hypothetmal\" domestic surveillance program rather than the Stellar Wind program as authorized by the Pr esident and carried out by the NSA:85 However, Gonzales also told us that he believed these first two memoranda descrlbed as lawful activities that were broader than those carried out under Stellar Wind, and that therefore these opinions \"covered\"\nthe Stellar Wind program. '(TS7'7'ST7'7LNFj\n\n## 2. Presidential Authorization Of Octeober 4, 2001\n\nOn October 4, 2001, President Bush issued the first of 43 Presidential Authorizations for the Stellar Wind program. The October 4 Authorization.\n\ndirected the Secretary of Defense to \"use the capabilities of the Department of Defense, including but not limited to the signals intelligence capabilities of the Nahonal Security Agency, to collect foreign. intelligence by electronic surveillance,\" provided the surveillance was mLended to:\n\n(&) acquire a communication (including but not limited to a wire\ncommunication carried into or out of the United States b\ncable) for: whwh there is probable cause to\nbelieve that\nIE )E)\nL\no party to such communication\nis a group\nengaged n mternatlonal terrorismi, or activities in\npreparation therefor, or an agent ol such a group; or\n(b) acquire, with respect to a communication,\nheader/router/addressing-type information, including\ntelecommunications dialing-type data, but not the contents\nof the communication, when (i) at least one party to such\ncommunication is outside the United States or (ii) no party to\nsuch communication is known to be a citizen of the United\nStates. (FS/STEW/SHAOCINA\nIty shott, this first Authorization allowed NSA to intercept the cotitent of any communication, including those to, from, or exclusively within the United States, where probable cause emstecl to. believe one of the: commumcants was engaged in international tenonsm, 1? B)E)\n:\n'\n'\nl The Authml?atlon also allowed\n' the N SA to \"acqmre telepho\n\\g and ewmafl Taeta data where one end of the\n'commmimatxon was forelgn or nexther communicant was known to be.a U.S, citizen.36 F&H\nroe The Authorization stated that it relied primarily on Article II of the Const1tut10n and on the recently passed Authorization for the Use of Military Force (AUIVII\") to support the intelligence-gathering activities. The.\n\nAuthorization also stated that the President's directive was based on threat assessments indicating that terrorist groups remained determined toattack in the United States, The Authorization stated that it was to terminate \"not later than 30 days\" from the date of its execution.\n\nAs several Office of Legal Counsel and other Department and N SA\nOfflCIals acknowledged, in addition to allowing the interception of the content of communications into or out of the United States, the literal terms of paragraph 4(a)(ii) of this first Authorization would have allowed NSA to intercept the content of purely domestic.communications. NSA Director Hayden told us he did not realize this until Addington spec1fica11y raised the subject during a meeting the two had to discuss renewing the first Authorization, According to Hayden, he told Addington that he did not want the NSA conducting such domestic interceptions and cited three reasons for this.\n\nFirst, he said the NSA was a foreign intelligence agency. Second, the NSA's collection infrastritcture would not-support the: collection of pure:ly domestic communications. Third, Hayden said he would require such a high evidentiary standard to justify intercepting pur -ely domestic fcommurucatlon that such cases might just as well go to the FISA Court.37\nmodifications to the Authorization in the next part of this chapter.\n\nl'PQ/ IQ'['T At / t%g%\nAs a result, Hayden said the NSA did not exercise the apparent authority in the first Authorization to intercept domestic-to-domestic:\ncommunications.\n\nGoldsmith stated that Hayden's position that the NSA not involve itself in domestic spying related back to NSA's \"getting in a lot of trouble\" for its abuses during the 1970s.\n\nIn addition, former Deputy Attorney General Comey told us that Hayden had said he was willing to\n\"walk up to the line\" but Would be careful \"not to get chalk on [his] shoes.\"\nAs discussed above, subsection (b) of paragraph 4 of the Authorization covered the acquisition of both e-mail and teIephony meta data. The e- rna11\nmeta data inchaded the \"to,\" \"from,\" \"ce,\" \"bee,\" a but not the \"subiect\" line or content of the e-\n. e\n.\n\n:\n:\n=\n'\n=\nTelephony meta data acqmsfl;xon\n1nc1uded the dxahng mformatmn from telephone billing data, such as the originating and terminating telephone number and the date, time, and duration of the telephone calls, but not the content of telephone calls.\n\nUnder the Presidential Authorization, collection of both e-mail and telephony meta data was limited to circumstances in which one party to the communication was outside the United States or no party to the communication was known to be a U.S. citizen.\n\n\nTE\n\"\nAttorney General Ashcroft approved the first Presidential Authorization as to \"form and legality\" on October 4, 2001. According to NSA records, this was the same day that Asheroft was verbally read into the Stellar Wind program. Daniel Levin, who in October 2001 was both a national security counselor to Attorney General Ashcroft and FBI Director Mueller''s Chief of Staff, told us that, according to Ashcroft, the Presidential Authorization was \"pushed in front of\" Ashcroft and he was told to sign it,38\nLevin stated that he was not with Ashcroft when this occurred and therefore he did not have an opportunity to advise Ashcroft about the Authorization before Ashcroft signed it. ARS/ASTLW\nST/ OC/NE})-\nJames Baker, Counsel for Intelligence Policy, told us that Levin had given him the same account of how Ashcroft came to approve the October 4,\n2001, Presidential Authorization. According to Baker, Ashcroft was told that the program was \"critically important\" and that it must be approved as to form and legality.\n\nBaker said that Levin told him Ashcroft approved the\n38 According to Hayden, Addington typed the Presidential Authorizations and personally couriered them around for signatures.\n\nHowever, the OIG was unable to determine whether Addington presented the first Authorization to Ashcroft for signature, because both Ashcroft and Addington declined or did not respond to our requests to interview them. ~{S/-H\n\n- Authorization on the spot. According to Baker, Levin alsa told Baker that\nwhen he learned there was no memorandum\nfrom the Office of Legal\n'Counsel concerning\nthe program, Levin told Yoo to draft one.\nLevin's account to us of the instruction that Yoo draft 4 memorandum concerning the legality of the program differed slightly from Baker's account.\n\nLevin told us that he said to Ashcroit that it \"wasn't fair\" that Ashcroft was the only Justice official read into the program, and that for Asheroft's protection Levin advised Ashcroft to have another Departmerit official read into the program for the purpose of providing advice on the legality of the program. Levin said he learned that Ashcroft was able to get permission from the White House to have one other person read into the program to advise Asheroft; although Levin was not certain how Yoo came to be selected as that person.3?\n\nAs discussed below, Gonzales told us that it was the President's decision to read Joln Yoo into the programi.\n\n## C. Presidential Authorization Is Revised And The Office Of Legal Counsel Issnes Legal Memoranda In Support Of The Program (November 2001 Through January 2002) I. Presidential Authorization Of November 2, 2001\n\nOn November 2, 2001, with the first Presidential Authorization set to expire, President Bush signed a second Presidential Authorization. The second Authorization relied upon the same authorities in support of the President's actions, chiefly the Article Il Commander-in-Chief powers and the AUMF.\n\nThe second Authorization cited the same findings in a threat assessment as to the magnitude of the potential threats and the likelihood of their occurrence in the future. However, the scope of authorized content collection and meta data acquisition was redefined by adding the italicized language below in paragraphs 4(a) and (b):\n\n(a) acquire a communication (including but not limited to a wire\ncommunication carried into or out of the United States by\ncable) for which, based on the factual and practical\nconsiderations\nof\nfexyy\nJifs\nFE\nFELSD\nto believe tha\nterrorlsm or act1v1t1es in preparatlon therefm' or ail J agent\nof:such a group; or\n(b) &equire, with respeet to a communication,\n'\n'header/router/addressing-type mformatlon, including\ntelecommunications dialing-type data, but not the contents:\nof the: commumcatxon, when (i) at lgast one: party to such\ncommumcatlon ig outside the United States, (i) no party to\nsuch cornmumnication is known to bea citizen of the United\nStates, .or (ili) bused on the factual ard practicdl\nconsiderations. of everyday life on which-reasonable and\nprudent persons act, there dre specific und articulable facts\ngiving redsoit to believe that such commmunication reldtes to\nmtematmnal terronsm, ar activities: in preparation therefor.\nThe new language therefore changed in three key respects the seope.\n\nof ollection and acquisition authorized tinder the Stellar Witid prograt.\n\nFirst, the \"prohable cause to believe\" standard for the collection of e<mail and telephone content was: replaced with \"for Whmh 'based on the factual and practlcal considerations of everyday life on which reasonable and prident, persors act, there are reasonable grounds-to believe , ..\n\n.* Baker told us this change was made by Addington because he beheved the terth\n\"probable cause\" was \"top freighted\" with usage in judicial opinions. Baker said he believed the change to more Lolloqwal language also was made because the standard was to be applied. by non-lawyers at the NSA.\n\nF1STEWS\n181/ /OC/NT)\n'Second, the new standard applied to the reasonable belief that \"such comrmunication originated or ter minated outside the United States\n...\n\n.\"\nThe riew language therefore eliminated the authority that existed in the first.\n\nAuthorization to intercept the content of purely domestic communications.\n\nThird, the second Authorization permitted the acquisition of a third category of e-mail and telephony meta data when \"based on the actual and practical considerations of everyday life on which reasonable and prudent persons act, there are specific and articulable facts giving reason to helieve that such communication relates to international terrorisni, or activities.in preparation therefore.\" This language represented an expansion of meta data. collection authority to include meta data pertaining to certain communieations even when both parties are U.S. persons, as long as there were facts giving reason to beheve thaL the c@mmumcahon was related to international terrorism.\n\n## 5. Yoo Drafts Office Of Legal Counsel Memoranduim Sing L Egality Of Stellar Wind Addre's\n\nThe Stellar Wind program was first authorized by President Bush and certified as to form and legality by Atterney General Ashcroft on October 4,\n3001, without the support of any formal legal opinion from the Office of Legal Counsel expressly addressing Stellar Wind. {ES//+SH/NE)-\nThe first OLC opinion directly supporting the legality of the Stellar Wind program was dated November 2, 2001, and was drafted by Yoo. His opinion also analyzed the legality of the first Presidential Authorization and a draft version of the second Authorization.*?\n\nS/ ST\nAttorney General Ashcroft, Yoo In his November 2 memorarndu !\n\nAs discussed in Chapter Four of this repor however, perc veddef_icieric'ies in Yoo's memorefidum later became critical to:the Office of Legal Counsel's decision to reassess the Stellar Wind program in 2003. We therefore describe Yoo's legal analysis in his November 2 memorandum. {F377/8H7/NF)\nYoo acknowledged at the outset of his November 2 memorandum that\n\"[blecause of the highly sensitive nature of this subject and the time pressures involved, this memorandum has not undergone the usual editing and review process for opinions that issue from our Office [OLC].\" The Yoo did acknowledge in his memorandum that the first Presidential Authorization was \"in tension with FISA.\" Yoo stated that FISA \"purports to be the exclusive statutory means for conducting electronic surveillance for foreign intelligence,\" but Yoo then opined that \"[sjuch a reading of FISA\nwould be an uncoenstitutional infringement on the President's Article II\nautharities,\"!\n\nCiting advice of the OLC and the position of the Department as presented to Congress during passage of the USA PATRIOT Act several weeks earlier, Yoo charactenzed FISA as merely providing a \"safe harbor for electronic. survefllance 7 adding that it \"cannot restrict the President's ability to. engage in Warrantless searches that protect the national security.\"\nRegarding whether the activities conducted under the Stellar Wind program could\n- be conducted under FISA, Yoo wrote that it was pm\"ltic that FISA required an application to the FISA Court to describe the or \"fagilities\"\nto be used by the target of the surveillance. Yoo also stated that it was unlikely that a FISA Court would grant a warrant to.C'ove_\nO\n| =s contemplated in the Presidential\n'\nuthoriz\n.\n\nNoting that the Authorization could be viewed as-a violation of FISA's civil and criminal sancetions in 50 U.8.C. 88 1809-10, Yoo opined that in this regard FISA represented an unconstitutional infringement on the President's Article II powers. According to Yoo, the ultimate test of whether the government may engage in warrantless electronic surveillance activities is whether such conduct is consistent with the Fourth Amendment, not whether it meets the standards of FISA.\n\nCiting cases applying the doctrine of constitutional avoidance, Yoo reasoned that reading FISA to restrict the President's inherent authority to conduct foreign intelligence surveillance would raise grave constitutional questions.4?2 Yoo wrote that \"nless Congress made a clear statement in FISA that it sought to restrict presidential authority to conduct warrantless searches in the national security area - which it has not - then the statute must be construed to avoid such a reading.\"*3\nST\nST\nO\nNT\nand Congress in matters of war and national security\" containing certain propositions that no longer reflect the views of the OLC and \"should not be treated as authoritative for any purpose.\" Steven G. Bradbury, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, Department of Justice, Memorandum for the Files, \"Re:\nStatus of Certain OLC\nOpinions Issued in the Aftermath of the Terrorist Attacks of September 11, 2001,\"\nJanuary 15, 2009,\n1, 11. Among these opinions was a February 2002 classified memorandum written by Yoo which asserted that Congress had not included a clear statement in FISA that it sought to restrict presidential authority to conduct warrantless surveillance activities in the national security area and that the FISA statute therefore does not apply to the president's exercise of his Commarider-in-Chief authority.\n\nIn a January 15, 2009, memorandum (included among those released in March), Bradbury stated that this proposition \"is problematic and questionable, given FISA's express references to the President's authority\" and is \"not supported by convincing reasoning.\"\nYoo's analysis of this point would later raise serious concerns for othet officials in the Office of Legal Counsel and the Office of the Deputy Attorney General (ODAG) in late 2003 and early 2004.44 Among other concerns, Yoo did not address the 15-day warrant requirement exception in FISA following a congressional declaration of war, See 50 U.S.C.  1811, Yoo's successors in the Office of Legal Counsel criticized this omission in in F'I'SA,'Congress arguably had d'e'monst'rated an intention to '?occupy the\n:fi'eld\"'x Ol_l:the matter of el_e(;tronic surveillance during wartime.45\nconcerns regarding the NSA surveillance program to the extent that the Authorizations applied to non-U.S. persons outside the United States.\n\npersons crossing the border and that interceptions of communications in or out of the United States fell within the \"border crossing exception.\" Yoo further opined that electronic surveillance in \"direct Support of military operations\" did not trigger constitutional rights-against illegal searches and seizures, in part because the Fourth Amendment is primarily aimed.\n\nat curbing law enforcement abuses. {PS/+STEW/SL. O/ NE\nFinally, Yoo wrote that the electronic surveillance described in the Presideritial Authorizations was \"reasonable under the Fourth Amendment and therefore did not require a warrant, In support of this position, Yoo.\n\ncited Supreme Court opinions upholding warrantless searches in a variety of contexts, such as drug testing of employees and sobriety checkpoints to detect drunk drivers, and in other circumstances \"when special needs, beyond the normal need for law enforc':'ement, make the warrant and probable cause requirement impracticable,\" Veronia School Dist. 477 v.\n\nActon, 515 U.S. 464, 652 (1995) (as quoted in November 2, 2001, Memorandum at 20).\n\nYoo wrote that in these situations the government's interest was found to have outweighed the individual's privacy interest, and to Yoo, the surveillance authorized by the Presidential Authorizations advanced this governmental security interest.\n\n:\nYoo also omitted from his November 2 memorandum - as well as from his earlier September 17 and October 4, 2001, memoranda - any discussion of Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.8. 579 (1952), a leading case on the distribution of government powers between the Executive and Legislative branches.*\" As discussed in Chapter Four, Justice J ackson's analysis of President Truman's Article II Comimander-in-Chief authority during warlime in'the Youngstewn case was-ar unportant factor in the.\n\nOffice of Legal Counsel's reevaluation in 2004 oi Yoo 's opinion on the legality of the Stellar Wind program.\n\nSH-\n\n## 3. Additional Presidential Authorizations (U)\n\nOn November 30, 2001, the President signed a third Authorization authorizing the Stellar Wmd program. The third Authorization was virtually identjeal to the second Authonzatmn of November 2, 2001, in finding that the threat of tefforist attacks in the United States cantmued to exist, the legal authorities cited ior confinumg the electronic surveillance, and the scope: of collection.\n\n)\n\n## Collectmn To Prowd'C.\n\n(a) dcquire & communication (including but not limited to & wire\n'communication carried into or out of the United States by\ncable) for which, based on the factual and praetical\nconsiderations of everyday life on which reasonable and\nprudent persons act, there are reasonable grounds to believe\nsuch commmunication originated or terminated outside the United States and a party to such communication is a group\n7 In Youngstown, the Supreme Court held that President Truman's Executive Order directing the Secretary of Commerce to seize and operate steel plants during a labor dispiite to prodiice steel needed for American (roops during the Korean War was an uicoristitutionsl exercise of the President's Article Il Commander-in-Chief authority. Ina corcurring opinion, Justice Jackson listed three categories of Presidential actions against which ta judge the Presidential powers, First, \"[wjhen the President acts pursuant to an express or implied authorization of Congress, his author ity is at its maximum[.]\"\nId. at\n635.\n\nSecond, Justice Jackson described a category of concurrent authority between the President and Congress as a \"zone of twilight\" in which the distribution of power is uneertain and dependant on \"the imperatives of events and contemporary imponderables rather than on abstract theories of law.\" Td. at 637 (footnote omitted).\n\nThird, \"[w]lien the President takes measures incompatible with the express or implied will of Congress, his.\n\npower is at its lowest ebb, for then he can rely only upon his own constitutional powers minus any constitutional powers of Congress over the mattet.\"\nId, Justice Jackson coricluded that President Truman's actions fell within this third category, and thus \"under citeumstances which leave Presidential power most viilnerable to attack and in the least favorable of possible canstitutional postures.\"\n1d. at 640.\n\n(U)\nengaged i in international terrorism, or activities in preparation therefor? or any agent of such a group; or\n\n(b) acquire, with respect to a communication,\nheader/router/ addressing-type. information, including\ntelecommunications dialing-type data, but not the contents\nof the communication, when (i) at least one party to- such\ncommunication is outside the United States, (ii) no party to\nsuch communication is known to be a citizen of the United\nStates, or (iii) based on the factual and pr dctical\nconsiderations of everyday life on which reasonable and\nprudent persons act, there are specific and articulable facts\ngiving reason to believe that such communication relates to\ninternational terrorism, or activities in preparation therefor,\nm January 20@9rema1ne\n, ent1a1 Authorlzatlons extenchng the Stellar Wmd Program until fhe\n\n## Chapter Fou1 ( 4, Subsequent Yoo Opinions (U)\n\nIn a 2-page memorandum to Attorney General Asheroft dated\n.Jartuary 9, zooz Yoo wrote that W ) (b)<3> o (0)\n.\n\n-\nlegeflijty of the Auth()mzsttlon, Several identical Presidential Authorizations recertifying the Stellar Wind program were signed in 2002. (U//FOHO;}\nIn October 2002, at Attorney General Ashcroft's request, Yoo drafted another opinion for Ashcroft concerning the Stellar Wind program.\n\nThis memorandum, dated October 11, 2002, reiterated the same basic analysis in Yoo s November 2 2001, memorandum in suort f the 1e ality of the\n\n## 5. Yoo's Communications With The White House (U)\n\nAs the only Office of Legal Counsel official who had been read into the S'-t;_ellar Wind program through early 2003, Yoo consulted directly with White House officials about the program during this period. Because we were unable to interview Yoo, we could not determine the exact nature and extent of these consultations. We were also unable to determine whether Ashcroft was fully aware of the advice Yoo was providing directly to the White House about the program. {S/7/NF\nGonzales told the OIG that Yoo was among those with whom the White House consulted to develop advice for the President on the program, but he asserted that Yoo was not sought out to provide approval of the program for the Department. However, Gonzales told us that he did not know how Yoo came to be the primary Justice Department official that the White House consulted during this period about the program. -{57/7/NFj~\nIn fact, Jay Bybee, who served as the OLC Assistant Attorney General for most of this period and was Yoo's supervisor, was never read into the Stellar Wind program.\n\nBybee told the OIG that during his tenure as Assistant Attorney General he did not know that Yoo was working alone on a sensitive compartmented program and he had no knowledge of how Yoo came to be selected for this responsibility.\n\nBybee told us that he was ssurprised\"\nand \"a little disappointed\" to learn in media accounts that he was not privy to Yoo's work on what Bybee had later learned to be a compartmented counterterrorism program involving warrantless electronic surveillance. Bybee said that it would not be unusual for a Deputy Assistant Attorney General such as Yoo to have direct contact with the White House for the purpose of rendering legal advice, but that the OLC\nAssistant Attorney General must be aware of all opinions that issue from the OLC. Bybee said that the Assistant Attorney General has-an obligation to \"see the whole picture\" and is the person in the office who knows the full range of issues that are being addressed by the OLC and who can assure that OLC opinions remain consistent. {FS/HSH-AE)\n\n## 6. Gonzales's View Of The Department's Role In Authorizing The Stellar Wind Program +{S//Nf)\n\nThe OIG asked Gonzales about how he, as White House Counsel, viewed the role of the Justice Department during the early phase of the Stellar Wind program.\n\nGonzales stated that he and others at the White House tried to be very careful to understand what could be done legally, and they wanted to have \"constarit comraunications with the Department\" in the first few months following the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks.\n\nGonzales also stated that it was the President, and not the Attorney General or the White House Counsel, who authorized the warrantless surveillance activity under the Stellar Wind program.\n\nHowever, Gonzales acknowledged that the President's decision was based on advice from the Attorney General and White House Counsel, among others. {E8/7/8H\n7/ -\nThe OIG also asked whether Gonzales had a personal belief about the justification for having a single attorney - Yoo - speak on behalf of the Department regarding the legality of the program. Gonzales stated that it was up to the Attorney General to make that determination or calculation.\n\nGonzales stated that he understood the Department's position was that the program was legal and that Yoo would sit down with Attorney General\n'Ashcroft to answer any legal questions when the Presidential Authorizations were presented to Ashcroft for his signature.\n\nGongzales said he understood that the Yoo opinions represented the legal opinion of the Department.\n\nHowever, as noted previously, for the first year and a half of the program the Department read-ins included only Yoo, Ashcroft, and Baker. FS+/8H-N\n-\nGonzales also stated that it was Ashcroft's decision as to how to satisfy his legal obligations as Attorney General.\n\nHowever, when the OIG\nasked whether Gonzales was aware if Asheroft ever requested to have additional people read into Stellar Wind, Gongzales stated that he recalled Ashcroft wanted Deputy Attorney General Larry Thompson and his Chief of Staff, David Ayres, read in.\n\nGonzales acknowledged that neither official was ever read into the program. Gonzales: said that Asheroft complained that it was \"inconvenient\" not to have Thompson and Ayres read in, but Gonzales also stated that he never got the sense from Ashcroft that it. affected the quality of the legal advice the Department. pr0V1ded to the White House Gongzales stated that other than Ashicroft's request that Thompson and Ayres be read in, he did not recall Ashecroft requesting to have additional Department offic1als read in.49 {S/NFH-\n\n## T, Nsa's Implementation Of The Stellar Wind 'Pro'Gram (U/ /Fou0O)\n\nIn this section, we describe the NSA's initial implementation of the Stellar Wind program. We first describe how the NSA acquired the communications data authorized for collection under the program. We also discuss the process the NSA used to analyze the information received from the Stellar Wind prog1 am and how this information was provided to the FBL\nu// FOUO}\n\n## A. Implementation Of Stellar Wind (U//Fouo)}\n\nOur description of the implementation of the Stellar Wind program is based on NSA and Justice Department documents we obtained during our review, as well as interviews of NSA and Department personnel W1th knowledge of Stellar Wind''s technical operat h\n4\n5\n:\nbasw overv1ew of how the NSA obtamed\n) ) (b)( 3)\n\n\"information is also 1mportant for later sections of thls rep01t that descnbe\nsignificant modifications to the Authorizations regardlng the manner-and\nscope of collection, the Department s re-assessment of the legal rationale\nsupporting the Stellar Wirid program during late 2003 and early. 2004 and\n49 Gonzales stated that Ashcroft, as the Attorney General, would be well-positioned to request the. President to allow additional attorneys to be read into the program.\n\nDrawing on his own experience as Attorney General, Gonzales cited his request to the President in\n2006 that the then head of the Office of Professional Responsibility (OPR) and several attorneys within OPR be granted security clearances in rder to conduct an inguiry inito the:\nprofessional conduct of Department lawyers with respect to the Stellar Wind program.\n\nGonzales said he made his request both through White House Counsel Harriet Miers and directly to the President.\n\nHowever, the President initially declined the request, and the request was not granted until October 2007.\n\n(U/ /FeHE)\n\nne to be commonly referred to as the three\n\"baskets.\"\ntion of the content of telephone and e-mail\n: basket 2 referred to collection of meta data associated\nSt We describe in Chapter Four changes made in March and ] 200+ ENSSES\nunder Presidential Authorization following a dispute between th i i the legality of the Stellar Wind program under Stellar Wmd (baskets 2\n\"3), as'well meta data AS\nwith. commumcauons targeted for content collection under the program, was placed into.an NSA database system called which according.\n\nto NSA officials is'a confisuration of databases and analytical tools.\n\ndatabases are segregated into \"realms\" organized by the specific owmg the parucular data to be collected 53 'The content data\n\n## A. Telephone Commiinications (U)\n\nIn this section we describe briefly the technical means used by the NSA to access the international telephone system to accomplish the collectmn of mternatlonal calls under the Stellar Wind program.55\n53 NSA officials said the realms also establish a system of access control to enstire that only authorized users access certain data. ~{S//Mg\n54 As discussed in Chapter Five of this report, the NSA created an additional realm in July 2004 when the government obtained FISA authority to collect e-mail meta data, and another realm in May 2006 when it obtained authority under FISA to collect telephony meta.data. These realms were separate from the realms that contained information collected under Stellar Wind. #S#S?LW%%@G%W}\n5 The NSA's interception of international telephone communications under Stellar Wind h1ghhghted the dramatic change in telecommumnications technology that had been takmg place for nearly 20 years.\n\nIn 1978, when FISA was enacted, telephone calls placed by and to individuals within the United States {domestic calls) were carried mostly on copper wires, while telephone calls placed to or from individuals outside the United States.\n\n(international calls) generally were transmitted by satellites, PFISA reflected the state of technology then by cleflmng the term \"electronic surveillance\" to be the acquisitipn of the contents of certain wire and radio (satellite) communications.\n\nFISA stated that as to radio\n(Cont'd.)\ncor cbrximiinicatiOns specifically, and thus as to most international communications, the interception of calls constituted \"electronic surveillance\" only if the acquisition intentionally targeted a particular kriown U.S. person in the United States, or if all participants to the ommunication were located in the United States.\n\nSee 50 U.S.C.  1801(f)(1) and (3).\n\nrdingly, government surveillance that targeted foreign persons outside the United Al\n;\nally was not considered electronic surveillance under FISA, and the rnnienit was not required to obtain a FISA Court order authorizing the surveillance i was authori inside the S hese records, also relerred Lo as Call aetall 1eCOrds, COlsISt ol lephone\n\"Tout Lformation that includes the driginating and terminating te number of each-call, and the date; time, and duration of each call. The call detail records.-do not include the substantive content of any communication or the name, address, or financial information of a subscriber or customer.\n\n'to communications where at least one party was outside the U\nes, where no party was known to be a United States citizen, or whete there was reasonable articulable suspicion to believe the ational terrorism. Asnoted in Chapter One, the information under the Stellar Wind program.\n\nThe data was archived into an NSA analytical database that contained exclusively Stellar Wind information and that was accessible only by spemally authorized NSA\npersonnel read into the program.\n\nauthorized only w1th respect to telephone communlcatlons that satisfied the Presidential Authorlzatxons \"acquisition\" standard.\n\nIn fact, the NSA\nreported that by the end of 2006, .001% of the data collected had actually been retrieved from its database for analysis. {FS//8TEW/1SHAOS/NF-\n-\nThe meta datathe NSA obtamed from e-mail commumca'uons included the information that appeared on the \"to,\" \"from,\" \"cc,\" \"bee,\" and\n\"sent\" lines.of a standard e-mail. Thus, the NSA collected the e -mail ddress of the sender, the e-mail addresses of any recipients, and the mformatlon concermng the date and time when the e-mail was sent.\n\nP\nfrom the\n* subject\" or \"re\" Imes of the e-mails or the body of t\n\n## B, Nsa Process For Analyzing Information Collected Under Stellar Wind {877Nf)\n\n'The NSA conducted two functionally distinct types of review of the massive amount of data it collected under the Stellar Wind program. Fitrst, the NSA conducted procedures intended to-ensure that it only reviewed or\n\"acquired\" the information that was within the scope of the Presidential Authorizations.\n\nSecond, the NSA conducted substantive analysis of the acquired information to determine whether it had intelligence value that should be disseminated to customer agencies such as the FBI and the CIA.\n\n'The NSA procedures to ensure that the acquisition and dissemination standards were satisfied became more formahzed over time. We describe below how the NSA handled the enormous volume of data it was collecting Wwith the Stellar Wind program. {FS/+SHNF}-\n\n## 1. Basket 1: Content Taskmg, Analysxs, And Dnssemmatmn :\n\nStellar Wind's \"basket 17 content database contains telephone and e-mail communications of individuals. The NSA refers to the telephone numbers-and e-mail addresses tasked for interception as \"selectors.\"\nTo task a selector under the Presidential Authorizations, the NSA was required to establish probable cause to believe the intercepted communications originated or terminated outside the United States and probable cause to believe a party to the communications was a group engaged in international terrorism, or activities in preparation therefor, or any agent of such a group.65 {TSHS%Wfi/SI-,l%@G-,LNE)\nThe NSA had two processes for tasking selectors under Stellar Wind.\n\nOne process applied to tasking foreign selectors, or selectors believed to be used by non-U.S, persons outside the United States. The other process.\n\napplied to tasking domestic selectors, or selectors believed to be used by persons inside the United States or by U.S. persons.abroad.\n\nA foreign selector could be tasked for collection under Stellar Wind based upon an NSA analyst's determination, following some amount of documented research and analysis about the selector, that the terms of the Authorizations were satisfied. The NSA did not require any additional levels of approval before a foreign selector could be tasked.66\nA domestic selector could be tasked only after the NSA analyst obtained specific approvals. The rigor of the process to task a domestie selector evolved over time, but essentially it required an analyst to draft a formal tasking package that demonstrated, through analysis and documentation, that the selector satisfied the terms of the Authorizations.\n\nThis package was reviewed by a designated senior official who could approve or reject the package, or request that additional information be provided.\n\n## Could Cominence Content\n\nL\n|\nof identifying a number or address ial Authorizations.\n\nIn other cases, for urgent or priority taskings In emergency situations, interception on a selector withi\n)\nthat satisfied the criteria in the Presiden interception commenced withir and within a week for routine taskings.\n\n(T34\nThe NSA conducted 15-, 30-, and 90-day reviews of tasked foreign and domestic selectors to assess whether the interception should continue.\n\nThe NSA stated that the selectors were \"de-tasked\" if the user was arrested, if probable cause could no longer be established, or if other targets took priority.\n\nTS/\n/STL\n;\n;\n.\n\nThe content intercepted under taskings was sent to the NSA and pl'aCed.in a database accessible by NSA analysts cleared into the Stellar Winid ;\nam. The analysts were responsible for reviewing the\n\n\n## 2. Baskets 2 And 8; Teelephony And E-Mail Meta Data Quenes, Analysns, And Dlssemmatlon\n\nThe NSA received a massive amount of telephony and -\ne-mail meta data (basket 2 and 3 information) that was stored in a realm.\n\n\"S1b1e only by NSA analysts asmgned to the Stellar Wmd pr ogram The\n. among partlcular telephone numbers and emall addresses b\n| 'hlsttcated analytlcal techmques called \"contact chammg'fi As described by the NSA in declarations filed with the FISA Court, contact chaining is. used to determine. the contacts made by a partleular telephone number or e-mail address (tier one contacts), as well as contacts made by subsequent contacts (tier two and tier three contacts). The NSA\nuses computer algorithms to identify the first two tiers of contacts ari e-mail address makes and the first three tiers of contacts a: telephone number makes. According to the NSA, multi-tiered contact analysis is particularly useful with telephony meta data because a telephone does not lend itself to As previously noted, the NSA interpreted the Presidential Authorizations to permit it to collect telephony and e-mail meta data in bulk.67 The NSA \"queried\" the databases that held this data to identify meta data for communications to or from a particular telephone or e-mail address\n(the \"selector,\" also known as the \"seed number\" or \"seed account'). NSA\nanalysts queried the database using a selector for which there was a reasonable articulable suspicion to believe that the number or account.had been used for communications related to.international terrorism.68\nAs with proposals to task selectors, an NSA shift coordinator typically reviewed for approval proposals to query either the e-mail or telephony meta data bulk databases using particular selectors.\n\nIf the shift coordinator agreed that the reasonable articulable suspicion standard was met, the selector was approved and the analyst was authorized to query the meta data bulk database to identify all of the other telephone numbers or e-mail addresses that had been in contact with the seed account.\n\nEach contact along the chain of contacts that originated with the selector was referred to asa \"hop,\" meaning that a telephone call from the seed account to telephone number A was considered \"one hop out,\" and a call from telephorne number A to telephone number B was considered \"two hops out\"\n(relative to the seed account), and so on.\n\nNSA analysts used specialized software to chain and analyze the contacts identified by each query. The NSA told us that Stellar Wind analysts were: perm1ttecl to chaln 'che results of queries up to three haps out from the selector.\n\n(T\n1\nThe restilts of each query were analy'zed to determine whether any of the contacts should be reported, or \"tipped,\" to Stellar Wind customers prlmarfly the FBI, CIA, and the National Counterterrorism Center. In the first months of the Stellar Wind program, the NSA reported to the FBI most contacts identified between a U.S. telephone number or e-mail address.and the selector used to query the meta data realm, as well as domestic contacts.\n\nthat were two and three hops out from a selector.\n\nAs discussed in Chapter Six of this report, over time the NSA and FBI worked to improve the reporting process and the quallw of the 1ntelllgence being disseminated under Stellar Wind.\n\n-\n.\n\nThe domestic contacts from specified numbers or e-mail addresses, called \"tlppe1 s,\" were provided to the FBI by the NSA. These tippers were included in reports that contained two sections separated by a dashed line, comronly referred to as a \"tearline,\" made to appear as a perforation:\nextending across the width of a page. The purpose of the tearline was to separate the compartmented information above the tearline, which could identify the specific: sources and methods used to Qb,tal_n the information, from the non-compartmented information that the FBI could further disseminate to its field offices. Only FBI personnel read into the Stellar Wind program could have access to the full Stellar Wind reports from NSA., The information that appeared above the tearline typically was classified Top Secret/SCI and identified Stellar Wind as the source of the mtelhcrcnce The 1nformat10n 1ncluded 5 emflc detailsf\n, s wellas any pertnent COmMMents by NSA mieligence analysts.\n\nThe information that appeared below the tearline of a report generally was classified Secret or Confidential and did not identify Stellar Wind as the source of the intelligence.\n\nThe text typically included some version of the following statement:\nAs examples, the following Stellar Wind reports were among those disseminated to the FBI in November 2001. We have excerpted only the information below the: tearline, which is often referred to simply as \"tearling\n1nformat10n 7\nIn addition, we did not provide the actual telephone numbers provided by the NSA to the FBI. {P&/SHNF\n\n## 1Ii. Fbys Eaily Participation In The Stellar Wind Program -{S7/Nf)\n\nStellar Wind was. not an FBI program; nor was the FBI involved in the program' 's creation. However, as the lead agency for counterterrorism in the United States, the FBI received much intelligence produced under Stellar Wlnd In the followmg sections, we describe how the FBI became involved in the Stellar Wind program, the personnel resources allocated to handle Stellar Wind information, and the initial procedures the FBI established to receive, control, and disseminate the program information.\n\nalso maintained a list of foreign and domestic telephone numbers and e-mail addresses for which, based on NSA analysts' assessments, there was a reasonable basis to believe were associated with international terrorism.\n\nThese selectors, called \"alerts,\" were queried against the incoming meta data automatically on a daily basts, and any contacts with a demestic telephone number or e-mail address were directed to NSA analysts for review and possfl:le reporting to the FBI. The NSA regularly updated the alert list by addmg or removing selectors, depending on the available intelligence.\n\n## 4. Fbi Director First Informed Of Stellar Wind Program (U] [Feeueyy\n\nDirector Mueller told us that his earliest recollection of the Stellar Wind program was a meeting he attended at the White House with Attorney General Asheroft, which occurred either after thee decision had been made to:\n'move forward with the presidentially authorized program or shortly after the October 4, 2001, Authorization was issued. 'Mugeller told us the meeting was\n\"more than a formal read-in\" and that Director Hayden may have attended.\n\nMueller said that at or around this time he also briefly reviewed the October 4, 2001, Presidenti 1l Authorization, swhich he characterized as\n\"relatively complex.\" ALS{fSHHOC\nMR-\nDirector Mueller said his impression at the time was that the terms of the Presidential Authorization might allow for collecting purely domestic telephone and e-mail communications. Mueller said he discussed the matter with Ashcroft and asked whether OLC had issued an opinion on the program. Mueller said that he recalled being told that OLC might have opined orally on the program and Mueller said he suggested to Ashcroft that OLC issuea formal written opinion. Mueller told us that he did niot think thc-;NSfA ever exercised authority under the Authorization to collect purely domestic communications. {FS/F+STEW/#8H\n134F)\nMueller stated that based on the meeting he attended at the White House and his brief review of the October 4, 2001, Presidential Auithorization; he understood the FBDs role in the Stellar Wind program was.\n\nto be a \"recipient\" of intelligence generated by the NSA, and to provide any technical support to the NSA as necessary to support the program.\n\n(y)]\nCadind aliviintan)\nWL 1Ly 4\nFAL SR\nAttorncy General formally directing the FBI to support the: NSA program Mueller said that he also 1equested the order because he wanted a record as to our participation.\"\n{F$\n'\n~\nIn response, on October 20, 2001, Attorney General Ashcroft sent a memorandum to Director Mueller stating:\nAs part of the Nation's self defense activities, the National Security Agency (NSA) is engaged in certain additional collection activities, the details of which you are aware. Those activities are legal and have been appropriately authorized, and the Federal Biireau of Investigation should cooperate with NSA as necessary for it to conduct those activities. ~(FS7//-SH-HNE-\nAccording to Mueller, the combination of this memeoerandum from the Attorney General and the November 2, 2001, memorandum prepared. by the Dep en ffice of Legal Counsel regarding the legahty of Stellar Wind g fort gt that tithe with the FBI's partn:lpatlon iti the program;\nBowman also told us that the White House officials primarily responsible for Stellar Wind, who he identified as the Vice President and Addington, were \"amateurs\" when it came to intelligence work. Bowman stated that one of the potential consequences of severely limiting the number of individuals read into a program is that uncleared personnel who occupy positions placing them in close proximity to program-related activities might construe certain actions as que stioriable or illegal and report that activity, thereby potentially comprormising the activities.\n\nBowman said that thisis what occurred with Stellar Wind.\n\nFor this reason and others; Bowman did not agree with the decision to so severely limit access to the program. (FS{SFEWT HAOCHN\nIn the immediate aftermath of the September 11 terrorist attacks, the FBI had created a task force of agents and analysts to analyze the flood of telephone numbers it received from multiple sources, including agencies within the U,S. Intelligence Community, foreign intelligence services, and concerned citizens. The task force, called the 'Telephone'Analysis'Unit\n(TAU), was located at FBI Headquarters and consisted of approximately 50\nFBI employees. working on shift rotations 24 hours per day, 6 days per week. The operation was supervised by FBI supervisors working out of the FBI's Strategic Information and Operations Center. As described below,\n'personnel.a_s'sigined to this task force were. ameng,tlf_Le first at the FBI to handle Stellar Wind-derived informatio o/\ne NEr {\nLST\n)\nI\nQCH\nNE\n\n## 1. Fbi Initiates _ [Shrf) B1, B3, B7E\n\nIn October or November 2001, several TAU analysts were assigned to what came to be called th B\nwhich was the FBI's effort to manage the Stellar Wind-derived information being received from the NSA. The information, referred to as Stellar Wind \"tippers,\" consisted of telephone numbers and e-mail accounts derived from NSA meta data analysis, and sometimes content intercepted from particular tele hone and e-mail communications. The essential purpose of th was to receive Stellar Wind tippers from the N SA and disseminate the information to FBI field offices for investigation in a manner that did not reveal the source of the information or the methods by which it was collected. {ES/HSTLWFSH-OES/NF}\nWorking alternating shifts in the FBI's Strategic Information and Operations Center, two FBI analysts were primarily responsible for managing Stellar Wind tippers in the initial months of the program. These analysts told the OIG that until December 2001, the Stellar Wind tippers consisted nearly exclusively of telephone niumbers. According to the analysts, the process for handling Stellar Wind tippers began when the NSA\nliaison co-located at FBI Headquarters provided one of the analysts the information below the tearline from & Stellar Wirid report contairiing orie or more tippers. The analyst then queried FBI databases for any information about each tipy h as whether the tipper appeared in any pending or closed FBI inves s, The analyst also queried the tipper against the FBI's\n|\ndatabase, which is the FBI's central repository b1, b3, for telephone subscriber data acquired during the course of investigations.\n\n b7E\nIn addition, the analyst checked each tipper against public source databases for relevant information, such as the identity of a telephone number subscriber:\nST\nSHO\nST\nAfter completing these database checks, the analyst drafted an Electronic Communication, or EC, from FBI Headquarters to the appropriate FBI field office. The EC described the tearline information about the tipper contained in the Stellar Wind report together with any additional information the analyst was able to locate, ECs disseminated to: field offices included several features concerning the nature of the information and how it could bl b3, be used.\n\nFirst, the ECs advised the field offices that the information being b7E\nprovided was \"derived from an established and reliable source\" and that it was \"being addressed by the TAU as th\n772 (S/INE)\nSecond, the ECs included a caveat about the tise-of the information being provided, stating that the information \"is for lead purposes only and is intended solely for the background information of recipients in developing their own collateral leads.\n\nIt cannot be used in affidavits; court proceedings, subpoenas; or for other legal or judicial purposes.\" The FBI said this language was included in each EC to protect the source of the information and the methods by which it was collected. +4S//NE)\nThird, the ECs provided an explanation about the qualitative rankings assigned to the tippers. As described previously, the SA assigned each Fourth, the ECs instructed the field offices how the tippers should be addressed. These instructions were provided as \"leads,\" for which the FBIL\nhad three categories: Action, Discretionary, and For Inform'afion._.An Action lead instructed a field office to take a particular action in response. to the EC. An Action lead was covered\" when the field office took the specified action or conducted appropriate investigation to address the information in the EC, A Discretionary lead allowed the field office to take whatever action it deemed appropriate.\n\nA field office that receives a \"For Information\" lead was not expected t6 take any specific action in response to the EC other than possibl'y route the communication to the office personnel whose investigations or duties the information concerned. S/\nAfter the FBI analyst completed this process and drafted the EC, an FBI Supervisory Special Agent read into the Stellar Wind program reviewed the EC, in part to ensure that it did not reveal the source of the information or the method by which the information was obtained.\n\nOnce approved, the analyst entered the EC into the FBI's Automated Case Management System and the receiving field offices were notified electronically to review the communication.\n\n4ES/f\n'\n'\nb1, b3, Eac EC typically contained muiltiple tippers and b7E\ntherefore was distributed to multiple field offices. The receiving field offices were responsible for handling the leads that concerned tippers falling in their respective geographic jurisdictions. SN\n'\nMost of the eads that disseminated Stellar Wind tippers were desighated Action leads. As noted, during this period the b1 b3\ntippers were almost exclusively telephone numbers, Accordingly, the typical b7:E\n'\nlead instructed the field office tof\n-\n1\ne\n.\n\n.\n\n.\n\nIThe lead also imstructed the field office.\n\nto report the investigative results to the Telephone Analysis Unit.\n\nThe two analysts told us that the focus of their work in the first months after the September 11 attacks was to detect what bl b3, many believed was an imminent second attack. During this period, nearly b7E\nall of the Stellar Wind tippers the FBI received were disseminated to a field office for investigation as quickly as possible. S/\nIn addition to tippers containing the content of intercepted telephone and e-mail communications (content tippers), in approximately December\n2001 the NSA began providing the FBI tippers\n derived from the NSA's e-mail meta data. analyms {e-mail tippers). THese e-mail tlppers 1n1t1511y were routed to the same two analysts who were managing the telephone tippers.\n\nThe analysts told us that the e-mail tippers were processed and disseminated in the same manner as the telephone tippers. Content tippers, which according to the analysts-were received very infrequently -\nduring this- early period, generally were also disseminated by EC to the\n-appropnate field offices, but little if any research regarding the information was conduicted. The analysts said they considered the content tippers parttcularly time-sensitive and for that reason occasionally transmitted the ECs directly to the appropriate field offices or called the offices to advise that the information was being loaded into the FBI's Automated Case Management System.\n\nIn 2002 responsibility for e-mail tippers was reasmgned to the Electronic Communications Analysis Unit.\n\n(TQ' I IQ\"N'm' / \"_'T/'/uu/ l'JI')\nFebruary 2002, one: of the tiwo FBI analysts left thef\n.\n\nafter being selected for a management pos1t10n in a different analytlcal section within the FBI's Counterterrorism Division, The b1, b3, b7E\nremaining analyst became: solely responsible for managing the Stellar Wind tippers under thej situation that continued for approximately the next 12 months. The analyst told us that while her work hours during this period were \"ridiculous,\" she did rot feel there was any pressure to add analysts to the project b because \"the process was working In early 2002, FBI management instructed the long analyst to conduct some of her work while physically located in the NSA Headquarters at Fort Meade, Maryland.\n\nThis. created an unusual bl, b3, arrangement for the analyst. The analyst contintied to receive the NSA's b7E\ndaily Stellar Wind reports at FBI Headquarters, and she would then drive to the NSA with the reports to draft the ECs (the analyst had remote access to FBI databases from an NSA workstation). The analyst told us that interaction with NSA counterparts during these daily visits was minimal.\n\nAfter the ECs were drafted, the analyst returned to FBI Headquarters to obtain approval to disseminate the communications to the FB['s field offices.\n\nThe analyst's impression was that FBI management created this unusual arrangement \"for show\" and that its purpose was to establish an FBI\n\"presence\" at the NSA in connection with Stellar Wind.\n\nThe analyst continued working on Stellar Wind matters until approximately February 2003, when a small team of FBI personnel were assigned permanently to the NSA to manage the FBI's participation in. the Stellar Winid program.\"\n(S NE\nbl, b3, b7E\n\n## 5. Fbi Field Offices' Response To Leads {S//NE)\n\nAccording to the two FBI analysts responsible for managing Stellar Witid information under th from approximately October 2001 to February\n2003;\nsome agents m: 'B field offices grew bl, b3, b7E\nfrustrated with the informati v were receiving under the program.\n\nBecause th Cs that disseminated the tippers to the field offices assigned most of them as Action leads, this required that the leads be covered expeditiously. (877N}\nUnder ordinary operating procedures, investigative leads for\n|\ninternational terrorism matters.are set by FBI Headquarters' International.\n\nTerrorism Operations Section.\n\nIn addition, the ECs assigning international terrorism Jeads typically identified a Supervisory Special Agent within ITOS\nas the point-of-contact for any questions field offices might have. Because the Stellar Wirid program was so-ti htly compartmented, the leads sent during this early period by the were not coordinated with ITOS, and the FBI Headquarters point-of a for any questions generally was one of the tw\n{B/NE\nanalysts, agents s complained that the lack of information is discussed in Chapter Six of this report. s Whether thele Was sufflclent predlcatlon to open an mvestlgatlon on the telephone number or to issue a national security letter for subscriber information. <{FS//SLA/NE)\nThe analyst stated that in response to these calls he could only reiterate to the agents that the information was provided by a reliable, sensitive source. The analyst said this situation plOduCCd a \"dichotomy\"\nwith the tippers.\n\nOn the one hand, there was a demand in the International Terrorism Operations Section and ield offices for the telephone numbers because of their prlorfi:y atusv and the.prevailing concern that there would be a second terr and, the limited and vague information contalned in th ECs caused somie confusmn and frustration among agents irivestigating the lead.\n\nFBI from past or pcndmg 1nvest1gat10ns and that th\n:\nECs were frov1dmg \"cm:ular reportmg 76 However, acc d1d not know the N SA was the source of the. 1ntelllgence Consequently, when-the agent. dlSCOVel ed that the number was 1dent1ca1 to a number the t th su:nply had 1dent1f1ed a prckusly known number, conducted sorne additional research that the field office likely had already done, and disseminated the information back to the field as new reporting. Because the analysts could n urce of the intelligence, the agent did not realize the\n|\n|\nreporting in fact reflected a new fore1gn connection to the telephone nuimber.\n\nAnother frustration veiced by agents to the analysts was that leads disseminated under the project that were d681gnated \"Action leads\" frequently did not yield mgmficant 1nvest1gat1ve and the NSA subsequently disseminated the results back to the FBI in a Stellar Wind The NSA responded to this frustration by implementing 'th'erankings described earlier to provide the agents some guidance on prioritizing the tippers. In addition, the FBI analysts.told us that they becarme more adept at telepho ne analvsis and \"got better at their game\" by eliminating low value tipper{ TSI (rom being disserninated to field offices. According to FBI documents, the FBLals sought additional information from the NSA about tippers ranked[]\nbefore the FBI disseminated these tippers to the field for investigat\n\n## 3. Fbi's Efforts To Track Ste'Llar' Wind Ti Executive Management On Status Of B1, B3, Leads {S//Nf}-\n\nTypically, FBI ECs-originate from a specific investigative or administrative case file number.\n\nA file number is also required for an EC to be loaded into the\n'BI's Automated Case Management System and te enable he sending office to assign a lead to the receiving office.. Howeve EBI\ners did not initially open an investigative file for thej bl, Cs that disseminated Stellar Wind tippers to field offices. One of\n'\nthe original analysts assigned to the project told the OIG that he was familiar with a telephone analysis project in the FBI's drug program and that as a result he decided to issue the first Stellar Wind-related EC from that drug investigative file. This confused some field offices receiving the earliest ECs because counterterrorism leads were being disseminated under a drug investigation file number.\n\nSEEWH-\ne, In mid-October 2001, the FBI created a subfile under the FBI's investigation of the September 11 terrorist attacks to disseminate Stellar b3, Wind information. The FBI used this subfile, referred to as th b7E\nuntil September 2002, when a more for disseminating Stellar Wind information, called was created.\"\"\n{ES/HSTLWHSHOCSNF\nThe.\n\n{analysts also told us that they created a bl, b3, database to attempt to track the status of leads disseminated to the field b7E\noffices. The database identified each tipper by field office and the status of the lead that was assigned.\n\nOne analyst stated that the response rate from field offices was uneven durmcr these carly months and:their SUPETViSOrs.\n\nb1, b3, instructed the analysts at one j\n: the head of each fleld office b7E\nto determine the status of the responsible, A4S/ NEy nalysts used the database they created to produce status reports for senior FBI offimals who were read into the Stellar b1, b3, Wlnd program. These reports provided statistics. regarding the quantity' and b7E\ninated tippers, as well as brief synopses of the status of leads.\n\nThe Stellar Wind program was viewed as-an emerb Yy rEs onse to the Septernber 11 attacks and these status reports.\n\nwere intended to provide FBI executives information about how the program was contributing to the FBI's counterterrorism efforts. {5875t/\n\n## Iv. Justice Department Office Of Intelligence Policy And Review's (Oipr) And Fisa Court's Early Role In Stellar Wind\n\nWhen the President signed the first Authorization for the program on October 4, 2001, only two Department officials outside the FBI were read into the Stellar Wmd program: Attorney General John Ashcroft, who cert1f1ed the Authorization as to form and legality; and John Yoo, the Deputy Assistant Attor ney General in the Office of Legal Counsel respon31b1e for advising the Attorney General on the matter and for drafting the Department's first memorandum on the legality of the program.' The Department's Office of Intelligence Policy and Review (OIPR), despite its:\nexpertise in FISA matters, was not asked to consider how FISA might affect the program's legality or implementation, nor was OIPR asked to consider how the program might affect the Department's FISA operations.\n\n\"(V'PQII 1/ C;T / /T\\TE'\\\nIn this section, we provide an overview of OIFR, how James Baker, the head of OIPR, inadvertently came to learn about Stellar Wind soon after it was initiated, and the subsequent role that OIPR played in the program's operation. We also describe the circumstances surrounding the decision to have the FISA Court Presiding Judge and his successor read into the Stellar Wind program, and the Court's response to the program.\n\n(TS//STLW L/ SI//OC/NE)\n78\nLevin told us that he did not believe Yoo was read into Stellar Wind before the October 4, 2001, Presidential Authorization was signed, and we were not able to determine precisely when Yoo s read-in occurred. However, Yoo's Nevember 2, 2001, memorandum ahalyzes the legality of the October 4, 2001, Authorization and the draft of the November 2,\n2001, Authorization. Thus, it appears that Yoo was read into the program not Tater than November 2, 2001. -&Sfifi?bW#SW@GfN-F}-\n\n## \" A. Overview Of Oipr (U)\n\nAt the time of the implementation of the Stellar Wind program, OIPR\nwas responsible for advising the Attorney General on matters relating to the national security activities of the United States.\"\nCreated shortly after enactment of the Foreigr Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, OIPR\nre_vic_wed executive orders, directives, and procedures relating to the intelligence community, and approved certain intelligence-gathering activities, OIPR also provided formal and 'inf'c')r-malvlegal advice to the Attorney General and U.8. intelligence agencies regarding questions of Jaw and procedure relating to U.S. intelligence activities.\n\nIn addition, OIPR\n-advised the Attorney General and agencies such as the CIA, FBI, and Defense and State Departments concerning questions of law relating to U.S.\n\nnational security activities and the legality of domestic and overseas intelligence operations. (U//FEU6)\nOIPR also represented the United States before the FISA Court. OIPR\nwas responsible for preparing and presenting applications to the FISA Court for orders authorizing electronic surveillance and physical searches by U.S.\n\nintelligence agencies for foreign intelligence purposes in investigations involving espionage and international terrorism. When evidence obtained under FISA was proposed to be used in criminal proceedings, OIPR sought the necessary authorization from the Attorney General_, and in-coordination with the Criminal Division and U.S. Attorney's Office prepared the motions arid briefs required by the federal court whenever surveillance under FISA\nwas challenged.\n\n(U)\n-\nThe head of OIPR was referred to as the Counsel for Intelligence Policy and was supported by two Deputy Counsel and a staff of attorneys, paralegals, and administrative professionals. James Baker served as the Counsel for OIPR from May 2001 to January 2007.80\n(U)\n\n## B. Oipr Counsel Learns Of Stellar Wind Program (U/ Freee)\n\nBalker told us that while standing outside the Department one evening several weeks after the September 11 attacks, he was approached by an FBI\ncolleague who said, \"There is something spooky going on,\" that it appeared period our review encompasses.\n\n80 Baker served as Acting Counsel for OIPR from May 2001 to January 2002, and as Counsel from February 2002 until January 2007. Baker officially resigned from the Justice Department in October 2007.\n\n(0\nforeign-to-domestic collection was being conducted without a FISA order, and that some FBI personnel \"were getting nervous.\" The FBI colleague asked Baker whether he knew anything about the activity, and Baker responded that he did not. {FSH-STEW/SHFSSNF\nBaker said that while reviewing a FISA application several weeks after this conversation, a par ticular passage regarding international communications \"leapt out at\" him. According to Baker, the passage contained \"strange, unattributed language\" and information that was \"not attributed in the usual way.\" Baker told the OIG that the information concerned coninections between telephone numbers, but he:could not recall if the information simply identified a link between individuals or also iricluded the content of communications. FSAASEHNE-\nBaker asked the OIPR attorney responsible for the application about the information in the passage, and the attorney responded that nobedy at the FBI would disclose where the information had come from, only that it was patt of a \"special collection.\" Baker therefore contacted the FBI about the application, Unable to obtain any answers to his questions, Baker informed the FBI that he would not allow the application to be filed with the FISA Court. Baker said that, to the best of his recollection, he did not.\n\nbelieve the application was filed with the Court. -(?SffSH%NF)\nSoon thereafter, Baker spoke with Daniel Levin, who. at that time was serving as both Counselor to the Attorney General and Chief of Staff to the FBI Director. Levin told Baker that approval from the White House was needed before he could tell Baker about the special collection.\n\nLevin told us that he successfully pressed the White House for Baker to be read into Stellar Wind, Baker stated that David Addington, counselor to Vice President Cheney, was the individual who approved his clearance into the program. -{FSSTEW/H\nS/ OC/NF\nAccording to NSA records, Baker was read into Stellar Wind in January 2002.81\nHe said his read in essentially consisted of Levin providing him a short briefing and a copy of Yoo's November 2, 2001, memorandum regarding the legality of the program. Baker told us that his initial reaction was that the program, and Yoo's memorandum, were flawed legally. Baker said he did not consider himself a constitutional law scholar, but was nevertheless surprised that while Stellar Wind was in. his view \"overriding a criminal statute\" on the basis of the President's power as Commander in\n'Chief, Yoo's memorandum did not even cite an important U.S..Supreme Court opinion on presidential authority during wartime, Youngstown Sheet\n& Tube Co.\n\nBa}kef said he believed that it is important to exercise-some\n\"hurmility\" when dealing with national security matters because of the complexity and importance of the issues, and he 'thcrefo_re- reserved final judgment on the memorandum until he researched the legal issues further.\n\nYet, Baker said his initial opinion that the memorandum was flawed legally did not change over time.\n\n:\nSTEWASH\n-\nWe asked Baker whether at the time he thought the collection\n'\nauthorized under Stellar Wind could have been accomplished under FISA.\n\nBalker said that his thinking on this issue has evolved over time, but that he staunchly believed that \"FISA works in wartime.\" He stated that although it is.difficult to do, FISA can be made to work under the circumstances that existed. following the September 11 attacks, but that it also was easy 1o\n\"make FISA not work\" under these circumstances.\n\nBaker cited a lack of resources as the primary impediment to using the FISA process;, rather than Stellar Wind, to collect foreign intelligence following the September 11 attacks. Baker said that he did not believe OIPR, as staffed in October 2001, had sufficient resources to process the volume of telephone numbers the NSA was tasking for content collection under Stellar Wind at that time.\n\nHowever, Baker explained that in his view FISA is \"scalable\" and that to some degree the statute's utility is limited by the resources allocated to OIPR:82\nF\no LOCHN\nBaker also observed that to bring Stellar Wind's content and meta data collections fully under FISA authority would have required a different approach to the statute. Baker said that developing such an approach wouild have been possible only by convening a working group to examine constitutional and practical issues. Baker, one of only three people inn the Justice Department read into Stellar Wind as of January 2002, said he did not have the ability or the authority to do this himself.83 Baker stated that his belief in this approach was informed by his own experience with and participation in a small, informal group composed of U.S. Intelligence Community officials that had worked periodically since shortly before the September 11 terrorist attacks to develop solutions to various foreign intelligence collection iesues\n8 {LSLSTLW/ /ST LOCHN\n\n## C. Fisa Court Is Informed Of Stellar Wind 4\n\n.\n\nBaker told the OIG that sometime in the December 2001 to January\n2002 time period he concluded, based on his awareness that information derived from Stellar Wind had been used to support at least one request for a FISA application, that the FISA Court also needed to be made aware of the Stellar Wind program. Baker said that the Department's counterterrorism efforts rely on good relations with the FISA Court and that candor and transparency are critical components of that relationship. According to Balker, OIPR had a policy of full disclosure with the Court that he said served the Department well when problematic issues arose. Baker also attributed the Department's record of success with FISA applications and the.'jilflpriove'd coordination between intelligence agents and prosecutors to the strong relationship that the Department had built with the Court.\n\nBaker believed it would be detrimental to this relationship if the Court learned later that information from Stellar Wind was included in FISA\napplications without notice to the Court.\n\nST\nAatar Baker said he raised the issue of the FISA Court not being informed about Stellar Wind with Levin, who first responded by suggesting that the Attorney General order Baker not to disclose the program to the Court while theissuie was being considered. Baker initially agreed to this approach and drafted a memorandum\n{rom Ashcroft to Baker to this effect. He said that Levin edited the document and presented it to Ashcroft, who signed it. The memorandum, dated January 17, 2002, stated that Asheroft understood FISA Court applications would include information obtained or derived from Stellar Wind, and that these applications would seek authorizations to conduiet surveillance of targets already subject to surveillance under Stellar Winid. Ashcroft's memorandum also stated that he was considering Baker's recommendation that the Department brief the FISA Court on the prograiil.\n\nThe mermorandum stated further:\nIn the interim, I am directing you to file applications with the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court without informing the court of the existence of the Stellar Wind program or any aspect thereof.\n\nI am also directing you not to brief any other However, as we discuss in Chapter Five, while the transition was successful with respect to bulk meta data collectior, the:legal theory to transition Stellar Wind's content collection, while initially approved by one FISA Court judge, subsequently was rejected by a second judge.\n\nindividuals in the Department of Justice, including the FBI,.\n\nregarding Stellar Wind without my prior authorization, Levin told us that he, as well as Ashcroft, soon came to agree with Baker that the FISA Court should be made aware of the program. Levin said he told Ashcroft during this: time that Baker had done a \"remarkable job\" building a relationship with the FISA Court that greatly benefited the Depattment's counterintelligerice and counterterrorism efforts. Levin said he advised Ashcroft, \"We should do what Baker thinks is right\" According to Levin, Ashcroft agreed, +F\nLevin said that he informed Gonzales and Addington at some point of Baker's position that the FISA Court should be made aware of Stellar Wind, but said they initially rejected the idea of reading any judges.into the program. Levin stated that he continued to press the issue without success.\n\nHowever, the issue came to a head on a weekend in. January 2002\nwhen Baker reviewed a second FISA application that contained the \"strange, unattributed language\" Baker understooed to indicate that the information referenced was obtained from the Stellar Wind program. This second FISA\napplication sought emergency ap roval from the FISA Courtito conduct v;lectronic.'survefllane-o\n.\n\n]\ne oers\n. ==\n|Becausethiswould be the first application seeking FISA authority t6 monitor this particular subject's telephone communications, Baker recognized that the NSA had already engaged in some level of electronic surveillance in the United States of a domestic telephone number without a FISA order.\n\nAlthough Baker viewed the memorandum from Ashcroft directing him not to inform the FISA Court about Stellar Wind as \"cover\" for him not to inform the FISA Court about Stellar Wind, he remained uncomfortable about filing an application that contained Stellar Wind information without informing the FISA Court. Baker therefore approached the Chief of the Justice Department's Professional Responsibility Advisory Office (PRAO) to discuss his ethical responsibilities to the FISA Court under circumstances where a FISA application contains certain information that is material to the Court's decision, but Baker was not authgrized to disclose the source of the information.85 Baker stated that the PRAO Chief told him that he had an affirmative duty of candor to the Court, and that this duty of candor was heightened due to the ex parte nature of the FISA proceedings:# Baker concurred with this guidance, which Baker felt also was compelled by his position as a federal officer and officer of the Court. Baker said he 'therefore concluded, and informed Levin, that he would not sign the pending application or present to it to the FISA Court, nor would he allow any OIPR\nattorney do so. According to Baker, Levin spoke to David Addington about the situation, but Addington nevertheless declared that the Court would not be read into the program.\n\n5\n'\n'\nAccording to Baker, the White House, the Attorney General, and Levin then decided that Levin, rather than Baker, would sign the FISA application and present it to Judge Claude M. Hilton, the FISA Court judge responsible for hearing FISA matters that weekend\n.87 Baker told us that he notified Judge Hilton in advance that the application was being handled in this manner. Levin said he brought the application to J udge Hilton's residence and explained that he, instead of the OIPR Counsel, wag presenting the case because it involved a \"special classified program.\" Levin told us that Judge Hilton approved the application without asking any questions. According to Levin, when he later told Addington how the matter was resalved, and that he agreed with Baker's position that the Court should be briefed into the program, Addington responded that Baker should be fired for insubordination for not signing the application. {F8/5\n:\nAccording to Baker, a CONSensus formed after this episode among the Attorney General, the FBI, and the White House that future FISA matters could not be handled in the same fashion, particularly in view of the anticipated increase in FISA applications resulting from the intelligence collected and disseminated under Stellar Wind.B Baker said that the material facts known to the lawyer which will enable the tribunal to make an informed decision, whether or not the facts are adverse.\" Baker stated that he also consulted with two officials from the Office of the Deputy Attorney General on the matter and that they provided the same advice as PRAO.\n\n(U)\n87 Director Mueller and Attorney General Ashceroft already had signed the application.\n\n(U)\n38 'We asked Baker whether he thought the FBI's restrictions on the use of Stellar Wind-derived leads disseminated to field offices, as described above, were sufficient to guard against including Stellar Wind information in FISA applications.\n\nBaker stated that his experience with FBI record-keeping practices did not give him a high degree of\n(Cont'd.)\ndecision was therefore made to brief the FISA Court's Presiding Judge, Royce Lamiberth.89\n{F8/4\n[SLL/C\nJudge Lamberth was read into Stellar Wind on January 31, 2002.\n\nThe briefing was conducted in the Attorney General's office at the Department, and was attended by Asheroft, Hayden, Mueller, Levin, Yoo, and Baker. According toa memorandum of talking points prepared for the briefing, Ashcroft provided Judge Lamberth a brief summary of the program's creation, explaining that the President had authorized a sensitive collection technique in response to the September 11 attacks in order to obtain foreign intelligence information necessary to protect the United States from future attacks and acts of international terrorism. Ashcroft said the NSA, at the instruction of the Secretary of Defense, implemented the collection, which was code named Stellar Wind. (PSS HSTEWSH-OE/NFY\nAccording to the talking points, Ashcroft also discussed the factors the President considered in determining that an \"extraordinary emergency exists\" to support electronic surveillance without a warrant. The factors.\n\ncited to Judge Lamberth paralleled those contained in the Presidential Authorizations, includihg \"the magnitude and probability of death from terrorist attacks, the need to detect and prevent such attacks with secrecy, the possible intrusion into the privacy of American citizens, the absence of a more harrowly-tailored means to obtain the information, and. the reasonableness of such intrusion in light of the magnitude of the potential threat of such terrorist acts and the probability of their occurrence.\"\nAccording to the talking points, Ashcroft stated that he determined, based upon the advice of the Office of Legal Counsel, that the President's actions were lawful under the Constitution.\n\nLevin told us that Ashcroft emphasized to Judge Lamberth that the FISA Court was not being asked to approve the program. AFS\nAT\nSHOS/ R\nFollowing Ashcroft's summary, the briefing continued in three parts.\n\nFirst, Hayden described how the program worked operationally.\n\nSecond, Yoo discussed legal aspects of the program.\n\nThird, Baker discussed a confidence that such separation could be consistently maintained.\n\nIn addition, Baker believed that the nature of FBI international terrorism investigations would make it difficult to track Stellar Wind-derived information. According the F Bl OGC, Baker did not share with the FBI his concerns about whether its record-keeping practices would keep Stellar Wind information from being used in FISA applications.\n\nRS\nSTEWAAS\nOO AN\nproposal for ha_ndhng FISA apphcauons that contained program-derived information.\n\nLevin told us that when the briefing concluded, Lamberth acknowledged he was not being asked to approve the program and expressed his appreciation for being read in. According to Baker, Lamberth also remiarked, \"Well, it all depends on whether you can get five votes on the Supreme Court, but I''m comfortable with it.\" For the next 4 months, until the end of his term in May 2002, Judge Lamba th Was the only FISA Court judge read into Stellar Wind.\n\n{F\n_\n\n## D. Oipr Implements \"Scrubbing\" Procedures For Stellar Wind Informatmn In Internatmnal Terrorism Fisa Applications\n\nFollowing Judge Lamberth's read-in to the Stellar Wind program, Baker implemented procedures in OIPR to address two scenarios in which Stellar Wind could affect international terrorism FISA applications.90\nFirst, information obtained or derived from Stellar Wind might be included in a FISA apphcatlon to establish probable cause that the target of the apphcatwn is-a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power and that the target is using or is about to use a particular \"facility\" (a term used in FISA\ngenerally to refer to a spec,lfic telephone number or e-mail address) at which the electronic surveillance is directed.\n\nSecond, a FISA application might target facilities that were also targeted by Stellar Wind, a situation referred to as \"dual coverage\" because the targeted communications were collected under two seeparate authorities.\n\nBaker's procedures, referred to as\n\"scriibbing\" procedures, applied to initial FISA applications as well as to renewal applications seeking to continue existing coverage of targets\n(electromc surveillance under FISA generally is authorized for 90-day periods). (FS7HSPEW/SHAOCHNR-\nJudge Lamberth required that all applications that contained NSA\ninformation derived from Stellar Wind or that would produce dual coverage of a facility be filed with him only. Baker told the OIG that the scrubbing process was his idea, with Judge Lamberth's full concurrence, and that it had as its core principle OIPR's obligation to inform the Court of all material facts contained in a FISA application.\n\nAccording to Baker, the scrubbing\n9% The procedurces implemented by Baker only applied to international terrorism FISA applications, not to counterintelligence FISA applications.\n\nAs Baker later explained in a letter to Judge Lamberth's successor as FISA Presiding Judge, this limitation was based on the understanding that the Stellar Wind program targeted only certain international terrorist communications \"and there is no reason to believe that the fruits of Stellar Wind collection would appear in a counterintelligence FISA application.\"\nprocedures were a means of implementing his ethical duty of candor to the Court without disclosing the existence of the Stellar Wind program to uncleared attorneys and judges. Bakeralso said that Judge Lamiberth wanted to be informed of applications that contained Stellar Wind information.and of dual coverage situations, and that Judge: Lamberth believed that the procedures devised by Baker were an appropriate and acceptable means of accomplishing this: According to Baker, the scrubbing process made him and Judge Lamberth \"comfortable the Court was being told what it needed to be told.\"!\n\nW\nELo i o i MAVASL\nAT\nOV\nS\nT\nWe describe below the initial two scrubbing procedures implemented by Baker as well as the difficulties they created for the FISA application process. WWGG%NF)\nLS\n'\n:\n\n## 1. Initial Scrubbing Procedures {T8//Sh-Nf)\n\nEach international terrorism FISA application was \"scrubbed\" for Stellar Wind information and dual coverage before it was filed.\n\nHowever, Baler, as the only person in OIPR read into Stellar Wind, was unable to explain to his staff why the scrubbing was being conducted. With the NSA's cooperation, Baker initially scrubbed the applications without any assistance from OIPR staff, Baker said the time-and effort he expended on this practice was not sustainable, and within. weeks.of beginning the scrubbing procedures Baker enlisted the assistance of OIPR's Acting Deputy Counsel for Intelligence Operations, Peggy Skelly-Nolen. Skelly-Nolen stated to the OIG that Baker told her at that time that he \"needed to tell me something that he couldn't tell me,\" but was:.able to convey that he needed her and the office's assistance to process international terrorism FISA\napplications because the supporting declarations contained information that required special handling.\n\nIS/\nN\nThe scrubbing process, or \"the program check\" as it came to be known within OIPR, had two purposes. The first purpose was to identify draft applications that contained Stellar Wind-derived information in support of probable cause to believe that the target of the application was a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power and was using or was about to use a particular facility. The second purpose was to identify applications that targeted facilities that were already actively targeted under the Stellar Wind program.\n\n:\nTo accomplish the first purpose, OIPR attorneys were required to identify any information in applications attributed to the NSA, even if there was 1o suggestion the information was derived from a special program. The OIPR attorneys provided by e-mail the relevant excerpts from the applications to a designated OIPR legal assistant, who in turn compiled the information and transmitted it to the NSA by secure e-mail or facsimile.\n\nUpon receipt, the NSA conducted a check of the identified information against the Stellar Wind reports database, among others, to determine whether the information was derived or obtained from the program (as distinguished from being obtained by some other NSA signals collection activity). The NSA provided OIPR the results of its search by return e-mail or facsimile, writing next to each excerpt either \"yes\" or \"no\" to indicate whether the information was Stellar Wind-derived. Judge Lamberth did not fequire that Stellar Wind-derived information be removed frem FISA\napplications, only that any such applications be filed with him exclusively and the Stellar Wind information identified to him orally.92\nThe second purpose of the scrub ~ to identify dual collection applications - followed similar steps. On approximately a weekly basis, an OIPR legal assistant requested. that OIPR attorneys transmit to him all facilities. targeted for electronic surveillance in applications scheduiled to be filed with the FISA Court that week. The legal assistant created a single list of all'targeted telephone numbers and e-mail aceounts and e-mailed or faxed the information to the NSA. The NSA in turn checked the Stellar Wind database to determine whether any of the listed facilities were tasked for content collection under the program. The NSA provided OIPR the resulfs of this check by return e-mail or facsimile, writing next to each facility either\n\"yes\" or \"no\" to indicate whether the facility was tasked under Stellar Wind.\n\nnning in earl 2002, any FISA ap iioations'rthativne_lude'd. the.\n\ns phre\n.\n\n'\n'\n:\n| were to be\n-\n.\n\neISO would inform 'J'u'd'ge 'EMB'e_~r{h?~dire1y: that it -WS a\n\"Lamberth only\" case to indicate it was connected to Stellar Wind.\n\n(TS /STIW/ /SLH/OC NE)-\n\n## 2. Complications With Scribbing Procedures.\n\nSkelly-Nolen told us thatno ene in OIPR, including her at that time, was aware that the checks Baker was requirinig the office to make concerned a specific compartmented program. However, the scrubbing procedures generated questions from OIPR attorneys and FBI agents, particularly when Skelly-Nolen instructed an OIPR attorriey to add to an application the descriptivephrasc Rl\n'\n-\nSkelly-Nolen told us that she wes not able to pre\n, to the questions because she did not have the answers. aListactory response\n'Skelly-Nolen also stated that it was stressful to comply with the procedures, due in large part to the fact that the attorneys-and agents responsible for the contents of the international terrorism applications were asked to follow certain procedures for filings but were not being provided an explanation for these measures.\n\nShe said this stress was compounded by the concurrent anthrax scare and the prevailing belief that there would be another terrorist attack.\n\nSkelly-Nolen stated that OIPR staff was acting based on Baker's representations alone, and while Baker sought to assuage any concerns the OIPR attorneys had over these new procedures by explaining to the office that he had spoken to the Attorney General and the FISA Court on the issue, some OIPR attorneys simply were not comfortable unider these circumstances and Skelly-Nolen had to reassign the international terrorism cases these attorneys were handling. Baker stated that he regularly told attorneys that they did not have to sign applications that they were not comfortable with,\n(PS4\n|\nThe process for filing international terrorism FISA applications was further complicated by the fact that of the two J ustice Department officials authorized to approve such applications - the Attorney General and the Deputy Attorney General - only Attorney General Ashecroft was read into Stellar Wind.94 As mentioned previously, Larry Thompson, who served as Deputy Attorney General from May 2001 to August 2003, was never read into the Stellar Wind program. Alberto Gonzales, who served as White House Counsel from January 2000 to February 2005, Stated to the OIG that\n7\n.\n\n.\n\nmconvenient\" not having these two The situation with Thompson caused Associate Deputy A'_'ttor'ney General David Kris, who oversaw national security matters in the Office of the Deputy Attorney General during Thompson's tenure, to draft a memorandum on January 11, 2002, advising Baker that he should not send Kris any FISA applications that included information obtained or derived from the Stellar Wind program, and that Kris intended to advise Thompson not to review or approve any such applications.9% The memorandum stated that Kris was aware of the existenice of a \"highly classified information-collection program that has the unclassified code name 'Stellar Wind',\" but that he was \"wholly unaware of the nature and scope of the Baker\n\n-\nprogram.\" Kris also stated in the memorandum that his request for a\nbriefing on the program had been denied and that he was aware Deputy\nAttorney (}enera-l ThompSon also had not been briefed on the program.?\n\n## E. Judge Kollar-Kotelly Succeeds Judge Lamberth As Fisa Court Presiding Judge (U)\n\nJudge Lamberth's 7-year term on-the FISA Court ended in May 2002\nOn May 19, 2002, Judge Colleen Kollar-Kotelly was appointed to the Court to replace Lamberth as the Presiding Judge.\n\nIn connection with this appointment, Judge Kollar-Kotelly was read into the Stellar Wind program and provided an opportunity to-examine the Department's analysis of the program's legality. Judge Kollar-Kotelly also spoke with Baker on numerous occasions about the scrubbing procedures he implemented to account for Stellar Wind information in international terrorism FISA applications and to identify applications that would result in dual coverage.\n\n## 1. Judge Kollar-Kotelly Modifies Oipr Scrubbing Procedures {F5//Sh-/Nf)\n\nJudge Kollar-Kotelly received her first briefing on the Stellar Wind program in the Attorney General's office on May 17, 2002, 2 days prior to being formally appointed Presiding Judge for the FISA Court. Baker, who attended the briefing, told us that the presentation was sirnilar to the briefing initially provided to Judge Lamberth. Judge Kollar-Kotelly had several questions concerning the scope of the President's authority to conduct warrantless surveillance, and the Department responded that same day with a letter signed by OLC Deputy Assistant Attorney General Yoo that outlined the legal basis for the activity. The letter essentially replicated Yoo's November 2, 2001, memorandum regarding the legality of Stellar Wind, ~{FS+H-SFE\n'-\n:\nAccording to Baker, Judge Kollar-Kotelly met at the White House with Addington, Gonzales, and Yoo to read Yoo's letter, but she was not permitted to retain a copy or take any notes. Judge Kollar-Kotelly later wrote in a letter to Baker that Yoo's letter \"set out a broad overview of the legal authority for conducting [Stellar Wind], but did not analyze the specifics of the [Stellar Wind] program.\" {FB/SHNF\nJudge Kollar-Kotelly also requested an opportunity to review the Presidential Authorization initiating Stellar Wmd On August 12, 2002, she reviewed the October 4, 2001, Authorization.\n\n51\nBaker said that he met with Judge Kollar-Kotelly on several occasions after her initial Stellar Wind briefing to discuss how OIPR had been handling Stellar Wind's impact on FISA apphcatlons Balter described for her the existing procedures to account for NSA information containied in FISA applications derived from Stellar Wind, and to identify applications that if. approved Would produce dual coverage of a facility.\n\nJudge Kollar-Kotelly also was iiiterested in identifying whether a facility targeted in a FISA application had been tipped to the FBI as Stellar-Wind derived information. Baker told the OIG that at this time he did not believe the FBI .and NSA had the ability to track Stellar Wind tips on a tlmely basis. Baker said he mistakenly believed that as tips passed from the NSA to FBI Headquarters, and from there to FBI field offices for investigation, it would be exceedmgly difficult to trace the specific source of\n. the information in a sufficiently timely mariner for inclusion in a FISA\napphcatlon. Baker provided his understanding to Judge KollarKotelly, llkenmg the Stellar Wind information in tips to:the FBI as \"salt in soup\" that is impossible to extract once added. Based on Baker's representations, Judge Kollar-Kotelly did not require- the Depattment to identify whether a facility targeted in a FISA apphcat1on was ever provided to the FBI under Stellar Wind.98\nJudge Kollar-Kotelly decided that the scrubbing procedures\n1mplemented under Judge Lamberth should contmue but she directed\n|las 2 means of\n; TIOULYINg Ner that tacmnes targeted by the' apphcat1ons were also targeted under Stellar Wind. Baker said that while Judge Kollar-Kotelly understood that instances of dual coverage would occur, she did not want to appear to judicially sanction Stellar Wind coverage. Baker told us his impression was that Judge Kollar-Kotelly \"did not want to rule on the legality of the program\" by appearing to \"authorize\" the NSA's technique for collecting the same information the government was seeking to collect under FISA .99\n98\nBaler eventually learned that the FBI and the NSA in fact did have some ability to. track Stellar Wind information.\n\nAs discussed in Chapter Six, in March 2004 Judge Kollar-Kotelly added to the scrubbing process a check performed by the FBI to determine whether any telephone numbers or e-mail addresses contained in a FISA application had ever been provided to the FBI in a Stellar Wind report. {FS7/STEW/SH1OSNE}\nBaker said he believes Judge Kollar-Kotelly was trying to protect the FISA\n'Ceu-r{t and did not want the 1eg\"a?li'cy of the Court's orders called irito question.F\nJudge Kollar-Kotelly also directed OIPR to excise from FISA\n'applications any information obtained or derived from Stellar Wind. Baker told Judge Kollar-Kotelly that OIPR could implement this requirement using the scrubbing procedures already in place, and that where the FBI included NSA information in an application dctermined to be Stellar Wind-derived,.\n\nOIPR would excise it.\n\nJSTIWLLSTH\nOGN\nJudge Kollar-Kotelly also instructed Baker to alert her of any instances where an application's basis for the requisite probable cause showing under FISA was weakened by excising the Stellar Wind information.\n\nIn such cases, Judge Kollar-Kotelly would then decide whether to.approve the application with the knowledge that additional relevant information had been excised.\n\n-\n~ Even though Judge Kollar-Kotelly's scrubbing process was intended to eliminate all Stellar Wind information from international terrorism FISA\napplications, she still required that scrubbed applications be filed with her only.\n\nIn time, Judge Kollar-Kotelly relaxed this requirement and permitted other judges on the Court to handle these applications, although only after first being filed with her. 100(FS/AASTEWA/S1//OC/NE).\n\n## 2. Oipr Implements Judge Kollar-Kotelly's Scrubbing Procedure {Ts{/Sh-Nf\n\nAccording to Baker and Skelly-Nolen, the mechanics within OIPR for determining whether an application contained Stellar Wind information or targeted a facility also targeted under Stellar Wind remained essentially unchanged after the transition from Judge Lamberth to Judge Kollar-Kotelly.\n\nHowever, the scrubbing process became more complex.\n\nFor FISC.\" The letter memorialized the information Judge Kollar-Kotelly received from the government about the program and how she requested the government to proceed in preparing and presenting applications.\n\nOn the subject of dual coverage, Judge Kollar-Kotelly wrote,\n\"Without opining on [Stellar Wind]-related legal issues,\n1 have sought to protect the proper functioning of the FISA process, under which separate court\n-\nauthorities are granted to conduct foreign intelligence collection against a set of targers that overlaps the set of [Stellar Wind] targets.\" We discuss this letter in Chapter Four of this R, example, because only the Attorney General could sign the applications and Judge Kollar-Kotelly required that only she receive the applications (even after being scrubbed), Skelly-Nolen had to regularly visit the Attorney General's and Presiding Judge's residences with stacks of what Skelly-Nolen:\ncame to refer to as \"AG-KK only\" FISA applications.\n\nThe situation was further complicated when Ashcroft was on overseas travel and his signature was needed for a serubbed apphcatlon ready to be filed. When this occurred, the classification of the application's signature page was' \"downgraded\" and then sent to Ashcroft by secure fax. The actual application was not faxed; instead, Skelly-Nolen typically included a statement from her or Baker with the signature page indicating that the application was proper and comphed with the requirements of the FISA\nstatute. Skelly-Nolen observed that in these cases Ashcroft essentially relied on her and Baker's assessments of the applications - even though Skelly-Nolen was not read into Stellar Wind at this time. Scrubbed applications were handled similarly when Ashcroft was traveling domestically, although in those instances the apphcatlons could be pr0v1ded.\n\nalong with the signature page if requested.10!\n\n:\nJudge Kollar-Kotelly also required that heanngs for the \"AG-KK only\"\nFISA apphcatlons and renewals be scheduled for late in the day or on the weekend, either in her courtreom chambers at the District Court for the District of Columbia or at her residence, According to Skelly-Nolen, Judge Kollar-Kotelly insisted on this practice so that the \"AG-KK only\" docket did not interfere with her regular court docket. From Skelly-Nolen's perspective, this practice proved to be an \"enormous burden,\" particularly in cases:\ninvolving applications to continue FISA coverage on targets of emergency suthorizations.192 Skelly-Nolen explained that these authorizations were, for \"no good operations reason\" that she was aware of, routinely approved by the Attorney General on Fridays, meaning that a FISA application had to be filed with the Court within 72 hours - by Monday ~ to continue the ernergency surveillanice coverage. However, because Judge Kollar-Kotelly had a regular court docket on Mondays, she required that any scrubbed FISA application seeking authority to continue surveillance initiated under W2 As previously described, under FISA during this time period, when the Attorney General reasonably determines that an emergency situation exists prior to obtaining a FISA\norder, the Attorney General may approve the use of electronic surveillanice for a period of up to 72 hours without an order.\n\n(U)\nemergency authorization be scheduled with her for 'Sunday. Skelly-Nolen stated that these cases would be in addition to the renewal applications that also had to be heard on Sundays so the authority for the surveillance in those cases did not expire and the coverage lapse.\n\n Baker identified another issue that stemmed from Judge Kollar-Kotelly's requirement that only she receive dual coverage applications. The problem arose when Judge Kollar-Kotelly was out of town and unavailable to hear a dual coverage .application, Baker's solution was either to fly the application to the place Judge Kollar-Kotelly was located, or to contact the NSA and request that it \"de-task\" the facilities that the FISA\napplication was targeting.\n\nIn this way, the application could be presented to an alternative FISA Court judge because it no longer targeted facilities that were also targeted under Stellar Wind.\n\nTS/\n/STLWHSHAOC, NF\nFor example, Baker described a situation where the FBI was urgeritly interested in a particular individual whose telephone was currently tasked by the NSA under Stellar Wind.\n\nIn this case, Baker instructed the NSA to de-task the telephone number so the FBI's FISA application could be presented to a judge other than Judge Kollar-Kotelly. To prevent any gap in coverage between the time the NSA detasked the telephone number and the Court approved the FBI's application, surveillance was initiated under FISA's emergency authorization provision and then presented to a FISA\nCourt judge within the requisite 72 hours. According to Baker, proceeding in this fashion \"made everyone comfortable,\" including the NSA. Baker told us that this situation occurred a couple of times each year.\n\nAccording to Baker and Skelly-Nolen, these examples illustrate how having only the Attorney General and a single judge on the FISA Court read into Stellar Wind complicated the FISA process. Baker said that \"fairly early on\" after being read into the program, Judge Kollar-Kotelly made several requests for other FISA Court judges to be read into the program. Baker told the OIG that these requests were generally made through him, orally and in writing, but was aware that on at least one occasion Judge Kollar-Kotelly made the request directly to Attorney General Ashcroft.\n\nBaker said that sometime prior to March 2004 he personally advised Ashcroft of Judge Kollar-Kotelly's concerns, and that Ashcroft responded with words to the effect that the White House would not allow more judges to be read into Stellar Wind. {FS/HSFEN/FSHFOC/\nN~\nIn a January 12, 2005, letter to Baker, Judge Kollar-Kotelly summarized the situation, stating, \"I have repeatedly asked that the other members of the FISC be given access to the same information that I have received regarding the [Stellar Wind] program.\n\nTo date, the executive As & consequence of only Judge Kollar-Kotelly being read into Stellar Wind and her insistence that she alone handle applications scrubbed of Stellar Wmd mformatmn or that mvolved taskmcr telephone numbfns or Novembe1 2004 she was handlmg applommatel perccnt of' all FISA\napplications. Judge Kollar-Kotelly also tended to heatr successive:\nappllcauons regarding the same targeted facilities. She discontinued this practice in November 2004 and permitted other judges to hear scrubbed apphcahons Judge Kollar-Kotelly later wrote that her decision was \"based on the operational systems\" OIPR had in place to scrub applications and that she assured her colleagues \"that they could properly decide [the cases]\nbased on the information in each application, without the additional information on which I have been briefed, but which, to date, the other judges have not received.\" (?SHS'H:W;';'SH;L@%N{H\n\n## V. Fbi Initiates Measures To Improve The Management Of Stellar Wind Information {S//Nf}-\n\nFollowing the terrorist attacks of September 11, the FBI had reallocated personnel and resources to counterterrorism operations, and established the Telephone Analysis Unit (TAU) to exploit telephone communications data. We described above how a small ents and bl, b3, analysts from this unit was reassigied to the which b7E\nwas responsible for handling the Stellar Wind reports provided by the NSA, In approximately May 2002, the TAU was renamed the Comimmunications Analysis Unit (CAU) and became one of the units within the newly ereated Communications. Exploltatlon Section (CXS). According to the first Acting CAU Unit Chlef the FBI s vision for the un1tw\n5\nthat i\n\n## Program Was One Source For Obtaining Thisf\n\nIn this section, we describe changes the FBI implemented in late 2002\nand early 2003 to manage the intelligence it received under Stellar Wind.\n\nThese changes included attempts to improve coordination with the NSA, implement a more formal program to receive intelligence from the NSA and disseminate it to FBI field offices, educate the FBI field offices about the value of the intelligence and FBI Headquarters' expectations concerning its use, and assign a small team of FBI personnel to work full-time at the NSA\non Stellar Wind. +SA+NF\n\n## Al Cau Acting Unit Chief Evaluates Fbi Response To Stellar Wind ~{S/HF\n\n'When the first CAU Unit Chief arrived at FBI Headquarters in September 2002, CXS was newly establishied and most of the Section's\n15-20 staff was there on temporary duty assignments. The CAU was staffed similarly at this time, but also contained some professional support employees from other divisions at FBI Headquarters. SN\nThe CAU Unit Chief said that the CAU's mission was to support FBI\ninternational terrorism investigations\n- al Qaeda investigations in particular\n- by analyzing telephone calling activity and e-mail communications. He explamed that prior lo September 11, 2001, the FBI analyzed telephone numbers receive ield offi her sources by querying the numbers against the FBI's\n.\n\n|database, the FBI's central b1, b3, repository for telepho scriber data. However, he said the FBI's b7E\ndatabase at that time was relatively small and had limited analytical capability.\n\nIn the wake of the September 11 attacks, the FBI gained access to additional tools and began te utilize more soph1st1cated analytical techmques Stellar Wind was one of those new tools.\n\nThe CAU Unit Chief said that after he was read into Stellar Wind in late September 2002, it was clear to him based on conversations with the CXS Acting Section Ch1ef that the FBI wanted to increase its participation in the Stellar Wind program. Asa counterterrorism agent in the FBI's Chicago field office, the Unit Chief had some exposure to Stellar Wind in the form of leads. He told us that he had recalled thinking the leads were \"stupid\" and \"not sensible,\" He also said that he had been critical of the leads because they dlcl not provide any context to the bl, information, such as he stated that the leads did not b3, adequately explain thef\n.\n\nrankings associated with the b7E\ntelephone numbers, and the leads were not suff1c1ently specific as to what action the field offlce e.\n\nIn his view, the intelligence disseminated by the ECs was not \"actionable.\" The Unit Chief told us that he could not figure out why FBI Headquarters was\n\"pushing this stuff out\" after September 11, and that other agents in the field shared his views.103 {ISALSTLW//SHAOC/NFY\n103\nAs previously described, former NSA Director Hayden told us that immediatel\n'followm the Se tember 11 tenorlst attacl(s the NSA mochfied the aenc 'S collectlon\n'and that this resulted in a flood of ot numbers to the FBL. Thus, it 5 'pee\";'sibl-' that\n(Cont'd.)\nand no guidance for how After becoming the actis the FBI was handling the was no unit that oversaw th g the NSA information should be processed by FBI\nanalysts, He also said that the process in-place - essentially re~typ1ng into ECs the tearline information contained in Stellar Wind reports. merely \"1'egurg;tated\" information that, by itself, was not actionable.\n\nHe was not critical of the FBT analysts responsible for drafting the ECs, who simply performmed this task as directed. Rather, he believed the process suffered from 4 lack of leadership.\n\nHe described the FBI's involvement in Stellar Wind up to this point as.\n\n\"happenstance\" and said the FBI did not have \"a real good handle on it.\" He said that the deficiencies he identified were attributable in part to the significant resource challenges the FBI encountered after September 11, but he nevertheless considered the FBI's effort to respond to the Stellar Wmd information as \"half-baked.\"\nHe said he therefore set about imnplementing changes within the CAU to better organize this effort, which he beelieved would i 1mprove the quallty of the intelligerice disserminated to FBI field offices.\n\n{F&\n.\n\n## B. Fbi Increases Cooperatmn Wri:H Nsa And Imtxate L\n\nThe CAU Unit Chief said that the first step he took to improve the FBI's involvement in Stellar Wind was to detail to the NSA one of CAU's temporary duty special agents.\n\nHe instructed the agent to form a working group at the NSA to 1dent1fy any problems and evaluate the quality of the information provided in the NSA's Stellar Wind reports; as well as the.\n\ninformation that the FBI reported back to the NSA about tips.10% The CAU\nUnit Chief said he took this step so that the NSA gained a \"case agernit's perspective\" on the type of information useful to FBI field offices, and also to explain to the NSA that the information that could be disseminated about the tippers should include \"context\" and \"clarity\" sufficient to justify the FBI\nconducting an inquiry under the FBI's investigative guidelines,105 He said he did not believe that the NSA's interest in obscuring the \"sources and methods\" associated with the information had to compromise the quality of the information provided to the FBI.\n\nHe also said that the NSA needed to FBI agents' early frustration with leads that provided telephone numbcrs was qtmbut'tble in part to the leads generated under this NSA collection activity.\n\n-\n.\n\nSy never provided the NSA any responses to the tipped information. ~tS//NF~\nunderstand how the FBI investigated intelligence that it received, and that FBI agents did not have to know the: spemflc sources and methods used to acqu1re information in order to effectively investigate the information.\n\nThe CAU Unit Chief said that this liaison effort occurred over a couple of weeks, with the temporary duty agent drlvmg to the NSA daily. According to the Unlt Chief, the agent explained to:NSA persontiel what the FBI was permitted to do with certain types of information and that the NSA would receive more feedback from the FBIif the quality of the disseminable information about the tippers improved, The Unit. Chief told us that followirig this exchange the NSA improved the Stellar Wind reports by providing better information in both the compartmented and tearline portions of the reports. ~(S//NF)\nIn addition, the CAU Unit Chief told us that he took steps to increase cogperation within the FBI between CAU, which was part of an analytical section that supported counterterrorism investigations, and FBI\n'Headquarters' Initernational Terrorism Operations Section, which was:\nresponsible for overseeing FBI counterterrorism investigations. The Unit Cliief said that based on his experience in the field working counterterrorism cases, he believed it was important that the CAU analysts consult with agents in Lhe operational section about'leads the CAU\nproposed to set in the ECs. While he was confident the CAU analysts could identify logical investigative steps, he thought they should nevertheless coordinate with the operational personnel to see if there was. agreement and to determine whether a lead potentially could affect any ongoing operations that the CAU was not aware of.\n\nHe also noted. that his CAU Unit Chief successors discontinued this practice, a decision he disagreed with and complained about to the Section Chief for CXS because he believed the program risked losing a measure of effectiveness.and efficiency as a consequence. {S/4NF\nAnother step the CAU Unit Chief took relating to the FBI's management of Stellar Wind information was to open an administrative file, or \"control file,\" to serve as the repository for all communications that the CAU sent to the field offices containing Stellar Wind information, as well as all communications the CAU received from field offices reporting the results of the investigative activi a to assigned leads,\n1%\nAs explained previously, thef communications had been disseminated from a subfile associated with the FBI's international terrorism investigation of the September 11 attacks. In the EC requesting that a control file be opened for Stellar Wind information, the CAU Unit Chief wrote that \"a dedicated control file for this project will better serve the specuflc needs of the Spe(:1al pl'Oj(':Ct and will add an additional layer of security for the source.\"\n+{F WS, W)\n:\nA control file for Stellar Wind information was-opened on September 30, 2002, and given the designation From that point forward, all ECS that. d1ssemmated Stella Wmd tips were sent in connection with the\n107\n-\nwere classified at the Secret level and, similar to the IECs, included a vague- cxplanatwn about the source of the information and a caveat concerning its use.108 TTS#S'FW']'S%#@G%NE\n107 \"The Unit Chief told us that Director Mueller held a telephone conference call in Octeber 2002 with the heads of all FBI field offices and advised the Headquarters was working to-improve the process for dissemindting information to the field offices by adding beth context and clarity to the communications.\n\nDirector Mueller expressed his expectation that the offices would act on the: information.\n\nAccordmg to the Unit- Chlef Dlrector Mue]ler essentlally was trymg to sell the program arid havmg spemfic d1scussmns W1th the heads of FBI fleld offlces about Stcllar W1nd\n'mfo1mat1on. TS\nSTEW\n7ol\n1O\nSeveral months later, in January 2003, the CAU Unit Chief sent an EC to all FBI field offices secking \"to clarify the mission of [CAU]\n.\n\n.\n\n. as well as to describe this unit's distinct role in the FBI's participation in the global\n|, 4\nwar on terror.\" The EC emphasized CAU's capabilities in examining b7,E\n'\ntelephone calling activity and its liaison function with members of the U.S.\n\nIntelligence Community that are \"in a unique position to provide potentially act\n'\nL\nbl, b3, b7E\n\n## C. Fbi Assigns Cau Personnel To Nsa On Full-Time Basis\n\nThe CAU. Unit Chief also assigned a team of FBI personnel to the NSA\non a full-time basis to manage Stellar Wind informationn.\n\nThe Unit Chief told us that shortly before his temporary duty assignment to FBI Headquarters was set to.expire, he and the CXS Acting Section Chief briefed Director Muieller's assistant - and later Director Mueller - about the role they recommended that the FBI take in the Stellar Wind program. The CAU Unit Chief recommended co-locating at the NSA approximately four FBI agents and analysts with remote access to FBI information systems.\n\nHe likened the suggestion to a \"task force environment\" that would introduce the FBI's investigative skills at the beginning of the NSA's analysis of Stellar Wind information.\n\nDirector Mueller approved the recommendation and told the CAU Unit Chief to implement it. {S/LANE)-\nDecember 2002 and 1y February 2003 a CAU team began 1ts eo locafion at the NSA to manage the FBI 's 1nvolvement m Stellar Wind. This co-location continues today.\n\n-\nLIRS\nHEE\n'\n\n## Vi, Oig Analysis (U)\n\nIn analyzing the Department's and the FBI's involvement in the NSA's expanded s1gnals intelligence collection activity after the September 11\nattacks, it is important to fecognize the exceptional circumstances that existed at the time. Many Department and. FBI officials empha31zed to us the sense of crisis and alarm during this period, ~and noted the widely shared concern within the Intelligence Community that a second wave: of attacks was imminent. The Stellar Wind program was conceived and implemented -amid these challenging circumstanees, (SR\nTh1s chapter described the role of Justice Department-and FBI\nofficials in the inception and early 1mp1ementat1on of the Stellar Wind\n'program, mcludlng the Department's initial reviews-of the legality of the program.\n\n:\n:\nWe believe that a significant problem during this-early phase of the Stellar Wind program was the lack of a sufficient number of Justice.\n\nDepartment attorneys read into the program to conduct an analysis of the program's legality.\n\nThe White House and according to Gonezales, the Piesident - determined who within the Department was permitted access to the program. We believe that Attorney General Ashcroft, who met frequently with the President on national securlty matters, was in a position: to personally advocate for the read-in of an adequate number of attorneys necessary for the Department to-perform a thorough and factually accurate legal analysis of the program. We know that Ashcroft's request that his chief of staff David Ayres and Deputy Attorney General Larry Thompson be read into the program was not granted. But because Ashcroft did not agree to be interviewed, we were unable to determine from him whether he sought additional Department read-ins to assist in the legal analysis of the program, how hard he may have pr essed for these additional resources; or whether he believed he was receiving adequate legal advice about the program from Yoo alone. F8/SH NP\nAs described in this chapter, John Yoo was the only Department attorney read in to work on the legal analysis supporting the program from Sept,emb'er'QOOl through May 2003.109\nAs described in Chapter Four, Departm'entvoffic'ialswho succeeded Yoo concluded that the analysis Yoo produced was significantly flawed and found the legal basis for aspects of the program to be lacking. We believe that reading in only one Department attorney to analyze the legality of the program impeded the Department's ability to conduct a thorough and factually accurate legal analysis, and andermined the Department's early role in the program. In Chapter Four we discuss the harm that resulted in late 2003 and early 2004 from the Department's highly restricted access to the program. FS//SH-NF)\nWe also described in this chapter how the harm attributable to the Justice Department's insufficient early involvement in the program extended beyond conducting an analysis of the program's legality. The Justice Department's relationship with the FISA Court was put at risk by not having officials from OIPR and members of the FISA Court read into Stellar Wind when program-derived information started being disseminated as investigative leads to FBI field offices.\n\nIn our view, it was foreseeable that Stellar Wind-derived information would be included in FISA applications.!10\nOIPR Counsel Baker told us that the Department's counterterrorism and counterintelligence efforts rely en good relations with the FISA Court and that candor and transparency are critical components of the relationship.\n\nBaker attributed the Department's record of success with FISA applications and the improved coordination between intelligence agents and prosecutors to the strong relationship that the Department built with the Court. Baker believed, and we agree, that it wotld have been detrimental to the relationship if the Court learned that information from Stellar Wind was While meeting with Ashcroft alone reflected the importance of the issues, it also placed me in a difficult position.\n\nI could not discuss certain matters with my DOJ superiors, or rely on the collective resources of OLC, which usually assigned several attorneys to work on an opinion.\n\nOperational security demanded by the war on terrorism changed some of OLC's standard operating procedures.\n\n## Wer By Other Means At 101. 8/\n\n110 The restrictions the FBI imiposed on the use of program-derived information -\nthat it could be used for \"lead purposes\" only and not for \"legal or judicial purposes\" (such as affidavits) - reflected a good faith and reasonable cffort.\n\nHowever, such restrictions\nould not ensure that program-derived information would not appear in FISA applications.\n\nIndeed, this eventuality led to Baker's.discovery of the program.\n\naxs\n-\ne\n:\nincluded in FISA applications without the Court being told so in-advance.\n\nYet we are not aware of any effort or consideration on the part-of Attorney General Ashcroft or officials at the White House to account for Stellar Wind's impact on Justice Department FISA operations by reading in any OIPR officials or members of the FISA Court. In fact, as we described in this chapter, Baker was read into Stellar Wind only after hearing from an:\nFBI colleague that \"there is something spooky going onTM with the collection of foreign-to-U.S. communications-and subsequently reviewing a FISA\napplication that contained \"strange, unattributed\" language-that the FBI\nwould not explain to him. Baker was read in when Daniel Levin, then Counselor to Ashcroft and Chief of Staff to Mueller, pressed White House officials for the clearance. (FSTFSTEWSHFOE/NF}\nMoreover, White House officials initially rejected the idea of reading in members of the FISA Court, and then took no action even as Levin, who together with Ashcroft agreed with Baker that the Court needed to be informed about the program, continued to press the issue.\n\nIt was not until Levin was required to sign and file a FISA application that Baker refused to handle because it contained Stellar Wind-derived information that the decision was made.to read in a single judge (Presiding Judge Lamberth, followed by Presiding Judge Kollar-Kotelly).\n\nThe decisions to read in Baker and a member of the FISA Court, which in our view were unnecessarily delayed, weree important steps in preserving the relationship the Justice Department had built with the Court. However, we believe that once Stellar Wind's impact on the Jiistice Department's FISA operations became evident, limiting read-ins to a single OIPR official and a single FISA Court judge was unduly restrictive and short-sighted. This chapter described how the scrubbing procedures.\n\nimposed by the FISA Court and implemented by QIPR to account for Stellar Wind-derived information created concerns among some. OIPR attorneys about the unexplained changes being made to their FISA applications. The scrubbing procedures also substantially distorted the assignment of cases to FISA Court judges and by Novembge2004 resulted in Judge Kollar-Kotelly handling approximately percent of all FISA applications, In our view, once Stellar Wind began to affect the functioning of the FISA\nprocess, OIPR and the FISA Court effectively became part of the program's operations and the number of OIPR staff and FISA Court judges read into Stellar Wind to manage the impact should have increased.\n\n'\nP\nSTLW A SEH O\n-\nThis chapter also described the FBI's handling of Stellar Wind-derived information in the initial weeks and months of the program. The FBI's chief objective during this period was to expeditiously disseminate g program-derived information to FBI field offices for investigation while protecting the source of the infarmation and the method by which it was obtaitied. We concluded that the FBI's procedures to meet thi ieptive senerally were reasonable. The FBI personnel assigned to the, developed a straightforward process for receiving Stellar Wind bi, reports; reproducing the information in a non-compartmented, Secret-level b3,\n'\n'\nb7E\nformat, and disseminating the information in Electronic Cominunications or ECs, to the appropriate field offices for investigation.\n\nThek RCs disseminated to FBI field offices also placed appropriate estrictions.on how the information could be used, iristructing field offices that the information was \"for lead purposes only\" and could not be used for any legal ot judicial purpose.\n\nFBI personnel at the field offices we visited as part of our review generally were familiar with the restrictions. {&//NE\nHowever, we found that the exceptionally compartmented nature of Stellat Wind created deficiencies in the FBI's initial process for handling program-derived information and understandably frustrated agents assigned to handle leads. The limited resources b1, b3, allocated tothe, .\n\nIhampered the analysts' ability to b7E\nenhance Stellar Wind information with relevant FBI or public source information before disseminatine leads to field offices for investigation.\n\nMore significantly, the\n.\n\nwas prohibited from disclosing information that agents traditionally were accustomed to receiving with leads that required investigation. The ECs consequently suffered from vagueness about the source of the information being provided and lacked factual details about the individuals allegedly involved with international terrorism and with whom the domestic numbers being disseminated possibly were in contact. {5HNS\n'We found that the FBI sought over time to address these deficiencies and improve the effectiveness of its participation in the Stellar Wind program.\n\nIn April 2002, transmitting Stellar Wind-derived leads to FBI field offices became a priority of the Communications Exploitation Section, and within it, the Communications Analysis Unit (CAU). The first chief of the bl, CAU assigned a team of FBI perso:\nrork full-time at the NSA on b3, Stellar Wind and to initiate th roject to manage the FBI's b7E\nparticipation in Stellar Wind.\n\nAs we discuss in this chapter and in Chapter Six, these measures enhanced the FBI's knowledge about Stellar Wind operations and gave the NSA better insight about how FBI field offices investigated Stellar Wind information, which improved Stellar Wind reports and the leads that were disseminated to FBI field offices.\n\nFS/HSTEWSHA\nO\nN F\n\n## Chapter Four Legal Reassessment Of Stellar Wind (May 2003 Through May 2004) R A B\n\nBy early 2003, while the operation of the Stellar Wind program had evolved, particularly with respect to the means by which intelligence from the program was provided to the FBI, the program still remained legally premised on John Yoo's November 2001 and October 2002 Office of Legal Counsel memoranda. ~FS/SHH\nN -\nThis chapter describes the pivotal period between May 2003 and May\n2004 during which Yoo's departure from the Office of Legal Counsel and the arrival of riew officials at the Justice Department resulted in a comprehensive reassessment of the Stellar Wind program's legal basis. This legal reassessment led to a contentious dispute between the Justice Department and the White House on the legality of important aspects of the program. This dispute eventually resulted in modifications to the operation of the program, and also contributed to the decision to place at least one aspect of the program under FISA authority. -{SDS#SLPL%LH-SH/L@G%-N-E}-\nSection I of this chapter discusses how personnel changes within the Office of Legal Counsel led to a re-examination of Yoo's legal analysis, culminating in a Justice Department legal position against continuing to certify the program and the resulting dispute with the White House. Section II describes how, faced with the prospect that the Attorney General, Deputy Attorney General, FBI Director, and other senior Department officials would resign in March 2004 if the program continued unchanged, the White House agreed to modify the program to conform it to the Department's revised legal analysis. {FSH-SHN\n\n## I Justice Department Reassesses Legality Of Stellar Wind Program Ts Hshaf- A. Overview Of Office Of Legal Counsel (U)\n\nOne of the responsibilities of the Assistant Attorney General for the Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) is to assist the Attorney General in his function as legal advisor to the President and all Executive Branch agencies.\n\nOLC drafts legal opinions for the Attorney General and also provides its own opinions in response to requests from the Counsel to the President, various agencies of the Executive Branch, and offices within the Department of Justice. OLC often deals with complex legal issues on which two or more agencies are in disagreement, and provides legal advice to the Executive Branch on constitutional questions, including the review of pending legislation for constitutionality.\n\nExecutive Orders proposed to be issued by the President are reviewed by OLC as to form and legality, as are other matters that require the President's for mal approval. OLC also reviews proposed orders by the Attorney General and all regulations requiring the Attorney General's approval.\n\n(U)\n\n## B. Personnel Changes Within Office Of Legal Counsel (U)\n\nJohn Yoo advised Attorney General Ashcroft and White House officials on the Stellar Wind program from the program's inception in October 2001\nthrough Yoo's resignation from the Department in May 2003. Upon Yoo's.\n\ndeparture; Patrick Philbin told the OIG that he was selected by the White House to assume Yoo's role as advisor to the Attorney General concerning the program.!1! With this personnel change came a fresh review of the legal underpinnings of the Stellar Wind program. We describe in the following sections the circumstances leading to what one official described as \"the great rethink\" of the program. TS/\nSTNE).\n\n## 1. Yoo's Role In The Program (October 2001 Through May 2003) (U)\n\nOn September 11, 2001, and through November 2001, Daniel Koffsky was the Acting Assistant Attorney General for OLC. Koffsky was not read into the Stellar Wind program.\n\nJay Bybee served as Assistant Attorney General for OLC from November 2001 until March 2003, when he became a judge on the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.. 112 Bybee also was never read into the Stellar Wind program. As discussed in Chapter Thtee, Jokn Yoo, a Deputy Assistant Attorney General in OLC, had sole responsibility within that office and within the Depar tment of Justice for developing the legal analysis relating to the Stellar Wind program until May\n2003.113 Bybee told us he was not aware at the time that Yoo was drafting legal opinions in connection with a compartmented program. FS//SH-HH\nBybee told us that the OLC normally adheres to a tradition called the\n\"two Deputy rule,\" so that OLC op1n1ons are reviewed by two OLC Deputy Assistant Attorneys General before going to the OLC Assistant Attorney General for approval.\n\nBybee said that the purpose of this rule is to ensure\n1 On June 1, 2003, Philbin became an Associate Deputy Attorney General.\n\nHowever, he told us that he still technically remained a Deputy Assistant Attorney General in OLC and was thus \"dual-hatted.\"\n(U)\nthe quality of the legal research and soundness of the legal analysis.\n\nIn addition, Bybee stressed that the Assistant Attorney General must be aware of all opinions that issue from the OLC. Bybee said that the OLC Assistant Attorney General has an obligation to \"see the whole picture\" and is the only person in the office who knows the full range of issues that are being addressed by the OLC.\n\nBybee also said the Assistant Attorney General is the only official in that office who can assure that OLC opinions remain consistent, Bybee stated that the Assistant Attorney General; as-a Senateconfirme'd official, has ultimate accountability for the work of the office. Bybee noted that, by contrast, the Deputy Assistant Attorney General position, though political, does not require Senate confirmation.\n\n(U)\nBybee told the OIG that it would not be unusual for a Deputy Assistant Attorney General such as Yoo to have direct contact with the White House for the purpose of rendering legal advice. Bybee stated that it is \"not clear\" whether or to what extent the Attorney General needs to be kept informed of such contacts, However, Bybee said that the Attorney General may appropriately decide to ask a single OLC attorney to work on a particular project, but that it is \"not the White House's call\" to make such assignments because the White House may not be aware of what advice the OLC is providing to other Executive Branch agencies. Bybee told us that during his tenure as Assistant Attorney General he did not know that Yoo was working alone on a sensitive compartmented program, and he had no knowledge of how Yoo came to be selected for this responsibility. )\nPhilbin said he believed that White House Counsel Gonzales and Vice President Cheney's Counsel David Addington had selected Yoo to draft the OLC's opinions on Stellar Wind and other national security programs, and that Yoo was the \"obvious choice\" to assume this role because of his expertise in war powers issues and the authority of the Commander-in-Chief.\n\n114 ~&/ANF-\nGonzales told the OIG he understood that Yoo had asked others within OLC to help out with specific legal issues during this period without telling them what they were being asked to assist with, and Yoo then aggregated that work into his memoranda concerning electronic surveillance and the Stellar Wind program.\n\nGonzales also stated that Yoo did not consult with any experts outside the Department in drafting his memoranda.lls FSAASHNF\nAs noted above, neither Yoo nor Ashcroft agreed to be interviewed for the OIG's investigation, Other witnesses gave the OIG various accounts.of Yoo's interactions with Atterney General Ashcroft and with the White House concerning the program.\n\nGonzales. told us that Yoo regularly advised Ashcroft on the legal aspects of the program so that Aslicroft could contiriue to certify it as to form and legality. Gonzales also said that it was incumbent on Ashcroft as Attorney General to satisfy the Department's legal obhgatlons regarding the program. Gonzales told us. he thus understood Yoo's opinions as representing the opinions of the Department.\n\nHowever, Gonzales acknowledged that White House officials consulted with Yoo and sought his advice without going through the Attorney General or Bybee -\nYoo's supervisor - although Gonzales also said they did not seek Department approval from Yoo concerning the Stellar Wind prograri.\n\nOther witnesses described their concerns regarding Yoo's direct contacts with the White House, and with Addington and Gonzales in particular. Philbin said he told Addington that Yoo's direct access to Addington on legal matters was \"not a good way to run things,\" referring to the lack of oversight of an OLC Deputy Assistant Attorney General by a supervisor.\n\nPhilbin stated that there was nothing wrong with assigning-a project to a subordinate, but not without the head of the office knowing what the subordinate was doing.\n\n(U)\nJack Goldsmith told us that when he became the Assistant Attorney General for the Office of Legal Counsel in October 2003, he learned that Yoo's contacts with the White House had had the effect of cutting the Attorney General \"out of the loop,\"\na practice Goldsmith said he resolved not to continue with any OLC attorney.\n\n(U)\nGoldsmith also told us the White House had wanted Yoo to replace Bybee as the Assistant Attorney General for the Office of Legal Counsel following Bybee's confirmation as a judge on the Ninth Circuit, but that Ashcroft blocked the move. Yoo resigned from the Department in May\n2003.116\n(U)\noutside expertise at the Department, although I don't know for sure.\" An NSA Associate General Counsel for Operations told the OIG that Yoo visited the NSA for a briefing about the program at some point after he had drafted his November 2, 2001, legal memorandurm.\n\n116\nIn addition to working on the legal analysis for the Stellar Wind program while at the Justice Department, Yoo also worked on at least one other project invelving a Top Secret compartmented detainee interrogation program.\n\nIn-contrast to the Stellar Wind program, the OIG determined that at least three OLC attorneys, including Bybee and Philbin, worked on the program's legal analysis with Yoo or participated by supervising his worl., In addition, attorneys from the Department's Criminal Division and from other\n{Cont'd.)\n\n## 2. Philbin Replaces Yoo (U)\n\nPatrick Philbin joined the Department as a Deputy Assistant Attorney General in the Office of Legal Counsel on September 4, 2001,117\nHe was read into the Stellar Wind program in late May 2003, just before Yoo left the Department.\n\nPhilbin said that he, accompanied by Yoo, was read into the program by Addington in Addington's office in the Old Executive Office Building. Philbin told us that Addington provided an overview of the:\nprogram, describing the two basic categories of collection as.\"coritent\" and\n\"meta data\" Philbin said that later, based on his legal analysis of the Stellar Wind program, he developed the \"three baskets\" terminology to describe more specifically the three types of collections.\n\nPhilbin said he was told by Addington he was being read into the program because Yoo was leaving the Department and another attorney was needed to review the threat assessments that supported the: Presidential Authorizations and to then advise the Attorney General on recertifying the:\nprogram as to form and legality.1 Philbin said he also was told that he and the Attorney General were the only Justice Department officials who were supposed to be involved in this \"review and recertification\" process. Philbin told us he was aware that OIPR Counsel James Baker had also been read into the program; however, Philbin stated that Addington told him he should not discuss the program with Baker and should only advise the Attorney General on the program.\n\nPhilbin said he believed Addington did not want Philbin speaking with Baker about the program because Addington had always taker the position that the program should be kept as compartmented as possible.\n\n119 (FS/FSH-AHE\nagencies were regularly consulted by Yoo in his drafting of the legal memoranda on the legality of this program. Yoo told the Department's Office of Professional Responsibility that Attorney General Asheroft determined who was allowed to work on the memoranda for the detainee interrogation program. Transcript of Interview of John Yoo By Office of Professional Responsibility, June 7, 2005, at 12. 1FS1H8FEWSHOEN\n118 When asked whether he had any knowledge of the program prior to being read in, Philbin said he did not, but he recalled that in the fall of 2001 he had a discussion with Yoo about some general electronic surveillance issues. Yoo told Philbin that Yoo was told to work alone on this particular matter.\n\nYoo did not state who had given him this instruction.\n\n{FSF/ ST\n119 Baker told us he was not similarly advised to avoid discussions with Philbin about the program, nor was he aware that Addington had instructed Philbin not to discuss the program with him.\n\nIn fact, according to Baker, Philbin initiated several conversations with Baker about the operational details of the program as Baker understood them at the time.\n\n(U)\nThe day after being read into the 'program,. Philbin.moved from the Office of Legal Counsel to the Office of the Deputy Attorney General to become an Associate Deputy Attorney General, although technically he still retained his OLC Deputy Assistant Attorney General position and was thus\n\"dualhatted  Philbin took over the \"national security portfolio\" from David Kris, whe had recently left the Department.\n\nPhilbin stated he was\n\"somewhat concerned\" that he would be advising the Attorney General on the Stellar Wind program even though Deputy Attorney General Larry Thompson, Philbin's supervisor, was not read into the program.\n\nHowever, Philbin said he anticipated at the outset that his work on the program would not require & lot of his time. {S7//NF\n\n## 3. Initial Concerns With Yoo's Analysis (U)\n\nPhilbin said that after he was read into the Stellar Wind program he believed he needed to do \"due d111gence\" to learn about the program. He said he rev1ewed Yoo's legal opinions about the program-and realized: that Yoo had omitted from his analysis any reference to the FISA provision allowmg the interception of electronic communications without a warrant for.a pemod of 15 days following a congressional declaration of war. See 50\nU.S.C.  1811. Philbin also stated that Yoo's OLC opinions were premised on the assumption that FISA did not expressly apply to wartime operat1ons '\nan assumption that from Philbin's perspectlve rendered the opinions\n\"problematic.\" Philbin said that this gap in Yoo's analysis was his first indication that the legal reasoning underpmnmg the Premdentlal Authorizations would have to be revisited.\n\naFAL\nPhilbin said the second indication of problems with Yoo's analysis Philbin said the errors in the Yoo's talking points document represented\n\"a significant step toward the realization that the whole legal analy31s was screwed up.\"\nPhilbin told us he felt he could not rely on the i\n\"\\g analysis and that he needed to \"build from the ground up.\"\n\n## 6. Decision To Draft New Olc Memorandum (U)\n\nIn August 2003, Philbin brought his concerns about the-OLC legal oplnlons to Attorriey General Asheroft. Philbin told Asheroft that there were problems with the legal analysis supporting the program | but probably not with the conclusions reached, Philbin told us that he believed that sirice:\nthe conclusions would not change there would be no need to \"pull the plug\"\non the analytically problematic aspects of the program, Philbin said he\n123 Ag deseribed later in this chapter, the term \"acquired\" was not clarified until the March 11, 2004, Presidential Authorization. That Authorization stated that meta data was\n\"'acqulred .,\n. when, and only when, the Department of Defense has searched for and retrieved:such header/router/addressing-lype information, including telecomimunications dialing-type data {and not when the Department obtains such hedder/router addregsing-t emfmm\"mon mclum telecommumo tlons dialing-type data, such as:{IEE (b)(3)\n=\n-\nL\nfor retention)!\"\ntherefore advised that Ashcroft could continue to certify the program \"as to However, Philbin also recommended that a new OLC memorandum be drafted. Accordingto Philbin, Ashcroft concurred, told him to continue working on his analysis, and asked to be kept updated on Philbin's progress. After meeting with Asheroft to discuss the issue, Philbin said he began to write a new memorandum on the legality of the entire Stellar Wind program.\n\n115 _{LS/\n8k 1F]\n\n## . Reassessment Of Legal Rationale For The Program 1. Goldsmith Becomes Olc Assistant Attorney General (U)\n\nJack Goldsmith told the OIG that he was recommended for the Assistant Attorney General position by Yoo after Yoo was not selected for the position.\n\nGoldsmith stated that during his interview for the position, Attorney General Ashcroft and Ashcroft's Chief of Staff David Ayres emphasized that the OLC Assistant Attorney General must keep the Attorney General informed of matters the Office of Legal Counsel was working on and stressed the importance of keeping thie Attorriey General\n\"in the loop.\" 'Goldsmith told the OIG that he believed Ashcroft-and Ayres raised these issues as a result of their experience with Yoo.\n\n(U)\n'Goldsmith was selected for the position, confirmed by the Senate, and on October 6, 2003; was sworn in as the OLC Assistant Attorney General.\n\nv)\nAccording to Goldsmith, he was told by Department colleagues that the procedurees OLC historically followed in drafting its opinions were changing and that the Attorney General was being circumvented in the new at he was not certain at the time that Ashcroft fully understood\n(L)), B)3)\nthel\n.\n\nhecause the subject matter was \"difficult.\"\nPhilbin also stated that for \"client management\" purposes, he needed to first make sure that he too fully understood the issues before raising his concerns to others.\n\nHe said he did not just want to be \"a naysayer\" identifying problems, but also wanted to propose solutions. He said that the program would be examined by Congress one day and that the legal analysis had to be\n\"carefully done to protect the President.\" Philbin said he therefore believed that the OLC\nlegal memoranda had to be rewritten to achieve that objective.\n\nPhilbin told us he also was concerned that the program not appear like a \"rogue operation,\" but rather as a responsible approach to collecting intelligence with adequate controls and oversight. In thisregard, Philbin emphasized that it would be important to demonstrate that the program had appropriate restrictions based on the law, and that the restrictions guarded against abuses.\n\n7)\nprocess. Goldsmith said that OLC Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General Ed Whelan. also told him that OLC's. pracedures, built on custom and practice but still \"hugely important,\" had \"broken down\" prior to Goldsmith's arrival as the Assistant Attorney General.\n\n(U)\nGoldsmith told us that he also became aware that Ashcroft sensed- -\nthere was a White House-Office of Legal Counsel relationship over which Ashcroft did not have full control. Goldsmith said that when he became the OLC Assistant Attorney General he immediately moved to \"bring things back to normalcy\" by, for example, making sure all OLC memoranda were provided to client agencies for review and input and that all memoranda were reviewed by two OLC deputies, as was the traditional OLC practice.126\n(U)\nWith regard to the Stellar Wind program, Philbin told us he had always intended to request that Goldsmith be read into the program after Goldsmith was confirmed by the. Senate.\n\nPhilbin. said that he went to the White House and asked Addington (and possibly Gonzales) to have Goldsmith read into the program.\n\nPhilbin stated that Addington told hirm that he would have been \"fine\" with not allowing Goldsmith to be read in, and that Bhilbin would have to justify the request before Addington would convey the request to the President. Philbin told us he explalned to Addington that he would rieed to have the head of OLC sign off on the new memorandum he was writing or the memorandum would lack credibility.\n\n(U/ [FeBer On November 17, 2003, Goldsmith was read into the Stellar Wind program by Addington in Addington's. office.1?7 Philbin was also present.\n\nOn the way to the read-in, Philbin told Goldsmith to \"prepare for your mind to be blown.\" Goldsmith told us that the read-in took approximately 5\nminutes, and when it was over he remarked to Philbin, \"That doesn't seem legal memoranda should reflect the positions and expertlse of interested agencies, and he also stressed the importance of a rigorous peer review process within the office before finalizing OLC memoranda.\n\n(U)\n127\nAfter Ashcroft, Yoo, Baker, and Philbin, Goldsmith was only the fifth non-FBI\nJustice Department official to be read into the Stellar Wind program since the program's inception over 2 years earlier.\n\nPhilbin stated that prior to Goldsmith's arrival at the Dcpartment arid subsequent read-in to the program, he had no one to help him draft a new legal memorandum and no one other than Asheroft with whom to discuss the legal issues.\n\nHe told the OIG that it was extremely beneficial to have another attorney working with him on the project.\n\nPhilbin also told us he did not press the White House to read in additional attorneys durmg the summer 2003 period before Goldsmith arrived at the Department.\n\nso bad,\" Goldsmith said that 3 weeks later, after studying the matter, he would come to a \"different conclusion.\" (U / FOYST\n\n## 2. Nsa Denied Access To Olc Memoranda (U//Fouq)\n\nOnee of the first Stellar Wind meetings Goldsmith and Philbin attended after Goldsmith's read-in 'was held in the DOJ Command Center with Addington, NSA Deputy General Counsel Vito Potenza, and NSA Inspector General Josl Brenner. Goldsmith stated that the NSA Inspector General requested a copy of the OLC legal memoranda regarding the program as part of an audit the NSA Office of the Inspector General wanted to-conduct of the program. According to Goldsmith, Addington \"bit [the Inspector General's] head off,\" and made it clear that the memoranda would not be provided to the NSA OIG. {(FS/HSHNF}-\nGoldsmith said he learned either at that meeting or shortly thereafter that NSA's Office of General Counsel also had been denied access to the OLC memoranda. Bob Deitz, the NSA General Counsel during this period, told the NSA OIG that he was never permitted to see Yoo's legal memoranda.\n\nDietz stated that he called Addington several weeks after the first Presidential Authorization was signed and asked'if he cotuild see a copy of Yoo's memorandum (likely the November 2, 2001, memorandurm), and that Addington responded \"no.\" Dietz said that Addington would only read \"a paragraph or two\" from the memorandum to him over a classified telephone line. Deitz stated that he never advised Yoo on his legal analysis, although He did advise NSA Director Hayden that he thought the program was legal and within the President's authority. (FS778H7NFr\n, PG\no8\nB\n.\n\n, The OIG also intervviewed} ) ( o the NSA's Associate General Counsel for Operations during\n3 00's and Goldsmiith's tenure in OLC.\n\nb3, be BIGHGN {01 us that he was not troubled by the fact that other senior NSA\nOfficials had been denied access to Yoo's legal memoranda, and that he felt no need to review them, [N stated that his primary concern with respect to the legality of the program was whether \"Justice was comfortable with it.\" Walso stated that he assumed that the Justice Department would find the program legal by resolving the tension between FISA and the President's inherent Commander-in-Chief authority based upon the dactrine of constitutional avoidance. {FS/FSTEW/SHHOC/NE)\nGoldsmith told us he found it \"shocking\" that the NSA was not provided access to Yoo's legal memoranda.\n\nHe stated that the decision to withhold the memoranda was one of the \"most astonishing things\" he learned about how the program was handled, and that he could not \"draw a good inference\" from that fact. Goldsmith emphasized that under the Stellar Wind program the NSA had been asked to do something contrary to its ordinary practices, and yet was not allowed to review the legal Just1flcat1ons for being permitted to do'it. Goldsmith told us he believed that the NSA might have identified problems or mistakes inn Yoo''s analysis ear ly in th@ program had it been given access to his memoranda.\n\nGoldsmith told us that upon becoming the Assistant Attorney General he intended to reverse the practice of keeping OLC memorarnda closely held, and that he also decided he would seek client agency expertise in drafting these documents. (U)\n\n## 3. Goldsmith Joins Effort To Reassess Legal Basis For The Program {Fs//Sh-Nf\n\nIn the two or three weeks following his read-in to the Stellar Wind program, Goldsmith reviewed several documents to educate himself about the program These included the memorandum that Philbin had already begun to draft (which included a description of how the program worked operationally), Yoo's memoranda, and older OLC memoranda concerning surveillance activities. After Goldsmith familiarized himself with the program, Goldsmith provided Philbin with add1t10na1 research a_ud helped supplement Philbin's draft memorandum.\n\n\n1\n)\nGoldsmith stated that Philbin had dene an \"amazingly heroic job\" in reviewing the program. Goldsmith believed \"ninety-nine out of a hundred\"\nattorneys in Philbin's position, having been asked simply to opine as to form and legality, would have just relied on the previous Office of Legal Counsel memoranda. Goldsmith said that Philbin, however, was not convinced by those imeroratida and therefore did not rely on them.\n\nIn addition, Goldsmith noted that Philbin sought to understand the program as it was actually 1mplemented at the NSA before advisinig the Attorney General on its\n31, 0)3), (0) 0)\nthe exceptions to this requii*ement. Goldsmith later wrote in his legal mermorandum reassessing the legality of the program that a proper analysis the Stellar Wind P,rogram\"v ((:}oldsmtit'h Memorandum, May 6, /;0(14').\n\ndiscussed in Section 1l C below, {FS71STEW 150G/ NE\nof Stellar Wind \"must not consider FISA in isolation\" but rather must consider whether Congress, by authorizing the use of military force against al Qaeda, also \"effectively exempts\" such surveillance from FISA. Goldsmith coneluded that this reading of the AUMF was correct because the AUMF\nauthorized the President to use \"all necessary and appropriate force\" against the enemy that attacked the United States on September 11, 2001, and to\n\"prevent any future acts of international terrorism against the Unlted States\" by such enemy\n- authority that has long been recogmzed to 1nc1ude the use of signals intelligence as a military tool.\n\n(F\nAlternatively, Goldsmith reasoned that even if the AUMF did not exempt surveillance under the program from the restrictions imposed by FISA, the question was sufficiently ambiguous to warrant the application of the doctrine of constitutional av01dance and therefore should be construed not to prohlblt the actlv1ty 18l (F\n\"\n3 153, TR\n6, 2004 memmandum Goldsmith concluded that if the-\n,\n'\n.\n\n. |larguments under the AUMF did not create sufficient\n'blgulty as to trigger the doctrine of constitutional avoidance, FISA as applied would replesent an unconstitutional infringement on the President's exclusive authority as Commander-in-Chief in wartime to protect the nation from attack.\n\n## Ice Of Le; 1] Ok Stellar Wind Program (December 2003 Through January 2004)133 E E\n\nDuring late 2003, Goldsmith and Philbin continued their-analysis of the legal bases for the Stellar Wind program, During this time Philbin and Goldsmith were the only two Department officials in a position to brief the Attorney General and White House: officials on the status of their legal reassessment and its potential ramifications for the operation of the program.\n\n18 {FS//SH-NE-\nWith the existing Presidential Authorization set to expire on December 11, 2003, Goldsmith and Philbin met with Asheroft on December 8, 2003; to advise him on recertifying the program as te form and legality. Goldsmith wrote in notes that he maintained during this time period that at the meeting he and Philbin \"note[d] problems gently\" to.\n\nAshcroft, Goldsmith told us Ashcroft was \"extraordinarily supportive\" of his and Philbin's efforts to reassess the legality of the program and madee clear hig view that the program had to be on solid legal footing, Goldsmith advised Ashcroft that, despite concerns about the program, Asheroft stiould certify the December 9, 2003, Authorization. Goldsmith Philbin, Goldsmith, Comey, Mueller, Gonzales, ard others. We also relied on Philbin's anc Goldsmith's contemporaneous notes, Goldsmith's chronology of events that he wrote- during this period, Mueller's Program Log documenting events in March 2004, and Attorney General Asheroft's FBI security detail log of events that occurred while Asheroft was hospitalized from March 4 through March 14, 2004, among other documents.\n\n(U)\nlater advised Asheroft to certify the January 14, 2004, Auithorization as well.\n\nGoldsmith told us he made these recommendations to Asheroft with the caveat that although he believed Yoo's memoranda te be flawed, Goldsmith had not yet concluded that the program itself was illegal. -(-'PSHSH%NF%\nBased on Goldsrith's advice, Ashcroft certified the December 9, 2003, and January 14, 2004, Authorizations. (FS/ASH/NE)\nIn December 2003 Philbin and Goldsmith informed Ashcroft that they believed Comey, who was sworn in as the new Deputy Attorney Generalin December 20083, also needed to be read into the program.\n\nPhilbin said he justified this request by noting that he would be traveling abroad for 2\nweelks later that month on an unrelated Justice Department matter.135\n(U)\nInr Deeember 2003, Goldsmith and Philbin met with Addingten and Gongzales at the White House to express their growing concerns abotit the legal underpintings for program. Goldsmith $aid he told them that OLC\nwag not sure the program could survive in its current form. According to Goldsmith's notes, these discussions did not contemplate an mterruptlon of the program, although the White House represented that it would \"agree to pull the plug\" if the problems with the program were found to be sufficiently serious. Goldsmith told us that the White House - . typically through Addington\n- told him \"several times\" that it would halt the program 1f the Department found that it could not be legally supported.\n\n{T37/SH-/M\ntold us he recalled thgt Addingt Goldsmniith to continue analyzmg the program and that if serious problcrns were found, the program would be shut down. {F&/STFEWASHA/OC/NE)\nOn December 18, 2003, while Philbin was abroad, Goldsmith met again with Addington and Gonzales. Goldsmith wrote in his chronology that this time he conveyed with \"more force\" his \"serious doubts and the need to get more help to resolve the issue [as soon as possible].\"\nGoldsmith also told Addington and Gonzales that he needed more resources to continue examining the legality of the program. They respended to this request by telling Goldsmith that Philbin should devote all of his time to the project.\n\nGoldsmith told us that he asked to have Comey read into the program, According to Goldsmith's notes, Addington and Gonzales \"bristle[d]\" at that suggestion. Goldsmith told us he made the request for Comey to be read in because hebelieved he would need the Deputy Attorney General's assistance to help \"make the case\" to the White House that the program was legally flawed.\n\nGoldsmith also stated that he wanted Comey read in because, as the Deputy Attorney General, Comey was. Philbin's direct supervisor. ~{ES/SH-NF-\nWe asked Gonzales when he first became aware that the Department had concerns about the legality of the Stellar Wind program.\n\nGonzales stated that he remembered that sometime after Philbin and Goldsmith joined the Department, they decided to conduct a programmatic review of the legal basis for Stellar Wind.\n\nGonzales said that he welcomed this review, and that it was always important to reassess the value of or need for the program, as well as its legality. Gonzales told us he thought that Goldsmith and Philbin's review arose out of concerns about Yoo's November 2, 2001, opinion and that their review was limited to that document. Gonzales said that Goldsmith periodically told him that Philbin was reviewing the program and that some questions had been raised or that some changes to the program might be needed as a result of their reassessment. Gonzales said that he told Goldsmith to let him know how the review was progressing.\n\nGonzales also told us he did not recall getting into any specific discussions with Goldsmith about OLC's concerns until early March 2004.\n\nIn contrast, Goldsmith told us he had been \"crystal clear\" with Gonzales and Addington that the Office of Legal Counsel had concerns about the legality of aspects of the program as early as December 2003, although Goldsmith also acknowledged that his discussions with Gonzales and Addington became more detailed in March 2004. Goldsmith told us that he gave the two White House officials the same caveats he gave Ashcroft when advising him on the legality of the program - that there were flaws in Yoo's analysis, but that OLC had not yet concluded that the program itself was illegal. PSS\nNFY\nGoldsmith's efforts to gain the White House's permission to have others (including Comey) read into the program continued through January\n2004. According to Goldsmith's notes, both Addington and Gonzales pressed Goldsmith on his reason for the request and continued to express doubt that additional resources were needed. However, in late January the White House agreed to allow Comey to be read in, provided that Philbin devoted all of his time to his analysis of the program and, according to Goldsmith, that the Department's legal analysis be completed by March\n7004 when the Presidential Authorization was due to be renewed.\n\n(U)\n\n## 6. Deputy Attorney General Comey Is Read Into The Program (U)\n\nComey became the Deputy Attorney General on December 2, 2003, and was read into the Stellar Wind program on February 17, 2004, Comey told us that he had no awareness of the program prior to bemg read in. He said e learned after his read-in that Addington had resisted Goldsmiith and Philbin's efforts to have him read in earlier. Comey said Addington was the\n\"gatekeeper\" for Stellar Wind and wanted to keep the program a \"close hold.\"\n)\nComey told us that NSA Director Hayden personally wanted to conduct Comey's read-in to the program. Hayden read in Comey at the Justice Cornmand Center in a briefing that took approximately 20 to 30\nminutes. Comey 'sald that at Lhe read iri, Hayden explained the \"three baskets\" to him.\n\n-\n:\nComey told us that after Hayden left the Command Center, Comey and Philbin continued discussing the program. Philbin told Comey that there were problems with the legality of the program and that there were\n\"operational issues\" as well, Comey told us that his: initial reaction to the program was \"unprintable.\" He said he thought that the NSA could not collect the coritent of certain communications covered by the program outside of FISA authority.\n\nHayden told the OIG that Comey raised no objections to him about the program upon being read in.\n\n(U)\nWithin the first month after being read in, Comey discussed the program with Ashcroft, Goldsmith, Philbin, and other Department officials who had been read in by this time, including James Baker, Cotinsel for Intelligence Policy; Chuck Rosenberg, Comey's Chief of Staff, and Daniel Levin, Counsel to the Attorney General.136 Comey said he did not recall having any discussions about the program with FBI Director Mueller during this period.\n\n(U)\nComey also recalled meeting with Scott Muller, the CIA General Counsel, shortly after being read into the program. Comey said that he told Muller about the legal concerns Philbin and Goldsmith had raised regarding Yoo's analysis and that Muller agreed that the concerns were well founded.\n\n(u)\nComey also told us that Goldsmith had identified for Comey as a particular concern the notion that Yoo's legal analysis entailed ignoring an act of Congress, and doing so in secret. Comey stated that '(}'o'ldsmifh described such action as \"breathtaking.\" Comey agreed, describing the action as \"unprecedented.\"\n(U)\n-\n\n## D. Office Of Legal Counsel Presents Its Conclusions To The White House (U)\n\nOn March 1, 2004, Philbin completed a first draft of a revised OLC\nopinien on the Stellar Wind program. According to Goldsmith's notes, at this time Goldsmith and Philbin had not yet concluded \"definitively\"\nthat there was \"anything certainly wrong\" with the program, with'the possible exception of the scope o In explaining the rationale for the revised opinion, Comey described to the OIG his view of two approaches or standards that could be used to undertake legal analysis of government action.\n\nIf the government is contemplating taking a particular action, QLC's legdl analysis will be based on a \"best view of the law\" standard. However, if the government already is taking the action, the analysis should instead focus on whether reasonable legal arguments can be made to support the continuation of the conduct. 187\nComey said that because Stellar Wind was an ongoing program, Goldsmith and Philbin's analysis proceeded under the second approach. Under this approach, at this point they concluded that there were reasonable legal arg nue the collection of\n2004\nsihg the sense was that \"we can an aggressive legal agalysis.\n\n|\nwould require Comey said that during carly March aet there\" 25 tc NN - .\n\nHowever, he said that collection of ACCOI dmg to a log Muellm kept documcntl_ g ev:\n/\n, concerning the program, Comey said he was: ryng to work out these problems with the OLC and \"sther interested parties.\"38 Mueller told us that March 1, 2004, was when he first became aware of the Department's coricerns about the legal support for the program.\n\nMueller described the-\nFBI as \"remp1ents of information from the program,\" and that the dialogue as to the program s 1ega11ty was between the Department and the White House:\n{5\n77\nN\n\n## 1. March 4, 2004: Comey Meets With Asheroft To Discuss Problems With The Program (U)\n\nComey told us he met with Attorhey General Ashcroft for lunch on March 4, 2004, to discuss the Stellar Wind program. Comey reminded Ashcroft of the details of the program and said he used salt and pepper shakers and a knife to represent the three baskets during the discussiorn, According to Comey, Ashcroft agreed with Comey and OLC's assessment of the potential legal problems,.and he instructed Comey to \"just fix it\" and\n\"tell them to make the changes that need to be done.\"\nComey said he assumed Ashcroft meant that Comey should reach out to the NSA and the White House for the necessary changes. The Presidential Authorization in effect at the titne was due to expire on March 11, 2004. Comey said Ashcroft did not discuss with him whether he would reeertify the program as it was currently being authorized by the President. {ES//SLL/NE)\nComey also dcscri-bed Ashcroft as being frustrated, and said he was\n\"beating himself up\" because he was \"in a box\" with Yoo, yet was learning from Philbin, Geldsmith, and now Comey that parts of the program were not in their view legally supportable. 139 (TS /L\nSLL/NE).-\nAfter the lunch meeting on March 4, Comey traveled to Phoenix, Arizona, to make a speech. Three hours after their lunch meeting, Ashcroft was struck with severe gallstone pancreatitis and was admitted to the extraordinary circumstances about which T would one day be questioned.\" Mueller said the program log was drafted \"relatively contemporaneously\" with the events described in it.\n\n(U)\nof the program in December 2003, he had already certified the program as to form and George We;shington University Hospital, .Afterfbc'ing\"informed that Ashcroft was hospitalized, Comey returned to Washington the next morning on-an FBI jet.\n\n(U)\n\n## 2. March 5, 2004: Comey Determines Asheroft Is \"Absent Or Disabled\" (U)\n\nOn March 5, 2004, Goldsmith advised Comey by memorandum that under the circumstances of Ashcroft's medical condition and hospitalization, a \"clear basis\" existed for Comey to determine that \"this is a case of 'absence or disability' of the Attorney Geeneral\" within the meaning of\n28 U.S.C.  508(a). This statute provides:\nIn case of a vacancy in the office of Attorney General, or of his absence or disability, the Deputy Attorney General may exercise all the duities of that office; and for purposes of 'section 3345 of title 5 the Deputy Attorney General is the first assistant to the Attorney General.\n\n(U)\nGoldsmith's memorandum further advised Comey that he could serve as Acting Attorney General until Asheroft's absence or disability no longer existed, and that Comey could exercise \"a1] the power and authority of the Attorney General, unless such power or authority is required by law to be exercised by the Attorney General personally.\" See 28 C.F.R.  0. 15(a).\n\nGoldsmith noted in the memorandum that there are \"very few duties\" that can be exercised only by the Attorney General. Goldsmith wrote that, except for these duties, Comey could opt to exercise the duties of the Attorney General as Deputy Attorney General rather than as Acting Attorney General, noting, \"Your office has informed us that this is your intention.\"140\n(V)\nGoldsmith's memorandum to Comey referenced an attached draft memorandum for Comey's review, which would memorialize Comey's decision to invoke 28 U.S.C.  508(a) in writing, although Goldsmith acdvised that it was not necessary to do so. The \"cc\" line of Goldsmith's memorandum to Comey indicated that a copy of the memorandum was also Whelan and other Department officials, among the duties that can only be exercised by the Attorney General or his designee is the authority to approve FISA applications to engage in electronic surveillance of a specific type of agent of a foreign power based on reguests of certain high level officials.\n\n50 U.S.C.  1804(e)(2){A).\n\nThis section represents an exception to FISA's general conferral of authority on the Attorney General, a term that is defined to include the Acting Attorney General and the Deputy Attorney General.\n\nsent to White House Counsel Gonzales.!4! As discussed below, a significant dlspute between White House and Department officials later arose over whether the White House in fact received notice of Comey's decision to assume the powers of the Attorney General, whether as Deputy Attorney General or otherwise.\n\n(U)\n\n## 3. March 5, 2004: Goldsmith And Philbin Seek Clarification From White House On Presidential Authorizations (U)\n\nOn the. afternoon of Friday, March 5, 2004 - 6 days before the Presidential Authorization then in effect was setto expire - Goldsmith and Philbin met with Addmgton and Gonzales at the White House to seek clar1f1cat10n on two key issues related to the Authorizatioris. (U / /)\nFirst .Goldsm1th eX ressed hlS bc:hef that the\n| H\n'\n(b)(1), (b)(3) T GIE\n:\n, brlefing the Presn:lent on this new legal approach to Justifymg thc. program L\n-\ncreated a serious issue.\n\nGonzales stated that Goldsmith's argument on this point was that Congress had spoken on the matter by enacting FISA, but Yoo previously had opined that FISA was unconstitutional to the extent it infringed on the President's Commander-in-Chief authority to conduct electronic surveillance without a judicial warrant.142 (PS//STEWHSH/OC/NE)\nGongzales also told us that the March 5, 2004, meeting with Goldsmith and Philbin represented the first substantively detailed discussion he had with the OLC officials regarding their concerns with the existing legal analysis and their reservations about continuing the program as it had been operating. As noted above, Goldsmith said that he had informed Gonzales anid Addington about his general concerns with Yoo's legal analysis of the program as early as December 2003. APSHSHNF\nLater that day on March 5, Gonzales called Goldsmith to request a letter from the OLC stating that Yoo's prior OLC opinions \"covered the program.\" Philbin told the OIG that Gonzales was not requesting a new opmlon that the program itself was legal, but only that the prior opinions had concluded that it was. (FS/-/SEH-NF-\n\n## 4, March 6 To 8, 2004: The Department Concludes That Yoo's Legal Memoranda Did Not Cover The Program (V)\n\nAs a result of Gonzales's request on March 3, Goldsmith re-examined Yoo's memoranda with a view toward determining whether they adequately described theactual collection activities of the NSA under the Authorizations. Goldsmith told us that after a brief review, he called Philbin to tell him he agreed with Philbin's assessment that Yoo's. memoranda were problematic from a factual standpoint. Philbin said that through this\n1e~exam1nat10n he and Goldsmlth conf1rmed Phflbm s initial sensethat\n><4)<b><3> B\nGoldsmith's account of the response to Gonzales's request was similar:\nGoldsmith also stated that his and Philbin's conclusion that Yoo's memoranda failed to adequately describe the[GEEIOF\n-\nmeant that OLC could not tell the White House that the program could continue under the authority of those legal memoranda.\n\nGoldsmith stated that he and Philbin realized at this point that the prograrm had been coniducted for 2 years without a proper OLC review.\n\nSpecifically, both Goldsmith and Philbin stated that they had always viewed Yoo's legal analysis as poorly reasoned; however, they were now realizing that Yoo's factual description of the program was inaccurate and incomplete as well, and thus did not \"cover\" aspects of the program. Goldsmith said Gonzales's request for ratification of Yoo's memoranda \"forced [the Office of Legal legahty fllpped 144\nOn Saturday, that they believed thef\n'\n:\n:\nGoldsmith -also told Comey that the Whlte House Would\n'Thave to be notified of this development Comey agreed with this recommendation..\n\nLater on: March 6, Goldsmith and Philbin went to the White House to\n\\ddington and Gonzales to conve theuconclusmns that the\n\nAccordmg to Goldsmi\n:\n181\nGonzales \"reacted calmly and said' they Would get back with us.\" Goldsmith told us that the White House was 1iow worried that it was \"out there,\"\nm}ea}nmg' that it was implementing a program without legal support.\n\nOn Sunday afternoon, March 7, 2004, Goldsmith and Philbin met agdin with Addington and Gonzales at the White House.145 According to Goldsmith, the White House officials informed Goldsmith and Philbin that they disagreed with Goldsmith and Philbin's-interpretation of Yoo's memoranda and on the need to change the scope of the NSA's collection. 46\nGonzales told us he recalled the meetings of March 6 and 7, 2004, but did not recall the specifics of the discussions. He said he remembered that the overall terior of the meetings with Goldsmith was one of trying to \"find a way forward.\"147 {PS/HSH/NF\n144 As noted in Chapter Three, Gonzales told us that he believed Yoo's memoranda described as lawful activities that were broader than those carried ouit under Stellar Wind, and that therefore these opiniens \"covered\" the Stellar Wind program. ~FS\nSN\n-\npresent for this meeting.\n\nGoldsmith's chronology indicates that only Addington and Gonzales were present.\n\n146\nIn discussing these early March meetings with the OIG, Goldsmith told us that Addington had stated on more than one occasion that Goldsmith was the head of OLC and if he determined that the program needed to be shut down, it would be shut down.\n\nGoldsmith told us he believed that the White House officials' references to \"shutting down the program\" extended only to those aspects of the program for which no legal support could be found. Goldsmith also told us that he did not know whether Addington and Gonzales were keeping the President informed of OLC's concerns. A PSSR\n147\nAs noted above, Gonzales was represented by counsel during his interview with the OIG.\n\nAlso present during the interview because of the issue-of executive privilege was a Special Counsel to the President, Emmitt Flood. We asked Gonzales whether the President had been informed by this point in time of the OLC position regarding the lack of legal\n{Cont'd.)\n35\nOn the evening of Sunday, March 7, 2004, Goldsrmth and Philbin met.\n\nwith Comey in Comey's office to-again review Yoo s opinions and make sure all three agreed with the conclusion that the opinions failed to support the Stellar Wmd program as it was being implemented. Philbin said that until Gonzales's March 5 request for a letter from the OLC stating that Yoo's prior OLC opinjons \"covered the program,\" he and Goldsrmth had 1nter1de, to recorhinend that the program be recertified qn Marcl\n()\ne the ontinued to work on the. neWOLOo pinion. [\nb) (0 (b)( (b)(3)\n'\nAccording to Goldsmith's chronology, there was no interaction with the White House on the issue on the. following day, Monday, March 8, 2004.\n\nGoldsmith wrote in his chronology of events for thisday: \"Monday, March 8: Silence.\"\n(Uy\n\n## 5. March 9, 2004: White House Seeks To Persuade Department.And Fbi To Support Continuation Of The Program {Shnfy\n\nOn Tuesday, March 9, 2004, Gonzales: called Goldsmith to-attend an early mormng meetlng (at 6 OO or 6 30 a.m. ) at the Wh1te House to dxscuss Goldsrmth called Phllbm and told h1m Lo meet Goldsmlth at the Whlte House. According to Goldsmith, Philbin was allowed into the White House, but Gonzales excluded Philbin from the meeting despite Goldsmith's requests that Philbin be allowed to participate. S/\nsupport for the program and. (b) (5) (b)( ( ( )\n-\n.\n\n'\n-\n. Flood objected to the questien on relevancy- grounds and: adv1sed Gonzales not to answer and Gongzales did not provide us an answer. However, when Gonzales commented on a draft of this report, he stated that he would not have brought Goldsmith and Philbin's \"concerns\" to the attention of the President because there would have been nothing for the President to act upon at that point.\n\nGonzales stated that this was especially true given that Ashcroft continued to certify the program as to legality during this period.\n\nGonzales stated he generally W uld onl bnng mattexs to the President's attention if the President could make Goldsmith said Gonzales tried first to persuade him that he and Phitbin were wrong to conclude that Yoo's memoranda did not pr ovide sufficient legal _]ustxflcatlon to cover the parts of the program that OLC had identified as problematic, but that Gonzales did not persuade him on this.\n\npoint. Gonzales next argued for a \"30-day bridge\" to get past the upcorming March 11, 2004, Authorization. Gonzales reasoned that Ashcroft, who was still hospltallzed was 1ot in any condition to sign the upcoming Authorization, and that a \"30-day bridge\" would move the situation to.a\n1p01nt where Ashcroft would be well enough to approve the program.\n\nGoldsrmth told Gonzales he could not agree to recommend an extension.\n\nGoldsmith said Gonzales noted that Ashcroft had certified the program as to form and legality for the previous two-and a half years, yet now Comey was the Acting Attorney General. Goldsmith said the implication of Gonzales's statement was that not:approving the March 11,\n2004, Authorization would \"undercut\" Ashcroft. Goldsmith said he made clear to' Gonzales that Ashcroft was \"supportive\" of his and Philbin's analysis. Goldsmith's notes from the meeting also indicate that Gonzales stated that he did not \"want to face\" Ashcroft in the hospital. Goldsmith told us he recommended to 'Gonzales that he:not visit Ashcroft.150\nGoldsmith said his discussion with Gonzales lasted about 1 hour.\n\nPhilbin was then brought into Gonzales's office and the issues were discussed again. According to Goldsmith's chronology, nothing was resolved during the meeting.\n\n(U)\nAt noon that day, another meeting was held in Andrew Card's office at the White House. According to Director Mueller's program log, Mueller, Chief of Staff Card, Vice President Cheney, CIA Deputy Director John McLatighlin, Hayden, Gonzales, and other unspecified officials were present.\n\nComey, Goldsmith, and Philbin were not invited to this meeting.\n\nMueller described this gathering as a \"pre-meeting\" in anticipation of another meeting that was to be held later that afternoon in which the Justice Department officials (Comey, Goldsmith, and Philbin) would be participating.15?\n\n(U)\nAccording to Mueller's notes, a presentation on the value of the Stellar Wind program was given by CIA and NSA representatives. 152 It was th\n:\n'explained to the group that Comey \"has problems\" wit Q')( e Mueller's riotes state that Vice President Cheney suggested\n\"that \"the President may have to reauthorize without [the] blessing of DOJ,\"\nto which Mueller responded \"I could have a problem with that,\" and that the FBI would \"have to review legahty of continued part1c1pat10n in the program.\"\nA third meeting was held at the White House that afternoon, at 4: 00\np.m.\n\nThe meeting included Comey, Goldsmith, and Philbin, in addition to Vice President Cheney, Card, Addington, Gonzales, Hayden, Mueller, CIA\nGeneral Counsel Muller, McLaughlin, and approximately 10 NSA analysts.\n\nGonzales told us the meeting was held to make sure that Comey understood what was at stake with the program and to demonstrate its value. {S//NF}\nAt the beginning of the meetmg the NSA analysts made a presentation to-Comey, Goldsmith, and Phfl'-\nSaid presentation consisted of harts showing the chalnmg el\n,\n'capabilities that could be generated from Stellar Wind- der1ved 1nformat1on as well as a description of \"success stories\" resulting from the program. Comey told us that the cases the analysts highlighted were not in his view the Stellar Wind sucecesses that the analysts claimed, and that he felt \"the NSA had no good stories to tell about the program.\"!58 Comey also told us that the: collection of content communications under Stellar Wind was somewhat duplicative of existing FISA coverage, and that only the meta data collectiont under baskets\n2 and 3 represented truly new- capabilities, However, Comey said he did not challenge the analysts on the assertion that Stellar Wind was. a critical anti-terrorism tool because the value of the program was not his prlrnary concern, Rather, Comey said he was willing to concede the program's value, and that his concern was with its legality. 1PS7/7/3TEW//ST//OC/NF\nGoldsmith told us that he did not believe it was his place to judge the value of the program from an intelligence-gathering standpoint. Goldsmith told us he found persuaswe a remark by Hayden that even though there may not have been major successes under the program to date, the program still could produce successes in the future.\n\nHowever, both Goldsmith and\n|were cited as bl, b3, bs,\n152 Mueller's notes indicate thaty\n'\nriefly in this chapter and b7E, b7C\nexamples during the presentation.\n\nWe discus\n*m Chapter Six. (DSA{STLW//SHHOCHNE\nbs,\n(TS// QLDW//DL//U\\,/ L'JI')\nThe NSA analysts were excused after their presentation and the meeeting continued.\n\nComey said Vice President Cheney stressed that the program was \"critically important\" and warned that Comey would risk\n\"thousands\" of lives if Comey did not agree to recertify it. Comey said he told those at the meeting that he, as the Deputy Attorney Generalexeraising\n{1 .r's:o'f the Attorney General, could support rea'uthori:z;i'ngi'1\nComey also told us-he was certain the Whit_e House understood him to be the 2\nng in Attorney General Asheroft's stead during this meeting.\n\n(U)\nGonzales told us that he came away from the meeting with the ot Comey DMIOREE\nS\n\n## G. Conflict Ensues Between Department And White House (U)\n\nEach of the Department witnesses we interviewed concerning the Department's discussions with the White House during this time period emphasized the sense of pressure. and anxiety that pervaded the discussions in March 2004.\n\nFor instance, Comey said discussions during the meeting at the White House on March 9 becarme heated as he sought to convey to everyone how difficult it was for the Department to take the position it was taking, and how hard the Department officials were working to find a selution. Comey also stated that Vice President Cheney was\n\"understandably friustrated\" because the Department was changing its advice to the White House about the program.\n\n(U)\nGoldsmith also recalled that at one point during these meetings with the White House, Addington told him that if he natrowed the Stellar Wird program Goldsmith \"will have the blood of 100,000 American lives on his hands,\"{S/NF-\nGoldsmith observed to us that from the White House's point of view, due to the timing of the events, and in partlcular with Ashcroft in the hospital, it appeared to the White House that a \"palace coup\" was takirig place at the Department of Justice.\n\nGoldsmith said that this perception was somewhat understandable under the circumstances,\n(U)\nPhilbin also stated that tensions were high during this period and that the Department and White House \"started to divide into camps.\"\nPhilbin added that Department and White House officials were \"starting to attribute motives\" to each other.\n\nPhilbin said he thought Addmgton came to beheve that Comey was opposed to recertifying the program for \"political reasons;'\nand that Comey wanted to be on the \"politically right\" side of the dispute.\n\n(U)\nComey said that his dealings with Gonzales, Card, Addington, and others at the White House were generally civil, Comey acknowledged that there was tension between the Department and the White House during the March 2004 period, but believed that it resulted primarily from differences in legal perspectives.\n\n(U)\n\n## I1. White House Continues Program Without Justice Department's Certification {Fs//Sh/Nf)-\n\nThe Presidential Authorization under which the program was operating during early 2004 was set to expire on March 11, 2004.\n\nAs described in the preceding section, Comey concurred with the views of Goldsmith and Philbin, and as the Deputy Attorney General exercising the powers of the Attorney General Comey refused to certify the program as to form and legality.\n\nHe conveyed this decision to the White House during the meeting on the afternoon of March 9, 2004.\n\nIn response, as described below, the President decided to reauthorize the program without the Justice Department's. support, precipitating a serious confrontation between White House and Departiment officials. {FSHSTEW//5H76\n\n## A, White House Counsel Gonzales Certifies March 11, 2004, Presidential Authorization {F&//Sh-Af) 1. March 10, 2004: Office Of Legal Counsel Presses For Solicitor General To Be Read Into Program (U)\n\nGoldsmith, Philbin, and Comey met in the early afterncon of March 10, 2004, to discuss the meeting at the White House the day before and how the Department should proceed. Goldsmith and. Phi reconfirmed their position to Cor\n;\n'\nel Goldsmith and Philbin also recommended to Comey that Solicitor Gerieral Theodore Olson be read into the program. Goldsmith told us that Olson had been at the Department for a long time and had valuable experience and credibility. Goldsmith said that given the importance-of the decisions being made at the Department concerning the program at this tirne, he believed it was imperative to have Olson read in.\n\n9]\nComey agreed with Goldsmith and Philbin, and he directed Goldsmith to call Gonzales to feaffirm the Department's position on the program and also to request that Olson be read in.\n\n(U)\nGoldsmith called Gonzales at 2:20 p.m. o the Department could not support the legality off\n..\n\nB\nB\n< then being implemented under the program.\n\nGioldsmith also told Gonzales of the \"urgent need\" for approval to read Olson into the program.\n\nGoldsmith's notes indicate that he called Gonzales twice that day with the request to have Olson read in, but by early evening had not heard back from Gonzales. {FSFHSEEW/HSHOCSNE}\n\n## 2. March 10, 2004: Congressional Leaders Briefed On Situation (U)\n\nGonzales told us that alter President Bush was advised of the results of the March 9, 2004, meeting, the President instructed Vice President Cheney on the morning of Wednesday, March 10, to call a meeting with congressional leaders to advise them of the impasse with the Justice Department.\n\nOn the afternoon of March 10, at approximately 4:00 or 5:00\np.m., Gonzales and other White House and intelligence agency officials, including Vice President Cheney, Card, Hayden, McLaughlin, and Director of Central Intelligence George Tenet, convened an \"emergency meeting\" with Congressional leaders in the White House Situation Room.\n\nThe congressional leaders in attendance were Senate Majority and Minority Leaders Bill Frist and Tom Daschle; Senate Select Committee on' Intelhgence Chairman Pat Roberts and Vice Chairman Jay Rockefeller; Speaker of- the House Dennis Hastert and House Minority Leader Nancy Pelosi; and House.\n\nPermancnt Select Committee on Intelligence Chair Porter Goss.and Ranking Member Jane Harman. This congressional group was known informally as:\nthe \"Gang of Eight.\"\n(U)\nNo.officials from the Department were present at the meeting. When we asked Gonzales whether the White House had given any consideration to inviting Department officials to attend, Gonzales declined to answer on the advice of the Special Counsel to the President, who was present during Gongzales's interview with the O1G.155\n(U)\nGonzales told us that President Bush also directed him to\n\"memorialize\" the mecting, although Gonzales said he could not recall whether the President directed him to do so before or after the meeting.\n\nGonzales did not take notes during the meeting.\n\nRather, he said he wrote down his recollection of the meeting within a few days of Wednesday, March 10, probably, according to him, the following, weekend.156 Gonzales said that, with the exceptlon of & single phrase discussed below, he wrote:\nhis notes in one sitting in his White House office.\n\n(U)\nThe notes indicate that Presiderit Bush appeared briefly at the start. of the meeting to explain how important the meeting was.\n\nVice President Cheney, who chaired the meeting, gave a general explanation of the program and indicated that the purpose of the meeting was to \"discuss potential legislation to continue the 'prog1 am,\" According to Gonzales's notes, Hayden then cxplamed the.\n\nunder the program:\n155 I-Iowever when Gonzales commented on a draft of this report, he stated that the Department was not invited to the meeting because the purpose- of the meeting was'to advise the congressional leaders that a legislative fix was necessary, not to describe or resolve the legal dispute between the Department and the White House.\n\n(U/ [EOUD)}\nAttorney General in 2005, he took the notes, which contained TS/SCI information relating to the Stellar Wind program, from the White House and improperly stored these notes at his residence for an indeterminate period. When he brought the notes to the Justice Department, he kept them in a sale near his office that was not cleared for storage of TS/8Cl material, The OIG also determined through this investigation that Gonzales imiproperly stored several other TS/SCI documents in the safe near his office, many of which concerned Stellar Wind. The OIG's report, entitled \"Repert of Inve'ahgatxon Regardmg Allegations of Mishandling of Classiflied Decuments by Attorney General Alberto Gonzales,\"\nwas released by the OIG on September 2, 2008, and can be found at http:/ /www.usdoj.gov/ oig/special/s0809/index htm. +S77NFJ\"\nfe and the remaining participants discussed the need for legislation so tha\n,sgintclligg:nc'e' collection activities could continue.\n\n-\nGonzales's notes indicate that when he was asked at the meeting why Comey was \"reluctant\" to sign the Authorization; Gonzales responded, \"r said it was not really my place to representf[eomey:'s]j'_positiOn,'-but I believed that he did not feel that the President's Constitutional authority would not\n[sic] override FISA.\" The notes do not indicate what else was discussed about the basis for the Department's concerns about the legal support for the program.*\nThe notes indicate that Andrew Card stated that \"it would be hard to explain if another attack.occurred and we could have stopped it with this tool.\" Gonzales's notes then state:\n\n-\nAndy asked if anyone had any reservation-and no one spoke up\nraising an objection\n-\nThe VP said that what I am hearing is that we should go forward with\nthe program for a period of 30-45 days and see if there was.a\nlegislative fix. {F877/SH7NF\nThe notes indicate that Vice President Chieney read aloud proposed language of new legislation. quever, the notes do not deseribe the proposed legislation that was discussed.\n\n(U)\nte Auia -\" should be According to Gonzales's notes, the reactions and comments of the congressional leaders were as follows: Both Hastert and Roberts \"said they the tool.\" although according to the notes Hiastert\n\"kept\n\nI\n(5)(1), (b)(3)\n.\n\n'\n=\n-\noberts said that if Comey would not certify fired.\" Harman suggested that another branch of governmerit \"should have some role, checks and balances on the program\" and raised the possibility of involving the FISA Court. According to the notes, Gonzales responded to Harman's suggestion by volunteering that it would be possible to have the Presiding Judge of the FISA Court\n\"gpprove or develop the guidelines to protect privacy rights.\" The notes state that Daschle felt it would be \"impossible to get [new legislation] passed without it becoming very pub'lic_-.\"\" Rockefeller was \"concerned about privacy safeguards\" and was advised of \"the 39 steps followed [by the NSA] to make sure privacy concerns were addressed.\" According to the notes, Pelosi.\n\nexpressed concern about giving \"total discretion\" to the President and discussed the need for the proposed legislation to be periodically renewed by Congress-and that it not be permanent.\n\nF5\nSR\nSHLOC/NEY\nGonzales told us he initially left a gap in one section of the notes where he described Pelosi's comments. He stated that a day or so later, after recalling what she had said at the meeting, he filled in the gap with the following italicized language: \"Pelosi said tell DAG that everyone is comfortable and the program stiould go forward.\"158\n(U)\n\n## 3. March 10, 2004: Hospital Visit (U)\n\nGonzales told us that following the meeting with the congressional leaders during the afterrioon of March 10, President Bush instructed him and Card to go to the George Washington University Hospital to speak to Ashcroft, who was recovering from surgery in the intensive care unit. The events that followed, which are recounted below, are based on notes from Ashcroft's FBI security detail, Goldsmith's notes, and Mueller's program log;\nthe OIG's interviews of Gonzales, Comey, Goldsmith, Philbin, and Mueller;\n'\nand Comey and Gonzales's congressional testimiony,159\n9))\nAt 6:20 p.m. on March 10, Card called the hospital and spoke with an agent in Ashcroft's FBI security detail, advisi-ng_th'e agent that President v Bush would be calling shortly to speak with Ashcroft. Ashcroft's wife told\n158 When Gonzales testified before the Senate Judiciary Committee on J uly 24,\n2007, he essentially described the congressional leaders' reactions to-the Mareh 10,2004, Gang of Eight briefing as he did in his handwritten notes of the briefing, stating, \"The consensus in the room from the congressional leadership is that we should eontinue the activities, at least for now.\" However, after Gonzales testified, Representative Pelosi, Senator Rockefeller, and Senator Daschle issued statements to the media sharply disputing Gonzales's characterization of their statements at the March 10, 2004, briefing, and stating that there was no consensus at the meeting that the program should proceed.\n\nSee\n\"Gonzales; Senators Spar on Credibility,\" by Dan Eggen and Paul Kane, The Washington Post (July 25, 2007).\n\nPelosi's office also issued a statement that she \"made clear my disagreement with what the White House was asking\" concerning the program.\n\nSee\n\"Gonzales Comes Under New Bipartisan Attack in Senate,\" by James Rowley, Bloomberg.com (July 24, 2007).\n\nWe did not attempt to interview the congressional leaders and obtain their recollections as to what was said at this meeting, because thiswas beyond the scope of our review,\n(U)\n159 Comey described the events surrounding the hospital visit in testimony before the Senate Judiciary Committee on May 15, 2007, Gonzales testified about these issues before the Senate Judiciary Committee on July 24, 2007.\n\nAs noted above, Attorney General Asheroft and Card declined our request to be interviewed.\n\nAyres, Asherolt's Chief of Staff at the time, also declined our request for an interview.\n\n(U)\nthe agent that Ashcroft woiild not accept: the call. Ten minutes later, the agent called Ashcroft's Chief of Staff David Ayres through the Justice Command Center to request that Ayres speak with Card about the President's intention to call Ashcroft. The agent conveyed to Ayres Mrs.\n\nAshcroft's desire that no calls be made to Ashcroft for another day or two.160\nAyres told the agent he would relay this message to Card. 1)\nN\nHowever, at 6:45 p.m,, Card and the President called the hospital and, according to the agent's notes, \"insisted on speaking [with Attorney General Ashcroft].\" According to the agent's notes, Mrs. Ashcroft, rather than Attorniey General Ashcroft, took the ca'll'from Card and the President.\n\nAccording to the agent's notes, she was informed that Gonzales and Card were coming to the hospital to see Ashcroft regarding a matter involving national security.\n\n(U)\nAt approximately 7:00 p.m., Ayres was advised, either by Mrs.\n\nAsheroft or a member of the Attorney General's security detail that Gonzales and Card were on their way to the hospital. Ayres then called Comey, who.\n\n4t the time was being driven home by his security detail, and told Comey that Gonzales and Card were on their way to the hospital. Comey told his driver to rush him to the hospital. According to Comey, his driver activated the emergency lights on the vehiele and headed to the hospital,\n(U)\nAccording to his congressional testimony, Comey then called his Chief of Staff, Chuck Rosenberg, and directed him to \"get as many of my people as possible to the hospital immediately.\" Comey then called FBI Director Mueller, who was having dinner with his wife and daughter at a restaurant, and told him that Gonzales arid Card were on their way to the hospital to see Ashcroft, and that Ashcroft was in no coridition to receive guests, much less make a decision about whether to continue the program, According to Mueller's program log, Comey asked Mueller to come to the hospital to\n\"witness [the] condition of AG.\" Mueller told Comey he would go to the hospital right away.\n\n(U)\nAt 7:05 p.m., Ayres was notified by an agent on Ashcroft's security detail that Comey was en route to the hospital. Ayres called the agent back at approximately 7:20 p.m. and told the agent that \"things may get 'a little weird\" when Gonzales and Card arrived.\n\nAyres instructed Ashcroft's security detail, which was composed of FBI agents, to give its \"full support\"\nto Comey and to follow Comey's instructions. Ayres also told the agent that the security detail should not allow the U.S. Secret Service agents who\n160 Ashcroft was recovering from his gallbladder surgery the prior day.\n\nHe was described by those who saw him that night as being very weak and appearing heavily medicated.\n\nPhilbin told us that Ashcroft was \"on morphine\" on the evening of March 10.\n\n(U)\nwould be accompanying Gonzales and Card to remove Comey from Ashcroft's room. The FBI agent told Ayres that the Attorney General's security detail would \"fully back\" Comey and that \"this is 'our scene'.\"\n(U)\nPhilbin said he was leaving work that evening when he received a call from Comey, who said that Philbin needed to get to the hospitdl right away because Gonzales and Card were on their way there \"to get Ashcroft to sign something,\" Comey also directed Philbin to call Goldsmith and tell him what was happening at the hospital.\n\nPhilbin called Goldsmith from a taxi on his way to the hospital. Goldsmith told us he was home having dinner when he received Philbin's call telling him to go immediately to the hospital.\n\n(U)\nComiey arrived at the hospital betweeri 7:10 and 7:30 p.m.16! In his congressional testimony, Comey said he ran up the stairs with his security detail to Ashcroft's floor, and he entered Ashcroft's room, which he described as darkened, with Ashcroft lying in bed and his wife standing bv the bed. Comey said he began speakirng to Ashcroft, \"trying to orient him as to time and place, and try to see if he could focus on what was happening.\"\nComey said it was not clear that Asheroft could focus and that he \"seemed pretty bad off.]\" Comey stepped out of the room into the hallway and telephoned Mueller, who was on his way to the hospital. With Mueller still on the line, Comey gave his phone to an FBI agent on Ashcroft's security detail, and according to Comey Mueller instructed the agent not to allow Comey to be removed from Ashcroft's room \"under any circumstances.\"\n(U)\nGoldsmith and Philbin arrived at the hospital within a few minutes of each other. Comey, Goldsmith, and Philbint met briefly in an FBI \"command post\" that had been set up in a room adjacent to Ashcroft's room. Moments later, word was received at the command post that Card and Gonzales had arrived at the hospital and were on their way upstairs to see Ashcroft.\n\nPhilbin told us the FBI agents in the command post called down to the checkpoint at the hospital entrance to ask whether Card and Gonzales were accompanied by Secret Service agents, which Philbin said indicated concern that a \"stand-off\" between the FBI agents and the Secret Service agents might ensue.\n\n(U)\nComey, Goldsmith, and Philbin entered Ashcroft's room. Goldsmith described Ashcroft's appcarance as \"weak\" and \"frail,\" and observed that his breathing was shallow.\n\nPhilbin said he was shocked by Ashcroft's appearance and said he \"looked terrible.\"\nPhilbin said that Ashcroft appeared to have lost a lot of weight, was \"gray in the face,\" and was \"almost out of it\" because he was on morphine. Comey stated that Ashcroft was\n\"clearly medicated.\"\n(U)\nComey testified that he sat in an armchair by the head of Ashecroft's bed, with Goldsmith and Philbin standing behind him; Mrs, Ashcroft stood on the other side of the bed holding Asheroft's arm. No security or medical personnel were present.\n\n(U)\nGoldsmith's notes indicate that at this point Comey and the others advised Asheroft \"not to sign anything\"\n(U)\nGonzales and Card, unaccompanied by Secret Service agents, entered Ashcroft's hospital room at 7:35 p.an., according to the FBI agent's notes.162\nThe two stood across from Mrs. Asheroft at the head of the bed, with Comey, Goldsmith, and Philbin behind them.\n\n(U)\nGonzales stated that when he entered the hospital room, Ashcroft was in the bed and his wife was \"at the 11:00 position.\" Gongzales said to us that he was unaware that Comey, Goldsmith, and Philbin were also present in the room until Card told him this later, Gonzales told us that he could\n\"sense\" that others were in the room, but that he was not sure who, because his focus was on Asheroft. Gonzales said he carried with himin a manila envelope the March 11, 2004, Presidential Authorization for Ashcroft to sign.\n\n(U)\nAccording to Philbin, CGonzales first asked Ashcroft how he was feeling. Ashcroft replied, \"Not well.\" Gonzales then said words to the effect,\n\"You know, there's a reauthorization that has to be renewed .\n\n. ..\"\n(U)\nGoldsmith told the OIG that Gonzales next reminded Ashcroft that he had been certifying the program for the past 2 years. Comey told us that Gonzales told Ashcroft, \"We have arranged for a legislative remediation;\nwe're going to get Congress to fix it,\" and that more time was needed to accomplish this. Comey told us he did not know what Gonzales meant by\n\"legislative remediation.\"\n(U)\nGonzales told us that he did not recall telling Ashcroft that a legislative remediation had been arranged, but rather may have told Ashcroft that White House officials had met with congressional leaders \"to pursue a legislative fix.\"\n(U)\nComey testified to the Senate Judiciary Committee about what happened next:\n'\n162 Gonzales told us he and Card arrived in Ashcroft's hospital room at 7:20.\n\n(U)\n\n..\n. Attorney General Ashcroft then stunned me:\nHe lifted his\nhead off the pillow and in very strong terms expressed\nhis view\nof the matter; rich in both substance\nand fact, which stunned\nme, drawn from the howrlong meeting we'd had a week earlier,\nand in yery strong\nterms expressed himself, and then laid his\nhead back down\non the pillow. He seemed spent.\n... And as\nhe laid back down, he said, \"But that doesn't matter, becauise\nI''m not the Attorney General, There is the Attorney General,\"\nand he pointed to me - I was just to his left. The two men\n[Gonzales and Card] did not acknowledge me; they turned and walked from the room. (U)\nComey also testified that \"I thought I had just witnessed an effort to take advantage of a very sick man, who did not have the powers of the Attorney Gerieral because they had been transferred.to me.\" (U)\nPhilbin described to us Ashcroft's statements. to Gonzales and Card in the hospital room, stating that Ashcroft \"rallied and held forth for two minutes\" about problems with.the program as had been explained to him by Comey, and that Ashcroft agreed with Comey. Gonzales told us that he did ot recall Asheroft stating that he agreed with Comey. Goldsmith's notes indicate that Ashcroft argued in particular that NSA's collection activities exceeded the scope of the Authorizations and the OLC o emoranda, stating that he was troubled by|\n'\n'\n163 According to voldsmith's notes Ashcroft also said thatitwas:\n-oubling that|\n, people in other agencies\" had been read into the program, but that Ashcroft's own Chief of Staff, and until recently the Deputy Attorney General, had not been allowed to be read in. 'Gonzales told us he responded to Ashcroft that this was the President's decision. {BS/8H/NF\nAccording to Goldsmith's notes, Ashcroft also complained that the White House had \"not returned phone calls,\" and that the Department had been \"treated badly and cut out of [the] whole affair.\" Asheroft told Gonzales that he was \"not prepared to sign anything.\"\n(U)\nWhen we interviewed Gonzales about the hospital visit, he stated that these were \"extraordinary circumstances,\" that the program had been reauthorized over the past two years, and that the sentiment of the\n.-0011gr'ssiQnal'vlcad'el*ship;was that it should contiriue. Gonzales said he therefore felt it was very important that Ashcroft be told what was:\nhappening, adding 1f [ were the Attorney General I would damn sure want to know.\"\n(U)\n|\nIn his July 2007 congressional testimony, Gonzales also explained the visit to the hospital by stating that it was \"imnportant that the Attorney General knew about the views. and recommendations of the congressional leadership; that as a former member of Congress and as -someone who had authorized these activities for over two yeafs? that it might be irnportant for him to hear this information. That was the reason that Mr. Card and\n1 went to the hospital.\" Gonzales further testified, \"We didn't know whether or not he knew of Mr. Comey's position and, if he did know, whether or not he agreed with it.\" Gonzales also disputed Goldsmith's account that Asheroft stated that he was \"not prepared to sign, anything,\" and referred us to his July 2007 testimony where he stated:\n(U)\n'\nMy recollection, Senator [Feinstein], is - and, of course, this happened some time ago and people's recollections are going to differ. My recollection is that Mr. Asheroft did most of the\n|\ntalking.\n\nAt the end, my recollection is, he said, \"I've.been told it would be improvident for me to sign. But that doesn't matter, because I'm no longer the Attorney General.\"\n(U)\n'\nGonzales told us that he and Card would not have gone-to the hospital if they believed Ashcroft did not have the authority to certify the Authorization and told us that as soon as Ashcroft stated he no longer retained authority to act, Gonzales decided not ask Ashcroft to sign the Authorization.\n\nIn his congressional testim_onyGonzales stated, \"Obvicusly there was concern about General Asheroft's condition\n.\n\n.\n\n. [We knew, of course, that he was ill, that he'd had surgery.\" Gonzales also stated that\n\"We would not have sought nor did we intend to get any approval from General Ashcroft if in fact he wasn't fully competent to make that decision.\"\nHe also testified, \"There's no governing legal principle that says that Mr.\n\nAshcroft\n[\n.\n\n.\n\n.\n\n] If he decided he felt better, could decide, T'm feeling better and I can make this decision, and I''m going to make this decision,\"!64\n(U)\nMoments after Gonzales-and Card departed, Mueller arrived at the hospital. According to Mueller's notes, outside the hospital room Comey informied him of the exchange that had occurted in Asheroft's room, and in particular that Ashcroft had stated that Comey was the Actling Attorney Gerieral, that \"all matters\" were to be taken to Comey, but that Ashcroft supported Comey's position regarding the program. Mueller's notes also state: \"The AG also told [Gonzales and Card] that he was barred from obtaining the advice he needed on the program by the strict compartmentalization rules of the (White House].\"\n(U)\nMueller's notes indicate that Comey asked Mueller to witness Ashcroft's condition, and requested Mugller to inform the FBI security detail that no visitors, other than family, be allowed to see Ashcroft without Mueller's consenit. Both Mueller's notes and the security detail log indicate that Mueller instructed the detail that under no circumstances was anyone to be allowed into Asheroft's room without express approval from either Mrs, Ashcroft or Mueller.\n\n(U)\nAt approximately 8:00 p.m. Mueller went into Ashcroft's room for 5 to\n10 minutes.\n\nMueller wrote in his p1 ogram log: \"AG in chair; is feeble, barely articulate, clearly stressed.\"\n(U)\n\n## 4., March 10, 2004: Olson Is Read Into The Program (U)\n\nAccording to Comey's congressional testimony, while he was speaking with Mueller prior to Mueller's departure from the hospital, an FBI agent interrupted, stating that Comey had an urgent telephone call from Card.\n\nComey testified that he then spoke with Card, who was very upset and demanded that Comey come to the White House immediately. Comey testified that he told Card that based on the conduct Comey had just witnessed at the hospital, he would not meet with Card without a witness present. Comey testified that Card replied, \"What conduct? We were just there to wish him well.\" Comey reiterated his condition that he would only meet Card with a witness present, and that he intended the witness to be Solicitor General Olson. Comey testified that until he could \"connect\" with Olson, he was not going to meet with Card.\n\nCard asked if Comey was refusing to come to the White House, and Comey responded that he was not refusing and would be there, but that he had to go back to the Justice Department first.\n\n(U)\nComey and the other Department officials left the hospital at 8:10\np.m.\n\nPhilbin stated that he returned to the Department with Comey in Comey's vehicle, and that the emergency lights were again activated.\n\nGoldsmith also left the hospital and went to the Department.\n\nAt the Department Comey, Goldsmith, and Philbin were joined by Olson, who had come to the Justice Department after being contacted at a dinner party.\n\nComey told us that he believed there was an urgent need to have Olson read into the program because he was confident Olson would agree with Comey and the others that Yoo's legal analysis was flawed and that Olson would be a strong ally in.the matter because of Olson's respected intellect and credibility.\n\n(U)\nDuring this meeting at the Justice Department, a call came from Vice President Cheney for Olson, which Olson took on a secure line in Comey's office while Comey waited outside. Comey told us he believes Vice President Cheney effectively read Olson into the program during that conversation.\n\n(U)\nComey and Olson then went to the White House at about 11:00 p.m., and met with Gonzales and Card that evening. Comey testified that Card would not allow Olson to enter his office. Comey relented and spoke to Card alone for about 15 minutes.. At that point, Gonzales arrived and brought Olson into the room. According to Comey, he communicated the Department's views on the dispute and that the dispute was not resolved in this discussion. Comey stated that Card was concerned that he had heard reports that there was to be-a large number of resignations at the Department.\n\n(U)\nGongzales told us that he recalled that Comey met first with him and Card while Olson waited outside the office, and that Olson joined them shortly thereafter. Gonzales said that little more was achieved than a general acknowledgement that a \"situation\" continued to exist because of the disagreement between the Department and the White House regarding the program.165\n(U)\n\n## 5. March 11, 2004: Goldsmith Proposes Compromise Solution (U)\n\nAccording to a memorandum to the file drafted by Goldsmith, he met with Gonzales at 6:30 a.m. the next morning, March 11, 2004, at the White House to discuss a proposal under which the Department could support the program, which is discussed below.\n\nHowever, Bradbury told us that Comey's characterization of Clement's view of the analysis was exaggerated.\n\nBradbury told us that Clement had remarked to him after these events transpired that Goldsmith and Philbin's analysis \"sounded reasonable to me at the time,\" and that Clement's view of the analysis was based only on a limited review of it. (RSFSHANE)-\nGoldsmith told us that he did not specifically recall this meeting.\n\nGonzales told us that he recalled conveying to Goldsmith and Philbin at some point during this day that the President had decided he had the constitutional authority to continue the program, Gonzales said he also expressed to Department officials the sentiment that the Department should continue seeking a way to \"get comfortable\" with the President's decision.\n\n(U)\n\n## 6. March 11, 2004: White House Asserts That Comey's Status As Acting Attorney General Was Unclear (U)\n\nGoldsniith told the OIG that later during the morning of March 11,\n2004, he received a call from Deputy White House Counsel David Leitch.\n\nGoldsmith said Leitch was \"yelling and screaming\" about the White House:\nnot being informed that Comey was the Acting Attorney General. Goldsmith told the OIG that Leitch made two specific complaints.\n\nFirst, Leitch claimed that the White House had never received a determination from OLC on Comey's assumption of Ashcroft's powers and duties. Goldsmith told us that to rebut this charge, OLC Deputy Assistant Attorney General Edward Whelan was sent to the Justice Command Center to retrieve from a waste basket the facsimile transmittal confirmation sheet from the March 5, 2004, memorandum Goldsmith had sent to Gonzales entitled \"Determination that Attorney General is absent or disabled.\" This confirmation sheet subsequently was sent to Leitch.166\n(U)\nLeitch's second claim was that the OLC memorandum was ambiguous because it.did not specify whether the Attorney General Wasy.determi_ned to.\n\nbe \"absent\" or \"disabled,\" a difference for purposes of the Attorney General's authority., According to Goldsmith, if the Attorney General was \"absent,\"\nthe Deputy Attorney General could act as. the Attorney General, although the Attorney General would retain his authority and technically could overrule the Deputy.\n\nIf the Attorney General was \"disabled,\" the Attorney Getneral was divested of all autherity. Goldsmith said he responded to Leitch by noting the inconsistency of the White House making this second clajm because, according to Leitch, it had not received Goldsmith's memoraridum in the first instance.\n\n(U)\nGoldsmith said he also told Leitch to \"lay off\" the complaints, but that Leitch did not. Goldsmith said he therefore reluctantly sent a detailed e-mail to Leitch on March 11 to support the Department's contention that it had properly informed the White House of Ashcroft's status. Goldsmith stated that in the e-mail he also made the point that his conversation with Gonzales on March 9, 2004 (discussed above) was premised on Gonzales's knowledge that Ashcroft was ill and that Comey needed to authorize a\n30-day bridge\" until Ashcroft was well enough to sign the Authorizations again.167\n(U)\nGonzales told us that he had no recollection of having seen OLC's March 5, 2004, memorandum entitled \"Determination that Attorney General is absent or disabled.\"\nAs described above, Gonzales stated that he and Card would not have gone to the hospital if they believed Ashcroft did not have the authority to certify the Authorization as to formand legality.\n\nGonzales also said that while he believed Comey would be making the decision to recertify the program, this did not mean that Ashcroft had relinquished his authority or had been \"recused\" from making the decision.\n\nGonzales said he believed that Ashcroft retained the authority if he was competent to exercise it and was inclined to do so.168 FSHSHNFY-\nmemorandum from Comey's Chief of Staff Chuck Rosenberg memorializing Comey's decision that the Attorney General was \"absent or disabled\" within the meaning of 28\nU.S.C.  508(a).\n\nLeitch's clarification stated that the Rosenberg memorandum had been in draft form.\n\n(U)\n167 The QIG searched for but was unable to find this e-mail from Goldsmith to Leitch,\n(U)\n168\nDuring his July 24, 2007, testimony before the Senate Judiciary Committee, however, Gonzales stated that he thought there had been newspaper accounts of Comey's assumption of the Attorney General's duties and stated that \"the fact that Mr. Comey was the acting Attorney General is probably something that I knew of.\" Gonzales testified that he was aware that Ashcroft was ill and had undergone surgery, but Gonzales stated that Ashcroft \"could always reclaim\" his authority.\n\n(U)\n\n## 7. March 11, 2004: Gonzales Certifies Presidential Authorization As To Form And Legality (Ts//Slh/Nf)\n\n'On the morning of March 11, 2004, with the Presidential Authorization set to expire, President Bush signed a new Authorization, 182\nIn'a departure from the past practice of having the Attorney General certify the-Authorization as to form and legality, the March 11 Authorization was certified by White House Counsel Gongzales. The March 11 Authorization also differed markedly from prior Authorizations in three other respects.\n\nThe first significant difference between the March 11, 2004, Presidential Authorization and prior Authoerizations was the President's explicit assertion that the exercise of his Article II Commander-in-Chief authority \"displace[s|the provisions of law, including the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act and chapter 119 of Title 18 of the United States Code lincluding 18 U.S.C. 2511(f) relating to exclusive means), to the extent of\n.\n\nany conflict between the provisions and such exercises under Article II[,]\"\n'As discussed above, FISA and the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, 18 U.8.C. 8 2510-2521 (generally referred to as Title III) are by their terms the \"exclusive means by which electronic surveillance, as defined ini [FISA], and the interception of domestic wire, oral, and electronic communications may be conducted.\"\n18 U.8.C.\n\n 2511(2)(f). This new language was based on the same legal rationale Yoo first advanced in support of the Stellar Wind program - that FISA cannot be read to infringe upon the President's Commander-in-Chief authority under Article 11 of the Constitution during wartime. +F8//STLW//SI//QC/NF)\n'\nSubsequent Presidential Authorizations did not include this language diseussing the legal bases for the program. Steven Bradbury told the OIG\nthat he believed the language was included in the March 11 Authorization as a way of indicating that the President did not agree with Goldsmith and Philbin's analysis, and to protect those who had been implementing the program under the prior OLC opinions. (FSALSLLNE\nSecond, to narrow the gap between the authority given on the face of prior Authorizations and the actual operation of the program by the NSA, the terms governing the collection of telephony and e-mail meta data were clarified. The underlying language for \"acquiring\" both telephony and e-mail meta data remained as it had been, giving the NSA authority to:\nacquire; with respect to-a communication, header/router/addressing-type information, iricluding telecommuniications dialing-type data, but not the contents:of the communicalion, whern (i) at leastione party 1o such communication is outside the United States, (ii) no party to such communication is known.to be a citizen of the United States, or (iii) based on the factual and practical considerations of everyday life on which reasonable and prudent persons act, there are specific and articulable facts giving reason to believe that.such communication relates to international terrorism; ot activities in preparation therefor,\n{FS/7SFk, E:\nC/NE\nPresidertial Authorization, March 11, 2004, para. 4(b). However, this language wasnow qualified by the following two.subparagraphs:\n-\n(i) the Department of Defense may obtain and retain header/router/addressing-type information. includi T\n;\nalinoctvoe data,\n(EEEEIE)\n[brovided that search\n\" and retrievs Theader/rout er/addressing-type information, ircluding telecommunications dialing-type data, shall occur only in accordance with this authorization; and\n]\n(ii) header/router/addressing-type information, including telecommunications dialing-type data, is \"acquired\" for purposes of subparagraph 4(b) above when, and only when, the Depattment of Defense has searched for and retrieved such header/router/addressing-type information, including telecommunications dialing-type data (and riot when the Department obtains such header/router/addressing-type ini tion.d ine telecammunications diglino-tvne data, ARkzvikae e\n\n## Id. At Para. 4(B)(I) 8 (Ii). (Es/A/Stlw/H/Shocnf)\n\nIn essence, the March 11, 2004, Authorization for the first time sought to make clear that the NSA could \"obtain and retain\" telephony and c-mail meta data (baskets 2 and J)[PEGIGE\nhut the meta data collected could only be queried (\"acquired\") in accordance with any of the three conditions set forth in paragraph 4(h).'70 This language clarifying what the term \"acquire\"\nmeant was included in-every successive Presidential Authorization for the remainder of the program. [TS//STLW//SL//OC/NE}\nMoreover, the President asserted in the March 11 Authorization that the newly drafted distinction between \"obtaining and retaining\" meta data versus \"acquiring\" the meta data \"reflects the consistent course of conduct under such Presidential Authorizations that has been knowr to and authorized by me, and shall be deemed to have been a partof such Presidential Authorizations as if [paragraph 4(b)(i) & (ii)] had been explicitly included in each such Presidential Authorization at the time of presidential signature; any action taken prior to presidential signature of this authorization that is. consistent with the preceding sentence is ratified and confirmed.\"7!\n\nId. at para. 4(b).\n\n(LS\nST/\nST /OGN\nAccording to Comey and Philbin, this new language was Addington's\n\"fix.\"172 Philbin said he believed the new language was \"sufficient\" to address the Department's concern that the Authorizations dicl not\n'adcquatelyides,'{:ribe the (%), (B)(1), ,(b}.@)'\n.\n\nbeing carried out.bi- the NSA, although he believed the new g\n\"cumbersome.\"\nIn his OIG interview, Gonzales declined to explain the significance of this new language, based on an assertion from the Special Courisel tothe:\n=\n& o O\n% %\nP\nFE s sy s o The-third significant departure from prior Authorizations was the inclusion of & statement that \"the Attorney General of the United States approved as to form and legality [all prior Presidential Authorizations]\nauthorizing the same activities as are cxtended by this authorization[]\" 1d.\n\n'However, Gonzales told us that he\n{0\nDepartinent understood that the NSA was Sihat Philbin had been to the NSA several times and had met with NSA officials to gain an understanding of how the program was actually implemented. APS /A\nSTEWNHEHFOE/NF)\nWe asked Gonzales why he signed the March 11, 2004, Presidential Authorization even though the Department could not support it.\n\nOn the advice of the Special Counsel fo the President, Gonzales declined to answer, However, Gonzales stated that the White House Counsel, like OLC, provides legal advice to the President and that his signature on the Authorization simply represented his advice as to its form and legality. {FS/SH/NE\nNSA Director Hayden told us that Addington asked him whether the NSA would be willing to continue the Stellar Wmd program without the Justicee Department's certification of the Presidential Authotization. Hayden said this was a \"tough question\" and that he consulted with his leadership team at the NSA before making a decision. Hayden said that three considerations persuaded him to continue the program. First; the congressional members briefed on the situation on March 10, 2004, were supportive of continuing the program without Comey's certification.\n\nSecond, the program had been operating for the previous two and a half years with Department approval. Third, the NSA General Counsel's office told him the program was legal, Hayden said he was unsure whether proceeding without the Department's certification was a sustainable approach, but that he was comfortable doing so when the issue arose in March 2004. @FS/FSH-NF\n\n## B. Department And Fbi Officials React To Issuance Of March 11, 2004, Authorization {Ts//Sh{Nf}-\n\nSeveral Department and FBI leadership officials considered resigning after the Presidential Authorization was signed despite the Deputy Attorney General's refusal to certify the program based on the Department's determination that certain activitics it authorized were without adequate legal support. Many of the Department, FBI, and White House officials we interviewed characterized the events 1mmed1ately surrounding the issuance of the March 11, 2004, Presidential Authorization ini dramatic, sharp terms.\n\nSeveral of the Department witnesses described the imnpasse as a \"crisis\" and described\n& sense of distrust and anger that permeated their relations with White House officials during this period.\n\nIn a letter of resignation that Comey wrote but did not send, he described this- period asan \"apocalyptic situation.\" {FS7 S\nIn this section, we describe the reactions of Department, FBI, and White House officials to the White House decision to continue the programl without the support of the Justice Department.\n\n(U)\n\n## 1. Initial Responses Of Department And Fbi Officials (U)\n\nWhite House Chief of Staff Card informed Comey by telephone on the morning of March 11, 2004, that the President had signed the new Aiithorization that morning, At approximately noon, Gonzales called Goldsmith to inform him that the President, in issuing the Authorization, had made an interpretation of law concerning his.authorities and that the Department should not act in contradiction of his determinations.\n\nGoldsmith took notes on the call. According to his notes, Goldsmith asked Gonzales; \"What were those determinations?\" and Gonzales responded that he would let Goldsmith know. {FS/SH-NFY\nLater that day, Gonzales called Goldsmith again and told him that OLC should continue working on its legal analysis of the program. Ina third call that day, however, Gonzales directed Goldsmith to suspend work on the legal analysis and to decline a request from the CIA General Counsel to review a draft of the new OLC memorandum. (ESAFSHHNEY\nGoldsmith followed up this series of calls with a letter to Gonzales seeking clarification on Gonzales's instructions. Goldsmith wrote that he interpreted the March 11, 2004, Authorization signed by the President to mean that \"the President has determined the legality of [the program] in all respects based upon the advice and analysis of your office, and that officers of the Department of Justice should refrain from calling into question the legality of [the programy], or from undertaking further legal analysis of it.\"\nIn the letter Goldsmith recounted how Gonzales had then called him to advise that OLC should continue its legal analysis of the program, adding, \"I am now uncertain about your direction based on the President's exercise of his authority.\" Goldsmith concluded his letter by reiterating OLC's position that its existing legal memoranda \"should not be relied upon in support for the entire program.\" Goldsmith described the document he wrote as a \"for the record\" letter.175 As described below, Goldsmith and Philbin delivered this letter to Gonzales at his residence at approximately 11:00 p.m. that night. {F&/ASLNE)\nAt rioon on March 11, 2004, Director Mueller met with Card at the White House. According to Mueller's program log, Card summoned Mueller to his office to bring Mueller up to date on the events of the preceding 24\nhours. Card recounted for Mueller the briefing of the congressional leaders thee prior afternoon and the President's issuance of the new Authorization without the Departmernt's. approval.\n\nIn addition, Card told Mueller that if no\n\"legislative fix\" could be found by May 6, 2004, when the current Authorlzatlon was set to expire, the program would be discontinued.\n\nAccording to Mueller's notes, Card acknowledged to Mueller that President Bush had sent him and Gonzales to the hospital to seek Ashcroft's ceertification for the March 11, 2004, Authorization, but that Ashcroft had said he was too ill to make the determination and that Comey was the Acting Attorney General.\n\nMueller wrote in his program log that he told Card that the failure to have Department of Justice representation at the congressional briefing and the attemnpt to have Ashcroft certify the Authorization without going through Comey \"gave the strong perception that the [White House] was trying to do an end run around the Acting [Attorney General] whom they knew to have serious concerns as to the legality of portions of the program.\" Card responded that he and Gonzales were unaware at the time of the hospital visit that Comey was the Acting Attorney General, and that they had only been following the directions of the President. {FS77/Si//NFY\nMueller reminded Card that Mueller had told Vice President Cheney during their March 9, 2004, noon meeting that Mueller could have problems with the FBI's continued involvement in the program if the White House issued an Authorization without the Department's approval.\n\nCard said he understood Mueller's concern and told him to stop by Gonzales's office to pick up a copy of the March 11, 2004, Authorization, which Mueller did.\n\nMueller met with Comey at 1:15 p.m. to review the Authorization, and he left a copy of it with Comey.\n\nDuring this meeting, Mueller told Comey he would be submitting a letter to Comey requesting advice on the legality of the FBI's continued participation in the program.!76 {IS//SL//NE}\nLater that day, Mueller sent Comey a memorandum, prepared by FBI\nGeneral Counsel Valerie Caproni and an FBI Deputy. @eneral Counsel, seeking guidance on iow the FBI should proceed in light of recent developments. The memorandum asked whether FBI agents detailed to the NSA to work on Stellar Wind should be recalled; whether the FBI should cantinue to receive and investigate tips based onf\n.\n\ns\n|| and whether\n'\nOffice of Intelligence Policy and Review (OIPR) Counsel James Baker also expressed his concern about the White House's action.\n\nOn the evening of March 11, 2004, he drafted a memorandum to Comey containing what he later described as a series of \"loaded questions\" concerning whether it was\n\"lawful and ethical\" for OIPR to continue filing applications with the FISA\nCourt under the circumstances. 77\nST\nGoldsmith and Philbin called Gonzales late in the evening of March 11\nto ask if they could visit him at his residence to deliver the letter Goldsmith had writteri earlier in the day. As described above, Goldsmith sought to make a record of his earlier conversations with Gonzales in which\n'Goldsmith believed Gonzales had conveyed conflicting instructions regarding how OLC should proceed in light of the President's issuance of the March 11 Authorization.\n\nL/\nNEY\nGonzales told us that Goldsmith drafted the letter because Goldsmith was \"confused\" about whether OLC should continue working on its legal analysis of the program.\n\nGonzales said he recalled that Goldsmith and Philbin were \"somber\" during the meeting at his house. Gonzales said that he told themi that the President had decided to go forward with the program, but that they should continue working to resolve the outstanding legal questions they had and try to find a solution.\n\nHe said he tried to convey to them his confidence that everyone would \"get through this.\" PSS HHN\nGoldsmith and Philbin told us that Gonzales was very cordial during the meeting and expressed regret for having gone to Ashcroft's hospital room that evening.\n\nPhilbin stated that initially he believed that Gonzales had instructed him and Goldsmith \"not to do our job, not to determine what the law is,\" but that it became evident to him that Gonzales \"wanted to do\n\nthe legally right thing.\" Goldsmith also stated that as a general proposition he encountered more \"pushback\" from Addington than from Gonzales, and that Gonzales \"wanted to do the right thing.\" {FS/+SH/NF\n\n## 2. Department And Fbi Officials Consider Resigning (U)\n\nCormey told us he drafted a letter of resignation shortly after the incident in Ashcroft's hospital room on March 10. Comey said he drafted the letter because he believed it was impossible for him to remain with the Departiment if the President would do something the Department said was ot legally supportable.178\n(U)\nComey also testified that Ashcroft's Chief of Staff David Ayres believed Ashcroft also was likely to resign and urged Comey to wait until Ashcroft was well enough to resign with him.\n\nIn written responses to Senator Charles Schumer following his testimony, Comey wrote that he believed the following individuals also were prepared to resign: Goldsmith, Philbin, Chuck Rosenberg, Daniel Levin, James Baker, David Ayres, Deputy Chief of Staff to the Attorney General David Israelite, and Director Mueller. Comey also responded to the question that he believed that \"a large portion\" of his staff also would have resigned if he had.\n\n(U}\nGoldsmith told us he was \"completely disgusted\" by his recent meetings with White House officials in connection with the Stellar Wind program and that he drafted a resignation letter at around the same time as Comey. The OIG obtained a handwritten list Goldsmith had compiled as these events were taking place to memorialize his grievances with the White House's actions duting this period. The list includes:\n\no\nthe \"[s|hoddiness of the whole thing,\" which Goldsmith told us\nreferred to his belief that both the process by which the\nprogram was implemented and the substantive analysis\nunderpinning it represented the extreme opposite of how to\nmanage a program as important as the White House claimed\nStellar Wind to be;\n[ am also hugely proud of the Department of Justice, including SG, Associate AG, OLC, Ayres, my staff, the AG, and even Mrs. Ashcroft.\n\nI believe this has been our finest hour, although it is not over yet.\n\n. ..\n\nI suspect\n[ will either be fired by the President or quit, but I will have done the right thing for my country.\n\n(U)\n\no\n\"[o]ver-secrecy,\" both in terms of not reading in attorneys at the\nJustice Department and other agencies, and not keeping\nCongress. informed;\no\nthe hospital incident, which Goldsmith described\nas \"shameful\";\n\"|d}isregard of law\" on the part of the White House (a reference\nGoldsmith did not expand upon with more specificity during his\ninterview with the OIG); and\n.\n'\no\nthe White House's claim that a legislative fix could be achieved,\nwhich Goldsmith regarded as \"irresponsible\" because he\nbelieved at the time that a legislative remedy was not a vidble\noption. {F&/4SHNF}\n~\nGoldsmith described three additional items on the list in particular as\n\"false representations\" by the White House:\n\no\n\"[lJies re shutting down,\" referring te the White House's\nassurances to Goldsmith on several occasions that it would\nshut down the program if the Office of Legal Counsel could not\nfind legal support for it;\no\n\"[lJies re telling [the President] of problem,\" referring to\nrepresentations that the President had been kept informed\nof\nthe Department's concerns about the program; and\no\nassertions by White House officials that they \"[d]idn't know AG\nwas incapacitated\". {FS/+SH-NF\nGoldsmith stated that on Thursday, March 11, Ayres asked him not to resign because the Attorney General should have the chance to do so first once he had fully recovered from his surgery. Goldsmith said he was still\n\"on the fence\" the following Monday or Tuesday about resigning and that there was great concern that his and other resignations would \"spark a panic\" that might lead to the program being revealed publicly.17\n(U)\nPhilbin told us that there was an \"eerie silence\" at the Department on March 11 as he and others awaited word from the White House on the fate of the program.\n\nPhilbin said he and others believed they would have to resign.\n\nPhilbin said his primary concern was that the White House planned to go forward with the Presidential Authorization and continue the program effective head of the Office of Legal Counsel after his \"unprecedented\" withdrawal of several legal memoranda, including those drafted by Yoo.\n\nGoldsmith added that he also resigned because he was \"exhausted\" from his work in OLC and had recently been offered a teaching position at Harvard Law School.\n\n(U)\ndespite the flaws that the Office of Legal Counsel had identified in its legal analysis. Philbin said he was \"absolutely serious\" about resigning, adding,\n(1] they re going to try to st1 ong~arm the guy on morphine, what else are they going to do?\"\n{LSLISE\nBaker told us that he also considered resigning after the President signed the Authorization but ultimately decided to remain in his position, in part because of his fear that if the White: House was Wllhng to tolerate mass.\n\nresignations of senior government officials rather than revise the Stellar Wind program, \"I don't know what this means in terms of the rule of law in this country.\" Baker also stated that he knew he had certain protections from removal for a period of time because he was a career official and that he wanted to rernain as Chief of OIPR to protect the government's relationship with the FISA Court and to protect the attorneys in his office.\n\n($ S\n'[ [SI\n/ [P}F)\nLevih said he was willing to resign over the matter, and he gave a signed reS1gnat10n letter to Comey to be used by him \"however [he] felt appropriate.\" Levin said he did so \"1f it would help to get the White House to changc its thind.\"\nLevin sai\n1o}\not certain he shared Goldsmith's view that thel was legally without support, he thought 1\nhe White House's conduct dunng the incident at the hospital had been \"outrageous and he was willing to resign on that basis alone.\n\nFBI General Counsel Caproni told us that she also was prepared to resign.\n\nShe said that the FBI's ptimary.concern 1egard111g the impasse between the Department and the White House over the program was not w1th issues of privacy and civil hbertles, but rather with \"the rule of law.\"\nAt approximately 1:30 a.n. on March 12, 2004, Mueller drafted by hand a letter stating, in part;\n\"[A]fter reviewing the plain language of the FISA statute, and the order issued yesterday by the President\n.\n\n.\n\n. and in the absence of further clarification of the legality of the program from the Attorney General, I am forced to withdraw the FBI from participation in the program.\n\nFurther, should the President order the continuation of the FBI's participation in the program, and in the absence of further legal advice from the AG, I would be constrained to resign as Director of the FBI.\" Mueller told us he planned on having the letter typed and then tendering it, along with his March 11, 2004, memorandum to Comey, but that based on subsequent events his resignation was not necessary. {FS//SL/NE)\n\n## 3. Comey And Mueller Meet With President Bush ()\n\nOn the morning of March 12; 2004, Comey and Mueller went to the White House to attend the regular daily threat briefing with the Presidentin .\n\nthe Oval Office. Comey said that following the briefing President Bush called him into the President's private study for an \"unscheduled meeting.\"\nU)\n, Comey told us that President Bush said to him; \"You look burdened.\"\nComey told the President that he did feel burdened, to which the President responded, \"Let me lift that burden from you.\" Comey told the President that he felt as if he were standing on railroad tracks with a train coming toward him to run over his career and 'I can't get off the tracks.\"\n(U)\nComey said he then explained to the President the three baskets of Stellar Wind collection and the issues and problems associated with each.\n\nPresident Bush responded with words to the effect, \"You whipped this on me\" all of a sudden, that he was hearing about these problems at the last minute, and that the President not being told of these developments regarding the program was \"not fair to the American people.\" Comey responded that the President's staff had been advised of these issues \"for weeks,\" and that the President was being \"poorly served\" and \"misled\" by his advisors. Comey also said to the President, \"The American people are going to freak when they hear what collection is going on.\" President Bush responded, \"That's for me to worry about.\" F8//8TEW/\n787 0S~\nAccording to Comey, the President said that he just needed until May 6 (the date of the next Authorization), and that if he could not get Congress to fix FISA by then he would shut down the program. The President emphasized the importance of the program and that it \"saves lives.\" Comey told the President that while he understood the President's position he still could not agree to certify the program.\n\nComey said he then quoted Martin Luther to the President: \"Here I stand, I can do no other.\"\nAt the end of the conversation, Comey told the President, \"You should know that Bob Mueller is going to resign this morning.\" The President thanked Comey for telling him that and said he would speak with Mueller next.\n\nComey said his conversation with the President lasted approximately\n15 minutes.\n\nFollowing the conversation, Comey went to Mueller, who was waiting in the West Wing, and started discussing his meeting with the President. Word was then sent to Mueller through a Secret Service agent that the President wanted to meet with him.80\n(U)\nMueller later made notes in his program log about his meeting with President Bush. According to his notes, the President told Mueller that he was \"tremendously concernied\" about another terrorist attack and that he had been 1nforrnecl that the Stellar Wmd program was essential to protecting\n|\nbe \"Justly he d accountable if he did not do everythmg possnble to prevent another attack. The President explained to Mueller that for these reasons he had authorized the continuation of the program even without the concurrence of the Attorney General as to the legality of \"various aspects of the program.\" {FS/HSTEW/ASHAOC/NE)\ncongressmnal leadershlp had been brlefed on the Pres1dent's action to extend the program and was \"understandmg and supportive of the President's position.\" The President also told Mueller that he had urged Comey to agree to extend the program until May 6 and that he hoped for a legislative fix by that tirhe, but that if no legislative solution could be found and the legahty of the program was still in question by that time, he \"would shut it down.\" -FS/FSH-NF\nAccording to Mueller's notes, Mueller told the President of his concerns regarding the FBI's continued participation in the program without an opinion from the Attorney General as to its legality, and that he was corsidering resigning if the FRBI were directed to continue to participate without the concurrence of the Attorney General. The President responded that he \"wished to relieve any burden [Mueller] may be laboring under\" and that he did not want Mueller to resign.\n\nMueller said he explained to the President that he had an \"independent obligation to the FBI and to the Justice Department to assure the legality of actions we undertook, and that a presidential order alone could not do that.\" {FS//SL{/NE)\nPresident just took me inte his private office for 15 minute one on one talk.\n\nTold him he was being misled and poorly served.\n\nWe had a very full and frank exchange.\n\nDan't know that either of us can see a way out.\n\nHe promised that he would shut down 5/6 if Congress didn't fix FISA.\n\nTold him Mueller was about to resign.\n\nHe just pulled Bob into his office.\n\nAccording to Mueller's notes, the President expressed understanding for Mueller's position and asked what needed to be done to address Mueller's concerns.\n\nMueller responded that Comey, the Office of Legal Counsel, the CIA, and the NSA \"needed to sit down immediately\" and assess the legal status of the program in light of OLC's doubts about the existing legal rationale and the March 11, 2004, Authorization. Mueller wrote:\nAccording to Mueller's notes, the President then directed Mueller to meet with Comey and other principals to address the legal concerns so that the FBI could continue participating in the program \"as appropriate under the law.\"\n-\nMueller told us he met with Comey an hour later to begin coordinating that effort.\n\nAt 4:50 p.m. that afternoon, Mueller called\n-Gonzales to request that additional Department lawyers be read into the program,8 Mueller told us that this request originated with Comey and that Mueller was merely acting as an \"intermediary.\"\n(U)\nThe President's direction to Mueller to meet with Comey and other principals to address the legal concerns averted the mass resignations at the Department and the FBI. According to Comey and other Department officials, the White House's decision to seek a legal solution and allow more attorneys to be read into the program was a significant step toward resolving the dispute, and in the words of one Department official provided a way of \"stepping back from the brink.\" As we describe below, these Department officials still faced the challenge of finding a legal and operational remedy for the program that would address the concerns of the White House, the NSA, and Department. {TS//SH/NF}\n\n## 4. Comey Directs Continued Cooperation With Nsa (U)\n\nOn the morning of March 12, 2004, Comey decided not to direct OIPR\nand the FBI to cease cooperating with the NSA in conjunction with the program. Comey's decision is documented in a 1-page memorandum from Goldsmith to Comey in which Goldsmith explained why Comey's action was legal. S+\n~In his memorandum, Goldsmith stated that the President, as\n'\nCommander-in-Chief and Chief Executive with the constitutional duty to\n\"take care that the laws are faithfully executed,\" made a determination that Stellar Wind, as practiced, was lawful. Goldsmith concluded that this\n\n## Department Conducts Additional Legal Analysis (U)\n\nQn March 12, 2004, an interagency working group was convened to coritinue the legal analysis of the program.\n\nIn accordance with the President's directive to Mueller, officials from the FBI, NSA, and the CIA\nwere brought into the process, although the OLC maintained the lead role.\n\nThe working group included Deputy Solicitor General Clement, Baker, FBI\nGeneral Counsel Caproni, Mueller, and several attorneys from OLC, Comey said CIA Director Tenet and his Deputy, McLaughlin, may have had limited participation as well. {FS/+ASTEW/SH/OC/NFI\nOn March 13, Mueller asked NSA Director Hayden to assist FBI\nGeneral Counsel Caproni in assessing the value of the Stellar Wind program.\n\nMueller said he wanted Caproni to become more familiar with the program and to understand how the FBI's view of the value of the program CQmP&fed.With that of the NSA.183 Mueller said that Hayden provided slides highlighting cases in which the NSA believed Stellar Wind-derived information proved useful, 4(S/NE\nCaproni told us that during this March 2004 period she and two other FBI officials made an effort to determine what value the FBI was getting from Stellar Wind-derived information. She explained that it was difficult to assess the value of the program during its early stages because FBI field offices at that time were not required to report back to FBI Headquarters with information about how information from the NSA program had been used. 184 (SLINE)\nOn the afternoon of Sunday, March 14, 2004, the Department convened a large meeting in the Justice Command Center to reyiew OLC's analysis on the legality of the program.\n\nMueller, Corney, Goldsmith, Philbin, Baker, CIA General Counsel Muller, Caproni, Tenet, Hayden, Olson, Clement, and several NSA lawyers attended the meeting.\n\nPSS/ SHHNFY\nPrior to the meeting, Goldsmith and Philbin prepared a detailed outline of OLC's current analysis, which Goldsmith described to us as his\n\"most honest take\" of the legal issues at that time, Goldsmith said he distributed the outline to meeting participants and used it to walk the group\n183 Caproni had been appointed the FBI General Cournsel in August 2003 and was read into the Stellar Wind program in.September or October 2003. She told us she did not give much thought to the program at the time because OLC had determiried that it was legal.\n\nShe stated that in 2004 she learned that OLC was re-examining Yoo's legal analysis and had concerns with it.\n\nShe told us she later spoke with Philbin, who confirmed to her\n+hat he and Goldsmith had problems with the legal support for the program and that he was frustrated because the program was so tightly compartmented that he could not talk to anybody about it.\n\nCaproni told us that at some point she obtained a copy of Yoo's legal opinion. She stated that after reading it she immediately understood Philbin's concerns because the opinion appeared to lack analysis and simply concluded that the program was legal, ESAASH N\n184 The FBIl's Electronic Communications Analysis Unit compiled a summary of knownBIBE\nI Stellar Wind tip results from January 1, 2003, through mid-December 2003.\n\nbl, b3\n; did not\n, (D)(3)\nHowever, the data included in the summary was incomplete, and the summ contain any analysis of the effectiveness of these tips. .Anether study of thelEE)\n;\ntippers was conducted in 2006.\n\nThe results of that study are discussed in Chapter Six of this report, along with the OIG's analysis of the effectiveness of the program.\n\n195 Goldsmith alse noted that as of the March 14, 2004, meeting, the Attorney General had not yet reported to Congress on the program under 28 U.S.C.  530D.\n\nHowever, as discussed above, the White House had briefed the congressional leadership about the program on March 10, 2004.\n\nIn addition, the former Presiding Judge of the FISA\nCourt, Royce Lamberth, and the current Presiding Judge, Colleen Kollar-Kotelly, had been read into the program hy this time.\n\n(U)\n~\nGoldsmith told us that the March 14 mieeting was designed to achieve full consensus among the principals on the issues, and that the meeting was successful in this regard.\n\n(U)\nThat evening, Mueller called Gonzales to.re hort that progress had been made, although legal support for RIS\nnot been found. Mueller also told Gonzales tha should speak directly with Comey on these matters.\n\n## 6. Comey Determines That Asheroft Remains \"Absent Or Disabled\" (U) :\n\nAttorney General Ashcroft was released from the hospital at noon on March 14, 2004. The next day, Comey advised Ayres by memorandum that Ashcroft's doctor believed that Ashcroft required additional time to recuperate at home and was not yet ready to resume his responsibilities as Attorney General.\n\nComey's memorandum noted that the doctor intended to reassess Ashcroft's condition on March 24, 2004. Comey's memoranduin stated that, based on these circumstances, Comey continued to believe that Asheroft was \"absent or disabled\" within the meaning of 28 U.S.C.  508(a).\n\nComey's memorandum concluded:\nAs before, notwithstanding my continued temporary capacity as Acting Attorney General,\n| intend, where possible, to exercise\n\"a1] the power and authority of the Attorney General\" pursuant to the authority that 28 C.F.R.  0.15(a) delegates to me in my regular capacity as Deputy Attorney General.\n\n(U)\nA copy of the memorandum was sent to Gonzales at the White House and to senior Department officials.1%?\n\n(U)\n\n## 7. Judge Kollar-Kotelly Briefed On Lack Of Attorney General Certification (U)\n\nAs discussed earlier in this report, the extent to which OIPR could use Stellar Wind-derived information in FISA applications had been limited by Judge Kollar-Kotelly, the FISA Court's Presiding Judge. After her read-in'to the program in May 2002, Judge Kollar-Kotelly had directed OIPR to continue, with some modifications, the \"scrubbing\" procedures for FISA\napplications in place at that time.\n\n-\nSTL\n:\nAccording to an -OLC memorandum, on March 14, 2004, Judge Kollar-Kotelly was informed that the President had reauthorized the Stellar Wind program, but that the latest Authorization lacked the Attorney General's certification as to form and legality.} The memorandum indicated that as a result of Judge Kollar-Kotelly's uncertainty about the implications of this development, she intended to insist on a complete separation of any information derived from Stellar Wind, whether directly o1\nindirectly, from all FISA applications presented to the FISA Court, The memorandum noted that \"{blecause of the way tips get worked into (and lost ir) the mix of intelligence information, that standard would have virtually crippled all counter-terrorism FISAs.\" {PSHSTLW/SHHOC/NE\n\n## 8. Comey And Gonzales Exchange Documents Asserting Conflicting Positions (U)\n\nAccording to Mueller's program log, on the morning of Monday, March 15, 2004, following the daily threat briefing in the White House Situation Room, President Bush remarked to Mueller that he understood\n\"progress had been made,\" referring to the discussions on the legal basis for the Stellar Wind program.\n\nMueller called Comey shortly thereafter to convey the President's remark.\n\nMueller suggested to Comey that additional briefings on the program should be given to Congress, including to both the House and Senate Judiciary Committees. FS/ASHANE\nAlso on March 15, Goldsmith drafted for Comey a 3-page memorandum summarizing OLC's views with respect to the legality of the program.\n\nThe memorandum recast in narrative form Goldsmith's outline of March 14, 2004 (discussed above), and noted that OLC had not reached any.\n\n\"final conclusions and [was] not yet prepared to issue a final opinion on the program.\" The memorandum also stated that the Stellar Wind program potentially implicated various congre ssional and intra-Executive Branch rgportmg'-r,e'qui:ements imposed both by statute and Executive Order. The\n. memorandum stated that OLC was only beginning to analyze these re.p(jrtifng issues.\n\n\nS8\nN\nGoldsmith and Philbin went to see Gonzales oti the-afternoon of March 15 to explain what OLC had determined in its legal analysis to that pcl),-i_n.t, and also to notify Gonzales that he would be hearing from Comey shortly about the Department's position as to the program's legality. (U)\nAccording to Philbin's contemporaneous notes on the events of the next two days, on March 16, 2004, following the morning threat briefing at the White House, Comey told President Bush that OLC had finished its preliminary legal analysis of the program. 9! Comey asked the President if Comey should convey the details of the analysis to Gonzales, and the President indicated that Comey should do so. {ES/ASH-NE\nAfter Comey returned to the Department, he signed a short memorandum to Gonzales that he had drafted the night before. In the memorandurn, Comey first recounted hew the President on March 12, 2004, had directed the Justice Department to continue its analysis of the Stellar Wind program and to \"provide its best advice concerning ways to change the program to conform with the Justice Department's understanding of the applicable law.\" Comey then described the composition of the working group convened to accomplish this objective and how the group's efforts had resulted in Goldsmith's 3-page analysis, which Comey attached to his memorandum.\n\n{F&H8HH\nComey then set ou t his advice to the President. According to the that the President may lawfully continue\n..\n\n=\n=\n| Comey OIS\nnvolved \"close legal questions, requiring legally aggressive indeed, novel\n- supporting arguments\n.\n\n.\n\n.\n\n.7 Comey further wrote that the Department remained unable to find a legal basis to Py )(1), (b)) .\n\nB\nAccordingly, Comey advised that such raised \"serious issues\" about congressional notification, \"particularly where the legal basis for the program is the President's decision to assert his authority to override an otherwise applicable Act of Congress.\" Comey wrote that the Department would continue to explore the notification issue.\n\n)\nComey instructed Goldsmith: and Philbin to hand deliver the memoranda to Gonzales at the White House, which they did.\n\nPhilbin also delivered copies to Solicitor General Olson.\n\nPhilbin's notes indicate that Olson was \"annoyed\" that Comey had sent the memoranda to the White House without consulting him, and asked Philbin several times, \"What's my role supposed to be here?\" Olson also said to Philbin that he thought the mermoranda were a \"poke in the eye\" to the White House. Philbin wrote that Olson's reaction \"raised concerns that [Comey] may have gotten himself too far ouit there alone\" by not bringing Olson in on the Department's legal opinion in advance.\n\n(U)\nComiey told us that he knew his memorandum would anger people at.\n\nthe White House because he had putin writing the arguments questioning the legality of aspects of the program and that the miemorandum and Goldsmith's attachment would become a part of the Presidential records and would be discovered later by historians.\n\nHe stated he believed it was important to \"make a record.\" (U)\nAccording to Mueller's program log, Gonzales called Mueller at 1:45\np-m. on March\n16 to discuss the situation.\n\nGonzales explained to Mueller hat in yiew of the Department's tentative conclusion that legal support for\n(b)@)\n,\n|\nwas still lacking, Gonzales would have to make a ecommendation to the President on how to proceed. Gonzales told Mueller he needed to know whether CEEREEEE Mueller would resign if the President decided\n| \\[cller responded that he\n\"would have to take time to consider his actions, but that he \"would have to give it serious consideration if the President decided to go ahead in the face of DOJ's finding.\" (ES/ASTLW//SHAOCHNE)-\nLater that afternoon on March 16, Card called Comey to the White House for a meeting, According to Philbin's notes, \"the back channel word from Judee Gonzales\" was that President Bush might be willing to\n'Prior to the meeting, Comey, Goldsmith, and Philbin agreed that Comey should be ready to convev, the White House that the Department would sup por gty also expressed to Department's eparty o o g v v\n1\n=\nPhilbin's notes indicate that at the meeting Card told resident was \"wrestling\" with the issue of whether to}s\n.\n\nand would decide \"very soon.\" Card\n'Comey his di sure that Comiey had put in writing the position on the legality of the program.\n\n-\nSTLWLLS\nThat evening, while attending a farewell dinner for a Department colleague at a local restaurant, Philbin received a call from David Addington indicatinig that he wanted to deliver a letter Gonzales had written to Comey.\n\nPhilbin met Addington at the Department at 8:30 p.m. that night to accept the letter. Philbin's notes also indicate that Gonzales had called Comey in advance to tell Comey \"not to get too overheated by the letter.\"\n(U)\nComey told us he recalled that Gonzales told him in the call that the White House would agree to work with the Department to fix the program aid that Comey should not \"overreact\" to Gonzales's letter. Comey said he believed Addington, and not Gonzales, had actually drafted the letter, and that Gonzales sent it only to counter Comey's. memorandum and to make a record on behalf of the White House.\n\n(U)\n'Gongzales's letter stated that the President had directed him to respond to Comey's memorandum. The letter stated:\nYour memorandum appears to have been based on a misunderstanding of the President's expectations regarding the conduct of the Department of Justice. While the President was, and remains, interested in any thoughts the Department of Justice may have on alternative ways to achieve effectively the goals of the activities authorized by the Presidential Authorization of March 11, 2004, the President has addressed definitively for the Executive Branch in the Presidential Authorization the interpretation of the law.192\nThe letter also excerpted the language of paragraph 10 from the March 11,\n2004, Authorization, which recited the bases on which the President acted to reauthorize the program, and then concluded:\n\"Please ensure that the\n\"According to Mueller Sfpmgram log, Gonzales called Comey to advise him of the Presuient s decision on Ma1ch 17 2004, and Comey passed this information to Mueller later that day. Comey, in an e-mail dated March 17, expressed relief at the President's decision, writing:\nToday, in a remarkable development we stepped back from: the brink of disaster. All seems well in the Government. The right thing was dene. TS/ STLWLSH-LOC/NE-\nGongzales told the OIG during his interview that he could not say whether the prospect of resignations at the Department and the FBIl may have had an impact on the President's decision.194 We were not able to interview others at the White House to determine what specifically caused the program to be modified in accord with the Department's legal position.\n\nU\nThe President's directive was expressed in two modifications to the March 11, 2004, Presidential Authorization. These modifications, as well as the operational and legal implications of the President's decision for the Department and the FBI, are described in the next sections. {TS//LSHHNF-\n\n## I. March 19, 2004, Modification (U)\n\nOn March 19, 2004, the President signed, and Gonzales certified as to form and legality, a Modification of the March 11, 2004, Presidential\n193 Comey stated that he did not believe Gonzales wrote this letter.\n\nHe stated that\n\"Addington was the flame-thrower\" and that Gonzales was generally more reasonable and moderate. Comey said that Gonzales had later apologized to both Comey and Ashcroft for his conduct during the March 10-incident at the hospital and had even come around to agree with Philbin and Goldsmith's analysis regarding the program.\n\nGonzales told the OlG\nthat he did not apologize to Ashcroft for the incident in the hospital because he had been instructed by the President to go there, but stated that he \"regretted\" the incident.\n\n(U)\nAuthorization. The first par agraph of the Modification stated that \"this memorandum, as a policy matter, modifies the Presidential Authorization of March 11, 2004 as set forth below . .\n\n. and granted by all the Presidential AuLhonzatmns to the extent set lorth:{in the Modification].\" The March 19 Mod1f10at1on made two significant changes to the existing Authorization and g\n_third\n-\nnt change affecting all Authorizations.\n\nTo allow for a ) !\n\n| these changes were to become effectwc beommnc at: mldmdhton March 26, 2004.\n\nFirst, the March 19 Modification inserted language to narrow content collection (basket 1) to al Qaeda and affiliated terrorist groups, as the Department had advised. The new content collection authority in paragraph\n4(a) of the March 11 Authorization, with the new language from the March 19 Modification indicated in italics, was:\nacquire a communication (including but not limited to a wire communication carried into or out of the United States by cable)\nfor which, based on the factual and practical considerations of everyday life on which reasonable and prudent persens act, there are reasonable grounds to believe such communication originated or terminated outside the United States and a.party to such communication is a group engaged in international terrorism, or activities in preparation therefor, or any agent of such a group, provided that such group is al Qa'ida, is a group affilzated with al Qa'ida, or is another group that I determine for purposes of this Presidential Autherization is in .armed conflict with the United States and poses a threat of hostile action within the United States|.]\n(P87\nHETHO\nModification, March 19, 2004, pa additional language resulted i in B\nEach Presidential Authorization had contained a directive to the Secretary of Defense not to disclose the program outside the Executive Branch without the President's approval.\n\nThe Modification reiterated that any change was not intended to reverse the President's control over access\n196 Bradbury was nominated to be Assistant Attorney General for OLC in June\n2005, He was not confirined for this positien, and told us that after exhausting the time period for use of the \"Acting\" title under the Vacancies Reform Act of 1998 (see 5 U.S.C.\n\n'3345 et-seq,). in April 2007, he reverted to Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General, the position he had held prior to his nomination.\n\nAs head of OLC, Bradbury became resporisible for briefing members' of Congress on OLC's legal analyses concerning the program as well as on the Presidential Authorizations. Bradbury's access to these documents and the officials responsible for drafting them provided him significant\n\n## 5. Judge Kollar-Kotelly S His Analysis Regardi\n\nAs noted abo;}.e, Judge Kollar-Kotelly was made aware on March 14,\n2004, that the March 11 Authorization had been signed by the President but had not been certified as to form and legality by the Justice Department. On March 18, 2004, Goldsmith, Philbin, Baker, and Gonzales met with Judge Kollar-Kotelly to further brief her on the status of the program.. According to an internal OLC memoranduin, they advised her that forthcoming legal opinions from OLC would allay her cencerns about the use offiprqg:r,vamederifved information in FISA applications,202\nThe OIG reviewed a handwritten letter from Judge Kollar-Kotelly to OIPR Counsel Baker, which\n'ed to have been written just after the initiation ofMIBEIGE\ns mandated in the March 19, 2004, Modification. Baker told us that the handwritten letter should be viewed as an informal draft designed to convey Judge Kollar-Kotelly's preliminary understanding of the issues raised by the changes to the Stellar Wind program.\n\nIn the letter, Judge Kollar-Kotelly reiterated her position that Stellar Wind-derived information should be excluded from FISA\napplications, writing, \"so there is no misunderstanding, I will not sign a FISA application which contains any information derived from and/or obtained from the [Stellar Wind] program,\" including applications in which a.\n\nStellar Wind tip \"was the sole or principal factor in starting an investigation by any of the agencies, even if the investigation was conducted independently of the tip from [Stellar Wind].\" Judge Kollar-Kotelly also requested, as a precondition to her agreeing to sign FISA applications in the future, that OIFR clarify in writing its proposal for reviewing FISA\napplicationis to ensure that all Stellar Wind-derived information had been excluded. Baker told us that he had a lot of \"verbal back and forth\" with Judge Kollar-Kotelly to explain OIPR's scrubbing procedures.\n\nOn March 263, 2004, OLC completed a draft mernorandum for Baker entitled \"Use or Disclosure of Certain Stellar Wind Information in Applications Under FISA.\" This memorandum addressed the inc TISA applications of information derived indirectly fro\n(b)(1).\n\n(B)(B)\n)\n{\n205\nOLC also provided Judge Kollar-Kotelly with a copy of its draft leg analysis.2%\n{(I577\n204 This argument is discussed below in connection with Goldsmith's May 6, 2004, legal analysis.\n\n(U)\n205 With respect to\n~ the memorandum stated that the Department did not believ ch information was subject to any constitutional restraints or statutory restrictions, but that \"[t]o the extent Judge Kollar-Kotelly has concerns about those conclusions, we note that the analysis in this memorandum independently demonstrates that there are no legal restrictions on the use of information indirectly derived fro JOTEREIEBOIET\n| tippers in FISA applications.\"\n200 The draft memorandum did not address inclusion in FISA applications of iriformati'on derived directly from the program because OIPR had successfully managed to address Judge Kollar-Kotelly''s order to exclude such information.\n\n(T\nQT RLLLSL\nL QO LNE\n(I\nA\nMY\nA Bl\n7T\n\n## 6. April 2, 2004, Modification (U)\n\nAttorney General Ashcr oft's doctors cleared him to resume his duties as Attorney General as of March 31, Comey advised Ayres in a March 30,\n0004, memorandum that as of 7:00 a.m. on March 31, the Attorney Gencral W4s no longer \"absent or disabled\" within the meaning of 28 U.S.C.  508(a), and that-as of that time Comey could no longer exercise the duties of the Office of Attorney General pursuant to the statute. A.copy of the memorandum was sent to White House Counsel Gonzales and other senior Departiment officials.\n\n(U)\nOn April 2, 2004, President Bush signed, and Gonzales certified as to form and legality, a second Modification of the March 11 2004 Presidential\n_Authorization, This modification addressed onlyRETHQIEE\n.\n\nactivities of the Stellar Wind program (TS\nSFEY\n207 An April 5, 2003, dsmith mem dum to file stated that OLC worked with Addirigton to craft the new\n3),\n(b S STEWT\nST/ TOCTINE]\n_208_Bradbury distinguished ially authorized\n, the Modifications ate?tf to FBI employees nation to the field.\n\nand subsequen horlzafi\n7\nS\n- ,,ere\n'\nrespcmsflale for tlpp ng Stellen W. nd in\n\n(\n~\nAformer Unit Chief in the Communications Analysis Unit (CAU)\nwithin the FBI's Communications Exploitation Section (CXS) of the\nCounterterrorism Division told us he became aware that at some point the\nscope of collection under Stellar Wind was narrowed to include only\npEres'\n|\nHesaid this 1nfo1 mation was passed along to him\nand others at\nthe FBI during either,\n]\nacterly meeting with\nNSA 1epresentat1ves\nHe said Lh =\nractice was \"taken\nvery seriously\" by the NSA. Asan example, he said that Requests for\nInformation (REL) from the FBI to the NSA on numbers not associated with\nwere rejected by the NSA as outs1de the 'scope of the\nrevised Authonzatmn An FBI Supervisory Special Agent in the CAU'S unit co-located at the NSA (called Team 10) told us thatwhenh first began collection and\n' ))('l (b)(S)\n=\n@\n=\n' om'c the scope of collec\"' 0\n, He sald that )\n(b?( )v mformatmn ona pal tlcular number, Lhe NSA closely analyzed the number and requested supporting information from the FBI before querying the Stellar Wind database.\n\nThis supervisor also stated that the NSA did a good job of keeping the co-located FBI personnel informed of changes to the scope of collections.\n\nHe said this information typically would be conveyed to appropriate personnel during the daily \"all hands meetings.\"\n\n## 8. Office Of Legal Counsel Assesses Nsa's Compliance With New Collection Standards {Es/Fsh7Nf|\n\nGoldsmiith told us that durmg the week of March 29, 2004, he and Philbin conduc:\ndit\"\nof the Stellar Wind program to ensure that the querying ofl\n. \\was being conducted in accordance with the Pres1dcnt1al Authouzauons {?SHS?LWH-SI%;LQQ%NE)\nGoldsmith said that while resources were not available to conduct a sprofessional\" audit, he visited the NSA apdes yiewed with releyant NSA\nofficials the legal parameters for queryingEREEIEER\n=\nwhich as discussed above required a showing of reasonable articulable suspicion that the target belonged to a group that was engaged in international terrorism.?0 Goldsmith told the OIG that as part of the review, he agd Philbin famili ized the NSA with the new collection parameters\n|\n35S\n71\nOn April 15. 2004, Goldsmith reported the results of his and Philbin's top P\n1 e Assistant General Counsel for Operations in the General 'Couneel at tfle time.\n\n## 9, May 5, 2004, Presidential Authorization {Es//Shane)-\n\nAs noted above, the March 11, 2004, Presidential Authorization, as modified, was set to expire on May 6, 2004.\n\nOn May 5, the President signed another Authorization extending the Stellar Wind program through June 24,\n.\n\n2004.\n\nUnlike the March 11 Authorization and the two modifications that followed it, the May 5 Authorization was certified as to form and legality by Attorney General Asheroft. TTS7/SIF7NFS\nThe May 5; Authorization contained the Authorization narrowing the scope of DG laneuage from the March 11\n.\n\nI\nTheMayS Authorization also-\n\"included the paragraph defining the scope of (RIS\n'\nEE\nmcdfiified' on Mrch9 to-encompass onl 1 )(1)(b)(3) -\n-\n\"reiterated the new collection standard s Modification, which required thatl L)1)\ni8]\n'\n=\n~\nWith minor variations, the collection standards.and other language set forth in the May 5, 2004, Presidential Autherization remained uncli'fangx_jd_ in all of the subsequent Authorizatiens.2!1\n\n## 10. May 6, 2004, Olc Memorandum (S Shnf\n\nOn May 6, 2004, Goldsmith completed a revised OLC memorandum on the legality of the Stellar Wind program. The 108-page document stated that it was written for the Attorney General in response to his request for OLC \"to undertake a thorough reexamination of the Stellar Wind program asitis currently operated to confirm that the actions that the President has directed the Department of Defense to undertake through the N ational Security Agency (NSA) are lawful.\" {FS//SL//NE)\n'\nThe memorandum traced the history of the program and analyzed the legality of each of the three collection baskets in light of applicable statutes, Executive Orders, cases, and constitutional provisions.\n\n'?i\n'The memorandum noted that Sectlon 111 of FISA, 50.U.8.C.  1811, proyiding that the President \"may authorize electroniic surveillance without a court order .\n\n.\n\n, to acquire foreign intelligence information for a period not.\n\nto exceed flfteen calendar days following a declaration of war by Congress,\"\nmade it clear that FISA expressly addresses electronic surveillarice during wartime.212 The memorandum stated that the Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMPF) passed by Congress shortly after the attacks of September 11, 2001, gave the President authority to use both domestically and abroad \"all necessary and appropriate force,\" inluding 31gnals intelligenice capabilities, to prevent future acts of international terrorism against the United States. According to the memorandum, the AUMF was.\n\nproperly read as an express authorization to conduct targeted electronic surveillance against al Qaeda and its affiliates, the entities responmble for attacking the United States. -(-'-PS#'S'H:W#-SH%@@%NFT\nThe memorandum noted that the legislative history of FISA - indicates that the 15-day window was \"thought sufficient for the President to secure legislation easing the restrictions of FISA for the conflict at hand.\" Quoting H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 95-1720, at 34, reprinted in U.5.C.C.A. N. 4048, 4063.\n\n(\"[T]he conferees intend that this period will allow time for consideration of any amendment to this act that may be appropriate during a wartime emergency\"). According to the OLC memorandum, \"The Congressional Authorization functions as precisely such legislation:\nit is emergency\n1cg1s1at10n passed to address a specific armed conflict and expressly designed to authorize whatever military actions the Executive deems appropriate to safeguard the United States.\" (PSS\nThe memorandum concluded that at a minimum the AUMF made the application of FISA in a wartime context sufficiently ambiguous that the doctrine of constitutional avoidance properly applied to avoid a conflict between FISA and the presidentially authorized Stellar Wind program.\n\nAlternatively, the memorandum argued that FISA, as applied in the particular circumstances of a President directing surveillance of the enemy to prevent future attacks upon the nation, represented an unconstitutional infringement on the President's Article I Commander~1n Chief powers.\n\nTS/ASTLW//SHAOC/NE),\n- the miemorandum discussed imulications of the Stellar Wind program. To determine whether interception o DRGSO\nB\nviolated the Fourth Amendment's prohibition a st unreasonable searches, the memorandum analyzed whether the importance of the government's interest in this collection outweighed the individual privacy interests at stake., Citing various,authorii yding Supreme Court opinions, the Federalist Papers,}\nand congressional testimony, the memorandum concluded that \"the government's overwhelming interest in detecting and thwarting further al Qaeda attacks is easily sufficient to make reasonable the intrusion into privacy involved in intercepting selected communications.\" The memorandum noted that the weight of the government's interest in this regard could change over time if the threat from al Qaeda were deeemed: to recede,\n1FSF\nNFSHOCINEY\nThe memorandum also analyzed telephone and e-mail meta data collection under the Fourth Amendment. The memorandum concluded, hased on the Supreme Court's holding in Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735,\n742 (1979), that there is no legitimate expectation offi.pr'ivacy in the numbers dialed to place telephone calls. Referring to cases holding that no expectation of privacy attached to the address information on either letter mail or e-mail, the memorandum concluded that no Fourth Amendment privacy interests were implicated in the collection of e-mail meta data.\n\n## Iil. Oig Analysis (U) A. Department's Access To And Legal Review Of Stellar Wind Program Through May 2004 {Es/Hfsthnf}\n\nThe Justice Department's access to the Stellar Wind program was controlled by the White House, and Gonzales told the OIG that the President decided whether non-operational personnel, including Department lawyers, could be read into the program. Department and FBI officials told us that obtaining approval to read in Department officials and FISA Court judges involved justifying the requests to Addington and Gonzales, who effectively acted as gatekeepers to the read-in process for non-operational officials.\n\nIn contrast, according to the NSA, operational personnel at the NSA, CIA, and the FBI were read into the program on the authority of the NSA Director, who at some point delegated this authority to the Stellar Wind Program Manager. FS/+1SH-NF\nVarious officials we interviewed about the issue uniformly agreed that the White House sought to strictly limit overall access to the Stellar Wind p]ro,g-rarna We believe that this policy was applied at the Department in an unnecessarily restrictive manter prior to March 2004, and was detrimental to the Department's role in the operation of the program through that period. We also believe that Attorney General Asheroft, as head of the Department, was responsible for seeking to Gi_'iSLH'C that the Department had adequate attorney resources to conduct a thorough and accurate review of the legality of the program. Because Ashcroft did not agree to be interviewed for this investigation, we were unable to-determine the extent of his efforts to press the White House to read in additional Department officials between the program's inception in October 2001 and the critical events of March 2004, FS/+SHNF\nIn Chapter Three we described how the Department's early involvement in the Stellar Wind program was limited to the participation of only three attorneys - Attorney General Asheroft, OLC Deputy Assistant Attorney General John Yoo, and Counsel for Intelligence Policy James Baker.216 Working alone, Yoo drafted several legal memoranda in 2001 and\n2002 advising the Attorney General and the White House that the program was legally supported.\n\nIn reliance on Yoo's advice, Attorney General Ashcroft certified the legality of the Presidential Authorizations to implement the program. {F&/EH7NFT\nBecause Yoo worked alone, his legal analysis was not reviewed by other attorneys, either in OLC or elsewhere in the Department.217 Even\n216 Counsel for Intelligence Policy James Baker was read into the program in either late 2001 or January 2002.\n\nBut Baker appears to have been read in only because he inadvertently came across information that suggested-such a program existed. While Baker had involvement in several aspects of the program, he had no involvement in drafting or reviewing Yoo's legal memoranda supporting the program. Daniel Levir, who served &s both Chief of Staff to FBI Director Mueller and briefly as a national security counselor to Ashcroft, also was read into Stellar Wind at the inception of the program.\n\nHowever, Levin only served for two months at the Department during this early phase of Stellar Wind and had very limited involvement in the program during this period, Levin told us he was read into Stellar Wind along with: Director Mueller at the FBI and that he understood that he was being cleared into the program as an FBI official. We therefore consider Levin to be an FBI read-in, not a Department read-in. {FS/LSTLW//SL/OC/NE)\n27\nGongzales told us that he thought Yoo may have assigned discrete tasks to other attorneys in connection with his work on the Stellar Wind legal memoranda. Because Yoo declined our request for an interview, we were unable to confirm this.\n\nIn any event, no other attorneys were read into Stellar Wind and therefore would not have beeri permitted to work on or review those portions of the memoranda that contdined Top Secret/Sensitive Compartmented Information (TS/ SClI) related to the Stellar Wind program.\n\nBy contrast, Yoo had at least one other OLC attorney to assist him in drafting other OLC legal memoranda on the detainee interrogation program during the 2001 to 2003 period, and these memoranda were reviewed by another OLC Deputy Assistant Attorney General\n(Cont'd.)\nwhen Jay Bybee became the OLC Assistant Attorney General in Novermber\n2001, and was therefore Yoo's supervisor, Bybee was not read into the program.?} Bybee told us he also was unaware that Yoo was providing advice to the Attorney General and the White House on the legal basis to support the program. {F877/5H/ 1)~\n~We believe that even before Patrick Philbin voiced his initial concerns with Yoo's analysis in 2008, the circumstances in 2001 and 2002 plainly called for additional Department resources to be applied to the legal review of the program and that it was the Attorney General's responsibility to be aware of this need and to take steps to address it. Moreover, because Ashcroft met frequently with the President on national security matters, he would have been well-positioned to request additional legal resources if he believed they were necessary. (FSAHHSHANE)\nThe facts suggest that Asheroft had some awareness and concern that Yoo was working on the legal justification for the Stellar Wind program without any Departmerit assistance or oversight, and possibly was advising the White House directly of his findings. Based on accounts of the incident in Ashcroft's hospital room in March 2004, Ashcroft made specific complaints to Gonzales and Card about insufficient legal resources at the Department and that the Department had been \"cut out of the whole affair.\"\nHe had also expressed frustration to Comey months earlier about being \"in a box\" with Yoo.\n\nFurther, according to Goldsmith, when Goldsmith first interviewed for the position of Assistant Attorney General for OLC in 2003, Ashcroft and his Chief of Staff alluded to concerns over being kept informed of matters the Office of Legal Counsel was working on and the imiportance of keeping the Attorney General \"in the loop.\" Wealso riote that Yoo's November 2, 2001, memorandum to Ashcroft indicated that \"[blecause of the highly sensitive riature of this subject and the time pressures involved, this memorandum has not undergone the usual editing and review process for opinions that issue from our Office [OLC].\" FS/+SHNEN\nWhile we believe that Ashcroft may have been aware that Yoo was working alone on the Stellar Wind analysis and had concerns about this, we do not know whether or how hard he pressed the White House to read in additional attorneys to assist or supervise Yoo.\n\nAt the same time, however,\n(Philbin} and approved by the OLC Assistant Attorney General {Bybee).\n\nThe detainee interrogation program also was classified as TS /SCl.\n\nWe also note that Philbin's background in telecommunications law would have made him a logical choice to assist Yoo on the Stellar Wind legal analysis. FS//-SHANE)\nwe cannot assume that any requests by Ashcroft for additional attorney read-ins would have been granted by the White House.\n\nGongzales told us that Ashcroft had requested that Deputy Attorney General Larry Thompson and Ashcroft's Chief of Staff David Ayres be read in. However, neither request was approved.?1?\n\nGongzales stated that he did not recall Ashcroft requesting additional read-ins beyond Thompson and Ayres.\n\n(U)\nIni analyzing the read-in 'situation at the Department during Yoo's tenure, we also considered that Ashcroft certified the program as to its legality each time the program came up for renewal, and did so at a time when Yoo's legal advice was the only Department guidance available concerning the program's legality.\n\nWe believe the fact that only three Department attorneys were read into Stellar Wind through mid-2003 may have heen due at least in part to Ashcroft's routine recertifications of the Presidential Authorizations during this period.\n\nAs noted in Chapter Three, Gornzales told us that it was up to the Attorney General to decide how to satisfy his legal obligations as Attorney General, and that if Ashcroft believed more attorneys were needed for this purpose, he could have asked the President to approve additional Department read-ins.\n\nGonzales also told us that Ashcroft's continued certifications of the Presidential Authorizations supported Gonzales's belief that Ashcroft was satisfied with the quality of the legal advice he was receiving at the time within the Department.\n\n)\n'There is evidence as well that Gonzales, as White House Counsel, was satisfied with Yoo's legal memoranda supporting the program. Gonzales told us that although he did not believe Yoo's first two memoranda fully addressed the White House's understanding of the Stellar Wind program, Gonzales believed that they described as lawful activities that were broader than those carried out under Stellar Wind, and that Yoo's memoranda therefore \"covered\" the program.?20 {FS/fSH\n -\npriefed about the program in\n-\n..\n\nto be read into'the program in 2003, The OIG does 10t Know who authorized these read-ins, -FS7SHNF-\n220 We were troubled by Gonzales's suggestion that Yoo's memoranda covered the program because the memoranda determined to be lawful a range of \"hypothetical\"\nactivities that were interpreted by Gonzales to be broader than those actually garried out under Stellar Wind.\n\nSuch an approach, if deemed acceptable by the \"client\" (in this case the White House), would encourage the Office of Legal Counsel to draft broad and imprecise\n{Cont'd.)\nHowever, even apart from the limited number of Department read-ins, we believe that the White House imposed excessively strict controls ever access to the program in other ways that were detrimental to the Department's ability to provide the White House with the soundest possible legal advice, For instance, we found no indication that Yoo coordinated his legal analysis with the NSA. According to Michael Hayden, the Director 'of the NSA when Stellar Wind began, the NSA relied on its Office of General Counsel, arid not the Department of Justice, for advice as to the legality of the program when it was created.\n\nHowever, we found that the NSA's Office of General Counsel did not coordinate its legal advice with the Department, and even as late as 2003 the NSA General Counsel was prevented by the White House from reviewing the Department's legal opinions on the program.??! Hayden also told the OIG that he was \"surprised with a small\n's\" that the Department did not participate in the early meetings with him and White House officials when Stellar Wind was first conceived.\n\nIn addition, Addington instructed Philbin not to discuss.the program with Baker, who as Counsel for Intelligence Policy was responsible for representing the government before the FISA Court.222 {FS//81//1F\nWe believe that that White House should have allowed and even ericouraged coordination between the Department and the NSA regarding the development of the legal analys1s of the program, especially as this analysis was first bBeing formulated in late 2001.. Such interaction between the Department and other Executive agencies is a mainstay of traditional OLC practlce and we believe its absence here contributed to factual errors in Yoo''s opinions regarding the operation of the program. IS L/SLILANE}\nAlthough we could not determine exactly why Yoo remained the only Department attorney assigned to assess the program's legality from 2001\nuziti] his departure in May 2003, we discuss below our belief that this practice represented an extraordinary and inappropriate departure from OLC's traditional review and oversight procedures and resulted in significant harm to the Department's role in the program. HF&//SH-/NF}-\nWhen Yoo left the Department in May 2003, he was replaced by Patrick Philbin, who was read into the program to advise Ashcroft whether he could continue to certify the Presidential Authorizations as to their form legal analysis and would discourage the type of careful scholarship to which the OLC\ntraditionally aspires.\n\n08773t/ NF\nIn addition, the NSA Office of the Inspector General, which wanted to conduct an internal audit of the program during this peried, was prevented by Addington from and legality. When Goldsmith became the OLC Assistant Attorney General in October 2003, Philbin pressed Addington to have Goldsmith read in, and Goldsmith became the first head of OLC to be read into the program.\n\nAs noted, Goldsmith's predecessor Jay Bybee was never read into the programi.\n\nThus, by the end of 2008, a total of only 5 Department officials - Yoo, Ashcroft, Baker, Philbin, and Goldsmith - had been read into Stellar Wind.\n\nBy comparison, and as shown in Chart 4. 1 below, we determined that many other individuals throughgut the coverpment were read in the program.\n\nh the same period.\n\nB\nhrou The assignment of only one Department attorney, John Yoo, to conduct a legal review of the program without assistance or oversight from anyone else at the Department, combined with the White House's decision to prevent the NSA from reviewing Yoo's work, resulted in legal opinions by\n.\n\nYoo that were later determined by OLC to be so inaccurate and incomplete as to be regarded as not covering key aspects of the Stellar Wind program Given the enormously complex nature of the program from both a technical and legal perspective, coupled with the fact that he was working alone, it was not altogether surprising that Yoo's analys1s contained inaccuracies and omitted critical elements, particularly glven the pressure to generate a\n'1egal analysis within weels of the program's implementation. However, Yoo's analysis did not charnge or inilude a more accurate description of the program s operatlon over the course of his 20-month tenure with the OLC.\n\nAfter reviewing Yo00's legal opiniens on the program, Goldsmith and Phflbm qulckly chscovered what they characterized as seriougflay\n00'S\n*'s fallure to descrtbe\n\"Philbin 'alisoacknoiged that tf riily'1 'correctly beheved the NSA s\n'\nwas broader than it in fact was under the program. However, unlike Yoo, Goldsmith and Philbin accurately characterized the collectior\n|\n\\and thus their legal advice was based.\n\non facts that wiore closely ref ected the actual operation of the program 22>\n)\nIn addition, Goldsmith and Philbin discovered that Yoo's assertion that the President had broad authority to conduct electronic surveillarice withouit a warrart pursuant to his Commander-in-Chief powers under Article 1 of the Constitution, particularly during wartime, never addressed\n'the FISA provision that expressly addressed electronic surveillance following a formal declaration of war.\n\nSee 50 U.S.C.  1811, Goldsmith alse criticized:\nYo60's legal memoranda for failing to support Yoo's aggressive Article I\nCommander-in-Chief theory with a fully developed separation of powers analysis, and instead offering only sweeping conclusions, As an example, Goldsmith. cited Yoo's assertion that reading FISA to be the \"exclusive statutory means for conducting electronic surveillance for foreign intelligence\" amounts to an \"yunconstitutiorial infringement on the President's Article II authorities.\"226 Moreover, noted Goldsmith, Yoo omitted from his separation-of-powers discussion any analysis of how the Youngstown Steel Seizure Case, a seminal Supreme Court decision on the distribution of governmental powers between the Executive and Legislative Branches during wartime, would affect the legality of the President's actions with respect to Stellar Wind.?27 {FS/STEWSHOCHNE)\nIn reliance on Yoo's advice, the Attorney General certified the program\n\"as to form and legality\" some 20 times before Yoo's analysis was\n'\ndetermined to be flawed by his successors in OLC and by attorneys in the Office of the Deputy Attorney General. We agree with many of the criticisms offered by Department officials regarding the practice of allowing a single Department attorney to develop the legal justification for the program stirveillance for foreign intelligence purposes,\"\nduring its early stage of operation. We summarize these criticisms below.\n\nGoldsmith described as \"crazy\" and \"outrageous\" the assignment of an OLC Deputy Assistant Attorney General to provide legal advice to the White House without the kriowledge or concurrence of the Senate-confirmed Assistant Attorney General for OLC, who is accountable for the legal positions taken by the office.\n\n(U)\nGoldsmith said that not a single critical eye reviewed Yoo's work on a program that Goldsmith described as \"flying in the face\" of the conventional understanding of the law at the time. Goldsmith neted that Yoo's legal ntemoranda did not include facts about how the Stellar Wind program operated in practice, and he surmised that Yoo instead might have \"keyed off\" the Presidential Authorizations rather than NSA's actual collection.\n\npractices in developing his analysis. Goldsmith also said it was \"insane\"\nthat Yoo's memoranda were not shared with the NSA. Goldsmith said that had the NSA reviewed these memoranda Yoo's failtire to accurately describe the nature and scope of the collection by the NSA and the resulting\n\"mismatch? between the actual practice and the wording of the Presidential Authorizations might have been detected earlier. {FS/SH-/NE\nSimilarly, Daniel Levin, who was one of the first FBI officials to be read into Stellar Wind and who would later become Acting Assistant Attorney General for OLC upon Goldsmith's departure in June 2004, criticized allowing a single attorney to be the sole voice of the OLC\nconcerning a program such as Stellar Wind. Levin stated that OLC has a special role at the Department and within the government, especially with.\n\n\"highly secret programs where opinions may never sce the light of day.\"\nUnder such circumstances, according to Levin, it is very difficult not to say\n\"yes\" to the White House - OLC''s client\n- in the face of national security threats.\n\nLevin stated that unlike situations where a court places limitations on the positions the government may take, there are no such limitations when OLC considers a position that will remain secret, and it is easier to be more aggressive and \"cut some corners\" under such circumstances.\n\n## ~Esh St Shfos Nf\n\nLevin stated that Yoo's memoranda justifying the program suffered from too little circulation and a lack of alternative views.\n\nHe said that the OLC memoranda produced under Goldsmith's tenure were better, not because the authors were \"smarter\" than Yoo, but because the authors benefited from multiple viewpoints and input. Levin also said that he never understood why the Stellar Wind program was deemed so sensitive at the operational level, Levin said he appreciated that the program was politically sensitive, but added that it was a \"huge mistake\" to keep the program so closely held within the Department. {FS//STEWHSHA/OC\nN\nWe believe that Goldsmith's and Levin's comments concerning the secreey of Stellar Wind are especially relevant to the need for legally and factiially sound OLC analysis with respect to classified national security programs. Because programs like Stellar Wind are not subject to the usual\n.external checks and balances on Executive authority, OLC's advisory role is particularly critical to the Executive's understanding of potential statutory and Constitutional constraints on its actions.\n\n%\nISHHLO\n Deputy Attorney General Comey also criticized the decision to allow asingle person to assess the legality of the program on behalf of the Department, Comey told us that Goldsmith had once aptly described the Yoo situation to him as \"the perfect storm\" in which the following factors converged:\nthe terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001; a \"brilliant guy\" at the Department who was \"an aggressive advocate for executive power\"; and a White House \"determined to restore executive power,\" Comey expressed a degree of sympathy for Yoo, noting the extraordinary situation into which Yoo had been placed. Comey also observed that the response to Septeniber 11 essentially placed the policy burden on lawyers, who were now looked to by others for guidance as to what counterterrorism activities fell within the bounds of the law. However, Comey said that he believed White House officials \"got what they ordered\" by asking Yoo for opinions and restricting the number of persons with access to the program or the opiriions.228 {PSH-SH-NF-\nAttorney General Ashcroft declined to be interviewed in our review, and we were thus unable to determine what his views were on the assignment of Yoo alone to conduct the legal review of the program.\n\nHowever, as noted above, witness accounts of his statements concerning the Yoo situation leave little doubt that Ashcroft was plainly upset with the White House for putting him \"in a box\" with Yoo. According to Goldsmith and Philbin, Ashcroft was direct about his grievances when Gonzales and Card came to see him in the hospital on March 10, 2004, including complaining that Ashcroft's Chief of Staff and until recently the Deputy Attorney General had not been allowed to be reac 1\ntread into the program, anhd that he found it \"very troubling that =2 28\n_people in other agencies\"\nhad been read into the program. What remains unclear is whether Ashcroft came to the realization that the Department had been given an insufficient number of read-ins only after Philbin and Goldsmith presented him with their concerns about the quality of Yoo's legal analysis, or at some point before. AFSHFSH-NF\nWe sought to obtain Yoo's and the White Housc:'sperspective on his selection as the sole Justice Department attorney to be read into Stellar Wind to provide advice on the legality of the program, We were not able to interview Yoo, who declined our request, or Addington and Card, who did not respond to our requests. {FS/ASHNE-\nThe OIG asked Gonzales about how the White House determined who in the Department could be read into the program, but on the advice of Special Counsel to the President, Gonzales limited his answer to his personal views and declined to discuss internal White House deliberations that may have factored into the read-in decisions.\n\nGonzales stated that he believed it was necessary for national security reasons to limit the number of read-ins to those \"who were absolutely essential.\" Gonzales also stated that there had to be sufficient operational personnel at the NSA, CIA, and FBI read in for the purpose of running the program, while reading in additional lawyers at the Department had comparatively less value because all lawyers will \"have opinions\" about the program.\n\nYet, Gonzales also stressed to us that he welcomed the Department's reassessment of Yoo's opinions and encouraged Goldsmith and Philbin to re-examine the legal basis for the program in 2003 and 2004.229 {FS// S/ NE)\nWe think the proposition that the participation of Department attorneys to analyze the legality of a program as factually and legally complex as Stellar Wind should be limited for the reasons offered by Gonzales is shortsighted and counterproductive.\n\nFirst, it is evident that Stellar Wind was as legally complex as it was technically challenging. Just as a sufficient number of operational personnel were read into the program to assure its proper technical implementation, we think as many attorneys as necessary should have been read in to assure the soundness of the program's legal foundation. This was not done during the early phase of the program. {FSHSHNF\nThe full history of the program also indicates that the program benefited from additional attorney read-ins.\n\nIn this chapter, we described how Philbin and Goldsmith - who held differing opinions on which legal theorv best supported the program - discovered serious deficiencies in Yoo's analysis and together drafted more factually accurate and legally thorough support for the program.\n\nIn Chapters Five, Six, and Seven we further describe how reading in additional attorneys facilitated the grounding of the program on firmer legal footing under FISA, allowed the Department more efficiently to \"scrub\" Stellar Wind-derived information in FISA applications, and improved the handling of Stellar Wind-related discovery issues in international terrorism prosecutions.\n\nAt SR\net Second, we do not believe that reading in a few additional Department attorneys during the first 2 years of the program would have jeopardized national security as suggested by Gonzales, especially given the hundreds of Q'pgrational personnel who were cleared into the program during the same period (see'Chart 4.1).\n\nIn fact, as noted above, we think the highly classified nature of the program, rather than constituting an argument for limiting the OLC read-ins to a single attorney, made the need for careful analysis and review within the Department and by the NSA only more compelling.\n\nIn sum, we concluded that the departure from established OLC and Department practices resulted in legal opinions to support the program that were later determined to be flawed. We believe the strict control over the Department's access to the program undermined the role of the Department to ensure the legality of Executive Branch actions, and as discussed below, contributed to the March 2004 crisis that nearly resulted in the mass resignation of the Department's leadership. {BS/A-SH-ANFY\n. We recommend that when the Justice Department is involved with such programs in the future, the Attorney General should carefully assess whether the Department has been given adequate resources to carry out its vital function as legal advisor to the President and should aggressively seek additional resources if they are found to be insufficient. We also believe that the White House should allow the Department a sufficient number of read-ins when requested, consistent with national security considerations, to ensure that sensitive programs receive 4 full and careful legal review.\n\n(U)\n\n## B. The Hospital Visit (U)\n\nThe Department's reassessment of Yoo's analysis led Comey, who was exercising the powers of the Attorney General while Ashcroft was hospitalized in March 2004, to conclude that he could not certify the legality of the Stellar Wind program.\n\nIn response, the President sent Gonzales and Chief of Staff Andrew Card to visit Ashcroft in the hospital to seek his certification of the program, an action Ashcroft refused to take. We believe that the way the White House handled its dispute with the Department about the program - particularly in dispatching Gonzales and Card to Ashcroft's hospital room to override Comey's decision - was troubling for several reasons. {FS/SH-NF-\nAs discussed in this chapter, by March 2004, when the Presidential Authorization was set to expire again, Goldsmith had placed Gonzales and Addington on notice for several months of the Department's doubts about After Attorney General Ashcroft was hospitalized and unable to fulfill This duties, the White House was informed that Deputy Attorney General Comey had assumed the Attorney General's responsibilities. We found that the assertion by some in the White House at the time that they had not been informed of the situation was subsequently contradicted by the facts, In particular, Gonzales later acknowledged that he was aware that Comey was acting as the Attorney General 231\n(U)\nBefore the Presidential Authorization was set to expire on March 11, Comey, who was exercising the powers of the Attorney General at the time, told top officials in the White House - including Vice President Cheney and White House Counsel Gonzales\n- that the Justice Department could not recertlfy the legality of the program as it was presently operating. The White House disagreed with the Justice Department's position, and on March 10,\n2004, convened a meeting of eight congressional leaders to brief them on the Just1ce Department's seemingly sudden reluctance to. recertify the program. and on the need to continue the program. The White House did not inyvite anyone from the Department to this briefing to describe the: basis for its advice about the legality of the program;, nor did it inform the Department of its intention to hold the meeting.232 {TS//\nST/ NE}\nFollowing this briefing, Gonzales and Card went to the hospital to ask Attorney General Ashcroft, who was in the intensive care unit recovering\n230 Qur conclusion that Goldsmith advised Gonzales and Addington of the Department's concerns in December 2003 is supported by his contemporaneous notes of these events.\n\nIn addltlon, although Gonzales told us that the first time he recalled hearing of these concerns in detail was in early March 2004, he did not dispute that Goldsmith had first begun to advise him of the Department's general concerns months earlier.. (U)\n231 During his congressional testimony, when questioned about whether he knew that Attorney General Ashcroft's powers had been transferred to Comey, Gonzales responded, \"I think that there were newspaper accounts, and that fact that Mr. Comey was the acting Attorney General is probably something T knew of.\"\n{U)\nGonzales commented on a draft of this report he stated that the purpose of the meetmg meetlng was not fo have a \"debate\" between the Whlte House and the Department concernmg the legality of the programi, but rather to explore just such a legislative \"fix.\"\nfrom surgery and according to witnesses appeared heavily medicated, to certify the program, notwithstanding Comey's stated opposition. Yet, they did not notify Comey or aryone lse in the Department that they intended to take this action. Their attempt to have Ashcroft recertify the program did not succeed. Asheroft told them from his hospital bed that he supported the Department's legal position, but that in any event he was not the Attorney General at the time - Comey was.\n\n(U)\nGon\"z'ales-stated that even if he knew that Ashcroft was aware of Comey''s opposition to recertifying the program, Gonzales would still have wanted to speak with Ashcroft because he believed Ashcroft still retained the authority to certify the program. Gonzales testified before the Senate Judiciary Committee in July 2007 that although there was concern over Ashcroft's condition, \"We would not have sought nor did we intend to get any approval from General Ashcroft if in fact he wasn't fully competent to make that decision.\" Gonzales also testified, \"There's no governing legal prineiple that says that Mr. Ashcroft, if he decided he felt better, could\n'decide, T'm feeling better and I can make this decision, and I'm going to make this decision.\"\n(U)\nWe found this explanation and the way the White House handled the dispute to be troubling. Rather, we agree with Director Mueller's observation, as recorded in his program log following his meeting with Card on March 11, 2004, that the failure to have Department of Justice representation at the congressional briefing and the attempt to have Ashcroft certify the Authorization by overruling Comey \"gave the strong perception that the [White House| was trying to do an end run around the Acting [Attorney General] whom they knew to have serious concerns as to the legality of portions of the program.\" AFS//8H7/NF)\nAt a minimum, we would have expected the White House to alert Comey directly that it planned to brief the congressional leaders on the Department's position and that it intended to seek Ashcroft's approval of the program despite Comey and Goldsmith's stated legal position against continuing certain activities under the program. Instead, White House officials briefed congressional leaders and sought to have Attorney General Ashcroft recertify the program from his hospital bed without any notice to Comey or anyone else at the Department.\n\nWe believe these actions gave the appearance of an \"end run\" around the ranking Justice Department official with whom they disagreed. {FS7/3H1NF)-\n\n## C. Recertification Of The Presidex_Ntial Authorization And Modification Of The Program (U)\n\nAs described in this chapter, the Department had notified Gonzales and Addington of its concerns about the legality of aspects of the program for several months.\n\nIn fact, the Department had made clear to the White House in December 2003 and more emphatically in a series: of meetings.in March 2004 that it believed that aspects of the program could not be legally supported in their existing form. Comey and Goldsmith were clear i in their advice to the President and other White House officials.\n\nAt the liospital, Ashcroft also expressed deep concern\n[T\nand told Gonzales and Card that he supported the position of his subordmates We beheve that Ashcroft acted admirably under arduous circumstances.\n\n-{F\n-\n;\nDespite the legal concerns uniformly expressed By senior:Department of Justice leaders, the White House, through White House Counsel Gongzales, recer tified the Authorization, allowing the program to continue substantively unchanged. {FS17/SH-/NF\nOnly after Mueller, Comey, and other senior Department and FBI\nofficials made known their intent to resign if the White House continued the program unchariged, despite the Department's conclusion that aspects of the program could not be legally supported, did the President direct that the issue be resolved, and the program be modified to address the Department's legal concerns. Because we were unable to interview key White House officials, we could not determine for certain what caused the White House to change its position and modify the program, although the prospect of mass resignations at the Department and the FBI appears to-have been a significant factor in this decision. 233 According to Corhey, the President raisec a concern that he was hearing about these problems at the last minute, and the President thought it was not fair that he was not told earlier about the Department's legal position.\n\nIn fact, as Comey informed the President, the President's staff had been advised of these issues \"for weeks.\" {FS/SH/NE-\nFinally, we believe that the Department and FBI officials who resisted the pressure to recertify the Stellar Wind program because of their belief that aspects of the program were not legally supportable acted courageously and at significant professional risk. We believe that this action by Department and FBI officials - particularly Ashcroft, Comey, Mueller, whether he would resign if the Presides responded that he \"would have to g p go Goldsmith, Philbin, and Baker - was in- accord Wlth the highest professional standards- of the Justice Department.\n\nL\n:\n\n## Chapter Five Stellar Wind Program's Transition To Fisa  Authority (June 2004 Through August 2007)\n\nIn this chapter we examine the transition in stages of the Stellar Wind programi from presidential authority to FISA authority. We first describe the FISA Court's approval in July 2004 of the government's application to\n'\nacquire foreign intelligence information through the collection of bulk e-mail meta data (basket 3 information). This application was based on a legal theory related to FISA's pen register and trap and trace device provisions, We next discuss. the government's successful May 2006 application to the FISA Court for an order to obtain bulk telephony meta data (basket 2\ninformation) by the production of business records by certain telecommunications carriers. We then describe the government's interaction with the FISA Court to place under FISA the government's\n}\nauthority to intercept the content of certain communications involving both domestic and foreign telephone numbers and e-mail addreesses (basket 1\ninformation).\n\nFinally, we summarize legislation enacted in August 2007 and July 2008 to amend FISA to address, among other concerns, the difficulty the government encountered in obtaining FISA authority for content collection, as well as the government's contention that certain provisions of FISA had failed to keep pace with changes in telecommunications technology.\n\n\n'\n\n## I 'E-Mail Meta Data Collection Under Fisa {Eshshhne) Decision To Seek A Pen Register And Trap And Trace (Pr/Tt) Order From The Fisa Court {Fs{Sh-Nf\n\nT\n'lbm told us that he encountered some opposition to the FISA\napproach from. Counsel to the Vice President David Addington, who argued that the FISA\" Court was unconstitutional arid questioned the need to seek its-authorization for e-mail meta data collection. Philbin said that he responded that obtaining an order from the FISA Court was \"ironclad safe.\"\nBaker recalled attending at least one meeting at the White House with White House Counsel Gonzales and Addington to discuss whether to seek an order from the FISA Court based on FISA's pen register and trap and trace device provisions (a PR/TT Order) and how the FISA Court should be approached to obtain such an order. Baker stated that during the meeting Addington said, \"We are one bomb away from getting rid of this obnoxious Court.\"\nBaker said Addington also stressed to him that there \"is a lot riding on your\n[Baker's] relatlonshlp with this Court.\" {FS/HASTEWHSHAOSHNE\nIn contrast, Hayden told us that he did not have any concerns about transitioning the bulk e-mail meta data collection to FISA authority and was enthusiastic about the move. Hayden stated that while he believed the President had the authority to collect the bulk meta data for the NSA to conduct meta data analysis, he believes that involving an additional branch of governmerit in the activity provided some clarity on this subject.\n\nGonzales told us that he did not recall much about the process of filing the application with the FISA Court to obtain e-mail meta data through a PR/TT Order, but stated that there may have been individuals at the Wh1te House who expressed concern that seeklno the Order from the\n; proessmnals told hland that he would not have supported the PR / TT\napphcatlon if NSA D11'ector I-Iayden and others did not believe the collection also told us that there was concern at the White House that filing the PR/TT\n,applic?ati'qn' could lead to an unauthorized disclosure of the program.\n\n## 2. 'Birie'Fing For Judge Kollar-Kotelly (U)\n\n'\n|| Baker, Philbin, and Goldsmith met with Gonzales and Addmgton at the White House 'to discuss how to approach Judge Kollar-Kotelly concermng the proposed PR/ TT apphcatlon and it was.\n\ndecided to give her a \"presentation\" aboyt\n.\n\nThe was provided to Judge Kollar-Kotelly on were Attorney: General Ashcroft, Centre Intelhgence Agency D1rector George Tenet, FBI Director Mueller, Hayden, Gonzales, OLC Assistant Attorney General Goldsmith, Philbin, Baker, and Director of the Terrorist Threat Integlatlon Center (TTIC) John Brennan. According to an agenda of the brlefing, and as conflrmed to the 0lG, the presentatlon was g1ven in three\n.collectmn 1nclud1ng how the information was to be collected arch1ved quened and minimized.\n\nThis portion of the presentat1on stressed that the NSA required the collection of meta data in bulk-to maximize analytic capabilities through contact chainingfl E\n toidentify terrorist communications.23* Third, Philbin explamed 'the governmerit's legal argument that FISA authorized the Court to approve a broad appllcatmn to collect e~ma11 meta data under the statute s pen register and\n\n## 3. The Pr/Tt Application {Es//8H/Rf)\n\nPhilbin, Baker, and at least two Office of Legal Counsel attorneys assumed primary respon51b111ty for drafting the PR/TT application to the FISA Court and a memorandum of law in support of the application.235\n(Cont'd.)\nBaker said that Judge Kollar-Kotelly was given a \"read-ahead copy\" of the application, since it was standard practice to give the FISA Court draft\n-applications for review. ~ES//SHNF\n-commumcatmns llnks between such oer The result products_would then be tipped out as leads to the FBI and other elements of\n_u >\nIntelligence Community to find members of L\n=\n:\ndisrupt their activities, and prevent future terrorlst attacks in the Umted States.236 (FS/HASTEW/\nST OC/NE)-\nThe Justice Department constructed its legal argument for this novel use of pen register and trap and trace devices around traditional authorities provided under FISA. Specifically, 50 U.S.C.  1842(a)(1) authorizes the Attorney General or other designated government attorney to apply for an order or an extension of an order authorizing or approving the installation and use of a pen register or trap and trace device for any investigation to obtain foreign intelligence information not concerning a United States person or to protect proposed e-mail meta data collection and identifying the government official seeking to use the pen register and trap and trace devices covered by the application for purposes of 50\nU.S.C.  1842(c)(1); a declaration of Dlrector of Central Intelligence Tenet describing the threat posed byf\n-\n; a certification from Attorney General Ashcxo t stating that the information hkely to be obtained from the pen register and trap and trace devices was relevant to an ongoing investigation to protect against international terrorism, as required by 50 U.S.C.  1842(c); and a memorandum of law and fact in support of the application, {8778/ NFI\n236\nT\nicati nphasized that Internet e-mail is one of the primary methods by wh1cl commumcate The memorandurn of law in sy port of the against international terrorism or clandestine intelligence activities, provided that such investigation of & United States person is not conducted solely upon the basis of activities protected by the first amendment to the Constitution which is being conducted by the Federal Bureau of Investigation under such guidelines as the Attorney General approves pursuant to Executive Order No. 12333, or a successor order. (F377/8H/N\nFISA incorporated the definitions of the terms \"pen register\" and \"trap and.\n\ntrace device\" from 18 U.S.C.  3127, Thus, FISA adopted as the definition of a \"pent register\"\na device or process which records or decodes dialing, routing, addressing, or signaling information transmitted by an instrument or facility from which a wire or electronic commurication is transmitted, provided, however, that such information shall net include the contents of any comimunication.\n\n{ES/+SH-NE)\n18 U.8.C.  3127(3). FISA also adopted as the definition of a \"trap and trace device\"\na device or process which captures the incoming electronic or other impulses which identify the originating number or other dialing, routing, addressing, and signaling information reasonably likely to identify the source of a wire or electronic\n. communication, provided, however, that such information shall not include the contents of any communication. (TS//SI//NE)-\n18 U.S.C.  3127(4).\n\nIn-its application the government argued that the NSA's proposed collection of meta data met the requirements of FISA by noting that the ricta data sought comported with the \"dialing, routing, addressing, or signaling information\" type of data described in FISA's definitions of pen registers and trap and trace devices. The government also noted that nothing in these definitions required that the \"instrument\" or \"facility\" on which the device is placed carry communications of only a single user rather than multiple users.\n\nThe government next argued that the information likely to be obtained from the pen register and trap and trace devices was relevant to an ongoing investigation to protect against international terrorism, as certified by the Attorney G\neral under 50 U.S.C.  1842(c).\n\nIn support of this \"certification ST\novernment stated that the FRL\nwas conductine more than of re LNE POVCLLL\nThe government acknowledged that \"the overwhelming majority of comumumnications from Wthh meta data will be collected will not be associated witht\n=\n22l\n\" However, the government maintairied that FISA d1d not. 1mpose any requirement to tailor collection prec1sely to obtain only communicatiens that are str1ctly relevant to the investigation. The government argued that, in any event, \"the tailoring analys1s muist be informed by the balarice between the overwhelming national secunty interest at stake .\n\n.\n\n, and the minimal intrusion into privacy interests that will be 1mp11cated by collecting meta data - especially meta data that will niever be seen by a human being unless a connection to a terrorist-associated e-mail is found.\" RS SN\nThe government also stated that the NSA needed to collect meta data in bulk in order to.effectively use analytic tools such as contact chaining that would enable the NSA to discover enemy\n\"communications. Thisargument echoed a premise many officials told us about the nature of intelligence gathering in general.\n\nFor example, Baker likened the search for useful intelligence, particularly in the meta data context, to fmdmg a rieedle in a haystack, stating, \"the only way to find the needle is to have the haystack.\" Gonzales argued that \"to connect the dots you first have to collect the dots.\" (FS/AFSLLNE]\nere described as rep esented that for most of the proposed collection on\n| it was \"overwhelmingly hkely\" that at least one end of the transmitted communication gither originated in or was destined for locations outside the United States, and that in some cases both ends of the commumcatlon were. entlrel. overseas.?37 Hovvever the government\n'As discussed below, the government argued and the FISA\n\"timately agreed that the above-described collectio\n:\nsatisfied the definitions of pen register and trap and trace devices under FISA and Title 18.\n\nSee 50 U.S.C.  1841(2); 18 U.S.C.  3127(3) & (4).\n\n{ES/SHHNE\nThe application also explained the proposed archiving and querying process. According to the application, the collected meta data would be stored in a secure NSA network accessible only through two administrative login accounts and by specially-cleared meta data archive system administrators. Each time the ddatabase was accessed, the retrieval request would be recorded for auditing purposes. (FS7//8H7/NF\nThe application proposed allowing 10 NSA analysts access to the database.238 The NSA analysts were to be briefed by the NSA Office of General Counsel concerning the circumstances under which the database could be queried, and all queries would have to be approved by one of seven senior NSA officials,\n239 {FSH-SH-NF\n The application explained that the bulk collection would be gueried with particular e-mail addresses in order to conduct chaininglffEii\n:\nproposed that queries of the e-ma 'meta data archive would when the e-mail address met the following standard:\nbased on the factual and practical considerations of everyday life on which reasonable and prudent persons act, there are.\n\nfacts giving rise to a reasonable articulable suspicion that a particular known e-mail address is associated withj In addition, the NSA proposed applying the minimization procedures in the United States Signals Intelligence Directive 18 (USSID 18) to minimize the information reported concerning U.S. persons. According to the application, compliance with these minimization procedures would be ymber of NSA analysts was increased to 15\nmonitored by the NSA's Inspector General and General Counsel. The government also proposed that in each renewal application the NSA would report to the FISA Court on queries that were made during the prior period and the application of the reasonable articulable suspicion standard for determining that queried addresses were terrorist-related. TS/} SHNEY\n'Therapplifcat:mn and supporting documents explained how the NSA\nintended to use the collected meta data. The NSA sought to use the meta application, the N\nthat through external intelligence gathering and internal analysis it would meet the proposed querying standard on average less than once a day. The NSA further estimated that these queries woulld generate approximately 400 tips to the FBI and CIA per year.24! Of these tips to the FBI and CIA, the NSA projected that 25 percent would include U.S. person information, amounting to leads including information on about \"four to five U.S. persons each month.\" {ES/1SH-AF)\n\n## Judge Kollar-Kotelly Raises Questions About Pr/Tt 4. Application {Ts//Sl//Nf}-\n\nOn Judge Kollar-Kotelly wrote Baker to inform him that she was considering the application and was in the process of preparing an Qpillion'-and order in response to it.\n\nShe wrote that before the opinion and Order could be completed, however, she required written responses to two questions:\n\n(1) Apart from the First Amendment proviso in the statute (S0\nU.S.C.  1842(a)(1), (c)(2)), what are the general First\nAmendment implications of collecting\nand retaining this\nlarge volume of information that is derived, in part, from the\ncommunications of U.S. persons?\n(2) For how long would the information collected under this\nauthority continue to be of operational value to the\ncounter-terrorism investigation(s) for which it would be\ncollected? {FS/4/SLLNE)\nBaker responded in a letter to the FISA Court onjgiE\nConcerning the first question, Baker's letter asserted that the proposed at this estimate based on the assumption that each query could be expected to generatglle-mail addresses \"one level out,\" anHaddresses \"two levels out.\" The overall number of direct and indirect contacts with the initial seed address would be significantly reduced using \"analytical tradecraft.\" TS LA\nSN}\ncollection activity was consistent with the First Amendment and that he could find no reported decisions holding that the use of pen register and trap and trace devices violated the First Amendment. PSASHHANE)\nIn his letter, Baker argued that although the meta data collection would include entirely innocent communications, a good ~faith mves'ugahon does not violate the First Amendment simply because it is \"broald] in scopeTM (quoting Laird v, Tatum, 408 U.8. 1, 10 (1972)).\n\nHe also wrote that the use. of the collected meta data would be \"narrowly constramed\" because the querying standard for the meta\n;\nreasonable articulable suspicion\" of a nexus tof\n-\nRegarding Judge Kollar-Kotelly's second question concerning how long the collected meta data would continue to be of operatmnal value, Baker wrote that, based on the analytic judgment of the No o SHCH\ninformation woeuld continue to be relevant tof il\n.\n\n[forat least 18 months. Baker also advised that the NSA be, ved the e-mail meta data would continue to retain operational value beyond 18 months, but that it should be stored \"off-line\" and be accessible to queries only by a\n'spec1allycleared administrator, Baker proposed that 3 years after the -\n18-month timeframe, or 4% years after it is first collected, the meta data cotild be destroyed.242 (FS/+SH-NE)\n\n## 5. Fisa Court Order (U)\n\nIn response to the application and follow-up questions, on July 14,\n2004, Judge Kollar-Kotelly signed a Pen Register and Trap and Trace Oplmon and Order based on her findings that the proposed collection of e-mail meta data and the government's proposed controls over and dissemination of this information satisfied the requirements of FISA.\n\nThe Order granted the government's application in all key respects.\n\nIt approved for a period of 90 days the collectlon Wltl'nn the United States of e-mail meta datag\n-\n,\n. | The Order also required the government to comply w1th certam add1t1onal restrictions and procedures either adapted from or not originally proposed in the application. {FS//HCS//SLL/NE)\nIn the Order, the Court found that the information to be collected was\n\"dialing, routing, addressing, or signaling information\" that did not include maintain bulk 'meta data on-line for 4% years after which time it must be destroyed.\n\nAccording to the NSA Office of General Counsel, the NSA still follows this retention the contents of any communpication. The Court stressed that it was on'l'y authorizing collection of the ceategories of information delineated in the application, but acknowledged that addltlonal information \"could be gleaned\" from that meta dataj\n'\n-\n.\n\n-\n| The Court found that the means by wh thel\n||\nElcategories of meta data were to be collected met the FISA dfiflIllthl'l of a \"pen register,\"\nand that the means for collecting th category of meta data satisfied the FISA definition of a \"trap and trace device.\"\nSee 18 U S.C.  3127(3) & (4), as incorperated in FISA at 50 U.S.C.  1841(2).\n\nTR\n#3\nThe Court further found that the government satisfied FISA's requlremcnt that the apphcatlon certify that the information likely to be obtained is relevant to an ongoing investigation to protect against international terrorism. The Court concluded that, \"under the\nircumstances of this case, the applicable relevance standard does not requ1re a statlstlcal \"4ight fit' between the volume of proposed collection and\n:\nller proportion of information that will be directly relevant to\n| FBI investigations.\"243 {FSHESHSHHNE-\nThe Court also agreed with the government's position that the privacy interest at stake in the collection of e-mail meta data did not rise.to the\n\"stature protected by the Fourth Amendment,\" and that the nature of the intrusion was mitigated by the restrictions on accessing. and disseminating the 1nformat10n, only a small percentage of which would be seen: by any persomn.\n\n:\nIn sum, the Court concluded that the use of pen register and trap and trace devices to collect e-mail meta data would not violate the First Amendment, stating that the bulk collection proposed in this case is analogous to suspicionless searches or seizures that have been upheld under the Fourth Amendment in that the Government's need is compelling and immediate, the intrusion on individual privacy interests is limited, and bulk collection appears to be a_\nreasonably effective means of detecting and monitoringf communications under the electronic surveillance provisions of FISA.\n\nThe Court noted important differences in the two types of collection, including the fact that overbroad electronic surveillance requires a showing of probable cause to believe the target is an agent of a foreign power, while the bulk meta data c'ollectlon under FISA's pen register and trap and trace device provisions merely requires a_\nL\nthe overbroad collection is.\n\njustified as necessary to discover unknowr{Z\nT . persons. The Court also contrasted the high pr1vacy interests at stake w1th respect to content communications with the absence of a privacy interest in meta data. {FS/SHNF\nHowever, the Court also was concerned that \"the extremely broad nature of this collection carries with it a heightened risk that collected information could be subject to various forms of misuse, potentially involving abridgement of First Amendment rights of innocent persons.\" The Court noted that under 50 U,S.C.  1842(c)(2), pen register and trap and trace information about the communications of a .S, person cannot be targeted for collection unless it is relevarnt to an investigation that is not solely based upon the First Amendment, Therefore, the Court ordered that the NSA modify its criterion for querying the archived data by inserting the following underlined language, as shown below:\n|\nwillqualifyasaseedf\n2\nSA\nbased on the factual:and practical considerations of everyday life on which reasonable and prudent persons act, there are facts giving rise to a reasonable articulable suspicion thata p articular known e-mail address is associated with Al\n..\n\n-\ner, thatanl\n@\n|believed fobe\n|\n shall not be regarded as associated with\n:\n-\nsolely on the\n-\nth ted by the First Amendment to the Constitution. {FS7/7FHESHSHNF-\nRegarding the storage, accessing, and disseminating of the e-mail meta data obtained by the NSA, the Court ordered that the NSA must store the information in a manner that ensures it is not commingled with other data, and must \"generate a log of auditing information for each occasion when the information is accessed, to include the\n.\n\n.\n\n. retrieval request.\" The Court further ordered that the e-mail meta data \"shall be accessed only through queries using the contact chainingfh\n..\n\nas described by the NSA in the government's application. {FS+HHESH/SH/7/NF)\nThe Court noted the \"distinctive legal considerations\" involved in implementing the authority the Court was vesting in the NSA.\n\nSpecifically, the Court observed that conventional pen register and trap and trace surveillance required judicial review before any particular e-mail account could be targeted. However, by granting the government's application, the Court noted that the\n's decision to target an e-mail address (sometimes referred to as a \"see\n\") would be made without judicial review.\n\nTherefore, the Court ordered that the NSA's Office of General Counsel would be responsible for training analysts to comply with querying standards and other procedures and \"to review the legal adequacy for the bas1s of such\n|\nqueries, including the First Amendment proviso. .\n\n.\n\n.\"\n\n:\n\\\nAs suggested by Baker in t ponse to Judge Kollar-Kotelly's inquiry regarding T the collected data; the Court ordered that the e-mail meta data shall be available for 18 months for querying. The Court further ordered that after the 18-month period, the data must be transferred to an \"off-line\" tape system from which it could still be accessed for querying upon approval of the NSA officials authorized to approve queries, and that such meta data must be destroyed 4%, years after initially collected.\n\n{FS;\n:\nThe Court's Order was set to expire after 90 days. The Court required that any application to renew or reinstate the authorlty granted in the Order must mclude a report dlscussmg querles made since the prior applrcauon\n'\nal stanidard to those querles, means of collectmn of the pen register and Finally, the Court issued separate orders to assist the NSA with the installation and use of the pen reglster and trap and trace devices and to maintain the secrecy of the NSA's act\n'\ncalled \"secondary orders,\"\nThe NSA was directed to compensate: the carriers for all assistance prov1ded in connection with the PR/TT Order.\n\n_\\L\"['C\\\n/ /U(\"Ql /QT/ /NEF)\nT\nBaker and other witnesses told us that obtaining the Order was seen by the Department as a great success, and that there was general agreement that the government had secured all the authorl it sought to conduct the bulk e- -mail meta data collect\n-\n\"'\n'obtammg the Order from the FISA Court also prov1ded an \"air of legitimacy\"\nto the program.?% {FSHSTEW/18H/OC/NF\nWe discuss below the President's directive and the OLC memorandum that was drafted to analyze its legality. (TS ASTLW /ST /QC/NE)\n\n## 1. The President's August , 2004, Memorandum To The Secretary Of Defense (?S++Shh}F)\n\nOn August 9, 2004, the same day a routine Presidential Authorization was issued to continue Stellar Wind, the Pres1dent sent a separate memorandur'n to t .\n\nerdinethe\n1las of the e-mail Augu t9 2004 Presuientlal Authonzatmn Avthorizations), the NSA was authorized tof party tothe commumcatmn belonged to\n(2) the purpose of the search was to produce forelgn 1ntelh-ence 1nformauon\n~\nJack Goldsmith resigned as Assistant Attorney General for the Office of Legal Counsel on July 30, 2004, Goldsmith was replaced by Daniel Levin, who served as the Acting Assistant Attorney General for OLC until February 2005.\n\n(U)\nDuring Ia lat\n2004, at the request of Comey and Ashcroft, Levin began\n247 The final version of the OLC memorandum was signed by Levin on February 4,\n2005.\n\nLevin told the OIG that a \"policy decision\" was made to limit application of the memorandum to the specific purposeffil\n'\n=\ns However, Levin stated that, based on his analysis of the issue, he believed thatf\n_\nThus, the President asserted extrajudicial authority to order the further use of e-mail meta data collected under Stellar Wind for the limited\n'purp':os'\"_gdesciribed in his August 9 memorandum. The FISA Court was notified of this action, although the government did not seek its permission.\n\n)\n\n## . Non-Compliance With Pr/Tt Order {Fs{/Sh-/Nf}\n\nAs with other orders issued under FISA, the PR/TT Order was renewed every\n90 days. During the early renewals, two major instances of Hon-compliance were brought te-the RISA Court's attentiori.\n\nAs described below, these violations of the Order resulted primarily from the NSA senior officials' failure to adequately communicate the technical requirements of the Order to the NSA operators tasked with implementing them, and from miscommunications among the FISA Court, the Justice Department, and the NSA concerning certain legal issues. {F877/8H/7/NF)\n\n## 1. Filtering Violations {Ts//Sh//NF}\n\n.\n\nOIPR filed a Notice of Compliance Incidents with the FISA\nCourt. In the Notice, Baker stated that the com liance incidents cited in the Notice \"raise compliance issues with about:w& the collection authorized by the Court.\"2# The Notice included asan attachment a letter from NSA Gernieral Counsel Robert Deitz to Baker\n03)(1)\nb?(3)\n.\n\n-\n__could be gueried for any purpose.\n\nLevin told us that, other than Addington, no one else was pushing to broaden the memorandum's application_\n(_TQ '/ l/ Q7T \"X/I/ l, ST '/ ,/f\\(\"ll 1\\;[}1'_)__\nBake1 told us. that Jtde Rollar {otefly was not nappy about the\n'\ni\n1ed an Order Regarding\n- Comphance Order)\nwere attested to by its Director and, at the Government s mVJtatlon adopted as provisions of the orders of this Court.\" The Court found that the violations \"resulted from deliberate actions by NSA personnel,\" as dlstmgtushed frorn technical failures. The Court stated it was also troubled ation of the violations, which extended from July 14 through\n\"'f and that the Court was reluctant to issue a renewal of t same. day, the Court issued an Order to address}|\n\n-sarding Reauired Information for Authorities Involvmg\n[\n,\n.\n\n_ be accompanied by\n'a sworni declaration by' the Secretary of Defense attestmg to the stdte of compliance with the PR/TT Order and a description of the procedures that would be used to ensure comphance AFSHSHINF\nOng B\\ the government moved for an extension of time\n(until EIEREEAS\n) within which to provide the Secretary of Defense's declar 1on The motlon Wthh the Court granted, assured the Court that\n' b)(i) (b}(d)\nf had been terminated on\n-\n(\nA had moved to a v\n\"?)m'(b)( )\nthrough S\n'\n| The NSA also represented that it reconstructed its contact cha_mmg database using only properly obtained meta data and purged the unauthorized meta data from the system. {TSAASLL/NE)\nA declaration by NSA Director Hayden accompanying the government's motion stated a total ofjgg)e- -mail addresses were tipped as leads to the FBI and CIA during the violation period and that]\nof these leads.-may have come from the unauthorized collection. Hayden wrote that\n- requmng that ani aiihcatlen this'lead was purged from the FBI's and CIA's databases on The NSA Office of the Inspector General subsequently issued a report on its investigation of the unauthorized collections. The NSA OIG report stated that the filtering violations \"probably led to actual unauthorized collection, but we have not been able to determine the extent of such\n_and we are not certain that we will be able to do g0.\" The report systemic management failures within the Signals Intelligence Directorate (SID}], and & complete lack of program management with regard to collection.\" The report stated that while the training provided by the NSA Office of General Counsel was\n\"yigorous, conscientious, and compliant with the July 14 Order, it was inadequate in scope.\"\nISTEWHHESTS\n'\nAceording to the report, the NSA removed as much of the tainted collection from the PR/TT database as hossible. The NSA was unable to segregate unauthotized collection from e Iso it rebuilt that portion of the PR/TT database from (b)(1) (b)m _\n(the day after the violation was discovered), forward. Moreover, according to the NSA OIG\nreport, analytical personriel were restricted from accessing the unauthorized meta data.\n\n## 2. Fisa Court Renews Pr/Tt Order (Ts//Su//Uf)\n\nT\ndate the government filed its first renewal applicati\n_Application sought authorization to collect e-mail meta data o and stated tha The FISA Court's PR/TT Order expired on )Of)l\" ('b)r(k)') .\n\nOn that on. The Renewal by, B)E)\nad fully complied with the PR/TT Order with respect to{QI0R\nment did not seek reauthorization for collection ue to a variety of operatiorial reasons which the app ion did not specify. {FSAFSH-PHE\nauthorlzmg throuh e R =he use of pen regist\n:\ntrace devices atff\n.\n\nto collect e-mail meta data The Renetwal Order and the orlglnal Order were similar in most respects.\n\nHowever, in the Renewal Order the. Court requlred the NSA to submit\n,reports every 30 days concermnuuermes made smce the pnor report and\n_describing an v changes made tol\n.\n\nand the_\nBaker told us that during one of his \"over31ght\" visits to the NSA\nfollowing the FISA Court's PR/TT Order, he was given a demonstration of how the NSA analysts processed the e-mail meta data, including an explanatlon of how e-mail meta data is collected and queried. Baker said he\n;\n18 among the pleces of: data that mlght be used to meet the\n\n## D. Subsequent Pr/Tt Appl\n\nAs described above, the PR/TT Order was first renewed o B\n)\nand was renewed by subsequent orders of the FISA Court at Ppro mat_ely 90day inter'valsv.%'* {TS//S1//NE)\n.\n\n|| {he FISA Court issued a Supplemental Order requiring the government to enhance its reporting to the Court of the foreign intelligence benefits realized under the PR/TT Orders. Writing for the FISA\nCourt; Judge Kollar-Kotelly stated that the authority granted under these Rolue o orders allowed the NSA \"to collect vast amounts of i'nforma;tiOna}bQut,eamajl\n| communications[,]\" but that \"the Court is unable on the current record to-ascertain the extent to which information so collected has actually resulted in the foreign intelligence benefits originally anticipated.\"\nSupplemental Order at 1-2. The government responded with a motion requesting that, in light of prior briefings it had given the FISA Court, it not be required to fully comply with the Supplemental Order.\n\nItis not clear what if any specific action the FISA Court took in response to this motion, althotigh based on the OIG's review of the PR/TT docket the government continued to submit regular reports to the FISA Court.\n\nb7E\nbl, b3, b7E\n\n## Ii. Telephony Meta Data Collection Under Fisa {Fs//Sh/Nf|-\n\nThe second part of the Stellar Wind program brought under FISA\nau'thonty was the NSA's bulk collection of telephony meta data (basket 2).\n\nAs described in Chapter Three, under this aspect of the Stellar Wind program the NSA obtained the call detail records of telephone calls domestic. and.mternatmnal -\n:\nbl, b3, b7E\nnumber of each call, and the date, time, and duration of each call.\n\ndo niof include the substantive content of any communication or the name, address, or financial information of a subscriber or customer.\n\n(TS L4 SLLANE)\nnature of the telephony collection provided the NSA the ability to conduct\n-\n| contact chainingg =\nThe transition of bulk telephony meta data collection from Presidential Authorization under the Stellar Wind program to FISA authority relied on a provision in the FISA statute that authorized the FBI to seek an order from the FISA Court compelling the. production of \"any tangible things\" from any business, organization, or entity, provided the items-are for an authorized investigation to protect against international terrorism or clandestine intelligence activities.\n\nSee 50 U.S.C.  1861.\n\nOrders under this provision commonly are referred to as \"Section 2157 orders in reference to Section 215 of the USA PATRIOT ACT, which amended the \"business records\" provision in title V of FISA.258 The \"tangible things\" the goverriment sought in the Section 215 application described in this section were the call detailrecordsf il il P\nWe describe below the circumstances that led to the government's decision to transition the bulk collection of telephony meta data from presidential authority to FISA Authority. We then summarize the government's initial application and the related Court Order.\n\n## A. Decision To Seek Order Compelling Production Of Call Detail Records {Fs//Sl/Nf\n\nThe timing of the Department's decision in May 2006 to seek a FISA\nCourt order for the bulk collection of telephony meta data was driven primarily by external events. On December 16, 2005, The New York Times published an article entitled, \"Bush Lets U.S. Spy on Callers Without Courts.\" The article, which we discuss in more detail in Chapter Eight, described in broad terms the content collection aspect of the Stellar Wind program, stating that the NSA had \"menitored the international telephone calls of hundreds, perhaps thousands, of people inside the United States without warrants over the past threg, in an c possible On December 17, 2005, in response to the article, President Bush publicly confirmed that he had authorized the NSA to intercept the international communications of people with \"known links\" to al Qaeda and related terrorist organizations (basket 1). On January 19, 2006, the Justice.\n\nDepartment issued a document entitled \"Legal Authorities Supporting the Activities of the National Security Agency Described by the President\" and informally referred to as a \"White Paper,\" that addressed in an unclassified form the legal basis for the collection activities that were described:in the New York Times article and corifirmed by the President.\n\n## B. Summary Of Department's Application And Related Fisa Court Oxder {S/Nf}\n\nAs noted previously, applications to the FISA Court that seek an order compelling the production of \"tangible things\" are commonly referred to as\n\"Section 215\" applications, in reference to Section 215 of the USA PATRIOT\nACT.\n\nSection 215 authorizes the FBI to request a FISA Court, order requiring the production of any tangible things (including books, records, papers, documents, and other items) for an investigation to obtain foreign intelligence information not concernirig a United States person or to protect against international terrorism or clandestine intelligence activities, provided that such investigation of a United States person is riot conducted solely upon the basis-of activities protected by the first amendment to the Constitution.\n\n(U)\n50 U.S.C.. 1861(a)(1).26!\n\nSection 215 does not require that the items sotight pertain to the subject of an investigation; the government need only demonstrate that the items are relevant to an authorized investigation.262\n(0)\nOn May 23, 2006, the FBI filed with the FISA Court a Section 215\napplication seeking authority to collect telephony meta data to assist the\n;\n'\nfinding and identifying known and unknown members or agents ol\n'\n-\n|\nlin support of thef\n.\n\nrelated FBI\ninvestigations then pending and other Intelligence Community operations.\n\nb1, b3, The application requested an order compelling v to b7E\nproduce (for the duration of the 90-day order) call detail records relating to all telephone communications maintained by the carriers. The application described call detail records as routing information that included the accommodation facilities, physical storage facilities, and vehicle rental facilities.\n\n(U)\noriginating and terminating telephone number of each call, and the date, time, and duration of each call. The application stated that telephony meta data did not include the substantive content of any communication or the name, address, or financidl information of a subscriber or customer.\n\nAccording to the application, the majority of the telephony meta data provided to the NSA was expected to involve communications that were (1)\nbetween the United States and abroad, or\n(2) wholly within the United States, including local telephone calls.\nThe application acknowledged that th collection would include records of communications of U.S. persons located within the United States who were not the subject of any FBI investigation. However, relying on the precedent established by the PR/TT Order, the application asserted that the collecti needed for the NSA to perform analysis to find known f\n| and to identify unknown operatives, some of whom may be\n\"in the United States or in communication with U.S. persons. The\n'\napplication stated that it was not possible to determine in advance which particular piece of meta data will identify a terrorist. The application stated that obtaining such bulk data increases the NSA's ability, through contact-chaining\n| to detect and identify members -o]f-\n-\n, B\n254 In other words, according to the application, meta data analysis is possible only if the NSA \"has collected and archived a broad set of metadata that contains within it the subset of communications that can later be identified as terrorist-related.\"265 {FS//SH-F\nconeideratians of everyday life on which reasonable and pruderit pei'ifspn'sact there are facts giving rise to & reasonable articulable suspicion that the regarded as assoc1ated w1th .\n\n.\n\nsolely on the basis of activities that are protected by the First Amendment to the Constitution.\" {FS/SH/NF-\nAccordmg to the application, the NSA estimated that only a tiny fraction (1 in 4 million, or 0.000025 percent) of the call detail records\n.mcluded in the database were expected to be analyzed The results of any The application also-proposed restrictions on access to, and the processing and dissemination of, the data collected that were essentially identical to those included in the PR/TT Order. These included the requirement that queries be approved by one of seven NSA officials or managers and that the NSA's Office of the General Counsel would review and approve proposed queries of telephone numbers reasonably believed to be used by U.S. persons.267 {FS/+SH-NF}\nof meta data, such as controls on the dissemination of any U.S. person information, the creation of a capability to audit NSA analysts with access to the meta data, the destruction of collected meta data after a period of 5 years (the destruction period for e-mail meta data was 4% years), and a review by the NSA's Inspector General and General Counsel conducted within 45 days of implementing the FISA Court order that assessed the A\n{Cont'd.)\nOn May 24, 2006, the FISA Court approved the Section 215\napphcatlon The Court's Order stated that there were reasonable grounds to believe that the telephony meta data records. sought were relevant to authorized investigations being conducted by the FBI to protect against international terrorism. The Order incorporated each of the procedures proposed in the government's application relating to access to and use of the meta data. These procedures included a requirement that any application to-renew or reinstate the authorlty for the bulk collection contain:a report descrlbmg {1) the queries made since the Order was granted; (2) the manner in which the procedures relating to access and use of the meta data were applied; and (3) any proposed changes in the way in which the call detail records would be received from the communications cartiers. The Order also requires the Justice Department to review, at least every 90 days, a sample of the NSA's justifications for querying the call detail records. {FS/HASTLNE).\n\nThrough March 2009, the FISA Court renewed the authorities granted in the: May 24 Order at apprommately 90-day 111tervals W1th some\n'215 Orders did not require the NSA to modlfy\n1ts use of the telephony meta data from an analytical perspective. However, as discussed below, the FISA\nCourt drastically changed the authority contained in its March 2009 Section\n715 Order following the government's disclosure of incidents involving the NSA's failure to comply with the terms of the Court's prior orders.\n\nadequacy of the management controls for the processing and dissemination of U.S. person information. -{FS/SH-ANF\n\n## . Non-Compliance With Section 215 Orders {Es//Shhmf\n\nOn January 9, 2009, representatives from the Departments National Security Division attcnded a briefing at the NSA concerning the telephony meta data collection.\n\nDuring the course of this briefing, and as confirmed by the NSA in the days that followed, the Department came to understand that the NSA was querying the telephony meta data in a manner that was riot authorized by the FISA Court's Section 215 Orders.\n\nSpecifically, the NSA was.on a daily basis automatically querying the meta data with thousands of telephone identifiers from an \"alert list\" that had not been determiined to satisfy the reasonable articulable suspicion (RAS) standard the Court requu'ed be met before the NSA was authorized to \"access.the archived data\" for search or analysis purposes. 269\nPGS/ ST/ NE)\nThe alert llst contamed telephone 1clent1flers that were. of 1nterest to conduct contact chamm\n 7\nHowever, automated ana ys erierated by non-RAS appto\\}od identifiers were not permitted; instead, the alerts were sent to analysts todetermine whether chaining was warranted in accordance with the RAS standard. (RS//SH-/NE)\nOn January 15, 2009, the Justice Department notlfied the FISA Court that the NSA had been accessm thetelehon\n;\n)\nWi L-RAS\nbl, b3, approved 1dent1f1ers P\n-\n'\n.\n\nb7E\n0 On January 28,' e\n269 The term \"telephone identifier\" used by the government means a telephone number as well as other unique identifiers associated with a particular user or telecommunications device for purposes of billing or routing communi cations.\n\n## {Fs7 7Sn\n\n270 Pollowing the Department's notice to the Court, the NSA attempted to complete a software fix to the alert process so that \"hits\" against the telephony meta data generated by non-RAS-approved telephone identifiers were deleted and that only \"hits\" generated by RAS-approved identifiers were sent to NSA analysts for further analysis.\n\nThe NSA also attempted to construct a new alert list consisting of only RAS-approved telephone identifiers, However, the implementation of these modifications was unsuccessful and on January 24, 2009, the NSA shut down the alert process completely, (fPSf/S-I-f-fN-F-}\n'Court issued an-order stating that it was \"exceptionally concerried about what appears to be a flagrant violation of its Order in this matter[.]* The Court required the government to file a brief to \"help the Court assess whether the Orders in this docket should be modified or rescinded; whether other remedial steps should be:directed; and whether the Court should take action regarding persons responsible for any misrepresentations to the Court of violation of its Orders, either through its coritempt powers or by referral to appropriate investigative offices.\" The Court alsa required the government to address several additional specific issues, including who knew that the alert list being used to query the meta data included identifiers that had not been determined to meet the reasonable and articulable suspicion standard, how long the \"Unauthorized querying\" had been conducted, and why none of the entities the Court directed to conduct reviews of the meeta data collection program identified the problem earlier.271\nOn February 17, 2009, the government responded to the Court's Ordeer and acknowledged that the NSA's previous descriptions to the Court of the alert list process were inaccurate and that the Section 215 Order did not 'authorize the government to use the alert list in the manner that it did.\n\nThe government described for the Court in detail how the NSA developed procedures in May 2006 to implement the Section 2 15 authority that resulted in the NSA querying the telephony meta data with fion-RAS\napproved telephone identifiers for over 2 years in violation of the Court's Orders, and how those procedures came to be described incorrectly to the Court. According to the government; the situation resulted from the NSA's interpretation of the term \"archived dataTM used in the Court's Orders and the NSA's mistaken belief that the alert process under the Section 215\n-authority operated the same as the alert process under the Pen Register/Trap and Trace authority.2'2 The government told the Court that\n\"there was never a complete understanding among key personnel\" who reviewed the initial report to the Court describing the alert process about\n\n372\nThe\nNSA understood the term \"archived data\" in the Court's Order to refer to the\nt}..\n\n\"archived,\" repository of telephony meta data.\n\nFor this reason, in the NSA's view, it was not required to limit the alert list to RAS-approved identifiers. ATS /STy What certain terminology was intended to mean, and that \"there was no smgle person who had complete technical understanding of the BR FISA\nsystem architecture.\" {FS/+8H-F\nThe government ar gued that the Section 215 Orders should not be rescirided or modified \"in light of the significant steps that the Government has already taken to remedy the alert list compliance incident and its effects, the sighificant oversight modifications the Government is.in the process of implementing, and the value. of the telephony metadata collection\n'to the Government's national security mission. 1278 Among the several measures the government highlighted to the Court was the NSA Director's decision to.order \"end-to-end system engineering-and process reviews\n(technical and operational) of NSA's handling of [telephony] metadata,\" Less than two weeks after the government filed the response summarized above, the government informed the Court that the NSA had identified additional compliance incidents during these reviews.27* {FS//SH/NE}-\nIn Orders dated March 2 and 5, 2009, the FISA Court addressed the compliance incidents reported by the government and imposed drastic changes to the Section 215 authorities prev1ously granted. The Court first addressed the NSA's interpretation of the term \"archived 'data.\" The Court said the interpretation \"strains credulity\" and observed that an mterpretatlon that turns on whether the meta data being accessed has been\n\"grchived\" in a particular database at the timie of the access would \"render compliance with the RAS requirerment merely optional.\" (RS\nST/NE)-\ndata for a report, the identifier was either already the subject of a FISA Court order ox had been reviewed by the NSA's Office of General Counsel to ensure the RAS determination was not based solely on a U.S. person's First Amendment-protected activities.\n\nTS\nLLSLANE}\nchaining-analyses in the telephony meta data using 14 non- RAS approved identifiers.\n\nAccording to the government's riotice to the Court, the analysts conducted queries of non-FISA authorized telephony meta data and were unaware their queries also ran against the FISA-authorized meta data. The government stated that none of the queries used an identifier associated with a U.S. person or telephone identifier and none of the queries.\n\nresulted in intelligence reporting. {FS{/SH-NF\nThe Court next addressed the misrepresentations the governiment made to the Court from August 2006 to December 2008 in reports that ihaccurately described the alert list process. The Court recounted the specific misrepresentations and summarized the government's explanation for their oceurrence: The Court then concluded, Regarc_lich of what factors contributed to making these misrepresentations, the Court finds that the government's failure toensure-that responsible officials adequately understood the NSA's alert list process, and to accurately report its implementation to the Court, has prevented, for more than two years, both the government and the FISC from taking steps to remedy daily violations of the minimization procedures set forth in FISC orders and designed to protect_can detail records pertaining to telephone communications-of U.S.\n\npersons located within the United States who are not the subject of any FBI investigations and whose call detail information could not otherwise have been legally captured in The Court also addressed the additional non-compliance incidents that were: identified during the initial review ordered by the NSA Director, observing that the incidents occurred despite the NSA implementing measures specifically intended to prevent their occurrence.\n\nIn view of the record of compliance incidents the government had reported to date, the Court stated,\n:\n[I]t has finally come to light that the FISC's authorizations of this vast collection program have been premised on a flawed depiction of how the NSA uses BR metadata. This misperception by the FISC existed from the inception of its atithorized collection in May 2006, buttressed by repeated inaccurate statements made in the government's submissions, and despite a government-devised and Court-mandated oversight regime. The minimization procedures proposed by the government in each successive application and approved and adopted as binding by the orders of the FISC have been so frequently and systemically violated that it can fairly be said that this critical element of the overall BR regime has never functioned effectively.\n\n-\n:\nDespite the Court's concerns with the telephony meta data program, and its lack of confidence \"that the government is doing its utmost to ensure that those responsible for implementation fully comply with the Court's orders,\" it authorized the government to continue collecting telephony meta data under the Section 215 Orders. The Court explained that in light of the government s repeated representations that the collection of the telephony meta data is vital to national security, taken together with the Court's prior determiination that the collection pr operly administered conforms with the FISA statute, \"it would not be prudent\" to order the government to cease the bulk collection. {(FS/SH-NF}\nHowever, believing that \"more is needed to protect the privacy of U.S.\n\nperson information acqulred and retained\" pursuant to the Section 215\nOrders, the Court prohibited the government from accessing the meta data collected \"until such time as the government is able to restore the Court's confidence that the govemrnent can and will comply with previously approved procedures for accessing such data. \"275 The government may, on a case-by-case basis, request authority from the Court to query the meta data to obtain foreign intelligence.276 Such a request must specify the telephone identifier to be used and the factual basis for the NSA's RAS\ndetermiriation. {FS/SHAHE-\nThe Court ordered that upon cornpletlon of the NSA's end to- end descrlbes the results of revrews dlscusses thc Steps taken to rcmedy non-complianice incidents, and proposes minimization and oversight procedures to employ should the Court.authorize resumption of regular access to the telephony meta data. The government's report also must inchide an affidavit from the FBI Director and any other government natiorial security official deemed appropriate describing the value of the telephony meta data to U.S. national security. FS5//SH/NF\nAdditionally, the Court ordered the government to implement oversight mechanisms proposed in the government's response to the compliance incidents. These mechanisims generally require the Justice Department's National Security Division to assume a more prominent role in the NSA's administration of the bulk collection program. For example, the NSA's Office of General Counsel must now consult with the National privacy interests of U.S. persons|.]\"{F8//8t//HF}\n276 The Court authorized the government to query the meta data without Court approval to protect against an imminent threat to-human life, with netice to the Court within the next business day of the query being conducted, The-Court also authorized the government to access the meta data to ensure \"data integrity\" and to develop and test technological measures designed to enable to the NSA to comply with previously approved procedures for accessing the meta data. FSH-SH-HH-\nSecurlty Division on all 31gn1flcant legal opinions. that relate to the initerpretation, scope, or implemeentation of past, cur rent, and future Section\n215 01 ders related to the telephony bulk meta data collection.\n\nOn May 29, 2009, the Court authorized the government to continue collecting telephony meta data under the Section 215 Orders for 43 days\n'subject t0 the same limitations:set out in its orders of March 2 and 5, 2009.\n\n## Iii. Content Collection Under Fisa {Ts//Shnf})-\n\nThe third and last part of the Stellar Wind program brought under FISA authorlty was conitent collection (basket 1). The effort to accomplish this transition was legally and operationally complex, and our discussion in this section does not address each statutory element or the full chronology of the governrnent s applications and related FISA Court: orders. Rather, we describe the c1rcumstanccs SUrroundlng the government's decxslon to\n\"Court's: response to the govemment's content: colIectlon proposals and the orders it issued.\n\nIn this section, we d describe one FISA Court judge's rejection of the government's legal approach to conterit collection; a decision that hastened the enactment of legislation that significantly amended the FISA statute and provided the government: survel]lance authorltles broader than those authorized under Stellar Wind.\n\n-\n\n## A. Decision To Seek Content Order {Fs//Sla/Nf}-\n\nThe Department first began work on bringing Stellar Wind's content collection activity (basket 1) under FISA in March 2005, shortly after Alberto Gonzales became Attorney General, Gonzales told us that he initiated discussions about making this change with OLC Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General Bradbury.\n\nGonzales said that he had questions about how the NSA was conducting the collection in terms of audits and checks being performed, and he wanted to ensure that the agency was running the program properly.\n\nGonzales told us that placing content collection under FISA authority would also eliminate the constitutional debate about the activity and would reassure people that the President was actlng accordmg to the Constitution and the law. Gonzales said that, in his view, it is better to conduct activities such as content collection without a direct order from the President when possible.\n\nGonzales added that in 2001 nobody thought it was poss1ble to bring Stellar Wind under FISA authority.,\n'\nWhen Gonzales became Attorney General in early 2005, however, he also kriew there had been a leak to The New York Times about the NSA's content collection activity under Stellar Wind and that the paper was actively investigating the story. In November 2004, Gonzales (then the White House Counsel), together with Deputy Attorney General Comey and his Chief of Staff, had met with New York Times reporters to discuss the potential article. 277 ~(S\n1\nSTEWS1-SHOE/NF-\nIn response to Gonzales's request, Bradbury, working with attorneys in OLC and the Office of Intelligence and Policy Review {(OIPR) as well as with NSA personnel, devised a legal theory, summarized below, for bringing under FISA the Stellar Wind program's content collection activities while preserving the \"speed and agility\" many Intelligence Commumty officials cited as the chief advantage of the NSA program.\n\nIn June 2005, Bradbury, together with Associate Deputy Attorney General Patrick Philbin, presented the legal theory to White House officials David Addington, Harriet Miers, and Daniel Levin and received their approval to continue work on a draft FISA\napplication.278 (FS/HSTEW/H-SHAOCNF\nBradbury told the OIG that he also spoke to the Director of National Intelligence and to NSA officials about bringing Stellar Wind's: content collection under FISA. According to Bradbury, the Director of National Iritelligence responded positively to the proposal, but the NSA was skeptical as to whether a FISA approach would be feasible, in view of the substantial administrative requirements under the FISA Court's PR/TT Order. The NSA\nalso believed that the FISA Court would be reluctant to grant the NSA the opera'tional flexibility it would insist on in any content application, resulting if1 less surveillance coverage of telephone numbers and e-mail addresses used by persons outside the United States. {FS/H-STEWHSHAOC/NF\nAs discussed in detail in Chapter Eight of this report, in December\n2005 The New York Times published its series of articles on the content collection portion of the Stellar Wind program, resulting in considerable controversy and public criticism of the NSA program. Through the spring of\n2006, the Department continued work on the content application.\n\nIn May\n2006, at the first of the FISA Court's semiannual meetings that year, the Department provided the Court a draft of the application for content collection to obtain feedback on the government's unconventional approach to the FISA statute.\n\nNone of FISA Court judges indicated whether the application would be granted if filed, but some 1dent1f1ed concerns with certairi.aspects of the proposal.\n\n(F87\n'\nAt this time, Congress and the Administration were also discussing how to modernize the FISA statute to authorize the. type of electronic survefllance that the content application sought. Work on the. application was temporarily suspended as the Department focused its attention on working with Congress to craft this legislation. However, this suspension of worlk on the content application was brief. Bradbury said he concluded by the fall of 2006, as Congress was headmg for recess; that there would be no legislative reform of the FISA statute in the foreseeable future that would\n'address content collection as it was being conducted under Stellar Wind. 'As a result, the Department pressed forward with the draft content application to the FISA Court. (FSHSTEWSHAOCNF\n\n## B. Summary Of Department's. December 13, 2006, Content Applncatlon +Eshshhnf\n\nIn November 2006, at the second of the Court's semiannual meetings, the Department presernted an updated draft of the apphcatlon that\n1ncorporated feedback received from members of the Court during the previous semiannual meeting. On December 13, 2006, the Department formally filed the content application with the Court. (IS\n'The government's December 13 application sought authority to, mterce ot the content of tele homc and electromc commun'\ntions. of bl, b3, b7E\n\n## \"Applcation Stated: |\n\nfl Commumty to be able quickly and efficiently to acqulre communications to or from individuals reasonably believed to be members or agents of 'the.,sfie-'fel\"eigll POWETS..\n\nAccordmg to the apphcatlon, the: goal 'was: to estabhsh an e_arly\n'1nd1v1duals w1t\n)\n \"early warning system\" SOught to replace the conventlonal practlce under FISA of filing individual applications each time the government had- probable cause to believe thata partlcular phone number or e-mail address, referred to by the NSA as a \"selector,\" was\n'bemg used or about to be used by members or agents of a foreign power.\n\nIn the place of this individualized process, the application proposed that the FISA Court establish broad parameters for the iriterception of communications ~ spemfically,fithat-can be targeted and the locations where the surveillance can be conducted and that NSA officials, rather than FISA Court Judges 'determine within these parameters the par i ular selectors Whose commumca S the NSA would mterce pt_f\n| albeit w th FISA Court v and supervis The legal arguments underlying the governmerit's approach are complex and involve substantial communications termlnology They also require lengthy disciission of the FISA statute and prev1ous FISA Coutt decisions. Rather than describe at length these issues, in this section we detail the two main components of the government's approach to content collection in the FISA application that are critical for understanding one judge's-approval of the application and another judge's later rejection of essentially the same application. (ES/1SH-NE)-\nFirst, the government proposed an interpretation of the term \"facility\"\nin the FISA statute that was broader than how the term was ordinarily, but NEY\nriot always, applied.?81\nSection 1805(a)(3)(B) of FISA provides that the Court may order electronic surveillance only upon finding that there is probable cause to believe that \"each of the facilities or places at which the electronic surveillance is directed is being used, or is about to be used, by\" a group involved in international terrorism. The term \"facilities\" generally was interpreted to refer to individual telephone numbers or e-mail addresses at which surveillance is \"directed.\"{FS+SH1F-\n~\nThegovernment pr oposed in its content application that the term\n\"facilities\" be interpreted broadly to includd\n'\n82 Under this approach, instead of XAl ng the target's use of particular telephone numbers or e-mail addresses; the Court would determine only .ther was probable commuricate telephonically or by e-mail ;283\nSecond, the government's application requested that senior NSA\nofficials be authorized to make individualized findings of probable cause about whether a particular telephone number or e-mail address was being used by a member or agent of one of the application's targets. Ordinarily, a FISA Court judge makes this probable cause determination. {FS/+SHN\n-\nTo implement this transfer of authority, the government proposed that NSA officials make the probable cause determinations as part of requirements called \"minimization procedures,\" which are detailed rules\n281 The governmerit's-Memorandum of Law filed in support of the content application described several instances where the FISA Court authorized surveillance of faci O\nLE\nAT\nThe government's proposed interpretation of the term in the content application was far broader than previously authorized by the Court. {ESFSHNF)\nbl, b3, b7E\nApplication ineluded a\"decifatibn' from the NSA Director that addressed]\n.\n\n|\nb3, bi&'g of the international telephone system and\n\"\nb7E\ncommunications. (ES7FSH7HF\nthat govern how the government must handle commuitications-that it intercepts pertaining to U.S. persons. The FISA statute provides that each FISA application must include, and the FISA Court must approve, minimization procedures that the agency will follow with respect to communications intercepted pursuant to a FISA Court order.\n\n'\nMinimization procedures, in the FISA context, ordinarily govern the handling of intercepted communications involving U.S. persons after the acquisition has been approved by the FISA Court.\n\nIn other words, a FISA\nCourt authorizes the agency to intercept the communications of particular selectors, and the agency follows the minimization procedures.\n\nwith respect to how it retains, uses, and disseminates any U.S. person information it collects under the Court's order. {FSA-SH/NF\nHowever, the government proposed as part of the content application that the minimization procedures also encompass how the NSA acquires the communications.?84 Specifically, the application proposed that the NSA\nconld intercept the communications of specific selectors if agency officials determined there was probable cause to believe that (1) the selector SRAY:\nused by a member or agerit.of a\n-\n-\n-\nB\nod (2) the communication is to-or from a foreign country. The application referred to this as the \"minimization probable cause standard.\"285\n(TS\nST/ /NE)}\nThus, the content application had a two-prong \"minimization probable.\n\ncause standard\"; (1) probable cause to believe a selector is being used by a member or agent of a targeted group, and (2) probable cause, to believe the n-country,\n'\n28 Bradbury told the OIG that this argument was based on the text of the FISA\nstatute, which states that minimization procedures apply to the \"acquisition\"\nof communications in addition to their retention and dissemination.\n\nSee 50 U.S.C.\n\n 1801(h)(1).\n\nIndeed, the government's Memorandum of Law filed in support of the content application described several cases in which the FISA Court authorized the governinent to conduct electronic surveillance that included minimization at the time of acquisition.\n\n_According to the application, the cases involved survei broadly targ'eted!\n\nb1, b3, b7E\nFor the first prong - probable cause to believe a selector is being used by a member or agent of a targeted group ~ NSA analysts would assess\n'sources of \"reliable intelligence,\" defined in the application as information from a variety of domestic and foreign intelligence and law enforcement activities. Under the terms of the application, positive findings of probable cause would be recorded in a database and the assessment process would be subject to periodic internal review by NSA officials, including the NSA\nGeneral Counsel and Inspector General. {FS/#8H-/2F)\ni,\n1T\n5\nki accordarice with NSA's standard tinimization procedures that apply to all of the agency's electronic surveillance activities, {TS//S0//NF)\n'\n287 As it did with telephorie communications, the application acknowledged that the manmer in which e-mail communications are routed would cause the NSA to collect some e-mail comrmunications that in fact are between communicants wholly within the United\n{Cont'd.)\nThus, viewing the government's approach to both \"facilities\" and\n\"rmmmlzatmn procedures\" together the Decembel 13 2006 content\n'dd'i'essc are to or from a foreign country If they were, the NSA could direct. the teleeommumca'uons carrlers to 1ntercept the commumcatlons of\n_\nUnder the terms of the application, communications acquired by the NSA could be retained for 5 years, unless the Court approved retention for a An additional aspect of the content application is important to understand. The \"early warning system\" the government propesed applied both to \"domestic selectors\" and \"foreign selectors.\" >\nDomestic selectors are telephone numbers and e-mail addresses reasonably believed to be used by individuals in the United States; foreign selectors are telephone numbers and e-mail addresses reasonably believed to be used by individuals outside the United States.\n\nUnder Stellar Wind, the NSA intercepted the communications of both categories of selectors, although the NSA tasked far more foreign selectors than domestic selectors. {FS//STEW//SHAOCNFY\nStates, even though the NSA had probable cause to believe the communication was to-or from a foreign country. The application stated that the NSA would handle any such communications in accordance with its standard minimization procedures. (TS/fSH-NF)\n~\nThe government proposed in its content application that the domestic selectors would be subject to more rigorous targeting approval and more frequent reporting to the FISA Court than foreign selectors, but the application sought to preserve NSA officials' authority to make the probable cause determinations as to each.?8% As we describe below, the first FISA.\n\nCourt judge to consider the content application, Judge Malcolm Howard, was unwilling to extend this authority to domestic selectors. 1TSS/\n\n## C. Judge Howard Grants Application In Part{Ts//Sl//Nf}\n\nThe Department's December 13, 2006, content application was assigned to Judge Howard, because he was the \"duty\" judge that week responsible for considering new applications,28% Judge Howard advised the Department orally that he would not authorize, on the terms proposed in the application, the electronic surveillance of selectors to be used by persons ini the United States (domestic selectors). He did not issue a written opinion or order concerning this decision. The Department, in response to\n'Judge Howard's oral advisement, filed a separate application requesting authority to conduct electronic surveillance on domestic selectors. This application, summarized below, was filed on January 9, 2007, and is considered the first \"domestic selectors application\"; the December 13\napplication is considered the first \"foreign selectors application.\"\nand whether t\n...\n\n\"facilitie\n1der FISA, he surveillance authority sought in the government's coritent application would in fact be \"directed\" not at these \"facilities\" but rather at the particular telephone numbers and e-mail addresses the government would task for collection. {FS/ASHNE-\nIn response, the Department filed a supplemental memorandum of law on January 2, 2007, arguing that the government's construction of the Court could direct that the surveillance of any selector cease.\n\nN\n289 The Department offered to submit the application to the FISA Presiding Judge, Judge Kollar-Kotelly, but she said that it should be filed in the normal fashion, which meant it would be assigned to the FISA duty judge that week. RSO}\nfurthe1 explamed Why the tradltlonal approach to survelllance under FISA\nWould not provide the speed and agility necessary for the \"early warning system\" the application sought to create.290 {TS//SLAANE)\nOn January 10, 2007, Judge Howard approved the Department's content appllcatlon as to foreign selectors, endorsing the legal framework on which the coritent application for foreign selectors was based, including the broad construction of the term \"facility\" and the use of minimization procedures to empower NSA officials to make targeting decisions.about particular selectors. Judge Howard's Order authorized the government to conduct electronic surveillance for a period of 90 days at the \"fac:1ht1es\n1dent1fied in the a.illcatmn and xpire.on April 6,\n2007, The Judge Howard's Order also required that an attorney from the Justice Department's National Security Division review the NSA's justifications for targeting particular foreign selectors. The Order required the government to submiit reports to the FISA Court every 30 days hstmg new selectors tasked during the previous 30 days and briefly summarizing the basis for the NSA's determination that the first prong of the minimization probable cause\n'standa.r_dhas been met for each new selector.?292 The Order preserved thie Court's authority to direct that surveillance cease on any selectors for which one motion or seeking one Attorney General\n290 On this point, the memorandum cited the government's limited resources as preseriting a significant obstacle to filing'a separate FISA application for each selector it wanted to place under surveillance. The government stated that it anticipated m1t1at1ng collection or\n'new selectors each month, a figure that translates to filj motion to amend a FISA order or seeking Attorney General emergency authority times per day (or, alternatively, filing emergency authorization coveringj a1\nnew selectors each day).\n\nThe government stated that if the government proceeded under any of these options, valuable intelligence would be lost. F&/HSHNF-\n291\nAs noted earlier, the Order compelled\n'\n, The Order also required that with each request for reauthorization, the g' vernment p scnt a list of current selectors previously reported to the Court that the government intended te continue bl,b3,b7E\ntasking, identify any selectors reasonably beheved to be used by U.S, persons outside the United States, and assgss the eff ection of comimunications that mentioned a tasked e-mail address -\n. but that were not to or from that selector.\n\nH*\nthe Court found that the first prong of the standard has not been satisfied.\n\nIn addition, the Order required the NSA Inspector General, General Counsel, and Signals Intelligence Directorate to periodically review the authorized collection activities. These NSA offices were required to submit a report to the Court\n60 days after the collection was initiated under the Order that would address the adequacy of management controls and whether U.,S.\n\nperson information was being handled properly. {ES/ASEHANE)-\nAccording to several Department and NSA officials, the effort to.\n\nAs a result of the Order, the Department and NSA submitted to the FISA Court for its review the factual basis for each selector supporting the governirent's determination that the \"minimization probable cause standard\" had been satisfied, The Department accomplished this pursuant t0.a_sC\n1le approved by Judge Howard under which the Department filed oreign selectors everydays for the duration of the\n90-day Order. ATS//SH-/NF)\nThe probable cause explanation for each foreign selector filed with the Court typically was described in several senternces. According to Bradbury, he impressed upon the NSA that Judge Howard would review each submission and inquire about how recently the NSA had acquired comrnunications relating to a particular selector. According to Matthew Olsen, the Deputy Assistant Attorney General in the Department's National Security Division who was responsible for overseeing intelligence matters, Judge Howard did in some cases inquire about the government's factual basis for believing the minimization probable cause standard has been met.2%% Bradbury also said he stressed that the Court would scrutinize the NSA's probable cause determinations more rigorously than the agency had been doing itself and that the Court was more likely to approve a selector where the surveillance was current than it would a selector that has\n\"remained dormant for months.\"294 (FS/F+SHNF\nOlsen told us thatf\n, oreign selectors ultimately were filed with the FISA Court under the terms of J udge Howard's Order.\n\nOlsen. said that the NSA strived to submit selectors that were deemed high priority; that had a well-documented nexus to R\nforeign powers, and that had recent communications activity. Attornieys from OIPR, who under the terms of the Order were required to review the NSA's justification for each foreign selector that it tasked, worked with the NSA omn this large-scale review process. According to Olsen, OIPR attorneys\n\"double-checked\" the NSA's probable cause determination for each selector, but did not conduct independent probable cause inquiries. This review identificd BB\nc]octors that in OIPR's judgment required.\n\nadditional documentation before they could be submitted to the Court.?95\nOlsen described the back-and-forth between OIPR and the NSA as\n\"constant,\" and said the NSA was receptive to OIPR's involvement, Olsen stated that the NSA committed significant resources to the transition of foreign selectors. {FS/SH/NFf Both Bradbury and Olsen observed that the transition of content collection of foreign selectors to FISA required:somie adjustment by the NSA\nin its approach to establishing probable cause.\n\nFor example, while an NSA\nanalyst might base a probable cause determination to seme extent on intuition, similar to a \"cop on the beat,\" it wasa differerit proposition when that probable cause determination had to be reviewed by several OIPR\nattorneys trying to anticipate how the FISA Court might view the judgment, Olsen stated that it was also \"new\" for the NSA to document the probable cause to the level OIPR believed the FISA Court would require. According to\n. Bradbury, the effort sought an equilibrium between \"the necessary speed and agility\" and the \"multiple layers of probable cause determination.\"\nBradbury and Olsen both told the OIG that the NSA had concerns about whether the FISA approach to content collection would work and the extent to which a measure of effectiveness would be lost under FISA Court supervision. (F8/75HNF\n\n## D. Domestic Selectors Application And Order{Fs//8H//Nf)\n\nIn contrast to foreign selectors, Judge Howard advised the Justice Department that requests for surveillance of the international calls of domestic selectors - telephone numbers or e-mail addresses reasonably believed to be used by individuals in the United States - should be filed with\n.\n\n295 Olsen told the OIG that he believes the NSA de-tasked some of these foreign selectors, {ES/SHAN\nthe Court in a separate application. Judge Howard also advised OIPR\nofficials that ary such application should take a more traditional approach to FISA, meaning the \"facilities\" targeted by the application should be particular telephone numbers and e-mail addresses and that the probable cause determination for tasking a selector would reside with the FISA Court, not with NSA officials pursuant to minimization procedures. {FS$/4SH-/NE}-\nOn January 9, 2007, the Department filed the first domestic selectors application. The application sought two things, First, the application requested authority to intercept the international communications of e specific domestic selectors.296 Second, the application b1 b3\n'sought, for purposes of future applications, approval to use a \"streamlined b7,E\n'\nversion\" of the emergency authorization procedures available under FISA.\n\nThese emergenicy procedures authorize the use of electronic surveillance for\n-aperiod of up to 72 hours without a Court order when the Attorney General reasonably determined that an emergency situation exists.\n\nSee 50 U.S.C.\n\n 1805(f). The procedures required the Attorney General to inform the FISA\nCourt that the surveillance has been initiated and required the Department to file with the Court an emergency application to continue the surveillance not more that 72 hours after the surveillance was authorized. {F8//8H-NE}\nThe goal of the Department's proposed streamlined emergency application procedures, referred to in the January 9, 2007, application as a\n\"Verified Application,\" was to ensure that the emergency surveillance process be completed as swiftly as possible for qualifying domestic selectors.\n\nThe proposal allowed the Verified Application to incorporate by reference the reasons or facts contained in the original domestic selectors application necessary to satisfy some of the statutory requirements under FISA, instead of reestablishing in each application for a new domestic selector that each of the requirements of FISA were met. The only new substantive information contained in a Verified Application would be the identity of the target, if known, the telephone number the target was using or was about to use and the factual basis sup ing probable cause to believe the target ish;\n-\n-\n.\n\n=== |andisusingorisabout to use the identified telephone number. {FS//SH-NF}\nJudge Howard granted the domestic selectors application on January 10, 2007, for a period of 90 days.\n\nHis Order also approved the\n296 Unlike the December 13, 2006 _appli did not seek authority to targetagentsofff 2 =2 2\n|\nmor did the application seek authority to conduct content surveillance of bl,\n\"e-mail communications. The declaration summarized for each of the domestic selectors b3, generally in two to three paragraphs, the facts that supported the government's belief that b7E\nt to be used by a known or unknown agent oif\n| located in the United States.\n\n(TS//SI//NF)\nstreamlined emergency authorization procedures proposed in the\n\napplication for any additional domestic selectors whose communications the government sought to intercept during the 90-day period for which surveillance was authorized.?97 {FSHSH-AE}-\nNSD Deputy Assistant Attorney General Olsen told the OIG that in comparison with foreign selectors, the Department conducted a more rigorous review of the initial domestic selectors submitted to the FISA Court to ensure that probable cause was met.\n\nOlsen said a few domestic selector packages\n\"on\n[their] face\" lacked sufficienit documentation and that these deficiencies were apparent to OIPR attorneys reviewing the information because the attorneys were looking at the information for the first time.\n\nHe said that the NSA analysts responsible for the selectors, in contrast, were very familiar with the numbers and knowledgeable of details about the users that might not have been evident to persons reviewing documentation\n'de novo. According to Olsen, for selector packages that were considered deficient, the NSA either provided the Justice Department attorneys with additional information or de-tasked the selector.?98 +{TS//SH-/NF}\n\n## E. Last Stellar Wind Presidential Authorization Expires\n\nOn December 8, 2006, the President signed what would become the final Presidential Authorization for the Stellar Wind program. The December 8 Authorization was scheduled to expire on February 1, 2007.\n\nHowever, Judge Howard's January 10, 2007, Orders relating to foreign and domestic selectors completed the transition of Stellar Wind's\n297 On January 22, 2007, the Department filed, and Judge Howard approved, the first Verified Application with the FISA Court using the streamlined procedures approved in the Order. 1ESHSH-NR)\n298 Qlsen and OIPR Deputy Counsel Margaret Skelly-Nolen told the OIG that during the application for and implementation of the domestic selectors Order, it became apparent that there were coordination problems between the FBI and the NSA. They noted that in many instances a domestic selector the NSA sought to task was already targeted by an FBI\nFISA order.\n\nAccording to Skelly-Nolen, in those cases problems can arise in providing accurate, current, and consistent information to the FISA Court about such selectors.\n\nShe said the NSA's practice has been to consult with the FBI analysts assigned to the NSA and to request from them the most current information the FBI has about a particular telephone number or user of that number. The FBI analysts at the NSA have access to FBI\ndatabases to search for such information, although the most current information frequently can only be obtained from the operational personnel at FBI Headquarters. Asa consequence, according to Skelly-Nolen, the FISA Court has on some limited occasions.\n\nbeen provided inconsistent information concerning domestic telephone numbers or the users of those numbers.\n\nOlsen told the OIG that the domestic selectors Order has required a higher level of coordination between the FBI and NSA and that the National Security Division has worked to address this issue. {FS7/SH7NE\ncommunications and meta data collection activities from Presidential Authorization to FISA authority. Bradbury told the OIG that because it was believed that Judge Howard's Orders, particularly the foreign selectors\n\"Order, provided the NSA. sufficient flexibility to conduct content collection; it was not necessary to renew the December 8, 2006, Presidential Authorization. {FSf T\nTherefore, on February 1, 2007, the Presidential Authorization for the Stellar Wind program officially expired.?9?\n\n## F. First Domestic And Foreign Selectors Fisa Renewal Applications T Shshhnf-\n\nJudge Howard's January 10, 2007, Orders were set to expire after 90\ndays. During the week of March 20, 2007, the government filed renewal applications to extend the authorities both as to domestic and foreign selectors. These applications were filed with Judge Roger Vinson, the FISA\nCourt duty judge that week. {FSHFSHFRFI\nThe domestic selectors application, filed March 22, 2007, was in all material respects identical to the go'vemment's original applicatiQn- Judge Vinson granted the application on April 5, 2007,300\n4TS/ LS\nNE)\nThe foreign selectors application was filed on March 20, 2007. The conterit and construction of the March 20 application was substantially identical to the government's original application, and advanced the same broad construction of the term \"facilitiesTM and the use of minimization procedures to authorize NSA officials, instead of judges, to make probable cause-determinations (subsequently reviewed by the FISA Court) about particular selectors.\n\n{355\nOn March 29, 2007, Judge Vinson orally advised the Department that he could not grant the foreign selectors application.\n\nHis decision validated some concerns within the Justice Department that Judge Howard's original\n300 As noted previously, the domestic selectors QOrder presented special coordination issues between the FBI and the NSA, and EEEE s e foooeaos e e e\n The Order was renewed for the final time infEEE ]\n| 2nd has since expired. (FS//SHNG-\nOrder might not be a sustainable long-term strategy for intercepting the commiunications of foreign selectors: J udge Vinson's decision also accelerated the Department's efforts to obtain legislation-amending the FISA\nstatute to authorize the type of surveillance conducted under Stellar Wind and that was approved by Judge Howard.\n\nTS/\n/SLLINE\nOn April 3, 2007, Judge Vinson issued an Order:and Memorandum Opinion explaining the reasoning for his conclusion that he could not grant the foreign selectors application. However, Judge Vinson did not deny the government's application. Instead, he enicouraged the Departrment to file a motion with Judge Howard requesting a 60-day extension of the existing January 10, 2007, foreign selectors:Order.\n\nIn explaining why he was:\nencouraging the Department of file the motion with Judge Howard, Judge Vinson wrote,\n|\n|\nI have concluded that an extension for this purpose.\n\nis appropriate, in view of the following circumstances: that the government has commendably devoted substantial resources to bring the NSA's surveillance program, which had been conducted under the President's assertion of non-FISA\nauthorities, within the purview of FISA; that a judge of this Coutt previously authorized this surveillance in [the January 10, 2007, foreign selectors Ordet], on substantially the same terms as the government now proposes; that it-would be tter for the government to terminate surveillance off l phone numbers and e-mail addresses under b1, b3, b7E\nFISA\nauthotity, and to decide whether and how it. should continue somie or all of the surveillance under non-FISA\nauthority; and, importantly, that within the-allotted time the government may be able to submit an application that would permit me to authorize at least part of the surveillance in a mantier consistent with this order and opinion. {FS/SHHNE\nJudge Vinson wrote that the Department's foreign selectors renewal application concerns an \"extremely important issue\" regarding who may make probable cause findings that determine the individuals and the communications that can be subjected to electronic surveillance under FISA.\n\nIn Judge Vinson's view, the question was whether probable cause determinations are required to be made by the FISA Court through procedures established by statute, or whether the NSA may make such determinations under an alternative mechanism cast as \"minimization procedures.\" Judge Vinson concluded, based on past practice under FISA\nand the congressional intent underlying the statuts, that probable cause determinations must be made by the FISA Court. {FSfSH-NF\n_\nIn explaining his reasoning, Judge Vinson first rejected the Departmerit's broad construction of the term \"facilities,\" concluding that'the\n\"elect'r,qnic,surveill;ance\" under the government's application - the acquisition of the content of communications - was directed at particular telephone. numbers.and e-mail addresses _and not at broad, swaths of\n.\n\n.\n\n- .\n\n-\n= -\n| asthe government contended. Judge Vinson aisunguisned prior cases that the government cited for its broad interpretation of \"facilities,\" observing;\n\"[t]ellingly, none of the cited cases stand for the proposition on which this.\n\napplication rests - that lectronic surveillance is not 'directed' at particular il addresses,g\n.\n\nJudge Vinson wrote that his conclusion was also supported by the government's and the Court's past practice, as well as the legislative history of FISA, which, according to Judge Vinson, made clear that \"Congress\n'\nintended the _pre~surveillanc_e judicial warrant procedure,\" and particularly the judge's probable cause findings, to provide an 'external check' on executive branch decisions to conduct surveillance  He wrote that the sovernment's proposal that \"the Court assessf\n.\n\ne\n| and make a highly\n-\nabstract and probable-cause findingp\n'\n.'\n\"\nremoved from the Court's pre-surveillance purview the question of whether the commurnications to be acquired will relate to the targeted foreign powers.301\nJudge Vinson rejected the government's \"minimization probable cause standard,\" stating that \"[m]inimization does not provide a substitute for, or a mechanism for overriding, the other requirements of FISA.\" Judge Vinson concluded that government's proposed minimization procedures, by authorizing the NSA to make probable cause decisions, conflicted with specific provisions of FISA that govern electronic surveillance, such the requirement that only the Attorney General can grant emergency approvals to conduct surveillance (followed within 72 hours by an application to the responsibility to make such findings based on the totality of circumstances.' Obviously, this would be inconsistent with the statutory requirement and the congressional intent that the Court make such findings prior to issuing the order (emphasis in original).\"\nLSS\nFISA Court), and that renewals for surveillance coverage must be based on\n\"new findings\" of probable cause by a judge. Judge Vinson summarized his position:\nThe clear purpose of these statutory provisions:is to ensure that, as a general rule, surveillances are supported by judicial determinations of probable cause before they commence; that demsmns to initiate surveillance prior to judicial review in emergency circumstances are made at politically accountable levels; that Jud1c1a1 review of such emiergency authorlzat1ons follows swiftly; and that decisions to continue surveillance receive the same degree of scrutiny as:decisions to initiate. The law does not permit me, under the rubric of minimization, to approve or authorize alternatlve procedures to relieve the government of burdensome safeguards expressly imposed by the statute. {FSF/SH/NF\nJudge Vinson wrote that he was mindful of the government's argument that the proposed minimization procedures were necessary to provide or enhance the \"speed and flexibility\" with which the NSA responds to threats, and that foreign intelligence information may be lost in the time it takes to obtain Attorney General emergency authorizations.\n\nHowever, in Judge Vinson's view, FISA's requiremerits reflected a balance struck by Congress between prlvacy interests and the need to obtain foreign intelligence information, and until Congress took legislative action on FISA\nto respond to the government's concerns, the Court must apply the statute's procedures.?92 He concluded that the government's application sought to strike a different balance for the surveillance of foreign telephone numbers and e-mail addresses. Vinson rejected this position, stating, \"provided that the surveillance is ' within FISA at all, the statute applies the same requirements to surveillance of fac111t1es used overseas as it does to surveillance of facilities used in the United States,\"303 {F8/781//NFJ\nand opinion.\" He continued, \"I believe that there are jurisdictional issues regarding the application of FISA to comthunications that-are between or among parties who are all located outside the United States.\" Judge Vinson suggested that \"Congress should also consider clarifying or modifying the scope of FISA and of this Court's jurisdiction with regard to such facilities\n.\n\n.\n\n. .\" Bradbury told the OIG that Judge Vinsorn's suggestion was an important spur to Congress's willingness to consider FISA modernization legislation in\n(Comt'd.)\n\n~\nAttorney General Gonzales told 11& that his reaction to-Judge Vinson''s.\ndecision was one of \"disappointment\" and that the decision \"confirmed our\nconcern about going to the [FISA Court].\" Gonzales also said he believed the\ndecision was \"troubling for purposes.of\nthe national security of our country.\"\nBradbury told us the government considered. several options after Judge Vinson's ruling, including appealing the decision to: the: FISA Court of Review, However, he said the decision was made to attempt to work with Judge Vinsomn to craft a revised application and also separately to renew the Administration's efforts to obtain legislation to modernize FISA..\n\n## G. Revised Renewal Application For Foreign Selectors And Order - { Qt\n\nAs suggested by Judge Vinson, in April 2007 the Justice Departmentobtained from Judge Howard an extension of the existing foreign selectors Order until May 31, 2007, to prepare a revised foreign selectors application.\n\nIn the interim, the Department filed two reports with -Judge Vinson describing a new approach to foreign selectors that addressed the concerns expressed in his Opinion, an\n| that sought input from the Court about how best to facilitate the submissiop.afan application that would seek authority to direct surveillance atfd\n|\nselectors. {FSHSH NE\nOn May 24, 2007, the Department filed a revised renewal application seeking to.renew, with modifications; the authorities granted in J udge Howard's Jariuary 10, 2007, Order. However, the -application did not include the broad construction of \"facilities\" and instead sought authority to conduct electronic sugyeillance of conventional facilities - telephone numbers and \"e-mailll\n_\n-\n'\n304 The application also did not include the \"probable cause minimization standard\" approved the summer of 2007.\n\nIn Section IV below, we summarize this legislation, the Protect America Act, and its successor, the FISA Amendments Act of 2008. (F&H/SHNE)}\n04 According to the May 24, 2007, application, such uses inclyde Internet\n4\nynications thatare sentto d.oretdevmail \"address, [t\n=\nto-use the term \"e-mail B eoTibe\n[he Tacinty at wicn e-mail surveillance would be directed;\n:\n. e\n=\ne However; according to the: application, the government \"routinely requests, and the court authorizes, electronic surveillance using [the e-mai\n|\nto identify this type of facility.\"\nSHHE\nby Judge Howard that had the effect of shifting from the FISA Court to the NSA the probable cause determinations about particular selectors.\n\nHowever, the targets of the government's revised applicatiorn remained selectors (telephone number and e-mail facilities) reasonably believed to be used outside the Umted States and for Wthh there is robable cause to\n. beheve were. bem L\ne\n11\n.\n\nShecifically, the application requested authority to- direct surveillance categories of foreign selectors:\n\no\nForeign telephone number and e-mail selectors presently known\nto the government, This category accounted for a portion of the\nforeign selectors alreadsy under surveillance\na0s. The May 24, 2007, apphcatmn explicitly stated that the government was not seeking survefllance authonty for any new facilities reasonably beheved by the NSA to be used by U.S. persons. 'The: apphcatmn stated that sutveillance-of those facilities would be initiated only through FISA's emergengy authorlzahon prOV]SlonS and the sti eamlmcd FISA\napphcahons approved :for domestxc selectors, TS\n_\n'Nmern ted an appendix with the revised renewal application that identifiect\n|\nfacilities and contained the factual basis for the NSA's belief that each of the facilities was being used by a person outside the United States and for which there was probable cause to believe were being used or about to-be used by a member or agent of one of the targeted foreign powers. The government had provided Judge Vinson these facilities on a rolling basis during May 2007 for his consideration. The NSA discontinued the surveillance of facilities that were targeted under Judge Howard's b7'E\nOrder, but that were not included amerng the facilities submitted te Judge Vinson for\n&\nroval The NSA told the OIG that the decision to discontinue surveillarice on these\n\"facflmes largely was a resource decision: and that was the amount the NSA could timely process for filing with the Court.\n\n@S,'/SIHNF)\nForeign e-mail 'selectors (not telephone number selectors)\npresently unknown to the government but that \"refer to\" or are\n\"about\" known foreign e-mail selectors. This category of surveillance, which the NSA had been conducting under Judge Howard's Order, includes situations where an already targeted e-mail facility is mentioned in the body of a message between:\ntwo third-party, non-targeted facilities.308 {FS/7SH/NF)\nAccording to the application, th surveillance would enable the NSA to\n1\no\n.+\ndiscovered facilities \"with the speed and agility necessary to obtain vital intelligence and to detect and prevent terrorist attacks.\" The application The collection authorities requested in the renewal application that pettained to currently unknown facilities would, according to the application, address this limitation.30? {FS/SH/NE}-\n'\nJudge Vinson granted the government's revised renewal application on May 31, 2007, His Order authorized, for a period of 90 days, each of the categories of electronic surveillance described above, although the\n308 The category presented an issue under FISA in that communications are being acquired because they contain the targeted e-mail selector, and not because there was probable cause to believe the e-mail accounts sending or receiving the communications are used or about to be used by an international terrorist group.\n\nIn such cases, the surveillance is not \"directed at\" the targeted e-mail selector. The government argued that such acquisition was still consistent with FISA because, \"at the time of acquisition, the NSA\nhas probable cause to believe that the facilities at which the NSA is directing surveillance are being used by the foreign power target.\"\n309 The government argued that the FISA Court's authority to authorize subsequent collection against new selectors unknown to the government at the time an application was approved is rooted in section 1805(c)(3) of FISA. That provision imposes specific reporting requirements on the government where the FISA Court approves an electronic surveillance in circumstarices where the nature and location of each of the facilities at which surveillance will be directed is unknown at the time of the application. FSASH-NFY\nOrder defined the precise circumstances under which the NSA could acquire gommUnlic_atio~ns falling within th'e-category of surveillance.310 The Order also included reporting schedules with respect to thef -\nWcategcries of surveillance, for which the government was required to\n'submit newly discovered selectors to the Court.\n\nSH-5E\nJudge Vinson initially approved foreign selectors under the terms of his May 31, 2007, Order (these selectors were submitted with the government's-May 24, 2007, application). Shortly after the Order was issued, the FISA Court decided that the weekly reports filed by the government notifying the Court of newly discovered selectors, as well as the government's motions seeking approval to conduct surveillance on additional selectors, could be filed for review with any member of the Court.\n\nAs the government received feedback from judges on the first reports and motions that were filed, it observed that judges were applying a more rigorous standard of review to the factual basis supg\n:\nurveillance for each selector than Judge Vinson applied to th:\nselectors he approved. The government consequently adjusted the amotnt of factual information it provid B\nin subsequent reports and motions and ultimately added Vinson's-Order.\n\n{tF\nAccording to Bradbury, the more rigorous: scrutiny applied by FISA\nCourt judges after Judge Vinson's initial approval\n| foreign selectors caused the NSA place only a fraction of the foreign ors under coverage than it wanted to. This concern, combined with the comparatively laborious process for targeting foreign selectors under Judge Vinson's Order, accelerated the government's efforts to obtain legislation that would amend FISA to address the government's sutveillance capabilities within the United States directed at persons located outside the United States. The Protect America Act, signed into law on August 5, 2007, accomplished this objective government's position that there was probable cause to believe that Internet communications relating to a previously targeted e-mail facility were themselves being sent or received by one of the targeted foreign powers and could be acquired. Judge Vinson called this holding \"novel,\" but concluded that the decision was \"consistent with the overall statutory requirements; it requires the government to promptly report and provide appropriate justification to the Court; and it supplies the Government with a necessary degree of agility and flexibility in tracking the targeted foreign powers.\" {F3//5H-/NF-\n\n- and effectively superseded Judge Vinson's foreign selectors Order. The\ngovernment therefore did not-seek to renew the 'Order when it expired\non\n- August 24, 2007, {BS/SH7N]\nIn the next s_ectiop, we Su'mmariz'e the effect of the Pr-o_tect' America Act and successor legislation, the FISA Amendments Act of 2008.\n\n(U)\n\n## Iv. The Protect America Act And The Fisa Amendments Act Of 2008 (U)\n\n~\nIn August 2007, the Protect America Act was enacted, amending FISA\nto address the government's ability to conduct electronic surveillance in the United States of persons reasonably believed to be located outside the United States. This legislation expired on February 1, 2008, but was extended by Congress to February 16, 2008.\n\nIn July 2008, the FISA\nAmendments Act of 2008 was enacted, which, among other things, created acomprehensive process under FISA for content collection directed at foreign targets. These two laws modernized the FISA statute as it applied to the acquisition in the United States of communications of persons reasonably believed to be outside the United States.\n\n(U)\nAs discussed in Chapter Three, FISA was enacted in 1978 when most international calls were carried by satellite. The interception of such calls constituted electronic surveillance\" for purposes of FISA only if the acquisition intentionally targeted a U.S. person in the United States, or if all participants to the commiunication were located in the United States.. Thus, government surveillance of satellite communications that targeted foreign persons. outside the United States generally was not considered electronic surveillance, and the government was not required to obtain a FISA Court order authorizing the surveillance even if one of the parties to the communication was in the United States. However, in the mid-1980s, fiber optic technology began to replace satellites as the primary means for trahsmitting interriational (and doriestic) telephone communications.\n\nThis change brought within FISA's definition of \"electronic surveillance\" the acquisition of telephone calls to or from a person in the United States if the acquisition occurred in the United States, thereby triggering the requirement that the government obtain FISA Court orders to conduct suiveillance that it previously conducted outside of FISA. {FS/SH-/NFY\n\nUnder the Stellar Wind progre\nNSA\ncollected international\ncommunicationsf\n=\n==\nb1, 13,\nby targeting facilities (telephone\nb7E\nnumbers and e-mail addresses) located outside the United States (foreign\n\nselectors):31! As noted in Chapters Three and Four, the Administration\n_contended that FISA, as supplemented by a subsequent legislative enactment (the AUMF), did not preclude the surveillance activities under Stellar Wind, or in the alternative represented an unconstitutional infringement on the President's Article I authority as Commander in Chief to the extent it conflicted with these collection activities.\n\nThe Justice Department's effort to transfer content collection from presidential authority under Stellar Wind to FISA raised the issue of FISA's application to the acquisition in the United States of cominunications to or from targeted foreign selectors. The Protect America Act and the FISA\nAmendments Act, in slightly different ways, addressed this issue by treating the chmunications of persons reasonably believed to be located outside the United States differently from communications of persons located in the United States.312 FS#STEW//SHHLOC/NID\n\n## A. The Protect America Act (U)\n\nThe Protect America Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-55, was a temporary measure signed into law on August 5, 0007.313 The Protect America Act's chief objective was to exclude from the requirements of FISA the interception ifi the United States of communications of persons located outside the United States, the category of communications referred to abave as \"foreign selectors.\"\n(U)\nThe Protect America Act amended FISA so that the interception of foreign selector communications fell outside the statute's definition of\nslectronic surveillance.\" Under the original definition of \"electronic surveillance,\" FISA generally applied to any communication to or from a known United States person inside the United States if the communication is acquired by targeting the known United States person.314 FISA also signed a bill to extend the Protect America Act for 15 days while further discussions on new legislation occurred.\n\nHowever, 1no agreement was reached on new legislation and the Act expired on February 16, 2008.\n\n(U)\n314 The original FISA definition of \"electronic surveillance\" included:\n'applie)d to the acquisition of other communications (such as k I3\nGormmunications acquired by targeting persons outside the United States) if the communication was a \"wire communication\" and the acquisition occurred inside the United States.\n\n(U)\nThe Protect America Act amenided FISA by stating: \"Nothing in the definition of electronic surveillance\n,\n.\n\n. shall be construed to encompass.\n\nsurveillance directed at a person reasonably believed to be located outside the United States.\" The effect of this amendment was to exclide from the requirements of FISA any communication acquired by targeting a foreign selector, regardless of where the communication was intercepted or whether the communication traveled by wire.\n\nAs aresult, the Act eliminated the need for Judge Vinson's May 2007 foreign selectors Order, because the collection of communications targeted under that Order no longer constituted \"electronic surveillance\" under FISA and therefore no longer required FISA Court orders.315 {FS/-+SH-F}\n(1) the dcquisition by an electronic, mechanical, or other surveillance device:\nof the contents of any wire or radio communication sent.by or intended to be received by a particular, known United States person who'is in the United States, if the tontents are acquired by intentionally. targeting that United States person, under circumstances-in which a persori has areasonable expectation of privacy and & warrant would be required for law enforcement purposes;\n(2) the acquisition by an electronic, mechanical, or other surveillatice device of the cantents of any wire communication to or from a person in the United States, without the consent of:any party thereto; if such acquisition eccurs in. the United States, but does:not include the acguisition of those commumnications of computer trespassers that would be-permissible under section 2511(20(i) of Title 18;\n(3) the intentional acquisition by an electronic, mechanical, or other surveillance device of the contents of any radio communication, under citeumstances in which a person has a reasonable expectation of privacy and a warrant would be required for law enforcement purposes, and if both the sender and all intended recipients are located within the United States;\nor\n(4) the installation or use of an electronic, mechanical, or other surveillance device in the United States for monitoring to acquire information, other than from a wire or radio communication, under circumstances in which a person has a reasonable expectation of privacy and a warrant would be required for law enforcement purposes.\n\n1In the place of individualized FISA Court orders, the Protect America Act also inserted several provisions into the FISA statute to-govern the acquisition of communications from persons \"reasonably believed to be outside the United States.\" These provisions authorized the Attorney General and the Director of National Intelligence to.acquire foreign intelligence information concerning such persons for up to one year, provided these officials certified that there are reasonable procedures in place for the government to determine thata target is reasonably believed to be outside the United States and that the acquisition of the foreign intelligenice therefore is not \"electronic surveillance\" under the amended definition of the term,316 The targeting procedures accompanying the certification had to be submitted to the FISA Court for approval, based on the clearly erroneous standard, within 120 days of the Protect America Act's enactment. However, the certification was not required to identify specific facilities or places at which the acquisition of foreign intelligence information would be directed.317\n(U}\nIn addition, the Protect America Act authorized the Attorney Gerieral and the Director of National Intelligence to direct a person\n(telecommunications carriers) to provide the government with \"all information, facilities, and assistance necessary to-accomplish the acquisition in such a manner as will protect the secrecy of the acquisition.\n\n. . .\" Protect America Act, Sec. 2(). The Protect America Act also authorized the Attorney General and the Director of N ational\n'The Protect America Act addressed this issue by excluding all\n\"surveillance directed at persons reasonably believed to be outside the United States.\n\nperson outside the United States, Thus, FISA orders issued prior to the enactment of the Protect America Act, and FISA orders, including applications for renewals, sought after enactment of the Protect America Act but not pursuant fo the Act's amendments\n(acquisition of foreign intelligence informatien from targets outside the United States) were still subject to FISA as it existed prior to the Protect America Act, The Protect America Act also provided, by means of an \"opt-out\" clause, that the government did not have to use the new procedures for new applications and could instead file applications under the provisions of FISA as it existed before the Protect America Act.\n\nSee Protect America Act, Sec, 6(b).\n\n(U)\nIntelligence to seck the assistance of the FISA Court to compel compliance with such directives, and implemented procedures for the telecommunications carriers to challenge the legality of any such directives.318\n(U)\n'\nThe Protect America Act authorized the Attorney General and.the\n'Director of National Intelligence to issue orders without individualized FISA\nCourt approval for up to one year targeting persons reasonably believed to be outside the Utiited States. These orders 'r'.eme'i'inqd*i_ri ffect beyond the expiration of the Protect America Act on February 16, 2008.\n\n1))\nOn August 10, 2007, the Attorney General and the Director of National Intelligence filed a certification with the FISA Court, as required under the Protect America Act, relating to surveillance of persons.\n\nreasonably believed to he outside the Inited States likely to cc\n:\ninformation concerning\n=\n=\n;\nIforeign selectors under Judge Vinson's Order were\n\"rolled over\"\nto the new Protect America Act authority. A Deputy Assistant Attorney General in the National Security Division familiar with b1\nthe transition of Stellar Wind to FISA Court authority told us that the b3, goverriment also began to \"build new selectors\" under the Protect America b7:E\nAct and worked toward restoring the universe of foreign selectors that were first authorized for tasking under Judge Howard's January 2007 Otder when content collection under Stellar Wind initially had. migrated. to FISA\nCourt authority.\n\n{ES//SLLL\nAlthough the Department viewed the Protect America Act as an adequate temporary fix to those provisions of FISA seen as outdated because of changes in telecommunications technology, Department officials continued to press Congress for more permanent modernization legislation.\n\n(U)\nauthorizing the Director of National Intelligence and the Attorney General to direct a person to assist the government in implementing the Act. See In Re: Directives [redacted text|\nPursuant to Section 105B of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, No. 08-01.\n\n{U)\n\n## B. The Fisa Amendments Act Of 2008 (U)\n\nOn July 11, 2008, the President signed the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 Amendments Act of 2008 (FISA Amendments Act).\n\nThis legislation, composed of four titles, replaced the Protect America Act with similar but more comprehensive surveillance authority. The provisions\n~\nof the FISA Amendments Act expire, with limited exceptions, on December 31, 2012,\n(U)\nA chief objective of the FISA Amendments Act was to change the rules for intercepting the electronic communications of persons reasonably believed to be outside the United States when the acquisition occurs i1 the United States.\n\nAs discussed above, the Protect America Act accomplished this by amending FISA's definition of \"slectronic surveillance\" to exclude this activity from FISA requirements. The FISA Amendments Act took a different approach. Instead of excluding the activity from the statute's definition of\n\"electronic. surveillance,\" the FISA Amendments Act created a new title in FISA to govern how the government may conduct this electronic surveillance. Under this approach, the FISA Amendments Act, unlike the Protect America Act, distinguishes between the targeting of non-U.S, and U.S. personsreasonably believed to be outside the United States.312\n(U)\nFor non-U.S. persons, the new title created by the FISA Amendments Act provides for surveillance authority similar to the Protect America Act.\n\nInstead of requiring the government to obtain individualized orders from the FISA Court to intercept c,ommunications of non-U.S. persons reasonably believed to be outside the United States, the FISA Amendments Act authorized the government to conduct any such interceptions for a period of up to one year provided that it adopts, and the FISA Court approves, general targeting procedures designed to ensure that the new authority is not used States, The FISA Amendments Act of 2008, instead of adopting the Protect America Act's modified.definition of \"electronic surveillance,\" explicitly stated that the targeting of non-U.8S. persons outside the United States shall be conducted under the new FISA\nprocedures, which does not require an -application for a FISA order.\n\nIn this way, the FISA\nAmendments Act accomplished the same goal as the Protect America Act without exempting the targeting of U.S. persons outside the United States from FISA's individualized order requirements.\n\n{U)\nto direct surveillance-at persons within the United States or at U.S. persons ouitside the United States.20 (U)\nTn contrast, to conduct U.S.-based surveillance of U.S; persons reasonably believed to be located outside the United States; the FISA\nAmendments Act requires the government to obtain individualized FISA\nCourt orders for 90-day periods based on a showing of probable cause to\n'believe that the U.S. person is outside the United States and is a foreign power or an agent, officer, or employee of a foreign power. Such\n'surveillance previously was governed by Executive Order 12333, and required only a certification from the Attorney General, not the FISA Court.\n\n(V)\nCompared to Stellar Wind, the FISA Amendments Act provides the government broader authority to acquire in the United States, with Court supetvision, the communications of non-U.S. persons reasonably believed to be located outside the United States. Under Stellar Wind, the NSA was authorized to collect communications where there was probable cause to believe the communications originated or terminated outside the United States and a party to the communications was al Qaeda or & group affiliated with al Qaeda. Under the FISA Amendments Act, the NSA is authorized to collect in the United States any communications of non-U.S. persons reasonably believed to be located outside the United States;. provided a ienificant purpose of the acquisition pertains to foreign intelligence, certification the government is required to file with the FISA Court must also contain minimization procedures and state that a significant purpose of the acquisition that will be conducted is to obtain foreign intelligence information.\n\nbetween U.S. and non:U.S. persons, and the NSA was authorized under Stellar Wind to intercept the communications of U.S, persons' (domestic selectors) provided the comrmunications originated or terminated outside the United States.\n\nunder Stellar Wind, and the government described the issue\n\n## V. Oig Analysis (U)\n\nAs discussed in this chapter, the government's effort to transition Stellar Wind from presidential authority to FISA, which began in March\n2004, eventually resulted in all three baskets of collection being authorized by FISA. While the legal theories supporting this transition were aggressive, we believe that the Department could have and should have pursued transition to FISA as a viable legal alternative earlier than it did, rather than operate aspects of the Stellar Wind program solely under presidential authority for several years. 4FS;\nL/\nSHHO\nIn Chapters Three and Four we discussed John Yoo's 2001 and 2002\nmemoranda concerning the legality of Stellar Wind and his contention that FISA represented an unconstitutional infringement on the President's Commander-in-Chief authority under Article II of the Constitution to conduct electronic surveillance during wartime. We recognize that Yoo's analysis was to some extent a response to the extraordinary circumstances that confronted the federal government immediately after the September 11\nterrorist attacks and its effort to take emergency steps to thwart what many officials believed was an imminent second wave of attacks.\n\nYet, even if one agrees with Yoo's Article IT analysis and supports the decision to enhance outside the judicial or legislative process the NSA's signals intelligence collection capabilities, we believe there are strong countervailing considerations that favored attermnpting to transition the program to FISA, especially as Stellar Wind became less a temporary response to the September 11 attacks and more a permanent surveillance tool.\n\nChief among these considerations was the Stellar Wind program's.\n\nsubstantial effect on privacy interests of U.S. persons. Under Stellar Wind, the government engaged in an unprecedented collection of information concerning U.S. persons. The President authorized the NSA to intercept, without judicial approval or oversight, the content of international communications involving many U.S. persons and the NSA collected large amounts of non-content data about U.S. persons' domestic and international telephone calls and to a lesser extent e-mail communications for possible analysis consistent with the extant Presidential Authorization.\n\nWe believe the FISA Court, as an Article III court and the judicial authority charged by statute to oversee U.S.-based electronic surveillance and other collection activities affecting U.S. persons for foreign intelligence purposes, was the appropriate entity to monitor and approve such broad acquisitions of'U;S',ffpe;sop_ig'fo;matign conducted under Stellar Wind, 322\n'Second, as several Justice Department and NSA officials commented the FISA statute offered a \"firmer footing\" for the NSA's collection activities under Stellar Wind, As discussed in Chapter Three and Four, the aggressive assertion of Article T authorlty on which Stellar Wmd was based largely reflected the legal reasoning of a single Justice Department attorney working alone, without-adequate review or scrutiny of his analysis, As we also concluded this led to a flawed legal analysis on which the program rested for several years, This approach also led to a contentious dispute between Department and White House officials in 2004 involving renewal of aspects of the program.\n\nBy contrast, the FISA statute provided an alternative basis for Stellar Wind-like collection activities that we believe should have been considered, and pursued, much earlier by the Administration. (iPSfiSiFEJoLHS{/yLQG%}\nIn this regard, the White House's strlct control over the Justice Departiment's access to the program lessened the opportumty for lawyers with relevant expertise to advise the Administration on the viability of workmg within the FISA statute to achieve the same operational objectives as the Stellar Wind program. Moreover, as the limited number of Department read-ins persisted, meaningful consideration of FISA asan alterna'uve ta pres1dent1al authonty for the program was limited.323\n'\nWe also found there were operational benefits to transitioning Stellar Wind to FISA. The PR/TT and Section 215 Orders to collect e-mail and\n:\n&\n.\n\no\n%\ne\n5\n-\n[\nbl, b3, b7E\nThe transition of Stellar Wind to FISA authority, together with the passage of the Protect America Act, allowed the N SA to begin the process to close, or \"de-compartment,\" the Stellar Wind program. This change, which was not completed until mid-2008, has allowed agents in FBI field offices r access to information about the telephone numbers and e-mail\ns being provided as leads. As described in Chap\n:\n.\n\nbi, plaint of agents who were assigned and b3, eads was the lack of detail provided about the nature of the.\n\nb7E\nyternational contacts and the foreign entity allegedly involved with terrorism that was one of the communicants. These details often were not provided because of the highly classified and compartmented nature of the Stellar Wind program. Now that such information is gathered under FISA\nauthority and not compartmented as it was under Stellar Wind, it is classified at a level that allows agents in FBI field offices to gain access to additional-details upon request.32 P8/\n'\nY/\nNF\nWe recognize that Stellar Wind''s transition to FISA resulted in the imposition of new responsibilities and conditions on the exercise of these:\nunprecedented collection authorities.\n\nIn the PR/TT and Section 215 Orders, the FISA Court imposed significant oversight measures that were not required under Stellar Wind. To be sure, the government, particularly the NSA, must devote substantial resources to ensure compliance with these oversight measures.\n\nYet, we believe that such requirements are appropriate, given the massive amounts of data collected and the potential impact on the privacy interests of U.S. persons. (LSALSTLW/SHOE/NF)\nWe also recognize that the transition of content collection from presidential authority to statutory authority under FISA resulted in significant diminution in authorized surveillance activity of the content of communications. We described in this chapter how first under Judge Howard's Order, and then more significantly under Judge Vinson's revised\n324 Chapter Six of this report discusses FBI agents' improved access to program-derived information under FISA after the Stellar Wind program was closed.\n\nforelgn selectors under Stellar Wm e\n'\nb1, b3, pplication in December 2006, but placed\n_fore1gn selectors under b7E\n'\n:\n'fice coverage under Judge Vinson's May 2007 Order. National\n\"\nId 'us that they sucoessfully:added\n:\n!\n\nforeign selectors under the terms of the Court's Order\n0;\nHowever, we believe that such broad surveillance and:collection activities conducted in the United\" States, particularly for a significant period of time, should be conducted pursuant to statute and judicial oversight, evern though this resulted in a diminution of foreign selectors due to resource issues. We also believe that placing the activities.under Court supervision provides an important measure of. accountab111ty for the government's conduct that is less assured when the activities are both\n'authorlzed and superv1sed by the Executive Branch alone.325\nin suin, we concluded there were compelling reasons to pursue beginning the process of transitioning the collection activities of Stellar Wind to FISA authority earlier thanhfZOO&L These inicluded the program's large collection of information about U.S, persons, which warranted judicial oversight; the 1nstab111ty of the legal reasoning on which the program rested for several years; and the substantial restrictions placed on FBEI agents' access to and use of program-derived information due to Stellar Wind's highly classified status. We acknowledge that transitioning Stellar Wind's collection activities to FISA would have been an enormously complex and time-consuming effort that rested upon novel interpretations.\n\nand uses of FISA that not all FISA Court judges would authorize.\n\nNevertheless, the events described in this chapter demonstrate that a full transition to PISA authority was achievable and, and in-our judgment, should have been pursued earlier. {ESH-STEWH/STHHOGHNE\napplication,f\n.\n\n.\n\n'\n.\n\n'\n.\n\n_was not without benefit. Judge Vinson's-decision reflected what some mtelhgence off1c1als considered limitations in the FISA statute as it applied to the acquisition of communications in the United States of persons located outside the United States, especially non-U.S. persons.\n\nIn this way, transitioning Stellar Wind''s content. collection to FISA helped the government make its case to Congress in concrete, non-hypothietical terms for modernization legislation amending the statute. (?SHSQ%%%/SH/OG#IE)\nThe preceding chapters examined the evolution of the Stellar Wind program and its transition from Presidential Authorization to FISA\nauthority.\n\nIn this-chapter, we examine more closely the FBI's involvement in Stellar Wind and the impact the program had on FBI counterterrorism efforts.\n\n-\n-\n7B\nis the codename for the project, classified at the Secret level, that the FBI initiated in September 2002 to disseminate Stellar Wind information to FBI field offices in a manner that did not disclose the source bl, b3, of the information or the means by which it was acquired. The FBI\noriginally opened as an administrative file to serve as the\n:epbsifiory for all commiunications FBI Headquarters disseminated to FBI\nfield offices relating to Stellar Wind information, as well as all cornmunications FBI Headquarters received from: field offices reporting the restilts of any investigation conducted in response to the \"tipped\"\ninformation originating from Stellar Wind.\n\n1o Nos\n=r 2006, the FBI\nopened an investigative file under the nameg\n26\nSection I of his chapter summarizes how the FBI used disseminate Stellar Wind information to FBI field offices. Section I\ndescribes the FBI's decision in mid-2003 to make its headquarters-based b1, b3, Comimunications Analysis Unit (CAU), instead of FBI field offices, b7E\nresponsible for issuing National Security Letters (NSL) to ebtain subscriber information for telephone numbers (basket 2 of Stellar Wind) disseminated un\n-\n327 Section III discusses the role the FBI played, beginning in approximately March 2004, in the process to \"scrub\"\ninternational terrorism FISA applications for Stellar Wind information.\n\nSection IV of this chapter examines the impact of the information obtained from Stellar Wind on FBI counterterrorism efforts.\n\nIt first provides statistics concerning the number of tippers the NSA derived from Stellar Wind information - telephony, e-mail, and content - disseminated to FBI\nzs preceded by thelila\n= and disseminate Ste\n'Winc derived information. Wfis&fi@fififi\n327 The CAU is the successor to the Teelephone Analysis Unit (TAU), which the FBI\ncreated after the Septemnber 11 terrorist attacks to analyze telephone communications. The CAU assumed TAU's responsibilities in late 2002. {S//NFy field offices through field offices generally investigated\n1ppers and thc: typ1ca1 results of the investigations. The section then summan izes two- statistical surveys of meta data tippers the FBI conducted in 2006 to assess the value of Stellar Wind to FBI operations, and. describes observations about the prograrns contribution and value prov1ded by FBI officials and employees in OIG\ninterviews. and contained in documents the OIG obtained during the course of this review.\n\nIn addition, the section examines five FBI international terrorism investigations commonly cited as examples of Stellar Wind's contl 1but10n to. counterterronsm efforts in the United States.:328\nLastly, Section V of this chapter contains the OIG's analysis\n\npact on FBI operations. (S/ANE\nprocess was: managed by a group of FBL employees.\n\nfrom CAU, designated as \"Team 10,\" who in February 2003 were assigned full-time to the NSA to'work on the Stellar Wind program.32? Team 10 was described to us as-a. \"conduit\" and a \"curtain\" between Stellar Wind 'and the FBI, in that Team 10's chief respons1b111ty was to disseminate Stellar Wind-derived information to FBI field offices for: mvestlgatmn without disclosing that the NSA was the source of the mformatmn 6r how the NSA\nacquired the information.\n\n{57+\nS\nN\nTeam 10 initially was staffed with two FBI spemal agerits (one of whom served as supervisor) and two analysts: The CAU subsequently replaced one agent position with a third analyst and later: added a fourth analyst.\n\nAt the NSA, Team 10 was co-located in a large open space with dozens of NSA and other Intelligenice Community personnel assigned to the Stellar Wind program. Each team member was provided a computer with direct access to NSA information associated with Stellar Wind. The NSA\ntold the OIG that Team 10 members worked at the NSA under the authority of the NSA Director and as such were required to adhere to NSA\nminimization rules and attend the same training as NSA employees. Team\n10 members also were provided access to Stellar Wind-related systems and\n328 As noted above, our report examines the FBI's role in the Stellar Wind program.\n\nand does not review the use of the program by other agencies, such as the CIA. SN}\n329 The CAU is organized into ten teams, nine.of which are responsible for providing communications analysis support to specific field offices and FBI Legal Attaches (Legat).\n\nAccording to an FBI organizational chart, Team 10 supports \"Off-gite. lntelhgence Com mumty Spemal Projects.\" Team 10 was exclusively responsible for managin\n~ databases, and had access from their com Avitomated Case Support (ACS) system and The process under nformation was similar to the process the FBI established under th\n:\ndescribed in Chapter Three.\n\nIn short, the NSA provided T\nSecret, compartmented Stellar Wind reports to Team 10, which in turn converted the information into Secret, non-compartmented electronic communications (EC) and disseminated the communications, referred to as\n\"tippers,\" to FBI field offices for appropriate action.330 T\nprocess was applied, with some differences, to each of Stellar Wind's three \"baskets\" of information. The vast majority of\n)\nStellar Wind reports involved the NSA's analysis of telephony meta data -\nthat is, basic information such as date, time, and duration, about contacts between foreign and domestic telephone numbers for which the NSA\ndetermined there was a reasonable articulable suspicion to believe were related to al Qaeda or an affiliated group.33!\n\n{F5//8T\n| |IECincluded a paragraph that summarized the\n| project and explained that the CAU could not disclose the sourCe'O'f'6'i:rif0rmation contained in the BC, but that the information came from-a \" 'sensitive and highly reliable\" source. Each EC also included\n&\nt advising the field offices that the information provided by the ource could be used for \"lead purposes only\" and could not be orpora .d into any affidavit, court proceeding, FISA application or e unclassified investigative file.\" In addition, each\n;\n\"lead\" that instructed the field office what investigative actio\n, if an should taken regarding the information provided, We further descrlbe ds and. FBI fleld offices handhng of them in Section IV of this pter bl, b3, b7E\nBefore Team 10 disseminated Stellar Wind-derived information to field offices, an analyst queried FBI databases for relevant information about the telephone number, e-mail address, or individual (in the case of a content report) identified in the Stellar Wmd report. Theese queries often identified, for example, subscriber information the FBI previously obtained for Stellar Wind telephone numbers as part of a prior FBI investigation, or active counterterrorism investigations in which the subscriber to a Stellar Wind-targeted number was the subject or in which the number; and sometimes the subscriber, were referenced. Team 10 analysts also checked puiblic and commercial databases, most commonly in connection with,\n-mall addresses\n' These checks sometimes identified the specific\n- and an domam names the user of an emafl inchuded in the EC asa \"CAU Comment\" or an \"Analyst Comment\" to differentiate the FBI mformatwn from the mforma'aon provided by the Stellar Wind source.332\n77s\n-\nOver time, Team 10 began to do more than receive and disseminate:\nprogram-derived information.\n\nFor example, Team 10 occasionally submitted telephone nurnbers to the NSA for possible querying against the database containing the bulk telephony meta data collected under Stellar Wind.333\n332 In this respect Team 10 handled Stellar Wind content reports differently from meta data reports, Team 10 analysts typically did not perform additional analyucal work on the information provided in Stellar Wind content reports other than to identify any FBI\ncases to which the information was relevant.\n\nFor example, a content report might summarize 1ntercepted communications indicating that an acquaintance of the subject of an FBI investigation is traveling to or from the United States. The connection between this ar Wind information and the relevant FBI investigation would be reported in the C. (PS1SFEWSH-OCHNE)\n333 As described in previous chapters, the purpose of the bulk collection of meta data under Stellar Wmd was to allow the NSA to use analytical tools such as contact chainingll\n'\no identify known and unknown individuals associated with al Qaeda or an. al Qaeda affihate The technique involves querylng the telephony or e-mail database with a number or address for which an analyst had a \"reasonable articulable suspicion\" to believe was used by persons involved in al Qaeda or.an al Qaeda affiliate, and then examining any contacts with that number or address. {FS/STEWHSHHOS/NE\nThe telephone numbers Team 10 provided typically were obtdined from the FBI's domestic and international counterterrorism operations; such as a riumber identified during a phone conversation monitored under FISA or a number found in the address book of a subject arrested abroad. The NSA\nconducted independent analysis to determine whether telephone numbers\n(or e-mail addresses) provided by Team 10 met the querying standard established by the Presidential Authorizations that governed Stellar Wind\n(that is, a reasonable articulable suspicion to believe that communications from the telephone number relate to al Qaeda or an affiliated group).33+\nTeam 10 also contributed to the NSA's drafting process for Stellar Wind reports. Telephone numbers and e-mail addresses identified through queries of the databases that contained the bulk telephony and e-mail meta data were reviewed by NSA analysts to determine whether the contacts should be reported to the FBI in a Stellar Wind report. Team 10\nparticipated in this process by reviewing draft reports and providing any information from FBI databases that might be relevant to this determination.335\ni LAOCHNR\n'We were told that one of the benefits of Team 10's presence at the NSA arid its involvement in the Stellar Wind report drafting process was an improvement in the quality of the information disseminated to FBI field offices. For example, the FBI Supervisory Special Agerit (SSA) who supervised Team 10 from April 2005\nto July 5006 told the OIG that he tried b1, b3, to reduce the NSA's reporting of telephone numbers that were several hops b7E\nremoved from the telephone humber linked to al Qaeda or an affiliated terrorist group. He said that he wanted Team 10 to disseminate: \"solid numbers with value,\" not numbers with questionable value.such as \"high volume numbers\"\n(public telephones, for example) and The FBI SSA said that the NSA expressed the concern\n334 Team 10 analysts submitted such telephone numbers to the NSA electronically through \"Requests for Information,\" or RFIs, which is the formal process by which the FBI\nand other agencies provide leads and request information from the Stellar Wind database.\n\nFBI records indicate that from April 2002 to January 2006 the FBI directedf\n.\n\nto NSA analysts for possible analysis under Stellar Wind.\n\nThe records'do not indicate the disposition of each RFIL\n{\n:\n;\ni\n335 The NSA developed formal \"checklists\" to guide the Stellar Wind report drafting process for telephony and e-mail tippers.\n\nThe checklists include over 30 steps that NSA\nanalysts were required to complete, and a supervisor had to approve, before a report could be distributed to the FBI or any other Stellar Wind customers (the CIA and National Counterterrorism Center).\n\nA significant feature of the checklist from the FBI's perspective was the requirement that NSA analysts check any telephone numbers and e-mail addresses in a draft report with the FBI and \"make best effort to include FBI\n.\n\n.\n\n. data in [the] tipper.\"\nthat it could not foresee whether any particular contact, although remote, mright prevent the next terrorist attack, and did not want to find itself in the position of defending its decision not to pass. that number to the FBI.\n\nHowever, he said the. NSA: took: several ste ps to imiprove the guality of inforrnation such asf\n=\nfor the domestic contacts that were reported and incl analytica Jfi&effiems about the contacts. 336\nAs discussed in Chapter Five, the government: transitioned Stellar Wind's bulk e-mail meta data collection (basket 3) to FISA authority in July\n2004 with the Pen Reglster /Trap and Trace Order, bulk telephony meta data collection (basket 2) in May 2006 with the Section 215 Business Records Order, and content collection (basket 1) in January 2007 when the FISA Court granted the govemment's domestic and foreign selectors applications.\n\nSTE\n'\nHowever, after the transition was completed the NSA continued to produce repoits: within the Stellar Wind compartierit to the FBI and other program customers, even though the information contained in the reports was derived from the FISA-authorized collection activities.\n\nCo the FBI continued to disseminate the information under the process. The current Team 10 supervisor told us that this decision,\n1\nafter consultation with the FBI's Office of the General Counsel (QGC), was made to adhere to the FISA Court's continuing requirement that international terrorism FISA apphcatlons be scrubbed for Stellar Wind information (the procedure for Wthh is described in Section HI of this chapter).\n\n-\n-\nThe NSA received permission to begin the process to close, or\n\"de- -compartrment, \" the Stellar Wind program after the Protect Amer1ca Act was passed in August 2007.\n\nIn mid-2008, the NSA oifimally closed the program and discontinued issuing \"Stellar Wind\"\nre\n1ber\n2008, the FBI initiated a new investigative file, e 0\n=\n=\n-\ndisseminate the NSA's FISA-derived information,337\nThe Team 10 supervisor program was that the NSA was serving two customers - the FBI and the CIA\n- but had _]LISt one set of reporting guldehnes This was so because the NSA tradm'\nmination process and the FBI's cgort ination with the.\n\ns similar to what occurred undex|\n1\ntold us that NSA\nunder\n'However, one notable ECs, can only include ecause the FBI's primary computer s cannot be used for Top Secret\n'\ne difference is that the NSA's FISA\n, while classitied at the Top Secret/Sensitive Compartmented Information\n(TS/SCI) level, are not subject to thecompartment desig is s standpoint.\n\n|\ninformation classified Secret.or lower network for disS'emihathlg' co1\n]\nformatio il agents in field .offices can NowW\nrequest access to additional information b0\nleads because agents have the appropriate clearances, 'As discussed in Chapter Three and addressed below, the chief criticism ol leads was the lack of detailed information that could be pro ded to field agents about tippers because of the highly compartmented nature of Stellar Wind.\n\n## 1L S Decision To Issue National Security Letters Unde To Obtain Telephone Subscriber Information (S/43F}-\n\nFrom August 2003 to November 2006, as part of the process the Communications Analysis Unit (CAU) assumed respo ty from the field offices for requesting National Security Letters (NSL)\nto obtain\n'subscriber information fo\n\\tclephorie nuimber tippers;338\nTk NSLs were authorized by the FBI's OGC\nand issued pu suant to the project. As discussed below, however, this practice was.contrary to applicable FBI investigative guidelines because non-investigative file and therefore under FBI policy should not have been used as the basis for issuing NSLs. ~(S/-NF)\nThe FBI uses NSLs to obtain information from third parties such as telephone companies, financial institutions, Internet service providers, and consumer credit agencies. NSLs, authorized by five specific provisiens comtained in four federal statutes, direct third parties to provide -customer account information and transactional records such as telephone toll billing\n338 Field offices remained responsible for issuing NSLs in connection with e-mail address tippers, which was likely attributable to the comparatively low volume of e-mail tippers and the ability of field offices to handle themn expeditiously: {8//8}-\nrecords,\n339 The OIG issued two reviews in 2007 and 2008 examining the:\nFBI's use of NSLs:30\n(U)\nJustice Department investigative guidelines issued by the Attorney General govern the circumstances under which the FBI may use NSLs. The Attorney General guidelines in effect during the Stellar Wind program authorized the FBI to issue NSLs relevant to and in the course of an authorized national security investigation,341 Further, FBI internal policy distinguishes between \"investigative files\" and non-investigative\n\"administrative files\" (commonly referred to as \"control files\"). This distinction is niot 4 mere techmicality. Investigative files, in the national security context, are opened based on evidence that a person, group, or organization is involved in international terrorism. From October 2003 to September 2008, the Attorney General Guidelines required the FBI to provide summary reports to the Justice Department at the end of each year bl, b3, b7E\n339 The four federal statutes are the Right to Financial Privacy Act, 12 U.8.C,\n'3401-3422; the Electronic Communications Privacy Act (ECPA), 18 U.S.C.  2709; the Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C.  1681 et seq.; and the National Security Act, 50\nU:S.C.. 436a)(1) (2000).\n\nNSLs issued underf Irelied on the ECPA statute, which provides that the FBL may obtain subscriber information from a communications service provider if the FBI certifies that the information sought is televant to an authorized investigation to protect against international terrorism or claridestine intelligence activities: provided that.such an investigation of a United States person is not coniducted solely on the basis of activities protected by the first amendment to the Constitution of the United States.\n\n18 U.S.C.  2709(b)(2) (2000 & Supp. IV 2005). The statute also permits access to \"toll billing records\" or \"electronic communication transactional records;\" 18 U.S.C.  2709(a), but requires a warrant:for access to the content of telephone communications.\n\nSee 18\nU.S.C.  2511 (Wiretap Act) and 3121 (Pen Register Act); see also 18 U.S.C.  2702(b)(8).\n\n(v\n,\n340 The OIQ's first report on NSLs, issued in March 2007, was entitled, A Review of the Federal Bureai of Investigation's Use of National Security Letters. The OIG's second report, issued in March 2008, was entitled, A Review of the FBI's Use of Nufional Security Letters: Assessment of Corrective Actions and Examination of 'NSL Usage in 2006.\n\n{U)\n34 Prom March 8, 1999, through October 31, 2003, national security investigations were governed by the Attormey General's Guidelines for FBI Foreign Intelligence Collection arid Foreign Counterintelligence Investigations (FCI Guidelines).\n\nThe FCI Guidelines were replaced, effective October 31, 2003, with the Attorney General's Guidelines for FBI\nNational Security Investigations and Foreign Intelligence Collection (NSI Guidelines).\n\n(U)\nbl, b3, b7E\n\n## \"Inquiry,\" Under The Fci Guidelines) Requires 0N1'Y S'\n\nof suich involvement.\n\nSee NSI Guidelines, Section II.C. (October 31, 2003); FCI Guidelines,\n'\nSection I1I.B. (March 8, 1999). {S7/NH-\na fuill nationial security investigation continues. These requirements helped ensure that there was sufficient, documented pred1cat10n for investigative activities FBI agents sought to conduct such as requesting NSLs.\n\nS\n/NE)\nControl files, in contrast, are \"separate files established for the purpose of administering specrfic phases of an 1nvest1gat1ve matter or program.\" The files do not require any predication and remain open b1, b3, indefinitely W1thout any reporting requirements for national security b7E\n:\nle, the September 2002 EC requestmg that a\n\"g dedicated control file for thls pr o_]ect w111 better serve the spec1f1c needs of the special p1 oject and will add an- additional layer of security for the source.\" The file has remamed open smce September 2002 without any\n\n\n(As d1scussed below 111\nthe FBI opened an control file was not closed.at that time.)\nimpropet for the FBI to issue NSLs from control files duri ing the Stellar Wind program. ~(S/7/NF-\nThe OIG's March 2007 NSL report identified th pro_]ect as orie of two circumstances where the FBI was using con ather than investigative files to issue NSLs. The OIG report concluded that this use Eliabl\n7\nwas contrary to FBI policy. However, our report also founid that the CAU\nofficials involved in the demsmn to issue NSLs from the file concluded i connect the]\n'\nN SLS with emstmg prehmmary' or full 1nvest1gat10ns of al Qaeda and affiliated groups or to open new preliminary or full investigations in compliance with Justice Department investigative guidelines. S/ NF}\nAs part of our review of the FBI's participation in 'Stell:\n:\nsought additional explanation for the uise of NSLs under We were told the purpose of having the CAU instead of t\n'\nhe field offices obtain approval for the issuance of such NSLs was to make the:telephony tippers\n\nthat field offices at a minimum knew the b1, b3, rs.\n\nAs described in Chapter Three, the members\n- b7E\nof thel v\n(the predecessor t had received comple rom agents in FBI field offices that leads lacked direction about how to make investigative use of the telephone. numbers and did not provide sufficient information to open nati al security h investigations. 'This was problematic because.\n\nisseminated under the and for a time unde nstructed field offices to obtain subseriber information for tipped telephone numbers, Thus, if agents could not locate the information in FBI or commercial databases, they faced a dilemma about how to proceed in the absence of what they viewed as sufficient predication.\n\n-\n:\nThe: CAU's first Unit Chief (who served in an Acting capacity)\nbl, b3,\n'\nroblem in an EC distributed in January 2003 that addressed b7E\nproject. The EC stated, on the nature of the information provided [in an\n|lead), field offices. may determine this intelligence used to predicate either a criminal investigation or an b1, b3, e investigation of someone in their territory.\n\nSome of b7E\ntheff@\n@\nleads may contain a request for a field office to confirm a subscriber in their territory, if possible, in addition to providing intelligence.\n\nThe identification of some subscribers might actually require a National Segurity Letter\n(NSL) or a Grand Jury subpoena; however, the\n__\ncontrolfile would not be the appropriate legal authority for these requests.\n\nThe Acting Unit ChiePs supervision of the CAU ended in February\n2003.\n\nIn March 2003, another FBI Supervisory Special Agent (SSA) was b1, b3, appointed as the CAU's first permanent Unit Chief.\n\nHe told us that when he b7E\njoined the CAU he was aware that field offices sometimes did not obtain i information on tippers because some agents did not believe\n| ECs provided sufficient information to open a national security investigation. The Unit Chief disagreed, based in part on his insider knowledge about how Stellar Wind operated.\n\nHe said that he believed the ppers contained sufficient information to open preliminary bl, b3, b7E\ninvestigations and issue NSLs.34F57//STEW FHOE/D\nThe Unit Chief wanted field offices at a minimum to know the identityof subscribers of tipped telephone numbers. He also said it was important\n'to ascertain the correct identities of the subscribers at the time the tipped calls were placed. The Unit Chief stated that if the field office did not issue an NSL for subscriber information promptly, or if the field office relied only\n.\n\non publicly available information, the passage of time could cause the user of the phone to be misidentified.\n\nIn addition, the Unit Chief said that even if a tipper did not result in any investigative value at the time of the tip, it nevertheless was important to identify the subscriber in the event the tipper became relevant in the future or to another investigation. For all of these reasons, the Unit Chief said he took steps to make the CAU, instead of the FBI field offices, responsible for issuing NSLs for telephone number tippers under the Stellar Wind program.34*\nAFT877/51E KHSHE\n'\nIn approximately Ju AU analyst was read into the Stellar Wind progfam to proces NSLs. The analyst told us she b1\nquestioned the Unit Chief and the Team 10 supervisor about whether it was b3'\npermissible to issue NSLs out of a control file; The Unit Chisf tald us that b7i\nhe was not aware at this time that a control file such asf sould not be used to issue NSLs. {FSH-STEW/SHFOENF-\nThe analyst volunteered to approach FBI OGC and met with Marion\n\"Spike\" Bowman of the OGC''s National Security Law Unit to discuss this concern.\n\nShe said she told Bowman that the CAU wanted to know if it bl, could issue NSLs under]\nin view of its status as a control file.\n\nb3, She said she told Bowman that the NSLs would seek subscriber information b7E\nonly and that field offices would be responsible for seeking related 'tqllv billing records if warranted by additional investigation. (FSHHSTEW/SHFOCTNF)\nAccording to the Bowman said that it would be permissible to issue NSLs out of thel\n1 file as long as only subscriber information\n1) 13\nwas sought.\n\nThe analyst said she could not recall whether Bowman b7ii\n'\naffirmatively stated that issuing NSLs from a control file would be\n343 On January 16, 2003, 2 months before the FBI SSA was appointed Unit Chief of the CAU, Attorney General Ashcroft authorized the FBI to issue NSLs during preliminary investigations, Prior to this time, the FCI guidelines authorized the FBI to issue NSLs only as part of a \"full investigation.\" S/HNF\n344 The Unit Chief told us that he did not believe it was critical at the preliminary stage to also obtain telephone subscribers' calling records, or \"toll records,\" identifying all outgoing and incoming calls.\n\nW\npermissible or whether he merely agreed that it would be permissible under the conditions the analyst presented.345 {FS/HSTLWH/SHHOCHNF\nShortly after the meeting, the CAU implemented procedures for reequesting that OGC issue NSLs to obtain subscriber information for each ephone number tipper disseminated to field offices that the slready aware of or for which it did not have subscriber Under these procedures, the CAU analyst received a copy of bl, b3, chi\n.\n\nEC with telephone number tippers.as they were issued by b7E\nTeam 10\nand drafted a separate approval EC to the NSLB that repeated this information and requested that the NSLB issue NSLs for the numbers listed.\n\nNSLB attorneys were responsible for determining whether the NSL requests were \"relevant to an authorized investigation,\" as required by statute. Ifthe attorneys determined that they were, NSLs were drafted and signed by the Deputy General Counsel for NSLB and forwarded to the CAU for service on the appropriate communications service providers.\n\nThe providers returned the responsive records to the: CAU, which in turn disseminated the information.\n\nto the appropriate FBI field offices. From\n\n'November 2006, the CAU issued over 500 NSLs under|\nB\n1. October 2004. She was responsible for b1, b3, NSLs requested by the CAU. Thomas b7E\n1\nthe operational reasons the CAU began issuing but stated that it was not until the OIG was iew of the FBI's use of NSLs in 2006 that she learned\n'g' NSLs.\n\nThomas said that the CAU's requests to NSLB to authorize NSLs under v always identified the specific file number associated with the project and indicated that the CAU had initiated a preliminary inquiry in connection with the NSL request. Thus, in Thomas's view, the NSL being requested was \"relevant to\" an authorized investigation, as bl, b3, the contact was related to al Qaeda or an affiliated group.\n\nCaproni said that in view of the b7E\nhundreds of al Qaeda investigations the EB\nconducting, Bowman likely concluded it was permissible to issue NSLs unde for the subscriber information of tippers even il at the time there was not a specific investigation to which each NSL could be connected. The Team 10 supervisor at this time told the OIG that he recalled the decision toissue NSLs from was based on close relationship to the FBIs ongoing investigations of al Qaeda and affiliated groups.\n\nrequired 'by';st'atute and Justice Department investigative guidelines.346\nHowever, Thomas said she did not believe th IS\ne improper even though they were issued from a control file.\n\nThomas stated that the NSLs in fact were relevant to authorized international terrorism b1\nvanBStlgathI'lS in that the FBI was conducting hundreds of investigations of b3,\n-al Qaeda and its affiliates at the time the NSLs issued. Thomas told the: OIG\nb7ii ithstanding this position, in November 2006 the FBI converted to an \"umbrella investigative file\" to reflect the program's relationship to international terrorism investigations. PSS/ NEY\nThe OIG reviewed the comimunication from the CAU opening this investigative file.\n\nIt stated that a member of the U.S. Intelligence Community [the NSA] reported to the FBI that al Qaeda members and\n'associates are using telecommunications systems to facilitate their terrorist activities, that the FBI has 1ndependently determined that this is oceurring, b1, b3, and that \"inasmuch that Al-Qa'ida is.a multi- faceted and international b7E\nterrorism organization, the FBI has determined it is appropriate to open a full field investigative [sic].\" The communication stated that the CAU was using information ebtained from the member of the U.S. Intelligence Communlty to issue NSLs and that the results are disseminated to the appropriate FBI field offices. The communication also advised thatall investigative leads associated with the investigation would be titled to protect the source of the information and the methods used.t\n'obtain the information. {FS/ASTEW//SHHAOC/NE)-\nyrrently is taking a similar approach to NSLs under the A field office (instead of the CAU) is authorized to issue an bl, b3, vestigative file, even if the field office does not b7E\ngatmn and the tlpped domestic telephone number or relevant to another open investigation. However, NSLs\n'open its own mvestl e- -mail\n- add:ces\n'\n\n## (Hps%%%L:Lne)\n\nThe FBI's decision to restrict\n|NSLs in this way was not bl, b3, required by law, but was an operational decision.\n\nAs discussed below, FBI\n47\nThomas told us that she did not realize that the\n\"C demgnatlon stood for\n\"Control File.\"\nIn addition, in the approval ECs reviewed by the OIG that sought the issuance of NSLs, the CAU stated, among other bl things, that thef\n'\nource\" reported telephomc contact between possible al Qaeda\n'\nor other international terrorism entities and numbers in the United States and that \"a b3, prehmmary CAU inquiry was coriducted for the US telephone numbers reported by this b7E\nsource, -('1'37'7'3'}'{7%'7'7'517'%9%?9\nfield offices addressed mos ippers by conducting \"threat assessmernts\" to determine whether the tipper had a nexus to terrorism and warranted the field office initiating a preliminary or full investigation. The subscriber information for a tipper is suf]\nt for purposes of completing a.\n\nthrc::a-tzas_sessjment.-\nThe same is true for|\ntippers, and t'he,currcnt'\nTeam 10 supervisor told us that it would 1ot be & \"good business\" practice to collect transactional records on a U.S. person unless a threat assessment justified the field office initiating its own preliminary or full investigation of the individual ES//SLLANE)\nWe believe the FBI should have opened an investigative:\nfile in July 2003 and used it to issue NSLs related to Stellar Wind information. The Justice Department investigative guidelines in effect at that time authorized the FBI to open full investigations of groups for which there were specific and articulable facts to believe were involved in international terrorism, such as al Qaeda. However, the FBI decided to issue Stellar Wind NSLs from an existing control file, which was contrary to FBI internal policy.\n\n-(PS/STEW/SHO/M\nWe did not find evidence that officials from the CAU and OGC invelved in the decision to use an existing control file to issue NSLs related to Stellar Wind information deliberately tried to circumvent FBI guidelines. The July\n2003 rationale for issuing the NSLs out of the control file ~ the close.\n\n'\nrelationship between the Stellar Wind program and the FBI's ongoing investigations of al Qaeda and affiliated groups eritially was the reasoning used in November 2006\n{\nen thef\n___\n|investigative file and in November 2008 to open the investigative file. As we found in our March 2007 report concerning the FBI's use of NSL\nAl OGC officials involved in the decision to issue NSLs from the control file concluded.\n\ni ith that the FBI had sufficient pi\n, either to connect th SLs with existing preliminary or full investigations of al Q\niliated groups orto open new preliminary or full investigations in compliance with Justice Department investigative guidelines, Nevertheless, the decision violated FBI internal policy.\n\n(PS/FSTEW\n81 OS/NF)-\n\n## Tix. And Scrubbing Process {Ts/7/Sh//Wf]\n\nAs discussed in Chapter Three, the Department implemented a process imposed by the FISA Court to \"scrub\" FISA applications to account for Stellar Wind-derived information. The objectives of the initial scrubbing process were to determine whether any NSA information contained in international terrorism FISA applications was derived from Stellar Wind and whether any of the facilities (telephone numbers or e-mail addresses)\ntargeted by international terrorism FISA applications were also targeted for Stellar Wind collection {commonly referred to as.dual coverage).\n\nThe scrubbing process was coordirated by the Justice. Department and NSA, beginning in February 2002 after Judge Lamberth was read into Stellar Wind., In May 2002, Judge Kollar=Kotelly succeeded Judge Lamberth as Presiding Judge of the FISA Court and continued the scrubbing procedures. However, whereas Judge Lamberth required only that he be notified of applications that contained Stellar Wind information, Judge Kollar-Kotelly required that such information be removed.\n\nAs described in Chapter Four, on March 14, 2004, OIPR Counsel Baker briefed Judge Kollar-Kotelly about the President's decision to sign the March 11, 2004, Presidential Authorization without the Justice Department's certification as to the Authorization's form and legality, and about subsequent changes the Authorization made to the Stellar Wind program. {FS775HT\nAccording to a handwritten letter Judge Kollar-Kotelly drafted to Baker following this meeting, Baker had informed her that the Stellar Wind\n|||\nTheletteralso stated that Baker informed her that with these\n'changes the Deputy Attorney General agreed to certify the program as to form and legality, and that OLC had prepared a new legal memorandurm regarding the legality of Stellar Wind to replace the November 2001\nmermorandum authored by Yoo,\n{FS/ASPEWHSL/QC/NE)\nJudge Kollar-Kotelly's letter marked the first time her expectations concerning the Department's use of Stellar 'Wind information in FISA\napplications was communicated in writing to OIPR. Judge Kollar-Kotelly wrote, Although the Court has every confidence in the oral representations of Jim Baker [and] does not have any reason to question his honesty or credibility with the FISC or this judge, I\nam requesting that representations, previously done orally, now be put in writing that relate to [Stellar Wind] and FISA\napplications so that there are no misunderstandings.\n\nI want to emphasize my position which has been consistent since I came on the FISC in May 2002, the [Stellar Wind]\nprogram and FISA applications are to be kept separate, and no information direct or indirect, derived or obtained from [Stellar Wind] should be included in FISA applications. Only in this way carl the 1ntegr1ty of the process and 1nte111gence collected\n{'PC:/ 'QTLW' /SL- I/OAIINF}\nJudge Kollar-Kotelly also wrote that she would not sign any FISA\napplications that contained substantive information from Stellar\n'Wind-generated tips or any apphcatmns where the Stellar Wind tip was the sole or principal factor for an agency initiating the underlying investigation,\n\"ayen if the investigation was conducted independently of the tip from\n[Stellar Wind].\" {(TS//STLWL\n/ST OENFY\nBaker told us that this letter was Judge Kollar-Kotelly's preliminary response to the changes in the Stellar Wind program. Through subsequent discussions between Judge Kollar-Kotelly and Baker, and between Baker and other Department and FBI officials, a more flex1b1e arrangement was reached on scrubbmg that addressed Judge Kollar-Kotelly's conceerns without imposing an absolute prohibition on including certain Stellar Wmddenved 1nformat10n in FISA applications.347\nbl, b3, b7E\nIn short, the scrubbing procedures implemented in March 2004, and that continue to the present day, substantially expanded the procedures OIPR originally developed in Februery 2002348 In addition to deterinining whether any NSA information contained in international terrorism FISA\napphcatlons was derived from Stellar Wind and whether there was any dual coverage, Judge Kollar-Kotelly required the FBI to determirie whether any facility (telephone number or e-mail address) that appeared in a FISA\napplication also appeared in a Stellar Wind report and, if so, whether the FBI had developed, independent of Stellar Wind.\n\nan investigative interest in the facility before it was the subject of an per.349 This third\n377 FBI OGC said that it was not until these discussions that the FBI was aware of the scrubbing procedures OIPR had implemented in approximately February 2002 after Judge Lamberth was read into the Stellar Wind program. {F&/{SH-ANE-\n348 The scrubbing procedures described here apply both to NSA information derived from the Stellar Wind program and to information derived from the FISA Court's PR/TT and Section 215 bulk meta data orders.\n\nUntil mid-2008 when the Stellar Wind program officially was closed, leads the NSA developed from the FISA-authorized bulk meta data collections were disseminated under the Stellar Wind compartment.\n\n349\nAs discussed in Chapter Three, Baker did not beheve in May 2002, when he first discussed the subject with Judge Kollar-Kotelly, that such a serub was possible. Baker told us that by March 2004 he better understood the NSA's and FBI's process for\n-dlssemmatmg Stellar Wind information and the agencies' ability to track program-derived tips in a timely manner.{T87/78TLW/\n/8T OC/NF)~\nscrub is coordinated among OIPR, the FBI's:\nNational Security Law Branch\n(NSLB), and Team 10.\n\nThe scrub requires NSLB to compile & list of all \"facilities\" = telephone numbers and e-mail addresses - that appeared it any draft international terrorism FISA applications.350 This list is compiled as 'FISA packages becorie ready for filing with the Court and is provided to an attorney in NSLB read into the Stellar Wind program. The attorney in turn forwards the facilities list to Team 10 at the NSA, Team 10 checks edch facility against the NSA's Stellar Wind reports database to determine whether a listed facility is contained in any Stellar Wind reports and, if so, whether the facility appeared in the tearline portion of a report that was further disserninated to FBI field offices.\n\nIf both inquiries are positive, Team 10\nnotes the date of the relevant Stellar Wind report and searches the FBI's Automated Case Support System (ACS) to determine whether the facility appears in ACS and, if so, the date the facility came to the FBI's attention.\n\nTeam 10 reports the results of these checks to the NSLB attorney for review.\n\n(187 /STLW //ST/ /QC/NE)\nThe NSLB attorney takes one of two steps at this stage.\n\nIf Team 10%s checks are negative - meaning none of the facilities are contained in a Stellar Wind report or contained in information below the tearline of a Stellar Wind report - the NSLB scrub attorney notifies the OIPR attorney and FBI case agent that the FISA application can be cleared for presentation to the FISA Court and that the application can proceed to final processing.\n\nIf both checks on a facility are positive, the NSLB attorney will try to determine if there is a basis for the Court to allow the information in the application based on the theories, discussed in further detail below, that the FBI had an independent investigative interest in or would have inevitably discovered the facility in question.\n\nTo determine this, the NSLB attorney researches FBI databases, analyzes records, and attempts to craft an argument under one of these theories. The NSLB attorney then provides this information to OIPR for presentation the Coutt.\n\nIf the NSLB attorney canmnot find a basis for including the information under either of the theories, and the facility is not essential to the showing of probable cause for the requested FISA coverage, the facility is excised from the FISA\napplication, and processing continues.\n\nIf the information is importarit to the probable cause showing, the NSLB attorney discusses with OIPR\nwhether to make the argument to the appropriate FISA Court judge (initially Judge Kollar-Kotelly and now, the judge assigned to case) that the facility rievertheless can remain in the application.\n\n-+\n:\nAccording to the Deputy General Counsel for NSLB, the argument to keep such information in an application is based on \"standard Fourth Amendment [exclusionary rule] analysis.\" The \"exclusionary rule\" generally holds that where the government obtains evidence in vielation of the Fourth Armiendment, the court will suppress, or exclude, the evidence from the prosecutor's case-in-chief in a eriminal trial. Under the \"fruit of the poisonous tree\" doctrine, a corollary to the exclusionary rule, any evidence obtained directly or derivatively from the government's improper conduct is also excluded. However, there are several exceptions to the exclusionary rule, two of which were relevant to scrubbing: independent source and inevitable discovery. The independent source exception holds that the exclusionary rule does not bar the use of evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment if there is also an independent, legal source for the evidence.351 The inevitable discovery exception applies when evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment would have been obtained independently had the illegal search not occurred, which the government rnust prove by a preponderance of the evidence.352\n(U)\nThus, in the scrubbing context, the issue is whether the Stellar Wind information contained in a FISA application should not be excluded, either because the FBI had an investigative basis independent of Stellar Wind for including the information in the application or because the FBI inevitably would have discovered the information in the absence of Stellar Wind.\n\nMore specifically, under the independent investigative basis exception, if Team\n10' search of ACS shows that a facility came to the FBI's attention before the facility appeared in a Stellar Wind report, this fact establishes that the FBI has an independent, non-Stellar Wind factual basis to include the facility in the application.353 NSLB Deputy General Counsel Thomas told us that in her experience the FBI already is aware of the facility - meaning it appears in ACS or other FBI databases - in nearly every instance that a facility contained in a FISA application also appears in a Stellar Wind report, {TS/STEWSHAOCTNF)\n(U)\n353\nFor example, in one case the NSLB attorney's review of the underlying investigative file showed that the FBI had obtained the telephone number at issue in response to an NSL Letter.\n\nBecause the NSL was dated earlier than the Stellar Wind report that also contained the telephone number, the FBI had an independent investigative basis for including the number in the FISA application. PSS\nASLLLOC/NE)\nThe inevitable discovery exception in the scrubbing context applies whien Team 10's check of ACS indicates the FBI was not aware of the facility before the date of the Stellar Wind report containing the facility. Under this approach, the NSLB attorney attempts to demonstrate to OIPR that normal investigative steps in the underlying investigation inevitably would have identified the facility in question. The scrubbing attorney analyzes such case evidence as close associates and other relatioriships of the subjects of the investigation that could logically lead investigators - through NSLs, for example\n- to the facility contained in the Stellar Wind report,354\nUntil January 2006, when the full FISA Court was read into Stellar Wind, Judge Kollar-Kotelly required that &ll applications the FBI determined contained facilities or information that also appeared in Stellar Wind reports be cleared with her before being filed with the FISA Court. As she wrote in a January 12, 2005, letter to OIPR, \"l want to ensure, that, to the extent\n'\npossible, [Stellar Wind] information is excluded from applications submitted to the FISC and that, if it is necessary to include such information, it'is specifically identified to the FISC as derived from [Stellar Wind] collection when the application is presented.\" OIPR Deputy Counsel Skelly-Nolen -\nwho was read into Stellar Wind on March 12, 2004, but who had been involved in the scrubbing process since 2001 - was responsible; along with Baker, for coordinating this aspect of the scrubbing process and, when warranted, for presenting the argument to the judge that an application containing information that was the subject of a Stellar Wind report to the:\nFBI should nevertheless be approved for filing.\n\nv WASHHOG:\nSkelly-Nolen characterized the applications she presented to Judge Kollar-Kotelly as either \"vanilla\" or \"non-vanilla.\" Vanilla applications were those for which Skelly-Nolen could confidently represent that the FBI had an independent investigative basis for the facility identified in the application that was the subject of a Stellar Wind report (for examiple, a facility the FBI learned of through FISA coverage that pre-dated the Stellar Wind report).\n\nSkelly-Nolen told us that over time Judge Kollar-Kotelly allowed the vanilla applications to be handled telephonically in an unclassified manner, a departure from her general requirement that the discussions be held in judge's chambers.\n\nNon-vanilla applications typically involved those cases that required Skelly-Nolan to demonstrate that the FBI\n354 For example, in one case a telephone number of a particular business did not appear in an FBI database prior to the date it appeared in a Stellar Wind report.\n\nHowever, the subject of the underlying investigation was the target of an FBI national security investigation, and OIPR argued that the telephone number inevitably would have been connected to the subject through the \"natural course of thie investigation,\" possibly from toll records associated with other telephonie numbers used by the subject, trash covers and open source information, or physical surveillance.\n\ninevitably would have discovered the facility in question during the normal course of investigation.\n\nSkelly-Nolen said these cases were-always discussed with Judge Kollar-Kotelly in persorn.\n\n-\nSkelly-Nolen told us that there were instances when Judge Kollar-Ketelly requested additional information to support the proffered theory for including Stellar Wind information in the FISA application. In some cases, Judge Kollar-Kotelly simply struck a line through the paragraphs in the filed application that contained the Stellar Wind-derived information and annotated in the margin, \"This section (strike) not considered in evaluation of probable cause,\" followed by her signature arid the date. Skelly-Nolen also said that in one or two cases Judge Kollar-Kotelly required that certain Stellar Wind information arguably necessary for establishing probable cause be removed from the applications.355 However, in general Judge Kollar-Kotelly accepted OIPR's and the FBI's assessment that there was a non-Stellar Wind investigative basis for the informiation in question, or that the information inevitably would have been discovered even in the absence of Stellar Wind-derived tips to the FBI. {FS/1SPEW/SHAOCNF-\nAfter operating under the expanded scrubbing procedures for approximately 6 months, Judge Kollar-Kotelly agreed in November 2004 to allow other FISA Court judges who had not yet been read irnito the Stellar Wind program to handle scrubbed international terrorism applications.\n\nHowever, Judge Kollar-Kotelly still required that Skelly-Nolen bring to her attention all vanilla and non-vanilla applications so they could be \"cleared\"\nbefore being formally filed. As noted above, it was not until January 2006, when the full FISA Court was read into Stellar Wind, that Skelly-Nolen was able to discuss such cases with other judges. {FS//STLW/FSHHAOCHNE}\nSince that time, the basic scrubbing procedure described above has continued. The Office of Intelligence attorney primarily responsible for the process told us that each new FISA application that references a facility that was disseminated under Stellar Wind is brought to the attention of the judge assigned to the case.3%6 However, with limited exceptions, the FISA\nCourt judges do not require that the government inform them of renewal applications that contain such facilities so long as they were previously brought to the Court's attention in the initiation application or prior renewal applications. The Office of Intelligence attorney told us that the government relies on the independent investigative interest theory in the majority of cases in which it seeks to keep a facility in an application; The attorney also said that from-the perspective of the Office of Intelligence the scrubbing process is more manageable today than in the past because the process is better organized, additional personnel have been read into the program, and the FISA Amendments Act of 2008 extended the period of time the government must bring emergency applications to the FISA Court from 72\nhiours to 7 days. However, from the FBI's perspective;, the scrubbing process-continues. to be burdensome and requires a significant expenditure of time and other resources.\n\n{FS//SEEWAHSHLOE/\n'\n\n## Iv. Impact Of Stellar Wind Information On Fbi Counterterrorism Efforts {8}\n\nThis section examines the impact of the information obtained from Stellar Wind on FBI counterterrorism efforts.\n\nIt first provides statistics the number of tippers from Stellar Wind information ~\n. e-mail, and content - disseminated to FBI field: offices through bl, b3,\n'\nNext, it describes how FBI field offices generally\n~ 7E\ntippers and the typical results of the investigations.\n\nThis section then\n\narizes two statistical surveys of mieta data tippers:\nthe FBI conducted in 2006 to assess the value of Stellar Wind to FBI\noperations, and describes observations about the program's value provided to us by FBI officials and employees in OIG interviews and contained in documents the OIG obtained during the course of this review.\n\nFinally, the section examines -FBI international terrorism investigations commonly cited as examples of Stellar Wind's contribution to counterterrorism efforts in the United States.\n\n{F3\nWHHSH\nAN\nA, bl, b3, b7E\nWe reviewed FBI and NSA statistics relating to the Stellar Wind program. According to an NSA document, from October 1, 2001, to bi, February 28, 2006, the NSA provided\n|telephone numbers and b3, e-mail addresses under the Stellar Wind program. The FBI disseminated b7E\nmost of these as tippers to field offices. Chart 6.1 depicts the distribution of the telephone numbers and e-mail addresses the NSA provided the FBI by type.\n\n{37+\nAs described in Chapter Three, the NSA provided ratings, or for each telephone number and e-mail address to help the FBI prioritize the tippers being disseminated to field offices. The FBI\n_defined the rankings in ECs disseminated to field offices in the following manner:\nThe FBI included these rankings in\n.\n\nECs until early 2003.\n\nAt that time, Team egan to make independent assessments about tippers' priority for the FB\non that basis, and generally discontinued including the ratingsinf\n=\nA ECs, As discussed in this chapter, Team 10 usually set tion leads for telephone numbers and e-mail addresses the FBI did not already know and Discretionary leads for those the FBI was aware of in connection with closed or onigoing cases.\n\nWe could not compare the relationship between the NSA's and the FBI's leads because the FBI did not maintain statistics about the lead type for each tipper that Team 10 disseminated, However, in connection with our visits to the FBI's Detroit and Seattle field offices, we examined the number of individual telephone numbers and e-mail addresses provided to those offices and the type of lead assigned for each.\n\nWe determined that FBI Headquarte i Action leads for approximately 50 percent of the total lleads sent to these offices.\n\nAs depicted in Chart 6.2, of th ads sent to the Detroit field office from December 2001 to December |\nAction leads. During this same period, of the eads sent mbels and e~ma1l addresses that NSA 111 terms of their connections to\n\\ Diec:etmnary\n:\nWe also found tha eads were distributed unevenly among FBI field offices.. The majority of tippers were disseminated to large offices with substantial counterterrorism programs, such as New York, bl, Washington, 'Chicago, and Los Angeles, and to offices. Whose territory contained significant Middle Eastern populations.\n\nsuch as. Yetroit.\n\nFor example, FBI records indicate that of thel leads disseminated in 2005, 50 percent were: as.31gned to 10 fie d offices. Table\n6.1 depicts: the d1st11buuon o lin 2005 among FBI field offices.358 {FS+\nseminated underfii g\n359 Rather, the type of lead that the EC assigned - Action, Discretio Information - governed a\n389\nAg discussed in Chapter Three, the practice under th first several weeks of the Stellar Wind program was to set Action leads for all telephone number tippers. This pgactice wasmg ified when th A\n;\n(s ipper\n360 An Action lead instructs a field office to take a particular action in response to the EC.\n\nAn Action lead is \"covered\" when the field office takes the specified action or conducts appropriate investigation to address the information in the EC.\n\nA Discretionary lead allows the field office to make a determination whether the information provided warrants investigative action.\n\nA field office that receives a \"For Information\" lead is not expected to take any specific action in response to the EC, other than possibly route the\n(Cont'd.)\nprovided information derived from communications of telephorie numbers\n'and e-tnail addresses under surveillance, generally assigned Discretionary or For Information leads. The information in these tippers usually related to bl, individuals already under FBI investigation and was provided to the agents b3, respons1ble for those cases,\n|\ne-mail address tippers generally b7E\nassigned Discretionary leads to field offices unless the information was particularly urgent. As noted above, content and e-mail address tippers accounted fora comparatlvely small portlon of the tippers disseminated by Team 10. {FS/5\n:\n-\nThe vast majority of FBI investigative activity related to Stellar Wind mformatlon involved responding toft i e telephone number tippers that assigned Action leads. Team 10 generally assigned Action leads for bl, telephone numbers that the FBI did not previously know or that Team 10.\n\nb3, othervvls deemed a high priority, such as a number that had a relationship b7E\n0\na FBI investigation.36! From approximately September 2002 (when\n_was created) to July 2003, Action leads instructed field offices to obtal ubscriber information for the telephone numbers within its jurisdiction and to conduct any \"logical investigation to determine terrorist connections.\" However, some agents complained that these Action leads\n'1acked guidance about how to make use of the tippers, particularly given concerns-that the communications provided insufficient prechcahon to. open na onal security investigations.\n\nTwo charnges in 2003 addressed some of these. complaints. First, in July 2003:the CAU assumed responsibility from field offices for issuing b1, b3, NSLs, as we discussed in Section II above. Second, in October 2003 the b7E\nAttorney General issued new gu1dehnes for FBI natlonal securlty investigations that ecre\n\"threat assessment.\"36\ncommiinication to the office personnel whose investigations or duties the information concerns,{S/~ANE\n361\nDlscretlonary leads were assigned 1o telephone numbers that already were known to the FBI, meaning the number or the number's subscriber was referenced in an active FBI investigation. These leads identified the case number of the related investigation and advised receiving field offices to \"use the information as deemed appropr iate\" to bring the information to the attention of the appropriate case agent. 8/NF\n362\nAs noted earlier, the October 2003 guidelines, entitled Attorney General's Guidelines for FBI National Security Investigations and Foreign Intelligence Collection (NSI\nguidelines), replaced the Attorney General Guidelines for FBI Foreign Intelligence Collection and Foreign Counterintelligence Investigations.\n\nIn September 2008, the Attorney Geneeral issued Guidelines for Domestic FBI Operations that replaced the October 2003 NSI\nguidelines with respect to domestic operations.\n\nThe September 2008 guidelines use the term \"assessment\" instead of \"threat assessment.\"\n(U)\nnumber tlppers 111structed field offices to con bl, b3, b7E\nDuring our review, we visited the Detroit and Seattle field offices to review their handling o\n|\nlleads, In addition, we interviewed several supervisory specnal agen s-at FBI Hcadquarters 'who had experience handlmg the leads in their respective field offices before being read into the rogram.\n\nIn.general, these agents' and analysts' experience with Teads was unremarkable.\n\nA threat assessment coriducted by these agents and analysts typically involved querying several FBI, public, and commercial databases for any information about the tipped telephone number, and requestmg that various state and local government entities conduct similar queries. Sometimes these queries identified the subscriber to the telephonhe number before: the CAU obtained the information with an NSL.\n\nIn other cases, the threat assessments contlnucd after the field office received the NSL results 363\nExamples of the databases utilized in their threat assessments ed s thc Automated Case Management System bl, b3, b7E\nThe results of their checks of these databases could sometimes be extensive and include personal information not only about the subscriber to the tipped telephone number, but also about individuals residing in the subscriber's residence ar other acquaintances. In other cases, checks were negative or revealed little information about the number or the subscriber. {S//ANE}\nbl, b3, b7E\nb1, b3, b7E\n~\nThe agents and analysts said they reviewed the results of these database hecks to determine whether additional investigative steps under the threat assessment were warranted or whether there was predmatlon to open a preliminary inquiry. None of the-agents we interviewed cou initiating any investigations based on a th:\nment of an|\ntipper.36* They said they frequently close conductmg a threat assessment interview: of the subscr ber and determining that there was no nexus to terrorism or threat to national security.\n\nAlternatively, the leads were closed based solely on the results of database checks, 4FS/H+SH-FNF\nUnder the Attorney Gereral's October 2003 national security investigations guidelines agents were not p ted to explain to subscribers how they bl b3, obtained the information that caused them to seek an interview.\n\nInstead, b7E\nagents simply asked subscribers about their contacts in certain countries and with specific telephone: numbers. Agents told us that stibscribers generally consented to these interviews: and were cooperative and forthcoming.\n\nIn-a few cases; subscrlbers refused the request or sought the advice of counsel.?66\nTS\n365 On September 29, 2008, the Attorney General 1ssued new gu1del1nes for domestic FBI operations, whlchxncludes national security in n Thy tidelines b1, b3, i\n'Compare b7E\nAttorriey General's Guidelines for Domestic FBI Operations,\n4.f. (September 29,\n2008), with Attorney General's Guidelines for FBI National Security Invest1gat1ons and Foreign Intelligence Collection, Section I.A.6.\n\n(October 31, 2003).\n\n877 NF\nnumbers appeared on their face to be in contact with an individual involved in terrorism.\n\nIn the Seattle field office, several interviews revealed that the foreign telephone calls placed to domestic numbers were made using a pre-paid telephone service from local stores hecause the callers, often relatives of the domestic contacts, did not have telephone service at their residences. Thus, while the intelligence indicating that an individual involved in terrorism used the foreign telephone number might have been accurate, the number also was used by individuals about whom there was no reason to believe were involved in terrorism.\n\n~\nFBI field offices were required to report the results of the threat assessments to the CAU.\n\nIn most of the ECs we reviewed, the field 'offices reported all of the information that was located about the telephone numbers, includirg the details of any subscriber interviews, and then stated that the office determmed the tipped telephone number-did not have a nexus to terrorism and considered the lead closed. Much less frequently, field offices reported that a preliminary investigation was opened to conduct:\nadditional investigation.367 Regardless of whether any links to international terrorism were identified, the results of any threat assessrnents and the information that was collected about subscribers generally were reported in communications to FBI Headquarters and uploaded into FBI databases.\n\n## C. Fbk Stmtnstncal Surveys Of Meta Data Tippers\n\nThe FBI made several attempts, both informal and more formal, to assess the value of Stellar Wind to FBI counterterrorism efforts. The first was an informal attempt by the FBI's OGC.\n\nFBI General Counsel Valerie Caproni told us that in early 2004 she spoke with the CAU Unit Chief and the Section Chief for the Communications Explmtahon Section about trying.\n\ntc assess the value of Stellar Wind information. According to Caproni, the two marnagers stated that based on anecdotal and informal feedback from FBI field offices, the telephony meta data tippers were the most valuable intelligence from the program for agents working on counterterrorism matters. However, Caproni told us it was difficult to conduct any meaningful assessment of the program's value in early 2004 because FBI\nfield offices-at that time were not required to report to PBI Headquarters the:\ninvestigative results of the Stellar Wind leads disseminated under Bl Headquarters did not make such reporting mandatory urntil ctober\n2004. As a result, Caproni's discussions with the FBI managers did not result in any written assessment of the program.\n\nimproving the NSA's analytical process, but he said it was sometimes difficult to obtain such feedback. A CAU Unit Chief told us that the NSA expressed partlcular concern about insufficient feedback from the FBI regarding investigative result g 10 the tippers'\nnexus to terrorism.\n\nHe said this was a difficult situation in that professed to be sending out high value information about known links to terrorism,\" and it was\n\"uncomfortable\" to receive little feedback from field offices other than, \"You're sending us garbage.\" Members of Team 10 told us that efforts to improve field office feedback over time had mixed results. {FS/ASTEW/HSHALOCHNE-\nThe FBI's second informal assessment of the value of Stellar Wind came after the December 2005 New York Times articles that publicly disclosed the content collection aspect of the Stellar Wind program. Caproni said that in preparation for Director Mueller's testimony at congressional hearings in 2006 on the issue, she attempted to evaluate the Stellar Wind.\n\nprogram, Caproni stated that because NSA Director Hayden asserted publicly that the program was valuable, she: wanted Mueller's testimony to identify, if possible, any investigations that illustrated Stellar Wind's positive contribution to the FBI's counterterrorism efforts. Caproni stated that this.\n\neffort was complicated by the fact that Mueller's testimony would- be limited only to the aspect of the program disclosed in the New York Times article and subsequently confirmed by the President - the content. collection basket.\n\nAs d1scussed above Caproni said that FBI field offices did not find thls\n'spect of the\n|\nbeas useful as thetelehon' metadata, _\nlwas comparati ely small and the FBI had P'ISA coverage on many of these already.\n\nCaproni told us that ultimately she was able to identify \"a couple\" of content tippers that contnbuted to FBI mvestlgatlons but she commented that there were not many.\n\n;\nS\nThe FBI subsequently conducted two more efforts to study the Stellar Wind procrarn s 1mact on FBI oper auons, both in early 2006. The first study sampled the[EEEEITTIRTE tippers the FBI had received\n'\nStellar Wind from 2001 through 2005. The second study reviewed\n. le-miail tippers the NSA provided the FBI from August 2004 through January 2006, In both of these studies, the FBI sought to determine what percentage of tlppers resulted in \"significant contribution{s] to the identification of terrorist subjects or activity on U.S. soil.\" We describe in the next sections the findings of these two studies.\n\nTS\nL/ STLW{ SELLOC/NE\n\n## Telephony And E-Mail 1. Early 2006 Survey Meta Data Tippers\n\nFollowing the December 2005 New York Times article publicly disclosing the content collection aspect of Stellar Wind, additional members of the Senate and House Intelligence Committees were read into the program. During this time, the NSA provided to cleared members of Congress substantive briefings about Stellar Wind, and the FBI was asked to testify about its participation in the program.\n\nIn preparation for these briefings and testimony, the FBI sought to quantify the value of Stellar Wind intelligence for FBI counterterrorism operatlons The CAU conducted a statistical study for this purpose, and in May 2006 the FBI provided a opy b1, b3, b7E\n:\nunlque telephone numbers and e- ma1l addresses the NSA provided the FBI from the iniception of the Stellar Wind program through 2005.368 The study sought to determine what percentage of the t1ppers resulted in s1gmf1cant Lontrlbutlon[ | to the identification of J.S\n- Wo kmg with an. FBI sta'ushelan Approximately 30 analysts from the FBI's. Counterterrorism Division were aSsigned the task of revi'ewin'\n't'ippers to determine the part1cular tlpper made a s1gn1f1cant\" contr1but1on to FBI counterterrorism bl, b3, efforts. For purposes of the study, a tipper was considered \"significant if it b7E\nled to any of three investigative results:. the identification of a terrorist, the deportamon from the United States of a suspected terrorist, or the development of an asset that can report about the activities of terrorists.\"\nA\ntipper that led to a field office opening a preliminary or full investigation was not considered \"significant\" for purposes of the study.\n\n)\nThe analysts researched each tipper's disposition in invest:\n~ords contained in FBI electronic databases, beginning with th\n;\nEC that disseminated the tipper to the field.\n\nIf an analyst conicluded b1, b3, baseed on this research that a tipper was significant, a second analyst who b7E\nwas familiar with the Stellar Wind program further reviewed that determination.\n\nIf the CAU analyst agreed with the initial finding, the tipper\n\n## Include Content Tippers. (Fsha\n\n369 Most of the analysts were not reggd he Stellar Win oram and were told that the study concerned the disposition of leads.\n\n- Of]\ntippers reviewed b1, b3, by the analysts, approximately 12 percent were e- -mail addresses, a figure consistent with b7E\nthe overall tlpper breakdown between e-mail addresses and telephone numbers.\n\nis methodolooy, the study found tha.t\n1.2 percent, ficant  The study extrapolated this b1, b3,\n|\ntippers and determined that one tippers the NSA provided the FBI\n'-could ekp ct to fi b7E\n\\J. S/' / STLVVT/, Il ST / /fi(\" /NW\\\nunder Stellar Wind were significant.\n\nThe report documerniting the study's findings included brief descriptions ol\n\"s1gn1f1cant\" tippers.\n\nFor example according to the report, one tipper led to the opening of a full investigation that developed eviderice that the user of the tipped e-mail address had \"definite ties to terrorism.\" The user was arrested and pled guflty to chargesoff bl,\n'\nAnother tipper led. to theld itificatic an. 1nd1v1dua1 A\"ho L\nE3>\n0ing Several of the \"significant\" tippers related to ongoing FBI\ninvestigations.\n\nFor example, information from one tipper designated as significant was already known to the relevant FBI field office, which had an\n1nvest1gat1on o1l concerning a subject associated with the tipper prior to receiving the EC. According to the study's brief description of b1, the case's sighificance, the investigative file stated that the tipper was \"very b3, beneficial in the on-going investigation\" by connecting the subject to b7E\nterrorism, without descrlblng that connection. Another tipper caused a field office to changc a preliminary 1nvest1 atlon to a full investigation regarding the possible illegall =\n=\nThe tipper indicated a connection between one 01 the subjects ot the prellmmary investigation and a known terrorist.\n\nThe study also found that 28 percent of .\n\ntippers were never disseminated to FBI field offices for investigation. According to the report, the CAU filtered out these tippers based on \"lack of significance\" when they bL, were first provided to the FBI by the NSA. These tippers were deemed\n113'?7'13\nnon-significant for purposes of the study.\n\nIn addition, the study found that for 22 percent of the sample tippers, FBI field offices did not report any\n370 According to a CAU analyst closely involved with the study, establishing a fairly\n\"tight\" criteria to identify \"significant\" tippers was necessary i1 order to obtain statistically significant results within the one-week time frame the CAU was given to complete the review. The analyst told the OIG that analysts initially applied a broader \"significant\"\nstandard in their reviews of the tippers, but that it immediately became apparent that a stricter standard was required. The Unit Chief for the CAU told the OIG that the definition of \"significant\" ultimately used for the study was reached by consensus among Counterterrorism Division operational and analytical personnel. SO\nNF\nthe tippers\n never disseminated to FBI\n_\nnknown invcs'tiga'tive results,;372\nThe FBIs report of the study did not explicitly state any conclusions aboufic,'Wh:ethef\"SteHar Wind was g valuable brogram, FBI OGC tols the 0OIG\nthat based in parton the results of this study, which found\n=\nofthe leads were significant, FBI executive managem;ent concluded: hat the\n372 By its methodology, the only tippers the study assessed for \"significance\" were those for which field offices reported investigative results to the CAU and therefore generally did not take into account tippers assigned ag Discretionary leads. Discretionaly leads, as distinguished from Action leads, did not require field offices to report to the CAl about how the tippers were used.\n\nYet, according to FBJ bersonnel, these leads sometimes were NSA continued to provide e-mail addresses to the FBI in Stellar Wind reports.\n\nF\n5\nThis second study, which reviewed each\n|\ne-mail tippers the NSA provided the FBI from August\n2004 through January 2006, applied the\n'sarle cmc'tl_f_i'o,d.olbgy for assessing \"significance\"\nthat was- ised in CAU's first bl, study. The second study found that none\n~\n|e-mail tippers was b3,\n\"significant\" under this standard.\n\nThe rep ed, however, that many of b7E\nthe investigations related to the reviewed e-mail tippers were still ongoing.\n\nIn addition, the study observed that some of the tippers reviewed had only recently been disseminated to field offices for ihVes'ti'getio'n and that it was possible investigation of these tippers had not been completed.\n\n(TS//STIW/\n/ST, /OC/NE)\n\n## D. ]F'?B?I_Judgmental Assessments Of Stellar Wind Information\n\nTo attempt to further dssess the value of Stellar Wind information for the FBI, we interviewed FBI Headquarters officials and employees wha regiilarly handled Stellar Wind information. We a'lso'nte'rivievvedl.\n\nrsonnel bl in FBI field offices who were responsible for handling]\ntippers.\n\nb3\nWe asked these witnesses for their assessments of the impact of Stellar bR\nWind orf information on FBI counterterrorism operations.. We also recognize that FBI officials and agents other than those we interviewed triay have had experiences withfll\n117\nifferent than those summarized below.\n\nTLW\nL/ SL/QC/T\nThe members of Team 10 ard its predecessor\n.\n\n.\n\nwere strong advocates of the program and stated that tt ey believed it bl, contributed significantly to FBI international terrorism investigations.\n\nb3, Several claimed that program tippers helped the FBI identify previously b7E\nunknown subjects, although they were not able to identify for us any specific cases where this occurred. Other witnesses cited the FBI's increased cooperation with the NSA on international terrorism matters as a side benefit of the Stellar Wind program.373 {FS/+STEW/SHFOE/NF)\nFBI officials and agents from the International Terrorism and Operations Section (ITOS) expressed a more moderate assessment of Stellar Wind.\n\nNonee of the ITOS officials we interviewed could identify significant investigations to which Stellar Wind substantially contributed. However, they were generally supportive-of the program, often stating that it was \"one tool of many\" in the FBI's fight against international terrorism, ITOS personnel frequently noted for us the deficiencies in the Stellar Wind information disseminated to field offices, suich as the lack of details about the foreign mndividuals allegedly involved in terrorism With whom domestic telephone numbers and e-mail addresses Wwere in contact, H,oWe_V@r, these FBI employees believed the possibility that such contacts bl, b3, related to terrorism made .inVes_tigatiflng the tips worthwhile., Some ITOS\nb7E\nwitnesses also told us that 1n their experience the FBI was already aware of telephone numbers and e-mail address'cs disseminated under q'oul'd ;\"h'e'l,p Mmove cases forward\" by eonfirming a subjlect's contacts with individuals involved in terrorism or identifying additional terrorist contacts.\n\ngent said that FBI field ffices might h\n|\nhad there been agents in b1\nthe offic-'e__s' read into Stellar Wind. He said that such agents would have b3, been better positioned than FBI Headquarters' officials to assure others in b7,E\nv\n, ple, one Supervisor stated that i represented FBI Headquarters' failure to Drioritize\n:\ninformation.\n\nHe said that by simply disseminatin ippers to field offices in ECs that often provided little in the way of details, FB]\nHeadquarters effectively made the field offices \"insurance carriers,\" placing the responsibility solely on them to timely and adequately investigate every lead.\n\nThe supervisor stated that ordinarily he accepts this responsibility as part of his job, but that the tippers were especially frustrating\n4, JRIS\nL\nX e AT RN\nA\nAERAI I STAS G\n1 aUVF@;R-N\nas compared to other counterterror ism leads the office rece1Ved because they did not provide sufficient information for him to prioritize the leads.374\nAnother supewis'ory Special a'gent exp'.ressed a sim'ilar assessment of priority matters. He told us that he did not have the freedom to prloi itize El'\n3, he manner he felt Was warranted by the information provided b7E\nField office agents who investigated\n@\n|leads also were-critical of the lack of details contained in ECs about the nature of the terrorist connection to the domestic contact, or about the contact itself, such as the duration or frequency of the calhng activity. Some agents we interviewed said they also occasionally were frustrated by the prohlbluon on bL\nusin nformation in any judicial process, such as in FISA\nb3, applications, although none could identify an investigation in which the b7E\nrestrictions adversely affected the case.\n\n{TS//STLW//SI//QC/NE)\nMost of the agents we interviewed viewed]\n_\nanother type of lead that required appropriate attention, and the agents bl, generally did not handle the leads with any greater care or sense of urgency b3, counterterrorism leads. {FS//SHNER-\nb7E\nb1, b3, al terrorism cases. Nevertheless the agents generally viewed b7E\nippers as a potentially valuable source of information, noting that the information developed from the investigations of tippers might prove useful in the future. (F57/SH-/NF)\nAgents. also stated that through the threat assessment interviews they b1, b3, conducted of the subscribers to tipped telephone numbers,\n\"opened a window\" to populations within the lield offices' jurisdiction that b7E\n371 The supervisor stated thatj eads had little investigative value to his office, b information beirig provided.\n\nSuch details might include, for example, what other\n1, ifdividuals had access to the foreign telephone allegedly used by someone invelved in b3, internationial terrorism, and how many calls were made from that number and for what b7E\ndirrations. These details would help evaluate the threat represented by the foreign number's contact with the tipped domestic number.\n\nSecond, the supervisor said thef tippers lacked direction about what the office should do with a tipped number after a threat assessment has been conducted. {8778T/7NFI\nIn 2007, FBI Deputy Director John Pistole briefed the Senate Seleet Commmnittee on Intelligenice concerning the FBI's participation in the Stellar Wind program.\n\nA document prepared in connection with that briefing addressed, among other subjects, the program's value in FBI national security investigations. The document stated,\n[S]uccessful national security investigations are rarely the result of & single source of information. Rather they occur after exhaustive hours of investigation and the use-of legal process in which bits and pieces of intelligerice from many sources are.\n\ngathered and combined into a coherent whole. The success or effectiveness of any mtelhgence program - whether Stellar Wind . .\n\n. or anything else ~ is sometimes. difficult to assess in the abstl.act because of that blending of multiple strains of intelligence and because success should never be measured only in terms of terrorist plots that have v131b1y been disrupted, but also in plots that never formed because our investigative actions themselves had a disruptive effect.\n\n(Italics in original )375 (F3//3TEW/\n/St OCTNF\nWe interviewed FBI Director Mueller in connection with this review and asked him about the value of Stellar Wind to the FBI's counterterrorism program.\n\nFBI Director Mueller told us that he believes the Stellar Wind program was useful and that the FBI must follow every lead it receives in order to prevent future terrorist attacks.\n\nHe said \"communications are absolutely essential\" to this task and called meta data the \"key\" to the FBI's\n[The] impact of any single piece of intelligence or program is difficult to quantify, Combination of various information, including humint, sigint, and elsur, is necessary to address the global threat.\n\nAccordingly, it is not possible to make an unequivocal \"but for\" connection between a tip and any particular FBI investigation that has resulted in a seizure or arrest.\n\nHowever, the information has .amplified, corroborated and directed FBI\ninvestigative resources. {(FS/STEW/73H//OC/\nNF\ncommunications analysis. Mueller also stated that to the extent such\n1nformat1on can be cratherc-:d and used leoally 1t must be explmted and that h11.s \" 'Asked 1f he was: famlhar w1th any spec1f1<: I\"BI mvestlgatlons that represent Stellar Wind successes, Mueller said that as a general matter it is.\n\nvery difficult to quantify the eeffectiveness of an intelligence program without\n\"tagging\" the leads that are produced in order to evaluate the role the program information played in any investigation.\n\n:\n'\nWe also asked Mueller about the issue of allocating finite FBI\nresources to respond to Stellar Wind leads. Mueller said that in the period after the September 11 terrorist attacks, the FBI remained in a state of continuous alert for several years.\n\nMueller stated that he understood the President's desire to take every step to prevent another terrorist attack, and believes that it would be wrong not to utilize all available capabilities to accomplish this, so long as it is-dore legally. {TS//STIW//ST//OC/NF)\nMueller also commented on media reports regarding FBI agents'\nfrustration with the volume of'}\ncads. For example, articles desctibed complamts of unidentified FBI field agents regarding the lack of informatien in the tippers they received underf\n] and how the high volume of tippers necessitated devoting s1gn icant resources to what were described as \"dry leads.\"376 Mueller said that the agents' frustration was similar to that expressed about other sources for the thousands of leads the FRI received after September 11, such as calls from citizens. Mueller stated that he understood the fr ustration associated with expending finite resources on numerous leads unlikely to have a terrorism nexus, but said that his philosophy after September 11 was that \"no lead goes unaddressed.\" Moreover, he stated that frustrations can result fram any counterterrorism program. (S7/NE-\nWe also interviewed Kenncth Wainstein, the first Assistant Attorney General for the Justice Department's National Security Division, which was created in September 2006. Wainstein told us that he was aware of \"both sides\" on the question of Stellar Wind's value.\n\nHe also said that he heard the government had not \"gotten a heck of a lot out of it,\" but noted that NSA\nDirector Hayden and FBI Director Mueller have stated that the program was valuable {S//NF\nHayden told us tha worthwhile and successful.\n\nmtelhgence base Hayden also observed that the enemy may nol have been as embedded in the United States.as much as, feared but sa1d that he believes Stellar Wind helped determine this.\n\n## E. Examples Of Fbi Counterterrorism Cases Involving Stellar Wind Information {S7/7/Nf)}\n\nAs part of our review, we sought to identify specific FBI international terror.iemi~i'nVes\\tig_a,tion's in which Stellar Wind information was tised-and to describe the information's specific contributions to the investigations. We agree with FBI officials that this is a difficult task in view of the nature of these investigations, which frequently are predicated on multiple sources of inforfmation. To the extent Stellar Wind tips played a role in an mvesugatlon the tips could be one of several sources of information acquired over time and used by the FBI to pursue the investigation.\n\nMoreover, the FBI agents and analysts we interviewed during our review could not say that \"but for\" a Stellar Wind tipper a given investigation would riot have been productive, and they were unable to recall specifically how, if at all, Stellar Wind intelligence may have caused their investigations to take a particular direction. [S7ANEL\n-Qur review did not seek to describe Stellar Wind's impact on each FBI\nfield office, and we recognize that FBI officials and her than those we interviewed rmght have had experlences Wlth\n1 reporting was not disseminated to FBI field offices under y contribution the information might have made to investigations FBI personnel we interviewed were familiar with might not have been accounted for in our questions about Stellar Wind and information. {FS//ASTLW/SL//QC/NE}-\nIn view of these difficulties, we examined several investigations frequently cited in NSA and FBI documents the OIG obtained during this review as examples of Stellar Wind information that contributed to aterterrorism efforts.377\nFor these investigations, we examined ECs, FBI Letterhead Memoranda describing the status of investigat activities in specific cases, Counterterrorism Division responses.te OIG\nquestions about the role-of n specific investigations, in international terrorism prosecutions, and FBI\n377 As noted above, the FBI was not the only customer of Stellar Wind information.\n\nThe CIA and the National Counterterrorism Center also received Stellar Wind reports potentially relevant to their operations. Pursuant to a directive in the FISA Amendments Act of 2008, Intelligence Community OIGs are examining the impact Stellar Wind had on their respective agencies or if Stellar Wind information contributed to their agencies'\noperations.\n\n-\n378 The briefing materials were prepared by the FBI's Communications Exploitation Section (CXS) shortly after aspects of the Stellar Wind program were publicly revealed in-a series of New York Times articles in December 2005. The briefing materials were prepared at the direction of FBI General Counsel Valarie Caproni, who anti'cipated that Director Mueller and Deputy Director Pistole would be called to testify about the program. These briefing materials were intended to help prepare Mueller and Pistole for their testimony.\n\nThe briefing materials include summaries of specific cases relating to Stellar Wind information that were highlighted by the NSA. AFS/STLWA/SH/OC/NE}\nbl, b3, bs, b7C, b7E\nb7C, b1, b3, b6, b7C, b7E\nlted in the FBI initiating investigations of to 1dentfl\"y any mvolVement in terrorism.\n\nIn\n'\nv\n.\n\nwas bl, b3, not relatcd'to any 1nv01vement in terrorism.\n\nHowever, in one case FBI\nb6, b7C, e 1r1d1v1dual was 1n contact w1th addltlonal b7E\n\nbl,\nb3, b6,\nb7C, b7E\nbl, b3, b7E\n\nut who was\n,voluritarily\n~ D7E\nThe subject of another of the leads generated by was already under investigation by an FBI fleld office. The\n1ead caused the FBI off1ce to convert 1ts prehmmary i 1V1d, al several t mes. and issued Natmnal Securlty Letters\n-\n'\n'\nHowever, the FBI did not develop any\n\"therelore was unable to stablish that there was a nationwide conspiracy\n:\nlto provide material support to\n\"successful dlsruptlon operatio:\nduring the course of the 1nvest1gat10ns. TS7'7'67'N'F)\nbl, b3, b6, b7C, b7E\nbl, b3, b6, b7C, b7E\nbl, b3, be, b7C, b7E\nbl, b3, b6, b7C, b7E\n385 FBI documents we reviewed do not indicate how this information was obtained or whether it was derived from Stellar Wind, {FS7/8TEW/7SI770C/NF\ne that it could not be verified whethe\n(S7T7OCTNF]~\nb1, b3, b6, b7C, b7E\nFBI briefing materials state that the FBI first be surveillance of an individual later determmecl to be misidentified\n8 Through open bl, b3, source investigation, the FBI obtained the telephon mber of the b6, m1s1dent1f1ecl subject and was granted emergency FISA authority on that b7C, nu_merrIA Selllane as initiated on the telephone believed to be b7E\nOn_ the FBI employees located at the NSA (Team 10)\nsubmitted a request to the NSA for call chaining analysis and corisideration for 'Stellar Wind \"tasking,\" or content collection. The NSA initiated content collectlon on the erronieous telephone number the same day.\n\nComntact aining on the telephone number did notr v contacts with any b1, b3, WIL terronstassomated numbers. Onf it was b6, b7C,\n>cl was not using the teleph ne number tasked and b7E\nchamed under Stellar Wind authority, e P\nalsc CeWU'thorized eelectronic surveillance of the numberf\n]\n11\nBy ongoing physical surveillance confirmed that the telephone number beheved to be assomated- had been misidentified.\n\n3FE:\n:\n~\n:\nb7C, b7D, b7E\n|\nbe,\n- b7C, b7E\nbl, b3, b6, b7C, b7E\nbl, b3, b6, b1, b3, b6, b7C, b7E\nb1, b3, b6, b7C, b7E\nbl, b3, b6, b7C, b7D, b7E\nAccording to afy sentation about the FBI's role in Stellar Wind, thd\n[\n.\n\n\\tipper \"facilitated the FBI's ablllty to locate, initiate phys1cal survelllance and debrieff\n@\nin o timely manner.\" The facts reviewed by the OIG show tha\n{failed to b1, b3, b6, result in notification to the FBI of return to the United State but b7C, b7E\nthat through Stellar Wind information the FBI was able to locate]\nobtain suryeillance o- FES,L,LS%LSI/,L@MF)\ninterviewed in connection with the FIB\nbl, b3, bs, b7C, b7E\nb3, be, b7C, b7E\nbl, b3, b6, b7C, b7E\nb6, b7C, b7E\nb6, In an undated:s ummary of successes under the Stellar Wind program, bl, b3, bl, b3, b6, b7C, b7E\nbl, b3, be, b7C, b7E\nthe FBI applied for and obtained a FISA order to_\nconduct ele\n1ic sur;\nce and a physu:al searchf A\nL\nbl B\nBy this time I 1od been in FBI custody for several days.59\nb3, Support: of the FISA apphcatmn the government reported thatfad\n|\nb6, e also in custody at that time, recently hadge e Zm g b7C\nb7E\nb1, b3, be, b7C, b7E\nb1, b3, be, b7C,\n:\n, b7E\n~\nThe NSA recommended that the FBI cite\n.\n\nlinvestigation in bnt,fing matenals as an example of Stellar Wind's con -ibution to Tism i fforl.s. The FBI bnefing mate1 1als also state that the Ee'b3'\nb7C, b7E\nIn response to the OIG's request for infformation about the ro:\ninformation 'played in the investigation\n_\nthe FBI's\n'Counterterrorisin Division told us that, based o its searches of\n.\n\ninternal FBI databases and discussions with the case agents bl, b3, reporting factored into mveshgatlon _Acco d' 19 to a|\nb6,\n-declaration the FBI filed inf T p1 -osecution, the\n\nipper in b7C, investigation \"did not directly lead to any ipformation of evidence b7E\nthat was used in the prasecution of the case againstf land was not mcorpm ated mlo emy apphcatlon to a court, including the [FISA Court].\"398\nb6, b7C\nb7E\nbl, b3, be6, b7C, b7E\nb1, b3, b6, b7C, b7E\n\n## V. Oig Analysis (U)\n\nThe FBI created th roject to disseminate Stellar Wind bl, information as leads to FBI field offices and assigned the CAU's Team 10 to b3, the NSA to work on Stell'alf Wind full-time for this purpose. We found that b7E\nthe co-location improved the FBI's knowledge about Stellar Wind operations:\n-\nand gave the NSA better insight about how FBI field offices investigated Stellar Wind information, We were told these benefits translated to impr ellar Wind report drafting process, and by extension, One of the changes the FBI implemented to attempt to improve the investigation off eads was to make FBI Headquarters-based b1, CAU, instead of the field offices, responsible for issuing National Security b3, Letters (NSL) to obtain subscriber information on tipped telephotrie numbers b7E\nand e-mail addresses, This measi initiated in July 2003, was intended to address agent concerns thatfy\n=\n|\njleads did not provide sufficient information to initiate national security investigations, a prerequisite under Justice Department investigative guidelines to issuing NSLs.\n\nHowever, we found that the CAU issued the NSLs from the control file, a non-investigative file created in September 2002 to repository forf related communications between FBI\nHeadquarters and field offices. Issuing the NSLs from a control file instead of an investigative file was contrary to i FBI policy. The FBI finally\n\nbl,\n\ni\n| project in November 2006.\n\nb3, b7E\n\n1\ndecision to issue NSLs h that the FBI had\n]\ncontrol file. concluded i sufficient predication either to connect the NSLs with existing preliminary or full investigations of al Qaeda an iliated groups or to open new preliminary or full investigations in compliance with Justice Department investigative guidelines.\n\nHowever, we also concluded that the could have, and should have, opened an investigative file for th n the decision first was made to have FBI Headquarters cads. {FSHFSTEWHSHOEINF)\nWe also described in this chapter a change the FISA Court made in March 2004 to the \"scrubbing\" process used to account for Stellar Wind information in international terrorism FISA applications. The change bl, b3, requires the FBI's Team 10 and FBI OGC, in coordination with the b7E\nDepartment's Office of Intelligence (formerly OIPR), to determine whether any facility (telephone number or e-mail address) that appears in a FISA\napplication also appeared in a Stellar Wind report and, if so, whether the FBI had developed, independent of Stellar Wind, an investigative interest in the facility before it was the subject of a ipper, or whether the facility would have been \"inevitably discovered.\" FISA Court Presiding Judge Kollar \"Kotelly imposed this additional scrubbing requirement after being advised of modifications made to Stellar Wind in March 2004 following the Justice Department's revised legal analysis of the program. The FBI and Office of Intelhgence continue to expend significant resources to comply with this scrubbing requirerment. 399 However, we did not find any instances of the requirement causing the FBI not to be able to obtain FISA surveillance coverage on a target. TS/ STEW/SHOC/NET\nOur primary focus in this chapter was to assess the general role of Stellar Wind information in FBI investigations and its value to the FBI's.\n\noverall counterterrorism efforts.\n\nSimilar to the FBI, we had difficulty assessing the specific value of the program to-the FBI's counterterrorism activities, However, based on our interviews of FBI managers and agents and our review of documents, and taking into account the substantial volume of leads the program generated for the FBI, we concluded that although the information produced under the Stellar Wind program had value in some counterterrorism investigations, it played a limited role in the FBI_ s overall counterterrorism efforts. {S/4F\nThe vast majority of Stellar Wind information the NSA provided the FBI related to telephone numbers and e-mail addresses the NSA identified through meta data analysis as having connections to individuals believed to I\nleads told us that most leads were determined not to have\n399 Ag noted earlier, the scrubbing procedure applies both to NSA information derived from the Stellar Wind program and to information derived from the FISA Court's PR/TT and Section 215 bulk meta data orders.\n\nThis is so because until mid-2008, when the Stellar Wind program officially was closed, leads the NSA developed from the FISA-anthorized bulk meta data collections were disseminated under the Stellar Wind compartment. {FS/H+SFEH--SHFEE\nN\n400\nStated another way, the Stellar Wind program generate leads for the FBI 'each month from October 2001 to February 2006,\n\n## Top Secret\n\nterrorism, and they did not identify for us any specific cases where leads helped the FBI identify previously unknown subjects involved in terrorism\n.\n\n(although several stated that this did occur). This is not surprising given that the vast majority of leads sent to FBI field offices for investigation concerned telephone numbers and e-mail addresses that the NSA already had determined were at best one or two steps removed from numbers and addresses suspected of being used by individuals believed to be involved in.\n\nterrorism. {ES/FSTLW//SH/OC/NF)\nThe FBI's two statistical studies that attempted to assess the:\n\"significance\" of Stellar Wind meta data leads to FBI counterterrorism efforts did not include explicit conclusions on the program's usefulness. The first study found\n.\n\nsamples taken fro ol meta data leads the bl, NSA\nprovided the FBI\nfrom approximately October 2001 to December 2005, b3, or 1.2 percemlma'de \"significant\"\ncontributions. The FBI's b7E\nsecond statistical study, which reviewed each|\n&\nle-mail tippers the NSA provided the FBI from August 2004 through January 2006, identified no examples of \"significant\" contributions to FBI counterterrorism efforts.401\nThe FBI OGC told us that FBI executive management's statements in congressional testimony that the Stellar Wind program had value was based in part on the results of the first study. FSHSTEWHASHOE/NT)\nWhile we believe Stellar Wind's role in FBI cases was limited, assessing the value of the program to the FBI's overall counterterrorism efforts is more complex. Some witnesses commented that an intelligence program's value cannot be assessed by statistical measures alone.\n\nOther witnesses, such as General Hayden, said that the value of the program may lie in its ability to help the Intelligence Community determine that the terrorist threat embedded within the country is not as great as once feared.\n\nWitnesses also suggested that the value of the program should not depend on documented \"success stories,\" but rather on maintaining an intelligence capability to detect potential terrorist activity in the future.\n\n(FS ST NE)\nFBI personnel we interviewed generally were supportive of the Stellar Wind\n(\nprogram, calling the information \"one tool of many\" in\n~\nbl, the FBI's anti-terrorism cfforts that \"could help move cases forward\" by, for b3, example, confirming a subject's contacts with individuals involved in b7E\nterrorism or identifying additional terrorist contacts. However, FBI\npersonnel also frequently noted for us the deficiencies in the Stellar Wind information disseminated to FBI field offices, such as the lack of details abouit the foreign individuals allegedly involved in terrorism with whom domestic telephorie numbers and e-mail addresses were in contact.\n\nYet, these FBI employees also believed the p0551b111ty that such contacts related -\nto terrorism made investigating thee tips worthwhile. Some FBI employees also.cited the FBIs increased coopera'mon with the' NSA on international terl orlsm matters asa 51de benefit of the Stellar Wind program.\n\nFBI Director Mueller told us that he believes the Stellar Wind program was useful and that the FBI must follow every lead it receives in order to prevent future terrorist attacks.\n\nHe said \"communications are absolutely essential\" to this task and called meta data the \"key\" to the FBI's communications analysis.\n\nMueller also stated that to the extent such information can be gathered and used legally it must be exploited and that he \"would not d1s:mlss the potency of a program based on the percentage of hits.\"\n-\n:\nWe sought to look beyond these. comments of: gcneral support for Stellar Wind to specific, concrete examples of the program's contributions that also illustrated the role Stellar Wind information could play. We therefore examined five cases frequently cited i in documents we reviewed\n:\ni al 1nvest1gat1on that led to arrest and conviction, it was an tipper that led to the national security investigation that preceded the criminal prosecution. {FS/STEWA/SLL/OC/NE]\nThe final investigation we exammed-dld not appear to result directly from Stellar Wind information: The NSA and the FBI at times have b1, b3, Clted-case as an example of the cortributions of Stellar Wind to b6,b7C, b7E\n\n## Prosecution 'Indicatd Thatll Couinterterrorism Investigations. An Fbl Declaration Filed Infl\n\n-\nMdredvr', the FBI\"ofld us in.response to our that Stellar Wind information did not \"factor 'i'n'toh\n|\ninvestigation.\" However, we concluded that Stellar Wind may have played some indirect rolMMMR]becoming the subject of a Full Investigation by the FBI. Our review of documents indicated that investigatior, which appears t0 have been advanCedifiby's.tcjllar'Win&\nreporting, might have caused the FBI to reopen its investigation We were unable to describe with the same certainty as i\n:\ninvestigation the extent of Stellar Wind's contribution to investigation, in part because of differing assessments in the FBL'\ndocuments regarding the role of Stellar Wind this matter.\n\nIn short, we found that Stellar Wind generally has played a limited role in FBI counterterrorism investigations, but that the evidence shows there are cases where Stellar Wind information had value.\n\nFor example, in sotne of the cases we examined Stellar Wind information caused the EBI to take action that led to useful investigative results. However, in others the connection between the Stellar Wind information and the FBI's investigative actions was more difficult to discern.. (SLINFY\nand in this chapter, Stellar Wind's bulk As discussed in Chapter Five\n'\nere transitioned to FISA authority and are meta data collection activities v ongoing. The FBI, under the\n| project (the successor t requir,.els field offices to conduct; at inimum, threat assessments on telephone numbers and e-mail addresses the NSA derives from this FISA-authorized collection that the FBI is not already aware of, including aumbers and addresses one or two steps removed from direct contacts with individuals involved in terrorism.\n\nIn view of our firidings about the Stellar Wind program's-contribution to the FBI's counterterrorism efforts, we believe that the FBI should regularly assess the impact leads have on FBI field offices and whether limited FBI resources should be used to investigate all of them. {FS//STLW//SL/ LQC/NE)\nAnother consequence of the Stellar Wind program and the FBI's approach to assigning leads was that many threat assessments were conducted on individuals located in the United States, including U.S.\n\npersons, who were determined not to have any nexus to terrorism or represent a threat to national security. 402 Thege assessments also caused the FBI to-collect and retain a significant amourit of personal information.\n\nabout the users of tipped telephone numbers: and e-mail addresses. In addition to an individual's name and home address, such information could include where the person worked, records of foreign travel, and the identity\n- of family members.\n\nThe results of these threat: assessments and the information that was collected. generally were reported in communications to FBI IIcadquarters and uploaded into FBI databases.\n\nThe FBI's collection of U.S. person information in this manner is ongoing under the NSA's FISA-authorized bulk meta data collection.\n\nTo the extent leads derived from this program generate results similar to those under Stellar Wind, the FBI will continue to collect and retain a significant amount of information about individuals in the United States, including U.S. persons, that do not have a nexus to terrorism or represent a threat to national security. ES/A/STLW //ST//OC/NE)\nWe recommend that as part of th\n. project, the Justice Department's National Security Division\n(NSD), working with the FBI, should collect information about the quant1ty of telephone numbers and e-mail addresses disseminated to FBI field offices that are assigned as Action leads and that require offices to coniduct threat assessments. The information compiled should include whether individuals identified in threat assessments are U.S. or non-U.S. persons and whether the threat assessments led to the opening of preliminary or full national security inivestigations. With respect to threat assessments that conclude that users of tipped telephone numbers or e-mail addresses are not involved in terrorism and are not threats to national security, the Justice Department should take steps to track the quantity and nature of the U. S. person information collected and how the FBI retains and utilizes this information.\n\nThis will enable the Justice Department and entities with oversight responslblhtles, including the OIG and congressmnal committees, to assess the impact this intelligence program has on the privacy interests of U.S.\n\npersons and to consider whether, and for how long, such information should be retained. (5!187L7/-S-}7'~/-67\"fi'1? )\nWe also recommend that, consistent with NSD's current oversight activities and as part of its periodic reviews of national security investigations at FBI Headauarters and field offices, NSD should review a b1, b3, representative sampling\n| leads to those offices.\n\nFor each lead b7E\nexamined, NSD should assess FBI compliance with applicable legal requirements in the use of the lead and in any ensuing investigations, particularly with the requirements governing the collection and use of U.S.\n\nperson information, {TS//SI//OC/NE)\nInn sum, we agree that it is difficult to assess or gquantify the effectiveness of a particular intelligence program.\n\nHowever, based on the interviews we conducted and documents we reviewed, we found that Stellar Wind information generally played a limited role in the FBI's counterterrorism efforts; but that the information had value in some cases.\n\nIn addition, some witnesses said the program provides an \"early warning system\" to allow the Intelligence Community to detect potential terrorist attacks, even if the system has not specifically uncovered evidence of preparations for such an attack. Moreover, other OIGs in the Intelligence Community are reviewing their agency's involvernent with the program and the results of those reviews, analyzed together, will provide a more comprehensive picture of the program's overall usefulness.\n\n(TS//STLW//SL// QC/NE)\nFinally, because the bulk meta data aspect of the Stellar Wind program continues under FISA authority, we recommend that the NSD take steps to gather information on the continuing operations of the program, including the use and handling of vast amounts of information on U.S.\n\npersons and the effectiveness of the program in FBI counterterrorism investigations, 4FS/ASTEW//SHHOCHE)\n\n## Chapter Seven Discovery Issues Related To Stellar Wind Information\n\nIn this chapter we discuss the government's statutory and judicial discovery obligations in international terrorism cases relating to Stellar Wind-derived information. Under the Stellar Wind program, the federal government-collected vast amounts of information, including the content of communications and meta data about telephone and e-mail ommu ons i U.S.\n\ncitizens and non-U.S. citizen Riiles of Criminal Procedure and applicable case law for the governmerit to disclose certain information to the defendant.\n\nThis obligation created a tension between the need to protect the secrecy of the Stellar Wind program and the need to comply with legal disclosure requirements.\n\nIn this chapter, we examine the process by which the Depariment of Justic,e:attempt?ed. to resolve this tension and meet its discovery obligations to criminal defendants.403\n(U)\n\n## L. Relevant Law (U)\n\nThe government's obligation to disclose certain statements made by a defendant and to disclose other information concerning a defendant in a criminal proceeding comes primarily from two sources:\nFederal Rule of Criminal Procedure 16 and the U.S. Supreme Court case of Brady v.\n\nMaryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).\n\n(U)\nFederal Rule of Criminal Procedure 16(a)(1)(B)i) requires the government to make various disclosures at the request of a criminal defendant. Among other things, the government must disclose \"any relevant written or recorded statement by the defendant if the statement is within the government's possession, custody, or control; and the attorney for the government knows - or through due diligence could know - that the statement exists[.]\"\nRule 16(a)(1)(E) provides that, upon a defendant's request, the government must allow a defendant to inspect and copy papers, documents, data, and other materials \"if the item is within the government's possession, custody, or control\" and the item is material to preparing the defense; the government intends touse the item in its case-in-chief at trial;\nor the item was obtained from or belongs to the defendant.\n\n(U)\nUnder Rule 16, a defendant's statements carry a \"near presumption of relevance,\" and \"the production of a defendant's statements has become practxcally g matter of right even without a showing of materiality.\" United States v. Yunis, 867 F.2d 617, 621-22, 625 & .10 (D.C. Circuit 1989).40\n(v)\nDisclosure of a defendant's statements is usually made by the government after receiving a request pursuant to Rule 16.\n\nHowever, even without making a Rule 16 request, a defendant has an independent right to discovery of his statements and certain other relevant information under Brady: v. Maryland 373 U.S. 83 (1963), Brady requires the government to disclose evidence in its possession favorable to the defendant and matenal to either guilt of punishment. Material evidence must be disclosed if it is exculpatory or if it could be used to impeach a government witness.\n\n(U)\nHowever, according to the memorandum, when production of the defendant's statements or other information would reveal classified information, the government may assert a national security privilege, sometimes known as the state secrets privilege.406\nIf the government asserts a colorable claim in a legal proceeding that classified information is privileged, the defendant must show that the information is not only relevant but material.\n\nIf the defendant can show materiality, some courts balance the defendant's need for disclosure against the government's\n~substantial interest in protecting sources and methods: assoc1ated with the sensitive information. See United States v. Sarkissian, 841 F.2d 959, 965\n(9th Cir. 1988); United States v. Smith, 781 F.2d 1102, 1180 (4 Cir. 1985)\n(eni banc).\n\n(U)\nThe government can dlso invoke the Classified Information Procedures Act (CIPA), 18 U.5.C. App. 3, to protect classified information in federal prosecutions.\n\nCIPA does not expand or limit a defendant's right to dlsoovery under Rule 16; rather, CIPA allows & court; \"upon a sufficient showing\" t authorize the government to delete specified items of classified 1nformat1on from otherwise discoverable documents, substitute a summary of the.\n\ninformation, or stipulate to relevant facts that the classified information would tend to prove.\n\n(U)\nAs detailed below, after aspects of the Stellar Wind program were.\n\ndisclosed in The New York Times and confirmed by the President in December 2005, the Justice Department invoked -CIPA to,.prevent d1sclosure of the program and any: -roram_-'denv d infor:\nslrel0)(1),\n(B '3)\n,\n\n## Il. Cases Raise Quesjtions About Government's Compliance With Discovery Obligations (U}\n\nThe tension between the highly classfl\"led nature of the Stellar Wind program and th 'ove'\n:\nnt's\n1scov\n:\nations in.criminal cases b1, b3,\n1n1t1311y arose 1\n(b)(3) - -\n-\nb7E\nbl, b3, b6, b7C, b7E\n|\ninformation collected under Stellar Wind would be discoverable and, more\n:Uenera]ly, how the Stellar Wind collections might be treated in view of the gove1 nment's dlSCOVCry obligations in eriminal prosecutions.\n\nBaker said he raised these issues with Attorney General Ashcroft, FBI\nDirector Mueller, and other Just1ce Department, FBI, and NSA officials.\n\nb1, Baker stated:that fhe clided that a determmatlon should first be made b3, whether thel e \"f [\nObtained through Stellar Wind also b6, were captured th1 euch FISA and thi efore could be produced. Baker said it b7C, turned out\n:\n-\n had been intercepted under FISA and b7E\ncolild be produced under that author1ty rather than as a result of Stellar Wind collectioris.\n\nBaker told the OIG that he was relieved by this outtome, but continued to be concerried about future cases.\n\nbl, b3, b6, b7C\nb7E\nb1, b3, b6, b7C, b7E\n\n.\n| Yooorally reecommended to Ashcroft that the\nt disclose the Stellar Wind program intercepts to the\nb1, b3, b6, b7C, b7E\nbl, b3, b6, b7C, b7E\nb6, b7C, b7E\n.\n\nInanothet internal Justice Department review of his actions, Yoo has acknowledged that he is not well versed in criminal law.\n\nDuring an interview with the Department's Office of Professional Responsibility (OPR)\nin connecticn with its investigation concerning his legal opinions in support of a. deetairiee interrogation program, Yoo stated that \"criminal prosecution process in the Department was not my specialty,\" and \"criminal law was not my area.*15 {FS{+SH-OC/NE)-\n\n## I, Criminal Division Examines Discovery Issues (U)\n\nF'ollowin : (bx?)f'\" | the Justice Department's Criminal Division was tasked with developing procedures for handling Rule 16\nbl b3. b6\ndisclosure issues because the issues fell within its area of expertise. Asa b7C b7E\nvrc_sult_,,in Patrick Rowan, a senior counsel in the Criminal\n'\nDivision, was read into the program to deal with Stellar Wind-related discovery issues, Rowan's supervisor, Criminal Division Assistant Attorne y General Christopher Wray, was also read into the program at the same time.\n\nb1, b3, b6, b7C, b7E\nto detainee interrogations.\n\nYoo drafted legal opinions for this program while in the Office of Legal Counsel.\n\nHowever, as discussed in Chapter Four, in contrast with the Stellar Wind program at least four other OLC attorneys assisted Yoo with drafting the legal memoranda., Yoo was also able to consult with Criminal Division attorneys and the client agency on this matter, TISTFSTHWSH-AOCLNE).\n\nWray and Rowan were the first Department attorneys with Criminal Division-level responsibility for terrorism prosecutions to be read into the program.ES/H\nL\nFSHH\n;\nWray told the OIG that after his and Rowan's read-in, they \"were kind of left on our own.\" He said that no one directed him or Rowan to continue studying the Rule 16 issues or the government's Brady obligations in connection with international terrorism prosecutions, nor did anyone tell them to develop any judgments or opinions on the subject,\n(U)\ne point after his read-in he may have read randum on the Department's discovery b1, b3, thatat som obligations in\n:\nand he instructed Rowan to review the b6, b7C, memorandum.\n\nRowan told us that he was familiar with Yoo's b7E\nmemorandum, but stated that he could not recall whether the purpose of Yoo's memorandum was to lay out in general the pertinent legal issues or to.\n\nin particular was to be handled. Rowan all having any problems with the conclusions Yoo\n)\ndocument how told s that he did not rec reached. (TS77STEW/7\n\n## A. The \"Informal Process\" For Treating Discovery Issues In International Terrorism Cases (U)\n\nDuring his OIG interview, Rowan described the processes at the Department prior to the December 2005 disclosure of aspects of the Stellar Wind program in The New York Times to address discovery obligations with respect to Stellar Wind-derived information.\n\nHe said that the NSA was generally aware of the Justice Department's international terrorism criminal cases, at least in part due to NSA's ongoing contacts with Patrick Philbin atid others in the Department. According to Rowa, the NSA's general awareness of the Department's international terrorism docket amounted to an \"informal process\" for spotting cases that may present discovery issues.\n\nRowan stated that prosecutors in U.S. Attorney's Offices typically would request the NSA to perform \"prudential searches\" of its databases for any relevant information concerning their prosecutions, including for discovery purposes, although this did not happen in every international terrorism case. Rowan stated that if the NSA located any responsive but classified information, it would be expected to notify senior Justice Department officials with the requisite clearances about the information. Rowan said he was confident that if Brady information were known to the NSA, it would be brought to the attention of the Department and steps would have been taken to dismiss the case or otherwise ensure the program was not disclosed. AESASTEW/18t/1OCTNF)\nIn addition to these routine communications between Department prosecutors and the NSA in criminal prosecutions, Rowan described other measures that were in place to keep Stellar Wind-derived information out of the criminal prosecution process. He stated that the FBI had \"walled off\"\nany evidence it collected from inclusionif.criminal cases by tipping out Stellar Wind-derived information under (T jith a caveat that the bi.b3, informiation in the tipper was 'f'vf01'-'1e'ad~p'urposesonly.\" Rowan noted. that b7E\nOIPR also had in place a scrubbing process. to delete program-derived.\n\ninformation from FISA applications, Rowan expressed confidence that these mechanisms c_nsgred that no program information was used in international terrorism prosecutions.*16 Finally, Rowan stated that the FBL\nis \"very quick to get FISAs up,\" thereby minimizing the likelihood that the\n-\nNSA's Stellar Wind database would be the sole repository of Brady material.\n\nTS/ ISTIW /ST OCHNFY-\n\n## | Memorandum Analyz By The Stellar Wind Program ~{T577St1 33\n\nAt the direction of Assistant Attorney General memorialized his research regarding these discov\n7\nowan saidhe wc on the worandum largely alone,\n\"consulting occasionally with Wray. Rowan said it was very difficult to work on the matter because of the secrecy surrounding the program and the other demands of his job.*17\n\n## Covery Issues Raised\n\n\nWray, Rowan issuesin a b7E\nAttorneys Manual (USAM)\nFor cases in which the Intelligence Commurity Had no active involvement in the criminal investigation, the USAM stated that there are two circumstances in which the prosecutor must conduct a\n\"suitable search\" of Intelligence Community files:\n(1) where the prosecutor has \"direct or reliable knowledge\" that the Intelligence Community bl b3 b6\npossesses potential Brady or other discovery material; or, (2) in the absence of such knowledge, where \"there nonetheless exists any rehable indication\n.suggestmu\" that the Intelligence Community possesses such material, USAM, Criminal Resources Manual  2052 (2002)., The USAM stated that, as a.general tule, a prosecutor should not seck access to Intelligence Community files unless there is an affirmative obligation to de so. However, it noted that certain types of cases, including terrorism prosecutions, fall outside this general rule, In such cases, the USAM advised that the prosecutor should conduct a \"prudential search.\"\nId.\n\nRowan wrote that the practice in several sections within the Criminal Division was to \"generally go beyond both the lega] obligations outlined [in his'memorandum] and the general rule outlined in the USAM, initiating searches out of prudence, rather than a legal obligation.\" For instance, Rowan reported that the practice of the Criminal Division's ounterespionage Section (CES) was to search Intelligence Community files in'slmoSt evelfy ca_se, even in instances.\n\nin which the Intellige ce Commumty\n,\n:\n|\n| Dion stated 'that stich searc es are cofiufimses in WmfihTfiemTMTlgellce collection concerning the defendant as \"suggested by the facts of the matter.\" He added that the searches were requested for a variety of TEasons, including for purposes of meeting discovery obligations.\n\nDion said that searches also were requested to determine whether the defendant has a \"relationship\" with an intelligence agency.\n\nHe noted that CES does not request prudential searches as a matter of course:to avoid makmg spurious requests. ~S/LMNE)L\n'\n._Dion said CES was a proponent sition that hne prosecutors with Whom CES co-prosecutes cases should have the\n'same lmowledge as CES concerning the \"national security equltles\" involved in each case.\n\nDion said this arrangement also allows for the AUSA, who is often the prosecutor most familiar with the case and the jurisdictional practices, to review any Intelligence Community material for Riile 16 and Brady purposes.\n\nDion acknowledged the limitations to this arrangement concerning strictly cornpartmented programs such as Stellar Wind, where the NSA understandably would. be reluctant to read in line prosecuitors for the limited purpose of screening defense discovery requests, (FS/SFEWEHOE/NF\nwas for the CES attorney to use the provisions of CIPA to prevent disclosure of 'sensitive material. Rowan noted that other sections within the Criminal Division also relied on CIPA to protect Intelligence Community files found\n-during searches.\n\n/SILLQCINE\nPr 111c1pa1 Deputy Assistant AtLomey Gcne1 al Steve Bradbu became the acting head of OLC.\n\nBradbury told us that he retalled having some discussion with Rowan about how d1scovery matters should be handled in connection with the Stellar Wind program. Bradbury said that John\n'Eisenberg, later a Deputy in OLC, also may have discussed the matter with Rowan. Bradbury stated that he did not believe that OLC followed up on Rowan s request that it contmue researching these issues.\n\nEisenberg told us that he discussed the Rule 16 issue with Rowan at some point, but did not recall Whether the: discussed the Br ady issue. He recalled dlscussmg Rty o)1) (0)3)\nmemorandum with Rowan and\n:\nartment took the position that the Yoo Was correct at least Wlth respect to Yoo's legal analysis 111-\nWhen we showed Eisenberg a copy of Rowan?\n\n.\n\nmemorandum, Eisenberg stated that he had not pl'eVIOLIS].y seen- 1t Eisenberg told us that OLC would not typlcally 'be responsible for addressing the discovery issues presented in Rowan's memorandum and that he was not aware of any OLC opinion on the subject other than Yoo's memoraiidum. Eisenbergalso said he was not aware of any formal procedures for handling Rule 16 disclosure requests or the government's:\naffirmative Brady obligations other than the ex parte in camera motions practice pursued by the National Security Division, discussed below.\n\nCES Chief Dion agreed that OLC would not be the ap'propriate entity to review discovery procedures in the context of Stellar Wind, in part because OLC attorneys generally do not have criminal htIgatmn expertise.\n\nDion suggested that if the Department were to develop procedures for handling discovery of Intelligence Community files, it should be done by the Department's National Security Division in coerdination with United States Attorneys' Offices, and it should be binding only on those two entities.\n\nRowan, while generally agreeing with Dion, told the OIG that he believed the OLC appropriately could have analyzed the legal issue of what impact a guilty_plea_ would have on the government's Brady obligations.\n\nWray also told us thet there was no organized Departmental effort to establish formal procedures for 1'eviewing,interna'tional terrorism prosecutions to comply with Rule 16 disclosure requests and Brady obligations:\nHe said \"the thinking was\" that the Rowan memorandum was the \"first step\" toward devisirig \"some kind of systematized process\" for such reviews. However, we found no indication that OLC followed uip-on Rowan's request to further study these discovery issueswith any kind of written product. (FS7S ity\n'\n\n## Iv. Yvuse Of The Classified Information Procedures Act (Cipa) To Respond To Discovery Requests (U)\n\nAfter publication of The New York Times articles in December 2005, the Justice Department received numerous discovery requests in connection with inte\"rnational terrorism prose_cutions throughout the country.\n\nAfter these articles, additional officials in the Criminal Division were read into the Stellar Wind progtam, including the new Assistant Attorney General Alice Fisher and other senior officials, both to assist with the Criminal Division's investigation into the leak of information to The New York Times and to handle the discovery requests following the public confirmation of the program by the President and other-Administration officials in December\n2005.423 After the National Security Division was created in September\n2006, it assumed much of the responsibility for handling the responses to discovery requests. {TS77/3TEW/SHAOCNEL\nTypically, the defense motions sought to compel the government to produce information concerning a defendant that had been derived from the\n\"Terrorist Surveillance Program,\" the term sometimes used by the government to refer to what the President confirmed after publication of The New York Times articles. The government responded to the discovery\n)\nrequests by filing ex parte in camera responses requesting to \"delete items\"\nfrom material to be produced in discovery pursuant to CIPA. AS//NF)~\nIn the following sections we provide a brief overview of CIPA and its use in international terrorism cases potentially involving Stellar Wind-derived intelligence. {PS1+STEW/SHAOCNE\n\n## A. Overview Of Cipa (U)\n\nThe Classified Information Procedures Act,\n18 U.S.C. App. 3, was enacted in 1980 to provide procedures for protecting classified information in federal criminal prosecutions. When a party to a criminal proceeding notifies the court that classified information will be used in the course of the proceeding, CIPA requires the court to initiate procedures to \"determine the use, relevance or admissibility of the classified information that would otherwise be made during the trial or pretrial proceeding.\"\n18 U.S.C. App. 3\n 6(a). Where the government holds the classified information, it may bring the matter before the court ex parte but it also must provide notice to the defense that classified information is at issue.\n\nId. at  6(b)(1).\n\n(U)\nProtective procedures generally are established through a CIPA\nhearing with both parties present. The hearing may be conducted in camera if the government certifies that an in camera hearing is necessary to protect the classified information.\n\nId. at  6(a). Typically, the government seeks an order to protect against the disclosure of any classified information to the defense. The government may also seek to withhold production of the classified information in one of three ways:\n(1) deletion of the classified items from the material disclosed to the defendant, (2) summarization of the classified information, or (3) admission of certain facts that the classified information would tend to prove.\n\nId. at  4.\n\nBased on the OIG's review of CIPA filings related to the Stellar Wind program, the government has only used option 1 (deleting classified items from material to be disclosed to the defendant) in response to defense motions for Stellar Wind information.\n\nTo prevent the disclosure of classified information, the government may make an ex parte showing to the court.\n\nTo do so the government must subrit \"an affidavit of the Attorney General certifying that disclosure of classified information would cause identifiable damage to the national security of the United States and explaining the basis for the classification of such information.\"\nId. at' 6(c](9)\nIf the court decides that the defendant's right to access to the evidence outweighs the government's national security interests, the government can choose to dismiss the indictment rather than make a disclosure.\n\nUnited States v. Moussaoui, 382\nF.3d 453, 466 n. 18, 474-76 (4t Cir. 2004).\n\n(U)\n\n## B. Use Of Cipa In International Terrorism Prosecutions Alleged Ito L[Nvolve Ste]Llan' Wmd Denved Information\n\nWe reviewed the CIPA pleadings files maintained in the National Security Division relating to the Stellar Wind program.\n\nIn almost every instance, the CIPA litigation was handled by the National Security Division without the involvement of the line prosecutors in the U.S. Attorney's Offices who handled the underlym prosecutlons but who were not read into the iri September 2008, told us tha The scope and nature of the defense motions initiating the CIPA\nlitigation varied, depending on the procedural posture of the case.\n\nFor instance, some defense motions sought to compel discovery of NSA\nsurveillance information, while others sought to suppress all government evidence and, in the altcrnatlve have the government's case dlSIDlSSBd on\n'the theory that 1llegal electromc surveillance caused the government to on in the first iristance..\n\n:\nRegardless of the varying procedural posture of the cases and the scope.and nature of the defense' motions, the governiment responses we examined were fairly uniform, consmtmg of a motion to delete items from\n:d1scovery, a legal memorandum in support of the motion, declarations from senior FBI and NSA off1c1als and a proposed order.\n\nThe government's CIPA submissions asserted that the information at\n1ssue 1n the d1scovery 11t1gat1on was classified and subject to the nat1onal The government's responses we reviewed uniformly stated that information in the NSA's intelligence reports had not been or would not be used as evidence, and that there was no causal connection between the information in the reports and any evidence used or to be used at trial, or was too attenuated from the evidence to be discoverable. The government argued that because the facts concerning the NSA's reporting would not aid the defense, the court need not explore the sources and methods used to acquire the information. The submissions also argued that the information collected by the NSA was not included in the government's FISA application, and therefore was too attenuated from the trial evidence to merit a review of the means by which the intelligence information was gathered.\n\nThe goverriment asserted that the \"causal connection\" between discovery of the:\nderivative evidence and the alleged illegal search \"may have become so important to note thai th\n\n## . Government Arguments In Specific Cases (U)\n\n~\nIn this section we describell]\n| |cases that illustrate the arguments made by the government in CIPA litigation with respect to defendant's quests for discovery of Stellar Wind-derived information.\n\nb1, b3, b6,\n\n## V., Oig Analysis (U)\n\nWe found that the Department made little effort to understand and comply with its discovery obligations in connection with Stellar Wind=derived information for the first several years of the program. The Dgpartm_cnt',slimited initial effort was also hampered by the limited number of attorneys who were read into the program. As a result, OLC attorney John Yoo alone initially analyzed the government's discovery obligations in one early case, and he produced a legal analysis that was based on an incorrect understanding of the facts of the case to which it applied. When other attorneys from the Department i e o read into the program Mue\n.\n\n.\n\nat, the Department eventually took steps toaddressfi\n0\n0\n|\nlits discovery obligations. However, in our view, those steps are not complete and do not fully ensure that the government has met its discovery obligations regarding information obtained through the Stellar Wind program.\n\n'\n'\n:\nAs described in this chapter, in 2002 the Department first recognized that the Stellar Wind program could have implications for discovery obligations in terrorism cases. OIPR Counsel Baker raised with Department\n~and FBL officials the question of how the government would meet its discovery obligations regarding Stellar Wind information.\n\nDespite awareness. of this-issue, the Department took no action at this time to bl b3\nensure that it was in compliance with Rule 16 or Brady with respect to b6'\n'\nStellar Wind-derived information. We believe that at this point senior b7'C\nD,epai;tment officials. were on notice that, at a minimum, the discovery.i b7E\nmerited attentio eT.\n\nHo concrete action was taken until eark in the-context of]\nwhen the Department had to address how to handle Stellar Wind information that was not also obtained under bl, b3, b6, b7C, b7E\neiror in Yoo's legal analysis may have resulted in part from the failure to subject his memorandum to typical OLC and Department review and serutiny. Because other Department attorneys were not read into the Stellar Wind program, the risk that the Department would produce a bl, b3, factually flawed and inadequate legal analysis of these important discovery b6, issues was escalated.\n\nAs we concluded in Chapters Three and Four, we b7C, believe the lack of sufficient legal resources at the Department during this b7E\ncarly phase of the Stellar Wind program hampered its legal analysis of important issues related to the program. We believe that Yoo's{\n)8)\nmemorandum is one more manifestation of this problem.\n\nIn July 2004, Patrick Rowan, a senior counsel in the Criminal Division; was read into the program and conducted a more systemic\n\n## ~With His Memorandum, Rowan Examined By Olc.\n\n.\n\nother than in informal discussions with Rowan concerning Yoo emorandum, OLC did not further examine these issues or bl, follow up on Rowan's recommendation.\n\nWhile we recognize that OLC was b3, not responsible for developing litigative strategy on this issue, we believe bs, that OLC or another appropriate Department component should have b7C, provided guidance on this important legal issue: (ESL/STIW//SI/JOC/NF)\n b7E\n\n## We Recommend That The Department Condu\n\nthat still remain unresolved he legal ramifications of a guilty plea on the government's disclosure obligations under Rule 16 and in p_articular Brady. We believe the Department should carefully consider whether it must re-examine past cases to see whether potentially discoverable but undisclosed Rule 16 or Brady material was collected by the NSA, and take appropriate steps:to ensure that it has complied with its discovery obligations in such cases. {PS/SHNF\nHowever, the Departmernt's handling of these motions did not require the Departinent to identify the potentially discoverable information derived under the Stellar Wind program that may exist in other cases. We recommend that the Department, in coordination with the NSA, develop and implement a procedure for identifying Stellar Wind-derived information that may be associated with international terrorism cases, currently pending or likely to be brought in the future, and to evaluate such information in light of the government's discovery obligations under Rule 16 and Brady.\n\n(IS//STLW\n/[ /SL/ LOC\n/NF)\n\n## Chapter Eight Public Statements About The Surveillance Program (U)\n\nThis chapter examines Attorney General Alberto Gonzales's testimony and public statements related to the Stellar Wind program. Aspects of this program were first disclosed publicly in a series of articles in The New York Times in December 2005. In response, the President publicly confirmed a portion of the Stellar Wind program - the interception of the content of international communications of people reasonably believed to have links to al Qaeda and related organizations. Subsequently, Attorney Gereral Gonzales was questioned about the program in two hearings before the Senate Judiciary Committee in February 2006 and July 2007. {S/NE)\nIn between those two hearings, former Deputy Attorney General James Comey testified before the Senate Judiciary Committee about the dispute between the Department and the White House concerning the program. Gonzales's and Comey's differing congressional testimony led to allegations that Gonzales had made misleading statements to Congress about the dispute and the program itself.434\n(U)\nIn this chapter, we examine whether Attorney Gereral Gonzales made:\nfalse, inaccurate, or misleading statements related to the Stellar Wind program. (U//FSHO)\n\n## I. Summary Of The Dispute About The Program (U)\n\nAs described in detail in Chapters Three and Four, the Stellar Wind program is best understood as consisting of three types of collections, informally referred to as \"baskets.\" Basket 1 related to the collection of e-mail and telephone content.\n\nInitially, the Stellar Wind program collected e-mail and telephone content when probable cause existed to believe one of the parties to the call or e-mail was outside the United States and at least one of the communicants was a member of an international terrorist group.\n\nthis chapter, we focus on his February 2006 and July 2007 testimony in which he discussed the events of March 2004.\n\n(U)\nBasket 2 involved bulk collection of telephony meta data, and basket 3\ninvolved bulk collection of e-mail meta data.\n\n(TS77STEWT7\no7\nThese collectioris were authorized by a Presidential Authorization that was re-issued at approximately 30 to 45-day intervals. Each Authorization was certified as to form and legality by the Attorney General. The Attorney General's certifications were initially supported by legal opinions from OLC\nattorney John Yoo affirming the legality of the program.\n\n(TS L/STIW [ /SL/ fOC/NF)\nAs discussed in Chapter Four, after Jack Goldsrmith was confirmed as Assistant Attorney General for OLC in October 2003, he, along with Associate Deputy Attorney General Patrick Philbin, conducted an analysis of the legal basis:underlying each basket in the Stellar Wind program. Asa result\n1is review, he, Philbin, and recently confirmed Deputy Attorney End In early March 2004, the dispute between the Department and the White House over the Department's revised legal analysis of the Stellar Wind program came to a head. Deputy Attorney General Comey, who assumed the duties of the Attorney General when Attorney General Ashcroft was hospitalized, informed the White House that the Department could not recertify the program. This dispute culminated in the unsuccessful attempt by then-White House Counsel Gonzales and White House Chief of Staff Andrew Card to get Attorney General Ashcroft to overrule Comey and recertify the program while he was in the hospital. When Ashcroft refused to certify the program and said that Comey was acting as the Attorney Gerneral, not him, the President reauthorized the program without the Attorney General's certification. Instead Gonzales, as White House Counsel, recertified the program. \"FS/FASHNF\nAfter the White House's actions to continue the program without Justice Department certifieation, Deputy Attorney General Comey, FBI\nDifecthMlj-l?flfel' and many other sernior 'D'epartmentxofficials considered\n\n## Ii. The New York Times Articles And President Bush's Confirmation Regarding Nsa Activities (U)\n\nIn 2004, aspects of the Stellar Wind program were disclosed to two reporters for The New York Times.\n\nThe reporters, James Risen and Eric Lichtblau, sought to publish an article about the program in late 2004.\n\nHowever, after a series of meetings with Administration officials who argued that publication of the story would harm the national security, The New York Times agreed to delay publishing the story. {S//NE}.\n\nThe New York Times eventually published a series of articles about the program on December 16 through 19, 2005. According to one of the reporters, the Times decided to publish the articles at least in part because the newspaper learned of serious concerns about the legality of the program that had \"reached the highest levels of the Bush Administration.\"#3%\n(U)\nThe first article, on December 16, 2005, was entitled, \"Bush Lets U.S.\n\nSpy on Callers Without Courts.\" This article stated that \"Months after the Sept. 11 attacks, President Bush secretly authorized the National Security Agency to eavesdrop on Americans and others inside the United States to search for evidence of terrorist activity without the court-approved warrants ordinarily required for domestic spying, according to government officials.\"\nThe article described in broad terms the content collection aspect of the NSA\nprogram (basket 1), stating that according to officials the NSA has\n\"monitored the international telephone calls of hundreds, perhaps\n'thousands, of people inside the United States without warrants over the past three years in an effort to track possible 'dirty numbers' linked to al Qaeda.\" The article stated that the NSA continued to seek warrants to motiitor purely domestic communications {FSHSTEWFSHAOS/ NP -\nThe article asserted that \"reservations about aspects of the program\"\nhad also been expressed by Senator Jay Rockefeller (the Vice Chair of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence) and a judge who presided over the FISA Court. The article added, \"Some of the questions about the [NSA's]\nnew powers led the administration to temporarily suspend the operation last year and impose more restrictions, officials said.\" The article also stated that \"In mid-2004, concerns about the program expressed by national security officials, government lawyers and a judge prompted the Bush administration to suspend elements of the program and revamp it.\"\nHowever, the article incorrectly tied this suspension of the program to Judge Colleen Kollar-Kotelly's concerns that information gained from the program was also being used to seek FISA orders, rather than to the March 2004\ndispute between Department officials and the White House about the legality of aspects of the program. ATS /A SH-NF\nOn December 17, 2005, the day after The New York Times published the first article, President Bush publicly acknowledged the portion of the NSA program that was described in the article.\n\nPresident Bush described in broad terms these NSA electronic surveillance activities, stating:\nIn the weeks following the terrorist attacks on our nation, I\nauthorized the National Security Agency, consistent with U.S.\n\nlaw and the Constitution, to intercept the international\n- communications of people with known links to al Qaeda and related terrorist organizations.\n\nBefore we intercept these communications, the government must have information that establishes a clear link to these terrorist networks.\n\nThis is a highly classified program that is crucial to our national security.\n\nIts purpose is to detect and prevent terrorist attacks against the United States, our friends and allies. Yesterday the existence of this secret program was revealed in media reports, after being improperly provided to news organizations.\n\nAs a result, our enemies have learned information they should not have, and the unauthorized disclosure of this effort damages our national security and puts our citizens at risk.\n\nRevealing classified information is illegal, alerts our enemies, and endangers our country\n.\n\n.\n\n.\n\n.\n\nThe activities I authorized are reviewed approximately every 45\ndays. Each review is based on a fresh intelligence assessment of terrorist threats to the continuity of our government and the threat of catastrophic damage to our homeland. During each assessment, previous activities under the authorization are reviewed. The review includes approval by our nation's top legal officials, including the Attorney General and the Counsel to the President.\n\nI have reauthorized the program more than 30 times:\nsince the September 11th attacks, and I intend to do so-for as longas our nation faces a continuing threat from al Qaeda and related groups.*36\n(U)\n\n## Iii. Other Administration Statements (U)\n\nOn January 19, 2006, the Justice Department issued a document, informally referred to as a \"White Paper,\" entitled \"Legal Authorities Supporting the Activities of the National Security Agency Described by the President.\" The 42-page document addressed in an unclassified form the.\n\nlegal basis for the collection activities that were described in the December. 16, 2005, New York Times article and other media reports and confirmed by President Bush. The White Paper stated that the President acknowledged that \"he has authorized the NSA to intercept international communications into and out of the United States of persons linked to al Qaeda or other related terrorist organizations.\"\n(U)\nThe White Paper reiterated the legal theory advanced by the Department in Goldsmith's May 2004 memorandum about the revised NSA\nprogram, which concluded that the September 18, 2001, Congressional Avithorization for the Use of Military Force authorized the President to employ \"warrantless communications intelligence targeted at the enemy,\" a fundamental incident of the use of military force, pursuant to the President's Article II Commander-in-Chief powers.\n\nThe White Paper also argued that the NSA's activities were consistent with FISA, as confirmed and supplemented by the AUMF.\n\nF5 H-SHHDNH\nOn January 22, 2006, the White House also issued a press release and memorandum to counter criticism of the NSA program by members of Congress. The press release was entitled \"Setting the Record Straight:\nDemocrats Continue to Attack the Terrorist Surveillance Program.\" This document was the first time we found any official use of the term \"Terrorist Surveillance Program\" to apply to the NSA program or aspects of the program.\n\n37 {SHNF\"\n'\nThe following day, on January 23, 2006, President Bush referred to the \"terrorist surveillance program\" during a speech at Kansas State University:\nLet me talk about one other program\n.\n\n. . something that you've been reading about in the news lately.\n\nIt's what I would call a terrorist surveillance program.\n\n(U)\nIn the speech, President Bush described the program as the interception \"of certain communications emanating between somebody inside the United States and outside the United States; and one of the numbers would be reasonably suspected to be an al Qaeda link or affiliate.\"\n(U)\nOn January 24, 2006, Attorney General Gonzales delivered a speech at the Georgetown University Law Center which, according to his prepared remarks, began by stating that his remarks \"speak only to those activities confirmed publicly by the President, and not to purported activities described in press reports.\" Gonzales referred to the program throughout his speech as either the \"terrorist surveillance program\" or \"the NSA's terrorist surveillance program.\"\n(U)\n\n## Iv. Testimony And Other Statements (U)\n\nAfter the New York Times articles disclosed aspects of the NSA\nprogram, members of Congress expressed concern that the President had exceeded his autherity by authorizing electronic surveillance activity without FISA orders, and congressional hearings were held on the issue.\n\nGonzales testified before the Senate Judiciary Committee on February 6,\n2006, and July 24, 2007, about the NSA's surveillance activities. We describe in the next sections his testimony and other statements he made about the NSA's activities, as well as testimony by former Deputy Attorney General Comey before the Senate Judiciary Committee on May 15, 2007.\n\n- (S\nSN\n-\n/20/92730 /0977.\n\n(U)\n\n## A. G@Nzales'-S February 6, 2006, Senate Judiciary Committee Testimony (U}\n\nIn his operiing s'tatement before the Senate Judiciary Committee ori February 6, 2006, Gonzales began by saying that his testir'nony would necessarily be limited:\nBefore going any further, I'should make clear what I can discuiss today. I am here to explain the Department's assessment that the President's terrorist surveillance program is consistent with our laws and Constitution.\n\nI am not here to discuss the operational details of that program, or any other classified activity. The President has described the terrorist surveillance program in response to certain leaks, and my discussion in this open forum must be limited to those facts the President has publicly confirmed - nothing more. Many operational details of our intelligence activities remain classified and unknown to our enemy - and it is vital that they remain so.\n\n)\nThe questioning of Gonzales at this hearing focused primarily on the nature of the NSA surveillance activity and the legal basis for it.**% Senator Charles Schumer asked Gonzales specifically about accounts of a\n'disagreement within the Justice Department over the NSA program:.\n\nSEN. SCHUMER:\nBut it's not just Republican senators who seriously question the NSA program, but very high-ranking officials within the administration itself.\n\nNow, you've already acknowledged that there were lawyers in the administration who expressed reservations about the NSA program. There was dissent.\n\nIs that right?\n\nATTY GEN. GONZALES:\nOf course, Senator.\n\nAs I indicated, this program implicates very difficult issues. The war on terror has generated several issues that are very, very complicated.\n\nSEN, SCHUMER:\nUnderstood.\n\nATTY GEN. GONZALES:\nLawyers disagree.\n\nSEN. SCHUMER:\nI concede all those points.\n\nLet me ask you about some specific reports.\n\nIt's been reported by multiple news outlets that the former number two man in the Justice Department the premier terrorism prosecutor, Jim Comey, expressed grave reservations about the NSA program; and at least once refused to give it his blessing.\n\nIs that true?\n\nATTY GEN. GONZALES:\nSenator, here's a response that I feel that I can give with respect to recent speculation or stories about disagreements. There has not been any ser ious disagreement, 1ncludmg and I think this is accurate - there's not been any serious disagreement about the program that the President has confirmed.\n\nThere have been disagreements about other matters regarding operations, which I cannot get into.\n\nI will also say -\nSEN. SCHUMER:\nBut there was some - I'm sorry to cut you off.\n\nBut there was some dissent within the administration, and Jim Comey did express at some point - that's all I asked you - some reservation.\n\nATTY GEN. GONZALES: The point I want to make is that, to my knowledge none of the reservations dealt with the program that we're talking about today. They dealt with operational capabilities that we're not talking about today.\n\nSEN. SCHUMER:\nI want to ask you again aboutI'm just - we have limited time.\n\nATTY GEN. GONZALES: Yes, sir.\n\nSEN ,SCHUMER:\nIt's also been reported that the head of the Office of Legal Counsel, Jack Goldsmith; a respected lawyer and professor at Harvard Law School, expressed reservations about the program.\n\nIs that true?\n\nATTY GEN. GONZALES:\nSenator, rather than going individual by individual -\nSEN. SCHUMER:\nNo, I think we're - this is -\nATTY GEN. GONZALES:\n- let me just say that I think differing views that have been the subject of some of these stories does not - did not deal with the program that I'm here testifying about today.\n\n\"SEN. SCHUMER:\nBut you are telling us that none of these people expressed any reservations about the ultimate program.\n\nIs that right?\n\nATTY GEN. GONZALES: 'Senator, I want to be very careful here, because, of course, I'm here only testifying about what the President has confirmed. And with respect to what the President has confirmed, I believe\n- I do not believe that these DOJ officials that you're identifying had concerns about this program.\n\n(U)\nThroughout the hearing, other Senators asked Gonzales questions relating to various-aspects of the NSA program, and Gonzales would often:\nqualify his answers by stating that he was not discussing activities beyond what the President had confirmed. However, in doing so Gonzalessometimes suggested that the N SA's activities under the program were limited to what the President had confirmed.\n\nIn one exchange with Senator Leahy, for example, Gonzales suggested that the electronic surveillance activities the President had publicly confirmed were the only activities the President had authorized to be conducted. Specifically, in response to a series of questions from Senator Leahy regarding what activities beyond warrantless electronic surveillance Gonzales would deem legal under the Authorization for the Use of Military Force, Gonzales stated, Sir, I have tried to outline for you and the committee what the President has authorized, and that is all that he has authorized.\n\n. .. There is all kinds of wild speculation out there about what the President has authorized and what we're actually doing.\n\nAnd I'm not going to getinto a discussion, Senator, about hypotheticals,\n439 {S//NE}\nresponses to questions that he had answered during his February 6 hearing and to clarify certain responses, Gonzales wrote that he confined his letter and testimony to the specific NSA activities that have been publicly confirmed by the President. Those activities invelve the interception by the NSA of the contents of communications in which one party is outside the United States where there are reasonable grounds to believe that at least one party to the communication is a member or agent of al Qaeda or an affiliated terrorist organization (hereinafter, the \"Terrorist Surveillance Program\").\n\nOne response Gonzales sought to clarify was this response to Senator Leahy.\n\nGonzales wrote:\nFirst, as | emphasized in my opening statement, in all of my testimony at the hearing I addressed - with limited exceptions - only the legal underpinnings of the Terrorist Surveillance Program, as defined above.\n\n[ did not and could not address operational aspects of the Program or any other classified intelligence activities.\n\nSo, for example, when 1 testified in response to questions from Senator Leahy, \"Sir, I have tried to outline for you and the Committee what the President has authorized, and that is all that he has authorized,\" Tr. at 53, I was confining my remarks to the Terrorist In response to Senator Sam Brownback's question about whether the FISA application process would include \"even these sort of operations we've read about data mining operations? Would that iniclude those sorts. of operations, or are those totally a separate type of field?\"\n(U)\nGonzales responded:\nT'm not here to talk about that. Again, let me just caution everyone that you need to read these stories with caution, There is a lot of mumbling - I mean, mixing and mangling of activities that are totally unrelated to what the President has authorized under the terrorist surveillance program, and so I'm uncomfortable talking about other kinds of operations that might - that are unrelated to the terrorist surveillance program.\n\n()\n\n## B. Comey's May 15, 2007, Senate Judiciary Committee 'Testimony (U)\n\nFormer Deputy Attorney General Comey appeared before the Senate Judiciary Committee on May 15, 2007, in a hearing called to examine whether the Department had politicized the firing of U.S. Attorneys.\n\nSenator Schumer; who presided over the hearmg, began the questioning by asking Comey about reports in the media that in March 2004 White House.\n\nCounsel Gonzales and White House Chief of Staff Card had visited Attorney General Ashcroft in the hospital in an effort to override Comey's decision, made when he served as Acting Attorney General, not to certify a classified program. Comey was asked to recount the details of the incident.\n\n(U)\nAfter prefacing his remarks by stating that he could not discuss classified information, Comey described the events of March 2004, including the confrontation between the Department and White House officials in Ashcroft's hospital room.\n\nIn describing these events, Comey referred to a single classified program.\n\nFor example, Comey testified that:\nIn the early part of 2004, the Department of Justice was engaged\n- the Office of Legal Counsel, under my supervision, in a reevaluation both factually and legally of a particular classified program. And it was a program that was renewed on a regular basis and required signature by the Attorney General\n()]\ncertifying to its legality. And the ~ and I remember the precise date; the program had to be renewed by March the 11th, which was a Thursday, of 2004. And we were engaged in a very interisive reevaluation of the matter.\n\n(U)\nComey also testified that \"as Acting Attorney General,\n[ would not certify the program as to its legality, and explained our reasoning in detail, which I will not go into here, nor am 1 corifirming it's any particular program.\" As detailed in Chapter Four, Comey then described from his perspective the incident in the hospital room and testified that after that incident \"[tJhe program was reauthorized without us, without a signature from the Department of Justice attesting as to its legality\n.\n\n.\n\n. Jo@)\n\n## C. Gonzales's June 5, 2007, Press Conference (U)\n\nIn light of Comey's statements, questions were raised abotit the accuracy of Gonzales's February 2006 testimony to the Senate Judiciary Committee. For example, in a press conference on June 5, 2007, called to announce the indictment of members of an international gang called MS-13, the first question a reporter asked Gonzales concerned Comey's testimony:\nREPORTER: Attorney General, last month Jim Comey testified about visits you and Andy Card made to John Ashcroft's hospital bed.\n\nCan you tell us your side of the story? Why were you there and did Mr. Comey testify truthfully about it? Did he remember it correctly?\n\nATTY GEN. GONZALES:\nMr. Comey's testimony related to a highly classified program which the President confirmed to the American people some time ago. Because it's on a classified program I'm not going to comment on his testimony.\n\n(U)\nAs discussed below, when later asked about this statement, Gonzales said that he had misspoke, and that he did not mean to say that Comey's testimony related to the program that the President confirmed.\n\n(U)\n\n## D. Gonzales's July 24, 2007, Senate Judiciary Committee Testimony (U)\n\nGongzales was again called to testify before the Senate Judiciary Committee on July 24, 2007.\n\nIn advance of Gonzales's July 24 appearance, Senator Leahy sent Gonzales a letter advising him of the questions that would he asked at the hearing,#*0 The letter referenced Gonzales's\n410 According to the letter, Senator Leahy took this step because in Gonzales's appearance before the Senate Judiciary Committee on April 19, 2007, to discuss the removal of nine U.S. Attorneys, Gonzales had responded to an estimated 100 questions that\n(Cont'd.)\nFebruary 6, 2006, testimony in which he stated that Department officials did net have \"concerns about this program.\" The letter also referenced\n'Comey s May 15 testimony concerning the incident in Asheroft's hospital roorn it March 2004. The letter specifically advised Gonzales that he would be asked to \"provide a full explanation for the legal authorization for the President's warrantless electronic surveillance program in March and April\n2004.\" (U)\nAt the July 24 hearing, Gonzales was repeatedly q'uesfi'o'ned about alleged inconsistencies between his and Comey's accounts of the events of March 2004 and the NSA program.\n\nFor example, Senator Specter asked:\nLet me move quickly through a series of questions - there's a lot to cover\n- starting with the issue that Mr. Comey raises. You said, quote, \"There has not been any serious disagreement about the program.\"\nMr. Comey's testimony was that Mr.\n\nGionzales began to discuss why they were there to seek approval and he-then says, quote, \"I was very upset.\n\nI was angry.\n\nI\nthought I had just witnessed an effort to take advantage of a very sick man.\"\nFirst of all, Mr., Attorney General, what credibility is left for you when you say there's no disagreement and you're party to going to the hospital to see Attorney General Ashcroft under sedation to try to get him to approve the program?\n\nATTY GEN. GONZALES:\nThe disagreement that occurred and the reason for the visit to the hospital, Senator, was about other intelligence activities.\n\nIt was not about the terrorist surveillance program that the President announced to the American people.\n\nV)\nAt other points in the hearing, Gonzales stated that the dispute referred to \"other intelligence activities,\" and not the \"terrorist surveillance program.\"\n(U)\nSenator Schumer also questioned Gonzales about his answer in the June 5 press conference in which he stated that Comey's testimony \"related to a highly classified program which the President confirmed to the American people some time ago.\" Gonzales first responded that he would have to look at the question and his response from the press conference, and then he said \"I'm told that what I'd in fact - here in the press he could \"not recall.\" Leahy wrote that he wanted to assist Gonzales with his preparation for the July 24 testimony to \"avoid a repeat of that performance.\"\n(U)\nconference ~ I did misspeak, but I also went baclk and clarified it with the reporter.\"#\n(U)\n'Gonzales then responded to Senator Schumer that \"The President confirmed the existence of one set of activities,\" and that \"Mr. Comey was talking about a disagreement that existed with respect to other intelligence activities.\n\n.\n\n:\n. Mr. Comey's testimony ahout the hospital visit was about.\n\nother intelligence activities, disagreements over other intelligence activities.\n\nThat's how we'd clarify it.\"\n(U)\nOther Senators questioned Gonzales's responses on this issue. For example, Senator Feingold stated:\nWith respect to the NSA's illegal wiretapping program, last year in hearings before this committee and the House Judiciary Comrnittee, you stated that, quote, \"There has not been arny serious disagreement about the program that the President has confirmed,\" unquote, that any disagreement that did eccur, quote, \"did noet deal with the program that I am here testifying about today,\" unquote, and that, quote, \"The disagreement that existed does not relate to the program the President confirmed in December to the American people,\" unquote.\n\n(U)\nTwo months ago, you sent a letter to me and other members of this committee defending that testimony and asserting that it remains accurate. And I believe you said that again today.\n\nNow, as you probably know, I'm a member of the Intelligence Committee. And therefore I'm one of the members of this committee who has been briefed on the NSA wiretapping program and other sensitive intelligence programs.\n\nI've had the opportunity to review the classified matters at issue here. Andl believe that your testimony was misleading, at best.\n\nI am prevented from elaborating in this setting, but I intend to send you a classified letter explaining why I have come to that conclusion.\n\n(U)\nSenator Whitehouse, also a member of the Intelligence Committee, similarly stated:\nMr. Gonzales, let me just follow up briefly on what Senator Feingold was saying, because I'm also a member of both committees. And I have to tell you, I have the exact same perception that he dees, and that is that if there is a kernel of truth in-what you've said about the program which we can't discuss but we know it to be the program at issue in your hospital visit to the Attorney General, the path to that kernel of truth is so convoluted and is so contrary to the plain import of what you said, that I, really, at this point have no choice but to believe that you intended to deceive us and to lead us or mislead us away from the dispute that the Deputy Attorney General subsequently brought to our attention.\n\nSo you may act as if He's behaving, you know, in a crazy way to even think this, but at least count two of us and take it seriously.#42\n(U)\nGonzales also offered to answer a question about the terrorist surveillance program in closed session during this exchange with Senator Specter:\nSEN. SPECTER:\nGoing back to the question about your credibility ori whether there was dissent within the administration as to the terrorist surveillance program, was there any distinction between the terrorist surveillance program in existence on March 10th, when you and the Chief of Staff went to see Attorney General Ashcroft, contrasted with the terrorist surveillance program which President Bush made public in December of 20057\nATTY GEN. GONZALES:\nSenator, this is a question that I\nshould answer in a lassified setting, quite frankly, because now you're asking me to hint or talk - to hint about our operational activities. And I'd be happy to answer that question, but in a classified setting.\n\nSEN. SPECTER:\nWell, if you won't answer that question, my suggestion to you, Attorney General Gonzales, is that you review this transcript very, very carefully.\n\nI do not find your testimony credible, candidly. When I look at the issue of credibility, it is my judgment that when Mr. Comey was testifying he was talking about the terrorist surveillance program and that inference arises in a number of ways, principally because it was such an important matter that led you and the Chief of Staff to Ashcroft's hospital room.\n\n... So my suggestion to you is that you review your testimony very carefully. The chairman's already said that the committee's going to review your testimony very carefully to see if your credibility has been breached to the point of being actionable.\n\no)\nNear-the end of the hearing Senator Schumer questioned Gonzales regarding the meeting at the White House with the \"Gang of Eight\"\ncongressional leaders, just before Gonzales and Card went to Ashcroft's hospital room on March 10, 2004:\nSEN. SCHUMER:\nOK. But you testified to us that you didn't believe there was serious dissent on the program that the President authorized. And now you're saying they knew of the dissent and you didn't?\n\nATTY GEN. GONZALES: The dissent related to other intelligence activities. The dissent was not about the terrorist surveillance program the President confirmed and .\n\n.\n\n.\n\nSEN. SCHUMER: You said, sir - sir, you said that they knew that there was dissent.\n\nBut when you testified before us, you said there has not been any serious disagreement. And it's about the same program.\n\nIt's about the same exact program.\n\nYou said the President authorized only one before.\n\nAnd the discussion - you see, it defies credulity to believe that the discussion with Attorney General Ashcroft or with this group of eight, which we can check on - and I hope we will, Mr.\n\nChairman:\nthat will be yours and Senator Specter's prerogative\n-- was about nothing other than the TSP. And if it was about the TSP, you're dissembling to this committee. Now was it about the TSP or not, the discussion on the eighth?\n\nATTY GEN, GONZALES: The disagreement on the 10th was about other intelligence activities.\n\nSEN. SCHUMER:\nNot about the TSP, yes or no?\n\nATTY GEN. GONZALES:\nThe disagreement and the reason we had to go to the hospital had to do with other intelligence activities.\n\nSEN. SCHUMER:\nNot the TSP? Come on.\n\nIf you say it's about\n\"other,\" that implies not. Now say it or not.\n\nATTY GEN. GONZALES:\nIt was not.\n\nIt was about other intelligence activities.\n\nSEN. SCHUMER: Was it about the TSP? Yes or no, please?\n\nThat's vital to whether you're telling the truth to this comimittee.\n\nATTY GEN. GONZALES:\nIt was about other intelligence actlvmes u)\nWhen we interviewed Gonzales, he stated that there was never any intent to hide the NSA program from Congress, and he said that Congress was briefed on multiple occasions about the program.#4\nGonzales also stated t at he could riot explain to\n'\nadjciary r\n'\nGonzales sald that hecould\n7\nthat when he used the term it 1eferred only to the content Collectlon activities the President had confirmed publicly, and that the rest of the program remained classified.\n\nGonzales also asserted that this distinction should have been clear to those on the committee who were read into the Stellar Wind program. {IS/LSTLW-//SHAGCNF-\n\n## E. [Fbi Director Mueller's July 26, 2007, House Committee On The Judiciary Testimony (U)\n\nTwo days after Gonzales's July 24, 2007, Senate Judiciary Committee testimony, FBI Director Mueller testlfled before the House Judiciary Comrmittee.\n\nAt this hearing, Mueller was asked about his conversation with Attorney General Ashcroft at the hospital on the evening of March 10, 2004.\n\nAs discussed in Chapter Four of this report, Mueller arrived at the hospital just after Gonzales and Card left.\n\nMueller was asked to recount what he learned from Ashcroft concerning Ashcroft's exchange with Gonzales and Card earlier that evening:\nREP. JACKSON LEE: Could I just say, did you have an understanding that the discussion was on TSP?\n\nMR. MUELLER:\nI had an understanding the discussion was on a-a NSA program, yes.\n\nREP JACKSON LEE:\nI guess we use \"TSP,\" we use warrantless wiretapping, so would I be comfortable in saying that those were the items that were part of the discussion?\n\nMR. MUELLER:\nI- the discussion was on a national an NSA\nprogram that has been much discussed, yes.\n\n(V)\nWe asked Mueller about his understanding of the term \"terrorist surveillance program.\" Mueller said that the term \"TSP\" was not used by the FBI prior to The New York Times article and the President's confirmation of one aspect of the program.\n\nMueller said he understood the term to refer to what the President publicly confirmed as to content intercepts. Mueller said he believed the term \"T'SP\"\nwas part of the \"overarching\" Stellar Wind program, but that \"TSP\" is not synonymous with Stellar Wind, #4% ~{S7/F)-\n\n## F. Gonzales's Follow-Up Letter To The Senate Judiciary Comimittee (U) :\n\nIn an effort to clarify his July 24, 2007, Senate testimony, on August 1, 2007, Gonzales sent unclassified letters to Judiciary Committee Chairman Leahy and Senator Specter. Gonzales's letter to Leahy stated that he was deeply concerned with suggestions that his testimony was\n'\nmisleading and he was determined to address any such .i'mp'ression.\n\nHe explained that \"shortly after 9/11, the President authorized the NSA to undertake a number of highly classified activities,\" and that, \"although the legal bases for these activities varied, all of them were authorized in one presidential order, which was reatithorized approximately every 45 days.\"\nGonzales wrote that before December 2005 \"the term 'Terrorist Surveillance Program' was riot used to refer to these activities, collectively or otherwise.\"\nRather, Gonzales wrote that the term was first used in early 2006 \"as part of the public debate.that followed the unauthorized disclosure [by the New York Times] and the President's acknowledgement of one aspect of the NSA\nactivities[.]?\n\n(U)\nGonzales also wrote in this letter that in his July 24 testimony he was discussing \"only that particular aspect of the NSA activities that the President has pubhcly acknowledged, and that we have called the Terrorist Survefllance Program|.]\"\nHe wrote that he recognized that his use of this term. or his shorthand reference to the \"program' publicly 'described by the President\" may have \"created confusion.\" Gonzales maintained that there was \"not a serious disagreement between the Department and the White House in March 2004 about whether there was a legal basis for the particular activity later called the Terrorist Surveillance Program.\" (U)\nGonzales also wrote in his letter, \"That is not to say that the legal issues raised by the Terrorist Surveillance Program were insubstantial; it was an extraordinary activity that presented novel and difficult issues and.\n\nwas, as 1 understand, the subject of intense deliberations within the Department.\n\nIn the-spring of 2004, after a thorough reexamination of all these activities, Mr. Comey and the Office of Legal Counsel ultimately agreed that the President could direct the NSA to intercept international communications withotit a court order where the interceptions were targeted at al Qaeda or its affiliates.\n\nOther aspects of the NSA's activitiesreferenced in the DNI's letter [attached to Gonzales's letter] did precipitate very serious disagreement.\"\n(U)\n\n## V. 0Oig Analysis (U}\n\nIn this section, we assess whether Gonzales made false, inaccurate, or misleading statements during his testimony before the Senate Judiciary Committee.\n\nAs discussed below, we concluded that Gonzales''s testimony did not constitute a false statement under the criminal statutes. We also concluded that he did not intend his testimony to be inaccurate, false, or misleading.\n\nHowever, we found in at least two important respects his testimony was confusing, inaccurate, and had the effect of misleading those who were not read into the program.\n\n(U)\nAt the outset, we recognize that Gonzales was in a difficult position because he was testifying in an open, unclassified forum about a highly classified program.\n\nIn this setting, it would be difficult for any witness to clearly explain the nature of the dispute between the White House and the Department while not disclosing additional details about classified activities, particularly because only certain NSA activities had been publicly confirmed by the President.\n\n(U)\nHowever, some of this difficulty was attributable to the White House's decision not to brief the Judiciary Committee, which had oversight of the Department of Justice, about the program.\n\nAs discussed in Chapter Four, the strict controls over the Department's access to the program hindered the Department's ability to adequately fulfill its legal responslblhtles concerning the program through March 2004. 'Similarly, the White House's decision not to allow at least the Chair and Ranking Members of the House and Senate Judiciary Commiittees to be briefed iiito the program created difficulties for Gonzales when he testified before Congress about the disputes regarding the program, ThlS limitation also affected the Comunittee's ability to understand or adequately assess the program, espec1a11y in connection with the March 2004 dispute.\n\nWe ag1ee with\n'Goldsmith's observation about the harm in the White House's\n\"over-secrecy\"\nfor this program, as well as Director Mueller's suggestlon made in March\n2004, that briefings on the program should have been given to the House and Senate Judiciary Committees.\n\nThis did not occur, and it made Gonzales's testimony to the Senate Judiciary Committee unusually difficult.\n\nYet, even given these difficulties, we believe that Gonzales's testimony was imprecise, confusing, and likely to lead those not read into the program to draw wrong conclusions about the nature of the dispute between White House and Department officials in March 2004.\n\nIn addition, two Senators who Had been read into the program stated that they were confused by Gonzales's testimony. Although we concluded that Gonzales did notintend to mislead Congress, his testimoriy nonetheless had the effect of creating confusion and inaccurate perceptions about certain issues covered during his hearings.\n\n(U)\nGonzales, as a participant in the March 2004 dispute between the White House and the Justice Department and, more importantly; as the nation's chief law enforcement officer, had a duty to balance his obligation not to disclose classified information with the need not to be misleading in his testimony about the events that nearly led to mass resignations of senior officials at the Justice Department and the FBI.\n\nInstead, Gonzales's testimony only deepened the confusion among members of Congress and the public about these matters. We were especially troubled by Gonzales's testimony at the July 2007 Senate hearing because it related to an important matter of significant public interest and because he had sufficient time to prepare for this hearing and the questions he knew he would be asked.\n\n(U)\nAt the outset of his testimony on February 6, 2006, Gonzales explained that he was confining his remarks to the program and the facts that the President publicly confirmed in his radio address on December 17,\n2005.\n\nIn those remarks, the President had, in essence, confirmed the content collection part, or basket 1, of the NSA surveillance program.#45\nThe President; and Gonzales, used the term \"terrorist surveillance program\"\nin connection with the President's confirmation of these NSA activities.\n\nHowever, as discussed below, it was not clear - even to those read into the program - whether the term \"terrorist surveillance program\" referred only to content collection (basket 1) or the entire program.\n\nNevertheless, Gonzales suggested in his testimony that the dispute between the White House and the Department concerned other intelligence activities that were unrelated to the content collection portion of the program that the President had confirmed. This was not accurate. (S//NE}\nWe recognize that the term \"terrorist surveillance program\" was intended by Gonzales and other Administration officials to describe a limited set of activities within the Stellar Wind program and that the term was created only in response to public disclosures about the program. However, by using phrases. such as the \"terrorist surveillance program\" or \"the program that the President has confirmed,\" and setting-, that program distinetly apart from \"other intelligence activities,\" Gonzales's testimony created a perception that the two sets of activities were entirely unrelated, which was not accurate.\n\nGonzales's testimony suggested that the dispute that Comey testified about was not related to the program that the President had confirmed, and instead that the dispute concerned unrelated\n\"operations\" or \"intelligence activities.\" Thus, While Gonzales may have\n1ntended the term \"terronst survefllance program\" to cover only content Gongzales reinforced this misperception throughout his testimony.\n\nFor example, when asked by Senator Leahy what activities Gonzales believed would be supported under the Authorization for Use of Military Force rationale, Gonzales stated, \"I have tried to outline for you and the committee what the President has authorized, and that is all that he has authorized.\"\nIn fact, the President had authorized two other types of collections in the same Authorization.\n\nGonzales himself subsequently realized that his response to Senator Leahy was problematic.\n\nIn a February 28, 2006, letter to Senators Specter and Leahy, Gonzales sought to clarify his response, stating, \"I was confining my remarks to the Terrorist Surveillance Program as descnbed by the President, the legality of which was the subject of the February 6th hearing.\"\nHowever, in our view this attempt to clarify his remarks did not go nearly far enough. As discussed below, it was not until after Gonzales's next appeararice before the Senate Judiciary Committee in July 2007 that Gonzales acknowledged that the President had also vauthonzed a range of intelligence-gathering activities, including those\n-descmbed undcr the terrorist surveillance program, in a single order.\n\nWe concluded that Gonzales created a misimpression for Congress and the public by suggesting that the March 2004 dispute between the Department and the White House concerned issues wholly unrelated to \"the program the President confirmed,\" or the terrorist surveillance program. We believe a fairer and more accurate characterization would have been that the March 2004 dispute concerned aspects of a larger program of which the.\n\nterrorist surveillance program was a part.\n\nAs discussed earlier, the NSA\nviewed the three types of collections as a single program. The three types of collections were all authorized by the same Presidential order and administered by a single intelligence agency.\n\nMoreover, all three collectioris were known in the Intelligence Community by the same Top Secret/ SenSLtlve Compartmented Information program cover term, Stellar was incomplete and not accurate. (FS/AASH-HOEINF)\nWhen Senator Schumer asked Gonzales at the February 2006 Senate hearing whether media accounts that Comey \"expressed grave reservations about the NSA program\" were true, Gonzales responded that there was no When we interviewed Gonzales, he told us that he was trying to be careful during his public testimony about discussing or characterizing a classufied program w1th persons not read into the program, and that he used he term nt\"\nto d1stmcrulsh the dlsacrreement regardmg Yet, even if one agrees th\n-\nwas not a \"serious disagreement\" between the Department and the White House, Gonzales's testimony is still problematic. When Senator Schumer pressed Gonzales on whether Department officials \"expressed any reservations about the ultimate program,\" Gonzales replied:\n\"Senator,\n[\nwant to be: very careful here, because, of course, I'm here only testifying about what the President has confirmed. And with respect to what the President has confirmed, I believe - I do not believe that these DOJ officials that you're identifying had concerns about this program.\"\nWe understand that it 1s possible to construct an argument thaL the accurate, it would still not account for key details that were omitted from\n'G:bnz'aerS's testimony that would be necessary for an accurate undetstanding of the situation, The Dep artment clearly had reservations and concerns about thefll\n|| of the program, or Specter the Pre\n.\n\nNorcover, Gonzales himself contrad construction by stating in a February 28, 2006, letter to Senat ance program was first authorized by\n=\n.\n\n| Gonzales knew that Comey, e Department had expressed \"reservations\" or Iprior to the President's decision tog\n.\n\noo\n:\nwas more significant than that Comey and others had the extent of the President's These concerns had been communicated to TrL\ns prior to.and in months.\n\ne House in several meetings over a period of March 2004, and the White House did not\n.\n\n|| part of the program in response to se coricerns. However, Gonzales's testimony suggested that such concerns and reservations on the part of Justice Department officials never existed. To the contrary, the Department's firm objections to this aspect of the program were instrumental in bringing abou\n|\ncollection in \"the program the President has confirmed.\"\nFoliowing his July 24, 2007, testimony, Gonzales acknowledged in an unclassified August 1, 2007, letter to Senator Leahy that his use of the term\n\"tetrorist surveillance program\" and his \"shorthand reference to the\n'program' publicly 'described by the President' may have created confusion,\"\nparticularly for those familiar with the full range of NSA activities authorized by the President. Gonzales wrote that he was determined to address any impression that his testimony was misleading.\n\nIn this letter, Gonzales attempted to describe what he had meant by the term \"terrorist surveillance program,\" stating that it covered one aspect of the NSA activities that the President had authorized.\n\nHis letter also acknowledged the dispute concerned the legal basis for certain NSA activities that were regularly avithorized in the same Presidential Authorization as the terrorist surveillance program.\n\nGonzales also acknowledged that Comey had refused to certify a Presidential Authorization \"because of concerns about the legal basis of certain of these NSA activities.\" Yet, this follow-up letter, while providing more context about the issues than his July 2007 statements, did not completely address the misimpressions created by his testimony.\n\n'Gonzales still suggested in his August 1 letter that the only dispute between\n. Lhe De' artment an 'the V 1LeHouse concerned aspects of the program Whlle we again acknowledge the difficulty of the situation Gonzales\n:\nfaced in testlfylng publicly about a highly classified and controversial program, we believe Gonzales could have done other things to provide clearer and more accurate testimony without divulging classified inforination. Sirnilarto the import of his August 1 letter, and without prov1d1ng operational details about these other activities, hie could have\nlarified that part of the dispute with the Department concerned the scope of what he called \"the terrorist surveillance program,\" while another part.of the dispute concerned other \"intelligence activities\" that were either related to the terrorist surveillance program or, mere accurately, a different aspect of the saine NSA program. Gonzales also could have explained that different activities under the program raised differerit concerns within the Department 'because each set of activities rested upon different legal theories. 447 {S//NF\nAlternatively, Gonzales could have declined to discuss any aspect of the dispute at an open hearing.#48\nOr, short of: seeking a closed sessiomn, Gonzales could have sought White House approval to brief the Chairs and Ranking Meinbers of the Senate and House Judiciary Commiittees about the program so that they would fully understand the nature of the NSA program anid the classified issties surrounding the dispute.\n\nInstead, Gonzales gave public testimony that was confusing and inaccurate, and had the effect of misleading those who were not read into the program, as well as some who were.\n\n(U)\nConcerning Gonzales's July 2007 testimony in particular, the questions 'Gonzales would be expected to answer were clearly foreseeable, especially in light of the disparities between his February 6, 2006, testimony and Comey's May 15, 2007, testimony.\n\nIn addition, Gonzales had been provided a letter by Senator Leahy referencing Comey's testimony and advising Gongzales to be prepared to discuss the legal authorization for the\n\"President's warrantless electronic surveillance program in March and April\n2004.\" Gonzales was therefore on notice that he would be expected to bring\n'clarity to the confusion that existed following Comey's testimony. Rather than clarify these matters, we believe Gonzales further confused the issues through his testimony..\n\n(U)\nFinally, we considered whether Gonzales's testimony constituted criminal false statements and concluded that his statements did not.\n\ncoristitute a criminal violation of 18 U.S.C.  1001.\n\nA person violates that statute by \"knowingly and willfully\" making a \"materially false, fictitious, or fraudulent statement or representation[.]\"\n18 U.S.C.  1001(a)(2). We do not believe the evidence showed that Gonzales intended to mislead Congress or willfully make a false statement. Moreover, we do not believe a prosecutor could prove beyond a reasonable doubt that there was no interpretation of his words that could be viewed as literally true, even if his testimony was confusing and created misperceptions.##?\n\n(U)\nIn surn, we believe that while the evidence did not show that Gonzales's statements constitute a criminal violation, or that he intended to mislead Congress, his testimony was confusing, not accurate, and had the effect.\n\nof misleading those who were not knowledgeable about the program.\n\nHis testimony also undermined his credibility on this important issue.\n\nAs the Attorney General, we believe Gonzales should have taken more care to erisure that his testimony was as accurate as possible without revealing classified information, particularly given the significance of this matter and the fact that aspects of the dispute had been made public previously.\n\n(U)\n(D.C. Cir. 1999)(reversing on other grounds).\n\n{U)\n\n## Chapter Nine Conclusions (U)\n\n'\nWithin weeks of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the National Security Agency (NSA) initiated a Top Secret, compartmented program to collect and analyze international and domestic telephone and e-mail communications and related data. The intent of the NSA program, which used the cover term Stellar Wind, was to function as an \"early warning system\" to detect and prevent future terrorist attacks within the United States. (TS//STLW//SHLOC/NF\nThe program was authorized by the President in a series of Presidential Authorizations that were issued at approximately 30 to 45 day intervals and certified as to form and legality by the Attorney General.\n\nThe Presidential Authorizations stated that an extraordinary emergency existed permitting the use of electronic surveillance within the United States for counterterrorism purposes, without a court order, under specified circumstances. Under the program the NSA collected vast amounts of information through electronic surveillance and other intelligence-gathering techniques, including information concerning the telephone and e-mail communications of American citizens and other U.S. persons. Top Secret compartmented information derived from this collection was provided to, among other agencies, the FBI, which sent Secret-level, non-compartmented versions of the information to FBI field offices as investigative leads.\n\nThe Stellar Wind program represented an extraordinary expansion of the NSA's signals intelligence activity and a departure from the traditional restrictions on electronic surveillance imposed under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA), Executive Order 12333, and other laws.\n\nYet, the program was conducted with limited notification to Congress and without judicial oversight, even as the program continued for years after the September 11 attacks. {FSHSTEW/SHAOES/\nN\nThe White House tightly controlled who within the Justice Department could be read into the Stellar Wind program.\n\nIn particular, we found that only three Department attorneys, including the Attorney General, were read into the program and only one attorney was assigned to assess the program's legality in its first year and a half of operation.\n\nThe limited number of Justice Department read-ins contrasted sharply with the hundreds of operational personnel who were read into the program at the FBI and other agencies involved with the program.\n\n## 1. Operation Of The Program (U//Foyq)\n\nUnder the program, the NSA initially 1ntcrcepted the content of international telephone and e-mail communications in cases where at least one of the communicants was reasonably believed to be associated with any international terronst group. These collections became known as basket 1\nof the Stellar Windn.\n\nJSA also collected bulk telephony and e-mail meta data -\ncommunications signaling information showing contacts between and among telephone numbers and e-mail addresses, but not the contents of those communications. These collections became known as basket 2\n\n(telephone meta data) and basket 3 (e~mail meta data) of the Stellar Wind program X\n:\nUnde: basket 2 collections.\n\n]\n-\n-\n#50 E-mail meta data included only the \"to,\" \"from,\"\n\"cc,\" \"bcc and other addressing-type information, but similar to call detafl 1.ecords did not include the subject line or the message contents. (FS/F+STPEWASHAOCNE)\nNSA analysts accessed baskets 2 and 3 for analytical purposes with specific telephone numbers or e-mail addresses that satisfied the standard for querying the data as described in the Presidential Authorizations.\n\nA\n\"tipped,\" to the F.\n\n-armall amount of the collected content and meta data was analyzed by the NSA, working with other members.of the Intelligence Community, to generate intelligence reports about suspected terrorists and individuals possibly associated with them. .Manyvof these reports were disseminated, or ther dissemination as leads to FBI field off:\nAs JE\n2\n|individual U.S. telephone number:\ne-mail addresses had been tipped to the FBI, the vast maj ority of which were dissemiinated to FBI field offices for investigation or other action.\n\nThe:\nresults of these investigations were uploaded into FBI databases.\n\nN\nThe Justice Department had two primary roles in the Stellar Wind program.\n\nFirst, the Attorney General was required to certify each Presidential Authorization as to form and legality - in effect, to give the Department's assurance that the activities the President was authorizing the NSA to conduct were legal. In carrying otit this responsibility, the Attorney General was advised by the Department's Office of Legal Counsel\n(OLC). As we described in this report and discuss in the next section, we foutid that during the early phase of the Stellar Wind program the Department lacked sufficient attorney resources to be applied to the legal review of the program and, due in significant part to the White House's extremely close hold over the program, was not able to coordinate its legatl review of the program with the NSA. {FS/HSTEW//ST/7OC/NF)\nThe Department's other primary role in Stellar Wind was as a member of the Initelligence Community. The FBI was one of two main customers of the intelligence produced under the program (the other being the CIA), Working with the NSA, a small team of FBI personnel converted the NSA's Top Secret Stellar Wind intelligence reports into leads that w disseminated at the Secret level, under an FBI program called\n|\nto FBI field offices for appropriate action.\n\nAs detailed in Chapt discussed below, we concluded that although the information produced under the Stellar Wind program had value in some counterterrorism investigations, it played a limited role in the FBI's overall counterterrorism efforts. (FS7/7/STEW//\nST/ O/\n1)\n\n## 1. Office Of Legal Counsel's Analysis Of The Stellar Wind Program 4Ts//Sl//Nf)\n\nAs described in Chapters Three, Four, and Five of this report, the Justice Department advised the Executive Branch, and in particular the President, as to the legality of the Stellar Wind program. The Department's view of the legal support for the activities conducted under the program changed over time as more attorneys were read into the program, These changes occurred in three phases.\n\nIn the first phase of the program\n(September 2001 through May 20083), the legality of the program was founded on an analysis developed by John Yoo, a Deputy Assistant Attorney General in OLC. In the second phase (May 2003 through May 2004), the:\nprogram's legal rationale underwent significant review and revision by OLC\nAssistant Attorney General Jack Goldsmith and Associate Deputy Attorney General Patrick Philbin. In the third and final phase (July 2004 through January 2007), based in part upon the legal concerns raised by the Department, the entire program was moved from presidential authority to statutory authority under FISA, with oversight by the FISA Court.\n\nIn Chapters Three and Four, we examined the Department's early role in assessing the legality of the Stellar Wind program.\n\nThe Justice Department's access to the program was controlled by the White House, and former White House Counsel and Attorney General Alberto Gonzales told the\n\"OIG that the President decided whether rion-operational personnel, including Department lawyers, could be read into the program. Department and FBI officials told us that obtaining approval to read in Department officials and FISA Court judges involved justifying the requests to Counsel to the Vice President David Addington and White House Counsel Gonzales, who effectively acted as gatekeepers to the read-in process for non-operational officials.\n\nIn contrast, according to the NSA, operational personnel at the NSA, CIA, and the FBI were read into the program on the authority of the NSA Director, who at some point delegated this authority to the Stellar Wind Program Manager. {FS/+5H-/NF)\nWe believe the White House's policy of limiting access to the program for non-operational personnel was applied at the Department of Justice in an unnecessarily restrictive manner prior to March 2004, and was detrimental to the Department's role in the operation of the program from its inception through that period. We also believe that Attorney General Asheroft, as head of the Department during this time, was responsible for seeking to ensure that the Department had adequate attorney resources to conduct a thorough and accurate review of the legality of the program.\n\nWe belicve that the circumstances as they existed as early as 2001 and 2002\ncalled for additional Department resources to be applied to the legal review of the program. As noted in Chapter Three, Ashcroft requested to have his Chief of Staff and Deputy Attorney General Larry Thompson read into the program, but the White House did not approve this request.\n\nHowever, because Ashcroft did not agree to be interviewed by the OIG for this investigation, we were unable to determine the full extent of his efforts to press the White House to read in additional Department officials between the program's inception in October 2001 and the critical events of March\n0004 FSSHF\nAlthough we could not determine exactly why Yoo remained the only Department attorney assigned to assess the program's legality from 2001\nuntil his departure in May 2003, we believe that this practice represented an extraordinary and inappropriate departure from OLC's traditional review and oversight procedures and resulted in significant harm to the Department's role in the program. ~ESHHSH-E\n1) the earliest phase of the program, Yoo advised Attorney General\n. Asheroft and the White House that the collection activities under Stellar Wind were a lawful exercise of the President's inherent authorities as Commander-in-Chief under Article II of the Constitution, subject only to the Fourth.Arnendment\"s reasonableness standard.\n\nIn reaching this conclusion, Yoo dismissed as constitutionally incompatible with the Presi'dcnt?s Article I1 authority the FISA statute's provision that FISA was: to be the \"exclusive means\" for conducting electronic surveillance in the United States for foreign intelligence purposes, and he concluded that these statutery provisions should be read to avoid conflicts with the President's constitutionial Commander-in-Chief authority. (ES/STEW/SHFOE/F)\nAs noted above, during the first year and a half of the Stellar Wind program only three Department attorneys were read into the program - Yoo, Attorney General Ashcroft, and James Baker, Counsel in the Office of Intelligence Policy and Review. Jay Bybee, the OLC Assistant Attorney General and Yoo's direct supervisor, was not read into the program and was unaware that Yoo was providing advice on the legal basis to support the program. Thus, Yoo was providing legal opinions on this unprecedented expansion of thie NSA's surveillance authority without review by his OLC\nsu;p_erx_iisor or any other Department attorney.\n\nRather, Yoo worked alone on this project, and produiced two major opinions supporting the legality of the program.\n\n:\nAiza When additional attorneys were read into the program in 2003, they provided a fresh review of Yoo's legal memoranda.\n\nPatrick Philbin, an Assoclate Deputy Attorney General, and later J ack Goldsmith, Bybee's replacement as the Assistant Attorney General for OLC, concluded that Yoo's analysis was seriously flawed, both factually and legally.\n\nGoldsmith Land Philb that the NSA was collecting]\ni\n:\n'\nlvsis fundamentally mischaracterized failing to address the fact and also failing to assess the legality of this activity as it was carried out by the NSA, Goldsmith and Philbin also pointed to Yoo's assertion that Congress had not sought to restrict presidential authority to conduct warrantless searches in the national security area, and criticized Yoo's omission from his analysis of a FISA provision (50 U.S.C.  1811) that addressed the President's authority to conduct electronic surveillance during wartime. They further noted that Yoo based his assessment.of the program's legality on an extremely ggressive view of the law that revolved around the Constitutional primacy of the President's Articlee II Commander-in-Chief powers, and he may have done so based on a faulty understanding of key elements of the program, As described in:-Chapter Four, Goldsmith and Philbin's reassessmeent of the legality of Stellar Wind began after Yoo left the Department in May\n2003, and culminated in a 108-page legal memorandum issued on May 6,\n2004. That memorandum superseded Yoo's earlier Stellar Wind opinions and premised the legality of the program's electronic surveillance activities on statutory rather than Article II constitutional grounds.*>1\nAs a consequence of this new legal rauonale Department officials concluded that the Pres1dent's authority to condu ct illance of the enemyin We agree with many of the criticisms offered by Department officials regarding the practice of allowing a single Department attorney to develop the legal justification for such a complex and contentious program without critical review both within the Department and by the NSA. These officials told us that errors in Yoo's legal memoranda may have been identified and corrected if the NSA had been allowed to review his work.\n\nThey also stressed the importance of adhering to OLC''s traditional practice of peer yeview of all OLC memoranda and the need for the OLC Assistant Attorney General, as a Senate-confirmed official, to review and approve all such opinions. {FS/SH/NFY\nThese officials also stated that such review and oversight measures are especially important with regard to legal opinions on classified matters that are not subjected to outside scrutiny. We agree with these officials'\ncomments and note that because programs like Stellar Wind are not subject to the usual external checks and balances on Executive authority, OLC's advisory role is particularly critical to the Executive's understanding of potential statutory and Constitutional constraints on its actions.\n\n{ES/1SHME)\nWe did not agree with Gonzales's view that it was necessary for national security reasons to: limiit the number of Departmerit read-ins to those \"who were absolutely essential,\" as distinguished from the numerous operational read-irs who were necessary to the technical implementation of the program.\n\nFirst, the program was as legally challenging as it was technically complex. Just as a sufficient number of operational personel were read into the program to assure its proper technical implementation, we believe that-as many attorneys as necessary should have been read in to assure the soundness of the prograrn's-legal foundation.\n\nThis was not done during at least the first 20 months of the program. FS/SH-{NE}-\nSecond, we do not believe that reading in a few additional Department attorneys during the initial phase of ould have jeopardized national security, especially given the perational personmnel who were cleared into the program during the same period.#52\nIn fact, the highly classified nature of the program, rather than constituting an argument for limiting the OLC read-ins to a single attorney, made the need for careful analysis and review within the Department and by the NSA more We also found that the expansion of legal thinking and breadth of expertise from readingin additional Department attorneys over time eventually produced more factually accurate and legally comprehensive andlyses concerning the program. Increased attorney read-ins also was an important factor in grounding the program on firmer legal footing under FISA. The transition of the program from presidential authority to statutory authority under FISA with judicial oversight was made possible through the collective work of the attorneys who finally were read into the program beginningin 2004. The applications to the FISA Court to effectuate this transition were produced by Department attorneys, working with both legal and technical personnel at the NSA, further reinforcing our view that such coordinated efforts are more likely to produce well-considered legal strategies and analysis. {FS/SH/NE}-\nIn addition, as discussed in Chapters Six and Seven, the increase in the number of attorneys read into the program beginning in 2004 helped the Department to more efficiently gcrub\" Stellar Wind-derived information in FISA applications and improve the handling of Stellar Wind-related discovery issues in international terrorism prosecutions.\n\nPhilbin,\nand Goldsmith had be\n\n## Il Hospital Visit And White House Recertification Of The Program )\n\nIn Chapter Four, we describe how the Department's reassessment of Yoo''s legal @nalysis led Deputy Attorney General James Comey, who was exercising the powers of the Attorney General while Ashcroft was hospitalized in March 2004, to conclude that he could not certify the legality of the Stellar Wind program. In response, the President sent Gonzales and Chief of Staff Andrew Card to visit Ashcroft in the hospital to seek his certification of the program, an dction Ashcroft refused to take. We believe that the way the White Houise handled its dispute with the Department about the program - particularly in dispatching Gonzales and Card to Ashcroft's hospital room in an attempt to override Comey's decision - was troubling, {FS77St/7NF)\n;\nAs detailed in Chapter Four, by March 2004 when the Presidential Authorization in effect at that time was set to. expire, Goldsmith had already notified the White House several months earlier about the Department's doubts concerning the legality of aspects of the Stellar Wind p am.\n\nHe\n-\n'\nWh'e-n,Attorney- General Ashcroft was hospitalized and unable to fulfill his duties; Deputy Attorney General Comey assumed the Attorney General's responsibilities. Before the Presidential Authorization was set to expire on March 11, 2004, Comey made clear to senior White House officials, including Vice President Cheney and White House Counsel Gonzales, that the Justice Department could not certify the program as legal. The White House disagreed with the Justice Department's position, and on March 10,\n2004, convened a meeting of eight congressional leaders to brief them on the Justice Department's decision not to recertify the program and on the need to continue the program. The White House did not ask Comey or anyorie from the Department to participate in this briefing, nor did it notify any Department officials that the briefing had been convened.\n\nFollowing this congressional briefing, at the direction of President Bush, Gonzales and White House Chief of Staff Andrew Card went to the hospital to seek Attorney General Ashcroft's certification of the.\n\nAuthorization.\n\nAgain, the White House did not notify any Department officials, including Comey, the ranking Department official at the time, that it planned to take this action.\n\nGonzales''s and Card's attempt to persuade Attorney General Ashcroft, who was in the intensive care unit recovering from surgery and according to witnesses appeared heavily medicated, to certify the program over Comey's opposition was unsuccessful.\n\nAshecroft\n't_old.Gonzales and Card from his hospital bed that he supported the Department's revised legal position, but that in .any event he was not the Attorney General at the time ~ Comey was. 53 P57/ SH/7NF)\nOn March 11, the following day, Gongzales (_:ertified the Presidential Authorization as to form and legality. {TS/ASH-ANE)-\n'We agree with Director Mueller's observation that the White House's failure to have Justice Department representation at the congressional briefing and the atterpt to persuade Ashcroft to recertify the Authorization without going through Comey \"gave the strong perception that the [White House] was trying to do an end run around the Acting [Attorney General]\nwhoni they knew to have serious concerns as to the legality of portions of the program.\"\n-\nAfter Mueller, Comey, and other senior Department and FBIL officials made known their intent to resign, the President directed that the issue be resolved, and the program was modified to address the Department's legal concerns. Because we were unable to interview key White House officials, we could not determine for certain what caused the White House to change its position and modify the program, although we believe the prospect of mass resignations at the Department and the FBI was a significant factor in this decision.{157;\n\\\nWe reached several conclusions based on our review of the Department's role in the legal analysis of this program and the everits surrounding the dispute between the Department and the White House.\n\nFirst, legal opinions supporting complex national security programs -\nespecially classified programs that press the bounds of established law -\nshould be collaborative products supported by sufficient legal and technical expertise and resources at the Department, working in concert with other participating agencies, with the goal of providing the Exccutive Branch the most informed and accurate legal advice.\n\nBy limiting access to this program as it did, the White House undermined the Department's ability to perform its critical legal function. FS/SH-HNE\nGeneral Ashcroft if in fact he wasn't fully competent to malke that decision.\" Gonzales also testified, \"There's no governing legal principle that says that Mr. Ashcroft\n[.\n\n.\n\n.]\nIfhe decided he felt better, could decide, I'm feeling better and\n1 can make this decision, and I'm going to make this decision.\"TM\n(U]}\nSecond, we believe that if the OLC's traditional peer review and supervisory procedures had been adhered to at the outset, the prospect that aspects of the program w ould have rested on a queshonable legal foundatlon for over 2 years would have been greatly mitigated.\n\nThird, we believe that the Department and FBI officials who resisted the pressure to recertify the Stellar Wind program because of their belief that aspects of the program were not legally supportable acted courageously and at significant professional risk. We believe that this action by Department and FBI officials - particularly Asheroft, Comey, Mueller, Goldsmith, Philbin, and Counsel for Intelligence Policy James Baker - was in accord with the highest professional standards of the Justice Department. (PS/FSLAANE)\nWe recommend that when the Department of Justice is involved with such programs in the future, the Attorney General should carefully assess whether the Department has been given adequate resources to carry out its vital funiction as legal advisor to the President and should aggressively seek additional resources if they are found to be insufficient. We also believe that the White House should allow the Departinent a sufficient number of read-ins when requested, consistent with national security considerations, to enstre that such sensitive programs receive a full and careful legal review.\n\n(U)\n\n## 1V. Tn'Ans1T10N Of Ngram To Fisa Authority\n\nWe also examined the transition of the Stellar Wind program's collection activities from presidential authority to FISA authority. We believe there were strong considerations that favored attempting to transition the program to FISA sooner than actually happened, especially as the program became less a temporary response to the September 11 attacks and more a permanent surveillance tool. 1FS77/STEW/\nST/ 7OCTNF)\nChief among these considerations was the Stellar Wind program's substantial effect on privacy interests of U.S. persons. Under Stellar Wind, the government engaged in an unprecedented collection of information concerning U.S. persons.\n\nThe President authorized the NSA to intercept, without judicial approval or oversight, the content of international communications involving many U.S. persons and the NSA collected massive amounts of non-content data about U.S. persons' domestic and international telephone calls and e-mail communications. We believe that such broad surveillance and collection activities, particularly for a significant period of time, should be conducted pursuant to statute and judicial oversight. We also believe that placing these activities under Court supervision provides an important measure of accountability for the\n~ government's conduct that is less assured where the activities are both authorized and supervised by the Executive Branch alone.\n\nThe instability of the legal reasoning on which the program rested for\n\" several years and the substantial restrictions placed on FBI agents' access to-and use of program-derived information due to Stellar Wind's highly classified status were additional reasons for transitioning Stellar Wind's collection activities to FISA authority. We acknowledge that the transition would always have been an enormously cornplex and time-consuming effort that rested upon novel interpretations and uses of FISA that not all FISA\nCourt: judges would authorize.\n\nNevertheless, the events described in this report-demonstrate that a full transition to FISA authority was achievable and, in our judgment, should have been pursued earlier.\n\nNF)\n\n## V. Impact Of Stellar Wind Information On Fbi Counterterrorism Efforts (S/Ne)\n\nAs a user of Stellar Wind,_program.informa.tion, the FBI disseminated leads or \"tippers\" to FBI field offices. These tippers primarily consisted of specific domestic telephone numbers and e-mail addresses that NSA\nb1, analysts had determined through meta data analysis were connected to b3, individuals involved with al Qaeda or affiliated groups. The tippers also b7E\nincluded content of communications intercepted by the NSA based upon its determination that there was probable cause to believe that a party to the communication was al Qaeda or-an affiliated group.\n\nF\nQctober 2001\nthrough February 2006, the NSA provided the FB]\n'\ntippers, the vast majority of which were domestic telephone numbers.\n\nThe FBI's chief objective during the earliest months of Stellar Wind's operation was to expeditiously disseminate program information to FBI field offices for investigation, while protecting the NSA as the source of the information and the methods used to collect the information. The FBI\nb1, assigned this task to a small group of personnel from the Telephone b3, Analysis Unit (TAU) at FBI Headquarters.\n\nThis group developed a b7E\nstraightforward process to receive the Top Secret, compartmented Stellar Wind reports from the NSA, reproduce the information in a rion-compartmented, Secret-level format, and disseminate the information in Electronic Communications, or ECs, to the appropriate field offices for investigation. These}\nECs placed restrictions on how the information could be use field offices that the information was \"for lead purposes only\" and could not be used for any legal or judicial purpose. {FSFHETEW;\n:\nThe FBI's participation in Stellar Wind evolved over time as the program became less a temporary response to the September 11 attacks and more a permanent surveillance capability.\n\nAs Stellar Wind continued to be reauthorized, the FBI tried to improve the effectiveness of its participation in the program. Most significantly, in February 2003 a team of FBI personriel (Team 10) was assigned to work full-time-at the NSA to manage the FBI's participation in the program. {FS//+SH-/MNE)\nTeam 10's chief responsibility was to disseminate Stellar Wind information to FBI field offices. However, over time Team 10 began to participate in Stellar Wind in other ways.\n\nFor example, Team 10 submitted telephione numbers and e-mail addresses to the NSA for possible querying against the bulk meta data collected under the program, and Team 10\nregularly contributed to the NSA's drafting process for Stellar Wind reports.\n\nOverall, we found that the decision to assign Team 10 to the NSA improved the FBI's knowledge about Stellar Wind operations and gave the NSA better insight about how FBI field offices investigated Stellar Wind information.\n\nThese benefits translated to improvements i Stellar Wind report drafting process, and by extension, in\n| leads.\n\n)\nOne of the other changes the FBI implemented to attempt to improve the process for handling Stellar Wind leads was to make the FBIl's Headquarters-based Communications Analysis Unit (CAU), instead of the field offices, responsible for issuing National Security Letters (NSL) to obtain subscriber information on tipped telephone numbers and e-mail addresses.\n\nThis measure, initiated in July 2003, was intended to address agent concerns that the leads, which reproduced the information in a rion-compartmented, Secret-level format, did not provide sulfficient information to initiate national security investigations, a prerequisite under Justice Department investigative guidelines to issuing NSLs. Agents complained that the ECs suffered from vagueness about the source of the information being provided and lacked factual details about the individuals allegedly involved with al Qaeda and with whom the domestic numbers being disseminated possibly were in contact. FSAFSTEWSHAOENE\nW\nfrom thef\n'\nSeptembe\n2\n&l\n:\nrelated communications bl, b3, b7E\nbetween FBI Headquarters and field oiiices.\n\nLssuing NSLs from a control file instead of an investigative file was contrary to internal FBI policy.\n\nIn mber 2006, the FBI finally opened an investigative file for th project. We believe the CAU and OGC officials involved in the decision good fai_th- that to.issue NSLs from the control file concluded in the FBI had sufficient predication either to conmnect thef\n7\nI NSLs ith existing preliminary or full investigations of al Qaeda and affiliated sroups or to open new preliminary or full investigations in compliance with Justice Department investigative guidelines.\n\nHowever, we concluded that the FBI could have, and should have, opened an investigative file fo when the decision was to have FBI Headquarters instead of fices issue NSLs for leads. [TS77STEW//SHEESEH\nWe also tried to assess the general role of Stellar Wind information in FBI investigations and its value to the FBI's overall counterterrorism efforts:\nSimilar to the FBI, we had difficulty assessing the specific value of the prdgrar'n to the FBI's counterterrorism activities. ~{S//N)\nThe majority of Stellar Wind information the NSA provided the FBI\n':r'e,'l,'a'tedj to domestic telephone numbers and e-mail addresses the NSA had isingly, FBI agents and analysts with expe estigating cads told us that most leads were determined not to have any connection to terrorism.\n\nThese ts and analysts did not identify for us atiy specific cases where:\neads helped the FBI identify previously unknown subjects involved in terrorism, although we recognize that FBI\n'\nofficials -and agents other than those we interviewed may have had different experiences with Stellar Wind information. S 3TEW /7SI 7TOCTNE)\nTwo FBI statistical studies that attempted to assess the value of Stellar Wind meta data leads to FBI counterterrorism efforts did not reach explicit conclusions on the program's usefulness. The first study found that\n1.2 percent of Stellar Wind leads made \"significant\" contributions.*3* The second study did not identify any examples of \"significant\" Stellar Wind contributions to FBI counterterrorism efforts.*35 The FBI OGC told us that\n455 As described earlier in this chapter, the FBI considered a tipper \"significant\" if it led to any of three investigative results:\nthe identification of a terrorist, the deportation from the United States of a suspected terrorist, or the development of an asset that can report about the activities of terrorists. P37\nstatements by senijor FBI officials in congressional testimony that the Stellar Wind program had value were based in part on the results of the first study, which found that 1.2 percent of the Stellar Wind leads made significant contributions to- FBI cases {FSHSPEWT\n/ST\nOCTNF)\nts we interviewed generally were supportive of Stellar Wind\n(or b1, b3, b7E\nO1\n)5 calling the information \"one tool of many\" in the FBI's anti-terrorism efforts that \"could help move cases forward\" by, for example, confirining a subject's contacts with individuals involved in terrorism or identifying additional terrorist contacts. However, FBI agents and analysts also told us that the Stellar Wind information disseminated to FBI field offices could also be frustrating because it often lacked details about the foreign individuals allegedly involved in terrorism with whom domestic telephone numb\n:\n1 addresses were in contact.\n\nSome agents also believed thatthel\n=\n1\n{project failed to adequately prioritize leads sent to FBI field offices.\n\n{IS//STL\n:\nAN\nFBI Director Mueller told us that he believes the Stellar Wind program was useful and that the FBI must follow every lead it receives in order to prevent future terrorist attacks.\n\nHe stated that to the extent such information can be gathered and used legally it must be exploited, and that he \"woiild not dismiss the potency of a program based on the percentage of hits.\" Other witnesses shared this view that an intelligence program's value cannot be assessed by statistical measures alone. General Hayden said that the value of the program may li in its ability to help the Intelligence Community determine that the terrorist threat embedded within the country is not as great as once feared. Some witnesses also believed that the value of the program should net depend on documented \"success stories,\" but rather on maintaining an intelligence capability to detect potential terrorist activity in the future. Several witnesses suggested that the program provides an \"early warning system\" to allow the Intelligence Community to detect potential terrorist attacks, even if the system has not specifically uncovered evidence of preparations for such an attack.\n\n(PSFSEEH\nL OSF)\nAs part of our analysis, we sought to look beyond these comments of general support for Stellar Wind to specific, concrete examples of the program's contributions that illustrated the role Stellar Wind information either has or could play in the FBI's counterterrorism efforts. We examined five cases frequently cited in documents we reviewed and during our interviews as examples of Stellar Wind's positive contributions to the FBI's counterterrorism efforts.\n\nThe evidence indicated that Stellar Wind information had value in some of these investigations by causing the FBI o take action that led to useful investigative results.\n\nIn other cases the connection between the Stellar Wind information and the FBI's investigative actions was more difficult to discern. ~FSAHSTEW//SHLOC/NE)\nIn the end, we found it difficult to assess or quantify the overall effectiveness of the Stellar Wind program to the FBI's counterterrorism activities. However, based on the interviews condiicted and documents reviewed, we concluded that although Stellar Wind information had value in some counterterrorism investigations, it generally played a limited role in the FBI's overall counterterrorism efforts. (77}\nIt is'also important to note that a significant consequence of the NSA\nprogram and the FBI's approach to assigning leads for program information was that FBI field offices conducted many threat assessments on individuals located in the United States, including U.S. persons, that typically were determined not to have any nexus to terrorism or represent a threat tonational security. As a result, the FBI collected and. retained\n-a significant amount of personal information about the users of tipped telephone numbers and e-mail addresses, such as names and home addresses, places of employment, foreign travel, and the identity of family members. The results of these threat assessments and the information collected generally were reported in communications to FBI Headquarters and uploaded into FBI databases.{FS//STEW\n'\nTRI's collection of information in this disseminates to FBI field offices lead information the NSA derives from bulk jony:\n-mail meta data now collected under FISA authority. Like b1\n.\n\n|\nproject requires FBI field offices to conduct threat b3'\nassessments on telephone numbers and e-mail addresses identified through b7i\nthe NSA's analytical process that the FBI is not already aware of, including telephone numbers and e-mail addresses one or two steps removed from direct contacts with individuals involved in terrorism.\n\nTo the extent the leads derived from the FISA-authorized activities generate results similar to those under Stellar Wind, the FBI threat assessments will continue to result in the collection and retention of a significant amount of personal information about individuals in the United States, including U.S. persomns, who do not have a nexus to terrorism or represent a threat to national security.\n\nWe recommend that, as part of the project, the Justice Department's National Security Division (NSD), working with the FBI, should collect information about the quantity of telephone numbers and e-mail addresses disseminated to FBI field offices that are assigned as bl, Action leads and that require offices to conduct threat assessments. The b3, information compiled by the Justice Department should include whether b7E\nindividuals identified in threat assessments are U.S. or non-U.S. persons and whether the threat assessments led to the opening of preliminary or full national security investigations.\n\nWith respect to threat assessments that conclude that users of tipped telephone numbers or e-mail addresses are not involved in terrorism and are not threats to national security, the Justice Depelrltment.shbul'd take steps to track the ,quantitya'n_d nature of tth,S., person information collected and how the FBI retains and utilizes this information. This will enable the Justice Department and entities with oversight responsibilities;, including the OIG and congressional committees, to assess the impact this intelligence program has on the privacy interests of U.S. persons and to consider whether, and for how long, such information should be retained. TTS77SH/NH\nWe also recommend that, consistent with NSD's current oversight activities and as part of its periodic reviews of national security\n'\ninvestigations at FBI Headquarters and field offices, NSD- shouild review a b1, b3, representative samplit lleads to those offices.\n\nFor each lead b7E\nexamined, NSD should assess FBl compliance with applicable legal requirements in the use of the lead and in any ensuing investigations, particularly with the requirements governing the collection and use of U.S.\n\nperson information. AFS{+SH/7NF)\n\n## Yi. Discovery And \"Scrubbing\" Issues {(Ts//Sh/Nf)\n\nAlthough Stellar Wind was conceived and implemented as an intelligence-gathering program, it was inevitable that the information from this program would intersect with the Department's prosecutorial funetions, both iri criminal cases brought in federal courts and in seeking FISA orders from the FISA Court. We found that the limited number of Department read-ins also had adverse conseguences on issues related to these Department functions. (FS/+5FEWSHFOEF)\nOne such issue concerned the Department's compliance with discovery obligations in international terrorism prosecutions, which we discuss in Chapter Seven. We determined that the Department was aware as early as that information collected under Stellar Wind could have:\n bl, b3\nimplications for the Department's litigation responsibilities under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 16 and Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963),\n(T\nLTI ML L LRT\nL\nL OCLNEY\nO\nR\nT T TN\nbl, b3, be, b7C, b7E\nNo Justice Department attorneys with terrorism prosecution responsibflifieswere read into the Stellar Wind program until mid-2004, and as a result the Department continued to lack the advice of attorneys who were best equipped to identify and examine the discovery issues in connection with the program.\n\nSince that time the Department has taken steps to respond, on a case-b discovery motions\n\n( (\nTk\n\\ r\"sponses inVoh}e the use of the Classified Information Procequres Act, 18 U.S.C. App. 3, to file ex parte in camera pleadings with However; the Department of Justice continues to lack a compreherisive process for identifying potentially discoverable Stellar Wind information in terrorism cases.\n\nIn this regard, we recommend that the Department assess its discovery obligations regarding Stellar Wind-derived information in international terrorism prosecutions. We also recommend that the Department carefully consider whether it must re-examine past cases to see whether potentially discoverable but undisclosed Rule 16 or Brady material was collected by the NSA under the program, and take appropriate steps to ensure that it has complied with its discovery obligations in such cases. We also recornmend that the Department, in coordination with the NSA, implement a procedure to identify Stellar Wind-derived information that may be associated with international terrorism cases currently pending or likely to be brought in the future and evaluate whether such information should be disclosed in light of the government's discovery obligations under Rule 16 and Brady.\n\nIn addition, we examined the issue of the Department's use of Stellar Wind-derived information in FISA applications. We believe it was foreseeable that some Stellar Wind-derived information would be contained in the FISA applications filed by the Department's Office of Intelligence Policy and Review (OIPR). OIPR Counsel Baker believed, and we agree, that it' would have been detrimental to this relationship if the Court learned that information from Stellar Wind was included in FISA applications without the Court being told so in advance. As discussed in Chapter Three, White House officials initially rejected the idea of reading in members of the FISA\nCourt, but after Department officials continued to press the issue,\n'\nultimately in January 2003 agreed to read in a single judge in January 2002\n(Presiding Judge Lamberth, followed by Presiding Judge Kollar-Kotelly in May 2002). 1ESHSTEW-SHHOSANE -\nThe \"scrubbing\" procedures imposed by the Court and implemented by Baker to account for Stellar Wind-derived information in international terrorism FISA applications created concerns among some OIPR attorneys about the unexplained changes being made to their FISA applications.\n\nThese scrubbing procedures also substantially altered the assignment of cases to FISA Court judges for nearly 3 years.\n\nWe concluded that once Stellar Wind began to affect the functioning of the FISA process shortly after the prograim's inception, the number of OIPR staff and FISA Court judges read into Stellar Wind should have increased.\n\nInstead, read-ins were limited to a sirigle OIPR official for over two years and to-the Presiding Judge of the FISA Court for a period of four years. {FS/STENAFSHAOCNF)\nThe Justice Department, together with the FBI and the NSA, today continues to apply scrubbing procedures to international terrorism FISA\napplications.\n\nSince January 2006, all members of the Court have been briefed on the Stellar Wind program and all of the judges handle applications that involve Stellar Wind-derived information in FISA\napplications. While we found that the government has expended considerable resources to comply with the scrubbing procedures required by the FISA Court since February 2002, we did not find any instances of the government being unable to obtain FISA surveillance coverage on a target because of this requirement. (IS//STIW//ST//QC/NE\n\n## Vii. Gomzales's Statements (U)\n\nAs part of this review, the OIG examined whether Attorney General Gonzales made false or misleading statements to Congress related to the\n'Stellar Wind program. We concluded that Gonzales's testimony did not constitute a false,<statement and that he did not intend to mislead Congress.\n\nHowever, we concluded that his testimony in several respects was\n; -\"(;anUjsinfg~, not aceurate, and had the effect of 'misleading those who were not knowledgeable about the program. {S77NF]\nAspects of the Stellar Wind program were first disclosed publicly in 4\n'series of articles in The New York Times in December 2005.\n\nIn response, the President publicly confirmed a portion of the program - which he called the terrorist surveillance program - describing it as the interception of the content of international communications of people reasonably believed to:\nhave links to al Qaeda and related organizations (basket 1). Subsequently, Attorney General Gonzales was questionied about NSA surveillance activities in two hearings before the Senate Judiciary Committee in February 2006\nand July 2007.\n\n(TS\nEWE\n.\n\n'Through media accounts and former Deputy Attorney General Comey's Senate Judiciary Committee testimony in May 2007, it was publicly revealed that the Department and the White House had a major disagreement related to the program in March 2004. As discussed in Chapter Four, this dispute - which resulted in the visit to Attorney General Ashcroft's hospital room by Gonzales and Card and brought several senior and FB\nink of resi the White In his testimony before the Senate Judiciary Committee, Gonzales stated that the dispute at issue between the Department and the White House did not relate to the \"Terrorist Surveillance Program\" that the President had confirmed, but rather pertained to other intelligence activities. We believe this testimony created the misimpression that the dispute concerned activities entirely unrelated to the terrorist surveillance program, which was not accurate. In addition, we believe Gonzales's testimony that Department attorneys did not have \"reservations\" or\n\"concerns\" about the program the \"President has confirmed\" was incomplete and confusing because Gonzales did no\n:\nor the fact that the Deparment's concerns were what led t\n\n| 2nd that these concerns had been conveyed to the White House over a period of months prior to and including March 2004 when the issue was resolved. {S/NF)\nWe recognize that Attorney General Gonzales was in the difficult position of testifying about a highly classified program in an open forum.\n\nHowever, we also believe that Gonzales, as a participant in the March 2004\ndispute between the White House and the Justice Department and, more importantly, as the nation's chief law enforcement officer, had a duty to balance his obligation not to disclose classified information with the need not to be misleading in his testimony about the events that nearly led to mass resignations of the most senior officials at the Justice Department and the FBI. Although we helieve that Gonzales did not intend to mislead Congress, we believe his testimony was confusing, inacecurate, and had the\n-effect of misleading those who were not knowledgeable about the program.\n\n## Viil. Conclusion (U)\n\nFrom the inception of the Stellar Wind program in October 2001, vast amounts of information abeut telephone and e-mail communications were gollected and stored in databases at the NSA. The NSA used this information to conduct analysis and disseminate reports to support the governinent's counterterrorism efforts. We found that in the early years of the Stellar Wind program, the Department of Justice lacked the necessary\n.legal resources to carry out an adequate review of the legality of the program. The White House strictly controlled the Department's access to the program.\n\nFor the first year and a half of the program only 3 Department officials were read into Stellar Wind, and only 3 more officials had been read in by the end of 2003. Only a single Department attorney analyzed the legal basis for the program during its first year and a half of its operation.\n\nBegmmng in mid-2003, after additional Department officials were read into the program, the Department determined that thls attorney s initial legal analysis was legally and factually flawed.\n\n-\n-\nWe believe that the strict controls over the Departmerit's access to the program undermined the role of the Justice Department in advising the President as to the legality of the program during its early phase of operation, The Depal tment's comprehenswe reassessment of the program's\n. legality beginning in mid-2003 resulted in a contentious dispute with the White House that nearly led to the mass resignation of the Department's senior leadership.\n\nIn March 2004 the White House continued the program despite the Department's conclusion that it found no legal support for aspects of the program.\n\nIn the face of the potential resignations, hewever, the White Housel in accord with the Department's legal concerns.\n\nEventually, the entire program was transitioned, in stages, to the authority.of the FISA statute.\n\nTS/ STEW/ 7S/ 0S\nGiven the broad nature of the collection activities under the Stellar Wind program, the substantial amount of information the program collected related to U.S. persons, and the novel legal theories advanced to support the program, we believe that the Department should have more carefully and thoroughly reviewed the legality of the program, in accord with its normal\n\n- peer review and over sight practices, particularly during its first year and a\nhalf of operation. {ES/STEW/SHAOC/NE)\nWe also concluded that the Department should have begun efforts to transition the Stellar Wind program to FISA authority earlier than March\n2004, when that process began, especially as Stellar Wind became less a temporary response to the September 11 attacks and more a permanent surveillance tool. We believe that such broad surveillance and collection activities conducted in the United States that impact U.S. persons, particularly when they extend for such a significant period of time, should be conducted pursuant to statute and be subjected to judicial oversight.\n\nPlacing such activities under Court supervision, as now occurs, also provides an important measure of accountability for the government's conduct that is:less assured when the activities are authorized and supervised by the Executive Branch alone. (TS77/STLW/7/SI//OCTNE)\n~\nFinally, we believe that the Department should carefully monitor the collection, use, and retention of the information that is now collected uinder FISA authorlty, given the expanswe scope of the collection activities. The Department and other agencies should also continue to examine the value of collecting such information to the government's ongoing counterterrorism efforts. {T877SI/7NF)"
    },
    {
        "text": "Office of the Director of National Intelligence Washington, DC 20511\nMr. Steven Aftergood SEP f 9 2014\nFederation of American Scientists\n1725 DeSales Street, NW, Suite 600\nWashington, DC 20036\nReference: FOIA Request DF-2010-00031\nDear Mr. Aftergood:\nThis is in response to your 23 December 2009 email to the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) (Enclosure 1), in which you requested, under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), copies of two ODNI SHARP (Summer Hard Problem Program) reports from July 2009.\n\nYour request was processed in accordance with the FOIA, 5 U.S.C.  552, as amended. A\nthorough search of our records and databases located documents responsive to your request.\n\nODNI reviewed one of the documents (Enclosure 2) and determined that material must be withheld pursuant to the following FOIA exemptions:\n\n-\n(b)(l), which protects properly classified information under Executive Order 13526,\nSection 1.4(c);\n-\n(b )(3), which applies to information specifically exempt by statutes, specifically 50\nU.S.C.  3024(i), which protects intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized\ndisclosure; and\n-\n(b)(5), which protects privileged interagency or Intra-Agency information.\nIf you wish to appeal ODNI' s determination on this request, please explain the basis of your appeal and forward to the address below within 45 days of the date of this letter.\n\nOffice of the Director of National Intelligence Information Management Office Washington D.C. 20511\nThe Department of Energy (DoE) also conducted a review on the material and determined that the document contained Restricted Data (RD), which has been redacted under Title 5, U.S.C. 552(b)(3) as containing information about weapon design. Enclosure 3 defines the justification for withholding this information, as well as instructions for submitting an appeal of the DOE determination.\n\nPlease be advised that one document originated with another agency. Because we are unable to make determinations as to the releasability of other agencies' information, the document has been referred to the appropriate agency for review and direct response to you.\n\nIf you have any questions regarding the denial of ODNI information, email our Requester Service Center at DNI-FOIA@dni.gov or call us at (703) 874-8500.\n\nSincerely,\n~~~~\n-kv f~trifer Hudson\n{)\nif:)i;ector, Information Management Division\n\n## Enclosures\n\n# Sharp.2009\n\nTransforming Nuclear Attril:w.t'f~;J\nCulture, Community, ;.3nd;;t~:paljge\n\n## Sec~;\n\n| (U)                                                                                                                                      | EXECUTIVE                                                                                                                                | SUMMARY                                                                                      | 5                                                                                         |\n|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|\n| (U)                                                                                                                                      |                                                                                                                                          |                                                                                              |                                                                                           |\n| EXECUTIVE                                                                                                                                | SUMMARY                                                                                                                                  | _,                                                                                           | - 5                                                                                       |\n| (U)                                                                                                                                      | KEY                                                                                                                                      | FINDINGS cceecrereireerarssnsnssansmssnrassasrsnsessnesssstasasassan                 | ssssrsessnsnnssassssessnssesssassesnsrsnsessssnast                                |\n| (U)                                                                                                        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                                                               | coveeeerrencememscscnscrnersserans                                                        |\n| (U)                                                                                                                                      |                                                                                                                                          |                                                                                              |                                                                                           |\n| COMMUNICATION CONCEPTS ....... - .... ..... - ........                                           |                                                                                                                                          |                                                                                              |                                                                                           |\n| ~~:~::~15                                                                                                                        |                                                                                                                                          |                                                                                              |                                                                                           |\n| (U)                                                                                                                                      |                                                                                                                                          |                                                                                              |                                                                                           |\n| COMMUNICATING A TIRIBUTION ASSESSMENTS . . .                                                                                      |                                                                                                                                          |                                                                                              |                                                                                           |\n| ~~~l~li~:~1~!~!i!                                                                                            |                                                                                                                                          |                                                                                              |                                                                                           |\n|                                                                                                                                          |                                                                                                                                          |                                                                                              |                                                                                           |\n| I                                                                                                                                        |                                                                                                                                          |                                                                                              |                                                                                           |\n| 5                                                                                                                                        |                                                                                                                                          |                                                                                              |                                                                                           |\n| (U)                                                                                                                                      | COMMUNICATING                                                                                                                            | ATTRIBUTION                                                                                  | ASSESSMENTS                                                                               |\n| (l!fr))rm.Lna1.1ch.m.msf..um...\"..n _.mI                                                                                                 |                                                                                                                                          |                                                                                              |                                                                                           |\n| (                                                                                                                                        | 1                                                                                                                                        |                                                                                              |                                                                                           |\n| o)                                                                                                                                       | ;                                                                                                                                        | S                                                                                            |                                                                                           |\n| ~\"'B!JC-                                                                                                                                 | r::::::::;::::::::~~::::~:::::~;i::;1f~::::::::                                                                 |                                                                                              |                                                                                           |\n| i!                                                                                                                                       |                                                                                                                                          |                                                                                              |                                                                                           |\n|                                                                                                                                         | .                                                                                                                                       |                                                                                              |                                                                                           |\n| ~                                                                                                                                        |                                                                                                                                          |                                                                                              |                                                                                           |\n| ..                                                                                                                                       |                                                                                                                                          |                                                                                              |                                                                                           |\n| ~l::;li~-J.                                                                                                                              | ~;r                                                                                                                                     |                                                                                              |                                                                                           |\n| (U)                                                                                                                                      |                                                                                                                                          |                                                                                              |                                                                                           |\n| EXPRESSING UNCERTAINTIES IN                                                                                                              | CRISES                                                                                                                                   | -                                                                                            |                                                                                           |\n| !i:r.~                                                                                                                                   |                                                                                                                                          |                                                                                              |                                                                                           |\n|                                                                                                                                          |                                                                                                                                          |                                                                                              |                                                                                           |\n| ~~i~t:L                                                                                                                                  |                                                                                                                                          |                                                                                              |                                                                                           |\n|                                                                                                                                          |                                                                                                                                          |                                                                                              |                                                                                           |\n| 19                                                                                                                                       |                                                                                                                                          |                                                                                              |                                                                                           |\n| (U)                                                                                                                                      | EXPRESSING                                                                                                                               | UNCERTAINTIES                                                                                | IN                                                                                        |\n| B,                                                                                                                                       | K                                                                                                                                        |                                                                                              |                                                                                           |\n| (U)                                                                                                                                      | A                                                                                                                                        | PROPOSAL                                                                                     | FOR                                                                                       |\n| (U)                                                                                                                                      | LESSONS                                                                                                                                  | FROM                                                                                         | PREVIOUS                                                                                  |\n| (U)                                                                                                                                      |                                                                                                                                          |                                                                                              |                                                                                           |\n| A PROPOSAL FOR DEVELOPING STANDARDS                                                                                                      | OF                                                                                                                                       | UNCERTAINTY                                                                                  |                                                                                           |\n| ~i(;-i-HE'D.:                                                                                                                            |                                                                                                                                          |                                                                                              |                                                                                           |\n| ...                                                                                                                                      |                                                                                                                                          |                                                                                              |                                                                                           |\n| :t                                                                                                                                     |                                                                                                                                          |                                                                                              |                                                                                           |\n| 20                                                                                                                                       |                                                                                                                                          |                                                                                              |                                                                                           |\n| (U)                                                                                                                                      |                                                                                                                                          |                                                                                              |                                                                                           |\n| LESSONS FROM PREVIOUS STUDIES ON UNCERTAINTY                                                                                             | ..                                                                                                                                      | ,:: -                                                                                        |                                                                                           |\n| .'t                                                                                                                                      |                                                                                                                                          |                                                                                              |                                                                                           |\n| ::~t&!f:                                                                                                                                 |                                                                                                                                          |                                                                                              |                                                                                           |\n|                                                                                                                                          |                                                                                                                                          |                                                                                              |                                                                                           |\n| 23                                                                                                                                       |                                                                                                                                          |                                                                                              |                                                                                           |\n| .::~~~~:;~                                                                                                                               | ~~-                                                                                                                                      |                                                                                              |                                                                                           |\n| (U)                                                                                                                                      | ORGANICALLY                                                                                                                              | GROW                                                                                         | A                                                                                         |\n| (U)                                                                                                                                      |                                                                                                                                          |                                                                                              |                                                                                           |\n| ORGANICALLY                                                                                                                              | GROW                                                                                                                                     | A LEXICON                                                                                    |                                                                                           |\n| ~~Ji*1~                                                                                                                                  |                                                                                                                                          |                                                                                              |                                                                                           |\n| ..                                                                                                                                       | .::..                                                                                                                                    |                                                                                              |                                                                                           |\n| ,~,~~                                                                                                                                    |                                                                                                                                          |                                                                                              |                                                                                           |\n|                                                                                                                                          | ...:..                                                                                                                                   |                                                                                              |                                                                                           |\n| 15                                                                                                                                       |                                                                                                                                          |                                                                                              |                                                                                           |\n| (U)                                                                                                                                      | SPLIT                                                                                                                                    | SECOND                                                                                       | DECISION-MAKING:                                                                          |\n| (U)                                                                                                                                      | MITIGATING                                                                                                                               | THE                                                                                          | \"CS1                                                                                      |\n| (U)                                                                                                                                      | LE/IC:                                                                                                                                   | RisK                                                                                         | OF                                                                                        |\n| (U)                                                                                                                                      |                                                                                                                                          |                                                                                              |                                                                                           |\n| SPLIT                                                                                                                                    | SECOND DECISION-MAKING:                                                                                                                  |                                                                                              |                                                                                           |\n| A:if!~w                                                                                                                                  | E~;f.:ORCE;f(l!f,tf.ERSPECTIVE                                                                                                          |                                                                                              |                                                                                           |\n| ..                                                                                                                                       | ----                                                                                                                          | 27                                                                                           |                                                                                           |\n| .                                                                                                                                        | \"                                                                                                                                        |                                                                                              |                                                                                           |\n| ~~:::~~;~~-                                                                                                                              | J~;                                                                                                                                    |                                                                                              |                                                                                           |\n| .                                                                                                                                       |                                                                                                                                          |                                                                                              |                                                                                           |\n| ;t                                                                                                                                      | .                                                                                                                                        |                                                                                              |                                                                                           |\n| (U)                                                                                                                                      |                                                                                                                                          |                                                                                              |                                                                                           |\n| MITIGATING THE                                                                                                                           | \"CSI                                                                                                                                     | EFFECT                                                                                       |                                                                                           |\n| .                                                                                                                                       |                                                                                                                                          |                                                                                              |                                                                                           |\n| ~                                                                                                                                        |                                                                                                                                          |                                                                                              |                                                                                           |\n| -                                                                                                                                        |                                                                                                                                          |                                                                                              |                                                                                           |\n| ~~::;i,,~                                                                                                                                |                                                                                                                                          |                                                                                              |                                                                                           |\n| ...                                                                                                                                      |                                                                                                                                          |                                                                                              |                                                                                           |\n| ,~:~:                                                                                                                                    |                                                                                                                                          |                                                                                              |                                                                                           |\n|                                                                                                                                          |                                                                                                                                          |                                                                                              |                                                                                           |\n| 21                                                                                                                                       |                                                                                                                                          |                                                                                              |                                                                                           |\n| (U)                                                                                                                                      |                                                                                                                                          |                                                                                              |                                                                                           |\n| LEIIC:                                                                                                                                   | RISK                                                                                                                                     | OF BEING                                                                                     | WRONG                                                                                     |\n| :!'J,ti{i~;:                                              |                                                                                                                                          |                                                                                              |                                                                                           |\n| 28                                                                                                                                       |                                                                                                                                          |                                                                                              |                                                                                           |\n| (U)                                                                                                                                      | MINEFIELDS                                                                                                                               | AND                                                                                          | MIND                                                                                      |\n| (U)                                                                                                                                      |                                                                                                                                          |                                                                                              |                                                                                           |\n| MINEFIELDS                                                                                                                               | AND MIND                                                                                                                                 | TRAPS                                                                                        | IN                                                                                        |\n| ~-                                                                                                                                       | ~it!~:~                                                                                                                                |                                                                                              |                                                                                           |\n| (U)                                                                                                                                      | THE                                                                                                                                      | ROAD                                                                                         | TO                                                                                        |\n| (U)                                                                                                                                      |                                                                                                                                          |                                                                                              |                                                                                           |\n| THE                                                                                                                                      | ROAD                                                                                                                                     | TO                                                                                           | HELL                                                                                      |\n| WIT~J~B~tiVE                                                                                                                             |                                                                                                                                          |                                                                                              |                                                                                           |\n| COGNITIONS                                                                                                                               | .. -                                                                                                                                     | 31                                                                                           |                                                                                           |\n| (U)                                                                                                                                      | ACCOUNTING FOR                                                                                                                           |                                                                                              |                                                                                           |\n| PSYCHOI.C!9.~~:f'-ND:~IAL                                                                                                                |                                                                                                                                          |                                                                                              |                                                                                           |\n| FACTORS THAT DEGRADE RESPONSE                                                                                                            | OR                                                                                                                                       | INHIBIT                                                                                      |                                                                                           |\n| INFORMATION SHARING                                                                                                                      |                                                                                                                                          |                                                                                              |                                                                                           |\n| IN                                                                                                                                       | LJANAJ:YSIS                                                                                                                              | ...... ........ ........ |                                                                                           |\n| 31                                                                                                                                       |                                                                                                                                          |                                                                                              |                                                                                           |\n| (U)                                                                                                                                      |                                                                                                                                          |                                                                                              |                                                                                           |\n| Core Concepts in                                                                                                                         | Judgiijent,.,a'nd                                                                                                                        |                                                                                              |                                                                                           |\n| D~ion-Malcing                                                                                                                            |                                                                                                                                          |                                                                                              |                                                                                           |\n|                                                                                                                                          |                                                                                                                                          |                                                                                              |                                                                                           |\n| 31                                                                                                                                       |                                                                                                                                          |                                                                                              |                                                                                           |\n| ~~Ji.~~::::                                                                                                                            |                                                                                                                                          |                                                                                              |                                                                                           |\n| ..                                                                                                                                       |                                                                                                                                          |                                                                                              |                                                                                           |\n| ~::::::::.::::                                                                                                                    |                                                                                                                                          |                                                                                              |                                                                                           |\n| ..                                                                                                                                       |                                                                                                                                          |                                                                                              |                                                                                           |\n| :.:~.::::::::                                                                                                  |                                                                                                                                          |                                                                                              |                                                                                           |\n|                                                                                                                                          |                                                                                                                                          |                                                                                              |                                                                                           |\n| ::::.::::.:.:::::!~                                                                                                                 |                                                                                                                                          |                                                                                              |                                                                                           |\n| (U),:Hnplicit.vs:                                                                                                                       |                                                                                                                                          |                                                                                              |                                                                                           |\n| Explic1t~i}ion-Making                                                                                                                    |                                                                                                                                          |                                                                                              |                                                                                           |\n| .                                                                                                                                        |                                                                                                                                          |                                                                                              |                                                                                           |\n|                                                                                                                                          |                                                                                                                                          |                                                                                              |                                                                                           |\n| 35                                                                                                                                       |                                                                                                                                          |                                                                                              |                                                                                           |\n| ...                                                                                                                                      |                                                                                                                                          |                                                                                              |                                                                                           |\n| ,r!~~-~                                                                                                                                  |                                                                                                                                          |                                                                                              |                                                                                           |\n| .                                                                                                                                        |                                                                                                                                          |                                                                                              |                                                                                           |\n| ~                                                                                                                                        |                                                                                                                                          |                                                                                              |                                                                                           |\n| ..                                                                                                                                       |                                                                                                                                          |                                                                                              |                                                                                           |\n| ~                                                                                                                                        |                                                                                                                                          |                                                                                              |                                                                                           |\n| ...                                                                                                                                      |                                                                                                                                          |                                                                                              |                                                                                           |\n| @}.The Haiiihis                                                                                                                          | of                                                                                                                                       |                                                                                              |                                                                                           |\n| Bias.~lfeuristics,                                                                                                                       |                                                                                                                                          |                                                                                              |                                                                                           |\n| and                                                                                                                                      |                                                                                                                                          |                                                                                              |                                                                                           |\n| Intuition 35                                                                                                                             |                                                                                                                                          |                                                                                              |                                                                                           |\n|                                                                                                                                        |                                                                                                                                          |                                                                                              |                                                                                           |\n| ~...                                                                                                                                     |                                                                                                                                          |                                                                                              |                                                                                           |\n| ,.                                                                                                                                       |                                                                                                                                          |                                                                                              |                                                                                           |\n| ?                                                                                                                                        |                                                                                                                                          |                                                                                              |                                                                                           |\n| .                                                                                                                                       | \"                                                                                                                                       |                                                                                              |                                                                                           |\n| M:IJ.FJ.ie~:Yfre                                                                                                                         |                                                                                                                                          |                                                                                              |                                                                                           |\n| Possessions'      | 36                                                                                                                                       |                                                                                              |                                                                                           |\n| (U)                                                                                                                                      |                                                                                                                                          |                                                                                              |                                                                                           |\n| ';4ifc.~~ring                                                                                                                            |                                                                                                                                          |                                                                                              |                                                                                           |\n| and                                                                                                                                      |                                                                                                                                          |                                                                                              |                                                                                           |\n| the Pressure to Round up the Usual Suspects                                                                                              | 36                                                                                                                                       |                                                                                              |                                                                                           |\n| ~                                                                                                                                        | Z~7~~~:~:.~~~::::::::i~ |                                                                                              |                                                                                           |\n| (U)                                                                                                                                      | ACCOUNTING                                                                                                                               | FOR                                                                                          | PSYCHOLOGICAL,AND;                                                                        |\n| INFORMATION                                                                                                                              | SHARING                                                                                                                                  | IN                                                                                           | I___:I'ANA;,YSIS                                                                          |\n| (U)                                                                                                                                      | Core                                                                                                                                     | Concepts                                                                                     | in                                                                                        |\n| (U)                                                                                                                                      | Rationality:                                                                                                                             | Bounded                                                                                      | and                                                                                       |\n| (U)                                                                                                                                      | Biases                                                                                                                                   | and                                                                                          | Heuri$fics                                                                                |\n| U                                                                                                                                        | Baunded                                                                                                                                  | Wzllpower                                                                                    | TR                                                                                        |\n| (U)                                                                                                                                      | Boun                                                                                                                                     | EESL                                                                                         | ..v.eeteesesemsessaeseesessnesssbuse                                                     |\n| (U):                                                                                                                                     | 'Imphcmvs                                                                                                                                | Exphc'itfl?egz,flonMakmg                                                                    |                                                                                           |\n| (l'{)                                                                                                                                    | The                                                                                                                                      | Hazara's                                                                                     | of                                                                                        |\n| -                                                                                                                                        | (U)r'Bg!zefi                                                                                                                             | ATE                                                                                          | POSSESSIONS                                                                               |\n| )                                                                                                                                        | Am:honng                                                                                                                                 | and                                                                                          | the                                                                                       |\n| )                                                                                                                                        | How_,sWe                                                                                                                                 | PErCeiVe                                                                                     | RiSK cccovvureemmsiineinisniinnssrer                                                      |\n| (U)                                                                                                                                      | Hot                                                                                                                                      | Cogggnon                                                                                     |                                                                                           |\n| (U)                                                                                                                                      | Stress                                                                                                                                   | Efi'ects                                                                                     | on                                                                                        |\n| (U) Stress                                                                                                                               |                                                                                                                                          |                                                                                              |                                                                                           |\n| Effects                                                                                                                                  |                                                                                                                                          |                                                                                              |                                                                                           |\n| on Analysts                                                                                                                              |                                                                                                                                          |                                                                                              |                                                                                           |\n| and                                                                                                                                      |                                                                                                                                          |                                                                                              |                                                                                           |\n| Policy-Malcers                                                                                                                           |                                                                                                                                          |                                                                                              |                                                                                           |\n|                                                                                                                                          |                                                                                                                                          |                                                                                              |                                                                                           |\n| 38                                                                                                                                       |                                                                                                                                          |                                                                                              |                                                                                           |\n| ,                                                                                                                                       |                                                                                                                                          |                                                                                              |                                                                                           |\n| (U)                                                                                                                                      | PERILS                                                                                                                                   | AND                                                                                          | PITFALLS                                                                                  |\n| (U)                                                                                                                                      |                                                                                                                                          |                                                                                              |                                                                                           |\n| PERILS                                                                                                                                   | AND PITFALLS                                                                                                                             | OF                                                                                           | GROUPS - _ _                                                                              |\n| (U)                                                                                                                                      |                                                                                                                                          |                                                                                              |                                                                                           |\n| SUCCESSFUL CULTURE IN                                                                                                                    | HIGH                                                                                                                                     | STRESS, HIGH AMBIGUITY ENVIRONMENTS ... .... .                             | 41                                                                                        |\n| (U)                                                                                                                                      |                                                                                                                                          |                                                                                              |                                                                                           |\n| Recommendationfor~re                                                                                                                     |                                                                                                                                          |                                                                                              |                                                                                           |\n| -                                                                                                                                        | 41                                                                                                                                       |                                                                                              |                                                                                           |\n| (U)                                                                                                                                      |                                                                                                                                          |                                                                                              |                                                                                           |\n| SOCIAL NETWORKS AND                                                                                                                      |                                                                                                                                          |                                                                                              |                                                                                           |\n| TilE                                                                                                                                     |                                                                                                                                          |                                                                                              |                                                                                           |\n| 42                                                                                                                                       |                                                                                                                                          |                                                                                              |                                                                                           |\n| (U)                                                                                                                                      |                                                                                                                                          |                                                                                              |                                                                                           |\n| GROUP                                                                                                                                    | DYNAMICS AND                                                                                                                             | MA                                                                                           | ONS .. - ... -  . ... ........                            |\n| (U)                                                                                                                                      |                                                                                                                                          |                                                                                              |                                                                                           |\n| \"Groupthink\"                                                                                                                             |                                                                                                                                          |                                                                                              |                                                                                           |\n|                                                                                                                                          |                                                                                                                                          |                                                                                              |                                                                                           |\n| 42.                                                                                                                                      |                                                                                                                                          |                                                                                              |                                                                                           |\n| (U) Stage                                                                                                                                | of                                                                                                                                       | Development 43                                                                               |                                                                                           |\n| (U)                                                                                                                                      |                                                                                                                                          |                                                                                              |                                                                                           |\n| MEMBERSHIP                                                                                                                               | -  -   - ..                                                                                                                       | ;                                                                                           | ....  .. .....                                                           |\n| (U)                                                                                                                                      |                                                                                                                                          |                                                                                              |                                                                                           |\n| Multi-disciplinary                                                                                                                       |                                                                                                                                          |                                                                                              |                                                                                           |\n| Advantage                                                                                                                                |                                                                                                                                          |                                                                                              |                                                                                           |\n| 43                                                                                                                                       |                                                                                                                                          |                                                                                              |                                                                                           |\n| (U)                                                                                                                                      | SuccesSFUL                                                                                                                               | CULTURE                                                                                      | IN                                                                                        |\n| (U)                                                                                                                                      | Recommendation                                                                                                                           | for                                                                                          | ulture                                                                                    |\n| (U)                                                                                                                                      | SOCIAL                                                                                                                                   | NETWORKS                                                                                     | AND                                                                                       |\n| (U)                                                                                                                                      | GROUP                                                                                                                                    | DYNAMICS                                                                                     | AND                                                                                       |\n| (U}                                                                                                                                      | \"Groupthink\"                                                                                                                             |                                                                                              | vereeerser                                                                                |\n| (U)                                                                                                                                      | Stage                                                                                                                                    | of                                                                                           | Development                                                                               |\n| {U)                                                                                                                                      | MEMBERSHIP...                                                                                                                            | reeeerecvernanaesesees                                                                       | :                                                                                         |\n| )                                                                                                                                        | Mulhdzsctplmmy                                                                                                                          | Advanlage                                                                                    | e                                                                                         |\n| (U)                                                                                                                                      | EXPERTISE: THE                                                                                                                           | GOOD,                                                                                        | THE                                                                                       |\n| (U)                                                                                                                                      | The                                                                                                                                      | All-Star                                                                                     | Problem.                                                                                  |\n| (U)                                                                                                                                      | All                                                                                                                                      | Expertise                                                                                    | is                                                                                        |\n| (U)                                                                                                                                      | EXPERTISE:                                                                                                                               | THE                                                                                          | GooD,                                                                                     |\n| (U) The All-Star                                                                                                                         |                                                                                                                                          |                                                                                              |                                                                                           |\n| Problem                                                                                                                                  |                                                                                                                                          |                                                                                              |                                                                                           |\n| 44                                                                                                                                       |                                                                                                                                          |                                                                                              |                                                                                           |\n| .                                                                                                                                        |                                                                                                                                          |                                                                                              |                                                                                           |\n| (U)                                                                                                                                      |                                                                                                                                          |                                                                                              |                                                                                           |\n| All                                                                                                                                      | Expertise is not the                                                                                                                     |                                                                                              |                                                                                           |\n| same.,                                                                                                                                   |                                                                                                                                          |                                                                                              |                                                                                           |\n| 45                                                                                                                                       |                                                                                                                                          |                                                                                              |                                                                                           |\n\n(U) WHAL iS EXPEIrISE? .......ooeeeanmeeeesiressraeasesersessassssamenssnsssstsstmsnssnssmsstastensmmmsessessssasnsanenn\n(U) Self-herding Cais?\n\n........ouceirireecncenecsnssenessossssmonsasesssesssisasssessassssnssassssesssissens\n(U) ROLE OF NEGOTIATION ......c.coooenenmecesrerssssnseseemmmaseesesesesemsesessssemssssesesmmmsseesessessensesssersssmsesessesssermnossers\n~ (U) THE CRITICAL ROLE OF EXERCISES AND TEAM-BUILDING ........\n\n(U) Recognize the Need for\nInoculation of Personnel and Information Networks Prior to Evenis....\n(U)Establish Metrics to Ensure Effectiveness of Exercises and Training.......\n-\n(U)Preserve Splits that Present Differences of Opinion to Policy-M\n(U) COUNTER DEBILITATING EFFECTS OF HIGH STRESS ENVIRONMENT\nMONITORS\n(U) Emphasize Informatmn Sharing and Enhanced D Coardmanon ----------------------------------------------------\n(U) What is Expertise? ........ 45\n(U) Self-herding Cats? ........ 46\n(U) ROLE OF NEGOTIATION ........ 47\n(U) THE CRITICAL ROLE OF EXERCISES AND TEAM-BUILDING ........ 47\n(U) Recognize the Need for 0Inoculation of Personnel and Information Networks Prior to Events .... 47\n(U)Establish Metrics to Ensure Effectiveness of Exercises and Training ........ 48\n(U)Preserve. Splits that Present Differences of *Opinion to* Policy-M~\n........ 48\n(U) COUNTER DEBILITATING EFFECTS OF HIGH STRESS ENVIRONMENT L___j BY EMPLOYING STRESS\nMONITORS ........ 49\n(U) Emphasize Information Sharing and *Enhanced* 0\nCoordination ........ 49\n(U) BRINGING THE RIGHT BROOMSTICK TO THE WIZARD\n(U) BRINGING THE RIGHT BROOMSTICK TO THE WIZARD ........ -------51\n(U) UNDERSTANDING THE SENSITIVITIES AND CONSTRAINTS OF SENIOR POLICY-MAKERS\n(U) The Efilzz{wt as Consultant ........cuenevceneneenn,\n(U) The\nt Ask the Right Questions ........cousveene\n------------\n(U) UNDERSTANDING THE SENSITIVITIES AND CoNSTRAINTS OF SENIOR POLICY -MAKERS ........ 51\n(U) The~yst as Cons~ltant ........ , ........ ; .... 51\n~\nThe\ntAsk the Ri ht\nlions ........ ::::::::~:::::::j~{~:::::::: ~~\nL\n(U) Recognize t t\nessure or Imm iate\nrt- erm\no ltical or *Policy* Responses'Will;:P,~o.:Pire,f!tly\nProportional to the Magnitude of the Consequences Surroundmg an Event\n22\n(U) Recognize that Policy-Maker Tolerance of Risk (and willingness to accept varioiis;measures or\nestimates of certainty) Will Diminish as the Magnitude of Potermal\nConseqqences (On Extl:er Action or\nProportional to the Magnitude of *the Consequences Surrounding an Event ........* ,,Nl:\"\"\"'\"~1~it:~,;F .... 55\n(U) Recognize that Policy-Maker Tolerance of *Risk (and willingness to accept* iznO~;/!!f!OSUreT-6r\nestimates of certainty) Will Diminish as *the Magnitude* of Potentia~ Conseq'f~'es (O,tl~!.i!l!lf...Action or\nInaction) Increases ........ f.,'!Jt: *........* :.i',-:~:~~:.; *........* :~~: ........ 55\n(U) Not All Senior Policy-Makers Are the Same ........ > *........* .'~:;:;~: ........ ::: ........ 57\nn 11 Th Co\n\n*A th\nb'\n~;!.\n-~~tt~!:~ .. l!.-..,-\n9\nI'-'./\ne\nntract1on OJ. u only *pro* .em ........ ~.':+;;z.: ........ :~ . ;::: ........ 5\n(U) Using the Right Kind of Expert Advisers to *Interoct With* P~f.if;fmaliefo~~ ........ /:'. ........ 60\n\"d'i't\nInaction) Increases........\ni\n(U) Not All Senior Policy-Makers Are the Same...\n(U) The Contraction of Authority problem...\n) Usmg the Right Kind of Expert Advisers to Interact With Pah;:y-make\n:\nThe Role of Blame Avoidance Strategies and How These May Comphcate,tke Atmbutzon Questxan Jor\n........\n(U) \"Safety in Numbers?\" The Hurricane Katrin& Rg;oblem i (U) The Surrounding Psychological Context for:bnd Pohcy-Maker in WMD Attribution........\n(U) Terrorists are \"Adaptive Enemies\" Who w;ll try t ) \"Muddy Ihe,'Waters \" to Complicate the Attribution\nProcess by Increasing Ambiguity\nw~-~~~~-~!.~~~~~.:7-~~~-~':;~~~e:...~~~-:::=~~~:~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~.~~~~~~.~~\n(U) 'Sqfety m Numbers.\nThe Hurncane Katrif!_lt;'IJt.iJ.~{em ...... ,:f::;:; ........ 62\n(U) The *Surrounding Psychological* Context.fo~\nPolicj.~'in WMD Attribution ........ 62\n(U) Terrorists are '\"Adaptive Enemies\" Wlfp;w;tl *try* trf.~ Muddy the;Waters\" to Complicate the Attribution\nProcess by *Increasing* .Ambiguity ........ :(::~:~~!:~i.:~~):~ ........ : ........ 63\n(U) THE RIGHT STUFF: HARVESTING EXPER'f.i~.1~ ........ --........ __, __ , ........ --........ 65\n(U) THE RIGHT STUFF: HARVESTING EXPER'I' SE\n2, l\nE\n........\n(U) INTEGRATING EXPERTISE\n'\n.......\n(U) ANALYTIC ROTATIONS FOR CULTURAL AWARENESS X\n------------\n(U) INTEGRA TINO EXPERTISE ........ :~;;f;!t:< ........ , ........ 65\n(U) ANALYTIC ROTATIONS FOR CULTURAL AW.~ESS,.;~: ........ 65\n(U) DRA WINO ON THE \"UN-cLEARED\" Wo~::: ........ 68\n(U) DRAWING ON THE \"UN-CLEARED\" WORH_I\n------------\n(U) RED TEAMS ARE Essmmm i,\n------------\n(U) EXERCISES AND TRAINING ..., 0.\n(U) COLLECTING AND PRESER\\;ING?ERISHABLE INFORMATION ........\n~~~~~::s~~~=.:i=~~~::;:1~~~:~:::~~::::::::~:\n(U) COLLECTING AND ~ER~P'PERISHABLE INFORMATION ........ 70\n\":fo;lo\n.:!.;;h\n=t~\n(U) INFORMATION SHA'RING%MONG DlSPARATE KINGDOMS\n.'.,.-\n(U) INFORMATION SJI#fUNGl~~1'.~~msp ARA TE KINGDOMS .. --.. -........ ---... - ........ 71\n------\n(U) THRO}\\!JNQ,JliEJii!.:S.~H .... ~.~~::~.:. ........ : ........ 71\n(U) C'.'~~Rni9its>w C6~~~~SE DATA AND AssESSMENTS ........ 72\n------\nW) CAFI'URING Low CONFIDENQE DATA AND ASSESSMENTS\n(9)) CQNT]NUITYOF CONNECI'[.VITY\n(U)-L-,EvERAGnJG THE CATALYST PROJECT\n(W) lT{N'rEnEACEs THAT ENHANCE INTERACTION\n..\no\n---------\n()] DATA: SHARING VIA COMMON DATABASES........ccccovnisivrnens\n) lNFORMA'flQN SHARING THROUGH SOCIAL NETWORKING TOOLS\nSh:1t.;~;ii~~~~R~~~~:::::::: ;;\n(U) IT~ACES THAT ENHANCE INTERACTION ........ 73\n(U) 0ATA~~~NO VIA COMMON DATABASES ........ 73\n(U) INFORMATI9}:1~SHARINO THROUGH SOCIAL NETWORKING TOOLS ........ 73\n!~;;~--\n(U) THE MIXED 'REALITY PERSPECTIVE\n(U) THE M~p'REALITY PERSPECTIVE.-........ - ........ - ........ _ ........ 75\n(U) INTELLIGENT AGENTS.....crovermeurssssasnsnsnsnes\n------------\n(U) OVERCOMING CLASSIFICATION BARRIERS\n(U) ENHANCING DATA MINING\n........\n........ ........\n(U) DYNAMIC ANALYSIS PROCESS FOR THE[\nIl\n-----\n(U) INTELLIGENT AGENTS ........ 76\n(U) OVERCOMING CLASSIFICATION BARRIERS ........ 76 (U) ENHANCING DATA MINING ........ 77\n(U) DYNAMIC ANALYSIS PROCESS FOR THE o ........ 77\n(U) LEVERAGING LOCAL ASSETS\n(U) LEVERAGING LOCAL ASSETS ...... -\n........ ~ ........ ~ ...... - ....... _ ........ __ ........ 79\n(U) INCREASING EFFICIENCY\n.....ccostivenrunensaesnenerersnsssassesessssnsasnssssarens\n(U) TEAMING WITH LOCAL LAW ENFORCEMENT\n(U) INCREASING EFFICIENCY ........ : .... 79\n(U) TEAMING WITH LOCAL LAW ENFORCEMENT ........ 79\n(U) CAN OTHERS UNDERSTAND YOUR DATA?\n(U) CAN OTHERS UNDERSTAND VOUR DATA?-........ _ ........ 81\n(U) MANAGING THE DATA\n....vevreerneceeneremenassasssnnes\n(U) DATA CHARACTERIZATION AND ANALYSIS ........\n(U) MANAGING THE DATA ........ 8 I\n(U). DATA CHARACTERIZATION AND ANALYSIS ........ 81\nBY EMPLOYING STRESS\n........\n........\nAR AN\n#'.ln.\n........\n--------------------------\n63\n--------\n........\n\n(U) DATA MODELING AND VISUALIZATION...\nLessssmsarescsssarsres 82\n(U) USING METADATA TO FOSTER INFORMATION SHARING AMONG SEPARATE COMMUNITIES ........ovvereenn.. 83\n(U) DATA MODELING AND VISUALIZATION ........ , .... : ........ 82\n(U) USING METADATA TO FOSTER INFORMATION SHARING AMONG SEPARATE COMMUNITIES ........ 83\n\n(U) HOW TO BEST USE TNF INFORMATION\n85\n(U) HOW TO BEST USE TNF INFORMATION ........ m._ ...... .-........ -------85\n(U) MANAGING EXPECTATIONS: WHAT CAN WE EXPECT FROM TNF AND WHEN CAN WE EXPECT IT?........ 85\n(U) Pre-Detonation vs. Post-Detonation\nterereretnesareerfesnestranesarabestearereeaeest\ns be s enanebasastensentans\n.86\n(U) TNF Support 10 IND AUTTOULION. ........ceueeereeeverriserivenssnerisnsnssessassssvsrssssassssassasassesnsassssasasasnss 86\n(U) TNF: Common MiSconceptions........ewveevuiuisnsesens\nesesecerasre\ne s\ne\ns ae s e sastnresanesrere 86\n(U) TNF: Exercising t0 DiSpel the MYIRS ........c.ocioioimieirerreeressssisiscsssasseeiasnssassessnsnsessssassassmssssansn 87\n(U) LIMITING BIAS IN TECHNICAL DATA INTERPRETATIONS\n.\n-\n89\n)\nharing Information with the TNF Team........iceeoeectecinicceseeeeaeesassssnens 89\n(U) Incorporating TNF Results into [\n|ASSESSMENLS ........c..coviimirisiinisssnssisisssinsssessissssnssss 90\n\n(U) MANAGING EXPECTATIONS: WHAT CAN WE ExPECT FROM TNF AND WHEN CAN WE EXPECT IT? ........ 85\n(U) Pre-Detonation vs. Post-Detonation ........ 86\n(U) TNF Support to IND Attribution ........ 86 (U) TNF: Common Misconceptions ........ 86\n(U) *TNF: Exercising to Dispel the Myths* ........ 87\n(U) LIMITING BIAS IN TECHNICAL DATA INTERPRETATIONS ........ 89\n(U)l\n~haring Information with the TNF Team ........ 89\n(U) Incorporating TNF Results into *r=JAssessments* ........ 90\n\n## M) Putting It All Together: Proposed Function And Structurh I\n\n~~-~~~~~~~-~~~~~~~:.~.~~-~~~~-~~~:~~~~-~~-~~~~~-~~::~7--91\n\n|                                                                                              |                                                                                                                                        | (U)                                     |\n|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------|\n| WHEN                                                                                         | TO INITIATE THE FORMAL PROCESS                                                                                                          |                                         |\n| ;~::.:.:;::,                                                                                |                                                                                                                                         |                                         |\n|                                                                                              | 92                                                                                                                                      |                                         |\n| ~~~ROPOSEoc:J<FsPONSIBILIIIES                                                                |                                                                                                                                         |                                         |\n|                                                                                              |                                                                                                                                         |                                         |\n| J::::::::;~~~;~~;~:::\"::~~~~~~;;J:::::i             |                                                                                                                                         |                                         |\n| (U)                                                                                          |                                                                                                                                         |                                         |\n| PROPOSED STRUCTURE OF                                                                        | THEC]                                                                                                                                   |                                         |\n| !                                                                                            | ..                                                                                                                                      | ;:                                      |\n| 93                                                                                           |                                                                                                                                         |                                         |\n| (U)                                                                                          |                                                                                                                                         |                                         |\n| A                                                                                            | Two-                                                                                                                                    | TIER STRUCTURE                          |\n| ~~~::                           |                                                                                                                                         |                                         |\n|                                                                                              |                                                                                                                                         |                                         |\n| :!;~~~~;:;:.:                                                                             |                                                                                                                                         |                                         |\n|                                                                                              |                                                                                                                                         |                                         |\n| 93                                                                                           |                                                                                                                                         |                                         |\n| (IJ)f~!:'::::::.::::::::l::::::::~;~~~~~;;::i~~::::::::E |                                                                                                                                         |                                         |\n| 1Y)'                                                                                         |                                                                                                                                         |                                         |\n| )                                                                                            |                                                                                                                                         |                                         |\n| (U)                                                                                          | PROPOSED                                                                                                                                | STRUCTURE                               |\n| (U)                                                                                          | A                                                                                                                                       | TWO-TIER                                |\n| (U)                                                                                          | \"                                                                                                                                       | IExecutive                              |\n| (U1                                                                                          | Support                                                                                                                                 | Group u...onneneceiieveeeesressivirenen |\n| W                                                                                            | |                                                                                                                                       | ]                                       |\n| (U)                                                                                          | REQUIRED                                                                                                                                | ACCESS                                  |\n| (U)                                                                                          |                                                                                                                                         |                                         |\n| REQUIRED ACCESS TO INFORMATION ... ........                             |                                                                                                                                         |                                         |\n| ,[:-~                                                                                        |                                                                                                                                         |                                         |\n| .                                                                                           | : ....                                                                                                                              |                                         |\n| ::;,;,;,;~                                                                           |                                                                                                                                         |                                         |\n|                                                                                              |                                                                                                                                         |                                         |\n| 97                                                                                           |                                                                                                                                         |                                         |\n| (U)                                                                                          | BUILDING                                                                                                                                | THE                                     |\n| :'\"\"                                                                                        |                                                                                                                                         |                                         |\n| \";!~:':i:i-;:0..                                                                             |                                                                                                                                         |                                         |\n| .                                                                                            |                                                                                                                                         |                                         |\n| (U)                                                                                          |                                                                                                                                         |                                         |\n| BUILDING                                                                                     | TJIE                                                                                                                                    | NUCLEAR ATTRIBUTION                     |\n| -.:~;t:                                                                                      |                                                                                                                                         |                                         |\n|                                                                                              | .-                                                                                                                                      |                                         |\n| 100                                                                                          |                                                                                                                                         |                                         |\n| (U)                                                                                          | TRADE                                                                                                                                   | SHOWS:                                  |\n| {U)                                                                                          | BRIDGING                                                                                                                                | THE                                     |\n| (U)                                                                                          | COMMUNICATE                                                                                                                             | TODAY;                                  |\n| (U)                                                                                          | WHEN                                                                                                                                    | REALITY                                 |\n| (U)                                                                                          |                                                                                                                                         |                                         |\n| COMPETITION                                                                                  |                                                                                                                                         |                                         |\n| 1S                                                                                           |                                                                                                                                         |                                         |\n| GOOD...                                                                                      |                                                                                                                                         |                                         |\n| (U)                                                                                          | OuTLOOK                                                                                                                                 | .                                       |\n| (U)                                                                                          |                                                                                                                                         |                                         |\n| TRADE SHOWS: VIRTUAL AND REAL .                                                          |                                                                                                                                         |                                         |\n| ;.;:;:;;;;~~~~=~~r!:::::::~;;~t;;.-                                                      |                                                                                                                                         |                                         |\n| ...                                                                                          |                                                                                                                                         |                                         |\n| ::~                                                                                 |                                                                                                                                         |                                         |\n|                                                                                              |                                                                                                                                         |                                         |\n| 100                                                                                          |                                                                                                                                         |                                         |\n| (U)                                                                                          |                                                                                                                                         |                                         |\n| BRIDGING THE NUCLEAR EXPERTISE                                                               |                                                                                                                                         |                                         |\n| GENE~TION                                                                                    | GA\"f:~:~::t~;~~f';:                                                                                                         |                                         |\n| ... .......                                                     |                                                                                                                                         |                                         |\n| 101                                                                                          |                                                                                                                                         |                                         |\n| (U)                                                                                          |                                                                                                                                         |                                         |\n| COMMUNICATE TODAY; STILL                                                                     |                                                                                                                                         |                                         |\n| CoMMU!'il~~j~!J                                                                              |                                                                                                                                         |                                         |\n| TOM.gRROW :;':-: .... .. ........                               | 102                                                                                                                                     |                                         |\n| (U)                                                                                          |                                                                                                                                         |                                         |\n| WHEN REALITY COSTS TOO MUCH,                                                                 |                                                                                                                                         |                                         |\n| Go\"VnitJj_;\\1,.,.,,;1:~                                                                      |                                                                                                                                         |                                         |\n| .... - .. - ...                                                                     | 102                                                                                                                                     |                                         |\n| ~                                                                                            | g=:;~-~~~-~~::::::::~~~~~~~t~~;~;;:::::::: | :~~                                     |\n| -                                                                                            | ..                                                                                                                                      |                                         |\n| !._.~~                                                                                       |                                                                                                                                         |                                         |\n| (U)                                                                                          | SUGGESTIONS:                                                                                                                            | REQUIRED                                |\n| e                                                                                            |                                                                                                                                         |                                         |\n| (U)                                                                                          |                                                                                                                                         |                                         |\n| SUGGESTIONS: REQUIRED                                                                        |                                                                                                                                         |                                         |\n| RESOURC~$,                                                                                   |                                                                                                                                         |                                         |\n| :::;                                                                                         | ,_                                                                                                                                      | - .. 104                                |\n| (U)                                                                                          | FUNDING                                                                                                                                 | NEUTRAL?                                |\n| (U)                                                                                          | GETTING                                                                                                                                 | BLOOD                                   |\n| (U)                                                                                          |                                                                                                                                         |                                         |\n| FUNDING NEUTRAL?                                                                             |                                                                                                                                         |                                         |\n| ;;;:;:,!~;~~~                                                         |                                                                                                                                         |                                         |\n|                                                                                              | ::.                                                                                                                                    |                                         |\n| 104                                                                                          |                                                                                                                                         |                                         |\n| (U)                                                                                          |                                                                                                                                         |                                         |\n| GETTING BLOOD                                                                                | FROM                                                                                                                                    |                                         |\n| A                                                                                            |                                                                                                                                         |                                         |\n| STQNE~i;:.~::                                                                                |                                                                                                                                         |                                         |\n| ..                                                                                         | :-::                                                                                                                                    |                                         |\n| (_U)                                                                                         |                                                                                                                                         |                                         |\n| SCRUBBING FOR RESoUR<:;Es                                                                    | ...                                                                                                                                    |                                         |\n| ,.;:~:.-                                                                                     |                                                                                                                                         |                                         |\n|                                                                                              | :,                                                                                                                                      |                                         |\n| (~F)                                                                                         |                                                                                                                                         |                                         |\n| AIRCRAFT                                                                                     | ANDAFTACSi:iPPORT.;:                                                                                                                    | .                                       |\n| UJ)                                                                                          | SCRUBBING                                                                                                                               | FOR                                     |\n| (SHINF)                                                                                      | AIRCRAFT                                                                                                                                | AND                                     |\n| (U)                                                                                          | How                                                                                                                                     | MANY                                    |\n| (U)                                                                                          |                                                                                                                                         |                                         |\n| How                                                                                          |                                                                                                                                         |                                         |\n| MANY~~~~~~~:~~~?::                                                                           |                                                                                                                                         |                                         |\n|                                                                                              | .                                                                                                                                       |                                         |\n| (U)                                                                                          | APPENDIX                                                                                                                                | A:                                      |\n| (U)                                                                                          |                                                                                                                                         |                                         |\n| APPENDIX A:                                                                                  |                                                                                                                                         |                                         |\n| INQ~S.                                                                                       |                                                                                                                                         |                                         |\n| OF                                                                                           | RECOMMENDATIONS AND                                                                                                                     | FINDINGS--                              |\n|                                                                                              |                                                                                                                                         |                                         |\n| ~.,.r                                                                                        |                                                                                                                                         |                                         |\n| ...                                                                                          | eoii.                                                                                                                                   |                                         |\n| 0]:.-;.~i~l!!                                                                             |                                                                                                                                         |                                         |\n| I                                                                                            | -A\"'r'l'mgy;rlon                                                                                                                        | TERMS                                   |\n\n## L8S) Appendix C Dynamic Analysis Process\n\n(U) APP~IxipJ;;ATm;!{fiQN TERMS ........ _ ........ -\n........ 117\n-\n.~;~&i\n.\n~:~~~\n~~: t:,~:o.. ...\n(U) \"-P.P,Ji;NDIX (J:'DYNAMl'ANALYSIS PROCESS ........ _ ........ - ........ 138\n.~ ... ~-~\":w!!-:\n'.\n.\n(U) APPENDIX D. SHARP 2009 NUCLEAR ATTRIBUTION PARTICIPANTS AND PERSONNEL. 141\n(u). APPiOO?,-.x'D: SHARP 2009 NUCLEAR ATTRIBUTION PARTICIPANTS AND PERSONNEL.I41\n(U) POLICY~fiocuMENTs ........ - ........ _ ........ - ........ 144\n::!!';;,;,~ .... ~\n-~:!!i!.;!;:\"'\n(U) POLICY bQCUMENTs\n144\n(U)END N(mafi\"f\"\"\n144\n(U) END NOTES:::. ........ _ .. , .... - ..... --.. - ........ _ .. _ ........ ---144\n..\n,.\n\n## (U) Executive Summary\n\n(U) A group of 30 experts from the government and private sector met in Tempe, Arizona in August 2009 to study the topic of nuclear attribution under the auspices of the Summer Hard Problem Program (SHARP), sponsored by the Office of the Director of National Intelligence\n(ODNI). Participants included intelligence analysts, members of law enforcement, scientists, academics, and subject matter experts in national security policy, proliferation, terrorism, law, crime, behavioral psychology, and other specialties. (See Appendix D for a list of participants). The study focused on communication challenges confronting three distinct communities involved in preparing nuclear attribution assessments for executive branch leadership. Information coll~ted and analyzed by those communities -\ntechnj~cat,nuclear forensics (TNF), law enforcement (LE) and Non-Title 50 organizations, and tti~~Jt.ltelligence Community (IC) - must be fused to formulate an overall attribution assessment'-\"~1\";-time.-\ncrisis environment with mostly incomplete and evolving information.\n\n.,;.:.:...\n\n'!::;~i:.~;;\n_.;:;~~:!~~~~.'\n~;'\"~~\n(FOoo)At SHARP, the participants role-played seve~l n~1ear a~J?;4~ion stEit)fibs while immersed in microcosms that combined law enforcement, ffi\"telligence;;:i:nd techilical communities. Leveraging this. microcosm environment, the p~~,~pantSw;~lasked with creating their best all-source attribution assessments. The~:;PcFi:~ces of identifying, developing, working with best practices for attribution W: ,,tpe SHARP;r~fcrocosm enabled the participants to scale up their findings ~!~~~iy]i~_& success'of deploying a new national attribution capability (e.g. an L_ .. ~_f'Til~~:!JARP;'~~Y..(mdings fall into four broad areas: culture, people, information sha$.t!jpfrastnj.Cture, andLJfunction and structure:\n\n.! *...* , .. ._,':'~~.;.~\n.. r..'\n'\n- . Culture: At least three distinct conimuillt,i~.oi'\"kingdoms\" (IC, LE, and TNF) will be\ninvolved in a nuclear attribution investigl:iii~,9;.,;, SHARP recommends several measures,\nsuch as information sharing, team-building, jq:~t.exercises, common training, common\nlexicons, and persistent social networlc:ijlg. Sl;!Ch measures will institutionalize the right\npractices, behavioral norms, .!!!!d cgUilboration that will be required of a multidisciplinary\nteam working seamlessly:.~=jj{OOuc~ attribution assessments.\n,..\n....\n. ..\n-\nPeople: SHARP sugges~ tJ:uit. a pr~gram of training, rotational assignments, and\nmentoring be deveJ,9:ped:~;~F2,~~il@ build a sustainable cadre of cleared analysts with the\nright expertise tQ:\\V,ork the:nuclear attribution account. Additional cleared specialized\nexpert,!should.o~;-l~eraged through a virtual architecture, and expertise from the open\nso~c~\";6ti,~;~hou1a:[~~J~veraged through technical means such as crowd-sourcing.\n-\n.. IMdrmatiori;:Sharing Iiifrastructure: SHARP recommends that a formal study be\n. cond~~~'io more comprehensively identify and prioritize options for mitigating\ninfoniill~9P. shapng impediments. The normal way of doing business is too slow and\nexclusive:t9!(1}iing the full capacity of the distributed law enforcement, intelligence, and\ntechnical ~hununities to bear on the problem in the quickest manner. Tools and\napproaches must be developed and deployed now that, when activated for a nuclear\nemergency, allow relevant players to share knowledge at the speed of technology, not at\nthe speed of bureaucracy.\n-\nunction and Structure: The SHARP study developed a two-tiered model of the\nconsisting of an executive level and a support group - and recommends adding\ntwo new responsibilities for the c=J I) Develop recommendations for communicating\ncrisis-related information With government entities (Congress, state, local, and foreign)\nand the public. 2) Establish a means to interface with consequence management\nconstituencies.\n(U) The findings of this SHARP are applicable to any operation where disparate communities\n~\nor teams must work together to be successful in solving difficult and complex tasks.\n\n## (U) Key Findings (U) Developing And Leveraging People (U) Scope Note\n\n(U) This report presents the findings and recommendations from the SHARP 2009 monthlong session, \"Assigning Attribution in Nuclear Forensics and Intelligence Analysis.\" The nuclear attribution SHARP session engaged approximately 24 total government and external experts, including nuclear scientists, forensics examiners, policy experts, cognitive I\nneuroscientists, behavioral scientists, proliferation experts, and intelligence and law enforcement analysts. The SHARP report represents the views and analytic fmdings of a diverse group of participants in tackling the hard problem of how to integrate three information streams - technical nuclear forensics (TNF), law enforcement (LE), and the intelligence community (I C) - to formulate rapid and credible assessments, ~4icl}.;may be based on incomplete or time-evolving information, in support of nuclear attribiltfbn.\n\n,!'!:\"':!::!:\" ...\n\n~\n~:~~~:~;,~\ni~\n(U) The study focused on identifying strategies and solutions to overco~~i~~~lenge&;:;.n:\nproducing effective multi-community-authored assessments suppo~:t].g;attri6iij~Qn. ,LE, TNF, and IC each use distinct terminology and has its own way 9.;~~hinki~~~~put the\"'P.t6blem and manner of assessing uncertainties. Yet, their assessments and wpclusiO'iiS.P.a~e\"io be fused and presented to policy-makers cohesively and cogently in ~!9ef;!~.;.\n\n~~~~~v\n. ;~:::~\n~~~!f;~~;t:~ ~\n\n-\nProvide the maximum amount of info~~~~n ~~j~ight as t<i'the source and\nperpetrator( s )\n'~ ''-li!,;\n. ,.,,,._\n'\n... :;~~\n. \"{~::!~\n,:~~:~.;ov'\n-\nConvey the results in a form that.ti~~t meetS:The need ofleadership;\n-\nMake as clear as possible the c~~fiii~~~l~~els and w;~ertainties that should be\nattached to findings and\n:~l:~;:;,\n'\n-\nEffectively present alternative analyses ~~(explanations for available information.\n(U) The final report is structured to convey fmdings and recommendations to the DNI on key factors that play in effective integration and communication of multi-community attribution assessments. As a result, the fmal report is presented as a compilation of articles, each addressing a key factor in the attributio~~~-~e SHARP participants self-assembled themselves into teams to write the articles within, and in many instances, participants contributed to several articles.\n\n(U) The findings from the SHARP 2009 Nuclear Attribution session are applicable to any mission where disparate communities must work together using incomplete and evolving information, and the conclusions must be effectively conveyed to decision-makers.\n\n## Se~ (U) Introduction To The Articles\n\n(U) The SHARP report is a compilation of articles that address key issues associated with successfully conducting multi-community-authored attribution assessments that would then be communicated to decision-makers. Taken as a whole, the articles would assist in developing and deploying a seamless team to producing rapid and credible attribution assessments based primarily on the information streams from the technical forensics, law enforcement, and intelligence communities.\n\n(U) ASSUMPTIONS\n\n## (U) Expressing Uncertainties In Crises (U//F<Th..O)Ir----------------------.1\n\nL__ ________\n__.jl Specifically, the intelligence, LE, TNF, and P.Q\\ifY cotilJP.l!l:rl'ties\n\nhave each, over time, established different lexicons utilizing quantitati~~:ruidif,tqalitah~e\ndescriptors to express uncertainties. Dr. Charles Weiss has;~ategoJ#~~ ~orne 6f:~ese\ndisparate lexicons and summarized them the table below1, ~::\n                                                                     -' :::::.~\n                                                                                  /\n                                                                .\n                                                                ~=~=~:~\n                                                                          ;::~~=,-~\n\nGiven the iif~~~9f..!lcommon objective standard for expressing uncertainty, policy- and decision-makef;\"often are unsure how to interpret the meaning of information being conveyed to tliem or what degree of action the analysis warrants.\n\n(U) The discussion of uncertainty usually centers on two distinct methods of expression. One is scientific uncertainty based on statistical analysis of numeric data, utilizing measures such as mean, median, standard deviation, and confidence interval. The second is subjective uncertainty, which does not lend itself to quantitative expression. In most cases, policy- and decision-makers are dealing with subjective expressions of uncertainty. This presents a difficulty, since subjectivity results in inconsistenc~es in interpretation.\n\n(U) For nuclear-related events, significant uncertainty may persist for some time, as the sCientific/statistical findings may not be available early on and will be subject to change as\n\n## Sec~Orn\n\nthe data are analyzed and interpreted. TNF findings are a combination of comparative statistics from isotopic ratios, measured levels of trace elements/molecules, shielding and packaging materials, and ancillary artifacts associated with the material package. The comparative isotopic ratios are based on analyzing the degree of agreement between measured ratios for the sample in hand and databases on such ratios for worldwide nuclear materials. Experienced nuclear scientists then make judgments on the most likely associations, taking into account other artifacts of the sample.\n\n(U) The judgments resulting from this process are presented in terms ofthe most likely to less likely matches to various possible sources, including some indication of confidence level.\n\nThe confidence levels are a combination of the statistics of measurements and seasoned judgments on bow closely the data fit with the sources in the worldwide infon.nati9n base.\n\nConveying this process as background to a decision-maker in a crisis may not;~~: practical, but I\nI should be prepared to do so in various levels of detail.\n\n,:.-:;\\::.,. _;\n(U) Intelligence analysis is often a qualitative process involving the int~~ii~p._.9f o6~~~ed facts, the views and opinions of government officials, and w.fonnati~q,jrom llii'fiiilJl-'sources of varying reliability, in the context of historical data and c'lifumon kiiciwl~ge .. Rarely does a\n.\n\n-\n\"\"'If'\nsingle observed fact drive a conclusion. Each of these sources. of.inforniatibn'has an associated level of uncertainty.\n\n. .:.:::; /'.;:~;;:;~~.\n\n_:::\n.,1! .. :.:-::.i\"\n(U) Law enforcement combines laboratory ev\\4~~!! 'ifij;~~issible;~i~cumstantial evidence, eyewitness testimony, information from infofiiiij;:and d.~limentary evidence to build a case against a defendant Measures oftW~~,rtainty:for the Ieg~i~ystem are referred to as\n\"standards of proof.\" In the criminal justi~:~Y.S~~iii. convictio\"n requires the highest level of certainty: proof beyond a reasonable doubt.;.;~;;::;,.\n\n'\n:\"!::-;-..\n\n..\n\n(U) A challenge for the integrated IC, LE,.Mtd ~~~mmunities, then, is how to aggregate the various means for reaching conclus_j5?_nj' with {meaningful way to present levels of confidence. A common lexicQ~::(qr,.expressing uncertainty and confidence would be ideal.\n\nHowever, an externally imJ)9~ecJ:~hol~sale transition to a new, common method of uncertainty expression !~-~i.kely to ~l)cceed.\n\nas a newly-established entity, has an opportunity to es~~Jish a;~~~~finethod for the expression of uncertainty. Approaches to doing thi~ ~!! de_t~.i! in the section entitled (U) ORGANICALLY GROW A LEXICON .\n\n.\n\n~::,.:::~~:!::. . :..;::'\"' .. ~\n(U) 'Ift~:~~~~-i~~fnent on~pPtlunOn lexicon will ease the work I\nI and enhan~e comj)R:Jl'ensionby decision-makers. It also provides a basis for a common language of uncertafu'ij;:t'fross all communities. This will not require that the individual communities abandon tl:ic;&:current standard approaches, but will facilitate enhanced collaboration .\n\n. ~-:;~:::~\n(U) A Propos; for Developing Stant:lanls of *Uncertainty\\L* ---=--=----'\n(U) Of the approaches to stating uncertainty, the legal standards might provide a starting point for expressing aggregate uncertainty in Nuclear Attribution. These legal standards or equivalents could be used to represent confidence associated with the combined inputs from LE, IC and TNF. The legal model also may be useful to the policy community in terms of standards of proof that should be met in recommending actions that employ national and domestic security levers of influence. These levers include, for example: judicial, diplomatic, intelligence, military, and economic.\n\n(U) The US judicial system uses a time-tested way of conveying uncertainty in reaching judgments on criminal and civil cases. These uncertainties are represented by standards of proof such as beyond a reasonable doubt, clear and convincing evidence, and preponderance of the evidence. Furthermore, standards of proof directly relate to verdicts which, in turn, a judge uses to decide on sentencing in criminal trials. The jury is made aware of what level of uncertainty must prevail in rendering a verdict on the basis of all evidence, testimony, and arguments presented during trial proceedings. In addition, the jury can request any additional information needed to be thorough and confident in reaching their verdict.\n\n(U) The types of evidence provided to a jury during the course of a trial include statisticalbased forensic findings, symbolic logic arguments crafted by attorneys for both sides of the case, testimony of experts, and testimony by defendants and witnesses. In a sens~. the judicial system already has had to. deal with a span of evidence much like woqlJt;g~ the case in WMD attribution and has developed a set of standards to convey confidenc~:iiJ\":l!Sgregate findings. Furthermore these standards, when met, correlate with a speci:ij9.:Q!Ilge 6t:~J!.t,i:nces that a judge may render.\n\n;::-:::::~..\n\n-\n... ...\n\n.,'l!,!f,\n(U) Discussing how the judicial uncertainty schema might\"fi~ ofus~).~~l\n::::'{\ncharacterization of uncertainty and confidence in findings reqt#~. crossf~~:;~e wall between WMD findings and possible US actions - the dreaded policy.. prC\"~g~on gtiideline. In US\nnational and domestic security, the range of responses fQr~giten thf~i:S:and actions against US domestic and foreign interests has been w~J!:9~~~~~~ througii\" experience. In the diplomatic area, actions include suspending,diplb\"iy~tic relat{C?I]~~,recalling the ambassador, imposing sanctions, and issuing demarc,lt~~ . Intell~~ence acti~ii's include covert operations, covert propaganda, infiltration of colleeii6'ii;!~~y_i~, and various forms of covert influence.\n\nMilitary responses can include declaring war;:~iif.gical strikes, sending in special operations forces, and complaining through the attache sysf~i!J; . ,~conomic actions could span embargos, cutting off selected trade, economic sancti9ps, andf6bmplaints to the World Bank.\n\n(U) Stepping away from policy;.proscri~~~~ conc~ms for a moment, if.---------., c=:::Jajudgment that it was:~rtJiility ~tertain that the AQ group in an area of Pakistan were responsible for the WMP e\\;en~ then_.tjJe President's advisers likely would have .. find and bomb the camp\" in the;F;fecb~~ndiifions. These advisers also would have a range of options, per~~ps att:tii.~.way dowl{t'O .. do nothing yet.\" At the other end of the spectrum, one would e~pCC:t~,1Y;~ry li'iSJ!~Jeve_l of confidence before considering a nuclear attack by the US.\n\nFor e~~p category ofWNfll>;:event, from yield-device to minor contamination, the President's adv.i~ers::will c.9tne forward with a range of options, depending on the confidence of the judgme~~~lfl~Y recei\\'e If the I\n~sessment were weak or consisted of multiple hyp9~~s~, then queries certainly would follow on what additional information is necessary to iiciii~\"ihe assessment.\n\n.\n\n~ .. :\n(U) As a first step toward establishing a standardized method of expressing uncertainty, we recommend that be exposed tp the existing lexicons on uncertainty. This step can be followed by the group going through a process of identifying aset of standards of proof. These standards ofproofwould be defined to convey uncertainty and confidence consistent with the risks inherent in a plausible range of actions that the President's advisers might recommend. Representatives from the President's advisory entities should be part of this exercise. As with the judicial system, the resulting standards of proof would not define the policy response (or analogously, the sentence in a criminal case). The standards of proof\n would represent the fact the there is sufficient confidence in fmdings to support a full range of response options. The President and advisor entities will drive the actual response.\n\n(U) In response to an actual event, I\nI\nwould evaluate the specific hypotheses, levels of confidence, and alternative interpretations presented by the aggregated LE, IC, and TNF\nassessments. If the findings are diverse in interpretation, the ~ould ask the community to iterate based on additional information accumulated over a finite period of time.\n\n(U) If a specific hypothesis is not strongly supported by the evidence and one or more alternatives are admissible, /\n/should have a practiced operational means for reaching some form of closure, if possible. This could take the form of a pro-side and con-side debate of the supporting evidence and the level of confidence associated with each hypothesis. The IC, LE, and TNF advisers would respond to information requests. If no refinement in fmdings is possible, then the policy community would be informed of the possibiij~es, associated confidence levels, and what information would be needed to resol~i;9f'\nsignificantly enhance the group's findings.\n\n.;:~;~;~!~;::-.\n\n.:\n(U) Whether analysis or information assessments originate from the LE;2it;:~~.'JNF .,,,,,.\n\ncommunities, each implicitly or explicitly works through q1,1~stions ~iii!cal to'~~~ssing confidence. In essence these questions are:\n:::''\n' '::~:::;..\n\n:~'\n\n-\nWhat is known?\n-\nWhat is unknown?\n-\nWhat do we think?\n-\nAre there several hypotheses?\n.::::::::~~~~;:: .. .\\i;=:=::..'\"\n-\nIs there one hypothesis that is n;19~:c;omp~jllng than 'ihe others?\n-\nAre there dissenting or contrarY hypotheses?\n\n-\nWhat is the line of argUm.ent for or ag~z _\n(U) Using the above as a standard forma(,.~:re~~l~~~~ings 4\nI woul~help to convey levels of certainty. Hav\\qgthe:3ii0ience's attention and the time to walk through these or equivalent questions :aiia;~s~iated discussions would be the most desirable situation. Uncertainty woul4 b.e:~ommunicated in plain English 'vice a \"catch phrase\" or statistical statement, in~r~Mion, P.r.ifudividual experience .\n\n.. ::;\n~-;:;:=~==~~::: -\n.\n\n/~~~!~=:-.\n\n. -.\n\n(U) What ~e~~\n((U)j\n\n## (U) Retommendations\n\n(U) Lessons from Previous Studies on Uncertainty\n(U) D\npublished reports on conveying uncertainty;:~*~:has. .p. ~i~li'lar applicability to how might approach ~e problem of_de~elop~g:a meilf~8.f.expre~sinf.\n\nuncertamty.\n\nat report, \"Uncertamty Commumcabon;,;ij~ues and GQOd Practtce\" ts recommended as a starting point for develoP.ip.g;~~:fJ.t~tlioH::~l~xpressiltg uncertainty inc=]\nassessments. The report provides guidan~~:on coitpjriunicaiifi~:;yncertainties and draws upon insights from the literature, from an in!et.#.,ipnal ~;Cperts' wqr:Kshop on uncertainty communications, and from several uncemiiii~~~xperiments. Especially significant is that this report focuses on communication to non-teclli:HCitl audiences, with special attention to policy.:\nmakers.\n\n-:::~j~~;/\n(U) The report expresses severatpP.po~f;rinciples. First is understanding that the target audience may be under extr~J,riif'iWie qonstraints and generally will have non-technical backgrounds. These facts fq~tilate t~e overarching character of the communication, which consists of a primary l~x~r, ~Ji'~~~ -~~J6ottom line assessments are presented, and a secondary layer, where the detru!e.<f data'~~~logic are presented. Most communication time will be spent on tlt~.~~l~y~r. If a written format is.used, the audience will typically self-select the primary'i'il.:Li.t;to reaci:J:si9.PPing much of the secondary layer. Consequently, colllJP.QQicatio~ipf unce~ty must be done in this primary layer; otherwise it may not ever\n. besee:ri1b'x.the:target audience.\n\n-~.:~~:~;~\n~:-:;-:-._\n(U) A secorid';P.:r;iAciple is that the audience will process the uncertainty within their personal frame of refer~ii~e and according to their biases and heuristics. The report clearly emphasizes that non-technical audiences will tend to relate better to verbal expressions of uncertainty than numerical expressions. Thus, there is some risk that qualitative expressions could lead to different interpretations by different people. This principal is discussed extensively in the report.\n\n(U) For the audiences to make sense of the uncertainties, it helps if they understand how the assessment was conducted. It is not merely a matter of reporting the uncertainties themselves, but the uncertainties also need to be properly reflected in the formulation of the main messages that are conveyed. Specifically, when communicating uncertainties to the policy-maker, the following items should be addressed:\n-\nReporting types of uncertainties and how they propagate to the outcomes.\n\n-\nHow uncertainty was dealt with in the analysis.\n-\nImplications of uncertainties.\n(U) The report identifies some important considerations in communicating the main message.\n\nSpecifically:\n-\nAs assessments evolve, explain any inconsistencies with prior assessments.\n\n-\nReport minority views and clearly label them as such.\n-\nState the essential conclusions in a clear and concise form.\n-\nDo not make statements that you cannot back up to a satisfactory level.\n-\nAim for policy-relevant conclusions\n-\nIntegrate uncertainty information into the formulation of the main message.\n-\nExplain that additional information may not always reduce the uncertaintY-~~ ,/\n-\nExplain that assessments could change as new information becomes avail~bt~:;~;\n\n## (U) Organically Grow A Lexicon\n\n(U) To enable rapid and credible attribution among the primary communities of intelligence, law enforcement, and technical nuclear forensics, a common lexicon is required to ensure that key conclusions with their associated levels of confidence are properly formulated among the communities and conveyed to the decision-makers. Presently, a common lexicon does not exist among the primary communities. Each community has developed its own way of conveying conclusions with their corresponding confidence levels. Based on discussions at SHARP 2009 and taking cues from lexicons arising from massive social networks, we suggest a method to implement a nuclear attribution lexicon.\n\n'\n.\n\n(U) Recent history has demonstrated successes of diffusing language change iR~J~ge-scale social networks. For example, approximately 10 years ago, terms such as ''w~liii~.:\n-\n0\n\"browser,\" \"wiki,\" \"blo~,\" \"tweets,\" \"broadband,\" or ''weblink\" were D;?-!~~-widel~~~~~\nacross all US demographtcs as they are today. Today, these new termstllave:C:fiffused across much of the US demographics mainly due ~o a large segm~I].~ of the J?9P.!.Jlati~fi:f~;,social network) that is engaged in internet-related activities. Theo'ffiffu,sioii sp~~-of new language, which is lexicon-related, is proportional to the size of the netw,<!~~:, Res~~has shown that regular and small-world networks will show gradual di~iQn iti':lab.~age:'thanges, while random and scale-free networks exhibit rapid diffusion}, Sihtilarly}i).~m;ork influences aid in the implementation of a lexicon among s~~~~<;Q~tftijij~s.\n\n/\n0\n~~ =~ :-:~::;:;;\n.\n\n:~~~::~..\n\n.\n\n(U) Network factors are dominant in orgaiD~Iy 3J~ing ~~~~on lexicon among separate communities. For example, for a massivl-~~9-!~!.rittwork, su~h as World ofWarcraft, the common lexicon was grown by large numbeii;~q~.persons frequently using specific terms with specific meanings. In time, the lexicon is devdb'~:~d implemented by the sheer number of people (i.e. millions) using and acceptii].g:theseJeims and their meanings within their network. However, the nuclear attribuqQtfcomoi\\mities do not have a massive social network to drive the use and ~ceq,~c~~of a common lexicon. Instead, a similar effect of organically growing a conu:p'on _lesticol! can be accomplished by increasing the frequency of interactions among the ~~mli\\uiiities ~ing specific terms. Research has shown that children's vocabulary iii&~~;~~i:ically with the number of interactions (i.e. network size). 5 Sim!].ij'ly, ~~~t~.?.'icon is \"grown by implementing a large number of person interactions using sp,~ific::i~htis, otl:~~-~a~,is not possible, implementing a large frequency of person interactions in afsinaller iietwork to achieve the desired effect.\n\n_ ... -:;~;:;~::~\n_:::-:\n)~\n(U) To d~~~J;6.p and implement a common nuclear attribution lexicon among the primary communitie's'~l~~ Jrequency of person interactions using the specific terms would need to be increased. At'P.resent, the primary nuclear attribution communities of technical nuclear forensics, law'~nforcement, and intelligence embark on average bi-annual or longer time interval exercises, which are too infrequent to simulate the number of interactions used by a massive social network in generating a successful lexicon.\n\n(U) From a sociolinguistic perspective, the development of specialized language or \"lexicon\"\nserves two primary purposes: to allow the group members to communicate clearly with each other, often about specialized concepts and topics to a degree beyond what everyday language facilitates, and to identify in-group vs. out-group members. 6 That is; evolution of language functions as a key indicator of.formation of a group. The degree to which a common lexicon emerges from these interactions is a measure of success for genuine community.-building within the nuclear attribution arena.\n\n## (U) Re(::Ommendations\n\n-\n(U) The following recommendations are presented to enable implementation of a\ncommon nuclear attribution lexicon among the primary communities and are based on the\ndemonstrated success of lexicons developed in massive social networks:\n-\n(U) Since the primary nuclear attribution communities are small and crossed, much more\nfrequent interactions among the communities are recommended to create the similar\neffect of developing a common lexicon with many interactions in a massive social\nnetwork.\n-\n(U) The increased frequency inte~tions among the communities could take the form of\nmonthly or bi-monthly secure, web-based, virtually-linked mini-exercises:;~n.a,.particular\nfacet of the attribution process to calibrate the communities with the speci~~~{~rms and\ntheir meaning.\n.\n;; ':;:;:;.,\n\n.... 0!'-!l~tlo\n.~\n-\n(U) The mini-exercises should be brief(e.g. -2 hours) to foster and sq!g~.develb\"~p;1~ht\nand acceptance of a common lexicon and to minimize disruptions t~{ong~1,pg_ mission\nareas.\n.~:::r\n===:!;:.\n~~::~t;=~~:\n-\n(U) Promulgate a mechanism for ongoing communication llJ).d ihte~tipn, iri' addition to\nthe mini-exercises, to further facilitate development of a cpfiiWpn lexi~r{ indicative of a\ngrowing community. Virtual means of interaction may::~ b~si;~%~~~;'as community\nmembers are geographically dispersed.\n;;:.,;:\n-~~~-\n\n## (U) Split Second Decision-Making: A Law Enforcement Perspective\n\n(U//FdNO) In a nuclear/radiological attribution scenario impacting the United States, it is the US Pr~~nt's responsibility to decide what the US strategic response will entail. As the President may have limited insights on the capabilities and limitations of Law Enforcement\n(LE), the Intelligence Community (IC), and technical nuclear forensics (TNF) to resolve attribution questions!\n\nJmust provide each new President (and his senior advisers) an understanding of the capabilities and limitations to ensure informed decision-making.\n\n## (U) Csi ~((~~. J~,~~Eived Misconceptions (U) ~~C:J~~Isioiii:Ilii~~. And The Public May Have Preconceived Misconceptions\n\nreg~d.ig.g the tYf;e and degree of certainty of evidence available to support WMD attribution assesslri~~-::The crimin3.1 justice system has been challenged by this issue, as jurors have been exp6~<to contemporary television crime shows (e.g., Crime Scene Investigation, also known as csf)~j1~d ~ften ex~ec~ irrefuta~le _eviden~ to have t>et:n ~blaine<~: an~d presented for ::p.;.cnmmal convtction, all wtthm 50 mmutes. In a stmdar fashton, ~\nand supporting anillytical personnel may be confronted by unrealistic expectations from an alarmed public and an eager body of elected officials, all of whose concerns will be fueled by an aggressive media that may further fuel these misconceptions. In LE circles, this phenomenon is referred to as the \"CSI Effect.\" It is important to convey to decision-makers that attribution and investigative speed often are constrained by the laws of science, in addition to adhering to prudent plaiming. 7\n(U) Mitigating the \"CSI Effect\"\n(U) \"Max Houck of West Virginia University complained of the 'CSI Effect' that has pushed expectations of crime scene inves~gations far beyond what is achievable.\"8 \"Jurors now expect us to have a DNA test for just a~e_:~~~case. They expect us to have the most SEC~FORN\n.\n\nadvanced technology possible, and they expect it to look like it does on television. \"8 This same level of expectation will influence decision-makers evaluating nuclear attribution assessments. It is important for the contributors to to be cognizant of the unrealistic expectations of their customers, an!i develop ways to operate effectively in this environment.\n\nThe LE community has experience that can be translated into the nuclear attribution environment. For example, here are some standard practices:\n\n-\n(U) Know your capabilities. Conduct a self assessment of your organization's\ncapabilities. Evaluate your capabilities. Determine how much time you need to conduct\nthe appropriate testing or assessment.\n- (U) Educate your partner( s) in an investigation on the capabilities and limi!&tigns of your\norganization.\n:;;.;.:\n(U)D customers may be reluctant to accept that attribution answers IJliJ.Y.~:=~~~is:~:::::\nunresolved for years, or possibly indefinitely. It is plausible that the re~i1ii\"8t;~ asses~ment of all available evidence and sources may not result in a defi.nitive ~wer on th~~pei:petrator\n\" :~>\n.. k  .,'!, .. ~..\n\n\\~, and complicit actors.\n\n.-.\n :::!--..\n\n.''\n(U) LERC: Risk-of Being Wrong\n\n-\n(U) a~s~ upon collaborative or high-confidence intelligence, provide a clear analytical\nassessnie\"#b~J?.ere the findings support a single outcome.\nOr,\n~:::.'\n\n-\n(U) Provide an alternative analytical assessment to the majority opinion, based upon\ninferential analysis or intelligence that may presently weakly support an alternative\nscenario, so that this view will not be lost as new information is gathered.\n(U) The analyst/operator needs to be empowered to make decisions with a degree of built-in flexibility to enable, for example, the development of alternative assessments, and needs to be held accountable for his/her results. Simultaneously, the analyst/operator needs to be encouraged to think outside the box by operating without concern for punitive consequences.\n\n(U) Empowering Personnel\n\n## (U) Minefields And Mind Traps In The Attribution Problem\n\n(\nIt is charged with providing the best possible attribution assessment, under tremendous pressure and in the face of uncertainty, to provide key decision-makers with information that is accurate, reliable, and actionable. In order to effectively and accurately perform under these conditions, there are a number of considerations from a social-psychological perspective that must be addressed.\n\no~~ly spf:aking, in order to perform this most critical task, it will be es~~nti~ILI _\n__j\n: ~\n!~~~~~d h=~~~i~r~:::;~ ;:~:~~~U::;e::.:-I::r::;;rks .. :.:~.:::-::;;~~~~!;~;;,;.!~\n\n-\n(U) Establish sound analytic processes, procedures, and methodologi~8-;:::!~:..\n\n-\n(U) Develop the ability to craft and deliver message eff~qtively ;;;:;{\n-:::;:;;/'\n-\n(U) Adapt to and function effectively in a crisis enviroiliilen~ :\n-:~::;;;.\n. -:.\n.\n.\n.:;~==~-\n~ .. !~f.:;; .. ;:\n(U) The following articles discuss the importance of each 9f.:tb~~~~~!~J:.llel1~~ the potential obstacles to achieving success with each of them, and rr..plnmeridati~~s'for how to overcome, or at least minimize, these obstacl~~::~!~M~~~ilHl~~~~ by addressing each of the following main questions:\n~/  ~:;:;=:\n:;;::::~-...\n\n1. (U) How can attribution analysis b~:i~~~X.~ ;:;::\n:3::\nby taking into account\nvarious psychological or social factors? ';;~~:=:.\n2. (U) What sensitivities or constraints on reai~i:if~:pt>licy-makers should I\n~e aware\nof or sensitive to in order to improve .~-effecfiveness of our communications and the\nvalue of our attributions?\n. *::=*\n\n3. (U) How can 1\nlfu.nttt:~~;be~;r across the three attribution communities in terms of\ninformation sharing, Iatehttc6mm\\inication, and coordination?\n\n## (U) The Road To Hell Is Paved With Normative Cognitions\n\n(U) Accounting for Psychological and Social Factors that Degrade Response or Inhibit Information Sharing in c=JAnalysis\n\n(U) The judgments and decisions.ofth,__.------'-'-==--.:=-====:....=..-=:.;:;\nthat influence everyday decision-making.\n\n~~~=r.~======~~\n:. ..::\n-: .. :-:\n(U) Core Concepts in Judgment and Decision-Making\n~:::;;;:::..\n\n.\n\n(U) Given a choice between two or more options, whether related to min9.r:d.~cisig~zQ\\\":fhose of great import, like attribution analysis, how do we decide between th~;iiililifpJc;: opti()its and their relative merits? At some level, the decision-making gr;gcess aelte.~ strai'~tforward:\nI '\n;1 '!iJ\n'\nwe consider those facts that we feel are relevant, weigh them in .termso.~~tpportance, and reach a conclusion. In many ways, however, this is a \"black bP.~~~procesS::i!!-:which the relevant facts get poured in and an answer emerges. In thi.!i~ktlfi~;we unpack the \"black box\" and describe some of its internal processes that re~:t!l~'m the erii~fg~nce of judgments and decisions. We will also explore the implic\\ltiP.IJS oJ:ili-ese normative processes on the decisions and judgments of adversaries, I . -'  - ~d p~lici.~:J~~~ers .\n\n.\n~-:;:~\n               ;.:1!~\n                              ~:::,\n\n, .. ,a .. ::~:;:-..\n                                  3\"'\n                                                                     /\"\n\n(U) Rationality: Bounded and Otherwise -:;::~;;{\n(U) Part of the attributiqn analysis will involv~-~~~iiig the likelihood that a given group or\nindividual would engage in actions of con,;9.!=rn ( e.g;=smuggling or selling nuclear materials, or\ncarrying out an .attack of a given type). ;-Such an analysis often begins with observations as to\nwhether it would be rational (ot;:fli~indiV:idual or group to engage in that behavior. Analysts\nmust bear in mind that assuP.i\"pti_oos of:rationality or irrationality can be hazardous.\nAssessments ofrationalicylifi_:atlonalitY~are generally made on the basis of the extent to which\na given behavior is c~qsisterit~~~:s~tietal/cultural norms (related to religious beliefs, moral\nvalues, rep~&\\~ce;:~~-), arises from a decision-making process that follows a logical\n\n\nsyllogi~w(of.:i~;~~nsiSi~t;~igt what observers would view as providing favorable outcomes.\n\n(U)\"ti~~~~z~~J=:f ass~; .rationality or irrationality are great, for the following reasons.\nFirst, analy~j~ of the behavior of others from one social or cultural perspective may be invalid\nif it does n6't!iake into account the social and cultural standards of the actor. Second,\nrationality in ;~frather than theoretical, terms is context-determined. The fact that a given\nbehavior may be considered aberrant or irrational by the majority of people does not render it\nirrational on the part of the actor behaving within the context of the actor's experience. For\nexample, individuals and groups can be behaving rationally even if the behavior is based\nupon misinformation or beliefs that are inconsistent with reality.\n\n(U) .Finally, utility-based approaches to rationality have been displaced by the concept of\nbounded rationality. 10 Taking into account that human beings have flawed memories and\nlimited computational skills, Simon's theory \\Vas based on the notion that -we use mental\nshortcuts and rules of thumb (see biases and heuristics, below) to allow us to compensate for\nour cognitive limitations. In developing the theory of bounded rationality, Simon described\ndecision-making as a process of searching for alternative behaviors and choices that will\n\n## Sec~Oforn\n\nresult in the actor reaching his or her goals. It is a search process in which decision alternatives are discovered until a satisfactory alternative is found. Simon coined the term\n\"satisficing\" to describe this process: a choice that may not be optimal, but sufficiently fulfills the criteria necessary for reaching the actor's goals. This comes into play when judging the likelihood that a given party will become engaged in a certain activity. For example, an adversary faced with a range of options may choose one that may not appear optimal to those analyzing the behavior, but that sufficiently meets the adversary's criteria for some degree of success.\n\n(U) Biases and Heuristics\n.\n\n(U) AnalystsJ\nI those individuals and groups whose behavior they ~.ana,Iyzing, as well as those who will determine a course of action on the basis of the attribution\" assessment, make decisions based on heuristics, or rules of thumb, and biases. 11 As noted;~~~xe, th~.se are the mental shortcuts related to bounded rationality.\n\n..::::::::\n:~:~*;;;:\n::::\nSUIIIlll01ized by s.-m include the following:;:: ,~:;:\"/'\n5\n'~:~~~iV . ,\n/~~~;~ :'\n\".;_~~;~:~~\n.. - )i.'\n( o) Extremeness Aversion: Given a range of altemative~;fi;om which~t~f.'(~hoose, people avoid extremes, which give rise to compromise eff~~~-~:~af~~~~nsidered' to be extreme is influenced by the frame in which the alte~uvesf#:preseii~9. )?or example, in merchandise purchasing decisions, an individual pre~~~ witli:i\\vo simii31-Xtems is more inclined to purchase the less expensive item ofthe'tw'i:::;ijo_wever, this individual will tend to choose the more expensive of these when presented witii~~;~ird similar item at an even higher price.\n\nThe same behavior would be expected to bold ~e;:w.l;len individuals are presented with items related to courses of action or levels of ce~ty. \"tit the context of attribution assessment, an outlier opinion offered by one member.~gitlie gro~p may lead others to agree to a position that is more extreme than th~!.1ni~!?ha~e initially chosen.\n\n(U) Hindsight Bias: If ap_.e~~p.{~c~~;there may be a tendency to believe that the event was inevitable. This in tl!m.::fiifltic;\"ri.~~~tJi~extent to which the same event is viewed as likely to\nbe repeated. This c!irr~pt relate~'\"to the notion of \"Black Swans,\" where low probability, high impact everi~:;iihreiro~~ct are believed to have been predictable. 12 Taleb argues that acts of terrorisfii, lik~'~iiifts in tll~~~liancial markets, are \"Black Swans\" that are in fact not\n.\n\npredl~~~-!~ ~~fhtust be aiiticipated.\n\n'\"~~::!:~:,.\n\n(U) Opti~~~~~:~~~: Sunstein suggests that human beings tend to be optimistic. Individuals and groups inv:Qlved in attribution assessment, as a result of selection bias, are less likely to be prone to optimism. However, optimism bias may play a role in how an individual views the validity of his or her own decision-making methodologies and accuracy of his or her assessments and judgments. The most difficult assessment I\n~ustomers to accept is that no answer may exist, which may conflict with an individual or group's optimistic bias. It also plays a role in bow the public perceives risk of harm from illness and disasters.\n\n(U) Overconfidence Bias: This refers to the phenomenon in which people, including almost all professionals, tend typically to have too much confidence in their own judgments, most likely due to insensitivity to the weakness of their underlying assumptions. 13\n(U) Status Quo Bias: Human beings tend to favor the status quo and require considerable incentive to depart from it. This relates to choices involving changes in behavior, including changes in decision-making strategies.\n\n(U) Confirmation Bias: Believing is seeing. In addition to those discussed by Sunstein, confirmation bias is a major consideration I\nI The psychological research is replete with demonstrations that context attu trclmmg onectly influence how we perceive objects and events, from optical illusions to the behavior of individuals and nations. Modem geopolitics provides us with examples of leaders who interpreted events according to their preconceived beliefs about the groups or countries involved in those events, rather than upon actual data, e.g. the adamant belief by some adminis~tion officials that Iraq possessed WMD in spite oflimited certainty on the part of the IC .\n\n.(U) Confirmation bias, also known as ''belief perseverance\" and \"selective pe~~~~tion,\" is a concept that captures the fact that ~pie tend to select and interpret informatiobl~~-~-way that supports their existing worldview. 4 This concept applies to how thorougW,:x. a persQ.)t~ll read a report, i.e., a person who disagrees with the conclusion of a repo.rj;iiiliY:~nc,>t rea'd''it at all, may read it superficially, or conversely, may read it in ~~t dep~,Vt an eft6f,t~ find fault\n\"thth l .\n\n\n-'\n~.\nwt e cone us1ons.\n\n-.\n.;~. .\n:;~\\:~,,. ' ,:-\n.<~; ~ -~.\n\n-~~: ..\n(U) 'The CSI Effect: An additional source of bias may aris~Jronf~?Spectations regarding the type and level of certainty of evidence provided by ana\\Y..s~'io 1\nr decision-makers, and the public. The criminal justice system h~,!?~!l,fn?ni~;Jhis issue lis jurors, having been exposed to modem television crime shows1,.oft~ff:~*pect ~fu!a~le evidence that will have been obtained, analyzed, and presented fQi;;:a critniAiii convictf8Ii; all within 50 minutes.\n\n\"Jurors now expect us to have a DNAtfsf:i\"ri~:j:us.t~bout ever case. They expect us to have the most advanced technology possible, and:tlt~t\"expect it to look like it does on television.\" 7\n... ,. .. ~.'!~>\n(U) Similarly,!\n\nlthe decision-~:~er~-.~,.,_..\n\nmay have unrealistic expectations about the level.~~certainty of the information that analysts can provide, as well as the time fi)wi~~W. wiiich it can be provided. Each of the three communities contributing tq::th~-~sessptent process needs to be prepared to deal with this environment of unrealistic exp<ftatio~. How can this be done?\n\n::::::..\n\n\":a:~~~:: .. :~:~=~~::;::~\n\n-\n(U).~>W ~!k~stom~::jr-:~\"-----------,lcontributing communities should establish\n~.~app~~;:with'~~.~~lti~te customer. This will include establishing an agreed-upon\n_.::il'exicoti\"~4;' ensurt(~fmessages are clearly understood. This will be especially critical\n.. -:~::;:*hen cainmunicatiil.g technical information to a decision-maker who has never been\n. ~;i{&~ed to such information.\n-\n(Ufliip;w_the capabilities of each analytic community. Each of the contributing\ncomni~ities should conduct a self assessment of its capabilities and limitations.\n-\n(U) Educate the customer as to the capabilities and limitations of each contributing\ncommunity.\n(U) The most difficult assessment I\nCustomers to accept is that no answer may exist.\n\nThe outcome from the assessment of all the evidence and sources may be that a defmitive answer is not achievable.\n\n\n\n## (U) Heuristics\n\n(U) In addition to biases, decision-making is influenced by heuristics. Heuristics are \"rules of thumb\" that help speed the decision-making process based on past experience and\n\n## Sec~/Noforn\n\nknowledge, both individual and institutional. They have been referred to as part of the\n\"Adaptive Toolbox\" of decision-making. 15 Sunstein describes the following heuristics:\n(U) Availability: When an incident involving risk is active in an individual's memory, as a result of either severity or length of time since t:b:e occurrence, there is a tendency to overestimate the probability ofthat risk being realized. Probability of risk estimates gradually decrease over time. For example, popular estimates of a terronst attack were extremely high immediately after 9/ll, but have decreased over time, regardless of the actual geopolitical situation. Similarly, estimates of the likelihood of a workplace violence incident increase when such an incident has occurred within a similar community.\n\n(U) Anchoring: Initial choices and probability judgments tend to serve as anc~ors _in the decision-making process, even if they were made on the basis of imperfect infpJ;rtiation .\n\n. .\n\n~-.\n\nAnchoring will take place early in the thought process and is a very powerfuHout~~ ofl!ias in thinking and can thus prevent an accurate attribution. Anchoring pre':~~ us fro~ls.e,ing or accepting new information when it does not fit the world view we hc;>fd'(i~~-~~our '-\"\"\npreconceived notions of who did it, who supplied it). As a.r.~sult, it.~~:J!nportiffi~:l9at analysts and decision-makers be aware of the weighting of initial jtiElgments'ino(der to be able to more fully incorporate new intelligence into the decision-ma.IQrj~,JlroceS~;~::::-\n.,, .. _~ .. ~-..\n\n. ......\n\n(U) Case-based Decisions: When faced with alternative,.ctiJi~es :1~~~~ value, people tend to reason on the basis of prior cases (i.e., .~Q~.js tlll~iiJ.~w case siihilar to or different from a similar prior case that was analyzed)/Tiil&:f~p.ds tO:;ljjnit ~reativity and the ability to incorpomte novel information in the anaJtl.c proc~~-\nMoreaYff~, use of historical analogies\n(e.g., this will be another Vietnam or MWi'~~~-~e and anchor people into more rigid ways of analyzing data, resulting in significant distQ~~-~s and biasing.\n\n~-::~:~::;;\n~~~\n_ .. :,;.\"\ni/ .. ~\n(U) Bounded Willpower\n.;;::\n(U) Bounded willpower is a c~ri~~t th~t recognizes human beings' desire for immediate gratification and reward. It ;SPe~~ to t!J.e issue of impulsiveness, which in the case of attribution analysis and. ~se$~ment can be thought of as a rush to judgment or premature closure. Once recogpi~ed, b()1W~~~illpower can be managed through a variety of mechanisms.,.iaciuQiiig,criticat\"re~lew by colleagues and members of other groups, as well as other che~~;~.biilali&~s. in $e decision-making process.\n\n\n.. :~~::~\n-~~:~;;\n~~~~;~:~-~~\n\n## Ruj;;Ti~D~~Lf-Lnter;;~\n\n(U) In addi~i6~:t~.bounded mtionality and bounded willpower, bounded self-interest is another factor\"t;Jiat contributes to human behavior and disproves the notion that human beings pursue behaviors based purely on maximization of personal utility. People care about other people, and about causes and values, leading them to act in ways that may actually harm themselves as individuals, yet provide some other reward. This comes into play in at least two forms in the attribution analysis process. First, it applies to the analysis of the likely behavior of adversaries. Second, regarding the idea of attribution analysis as negotiation, whether an individual feels he or she is being treated fairly or unfairly in a bargaining process has an influence on the toughness of the stance that is taken by that individual in the ongoing bargaining process. As attribution analysis is a collaborative process, it sneaks to the importance of establishing a culture of openness, respect, and objectivityLI -----'\n(U) Implicit vs. Explicit Decision-Making\n(U) Analysts will make explicit decisions about what information is and is not important on the basis of their rofessional ex rtise.\n\nThe decision as to the relative importance and mearung o a particu ar p1ece o 1 otmat10n reflects the professional judgment I\nI influenced by factors such as time pressure, severity of the threat, and recent social and political events, both foreign and domestic. These decisions, like explicit memories, can be explained by reference to specific data points and events (i.e., \"I know that this is Cs-137 because the following analyses were run yielding the following results.\")\n(U) Decision-making, like memory, also occurs at the implicit level. lmplicit:Ut~tpory, which is also called process memory, cannot be explained by reference to known sp~~i~~ prior experiences. Similarly, a host of other factors ofwhich the decision-maker is:n~t;~:Qpsci9usly aware can influence the decision-making process. These factors can be !JD..ig~e to ffi~;~;:;i~\nindividual, who is reacting almost instantaneously and in light of pas~ ~#~en~~~~s ~d\ninformation, heuristics/biases, and subtle clues of agreemeP.t;,or di~~~!.llent fiQ:@~others engaged in the group decision-making process. Psychologi'cid ~xperiiii~#-t$. haveshown that over time, gist information, i.e., a general sense of the meaning~~~!!: data\"~;:i more persistent in memory and has a greater impact on behavio~;,t9an vew~tin:a, ihformation. For example, information that a particular radical group has.;9.tm involve~~fu. attempts to traffic nuclear materials (although has never done S'Hlis;c.~ssfiill&;) .. .will persist in memory far longer\n.\n\n- .... re .. ..\n\n.._. po than the details of the failed trafficking att~mpts:-;:::~::\n::~;:;;..\n_,_.;:=:~..\n\n~:~:~\nl:::!M\n(U) Implicit decision-making, like clirii~~f~~gqt~rit in medi~ine, is a form of intuition.\n\nBased on a combination of explicit knowledg~~4 gist memory, it provides an informational infrastructure for decision-making of which the'd6~i!!ion-maker may not even be aware.\n\nTpese are essential tools and add to the q~ty of~&ision-making in repetitive situations\n(i.e., conditions or events with which t:IJ~:'decision-maker is familiar). However, when dealing with unique situation;;-ot:\\Y.he~ifattempts are being made to deceive the decisionmaker, they may actually hi;tideJ;\".accllf4te assessments.\n\n. .\n\n~~~ ..\n;::\n(U) With regard to d!e:~~flu~~~i~~:~~ opinions of other members of a group deliberative process, in~ixip~al~~i:py in terms of their ability to perceive and the extent to which they are influens\"by:\\ij~. reacti~~pf.,others. This is influenced by individual personality factors and life e~~rienc~~~;Which irt'~tj;itfi may be tied to such specific individual factors as variations in the-:tiliib~~n.it}g\"ofmirron\\eurons in the brain. In addition to playing a role in anticipating the physical~~yiors of others, mirror neurons are believed to play a role in the capacity for empathy, oili~~.e known as the understanding of another person's emotional response to a given situation~:;in the high stress setting ofl kieliberative process, a presenting analyst can be'expected to be constantly reacting to the emotional cues of his or her audience.\n\nThe ideal analyst would be one who has the capacity to incorporate both the data and more subtle cues provided from others, without his or her objective analytic capacities becoming overwhelmed.\n\n(U) The Hazards of Bias, Heuristics, and Intuition\n(U) Biases, heuristics, and intuition all have an impact on normative decision-making. As noted above, biases influence the manner and extent to which information is processed and treated. Heuristics have been referred to as part of the Adaptive Toolbox of decision-making and can speed the process and increase accuracy. They are especially helpful in situations where the problems and tasks are repetitive or do not vary widely, and where active attempts are not being made to deceive the analyst or decision-maker. Where such attempts are being made, as may be the case in events coming to the attention j lor where the problems being analyzed are unique, these factors can have a negative impact on the accuracy of decision-making.\n\n(U) The tasks of analysts serving j lwm be repetitive to some extent. This certainly will be true when it comes to analyzing forensic data. The attribution analysis itself, however, is less likely to be repetitive, especially in the case of major events. These events will be rare, but potentially devastating in their consequences. They fulfill the first two characteristics of Black Swans, and in hindsight many would attribute the third quality as well, that the occurrence was predictable. With low incidence phenomena, th,c;:re j~\nconsiderable risk in resorting to shortcuts that derive their validity from the si@J;hity of current and past situations and the accuracy of the underlying data. In such sihl~~ons, the Adaptive Toolbox may become the \"Maladaptive Toolbox,\" leading to f~.~,,foncl~iR~:\nreached with high confidence due to the explicit and implicit knowledg~:ffia'~~~.!?-~es wiih expertise, overconfidence bias, and confirmation bias. Thi.s, is partie:(J.J*ly prot?ler;natic where the perpetrator has taken steps to deceive investigat<i~ in ord~'t::ffi:~~scape.:ii~tection and identification. As such, factors that provide shortcuts for decisiQn.,-maidfi~::must be actively guarded against, and a careful balance struck between the ':!~i~izati~~:!?f bi~~s. heuristics, and intuition, and recognition that!\n\nfvill be facing aJ~!ick Swan:~4ttially every time it is called to action.\n\n. . . .\n.;::;:::~.\n\n:\n(U) Careful crafting of the message and.~q~~~:::i~n-~f:!~;~~ihod of communication\n(including the communication of uncertaiii~)..!=a..fi:bontribute greatly towards combating the negative effects of biases, heuristics, and inhiit;i'9n. A detailed discussion of these techniques is found in the section of this report entitled, M~~~RESSING UNCERTAINTIES IN\nCRISES.\n\n.:~>\n-~~;:\n_ .. :::.: ..\n...... ~~ ...... ... . :::: ....\n\n(U) Beliefs *Are* Possessions,/;.)_:::~\n~\n(U) One challenge to tl1t:.k~<t'~fthin}()ng-outside-of-the-box that attribution questions may require is how we de!ll:W.th eiiJ!t:t:::ft1' the pre-existing beliefs on the part of policy-makers\n( confirmatiop, \\>ias ~::~la~d to eiili~r the correctness of prior policy approaches or interpretatio~~~:}fthe'rii~J!yations of potential perpetrators), or (2) the prior institutional apprqhes thS:tiprevio~l};,iliave been adopted to deal with the problem or issue (optimistic bias-~::r~J~ted;fri previous'sOPs or the historical manner in which the relevant organizations have ini~~~~d or handled these issues). Once beliefs have been adopted by policy-makers or implemen~~~Y.-organiZ;ations, they become possessions to cherish, protect against change, and adhere to -~~en in the face of considerable evidence of failure or inadequacy vis-a-vis the problem. For.a'ttribution, it is important for policy-makers and organizations to avoid the trap of having these prior beliefs function unduly as anchors that prevent alternative or competing analysis from being considered. This is especially important, given the high policy consequences likely to flow from any assignment of WMD attribution.\n\n(U) Anchoring and the Pressure to Round up the Usual Suspects\n(U) There will almost certainly be a disconnect between the speed at which the national leadership must respond to the policy/political environment and the slower pace at which forensic evidence, technical analysis, and law enforcement investigations can proceed. This gives rise to an anchoring problem (i.e. a tendency to anchor on the usual suspects in\n\n## Se~Orn\n\nattributing responsibility for an event). Given the magnitude of the likely national response roany substantial WMD event, those involved in the attribution process need to be cautious of leaping to conclus~ons ahead of the evidence, based on the emotions of the moment and the general tendency of people under stress to rely more on biases and available simplifying heuristics (such as stereotypes, ideology, pre-conceived belief structures, etc.) Two examples of this are provided by the Oklahoma City Bombing and tile Centennial Park Bombing at the Atlanta Olympics. In the former, there was a rush to judgment that the perpetrator was a Middle Eastern male. In the latter, a security guard was falsely targeted as the perpetrator because he fit a supposed profile of those who would engage in such acts.\n\n(U) Moreover, given the tendency toward anchoring and reliance upol simnlifvinsz heuristics, especially during times of heightened stress and crisis, it is important_\n~o ensure that its ongoing presentation of the evidence does not unduly bias policy-mak~t:.s{ This is particularly important because the evidence may be relatively incomplete duriii~~~ tim~\nrra.ne when some retaliatory decisions of great consequence may be um:!~t:.SY,ruiid~~ti,9#\n:~~~,~-:01:~-'\n~~-'!\n\n(U) In addition, related to this anchoring problem is the r~9~nition.~,lr----1~~ysis should avoid assuming or describing terror groups or nationalleadeis from'hos~te8' as being crazy or irrational, since this is almost invariably inaccurate (b~.~ on o'ifr~9\\Vfi affect or emotion) and distorts our own analysis of their current an<U\\lfui-e:~~paviof.:' At worst, it creates situations of self-deterrence on our own part or l)~gtl1y inacc~te\" predictions of what futUre behavior they may pursue against us. 1~~.1!!~~ 'Y-itii~~f exceptioh, national or terror group leaders are rational if you understan~i:;tlie\"cd~~~xt witJiiA.~~ich they operate and their own belief systems. Often, describing t!t~~ indiv~t}uals as cijey reflects a normative judgment, that by Western standards, t:Ileiii~e.l}lly,io\"r is irrational. While that is perhaps so, leadership analysts routinely note that undetstQQQ. within their own country, regional, or group contexts, these supposedly crazy or iLtf!iiiiaUeaders are perfectly rational and predictable. Since a potentially critical tasl<.:_\nI may well be ascertaining. motives among potential perpetrators, the likeliJ?,gp<i of their involvement, or the credibility of possible follow-on attacks, it J~~portiiit to adopt a more objective analytic frame in assessing these individuals .. Anl:!hi;iing~to stereotypes of opponents is analysis by labeling, and distorts our.unders~di!u~~'Ofthe.~~l threat environment.\n\n~i\n.:::: <:::::::-::=:=\n(U) How We Perceive Risk\n(U) The path-breaking work in the field of risk perception by Kahneman and Tversky has resulted in the development of prospect theory, which argues that choices are strongly influenced by whether the problem is framed in terms of potential gains or losses, with people being more risk averse in the domain of gains and more risk accepting in the domain of losses. In the nuclear deterrence context, for example, prospect theory suggests policymakers placed in the position of obtaining potential gains (i.e. conquering a neighboring\n\n## S~Rn\n\nprovince or country, making a preemptive strike to disarm the retaliatory forces of their opponent, etc.), at the potential cost of the loss of their own current resources such as national survival or military and economic capabilities, would be expected to be highly risk averse. In contrast, policy-makers facing a situation framed as one in. which they were facing pot~ntial losses (such as being invaded and conquered by another state, or facing destruction of their political regime or economic capabilities), would be expected to be highly risk accepting. In other words, prospect theory clearly shows that people are more willing to take risks to avoid losses than they are to obtain potential gains. A good illustration of this work is found in their book, \"Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Bias.\"16\n(U)I\nI\nthis is relevant to any discussion of how issues of uncertainty regarding intelligence or other kinds of assessments are communicated or considered by,.pol!~y-makers.\n\nAccording to prospect theory, we must remain aware that attributions (or the {1~~-t~Y responses likely to be called for by given types of attributions) that are framed in terms oilc;i~~~s wjll elicit far greater willingness to accept risk by decision-makers than will_~J~-~utiotis~~ed in terms of gains.\n\n/ t:~.\n\n\n. .\n\n::~:; . *.:=\\t;;b_.* ==~:~~~::\n(U) Hot Cognition\n,;;=>~\n::::: -\n(U) In many ofthe contexts in which~will activa!~~:e;sp~~t~l!' cas~~ of postdetonation or large-scale RDD incidelits,tliee'motions gf.~ruysts ail~:JX}licy-makers alike will no doubt be running high. Hot cognition.(~f{e~t or:~ptions) ha8.an immense potential for distorting our perceptions of the enviro,P.riiiririi!i~ ho~~-w~i:i.nt~rpret information. It leads us to more extreme judgments of info~fi~n, perijilps far trey:(;ii.d what they warrant. And it may lead us to fill in the gaps of missing \"o(w~jgiious information with emotional filler that could seriously distort our assessments. Higli::4~grees of affect are well-known for creating a polarizing effect on judgments and perception5;:~M!~g them toward whatever emotion\n(positive or negative) that exists until thex.~ach ~b'far ends of the continuum. The emotional response from the public anq._p<mcy-makers in a WMD event is likely to'l ~~..., I\nb produce information fa:st~tthan\" it becomes available, to reach attributions more quickly than is warranted, apd tg.follow along with certain attributions of blame in the heat of that J;lloment. It is impq~f;~atl lbe aware of this hot cognition component, as it likely will be involv~d}tl\"alf~~:~enario_s,. I\nlwill need to structure itself to insulate itsel(~d ttiih.hnize the effects of hot cognttmn on its attribution efforts.\n\n~r':;~ ~;~::::=::\n6\n:pon bolli an&ysm and policy-~ md how these migp,ta;ffect attribution analysis also requires consideration. For example, individuals unijif~high levels of stress in ambiguous information environments tend to rely heavily upon stereotypes, analogies, or pre-existing beliefs, rather than upon the information at hand, due to a perceived lack of time to reach decisions. Thus, in addition to the anchoring problem discussed earlier, high stress levels can serve to make these anchoring effects even more powerful. In addition, traditional group malfunctions associated with groupthink are seen as being partially triggered by high levels of stress in these groups. Taken in conjunction with the contraction of authority problem and the tendency of groups under pressure to have a collapsed time perspective, groups have a propensity to rush to solutions, have premature closure of debate, and bolster their pre-existing views, rather than challenge them during crisis. Janis and Mann's book, ''Decision-Making: A Psychological Analysis of Conflict, Choice, and Commitment,\" provides a solid overview of many of the coping strategies (positive and negative) groups resort to in crisis contexts. 17\nfrequent exercises involving simulated WMD incidents can help inoculate against some of these stress effects and will allow members to develop proper coping mechanisms, learn from mistakes, and be less likely overwhelmed by the stress of a real-life situation.\n\n\n(U) Another effect of stress upon the surrounding problem environment j I may be the problem of panic and mass sociogenic illness on the part of the public in response to a ROD or post-detonation situation (or one in which follow-on attacks are possible). There have been many situations in which an event occurs (i.e. Sarin attacks on Tokyo subway, Scuds landing on Israel during the First Gulf War) and medical facilities are nearly overwhelmed by people who imagine they have been exposed to harmful agents, even though they were not. For every one casualty actually caused by an event, as many as fifty other individuals may descend upon local medical facilities presenting with psycho~p~tic symptoms. Moreover, fear and panic may cause large populations to flee the 19~~tion of the event or the perceived target location, further complicating response efforts. :Thi~~~atters for II\ndu~ to the_ fact that the s~ounding con~ext is quite ~redic~ble!:~~-wili'~~~in\n~\nsemor pobcy-makers. Pohcy-makers wtll be under mcreasmg:pres~w~ to talCe action of some kind, and will quite understandably become.,C!ven mot~:.~enuuiaiP'g.~f information\n. This suggests the real needl\n-l~i~~velop':sirong, active communication links to policy-makers, while allowing ~.~!.'?r analy-f!~rfo remain immersed in their analysis without being pulled away to an~~eiitil~!ions} Assuring that the c=Jtas a robust capability in these attribution envirolffiliiiis requl~~~it' to have a supporting communication/liaison ability that will allow !.!.!-9-~~n'?.ti~~:;~uring such highly charged, stressful contexts.\n\n.'\"-:::-;\n-~;:::.\n\n(U) The organizational structure and ope~~~~:P!lL~]1gnJ\n-;~~~~=' I also should take into account the well-documented physiological.e(f~ts of sleep deprivation and working under high stress conditions. Occupational health prdf~~~j9pals, especially those who have experience working with groups functioni~g. under~:liigh stress conditions, should be consulted about work schedules, nutrit~Qpiii aspects of stress, and psychological support services.\n\n_ .. -~:~:;:!? :\n(U) In addition to provi~\\!lg~f.ol~~rvig~s focusing on the health o~\nI participants, efforts to reduce the i.nipict b'f;'s~~:jnd other cognitive mind traps should include training\n'exercises and simulaiirins to edtititec=::Jarticipants on the various cognitive factors that could un4et6ihbei~ ~t'&i:Qution analysis. By using scenarios that highlight the dangers of anch9~g anl~!'ltstrate 'o~~rcognitive traps that may alter analyses, CJarticipants will be niote~'aware:of the problems and can learn to counter them as well.\n\n.\n\n:-===~=~ ::: ~~\n.\n\n## (U) Summary Recommendations Sec~Forn (U) Perils And Pitfalls Of Groups\n\n(U)I\n!will face the challenge of melding disparate elements together to forge an appropriate organizational culture for its mission. Issues of identity and norms, group dynamics, and social networks must be addressed to enable efficient effective performance in times of stress. Similar to the air we breathe, we are surrounded by the culture (or cultures)\nwe are part of, yet culture remains largely invisible to us and goes unnoticed until its norms are violated. This is simply \"the way we do things,\" as well the underlying ralues. soctl norms, beliefs, and history of the groups and networks to which we belong.\n\nas a group composed of members from a variety of organizations, professional dis(!iplj.pes, and traditions, will face the challenge of creating an appropriate culture for its mi~~~q~, and melding these disparate elements together effectively.\n\n:;-::::;:::..\n\n.\n\n~~ ... 'I!-\n.....\n\n(U) The nature of the interactions within 1\n~ and the social netw~it~:~1J.~~h ~~~~~::\nunderpin group and individual actions, alSo pose additionaUhreats j r:@~is section, we will capture key components of group culture, 'd~cs, ait~~~cial~etworks to enable 1\nIto navigate across this potential minefield. C~~ti_~g the'~gh(social environment for j\n~s critical and will help establisl_l:~si:ro'ii'~;f.~un~ilon for future performance\n.. ;:\n-~;;:;'\n.. -.-::::-:..\n\n...~:!l~~::..\n\n_;-'' .\n\n(U) This article will illuminate a number o.f;pitfiill~;;ipcludiij\"g.;t)l.t!Challenges of overcoming a clash of cultures to forge a common gr~~P:J.~ntitY.!:::This artl~f~'will also cover the importance of building robust social netW'&r~,acri>ss community boundaries, the dangers of\n.. , ........\n\ngroup think and other maladaptive group dyii~fS, and the natural limitations of experts.\n\nFurthermore, it will also provide a number of ree:6b:\\QJendations for overcoming these challenges.\n\n..::!:\n:~::''\n... ::::!~'\"\n.:\n-~ :;~:::~:::~: ::::\n(U) Successful Culture in Jlig~~:stre~s, ffigh Ambiguity Environments\n(U) Whilellfae:~ c~~i~~ge~.:iP integrating members from many different organizati~r~s:and c6~Qii1ties, it has the advantage of being a newly created group, unencum~r.~.,\\yit\\1:~~;.9wn historleal baggage. There is an opportunity to be successful and effecti':'~;.froili;~$? start;~~W.l~_!ng a culture robust enough to cope with its inherent challenges.\n\nCrea,Wjg ash~ group ia:entity which members value and relate to, with a base of healthy, appib'pij~~ ~Btms for behavior and interaction enabled by inclusive social networks, will position\"itl~~ll. 18\n..\n\n~ ,;. ..\n\n(U) Reco~'l~donforOculture\n(U) We reconiinend actively promoting the following elements to help navigate the minefield of group interaction, and regularly evaluating the group and its members.\n\n-\nOpen communication and information sharing\n-\nMinimal in-group status distinctions\n-\nInclusiveness (permeable boundaries for belonging, especially with regard to analytic\naspects)\n-\nTrust in intentions\n-\nCommon group identity\n-\nShared sense of goals and mission\n-\nRole of devil's advocate or red teaming\n-\nUnderstanding the strengths and limitations of expertise (link to expertise section)\n-\nHealthy interactive strategies, such as negotiation (link to negotiation section)\n(U) Rather than conceiving itself as a team or group with specific members called in during a crisis, I\nI can think of itself as the core, or hub, of a larger connected community of analysts, law enforcement, and more. Success in reaching this goal will require strong leadership that sets an example of cooperation, information sharing, and openness to new ideas and sources of information for the rest of the organization. These behaviors can be incentivized by making them part of the metric for professional success.\n\n. .. .\n\n(U) Group Dynamics and Malfuncti~Q'$:::\n,\n(U) Another factor is the pot~~ti~{!for ~~up dynamics or malfunctions to undercut ~\nperformance. During disc~i<?!l~ lnvQ!ving its structure and membership, 1;::.::_:__:_:._:__:_~;-::-~=:;il;;-l-=n-=ee:-jd to take into account how;-it ~ilf appro~h its analytic or investigative tasks, and how it will interact and commw:M~~ie wiii:i~Q~~r:~ctors. Under normal, non-crisis situations (i.e., low threat to sig@ti~ant::\\(~Lqes, no time constraints, limited stress), groups have the luxury of explori~jfOpti9~ imd\"g~PJ,~!i,ng information at a leisurely pace. Policy-makers will not be on the phdne eve..Y:;ien minlif~~expecting results from analysts, and tests will not have to be rusliea;::~<.:>r wjlfassessmeiits be made on the basis of incomplete or partial information. The normal f)~~ that groups go through in terms of developing working or personal relationship~~:;iQ.:g~tting to know one another so that disagreements can be expressed comfortably, ~~fin obtaining an adequate understanding of the lay of the land (regarding the\nSOPs of the organizations involved, where information or expertise is housed, etc.), have time to be ironed out. It is unfortunate that in a crisis, groups- especially newly-fofl?led groups or ones that seldom interact- do not have the opportunity to establish these links.\n\nThis can lead to a substantial number of group malfunctions, problems of communication, and difficulties of interaction, not only within the groups themselves, but in communications with other groups as well.\n\n(U) \"Groupthink\"\n(U) A large body of academic research, including the well-known book by lrvinf Janis,\n\"Groupthink\" 19 and the Hart, Sundelius, and Stem, eds., \"Beyond Groupthink\"2 , has\n(U) Stllge of Development\n..\n\n.\n\n.. .\n\n(U) The stage of group development is a factor that has significant impact up4~:tfie performance of groups during crises. For example, Stem noted the problem of'N\"~);v~Gro.up Syndrome during the Bay of Pigs for President Kennedy, and how the o~~~t.?,fthe\"i'ii.~~~:after only a few months in office had not allowed the national security grouR;llie'~~ideni\"reJied upon to adequately form or establish their footing. As a r~y]t, ther~(}Y,~ limi\";~;pebate, largely uncritical acceptance of the intelligence and plannirig presented: bY. the OIA and JCS, and an overall group process that would lead to what Janis latei:4~_scrib~:~:a policy fiasco.\n\nA more established advisory group surrounded Kennedy l.~;:yiori~:;J~ter .. 1t had developed working relationships and knew: the \"lay of the land.\" It~as not as'v.\\i}iierable to the same new group problems and handled the Cuban ~i~!-!~ Gti~~~W an exeriiplary fashion. For the c=J it is critical that the attribution com~t;niliity~i~ws the:grql,lp as one that is well established, familiar, unified, exerc.ises roJltinely, aiiil has str~ng communication systems in place. In the midst of a WMD crisis, if~ld~~-yitili that thes~ things are established beforehand, simply because there will be noi:im~.~o learn it on the fly.\n\n'!':~.::.;;:.~.... . ...\n\ne::~::~\n'\n~::: ~ ~\n(U) Membership\n-:~}=\n(U) The issue of group membet'shlj;(~~~ the participants are within the group) is also potentially significant fo\n.. rCJ.-!\n,Lea~\n__ ng aside the technical skills or expertise that members might require in the Va.9.P.psc.=Jgr9!J.Ps, there are basic issues of group dynamics to consider when these,ptayers CQll)e:t.()gether to address the WMD attribution problem. For example, i~ }.J,~.~ee~~;w.i,qely demo'iiStrated in social psychology literature that the status of .\n\nindivid~:~i)~~;pieniti~~~J?l!!-YS a major role in determining which participants will dominate the d!~.~ssion84;!ind whe\"tlr~\"Fthe group is able to think outside of the box on issues. Ideally, groupS\\;~9.~14.-Iiot be top tieavy with only one or two high status individuals, since this tends to reduce::tJi~:.participation of lower status group members, especially if their contributions or views confli~;~).tpthe standard view held by the high status individuals. Also, if high status individuals are:;piirticipating in these groups, it is recommended that there be balance from different orgamzations/institutions in order to prevent premature closure of discussions.\n\n(U) Multi-disciplinuy Advantllge\n(U) In terms of the classic groupthink malfunctions (i.e., those arising from highly cohesive, insular groups under high stress/high stakes decision contexts); it is possible that the multidisciplinary/multi-organizational composition of I\nI may reduce some of its vulnerability to these problems. By its very nature,i I will be a less insular group, although efforts should be undertaken weii ahead o tts acftvation to ensure the kind of communication and building of healthy cross-organizational relationships that would better integrate the more insular, individual communities that comprise I\nI. What is important, however, is to not overreact to the fears of groupthink in ways that would\n\n## Se~\n\nundermine effective intergrrup crrdination in a crisis. For example, a phrase commonly heard during discussions of functions and organiZation is the idea of keeping the TNF\nanalysts isolated from the IC or law enforcement efforts in order to maintain their objectivity.\n\nYet given the overriding needs for information sharing and coordination that a real-life WMD\nincident would demand, this would be counterproductive.\n\n(U) Indeed, the challenges of coordination, information sharing, cooperation across these three communities cannot be overstated, and if not facilitated will result in serious inefficiencies, lack of coordination, and breakdowns of communications that could be seriously detrimental to the 0\nmission. So for example, while on one level it might make sense to maintain separation to reduce biases being introduced into the TNF from the IC or law enforcement efforts, this potential problem would be outweighed by the probl~ms posed by lack of communication and coordination, and by the benefits that would b~i9.ti~ined by enhancing these elements. In addition, the multi-organizational composition I\nI also should help to reduce the problems of anticipatory compliance -a group .~l:!lfunctl~~;:.i whereby group members try to please an external leader in advance by pi\\T1iij:i{g what\"''\"\ninformation or feedback they would like to hear, rather t~\n~hat th~:~yidence::~\\lpports.\n\n=:=~\n                  .: ::~t:::.. .\n                                           .\n                                               :~:\n\n                                                                                                                                                        ~::...\n\n                                                                                                                                                                                 .... -.-~\"-...\n(U) Expertise: The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly\n                                                                                                                                             ... ' :::;:;:;..\n                                                                                                                                                                                  ~:::.\n\n(U) Also important to consider is the impact of perceive.4 ~~pertis~:~i:tliin groups of decision-\nmakers. As a rule, experts (or those group merol>.~~ pei'~iye to be experts) tend to have far\ngreater influence on group discu5sions, fnupiilifisW.~s an(i'i!!.e.rnatives, etc. than do non-\nexperts (or those who perceive themselx~~~~'? be le.slexpert)>!~s a result, group process can\nbecome skewed towards the views of oni:Y=~:J:e.w .. eiperts, and potentially valuable dissenting\nor alternative views from other group memb~~~ be self-censored. Within such groups, a\nserious consequence of this dynamic is the shorti!~iJ\"~}liting of more involved debates over\nevidence, reduction in the variety of input _P,mvid~$ffor group discussions, and premature\nclosure of debate.\n                                     /:;=\n                                                .\n\n(U) Fori\n                          ~.O~;.~:;oups operating within the IC, LE, and TNF communities,\nit is important to asstgn.~_r~.team toAhallenge the expert assumptions and to encourage a\nwide consideration ~f ~piiori~f:~!~-~!>;P'nor to closure. One solution to consider is the notion\nof having a :~p_llec~9F:~:within the group whose primary role is to speak individually with\nother m~nib~~!i9 eiici~~~ws_and perceptions which can later be presented to the group as\naltema.tive hypqtheses. Ati:esipert opinion should be carefully labeled and considered, and\n\nshouici:~:9eP.ciident upori\"ihe scenario at hand. One's area of expertise may not align with\nthe actuiit:ev.~nt itself, since domains of expertise may be specific. The value added by\nhaving spe'Ciii~:~xpertise, however, is the ability to rapidly synthesize information into\nmeaningful ch\\!riiCs, recognize patterns in large sets of data, process information faster, and\nidentify incongruent data ..\n\n(U) Studies have shown that small city or rural fire station commanders with twelve years of\nexperience were less expert than those with onl~ two years experience but who worked inner\ncities with multiple four-alarm fires per month. 1 This point also relates to 'the status issue,\nsince participants with experience also may be perceived to have expertise by groups, when\nthese may well be different things.\n\n(U). The AU-Star Problem\n\n(U) A related problem for group dynamics and composition lc__ ___ _,lis the \"All-Star\"\nproblem. It has been observed in a number of professional level sporting events, that all-star teams - that is, teams created by joining the most exceptional players from across the league\n- rarely produce the best team overall. While their members have exceptional skills and are tremendous athletes individually, these all-star teams typically do not perform as well as expected, or nor do individual all-stars perform as well as they performed on their originating team.\n\n(U) I\nlwe need to consider mechanisms for melding a genuine team out of a group of experts from different domains, with different organil'Jltional backgrounds, different cultures, different lexicons, and so on. Can we foster healthy, well-functioning social networks to enable efficient communication, work flow, and trust in a crisis? How should we assess success? This suggests that criteria for team membership should be a ~~~~e of expertise and the ability to work effectively with others. More often than not,::f;;p~itive group chemistry trumps individual dynamics. On the other hand, it may be possible;(<;:~. on the side of expertise, so long as there is a skilled leader who can manage the .P.<E~onal.iii~~!'.:<;:\n,;~:,~-:;::~:~~~,\n~-.\n(U) Furthermore, for an all-star team, the needed types of C.:~l.?erts ar;;:95_fined ti~~e positions to be filled; pitcher, catcher, etc.\n\nhowever, tile exacftyp~:of expertise needed cannot be fully predicted. The need for contributions from s~!}.~, higb:i*~pec;ialized experts may ebb and surge with the state of the problem. 1\nI\nI\n.:::~L.:.....-r --..-;-;-:-\\:;7;-;--,\n- __\n____,\n(U) AU Expertise is not the same\n.. :::::::=:::;~ti~: _;-:::::\\~~=~::\n\n|       | -..    |\n|-------|---------|\n| .1' |         |\n| ..    |        |\n\n(lD As teams ofexnerts are selected I\n/\nL\n~t is important to create a mixture of differing types of expertise and should not be tii'6iJ.gg~.of only in terms of topical areas of specialty, but instead in terms of differing_.!y.pes o~~competencies .\n\n.,P::'\n,'\"\n.-.. -\n(U) This recognizes that not ~l~P.erti~~ is the same. Some types of competency are more focused upon accomplishing=~~n ta_Sks, such as in TNR analysis of nuclear materials composition, whereas otl}.er\\~~s of ~.Qnipetencies are broader in scope. One example would be the Director of a l!a#ii'na!' fa~At9'ry overseeing and directing teams of individual technical analysts.\n\n:::::;::.\n\n~ -\n. : ~ ~! :! :;: . - . - :: :-,\n(U)/ .. , : .. ::~1 it is 'i'iii~ttant that a mixture of expertise (task and general) is included witliiri:~n.pf i~:subgroups: Given that narrow, topical expertise may find itself out of sync with an'~iiibi~ous, new threat environment, the inclusion of those with general competencies will help s~i~~-~~\n!flexibility to adapt to unique and unanticipated situations and preserve more'~$-iiOOng-outSade-of-the-box capabilities. Also, having broad competencies included with-those members with strong task comJetencies would add to I\nI\ncoordinating and information sharing. capabilities.\n\n## (U) Whlll Is Expertise?\n\n(U) To be a genuine expert in a specific field, one must be much more than well-known and admired, or simply been around for a long time. An expert will be well-regarded by peers, able to render exceptionally accurate and reliable judgments in the domain, and will perform skillfully and economically while handling the atypical or unusual problems in their domain. 23 Some key points to remember are:\n-\nExpertise requires extensive practice, often a decade or more.\n\n-\nExpertise is domain-dependent (i.e. chess experts know chess, but may be mediocre at\nbackgammon).\n-\nExpertise requires deliberate practice. Time of service is not enough; experts focus on\nspecifically improving performance.\n-\nExperts see differently. Sophisticated mental models of the problem allow experts to\nmake distinctions, which others may not even be able to perceive.\n-\nExperts can get trapped. Very deep expertise can lead experts to become inflexible,\nbiased by their years of experience, and enamored of their intuition - ((U) Implicit vs.\nExplicit Decision-Making).\n-\nExperts cannot go at it alone against multidisciplinary problems.24\n(U} Experts can solve problems within their domain faster, and more accurately tban less experienced or proficient individuals. And they usually perform best at solving:J{pown (but difficult) problems in their domain. I\nlwill undoubtedly be facing probl~~ .. no qne has actually faced before, so the tried-and-true methods may not be appropR~te.\n\n~=:~::::;:\n-~~ ~ .:-:-::..\n\n.. ~\n\n        ....\n                           ..~-\n-\n       -\n                                 p .. .\n\n(U) Experts are adaptive. They have the capacity to fluidly.;~nd cr~ti~~'y adjtist;tl:ieir\n\npro~l~m-so~ving strategies, ~enerate new ones, and find alieina:!J.~epers~!~~~s:' This will be\na cnttcal skill for the experts!_\n                                    l\n                                                        ::::::~..\n                                                                  ::::\n\n.. {==.\n                    =:;i:~:::.:.- ,.\n\n(U) Self-herding Cats?\n                                           .. : :::.\n                                                   _}:;~~t..\n                                                                .::\n\n(U) The challenges of bringing together a_gfb~p-~f:~xpe~~=:i;};'tJen mixing experts and\ngeneralists, have been observed many tiri)~~;in va.rj\"Oils circu~iances (see the All-Star\nProblem). This. is a task akin to herding ca~::::lp:'groups with distributed knowledge and\nexpertise, lower than average performance ctiitlibonly has been found. But there seem to be\nfactors that mediate this effect: the networks of~~i!ll\"relationships among group members\ncan minimize the problem.\n                                       ..::::= .\n                                                .:\n                                      . .. .\n\n(U) In complex situationswhe\"fctirl'forJ~~ion must be pooled across several domains,\ndecentralized networks feaqfumfhealtby working relationships among many members have\nbeen proven to be mon::.;~ff~~iye th~J{centralized networks. Centralized networks often are\nhierarchical structure$;:whereiiiQ~~:ii\\dividuals tend to have just a few relationships which\nend up all Aq~i.p.g,m~Q;!l_few prominent others.25\n       . .;- \".:' .. ~-~~::;!:~.\n                     ,=:=:=~-.\n\n(U) n~P.pears 'iii~ advan~~~-~f decentralized, well-connected networks is that the flow of\n\nkn6wi~8~.1!f:ldmformation is maximized. Lack of shared baseline knowledge or expertise is\noverconie@.Qugh connections to others who know what is needed. What would otherwise\nremain isolaf~:P.Qekets of knowledge can more easily be integrated. The existence and\nfunctioning o(ili~se networks can be studied, and methods used in social network analysis\ncan better enable visualization and measurement of group structure and information flow.\n\n(U) Recommendations for Handling Expertise Issues\n-\n(U) Select for fluid expertise in your experts. Encourage and teach fluid expertise\nmethods to all members of the group.\n-\nfiU-AFknowledge that expertise alone will not be sufficient to solve the problemsD\nL__jwill face. Incentivize collaborative, instead of\"all-star,\" behavior.\n-\n(U) Build robust, decentralized social networks for information sharing. Measure and\nevaluate these social networks, and take steps to improve them as deficiencies are\nobserved. Share results with the group.\n-\n(U) Institutionalize these practices and metrics to shape the culture.\n(U) Role of Negotiation\n(U} In fulfilling its task, ~,---,Jwill be considering an array of ideas from these different communities that will be in competition at times. As noted previously, beliefs are possessions, often carefully guarded and reluctantly surrendered. Under situational pressures, including high emotion and stress, we tend to cling to what we know and believe, i.e., conclusions and decision algorithms that have held up in the past. The process of yielding a position or idea on a given subject is much like any other negotiation process. Two or more parties, all focused on the critical shared task of attribution analysis, will be taking different positions on a variety of questions. The resolution of those differences will rt;guite a giveand-take of ideas that will lead to a conclusion. As such, the concepts ofbowj~$1 rationality, bounded willpower, and bounded self-interest described earlier will apply.\n\n' ;:!:::.,\n-\n. -~-~ .\n\n-.;~:: .. ;.;,,:;\n(U) Studies of the negotiation process have shown that participants in ~~:tt~~~~~ r~~~d positively, and behave more generously and are more willi.Qg to co~~g~r the po~i!ion of the other party when they feel they are being treated fairly. Mlitkers ot\"faitri:re.atmerii can include being given an opportunity to participate fully in the decision-ri\\~ing pro~~~s; attention and\n~ct given to input, posi~on in ~e hie~chy, h?nesty, ~p ope~~~;s~ _.E~tablishme~t of an L_j culture that fosters th1s behav1or wdl result m a IJlQ: collaboraHYe and productive analytic and decision-making environment.\n\n.. ::'.-.\n\n,.::::::~=:.\n\n--\n.. ::~(:;~-:-::\\)\n::::~~~~~:~=\n\n## (U) The Critical Role Of **Exercises** AnCjt~P.J-~Iiilding .\n\n(U)j jshould meet regularly for joi~~=~~_xrcises to build relationships and the expenence necessary for a real crisis. Across tlie;:!mee communities, the key challenge will be to improve information sharing, cormnunicatioils, and build relationships to facilitate cooperation and sharing betwee~-~ey ~6imel, prior to a real-Iifec:==J\"ctivation. By identifying seniorc=Jrepr~~en~J:ives\"in advance, running exercises, and increasing awareness ofagency-specifiC' ~pabiliiies and information requirements, the group's performance in a real c~is ~ifl proy~;inore fluid than without any preparation. This is due to the fact that if 1\n- Ji~ acfWAl~~quired for an incident, the normal learning curve of this important 8!'9-P.P. witi~J?.~ reduce~ ihereby improving performance. Having representatives from th~:IG::t:~.~~d ~.'?Oplmunities working closely together, sharing information in realtime,.-~9 serviQ:g' as comfi;ijibity-wide liaisons will speed analysis, enhance situational awar~ii'~~~~\n'.\n\n.\n\n~ and reduce the risk of groupthink (which the communities might fac%~!;~~orkmg as mdependent entities). Analysts at NCTC who have access-to-the data system8;~f;9,~S these communities should support this effort. At different stages of an incident, this C9<lrdination and information sharing hopefully will allowt=ho perform far more efficiently at integrating the attribution process.\n\n\n(U) Recognize the Need forD Inoculation of Personnel and Information Networks Prior to Events\n(U) In considering how to structure II\nand facilitate communications, it is important for C]personnel to stand up mor~tly than just during a crisis. There need to be ongoing table top exercises and drills, as well as team-building activities, that help to familiarize people with each other (and build the personal relationships and trust necessary to facilitate communications and information sharing), and also create awareness of the unique\n\nchallenges faced by I\n~cross different types of scenarios. One advantage of running simulations and other exercises is the inoculating effect on the participants: This inoculation may include reducing the need to learn who other people are in their groups, or in outside groups with which they will have to work. It also builds personal relationships that help encourage information sharing and a greater ability to challenge assumptions or 'arguments raised in group settings (since people with pre-established personal relationships have a greater comfort level in challenging assumptions and arguments raised by people they know well, as opposed to relative strangers).\n\n(U) It also will facilitate the development of people who could become liaisons across the three communities, due to their increased awareness of the issues and information needed by the different communities and their personal relations and comfort zones. Th~~ is,guite similar to how President Eisenhower organized the Policy Planning Board (P~~:).:~on his NSC.\n\nHe wanted his NSC policy planning staff to work on exercises and plans for scel:\\~~s th3lt did not yet exist, primarily because this provided experience working thq~FY,pes of:~~s\n(thereby reducing stress when the cases happened in real life) and beca~sifft~prQvide(l'\n.\n\nexperience in interacting and challenging each others' assu!}!ptions. 4~i~enho~~:9:id not want his advisers trying to acclimate to a crisis context on the tl}i;ilor to.:i~t~:~?'perie~ce interacting and challenging each other (or him) during delibem,tiP,~ H~~~~ted that rperienle to ~xist prior to an eve~t. This underscores th~:~~lue(it.!~?c~tati?n of groups. 0\n, and It also suggests that 1t would be best not tQ havec=Jw~eractmg only durmg stand ups of actual WMD events; team memb~~sJloutd,~~._interacting' continually.\n\n,,/'':,:;~,\\~1~: .\n\n:~;~t:::.;/\n(U)Estllblish Metrics to *Ensure* Effecti~~~~.o.[.lfcercises ~~~Training\n(U) Exercises and training are essential to ~s'\\i:~g healthy and effective group interactions and accurate attribution analyses. The effectivii~.ofthese activities must be measured objectively, however. As mentioned else\"Y-pere, tiji~should include exercises under realistic, high stress conditions with active red t~1ng to ~hallenge the C=:J response capabilities.\n\nIn addition, the performance 9f:tb~~~group and individual members should be assessed by an unidentified observer so thafpar.tibipaqts do not behave differently around the observer\n(avoiding the \"Hawtho~~ E!~t\"). ~~ermore, there should be a thorough debriefing of the successes and faUuf~:Of ea~JJ=~~rcise that will include an anonymous 360 degree evaluation .'?-f-~!f:ch P.~.~ipant. Finally, social network analysis should be conducted of email, telephoq~?an~;ffi~el-pe~Jll C!)mmunication among participating members to assess the exte~t;~d na~ of therr=~6rmation sharing and sourcing.\n\n,..~=-~;~:;::a~\n)\n... ~\n~~==~~~:-.... -~\n\n## (U)Pres~Iif~~Plits.That Present Differences Of Opinion To Policy-Makers .\n\n(U) Much as p~gident Eisenhower insisted that policy splits between departments or advisers be preserved in NSC papers produced by the Policy Planning Board, so that disagreements or uncertainties would not be papered over prior to his being able to consider the competing arguments, it is critically important that c=Jproducts also preserve splits in reporting for senior policy-makers. Although there is the understandable desire to provide a consensus response for policy-makers, this is offset by the magnitude of the decisions and actions that senior policy-makers will have to take in response to a highly charged WMD event. Even if it adds to the uncertainty and ambiguity of the policy context, those very elements could be important factors for their consideration and assist in avoiding anchoring to the usual suspects, and other cognitiv~ errors. Given the differing speeds at which the three communities likely ~ill enter evidence into the system, reporting these disagreements (or areas where there is an argument for withholding judgment until further analysis is completed) would greatly benefit policy-makers by providing additional context for interpreting the data.\n\n(U) Counter Debilitllling Effects of High Stress Environment on AA G by Employing Stress Monitors\n(U) Groups operating in highly emotional and stressful environments, are at risk of having their attributions biased by tl).e effects of hot cognition (the intense emotions of the moment) or by stress-based group malfunctions (i.e., the perception of short time, overreliance on stereotypes and other shortcuts, premature anchoring, etc.). Having group members educated about the effects of stress and emotion on their cognition will help them to serve as stress monitors for any c=Jgroup in which they serve by watching;f,?r J!.ebilitating symptoms in the group and warning against them during the attribution proces~~K\n~:~~~:~!~!:;:.\n\n;:\n...... .. ..\n\n .. !:;::;~:-~.~~\n(U) Emph11Size Information Sharing *and* Enhanced~\nCoordinatitili::;;~;;z.(,\n .... ;.\n\n(U) Given the overriding need for information sharing and . ~9ordin(\\~~;: duri~~:~;;)VMD\nincident, should focus on taking steps to avoid inl!'ffici~m5ies\n1fU~c.ommiihication that could prove detrimental to theC]mission. This should be gixc:.l:! prioliij;~\\ier concerns about groupthink. Any reduction in biases being introduc~(:t'~intO'~, f9r'example, from the IC or LE efforts is far outweighed by the problems posct~U?Y lack of~mmunication or coordination, and the benefits that would be oJ:!~ip,~ py:~}Wancing tfiese elements. As an organization composed of members from wiiltipl~ljgenci~~;:~9.1P-'Within and outside of GovernmentJ\nI is not the kind ot:J.W1m'Y, ip~ar orgiji'i~tion susceptible to groupthink. nius, the focus should be'upt:)Ii:~.aiicing inforination sharing and coordination.\n\n~\":=~~=~:~ ...\n\n## !'::~::;.. . (U) Summary Of Recommendations ~:R:\n\n(U) Promote a healthy cultur~.,.,...... .,);;:?\n\n/\n\n(U)J\nJas a new org~izatj'on,.~an seize the opportunity to explicitly shape an orgamzatlonal culture desigije~to opt~ize functioning and mitigate or eliminate the effects of known negative factotS. This culttire could include behavioral norms and attitudes such as:\n=~~~iy~ ._,\n;:~::~;~;~;~~~~~t\n\n-\nFacili~~;p~n:c6tpro.unication and information sharing\n-\nMi,Wfiiiie'iP.*iroup s~~-distinctions\n-\n.~!i~e in~iiisivenesfi;(iiermeable boundaries for belonging, especially with regard to\n aniil~ic.aspects)\n... ,. .....\n\n-\nTrust iti:~~~?~9ns\n.\n-\nCreate co~on group identity\n-\nEstablish a\"~hared sense of goals and mission\n-\nIncorporate a role of \"devil's advocate\" or red teaming\n-\nUnderstand the strengths and limitations of expertise (link to expertise section)\n-\nPractice healthy interactive strategies, such as negotiation (link to negotiation section)\n(U). Maintain and grow social networks\n(U) Among their many benefits, well-connected and well-structured social netw~rks improve performance in groups facing complex problems. c=J members must maintain and leverage their existing networks while building new relationships both within and across group boundaries. Regular, formal assessments on network structure and individual position and performance within the network, using methods from social network analysis, will provide a\n\nmeans to evaluate the current functional status and suggest areas for improvement.\n\n(U) Manage Expertise Effectively\n(U) Expertise, while often critical, can be a double-edged sword in groups, generating conflict, rigidity, and excessive deference. To leverage expertise effectively, I\n~hould\n\nconsider:\n-\nSelecting for fluid expertise in its members, and encouraging and teaching fluid expertise\nmethods to the group.\n-\nincentivizing collaborative, instead of all-star, behavior. Expertise alone is not sufficient.\nMetrics for individual success should include cooperative behavior and information\nsharing. Provide actionable feedback to individuals, such as a personal social network .\nanalysis.\n:: .. -:~:\n-\nBuilding robust, decentralized social networks for information sharing 1,--.::.::.w\"- ---..,\nc=J Measure and e~aluate these organizational social networks, and take si~p~,_to .~\nimprove them as deficiencies are observed. Share results.\n,.;;~:~:;:;..\n:;~::~;::-\n-\nInstitutionalizing these practices and metrics to shape the culture.:;-.{\n;~'~;;:;:~: .  .\n.\n:~~!;\n>=~ ~~~;:~: .\n~~ :f~~~\n(U) Mitigate maladaptive group dynamics.\nk:-.\n-:;;;:;;,_ ...\n- ~;;~!;~'=; ~\n..~;. ':;\"\"\n-\n(U) Avoid over worry about groupthink, but also avoiq.j!J.sulat.ji:y,,ofpei'spectives.\nConsider membership criteria to create a balance witbiii\"the gn)iip~{aeross status,\nexpertise, etc.) and recognize problems ~~S?f-~~ed,~iiji:~ewly forfued groups.\n-\n(U) Recognize the need for inoculatiol}.:ofpers~!ptl ana:i:9f-9~tion networks prior to\nevents and meet regularly for joint ~~~f.sises ro.:J;uild the ~hitionships/experience\nnecessary before a real crisis.\n  -:~;:;::. _/,'\n\n-\n(U) Preserve splits involving differencesi8fiqpinion in reporting to consumers and\nemphasize information sharing and enhancMt:=J coordina ..\nti_on_._--,\n-\n(U) Counter debilitating effects of a ~j~ stre~s-~environmen~\nI by employing stress\nmonitors.\n. . ..\n..{::\n\n-\n~elect a mixture of e.?C-Pe~:Witli' differing competencies (both task and general) for\nL__j subgroups to enh~cc:.:flexibijity in dealing with ambiguous environments and\ncoordination across_t]le ~communities .\n.\n:)~~~\n~:~:::::::~:;:::;-~\n\n## (U) Bringing The Right Broomstick To The Wizard\n\n(U) This article focuses upon key elements of the senior policy-maker environment and how these may pose challenges I\nlin effectively communicating its attribution assessments.\n\nThese elements include: how senior consumers may view threats and risk, differences in accessibility to inner circles, the right kinds of experts to communicate with them, and the importance of making I\nIa key information hub for decision-makers.\n\n(U) Understanding the Sensitivities and Constraints of Senior Policy-Makers\n(U) One of the key challenges!\n\n~ill be to not only produce the highest quality attribution assessments, but also to understand that the consumers of its informati.Qn (senior policy-makers) will be deal in with olitical issues and perspectives that may:ij~ye significant impact upon ow its assessments are used. I\n1.\n\nI\nlit must unders at not a 1 policy-makers use information and:advici;ih~~thc;\nsame ways. To maintain effective communication or input into the polj~ypf~_~S, it\"fs'\nessential j I to understand hQw policy-makers di!f~r frolll:iP.9~ .. anothei-;jipd how they d\n. . .\n\n.\n\n....\n\n.;\n.....\n\n'to'\nrespon to cnsts sttuabons.\n\n\n.\n~;~~:;;~\n.. ,\n.-~~=j~.\n\n.\n\n~:.::~~~:y~\n(U) We also must consider the state-of-mind of the decisio11-~.ii~J5(~ well~ the analyst providing data and assessments to the decision-maker) .~'!.~~~uent io:~;;lilgh consequence event such as a nuclear detonation. They wilL~::11.g!tated;;~9rried atiout family and friends, and may well be in a vengeful state-of-m~9~~iti:~s9 coni~k:~~z-~ould a decision-~aker be willing to react with punitive actions, ey.~il:oifthe c~inty ofPl'e attributions or clarity of the evidence may not be there? Will their'sti.fi~'J::.otproof change? Will the psychology associated with the event and the pressures fo~:~~tion reduce the decision-maker's standard of proof and his or her demanded level of certaincy:t~;QJ.e'assessment process? We need to also consider the public demand for the govei'I}P[lent to:;tiike action in the aftermath of a catastrophic event. This can cause tretp.~iiaous pressure to shorten timelines, and lower the threshold for action. It could.b\"e:JjiUdeiii to define certainty thresholds in advance of an event to help circumvent these ph~o,:nena. :.\n\n!~ .. ::\"'\n. ::\n(U\nit is important to undersla!l9:,~!=ver.ali~~~ues regaroing the sensitivities and constraints that are likely to apply to seni?f.:-P9li6~f:Fers::~~P.~,the activation ofj j\n.. ~;::~;~=:~.\n\n)!:-\n~~=~~~\n(DJ Th~t::JAnalyst as Consultant\n(U>I\ndependent on a host of other factors and constraints. Information must be actively incorporated into the mind. New information has to be assimilated into a person's preexisting\n\n## Secre~\n\ncontext, or state of information about the world. \"Meaning construction\" takes place when this new information can connect with what is already understood. Our ability to absorb new information is limited. People selectively attend to new information that connects, and may be oblivious to the rest.27 Emotional states, such as stress and anxiety, as well as the degree of cognitive openness, can limit one's ability to wrestle with new information, especially if it conflicts with previously held beliefs.\n\n(U) In the non-routine, hard problem world!\n\nI, information seeking will be part of a process. The early stages of information seeking are likely to show a marked lack of clarity and precision because the specifics of the problem are still imperfectly understood.\n\nConfusion, uncertainty, doubt and frustration are natural, and a desire to just drop it and move on to some other aspect of the problem needs to be tempered with realistic expectations of how information seeking actually works.\n\n;!~;;{''\n.. ~;:::;:;:~ ~\n.\n\n(U) Later, as new information gathering starts and understanding of the P.IY.~!em ifiiP.~9~bs, one may experience relief and satisfaction that the needed information ~h:g'~~J? . suppllea. Conversely, one may experience disappointment that no re~Qlution ~~r{be aclil~v~ even though the information need is clear and focused.\n:::-;\n!; '~;::~:..\n\n?:\n.\n\n.\n\n..... _\n~ .\n\n.,..\n\n.\n\n(U) Paradoxically, only after you know your answer are y~~=~~~~~;Y?-.kn~~;t~ur question.\n\n3:~,~~- .-\n-~~~:~~;:~~\n(U) Performing a Reality Check on Information.;Seekiri'g:;g;.,\n,;\n(U) From the perspective ofthe analyst\n.. ,,,.,,.,,,...\n\n,\nI\nI there is a compleme~~-'-:\n-\n.,...,,.;:p-~--cob:-:1:-em\".\n\n;-7\\. --=Th=-e-p-ro\"\"=)j\"'=le_m_ma_y_tr_a_n_sn-=-o-rm---:fr=-o-m----::''what do I need to know to take action\" into ;wlia(~(!<;,>.~s;my client really need me to provide?\" By taking the perspective of analyst as consultantl:J:t;~ill require more than simply answering the questions that were asked. Optimal performance:l~:!aformation seeking in this context has to be oriented around knowing the mind oftheclieni:::\n.. ~;~'~\n.\n\n-\n(U) What is the goal ~r:fii~;!;c~~der's intent?\" Questions may be tailored to\naddress what they p~cejVe cari:be answered, instead of stating their actual goal.\n-\n(U) What is the.;qtfxr:~tion Pr::<iecision to be taken?\n'.: - .: ,..\n.. .lo ... :!i .... - .. ~~;;~:-~\n- (U) What lev.~tof detaihrs:fiiily needed?\n-\n(l!.):J.~;:!8~re:;afi~~~r authority/group beyond the current client to whom this\n j.nfonrl~~pn nee~~g.,be presented?\n(U):Q~j\"\n=r:ctivities !;n undoubtedly go beyond providing a single final assessment report. T&:~~~le ~ew information needs in a dynamic environment, the process must be interactive ana~;~~lf-corre~ting to whatever degree possible, not \"fire.:and-forget.\" To confirm understanding,<5fwhat is actually needed, llmay choose to implement steps such as:\n\n-\n(U) Provide interim feedback on th'estateof the work, and allow for course\ncorrections.\n-\n(U) Provide samples of answers -they will know it when they see it.\n-\n(U) Rule out the irrelevant or superfluous with counter-examples.\n(U) Is it Safe to not Know?\n\n(U) Acknowledging ignorance, that is, lack of specific knowledge of expertise in a social environment, can be a risky proposition. Given the complexities of the c:=Jmission and operating environment, and its composition, both lack of joint expertise and of situation-\n\n## S~\n\nspecific pieces of information are a given. I\n!will need to create a social norm that reaching out to gather information and expertise is not just appropriate, it is required.\n\nAcknowledging lack of perfect expertise, and taking action to rectify the situation, must be valued normative behavior.\n\n(U) Recommendations Relating to Asking the Right Question\n(U) Dealing with the social and psychological factors around information seeking will be critical!\n\n~ The following should be considered as potential methods to improve fllriction:\n(U) Providing education on the information seeking process, to avoid common pitfalls and overcome natural frustrations, and be able to optimize their own behaviors. ::..\n\n(U) Creating social norms that accept imperfect knowledge among members, .~4;{eward\n outreach to acquire the right knowledge and expertise.\n\n\n'\n::;~;:;..\n\n(U) Tapping into the mind of the client.\n\n.:;:=::::1::::-.\n\n:::~~;(\n\n                                                                                                                                                              :;:~:= .\n                                                                                                                                                             .l:o\" ~~~-:~ ..\n(U) Recognize that Pressure for immediate (Short-Term) Political or Pfl_ljt;y R;J~~~f!; WiU\nBe Directly Proportional to the Magnitude of the Consequences Surniiiidi~g an E~int\n\n/;. (\n                        ~~~;~~~~:.~.\n                                            ..\n\n(U) In the event of a substantial WMD incident, policy-maii~rs yviU:fJ~i~,~~me~~~~s pressure\nto respond publicly to an event (especially to a highly visible w,Mp emplQ'Y;m'imt resulting in\nsubstantial loss of life or contamination) by quickly asce~~g~''bJ~e o't'responsibility for\nthe incident, implementing strategies for managing the H~~onse, and:).~unching punitive\nactions against the perpetrator(s).\n                                            . ...... ..::::}:,.\n                                                                 -\n\n(U) Ahead of any WMD event,r--l~h~u,ld f~~~ upo~-~~h~~ting senior consumers about the reality that technical ~rliij~\n.. ~\"ene investigations, or IC efforts are likely to lag behind their desire for more rapid delivefY.:~f.actionable information. This is where managing the expectations of policy-makers thtQqgb.pre-incident education is important so that realistic understandings oftechnical ~<!Flbilitie~, how fast certain analyses are likely to take, etc. can be provided prior to the op,S:et of a crisis situation (when tolerance for that type of learning will be extremely,~i.nijt~d).':Pre-event exercises (ideally including senior customers) would educate tl!e\"~.!c;-8ar4ing the reality of how fast they will receive actionable information.\n\n.c :=:-(\n.. ;::\n~==~:~'\"\n~~=:~!-:;~;-::;::\n(U) Recogn~~i/}!it:J;~kCJ!;-Ma::;;olerance of Risk (and wiUingness to IICcept various meiiS.f!ifis or es'j/!nates Of.?,e.iiamty) WiU Diminish as the Magnitude of Potential Co.nseij\"f!;~:nces:'(On *EithefAction* or Jn~~etion) lncreiiSes\n\";:::::: .... ~:\n(U) Reg~~i~~~:9f.how many different standards or measures I\nlmight use to communicate ~j.iying levels of certainty to policy-makers about its findings, the actual consequencesof an event (either real or potential) will cause a subjective shift on the part of policy-makers in how they will interpret this information. For example, faced with the chance that a nuclear device might be detonated in a major US city -and a 75% certainty expressed by the IC or law enforcement that the device could be seized and rendered safe from terrorists before it could be detonated- it is likely that policy-makers would consider a\n25% chance of a nuclear explosion in an American city too large a risk to take at that moment.\n\n(U) During the Cuban Missile Crisis, US Air Force and IC estimates that 90% of 'known'\nnuclear missiles could be struck with air power (while only about 67% of the missiles likely to be on the island had been found) provoked Defense Secretary McNamara to argue in the\n\n## Se~ (B) (1)\n\nExComm that even one missile launched at an American city was too great a risk for any President to take (and a consequence beyond acceptable imagining). When consequences for an action are high (in terms of physical, economic, military, or political blow back), the standard of certainty policy-makers are likely to demand will be greater than under other consequences. In contrast, if such a certainty level were expressed about the possible origins of the material found in an unexploded, interdicted ROD (for instance, from stolen medical equipment in the FSU), policy-makers might well view this as acceptable proof for taking actions like contacting the. Russian government diplomatically to request information and assistance.\n\n(~) The attribution question may involve a spectrum ranging from successful interdiction of nuclear materials that failed to detonate (which allows greater time for inve~tiga,tions, more careful analysis, and a process that takes place out of the public view) to thos~itqv'otving significant, visible consequences (use of a Radiological Dispersal Device, alsci\"kli()~ as. an ROD, or nuclear detonation). In those cases where substantial military r.~.~M1ltio~~~q;#t adverse impact on US interests might follow as a result), policy-make~:M'i'li~~ly to iitSist upon a very high level of attribution certainty.\n\n\n...\n\n.~::::J\n,;;~::::;-\n:=:~~\n;.e~~~~=-~~:\n~~~ .. -\n~)\n!fte hypoth~ti~l ex~ple_ of a l~ely conne~tion to te~~r.jst ~~-~~~o;;h K~~ean matenalm an ROD tnctdent m Chicago Illustrates th1s pro~l~in. '!l~ause.any US m1htary strike against Pyongyang could potentially trigger a rea~.tibfi from itie;~orth (such as a new war on the peninsula or retaliation against Seq!lk9.x:.otl)~f;6lgional aUit!s), the probable consequences of the policy actions if the a~i56iii>~:js ace~pioo would obviously temper how policy-makers would view the degree o{,~nty'fli~y wouia:~re:<iuire regarding the evidence\n. .\n\n'\n.\n\n~ ~,...\n~-\n....\n\npnor to taking act1on.\n\n.\n-:~:;;,_\n/\n\n=:~~~~~~;;_\n(U) Policy-makers facing substantial consequei:iC.~~f-9r taking (or not taking) certain actions will be far more risk averse (and require f~P.:~P.ighe~;ii:vels of confidence that the analysis is sound) than will those facing more limi_~;&r less'significant costs. In those cases, lower levels of certainty may be ac~p.~b.Je, ff'ihe costs of such acceptance appear not to be prohibitive. As cqiiS\"i4~ v~ous measures of certainty for attribution, it should\ntake into account this b~jc ~~!illty: ~~!risk acceptance on the part of policy-makers i~\nclosely bound to thei!' percepij~~;~9ritlle consequences. It is part of the complex politicalrsychol.of;!~~~~~r~~~~;~.,w~ll \"diive how policy-makers actually interpret the analysis from\n(U)-~~;jJ.lhere~f.imprec~:i~:ofterminology for expressing levels of certainty together with the varY'iii.g:9-~grees of meaning individuals can assign to the same term suggests that making an effort to:~~bli&h a shared understanding of terms relating to certainty is imperative. For example, diffegnfindividuals show surprising contrasts in their interpretation of terms such as possibly, prbbably, likely, unlikely, and certainly. But even if the communities adopted legal terms such as beyond a reasonable doubt, clear and convincing evidence, and the preponderance of the evidence that have the appeal of familiarity to the listener, they still\n.\n\nretain the same kinds of imprecision due to each individual's own subjective idea of what the terms mean. This is an area where ~\nlwill have to move purposefully to induce the three communities to work more closely together to reduce the risk of miscommunication by establishing a common lexicon and definitions regarding levels of certainty.\n\n## (Ul Understand That Peoole Resoond To Estimates Of Risk Based Upon Whether These Are Presented In The Domain Of Gains Or Loses\n\n(U) Prospect theory notes that people are risk accepting when information (such as reports or data being presented to decision-makers) is couched in language emphasizing their loss of current possessions, status, etc., but risk averse when such information is framed in terms of gains that also requires risking current security or possessions. Thus, /\n~enior Level must exercise care in the labeling of various kinds of attributions, estimates of a current situation, or the chances of an operation being successful or not - since senior leaders will likely respond in prospect theory ways to the presented information.\n\n## (U) Not Au Senior Policy-Makers Are The Same\n\n(U) One of the major challenges I\nI in providing information t9;~~9::;:~~i~~:f::-:;:\nmakers (including the President) is the reality that no single approach fj.ts all:P.<?l.icy-ni3.kers.\n\nRegardless of how~\n~tructures itself, sets up acces~.;~hannel,sJ~~:.senioi\":l~~18, or packages its assessments, these things will ultimately run tip''ag~inst tH~:P,~rsonat styles and characteristics of the policy-makers themselves. Like all indiv,i$J;~ls, seiif~~policy-makers will vary greatly from one another in their needs for info~tior{g~t;!l~ring'\"\"and debate (prior to making decisions), how much they feel the need to reJy:lij)on ex~eij~opinions prior to reaching decisions, and in their overall sensitiy;i~;~Q t~t;;:~~ounding 'policy environment .\n\n... ;~;/: ~:::::~::\n.\n\n~:::~~:;:.-~\n(U) This is reflected in the broad leadet:~~.P,..literat!J!:e that ha8;:Qeveloped over the years in the fields of political psychology and Presidd1q~~:~Wdies. It chrOnicles the wide range of differences in how modem American Presideii~:J!ls well as foreign leaders) have structured and actually 'used' their advisory systems durilig:\"Cti_s_is decision-making as a result of their own, unique individual differences (i.e., ~r.;onalii};:bharacteristics, style, prior background, etc.) Illustrating this point is the book, ;':f}ie President and His Inner Circle: Leadership Style and the Advisory Process in f:oi~ign Affairs,\" by Thomas Preston which profiles modem Presidents from Harry Trull}in !ht'ougl! George H. W. Bush across foreign policy decisionmaking cases. 28 Here . t!t~ ijl.9ividuat~haracteristics ofthese Presidents played a predictive role in shaping how ~h~y:woill~:~~~fiire and utilize their advisory systems during future crises.\n\n.-:~::::.\n\n-\n~-::;:~:;:::::::~ .\n-::::~i ...\n\n(U) D.Uferent ~s of ~~~id~~ts favored more or less open advisory systems, sought out more:a~:J~~s qiVerse sets df advisers, had widely varying needs for-information or diversity of advice, liiia;Dad differing needs for (or reliance upon) expert advice. In simple terms, this distinction~f~:J?-~.~ought of as a difference between leaders in terms of I) the degree of control or per8c?nill involvement they required; and 2) their own personal need for information and sensitivity to the broader policy environment around them.\n\n(U) Leaders who are more hands-on tend to delegate less to subordinates and want more personal engagement throughout the policy or decision process. Leaders having substantial policy experience or expertise in a given area would also be expected to be more engaged and to delegate less to experts. Presidents Eisenhower and GHW Bush, for example, were much more highly engaged throughout the policy process (and much less dependent upon the views of expert advisers in coming to their own judgments) in the foreign policy arena than they were in the domestic policy arena (where both had less experience and interest). In contrast, those with less personal experience or expertise in an area will be much more inclined to delegate to subordinates and will be more dependent upon expert advice in reaching conclusions. So for Presidents Truman or George W. Bush, who both lacked extensive foreign policy experience or knowledge, expert advisers around them had much more of an impact (and were delegated more of a role in policy formulation) than were advisers to President Eisenhower.\n\n(U)\nf one is dealing with an engaged, hands-on consumer\n(perhaps one who has substantial foreign policy experience), the attributions or analyses provided senior leaders may be used far more selectively than would be the case if the consumer were of the opposite type. Moreover, it is very important to have educated the more hands-on or experienced leaders in advance of crises regarding I\nS\nabilities and value in attribution assessments, so that a pre-established relationship will be developed that thoroughly engages with that leader's desire for involvement. :.\n\n..\n\n=t~:.:=J\n(U) Similarly, less sensitive leaders, who see the world in more absolute, black~~9;:~hite terms, tend to be more ideological, rely more upon simple stereotypes or,~!ogies:t~;i:i~\nunderstand their problem environment (or the options presented to thetiJX\"iliii:{~t~d ti>\"ll'ave more closed advisory systems populated by advisers who sb~re simiJ~iJ>elieti~~:views as the leader (and have less diversity of view as a result). Histb'ric exailip\\~s.-~f such American Presidentswould include PresidentS Truman, Johnson, Reagaq;~:~p G.'W.:!~.gsh. More sensitive leaders (who show more differentiation in their ~~~jro~~JJ-! seeing the world in shades of gray and many perspectives instead of in absQ,lp~es) tend \"titb.ave more open advisory systems, gather information from m1!.~~;~~r~~:d~~~r.se sources (that both supports and contradicts their own views), and pop':l~atethejt.~~visoi:t~Y.~tems with a diverse group of advisers who do not share common vie~~:9.r positipiis. HistciBe examples here would include Presidents Eisenhower, Kennedy, GHW\":B4J:l,_<;::,liiiton, and Obama.\n\n .. :~~-:-:\n(U) This distinction between sensitive and le;~:~~~j~ive styles is important for I\nI if the consumer is a more sensitive type of l~per, I .\n\nI will be operating in an environment more conducive for communicating inf9tJiiation to senior levels (since these styles are more active in gathering informatio9.f~~jce from a broad array of sources), have more open advisory systems, and compfise .a.Ctors;.who monitor their surrounding environments. As a result, the contraction o,f..~u$.~rity pr<J:~lem will be less severe for I\nland the problems of access to senior lc::v~ls:'les~::~.~~RU~ted than it will be when providing assessments and attributions ~'?.less ~~A~itive leaders: For these less sensitive leaders, I\n1 should anticipat~;:iB!i@!l mo~:~losed advisory and advice system and greater difficulty in coiilll?:~icating!~ffectiveiY.,:}o\"senior levels.\n\nmust recognize that greater barriers will~'i:i~t;.to gaiiilng the attention of policy-makers. For example, because less sensitive leader,; te;~p be more ideological, more likely to adopt stereotypes of opponents or analogies dii:Y,~Q by. personal experiences, and surround themselves with similar types of\nadvisers in te~:;ofbeliefs, it will be very difficult to successfully communicate that the usual suspectsfuight not be behind a given WMD incident, strong, pre-existing belief structures notwithstanding.\n\n(U) Generally, discrepant information has a great deal of difficulty penetrating to senior policy-makers in such contexts and, even if it does, has the problem of gaining the attention of policy-makers (or perhaps more importantly) the perception of 'credibili 'for them if it conflicts with pre-existing views. This is why having an informed, active ctor as part of the inner circle for such leaders (who then provides credibility to assessments due to their own status within the leadership group) becomes so critical. This relates ~o the idea noted earlier that beliefs are possessions and that a major hurdle in getting policy-makers to think outside of the box in attribution environments requires a willingness to challenge preconceived notions or views./\n~his will become most problematic when the consumers have less sensitive styles because those prior beliefs or modes of operation that previously were employed will represent a simplifying heuristic (or shortcut) to them. It will require more effort for an c=:Jlttribution assessment that violates these to receive a fair hearing. More sensitive leader styles will be more amenable to considering these outside the box assessments and will not rely so heavily upon preconceived notions in framing or\n-understanding the policy environment or situation.\n\n(U} Bottom-line: If/\n~s dealing with a President favoring a more open advisory process, diverse sets of advisors and extensive collection of advice and information - the task of obtaining access for providing attribution information will be far easier than it will be if advising the reverse style of leadership. Although prior education of the existing White House regarding capabilities, managing expectations, and setting up relations~ig{for c=J\ntechnical advisers should be done in any event, with less sensitive leader styles\"iil\"d.more closed advisory systems, this becomes critical to avoid serious communi'?{l~~n p;6t;!~m~: in the event of a crisis. On the positive side, leaders with less expertise in:iif~~-.will Se'inore dependent upon expert advice or explanations of the problero envirqp;qient, sci:~j~hproper access, the analytic product I\nI could be of great ~~istanc~iiftib,J,se for;~uch leaders in understanding their situation and evaluating options.\n\n/:::..\n\n:::;~;::;:'\n{U) c=Must Calibrate Communications with Senior c6g~m:!~~1ea -~pon the Way Different Leaders Structure Their Advisory Systems /::;:;;:;..\n\n\n(U) Because the flows of access to sen!.o~i!~~_:_:~_ ';l..,ircl:~=~;;t oolirmakers (such as the President) change from one White'Hoilse;Qc.cbpant to the nex must take into account differences across consumers in tenliS:~~f:J:;10w ~ey use advice, how much information they tend to gather, and how attentiV~:!ste'ihey to their environment in setting up their communication strategies.\n\n..;:)\n.. :-\n_ .. : .. :-\"\n.... -\n.~~;~~\n.\n\n(U) Leaders with closed adv\\soi}i::s\"ystems and tendencies toward limited (highly selective)\ninformation search will proy,'e ~p.O~e difpcult for C:=J to communicate with effectively than will consumers with m9~ o~~ sys~~Qis who actively seek out broader ranges of information.\n\nM As a result. c--j:r:t e~~~i~~{~ommunication conduits to senior policy-makers\n/\n~ These conduits must be sufficiently robust to pe~?.9Y.~ffec~~~ly ~d ~aintain access in cases where leaders have relatively closed inner circles~Q'~!~ll~ the contraction of authority during a crisis makes even open systems more imperm~il~J.~? ....\n\n:::~:::::~;~ ..\n\n## (U) *The* Con;~~Tion Of Authority Problem\n\n(U) The Contraction of Authority problem reflects the reality that the inner circle around the national leadership tends to shrink during intense, high stakes crises to much smaller groups composed primarily of the closest personal advisers to the President. This occurs because of\n1) time constraints, secrecy requirements, and the need for rapid decision-making often imposed by such crises; and (2) the desire ofleaders for a comfort zone composed of their most trusted advisers during such times.\n(U)\nthis contraction of authority could potentially pose serious problems for its ability to effectively communicate its attribution assessments and maintain the kind of ongoing contact necessary to keep policy-makers adequately informed of new developments\n\n## Sec~Orn\n\nas evidence continues to be gathered and evaluated during a crisis. Therefore, prior to the actual activation I\n!during a WMD crisis, it is critical to work to create and maintain an access channel to senior policy-makers that can survive ~ction of authority during an event. This could be pursued by: 1) setting up theL__Prganizational structure to include a senior Presidential adviser (someone who would be expected to remain within even the tightest crisis inner circle or have easy access to it), who would become an active c=::Jparticipant, take part in its exercises, and become a knowledgeable conduit for information to senior levels; 2) educating senior policy-makers at the highest levels about the c=:Jmd the functions/information it can provide so that it is instantly thought of by these leaders (even during a time-constrained crisis) as the main resource for understanding the difficult questions they will face and coordinating the views across the IC, LE, and TNF\ncommunities.\n\n~...\n\n~ ..\n\n;~:~~~\"'\n:-..~::~ ..\n\n(U) Using the Right Kind of Expert Advisers to Interact With *Policy-m(!lce.:S* . -;:;::;:~ .,,;:\nl'L>o'\n\"''\" f.\n(U) Another challenge is fmding the right kind of messeng~f\"'of.;~p.ndui(iiot only for communicating the basic attribution information t~.senior pi)l~~y-mal(~i];:out also for facilitating the ongoing back-and-forth interaction required!\n\njtO,~~sist iri'coordinating the IC, Law Enforcement, and TNF communities in ongoing a@.f2:1:ltion taS~s:' It requires that the ~ght type o~ ex~ert advi~e~s) is still involv~d w~thin ~!f.t.innt;(~~~~le w~o can_ convey the avatlable techntcal mformatton I m a ttm~ly~and effecft~fashton wtthout distortion. Assuring the presence ofsuch an ~~~!1;W9u(4;~1Jow policymakers the best handle on the moment pos~;ble \"(8$~;-W,ell aS'~l!ge the expectations of policy-makers), given the available attripjju~m infdffuation sO:jllat this sometimes technical data can be given its proper context in-'or<i~t:tq. afoSi.st the White House to improve its situational awareness. This would require eei~q~tjon of policy-makers prior to an event apout the value of including such an adviser, and a s~li:(>:f:p:rotocols for identifying this individual in advance so that there is no discmmect be~~en pojicy-makers and the best the technical community I\nI have to offer dutirfg:;im intense, fast-moving crisis .\n\n.. ~:; .. ::;::::~> :::.r\n(U) Given that many senior .pol~~~rna.!cers lack technical backgrounds (having business or political backgrounds i~~t~4)~it is imPortant o be \"bilingual,\" in the sense that they ar~ ,~iinv~~~;~d.imderstand the politicaVpolicy environment (and problems) faF~.d by;(ljc;;.White House, as well as the technical, scientific side of the attribution equation,fo~~C:f:.tiponi I. This would greatly facilitate a bridging of the gap betw~!~j:{those\"W.Iiose foc~;(ilnd comfort zones) are in the policy realm and those who come from'ii~:i!t~re ~~i~ntific or technical community. Clearly, in a nuclear (or other WMD)\nattributlciii!setting, it is of critical importance to reduce the chances of miscommunication or any lack orP.~~!-~i.9n in the communication or understanding 1\n!data by policy-makers.\n\n~-:::~=-.\n\n.\n(U) *The Role* of Blam~ce Strategies and How These May Complicate the Attribution QuestionL_J\n(U)\nWhether it be the IC, the TNF, or law enforcement communities, or the senior policy-makers themselves - during a WMD\nincident, there will be a sensitivity and awareness regarding the potential political, institutional, or career damage that would result from attribution failures (for example, technical mistakes, incorrect interpretations of intelligence, or failure to pursue certain leads)\nand a desire to avoid divert -or even direct -blame were they to occur. Similarly, policymakers themselves will be highly sensitive to the political damage that would result from policy mistakes (for example, mistaken attributions of blame resulting from retaliating against the wrong party, negative reaction to policy actions (even if the correct perpetrator was identified), failure to take action in the face of evidence later judged to be sufficient.\n\n:: . . /\n(U) The higher the potential or real consequences of the crisis incident, the greater the resultant emphasis upon blame avoidance strategies becomes -which in extreme circumstances could severely hamper trust and communication between the three communities An excellent illustration of this area of research in crisis management that focuses not only upon crisis response, but also the management of response and its aftermath from a blame avoidance standpoint (both for institutions and policy-makers) is found in the book \"Crisis and After:\nThe Politics oflnvestigation, Accountability, and Learning.\"\n29\n(U) Because of blame avoidance, policy-makers (or institutions j\n/)~;~~~!_fmq themselves seeing to selectively process information during the attributig!M~!ldeavorj~f,.9r example, assume hypothetically that policy-makers had a desire to adv#ce'~:Rortanrj:}eac~\ntalks or maintain cooperation with another country in a polj~y area Qfgfeat irii';;9rtance to the United States, and an attribution assessment arose that potei1tially lihki6~1-:that nation to a domestic WMD incident. Depending on the severity of the incJ~~pt, on~:%.9y.ld imagine in certain contexts policy-makers desiring to search the avail~~>Je' errQf.:pars iir'the attribution evidence to introduce doubt (much like a competent def~rise attorneyJ.~:,'fhis introduces\n'politics' into the way in which attribution ev~~V~~. is . \\ii~}Y.~d by poll~y-makers, and certainly skews it in directions unrelated tC?,:th~'C:]foc~~P.~ ~\\J.e IC, legal, or technical analysis.\n\n. ... :{h:..\n\n.~;t .\n\n}~;:\n(U) Similarly, ifa particularly horrendous WMP., attack occurred and there was a lack of clear evidence linking a perpetrator to the crime, there:~C?gld be immense pressure on policymakers to avoid being blamed by the publi~;.for d().iifg nothing in response to the crime and to\n\"round up the usual suspects,\" so as to g!'Yii\" the public the perception of decisive, strong action. This gambit could res9.lt:;w;!poli\"<:y-makers taking actions against parties based upon I\n!attributions that h~d vt;cy lovy levels of certainty by selectively using bits of the evidence to point the finger:in-tbe desi:fed direction. In fact, there are almost endless scenarios for how th!? ijiiioe;~Y,~iPM~~ game might be played or what confounding effects it could have,_~g~~ ~~CJ.ttriotifion effo~. ~is observation is not me~t to denigrate any party, b~t;me~IY.. to recl)gntze that the attributiOn process wtll not be conducted\n.... ~\n\"- ... .\n\n...\n\n.. .\n\n. ...\n\nin a v~:ffilm, an~that pcili~~s- sometimes not directly related to the issue at hand- might playa=:ffit~ in btiw policy-iiiakers actually will interpret or make use of any attribution data I\nI\n~:-::~.\n\n(U) Because~:ijighly charged and ambiguous environment is likely to result from the circumstances~urrounding the activation ~\n1. and the political consequences of the attributions themselves and the policies or actions that senior policy-makers may take as a result, it makes sense to focus upon building sound, pre-existing relationships among the relevant actors within the CJ community and its key representatives t<_> senior policy levels.\n\nOnly levels of trust built on longstanding relationships among the parties, as well as knowledge and awareness of the technical capabilities (and analytic processes engaged in) by the CJcommunity on the part of policy-makers, will help prevent dysfunctions in performance during an event -where all the parties have to feel assured that they will not be\n\"thrown under the bus\" by the others.\n\n## (U) \"Safety In Numbers?\" The Hurricane Katrina Problem\n\n(U) How many people died in Katrina? Early on, estimates flowed in from a variety of sources; hospitals, morgues, law enforcement, emergency management bodies, news services, unofficial Katrina web sites, and more. Some groups tried to aggregate data obtained from others, counting the same cases again and again. There were complexities in determining what constituted the categories defining how the person was killed. Individuals who drowned in the flood, or were crushed by debris were certainly included within those categories, but it is unclear how those who may have been killed in a car crash during evacuation, or succumbed to their preexisting medical conditions in the high-stress environment were categorized and counted.\n\n:~~..\n\n_.,;~\n(U) In an environment of information overload and time pressure, keeping on~~s;i~ye on the ball versus constantly playing information catch-up, is a challenge. Dependence:9]l..Jnm:\"an memory for keeping track of information (for example, to pull threads or,:f~ll9w them~~)', especially given the acknowledged limitations of human memory anq c~gt;\"liiY,M,iases;is destined to be inadequate, if not fail outright. From the teclm.ologic~:;I}~rspediW;<:tbe concept of an information clearinghouse is a step in the rigtli dix:~ctioii;i~!.JJ.an actual analytic\n;::~:~:::::.:::ili~pro==~~\\~::!~~-wuups Mil need a common framework, or a set of COmm9A:P.r!>..CeSs~~ir work, to help clarify that they are focused on the right things, and t~.afgaps~~~ beifi!ff]:~.~d. It will be extremely important to remain focused on the key .p:qin.ts:\n;~::~\n~Y\n\n-\n(U) What do we know?\n . -::;;;:;:-.-.. /\n.\n-\n(U) What do we need to know, but do=ii~g-\n_\n-\n(U) Can we fill in the gaps? How?\n-::::::::\n... ;::~\n.. :~-.\n\n(U) This will require more than.P.~rson~_l~discipli~e. Under pressure, procedures, processes, tools, group norms, and commbti;~ituational awareness will be critical I\nl Having a scorecard to fill out may h~lp_pr~vid some critical structure and focus in constructing an assessment. I\n~\nI Clarifying these goals/tasks will help to clarify ~~ttC flow/p(Qcesses/procedures, as well as help to define an appropriate analytic lll')~jJ1(Qm)itt~QI.J.. environment.\n\n\n.\n\n.. :;~:.:~.;~~=-=~~\n==~\n.. ::::~\n~~:~;:\n;~;;t:: ....\n(U)\"\"Tii~:~wr.ounding Psy~hological Context for JL._ __\n_jiPolicy-Maker in WMD\nAttribuiiOfi:!t\n~ .....  ..\n\n:::::~\"'. ~~~\n\n## (U) *Te\"Orists Are \"Adaptive Enemies\"Jlfbo* Wilit~ To \"M';;Fid/The Waters\" To Complicate The Attribution Process By Jncreasing)Ifiiii'Fg!Liij!}' .\n\n-::)~ ..\n-:~ .....\n\nIn addition, inf~r;mation;,tliat evolves may have been purposefully Ld=is-t-ort....,--ed~b-y-t,--he-o-ppo-s-:iti-:. o..Jn, which mig~J;:irilslead 'investigators and conceal information about perpetrators and their actions._.t'T:~ftarists should be considered the ultimate iil adaptive enemies, who in the event o,fa WMD \"ipcident will inflict damage (both physical and psychological), as well-~ g#tsuppofi:and admiration among their followers. In many scenarios we would ~nyis'iori'l\n~\nI terrorists likely will have a great interest in confusing 3.!1.<! _!::omptf~a.ting our response, and magnifying the psychological effects of the incident. :I\n~-~~~---~-.~--....,--~---....,---~1 1nlSWOUlOOea~tCUlM1Y\nimportant eop,'sJ9ef1ltion in the event that a state actor clandestinely supplied fissile material to a terror group;.:~~:f~rrorists may expressly attempt to leave an impression that more attacks Me impending in &der to generate fear in the public, as well as apply added pressure on policymakers.\n\n## (U) Summary Of Recommendations\n\n(U) Make I\nI a valuable information hub for policy-makers, a one-stop shop for gathering the coordinated attribution information flowing from the three communities.\n\n(U) Recognize that pressure for immediate responses will be directly proportional to the magnitude of the consequences surrounding an event.\n\n(U) Recognize tolerance of risk by policy-makers (and their willingness to accept various measures or estimates ofcertainty) will be reduced as the magnitude of potential\n.\n\nSE~RN\ncont::J(for either action or inaction) increases.\n\n(U)\nmust calibrate communications with senior consumers based upon the way in whic\n1 erent leaders structure their advisory systems. Understand that not all leaders are the same.\n(U) Understand that people respond to estimates of risk on the basis of whether these are presented in the domain of gains or losses.\n\n(U) If attribution information presented to senior policy-makers diverges from their preexisting, deeply held beliefs, more evidence will be required to gain their attention.\n\n(U) Fori to get the right answers, they must learn how to ask the right questions.\n\n(U) Use the correct set of expert advisers to interact with policy-makers, those who are\n\"bilingual\" and understand the political/policy environment and problems faced by the White House, as well as the technical aspect of the attribution equation focused j I\n\n## (U) The Right Stuff: Harvesting Expertise\n\n(~\nHaving examined the range of capabilities that the US Government will bring to the issue of nuclear attribution, we conclude that IC, LE, and TNF capabilities, as currently configured, are likely to result in *eventual* success. By this we mean that we are confident that these efforts would eventually result in identification of those who mounted and sponsored any nuclear-related attack on the US or engaged in related activities. We are far less confident that as currently configured these agencies will be able to deliver meaningfUl, rapid success. In the event of a nuclear attack or imminent nuclear strike, the LE, IC and TNF communities each stands a cl).ance of uncovering meaningful and timely leads to. the perpetrators. Current resources might succeed in interdicting an attack or, aft~r an. attack, providing the President with a quick and accurate identification of those respcip~jole.\n\nHowever, in such a serious event, it is not sufficient to say that these resourceS\"7ii'jgfzt\n~ -\nd succee .\n\n. .......\n\n\":::;;<=\n'>~~::: .. :~ ~\n\"!~=\"\n(~The key question is what can be done to dramatically increa!'l.~~ c~iik<l.~~.ofrapid success. Rapid success is important in any scenario, but vitiii in scer1iili.as where~:\\Ve have an opportunity to interdict a nuclear device before detonation. W.<i:~P,nclud~;~~~u;_vestments in individual attribution capabilities are necessary but not suffj.~_ieiiti:9; gtake .li'ieal difference.\n\nRather, the greatest progress will come from forming a ~-~~fuless teaijt;.trom the IC, LE, aiJ.d TNF communities. We must tear down the re~ingJfilp~iments to\"teamwork in this arena.\n\n. -:::(::~:::::::~~J:  ;:;;~\\;;/\n~>I\n(U) In this example, a senior LE analyst is chosen to serve in a rotational assignment at DOE.\n\nFollowing this tour, the analyst returns toLE-related duty. After a set period of time, the\n. SECRE~ORN\nanalyst serv.es another rotational tour in an applicable IC organization, returning to his or her\n~ffice with experience in both DOE and IC communities and better able to support L_jsues.\n\n(U) C.~cting and Preserving Perishable lnformtltion\n(U//FO 0) The information age has enabled a high percentage of citizens witJl in~tantaneous communi tions coupled with sound and photographic recording capabilities.;:O.able News Network (CNN) has exploited this new capability with their \"!-Reports\" in wlii(;li;:lilPyon~\nwho sees something of interest can submit it for CNN's broadcast consideration. Sfdri.e~that would otherwise be a mere verbal or written description are now docum~~~f~4UP. picblr~s and sound by the omnipresent public.\n\n._.;.\n\n}:;{\n:::=::::\n~-;-\n. . ........\n\n\n... ~\n(U) In the case of a nuclear event, it is likely that individual Pri:~~~e citii~~~::~ili' have ima es stored on cell phones or digital cameras that could help the.attfiouti~n question.\n\nshould make arrangements in advance of any actual emerg~:~cy th~FW.~mld give e pu tc a way to send information to government serve~,f.o.r.an~y.j:~ .. During.iio emergency, the public could be advised via public announc.effi~riftPi::globiii::text message, of the way to submit photos and other information theY.;~ave tha:i:~ould sh~~~light on the event.\n\nTechnology now allows users effortle~IY:tb':;inct~de the date;. time, and GPS location in pictures. Experience with the Space Shuttl~:t\"9l1,1lllbia crash debris recovery effort or the Hurricane Katrina response indicates a hugely.sXiPP.l!thetic public anxious to contribute in response to a national emergency/disaster:.::Ysing:ifils capability requires some advance planning, however.\n\n--...-. :;::::==\n\n(U/~UO) A second sourcc{~ij;irish!ible data is security cameras, traffic cameras, and clos~ddrcuit televisio~ {~X~T.V). If ~:;nuclear/radiological attribution event were to occur within a metropolitaQ a;iea of:i:be:C.oii'iinental United States (CONUS), a collection and review ofC9,TY da~~~ould beiieiii:.an investigation to determine the who, what, where, and when aspcrs::q:the cas:~:-~. Throughout most major metropolitan areas there are a multitude of publi~.~~d pri\\ii((e CCTV:~sfems. Most CCTV systems are designed to regularly delete old footig~;~m !}i~lr memory systems. The value of CCTV information became clear following the bomoipg;pfthe London subway system on July 7, 2005. The subsequent investigation revealed sU'J;.~iA~ce footage of the suicide bombers parking their vehicle at the Edgeware Road subway~t~tion and entering the station. From the surveillance footage, the bombers were identified; greatly aiding the investigation and leading to discovery of the planning process for the bombing.\n\n(U//FduO) A system should be implemented that will preserve all relevant CCTV footage at the very ~tset of a nuclear/radiological attribution event to aid the investigation. The CONOPS should incorporate a process whereby I\nFoordinates with the Department of Justice to ensure that a formal request for the preservation of records and other evidence pursuant to 18 USC. 2703(f) pending further legal process is issued and/or the establishment of an agreement network through Interagency Governmental Agreements\n\"(IGA).\n\n## (U) Information Sharing Among Disparate Kingdoms\n\n(U//FO~O) Successful attribution depends on pulling together data from a broad range of governmental and non-governmental sources and applying the skills of analysts working across a variety of disCiplines and locations. A nuclear emergency would require that this work occur at unprecedented speed. More than any event we can envision, a nuclear emergency inside the United States would require that knowledge flow rapidly between the relevant responders. Current limits to information sharing exist for good reasons, including the need to protect sources, the need to avoid tainting legal prosecution, and the need to protect rights to privacy. These. reasons will remain important in a nuclear emergency, but c_annot be allowed to impede the higher priority of protecting thousands or mi:!f.~~~ of human\n::&'0) By its nature, the normal method for cross-agency and diS!aJ!,~;~~~:is largel;~erial and often hierarchical process. This normal way of doi~!{b~~~ss is.'too slow and exclusive to bring the full capacity of the distributed law. enforct}fu,~nt, int~U~~ence, and technical communities to bear on the problem in the quick~St mtmn~;:~;~~;~ nucl~ar emergency, we will need these three communities (IC, LE, ang~\":f,NF) toti~~cmt from each others' knowledge as fast as technology allows. We must prpar~~:i:f. tools~d approaches now, that when activated for a nuclear emergency, allow;.iei~vant j;ij~e~ to share knowledge at the speed of technology, not the speed ofbqr.~~q!;rac}i::~;::.\n\n.:\n(U) Capturing Low *Confidence Data and* Assessm~nts\n(VI IF~) It is important that we protect against the loss of \"low confidence\" data and assessments that are easily overlooked in a crisis. Individual organizations may tend to dismiss low confidence data as \"low value\" data and not pass it up the chain or share it with the rest of the community. Taken as a whole, however, the collective picture,drawn by integrating all of the data- including low confidence data- may open up new;~~i.~nues of investigation or lend support to alternate hypothesis. Understandable organizati9P,~l aversion to risk should not be allowed to be an impediment to integrating this dat~.~.t:eal tlffi:~;!J!~o a single environment where it can be aggregated with other information lP:iifJiC:.~~ibly prbvide\n. '\n~ ~-\" ~.\n\nadditional value. However, once the augmentation group i~fonned.!!AcJ connec~~~i;-it is essential that low confidence data, with proper caveats, be :;;c>ntinua:ily:]}iitegra~d;~into the assessment process.\n\n:::::..\n\n:::;;:::/\n... \" =::::;:..\n\n.~~:'\n... ...\n\n'\"\"'~ ...... ~.\n\n~ :~~.\n .. ::~:=~-\" .\n\n(U) Continuity of Connectivity\n.. ..\n\n.;:;::::~.\n\n/.\n(U) The connective process should be ~i~b~!~~~~~i~:~~-~.Jow level with regular alerts and exercises to test connectivity, trans~!i.<!q. . to o.ry.itional st(tiiS, and to encourage the community to be interactive. In effec~ this::~B.~.l.d;be continUally building and improving the system in anticipation of an event. Through p~~ipation in test alerts and transitioning to operational status exercises, c=Jnembers wiil=:~M:amiliar with the computer systems, applications and resources before a crisis ~~ 'ijiis type of approach has proven very successful in the NEST Program (Nucl~#;Emergfncy Search Program) .\n\n.\n\n-~~=:~:::::-\n-~~.\n\n(U) Once the tools and proto6ols,for the larger expert group have been established, the concept could be expan4 tQ:a.mucJ:d~rger group of potential collaborators via parallel communication and ~\\iiit{l~Y.rn~gfbut with the same focus of real-time participation and information ~b;uing:(~~'~ppropnaie to the community of interest). In this fashion, the huge resourc~;efUQ.'~~~slfied~WOfl!lation and brains might be engaged in a \"hive\" fashion that coul<tJie mini.ti\"g::infonnanQii\"and investigating hypotheses in parallel with the group selected I\n    I ~q:\\vork in thl secure environment. This unprecedented engagement of\n. informati~~i:~sources would be transformational and should be a consideration aslr------, augmentati<f~i~omponent becomes a concurrent collective and lessons are learned.\n\n-=!;~~~= ..\n\n(U) Leveragi~l;~e Catalyst Project\n(U/If~UJ~1\\11 11------------------------------------------~~\n\n| (U)                                          | IT    | Interfaces That Enhance Interaction    |\n|----------------------------------------------|-------|----------------------------------------|\n| .                                            | ,:;   | . .{                                   |\n| :::::;.~--                               |       |                                        |\n| (U) Information Technology (IT) is integral! |       |                                        |\n| .~.:                                        | ~_as  | il~~~iJjtates                          |\n\ncommunication and ultimately enables collaboration to produc~;~ffective'and'timely analysis.\n\nIn order to leverage the benefits of the IT available j\n. p.i;~p be .iiiiportant to plan and coordinate these tools before the start of an exercis~,~f an actmil~~s\"is. There are two primary areas of concern in the use .of IT as ~-~M~ler-6~~!?-~municationj I\n\n| 1.         | Data sharing via common databases,         | anQ.:::'\"    |\n|------------|--------------------------------------------|---------------|\n| -~<::::~: | -;:::~:.:                                 |               |\n| ...        | ,.                                         |               |\n| 2.         | Information sharing via social networ.\\#g. | :::;:         |\n| :?:     |                                           |               |\n| .-~        |                                            |               |\n| -          | -                                          | ..            |\n| :~:::~::~ |                                            |               |\n| _          | ..                                         | !             |\n| .~:-'      |                                            |               |\n| .-        |                                            |               |\n\n(U) Each of these areas shares some common:~~~llenges with regard to successful implementation:\n-;~~;~~;;:/\n\n-\nParticular clearances are needed for.:~~~~~sing agencies' data.\n-\nComputer systems that c~:~rate':at a common level must be properly cleared.\n-\nAll members 4\n,  i IJ),U~t be (amiliar with the computer systems and applications\nbefore the start o.~ ~:~~s~f:;:;::::::::}\n\n(U) *Data Sharing* V,iil.~Common Databases\n(U) A IJ.w:tilie~~~~:o'~g~i~tiQ!lS have proprietary interests in their particular databases. In\n\nligh~.~~:!}lis, it Wadvisabi~::fo~ the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) to maintain a separi:ifu:1U.s!~~g'of other existing databases that can be accessed through assigned points of contact (li#~-?.!1 officers).\n\n(U) lnform~i~~;S~aring Through Social Networking Tools\n(U) Tools are'~vailable now that, with some work, could helJ1r--------'ir,----,l\n'-:--:-:--:-:---:--=----=---=-_.,., This widerc:=Jworking group could consist of sevefal hundied individuals from the intelligence, scientific, and law enforcement communities, all needing to share the same data in an integrated workspace but far from a common workplace. One possible near term approach to this issue could involve the use of existing classified network tools such as lntellipedia or A-Space. Special access r--liostances of these useful tools could provide properly cleared analysts with a place tOoiSc'uss ongoing nuclear attribution activity, share assessments, build consensus and develop alternate assessments. Use of the existing infrastructure could provide a rapid. relatively inexpensive way to share information and build a more integrated analytical community. Once piloted, the infrastructure and tools might be extended over non-traditional elements such as state and local law enforcement and\n\nthe broader technical community.\n\n(U) There are many advantages to the use of social networking tools- Facebook and Intellipedia, for example - as opposed to the typical way of delivering data in the form of formal reports or serial distribution. One advantage is that information is organized topically as opposed to organizationally. The use of these tools allows for a collection of data in the form of what is known as a whole, rather than what an individual organization thinks based on its limited set of data.\n\n(U) These tools also have an inherent ability to record the development of ideas on an issue through the archiving of previous assessments and the discussions that led to those assessments. The effect is to allow rich local data mining and a high degree of concurrency in sharing information and interaction, which can also serve to increase the lik~lili'ood of interactions across comniunities, a somewhat rare occurrence today. More int~ra'9!i.on wjll help to create pathways that will improve our ability to harness the colle~P.~~ braiiip9~~j. of the institutions involved.\n\n}'~,;::rz.;\n.-.\n...... :\n::~:~ ........\n\n(U) The Intelligence Community (I C) has established a nufu~er of ri~~:~r:ogranl~imed at bringing \"Web 2.0\" technology to the Intelink user. \"Web 2.~::i:~~Jhe sec~M-generation of Internet development and web design. It is characterized ~JaCiH~fulg coi:iimunication, information sharing, interoperability, user-centered des~gri:and colia'69pttion on the Internet It has led to the development and evolution of}v,eb:-basid:communitids, hosted services, and web applications. Examples of Web 2.0 enabl~;~~b.d~c~~:irlt:lude social-networking sites, video-sharing sites, wikis, blogs, mashup_s~~:and fo~onomi~:~;~:,;\n(U) One of the key concepts of Web 2-~~.--~~~~t~~ to Intern~~ experts John Batelle and Tim O'Reilly, is that customers are building your bus].i!.~~~.for you by generating content- in the form of ideas, text, videos or pictures- thl!-t~ b~:Kamessed to create value. Users can own the data on a Web 2.0 sites and exercis~.:~6iitrol o'Ver that data. Web 2.0 sites encourage users to participate and add value to.,tb,e;:appll~ation as they use it. This differs from earlier approaches, where content \"'~ ~tatic, vsers were merely passive viewers of fmished products, and only the *e q~h co~~ change the information.\n\n!=~:~~\n:::~;.::~=:~::='\n(U) \"Socia_l -~dia\"j~~ be thought\"ofas a fusion oftechnology and sociology, where modem technolqgi~~:m:,\\lsecf'to;:pring people to connect and form relationships for personal, politi.~~~ busin~~s, and j)fQ'fessional uses. Web 2.0 technologies allow for a range of Social M~di~;~~~h ~;:ihat found')n the Intelink applications A-Space, Jabber, Intellipedia, classified blogs, ali\":~qtJier applications .\n\n.\n\n-~~:::.: .. .\n\n ..  .. -.... .\n\n(U)/\n-\n-\n-\n(U)\n\n. -\n(U) InteUipedia -This application is, in effect, a classified Wikipedia. Users are not\nanonymous and are able to create or modify web pages covering a wide range of topics.\n-\n(U) A-Space - Analyst Space is a social media application where users can sign up to\ndiscussion groups and share information (including finished intelligence, all-source\nintelligence, open source information, and other types of media) with other users\nthroughout the Intelligence Community.\n-\n(U) Jabber, Intelink Instant Messager- These tools allow users to send short messages\nto individuals or user groups in a secure environment.\n\n## (U) Recommendations\n\n~..\n.. ...\n\n-\n(U) Establish a concurrent work environment for all those who support'---'\"\"\"';-::-----'\nI\n~hroughout the country and in law enforcement, intelligeli't~.?<and -\ntechnical communities (as in A-Space) to assure collective awarenes~;,jpteracti'sQ.;;!l#d\nintegration of diverse data, including especially low confidence da~rz~;::;~~.\n.,\n\n| '~         |\n|------------|\n| ...        |\n| (!~;:::;~\" |\n\n-\n-\n(U) Provide networking equipment and ca.n~l;lil;tieS:~t~~:ickly ~~:~~~arate communities\ninto a concurrent communication envir!)nmeiiltthrougil;c~P.~ilities such as a STE phone\nand media-less terminals)\n._3!:;..\n:~;::\n;;:\n-\n(U) Use social networking tools to ~n~~~1~~;~;;~ective ap~roach of analyzing data. Test\nand further refine the network!\nftlii-ough regular exercises and real events\n(at lower concern levels).\n\n~:~:-\n~ ..\n\n- M Test the possibility ofeijijitid~~t~e collective beyond cleared and individually\nauthorized people to the;~iB!'ger coriununity in the unclassified environment to evaluate the\nbenefit of engaging;tjps :~Hge resqiP\"ce .\n.\n~. ::J';\n~~:~:~:::::~:!~~~.~\n-\n(U) Ct:t~~t~:-WliY~Q:\\,~tandards for analysis coupled with a common protocol for reporting\npUJ\"P.O~~~=,!~T!i~s woiii9~~~rye well in minimizing tradecraft differences among agencies .\n... ::::..\n:::~\n~:::r\n-\n(U):;r-----ri~formatiori'~haring should take place within a common computer system\ninte~teared to the highest practical levels. However, given proprietary data among organiziti~~.- the NCTC should have a key to databases with assigned points of contact,\nthrough w~ith access to individual databases may be enabled. The chosen fl\ncomputer Infrastructure should be configured as soon as possible, and all c:::Jii'embers\nshould be rapidly yet thoroughly familiarized, trained, and exercised on these systems,\napplications, and protocols.\n\n## (U) The Mixed Reality Perspective\n\n(U) This article was provided by members of the Mixed Reality SHARP group, which was meeting in the same facility as the Nuclear Attribution group. This article discusses the establishment of an infrastructure for supporting anc:=Jcommunity of interest, which will facilitate rapid analysis of an impending or recent event.\n\n## Analysts And Law Enforcement\n\n(U) **Intelligent** Ageqts;i;~;~\n  .\n\n.\n\n(U) The ~~btl~lo~l~ncept for streamlining access to pertinent data, and facilitating commUP.icafici~:;aeros~itiJ~c=Jcommunity, leading up to, during, and after an event involY.~~ three iQiijor compdnents:\n-\n(U);~~~.at~ess,\n-\n\n-\n(U) ~;!B~lligent agent-based system and\n-\n(U) sectii~;tm(jbile hardware .\n- 11'1:&'1!'\n.. :~'!\n\n(U) Overcoming Classification Barriers\n(U) Members of the CJ community should be provided with all of the data they need .\n\nwhen they need it. Each piece of data should be tagged with the level of access required to view it. Tagging each piece of data will provide granular control over access to datasets.\n\nRather than applying credentials to an entire dataset, which may exclude a user from all of the data contain~d within, tagging each piece of data ensures that users with the appropriate credentials will have access to the entire subset of the data for which they are cleared, even as their clearances change.\n\n(U) Enhancing Data Mining\n(U) Software robots known as intelligent agents should be utilized to access and collect data on a user's behalf. By passively learning from users' behavior over time, the intelligent agents will anticipate the types of data to collect for each user. The robots will be able to access and store data beyond the users' level of clearance and will act as a proxy to this data so that all necessary data will already be in place for when a user may be granted more clearance to the data. Agents also will have the ability to proactively notify users that there is data pertinent to their interests to which they may not have access, and will tell users to whom they must speak to gain access. This approach will ensure no user has access to offlimits data prior to being granted more access while at the same time ensuring that the user will have access to pertinent data as soon as it is deemed necessary and properly granted.\n\n(U) Secure hardware dev_ices should be put in the hands of the r--lcomm11D:~~~;~~~o that i~\nmembers can access pertment data, and each other, whenever ~erever reqo~~\n.. U~mg this technology ensures that local law enforcement and on-the-ground ~~~n.nel \"'\"i4~P..~ve upto-the-minute, secure access to intelligence, and may in turn provide int~iiigt:fi~ and\nsituational awareness to community members who may not,J~e on-tq~~g{oun=;ij;n-<iware exists today that uses mobile technology similar to the BlackbelJY In cenj:qnction .with cryptographic devices to ensure secure communications. Lap!.O\"Ji~:a.lso ~~;~yahable that provide the same capability but are slightly less mobile. II].:;qlese''Si?.!\"!:\\~iol;ls';'data security is maintained by serving data from a remote server withmJtstoring any:9ifia locally .\n\n                                        .. ~. .. \",.'\n                                                                                                      I .\n.\n  .. ;\n       ~ :~:~; -:.. .\n                                      ~~ ~~:~: =~~~..\n                                                                                                    .\n\n(U) While the above discussion centers on~te'Ciinolegy, esci:b\\i~Ji.ing an effectivec=J\nnetwork relies on a solid community o9~~sted .ilSers. Thi~:~ommunity culture challenge\nrequires an appropriate medium for key melj:l~~(Sio identify each other and discover\nindividual expertise and interests. Regular c6fiiil:tunication between members will contribute\nto the success of the system.\n                                              '::::~:::::\n\n(U) Of note, the approach described ab.g~;~um;~-~t data in the pertinent datasets be pre-\ntagged with access permissi~}\\l::r.I@ts, iequirements, and metadata concerning the data's\ncontent. While this is a tracthbl~:Yet O:ontrivial task, further discussion is beyond the scope of\nthis document. Similarly., t~~C:=::ft-~iwork approach will require the sponsorship of senior\nleadership to addres~_poltcy iiifd:atS'iliiizational challenges, which is also beyond the scope of\nthis appem~i?t:..\n                  /~:t.\n                              . '\"''\"\n\n.. ;://'=-=:;;~j} . ::::~=~~:;:-\n\n(U):by:iilWJic ~alysis Process foriL ___ __,\n\n(U) Verj:~lk4 to nearly intractable intelligence problems usually go through an initial \"stab\"\nby a highlyr~~.d special analytical team. Outputs from the team's efforts are used to\nupdate collectiQii' requirements and sometimes result in the formation of a new entity to work\nthe problem fuil time. After a long period of little progress or no real intelligence production,\nthe problem may fall below day-to-day focus. If and when activities related to the concern\nabout the issue remind consumers of the threat, then another focused look may be initiated.\n\n(U) For certain classes of issues, failure represents catastrophic consequences. Issues of this\nnature require a level of focus that demands deep daily digs, even if the result is negative over\nlong periods of time. Here, dedicating some resources to working the problem on a\ncontinuing basis is worth the effort. A dynamic approach to analysis and collection for hard\nto nearly intractable issues is illustrated in the attached chart. 30\n\n## I\n\n(U) The dynamic analysis concept is straightforward. The first step involves creating a notional series of phases that any entity would use to start and achieve a particular objective.\n\nThe actual steps would be based on whatever is known about the entity's ilk and the real world activities that would have to take place to achieve its objective. Under each phase or step, participants in the process brainstorm the manifestations of activities tha! m~t occur for an entity to proceed with its objective. In concert with this brainstorming, patii~_ipants identify what might be collectible from any particular manifestation. For exailipi~;:.there_\nwould be a number of areas where information and phenomena would be ge.nerateii:\":i11.th\"e course of arranging for a safehouse for a covert meeting of the \"group-wlio!l\\~t_f)s-potiiioes.\"\nSomeone would have to make the arrangements for a roo~ P.r hous~,:~tli-ereby 'Iiljing a paper trail. Some attendees might rent cars, another paper trail. ears on th~i~:way to .tHe meeting would cause Doppler shifts in local radio frequency signals. Aii:upswing;iQ.~ti-potato rhetoric might appear in internet media. Collectible info~Jibti-~9:t:ild be:fu:.rayed against the capabilities of existing collection resources. If a collectioii\"iesource:;~~\"rthe access and ability to collect the information, an appropri~~t:-r~ui~~DJ~Q.t would b~ initiated.\n\nAlternatively, requirements already on the b.o\"cik's':wpuid be:lij,dated if necessary. If collection were feasible but no capability yet exist~~:~ ass~iated gaj;:::~iosing research objective might be initiated.\n\n/\n::::~~:::; ...... :\n.'\n-:::-.\n\n(U) When run on a continuing basis, the dynami~::~~lysis process would constantly iterate the issue's evolutionary steps and possibl~.p;tanife\"silltions. These iterations would be based on any enrichment in understanding th~-:~'ofthe'target entity and specific intelligence information. A simple analogy..:is;~he cb'iistant process of writing and rewriting scripts for a movie as a movie director sltoo~:ilild e.valuates scenes or as the scriptwriter does more research.\n\n..:::. \\:(\n.. ):\n(U/IF'n.uO? _W~r~ ?-~;J~~lear~~~t~~n is more than just picking up the ?ieee~ after an event takes p~:::~tgtlance:ui-:workmg the tssue before any harm takes place IS a v1tal part of the job. ~!l.i~rdictl~~;as eariy=~-possible should be the primary objective. Substantial resources shouia::ti~.~ed.idlited to fre<juently revisiting what indications might emerge in LE, TNF, and intelligeii~::st'ata from motivation to the aftermath of a terrorism-based nuclear event. A\ndynamic aii~JY.~!~ P.rocess should be among the responsibilities of the dedicated working group propos,1for the c=:FONOPS.\n\n## (U) Leveraging Local Assets\n\n(U) l\"'reasing Efftciency\n(U//FOUQ)I\n| (U)        |\n|------------|\n| ,.{~;~     |\n| ::::l:: |\n\n(U) Local law enforcement may be the primary means of _q(ili~tirlg:;q. intelligence in a domestic nuclear event. Crucial initial information likely.:will be deheo from local law enforcement. The Intelligence Community mU.sHmsur{itiii_tJocal investigators are seen as valued contributors. The best means of a~qornplfs~{!lg this:i~:t,ht:ough proactive teambuilding with common training as a basjs\";::..\n\n.::;\n-;:::.\n\n... ..\n~ ....... \": .:.\n~-~\n.\n\n(U) The Bush Administration's \"Natio~al ~~~~~'for Information Sharing\" (October 2007)\ndirects the continued support of fusion centers ~i:~ij~~state, local, and tribal levels. The following considerations are suggested al!-:W.eans of enhancing this crucial area of the criminal justice system.\n\n,::;;:'\n\n\n1. (U) Aggressively foster. c;:xj)S.:Q8ioitof the network of state and local fusion centers.\nCombine the efforts ofth~;F~I:Joint;Jerrorism Task Forces (JTTF) with the efforts of the\nlocal fusion centers l9;.~~nli~~e the. ~Q:fonnation sharing process in venues where both exist.\nEach agency 1n eithefisr txifli::a-;H~iF and local fusion center, within the constraints of\n\nmandatec;l.it}{Qrm~ti~ij classifl~~ti~n restrictions, should be aware of the collection needs of their paffii~i;~gencie8;:3;:.;.. .\n.... :::\n\\~::~\n .. ::;:Y'\n2-:(U}~~Q~jd~ technica{tools and training to state and local law enforcements to enhance their a&il}ti~s to recognize, collect, collaborate, analyze, and share information. The training sho~l~. jnclude a standard training protocol for LE to become familiar with Federal guidelines oifiiiformation sharing, investigative techniques, and source development focusing onintelligence and terrorism data recognition and collection. This is effective not only in combating terrorism but likely will result as well in enhanced crime reduction.\n\nHistorically, local detectives have done an outstanding job in developing street sources and criminal intelligence, so additional training to hone these investigators' abilities to recognize and pursue terrorism related data would result in potentially vital contributions.\n\n3. (U) Develop and implement a nationwide intelligence liaison program linking federal/state/locaVtriballaw enforcement information sharing activities. The model of the Terrorism Liaison Officer (TLO) - developed at the Arizona fusion center- should be emulated nationally to support intelligence operations. This TLO program has proven tobe an effective tool for disseminating informatio~ to all levels oflaw enforcement, and to entities within the Intelligence Community.\n\n## (U) Arizona's Tlo Program\n\n(U) The Arizona fusion center created the Terrorism Liaison Officer (TLO) position to address the center's need to reach out to new enforcement entities throughout the state. The TLO has two intelligence-related duties. First, the TLO serves as a conduit between the fusion center and the TLO's home agency. In this role, the TLO identities and disseminates pertinent information to his home agency including street level peers. Privy to the fusion center's collection needs, the TLO monitors his jurisdiction for this information and advises the fusion center of the relevant information. Second, the TLO serves as the \"eyes and ears\" of the fusion center when responding to an incident. The presence of the TLO on-scene provides observations, reporting and validation of information from a vetted source. This is invaluable for reporting on real world incidents and also for preventing unnecessary escalation for non~vents.\n\n(b) (1) (b) ( 3) (b) (5)\n(U) CAN OTHERS UNDERSTAND YOUR DATA?\n\n## ~:I\n\nk---------------------------------------~\n(U) The following provides a framework of four general scenarios of nuclear/radiological events: pre-detonation, post-detonation, pre-dispersal, post-dispersal.\n\nI. Scenario of Pre-detonation: Investigating and attributing a threat of nuclear detonation or interdiction of fissile material.\n\n2. Scenario of Post-detonation: Investigation and attribution in the aftermath of a nuclear detonation.\n\n3. Scenario of Pre-dispersal: Investigating and attributing a threat ofradiological dispersal or interdiction of radiological material.\n\n~--\n..\n\n4. Scenario of Post-dispersal: Investigation and attribution during or in the~'~ftermath of radiological dispersal.\n\n;::-::~:~:~:-.\n\n.\n\n| ~    | ~.    |\n|------|-------|\n| ..,  | .     |\n| ~~   |       |\n\n(U) The following best practices are recommended:\n}::~:::::::,.\n-:~;::-:\n-\nMaximizing information sharing and collaboration in. a connect~d env'itdiiment where\n\"need-to-know\" and security issues are remedied to=ffi.e ~xt~P~:s,sjble .. :~:=\n-\nErring on the side of retaining and preserving informati~Q~,.includi~g~low confidence\ninformation.\n.\n~~;:::.~ ...  .:;::;~::-.. _ ... ~.-\n-\nApplying analytic methods such as the Dynami(f.A.jialysis Prq~ess and Alternate\n\nCompeting Hypotheses.\n_.:::-~;::::~j._~_;; i'''~~:(;ii: .. _~.!:::\n.:-\n.-:::::~~\n\n(U) Analydc Methods (U) Dvnamjc Analysis Process - a \"cradle-to-grave\" methodology of activity awareness (see Appendix C) (U) Analysis of Competing Hvootheses - an analytic tool for comparing alternative explanations, where all conceivable hypotheses are analyzed in a matrix against corresponding evidence. Each \"hypothesisevidence\" pair is weighed to develop a probability or confidence level for each overall hypothesis.\n\n-:-~ ....\n\n... :~~~\n:;::~--\n.:.~-:.\n\n## (U) Data ~~4~1Ing::~~;'Vis~~~:~~~N\n\n(U/IFCWd}'X:~~y-to ~~~~tpg;any crime or mystery is the employment of effective methods to gath.~r;;jpmlyzei::llnd relat~;mformation about the case. In the process of collecting and fusing intelilgt}:qf.t?~.-~G ability to. visualize numeric and non-numeric information spatially and temporafl~i~-paramount. Laying out the information in graphical and/or tabular form, with associated 26M<Jen:ce levels, and showing links to locations, movements, materials, actors, nation states, ~jf:; can provide a rapid relational context. Maps may be utilized to show not only location~fbut concentrations, correlations, directions, distances, domains, flows, routes, vicinities, and countless other geospatial relationships. By the same token, event time lines can be graphed to visualize time sequences and intervals. Additionally, the temporal information can be mapped to graphically show the effects and nuances of evolving events.\n\n(U/~TTO) Insofar as efficiencies are gained and time lines met, the ability to graph and vi~~~ay include the full array of classic information visualization methods, such as pie charts, bar charts, and scatter plots as well as relatior=:J: graphs, ephemeral \"flythrmighs,\" and virtual renderings of scientific data.\n\nshould employ data visualization techniques that enable robust analysis an o er tunely illustrative presentation graphics that accurately portray current analytical findings.\n\n(U) Using Metadata to Foster Information Sharing Among Separate Communities\n(U) In order to facilitate ready sharing of information among well-established communities, metadata could be used to ensure that community-determined relevant inform;t.tiol). is available to all cognizant parties involved in the attribution process. By lever~gwg metadata successes implemented by other communities, the use of metadata would facilita(~:ld .\n\naccelerate effective data and information sharing among the nuclear a~.~~t~~n co~~ities as designed and developed to meet each community's needs.\n\n}  ,:::::<\n-\n~-~ :-\n~~~-:-..... -~\n..... -\n... .:~\n.......\n. '\n(U) What Is Metadata?\n\n(U) Metadata typically refers to distilled infonnation that describes the semantic content of a piece of information [I]. An example of metadata in nuclear forensics is the geometrical parameters of a cluster of isotopic measurements (e.g. major and minor radii, standard deviation ellipses, etc). A cluster may comprise thousands of raw measurements, but the geometrical parameters that enable the cluster to be defined are the metadata. In support of data interpretations, one would match a questioned sample with the signature families that are denoted by the cluster \"cloud,\" not with the actual raw measurements, i.e. match with the signature family, not the data points.\n\n::~:=:...\n\n.\n\n(U) Metadata is formulated within each cornmuiiiij:by their experts, and the originating community determines what information.~iifi be distilled into metadata to be shared with others. The strategy is that cornm~tic{will drive the metadata development process so that they are comfortable with tn~:iti~tiiaata.constructs that will be available and shared. Metadata also is used in directing datal.apd \"inforination searches into a manual search mode using simple contact infonn~.~pn ~~4~-- .f.pf::Cxample, a \"library card\" with contact information would be inserted iqt.Q;a metaClata:<lliiabase so that an analyst would know whom to.contact for more i!J.:fpffil!ltioii-:fij{l! may be relevant to his or her task, when the additional information catino~.;blsliar~;.automilft~11Y via a database:\n(Ufj~~~!l~.iil~~ is used~:~~ facilitate and accelerate knowledge discovery among disparate collectiotis~;(if.pata and information, as it provides standardized data constructs for latent pattern analy~!~:;;:For example, the MASINT\n31 community, via the MASINT Standards Working Group:\"ofthe National MASINT Management Office (NMMO), has deployed common metadata templates for all MASINT executive summaries. The use of common metadata templates enables fonnulating metadata from the MASINT executive summaries to aid in finding commonalities and hidden themes in the MASINT summaries.\n\n(U) Similar to the MASINT community, many other disciplines are using metadata to enable effective information sharing within their community and also across separate communities.\n\nThe following general recommendations have been identified to facilitate successful implementation of metadata to enable effective sharing among communities.\n\n- (U) Explicitly designate ownership of a classification: whoever is the original source of the data is always correct with respect to the application of the metadata to its\n\n## Se~\n\ndescription. 32\n\n-\n(U) Ensure agreement between researchers and domain specialists: although researchers\nmay be more consistent, their interpretations of the metadata may differ from specialists\nwho have direct experience of the specific domain. 33\n-\n(U) Ensure consistent quality of meta-tagged data items: it is important to refine data and\ninformation that does not p~ovide sufficient contextual information to enable metadata to\nbe formulated in a consistent manner. 32\n-\n(U) Ensure consistent training and skills of the metadata developers: formulating\nmetadata from data items has been shown to be strongly influenced by preyious\nexperience with coding.\n(U) RECOMMENDATION\n.:::::\ni=:{::... ::~)::-'\n(U) By leveraging metadata successes implemented by other c~mmuniti~sl:~e use of metadata would facilitate and accelerate effective data an4,:ipforrDB.:tiQ~ shanng among the nuclear attribution communities as designed and develQ~ifto meet'~~cli\" community's needs.\n\n## (U) How To Best Use Tnf Information\n\n(U) Managing Expectations: What Can We Expect From TNF and When Can We Expect It?\n\n(U) A post-detonation IND event can be accepted as having the most dire consequences for the public, and, consequently, as posing the greatest pressures for timely and accurate attribution. Therefore, this section presents suggestions for best practices and other considerations for managing expectations for just such an event. These suggestions can be adapted to improve expectation management for the other nuclear attribution scenarios, such as a pre-detonation event, the interdiction of an IND or-an RDD prior to detonation, the detonation of an RDD, or the interdiction of nuclear materials where no device is evident.\n\n(b) (1) (b) (3)\n\n(U) Recommendations\n-\nill) I\n\n## (U) Limiting Bias In Technical Data Interpretations Secre~\n\n(b) (1)\n(b) (3)\n(b) (3)\n(b) (5)\n\n## (F~O) Put'1;Jng It All Tqgether: Proposed Function And Structure!\n\nb)\n(3\n(b)\n(b) (3)\n(b) (1)\n(b) (3)\n\n## (U) Building The Nuclear Attribution Community 2030\n\n(U) In examining the nuclear attribution problem, SHARP highlighted the fact that doing attribution well requires a broad and robust community of experts working together seamlessly, but in reality nuclear expertise is often sequestered behind physical, virtual, and policy walls.\n\n(U) To improve information sharing and create a true community of analysts, a variety 'of traditional and modern approaches can be used. None of these approaches are cost free, and all require overt action and endorsement by senior management. However, by.stp:ting with a variety of approaches and scaling up those that work, effective methods can b~t;(ound. By building a community, nuclear analysts and scientists will benefit from buildiliif~~M\nstrengthening collaboration across the wider intelligence, nuclear forensip;.:l!J!d la\\\\l.~:::;~,:;i~\nenforcement communities, with an attendant improvement in their analyiiS:::;:::::..\n\n\n,.s~\n.;;~-:~:;~\n:.:~::~~:.:::\n(U) Emerging computer technology along with traditional ~~nt9ririg''ciiii:-qe merg~d to produce a robust, distributed community of nuclear experts in~HQked tflt~ygh social networking. The goal is to achieve four major objectives:,.;.; ..  ::::::;..\n\n.:\"\n-~~ ::-\n~::=:~::~\n\n-\nEnable Knowledge and Information Shruj~g;:;;..\n)!:~;~:~..\n::\n.~ .... -~- ... . .\n. . ~~'\"\n-\nBridge. the Nuclear Expertise Generatj~n'Gap:;:;:::\n:~~==~=:~..\n-\nSustain a Common Lexicon\n. :::::...\n.:::\n;::,.\n- -!\"\n.\n,\n-\nImplement Virtual Exercises\n.\n''=::::!: . ,/\n.. : ~ ..\n- \"'! !\"~ -~\n\n... : .. ::.\n\n.\n\n- .. ;.~!\" .... \"\n.. -z~t~~ti-\n(U) Trade Shows: Virtual and Real\n.. :~;:..\n\n.\n(U) For the nuclear community ~Q __ over~ffie geogrnphic and organizational sharing impediments, it is necessary ~:iJeyelop\"real world and virtual professional I social information sharing environm~t5: Nuclear experts are not immune to the human tendency to associate only with indiv.i.Prlils.or co.-:Workers with similar interests. The blending of social networking technol~gy;~nd ~~Jili~~wl or annual nuclear analytical workshops will create a communifX8f~s!;~~:!~nd itseiitoward a collaborative environment.\n\n.~;4.:-. ;~~;~:=!~\n::~;~~:-: ..\n\n(U) A;ieai worl<l'example\\~f such a nuclear analyst network is the Project on Nuclear Issues\n(P0Ni:t~\"<>~tcx~~&y the Center for Strategic & International Studies (CSIS).34 The goal of PONI is'fiij(;~~!lild and sustain a networked community of young nuclear experts from military, miii~~-~.}aboratories, industry, academia, and policy communities.\" PONI hosts four major corifeiences where young experts across the community present their ideas on issues ranging.from US nuclear weapons stockpile issues, foreign nuclear programs, to technical nuclear forensics and attribution. PONI also hosts smaller events with guest speakers and maintains an online blog.\n\n(U) Due to the public nature ofPONI, there is limited involvement with the Intelligence Community. All discussions at the conferences are held at the unclassified level. PONI, however, serves as an inspiration and a possible forum to model after for the USG nuclear community. The proposed USG nuclear network will provide intelligence analysts with similar opportunities at the appropriate classification levels.\n\n## (U) Recommendations\n\n-\n(U} Develop a nuclear analyst social network, where nuclear analysts from the\nintelligence, law enforcement, and nuclear forensic communities could participate.\nRather than a workjng group, this is a support network designed to bridge the\nexpertise and age gap within the nuclear community. This could lead to the\ndevelopment of local \"chapters\" throughout the US or subculture to the analytical\ncommunity.\n-\n(U) Create a \"virtual community\" of nuclear experts by leveraging emergent social\nnetworking technology. Regularly scheduled informal chat sessions can be held on\nthe appropriate computer systems. The only limitation in this scenario would be\naccess to appropriate classified computer networks and systems.\no\n(U) Such a community could include the use of classified or unclassified\nnetworks to conduct meetings using privately hosted sites sucl\\,as ~econd Life.\no (U) Classified seminars, briefings, and exchanges could be orgpj:lj~ed using A-\nSpace or other social networking tools.\n; ::::::..\n-\no\n(U) Virtual world platforms, such as Second Life, could b~,;q<;lapted'ilr~:P.Qrted\nto SECRET networks or JWICS to conduct simulations ~t'ili~:~JiJ:Ssifiealevel.\n.:::::\n.l~t-.\n\n-:~:~~::/\n\n## (U) Bridging The Nuclear Expertise Generation Gap :~:~. -:::~---.'\"\n\n)~::~~==~-\n__.::\"'\n.\n\n.:.-.....\n\n(U) There is a recognized and widening experience and,ag~~~ap ~~~en' senior and junior analysts in the federal government, a gap that.iS.-P.l!J.St e\\:iitJ~P! and critical within the nuclear community.\n\n.;~::.:~.~ ~~=~~~=~~=:\nt,::;~:;:~ ... ;\n.\n\n~ :~:::\n:~:::\n~,:~~=~.\n\n(U) The number of radiochemistry pr()giifrii:s:{t~dikfio chenitsts in United States National laboratories and universities has dramatically~id~Jined over the past several decades. The narrowing pipeline of qualified people into this-~ii;tj:~al field is a serious impediment to maintaining a robust and credible nuclear_fQrensich)rogram.\"35\n-\n-~., :i:'\"\n-\nr\n.=.r:.~\n(U) Senior analysts who are ~~Pii;i~nc~1' in communicating technical information to senior policy-makers are retiring. Tbi;;:is a sk;illlearned through experience and lost to the next generation of analysts as.,seliior.analysls retire.\n\n~. ~=:~~~~\n.. ~:;==~~:;:::~~::\n(U) Recom!IJ.~!':datiO'fi_S;.,\n\n\n-\nOJ)'llil#~~ a pf~~-where junior analysts shadow senior analysts at high-level\n.. ;:~Hnitiativ~~l\n :\nIto provide the next generation of analysts the experience\n- '::;fu;~e-~~liiping and'~i-esenting assessments to senior customers.\n-\n(tJl:~.p a regular basis, provide information to junior analysts on current assessments,\ntechlii~V~telligence gaps facing the community, and lessons learned from recent\nassessriieiiis .\n..\n-\n(U) Initiate training programs to instruct junior analysts in the tradecraft of writing\nahd briefing senior customers.\no\n(U) This could include training with Toastmasters, or other public speaking\ngroups.\no (U) Specialized training to teach junior analysts to write effectively on nuclear\nissues.\n-\n(U) Initiate a training program, similar to an existing IC initiative, where junior\nanalysts work and interact with scientists and analysts at the National laboratories.\n-\n(U) Establish a formal nuclear mentoring program that pairs junior analysts with\nnuclear experts both inside and outside the US Government that includes formal/\ninformal training programs and si~sits.\n\n## Secre~Forn (U) Communicate Today; Still Communicating Tomorrow\n\n(U) As discussed in the Communications Section of this report, a common lexicon is required to ensure key attribution conclusions are properly formulated and communicated. The entire nuclear community will benefit from a common lexicon to communicate conclusions and associated uncertainty. A nuclear community network will foster the sustainment and adaptation of the nuclear lexicon for future generations, ensuring continuity of operations as the attribution community grows and matures (see the article \"(U) ORGANICALLY GROW\nA LEXICON\" for details on developing a nuClear attribution lexicon).\n\n## ( U) Recommendation\n\n-\n(U) In addition to the recommended monthly secure web-based, yjrtQally-liti{{!:t:;miniexercises, encourage the virtual coordination of analytic produc~Hiii=fi!l,~ tecilliology,\nsuch as Intellipedia, \"table top\" exercises using virtual worldS',~~ihcorpof.itfug mixed\nreality features in crowd-sourcing interpretations, Jith tpe o~o~~~f;J~ucle~ community\nto foster sustainment and adaptation of the nuclear attril>iltion lexi'cant\n;::::= , ... ;:~:~!!~::::~. .::\n\n## (U) When Reauty Costs Too Much, Go Vi~~L:... ./~~{., _;::\n\n.-/~.~-;;~;=:~:~:~: .\n':::;~::;;:.:\n(U) Conducting nuclear terrorism exe~j-~.9an beZ~kpensive:.~fiTo mitigate the costs it may be possible to modify or adapt commercial so'~Ar,e'to allow nuclear analysts a new way of participating in exercises related to nuclear afii!ibution. Platforms such as Second Life or a , modified \"first person shooter'' video game col'ii(t:~e..used for scripted exercises. Analysts at remote sites around the world could log in.:t:P a secfue network and interact with their peers in a variety of nuclear forensic scenarios ~p~ii' as:\n\n\n-\nA pre-detonation sear~li~f;nu~f~ar materials smuggled into the US.\n-\nPost-detonation gath,~ri!llof it\\rormation leading to an attribution assessment.\n-\nOperations at a,;~~(.opc;:~~i,ns center\" where inputs from the field and\nrequirement~;;f.tom seme~::<fecision-makers are dealt with in real time .\n.. ~;:o:::i:;:;:~~\n_.:::::~::.~ ..\n(U) Adyantag~~:t~f virtilil;l~xercises include:\n!!::::~~.o mt=~equirel~~embers couid participate from home or their home offices,\n'  :-a:~~Q.dlng on the ievel of classification.\n-\nln~~p~sive_ - limited software development costs, no TOY costs, limited IT support.\n-\nAllows=.forreal time interaction.\n-\nA vail~E:l~ any time - could have multiple exercises every month if needed.\n-\nwould build team cohesion - learn how people work in a simulated crisis.\n-\nTroubleshooting- issues regarding protocols or procedures can be identified and fixed\nprior to an actual event.\n-\nExpandable to whatever size required, within limits.\n-\nEasy for exercise ''referees\" to view activity without being intrusive to action.\n-\nLimited training required to learn how to use software.\n-\nGenerates interest and enthusiasm from the next generation of analysts in tackling\ntoday's attribution challenges.\n(U) Some of the possible disadvantages of this approach may be:\n\n## S~Rn\n\n-\nPeople might not feel comfortable adopting the new technology.\n-\nLess than perfect technology may not yet be immersive enough to make it seem really\n\"real.\"\n-\nThere would be some IT and accreditation costs to host commercial software on\nclassified networks.\n-\nParticipation may look like \"goofmg off'' to certain managers who do not understand\nthe purpose of the effort.\n(U) Collaboration tools, such as wilds, could also be used for ''virtual exercises\" and could greatly reduce overhead and costs. No one would have to go TDY and people could fit their\n\"moves'1 in when they had time available. The wiki could simply be a clearinghouse for\n\"game\" moves. The idea of a virtual exercise would cause far less disruptionjp. W.,.y-to-day activities and would allow more frequent tests ofthe !I\nprocess, costing ot!i~:~hat it would take to form a small group of people to design ~mutation with realisii'C;;~;;..\n\n-\ninformation. These people would not even need to be physically locatec:H~g!=.ther.\"\":E~~rtises could be designed on a wild over a period of time by allowing expe~ yi'criiiw.Jt>,pte _to ihe exercise as time permits. What would be very interesting ~~;~o use ~~~i~~ inchia~::a;\"red team\" in the exercise who could respond to the IC's moves:Th~y coum::~~ge their actions depending on what the \"blue team\" did, providing for a more ~e~Jt~tic sceiijio instead of a planned out one.\n\n.;::::.\n:;;~:;::..\n\n. .: -\n)~~=} ~\n~-:~~~;;~\"\n~~=~====~=:~~-~\n:--~~.;; .. :-.\n\n.\n\n(U) Competition is Good\n.. --  :::. .\n\n::;::;~..\n\n.\n\n(U) Including competitive aspects to vi;1i~~~~~!ci~~~: will a~~~::rate creation and sustainment of a secure on-line attribution co~\\Jpity. Analogous to \"fantasy baseball,\"\nvirtu~l attribution \"teams\" comprising individual~~~rii different agencies, offices, and programs and would compete against eac~:i>ther 9\\:iddressing attribution-relevant topics.\n\nEach virtual team could have a !I!~~ o(!Nf', IC, and LE expertise rather than only one discipline (e.g., a LE-only.m~mS'ers team). The composite mix of the teams coupled with the competitive environmenf wpuid fo~ter and accelerate 1) lexicon and semantics development between ~q ~!lg ~\n(see (U) ORGANICALLY GROW A LEXICON), 2)\nsharpen members' a9~~yticafii(~~Yaft with sustained exposure to different perspectives, 3)'\nfoster coll!<&f~J~!!Dq;te~work habits that would morph into effective best practices during actual n.tJCI\"eai;~~butioti:~\"Y~t\\ts .\n\n.\n\n/:{~::;;,_ _,}~;\n':~~::;\n(U) Outlci~l(.\n\n, ~::~: ....\n\n(U) Success ~~~~~tiding the ~f the future will require cooperation from all organizations involved and a commitmen~owing and maintaining the next generation of nuclear experts needed to take the L_jnto the future. For each recommendation chosen for implementation, we recommend a high level \"Champion\" be identified to shepherd the process into reality.\n\n## Recommendations\n\n-\nThe USG must start building a stronger nuclear community, not just as it applies to\nthe attribution problem, in order to ensure sustainmept of current capabilities into the\nfuture.\n\n## (U) Suggestions: Required Resources\n\n(~F) There are a::{k fun~~~~~~ assumptions that can frame the debate.\n\n## (U) Appendix A: Index Of Recommendations And Findings\n\n(U) Recommendations (Not in any order)\n(U~buOl'~------------------------------~1\n(U) Applying Catalyst to Nuclear Attribution . ='\n;:=:;:;::..\n\n)'\nAn information technology (IT) solution- .b~&i;<in:tlie Catalyst program- is recommended to allow a single \"switch\" to be thrown Ui~iwill gf~~ all rele~~t players in the emergency the access to information and informacl(;i{ifrols hl~r she neetis. Based on a subset of the Catalyst concept, the architecture and moda.'iii1~~;{or interactive information sharing and analytic exchange across the IC communities c6uld:b~readily created to improve the quality and speed of the analytical work dealing ~ith a c~ihle WMD threat or event. In addition to the obvious agility and potential for syq_~tgy, it is'expected that this capability could reduce the assessment time and imprpy~=~~cuf.icy more than almost any other approach: While the Catalyst Project is focused gri tl!e'intel!igence Community, the concept of a fully interactive community with conc~en(~warene~; connectivity, and access to appropriate elements of the total database can tjfteaallf.extenaed to include law enforcement and technical forensic elements. PJ:wning,i~fully ~1:fp;~viding appropriate permissions prior to an event can allow the;riipia::fQnniiig~q:f...a ll!fge virtual working group that can much more quickly intem:;l\\t~ and ~tiluate di~;iift(i can facilitate rapid overall synthesis and suggestions for additici@..~olJ6Stion and afualysis. [(U) INFORMATION SHARING AMONG\nDISPA.Ji:XTE KINGDOMS]\n~~~:;~~;~ ..\n\nMi I\n\n## (U) Using New Internet And Media Technologies To Enhance Information Sharing\n\n1\n~hould ensure that the channels for sharing information and expertise that will be requ1red to make a credible attribution assessment are in place and regularly exercised so that they can be used effectively and immediately in the event of a nuclear event The use of new Internet technologies, e.g. Web 2.0, and new media technologies should be strongly considered as a means for achieving this goal. [(U) INFORMATION SHARING AMONG\nDISPARATE KINGDOMS]\n(U) The Technical Event Manager (TEM)\n..~.:- .\n-:~:~;~;;~:.,~;;:\nAccess to all-source information early in the analytic process may undql~~bi~;tJte u;a-ifuical analysis. This risk can be mitigated, and the benefits of inf9Jillation;~h~ng ili~p._q.ined, by providing event-related all-source information to the Techiii~al ~vent=~~ager.{TEM). This will maintain the benefits enumerated in the planning and intem~~tion''6~~e\"technical data and provides context for the technical analyses. *[(U)* Limiting\"Bi~::irt,Techiiical Data Interpretations]\n.. :?\n-:::~;;;:;::\n(U) Nuclear Community.)0~-9/\n_;;~\nStart a nuclear anal~t;social:gr~up;:~here all nuclear analysts from the intelligence, law enforcemen!,,.~d n~~!~ foreiisi~''~ommunities can participate. This would not be another workin~_gioui?.i;:~~t a 'sli~J?.~rt !letwork intended to bridge the expertise gap within the nuclear comn:t\\JPity. Tli!~ would-b~)goographically limited, but \"chapters\" in different parts of the counicy::t:,ouldfoim and begin to socialize. Augment the traditional social groups with the use of emergii}:g!~~cial networking technology to create a \"virtual community\" of nuclear experts who hold r~~l!!f, ~formal chat sessions on the appropriate computer systems. The only limitation in tlli~;!icenario would be access to appropriate classified computer systems. Most analysts have .access to at least SECRET level computer systems, and many have access to JWICS. Establish a formal nuclear mentorship program, where junior analysts are paired with nuclear experts both inside and outside the US Government. Modify or adapt commercial software to allow nuclear analysts a new way of participating in exercises related to nuclear attribution. Consider the use of programs such as Second Life or a modified \"first person shooter\" video game as a platform for a scripted exercise. Use social networking tools as a means to create virtual exercises with adaptable adversaries to test thec=::process for attribution. [(U) BUILDING THE NUCLEAR ATTRIBUTIO~ COMMUNITY 2030]\n(U) Crowd Sourcing To consider the benefits of\"crowd sourcing,\" test the possibility of expanding the collective beyond cleared and individually authorized people to the larger community in the unclassified environment to evaluate the benefit of engaging this huge resource. [(U) THE\nRIGHT STUFF: HARVESTING EXPERTISE]\n(U) Characterizing TNF Capabilities and Limitations\n(U) An existing limitation of interpreting TNF data is due to an incomplete knowledge of foreign nuclear materials stocks, foreign nuclear weapons design, and an infinite design trade-space for IND designs. In addition to studying the capabilities and limitations of producing TNF data, a separate study should be conducted- possibly under the auspices of the JAEIC- to characterize our posture to interpret TNF in the context of what is known, and what is not known about nuclear materials and designs. Such a study should i.dentify means to reduce or eliminate these deficiencies. [(U) HOW TO **BEST USE TNF** '::;;;/'\"\nINFORMATION]\n}::;.t..\n\n## (U) Findings\n\nOn the .topic of Lexicons and Communication:\n\n- (U)I\n- Ml\n- N1\n-\n.\n-\n(U) Use terminology universally recognized an<!:~~~epted ~~~{i~ommunicating\ninternally and externally. [(U) SPLI'!~~~pND:~P,.f;,CISION-MAKING: A LAW\nENFORCEMENT PERSPEC~)'\n-:~:::~~:\n';:~:i;;;.;.-'\n-\n(U) Prevent the \"CSI Effect\" by.c:9~uni~iing and ~ducating the customer. [(U)\nSPLIT SECOND DEC1SION-MA~G: A LAW ENFORCEMENT\nPERSPECTIVE]\n:::;::~. .\n.\n-\n(U) Speed of technical nuclear analysis ci'~:orily proceed as fast as the laws of physics\nallow. [(U) SPLIT SECOND D:tciiSI()N:::MAKING: A LAW ENFORCEMENT\nPERSPECTIVE]\n.. ::.. ./i::'\n-\n(U) Differences in cultifre;:C!Iifl ~pply additional pressure to a pressurized situation,\nwhich can spin \"Wh~t po:we kitow?'' and \"How do we know it?\" out of controL [(U)\n:~~~~~i~ rii;~~~~g~~MAKING: A LAW ENFORCEMENT\n-\n(U);M~~ irif~~~d intelligence-driven decisions, by find multiple sources of\n. .;infoiiii.~~~n to s\\lpP.Qfl: exiting data and .to capture differing perspectives. [(U) SPLIT\n-\n(U) Since the nuclear attribution primary communities are small and closed, much\nmore frequent interactions among the communities is recommended t<t.~r~te the\nsimilar effect of developing a common lexicon with many interactions:~i9i~ massive\nsocial network. [(U) ORGANICALLY GROW A LEXICON]\n . ;:::~;.\n,\n-\n(U) Promulgate a mechanism for ongoing communication and i~t~-~on, 'ifi1~dltion\nto the mini-exercises, to further facilitate development of a c~nyli~iit~~j9on\nindicative of a growing community. Virtual means;,<?,[ inte~~#S!i may b~\"!>est suited,\nas community members are geographically disperseo. [(U)\"OR:?~CALL Y\nGROW A LEXICON]\n.-------'';..;.;::!i.l::\n;~l:/\n-\n(U) Information Technology (IT) is integral!\nl~ft\"c?.tt, as if facilitates\ncommunication and ultimately enables effective,I;Pid timely ~itlysis. In order to\nleverage the benefits of the IT availab,I~j\n: ~,it will beimportant to plan and\ncoordinate these tools before the s~ofaqj~~ercise:~f.;~actual crisis. [(U)\nINFORMATION SHARING ~9NG J?-jSPARAtE' KINGDOMS]\n-\n(U) r--1oformation sharing ~houi(J::t,!lkt(place within a common computer system\ninte~cleared to the highest practi~=Jc;vels. However, given proprietary data\namong organizations, the NCTC should.iii!,Y,~,a key to databases with assigned points\nof contact, through which aceess ~q:~divi~iial databases may be enabled. The chosen\nII\ncomputer infrastni~ .. W!e ~~gfiid be configured as soon as possible, and all c=J\n'riieiiiliers should be Jl,pi'fti~!:Yet thoroughly familiarized, trained, and exercised on\n ~ese systems, appli~~~Qns, an(! protocols. [(U) INFORMATION SHARING\nAMONG DISP.AR.t\\:;{E KINGDOMS]\nOn the topic of Collaboration:\n\n-\n(U) Collaboration teams sho~ld be identified and begin working together to establish\neffective working relationships prior to an actual nuclear related event. [(U)\nINFORMATION SHARING AMONG DISPARATE KINGDOMS]\n-\n(U) It also is recommended that collaboration should not extend down to the those\ninvolved with basic generation of data in order to prevent initial bias or cause data\ngeneration to be diverted away from what may be eventually proved to be valuable\ninformation. [(U) INFORMATION SHARING AMONGDISPARATE\nKINGDOMS]\n-\n(U) Have working groups meet often and practice not only on exercises but real world\nevents.\nTHE RIGHT STUFF: HARVESTING EXPERTISE\nOn the topip;.of;:rraiiii\"g.and Ex~~cises:\n\n':::::@ Thti:increased:frequency interactions among the communities could take the form\n\n6~P.t!lritltly or bi-monthly secure, web-based, virtually-linked mini-exercises on a\nparti~\\llar facet of the attribution process to calibrate the communities with the\nspedfi~::wnns and their meaning. [(U) ORGANICALLY GROW A LEXICON]\n-\n(U) T~~-inini-exercises should be brief (e.g., -2 hours) to foster and stage\ndevelopment and acceptance of a common lexicon and to minimize disruptions to\nongoing mission areas. [(U) ORGANICALLY GROW A LEXICON] ]\n-\n(U) Explicitly train c=:Jmembers on issues of biases, heuristics, intuition, bounded\nrationality, etc. [(U) THE ROAD TO HELL IS PAVED WITH NORMATIVE\nCOGNITIONS]\n-\n(U) Members ofthec==]should be selected based upon criteria that include the\nability to be aware of, and counterbalance, the influence of heuristics and internal\nbiases. [(U) THE ROAD TO HELL IS PAVED WITH NORMATIVE\nCOGNITIONS]\n-\n(U) Include elements and activities invoking biases and cognitive mind traps that\nundercut attribution analysis into ormal exercises- (to be included in quarterly\nsimulations or other exercises forD[(U) THE ROAD TO HELL IS PAVED\nWITH NORMATIVE COGNITIONS]\nOn the topic of A voiding Analytic Minefields\n\n-\nDo not lose objectivity by deviating from the establishe(j investigative plan. [(U)\nSPLIT SECOND DECISION-MAKING: A LAW ENFORCEMENT\nPERSPECTIVE]\n-\n(U) Lower level employees should be empowered to make certain decisions and be\nheld accountable for them or without concern for negative consequences/punishment.\n[(U) SPLIT SECOND DECISION-MAKING: A LAW ENFORC~~~T\nPERSPECTIVE]\n.\n:;~;:;::\n-:,.:!-: ... '!'\n-\n(U) Build into the decision-making process critical review by collea~es -~l~::.A\nmembers of other groups, as well as other checks and balances,:i6.-;niiig~te nis'h.to\njudgment (bounded willpower). [(U) THE ROAD T~ HE~t~:!$ PA ~~::WITH\nNORMATIVE COGNITIONS]\n:.:\n.\n' ::::~::..\n. ~\n-\n(U) Cr~ate s~ctures and processes to enablerl~~~f~~~~~::~~:lf~to wh~te~er\ndegree IS poss1ble) from the effects of extrem~ot co891fion) on 1ts attnbution\nefforts. [(U) THE ROAD TO HELL.lS:;~;A VE~D;~WITH N6RMATIVE\nCOGNITIONS]\n.: .:.:.;.;..\n. .;.;;:..\n.\n_,:::~~;-\n~=~~:\n\"'-!:~;~~.~;\n-\n(U) Th~\nlhould develop fu~~\\!~.i~gate maladaptive group dynamics. [(U)\nPERILS AND PITFALLS OF GROW!~]\n-\n(U) Thec:J;hould avoid over worry iih!>:iWgroupthink, but avoid insularity of\n perspectives, consider membershiP.:~riteria=;io create balance within group (across\nstatus, expertise, etc.), aq~_recQgpl~e problems associated with new groups. [(U)\nPERILS AND PITF'~~$\";0fGROUPSJ\n-\n(U) The c=:J shoulg ~'Ogniz~ the need for inoculation of personal and information\nnetworks prior J~;ev~~ ~4:w'eet regularly for joint exercises to build the\nrelationship~~.J.~perience~~~ssary before a real crisis. [(U) PERILS AND\nPllf:~L$~QJ.i!.pROUPSJ\n- . .Jtrj''n~O sli~~!~,p~es~rve spli_ts\" invo.lving differences of opinion i~ re~orting to\n.:::~:::~pnsull!~ ana eny>haslze anformabon shanng and enhancedc::::Jcoordanabon. [(U)\n.\n::e~RJI;S AND PITFALLS OF GROUPS]\n-\n(ti}:~.~ CJ should counter the debilitating effects of a high stress environment on\nC=JB.~~niploying stress monitors. [(U) PERILS AND PITFALLS OF GROUPS]\n-\n(U) Th_e'l=J should select a mixture of experts with differing competencies (both\ntask and general) for c=:Fbgroups to enhance flexibility in dealing with\nambiguous environments and coordination across the three communities. [(U)\nPERILS AND PITFALLS OF GROUPS]\n\n## Best Practices Recommended ~ I\n\n-\n(U) Assimilating, analyzing, consolidating, summarizing, and reporting nuclear\nforensics information must be a two-pronged iterative process- continua.lly building\nthe case and succinctly reporting findings. Employ dynamic analysis methods that\nweigh hypotheses against evidence. As time permits, use data modeling and\nvisualization tools to gain deeper insights and accentuate reporting. [(U) CAN\nOTHERS UNDERSTAND YOUR DATA?]\n-\n(U) Leveraging metadata successes implemented by other communities. Use of\nmetadata would facilitate and accelerate effective sharing of data and information\namong the nuclear attribution communities as designed and developed to meet each\ncommunity's needs. [(U) Using Metadata to Foster Information Sharing Among\nSeparate Communities]\n-\nThe Administration might r~uest authorization/appropriation of anc=J>perational\nfund, to be available if/when_\n~s formally mobilized during a Level One or\nTwo Threat. [(U) SUGGESTIONS: REQUIRED RESOURCES]\n-\n(U) The c=J:eeds to recognize that pressure for immediate responses will be\ndirectly proportional to the magnitude of the consequences surrounding an e:vent.\nThrough exercises, the c==lhould educate senior consumers about the reality that\ntechnical analysis, crime scene investigations, or IC efforts are likely to lag behind\ntheir more rapid desire for actionable information. [(U) BRINGING ~RIGHT\nBROOMSTICK TO THE WIZARD]\n:- ;::::;:..\n-\n-\n(U) The c::::::J needs to recognize how consequences affect risk ~g!~.l)ce of:R9];icymakers. [(U) BRINGING THE RIGHT BROOMSTICK ~9.~niEi:}.Y,!ZARD]\n-\n(U) ~ell must calibrate co~uni~tions with.i~~nior c~R.~ers b~~d'upon the\nway dttterefitleaders structure thetr advtsory systems [(Y} BRIN.~P'li9THE\n-\n.~\n,.,.., ~ ~ 4\nRIGHT BROOMSTICK TO THE WIZARD]\n;:~;;:;~,,.\n:::\n-\n(U) Thec=Jneeds to understand that people res~rid to'~'S~W?!:l~J:s'~frisk based upon\nwhether these are presented in the domain of gaiAs::or losses.l(V) BRINGING THE\nRIGHT BROOMSTICK TO THE_,\"WJ~~j;:;:~:::~..\n.-\n-\n(U) The r--lneeds to recognize t}}it if ati;pJjution iitf9f!liation being presented to\nsenior p~makers diverges fOO~;~eir P.(~:.Cxisting?deeply held b~liefs, more\nevidence will be required to gain tfie~;~~ehtion [(U) BRINGING THE RIGHT\nBROOMSTICK TO THE WIZARD[:~;:~\n.\n-\n(U) For the II\nto get the right answer,:~~ey 'must learn how to ask the right\nquestions. Deallng with the factQ~:around'information seeking will be critical to the\nc:=::Jand its supportingJ~:x~rs.;:f.liey shoUld consider: Education on the information\nseeking process, to a~oi'd';$rrupon pitfalls and overcome natural frustrations, and be\nable to optimize theif Qwn beh~viors; creating social norms that accept imperfect\nknowledge am~~g ni~m~~~~;:l!fid reward outreach to acquire the right knowledge and\nexpertise; g~W.yg into'~tli~;~:mind of the client\" and incorporating interactive strategies\nto ~e.ep;Jpformation seeking focused. [(U) BRINGING THE RIGHT\n.JJROO~TicKi:'!(}.-:THE WIZARD]\n.~;:::;:J:he c::J should i15e the \"right\" kind of expert advisers to interact with policy-\n'\n;~-~-\"[(U) BRINGING THE RIGHT BROOMSTICK TO THE WIZARD]\n-\nM:ftt:qmote a healthy culture: Thec==:J as a new organization, can seize the\noppo~f;y to explicitly shape an organizational culture designed to optimize\nfunctiqnlng and mitigate or eliminate the effects of known negative factors. This\nculture could include behavioral norms and attitudes such as: open communication\nand information sharing, minimal in-group status distinctions, inclusiveness\n(permeable boundaries for belonging, especially with regard to analytic aspects, trust\nin intentions, common group identity, shared sense of goals and mission, role of\ndevil's advocate or red teaming, understanding the strengths and limitations of\nexpertise (link to expertise section), and healthy interactive strategies, such as\nnegotiation (link to negotiation section). Consultation from occupational health\nprofessionals should be obtained regarding mitigation of the physiological aspects of\nstress. [(U) PERILS AND PITFALLS OF GROUPS]\n-\n(U) Maintain and grow social networks: Well-connected and well-structured social\nnetworks, among their many benefits, improve performance in groups facing complex\nproblems. c=]members must maintain and leverage their existing networks while building new relationships both within and across group boundaries. Regular, formal assessments on network structure and individual position and performance within the network, using methods from social network analysis, will provide a means to evaluate the current functional status and suggest areas for improvement. [ (U)\nPERILS AND PITFALLS OF GROUPS]\n.\n\n-\n(U) The rl\nneeds to manage expertise effectively. Expertise, while often critical,\ncan be a doii6\\e-edged sword in groups, genr 1ic4 rigidity, and excessive\ndeference. To leverage expertise effectively, the\nshould consider:\no (U) 1. Selecting for fluid expertise in its mem rs, and encouraging and\nteaching fluid expertise methods to the group.\no (U) 2. Incentivizing collaborative, instead of allstar behavior.,~ ExP.ertise alone\nis not sufficient. Metrics for individual success should include!~-~perative\nbehavior and information sharing. Provide actionable feedbacK' icl'!iJ.ldivic:juals,\nsuch as a personal social network analysis. .\n.-::>\n=t~~,,;::\no (U) 3. Building ~decentralized social networks fodiittif.ination si'i&ing\nacross the entire L_j Measure and evalua!~. these 9fg~izati6iiitJ::social\n.\n..\n.~.....\n..\n;!! .. ::;-:-.:.~\n,,.~\nnetworks, and take steps to Improve them asdeficiencies::are observed. Share\nresults.\n\n.:::;:...\n-:~:::;-:.\no (U) 4. Institutionalizing these practices and.metrl'~~it~,.sha~'ilie culture. [(U)\nPERILS AND PITFALLS OF GROu:rsf'\n::::;::\n\n## (U) Appendix B: Attribution Terms A\n\n(U) Accelerator Mass Spectrometry (AMS) - A mass spectrometry techilique that uses a high-energy particle accelerator to measure rare isotopes. The technique was originally developed to measure 14C in small samples. Recently, AMS has been applied to measuring uranium and plutonium. Like other forms of mass spectrometry, AMS requires extensive chemistry to dissolve the sample and to separate and purify the element for aq~ly~is. AMS\ninstrumentation is large, complex, and expensive, and is found in only a smalf~q(itnber of laboratories around the world. AMS excels at measuring exceedingly small isoiiift~-~ati<?s\n(e.g., AMS can measure the 14C/12C ratio to as small as lx 1 0\" 15). AMS C!!Jt,p~tediij{t:e;W as\n1,000,000 atoms of plutonium, and can measure isotope ratios to bette~;dJ'iliii~~?.p~-in:=ioo precision for larger samples.\n\n::;;;;;\n:~:=h -~\n:.~:!:\n\" -  .. .\n\n~ ~ p\n.' ~ -~:t=!~~~-\n.;;\n(U) Activity (or Radioactive Activity)- The decay rate ofth~;rMioactl~~;fi~topes present in a sample. The activity is measured by detecting the alpha,p~ici~H~~taparticles, or gamma rays emitted by decaying isotopes in the sample. Activi~~l's\"measu~;in units of decays per time, including Bequerel, Curie, and dpm. 'fl!~-:t~~ \",sp~~f}c activitY\" refers to the activity per mass of sample, element, or isotope. ~-~e'also:~ta parli4l~ ... ~pha particle, and gamma ray.\n\n.-:~::t~h:._,:)f\n::;:~: ..\n\n(U) Actinide Element - A group of elements~P,.~;t!te periodic table of elements that includes uranium, plutonium, thorium, neptunium, amerl~i~.and curium. These elements are chemically similar and have been groupe<twith th~'ilightest element of the series, actinium\n(hence the name actinides). The actinid.~S;have elements with high enough atomic weights that fission becomes significapt;:::1Ibe a~tinides are also chemically similar to another group of elements, the lanthanide ~fe~eiits (a)so called the rare-earth elements).\n\n~= ....\n\n=~\n(U) Activation Ana~y~j~i~ ~=~~~AAi.qJ~ for measuring trace quantities of elements iri. material by making th~P.l rad.i:9J(ctive by neutron irradiation. The result is an elemental signature, or fingerprj!lt{~!:~ be:~~ tQ determine the elemental composition of the sample.\n\nActi':~.~i~n anal5fsis, or n~~!fo'n activation analysis, is often used in forensic investigations.\n\nTheiio.i9~.ctiyjcy of the activated sample is usually negligible. Activation analysis requires irradiati6ii~ii{a reactor, radiochemistry to separate each element for analysis (although some elements ~!}:.~~tected without radiochemical separation), and radiation detection to measure the a.tD.olint of radioactivity produced by the activation. Both beta particle and gamma ray detection are used for analysis.\n\n(U) Activation Products- Generally, radioactive isotopes produced by neutron irradiation of a material. An example is the production of radioactive cobalt (60Co) by irradiation of stable cobalt e9co).\n\n(U) AEA - See alpha energy analysis. (U) Age-dating - A process of measuring the amount of decay of a radioactive isotope in a material to determine the length of time between the time of imalysis and when the material was last chemically altered. The amount of decay is determined by measuring the decay\n\nproduct (or daughter isotopes) of the radioactive isotope (often called the parent isotope).\n\nBoth mass spectrometry and radiation detection methods are used to measure the amount of parent and daughter isotopes in a sample. An example: measuring the parent isotope 234U and the daughter isotope 23'7h to age date uranium.\n\n(U) Airborne Radioactivity - any radioactive material suspended in the atmosphere.\n\n(U) Alpha Particle Radiation- A positively charged particle made up of two neutrons and two protons, emitted during the radioactive decay of certain radioactive isotopes. Alpha particles emitted by the decay of radioactive isotopes, which include most uranium and plutonium isotopes, have specific energies that are characteristic to the specific isotope and decay scheme. Alpha particles travel approximately one inch in air and can b.~ st9:pped by thin layers of light material such as a sheet of paper. While alpha particles po$~:-iio direct or external radiation threat, they can pose a serious health threat if ingested or inli'iii~~.\n\n~\n........ :...\n\n~:~:~~=to .. -,:;\n(U) Alpha Energy Analysis (AEA) - a radiation detection technique tl:!iit;ffi.~pres tiii\nenergies of alpha particles. Alpha particles emitted by the d~ay of.r:j,4{oacti~~:;l9topes have specific energies that are characteristic to that isotope and d~cay scl:ieift~;:.AEA.ean be used to identify specific radioactive isotopes and to determine the aW9H;_nt (or\"a~ij~ity) of that isotope in a sample. AEA normally requires chemical dissohiti6ii~~sl purification of the sample. The detector types include solid-state detecto~ . ga$\"\"propt)fi\\q~~il detectors, liquid scintillation detectors, and solid scintillation d~~~~rs}~.t\\ can det&t quantities of radioactive isotopes as small as 0.001 dpm,...:-~.:;:.:;;:~:;;.\n~~;::;:-.\n\n- .\n\n.\n\n'~;::::~\n:::?\n\n~~::~:-\n(U) Alpha Spectrometry - Another nam~::(~r:Npiia Energy :A.nalysis or AEA.\n\n~ ...  ....\n-:-::\".\n\n(U) AMS - See Accelerator Mass SpectrometrY;:~:~~~~;::\n(U) Analysis Class - A term that describeithe lev~l of effort applied to the forensic sample and the degree to which the for.ens'ic rui~-can be interpreted. The analysis classes are ordered in the sequence of their exe~tiqri:'det(!ction, identification, characterization, and attribution.\n\nThat is, an event happe~, s9.~~thingj~ detected, samples are taken, and material is identified, the materiaJ.:is'chiii'ii<;t,eriie<l and, if needed, the forensic data are combined with other information fof.:~itributiort;:-.-\n\n\n.. -:;::!::::...\n\n..~ ~::::.: ...\n\n(U) ~~9~~~ ~~~~rpti~'~::~pectrometer (AAS)- A technique that measures light absorption to idefitify and~C:letermine.the amount or concentration of an element in a sample.\n\n..... ....\n\n.\"&\n~-::: \".\n(U) A.to~i~=~~P_<!r..Laser Isotope Sef.aration (AVLIS)- A VLIS uranium enrichment technology is\"'ti~ed on the fact that 23 U atoms and 238U atoms absorb light of different frequencies. Although the absorption frequencies of these two isotopes differ only by~ very small amount (about one part in a million), dye lasers can be tuned so that only the 235U\natoms absorb the laser light. As the mu atom absorbs the light, its electrons are excited to a higher energy state. With the absorption of sufficient energy, a 235U atom will eject an electron and become a positively charged ion. The mu ions may then be deflected by an electrostatiC? field to a product collector. The 23Bu remain neutral and pass through the product collector section and are deposited on a tails collector. Although A VLIS technology appears promising, it has proven to be extremely difficult to master and may be beyond the reach of even technically advanced states.\n\n(U) Attribution - Nuclear attribution is the assignment of responsibility for the intended or actual use of nuclear or radiological materials/devices in criminal acts or acts that threaten national security.\n\n~/\n:::::: ..\n\n(U) Autoradiography - The process of making a photographic image or map of the radioactivity of a surface. This technique is widely used in biochemistry and genetic studies;\nit is also used to study oil paintings. The radioactivity of the activated surface involved is usually very low. Autoradiography is extremely useful for locating radioactive particles\n(sometimes called \"hot particles\") in samples, so that the particles can be isolated and analyzed individually. Autoradiography offers an alternative to fission track analysis for particle location and identification.\n\nB\n.-;::. , .\n\n::;:::~==)\n(U) Background Radiation - Radiation from natural and man-made SQ.iftces~;:!~cludifig from natural radioactivity in the environment, cosmic rays, and f!-9m radis~~!ivity rel~ed from nuclear power plants, nuclear production activities, and nuclear weap~;~sting::'\n.:~:=:~~\n... :::~:~:-~\n(U) Bac:ksc:Btter - A method of identifying material or m~prlng;~p_ating.tfllckness by measuring the amount of radiation reflected back from ~.Jieiiln proj~e~'into the material.\n\n~ .. ~.~\n~;;!~::::.~\n.. :~\n(U) Becquerel (Bq) - A measure of the inten~it;~(htdio'icitiv.ity,. One Becquerel is one decay (or disintegration) per second of ~.ri@.ioactiY,~=isotope:==~i::3q equals: 2. 70 x 10\"11 Ci or\n60 dpm.\n\n/::::;:;.. ./\n\n(U) Beryllium (Be)- A chemical element ~J~~:~.veral useful nuclear properties, including a high cross-section for reflecting neutro~ ;~Ptd a \"Iii@t cross section for absorbing alpha particles and producing neutrons. Becy,lJirlfu metill can be used as a neutron reflector in nuclear weapons. When exp9~~::!9a ~ifong alpha emitter (such as 21'1>o), beryllium metal will generate neutrons, whi~h c:w\"initi~te a chain reaction in a critical mass of fissile material.\n\n.. :\n.~ ..\n: ..\n\n(U) Beta Detector - ~~=o/~i~!=~~::aes of radiation detectors that detect and measure beta particles emitt~d fn;.Wradioactfve'isotopes. The detector types include solid-state detectors, gas proPQrtfo~t:.9eie\"&Ats, Geiger counters, liquid scintillation detectors, and solid scint~l,l~tion d~(~tors. fii:~:most sensitive beta detectors can detect activities of 0.1 dpm or le~s::::::::.,.\n\n./'\n,.\n.\n\n:~::~:~ .... ; ....\n\n(U) Beta -~~):uc:le Radiation - An electron that has been emitted from a nucleus. A beta particle typi~itY,;:li~s an energy between 0.001 and 4 MeV. Its penetration in material is short, but nucli<ies deposited on the skin can be an external radiation hazard. Beta emitters deposited within the body are a serious internal radiation hazard.\n\n(U) Bismuth (Bi) - A chemical element that can be irradiated by neutrons to form 21'1>o, which can be used in neutron initiators for nuclear weapons.\n\n(U) Boosting - The use of a DT reaction to produce 14 MeV neutrons to enhance the fission in a nuclear weapon. Boosting can greatly enhance the efficiency of a fission weapon.\n\n(U) Boron (B) - A chemical element that has a high cross-section for absorbing neutrons.\n\nBoron is used as a neutron absorber in control rods to control nuclear reactors.\n\n## Se~Rn S~\n\n(U) Bulk Analysis - The analysis of macroscopic amounts of material to determine the concentrations of elements and isotopes in that sample.\n\n(U) Burn up - A term used to characterize the extent of use of nuclear reactor fuel. Bum up is a measure of how much of the fissile isotope (usually 235U) has been consumed in nuclear fuel. Typical units are megawatt days per ton of uranium fuel.\n\nc\n:; ..... ,\n.:;::~!:: ....\n\n(U) Cadmium (Cd) - A chemical element that has a high cross section ~QJ;.~psorhi~g:~-;)\nneutrons. Cadmium is used as a neutron absorber in control rods to ~~~~6\"l\"I\\~~~~-r~actors.\n\n(U) Carbon Composite - A material consisting of carbon fiBer \"clciffii~~impre~ii~d with\nepoxy resin. Carbon composites have high strength and light W,~jght, an\"tirprut;\"easily be shaped prior to the application and setting of the epoxy. The.iDe'cfilWicallilid manufacturing properties are highly useful for gas centrifuge manufac~~?-Carb~&'~niposites also are used extensively in aircraft and missiles.\n\n. . .::..\n\n,.;~;;::;:.,\n.:\n.\n\n1\"-\".\"':..~ .  .. ~ .....\n\n(U) Centrifuge- A rotating vessel that<;;~:,. u~~~}or the-~t~h~ent of uranium. A device that applies centripetal force to a sampie;~~~ly:Via motor-diiven rotary motion of the sample. There are many different kinds of e~mfuges, often for specialized purposes in research laboratories, medical labs, and material:i~~~h. (See also gas centrifuges).\n\n.\n\n-=~\n.... :::\" ..\n\n(U) Ceramic- A hard, pottery-like ma~~6iii with a high resistance to heat (e.g., oxides or carbides of metals). Fuels fo~:Pil.~!~i'~actors operating at high temperatures are often ceramics (e.g., ura!lium dio~idc::, .. uraniym carbide).\n\n:\"~ .-:.\n\n.~:\n(U) Characterization;~~~aegfl~catiofi::of material and device properties. This information is vital to perf<J~ing .~i!tJJJution, \"6~i\"\"ii also may be sufficient in and of itself to perform\n-\n-\n~~'\ni .:. ..\n\nattnbutt9~~=~::;:;t;!~.\n:::~:::: ..\n\n. ;:~r\n~::::\n::!:::~;;\n(U)-<::ii~~ical/Assay- Ch~mical titration and controlled potential coulometry are standard methods;r9~~~etermination of the element concentrations of uranium, plutonium, neptunium or other nUij~f:~~9.~Ponents of nuclear fuel material for accountability meas~ments or accountabilitY\"Y.efifications. In chemical titration, the sample is made to react with an exactly measured amoiint of a selective reagent of known composition, leading to the completion or characteristic end point of a well known stoichiometric reaction. Titration methods are designated according to the mode of detection and the end points. In controlled potential coulometry, the element to be analyzed is selectively oxidized or reduced at a metallic electrode maintained at a suitably selected potential. The number of electrons used in the oxidation or reduction is a measure of the amount of element present in the sample. The precision and accuracy of these methods is better than 0.1 %. They are well established and used routinely in nuclear accountancy and safeguards laboratories. They therefore can be very effective for the characterization of interdicted material, provided that samples of at least a few tenths of a gram can be made available.\n\n(U) Contamination - The deposition of unwanted material of any type (radioactive or chemical) on the surfaces of structures, objects, or personnel.\n\n(U) Conventional Forensics - The application of forensic science to conventional criminal cases. More specifically, conventional forensics is the scientific analysis of samples, things, and people with the goal oflinking places, people, things, and events. Conventional forensics includes the analysis of fingerprints, DNA, fibers, hairs, paint chips, pollen, etc. See also Forensic Science.\n\n{U) Counter (or Radiation Counter)- A radiation measurement system that reads out the counts or countrate directly, in contrast to a dosimeter, which reads out in units of radiation\n~\n~-\n.\n\n~~;::~~-\n(U) Critical Mass, Critical, Criticality - The smallest mass of fissile material\"th'~-~ill ~low a self-sustaining nuclear chain reaction, or criticality. At criticality, the a.~.9:n>tion~ij.~;9f neutrons is just balanced out by the production of new neutrons by fissi9ii:';Th~. criticli:f mass depends on the type of fissile isotope, its chemical form, ge_Qmetricat:-rangerrt~t, . and density; the amount of material needed is decreased if the rr.iiiterial i~\"b~@.P.resse,d'!' Nuclear power reactors need to operate at criticality to produce electrici&.  Nuct~;weapons are based on highly supercritical designs.\n\n.,- ' -::::.11:;:-,\n.. :-:\n~--=~\n......\n\n, .. -.\n\n'\" .. :~~~-~ .. ~.\n(U) Curie (Ci) -A unit of radioactive decay ~~.j~ .. ba!,!~4;~~ the acti*iiY of one gram of radium. 1 Ci equals 3.7 X 1010 Bq or decaysp~t~~prid or'~~22 X 1012 dpm.\n\n,.;~~:{;:;.. )?\n\n')~;;-\n.\n\n~~:=:=:-~y\nD\n.. -~==~~j_~.~~--~~:,/\n. ,. ....\n\n;::====:\n(U) Daughter Isotope - A Jlaj~~~~i~e;,isotope (called the parent isotope) decays into another isotope which is .called .fu~ d.a:uibter i~9tope or decay product  The daughter isotope can be either stable or radio,;t~Hve, d~9!~g on the parent isotope.\n\n(U) Dec~y~~iti$,~~~~~~~.~us .=formation of one nuclide into a different nuclide: Decay may inyolve tnetemission~~ofalpha particles, beta particles, positrons, or gamma rays from the nuct6\\isbbe ca~b.tre of elegtrons by the nuclear, or fission of the nucleus. A decay process is charact~~~(by a half-life (i.e. the time for half of the atoms of a radioisotope to undergo decay). Ai<>~ealled \"radioactive disintegration.\"\n~-:~:~:,;. ... .;!'\n-.-.. ~\n(U) Decay Pr.iduct- The outcome of radioactive decay. See daughter isotope.\n\n(U) DeUberate Signature - A signature, such as the isotopic composition of HEO that is controlled and specified. Deliberate signatures are essentially product specifications.\n\n(U) Depleted Uranium, D-38,or DU- Uranium with a concentration of 235U smaller than that found in nature (0.72% atom%). It is largely obtained as a by-product or \"tails\" of the uranium enrichment process or obtained from spent (used) fuel elements. This material has low specific radioactivity and poses no significant risk to human health. It often is found in aircraft as counterweights and in boats as ballast material. It is also used in anti-tank or armor-piercing ammunition to enhance penetration.\n\n(U) Detonator - A device that initiates the detonation of a charge of high explosive by subjecting it to percussion by a shock wave.\n\n(U) Deuterium (D) -An isotope of hydrogen in which the nucleus has one proton and one neutron (nonnal hydrogen has no neutrons). Deuterium is useful as a neutron moderator (in the form of heavy water) and has nuclear properties that are useful for thermonuclear or fusion reactions.\n\n(U) Discovery Class - A term that describes at what stage a nuclear or radiological event was discovered. The underlying assumption is that the unfolding of an event consists of a sequence of processes that lead from the planning to the execution of an even~,.\n\n._\n:ii~,.~.::\n(U) Dirty Bomb - An explosive device that is intended to spread radioactive ~$!i~l fr~m the detonation of conventional explosive . See also \"Radiological Dispe~!!lJ.Jevice.;~~D).\"\n~~=~ ~-~-::;;~~=~..\n\n~- ..\n\n(U) Dose- A general term for the amount of radiation abs~IY.ed ove~ll;~period'~fj~~iJ;ne.\n\n~:~~.\n\n.~ ~!~~::~....\n\n!~-\n(U) dpm (decays per minute)- A convenient unit ofradioactiY\":~-decaY::t:j;;dpfu equals\n13\nI! -~~ -\n4!1Jr\n0.0167 Bq or 4.50 x 10 Ci.\n\n..:-;/\n.:~:;::..\n\n..-.\n.\n\n.: .. ~--.~\n':~~~;~~~~;\n(U) DT Reaction - A thermonuclear or fusion r~tion:~(\\yeen the J:lydrogen isotopes deuterium (D) and tritium <n that produc~~;-t4'N1~~,ri'euir'Q:~ . Jbe DT reaction requires the least amount of energy to initiate and is ~es:I as a s~lirce of IUglfenergy neutrons for boosting fission weapons and for thermonuclear~~RQ~~,}'\n\n-;~~;t~~~::;;\n~~=\n.\n\n...... '!!'\n\n## E\n\ni(::::~::;;:=-\n.~~\n(U) Electromagneti~ (~Ciio~~~~P~riiiion (EMIS) - A process that uses strong magnetic fields to separate ioiliz'ed uraniUiil~isotopes. The EMIS process works like a mass spectrof!l~u;t,J~Mt d~-~~~yf.h l~ger scale. EMIS was the major process used by the US\nduring:!Jie Ma.tlWittan P;oj.~t'for the production of 235U for the bomb dropped on Hiroshima.\n\nlndiv1(J(ial uni~~were knoWn as calutrons, and some are still in service to supply small quantiti~(Qtyarious isotopes for research purposes. In 1991, the Iraqis were discovered to be developing')?MIS t~hnology for uranium enrichment.\n\n-~~:;~~~~;~~\n(U) Electron *,lA.* negatively charged particle which has a mass of about l/2000 of a neutron.\n\nOne or more electrons surround the nucleus of an atom. A positively charged electron is known as a positron.\n\n(U) Electron Microscopy -A technique that uses a high-energy, finely focused beam of electrons to image samples at very high magnification. Features as small as 10 nanometers (I\nx I0\"8meters) can-be resolved. Two common versions are scanning electron microscopy\n(SEM), which images the sample surface by reflection of the electron beam, and transmission electron microscopy (TEM), which images the interior of the sample by electrons that pass through the sample. SEM and TEM are analogous to reflected and transmitted optical microscopy. Many SEM and TEM instruments are equipped with x-ray detectors, which are\n\n## Se~Forn\n\nused to measure the elemental compositions of the samples. See Electron Microprobe Analysis.\n\n(U) Electron Microprobe Analysis (EMPA)- A technique that uses a high-energy, finely focused beam of electrons to induce x-ray fluorescence in samples at very high magnification. The induced x-rays have energies that are specific to the elements in the sample. The measurement and analysis of the induced x-rays provides information on the elemental composition of the sample. EMP A instruments work like scanning electron microscopes (SEM) and can resolve elements at resolutions down to about l micrometer.\n\nEMPA can detect elements at concentrations above 0.01 weight percent, depending on the element and the composition of the sample.\n\n(U) Electron Volt- Also called an eV. A unit of energy often used in the m~~!#,~ment of n1,1clear and atomic radiation. One eV equals 1.60 x 10-19 Joules or 3.83 x to1'c~!~~es.~\n. -~\n.. ~z;:~;; .... , .. ~;\n235U,Js~td~;~as b~~fi\n(U) Enriched Uranium- Uranium in which the abundance of the increased above the natural amount (0.72 atom%). Most ligbt-water:~actors \\l&~:~rimium enriched to 2 to 5% of 235U.\n\n::;:\n,..,::~:;;~..\n\n?'\n(U) Enrichment - The process of i~creasing the concentrati~il~~~;q~ i~:~~~:f an element\n,relative to the other isotopes. In a typical enrichment P~gfe:s~, the ii~~a:i feed material is separated into a product stream (enriched) an<t~~~s (deP,J~red) stream for waste .\n\n... ;~~,!~~~:~~~:=~~ ... '\n'l:::::;-:.\n\n(U) Event Class - A categorization of t!J..~~;~e of ~~~lear o~;~ai~logical event. The classes are: nuclear yield event, failed yield everit;:~:X.P.l~sive RDD event, non-explosive RDD event, source emplacement event, interdiction eveiit~:~;;.,\n(U) Exemplar- A sample that serves as a.m~:i=~~;~~~dard. For nuclear forensic purposes, an exemplar would be a material of knowif'origin' and pedigree .\n\n........\n\n~ .. .:.....\n\n.\n\n.~ ....\n\n. -~~ : ..\n.. ;:~~;.'\n.\n\n..\n\n:;~ ,.; ,.\n\n,.<~-.\n\n- {~:;\n::i[i~:::;;::::(::\n\n## F\n\n        ----::-:.\n.. /_.:.'.-.;~::~:~~: ./ti:_::--~-==-.: .. -\n                                 . .\n                                       .\n                                            .\n\n(U)-F~~~t -.~itoome nJi~active particles from the cloud produced by the explosion of a\n\nnuclearW~~p.im.\n\n(U) Fissile;~=t::is~tope that can have its nucleus split, releasing a vast amount of energy.\n\n~,. . .\n\n(U) Fissile Material, Fissile Isotope - An isotope that readily fissions after absorbing a\nneutron of any energy, either fast or slow. Fissile materials are 235U, 233U, 239Pu, and 241Pu.\n235U is the only naturally occurring fissile isotope.\n\n24~, and 252Cf (see\n\n(U) Fission - The splitting of the nucleus of a heavy atom into two lighter nuclei. It is\naccompanied by the release of neutrons, x-rays, gamma rays, and the kinetic energy of the\nfission products. It is usually triggered when the nucleus is hit with a neutron, but in some\ncases can be induced by protons and other particles or gamma rays. Some isotopes decay\nspontaneously by fission, where an isotope naturally decays by fission without a neutron\ntrigger. Spontaneous fission can occur in isotopes such as 238U,\n\n## Se~\n\nspontaneous fission).\n\n(U) Fission Products - The radioactive and stable isotopes produced by fission. Each isotope produces a unique pattern of isotope masses. In addition, the pattern of the isotope masses depends on the energy of the neutron spectrum. Three neutron energy ranges are of interest: fission spectrum (neutrons produced directly from fission), thermal (neutrons that have been slowed or moderated have thermal energies), and 14 MeV (which are produced by the fusion reaction of tritium and deuterium). Generally, the analysis of fission products focuses on the analysis of radioactive isotopes.\n\n(U) Fission Spectrum Neutron - The energy of neutrons produced by the fission process.\n\nTypical energies of fission spectrum neutrons are in the l to 3 MeV range.\n\n,~i-\n..\n\n:::::: ..\n\n(U) Fissionable Material - Commonly used as a synonym for fissile materiaft~;.rpeaning of\n~-.\n\n.\n\nthis term has been extended to include material that can be fissioned. by f~~,peutro~~Qp}y, such as 238U\n;:;::;::;\n::\n\n\n                                     .... :\n                                            .:i:~=r\n                                                  :::::;f::/\n\n(U) Fission Track Analysis - A method for finding particles that carifiin;uranium or\nplutonium by fissioning a small amount of the fissile isotope ari'tt~.Qetectiit~;ftle fission tracks\n\n                                                                                                                                               ''\"-~\"';-\n                                                                                                                                                                            --il\"'\nproduced in a detector. Also called Lexan screening, beca~'Lex~\n                                                                                                                                                              . J?lastic is used to detect\nthe fission tracks. This method uses optical microscopy,Jo\"locate aiii;jsdlate particles of\ninterest in nuclear forensic samples. The pr~:'}~~-9~ ~,f!ij~~ipn tracks;:r~quires neutron\nirradiation, which is usually done in a resear.Ch'te~ior.\n                                                                                                                                     .,*~;:.. . ..\n                                                                                           .. ;:~t.\n                                                                                                                   -~r\n                                                                                                                                          :;~;:::\n\n(U) Fission Weapon- A weapon designea;w~pr9'fuce blast, thermal radiation, and nuclear\nradiation through the fissioning of fissile miltilfi{l\\1. (e.g., 235U and\n\n                                                                                   23~). The complete fission\nof one pound of fissionable material has a yield;~~y.alent to 8,000 tons of TNT .\n\n.... ~.:Jr.~.\n\n(U) Forensic Science - The comprehe~~i~{~~ieni~~c analysis of physical and biological\nevidence in the context of civ,ih:~.J;.tliriill: or international law. The goal of forensics is to link\npeople, places,-things, and t:-.Yen~::see.also conventional forensics.\n\n=~~ .~;fr'\n                     .~-:~\n\n(U) Fourier Transf'!r~1J:nt~~!\"~~~(l#hR) Spectrometry -A high-resolution infrared\nspectrometrY. !~cfmA~. that eniploys an optical interferometer to simultaneously detect and\nanalyze ~-wt~~f!n:ge.,.C>tiipfrared wavelengths. The data are analyzed by performing a Fourier\n\nT~f9.hn, wii(~'h is a ~eiliatical process to convert intensity as a function of the\n\nint~ci;~w.~te!~position to'mtensity as a function of energy (i.e., inverse wavelength). FTIR\n\nbecamef~~~tile with the advent of modem computers and computational algorithms. FTIR\nis useful fd~~~.11JY3ing a variety of materials in solid, liquid, and gaseous form.\n\n==~~r;-\n\n(U) Fuel Eleni~~t - A rod, tube, plate, or other mechanical shape or form into which nuclear\nfuel is fabricated for use in a nuclear reactor.\n\n(U) Fuel Fabrication Plant - A facility where the nuclear material, such as enriched or\nnatural uranium, is fabricated into a ceramic material called uranium dioxide in a form\nsuitable for use as fuel in a nuclear reactor.\n\n(U) Fuel-~ade Plutonium - Plutonium produced in nuclear reactors that has between 7%\nand 19%\n           Pu relative to other isotopes of plutonium.\n\n\n(U) Fuel Pellets - Typically, sintered (or fused) and ground cylinders of uranium dioxide, about 112 inch long and of various diameters, are stacked in tubes to form the fuel pins or rod.\n\n(U) Fusion- The opposite of fission, in which two light nuclei atoms- typically deuterium and/or tritium- combine to form a heavier nucleus with the release of a substantial amount of energy. Extremely high temperatures, resulting in highly energetic, fast-moving nuclei, are required to initiate fusion reactions. '\n(b) (3) per DOE\nSRD, TCG-NAS-2\nTopic 506.4\n(U) Gamma Ray Emitter- A material that emits garrupji.:f.a~:(:~:~~!ler; photons). 60Co .\n\nis a strong gamma ray emitter.\n\n. ,,_.;:..\n\n_X;~::::-.\n\n_..\n\n(U) Gamma Ray Radiation - Also call~9i:~=lli~tor s~~jtHi~-energy electromagnetic radiation emitted by nuclei during nucl~af:~~'?ti_!>rlS or radioactive decay. Many radioactive isotopes emit gamma rays and these gammatitY:~,have specific energies that are characteristic to the specific isotope and decay scheme. Gatillif~~t:_ays have high energy (generally 30 KeV\nto many MeV) and a short wave length. Sltjelding;iigainst gamma radiation requires thick layers of dense material, such as lead. Q.afuma rays are potentially lethal to humans, depending on the intensity of.9leT~UX. :\n.. -\n_f.\n\n-.\n\n(U) Gamma Spectrom.':_t.ri~ . .A.detec,t}on system that measures the energy of gamma rays emitted by a radioac!i~~.>samp~~:=:Th~igamma ray energy and intensity is used to identify the radioactive isotope .and. the amount of the isotope in the sample. The detector types include solid-sta~:;d~t~tptS: \"glis~P.roportional detectors, and solid scintillation detectors. The most COtnn:19P'type bf~solid-sta~~d'~tector uses a large, high purity, single crystal of germanium\n(also=~liJ!~~ IWGe). A soii'il scintillation detector often uses large crystals of sodium iodide.\n\nThe mosf~~~itive gamma spectrometer can detect activities of 0.1 dpm or less.\n\n!\";:;!::,...\n\n.\n\n(U) Gas Ce~t6fuge - A uranium enrichment process that uses rapidly rotating cylinders (gas centrifuges, also called rotors) to enrich 23Su. Uranium hexafluoride (UF6) gas is fed into a gas centrifuge and rotated at high speed. The centrifugal forces produced by the rotation cause the heavier 238U to migrate toward the outside of the rotor and the lighter 235U to migrate towards the center. Gas removed from the center is slightly enriched in 235U and gas removed from near the outside of the rotor is slightly depleted in 235U. The separation efficiency is increased by a relatively slow axial countercurrent flow of gas within the centrifuge. The countercurrent flow process produces further enrichment by concentrating enriched gas at one end and depleted gas at the other. Feed UF6 is introduced near the middle of the rotor, and enriched and depleted uF' are removed near the ends. The separation capacity of a single rotor increases with the length of the rotorand the rotor wall speed (i.e.\n\nwith increasiD.g rotation rate). Consequently, centrifuges consisting of long, high-speed\n\n## Secre~Rn\n\nrotors are the goal of centrifuge development programs, subject to materials and mechanical constraints. A typical gas centrifuge plant can have thousands of rotors, connected in series.\n\nGas centrifuges must be constructed of very strong materials, such as carbon fiber or highstrength aluminum or steel alloys. The gas centrifuge process is much more energy efficient than gaseous diffusion.\n\n(U) Gaseous Diffusion - This isotope separation process is based on the fact that the lighter isotopes of 23SU gas diffuse through a porous barrier at a faster rate than the heavier isotopes.\n\nThis method requires large plants and enormous amounts of electrical power. China, France, Russia, Great Britain, and the United States have used this isotope separation process.\n\n(U) Gas Proportional Detector - A radiation detector that detects beta particles o.r gamma rays by the ionization they produce in a gas. Gas proportional detectors can ~~~~re the energy of the gamma ray and are used in gamma spectrometry. The most sen8itiY.~;.gas .\n\nproportion detectors can detect activities ofO.I dpm or less.\n\n,::;.\n\n-:::;~;;.;,;;\n(U) Geiger Counter - A radiation detector that can detect beta partic1et:~~~~fnma ;~;s.\n\nThe Geiger counter is widely used for radiation detection trl~asureni~if~~(qr he~ifu. physics and radiation safety.\n\n;;!:::.\n\n'::!;~:;~<\n.. :\n.. :..:~~.. .\n\n: .. ,.-\n(U) Glow Discharge Mass Spectrometry (GD-MS) - :fu ~i~w d~~~lifg~ ~s spectrometry\n(GD-MS), the sample serves as the cathode o~~,gJ.ow ~~~~!lfge (argon is usually the support gas). The sample i~ sputtered by argon io:J?,~;iftiCi::ij~.spurti~r~~t~~.utrals from the sample diffuse into the plasma. In the plasma, tlt~t.:~eutral~{~ ionize~l'ieither by electron impact or, more typically, by collision with metaSt3.Bi~:M:g~n:=iitoms (penning ionization). GD-MS can be an effective technique for directly measuii'Q~tbulk samples, such as dirt. GD-MS is highly quantitative, suffering from very few matrix eff~~~-.-Jtcan be fused as a sensitive survey tool with detection limits ranging from less th~;11 ppiY:i&'a few ppm, depending on the element.\n\nHowever, it lacks the precision associat~5f!\\Vith railiochemistry, TIMS, or ICP-MS. It also can provide misleading result.~.~f~~;~om~'heterogeneous samples, since the sampled volume is small, and there is no sampl~'hopJoge:Q.ization provided by dissolution or a similar process .\n\n. .~.\n\n==~ ... ~--~\n.~::\n(U) Graphite - A forni:o'f catb,o.~.;:Effiiphite is used as a neutron moderator in some nuclear reactors. Such react~~. can ~-()ifii'atural uranium and are useful for producing weaponsgrade pl~~ffi~} M~~~t-~he_ US weapons-grade plutonium was produced in graphitemode~~ed reac(Qrs at th~~WSDepartment of Energy's Hanford Site in Washington state.\n\n_\n_..:::;:~:i:;,,\n. ::--\ny\n(U) Greeg:~~t- Green Salt is the term used to describe uranium tetrafluoride (UF4) which is a green ccy~f@!:W~.solid compound of uranium. UF4 is generally an intermediate in the conversion of\\lilihium hexafluoride (UF6) to either uranium oxides (U30s or U02) or uranium metal~' It is formed by the reaction ofUF6 with hydrogen gas in a vertical tube-type reactor or by the action of hydrogen fluoride (HF) on uranium dioxide.\n\n## H\n\n(U) Half-life - The amount of time needed for half of the atoms of a radioactive material to disintegrate or decay.\n\n(U) Health Physics - The science concerned with recognitioD, evaluation, and control of health hazards resulting from ionized radiation.\n\n(U) Heavy Water - A form of water in which the hydrogen has been replaced by deuterium.\n\nHeavy water is used as a neutron moderator in some nuclear reactors. Such reactors can run on natural uranium and are useful for producing weapons-grade plutonium, Some of the US\nweapons-grade plutonium (and most of the tritium) was produced in heavy-water-moderated reactors at the US Department of Energy's Savannah River Site in South Carolina.\n\n(U) Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) - Uranium that contains 20 _atom% or more 23SU.\n\n(U) High Explosives (HE) - Energetic materials that consist of chemical com~Qtiiids or mixtures of compounds that when properly initiated evolve large volumes of ilfs:IA:!i short period of time and produce_ a high pressure shock wave that is capable o(~~!J:erixl8;P.r:.;;;\ncompressing surrounding media. Examples of HE compounds suitable:fdt'ii'ti~I~ar w~apons include:\n:~::\n/~~i:..\n\n-;~:!:1~;::::\n(U) HMX (cyclotetramethylenetetranitroramine)\n:~:::..\n\n-::::~;;;_:,.<\n~\n~~(~~~':a~:!;~~~:::::;nne)\n,:;:;./:: . :;:~~~~~~~)-... /-\n(U) TA TB (triamino-trinitrobenzene)\n.;.::..\n\n_:-'-::;~:_;_::....\n\n\"\n(U) TNT (trinitrotoluene)\n. /;,:::::.~:.;:_:\n(U) Tetrya (trinitrophenylmethylnitr~w~)\n... ,.\n\n-\\!::=-\n.. il..\n\n..:.\n._,.. ' .. ~~::;:~:~ .. -~-\n(U) All of these HE compounds consist of org@)~ compounds with attached nitrogen oxide\n(or \"nitro\" groups), which are responsible for tfie;~~.P.~osive character of these compounds.\n\nFor nuclear weapon applications, these (or:~imilaii:C!ompounds are usually blended with inert binders (such as plastic) to obtain a phY.~!.tkl fom1ofthe HE compound that can be molded or machined into the desired shaP,:;:;:::.\n\n::\n... -\n.  .. ~~\n.\n\n;i\n_'!\n\nl\n(U) HPGe Detector - A,.~,.ef g~\nray detector that uses a large crystal of high purity germanium to detect g!ilffina'~Y,~.:\":HPGe detectors can measure the energy of the gamma ray and are used.i.t! g~,spectroliie-fiY. HPGe detectors must be cooled to cryogenic temperawrC:S;~~p~h:'as'li~;~ing liquid nitrogen, to work properly. Hence, HPGe detectors are not e~jiy mad~!f;ortabll~~:}Jte most sensitive HPGe detectors can detect activities of 0.1 dpm, or les~:~;;:. . }\n_,:\n-.-;\" .. :. ..\n:::::~=:\n-.. ~i!.'a\n.. :;~:;:::~.:-; --\n~:::\n/\n\n## 1\n\n(U) IC- Intelligence Community.\n\n(U) ICP/MS- See Inductively-coupled-plasma mass spectrometry.\n\n(U) ICP/OES - See Inductively-coupled-plasma optical emission spectrometry.\n\n(U) International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) - An independent, intergovernmental, science and technology-based organization of the United Nations that serves as the global focal point for nuclear cooperation. The mission of the IAEA is to verify through its inspection system that its member States comply with their commitments under the Non-\nProliferation Treaty and other non-proliferation agreements, to use nuclear material an~\nfacilities only for peaceful purposes.\n\n;:::\"'\n-:;;;:.~ .. -- .. ~\n.. ~\n\"' .. \".'\"~~>'\"\"\n(U) Inadvertent Signature - A signature, su~h,a,s .. ~ tr11ritii~J~ment or.i~otope that is present in a material that is othe~ise unimpo~t to .~~=ti~e;~~~ the ~~~B~ An example would be ~\ntrace amount ofplutomum found wtth an':HEU sample. This\"trace Pu would have no bearmg on any of the material properties ofthe'Irniit;I!9t.does its conbentration in the HEU pose any issues for its bulk nuclear properties. The tili~~eP.,u would not be controlled, but it would be a signature of the process that produced the HEif;~:~:;.>/\n6 ........\n\n.\n\n. .\n\n. -~:.~:_?:-\n(U) Inductively-coupled-plasma Opti~aP:iJtmission Spectrometry (ICP/OES) - An instrument used for elemental.~ysis~tfiat uses a hot plasma to vaporize elements for optical spectrographic analysis. ~{nq~almethod of introducing the sample into an ICP/OES is by dissolving the sampl~! g~~futing.~ aerosol from the solution and feeding the aerosol into the hot plasma. The h~Fpla8ili~:sil#~s many of the elements to emit light at characteristic wavelengths. The s,p~p-ograplii'c'analysis of the emitted light is used to determine what elelllen~,a.re:~t,e.~,eiit Iii:i~s: sample and their concentrations in the sample. ICP/OES uses the\n.:.\n~-- .. ~\n~!i :II;..\n\n......\n\n..\n\nsame,m;e ofpl~ina torc~Ji~~l.lsed man ICP/MS. ICP/OES can detect elements down to partper.-b'iilion to pan-per-million levels.\n\n\n-~~:;:=~~;, *'1::* J\n-;-~~\n(U) Inducti~~h~:-eo.upled-plasma Mass Spectrometry (ICP/MS)- A mass spectrometry technique th~tf@~~ a hot plasma to vaporize and ionize elements for mass analysis. The normal method\"ofintroducing the sample into an ICP/MS is by dissolving the sample, generating an aerosol from the solution, and feeding the aerosol into the hot plasma. ICP/MS\nwas initially developed in the early 1980s and has been developed into a general technique for analyzing the elemental compositions of samples, as well as the isotopic composition of individual elements. ICP/MS is pmnarily used for bulk analysis. The technique normally requires extensive cheinistry to dissolve the sample and to separate and purify the element for analysis. However, for particle analysis, small, micrometer-sized particles can be loaded dir~ctly onto a filament for isotopic analysis of uranium and plutonium- no chemistry is used and the atoms are vaporized directly into the carrier gas and transported to the plasma.\n\nICP/MS.can detect as few as 100,000 atoms ofplutonium, and can measure isotope ratios to better than 1 part in 1000 precision for larger samples.\n\n(U) Ion Microprobe Mass Spectrometry - A mass spectrometry technique that uses a focused ion beam to remove (or sputter) atoms from a sample for analysis in a mass spectrometer. The ion microprobe can analyze the elemental and isotopic composition of\n small pieces of material without the need to perform any chemistry on the samples, which is different from other types of mass spectrometry. The technique can analyze areas smaller than 1 micrometer (or micron) in diameter, can detect elements at concentrations as low as one part-per-billion, and can measure the isotopic compositions of elements to precisions better than one part in I ,000. Also called secondary ionization mass spectrometry or SIMS.\n\n(U) Ionization - The removal or addition of an electron from an electrically neutral atom or molecule, thus leaving a positively or negatively charged ion, respectively. , :;:: -- .-~\n(U) Ionizing Radiation- Any radiation that causes the removal of electrons :ff~iq~~~oms.or molecules, thereby producing ions.\n\n. .....\n\n~;;:; .. ,,::\n;::~~:::!~,~.\n\n. .;:;:,.\n\n(U) Isotope - Atoms of the same chemicai element but wi~.;Piffereq.ti~~b;~;~ltJ.eutrons in their nucleus. An isotope is specified by its atomic weight~aiid a syin'I)Qlidenotirig the chemical element, such as 235U for uranium with 235 neutrons.ahd prot~~~iJs\"Otopes can be either stable or unstable (radioactive).\n\n,.;,, ;.-;.::;:\\.\n\n}i'\n\n## K\n\n(U) KeV- Kilo-electrQii:~ott~:l;Q:ikctron volts): a unit of energy often used in the measuremen~ p_f nu~J~~ radiatfoii=such as gamma rays, alpha particles, beta particles, and neutron!!, .. anO::~~Qnttc.hlaiation such as x-rays. See also electron volt and MeV .\n\n.\n\n<~=;i.'\n~~=~~:\n-.~~:~;;:;~ .. ;\n(U)l(~q~n S_~fuple (K) :A sample of known origin and attributes, which is used in the forensic~C:<iqiparison with an unknown or questioned sarilple. The known sample has been previously~abalyzed and documented and the information is likely to have been incorporated into a datab~~~~~See Questioned Sample (Q).\n\n,.\n\n(U) Krypton (Kr) - A chemical element with atomic number 36. It is a noble gas that occurs in trace amounts in Earth's atmosphere. There are 20 known isotopes ofKr. Naturally occurring Kr is made of 5 stable isotopes and one slightly radioactive isotope. 85Kr is a radioactive isotope produced by the fission of uranium and plutonium and is produced by nuclear reactors and nuclear explosions.\n\n## L\n\n(U) Lanthanide Element -A group of elements (also called the rare-earth elements) on the periodic table of the elements that includes lanthanum, neodymium, cerium, and samarium.\n\nThese elements are chemically similar and have been grouped with the lightest element of the series, lanthanum (hence the name lanthanides). The lanthanides are important to nuclear forensics because they include many important fission products, which can be interpreted to determine the fissile isotope and to determine the energy spectrum of the neutrons that produced the fission. The lanthanides are also similar to another group of elements, the actinide elements.\n\n(U) LEA - Law Enforcement Agencies.\n\n~=:~ ....\n.. ~\n1;.1'1;.\" ..\n(U) Liquid Scintillation Detector - A radiation detector that detects alpha pattie\"\\e~ or ~ta particles by the light they produce in a liquid. Liquid scintillation detec~f;.~an mg~W:~~the energy of the alpha particles or beta particles and are used in alpha speji6ih~~. The'inost sensitive liquid scintillation detectors can detect activities ofO.l dpni;o'r less. {::~, - ..-\n,:~:>; '\n;::;~=~~::.\n\n}''\n(U) Lithium - A chemical element that has nuclear properties .$~tare usethl,for thermonuclear or fusion reactions. Lithium is also used ~.,3;-~rgei';(~,r production of tritium .\n\n(U) Maraging Steel - Maraging steel is an:4mpo~r~omponent in the design of gas centrifuge rotors. It allows for the veryJpgh rotor\" wall speed necessary to separate 238U from\n235U, This type of steel (whic!l:b:~::a htgb cobalt content) is the most popular rotor material for proliferant countries to lJ.$e it);fiuilqing isotope separation facilities .\n\n. - !;: ~~/~\n):\n(U) Mass Spectrom~t~f;l Ah~!!q~~~l instrument used to measure the composition of a sample based on the~atomic (or'blolecular) weights (masses) of its constituents. Some mass spectrorp,.~ilit$~~~ h~~t~ly measure the isotopic composition of samples .. Different types of mas&spectrometers includf:\n\n.... ,,.,.\n                             ~Iii!'\n                                                            ;~\"'\n                                                                                                                        .\n\n(U)-~~~~lerato.r'mass spectrometer- AMS\n(U) Induct!:V.~!y-coupled-plasma mass spectrometer - ICP/MS\n(U) Ion mi~9-P.~pb~ mass spectrometer (also called a secondary ionization mass spectrometer\n- SIMS)\n            . ~:::::;,\n\n(U) Thermal irlriization mass spectrometer - TIMS\n\n(U) Each type of mass spectrometer has a specific range of elements (hence isotopes) it can\nanalyze and associated detection limits, as well as requirements for sample preparation\nchemistry and handling.\n                                                               '\n\n(U) Material Signature - .. Material signatures\" include all characteristics of a particular\nmaterial, whether the characteristics ate specifications or nor - i.e., the material\n.. fingerprint.\" .. Material sigriatures\"' include ''process signatures\", but also include\ninadvertent or unspecified signatures. Inadvertent signatures are unimportant as\nspecifications for the process and, hence, are not under deliberate control. Evaluatidn of\n\nmaterial signatures has the potential to identify where (hence, by whom) the material was made. An important point is that \"the interpretation of material signatures requires extensive databases to reveal the origin of the materials.\" \"Exemplars- that is, examples from known processes and locations- are essential.\" See Process Signatures.\n\n(U) MeV- Mega-electron-volt (1,000,000 electron volts): a unit of energy often used in the measurement of nuclear radiation such as gamma rays, alpha particles, and neutrons. See also eV and KeV.\n\n{U) Micron - A micrometer or one-millionth of a meter ( 1 x 10-6 meter). See micrometer.\n\n_(U) Micrometer- One-millionth of a meter (1 x 10-6 meter). The wavelen~.ofY.ellow light is 0.5 micrometers.\n\ni;::/'\n.. .~~~ ,..\n\n{U) Molecular Laser Isotope Separation (MLIS) - There are two basic .. ~~~~ ~~~~l~9;1n the MLIS process. In the first step, UF6 is irradiated by an infrared las~fS'y~i~ ope~iing near the 16 mm wavelength, which selectively excites the\n2~-:UF6 , lea~g the;~~6\nrelatively unexcited. In the second step, photons from a se~6nd 1as<;a~~~m (infrared or ultraviolet) preferentially dissociate the excited 235UF6 to form}?~UFs aifa~it;ee''fluorine atoms. The 235UF5 formed from the dissociation precipita~N:.~.::frotii:~m~ gas-iiS' a powder that can be filtered from the gas stream. In terms of the gas ,~qw for the~~IS process, gaseous\n235UF 6 is mixed with a carrier gas and a scavet:tg~F .. gas Js:~~panded th'fough a supersonic nozzle that cools the gas to low temperatw;~s:~;Hyaf.Qgen Br;:i,ooble gas are suitable as carriers. A scavenger gas (such as me~.~~~ is us~io captt.if~:tb.e fluorine atoms that are released as a result of the dissociation of\n23~tJF.6 niolecules. Like AVLIS, MLIS technology appears promising bus has proven to be extr'~fEiy difficult to master and may be beyond the reach of even technically advanced states.\n\n~:::~::~:-:/\n.\n;~: ...\n\n(U) MOX-Grade Plutonium - Mixed Q.ilc:ie foe( which contains both uranium and plutonium oxides. MOX fueljs::m.~e ~ing plutonium extracted by reprocessing spent power reactor fuel and typically h~'~ier t'tt_an 30% 24<Tu.\n\n!~~ -~~'!\n\n~!:\nfoa ~-\n\"lo\"\n-~~~;=:~ =~~;::~::~~.\n\nAtoms are about\n(U) Neptunium (Np)- A metallic radioactive element with atomic number 93. Neptunium is found in trace quantities in uranium ores and is also produced synthetically in nuclear reactions.\n\n(U) Neutron - The neutron is an electrically neutral particle of nearly the same mass as the proton. Neutrons are one of the three basic particles that make up the atom, the others being protons and electrons. Neutrons as released by fission and can be produced by other nuclear reactions, such as bombardment of beryllium by alpha particles. Neutrons can be absorbed by paraffin, hydrogenous material, or by very thick layers of lead.\n\n(U) Neutron Initiator - A device that emits a burst of neutrons to start a chain reaction in a critical mass of fissile material. The initiator triggers the nuclear detonation once the critical mass has been assembled by high explosives.\n\n\n(U) Neutron Moderator - A material that slows neutrons. Examples include graphite and heavy water. Moderators are used in nuclear reactors to slow neutrons from fission energies .\n\nto thermal energies to increase the probability that the neutrons will react with the nuclear fuel in the reactor.\n\n(U) Nickel (Ni) - A chemical element that is used in many nuclear applications because of its chemical resistance to oxygen and fluorine. Nickel is also a component of many types of steels.\n\n~~:..\n\n~ <~\n.. ~ .. '~'\";.. .\n\n(U) Nuclear Attribution- The assignment of responsibility (people) for the fii=i~~~~d or.\n\nactual use of nuclear material.\n\n.:~>.\n\n':~!;1:;.,)\n:~=~'- --~:~~~~~..\n\n~: .. :~::\"\n(U) Nuclear Characterization- The description of the ch~tp.ical, el~]ri~ntal,'\n::~pic, and physical aspects of the nuclear material as well as the inferf~ histoilaq:~(pedigr(!eJprocess)\norigins of the nuclear material.\n\n.:=::::..\n\n:::;:~:.~~ ..\n\n. .. . .\n\n~\n~:~:~:::.,\n?t~\n(U) Nuclear Forensics- The application of nuclear physici~:~nd ~~iy~cal technologies to the study of nuclear material in forensic samples .. M:~ith;:6~qyentionaLforensics, the goal is to link people, places, things, and events. Nu_~l~::r6~sics it~~.s~ks to identify how nuclear materials were produced, their intended u&e, and W.here they\"we're produced. The findings may be presented as technical evidencliiri~~~~r:Sf law or oh. a national security setting.\n\n-~ .... - ~li\n(U) Nuclear Detonation -A nuclear explosion:~~~!~ng from fission or fusion reactions in nuclear materials, such as from a nuclear w~apon:;:\n.-:-;....\n\n.\n(U) Nuclear Energy - The energy::r.etei~d when the nucleus of an atom splits or when two nuclei fuse. (See fission an~=fu~ion). : .\n\n.\n\n~..\n\n:~;~;::~\n'~~:\n(U) Nuclear Radiati_o~:~'Pai'ij~~~;~d'electromagnetic radiation emitted from various nuclear processes in .~t~mic;;P~~lei. The'imiJortant radiations, from the nuclear weapon effects standpoi9t;i~~~lplia 'liii<J::beta particles, gamma rays, and neutrons.\n\n(U) Optical Microscopy- A microscope that magnifies light. Features as small as about I\nmicrometer (or micron) can be resolved by this technique. Two variants are reflected light microscopy, which images the sample surface by reflection of light shone on the sample, and transmitted light microscopy, which images the interior of the sample by light that passes through the sample.\n\n(U) Parent Isotope - A radioactive isotope that decays to produce a daughter isotope. The concept of parent isotope and daughter isotope are crucial for age-dating.\n\n(U) Penetrating Radiation - External radiations of such penetrating power that the absorbed dose from exposure is delivered in significant and damaging quantities to human tissue and other organs. It refers to most gamma radiation, x-ray radiation (excluding those with very low energy), and neutron radiation assembly, but not including safmg material.\n\n,\n\"~....\n\n~\n:!'.,'rl~ ~'\n(U) Pit - A pit is the core of an implosion type nuclear weapon. It contains th~:;Kssile material and any reflector or tamper associated with it.\n\n:~~;:::,~ ... ::\n;;f ~;~:~ :=:~...\n\n~::.~ ~ ..\n\nlliJ Plutonium (Pu) - A transuranic element with a fissile j_~.9tope o.~~~ss.n~~~f239\n(23 Pu).\n\n~-:-' .::::~. ,,. -;~~;:~:::~:~:/ /\n(U) Poloniu~-210 e'0Po)- ~alpha-emitting radioactiv~~~~blp~:~}h ~ J~g day half-life ..\n\n2'0po occurs m trace amounts m nature due to the decay.ofnaturally;oooumng\n23~. 2'0po ts produced in nuclear reactors by irradiation of\n2~:i (th~s9J~.stable is<Stope of bismuth) and is used commercially for a variety of purposes,t(sii6Ii:ijs.. in srii~:fi;,_encapsulated sources to eliminate static electricitY) and in nucle~~eapon~:;iiS part of~;ii~utron initiator (when mixed with beryllium).\n\n./ ::::;:;....\n\n/~\n'\n4::~~:=~=:\n(U) ppb - Parts per billion; refers to the con~~~~p~of something in a material.\n\n.\n-~:.t.~\n.~;j~-\n.:\n(U) ppm - Parts per million; refers to ~e::ooncenti\"ation of something in a material.\n\n.... ~ ..\n\n~ ~ .. ;.,..\n\n~.-.. ~\n.\n\n(U) ppt - Parts per trillion; re:f~;ji~-~h~ concentration of something in a material.\n\n.\n\n~: ... !;:,\n.. ::\n(U) Process Signatur4!\"r~? P1~b{~i~~tures generally arise from product specifications,\nwhich depen~ ~n h9w~:iJte matefiiii'was produced and how the material will be used. An importantpil'iJii:i~ that:~t};rpcess signatures can generally be interpreted without the need for exte~~~ye data~~es.\" rri~wtelpret process signatures one usually needs only knowledge of the.pf~,s (L~~'fmal prod'bct specifications). See Material Signatures.\n\n ..\n.. -.. -.......\n\n~~\n.\n\n(U) Prot~~:~;~~ .P.roton is a positively charged particle of nearly the same mass as the neutron. ProiB:~;Iire one of the three basic particles that make up the atom, the others being neutrons and eiectrons.\n\n(U) Pusher - A shell made out of low density metal- such as aluminum, beryllium, or other metals- which is located between the explosive lens and the tamper in an implosion type nuclear weapon. It works by reflecting some of the shock wave backwards, having the effect of lengthening its duration.\n\n\n\n## R\n\n{fooQ) Radiological Dispersal Device (RDD) -A Radiological Dispersal Device (ROD) is defined by the US Department of Defense as, \"any device, including any weapon or equipment, excluding a yield-producing nuclear device, designed to employ radioactive material to cause destruction, damage, or injury by means of radiation produced by decay of such materials.\" An RDD may cause mass disruption- possibly causing mas$. hy~Jeria, fear, and significant cleanup costs- but is not considered a WMD\n:;:;,(\n~=~~==!i:::..\n\n-\n(U) Radioactive Counting Techniques - Each radioactive isotope emi~SM\\jatiorie~~~own types and energies at a known rate. By measuring the radiation emitte(,lilifhts.~ple;ft'is possible to quantify the amount of each measured isotope P!-~sent. ~~~e are ~~-types of radiation that are usually considered for measurement.: alplia~ beta ahog~ma nRtiation.\n\nEach type of radiation has its own properties and methods of ru;ieP.tion. ';;:;;::\n(U) Silicon surface barrier detectors commonly detect alp~~?pidiacll~!!:\n}\"'\n(U) Scintillation techniques or gas ionization detectors ~~(used to d~fbeta radiation.\n\n(U) Germanium crystals are commonly used ~q,9:~~,ct .8'1iWwa radiation.\n\n'\"~::!;(~:::~::::;: -\n.-::~~~=~~~~ .r'\n(U) Radioactivity - The phenomenon, ~~~ited \\>Y.!and bems::aproperty of certain elements, of spontaneously emitting radiation resultiqg.from':Changes iri the nuclei of atoms of the\n.... ~: .. :~\nelement.\n\n..;.\n\n=~=~=~-\n.\n\n .. :::::;::.~4\n(U) Radiochemistry - Many samples are ,t~,9 com;lex for all the radioactive isotopes present to be measured directly. By utilizing fl!~;idifferenees in chemical properties of the elements, it is. possible to devise schemes.9-:~!,l:emi~iil reactions to separate and purify elements, or groups of elements, to allow measurem~ni oft}le isotopes present by radioactive counting methods, or mass spectrometry. The fs.otf>pes l!(easured are related back to the original sample by referencing to an interriai'isrlf<>pjc;.sWi'dard called a \"spike.\" The chemical separation and purification steps intYcltse botii'tlifsensitivity and selectivity of the technique.\n\nRadioch~~~~ftY;;is ~~~~Wly important to allow measurement of isotopes that are present at low a~P.t'ity an'&,r!ire besi~~ured by their alpha or beta emissions or by mass spectrometry.\n\n~i\\~i~::\n/='\nRaditi~li~~istt:Y'J.n combination with radioactive counting techniques and.mass spectrometry has the.fj(;wp~al to measure down to 106 atoms or lower of certain isotopes.\n\ns\n(U) Sating Arming Fuzing Firing (SAFF) system - A SAFF system is crucial to the development of a militarily usable nuclear weapon. It consists of the following subsystems:\n(U) Sating: Used to ensure that a nuclear weapon will not experience a nuclear detonation as it is being stored, handled, deployed, and employed. Sating usually involved multiple mechanical interruptions of both power sources and explosive firing trains. The nuclear components may be designed so that an accidental detonation of the high explosives is\n\nintrinsically unable to produce a significant nuclear yield.\n\n(U) Arming: Placing the nuclear warhead in a ready operational state, such that it can be initiated under specified firing conditions. Arming generally involves mechanical restoration of the sating interrupts in response to conditions that are unique to the launch or deployment of the system.\n\n(U) Fuzing: Detecting that the desired conditions for warhead detonation have been met and providing an appropriate command signal to the firing set to initiate nuclear detonation.\n\n(U) Firing: Delivering a precise level of precisely timed electrical or pyrotechnic energy to one or more warhead detonating devices.\n\n=~=:==~~,\n,.\n\n- -\n(U) Tamper - A shell surrounding the fission core in an imnlosion tyP.i~::~~~~~pon which keeps the nuclear material confined during the impldsion for\"a'Iij~ger timtraising the\n. ld f th\n. - .\n\n=~~~- ...\n\nyte o e weapon.\n\n;.;.;-,\n,=~-:\n.;:~::,., =:t~~;..\n\n?'\n(U) Thermal Ionization Mass Spectrometry (TIMS) 7.1ii\"tiMS, a::~~ple is deposited on a metal filament, w~ich _is hea~d i~ a high ~ac~~:~:,; ~~~~~-a currerifthro~p it. TIMS is capable ofmeasunng tsotoptcranos on ptsggram<(:!~9\n12 g)tQ~~~c;>gram (10 g) samples, or down to tens offemtograms (1 x 10\"15 g);,p~jng spe~jil pre-c6!)\"c-entration techniques. TIMS\nroutinely measures differences in isotopc(riiiiss ratibs of the order of 1 in a million.\n\n{U) Thorium (Th) - A radioactive metallic :~J*~~-.vy.ith atomic number 90. Thonum may\n. be used as fuel for special types of nuclear:t.:eacto~~\n.. ~!;~:;'\n.\n(U) TNF- Technical Nuclear.F.ort:nsics:\n-  I\n~,~.~\n..\n\n.\n....\n\n: ... ./\n::::~:=\n\\~i~::::::/:::-\n'!.II':~\"'\n\n                                          ;:~-:\nU\n                                           _\n                                            ....\n\n.. /(\"'lt:~\n                                  \"~''\\;--'\n\nM. U;~~~ttf~U) -A ra~oactive element with various fissile isotopes. 235U is used in\nnuclear witl~ns and as fuel for nuclear reactors.\n\n-~::::~~-\n\n(U) Uranium-ilexafluoride (UF6) - A compound used in the uranium enrichment process\nwhich produces fuel for nuclear reactors or highly enriched uranium for nuclear weapons.\nUF 6 is used as the feed material for gas centrifuges, gaseous diffusion, and MLIS enrichment\nmethods. UF6 is produced by reacting UF4 with fluorine.\nv\n\n(U) Visual Inspection and Photography - Visual inspection of a sample can give an expert\n\n## S~Rn\n\ninformation as to its possible identity, especially in conjunction with data from NDA\ntechniques such as gamma spectrometry and survey data. Size and shape can be sufficient to identify some items, especially if serial numbers or other identifying marks can be seen. For chemicals, the color and form of the material can be important clues.\n\n(U) X-ray - A form of electromagnetic radiation, similar to.,isible IJ!Wl but of.~~w:ter wavelength (between 0.1 to 10 nm) and capable ofpenetraiftig solicfs~~.jonizipg gasses.\n\n!\"~~;;~~~t\n~:::;j~:~~? .\\\n(U) X-ray Diffraction Analysis (XRD) - XRD analysis isJ!J.' s~~d method for identifying the chemical structure of inorganic and orgat)iS'ciystallin~:!;Iiaterial. X-ray beams that impinge on regularly ordered lattices underg9-,~on~~tive and d~structive interference that depends on the spacing of the lattice, t:Pe'Wii\\i:fJ.~gth6f;J9F.?C-rays, and the angle of incidence of the X-ray beam. By rotatingji}.e samP.\\e relative:tf{a fixed X-ray source, variations in interference occur, leading\"t6~~~,~teristic ditrraction patterns. These diffraction patterns can be compared to refert?~~.~pectra to identify the specific crystalline phase. XRD cannot generate diffraction pattems:~~~~amorphous (non-crystalline) material.\n\n(U) X-ray Fluorescence Analysis <XI9.9;~::XRF .~:lysis can be useful for the broad and non-destructive elemental qWlP.tifig.atioii of a sample. An incident X -ray beam is used to excite characteristic seconrupy ~-fay y.:avelengths and energies in a solid sample. These X-\nrays are counted using ~.soll,q.state o:r:;proportional counter. The detection limits for XRF are in the range of 10 p~~~!i\"i\\mil*~i.~:8f~tlie light elements is possible but more problematic du~\nto the low characteriSti~ X-ray energies involved. XRF is strictly an elemental analysis tool, while IC:p.,-M~:9.r. d:i:i~~S.. which are more sensitive, are able to measure isotopic compqsition. ')tlzy can fi=~:irefformed direetly on solid samples, although dissolutions are ofteri;;il'ii~!yz~:ii> providehomogenization of the sample.\n\n~ .&\n\"' \"'\n(U) Xe~~~~&.~l- ~ chemical element of atomic number 54. Xe is a noble gas which occurs in the Earth's'il:iQiosphere in trace amounts. Naturally occurring Xe consists of9 stable isotopes. Xe afso has over 40 unstable isotopes that undergo radioactive decay. 135Xe is produced as a result of nuclear fission.\n\n## Y\n\n(U) Yellowcake- A processed oxide of uranium (U30s) which is extracted and concentrated from uranium ore. It is used as the raw material for commercial nuclear materials.\n\n## Z (U) Appendix C: Dynamic Analysis Process\n\n(U/tRmO)Very hard to nearly intractable intelligence problems usually go through to an initials~ by a highly-focused special analytical team. Outputs from the team's efforts are used to update collection requirements, and sometimes result in the formation of a new entity to work the problem full-time. After a long period of little progress or no real intelligence production, the problem may fall below the day-to-day focus. If and when activities related to the concern about the issue remind consumers of the threat, then another focused look at the problem may be initiated.\n\n(U//f'6:t.JO) For certain classes of issues, failure represents catastrophic conseq1,1~nees. Issues of this n~e demand a level of focus that digs deep every day, even if the resiilts-:are negative over long periods of time. In such situations, dedicating some reso~~!:fiJ;.wodcing the problem on a continuing basis is worth the effort.\n\n:;:i:;;::::...\n\n~:;:;:::'\n'\n-J<.\"' .. ~\n.\n\n~\n~~~---~:\n~-~:!=~~~ --:~--\n~U//F~O) A dyn~ic approach to analysis ~d collect~ori=t6r bard:{~:~~ly in.~ctable Issues ts Illustrated m the chart below (Dynamtc Analysts and ~-~!Jectton'~s:le Process).\n\nThis approach has previously been recommended in severa!;stUdie~!perforliied by the DNI's now defunct Intelligence Concepts Development Office..({cirmerly 'ii~~~r'the ADCI/Collection as the Collection Concepts Development Ce<n~c:9..-:-Jh~.;~~~endatibns were generated by applying the process to developing analysi~._aiid~dH~ctioti=~qQmmendations on particular hard problems identified by the NICB. ..:;:::\n-~~::~\n::;7;_;;.'\n.\n\n. .... -:~;:;z: .. _ .... ~~7\n~\n(U//F~O) The concept for dynamic anal;~i~1i:f~-~ig~t forward. The first phase involves creating a notional series of phases that any entity;;}Xoidd use to start and achieve a particular objective. The actual steps would be b~;:on wl)iifever is known about the ilk of the entity and real world activities that would have;:ib take place to achieve their objective .\n\n. .. .;-....\n\n~ ..\n.. ~~;::--~:~;:; ..\n\n(U//FDuO) Under each ph~~~;~i'step~1~articipants in the process brainstorm the manifesthions of activities ttiat .. must::occur in order for an entity forward on their objective.\n\nIn concert with this .l;J~tonrlirig;=p-iuticipants identify what might be collectable from any particul~.-9'!~t~stifi6~::.JFor example, there would be a number of areas where information and p}?.~itomeli*~ould -ti~~g~erated in the course of arranging for a safe-bouse to set up a cov~;ip~eting.:dtthe ''grriuP..wbo-hates-potatoes\". Someone would have to make the aria~g~~~p.t:sfor a room or house-leaving a trail of paper. Some attendees might rent cars-anriii!~~.!fail of paper. Cars on the way to the meeting would cause a Doppler shift in any local radi~]~~quency signals. An upswing in anti-potato rhetoric might show up in internet medi~f Possible collectable information would be arrayed against the capabilities of existing collection resources.\n\n(U//F~O) If a collection resource had the access to and ability to collect the information, an approprilh:e requirement would be initiated. Alternatively, requirements already in place would be updated if necessary.\n\n(U//F~O) If collection was feasible but no capability yet existed, an associated gap-closing research objective might be initiated.\n\n(U/F~) When conducted on a conti uing basis, the dynamic analysis process would SEC\nOFORN\nconstantly iterate the issue's evolutionary steps and possible manifestations. These iterations would be based in any refinement in understanding the ilk of the target entity and specific intelligence information. (A simple analogy is the constant process of writing and rewriting scripts for a movie, as a movie director shoots and evaluates scenes or as the script writer does more research.)\n(U/ ~)\nWork on nuclear attribution is more than just picking up the pieces after an event takes place. Vigilance in working the issue before any harm takes place is a vital part of the job. Interdiction as early as possible should be the primary objective. Some resources should be dedicated to a achieve the objective of frequently revisiting what indications might emerge in LE, TNF and intelligence data from motivation to the aftermath of a terrorism-based nuclear event.\n\n## S~ 0) Dyamic Analysis And Collection Cycle Process (U) Policy Documents\n\n(U) END NOTES\n:-. ..:;\n::::::::\n.':\"lele.;::'.;,\n. ., :~::~:~..\n~\n\n1 [Journal I Weiss, Charles !\"Communicating Uncertainty in. Intelligence and Other Professions\" I f~lt?inational Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence I Date of Publication: 2008 I Pages 57f8\"5\"j'V.~!~:.? II\n. ., .\n2 [Journal I Weiss, Charles I \"Scientific Uncertainty in Advising and A~y.!,>Cacy\" I J:~~nology'iij;}~pciety I Date of Publication: 20021 Pages 375-3861 Vol. 24]\n.\n\n:\n~ ::~:~:..\n\n_.:~:\n3 [Website 1 Kloprogge, Penny; van der Sluijs, Jeroen; and Wardekker, ArjaA:t::unce.:Gqi~.Co~munication Issues and Good Practice\"! December 2007 I\n....  '<:1:::;..\n\n:('\nURL: www.nusap.net/downloadslreports/uncertainty communicationifiidfl RePii~NwS:E-2007-199, ISBN\n978-90-8672-026-21 Copernicus Institute for Sustainable -~velom#~t and lnnov~bn, Departinent of Science Technology and Society (STS), Heidelberglaan 2, 3S~;p.l);.!J.~Ii~'~~sr.J'letherlaitds, Phone+ 31-30-2537631, Fax +31-30-2537601]\n.. r\n'::~:;::\n~::::: .. -/\n4 [Journal! Ke, J, Gong, T., Wang, WI Comml!l).i~pPns in <!;3inputation~jPhysics !\"Language Change and Social Networks\" I Page 935-9491 Vol. 3, No:''ij\" ~~;:~~;;;  ... /\n\n5 [Journal! Ke, J., Yao, Y I Journal of Quantitative Li~i!~t:!_cs I \"Analyzing Language Development from a Network Approach I Date of Publication: 20081 Page 70:~;:1:!\\'RI, 15, No. 1]\n6 [Labov 1 \"The Social stratification of English in!:'~~~ Y od1~elty\" 1 Date of Publication: 1966]\n7 [Journal! Shelton, Donald E. I \"The 'CSl Etfec.t:f~es It R~lly Exist\" I NIJ Journal No. 2591 Date of Posting\n17 March 20081 URL: www.ojp.usd9j.ppyfnijij6iirnals/259]\n8 [Newspaper I Weiss, Rick I Wasbi~irt~~;Posti\"CSI Effect Vexes Real Sleuths\" I Date of Publication: 21\nFebruary 20051 Page A13]\n::. /\n. :\n9 [Bulletin I Shane, Jon I FBl;a~~~fQre,~Qlili Bulletin I\"Compstat Process\" I Date of Publication: April20041\nPage 12-21; and FBI La~;-~~forceri\\tffi~~Biiitetin 1 \"Compstat Design\" 1 Date of Publication: May 2004 1 Page 12-\n\n19]\n            .:~.~~=-=~~:-\n                        /~~:~~;i~;...\n                                                                                                                 .\n\n10 [ Journ_!l:i~fsiiTiO.n~~A I\"Rii~9P.Ill ~boice and the Structure of Environments\" 1 Date of Publication: 19561\n\nPsych:,y;~v. 63: P~te 129-13s''i1~$iffion HA. 19571 Models of Man. New York: Wiley]\n11 [Bci6k:j;~}lllstc<iii'CR 1 Behavioral Law and Economics 1 Date of Publication: 2000 1 Page 3-91 Cambridge:\n\nCambridg~;Oniversity Press 1\n\n\n12 [Taleb NN;:Q~te.ofP-ublication: 2008)\n13 [Journal! Fi~H~i(B.; Lichtenstein, S; Slovic, PI Behavioral Decision Theory Perspectives on Risk and\nSafety; Acta Psy_cllologica I Date of Publication: August 19841 Page 183-2031 Volume: 56, Issue: 1-3]\n\n14 [Journal! Pidgeon NF; Poortinga WI Risk Analysis !\"Trust, the Asymmetry Principle, and the Role of Prior\nBeliefs\" I Date of Publication: 2004124(6): Page 1475-1486]. 24(6):1475-1486]\n\nIS [Book I Gigerenzer G, Selten R.I\"The Adaptive Toolbox: In Bounded Rationality\" l Date of Publication 2002\nI Page 37-491 Cambridge, MA: MIT Press]\n\n16 [Book I Kahneman & Tversky 1 Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Bias I Date of Publication: 1982 I\nCambridge University Press]\n\n17 (Book I Janis, I. & Mann I Pecision-Mal<ing: A Psychological Analvsis of Conflict. Choice. and Commitment\nI Date of Publication: 19771 Free Press]\n18 [Katz et aii\"Network Theory and Small Groups\" l Date of Publication: 2004]\n19 [Book I Janis, Irving I Groupthink I Date of Publication: 19721 Houghton Miffiin]\n20 [Book I Hart, Sundelius, & Stern eds.j Beyond Groypthjnk; I Date of Publication: 19771 University of\n\n## Se~\n\nMichigan Press]\n21 [Klein, Gary; Hoffman, Robert R. eds.j\"Using Knowledge Engineering to Preserve Corporate Memory\" and\n\"'The Psychology of Expertise: Cognitive Research and Empirical AI\" I Date of Publication: 1992 I New York:\nSpringer-Verlag]\n22 [Book I Connell, M.; Gardner, H; Sheridan,K I The Psychology of Abilities, Competencies, and Expertise I On\n\"Abilities and Domains\"! Edited by Robert Sternberg and Elena Grigorenko I Date of Publication: 2003 I\nCambridge University Press]\n23 [Adapted from Chi 12006]\n24 [Adapted from Clark !\"Building Expertise~' I Page 9-15]\n25 [Gvlaskeiwicz & Rulke !\"Distribution of Knowledge, Group Network Structure, and Group Performance'1\n26 [Journal! Cvetkovich GT; Siegrist M. 1 Risk Analysis !\"Better Negative Than Positive? Evidence of a Bias for Negative Information About Possible Health Dangers\" 1 Date of Publication: 2001 121 (I )::;P~ge 199-206]\n27 [K~hlthau I \"Inside the Search Process: Information Seeking from the Users' Perspective\"]:;~:;:;~.\n\n28 [Book I Preston, Thomas 1 The President and His Inner Circle: Leadership Style and the A~~j~~fifrocss in Foreign Affairs I Date of Publication: 2001 1 Columbia University Press]\n. ::::;'\".\n\n:ii~~;::{\n29 [Book I Boin, Hart, and McConnell! Crisis and After: The Politics oflnve5tigationG'i\\~\"C6iiiitabilitv;~~\nkearning I Date of Publication: 20081 Cambridge University Press]\n.-.\n\n;:;~~:\n:;::~:;.;:\n30 [Website I Dynamic Analysis Spreadsheet I\n:::;\n.:'\":;:;:;::..\n\n;:\nhttp://www.sharp.gov:8080/knowledgetree/view.php?tDocumentld=376\n;:;:::.\n\n::~:t:::\n31 Measurement and Signals Intelligence, which includes Technical Nucl~-~~~l!ics ~-\n32 [Journal! McDonnell, J. & Stumpf, S.i Journal of Universal Co!11PU:tlt\"Scienc~ij~~gInvestigation into Sharing Metadata: \"I'm not thinking what yo_u are thinking\"! Datc:.ofPublj~t!qn: 20041 Page 740-748 1 Vol. I 0, No. 6]\n33 [Book I McDonnell, J. & Stumpf, S.l Proceedines-oOhe~;i~lli Interii~ti!mal Worksbon on Database and Expert Systems APPlications CDEXAl 1 \"Sharing Metada!;l!:'ProbleifiS;~and Poteifti~J;S~Iutions\" 1 Date of Publication:\nw~\n-~~\n~\n7\n34 [Website I Center for Strategic Intemationai Studl~~~;t.pa~e of Publication: 5 August 2009)\nhttp://csis.org/prograrnlproject-nuclear-issues]\n-::~::::~.\n\n3s [H.R. 730 I \"Nuclear Forensics and Attribution A~t\"!26~:~hioo9]\n.... ::;:\n~ ..\n\n~;~::"
    },
    {
        "text": "# Nonproliferation Nuclear Forensics\n\nI. Hutcheon, M. Kristo, K. Knight\n\n## December 3, 2015\n\nMineralogical Assocaition of Canada Short Course Series #43 Winnipeg, Canada May 20, 2013 through May 21, 2013\nDisclaimer\n\nThis document was prepared as an account of work sponsored by an agency of the United States government. Neither the United States government nor Lawrence Livermore National Security, LLC, nor any of their employees makes any warranty, expressed or implied, or assumes any legal liability or responsibility for the accuracy, completeness, or usefulness of any information, apparatus, product, or process disclosed, or represents that its use would not infringe privately owned rights. Reference herein to any specific commercial product, process, or service by trade name, trademark, manufacturer, or otherwise does not necessarily constitute or imply its endorsement, recommendation, or favoring by the United States government or Lawrence Livermore National Security, LLC. The views and opinions of authors expressed herein do not necessarily state or reflect those of the United States government or Lawrence Livermore National Security, LLC, and shall not be used for advertising or product endorsement purposes.\n\n\nCHAPTER 13: NONPROLIFERATION NUCLEAR FORENSICS Ian D. Hutcheon, Michael J. Kristo and Kim B. Knight Glenn Seaborg Institute Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory P.O. Box 808, Livermore, California, 94551-0808, USA\ne-mail: hutcheon1@llnl.gov INTRODUCTION\nBeginning with the breakup of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s, unprecedented amounts of illicitly obtained radiological and nuclear materials began to be seized at border crossings and international points of entry. The first instances of this new criminal activity, \"nuclear smuggling\", were reported in 1991 in Italy and Switzerland and in subsequent years numerous incidents involving illicit trafficking of radioactive or nuclear material occurred in a number of central European countries. Between 1993 and 2011, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) recorded more than 2150 incidents of illicit trafficking of radioactive material (IAEA 2012) More than 400 of these incidents involve *bona fide* nuclear material, primarily depleted, natural or low-enriched uranium. Of special concern, moreover, are the 16 or so events involving highly enriched U or Pu (Table 13-1). The overt evidence of significant amounts of nuclear material outside lawful control has created international concern over the importance of maintaining global nuclear order and underscores U.S. President Obama's statement in Prague in 2009, \"In a strange turn of history, the threat of global nuclear war has gone down, but the risk of nuclear attack has gone up.\"\nThe new scientific discipline of Nuclear Forensics was developed out of the need not only to identify and characterize illicit nuclear materials but also to learn more about the original and intended use of the material, its origin and the putative trafficking route. In the U.S., the nuclear forensics effort was jump-started by taking advantage of several decades of experience developed through the nuclear weapons program, supplemented with expertise from geochemistry, material science and conventional forensics.\nNuclear forensics is the technical means by which intercepted radioactive or nuclear material (and any associated non-nuclear material) is characterized to determine, for example, their chemical and isotopic composition, physical state\n\nMineralogical Association of Canada Short Course 43, Winnipeg MB, May 2013, p. xxx-xxx.\n\nand age; these data are then interpreted to evaluate provenance, production history and trafficking route. The goal of these analyses is to identify forensic indicators in the interdicted nuclear and radiological samples or the surrounding environment, *e.g.*, container, transport vehicle or packaging. These indicators arise from known relationships between material characteristics and process history. Nuclear forensics requires a combination of technical data, relevant databases, and specialized skills and knowledge to generate, analyze, and interpret the data. When combined with law enforcement and intelligence data, nuclear forensics can suggest or exclude potential origins and thereby contribute to attribution of the material to its source or production facility.\n\nA primary objective of nuclear forensics is to identify the source, or sources, of stolen or illicitly trafficked nuclear materials and thereby prevent, or make more difficult, terrorist acts that would use material from these same sources (Mayer *et al.* 2007, Moody *et al.* 2005). The perception of effective nuclear forensics is likely to deter some of the individuals who would need to be involved in any act of nuclear terrorism and provides incentives to states to guard their materials and facilities better.\nThe terrorist attacks on New York City and Washington, DC, on September 11, 2001, greatly increased the visibility of nuclear forensics, as policy makers worldwide became increasingly concerned about the possibility of terrorist groups obtaining a nuclear weapon or using a radiological dispersal device (RDD or so-called \"dirty bomb\"). More recently, a consensus has developed among international leaders that the threat of nuclear terrorism poses a real and present danger to both national and international security. U.S. President Obama, the leaders of 46 other nations, the heads of the International Atomic Energy Agency and the United Nations, and numerous experts have called nuclear terrorism one of the most serious threats to global security and stability. The Communique of the 2012 Seoul National Security Summit\n\n## Table 13-1: Selected Interdictions Of Nuclear Material\n\n| Year          | Location                            | Type    |\n|---------------|-------------------------------------|---------|\n| Enrichment or |                                     |         |\n| 239           |                                     |         |\n| Pu            |                                     |         |\n| content       |                                     |         |\n| Mass          |                                     |         |\n| 1992          | Augsburg, Germany                   | LEU     |\n| 1992          | Podolsk, Russia                     | HEU     |\n| 1993          | Vilnius, Lithuania                  | HEU     |\n| 1993          | Andreeva Guba, Russia               | HEU     |\n| 1993          | Murmansk, Russia                    | HEU     |\n| 1994          | St. Petersburg, Russia              | HEU     |\n| 1994          | Tengen, Germany                     | Pu      |\n| 1994          | Landshut, Germany                   | HEU     |\n| 1994          | Munich, Germany                     | Pu      |\n|               |                                     | LEU     |\n| 1994          | Prague, Czech Republic              | HEU     |\n| 1995          | Prague, Czech Republic              | HEU     |\n| 1995          | Prague, Ceske Budejovice            | HEU     |\n| 1995          | Moscow, Russia                      | HEU     |\n| 1999          | Ruse, Bulgaria                      | HEU     |\n| 2001          | Paris, France                       | HEU     |\n| 2003          | Ignalina, Lithuania                 | LEU     |\n| 2003          | Georgia/Armenia Border, Georgia     | HEU     |\n| 2003          | Rotterdam, Netherlands              | NU      |\n| 2006          | Tbilisi, Georgia                    | HEU     |\n| 2007          | Pribenik-Lacacseke Border, Slovakia | NU      |\n| 2010          | Tbilisi, Georgia                    | HEU     |\n\nAdapted from Kristo (2012).  LEU, low enriched uranium; HEU, highly enriched uranium; NU, natural uranium; Pu, plutonium               .\n\nor radiological materials thoroughly in order to understand their origin and site of production, age, point of diversion, transit route, and intended end use. While nuclear forensics has been increasingly utilized to develop evidence for the potential prosecution of individuals who illegally possess nuclear materials, there is also increasing recognition of the utility of nuclear forensics to provide an independent and objective measure of state declarations concerning nuclear capabilities, as well as application and intent. \"Nonproliferation nuclear forensics\" (NNF) supports international efforts to safeguard the nuclear fuel cycle by supplying information necessary to verify declarations, *e.g.*, compliance with the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, as well as attribute illegally transferred materials.\n\nWhile robust nuclear forensic practices serve individual national security regimes within the recognizes that nuclear forensics can be an effective tool in the battle against global nuclear terrorism and encourages states to work with one another, as well as with the IAEA, to develop and enhance nuclear forensics capabilities and underscores the importance of international cooperation both in technology and human resource development to advance nuclear forensics (Communique 2012).\n\nAlthough the term \"nuclear forensics\" was originally applied to the analysis of interdicted nuclear materials in support of law enforcement, the same analytical and interpretative capabilities used to examine interdicted samples may also be employed to investigate suspected proliferation at undeclared sites or to verify that declared nuclear programs are fully sanctioned (Dreicer *et al.* 2009, Fedchenko 2007, 2008). The challenges posed by illicit trafficking and nuclear proliferation share the requirement to identify the characteristics of nuclear\n\ninclude the application of modern material analysis techniques, knowledge of commercial and military nuclear fuel cycles, and scientific principles to analyze unknown nuclear materials or devices and provide information of value to decision makers. This problem is complex enough before considering the wide range of potential materials that may be encountered and the many different types of information that potentially may be required. As in classical forensics, nuclear forensics relies on the fact that certain measurable parameters in a sample are characteristic for a given material. Using these characteristic parameters, also known as\n\"signatures\", nuclear forensic analysis seeks to draw conclusions on the origin and intended use of the intercepted material.\nThe technical response to specific nuclear incidents requires a graded, iterative approach. \"Categorization\" addresses the threat posed by specific interdicted material by identifying the risk to first responders, law enforcement personnel, and the public. Following this step is an assessment to determine if there is any indication of criminal activity or threat to national security.\n\n\"Characterization\" provides a more thorough analysis of the material to determine the nature of the radioactive and associated, non-nuclear evidence. \"Interpretation\" seeks to draw validated technical conclusions from the analytical results, correlating the characteristics of the material with material production history. While interpretation is the end product for the nuclear forensic laboratory, the nuclear attribution process only begins at this stage. Complete nuclear forensic analysis, therefore, includes characterization of all materials, traditional forensic analysis, and interpretation. This approach, predicated on the model action plan developed by the Nuclear Forensics ITWG, is described in much greater detail in the IAEA publication, \"Nuclear Forensics Support,\" Nuclear Security Series Number 2 (Smith *et al.* 2008, IAEA 2006).\n\nNuclear forensic interpretation is a deductive process (*e.g.*, Fig. 13-1), much like the scientific method itself. Initially, a hypothesis, or set of hypotheses, is developed based upon the initial analytical results. In most cases, the initial results will be consistent with multiple hypotheses, which may, in turn, suggest additional signatures. The team then develops additional measurements to verify the presence or absence of the signatures. If analyses show that the signature is absent, this hypothesis must be rejected or adjusted to fit the new  results.  If,  instead,  the  analyses  confirm  the context of illicit trafficking, the goals of nonproliferation nuclear forensics are global in scope and provide an international verification capability. NNF encourages governments to secure vulnerable inventories of nuclear materials and deters nation states and organizations from producing or transferring nuclear materials for malfeasant purposes.\n\nIllicit trafficking of nuclear/radiological materials, investigations of interdicted samples, and nuclear nonproliferation and safeguards are inherently international problems; no single country can hope to address these critical 21st century issues, even on a local scale, without global engagement. In this vein, many states have begun to develop international partnerships in nuclear forensics. In particular, global participation in the Nuclear Smuggling International Technical Working Group (ITWG) has led to the adoption of nuclear forensic best practices multi-laterally in more than 30 states and international organizations (Niemeyer & Koch 2002). The growing recognition of the importance of international engagement to accomplish both nuclear nonproliferation and counter-terrorism objectives underscores the need for a clearly articulated approach to international engagement that identifies and prioritizes foreign partners with respect to access to the nuclear fuel cycle and joint scientific endeavors.\n\nThe requirements of many national nuclear forensic programs exceed those of commercial and international verification regimes. Nuclear forensic investigations require the sharing of validated protocols not only on major and minor isotopes, chemical (trace element) compositions, and physical forms (grain size, sorting, admixtures) of the materials, but also concerning the processes used in facilities across the nuclear fuel cycle. Access to this broad suite of information is critical to evaluate the source and route of smuggled or proliferated materials. There is also a compelling need to ensure that states conducting nuclear forensic measurements - either independently or cooperatively - have access to sufficient data for rigorous, high confidence, interpretation. The need to share data may, by necessity, infringe on proprietary or national security information; these concerns must be addressed at the outset of any exchange and the potential to reveal specific capabilities or methods used by states as part of counter-terrorism and nonproliferation programs may restrict an unfettered exchange of information.\n\nBasic challenges facing nuclear forensics signature, then either the investigation has come to a unique  technical  interpretation   (*i.e.*,   the   desired result) or additional tests to exclude other remaining hypotheses must be developed. In the ideal case, only a single hypothesis or interpretation will eventually prove consistent with all results, although this is seldom true in practice.\n\nSignatures\n\n\nThe term \"signatures\" is used to describe material characteristics that may be used to link samples to people, places, and processes, much as a written signature can be used to link a document to a particular individual. \"Signatures\" describe any characteristic or group of characteristics that can be used to help distinguish materials from one another or identify the processes history of a material. Signatures are essentially combinations of variables used to make comparisons. Some signatures, such as those associated with U or Pu isotopic analyses, may provide only general clues that serve to place the material in a broad category, *e.g.*, Depleted Uranium (DU) or Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU), or, perhaps, narrow the field of potential countries of origin. Other signatures, such as characteristic dimensions or markings, are generally applicable to only a restricted class of materials, *e.g.*, reactor fuel elements or sealed sources, but may provide valuable clues identifying a specific facility or date of manufacture. In some cases, data generated in a nuclear forensic investigation may provide useful information only when combined with other, complementary results. Signatures for nuclear materials are intimately connected to the nuclear fuel cycle since each step in the fuel cycle (Fig. 13-2) both creates new signatures and erases or modifies some existing signatures. An on-going challenge for nuclear forensics is to validate signatures for each step in the fuel cycle and understand the processes that control a signature's persistence.\n\nAlmost without exception, a single signature is insufficient to answer all of the relevant questions. Independent signatures that reach the same conclusion increase confidence in the technical interpretation, while results that provide different or conflicting conclusions decrease the level of confidence. Nuclear forensic investigations are most successful when independent signatures representing a variety of material characteristics can be linked and point toward a unique conclusion. Figure 13-3 illustrates this process schematically by depicting the universe of potential nuclear material sources and processes. Each individual signature defines a subset of known materials from which an intercepted sample may have originated. In the ideal case, the use of multiple signatures leads to a unique point of intersection of multiple subsets corresponding to a unique identification of the source and/or process.\nSignatures generally fall into two broad categories: comparative signatures and predictive signatures. Comparative signatures involve the comparison of the measured properties (*e.g.*, grain size, color, chemical and isotopic composition) of an unknown sample (or \"questioned sample\" in law enforcement parlance) to a similar set of properties for one or more reference samples. The critical question to be addressed is whether or not the characteristics of an unknown sample are the same as, or at least are similar to, those of one or more of the reference samples. The use of comparative signatures to identify an interdicted sample may involve either a point-to-point comparison or a point-to-population comparison. Point-to-point comparisons are relatively rare and rely on the intercomparison of two or more closely matched samples, *e.g.*, HEU samples interdicted in Bulgaria in 1999 and in Paris in 2001 (Adamson *et al.* 2001, Baude 2008, Baude *et al*. 2008). Point-to-population comparisons look for similarities between the characteristics of an unknown sample and those of a population of potentially similar materials and are more broadly applicable. Point-to-population comparisons usually require access to databases containing information on hundreds or thousands of samples, or to nuclear forensic sample archives, which may contain tens or hundreds of physical samples. The value of the comparative approach then depends strongly on the relevance and coverage of the database and/or sample archive (see, e.g., Dolgov *et al.* 1999, Robel *et al.* 2009).\n\n\nPredictive signatures, in contrast, come into play when representative data for a suite of appropriate reference materials are unavailable. Predictive signatures typically derive from underlying scientific principles, such as isotopic and chemical fractionation in the case of U ore and ore concentrate, neutron capture activation and fission in the case of nuclear reactor modeling, or radioactive decay in the case of age dating. Predictive signatures seek to calculate material characteristics useful for attribution based on a detailed understanding of the physical or chemical mechanisms responsible for producing the signatures. The advantage of the predictive approach is that the processes (and possibly locations) of unanalyzed nuclear materials can be inferred from their measured characteristics, something of critical importance for types of materials that are not readily available, *e.g.*, materials from historical processes or tightly held materials from foreign countries. The disadvantage of the predictive approach is that significant effort must be expended to develop and validate the capability and to understand accurately the processes affecting signatures.\n\nNew predictive signatures can also be developed through advances in the understanding of the processes affecting chemical and isotope distributions at the molecular, atomic and nuclear scale. The 234U/238U ratio, for example, exhibits bulk constituents of a sample to assess the threat posed by the material and confirm whether the interdicted material is contraband; categorization forms the basis for continued investigation. Categorization should occur on-site, at the point of interdiction and utilize non-destructive analytical techniques such as field-portable gamma-ray spectrometry, and hand-held X-ray fluorescence. These nondestructive analyses can quickly distinguish between naturally occurring radioactive material, special nuclear material, radioactively contaminated material, or a commercial radioactive source.\n\nThe goal of **characterization** is to determine the nature of the radioactive evidence. Characterization provides full elemental analysis of the interdicted material, including major, minor and trace constituents. For major constituents of the radioactive material, characterization should also include determination of isotopic and phase (*i.e.*, molecular)\nproperties.\n\nCharacterization also includes measurement of physical properties, including accurate measurement of critical dimensions of solid samples, determination of particle size and morphology for powder samples, and high magnification imaging of the material by optical and scanning electron microscopy.\nThe goal of **full nuclear forensic analysis** is to\n(i) analyze all radioactive and traditional forensic evidence, (ii) gather information to address questions of material origin, method of production, loss of legitimate control, transit route from point of diversion to interdiction, and (iii) assess the likelihood that additional material is available. Full nuclear forensic analysis also includes detailed interpretation and often includes comparison of measured signatures against information contained in nuclear forensics databases or sample archives or against predictive signatures generated by, *e.g.*, reactor modeling, to assist in the identification of the method of manufacture and most plausible source of the material.\nNuclear forensics employs a wide array of analytical tools to detect signatures in radioactive material. The international nuclear forensics community has achieved a general consensus on the proper sequencing of analytical techniques to provide the most valuable information as early as possible during an investigation. This consensus was achieved through discussions at meetings of the ITWG, as well as the experiences of nuclear forensic laboratories in round-robin analyses. The ITWG and IAEA both recommend that the substantial variability in water, soil and sediment and U ore samples of different geographical origin\n(Gascoyne 1992). 234U is preferentially leached compared with 238U from solids due to radiation damage of the crystal lattice from alpha decay of\n238U, oxidation of insoluble tetravalent 234U to soluble hexavalent 234U, and alpha recoil of 234Th\n(and its daughter 234U) into fluid phases. Ores leached by groundwater over long periods of time exhibit significant depletions in 234U, whereas ores formed through deposition of those water leachates exhibit complementary enrichment in 234U; the full range in 234U concentration is nearly 20%. Modern mass spectrometry provides results of sufficient precision and accuracy to allow small variations in the 238U/235U ratio, once thought to be invariant in nature, to be measured.\n\nThe depositional environment of an ore body appears to strongly influence the 238U/235U ratio with low temperature ores having systematically higher ratios than deposits formed at higher temperatures (Brennecka et al. 2010). In addition, naturally occurring variations in 236U content can also be exploited as a nuclear forensic signature. Generally considered to be an anthropogenic isotope, 236U is produced at very low levels in U ore bodies through neutron capture on 235U; the abundance of 236U is strongly influenced by the age of the ore body and the volume of water in contact with ore (Tumey *et al.*\n2009, Wilcken *et al.* 2008). All these features of the isotopic distribution of natural U are potentially useful (predictive) signatures for attribution of U ore and ore concentrate.\n\nNuclear Forensic Analysis.\n\nNuclear forensic analysis does not lend itself to a simple \"cook-book\" approach, universally applicable to all types of nuclear and radiological material. Instead, nuclear forensics involves an iterative approach, in which the results from one analysis are used to guide subsequent analyses. The international nuclear forensics community has defined 3 levels of analysis - categorization, characterization, and full nuclear forensic analysis - each of which serves a specific purpose in an investigation. In all cases, though, sampling and analysis must be performed with due regard for preservation of evidence and chain-of-custody requirements. Many of the analytical tools used in these analyses are destructive and consume some amount of sample during analysis. Proper selection and sequencing of analyses is, therefore, critical.\n\nThe goal of **categorization** is to identify the nuclides of potential interest such as 14C and 3H)\nundergo -decay without accompanying photon emission.\n\nGamma spectroscopy has a dual role in nuclear forensics. It is the first technique that is used when interdicted nuclear material is investigated. Since gamma rays are only slightly attenuated by packaging material (unless shielding like lead is used), initial measurements in the field (*e.g.*, at border-crossing stations) carried out with simple, portable gamma spectrometers provide rapid and accurate categorization of the material. For example, it is possible to distinguish between naturally occurring radioactive material, radioactive source, medical isotopes or anthropogenic nuclear material. In laboratories, more sophisticated high-resolution gamma spectrometers (HRGS) are used. Their energy resolution is much better compared to the portable instruments, allowing gamma rays with energies very close to each other to be resolved. HRGS provides an initial determination of the isotopic composition of U and/or Pu, as well as detection and quantification of trace fission and activation products. It should, however, be noted that some nuclides like 242Pu or 236U cannot be detected by gamma spectroscopy. In these cases, mass spectrometry offers a useful alternative.\n\nAlpha spectroscopy is used to quantify the abundance of -emitting radionuclides, particularly those with relatively short half-lives. Alpha particles are stopped for example by a paper sheet, because collection of time-sensitive or environmentally sensitive samples should occur within the first 24 hours after interdiction. Non-destructive analysis should be conducted before destructive analyses whenever possible. Table 13-2 shows the generally accepted sequence of analysis, broken down into techniques that should be performed within 24 hours, 1 week, or 2 months after interdiction. Table 13-3 provides an overview of many analytical techniques commonly used in nuclear forensic investigations; additional information may be found in (Moody *et al.* 2005).\n\n\nRadiometric Techniques measure the radiation emitted by radioactive nuclides during decay to a daughter nuclide. There are three types of radiation commonly encountered in nuclear forensics - alpha, beta and gamma radiation, each with its own properties and methods of detection. Most heavy nuclides (*e.g.*, U and Pu) decay by emitting an alpha particle. Gamma radiation is also often emitted after the alpha decay to bring the daughter nuclide from an excited state to the ground state. Each nuclide emits characteristic gamma rays with energies specific to an individual radioisotope. While useful for characterizing the performance of chemical separations in the laboratory,\n\nspectrometry is rarely employed as a quantitative technique. Most -emitting radionuclides also emit  rays characteristic of the decaying nuclides; however, a few radionuclides (including long-lived fission products such as 99Tc and 147Pm and other\n\n## Table 13-2.  Time Line Of Analyses In Nuclear Forensic Analyses\n\n| Techniques/Methods      | 24 hour                  | One week    |\n|-------------------------|--------------------------|-------------|\n|                         |                          |             |\n| Radiological            | Estimated total activity |             |\n| Dose rate (, , , n)  |                          |             |\n| Surface contamination   |                          |             |\n|                         |                          |             |\n| Physical                |                          |             |\n| characterization        |                          |             |\n| Visual inspection       |                          |             |\n| Raadiography            |                          |             |\n| Photography             |                          |             |\n| Weight                  |                          |             |\n| Dimensions              |                          |             |\n| Optical microscopy      |                          |             |\n| Density                 |                          |             |\n| Traditional forensic    |                          |             |\n| analysis                |                          |             |\n| Fingerprints, fibers    |                          |             |\n| Radiochemical           |                          |             |\n| separations             |                          |             |\n| Isotope analysis        | -spectroscopy           |             |\n| -spectroscopy          |                          |             |\n| Mass spectrometry       |                          |             |\n| (SIMS, TIMS, ICP       |                          |             |\n| MS)                     |                          |             |\n| GC/MS                   |                          |             |\n| Elemental/chemical      |                          | ICPMS      |\n| XRF                     |                          |             |\n| Assay (titration, IDMS) |                          |             |\nMeasurement goal\nTechnique\nType of\ninformation\nTypical detection\n        limit\nSpatial resolution\nSurvey\nHRGS\nIsotopic\nng - g\n\nChemical Assay\nElemental\nmg\n\nElemental and Isotopic Bulk Analysis\nRadiochemistry/Radiometric Methods\nIsotopic, Elemental\nfg - pg\n\nTIMS\nIsotopic,\nElemental\npg - ng\n\nICPMS\nIsotopic\nElemental\npg - ng\n\nXRF\nElemental\n10 g/g\n\nXRD\nMolecular\n~1 at.%\n\n\nGC/MS\nMolecular\n g/g\n\nImaging\nVisual Inspection\nMacroscopic\n\n0.1 mm\n\nOptical Microscopy\nMicroscopic\nStructure\n\n1 m\n\nSEM\n\n\n1 nm\n\nTEM\n\n\n0.1 nm\nMicroanalysis\nSIMS\nElemental\nIsotopic\n0.1 ng/g -\n10 g/g\n0.1 - 1 m\n\nSEM/EDS or WDS\nElemental\n0.1 - 1 wt.%\n1 m\n\nFTIR\nMolecular\n0.1 - 1 wt.%\n10 m\n\nRaman\nMolecular\n~1 wt.%\n1 m\nmg =milligram = 103 gram\ng = microgram = 106 gram ng = nanogram = 109 gram\npg = picogram = 1012 gram\nfg =femtogram = 1015 gram\nat.% = atom percent wt.% = weight percent ppm = parts per million by weight ppb = parts per billion by weight\nm = micrometre = 106 metre\nHRGS = High-Resolution Gamma Spectrometry TIMS = Thermal Ionization Mass Spectrometry ICPMS = Inductively Coupled Plasma Mass Spectrometry XRF = X-ray Fluorescence Analysis XRD = X-ray Diffraction Analysis GC/MS = Gas Chromatography/Mass Spectrometry\n\nSEM = Scanning Electron Microscopy TEM = Transmission Electron Microscopy SIMS = Secondary Ion Mass Spectrometry EDS = Energy Dispersive Spectroscopy WDS = Wavelength Dispersive Spectroscopy FTIR = Fourier Transform InfraRed Spectroscopy\n\nof their strong interaction with matter.\n\nConsequently, an alpha measurement through packaging material or shielding is impossible. Unlike -spectroscopy, -spectrometry is a destructive technique requiring rather laborious sample preparation. Source preparation is crucial for achieving good energy resolution in -spectroscopy and target elements are usually separated and purified before being deposited onto a flat surface. Quantification is achieved by spiking the samples with known amounts of an isotopic spike or tracer. Alpha spectrometry is especially suited for quantifying 232U and 238Pu due to their short halflives and, in the case of 238Pu, the potential interference from 238U in mass spectrometry. Alpha spectrometry is also used to quantify 241Am\n(daughter of 241Pu), whose concentration can then be used to calculate the date of the last Pu purification performed on a sample and 230Th (daughter of 234U), to determine a last purification date for U materials.\n\n\nMass spectrometry Mass spectrometric techniques make use of small mass differences between nuclides. In mass spectrometry the atoms contained in a sample are converted to ions and then separated according to their respective mass to charge ratios and the intensities of the mass-separated ion beams measured. Mass spectrometry is used to determine both the elemental and isotopic compositions of nuclear materials, providing extremely high precision and accuracy, as well as the capability to analyze both radioactive and stable isotopes. Mass spectrometry can quantify elemental concentrations either by using an isotopic spike (isotopic dilution powerful and widely applied method for quantifying trace element abundances. The minimum detection limit for MCICPMS is typically <1 pg/g and can attain the fg/g range for favorable elements.\nLaser ablation inductively coupled plasma mass spectrometry (LAICPMS) uses a high energy light source and laser ablation cell and to supplant the spray chamber/nebulizer of a standard ICPMS instrument. Material is ablated from a sample using a pulsed laser (often a Nd-YAG tuned to 266 or 213 nm) and transported in an inert gas stream (typically He or Ar) to the plasma torch for ionization and subsequent mass analysis as per solution ICPMS. LAICPMS analyses require minimal sample preparation. While laser spot sizes can be reduced to several micrometres, sensitivity is degraded, and spatial resolution is typically ~10100 m. Matrix matched standards are preferred (but not always required) for accurate trace element and isotope analyses in LAICPMS. Depending on the quality of standards, LAICPMS accuracy for trace element abundances is typically 110% with limits of detection in the ng/g range. The combination of laser ablation and MCICPMS is capable of producing data with much higher precision and accuracy (*e.g.*, Arevalo *et al.* 2010).\n\nSecondary ion mass spectrometry (SIMS) is a microanalytical technique applicable to samples ranging in size from centimetres to submicrometre particles and providing both elemental and isotopic information. SIMS uses a finely focused primary ion beam, *e.g.*, O2\n+, O, Cs+, or Ga+, to sputter the sample surface, producing secondary ions that are then analyzed by a mass spectrometer. SIMS is capable of acquiring microscopic images of isotopic and elemental distributions with spatial resolution exceeding 50 nm and can be used to measure the concentration of any element, from H to Pu, with a dynamic range of more than nine orders of magnitude in concentration. SIMS is applied in nuclear forensics when only small amounts of sample are available or when the sample is inhomogeneous and spatially resolved analyses are required. The sputtering process is highly matrixdependent and accurate quantitation requires matrixmatched standards. The accuracy is typically 0.1 0.5% for isotope ratio measurements and 210% for trace element measurements. SIMS is the technique of choice to determine isotope ratios and trace element abundances in particulate samples. Using a sharply focused primary ion beam, SIMS can analyze particles in the m-size range, weighing <1 pg, with a precision and accuracy of better than mass spectrometry) or through calibration against standards. Nuclear forensic analysis utilizes a variety of different types of mass spectrometers, differing primarily in the way ions are generated and whether samples are introduced as liquids, gases or solids. One important exception is accelerator mass spectrometry, which accelerates ions to MeV energies rather that the keV energies used in most mass spectrometers.\n\nIn Thermal Ionization Mass Spectrometry\n(TIMS), samples consisting of small (~fgg)\nquantities of chemically separated and purified analytes dissolved in a small volume (typically 110 ml) are deposited on a refractory metal filament\n(*e.g.*, high purity W or Re) and evaporated to dryness. The filament is then heated to temperatures of 1,0002,500C in the ion source by resistive heating or electron bombardment. If the ionization potential of the analyte is low compared to the work function of the filament, a fraction (typically <1%) of the analyte atoms will be ionized and emitted from the filament surface. Multi-collector TIMS instruments, employing multiple detectors able to measure over a dozen isotopes simultaneously, are capable of measuring differences in isotope abundance ratios as small as a few parts in 106.\n\nTIMS is the preferred technique for measuring Sr, Nd, U and Pb isotopes with the highest possible precision and accuracy. A disadvantage of TIMS is the laborious sample preparation. As in the case of -spectrometry, samples need to be dissolved and chemically purified to avoid mass interferences and achieve high sensitivity, accuracy and precision.\nIn many laboratories TIMS has been supplemented by multi-collection inductively coupled plasma source mass spectrometers (MC ICPMS). For solution mode MCICPMS, a chemically separated and purified sample containing the element of interest is dissolved in an acid solution, which is converted into an aerosol spray using a nebulizer and subsequently aspirated into an Ar-based plasma. The analyte dissociates into atomic constituents and ionizes in the high temperature plasma (5,0008,000 K) with very high efficiency (>90% for elements with a first ionization potential of <8 eV). The salient features of ICPMS are multi-element capability, high sample throughput, good sensitivity and large dynamic range. Multi-collector instruments provide isotope measurements with high precision and accuracy for a variety of elements across the periodic table including Mg, Fe, Mo, Hf, Pb, U and Pu. In addition to measuring isotopic compositions, ICPMS is a instrument used to examine a sample in detail, and allows the forensic scientist to answer the simple, yet vital, question, \"what does the sample look like?\" before proceeding with more extensive, and often destructive, analyses. Optical microscopy reveals details of color, surface morphology and texture, shape and size, tool marks, wear patterns, surficial coatings, corrosion, and mineralogy (Grant et al. 1998, Moody *et al.* 2005). The stereomicroscope produces three-dimensional images at relatively low magnification (~280 ) and is very useful for dissecting or aliquoting samples for additional analyses. The polarizing microscope passes light through a set of polarizing filters to gain additional information about the sample from optical properties such as crystallinity, anisotropy, pleochroism and birefringence;\npolarizing microscopes can readily magnify an image to 1000 . The limit of resolution is set by the wavelength of light used to illuminate the sample; the theoretical resolution limit of conventional microscopes is 200 nm, but values closer to 1 m are more commonly achieved.\nIn Scanning Electron Microscopy (SEM), a finely focused electron beam is rastered over a sample and the interaction of the incident electron beam with the sample produces a variety of signals: back-scattered electrons, secondary electrons, Auger electrons, X-rays, and photons. By measuring the intensity of one or more of these types of particles as a function of raster position, an image of the sample is constructed. Each type of emitted particle conveys different information about the sample, and, by choosing the appropriate detection mode, either topographic or compositional contrast is revealed in the image. Secondary electrons arise from inelastic collisions between incident electrons and atomic electrons within the outer few nm of the surface and carry information about sample topology (*e.g.*, Fig, 13-4). Back-scattered electrons, in contrast, have energies comparable to the incident electron beam, carry information about the mean atomic number and can be used to construct maps of the distribution of phases with disparate chemical composition. With thermionic, W filament sources, image resolution is limited to ~10 nm, with a corresponding maximum magnification of 100,000. With field-emission electron sources, the resolution exceeds 1 nm with a corresponding maximum magnification of 1,000,000.\nTransmission electron microscopy (TEM) lies at the opposite end of the spectrum from optical microscopy - difficult to use and requiring elaborate\n0.5%. In many nuclear forensic applications, a few U- or Pu-bearing particles may be immersed in a sea of environmental detritus containing little forensic information. SIMS can be used in particle-search mode to locate and analyze these rare, but highly valued, particles. As with laser ablation ICPMS, the adoption of large geometry, multi-collector mass spectrometers has significantly improved SIMS capabilities, particularly for determination of lowabundance isotopes like 236U (*e.g.*, Ranebo *et al.*\n2009).\n\nGas chromatographymass spectrometry (GC\nMS) is a technique for detecting and measuring trace organic constituents in a bulk sample. In GC\nMS, the components of a mixture are separated in a gas chromatograph and identified in a mass spectrometer. The primary component of a GC is a narrow-bore tube maintained inside an oven. In the simplest arrangement, the analyte mixture is flashvaporized in a heated injection port. The various components are swept through the column by a carrier gas for separation based upon relative absorption affinities. In an ideal case, components elute from the column separated in time and can be introduced into the mass spectrometer as a time series. The mass spectrometer detects and quantifies the concentration of each component as it elutes from the column. GCMS analyses provide very high specificity, allowing extremely complex mixtures to be accurately separated and individual species to be identified accurately. Limits of detection for scanning GCMS are on the order of ng of material, corresponding to sensitivities of ~1\npart in 1013 for simple samples and 1 part in 1011 for complex mixtures.\n\n\n\nImaging Techniques The role of microscopy is to provide a magnified image of a sample, allowing the observation of features beyond the resolution of the unaided human eye (roughly 50100 m). The ability to identify and characterize diverse suites of samples rapidly and without compromising the integrity of the sample is an essential starting point of most forensic investigations. A variety of microscopy techniques are applied in nuclear forensic science, using photons, electrons, and X-rays to probe the physical, chemical, and structural make-up of samples at spatial scales ranging from nanometres to centimetres.\nOptical microscopy dates back more than 300\nyears and remains one of the most basic and fundamental characterization techniques in nuclear forensics. The optical microscope is often the first sample preparation. Its unique capabilities for ultrahigh spatial resolution and for revealing microstructural information, however, make the TEM an important tool in many nuclear forensic investigations. In TEM, a high-energy electron beam is transmitted through a very thin sample (<300 nm thickness). In imaging mode TEM produces a magnified image of the sample providing information on thickness, crystallinity, crystal orientation, defects and deformations. Understanding how contrast is generated is key to distinguishing among these competing effects and presents a significant challenge in image interpretation. The diffraction mode provides an electron diffraction pattern, analogous to an X-ray diffraction pattern. Electron diffraction patterns can be indexed by the same procedures used in X-ray diffraction and used to identify phases on an extremely fine spatial scale. Just as in SEM, characteristic X-rays are generated by the interaction of the electron beam with the sample. X- ray analysis can be combined with TEM imaging and diffraction to provide comprehensive information on a specimen's internal microstructure, with nm spatial resolution. TEM is capable of an extremely wide range of magnification (from ~ 50  to several million ) and is able to image extremely fine structural detail, but at the expense of severe restrictions on sample thickness.\nThe characteristic X-rays generated by interactions between energetic electrons and the sample in SEM or TEM carry information on chemical composition and provide an important method to determine elemental concentrations for most solid samples, including micrometre-size particles. Characteristic X-rays can be analyzed by one of two methods. An energy-dispersive X-ray spectrometer\n(EDS)\nuses the photoelectric absorption of X-rays in a semiconductor detector, usually Si(Li), to measure the energy and intensity of incident X-rays simultaneously. EDS systems provide an easy-to-use method of measuring X-ray spectra over a broad energy range and can detect elements from B to U. Detection limits are typically ~0.1% for silicate and oxide materials. A wavelength-dispersive spectrometer (WDS) operates on the principle of Bragg diffraction; X-rays are dispersed according to wavelength, rather than energy. WDS provides much higher energy resolution and sensitivity (~10 ) compared to EDS and can detect elements from Be to Pu, with detection limits of 0.01%. X-ray microanalysis is particularly valuable in nuclear forensic investigations for the speed with which X-ray intensities can be accurately quantified to yield elemental concentrations in interdicted samples. Other techniques. X-ray diffraction (XRD) is the standard method for identifying the chemical structure of crystalline materials. A collimated beam of X-rays impinging on regularly ordered lattices undergoes constructive and destructive interference depending on the spacing of the lattice, the wavelength of the X-rays, and the angle of incidence of the X-ray beam. By rotating a sample relative to a fixed X-ray source, variations in interference lead to characteristic diffraction patterns. These diffraction patterns can be compared to reference spectra to identify specific crystalline phase. XRD is not applicable to amorphous (noncrystalline) materials.\n\nX-ray fluorescence (XRF) provides nondestructive quantification of chemical concentrations in both solid samples and solutions for elements from Mg to Pu. A beam of high energy X-rays excites characteristic secondary X-rays whose intensities are quantified using a wavelengthor energy-sensitive detector. The detection limits for XRF are generally in the range of tens of g/g, although actinide matrices generate many X-rays that interfere with the lower energy X-rays of lighter elements, potentially decreasing signal-to-noise ratios and increasing detection limits. Wavelength dispersive analysis (WDS) provides higher energy resolution than energy dispersive analysis (EDS), and is capable of resolving some of these interferences. XRF is often used as a screening tool in nuclear forensic analyses to guide additional analyses using mass spectrometry.\nInfrared Spectroscopy (IR) is useful for the identification of organic compounds. Through the use of an infrared microscope, IR can be performed on samples as small as 10 m and is an important microanalytical technique in nuclear forensics. Molecular bonds vibrate at characteristic frequencies and if a particular molecular vibration results in a change in a bond's dipole moment, the molecule will absorb infrared radiation corresponding to that characteristic frequency. In IR, a sample is irradiated with a broad band of infrared frequencies and the intensity of the reflected or transmitted radiation is measured as a function of frequency. Absorption at specific frequencies is characteristic of specific bonds and the IR spectrum identifies the various bonds and functional groups within the molecule. Extensive libraries of IR spectra help identify unknown compounds but unambiguous identification usually requires an additional analytical technique, such as mass spectrometry or NMR.\n\n\nChronology. Radionuclides linked to one another by radioactive decay have relative concentrations that can be calculated by the simple laws of radioactive in-growth or, in more complicated cases, by the Bateman equations. The measurement of the relative concentrations of parent and daughter isotopes provides a direct measure of the time since the daughter radionuclides were last removed from the respective parent isotopes. In nuclear forensic investigations, the interval between the time a sample was purified and the time it was subsequently analyzed is defined as the \"age\" of the material (Moody *et al.* 2005, Mayer *et al.* 2005).\n\nThe presence of both U and Pu provides the opportunity to measure the age of a sample through as many as a dozen different chronometers. If the ages given by different chronometers \"agree\" with each other (concordant ages), then we have high confidence the assumptions for accurate age-dating are satisfied and the model ages reflect the time since purification. If the chronometers do not agree with each other (discordant ages), caution must be exercised in the way model ages are interpreted, as they may fail to indicate accurately the time since purification. Table 13-4 lists the quantities of heavyelement daughter nuclides present in a 1 gram sample of weapons grade Pu after an in-growth period of one year. If the sample was completely purified during the last chemical separation, all of the chronometers should yield the same age.\n\nHowever, while the 232U236Pu, 234U238Pu, 235U\n239Pu and 236U240Pu chronometers all yield the same age in most U.S. weapons grade Pu metal samples, 241Am241Pu often gives a significantly larger value. This discordance indicates that when U was last removed from the Pu, some Am was left behind. As a result, there will be more 241Am in the sample than can be explained by in-growth, resulting in an apparent age that is too large. An example of the application of several radiochronometers to HEU and the ability to tightly constrain the sample age is contained in the discussion of the Bulgarian seizure below.\n\n\nCase Studies The ultimate test for protocols developed in the laboratory in a controlled environment is posed by their application to real world samples, obtained under uncontrolled conditions and whose properties often contain unexpected features. Case studies are normally conducted in cooperation with government or law enforcement agencies with responsibility for sample collection. The agency responsible for collecting the sample works with the nuclear forensic scientists to develop a Statement of Work (SOW) specifying the material properties to be measured. In most cases the SOW follows the nuclear forensics Model Action Plan described in IAEA *Nuclear Security Series #2* (IAEA 2006). The SOW also lays out the time lines for analysis and reporting of final results.\n\nNuclide\nHalf-life\n(Myr)\nMass\n(ng)\nActivity\n(dpm)\n230Th\n0.075\n1.3 x 10-3\n0.06\n231Pa\n0.033\n1.3 x 10-5\n0.0013\n233U\n0.16\n5.6x 10-5\n0.0012\n234U\n0.25\n915\n12700\n235U\n704\n26300\n126\n236U\n23.4\n6250\n897\n238U\n4470\n0.42\n3.2 x 10-4\n237Np\n2.14\n355\n555\n241Am\n4.32 x 10-4\n427000\n3.3e9\n\nCounterweight - A Nuclear Smuggling Hoax. A\ndense, dark gray ~9 kg metal sample was involved in a sale of illicit nuclear materials in Hong Kong in 1988. The sample was originally offered for sale as \"nuclear weapon-useable material\" by a Southeast Asian military official and then subsequently rediscovered in a U.S. consulate nearly 10 years later. Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) was contacted with a request for forensic characterization (a photograph of the sample may be found in Grant *et al.* 1998).\nHRGS analysis revealed that the main radioactive component of the specimen was U, considerably depleted in 235U. Bulk analysis of the sample yielded a density of (17  0.3) g/cm3, somewhat less than the theoretical density of U metal. The reduced density of the part suggested that voids could be present or that it was composed of two or more inhomogeneous phases.\nAfter consultation with the collecting agency, the sample was characterized using radiochemical analysis, electron microprobe, SIMS, ICPMS and XRF. The results showed that the material was depleted U containing ~0.3 wt.% 235U and was a metal alloy of 90% U with 10% Mo. The sample was coated with electroplated Ni ranging in thickness between 85 to 150 m. The crenulated outer margin implied that the piece had been cast and then not machined prior to Ni plating. Radiochronometry based on 234U230Th determined the date of last chemical purification as 1961 ( 3 years).\n\nOnce the nuclear forensic information was collected, LLNL carried out a complementary investigation using conventional forensics and determined the part had been made by the National Lead Company of Albany, NY and then transferred to Nuclear Metals, Inc. The interdicted specimen was most plausibly a piece of an aircraft counterweight assembly, most plausibly from a U.S. military aircraft.\n\nIn the nuclear smuggling world, this sample was one of the earliest contraband items in what ultimately became known as the \"Southeast Asian Uranium\" scam. This hoax was a pervasive swindle, first reported in 1991, and especially prevalent in Thailand, Vietnam, and Cambodia. Transactions of irregularly shaped metal parts, alleged to be 235U, with asking prices of ~$10,000 per item, are not uncommon. Similar material has also been used for barter as substitute currency in drug-trafficking operations.\n\n\nHigh Enriched Uranium Interdicted in Bulgaria.\n\nJust after midnight on 29 May 1999, a Turkish citizen, Urskan Hanifi, was stopped at a border crossing in Ruse, Bulgaria, on his way into Romania. Although claiming to be returning from an extended trip to Turkey, the Bulgarian border guard became suspicious because the car's interior was very tidy and appeared to contain no luggage. A search of the car turned up a certificate for the purchase of \"99.99% uranium 235\" written in Cyrillic and a lead container labeled \"uranium 235\" concealed inside an air compressor in the trunk of the car. Inside the container was a glass ampoule filled with several grams of fine black powder that Bulgarian scientists confirmed to be highly enriched uranium (Fig. 13-5). Hanifi then tried to bribe the customs officials, who, to their credit, refused his money and instead arrested him. According to press reports, Mr. Hanifi, told police he had purchased the uranium in Moldova and had been trying to sell it in Turkey; having failed, he was attempting to return to Moldova.\n\n\nfrequency analysis of grains showed a wide distribution of sizes, spanning the interval from 30 to 550 nm, with a mean diameter of only ~160 nm. The abundance of very small grains with diameters of <300 nm, provided an important clue to the manufacturing process used to make the HEU, as such small sizes are difficult to generate by mechanical grinding and milling.\n\nThe concentrations of 72 elements, ranging from Li to Th, were measured using a variety of analytical techniques. Individual elements vary widely in concentration, from <2 ng/g to ~200 g/g.\n\nThe total impurity inventory, 500 to 800 g/g, is high compared to other HEU samples, with 4\nelements (Cl, S, Fe, and Br) accounting for ~60% of the total inventory. The enrichment of the volatile, electronegative elements, S, Cl, and Br, is most readily interpreted as a signature of chemical reprocessing. Overall, the trace element abundances are much higher than expected for laboratory scale reprocessing and suggest the HEU is an aliquot of batch reprocessing.\nThe concentrations of 35 radionuclides, spanning 15 orders of magnitude in concentration, were determined by - and -spectrometry following radiochemical separation. The major constituents are the six U isotopes - 238U, 236U, 235U, 234U, 233U, and 232U - plus 230Th (produced by decay of 234U);\n241Am, five Pu isotopes - 242Pu, 241Pu, 240Pu, 239Pu, and 238Pu - 237Np and the fission products - 125Sn,\n134Cs, and 137Cs - were also detected. The presence of the three fission products provides incontrovertible evidence the sample is reprocessed U, irradiated in a nuclear reactor.\nRoughly one year after the U-filled vial was seized in Bulgaria, the U.S. Dept. of State arranged for it to be sent to Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory with the hope that detailed analyses could offer clues to the material's origin. Over the next 9 or so months, a team of nuclear forensic scientists from LLNL and several other Dept. of Energy laboratories performed an exhaustive study of the HEU and the associated packaging materials, revealing a wealth of information that ultimately led investigators to the source of the HEU (Adamson et al. 2001).\n\nFollowing an initial evaluation by HRGS, revealing that the HEU contained ~72% 235U, 1%\n234U and no significant Pu, the sample and packaging materials were characterized using optical microscopy, SEM and TEM, both with energy dispersive X-ray analysis, XRD, radiochemistry followed by - and -spectrometry and mass spectrometry, optical emission spectrometry, ion-, gas- and gel- permeation chromatography, GCMS, IR spectrometry, X-ray photo-electron spectroscopy, and XRF.\n\nThe HEU is a very fine-grained powder composed predominantly of U3O8. The powder formed loosely compacted clumps ranging to 100 m in size. Individual particles are irregularly shaped and distinctive morphologies are absent at the resolution provided by the SEM. TEM performed on an aliquot of the sample revealed two distinctive classes of particles. Equant to slightly ovoid grains dominate the population, comprising ~90% of the total, with rod-shaped and plate-shaped grains making up the remainder (Fig. 13-6). A size\nThe isotopic composition of U was determined by three different techniques - SIMS, TIMS, and MCICPMS - and the Pu isotopic composition was determined by TIMS. SIMS provided a rapid (within 24 hours of sample aliquoting), reasonably accurate, initial analysis of the major U isotopes. TIMS and MCICPMS provided data on all six U\nisotopes, including the low abundance isotopes 232U\nand 233U, with much higher accuracy than SIMS or HRGS. The analyses by all of the instrumental methods yielded a consistent U isotopic composition for the HEU powder, notable especially for the extremely high 236U content. These data are summarized in Table 13-5. The U isotope abundances identify the material as HEU containing ~73% 235U, i.e., weapon-usable material. The U isotope abundances suggest an initial enrichment of ~90% and the high concentration of 236U indicates a prolonged irradiation history. The isotopic composition of Pu is consistent with weapon-useable material but the concentration (~2 ng/g) is much too low for the HEU to be a significant source of weaponizable Pu.\n\nThe age of the sample was determined using nine radio-chronometers, based on the decay of U and Pu. The mean age of the HEU was 6.5 y, relative to the date the radiochemical separation was carried out at LLNL, 17 April 2000, indicating the HEU was reprocessed on 30 October 1993 with an uncertainty of <1 month. The agreement in age for the nine radio-chronometers indicates that the trace level of Pu in the sample was introduced during reprocessing and is not a recently added contaminant. The ability to determine sample age with high accuracy is significant from a Safeguards perspective. In principle, if the HEU had been diverted from a facility subject to International Atomic Energy Agency oversight, and if reprocessing records were complete, the identity of the sample could be determined on the basis of the accurate age determination alone.\n\n| Isotope    | Abundance (atom %)   |\n|------------|----------------------|\n| 1          |                      |\n|            |                      |\n| 232        |                      |\n| U          | (1.06  0.06) x 10   |\n| -6         |                      |\n|            |                      |\n| 233        |                      |\n| U          | (3.0  0.18) x 10    |\n| -5         |                      |\n|            |                      |\n| 234        |                      |\n| U          | 1.175  0.003        |\n| 235        |                      |\n| U          | 72.657  0.012       |\n| 236        |                      |\n| U          | 12.133  0.004       |\n| 238        |                      |\n| U          | 14.045  0.011       |\n\nCollateral Evidence. The Pb container was examined via optical and scanning electron microscopy. Marks on the outer surface provided clear evidence of coarse filing by hand for shaping and smoothing; marks indicative of the use of machine tools are absent. The overall appearance of the container, especially the irregular form, suggests the container was cast in a crude sand mold and shaped by hand. This supposition was later confirmed by metallurgical examination.\n\nA small fragment was cut from the container, polished, and etched to reveal the microstructure. The structure, consisting of Pb dendrites surrounded by a two-phase eutectic region, is characteristic of common, cast Pb metal. SEM/EDS showed ~5 wt.% Sb had been added to the Pb to produce an alloy with greater malleability. The SEM also revealed remnants of an aluminosilicate, similar to kyanite\n(Al2SiO5), trapped in the Pb. Kyanite, a naturally occurring mineral, is commonly used for hightemperature insulation and may have been used as a mold wash, liner, or release agent in the casting process.\nThe yellow wax filling the interior of the Pb container was analyzed by Fourier transform infrared spectrometry to identify molecular compounds. Based on FTIR spectra, the wax was identified as a paraffin derivative with composition inconsistent with many commercial waxes but strikingly similar to the paraffin-based wax, Parowax. The coloring agent was identified using methylene chloride to extract the paraffin from the inorganic component and then XRF to examine the residue. XRF identified the inorganic residue as Ba chromate\n(BaCrO4), once commonly used as yellow pigment in paints, glass, and ceramic over-glazes, as an oxidizer in pyrotechnics, and as an oxidizer in heat powders and igniters. Barium chromate is rarely used today in the U.S. or most western countries because of environmental and health concerns but widespread use persists in Brazil, China, India, and eastern European countries.\n\nThe two paper samples retrieved from the Pb container were characterized using forensic microscopy to determine the composition of the wood fibers making up the paper. The quality of the paper is similar to commercial office paper. Fibers from the inner paper liner separating the ampoule from the paraffin wax consisted of 61% bleached softwood and 39% bleached hardwood, while fibers from the label removed from the cap on the shield consisted of 38% bleached softwood, 23% semibleached softwood and 39% bleached hardwood. Both the softwood and the hardwood fibers were produced with the Kraft pulping process. The fibers in these papers are not found in North America, Western Europe, or Scandinavia and the two paper samples were most plausibly produced in Eastern Europe.\n\nNuclear Forensic Interpretation. The primary goal of nuclear forensic interpretation is to identify the original source of the material, the intended, or original, use, and the responsible individual or organization. Typically, interpretation proceeds in stages, focusing first on unambiguous signatures\n(*e.g.*, U isotopic composition), then proceeding to more subtle signatures (*e.g.*, trace elements and physical properties), and finally considering collateral signatures found, *e.g.*, in packaging. The dominant signature of the HEU is the U isotopic composition. The U isotope abundances, especially the unusually high concentration of 236U, clearly indicate the sample is HEU irradiated and then reprocessed reactor fuel. The HEU had an initial\n235U abundance of ~90%, immediately excluding material manufactured in the United States, since most U.S. HEU has a 235U content of ~93%. The\n90% enrichment is consistent with HEU produced in the one of the states of the former Soviet Union (hereafter, FSU).\n\nOther characteristics of the fuel and packaging also point to an origin in the FSU. The grain size is characteristic of material prepared for specialized use, *e.g.*, powder metallurgy. The extremely fine grain size of the powder is unlike that found in U.S. facilities, where coarser sizes are used to minimize the health hazard created by respiration of fine dust. The HEU has the characteristics of feedstock for fabrication of fuel pellets and blending with other batches of U oxide at U fuel conversion facilities in the FSU. Multiple samples, similar to the one discussed here, are commonly taken from batches of U oxide product for analysis and archive.\n\nDetermining the type of reactor in which the HEU was irradiated is a much more involved process, using knowledge of reactor designs and operating conditions and computer modeling of fuel burn-up. Calculations were performed with the ORIGEN2 code to determine the initial isotope abundances and the reactor neutron spectrum most consistent with the observed U isotope abundances. These calculations indicate that a thermal energy spectrum and a burn-up exposure of ~350,000 MWD/MT best match the measured U isotope abundances. The most likely source is a light water reactor, possibly a pressurized water reactor, test facility, a research reactor for naval propulsion systems, or a materials test reactor. The low abundance of 241Pu suggests the fuel was stored for\n1020 y after discharge before reprocessing.\nThe data for the non-nuclear samples reinforces the assertion that the sample originated in the former Soviet Union. The ampoule has been identified by visitors to FSU nuclear facilities as strongly resembling the glass containers used to preserve aliquots of production runs for archival material. The Ba chromate giving the wax its distinctive yellow color is banned in the U.S. and most Western countries but is still widespread in Brazil, China, India and many of the Newly Independent States. The paper products are derived from mixtures of hardwood and softwood trees not found in the U.S. or Western Europe, but common in Eastern Europe. Finally, the Pb isotope composition of the container is inconsistent with Pb mined in the U.S. but compatible with lead from Asia or Eastern Europe.\n\nThe preponderance of the evidence thus points to an origin in the FSU. Efforts to refine this attribution analysis are continuing, including recent efforts to compare the characteristics of the HEU seized in Bulgaria with similar material interdicted in Paris (Baude 2008, Baude *et al*. 2008).\n\nRecent interdictions (Sokova & Potter 2008, Global Security Newswire 2010, 2011) suggest that attempts to smuggle weapon-useable nuclear materials across international borders still continue. Illicit trafficking in nuclear materials remains an important area of concern for the International Atomic Energy Agency, Europol, and national law enforcement agencies, and has gained increased attention in the context of recent Nuclear Security Summits.\n\n\nCONCLUSIONS\nNuclear forensics is an emerging science, driven primarily by national security objectives, including those of both law enforcement and national intelligence. Nuclear forensics is one input into nuclear attribution, in which responsibility is assigned, along with other sources of information, such as law enforcement and intelligence. Nuclear forensics is used to generate technical conclusions by applying validated signatures to analytical results from the interdicted material. These validated signatures include both comparative signatures, in which the interdicted material is compared to the results from material of known origins, and predictive signatures, in which conclusions are\n\ngenerated without reference to other samples. Valid analytical results, in turn, depend on appropriately validated analytical methods, proper analytical sampling, and a quality control/assurance program.\n\nACKNOWLEDGEMENTS\nWe thank the members of the LLNL nuclear\nforensics team for their many contributions and stimulating engagement and who deserve full credit for the activities described herein. We also thank A. Simonetti for a thorough review and helpful comments. This chapter was prepared by a contractor of the U.S. Government under contract number DE-AC52-07NA27344. Accordingly, the\nU.S. Government retains a nonexclusive, royaltyfree license to publish or reproduce the published form of this contribution, or allow other to do so, for U.S. Government purposes. REFERENCES\nADAMSON, M., ALCARAZ, A., ANDRESEN, B.,\nBAZAN, J., CANTLIN, S., CHAMBERS, D., CONRADO, C., ESSER, B., GRANT, P., HUDSON, B., HUTCHEON, I., MENAPACE, J., MOODY, K., MORAN, J., NIEMEYER, S., OVERTURF, G., RANDICH, E., ROBBINS, W., RUSS, P., WALL, M., WHIPPLE, R., WILLIAMS, R., ZELLAR, L., PERSIANI, P., BICHA, W., BOLINGER, W., CARTER, J., CHAMBERS, C., GOODPASTURE, T., HEMBREE JR., D., HINTON JR., E., RAYBORN, C., THOMPSON, K., TUCKER, H., WILSON, J., FINCH, D., GOUGE, T., HALVERSON, J., WALTER S., WEBB, R., RAY, I. & STREZOV, A. (2001): Forensic Analysis of a\nSmuggled HEU Sample Interdicted in Bulgaria. UCRL-ID-143216. Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory,\nU.S.\nDepartment\nof\nEnergy,\nLivermore, CA, pp. 88.\nAREVALO, R., JR., BELLUCCI, J., & MCDONOUGH,\nW. F. (2010): *Geostand. & Geoanalyt. Res.* 34,\n327-341\nDOI:\n10.1111/j.1751-908X.2010.\n00934.x\nBAUDE S. (2008): HEU seized in July 2001 in Paris:\nAnalytical investigations performed on the\nmaterial. Proc. IAEA Conference on Illicit Nuclear Trafficking, Edinburgh, Scotland, 1922\nNovember 2007 pp. 397399.\nBAUDE, S., CHARTIER, B., KIMMEL, D., MARIOTTE,\nF., MASSE, D., PERON, H., TILLY, D. (2008): The\nFrench response in cases of illicit nuclear trafficking. Proc. IAEA Conference on Illicit Nuclear Trafficking, Edinburgh, Scotland, 19-22 November 2007 pp. 363-372.\nBRENNECKA, G.A., BORG, L.E., HUTCHEON, I.D.,\nSHARP, M.A. AND ANBAR, A.D. (2010): Natural\nvariations in uranium isotope ratios of uranium ore concentrates: understanding the U-238/U-235\nfractionation mechanism, *Earth Planet. Sci. Lett.*\n291, 228-235.\nCOMMUNIQUE 2012 SEOUL NUCLEAR SECURITY\nSUMMIT (2012) http://www.thenuclearsecurity\nsummit.org/userfiles/Seoul%20Communique_FIN AL.pdf\nDOLGOV, J., BIBILASHVILI, Y.K., CHOROKHOV,\nN.A., SCHUBERT, A, JANSSEN, G., MAYER, K. & KOCH, L. (1999): Installation of a database for\nidentification of nuclear material of unknown\norigin, Proc. 21st ESARDA Symposium, VNIINM Moscow, 1999, Sevilla, Spain, Report EUR 18963 EN.\nDREICER, M., HUTCHEON, I.D., KRISTO, M.K.,\nSMITH, D.K., VERGINO, E.S. & WILLIAMS, R.W. (2009): International Nuclear Forensics Cooperation - Future Opportunities, Proceedings of the\n50th Institute for Nuclear Materials Management\n(INMM) Meeting, Tucson, AZ.\nFEDCHENKO V. (2007): Weapons of Mass Analysis,\nJane's Intelligence Review 19, No. 11, pp. 48-51.\nFEDCHENKO V. (2008): Nuclear Forensic Analysis,\nSIPRI Yearbook 2008: Armaments, Disarmament, and International Security (Oxford University Press), pp. 415-427.\nGASCOYNE, M. (1992): Geochemistry of the\nActinides and Their Daughters. In: Uranium\nSeries Disequilibrium: Applications to Earth, Marine, and Environmental Sciences (M.\nIvanovich & R.S. Harmon, eds.) 2nd Ed.,\nClarendon Press, Oxford.\nGLOBAL SECURITY NEWSWIRE (2010): Men admit to\nattempting HEU sale in Georgia, http://www.nti. org/gsn/article/men-admit-to-attempting-heu-salein-georgia/\nGLOBAL SECURITY NEWSWIRE (2011): Moldova,\nU.S. Pursue HEU Held by Criminal Organization, http://www.nti.org/gsn/article/moldova-uspursue-heu-held-by-criminal-organization/\nGRANT, P.M., MOODY, K.J., HUTCHEON, I.D.,\nPHINNEY, D.L., WHIPPLE, R.E., HAAS, J.S., ALCARAZ, A, ANDREWS, J.E., KLUNDER, G.L., RUSSO, R.E., FICKIES, T.E., PELKEY, G.E., ANDRESEN, B.D., KRUCHTEN, D.A. & CANTLIN,\nS. (1998): Nuclear forensics in law enforcement\napplications, *J. Radioanal. Nucl. Chem.*, **235**(1-\n2), 129.\nisotopic SIMS measurements of uranium particles\nfor nuclear safeguard purposes, J. Analytic.\nAtomic Spectr. 24, 277-287\nROBEL, M., KRISTO, M. & HELLER, M. (2009):\nNuclear Forensic Inferences Using Multidimensional Statistics. Proc., 50th Annual Meeting of the Institute for Nuclear Materials Management, Tucson, AZ.\nSMITH, D.K., KRISTO, M.J., NIEMEYER, S. &\nDUDDER, G.B. (2008): Documentation of a model\naction plan to deter illicit nuclear trafficking, J.\nRadioanal. Nucl. Chem. 276, 415-419.\nSOKOVA. E.K. & POTTER, W.C. (2008): The 2003\nand 2006 high enriched uranium seizures in Georgia: some answers and possible lessons. Proc. IAEA Conference on Illicit Nuclear Trafficking,\nEdinburgh,\nScotland,\n1922\nNovember 2007, pp. 405424.\nTUMEY, S.J., BROWN, T.A., BUCHHOLZ, B.A.,\nHAMILTON, T.F., HUTCHEON, I.D. & R.W. WILLIAMS (2009): Ultra-sensitive measurements\nof U-233 by accelerator mass spectrometry for\nnational security applications, J. Radioanal. Nucl.\nChem 282, 721-726.\nU.S.\nDEPARTMENT\nOF\nDEFENSE\n(2010):\nQuadrennial Defense Review (2010) http://www. defense.gov/qdr/images/QDR_as_of_12Feb10_10 00.pdf.\nWILCKEN, K.M., FIFIELD, L.K., BARROWS, T.T.,\nTIMS, S.G. & GLADKIS, L.G. (2008): Nucleogenic\nCl- 36, U-236 and Pu-239 in uranium ores. Nucl.\nInstr. Meth. Phys. Res. B 266, 3614 - 3624.\nINTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY (2006):\nIAEA Nuclear Security Series #2, Nuclear Forensics\nSupport\nTechnical\nGuidance,\nSTI/PUB/1241, 67 pp., ISBN 92-0-100306-4.\nINTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY (2012):\nIllicit Trafficking Database (ITDB), IAEA, Vienna. http://www-ns.iaea.org/security/itdb.asp\nKRISTO, M.J. (2012): Nuclear Forensics. In\nHandbook of Radioactivity Analysis, 3rd edition,\nM.F. L'Annunziata, (ed.) 1281-1302, Elsevier\nPress.\nMAYER, K., WALLENIUS, M. AND RAY, I. (2005):\nNuclear forensics - a methodology providing\nclues on the origin of illicitly trafficked nuclear\nmaterials, *Analyst* 130, 433-441.\nMAYER, K., WALLENIUS, M. & FANGHANEL, T.\n(2007): Nuclear Forensic Science - from cradle to\nmaturity, *J. Alloys & Compounds* **444-445**, 50\n56.\nMOODY, K., HUTCHEON, I.D. & GRANT, P.M.\n(2005): *Nuclear Forensic Analysis*, Taylor and\nFrancis, 432 pp.\nNIEMEYER, S. & KOCH, L. (2002): The nuclear\nsmuggling International Technical Working Group: Making a difference in combating illicit\ntrafficking. In Proceedings, Conference on\nAdvances in Destructive and Non-Destructive Analysis for Environmental Monitoring and Nuclear Forensics, Karlsruhe, Germany, October 21-23, 2002, International Atomic Energy Agency, Vienna, pp. 17-19.\nRANEBO, Y., HEDBERG, P.M.L., WHITEHOUSE, M. J.,\nINGENERI, K & LITTMANN, S. (2009): Improved"
    },
    {
        "text": "## Background To \"Assessing Russian Activities And Intentions In Recent Us Elections\": The Analytic Process And Cyber Incident Attribution Background To \"Assessing Russian Activities And Intentions In Recent Us Elections\": The Analytic Process And Cyber Incident Attribution\n\n\"Assessing Russian Activities and Intentions in Recent US Elections\" is a declassified version of a highly classified assessment that has been provided to the President and to recipients approved by the President.\n\n\nThe Intelligence Community rarely can publicly reveal the full extent of its knowledge or the precise bases for its assessments, as the release of such information would reveal sensitive sources or methods and imperil the ability to collect critical foreign intelligence in the future.\n\nThus, while the conclusions in the report are all reflected in the classified assessment, the declassified report does not and cannot include the full supporting information, including specific intelligence and sources and methods.\n\n## The Analytic Process\n\nThe mission of the Intelligence Community is to seek to reduce the uncertainty surrounding foreign activities, capabilities, or leaders' intentions.  This objective is difficult to achieve when seeking to understand complex issues on which foreign actors go to extraordinary lengths to hide or obfuscate their activities.\n\n\nOn these issues of great importance to US national security, the goal of intelligence analysis is to provide assessments to decisionmakers that are intellectually rigorous, objective, timely, and useful, and that adhere to tradecraft standards.\n\nThe tradecraft standards for analytic products have been refined over the past ten years.  These standards include describing sources (including their reliability and access to the information they provide), clearly expressing uncertainty, distinguishing between underlying information and analysts' judgments and assumptions, exploring alternatives, demonstrating relevance to the customer, using strong and transparent logic, and explaining change or consistency in judgments over time.\n\nApplying these standards helps ensure that the Intelligence Community provides US policymakers, warfighters, and operators with the best and most accurate insight, warning, and context, as well as\npotential opportunities to advance US national security.\nIntelligence Community analysts integrate information from a wide range of sources, including human sources, technical collection, and open source information, and apply specialized skills and structured analytic tools to draw inferences informed by the data available, relevant past activity, and logic and reasoning to provide insight into what is happening and the prospects for the future.\n\n\nA critical part of the analyst's task is to explain uncertainties associated with major judgments based on the quantity and quality of the source material, information gaps, and the complexity of the issue.\n\nWhen Intelligence Community analysts use words such as \"we assess\" or \"we judge,\" they are conveying an analytic assessment or judgment.\n\nSome analytic judgments are based directly on collected information; others rest on previous judgments, which serve as building blocks in rigorous analysis.  In either type of judgment, the tradecraft standards outlined above ensure that analysts have an appropriate basis for the judgment.\n\nIntelligence Community judgments often include two important elements: judgments of how likely it is that something has happened or will happen (using terms such as \"likely\" or \"unlikely\") and confidence levels in those judgments (low, moderate, and high) that refer to the evidentiary basis, logic and reasoning, and precedents that underpin the judgments.\n\n## Determining Attribution In Cyber Incidents\n\nThe nature of cyberspace makes attribution of cyber operations difficult but not impossible.  Every kind of cyber operationmalicious or notleaves a trail.  US Intelligence Community analysts use this information, their constantly growing knowledge base of previous events and known malicious actors, and their knowledge of how these malicious actors work and the tools that they use, to attempt to trace these operations back to their source.  In every case, they apply the same tradecraft standards described in the Analytic Process above.\n\n\nAnalysts consider a series of questions to assess how the information compares with existing knowledge and adjust their confidence in their judgments as appropriate to account for any alternative hypotheses and ambiguities.\n\nAn assessment of attribution usually is not a simple statement of who conducted an operation, but rather a series of judgments that describe whether it was an isolated incident, who was the likely perpetrator, that perpetrator's possible motivations, and whether a foreign government had a role in ordering or leading the operation.\n\nThis report is a downgraded version of a more sensitive assessment; its conclusions are identical to those in the more sensitive assessment but this version does not include the full supporting information on key elements of the influence campaign.\n\nassessment but this version does not include the full supporting information on key elements of the influence campaign.\n\n## Assessing Russian Activities And Intentions In Recent Us Elections\n\nICA 2017-01D  |  6 January 2017\n\n\nThis page intentionally left blank.\n\n\n## Scope And Sourcing Information Available As Of 29 December 2016 Was Used In The Preparation Of This Product. Scope\n\nThis report includes an analytic assessment drafted and coordinated among The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), and The National Security Agency (NSA), which draws on intelligence information collected and disseminated by those three agencies.  It covers the motivation and scope of Moscow's intentions regarding US elections and Moscow's use of cyber tools and media campaigns to influence US public opinion.  The assessment focuses on activities aimed at the 2016 US presidential election and draws on our understanding of previous Russian influence operations. When we use the term \"we\" it refers to an assessment by all three agencies.\n\n\n\nThis report is a declassified version of a highly classified assessment.  This document's conclusions are identical to the highly classified assessment, but this document does not include the full supporting information, including specific intelligence on key elements of the influence campaign.  Given the redactions, we made minor edits purely for readability and flow.\n\nWe did not make an assessment of the impact that Russian activities had on the outcome of the 2016 election.  The US Intelligence Community is charged with monitoring and assessing the intentions, capabilities, and actions of foreign actors; it does not analyze US political processes or US public opinion.\n\n\nNew information continues to emerge, providing increased insight into Russian activities.\n\n## Sourcing\n\nMany of the key judgments in this assessment rely on a body of reporting from multiple sources that are consistent with our understanding of Russian behavior.  Insights into Russian effortsincluding specific cyber operationsand Russian views of key US players derive from multiple corroborating sources.\n\nSome of our judgments about Kremlin preferences and intent are drawn from the behavior of Kremlinloyal political figures, state media, and pro-Kremlin social media actors, all of whom the Kremlin either directly uses to convey messages or who are answerable to the Kremlin.  The Russian leadership invests significant resources in both foreign and domestic propaganda and places a premium on transmitting what it views as consistent, self-reinforcing narratives regarding its desires and redlines, whether on Ukraine, Syria, or relations with the United States.\n\n## Assessing Russian Activities And Intentions In Recent Us Elections Key Judgments\n\nRussian efforts to influence the 2016 US presidential election represent the most recent expression of Moscow's longstanding desire to undermine the US-led liberal democratic order, but these activities demonstrated a significant escalation in directness, level of activity, and scope of effort compared to previous operations.\n\nWe assess Russian President Vladimir Putin ordered an influence campaign in 2016 aimed at the US presidential election.  Russia's goals were to undermine public faith in the US democratic process, denigrate Secretary Clinton, and harm her electability and potential presidency.  We further assess Putin and the Russian Government developed a clear preference for President-elect Trump.  We have high confidence in these judgments.\n\n\nWe also assess Putin and the Russian Government aspired to help President-elect Trump's election chances when possible by discrediting Secretary Clinton and publicly contrasting her unfavorably to him.  All three agencies agree with this judgment.  CIA and FBI have high confidence in this judgment; NSA has moderate confidence.\n\nMoscow's approach evolved over the course of the campaign based on Russia's understanding of the electoral prospects of the two main candidates.  When it appeared to Moscow that Secretary Clinton was likely to win the election, the Russian influence campaign began to focus more on undermining her future presidency.\n\nFurther information has come to light since Election Day that, when combined with Russian behavior since early November 2016, increases our confidence in our assessments of Russian motivations and\ngoals.\nMoscow's influence campaign followed a Russian messaging strategy that blends covert intelligence operationssuch as cyber activitywith overt efforts by Russian Government agencies, state-funded media, third-party intermediaries, and paid social media users or \"trolls.\" Russia, like its Soviet predecessor, has a history of conducting covert influence campaigns focused on US presidential elections that have used intelligence officers and agents and press placements to disparage candidates perceived as hostile to the Kremlin.\n\n\nRussia's intelligence services conducted cyber operations against targets associated with the 2016 US presidential election, including targets associated with both major US political parties.\n\nWe assess with high confidence that Russian military intelligence (General Staff Main Intelligence Directorate or GRU) used the Guccifer 2.0 persona and DCLeaks.com to release US victim data\n\nobtained in cyber operations publicly and in exclusives to media outlets and relayed material to WikiLeaks.\n\nRussian intelligence obtained and maintained access to elements of multiple US state or local electoral boards.  DHS assesses that the types of systems Russian actors targeted or compromised were not involved in vote tallying.\n\nRussia's state-run propaganda machine contributed to the influence campaign by serving as a platform for Kremlin messaging to Russian and international audiences.\n\nWe assess Moscow will apply lessons learned from its Putin-ordered campaign aimed at the US\npresidential election to future influence efforts worldwide, including against US allies and their\nelection processes.\n\n\n## Contents\n\nScope and Sourcing Key Judgments\ni\nii\niv\n\nContents\n\n## Cia/Fbi/Nsa Assessment: Russia's Influence Campaign Targeting The 2016 Us Presidential Election\n\n1\n\n2\n\n5\n\nPutin Ordered Campaign To Influence US Election Russian Campaign Was Multifaceted Influence Effort Was Boldest Yet in the US Election Operation Signals \"New Normal\" in Russian Influence Efforts\n5\n\n\n## Annexes\n\n| 6                       |   A:  RussiaKremlin's TV Seeks To Influence Politics, Fuel Discontent in US  |\n|-------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------|\n| B:  Estimative Language |                                                                           13  |\n|                         |                                                                               |\n|                         |                                                                               |\n\n Russia's Influence Campaign Targeting the 2016 US Presidential Election\n\n## Russia's Influence Campaign Targeting The 2016 Us Presidential Election Putin Ordered Campaign To Influence Us Election\n\nWe assess with high confidence that Russian President Vladimir Putin ordered an influence campaign in 2016 aimed at the US presidential election, the consistent goals of which were to undermine public faith in the US democratic process, denigrate Secretary Clinton, and harm her electability and potential presidency.  We further assess Putin and the Russian Government developed a clear preference for President-elect Trump.  When it appeared to Moscow that Secretary Clinton was likely to win the election, the Russian influence campaign then focused on undermining her expected presidency.\n\n\nWe also assess Putin and the Russian Government aspired to help President-elect Trump's election chances when possible by discrediting Secretary Clinton and publicly contrasting her unfavorably to him.  All three agencies agree with this judgment.  CIA and FBI have high confidence in this judgment; NSA has moderate confidence.\n\nIn trying to influence the US election, we assess the Kremlin sought to advance its longstanding desire to undermine the US-led liberal democratic order, the promotion of which Putin and other senior Russian leaders view as a threat to Russia and Putin's regime.\n\nPutin publicly pointed to the Panama Papers disclosure and the Olympic doping scandal as US-directed efforts to defame Russia, suggesting he sought to use disclosures to discredit the image of the United States and cast it as hypocritical.\n\nPutin most likely wanted to discredit Secretary Clinton because he has publicly blamed her since 2011 for inciting mass protests against his regime in late 2011 and early 2012, and because he holds a grudge for comments he almost certainly saw as disparaging him.\nWe assess Putin, his advisers, and the Russian Government developed a clear preference for President-elect Trump over Secretary Clinton.\n\n\nBeginning in June, Putin's public comments about the US presidential race avoided directly praising President-elect Trump, probably because Kremlin officials thought that any praise from Putin personally would backfire in the United States. Nonetheless, Putin publicly indicated a preference for President-elect Trump's stated policy to work with Russia, and pro-Kremlin figures spoke highly about what they saw as his Russia-friendly positions on Syria and Ukraine. Putin publicly contrasted the President-elect's approach to Russia with Secretary Clinton's \"aggressive rhetoric.\"\n\nMoscow also saw the election of Presidentelect Trump as a way to achieve an international counterterrorism coalition against the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL).\n\nPutin has had many positive experiences working with Western political leaders whose business interests made them more disposed to deal with Russia, such as former Italian Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi and former German Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder.\n\nPutin, Russian officials, and other pro-Kremlin pundits stopped publicly criticizing the US election process as unfair almost immediately\nafter the election because Moscow probably assessed it would be counterproductive to building positive relations.\nWe assess the influence campaign aspired to help President-elect Trump's chances of victory when possible by discrediting Secretary Clinton and publicly contrasting her unfavorably to the President-elect.  When it appeared to Moscow that Secretary Clinton was likely to win the presidency the Russian influence campaign focused more on undercutting Secretary Clinton's legitimacy and crippling her presidency from its start, including by impugning the fairness of the election.\n\n\nBefore the election, Russian diplomats had publicly denounced the US electoral process and were prepared to publicly call into question the validity of the results.  Pro- Kremlin bloggers had prepared a Twitter campaign, #DemocracyRIP, on election night in anticipation of Secretary Clinton's victory, judging from their social media activity.\n\n## Russian Campaign Was Multifaceted\n\nMoscow's use of disclosures during the US election was unprecedented, but its influence campaign otherwise followed a longstanding Russian messaging strategy that blends covert intelligence operationssuch as cyber activitywith overt efforts by Russian Government agencies, statefunded media, third-party intermediaries, and paid social media users or \"trolls.\"\n\n\nWe assess that influence campaigns are approved at the highest levels of the Russian Governmentparticularly those that would be politically sensitive.\n\nMoscow's campaign aimed at the US election reflected years of investment in its capabilities, which Moscow has honed in the former Soviet states.\n\nBy their nature, Russian influence campaigns are multifaceted and designed to be deniable because they use a mix of agents of influence, cutouts, front organizations, and false-flag operations.  Moscow demonstrated this during the Ukraine crisis in 2014, when Russia deployed forces and advisers to eastern Ukraine and denied it publicly.\nThe Kremlin's campaign aimed at the US election featured disclosures of data obtained through Russian cyber operations; intrusions into US state and local electoral boards; and overt propaganda. Russian intelligence collection both informed and enabled the influence campaign. Cyber Espionage Against US Political Organizations.  Russia's intelligence services conducted cyber operations against targets associated with the 2016 US presidential election, including targets associated with both major US political parties. We assess Russian intelligence services collected against the US primary campaigns, think tanks, and lobbying groups they viewed as likely to shape future US policies.  In July 2015, Russian intelligence gained access to Democratic National Committee (DNC) networks and maintained that access until at least June 2016.\n\n\nThe General Staff Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU) probably began cyber operations aimed at the US election by March 2016.  We assess that the GRU operations resulted in the compromise of the personal e-mail accounts of Democratic Party officials and political figures. By May, the GRU had exfiltrated large volumes of data from the DNC.\nPublic Disclosures of Russian-Collected Data. We assess with high confidence that the GRU used the Guccifer 2.0 persona, DCLeaks.com, and WikiLeaks to release US victim data obtained in cyber operations publicly and in exclusives to media outlets.\n\n\nGuccifer 2.0, who claimed to be an independent Romanian hacker, made multiple contradictory statements and false claims about his likely Russian identity throughout the election.  Press reporting suggests more than one person claiming to be Guccifer 2.0 interacted with journalists.\n\nContent that we assess was taken from e-mail\naccounts targeted by the GRU in March 2016 appeared on DCLeaks.com starting in June.\nWe assess with high confidence that the GRU relayed material it acquired from the DNC and senior Democratic officials to WikiLeaks.  Moscow most likely chose WikiLeaks because of its selfproclaimed reputation for authenticity.  Disclosures through WikiLeaks did not contain any evident forgeries.\n\n\nIn early September, Putin said publicly it was important the DNC data was exposed to WikiLeaks, calling the search for the source of the leaks a distraction and denying Russian \"state-level\" involvement.\n\nThe Kremlin's principal international propaganda outlet RT (formerly Russia Today)\nhas actively collaborated with WikiLeaks.  RT's editor-in-chief visited WikiLeaks founder Julian Assange at the Ecuadorian Embassy in London in August 2013, where they discussed renewing his broadcast contract with RT, according to Russian and Western media.  Russian media subsequently announced that RT had become \"the only Russian media company\" to partner with WikiLeaks and had received access to \"new leaks of secret information.\"  RT routinely gives Assange sympathetic coverage and provides him a platform to denounce the United States.\nThese election-related disclosures reflect a pattern of Russian intelligence using hacked information in targeted influence efforts against targets such as Olympic athletes and other foreign governments. Such efforts have included releasing or altering personal data, defacing websites, or releasing emails.\n\n\nA prominent target since the 2016 Summer Olympics has been the World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA), with leaks that we assess to have originated with the GRU and that have\ninvolved data on US athletes.\nRussia collected on some Republican-affiliated targets but did not conduct a comparable disclosure campaign. Russian Cyber Intrusions Into State and Local Electoral Boards.  Russian intelligence accessed elements of multiple state or local electoral boards. Since early 2014, Russian intelligence has researched US electoral processes and related technology and equipment.\n\n\nDHS assesses that the types of systems we observed Russian actors targeting or compromising are not involved in vote tallying.\nRussian Propaganda Efforts. Russia's state-run propaganda machinecomprised of its domestic media apparatus, outlets targeting global audiences such as RT and Sputnik, and a network of quasi-government trollscontributed to the influence campaign by serving as a platform for Kremlin messaging to Russian and international audiences.  State-owned Russian media made increasingly favorable comments about Presidentelect Trump as the 2016 US general and primary election campaigns progressed while consistently offering negative coverage of Secretary Clinton.\n\n\nStarting in March 2016, Russian Government linked actors began openly supporting President-elect Trump's candidacy in media\non Putin by airing segments devoted to Secretary Clinton's alleged health problems.\n\naimed at English-speaking audiences.  RT and Sputnikanother government-funded outlet producing pro-Kremlin radio and online content in a variety of languages for international audiencesconsistently cast President-elect Trump as the target of unfair coverage from traditional US media outlets that they claimed were subservient to a corrupt political establishment.\n\n\nRussian media hailed President-elect Trump's victory as a vindication of Putin's advocacy of\nglobal populist movementsthe theme of Putin's annual conference for Western academics in October 2016and the latest example of Western liberalism's collapse.\n\nOn 6 August, RT published an Englishlanguage video called \"Julian Assange Special: Do WikiLeaks Have the E-mail That'll Put Clinton in Prison?\" and an exclusive interview with Assange entitled \"Clinton and ISIS Funded by the Same Money.\"  RT's most popular video on Secretary Clinton, \"How 100% of the Clintons' 'Charity' Went to...Themselves,\" had more than 9 million views on social media\nplatforms.  RT's most popular English language video about the President-elect, called \"Trump Will Not Be Permitted To Win,\" featured Assange and had 2.2 million views.\n\nFor more on Russia's past media efforts including portraying the 2012 US electoral process as undemocraticplease see Annex A: RussiaKremlin's TV Seeks To Influence Politics, Fuel Discontent in US.\n\nPutin's chief propagandist Dmitriy Kiselev used his flagship weekly newsmagazine program this fall to cast President-elect Trump as an outsider victimized by a corrupt political establishment and faulty democratic election process that aimed to prevent his election because of his desire to work with Moscow.\nRussia used trolls as well as RT as part of its influence efforts to denigrate Secretary Clinton. This effort amplified stories on scandals about Secretary Clinton and the role of WikiLeaks in the election campaign.\n\n\nPro-Kremlin proxy Vladimir Zhirinovskiy, leader of the nationalist Liberal Democratic Party of Russia, proclaimed just before the election that if President-elect Trump won, Russia would \"drink champagne\" in anticipation of being\nable to advance its positions on Syria and Ukraine.\n\nThe likely financier of the so-called Internet\nResearch Agency of professional trolls located in Saint Petersburg is a close Putin ally with ties to Russian intelligence.\nRT's coverage of Secretary Clinton throughout the US presidential campaign was consistently negative and focused on her leaked e-mails and accused her of corruption, poor physical and mental health, and ties to Islamic extremism.  Some Russian officials echoed Russian lines for the influence campaign that Secretary Clinton's election could lead to a war between the United States and Russia.\n\n\nA journalist who is a leading expert on the Internet Research Agency claimed that some social media accounts that appear to be tied to Russia's professional trollsbecause they previously were devoted to supporting Russian actions in Ukrainestarted to advocate for President-elect Trump as early as December 2015.\n\n\n\nIn August, Kremlin-linked political analysts suggested avenging negative Western reports\n\n\n## Influence Effort Was Boldest Yet In The Us Election Operation Signals \"New Normal\" In Russian Influence Efforts\n\nWe assess Moscow will apply lessons learned from its campaign aimed at the US presidential election to future influence efforts in the United States and worldwide, including against US allies and their election processes.  We assess the Russian intelligence services would have seen their election influence campaign as at least a qualified success because of their perceived ability to impact public discussion.\n\nRussia's effort to influence the 2016 US presidential election represented a significant escalation in directness, level of activity, and scope of effort compared to previous operations aimed at US elections.  We assess the 2016 influence campaign reflected the Kremlin's recognition of the worldwide effects that mass disclosures of US Government and other private datasuch as those conducted by WikiLeaks and othershave achieved in recent years, and their understanding of the value of orchestrating such disclosures to maximize the impact of compromising information.\n\n\nDuring the Cold War, the Soviet Union used intelligence officers, influence agents, forgeries, and press placements to disparage candidates perceived as hostile to the Kremlin, according to a former KGB archivist.\n\nPutin's public views of the disclosures suggest the Kremlin and the intelligence services will continue to consider using cyber-enabled disclosure operations because of their belief that these can accomplish Russian goals relatively easily without significant damage to Russian interests.\n\nRussia has sought to influence elections across Europe.\nSince the Cold War, Russian intelligence efforts related to US elections have primarily focused on foreign intelligence collection.  For decades, Russian and Soviet intelligence services have sought to collect insider information from US political parties that could help Russian leaders understand a new US administration's plans and priorities.\n\n\nThe Russian Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR) Directorate S (Illegals) officers arrested in the United States in 2010 reported to Moscow about the 2008 election.\nWe assess Russian intelligence services will continue to develop capabilities to provide Putin with options to use against the United States, judging from past practice and current efforts. Immediately after Election Day, we assess Russian intelligence began a spearphishing campaign targeting US Government employees and individuals associated with US think tanks and NGOs in national security, defense, and foreign policy fields.  This campaign could provide material for future influence efforts as well as foreign intelligence collection on the incoming administration's goals and plans.\n\n\nIn the 1970s, the KGB recruited a Democratic Party activist who reported information about then-presidential hopeful Jimmy Carter's campaign and foreign policy plans, according to a former KGB archivist.\n\n\n## Annex A Russia -- Kremlin's Tv Seeks To Influence Politics, Fuel Discontent In Us*\n\nRT America TV, a Kremlin-financed channel operated from within the United States, has substantially expanded its repertoire of programming that highlights criticism of alleged US shortcomings in democracy and civil liberties.  The rapid expansion of RT's operations and budget and recent candid statements by RT's leadership point to the channel's importance to the Kremlin as a messaging tool and indicate a Kremlindirected campaign to undermine faith in the US Government and fuel political protest.  The Kremlin has committed significant resources to expanding the channel's reach, particularly its social media footprint.  A reliable UK report states that RT recently was the most-watched foreign news channel in the UK.  RT America has positioned itself as a domestic US channel and has deliberately sought to obscure any legal ties to the Russian Government.\nIn the runup to the 2012 US presidential election in November, English-language channel RT America -- created and financed by the Russian Government and part of Russian Government-sponsored RT TV (see textbox 1) -- intensified its usually critical coverage of the United States.  The channel portrayed the US electoral process as undemocratic and featured calls by US protesters for the public to rise up and \"take this government back.\"\n\n\nRT introduced two new shows -- \"Breaking the Set\" on 4 September and \"Truthseeker\" on 2 November -- both overwhelmingly focused on criticism of US and Western governments as well as the promotion of radical discontent.\n\nFrom August to November 2012, RT ran numerous reports on alleged US election fraud and voting machine vulnerabilities, contending that US election results cannot\nbe trusted and do not reflect the popular will.\n\nIn an effort to highlight the alleged \"lack of democracy\" in the United States, RT broadcast, hosted, and advertised thirdparty candidate debates and ran reporting supportive of the political agenda of these candidates. The RT hosts asserted that the US two-party system does not represent the views of at least one-third of the population and is a \"sham.\"\n\n\n\nRT aired a documentary about the Occupy Wall Street movement on 1, 2, and 4 November.  RT framed the movement as a fight against \"the ruling class\" and described the current US political system as corrupt and dominated by corporations.  RT advertising for the documentary featured Occupy movement calls to \"take back\" the government.  The documentary claimed that the US system cannot be changed democratically, but only through \"revolution.\" After the 6 November US presidential election, RT aired a documentary called\n\"Cultures of Protest,\" about active and often violent political resistance  (RT, 1- 10 November).\n\n## Rt Conducts Strategic Messaging For Russian Government\n\nRT's criticism of the US election was the latest facet of its broader and longer-standing anti-US messaging likely aimed at undermining viewers' trust in US democratic procedures and undercutting US criticism of Russia's political system.  RT Editor in Chief Margarita Simonyan recently declared that the United States itself lacks democracy and that it has \"no moral right to teach the rest of the world\" (*Kommersant*, 6 November).\n\n\nSimonyan has characterized RT's coverage of the Occupy Wall Street movement as \"information warfare\" that is aimed at promoting popular dissatisfaction with the US Government.  RT created a *Facebook* app to connect Occupy Wall Street protesters via social media.  In addition, RT featured its own\nhosts in Occupy rallies (\"Minaev Live,\" 10 April; RT, 2, 12 June).\n\nRT's reports often characterize the United States as a \"surveillance state\" and allege widespread infringements of civil liberties, police brutality, and drone use (RT, 24, 28 October, 1-10 November).\n\nRT has also focused on criticism of the US economic system, US currency policy, alleged Wall Street greed, and the US national debt.  Some of RT's hosts have compared the United States to Imperial Rome and have predicted that government corruption and \"corporate greed\" will lead to US financial collapse (RT, 31 October, 4 November).\n\nRT broadcasts support for other Russian interests in areas such as foreign and energy policy.\n\n\nRT runs anti-fracking programming, highlighting environmental issues and the impacts on public health.  This is likely reflective of the Russian Government's concern about the impact of fracking and US natural gas production on the global energy market and the potential challenges to Gazprom's profitability (5 October).\n\n\n\nRT is a leading media voice opposing Western intervention in the Syrian conflict and blaming the West for waging\n\"information wars\" against the Syrian Government (RT, 10 October-9 November).\nRT anti-fracking reporting (RT, 5 October)\n\n\nIn an earlier example of RT's messaging in support of the Russian Government, during the Georgia-Russia military conflict the channel accused Georgians of killing civilians and organizing a genocide of the Ossetian people.  According to Simonyan, when \"the Ministry of Defense was at war with Georgia,\" RT was \"waging an information war against the entire Western world\" (*Kommersant*, 11 July).\nIn recent interviews, RT's leadership has candidly acknowledged its mission to expand its US audience and to expose it to Kremlin messaging.  However, the leadership rejected claims that RT interferes in US domestic affairs.\n\n\nSimonyan claimed in popular arts magazine *Afisha* on 3 October: \"It is important to have a channel that people get used to, and then, when needed, you show them what you need to show.  In some sense, not having our own foreign broadcasting is the same as not having a ministry of defense. When there is no war, it looks like we don't need it.  However, when there is a war, it is critical.\"\n\nAccording to Simonyan, \"the word 'propaganda' has a very negative connotation, but indeed, there is not a single international foreign TV channel that is doing something other than promotion of the values of the country that it is broadcasting from.\"  She added that \"when Russia is at war, we are, of course, on Russia's side\" (*Afisha*, 3 October; *Kommersant*, 4 July).\n\nTV-Novosti director Nikolov said on 4 October to the Association of Cable Television that RT builds on worldwide demand for \"an alternative view of the entire world.\"  Simonyan asserted on 3 October in Afisha that RT's goal is \"to make an alternative channel that shares information unavailable elsewhere\" in order to \"conquer the audience\" and expose it to Russian state messaging (*Afisha*, 3 October; Kommersant, 4 July).\n\nOn 26 May, Simonyan tweeted with irony:  \"Ambassador McFaul hints that our channel is interference with US domestic affairs.  And we, sinful souls, were thinking that it is freedom of speech.\"\n\n## Rt Leadership Closely Tied To, Controlled By Kremlin\n\nRT Editor in Chief Margarita Simonyan has close ties to top Russian Government officials, especially Presidential Administration Deputy Chief of Staff Aleksey Gromov, who reportedly manages political TV coverage in Russia and is one of the founders of RT.\n\n\nSimonyan has claimed that Gromov shielded her from other officials and their requests to air certain reports.  Russian media consider Simonyan to be Gromov's protege (*Kommersant*, 4 July; Dozhd TV, 11 July).\n\nSimonyan replaced Gromov on stateowned Channel One's Board of Directors.\nGovernment officials, including Gromov and Putin's Press Secretary Peskov were involved in creating RT and appointing Simonyan (*Afisha*, 3 October).\n\n\n\nAccording to Simonyan, Gromov oversees political coverage on TV, and he has periodic meetings with media managers where he shares classified information and discusses their coverage plans.  Some opposition journalists, including Andrey Loshak, claim that he also ordered media attacks on opposition figures (*Kommersant*, 11 July).\nThe Kremlin staffs RT and closely supervises RT's coverage, recruiting people who can convey Russian strategic messaging because of their ideological beliefs.\n\n\nThe head of RT's Arabic-language service, Aydar Aganin, was rotated from the diplomatic service to manage RT's Arabic-language expansion, suggesting a close relationship between RT and Russia's foreign policy apparatus.  RT's London Bureau is managed by Darya Pushkova, the daughter of Aleksey Pushkov, the current chair of the Duma Russian Foreign Affairs Committee and a former Gorbachev speechwriter (DXB, 26 March 2009; *MK.ru*, 13 March 2006).\n\nAccording to Simonyan, the Russian Government sets rating and viewership requirements for RT and, \"since RT receives budget from the state, it must complete tasks given by the state.\"  According to Nikolov, RT news stories are written and edited \"to become news\" exclusively in RT's Moscow office (Dozhd TV, 11 July; AKT, 4 October).\n\nIn her interview with pro-Kremlin journalist Sergey Minaev, Simonyan complimented RT staff in the United States for passionately defending Russian positions on the air and in social media.  Simonyan said:  \"I wish you could see...how these guys, not just on air, but on their own social networks, *Twitter*, and when giving interviews, how they defend the positions that we stand on!\" (\"Minaev Live,\" 10 April).\n\n## Rt Focuses On Social Media, Building Audience\n\nRT aggressively advertises its social media accounts and has a significant and fast-growing social media footprint.  In line with its efforts to present itself as anti-mainstream and to provide viewers alternative news content, RT is making its social media operations a top priority, both to avoid broadcast TV regulations and to expand its overall audience.\n\n\nAccording to RT management, RT's website receives at least 500,000 unique viewers every day.  Since its inception in 2005, RT videos received more than 800 million views on *YouTube* (1 million views per day), which is the highest among news outlets (see graphics for comparison with other news channels) (AKT, 4 October).\n\nAccording to Simonyan, the TV audience worldwide is losing trust in traditional TV broadcasts and stations, while the popularity of \"alternative channels\" like RT or Al Jazeera grows.  RT markets itself as an \"alternative channel\" that is available via the Internet everywhere in the world, and it encourages\ninteraction and social networking (*Kommersant*, 29 September).\n\nAccording to Simonyan, RT uses social media to expand the reach of its political reporting and uses well-trained people to monitor public opinion in social media commentaries (*Kommersant*, 29 September).\n\nAccording to Nikolov, RT requires its hosts to have social media accounts, in part because social media allows the distribution of content that would not be allowed on television (*Newreporter.org*, 11 October).\n\nSimonyan claimed in her 3 October interview to independent TV channel Dozhd that Occupy Wall Street coverage gave RT a significant audience boost.\nThe Kremlin spends $190 million a year on the distribution and dissemination of RT programming, focusing on hotels and satellite, terrestrial, and cable broadcasting.  The Kremlin is rapidly expanding RT's availability around the world and giving it a reach comparable to channels such as Al Jazeera English. According to Simonyan, the United Kingdom and the United States are RT's most successful markets.   RT does not, however, publish audience information.\n\n\nAccording to market research company Nielsen, RT had the most rapid growth (40 percent) among all international news channels in the United States over the past year (2012).  Its audience in New York tripled and in Washington DC grew by 60% (*Kommersant*, 4 July).\n\nRT claims that it is surpassing Al Jazeera in viewership in New York and Washington DC (*BARB*, 20 November; RT, 21 November).\n\nRT states on its website that it can reach more than 550 million people worldwide and 85 million people in the United States; however, it does not publicize its actual US audience numbers (RT, 10 December).\n\n## Formal Disassociation From Kremlin Facilitates Rt Us Messaging\n\nRT America formally disassociates itself from the Russian Government by using a Moscow-based autonomous nonprofit organization to finance its US operations.  According to RT's leadership, this structure was set up to avoid the Foreign Agents Registration Act and to facilitate licensing abroad.  In addition, RT rebranded itself in 2008 to deemphasize its Russian origin.\n\n\nAccording to Simonyan, RT America differs from other Russian state institutions in terms of ownership, but not in terms of financing.  To disassociate RT from the Russian Government, the federal news agency RIA Novosti established a subsidiary autonomous nonprofit organization, TV- Novosti, using the formal independence of this company to establish and finance RT worldwide (Dozhd TV, 11 July).\n\nNikolov claimed that RT is an \"autonomous noncommercial entity,\" which is \"well received by foreign regulators\" and \"simplifies getting a license.\"  Simonyan said that RT America is not a \"foreign agent\"\naccording to US law because it uses a US commercial organization for its broadcasts (*AKT,* 4 October; Dozhd TV, 11 July).\n\nSimonyan observed that RT's original Russia-centric news reporting did not generate sufficient audience, so RT switched to covering international and US domestic affairs and removed the words \"Russia Today\" from the logo \"to stop scaring away the audience\" (*Afisha*, 18 October; *Kommersant*, 4 July).\n\nRT hires or makes contractual agreements with Westerners with views that fit its agenda and airs them on RT.  Simonyan said on the pro-Kremlin show \"Minaev Live\" on 10 April that RT has enough audience and money to be able to choose its hosts, and it chooses the hosts that \"think like us,\" \"are interested in working in the anti-mainstream,\" and defend RT's beliefs on social media.  Some hosts and journalists do not present themselves as associated with RT when interviewing people, and many of them have affiliations to other media and activist organizations in the United States (\"Minaev Live,\" 10 April).\n\n## Annex B\n\n\n\nThis page intentionally left blank."
    },
    {
        "text": "## The Evolution Of Strategic Influence\n\nby LTC SUSAN L. GOUGH\nUNITED STATES ARMY\nProfessor Frank Jones Project Adviser The views expressed in this academic research paper are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the U.S. Government, the Department of Defense, or any of its agencies.\n\nU.S. Army War College CARLISLE BARRACKS, PENNSYLVANIA 17013\n\n## Abstract\n\nAUTHOR:\nLTC Susan L. Gough\nTITLE:\nThe Evolution of Strategic Influence\nFORMAT:\nStrategy Research Project\nDATE:\n7 April 2003                    PAGES:  60        CLASSIFICATION:  Unclassified\nThis paper will examine the evolution of how the U.S. Government and the Department of Defense have organized to conduct strategic influence as an instrument of national power, from the Psychological Warfare Division of World War II, through the Psychological Strategy Board and Operations Coordinating Board of the early Cold War, through the Vietnam years to today.\n\nAre they organized effectively today to meet the asymmetric threats of the 21st Century?\n\n## Table Of Contents\n\nABSTRACT........ ........iii\nTHE EVOLUTION OF STRATEGIC INFLUENCE........1\nWORLD WAR II ........3\nEARLY COLD WAR........ ........6 TRUMAN........7 EISENHOWER........ ........12\nMIDDLE COLD WAR........15 REAGAN AND BEYOND........20\nSTRATEGIC INFLUENCE TODAY........28\nTHE WAY AHEAD........33\nENDNOTES........39 BIBLIOGRAPHY........49\n\n## The Evolution Of Strategic Influence\n\nIt is the significant actions taken by government in and of themselves, the appropriate and most desirable arrangements of such actions, and the manner and emphasis of the publication of such actions to the world, that advance the struggle for men's minds and create a desirable climate of world opinion.\n\nRobert Cutler In the aftermath of the terrorist attacks on America in September 2001, both the American people and the U.S. Government tried to understand why some people could hate the United States so much that they would perpetrate such acts.  Time and investigation into the motivations behind the terrorist acts have revealed that simply destroying terrorist organizations will not alter the conditions or mindsets that fostered such actions.\n\nAmerica has again entered a war of ideas, of hearts and minds - a war of ideologies as potent and potentially dangerous as the Cold War.  Failure to succeed could have equally dire consequences as any envisioned in the struggle against the Soviet Union and Communism. Like the Cold War, this is a global war.  Like the Cold War, the War on Terrorism needs to contain the wellsprings of Anti-Americanism to prevent further spreading, and then to erode and eventually eliminate those wellsprings.  As before, this new war for the minds of men includes our friends, allies and neutral audiences, as well as hostile ones.  Despite its lone superpower status, the United States will need the support of other nations to succeed on a long-term, global scale.\n\nSince September 11, the Bush Administration has wrestled with how to organize and conduct a campaign to influence world audiences on a global scale - how to organize for strategic influence.  In this paper, strategic influence is broadly defined as the deliberate, conscious coordination or integration of all government informational activities designed to influence opinions, attitudes, and behavior of foreign groups in ways that will promote U.S. national objectives, combined with other elements of national power to achieve maximum psychological effect.\n\nEvery act of government has a psychological impact.  The movement of a carrier battle group from one end of the Mediterranean Sea to the other, for example, has a direct psychological impact on the countries in the area it departed and the countries near its new location.  It may also indirectly influence other audiences around the world.  The movement of the carrier becomes part of a strategic influence campaign when its movement was deliberately directed and timed with White House and Department of Defense (DoD) press conferences, with State Department diplomatic endeavors, and with other government actions to magnify the psychological effect.\n\nStrategic influence is nothing new; the United States has conducted strategic influence campaigns since its inception.  The history of strategic influence in the United States has been a roller coaster, with ups and downs and occasional unexpected turns in new directions.   And like a roller coaster, we always seem to end up back where we started.  This oscillating approach has been a result of a peculiarly American outlook that using persuasion and influence at the national level is somehow unethical and inconsistent with a democracy, that using\n\"psychological tricks\" is \"dirty\" and immoral, and that it's completely unnecessary:  there is no need to overtly persuade; the United States should just factually show the world who we are, and everyone will automatically recognize how wonderful we are and want to emulate us.  The successful propaganda efforts of U.S. enemies also contributed to the American distaste in many circles for strategic influence.  Anything that smacked of propaganda or psychological warfare became something that only the \"bad guys\" did:  first the Nazis, then the Soviets. Fortunately, despite this attitude and resistance, most U.S. administrations in the latter half of the 20th Century recognized both the value and need for strategic influence.\n\nStrategic influence and its elements have been known by many names:  foreign information program, international information activities, political warfare, propaganda, psychological warfare, psychological operations, public information, public affairs, public diplomacy, international military information, information operations, influence operations, and perception management, to name just a few.  Further, strategic influence has always had both overt and covert components.\n\nToday, key informational components of strategic influence include public affairs, political warfare, political advocacy, public diplomacy and psychological operations.  While each of the components contains a persuasive element to some degree, by themselves they do not constitute strategic influence.  Public diplomacy by itself is not strategic influence. Psychological operations are not strategic influence.  None of these components can be conducted in isolation in the 21st Century.  Strategic influence constitutes the orchestrated combination of them all.\n\nThere is an accepted belief that history repeats itself, and that the mistakes of history will be repeated if we don't learn them.  As the Bush Administration continues to prosecute the War on Terrorism, what can history teach us about organizing for strategic influence?  How has the U.S. Government organized in the past to coordinate and conduct strategic influence?  What has been the DoD organization for and role in strategic influence?  In a world where information, both true and false, is available worldwide, twenty-four hours a day, where events are broadcast worldwide virtually instantaneously, is the United States organized effectively to win the strategic influence battle of the War on Terrorism?\n\n## World War Ii\n\nThe real crucible for the evolution of U.S. strategic influence was World War II.  While there had been a successful foray into propaganda during World War I, that experience was fleeting.  U.S. propaganda in World War I had no lasting impact on the people involved, the U.S. Government, or the War Department.  World War II, however, laid the foundation for the future for strategic influence.  While many people still had doubts about the efficacy of propaganda and psychological warfare, few had been unexposed to it.  Propaganda was everywhere:  on the home front, in local, national and international news, and across the battlefields.  Names synonymous with early U.S. Government and DoD efforts in strategic influence had their seminal experiences in psychological warfare in World War II - Robert McClure, Robert Cutler, and Gordon Gray, to name just a few.  And the impressions and experience of these and other World War II veterans directly affected the U.S. Government's approach to strategic influence through at least 1960.\n\nAt the outbreak of World War II, neither the U.S. Government nor the War Department had an organized capability to conduct psychological warfare.  There were no committees trying to coordinate amongst the departments.  No departments or agencies had offices or personnel dedicated to propaganda.  The Army had no psychological operations units, and had not had a psychological warfare office on the staff since 1918.1\nIn early 1941, Colonel William B. Donovan conducted a fact-finding trip to the Middle East and Great Britain.  Donovan was particularly impressed by Britain's system of coordinating and combining intelligence, counterintelligence, psychological warfare and unorthodox methods of sabotage, subversion and guerrilla warfare to achieve objectives.  Upon his return, Donovan recommended that the U.S. establish a single agency to coordinate and control these same elements for the U.S. Government.\n\nDonovan's recommendations, combined with the growing Nazi threat, apparently received support within the Roosevelt Administration.  On 11 July 1941, President Franklin D. Roosevelt established the office of the Coordinator of Information (COI), with Donovan as its first director.  COI had two divisions, Research & Analysis and the Foreign Information Service\n(FIS), plus sections for special intelligence and sabotage.  FIS had the information piece, with a mission to explain U.S. policy everywhere except Latin America.2\nThus the initial seed for strategic influence was sowed.  But conjoined to that seed from its inception was a disease that continues to plague strategic influence today:  internecine and interagency rivalry, misperceptions, misinformation, and \"turf\" battles over control, frequently leading to deliberate roadblocks.  Not everyone was happy with COI; too few people understood either psychological warfare or the infant \"special operations.\"\nLess than a year later, on 11 June 1942, Roosevelt dissolved the COI, replacing it with two new organizations:  the Office of War Information (OWI), responsible for the psychological warfare function, and the Office of Strategic Services (OSS), responsible for special operations. Roosevelt created OWI due to a need to consolidate wartime information and psychological warfare activities in one agency and to better coordinate with the increasing number of agencies involved in propaganda. Roosevelt also desired to separate wartime propaganda from strategic intelligence and special operations.  Over the next several months, additional presidential directives clarified the lines of responsibility between OWI and OSS.  OWI had responsibility for domestic and overt psychological warfare, while OSS had the mission to conduct covert operations, including covert psychological warfare.  Interestingly, the last such directive, in March 1943, directed that OWI coordinate its activities with the military services, but did not direct that OSS do the same.3\nThe War Department also began examining psychological warfare.  In June 1941, John J. McCloy, the Assistant Secretary of War, formed a Special Study Group within G-2 to plan for future psychological warfare operations.  This office eventually evolved into the Psychological Warfare Branch (PWB), G-2.4\nOver the next year, a multitude of committees and groups were established to wrestle with psychological warfare issues:  the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) established a Joint Psychological Warfare Committee and a Joint Psychological Warfare Advisory Subcommittee; OSS established a Supporting Committee on Psychological Warfare; and Donovan chaired a Joint Psychological Warfare Advisory Committee that was chartered to coordinate psychological warfare activities with other government and civilian agencies outside JCS purview, including OWI and the State Department.5\nThis multitude of groups actually proved counterproductive at this stage of the development of strategic influence.  In December 1942, the War Department disbanded the PWB.  Too many agencies complained about the difficulty of defining psychological warfare and the various interpretations caused conflict within the Department.  Interagency \"turf\" battles in the new arena hampered any coordinated, constructive effort.  JCS subsequently abolished all of its psychological warfare committees and gave OSS responsibility for military psychological activities.  In response, the Army eliminated its PWB.6  More than a year before the U.S.\n\nlaunched Operation Overlord, the top levels of the military bureaucracy had no psychological warfare offices, because they could not agree on a definition or who should be responsible for what activities.\n\nHowever, the military was not bereft of psychological warfare assets.  The same JCS\ndocument which disbanded the PWB and committees also gave the military theater commanders control of psychological warfare within their areas.  This direction implicitly gave theater commanders the authority to determine their own relationship with OWI and OSS.7\nBoth the Pacific and European theaters conducted operational and tactical psychological warfare, controlled by organizations at the theater level.  The theater commands created Psychological Warfare Branches or Divisions, depending on their needs.  General Eisenhower activated the largest of these, the PWB at Allied Forces Headquarters (PWB/AFHQ), in North Africa in November 1942.  By February 1944, PWB/AFHQ had expanded to become the Psychological Warfare Division, Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force.8  At the tactical level, the Army established a number of Mobile Radio Broadcasting Companies, armed with print presses, loudspeakers, typewriters, radios, public address systems and leaflet bombs. These units operated much as military tactical psychological operations units do today, forming small teams that deploy forward to directly support the combat units.9\nIn November 1943, after much discussion and still with lukewarm endorsements, the Army reversed its earlier decision and established a Propaganda Branch in G-2 in November 1943.  The new branch had responsibility to coordinate propaganda functions for the War Department, to staff OWI plans through JCS, and to provide an Army representative to the JCS\nliaison with OWI.10\nFollowing World War II, despite advice to the contrary and the efforts of those involved, Army psychological warfare staffs and units virtually disappeared during the post-war drawdown.  OWI and OSS also disbanded.  By the outbreak of the Korean War five years later, the Army had only one operational psychological warfare troop unit.11\nTwo notable exceptions remained.  In the occupied territories, the theater military Psychological Warfare Divisions became Information Control Divisions (ICD).  The ICDs focused on \"consolidation psychological operations\" - gaining the cooperation of the civilian and military populace in the occupied area, creating favorable public opinions for Allied objectives for the areas, and controlling all information sources as well as the dissemination of information within the occupied territories.12\nAt the War Department and Army headquarters, the Psychological Warfare Branch moved in late 1946 from the G-2 to the Policy Section, Plans and Operations Division.  This marked the first recognition that psychological operations are operational in nature, and while intelligence supports psychological operations, psychological activities are not an intelligence function.  However, centralization of psychological warfare still eluded the War Department. Responsibilities for different aspects of psychological warfare rested with several different agencies within the Department.  Not until the Office of the Chief of Psychological Warfare was established in January 1951 did the War Department achieve centralization of effort.13\nAt the end of World War II, while writing about his experiences as Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Forces, General Eisenhower noted:\n\"In this war, which was total in every sense of the word, we have seen many great changes in military science.  It seems to me that not the least of these was the development of psychological warfare as a specific and effective weapon...I am convinced that the expenditure of men and money in wielding the spoken and written word was an important contributing factor...Without doubt, psychological warfare has proved its right to a place of dignity in our military arsenal.\"14\nWhen Eisenhower became President, psychological warfare became far more than just a piece of the military arsenal.\n\n## The Early Cold War\n\nThe early Cold War years were a \"Golden Age\" for strategic influence.  Veterans populated every department and agency of the U.S. Government - veterans, who, while they may not have been directly involved in psychological warfare, had seen the value and impact of such activities, and wanted to keep and utilize that capability in the future.  Many people in government also correctly read the early evidence that the Soviet Union had also recognized the impact of propaganda during World War II, and was quickly building what would become a fearsome propaganda machine.  The perspective of the country changed, too, in the aftermath of World War II and the beginning of the \"Nuclear Age\" - no longer could isolationism rule; the U.S. had to become the leader of the free world.  Information and influence on the international scene grew in importance, as did the means to disseminate information.\n\nThe need for enhanced coordination of national security policy at the top levels of the U.S. Government arrived on the coattails of World War II.  In June 1945, James Forrestal, Secretary of the Navy, asked Ferdinand Eberstadt, vice chairman of the War Productions Board, to conduct a study on what form of postwar organization should be established to provide for national security.  Forrestal requested recommendations not just for better organizing the War and Navy Departments, but also how to better integrate the military services with other government departments and agencies for national security matters.15\nIn his report to Forrestal, Eberstadt recognized that a new organization for the military services and their integration with other departments was just one piece of a larger problem that needed to be solved.  He discussed the growing necessity to integrate and provide direction for all the departments and agencies within the U.S. Government towards a common goal and a unity of effort.  Eberstadt also believed that stronger ties should be created among the military services, departments and agencies for strategy, logistics, planning, scientific research, mobilization, and \"between the gathering of information and intelligence and its dissemination and use.\"16\nTo accomplish the necessary integration and direction, Eberstadt recommended the creation of a National Security Council to be the cornerstone of a new national security organization.  Among its duties and functions as the formulator and coordinator for national security policy, Eberstadt recommended, \"the Council should also control the policies and activities of the organizations responsible for the conduct of psychological and economic warfare.\"17  Strategic influence, then, has been a part of the National Security Council since its inception.\n\n## Truman\n\nTwo years later, on 26 July 1947, President Truman signed the National Security Act, to\n\"provide for the establishment of integrated policies and procedures for the departments, agencies, and functions of the Government relating to national security.\"18  The National Security Act enacted many of Eberstadt's recommendations, including both the creation of the National Security Council, to advise the President on the integration of domestic, foreign, and military policies relating to national security, and the creation of the Central Intelligence Agency\n(CIA).19\nThe National Security Council's first foray into a national information policy came in December 1947, with the signing of National Security Council Memorandum (NSC) 4/4A, \"Coordination of Foreign Information Measures.\"   The National Security Council hoped this directive would correct the lack of coordination in a weak U.S. propaganda campaign, to counter the well-coordinated and increasingly effective Soviet propaganda campaign.  NSC 4 dealt with overt information policy.  The memorandum designated the State Department as the primary coordinator of U.S. information policy, and created the Interagency Foreign Information Organization (IFIO).   NSC 4 also identified the CIA and the Army's Chief of Information, under the Deputy Chief of Staff, as key supporters of the national propaganda effort.  NSC 4 included the Navy's Division of Public Information and the Air Force Troop Information and Education Division as potential players as well.  The latter agency, and others similar to it, was included in information policy organizations throughout the Cold War because Cold War psychological warfare and counter-propaganda campaigns also included protecting and arming troops against hostile propaganda.  NSC 4A, a classified annex, directed the CIA to initiate and conduct covert psychological operations to counteract Soviet propaganda.20  Echoes of OWI and OSS can be clearly seen in this delineation of effort between overt and covert operations.\n\nIFIO members included the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), CIA and the National Security Resources Board.21  The Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs headed the organization.  IFIO did little until the Korean War.  During that conflict, IFIO issued weekly directives that were to be used by member agencies as a basis for their propaganda activities overseas.  IFIO's more lasting contribution came from its chairman, Edward Barrett, who first suggested the creation of a National Psychological Strategy Board in August 1950 to more effectively coordinate the national effort.  For Barrett and the State Department, however, it was also a move to demilitarize the Government's psychological warfare activities.22\nCongress also maintained a keen interest in national information and security policy.\n\nAfter a visit to Europe, where they had been inundated with hostile Soviet propaganda, Senator H. Alexander Smith and Representative Karl Mundt sponsored the Smith-Mundt Act.  This Act, which passed with little difficulty on 16 January 1948, \"breathed life into overseas information programs,\" and laid the groundwork for the future U.S. Information Agency (USIA).  The Smith- Mundt Act provided funds \"to spread America's message to the world\" through a variety of media, including radio, print, film and exchange programs.\"23  The Smith-Mundt Act also directed that any such information and programs \"shall not be disseminated within the United States, its territories, or possessions.\"24  Congressional and Department of Defense General Counsels have interpreted this statute to also apply to military psychological operations.\n\nIn response to the concerns and disagreements between DoD and the State Department over the implications of NSC 4/4A, President Truman signed NSC 10/2 on 18 June 1948.  This directive created the Office of Special Projects, to carry out covert activities that had been assigned to the CIA, including covert psychological operations.  The Office of Special Projects carried out plans as formulated by the Departments of State and Defense, but reported only to the CIA.  This gave State and Defense some input into covert operations, but kept responsibility for it within the CIA.  To maintain the secrecy and security of the covert operations, the name of the office changed shortly thereafter to the more ambiguous Office of Policy Coordination.25\nOne of CIA's early ventures included the establishment and covert funding of U.S.-controlled overseas broadcasting stations, including Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty.26\nAs the Cold War continued to build, some officials in the Truman Administration argued that the U.S. needed to do more than it was currently doing to influence the world situation. Based on recommendations from an ad hoc committee headed by Paul Nitze, Truman signed NSC 68 on 14 Apr 1950.  NSC 68 called for an intense program of both overt and covert economic, political and psychological warfare to influence the political and psychological conditions in both the Free World and Soviet areas, with a particular aim to foster unrest in Soviet satellite countries.\"27  NSC 68 was the hallmark of the American containment strategy of the Cold War.\n\nWhile the Truman Administration prepared to fight both the Cold War and a potential World War III, North Korea attacked South Korea in the Fall of 1950 and precipitated a new type of war - \"limited\" war.  The Soviet role in the origins of the Korean War galvanized the need for better coordination and planning of psychological warfare at the national level.  The Soviets increasingly used propaganda and other unorthodox methods to increase their sphere of influence.  The United States needed to find ways to counter Soviet influence that would not trigger nuclear war.  Recognition arose that this was as much a battle of ideas, a battle for the hearts and minds of men, as it was a battle of tanks and artillery.  Political and psychological warfare became key weapons in the U.S. arsenal.\n\nAt the Pentagon, the Army activated the Psychological Warfare Division (PWD), G-3, to handle Army's psychological warfare responsibilities in both Korea and the growing Cold War. Six months later, the PWD became the Office of the Chief of Psychological Warfare (OCPW). OCPW was not a section within the G-staff, but a special staff office with over 100 personnel and a direct access to the Chief of Staff.  OCPW had responsibility for developing Army psychological and special operations plans, recommending policies for psychological warfare and special operations, and supervising the execution of Army programs in the field.28\nWithin the Korean theater, the military organized theater, operational and tactical level military psychological units much like the ones in World War II - with one key advancement.\n\nThe 1st Radio Broadcasting and Leaflet Group (1st RB&L) was specifically designed to conduct strategic propaganda in direct support of military operations and to further long-term strategic aims.  The 1st RB&L targeted not just enemy forces, but foreign populations in both friendly- and enemy-occupied areas.29  It was the first military psychological operations troop unit to have a strategic psychological mission.\n\nOn 4 April 1951, President Truman created the Psychological Strategy Board (PSB) to develop, coordinate and evaluate the national psychological strategy effort, including the formulation and promulgation of national psychological objectives, policies and programs.30  The PSB had three principal tasks: \"(1) to provide more effective planning of psychological operations within the framework of approved national policies; (2) to coordinate the psychological operations of all departments and agencies of government; and (3) to evaluate the effectiveness of the national psychological effort.\"31\nThe creation of the PSB was the first time the U.S. Government attempted to organize a national psychological effort for influencing international audiences above the military theater/operational level.  PSB members included the Under Secretary of State, the Deputy Secretary of Defense, and the Director of Central Intelligence; JCS provided a representative as the principal military adviser.  PSB had a full-time Director, an Executive Secretariat, and a staff. The staff was organized into three offices, each under an Assistant Secretary:  Plans and Policy, Coordination, and Review.  The PSB also established panels, made up of representatives from each Office, and others agencies as needed.  Panels were created as needed to handle one issue, and reported to the Offices and directly to the Board.32  The PSB\nwas not technically a part of the National Security Council structure.  Rather, it was an independent organization, but was required to report to the NSC on its activities and its evaluation of national psychological efforts.33  An important distinction - the PSB was intended as a coordinating organization and was not authorized to perform psychological operations.34\nTruman's first PSB director was Gordon Gray, former Secretary of the Army.35  Gray took a very broad view of PSB's responsibilities.  None of the directives governing the PSB provided a specific definition for \"psychological strategy\" or \"psychological operations\".  Gray interpreted PSB responsibilities as having cognizance over anything that had a psychological impact.  Since virtually any act by a nation has such an impact, Gray eventually believed that PSB should have the lead on all foreign policy matters short of formal hostilities.  A clash with State was inevitable.  State firmly believed that PSB should be restricted to just coordinating information and propaganda, and not other aspects of foreign policy.  Over time, other agencies and departments also became concerned that PSB was overstepping its boundaries and becoming almost a second National Security Council. This friction and broad interpretation of responsibilities eventually led to the PSB's downfall.36\nGray's early priorities on taking charge, however, are still a model for today:\ndevelopment of a strategic plan, an estimate of the current situation, a statement of objectives, a plan for reaching national goals, and a clear delineation of responsibilities.  Gray was also an early proponent of the need to improve understanding of the scientific aspects of psychological operations.37\nAdditional specific tasks and responsibilities for psychological operations were articulated in NSC 59/1, which covered overt propaganda efforts and established the Psychological Operations Coordinating Committee, and NSC 10/5, signed 21 October 1951, which expanded on NSC 10/2, reaffirming CIA responsibility for covert operations, including covert psychological operations, and calling for intensified covert action.38 At this time, there were three key players in strategic influence: CIA, State and DoD.  On 16 January 1952, State Department established the International Information Administration as its information arm that coordinated with PSB.39\nIn response to the establishment of the PSB and the additional psychological operations tasks specified in NSC Memorandums 10/2, 10/5 and 59/1, the Department of Defense (DoD) published DoD Directive C-5132.1 in April 1952, titled \"Organization, Office of Psychological Policy.\"  This directive established the Office of Psychological Policy, under the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs.  The new office was headed by a Deputy for Psychological Policy, formally known in Defense parlance as the Deputy Assistant to the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Affairs - Psychological Policy.  DoD signaled the importance it gave this new office by specifying in the directive that the Deputy for Psychological Policy \"shall have direct access to the DoD member of the PSB on matters pertaining to PSB and to the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs on other matters.\"40\nThe directive laid out DoD responsibilities, which included developing DoD positions on all PSB objectives, policies and programs; providing representation to the PSB and its panels, to the Consultant's Committee established by NSC 10/2, to any ad hoc committees established by NSC 10/5, and to the Psychological Operations Coordinating Committee established by NSC 59/1; and ensuring coordination with all DoD departments and agencies participating in any of these committees' activities.41\nThe role of DoD in peacetime psychological operations was not clear in DoD, let alone the other departments.  The other departments tended to believe that, while DoD had a clear role in psychological warfare during hostilities, it didn't have much to do in peacetime.  Some senior officials in DoD, though, felt that DoD capabilities could be utilized more effectively in peacetime than the limited scope envisaged by other departments.  DoD began to make a case for a larger role in psychological operations and planning its portion of the PSB's first status report, outlining the planning it had already done for wartime, when most of the U.S.\n\npropaganda machine would be subordinated to military goals.  In the report, DoD also called for increased use of military assets for peacetime propaganda value.43  In March 1952, the Army established the Psychological Warfare Center at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, to train both psychological operations and special operations personnel and units.44  In late 1952, DoD\nfurther supplemented and expanded on its policy and roles regarding psychological operations with DoD Directive S-3140.1.\n\nTwo of the key purposes in DoD Dir S-3140.1 were establishing authority for using DoD\ncapabilities to conduct psychological operations when not at war, and establishing a DoD Committee on Psychological Operations to more effectively coordinate and integrate DoD\npsychological operations efforts in the national psychological operations effort.45  The directive also sought to increase senior official attention on psychological operations, and to enhance continuity, consistency, security and timeliness of psychological actions.  To ensure that psychological operations received the necessary consideration at the top levels of the policy decision-making chain, DoD directed the Services Secretaries to assign functional responsibilities for psychological operations to Under Secretaries or Assistant Secretaries, and directed the Joint Chiefs of Staff to assign responsibility for military psychological matters to a general or flag officer.  These officials, plus a representative from the DoD Office of Public Information, constituted the members of the new DoD Committee on Psychological Operations, headed by the Deputy for Psychological Policy.  As with the earlier directive, DoD declared the significance of these new responsibilities by stipulating that the committee members \"shall be specifically empowered to have necessary access to key personnel within their respective departments in all matters concerning psychological problems with which they are concerned.\"46\nThe committee's purpose included securing the exploitation and integration of DoD potential in psychological operations and securing DoD viewpoints on psychological operations matters. The committee's initial task included developing and submitting an outline of the specific roles, objectives and capabilities of DoD to conduct psychological operations during the Cold War.47\n\n## Eisenhower\n\nThe \"Golden Age\" for strategic influence continued under Eisenhower.  Due to his wartime experience, Eisenhower came to the presidency with a clear idea on the uses and effectiveness of information and psychological warfare.  He also had some very firm ideas about the need for coordination at the highest level of government to win the battle against Communism.  In a campaign speech in 1952, he spoke about the need to coordinate every significant act of government, to time and direct all the departments' actions, to produce the maximum effect.48   In his second National Security Council directive, Eisenhower stated,\n\"psychological operations are established instruments of national power.\"49\nEarly in 1953 Eisenhower established the President's Committee on International Information Activities (PCIIA), to examine in depth the nation's Cold War information policy.  The committee was headed by William H. Jackson, a lawyer and former Deputy Director of the CIA, and included other notables in Eisenhower's Administration:  Robert Cutler, Eisenhower's first National Security Adviser and a one-time member of the PSB; Gordon Gray, who would later become one of Eisenhower's National Security Advisers; John C. Hughes, one of Eisenhower's aides; and C.D. Jackson, a former member of the OWI who had worked with Eisenhower during World War II and Eisenhower's future PSB Director.50\nThe PCIIA report, published in June 1953, criticized the current state of information policy and the PSB in several areas.  First, while the PSB had accomplished significant planning and provided guidance to the other agencies, it lacked the power and authority to effectively coordinate within an uncooperative interagency environment and to ensure implementation of its plans and policy guidance.  Second, the PCIIA criticized the Truman Administration for conducting a defensive campaign against the Soviet regime, and urged Eisenhower to take the offensive in psychological warfare.  And, third, they felt that the PSB had gone too far in developing an independently existing psychological strategy that was not integrated with overall national strategy.  The name itself fostered a misconception that psychological strategy could be separated from every act the nation took.51\nAt this time, the National Security Council was an advisory board, not a coordinating agency.  There were no interagency working groups, no policy coordinating committees as there are today.  There was not even a National Security Adviser yet.  PSB, at least while under Gray, had tried to fill that coordinating role, but without the proper authority, was unsuccessful.\n\nAmongst PCIIA's recommendations, Eisenhower enacted three key ones that were to have a profound effect on national security policy-making and psychological warfare under his Administration:  the creation of the Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, the creation of the Operations Coordinating Board, with the subsequent abolition of the PSB, and the creation of the USIA.\n\nCutler, in a separate report to Eisenhower, first recommended that the President's Special Assistant for Cold War Planning become an adviser to the National Security Council, with the corresponding elimination of the PSB Director as an observer.  Not long after, the Cold War Planning position became the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs, and Eisenhower chose Cutler as his first National Security Adviser.52\nPCIIA strongly recommended replacing the PSB with the Operations Coordinating Board\n(OCB) to \"coordinate and integrate psychological with national strategy and, more importantly, to act as the coordinating and integrating arm of the National Security Council for all aspects of the implementation of national security policy.\"53  PCIIA clearly intended to fix some of PSB's problems, and signaled a change in the view of the National Security Council from advisory to coordinating.  This was also the birth of the modern National Security Council interagency committee system.\n\nEisenhower established the OCB by Executive Order 10483 on 2 September 1953.  Like the PSB, OCB was not originally within the NSC structure, but a separate agency that reported to it.  The order also designated the Under Secretary of State as OCB chair.  According to Cutler, the OCB would coordinate and \"ride herd on\" the performance and policies of all departments and agencies responsible for carrying out national security policy, and would be\n\"constantly mindful\" of the psychological implications of their actions.54\nIn January 1954, Eisenhower signed a National Security Council Memorandum that delineated the responsibilities for the departments and agencies participating in foreign information programs and psychological operations under his new National Security Council system.  OCB responsibilities, with respect to psychological operations, included initiating new proposals for action, advising agencies on their operational planning responsibilities, coordinating the interdepartmental aspects of those plans, and orchestrating the timely execution of psychological operations to ensure their full contribution to the attainment of national security objectives.55\nThe third key recommendation of the PCIIA was the creation of the USIA.  Truman had created the International Communications Agency to manage the activities under the Smith-\nMundt Act.56  Based upon the PCIIA report, Eisenhower created the USIA to perform the same work, but now as an autonomous agency reporting directly to the National Security Council.\n\nThe USIA Director regularly attended National Security Council meetings as an observer.57\nEisenhower's directive gave USIA responsibility for coordination of policies, plans and operations for the national foreign information program. USIA also had responsibility for disseminating to other departments guidance concerning the official treatment of news in foreign information outlets.  In another attempt to correct the PSB's problems, the memo also stipulated that such guidance was authoritative for all departments and agencies.  The directive also drew a line between USIA and DoD responsibilities:  USIA had responsibility for the foreign information program only in areas that were not military theaters of operations or where U.S. troops were actually engaged in combat operations.  Since this NSC Memorandum also reconfirmed CIA's responsibility for covert psychological operations in accordance with the applicable NSC directives (NSC 10 series), this relegated DoD to military psychological operations matters only, and an advisory role for the rest.58\nThis same directive also rescinded NSC 59/1, which had established the Psychological Operations Coordinating Committee (POCC), and established a new organization to provide OCB with a forum for carrying out its psychological operations responsibilities.  Chaired by the Executive Secretary of OCB, other members included representatives from DoD, State, CIA, JCS, USIA, and the Foreign Operations Administration.  The Service's psychological warfare chiefs established in DoD Directive S-3140.1 served as consultants.  All of the members also provided personnel to be a full-time staff, with OCB providing administrative support.59\nThroughout the rest of his time in office, Eisenhower continued to refine his mechanisms for coordinating national security policy and the national psychological operations effort.  On 25 February 1957, Executive Order 10700 changed OCB's status from an independent coordinating board to actually part of the National Security Council structure.  The Executive Order also changed the OCB chairman from State Department to whomever the president designated60 - and Eisenhower's first choice was Gordon Gray.61\nOn 4 June 1958, Eisenhower signed NSC 5812/1, which dealt with wartime responsibilities for psychological operations.  Recognizing that \"no single department or agency having responsibility in the field of psychological operations can feasibly perform these operations for the entire Executive Branch,\" this directive specified the responsibilities of DoD, CIA, USIA and DoD under a variety of conditions.  Eisenhower covered not just the general wartime responsibilities, but also which department or agency was in charge, depending on whether the target audience was friendly, neutral or hostile, and within or without the theater of operations.  The directive also specified the workings of the coordination and flow of guidance from Washington to overseas and back.62\n\n## The Middle Cold War\n\nThe next two decades after Eisenhower's term constituted an \"Ice Age\" for strategic influence.  The interagency structures and committees that Truman and Eisenhower built to coordinate strategic influence disappeared.  The psychological warfare offices in DoD, JCS and the Army dissolved, as did their coordinating committees. The few people on the staff who retained some responsibility, now lowly action officers rather than generals or Assistant Secretaries, lost direct access to the decision makers - an access that has never been regained.  The military psychological troop units demobilized after the Korean War, except for one lone unit at Fort Bragg.  Even before President Kennedy's assassination, the focus of the Psychological Warfare Center had changed to special operations - even the name had changed, to Special Warfare Center.  As one writer put it, \"The congenial climate for American psychological operations was polluted in the seventeen years that followed 1956; not until President Reagan's Westminster speech was there again much sunshine.\"63\nSubsequent administrations still used information and psychological methods in the Cold War, but they no longer received top-level attention.  The elements of strategic influence still existed, but were compartmentalized throughout the departments.  CIA retained the covert operations mission.  State Department conducted its traditional foreign diplomacy mission, and USIA had the overt foreign information mission.   However, starting in the 1960s, the USIA shifted focus.  The informative function, focusing on objective, factual reporting of news, gained emphasis, while attention on the persuasive function and the function of advising other departments on psychological implications declined.64\nThe various administrations during this period did not create any permanent overarching committees to coordinate psychological activities within the government.  Departments and agencies were expected to coordinate with the others, but no one \"ran the show\".  There was no national level effort to direct and coordinate the timing of acts to ensure maximum effect.  Ad hoc committees sometimes appeared to fill the vacuum, but these were usually narrowly focused and of short duration.\n\nParty politics played a key role in this change.  Eisenhower carried over into his Administration people who had been key in Truman's Administration, such as Gordon Gray. Kennedy, much like modern presidents, brought in a whole new team.  Kennedy also, both personally and as a Democrat, had a vastly different view of the role of the National Security Council and its organization.\n\nAnother key factor appears to be the loss of a voice of sufficient stature to influence the top levels of the government.  This may have been due to a generational change and lack of direct experience.  The Truman and Eisenhower Administrations had been filled with highranking World War II veterans who had worked together, or at least known one another, during the war, and who had had to consider the implications of psychological warfare at the theater level.  Starting with Kennedy, World War II veterans in the Administration tended to have been junior or field grade officers, with virtually no propaganda experience except at the receiving end.  Truman and Eisenhower had many advocates for strategic influence; Kennedy and Johnson had few.\n\nPrior to Kennedy taking office, Senator Henry M. Jackson headed a congressional inquiry into government methods for formulating national policy in the Cold War.  Jackson's report was highly critical of Eisenhower's National Security Council system, deeming it a bloated paper mill that didn't accomplish much real work, and that exceeded what he envisioned as the proper role for the Council.  Jackson viewed the National Security Council as a small forum of intimates for the President to explore intelligence and policy options; he believed it ill-suited for comprehensive coordinating and follow-through of responsibilities.65\nJackson recommended a complete reorganization of the National Security Council, starting with the abolishment of the OCB.  He believed that State Department should not only have control over foreign information policy, but should also be the agent of coordination on all major policies toward other nations.  In his view, OCB infringed on this basic responsibility. Jackson also saw no need for permanent interdepartmental committees.  He believed that the lead agency should have responsibility for implementation of policies cutting across departmental lines, with possibly the assistance of an informal, temporary interdepartmental group.66\nJackson's views dovetailed completely with Kennedy's own views.  Less than a month after taking office, Kennedy issued Executive Order 10920, abolishing the OCB.  Over 45 interagency committees died with OCB.  In the next few weeks, Kennedy continued to dismantle Eisenhower's system, abolishing another 40 interdepartmental groups.  The National Security Council staff decreased significantly and lost much of its power.67\nKennedy did not completely abandon psychological warfare, due to the focus on counter-insurgency throughout his term.   Kennedy issued a number of National Security Action Memorandums (NSAM) directing increased emphasis, spending and action in counterinsurgency.  While psychological activities rarely received primacy, they were normally imbedded in many of these policy directives.  Four in particular demonstrated that the Administration did not ignore information as an element of national power.\n\nNSAM 3, issued 15 April 1961, directed the Bureau of Budget to study continued CIA\nfunding of activities such as Radio Free Europe, and whether open government support would be better.  Someone had raised the very valid concern that if the CIA cover were compromised, the program would lose credibility and therefore most of its effectiveness.68\nNSAM 61, issued 14 July 1961, directed the State Department and USIA to use their means to support and disseminate an approved counter-theme to combat a Soviet propaganda theme called \"peaceful coexistence\".69\nNSAM 63, issued ten days later, directed the State Department, through the USIA, to provide foreign policy guidance to all international radio broadcasting and television stations controlled by U.S. Government agencies.  These included DoD stations, such as the Armed Forces Radio and Television Service and the Voice of the United Nations Command in Korea. NSAM 63 also gave the USIA the authority to preempt any of these stations as needed for\n\"special programs\".70\nKennedy did establish some interdepartmental groups, which he called \"Special Groups\".  On 18 January 1962, NSAM 124 established the Special Group (Counter-Insurgency). Special Group (CI) functions included insuring that all U.S. Government agencies recognized that subversive insurgency was a major form of politico-military conflict on a par with conventional war, and that such recognition was included in the \"political, economic, intelligence, military aid and informational programs conducted overseas by State, Defense,\n[U.S. Agency for International Development], USIA and CIA.\"71\nDuring the Vietnam years, the U.S. Government and DoD again established a fairly robust psychological operations effort to support the war.  But this effort was narrowly focused to that theater, primarily tactical in nature, and did not last once the war ended.72\nA study on national coordination of psychological operations conducted by the Joint Staff in the early 1970s noted that an ad hoc committee approach had arisen to fill the void caused by both a lack of coordination and insufficient authority at high enough level providing guidance for psychological operations.  One example cited was the Psychological Operations in Critical Areas Watch Committee (POCA).  Another ad hoc group, the Interagency Working Group on Psychological Operations in Critical Areas, had formed POCA based upon a 1965 USIA study. The Joint Staff deemed POCA moribund at the time of its study, as POCA had had no meetings since May 1969, even though the memorandum of agreement establishing it was still valid.73\nMilitary psychological operations units during the Vietnam years traveled the familiar roller coaster track.  In the 1960s, the Army had just one psychological operations unit.  At the height of the Vietnam War, the Army had a full Group operating in Vietnam, and other psychological operations units stationed in Fort Bragg, Germany, Panama and Okinawa.  By the mid-1970s, all that remained in the active component was one Psychological Operations Group\n- undermanned and with poor, antiquated equipment.74\nPresident Johnson's national security system was modeled after Truman75, but regarding strategic influence resembled Kennedy's.  USIA clearly had the lead on psychological warfare programs, and the emphasis was on Southeast Asia.76  While Johnson strengthened the National Security Council and established interdepartmental working groups, none appear to have dealt directly with strategic influence or psychological operations.  A few, limited-scope ad hoc bodies did appear:  the Vietnam Psychological Operations Working Group, which had been dormant for over a year by 1967, and the Psychological Operations Pressure Operations Group, which appeared briefly during the latter stages of the Vietnam War.77  Like Kennedy, Johnson believed that the State Department should have the lead in foreign policy.  In March 1966, Johnson signed NSAM 341, which gave the Secretary of State authority and full responsibility for the overall direction, coordination and supervision of interdepartmental activities overseas.78\nPresident Nixon reformed the National Security Council more along Eisenhower's lines.\n\nRegarding strategic influence, though, he did not resurrect anything similar to the Psychological Strategy Board or the Operations Coordinating Board.  Nixon continued a multi-pronged approach with CIA, State, and USIA, responsible for covert psychological operations, public diplomacy and overt information programs, respectively. DoD continued to have responsibility for psychological operations only in military theaters of operations.\n\nNixon did issue a number of National Security Decision Memorandum (NSDMs) which had informational or psychological components:  NSDM 3, \"Direction, Coordination and Supervision of Interdepartmental Activities Overseas\"; NSDM 7, \"Direction, Coordination and Supervision of Interdepartmental Groups\"; NSDM 19, \"Washington Special Actions Group\"; NSDM 23, \"Vietnamese Special Studies Group\"; and NSDM 40, \"Responsibility for Conduct, Supervision and Coordination of Covert Action Operations\".  Only one dealt directly with psychological operations:  NSDM 63, \"Psychological Warfare Operations Against Vietnamese Communists\".79  This NSDM continued the national-level narrow strategic influence focus on the Vietnamese theater, as opposed to a global focus.  Unfortunately, further information dealing specifically with these NSDMs or the establishment of any ad hoc interagency committees was unavailable or still classified.\n\nThe lack of attention at the upper levels of the government on strategic influence and the limited focus on Southeast Asia led to a reduction in effectiveness against Communist propaganda worldwide.  Most U.S. efforts outside the Vietnam theater were negated by the virulent anti-Vietnam movement, and the highly effective Soviet and Communist psychological operations programs, which were both strategic and global.80  At the time, both JCS and the Army strongly recommended the establishment of a permanent standing committee with broadened responsibilities to coordinate implementation by all government agencies of the psychological aspects of decisions rendered by the National Security Council.81  Their recommendations fell on deaf ears.  As one writer put it, \"During the Vietnam years, in spite of some notable successes with psychological and political techniques of counterinsurgency warfare, the US military and the government as a whole proved unable to devise and execute an overall strategy that took due account of the vital importance of the psychological-political dimension of the struggle.\"82\nPresident Carter continued the separation of the elements of strategic influence among CIA, USIA, State Department and DoD.  However, in his restructuring of the National Security Council system, he established two new committees that included information policy within their scope, but not as a primary focus.  The Policy Review Committee developed national security policies in those areas that were the primary responsibility of one department but where the subject also had important implications for other departments.  These areas included foreign policy issues with significant military or interagency aspects and defense policy issues having international implications.  The Special Coordinating Committee handled sensitive intelligence activities and covert operations.83\n\n## Reagan And Beyond\n\nUnder President Reagan, strategic influence experienced a rebirth, buoyed by his emphasis on foreign policy and determination to win the Cold War.  During his terms in office, the press dubbed Reagan \"the Great Communicator\" for his ability to use his speeches to gain support for his policies.  It is an equally apt term for what he accomplished for strategic influence.\n\nReagan's initial national security strategy contained four basic components:  diplomatic, economic, military and informational.84  This was the first time that information had been elevated from a supporting instrument to a top element of national strategy.  This emphasis on information and the psychological component - on strategic influence - of national security strategy continued throughout his terms.\n\nThree National Security Decision Directives (NSDDs) built the cornerstone of Reagan's strategic influence policy:  NSDD 45, signed 15 July 1982; NSDD 77, 14 January 1983; and NSDD 130, 6 March 1984.\n\nNSDD 45 revitalized the U.S. international broadcasting program, declaring it an important instrument of national security policy.  It directed quantum improvements in the quality and capabilities of US-controlled broadcasting stations, such as Voice of America, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, and Radio in the American Sector of Berlin.  The directive established Radio Marti, to garner and consolidate anti-Castro support in Cuba and among Cuban exiles in the U.S.  Reagan specifically stipulated that the money and other resources required to implement his improvements were to be given the same priority as other programs deemed vital to the national security.85  NSDD 45 also directed that State Department give high priority to the diplomatic requirements for modernizing and expanding these stations, with particular emphasis on obtaining international support to halt and deter Soviet jamming of the stations and to develop countermeasures to that jamming.86  Reagan foresaw the future of space-borne platforms and initiated further research into direct broadcasting by satellite.  Finally, NSDD 45\ndirected a study between State and DoD on closer integration and role of broadcasting facilities in crisis and war.87\nNSDD 77 established a Special Planning Group (SPG) under the National Security Council to strengthen the organization, planning and coordination of the various aspects of public diplomacy related to national security.  Chaired by the President's National Security Adviser, SPG members included the Secretaries of State and Defense, the Director, USIA, and the Assistant to the President for Communications, with other agencies invited as needed.  The directive indicated the importance Reagan placed on strategic influence by listing department and agency principals as the primary members, although they could designate an alternate.88\nNSDD 77 also established four interagency standing committees that reported to the SPG: the Public Affairs Committee, the International Information Committee, the International Political Committee, and the International Broadcasting Committee.  The latter committee had responsibility for planning and coordinating international broadcasting activities pursuant to NSDD 45.89\nNSDD 77 gave the Public Affairs Committee responsibility for the planning and coordination of major speeches on national security subjects, and for the planning and coordination of public affairs for foreign policy events and foreign and domestic issues with a national security dimension.  The International Information Committee had responsibility for planning, coordinating and implementing international information activities in support of US national security interests.  This committee dealt almost exclusively with USIA activities, and was chaired by the Director, USIA. 90\nThe International Political Committee had a broader role than the other three.  Headed by the State Department, it had responsibility for planning, coordinating and implementing international political activities in support of US national security interests.  These activities included State Department's role in foreign aid, in training and organizational support for democratization, and coordination and cooperation with non-government organizations and private voluntary organizations that supported democratization.  NSDD 77 specifically directed the International Political Committee to develop means to increase the U.S. Government capability to promote democracy, \"as enunciated in the President's speech in London, 8 Jun 82,\" known as the Westminster speech.  The directive also directed the committee to develop and implement plans, programs and strategies to counter totalitarian ideologies and political action by the Soviets.  Additionally, NSDD 77 gave the State Department some authority to direct other departments to implement political action strategies in support of objectives established by the International Political Committee.91\nWhile Reagan was generally pleased with the progress made under NSDDs 45 and 77, he did not feel that the departments had gone far enough, nor that they were maintaining focus. On 6 March 1984 he signed NSDD 130 to re-emphasize and clarify his policy on strategic influence.92\nNSDD 130 reiterated the importance of U.S. international information programs to national security, expanded Reagan's policies set out in NSDDs 45 and 77, and directed \"sustained commitment over time to improving the quality and effectiveness of U.S. international information efforts\" - including improving the level of resources devoted to international information activities and their coordination with other elements of national power.  Areas highlighted for improvement included designing products for different cultural target audiences, further enhancing international radio broadcasting, and reconstituting a program for disseminating books and other publications abroad.  NSDD 130 directed studies into more effective use of international television broadcasting, including the new audio and videocassette technologies, and into how to utilize new communications technologies to penetrate closed societies.  NSDD 130 also addressed functional and personnel requirements, including development of career tracks and education programs.93\nNSDD 130 also directed great changes and improvements for DoD.  First, NSDD 130\ndirected DoD to give a high priority to the revitalization and full integration of PSYOP in military operations and planning.  Second, Reagan directed DoD to participate in overt PSYOP programs in peacetime.  Third, he tasked the SPG to lead the development of coordinated interagency international information plans that included utilizing DoD capabilities.  Fourth, NSDD 130 directed all departments and agencies to develop special procedures to ensure policy consistency and timeliness in international information programs during crisis and war.94\nWhen NSDD 130 was published, DoD undertook a major review and evaluation of military psyop capabilities.  That review showed that DoD capabilities had significantly atrophied since the Vietnam War.  DoD's solution to correct its deficiencies was the DoD Psychological Operations (PSYOP) Master Plan of 1985.  This watershed document provided a comprehensive plan for the fundamental improvement of DoD PSYOP capabilities worldwide, across the spectrum of conflict.95\nThroughout DoD, PSYOP offices were re-established or improved.  DoD created a PSYOP directorate, the first such office on the staff in over 20 years.  JCS upgraded its PSYOP staff element from a branch to a division.  The Department of the Army Staff upgraded its PSYOP staff element from a one-man shop to a PSYOP and Civil Affairs division.96  Both Active and Reserve PSYOP units experienced growth in personnel, more funding for training, exercises and operations, and received updated equipment.\n\nOne important directive of the Master Plan was the separation of PSYOP staff elements from special operations staff elements throughout DoD, including the military departments, the Joint Staff, Service staffs, unified and specified command staffs and their components.  The DoD review had determined that the subordination of PSYOP personnel under special operations \"de-linked\" the PSYOP personnel from broad support of national policy and objectives and critical interagency coordination.  The Plan also noted that PSYOP personnel in special operations staffs tended to work PSYOP issues only part-time, and the placement within special operations staffs contributed to a continuing lack of understanding within DoD of PSYOP.  It also tended to reinforce the misperception by both military and civilian senior leaders that PSYOP focused primarily on special operations.97\nThe 1985 PSYOP Master Plan also called for the creation of a Joint PSYOP Center\n(JPOC), dedicated to the long-term development and nurturing of joint PSYOP capabilities in DoD.  Among the responsibilities envisaged for the JPOC would have been developing longrange strategic PSYOP plans, and assisting both JCS and the Office of Secretary of Defense (OSD) to develop, plan and coordinate the DoD portion of national psychological operations activities.  DoD placed the implementation of the JPOC on hold pending resolution of several issues resulting from the congressionally mandated reorganization of special operations, including the creation of the U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM).  Once military PSYOP was placed under USSOCOM, the implementation of JPOC was never executed - lost in the internecine battle for resources within USSOCOM.98  Nevertheless, the other directives within the PSYOP Master Plan greatly strengthened and improved military PSYOP.\n\nReagan provided additional guidance to DoD for increasing psychological operations with Executive Order 12333.  Reagan wanted to increase and expand the execution of democratization programs in Latin America.  The EO established a presidential finding for CIA covert psychological activities and directed DoD to initiate several programs in the region.\n\nOn 26 July 1984 DoD published DoD Directive S-3321.1, Overt PSYOP Conducted by Military Services in Peacetime, in direct response to NSDD 130 and Executive Order 12333. This directive is still valid and used daily as the policy guidance for peacetime PSYOP.  DoD Directive S-3321.1 established the Overt Peacetime PSYOP Program (OP3), still operative today.  Under OP3 each regional combatant commander develops and submits a plan for conducting peacetime psychological activities to support combatant commander and national security objectives within their area of responsibility.  These activities are not limited to military PSYOP units, nor even to military activities - regional combatant commanders can recommend that other departments execute certain activities.  Combatant commanders coordinate their OP3 plans with Ambassadors in their region, and then submit the plans to JCS.  JCS obtains concurrence within the military side of the Pentagon, while concurrently sending the proposed OP3 plans to OSD.  OSD then coordinates within the interagency for review, comment and deconfliction.  JCS passes approval of the plans back to the combatant commander once OSD has approved the plans.  This process ensures that all the key players have had an opportunity to review the OP3 plans before the combatant commander executes the plan. 99\nReagan also created the National Endowment for Democracy (NED) as a mechanism for overseeing disbursement of funds for the support of democratic political and cultural institutions abroad.100  In his Westminster speech, Reagan proposed an initiative \"to foster the infrastructure of democracy - the system of a free press, unions, political parties, universities - which allows a people to choose their own way, to develop their own culture, to reconcile their own differences through peaceful means.\"101  Congress authorized NED as part of the Fiscal Year 1984/85 State Department Authorization Act.  Since its inception NED worked closely with State, USIA and, especially, private sector groups to foster abroad cultural values, institutions and organizations of democratic pluralism.  By 1992, both Canada and the United Kingdom had developed similar grant programs.  NED is still extant today as an independent organization which continues to work with the private sector to promote democratic institutions around the world.102\nDespite a setback from the Iran-Contra Affair, the success and potency of Reagan's strategic influence program directly contributed to President George Bush's (\"Bush I\") success in building and maintaining a coalition during the Gulf War.  Reagan's improvement of U.S. military PSYOP capabilities also directly resulted in a highly successful psychological operations campaign during the conflict.\n\nWhen Bush I took office, many \"Reaganites\" continued to serve in the new administration.  Bush I continued many of Reagan's policies and practices, but not all of them. Many of the Reaganites tried to re-establish the best of Reagan's conventions, particularly those dealing with strategic influence.  However, none were of sufficient stature to \"carry the torch\" through either the aftermath of Iran-Contra or the distraction of the re-election season.  During the Gulf War, Bush's National Security Council did establish and chair an ad hoc committee, the PSYOP, Propaganda and Public Diplomacy Committee (3PD).  3PD included representatives from OSD, State Department, USIA, CIA and JCS.  The committee generally met at least twice a week, and focused on coordination and exchange of information between the participating agencies, rather than tasking or execution of activities.  3PD ended quickly after the Gulf War. OSD and JCS, with positive endorsements from the other members, led a drive to get it permanently established, but NSC never took action.  Most of the senior Administration officials did not see the utility of a standing committee in peacetime.103\nOn 28 March 1990, Bush I signed National Security Review (NSR) 24.  NSR 24 directed a broad examination of U.S. Government international broadcasting activities in the context of overall U.S. foreign policy objectives.  The dramatic changes in the word political situation - the reintegration of Germany, the fall of the \"Iron Curtain\" and the pending dissolution of the Soviet Union - prompted the complete review of the mission, objectives and resource implications of government broadcasting.  Bush I intended to use the response to NSR 24 for short-term decisions in the next two years.  The NSR was very comprehensive, including directives for both a detailed assessment of current and future roles, and for the development of a broad range of policy options.104\nSix months later, Bush I superseded NSDD 77 with National Security Directive (NSD)\n51.  NSD 51 reaffirmed the four basic missions for U.S. Government international broadcasting: explaining U.S. policies and actions to foreign audiences; describing and explaining American culture and institutions; providing objective news, commentary and information about U.S. and world events; and providing surrogate programming to areas of U.S. interest where there is not a free press.  Additionally, NSD established a Policy Coordinating Committee on International Broadcasting, chaired by State.  However, NSD 51 also directed the consolidation of broadcasting operations and other austerity measures due to constrained budget levels.105\nPerhaps the most important directive in NSD 51 was the appointment of an independent bipartisan task force to study U.S. broadcasting assets, activities and technologies.  Further, Bush I directed the task force to provide him with recommendations on the most appropriate organization and structure for a single U.S. Government broadcasting entity.  This was the genesis of the Broadcasting Board of Governors (BBG).  . On 1 October 1 1999, as part of the 1998 Foreign Affairs Reform and Restructuring Act, the BBG became an independent, autonomous entity responsible for all U.S. Government and government sponsored, nonmilitary, international broadcasting.106\nOne outcome of the Gulf War was the rise in the military of the term \"command and control warfare\" (C2W).  C2W was a new concept for disrupting an enemy's decision cycle. C2W consisted of five elements, called \"pillars\":  PSYOP, electronic warfare, deception, operations security, and physical destruction, all supported by intelligence as the foundation.  By the end of the 1990s, C2W had become a subset of the broader \"information operations,\" which added computer network operations and critical information infrastructure defense to the original five pillars.\n\nWhen President Clinton took office, he abolished what remained of Reagan's and Bush's strategic influence interagency mechanisms.  However, most of the military gains - the PSYOP Master Plan, OP3, and the improvement in military PSYOP troop units - remained, even through the post-Gulf War drawdown.\n\nIn the late 1990s, Congress pushed for significant decreases in the foreign policy budget, including public diplomacy, under the pretext that with the winning of the Cold War, such a large public diplomacy machine was no longer needed - in reality, Congress was looking for money for domestic programs.  In 1998, Congress passed the Foreign Affairs Reform and Restructuring Act.  Among its many actions, the Foreign Affairs Reform Act disestablished the formerly independent USIA, and merged its functions and missions under the cognizance of the Department of State, within the new Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy & Public Affairs.107\nThe same act slashed the State Department's budget, a condition that persisted for over a decade.  In 2001 the share of the budget devoted to international affairs was only 1.18\npercent.108\nBy the end of the 1990s, the rise of the Internet and global media capabilities led to vast amounts of information, misinformation and opinions being available to the global audience. Much of the information and opinions spread by these new communications means did not reflect well on the U.S. or support national security objectives.  Yet until 1999, the Clinton Administration did not have any specific national security policy concerning public diplomacy, international information, or information operations.109  Two key events in which information was used to devastating effect - the Balkans and the genocidal wars in Rwanda - galvanized Clinton into developing a national security policy to better fight this \"new\" war of ideas.110\nOn 30 April 1999, President Clinton finally established a policy on strategic influence by signing Presidential Decision Directive/NSC-68, \"International Public Information\".  The overall objective of this presidential decision directive (PDD) was to \"promote understanding and support for U.S. foreign policy initiatives around the world.\"111  PDD 69 goals included developing and executing a more effective and coordinated international public information (IPI) strategy, countering the growing hostile misinformation about the United States, and more effectively promoting U.S. policy, values and interests to foreign audiences.  Most importantly, the PDD sought to harmonize and synchronize at the national level the efforts of all the various players and planners in IPI - including what the PDD terms \"overt international military information.\"112\nPDD 68 directed three key implementation strategies to ensure that IPI was integrated into national security policy-making. First, PDD 68 established the IPI Core Group (IPICG) as the interagency working group responsible for coordinating the activities and efforts of all government agencies that planned and conducted IPI activities.113\nThe State Department chaired the IPICG, with NSC serving as deputy chair.  Other permanent members included Assistant Secretary-level representatives from DoD, JCS, USAID, and the National Security Council, plus a stipulation for others as required, and the option to establish sub-groups on regional, functional and transnational issues as appropriate.114\nSecond, PDD 68 directed the development of a national IPI strategy, including IPI plans for potential major regional and transnational challenges and contingencies.  Plans were to address U.S. responses, resources required, scope and duration of IPI activities, and the desired result.  The PDD also directed that these IPI plans be integrated into interagency planning as mandated in PDD 56, \"Managing Complex Contingency Operations.\"115\nThird, PDD 68 directed the IPICG to work with U.S. Government educational institutions to develop and conduct annual education and training activities designed to foster expertise in IPI\nand promote better coordination.116\nAt the instigation of OSD and Joint Staff, PDD 68 also directed the detailing, on a full-time, non-reimbursable basis, of one or more military personnel to the IPICG Secretariat, in recognition of the \"predominant interest of DoD.\"117\nPDD 68 was initially welcomed by the parties involved in its crafting.  There had been no presidential guidance on strategic influence since Reagan's NSDDs in the 1980s.  And as USIA had been the primary means of \"telling America's story\" overseas during the Cold War, there was growing concern about the U.S. Government's ability to influence foreign audiences.  PDD\n68 was seen as a way to alleviate these concerns.118\nHowever, PDD 68 ran into problems almost from its inception.  State Department had the chair, but did not have the necessary direction and tasking authority over the other departments.\n\nMeetings turned in reporting forums rather coordinating arenas.119  The State Under Secretary also hesitated in acting and forming the IPICG; in two years only two meetings of the formal IPICG were convened, although action officers did meet.  Resourcing was another issue.  PDD 68 did not specifically provide any means or resources to the IPICG or to the implementing agencies.  The departments hesitated to expand upon or initiate any new information activities without the assurance of funds to do so.121\nPDD 68 was also an unclassified document.  It soon appeared in the media, and critics abounded, from journalists, to former officials, to current \"unnamed\" officials.  Criticism ranged from those who thought it would be no more than a global spin machine, to those who thought it would filter information normally widely available to reporters, to those who thought it was meant to propagandize the American public, to those who thought the party in power would use it as a political tool.122\nPDD 68 did have some accomplishments before its denouement.  Under the IPICG, the Balkan IPI Working Group has been very effective in coordinating IPI activities in support of the continuing operations in Bosnia and Kosovo.  And PDD 68 was the genesis of what is today a very close, mutually beneficial working relationship between DoD, the Broadcasting Board of Governors and the Voice of America.123\n\n## Strategic Influence Today\n\nShortly after taking office, President George W. Bush issued National Security Policy Directive (NSPD) 1, which restructured the NSC system.  NSPD 1 abolished all of Clinton's standing interagency working groups (IWG) and ad hoc groups.  Instead of IWGs, Bush established policy coordination committees (PCC).  NSPD 1 established a number of PCCs; more would be established in later NSPDs.  NSPD 1 also recreated some of Clinton's IWGs as subcommittees under one of the new PCCs.\n\nThe IPICG was one of many former IWGs that languished for several months, awaiting a decision from the new Administration.  Eventually Bush decided to grandfather PDD 68, and the IPICG became a subcommittee under the new Counter Terrorism PCC.  However, the IPICG lost momentum as an interagency coordinating body during its time in limbo.  While it still continued to operate, it became primarily a State Department operation.124\nThe events of 11 September 2001 changed everything, not least of which was the administration's outlook concerning strategic influence.  Faced with direct evidence that many people around the world actively hated the United States, Bush began taking action to more effectively explain U.S. policy overseas.\n\nInitially the White House and DoD turned to the Rendon Group, a private public relations firm that was already under contract to burnish the U.S. image overseas.  Rendon focused on the immediate 24-hours news cycle as a means to shape opinions, rather than a long-term ideological change.  Rendon helped create Coalition Information Centers (CIC) in Washington, London and Islamabad.  Personnel in these offices prepared daily press releases and responses to any enemy propaganda in the news, conducted polling and held focus groups, and coordinated the appearances of U.S. officials on key Arabic television programs to occur at strategic, highly watched moments.125  Over time, Rendon's work was supplanted by other organizations.\n\nIn October 2001, Bush swore in Charlotte Beers as the new Under Secretary of State for Public Affairs and Public Diplomacy.  Beers had been a highly successful advertising executive on Madison Avenue.  Secretary of State Colin Powell and President Bush hoped that Beers would be able to use her advertising skills to rejuvenate State's public affairs and public diplomacy programs to sell American policy and values overseas.126\nReactions to Beers' appointment and to her first year in office have been mixed.  Many critics doubt that the skills which succeed in selling a brand-name product to American consumers translate well into skills needed to sell policy and win a war of ideas with foreigners. Many complain that world opinion has changed little, or even worsened in the last year.  Others feel that Beers has initiated several programs that may have an impact over time.127\nEarly in August 2002, Bush announced the creation of the Office of Global Communications (OGC) to help manage and shape the U.S. image abroad.128   Five months later Bush signed Executive Order 13283, officially establishing OGC within the White House Office.  Bush assigned OGC the mission to advise the President on the most effective means \"to ensure consistency in messages that will promote the interests of the United States abroad, prevent misunderstanding, build support for and among coalition partners of the United States, and inform international audiences.\"  This advice was to be given only for overt information activities.129\nOther OGC functions specified in the Executive Order include assessing methods and strategies used by the government; coordinating the formulation of messages among appropriate agencies; working with other departments to develop a strategy for disseminating\n\"truthful, accurate and effective messages\" about American policies, people and culture; and coordinating the creation of temporary communication teams that would deploy to areas of high global interest and media attention.  Teams could not deploy without consultation with State Department and DoD.130\nLike the Rendon Group, OGC is focusing on the short-term goal of winning the evening news cycle rather than making any long-term effort to change attitudes and opinions.  Its messages are more informative, more journalistic, than persuasive.  OGC reports only to the White House; it is not within the NSC structure, although it does coordinate with the two PCCs discussed below.  Despite its direct link to the White House, OGC does not have any tasking authority.  The last line of the Executive Order specifically states that OGC does not have authority to issue directives to other agencies.131\nBush split the remaining elements of strategic influence between two PCCs, the Counter Terrorism Information Strategy (CTIS) PCC and the Strategic Communications PCC (SC).  NSC chairs the CTIS PCC, which is responsible for countering terrorist hostile propaganda and contains at least one subgroup, the Counter Propaganda Working Group.  Both CIA and DoD participate in the CTIS PCC.  NSC and State Department act as co-chairs of the SC PCC, which is responsible for overt public affairs and public diplomacy.  The SC PCC has four subcommittees: Future Directions, Afghanistan, Iraq, and the State Fusion Center.  Neither CIA nor DoD attends the SC PCC.  And while the NSC chair of the CTIS PCC attends SC PCC\nmeetings, the reverse is not true.132\nIn August 2002, Congress also approved spending $225 million on cultural and information programs abroad, mostly targeting Muslim countries.  Representative Henry Hyde sponsored the bill, citing a need to correct a \"cacophony of hate and misinformation\" about the U.S. \"133\nIn March 2002, the U.S. Broadcasting Board of Governors (BBG) launched Radio Sawa, an Arabic entertainment and news station that can be heard throughout the Middle East.  Within just a few months, ratings increased by 33%.  The BBG is now planning a television counterpart.134\nIn 2001, OSD established the Office of Strategic Influence (OSI), in an attempt to fill the gaps between Bush's PCCs and the OGC.  Officials within DoD were also concerned about the void left from the nonfunctional IPICG.  Bush's organizations took a long time to become fully established and begin working.  DoD also felt that the three organizations were too narrowly focused on explaining U.S. policy to broad, global audiences.  None appeared to be focused on specific target audiences, with a specific strategy and objectives in mind, or on the government actions needed to affect long-term U.S. goals.135\nOSI was headed by Major General Worden, U.S. Air Force.  OSI was nominally under the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict (ASD SOLIC), who had policy oversight of psychological operations, but it reported directly to the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy.  DoD did not envision that OSI would be solely a DoD organization.  OSI sought input and representatives from other departments from the beginning. DoD hoped that OSI would be a catalyst for action, and once it started developing and implementing influence campaigns, State would take a bigger role, and eventually OSI would become an interagency body.136\nMG Worden had a vision, plans and objectives for what he believed OSI should accomplish in support of national objectives - something that was lacking in the other players in strategic influence at the time.  One of the first things OSI looked at was how to affect change in the madrassas, the Muslim schools, where the current curriculum and textbooks are virulently anti-American.137\nIn a classic example of the internecine battles that have always plagued strategic influence, OSI was sabotaged internally within DoD and abolished by Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld less than five months after its establishment.  Someone in DoD leaked information to the press that OSI intended to plant false messages and misinformation in overseas media, news that would then be reported in the U.S. as factual.  This type of action was not in OSI's charter, and the charge was never substantiated.  Nonetheless, Rumsfeld felt that the damage caused by the media controversy and exposure were too great to overcome, and he closed the office.\n\nAll that remains in OSD for strategic influence is a small Office of Information Activities\n(OIA) buried within ASD SOLIC.  OIA has retained responsibility for policy oversight of military psychological operations activities.  It also provides the OSD representative to the CTIS PCC. OIA hopes to implement a few of the actions recommended by OSI, but with few resources, few personnel, and little authority, its effectiveness is doubtful.  Additionally, OIA is maintaining a low profile, due to fears that whoever sabotaged OSI will also sabotage OIA.138\nJCS currently has a PSYOP division, generally six personnel headed by an Army O-6, within the J-39, Deputy Director for Information Operations (DDIO), a directorate that has existed only since 1997.  Other divisions within DDIO have responsibility for other elements of information operations.  The DDIO himself is a brigadier general; the first three have been Air Force generals.  This gives functional responsibility for a majority of strategic influence to a general or flag officer, something that had been missing for decades.  The PSYOP Division has a multitude of responsibilities:  coordinating PSYOP policy within JCS; developing and staffing JCS positions on DoD and national policy regarding PSYOP; promulgating joint PSYOP\ndoctrine; representing JCS in the interagency; preparing and staffing deployment orders for PSYOP units; shepherding approval of PSYOP plans and orders within JCS and the Services; providing national-level PSYOP guidance to the combatant commanders; staffing PSYOP product approval within JCS and with OSD, when approval has not been delegated to the regional combatant commanders; and providing the U.S. representative to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) PSYOP Working Group.139\nWhen the War on Terrorism started in the Fall of 2001, JCS established the Information Operations Task Force (IOTF), at the direction of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), General Myers.  Originally, the CJCS intended the IOTF to be an interagency group that would direct information and influence operations and act as the single point of contact for the U.S. Government; its original title was \"Information Operations Resource Center (IORC).\" But no other agencies or departments would participate in the IORC.  No other agency wanted to put their people under a DoD brigadier general.140\nWhen the IORC didn't become an interagency group, JCS established the IOTF.  It was given space, but few other resources.  DDIO stripped almost two-thirds of its own people, including all of the PSYOP Division, away from their normal duties to fill the IOTF.141\nThe IOTF was largely ineffective and was disbanded in July 2002.  It initially developed a system of public affairs, PSYOP and information operations \"alerts\" to provide guidance and information to DoD senior officials and the regional combatant commands.  No one ever used the public affairs or PSYOP alerts.  The information operations alerts became just \"FYI\" notes for the DoD leadership, rather than action documents.  The alert system had been designed to address both foreign and domestic audiences; however, the focus quickly changed to domestic audiences to gain public support for the War on Terrorism.  One positive outcome of this illconceived idea was that PSYOP Division personnel were returned to their normal duties, due to concerns over violation of the Smith-Mundt Act.142\nThe IOTF did create an excellent, scientific database to measure and track \"Measures of Effectiveness\" (MOE) for information operations.  Effective MOE tracking is a shortcoming in PSYOP and information operations.  However, many DoD officials questioned the resources and effort put into the MOE database when there was not an effective information operations program to track.  As one official put it, \"we had the Cadillac of MOE databases with the Yugo of information operations campaigns.\"143\nWithin the Armed Forces, there is still only one active duty organization, the 4th Psychological Operations Group (4th POG).  It is a de facto national asset.  This one unit provides support to all levels of DoD, from brigade to unified command, to both conventional forces and special operations, and to the other Services.  4th POG also frequently provides analytical support and PSYOP products directly to national level agencies and organizations.\n\nWithin the 4th POG is the Strategic Studies Detachment - a group of high-quality civilian intelligence analysts and area experts who provide detailed PSYOP studies and assessments in support of unified commands and national-level agencies.\n\nIn early 2002, Rumsfeld published his Defense Planning Guidance (DPG).  The DPG\ndirected OSD, JCS and the Services to develop an \"Information Operations Roadmap\" to improve DoD capabilities.  The DPG included fourteen separate sub-studies that were to be addressed in the Roadmap.  These included recommendations for the establishment of a strategic PSYOP detachment, for improved education on information operations, and for improvements in the information operations career field, including the creation of flag officer positions.144\nThe DPG itself and the Information Operations Roadmap developed within DOD remain classified.  The Roadmap does recommend a significant budget increase for military PSYOP.  It also recommends the establishment of a strategic PSYOP unit.  Officials in DoD are not commenting on what the unit will look like, where it will be located or to whom it will report. Experts in the field believe that it should be located in the Washington, D.C. area, to properly integrate into the interagency strategic influence effort, including providing support to other agencies.  However, many are afraid that the controversy over OSI would extend to the new unit and limit its ability if it were located in the area; alternative sites and command structures are being explored.\n\n## The Way Ahead\n\n\"Why is the PSYOP contest so asymmetrical? One might assume that a \"battle of ideas\" should be won by a superpower that has more communications consultants, advertising executives, information and media specialists, political advisers, public relations professionals, and psychologists than the total number of [operatives in Al Qaeda].\"145\nOriginally written about the failure of U.S. \"hearts and minds\" campaigns during the Vietnam War, the quote above is equally valid today.  Is the Bush Administration organized effectively to counter the growing anti-American sentiment around the world?  What can the Bush Administration learn from the past?\n\nThe strongest periods of U.S. strategic influence had several common features:\npermanent, rather than ad hoc organizations; specific charters outlining roles and responsibilities for all agencies; top-level interest, guidance and cover; and full-time staffs. Further, the various departments had dedicated full-time people who had direct access to key policy decision makers.\n\nIt's ironic that back in Truman's and Eisenhower's Administrations, when the news media was extremely slow compared to today, there was better recognition than exists today that timeliness of decisions and activities is critical to strategic influence.  This is particularly true in DoD, where the trained, experienced action officers are buried under layers of staffs levels, often headed by people who have little understanding or appreciation of the psychological impacts of policy.  The 21st century information cycle will not wait while an action officer staffs policy decisions through several levels.\n\nThe Bush Administration should re-evaluate how it has organized to conduct strategic influence.  The current structure is trifurcated, with responsibilities split between three different organizations (OGC, CTIS PCC, SC PCC).  Additionally, due to their narrow focus and lack of participation by all departments involved in strategic influence, gaps exist.  Areas available for influence are not being exploited.\n\nOne person should be in charge of strategic influence for the President - one person, who is a member of NSC, not one of the departments, agencies, PCCs, or OGC; one who can direct, coordinate and provide guidance to all.  In today's Information Age, the President needs a Special Assistant to the President for Information Activities - a National Information Adviser\n(NIA).  The NIA should be provided a full-time staff, with experts from all the agencies, as Eisenhower did with his second POCC, established in January 1954.\n\nBoth Eisenhower's POCC and Reagan's SPG, established under NSPD 77, provide models to build on.  The role of the NIA would not be much different from the POCC Chair, the OCB Executive Secretary, or the SPG Chair, the National Security Adviser.  The key difference is that national psychological strategy was just one of their myriad duties.  Appointing an NIA, with a dedicated staff, whose sole responsibility would be strategic influence, would greatly improve coordination of strategic influence activities and the quality of advice provided to the President.  The authority invested in the position would also improve implementation of activities.  Both the PSB and IPICG failed because they lacked sufficient authority to direct the coordination and implementation of policy decisions, and because they could not rise above interagency rivalry.  Further, having an NIA should improve timeliness of interagency action.  It has taken Bush's SC PCC nearly two years to develop a vision and charter.\n\nAdditionally, the Bush Administration needs to articulate a national psychological strategy, a strategy that is as broad and encompassing as the containment strategy of the Cold War.  The nuclear threat, combined with other weapons of mass destructions (WMD), is as imminent today as ever.  And the threat of another attack like 11 September is even greater. But now many of the potential perpetrators are non-state actors.  Just as in the Cold War, the U.S. must use all elements of national power to deter the use of WMD.  Strategic influence, as defined in the beginning of this paper, will be key to success.  Persuasive information alone will not be sufficient; messages must be backed up by action or they will be ineffectual.  Reagan's NSPD 130 provides a starting model, although it needs to be updated.   As one writer put it, \"NSDD 130 should be dusted off and made required reading throughout the executive and legislative branches.  This landmark document established international information as a major instrument of national security policy, and the responsibility of no single agency of the government.\"146\nGordon Gray's priorities upon becoming director of the PSB also provide a good example of how to begin addressing a national psychological strategy.  The national psychological strategy should clearly define national interests and objectives.  Goals not clearly defined are rarely achieved.  Goals specifically defined will guide effective action by the departments; generalized statements will lead to continued inaction and interagency rivalry, and, ultimately, an ineffective strategic influence program.  Objectives should include not just adversarial or hostile audiences, but also allies and neutral audiences.  The weakening of U.S.\n\nalliance structures has been a key strategic objective of U.S. opponents in recent years.147\nA national psychological strategy should concentrate equally on long-term attitude and behavior changes as on explaining U.S. policy to foreign audiences.  The feelings that begat the acts of 11 September did not occur overnight.  Those attitudes had been building for years, and they will not change overnight.  A national psychological strategy should also incorporate U.S. Government actions that help foster positive changes in the social and political conditions that continue to create animosity towards the U.S.  This may include re-examining U.S. policies versus U.S. national interests - is it more in the national interest to continue policies which are engendering such hostile attitudes, or would it be more in the U.S. national interest to modify that policy to mitigate the negative response?\n\nThe PSB's first report on its assessment of the U.S psychological efforts noted that, \"the contract between the messages of freedom and democracy that were often broadcast and the actions of the U.S. was often stark.  The implication was that the current method of policy formulation could be more effective if the message and the actions were more closely coordinated.\"148  One of the NIA's responsibilities would be to ensure that psychological impact of policies when communicated to foreign audiences is considered before the adoption of the policy.\n\nSecretary Rumsfeld needs to reorganize DoD as well.  First, DoD needs someone with the appropriate position and authority to oversee the policy and to coordinate DoD strategic influence activities among DoD public affairs, military PSYOP, and other military information activities.  Just as the President needs an NIA, so too does Secretary Rumsfeld need an adviser who is dedicated to strategic influence.  History provides an example - the Deputy for Psychological Policy under Truman.  Today, however, a \"Deputy for Information Policy\" would best be placed directly under the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (USDP),149 so that the position would be above that of the several Assistant Secretaries of Defense who are players in strategic influence.  OIA should then be moved under the new Deputy for Information Policy.\n\n DoD also needs to formally establish a DoD Committee on strategic influence, as has been done several times in the past.  The officers and officials within JCS and OSD do a good job of communicating and coordinating among themselves.  However, formalization lends legitimacy and gets attention.  Flag officers and senior officials do not perceive ad hoc groups and meetings as being important compared to committee meetings which the Secretary of Defense or the USDP has declared will occur.\nOne area that the Administration should address immediately is the distrust and antipathy of the military by other departments involved in strategic influence.  PSB was based on the false premise that you could separate psychological strategy from national strategy.\n\nEqually fallacious in today's world of instant, worldwide communications is the notion that you can separate military psychological activities from public affairs and public diplomacy.  There is a prevailing misconception in the State Department and public affairs field that military psychological operations are not truthful, and that contact with PSYOP will somehow taint public affairs and public diplomacy.  While there are valid reasons for keeping the messages and activities separated in the eyes of foreign audiences, those reasons do not apply to coordination at the U.S. national level.\n\nThe initial strategic influence efforts of the Bush Administration have revealed a typically American myopic viewpoint:  Americans assume that other people think as they do and want the same things that American do - that other people want to be like Americans.  For instance, one of the first information products developed by Beers was a series of videos showing Muslim life and activities in the U.S.  This exemplifies the naivete that simply showing America to foreign Muslims would convince them that they would want to emulate America and shouldn't disagree with U.S. policies.  It also demonstrated little understanding of how the target audience would view the film - Muslims in this country live in luxury compared to most of the Muslims overseas that the videos targeted.  The target audiences could not identify with the film, there was no emotional connection.\n\nThe Administration's efforts also appear to be hampered by \"political correctness,\"\nsomething that has been a bane for military PSYOP for years.  In an effort not to offend anybody, products are bland, without emotional impact.  On other hand, terrorist propaganda does not simply reach for hearts and minds; it activates envy, fear and anger by stirring primal emotions.150  Television provides numerous examples of angry, intense, committed anti-\nAmerican protestors.  Seldom do you see equally emotionally committed people protesting for the United States.  At some point, strategic influence must go beyond simply informing and educating and must involve the emotions of the target audiences.\n\n \"Painful as it may be to face squarely the question of American cultural inhibitions in the area of psychological-political conflict, the effort is necessary - in order not only to develop intelligent approaches to dealing with them but also to achieve the cultural self-consciousness essential for effective participation in this kind of conflict.  It is essential because Americans tend to assume that people everywhere are much like themselves, with similar fundamental motivations and views of the world. But blindness to differences in national characteristics is apt to be a fatal handicap for anyone attempting to affect the psychological orientation and political behavior of foreign audiences.\"151\nThe answer to the question, \"Why do they hate us?,\" is not just that they don't understand us.  Simply explaining U.S. policy, U.S motives, and the U.S. way of life will not change hostile audiences if they perceive our policies as inimical to their way of life.  A worldclass strategic influence campaign will not be the panacea for overcoming the current difficulties in world opinion.  No wizardry in communications can make bad policy decisions or actions palatable.  However, having a competent strategic influence campaign is essential to U.S. victory in the War on Terrorism.  Without one, anti-American sentiment will continue to grow, and the U.S will be increasingly vulnerable to more attacks like 11 September 2001.\n\n## Endnotes\n\n1 Alfred H. Paddock, Jr., \"Military Psychological Operations,\" in Political Warfare and Psychological Operations:  Rethinking the US Approach, ed. Frank B. Barnett and Carnes Lord (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1989), 46.\n\n2 Alfred H. Paddock, Jr., *U.S. Army Special Warfare: Its Origins* (Lawrence, KS:\nUniversity Press of Kansas, 2002), 3-4.\n\n3 Ibid., 4-6. 4 Ibid., 6-7. 5 Ibid., 8. 6 Ibid., 8-9. 7 Ibid., 9. 8 Paddock, *Political Warfare and Psychological Operations*, 46. 9 Paddock, *U.S. Army Special Warfare*, 12. 10 Ibid., 15-17. 11 Paddock, *Political Warfare and Psychological Operations*, 47. 12 Paddock, *U.S. Army Special Warfare*, 41.\n\n13 Ibid., 43-45.\n\n14 Ibid., 20. 15 Ferdinand Eberstadt, \"Postwar Organization for National Security,\" in Decisions of the Highest Order: Perspectives on the National Security Council, ed. Karl F. Inderfurth and Loch K. Johnson (Pacific Grove, CA: Brooks/Cole Publishing Company, 1988), 29-30.\n\n16 Ibid., 31. 17 Ibid., 33. 18 U.S. Congress, \"The National Security Act of 1947,\" in Decisions of the Highest Order:\nPerspectives on the National Security Council, ed. Karl F. Inderfurth and Loch K. Johnson (Pacific Grove, CA: Brooks/Cole Publishing Company, 1988), 37.\n\n19 Ibid., 38-39; Eberstadt, \"Post War Organization\", 33. 20 Benjamin R. Rose, Presidentially Mandated Strategic Psychological Warfare Policy Coordination Under Truman and Eisenhower: The Psychological Strategy Board and the Operations Coordinating Board (Harrisonburg, VA:  James Madison University, 1999), 10-11.\n\n21 The National Security Resources Board (NSRB) was created by the National Security Act of 1947, and disestablished in 1953, primarily because many of its functions were transferred to other agencies.  The NSRB monitored, planned and coordinated the use of national assets in the event of an atomic attack on the U.S.\n\n22 Rose, 15-16. 23 Ibid., 11-12.\n\n24 Smith-Mundt Act, *U.S. Code*, Title 22, Chapter 18, Sec. 1461 (1948); excerpt available from <http:www4.law.cornell.edu.uscode/22/1461.html>; Internet; accessed 27 February 2003.\n\n25 Rose, 13-15. 26 Carnes Lord, \"The Psychological Dimension in National Security,\" in Political Warfare and Psychological Operations:  Rethinking the US Approach, ed. Frank B. Barnett and Carnes Lord (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1989), 14; Rose, 40.\n\n27 Rose, 18; Paddock, *U.S. Army Special Warfare*, 40. 28 Paddock, *U.S. Army Special Warfare*, 94-95. 29 Paddock, *Political Warfare and Psychological Operations*, 47. 30 Rose, 20. 31 U.S. Department of Defense, *Organization, Office of Psychological Policy*, Department of Defense Directive C-5132.1 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Defense, 21 April 1952), 1.\n\n32 Rose, 21. 33 Stanley L. Falk, \"The NSC Under Truman and Eisenhower,\" in Decisions of the Highest Order: Perspectives on the National Security Council, ed. Karl F. Inderfurth and Loch K. Johnson (Pacific Grove, CA: Brooks/Cole Publishing Company, 1988), 71;  Thomas J. Saxon, Jr., *The Evolution of the National Security Council System Under President Nixon* (Ann Arbor, MI: University Microfilms, 1971), 94.\n\n34 Department of Defense Directive C-5132.1, 1. 35 Rose, 21. 36 Rose, 24. 37 Rose, 22-23. 38 Department of Defense Directive C-5132.1, 1; Paddock, *U.S. Army Special Warfare*,\n40.\n\n39 Lord, *Political Warfare and Psychological Operations*, 14. 40 Department of Defense Directive C-5132.1, 2. 41 Ibid., 3. 42 Paddock, *U.S. Army Special Warfare*, 2. 43 Rose, 29.\n\n44 Paddock, *U.S. Army Special Warfare*, 139. 45 U.S. Department of Defense, Internal Organization of the Department of Defense for Psychological Operations, Department of Defense Directive S-3140.1 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Defense, 10 January 1953), 1.\n\n46 Ibid., 3. 47 Ibid., 4. 48 Saxon, 108; Rose, 35. 49 National Security Council, Responsibilities and Principles Governing the Conduct of the Foreign Information Program and Psychological Warfare, National Security Council Memorandum (Washington, D.C.: National Security Council, 25 January 1954), 2.\n\n50 Saxon, 110, 117; Rose, 38, 42. 51 Saxon, 117; Robert Cutler, \"The Development of the National Security Council,\" in Decisions of the Highest Order: Perspectives on the National Security Council, ed. Karl F.\n\nInderfurth and Loch K. Johnson (Pacific Grove, CA: Brooks/Cole Publishing Company, 1988), 59; Rose, 46-47.\n\n52 Saxon, 113. 53 Saxon, 117; Falk, 73. 54 Saxon, 117-119. 55 National Security Council Memorandum, Responsibilities and Principles Governing the Conduct of the Foreign Information Program and Psychological Warfare, 2.\n\n56 Lord, *Political Warfare and Psychological Operations,* 19. 57 Cutler, 61; Lord, 14. 58 National Security Council Memorandum, Responsibilities and Principles Governing the Conduct of the Foreign Information Program and Psychological Warfare, 3.\n\n59 National Security Council Memorandum, Responsibilities and Principles Governing the Conduct of the Foreign Information Program and Psychological Warfare, 4.\n\n60 Saxon, 120. 61 Saxon, 142. 62 National Security Council, Wartime Organization for Overseas Psychological Operations, National Security Council Memorandum 5812/1 (Washington, D.C.: National Security Council, 4 June 1958).\n\n63 Frank R. Barnett, \"Afterword - Twelve Steps to Improving American PSYOP,\" in Political Warfare and Psychological Operations:  Rethinking the US Approach, ed. Frank B. Barnett and Carnes Lord (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1989), 212.\n\n64 U.S Department of the Army, The Art and Science of Psychological Operations: Case Studies of Military Application, Volume One, Department of the Army Pamphlet 525-7-1 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of the Army, April 1976), 110.\n\n65 Saxon, 149; Henry M. Jackson, \"Organizing for National Security,\" in Decisions of the Highest Order: Perspectives on the National Security Council, ed. Karl F. Inderfurth and Loch K. Johnson (Pacific Grove, CA: Brooks/Cole Publishing Company, 1988), 85.\n\n66 Jackson, 86-87. 67 Saxon, 158. 68 McGeorge Bundy, \"Questions Arising from CIA Support of Certain Activities,\" National Security Action Memorandum Number 3 (Washington, D.C.: The White House, 15 April 1961).\n\n69 McGeorge Bundy, \"An Effective Countertheme to 'Peaceful Coexistence',\" National Security Action Memorandum Number 61 (Washington, D.C.: The White House, 14 July 1961).\n\n70 McGeorge Bundy, \"Policy Guidance and Preemption of U.S. Government-Controlled Broadcasting,\" *National Security Action Memorandum Number 63* (Washington, D.C.: The White House, 24 July 1961).\n\n71 John F. Kennedy, \"Establishment of the Special Group (Counter-Insurgency),\"\nNational Security Action Memorandum Number 124 (Washington, D.C.: The White House, 18 January 1962).\n\n72 Barnett, *Political Warfare and Psychological Operations,* 212. 73 U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *National Coordination of Psychological Operations,* Joint Chiefs of Staff Study (Washington, D.C.:  The Joint Staff, n.d.), II-3 - II-4.\n\n74 Paddock, *Political Warfare and Psychological Operations*, 48. 75 Saxon, 238.\n\n76 Lyndon B. Johnson, \"Informational and Psychological Warfare Programs in South Vietnam,\" *National Security Action Memorandum Number 325* (Washington, D.C.: The White House, 12 March 1965); Lyndon B. Johnson, \"Intensified and Expanded PSYOPS Activities in Vietnam,\" *National Security Action Memorandum Number 330* (Washington, D.C.: The White House, 9 April 1965).\n\n77 Alfred H. Paddock, Jr, <paddockal@earthlink.net>, \"Assistance,\" electronic mail message to author, 12 February 2003.\n\n78 Saxon, 255.\n\n79 \"Presidential Directives and Executive Orders,\" Available from\n<http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/direct.htm>; Internet; accessed 28 January 2003.\n\n80 Barnett, *Political Warfare and Psychological Operations,* 212. 81 Paddock, \"Assistance.\" 82 Lord, *Political Warfare and Psychological Operations,* 15. 83 James E. Carter, \"The National Security Council System,\" Presidential Directive/NSC-\n2 (Washington, D.C.: The White House, 20 January 1977).\n\n84 Alfred H. Paddock, Jr.,  \"U.S. Military Psychological Operations: Past, Present, and Future,\" in *Psychological Operations and Political Warfare in Long-Term Strategic Planning,* ed. Janos Radvanyi (New York: Praeger's, 1990), 23.\n\n85 Ronald W. Reagan, \"United States International Broadcasting,\" National Security Decision Directive Number 45 (Washington, D.C.: The White House, 15 July 1982), 1.\n\n86 Ibid., 1-2. 87 Ibid., 3. 88 Ronald W. Reagan, \"Management of Public Diplomacy Relative to National Security,\"\nNational Security Decision Directive Number 77 (Washington, D.C.: The White House, 14 January 1983), 1.\n\n89 Ibid., 3. 90 Ibid., 2. 91 Ibid., 2-3. 92 Ronald W. Reagan, \"US International Information Policy,\" National Security Decision Directive Number 130 (Washington, D.C.: The White House, 6 March 1984), 1.\n\n93 Ibid., 1-4. 94 Ibid., 3-4.\n\n95 Paddock, *Psychological Operations and Political Warfare*, 23.\n\n96 Ibid., 24. 97 Ibid., 29. 98 Ibid., 30. 99 Jack Summe, COL (USA), Chief, Information Strategy Division, Joint Staff J-39, interview by author, 3 February 2003, The Pentagon, Arlington, VA.\n\n100 Lord, *Political Warfare and Psychological Operations,* 21. 101 Dave Lowe, Idea to Reality: A Brief History of the National Endowment for Democracy; available from <http://www.ned.org/about/nedhistory.html>; Internet; accessed 1 February 2003.\n\n102 Ibid. 103 Robert W. Trost III, COL (USA, Ret), Chief, Information Strategy Division, Joint Staff J-39, June 1997 - July 2000, interviews by author, October 2002 and February 2003, Fairfax, VA.\n\n104 George Bush, \"Review of U.S. Government International Broadcasting Activities,\"\nNational Security Review 24 (Washington, D.C.: The White House, 28 March 1990).\n\n105 George Bush, \"United States Government International Broadcasting,\" National Security Directive 51 (Washington, D.C.:  The White House, 17 October 1990).\n\n106 Ibid.; \"About the Broadcasting Board of Governors;\" available from\n<http:www.bbg.gov/bbg_aboutus.htm>; Internet; accessed 5 March 2003.\n\n107 William J. Clinton, \"International Public Information,\" Presidential Decision Directive/NSC-68 (Washington, D.C.: The White House, 30 April 1999); Joshua Muravchik, \"Hearts, Minds, and the War Against Terror,\" *Commentator* (May 2002): 25-30; database online; available from ProQuest; accessed 1 October 2002.\n\n108 Richard G. Lugar, \"Beating Terror,\" *Washington Post* (27 January 2003); available from <http://www.us.arm.mil/portal/jhtml/earlyBird/Jan2003/e20030127149168.html>; Internet; accessed 27 January 2003.\n\n109 Trost. 110 Clinton, 2; Neil Munro, \"Infowar:  AK-47s, Lies and Videotape,\" Association for Computing Machinery (July 1999): 19-22; database on-line; available from ProQuest; accessed 22 October 2002.\n\n111 Clinton, 1. 112 Ibid., 2; \"Overt international military information\" is just one of several euphemisms used by other agencies to refer to military psychological operations.\n\n113 Ibid., 3. 114 Ibid. 115 Ibid. 116 Ibid., 4. 117 Ibid., 4; Trost.\n\n118 Clinton, 1; Muravchik. 119 Trost. 120 Trost. 121 Jack Summe <jack.summe@js.pentagon.mil>, \"PDD 68 & the IPI Core Group,\"\nelectronic mail message to author, 22 October 2002.\n\n122 \"The U.S. Tries Spinning the Globe,\" *Columbia Journalism Review* (Nov/Dec 1999):\n11; database on-line; available from ProQuest; accessed 1 October 2002; \"U.S. Creates New Agency; Unit to Coordinate Flow of Information Overseas,\" *The Washington Post*  (13 August 1999): A23; database on-line; available from ProQuest; accessed 1 October 2002; Ben Barber, \"Information-Control Plan Aimed at U.S., Insider Says,\" *The Washington Times* (29 July 1999): A1; database on-line; available from NewsLibrary; accessed 16 October 2002; Joel Bleifuss, \"Ready, Aim, Inform,\" *In These Times* (March 2000); database on-line; available from Guerrilla News Network <http://www.guerillanews.com/counter_intel/propaganda_inc/ready_aim_inform.html>; internet; accessed 21 October 2002.\n\n123 Summe, \"PDD 68 & the IPI Core Group.\"\n124 Summe, interview. 125 Franklin Foer, \"Flacks Americana:  John Rendon's Shallow P.R. War on Terrorism,\"\nThe New Republic (20 May 2002); internet; available at <http://www.tnr.com/docprint.mhtml?i=20020520&s=foer05202002>; accessed 6 Mar 2003.\n\n126 John Barry, Richard Wolffe, and Christopher Dickey, \"The Real War will be for Muslim Hearts and Minds; Selling the United States,\" *Newsweek* (30 December 2002); database online; available from ProQuest; accessed 27 February 2002; Arundhati Parmar, \"Full-Court Press,\" *Marketing News* (9 December 2002); database on-line; available from ProQuest; accessed 27 February 2003.\n\n127 Ira Teinowitz, \"Beers Draws Mixed Review After One Year,\" *Advertising Age* (23\nSeptember 2002); database on-line; available from ProQuest; accessed 27 February 2003;\nParmar.\n\n128 Ellen Hale, \"Global Warmth for U.S. After 9/1 Turns to Frost; Military Plans Repulse Even European Allies,\" *USA Today Online* (14 August 2002); database on-line; available from ProQuest; accessed 10 February 2003; Michael Holtzman, \"Privatize Public Diplomacy,\" New York Times (8 August 2002): 25; database on-line; available from ProQuest; accessed 1 October 2002.\n\n129 George W. Bush, \"Establishing the Office of Global Communications,\" Executive Order 13283 (21 January 2003); available from <http:www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/eo/eo-\n13283.htm>; accessed 25 February 2003.\n\n130 Ibid. 131 Ibid. 132 Summe, interview; Trost; Thomas Timmes, Policy Assistant, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict, interview by author, 3 February 2003, The Pentagon, Arlington, VA.\n\n133 Hale. 134 John Harwood, \"Public Diplomacy Problems Predate Bush Administration,\" Wall Street Journal (5 March 2003); database on-line; available from ProQuest; accessed 6 March 2003; Parmar.\n\n135 Timmes; Michael Furlong, Policy Assistant, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict, interview by author, 3 February 2003, The Pentagon, Arlington, VA; Daniel Devlin, Policy Assistant, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict, interview by author, 3 February 2003, The Pentagon, Arlington, VA.\n\n136 Timmes; Furlong; Devlin. 137 Timmes; Furlong; Devlin. 138 Timmes; Furlong; Devlin. 139 Trost; Summe, interview. 140 Summe, interview. 141 Ibid. 142 Ibid. 143 Ibid.; Timmes. 144 Summe, interview.\n\n145 Barnett, *Political Warfare and Psychological Operations,* 213.  The original quote read, \"...soldiers in Hanoi's army.\"\n146 Richard G. Stilwell, \"Comment - The Psychological Dimension in National Security,\"\nin *Political Warfare and Psychological Operations:  Rethinking the US Approach*, ed. Frank B. Barnett and Carnes Lord (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1989), 42.\n\n147 Lord, *Political Warfare and Psychological Operations*,17. 148 Rose, 28.\n\n149 The formal title would then become, \"Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Information Policy.\"\n150 Barnett, *Political Warfare and Psychological Operations,* 217. 151 Lord, *Political Warfare and Psychological Operations*, 21 22.\n\n## Bibliography\n\n\"About the Broadcasting Board of Governors.\" Available from\n<http://www.bbg.gov/bbg_aboutus.htm>.  Internet.  Accessed 5 March 2003.\n\"Banging the Drum for the U.S.\" CBS News 30 July 2002. Journal on-line.  Available from\n<http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2002/07/30/politics/main516881.shtml>. Internet. 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Accessed 1 October 2002.\nHale, Ellen.  \"Global Warmth for U.S. After 9/1 Turns to Frost; Military Plans Repulse Even\nEuropean Allies.\" *USA Today Online* (14 August 2002).  Database on-line.  Available from ProQuest.  Accessed 10 February 2003.\nHarwood, John.  \"Public Diplomacy Problems Predate Bush Administration.\" Wall Street Journal\n(5 March 2003).  Database on-line.  Available from ProQuest.  Accessed 6 March 2003.\nHoltzman, Michael.  \"Privatize Public Diplomacy.\" *New York Times* (8 August 2002): 25.\nDatabase on-line.  Available from ProQuest.  Accessed 1 October 2002.\nHughes, John. \"Why America's Story Needs to be Sent Overseas.\" *Christian Science Monitor* (3\nApril 2002): 9.  Database on-line.  Available from ProQuest.  Accessed 10 October 2002.\nInderfurth, Karl F. and Loch K. Johnson, eds.  Decisions of the Highest Order: Perspectives on\nthe National Security Council. 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    },
    {
        "text": "## Terms & Definitions Of Interest For Counterintelligence Professionals Wisdom Begins With The Definition Of Terms\n\n                                    -- Socrates 2X.  The manager of the counterintelligence and human intelligence missions at various levels of DoD structure, including joint, command, service, and task force. The 2X structure includes the Counterintelligence Coordinating Authority (CICA) and the Human Intelligence Operations Center (HOC). (AR 381-20, Army CI Program, 25 May 2010)  Also see J2X.\n\n-- Also, the counterintelligence and human intelligence advisor to the C/J/G/S-2. Denotes the 2X\npositions at all echelons. The 2X staff conducts technical control and oversight for all counterintelligence and human intelligence entities with[in] their operational purview. It coordinates, de-conflicts, and synchronizes all counterintelligence and human intelligence activities at each level of command. (Army FM 2-22.2, Counterintelligence, Oct 2009)\n\n\n    Term also refers to the staff section that the 2X leads.\n\n    Interesting historical note:  During World War II the counterintelligence element of the Office of\nStrategic Services (OSS) was known as \"X-2\" (Counter Espionage Branch). The OSS--predecessor to today's Central Intelligence Agency--was established on 13 June 1942 by order of President Roosevelt.  Also \"XX\" was the Double-Cross System, a World War II counterespionage and deception operation controlled British military intelligence; see *The Double-Cross System*, Yale University Press (1972) by Sir John Cecil Masterman,\n\n603 Referral. See *Section 603 Referral*. 811 Referral. See *Section 811 Referral*.\n\n\n\nDepartment of Defense (DoD); however other CI professionals may find it of use.  It provides a comprehensive compilation of unclassified terms that may be encountered when dealing with the dynamic discipline of counterintelligence and related activities. Where some words may several meanings within the counterintelligence or intelligence context, a variety of definitions are included.\n\n    Definitions within this Glossary cite an original source document. The quotes selected, as well as\nthe views and comments expressed in the shadow boxes are those of the editor and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Department of Defense, the Office of the National Counterintelligence Executive, the Intelligence Community, the Office of National Intelligence, or the United States Government.\n\n    This Glossary is periodically updated.  Users are encouraged to submit proposed changes,\ncorrections, and/or additions. Please provide a source citation for any recommended definitions.\nA ========================================== A-Space (abbreviation for *Analytical Space*).  A-Space transitioned to i-Space -- see \"i-Space.\" A-Space was a virtual work environment that provided \"analysts\" from across the Intelligence Community a common platform for research, analysis and collaboration. Abort.  To terminate a mission for any reason other than enemy action.  It may occur at any point after the beginning of the mission and prior to its completion. (previously in Joint Publication 1-02, DoD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, hereafter referred to as JP 1-02)* Abduction.  [One of the four basic types of reasoning applied to intelligence analysis,] it is the process of generating a novel hypothesis to explain given evidence that does not readily suggest a familiar explanation. (DIA, *Intelligence Essentials for Everyone*, June 1999)  Also see deduction; induction;\nscientific method.\n\n## For Additional Information See *Knowledge Management In The Intelligence Enterprise* By Edward Waltz (2003) And *Critical Thinking And Intelligence Analysis* By David T. Moore, Jmic Press (2006).\n\n Access.  In counterintelligence and intelligence use: 1) A way or means of approach to identify a target; 2) Exploitable proximity to or ability to approach an individual, facility, or information that enables target to carry out the intended mission. (JP 1-02 and JP 2-01.2, CI & HUMINT in Joint Operations, 16 Mar 2011 w/ chg 1 dated 26 Aug 2011) -- Also, the ability and opportunity to obtain knowledge of classified sensitive information or to be in a place where one could expect to gain such knowledge. (Counterintelligence Community Lexicon, June 2000, hereinafter referred to as CI Community Lexicon)\n-- Also, the ability or opportunity to obtain knowledge of classified or sensitive information. (IC\nStandard 700-1, 4 Apr 2008 and DoD Manual 5200.01-Vol 1, Information Security Program, 24 Feb 2012)\n-- Also, the ability and opportunity to obtain knowledge of classified information. (DoD Manual\nS-5240.09-M, OFCO Procedures & Security Classification Guide, 13 Jan 2011 and DSS Glossary)\n\n    Access generally refers to the ability of a human source/asset (either CI or HUMINT) to perform a\nspecific operational task within the limits of acceptable risk.  Types of access include direct, indirect, first-hand, second-hand, etc.\n\nAccess Agent.  An individual used to acquire information on an otherwise inaccessible target. (Human Derived Information Lexicon Terms and Definitions for HUMINT, Counterintelligence, and Related Activities, April 2008, hereinafter referred to as HDI Lexicon)  Also see *agent*.\n\n\n-- Also, an agent whose relationship or potential relationship with a foreign intelligence personality allows him or her to serve as a channel for the introduction of another controlled agent for the purpose of recruitment of the target. (AFOSI Manual 71-142, OFCO, 9 Jun 2000)\n\n\n-- Also, a person who facilitates contact with a target individual or entry into a facility. (Spycraft: The Secret History of the CIA's Spytechs from Communism to Al-Qaeda, 2008; hereinafter referred to as Spycraft)\n\n                                                                 Access Agents\n    Another method of identifying and keeping track of suspected intelligence personnel is to recruit\npeople close to suspects, known in the jargon as \"access agents.\" Counterintelligence operators can seek out secretaries, janitors, chauffeurs, interpreters, neighbors, or friends and request that they pass on information about the target's predilections and behavior.\n\n       -- Roy Godson, *Dirty Tricks or Trump Cards: US Covert and Counterintelligence* (1995), pp. 218-219\n Access to Classified Information.  The ability and opportunity to obtain knowledge of classified information. Persons have access to classified information if they are permitted to gain knowledge of the information or if they are in a place where they would be expected to gain such knowledge. Persons do not have access to classified information by being in a place where classified information is kept if security measures prevent them from gaining knowledge of the information. (JP 1-02) Accommodation Address.  An address for a person or organization that does not occupy the premises. (HDI Lexicon, April 2008)\n-- Also, an address where regular posted mail, or sometimes another type of communication, is received and then held for pickup or forwarded, transmitted, or relayed to a member of a intelligence service who does not occupy the premises. Sometimes called a mail drop, live letterbox, or cutout. (AFOSI Manual 71-142, OFCO, 9 Jun 2000 and Spy Book) -- Also, a \"safe\" address, not overtly associated with intelligence activity, used by an agent to communicate with the intelligence service for whom he working. (FBI -- Affidavit:  USA vs. Robert Philip Hanssen, 16 Feb 2001)\n-- Also, an address with no obvious connection to an intelligence agency, used for receiving mail containing sensitive material or information (Spycraft)\n-- Also, a prearranged temporary address or location where an intelligence operative may receive mail clandestinely from a third party. (*Encyclopedia of the CIA*, 2003) ACIC.  See *Army Counterintelligence Center*. Acknowledged SAP.  A SAP [Special Access Program] whose existence is acknowledged but its specific details (technologies, materials, techniques, etc.) are classified as specified in the applicable security classification guide. (DoDD 5205.07, SAP Policy, 1 July 2010)  Also see *unacknowledged SAP*.\n\n-- Also, a Special Access Program that is acknowledged to exist and whose purpose is identified\n(e.g., the B-2 or the F-117 aircraft program) while the details, technologies, materials, techniques, etc., of the program are classified as dictated by their vulnerability to exploitation and the risk of compromise. Program funding is generally unclassified. Note: Members of the four Congressional Defense Committees are authorized access to the program. (DSS Glossary) Acoustic Intelligence (ACINT).  Intelligence derived from the collection and processing of acoustic phenomena. (JP 1-02 and JP 2-0, Joint Intelligence, 22 Oct 2013) Acoustical Security.  Those security measures designed and used to deny aural access to classified information. (DSS Glossary and AR 381-14, Technical Counterintelligence, 30 Sep 2002) Acoustical Surveillance.  Employment of electronic devices, including sound-recording, -receiving, or -transmitting equipment, for the collection of information. (JP 1-02) Acquisition Special Access Program.  A special access program established primarily to protect sensitive research, development, testing, and evaluation or procurement activities in support of sensitive military and intelligence requirements. (DSS Glossary) Acquisition Security Database (ASDB).  A classified DoD database designed to support Program Managers, Research Technology Protection (RTP), Anti-Tamper, Counterintelligence, OPSEC, and Security personnel supporting DoD Acquisition Programs with automated tools and functionality to enable efficient and cost-effective identification and protection of Critical Technologies (CT) and Critical Program Information (CPI).\n\n-- Also, [proposed definition] the DoD horizontal protection database providing online storage, retrieval, and tracking of CPI and supporting Program Protection documents in order to facilitate comparative analysis of defense systems' technology and align CPI protection activities across the DoD. (*Draft* DoDI 5200.39, CPI Identification and Protection within RDA Programs)\n\n    All DoD CI personnel providing CI support to RDA should obtain an ASDB account.\n\n    ASDB is a key database for CI support to Research Development & Acquisition (RDA) which\nprovides on-line storage and retrieval of Program Protection Plans (PPPs), Anti-Tamper Plans, Technology Assessment/Control Plans, Multi-Disciplined Counterintelligence Threat Assessments, Program Protection Implementation Plans, OPSEC Plans and Security Classification Guides (SCGs).\n\n    On SIPRNet see <https://asdb.strikenet.navy.smil.mil>\n Acquisition Systems Protection (ASP).  The safeguarding of defense systems anywhere in the acquisition process as defined in DoD Directive 5000.1, the defense technologies being developed that could lead to weapon or defense systems, and defense research data.  ASP integrates all security disciplines, counterintelligence, and other defensive methods to deny foreign collection efforts and prevent unauthorized disclosure to deliver to our force uncompromised combat effectiveness over the life expectancy of the system. (DoD 5200.1-M, Acquisition Systems Protection Program, Mar 1994) Actionable Intelligence.  Intelligence information that is directly useful to customers for immediate exploitation without having to go through the full intelligence production process. (ICS Glossary and\nJP 2-01.2, CI & HUMINT in Joint Operations, 16 Mar 2011 w/ chg 1 dated 26 Aug 2011) Active Cyber Defense.  The Department of Defense's real-time capability to discover, detect, analyze, and mitigate threats and vulnerabilities to defend networks and systems. (DoD Strategy for Operating in Cyberspace, May 2011)\nActive Measures.  In Russian, aktivnyye mery or *aktivnyye meropriyatiya*. ...Soviet KGB tradecraft jargon for operation involving disinformation, manipulation of communist-front organizations, agent-of-influence operations, forgeries and counterfeiting. (The CIA Insider's Dictionary by Leo D. Carl, 1996)\n-- Also, influence operations organized by the Soviet government. These include white, gray, and black propaganda, as well as disinformation. (Encyclopedia of Espionage, Intelligence, and Security by The Gale Group, Inc)\n\n-- Also, the Soviet term for strategies that in the West would be described as black propaganda. The purpose was to denigrate ''the main adversary'' by using whatever disinformation channels were available to spread false stories, plant bogus reports into the media, spread untrue rumors, and support Soviet foreign policy objectives by undermining confidence in its opponents. (Historical Dictionary of Cold War Counterintelligence by Nigel West) -- Also, a form of political warfare conducted by Soviet intelligence and security services to influence the course of world events.  Active measures ranged \"from media manipulations to special actions involving various degrees of violence\" and included disinformation, propaganda, counterfeiting official documents, assassinations, and political repression, such as penetration in churches, and persecution of political dissidents. (Extract from Christopher Andrew and Vasili Mitrokhin, The Mitrokhin Archive: The KGB in Europe and the West, 2000)\n\n    The scale of the Soviet's active measures campaign, and the KGB's involvement in the\ndevelopment and execution of specific items of disinformation was disclosed by a KGB officer, Anatoli Golitsyn, following his defection in Helsinki in December 1961.\n____________________\n\n    Active measures proved highly relevant to the Western counterintelligence community because it\nwas in the KGB's interests to subvert the CIA, by suggesting it was driven by corruption and\ninfluenced by dishonest politicians. The key to successful campaigns proved to be the deliberate\ndistortion of known facts, mixed with an element of fabrication. [...]  In addition, there is some\nevidence to suggest that the KGB attempted to protect some of its most vital sources by interfering in Western mole hunts through the introduction of false or misleading clues to throw the investigations onto unproductive lines of inquiry.\n\n       -- Nigel West, Historical Dictionary of Cold War Counterintelligence\n_____________________ For more information see:  *Soviet Active Measures in the \"Post-Cold War\" Era 1988-1991*, A\nReport Prepared at the Request of the United States House of Representatives Committee on Appropriations by the United States Information Agency, June 1992.  Copy available on line at: <http://intellit.muskingum.edu/russia_folder/pcw_era/index.htm>\n\n    Also see Deception, Disinformation, and Strategic Communications: How One Interagency Group Made a Major Difference by Fletcher Schoen and Christopher J. Lamb, Institute for National\nStrategic Studies, National Defense University, June 2012; copy available on line at: <http://www.ndu.edu/inss/news.cfm?action=view&id=160>\n Activity Based Intelligence (ABI).  A discipline of intelligence where the analysis and subsequent collection is focused on the activity and transactions associated with an entity, a population or an area of interest. (NGA)\n\n    ABI is a multi-intelligence approach based on persistent collection of intelligence over a broad area\nfrom multiple sources. Geospatial Intelligence (GEOINT), coupled with human domain analytics, is the foundation of ABI.\n\n    The National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA) is at the forefront of the ABI push within the\nIntelligence Community. The ubiquitous nature of geo-spatial intelligence (GEOINT), coupled with Human Domain Analytics (HDA), forms the true foundation of ABI.\n\n    See \"A Brief Overview of Activity Based Intelligence and Human Domain Analytics,\" (Sep 2012) by\nMark Phillips available on line at: <http://trajectorymagazine.com/images/winter2012/A_Brief_Overview_of_ABI.pdf>\n______________________\n\n    ABI is an inherently multi-INT approach to activity and transactional data analysis to resolve\nunknowns, develop object and network knowledge, and drive collection.\n_____________________\n\n    ABI is really a new tradecraft that builds on top of something that's been around for awhile called\n'patterns of life.'\n\n        -- Jordan Becker, Vice President & General Manger for GEOINT-ISR, BAE Systems,\n            Quoted in \"GEOINT Tradecraft:  Human Geography\" by Greg Slabodkin, *DefenseSystems*,\n            Vol 7, No. 6, Oct/Nov 2013, p. 7\n Activity Security Manager.  The individual specifically designated in writing and responsible for the activity's information security program, which ensures that classified information (except SCI which is the responsibility of the SSO appointed by the senior intelligence official) and CUI are properly handled during their entire life cycle. This includes ensuring information is appropriately identified, marked, stored, disseminated, disposed of, and accounted for, as well as providing guidance on the handling of security incidents to minimize adverse effects and ensure that appropriate corrective action is taken. The security manager may be assigned responsibilities in other security disciplines such as personnel and physical security, etc. (DoD Manual 5200.01-Vol 1, Information Security Program, 24 Feb 2012) Ad-Hoc Requirement (AHR).  A HUMINT collection requirement with a limited emphasis, based on time or other requirements. (Defense HUMINT Enterprise Manual 3301.02, Vol II Collection Operations, 23 Nov 2010)\n-- Also, an intelligence need that was not addressed in [a] standing tasking. (National HUMINT\nGlossary) Adaptive Planning.  The joint capability to create and revise plans rapidly and systematically, as circumstances require. Also see Adaptive Planning and Execution *(APEX); intelligence planning*. Adaptive Planning and Execution (APEX).  A Department of Defense system of joint policies, processes, procedures, and reporting structures, supported by communications and information technology, that is used by the joint planning and execution community to monitor, plan, and execute mobilization, deployment, employment, sustainment, redeployment, and demobilization activities associated with joint operations. (JP 1-02 and JP 5-0, Joint Operation Planning, 11 Aug 2011) Adequate Security. Security commensurate with the risk and the magnitude of harm resulting from the loss, misuse, or unauthorized access to or modification of information. (NIST, Glossary of Key Information Security Terms, May 2013) Adherents.  [In counterterrorism usage] individual who have formed collaborative relationships with, act on behalf of, or are otherwise inspired to take action in furtherance of the goals of al-Qa'idathe organization and ideologyincluding b engaging in violence regardless of whether such violence is targeted at the United States, its citizens, or its interests. (National Strategy for Counterterrorism,\nJune 2011) Ad-hoc HUMINT Requirement (AHR). A HUMINT collection requirement with a limited emphasis, based upon time or other requirements. (DHE-M 3301.001, DIA HUMINT Manual, Vol I, 30 Jan 2009 w/ chg 2) Adjudication.  Evaluation of personnel security investigations and other relevant information to determine if it is clearly consistent with the interests of national security for persons to be granted or retain eligibility for access to classified information, and continue to hold positions requiring a trustworthiness decision.\n\n(DSS Glossary) Administrative Control (ADCON).  Direction or exercise of authority over subordinate or other organizations in respect to administration and support. (JP 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States, 25 Mar 2013)\n\nAdmission.  A polygraph examinee's acknowledgement of a fact or a capable statement associated with a relevant issue. (AR 381-20, Army CI Program, 25 May 2010)\n\n\nAdvanced Persistent Threat (APT). An extremely proficient, patient, determined, and capable adversary, including two or more of such adversaries working together. (DoDI 5205.13, Defense Industrial Base Cyber Security/Information Assurance Activities, 29 Jan 2010)\n-- Also, an adversary that possesses sophisticated levels of expertise and significant resources which allow it to create opportunities to achieve its objectives by using multiple attack vectors (e.g., cyber, physical, and deception). These objectives typically include establishing and extending footholds within the information technology infrastructure of the targeted organizations for purposes of exfiltrating information, undermining or impeding critical aspects of a mission, program, or organization; or positioning itself to carry out these objectives in the future. The advanced persistent threat: (i) pursues its objectives repeatedly over an extended period of time; (ii) adapts to defenders' efforts to resist it; and (iii) is determined to maintain the level of interaction needed to execute its objectives. (NIST, Glossary of Key Information Security Terms, May 2013)\n\n-- Also, a cyberattack campaign with specific, targeted objectives, conducted by a coordinated team of specialized experts, combining organization, intelligence complexity, and patience. (Cybersecurity and Cyberwar)\n-- Also, cyber attacks mounted by organizational teams that have deep resources, advanced penetration skills, specific target profiles and are remarkably persistent in their efforts. They tend to use sophisticated custom malware that can circumvent most defenses, stealthy tactics and demonstrate good situational awareness by evaluating defenders responses and escalating their attack techniques accordingly. (<www.hackingtheuniverse.com/infosec/isnews/advanced-persistent-threat>; accessed 5 Jan 2010)\n The technological (cyber) APT has been used by actors in many nations as a means to gather intelligence on individuals, and groups of individuals of interest.  See additional information at:\n\n      -- <http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/08_16/b4080032220668.htm> -- <http://www.prometheus-group.com/blogs/36-web-security/152-anatomy-of-apt.html> -- <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/GhostNet>\n_________________________\n\n    Also see Mandiant Report, *APT1: Exposing One of China's Cyber Espionage Units*, undated (circa Feb 2013); copy available at:  <http://intelreport.mandiant.com/Mandiant_APT1_Report.pdf> Adverse Information.  Any information that adversely reflects on the integrity or character of a cleared employee, that suggests that his or her ability to safeguard classified information may be impaired, or that his or her access to classified information clearly may not be in the interest of national security.   (DoD Manual 5220.22-M, National Industrial Security Program Operating Manual, 28 Feb 2006)\n\nAdversarial Supply Chain Operation (ASCO).  ASCOs are the actions taken across the entire supply chain life-cycle to attck and exploit the supply chain.  ASCOs can include threatening or exploiting the supply chains. These operations are carried out through compromise, subversion, and exposure of material and components to or through the supply chain.  The implications of ASCOs are possible adverse effects to mission assurance affecting material, system operations and key capabilities. (DIA)\nAlso see *supply chain, supply chain risk, supply chain risk management*. Adversary.  An individual, group, organization, or government that must be denied essential information. (DoD Manual 5200.1-M, Acquisition Systems Protection Program, Mar 1994)\n\n-- Also, a party acknowledged as potentially hostile to a friendly party and against which the use of force may be envisaged. (JP 1-02 and JP 3-0, Joint Operations, 11 Aug 2011)\n\n-- Also, any individual, group, organization, or government that conducts or has the intent and capability to conduct activities detrimental to the US Government or its assets.  Adversaries may include intelligence services, political or terrorist groups, criminals, and private interests. (CI Community Lexicon)\n-- Also, any foreign individual, group, organizations, or government that conducts or has the intent and capability to conduct activities detrimental to the national security or defense of the United States or its assets, including foreign intelligence services, political or international terrorist groups, and insurgents. (AR 381-20, Army CI Program, 25 May 2010)\n\n\n-- Also, individual, group, organization, or government that conducts or has the intent to conduct detrimental activities. (NIST, Glossary of Key Information Security Terms, May 2013) Adversary Collection Methodology.  Any resource and method available to and used by an adversary for the collection and exploitation of sensitive/critical information or indicators thereof. (DSS Glossary) Adversary Intelligence Systems.  Resources and methods available to and used by an adversary for the collection and exploitation of critical information or indicators thereof. (DoDD 5205.02E, DoD OPSEC Program, 20 Jun 2013) Advisory Tasking.  A term used in collection management to refer to collection notices that are discretionary rather than directive in nature, with the receiving agency determining whether the requirement is relevant to the mission of the agency and whether the agency has the resources to collect against it. (AR 381-20, Army CI Program, 25 May 2010) AFOSI.  Acronym, see *Air Force Office of Special Investigations*. Agency.  In intelligence usage, an organization or individual engaged in collecting and/or processing information.  (JP 1-02 and JP 2-01, Joint and National Intelligence Support to Military Operations, 5 Jan 2012) Agent.  In intelligence usage, one who is authorized and trained to obtain or to assist in obtaining information for intelligence or counterintelligence purposes. (JP 1-02 and JP 2-01.2, CI & HUMINT in Joint Operations, 16 Mar 2011 w/ chg 1 dated 26 Aug 2011)  Also see agent of influence; agent of a foreign entity; asset; foreign intelligence agent.\n\n-- Also, a person who engages in clandestine intelligence activities under the direction of an intelligence organization, but is not an officer, employee, or co-opted worker of that organization. (National HUMINT Glossary) -- Also, an individual other than an officer, employee, or co-opted worker of an intelligence service to whim specific intelligence assignments are given by an intelligence service. An agent in a target country can be operated by a legal or illegal residency or directly by the center. An agent can be of any nationality. (FBI FCI Terms)\n\n-- Also, 1) A person who engages in clandestine intelligence activity under the direction of an intelligence organization but who is not an officer, employee, or co-opted worker of that organization; 2) An individual who acts under the direction of an intelligence agency or security service to obtain, or assist in obtaining, information for intelligence or counterintelligence proposes; [and] 3) One who is authorized or instructed to obtain or assist in obtaining information for intelligence or counterintelligence purposes.\n\n(ICS Glossary)\n\n    Typically, the aim of an espionage operation is to recruit an **agent** [emphasis added], usually a\nforeign person, to carry out the actual spying. The person who targets, recruits, trains, and runs the agent is, in American parlance, the 'case officer.'\n\n         -- Arthur S. Hulnick, \"Espionage: Does It Have a Future in the 21st Century?\"\n            *The Brown Journal of World Affairs;* v XI: n 1 (2004).\n_____________________\n\n    ...[T]ypes of agentssingletons, sleepers, illegal spies actively running one or more sources,\nillegal residents running a group of other illegals, and so forth.\n\n        -- Peter Wright, *Spycatcher* (1987), p. 139\n\n## _____________________\n\n\n    Espionage is one of the toughest games played.  An agent in the right place is hard to find, but\nwhen he is found he should be regarded as a pearl beyond price.\n\n        -- David Nelligan, *The Spy in the Castle* (1968)\n Agent-in-Place.  A person who remains in a position while acting under the direction of a hostile intelligence service, so as to obtain current intelligence information. It is also called a recruitment-in-place. (FBI -- Affidavit:  USA vs. Robert Philip Hanssen, 16 Feb 2001)  Also see recruitment-in-place (RIP). Agent of Influence.  An agent of some stature who uses his or her position to influence public opinion or decision making to produce results beneficial to the country whose intelligence service operates the agent. (AFOSI Manual 71-142, OFCO, 9 Jun 2000)   [Originally a Soviet term]\n-- Also, a person who is directed by an intelligence organization to use his position to influence public opinion or decision-making in a manner that will advance the objective of the country for which that organization operates. (ICS Glossary)\n-- Also, an individual who acts in the interest of an adversary without open declaration of allegiance and attempts to exercise influence covertly, but is not necessarily gathering intelligence or compromising classified material, is known as an agent of influence. (Historical Dictionary of Cold War Counterintelligence, 2007)\n\n\n-- Also, an agent operating under intelligence instructions who uses his official or public position, and other means, to exert influence on policy, public opinion, the course of particular events, the activity of political organizations and state agencies in target countries. (KGB Lexicon: The Soviet Intelligence Officer's Handbook, edited by KGB archivist Vasiliy Mitrokhin, 2002).\n\n    An agent of influence is a person who uses his or her position, influence, power, and credibility to\n\npromote the objectives of an alien power..., in ways unattributable to that power, Such agents may operate openly or surreptitiously, and their effectiveness depends on their position and the extent to which they are prepared to misuse it, but any degree of deliberate support for an adversary power, especially if applied in an underhanded way, savours of treachery.\n\n       -- Chapman Pincher, *Traitors: The Anatomy of Treason*, First U.S. Edition (1999), p. 34\n Agent of a Foreign Entity.  A person who engages in intelligence activities under the covert direction of a foreign intelligence or security entity, but is not an officer, employee, or co-opted worker of that entity.\n\n(ONCIX Analytic Chiefs Working Group, Jan 2011)  Also see agent; agent of a foreign power; asset. Agent of a Foreign Power.  Means:  (1) any person other than a United States person, who - (A) acts in the United States as an officer or employee of a foreign power, or as a member of a foreign power as defined in subsection (a)(4) of this section; (B) acts for or on behalf of a foreign power which engages in clandestine intelligence activities in the United States contrary to the interests of the United States, when the circumstances of such person's presence in the United States indicate that such person may engage in such activities in the United States, or when such person knowingly aids or abets any person in the conduct of such activities or knowingly conspires with any person to engage in such activities; or (C) engages in international terrorism or activities in preparation therefore; or (2) any person who - (A) knowingly engages in clandestine intelligence gathering activities for or on behalf of a foreign power, which activities involve or may involve a violation of the criminal statutes of the United States; (B) pursuant to the direction of an intelligence service or network of a foreign power, knowingly engages in any other clandestine intelligence activities for or on behalf of such foreign power, which activities involve or are about to involve a violation of the criminal statutes of the United States; (C) knowingly engages in sabotage or international terrorism, or activities that are in preparation therefore, for or on behalf of a foreign power; (D) knowingly enters the United States under a false or fraudulent identity for or on behalf\n\nof a foreign power or, while in the United States, knowingly assumes a false or fraudulent identity for or on behalf of a foreign power; or (E) knowingly aids or abets any person in the conduct of activities described in subparagraph (A), (B), or (C) or knowingly conspires with any person to engage in activities described in subparagraph (A), (B), or (C). (Source: 50 USC  1801b)   Also see *foreign power*. Agent Handler.  An [intelligence] officer or principal agent who directly manages an agent or agent network. (National HUMINT Glossary)  Also see *case officer*. Agent Net.  An intelligence gathering unit of agents supervised by a principal agent who is operating under the direction of an intelligence officer.  An agent net can operate in either the legal or illegal field. (ICS Glossary and FBI FCI Terms) Agent Recruitment Cycle (ARC). See *recruitment cycle*. Air Force Office of Special Investigations (AFOSI).  U.S. Air Force's major investigative service; a federal law enforcement and investigative agency operating throughout the full spectrum of conflict, seamlessly within any domain; conducting criminal investigations and providing counterintelligence services. (<www.osi.andrews.af.mil>; accessed 27 June 2012)\n\n\n    AFOSI Mission:  Identify, exploit and neutralize criminal, terrorist and intelligence threats to the Air Force, Department of Defense and U.S. Government.\n\n   AFOSI Capabilities: -- Protect critical technologies and information -- Detect and mitigate threats -- Provide global specialized services -- Conduct major criminal investigation -- Engage foreign adversaries and threats offensively\n\n                                                             Source:  AFOSI web site (accessed 27 June 2012)\n\n  Fact sheet at: <http://www.osi.andrews.af.mil/library/factsheets/factsheet_print.asp?fsID=4848&page=1> All-Source Analysis.  An intelligence activity involving the integration, evaluation, and interpretation of information from all available data sources and types, to include human intelligence, signals intelligence, geospatial intelligence, measurement & signature intelligence, and open source intelligence. (DoDD 5240.01, DoD Intelligence Activities, 27 Aug 2007)  Also see a*nalysis; analysis and production*;\ncounterintelligence analysis. -- Also, an intelligence activity involving the integration, evaluation, and interpretation of information from all available data sources and types, to include HUMINT, SIGINT, MASINT, GEOINT, OSINT, and CI. (DoDI 5105.21, DIA, 18 Mar 2008)  {note this definition includes *counterintelligence*}.\n\n    All-source analysis can transform raw intelligence, data, and information into knowledge and\nunderstanding.\n________________________\n\n\n    Integrated all-source analysis should also inform and shape strategies to collect more\nintelligence.... The importance of integrated, all-source analysis cannot be overstated. Without it,\nit is not possible to \"connect the dots.\"\n\n       -- Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (2004)\n All-Source Intelligence. 1) Intelligence products and/or organizations and activities that incorporate all sources of information in the production of finished intelligence.  2) In intelligence collection, a phrase that indicates that in the satisfaction of intelligence requirements, all collection, processing, exploitation, and reporting systems and resources are identified for possible use and those most capable are tasked. (JP 2-0, Joint Intelligence, 22 Oct 2013)\n\n\n-- Also, intelligence information derived from several or all the intelligence disciplines, including SIGINT, HUMINT, MASINT, OSINT, and GEOINT. (ODNI, U.S. Intelligence - An Overview 2011)\n-- Also, the integration of intelligence and information from all relevant sources in order to analyze situations or conditions that impact operations. (ADRP 2-0, Intelligence, Aug 2012)*\n    * Note: supersedes the definition in Army FM 2-0, *Intelligence*, 23 Mar 2010.\n\n\n    ADRP = Army Doctrinal Reference Publication. ADRPs are available online at  <hhtps://armypubs.us.army.mil/doctrine/index.html> Alliance.  The relationship that results from a formal agreement between two or more nations for broad, long-term objectives that further the common interests of the members. (JP 1-02 and JP 3-0, Joint Operations, 11 Aug 2011) Alias.  A false identity used while carrying out authorized activities and lawful operations. (DoDI S-\n5105.63, Implementation of DoD Cover and Cover Support Activities, 20 Jun 2013)\n-- Also, an alternative name, used for cover purposes. (Defense HUMINT Enterprise Manual\n3301.002, Vol II, Collection Operations, 23 Nov 2010)\n-- Also, a false name. (National HUMINT Glossary)\n-- Also, a false name assumed by an individual for a specific and often temporary purpose, i.e., to conceal a true identity from persons or organizations with whom he or she is in contact. Also called a pseudonym or cover name. (AFOSI Manual 71-142, OFCO, 9 Jun 2000)\n-- Also, an assumed name, usually consisting of a first and last name, used by an individual for a specific and often temporary purpose. (FBI FCI Terms) Alternate Meet.  A prearranged meeting that takes place in the event a regularly scheduled meet is missed for any reason. (FBI FCI Terms) Alternative Analysis.  [Analysis that] involves a fairly intensive, though time limited, effort to challenge assumptions or to identify alternative outcomes, depending on the technique employed, with the results captured, implicitly or explicitly, in a written product delivered to relevant policy-makers.(CIA - Sherman Kent Center for Intelligence Analysis)\n\n    Alternative analysis includes techniques to challenge analytic assumptions (e.g., \"devil's\nadvocacy\"), and those to expand the range.\n\n    See article \"Rethinking \"Alternative Analysis\" to Address Transnational Threats\" at: <https://www.cia.gov/library/kent-center-occasional-papers/vol3no2.htm>\n\nAlternative Compensatory Control Measures (ACCM).  Measures designed to safeguard sensitive intelligence and operations when normal security measures are either not sufficient to achieve strict controls over access to information, but where strict SAP [Special Access Program] access controls are either not required or are too stringent. (AR 381-20, Army CI Program, 25 May 2010)\n\n-- Also, used to safeguard sensitive intelligence or operations and support information (acquisition programs do not qualify) when normal measures are insufficient to achieve strict need-to-know controls, and where Special Access Program controls are not required. (DSS Glossary)\n\n\n    ACCMs are not Special Access Programs (SAPs).  Guidance for ACCMs is contained in DoD\nManual 5200.01, Vol 3, *DoD Information Security Program:  Protection of Classified Information*, 24 Feb 2012,\n\n\nAmbassador.  Diplomatic official of the highest rank who is accredited to a foreign sovereign or government, or to an international organization, as the resident representative of the sending government or appointed for a specific diplomatic assignment. (Department of State)  Also see *Chief of Mission*.\n\n    A U.S. ambassador serving abroad symbolizes the sovereignty of the United States and serves as\nthe personal representative of the President of the United States.  Ambassadorial duties include negotiating agreements, reporting on political, economic and social conditions, advising on policy options, protecting American interests, and coordinating the activities of all U.S. Government agencies and personnel in the country.\n Analysis.  [In intelligence usage] the process by which information is transformed into intelligence; a systemic examination of information to identify significant facts, make judgments, and draw conclusions. (ODNI, U.S. Intelligence - An Overview 2011)  Also see analysis and production; all-source analysis; counterintelligence analysis; intelligence analysis.\n\n-- Also, the process by which collected information is evaluated and integrated with existing information to produce intelligence that describes the currentand attempts to predict the futureimpact of the threat, terrain and weather, and civil considerations on operations. (Army FM 2-0, Intelligence, 23 Mar 2010) -- Also, a stage in the intelligence processing cycle whereby collected information is reviewed to identify significant facts; the information is compared with and collated with other data, and conclusions, which also incorporate the memory and judgment of the intelligence analyst, are derived from it. (Senate Report 94-755, Book I - Glossary, 26 Apr 1976)\n\n\n## Intelligence Analysis...\n\n \"Joe, you're guessing!\"\nNavy Capitan Matthew Garth\n(Charlton Heston)\n \"Sir, we like to call it analysis.\"\nNaval Intelligence Officer Joseph Rochefort\n(Harold Rowe \"Hal\" Holbrook, Jr.)\n-- The movie *Midway* (1976)\n\n    Analysis is the process by which people transform information into intelligence.  It includes\n\nintegrating, evaluating, and analyzing all available data -- which is often fragmented and even contradictory -- and preparing intelligence products.\n\n Former DCI Richard Helms noted that despite all the attention focused on the operational\n(collection) side of intelligence, *analysis* is the core of the process to inform decision makers.\n_______________________\nout of a number of facts, which are incidental and which are vital.\n\n\n-- Sherlock Holmes From A. Conan Doyle's \"The Reigate Squire\" June 1893\n(M. Hardwick, *The Complete Guide to Sherlock Holmes, 1*986, pp. 86-87)\n_______________________\n\nAnalysis is the thinking part of the intelligence process\n\n-- James B. Bruce and Roger Z. George\n-- President Ronald Reagan (4 Dec 1981)\n...[A]nalysis must always be timely, responsive and relevant to... customer's needs.\n\n\n-- LTG Michael T. Flynn, USA, Director Defense Intelligence Agency (Jul 2012)\n_____________________\n\n\n    Intelligence analysts select and filter information; they interpret the resultant evidence, put it into\ncontext, and tailor it to meet... customers' needs.  In short, analysts and analysts only, create\nintelligence.\n\n        -- David T. Moore, \"Species of Competencies for Intelligence,\" *American Intelligence Journal* (2005)\n _____________________\n\n    Analysis must do more than just describe what is happening and why; it must identify a range of\nopportunities...  Analysis is the key to making sense of the data and finding opportunities to take\n  *action.*\n        -- DNI 2006 Annual Report of the US Intelligence Community (Feb 2007)\n_____________________\n\n    The primary purpose of analytic effort is \"sensemaking\" and understanding, not producing reports;\nthe objective of analysis is to provide information in a meaningful context, not individual factoids.\n\n       -- Jeffrey R, Cooper, *Curing Analytical Pathologies*, Center for the Study of Intelligence (Dec 2005), p. 42\n_____________________\n\n    Today, U.S. intelligence analysts spend roughly 80 percent of their time gathering intelligence but\nonly 20 percent analyzing it.\n\n       -- LTG Bob Noonan (USA Ret) and Greg Wenzel, \"Fixing the 'I' in ISR,\" *DefenseNews*, 24 Sep 2012, p. 45\n_____________________\n\nAnalysts are the voice of the Intelligence Community\n\n-- WMD Report (31 Mar 2005), p. 388\n____________________\n\nAnalysts must absorb information with the thoroughness of historians, organize it with the skill of librarians, and disseminate it with the zeal of journalists.\n\n\n--TRADOC Pam 525-2-1, *US Army Functional Concept for Intelligence 2016-2028*, 13 Oct 2010; p. 66\n________________________\n\nIntelligence analysis is inherently an intellectual activity that requires knowledge, judgment, and a degree of intuition.\n\n    Selected references for **intelligence analysis**: Richards J. Heuer, Jr., *Psychology of Intelligence Analysis* (Washington, DC: Center for the Study\nof Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency), 1999.\n\n    Copy available online at:  <http://www.archive.org/details/PsychologyOfIntelligenceAnalysis>\nAlso at: <https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/books-andmonographs/psychology-of-intelligence-analysis/index.html>\n\n    Richards J. Heuer, Jr. and Randolph H. Pherson, Structured Analytical Techniques for Intelligence\nAnalysis (Washington, DC; CQ Press), 2010.\n\n    Richards J. Heuer, Jr, *Improving Intelligence Analysis with ACH*, 2005. This learning aid extracts, revises, and partially updates those portions of the author's book,\nPsychology of Intelligence Analysis [cited above], that deal with Analysis of Competing Hypotheses (ACH) and with how and why the ACH software helps intelligence analysts reduce the risk of\nsurprise. ACH software is available at:  <http://www2.parc.com/istl/projects/ach/ach.html>\n\n    Roger Z. George and James B. Bruce, eds., Analyzing Intelligence: Origins, Obstacles, and\nInnovation (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press), 2008.\n\n    Robert M. Clark, *Intelligence Analysis: A Target-Centric Approach*, rev. ed. (Washington, DC: CQ\nPress), 2007; also paperback 2012\n\n    David A. Schum, *Evidence and Inference for the Intelligence Analyst* (Lanham, MD: University\nPress of America) 1987.\n\n    Morgan Jones, *The Thinker's Toolkit: 14 Powerful Techniques for Problem Solving*, rev. ed. (New\nYork: Three Rivers Press), 1998.\n\n    Robert S. Sinclair, *Thinking and Writing: Cognitive Science and Intelligence Analysis,* revised\nedition (Washington, DC: Center for the Study of Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency), 2010.\n    Copy available at:  <https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csipublications/books-and-monographs/thinking-and-writing.html>\n\n    David T. Moore, *Sensemaking: A Structure for an Intelligence Revolution* (Washington, DC:\nNational Defense Intelligence College, 2011).\n    Copy available at <http://ni-u.edu/ni_press/pdf/Sensemaking.pdf>\n\n    A Tradecraft Primer:  Structured Analytical Techniques for Improving Intelligence Analysis\n(Washington, DC:  U.S. Government), 2009.\n    Copy available at: <https://www.cia.gov/library/ publications/publications-rss-updates/tradecraftprimer-may-4-2009.html>\n\n    A Compendium of Analytic Tradecraft Notes, Volume I, Notes 1-10, reprinted (Washington, DC:\nCentral Intelligence Agency), 1997.\n    Copy available at:  <http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/cia/tradecraft_notes/contents.htm>\n\n    *The Sherman Kent Center for Intelligence Analysis Occasional Papers,* (CIA).\n    Available online at:  <https://www.cia.gov/library/kent-center-occasional-papers/index.html>\n\n    Frank Watanabe, \"Fifteen Axioms for Intelligence Analysts.\" *Studies in Intelligence*, CIA,\nSemiannual Edition, No. 1, 1997, pp. 45-47.\n    Copy available on line at:  <https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/kentcsi/vol40no5/pdf/v40i5a06p.pdf>\n\n    Also see Mark Lowenthal, PhD, *Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy,*  5th Edition (CQ Press), 2011.\n Analysis and Production.  In intelligence usage, the conversion of processed information into intelligence through the integration, evaluation, analysis, and interpretation of all source data and the preparation of intelligence products in support of known or anticipated user requirements. (JP 1-02 and JP 2-01, Joint and National Intelligence Support to Military Operations, 5 Jan 2012)  Also see analysis; all-source analysis; counterintelligence analysis.\n\n-- Also, the ability to integrate, evaluate, and interpret information from available sources and develop intelligence products that enable situational awareness. (Joint Capability Areas Taxonomy & Lexicon, 15 Jan 2008) Analysis of Competing Hypothesis (ACH).  Identification of alternate explanations (hypothesis) and evaluation of all evidence that will disconfirm rather that confirm hypotheses. (CIA, A Tradecraft Primer: Structured Analytical Techniques for Improving Intelligence Analysis, June 2005)\n\n\n    ACH a highly effective technique when there is a large amount of data to absorb and evaluate. It\nis particular appropriate for controversial issues when analysts want to develop a clear record that shows what theories they have considered and how they arrived at their judgments.\n\n    See Richards J. Heuer, Jr, *Improving Intelligence Analysis with ACH*, Nov 2005 (Learning Aid,\nACH Version 2.0). This learning aid extracts, revises, and partially updates those portions of the author's book, *Psychology of Intelligence Analysis* [cited above], that deal with Analysis of Competing Hypotheses (ACH) and with how and why the ACH software helps intelligence analysts reduce the risk of surprise.\n\n    ACH software available for download at:  <http://www2.parc.com/istl/projects/ach/ach.html>\n\nAnalysis Report.  A type of DoD CI analytical product prepared IAW DoDI 5240.18; it may require indepth study and research, but generally is not as involved as an assessment. (DoDI 5240.18, CI Analysis\n& Production, 17 Nov 2009 with change 1 dated 15 Oct 2013). Also see Counterintelligence Analytical Product. Analytic Outreach.  The open, overt, and deliberate act of an IC [Intelligence Community] analyst engaging with an individual outside the IC to explore ideas and alternate perspectives, gain new insights, generate new knowledge, or obtain new information. (ICD 205, Analytic Outreach, 16 Jul 2008) Analytic Tradecraft.  The practiced skill of applying learned techniques and methodologies appropriate to an issue to mitigate, gain insight, and provide persuasive understanding of the issue to members of the U.S. Government and its allies. (DIA, *A Tradecraft Primer: Basic Structured Analytic Techniques,* March 2008).\n\n    Note:  The source document (First Edition) cited above is no longer available online.  The current\nversion:  *Tradecraft Primer: Structured Analytic Techniques*, 3rd Edition (3 March 2010) is now\nDefense Intelligence Reference Document, *Analytic Methodologies*, DIA-01-1003-001A, and is controlled as UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY.\n Anomalies.  Foreign power activity or knowledge, inconsistent with the expected norms that suggest prior foreign knowledge of US national security information, processes or capabilities. (DoDD O-5240.02, Counterintelligence, 20 Dec 2007 with change 1 dated 30 Dec 2010)  See *anomalous activity; anomaly*.\n\n-- Also, irregular or unusual activities that may cue the analyst on the existence of FISS and ITO\n[international terrorist organizations] activity. (Army FM 2-22.2, Counterintelligence, Oct 2009)\n\n    CI anomalies differ from CI indicators (see *potential espionage indicators*).  CI anomalies surface\nas a result of FIE activities, whereas CI indictors are manifested in an insider's actions, activities,\nand/or behaviors.\n______________________\n\n    Recognizing the importance of CI anomalies in the early detection and neutralization of espionage,\na White House Memorandum of August 23, 1996 called for a more systematic approach to the handling of CI anomalies. The memorandum emphasized the need for, and value of, timely participation of CI elements in detecting and reporting CI anomalies indicating threats to U.S. national security.\n\n      -- DIA tri-fold, *Counterintelligence Anomalies: What are They and Why Should We Look for Them?*, Jan 2012\n______________________\n\n\nLook for the anomalies...\nLook for the odd bits that seem to be out of focus, or out of sequence.\nLook for the inexplicable.\n\n\n-- Sean Flannery, *Crossed Swords*, 1989\n Anomalous Activity.  Irregular or unusual deviations from what is usual, normal, or expected; activity inconsistent with the expected norm. See *anomalies; anomaly*.\n\n-- Also, [in DoD cyber usage] network activities that are inconsistent with the expected norms that may suggest FIE [Foreign Intelligence Entity] exploitation of cyber vulnerabilities or prior knowledge of U.S. national security information, processes, or capabilities. (DoDI S-5240.23, CI Activities in Cyberspace, 13 Dec 2010 with change 1 dated 16 Oct 2013)\n\n## Anomalous Behavior Analysis\n\n    [The CI] analyst seeks out strange or puzzling behavior pointing to a counterintelligence problem\neven before it is known to exist. There are various kinds of anomalous behaviors that might tip off\nan analyst about a foreign intelligence service's successful operations. One is strategic behavior.\nWhen a foreign government starts using the same secret technology as another government, the\n   analyst who finds this out may hypothesize that it because such secrets have been stolen.\n      -- Roy Godson, *Dirty Tricks or Trump Cards: US Covert Action and Counterintelligence* (1995), p. 196\n Anomaly.  Activity or knowledge, outside the norm, that suggests a foreign entity has foreknowledge of U.S. information, processes, or capabilities. (DoDD 5240.06, CIAR, 17 May 2011 with change 1 dated 30 May 3013)  See anomalies, anomalous activity, anomaly-based detection.\n\n\n\nAnomaly-based Detection.  The process of comparing CI, security, IA [Information Assurance], LE [law enforcement], and AT/FP [antiterrorism and force protection] behaviors and activities that are deemed normal against other observed events to identify significant deviations and or anomalous behavior. (DoDI 5240.26, Countering Espionage, International Terrorism, and Counterintelligence Insider Threat, 4 May 2012 with change 1 dated 15 Oct 2013) -- Also, the process of comparing definitions of what activity is considered normal against observed events to identify significant deviations. (NIST, Glossary of Key Information Security Terms, May 2013)\n\n## Anomaly Detection\n\n    The systems and processes used to assess deviant or unscheduled activities or presences which\nmay indicate anomalous activities or unauthorized access. This interpretation assumes a baseline norm from which deviations are assumed to indicate some type of intrusion.\n\n        -- Julie K. Petersen, Understanding Surveillance Technologies: Spy Devices, Their Origins & Applications (2001)\n\nAnti-Tamper.  Systems engineering activities intended to deter and/or delay exploitation of critical technologies in a U.S. defense system in order to impede countermeasure development, unintended technology transfer, or alteration of a system. (DoDI 5200.39, CPI Protection within DoD, 16 Jul 2008)\n\n\n    Note:  DoDI 5200.39 under revision, proposed revised definition for AT:  Systems engineering\nactivities intended to prevent, or delay exploitation of CPI in U.S. defense systems to impede countermeasure development, unintended technology transfer, or alteration of a system due.\n(Draft circa Feb 2014)\n\n    DoD Anti-Tamper Executive Agent:  chartered by the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition,\nTechnology, and Logistics), and assigned to the Directorate for Special Programs, Office of the\nAssistant Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition.\n\nAntiterrorism (AT).  Defensive measures used to reduce the vulnerability of individuals and property to terrorist acts, to include limited response and containment by local military and civilian forces. (JP 1-02; and JP 3-07.2, Antiterrorism, 24 Nov 2010)\n\n    Also see DoDI 2000.12, *DoD Antiterrorism Program*, 1 Mar 2012 (w/ chg 1) and DoD O-2000.12-H,\nDoD Antiterrorism Handbook, 1 February 2004 Apportionment.  In the general sense, distribution for planning of limited resources among competing requirements. (JP 1-02) Apprehension.  The taking of a person into custody or the military equivalent of \"arrest.\" Under Rule 304, Manual for Courts Martial (MCM), the restraint of a person by oral or written order directing him to remain\nwithin specified limits. (AR 381-20, Army CI Program, 25 May 2010)\nArea of Responsibility (AOR).  The geographical area associated with a combatant command within which a geographic combatant commander has authority to plan and conduct operations. (JP 1-02) Army Counterintelligence Center (ACIC).  The Army's counterintelligence analysis and production center.\n    ACIC's mission is to provide timely, accurate, effective multidiscipline counterintelligence analysis\nin support of the US Army combating terrorism program, ground systems technologies, and counterintelligence investigations, operation, and activities. The ACIC is a subordinate unit of the 902d Military Intelligence Group, US Army Intelligence and Security Command, located at Fort\nMeade, Maryland.\n\nArmy G-2X.  The element which manages and provides technical control of the CI and HUMINT missions in the Army. (AR 380-20, Army CI Program, 25 May 2010) Arrest. The act of detaining in legal custody. An \"arrest\" is the deprivation of a person's liberty by legal authority in response to a criminal charge. (www.ojp.usdoj.gov; accessed 29 Apr 2013) ASDB.  Acronym, see *Acquisition Security Database*. Assassination.  The murder or attempted murder of DoD personnel for political or retaliatory reasons by international terrorists or agents of a foreign power. (AR 381-20, Army CI Program, 25 May 2010)\n\n-- Also, to murder (usually a prominent person) by a sudden and/or secret attack, often for political reasons. (Wikipedia; accessed 15 Feb 2010)\n\"[The KGB] did everything from plotting ways to poison the capital's\nwater systems to drawing up assassination plans for US leaders.\"\n\n-- Oleg Kalugin, Former Major General in the KGB\nas cited in Andrew & Mitrokhin, *The Mitrokhin Archive* (1999)\n__________________________\n\n\n    Assassination constitutes an act of murder that is prohibited by international law and Executive\nOrder 12333.  In general, assassination involves murder of a targeted individual for political purposes. Example, the 1978 \"poisoned-tip umbrella\" killing of Bulgarian defector Georgi Markov by Bulgarian State Security agents on the streets of London falls into the category of an act of murder carried out for political purposes, and constitutes an assassination.\n\n    \"Wet Work\" - a term originated within the Soviet intelligence - describes the art of assassination.\nIn 1965, Peter Deriabin, a KGB defector, testified to a Senate committee -\n\n            \"The [KGB] thirteenth department is responsible for assignation and terror. This\n             Department is called the department of wet affairs, or in Russian 'Mokrie Dela'.... 'Mokrei' means 'wet' and in this case 'mokrie' means 'blood wet'.\"\n\n    Unquestionably the most neglected aspect of U.S. counterintelligence.  EO 12333 specifically\nprovides that \"*Counterintelligence* means information gathered and activities conducted to identify,\ndeceive, exploit, disrupt, or protect against... **assassinations** [emphasis added] conducted for or\non behalf of foreign powers, organizations, or persons, or their agents, or international terrorist organizations or activities.\"\n\n    The word *assassin* is derived from the word Hashshashin (Arabic: , ashshashiyin, also\nHashishin, Hashashiyyin, or Assassins).  It referred to the Nizari branch of the Isma'ili Shia founded by the Persian Hassan as-Sabbah during the Middle Ages. They were active in Iran from the 8th to the 14th centuries, and also controlled the castle of Masyaf in Syria. The group killed members of the Muslim Abbasid, Seljuq, and Christian Crusader elite for political and religious reasons.\n___________________\n\n\nThe important thing to know about any assassination or an attempted assassination is not who fired the shot, but who paid for the bullet.\n\n-- Eric Ambler, *A Coffin for Dimitrios* (1939)\n\nAssessment. 1) a continuous process that measures the overall effectiveness of employing joint force capabilities during military operations; 2) determination of the progress toward accomplishing a task, creating a condition, or achieving an objective; 3) analysis of the security, effectiveness, and potential of an existing or planned intelligence activity; and 4) [in human source operations] judgment of the motives, qualifications, and characteristics of present or prospective employees or \"agents.\"\n[emphasis added] (JP 1-02 and JP 3-0, Joint Operations, 11 Aug 2011)\n-- Also, [In CI analysis usage] a type of DoD CI analytical product prepared IAW DoDI 5240.18; it requires in-depth study and research. (DoDI 5240.18, CI Analysis & Production, 17 Nov 2009 with change 1 dated 15 Oct 2013).  Also see *Counterintelligence Analytical Product*.\n\n\n\n-- Also, [in intelligence usage], appraisal of the worth of an intelligence activity, source, information, or product in terms of its contribution to a specific goal, or the credibility, reliability, pertinence, accuracy, or usefulness of information in terms of an intelligence need. (National HUMINT Glossary)\n\nAssessment--within the human source environment...\n\n\"A process of getting to know and understand people and describing them.\"\n\n-- Robert R. Holt, *Assessing Personality* (1971)\n\nEffective assessment of human beings is an art\n\nFrom an Agent Handler perspective...\n\n    \"...[F]inding a likely candidate, getting to know him personally, ascertaining his interests,\nuncovering his vices and possible Achilles' heel.\"\n        -- Victor Cherkashin, KGB Counterintelligence Officer and author of *Spy Handler* (2005)\n Asset.  Any human or technical resource available to an intelligence or security service for operational purposes. (FBI FCI Terms)   Also see *agent; foreign intelligence agent; Intelligence asset; source.* -- Also, [in human source operations] a recruited source. (Defense HUMINT Enterprise Manual\n3301.002, Vol II Collection Operations, 23 Nov 2010) -- Also, any resourcehuman, technical, or otherwiseavailable to an intelligence or security service for operational use. In U.S. usage, usually a person. (Spy Book) -- Also, [in defense critical infrastructure usage] a distinguishable entity that provides a service or capability. Assets are people, physical entities, or information located either within or outside the United States and employed, owned or operated by domestic, foreign, public, or private sector organizations. (DoDD 3020.40, Critical Infrastructure, 14 Jan 2010 w/ chg 2 dated 21 Sep 2012)  Also see defense critical infrastructure program. -- Also, [in critical infrastructure protection] person, structure, facility, information, material, or process that has value. (DHS Lexicon, 2010)  Also see *crucial infrastructure*.\n\n\nAsset Owner. [In DCIP usage,] the DoD Components with responsibility for a DoD asset, or organizations that own or operate a non-DoD asset. (DoDI 3020.45, DCIP Management, 21 Apr 2008)  Also see task asset, task critical asset. Asset Validation.  In intelligence use, the process used to determine the asset authenticity, reliability, utility, suitability, and degree of control the case officer or others have. (JP 1-02 and JP 2-01.2, CI &\nHUMINT in Joint Operations, 16 Mar 2011 w/ chg 1 dated 26 Aug 2011) Also see *Source Validation*.\n\n\n## The Cardinal Rule In Tradecraft Is: Never, Ever Fall In Love With Your Agent.\n\n\n-- Robert D. Chapman, Retired CIA Operations Officer\n\"Patriot or Traitor?\" Book review of A Secret Life in International\nJournal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence, Vol 18 No 2 (Summer 2005), p. 367\n\n## _____________________ Some Human Intelligence Agencies Do A Poor Job Of Validating Human Sources.\n\n    The story of 'Curveball'the human source who lied to the Intelligence Community about Iraq's\nbiological weapons programsis an all-too familiar one. Every agency that collects human intelligence has been burned in the past by false reporting; indeed, the Intelligence Community has been completely fooled several times by large-scale double-agent operations run by, among others, the Cubans, East Germans, and Soviets. It is therefore critical that our human intelligence agencies have excellent practices of validating and vetting their sources.\n-- Also, the process used to determine the asset authenticity, reliability, utility, suitability, and degree of control the case officer or others have.  This process continues through the life of the relationship. It may be more or less formal depending on the sensitivity of the relationship and the nature of the source. For clandestine sources, particularly foreign nationals, the process is usually formal and revalidation is required on a periodic basis.  Whether or not it is conducted formally, it must be a well-planned and thought out activity. (DoD CI Collection IWG Handbook, TTP for CI Collection, Collection Management, and Collection Operations, 8 Aug 2006)\n\nIn the spy trade asset validation is simply a system of measures to establish the reliability and veracity of sources.\n\n-- Michael J. Sulick, American Spies: Espionage Against\nthe United States from the Cold War to the Present, 2013, p. 255\n_________________________\n\nFor any organization that collects human intelligence, having an independent system for asset validation is critical to producing reliable, well-vetted intelligence.\n\n\n-- WMD Report (31 Mar 2005), p. 455\n_________________________\n\nEvery intelligence service has the problem of distinguishing...\nbetween a bona fide volunteer and a penetration agent who has been sent\nby the other side. This is no easy matter.\n\n\n-- Allen W. Dulles, *The Craft of Intelligence* (2006), p. 121\n_________________________\n\n    See DoDI S-3325.07, *Guidance for the Conduct of DoD Human Source Validation* (U) and\nNational HUMINT Manager Directive 001.008, *HUMINT Source Validation*. Assign.  1) To place units or personnel in an organization when such placement is relatively permanent, and/or where such organization controls and administers the units or personnel for the primary function, or greater portion of the functions, of the unit or personnel; or 2) To detail individuals to specific duties or functions where such duties or functions are primary and/or relatively permanent. (JP 1-02 and JP 5-0, Joint Operations Planning, 11 Aug 2011)  Also see *attach.* Assumption.  A supposition on the current situation or a presupposition on the future course of events, either or both assumed to be true in the absence of positive proof, necessary to enable the commander in the process of planning to complete an estimate of the situation and make a decision on the course of action. (JP 1-02 and JP 5-0, Joint Operations Planning, 11 Aug 2011) Asylum.  Protection granted by the U.S. Government within the United States to a foreign national who, due to persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of his or her race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion, is unable or unwilling to avail himself or herself of the protection of his or her country of nationality (or, if stateless, of last habitual residence). (DoDI 2000.11, Procedures for Handling Requests for Asylum and Temporary Refuge, 13\nMay 2010) Asymmetric Threat.  An adversary strength that can be used against a friendly vulnerability.  An adversary may pursue an asymmetric advantage on the tactical or strategic level by identifying key vulnerabilities and devising asymmetric concepts and capabilities to strike or exploit them.  To complicate matters, our adversaries may pursue a combination of asymmetries. (USD/I Taking Stock of Defense Intelligence Report, 22 Jan 2004)\n\n-- Also, a broad and unpredictable spectrum of military, paramilitary, and information operations, conducted by nations, organizations, or individuals or by indigenous or surrogate forces under their control, specifically targeting weaknesses and vulnerabilities within an enemy government or armed force. (Source:  Michael L. Kolodzie, US Army, circa 2001)\n\n\n-- Also, a broad and unpredictable spectrum of risks, actions, and operations conducted by state and non-state actors that can potentially undermine national and global security. (Cyber Threats to National Security, Symposium Five, 2011) Asymmetric Warfare. Combat between two or more state or non-state actors whose relative military power, strategies, tactics, resources, and goals differ significantly. (Cyber Threats to National Security, Symposium Five, 2011) Atmospherics.  Information regarding the surrounding or pervading mood, environment, or influence on a given population. (DoDD 3600.01, Information Operations, 14 Aug 2006 with Chg 1, 23 May 2011) Attach.  1) The placement of units or personnel in an organization where such placement is relatively temporary; or 2) The detailing of individuals to specific duties or functions where such functions are secondary or relatively temporary. (JP 1-02 and JP 3-0, Joint Operations, 11 Aug 2011)  Also see *assign.*\nAttache.  A diplomatic official or military officer attached to an embassy or legation, especially in a technical capacity.   Also see *Senior Defense Official / Defense Attache (SDO/DATT).* Authenticate.  A challenge given by voice or electrical means to attest to the authenticity of a message or transmission. (JP 1-02) Authentication. 1) A security measure designed to protect a communications system against acceptance of a fraudulent transmission or simulation by establishing the validity of a transmission, message, or originator;  2) A means of identifying individuals and verifying their eligibility to receive specific categories of information; 3) Evidence by proper signature or seal that a document is genuine and official; and 4) In personnel recovery missions, the process whereby the identity of an isolated person is confirmed. (JP 1-02 and JP 3-50, Personnel Recovery, 5 Jan 2007) Authenticator.  A symbol or group of symbols, or a series of bits, selected or derived in a prearranged manner and usually inserted at a predetermined point within a message or transmission for the purpose of attesting to the validity of the message or transmission. (JP 1-02)\n\nB ========================================== Background Investigation (BI).  An official inquiry into the activities of a person designed to develop information from a review of records, interviews of the subject, and interviews of people having knowledge of the subject. (IC Standard 700-1, 4 Apr 2008)   See *personnel security investigation*.\n\n    The Office of Personnel Management, Federal Investigative Services (OPM-FIS) provides\ninvestigative products and services for over 100 Federal agencies to use as the basis for suitability and security clearance determinations as required by Executive Orders, et al. OPM provides over 90% of the Government's background investigations, conducting over two million investigations a year.\n\n    See OPM web site at:  <http://www.opm.gov/investigations/background-investigations/>\n Backdoor.  Typically unauthorized hidden software or hardware mechanism used to circumvent security controls. (CNSSI No. 4009, National Information Assurance Glossary, 26 April 2010) Backstop.  Arrangements made to support a cover so that inquiries about the cover will elicit responses that make the cover appear to be true. (DoDI S-5105.63, Implementation of DoD Cover and Cover Support Activities, 20 Jun 2013)\n-- Also, the arrangement made by documentary or oral means to support a cover story so that inquiries about it will elicit responses indicating the story is true. (ICS Glossary & AFOSI Manual 71-142, OFCO, 9 Jun 2000)\n-- Also, to make arrangements made through documentary, oral, technical, fiscal, legal, or other means to support covers (both individual and organizational). A backstopped cover provides sufficient documentation to protect an identity in the immediate area or circumstance and in primary U.S. Government and commercial information systems. A backstopped cover is constructed to withstand routine scrutiny. (DHE-M 3301.002, Vol II Collection Operations, 23 Nov 2010)\n-- Also, an arrangement made to support a cover story. (FBI FCI Terms) Backstopping.  Arrangements made to support covers and activities. (HDI Lexicon, April 2008)\n-- Also, arrangements made through documentary, oral, technical, fiscal, physical, or other means\nto support covers (both individual and organizational). A backstopped cover provides sufficient documentation to project an identity in the immediate area or circumstance and in primary USG and commercial information systems. Backstopping cover may be constructed to withstand scrutiny ranging from casual or unwitting general population to a targeted hostile adversary. (DTM 08-050, Defense Cover Program Guidance (U), 31 Mar 2009 w/ chg 2 dated 14 Apr 2011) -- Also, verification and support of cover arrangements for an agent [case officer or intelligence operative] in anticipation of inquiries or other actions that might test credibility of his or her cover. (Spy Book)\n\n-- Also, a CIA term for providing appropriate verification and support of cover arrangements for an agent\nor asset in anticipation of inquiries or other actions which might test the credibility of his or its cover. (Senate Report 94-755, Book I - Glossary, 26 Apr 1976)\n\nBadge.  A distinctive official device usually made of cast metal, which is provided by the DoD Component and worn or carried by the bearer as a sign of authority. (DoDI 5240.25, Counterintelligence Badges and Credentials, 30 Sep 2011 with change 1 dated 15 Oct 2013)  Also see *credentials*.\n\n\nBasic Intelligence.  Fundamental intelligence concerning the general situation, resources, capabilities, and vulnerabilities of foreign countries or areas which may be used as reference material in the planning of operations at any level and in evaluating subsequent information relating to the same subject.\n(JP 1-02) Beacon.  A device typically fastened to an object or individual that transmits a radio signal in order to track its location.  The technological discipline is called beaconry. (Spycraft) Behavioral Science Consultant.  A professional with extensive training in behavioral science, mental health, psychiatry, or psychology. (Previously in JP 2-01.2, CI & HUMINT Support to Joint Operations, 13 Jun 2006)\n\n    Behavioral Science Consultants are psychologists and forensic psychiatrists, not assigned to\nclinical practice functions, but to provide consultative services to support authorized law enforcement, counterintelligence or intelligence activities, including detention and related counterintelligence, intelligence, interrogation, and detainee debriefing operations.\n Bilateral Collection.  A collection activity run jointly with a foreign intelligence service. (Previously in DoDI S-5240.17,  CI Collection, 12 Jan 2009)   Also see *multilateral.*\n   Bilateral:  Activities conducted with only a single foreign nation. Bilateral/BILAT Operation.  An operation run jointly with a foreign intelligence service or between two US intelligence/CI services. (CI Community Lexicon)   Also see *unilateral operation.* Bigot Case.  An investigation that due to the sensitivity of the subject or the nature of the investigation, requires that it be handled on a strict need to know basis. Access to these investigations is controlled by maintaining a list of personnel who have been approved for access, called a \"bigot list.\"  (AR 381-20, Army CI Program, 25 May 2010)  Also see bigot list, compartmentation. Bigot List.  Tradecraft jargon for any list of names of cleared personnel having restricted access (need-to-know) to a sensitive operation, investigation or to special access/compartmented intelligence. Also see bigot case, *compartmentation*.\n\n-- Also, a restrictive list of persons who have access to a particular, and highly sensitive class of information. (Senate Report 94-755, Book I - Glossary, 26 Apr 1976)\n\n\n  In some instances, a case, due to its sensitivity or the sensitivity of the information involved, will\nrequire that it be handled on a strict need-to-know basis. These cases are often referred to as BIGOT cases because access to them is controlled by a BIGOT list.\n\n       -- Army FM 2-22.2, *Counterintelligence*, October 2009\n________________________\n\n    According to a variety of sources, the term dates back to World War II when Allied orders for\nofficers were stamped \"TO GIB\" for those being sent to Gibraltar for preparations for the invasion of North Africa; later their orders were stamped \"BIG OT\" (TO GIB backwards) when they were sent\nback to begin planning Operation OVERLORD, the invasion of Normandy.  In WWII, it was\nconvenient, in trying to find out if someone had access to highly restricted NEPTUNE and OVERLORD planning information, to ask \"are you bigoted?\"  An indignant answer of \"no\" ended that part of classified discussion.\n Biographical Intelligence.  That component of intelligence that deals with individual foreign personalities of actual or potential importance. (JP 1-02) Biometrics.  The process of recognizing an individual based on measurable anatomical, physiological, and behavioral characteristics. (JP 1-02 and JP 2-0, Joint Intelligence, 22 Oct 2013) Also see biometrics enabled-intelligence.\n\n\n-- Also, a general term used alternatively to describe a characteristic or a process. *As a characteristic:*\nA measurable biological (anatomical & physiological) and behavioral characteristic that can be used for automated recognition. *As a process:* Automated methods of recognizing an individual based on measurable biological (anatomical & physiological) and behavioral characteristics. (DoDD 8521.01E, DoD Biometrics, 21 Feb 2008)\n-- Also, the measurable biological (anatomical and physiological) and behavioral characteristics\nthat can be used for automated recognition; examples include fingerprint, face, and iris recognition. (NSPD 59 / HSPD 24, Biometrics for Identification and Screening to Enhance National Security, 5 Jun 2008)\n-- Also, measurable biological (anatomical and physiological) and behavioral characteristic that\nmay be used for automated recognition of the identity of a person or to verify his claimed identity. Includes fingerprints, iris/retina, voice, facial, DNA, fingernail, and thermal signature. (AR 381-20, Army  CI Program, 25 May 2010)\n\n\n   \"Biometrics has become a non-lethal weapons systems in complex, irregular warfare environments.\nWhen you enroll a person in biometric systems now in use on the battlefield, you take away from our enemies the ability to remain anonymous. It's a high impact tool in the ongoing War on Terror\n  and gives tactical commanders a decisive edge in today and tomorrow's battlespace.\"\n       -- LTG John F. Kimmons, U.S. Army G-2\n________________________\n\n\n    The Secretary of the Army is the DoD Executive Agent for DoD Biometrics.\n\n     The term \"biometrics\" also describes both a *process* and a *characteristic*. As a process, biometrics\nconsists of the automated methods of recognizing an individual based on measurable biological (anatomical and physiological) and behavioral characteristics.\n\n    Two basic types of biometrics:  1) *physical characteristics*, e.g., face, hand & finger geometry, iris,\nand vein structure; and 2) *behavioral characteristics*, e.g., voice, handwriting, typing, rhythm, and gait. For general information see <http://www.howstuffworks.com/biometrics.htm>\n\n    See Army TC 2-22.82, *Biometrics-Enabled Intelligence*, March 2011\n\n    Also see John Woodward, \"Biometrics in the War on Terror,\" RAND Corporation (Dec 2005);\navailable at -- <http://www.rand.org/commentary/2005/12/18/UPI.html>\n Biometrics-Enabled Intelligence (BEI).  Intelligence information associated with and or derived from biometrics data that matches a specific person or unknown identity to a place, activity, device, component, or weapon that supports terrorist / insurgent network and related pattern analysis, facilitates high value individual targeting, reveals movement patterns, and confirms claimed identity. (DoDD 8521.01E, DoD Biometrics, 21 Feb 2008)  Also see *biometric-enabled watch list (BEWL).*\n\n-- Also, the intelligence derived from the processing of biologic identity data and other all-source for information concerning persons of interest. (JP 2-0, Joint Intelligence, 22 Oct 2013)\n-- Also, the information associated with and/or derived from biometric signatures and the associated contextual information that positively identifies a specific person and/or matches an unknown identity to a place, activity, device, component, or weapon. (ADRP 2-0, Intelligence, Aug 2012)\n\n\n    BEI is a specialized analytical discipline that relies on all-source collections and a distinct\nprocessing, exploitation, reporting, and dissemination enterprise to integrate the information from U.S. and non-U.S. biometric collection and processing capabilities into all-source intelligence analysis for the purpose of monitoring or neutralizing the influence and operational capacity of individuals, cells, and networks of interest.\n\n        -- TC 2-22.82, *Biometrics-Enabled Intelligence*, March 2011, p. 1-9\n\nBiometrics-Enabled Watch List (BEWL).  Any list of interest with individuals identified by biometric sample instead of by name, and the desired/recommended disposition instructions for each individual. (TC2-22.82, Biometrics-Enabled Intelligence, March 2011)\n\n    Within DoD, BEWL is a decision aid to help commanders determine what action to take when\nencountering a person of interest.\n Black.  1) tradecraft jargon for inconspicuousness in the sense of being free of hostile surveillance [going black: become free of surveillance before conducting an operational act]; and 2) CIA tradecraft jargon for clandestine or covert. (Leo D. Carl, *The CIA's Insider Dictionary*, 1996)\n-- Also, being free of hostile surveillance while on a clandestine mission; also refers to being in place undetected or unknown, such as flying in black. (A Spy's Journey) -- Also, BLACK: designation applied  to encrypted information and the information systems, the associated areas, circuits, components, and equipment processing that information.  Also see RED.\n\n(CNSSI No. 4009, National Information Assurance Glossary, 26 April 2010) Black Bag Job.  [Tradecraft jargon] a surreptitious entry operation usually conducted by the FBI against a domestically located foreign intelligence target. (Spy Dust)  Also see *surreptitious entry.*\n\nAka Covert Entry...\n\n    Tactical Operations, a supersecret unit of FBI break-in artists who conduct court-authorized\nburglaries [covert entries] in homes, offices, and  embassies to plant hidden microphones and video cameras and snoop into computers. ...In any given year, TacOps conducts as many as four hundred of what the FBI calls covert entries. Eighty percent are conducted in national security cases relating to terrorism or counterintelligence.\n\n    Over the years, the FBI has conducted successful covert entries at the Russian and Chinese\nembassies or their official diplomatic establishments, as well as at the homes of their diplomats and intelligence officers.\n\n    Going up against foreign intelligence agencies is the biggest challenge because they set traps to\ndetect entries.\n\n      -- Ronald Kessler, *The Secrets of the FBI* (2011), pp 2, 7, 11, & 173\n__________________________\n\n    \"Black Bag\" -- The term applied to clandestine entries of premises containing information that is\nlikely to be of exceptional importance. The material may range from cryptographic data to the membership rolls of target organizations.\n\n      -- Nigel West, Historical Dictionary of International Intelligence.\n\nBlack List.  [A list that] contains the identities and locations of individuals whose capture and detention\nare of prime importance, or individuals who have been determined to be intelligence fabricators. (CI Community Lexicon)  Also see *Gray List; White List*.\n\n-- Also, an official counterintelligence listing of actual or potential hostile collaborators, sympathizers, intelligence suspects, or other persons viewed as threatening to the security of friendly military forces. (Senate Report 94-755, Book I - Glossary, 26 Apr 1976)\n\n\n  Previous DoD definition in JP 1-02:  an official counterintelligence listing of actual or potential\nenemy collaborators, sympathizers, intelligence suspects, and other persons whose presence menaces the security of friendly forces.  *Note: this definition rescinded by JP 2-01.02, 11 Mar 2011*.\n_________________________\n\n\n   Examples of individuals who may be included on a Black List:\n     1) Known or suspected enemy or hostile espionage, sabotage, terrorist, political, and\n         subversive individuals. 2) Known or suspected leaders and members of hostile paramilitary, partisan, or guerrilla groups.\n     3) Political leaders known or suspected to be hostile to the military and political objectives of the United States and/or an allied nation. 4) Known or suspected officials of enemy governments whose presence in the theater of operations poses a security threat to the U.S. Forces. 5) Known or suspected enemy collaborators and sympathizers whose presence in the theater of operations poses a security threat to the U.S. Forces. 6) Known enemy military or civilian personnel who have engaged in intelligence, CI, security, police, or political indoctrination activities among troops or civilians. 7) Other enemy personalities such as local political personalities, police chiefs, and heads of significant municipal and/or national departments or agencies.\n\n            -- USMC, MCWP 2-6 (previously 2-14), *Counterintelligence*, 5 Sep 2000\n\nBlack Swan Event. An event that is rare, predictable only in retrospect, with extreme impacts. Blow  [Tradecraft jargon] to exposeoften unintentionallypersonnel, installations or other elements of a clandestine activity or organization. (Senate Report 94-755, Book I - Glossary, 26 Apr 1976)   Also see blown. Blown  [Tradecraft jargon] to have one's cover exposed; to have an operation become public. (A Spy's Journey) Bona Fides.  The lack of fraud or deceit: a determination that a person is who he/she says he/she is. (National HUMINT Glossary)\n\n    Tradecraft jargon for credentials which establishes the credibility of a human source.\n_______________________\n\n    The determination of a defector or agent's bona fides, the verification of their truthfulness, is critical\nto the assessment of the information they provide.\n\n       -- Michael J. Sulick, American Spies: Espionage Against the United States from the Cold War to\n           the Present, 2013, p. 77\n\n-- Also, good faith. In personnel recovery, the use of verbal or visual communication by individuals who are unknown to one another, to establish their authenticity, sincerity, honesty, and truthfulness. (JP 1-02 and JP 3-50, Personnel Recovery, 5 Jan 2007)\n\n-- Also. the lack of fraud or deceit: a determination that a person is who he/she says he/she is.\n(JP 1-02 and JP 2-01.2, CI & HUMINT in Joint Operations, 16 Mar 2011 w/ chg 1 dated 26 Aug 2011)\n\n-- Also, physical and/or oral exchanges employed by an unknown individual to prove identity and foster trust. (HDI Lexicon, April 2008)\n-- Also, documents, information, action, codes, etc., offered by an unknown or otherwise suspected individual to establish his or her good faith, identification, dependability, truthfulness, or motivation.\n(ICS Glossary & AFOSI Manual 71-142, OFCO, 9 Jun 2000) Border Crosser.  An individual, living close to a frontier, who normally has to cross the frontier frequently for legitimate purposes. (JP 1-02) Botnet.  A collection of zombie PCs [personal computers]. Botnet is short for robot network. A botnet can consist of tens or even hundreds of thousands of zombie computers. A single PC in a botnet can automatically send thousands of spam messages per day. The most common spam messages come from zombie computers. (McAfee Labs - Threat Glossary)  Also see *zombie*.\n\n-- Also, Botnets, or Bot Networks, are made up of vast numbers of compromised computers that have been infected with malicious code, and can be remotely-controlled through commands sent via the Internet. (CRS Report PL32114, 29 Jan 2008) -- Also, A network of \"zombie\" computers controlled by a single actor. Botnets are a common tool for malicious activity on the Internet, such as denial-of-service attacks and spam, since they provide free 9stolen) computation and network resources while hiding the identity of the controller. (Cybersecurity and Cyberwar)\n\n\n## Because They Are So Versatile.\n\n Brevity Code.  [In intelligence usage] Communications security (COMSEC) term for a code used only for shortening the length of a message, but not to conceal its content. (Cited as FBI Glossary in CIA's Insider's Dictionary by Leo D. Carl)  [Note: although the brevity code does not conceal content (the actual words used), it can be used to conceal true meaning]\n-- Also, [non intelligence usage] a code which provides no security but which has as its sole purpose the shortening of messages rather than the concealment of their content. (JP 1-02; JP 3-04; and FM 1-02.1, Multi-Service Brevity Codes, Jun 2005) Brief Encounter.  A short and discreet operational contact. (HDI Lexicon, April 2008) Also see brush contact; brush pass.\n\n-- Also, any brief physical contact between a case officer and an agent under threat of surveillance.\n\n(CI Centre Glossary) Brush Contact.  A discreet momentary contact, usually prearranged between intelligence personnel, during which material or oral information is passed. (ICS Glossary & AFOSI Manual 71-142, OFCO, 9 Jun 2000)  Also see *brush pass; brief encounter*.\n\nSuch a contact is extremely brief as well as surreptitious, and usually it is quite secure if well executed.\n\n\n-- Victor Marchetti & John D. Marks, The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence, 2nd edition (1980), p 230\n\n-- Also, a  discreet, usually prearranged momentary contact between intelligence personnel when information or documents are passed. Also known as a brief encounter.  (FBI FCI Terms)\n\n-- Also, a technique used by case officers to receive [or] exchange information from an agent clandestinely without betraying any signs of recognition between participants.  The objective is to complete the transaction without detection by any hostile surveillance. (Historical Dictionary of Cold War Counterintelligence, 2007)\n\n\n    *Brush Contact* - credited largely to Haviland Smith, who served as the CIA station chief in Prague\nfrom 1958 to 1960.  See Benjamin Weiser, A Secret Life: The Polish Officer, His Covert Mission, and the Price He Paid to Save His Country (2004)\n\n       \"He found that if he walked along a street and turned right, he created a gap in which the\nagents [surveillance] trailing him would lose sight of him for a few seconds....  Do not elude surveillance, accept it as a way of life.\"\n Brush Pass.  A brief operational encounter (seconds or less) in which the case officer passes something (verbally or physically) to or receives something from the agent, or a two-way exchange takes place. (National HUMINT Glossary)  Also see brief encounter; *brush contact*.\n\n\n-- Also, a discreet, monetary contact during which something is exchanged. (HDI Lexicon, April 2008)\n\n\n-- Also, a brief encounter where something is passed between a case officer and an agent. (CI Centre Glossary)\n-- Also, the clandestine, hand-to-hand delivery of items or payments - made as one person walks past another in a public place [The Russian Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR) refers to a brush pass as a \"flash meeting\"]. (FBI - Court Affidavit re: Russian Illegals, 25 June 2010) Bug. [Tradecraft jargon] 1) Concealed listening device or other equipment used in audio surveillance;\n2) To install such a device; the term \"bugged\" refers to a room or object that contains a concealed listening device. (Spy Book)\n-- Also, a concealed listening device or microphone, or other audiosurveillance device; also to install the means for audiosurveillance of a subject or target. (Senate Report 94-755, Book I - Glossary, 26 Apr 1976)\n\n## Bugging... Electronic Surveillance\n\n\n    Bugging is a term in common use that refers to the various forms of clandestine electronic\nsurveillance, or eavesdropping.  See *Spycraft*, pp. 405-416, for details.\n______________________\n\n    Bug -- a covert or clandestine listening or viewing device that is noted for its small, inconspicuous\n(bug-like) size. Bugs used to primarily mean primarily listening devices, small microphones that could be hidden in plants or phone handsets, but the term now is also used to describe tiny pinhole cameras that are as small as audio bugs used to be twenty years ago. A bug may be wired or wireless and may or may not be sending information a recording device.\n\n       -- Julie K. Petersen, Understanding Surveillance Technologies: Spy Devices, Their Origins &\n           *Applications* (2001)\n\n    [The FBI's] Engineering Research Facility at Quantico... makes custom-designed bugging devices,\ntracking devices, sensors, and surveillance cameras to watch and record bad guys. It also develops ways to penetrate computers and defeat locks, surveillance Cameras, and alarm and\n     access control systems.\n    ...state-of-the-art FBI bug... a circuit board that is the size of a postage stamp and the thickness of\ntwo stacked quarters \"It's a transmitter and stereo recorder... it records for about twenty-one hours,\nand will transmit to a local receiver in encrypted form.... This is actually big in comparison to some of our bugs.\"\n\n        -- Ronald Kessler, *The Secrets of the FBI* (2011), pp 8-9 and 227-228\n Bugged.  Room or object that contains a concealed listening device. (JP 1-02)\nBurned.  [Tradecraft jargon]  When a case officer or agent is compromised, or a surveillant has been made by a target, usually because they make eye contact. (CI Centre Glossary) Burn Notice.  Within DoD: None - term removed from JP 1-02 per JP 2-0 Joint Intelligence (22 Oct 2013).\n\n\n    Previously defined in JP 1-02 as:  an official statement by one intelligence agency to other\nagencies, domestic or foreign, that an individual or group is unreliable for any of a variety of reasons.\n\n\nC ========================================== Campaign.  A series of related military operations aimed at achieving strategic or operational objectives within a given time and space. (JP 1-02 and JP 5-0, Joint Operation Planning, 11 Aug 2011)  Also see DoD Strategic CI Campaign. Campaign Plan.  A joint operation plan for a series of related military operations aimed at achieving strategic or operational objectives within a given time and space. (JP 1-02 and JP 5-0, Joint Operation Planning, 11 Aug 2011)  Also see *Campaign; Campaign Planning; DoD Strategic CI Campaign*. Campaign Planning.  The process whereby combatant commanders and subordinate joint force commanders translate national or theater strategy into operational concepts through the development of an operation plan for a campaign. (JP 1-02 and JP 5-0, Joint Operation Planning, 11 Aug 2011)  Also see campaign; campaign plan. Capability.  The ability to execute a specified course of action. (A capability may or may not be accompanied by an intention.) (JP 1-02) Capability Gap.  The inability to achieve a desired effect under specified standards and conditions through combinations of means and ways to perform a set of tasks.  The gap may be the result of no existing capability or lack of proficiency or sufficiency in existing capability. Captured or Detained Personnel. Any person captured, detained, held, or otherwise under the control of DoD personnel (military or civilian). This does not include DoD personnel or DoD contractor personnel being held for law enforcement purposes. (DoDD 3115.09, DoD Intelligence Interrogations, Detainee Debriefings, and Tactical Questioning, 11 Oct 2012 w/ chg 1 dated 15 Nov 2013) Car Pick-Up.  A personal meeting wherein the handler picks up the source. (HDI Lexicon, April 2008) Car Toss.  A form of dead drop using a concealment device thrown to a preselected site from a vehicle traveling along a designated route. (HDI Lexicon, April 2008)  Also see brief encounter; brush contact, brush pass.\n\n-- Also, the method of conveying information clandestinely by throwing a package into, or out of,\na vehicle is known as the \"car toss.\" (*Historical Dictionary of Cold War Counterintelligence*, 2007)\n\n    [P]ull just far enough ahead of [surveillance] so that when he turned a curve.... or disappeared over\na small hill, he was able to create ten- to twenty-second gaps during which he could throw a soda can or bottle out the window and in to a ditch by the road. In such \"car tosses\", beepers might be placed inside the object along with a message, so that the agent with a small radio could find it easily.\n\n       -- Benjamin Weiser, *A Secret Life* (2004) pb, p.79\n Carbons.  Paper that produces secret writing [SW] through the use of chemicals. (FBI FCI Terms and Spy Book)  Also see *secret writing*.\n\n-- Also, paper invisibly impregnated with chemicals which, when used in accordance with directions, will produce secret writing. Illegals and agents often posses carbons which appear as ordinary sheets in writing pads that are manufactured in the target country.  (AFOSI Manual 71-142, OFCO, 9 June 2000)\nCarve-Out.  A provision approved by the Secretary or Deputy Secretary of Defense that relieves DSS [Defense Security Service} of its National Industrial Security Program obligation to perform industrial security oversight functions for a DoD SAP [Special Access Program]. (DoDD 5205.07, SAP Policy, 1 Jul 2010)\n\n\n-- Also, a classified contract for which the Defense Security Service (DSS) has been relieved of inspection responsibility in whole or in part. (DSS Glossary) CARVER.  A special operations forces acronym used throughout the targeting and mission planning cycle to assess mission validity and requirements. The acronym stands for criticality, accessibility, recuperability, vulnerability, effect, and recognizability. (JP 1-02 and JP 3-05.1, Joint Special Operations Task Force Operations, 26 Apr 2007) Case.  The framework which not only acts as the repository for all logically/physically related facts, issues, allegations and products (outputs) associated with the investigative process, but also serves to document, in a case file, the approvals, authorities, waivers, plans, notes and other artifacts relevant to that particular instance of the process. (ONCIX Insider Threat Detection - Glossary)\n-- Also, an intelligence operation in its entirety; the term also refers to a record of the development of an intelligence operation, how it will operate, and the objectives of the operation. (Senate Report 94-755, Book I - Glossary, 26 Apr 1976)\n\n\n    Can also be used as a verb, to case, meaning to surreptitiously observe a physical location to\ndetermine its suitability for possible future operational use.\n\n    Previously defined in DoD (JP 1-02) as: 1) An intelligence operation in its entirety; or 2) Record of\nthe development of an intelligence operation, including personnel, modus operandi, and objectives. Approved for removal per JP 2-0 *Joint Intelligence* (22 Oct 2013).\n Case Officer (C/O).  A professional employee of an intelligence or counterintelligence organization who is responsible for providing directions for an agent operation and/or handling intelligence assets. (JP 1-02; JP 2-01.2, CI & HUMINT in Joint Operations, 16 Mar 2011 w/ chg 1 dated 26 Aug 2011; CI Community Lexicon; and ICS Glossary)   Also see *Agent Handler*.\n\n-- Also, [an intelligence employee] who is responsible for managing and directing agents (assets) in the field. Case officers are sometimes referred to as \"operations officers.\" (*Encyclopedia of the CIA*, 2003)\n\n\n   \"...the case officer's job is to handle operational cases and assets; this is to say the case officer\nrecruits and directs foreign indigenous spies who are known as \"agents.\"\n\n        -- Fred Rustmann, Jr., \"Debunking the CIA Case Officer Myth,\" *AFIO Newsletter*; 25: 1&2 (2002)\n Casing.  Reconnaissance of an operating area, whether for surveillance or for personal or impersonal communications. (CI Community Lexicon)\n-- Also, a study of a site to determine operational suitability. (HDI Lexicon, April 2008)\n-- Also, covert or clandestine inspection or surveillance of an area, place, or building to determine its suitability for operational use or its vulnerability to an intelligence operation. (AFOSI Instruction 71-101, 6 Jun 2000 and AFOSI Manual 71-142, OFCO, 9 Jun 2000) Catastrophic Event.  Any natural or man-made incident, including terrorism, which results in extraordinary levels of mass casualties, damage, or disruption severely affecting the population, infrastructure, environment, economy, national morale, and/or government functions. (JP 1-02 and JP 3-28, Defense Support of Civil Authorities, 31 Jul 2013)  Also see *complex catastrophe*. Caveat.  A designator used with or without a security classification to further limit the dissemination of restricted information, e.g., FOUO and NOFORN. (IC Standard 700-1, 4 Apr 2008)\n\n-- Also, a designator used with a classification to further limit the dissemination of restricted information. (JP 1-02 and JP 3-07.4, Joint Counterdrug Operations, 13 Jun 2007)\n\n\nCell.  [In intelligence usage,] a small group of individuals who work together for clandestine or subversive purposes. CELLEX. See *cellular telephone exploitation*. Cellular Telephone Exploitation (CELLEX).  Exploitation of cellular phones at the logical or physical level to extract cogent contextual information, includes holistic examinations of mobile devices and associated digital media (e.g., SIM cards, media cards). Center [British spelling: *Centre*].  The headquarters site in the home country where control of intelligence and espionage operations in foreign countries is maintained. (AFOSI Manual 71-142, OFCO, 9 Jun 2000)\n-- Also, intelligence service headquarters. (FBI FCI Terms) Center of Gravity (COG). The source of power that provides moral or physical strength, freedom of action, or will to act. (JP 1-02 and JP 5-0, Joint Operation Planning, 11 Aug 2011) Central Intelligence Agency (CIA).  An independent US Government agency responsible for providing national security intelligence to senior US policymakers.  Primary mission:  collect, analyze, evaluate, and disseminate foreign intelligence to assist the President and senior US government policymakers in making decisions relating to national security.  Major components: National Clandestine Service (NCS), Directorate of Intelligence, Directorate of Science & Technology and Directorate of Support. (cia.gov) Also see *National Clandestine Service*.\n\n\n## We Do Espionage. That Is The Nature Of What We Do. We Steal Secrets.\n\n\n-- DCI George Tenet, 23 June 1998\nInterview in *Studies in Intelligence*, 42:1 (1998)\n\n\n Director CIA is designated the Functional Manager for human intelligence IAW EO 12333; and is\nalso the National HUMINT Manager IAW ICD 304, Human Intelligence.\n\n    Director CIA coordinates the clandestine collection of foreign intelligence through human sources\nor through human-enabled means and counterintelligence activities outside the United States (EO 12333).\n\n    The CIA may engage in covert action at the President's direction and in accordance with applicable\nlaw; see *covert action*.\n_____________________\n\n    The Director CIA serves as the head of the Central Intelligence Agency and reports to the Director\nof National Intelligence. The CIA director's responsibilities include:\n\n    -- Collecting intelligence through human sources and by other appropriate means, except that he\nshall have no police, subpoena, or law enforcement powers or internal security functions;\n    -- Correlating and evaluating intelligence related to the national security and providing appropriate dissemination of such intelligence; -- Providing overall direction for and coordination of the collection of national intelligence outside the United States through human sources by elements of the Intelligence Community authorized\nto undertake such collection and, in coordination with other departments, agencies, or elements of the United States Government which are authorized to undertake such collection, ensuring that the most effective use is made of resources and that appropriate account is taken of the risks to the United States and those involved in such collection; and\n    -- Performing such other functions and duties related to intelligence affecting the national security\nas the President or the Director of National Intelligence may direct.\n\n    The function of the Central Intelligence Agency is to assist the Director of the Central Intelligence\nAgency in carrying out the responsibilities outlined above.\n\n\n\nCFIUS.  See *Committee of Foreign Investment in the United States*. Chain of Custody.  A chronological written record reflecting the release and receipt of evidence from initial acquisition until final disposition. (AR 195-5, Evidence Procedures, 25 Jun 2007)  Also see evidence; chain of evidence.\n\n-- Also, a process that tracks the movement of evidence through its collection, safeguarding, and analysis lifecycle by documenting each person who handled the evidence, the date/time it was collected or transferred, and the purpose for the transfer. (CNSSI No. 4009, National Information Assurance Glossary, 26 April 2010)\n\n-- Also, a process used to maintain and document the chronological history of the evidence.\n\n(Documents should include name or initials of the individual collecting the evidence, each person or entity subsequently having custody of it, dates the items were collected or transferred, agency and case number, victim's or suspect's name, and a brief description of the item.) (Crime Scene Investigation: A\nGuide for Law Enforcement, Sep 2013)\n\n   Chain of Custody is a process used to document the chronological history of evidence to maintain\nthe security, integrity and accountability of its handling.\n Chain of Evidence.  A process and record that shows who obtained the evidence; where and when the evidence was obtained; who secured the evidence; and who had control or possession of the evidence.\n\nThe \"sequencing\" of the chain of evidence follows this order: collection and identification; analysis;\nstorage; preservation; presentation in court; return to owner. (CNSSI No. 4009, National Information Assurance Glossary, 26 April 2010)  Also see *evidence; chain of custody* Chairman's Guidance (CG).  Provides a common set of assumptions, priorities, intent, and critical planning factors required to develop future strategies and plans.  It is an integral part of the strategy development process. CG may be established pursuant to conducting a Joint Strategy Review, to preparing a Joint Vision, or to Drafting a new National Military Strategy; or it may be provided separately\nif deemed appropriate. (CJCSI 3100.01A, Joint Strategic Planning System, 1 Sep 1999) Chancery.  The building upon a diplomatic or consular compound which houses the offices of the chief of mission or principal officer. (JP 1-02) Characterization.  [In critical infrastructure protection usage] the analytic decomposition of functions, systems, assets, and dependencies related to supporting DoD operational capabilities and assets. DoDD 3020.40, ( DoD Policy and Responsibilities for Critical Infrastructure, 14 Jan 2010, w/ chg 2 dated 21 Sep 2012) Chief of Mission (CoM).  The principal officer in charge of U.S. Diplomatic Missions and U.S. offices abroad, which the Secretary of State has designated as diplomatic in nature. The CoM reports to the President through the Secretary of State.   Also see *Ambassador*.\n\n-- Also, the principal officer (the ambassador) in charge of a diplomatic facility of the United States, including any individual assigned to be temporarily in charge of such a facility. The CoM is the personal representative of the President to the country of accreditation and is responsible for the direction, coordination, and supervision of all US Government executive branch employees in that country (except those under the command of a US area military commander). The security of the diplomatic post is the CoM's direct responsibility. (JP 1-02 and JP 3-08, Interorganizational Coordination During Joint Operations, 24 Jun 2011)\n\n The U.S. Ambassador to a foreign country, for example, is the Chief of the U.S. Mission (CoM) in\nthat country. Other CoMs include the Chiefs of permanent U.S. Missions to international organizations (e.g., the U.S. Mission to International Organizations in Vienna), the Principal Officers of Consulates General, and the U.S. Interest Section in the Swiss Embassy in Havana.\n\n\n    The CoM has full responsibility and authority for the direction, coordination, and supervision of all USG executive branch employees in country and at international organizations, regardless of their\nemployment categories or location, except those under command of a U.S. area military\ncommander or on the staff of an international organization.\n Chief of Station (CoS).  The senior United States intelligence officer in a foreign country, and is the direct representative of the Director National Intelligence, to whom the officer reports through the Director Central Intelligence Agency. Usually the senior representative of the Central Intelligence Agency assigned to a US Mission. (JP 1-02 and JP 2-01.2, CI & HUMINT in Joint Operations, 16 Mar 2011 w/ chg 1 dated 26 Aug 2011) Choke Point.  A narrow passage--such as a bridge, tunnel, or Metro station--used as a surveillance or countersurveillance tool for channeling the opposing force or monitoring their passage. (CI Centre Glossary) CHROME. Acronym for Counterintelligence and Human Intelligence Requirements-Reporting and Operations Management Environment.  Interoperable, synchronized information technology architecture to replace and retire legacy software systems to accelerate workflow, increase efficiency, and broaden intelligence sharing within DoD and across the IC. (DoD FCIP Strategy FY 2013-2017) Church Committee (aka the United States Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities).  A U.S. Senate committee chaired by Senator Frank Church (D-ID) in 1975. A precursor to the U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI), the committee investigated intelligence gathering by the CIA, FBI, and NSA after certain activities had been revealed by the Watergate affair. (Wikipedia at <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Church_Committee>)\n\n    In 1975 and 1976, the Church Committee published fourteen reports on the formation of U.S.\nintelligence agencies, their operations, and the alleged abuses of law and of power that they had\ncommitted, together with recommendations for reform, some of which were put in place. Under\nrecommendations and pressure by this committee, President Gerald Ford issued Executive Order 11905 (ultimately replaced in 1981 by President Reagan's Executive Order 12333).\n\n    Regarding counterintelligence see Book I *Foreign and Military Intelligence*, pp. 163-178\n\n    Copies of the Church Committee reports at the following two web sites: --  <http://www.intelligence.senate.gov/churchcommittee.html>\n      --  <http://www.aarclibrary.org/publib/contents/church/contents_church_reports.htm>\n\n## Ci. See *Counterintelligence*. Ci-21.  Counterintelligence For The 21St Century. (See White House Fact Sheet, \"The Pdd On Ci-21: Counterintelligence For The 21St Century\" - Copy At <Http://Www.Fas.Org/Irp/Offdocs/Pdd/Pdd-75.Htm>)\n\n    Designed to provide a national counterintelligence system which is predictive and proactive, one\nthat includes integrated oversight of national CI activities across government and the private sector. Established: 1)  the National CI Policy Board of Directors (Dir FBI, Dep SECDEF, DDCI, and DoJ Representative); 2) the National CI Executive (NCIX); and the Office of the National CI Executive.\n________________________\n\n   \"The general premise behind CI-21 is to try and determine what are America's true equities, and\nthen extend this interagency cooperation in a systematic way to try and better protect those assets and deter acts of espionage that target them.  We can no longer afford to focus our counterintelligence efforts only after an incident has sparked a full criminal case, because at that point it's too late.  The damage has already been done.\"\n\n________________________\n\n\n   \"CI-21 is a manifestation of a process... we all began to realize that the threats to U.S. security\nwere changing in a way that our traditional organizations and structures couldn't match...\nGlobalization and technology were lowering traditional boundaries between what constitutes an international or domestic threat, and terrorists, drug cartels, spies and hackers were all leaping those boundaries with impunity.\"\n\n      -- John MacGaffin, Former ADDO, CIA and Former FBI Consultant who spearhead CI-21\n CI Campaign.  See *DoD Counterintelligence Campaign*. CI Mission Tasking Authority.  See *Counterintelligence Mission Tasking Authority*. Cipher.  Any cryptographic system in which arbitrary symbols (or groups of symbols) represent units of plain text of regular length, usually single letters; units of plain text are rearranged; or both, in accordance with certain predetermined rules. (JP 1-02)  Also see *code; cipher pad*. Cipher Pad.  A small thin pad of paper sheets having nonrepetitive key, usually machine printed.  A sheet is used once for enciphering and another sheet used once for deciphering a communication. Occasionally called a one-time pad (OTP). (AFOSI Manual 71-142, OFCO, 9 Jun 2000) CISO  Acronym for Counterintelligence Staff Officer.  Within DoD, term rescinded.\n\n    Note:  within DoD this term replaced by \"*Command CI Coordinating Authority*\" or CCICA. CIR. Acronym for Counterintelligence Incident Report. Civil Authorities.  Those elected and appointed officers and employees who constitute the government of the United States, the governments of the 50 states, the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, United States territories, and political subdivisions thereof. (JP 1-02 and JP 3-28, Defense Support of Civil Authorities, 31 Jul 2013) Civil Aviation Intelligence.  Activities undertaken to understand how trends in the global civil aviation industry impact U.S. interests; or detect, analyze, monitor, and warn of illicit activity or threats to the United States, its allies, or its interests involving civil aviation. (DoDI 3115.14, Civil Aviation Intelligence, 29 Jul 2011) Civil Disturbance.  *Within DoD: None -- term removed from JP 1-02.*\n\n    Previous defined in JP 3-28, Civil Support (14 Sep 2007) as:  Group acts of violence and disorder\nprejudicial to public law and order.\n\nCivilian Internee.  A civilian who is interned during armed conflict, occupation, or other military operation for security reasons, for protection, or because he or she committed an offense against the detaining power. (JP 3-63, Detainee Operations, 30 May 2008) Clandestine.  Any activity or operation sponsored or conducted by governmental departments or agencies with the intent to assure secrecy or concealment. (JP 1-02 and JP 2-01.2, CI & HUMINT in Joint Operations, 16 Mar 2011 w/ chg 1 dated 26 Aug 2011)  See clandestine collection; clandestine intelligence; clandestine intelligence activity; clandestine intelligence collection clandestine operation; covert.\n\n-- Also, any HUMINT [Human Intelligence] or other activity or operation sponsored or conducted by governmental departments or agencies with the intent to assure secrecy or concealment. (ICD 304, HUMINT, 1 Mar 2007 and DoDD S-5200.37, Management & Execution of Defense HUMINT, 9 Feb 2009) -- Also, any illicit/illegal activity that is designed not to be detected by anyone, including a local security service.  Concealed, hidden, secret, or surreptitious operation conducted without the knowledge of anyone but the organization conducting the operation or investigation. (CI Community Lexicon) -- Also, method of conducting operations with secrecy by design. Differs from covert in that covert conceals the identity of the sponsor, whereas clandestine conceals the identity of the operation. (National HUMINT Glossary) -- Also, secret or hidden activity conducted with secrecy by design. (ICS Glossary, 1978)\nClandestine, from the Latin *clam*, ''secretly, in private.''\n\nWords have meaning... clandestine and covert are not synonymous\n_______________________\n\n \"I don't take lightly the distinction between clandestine and covert...\nIt makes all the difference in the world.\"\n\n-- Senator Jay Rockefeller, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence\n\nClandestine Collection.  The acquisition of protected intelligence information in a way designed to protect the source, and conceal the operation, identity of operators and sources, and actual methodologies employed. (Previously in DoDI S-5240.17, CI collection, 12 Jan 2009)  Also see clandestine intelligence;\nclandestine intelligence collection. Clandestine Intelligence.  Intelligence information collected by clandestine sources. (Senate Report 94-755, Book I - Glossary, 26 Apr 1976) Clandestine Intelligence Activity.  An activity conducted by or on behalf of a foreign power for intelligence purposes or for the purpose of affecting political or governmental processes if the activity is conducted in a manner designed to conceal from the U.S. Government the nature or fact of such activity or the role of such foreign power; also, any activity conducted in support of such activity. (AR 381-12, Threat Awareness and Reporting Program, 4 Oct 2010) Clandestine Intelligence Collection.  The acquisition of protected intelligence information in a way designed to conceal the nature of the operation and protect the source. (JP 1-02 and JP 2-01.2, CI & HUMINT in Joint Operations, 16 Mar 2011 w/ chg 1 dated 26 Aug 2011)\n-- Also, the acquisition of protected intelligence information in a way designed to protect the source.\n\n(National HUMINT Glossary) Clandestine Operation.  An operation sponsored or conducted by governmental departments or agencies in such a way as to assure secrecy or concealment.  A clandestine operation differs from a covert operation in that emphasis is placed on concealment of the operation rather than on concealment of the identity of the sponsor.  In special operations, an activity may be both covert and clandestine and may focus equally on operational considerations and intelligence-related activities. (JP 1-02 and JP 3-05.1, Joint Special Operations Task Force Operations, 26 Apr 2007)\n-- Also, activities to accomplish intelligence, CI, or similar activities in such a way as to maintain secrecy or concealment especially for the purpose of deception or subversion. (CI Community Lexicon)\n\n-- Also, a pre-planned secret intelligence information collection activity, technical operation, or covert political, economic, propaganda, or paramilitary action conducted so as to assure the secrecy of the operation; encompasses clandestine collection, counterintelligence, and covert action. (National HUMINT Glossary)\n\n\n-- Also, any HUMINT or other activity or operation sponsored or conducted by governmental departments or agencies with the intent to assure secrecy or concealment. (DHE-M 3301.002, Vol II, Collection Operations, 23 Nov 2010)\n\n    Clandestine operations are sometimes incorrectly referred to as \"covert operations.\"  Although both\nare secret and sensitive activities, the terms are not interchangeable.   See c*overt operation*.\n Clandestine Nuclear Threat. A nuclear or radiological attack by anyone for any purpose, against the United States and/or U.S. military operations, and delivered by means other than (military) missiles or aircraft.  A large subset of this threat is the smuggling of nuclear weapons, devices, or materials for use against the United States. (DSB Report, Jun 2004)\n\n## Today, It Would Be Easy For Adversaries To Introduce And Detonate A Nuclear Explosive Clandestinely In The United States. -- Defense Science Board Report (June 2004)*\n\n\n   *Copy of \"Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force Report on Preventing and Defending Against\nClandestine Nuclear Attack,\" June 2004 available at: <http://www.acq.osd.mil/dsb/reports/ADA429042.pdf>\n Clandestine Service.  See *National Clandestine Service (NCS); Defense Clandestine Service (DCS).* Classification.  The determination that official information requires, in the interests of national security, a specific degree of protection against unauthorized disclosure, coupled with a designation signifying that such a determination has been made. (JP 1-02 and JP 2-01.2, CI & HUMINT in Joint Operations, 16 Mar 2011 w/ chg 1 dated 26 Aug 2011)\n\n## ClassificationDriving Security\n\n\n    The classification system is designed primarily to protect the confidentiality of certain military,\nforeign policy, and intelligence information. It deals only with a small slice of the government'\ninformation that requires protection although it drives the government's security apparatus and most of its costs.\n\n       -- Joint Security Commission, Redefining Security: A Report to the Secretary of Defense and the Director\nCentral Intelligence, 28 Feb 1994, pp.7\n Classified Information.  Official information that has been determined to require, in the interests of national security, protection against unauthorized disclosure and which has been so designated. (JP 1-02 and JP 2-01.2, CI & HUMINT in Joint Operations, 16 Mar 2011 w/ chg 1 dated 26 Aug 2011)\n-- Also, information or material designated and clearly represented, pursuant to the provisions of a statute or Executive order (or a regulation or order issued pursuant to a statue or Executive order), as requiring a specific degree of protection against unauthorized disclosure for reasons of national security. (50 USC  426[1])\nClassified Information Procedures Act (CIPA).  The tool with which the proper protection of classified information may be ensured in indicted cases.  After a criminal indictment becomes public, the prosecutor remains responsible for taking reasonable precautions against the unauthorized disclosure of classified information during the case. This responsibility applies both when the government intends to use classified information in its case-in-chief as well as when the defendant seeks to use classified information in his/her defense. (18 USC, App III, Sec 1-16)  Also see *graymail*.\n\n\n Congress enacted CIPA (Public Law 96-456) in 1980. The procedural protections of CIPA protect\nunnecessary disclosure of classified information. The primary purpose was to limit the practice of \"graymail\" by criminal defendants in possession of sensitive government secrets.\n\n   \"Gray mail\" refers to the threat by a criminal defendant to disclose classified information during the\ncourse of a trial. The gray mailing defendant essentially presented the government with a \"Hobson's choice\":  either allow disclosure of the classified information or dismiss the indictment.\n\n    CIPA is a procedural statute that balances the right of a criminal defendant with the right of the\nsovereign to know in advance of a potential threat from a criminal prosecution to its national security.  CIPA's provisions are designed to prevent unnecessary or inadvertent disclosures of classified information and to advise the government of the national security \"cost\" of going forward.\n\n See:  <http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/eousa/foia_reading_room/usam/title9/crm02054.htm>\n Classified Military Information (CMI).  Information requiring protection in the interest of national security and is limited to three classifications: TOP SECRET, SECRET and CONFIDENTIAL as described in Executive Order 13526, *Classified National Security Information* (previously EO 12958 13526) and which is under the control or jurisdiction of the DoD or its Departments or Agencies.\n\n    Basic USG policy provided in National Security Decision Memorandum (NSDM) 119 \"Disclosure of\nClassified United States Military Information to Foreign Governments and International\nOrganizations\":  CMI is a national security asset which must be conserved and protected and which\nmust be shared with foreign governments and international organizations only where there is a clearly defined advantage to the U.S.\n\n    Copy of NSDM 119 at: <http://www.nixonlibrary.gov/virtuallibrary/documents/nsdm/nsdm_119.pdf>\n Classified National Intelligence (CNI). National intelligence as defined in 50 USC 401a(5), classified pursuant to EO 13526. (ICD 703, Protection of Classified National Intelligence Including Sensitive Compartmented Information, 21 Jun 2013)  Also see *Sensitive Compartmented Information*.\n\n    Protection of CNI, including SCI, is also achieved through adherence to counterintelligence (CI)\nand security practices.\n\n       -- ICD 703, *Protection of Classified National Intelligence, including Sensitive Compartmented Information*, 21 Jun 2013, p. 2\n Clean. [Tradecraft jargon] To be free of hostile surveillance. (*A Spy's Journey*) Clean Phone.  Tradecraft jargon which typically refers to a disposable, pre-paid cellular telephone that cannot be traced back to the original retail purchaser or subsequent user(s). Clearance.  Formal security determination by an authorized adjudicative office that an individual is authorized access, on a need to know basis, to a specific level of collateral classified information (TOP SECRET, SECRET, CONFIDENTIAL). (CNSSI No. 4009, National Information Assurance Glossary, 26 April 2010) Cleared Contractor (CC).  A person or facility operating under the National Industrial Security Program (NISP), that has had an administrative determination that they are eligible, from a security point of view, for access to classified information of a certain level (and all lower levels). There are approximately 8500 cleared contractors with over 13,000 facilities. (DSS - Glossary to Insider Threat Awareness Course)\n\n    The Defense Security Service (DSS) refers to \"cleared contractors\" as they support DoD as well as\nother U.S. Government Departments and Agencies.  DSS oversees the protection of U.S. and foreign classified information and technologies in the hands of industry under the National Industrial Security Program (NISP). \"The NISP applies to all Executive Branch Departments and Agencies and to all cleared contractor facilities located within the United States\" (para 1-102, NISPOM).\n Cleared Defense Contractor (CDC). A company or academic institution (i.e., university or college) that has entered into a security agreement with the DoD, and was granted a facility (security) clearance enabling the entity to be eligible for access to classified information of a certain category, as well as all lower categories. (DoDI O-5240.24, CI Activities Supporting RDA, 8 Jun 2011 with change 1 dated 15 Oct 2013)\n\n-- Also, a subset of contractors cleared under the NISP who have contracts with the Department of Defense. Therefore, not all cleared contractors have contracts with DoD. (DSS - Glossary to Insider Threat Awareness Course) Click-jacking.  Concealing hyperlinks beneath legitimate clickable content which, when clicked, causes a user to unknowingly perform actions, such as downloading malware, or sending your ID to a site. Numerous click-jacking scams have employed \"Like\" and \"Share\" buttons on social networking sites. (FBI; see <http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/investigate/counterintelligence/internet-social-networking-risks>) Coalition.  An arrangement between two or more nations for common action. (JP 1-02 and JP 5-0, Joint Operation Planning, 11 Aug 2011)  Also see alliance; *multinational.* Coast Guard Counterintelligence Service (CGCIS).  Component of Coast Guard Intelligence that provides full-spectrum counterintelligence support to the U.S. Coast Guard.  Office symbol: CG-2-CI.\n\n    CGCIS preserves the operational integrity of the Coast Guard by shielding its operations,\npersonnel, systems, facilities and information from Foreign Intelligence and Security Services (FISS), and the intelligence efforts of terrorist organizations, drug trafficking elements and other organized crime groups, and adversaries, and insider threats. CGCIS supports the identification, understanding, neutralization, and exploitation of the operations of FISS and of non-state actors who employ intelligence tradecraft. CGCIS manages the Foreign Visitor Program, providing tailored foreign intelligence threat and awareness briefings specific to foreigners visiting Coast Guard commands. CGCIS also conducts foreign travel briefs and debriefs, providing tailored foreign intelligence threat and awareness briefings on FISS, terrorism, and criminal threats, and health concerns to educate Coast Guard personnel traveling to high-threat countries.\n\n      -- Coast Guard Publication 2-0, *Intelligence*, May 2010\n Code.  1) Any system of communication in which arbitrary groups of symbols represent units of plain text of varying length. Codes may be used for brevity or for security; 2) a cryptosystem in which the cryptographic equivalents (usually called \"code groups\"), typically consisting of letters or digits (or both) in otherwise meaningless combinations, are substituted for plain text elements which are primarily words, phrases, or sentences. (Previously in JP 1-02)  Also see *cipher*.\n\n-- Also, system of communication in which arbitrary groups of letters, numbers, or symbols represent units of plain text of varying length. (CNSSI No. 4009, National Information Assurance Glossary, 26 April 2010)\n-- Also, a system of communication in which arbitrary groups of symbols represent units of plain text.\n\nCodes may be used for brevity or for security. (Senate Report 94-755, Book I - Glossary, 26 Apr 1976)\n\n\n  \"There is no sharp theoretical line between codes and ciphers; [a] useful distinction is that code\noperates on linguistic entities, dividing its raw material into meaningful elements and cipher does\n   *not.\"*\n       -- David Kahn, *The Code Breakers* (1967)\n Code Book.  Document containing plain text and code equivalents in a systematic arrangement, or a technique of machine encryption using a word substitution technique. (CNSSI No. 4009, National Information Assurance Glossary, 26 April 2010) Code Word.  A single word assigned a classified meaning by appropriate authority to ensure proper security concerning intentions and to safeguard information pertaining to actual, real-world military plans, activities or operations classified CONFIDENTIAL or higher. (DoDI 5205.11, Management, Administration, and Oversight of DoD Special Access Programs, 6 Feb 2013) -- Also, a single classified word assigned to represent a specific SAP or portions thereof. (DoD\n5220.22.22-M-Sup 1, NISPOM Supplement, Feb 1995)\n-- Also, 1) A word that has been assigned a classification and a classified meaning to safeguard intentions and information regarding a classified plan or operation; and  2)  A cryptonym used to identify sensitive intelligence data. (JP 1-02 and JP 3-50, Personnel Recovery, 20 Dec 2011)\n\n\n-- Also, a prearranged word used in communication or conversation to disguise the identity of someone or something or to convey a meaning other than its conventional meaning. (AFOSI Manual 71-142, 9 Jun 2000)   Also see *nickname*. Cold Pitch.  Recruitment approach without prior development or, in some cases, contact. (National HUMINT Glossary)\n\n    The confrontational \"cold pitch\" was one of the riskiest methods, putting great psychological\npressure on a target, and often failed. Even when successful, it often produced agents whose handlers had to maintain constant pressure on them to stay involved.  When such agents had a chance to cut their tieswhen they were assigned to new posts or when communications with their contacts became riskythey often took it.\n\n       -- Victor Cherkashin, KGB Counterintelligence Officer and author of *Spy Handler* (2005)\n_________________________________\n\n    Nobody likes cold pitches because they're the worst technique in the profession of intelligence. It's\ngoing up to somebody whom you don't know and asking them to do the equivalent of going to bed with you. It's a very intimate, and if you're not developing it from a practical interrelationship human kind of way, 99.9 percent of the folks will say no.\n\n        -- Michael T. Rochford, Chief, Espionage Section, Counterintelligence Division, FBI as quoted in *The Secrets of the FBI* (2011) by Ronald Kessler, p. 125\n Cold War.  Term generally used to describe the long-term, but nonshooting, conflict or state of tension between the United States and the Soviet Union that lasted from the close of World War II in 1945 until the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. (*Encyclopedia of the CIA*, 2003) COLISEUM.  See *Community On-Line Intelligence System for End-Users and Managers*. Collaborating Analytical Center (CAC).  An intelligence organization that has responsibility to support and assist a Responsible Analytical Center (RAC) produce an intelligence product to answer a specific COCOM Intelligence Task List (ITL) task or sub-task. CACs may provide all-source analysis, application of analysis, or single-source analysis, exploitation, or reporting.  DoD organizations that may serve as CACs include: Combat Support Agencies (DIA, NSA, NGA), the COCOM JIOCs, and the Service Intelligence Centers (NGIC, ONI, NASIC & MCIA). (CJCSM 3314.01, Intelligence Planning, 28 Feb 2007) Collateral.  All national security information classified Confidential, Secret, or Top Secret under the provisions of an Executive Order for which special systems of compartmentation (such as SCI or SAPs) are not formally required. (DoDI 5200.01, 9 Oct 2008)\nCollation.  The organizing of relevant information in a coherent way, looking at source and context. It includes evaluating the information for accuracy, completeness, and meaning. (Robert M. Clark, Intelligence Analysis: A Target-Centric Approach, 2004) Collection.  In intelligence usage, the acquisition of information and the provision of this information to processing elements. (JP 1-02 and JP 2-01, Joint and National Intelligence Support to Military Operations, 5 Jan 2012)  Also see counterintelligence collection; clandestine intelligence collection;\nintelligence collection; military counterintelligence collection.\n\n-- Also, the acquisition of information to meet an intelligence requirement. (ICD 300, 3 Oct 2006)\n\n\n    ICD 300 (*Management, Integration, and Oversight of Intelligence Collection and Cover Action*, 3\nOct 2006) establishes DNI policy to integrate, prioritize, and maximize IC collection capabilities and activities to produce timely and useful national intelligence information for policymakers, Defense, and other intelligence consumers.\n\n\n-- Also, the identification, location, and recording and storing of information typically from an original source and using both human and technological meansfor input into the Intelligence Cycle for the purpose of meeting a defined tactical or strategic intelligence goal. (ODNI, U.S. National Intelligence - An Overview 2011)\n-- Also, the exploitation of sources by collection agencies, and the delivery of the information obtained to the appropriate processing unit for use in the production of intelligence. (National HUMINT Glossary) -- Also, the acquisition of information by any means and its delivery to the proper intelligence processing unit for use in the production of intelligence. (Senate Report 94-755, Book I, 26 Apr 1976)\n\n  \"Collection is the gathering of valued information, much of it by clandestine means.\"\n\n       -- Roy Godson, Dirty Tricks or Trump Card: US Covert Action and Counterintelligence (1995), p.1\n\n  \"The collection of information is the foundation of everything that the Intelligence Community does.\nWhile successful collection cannot ensure a good analytical product, the failure to collect... turns\nanalysis into guesswork.\"\n\n       -- *WMD Report* (2005); p. 351\n\n    EO 12333, *US Intelligence Activities*, directs that IC elements use the least intrusive collection\ntechniques feasible within the United States or directed against US persons abroad (para 2.4 - Collection Techniques).\n Collection Agency.  Any individual, organization, or unit that has access to sources of information and the capability of collecting information from them. (JP 1-02 and JP 2-01, Joint and National Intelligence Support to Military Operations, 5 Jan 2012) Collection Asset.  A collection system, platform, or capability that is supporting, assigned, or attached to a particular commander. (JP 1-02 and JP 2-01, Joint and National Intelligence Support to Military Operations, 5 Jan 2012) Collection Emphasis.  Identifies new short- to intermediate-term information needs in response to unforeseen situations, emerging crises, or contingencies.  It can be used to register additional or refined requirements in connection with a unique collection opportunity. (DoD CI Collection Integrated Working Group Handbook 1-02, 8 Aug 2006) Collection Management (CM).  In intelligence usage, the process of converting intelligence requirements into collection requirements, establishing priorities, tasking or coordinating with appropriate collection sources or agencies, monitoring results, and re-tasking, as required. (JP 1-02 and JP 2-0, Joint Intelligence, 22 Oct 2013)\n\n\n CM has two distinct functions: collection requirements management (CRM) and collection\noperations management (COM).  CRM established the collection need and COM provides the \"how to\" for conducting the actual collection.  See *collection requirements management* and collection\noperations management.\n\n   \"The matters that interest an intelligence service are so numerous and diverse that some order\nmust be established in the process of collecting information.\"\n\n       -- Allen W. Dulles, *The Craft of Intelligence* (2006), p.75\n\nCollection Management Authority (CMA).  Within DoD, CMA constitutes the authority to establish, prioritize, and validate theater collection requirements, establish sensor tasking guidance, and develop theater-wide collection policies. (JP 1-02 and JP 2-01.2, CI & HUMINT in Joint Operations, 16 Mar 2011 w/ chg 1 dated 26 Aug 2011)\n\n\nCollection Manager.  An individual with responsibility for the timely and efficient tasking of organic collection resources and the development of requirements for theater and national assets that could satisfy specific information needs in support of the mission. (JP 1-02 and JP 2-01, Joint and National Intelligence Support to Military Operations, 5 Jan 2012) Collection Operations Management (COM).  The authoritative direction, scheduling, and control of specific collection operations and associated processing, exploitation, and reporting resources. (JP 1-02\nand JP 2-0, Joint Intelligence, 22 Oct 2013)  Also see collection management; collection requirements management.\n\n    COM is the process by which it is determined **\"how\"** a requirement will be answered within an\nintelligence discipline and \"who\" will execute the collection activity.\n_________________\n\n    \"Essentially, CRM is what gets done in the collection cycle, while COM is how it gets done.\"\n\n        -- ODNI, U.S. National Intelligence - An Overview 2011\n Collection Plan.  A systematic scheme to optimize the employment of all available collection capabilities and associated processing, exploitation, and dissemination resources to satisfy specific information requirements. (JP 2-0, Joint Intelligence, 22 Oct 2013)\n\n    The collection plan determines how a collection requirement will be satisfied.\n Collection Planning.  A continuous process that coordinates and integrates the efforts of all collection units and agencies. (JP 1-02 and JP 2-0, Joint Intelligence, 22 Oct 2013) Collection Posture. The current status of collection assets and resources to satisfy identified information requirements. (JP 2-0, Joint Intelligence, 22 Oct 2013) Collection Requirement. A valid need to close a specific gap in intelligence holdings in direct response to a request for information (JP 2-0, Joint Intelligence, 22 Oct 2013)  Also see intelligence requirement; information requirements.\n\n-- Also, 1) An intelligence need considered in the allocation of intelligence resources.  Within the Department of Defense, these collection requirements fulfill the essential elements of information and other intelligence needs of a commander, or an agency; or 2) An established intelligence need, validated against the appropriate allocation of intelligence resources (as a requirement) to fulfill the essential elements of information and other intelligence needs of an intelligence consumer. (JP 2-01.2, CI & HUMINT in Joint Operations, 16 Mar 2011 w/ chg 1 dated 26 Aug 2011)\nCollection Requirements Management (CRM).  The authoritative development and control of collection, processing, exploitation, and/or reporting requirements that normally result in either the direct tasking of assets over which the collection manager has authority, or the generation of tasking requests to collection management authorities at a higher, lower, or lateral echelon to accomplish the collection mission. (JP 1-02 and JP 2-0, Joint Intelligence, 22 Oct 2013)  Also see collection management; collection operations management.\n\n\n CRM is the process by which it is determined **\"what\"** will be collected and by \"which\" intelligence\ndiscipline.  CRM defines \"what\" intelligence systems must collect and focuses on the requirements of the customer; it is all-source oriented and advocates \"what\" information is necessary for collection.\n\nCollection Resource.  A collection system, platform, or capability that is not assigned or attached to a specific unit or echelon which must be requested and coordinated through the chain of command. (JP 1-02 and JP 2-01, Joint and National Intelligence Support to Military Operations, 5 Jan 2012)\n\n\nCollection Strategy.  An analytical approach used by collection managers to determine which intelligence disciplines can be applied to satisfy information requirements. (JP 2-0, Joint Intelligence, 22 Oct 2013) Collection Support Brief (CSB).  A supplement to a collection requirement on key country topics, technical subjects, and other complex issues. It provides more detailed tutorial information for HUMINT collectors regarding technical developments, organizations, facilities, and personalities associated with the collection topic. (DHE-M 3301.002, Vol II, Collection Operations, 23 Nov 2010) Collector.  A person who acquires information or services from a source. (HDI Lexicon, Apr 2008) Combat Intelligence.  Within DoD: None - term removed from JP 1-02 per JP 2-0 Joint Intelligence 22 Oct\n2013.\n\n\n\n    Previously defined in JP 1-02 as:  that knowledge of the enemy, weather, and geographical\nfeatures required by a commander in the planning and conduct of combat operations.\n\nCombat Support Agency (CSA).  A Department of Defense agency so designated by Congress or the Secretary of Defense that supports military combat operations. (JP 5-0, Joint Operation Planning, 11 Aug 2011) Combatant Command (COCOM) A unified or specified command with a broad continuing mission under a single commander established and so designated by the President, through the Secretary of Defense and with the advice and assistance of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. (JP 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States, 25 Mar 2013) Combatant Command (command authority). Nontransferable command authority, which cannot be delegated, of a combatant commander to perform those functions of command over assigned forces involving organizing and employing commands and forces; assigning tasks; designating objectives; giving authoritative direction over all aspects of military operations, joint training, and logistics necessary to accomplish the missions assigned to the command. (JP 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States, 25 Mar 2013) Also see *Unified Command Plan*. Combatant Commander (CCDR). A commander of one of the unified or specified combatant commands established by the President. (JP 1-02)  Also see *Unified Command Plan*. Combating Terrorism (CbT).  Actions, including antiterrorism (defensive measures taken to reduce vulnerability to terrorist acts) and counterterrorism (offensive measures taken to prevent, deter, and respond to terrorism), taken to oppose terrorism throughout the entire threat spectrum. (JP 1-02 and JP 3-26, Counterterrorism, 13 Nov 2009)\n\n-- Also, within DoD, encompasses all actions taken to oppose terrorism throughout the entire threat spectrum including terrorist use of CBRNE devices. Actions taken include AT, counterterrorism, terrorism consequence management, and intelligence support (collection, analysis, and dissemination of terrorism-related information). (DoDI 2000.12, DoD Antiterrorism Program, 1 Mar 2012 with change 1 dated 9 Sep 2013) Combat Support Agency (CSA).  A Department of Defense agency so designated by Congress or the Secretary of Defense that supports military combat operations. (JP 1-02 and JP 5-0, Joint Operation Planning, 11 Aug 2011)\nCommand and Control (C2).  The exercise of authority and direction by a properly designated commander over assigned and attached forces in the accomplishment of the mission. (JP 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States, 25 Mar 2013)\n\n\nCommand Counterintelligence Coordinating Authority (CCICA). The senior command representative to conduct and exercise staff coordination authority over CI activities. Develops and implements the Combatant Command's CI strategy and plans, serves as the focal point for CI issues impacting the command, identifies command resource requirements, and coordinates CI support to the command. Formerly known as \"CI Staff Officer\" [or CISO]. (DoDI 5240.10, CI in the Combatant Commands and Other DoD Components, 5 Oct 2011 with change 1 dated 15 Oct 2013)\n    Note:  this term is approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.\n\n\n-- Also, the Combatant Commander's senior representative for CI.  The CCICA serves as the authoritative point of contact for the Combatant Command on CI issues and activities and assists in exercising the command's CI activities. JP 2-01.2, CI & HUMINT in Joint Operations, 16 Mar 2011 w/ chg 1 dated 26 Aug 2011)   Also see *Counterintelligence Coordinating Authority (CICA)*.\n\n    The CCICA is a CI subject matter expert and the senior CI adviser to the Combatant Command.\nDoD Instruction 5240.10 directs that the CICCA shall be either a military O5/O6 or civilian\nequivalent, and shall have CI experience [not further defined].\n\n    For additional information see JP 2.01.2, *CI & HUMINT in Joint Operations*, 11 Mar 2011 (para 2a)\n Commander's Critical Information Requirement (CCIR). An information requirement identified by the commander as being critical to facilitating timely decision-making.  (JP 1-02 and JP 3-0, Joint Operations, 11 Aug 2011) Committee of Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS).  An interagency committee that serves the President in overseeing the national security implications of foreign investments. (Department of Treasury website at <http://www.treas.gov/offices/international-affairs/exon-florio/>)\n    CFIUS has 12 members under the chairmanship of the Secretary of Treasury consisting of: the\n\nSecretaries of State, Defense, Commerce, and Homeland Security, the Attorney General, Director OMB, Director of the Office of Science and Technology Policy, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, Assistant to the President for Economic Policy, US Trade Representative, and Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers.\n\n       -- Department of Treasury website (cited above)\n\n Originally established in 1975 by EO 11858 mainly to monitor and evaluate the impact of foreign\ninvestment in the United States.  In 1988, EO 12661 designated CFIUS to receive notices of foreign acquisitions of U.S. companies, to determine whether a particular acquisition has national security issues sufficient to warrant an investigation and to undertake an investigation, if necessary,\nand to submit a report and recommendation to the President at the conclusion of an investigation.\n\n    On 26 July 2077, *the Foreign Investment and National Security Act of 2007* (PL 110-49) was\nenacted.  The act was implemented by EO 13456 and addresses many issues, e.g., Congressional notification requirements; more stringent rules for the review and formal investigation of transactions, especially those involving foreign governments or critical infrastructure assets; requires senior-level involvement in various required certifications and reports, limiting the agencies' delegation authority; established the membership of CFIUS by statute; and created a defined role for the Director of National Intelligence as an ex-officio member who must evaluate the transaction's national security implications.\n\n    Also see CRS Report:  <http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RL33388.pdf>\n Common Operational Picture (COP).  A single identical display of relevant information shared by more than one command.  A common operational picture facilitates collaborative planning and assists all echelons to achieve situational awareness. (JP 1-02 and JP 3-0, Joint Operations, 11 Aug 2011)\n-- Also, (Army) A single display of relevant information within a commander's area of interest tailored to the user's requirements and based on common data and information shared by more than one command.\n\n(ADRP 6-0, Mission Command, May 2012) Communications Cover.  Concealing or altering of characteristic communications patterns to hide information that could be of value to an adversary. (CNSSI No. 4009, National Information Assurance Glossary, 26 April 2010) Communications Intelligence (COMINT).  Technical information and intelligence derived from foreign communications by other than the intended recipients. (JP 1-02 and JP 2-0, Joint Intelligence, 22 Oct 2013)  Also see signals intelligence. -- Also, the capture of information, either encrypted or in \"plaintext,\" exchanged between intelligence targets or transmitted by a known or suspected intelligence target for the purpose of tracking communications patterns and protocols (traffic analysis), establishing links between intercommunicating parties or groups, or analysis of the substantive meaning of the communication. COMINT is a subdiscipline of SIGINT. (ODNI, U.S. National Intelligence - An Overview 2011)\n\n    COMINT is a sub-category of signals intelligence that engages in dealing with messages or voice\ninformation derived from the interception of foreign communications.  It is produced by the\ncollection and processing of foreign communications passed by radio, wire or other electromagnetic means, and by the processing of foreign encrypted communications, however transmitted. Collection comprises search, intercept, and direction finding.\n__________________\n\n    Communications Intelligence or COMINT: technical and intelligence information derived from\nforeign communications by other than intended recipients.  COMINT activities... those activities that produce COMINT by the collection and processing of foreign communications passed by radio,\nwire, or other electromagnetic means... and by processing foreign encrypted communications,\nhowever transmitted. Collection comprises search, intercept and direct finding. Processing comprises range estimation, transmitter, operator identification, signal analysis, traffic analysis, cryptanalysis, decryption study of plain text, the fusion of these activities and the reporting of results.\n\n       -- NSCID 6, Signals Intelligence, 17 Feb 1972 (redacted copy, complete original version is TOP SECRET) Available at:  http://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB23/docs/doc05.pdf\n___________________\n\n    [T]here 'is' something special about communications intelligence... in a nutshell, its special value\nlies in the fact that this kind of intelligence is generally accurate, reliable, 'authentic,' continuous,\nand most of all, 'timely'.\n\n       -- NSA, A History of U.S. Communications Security (U) [Vol I], revised July 1973, p.9; originally classified\n          SECRET/NORFORN//COMINT, declassified by NSA 10 Dec 2008)\n Communications Security (COMSEC).  The protection resulting from all measures designed to deny unauthorized persons information of value that might be derived from the possession and study of telecommunications, or to mislead unauthorized persons in their interpretation of the results of such possession and study. (JP 1-02 and JP 6-0, Joint Communications Systems, 10 Jun 2010)\n\n-- Also, protective measures taken to deny unauthorized persons information derived from telecommunications of the U.S. Government related to national security and to ensure the authenticity of such communications.  Such protection results from the application of security measures (including cryptosecurity, transmission security, emissions security, and jamming resistance) to telecommunications and to electrical systems generating, handling, processing, or using national security or national security-related information.  It also includes the application of physical security measures to COMSEC information or materials. (DoDD 4640.6 Communications Security Telephone Monitoring and Recording, 26 Jun 1981)\n\n-- Also, measures and controls taken to deny unauthorized individuals information derived from telecommunications and to ensure the authenticity of such telecommunications. COMSEC includes cryptosecurity, transmission security, emission security, and physical security of COMSEC material.\n\n(DoDD 5100.20, NSA, 26 Jan 2010)\n\n\n-- Also, a component of Information Assurance that deals with measures and controls taken to deny unauthorized persons information derived from telecommunications and to ensure the authenticity of such telecommunications. COMSEC includes crypto security, transmission security, emissions security, and physical security of COMSEC material. (CNSS Instruction No, 4009, National IA Glossary, 26 Apr 2010) Communications Security Monitoring.  The act of listening to, copying, or recording transmissions of one's own circuits (or when specially agreed, e.g., in allied exercises, those of friendly forces) to provide material for communications security analysis in order to determine the degree of security being provided to those transmissions. In particular, the purposes include providing a basis for advising commanders on the security risks resulting from their transmissions, improving the security of communications, and planning and conducting manipulative communications deception operations. (previously in JP 1-02) Community On-Line Intelligence System for End-Users and Managers (COLISEUM).  The management system for production requirements and requests for information. CI production. (DoDI 5240.18, CI Analysis & Production, 17 Nov 2009 with change 1 dated 15 Oct 2013)\n-- Also, an analysis requirements management tool used throughout the DIE for tasking and managing requirements for finished intelligence production. (DoDI 3020.51, Intelligence Support to DCIP, 23 Jun 2011)\n-- Also, the primary production requirements management system for the Defense Intelligence Analysis Program (DIAP). It supports the DIAP mission to consolidate and gain synergism of DoD intelligence production resources by automating the basic production requirement process defined in the DIAP and its key operational concepts. (DIA DIAP)\n-- Also, an analysis requirement management tool used throughout the Defense Intelligence Community to register and track requests for information/analytical requirements, search for existing intelligence, and manage/account for analytical resources. It is a web-based application available through Intelink. (Joint Military Intelligence Training Center, *Fundamentals of COLISEUM 5.0*, Jun 2008)\n\n Defense CI Components shall use the CI-approved electronic archiving system to validate, task,\nand disseminate production requirements for CI analysis. The approved system is the primary method to communicate analysis and production requirements within the DoD CI enterprise. Defense CI Components without access to the approved system may use COLISEUM.\n\n       -- DoDI 5140.18, *CI Analysis & Production*, 17 Nov 2009\n Compartmentation.  The principle of controlling access to sensitive information so that it is available only to those individuals or organizational components with an official \"need-to-know\" and only to the extent required for the performance of assigned responsibilities. (National HUMINT Glossary)   Also see Bigot List.\n\n-- Also, establishment and management of an organization so that information about the personnel, internal organization, or activities of one component is made available to any other component only to the extent required for the performance of assigned duties. (JP 1-02 and JP 3-05.1, Joint Special Operations Task Force Operations, 26 Apr 2007)\n-- Also, management of an intelligence service so that information about personnel, organization, or activities of one component is made available to any other component only to the extent required for the performance of assigned duties. (FBI FCI Terms) -- Also, the practice of establishing specials channels for handling sensitive intelligence information.\n\nThe channels are limited to individuals with a specific need for such information and who are therefore given special security clearances in order to have access to it. (Senate Report 94-755, Book I - Glossary, 26 Apr 1976)\n\n-- Also, the process of strictly limiting the number of people who are aware of a given intelligence operation.... Only personnel with an absolute \"need to know\" should be admitted into the compartment. (James M. Olson, *Fair Play: The Moral Dilemmas of Spying*, 2006)\n\n    The primary purpose of compartmentation is security, to protect extremely sensitive information\nfrom compromise.\n_________________________\n\nAn intelligence service that is careless about compartmentation pays the price.\n\n\n-- James M. Olson, Former Chief of CIA Counterintelligence\n_________________________\n\n\nEffective compartmentation is fundamental to all secret activity....\n\n\n-- Richard Helms, Former Director CIA (1966-1973)\n(see Richard Helms with William Hood, *A Look Over My Shoulder*, 2003, pp.184-185)\n_________________________\n\n\n    [It's]...essential to practice strict compartmentation in counterintelligence investigations.\n-- Colonel Stuart A. Herrington, US Army (Ret)\n(see *Traitors Among Us: Inside the Spy Catcher's World*,1999, pp.272-273)\n Compartmented Intelligence.  National intelligence placed in a DNI-approved control system to ensure handling by specifically identified and access approved individuals. (IC Standard 700-1, 4 Apr 2008) -- Also, national intelligence information under a control system and only available to designated individuals. (National Intelligence: A Consumer's Guide - 2009).\n\n    Compartmented intelligence became institutionalized during World War II [SIGINT, e.g., ULTRA,\nMAGIC, etc.]....  Compartmentalizing information is the way they restrict what is known.\n\n        -- William E. Burrows, *Deep Black* (1986)\n____________________\n\n\n    In the secret operations canon it is axiomatic that the probability of leaks escalates exponentially\neach time a classified document is exposed to another person....  Effective compartmentation is fundamental to all secret activity.\n\n       -- Richard Helms (Former DCI), *A Look Over My Shoulder* (2003)\n Complaint-type Investigation.  A counterintelligence investigation in which sabotage, espionage, treason, sedition, subversive activity, or disaffection is suspected. (JP 1-02) Complex Catastrophe.  Any natural or man-made incident, including cyberspace attack, power grid failure, and terrorism, which results in cascading failures of multiple, interdependent, critical, lifesustaining infrastructure sectors and causes extraordinary levels of mass casualties, damage or disruption severely affecting the population, environment, economy, public health, national morale, response efforts, and/or government functions. (Deputy Secretary of Defense Memorandum, 19 February 2013 cited in JP 3-28, Defense Support of Civil Authorities, 31 Jul 2013)  Also see *catastrophic event*. Compromise.  A communication or physical transfer of classified information to an unauthorized recipient. (DoDD 5200.1, DoD Information Security Program, 13 Dec 1996)\n\n\n-- Also, an unauthorized disclosure of classified information. (DoDM 5200.01-Vol 1, DoD Information Security, 24 Feb 2012 and DoD 5220.22-M, NISPOM, 28 Feb 2006)\n-- Also, the known or suspected exposure of clandestine personnel, installations, or other assets or of classified information or material, to an unauthorized person. (JP 1-02 and JP 2-01.2, CI & HUMINT in Joint Operations, 16 Mar 2011 w/ chg 1 dated 26 Aug 2011)\n\n\n-- Also, the disclosure or release of classified information to unauthorized person(s). (IC Standard\n700-1, 4 Apr 2008\n\n\n-- Also, type of incident where information is disclosed to unauthorized individuals or a violation of the security policy of a system in which unauthorized intentional or unintentional disclosure, modification, destruction, or loss of an object may have occurred. (CNSSI No. 4009, National Information Assurance Glossary, 26 April 2010) -- Also, a known or suspected exposure of clandestine personnel, installations, or other assets, or of classified information or material, to an unauthorized person. (Senate Report 94-755, Book I - Glossary, 26 Apr 1976) Compromised.  A term applied to classified matter, knowledge of which has, in whole or in part, passed to an unauthorized person or persons, or which has been subject to risk of such passing. (JP 1-02 and JP 2-01.2, CI & HUMINT in Joint Operations, 16 Mar 2011 w/ chg 1 dated 26 Aug 2011)\n-- Also, when an operation, asset, or agent is uncovered and cannot remain secret. (CI Centre Glossary) Compromising Emanations.  Unintentional emissions that could disclose information being transmitted, received, or handled by any information-processing equipment. (ICS Glossary)  Also see TEMPEST; TEMPEST Test.\n\n-- Also, unintentional signals that, if intercepted and analyzed, would disclose the information transmitted, received, handled or otherwise processed by information system equipment. (CNSSI No. 4009, National Information Assurance Glossary, 26 April 2010; also NSTISSI 7002)\n\nComputer Forensics.  The practice of gathering, retaining, and analyzing computer-related data for investigative purposes in a manner that maintains the integrity of the data. (CNSSI No. 4009, National Information Assurance Glossary, 26 April 2010)\n-- Also, the scientific, systematic inspection and analysis of digital media and its contents to gather information on the facts and circumstances which may connect an incident to a threat to national security or other computer use that is contrary to security of information systems or may indicative of espionage. The objectives are to perform a structured investigation, maintain the proper chain of evidence, reconstruct the activities of a computer user, and preserve the integrity of the data. (AR 381-20, Army CI Program, 25 May 2010) Computer Intrusion.  Within DoD:  None - term removed from JP 1-02 per JP 3-13, Cyberspace Operations, 5 Feb 2013.\n\n\n    Previously defined in JP 1-02 as:  an incident of unauthorized access to data or an automated\ninformation system.\n\nComputer Intrusion Detection.  Within DoD:  None - term removed from JP 1-02 per JP 3-13, Cyberspace Operations, 5 Feb 2013.\n\n\n    Previously defined in JP 1-02 as:  the process of identifying that a computer intrusion has been\nattempted,  is occurring, or has occurred.\n Computer Network.  The constituent element of an enclave responsible for connecting computing environments by providing short-haul data transport capabilities, such as local or campus area networks, or long-haul data transport capabilities, such as operational, metropolitan, or wide area and backbone networks. (DoDI S-5240.23, CI Activities in Cyberspace, 13 Dec 2010 with change 1 dated 16 Oct 2013) Computer Network Attack (CNA).  Operations to manipulate, disrupt, deny, degrade, or destroy information resident in computers and computer networks, or the computers and networks themselves. (DCID 7/3, Information Operations and IC Related Activities (U), 1 Jul 1999, updated 5 Jun 2003)\n\n    Within DoD:  None - term removed from JP 1-02 per JP 3-13, 27 Nov 2012.\n\n    Defined in the previous edition of JP 3-13, *Information Operations*, dated 13 Feb 2006, as:\nActions taken through the use of computer networks to disrupt, deny, degrade, or destroy information resident in computers and computer networks, or the computers and networks themselves.\n Computer Network Defense (CND). Efforts to defend against the computer network operations of others, especially that directed against U.S. and allied computers and networks. (DCID 7/3, Information Operations and IC Related Activities (U), 1 Jul 1999, updated 5 Jun 2003)\n\n\n     Within DoD:  None - term removed from JP 1-02 per JP 3-13, 27 Nov 2012.\n    Previously defined as:  Actions taken through the use of computer networks to protect, monitor,\nanalyze, detect and respond to unauthorized activity within Department of Defense information systems and computer networks.\n\nComputer Network Exploitation (CNE).  Intelligence collection and enabling operations to gather data from target or adversary automated information systems or networks. (DCID 7/3, Information Operations and IC Related Activities (U), 1 Jul 1999, updated 5 Jun 2003)\n\n\n     *Within DoD:  None - term removed from JP 1-02 per JP 3-13, 27 Nov 2012).*\n    Previously defined as:  Enabling operations and intelligence collection capabilities conducted\nthrough the use of computer networks to gather data from target or adversary automated information systems or networks.\n Computer Network Operations (CNO).  Within DoD: None - term removed from JP 1-02 per JP 3-13,\n27 Nov 2012.\n\n    Previously defined as:  comprised of computer network attack, computer network defense, and\n\nrelated computer network exploitation enabling operations.\n Computer Security (COMUSEC).  The protection resulting from all measures to deny unauthorized access and exploitation of friendly computer systems. (JP 1-02 and JP 6-0, Joint Communications, 10 Jun 2010)  Also see Information Security (INFOSEC); Cybersecurity.\n\nComputer Trespasser.  A person who accesses a protected computer without authorization and thus has no reasonable expectation of privacy in any communication transmitted to, through, or from the protected computer; see 18 USC 2510 (21)(a). (AR 381-20, Army CI Program, 25 May 2010) Computer Virus.  A software program, script, or macro that has been designed to infect, destroy, modify, or cause other problems with a computer or software program. (US Army TRADOC DCSINT Handbook\n1.02, 15 Aug 2007)\n\n-- Also, a computer program that can copy itself and infect a computer without permission or knowledge of the user. (Wikipedia; accessed 2 Oct 2007)\n\n\nConcealed Monitoring. Targeting by electronic, optical, or mechanical devices a particular person or a group of persons without their consent in a surreptitious and continuous manner. Monitoring is surreptitious when it is targeted in a manner designed to keep the subject of the monitoring unaware of it. Monitoring is continuous if it is conducted without interruption for a substantial period of time. (DoD 5240.1-R, Procedures Governing the Activities of DoD Intelligence Components that Affect US Persons, Dec 1982)\n\n    Concealed monitoring includes, but is not limited to the use of microphones, video cameras,\nbeepers, beacons, transponders, and GPS locators.\n\n    Within DoD, if there is a reasonable expectation of privacy, a Procedure 6 is required IAW DoD\n5240.1-R. Procedures Governing the Activities of DoD Intelligence Components that Affect United States Persons,\n\nConcealment.  The act of remaining hidden. (DSS Glossary)\n\nConcealment Device (CD).  A container designed to hide materials. (HDI Lexicon, April 2008)\n-- Also, innocuous object designed or adapted as a container for secreting any selected material or equipment. Also called containers. (AFOSI Manual 71-142, OFCO, 9 Jun 2000)\n-- Also, any one of a variety of innocuous devices used to secretly store and transport materials relating to an operation. (CI Centre Glossary) -- Also, an object modified or fabricated to contain either a device or intelligence materials for the purpose of covert storage, transport, placement within a target, or dead-dropping. (Spycraft) Concept of Intelligence Operations. Within the Department of Defense, a verbal or graphic statement, in broad outline, of an intelligence directorate's assumptions or intent in regard to intelligence support of an operation or series of operations. (JP 2.0, Joint Intelligence, 22 Oct 2013) Concept of Operations (CONOPS).  A verbal or graphic statement that clearly and concisely expresses what the joint force commander intends to accomplish and how it will be done using available resources. (JP 5-0, Joint Operation Planning, 11 Aug 2011) Concept Plan (CONPLAN).  In the context of joint operation planning level 3 planning detail, an operation plan in an abbreviated format that may require considerable expansion or alteration to convert it into a complete operation plan or operation order.  (JP 1-02 and JP 5-0, Joint Operation Planning, 11 Aug 2011) Conduits.  Within military deception, conduits are information or intelligence gateways to the deception target. Examples of conduits include: foreign intelligence and security services, intelligence collection platforms, open-source intelligence, news mediaforeign and domestic. (JP 3-13.4, Military Deception,\n26 Jan 2012) See *military deception*. Confidential.  Security classification that shall be applied to information, the unauthorized disclosure of which reasonably could be expected to cause damage to the national security that the original classification authority is able to identify or describe. (EO 13526, Classified National Security Information,\n31 Dec 2009)  Also see *security classification.*\nConfidential Source.  Any individual or organization that provides information to the U.S. Government on matters pertaining to national security and expects, in return, that the information or relationship, or both, will be held in confidence. This definition is not to be confused with \"intelligence source\" as used in the Human Intelligence Community. (IC Standard 700-1, 4 Apr 2008)\n\n\n-- Also, any individual or organization that has provided, or that may reasonably be expected to provide, information to the United States on matters pertaining to the national security with the expectation that the information or relationship, or both, are to be held in confidence. (EO 13526, Classified National Security Information, 31 Dec 2009) -- Also [within AFOSI], any individual whose identity is being protected, with whom AFOSI establishes a formal managed relationship, and whose AFOSI directed activities result in the gathering of information or testimonial or physical evidence. This does not include those individuals who provide information as a result of their official duties or one time witness to an incident or crime. (AFOSI Manual 71-118, Vol I, Confidential Source Management, 3 Oct 2002) Confusion Agent.  An individual dispatched by his sponsor to confound the intelligence or counterintelligence apparatus of another country rather than to collect and transmit information. (Senate Report 94-755, Book I - Glossary, 26 Apr 1976)\n\n--  *Within DoD: None - term removed from JP 1-02 (rescinded 11 Mar 2011).*\n\n\n    Previously defined in JP 1-02 as:  an individual who is dispatched by the sponsor for the primary\npurpose of confounding the intelligence or counterintelligence apparatus of another country rather\nthan for the purpose of collecting and transmitting information.\n Congressional Intelligence Committees.  The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI) and the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (HPSCI). Also see *SSCI; HPSCI*.\n\n  The 1980 Intelligence Oversight Act charged the SSCI and HPSCI with authorizing the programs\nof US intelligence agencies and overseeing their activities.\n\n   -- SSCI website at <http://intelligence.senate.gov/> and HPSCI at <http://intelligence.house.gov/>\n Consensual Monitoring.  Monitoring of communications for which a court order or warrant is not legally required because of the consent of a party to the communication. (Attorney General's Guidelines for Domestic FBI Operations, 29 Sep 2008) Consolidated Adjudications Facility (CAF). The DoD CAF, under the direction of the Washington Headquarters Services (WHS)a DoD Field Activitygrants, denies, or revokes eligibility for access to classified information and eligibility for occupancy of sensitive positions, and supports the use of automated and consolidated adjudicative processes to the maximum extent practicable in accordance with DoDD 5220.6 (Defense Industrial Personnel Security Clearance Review Program) and DoD Regulation 5200.2-R (Personnel Security Program).\n\n    DoD established the DoD CAF to consolidate resources and standardize adjudicative processes.\nOn May 3, 2012, the Deputy SECDEF directed a complete consolidation of the functions, resources, and assets of the Army Central Clearance Facility, Department of the Navy CAF, Air Force CAF, Joint Staff CAF, Washington Headquarters (WHS) CAF, Defense Industrial Security Clearance Office (DISCO), and the Defense Office of Hearings and Appeals (DOHA) into a single organization under the authority, direction and control of the Director of Administration and Management. The DoD CAF is located on Fort Meade, MD.\n\nConstraint.  In the context of joint operation planning, a requirement placed on the command by a higher command that dictates an action, thus restricting freedom of action. (JP 5-0, Joint Operation Planning, 11 Aug 2011) Contact Report (CR).  A report of an operational event; a format providing the officer the ability to document routine aspects of operational activities not otherwise covered by other intelligence or operational reporting. (National HUMINT Glossary)\n\n\n-- Also, a report used during the conduct of source operations to document the circumstances of, and establish a historical report of the operation. (Army FM 2.22-2, Counterintelligence, Oct 2009) Contamination.  Type of incident involving the introduction of data of one security classification or security category into data of a lower security classification or different security category. (CNSSI No. 4009, National Information Assurance Glossary, 26 April 2010) Continental United States (CONUS).  United States territory, including the adjacent territorial waters, located within North America between Canada and Mexico. (JP 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States, 25 Mar 2013) Contingency.  A situation requiring military operations in response to natural disasters, terrorists, subversives, or as otherwise directed by appropriate authority to protect US interests. (JP 5-0, Joint Operation Planning, 11 Aug 2011) Contingency Planning Guidance (CPG).  Secretary of Defense written guidance, approved by the President, for the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, which focuses the guidance given in the national security strategy and Defense Planning Guidance, and is the principal source document for the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan. (JP 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States, 25 Mar 2013) Contingency Operation.  A military operation that is either designated by the Secretary of Defense as a contingency operation or becomes a contingency operation as a matter of law (Title 10, USC 101[a][13] and JP1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States, 25 Mar 2013) Continuity of Government (COG). A coordinated effort within the Federal Government's executive branch to ensure that National Essential Functions continue to be performed during a Catastrophic Emergency. (NSPD 51, National Continuity Program, 9 May 2007)\n-- Also, a coordinated effort within the Executive Branch that ensures the continuation of minimum essential functions in any emergency situation, including catastrophic emergencies that impair or threaten day-to-day operations of departments/agencies within the branch. COG activities involve ensuring the continuity of minimum essential functions utilizing infrastructures outside the Washington Metropolitan Area (WMA) and must be capable of implementation with and without warning. (NIP - FY 2009 Congressional Budget Justification Book, redacted version)*\n     * Copy available at:  <http://www.fas.org/irp/dni/cbjb-2009.pdf > (accessed 24 Jan 2013. Continuous Evaluation.  Means reviewing the background of an individual who has been determined to be eligible for access to classified information (including additional or new checks of commercial databases, Government databases, and other information lawfully available to security officials) at any time during the period of eligibility to determine whether that individual continues to meet the requirements for eligibility for access to classified information. (EO 13467, 2 Jul 2008 & DoDI 5200.02, DoD Personnel Sceurity Program, 21 Mar 2014)\n\n    All personnel in national security positions shall be subject to continuous evaluation.\n       -- DoDI 5200.02, DoD Personnel Security Program, 21 Mar 2014 (encl 3, para 6)\n\nControl.  [As used in intelligence human source operations], the capacity of a case officer (and his service) to generate, alter, or halt agent behavior by using or indicating his capacity to use physical or psychological means of leverage. (Source:  John P. Dimmer, Jr., \"Observations on the Double Agent,\"\nStudies in Intelligence, vol. 6, no. 1 (Winter 1962), pp 57-72. Declassified, originally classified SECRET)\n\n-- Also, [in intelligence usage,] physical or psychological pressures exerted with the intent to assure that an agent or group will respond as directed. (JP 1-02)\n\n\n-- Also, physical or psychological pressure exerted on an agent to ensure that he or she responds to directions from an intelligence agency or service. (Spy Book)\n\n\n   \"A case officer does not control an agent the way he controls an automobile [or] the way a\npoliceman controls an informer.  The intelligence officer who thinks of control in absolutes of\nblack and white does his operations a disservice; the areas of gray predominate.\"\n\n       -- John P. Dimmer, Jr., CIA Operations Officer (1962)\n Control of Compromising Emanations (aka TEMPEST). TEMPEST Countermeasures are designed to prevent exploitation of compromising emanations by containing them within the equipment or IS [inspectable space] of the facility processing classified information. (AR 381-14, Technical Counterintelligence, 30 Sep 2002) Controlled Information.  1) Information conveyed to an adversary in a deception operation to evoke desired appreciations; or 2) Information and indicators deliberately conveyed or denied to foreign targets to evoke invalid official estimates that result in foreign official actions advantageous to US interests and objectives. (JP 1-02 and JP 2-01.2, CI & HUMINT in Joint Ops, 16 Mar 2011 w/ chg 1 dated 26 Aug 2011) Controlled Source.  In counterintelligence use, a person employed by or under the control of an intelligence activity and responding to intelligence tasking.  (JP 1-02 and JP 2-01.2, CI & HUMINT in Joint Operations, 16 Mar 2011 w/ chg 1 dated 26 Aug 2011)  Also see source; control; controlled source operation. Controlled Source Operation (CSO).  A type of offensive counterintelligence operation (OFCO); see DoDI S-5240.09, OFCO, 29 Oct 2008 (*under revision*). Controlled Technical Services (CTS).  The controlled use of technology to enhance counterintelligence and human intelligence activities. (JP 1-02 and JP 2-01.2, CI & HUMINT in Joint Ops, 16 Mar 2011 w/ chg 1 dated 26 Aug 2011)\n\n    CTS include asset communications, validation tools, tailored form factors, and technology or tools\nused with sources or CI and HUMINT officers to enhance their collection efforts.  CTS are a support function of CI and HIMINT and are not independent operations.\n\n       -- JP 2.01.2, *CI & HUMINT in Joint Operations*, 11 Mar 2011 w/ chg 1 (p. II-15)\n Controlled Unclassified Information (CUI).  Unclassified information that does not meet the standards for National Security Classification under Executive Order 12958 but is (1) pertinent to the national interests of the United States or to the important interests of entities outside the Federal Government, and (2) under law or policy requires protection from unauthorized disclosure, special handling safeguards, or prescribed limits on exchange or dissemination. (White House Memo, subj: Designation and Sharing of Controlled Unclassified Information, dated 7 May 2008)\n\n\n    All federal agencies\n\nroutinely generate, use, store, and share information that, while not\nappropriate for \"classification\" under EO 12958 or other authority,\n\nnevertheless requires some level\nof protection from unauthorized access and release.  Currently this information is identified by over 100 unique markings and handling regimes, such as \"Law Enforcement Sensitive,\" \"FOUO,\" etc.\n\n    An Interagency Task Force reviewed the CUI framework and recommended that the definition of\nCUI should be simplified to:  All unclassified information for which, pursuant to statute, regulation,\nor departmental or agency policy, there is a compelling requirement for safeguarding and/or\ndissemination controls.\n\n    See Report and Recommendations of the Presidential Task Force on Controlled Unclassified\nInformation, 25 August 2009, at <http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/cui_task_force_rpt.pdf>\n Cooperative Contact.  An asset validation term referring to an individual who wittingly responds to tasking in certain areas, but is unwilling to enter into a controlled clandestine relationship. (National HUMINT\nGlossary)\n\n\nCooperative Detainee.  A detainee who has established a pattern of answering all questions truthfully and unconditionally and, in fact, answers all questions truthfully and unconditionally. A detainee is not cooperative if the detainee refuses to answer, avoids answering, or falsely answers questions, or if the detainee is intentionally deceptive. A detainee who fluctuates between cooperation and resistance is not cooperative. (DoDD 3115.09, DoD Intelligence Interrogations, Detainee Debriefings, and Tactical Questioning, 11 Oct 2012 w/ chg 1 dated 15 Nov 2013) Co-Opted Worker or Co-Optee.  A national of a country, but not an officer or employee of that country's intelligence service, who assists that service on a temporary or opportunity basis. (ICS Glossary & CI Community Lexicon) Coordination.  The process of sharing information regarding planned activity, affording potentially affected parties the opportunity to comment, prior to undertaking action.  The process of coordination does not infer seeking authorization for action. (DoDD S-5200.37, Management and Execution of Defense HUMINT (U), 9 Feb 2009)\n\n-- Also, the process of sharing operational information and deconflicting activities prior to undertaking a proposed action. Coordination does not require approval or disapproval of the proposed action. (DoDD S-3325.09, Oversight, Management, and Execution of Defense Clandestine Source Operations (U), 9 Jan 2013 w/ chg 1, dated 13 Jun 2013)\n\n## Dod Counterintelligence Coordination...\n\nSECDEF shall conduct counterintelligence activities in support of Department of Defense components and coordinate activities...\n\n-- Dir FBI shall coordinate the clandestine collection of foreign intelligence\ncollected through human sources or through human-enabled means and counterintelligence activities inside the United States.\n-- Dir CIA shall coordinate the clandestine collection of foreign intelligence\ncollected through human sources or through human-enabled means and counterintelligence activities outside the United States.\n-- EO 12333, U.S. Intelligence Activities EO 12333 directs that the Director FBI coordinates CI activities inside the U.S. and that Director CIA coordinates CI activities outside the U.S.  For coordination of DoD CI activities see:\n\n\n     -- **DoD/FBI MOU**:  Memorandum of Understanding between the FBI and DoD Governing\n         Information Sharing, Operation Coordination, and Investigative Responsibilities, 2 Aug 2011\n+  Annex A - Counterterrorism Information Sharing, 14 Mar 2012\n\n+  Annex B - Counterintelligence Investigative Information Sharing, 9 Dec 2011\n\n+  Annex C - *To be Published* -- Coordinating Counterintelligence Activities\n\n+  Annex TBD - *To be Published* -- Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF)\nthe MOA Between the Attorney General and the Secretary of Defense, \"Agreement Governing the Conduct of Defense Department Counterintelligence Activities in Conjunction with the Federal Bureau of Investigation (U), dated 5 April 1979 and the 1996 supplement thereto, \"MOU Regarding Coordination of Counterintelligence Matters.\"\n\n\n\nThe DoD/FBI MOU (2011) defines *Operational Coordination* as: \"The solicitation of inputs prior\nto undertaking a proposed action, with the understanding that no such action will be taken until\nany identified objections have been resolved.\"\n\n -- **DoD/CIA MOA:**  Annex 3 to the Memorandum of Agreement Between the Central Intelligence\nAgency and the Department of Defense, \"MOA Between CIA and DoD Regarding CI Activities\nAbroad (U),\" 6 Dec 2007, classified SECRET//NOFORN\n\n       Note: Annex 3 streamlines the coordination process by assigning primary responsibility for deconfliction to\nDoD CI field elements and the local Chief of Station/Chief of Base and defines \"coordination\" as the process\nof sharing operational information and deconflicting activities prior to undertaking a proposed action. (USD/I Memo, subj: Procedures for Coordination of Counterintelligence Activities Outside the United States, 4 Jan\n2008).\n\n    For coordination regarding HUMINT activities see ICD 304, *Human Intelligence*, 6 Mar 2008\n Coordinating Authority.  The commander or individual who has the authority to require consultation between the specific functions or activities involving forces of two or more Services, joint force components, or forces of the same Service or agencies, but does not have the authority to compel agreement. (JP 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States, 25 Mar 2013) Counter Surveillance.  Measures or actions taken when under verified or suspected surveillance. (DoDI S-5240.15, FPRG, 20 Oct 2010) Also see countersurveillance; surveillance; surveillance detection. Counter Threat Finance (CTF).  Efforts to stop money that funds terrorism, proliferation, narcotics networks, espionage, WMD networks, trafficking in persons, weapons trafficking, precursor chemical smuggling, and other activities that generate revenue through illicit trafficking networks. (A Guide to Counter Threat Finance Intelligence by Marilyn B. Peterson, 2009)  Also see *threat finance*.\n\n    Commander, U.S. Special Operations Command is the DoD CTF lead component for\nsynchronizing DoD CTF activities.\n\n    For DoD policy see DoDD 5205.14, *DoD Counter Threat Finance Policy*, 19 Aug 2010 (w/ chg 1 dated 16 Nov 2012).\n\n-- CTF Activities and Capabilities [within DoD].  DoD activities and capabilities, apart from those included under DoD CTFI [Counter Threat Intelligence], to deny, disrupt, destroy, or defeat finance systems and networks that negatively affect U.S. interests in compliance with all existing authorities and procedures. This includes those activities and capabilities undertaken with other Government agencies and/or partner nations. DoD CTF counters financing used to engage in terrorist activities and illicit networks that traffic narcotics, WMDs, improvised explosive devices, other weapons, persons, precursor chemicals, and related activities that support an adversary's ability to negatively affect U.S. interests. (DoDD 5205.14, DoD Counter Threat Finance Policy, 19 Aug 2010)\n-- CTF Intelligence (CTFI) [within DoD].  DoD intelligence actions, including those undertaken with other USG agencies and/or coalition partners, that involve the collection, processing, integration, evaluation, analysis, interpretation, production, and dissemination of intelligence products in support of DoD CTF activities and capabilities. (DoDD 5205.14, DoD Counter Threat Finance Policy, 19 Aug 2010)\nCounterdeception.  Efforts to negate, neutralize, diminish the effects of, or gain advantage from a foreign deception operation. *Counterdeception* does not include the intelligence function of identifying foreign deception operations. (JP 1-02 and JP 3-13.4, Military Deception, 13 Jul 2006)  Also see *deception*; military deception.\n\n\n\n-- Also, the detection of deception. (Textbook of Political-Military Counterdeception: Basic Principles &\nMethods, August 2007)\nIn principle, it should always be possible to unmask a deception.\n\n\n-- R.V. Jones, *Intelligence and Deception* (1981)\n____________________________\n\n\n    Ideal counterdeception reveals the truth behind the lie, the face beneath the mask, the reality under the camouflage.\n\n       -- Barton Whaley, *Textbook of Political-Military Counterdeception: Basic Principles & Methods* (2007)\n Counterespionage (CE).  That aspect of counterintelligence designed to detect, destroy, neutralize, exploit, or prevent espionage activities through identification, penetration, manipulation, deception, and repression of individuals, groups, or organizations conducting or suspected of conducting espionage activities. (JP 1-02 and JP 2-01.2, CI & HUMINT in Joint Operations, 16 Mar 2011 w/ chg 1 dated 26 Aug 2011)  Also see *counterintelligence*.\n\n-- Also, actions undertaken to investigate specific allegations or circumstances and to acquire information concerning a person or persons involved in the violation of US espionage laws. (National HUMINT Glossary)\n-- Also, those aggressive, comprehensive, and coordinated CI defensive and offensive endeavors worldwide designed to detect, identify, assess, and counter, neutralize, penetrate, or exploit the foreign intelligence threat to the Department of Defense (AR 381-20, Army CI Program, 25 May 2010)\n-- Also, the act of conducting counterintelligence operations that involve the penetration of an opposing intelligence service. (*Encyclopedia of the CIA*, 2003)\nCounterespionage is often touted as the aristocratic sector of secret operations.\n\n-- Harry Rositzke, *CIA's Secret Operations* (1977)\n\n    Counterespionage... is a widely misunderstood branch of secret operations....  CE is an offensive\noperation, a means of obtaining intelligence about the opposition by usingor, more usually, attempting to usethe opposition's operations. CE is a form of secret intelligence operation, but it is a form so esoteric, so complex and important as to stand by itself.\n__________________\n\n    Counterespionage (CE) is the offensive, or aggressive, side of counterintelligence. It involves the\nidentification of a specific adversary and a knowledge of the specific operation he is conducting. Counterespionage personnel must then attempt to counter these operations by infiltrating the hostile service (called penetration) and through various forms of manipulation.  Ideally, the thrust of the hostile operation is turned back against the enemy.\n\n        -- Senate Report # 94-755 (aka Church Committee Report), Book I, 26 April 1976, p. 166\n___________________\n\n    Counterespionage is like putting a virus into the bloodstream of the enemy.\n\n       -- Robin W. Winks, *Cloak and Glown:  Scholars in the Secret War* (1987), p. 422\n Counterfeit Material.  An item that is an unauthorized copy or substitute that has been identified, marked, or altered by a source other than the item's legally authorized source and has been misrepresented to be an authorized item of the legally authorized source. (DoDI 4140.67, DoD Counterfeit Prevention Policy, 26 Apr 2013)  Also see *suspect counterfeit*.\n\n    For general background information see Senate Armed Services Committee Report 112-167,\nInquiry into Counterfeit Electronic Parts in the Department of Defense Supply Chain, 21 May 2012.\n\n    Copy at:  http://www.armed-services.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Counterfeit-Electronic-Parts.pdf\n Counterguerrilla Operations.  Operations and activities conducted by armed forces, paramilitary forces, or nonmilitary agencies against guerrillas. (JP 1-02 and JP 3-24, Counterinsurgency, 22 Nov 2013) Counterinsurgency (COIN).  Comprehensive civilian and military efforts designed to simultaneously defeat and contain insurgency and address its root causes. (JP 3-24, Counterinsurgency, 22 Nov 2013)\n\n    ...the success of a counterinsurgency depends less on defeating the terrorist, guerrilla, or military\ntactics of the insurgents than on uncovering and undermining the secret network and neutralizing its violent tactics.   ...The pivotal elements of counterinsurgency are intelligence and counterintelligence.\n\n       -- Roy Godson, *Dirty Tricks or Trump Cards: US Covert Action and Counterintelligence* (1995), p. 165\n Counterintelligence (CI).  Information gathered and activities conducted to identify, deceive, exploit, disrupt, or protect against espionage, other intelligence activities, sabotage, or assassinations conducted for or on behalf of foreign powers, organizations or persons, or their agents, or international terrorist organizations or activities. (Executive Order 12333, as amended 30 July 2008 and JP 2-01.2, CI & HUMINT in Joint Operations, 16 Mar 2011 w/ chg 1 dated 26 Aug 2011)   Also see *counterespionage*.\n\n\n\n## Counterintelligence... The Core Mission Simply Stated -- Combating Adversarial Intelligence Threats\n\n\n-- COL Mark L. Reagan (USA Ret)\n\n    For DoD counterintelligence policy, see DoD Directive O-5240.02, *Counterintelligence*\n\n--  Also, information gathered, and activities conducted, to protect against espionage, other intelligence activities, sabotage, or assassinations conducted by or on behalf of foreign governments or elements thereof, foreign organizations, or foreign persons, or international terrorist activities. (50 USC 401a)\n\n\n  Counterintelligence:  [noun] intelligence activities concerned with identifying and\ncountering the threat to security posed by hostile intelligence organizations or by individuals engaged in espionage or sabotage or subversion or terrorism.\n\n\n\n-- Also, intelligence activity, with its resultant product, devoted to destroying the effectiveness of inimical foreign intelligence activities and undertaken to protect the security of the nation and its personnel, information, and installations against espionage, sabotage, and subversion. Includes the process of procuring, developing, recording, and disseminating information concerning hostile clandestine activity and of penetrating, manipulating, or repressing individuals, groups, or organizations conducting such activity. (National Security Council Intelligence Directive [NSCID] No. 5, 17 Feb 1972) -- Also, encompasses actions taken to detect and counteract foreign intelligence activity that adversely affects U.S. national security interest. (WMD Report, 31 Mar 2005) -- Also, counterintelligence involves all those defensive and offensive activities conducted at home and abroad to protect against traditional and emerging foreign intelligence and international terrorist threats to the national security and to the national defense. (DHE-M 3301.002, Defense HUMINT Enterprise Manual, Vol II: Collection Operations, 23 Nov 2010)\n-- Also, counters or neutralizes foreign intelligence and security services (FISS) and international terrorist organizations (ITO) intelligence collection efforts.  It does this through collection, CI investigations, operations, analysis, production, and functional and technical services.  CI includes all actions taken to detect, identify, track, exploit, and neutralize the multidiscipline intelligence activities of friends, competitors, opponents, adversaries, and enemies.  It is the key intelligence community contributor to the protection of U.S. interests and equities.  CI helps identify EEFIs [essential elements of friendly information] by identifying vulnerabilities to threat collection and actions taken to counter collection and operations against U.S. forces. (Army FM 2-0, Intelligence, 23 Mar 2010)\n\n\n-- Also, the total action taken... by which information is gathered and activities are conducted to protect that agency against espionage, theft of materials, sabotage, assignations, or other intelligence activities conducted by, or on behalf of, hostile foreign governments or other \"threatening\" foreign organizations (terrorist groups, rogue military units, etc.). (*Encyclopedia of the CIA*, 2003) -- Also, CI is a discipline and mindset that identifies, analyzes and neutralizes the efforts of others who seek to interfere with our [CIA's] ability to collect and analyze intelligence. (CIA/CIC, circa Mar 2010)\n\n Counterintelligence's core mission can be simply stated as combating adversarial intelligence\nthreats.  It is the business of identifying and combating foreign intelligence threats through\nknowledge and *action* -- knowledge of and action in countering global adversarial intelligence\nthreats posed by a variety of intelligence entities directed by foreign states, as well as non-state actors, such as transnational terrorist groups.\n\n    CI is an integral component of U.S. Intelligencehistorically and doctrinally, as well as by statute,\nexecutive order and policy.  CI is an \"intelligence activity\" in accordance with the National Security\nAct of 1947 and EO 12333, which both specifically define \"intelligence\" as including\ncounterintelligence and foreign intelligence.  CI is *intelligence activity* focused on undermining the effectiveness of -- as well as exploiting -- adversary intelligence activities directed against US national security interests.  Counterintelligence is one word in the United States -- it is not counter intelligence (two words) or counter-intelligence (hyphenated).\n\n   CI is often confused with the foreign intelligence (FI) collection discipline referred to as human\nintelligence or HUMINT.  Although CI and HUMINT are both intelligence activities that operate in the human domain -- they are distinctly different...different missions, different authorities,\neach focused on different content, as well as outcomes.\n\n    The need for CI knowledge and action is much different from the need for FI collection.  FI\ncollection values the information above all, whereas CI insists on acting on that information-- a totally different operational dynamic.\n________________________\n\n    FI [foreign intelligence] is the task of producing and analyzing otherwise unobtainable intelligence\n(i.e., \"stealing secrets); CI focuses on preventing others from stealing secrets....\n\n         -- Andre Le Gallo, \"Covert Action: A Vital Option in U.S. National Security Policy, International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence, Vol 18 No 2 (Summer 2005), p. 354\n________________________\n\n    [Foreign] intelligence is, in essence, the gathering and analysis of secret information about other\nnations.  Its opposite twin, security, is the protection of one's own secrets. Counterintelligence seeks to protect both of the elements from foreign intelligence activities.\n\n         -- *American Counterintelligence and Security for the 21st Century*, The Institute of World Politics\n_________________________\n\n\n## Knowledge And Action...\n\n\n    CI \"is a strategic instrument available to states to protect themselves and advance their interests\nin the struggle for power, wealth, and influence.  ...But the end product, the mission of counterintelligence, is actionaction to protect against foreigners and action to manipulate\n  foreigners in the service of national goals.\"\n       -- Roy Godson, *Dirty Tricks or Trump Cards: US Covert Action and Counterintelligence* (1995)\n_________________________\n\n    The primary mission of counterintelligence is to identify, neutralize, and exploit the intelligence or\nsecret infrastructure of others. It is by its very nature both a defensive and offensive tool. ...\nOffensively, counterintelligence helps to advance strategy and policy through knowledge about\nadversary intelligence and exploit an adversary's vulnerabilities to weaken or manipulate them to\nadvantage. ... But only counterintelligence... has the mission and the capabilities to understand,\n  defend against, and exploit an adversary's secret intelligence.\n       -- Roy Godson, *Dirty Tricks or Trump Cards: US Covert Action and Counterintelligence*, with new\n            introduction by the author (paperback 2001), p. xxviii\n_________________________\n\n## Ci Wages \"Nothing Less Than A Secret War Against Antagonist Intelligence Services.\"\n\n\n-- U.S. Senate Report 94-755, Book I, 26 April 1976, p. 163 -- Also, CI encompasses information collections, analysis, investigations and operations conducted\nto identify and neutralize espionage and foreign intelligence activities, the intelligence-related activities of terrorists, and adversary efforts to degrade, manipulate or covertly influence U.S. intelligence, political processes, policy or public opinion. (NIPF [U], Jul 2006)\n\n\n    CI works closely with intelligence, security, infrastructure protections and law enforcement to\nensure an integrated approach to the protection of U.S. forces, our intelligence and national assets, U.S. research, development and technology, and the U.S. economy.\n\n CI is composed of both offensive and defensive elements.  Offensive CI includes the penetration\nand deception of adversary groups.  Defensive CI involves protecting vital U.S. national security\nrelated information from being obtained or manipulated by an adversary's intelligence\norganizations, activities and operations. This two-pronged approach forms a comprehensive CI strategy that is informed by collection results and feeds more effective CI operations.\n\n Counterintelligence is a universal constant that should be factored in whenever U.S. intelligence or\nnational security capabilities are deployed or when we are targeted by our adversaries.  'Every'\nU.S. intelligence capability and requirement needs to be protected and 'every' intelligence threat deployed against us should be countered by effective offensive and defensive CI. -- NIPF - Intelligence Topic Definitions and Information Needs (U), July 2006\n\n-- Also, CI may also be thought of as *knowledge* needed for the protection and preservation of the military, economic, and productive strength of the United States, including the security of the Government in domestic and foreign affairs against or from espionage, sabotage, and all other similar clandestine activities designed to weaken or destroy the United States. (Report of the Commission on Government Security - 1957, as cited in Church Committee Report, 26 April 1976, p. 163, footnote 1)\n   Counterintelligence (CI) is a special form of intelligence activity, separate and distinct\n\nfrom other disciplines. Its purpose is to discover hostile foreign intelligence operations and destroy their effectiveness. This objective involves the protection of the United State Government against infiltration by foreign agents, as well as the control and manipulation of adversary intelligence operations.  An effort is made to both discern and decive [sic] the plans and intentions of enemy intelligence services.\n\n    Defined more formally, counterintelligence is an intelligence activity dedicated to\nundermining the effectiveness of hostile intelligence services. -- Senate Report 94-755 (aka Church Committee Report), 26 April 1976 (p. 163)\n\n\n## Counterintelligence - Senate Report 94-755\n\n\n Counterintelligence:  Activities conducted to destroy the effectiveness of foreign intelligence\noperations and to protect information against espionage, individuals against subversion, and installations against sabotage. The term also refers to information developed by or used in\ncounterintelligence operations. See counterespionage, countersabotage, and countersubversion [below].\n\n\nCounterespionage:  Those aspects of counterintelligence concerned with aggressive operations against another intelligence service to reduce its effectiveness, or to detect and neutralize foreign espionage. This is done by identification, penetration, manipulation, deception, and repression of individuals, groups, or organizations conducting or suspected of conducting espionage activities in order to destroy. Neutralize, exploit, or prevent such espionage activities.\n\n\nCountersabotage:  That aspect of counterintelligence designed to detect, destroy, neutralize, or prevent sabotage activities through identification, penetration, manipulation, deception, and repression of individuals, groups, or organizations conducting or suspected of conducting sabotage activities.\n\n\nCountersubversion:  That part of counterintelligence designed to destroy the effectiveness of subversive activities through the detection, identification, exploitation, penetration, manipulation, deception, and repression of individuals, groups, or organizations conducting or capable of conducting such activities.\n\nCounterintelligence Activities.  [An alternate term for] one or more of the five functions of counterintelligence: operations, investigations, collection, analysis & production, and functional services. (DoDD O-5240.02, Counterintelligence, 20 Dec 2007; JP 1-02; and JP 2-01.2, CI & HUMINT in Joint Operations, 16 Mar 2011 w/ chg 1 dated 26 Aug 2011)  Also see counterintelligence functions. Counterintelligence Activities in Cyberspace.  CI activities in cyberspace include those forensics examinations of DoD affiliated information systems and other approved virtual or on-line activities to identify, disrupt, neutralize, penetrate, or exploit FIEs [Foreign Intelligence Entities]. DoD CI activities in cyberspace do not include Offensive Computer Operations as defined in NSPD-38 or the collection and processing of technical and intelligence information derived from foreign communications by other than an intended recipient. (DoDI S-5240.23, CI Activities in Cyberspace (U), 13 Dec 2010 with chg 1)\n\n    For additional information see --\n\n    1) JP 2-01.2, *Counterintelligence and Human Intelligence in Joint Operations (U)*, 16 Mar 2011 w/ chg 1 dated 26 Aug 2011 (para 3f, p. III-17, \"CI Activities in Cyberspace\"). 2) *The DoD Strategy for Counterintelligence in Cyberspace* (28 Aug 2009).\n    3) *The United States Government-Wide Cyber Counterintelligence Plan - 2008* (classified).\n\n\n## Cyberspace Is A Venue\n\n Counterintelligence Analysis.  The methodical process of examining and evaluating information to determine the nature, function, interrelationships, personalities, and intent regarding the intelligence capabilities of foreign powers, international terrorists, and other entities. (DoDD O-5240.02, Counterintelligence, 20 Dec 2007 with change 1 dated 20 Dec 2010)  Also see counterintelligence production.\n\n## Ci Function: Ci Analysis & Production...\n\nAstute analysis is [a] critical enabler... Strategic analysis allows DoD CI to understand today's risk environment.  ...[it] allows the Department to learn and use an adversary's pressure points to influence its actions.\n\n-- DoD Counterintelligence Strategy - FY 2004\n\"It is not enough, of course, simply to collect information.\n\nThoughtful analysis is vital to sound decisionmaking.\"\n-- President Ronald Reagan (4 Dec 1981)\n\"Analysis - Collecting information is one thing.\nMaking sense of it and using it to frustrate and exploit foreign services is another.\"\n-- Roy Godson, *Dirty Tricks or Trump Cards: US Covert Action and Counterintelligence* (1995), p. 81\nCounterintelligence Analysis - the Queen of the Counterintelligence Chessboard\n\n    Intelligence Community analytical tradecraft standards established in ICD 203, Analytical\nStandards, serve to guide the writing of intelligence analysis and apply to counterintelligence analysis.\n_________________________\n\n\n   \"Effective counterintelligence analysis is a tall order. Good macro-analysis is not synonymous with\njournalism, or narrative description, or even investigations. Macro-counterintelligence analysis is meant to be explanatory, systematic, empirical, cumulative, reliable, comprehensive, integrated, and policy relevant. Analysis should discover and connect the seemingly disconnected, illuminate hidden relationships, identify unseen linkages, reveal patterns of activity and behavior heretofore unobserved. Good counterintelligence analysis should provide reliable knowledge and authoritative\njudgments to policymakers and operators. The product of counterintelligence and security analysis is understanding and explanation, and if possible, to answer the questions how and why.\"\n\n        -- Kenneth E, deGraffenreid, *Countering Hostile Intelligence Activities as a Strategic Threat* (1989)\n\n\n## Ci Analysis Drives Collections, Enhances Ci Investigative Activity, Shapes Operations, Enables Mission Execution, And Informs Decision Makers\n\n - Also, the process of examining and evaluating information to determine the nature, function, interrelationships, personalities, and intent regarding the intelligence capabilities of state and non-state actors and other entities and activities of CI interest. (JP 2.01.2, CI & HUMINT in Joint Operations, 11 Mar 2011)\n\n-- Also, a step in the process of producing timely, accurate, and relevant assessments regarding the actual and potential foreign intelligence and international terrorist threat to Department of Defense in which the collected information is subjected to review to identify significant facts for subsequent interpretation. (AR 381-20, Army CI Program, 25 May 2010)\n\n## Dod Ci Analysis High Level View... Counterintelligence Analysis - The Queen Of The Counterintelligence Chessboard Create Ci Knowledge\n\nAnalysis - Collecting information is one thing.\n\nMaking sense of it and using it to frustrate and exploit foreign services is another.\n\n\n        -- Roy Godson, *Dirty Tricks or Trump Cards: US Covert Action and Counterintelligence* (1995), p. 81\n\n\n## Ci Analysis... Look At The Details And See The Passion\n\n\n    I can't possibly overstate the importance of good research. Everyone goes through life dropping\ncrumbs. If you can recognize the crumbs, you can trace a path all the way back from your death certificate to the dinner and a movie that resulted in you in the first place. But research is an art, not a science, because anyone who knows what they're doing can find the crumbs, the wheres, whats, and whos. The art is in the whys: the ability to read between the crumbs, not to mix metaphors. For every event, there is a cause and effect. For every crime, a motive. And for every motive, a passion. The art of research is the ability to look at the details, and see the passion.\n        -- Daryl Zero, *The Zero Effect* (1998)\n___________________________________\n\n    Analysis... often raises more questions than it answers.  ...remember of the basic principle:  All\naction, whether human or physical, disturbs the environment is some way. Find that disturbance and you have a key to the action.\n\n    For analysis to play its proper CI role it must be able to survey all of the intelligence data available\nto one's own government, and it must be able to somehow direct the rest of CI. -- Angelo Codevilla, *Informing Statecraft: Intelligence for a New Century* (1992), pp. 330-331\n___________________________________\n\n    For a \"snap shot\" of CI analysis see Irvin D. Sugg, Jr., Basic Counterintelligence Analysis in a\nNutshell: Quick Reference Guide, Joint Counterintelligence Training Academy (JCITA), n.d.\n    Copy available at:  <http://www.ntis.gov/search/product.aspx?ABBR=PB2010105593>\n Counterintelligence Analysis and Production Council (CIAPC).  The principal forum for coordinating CI analysis and production requirements, discussing CI analysis and production priorities within the enterprise, and discussing other IC issues. (DoDI 5240.18, CI Analysis & Production, 17 Nov 2009 with change 1 dated 15 Oct 2013)\n\n    CIAPC Membership:  The Director, Defense CI & HUMINT Center (DCHC), appoints the Chair.\nCore membership includes the DCHC analysis and production enterprise manager and the managers of the Defense CI Component analysis and production elements. The Chair may expand membership, to include other full-time or permanent part-time Federal employees.\n Counterintelligence Analysis and Production Element.  The element within a Defense CI Component that performs CI analysis in any form; produces a CI analytical product in any of the categories of CI analysis; or responds to requests for CI analysis from an internal organization and/or from organizations external to the Defense CI Component. (DoDI 5240.18, CI Analysis & Production, 17 Nov 2009) Counterintelligence Analysis Centers. See *ACIC, ICON, MTAC* for DoD CI Analysis Centers. . Counterintelligence Analysis Report.  A document produced by a CI analysis and production element stating the results of analysis regarding a relevant CI topic, event, situation, or development, and containing the characteristics outlined in [DoDI 5240.18] Appendix 2 to Enclosure 3. (DoDI 5240.18, CI Analysis & Production, 17 Nov 2009)\nCounterintelligence Analytical Product.  Any document that contains the work of, is supported by, collaborated on, or produced by a CI analyst at any echelon within a Defense CI Component. It may or may not include CI production. (DoDI 5240.18, CI Analysis & Production, 17 Nov 2009)\n    Objectives of CI analytical products are to: 1) Outline, describe, or illustrate the threat posed by an\n\nForeign Intelligence Entity (FIE) to installations, personnel, assets, operations, or resources; 2) Identify opportunities to conduct offensive CI operations (OFCO) targeting a FIE; and 3) Identify CI investigative opportunities.\n\n   CI analytical products seek to satisfy a core CI production requirement to identify people,\norganizations, locations, activities, and resources associated with a FIE or a target of a FIE.\n\n    Within DoD, CI analytical products are categorized based on the purpose of the product, analytical\neffort, the production timeline, and other distinguishing characteristics.  The primary categories of\nCI analytical products are: 1) Assessment, 2) Analysis Report, 3) Threat Advisory, and 4) Functional Support.  Associated analytical products with CI collections, investigations and operations are summarized below.\n\n## -- **Analytical Products Associated With Ci Collections Are:**\n\nCollection Support Brief.  Provides near-comprehensive background detail on a collection issue to guide and enhance collection efforts. (DoDI 5240.18, 17 Nov 2009) Collection Source Evaluation.  An evaluation of a source to determine if the information provided is valuable and credible and to ascertain the reliability and veracity of the source. (DoDI 5240.18, 17 Nov 2009) Collection Emphasis.  Supplements a standing collection requirement and identifies areas of emphasis or information gaps to the CI collector. (DoDI 5240.18, 17 Nov 2009) Source-Directed Requirement.  Established by a CI analysts based on knowledge of a source's access and placement to necessary information. (DoDI 5240.18, 17 Nov 2009) IIR Evaluation.  An analyst's evaluation of how well an IIR satisfied the intelligence requirement for which it was collected. (DoDI 5240.18, 17 Nov 2009)\n\n## -- Analytical Products Associated With Ci Investigations Are:\n\n Investigative Analysis Report.  An evaluation of all available information obtained during a CI inquiry to determine if an investigation is warranted; an evaluation of an on-going CI investigation to develop leads, identify trends, patterns, or anomalies in furtherance of the investigative effort; or produced at the conclusion of a CI investigation to identify previously unknown methods of operation, describe lessons learned, and to support damage assessments when initiated. (DoDI 5240.18, 17 Nov 2009) Investigative Source Evaluation.  An evaluation of a source to determine if the information provided is valuable and credible, and to ascertain the reliability and veracity of the source. (DoDI 5240.18, 17 Nov 2009) Investigative Support Package.  An evaluation of all available information pertaining to an unknown\nsubject CI inquiry or investigation in an effort to identify a person, place, or thing of CI interest based\non analysis of the information. (DoDI 5240.18, 17 Nov 2009)\n\n  -- Analytical products associated with CI operations are:\n\nOperational Analysis Report.  An evaluation of information from a variety of sources to determine if favorable conditions are present for initiation of a CI operation and the report may offer suggestions\nas to the type of asset and/or the access and placement required to meet the foreign essential\nelements of information requirements. (DoDI 5240.18, 17 Nov 2009)\n\nOperational Asset Evaluation.  Evaluates an asset's reliability and veracity in a CI operation. (DoDI 5240.18, 17 Nov 2009)\n\nOperational Support Package.  Comprehensive analysis of all available intelligence on a target of\ninterest to a Defense CI Component or determined to be of interest to DoD CI. It details the\nsignificance of the target, relates it to strategic objectives, identifies desired effects, and suggests\nmethods of engagement to achieve desired results. (DoDI 5240.18, 17 Nov 2009)\n Counterintelligence Assessment.  A document produced by a CI analysis and production element stating the in-depth and comprehensive results of analysis regarding a relevant CI topic, event, situation, or development, and contains the characteristics outlined in [DoDI 5140.18] Appendix 2 to Enclosure 3. (DoDI 5140.18, CI Analysis & Production, 17 Nov 2009)\n-- Also, an analysis of the actual or potential foreign intelligence and international terrorist threat to DoD, with the objective of protecting personnel, plans, information. Research and technology, critical infrastructure, and other national security interests. (AR 381-20, Army CI Program, 25 May 2010)\n-- Also, a DoD Component's comprehensive analysis or study of a relevant CI topic, event, situation, issue, or development. When conducted in support of an RDA program with CPI [Critical Program Information], the assessment describes the threat a foreign entity (person, representative, corporation, government, military, commercial, etc.) represents to the CPI/system assessed. (DoDI 5200.39, CPI Protection within DoD, 16 Jul 2008, w/ change 1 dated 28 Dec\n2010)\n\n\n   The CI assessment is multidisciplinary as it includes an analysis of the diverse foreign\ncollection modalities available, the relative effectiveness of each, and capability of the foreign entity to collect information about research efforts, the technology, and/or system under development. The assessment may include the impact to the DoD if the technology is compromised and be complimentary to, integrated with, or independent of the TTRA provided by the Defense Intelligence Community.\n\n      -- DoDI 5200.39, *CPI Protection within DoD*, 16 Jul 2008, w/ chg 1 dated 28 Dec 2010\n Counterintelligence Awareness.  An individual's level of comprehension as to the FIE [foreign intelligence entity] threat, methods, indicators, and reporting requirements. (DoDD 5240.06, CIAR, 17 May 2011 with change 1 dated 30 May 2013)\n-- Also, a state of being aware of the sensitivity of classified information one possesses, collaterally aware of the many modes of operation of hostile intelligence persons and others whose interests are inimical to the United States while being able to recognize attempts to compromise one's information, and the actions one should take, when one suspects he has been approached, to impart the necessary facts to trained counterintelligence personnel. (DoD 5220.22.22-M-Sup 1, NISPOM Supplement, Feb 1995) Counterintelligence Awareness Products.  A DoD Component's analysis of a CI topic, event, situation, issue, or development. These products differ from an assessment in that they are often time sensitive, are published as needed or annually, and normally do not require extensive research to produce.  Products of this nature ensure a consistent flow of appropriately classified or categorized threat information is available to the community to increase awareness and action as appropriate. The Defense Security Service *\"Technology Collection Trends in Defense Industry\"* and the Office of the National Counterintelligence Executive *\"Annual Report to Congress on Foreign Economic Espionage\"* are examples of products meeting this objective. (DoDI 5200.39, CPI Protection within DoD, 16 Jul 2008, w/ chg 1 dated 28 Dec 2010) Counterintelligence Campaign (CI Campaign).  See DoD Counterintelligence Campaign.\n\nCounterintelligence Collection.  The systematic acquisition of intelligence information to answer CI collection requirements. (DoDI S-5140.17, CI Collection Activities, 14 Mar 2014)  Also see Counterintelligence Collection Activities; *Military Counterintelligence Collection*.\n\n\n    See \"Counterintelligence Collection Methods\" addressed in Appendix C, Joint Publication 2-01.2,\nCounterintelligence and Human Intelligence in Joint Operations (U), 16 Mar 2011  w/ chg 1 dated 26 Aug 2011.\n\n    Director DIA is the Defense CI Collection Manager.\n\n\n-- Also, the systematic acquisition of information (through investigations, operations, or liaison)\nconcerning espionage, sabotage, terrorism, other intelligence activities or assassinations conducted by or on behalf of foreign governments or elements thereof, foreign organizations, or foreign persons that are directed against or threaten Department of Defense interests. (JP 1-02 and JP 2-01.2, CI & HUMINT in Joint Operations (U),16 Mar 2011 w/ chg 1 dated 26 Aug 2011)\n\n\n## Ci Function: Ci Collection...\n\nCI Collection\nObtaining information about foreign intelligence entities, other clandestine & covert threats, as well as international terrorists groups/networks\n\n## Counterintelligence Collection:  The Systematic Acquisition Of Intelligence Information To Answer Ci Collection Requirements.\n\n CI Collection activities are designed to collect specific information or develop\nleads concerning adversary intelligence collection requirements, capabilities,\nefforts, operations, structure, personalities, and methods of operations\n CI Collection can result from ongoing CI investigations or operations or serve\nto initiate CI investigations and/or operations\n Types of CI Collection within DoD include:\n- Military Counterintelligence Collection (MCC)\n- CI Interviews & Debriefings...\nincluding Debriefing of Enemy POWs, Displaced Persons & Refugees\n- Liaison - Open Source & Media Exploitation - CI Collection in the Cyberspace Domain\nCI Collection feeds analysis... which in turn informs decision makers, drives additional collections, enhances investigative activity, shapes operations, and enables mission execution\n\n        See DoDI S-5240.17, (U) *CI Collection Activities,* 14 Mar 2014 for DoD policy and additional information.\n Counterintelligence Collection Activities (CCA): CI collection activities to include military CI collection, CI questioning of EPWs and detainees, CI debriefings, liaison, open source and media exploitation, and CI\ncollection in cyberspace. (DoDI S-5140.17, CI Collection Activities, 14 Mar 2014)  Also see Counterintelligence Collection; *Military Counterintelligence Collection*. Counterintelligence Collection in Cyberspace.  The use of cyber means as the primary tradecraft methodology to engage in targeting and collecting cyber based FIE [Foreign Intelligence Entity] activities.\n\nCI Collection in cyberspace may include the use of authorized non-attributable Internet connections, development and use of national cyber personas, use of authorized obfuscation techniques, as well as appropriate digital tradecraft and cover. (DoDI S-5240.23, CI Activities in Cyberspace (U), 13 Dec 2010 with change 1 dated 16 Oct 2013) Counterintelligence Collection Operations.  Intelligence collection operations that use human sources and CI resources to answer validated CI requirements. CI collection operations are deliberate, planned activities primarily using human sources to satisfy one or more validated CI information requirements. (DoD CI Collection Integrated Working Group Handbook 1-02, 8 Aug 2006) Counterintelligence Controlled Source Operation (CI CSO).  A type of offensive counterintelligence operation (OFCO); see DoDI S-5240.09, OFCO, 29 Oct 2008 for detailed information. Counterintelligence Coordinating Authority (CICA).  A designated CI representative in country, the CICA coordinates, deconflicts, and/or synchronizes all joint CI issues in the country with the Service CI elements assigned to or operating within that country, and with the US embassy or consulate. (JP 2-01.2, CI & HUMINT in Joint Operations, 16 Mar 2011 w/ chg 1 dated 26 Aug 2011)  Also see Command Counterintelligence Coordinating Authority (CCICA). Counterintelligence Cyber Investigation.  An investigation using techniques that identify and interdict the misuse of DoD information systems by a trusted insider or an external intruder. These investigations may involve computer intrusions, exceeding authorized network access, denial of service attacks, or the introduction of a virus or a malicious code. (Previously defined in DoDI 5240.19, CI Support to the Defense Critical Infrastructure Program, 27 Aug 2007 with change 1 dated 28 Dec 2010) Counterintelligence Effects-Based Operations (CI EBO).  As applied to counterintelligence, effects-based operations is a process for obtaining a desired strategic outcome of effect on adversary intelligence activities through the synergistic, multiplicative, and cumulative application of the full range of CI capabilities at the tactical, operational and strategic levels, to include leveraging non-CI capabilities. Successful CI effects-based operations rest on an explicit linking of CI actions to desired strategic outcomes.  CI effects-based operations proactively shape the battlespace in our war against adversary intelligence activities and terrorist networks through the robust execution of *full-spectrum* CI capabilities across the entire spectrum of conflict in an orchestrated and synchronized manner to achieve national, departmental, and combatant commander objectives. (COL Mark L. Reagan, USA Ret) Counterintelligence Enhancement Act of 2002.  The act facilitates enhancement of US counterintelligence activities by: (1) enabling the counterintelligence community of the US Government to fulfill better its mission of identifying, assessing, prioritizing, and countering the intelligence threats to the United States; (2) ensuring that the counterintelligence community of the US Government acts in an efficient and effective manner; and (3) providing for the integration of all the US CI activities. The act also established the National Counterintelligence Executive (NCIX), the National CI Policy Board and the Office of the National CI Executive (ONCIX) which replaced the National Counterintelligence Center (NACIC). ( 901-904 PL 107-306)\n    The act is available at <http://www.ncix.gov/publications/law/index.html> Counterintelligence Equity.  Facts or circumstances connecting an incident, event, or person to an actual or potential intelligence or terrorist threat to Army or DoD personnel, programs, plans, operations, installations, systems, technology, or security. (AR 381-20, Army CI Program, 25 May 2010)\n\nCounterintelligence Flags.  Indicators that should alert a source handler to suspicious action that may bring the source's bona fides into question.  (DoDI S-3325.07, Guidance for the Conduct of DoD Human Source Validation (U), 22 Jun 2009.)\n    \"CI Flags\" are different from reportable CI indicators and behaviors as addressed in DoD Directive\n\n5240.06,CI Awareness and Reporting (CAIR, 17 May 2011 w/ chg 1 dated 30 May 2013; see potential espionage indicators.\n\nCounterintelligence Force Protection Detachment.  See Force Protection Detachment (FPD). Counterintelligence Force Protection Source Operations (CFSO).  Overt source collection activities of an expedient nature intended to identify threats to the command in support of the commander's force protection mission. (Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication 2-6 [previously 2-14], Counterintelligence, 5 Sep 2000, p. 2-3) Counterintelligence Functions.  The five functions of counterintelligence:  operations, investigations, collection, analysis & production, and functional services. (JP 1-02)   Also see CI Activities.\n\n\n\n    CI functions are interrelated, mutually supporting, and can be derived from one another.\n\n    Functions vs. Missions:  \"Functions differ from CI missions in that missions focus on end results to\nbe accomplished, rather than on the means for accomplishment. \"\n      -- Mission Area Analysis of DoD Counterintelligence, Institute for Defense Analyses, May 1999, p.7\n\n\n## Ci Functions Are Useful Terms Of Reference To Describe \"What Is Done\" Ci Missions Focus On The \"End Result\"  To Be Accomplished Ci Functions\n\nInvestigations\nCatching traitors who spy for foreign intelligence, or assist international terrorists, or commit other national security crimes\nOperations\nWide range of actions to hinder, frustrate, and exploit foreign\nintelligence efforts and other foreign clandestine & covert activities damaging to US national security\nCollection\nObtaining information about foreign intelligence entities, other clandestine & covert threats, as well as international terrorists groups/networks\nAssimilating, evaluating, interpreting, and disseminating information of CI relevancy - a critical enabler providing insights into clandestine & covert threats\nCI activities that support other intelligence or operational activities, including specialized defensive CI services such as TSCM, polygraph/credibility assessment services, behavioral\nscience support, cyber services (digital forensics, etc.)\n\n\nCounterintelligence Functional Services (CIFS).  CI activities that support other intelligence or DoD operations by providing specialized defensive CI services to identify and counter the intelligence capabilities and activities of terrorists, foreign powers, and other entities directed against US national security. (DoDD O-5240.02, Counterintelligence, 20 Dec 2007 with change 1 dated 30 Dec 2010)\n\n-- Also, activities engaged in by personnel trained in CI and conducted to detect espionage, sabotage, terrorism, or related intelligence activities of an FIE directed against the DoD, and that enable one or more of the CI functions (investigations, collection, operations, or analysis and production). (DoDI O-5240.24, CI Activities Supporting RDA, 8 Jun 2011 with change 1 dated 15 Oct 2013)\n\n\n-- Also, CI activities that support other intelligence or DoD operational activities, providing specialized defensive CI services to identify and counter terrorism, espionage, sabotage, and related activities of Foreign Intelligence Entities. (JP 2.01.2, CI & HUMINT in Joint Operations, 11 Mar 2011)\n\n    For DoD Policy see DoD Instruction, *Counterintelligence Functional Services (CIFS),* 27 Aug 2012.\n\n    For more in-depth information regarding CI functional services see Department of Defense, CI\nFunctional Services Integrated Working Group Handbook, Doctrine, Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Counterintelligence Functional Services, 19 Feb 2009.   This handbook further defines CI functional services as: those activities that are not unique to other CI functions and that support other CI functions and missions; specialized services, which are not inherently CI but support the CI mission and functions.\n\n    Within DoD, CI functional services consist of basic CI activities (including espionage detection and\nCI support to military operations) and specialized services (e.g., polygraph/credibility assessments, TSCM, behavioral science support, cyber services).\n\nCounterintelligence Functional Support Plan (CI FSP).  Director Defense CI and HUMINT Center is responsible for preparation of CI FSPs as part of the Intelligence Planning process (CJCSM 3314.01). Format for CI FSPS is provided at enclosure E to CJCSM 3314.01, Intelligence Planning, 28 Feb 2008. Counterintelligence Inquiry.  An examination of the facts surrounding an incident of potential CI interest, to determine if a CI investigation is necessary. (DoDD 5240.02, CI, 20 Dec 2007 with change 1 dated 30 Dec 2010)  Also see *counterintelligence investigation*.\n\n For information regarding CI inquiries within DoD see:  1)  DoDI O-5240.21, CI Inquires, 14 May\n2009, which provides DoD policy and outlines the procedures for initiating and conducting CI Inquires; and 2) DoD, CI Functional Services Integrated Working Group Handbook, Doctrine, Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Counterintelligence Functional Services (U), 19 Feb 2009.\n\n    According to the DoD handbook on CI functional services, \"[w]ithin DoD a CI inquiry does not\nrequire \"investigative authority\" as it is not a CI investigation.\"   A **CI inquiry** is designed to gather\ninformation, identify and/or verify the credibility of potential sources and subjects(s) of CI interest, and to recommend appropriate action if the inquiry does not resolve the matter.  The goal is to\nestablish or refute a **reasonable belief** that a particular person is acting for or on behalf of, or an\nevent is related to, a foreign power engaged is spying, or committing espionage, sabotage, or other national security crimes (e.g., treason), or international terrorist activities.  Establishment of *reasonable belief* provides the basis for opening a CI investigation.  Once a *reasonable belief* is established the matter must be referred to the appropriate Military Department CI organization and/or the FBI [see Section 811 referral].  Refer to the definition of *reasonable belief*.\n\n The DoD handbook stresses that \"[w]ithin DoD, only Military Department CI organizations have CI\ninvestigative authority and may, accordingly, use the intrusive techniques provided for in Procedures 5 through 13 of DoD 5240.1-R....  It is absolutely vital that CI personnel obtain guidance from their own organization's legal counsel as to what specific investigative techniques and activities are allowable in their organization and approval from their organization's leadership to employ those techniques in the course of CI activity.\"\n\n\n## A Ci Inquiry Is Not A Ci Investigation, But It Can Provide The Basis For A Ci Investigation.\n\n Counterintelligence Insider Threat (CI InT).  A person who uses their authorized access to DoD facilities, systems, equipment, information or infrastructure to damage, disrupt operations, compromise DoD\ninformation or commit espionage on behalf of an FIE [Foreign Intelligence Entity]. (DoDD 5240.06, CIAR, 17 May 2011 with change 1 dated 30 May 2013)\n-- Also, a person, known or suspected, who uses their authorized access to DoD facilities, personnel, systems, equipment, information, or infrastructure to damage and disrupt operations, compromise DoD\ninformation, or commit espionage on behalf of an FIE [foreign intelligence entity]. (DoDI 5240.26, Countering Espionage, International Terrorism, and Counterintelligence Insider Threat, 4 May 2012 with change 1 dated 15 Oct 2013)   Also see *insider, insider threat*.\n\n\n    CI is one critical component in countering \"insider threats,\" the other components are security,\ninformation assurance (IA), law enforcement, and antiterrorism/force protection.\n\n    CI Insider Threat Program Elements: -- CI Analysis of Information Technology Auditing & Monitoring\n        -- CI Insider Threat Awareness & Training -- Foreign Travel and Contact Reporting and Analysis -- Polygraph & Credibility Assessment -- Personnel Security, Evaluation, Analysis, and Reporting -- Security Incident Reporting & Evaluation -- Proactive CI Initiatives\n\n    For additional information see DoDI 5240.26, Countering Espionage, International Terrorism, and\nCounterintelligence Insider Threat, 4 May 2012\n________________________\n\n    Insider threat detection should be a comprehensive US Government (USG) effort dedicated to\ncountering potential threats and mitigating damage that could result from unauthorized disclosure of information, espionage, terrorism, and other national security crimes.\n\n       -- U.S. Government Threat Detection Guide - 2011\n Counterintelligence Investigation.  Formal investigative activities undertaken to determine whether a particular person is acting for or on behalf of, or an event is related to, a foreign power engaged in spying or committing espionage, sabotage, treason, sedition, subversion, assassinations, or international terrorist activities, and to determine actions required to neutralize such acts. (DoDI 5240.04, CI Investigations, 4 Feb 2009 with change 1 dated 15 Oct 2013)  Also see counterintelligence inquiry, investigation.\n\n## Ci Function: Ci Investigations...\n\nBy far the hardest part of any CI case is to realize that the case exists\nthat some person, some thing, has the enemy's hidden hand in it.\n\n-- Angelo Codevilla, *Informing Statecraft: Intelligence for a New Century* (1992), p. 326\n\n\n    CI investigations are undertaken to determine whether a particular person is acting for or on\nbehalf of a foreign power or international terrorist organization or whether an event is related to\n  foreign intelligence or international terrorism.\n    CI investigations focus on resolving allegations of known or suspected acts that may constitute\nnational security crimes under U.S. law or Uniform Code of Military Justice.\n\n    The agencies responsible for the investigation and ultimate referral for prosecution of violations\nof US espionage law (primarily Sections 792-798, Chap 37 of Title 18) are the FBI and the CI components of the military services that participate in the DoD Foreign CI Program (FCIP).\n\n         DoD Policy: The Secretaries of the Military Departments exercise authority, direction, and\n          control over CI investigations and attendant matters for their respective personnel.\n\n             -- Para 5.10.3, DoDD O-5240.02, Counterintelligence, 20 Dec 2007 w/ chg 1 dated 30 Dec 2010\n\n    CI investigations are conducted following appropriate legal standards and in a manner which will\nnot jeopardize the potential for prosecution.\n\n    Within DoD, DIA's Office of Counterintelligence (DXC) exercises administrative and management\noversight of all DoD national security investigations. All significant CI activities must be reported promptly to the DXC IAW DoDD O-5240.02 (see encl 4 for significant CI reporting criteria).\n\n-- Also, inquiries and other activities undertaken to determine whether a particular person is acting\nfor or on behalf of, or an event is related to, a foreign power for espionage, treason, spying, sedition, subversion, sabotage, assassinations, international terrorist activities, and actions to neutralize such acts. (DoDD O-5240.02, Counterintelligence, 20 Dec 2007 with change 1 dated 30 Dec 2010)\n-- Also, includes inquiries and other activities undertaken to determine whether a particular United States person is acting for, or on behalf of, a foreign power for the purposes of conducting espionage and other intelligence activities, sabotage, assassinations, treason, international terrorist activities, and actions to neutralize such acts. (DoD 5240.1-R, Procedures Governing the Activities of DoD Intelligence Components that Affect United States Persons, 7 Dec 1982)\n\n-- Also, an official, systematic search for facts to determine whether a person(s) is engaged in activities that may be injurious to U.S. national security or advantageous to a foreign power. (JP 1-02 and JP 2.01.2, CI & HUMINT in Joint Operations,11 Mar 2011 w/ chg 1, dated 26 Aug 2011)\n-- Also, the systematic collection of information regarding a person or group which is, or may be, engaged in espionage or other clandestine intelligence activity, sabotage, or international terrorist activities conducted for, or on behalf of, foreign powers, organizations, or persons. (CI Community Lexicon)\n\n## The First Priority For All Ci Investigative Situations Is To Assess For Possible Exploitation. -- Army Fm 2-22.2, *Counterintelligence*, October 2009\n\n\n   CI investigations focus on resolving allegations of known or suspected acts that may constitute\nnational security crimes under U.S. law or Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ).  Investigative actions must preserve the potential for legal action and when appropriate exploit threatening intelligence collection directed against DoD.  In simple terms, CI investigations seek to identify spies and put them out of business.  CI investigations are about discovering the facts and conveying them to decision makers, while maintaining a full range of options, including apprehension, prosecution, expulsion, as well as exploitation.\n__________________\n\n   \"The ultimate objective of... [DoD] CI investigations... is to detect, identify, exploit and neutralize the\nintelligence collection threat posed by foreign intelligence and security services and foreign terrorist groups. [...] The most significant objectives of CI investigations are to minimize or prevent the loss of sensitive and classified defense information to foreign governments, and to prevent, preempt, or disrupt foreign terrorist attacks against... DoD interests\"\n\n        -- 902d MI Group Investigations Handbook, Jun 2012, p.19\n___________________\n\n   \"CI investigation is an art form carried out by experts. It is not science, and throwing money and\nunqualified personnel or helpers at such s problem does not guarantee or even improve the chances of success. In many cases, quite the opposite results is achievedanalytical chaos with no resolution.\"\n\n       -- Sandra Grimes and Jeanne Vertefeuille, Circle of Treason: A CIA Account of Traitor Aldrich Ames and *the Men He Betrayed*, 2012, p. 189\n___________________ Credentialed CI Special Agents use specialized investigative techniques and methodologies to\ngather intelligence (facts/evidence) about known and/or suspected acts that may constitute National Security crimes, e.g., espionage, treason, spying, etc.  All investigative activities are\nconducted within guidelines established in applicable departmental policy/directives, Attorney General Guidelines, and U.S. federal statutes.\n\n    DoD CI investigations are conducted in a manner to \"preserve\" the potential for prosecution of all\nculpable parties identified.  Although all national security investigations are conducted in a manner to preserve the potential for prosecution, this purpose is secondary to the CI mission of detecting, identifying, fully determining the extent of, and neutralizing/disrupting national security threats to the DoD and  U.S. national security.\n\n    CI investigative results also contribute to the identification and elimination of security vulnerabilities;\nidentification of current foreign intelligence tradecraft, agent handlers/operatives and their support networks; assessment of damage to DoD and National Security; and improvement of the overall DoD security posture, as well as assisting decision makers in risk management decisions.\n\n    DoD CI investigations are conducted in accordance with DoDI 5240.04, *CI Investigations*.  The\nDoD agencies responsible for CI investigations and the ultimate referral for prosecution of violations of US espionage law (primarily  792-798, Chap 37, Title 18 USC) are the CI components of the military departments, i.e., NCIS, AFOSI, and Army CI.\n\n    See Stuart A. Herrington, *Traitors among Us: Inside the Spy Catcher's World* (1999), for an\nexcellent unclassified overview of two CI investigations concerning Clyde Conrad and James Hall.\n\n    Other interesting reads on CI investigative cases include - -- Scott W. Carmichael, *True Believer: Inside the Investigation and Capture of Ana Montes,* Cuba's Master Spy (2007)\n       -- Sandra Grimes and Jeanne Vertefeuille, *Circle of Treason: A CIA Account of Traitor Aldrich* Ames and the Men He Betrayed (2012).\n                                     *Spy catching... the surgery of counterintelligence*\n\nThe thankless and exhausting task of tracking down\na traitor always seems much easier in retrospect than in prospect.\nThe clues always seem so obviousbut only after the hunt has caught its prey.\n\n\n                   -- Markus Wolf, Former Director HVA, East German Intelligence Service (1958-1987)\n\n Counterintelligence Investigative Source Operation.  See *Investigative Source Operation (ISO).* Counterintelligence Mission.  Exploit and defeat adversarial intelligence activities directed against US interests; protect the integrity of the US intelligence system; provide incisive, actionable intelligence to decision makers at all levels; protect vital national assets from adversarial intelligence activities; and neutralize and exploit adversarial intelligence activities targeting the armed forces. (ONCIX website: <http://www.ncix.gov/about/mission.html>) Counterintelligence Missions.  DoD CI responsibilities to support force protection; research, development, and acquisition; defense critical infrastructure; and countering espionage. (DoDD 5240.16, DoD CI\nFunctional Services, 27 Aug 2012 with change 1 dated 15 Oct 2013)\n\n## Ci Missions Vs. Ci Functions\n\n\n   \"Functions differ from CI missions in that missions focus on end results to be accomplished, rather\nthan on the means for accomplishment.\"\n      -- *Mission Area Analysis of DoD Counterintelligence*, Institute for Defense Analyses, May 1999, p.7\n\n\n    Note:  The Army identified four primary CI mission areas in FM 2-22.2 as: +  Counterespionage +  CI Support to Force Protection +  CI Support to Research, Development, and Acquisition\n      +  Cyber CI\n    See Army FM 2-22.2, *Counterintelligence*, Oct 2009 and ADRP 2-0, *Intelligence*, Aug 2012 Counterintelligence Mission Manager.  The National Counterintelligence Executive (NCIX) serves as the Mission Manager for Counterintelligence IAW Intelligence Community Directive (ICD) 900.  Also see mission managers. Counterintelligence Mission Tasking Authority (CI MTA).  The authority to task a Military Service CI organizations' headquarters or a Defense Agency's organic CI element to execute a specific CI mission or conduct a CI function within that organization's CI charter. (DoDD O-5240.02, CI, 20 Dec 2007)\n\n   Director, Defense CI & HUMINT Center, exercises CI MTA to ensure the effective integration and\nsynchronization of the DoD CI community (para 5.2.3, DoDD O-5240.02).\n Counterintelligence Operational Concept/Proposal.  The document used to propose an offensive counterintelligence operation (OFCO) which serves as the basis for the planning, review, and approval process. (AR 381-20, Army CI Program, 25 May 2010) Counterintelligence Operational Leads (CIOLs).  Interagency CI referrals from CIA operations; generally produced and disseminated by the Counterespionage Group (CEG), Counterintelligence Center (CIC) at CIA headquarters. (902d MI Group Investigative Handbook, Jun 2012 2007, p.62) Counterintelligence Operational Tasking Authority (CIOTA). The levying of CI requirements specific to joint military activities and operations. Counterintelligence operational tasking authority is exercised through supporting components. (JP 1-02)\n    Term previously in DoDI 5240.10, dated 14 May 2004 and JP 2-01.2, dated 13 Jun 2006. Counterintelligence Operations.  Proactive activities designed to identify, exploit, neutralize, or deter foreign intelligence collection and terrorist activities directed against the United States. (JP 1-02 and JP 2-01.2, CI & HUMINT in Joint Operations, 16 Mar 2011 w/ chg 1 dated 26 Aug 2011)  Also see Offensive Counterintelligence Operation (OFCO); recruitment-in-place (RIP); penetration; penetration operation.\n\n-- Also, operations/efforts intended to negate, confuse, deceive, subvert, monitor, or control the clandestine collection operations of foreign governments or agencies. (CI Community Lexicon)\n\n\n\nUNCLASSIFIED\n\n## Ci Function: Ci Operations...\n\nOperations\nWide range of actions to hinder, frustrate, and exploit foreign\nintelligence efforts and other foreign clandestine & covert activities damaging to US national security\nCounterintelligence operations consist of obtaining and analyzing information on the adversary and then using it against him in accordance with the requirements of the situation and in light of\nour knowledge of his practices and psychological outlook.\nAn ideal counterintelligence system anticipates the enemy's move, notionally\nsatisfies his needs, and indeed operates a notional intelligence service for him.\n\n-- Eric W. Timm in \"CountersabotageA Counterintelligence Function, CIA *Studies in Intelligence*, V7: 2 (Spring 1963), pg. 67\n\n   Counterintelligence Operationsone of five CI functionsare conducted to: -- manipulate, disrupt, neutralize and or destroy the effectiveness of foreign intelligence activities; -- recruit or induce defection of foreign intelligence officers and personnel; -- collect threat information on foreign intelligence operations, modus operandi, intelligence requirements, targeting, objectives, personalities, communications, capabilities, limitations, and vulnerabilities; -- provide information and operations databases to support decision makers; -- provide CI support to clandestine human intelligence operations; -- identify past, ongoing or planned espionage; -- support force protection, operations other than war and peacekeeping; -- acquire foreign intelligence espionage equipment for analysis and\n        countermeasures development; -- develop operational data, threat data and espionage leads for future CI operations, investigations, and projects and develop the potential of these leads to enhance DoD security overall; and -- support specific [Service], Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff, DoD and national plans.\n\n            Source:  JP 1-02 and SEVNAVINST 3850.2C, *Department of Navy Counterintelligence*, 20 Jul 2005\n Counterintelligence Production.  The process of analyzing all-source information concerning espionage or other multidiscipline intelligence collection threats, sabotage, terrorism, and other related threats to US\nmilitary commanders, the DoD, and the US Intelligence Community and developing it into a final product that is disseminated. Counterintelligence production is used in formulating security policy, plans, and operations. (JP 1-02 and JP 2-01.2, CI & HUMINT in Joint Operations, 16 Mar 2011 w/ chg 1 dated 26 Aug 2011)\n\n-- Also, the creation of finished intelligence products incorporating CI analysis in to known or anticipated CI concerns. (DoDD 5240.02, CI, 20 Dec 2007 with change 1 dated 30 Dec 2010)\n\n\n-- Also, the creation of finished intelligence products incorporating CI analysis in response to known or anticipated customer CI concerns. (JP 2.01.2, CI & HUMINT in Joint Operations, 11 Mar 2011) -- Also, the conversion of analyzed CI information into intelligence products in support of known or anticipated user requirements. (DIA Instruction 5240.002, DIA CI Activities, 15 Jun 2005) Counterintelligence Programs.  Capabilities and activities established within an organization for the purposes of identifying, deceiving, exploiting, disrupting, or protecting against espionage, other intelligence activities, sabotage, or assassinations conducted for or on behalf of FIEs [Foreign Intelligence Entities]. (ICD 750, Counterintelligence Programs, 5 Jul 2013) Counterintelligence Recruitment Lead (CIRL). An individual being assessed for possible use in a counterintelligence operation, investigation, or project as a controlled source. (AR 381-47, Offensive Counterintelligence Operations, 17 Mar 2006)\nCounterintelligence-scope Polygraph (CSP).  A screening polygraph examination that uses relevant questions limited to prescribed CI issues. (DoDI 5210.91, PCA Procedures, 12 Aug 2010 with change 1 dated 15 Oct 2013) Counterintelligence Screening.  A systematic process for obtaining information of CI interest from a specific person or target audience. (FM 2-22.2, Counterintelligence, Oct 2009)\n\n    CI screening normally is non-confrontational - *it is NOT an interrogation*.  See Chapter 4,\nCI Collection Program of FM 2-22.2, Counterintelligence, Oct 2009 (page 4-5 through 4-7).\n\n    CI screening should not use any of the \"interrogation methods\" defined in FM 2-22.3, Human\nIntelligence Collector Operations.\n Counterintelligence Special Agent.  Within DoD, US Government personnel (military and civilian employees) who have successfully completed an approved Counterintelligence Special Agent course of instruction, who are authorized to be issued CI Badge and Credentials (B&Cs), and who are assigned to conduct CI investigations and/or operations. .\n\n    Within the US Army:  military personnel holding the military occupational specialty (MOS) 35L,\n351L, or 35E as a primary or additional specialty, and selective civilian employees in the GS-0132 career field; see AR 381-20, Army CI Program (U).\n Counterintelligence Special Operations Concept (CISOC).  The document used to propose a defensive counterintelligence operation, special investigative activity. Or counterintelligence source operation which serves as the basis for the planning, review, and approval process. (AR 381-20, Army CI Program, 25\nMay 2010) Counterintelligence Staff Officer (CISO).  This term replaced by \"*Command CI Coordinating Authority*\" or CCICA; see DoDI 5240.10, CI in the Combatant Commands and Other DoD Components, 5 Oct 2011. Counterintelligence Support.  Conducting counterintelligence activities to protect against espionage and other foreign intelligence activities, sabotage, international terrorist activities, or assassinations conducted for or on behalf of foreign powers, organizations, or persons. (JP 1-02 and JP 2-01.2, CI & HUMINT in Joint Operations, 16 Mar 2011 w/ chg 1 dated 26 Aug 2011) Also see *counterintelligence*.\n\n-- Also, the application of knowledge regarding the foreign intelligence and international terrorist threat to assist commanders, program managers, and agency heads to identify the insider threat and to protect information or technology vital to the national defense, including the force, technology, critical infrastructure, and information systems. (AR 381-20, Army CI Program, 25 May 2010)\n\n\nCounterintelligence Support Plan (CISP).  A formal and living plan describing activities conducted by a Defense CI Component in support of a DoD RDA [Research, Development and Acquisition] program or activity with CPI [critical program information], at DoD-affiliated RDT&E facilities, and at essential CDCs [cleared defense contractor] where CPI resides. (DoDI O-5240.24, CI Activities Supporting RDA, 8 Jun 2011 with change 1 dated 15 Oct 2013) -- Also, a formal plan that outlines and describes the CI support to be provided to research and development facilities, RDA [Research, Development and Acquisition] programs with CPI [critical program information], and CPI resident at cleared Defense contractor facilities. CISPs are coordinated with and approved by the RDA Director, Program Executive Office, or Program Manager, as appropriate, and are an appendix to the PPP. (DoDI 5200.39, CPI Protection within DoD, 16 Jul 2008, with change 1 dated 28 Dec 2010)\n\n    Defense CI Components use a CISP to integrate CI activities into RDA, manage, and document\nnon-investigative or non-operational activities conducted.  See Appendix 2 to Encl 3 of DoD Instruction O-5240.24, *CI Activities Supporting RDA*, 8 June 2001 (pp. 22-23) for specifics to\ninclude elements of a CISP.\n\n## _________________________\n\n\n    Note:  A CISP takes precedence over a *DCIP CI Coverage Plan* at supported locations where a\nCISP is required in accordance with DoD Instruction 5240.24, Counterintelligence Activities Supporting RDA.\n Counterintelligence Support to HUMINT.  [CI activities which] prevents the detection, neutralization or manipulation of strategic U.S. DoD HUMINT collection activities by foreign intelligence or security servives. (DIA Instruction 5240.002, *DIA Counterintelligence Activities*, 15 Jun 2005)\n\n    For additional information see Appendix D, *Counterintelligence Support to Human Intelligence (U),*\nJP 2-01.2, *CI & HUMINT in Joint Operations (U),* 16 Mar 2011 with chg 1 dated 26 Aug 2011\n Counterintelligence Targets.  CI targets include personalities, organizations, and installations (PO&I) of intelligence or CI interest, which must be seized, exploited, neutralized or protected. Also see Black List, Gray List, White List. (USMC, MCWP 2-6 [previously 2-14], Counterintelligence, 5 Sep 2000) Counterintelligence Technical Services (CITS).  Encompasses Technical Surveillance Countermeasures (TSCM) and Technical Support to Counterintelligence (TSCI). TSCM is used to detect the presence of technical surveillance devices and hazards and to identify technical security vulnerabilities that put the surveyed facility at risk.  TSCI provides technical surveillance and countersurveillance in support of CI activities. Also see *Technical Surveillance Countermeasures*.\n\nCounterintelligence Threat (CI Threat). The capability and intent of one entity to detect and counteract another's intelligence activities - the objective is to undermine the effectiveness of opposing intelligence activities.\n\n    To date, the term \"CI Threat\" remains undefined officially by DoD or IC policy.  CI threat is often\nmisused when actually referring to the \"intelligence collection threat.\"\n\n    The \"CI Threat\" includes all activities undertaken by an adversary to identify, disrupt, manipulate,\nexploit, and/or destroy the effectiveness of friendly intelligence operations/activities.  Specifically,\nCI threats are actions one country/entity directs against another's intelligence operations and other\nclandestine/covert activities. Hence the CI threat to US intelligence is the capability and intent of any entity to detect and counteract U.S. intelligence activities -- separate and distinct from intelligence threats.  \"CI threats\" are not analogous to the threats of interest to counterintelligence.\n\n    From the US perspective -- the CI threat is foreign counterintelligence or security services efforts to\ncounter -- detect, disrupt, neutralize, and exploit -- US intelligence activities or other US clandestine/covert activities.\n\nCounterintelligence Training.  Institutional training in knowledge, skills, abilities, and core competencies unique to CI missions and functions. (DoDI 3305.11, DoD CI Training, 19 Mar 2007)\n-- Also, instructions and applied exercises offered through various media and methods for the acquisition, retention, and enhancement of skills, knowledge, and abilities required to counter or neutralize: intelligence collection efforts; other intelligence activities; sabotage; and terrorist activities and assassination efforts on behalf of foreign powers. (DoDI 3305.12, Intelligence and Counterintelligence Training of Non-US Persons, 25 Oct 2007 w/ chg 2 dated 15 Oct 2013) Counterproliferation (CP).  Those actions (e.g., detect and monitor, prepare to conduct counterproliferation operations, offensive operations, weapons of mass destruction, active defense, and passive defense) taken to defeat the threat and/or use of weapons of mass destruction against the United States, our military forces, friends, and allies. (JP 1-02 and JP 3-40, Combating WMD, 10 Jun 2009)\n-- Also, the activity by United States government intended to prevent the proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological capabilities to other nations. (HPSCI Report, 27 Jul 2006) Countermeasure.  Anything that effectively negates or mitigates an adversary's ability to exploit vulnerabilities. (DoD 5205.02-M, DoD OPSEC Program Manual, 3 Nov 2008)\n--  Also, action, device, procedure, technique, or other measure that reduces or eliminates one or more vulnerabilities. (DoD Insider Threat IPT Final Report, 24 Apr 2000) -- Also, [in TEMPEST usage] action, device, procedure, technique, or other measure that reduces the vulnerability of any equipment that electronically processes information (NSTISSI 7002, TEMPEST Glossary, 17 Mar 1995).\n\n\nCountermeasures.  That form of military science that, by the employment of devices and/or techniques, has as its objective the impairment of the operational effectiveness of enemy activity. (JP 1-02)\n-- Also, defensive security programs and activities which seek to protect against both foreign intelligence collection efforts and unauthorized access to, or disclosure of, protected facilities, information, and material. (AR 380-20, Army CI Program, 25 May 2010)\n\n-- Also, the employment of devices and/or techniques that has as its objective the impairment of the operational effectiveness of an adversary's activity. Countermeasures may include anything that effectively negates an adversary's ability to exploit vulnerabilities. (DSS Glossary) -- Also, the employment of devices or techniques that impair the operational effectiveness of enemy activity.  Countermeasures may include anything that effectively negates an adversary's ability to exploit vulnerabilities. (*Draft* DoDI 5200.39, CPI Identification and Protection within RDA Programs) -- Also, [in polygraph and credibility assessment usage] those strategies employed by examinees to affect PCA testing by the intentional application of physical, mental, pharmacological, or behavioral tactics. (DoDI 5210.21, PCA Procedures, 12 Aug 2010 w/ chg 1 dated 15 Oct 2013)\nCounterproliferation.  Those actions taken to defeat the threat and/or use of weapons of mass destruction against the United States, our forces, friends, allies, and partners. (JP 1-02 and JP 3-40, Combating WMD, 10 Jun 2009) Countersurveillance.  All measures, active or passive, taken to counteract hostile surveillance. (JP 1-02 and JP 3-07.2, Antiterrorism, 24 Nov 2010)  Also see *counter surveillance; surveillance detection.*\n\n-- Also,...security techniques designed to detect, prevent, or deceive hostile observation of friendly operations or activities. (CI Community Lexicon)\n\n\n-- Also, the total action taken to detect and frustrate hostile surveillance. (*Encyclopedia of the CIA*,\n2003) -- Also, [Counter Surveillance].  Measures or actions taken when under verified or suspected surveillance. (DoDI S-5240.15, FPRG, 20 Oct 2010 with change 1 dated 16 Oct 2013)\n-- Also, the process of detecting and mitigating hostile surveillance (Stratfor - Global Intelligence)\n\n    An effective CS [countersurveillance] program depends on knowing two \"secrets\": first, hostile\nsurveillance is vulnerable to detection because those performing it are not always as sophisticated in their tradecraft as commonly perceived; and second, hostile surveillance can be manipulated and the operatives forced into making errors that will reveal their presence.\n\n    ...CS can be performed by a person who is aware of his or her surroundings and who is watching\nfor people who violate the principles of TEDD.*  At a more advanced level, the single person can use surveillance detection routes (SDRs) to draw out surveillance.\n\n* The U.S. government uses the acronym TEDD to illustrate the principles one can use to identify surveillance. So, a person who sees someone repeatedly over Time, in different Environments and over Distance, or one who displays poor Demeanor can assume he or she is under surveillance. Surveillants who exhibit poor demeanor, meaning they act unnaturally, can look blatantly suspicious, though they also can be lurkers -- those who have no reason for being where they are or for doing what they are doing. Sometimes they exhibit almost imperceptible behaviors that the target senses more than observes. Other giveaways include moving when the target moves, communicating when the target moves, avoiding eye contact with the target, making sudden turns or stops, or even using hand signals to communicate with other members of a surveillance team.\n\n      --  Fred Burton, \"The Secrets of Countersurveillance,\" *Security Weekly*, Stratfor, 6 Jun 20007; article on line at: <http://www.stratfor.com/secrets_countersurveillance>\n Counterterrorism (CT).  Actions taken directly against terrorist networks and indirectly to influence and render global and regional environments inhospitable to terrorist networks. (JP 1-02 and JP 3-26, Counterterrorism, 13 Nov 2009)  Also see antiterrorism; *terrorism; combating terrorism*.\n\n-- Also, the practices, tactics, techniques, and strategies adopted to prevent or respond to terrorist threats or acts, both real and suspected. (ODNI, U.S. National Intelligence - An Overview 2011)\n   Also see *National Strategy for Counterterrorism*, June 2011 at < http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/counterterrorism_strategy.pdf > Country Clearance.  Clearance for official U.S. Government representative travel to a foreign country granted through the cognizant U.S. Embassy or U.S. Mission. (DoDD 4500.54E, DoD Foreign Clearance Program, 28 Dec 2009) Country Team.  The senior, in-country, US coordinating and supervising body, headed by the chief of the US diplomatic mission, and composed of the senior member of each represented US department or agency, as desired by the chief of the US diplomatic mission. (JP 1-02 and JP 3-07.4, Joint Counterdrug Operations, 13 Jun 2007) Courier.  Person who carries an item or information from one person or place to another.  The courier may or may not be aware of the nature of the item or information being transported. (AFOSI Manual 71-142, OFCO, 9 Jun 2000)\n\n-- Also, a messenger responsible for the secure physical transmission and delivery of documents and materials. (Senate Report 94-755, Book I - Glossary, 26 Apr 1976)\n\n\nCover.  A protective guise used by a person, organization, or installation to conceal true affiliation with clandestine or other sensitive activities. (DoDD S-5105.61, DoD Cover and Cover Support Activities (U), 6 May 2010)  Also see *cover for action; cover for status*.\n\n-- Also, the concealment of true identity, purpose, or organizational affiliation with assertions of false information as part of, or in support of, official duties to carry out authorized activities and lawful operations. (DoDI S-5105.63, Implementation of DoD Cover and Cover Support Activities, 20 Jun 2013)\n-- Also In intelligence usage, those measures necessary to give protection to a person, plan, operation, formation, or installation from enemy intelligence effort and leakage of information. (JP 1-02 and JP 2-01.2, CI & HUMINT in Joint Operations, 16 Mar 2011 w/ chg 1 dated 26 Aug 2011) -- Also, actions to conceal actual friendly intentions, capabilities, operations, and other activities by providing a plausible yet erroneous explanation of the observable. (Defense HUMINT Enterprise Manual 3301.002, Vol II Collection Operations, 23 Nov 2010)\n-- Also, a verifiable and documented protective guise used by a person, organization, or installation to conceal true identity or affiliation. (HDI Lexicon, April 2008)\n-- Also, a protective guise used by a person, organization, or installation to prevent identification with clandestine activities and to conceal the true affiliation of personnel and the true sponsorship of their activities. (Senate Report 94-755, Book I - Glossary, 26 Apr 1976)\n-- Also, protective action taken to mask or conceal an operation or activity from an adversary. (DSS\nGlossary)\n-- Also, a protective guise used by an individual, organization, or installation to prevent identification with intelligence activities.  To hide, conceal, obscure, or otherwise protect the exact identity of an individual, unit, or activity.  Supported with or without documentation and backstopping depending on the sensitivity and scope of the operation.  *Cover* can be anything that masks the true nature of an activity. (CI Community Lexicon)\n    DoD cover may be used to protect the Department of Defense, its intelligence sources and\n\nmethods, and its clandestine tactics, techniques, and procedures from exposure to the enemy and overt association with sensitive activities.  The fact that DoD uses cover to protect its activities is unclassified.\n\n    For DoD policy see DoDD S-5105.61, *DoD Cover and Cover Support Activities (U),* 6 May 2010.\n\n## Cover Shields Secret Activities From The Opposition\n\n\n    Good cover ...reaches into the mind of the opponent, thinks as he would think, and then creates\na combination of fact and fancy, of actual arrangements and contrived impressions, which the opposing mind is prepared to believe....  Cover takes an infinite variety of forms.\n\n   The best cover is that which contains the least notional and the maximum possible legitimate\nmaterial....  Perfect cover is an ideal, rarely achieved in practice.\n\n      -- Christopher Felix (James McCargar), *A Short Course in the Secret War*, 4th Edition (2001)\n_______________________\n\n\n## Special Cover Measures...\n\n\n    There are many valid reasons for the special cover measures used by some military and\nintelligence organizations, such as potentially life-threatening, high-risk, covert operations and intelligence and counterintelligence investigations or operations.\n Cover for Action.  A logical reason for doing the specific action involved. (CI Community Lexicon)\n\n\n\n-- Also, a verifiable and documented protective guise used to disguise the true intent of an individual, organization, or activity and to provide a credible explanation as to participation in a particular activity. (Defense HUMINT Enterprise Manual 3301.002, Vol II Collection Operations, 23 Nov 2010)  Also see cover for status.\n\n    Cover for Action. This cover, combined with the use of appropriate clandestine tradecraft\ntechniques (e.g. alias, disguise, darkness, surveillance detection routes to and from meetings, etc.) is what provides cover and security for clandestine meetings.\n\n        -- F.W. Rustmann, Jr., \"Debunking the CIA Case Officer Myth,\" Association of Former Intelligence Officers\n          *(AFIO) Newsletter* (Fall 2003), <http://ctcintl.com/Debunk.htm>; accessed 7 Mar 2011\n Cover for Status.  A logical and backstopped reason for being in an area or processing a particular item at a particular time. (CI Community Lexicon)  Also see *cover for action*.\n\n-- Also, a verifiable and documented protective guise used to legitimize an individual's, organization's, or activity's extended presence in a particular area. (Defense HUMINT Enterprise Manual 3301.002,\nVol II, Collection Operations, 23 Nov 2010)\n\n    Cover for Status.  This is the cover that permits [a case officer] to live and work in a particular\ncountry. If the case officer is under official cover, this means he must blend into the environment of an embassy or other official US installation abroad.\n\n        -- F.W. Rustmann, Jr., \"Debunking the CIA Case Officer Myth,\" Association of Former Intelligence Officers\n          *(AFIO) Newsletter* (Fall 2003), <http://ctcintl.com/Debunk.htm>; accessed 7 Mar 2011\n Cover Legend.  A contrived scenario or story designed to explain an organizational or personal background and past or present activities, in terms intended to protect or conceal involvement in a clandestine or otherwise sensitive activity. It incorporates as much truth as possible. It must be plausible. (DoDI S-5105.63, Implementation of DoD Cover and Cover Support Activities, 20 Jun 2013)\n-- Also, a contrived scenario, designed to explain an organizational or personal background and past or present activities, in terms intended to protect and/or conceal involvement in a clandestine or otherwise sensitive activity.  It incorporates as much truth as possible. (Defense HUMINT Enterprise Manual 3301.002, Vol II Collection Operations, 23 Nov 2010)  Also see *cover story*. Cover Mechanism.  Any documentary, oral, technical, fiscal, logistical, or other means provided to backstop a cover. (DoDI S-5105.63, Implementation of DoD Cover and Cover Support Activities, 20 Jun 2013) Cover Stop.  A stop made while under surveillance that provides an ostensibly innocent reason for a trip. (CI Centre Glossary and Spy Dust) Cover Story.  Coherent and plausible account of background, residence, employment, activities, access, etc., furnished to an individual to substantiate whatever claims are necessary to successfully carry out an operation. The difference between a cover story and a legend is that a legend is furnished to an illegal or agent by FIS. (AFOSI Manual 71-142, OFCO, 9 Jun 2000)  Also see *cover legend*.\n\n-- Also, the background legend you have developed to explain who you are and why you are where you are. (*A Spy's Journey*)\n\n    The cover story is most frequently used to explain the visible evidences of a clandestine operation\nor to provide an explanation when an operations encounters difficulties.\n\n    ...cover stories in general: they should not be too precise or too detailed, and they should not be\nforthcoming too quickly or all at once.  ...To be too precise in a cover story qualitatively increases\nthe chances of repudiation of the story; to be too detailed increases those chances quantitatively.\n\n        -- Christopher Felix (aka James McCargar), *A Short Course in the Secret War*, 4th Edition (2001)\n\nCover Support Activities.  All measures taken to develop, coordinate, approve, activate, operate, and terminate cover. (DoDD S-5105.61, DoD Cover and Cover Support Activities (U), 6 May 2010) Cover Within Cover.  A credible confession to an act that is less serious than espionage and will explain all actions under suspicion by foreign intelligence services. (Words of Intelligence, 2nd Edition, 2011) Covering Agent.  [As used within US Army] a CI Agent who provides dedicated full or part time counterintelligence support, education, and liaison to an organization, agency, or research, development, and acquisition program. (AR 381-20, Army CI Program, 25 May 2010) Covert.  A method of conducting operations that hides the true intent, affiliation or relationship of its participants.  Differs from clandestine in that covert conceals the identity of the sponsor, whereas clandestine conceals the identity of the operation. (National HUMINT Glossary)  See clandestine; covert action; covert operation.\n\n    Covert, from the Latin *cooperire*, \"to cover,'' means ''concealed, hidden, under cover, not avowed.''\n\nCovert and clandestine are not synonymous! Covert Action.  Activity or activities of the United States Government to influence political, economic, or military conditions abroad, where it is intended that the role of the United States Government will not be apparent or acknowledged publicly. Covert action **does not include** activities the primary purpose of which is to acquire intelligence, **traditional counterintelligence activities** [*emphasis added*], traditional activities to improve or maintain the operational security of United States Government programs, or administrative activities. (Section 503e, National Security Act of 1947 [50 USC 413b])  Also see covert; covert operation; finding; special activities.\n\n## Covert Action Should Not Be Confused With Missionary Work.\n\n\n-- Henry Kissinger as cited in James M. Olson, *Fair Play: The Moral Dilemmas of Spying* (2006), p. 33\n\n...the overt foreign activities of the US Government must be supplemented by covert operations\n\nNSC Directive 10/2 (dated 18 Jun 1948)\nas cited in Warner, *CIA Under Truman* (1994)\n\n_________________________ Covert actions are designed to avoid revealing the role of the United States in their planning or\nexecution.  EO 12333 (as amended 30 Jul 2008) directs that no agency except CIA (or the Armed Forces of the United States in time of war declared by Congress or during any period covered by a report from the President to the Congress consistent with the War Powers Resolution, Public Law\n93-148) may conduct any covert action activity unless the President determines that another agency is more likely to achieve a particular objective.\n\n    EO 12333 limits covert action, i.e., \"no covert action may be conducted which  is intended to\ninfluence US political processes, public opinion, policies, or media. \" (EO 12333, para 2.13)\n\n    Covert action by DoD must be directed by the President, subsequently approved by the Secretary\nof Defense, and executed in accordance with applicable law.\n\n_________________________\n\n\n## Evolution Of Covert Action\n\n    [I]n December 1947, the National Security Council issued a series of classified directives specifying\nand expanding the CIA's covert mission. The first of these directives, NSC-4-A, authorized the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) to conduct covert psychological operations consistent with United States policy and in coordination with the Departments of State and Defense. A later directive, NSC 10/2, authorized the CIA to conduct covert political and paramilitary operations.  [...] The United States should ,maintain the option of reacting in the future to a grave, unforeseen threat to United States national security through covert means.\n\n       -- Church Committee - 1976 (Senate Report 94-755, Book I, 26 April 1976)\n_________________________\n\n\n    Covert action must be consistent with and supportive of national policy and must be placed\nappropriately within a national security policy framework. Covert action must never be used as a substitute for policy.\n\n        -- National Security Decision Directive 159, 18 Jan 1985 (originally Top Secret-Sensitive, declassified)\n________________________\n\n    Covert actions are...  legally distinct from clandestine missions: 'clandestine' refers to the tactical\nsecrecy of the operation itself, 'covert' refers to the secrecy of the sponsor.  ...covert action can include a wide range of activity, from propaganda and disinformation to political influence operations, economic destabilization, and paramilitary operations. Historically, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) has been the main agent of US covert action....\n\n     -- Jennifer D. Kinne, \"Covert Action and the Pentagon,\" *Intelligence and National Security*, Vol. 22 No. 1,\n           February 2007, pp. 57-58\n________________________ *Covert action*, or to use the British term, *special political action*, is the attempt by a government or\ngroup to influence events in another state or territory without revealing its own involvement.\n...Covert action is really an American term-of-art that came into use after World War II.\n\n        -- Roy Godson, *Dirty Tricks or Trump Cards: US Covert Action and Counterintelligence* (1995), p. 2\n________________________\n\n    Typically, covert actions are carried out by the CIA with such assistance as may be necessary by\nother elements of the intelligence Community as directed by the President.  U.S. law requires that\nall covert actions be approved prior to their execution by the President in a written 'finding' and that\nnotification be provided to the two intelligence committees in Congress.  Covert actions may involve\npolitical, economic, propaganda, or paramilitary activities.\n\n        -- WMD Report, 31 Mar 2005\n________________________\n\n    Covert action is often called the \"dirty tricks\" side of spying. It consists of sabotage, subversion,\nparamilitary operations, political action, psychological; operations, and black propaganda. It is not\nalways pretty. Covert action has historically been a relatively small part of the CIA's overall activity,\nbut it is certainly the aspect of U.S. spying that has been the most controversial.\n\n        -- James M. Olson, *Fair Play: The Moral Dilemmas of Spying* (2006)\n ________________________ The three basic types of covert action are perception management (historically known as\npropaganda), political action (influencing the actions of a foreign leader or government), and paramilitary operations (support to insurgents).\n\n        -- Duane R. Clarridge, *A Spy For All Season: My Life in the CIA* (1997), p. 410\n________________________\n\n    Covert action is not intelligence. Rather, CA is the most sensitive technique for implanting national\nsecurity policy. Operating in the space between diplomacy and military force, covert actions are the \"third way\" of accomplishing a nation's goals.\n\n         -- Dr. James E. Steiner (retired CIA), \"Restoring the Red Line Between Intelligence and Policy on Cover Action,\" *International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence*, Vol 19 No 1 (Spring 2006), p. 157\n________________________\n\nCovert action can serve as a more subtle and surgical tool\nthan forms of acknowledge employment of U.S. power and influence.\n-- WMD Report (31 Mar 2005), p. 33\n\nSecurity is indispensable to the successful conduct of covert action.\n\n...[A]ccess to information on US covert action policies shall be restricted\nto the absolute minimum number of persons possible.\n\n\n-- President Ronald Reagan, NSSD 159 (18 Jan 1985)\n\nCovert Channel.  An unauthorized communication path that manipulates a communications medium in an unexpected, unconventional, or unforeseen way in order to transmit information without detection by anyone other than the entities operating the covert channel. (CNSSI No. 4009, National Information Assurance Glossary, 26 April 2010) Covert Channel Analysis.  Determination of the extent to which the security policy model and subsequent lower-level program descriptions may allow unauthorized access to information. (CNSSI No. 4009, National Information Assurance Glossary, 26 April 2010) Covert Communication (COVCOM).  Clandestine, hidden communication that protects both the information being shared and the relationship between the sending and receiving parties. (National HUMINT Glossary)\n-- Also, any technique or device used to relay data clandestinely from case officer to agent or agent to case officer. (Spycraft) -- Also, an agent's spy gear for communicating with his case officer. ( *A Spy's Journey*) Covert Operation.  An operation that is so planned and executed as to conceal the identity of or permit plausible denial by the sponsor. (JP 1-02 and JP 3-05, Special Operations, 18 Apr 2011)  Also see covert;\ncovert action, clandestine operation.\n\n\n## Covert Refers To The Secrecy Of The Sponsor\n\n\n Clandestine operations are sometimes incorrectly referred to as \"covert operations.\"  Although both\nare secret and sensitive activities, the terms are not interchangeable.  See *clandestine operation*.\n_______________________\n\n   \"Avowal of a covert operation, however implicit, is a hostile act, and it is wise never to indulge in\nhostile acts unless one is able and prepared to back them up.\"\n\n      -- Christopher Felix (aka James McCargar), *A Short Course in the Secret War*, 4th Edition (2001)\n________________________\n\n    A 1948 National Security Council Intelligence Directive defined *covert operations* as actions by the\nU.S. against foreign states ''which are so planned and executed that any U.S. Government responsibility for them is not evident to unauthorized persons and that if uncovered the U.S. Government can plausibly disclaim any responsibility for them.''\n________________________\n\n   \"Covert action is the term that describes our efforts to influence the course of events in a foreign\ncountry without our role being known....[it] has always been assigned to the CIA to perform, by\nmeans of unattributable propaganda, sub rosa political action, or secret paramilitary support.\"\n\n       -- Stansfield Turner, Former Director Central Intelligence Agency\n\nCPI.  See *Critical Program Information*. Credentials [Counterintelligence].  An official document or set of documents presenting evidence of the identity, authority, and status of the bearer and for use in conducting authorized CI activities. (DoDI\n5240.25, Counterintelligence Badge and Credentials, 30 Mar 2011 with change 1 dated 15 Oct 2013)\nAlso see *badge; special agent*.\n\n-- Also, official documents which identify the bearer as a representative of a specific agency or department of the U.S. Government. Credible Information.  Information disclosed or obtained by a criminal investigator that, considering its source and nature and all the circumstances, is believable enough that a trained criminal investigator can state the information is true. (DoDI 5505.7, Titling & Indexing Subjects of Criminal Investigations in DoD, 27 Jan 2012)\n\n\n-- Also, information disclosed to or obtained by an investigator that, considering the source and nature of the information and the totality of the circumstances, is sufficiently believable to indicate that criminal activity has occurred and would cause a reasonable investigator under similar circumstances to pursue further the facts of the case to determine whether a criminal act occurred or may have occurred. (AR 195-2, Criminal Investigation Activities, 15 May 2009) Credibility Assessment.  The multi-disciplinary field of existing, as well as potential, techniques and procedures to assess truthfulness that relies on physiological reactions and behavioral measures to test the agreement between an individual's memories and statements.  (DoDD 5210.48, Polygraph and Credibility Assessment Program, 25 Jan 2007 with change 2 dated 15 Nov 2013) Criminal Intelligence (CRIMINT).  Law enforcement information derived from the analysis of information collected through investigations, forensics, crime scene and evidentiary processes to establish intent, history, capability, vulnerability, and modus operandi of threat and criminal elements. (DoDI 2000.16, DoD Antiterrorism Standards, 2 Oct 2006)\n\n-- Also, a category of police intelligence derived from the collection, analysis, and interpretation of all available information concerning known and potential criminal threats and vulnerabilities of supported organizations. (ATTP 3-39.20, Police Intelligence Operations, Jul 2010) -- Also, information compiled, analyzed, and/or disseminated in an effort to anticipate, prevent, or monitor criminal activity. (National Criminal Intelligence Sharing Plan, Oct 2003)\n\n    For DoD Policy see DoDI 5525.18, Law Enforcement Criminal Intelligence in DoD (Note: does not\napply to counterintelligence personnel).\n\n    CRIMINT gathering is a fundamental and essential element in the all-encompassing duties of all\nDoD Law Enforcement Agencies. CRIMINT can aid in crime prevention, threat disruption, offender pursuit and apprehension, and evidence capture necessary for conviction.\n Criminal Investigation.  Investigation into alleged or apparent violations of law undertaken for purposes which include the collection of evidence in support of potential criminal prosecution. (DoDI 5505.7, Titling & Indexing Subjects of Criminal Investigations in DoD, 27 Jan 2012) -- Also, the process of searching, collecting, preparing, identifying, and presenting evidence to prove the truth or falsity of an issue of law. (US Army, FM 3-19.13, Law Enforcement Investigations, Jan 2005)\n\n## Criminal Investigation Is Both An Art And A Science.\n\n\n    In science, the absolute truth is often achieved.  Experience has shown that in criminal\ninvestigations a less decisive hypothesis may sometimes be all that is possible to achieve.\n\n    A criminal investigation is the process of searching, collecting, preparing, identifying, and\npresenting evidence to prove the truth or falsity of an issue of law.\n\n    Objectives of Criminal Investigations: - 1)  Determine if a crime was committed; - 2)  *Collect information and evidence legally to identify who was responsible;* - 3)  Apprehend the person responsible; - 4)  Recover stolen property; - 5)  *Present the best possible case to the prosecutor; and* - 6)  *Provide clear, concise testimony.*\n\n_____________________\n\n\n    A criminal investigation is normally initiated when objective facts and circumstances reasonably\nindicate a crime has been, is being or will be committed.  A criminal investigation is normally limited to: who committed the act; secure evidence to establish the elements of the offense; and support prosecution.\n\n    Also see *Crime Scene Investigation:  A Guide for Law Enforcement*, Sep 3013; available on line at\n<http://www.nist.gov/oles/csiguide.cfm>\n Criminal Investigative Information.  Information compiled in the course of a criminal investigation. (AR 195-2, Criminal Investigation Activities, 15 May 2009) Criminal Investigation Task Force (CITF). The DoD CITF is a strategic-level organization with a mission to develop and fuse police intelligence with MI [military intelligence] for the purpose of building criminal cases against terrorist criminals that have attacked U.S. interests. (ATTP 3-39.20, Police Intelligence Operations, Jul 2010)\n\n    The CITF conducts complicated criminal investigations targeting terrorists and complex criminal\norganizations. These cases typically cross international borders and involve criminals captured as a result of military operations, requiring coordination with international police and intelligence agencies. The CITF combines USACIDC special agents (and criminal investigators from other Services), police and intelligence analysts, and attorneys into teams. These teams synchronize and fuse information and intelligence from all available sources to conduct criminal investigations that enable criminal prosecution in U.S. or host nation legal systems.\n\n       -- ATTP 3-39.20 (FM 3-19.50), Police Intelligence Operations, July 2010\n Criminal Offense.  Any criminal act or omission as defined and prohibited by the Uniform Code of Military Justice, the United States Code, State and local codes, foreign law, or international law or treaty. As used herein, this term does not include military offenses as defined below. In the case of juveniles, this term refers to those acts which, if committed by an adult, would be subject to criminal sanctions. (AR 195-2, Criminal Investigation Activities, 15 May 2009) Crisis.  An incident or situation involving a threat to the United States, its citizens, military forces, possessions, or vital interests that develops rapidly and creates a condition of such diplomatic, economic, or military importance that commitment of US military forces and resources is contemplated in order to achieve national objectives. (JP 1-02 and JP 3-0, Joint Operations, 11 Aug 2011) Crisis Action Planning (CAP).  The Adaptive Planning and Execution System process involving the timesensitive development of joint operation plans and operation orders for the deployment, employment, and sustainment of assigned and allocated forces and resources in response to an imminent crisis.  (JP 5-0, Joint Operation Planning, 11 Aug 2011)\nCrisis Management (CrM).  Measures, normally executed under federal law, to identify, acquire, and plan the use of resources needed to anticipate, prevent, and/or resolve a threat or an act of terrorism. (JP 1-02 and JP 3-28, Defense Support of Civil Authorities, 31 Jul 2013) CRITIC.  Critical information messages sent over the CRITICOMM System that must be delivered to the President within 10 minutes upon recognition. (DoDD 5100.20, NSA, 26 Jan 2010)\nCritical Asset.  A specific entity that is of such extraordinary importance that its incapacitation or destruction would have a very serious, debilitating effect on the ability of a nation to continue to function effectively. (JP 1-02 and JP 3-07.2, Antiterrorism, 24 Nov 2010)\n\n-- Also, *Defense Critical Asset*: an asset of such extraordinary importance to DoD operations in peace, crisis, and war that its incapacitation or destruction would have a very serious, debilitating effect on the ability of the Department of Defense to fulfill its mission. (DoDI 2000.16, DoD Antiterrorism Standards, 2 Oct 2006)\n\n\n-- Also, any asset (person, group, relationship, instrument, installation, process or supply at the disposition of an organization for use in an operational or support role) whose loss or compromise would have a negative impact on the capability of a department or agency to carry out its mission; or may have a negative impact the ability of another U.S. Government department or agency to conduct its mission; or could result in substantial economic loss; or which may have  a negative impact on the national security of the U.S. (ICD 750, Counterintelligence Programs, 5 Jul 2013) Critical Information (also called CRITIC).  Specific facts about friendly intentions, capabilities, and activities needed by adversaries for them to plan and act effectively so as to guarantee failure or unacceptable consequences for friendly mission accomplishment.(JP 2-0, Joint Intelligence, 22 Oct 2013)\n-- Also, decisions, intentions, or actions of foreign governments, organizations, or individuals that could imminently and materially jeopardize vital U.S. policy, economic, informational, or military interests to such an extent that the immediate attention of the President and the National Security Council may be required. (DoDD 5100.20, NSA, 26 Jan 2010) Critical Infrastructure.  Systems and assets, whether physical or virtual, so vital to the United States that the incapacity or destruction of such systems and assets would have a deliberating impact on the security, national economic security, national public health and safety, or any combination of those matters. (Critical Infrastructures Protection Act of 2002 and USA Patriot Act 1016)\n-- Physical or virtual systems and assets that if compromised by a physical or cyberspace incident negatively impact the national security, economic stability, public confidence, health, or safety of the United States. (DoD Strategy for Operating in Cyberspace, May 2011)\n-- Also, [within DoD] infrastructure deemed essential to DoD operations or the functioning of a critical asset.\n\n  Nation's critical infrastructure and key resources, as set forth in the 2006 National Infrastructure\nProtection Plan (NIPP) includes the assets, systems, and networks, whether physical or virtual, so vital to the United States that their incapacitation or destruction would have a debilitating effect on security, national economic security, public health or safety, or any combination thereof.  Key resources are publicly or privately controlled resources essential to the minimal operations of the economy and government.\n\n       -- Cited in the National Strategy for Homeland Security\n_______________________\n\n    Failure of critical assets degrades or disrupts operations; cascading failures of critical\ninfrastructure assets within and across infrastructures may lead to mission failure\n\n       -- DoD Critical Infrastructure Protection Strategy, April 2003\n__________________________\n\n    Copy of the 2009 *National Infrastructure Protection Plan* (NIPP) at: <http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/NIPP_Plan.pdf> Critical Infrastructure and Key Resources (CI/KR). The infrastructure and assets vital to a nation's security, governance, public health and safety, economy, and public confidence. (JP 3-27, Homeland Defense, 29 Jul 2013) Critical Infrastructure Protection (CIP).  Actions taken to prevent, remediate, or mitigate the risks resulting from vulnerabilities of critical infrastructure assets. (JP 1-02 and JP 3-28, Defense Support of Civil Authorities, 31 Jul 2013) Also see *Defense Critical Infrastructure*.\n\n    PDD-63 set as a national goal the ability to protect the nation's critical infrastructure from\nintentional attacks (both physical and cyber).  Also see PPD-21, Critical Infrastructure Security and Resilience, 12 Feb 2013.  PPD-21 identifies 16 critical infrastructure sectors; DoD is the sectorspecific agency for the Defense Industrial Base (DIB).\n\n    For DoD policy see DoDD 3020.40, *DoD Policy and Responsibilities for Critical Infrastructure*.\n Critical Intelligence. Intelligence that is crucial and requires the immediate attention of the commander. (JP 2-0, Joint Intelligence, 22 Oct 2013) Critical National Asset (CNA).  Any information, policies, plans, technologies, or capabilities that, if acquired (stolen), modified, or manipulated by an adversary, would seriously threaten US national or economic security. (NIP - FY 2009 Congressional Budget Justification *Book*, redacted version)*\n    * Copy available at:  <http://www.fas.org/irp/dni/cbjb-2009.pdf> (accessed 24 Jan 2013). Critical Program Information (CPI).  Elements or components of an RDA [research, development & acquisition] program that, if compromised, could cause significant degradation in mission effectiveness; shorten the expected combat-effective life of the system; reduce technological advantage; significantly alter program direction; or enable an adversary to defeat, counter, copy, or reverse engineer the technology or capability. (DoDI 5200.39, CPI Protection within DoD, 16 Jul 2008 w/ change 1 dated 28 Dec 2010)\n\n\n    Note:  DoDI 5200.39 is under revision, proposed revised definition for CPI:  U.S. capability\nelements that contribute to the warfigthers' technical advantage throughout the life cycle, which if compromised or subject to unauthorized disclosure, decrease the advantage.  U.S. capability elements may include, but are not limited to, technologies and algorithms residing on the system,\nits training equipment, or maintenance support equipment.\n____________________\n\n    It is DoD policy (IAW DoDI 5200.39) to provide uncompromised and secure military systems to the\nwarfighter by performing comprehensive protection of CPI through the integrated and synchronized application of Counterintelligence, Intelligence, Security, systems engineering, and other defensive counter-measures to mitigate risk.\n\n    Failure to apply consistent protection of CPI may result in the loss of confidentiality, integrity, or\navailability of CPI, resulting in the impairment of the warfighter's capability and DoD's technological\nsuperiority.\n\n    CPI includes:   information about applications, capabilities, processes, and end-items; elements or\ncomponents critical to a military system or network mission effectiveness; and technology that would reduce the US technological advantage if it came under foreign control.\n\n    CPI information shall be identified early in the research, technology development and acquisition\nprocesses, but no later than when a DoD Agency or military component demonstrates an application for the technology in an operational setting, in support of a transition agreement with a pre-systems acquisition or acquisition program, or in exceptional cases, at the discretion of the laboratory/technical director.\n\nCritical Technology. Technology or technologies essential to the design, development, production, operation, application, or maintenance of an article or service which makes or could make a significant contribution to the military potential of any country, including the United States. This includes, but is not limited to, design and manufacturing know-how, technical data, keystone equipment, and inspection and test equipment. (DoDI 2040.02, International Transfers of Technology, Articles and Services, 10 Jul 2008)\nAlso see dual-use, *technology*.\n\n## Dod Policy - Critical Technology\n\n    Dual-use and defense-related technology shall be treated as valuable national security resources,\nto be protected and transferred only in pursuit of national security and foreign policy objectives. Those objectives include ensuring that: critical U.S. military technological advantages are preserved; transfers which could prove detrimental to U.S. security interests are controlled and limited; proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery are prevented; and diversion of defense-related goods to terrorists is prevented.\n\n    See DoDI 2040.02, *International Transfers of Technology, Articles and Services*, 10 Jul 2008.\n\n\nCritical Thinking.  A deliberate meta-cognitive (thinking about thinking) and cognitive (thinking) act whereby a person reflects on the quality of the reasoning process simultaneously while reasoning to a conclusion. The thinker has two equally important goals: coming to a solution and improving the way she or he reasons. (David T. Moore, *Critical Thinking and Intelligence Analysis*)\n-- Also, intellectual discipline of rigorously weighing evidence and assumptions, and assessing multiple hypotheses resulting in accurate, persuasive, and policy-relevant conclusions. (DIA, 2012-2017 Defense Intelligence Agency Strategy)\n\n   *Critical Thinking and Intelligence Analysis*, National Defense Intelligence College occasional paper\nno. 14, March 2007.\n   Copy available at <http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/dia/ndic_moore_crit_analysis_hires.pdf>\n\n    Also see The Foundation for Critical Thinking, www.criticialthinking.org, The Thinker's Guide to\nAnalytical Thinking, 2007.\n Criticality.  [In critical infrastructure usage] a metric used to describe the consequence of loss of an asset, based on the effect the incapacitation or destruction of the asset would have on DoD operations and the ability of the Department of Defense to fulfill its missions. (DoDI 3020.45, DCIP Management, 21 Apr 2008) Cross-cuing.  The use of one intelligence source to initiate the collection against a particular target with another intelligence collector. Also see *cueing.*\n\n    CI and HUMINT provide unique opportunities for enabling and cross-cuing other intelligence\ndisciplines or capabilities.  CI and HUMINT sources can enable other intelligence collection disciplines or provide time sensitive \"tip off\" information to cue other collection capabilities.\n\n       -- JP 2-01.2, *CI & HUMINT in Joint Operations*, 16 Mar 2011 w/ chg 1 dated 26 Aug 2011, para 3b (p. V-2)\n Cryptanalysis.  The steps and operations performed in converting encrypted messages into plain text without initial knowledge of the key employed in the encryption. (JP 1-02) Cryptography.  The art and science concerning the principles, means, and methods for rendering plain information unintelligible and for restoring encrypted information to intelligible form. (DoDD 5100.20, NSA, 26 Jan 2010) Cryptology.  The science that deals with hidden, disguised, or encrypted communications. It includes communications security and communications intelligence. (JP 1-02)\n-- Also, the branch of knowledge that treats the principles of cryptography and cryptanalytics; and the activities involved in producing signals intelligence (SIGINT) and maintaining communications security\n(COMSEC). (DoDD 5100.20, NSA, 26 Jan 2010) Cryptonym.  Code name; crypt or crypto for short, always capitalized. ...prefixes to code names are used to identify the nature of the clandestine source, [e.g., GT and CK] prefixes were both \"diagraph\" identifiers for the Soviet and East European program..... The diagraph is used in front of the cryptonym of the source as a more formal way of referring to the subject, not unlike putting \"Mr.\" in front of \"Smallwood.\" (Spy Dust)\n\n-- Also, a false name used in official correspondence to hide the identity of the agent, officer, or operation. (A Spy's Journey) Cueing.  The use of one or more sensor systems to provide data that directs collection by other systems.\n\n(term previously defined in FM 2-0, Intelligence, May 2004)   Also see *cross-cuing*.\n\n\n\nCultivation.  A deliberate and calculated association with a person for the purpose of recruitment, obtaining information, or gaining control. (AFOSI Instruction 71-101, 6 Jun 2000)\n-- Also, apparently casual but actually deliberate and calculated effort to gain control of an individual, induce him to furnish information, and agree to recruitment. Cultivation can extend over a considerable periods of time. (FBI FCI Terms) Cultural Intelligence.  Knowledge resulting from all-source analysis of cultural factors, which assists in anticipating the actions of people or groups of people. (National Intelligence: Consumer's Guide - 2009). Current Intelligence.  Within DoD:  None - term removed from JP 1-02 per JP 2-0 Joint Intelligence, 22\nOct 2013.\n\n\n    Previously defined as:  one of two categories of descriptive intelligence that is concerned with\n\ndescribing the existing situation.\n\nCustodial Interview.  Interview conducted of a subject following formal arrest or detention. Subjects are made fully aware of their deprivation of freedom or their \"in custody\" status. (Army FM 2.22-2, CI, Oct 2009). Cutout.  An intermediary or device used to obviate direct contact between members of a clandestine organization. (JP 1-02) -- Also, an intermediary used to obviate direct linkage between either the origin or destination of an intelligence operation or action. (Defense HUMINT Enterprise Manual 3301.002, Vol II Collection Operations, 23 Nov 2010) -- Also, an individual whose services are used to prevent contact and recognition between specific members of an intelligence service with the purpose of providing compartmentation and security. (AFOSI Manual 71-142, OFCO, 9 Jun 2000) -- Also, a mechanism or person that acts as a compartment between the members of an operation but which allows them to pass material or messages securely. (CI Centre Glossary) Cyber.  1) Any process, program, or protocol relating to the use of the Internet or an intranet, automatic data processing or transmission, or telecommunication via the Internet or an intranet; and 2) any matter relating to, or involving the use of, computers or computer networks. (Cybersecurity Act of 2009) Cyber Attack.  An attack, via cyberspace, targeting an enterprise's use of cyberspace for the purpose of disrupting, disabling, destroying, or maliciously controlling a computing environment/infrastructure; or destroying the integrity of the data or stealing controlled information. (CNSSI No. 4009, National Information Assurance Glossary, 26 April 2010) Also see *cyber espionage, cyber threat*.\n\n\n    Disruptive and destructive cyber attacks are becoming a part of conflict between states, within\nstates, and among nonstate actors. The borderless nature of cyberspace means anyone, anywhere in the world, can use cyber to affect someone else.  ... The rise of cyber is the most striking development in the post-9/11 national security landscape.\n\n       -- General Martin E. Dempsey (USA), Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, June 2013 (Quoted in *Army* Magazine, August 2013, p. 8)\n______________________\n\n    **Cyber attack** is a non-kinetic offensive operation intended to create physical effects or to\nmanipulate, disrupt, or delete data. It might range from a denial-of-service operation that temporarily prevents access to a website, to an attack on a power turbine that causes physical damage and an outage lasting for days.\n\n       -- DNI, *Worldwide Threat Assessment of the US Intelligence Community*, SSCI, 12 Mar 2013\n______________________\n\n    Existential Cyber Attack is defined as an attack that is capable of causing sufficient wide scale\ndamage for the government potentially to lose control of the country, including loss or damage to significant portions of military and critical infrastructure: power generation, communications, fuel and transportation, emergency services, financial services, etc.\n\n       -- Defense Science Board, Task Force Report: Resilient Military Systems and the Advanced Cyber\n           Threat, Jan 2013; copy at: <http://www.acq.osd.mil/dsb/reports/ResilientMilitarySystems.CyberThreat.pdf>\n____________________________\n\n    Also see P.W. Singer and Allan Friedman, Cybersecurity and Cyberwar: What Everyone Needs To\nKnow (2014) -- Also, Cyberattack: deliberate disruption of a computer system or network and functions delivered or\nsupported by it. (National Research Council - 2009)\n\n## Cyberattacks\n\nAdapted from:  Eric Rosenbach and Robert Belk, \"U.S. Cybersecurity: The Current Threat and Future Challenges,\" Nicholas Burns\n\n## Cyber Attacks Are Growing In Frequency, Scale, Complexity And Destructiveness.\n\n\n\n## Cyber Attacks Are A Way Of Life... *Since 2006, Cyber Incidents Against The Usg Increased 782%* (Gpo).\n\n\nCyber Counterintelligence.  Counterintelligence, by any means, where a significant target or tool of the adversarial activity is a computer, computer network, embedded processor or controller, or the information thereon. (The United States Government-Wide Cyber Counterintelligence Plan - 2009 (U)) Also see *counterintelligence activities in cyberspace; cyberspace.*\n\nCyberspace is a venue.\n\n\n\nCyber Effect:  The manipulation, disruption, denial, degradation, or destruction of computers, information or communications systems, networks, physical or virtual infrastructure controlled by computers or information systems, or information resident thereon. (PDD-20, US Cyber Operations Policy (U), 16 Oct 2012) Cyber Electromagnetic Activities (CEMA).  Activities leveraged to seize, retain, and exploit an advantage over adversaries and enemies in both cyberspace and the electromagnetic spectrum, while simultaneously denying and degrading adversary and enemy use of the same and protecting the mission command system. (Army FM 3-13, Inform and Influence Activities, Jan 2013)\n\n    CEMA consist of cyberspace operations (CO), electronic warfare (EW), and spectrum\nmanagement operations (SMO).\n\n    See Army FM 3-38, *Cyber Electromagnetic Activities*, 12 Feb 2014.\n Cyber Espionage.  Refers to intrusions into networks to access sensitive diplomatic, military, or economic information. (DNI, Worldwide Threat Assessment of the US Intelligence Community, SSCI, 12 Mar 2013) Also see *cyber attack, cyber threat*.\n\n-- Also, the act or practice of obtaining secrets without the permission of the holder of the information\n(personal, sensitive, proprietary or of classified nature), from individuals, competitors, rivals, groups, governments and enemies for personal, economic, political or military advantage using illegal exploitation methods on internet, networks or individual computers... (Wikipedia at <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cyber_espionage>; accessed 5 Jan 2010)\n\n   \"Counterintelligence...is now a concern for every organization that lives on electronic\nnetworks and has secrets to keep. Information is liquid and liquid leaks.\"\n\n       -- Joel Brenner (former NCIX), America the Vulnerable,: Inside the New Threat Matrix of Digital Espionage,\nCrime, and Warfare, 2011, p. 64.\n Cyber Exploitation:  Penetration of an adversary's computer system or network to seize information (National Research Council, 2009)\n\n    Essentially an intelligence-gathering activity, e.g., Ghostnet, Operation Aurora.  Technically,\nexploits and attack can be similar, i.e., utilize same access vector and manipulate same vulnerability.\n\n    \"Distinction between intelligence collection and damage to systems is a few key strokes\"\n\n       -- Richard A. Clarke, Author of *Cyber War*\n\nCyber Incident.  Any attempted or successful access to, exfiltration of, manipulation of, or impairment to the integrity, confidentiality, security, or availability of data, an application, or an information system, without lawful authority. (NSPD-54 / HSPD-23) Cyber Intrusion Damage Assessment.  A managed, coordinated, and standardized process conducted to determine the impact on future defense programs, defense scientific and research projects, or defense warfighting capabilities resulting from an intrusion into a DIB unclassified computer system or network. (DoDD 5505.13E, DoD Executive Agent for the DoD Cyber Crime Center [DC3], 1 Mar 2010) Cyber Persona.  An identity used in cyberspace to obtain information or influence others, while dissociating the actor's true identity or affiliation. (DoDI S-5240.23, CI Activities in Cyberspace, 13 Dec10 with change 1 dated 16 Oct 2013)\n\n\nCyber Power.  The ability to use cyberspace to create advantages and influence events in other operational environments and across the instruments of power. (Daniel T. Kuehl, \"From Cyberspace to Cyberpower: Defining the Problem,\" in Franklin D. Kramer, Stuart Starr, and Larry K. Wentz, eds., Cyberpower and National Security, Washington, D.C.: National Defense University, 2009)\n\n    Cyber power can be used to produce preferred outcomes within cyberspace or it can be use cyber\ninstruments to produce preferred outcomes in other domains outside cyberspace. See \"Cyber Power\" by Joseph S. Nye, Harvard Kennedy School, May 2010; available online at:\nbelfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/cyber-power.pdf\n Cyber Security (or Cybersecurity).  Measures taken to protect a computer network, system, or electronic information storage against unauthorized access or attempted access. (DoDI 5205.13, Defense Industrial Base Cyber Security/Information Assurance Activities, 29 Jan 2010 w/ chg 1 dated 21 Sep 2012)   Also see computer security; information security (INFOSEC).\n\n-- Also, includes preventing damage to, unauthorized use of, or exploitation of electronic information and communications systems and the information contained therein to ensure confidentiality, integrity, and availability; also includes restoring electronic information and communications systems in the event of a terrorist attack or natural disaster. (DoDD 3020.40, DoD Policy and Responsibilities for Critical Infrastructure, 14 Jan 2010 w/ chg 2 dated 21 Sep 2012) - Also, the ability to protect, defend, and maintain availability, confidentiality, authentication, and integrity of networks, systems, and the data resident therein. (DoD Strategy for Operating in Cyberspace, May 2011)\n-- Also, the ability to protect or defend the use of cyberspace from cyber attacks. (CNSSI No. 4009, National Information Assurance Glossary, 26 April 2010)\n\n\n## Cybersecurity Threats Represent One Of The Most Serious National Security, Public Safety, And Economic Challenges We Face As A Nation.\n\n\n-- National Security Strategy - 2010\n\n\n   \"Cybersecurity vulnerabilities challenge governments, businesses, and individuals worldwide.\nAttacks have been initiated by individuals, as well as countries. Targets have included government networks, military defenses, companies, or political organizations, depending upon whether the attacker was seeking military intelligence, conducting diplomatic or industrial espionage, or intimidating political activists. In addition, national borders mean little or nothing to cyberattackers, and attributing an attack to a specific location can be difficult, which also makes a response problematic.\"\n\n       -- CRS Report, *Cybersecurity:  Authoritative Reports and Resources*, 25 Oct 2013\n\n       Copy available at:  <http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R42507.pdf>\n______________________\n\n   \"As long as nations rely on computer networks as a foundation for military and economic power\n  and as long as such computer networks are accessible to the outside, they are at risk.\"\n       -- Rand Report, \"Cyberdeterrence and Cyberwar,\" by Martin C. Libicki (2009)\n______________________\n\n   \"America is being 'invaded,' every hour of every day, by hostile forces using computers...from minor\nannoyances by young computer hackers to those from sophisticated nations and could cost American lives...the irony is that this new threat stems from the technical sophistication that helps\nmake the US military the strongest in the world.\"\n       -- John Randle, Voice of America, *Future War in Cyberspace*\n______________________ U.S. military networks \"are constantly under attack. They are probed thousands of times a day.\nThey are scanned millions of times a day. And the frequency and sophistication of attacks are\nincreasing exponentially.\"\n\n   \"The power to disrupt and destroy, once the sole province of nations, now also rests with small\ngroups and individuals, from terrorist groups to organized crime, from hacker activists to teenage hackers, from industrial spies to foreign intelligence services.\"\n\n        -- William Lynn, Deputy Secretary of Defense (as quoted in \"In Cyber War, Most of U.S. Must Defend Itself,\" by William Matthews,  *DefenseNews*, 1 Feb 2010, p. 29)\n   ______________________\n\n   \"Forcing Cybersecurity into a simplified unitary framework limits our choices and underestimates\nthe complexity of the most novel and serious disruptive threat to our national security since the onset of the nuclear age sixty years ago.\"\n\n      -- Michael Chertoff, Former US Secretary of Homeland Security & John M. McConnell, Former DNI\n          As quoted in *Securing Cyberspace: A new Domain for National Security*, 2012, p. 192\n______________________\n\n    Cyber security within the military is daunting - \"The Department operates over 15,000 networks\nand 7 million computing devices across hundreds of installations in dozens of countries around the globe.\"\n\n       -- Zachary J. Lemnios, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering, 20 March 2012 Testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee hearing on Emerging Threats and Capabilities\n______________________\n\n   \"In the cyber realm, new exploits can render defenses that seemed effective obsolete in a matter of\nseconds. Given the speed with which cyber capabilities can be created and the relatively low cost for entry, the potential for possibly far-reaching technological surprise is very high.\"\n\n      -- Dr. James S. Perry, Director of Information Systems Analysis Center at Sandia National Laboratories,\n          20 March 2012. Testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee hearing on Emerging Threats and Capabilities\n\n   \"Repeated cyber intrusions into critical infrastructure demonstrate the need for improved\nCybersecurity.  The cyber threat to critical infrastructure continues to grow and represents one of the most serious national security challenges we must confront.\"\n\n       -- EO 13636, *Improving Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity*, 12 Feb 2013\n\n    See the \"The Comprehensive National Cybersecurity Initiative\" at:\n<http://www.whitehouse.gov/cybersecurity/comprehensive-national-cybersecurity-initiative>\n\n    Also see Committee on National Security Systems, *National Information Assurance (IA) Glossary*,\nApril 2010, <http://www.cnss.gov/Assets/pdf/cnssi_4009.pdf>\n\n    Also see P.W. Singer and Allan Friedman, Cybersecurity and Cyberwar: What Everyone Needs To\nKnow (2014)\n\n\n## Cyberattacks Are Possible Only Because Systems Have Flaws.\n\n\nCyber Threat. The cyber threat is characterized in terms of three classes of increasing sophistication: 1) those practitioners who rely on others to develop the malicious code, 2) those who can develop their own tools to exploit publically known vulnerabilities as well as discovering new vulnerabilities, and 3) those who have significant resources and can dedicate them to creating vulnerabilities in systems. (Defense Science Board, *Task Force Report: Resilient Military Systems and the Advanced Cyber Threat,* Jan 2013) Also see *cyber attack*, cyber espionage, cyber threat investigation.\n\n\n\n## Cyber Threat Serious & Increasing...\n\nIn cyberspace, attackers can be anywhere at the speed of light...\n\n**Distinction between intel collection and damage to systems is a few key strokes**2 Cyber incidents reported by federal agencies *increased 782% since 2006*3\n1 Government Accounting Office (GAO)\n2 Richard A. Clarke, author of Cyber War Updated 20 July 2013\n\n## Cyber Threat\n\n   \"In the United States, we define cyber threats in terms of cyber attacks and cyber espionage.  A\ncyber attack is a non-kinetic offensive operation intended to create physical effects or to manipulate, disrupt, or delete data. It might range from a denial-of-service operation that temporarily prevents access to a website, to an attack on a power turbine that causes physical damage and an outage lasting for days. Cyber espionage refers to intrusions into networks to access sensitive diplomatic, military, or economic information.\"\n\n       -- James R. Clapper, DNI, Statement for the Record, Worldwide Threat Assessment of the US Intelligence Community, Senate Committee on Armed Services, 18 April 2013\n___________________________\n\n    The cyber threat the United States faces is increasing in severity and is accessible to a wide range\nof enemies. \"Most of what we see today is exploitation -- that's theft, stealing secrets, either\ncommercial or military... we know the tools exist to destroy things, to destroy physical property, to destroy networks, to destroy data, maybe even take human lives.\"\n\n       -- Deputy Defense Secretary William J. Lynn III in a television interview on PBS 14 July 2011\n___________________________\n\n    The FBI has noted three primary categories of *cyber threat actors*:\n\n       \"[1] organized crime groups that are primarily threatening the financial services sector, and they  are expanding the scope of their attacks; [2] state sponsorsforeign governments that are interested in pilfering data, including intellectual property and research and development data from major manufacturers, government agencies, and defense contractors; and [3] increasingly there are terrorist groups who want to impact this country the same way They did on 9/11 by flying planes into buildings. They are seeking to use the network to challenge the United States by looking at critical infrastructure to disrupt or harm the viability of our way of life.\"\n___________________________\n3  According to GAO (FCW.com, 18 Jul 2013)\n4\"Whacking Hackers,\" Newsweek, 15 Oct 2007, p. 10\n\n\n\n    Foreign intelligence and security services have penetrated numerous computer networks of US\nGovernment, business, academic, and private sector entities. Most detected activity has targeted unclassified networks connected to the Internet, but foreign cyber actors are also targeting classified networks.\n\n       -- DNI, *Worldwide Threat Assessment of the US Intelligence Community*, SSCI, 12 March 2013, p. 2\n__________________________\n\n    [C]omputer network 'exploitation' and 'disruption' activities such as denial-of-service attacks will\ncontinue.  ...the likelihood of a 'destructive' attack that deletes information or renders systems inoperable will increase as malware and attack tradecraft proliferate.\n\n       -- DNI, *Worldwide Threat Assessment of the US Intelligence Community*, SSCI, 29 January 2014, p. 1\n Cyber Threat Investigation.  Any actions taken within the United States, consistent with applicable law and presidential guidance, to determine the identify, location, intent, motivation, capabilities, alliances, funding, or methodologies of one or more cyber threat groups or individuals. (NSPD-54 / HSPD-23)\n-- Also, actions taken, consistent with applicable law and Presidential guidance, to determine the identify, location, intent, motivation, capabilities, alliances, funding, or methodologies of one or more FIEs [Foreign Intelligence Entities], that has attempted to penetrate or has, in fact, penetrated a DoD, IC, or DIB [defense industrial base] information system. (DoDI S-5240.23, CI Activities in Cyberspace (U), 13 Dec 2010 with change 1 dated 16 Oct 2013)\n\nAttribution is a major problem in the cyber realm\n\n   \"*Who: Attribution...* blurry lines between various types of malicious activity in cyberspace may\nmake it difficult for investigators to attribute an incident to a specific individual or organization. Criminal attribution is a key delineating factor between cybercrime and other cyber threats. When investigating a given threat, law enforcement is challenged with tracing the action to its source and determining whether the actor is a criminal or whether the actor may be a terrorist or state actor posing a potentially greater national security threat.\"\n\n       -- CRS Report R42547, *Cybercrime: Conceptual Issues for Congress & U.S. Law Enforcement*, 23 May 2012\n_______________________\n\n   \"The damage caused by malicious activity in cyberspace is enormous and unrelenting.  Every year,\ncyber attacks inflict vast damage on our Nation's consumers, businesses, and government agencies.  This constant cyber assault has resulted in the theft of millions of Americans' identities; exfiltration of billions of dollars of intellectual property; loss of countless American jobs; vulnerability of critical infrastructure to sabotage; and intrusions into sensitive government networks.\"\n\n        -- Senator Sheldon Whitehouse, 14 April 2011\n_______________________\n\n    James Clapper, Director of National Intelligence, noted that \"[t]wo of our greatest strategic\nchallenges regarding cyber threats are: (1) the difficulty of providing timely, actionable warning of cyber threats and incidents, such as identifying past or present security breaches, definitively attributing them [emphasis added], and accurately distinguishing between cyber espionage intrusions and potentially disruptive cyber attacks; and (2) the highly complex vulnerabilities associated with the IT supply chain for US networks.\"\n\n       -- Office of the Director of National Intelligence, Unclassified Statement for the Record on the\n           Worldwide Threat Assessment of the US Intelligence Community for the Senate Select Committee\n           on Intelligence, 31 Jan 2012, p. 8.\n_______________________\n\nAttribution in cyber is always going to be difficult.\n\nMissiles come with a return address, cyber attacks do not.\n\n-- William Lynn, US Deputy Secrete of Defense Interview Defense News, 18 July 2011\n\n\nCyber Threats.  Natural or man-made incidents (intentional or  unintentional) that would be detrimental to the cyber domain, or which are dependent on or operate through cyberspace/cyber domain. (Cyber Threats to National Security, Symposium Five, 2011) Also see *cyber threat*.\n\n    In the United States, we define cyber threats in terms of cyber attacks and cyber espionage.\n\n       -- Hon. James R. Clapper, DNI, Statement for the Record Worldwide Threat assessment of the US Intelligence Community, Senate Committee on Armed Services,18 Apr 2013\n\n## Cyber Threat Increasing Danger...\n\nWorldwide Internet Users:\n\"...an increasing number of adversaries are developing new options for exerting leverage over the United States through cyberspace...    Creating damage as well as conducting espionage against the U.S. Cyberspace provides clear avenues and the prospect of anonymity.\"\n-- National Intelligence Council (June 2003)\n\n## Criminals, Terrorists, And Foreign Governments Are Exploiting The Anonymity And Global Reach Of The Internet To\n\nAttack the U.S. information infrastructure Perform reconnaissance for physical attack Conduct hostile information operations Steal money, identities, and secrets\nPotentially undermine the U.S. economy\nSource: \"Cybersecurity for the Homeland\" (Dec 2004), Report of the Activities and Findings by the Chairman and Ranking Member Subcommittee on Cybersecurity, Science, and Research & Development, US House of Representatives Select Committee on Homeland Security, pages 3 & 10\nPrepared by Mark L Reagan - 3 Jan 2006\nUpdate 9 Jun 2014 Cyber-Terrorism.   A criminal act perpetrated by the use of computers and telecommunications capabilities, resulting in violence, destruction and/or disruption of services, where the intended purpose is to create fear by causing confusion and uncertainty within a given population, with the goal of influencing a government or population to conform to a particular political, social or ideological agenda. (FBI)\n-- Also, cyberterrorism: the unlawful attacks and threats of attack against computers, networks, and the information stored therein when done to intimidate or coerce a government or its people to further political or social objectives. Actors who engage in these kinds of activities are commonly referred to as cyber terrorists. (Cyber Threats to National Security, Symposium Five, 2011) Cybercrime.  Crime involving use of a computer system or network.\n\n    Typically involves data theft (e.g., credit cards, etc.) or transmission (e.g., child porn).\n______________________\n\n   \"Cybercriminals also threaten US economic interests. They are selling tools, via a growing black\nmarket, that might enable access to critical infrastructure systems or get into the hands of state and nonstate actors. In addition, a handful of commercial companies sell computer intrusion kits on the open market. These hardware and software packages can give governments and cybercriminals the capability to steal, manipulate, or delete information on targeted systems. Even more companies develop and sell professional-quality technologies to support cyber operationsoften branding these tools as lawful-intercept or defensive security research products. Foreign governments already use some of these tools to target US systems.\"\n\n\nCyberexploitation.  Penetration of an adversary's computer system or network to seize information. (National Research Council - 2009)\n    Essentially an intelligence-gathering activity, e.g., Ghostnet, Operation Aurora. Cyberspace.  A global domain within the information environment consisting of the independent networks of information technology infrastructures and resident data, including the Internet, telecommunications networks, computer systems, and embedded processors and controllers.  (JP 1-02 and JP 3-12, Cyberspace Operations, 5 Feb 2012)  Also see *cyberspace domain*.\n\n-- Also, the interdependent network of information technology infrastructures that includes the Internet, telecommunications networks, computers, information or communications systems, networks, and embedded possessors and controllers. (PPD-20, U.S. Cyber Operations Policy (U), 16 Oct 2012) -- Also, the interdependent network of information technology infrastructures, and includes the Internet, telecommunications networks, computer systems, and embedded possessors and controllers in critical industries. (NSPD-54 / HSPD-23, 8 Jan 2008) -- Also, the range of information and resources available through computer networks - especially the Internet. (ODNI Cyberspace Initiative) -- Also, a global domain within the information environment consisting of the independent network of information technology infrastructures, including the Internet, telecommunications networks, computer systems, and embedded processors and controllers. (CNSSI No. 4009, National Information Assurance Glossary, 26 April 2010)\n\n                                                                                              -- Adapted from RAND Graphic\n\nIn cyberspace, the war has begun...\n\n    Cyberspace is a decentralized domain characterized by increasing global connectivity, ubiquity,\nand mobility, where power can be wielded remotely, instantaneously, inexpensively, and anonymously. This environment presents enormous challenges and unprecedented opportunities...\n\n    Cyberspace is a domain that requires man-made technology to enter and exploit.  Effects of\ncyberspace operations can occur simultaneously in many places and they can be precise, broad, enduring and transitory.\n\n    *Challenges* -- Our national security is inextricably linked to the cyberspace domain, where conflict\nis not limited by geography or time. Cyberspace crosses geographic and jurisdictional boundaries. The expanding use of cyberspace places United States' interests at greater risk from cyber threats and vulnerabilities. Cyber actors can operate globally, within our own borders, and within the borders of our allies and adversaries. The complexity and amount of activity in this evolving domain make it difficult to detect, interdict, and attribute malicious activities.\n\n    Threats to cyberspace pose one of the most serious economic and national security challenges\nof the 21st Century for the United States and our allies.  On the flip side -- cyberspace offers DoD\nunprecedented opportunities to shape and control the battlespace to achieve national objectives.\n_________________________\n\n    Cyberspace will become a main front in both irregular and traditional conflicts. Enemies in\ncyberspace will include both states and non-states and will range from the unsophisticated amateur to highly trained professional hackers. Through cyberspace, enemies will target industry, academia, government, as well as the military in the air, land, maritime, and space domains.  In much the same way that airpower transformed the battlefield of World War II, cyberspace has fractured the physical barriers that shield a nation from attacks on its commerce and communication.  Indeed, adversaries have already taken advantage of computer networks and the power of information technology not only to plan and execute savage acts of terrorism, but also to influence directly the\nperceptions and will of the U.S. Government and the American population.\n\n        -- *The Joint Operating Environment 2010*, US Joint Forces Command\n__________________________\n\n\"[I]n cyberspace some malicious actors consider that no boundaries\nexist between military and civilian targets.\"\n\n-- Congressional Research Service, Report RL32114 (29 Jan 2008)\n__________________________\n\n\"...the United States will respond to hostile acts in cyberspace,\nas we would to any other threat to our country.\"\n\n-- International Strategy for Cyberspace, May 2011\n__________________________\n\n\"Cyberspace is contested every day, every hour, every minute, every second.\n\n [The internet] lowers the bar for entry to the espionage game, both for\nstates and for criminal actors. The threat is complex and not easily\naddressed by just building the security walls higher and higher.\"\n\n -- Iain Lobban, Chief GCHQ, 13 October 2010\n__________________________\n\n\"The myth persists that the United States hasn't been invaded since 1812.\nI'd like to inform you otherwise. And that is the fact that invasion\nthrough cyberspace is now a daily occurrence.\"\n\n -- Frank Ciffullo, Center for Strategic & International Studies\n__________________________\n\n\"The cyber threat is serious, with potential consequences similar in some ways to the nuclear threat of the Cold War\"\n\n-- Defense Science Board, Jan 2013\n__________________________\n\n\n     For additional information see:\n        -- DoD website at: <http://www.defense.gov/home/features/2011/0411_cyberstrategy/> -- *International Strategy for Cyberspace*, May 2011 -- *DoD Strategy for Operating in Cyberspace* (U), May 2011 (classified version)\n        -- *DoD Strategy for Operating in Cyberspace*, July 2011 (unclassified version) Copy available at <http://www.defense.gov/home/features/2011/0411_ cyberstrategy/docs/DoD_Strategy_for_Operating_in_Cyberspace_July_2011.pdf> -- ONCIX, Foreign Spies Stealing US Economic Secrets in Cyberspace: Report to Congress on Foreign Economic Collection and Industrial Espionage, 2009-2011, October 2011 -- DSS, Targeting US Technologies: A Trend Analysis of Reporting from Defense Industry -\n           2012\n        -- Defense Science Board, Task Force Report: Resilient Military Systems and the Advanced *Cyber Threat,* Jan 2013 Copy at: <http://www.acq.osd.mil/dsb/reports/ResilientMilitarySystems.CyberThreat.pdf>\n Cyberspace Domain.  A domain characterized by the use of electronics and electromagnetic spectrum\nto store, modify, and exchange data via networked systems and associated physical infrastructures. (Previously defined in DoDI S-5240.17, CI Collection, 12 Jan 2009) Cyberspace Operations.  The employment of cyber capabilities where the primary purpose is to achieve military objectives in or through cyberspace. (JP 1-02; and JP 3-0, Joint Operations, 11 Aug 2011) Cybervetting.  Checking blogs, social media sites, and other Internet-based sources to identify issues of security concern applicable to people holding or seeking positions of trust. (PERSEREC; accessed 9 Jan 2013)\n\n    PERSEREC's initial effort regarding cybervetting entailed working with the national security and\nlaw enforcement communities to identify the primary legal, privacy, policy, and procedural considerations that should be taken into account when establishing a cybervetting program. Pilot projects are planned to test the efficacy of cybervetting. In addition, a series of CyberPsychology studies are exploring how certain types of activities in cyber environments, such as Second Life, can spill over into negative affects [sic] on workplace reliability, judgment, and other areas of personnel security concern.\n\n       --  PERSEREC at <http://www.dhra.mil/perserec/currentinitiatives.html#Cyber> (accessed 9 Jan 2013)\n\nD ========================================== Damage.  A loss of friendly effectiveness due to adversary action. Synonymous with harm. (DSS\nGlossary)\n\nDamage Assessment.  [In intelligence usage,] a determination of the effect of a compromise of classified information on national security. (JP 1-02 and JP 3-60, Joint Targeting, 13 Apr 2007) -- Also, the analysis of the impact on national security of a disclosure of classified information to an unauthorized person. (IC Standard 700-1, 4 Apr 2008)\n-- Also, systematic analysis that determines the impact of a compromise of classified information on the national security of the United States. (CI Community Lexicon)\n\n-- Also, systematic, comprehensive examination of an intentional and/or inadvertent compromise of classified or sensitive information. (ONCIX, Damage Assessment Guide (U), 21 Mar 2008)\n\n\n   See ONCIX's *Damage Assessment Guide* - October 2009 (U) for a standardized framework and\noutline of the processes and procedures involved in national-level damage assessment activity.\n Damage to the National Security.  Harm to the national defense or foreign relations of the United States from unauthorized disclosure of information, taking into consideration such aspects of the information as the sensitivity, value, utility, and provenance of that information. (EO 13526, Classified National Security Information, 29 Dec 2009) Danger Signals.  Prearranged signals or marks on walls, posts, etc., [used] as a communication system between agents or [case] officers to indicate that the opposition or active enemy is nearby, has been tipped off, or has the area under surveillance. (TOP SECRET: The Dictionary of Espionage and Intelligence, 2005) Dangle.  A person controlled by one intelligence service who is made to appear as a lucrative and exploitable target to an opposing intelligence service. (HDI Lexicon, April 2008) Also see dangle operation; double agent;  penetration; provocation.\n\n-- Also, an asset placed within the professional or personal view of a FIS [Foreign Intelligence Service] officer or agent with the intention of observing the actions of and possibly being recruited by the FIS. (AFOSI Manual 71-142, OFCO, 9 Jun 2000)\n\n-- Also, counterespionage terminology for the process of presenting an individual to a foreign intelligence service in a manner as to encourage his recruitment as an agent; as \"to dangle\" or a dangle operation. (CIA in D&D Lexicon, 1 May 2002)\n\n-- Also, an individual who deliberately appears available for recruitment. (Encyclopedia of Espionage, Spies, and Secret Operations, 3rd Edition, 2012)\n\nIf you wait for the enemy to come to you, you may not know when he does.\n\n\n    ...If the fish do not swim into your net, you have to give them a lure, a provocation, something that\nlooks like a juicy worm but that has a hook in it.\n\n        -- William R. Johnson, *Thwarting Enemies at Home and Abroad* (2009)\n________________________\n\n ...dangles were a doubled-edged sword, whose specter overshadowed every decision to recruit\nagents we believed to be real.  ...Fear of them caused both the KGB and CIA to turn away countless volunteers.\n\n        -- Victor Cherkashin, Former KGB Intelligence Officer and author of *Spy Handler* (2005)\n Dangle Operation.  An operation in which an enticing intelligence target is dangled in front of an opposition service in hopes they will think him or her a bona fide recruit. The dangle is really a double agent. (Spy Dust)   Also see *dangle; double agent penetration; provocation*\nDatabase.  Within DoD: None - term removed from JP 1-02.\n\n\n\n    Previously defined in JP 2-0, Joint Intelligence (22 Jun 2007) as:  information that is normally\nstructured and indexed for user access and review. Databases may exist in the form of physical files (folders, documents, etc.) or formatted automated data processing system data files.\n Data Mining.  A program involving pattern-based queries, searches or other analyses of I or more electronic databases, where -- (a) a department or agency of the Federal Government. or a non-Federal entity acting on behalf of the Federal Government, is conducting the queries, searches, or other analyses to discover or locate a predictive pattern or anomaly indicative of terrorist or criminal activity on the part of any individual or individuals; (b) the queries, searches, or other analyses are not subject-based and do not use personal identifiers of a specific individual. or inputs associated with a specific individual or group of individuals, to retrieve information from the database or databases; and (c) the purpose of the queries, searches, or other analyses is not solely- (i) the detection of fraud, waste, or abuse in a Government agency or program; or (ii) the security of a Government computer system. (Data Mining Reporting Act, 804(b)(I)(A))\n\n    This definition limits covered activities to predictive, pattern-based data mining, which is significant\nbecause analysis performed within the ODNI and its constituent elements for counterterrorism and similar purposes is often performed using various types of \"link analysis\" tools.\n\n    Unlike \"pattern-based\" tools, these link analysis tools start with a known or suspected terrorist or\nother subject of foreign intelligence interest and use various methods to uncover links between that known subject and potential associates or other persons with whom that subject is or has been in contact. The Data Mining Reporting Act does not include such analyses within its definition of \"data mining\" because such analyses are not \"pattern-based.\"\n\n      -- ODNI 2009 Data Mining Report\n____________________________\n\n    Data mining is finding key pieces of intelligence that may be buried in the mass of data available.\nData mining uses automated statistical analysis techniques to search for the specific data parameters that intelligence professionals predetermine will answer their information requirements. Data mining can help organize the mass of collected data.\n\n      -- ADRP 2-0, *Intelligence*, Aug 2012, p. 3-6\n DCAT.  See *Defense Counterintelligence Anomalies Team*.\n\nDCII.  See *Defense Central Index of Investigations*.\n\nDCIP.  See *Defense Critical Infrastructure Program*. DCIP Assessment.  A comprehensive assessment of a Defense Critical Asset consisting of an in-depth look based on current DoD DCIP Assessment benchmarks. (CJCSI 3209.01, Defense Critical Infrastructure Program, 9 Jan 2012)  Also see *Defense Critical Infrastructure Program.* DCIP CI Coverage Plan.  A formally coordinated, comprehensive plan that outlines the CI support to DCA and Tier 1 TCA protection. A DCIP CI coverage plan is prepared by the critical asset manager and identifies the appropriate support of DoD, non-DoD, and other CI elements necessary to the development and validation of DoD-wide CI support to the DCIP. (DoDI 5240.19, CI Support to DCIP, 31 Jan 2014).\nAlso see *Defense Critical Infrastructure Program.*\n\n    If a \"CI Support Plan (CISP)\" has been developed for the DCIP organization and meets the\nrequirements of the DCIP CI Coverage Plan IAW DoDI 5240.19 (Table 2) then another plan is not required.  For CISPs see DoD Instruction 5240.24, *Counterintelligence Activities Supporting RDA*.\n DCIP Threat Assessment.  A compilation of strategic intelligence information incorporating multi-faceted threats facing DCAs [Defense Critical Assets] and Tier 1 TCAs [Task Critical Assets].  DCIP threat assessments address threats posed to DCAs from domestic and transnational terrorist elements, foreign intelligence and security services, and weapons of mass destruction. (DoDI 5240.19, CI Support to DCIP, 31 Jan 2014)  Also see *Defense Critical Infrastructure Program.* Dead Drop.  A clandestine location for transferring material to or from an agent or asset. (National HUMINT Glossary)\n-- Also, a place where a person might leave communications or material in concealment for another person. It serves as a cutout between human elements of a clandestine organization. (AFOSI Instruction 71-101, 6 Jun 2000) -- Also, a place, unattended by witting individuals, to which communications, materials, or equipment can be left by one individual and from which they can be taken by another individual without either meeting or, ordinarily, seeing one another.  Also called a dead letter box, or simply drop. (AFOSI Manual 71-142, OFCO, 9 Jun 2000)\n-- Also, a prearranged hidden location used for the clandestine exchange of packages, messages, and payments, which avoids the necessity of an intelligence officer and an agent being present at the same time. (FBI -- Affidavit:  USA vs. Robert Philip Hanssen, 16 Feb 2001)\n-- Also, a secret location where materials can be left in concealment for another party to retrieve.\nThis eliminates the need for direct contact in hostile situations. (CI Centre Glossary) -- Also, a preferred means of covert communications in denied areas, separates the agent and handler [case officer] by time, but carries the risk of leaving the package unattended in an environment that could change without warning. (Spycraft, p. 61)\n-- Also, pre-cased hiding places used by intelligence services to conduct [clandestine] exchanges with agents. (James M. Olson, Fair *Play: The Moral Dilemmas of Spying*, 2006)\n-- Also, a predetermined secret location where [case] officers and agents leave messages and other items for undetected collection by other parties. (*Encyclopedia of the CIA*, 2003) -- Also, a clandestine communications technique, the dead drop allows agents to exchange messages and other items without the need for a meeting that might attract the attention of hostile surveillance. The dead drop is usually an innocuous, prearranged site where a package or film canister can be secreted temporarily so it can be recovered by the addressee.  Ideally, the location is sufficiently innocent to enable both parties to visit it, at different times, without compromising themselves.  The use of dead drops is standard tradecraft for espionage professionals, and is usually associated with a remote signaling arrangement so both sides can indicate to the other when a particular drop is ready for servicing.  The objective is to obviate the need for personal contact that in denied areas is high risk.\n\n(*Historical Dictionary of Cold War Counterintelligence*, 2007)\n\nEliminates the need for direct contact... In intelligence usage, dead drops are used as a clandestine cut-out to avoid personal meetings\nwhich can draw attention to the connection between an intelligence officer/agent handler and an agent/asset.  As a rule, a dead drop site is not used more than once.\n\n    For a detailed description of dead drops and concealment devices, see *Spycraft*, pp. 388-400.\n\n\nDebriefing.  Systematically covering topics and areas with a voluntary source who consents to a formal interview. (Educing Information - Interrogation: Science and Art, Dec 2006)  Also see *strategic debriefing*; educing information; *elicitation; intelligence interrogation; interrogation; interview*. -- Also, the systematic questioning of individuals to procure information to answer specific collection requirements by direct and indirect questioning techniques. (Defense HUMINT Enterprise Manual 3301.002, Vol II Collection Operations, 23 Nov 2010; also Army FM 2-22.3, HUMINT Collector Operations, 6 Sep 2006) -- Also, [in detainee operations] the process of using direct questions to elicit intelligence information from a cooperative detainee to satisfy intelligence requirements. (DoDD 3115.09, DoD Intelligence Interrogations, Detainee Debriefings, and Tactical Questioning, 11 Oct 2012 w/ chg 1 dated 15 Nov 2013)\n-- Also, interviewing under other than hostile conditions, of an individual who has completed an intelligence assignment or who has, through observation, participation, or personal knowledge, information of intelligence or counterintelligence value or significance. (AR 381-20, Army CI Program, 25 May 2010)\n\n Counterintelligence debriefings are forms of overt collection entailing the questioning of human\nsources to satisfy CI requirements.\n\n    Debriefings are conducted to obtain CI information acquired by the Component's own employees\nin the course of their duties. CI debriefings are also used to exploit the opportunity presented by walk-ins and other persons who contact CI elements to provide information of potential CI interest.\n\n         -- DoDI S-5240.17, (U) CI Collection *Activities*, 14 Mar 2014 (encl 3, para 2c(1))\n\n     Also see Appendix C \"Counterintelligence Collection Methods (U)\" in JP 2-01.2, Counterintelligence\nand Human Intelligence in Joint operations (U), 16 Mar 2011 w/ chg 1 dated 26 Aug 2011.\n Debriefing Operations.  Operations conducted to debrief cooperating sources may include refugees, emigres, displaced persons (DPs), local populace, friendly forces, members of U.S. and foreign governmental and non-governmental organizations, as well as U.S. and foreign personnel employed within the academic, business, or scientific communities. The source may or may not be in custody, and their willingness to cooperate need not be immediate or constant. (DHE-M 3301.002, Vol II Collection Operations, 23 Nov 2010) Decentralized Execution.  Delegation of execution authority to subordinate commanders. (JP 1-02) Deception.  Those measures designed to mislead the enemy by manipulation, distortion, or falsification of evidence to induce the enemy to react in a manner prejudicial to the enemy's interests. (JP 1-02 and JP 3-13.4, Military Deception, 13 Jul 2006)  Also see counterdeception; deception means; deception in support of OPSEC; denial, military deception.\n\n-- Also, deliberately manipulating information and perceptions in order to mislead. (Foreign Denial &\nDeception Committee, 30 Mar 2006) -- Also, an action intended by an actor to influence the perceptions, decisions, and actions of another.\n\n(CIA, *A Tradecraft Primer: Structured Analytical Techniques for Improving Intelligence Analysis*, June 2005)\n\n-- Also, any attemptby words or actionsintended to distort another person's or group's perception of reality. (Textbook of Political-Military Counterdeception: Basic Principles & Methods, August 2007)\nDeception is a fundamental ingredient of military art.\n\nAll warfare is based on deception.\n\n\n-- Sun Tzu (400-320 B.C.)\n\n\n## Deception Is The Distortion Of Perceived Reality\n\n\n    \"Deception is an instrument of policy.... [It] must be orchestrated to succeed.\"\n\n        -- William R. Johnson, *Thwarting Enemies at Home and Abroad* (2009)\n\n    Analysts should routinely consider that their information base is susceptible to deception-- the\ndistortion of perceived reality.\n\n    Richard Heuer, author of *Psychology of Intelligence Analysis,* notes that analysts often reject the\npossibility of deception because they see no evidence of it. He then argues that rejection is not justified under these circumstances. If deception is well planned and properly executed, one should not expect to see evidence of it readily at hand. Rejecting a plausible but unproven hypothesis too early tends to bias the subsequent analysis, because one does not look for the evidence that might support it. The possibility of deception should not be rejected until it is disproved or, at least, until a systematic search for evidence has been made and none has been found.\n\n    See *Deception 101 A Primer on Deception* (2004) by Joseph W. Caddell; available online at: <http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?pubID=589>\n\n    Also see Textbook of *Political-Military Counterdeception: Basic Principles & Methods* (2007) by\nBarton Whaley, published by the National Defense Intelligence College.\n\nO, what a tangled web we weave, When first we practise to deceive!\n\n\n\n-- Sir Walter Scott, *Marmion* (1808)\n\n\n## Maskirovka\n\n\n\n    According to a declassified 1983 White House National Security Decision Directive -- The Soviet Union... doctrine of \"maskirovka\" [called] for the use of camouflage, concealment and\ndeception (CC&D) in defense-related programs and in the conduct of military operations. They define maskirovka as a set of measures to deceive, or mislead, the enemy with respect to Soviet national security capabilities, actions, and intentions. These measures include concealment, simulation, diversionary actions and disinformation.\n\n       -- National Security Decision Directive 108, *Soviet Camouflage, Concealment and Deception,* 12 Oct 1983 (declassified).  Copy available at <http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nsdd/nsdd-108.pdf>\n Deception Channel.  A means by which controlled information can be reliably transmitted to the target. (CIA in D&D Lexicon, 1 May 2002)\n\n    Feeding the enemy self-destructive information is the oldest of arts....  A successful feed should\nnot be considered an operation in and of itself, but rather the fruit of a long fight for control over a\nchannel of information. Therein lies the art.\n\n       -- Angelo Codevilla, *Informing Statecraft: Intelligence for a New Century* (1992), p. 349\n Deception In Support of OPSEC (DISO). A military deception activity that protects friendly operations, personnel, programs, equipment, and other assets from FISS [Foreign Intelligence Security Service] collection. (DoDI S-3604.01, Department of Defense Military Deception, 11 Mar 2013) Also see deception, military deception.\n\n    The intent of DISO is to create multiple false indicators to confuse FISS, make friendly intentions\nharder to interpret by FISS, or to limit the ability of FISS to collect accurate intelligence on friendly forces.\n\n    DISOs are not targeted against adversary military, paramilitary, or violent extremist organization\ndecision-makers with the intent of eliciting a particular decision or reaction, but are targeted against\na FISS or an adversary's intelligence collectors to protect friendly forces by masking, simulating, or\ndissimulating signatures and observables needed to ascertain friendly capabilities, intent, or vulnerabilities.\n\n\nDeception Means.  Methods, resources, and techniques that can be used to convey information to the deception target. There are three categories of deception means:  1) physical means -- activities and resources used to convey or deny selected information to a foreign power; 2) technical means -- military material resources and their associated operating techniques used to convey or deny selected information to a foreign power; and 3) administrative means -- resources, methods, and techniques to convey or deny oral, pictorial, documentary, or other physical evidence to a foreign power. (JP 1-02 and JP 3-13.4, Military Deception, 13 Jul 2006) -- Also, the vehicles or resources for conveying the deception story or deception-related information directly or indirectly to the target. These generally consist of sources accepted by the target as reliable or believable. Deception means have been subdivided into: physical, technical, administrative, and special means. (CIA in D&D Lexicon, 1 May 2002) Deception Target.  The adversary decisionmaker with the authority to make the decision that will achieve the deception objective. (JP 1-02 and JP 3-13.4, Military Deception, 13 Jul 2006) Decipher.  Convert enciphered text to plain text by means of a cryptographic system. (CNSSI No. 4009, National Information Assurance Glossary, 26 April 2010) Declared.  An individual or action whose intelligence affiliation is disclosed. (HDI Lexicon, April 2008)\n-- Also, an officer, asset, agent, or action whose Agency affiliation is formally identified to a foreign intelligence or security service, government or organization, or other USG entity. (National HUMINT Glossary) Declassification.  The authorized change in the status of information from classified information to unclassified information. (EO 13526, Classified National Security Information, 29 Dec 2009 and DoD IG\nEvaluation Guide, 22 Jan 2013) Deconfliction.  The process of sharing information regarding collection between multiple agencies to eliminate potential duplication of effort, multiple unintended use of the same source, or circular reporting. (Previously in DoDI S-5240.17, CI Collection, 12 Jan 2009) Decoy.  An imitation in any sense of a person, object, or phenomenon which is intended to deceive enemy surveillance devices or mislead enemy evaluation. (JP 1-02). Decode.  Convert encoded text to plain text by means of a code. (CNSSI No. 4009, National Information Assurance Glossary, 26 April 2010)\n\nDecrypt.  Generic term encompassing decode and decipher. (CNSSI No. 4009, National Information Assurance Glossary, 26 April 2010) Deduction.  [One of the four basic types of reasoning applied to intelligence analysis,] it is the process of reasoning from general rules to particular cases. Deduction may also involve drawing out or analyzing premises to form a conclusion. (Cited in (DIA, *Intelligence Essentials for Everyone*, June 1999)  Also see abduction; induction; scientific method.\n\n\n    For additional information see *Knowledge Management in the Intelligence Enterprise* by Edward\nWaltz (2003) and *Critical Thinking and Intelligence Analysis* by David Moore, JMIC Press (2006).\n Deep Cover.  A cover for status designed to withstand close scrutiny by the opposition or through due diligence. (National HUMINT Glossary) Defection.  Conscious abandonment of loyalty, duty, and principle to one's country. (AFOSI Manual 71-142, OFCO, 9 Jun 2000)\n\n\n-- Also, conscious (mental and/or physical) abandonment of loyalty, allegiance, duty, and principle to one's country. (ICS Glossary) Defector.  A person who has consciously abandoned loyalty to his country and who possess intelligence information of value to another country or countries. (CI Community Lexicon)\n-- Also, a person who, for political or other reasons, has repudiated his country and may be in possession of information of interest to the US Government. (ICS Glossary) -- Also, a person of any nationality, usually from a country whose interests are hostile or inimical to the U.S., who has escaped from the control of his or her country, is unwilling to return to that country, and is of special value to the U.S. Government because: he or she is able to add valuable new or confirmatory information to existing U.S. intelligence knowledge; he or she is, or has been, of operational or political value to a U.S. department or agency; or the defection can be psychologically exploited to the advantage of the U.S. (Defense HUMINT Enterprise Manual 3301.002, Vol II Collection Operations, 23 Nov 2010)\n\n\n## \"Next To Penetrations (Moles), Defectors Are Your Best Weapon Against Alien Intelligence Services.\"\n\n\n\n                                  -- William R. Johnson, *Thwarting Enemies at Home and Abroad* (2009)\n____________________\n\n    An act of treason - a \"defector is an individual who has committed treason, a person who first\naccepted identification with a regime and then betrayed his allegiance to cooperate with a hostile\nforeign intelligence service.\"\n\n      -- Wilhelm Marbes, \"Psychology of Treason,\" in *Studies of Intelligence*, vol. 30, no. 2 (Summer 1986),\n          pp. 1-11.  Originally classified \"Secret\" [declassified].\n____________________\n\n    Defectors \"...certainly the next best thing to penetration. But defector information was finite: it\nceased the moment the defector stepped out of his office and crossed to our side.\"\n\n       -- Richard Helms, *A Look Over My Shoulder: A Life in the Central Intelligence Agency*(2003)\n____________________\n\n   \"It's the job of intelligence agencies to distinguish between defectors who claim to have something\nto say and defectors who are lying and they obviously didn't do their job. The Germans didn't, and we didn't.\"\n       ****      -- Richard Perle regarding the Iraqi defector CURVEBALL, 15 Feb 2011\n____________________\n\n   \"Sometimes the bona fides of a defector remain in dispute for many years, as is the case of Yuri\nNosenko, who defected from the U.S.S.R. soon after the assignation of President John F. Kennedy\nin 1963.\"\n\n       -- Loch K. Johnson and James J. Wirtz, *Intelligence and National Security: The Secret World of Spies*\n           (2008), p.299\n Defector in Place.  See *recruitment-in-place*. Defense Attache.  See *Senior Defense Official / Defense Attache (SDO/DATT).* Defense Attache Office (DAO).  An organizational element of the U.S. diplomatic mission through which the Defense Attache System conducts its mission and to which may be attached or assigned such other military detachments or elements as the Secretary of Defense may direct. (DoDI C-5105.32, Defense Attache System, 18 Mar 2009)  Also see Senior Defense Official / Defense Attache (SDO/DATT).\n\n-- Also, a DoD organization established as part of the U.S. diplomatic mission, through which the mission of the Defense Attache System is accomplished. (DoDI C-5105.81, Implementing Instructions for DoD Operations at U.S. Embassies, 6 Nov 2008)\n\n\nDefense Central Index of Investigations (DCII).  An automated DoD repository that identifies investigations conducted by DoD investigative agencies. DCII does not contain eligibility information. (IC Standard 700-1, 4 Apr 2008)\n\n    Effective 26 July 2010, DCII is operated and maintained by the Defense Manpower Data Center\n(DMDC) on behalf of the DoD components and USD(I).  See website at: <https://dcii.dmdc.osd.mil> Access to DCII is normally limited to DoD and other federal agencies that have adjudicative,\ninvestigative and/or counterintelligence missions.   Although the DCII database is physically maintained by the DMDC the data it contains is the responsibility of the contributing agencies.\n -- Also, a centralized database, organized in a searchable format, of selected unique identifying information and security clearance data utilized by security and investigative agencies in the DoD, as well as selected other Federal agencies, to determine security clearance status and the existence or physical location of criminal and personnel security investigative files.  The DCII database is physically maintained by the Defense Manpower Data Center; however, the data that it contains is the responsibility of the contributing agencies. (DoDI 5505.7, Titling & Indexing Subjects of Criminal Investigations in DoD, 27 Jan 2012) -- Also, an alphabetical index of personal names and impersonal titles that appear as subjects of incidents in investigative documents held by the criminal, counterintelligence, fraud, and personnel security investigative activities of the Defense Investigative Service (DIS), the Defense Criminal Investigative Service (DCIS), and the NSA. DCII records will be checked on all subjects of DOD investigations. (AR 380-67, Personnel Security Program, 24 Jan 2014)\n\nDefense Clandestine Service (DCS).  The primary DoD element authorized to conduct clandestine human intelligence (HUMINT) operations is response to high priority national-level intelligence requirements as identified by the USD(I). DCS shall operate worldwide, to include high CI threat and politically sensitive environments.  Also see *National Clandestine Service*.\n\n    See <http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=116064>\n\n    Also see classified SECDEF memorandum, subj: (U) Established of the Defense Clandestine\nService, 20 Apr 2012\n\n-- Also, [a DoD organization that] conducts human intelligence (HUMINT) operations to answer national-level defense objectives for the President, the Secretary of Defense, and senior policymakers. The civilian and military workforce of the DCS conducts clandestine and overt intelligence operations in concert with the Central Intelligence Agency, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and our Military Services to accomplish their mission in defense of the Nation. (www.dia.mil/dcs/; accessed 5 Sep 2013)\nDefense Combating Terrorism Center (DCTC).  A functional center with the Defense Intelligence Agency focused on terrorism intelligence and related issues within DoD.\n\n    Previously known as the Joint Intelligence Task Force for Combating Terrorism (JITF-CT).  In the\nfall of 2012,  JITF-CT, the Joint Threat Finance Intelligence Office (JTFI), selected elements from the Defense CI & HUMINT Center, and DIA elements from the Counternarcotics and Western Hemisphere Office (CNW), transitioned into a single center -- the Defense Combating Terrorism Center (DCTC).\n\n    DCTC is the lead national-level, all-source international terrorism intelligence effort within DoD. It is\nDoD's all-source national-level intelligence fusion center responsible for enabling DoD counterterrorism and force protection operations.  DCTC analytical assessments address terrorist capabilities, activities and intentions, including terrorist finance activity; see DoDD 2000.12 and DoDI 2000.12.\n\n    DIA's Office of Counterintelligence(OCI) focuses on the intelligence apparatus and intelligence\nactivities of international terrorists. In instances where the two missions intersect, DCTC and OCI collaborate and coordinate to ensure that DIA presents a timely, accurate, and consistent picture of\nthe threat to U.S. forces and interests around the world.\n Defense Counterintelligence and Human Intelligence Center (DCHC).  Previously a center within the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) for counterintelligence and human intelligence that was established on 3 August 2008. DCHC was disestablished 28 Jan 2013 by Dir DIA (DIA Vision2020). Defense Counterintelligence Anomalies Team (DCAT). [DoD CI element that] provides analysis and deconfliction of anomalies and identifies and shares CI insider threat trends with the DoD Components. The DCAT develops, promotes, expands, and improves upon insider threat detection efforts by reaching across organization boundaries and cultivating awareness of anomalies. (DoD Manual 5240.26, CI Insider Threat Program, *draft* 20 Nov 2013)  See *anomalies*.\n\n    DoD Components report and handle \"anomalies\" in accordance with DoDD O-5240.02\n(Counterintelligence) and DoDI 5240.26 (Countering Espionage, International Terrorism, and the CI Insider Threat).\n Defense Counterintelligence Components.  DoD organizations that perform national and DoD\ncounterintelligence and counterintelligence-related functions, including the DoD Counterintelligence Field Activity and the counterintelligence elements of the Military Departments, the Defense Agencies with organic counterintelligence, the Joint Staff, the Office of the Secretary of Defense, and the Combatant Commands. (DoDD 5143.01, USD/I, 23 Nov 2005) Defense Counterintelligence Enterprise.  The collective of DoD organizations authorized to conduct counterintelligence and related activities.  See Defense Counterintelligence Components, Defense Counterintelligence Knowledge Base (DCIKB).  Serves the Defense CI enterprise as the webenabled system for collecting observations of CI best practices and lessons learned, disseminating these across DoD CI, conducting triage for further action and facilitating change.\n\n    DCIKB collects, analyzes, manages, and disseminates knowledge gained through operational\nexperience, exercises, and supporting activities in order to achieve higher levels of performance and to provide information and analysis on emerging issues and trends.\n\n      -- NIPRNet website at:  <https//sss.mccll.usmc/dcikb> -- SIPRNet website at:  <www.mccll.usmc.smil.mil/dcikb>\n Defense Counterintelligence Manager.  The official responsible who provides the centralized management of Defense CI Enterprise-wide activities. (DoDD O-5240.02, CI, 20 Dec 2007 with change 1 dated 30 Dec 2010)\n\n    Director DIA serves as the *Defense CI Manager*, with responsibility to provided for central\nmanagement of Defense CI Enterprise-wide activities (see O-DoDD 5240.02, para 5.3.1). This role is a corollary to the Director DIA's role as the Defense HUMINT Manager; see Defense HUMINT Manager.\n\nDefense Courier Service (DCS).  A global courier network for the expeditious, cost-effective, and secure distribution of highly classified and sensitive material.\n\n    For DoD policy see DoDI 5200.33, *Defense Courier Operations (DCO),* 30 Jun 2011.\n\n    DCS is under the United States Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM). On 15 November\n2005, the Defense Courier Division (TCJ3-C) assumed operational control of worldwide defense courier stations and continues to synchronize the defense courier related activities of the USTRANSCOM staff. See web site at: <http://www.transcom.mil/dcd/> Note:  DCS was previously known as the Armed Forces Courier Service (ARFCOS).\n Defense Criminal Investigative Service (DCIS).  The criminal investigative arm of the Inspector General (IG) of the Department of Defense responsible for investigating: terrorism; technology/munitions theft & diversion; cyber crime; substandard/defective products; and fraud, bribery & corruption. (DCIS - see website at <http://www.dodig.mil/INV/DCIS/index.html>) Defense Criminal Investigative Organizations (DCIOs).  The Defense Criminal Investigative Service, the U.S. Army Criminal Investigation Command, the Naval Criminal Investigation Service, and the Air Force Office of Special Investigations. (DoDI 5505.7, Titling & Indexing Subjects of Criminal Investigations in DoD, 27 Jan 2012) Defense Critical Asset (DCA).  An asset of such extraordinary importance to operations in peace, crisis, and war that its incapacitation or destruction would have a very serious, debilitating effect on the ability of the Department of Defense to fulfill its missions. (DoDD 3020.40, DoD Policy and Responsibilities for Critical Infrastructure, 14 Jan 2010 w/ chg 2 dated 21 Sep 2012)  Also see defense critical infrastructure program (DCIP); task critical asset (TCA). Defense Critical Infrastructure (DCI). The composite of DoD and non-DoD assets essential to project, support, and sustain military forces and operations worldwide. DCI is a combination of task critical assets and defense critical assets. (DoDD 3020.40, DoD Policy and Responsibilities for Critical Infrastructure,\n14 Jan 2010 w/ chg 2 dated 21 Sep 2012)  Also see *defense critical infrastructure program (DCIP).* -- Also, Department of Defense and non-Department of Defense networked assets and facilities essential to project, support, and sustain military forces and operations worldwide. (JP 3-27, Homeland Defense, 29 Jul 2013)\n-- Also, DoD and non-DoD cyber and physical assets and associated infrastructure essential to project and support military forces worldwide. (DoD Strategy for Homeland Defense & Civil Support) Defense Critical Infrastructure Program (DCIP).  A DoD risk management program that seeks to ensure the availability of DCI [Defense Critical Infrastructure]. (DoDD 3020.40, DoD Policy and Responsibilities for Critical Infrastructure, 14 Jan 2010 w/ chg 2 dated 21 Sep 2012)  Also see *defense critical asset*, defense critical infrastructure, *task critical asset*.\n\n    DCIP is an integrated risk management program designed to support DoD mission assurance.\nThe purpose of the DCIP is to ensure the availability of Defense Critical Infrastructure in an allthreat and all-hazard environment.\n    Key DCIP references include: -- DoD, *Strategy for Defense Critical Infrastructure*, March 2008 -- DoDD 3020.40, *DoD Policy & Responsibilities for Critical Infrastructure*, 14 Jan 2010 with Chg 2 -- DoDI 3020.45, *DCIP Management*, 21 Apr 2008 -- DoDI 3020. 51, *Intelligence Support to DCIP*, 23 Jun 2011 -- DoDI 5240.19, *CI Support to DCIP*, 31 Jan 2014\n      -- DoD Manual 3020.45-M, Vol 3, *DCIP Security Classification Manual*, 15 Feb 2011 -- CJCSI 3209.01, Defense Critical Infrastructure Program, 9 Jan 2012 -- USSTRATCOM, *Strategic Mission Assurance Data System (SMADS) User Manual*,  Apr 2013\n\n    DCIP is a evolving program, see web site at: <http://dcip.dtic.mil/>\n Defense Cyber Crime Center (DC3).  The Defense Computer Forensics Laboratory and the Defense Computer Investigations Training Program comprise the Defense Cyber Crime Center. The forensics laboratory provides counterintelligence, criminal, and fraud computer-evidence processing, analysis,\nand diagnosis to DoD investigations. The investigations training program provides training in computer investigations and computer forensics to DoD investigators and examiners.  AFOSI is the DoD executive agent for the Center. (DC3 web site)\n\n    DC3 sets standards for digital evidence processing, analysis, and diagnostics for any DoD\ninvestigation that requires computer forensic support to detect, enhance, or recover digital media, including audio and video. The Center assists in criminal, counterintelligence, counterterrorism, and fraud investigations of the Defense Criminal Investigative Organizations (DCIOs) and DoD counterintelligence activities. It also supports safety investigations and Inspector General and commander-directed inquiries.\n\n    DC3 aids in meeting intelligence community document exploitation objectives from a criminal law\nenforcement forensics and counterintelligence perspective. DC3 provides computer investigation training to forensic examiners, investigators, system administrators, and any other DoD members who must ensure Defense information systems are secure from unauthorized use, criminal and fraudulent activities, and foreign intelligence service exploitation. DC3 remains on the leading edge\nof computer technologies and techniques through research, development, testing, and evaluation applied to digital evidence processing and computer forensic analysis; and by partnering with governmental, academic, and private industry computer security officials.\n        -- DC3 web site at <http://www.dc3.mil/dc3/dc3About.php>\n    Also see DoDD 5505.13E, *DoD Executive Agent for DC3*, 1 Mar 2010\n Defense HUMINT Enterprise (DHE).  The collective of DoD organizations authorized to conduct HUMINT and related activities under the centralized management of the DHM [Defense HUMINT Manager]. (DoDD S-3325.09, Oversight, Management, and Execution of Defense Clandestine Source Operations, 9 Jan 2013 w/ chg 1 dated 13 Jun 2013)  Also see *Defense Clandestine Service*.\n\n-- Also, the collective of DoD organizations authorized to conduct HUMINT and related activities.\n\n(DoDD S-5200.37, Management & Execution of Defense HUMINT (U), 9 Feb 2009) Defense HUMINT Executor.  The senior DoD intelligence official as designated by the head of each of the DoD components who are authorized to conduct human intelligence and related intelligence activities. (JP 1-02 and JP 2-01.2, CI & HUMINT in Joint Operations, 16 Mar 2011 w/ chg 1 dated 26 Aug 2011) Defense HUMINT Manager (DHM).  The Director DIA, as designated by the USD(I), is the official responsible   for the centralized management of the DoD-wide HUMINT Enterprise. (DoDD S-5200.37, Management and Execution of Defense HUMINT (U), 9 Feb 2009)\n-- Also, [Dir DIA] serve as the Defense HUMINT Manager (DHM) responsible for centralized management of the DoD-wide HUMINT enterprise, which is based on decentralized execution of HUMINT operations and related activities. (DoDD 5105.21, DIA, 18 Mar 2008) Defense Industrial Base (DIB).  The Department of Defense, government, and private sector worldwide industrial complex with capabilities to perform research and development, design, produce, and maintain military weapon systems, subsystems, components, or parts to meet military requirements. (JP 1-02 and JP 3-27, Homeland Defense, 29 Jul 2013)\n\n    DoD is responsible for critical infrastructure protection within the defense industrial base per PDD-21.\n\n      -- PDD-21, *Critical Infrastructure Security and Resilience*, 12 Feb 2013\n_______________________\n\n    The DIB Sector consists of government and private sector organizations that can support military\noperations directly; perform R&D; design, manufacture, and integrate systems; and maintain depots and service military weapon systems, subsystems, components, subcomponents, or partsall of which are intended to satisfy U.S. military national defense requirements.\n\n    The government component of the DIB consists of certain laboratories, special-purpose\nmanufacturing facilities, capabilities for production of uniquely military material such as arsenals and ammunition plats, and other services. The private sector of the DIB consists of hundreds of thousands of independent, competing domestic\nand foreign companies and supply chains, delivering a vast array of products and services to DoD. DIB defense-related products and services equip, inform, mobilize, deploy, and sustain U.S. military and allied military forces worldwide. The DIB companies also deliver national security products and services to other federal agencies.\n\nDefense Infrastructure Sector (DIS),  A virtual association within the DCIP that traverses normal organizational boundaries and encompasses defense networks, assets, and associated dependencies that perform similar functions within the Department of Defense and are essential to the execution of the National Defense Strategy. (DoDD 3020.40, DoD Policy and Responsibilities for Critical Infrastructure, 14 Jan 2010 w/ chg 2 dated 21 Sep 2012)\n    IAW the DoDD 3020.40, the ten (10) *defense infrastructure sectors* are:\n\n    DIB Sector. The DoD, U.S. Government (USG), and private sector worldwide industrial complex\n\nwith capabilities to perform research, development, and design and to produce and maintain\n  military weapon systems, subsystems, components, or parts to meet military requirements.\n    Financial Services Sector. The DoD, USG, and private sector worldwide network and its supporting\ninfrastructure that meet the financial services needs of the Department of Defense across the range of military operations.\n\n    GIG Sector. The globally interconnected, end-to-end set of information capabilities, associated\nprocesses, and personnel for collecting, processing, storing, disseminating, and managing\ninformation on demand to warfighters, policy makers, and support personnel. It includes all owned\nand leased communications (commercial telecommunication infrastructure) and computing systems and services, software (including applications), data, security services, and other associated services necessary to achieve information superiority. It also includes National Security Systems as defined in section 11103 of title 40, U.S.C. (Reference (n)).\n\n    Health Affairs Sector. The DoD, USG, and private sector worldwide healthcare network and its\nsupporting infrastructure that meet the healthcare needs of DoD personnel across the range of military operations.\n\n    Intelligence Sector. Those DoD, USG, and private sector facilities, networks, and systems (assets)\nlocated worldwide or extra-terrestrially that conduct and support the collection, production, and dissemination of intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance information essential to the execution of the National Military Strategy. These assets encompass human intelligence, geospatial intelligence, measurement and signature intelligence, signals intelligence, open-source intelligence, and technical intelligence; counterintelligence collection, processing, and exploitation means; and all-source analysis and production, including the networks and means over which intelligence information is shared, communicated, and/or disseminated.\n\n    Logistics Sector. The DoD, USG, and private sector worldwide facilities, networks, and systems\nthat support the provision of supplies and services to U.S. forces.\n\n    Personnel Sector. The DoD, USG, and private sector worldwide network that coordinates and\nsupports personnel and human resource functions of DoD personnel.\n\n    Public Works Sector. The DoD, USG, and private sector worldwide network, including the real\nproperty inventories (environment, land, buildings, and utilities), that manages the support,\ngeneration, production, and transport of commodities (e.g., electric power, oil and natural gas, water and sewer, and emergency services) for and to the Department of Defense.\n\n    Space Sector. The DoD, USG, and private sector worldwide network, including both space- and\nground-based systems and facilities, that supports launch, operation, maintenance, specialized logistics, and control systems for the space assets relied upon by the Department of Defense.\n\n    Transportation Sector. The DoD, USG, and private sector worldwide network that provides military\nlift support (surface, sea, and air) for U.S. military operations.\n Defense Infrastructure Sector Lead Agents (DISLAs). Designated DoD officials and their respective defense sector organizations that perform defense infrastructure sector responsibilities. In coordination with their respective PSAs [Principal Staff Assistants], the DISLAs characterize their defense infrastructure sectors to identify functions, systems, interdependencies, and, ultimately, sector task critical assets that support Combatant Command, Military Department, and Defense Agency missions and sector functions. (DoDD 3020.40, DoD Policy and Responsibilities for Critical Infrastructure, 14 Jan 2010 w/ chg 2 dated 21 Sep 2012)\n\nDefense Intelligence.  Integrated departmental intelligence that covers the broad aspects of national policy and national security and that intelligence relating to capabilities, intentions, and activities of foreign powers, organizations, or persons, including any foreign military or military-related situation or activity which is significant to Defense policy-making or the planning and conduct of military operations and activities. Defense intelligence includes Active and Reserve military, strategic, operational, and tactical intelligence. (DoDD 5143.01, USD/I, 23 Nov 2005) Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA).  A Department of Defense combat support agency and a member of the United States Intelligence Community responsible for providing timely, objective, and cogent military intelligence to warfighters, defense planners, and defense and national security policymakers.  DIA is a major producer and manager of foreign military intelligence.\n\n    DIA is the nation's premier all-source military intelligence organization, providing the most\nauthoritative assessments of foreign military intentions and capabilities to U.S. military commanders and civilian policymakers.\n______________________\n\n    DIA's core mission resides in four intelligence competencies: all-source analysis,\ncounterintelligence (CI), human intelligence (HUMINT), and measurement and signature intelligence (MASINT).\n\n      -- 2012-2017 Defense Intelligence Agency Strategy Copy available at:  <http://www.dia.mil/about/strategic-plan/2012-2017-DIA-Strategic-Plan.pdf>\n______________________\n\n    Director DIA serves as the Defense HUMINT Manager responsible for centralized management of\nthe DoD-wide HUMINT enterprise.\n\n      -- DoDI 5105.21, DIA, 18 Par 2008, para 6.2.1, p.5\n\n\n## Dia Vision2020\n\n(IOC 28 Jan 2013)\n\n\n  VISION2020 [is] a transformational effort within DIA that redesigns and will fundamentally\nreposition the Agency to better address our nation's challenges.  [...]\n\n  VISION2020 aims to build a strong intelligence capability that will integrate and operationalize\nintelligence to ensure the security of the United States well into the 21st Century.\n\n  DIA's new center of gravity will be compromise of four Regional Centers (Asia/Pacific,\nEurope/Eurasia, Middle East/Africa, and the Americas) and one Functional Center (Defense Combating Terrorism Center DCTC))...\n\n      -- LTG Michael T. Flynn (USA), Director DIA\n\nDefense Intelligence Analysis Program (DIAP).  The DoD intelligence analysis community's resource allocation and prioritization program. The DIAP establishes the policies, procedures, responsibilities,\nand levels of analytic effort required to provide timely, objective, and cogent intelligence to warfighters, defense planners, and policymakers. (DoDI 5240.18, CI Analysis & Production, 17 Nov 2009 with change 1 dated 15 Oct 2013) -- Also, a DIA developed intelligence analysis production plan to enhance the ability of defense intelligence to focus on critical areas of national security interest, while maintaining a perspective on potential emerging threats. (DIA)\n\n\n GDIP Directive No. 006, Subject: *Defense Intelligence Analysis Program*, 31 Oct 2005, establishes\nthe policies, procedures, responsibilities, and levels of analytical effort required for Defense intelligence to provide timely, objective, and cogent military intelligence to warfighters, defense planners, and defense and national security policymakers.  Program guidance and roles and responsibilities posted on INTELINK at:  <http://www.dia.ic.gov/admin/diap/index.htm>.\n\n    DIAP organizations are responsible for proactively producing intelligence on topics for which they\nare assigned responsibility IAW *Defense Intelligence Analysis Program Management Guidance*, 24 Feb 2010.  DIA's Office of Counterintelligence is responsible for analyzing foreign intelligence activities and threats to US Defense and Service interests.\n Defense Intelligence Components.  All DoD organizations that perform national intelligence, Defense Intelligence, and intelligence-related functions, including: the Defense Intelligence Agency; the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency; the National Reconnaissance Office; the National Security Agency/ Central Security Service; and the intelligence elements of the Active and Reserve component of the Military Departments, including the United States Coast Guard when operating as a service in the United States Navy. (DoDD 5143.01, USD/I, 23 Nov 2005) Defense Intelligence Enterprise.  The Enterprise is comprised of intelligence, CI, and security components of the Joint Staff, Combatant Commands, Military Departments, and other Department elements, as well as those organizations under the authority, direction, and control of the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence (USD(I)). (DIA, 2012-2017 Defense Intelligence Agency Strategy) Defense Intelligence Operations Coordination Center (DIOCC).  [Defense-level entity that] integrates and synchronizes military and National Intelligence capabilities.  The DIOCC plans, prepares, integrates, directs, manages and synchronizes continuous full-spectrum Defense intelligence operations in support of Combatant Commands. (CJCSM 3314.01, Intelligence Planning, 28 Feb 2007)  Also see Joint Intelligence Operations Center (JIOC).\n\n\n To be disestablished per SECDEF memo, subj: Track Four Efficient Initiatives Decision, 14 Mar\n2011 (p.43) which directs the disestablishment the DIOCC and the transfer of its functions to the Joint Staff.\n Defense Personnel Security Research Center (PERSEREC).  A Department of Defense entity dedicated to improving the effectiveness, efficiency and fairness of the DoD personnel security system.\n\n    PERSEREC was established in response to a recommendation by the DoD Security Review\nCommission (known as the Stilwell Commission), set up in the wake of the very damaging Walker espionage case, to improve DoD's personnel security system.  In its 1985 report, the commission called for a personnel security research center to provide policymakers with an objective basis for policies and processes related to the security clearance system.\n\n    PERSEREC report entitled, Espionage and Other Compromises of National Security: Case\nSummaries from 1975 to 2008 (11 Aug 2009), provides summaries of 141 publicly reported espionage related cases.  These cases demonstrate that loyal and conscientious employees continue to be the target of attempts by agents of foreign intelligence services to recruit them as sources of sensitive defense and intelligence information.\n\n    Also see *Changes in Espionage by American: 1947- 2007*, PERSEREC Technical Report 08-5\n(March 2008).  PERSEREC reports available at:  <http://www.dhra.mil/perserec/index.html>\n\nDefense Security Enterprise (DSE).  The organizations, infrastructure, and measures (to include policies, processes, procedures, and products) in place to safeguard DoD personnel, information, operations, resources, technologies, and facilities against harm, loss, or hostile acts and influences. This system of systems comprises personnel, physical, industrial, information, and operations security, as well as SAP security policy, critical program information protection policy, and security training. It addresses, as part of information security, classified information, including sensitive compartmented information, and controlled unclassified information. It aligns with counterintelligence, information assurance, foreign disclosure, security cooperation, technology transfer, export control, cyber security, nuclear physical security, chemical and biological agent security, antiterrorism, force protection, and mission assurance policy and is informed by other security related efforts. (DoDD 5200.43, Management of the Defense Security Enterprise, 1 Oct 2012, w/ chg 1 dated 24 Apr 2013)\n\n\nDefense Security Service (DSS).  An agency of the Department of Defense (DoD) located in Quantico, Virginia with field offices throughout the United States. The Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence provides authority, direction and control over DSS. DSS provides the military services, Defense Agencies, 24 federal agencies and approximately 13,000 cleared contractor facilities with security support services. (DSS Glossary)   Also see industrial security; *National Industrial Security Program (NISP).*\n\n    DSS is the DoD Cognizant Security Office for industrial security, responsible for the DoD portion of\nthe National Industrial Security Program (NISP) and, by mutual agreement, other U.S. Government departments and agencies; provides security education & training products and services; administers the industrial portion of the DoD Personnel Security Program (PSP); provides authorized counterintelligence services; and also supports DoD efforts to improve security programs and processes.\n\n       - DoDD 5105.42, *Defense Security Service*, 3 Aug 2010 (w/ chg 1 dated 31 Mar 2011)\n_______________________\n\n    On behalf of the Department of Defense and other U.S. Government Departments and Agencies,\nthe DSS supports national security and the warfighter through our security oversight and education\nmissions.  DSS oversees the protection of U.S. and foreign classified information and technologies\nin the hands of industry under the National Industrial Security Program (NISP).\n   The NISP applies to all Executive Branch Departments and Agencies and to all cleared contractor\nfacilities located within the United States (Para 1-102, NISPOM).\n\n     DSS elements include:\n    The Center for Development of Security Excellence (CDSE) is located in Linthicum, Md., and\nprovides security education and training to DoD security professionals through formal classroom and distributed learning methodologies (i.e., computer-based, web-based and tele-training).\n\n    The Defense Industrial Security Clearance Office (DISCO), located in Fort Meade, Md., processes\nrequests for industrial personnel security investigations and provides eligibility or clearance determinations for cleared industry personnel under the NISP.\n\n    See DSS web site at:  <http://www.dss.mil/ >      (SIPRNet at <https://www.dss.smil.mil>)\n_______________________\n\n    DSS has organic counterintelligence support.  The DSS CI Directorate's mission is to identify\nunlawful penetrators of cleared U.S. defense industry and articulate the threat for industry and U.S. government leaders.\n\n    The CI Directorate's premier publication, Targeting U.S. Technologies: A Trend Analysis of\nReporting from Defense Industry, analyzes suspicious contact reports (SCRs) from across the DIB describing suspicious foreign activity targeting U.S. personnel, technologies, and export-controlled products.  This publication is available in both an unclassified and classified version.    See DSS CI web page at:  <http://www.dss.mil/isp/count_intell/index.html>\n_______________________\n\n    Timelines - Jan 1972  - the Defense Investigative Service (DIS)predecessor to DSSestablished  to consolidate DoD personnel security investigations (PSIs) May 1993 - DIS established a counterintelligence office Nov 1997 - DIS redesignated as the Defense Security Service (DSS) to reflect the agency's broader mission and functions, including industrial security, personnel security, security education and training missions. Feb 2005 - DSS's personnel security investigations functions transferred to the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) Dec 2007 - Director DSS named the functional manger for DoD security training\n Defense Technology Base.  All aspects of basic research plus those portions of applied research and technology development devoted to military systems in the generic sense. Prototyping and test and evaluation of specific technology enabled capabilities to prove the feasibility of a concept are also included. Development and engineering for specific military systems are NOT part of the defense technology base. (DoDI 3100.08, The Technical Cooperation Program (TTCP), 7 Aug 2012)\n\n\nDefense Unknown Subject Team (DUST). DoD's Enterprise-level focal point and action center to resolve CI leads in which the subject's identity and/or specific affiliation with the DoD is not evident. (DoD FCIP Strategy FY 2013-2017)  Also see *Unknown Subject; Unknown Subject Lead*.\n\n-- Also, [DoD element that] serves as the DoD focal point to resolve CI leads in which the subject's identity and specific affiliation with DoD is not evident.\n\n    DoD Components will report unknown subject leads to the DUST in accordance with DoD\nInstruction 5240.26, Countering Espionage, International Terrorism, and the Counterintelligence Insider Threat (Enclosure 3, paragraph 1)\n Defensive Counterintelligence Activities.  Those counterintelligence activities designed to protect... personnel, operations, technology, and information against collection or exploitation by a foreign intelligence service, as contrasted with offensive counterintelligence activities, which are designed to attack the intelligence services of foreign adversaries by penetrating, collaborating, or conspiring with them to achieve that purpose. (AR 381-20, Army CI Program, 25 May 2010) Defensive Cyberspace Operations (DCO).  Passive and active cyberspace operations intended to preserve the ability to utilize friendly cyberspace capabilities and protect data, networks, net-centric capabilities, and other designated systems. (JP 1-02 and JP 3-12, Cyberspace Operations, 5 Fen 2013)\nDefensive Travel Security Briefing.  Formal advisories that alert traveling personnel of the potential for harassment, exploitation, provocation, capture, entrapment, or criminal activity.  These briefings, based upon actual experience when available, include recommended courses of action to mitigate adverse security and personal consequences. The briefings also suggest passive and active measures that personnel should take to avoid becoming targets or inadvertent victims in hazardous areas. (DSS Glossary) Deliberate Compromise.  The act, attempt, or contemplation of intentionally conveying classified documents, information, or material to any unauthorized person, including public disclosure, or the intentional misuse or mishandling of classified information, (AR 381-20, Army CI Program, 25 May 2010) Delimitations Agreement.  Common term for the DoD/Department of Justice Agreement Governing the Conduct of Defense Department Counterintelligence Activities in Conjunction with the Federal Bureau of Investigation. (AR 381-20, Army CI Program, 25 May 2010) Demarche.  An official protest delivered through diplomatic channels from one government to another.\n\n(Words of Intelligence, 2nd Edition, 20110\n\nDenial.  Measures taken to block, prevent, or impair US intelligence collection. (Foreign Denial &\nDeception Committee, 30 Mar 2006)\n-- Also, the attempt to block information that could be used by an opponent to learn some truth.\n(Roy Godson and James J. Wirtz, \"Strategic Denial and Deception,\" in Strategic Denial and Deception:\nThe 21st *Century Challenge*, eds. Roy Godson and James J. Wirtz, 2002)  Also see *deception*.\n\n\n-- Also, methods used to conceal state and military secrets particularly from foreign intelligence collections. (Joseph W. Caddell; *Deception 101 - A Primer on Deception*, Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, 2004)\n\n-- Also, activities and programs designed to eliminate, impair, degrade, or neutralize the effectiveness of intelligence collection within and across any or all collection disciplines, human and technical. (Dr. James B. Bruce, \"Denial and Deception in the 21st Century: Adaptation Implications for Western Intelligence,\" in *Defense Intelligence Journal*, Vol 15, No 2, 2006; pp 13-27)\n\n## Denial And Deception - Equal Parts Art And Science\n\n\n    Keeping secrets and negating access conceals the truth from an opponent's acquisition.  Denial\nhides the real and *deception* portrays the fake.\n\n    For additional information see Joint Pub 3-13.4, *Military Deception*, 13 Jul 2006\n\nDenial of intelligence collection is a significant impediment to successful analysis\n\n Denied Area.  An area under enemy or unfriendly control in which friendly forces cannot expect to operate successfully within existing operational constraints and force capabilities. (JP 1-02 and JP 3-05, Special Operations, 18 Apr 2011)\n\n-- Also, a country with which the US has no official or formal diplomatic relations, or a country in which the capabilities and focus of the local CI services create an operating environment so hostile as to require non-traditional tradecraft of the highest order. (National HUMINT Glossary) Denied Area Tradecraft.  The specialized clandestine methodology used in handling agents in particularly difficult and hostile environments. (James M. Olson, *Fair Play: The Moral Dilemmas of Spying*, 2006) Departmental Intelligence.  Intelligence that any department or agency of the Federal Government requires to execute its own mission. (JP 1-02) Department of Defense Components.  The Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Military Departments, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Joint Staff, the combatant commands, the Office of the Inspector General of the Department of Defense, the Department of Defense agencies, Department of Defense field activities, and all other organizational entities in the Department of Defense. (JP 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States, 25 Mar 2013) Department of Defense Intelligence Information System (DoDIIS). The combination of Department of Defense personnel, procedures, equipment, computer programs, and supporting communications that support the timely and comprehensive preparation and presentation of intelligence and information to military commanders and national-level decision makers. (JP 2-0, Joint Intelligence, 22 Oct 2013) -- Also, a DIA-led enterprise that manages the intelligence information technology activities of and provides intelligence technology to the Department of Defense, the combatant commands, and other national security entities. (National Intelligence: A Consumer's Guide - 2009) Department of State / Bureau of Diplomatic Security (DS).  The security and law enforcement arm of the U.S. Department of State.  DS is responsible for providing a safe and secure environment for the conduct of U.S. foreign policy; it is involved in international investigations, threat analysis, cyber security, counterterrorism, security technology, and protection of people, property, and information.\n\n(www.state.gov)  Also see *Regional Security Officer*.\n\n    Every diplomatic mission in the world operates under a security program designed and maintained\nby DS. In the United States, diplomatic security personnel protect the Secretary of State and highranking foreign dignitaries and officials visiting the United States, investigates passport and visa fraud, and conducts personnel security investigations. Operating from a global platform in 25 U.S. cities and 159 foreign countries, diplomatic security ensures that America can conduct diplomacy safely and securely. DS plays a vital role in protecting U.S. embassies and personnel overseas, securing critical information systems, investigating passport and visa fraud, and fighting the war on terror.\n Department of State / Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR).  State's intelligence component that provides analysis of global developments to the State Department and contributes its unique perspectives to the community's National Intelligence Estimates. (WMD Report, 31 Mar 2005)\n    For additional information:  <http://www.state.gov/s/inr/ > Department of Homeland Security (DHS) / Directorate of Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection.  Monitors, assesses, and integrates terrorist-related information; and assesses and addresses the vulnerabilities of the nation's critical infrastructure. (WMD Report, 31 Mar 2005) Department of Treasury / Office of Terrorism and Financial Intelligence.  Treasury's intelligence component that collects and processes information that bears on U.S. fiscal and monetary policy and threats to U.S. financial intuitions. (WMD Report, 31 Mar 2005) Dependency.  [In critical infrastructure protection usage] a relationship or connection in which one entity\nis influenced or controlled by another entity. (DoDD 3020.40, DoD Policy and Responsibilities for Critical Infrastructure, 14 Jan 2010 w/ chg 2 dated 21 Sep 2012) Derogatory Information.  Issue information that adversely reflects on a person's loyalty, reliability and trustworthiness. (IC Standard 700-1, 4 Apr 2008) Desired Perception.  In military deception, what the deception target must believe for it to make the decision that will achieve the deception objective. (JP 1-02 and JP 3-13.4, Military Deception, 13 Jul 2006) Detainee.  A term used for any person captured or otherwise detained by an armed force. (JP 1-02)\n\n\n    Within DoD, detainee includes any person captured, detained, or otherwise under the control of\nDoD personnel (military, civilian, or contract employee). It does not include persons being held primarily for law enforcement purposes except where the United States is the occupying power. As a matter of policy, all detainees will be treated as EPWs until some other legal status is determined by competent authority.\n\n    For additional information see JP 3-63, *Detainee Operations*, 30 May 2008.\n Detection.  1) In tactical operations, the perception of an object of possible military interest but unconfirmed by recognition; 2) In surveillance, the determination and transmission by a surveillance system that an event has occurred; 3) In arms control, the first step in the process of ascertaining the occurrence of a violation of an arms control agreement; and 4) In chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear environments, the act of locating chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear hazards by use of chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear detectors or monitoring and/or survey teams. (JP 1-02) Deterrence.  The prevention from action by fear of the consequences.  Deterrence is a state of mind brought about by the existence of a credible threat of unacceptable counteraction. (JP 1-02) Devil's Advocacy.  Challenging a single, strongly held view or consensus by building the best possible case for an alternative explanation. (CIA, A Tradecraft Primer: Structured Analytical Techniques for Improving Intelligence Analysis, June 2005)\n\n    *Devil's Advocacy* is most effective when used to challenge an analytical consensus or key\nassumption regarding a critically important intelligence question.\n\nDIAP.  Also see *Defense Intelligence Analysis Program (DIAP)*.\n\n\n\nDigital and Multimedia (D/MM) Forensics.  The application of computer science and investigative procedures involving the examination of D/MM material. D/MM forensics is derived from a combination of definitions as it applies across the spectrum of computer forensics, audio forensics, image analysis, and video analysis.  Also see *digital evidence, digital forensics*, and *forensic science*.\n\n    D/MM forensic sub-disciplines include: Computer and Electronic Device Forensics.  The scientific examination, analysis, and/or\nevaluation of digital and electronic materials.\n\n    Audio Forensics.  The scientific examination, analysis, comparison, and/or evaluation of audio.\n\n    Image Analysis.  The application of image science and domain expertise to examine and interpret\nthe content of an image and/or the image itself.\n\n    Video Analysis.  The scientific examination, comparison, and/or evaluation of video.\n Digital Evidence.  Information of probative value stored or transmitted in binary form. (DoDD 5505.13E, DoD Executive Agent for the DoD Cyber Crime Center, 1 Mar 2010)\n-- Also, information stored or transmitted in binary form that may be introduced and relied upon in court. (DoJ, Electronic Crime Scene Investigation, 2nd *Edition: A Guide for First Responders*, Apr 2008)\n\n\n    Digital evidence is information and data of value to an investigation that is stored on, received, or\ntransmitted by an electronic device. This evidence is acquired when data or electronic devices are seized and secured for examination. Digital evidence:\n        -  Is latent, like fingerprints or DNA evidence. -  Crosses jurisdictional borders quickly and easily. -  Is easily altered, damaged, or destroyed. -  Can be time sensitive.\n\n                -- Electronic Crime Scene Investigation, 2nd *Edition,* April 2008.\n                   Available online at: www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/219941.pdf\n\n    Also see United States Secret Service, Best Practices for Seizing Electronic Evidence v.3, A\nPocket Guide for First Responders\n Digital Forensics.  In its strictest connotation, the application of computer science and investigative procedures involving the examination of digital evidence - following proper search authority, chain of custody, validation with mathematics, use of validated tools, repeatability, reporting, and possibly expert testimony. Beyond traditional legal purposes, the same techniques, scientific rigor, and procedural precision now support the range of military operations and courses of action, e.g., computer network operations as well as CI objectives. (DoDD 5505.13E, DoD Executive Agent for the DoD Cyber Crime Center, 1 Mar 2010)  Also see *digital & multimedia forensics, digital evidence*, and *forensic science*.\n\n-- Also, the application of science to the identification, collection, examination, and analysis of data while preserving the integrity of the information and maintaining a strict chain of custody for the data.\n\n(NIST, Glossary of Key Information Security Terms, May 2013) Digital Tradecraft.  The conduct, topics, or techniques of modern espionage or CI that employ digital or cyber means. (DoDI S-5240.23, CI Activities in Cyberspace, 13 Dec 2010 with change 1 dated 16 Oct 2013)\n-- Also, digital or cyber tactics, techniques, and procedures designed to obscure or frustrate observation by hostile or unfriendly entities. (DoDI S-3325.10, [FOUO title], 6 Jun 2013) Digraph and/or Trigraph.  A two and/or three-letter acronym for the assigned Codeword or nickname.\n\n(DoD 5220.22.22-M-Sup 1, NISPOM Supplement, Feb 1995)\n\n\nDiplomatic and/or Consular Facility.  Any Foreign Service establishment maintained by the US Department of State abroad.  It may be designated a \"mission\" or \"consular office,\" or given a special designation for particular purposes, such as \"United States Liaison Office.\"  A \"mission\" is designated as an embassy and is maintained in order to conduct normal continuing diplomatic relations between the US Government and other governments.  A \"consular office\" is any consulate general or consulate that may participate in most foreign affairs activities, and varies in size and scope. (JP 1-02) Diplomatic Establishment.  A mission, consulate, embassy, residential compound, or other premises owned or leased and used by a government for official purposes. (Words of Intelligence, 2nd Edition,\n2011) Diplomatic Immunity.  A status wherein diplomatic officers accredited to a foreign government as ambassadors, or other public ministers, are immune from the jurisdiction of all courts and tribunals of the receiving states whether criminal or civil.  The status of diplomatic immunity protects the bearer from prosecution, civil suit, punishment, or compelled testimony in the country to which he or she is accredited.\n\n(Words of Intelligence, 2nd Edition, 2011) Diplomatic Security.  The set of measures enacted to ensure that the diplomatic representatives of a nation-state, kingdom, or other political entity are able to conduct that entity's foreign affairs in a confidential, safe manner. (US State Department)  See Department of State / Bureau of Diplomatic Security.\n\n    Security is a basic function of diplomacy, and specific components of diplomatic security include\npreserving the confidentiality of diplomatic documents and communications, protecting diplomatic personnel, ensuring the integrity of diplomatic personnel through background investigations, and safeguarding diplomatic posts overseas and diplomatic facilities at home.\n\n     -- History of the Bureau of Diplomatic Security of the United States Department of State (October 2011) Copy at <http://www.state.gov/m/ds/rls/rpt/c47602.htm>\n Direct Access.  Descriptor used for sources with firsthand access to the information provided. (DoDI S-5200.42, Defense HUMINT and Related Intelligence Activities (U), 8 Dec 2009)  Also see indirect access. Direct Liaison Authorized (DIRLAUTH).  That authority granted by a commander (any level) to a subordinate to directly consult or coordinate an action with a command or agency within or outside of the granting command. (JP 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States, 25 Mar 2013) Direct Support (DS).  A mission requiring a force to support another specific force and authorizing it to answer directly to the supported force's request for assistance. (JP 1-02)\n\nDirection Finding (DF).  A procedure for obtaining bearings of radio frequency emitters by using a highly directional antenna and a display unit on an intercept receiver or ancillary equipment. (JP 1-02) Director Defense Intelligence Agency (Dir DIA).  Advises the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Combatant Commanders on all matters concerning all-source Defense Intelligence.\n\n\n    Director DIA serves as the **Defense Counterintelligence Manager** [emphasis added], the\nDefense HUMINT Manager, the Defense Collection Manager..., and the Commander of the Joint Functional Component Command-Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (JFCC-ISR). See DoDD 5105.21, DIA, 18 Mar 2002.\n\n\nDirector of National Intelligence (DNI).  Serves as the principal adviser to the President, the National Security Council, and the Homeland Security Council for intelligence matters related to the national security; oversees the 16 federal organizations that make up the intelligence community (IC); and manages the implementation of the National Intelligence Program (NIP). (IRTPA 2004)\n\n   Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) is charged with: 1) integrating the domestic\nand foreign dimensions of US intelligence so that there are no gaps in our understanding of threats to our national security; 2) bringing more depth and accuracy to intelligence analysis; and 3) ensuring that US intelligence resources generate future capabilities as well as present results.\n\n DNI created by Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (IRTPA) in December\n2004.  The Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) began operations in April 2005. It was created to drive strategic integration, ensure better coordination, and provide oversight & governance of the Intelligence Community (IC).\n\n    -- See ODNI Fact Sheet (Oct 2011): <http://www.dni.gov/files/documents/ODNI%20Fact%20Sheet_2011.pdf>\n Dirty Bomb.  An explosive-driven radiological dispersal device.\n\n\n    See NRC fact sheet, \"Dirty Bombs,\" May 2007(accessed 27 June 2011); available on line at: <http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/fact-sheets/dirty-bombs-bg.pdf>\n\n    Also see Congressional Research Service (CRS) report R41890, \"Dirty Bombs\": Technical\nBackground, Attack Prevention and Response, Issues for Congress,\" 24 June 2011.\n Disaffected Person.  A person who is alienated or estranged from those in authority or lacks loyalty to the government; a state of mind. (JP 1-02) Discards.  [S]pies supposedly deliberately sacrificed to distract a counterintelligence investigation away from a better target.  This is a controversial strategy about which there remains much debate within the intelligence community... (*Historical Dictionary of Cold War Counterintelligence*, 2007) Discovery.  Part of the pre-trial litigation process during which each party requests relevant information and documents from the other side in an attempt to \"discover\" pertinent facts. Generally discovery devices include depositions, interrogatories, requests for admissions, document production requests and requests for inspection.  (<http://www.lectlaw.com/def/d058.htm>; accessed 18 Sep 2012) Discoverability.  Discoverability means users can \"discover\" selected values (e.g., who, what, where, when), but cannot gain access to the underlying information until the user requesting access is authorized and authenticated. (Markle Task Force, 1 Sep 2009)\n\n    Discoverability is the first step in an effective system for information sharing, offering users the\nability to \"discover\" data that exists elsewhere. Discoverability means users can \"discover\" selected\nvalues (e.g., who, what, where, when), but cannot gain access to the underlying information until the user requesting access is authorized and authenticated. In many ways, knowing where relevant information can be found or who has the information is the essential first step towards information sharing as this makes collaboration and analysis possible. A system of discoverability also avoids the bulk transfers of data required in large centralized databases, improving security and minimizing privacy risks.\n\n    See:  <http://www.markle.org/sites/default/files/MTFBrief_Discoverability.pdf>\n\nDisguise.  Concealment or misrepresentation of the physical characteristics or true nature or identity of a person or object. (CIA in D&D Lexicon, 1 May 2002)\nDisinformation.  Carefully contrived misinformation prepared by an intelligence or CI service for the purpose of misleading, deluding, disrupting, or undermining confidence in individuals, organizations, or governments. (CI Community Lexicon)\n\n\nDissemination.  The timely distribution of intelligence products (oral, written, or graphic form) to departmental and agency intelligence Consumer's is a suitable format. (CI Community Glossary)\n-- Also, the timely conveyance of intelligence in suitable form to customers. (ICS Glossary) Dissemination and Integration.  In intelligence usage, the delivery of intelligence to users in a suitable form and the application of the intelligence to appropriate missions, tasks, and functions.  Also see intelligence process. (JP 1-02 and JP 2-01, Joint and National Intelligence Support to Military Operations, 5 Jan 2012) Divided Loyalties. Broadly defined, individuals with intellectual or emotional commitments to another country through cultural affinity. (PERSEREC Technical Report 02-5, Espionage Against the United States by American Citizens 1947-2001, July 2002)  Also see *ideology, MICE*. DNA.  The abbreviation for deoxyribonucleic acid, which is the genetic material present in the cells of all living organisms. DNA is the fundamental building block for an individual's entire genetic makeup. (www.ojp.usdoj.gov; accessed 29 Apr 2013)\n\n    A person's DNA is the same in every cell (with a nucleus). DNA is contained in blood, semen, skin\ncells, tissue, organs, muscle, brain cells, bone, teeth, hair, saliva, mucus, perspiration, fingernails, urine, feces, etc.\n Document and Media Exploitation (DOMEX).  The processing, translation, analysis, and dissemination\nof collected hard copy documents and electronic media, which are under U.S. Government's physical control and are not publicly available; excludes: handling of documents and media during collection, initial review, and inventory process; and documents and media withheld from the IC DOMEX dissemination system in accordance with DNI-sanctioned agreements and policies to protect sources and methods. (ICD 302, Document and Media Exploitation, 6 Jul 2007)  Also see Document Exploitation (*DOCEX),* Harmony, and *National Media Exploitation Center (NMEC)*.\n\n-- Also, the processing, translation, analysis, and dissemination of collected hard-copy documents and electronic media that are under U.S. Government physical control and are not publicly available. In the Department of Defense this includes the handling of documents and media during their collection, initial review, inventory, and input to a database. (DoDD 3300.03, DoD DOMEX, 11 Jan 2011) -- Also, the handling and exploitation of documents and/or media for intelligence purposes. (HDI\nLexicon, April 2008)\n\n    The National Media Exploitation Center (NMEC) is responsible for ensuring the rapid collection,\nprocessing, exploitation, dissemination and sharing of all acquired and seized media throughout the intelligence, counterintelligence, military and law enforcement communities.  See ICD 302, copy available online at  <http://www.fas.org/irp/dni/icd/icd-302.pdf>\n\n    Director DIA is the IC Executive Agent for NMEC (DoDD 3300.03, *DoD DOMEX*, 11 Jan 2011)\n Document Exploitation (DOCEX).  The systematic extraction of information from all media formats is response to collection requirements. (Term previously defined in Army FM 2-0, Intelligence, May 2004)\nAlso see *Document and Media Exploitation (DOMEX); Harmony;* and NMEC. Doctrine.  Fundamental principles by which the military forces or elements thereof guide their actions in support of national objectives. It is authoritative but requires judgment in application. (JP 1-02)\n\n-- Also, *Joint Doctrine*: fundamental principles that guide the employment of US military forces in coordinated action toward a common objective.  Joint doctrine contained in joint publications also includes terms, tactics, techniques, and procedures.  It is authoritative but requires judgment in application. (JP 1-02) DoD CI Campaign (previously referred to as \"*DoD CI Strategic Campaign).*  See the FOUO definition in O-DoDD 5240.02, Counterintelligence, 20 Dec 2007, with change 1 dated 30 Dec 2010; available on SIPRNet at <http://www.dtic.smil.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/524002p.pdf>\n\n    DoD CI Campaigns drive and shape Defense CI engagement against critical foreign intelligence\nthreats globally to achieve strategic outcomes; these CI Campaigns are managed by DIA's Office of Counterintelligence (OCI-1).\n DoD Criminal Investigative Organizations.  The term refers collectively to the United States Army Criminal Investigation Command, Naval Criminal Investigative Service, U.S. Air Force Office of Special Investigations, and Defense Criminal Investigative Service, Office of the IG DoD. (DoDD 5525.07) DoD Functional Manager for Security Training. Director Defense Security Service (DSS). DoD Law Enforcement Organizations.  Organizations, agencies, entities, and offices of the Military Departments and Defense Agencies and the DoD Inspector General that perform a law enforcement function for those departments and agencies and are manned by DoD LEOs [Law Enforcement Officers]. (DoDI 2000.26, Suspicious Activity Reporting, 1 Nov 2011) DoD Personnel Travel Clearance.  Travel clearance for DoD and DoD-sponsored personnel performing official temporary travel abroad. The three types of clearance are country clearance, theater clearance, and special area clearance. (DoDD 4500.54E, DoD Foreign Clearance Program, 28 Dec 2009) DoD Strategic CI Campaign.  See FOUO definition in O-DoDD 5240.02, CI, 20 Dec 2007. DoD Unknown Subject.  The subject of a DoD CI investigation whose identity has not been determined. (DoDI 5240.04, CI Investigations, 2 February 2009 with change 1 dated 15 Oct 2013)  Also see Defense Unknown Subject Team; *Unknown Subject*.\n\n     An \"unknown subject\" is commonly referred to as an \"UNSUB.\"\n    DIA's Office of Counterintelligence (OCI-2) serves as the focal point and central repository for DoD\nunknown subject CI leads, reports and information.\n Domestic Activities.  Activities within the United States that do not involve a significant connection with\na foreign power, organization, or person. (AR 381-20, Army CI Program. 25 May 2010) Domestic Intelligence.  Intelligence relating to activities or conditions within the United States that threaten internal security and that might require the employment of troops; and intelligence relating to activities of individuals or agencies potentially or actually dangerous to the security of the Department of Defense. (JP 1-02 and JP 3-08, Interorganizational Coordination During Joint Operations, 24 Jun 2011) Domestic Terrorism.  Terrorism perpetrated by the citizens of one country against persons in that country.\nThis includes acts against citizens of a second country when they are in the host country, and not the principal or intended target. (DoDI 2000.12, DoD Antiterrorism Program, 1 Mar 2012 with change 1 dated 9 Sep 2013)\n\n-- Also, Americans attacking Americans based on U.S.-based extremist ideologies. (FBI)\n-- Also, domestic terrorists: people who commit crimes within the homeland and draw inspiration from U.S.-based extremist ideologies and movements. (CRS Report R42536, The Domestic Terrorist Threat: Background and Issues for Congress, 15 May 2012)\n\n\n    One particularly insidious concern that touches all forms of domestic extremism is the lone\noffendera single individual driven to hateful attacks based on a particular set of beliefs without a\nlarger group's knowledge or support. In some cases, these lone offenders may have tried to join a\ngroup but were kicked out for being too radical or simply left the group because they felt it wasn't extreme or violent enough. We believe most domestic attacks are carried out by lone offenders to\npromote their own grievances and agendas.\n\n     -- FBI at <http://www.fbi.gov/news/stories/2009/september/domterror_090709> (accessed 18 Dec 2012)\n\n_______________________\n\n    The Department of Justice (DOJ) and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) do not officially list\ndomestic terrorist organizations, but they have openly delineated domestic terrorist \"threats.\" These include individuals who commit crimes in the name of ideologies supporting animal rights, environmental rights, anarchism, white supremacy, anti-government ideals, black separatism, and anti-abortion beliefs.\n\n     -- CRS Report R42536, *The Domestic Terrorist Threat: Background and Issues for Congress*, 15 May 2012\n\nDossier.  A file consisting of information concerning an individual. (National HUMINT Glossary) Double Agent.  Agent in contact with two opposing intelligence services, only one of which is aware of the double contact or quasi-intelligence services. (JP 1-02 and JP 2-01.2, CI & HUMINT in Joint Operations, 16 Mar 2011 w/ chg 1 dated 26 Aug 2011) Also see *dangle; dangle operation; provocation*.\n\n\nNo term is more misused by amateurs and greenhorns than \"double agent.\"\n\n-- William R. Johnson, Former Army Intelligence and CIA\n\n\nIn its simplest form, a double agent works for two intelligence services at the same time, with only one of the services understanding this.\n\n\n-- Stuart A. Herrington, *Traitors Among Us: Inside the Spy Catcher's World* (1999), p. 132\n_________________________\n\nThe double agent is the most characteristic tool of counterespionage operations, and he comes in many guises.\n\n-- Allan W. Dulles, The Craft of Intelligence (2006), p. 123\n_________________________\n\n\n    The first purpose of any double agent program is to engage the enemy.  ...The basic use of double\nagents is to keep contact with the enemy. What you use that contact for depends on the state of your CI program at any moment. But without contact, there isn't much you can do.\n\n    A double agent operation is a channel in which information moves in both directions. On each end\nof the channel is an intelligence or counterintelligence service. The intelligence service seeks to\nensure that the flow of material through the channel is beneficial to itself. The CI service seeks to ensure that the flow of material is detrimental to its opponent.\n\n      -- William R. Johnson (Former CIA Officer)\n_________________________\n\n\n-- Also, an agent who is cooperating with an intelligence service of one government on behalf of and under the control of an intelligence or security service of another government, and is manipulated by one to the detriment of the other. (Glossary of Intelligence Terms and Definitions, IC Staff, 1978) -- Also, a person pretending to work as a spy for one government while actually working as [an asset]\nfor another government. (WMD Report, 31 Mar 2005)\n-- Also, an agent working for two opposing agencies; he is loyal to one while betraying the other.\n\n(*TOP SECRET: The Dictionary of Espionage and Intelligence*, 2005) -- Also, *double agents* - individuals under the control of one intelligence agency who offer their services to an opposing intelligence agency. (\"Double Agent Operations,\" *Espionage*, Naval Investigative Service Command; nd, circa 1989)\n\n-- Also, a clandestine operative who works for two opposing espionage organizations but who is loyal to one of the organizations and betrays the other. (*Encyclopedia of the CIA*, 2003) -- Also, a person who engages in clandestine activity for two intelligence or security services (or more in joint operations), who provides information about one or about each to the other, and who wittingly withholds significant information from one on the instructions of the other or is unwittingly manipulated by one so that significant facts are withheld from the adversary. (John P. Dimmer - 1962; see below)\n\n\n## A World Of Stratagems\n\n   \"To tackle enemy espionage (whoever the enemy may turn out to be) it is therefore of paramount\nimportance to keep a firm hold on the enemy's own system of agents and informers. Knowledge of his methods, knowledge of his intentions, and knowledge of the personnel of his organization are all vitally necessary. Surely all these objects are the best attained by the maintenance of double\nagents!  The confession of faith is consequently a simple one. It amounts to this: that in peace as well as in war a carefully cultivated double agent system is the safest and surest weapon of counterespionage [emphasis added], and the one most easily adaptable to changing conditions,\nchanging problems, and even changing enemies.\"\n\n         -- J.C. Masterman, *The Double-Cross System* (1972)\n_____________________\n\n    The term \"double agents\" as used during OSS operations in WWII:   \"...captured agents who would\nbe persuaded to continue their activities for the enemy, ostensibly in good faith but acting at the\ndirection of X-2 [OSS Counterintelligence]....\"   Also \"the case of an agent recruited by X-2 [OSS\nCI] and infiltrated into enemy territory to induce the enemy to employ him as an agent and return\nhim to Allied territory.\"\n\n          -- Kermit Roosevelt, *War Report of the OSS* (1976)\n_____________________\n\n   \"The fact that doubles have an agent relationship with both sides distinguishes them from\npenetrations, who normally are placed with the target service in a staff or officer capacity....  The double agent is one of the most demanding and complex counterintelligence activities in which an intelligence service can engage.  Directing even one double agent is a time-consuming and tricky undertaking that should be attempted only by a service having both competence and\n  *sophistication.\"*\n         -- John P. Dimmer, CIA (1962)\n_____________________\n\n   \"One side has a agent whom it deliberately tries to work in as an agent on the other side, of course\nwithout the other knowing anything about it... the most advanced and dangerous kind of work an\nagent can do, both for the agent himself and for the two parties.\"\n\n         -- Colonel Stig Erik Constans Wennerstrom, Swedish Air Force\n              Spy for the GRU -- convicted of treason in 1964\n\n## _____________________\n\n\n    Double Agents \"can serve as excellent channels through which misleading information can flow\nto the enemy.  So double agents serve both as collectors of positive intelligence and channels for\ndeception.\"\n\n        -- Church Committee (Senate Report 94-755 , 26 April 1976)\n\n\n## A Condoned Channel Of Communication With The Enemy\n\n\n   For additional open source information regarding double agents see:\n\n    William R. Johnson, Thwarting Enemies at Home and Abroad:  How to Be a Counterintelligence\nOfficer, Georgetown University Press (2009); pp. 91-153.\n\n    *Federal Government Security Clearance Programs*, Report # 99-166, Hearings before the\nPermanent Subcommittee on Investigations of the Committee on Governmental Affairs, US Senate, April 1985, specifically testimony on pp. 63-103 regarding two Army CI controlled double agent operations:  1) Chief Warrant Officer Jamos Szmolka against the Hungarian Intelligence Service in\n       1977-1981; and 2) Sergeant \"Smith\" against the KGB for over 10 years starting in the early 1970's.\n    \"Double Agent Operations,*\" Espionage*, Naval Investigative Service Command (nd, circa 1989);\npp. 24-33.\n\n    John P. Dimmer (aka F.M. Begum), \"Observations on the Double Agent,\" *Studies in Intelligence*,\nV6: 11, pp 57-72 (1962); declassified, originally classified Secret.  Available online at: <https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/kent-csi/vol6no1/html/v06i1a05p_0001.htm>\n\n    J.C. Masterman, *The Double-Cross System* (1972).  Double agent operations against the Germans\nin World War II. Nazi agents in Britain were captured or turned themselves in and were then used by the British to broadcast mainly disinformation to their Nazi controllers.\n\n    John Barron, *Operation Solo: The FBI's Man in the Kremlin* (1996).  Operation Solo tells the\nremarkable and true story of FBI run double agent Morris Childs, code named \"Agent 58\", who, for twenty-seven years, provided the FBI with the Kremlin's innermost secrets during fifty-two clandestine missions to the Soviet Union, China, and Eastern Europe.\n\n    David Wise, *Cassidy's Run* (2000).  True-life story of US Army Sgt. Joseph Cassidy who\nsuccessfully pretended to be a traitor to his country. In the eyes of his Soviet handlers, he was a mole planted deep inside DoD.  This US Army/FBI double agent operation - code named Operation SHOCKER -- flushed out 10 Soviet spies including a Russian sleeper agent in the Bronx and revealed the lengths to which Soviet intelligence would go to penetrate DoD.\n\n    Andrew Tully, *Inside the FBI* (1980). Chapter 5 \"Spies for Sale\" (pp. 70-81) tells the story of a joint\nNaval Investigative Service and FBI double agent operation [Operation LEMONAID] targeting the Russian Intelligence Service resulting in the arrest of three Russians working out of the United Nations for espionage on 20 May 1978.  Also see Jeremy J. Leggatt, \"Art Lindberg's Walk in the\nCold,\" *Reader's Digest*, June 1980.\n Downgrade.  To determine that classified information requires, in the interests of national security, a lower degree of protection against unauthorized disclosure than currently provided, coupled with a changing of the classification designation to reflect such a lower degree. (JP 1-02)\nDoxing.  [Cyber usage] Publicly releasing a person's identifying information including full name, date of birth, address, and pictures typically retrieved from social networking site profiles. (FBI; see <http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/investigate/counterintelligence/internet-social-networking-risks-1>) Dry Clean.  [Tradecraft jargon]  Actions taken to determine if one is under surveillance. (Spy Book) Dry Cleaning.  [Tradecraft jargon]  Any technique used to elude surveillance.  A usual precaution used by intelligence personnel when actively engaged in an operation. (AFOSI Manual 71-142, OFCO, 9 Jun\n2000)\n-- Also, any technique used to detect surveillance; a usual precaution engaged in by intelligence personnel when actively engaged in an operation. (FBI FCI Terms) Dynamic Threat Assessment (DTA).  An intelligence assessment developed by the Defense Intelligence Agency that details the threat, capabilities, and intentions of adversaries in each of the priority plans in the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan. (JP 2-0, Joint Intelligence, 22 Oct 2013)\n\n The DTA is used by the Combatant Commanders and COCOM planning staffs to conduct Mission Analysis for Step 1 - Strategic Guidance under Adaptive Planning and Execution (APEX). Dual Agent.  *Within DoD, term rescinded by JP 2-01.2, CI & HUMINT in Joint Operations, 16 Mar 2011.*\n\n    Previously defined in JP 1-02 as \"one who is simultaneously and independently employed by two\nor more intelligence agencies, covering targets for both.\"\n\nDual Citizen.  Any person who is simultaneously a citizen of more than one country. (DSS Glossary)\n\nDual-use.  Technology and articles that are potentially used either for commercial/civilian purposes or for military, defense, or defense-related purposes. (DoDI 2040.02, International Transfers of Technology, Articles, and Services, 10 Jul 2008)  See *critical technology*. DUST.  See *Defense Unknown Subject Team*.\n\nE ========================================== Economic Espionage.  The knowing misappropriation of trade secrets with the knowledge or intent that the offense will benefit a foreign government, foreign instrumentality, or foreign agent.  Misappropriation includes, but is not limited to, stealing, copying, altering, destroying, transmitting, sending, receiving, buying, possessing, or conspiring to obtain trade secrets without authorization. (Economic Espionage Act of 1996, PL 104-294)\n\n## Economic Espionage... Is A Fact Of Life\n\n\n    I think you have to separate very clearly what are the fields which are covered by the alliance and\nthe fields which are not covered by an alliance.  It's clear that when you are allies, you have certain\nsectors, I'm speaking of the armaments.  I'm thinking of diplomatic matters where normally you should not try to gather intelligence.  But in all of the other fields, being allied does not prevent the states from being competitors.  Even during the Cold War, the economic competition existed.  Now the competition between the states is moving from the political-military level to the economic and\ntechnological level.  **In economics, we are competitors, not allies.**  I think that even during the\nCold War getting intelligence on economic, technological, and industrial matters from a country with which you are allies is not incompatible with the fact that you are allies.\n\n-- Pierre Marion, Former Director of French Intelligence (DGSE)\nas quoted in *Friendly Spies* by Peter Schweizer (1993)\n_______________________________\n\n    Section 101(a) of the Economic Espionage Act of 1996 criminalizes economic espionage. See <http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PLAW-104publ294/content-detail.html> Also see <http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/investigate/counterintelligence/economic-espionage>\n\n    The **Economic Espionage Act (EEA) of 1996** (18 USC  1831-1839) is concerned in particular\nwith economic espionage and foreign activities to acquire US trade secrets. In this context, trade secrets are all forms and types of financial, business, scientific, technical, economic, or engineering information, including patterns, plans, compilations, program devices, formulas, designs, prototypes, methods, techniques, processes, procedures, programs, or codes, whether tangible or intangible, and whether stored or unstored, compiled, or memorialized physically, electronically, graphically, photographically, or in writing, if the owner (the person or entity in whom or in which rightful legal or equitable title to, or license in, is reposed) has taken reasonable measures to keep such information secret and the information derives independent economic value, actual, or potential from not being generally known to, and not being readily ascertainable through, proper means by the public. Activities to acquire these secrets include the criminal offenses: economic espionage and industrial espionage.\n\n    The Office of the National Counterintelligence Executive submits an annual report to Congress on\nthe threat to the United States from foreign economic collection and industrial espionage; see annual reports at:  <http://www.ncix.gov/publications/reports/fecie_all/index.html>\n_______________________________\n\n\n\"US intelligence officials put the cost of lost sales due to illicit appropriation of\ntechnology and business ideas at between $US100 billion and $US250 billion a year.\"\n\n-- *Financial Times*, January 2011\n\nEducing Information (EI).  The full range of approaches to obtain useful information from sources. EI includes elicitation, debriefing, and interrogation. (Educing Information - Interrogation: Science and\nArt, Dec 2006)  Also see debriefing; elicitation; interrogation; *interview*.\n\n    The 2006 Intelligence Science Board report Educing Information - Interrogation: Science and Art\nis available online at <http://www.ndic.edu/press/3866.htm>\n Effect.  1) The physical or behavioral state of a system that results from an action, a set of actions, or another effect; 2) The result, outcome, or consequence of an action; 3) A change to a condition, behavior, or degree of freedom. (JP 1-02 and JP 3-0, Joint Operations, 11 Aug 2011)\n\n\nEffects-Based Operations (EBO).  [Non-doctrinal term]  A process for obtaining a desired strategic outcome [emphasis added] or *effect* on the enemy. (JFCOM Glossary at www.jfcom.mil/about/glossary.htm)\n\n\n    Effects Bases Operations:  Coordinated sets of actions directed at shaping the behavior of friends,\nfoes, and neutrals in peace, crisis, and war.\n\n    The concept of EBO focuses \"coordinated sets of actions\" on objectives defined in terms of human\nbehaviors in multiple dimensions and on multiple levels, and measures their success in terms of the behavior produced....   Effects cannot be isolated.  All effects, at each level and in each arena, are interrelated and are cumulative over time. And lastly, effects are both physical and psychological in nature.\n\n        -- Edward A. Smith, *Effects Based Operations: Applying Network Centric Warfare in Peace, Crisis, and War* (2002)\n eGuardian.  The FBI's unclassified, law enforcement-centric threat reporting system. It provides a means to disseminate SARs dealing with information regarding a potential threat or suspicious activity rapidly throughout the national law enforcement community. (DoDI 2000.26, Suspicious Activity Reporting, 1 Nov 2011)  See *suspicious activity report*.\n\n    All reports in the eGuardian system Shared Data Repository are viewable through Guardian, the\nFBI's classified threat reporting system.  DoD personnel assigned to Joint Terrorism Task Forces\n(JTTFs) and the National Joint Terrorism Task Force (NJTTF) have access to Guardian.\n\n    For additional information see:   <http://foia.fbi.gov/eguardian_threat.htm>\n Electronic Intelligence (ELINT).  Technical and geolocation intelligence derived from foreign noncommunications electromagnetic radiations emanating from other than nuclear detonations or radioactive sources.  (JP 1-02 and JP 3-13.1, Electronic Warfare, 25 Jan 2007)  Also see electronic\nwarfare; foreign instrumentation signals intelligence; signals intelligence.\n\n\n\n    ELINT is a sub-category of signals intelligence (SIGINT) that engages in dealing with information\nderived primarily from electronic signals that do not contain speech or text (which are considered Communications Intelligence aka COMINT). Two major branches of ELINT are Technical ELINT (TechELINT) and Operational ELINT (OpELINT) described as follows:\n\n         -- TechELINT describes the signal structure, emission characteristics, modes of operation, emitter functions, and weapons systems associations of such emitters as radars, beacons, jammers, and navigational signals.  A main purpose of TechELINT is to obtain signal parameters which can define the capabilities and the role that the emitter plays in the larger system, such as a ground radar locating aircraft, and thus lead to the design of radar detection, countermeasure, or counterweapons equipment.\n\n         -- OpELINT concentrates on locating specific ELINT targets and determining the operational patterns of the systems; these results are commonly called Electronic Order of Battle (EOB).\n\n    For additional information see:   Richard L. Bernard, *Electronic Intelligence (ELINT) at NSA*, 2009.\nOn line at:  <http://www.nsa.gov/about/_files/cryptologic_heritage/publications/misc/elint.pdf>\n\n    Also see additional background information at:  <www.fas.org/irp/nsa/almanac-elint.pdf>\n\nElectronic Surveillance.  The acquisition of a nonpublic communication by electronic means without the consent of a person who is party to an electronic communication or, in the case of a nonelectronic communication, without the consent of a person who is visibly present at the place of communication. (DoD 5240.1-R, Dec 1982)  Also see *surveillance; foreign intelligence surveillance act (FISA).*\n\n    Governed by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) of 1978 (50 USC 1805).\n\n    For DoD CI see Chap 5. Proc 5 - Electronic Surveillance, DoD 5240.1-R, Procedures Governing\n\nthe Activities of DoD Intelligence Components that Affect United States Persons, 7 Dec 1982\n______________________\n\n\n    The Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986 (ECPA) prohibits unauthorized electronic\neavesdropping. ECPA consists of three parts. The first, often referred to as Title III, outlaws\nwiretapping and electronic eavesdropping, except as otherwise provided. The second, the Stored Communications Act, governs the privacy of, and government access to, the content of electronic communications and to related records. The third outlaws the use and installation of pen registers\nand of trap and trace devices, unless judicially approved for law enforcement or intelligence gathering purposes.\n\n-- Also, the use of electronic devices to monitor or record conversations, activities, sound, or electronic impulses. (Army FM 2-22.2, Counterintelligence, Oct 2009) -- Also, (ELSUR) under Title III and FISA is the non-consensual electronic collection of information\n(usually communications) under circumstances in which the parties have a reasonable expectation of privacy and court orders or warrants are required. (FBI Domestic Investigations and Operations Guide, 15 Oct 2011)\nElectronic Tracking Device.  Direction finder including electronic tracking devices, such as, radio frequency beacons and transmitters, vehicle locator units, and the various devices that use a Global Positioning System [GPS] or other satellite system for monitoring non-communication activity. (FBI Domestic Investigations and Operations Guide, 16 Dec 2008) Electronic Warfare (EW).  Military action involving the use of electromagnetic and directed energy to control the electromagnetic spectrum or to attack the enemy. Electronic warfare consists of three divisions: electronic attack, electronic protection, and electronic warfare support. (JP 1-02 and JP 3-13.1, Electronic Warfare, 25 Jan 2007) Electronics Security.  The protection resulting from all measures designed to deny unauthorized persons information of value that might be derived from their interception and study of noncommunications electromagnetic radiations, e.g., radar. (JP 1-02 and JP 3-13.1, Electronic Warfare, 25 Jan 2007) Elements of Espionage.  The fundamentals components in which an intelligence service conducts espionage... some or all of the following elements are present in every espionage operation: 1) contact & communication; 2) collection; 3) motive / reward; 4 travel; and 5) tradecraft. (Espionage 101: Elements of Espionage, US Army AFCITC Course Handout, 3 Dec 1996, authored by CW4 Constance Y. Huff, USA) Also see Espionage; Espionage Act; Espionage Against the United States.\n\n    Espionage *investigative elements* are different than the *prosecutorial elements* (which are\naddressed in Title 18 USC,  792-798 and Article 106, UCMJ).\n Elicitation.  In intelligence usage, the acquisition of information from a person or group in a manner that does not disclose the intent of the interview or conversation. (JP 2-0, Joint Intelligence, 22 Oct 2013) Also see educing information; debriefing; interrogation; *interview.*\n-- Also, engaging with a source in such a manner that he or she reveals information without being aware of giving away anything of value. (Educing Information - Interrogation: Science and Art, Dec 2006)\n-- Also, the strategic use of conversation to extract information from people without giving them the feeling they are being interrogated. (FBI) -- Also, the use of generalized questions to ascertain someone's knowledge on a particular topic.\n\n(Army FM 2-22.2, Counterintelligence, Oct 2009\n\n\nA casual conversation with a hidden agenda The subtle extraction of information during an apparently \"normal\" and \"innocent\" conversation.\nA supplemental technique used during interviews, debriefings and interrogations.\n_____________________\n\n\n\n    Elicitation is the practice of obtaining information about a topic from conversations, preferably\nwithout the source knowing what is happening.\n\n      -- Robert M. Clark, *Intelligence Analysis: A Target-Centric Approach* (2004), p. 72\n_____________________\n\n    Elicitation, that is to say, like a lot of other tradecraft techniques, has its Scylla and Charybdis. On\none hand, the cautious seeker risks concealing his purpose in such general questions or remarks that he evokes nothing of value. On the other hand, if the questions are excessively direct, the contact may quickly suspect he is being interrogated for intelligence purposes and bring the interview to an abrupt and unpleasant end.\n\n       -- George G. Bull, \"The Elicitation Interview,\" *Studies in Intelligence*, vol. 14 no. 2 (Fall 1970), pp. 115-22. Originally classified \"Secret\" [declassified].\n_____________________\n\n    Elicitation is a technique used to discreetly gather information. It is a conversation with a specific\npurpose: collect information that is not readily available and do so without raising suspicion that specific facts are being sought. It is usually non-threatening, easy to disguise, deniable, and effective. The conversation can be in person, over the phone, or in writing. Conducted by a skilled collector, elicitation will appear to be normal social or professional conversation. A person may never realize she was the target of elicitation or that she provided meaningful information.\n\n        -- *Elicitation Techniques*, FBI (accessed 20 Aug 2012) See pdf available at:  <http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/investigate/counterintelligence/elicitation-brochure>\n\nEmanation Security.  Unintentional signals that, if intercepted and analyzed, would disclose the information transmitted, received, handled, or otherwise processed by information systems. Synonymous with Transient Electromagnetic Pulse Emanation Standard (TEMPEST). (DSS Glossary) Also see *TEMPEST.* Emerging Warning Concerns. Newly identified issues relevant to national security of sufficient significance to warrant temporary attention by the Defense Intelligence Enterprise. An emerging warning issue may be redefined as an enduring warning issue based on national security priorities and operational plans. (DoDD 3115.16, The Defense Warning Network,5 Dec 2013) Emigre.  A person who lawfully departed his or her country with the intention of resettlement elsewhere. (Defense HUMINT Enterprise Manual 3301.002, Vol II Collection Operations, 23 Nov 2010)\n-- Also, a person who departs from his country for any lawful reason with the intention of permanently resettling elsewhere. (ICS Glossary) Emission Security.  The component of communications security that results from all measures taken to deny unauthorized persons information of value that might be derived from intercept and analysis of compromising emanations from cryptoequipment and telecommunications systems. (JP 1-02 and JP 6-0, Joint Communications, 10 Jun 2010).  Also see also *communications security*.\n\nEquipment Exploitation Operations.  Intelligence exploitation operations of all types foreign and nonforeign material which may have military application or answer a collection requirement. This material includes material found on a detainee or on the battlefield (Captured Enemy Equipment (CEE)), or purchased through either open or clandestine means (Foreign Military Acquisition). (DHE-M 3301.002, Vol II Collection Operations, 23 Nov 2010) Enabling Activities.  [In CI and HUMINT usage] Any activity that supports Defense CI and HUMINT\noperations, functions, and missions, including source validation, collection management, collection requirements management, cover, cover support, information systems, production management, source communications, targeting, and training. (DoDI O-5100.93, Defense CI & HUMINT Center, 13 Aug 2010)\n\n\nEncipher.  To convert plain text into unintelligible form by means of a cipher system. (JP 1-02)\n-- Also, convert plain text to cipher text by means of a cryptographic system. (CNSSI No. 4009, National Information Assurance Glossary, 26 April 2010) Encode.  Convert plain text to cipher text by means of a code. (CNSSI No. 4009, National Information Assurance Glossary, 26 April 2010) Encrypt.  Generic term encompassing encipher and encode. (CNSSI No. 4009, National Information Assurance Glossary, 26 April 2010) Encryption.  The process of changing plaintext into ciphertext for the purpose of security or privacy. (CNSSI No. 4009, National Information Assurance Glossary, 26 April 2010) End State.  Set of required conditions that defines achievement of the commander's objectives. (JP 1-02) Enduring Warning Issue. A significant national security issue, usually linked to an operation plan or concept plan, that is well defined and are longstanding potential threats to the interests of the U.S. and its allies. (DoDD 3115.16, The Defense Warning Network,5 Dec 2013) Enemy Combatant (EC).  A person engaged in hostilities against the United States or its coalition partners during an armed conflict. (DoDD 2310.01E and  JP 3-56, Detainee Operations, 6 Feb 2008) Esoteric Communications.  Public statements whose surface meaning (manifest content) does not reveal the real purpose, meaning, or significance (latent content) of the author. (Army Techniques Publication 2-22.9, Open-Source Intelligence, 10 Jul 2012) Espionage.  Intelligence activity directed towards the acquisition of information through clandestine means. (NSCID 5 and DCID 5/1)  Also see Elements of Espionage; Espionage Act; Espionage Against the United States.\n\n   \"The object of secret intelligence activity [espionage] is to obtain by secret means\ninformation  which cannot otherwise be secured and which is not elsewhere available.\"\n\n        -- Kermit Roosevelt, *War Report of the OSS* (1976)\n\n   \"In espionage, two factors are constant. Intelligence officers recruit foreign nationals who can\nprovide classified information on their governments' plans and intentions, and the\ncounterintelligence services of those countries try to thwart these operations.\"\n\n       -- Brian P. Fairchild (CIA Case Officer for 20 years), \"Human Intelligence, Operational Security and the\n           CIA's Directorate of Operations.\" Statement before the Joint Economic Committee, United States\n           Congress 20 May 1998\n\n-- Also, 1) Intelligence activity directed toward the acquisition [of] information through clandestine means and proscribed by the laws of the country against which it is committed; 2) Overt, cover, or clandestine activity designed to obtain information relating to the national defense with an intent or reason to believe that it will be used to the injury of the United States or to the advantage of a foreign nation.\n(CI Community Lexicon)\n-- Also, Clandestine intelligence activity. This term is often interchanged with \"clandestine collection.\"\n(Senate Report 94-755, Book I - Glossary, 26 Apr 1976)\n\n-- Also, 1) The art of spying; 2) The act of seeking information for one government that the other government wishes to keep secret. (*TOP SECRET: The Dictionary of Espionage and Intelligence*, 2005)\n\n\n    Espionage is the clandestine collection of information by people either in a position of trust for the\ntargeted entity, or with access to people with such access. The process of recruiting such individuals and supporting their operations is the HUMINT discipline of *agent handling*.\n\n## _____________________\n\n\n  \"Espionagethe use of spies or secret agents to steal information from enemies, adversaries, or competitorsis one of the oldest forms of intelligence gathering.\"\n\n            -- Arthur S. Hulnick, \"Espionage: Does It Have a Future in the 21st Century?\"\n               *The Brown Journal of World Affairs;* XI: 1 (2004)\n\n## _____________________\n\n\n   \"Espionage is distinguished from other forms of intelligence gathering by its clandestinity\nand its 'illegal means' of acquisition.\"\n\n          -- Frederick P. Hitz, Former Inspector General of the CIA (1990-1998)\n  _____________________\n\n   \"Espionage is the theft of information in contravention of another nation's laws by a person known\nas an 'agent.' This act of theft may be direct, as in the secret copying of a classified document, or\nthe indirect, as in hiding of an eavesdropping device, or merely oral, but is done by an agent and it breaks either a foreign law or the internal regulation of an alien organization. Espionage is not the confidential purchase of information where mere embarrassment, rather than illegality, is risked. It is not the flattery, bribery, or coercion of a person to influence his actions within legal limits. It is not 'a scuttling, violence-prone business. . .  incompatible with democracy.' But rather a silent, surreptitious, violence-shunning business serving the nation.\"\n         -- William R. Johnson, \"Clandestinity and Current Intelligence,\" *Studies in Intelligence*, vol. 20, no. 3\n             (Fall 1976), pp. 15-69. Originally classified \"Secret / No Foreign Dissem\" [declassified].\n\n\n## Espionage, Since It Is Based On Human Vulnerability, Can Penetrate Even The Most Heavily Guarded Repositories Of National Secrets.\n\n -- Also, [*Crime of Espionage*] the act of obtaining, delivering, transmitting, communicating, or receiving information about the national defense with an intent, or reason to believe, that the information may be used to the injury of the United States or to the advantage of any foreign nation. (JP 1-02 and JP 2-01.2, CI & HUMINT in Joint Operations, 16 Mar 2011 w/ chg 1 dated 26 Aug 2011)\n\n    Espionage is a national security crime, specifically a violation of Title 18 USC,  792-798 and\nArticle 106, Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ).\n\n    See article \"Espionage: The American Judicial Response. An in Depth Analysis of the Espionage\nLaws and Related Statues\" by Harold W. Bank (45 pages).\n    Copy at <http://www.wcl.american.edu/journal/lawrev/21/bank.pdf.>  (accessed 31 Oct 2012)\n______________________\n\n \"The man engaged in espionage on behalf of his own country is committing a patriotic act.\nThe man who gives away or sells his own country's secrets is committing treason.\"\n\n-- Allen W. Dulles, *The Craft of Intelligence* (2006), p. 179\n\n______________________\n\n\"Espionage is a crime almost devoid of evidence...\"\n\n-- Peter Wright (Former Asst Director MI5), *Spycatcher* (1987)\n______________________\n\n   \"The act of espionage is unlike any other criminal act in that it leaves no traces. Indeed,  unless the\nagent is caught, the government office that has been penetrated is usually unaware that any crime has taken place. The actual detection of espionage is a very specialized task....\"\n\n-- Miles Copeland, *Without Cloak or Dagger* (1974), p. 160\n_____________________\n\n   \"...[E]spionage in it's own way is a very unique crime:  There are no smoking guns, no battered\nvictims, rarely do we have any forensic evidence, no bait money, no exploding dye packs, no bank surveillance films.  Espionage, in many cases, leaves no footprints.\"\n\n-- William H. Webster, Director FBI (12/10/85)\n______________________\n\n   \"Because it leaves no footprints, espionage is one of the more difficult crimes to uncover. Yet the\nbusiness of catching spies affects profoundly the American way of life. If done well, it protects our freedoms by keeping us strong. If done poorly, it can impinge on our liberties just as surely as a takeover by a foreign power.\"\n-- Ronald Kessler, *Spy vs. Spy* (1988), p. 8\n______________________\n\n    \"... the essence of espionage, even the most innocuous sort, is betrayal of trust. One\n     might almost  say that is the defining element, because without it, there is no espionage.\"\n\n-- Aldrich Ames, CIA Traitor & Convicted Spy\nas quoted in as quoted in *Confessions of a Spy* by Pete Earley\n______________________\n\n   \"Espionage is a crime of double-edged secrecy. Spies, well experienced in clandestine procedures\nand operating not as individuals but as agents of a nation, are hard to detect by traditional police work. And the loot that they seek is not the kind of evidence that can be labeled Exhibit A in the courtroom. ...And there is still another kind of secret that a trail reveals: the failings of the secretholder's own security safeguards\"\n\n-- Thomas B. Allen and Norman Polmar, *Merchants of Treason: America's Secret for Sale* (1988), p. 163\n______________________\n\n\"No matter how overwhelming the evidence can be, prosecuting espionage cases is never easy.\"\n\n-- John L. Martin, Retired Chief Counterespionage Section, US Department of Justice Espionage Act.  The Espionage Act of 1917 (18 USC  792 et seq.) is a U.S. federal law passed in June 1917, shortly after the U.S. entry into World War I. It prohibited any attempt to interfere with military operations, to support U.S. enemies during wartime, to promote insubordination in the military, or to interfere with military recruitment. The law was further strengthen by the Espionage and Sabotage Act of 1954, which authorized the death penalty or life imprisonment for espionage or sabotage in peacetime as well as during wartime. The Act requires agents of foreign governments to register with the U.S. Government. It also suspended the statue of limitations for treason.  In 1958, the scope of the act was broaden to cover Americans engaged in espionage against the U.S. while overseas.  Also see *espionage.*\n\n    Statues now governing espionage date from the first effort to protect the governments' secrets in\nthe Defense Secrets Act of 1911. The Espionage Act of 1917 adopted the approach take in 1911, incorporating many of its key phrases. Most of the 1917 act in turn has been incorporated without many revisions into 18 U.S. Code 793, the core statute for dealing with espionage. The last revisions in wording made to section 793 were in 1950 with the Internal Security Act; also in that act 18 U.S. Code 794 was added.\n\n      -- PERSEREC Technical Report 08-05, *Changes in Espionage by Americans: 1947-2007*, March 2008.\n___________________________\n\n    The Federal Espionage Laws codified in Title 18 Section 793 and 794 US Code along with other\nrelated crimes date back to the terrorist attack of 1916 on Black Tom Island carried out by the German IIIb intelligence service. This event had such an impact on the nation that proposals were made to court martial civilians since there were no viable laws to deal with espionage at the time.\n\n    The result was the 1917 Espionage Law of which codified a very restricted definition of the crime\nof Espionage. As you know espionage has four elements:\n        - Unauthorized transmittal - of national defense information - to a foreign power or agent - with the intent to harm the US or aid that foreign power.\n\n      As a result of a German espionage case in the early 1940s, that was appealed, and precedence\nwas established that the national defense security information transmitted in an espionage case had to be protected information. Accordingly, it is essential to prove in an espionage prosecution that the information affected the military defense of the United States and was protected information not in the public domain at the time it was transmitted.\n_______________________________\n\n    Prominent among the statutory offenses enacted by Congress and relating to matters of national\nsecurity are the espionage laws found in title 18, sections 791 through 798.' The activities covered therein by these sections go far beyond those limited to any dictionary definition or popular concept of the term \"espionage.\"\n\n    The obtaining of national defense information for the benefit or use of foreign nations or its\nsubsequent transmittal is the primary target of the espionage laws. However, equally as criminal is the conspiracy and attempt to do any of the above as well as the receiving or obtaining of national defense information with reason to believe that such information was to be used in violation of the espionage laws. In addition, the willful refusal to turn over national defense information upon proper demand by lawful authority and the loss or compromise of national defense information through gross negligence is also included in the statutory proscription. The penalties prescribed for violation of the espionage laws are severe.\n\n       -- Commission on Government Security - 1957, p. 617\n Espionage Indicators.  Warning signs that an insider may be working for or is susceptible to control by a Foreign Intelligence Entity (FIE).  These warning signs are the result of an insider's actions, activities, and behaviors that may be indicative of potential espionage-related activity. Also see *indicator*.\n\n-- Also, Potential Espionage Indicators: Activities, behavior or circumstances that may, unless satisfactorily explained, be indicative of potential espionage activity by an individual who may be acting as a witting espionage agent or spy. (DSS CI Report, Potential Espionage Indicators in Personnel Security Investigations, undated, circa early 2000)\n\n   Mere exhibition of an espionage indicator does not necessarily indicate spying or a Foreign\nIntelligence Entity (FIE) connection; individuals may exhibit PEI for a variety of legitimate reasons. Presence of PEI, especially multiple PEI, warrants further CI action.\n\n    In CI usage, *Indicators are different from anomalies.*  Espionage indicators are manifested in an\ninsider's actions, activities, and behaviors whereas anomalies surface as a result of FIE actions and activities [see *anomalies, anomalous activity, anomaly*].\n        -- Indicator:  an individual's action, activity or behavior -- Anomaly:  foreign power activity or knowledge\n\n    Potential Espionage Indicators alone do not presuppose that an individual is necessarily working\non behalf of a FIE... additional CI follow-up is required.\n\n    DoD Directive 5240.06, *Counterintelligence Awareness and Reporting*, 17 May 2011, lists\nreportable contacts , activities, indicators, and behaviors associated with foreign intelligence activities (FIEs), a term that includes international terrorists; for specifics see Tables 1-3 at Enclosure 4.\n Essential Elements of Information (EEI).  The most critical information requirements regarding the adversary and the environment needed by the commander by a particular time to relate with other available information and intelligence in order to assist in reaching a logical decision. (JP 2-0, Joint Intelligence, 22 Oct 2013) Essential Elements of Friendly Information (EEFI).  Key questions likely to be asked by adversary officials and intelligence systems about specific friendly intentions, capabilities, and activities, so they can obtain answers critical to their operational effectiveness. (Previously in JP 2-01, Joint and National Intelligence Support to Military Operations)\nEssential Task.  A specified or implied task that an organization must perform to accomplish the mission that is typically included in the mission statement. (JP 5-0, Joint Operation Planning, 11 Aug 2011)\nAlso see *implied task; specified task*. Estimative Intelligence.  Intelligence that identifies, describes, and forecasts adversary capabilities and the implications for planning and executing military operations. (JP 1-02 and JP 2-0, Joint Intelligence,\n22 Oct 2013) Evaluation.  In intelligence usage, appraisal of an item of information in terms of credibility, reliability, pertinence, and accuracy. (JP 1-02) Evaluation and Feedback.  In intelligence usage, continuous assessment of intelligence operations throughout the intelligence process to ensure that the commander's intelligence requirements are being met. (JP 2-01, Joint and National Intelligence Support to Military Operations, 5 Jan 2012) Evidence.  Testimony, writings, material object, or other things presented to the senses that are offered to prove the existence or nonexistence of a fact.\n\n## \"No Matter How Overwhelming The Evidence Can Be, Prosecuting Espionage Cases Is Never Easy.\"\n\n\n-- John L. Martin, Retired Chief of Internal Security at the Department of Justice\n\n\n    In legal proceedings there are several different types: 1) in terms of their relationship to the crime,\nthey are known as \"direct\" or \"circumstantial,\" and 2) in terms of their relationship to the world at\nlarge, they are known as \"testimonial\" or \"physical.\"\n\n     TESTIMONIAL: statements or the spoken word from the victim(s) or witness(es).\n    PHYSICAL: includes such things as hairs, fibers, latent fingerprints, and biological material.\nPhysical evidence is objective and when documented, collected, and preserved properly may be the only definitive way to reliably place or link someone to a crime scene. This is why Physical evidence is known as the \"silent witness.\"\n\n\n## Physical Evidence Has The Potential To Play A Critical Role In The Overall Investigation And Resolution Of A Suspected Criminal Act.\n\n\n-- US Department of Justice,\nCrime Scene Investigation: A Guide for Law Enforcement, January 2000\n\n-- Also, anything that helps to ascertain the truth of a matter, or gives proof of a fact. Evidence may\nbe physical or testimonial. (AR 195-5, Evidence Procedures, 25 Jun 2007) -- Also, the legal data that conclusions or judgments may be based on. It is the documentary or verbal statements and material objects admissible as testimony in a court of law.  Evidence is the means by which any alleged matter of fact is proven or disproved. Evidence includes all matters, except comment or argument, legally submitted to a court. Evidence is the source from which a court-martial or jury must form its conclusions as to the guilt or innocence of an accused. *Testimonial evidence*, e.g., sworn statements of eyewitness accounts and admissions of guilt, is obtained through communication with people.  *Physical evidence*, e.g., identified weapons and fingerprints, is obtained by searching crime scenes, tracing leads, and developing technical data.  Investigators must always be evidence conscious.\n\nBoth physical and testimonial evidence are vital to the successful prosecution of an investigation. (Army FM 3-19.13, Law Enforcement Investigations, Jan 2005)\n\n   Evidence is the source from which a court-martial or jury must form its conclusions as to the guilt or\ninnocence of an accused.  Evidence is the means by which any alleged matter of fact is proven or disproved.  Evidence includes all matters, except comment or argument, legally submitted to a court.\n       -- Army FM 3-19.13, *Law Enforcement Investigations*, Jan 2005, p. 1-8\n\n-- Also, evidence in its broadest sense, refers to anything that is used to determine or demonstrate the truth of an assertion; the term has specialized meanings when used with respect to specific fields, such as criminal investigations and legal discourse.  ...Legal evidence concerns the tight rules governing the presentation of facts that tend to prove or disprove the point at issue.  ...Testimony (which tells) and exhibits (which show) are the two main categories of evidence presented at a trial or hearing. (Wikipedia;\naccessed 1 Aug 2007)\n\n    The law of evidence governs the use of testimony (e.g., oral or written statements, such as an\naffidavit) and exhibits (e.g., physical objects) or other documentary material which is admissible (i.e., allowed to be considered by the trier of fact, such as a jury) in a judicial or administrative proceeding (e.g., a court of law).  Evidence must be acquired/received, processed, safeguarded and disposed of properly.\n\n    Military Rules of Evidence are Part III of the *Manual for Courts-Martial*; Appendix 22 of the MCM is\nAnalysis of the Military Rules of Evidence.\n\n    Also see \"Evidence\" in Chapter 8 of Army FM 2-22.2, *Counterintelligence*, October 2009, pp. 8-5\nthrough 8-8.\n____________________\n\n\"Espionage is a crime **almost** devoid of evidence...\"\n\n-- Peter Wright, *Spycatcher* (1987)\n____________________\n\n\"While espionage may be **ALMOST** devoid of evidence, it is **NOT VOID** of evidence.\"\n\n-- *ESPIONAGE 101: Elements of Espionage* by CW4 Connie Huff (USA), 3 Dec 1996 Evidence Identifiers.  Tape, labels, containers, and string tags used to identify the evidence, the person collecting the evidence, the date the evidence was gathered, basic criminal offense information, and a brief description of the pertinent evidence. (Crime Scene Investigation: A Guide for Law Enforcement, Sep 2013) Execute Order (EXORD).  1) An order issued by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, by the authority and at the direction of the Secretary of the Defense, to implement a decision by the President or SECDEF to initiate military operations; 2) An order to initiate military operations as directed. (JP 1-02 and JP 5-0, Joint Operation Planning, 11 Aug 2011) Execution Planning.  The Adaptive Planning and Execution System translation of an approved course of action into an executable plan of action through the preparation of a complete operation plan or operation order. (JP 5-0, Joint Operation Planning, 11 Aug 2011)\n\nExecutive Agent (EA) [within DoD].  A term used to indicate a delegation of authority by the Secretary of Defense or Deputy Secretary of Defense to a subordinate to act on behalf of the Secretary of Defense.\n\n(JP 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States, 25 Mar 2013) Exfiltration.  The removal of personnel or units from areas under enemy control by stealth, deception, surprise, or clandestine means. (JP 1-02)\n\n\n-- Also, a clandestine rescue operation designed to get a defector, refugee, or operative and his or her family out of harm's way. (CI Centre Glossary)\n\n-- Also, a clandestine operation undertaken to remove an individual from a denied area. (Historical Dictionary of Cold War Counterintelligence, 2007) -- Also, the surreptitious extraction of operatives in the field. (*Encyclopedia of the CIA*, 2003)\n\n     -- Also, an operation to get an individual secretly and illegally [in violation of a foreign country's law] out of a hostile area. (James M. Olson, *Fair Play: The Moral Dilemmas of Spying*, 2006)\n\n    Examples include the escapes of KGB officer Oleg Gordievsky from the Soviet Union in 1985,\norchestrated by MI6, and KGB officer Victor Sheymov, his wife, and daughter from the Soviet Union\nin 1980, carried out by the CIA.\n Expanded-scope Screening [Polygraph]. (ESS)  An examination that includes the questions from a CSP polygraph and questions related to falsification of security forms, involvement with illegal drugs, and criminal activity. Previously known as full-scope polygraph. (DoDI 5210.91, PCA Procedures, 12 Aug 2010 with change 1 dated 15 Oct 2013)\nExploitation.  The process of obtaining information from any source and taking advantage of it. (DoDD\n5205.02E, DoD OPSEC Program, 20 Jun 2012)\n-- Also, the process of obtaining intelligence information from any source and taking advantage of  it for intelligence purposes.  (ODNI, U.S. National Intelligence - An Overview 2011) Export Enforcement Coordination Center (E2C2).  The primary forum within the federal government for executive departments and agencies to coordinate and enhance their export control enforcement efforts. The Center maximizes information sharing, consistent with national security and applicable laws. This helps partner agencies detect, prevent, disrupt, investigate and prosecute violations of U.S. export control laws. (www.ice.gov)\n\n    Executive Order 13558 created the Export Enforcement Coordination Center.  E2C2 provides a\nvenue through which to deconflict technology transfer investigations,\n\n    For additional information see <http://www.ice.gov/export-enforcement-coordination-center/>\n Extremist Activity.  As used in this regulation, an activity that involves the use of unlawful violence or the threat of unlawful violence directed against the Army, DOD, or the United States based on political, ideological, or religious tenets, principals, or beliefs. (AR 381-12, Threat Awareness and Reporting Program, 4 Oct 2010) Eyewash.  [Tradecraft jargon] False entries made in files, usually to protect the security of a source, often indicating that a particular target has rejected a pitch, when in fact the offer was accepted. (Historical Dictionary of Cold War Counterintelligence, 2007)\n\nF ========================================== Fabricator.  An individual or group who, usually without genuine resources, invents or inflates information for personal or political gain or political purposes. (JP 1-02 and JP 2-01.2, CI & HUMINT in Joint Operations, 16 Mar 2011 w/ chg 1 dated 26 Aug 2011)\n-- Also, an agent who furnishes false information for financial gain. (A Spy's Journey) False Flag.  Development or execution of any imitative or operation under false national sponsorship or credentials (aka \"false colors\").  The Russian term is foreign flag. (CIA in D&D Lexicon, 1 May 2002) Also see *false-flag approach* and *false-flag recruitment*\n-- Also, occurs when an individual is recruited believing he or she is cooperating with an intelligence service of a specific country. In actuality, he or she has been deceived and is cooperating with an intelligence service of another country. (AFOSI Manual 71-119, CI Investigations, 27 Oct 2009)\n-- Also, the technique for misrepresenting an individual's country of origin is a risky but wellestablished tactic adopted by all counterintelligence agencies in the absence of other, safer alternatives. Invariably, the strategy is one of last resort when a suspect is known to have engaged in espionage, but is thought to be currently inactive. The offer to be reengaged as a spy may be accepted and result in sufficient evidence to secure a conviction, or may prompt an incriminating action. (Historical Dictionary of Cold War Counterintelligence, 2007)\n-- Also, approach by a hostile intelligence officer who misrepresents himself or herself as a citizen\nof a friendly country or organization.  The person who is approached may give up sensitive information believing that it is going to an ally, not a hostile power. (Spy Book) -- Also, the use of a third country's nationality to effect the recruitment of an agent so they do not know an activity's true country of origin. (A Spy's Journey) False-Flag Approach.  An intelligence officer or agent who represents themselves as a person of another nationality in order to foster trust and lessen suspicion about the contact. (AR 381-12, Threat Awareness and Reporting Program, 4 Oct 2010)  Also see *false flag; false-flag recruitment*. False-Flag Recruitment.  A situation that occurs when an individual is recruited believing that he/she is cooperating with an intelligence eservice of a specific country, when in actually he/she has been deceived and is cooperating with an intelligence service of another country. (CI Community Lexicon)   Also see false-flag; *false-flag approach*.\n\n   \"...'false flag' recruitmentwhen an intelligence service recruits a target while pretending to\nrepresent another nationa common piece of tradecraft. When you finally recruit the target, he believes he is providing information to some other nation. The Israelis have often used this technique by impersonating CIA officers when trying to recruit Arabs.\"\n\n        -- Duane R. Clarridge, *A Spy For All Seasons: My Life in the CIA* (1997), p. 97\n\n-- Also, an individual recruited believing he/she is cooperating with an intelligence service of a specific country when, in reality, the individual has been deceived and is working on behalf of an intelligence service of another country. (ICS Glossary & AR 381-47, OFCO, 17 Mar 2006) -- Also, recruitment of an individual under the guise of working for one entity when actually working for another entity. (HDI Lexicon, April 2008)\n\n    Can also be used as a CI investigative technique to determine whether a suspected spy intends to\nor has committed espionage or other national security crimes against the United States; in this type of false flag a U.S. CI or law enforcement officer poses as an intelligence operative of a foreign power in an undercover operation.  The FBI has successfully used this type of false flag operation in several espionage cases, e.g., see United States of America v. Stewart Davis Nozette (U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia, case number: 09-0565M)\n Faraday Bag.  Specialty collection bags for electronic parts with lining to protect the contents from electromagnetic forces. (Crime Scene Investigation: A Guide for Law Enforcement, Sep 2013) FIE.  See *Foreign Intelligence Entity*.\n\nFISS. See *Foreign Intelligence and Security Service*. Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI).  The primary investigative arm of the US Department of Justice (DoJ) with jurisdiction over violations of more than 200 categories of federal law and also a statutory member of the US Intelligence Community.  The FBI's mission is to protect and defend the United States against terrorist and foreign intelligence threats, to uphold and enforce the criminal laws of the United States, and to provide leadership and criminal justice services to federal, state, municipal, and international agencies and partners. (www.fbi.gov)\n\n   \"The FBI is unique in having a dual responsibilityto prevent harm to national security as a\nmember of the U.S. Intelligence Community and to enforce federal laws as part of the Department of Justice. The Bureau reports to both the Attorney General and the Director of National Intelligence.\"\n\n        -- FBI, Today's FBI - Facts and Figures 2010-2011\n___________________\n\n    The FBI has authority to investigate threats to the national security pursuant to Presidential\nExecutive Orders, Attorney General authorities, and various statutory sources.  Per EO 12333 (US Intelligence Activities) the FBI coordinates the clandestine collection of foreign intelligence collected through human sources or through human-enabled means and counterintelligence activities inside the United States.\n___________________\n\n   \"We always thought of the FBI highly. We viewed it, this organization, as a formidable one. In the\nintelligence business, it's better to overestimate than underestimate, we never just thought of the\nFBI as incompetent or weak organization. It was an adversary, a formidable adversary, truly.\"\n\n       -- Oleg Kalugin, Retired KGB General (served in Washington DC and Former Chief of Line KR)\n\nFederal Grand Jury (FGJ). An independent panel charged with determining whether there is probable cause to believe one or more persons committed a particular federal offense. If the FGJ believes probable cause exists, it will vote a \"true bill\" and the person will be indicted. An indictment is the most typical way a person is charged with a felony in federal court.  (FBI Domestic Investigations and Operations Guide, 15 Oct 2011) Federal Polygraph Examiner.  Military, civilian, or contractor personnel authorized to conduct polygraph examinations on behalf of a federal agency. (DoD 5210.48, Polygraph and Credibility Assessment Program, 25 Jan 2007 with change 2 dated 15 Nov 2013)\n\n\nFederally Funded Research and Development Center (FFRDC).  Research and development-performing organizations that are exclusively to substantially financed by the Federal Government and are supported by the Federal Government either to meet a particular research and development objective or, in some instances, to provide major facilities at either universities or corporate or contractor locations for applied research to development purpose. (DoDI O-5240.24, CI Activities Supporting RDA, 8 Jun 2011 with change 1 dated 15 Oct 2013) Feed Material. Information that is usually true but unimportant given to an individual to pass to another intelligence service to maintain or enhance his value to that service. Sometimes called build-up material. (FBI FCI Terms) Feedback.  Information or intelligence provided to deception planners as to the progress of a deception operation and, ultimately, its success or failure. (CIA in D&D Lexicon, 1 May 2002) Fifth Columnist.  A subversive who acts out of secret sympathy for an enemy of his or her own country.\n\n(*Encyclopedia of the CIA*, 2003)\n-- Also, people who clandestinely undermine a larger group such as a nation from within.  A fifth column can be a group of secret sympathizers of an enemy that are involved in sabotage within military defense lines, or a country's borders. A key tactic of the fifth column is the secret introduction of supporters into the whole fabric of the entity under attack. (Wikipedia; accessed 9 August 2012)\n\n    The term was coined in 1936, during the Spanish Civil War. It was said then that the Spanish\nrebels had four columns of troops marching on the city of Madridand an additional \"fifth column\" of sympathizers within the city itself. Ready to take up arms at a moments' notice.\n\n        -- Encyclopedia of the CIA (2003)\n______________________________ In the United States at the end of the 1930s, as involvement in the European war seemed ever\nmore likely, those who feared the possibility of betrayal from within used the newly coined term \"fifth column\" as a shorthand for sedition and disloyalty.\n\n        -- Wikipedia; accessed 9 August 2012\n______________________________\n\n    The fifth column is \"that portion of our population which is ready to give assistance or\nencouragement in any form to invading or opposing ideologies.\"\n\n        -- Attorney General Robert H. Jackson, 1940 (later Associate Justice of the United States Supreme Court, 19411954)\n  ______________________________\n\nThe Communist Party of the United States is a fifth column if there ever was one.\n\n\n-- J. Edgar Hoover, Director Federal Bureau of Investigation Testimony before Committee on Un-American Activities,\n                                            U. S. House of Representatives, circa 1948 Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN).  An element of the Department of Treasury with the mission to safeguard the financial system from the abuses of financial crime, including terrorist financing, money laundering and other illicit activity.  FinCEN administers the Bank Secrecy Act; supports law enforcement, intelligence, and regulatory agencies through sharing and analysis of financial intelligence;\nbuilds global cooperation with counterpart financial intelligence units; and networks people, ideas, and information. (website: <http://www.fincen.gov>)\n\n\n    FinCEN exercises regulatory functions primarily under the Currency and Financial Transactions\nReporting Act of 1970, as amended by Title III of the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001 and other legislation, which legislative framework is commonly referred to as the \"Bank Secrecy Act\" (BSA).\n\n    The BSA is the nation's first and most comprehensive Federal anti-money laundering and counterterrorism financing (AML/CFT) statute. In brief, the BSA authorizes the Secretary of the Treasury to issue regulations requiring banks and other financial institutions to take a number of precautions against financial crime, including the establishment of AML programs and the filing of reports that have been determined to have a high degree of usefulness in criminal, tax, and regulatory\ninvestigations and proceedings, and certain intelligence and counter-terrorism matters.\n Financial Record.  An original, its copy, or information known to have been derived from the original record held by a financial institution that pertains to a customer's relationship with the financial institution. (DoDI 5400.15, Guidance on Obtaining Information from Financial Institutions, 2 Dec 2004 w/ chg 3 Jul 2007) Finding.  A written legal determination made by the President of the United States authorizing a particular covert action important to US national security, in compliance with the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended by the 1971 Hughes-Ryan Amendment. (National HUMINT Glossary)  Also see *covert action*.\n\n   The President shall approve all covert action Findings in writing.  Under Section 662 of the Foreign\nAssistance Act of 1961, as amended, all covert actions undertaken... must be authorized by a\nPresidential Finding that each such operation is important to US national security.\n\n       -- National Security Decision Directive Number 159, 18 Jan 1985 (originally TS-Sensitive, declassified)\n\n    According to the Congressional Research Service, the reference to a **\"presidential finding\"** took\non its current popular meaning when Congress adopted the Hughes-Ryan amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act in 1974.  Section 662 of the statute prohibits the expenditure of appropriated funds by or on behalf of the CIA for covert actions \"unless and until the President finds that each such operation is important to the national security of the United States and reports, in a timely fashion, a description and scope of such operation to the appropriate committees of Congress.\"\n\n    The requirements of this provision subsequently went through a series of transformations, the\nvestiges of which were recently codified in the Intelligence Authorization Act, FY1991, which still requires a written presidential finding satisfying certain conditions set forth in the statute for covert actions to occur.  Such presidential findings, which are classified, are to be \"reported to the\nintelligence committees as soon as possible\" after being approved \"and before the initiation of the\ncovert action authorized by the finding.\"  These findings are not published in the Federal Register\nor reproduced in CFR Title 3 compilations.\n Firewall.  A hardware/software capability that limits access between networks and/or systems in accordance with a specific security policy. . (CNSSI No. 4009, National Information Assurance Glossary, 26 April 2010) FIVE EYES (FVEY).  Australia, Canada, New Zealand, United Kingdom and the United States. (CAPCO\nand DoDI C-5240.08, CI Security Classification Guide, 28 Nov 2011)\nFive Ws (also known as the Five Ws and one H).  The formula for getting the \"full\" story on something. The maxim of the Five Ws (and one H) is that in order for a report to be considered complete it must answer a checklist of six questions, each of which comprises an interrogative word:  Who, What, When, Where, Why, and How? (Wikipedia; accessed 20 Feb 2009)\nFlag Officer.   A term applied to an officer holding the rank of general, lieutenant general, major general, or brigadier general in the US Army, Air Force or Marine Corps or admiral, vice admiral, or rear admiral\nin the US Navy or Coast Guard. (JP 1-02) Flaps and Seals.  [Intelligence parlance for] the clandestine opening, reading, and resealing of either envelopes or packages without the recipient's knowledge. (Spycraft)\n\n\nFor or On Behalf of a Foreign Power.  The determination that activities are for or on behalf of a foreign power shall be based on consideration of the extent to which the foreign power is involved in (a) control or policy direction; (b) financial or material support; or (c) leadership, assignments, or discipline. (AFOSI Manual 71-119, CI Investigations, 27 Oct 2009) Force Multiplier.  A capability that, when added to and employed by a combat force, significantly increases the combat potential of that force and thus enhances the probability of successful mission accomplishment. (JP 1-02 and JP 3-05.1, Joint Special Operations Task Force Operations, 26 Apr 2007) Force Protection (FP).  Preventive measures taken to mitigate hostile actions against Department of Defense personnel (to include family members), resources, facilities, and critical information . (JP 1-02 and JP 3-0, Joint Operations, 11 Aug 2011)\nForce Protection Detachment (FPD).  A CI element that provides CI support to transiting and assigned ships, personnel, and aircraft in regions of elevated threat. (DoDD O-5240.02, Counterintelligence,\n20 Dec 2007 with change 1 dated 30 Dec 2010; also JP 1-02 and JP 2-01.2, CI & HUMINT in Joint Operations, 16 Mar 2011 w/ change 1 dated 26 Aug 2011)\n\n\n    The primary focus of FPDs is to provide current and actionable force protection information to the\ncommander of \"in transit\" resources.  FPDs were created in the aftermath of the USS Cole (DDG 67) bombing in the Port of Aden, Yemen on 12 October 2000.\n_____________________\n\n    Service counterintelligence programs are integral to force protection and must be adequately\nmanned and funded to meet the dynamic demands of supporting in-transit forces.\n\n       -- Finding 20, *DoD USS Cole Commission Report*, 8 Jan 2001 (p. 97); p. 7 in the unclassified version.\n_____________________\n\n    The FPD primary mission is to detect and warn of threats to DoD personnel and resources intransit at overseas locations without a permanent DoD CI presence. ... FPDs shall maintain liaison contact with host nation officials to assess an operational picture of the local intelligence, terrorist, and criminal threat.\n\n       -- DoDI 5240.22, *CI Support to Force Protection,* 24 Sep 2009, pp. 7-8 (encl 3, para 5)\n\n    The principal responsibility of the FPD is to provide FP [force protection] services to DoD\npersonnel, aircraft, ships and resources, as well as coordinate component FP activities. The FPD detects and warns of threats to DoD military and civilian assets in-transit at overseas locations that do not possess a permanent DoD CI presence.\n\n       -- Erika Triscari, \"Force Protection Detachments, the Force Multiplier,\" *The Guardian*, April 2006, pp. 6-9.\n\nForce Protection Response Group (FPRG).  For specifics see DoDI S-5240.15, FPRG (U), 20 Aug 2010.\n\nForeign Agents Registration Act (FARA).  A disclosure statute, enacted in 1938, that requires persons acting as agents of foreign principals in a political or quasi-political capacity to make periodic public disclosure of their relationship with the foreign principal, as well as activities, receipts and disbursements in support of those activities.  Disclosure of the required information facilitates evaluation by the government and the American people of the statements and activities of such persons in light of their function as foreign agents. (22 USC 611)\n\n\n    See more on the FARA at DoJ website:  <http://www.fara.gov>\n\n    The FARA Registration Unit of the Counterespionage Section in the National Security Division\n(NSD), Department of Justice (DoJ) is responsible for the administration and enforcement of the Act.  See DoJ website at <http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/fara/index.html>\n\n\nForeign Collection Threat.  Opportunity for a foreign entity or cooperating DoD personnel (an insider) to overtly, covertly or clandestinely collect information about RDA programs, technologies, system capabilities and employment methods that may enable an adversary to copy, counter, or defeat6 a capability, or inhibit, exploit, or sabotage a defense system.  Within the context of [DoDI O-5240.24], the term collectively refers to threats posed by or form an insider, cyber exploitation, supply chain manipulation, an FIE [foreign intelligence entity], a foreign company, international transfers or exports of technology, and disposal of export-controlled technology. (DoDI O-5240.24, CI Activities Supporting RDA, 8 Jun 2011 with change 1 dated 15 Oct 2013) Foreign Computer Intrusion.  The use or attempted use of any cyber-activity or other means, by, for, or on behalf of a foreign power to scan, probe, or gain unauthorized access into one or more U.S.-based computers. (AG Guidelines for Domestic FBI Operations, 29 Sep 2008) Foreign Contact.  Contact with any person or entity that is not a U.S. Person. (IC Standard 700-1, 4 Apr 2008) Foreign Connection.  A U.S. person has a foreign connection when a reasonable belief exists that the U.S. person is or has been in contact with, or has attempted to contact, a foreign person or representative of a foreign power for purposes harmful to U.S. national security interests; or when a reasonable belief exists that the U.S. person is acting or encouraging others to act in furtherance of the goals or objectives of a foreign person or power for purposes harmful to U.S. national security interests. (DoDD 5148.11, ATSD/IO, 24 Apr 2013)\n-- Also, a foreign connection is established by a reasonable belief that a U.S. person is or has been in contact with, or has attempted to contact, a foreign person or a representative of a foreign power, or a reasonable belief that a U.S. person is acting or encouraging others to act to further the goals or objectives of a foreign person or foreign power. (DoDI 2000.12, DoD Antiterrorism Program, 1 Mar 2012 with change 1 dated 9 Sep 2013) Foreign Counterintelligence Program (FCIP).  Military component of the National Intelligence Program (NIP) that conducts counterintelligence activities in support of the Department of Defense.  Also see National Intelligence Program (NIP).\n\n    Within the National Intelligence Program (NIP) the two key national-level DoD intelligence\nprograms are the General Defense Intelligence Program (GDIP) and the FCIP.\n\n     -- Adapted from Dan Elkins, *Financial Management of Intelligence Resources: A Primer* (3rd Edition), May 1992\n Foreign Cultural Analysis.   Analysis of information on the demographics, norms, values, institutions, and artifacts of a population used to assist in anticipating the actions of that population within the operating environment. (DoDD 3600.01, Information Operations, 14 Aug 2006 with chg 1, 23 May 2011) Foreign Denial & Deception.  Foreign capabilities and techniques designed to conceal, manipulate, deny, deceive, influence, induct uncertainty, and generate gaps in U.S. intelligence capabilities and/or conceal intentions.  Also see *denial; deception, military deception*.\n\n## Aggressive Foreign D&D Efforts Erode Our Intelligence Advantage\n\n\n    Foreign knowledge and understanding of US intelligence capabilities are significant and growing\nproblems across all intelligence disciplines and represent serious challenges to US national Security.\n\n\"America's toughest adversaries know a great deal about our intelligence system and are becoming better at hiding their intentions and capabilities.\"\n\n-- *The National Intelligence Strategy*, October 2005, p.9 Foreign Denial & Deception Committee (FDDC).  An interagency intelligence committee that operates under the auspices of the National Intelligence Council (see ICD 204).\n\n\n\nForeign Instrumentation Signals Intelligence (FISINT).  Technical information and intelligence derived from the intercept of foreign electromagnetic emissions associated with the testing and operational deployment of non-US aerospace, surface, and subsurface systems. Foreign instrumentation signals intelligence is a subcategory of signals intelligence. Foreign instrumentation signals include but are not limited to telemetry, beaconry, electronic interrogators, and video data links. (JP 1-02 and JP 2-01, Joint and National Intelligence Support to Military Operations, 5 Jan 2012)  Also see signals intelligence (SIGINT).\n\n    In the early 1980s the term TELINT (telemetry intelligence) was broadened to include other key\nsignals that also describe missile/space events and was renamed Foreign Instrumentation Signals Intelligence (FISINT).\n Foreign Intelligence (FI). Information relating to capabilities, intentions, and activities of foreign powers, organizations, or persons, but not including counterintelligence, except for information on international terrorist activities. (National Security Act 3(2), 50 USC 401a)   Also see *positive intelligence*.\n\n-- Also, information relating to the capabilities, intentions, or activities of foreign governments or elements thereof, foreign organizations, foreign persons, or international terrorist activities. (EO 12333 as amended and JP 2-0, Joint Intelligence, 22 Oct 2013)\n\n FI collection disciplines include:  human intelligence (HUMINT); signals intelligence (SIGINT);\ngeospatial intelligence (GEOINT), including imagery intelligence (IMINT); and measurement & signatures intelligence (MASINT).\n\n    FI does not include counterintelligence.  FI is one of the two components of intelligence, the other\nis counterintelligence (CI) per Executive Order 12333 *US Intelligence Activities* as amended and the National Security Act of 1947 as amended.\n Foreign Intelligence Agent.  A person other than a foreign intelligence officer, who is engaged in intelligence activities or sabotage for on the behalf of a foreign power, or international terrorist activity, or who knowingly conspires with or aids and abets such a person in these activities. (CI Community Lexicon) Also see *agent;* and agent net. Foreign Intelligence and Security Service (FISS).  An organization of a foreign country capable of executing all or part of the intelligence cycle.  Note: sometimes referred to as FIS (Foreign Intelligence Service).  Also see *foreign intelligence entity*.\n\n-- Also, a foreign government's intelligence and security organization. (DoD FCIP Strategy FY 2013-\n2017)\nForeign Intelligence Collection Threat.  The potential of a foreign power, organization, or person to overtly or covertly collect information about U.S. acquisition program technologies, capabilities, and methods of employment that could be used to develop a similar weapon system or countermeasures to the U.S. system or related operations. (DoD 5200.1-M, Acquisition Systems Protection Program, March 1994)\nForeign Intelligence Entity (FIE).  Any known or suspected foreign organization, person, or group (public, private, or governmental) that conducts intelligence activities to acquire U.S. information, block or impair U.S. intelligence collection, influence U.S. policy, or disrupt U.S. systems and programs. This term includes a foreign intelligence and security service [FISS] and international terrorist organizations.\n(JP 1-02; JP 2-01.2, CI & HUMINT in Joint Operations, 16 Mar 2011 w/ chg 1 dated 26 Aug 2011; DoDD\n5240.06, CIAR, 17 May 2011 with change 1 dated 30 May 2013; and DoDI S-5240.17, CI Collection Activities, 14 Mar 2014)\n\n\n    FIE is a more encompassing term, which includes but not limited to Foreign Intelligence and\nSecurity Services (FISS), as well as Foreign Intelligence Services (FIS).\n\n\n-- Also, any known or suspected foreign organization, person, or group (public, private, or governmental) that conducts intelligence activities to acquire U.S. information, blocks or impairs U.S. intelligence collection, influences U.S. policy, or disrupts U.S. systems and programs. This term includes a foreign intelligence and security service and international terrorists. (DoDI 5240.26, Countering Espionage, International Terrorism, and Counterintelligence Insider Threat, 4 May 2012 with change 1 dated 15 Oct 2013) -- Also, any known or suspected foreign organization, person, or group (public, private, governmental)\nthat conducts intelligence activities to acquire U.S. information, blocks or impairs US intelligence collection, influence US policy, or disrupts US systems and programs. This term includes foreign intelligence and security services and international terrorists. (DoDI S-5240.23, CI Activities in Cyberspace, 13 Dec 2010 with change 1 dated 16 Oct 2013)  Note: this definition is slightly different than the one above. -- Also, any foreign organization, person, or group (public, private, governmental) that conducts intelligence activities to acquire U.S. information, block or impair U.S. intelligence collection, influence U.S. policy, or disrupt U.S. systems and programs. This term includes a foreign intelligence and security service as defined in Joint Publication 1-02. (DoDI 5240.18, CI Analysis & Production, 17 Nov 2009 with change 1 dated 15 Oct 2013) -- Also, known or suspected foreign state or non-state organizations or persons that conduct intelligence activities to acquire U.S. information, block or impair U.S. intelligence collection, influence U.S. policy, or disrupt U.S. systems and programs. The term includes foreign intelligence and service services and international terrorists. (ICD 750, Counterintelligence Programs, 5 Jul 2013) Foreign Intelligence Information.  1) Information that relates to, and if concerning a United States person is necessary to, the ability of the United States to protect against (a) actual or potential attack or other grave hostile acts of a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power; (b) sabotage or international terrorism by a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power; or (c) clandestine intelligence activities by an intelligence service or network of a foreign power or by an agent of a foreign power; or 2) information with respect to a foreign power or foreign territory that relates to, and if concerning a United States person is necessary to(a) the national defense or the security of the United States; or (b) the conduct of the foreign affairs of the United States. (Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978; Public Law 95511, 25 October 1978)  Also see Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA). Foreign Intelligence Liaison.  Activities or relationships between elements of the United States Government and elements of foreign governments or international organizations on matters involving foreign intelligence, counterintelligence, or clandestine intelligence activity.\n\nForeign Intelligence Officer.  A member of a foreign intelligence service. (CI Community Lexicon) [Also referred to as an IO (intelligence officer)].  Also see *agent handler.* Foreign Intelligence Service (FIS).  An organization of a foreign country capable of executing all or part\nof the intelligence cycle. (CI Community Lexicon)  Also see Foreign Intelligence and Security Service, Foreign Intelligence Entity.\n\n    Foreign Intelligence Entity (FIE) is a more all encompassing term which includes but is not limited\nto FIS.\n_________________________\n\n    The importance of intelligence services in the fortune of nations can't be overstated....  The\nexistence or absence of a well-working spy network on the territory of a potential enemy may well spell the difference between victory and defeat.\n\n       -- Alexander Orlov in *Handbook of Intelligence and Guerrilla Warfare* (1963)\n\nForeign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA). [50 USC 1801 / Public Law 95-111] ...the legal authority authorizing and regulating electronic surveillance within the United States for foreign intelligence or counterintelligence purposes and physicals searches within the United States for foreign intelligence purposes. The act sets out the application, order, and report process to be followed. (CI Community Lexicon)   Also see *Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court*.\n\n## Primary Purpose Must Be Collection Of Foreign Intelligence Information.\n\n\n    FISA prescribes procedures for the physical & electronic surveillance and collection of \"foreign\nintelligence information\" between or among \"foreign powers\".  Subchapters of FISA provide for: electronic surveillance; physical searches; pen registers and trap & trace devices for Foreign Intelligence (FI) purposes; and access to certain business records for FI purposes.  FISA does not apply to U.S. counterintelligence activities overseas.\n\n    -- FISA, codified in 50 U.S.C. 1801, et seq was amended by the FISA Amendments Act of 2008.\n_____________________\n\n    The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, P.L. 95-511, 92 Stat. 1783 (25 Oct 1978), 50\nUSC  1801 et seq., provides a statutory framework for gathering foreign intelligence\ninformation through the use of electronic surveillance, physical searches, and pen registers or\ntrap and trace devices, and access to business records and other tangible things, the 1978 Act dealt only with electronic surveillance.\n\n    The provisions passed almost 30 years ago became Title I of FISA. As originally enacted, the\nmeasure provided a statutory framework for collection of **foreign intelligence information** through\nthe use of electronic surveillance of communications of foreign powers or agents of foreign powers, as those terms were defined in the act. The act has been amended repeatedly in the intervening years in an effort to address changing circumstances. Then, as now, the Congress sought to strike\n   a balance between national security interests and civil liberties.\n    FISA consists of seven parts. The first authorizes electronic surveillance in foreign intelligence\ninvestigations. The second authorizes physical searches in foreign intelligence cases. The third permits the use and installation of pen registers and trap and trace devices in the context of a foreign intelligence investigation. The fourth affords intelligence officials access to business records and other tangible items. The fifth directs the Attorney General to report to Congress on the specifics of the exercise of FISA authority. The sixth, scheduled to expire on 30 December 2012, permits the acquisition of the communications of targeted overseas individuals and entities. The seventh creates a safe harbor from civil liability for those who assist or have assisted in the collection of information relating to the activities of foreign powers and their agents.\n____________________\n\n    Electronic surveillance can provide vital information needed to identify those who are acting or\npreparing to act against U.S. interests for the benefit of foreign powers, including those engaged in espionage, sabotage, or terrorist acts or who otherwise pose a threat to the nation or its citizens,\nand to uncover their plans or activities. This information may not be readily uncovered by other investigative means. Thus, surveillance can provide a valuable tool for protecting the security of the nation and its citizens.\n\n       -- CRS Report RL34279: *Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act: An Overview of Selected Issues*, 7 Jul 2008\n            Copy available on line at:  <http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/intel/RL34279.pdf>\n_______________________\n\n    Note:  Under 50 USC 1801(e)(1), *foreign intelligence information* is information that relates\nto U.S. ability to protect against: 1) possible hostile acts of a foreign power or agent of a foreign power; 2) sabotage or terrorism by a foreign power or agent, and: 3) . clandestine intelligence activities by a foreign power or agent. Foreign intelligence information includes information with respect to a foreign power or foreign territory that relates to the national defense, national security, or conduct of foreign affairs of the United States.\n_______________________\n    Probable cause under FISA:  \"Ordinarily, probable cause speaks to the probability of the existence\nof a certain fact, e.g., probable cause to believe a crime has been, is, or is about to be committed and that the search will result in the discovery of evidence or contraband. FISA authorizes issuance of a surveillance or search order predicated upon the probability of a possibility; the probability to believe that the foreign target of the order may engage in spying, or the probability to believe that the American target of the order may engage in criminal spying activities, 50 U.S.C. 1805(a)(3)(A),\n1824(a)(3)(A), 1801(b)(1)(B), (b)(2)(A).3 But it is the predicate not the standard that is changed. The probable cause standard is the same in FISA as in a criminal context: would a prudent individual believe that a fact is probably true. It is the focus that is different. Would a prudent individual believe that spying may occur.\"\n\n        -- CRS Memorandum (American Law Division), 30 Jan 2006\n\n## _______________________ Misc. Fisa References& Background\n\n\n    Foreign Intelligence Surveillance of 1978, 50 USC 1801 (Public Law 95-111)\n\n    Presidential Directive/NSC-19, Electronic Surveillance Abroad and Physical Searches for Foreign\nIntelligence Purposes, 25 Aug 1977 [declassified]; amended by POTUS via 24 Aug 1979 White House Memo [declassified]\n\n    Executive Order 12139, FISA, 23 May 1979\n\n    Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 Amendments Act of 2008 (PL 110-261), 10 Jul 2008\n\n    Executive Order 12949, Foreign Intelligence Searches, 9 Feb 1995\n\n    A thorough constitutional justification of FISA can be found in *United States v. Duggan* (743 F.2d\n59[2d Cir. 1984]) where both Fourth and Fifth Amendment challenges to this kind of electronic surveillance were addressed by the court.\n\n    US Senate. *The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978: The First Five Years*, Report 98-\n660, 98th Congress, 2nd Session, Washington, DC, 1984.\n\n    CRS Report R42725, *Reauthorization of the FISA Amendment s Act*, 2 Jan 2013; copy available\nat:  <http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/intel/R42725.pdf>\n\n    For additional FISA background see FAS website at:  <http://www.fas.org/irp/agency/doj/fisa/>\n Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC) [often referred to as the \"FISA Court\"].  A U.S. federal court established in 1978 when Congress enacted the *Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act* (FISA)--codified, as amended, at 50 USC  1801-1885c. The Court entertains applications submitted by the U.S. Government for approval of electronic surveillance, physical search, and other investigative actions for foreign intelligence purposes.\n\n    Most of the Court's work is conducted ex parte as required by statute, and due to the need to\nprotect classified national security information. The FISC sits in Washington D.C. and is composed of eleven federal district court judges who are designated by the Chief Justice of the United States.\n\n    Each judge serves for a maximum of seven years and their terms are staggered to ensure\ncontinuity on the Court. By statute, the judges must be drawn from at least seven of the United States judicial circuits, and three of the judges must reside within 20 miles of the District of Columbia.  No judge may be appointed to this court more than once, and no judge may be appointed to both the Court of Review and the FISC. FISC Judges typically sit for one week at a\n    time, on a rotating basis.\n    For additional information, see the FISC web site at:  <http://www.fisc.uscourts.gov/> -- FISC Rules of Procedures at:  <http://www.fisc.uscourts.gov/rules-procedure> -- FISC Public Findings at:  <http://www.fisc.uscourts.gov/public-filings>\n\nForeign Intelligence Threat. The all-source intelligence threat posed by foreign intelligence entities to US interests.\n\n## Foreign Intelligence Threats\n\n\n    [T]he leading state intelligence threats to US interests in 2014 will continue to be Russia and\nChina, based on their capabilities, intent, and broad operational scope.  Sophisticated foreign intelligence entities will continue to employ human and cyber means to collect national security information.\n\n       -- Hon. James R. Clapper, DNI, Statement for the Record, Worldwide Threat Assessment of the US Intelligence Community, SSCI, 29 January 2014\n________________________\n\n    Foreign intelligence services, along with terrorist groups, transnational criminal organizations, and\nother nonstate actors, are targeting and acquiring our national security information, undermining our economic and technological advantages, and seeking to influence our national policies and processes covertly. These foreign intelligence efforts employ traditional methods of espionage and,\nwith growing frequency, innovative technical means. Among significant foreign threats, **Russia** and China remain the most capable and persistent intelligence threats and are aggressive practitioners\nof economic espionage against the United States. Countering such foreign intelligence threats is a top priority for the Intelligence Community for the year ahead [emphasis added].\n\n        -- Hon. James R. Clapper, DNI, Statement for the Record, Worldwide Threat Assessment of the US\n           Intelligence Community, Senate Committee on Armed Services, 18 April 2013, p. 8\n Foreign Liaison Officer (FLO).  A foreign government military member or civilian employee who is authorized by his or her government to act as an official representative of that government in its dealings with the DoD and Military Services in connection with programs, projects, or agreements of mutual interest to DoD and the foreign government. (adapted from AR 380-10, 22 Jun 2005)\n\n    Three types of FLOs:\n\n    1) A *Security Assistance FLO* is a foreign government representative who is assigned to a DoD\nelement or contractor facility pursuant to a requirement that is described in an FMS LOA;\n\n    2) An *Operational FLO* is a foreign government representative who is assigned to a DoD element\npursuant to a documented requirement to coordinate operational matters, such as combined planning or training and education; and\n\n    3) A *National Representative FLO* is a foreign government representative who is assigned to his or\nher national embassy or legation in Washington, DC (for example, an attache), to conduct liaison activities with DoD / Military Services.\n Foreign Material.  Any item of foreign origin including physical possession of, or access to, an item of foreign material or technology. (DIAM 58-4, Foreign Material Program, 22 Feb 2002) Foreign Material Acquisition (FMA).  FMP [Foreign Material Program] activities that include gaining physical possession, or access to, an item of foreign material or technology. (DoDD S-3325.01E, Foreign Material Program (U), 30 Dec 2011) Foreign Material Exploitation (FME).  FMP [Foreign Material Program] activities that include analysis, testing, evaluation, and documentation of the S&TI [Scientific & Technical Intelligence] characteristics of an item of foreign material. (DoDD S-3325.01E, Foreign Material Program (U), 30 Dec 2011) Foreign Military Intelligence Collection Activities (FORMICA).  Entails the overt debriefing, by trained HUMINT personnel, of all U.S. persons employed by the Department of Defense who have access to information of potential national security value. (DoDI C-5205.01, FORMICA (U), 22 Jan 2009; also\nJP 1-02 and JP 2-01.2, CI & HUMINT in Joint Operations, 16 Mar 2011 w/ chg 1 dated 26 Aug 2011)\n\nForeign National.  Any person other than a US citizen, US permanent or temporary legal resident alien, or person in US custody. (JP 1-02)\n\n\n-- Also, any person who is not a citizen of the U.S. (IC Standard 700-1, 4 Apr 2008) Foreign Ownership, Control or Influence (FOCI).  A U.S. company is considered under foreign ownership, control, or influence whenever a foreign interest has the power, direct or indirect, whether or not exercised and whether or not exercisable through ownership of the U.S. company's securities, by contractual arrangements or other means, to direct or decide matters affecting the management or operations of that company in a manner which may result in unauthorized access to classified information and/or special nuclear material or may affect adversely the performance of classified matters. (ISC 2008-700-1, 4 Apr 2008)\n   Within DoD, see DTM 09-019, *Policy Guidance for FOCI*, 2 Sep 2009 (with chg 6 dated 9 Jan\n2014) Foreign Power.  Any foreign government (regardless of whether recognized by the United States), foreign-based political party (or faction thereof), foreign military force, foreign-based terrorist group, or any organization composed, in major part, of any such entity or entities. (DoD 5240.1-R, Dec 1982)\n\n-- Also, foreign power means: (1) a foreign government or any component thereof, whether or not recognized by the United States; (2) a faction of a foreign nation or nations, not substantially composed of United States persons; (3) an entity that is openly acknowledged by a foreign government or governments to be directed and controlled by such foreign government or governments; (4) a group engaged in international terrorism or activities in preparation thereof; (5) a foreign-based political organization, not substantially composed of United States persons; or (6) an entity that is directed and controlled by a foreign government or governments. (50 USC  1801a).  Also see Agent of a Foreign Power. Foreign Service National (FSN).  Foreign nationals who provide clerical, administrative, technical, fiscal, and other support at foreign service posts abroad and are not citizens of the United States. The term includes third country nationals who are individuals employed by a US mission abroad and are neither a citizen of the US nor of the country to which assigned for duty. (JP 1-02 and JP 3-68, Noncombatant Evacuation Operations, 23 Dec 2010) Foreign Terrorist Tracking Task Force (FTTTF). A specialized task force that was created pursuant to Homeland Security Presidential Directive No. 2 and was consolidated into the FBI pursuant to the Attorney General's directive in August 2002. The FTTTF uses innovative analytical techniques and technologies that help keep foreign terrorists and their supporters out of the United States or lead to their location, detention, prosecution, or removal. The participants include DoD, Department of Homeland Security's bureaus of Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) and Customs and Border Protection, State Department, Social Security Administration, Office of Personnel Management, Department of Energy, and CIA. (FBI website: <http://www.fbi.gov/congress/congress06/mueller120606.htm>) Foreign Visits System (FVS).  Automated system operated by the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Policy) that provides staffing and database support for processing requests for visits by foreign nationals to DoD activities and defense contractors.  FVS consists of an unclassified segment that allows the online submission of visit requests from embassies in Washington, DC, and, in some cases, directly from foreign governments overseas. FVS also has a classified segment that provides staffing, decisionmaking support, and database capabilities to the military departments and DIA. Forensics.  [In computer / cyber usage] The practice of gathering, retaining, and analyzing computerrelated data for investigative purposes in a manner that maintains the integrity of the data. (CNSSI No.\n\n4009, National Information Assurance Glossary, 26 April 2010)  Also see *forensic science*. Forensic Copy.  An accurate bit-for-bit reproduction of the information contained on an electronic device or associated media, whose validity and integrity has been verified using an accepted algorithm. (CNSSI No. 4009, National Information Assurance Glossary, 26 April 2010) Forensic Science (often shortened to forensics).  The application of multidisciplinary scientific processes to establish facts. (DoDD 5205.15E, DoD Forensic Enterprise, 16 Apr 2011) Also see digital & multimedia forensics, digital evidence, and *digital forensics*.\n\n\n    The Secretary of the Army is the DoD Executive Agent (EA) for Forensics, specifically for those\nforensic disciplines relating to deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA), serology, firearms and tool marks, latent prints, questioned documents, drug chemistry, and trace materials, as well as forensics relating to forensic medicine disciplines such as forensic pathology, forensic anthropology, forensic toxicology, and DNA analysis to identify human remains.\n\n    The Secretary of the Air Force is the DoD EA for Digital and Multimedia (D/MM) Forensics,\nspecifically for those forensics disciplines relating to computer and electronic device forensics, audio forensics, image analysis, and video analysis.\n Forensic-Enabled Intelligence (FEI). The intelligence resulting from the integration of scientifically examined materials and other information to establish full characterization, attribution, and the linkage of events, locations, items, signatures, nefarious intent, and persons of interest. (JP 2-0, Joint Intelligence, 22 Oct 2013. FORMICA.  See *Foreign Military Intelligence Collection Activities*. FOUR EYES (ACGU).  Australia, Canada, United Kingdom, and the United States. (CAPCO) Front.  [In intelligence usage] a legitimate operation created by an intelligence organization as a cover for its operatives. (*Encyclopedia of the CIA*, 2003)\n-- Also, Front Company [in law enforcement/criminal investigation usage] a company or business entity that is established, used, or co-opted for an illicit purpose; wherein the management, control, influence or criminal activities are being directed by a hidden or disguised individual or group. (Colin A. May, M.S., CFE, U.S. Department of Commerce, Sep 2010)\n\n    For additional information see Colin A. May, \"Front Companies: Challenges and Tools in Criminal\nInvestigations,\" *IALEIA Journal*, Vol. 19, No. 1, pp. 101-120, September 2010.  The *IALEIA Journal* is published by the International Association of Law Enforcement Intelligence Analysts, Inc.,\n\n           According to Colin May (in his article cited above, p. 102),\"many people use the phrase 'front\ncompany' when they are really describing the front company's distant cousinthe Shell Company. The Financial Crimes Enforcement Network... defines shell companies as 'limited liability companies and other business entities with no significant assets or ongoing business\nactivities.'  The shell simply is a paper company; they have also been called \"International Business Corporations (IBCs)\" or 'shelf companies,' since in some off-shore jurisdictions, the incorporators already have created the companies and simply pull them off the shelf to change the beneficial owner. The difference cannot be overstated....\"\n\n          \"Front companies conduct actual businessshells do not. [Shells] are simply paper\ncompanies.  Front companies have tangible operations, although they may be illicit or illegitimate, they are definite business transactions. The main difference that many investigators and intelligence analysts seem to miss is the 'action' piece in a front company\nand that, of course, is highly dependent on the criminal's intended purpose for the front\ncompany. A shell, used by a criminal, disguises their involvement in the business, but the shell has no actual operations, whereas the front company does.\"\n\n    <http://www.dss.mil/isp/count_intell/front_comp_who_user.html>\n\nFull Field Counterintelligence Investigation.  An investigation which is conducted when there are specific and articulable facts giving reason to believe that a person over whom Army counterintelligence has jurisdiction may be involved in acts that may constitute threats to national security. (AR 381-20, Army CI Program, 25 May 2010)  See *CI Investigation*.\n\n    Within the FBI referred to as \"Full Investigation\" which may be opened to detect, obtain information\nabout, or prevent or protect against federal crimes or threats to the national security or collect\nforeign intelligence.  These cases may be opened if there is an \"articulable basis\" of possible\ncriminal or national threat activity.\n\n    The Investigation of threats to the national security can be investigated under FBI's criminal\ninvestigation authority or its authority to investigate threats to the national security. A Full Investigation solely for the collection of positive foreign intelligence extends the sphere of the FBI's information gathering activities beyond federal crimes and threats to the national security and permits the FBI to seek information regarding a broader range of matters relating to foreign powers, organizations, or persons that may be of interest to the conduct of the United States' foreign affairs.\n\n      -- FBI's Domestic Investigation and Operations Guide (redacted copy), 15 Oct 2011\n Full-Spectrum Counterintelligence Activities.  Full array of CI activities - both offensive & defensive - that can be applied in executing CI effects-based operations to achieve strategic outcomes in peacetime, crisis, war and post conflict activities (e.g., stabilization operations/reconstruction efforts). These activities support national security objectives, as well as defense decision-makers and the Combatant Commanders. Functional Component Command.  A command normally, but not necessarily, composed of forces of two or more Military Departments which may be established across the range of military operations to perform particular operational missions that may be of short duration or may extend over a period of time. (JP 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States, 25 Mar 2013) Functional Managers.  Executive Order 12333 designates three Functional Managers: Director CIA for human intelligence (HUMINT), Director NSA for signals intelligence (SIGINT), and Director NGA for geospatial intelligence (GEOINT), (EO 12333, para 1.3 (b)(12)(A)(i-iiii)) See ICD 113, Functional Managers.\n\n    Pursuant to EO 12333, Functional Managers report to the DNI concerning the extent of their duties\nas Functional Managers, and may be charged with developing and implementing strategic guidance, policies, and procedures for activities related to a specific intelligence discipline or set of intelligence activities; setting training and tradecraft standards; and ensuring coordination within and across intelligence disciplines and IC elements and with related non-intelligence activities.\n\n    Functional Managers may also advise on resource management; policies and procedures;\ncollection capabilities and gaps; intelligence processing and dissemination; technical architectures; and other issues or activities, as applicable.\n\n    Note: The National Counterintelligence Executive (NCIX) is the Mission Manager for CI.\n Functional Support [Analytical Product].  A type of CI analytical product that supports the specific needs of a Defense CI Component.  A functional support product is related to the CI functions of collection, investigation, OFCO {Offensive Counterintelligence Operation], and functional services as described in DoDI 5240.16. The depth and comprehensiveness varies depending on the requestor's requirements. An investment in analytical effort may be significant. The production timeline ranges from hours to weeks, but can vary widely depending on the function the analysis supports. (DoDI 5240.18, CI Analysis &\nProduction, 17 Nov 2009 with change 1 dated 15 Oct 2013)  Also see Counterintelligence Analytical Product.\n\n\n\nFunctional Support Plan (FSP).  Annexes to the National Intelligence Support Plan (NISP) [that] describe how service intelligence centers and Combat Support Agencies support COCOM plans. (Adaptive Planning Roadmap II, 5 Mar 2008)  Also see *Counterintelligence Functional Support Plan (CI FSP).*\n\n    Director DoD Counterintelligence Field Activity (CIFA)* will \"fully integrate CI into the intelligence\ncampaign planning process by developing and updating the CI functional support plans.\"\n\n       -- DUSD (CI&S) memo, subj: Counterintelligence Support to COCOMs, 29 Dec 2006\n\n    * Note: CIFA's mission and functions transitioned into DIA effective 3 August 2008.\n Fusion. In intelligence usage, the process of managing information to conduct all-source analysis and derive a complete assessment of activity. (JP 2-0, Joint Intelligence, 22 Oct 2013)\n-- Also, consolidating, combining, and correlating information together. (ADRP 2-0, Intelligence,\nAug 2012)\nFusion Center. A State and major urban area focal point for the receipt, analysis, gathering, and sharing of threat-related information between the Federal Government, SLTT, and private sector partners. (Source: DHS in the National Infrastructure Protection Plan 2013)\n\nG ========================================== Gap.  See *intelligence gap*. GAMA (G).  Unclassified term used to describe a type of sensitive compartmentalized information (SCI).\n\n(Words of Intelligence, 2nd Edition, 2011) General Defense Intelligence Program (GDIP).  An integrated Defense Intelligence capability that includes DIA, the Service technical production centers, and special collection activities. The GDIP integrates and produces National Intelligence for Defense and national Consumer's. It represents the national Defense Intelligence priorities for operational customers, national and Defense-wide collection management, All-Source Analysis, HUMINT, MASINT, IT, and Special Activities. The GDIP is an integrated capability, and the Director, DIA, serves as the Program Manager. The GDIP is part of the NIP, as defined in EO 12333. The GDIP may include other NIP activities as agreed between the Secretary of Defense and the DNI. (DoDI 5105.21, DIA, 18 Mar 2008)  Also see *National Intelligence Program*.\n\n    The GDIP is the broadest-based NIP program within the Department Of Defense and the military\nservices. This program funds all national-level military intelligence units and activities that involve something other than cryptology, counterintelligence, and certain types of specialized reconnaissance,  The GDIP funds intelligence production, collection, and infrastructure, which includes all defense intelligence production, all national-level DoD Human Source Intelligence (HUMINT), etc.\n\n       -- Adapted from Dan Elkins, *Financial Management of Intelligence Resources: A Primer* (3rd Edition),\n           May 1982, pp. 13-14\n General Military Intelligence (GMI). Intelligence concerning the military capabilities of foreign countries or organizations, or topics affecting potential United States or multinational military operations. (JP 2-0, Joint Intelligence, 22 Oct 2013)  Also see *intelligence; military intelligence*. General Support (GS).  That support which is given to the supported force as a whole and not to any particular subdivision thereof. (JP 1-02)  Also see *direct support*.\n\n\nGeospatial Information.  Information that identifies the geographic location and characteristics of natural or constructed features and boundaries on the Earth, including: statistical data and information derived from, among other things, remote sensing, mapping, and surveying technologies; and mapping, charting, geodetic data and related products. (JP 2-03, GEOINT Support to Joint Operations, 22 Mar 2007)\n\n    See Congressional Research Report (CRS) R41825 (18 May 2011) for an unclassified primer on geospatial data & geographic information systems:  <http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R41825.pdf>\n\nGeospatial Information and Services (GI&S).  The collection, information extraction, storage, dissemination, and exploitation of geodetic, geomagnetic, imagery (both commercial and national source), gravimetric, aeronautical, topographic, hydrographic, littoral, cultural, and toponymic data accurately referenced to a precise location on the Earth's surface.  Geospatial services include tools that enable users to access and manipulate data, and also include instruction, training, laboratory support, and guidance for the use of geospatial data. (DoDD 5105.60, NGA, 29 Jul 2009 and JP 2-03, GEOINT Support to Joint Operations, 22 Mar 2007)\nGeospatial Intelligence (GEOINT).  The exploitation and analysis of imagery and geospatial information to describe, assess, and visually depict physical features and geographically referenced activities on the Earth. Geospatial intelligence consists of imagery, imagery intelligence, and geospatial information.\n(ICD 1, 1 May 2006; also JP 1-02 and JP 2-03, GEOINT Support to Joint Operations, 22 Mar 2007)\n\n-- Also, intelligence derived from the exploitation of imagery and geospatial information to describe, assess, and visually depict physical features and geographically referenced activities on the earth. (ODNI, U.S. National Intelligence - An Overview 2011)\n\n    The Intelligence Community refers to the use and analysis of geospatial information to assess\ngeographically referenced activities on Earth as geospatial intelligence (GEOINT). It is everything\nyou can see or know about the earth.  GEOINT consists of:  Imagery - a likeness of any natural or man-made feature, as well as its location; Imagery Intelligence (IMINT) - information derived through interpreting imagery; and Geospatial Information - information that identifies a natural or constructed feature on Earth by its geographic location and other characteristics.\n\n         -- www.cia.gov  (accessed 30 Nov 2010)\n_________________________\n\n    GEOINT collection encompasses all aspects of: literal, infrared (IR), and synthetic aperture radar\n(SAR) imagery; overhead persistent infrared capabilities; and geospatial information and services. GEOINT includes the exploitation and analysis of electro-optical, IR, and radar imagery; and of geospatial, spectral, laser, IR, radiometric, SAR phase history, polarimetric, spatial, and temporal data. It employs all ancillary data, signature information, and fused data products, as necessary. Integrated GEOINT products may also include data and information from collateral sources.\n\n         -- DoDD 5105.60, NGA, 29 Jul 2009\n_________________________\n\n    GEOINT is typically gathered from commercial satellites, government satellites, reconnaissance\naircraft, or by other means such as maps, commercial databases, census information, GPS waypoints, utility schematics, or any discrete data that have locations on earth. This data is utilized to support our national security, which includes everything from assisting soldiers on the battlefield to assisting humanitarian and disaster relief efforts.\n\n         -- www.intelligence.gov (accessed 13 Aug 2012)\n Ghost Surveillance.  Extremely discreet and seemingly omnipresent surveillance, working mostly out of the view of the target. (CI Centre Glossary)  Also see *surveillance*. Global Information Grid (GIG). The globally interconnected, end-to-end set of information capabilities, associated processes and personnel for collecting, processing, storing, disseminating, and managing information on demand to warfighters, policy makers, and support personnel. The GIG includes owned and leased communications and computing systems and services, software (including applications), data, security services, other associated services and National Security Systems. (JP 1-02 and JP 6-0, Joint Communications, 10 Jun 2010) Global Force Management (GFM).  The ability to align force apportionment, assignment, and allocation methodologies in support of the National Defense Strategy and joint force availability requirements; present comprehensive insights into global availability and operational readiness of U.S. military forces;\nglobally source joint force requirements; and provide senior decision-makers a vehicle to quickly and accurately assess the impact and risk of proposed allocation, assignment, and apportionment changes. (Joint Capability Areas Taxonomy & Lexicon, 15 Jan 2008) Global Positioning System (GPS).  A satellite-based radio navigation system operated by the Department of Defense to provide all military, civil, and commercial users with precise positioning, navigation, and timing. Also called GPS. (JP 1-02 and JP 3-14, Space Operations, 6 Jan 2009)\nGoldwater-Nichols Act (GNA).  The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 (PL 99-433), sponsored by Sen. Barry Goldwater and Rep. Bill Nichols, was a major reorganization of U.S. defense institutions and processes. Operational authority was centralized through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as opposed to the service chiefs. The Chairman was designated as the principal military advisor to the President, National Security Council, and Secretary of Defense. The act\n\n\nestablished the position of vice-chairman and streamlined the operational chain of command from the President to the Secretary of Defense to the Unified Commanders.\n\n   For additional information see <http://www.ndu.edu/library/goldnich/goldnich.html> Copy of PL 99-443 at <http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/congress/title_10.htm>\n Gray Literature (aka Grey Literature). Material not well covered by conventional book trade channels. Gray literature is intrinsically more difficult to identify, acquire, process, access, and otherwise handle than conventional literature. Examples include but are not limited to conference papers, trade literature, electronic bulletin boards, and foreign government reports. The information that grey literature contains is not available in any kind of source. (Words of Intelligence, 2nd Edition, 2011) Gray List.  Contains the identities and locations of those personalities whose inclinations and attitudes toward the political and military objectives of the United States are obscure.  Regardless of their political inclinations or attitudes, personalities may be listed on gray lists when they are known to possess information or particular skills required by US forces. They may be individuals whose political motivations require further exploration before they can be utilized effectively by US forces. (CI Community Lexicon) Also see *Black List; White List.*\n-- Also, a list of those foreign personalities of operational interest whose inclinations and attitudes toward the political and military objectives of the United Sates are unknown. (HDI Lexicon, April 2008)\n\n\n    Regardless of their leanings, personalities may be on gray lists when known to possess information\nor particular skills required by friendly forces. They may be individuals whose political motivations require further exploration before they can be used effectively. Examples of individuals who may be included in this category are:\n       1) Potential or actual defectors from the hostile cause whose credibility has not been established.\n       2) Individuals who have resisted, or are believed to have resisted the enemy government and who may be willing to cooperate with friendly forces, but whose credibility has not been established. 3) Nuclear, biological, chemical and other scientists and technicians suspected of having been engaged in enemy weapons of mass destruction and other programs against their will.\n\n            -- USMC, MCWP 2-6 (previously 2-14), Counterintelligence, 5 Sep 2000\n Graymail.  Threat by a defendant in a trail to expose intelligence activities or other classified information if prosecuted. (Spy Book)   Also see *Classified Information Procedures Act (CIPA).*\n\n   \"Graymail\" colloquially refers to situations where a defendant may seek to introduce tangentially\nrelated classified information solely to force the prosecution to dismiss the charges against him.\n\n    A criminal prosecution involving classified information may cause tension between the\ngovernment's interest in protecting classified information and the criminal defendant's right to a constitutionally valid trial. In some cases, a defendant may threaten to disclose classified information in an effort to gain leverage.\n\n    Concerns about this practice, referred to as \"graymail,\"  led the 96th Congress to enact the\nClassified Information Procedures Act (CIPA) to provide uniform procedures for prosecutions involving classified information.\n\nGreen Door.  Slang term for the metaphorical locked door behind which intelligence personnel are said to hide their codeword secrets and important information not shared with consumers who need and should get it. (Words of Intelligence, 2nd Edition, 2001)\n\nGroupthink.  A decision-making flaw that occurs when a group does not consider alternatives and desires unanimity at the expense of quality decisions. Groupthink can lead to seeking out few alternative solutions because there is an illusion of group invulnerability (\"we all can't be wrong'). Some symptoms of groupthink are the absence of critical discussion of information, a sharing of stereotypes to guide decisions, a strong moral climate, and the suppression of true feelings among the participants in the group.  (Words of Intelligence, 2nd Edition, 2011) GRU.  *Glavnoye Razvedyvatel'noye Upravlenie* (Chief Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff); aka Russian Military Intelligence.\n\n   Russian military intelligence has a spy network abroad that is believed by\n   espionage experts to be several times bigger than that of Russia's Foreign\n   Intelligence Service.\n\n      -- Reuters, 24 Apr 2009\n____________________\n\n   Also see Viktor Suvorov's (alias for GRU defector Vladimir Bogdanovich Rezun) books: *Aquarium* (), 1985 and Inside Soviet Military Intelligence, 1984.\n\nGuerrilla Force.  A group of irregular, predominantly indigenous personnel organized along military lines to conduct military and paramilitary operations in enemy-held, hostile, or denied territory. (JP 1-02 and\nJP 3-05, Special Operations, 18 Apr 2011)\n\nH ========================================== Hacker.  Unauthorized user who attempts to or gains access to an information system. (CNSSI No. 4009, National Information Assurance Glossary, 26 April 2010)\n-- Also, a person who creates and modifies computer software and hardware, including computer programming, administration, and security-related items. This can be done for either negative or positive reasons. Criminal hackers create malware in order to commit crimes. (McAfee.com; accessed 15 Nov 2010)\n\n    In computer security usage, a term used for a person who accesses a computer system by\ncircumventing its security system.\n\nHacktivism.  The nonviolent use of ambiguous digital tools in pursuit of political ends; these tools include website defacements, redirects, denial-of-service attacks, information theft, website parodies, virtual sitins, virtual sabotage, and software development. (<en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hacktivists>; accessed 2 Apr 2009)  Also see *hacktivists*.\n\n\n    Hacktivism is the use of cyber instruments for political or ideological purposes.\n\n    Hacktivism is a controversial term.  Some argue it was coined to describe how electronic direct\naction might work toward social change by combining programming skills with critical thinking. Others use it as practically synonymous with malicious, destructive acts that undermine the\nsecurity of the Internet as a technical, economic, and political platform.\n\n    The term \"hackitivism\" first appeared in 1998, when members of a hacker group called the Cult of\nthe Dead Cow used it as they chatted online about hacking and political liberation while discussing ideas to work with Chinese hackers following the Tiananmen Square protests.\n\n    For additional information see McAfee White Paper, \"Cybercrime and Hacktivism\" (undated),\navailable online at:  <www.mcafee.com/us/resources/white-papers/wp-cybercrime-hactivism.pdf>\n Hacktivists. Individuals who hack or attack Web sites and computer systems to communicate an ideological, social, or political message and further their cause. (FBI, Nov 2012) Also see *hacktivism*.\n\n    Hacktivists continue to target a wide range of companies and organizations in denial-of-service\nattacks....  Most hacktivists use short-term denial-of-service operations or expose personally identifiable information held by target companies, as forms of political protest. However, a more radical group might form to inflict more systemic impactssuch as disrupting financial networks\nor accidentally trigger unintended consequences that could be misinterpreted as a state-sponsored attack.\n\n       -- DNI, *Worldwide Threat Assessment of the US Intelligence Community*, SSCI, 12 March 2013\n\nHandler.  An intelligence officer or co-opted worker directly responsible for the operational activities of an agent; also agent handler or case officer. (CI Community Lexicon)  Also see agent handler; case officer.\n\n-- Also, an intelligence collector directly responsible for the operational activities of an agent, source, or asset. (HDI Lexicon, April 2008) Hard Target.  A person, nation, group, or technical system often hostile to the US or heavily protected, with a well-honed counterintelligence capability that presents a potential threat to the US or its interests, and provides significant difficulty for agent infiltration or penetration. (National HUMINT Glossary) Harmony.  The Intelligence Community's centralized database for foreign military, technical and opensource documents and their translations.  Harmony is managed by the US Army's National Ground Intelligence Center (NGIC). Also see *DOMEX; DOCEX*.\n\n\n\nHawala.  The word comes originally from the Arabic language and means transfer or remittance. (US Department of Treasury)\n\n    Hawala provides a fast and cost-effective method for worldwide remittance of money or value,\nparticularly for persons who may be outside the reach of the traditional financial sector. In some\nnations hawala is illegal, in others the activity is considered a part of the \"gray\" economy. It is\ntherefore difficult to accurately measure the total volume of financial activity associated with the system, however, it is estimated that the figures are in the tens of billions of dollars, at a minimum. Officials in Pakistan, for example, estimate that more than $7 billion flow into the nation through hawala channels each year. Other Alternative Remittance or Informal Value Transfer Systems include \"hundi,\" \"fei ch 'ien,\" \"chit system,\" \"poey kuan\" and the black market peso exchange.\n\n      -- US Department of Treasury web site, accessed 19 Nov 2012 <http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/terrorist-illicit-finance/Pages/Hawala-and-Alternatives.aspx>\n Hazard or Hazardous Condition. [In TSCM] a condition, either technical or physical, that could permit the exfiltration and exploitation of information. (DoDI 5240.05, TSCM, 3 Apr 2014) Hazards. [In critical infrastructure protection usage] non-hostile incidents such as accidents, natural forces, and technological failure that cause loss or damage to infrastructure assets. (DoDD 3020.40, DoD Policy and Responsibilities for Critical Infrastructure, 14 Jan 2010 w/ chg 2 dated 21 Sep 2012) Hello Number.  Tradecraft jargon for a cutout telephone where the speaker does not identify himself or his/her location.  This procedure is used by proprietaries, devised facilities or cover offices of clandestine intelligence agencies for certain types of contacts with agents or affiliated personnel, usually in an emergency, and only information given by the caller over the phone is a codeword or danger signal to be relayed to the appropriate case officer for immediate call-back or other pre-arranged action. (Leo D. Carl, The CIA Insider's Dictionary, 1996) Heuristics.  Normal, intuitive mental shortcuts for processing information. They can be effective aids for problem-solving, but can lead to biases and thus to analytic errors. High-Payoff Target (HPT).  A target whose loss to the enemy will significantly contribute to the success of the friendly course of action. High-payoff targets are those high-value targets that must be acquired and successfully attacked for the success of the friendly commander's mission. (JP 1-02 and JP 3-60, Joint Targeting, 13 Apr 2007)  Also see *high-value target; target.* High-Risk Personnel (HRP).  Personnel who, by their grade, assignment, symbolic value, or relative isolation, are likely to be attractive or accessible terrorist targets. (JP 1-02 and JP 3-07.2, Antiterrorism, 24 Nov 2010)\nHigh-Value Detainee Interrogation Group (HIG).  The interagency body under the administrative control of the Federal Bureau of Investigation that was established to assemble and dispatch mobile interrogation teams to interrogate high-value detainees. (DoDD 3115.13, DoD Support to the High-Value Detainee Interrogation Group, 9 Dec 2010 w/ chg 1 dated 15 Nov 2013)\n-- Also, an interagency body that collects intelligence from key terror suspects to prevent attacks against the United States and its allies. (www.fbi.gov)   Also see *National Security Branch*.\n\n\n    In response to Task Force recommendations from Executive Order 13491, Ensuring Lawful\nInterrogations, the High-Value Detainee Interrogation Group was created in 2009 to coordinate law enforcement, military, and intelligence efforts in interrogating key terror suspects.  The HIG is\nhoused in the FBI's NSB [National Security Branch], and staffed with members from various IC\n[Intelligence Community] agencies.\n\n       -- FBI web site at <http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/nsb/national-security-branch-brochure>\n\nHigh-Value Target (HVT).  A target the enemy commander requires for the successful completion of the mission. The loss of high-value targets would be expected to seriously degrade important enemy functions throughout the friendly commander's area of interest. (JP 1-02 and JP 3-60, Joint Targeting,\n13 Apr 2007)  Also see *high-payoff target* and target. HOCNet.  HUMINT Operational Communication Network (HOCNet) provides information technology, communications, and desktop services for DoD HUMINT needs. (National Intelligence: A Consumer's Guide - 2009) Homegrown Violent Extremist (HVE).  A person of any citizenship who has lived and/or operated primarily in the United States or its territories who advocates, is engaged in, or is preparing to engage in ideologically-motivated terrorist activities (including providing support to terrorism) in furtherance of political or social objectives promoted by a foreign terrorist organization, but is acting independently of direction by a foreign terrorist organization. (FBI & DHS, cited in CRS Report R42536, 15 May 2012)\n\n  \"HVEs are growing threat to the DoD, as evidenced by numerous disrupted plots targeting DoD\nfacilities, installations, and personnel since 2009. The majority of HVE plots are unsophisticated, use readily available weapons, and target nearby facilities. While they are less likely to generate spectacular, mass casualty attacks than transnational terror groups, HVE attacks are considerably more difficult for law enforcement and intelligence agencies to detect and disrupt.\"\n\n       --  LTG Michael Flynn, Director, DIA, Annual Threat Assessment [Unclassified], Statement before the Senate Armed Services Committee, 18 April 2013,  p.10\n Homegrown Terrorist.  As defined by the Congressional Research Service, homegrown describes terrorist activity or plots perpetrated within the United States or abroad by American citizens, legal permanent residents, or visitors radicalized largely within the United States. (CRS Report R41416, 23 Jan 2013)\n\n    *American Jihadist Terrorism: Combating a Complex Threat*, CRS Report R41416, 23 Jan 2013\navailable online at: <http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/terror/R41416.pdf>\n______________________\n\n   The term \"homegrown terrorism\" means the use, planned use, or threatened use, of force or\nviolence by a group or individual born, raised, or based and operating primarily within the United States or any possession of the United States to intimidate or coerce the United States government, the civilian population of the United States, or any segment thereof, in furtherance of political or social objectives.\n       -- House Bill 1955, 110th Congress, 24 Oct 2007\n______________________\n\n     [T]he long war on terrorism is far from over. Most disturbingly, an increasing number of Islamistinspired terrorist attacks are originating within America's borders. The rise of homegrown\nextremism is the next front in the fight against terrorism and should be taken seriously by the Administration.\n\n        -- The Heritage Foundation, Special Report No. 137, 60 Terrorist Plots Since 9/11: Continued Lessons in Domestic Counterterrorism, 22 July 2013\n Homeland.  The physical region that includes the continental United States, Alaska, Hawaii, United States territories, and surrounding territorial waters and airspace. (JP 1-02 and JP 3-28, Defense Support of Civil Authorities, 31 Jul 2013)\n\nHomeland Defense (HD). The protection of United States sovereignty, territory, domestic population, and critical infrastructure against external threats and aggression, or other threats as directed by the President. (JP 1-02 and JP 3-27, Homeland Defense, 29 Jul 2013) Homeland Security (HS).  A concerted national effort to prevent terrorist attacks within the United States; reduce America's vulnerability to terrorism, major disasters, and other emergencies; and minimize the damage and recover from attacks, major disasters, and other emergencies that occur. (JP 3-27, Homeland Defense, 29 Jul 2013)\n\n\n-- Also, a concerted national effort to prevent terrorist attacks within the United Sates, reduce America's vulnerability to terrorism, and minimize the damage and recover from attacks that do occur.\n\n(National Strategy for Homeland Security, Oct 2007).\n\n-- Also, describes the intersection of evolving threats and hazards with traditional governmental and civic responsibilities for civil defense, emergency response, law enforcement, customs, border control, and immigration. (Quadrennial Homeland Security Review Report, Feb 2010) -- Also, defensive efforts to counter terrorist threats. (National Strategy for Counterterrorism, 2011)\n\n In the years since 9/11, homeland security has become commonly and broadly known as both a\n  term and as a Federal department.\n Homeland security is a concerted effort to ensure a homeland that is safe, secure, and resilient\n\nagainst terrorism and other hazards where American interests, aspirations, and way of life can thrive. Ultimately, homeland security is about effectively managing risks to the Nation's security.\n\n        -- Quadrennial Homeland Security Review Report, Feb 2010\n The *Quadrennial Homeland Security Review Report* (Feb 2010) is available online at:\n<http://www.dhs.gov/xabout/gc_1208534155450.shtm>\n\n## ________________________\n\n\n    According a Jan 2013 Congressional Research Service (CRS) report, the U.S. government does\nnot have a single definition for \"homeland security.\"  Currently, different strategic documents and mission statements offer varying missions that are derived from different homeland security definitions. The concept of homeland security has evolved over the last decade.\n\n        -- See CRS Report R42462, 8 Jan 2013 (accessed 9 Jan 2013)\n            copy available at:  <http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/homesec/R42462.pdf>\n Homeland Security Information.  Any information possessed by a Federal, State, or local agency that: a) relates to the threat of terrorist activity; b) relates to the ability to prevent, interdict, or disrupt terrorist activity; c) would improve the identification or investigation of a suspected terrorist organization; or d) would improve the response to a terrorist act. (Homeland Security Act,  891)\n\nHoney Pot.  A trap set to detect, deflect, or in some manner counteract attempts at unauthorized use of information systems. Generally it consists of a computer, data, or a network site that appears to be part of a network, but is actually isolated, (un)protected, and monitored, and which seems to contain information or a resource of value to attackers. (JP 1-02 and JP 3-13.4, Military Deception)\n-- Also, a system (e.g., a web server) or system resource (e.g., a file on a server) that is designed to be attractive to potential crackers and intruders and has no authorized users other than its administrators. (CNSSI No. 4009, National Information Assurance Glossary, 26 April 2010)\n\n-- Also, in computer terminology, a trap set to detect, deflect, or in some manner counteract attempts at unauthorized use of information systems. Generally it consists of a computer, data, or a network site that appears to be part of a network but which is actually isolated, (un)protected, and monitored, and which seems to contain information or a resource that would be of value to attackers. (Wikipedia; accessed 18 Jan 2011) Honey Trap.  The term universally applied to operations undertaken to ensnare an unwary target in a compromising sexual encounter that may leave the victim vulnerable to blackmail that might result in espionage. (*Historical Dictionary of Cold War Counterintelligence*, 2007)   .\n\n\n-- Also, slang for use of men or women in sexual situations to intimidate or snare others. ...[U]se of sex to trap or blackmail an individual.... (Spy Book)\n\n\n-- Also, an often-used espionage technique wherein a person is deliberately targeted for sexual entrapment. (*Encyclopedia of the CIA*, 2003)\n\n    *Pravda* (the Russian news organization) reported on the use of sexual blackmail by the KGB\n(Soviet Foreign Intelligence Service), see \"KGB Sex Espionage,\" *Pravda*, 7 Aug 2002.\n________________________\n\n    Honey Trap -- a strategy regularly adopted by the KGB's Second Chief Directorate which routinely\nattempted to entrap Western businessmen, foreign diplomats, and other visitors in Moscow, the techniques included the deployment of attractive women, known as ''Swallows,''  and men, referred\nto as ''Romeos,'' who homed in on vulnerable women, often lonely secretaries with access to\nclassified information.\n\n       -- Nigel West, *Historical Dictionary of Cold War Counterintelligence*, 2007, p. 155\n______________________\n\n   The use of sex is \"a common practice among intelligence services all over the world. This is a tough\ndirty business. We have used that technique against the Soviets. They have used it against us.\"\n\n       -- Former Assistant FBI Director William C. Sullivan Testimony before the Church Committee, United States Senate, 1 November 1975\n Horizontal Identification. [Proposed DoD definition] consistent determination of CPI across two or more RDA programs as a result of a former CPI identification process. (*Draft* 5200.39 CPI Identification and Protection within RDA Programs) Horizontal Integration.  Processes and capabilities to acquire, synchronize, correlate, and deliver National Security Community data with responsiveness to ensure success across all policy and operational missions. (CJCSI 3340.02, Horizontal Integration of Warfighter Intelligence, 23 Dec 2005) Horizontal Protection.  The process which ensures that critical program information (CPI) associated with two or more acquisition programs is protected to the same degree by all responsible DoD agencies. (AR 381-20, Army CI Program, 25 May 2010)  Also see *critical program information*.\n\n-- Also, [proposed DoD definition] application of a consistent level of protection to similar CPI\nassociated with more than one RDA program, including inherited CPI.  (*Draft* DoDI 5200.39, CPI Identification and Protection within RDA Programs) Horizontal Protection Analysis.  The process that determines if critical Defense technologies, to include CPI [critical program information], associated with more than one RDA [research, development & acquisition] program are protected to the same degree by all involved DoD activities. (DoDI 5200.39, CPI Protection within DoD, 16 Jul 2008 with change 1 dated 28 Dec 2010)\n\n    Horizontal protection within DoD is focused on ensuring that research, development and\nacquisition (RDA) information associated with more than one research and technology activity or acquisition program is protected to the same degree by all DoD activities, or is adequately\nprotected based on the impact of an aggregation of the correlated information.\n Host Country.  A nation which permits, either by written agreement or official invitation, government representatives and/or agencies of another nation to operate, under specified conditions, within its borders. (JP 1-02 and JP 2-01.2, CI & HUMINT in Joint Operations, 16 Mar 2011 chg 1 dated 26 Aug\n2011)\nHost Nation (HN). A nation that receives the forces and/or supplies of allied nations, coalition partners, and/or NATO organizations to be located on, to operate in, or to transit through its territory. (JP 1-02) Host-Nation Support (HNS).  Civil and/or military assistance rendered by a nation to foreign forces within its territory during peacetime, crises or emergencies, or war based on agreements mutually concluded between nations. (JP 1-02 and JP 4-0, Joint Logistics, 18 Jul 2008) Hostage Rescue (HR).  A personnel recovery method used to recover isolated personnel who are specifically designated as hostages. (JP 1-02 and JP 3-50, Personnel Recovery, 5 Jan 2007) Hostile Act.  An attack or other use of force against the United States, United States forces, or other designated persons or property to preclude or impede the mission and/or duties of United States forces, including the recovery of United States personnel or vital United States Government property. (JP 1-02 and JP 3-28, Defense Support of Civil Authorities, 31 Jul 2013) Hostile Environment.  Operational environment in which hostile forces have control as well as the intent and capability to effectively oppose or react to the operations a unit intends to conduct. (JP 1-02) Hostile Intent.  The threat of imminent use of force against the United States, United States forces, or other designated persons or property. (JP 1-02 and JP 3-01, Countering Air and Missile Threats, 23 Mar 2012) HotR.  DoD acronym for HUMINT On-Line Tasking and Reporting System.  HotR is a web-based software application that supports DoD HUMINT, as well as DoD Counterintelligence. House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (HPSCI).  A committee of the US House of Representatives, established by House Resolution 658 on July 14, 1977.  It is the primary committee in the U.S. House of Representatives charged with the oversight of the US Intelligence Community and intelligence-related activities of all other government organizations.  Also see Senate Select Committee on Intelligence.\n\n\n    The 1980 Intelligence Oversight Act charged the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and\nHPSCI with authorizing the programs of US intelligence agencies and overseeing their activities.\n\n    It is IC policy that IC elements shall, in a timely manner, keep the Congressional intelligence\ncommittees fully informed, in writing, of all significant anticipated intelligence activities, significant intelligence failures, significant intelligence activities, and illegal activities.\n\n      -- ICD 112, *Congressional Notification*, 16 Nov 2011\n Human Derived Information (HDI).  Activities related to the conduct of the collection of intelligence information by or through humans.  It includes the following forms of information:  FI, CI, Force Protection, Research and Technology Protection, and Law Enforcement. (SECNAVINST S3821.1, 19 Nov 2008) Human Domain.  The presence, activities, social structure or organization, networks and relationships, motivation, intent, vulnerabilities and capabilities of individuals or groups.\n\n    The human domain encompasses the totality of the physical, cultural, and social environments that\ninfluence human behavior.   Success in the human domain will depend upon understanding the\n   human terrain and establishing trust with those humans who occupy that space.\n       -- Navy Adm. William H. McRaven, Commander, US Special Operations Command, 5 June 2013\n____________________\n\n    The Human Domain, or Human Dimension, which is a vital and integral part of ABI [Activity Based\nIntelligence], is defined as the presence, activities (including transactions - both physical and virtual), culture, social structure/organization, networks and relationships, motivation, intent, vulnerabilities, and capabilities of humans (single or groups) across all domains of the operational environment (Space, Air, Maritime, Ground, and Cyber).\n Human Enabled Information (HEI).  Activities designed to spot, assess and develop platforms which facilitate information collection and other assigned operations. (SECNAVINST S3821.1, 19 Nov 2008) Human Factors.  The physical, cultural, psychological, and behavioral attributes of an individual or group that influence perceptions, understanding, and interactions. (JP 2-0, Joint Intelligence, 22 Oct 2013) Also see *human domain*. Human Intelligence (HUMINT).  A category of intelligence derived from information collected and provided by human sources [includes HUMINT enabling]. (ICD 1, 1 May 2006; JP 1-02; JP 2-0, Joint Intelligence, 22 Oct 2013; and DoDD S-5200.37, Management and Execution of Defense HUMINT, 9 Feb 2009)\n\n-- Also, a category of intelligence derived from information collected by USG civilian employees or military personnel. Who are trained and certified HUMINT collectors, and assigned to an organization with the mission and authority to collect foreign intelligence from human sources in response to validated intelligence requirements. (DHE-M 3301.002, Vol II Collection Operations, 23 Nov 2010)\n-- Also, intelligence derived from information collected and provided by human sources. This intelligence includes overt data collected by personnel in diplomatic and consular posts, as well as otherwise unobtainable information collected via clandestine sources of information, debriefings of foreign nationals and U.S. citizens who travel abroad, official contacts with foreign governments, and direct observation. (National Intelligence: A Consumer's Guide - 2009) -- Also, [from CIA perspective] vital information from human sources acquired by Core Collectors of the National Clandestine Service in response to national intelligence requirements. (www.cia.gov, posted 23 Mar 2009)  Also see *national clandestine service*. -- Also, the collection by a trained human intelligence collector of foreign information from people and multimedia to identify elements, intentions, composition, strength, dispositions, tactics, equipment, and capabilities. (Army FM 2-0, Intelligence 23 Mar 2010 and FM 2-22.2, CI, Oct 2009) -- Also, consists of information obtained from individuals who know or have access to sensitive foreign information that has implications for U.S. security interests. (WMD Report, 31 Mar 2005) -- Also, a category of intelligence, that which is reported by a government information collector, who has obtained it either directly or indirectly from a human source. (IC21, HPSCI Staff Study, 9 Apr 1996)\n\n## Humint Collection Is A Science And An Art. -- Army Fm 2-22.3, Human Intelligence Collector Operations Humint - Espionage - Is The Heart Of The Spy Business\n\n\n    Core Mission: Collect foreign intelligence through human sources to fill critical intelligence gaps.\n\n Human Intelligence (HUMINT) is intelligence derived from human beings who may act as both\nsources and collectors, and where the human is the primary collection instrument.  It is a foreign intelligence (FI) collection discipline.  HUMINT collectors focus on acquiring information from individuals with access to vital intelligence on the full range of national security issues.\n\n    There are two basic types of HUMINT:  overt and clandestine.  Overt HUMINT methods include,\nbut are not limited to, debriefing, interrogation, elicitation, and observation.  Clandestine HUMINT, sometimes referred to as Clan HUMINT, involves intelligence activity using human sources directed towards the acquisition of information through clandestine means, i.e., *espionage*.\n         \"In overt collection, the collector meets openly with sources as a declared U.S. Government\nrepresentative.  ...Clandestine collection is conducted in secret.  ...After the source is recruited, contact is usually strictly controlled in  an effort to elude discovery. The recruitment\n          of a clandestine human source can take months or years, but the leak of a source's\ninformation may immediately eliminate access to that source.\"\n\n    The Director CIA serves as the *National HUMINT Manager* for the Intelligence Community (IC)\nwith the authority to coordinate, deconflict, and evaluate HUMINT operations across the IC; authorities for clandestine HUMINT delegated to the Director of the National Clandestine Service (NCS); see ICD 300 and ICD 304.\n\n    The Director DIA serves as the *Defense HUMINT Manager* responsible for providing centralized\nmanagement of DoD HUMINT.\n\n U.S. FI collection priorities are driven by the National Intelligence Priorities Framework (NIPF);\nsee NSPD 26 and ICD 204.  For DoD HUMINT policy see DoDD S-5200.37, Management and Execution of Defense Human Intelligence (HUMINT) (U), 9 Feb 2009 with chg 2.\n___________________________\n\n     Foreign intelligence entities worldwide, as well as a variety of non-state actors, commercial\nenterprises, and regional organizations) use clandestine human intelligence collection to \"acquire information\" (aka conduct espionage).  Typically intelligence entities rely upon specially trained or designated employees, often referred to as \"case officers\" or \"agent handlers\" (aka operations officers within CIA) to spot, access, develop, and recruit agents who can provide information that is not publicly available.\n\n    Within CIA, Operations Officers (OOs) are certified Core Collectors who collect human intelligence\nof concern to the U.S. President, policymakers, and military by recruiting and handling clandestine human sources in a secure manner.  OOs clandestinely spot, assess, develop, recruit and handle human sources with access to vital intelligence.\n\n       -- See <https://www.cia.gov/offices-of-cia/clandestine-service/careers/careers-operations-officer.html>\n\n___________________________\n\n    Human-Source Intelligence (HUMINT).  The oldest method for collecting information, this is\nintelligence derived from human sources. Collection includes clandestine acquisition of photography, documents, and other material; overt collection by personnel in diplomatic and consular posts; debriefing of foreign nationals and US citizens who travel abroad; and official contacts with foreign governments. To the public, HUMINT is synonymous with espionage and clandestine activities. However, most of it is accumulated by overt collectors such as diplomats and military attaches.\n\n    The CIA, working closely with the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) established\nthe National Clandestine Service (NCS) to improve HUMINT throughout the IC. The NCS serves as the national authority for coordination, de-confliction, and evaluation of clandestine HUMINT operations, both abroad and inside the United States. While the ODNI establishes policy related to clandestine HUMINT, the NCS executes and implements that policy across the Intelligence Community (IC).\n       -- <http://www.intelligence.gov/about-the-intelligence-community/how-intelligence-works/data-gathering.html>\n___________________________\n\n    Human Intelligence is derived from the analysis of foreign positive information collected by a\ntrained HUMINT Collector from people and multimedia to identify elements, intentions, composition, strength, dispositions, tactics, equipment, personnel, and capabilities. It uses human contacts and informants as a tool, and a variety of collection methods to gather information that satisfies the commander's critical information requirements (CCIR) and cues other collection resources.\n\n       -- Colonel Jerry W. Jones (USA Retired), \"CI and HUMINT or HUMINT and CI or CI/HUMINT or TAC HUMINT,\"   *Military Intelligence Professional Bulletin*, vol. 28, no. 2 (April 2002), p 29.\n___________________________\n\n    HUMINT is the oldest collection discipline and a key contributor to the all-source picture of the\nbattlefield. HUMINT is the intelligence, to include adversary intentions, derived from information collected from people and related documents.  It uses human sources acquired both passively and actively to gather information to answer intelligence requirements and to cross-cue other intelligence disciplines. HUMINT is produced from the collection on a wide range of requirements with the purpose of identifying adversary capabilities and intentions.\n___________________________\n\n\n\n    The U.S. will continue to need the capabilities to collect HUMINT, especially as a major insight into\nintentions and plans of hostile states or groups, and to carry out covert action.\n\n       -- IC 21: HPSCI Staff Study, 9 Apr 1996 (Finding, p.18)\n___________________________\n\n    As George Kisevalter, a CIA case officer who handled defector Col. Oleg Penkovsky, stressed,\nHUMINT was as much an art as a science, and that \"common sense, and the ability to analyze\ncharter quickly and decisively, were the intelligence officer's greatest assets.\" So too, the mastery of intelligence tradecraft is imperative for success.\n\n      -- Julie Anderson, \"The HUMINT Offensive from Putin's Chekist State,\" International Journal of Intelligence\n          and Counterintelligence, Vol 20 No 2 (Summer 2007), p. 274\n\n    Note: Mr. Kisevalter handled both Major Pyotr Popov, the first Soviet GRU officer run by the CIA, as well as\nColonel Oleg Penkovsky.  See Clarence Ashley. *CIA SpyMaster* (2004) for the inside story on a CIA legend. .\n___________________________\n\n    Counterintelligence (CI) is often mistaken as part of or a subset of HUMINT.  Although HUMINT\nand CI are partners in the Human Domain -- both are intelligence activities that operate in the\nhuman domain -- they are distinctly different...different missions, different authorities, each focused on different content, as well as outcomes. FI collection values the information above\nall, whereas CI insists on acting on that information--*a totally different operational dynamic*.  See counterintelligence.\n Human Intelligence Collector.  See *HUMINT Collector.* Human Intelligence Source.  People who provide intelligence directly; individuals associated with organizations (such as foreign government entities and intelligence services) who willingly share intelligence information with the United States; individuals and organizations who facilitate the placement or service of technical collection means that could not succeed without their support; and foreign citizens who are identified as of an intelligence interest to the United States with a reasonable expectation that they will provide information or services in the future. Information that may reveal the identities of people upon whom the United States relies for information, access to information, or cooperation leading to obtaining information is considered to potentially reveal human intelligence sources. (DoD Manual 5200.01-Vol 1,  DoD Information Security Program, 24 Feb 2012)  Also see Human Source, Source. Human Source.  A person who wittingly or unwittingly conveys by any means information of potential intelligence value. (ICS Glossary)  Also see Human Intelligence Source; *Source.*\n-- Also, a person from whom information can be obtained. (Army FM 2-22.3, HUMINT Collector Operations, 6 Sep 2006)\n\n\n   \"Every personfriendly, hostile, or neutralis a potential source of information. The HUMINT\ninformation collection system uses various methods to collect information from a number of sources.\"\n\n        -- U.S. Army ST 2-22.7, *Tactical Human Intelligence and Counterintelligence Operations*, Apr 2002\n_______________________\n\n   \"[H]uman sources collect the smallest volume of intelligence but generally it is the most difficult to\nobtain and the most useful when we do get it. It is in this area that the best information is acquired on the all-important subject of intentions.\"\n\n         -- General Veron Walters (Former DCI), *Silent Missions* (1978)\n\n\nHuman Source Contact Operations (SCO).  HUMINT collection activity directed toward the establishment of human sources who have agreed to meet and cooperate with HUMINT collectors for the purpose of providing information. (Army FM 2-22.3, HUMINT Collector Operations, 6 Sep 2006)\n\n SCO sources include: one-time contacts, continuous contacts, and formal contacts from\ndebriefings, liaison, and contact operations. The basic goal of all levels of contact is to collect\ninformation in response to collection tasking.\n\n        -- Army FM 2-22.3, *Human Intelligence Collector Operations* (2006)\n Human-Source Intelligence. Intelligence obtained from human sources.  See *Human Intelligence*. Human Terrain Analysis.  A multidisciplinary approach to describe and predict geospatial and temporal patterns of human behavior by analyzing the attributes, actions, reactions, and interactions of groups or individuals in the context of their environment. (DoDD 3600.01, Information Operations, 14 Aug 2006 with chg 1, 23 May 2011)\nHUMINT.  See *Human Intelligence*. HUMINT Collection Activities.  Categories include:  tactical questioning; screening, interrogation; debriefing; liaison; human source contact operations (SCOs), documents exploitation (DOCEX); and captured enemy equipment (CEE) operations. (Army FM 2-22.3, HUMINT Collector Operations, 6 Sep 2006)\n\n    DoDD S-5200.37 provides overarching policy for all Defense HUMINT collection operations.  Also\nsee:  DHE-M 3301.001, Vol I, *Collection Requirements, Reporting, and Evaluation Procedures* (U); DHE-M 3301.002, Vol II, *Collection Operations* (U); and Army FM 2-22.3, Human Intelligence\nCollector Operations.\n HUMINT Collection Requirement (HCR). A long-term, DoD validated HUMINT collection requirement which supports DoD or IC operational planning, policy- and decision making, intelligence production, and intelligence databases. (DHE-M 3301.001, DIA HUMINT Manual, Vol I, 30 Jan 2009 w/ chg 2) HUMINT Collection Methods.  There are two HUMINT collection methods authorized for use within DoD: overt and clandestine. (JP 2-01.2, CI & HUMINT in Joint Operations, 16 Mar 2011 w/ chg 1 dated 26 Aug 2011) HUMINT Collection Requirement (HCR).  A long-term DoD-wide HUMINT collection requirement which supports DoD operational planning, policy- and decision-making, intelligence production, and intelligence databases. (Defense HUMINT Enterprise Manual 3301.002, Vol II Collection Operations, 23 Nov 2010)\n\nHUMINT Collection Team (HCT).  Element that collects information from human sources. (Army FM 2-22.3, HUMINT Collector Operations, 6 Sep 2006) HUMINT Collector.  A person who is specifically trained and certified for, tasked with, and engages in the collection of information from HUMINT sources for the purposes of answering intelligence information requirements. (DHE-M 3301.001, Vol I: Collection Requirement, Reporting, and Evaluation Procedures,\n30 Jan 2009, w/ chg 2 dated 1 Feb 2012) -- Also, a person who is specifically trained and certified for, tasked with, and engages in the collection of information from individuals (HUMINT sources) for the purpose of answering intelligence information requirements. (Army FM 2-22.3, HUMINT Collector Operations, Sep 2006)\n\n    Within DoD, appropriately trained and certified individuals are the only personnel authorized to\nconduct HUMINT operations beyond tactical questioning.\n HUMINT Enabling.  An operational support function in which non-HUMINT intelligence collection operations are facilitated by HUMINT collection platforms. HUMINT Operations.  Intelligence activities, including military source operations, the primary purpose of which is to obtain foreign intelligence information collected and provided by human sources. (DoDD S-3325.09, Oversight, Management, and Execution of Defense Clandestine Source Operations, 9 Jan 2013, with chg 1 dated 13 Jun 2013)  Also see *human intelligence*.\n\n    DoD HUMINT operations are conducted in response to DoD or national requirements based on the\nneeds of the originator.\n HUMINT Operations Cell (HOC).  Assigned under the J/G2X to track all HUMINT activities in the area of intelligence responsibility.  It provides technical support to all HUMINT collection operations and deconflicts HUMINT collection operations in the AO. (Term previously defined in Army FM 2-0, Intelligence, May 2004)\n\n\n    For additional information on the HOC see:  JP 2-01.2, *CI & HUMINT in Joint Operations (U)*,\n16 Mar 2011 (w/ chg 1 dated 26 Aug 2011),  p. II-8 (para 3c).\n HUMINT Source.  A person from which services or intelligence information are obtained. The source may possess either first or second-hand knowledge normally obtained through sight or hearing and may be witting or unwitting. (DHE-M 3301.002, Vol II Collection Operations, 23 Nov 2010)  Also see human source; source.\n\n-- Also, a person from whom information can be obtained. (Army FM 2-22.3, HUMINT Collector Operations, 6 Sep 2006) HUMINT Support Element (HSE).  A DIA representative or staff element assigned to support a COCOM. An HSE provides liaison and assists the COCOM with HUMINT planning, coordination, collection management, training, and operations. (DHE-M 3301.002, Vol II Collection Operations, 23 Nov 2010) HUMINT Targeting.  The integration of all-source intelligence and systemic analytic methodologies to identify and develop relevant HUMINT leads in direct support of HUMINT collection operations. (DHE-M 3301.002, Vol II Collection Operations, 23 Nov 2010) HUMINT Tasks.  Include but not limited to: conducting source operations; liaising with host nation officials and allied counterparts; eliciting information from select sources; debriefing US and allied forces and civilian personnel including refugees, displaced persons, third-country nationals, and local inhabitants;\ninterrogating enemy prisoners of war and other detainees; and initially exploiting documents, media, and material. (Army FM 2-22.3, HUMINT Collector Operations, 6 Sep 2006) HUMINT Training.  Instruction and applied exercises for acquiring and retaining skills and knowledge required in the acquisition of foreign intelligence derived from the collection discipline that uses human beings as both sources and collectors. (DoDI 3305.15, DoD HUMINT Training, 25 Feb 2008)\nHUMINT Training Joint Center of Excellence (HT-JCOE). An advanced joint HUMINT training activity that supports HUMINT activities within the DCHE [Defense CI and HUMINT Enterprise].  The HT-JCOE is comprised of HT-JCOE West and HT-JCOE East.  The HT-JCOE West operates with the Department of the Army.  The JT-JCOE East operates within the [Defense Intelligence Agency]. (DoDI O-5109.95, HT-JCOE, 18 Apr 2012)\n\n\nHybrid Threats.  Hybrid threats refer to the ability of adversarieslone attackers, criminal, transnational terrorist organizations, even nation-statesto employ combinations of tactics, technologies, and capabilities to gin an asymmetric advantage. (Quadrennial Homeland Security Review Report, Feb 2010)\n-- Also, the diverse and dynamic combination of regular forces, irregular forces, terrorist forces, and/or criminal elements unified to achieve mutually benefitting effects. (ADRP 3-0, Unified Land Operations, May 2012) Hyperspectral Imagery (HSI).  Term used to describe the imagery derived from subdividing the electromagnetic spectrum into very narrow bandwidths. These narrow bandwidths may be combined with or subtracted from each other in various ways to form images useful in precise terrain or target analysis. (JP 1-02 and JP 2-03, Geospatial Intelligence Support to Joint Operations, 31 Oct 2012).\n\n\n\nI ========================================== i-Space (Integrated Space): a U.S. Intelligence Community (IC) social networking and collaboration service hosted on JWICS; intended to foster and facilitate collaboration between IC members.  Previously known as \"A-Space,\" the transformation to i-Space broadens membership from analyst only to virtually any intelligence professional with access and a mission need. (Intellipedia, accessed 1 Nov 2013) ICE-mail.  Email between organizations over JWICS network. Also referred to as ICE-mail or JWICS email. (National Intelligence: A Consumer's Guide - 2009) ICON.  See *Investigations, Collections and Operations Nexus*. Identity.  The distinguishing characteristics or personality of an individual or facility. (DoDI S-5105.63, Implementation of DoD Cover and Cover Support Activities, 20 Jun 2013)\n\nIdentity Intelligence (I2). The intelligence resulting from the processing of identity attributes concerning individuals, groups, networks, or populations of interest. (JP 2-0, Joint Intelligence, 22 Oct 2013) Ideology. Commitment to a competing political or economic system such as Communism. (PERSEREC 1992)  Also see divided loyalties, MICE. IDSRS.  See *Integrated Defense Source Registry System*. Illegal.  An officer, employee, or agent of an intelligence organization who is dispatched abroad and who has no overt relationship with the intelligence service with which he/she is connected or with the government operations that intelligence service.  Term is derived from the fact that the individual is in the host country illegally. (CI Community Lexicon)\n-- Also, an intelligence officer or a recruited agent who operates in a foreign country in the guise of a private person, and is often present under false identity. (FBI -- Affidavit: USA vs. Robert Philip Hanssen, 16 Feb 2001) -- Also*, Illegal Intelligence Officers (IIO)* - individuals who enter a country either by circumventing border controls or by using false documentation. False documents permit the IIO to remain within the country for a long time while being able to withstand extensive background checks and leave the country with minimum official scrutiny. The very nature of  the IIO's covert activity makes it extremely difficult for counterintelligence agencies to identify or accurately assess their total strength and potential impact on national security. (AFOSI Manual 71-144, Vol 5, CI Program, 15 May 2009)\n\n\n   \"Illegals\" have no \"easily\" detectable contacts with their parent intelligence service.  They pose as\nlegitimate residents of the target country and operate without benefits of diplomatic cover.\n_________________________\n\n   \"In intelligence parlance, an 'illegal' is a spy operating without benefit of diplomatic cover. If caught,\nan illegal can be prosecuted, imprisoned, or even executed; by contrast, a diplomat can only be declared persona non grata and expelled by the host country.\"\n\n       -- David Wise, *Tiger Trap: America's Secret War with China* (2011), p. 208\n_________________________\n\n\n   \"The illegal is a highly trained specialist in espionage tradecraft.  He may be a [foreign] national\nand/or a professional intelligence officer dispatched to the United States under a false identity.\"\n\n       -- FBI as cited in Senate Report # 94-755 (aka Church Committee Report), Book I, 26 April 1976, p.164\n_________________________\n\n   \"Illegal agentsthat is, operatives for whom an alias identity has been systemically developed\nwhich enables them to live in the United States as America citizens or resident aliens without our knowledge of their true origins.\"\n\n        -- Rockefeller Committee Report, June 1975, p. 8\n Illegal Net.  An intelligence gathering unit operating under the control of an illegal residency. (AFOSI Manual 71-142, OFCO, 9 Jun 2000 and FBI FCI Terms)\n\n    Operation GHOST STORIES -- FBI investigation of  a network of Russian sleeper agents under\nnon-official cover in the United States.  July 2010, the FBI arrest of 10 Russian \"illegals\" which provided a chilling reminder that espionage on U.S. soil did not disappear when the Cold War\nended.  The FBI case against the Russian Intelligence  operatives went on for more than a decade.\n\n    The FBI released dozens of still images, surveillance video clips, and documents related to the\ninvestigation, see <http://www.fbi.gov/news/stories/2011/october/russian_103111/russian_103111>\n Illegal Residency.  An intelligence apparatus established in a foreign country and composed of one or more intelligence officers, which has no apparent connection with the sponsoring intelligence organization or with the government of the country operating the intelligence organization. (ICS Glossary) Illegal Support Officer.  An intelligence officer assigned to a legal residency whose primary function is to support illegal agents by supplying anything needed.  A secondary function is the gathering of information and documents that will serve as guidance and models for documentation of future illegal agents. (AFOSI Manual 71-142, OFCO, 9 Jun 2000)\n\nImagery.  A likeness or presentation of any natural or man-made feature or related object or activity, and the positional data acquired at the same time the likeness or representation was acquired, including: products produced by space-based national intelligence reconnaissance systems; and likeness and presentations produced by satellites, airborne platforms, unmanned aerial vehicles, or other similar means (except that such term does not include handheld or clandestine photography taken by or on behalf of human intelligence collection organizations). (JP 1-02 and JP 2-03, GEOINT Support to Joint Operations, 22 Mar 2007)\n-- Also, representations of objects reproduced electronically or by optical means on film, electronic display devices, or other media. (Senate Report 94-755, Book I - Glossary, 26 Apr 1976) Imagery Exploitation.  The cycle of processing, using, interpreting, mensuration and/or manipulating imagery, and any assembly or consolidation of the results for dissemination. (JP 1-02.and JP 2-03, GEOINT Support to Joint Operations, 31 Oct 2012) Imagery Intelligence (IMINT).  The technical, geographic, and intelligence information derived through the interpretation or analysis of imagery and collateral materials. (JP 1-02 and JP 2-03, GEOINT Support to Joint Operations, 31 Oct 2012) Also see *geospatial intelligence*. -- Also, IMINT is derived from the exploitation of imagery collected by visual photography, infrared sensors, lasers, multispectral sensors, and radar.  These sensors produce images of objects optically, electronically, or digitally on film, electronic display devices, or other media. (Army FM 2-0, Intelligence, 23 Mar 2010) -- Also, intelligence that includes representations of objects reproduced electronically or by optical means on film, electronic display devices, or other media. Imagery can be derived from visual photography, radar sensors, infrared sensors, lasers, and electro-optics. (ODNI, U.S. National Intelligence - An Overview 2011)\n\n    Imagery Intelligence (IMINT):  The National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA) manages all\nIMINT activities, both classified and unclassified, within the US Government . This includes requirements, collection, processing, exploitation, dissemination, archiving, and retrieval.\n\n        -- www.intelligence.gov (accessed 13 Aug 2012)\n_____________________\n\n    There are two general types of imagery collection platforms: + Satellitescompromised of national technical means [NTM] and commercial platforms. + Airborne Systemscompromised of national, commercial, theater, and tactical.\n\n     There are two general types of imagery sensors:\n         + Electro-optical:  panchromatic (visible); infrared; special (multispectral & hyperspectral);\n            and polarmetric. + Radar:  synthetic aperture radar systems that collect and display data either as representations of fixed targets or as moving target indicators.\n\n          -- Army FM 2-0, *Intelligence,* 23 Mar 2010, pp. 9-2 & 9-3\n\nImmigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE).  The principal investigative arm of the U.S. Department Homeland Security (DHS). Created in 2003 through a merger of the investigative and interior enforcement elements of the U.S. Customs Service and the Immigration and Naturalization Service,\n\n\n    ICE's primary mission is to promote homeland security and public safety through the criminal and\ncivil enforcement of federal laws governing border control, customs, trade and immigration. ICE's\ntwo principal operating components are Homeland Security Investigations (HSI) and Enforcement and Removal Operations (ERO).\n\n    See ICE website at:  <http://www.ice.gov/index.htm>\n\nImpersonal Communication.  Communications between a handler and asset which do not involve direct contact. (HDI Lexicon, April 2008)\n-- Also, secret communication techniques used between a case officer and a human intelligence asset when no physical contact is possible or desired. (CI Centre Glossary)\n\n\n## Impersonal Communications...\n\n    [C]landestine techniques to avoid risky face-to-face contact that often employed methods such as\ndead drops and elaborate systems of signaling readiness to send and receive those caches of information. This system had been used successfully by intelligence services for centuries.\n\n        -- Michael J. Sulick, American Spies: Espionage Against the United States from the Cold War to\n            the Present, 2013, p. 10\n Implant.  Electronic device or electronic equipment modification designed to gain unauthorized interception of information-bearing emanations. (CNSSI No. 4009, National Information Assurance Glossary, 26 April 2010)\nImplied Task.  In the context of joint operation planning, a task derived during mission analysis that an organization must perform or prepare to perform to accomplish a specified task or the mission, but which is not stated in the higher headquarters order. (JP 5-0, Joint Operation Planning, 11 Aug 2011)  Also see essential task; specified task.\n\n\n\nImprovised Explosive Device (IED).  A device placed or fabricated in an improvised manner incorporating destructive, lethal, noxious, pyrotechnic, or incendiary chemicals and designed to destroy, incapacitate, harass, or distract. It may incorporate military stores, but is normally devised from nonmilitary components. (JP 1-02) In the Gap.  [Tradecraft jargon] Surveillance-free for a few seconds but not as long as a minute. (Spy Dust) Inadvertent Disclosure.  Type of incident involving accidental exposure of information to an individual not authorized access. (CNSS Instruction No. 4009)\n-- Also, a set of circumstances or a security incident in which a person has had involuntary access to classified information to which the individual was or is not normally authorized. (DoD 5220.22.22-M-Sup 1, NISPOM Supplement, Feb 1995)\nIndication and Warning.  Within DoD, term changed to \"warning.\"  See *warning.* Indications.  In intelligence usage, information in various degrees of evaluation, all of which bear on the intention of a potential enemy to adopt or reject a course of action. (JP 2-0, Joint Intelligence, 22 Oct 2013) Indicator.  In intelligence usage, an item of information which reflects the intention or capability of a potential enemy to adopt or reject a course of action. (JP 1-02 and JP 2-0, Joint Intelligence, 22 Oct 2013)  Also see *espionage indicator*.\n\n-- Also, data derived from friendly detectable actions and open-source information that adversaries can interpret and piece together to reach conclusions or estimates of critical or classified information concerning friendly intentions, capabilities, or activities. (DoD 5205.02-M, DoD OPSEC Program Manual, 3 Nov 2008)\n-- Also, *\"Threat Indicator\"* any observable action that suggests violent behavior, abnormal disgruntlement, radicalization, or an extreme religious or other ideological worldview. (US Army Tactical Reference Guide,  Radicalization into Violent Extremism:  *A Guide for Military Leaders*, Aug 2011)  Also see radicalization, terrorism, *violent radicalization.* Indirect Access.  Descriptor used for sources who do not have firsthand access to the information provided and who have come upon it through one or more sub-sources. (DoDI S-5200.42, Defense HUMINT and Related Activities (U), 8 Dec 2009)  Also see *direct access*.\n\nIndoctrination (or read-on).  An initial indoctrination and/or instruction provided each individual approved to a SAP prior to his exposure concerning the unique nature of program information and the policies, procedures, and practices for its handling. (DoD 5220.22.22-M-Sup 1, NISPOM Supplement, Feb 1995) Induced Defection.  Tradecraft jargon for developing and encouraging a foreign official's defection from his country. (Leo D. Carl, *The CIA Insider's Dictionary*, 1996)\n\n## \"Inducement\" Is The Jargon Used For Persuading Somebody To Defect To You.\n\n\n-- William R. Johnson, *Thwarting Enemies at Home and Abroad* (2009) Induced Operation.  An operation in which a source or agent is established in such a manner as to induce the opposition to recruit him as its agent. (CI Community Lexicon)\n\n\nInduction.  [One of the four basic types of reasoning applied to intelligence analysis, it is the process] of discovering relationships among the phenomena under study. ...[it draws] generalizations on the basis of observations or other evidence. (DIA, *Intelligence Essentials for Everyone*, June 1999)  Also see abduction; deduction; scientific method.\n\n\n    For additional information see *Knowledge Management in the Intelligence Enterprise* by Edward\nWaltz (2003) and *Critical Thinking and Intelligence Analysis* by David Moore, JMIC Press (2006).\n Industrial Espionage.  The knowing misappropriation of trade secrets related to, or included in, a product that is made for or placed in interstate or foreign commerce to the economic benefit of anyone other than the owner, with the knowledge or intent that the offense will injure the owner of that trade secret.\n\n-- Also, the act of seeking a competitive, commercial advantage by obtaining a competitor's trade secrets and/or logistics. The acquisition of industrial information through clandestine operations. (DSS Glossary)\n\n    Industrial espionage is criminalized under the Economic Espionage Act of 1996, PL 104-294.\n     See <http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PLAW-104publ294/content-detail.html>\n    Industrial espionage, or theft of trade secrets, occurs when an actor, intending or knowing that his\nor her offense will injure the owner of a trade secret of a product produced for or placed in interstate or foreign commerce, acts with the intent to convert that trade secret to the economic benefit of anyone other than the owner by: (1) stealing, or without authorization appropriating, carrying away, concealing, or obtaining by deception or fraud information related to that secret; (2) copying, duplicating, reproducing, destroying, uploading, downloading, or otherwise transmitting that information without authorization; or (3) receiving that information knowing that that information had been stolen, appropriated, obtained or converted without authorization (Section 101 of the EEA, 18 USC  1832).\n Industrial Security.  That portion of information security which is concerned with the protection of classified information in the custody of U.S. industry. (DoD 5220.22-M, NISPOM, 28 Feb 2006)  Also see *Defense Security Service (DSS); National Industrial Security Program (NISP).*\n-- Also, a mutli-disciplinary security program concerned with the protection of classified information developed by or entrusted to U.S. industry. (IC Standard 700-1, 4 Apr 2008 and DoDD 5200.43, Management of the Defense Security Enterprise, 1 Oct 2012 w/ chg 1 dated 24 Apr 2013) Infiltrate.  Tradecraft jargon for the act of penetrating a country or organization. (Leo D. Carl, The CIA Insider's Dictionary, 1996) Infiltration.  In intelligence usage, placing an agent or other person in a target area in hostile territory.\n\nUsually involves crossing a frontier or other guarded line.  Methods of infiltration are: black (clandestine);\ngrey (through legal crossing point but under false documentation); and white (legal). (JP 1-02 and JP 3-05.1, Joint Special Operations Task Force Operations, 26 Apr 2007) Inform and Influence Activities.  The integration of designated information-related capabilities in order to synchronize themes, messages, and actions with operations to inform United States and global audiences, influence foreign audiences, and affect adversary and enemy decisionmaking. (Army\nFM 3-13, Inform and Influence Activities, Jan 2013) Informant.  A person who, wittingly or unwittingly, provides information to an agent, a clandestine service, or the police. (ICS Glossary and Senate Report 94-755, Book I - Glossary, 26 Apr 1976) Information.  Facts, data, or instructions in any medium or form.  The meaning that a human assigns to data by means of the known conventions used in their representation. (JP 3-13.1, Electronic Warfare, 25 Jan 2007)\n\n\nInformation and Communications Technology (ICT).  Includes but is not limited to information technology as defined in section 11101 of title 40, U.S.C.. The term reflects the convergence of information technology and communications. ICT includes all categories of ubiquitous technology used for gathering, storing, transmitting, retrieving, or processing information (e.g., computing systems, software, mobile telephony, satellite communications, and networks. (DoDI  O-5240.24, CI Activities Supporting RDA, 8 Jun 2011 with change 1 dated 15 Oct 2013) Information Assurance (IA).  Measures that protect and defend information and information systems by ensuring their availability, integrity, authentication, confidentiality, and nonrepudiation. This includes providing for restoration of information systems by incorporating protection, detection, and reaction capabilities. (DoDD 8500.01E, Information Assurance and CNSSI-4009) Also see *Information Operations*.\n\n-- Also, actions that protect and defend information systems by ensuring availability, integrity, authentication, confidentiality, and nonrepudiation. (JP 1-02 and JP 3-12, Cyberspace Operations, 5 Feb 2013)\n\n-- Also, protecting information's confidentiality, integrity, and availability. (National Intelligence: A\nConsumer's Guide - 2009).\n\n-- Also, the protection of systems and information in storage, processing, or transit from unauthorized access or modification; denial of service to unauthorized users; or the provision of service to authorized users. It also includes those measures necessary to detect, document, and counter such threats. Measures that protect and defend information and information systems by ensuring their availability, integrity, authentication, confidentiality, and non-repudiation. This includes providing for restoration of information systems by incorporating protection, detection, and reaction capabilities.  IA is a security discipline that encompasses COMSEC, INFOSEC, and control of compromising emanations (TEMPEST). (AR 25-2, Information Assurance, 3 Aug 2007) Information Collection.  An activity that synchronizes and integrates the planning and employment of sensors and assets as well as the processing, exploitation, and dissemination of systems in direct support of current and future operations. (Army FM 3-55, Information Collection, April 2012) Information Environment.  The aggregate of individuals, organizations, and systems that collect, process, disseminate, or act on information. (JP 1-02 and JP 3-13, Information Operations, 13 Feb 2006) Information Fratricide.  The result of employing information-related capabilities in a way that causes effects in the information environment that impede the conduct of friendly operations or adversely affect friendly forces. (Army FM 3-13, Inform and Influence Activities, Jan 2013) Information Protection.  Active or passive measures used to safeguard and defend friendly information and information systems. (ADRP 6-0, Mission Command, May 2012) Information Operations (IO).  The integrated employment, during military operations, of informationrelated capabilities in concert with other lines of operations to influence, disrupt, corrupt, or usurp the decision-making of adversaries and potential adversaries, while protecting our own. (JP 3-13, Information Operation, 27 Nov 2012; approved for inclusion in update to JP 1-02)\n\n    For DoD policy see DoDD 3600.01, *Information Operations*, 2 May 2013\n\n    Counterintelligence investigations, operations, collection, analysis, production, and dynamic\nfunctional CI services are employed in support of appropriate IO activities to detect and mitigate\nforeign intelligence, hacker, and insider threats to DoD information and information systems.\n______________________\n\n    IO will be the principal mechanism used during military operations to integrate, synchronize,\nemploy, and assess a wide variety of information-related capabilities (IRCs) in concert with other lines of operations to effect adversaries' or potential adversaries' decision-making while protecting our own.\n\n       - DoDD 3600.01, *Information Operations*, 2 May 2013\n Information Related Capability (IRC).  A capability that is a tool, technique, or activity employed within a dimension(s) of the information environment that can be used to achieve a specific end(s). (DoDD 3600.01, Information Operations, 2 May 2013)  Also see *information operations*. Information Requirements.  In intelligence usage, those items of information regarding the adversary and other relevant aspects of the operational environment that need to be collected and processed in order to meet the intelligence requirements of a commander. (JP 2-0, Joint Intelligence, 22 Oct 2013)  Also see intelligence requirement; collection requirement.\n\n## The Requirements Process Has Traditionally Been One Of The Most Vexing Aspects Of Intelligence Management.\n\n\n-- IC 21: HPSCI Staff Study, 6 Apr 1996 Information Security. The security discipline concerned with implementation of a system of administrative policies and procedures for identifying, controlling, and protecting from unauthorized disclosure information that is authorized protection by Executive order, statute, or regulation. Information security includes protection of classified, controlled unclassified, and sensitive compartmented information. (DoDD 5200.43, Management of the Defense Security Enterprise, 1 Oct 2012, w/ chg 1 dated 24 Apr 2013)\n-- Also, INFOSEC the system of policies, procedures, and requirements established in accordance with Executive Order 13526 to protect information that, if subjected to unauthorized disclosure, could reasonably be expected to cause damage to national security. The term also applies    to policies, procedures, and requirements established to protect unclassified information that may be withheld from release to the public pursuant to Executive Order, statute or regulation. (DoD Manual 5200.01-Vol 1, DoD\nInformation Security Program, 24 Feb 2012) Also see *computer security; cyber security.*\n\n-- Also, protecting information's confidentiality, integrity, and availability. (National Intelligence: A\nConsumer's Guide - 2009)\n\n   To be withdrawn from JP 1-02 per JP 3-13, 27 Nov 2012; previously defined as:  the protection of\ninformation and information systems against unauthorized access or modification of information,\nwhether in storage, processing, or transit, and against denial of service to authorized users. INFOSEC includes those measures necessary to detect, document, and counter such threats. INFOSEC is composed of computer security and communications security.\n\n         -- JP 3-13, *Information Operations*, 13 Feb 2006\n\n## _________________________ Infosec Plays A Vital Role In National Security And In The Critical Infrastructure\n\n\n    The goal of INFOSEC is to ensure that the National Security Community has reliable and secure\nnetworks to originate, store, manipulate, and make information available to those who need it and are authorized to have it.\n\n         -- Joint Security Commission  II Report, 24 Aug 1999, p. 18\n Information Security Oversight Office (ISOO).  US Government office that is responsible to the President for policy and oversight of the Government-wide security classification system and the National Industrial Security Program.\n\n    The ISOO is responsible to the President for policy and oversight of the Government-wide security\nclassification system and the National Industrial Security Program.  The ISOO is also responsible for implementing and overseeing the National Industrial Security Program (NISP) under Executive Order 12829, as amended, issued in 1993.\n\n    ISSO web site at:  <http://www.archives.gov/isoo/>\n Information Superiority.  The operational advantage derived from the ability to collect, process, and disseminate an uninterrupted flow of information while exploiting or denying an adversary's ability to do the same. (JP 1-02 and JP 3-13, Information Operations, 27 Nov 2012)   Also see *information operations*.\n\nInformer.  One who intentionally discloses information about other persons or activities to police or a security service (such as the FBI), usually for a financial reward. (Senate Report 94-755, Book I - Glossary, 26 Apr\n1976) Infrared Imagery.  That imagery produced as a result of sensing electromagnetic radiations emitted or reflected from a given target surface in the infrared position of the electromagnetic spectrum (approximately 0.72 to 1,000 microns). (JP 1-02 and JP 2-03, Geospatial Intelligence Support to Joint Operations, 31 October 2012)\nInfraGard.  A partnership between the FBI and the private sector. InfraGard is an association of individuals, academic institutions, state and local law enforcement agencies, and other participants dedicated to sharing information and intelligence to prevent hostile acts against the United States. InfraGard Chapters are geographically linked with FBI Field Office territories. (FBI)\n\n\n    Infragard a collaboration for infrastructure protection.  For more information see\n<http://www.infragard.net/>\n Infrastructure. The framework of interdependent physical and cyber-based systems comprising identifiable industries, institutions (including people and procedures), and distribution capabilities that provide a reliable flow of products and services essential to the defense and economic security of the United States, to the smooth functioning of government at all levels, and to society as a whole. (DoDD 3020.40, DoD Policy and Responsibilities for Critical Infrastructure, 14 Jan 2010 w/ chg 2 dated\n21 Sep 2012)\n\n\nInherited CPI.  [Proposed DoD definition] CPI that is owned and generated by one RDA program, subsystem, or project that is incorporated into and used by another RDA program. (*Draft* DoDI 5200.39, CPI Identification and Protection within RDA Programs) Initial Contact Point (ICP).  A physical location where an intelligence officer makes an initial contact or brush pass with his source or asset. (AFOSI Manual 71-142, OFCO, 9 Jun 2000) Insider.  [Within DoD,] anyone who has authorized access to DoD resources by virtue of employment, volunteer activities, or contractual relationship with DoD. (DoDI 5240.26, Countering Espionage, International Terrorism, and Counterintelligence Insider Threat, 4 May 2012 with change 1 dated 15 Oct 2013)  Also see insider threat,     CI insider threat.\n\n-- Also, any person with authorized access to any U.S. Government (USG) resource, to include personnel, facilities, information, equipment, networks, or systems. (U.S. Government Threat Detection Guide - 2011) -- Also, anyone with access, privilege, or knowledge of information systems or services. Malicious insider is [a person] motivated to intentionally adversely impact an organization's mission (e.g., deny, damage, degrade, destroy). (Rand Study, *Understanding the Insider Threat*, March 2004) Insider Threat (InT).  A person with authorized access, who uses that access, wittingly or unwittingly, to harm national security interests or national security through unauthorized disclosure, data modification, espionage, terrorism, or kinetic actions resulting in loss or degradation of resources or capabilities. (DoDI 5240.26, Countering Espionage, International Terrorism, and Counterintelligence Insider Threat, 4 May 2012 w/ chg 1 dated 15 Oct 2013 and DoDD 5200.43, Management of the Defense Security Enterprise, 1 Oct 2012 w/ chg 1 dated 24 Apr 2013)   Also see *insider, CI insider threat*.\n\n-- Also, a person, known or suspected, who uses their authorized access to Department of Defense facilities, systems, equipment, information or infrastructure to damage, disrupt operations, commit espionage on behalf of a foreign intelligence entity or support international terrorist organizations. (JP 1-02 and JP 2-01.2, CI & HUMINT in Joint Operations, 16 Mar 2011 w/ chg 1 dated 26 Aug 2011)\n-- Also, the threat that an insider will use their authorized access to harm the security of the United States. This threat can include damage to the US through espionage, terrorism, unauthorized disclosure of information, or through the loss or degradation of departmental resources or capabilities [sabotage]. (U.S. Government Threat Detection Guide - 2011 and IC Standard 700-2, 2 June 2011) -- Also, activities conducted by a person with placement and access that intentionally or unintentionally compromise an agency's ability to accomplish its mission, including but not limited to espionage, other criminal activity, unauthorized disclosure of information and loss or degradation of departmental resources or capabilities. (National CI Strategy Operating Plan 2008-2010, 9 Aug 2007) -- Also, the ability of a trusted insider to bypass or defeat security safeguards or otherwise adversely affect the national security. (IC Standard 700-1, 4 Apr 2008) -- Also, an entity with authorized access (i.e., within the security domain) that has the potential to harm an information system or enterprise through destruction, disclosure, modification of data, and/or denial of service. (CNSSI No. 4009, National Information Assurance Glossary, 26 April 2010) -- Also, a person with placement and access who intentionally or unintentionally causes loss or degradation of resources or capabilities and compromises the ability of an organization to accomplish its mission through espionage, providing support to international terrorism, other criminal activity, or unauthorized release or disclosure of information. (AR 381-20, Army CI Program, 25 May 2010)\n\n\n-- Also, any insider with legitimate access to government information, personnel, and facilities may intentionally or unintentionally pose a threat. (NSA CI Awareness Pamphlet on Insider Threat, undated) -- Also, the *insider threat to critical infrastructure* is one or more individuals with the access and/or inside knowledge of a company, organization, or enterprise that would allow them to exploit the vulnerabilities of that entity's security, systems, services, products, or facilities with the intent to cause harm. (National Infrastructure Advisory Council's Report, *The Insider Threat to Critical Infrastructures*, 8 April 2008)\n\n## Trusted Insiders With Means, Motive, And Opportunity Pose A Major Threat\n\n\n   \"Countering insider threats are coordinated CI, security, information assurance (IA), law\nenforcement (LE), and antiterrorism & force protection (AT/FP) activities...\"\n\n        -- DoDI 5240.26, *Countering Espionage, International Terrorism, and the CI Insider Threats*, 4 May 2012\n______________________\n\n    \"Insider threats remain the top counterintelligence challenge to our community.\"\n\n         -- Robert \"Bear\" Bryant, National Counterintelligence Executive\n______________________\n\n    \"The problem of insider spies has bedeviled intelligence services from time immemorial.\"\n\n         -- David L. Charney. M.D., \"True Psychology of the Insider Spy,\" in Intelligencer: Journal of U.S. Intelligence Studies (Fall/Winter 2010), p. 47.\n______________________\n\n   \"[H]istory teaches us to expect spies among us and to anticipate that some of those spies will be\nus....  [W]e cannot eliminate espionage... [but we must] minimize the harm that those who betray us can do to our national security and minimize the time between their defection and detection.\"\n\n         -- Webster Commission Report (A Review of FBI Security Programs), March 2002, pp. 17-18.\n ______________________\n\n   \"The Insider Threat is the single-most pervasive and damaging security risk facing global\norganizations and governments today.\"\n\n          -- www.intrusic.com\n  ______________________ \"Malicious insiders may exploit their access at the behest of foreign governments, terrorists groups,\ncriminal elements, unscrupulous associates, or on their own initiative. Whether malicious insiders are committing espionage, making a political statement, or expressing personal disgruntlement, the consequences for DoD, and national security, can be devastating.\"\n\n           -- *DoD Strategy for Operating in Cyberspace*, July 2011\n____________________\n\n   \"...the threat lies in the potential that a trusted employee may betray their obligations and\nallegiances to their employer and conduct sabotage or espionage against them.  Insider betrayals cover a broad range of actions, from secretive acts of theft or subtle forms of sabotage to more aggressive and overt forms of vengeance, sabotage, and even workplace violence.  The threat posed by insiders is one most owner-operators neither understand nor appreciate.\"\n\n           -- T. Noonan and E. Archuleta, *The Insider Threat to Critical Infrastructures* , The National\n               Infrastructure Advisory Council, April 6, 2008, p. 32.\n____________________\n\n   \"WikiLeaks represents a somewhat different kind of threat. It's an insider threat, as opposed to a\nremote threat where someone is trying to come across the networks at you.\"\n\n          -- William Lynn, US Deputy Defense Secretary, Interview reported in *DefenseNews*, 18 July 2011\n____________________\n\n   \"In addition to threats by foreign intelligence entities, insider threats will also pose a persistent\nchallenge.  Trusted insiders with the intent to do harm can exploit their access to compromise vast amounts of sensitive and classified information as part of a personal ideology or at the direction of a foreign government.  The unauthorized disclosure of this information to state adversaries, nonstate activists, or other entities will continue to pose a critical threat.\"\n\n        -- DNI, Worldwide Threat Assessment of the US Intelligence Community, SSCI, 29 January 2014\n____________________\n\n    See ONCIX classified report, *U.S. Government Insider Threat Detection Guide - 2011* (U).\n\n    See Army Directive 2013-18, Army Insider Threat Program, 31 Jul 2013; copy available at: <http://www.fas.org/irp/doddir/army/insider.pdf>\n\n    See SECNAV Instruction 5510.37, Department of the Navy Insider Threat Program, 8 Aug 2013;\ncopy available at:  <http://www.fas.org/irp/doddir/navy/secnavinst/5510_37.pdf>\n\n    See NCIS *CI & Insider Threat Awareness and Reporting Brief* - Briefers Handbook, March 2013\nwith DVD (a professionally produced briefing tool for NCIS Agents)\n\n     Also see \"True Psychology of the Insider Spy,\" in AFIO Intelligencer: Journal of U.S. Intelligence\nStudies (Fall/Winter 2010), p. 47 -- copy available at < http://www.ncix.gov/issues/ithreat/Charney- PsychologyofInsiderSpyAFIO-INTEL_Fall-Winter2010.pdf >\n\n    Additional open source information on insider threat issues at <http://www.cert.org/insider_threat/>\n\n\"A nation can survive its fools and even the ambitious.\nBut it cannot survive treason from within.\"\n\n-- Cicero (106-43 B.C.)\nSpeech in the Roman Senate - circa 58 BC Instruments of National Power.  All of the means available to the government in its pursuit of national objectives. They are expressed as diplomatic, economic, informational and military. (JP 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States, 25 Mar 2013 and JP 1-02) Insurgency.  The organized use of subversion and violence to seize, nullify, or challenge political control of a region. Insurgency can also refer to the group itself. (JP 3-24, Counterinsurgency, 22 Nov 2013)\n-- Also,  the organized use of subversion and violence to seize, nullify, or challenge political control of a region. (Army FM 3-24, Insurgencies and Countering Insurgencies, May 2014)\n\n\n    According to FM 3-24, insurgency in the most basic form is a struggle for control and influence,\ngenerally from a position of relative weakness, outside existing state institutions. Insurgencies can exist apart from or before, during, or after a conventional conflict.\n\nInsurgent.  See *insurgency.* Integrated Defense Source Registration System (IDSRS).  A DoD-level system to enable the sharing of HUMINT source information, meant to ensure Deconfliction of DoD-wide HUMINT sources. (Defense HUMINT Enterprise Manual, Vol II, 23 Nov 2010)\n\n    See USD(I) Memo, 13 August 2005 and IDSRS website on SIPRNet at: <http://dh.dia.smil/idsr/>\n\nINTELINK.  INTELINK is the classified, worldwide intranet for the U.S. Intelligence Community.  At its most secure level, INTELINK utilizes the Joint Worldwide Intelligence Communications System (JWICS) as its communication vehicle.  JWICS is a 24 hour a day network designed to meet the requirements for secure multi-media intelligence communications worldwide up to the Top Secret/SCI level. INTELINK-S.  INTELINK-S is similar to INTELINK except that it is accessed through the Secret Internet Protocol Router Network (SIPRNet).  It is a 24 hour a day network designed to meet the requirements for secure multi-media intelligence communications worldwide at the Secret level and below.\n\n\n\nIntelligence. 1) The product resulting from the collection, processing, integration, evaluation, analysis, and interpretation of available information concerning foreign nations, hostile or potentially hostile forces or elements, or areas of actual or potential operations. 2) The activities that result in the product. 3) The organizations engaged in such activities. (JP 2-0, Joint Intelligence, 22 Oct 2013)  Also see foreign intelligence; counterintelligence.\n\n\n## \"Intelligence Deals With All Things Which Should Be Known In Advance Of Initiating A Course Of Action\"\n\n\n-- Task Force on Intelligence Activities (Hoover Commission) - 1955\n\n\n    The term \"intelligence\" includes foreign intelligence and counterintelligence.\n\n        -- National Security Act of 1947 (as amended), 50 USC 401a, and EO 12333 (as amended 30 Jul 2008)\n\n    The main methods of collecting foreign intelligence (FI), collectively referred to as \"intelligence\ncollection disciplines\" or the \"INTs,\" are:  human intelligence (HUMINT); signals intelligence (SIGINT); geospatial intelligence (GEOINT), including imagery intelligence (IMINT); measurement & signatures intelligence (MASINT); and open source intelligence (OSINT).\n\n    Recommended:  Mark Lowenthal, PhD, *Intelligence:  From Secrets to Policy* (2011, 5th edition)\n\n-- Also, a body of evidence and the conclusions drawn there from that is acquired and furnished in response to the known or perceived requirements of Consumer's. It is often derived from information that is concealed or not intended to be available for use by the acquirer. (ODNI website www.dni.gov) -- Also, information that has been analyzed and refined so that it is useful to policymakers in making decisionsspecifically, decisions about potential threats to our national security. (FBI at <http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/intelligence/defined>) -- Also, the product resulting from the collection, processing, integration, analysis, evaluation, and interpretation of available information concerning foreign countries or areas. Information and knowledge about an adversary obtained through observation, investigation, analysis, or understanding. (TRADOC Pam 525-2-1, US Army Functional Concept for Intelligence, 13 Oct 10)\n-- Also, secret, state activity to understand or influence foreign entities. (Michael Warner, \"Wanted:\nA definition of Intelligence,\" *Studies in Intelligence,* 46: 3, 2002, pp.15-22)\n\n## A Plethora Of Definitions For Intelligence\n\n\n    Sherman Kent, former Chairman of CIA's Office of National Estimates asserted that intelligence\ncan be thought of as a process, a product, as well as an organization.  His point is valid, as organizations that make up the US Intelligence Community use the term \"intelligence\" in three\ndifferent ways*product, process, and organization*:\n\n        1) Intelligence is a *product* that consists of information that has been refined to meet the\n            needs of policymakers/decision makers;\n        2) Intelligence is also a *process* through which that information is identified, collected,\n            Analyzed, and disseminated; and\n        3) Intelligence refers to both the individual *organizations* that shape raw data into a finished\n            intelligence product for the benefit of decision makers and the larger community of these\n            organizations collected referred to as the Intelligence Community or IC.\n___________________________ A word of caution about the term \"intelligence\" is in order.  Too often it is used synonymously or\ninterchangeably with \"information.\"  This is inaccurate and quite misleading. Information until may be interesting, amusing, or hitherto unknown to the person receiving it, but by and in itself it is inappropriate to call it intelligence.\n\n        -- William R. Corson, *The Armies of Ignorance: The Rise of the American Intelligence Empire* (1977)\n___________________________\n\n    Intelligence is the process by which specific types of information important to national security\nare requested, collected, analyzed, and provided to policymakers; the products of that process; the safeguarding of these processes and this information by counterintelligence activities; and the carrying out of operations as requested by lawful authorities.\n\n        -- Mark M. Lowenthal, *Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy.* 4th Edition  (2009), p. 8\n___________________________\n\n    [Intelligence is] mainly secret activities---targeting, collection, analysis, dissemination and action\nintended to enhance security and/or maintain power relative to competitors by forewarning of threats and opportunities.\n\n       -- P. Gill, \"Theories of Intelligence: Where Are We, Where Should We Go and How Might We Proceed?\"\n           in *Intelligence Theory: Key Questions and Debates*,  2009, p. 214\n________________________\n\n    [I]ntelligence in general can be thought of as the complex process of understanding meaning in\navailable information. A typical goal of intelligence is to establish facts and then to develop precise, reliable, and valid inferences (hypotheses, estimations, conclusions, or predictions) for use in strategic decisionmaking or operational planning.\n\n        -- Robert M. Clark, *Intelligence Analysis: A Target-Centric Approach* (2004), p. 13\n___________________________\n\n    By definition, intelligence deals with the unclear, the unknown the deliberately hidden....  In the\nintelligence business, you are almost never completely wrong or completely right.\n\n         -- George J. Tenet, Director CIA (5 Feb 2004)\n___________________________\n\n    For intelligence to have any real value, it must be acted on, sometimes quite promptly and\ndecisively; otherwise, it can be about as useful as warm spit, regardless how romantic or dramatic it may sound.\n\n        -- LTG Samuel Wilson (Retired), Former Director DIA, April 2009\n___________________________\n\n\"The truth is that there is never enough good intelligence.\"\n\n-- R. Jack Smith (Former DDI CIA), *The Unknown CIA* (1989)\n\n\n\"Timely intelligence is a critical component of preserving our national security.\"\n\n-- Ambassador John D. Negroponte (12 April 2005) Intelligence Activities.  All activities that elements of the Intelligence Community are authorized to conduct pursuant to Executive Order 12333. (EO 12333, as amended 30 Jul 2008)   Also see *intelligence*.\n\n-- Also, all activities that agencies within the Intelligence Community are authorized to conduct pursuant to Executive Order 12333. (DoD 5240.1-R, Procedures Governing the Activities of DoD\nIntelligence Components that Affect Unites States Persons, Dec 1982)\n-- Also, the collection, production and dissemination of foreign intelligence and counterintelligence pursuant to DoDD 5143.01 and EO 12333. (DoDD 5240.01, DoD Intelligence Activities, 27 Aug 2007 w/ chg 1 dated 27 Aug 2013)\n\n   Note:  Executive Order 12333 (United States Intelligence Activities) specifically defines the term\n   *intelligence* as including foreign intelligence (FI) and counterintelligence (CI). Intelligence Analysis.  The process by which collected information is evaluated and integrated with existing information to facilitate intelligence production. (ADRP 2-0, Intelligence, Aug 2012)   Also see analysis.\n\nIntelligence analysis is an intellectual process.\n\n\n-- Mark Lowenthal, PhD\n\n\nIntelligence Analyst.  A professional intelligence officer who is responsible for performing, coordinating, or supervising the collection, analysis, and dissemination of intelligence. (ODNI, U.S. National Intelligence - An Overview 2011)\n\n    Intelligence analysts use critical and creative thinking to conduct intelligence analysis and produce\ntimely, predictive intelligence.\n\n       -- ADRP 2-0, *Intelligence,* August 2012\n Intelligence Asset.  Any resource utilized by an intelligence organization for an operational support role. (JP 2-0, Joint Intelligence, 22 Oct 2013)   Also see *asset*. Intelligence Collection.  The acquisition of information or intelligence information and the provision of it to processing and/or production elements. (CI Community Lexicon)  Also see *counterintelligence collection*; clandestine intelligence collection; intelligence collection.\n\n\n    The main methods of collecting foreign intelligence (FI), collectively referred to as \"intelligence\ncollection disciplines\" or the \"INTs,\" are:  human intelligence (HUMINT); signals intelligence\n(SIGINT); geospatial intelligence (GEOINT), including imagery intelligence (IMINT); measurement & signatures intelligence (MASINT); and open source intelligence (OSINT).\n_______________________\n\n\n   [I]ntelligence collection is an imperfect process and will rarely be able to provide analysts with\neverything they need to know.\n\n        -- Mark Lowenthal, PhD, \"Intelligence Analysis Guide to its Study,\" The Intelligencer: Journal of U.S.\n           Intelligence Studies, Vol 18, No. 4, Summer/Fall 2011, p. 61\n Intelligence Collection Activities.  The collection of foreign intelligence and counterintelligence information. (Title 10 USC 431) Intelligence Collection Plan.  A plan for gathering information from all available sources to meet an intelligence requirement.  Specifically, a logical plan for transforming the essential elements of information into orders or requests to sources within a required time limit. (JP 1-02) Intelligence Collector.  A phrase sometimes used to refer to an individual, system, organization or agency that engages in the collection step of the intelligence cycle. (ICS Glossary) Intelligence Community (IC).  All departments or agencies of a government that are concerned with intelligence activity, either in an oversight, managerial, support, or participatory role. (JP 2-0, Joint Intelligence, 22 Oct 2013 and JP 2-01.2, CI & HUMINT in Joint Operations, 16 Mar 2011 w/ chg 1 dated 26 Aug 2011) -- Also, the federal agencies and departments that have a legal mandate to collect, analyze, and disseminate intelligence. Executive Order 12333 specifically identifies members of the IC. (CI Community Lexicon)\n\n-- Also, a federation of Executive Branch agencies and organizations that work separately and together to conduct intelligence activities necessary for the conduct of foreign relations and the protection of U.S. national security. (ODNI, U.S. National Intelligence - An Overview 2011)\n\n\n## U.S. Intelligence Community (50 Usc 401A And Eo 12333)\n\n\n\n           -- Office of the Director of National Intelligence\n            -- Central Intelligence Agency -- National Security Agency -- Defense Intelligence Agency -- National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency -- National Reconnaissance Office -- Intelligence & CI components of the U.S. Army, Navy, Marines, and Air Force -- Federal Bureau of Investigation (National Security Branch) -- Department of Energy (Office of Intelligence & Counterintelligence) -- Drug Enforcement Administration (Office of National Security Intelligence) -- Department of Homeland Security (Office of Intelligence & Analysis) -- Department of State (Bureau of Intelligence & Research) -- Department of Treasury (Office of Intelligence & Analysis) -- Intelligence & CI components of the Coast Guard\n\n    For additional information see \"An Overview of the United States Intelligence Community\"\n    at <http://www.dni.gov/who_what/061222_DNIHandbook_Final.pdf>\n_______________________\n\n    Also see Jeffrey T. Richelson, *The US Intelligence Community* (2012, 5th Edition) Intelligence Community Directives (ICDs).  Principal issuances through which the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) provides policy direction to the Intelligence Community (IC). (ICD 1, 1 May 2006)\n\n ICDs are overarching policy documents of the Intelligence Community signed by the DNI and are replacing the legacy Director of Central Intelligence Directives (DCIDs). Intelligence Contingency Funds (ICF).  Appropriated funds to be used for intelligence activities when the use of other funds is not applicable or would either jeopardize or impede the mission of the intelligence unit. (JP 1-02 and JP 2-01.2, CI & HUMINT in Joint Operations, 16 Mar 2011 w/ chg 1 dtd 26 Aug 2011) Intelligence Cycle.  The process by which information is acquired, converted into intelligence, and made available to policymakers and Consumer's. (National HUMINT Glossary)   Also see *intelligence process*.\n\n\n-- Also, the steps through which information is converted into intelligence and made available to users.  The cycle typically includes six steps: planning and direction, collection, processing and exploitation, analysis and production, dissemination, and evaluation. (ODNI, U.S. National Intelligence - An Overview 2011)   [Note: \"evaluation\" recently added as the sixth step in the cycle.]\n\n\n\n    The *Intelligence Cycle* is customarily illustrated as a repeating process consisting of [see graphic\nabove].\n\n\n    [1] *Planning and direction* encompasses the management of the entire effort and involves, in\nparticular, determining collection requirements based on customer requests.\n\n    [2] *Collection* refers to the gathering of raw data to meet the collection requirements. These data\ncan be derived from any number and type of open and secret sources.\n\n    [3] *Processing* refers to the conversion of raw data into a format analysts can use.\n\n    [4] *Analysis and production* describes the process of evaluating data for reliability, validity, and\nrelevance; integrating and analyzing it; and converting the product of this effort into a meaningful whole, which includes assessments of events and implications of the information collected.\n\n    [5] [*Dissemination*] the product is disseminated to its intended audience.\n\n-- Also, the process of developing unrefined data into polished intelligence for the use of policymakers\n(FBI at <http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/intelligence/intelligence-cycle>)\n\n\n## The \"Intelligence\" Cycle\n\n\n    [The intelligence cycle is] a series of feedback loops, with analyst at the center.  Initial problem\ndefinition may come from either a policymaker request or an analyst's assessment that an issue merits analytic attention. The analyst then looks at the data available and ideally may engage in a series of interactions with collectors, a series of feedback loops.  While in the collection phase, the analyst should be simultaneously engaging with policymakers or the war fighters, as appropriate, to refine questions as conditions change. When a finished intelligence product is produced, it should generate further questions from the consumer, and the feedback loops continue. The process operates on a continuum, as opposed to a discrete series of events with a defined beginning and end.\n-- Also, an iterative process in which collection requirements based on national security threats are developed, and intelligence is collected, analyzed, and disseminated to a broad range of customers. Consumers sometimes provide feedback on finished intelligence products, which can be used to refine any part of the intelligence cycle to ensure consumers are getting the intelligence they need to make informed decisions and/or take appropriate actions. (Congressional Research Service (CRS) Report RL33616, 14 Jan 2009)\n\n## The Intelligence Cycle - An Iterative Process\n\n\n\n## Intelligence Shapes National Security Policies...\n\n\n    The successful intelligence process converts acquired information into clear, comprehensible\nintelligence and delivers it to the President, policymakers, and military commanders in a form they can utilize to make educated policy decisions.  Generating reliable, accurate intelligence is an active, never-ending process commonly referred to as the intelligence cycle.\n\n    The process begins with identifying the issues in which policy makers are interested and defining\nthe answers they need to make educated decisions regarding those issues.  We then lay out a plan for acquiring that information and go about collecting it.  Once we have the proper intelligence, we sort through it, analyze what it means, and prepare summary reports and recommendations, which we deliver to national security policy makers. The answers our reports supply often reveal other areas of concern, which lead to more questions.  In this way, the end of one cycle effectively leads to the start of the next. -- Intelligence.Gov - How Intelligence Works (accessed 28 April 2011)\n            <http://www.intelligence.gov/about-the-intelligence-community/how-intelligence-works/>\n\n\n## Dynamic Process Fueling Dynamic Solutions ________________________\n\n\n\n## Intelligence Cycle... Still Valid????\n\n\n    According to Kristan J. Wheaton, Assistant Professor of Intelligence Studies at Mercyhurst\nUniversity, \"Intelligence professionals have long known that the traditional way of describing the\nintelligence process, the so called 'intelligence cycle,' is flawed.\" He concludes the intelligence cycle fails on three counts:  \"We cannot define what it is and what it isn't, it does not match the way intelligence actually works in the 21st Century, and it does not help us explain our processes to the decision-makers we support. Efforts to fix these flaws have not worked and, furthermore, this is all\nwidely recognized by those who have studied the role and impact of the cycle.\"\n\n\nIntelligence Database.  The sum of holdings of intelligence data and finished intelligence products at a given organization. (JP 1-02 and 2-01, Joint and National Intelligence Support to Military Operations, 5 January 2012) Intelligence Discipline.  A well-defined area of intelligence planning, collection, processing, exploitation, analysis, and reporting using a specific category of technical or human resources. (JP 2-0, Joint Intelligence, 22 Oct 2013)  Also see human intelligence (HUMINT); geospatial intelligence (GEOINT);\nmeasurement and signature intelligence MASINT); signals intelligence (SIGINT); open-source intelligence\n(OSINT); technical intelligence (TECHINT); counterintelligence (CI). Intelligence Enterprise.  The sum total of the intelligence efforts of the entire U.S. intelligence community. (ADRP 2-0, Intelligence, Aug 2012, p. 2-6) Intelligence Estimate.  The appraisal, expressed in writing or orally, of available intelligence relating to a specific situation or condition with a view to determining the courses of action open to the enemy or adversary and the order of probability of their adoption. (JP 1-02 and JP 2-0, Joint Intelligence, 22 Oct\n2013) Intelligence Federation.  A formal agreement in which a combatant command joint intelligence center receives preplanned intelligence support from other joint intelligence centers, Service intelligence organizations, Reserve organizations, and national agencies during crisis or contingency operations. (JP 1-02 and JP 2-01, Joint and National Intelligence Support to Military Operations, 5 Jan 2012) Intelligence Gap.  Information that is needed to inform intelligence analysis but is absent from reporting what we know we don't know.\n\n-- Also, a missing element that, if found, allows one to choose among alternatives with greater confidence. (Robert M. Clark, *Intelligence Analysis: A Target Centric Approach*, 2004)\n\n\n## Identifying [Intelligence] Gaps Is A Continuous And Iterative Process...\n\n\n-- Robert M. Clark, *Intelligence Analysis: A Target Centric Approach* (2004), p. 143 Intelligence Information Need.  A need, expressed by users of intelligence, for information necessary to support their mission. (Intellipedia) Intelligence Information Report (IIR). The primary vehicle used to provide HUMINT information to the consumer.  It utilizes a message format structure that supports automated data entry into the Intelligence Community databases. (JP 1-02 and JP 2-01.2, CI & HUMINT in Joint Operations, 16 Mar 2011 w/ chg 1 dated 26 Aug 2011)\n\n\n    IIRs contain *raw intelligence*unevaluated intelligence information, generally from a single source,\nthat has not been fully evaluated, integrated with other information, or interpreted and analyzed.\n\n-- Also, a report used to provide information collected via HUMINT to DoD and IC customers. The IIR\nutilizes a message format to support automated data entry into IC databases. (DHE-M 3301.001, Vol I: Collection Requirement, Reporting, and Evaluation Procedures, 30 Jan 2009, w/ chg 2 dated 1 Feb 2012)\n\nIntelligence Interrogation.  The systematic process of using approved interrogation approaches to question a captured or detained person to obtain reliable information to satisfy intelligence requirements, consistent with applicable law. (JP 1-02 and JP 2-01.2, CI & HUMINT in Joint Operations, 16 Mar 2011 w/ chg 1 dated 26 Aug 2011)  Also see educing information; elicitation; debriefing; interrogation;\nintelligence interviewing; interview.\n\n\n\n-- Also, the systematic process of using interrogation approaches to question a captured or detained person to obtain reliable information to satisfy foreign intelligence collection requirements. (DoDD 3115.09, DoD Intelligence Interrogations, Detainee Debriefings, and Tactical Questioning, 11 Oct 2012 w/ chg 1 dated 15 Nov 2013) DoD Policy:  No person in the custody or physical control of DoD or detained in a DoD facility shall\n\nbe subject to cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment as defined in title XIV of Public Law 109-163, also known as, \"The Detainee Treatment Act of 2005.\"  Acts of physical or mental torture are prohibited.\n\n    All intelligence interrogations, debriefings, or tactical questioning to gain intelligence from captured\nor detained personnel shall be conducted humanely, in accordance with applicable law and policy, including Army FM 2-22.3 (*Human Intelligence Collector Operations*, 6 Sep 2006).\n\n____________________\n\n    Intelligence interrogations and tactical questioning will be conducted only by personnel trained\nand certified IAW DoDD 3115.09.  All DoD interrogations will operate using US Army Field Manual\n2-22.3, Human Intelligence Collector Operations.\n\n       -- JP 2-01.2, *CI & HUMINT in Joint Operations (U),* 16 Mar 2011 w/ chg 1 dated 26 Aug 2013, p. IV-9\n____________________\n\n    For DoD policy see DoDD 3115.09, DoD Intelligence Interrogations, Detainee Debriefings, and\n   *Tactical Questioning*, 11 Oct 2012 with change 1 dated 15 Nov 2013.\n    Also see *Interrogation: World War II, Vietnam, and Iraq* (Washington, DC: National Intelligence\nCollege, Sep 2008); available online at <http://www.ndic.edu/press/12010.htm>\n\n Intelligence Interviewing.  The [non-coercive] gathering of useful and accurate information by professionals questioning detainees. (Intelligence Science Board, Intelligence Interviewing: Teaching Papers and Case Studies, April 2009)  Also see educing information; elicitation; debriefing; interrogation; interview.\n\n    See the 2009 Intelligence Science Board report, Intelligence Interviewing: Teaching Papers and\nCase Studies, available online at <www.fas.org/irp/dni/isb/interview.pdf> -- the emphasis of this report is on non-coercive intelligence interviewing.\n\n    This report may be of interest to the full range of intelligence professionals involved with\ninterrogation and intelligence interviewing. In particular to those who focus on strategic interrogation and/or \"high-value\" detainees.\n Intelligence Liaison.  [Activity which] includes official contacts between a component of the US Intelligence Community and a foreign intelligence or security service which are directly related to espionage or counterintelligence, or other intelligence activities. (DCID 5/1P)  Also see *liaison.* Intelligence Mission Management (IMM).  A systematic process by a joint intelligence staff to proactively and continuously formulate and revise command intelligence requirements, and track the resulting information through the processing, exploitation, and dissemination process to satisfy user requirements. (JP 1-02 and JP 2-01, Joint and National Intelligence Support to Military Operations, 5 Jan 2012)\nIntelligence Officer (IO).  A professionally trained member of an intelligence service. He or she may be serving in the home country or abroad as a member of a legal or illegal residency. (AFOSI Manual 71-142, 9 Jun 2000 and FBI FCI Terms)\n-- Also, a professional employee of an intelligence organization engaged in intelligence activities.\n\n(ODNI, U.S. National Intelligence - An Overview 2011)\n\n\nIntelligence Operations.  The variety of intelligence and counterintelligence tasks that are carried out by various intelligence organizations and activities within the intelligence process.  Intelligence operations include planning and direction, collection, processing and exploitation, analysis and production, dissemination and integration, and evaluation and feedback. (JP 1-02 and JP 2-01, Joint and National Intelligence Support to Military Operations, 5 Jan 2012)\n-- Also, the tasks undertaken by military intelligence units and Soldiers to obtain information to satisfy validated requirements. (ADRP 2-0, Intelligence, Aug 2012)\n\n    Note:  Intelligence consists of two components:  foreign intelligence (FI) and counterintelligence\n(CI).  *Intelligence operations* is a broad term with broad application, whereas \"CI operations\" is a specific term with a precise application.\n_____________________\n\nIntelligence operations are conducted to provide intelligence in support of all missions.\n\n    Intelligence operations gain and maintain contact with threat forces; collect signatures and\nobservables to identify, locate, and provide intentions of threat forces and threat networks. Intelligence operations are not solely accomplished from airborne platforms or standoff surveillance sites. They are often executed in and amongst local populations and in close proximity to threat forces and/or groups. Intelligence operations also facilitate understanding of the terrain and civil considerations within an area of operations.\n\n       -- U.S. Army TRADOC Pam 525-2-1, US Army Concept for Intelligence  2016-2028, 13 Oct 2010, p. 9\n Intelligence Oversight. The process of independently ensuring all DoD intelligence, counterintelligence, and intelligence-related activities are conducted in accordance with applicable U.S. law, E.O.s, Presidential directives, and DoD issuances designed to balance the requirement for acquisition of essential information by the IC, and the protection of Constitutional and statutory rights of U.S. persons. Intelligence Oversight also includes the identification, investigation, and reporting of questionable intelligence activities and S/HS matters involving intelligence activities. (DoDD 5148.11, ATSD/IO, 24 Apr 2013) Intelligence Planning (IP).  The intelligence component of the Adaptive Planning and Execution system, which coordinates and integrates all available Defense Intelligence Enterprise capabilities to meet combatant commander intelligence requirements. (JP 2-0, Joint Intelligence, 22 Oct 2013)  Also see Counterintelligence Functional Support Plan (CI FSP).\n\n-- Also, the intelligence portion of Adaptive Planning and Execution (APEX).  Intelligence planning provides a process that effectively integrates, synchronizes, prioritizes and focuses Defense intelligence (both Theater and National) on achieving the supported commander's operational objectives and desired effects during all phases of the plan.  Additionally, the process identifies knowledge gaps and capability shortcomings within the DoD intelligence community (IC). (CJCSM 3314.01, Intelligence Planning, 28 Feb\n2008)\n\n\n    Note:  the term \"Intelligence Campaign Planning\" or \"ICP\" is no longer in use; the process is now\nreferred to as \"Intelligence Planning.\"\n Intelligence Planning Process.  The intelligence component of Adaptive Planning. It is a process that integrates, synchronizes, prioritizes, and focuses DoD Intelligence (both theater and national) on achieving the supported commander's operational objectives and desired effects during all phases of an OPLAN or concept plan. Additionally, the process identifies knowledge gaps and capability shortfalls within DoD Intelligence. (DoDI 5105.21, DIA, 18 Mar 2008)\nIntelligence Preparation of the Battlespace (IPB).  The analytical methodologies employed by the Services or joint force component commands to reduce uncertainties concerning the enemy, environment, time, and terrain. Intelligence preparation of the battlespace supports the individual operations of the joint force component commands. (JP 1-02 and JP 2-01.3, Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment)  Also see Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment. Intelligence Process.  The process by which information is converted into intelligence and made available to users.  The process consists of six interrelated intelligence operations:  planning and direction, collection, processing and exploitation, analysis and production, dissemination and integration, and evaluation and feedback. (JP 1-02 and JP 2-01, Joint and National Intelligence Support to Military Operations, 5 Jan 2012)  Also see *intelligence cycle*.\n\n-- Also, the Army refers to the intelligence cycle as the \"intelligence process,\" which it defines as:\nintelligence operations are conducted by performing four steps that constitute the intelligence process: Plan, Prepare, Collect, and Produce.  Additionally, there are four continuing activities that occur across the four intelligence process steps: Generate intelligence knowledge, Analyze, Assess, and Disseminate. (See Chapter 4, \"Intelligence Process in Full Spectrum Operations,\" Army FM 2-0, Intelligence, Mar 2010)\n-- Also, those steps by which information is collected, converted into intelligence, and disseminated.\n\n(Senate Report 95-755, Book I - Glossary, 26 Apr 1976)\n\nIntelligence Processing.  Conversion of collected information and/or intelligence into a form more suitable for the production of intelligence. (CI Community Glossary and ICS Glossary) Intelligence Product.  An intelligence report disseminated to customers by an intelligence agency or element. The report contains information and/or analysis of potential intelligence value to meet the intelligence needs of users within and outside the Intelligence Community.  It may involve current or future developments or capabilities, intentions, and activities of entities of interest. (ICD 208, 17 Dec 2008) Intelligence Production. The integration, evaluation, analysis, and interpretation of information from single or multiple sources into finished intelligence for known or anticipated military and related national security consumer requirements. (JP 2-0, Joint Intelligence, 22 Oct 2013)  Also see *production*.\n\n-- Also, conversion of material into finished intelligence through the integration, analysis, evaluation, and/or interpretation of all available data and the preparation of intelligence products is support of known or anticipated customer requirements. (CI Community Glossary and ICS Glossary) Intelligence Reach.  The activity by which intelligence organizations proactively and rapidly access information from, receive support from, and conduct direct collaboration and information sharing with other units and agencies, both within and outside the area of operations, unconstrained by geographic proximity, echelon, or command. (ADRP 2-0, Intelligence, Aug 2012)*\n    * Note:  Supersedes the definition in Army FM 2-0, *Intelligence*, 23 Mar 2010\n________________________\n\nThree important aspects of intelligence reach are searches and queries, data mining, and collaboration.\n\n\n-- ADRP 2-0, *Intelligence*, Aug 2012 Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (IRTPA).  An act to reform the intelligence community and the intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the United States Government, and for other purposes. IRTPA established both the position of Director of National Intelligence (DNI) and the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC). (PL 108-458, 17 Dec 2004)\n    Link to the IRTPA: <http://www.ncix.gov/publications/law/index.html> Intelligence-Related Activities.  Those activities outside the consolidated defense intelligence program that: respond to operational commanders' tasking for time-sensitive information on foreign entities; respond to national intelligence community tasking of systems whose primary mission is support to operating forces; train personnel for intelligence duties; provide an intelligence reserve; or are devoted to research and development of intelligence or related capabilities. (Specifically excluded are programs that\n\n\nare so closely integrated with a weapon system that their primary function is to provide immediate-use targeting data.) (JP 1-02 and JP 2-01, Joint and National Intelligence Support to Military Operations, 5 Jan 2012) Intelligence Report (INTREP).  A specific report of information, usually on a single item, made at any level of command in tactical operations and disseminated as rapidly as possible in keeping with the timeliness of the information. (JP 1-02 and JP 2-01, Joint and National Intelligence Support to Military Operations, 5 Jan 2012)\n-- Also, a product of the production step of the intelligence cycle. (ICS Glossary)\n\nIntelligence Reporting.  The preparation and conveyance of information by any means. More commonly, the term is restricted to reports as they are prepared by the collector and as they are transmitted by the collector to the latter's headquarters and by this component of the intelligence structure to one or more intelligence-producing components. Thus, even in this limited sense, reporting embraces both collection and dissemination. (JP 1-02 and JP 2-01.2, CI & HUMINT in Joint Operations, 16 Mar 2011 w/ chg 1 dated 26 Aug 2011) Intelligence Requirement (IR). 1) Any subject, general or specific, upon which there is a need for the collection of information, or the production of intelligence; 2) A requirement for intelligence to fill a gap in the command's knowledge or understanding of the operational environment or threat forces. (JP 2-0, Joint Intelligence, 22 Oct 2013)  Also see *information requirements; collection requirement*.\n\n## The Articulation Of The Requirement Is The Most Important Part Of The Process, And It Seldom Is As Simple As It Might Seem. - Dia, *Intelligence Essentials For Everyone*, June 1999\n\n -- Also, a requirement for intelligence to fill a gap in the command's knowledge or understanding of the operational environment or threat forces. (DoDD S-3325.09, Oversight, Management, and Execution of Defense Clandestine Source Operations (U), 9 Jan 2013 w/ chg 1 dated 13 Jun 2013) -- Also, [intelligence] requirement: a general or specific validated request for intelligence information made by a user. (National HUMINT Glossary) -- Also, a type of information requirement developed by subordinate commanders and the staff\n(including subordinate staffs) that requires dedicated ISR collection for the elements of threat, terrain and weather, and civil considerations. (Army FM 2-0, Intelligence, 23 Mar 2010)\n-- Also, the need to collect intelligence information or to produce intelligence, either general or specific, on a particular subject. (ODNI, U.S. National Intelligence - An Overview 2011) Intelligence Sensemaking.  Encompasses the processes by which specialized knowledge about ambiguous, complex, and uncertain issues is created. This knowledge is generated by professionals\nwho in this context become known as Intelligence Sensemakers. (Sensemaking: A Structure for an Intelligence Revolution by David T. Moore)  Also see *sensemaking*.\n\n\n    Copy of *Sensemaking: A Structure for an Intelligence Revolution* by David T. Moore available at\n<http://ni-u.edu/ni_press/pdf/Sensemaking.pdf>\n\nIntelligence Source.  The means or system that can be used to observe and record information relating to the condition, situation, or activities of a targeted location, organization, or individual. (JP 2-0, Joint Intelligence, 22 Oct 2013)\n\n    An \"intelligence source\" can be people, documents, equipment, or technical sensors.\n\n\nIntelligence Sources and Methods.  1) *Sources*:  Persons, images, signals, documents, data bases, and communications media capable of providing intelligence information through collection and analysis programs, e.g., HUMINT, IMINT, SIGINT, and MASINT; and 2) *Methods*:  Information collection and analysis strategies, tactics, operations and technologies employed to produce intelligence products. If intelligence sources and methods are disclosed without authorization their effectiveness may be substantially negated or impaired. (IC Standard 700-1, 4 Apr 2008)\n\n The terms \"intelligence sources and methods\" are used in legislation and executive orders to denote specific protection responsibilities of the Director of National Intelligence (DNI). Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR).  An activity that synchronizes and integrates the planning and operation of sensors, assets, and processing, exploitation, and dissemination systems in direct support of current and future operations; this is an integrated intelligence and operations function. (DoDD 5143.01; JP 1-02; and JP 2-01, Joint and National Intelligence Support to Military Operations, 5 Jan 2012)\nIntelligence Synchronization.  The \"art\" of integrating information collection and intelligence analysis with operations to effectively and efficiently support decisionmaking. (ADRP 2-0, Intelligence, Aug 2012) Intelligence System.  Any formal or informal system to manage data gathering, to obtain and process the data, to interpret the data, and to provide reasoned judgments to decision makers as a basis for action. (JP 1-02 and JP 2-01, Joint and National Intelligence Support to Military Operations, 5 Jan 2012) Intelligence Task List (ITL).  A compilation of the specified and implied intelligence tasks required to satisfy the information needs to support the successful achievement of the Combatant Command's operational objectives. The ITL is developed by the Combatant Command J2 and Defense Intelligence Operations Coordination Center (DIOCC).  Assignment of roles and responsibilities for the specific collection, analysis and production is accomplished during the development of the [COCOM's IPLAN] and the NISP. The end state is a synchronized collection, analysis and production effort, from tactical to national level that will support the successful achievement of the Combat Command's operational objectives. (CJCSM 3314.01, Intelligence Planning, 28 Feb 2007) Intelligence Threat.  The intention and capability of any adversary to acquire and exploit critical information.  The purpose of the acquisition is to gain a competitive edge or diminish the success of a particular U.S program, operations, or industrial activity. (IOSS Intelligence Threat Handbook - Jun 2004) Also see threat; threat to national security; transnational threat; foreign intelligence collection threat.\n\n    Foreign intelligence services, along with terrorist groups, transnational criminal organizations, and\nother nonstate actors, are targeting and acquiring our national security information, undermining our economic and technological advantages, and seeking to influence our national policies and processes covertly. These foreign intelligence efforts employ traditional methods of espionage and, with growing frequency, innovative technical means.\n\n    Among significant foreign threats, **Russia** and **China** remain the most capable and persistent\nintelligence threats and are aggressive practitioners of economic espionage against the United States.\n\n        -- DNI, *Worldwide Threat Assessment of the US Intelligence Community*, SSCI, 12 March 2013\n\nIntellipedia.  The Intelligence Community's version of the famous encyclopedia. It is used by analysts, working groups, and engineers throughout the IC. (CIA news release March 2008) Interagency.  United States Government agencies and departments, including the Department of Defense. (JP 1-02 and JP 3-08, Interorganizational Coordination During Joint Operations, 24 Jun 2011) Also see interagency coordination. Interagency Coordination.  Within the context of DoD involvement, the coordination that occurs between elements of DoD, and engaged US Government agencies and departments for the purpose of accomplishing an objective. (JP 1-02 and JP 3-0, Joint Operations, 11 Aug 2011) Inter-dependency. [In critical infrastructure usage] relationships or connections between entities of different DoD Components and defense infrastructure sectors. (DoDD 3020.40, DoD Policy and Responsibilities for Critical Infrastructure, 14 Jan 2010 w/ chg 2 dated 21 Sep 2012)  Also see intradependency. Interdiction.  1) An action to divert, disrupt, delay, or destroy the enemy's military surface capability before it can be used effectively against friendly forces, or to otherwise achieve objectives; and 2) In support of law enforcement, activities conducted to divert, disrupt, delay, intercept, board, detain, or destroy, as appropriate, vessels, vehicles, aircraft, people, and cargo. See also air interdiction. (JP 1-02 and JP 3-03, Joint Interdiction, 3 May 2007) Intergovernmental Organization (IGO).  An organization created by a formal agreement (e.g., a treaty) between two or more governments. It may be established on a global, regional, or functional basis for wide-ranging or narrowly defined purposes. Formed to protect and promote national interests shared by member states. Examples include the United Nations, North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and the African Union. (JP 1-02 and JP 3-08, Interorganizational Coordination During Joint Operations, 24 Jun 2011)\n-- Also, an organization comprised primarily of sovereign states (referred to as member states), or\nof other IGOs. ( w/ chg 2 dated 21 Sep 2012, DoD Policy and Responsibilities for Critical Infrastructure, 14 Jan 2010) Internal Security.  The state of law and order prevailing within a nation. (JP 1-02 and JP 3-08, Interorganizational Coordination During Joint Operations, 24 Jun 2011) International Terrorist Activities.  Activities undertaken by or in support of terrorists or terrorist organizations that occur totally outside the United States, or that transcend national boundaries in terms of the means by which they are accomplished, the persons they appear intended to coerce or intimidate, or the locale in which the perpetrators operate or seek asylum. (DoD 5240.1-R, 7 Dec 1982) International Terrorism.  Activities that involve violent acts or acts dangerous to human life that violate federal, state, local, or tribal criminal law or would violate such law if committed within the United States or a state. Local, or tribal jurisdiction; appear to be intended to intimidate or coerce a civilian population; to influence the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion; or to affect the conduct of a government by assassination or kidnapping; and occur totally outside the United States, or transcend national borders in terms of the means by which they are accomplished, the persons they appear to be intended to coerce or intimidate, or the locale in which their perpetrators operate or seek asylum. (50 USC 1810 Section 101(c) and FBI Domestic Investigations and Operations Guide, 15 Oct 2011)\nInternational Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR).  A set of United States government regulations that control the export and import of defense-related articles and services on the United States Munitions List\n(USML). (Wikipedia, accessed 10 Sep 2013)\n\n    ITAR implements the provisions of the Arms Export Control Act (AECA), and are described in Title\n22 (Foreign Relations), Chapter I (Department of State), Subchapter M of the Code of Federal Regulations. The Department of State Directorate of Defense Trade Controls (DDTC) interprets and enforces ITAR. Its goal is to safeguard U.S. national security and further U.S. foreign policy objectives.\n\n    The related Export Administration Regulations are enforced and interpreted by the Commerce\nDepartment. DoD is also involved in the review and approval process. Physical enforcement of import and export laws at border crossings is performed by Customs and Border Protection, an agency of the Department of Homeland Security.\n\n    See State Department web site at: http://www.pmddtc.state.gov/regulations_laws/itar_official.html\n\n\nINTERPOL. The world's largest international police organization, with 188 member countries. Created in\n1923, it facilitates cross-border police co-operation, and supports and assists all organizations, authorities and services whose mission is to prevent or combat international crime. (www.interpol.int/)\n\n    INTERPOL aims to facilitate international police co-operation even where diplomatic relations do\nnot exist between particular countries. Action is taken within the limits of existing laws in different countries and in the spirit of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. INTERPOL's constitution prohibits \"any intervention or activities of a political, military, religious or racial character.\"\n Interpretation.  A part of the analysis and production phase in the intelligence process in which the significance of information is judged in relation to the current body of knowledge. (Previously in JP 2-0, Joint Intelligence, 22 Jun 2007) Interrogation.  Systematic effort to procure information by direct questioning of a person under the control of the questioner. (JP 1-02; JP 2-01.2, CI & HUMINT in Joint Operations, 16 Mar 2011 w/ chg 1 dated 26\nAug 2011; and Senate Report 94-755, Book I - Glossary, 26 Apr 1976)  Also see *educing information;*\nelicitation; debriefing; intelligence interrogation; intelligence interviewing; interview; strategic intelligence interrogation.\n\n\n\n-- Also, interaction and conversation with a source who appears initially unwilling to provide information. (Educing Information - Interrogation: Science and Art, Dec 2006)\n-- Also, systematic effort to procure information to answer specific collection requirements by direct and indirect questioning techniques of a person who is in the custody of the forces conducting the questioning. (Army FM 2-22.3, HUMINT Collector Operations, 6 Sep 2006 and FM 2-0, Intelligence, 23 Mar 2010) -- Also [law enforcement interrogation], the systematic effort by law enforcement investigators to prove, disprove, or corroborate information relevant to a criminal investigation using direct questioning in a controlled environment. (FM 19-10 / ATTP 3-39, Law and Order Operations, June 2011) -- Also, a methodology employed during the interview of a person to obtain information that the source would not otherwise willingly disclose.  A typical purpose is not necessarily to force a confession, but rather to develop, playing on the source's character, sufficient rapport as to prompt the source to disclose information valuable to the interrogator. (Wikipedia; accessed 1 Aug 2007)\n\n    Within DoD:  Intelligence interrogation is the systematic process of using approved techniques,\nconsistent with applicable law, to question a captured or detained person to obtain reliable information responsive to intelligence requirements.  Interrogation is considered an overt HUMINT\ncollection method but is regulated separately from other DoD HUMINT activities.\n____________________\n\n\n    For DoD policy see DoDD 3115.09, DoD Intelligence Interrogation, Detainee Debriefings, and\nTactical Questioning, 11 Oct 2012.\n\n    Per Executive Order 13491, *Ensuring Lawful Interrogations* (22 Jan 2009), only those interrogation\napproaches and techniques addressed in U.S. Army FM 2-22.3 are authorized.\n\n    U.S. Army FM 2-22.3, *Human Intelligence Collector Operations* (Sep 2006),  available online at:\n<http://www.fas.org/irp/doddir/army/fm2-22-3.pdf>\n\nInterrogation Approach.  [In detainee operations] an interrogation technique as identified in U.S. Army Field Manual 2-22.3 that is used by trained and certified interrogators to establish and maintain control over and rapport with a detainee in order to gain the detainee's cooperation to answer the interrogator's questions. (DoDD 3115.09, DoD Intelligence Interrogations, Detainee Debriefings, and Tactical Questioning, 11 Oct 2012 w/ chg 1 dated 15 Nov 2013)\n\n\nInterview.  [In intelligence usage,] to gather information from a person who is aware that information is being given although there is ignorance of the true connection and purposes of the interviewer. Generally overt unless the collector is other than purported to be. (JP 1-02)  Also see educing information; elicitation; debriefing; intelligence interrogation; intelligence interviewing; interrogation.\n\n-- Also, a nonstructured discussion, where open-ended questions are asked to determine facts about an incident or crime. (FM 19-10 / ATTP 3-39, Law and Order Operations, June 2011) -- Also, a dynamic human interaction to collect facts to be used for decision-making and/or actiontaking.  Interviewing is the gathering of facts/information; it is non-accusatory and less structured than an interrogation. -- Also, a conversation between two or more people (the interviewer and the interviewee) where questions are asked by the interviewer to obtain information from the interviewee. Interviews can be divided into two rough types, interviews of assessment and interviews for information. (Wikipedia)\n\n Investigative interview is the process whereby an investigator verbally obtains information from\n\npeople associated with direct knowledge relevant to the investigation.\n Intra-dependency. Relationships or connections between entities of a DoD Component and a defense infrastructure sector. (DoDD 3020.40, DoD Policy and Responsibilities for Critical Infrastructure, 14 Jan 2010 w/ chg 2 dated 21 Sep 2012)  Also see *inter-dependency*. Intrusion.  [In cyber usage], unauthorized access to a DoD, DIB [defense industrial base], or critical infrastructure network, information system, or application. (DoDI S-5240.23, CI Activities in Cyberspace (U), 13 Dec 2010 with change 1 dated 16 Oct 2013)\n-- Also, unauthorized act of bypassing the security mechanisms of a system. (CNSSI No. 4009, National Information Assurance Glossary, 26 April 2010)\n-- Also.  movement of a unit or force within another nation's specified operational area outside of territorial seas and territorial airspace for surveillance or intelligence gathering in time of peace or tension. (JP 1-02) Investigation.  The systematic inquiry into an allegation of unfamiliar or questionable activities, wherein evidence is gathered to substantiate or refute the allegation or questionable activity. An investigation is initiated when there are articulable facts that indicate a possible violation of law or policy. Some investigations may be conducted unilaterally by an agency (depending on their authorities), jointly with an external investigate body, or referred to an external investigate body for unilateral investigation. (ONCIX\nInsider Threat Detection - Glossary)  Also see *counterintelligence investigation.*\n-- Also, the application of law enforcement and/or counterintelligence authorities and methodologies to conduct a detailed, sustained, structured, and objective inquiry to ascertain the truth about an event, situation, or individual. (SECNAVINST 5430.107, Mission & Functions of the NCIS, 28 Dec 2005)\n-- Also, the act of investigating; the process of inquiring into or following up; research; study; inquiry, especially patient or thorough inquiry or examination.... (Wiktionary; accessed 28 June 2012)\n\n\n    Conducting a successful investigation is often the result of having a wide range of knowledge and\nusing common sense in its application. There are certain actions that apply to all investigations. Investigators follow these intelligent and logical steps to ensure that an investigation is conducted systematically and impartially. There are certain actions that, over time, have proven useful for specific investigations. It is a wise investigator who understands and applies the knowledge, skills, and techniques learned for a particular investigation and uses them wherever they are most useful in any investigation.\n\nInvestigations, Collections & Operations Nexus (ICON).  The Air Force's central counterintelligence and counterterrorism analysis center of excellence; an element of the Air Force Office of Special Investigations (AFOSI).\n\n   The ICON is AFOSI's primary stop for analytical and specialist support for all criminal and\ncounterintelligence investigations and operations.  It is the home to AFOSI's 24/7 Global Watch\nCenter and the current Intelligence Desk which produces AFOSI\"S flagship publication, the \"AFOSI Blue Line.\"  Additionally, the ICON is responsible for acting as the key liaison and interface with National Intelligence and Law Enforcement organizations for AFOSI's CI, CT, criminal, economic\ncrime, and cyber operational issues.\n\n       -- Air Force Office of Special Investigations\n Investigative Jurisdiction.  Term for the jurisdiction of an investigative agency over a particular crime or over the locus of where the crime was committed. (Leo D. Carl, *The CIA Insider's Dictionary*, 1996) Investigative Lead.  A person who possesses information about or was a witness to an incident under investigation or a record which contains information of value to the investigation. (AR 381-20, Army CI Program, 25 May 2010)  Also see *lead*. Investigative Plan (IP).  A detailed plan for the conduct of a CI investigation to ensure that all investigative activity is conducted in a properly sequenced, coordinated, coherent, timely and efficient manner. The plan should outline the actions to be accomplished to resolve an allegation, a report, or information relating to matters under investigation. (AR 381-20, Army CI Program, 25 May 2010) -- Also, a document used to plan proposed investigative activities, including special investigative techniques, to support counterintelligence investigation. (Army FM 2-22.2, CI, Oct 2009)\n\n## Blueprint For A Ci Investigation - A Tool To Describe The Purpose & Objectives\n\n\nThe IP is the equivalent of an operations order for the conduct of a CI investigation.\n\n\n-- 902d MI Group Investigations Handbook, Jun 2012, p.94\n\n    CI investigations will vary is scope, objective, and resources to successfully resolve the incident\n\nunder investigation.  The IP is the document that provides a detailed road map on the conduct of CI investigations including all investigative participants, all investigative activities required, all resources and external support required, and all interagency or legal coordination required to successfully resolve the incident.  IPs are living documents and may require revision due to information development and case direction.\n\n      - Army FM 2-22.2, *Counterintelligence*, Oct 2009 (Chapter 2 - CI Investigations, pp. 2-1 thru 2-47)\n Investigative Source.  See FOUO definition in AR 381-20, Army CI Program (U), 25 May 2010. Investigative Source Operation (ISO).  A controlled counterintelligence operation that may be used in counterintelligence investigations.  Also see *counterintelligence investigation*.\n\n    Three types of CI Investigative Source Operations are:  role players; collaborative sources; and\ninvestigative access sources.\n\n    Proposals for the use of an ISO require proper legal review and formal approval.  For detailed\ninformation see classified Army Regulation 381-20, *Army Counterintelligence  Program (U),* 25 May 2010, Chapter 10 - Counterintelligence Operations, paragraph 10 -2 (pp. 44-47).\n\nIrregular Warfare (IW)  A violent struggle among state and non-state actors for legitimacy and influence over the relevant population(s). (JP 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States, 25 Mar 2013)\n\n\n-- Also, a violent struggle among state and non-state actors for legitimacy and influence over the relevant population(s).  Irregular warfare favors indirect and asymmetric approaches, though it may employ the full range of military and other capacities, in order to erode an adversary's power, influence, and will. (DoD 3000.07, Irregular Warfare, 1 Dec 2008)\n-- Also, [as defined by Army] a violent struggle among state and nonstate actors for legitimacy and influence over a population. (FM 3-0, Operations, Feb 2008) ITAR.  See *International Traffic in Arms Regulations*.\n\nJ ========================================== J-2X.  The staff element of the intelligence directorate of a joint staff that combines and represents the principal authority for counterintelligence and human intelligence support. (JP 1-02 and JP 2-01.2, CI & HUMINT in Joint Operations, 16 Mar 2011 w/ chg 1 dated 26 Aug 2011)  Also see 2X.\n\n-- Also, a J-2 staff element normally associated with a deployed joint force, consisting basically of the HUMINT operations cell (HOC) and the task force counterintelligence coordinating authority (TFCICA), and the Operational Support Element (OSE). The J-2X is responsible for coordination and deconfliction of all human source-related activity. (DHE-M 3301.002, Vol II Collection Operations, 23 Nov 2010) Jack-in-the-Box (JIB).  A dummysometimes inflatableplaced in a car to deceive [surveillance] about the number of persons in the vehicle. (Spy Book)\n\n\n\n   \"A three-dimensional human torso sitting atop a spring-activated scissor-lift mechanism fitted with\na rotating head, which collapse[s] into a small portable briefcase or duffel bag. \"   Can be used to effectively elude surveillance by \"controlling the location of the event (an empty street...), the lighting (an unlit area), the audience (the trailing surveillance car), the timing (when the cars were a sufficient distance apart), and the sight line (visible only from the rear).\"\n\n       -- H. Keith Melton and Robert Wallace, *The Official CIA Manual of Trickery and Deception* (2009)\n________________________\n\n   \"It is used in an automobile to evade surveillance, by deceiving (a) surveillant(s) that a person being\ntailed is still in the automobile, when, in fact, the jib has replaced him or her.  The FBI was allegedly thus deceived while staking out Edward Lee Howard, the former CIA case officer who escaped and subsequently defected to the former USSR.\"\n        -- Leo D. Carl, *The CIA Insider's Dictionary* (1996), p. 319\n________________________\n\n   \"A jib is an inflatable man-sized dummy first employed by the CIA in the early 1980s. It was\ndesigned to replace an operative escaping from the inside of a moving vehicle. As the escapee rolls from the passenger side of the vehicle, the jib is employed. Thus, the jib serves as a decoy for pursuers [trailing surveillance team].\"\n\n       -- W. Thomas Smith, Jr., *Encyclopedia of the CIA*, 2003\n Jihad.  Arabic word derived from a verb that means \"to struggle, strive, or exert oneself.\"  Violent extremists understand the concept *jihad* as a \"religious call to arms.\"   Also see *jihadist*. Historically, key Sunni and Shia religious texts most often referred to *jihad* in terms of religious\n\napproved fighting on behalf of Islam and Muslims.  Most Al Qaeda-produced ideological material reflects Al Qaeda supporters' shared view of *jihad* as an individual duty to fight on behalf of Islam and Muslims, and, in some case, to offensively attack Muslims and non-Muslims who are deemed insufficiently pious or who oppose enforcement of Islamic principles and religious law.\n\n    The terms *jihadist, violent Islamist*, and *militant Islamist* refer to groups and individuals whose\nstatements indicate that they share such an understanding of *jihad* and who advocate or use violence against the United States or in support of transnational Islamist agendas.\n\n       -- Congressional Research Service (CRS) Report R41674, 8 Mar 2011\n____________________________\n\n    ...[J]ihad is a complex term that can be understood in a number of different ways. Traditional\nIslamic jurisprudence distinguishes between two major levels of jihad. The Greater Jihad refers to the inner struggle of the individual believer to affirm his or her commitment to the requirements of Islam, and is also called jihad of the heart. It is the Lesser Jihad, or jihad of the sword (often\ntranslated \"holy war,\" a translation the author scrupulously avoids) that is the central concern of his\nstudy.\n\n    Sometimes called the \"sixth pillar of Islam,\" there is no question that jihad is a required commitment\nof the Muslim. Moreover, although most Qur'anic verses define it as the collective responsibility all\nMuslims to defend the community against non-Muslim aggressors, there are a few verses, as well as hadith (authentic traditions ascribed to the Prophet Muhammad), that can be interpreted to justify wars of imperial conquest. It is also certainly true that at various times in Islamic history conquerors have used the concept of jihad to justify imperial expansion.\n\n       -- Max L. Gross, Dean of the School of Intelligence Studies, Joint Military Intelligence College,\n           and Middle East scholar and intelligence analyst. (As quoted in Joint Military Intelligence College, Discussion Paper 13, entitled *Global War Terrorism: Analyzing the Strategic Threat*, Nov 2004, p. viii-ix).\n Jihadist.  Term describes radicalized individuals using Islam as an ideological and/or religious justification for their belief in the establishment of a global caliphate, or jurisdiction governed by a Muslim civil and religious leader known as a caliph. (CRS Report R41416, 23 Jan 2013)  Also see *jihad*.\n\n Jihadists draw on Salafi Islamthe fundamentalist belief that society should be governed by\nIslamic law based on the Quran and following the model of the immediate followers and companions of the Prophet Muhammad.\n\n The CRS Report points out there is an important distinction between the terms \"radicalization\" and\n\"violent extremism\" as it relates to the threshold of U.S. law enforcement interest and action. This is because Americans have the right under the First Amendment to adopt, express, or disseminate ideas, even hateful and extremist ones. But when radicalized individuals mobilize their views, i.e., they move from a radicalized viewpoint to membership in a terrorist group, or to planning, materially supporting, or executing terrorist activity, then the nation's public safety and security interests are activated.  Thus, the terms may be differentiated as follows:\n\n        -- *\"Radicalization\"* describes the process of acquiring and holding radical, extremist, or jihadist\nbeliefs.\n\n        -- *\"Violent Extremism\"* describes violent action taken on the basis of radical or extremist\nbeliefs. For many, this term is synonymous with \"violent jihadist\" and \"jihadist terrorist.\"\n\n The term \"violent jihadist\" characterizes jihadists who have made the jump to illegally supporting,\nplotting, or directly engaging in violent terrorist activity.\n\n See CRS Report R41416, *American Jihadist Terrorism: Combating a Complex Threat*.  For more\non Salafi Islam, see CRS Report RS21695, *The Islamic Traditions of Wahhabism and Salafiyya*.\n\n    For more on Al Qaeda's global network, see CRS Report R41070, Al Qaeda and Affiliates:\nHistorical Perspective, Global Presence, and Implications for U.S. Policy.\n Joint.  Connotes activities, operations, organizations, etc., in which elements of two or more Military Departments participate. (JP1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States, 25 Mar 2013 and JP 1-02)\n\nJoint Base.  For purposes of base defense operations, a joint base is a locality from which operations of two or more of the Military Departments are projected or supported and which is manned by significant elements of two or more Military Departments or in which significant elements of two or more Military Departments are located. (JP 1-02 and JP 3-10, Joint Security Operations in Theater, 03 February 2010) Joint Captured Materiel Exploitation Center (JCMEC).  A physical location for deriving intelligence information from captured enemy materiel.  It is normally subordinate to the Joint Force/J-2. (JP 2-01, Joint and National Intelligence Support to Military Operations, 5 Jan 2012) Joint Counterintelligence Unit (JCIU).  An organization composed of Service and Department of Defense agency counterintelligence personnel, formed under the authority of the Secretary of Defense and assigned to a combatant commander, which focuses on the combatant command strategic and operational counterintelligence missions. (JP 1-02 and JP 2-01.2, CI & HUMINT in Joint Operations, 16 Mar 2011 w/ chg 1 dated 26 Aug 2011)\n\n\n-- Also, an organization composed of Service and Defense agency CI personnel, formed under the authority of a Secretary of Defense-approved operation order, which focuses on combatant command strategic and operational CI missions within an area of conflict.  This unit is under the command authority of the Combatant Commander, or his or her duly designated subordinate joint force commander, for the duration of the operation, or as otherwise specified in the operation plan or order. (DoDI S-5240.09, OFCO, 29 Oct 2008)\n\n    For more detailed discussion of the JCIU see Appendix B, Joint Counterintelligence Unit (U),\nJP 2-01.2, *CI & HUMINT in Joint Operations (U),* 16 Mar 2011 w/ chg 1 dated 26 Aug 2011.\n\n    Also see the *Joint Counterintelligence Unit Handbook (U)*, published June 2010 by the Defense\nCI & HUMINT Center (D2X-ES-C Lessons Learned Branch).\n\n    For lessons learned see the following classified reports - -- (U) *Strategic CI Directorate Iraq (SCID-I) Lesson Learned Report*,  5 Jun 2009 -- (U) *Strategic CI Directorate Afghanistan (SCID-A) Lesson Learned Report*, undated\n                circa Jun 2010)\n\n    Note:  The transition of Strategic CI Directorates (SCIDs) to Joint CI Units (JCIUs) was not merely\na change in titleit fundamentally changed the SCID from a CI organization with no clear chain of command to a CI unit that is directed, controlled, and focused by the Combatant Commander at the operational level of war.\n Joint Counterintelligence Training Academy (JCITA). Professional training and education institution for advanced joint DoD CI training. (DoDI 3305.11, DoD CI Training, 19 Mar 2007)   See counterintelligence training.\n\n-- Also, the primary professional training and education center for advanced and joint CI training within DoD and is known as the DoD Center of Excellence for CI training. (DoDI JCITA, 13 Nov 2013)\n\n    JCITA provides advanced counterintelligence training to the Department of Defense and\nother national security stakeholders agencies within the federal government.\n\n    JCITA SIPRNet website at:  <https://jcita.dia.smil.mil>\n\nJCITA  ...training counterintelligence today to protect our nation tomorrow.\n Joint Deployable Intelligence Support System (JDISS).  A transportable workstation and communications suite that electronically extends a joint intelligence center to a joint task force or other tactical user. (JP 1-02 and JP 2-0, Joint Intelligence, 22 Oct 2013) Joint Doctrine.  Fundamental principles that guide the employment of US military forces in coordinated action toward a common objective. Joint doctrine contained in joint publications also includes terms, tactics, techniques, and procedures. It is authoritative but requires judgment in application. (JP 1-02) Joint Document Exploitation Center (JDEC).  A physical location for deriving intelligence information from captured adversary documents including all forms of electronic data and other forms of stored textual and graphic information. It is normally subordinate to the joint force intelligence directorate. (JP 1-02 and\nJP 2-01.2, CI & HUMINT in Joint Operations, 16 Mar 2011 w/ chg 1 dated 26 Aug 2011)\n-- Also, a joint center established to receive, inventory, catalogue, selectively translate, and disseminate captured or acquired documents and media. (DHE-M 3301.002, Vol II Collection Operations, 23 Nov 2010)\n\n\nJoint Force.  A general term applied to a force composed of significant elements, assigned or attached, of two or more Military Departments operating under a single joint force commander. (JP 1-02) Joint Force Commander (JFC).  A general term applied to a combatant commander, subunified commander, or joint task force commander authorized to exercise combatant command (command authority) or operational control over a joint force.  (JP1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States, 25 Mar 2013 and JP 1-02)  Also see *joint force*. Joint Intelligence.  Intelligence produced by elements of more than one Service of the same nation. (JP 1-02 and JP 2-0, Joint Intelligence, 22 Oct 2013) Joint Intelligence Operations Center (JIOC).  An interdependent, operational intelligence organization at the Department of Defense, combatant command, or joint task force (if established) level, that is integrated with national intelligence centers, and capable of accessing all sources of intelligence impacting military operations planning, execution, and assessment. (JP 1-02 and JP 2-0, Joint Intelligence, 22 Oct 2013) -- Also, those centers, below the Defense-level (COCOM and specified Unified Commands)\nestablished by the Secretary of Defense on 3 April 2006, to plan, prepare, integrate, direct, synchronize, and manage continuous, full-spectrum defense intelligence operations within their respective AORs. The J2 of each command is designated as the respective JIOC Director. (DIA HUMINT Manual, Vol I, DHE-M 3301.001, 30 Jan 2009 w/ chg 2 dated 1 Feb 2012) Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment (JIPOE).  The analytical process used by joint intelligence organizations to produce intelligence estimates and other intelligence products in support of the joint force commander's decision-making process. It is a continuous process that includes defining the operational environment; describing the impact of the operational environment; evaluating the adversary; and determining adversary courses of action. (JP 1-02 and JP 2-01.3, Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment) Joint Intelligence Support Element (JISE).  A subordinate joint force element whose focus is on intelligence support for joint operations, providing the joint force commander, joint staff, and components with the complete air, space, ground, and maritime adversary situation. (JP 1-02 and JP 2-01, Joint and National Intelligence Support to Military Operations, 5 Jan 2012) Joint Intelligence Task Force-Combating Terrorism (JITF-CT). See Defense Combating Terrorism Center\n(DCTC).\n\n In the fall of 2012 the JITF-CT transitioned to the Defense Combating Terrorism Center (DCTC).\n\nJoint Intelligence Training (JIT).  Fundamental training that guides the development and utilization of intelligence professionals and organizations designed to support two or more Services employed in coordinated action. (DoDI 3305.14, JIT, 28 Dec 2007) Joint Inter-Agency Cyber Task Force (JIACTF). Joint inter-agency task force created by the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) to execute DNI responsibilities in monitoring and coordinating the CNCI and\nto report to the President on Comprehensive National Cybersecurity Initiative (CNCI) implementation, together with recommendations as deemed appropriate. (Securing Cyberspace for the 44th Presidency, Dec 2008)\n\n\nJoint Interrogation and Debriefing Center (JIDC).  Physical location for the exploitation of intelligence information from detainees and other sources. (JP 1-02 and JP 2-01.2, CI & HUMINT in Joint Operations, 16 Mar 2011 w/ chg 1 dated 26 Aug 2011)\n\n    JIDCs are established under the direction of the joint force commander within the joint operations\narea and are normally collocated with detainee holding facilities. The mission of the JIDC is to conduct screening and interrogation of detainees, questioning of walk-in sources, and translation and exploitation of documents associated with detainees. The JIDC coordinates exploitation of captured equipment with the joint captured material exploitation center, captured documents with the joint document exploitation center, and high-value human sources with the joint strategic exploitation center.\n\n   For additional information see JP 3-63, *Detainee Operations*, 30 May 2008\n\n Joint Interrogation Operations (JIO). 1) Activities conducted by a joint or interagency organization to extract information for intelligence purposes from enemy prisoners of war, dislocated civilians, enemy combatants, or other uncategorized detainees; or 2) Activities conducted in support of law enforcement efforts to adjudicate enemy combatants who are believed to have committed crimes against US persons or property. (JP 1-02 and JP 2-01, Joint and National Intelligence Support to Military Operations, 5 Jan 2012) Joint Investigation.  An investigation in which more than one investigative agency has established investigative authority over an offense and/or subject of the investigation, and the agencies involved agree to pursue the investigation in concert, with agreements reached detailing investigative responsibilities, procedures, and methods. (CI Community Lexicon) Joint Operational Planning.  Planning activities associated with joint military operations by combatant commanders and their subordinate joint force commanders in response to contingencies and crises. (JP 5-0, Joint Operation Planning, 11 Aug 2011) Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES).  An Adaptive Planning and Execution system technology. (JP 5-0, Joint Operation Planning, 11 Aug 2011) Joint Operation Planning Process (JOPP).  An orderly, analytical process that consists of a logical set of steps to analyze a mission, select the best course of action, and produce a joint operation plan or order. (JP 5-0, Joint Operation Planning, 11 Aug 2011) Joint Operations.  A general term to describe military actions conducted by joint forces and those Service forces employed in specified command relationships with each other, which of themselves, do not establish joint forces. (JP 1-02 and JP 3-0, Joint Operations, 11 Aug 2011)\n\nJoint Operations Area (JOA).  An area of land, sea, and airspace, defined by a geographic combatant commander or subordinate unified commander, in which a joint force commander (normally a joint task force commander) conducts military operations to accomplish a specific mission. (JP 1-02 and JP 3-0, Joint Operations, 11 Aug 2011) Joint Personnel Adjudication System (JPAS).  The centralized database of standardized personnel security processes; virtually consolidates the DoD Central Adjudication Facilities by offering real time information concerning clearances, access, and investigative statuses to authorized DoD security personnel and other interfacing organizations. (IC Standard 700-1, 4 Apr 2008)\n-- Also, the centralized Department of Defense database of standardized personnel security processes; virtually consolidates the DoD Central Adjudication Facilities by offering real time information concerning clearances, access, and investigative statuses to authorized DoD security personnel and other interfacing organizations (e.g., Defense Security Service, Defense Manpower Data Center, Defense Civilian Personnel Management, and the Air Force personnel Center). (DSS Glossary)\n\n\nJoint Personnel Recovery Center (JPRC).  The primary joint force organization responsible for planning and coordinating personnel recovery for military operations within the assigned operational area. (JP 1-02 and JP 3-50, Personnel Recovery, 5 Jan 2007) Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP).  A plan that provides guidance to the combatant commanders and the Joint Chiefs of Staff to accomplish tasks and missions based on current military capabilities. (JP 5-0, Joint Operation Planning, 11 Aug 2011) Joint Strategic Exploitation Center (JSEC).  Theater-level physical location for an exploitation facility that functions under the direction of the joint force commander and is used to hold detainees with potential long-term strategic intelligence value, deemed to be of interest to **counterintelligence** or criminal investigators, or who may be a significant threat to the Unites States, its citizens or interest, or US allies.\n\n(JP 1-02 and JP 2-01.2, CI & HUMINT in Joint Operations, 16 Mar 2011 w/ chg 1 dated 26 Aug 2011)\n\n\n    The JSEC is a theater-level exploitation facility and is normally collocated with a rear area\ncollection and holding center for detainees.  The JSEC's mission is the conduct of interrogations\nand debriefings to generate intelligence information responsive to theater and national\nrequirements, and to identify detainees with potential long-term strategic intelligence value,\ndeemed to be of interest to **counterintelligence** or criminal investigators, or who may be a\nsignificant threat to the United States, its citizens or interests, or US allies.\n Joint Task Force (JTF).  A joint force that is constituted and so designated by the Secretary of Defense, a combatant commander, a subunified commander, or an existing joint task force commander. (JP 1-02) Joint Task Force Counterintelligence Coordinating Authority.  See Task Force Counterintelligence Coordinating Authority (TFCICA). Joint Terrorism Task Forces (JTTFs). Small cells of highly trained, locally based, investigators, analysts, linguists, SWAT experts, and other specialists from dozens of U.S. law enforcement and intelligence agencies. It is a multi-agency effort led by the Justice Department and FBI designed to combine the resources of federal, state, and local law enforcement. (DoJ website: <http://www.usdoj.gov/jttf/>)  Also see *National Joint Terrorism Task Force*. -- Also, a coordinated \"action arm\" for federal, state, and local government response to terrorist threats in specific U.S. geographic regions. The FBI is the lead agency that oversees the JTTFs. (ODNI, U.S. National Intelligence - An Overview 2011)\n-- Also, an FBI-led task force whose primary mission is to collect intelligence of actual, suspected, or planned acts of terrorism directed against U.S. persons and property. (DoD FCIP Strategy FY 2013-2017)\n\n    JTTFs were established by the FBI to conduct operations to predict and disrupt terrorist plots.\nJTTFs are in over 100 cities nationwide; in addition, there is at least one in each of the FBI's 56 field offices. The National Joint Terrorism Task Force (NJTTF), in Washington, D.C., coordinates all the JTTFs.\n\n       -- ODNI, *U.S. National Intelligence - An Overview 2011*, p. 30\n____________________\n\n    Joint Terrorism Task Forces (JTTFs) are based in 103 cities nationwide, with at least one in each\nof the FBI's 56 field offices. They include more than 4,400 members nationwide and represent\nsome 600 state and local agencies and 50 federal agencies.\n\n       -- FBI, Today's FBI: Facts & Figures 2013-2014\n____________________\n\n    DoD CI personnel participating on JTTFs work in partnership with other JTTF members to detect\nand neutralize terrorists, terrorist-enabling individuals, and organizations threatening DoD interest.\n\nJoint Worldwide Intelligence Communications System (JWICS). The sensitive compartmented information portion of the Defense Information Systems Network, which incorporates advanced networking technologies that permit point-to-point or multipoint information exchange involving voice, text, graphics, data, and video teleconferencing. (JP 2-0, Joint Intelligence, 22 Oct 2013)\n-- Also, the Intelligence Community's TS-SCI global network; a communications network that delivers secure information services to national and defense intelligence components around the world. All U.S. Government TS-SCI networks run off of JWICS. (National Intelligence: A Consumer's Guide - 2009) Judgment.  [As used in intelligence analysis] Judgment is what analysts use to fill gaps in their knowledge. It entails going beyond the available information and is the principal means of coping with uncertainty. It always involves an analytical leap, from the known into the uncertain. Judgment is an integral part of all intelligence analysis. (*Psychology of Analysis* by Richards J. Heuer, Jr, 1999)\n\n\nK ========================================== Key.  A numerical value used to control cryptographic operations, such as decryption, encryption, signature generation, or signature verification. (CNSSI No. 4009, National Information Assurance Glossary, 26 April 2010) Key Enabler.  That crucial element that supplies the means, knowledge, or opportunity that allows for the success of an assigned task or mission. (USJFCOM Glossary) Key Facilities List.  A register of selected command installations and industrial facilities of primary importance to the support of military operations or military production programs. It is prepared under the policy direction of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. (JP 1-02)\nKeystroke Monitoring.  The process used to view or record both the keystrokes entered by a computer user and the computer's response during an inactive session. (NIST, Glossary of Key Information Security Terms, May 2013) Khobar Towers Bombing.  A terrorist [truck] bombing of the residence of U.S. military personnel at the Khobar Towers complex in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia, on 25 June 1996 killed 19 American military personnel and wounded hundreds more. (Words of Intelligence, 2nd Edition, 2011) Knowledge.  In the context of the cognitive hierarchy, information analyzed to provide meaning and value or evaluated as to implications for the operation. (FM 6-0, Mission Command, 11 Aug 2003). Knowledge Management.  The process of enabling knowledge flow to enhance shared understanding, learning, and decisionmaking. (ADRP 6-0, Mission Command, May 2012) Knowledgeability Brief (KB).  A document used to notify consumers of the availability and background of an overt source for debriefing. (DHE-M 3301.002, Vol II Collection Operations, 23 Nov 2010)\n\nL ========================================== Laundering.  In counterdrug operations, the process of transforming drug money into a more manageable form while concealing its illicit origin. Foreign bank accounts and dummy corporations are used as shelters. (JP 1-02 and JP 3-07.4, Joint Counterdrug Operations, 13 Jun 2007)\n-- Also, a process of hiding sources, transmittal, and people involved in financial matters and transfers of money for intelligence and today more commonly for criminal purposes, primarily associated with terrorist activity and narcotics trafficking. (Words of Intelligence, 2nd Edition, 2011) Law Enforcement.  Activities to protect people, places and things from criminal activity resulting from noncompliance with laws, includes patrols, emergency responses, undercover operations, arrests, raids, etc.\n\n-- Also, the generic name for the activities of the agencies responsible for maintaining public order and enforcing the law, particularly the activities of prevention, detection, and investigation of crime and the apprehension of criminals. (www.ojp.usdoj.gov; accessed 29 Apr 2013)\n\n\n## Counterintelligence Is Part Art, Part Science, A Discipline Aimed At Identifying And Exploiting Or Stopping Foreign Spies. Law Enforcement Is Easier: You Identify The Bad Guys And Arrest Them.\n\n\n-- Bill Gertz, \"Enemies,\" *The Washington Times*, 18 Sep 2006\n\n\n\n    Traditional law enforcement activities aim at apprehending and prosecuting perpetrators of criminal\nactivity after the commission of their crimes.  In most circumstances, the primary responsibility of law enforcement is to determine whether a crime has been committed, conduct an investigation to identify and apprehend the perpetrator, and gather evidence to assist prosecutors in a criminal trial.\n\n    Law Enforcement is police work waging a war against crime*it's evidence-prosecution centric*.\nWhereas counterintelligence is national security work waging a war against foreign intelligence threats*it's information-exploitation centric.*\n\n    Each operates in fundamentally dissimilar manners... different legal authorities, oversight\nstructures, governing paradigms, cultures, etc.  These two disciplines merge or intersect when hidden intelligence activity is also criminal, i.e., national security crimes (espionage, treason, spying, etc.).\n\n         \"Effective enforcement of U.S. espionage statues and Articles 104 and 106 of\n\nthe Uniform Code of Military Justice is essential to national security.... Services\n\nhave different approaches to counterintelligence due to their unique missions....\n\nNCIS and AFOSI counterintelligence doctrine holds that counterintelligence\n\nprimarily is a law enforcement issue.  ...under Army counterintelligence doctrine,\n           counterintelligence is, first and foremost, an intelligence mission....\nConsiderable intersection exists between law enforcement, counterintelligence,\n\nand intelligence in the areas of espionage, terrorism, and low-intensity conflict....\n\nThe law enforcement, counterintelligence, and intelligence collection disciplines\n\n must complement one another.\"\n\n\n## ___________________ The Goals Of Law Enforcement And Intelligence Collection Conflict...\n\n          \"Law enforcement agencies collect information solely to put criminals in prisona onetime,\nshort-term goal; pay the informant, make a bust, go to trial with the informer as witness. Espionage is conducted for long-term production of intelligence:  recruit the agent, collect the information, hopefully for years or decades.\"\n\nLaw Enforcement Agency (LEA).  Any of a number of agencies (outside the Department of Defense) chartered and empowered to enforce US laws in the United States, a state or territory (or political subdivision) of the United States, a federally recognized Native American tribe or Alaskan Native Village, or within the borders of a host nation. (JP 1-02 and JP 3-28, Defense Support of Civil Authorities, 31 Jul 2013) Law Enforcement Officer.  An employee, the duties of whose position are primarily the prevention, investigation, apprehension, or detention of individuals suspected or convicted of offenses against the criminal laws, including an employee engaged in this activity who is transferred to a supervisory or administrative position; or serving as a probation or pretrial services officer. (Cited as 18 USC at <http://www.lectlaw.com/def/l008.htm>) Law of War.  That part of international law that regulates the conduct of armed hostilities. Also called the law of armed conflict. (JP 1-02 and JP 1-04, Legal Support to Military Operations,17 August 2011)\nLawful Search.  An examination, authorized by law, of a specific person, property, or area for specified property evidence, or a specific person, for the purpose of seizing such property, evidence or person. (AR 190-30, Military Police Investigation, 1 Nov 2005) Lead.  In intelligence usage, a person with potential for exploitation, warranting additional assessment, contact, and/or development. (JP 1-02 and JP 2-01.2, CI & HUMINT in Joint Operations, 16 Mar 2011 w/ chg 1 dated 26 Aug 2011)   Also see *Counterintelligence Operational Lead (CIOL).*\n-- Also, an identified potential source. (HDI Lexicon, April 2008 and Defense HUMINT Enterprise Manual 3301.002, Vol II Collection Operations, 23 Nov 2010)\n-- Also, [for investigative purposes,] single investigative element of a case requiring action. (IC\nStandard 2008-700-01, 4 Apr 2008)\n-- Also, any source of information that, if exploited, may reveal information of value in the conduct of\na counterintelligence investigation. (AR 381-20, Army CI Program, 25 May 2010)\n-- Also, for CI collection purposes, any person who has the potential to provide information of value\nto the supported command. (DoD, CI Functional Services IWG Handbook, 19 Feb 2009) Lead Agency.  The US Government agency designed to coordinate the interagency oversight of the dayto-day conduct of an ongoing operation. (JP 1-02 and JP 3-08 Interorganizational Coordination During Joint Operations, 24 June 2011)\n\n-- Also, in CI usage concerning an investigation, the agency in a joint investigation that has primary authority concerning the offense committed or is designated as such by agreement of the investigative agencies involved.  The lead agency is ultimately responsible for determination of investigative responsibilities, procedures, and methods. Also see *joint investigation.*\nLead Federal Agency (LFA).  The federal agency that leads and coordinates the overall federal response to an emergency. Designation and responsibilities of a lead federal agency vary according to the type of emergency and the agency's statutory authority. (JP 1-02 and JP 3-41, CBRNE Consequence Management, 2 Oct 2006) Leaks.  See *unauthorized disclosure*.\n\n## National Security Leaks\n\n\n   \"I am deeply disturbed by the continuing leaks of classified information to the media..., disclosures\nof this type endanger American lives and undermine America's national security.\"\n\n        -- Senator Dianne Feinstein, Chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee, 5 June 2012\n\n\nLeast Intrusive Means.  See *Rule of Least Intrusive Means*. The collection of information about US persons shall be accomplished by the *least intrusive means*. Legal Attache (LEGAT). The FBI has offices around the globe. These officescalled legal attaches or legatsare located in U.S. embassies. (fbi.gov)   -- See <http://www.fbi.gov/contact-us/legat>\n-- Also, the title of FBI special agents deployed abroad to liaison posts in overseas diplomatic missions... (*Historical Dictionary of Cold War Counterintelligence*, 2007) Legal Residency.  An intelligence apparatus in a foreign country composed of intelligence officers assigned as overt representatives of their government, but not necessarily identified as intelligence officers. (ICS Glossary) Legal Traveler.  Any individual traveling with legitimate documentation to perform a specific collection or support mission. (National HUMINT Glossary)\n\n-- Also, any individual traveling with legal documentation to perform specified intelligence collection\nor support missions, or any individual who may be selected for debriefing on legal travel to or through geographical areas of interest. (AR 381-20, Army CI Program, 25 May 2010) Legend.  The complete cover story developed for an operative. (CI Centre Glossary)\n-- Also, a coherent and plausible account of an individual's background, living arrangements, employment, daily activities, and family given by a foreign intelligence service by an illegal or agent. Often the legend will be supported by fraudulent documents. (FBI FCI Terms)\n-- Also, false identify that an agent builds up through forged documents and other means such as living under the name of the person whose identify he assumes. (Spy Book)\n-- Also, a carefully constructed cover for an intelligence officer. (Spycraft)\n-- Also, a spy's fictional identity and a complete cover story developed for operatives. (Encyclopedia of Cold War Espionage, Spies, and Secret Operations, 3rd edition, 2012) Liaison.  That contact or intercommunication maintained between elements of military forces or other agencies to ensure mutual understanding and unity of purpose and action. (JP 1-02 and JP 3-08, Interorganizational Coordination During Joint Operations, 24 Jun 2011)  Also see *intelligence liaison*.\n\n\n-- Also, [activity] conducted to obtain information and assistance, to coordinate or procure material, and to develop views necessary to understand counterparts. Liaison contacts are normally members of the government, military, law enforcement, or other member of the local or coalition infrastructure. The basic tenet of liaison is *quid pro quo*. An exchange of information, services, material, or other assistance is usually a part of the transaction. (Army FM 2-22.3, HUMINT Collector Operations, 6 Sep 2006)\n\n## A Basic Tenet Of Liaison Is Quid Pro Quo (Something For Something Exchange.\n\n\n-- FM 2-22.2, Counterintelligence , October 2009, p. 4-8\n_______________________\n\n\n    \"A crucial but often overlooked part of U.S. intelligence efforts is liaison with foreign intelligence\nservices.... A productive liaison relationship does not necessarily preclude spying on each other\nbut it does mean both sides try to be especially careful not to get caught at it.\"\n\n       -- James M. Olson, *Fair Play: The Moral Dilemmas of Spying* (2006)\n_______________________\n\n  \"Liaison is not explicitly spelled out in the theoretical approaches [regarding]  intelligence. If one\nlooks to the intelligence cycle paradigm, one will even discover that liaison has no fixed location in the cycle... it is actually a mode of activity in every point in the intelligence cycle [and] shares this quality\nwith counter-intelligence.\"\n\n       -- Dutch Analysts Bob De Graaf and Cees Wiebes in Jeffreys-Jones, *External Vigilance* (1997)\n_______________________\n\n   \"Answering questions about the costs and benefits of foreign intelligence liaison requires a thorough\nunderstanding of the subject in theory and in U.S. practice. Although sometimes equated with intelligence sharing, intelligence liaison is actually better understood as a form of subcontracted intelligence collection based on barter.\"\n\n       -- Dr. Jennifer E. Sims, \"Foreign Intelligence Liaison: Devils, Deals, and Details,\" International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence, Vol 19 No 2 (Summer 2006), p. 196\n_______________________\n\n   \"Liaison has a number of associated risks, one being the problem of false corroboration. It is not\nuncommon for several intelligence services to unwittingly use the same agent.\"\n\n        -- Robert M. Clark, *Intelligence Analysis: A Target-Centric Approach* (2004), p. 72\n Liaison Operations. Operations to coordinate activities and exchange information with foreign military, governmental, and non-governmental civilian agencies. (DHE-M 3301.002, Vol II Collection Operations, 23 Nov 2011)\n\n    According to Army FM 2-22.3 (HUMINT Collector Operations), \"liaison operations\" are programs\nto coordinate activities and exchange information with host country and allied military and civilian agencies and NGOs.  CI liaison activities are designed to ensure a cooperative operating environment for CI elements and/or to obtain information, gain assistance, develop CI leads for\nfurther exploitation, procure material, etc.\n Lie.  Any statement made with the intent to deceive. (Textbook of Political-Military Counterdeception: Basic Principles & Methods, August 2007) Light Cover [aka shallow cover].  A type of cover that will not withstand close scrutiny or due diligence. (National HUMINT Glossary) Line of Operations.  1) A logical line that connects actions on nodes and/or decisive points related in time and purpose with an objective(s).  2) A physical line that defines the interior or exterior orientation of the force in relation to the enemy or that connects actions on nodes and/or decisive points related in time and space to an objective(s). (JP 1-02)\n-- Also, a line that defines the directional orientation of a force in time and space in relation to the enemy and links the force with its base of operations and objectives. (Army FM 3-0, Operations, Feb\n2008) Link.  A behavioral, physical, or functional relationship between nodes. (JP 1-02)\nLink Analysis.  Subset of network analysis, exploring associations between objects. Listening Post.  A secure site at which signals from an audio operation are monitored and/or received. (Spycraft)\nLoad.  Tradecraft jargon... to put something in a dead drop; to service a dead drop. (Leo D. Carl, The CIA Insider's Dictionary, 1996)\n\n\nLoad Signal.  A visual signal to indicate the presence of an individual or object at a given location. (HDI Lexicon, April 2008)\n-- Also, ...a visual signal displayed in a covert manner to indicate the presence of an individual or object at a given location. (JP 1-02 and JP 3-50, Personnel Recovery, 5 Jan 2007) Local Agency Check (LAC).  A review of the appropriate criminal history and court records in jurisdictions over areas where the Subject has resided, attended school, or been employed during a specific period of time. (IC Standard 700-1, 4 Apr 2008) Also see *Military Agency Check; National Agency Check*.\n\n-- Also, a records or files check of official or publicly available information retained by any local office or government agency within the AO [area of operation] of the field element conducting the check. (FM 2- 22.2, Counterintelligence, October 2009) -- Also, a records or files check of official or publicly available information conducted at any local office or government agencies within the operational area of the [CI] field element conducting the check. These records may include holdings and databases maintained by local and state law agencies, local courts, and local offices of federal agencies. (902d MI Group Investigations Handbook, Jun 2012)\n-- Also, an investigative check of local police departments, courts, etc., to determine whether the subject has been involved in criminal conduct. The LAC is a part of all Personnel Security Investigations (PSIs) except the Entrance National Agency Check (ENTNAC). (DSS Glossary) Logic Bomb.  A piece of code intentionally inserted into a software system that will set off a malicious function when specified conditions are met. (NIST, Glossary of Key Information Security Terms, May 2013)\n-- Also, computer jargon for programmed instructions clandestinely inserted into software, where they remain inactive and undetected until the computer reached a certain point in its operations, at which time the instructions take over. (Leo D. Carl, *The CIA Insider's Dictionary*, 1996)\n-- Also, [in cyber usage] also known as a \"time bomb,\" a program that allows a Trojan to lie dormant and then attack when the conditions are just right. Triggers for logic bombs include a change in a file, a particular series of keystrokes, or a specific time or date. (McAfee Labs - Threat Glossary) Lone Wolf.  A lone wolf or lone-wolf fighter is someone who commits violent acts in support of some group, movement, or ideology, but does so alone, outside of any command structure. (Wikipedia; accessed 28 Jun 2011)\n\n## The Lone Wolf - One Of The Biggest Challenges\n\n\n    Individuals who sympathize with or actively support al-Qa'ida may be inspired to violence and\ncan pose an ongoing threat, even if they have little or no formal contact with al-Qa'ida.\n\n        -- National Strategy for Counterterrorism, June 2011, p. 4\n___________________________\n\n    Lone wolf terrorism involves terrorist attacks carried out by persons who (a) operate individually,\n(b) do not belong to an organized terrorist group on network, and (c) whose modi operandi are collected are conceived and directed by the individual without any direct outside hierarchy.\n\n       -- Flukiger, \"The Radical,\" pp. 111-119.\n___________________________\n\n   \"Inspire\" magazine -- al Qaeda of the Arabian Peninsula's English-language magazine -- has a\nregular feature called \"Open Source Jihad\" ...that is intended to train... lone wolves and small cells\nin the West to conduct attacks and to provide them with the tools necessary to do attacks. [This magazine seeks to encourage]  ...jihadists to conduct lone wolf attacks. Lone wolf assailants are really the most difficult type for government intelligence and security agencies to gather intelligence about. Really to find a lone wolf assailant, you need to monitor his activities closely and understand\nwhat's going on inside his head if he doesn't communicate to other people. Because of this, the\nlone wolf really presents a challenge to Western security and intelligence agencies.\n\n        -- Stratfor.com (4 April 2010)\n     <http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/20110404-dispatch-al-qaedas-inspire-magazine>\n___________________________\n\n    A Lone Wolf is characterized by the following operational strengths and weaknesses. First, it is\ndifficult to anticipate who a Lone Wolf is because there is no longer any need for physical contact with extremists for radicalization to occur. As Raffaello Pantucci puts it in his article on Lone Wolves: \"The increasing prevalence of the Internet and the easy availability of extremist material\nonline have fostered the growth of the autodidactic extremist.\"  Second, the Lone Wolf actor is the most difficult terrorist to detect, deter, or capture, because his planning takes place\nalmost entirely within his own mind [emphasis added].\n\n       -- Thomas F. Ranieri with Spencer Barrs, \"Internet and Ideology: The Military Counterintelligence\n           Challenges of the Net Wolf,\" *American Intelligence Journal*, Vol 29, No 2, 2011, p. 82\n Lookout.  Stationary position from which a fixed surveillance is conducted and is ostensibly hidden from view or knowledge of the target of the surveillance. (Words of Intelligence, 2nd Edition, 2011) Low Visibility Operations.  Sensitive operations wherein the political-military restrictions inherent in covert and clandestine operations are either not necessary or not feasible; actions are taken as required to limit exposure of those involved and/or their activities. Execution of these operations is undertaken with the knowledge that the action and/or sponsorship of the operation may preclude plausible denial by the initiating power. (JP 1-02 and JP 3-05.1, Joint Special Operations Task Force Operations, 26 Apr 2007)\n\nM ========================================= M3.  Acronym for \"Multimedia Message Manager\" within the DoD Intelligence Information System (DoDIIS). M3 provides automated text message handling to the military and civilian intelligence community in a classified environment.\n\n    M3 is the standard message handler for the DoDIIS community which provides:  real-time\ndissemination of incoming message traffic based on user interest profiles; retrospective search of archive message database; and message composition, co-ordination, release and validation. M3 software automatically filters and delivers personalized information to individuals and groups, based on their content and delivery preferences. The search software also enables users to search through more than 20 years' worth of stored messages.\n Mail Cover.  The process by which a record is made of any data appearing on the outside cover of\nany class of mail matter as permitted by law, other than that necessary for the delivery of mail or administration of the Postal Service. (DoD 5240.1-R, Dec 1982)\n-- A record of information on the outside (cover) of any mail piece. It is kept to locate a fugitive, protect national security, or obtain evidence of a crime punishable by a prison term exceeding 1 year. This record is one of the few ways information on mail may be disclosed outside the USPS, and its use is lawful only if authorized by postal regulations. (USPS Pub 32, *Glossary of Postal Terms*, May 1997) -- Also, an investigative tool used to record information on the outside container, envelope, or wrapper of mail, including the name and address of the sender and the place and date of postmarking. (USPS Publication 146, *A Law Enforcement Guide to the U.S. Postal Service,* Sep 2008)\n\n    Postal Service Regulation 39 CFR  233.3 is the sole authority and procedure for opening a mail\ncover and for processing, using and disclosing information obtained from a *mail cover*.\n\n    See USPS Pub 146, *A Law Enforcement Guide to the U.S. Postal Service* (Sep 2008)* and USPS\nPub 55, *USPS Procedures: Mail Cover Requests,* available from the US Postal Service by request to authorized users.\n\n           * USPS Pub 146 also available at:  <www.hsdl.org/?view&doc=112575&coll=limited>\n Make (aka made).  Tradecraft jargon... surveillance term for the surveillant being detected by the subject of a surveillance. (Leo D. Carl, The CIA Insider's Dictionary, 1996) Malicious Code.  Software or firmware intended to perform an unauthorized process that will have adverse impact on the confidentiality, integrity, or availability of an information system. A virus, worm, Trojan horse, or other code-based entity that infects a host. (NIST, Glossary of Key Information Security Terms, May 2013) Also see malware, *Trojan Horse.* Malicious Cyber Activity.  Activities, other than those authorized by or in accordance with U.S. law, that seek to compromise or impair the confidentiality, integrity, or availability of computers, information or communications systems, networks, physical or virtual infrastructure controlled by computers or information systems, or information resident thereon. (PPD-20, US Cyber Operation (U), 16 Oct 2012) Malware.  A program that is inserted into a system, usually covertly, with the intent of compromising the confidentiality, integrity, or availability of the victim's data, applications, or operating system or of otherwise annoying or disrupting the victim. (NIST, Glossary of Key Information Security Terms, May 2013)\n\n\n-- Also, a generic term used to describe malicious software such as viruses, Trojan horses, spyware, and malicious active content. (McAfee.com; accessed 15 Nov 2010) -- Also, malicious or malevolent software, including viruses, worms, and Trojans, that is preprogrammed to attack, disrupt, and/or compromise other computers and networks. A packaged exploitation of vulnerability, there is often a  \"payload\" of instructions detailing what the system should do after it has been compromised. (Cybersecurity and Cyberwar) -- Also, malicious software that secretly accesses a computer system without the owner's informed consent.  A general term to mean a variety of forms of hostile, intrusive, or annoying software or program code, including computer viruses, worms, trojan horses, spyware, most rootkits, and other malicious software or program. (Wikipedia)\n\n\n   Malware -- an acronym that stands for MALicious softWARE -- comes in many forms.  Generally\nspeaking, malware is software code or snippets of code designed with malice in mind and usually performs \"undesirable actions\" on a host system.\n_____________________\n\n    According to Kevin Coleman, *Defense Systems*,  \"...in 2009, there were 25 million new strains of\nmalware.  That equals a new strain of malware every 0.79 seconds.\"  Recently he blogged that \"...in the past month [Sep 2012] there were more than 2,166,000 new strains of malware introduced into our operational environment.\"\n\n         -- Source:  <http://defensesystems.com/blogs/cyber-report/2012/09/cyber-threats.aspx?sc_lang=en > (accessed 15 Dec 2012)\n_____________________\n\n    According to an article in the *Journal of Homeland and National Security Perspectives*,  In 2008,\n\"a service member in the Middle East inserted a flash drive with malware known as\n\nagent.btz into a classified government computer. The worm infected the classified\n\nintranets titled Secret Internet Protocol Router Network (SIPRNET) and Joint Worldwide Intelligence communication System (JWICS). The worm had been designed to execute\n\na predetermined search once on the targeted computer system, upon finding the\n\ndesired data it would transfer it covertly to the thumb drive, and once reinserted into\n\na machine connected to the internet the data immediately transferred from the thumb\n\ndrive back to the creators of the malware. The foreign intelligence agency that designed\n\nthis worm, suspected of being Russian Intelligence, created a highly sophisticated worm\n\nin agent.btz that could think for itself, morphing when threatened and capable of\n\nidentifying and using multiple exfiltration paths. Agent.btz is probably not the only\n\nmalware that has successfully accessed classified American systems. Foreig\n\n intelligence agencies are constantly working to develop more advanced intrusion\n\nsets, at the same time the U.S. attempts to detect intrusions. It would be irresponsible\n\nto assume that U.S. networks are fully secure, and the U.S., and every other nation,\n\nwill have to deal with that reality for the foreseeable future.\"\n\n        --  Ashley Tanner, \"Examining the Need for a Cyber Intelligence Discipline,\" Journal of Homeland\n            *and National Security Perspectives* 1:1, 2014\n\nManipulation.  The mixing of factual and fictitious or exaggerated evidence (one of the four deception means for conveying deception information to a target). (CIA, D&D Lexicon, 1 May 2002) Maritime Domain.  All areas and things of, on, under, relating to, adjacent to, or bordering on a sea, ocean or other navigable waterway, including all maritime-related activities, infrastructure, people, cargo, and vessels and other conveyances. (NSPD-41/HSPD-13, Maritime Security Policy, 21 Dec 2004)\n-- Also, the oceans, seas, bays, estuaries, islands, coastal areas, and the airspace above these, including the littorals. (JP 3-32, Command and Control for Joint Maritime Operations, 8 Aug 2006) Marine Corps Intelligence Activity (MCIA). MCIA provides tailored intelligence and services to the Marine Corps, other services, and the IC based on expeditionary mission profiles in littoral areas. (DoD FCIP Strategy FY 2013-2017)\n\n    For Marine Corps doctrine, tactics, techniques, and procedures on counterintelligence see Marine\nCorps Warfighting Publication (MCWP) 2-14, *Counterintelligence*, 5 Sep 2000.\n Maskirovka.  Soviet term -- a set of measures to deceive, or mislead, the enemy with respect to Soviet national security capabilities, actions, and intentions. These measures include concealment, simulation, diversionary actions and disinformation. The Soviet Union doctrine of maskirovka calls for the use of camouflage, concealment and deception (CC&D) in defense-related programs and in the conduct of military operations. (NSSD 108, 12 Oct 1983)  Also see *deception*.\n\n    *Maskirovka* is actually a very broad concept that encompasses many English terms. These\ninclude: camouflage, concealment, deception, imitation, disinformation, secrecy, security, feints,\ndiversions, and simulation. While terms overlap to a great extent, a complication is that the Russian\nterm is greater than the sum of these English terms. Thus, those in the West should attempt to grasp the entire concept rather than its components.\n\n    Maskirovka is not a new concept in the USSR. Its roots can be traced to the Russian Imperial\nArmy. Several Soviet authors trace it back to Dmitry Donskoy's placing a portion of his mounted forces in an adjacent forest at the Battle of Kulikovo Field in 1380. Seeing a smaller force than anticipated, the Tatars attacked, only to be suddenly overpowered by the concealed force.\n\n         -- Charles Smith,\"Soviet Maskirovko,\" *Airpower Journal*, Spring 1988\n           Copy available at <http://www.airpower.au.af.mil/airchronicles/apj/apj88/spr88/smith.html>\n MCC. See *Military Counterintelligence Collection*. McCarthyism.  The practice of making accusations of disloyalty, subversion, or treason without proper regard for evidence.  (<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/McCarthyism>; accessed 29 Aug 2012)\n\n    The term has its origins in the period in the United States known as the Second Red Scare, lasting\nroughly from 1950 to 1954 and characterized by heightened fears of communist influence on American institutions and espionage by Soviet agents. Originally coined to criticize the anticommunist pursuits of Republican U.S. Senator Joseph McCarthy of Wisconsin, \"McCarthyism\" soon took on a broader meaning, describing the excesses of similar efforts. The term is also now used more generally to describe reckless, unsubstantiated accusations, as well as demagogic attacks on the character or patriotism of political adversaries.\n\n       -- Source:  Wikipedia at <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/McCarthyism> (accessed 29 Aug 2012)\n\nMeaconing.  A system of receiving radio beacon signals and rebroadcasting them on the same frequency to confuse navigation.  The meaconing stations cause inaccurate bearings to be obtained by aircraft or ground stations. (JP 1-02 and JP 3-13.1, Electronic Warfare, 25 Jan 2007) Measurement and Signature Intelligence (MASINT).  Information produced by quantitative and qualitative analysis of physical attributes of targets and events in order to characterize, and identify them. (ICD 1, Intelligence Community Leadership, 1 May 2006)\n\n-- Also, technically derived intelligence data other than imagery and SIGINT. The data results in intelligence that locates, identifies, or describes distinctive characteristics of targets. It employs a broad group of disciplines including nuclear, optical, radio frequency, acoustics, seismic, and materials sciences. (ODNI, U.S. National Intelligence - An Overview 2011)\n\n\n-- Also, information produced by quantitative and qualitative analysis of physical attributes of targets and events in order to characterize, locate, and identify them. MASINT exploits a variety of phenomenolgies to support signature development and analysis, to perform technical analysis, and to detect, characterize, locate, and identify targets and events. MASINT is derived from specialized, technically-derived measurements of physical phenomenon intrinsic to an object or event and it includes the use of quantitative signatures to interpret the data. (DoDI 5105.58, MASINT, 22 Apr 2009)\n-- Also, information produced by quantitative and qualitative analysis of physical attributes of targets and events to characterize, locate, and identify targets and events, and derived from specialized, technically derived measurements of physical phenomenon intrinsic to an object or event. (JP 2-0, Joint Intelligence, 22 Oct 2013)\n-- Also, describes a category of technically derived information that provides distinctive characteristics of a specific event such as a nuclear explosion, or locates, identifies, and describes distinctive characteristics of targets through such means as optical, acoustic, or seismic sensors. (WMD Report)\n\n\n    MASINT will become increasingly important in providing unique scientific or highly technical\ninformation contributions to the IC. It can provide specific weapon identifications, chemical compositions and material content, and a potential adversary's capability to employ weapons.\n\n       -- IC21: HPSCI Staff Study, 6 Apr 1996 (p. 40)\n__________________________\n\n    MASINT is scientific and technical intelligence information used to locate, identify, or describe\ndistinctive characteristics of specific targets. It employs a broad group of disciplines including nuclear, optical, radio frequency, acoustics, seismic, and materials sciences. For example, MASINT can identify distinctive radar signatures created by specific aircraft systems or the chemical composition of air and water samples.\n\n    The Central MASINT Organization, a component of the Defense Intelligence Agency, is the focus\nfor all national and Department of Defense MASINT matters.\n\n       -- www.intelligence.gov (accessed 13 Aug 2012)\n__________________________\n\n    An excellent open source book on MASINT see:  Robert M. Clark, The Technical Collection of\nIntelligence. Washington, DC: CQ Press, 2011.\n Measures of Effectiveness (MOE).  A criterion used to assess changes in system behavior, capability, or operational environment that is tied to measuring the attainment of an end state, achievement of an objective, or creation of an effect. (JP 1-02 and JP 3-0, Joint Operations, 11 Aug 2011) Media Exploitation.  The receipt, cataloging, duplication, screening/prioritizing, gisting, initial evaluation, translating key pieces of media, uploading data into appropriate data bases, identifying the need for further detailed exploitation of pieces of media, tracking the requested detailed exploitation efforts, and disseminating selected media for further use/analysis by the Intelligence Community. (National Media Exploitation Center CONOPS, Jan 2004) MI5.  British Security Service is responsible for \"protecting the UK against threats to national security from espionage, terrorism and sabotage, from the activities of agents of foreign powers, and from actions intended to overthrow or undermine parliamentary democracy by political, industrial or violent means.\"\n(www.mi5.gov.uk/) MI6.  British Secret Intelligence Service (SIS) is responsible for foreign intelligence. MI6 collects secret intelligence and mounts covert operations overseas in support of British Government objectives IAW the UK's Intelligence Services Act of 1994. (www.sis.gov.uk/)\n\n\nMICE.  The commonly used acronym to explain the motivation of traitors.  MICE stands for \"money, ideology, coercion, and ego,\" a combination of which may prompt an individual to betray his/her country. (*Historical Dictionary of Cold War Counterintelligence*, 2007)  Also see *motivation.*\n\n## Motivations For Espionage Vary\n\n\nIf you add \"revenge\" to the list above, then the acronym is \"CRIME\"\n\n\"MALICE\" is another acronym for Money, Anger, Lust, Ideology, Compromise, and Ego.\n___________________________\n\n    \"Spies, being human, often invent a better-sounding motive if their sole reason for\n     betraying their country is money.\" **       -- General Frantisek Moravec, Former head of Czech Military Intelligence Microdot.  Photographic reduction of documents to three by six millimeters. (FBI FCI Terms)  See *Mikrat.*\n-- Also, the photographic reduction of writing or other material to facilitate transfer from one location\nto another without detection. (Spy Book) -- Also, an optical reduction of a photographic negative to a size that is illegible without magnification, usually 1mm or smaller in area. (Spycraft)\n\n    Microdots are another method of surreptitious communication between an agent in the field and his\ncontroller. Photographs are reduced down to microscopic size, so that they are practically invisible to the naked eye. Microdots are generally concealed under stamps, on top of punctuation marks in\ntypewritten letters, or under the lips of envelopes.\n\n       - Peter Wright, *Spycatcher* (1987), p. 119\n Mikrat.  Smaller than a microdot. (FBI FCI Terms)  See *microdot.*\n\n-- Also, the product of microphotography, as used in microdots. (Spy Book)\n\n\nMilitary Agency Check (MAC).  A records or files check conducted at any military agency with the AO [area of operations] of the field element conducting the check. (FM2.22-2, Counterintelligence, Oct 2009). Also see local agency check; national  agency check. Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG).  A joint Service group, normally under the military command of a commander of a unified command and representing the Secretary of Defense, which primarily administers the US military assistance planning and programming in the host country. (JP 1-02 and JP 3-22, Foreign Internal Defense, 12 Jul 2010) Militarily Critical Technology.  See critical technology; militarily critical technologies list; technology. Militarily Critical Technologies List (MCTL).  A technical reference for the development and implementation of DoD technology security policies on international transfers of defense related goods, services, and technologies as administered by the Director, Defense Technology Security Administration (DTSA). (DoDI 3020.46, MCTL, 24 Oct 2008)\n\n\n    -- MCTL website at <http://www.dtic.mil/mctl/>\n    -- Also see <http://www.acq.osd.mil/rd/tech_security/mctp/mctl.html>\n\n    -- Also see <http://www.dhra.mil/perserec/csg/t1threat/mctl.htm>\n Military Counterintelligence Collection (MCC).  An CI collection activity using recruited or non-recruited sources to collect information responsive to operational, tactical, and strategic CI requirements, to include those of the Military Departments. (DoDI S-5240.17, CI Collection Activities, 14 Mar 2014) Also see collection; counterintelligence collection; *counterintelligence collection activities*. Military Deception (MILDEC). Deception that is conducted to deliberately mislead adversary and potential adversary decision makers and commanders in order to cause the adversary to take specific actions or inactions that will contribute to the accomplishment of the friendly mission. [This definition is proposed for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02]. (DoDI S-3604.01, Department of Defense Military Deception, 11 Mar 2013) Also see *deception, deception in support of OPSEC*.\n\n-- Also, actions executed to deliberately mislead adversary military decision makers as to friendly military capabilities, intentions, and operations, thereby causing the adversary to take specific actions (or inactions) that will contribute to the accomplishment of the friendly mission. (JP 1-02 and JP 3-13.4, Military Deception, 13 Jul 2006)\n-- Also, those actions executed to deliberately mislead adversary decisionmakers as to friendly military capabilities, intentions, and operations, thereby causing the adversary to take specific actions (or inactions) that will contribute to the accomplishment of the friendly mission. (Army FM 3-0, Operations, with Chg 1,  2011)\n\n\nIn war-time, truth is so precious that she should always be attended by a bodyguard of lies\n\n-- Winston Churchill (November 1943)\n\nas cited in Anthony Cave Brown, *Bodyguard of Lies: The Extraordinary True Story Behind D-Day* (1975)\n\n\n    MILDEC is conducted to deliberately mislead adversary and potential adversary decision makers\nand commanders in order to cause the adversary to take specific actions or inactions that will contribute to accomplishment of the friendly mission.\n\n    MILDEC can mask, protect, reinforce, exaggerate, minimize, distort, or otherwise misrepresent\nU.S. technical and operational capabilities, intentions, operations, and associated activities.\n___________________\n\n    According to JP 3-13.4, Counterintelligence provides the following for MILDEC planners:\n\n\n    1)  Identification and analysis of adversary intelligence systems to determine the best deception conduits; 2)  Establishment and control of deception conduits within the adversary intelligence system, also known as offensive CI operations;\n    3)  Participation in counterdeception operations; 4)  Identification and analysis of the adversary's intelligence system and its susceptibility to deception and surprise; and 5)  Feedback regarding adversary intelligence system responses to deception operations.\n\n    For additional information see Joint Pub 3-13.4, *Military Deception*, 13 Jul 2006\n_____________________\n\nIt was Desert Storm that I became convinced of the power of deception in warfare, it truly is a force multiplier.\n\n\n-- Tommy Franks (General, USA Ret), *American Solider* (2004) Military Department (MILDEP).  One of the departments within the Department of Defense created by\nthe National Security Act of 1947, which are the Department of the Army, the Department of the Navy, and the Department of the Air Force. (JP 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States, 25 Mar 2013) Military Department Counterintelligence Organization (MDCO).  Elements of the Military Departments authorized to conduct CI investigations, i.e., Army CI, Naval Criminal Investigative Service [NCIS], and the Air Force Office of Special Investigations [AFOSI]. (DoDD 5240.06, CIAR, 17 May 2011 w/ chg 1 and DoDI 5240.10, CI in the Combatant Commands and Other DoD Components, 5 Oct 2011 w/ chg 1)\n    MDCO, formerly known as \"CI Lead Agencies,\" approved for inclusion in next edition of JP 1-02. Military Information Support Operations (MISO).  Planned operations to convey selected information and indicators to foreign audiences to influence their emotions, motives, objective reasoning, and ultimately the behavior of foreign governments, organizations, groups, and individuals. The purpose of psychological operations is to induce or reinforce foreign attitudes and behavior favorable to the originator's objectives. (JP 1-02 and JP 3-13.2, Psychological Operations, 7 Jan 2010)\n\n    Previously known as Psychological Operations or PSYOP; this change directed by SECDEF\nMemo, subject: Changing the Term Psychological Operations (PSYOP) to Military Information Support Operations (MISO), dated 3 Dec 2010.  Also FY2012 National Defense Authorization Act (P.L.112-81) Section 1086, re-designates \"psychological operations\" as \"military information support operations\" in Title 10, United States Code, to conform to DoD usage.\n Military Intelligence (MI).  The collection, analysis, production, and dissemination of information relating to any foreign military or military-related situation or activity that is significant to military policy-making or the planning and conduct of military operations and activities. (DoDD 5143.01, USD/I, 23 Nov 2005)\n\n\n    Military intelligence appears in three basic forms:  strategic, operational, and tactical.\n\n    -- **Strategic Intelligence**:  intelligence that is required for the formulation of strategy, policy, and\n        military plans and operations at the national and theater levels.\n\n    -- **Operational Intelligence**:  intelligence that is required for planning and conducting campaigns\nand major operations to accomplish strategic objectives within theaters or operational areas.  It focuses on narrower, but significant theater-oriented military responsibilities.\n\n    -- **Tactical Intelligence**:  intelligence that is required for planning and conducting tactical military\noperations at the local level. It concerns information about the enemy that is designed to help locate the enemy and decide which tactics, units, and weapons will most likely contribute to victory in an assigned area, and when properly applied, it can be a significant force multiplier.\n\nMilitary Intelligence Board (MIB).  A decision-making forum which formulates Department of Defense intelligence policy and programming priorities. (JP 1-02 and JP 2-0, Joint Intelligence, 22 Oct 2013) Military Intelligence Program (MIP).  The MIP consists of programs, projects, or activities that support the Secretary of Defense's intelligence, counterintelligence, and related intelligence responsibilities. This includes those intelligence and counterintelligence programs, projects, or activities that provide capabilities to meet warfighters' operational and tactical requirements more effectively. The term excludes capabilities associated with a weapons system whose primary mission is not intelligence. The term \"MIP\" replaces the terms \"Joint Military Intelligence Program (JMIP)\" and \"Tactical Intelligence and Related Activities (TIARA).\" (DoDD 5205.12, MIP, 14 Nov 2008)\n\n    The Joint Military Intelligence Program (JMIP) and the Tactical Intelligence and Related Activities\n(TIARA) were combined in 2005 to form the MIP.\n\n   \"The MIP was established to improve management of Defense Intelligence capabilities and\nresources.  USD/I is the Program Executive for the MIP.\"\n\n        -- USD/I Memo, subj: Establishment of the MIP, 1 Sep 2005\n Military Service.  A branch of the Armed Forces of the United States, established by act of Congress, in which persons are appointed, enlisted, or inducted for military service, and which operates and is administered within a military or executive department. The Military Services are: the United States Army, the United States Navy, the United States Air Force, the United States Marine Corps, and the United States Coast Guard. (JP 1-02) Military Source Operations.  The collection, from, by and/or via humans, of foreign, military and militaryrelated intelligence. (JP 1-02 and JP 2-01.2, CI & HUMINT in Joint Operations, 16 Mar 2011 w/ chg 1 dated 26 Aug 2011)\n-- Also, DoD HUMINT collection and operations focused on foreign military and military-related intelligence conducted under the authorities of the Secretary of Defense. Military source operations are conducted by appropriately trained and certified personnel under the control of a Defense HUMINT Executor. (DoDD S-3325.09, Oversight, Management, and Execution of Defense Clandestine Source Operations, 9 Jan 2013, with chg 1 dated 13 Jun 2013) -- Also, the collection from, by, and/or via humans, of foreign military and military-related intelligence conducted under SecDef authorities to satisfy DoD needs. (HDI Lexicon, April 2008)\n-- Also, DoD HUMINT activity or operation which is conducted to specifically respond to, and satisfy, DoD intelligence collection requirements. These operations directly support the execution of the Secretary's responsibilities, commanders in the field, military operational planners, and the specialized requirements of the military departments (e.g., research and development process, the acquisition of military equipment, and training and doctrine) and span the entire HUMINT operational continuum, utilizing varying degrees of tradecraft to ensure the safety and security of the operation.  (Defense HUMINT Enterprise Manual 3301.002, Vol II Collection Operations, 23 Nov 2010)\n\n\n    Military Source Operations are conducted by trained personnel under the control of Defense\nHUMINT Executors.  See DoDD S-5200.37, *Management and Execution of Defense HUMINT (U),* 9 Feb 2009 for specifics.\n Misdirection.  A classic conjurer's trick, misdirection is the term applied in the counterintelligence community for the tactic of supplying an ostensibly plausible explanation for an event actually caused by something quite different, probably by an individual or an operation, deemed sufficiently valuable to require protection. Invariably a human asset may produce some information which requires action that could compromise him or her, so misdirection is intended to divert attention elsewhere. (Historical Dictionary of Cold War Counterintelligence, 2007)\n\n\nMisperception.  The formation of an incomplete or inaccurate image or perception of some aspect of reality. The faulty image may be formed due to a lack of information or intentionally erroneous information provided to the perceiver. (CIA, D&D Lexicon, 1 May 2002) Mission.  1) The task, together with the purpose, that clearly indicates the action to be taken and the reason therefore; 2) in common usage, especially when applied to lower military units, a duty assigned to an individual or unit; a task. (JP 1-02 and JP 3-0, Joint Operations, 11 Aug 2011)\nMission Assurance. A process to protect or ensure the continued function and resilience of capabilities and assetsincluding personnel, equipment, facilities, networks, information and information systems, infrastructure, and supply chainscritical to the execution of DoD mission-essential functions in any operating environment or condition. (DoDD 3020.40, DoD Policy and Responsibilities for Critical Infrastructure, 14 Jan 2010 w/ chg 2 dated 21 Sep 2012)\n-- Also, the process or state of ensuring the survival of an organization's essential missions and operating capability when confronted by natural or man-made emergencies and disasters. (DoD Strategy for Operating in Cyberspace, May 2011) Mission Critical Functions.  Any function, the compromise of which would degrade the system effectiveness in achieving the core mission for which it was designed. (DoDI 5200.44, Protection of Mission Critical Functions to Achieve Trusted Systems and Networks, 5 Nov 2012) Mission Manager.  A position with the [Intelligence] Community for an individual, operating with the Director's [DNI] authorities, who coordinates all intelligence activities against a specific country or topic\n[e.g., counterterrorism counterproliferation, counterintelligence]. (HPSCI Report 27 Jul 2006)\n-- Also, *Mission Managers* are the principal Intelligence Community officials overseeing all aspects\nof national intelligence related to their respective mission areas.  Mission Managers are designated for counterintelligence, counterterrorism, Counterproliferation, Iran, North Korea, and Cuba & Venezuela. (ICD 900, Mission Management, 21 Dec 2006)\n    The NCIX serves as the Mission Manger for Counterintelligence. The Director NCTC serves as the Mission Manager for Counterterrorism. Mission Need.  A requirement for access to specific information to perform or assist in a lawful and authorized governmental function.  Mission needs are determined by the mission and functions of an IC element or the roles and responsibilities of particular IC personnel in the course of their official duties. (ICD 501, 21 Jan 2009)\nMission Statement.  A short sentence or paragraph that describes the organization's essential task(s), purpose, and action containing the elements of who, what, when, where, and why. (JP 1-02 and JP 5-0, Joint Operation Planning, 11 Aug 2011)  Also see *mission*.\n\nMission Tasking Authority (MTA).  See *Counterintelligence Mission Tasking Authority*.\n\nMitigation.  Actions taken in response to a warning or after an incident occurs that are intended to lessen the potentially adverse effects on a given military operation or infrastructure. (DoDD 3020.40, DoD Policy and Responsibilities for Critical Infrastructure, 14 Jan 2010 w/ chg 2 dated 21 Sep 2012)\n-- Also, ongoing and sustained action to reduce the probability of or lessen the impact of an adverse incident. Includes solutions that contain or resolve risks through analysis of threat activity and vulnerability data, which provide timely and accurate responses to prevent attacks, reduce vulnerabilities, and fix systems. (DSS Glossary)\n\n-- Also, capabilities necessary to reduce loss of life and property by lessening the impact of disasters.\n\n( PPD-8, 2011)\n\n\nModus Operandi (MO).  A distinct pattern or method of procedure thought to be characteristic of or habitually followed by an individual or an organization involved in criminal or intelligence activity. (AR 381-20, Army CI Program, 25 May 2010)\n\n    Modus Operandi--a Latin phrase--approximately translated as \"method of operating.\"  The term is\nused to describe someone's habits or manner of working, their method of operating or functioning. In English, it is frequently shortened to M.O.\n Mole.  A member of an organization who is spying and reporting on his/her own organization on behalf of a foreign country; also called a penetration. (National HUMINT Glossary)  Also see *mole hunt*; penetration.\n\n-- Also, a human penetration into an intelligence service or other highly sensitive organization. Quite often a mole is a defector who agrees to work in place. (CI Centre Glossary)\n\n-- Also, literary and media term for penetration agent infiltrated into an opposition government agency.\n\n(Leo D. Carl, *The CIA Insider's Dictionary*, 1996)\n-- Also, the opposing faction's insert, or penetration, into an intelligence apparatus. (TOP SECRET:\nThe Dictionary of Espionage and Intelligence, 2005)\n\n     In 1622, Sir Francis Bacon used the term \"mole\" in the *History of the Reign of King Henry VII:*\n             He was careful and liberal to obtain good Intelligence from all parts abroad....  As\n\nfor his secret spials, which he did employ both at home and abroad, by them to\n             discover what practices and conspiracies were against him, surely his care required\n             it; he had such *moles* [emphasis added] perpetually working and casting to undermine\n             him. (p. 216)\n\n    In modern times, the term was popularized by John le Carre (penname for David Cornwell, a\nBritish author of espionage novels) who used the term \"mole\" to mean a \"penetration\" of a adversary intelligence service.  In le Carre's 1974 novel, *Tinker, Tailor, Soldier, Spy*, Smiley is recalled to hunt down a Soviet \"mole\" in the Circus (British Secret Intelligence Service, aka MI6).\n\n    Also a title of a book by William Hood, Mole: The True Story of the First Russian Spy to Become\nan American Counterspy about Pyotr Semyonovich Popov, a Major in Soviet Military Intelligence (the GRU); see <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pyotr_Semyonovich_Popov>.\n\n    Hood's book, *Mole*, is one of the best publicly available descriptions of a penetration of an\nintelligence service and provides a detailed and highly personal account of how intelligence tradecraft is practiced, the mental and psychological toll this takes, and the risks involved (for\nboth agent and case officer).\n\nMole Hunt.  The term popularized by John le Carre for a counterintelligence investigation conducted into hostile penetration. (*Historical Dictionary of Cold War Counterintelligence*, 2007)  Also see *mole*.\n\n-- Also, the search for moles in one's own service. (Encyclopedia of Cold War Espionage, Spies, and Secret Operations, 3rd edition, 2012)\n\n\n    Also the title of a book by David Wise, Molehunt:  The Secret Search for Traitors That Shattered\nthe CIA (1992).\n Money Laundering.  Generally refers to financial transactions in which criminals, including terrorist organizations, attempt to disguise the proceeds, sources or nature of their illicit activities. (US Department of Treasury)\n\n\nMoscow Rules.  The ultimate tradecraft methods for use in the most hostile of the operational environments.  During the Cold War, Moscow was considered the most difficult of operating environments. (Spy Dust)\n\n  Once, an accident. Twice, a coincidence. Three times, an enemy action.\n\n\n-- Ian Fleming, *Goldfinger* (1959)\n\nAuric Goldfinger mentions this rule to James Bond in Goldfinger's warehouse in Geneva.\n\n\n\n   \"Moscow rules\" ...the precepts we all understand for conducting our operations in the most difficult\nof operating environments: the Soviet capital.  ...They were dead simple, and all full of common sense:\n       -- Never make surveillance mad or embarrassedthey will shut you down. -- Never look over your shoulder or steal free looks in store windows when on the street. -- Make them think it was their fault that they had lost you, not vice versa, because KGB officers knew better than to report their own mistakes.\n\n    ... a mantra that could guide them in determining whether they were the subject of hostile\n        surveillance: Once, an accident. Twice, a coincidence. Three times, an enemy action.\n\n                  -- Antonio and Jonna Mendez, Spy Dust: Two Masters of Disguise Reveal the Tools and Operations that Helped Win the Cold War (2002), p. 36\n Motivation.  The complex of reasoning and emotional or other drives that induces a person to accept employment or cooperate with an agency for a particular assignment. (AFOSI Instruction 71-101, 6 Jun 2000)  Also see *\"MICE.\"*\n-- Also, broadly defined, is a feeling or state of mind that influences one's choices and actions.\n\n(PERSEREC Technical Report 05-10, May 2005) -- Also, tradecraft jargon for bases for agent recruitment that are usually (1) ideological; (2) financial;\n(3) coercion or blackmail; (4) sexual; (5) ego satisfaction; (6) familial; (7) love of adventure or excitement; (8) a combination of two or more of the preceding. (Leo D. Carl, *The CIA Insider's Dictionary*, 1996)\n\n\n## Motivation For Espionage Results From A Complex Interaction Between Personality Characteristics And Situational Factors\n\n\n-- PERSEREC Technical Report 05-10, May 2005 (p.1)\n____________________________\n\n\n    Psychological portraits of the major spies show complex motivations, which often include\ndissatisfaction with the job. ...The profile of a traitor may not be significantly different from that of many sociopaths or felons. ...Spies also usually have two other characteristics: They relish the\nsecret world of intrigue and they enjoy the chance to show others as fools. ...The typical spy enjoys\ndeception and may have a personality bordering on, or well into, the psychotic.\n\n        -- Thomas B. Allen and Norman Polmar, *Merchants of Treason: America's Secrets for Sale* (1988), pp.51-52\n\n\n## Espionage Motivations\n\n\n    Motives by which spies are driven are highly individualizedsimple motives often conceal deeper\nand more complicated motivations. Motivation for espionage is often elusive and frequently involves multiple reasons. According to a 2008 PERSEREC study, assigning the motivation for committing espionage is often most accurate when motivation is inferred from evidence available while the crime was being committed, rather than from the self justifications after the fact. Like most criminals, once caught, spies see their own past intentions and the pressures that may have affected their behavior in a changed light.  Motives for espionage can also change over the course of espionage activities.\n\n    MONEY: Historically a leading motivation -- the primacy of money as a motive is a common\nobservation in studies of espionage. Money (financial gain) also appears frequently in combination with other motives. Americans most consistently have cited money as the dominant motive for espionage, especially in the 1980s*the decade of the spy*. This motivation reflects a person's need for money (e.g., indebtedness, financial pressures), or simple greed, or some combination thereof. Often seen in people who see themselves as underpaid (whether real or perceived). Many\ncases involved indebtedness. Being in debt or having a history of insolvency, bankruptcy, or late payments is a major component of the financial considerations scrutinized in a personnel security investigation for a security clearance. Among the typical financial motives of debt or greed, debt continues to motivate espionage more than just greed. Although no recent cases, several past spies were frequent gamblers. Money remains one of multiple motives in many recent cases.\n\n\n          \"Spies, being human, often invent a better-sounding motive if their sole reason\n           for betraying their country is money.\"\n                  -- General Frantisel Moravec, Former Head of Czech Military Intelligence\n\n    IDEOLOGY/DIVIDED LOYALTIES: This motivation encompasses both ideological driven motives\n(commitment to a competing political or economic system, e.g. Communism or Jihadism) and/or those with competing allegiances (i.e., intellectual or emotional commitments to another country through birth, family ties or cultural affinity). Ideology was the dominant motive in the 1940s, whereas divided loyalties has increased over time of all motives for espionage. Divided loyalties holding and acting on an allegiance to a foreign country or cause in addition to or in preference to allegiance to the United Stateshas dramatically increased since 1990. PERSEREC studies indicate that spying prompted by divided loyalties has become the most common motive for\nAmerican espionage, replacing spying for money as the primary motive. Additionally this trend has been accelerating since 2000.\n\n    COMPROMISE/COERCION: Being forced to commit espionage through blackmail or threat to\nrelatives in a foreign country. Used to recruit spies most often in the early period before 1980, when foreign intelligence services engaged in occasional blackmail using relatives overseas, or entrapped Americans in sexual blackmail scams. Has not been seen in recent cases.\n\n   EGO/THRILLS: Some spies commit espionage for thrills or to make themselves feel important\nego-boosting.  Some have a fascination with spying and find espionage a thrilling enterprise that allows them to enact fantasies of secret lives and heroic deeds they have read about in popular spy novels.  Includes the related ego-boost of getting away with it, as well as the thrill of successfully maintaining a secret life parallel to the spy's professional career, and thereby cleverly demonstrating that his competence surpasses his colleagues.  Although rarely the primary motive, there have been several cases involving individuals who spied for the thrill of getting away with espionage, or from their need to stroke their egos.\n\n   DISGRUNTLEMENT/REVENGE: In recent cases, disgruntlement was the second most common\ncause.  This motive takes many different forms: disenhancement, extreme unhappiness with people and employment, disaffection, bitterness, frustration, anger, disillusionment, and alienation. Usually directly related to employment/work-related issues caused by the person's relationships or treatment in the workplace, and associated desire to take revenge. Disappointment, anger, frustration, or alienation can arise from interactions among coworkers or between employees and supervisors. Feelings of disgruntlement often lead to efforts to get revenge and espionage is one way to get bak at the offending individual, organization, or at the whole government they represent. A common motivation among those who volunteer.\n\n   INGRATIATION: The desire to help or please someone else motive some to commit espionage.\nMost often through an emotional, personal relationship or attachment. This motivation can also manifest when trying to impress a potential future employer.  Most spies who committed espionage to please others tended to be successful.\n\n   RECOGITION: Usually a secondary motive of spies seeking recognition, approval and/or attention\nfrom those to whom they provided information.  Individuals often feel overworked and underappreciated and espionage allows them to connect or bond with an agent  handler and seek the approval and attention of the handler.\n    ___________________________\n\n   For more information, see following Defense Personnel Security Research Center (PERSEREC)  Reports:\n\n   -- *Americans Who Spied Against Their Country Since World War II*, Rpt PERS-TR-92-005, May 1992 -- Espionage Against the United States by American Citizens 1947-2001, Rpt 02-5, Jul 2002 -- *Changes in Espionage by Americans: 1947-2007*, Tech Rpt 08-05, Mar 2008 -- *Espionage and Other Compromises of National Security: Case Summaries from 1975 to 2008*, 2 Nov 2009\n\nMTAC.  See *Multiple Threat Alert Center.* Multiple Threat Alert Center (MTAC).  Department of Navy's fusion, analysis and dissemination center for terrorist, criminal, counterintelligence and security information; operated by the Naval Criminal Investigative Service (NCIS).\n\n    The terrorist attack on the World Trade Center in New York and the Pentagon in Washington, DC\non September 11, 2001 led NCIS to transform the Antiterrorist Alert Center (ATAC) into the MTAC in 2002.\n\n         -- NCIS <http://www.ncis.navy.mil/AboutNCIS/History/Pages/default.aspx>\n Multilateral Collection.  A collection activity conducted with two or more cooperating foreign intelligence services against a mutually targeted foreign intelligence, security service, or international terrorist entity. (Previously in DoDI S-5240.17, CI Collection, 12 Jan 2009)  Also see bilateral.\n\nMultilateral:  activities conducted with more than one nation. Multilateral OFCO.  An OFCO [Offensive Counterintelligence Operation] conducted by a U.S. CI agency with two or more cooperating foreign intelligence services against a mutually targeted FISS, foreign entity, or terrorist element. (DoDI S-5240.09, 29 Oct 2008) Multilevel Security (MLS).  Concept of processing information with different classifications and categories that simultaneously permits access by users with different security clearances and denies access to users who lack authorization. (CNSSI No. 4009, National Information Assurance Glossary, 26 April 2010) Multinational.  Between two or more forces or agencies of two or more nations or coalition partners. Also see also *alliance; coalition*. (JP 1-02) Multinational Force (MNF).  A force composed of military elements of nations who have formed an alliance or coalition for some specific purpose. (JP 1-02)  Also see multinational operations. Multinational Operations.  A collective term to describe military actions conducted by forces of two or more nations, usually undertaken within the structure of a coalition or alliance. (JP 1-02 and JP 3-16, Multinational Operations, 7 Mar 2007)  Also see *alliance; coalition; coalition action.* Multispectral Imagery (MSI).  The image of an object obtained simultaneously in a number of discrete spectral bands.(JP 1-02 and JP 3-14, Space Operations, 6 Jan 2009)\n\nN ========================================== Narcoterrorism.  Terrorism that is linked to illicit drug trafficking. (JP 1-02 and JP 3-07.4, Joint Counterdrug Operations, 13 Jun 2007) Name Trace.  A search of available recorded data to find information about a person, normally conducted to determine the presence or absence of derogatory information about the person, as a first step in judging his suitability or intelligence value. (DHE-M 3301.002, Vol II Collection Operations, 23 Nov 2010)\n-- Also, a search of data for information about an individual, organization, or subject. (National HUMINT Glossary) National Agency Check (NAC).  An in-depth name trace consisting of Federal Bureau of Investigation Name and Criminal History Fingerprint Checks, Defense Clearance Investigation Index (DCII) search, and can include checks on military personnel records, citizenship, selective service, Central Intelligence Agency records, State Department records, and other US Government agencies.  Also see local agency check; military agency check.\n\n-- Also, [part of a] personnel security investigation consisting of a review of: investigative and criminal history files of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, including a technical fingerprint check; Office of Personnel Management Security/Suitability Investigations Index; DoD Central Index of Investigations (DCII) and Joint Personnel Adjudication System (JPAS); and such other national agencies (e.g., CIA, DNI) as appropriate to the individual's background. (IC Standard 700-1, 4 Apr 2008) -- Also, formal request to federal agencies for searches of their records and supporting databases and files for information of investigative [/CI] interest. (FM 2-22.2, Counterintelligence, Oct 2009 and 902d MI Group Investigations Handbook, Jun 2012) -- Also, an integral part of all background investigations, the NAC consists of searches of OPM's Security/Suitability Investigations Index (SII); the Defense Clearance and Investigations Index (DCII); the FBI Identification Division's name and fingerprint files, and other files or indices when necessary. (Army - see below)\n    National Agency Check and Inquiries (NACI) - This is the basic and minimum investigation required\n\non all new Federal employees. It consists of a NAC with written inquiries and searches of records covering specific areas of a person's background during the past five years. Those inquiries are\nsent to current and past employers, schools attended, references, and local law enforcement authorities.\n\nAccess NACI (ANACI) - This is a new investigation designed as the required initial investigation for Federal employees who will need access to classified national security information at the Confidential or Secret level. The ANACI includes NACI and Credit coverage with additional local law enforcement agency checks.\n\nNAC with Local Agency Check and Credit (NACLC) - This is a new investigation which is the same as the ANACI without the written inquiries to past employers, schools attended, etc. It is designed as the initial investigation for contractors at the Confidential and Secret national security access levels. The NACLC also is to be used to meet the reinvestigation requirement for all individuals (including contractors) who have Confidential or Secret clearances.\n\n      -- US Army at: <http://www.dami.army.pentagon.mil/site/PerSec/InvTypes.aspx> (accesses 24 Sep 2013)\n National Capital Region (NCR).  A geographic area encompassing the District of Columbia and eleven local jurisdictions in the State of Maryland and the Commonwealth of Virginia. (JP 1-02 and JP 3-28, Defense Support of Civil Authorities, 31 Jul 2013)\n\n\nNational Center for Credibility Assessment (NCCA).  A federally funded institution providing graduate and continuing education courses in psychophysiological detection of deception (PDD). (www.ncca.mil/mission.htm)\n-- Also, an interagency training institute that provides polygraph education and training, conducts credibility assessment research and development, and manages the Polygraph Quality Assurance Program. (DoD FCIP Strategy FY 2013-2017)\n\n    For DoD policy see DoDD 5210.48, Polygraph and Credibility Assessment Program.  NCCA is under\nthe operational control of the Defense Counterintelligence and Human Intelligence Center (DCHC), DIA. It was previous known as the Defense Academy for Credibility Assessment (DACA) and before that as the DoD Polygraph Institute (DoDPI).\n National Clandestine Service (NCS).  The NCS operates as the clandestine arm of the CIA, and serves as the national authority for the coordination, deconfliction, and evaluation of clandestine human intelligence operations across the Intelligence Community. The NCS supports our country's security and foreign policy interests by conducting clandestine activities to collect information that is not obtainable through other means. The NCS also conducts counterintelligence and special activities as authorized by the President. (CIA at <https://www.cia.gov/offices-of-cia/clandestine-service/index.html>)\n-- Also, the NCS serves as the national authority for the integration, coordination, deconfliction, and evaluation of human intelligence operations across the entire Intelligence Community, under authorities delegated to the Director of the CIA who serves as the National HUMINT Manager. The Director of the NCS reports directly to the Director of the CIA and will work with the Office of the Director of National Intelligence to implement all of the DNI's statutory authorities. (ODNI News release 3-05, 13 Oct 2005) Also see *Defense Clandestine Service*.\n\n    Formerly known as CIA Directorate of Operations or DO (in 2005, the DO transitioned to the NCS).\nThe NCS was established in response  to recommendations made in March 2005 by the President's Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction.\n    Collecting foreign intelligence - finding someone who has protected information and convincing\nthat person to share it - is the \"bread and butter\" of what the clandestine service does, although \"if we succeed, we'd rather not talk about it.\"\n\n         -- Thomas Twetten, Former Chief of CIA Clandestine Operations, 27 Jan 2011\n\n## ________________________ Clandestine Service...\n\n    A clandestine service does much more than simply collect \"HUMINT\" clandestinely, that is secretly\nexploit agents for the purpose of collecting intelligence.  A clandestine service also works in liaison with other spy services to run all types of operations; it taps telephones and installs listening devices; it breaks into or otherwise gains access to the contents of secured facilities, safes, and computers; it steals, compromises, and influences foreign cryptographic capabilities so as to make them exploitable by US SIGINT; it protects its operations and defends the government from other intelligence services by engaging in a variety of counterespionage activities, including the aggressive use of double agents and penetrations of foreign services; and it clandestinely emplaces and services secret SIGINT and MASINT sensors.  It also has the capability of using its techniques and access to run programs at the President's direction to influence foreign governments and developments, that is, \"covert action.\" The unifying aspect of these activities is not some connection to HUMINT; rather, they are highly diverse but interdependent activities that are best conducted by a clandestine service.\n\nNational Counterintelligence Executive (NCIX).  Performs duties provided in the CI Enhancement Act of 2002 and such other duties as may be prescribed by the Director of National Intelligence or specified by law. NCIX serves as Mission Manager of Counterintelligence and the Chairperson of the National CI Policy Board. Resides within the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI). (CI Enhancement Act of 2002)  Also see *Office of the National Counterintelligence Executive*.\n\n-- Also, the NCIX serves as the head of national counterintelligence for the U.S. Government, per the CI Enhancement Act of 2002. (National Intelligence: A Consumer's Guide - 2009)\n\n    Additional information on NCIX at <http://www.ncix.gov/about/index.html> National Counterintelligence Policy Board (NACIPB).  Special board established by statue within the executive branch of Government; reports to the President through the National Security Council.  The Board serves as the principal mechanism for developing policies and procedures for the approval of the President to govern the conduct of counterintelligence activities; and upon the direction of the President, resolving conflicts that arise between elements of the Government conducting such activities.  The Board also acts as an interagency working group to ensure the discussion and review of matters relating to the implementation of the Counterintelligence Enhancement Act of 2002 and provides advice to the National Counterintelligence Executive on priorities in the implementation of the National Counterintelligence Strategy. (Extracted from 50 U.S.C. 402a)\n\n    NACIPB is chaired by the National Counterintelligence Executive and consists of senior USG\npersonnel appointed by the head of the department or element concerned, as follows: Department of Justice, including the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI); Department of Defense, including the Joint Chiefs of Staff; Central Intelligence Agency (CIA); Department of State; Department of Energy; and any other department, agency, or element of the US Government specified by the\nPresident.\n National Counterproliferation Center (NCPC).  Coordinates strategic planning within the Intelligence Community (IC) to enhance intelligence support to United States efforts to stem the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and related delivery systems. It works with the IC to identify critical intelligence gaps or shortfalls in collection, analysis or exploitation, and develop solutions to ameliorate or close these gaps. It also works with the IC to identify long-term proliferation threats and requirements and develop strategies to ensure the IC is positioned to address these threats and issues. NCPC will reach out to elements both inside the IC and outside the IC and the U.S. Government to identify new methods or technologies that can enhance the capabilities of the IC to detect and defeat future proliferation threats. (ODNI News release 9-05, 21 Dec 2005)\n-- Also, the NCPC, which resides in the ODNI, is the bridge from the IC to the policy community for activities within the U.S. Government associated with countering the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). (National Intelligence: A Consumer's Guide - 2009) National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC).  The primary center for US government analysis of terrorism. It falls under the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI). One of its primary missions is \"to serve as the central and shared knowledge bank on known and suspected terrorists and international terrorist groups, as well as their goals, strategies, capabilities, and networks of contacts and support.\" (EO 13354, National Counterterrorism Center, 27 Aug 2004)\n\n\n In August 2004, the President established the NCTC to serve as the primary USG organization for\nintegrating and analyzing all intelligence pertaining to terrorism and counterterrorism and to conduct strategic operational planning by integrating all instruments of national power.  In December 2004, Congress codified the NCTC in the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act (IRTPA) and placed the NCTC in the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI). NCTC is a multi-agency organization dedicated to eliminating the terrorist threat to US interests at\n     home and abroad.\n        -- NCTC website:  <http://www.nctc.gov/about_us/about_nctc.html >\n____________________\n\n    NCTC was established in 2004 to ensure that information from any source about potential terrorist\nacts against the U.S. could be made available to analysts and that appropriate responses could be planned. Investigations of the 9/11 attacks had demonstrated that information possessed by different agencies had not been shared and thus that disparate indications of the looming threat had not been connected and warning had not been provided.\n\n    NCTC prepares studies ranging from strategic assessments of potential terrorist threats to daily\nbriefings and situation reports. It is also responsible, directly to the President, for planning (but not directing) counterterrorism efforts. The NCTC received a statutory charter in the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (P.L. 108-458); it currently operates with a staff of more than 500 personnel from its headquarters in northern Virginia.\n\n       -- Congressional Research Service (CRS) Report R41022, 19 Dec 2011\n National Crime Information Center (NCIC).  A computerized system of crime records and data, maintained by the Federal Bureau of Investigation, that can be tapped into by virtually every criminal justice agency nationwide. (Cyber Threats to National Security, Symposium Five, 2011)\n     See <http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ncic/ncic > National Critical Infrastructure and Key Assets (NCI & KA).  Within DoD:  None - term removed from\nJP 1-02.\n\n\n\n    Previously defined in JP 3-28, Civil Support (14 Sep 2007) as:  The infrastructure and assets vital\nto a nation's security, governance, public health and safety, economy, and public confidence.  They\ninclude telecommunications, electrical power systems, gas and oil distribution and storage, water supply systems, banking and finance, transportation, emergency services, industrial assets, information systems, and continuity of government operations.\n National Critical Systems and Technology Joint Task Force (NCST-JTF).  A collaborative forum to lead USIC and federal agency counterintelligence efforts for the protection of critical technologies. (NCST-JTF tri-fold, undated, circa 2012)\n\n## Ncst-Jtf Mission\n\n\n    Leverage the collective CI resources of the Task Force member agencies to prevent, preempt,\ndeter, and investigate attempts to acquire, proliferate and transfer critical US technologies to foreign powers.\n\n    Apprehend and prosecute individuals who may commit or plan such acts negatively affecting U.S.\nNational Security interest.\n National Cyber Investigate Joint Task Force (NCIJTF). The focal point for all government agencies to coordinate, integrate, and share information related to all domestic cyber threat investigations. The FBI\nis responsible for developing and supporting the joint task force, which includes 19 intelligence agencies and law enforcement, working side by side to identify key players and schemes. Its goal is to predict and prevent what's on the horizon and to pursue the enterprises behind cyber attacks. (www.fbi.gov; accessed 18 Jun 2013)\n\n    On 8 January 2008, the President signed Presidential Directive NSPD-54/HSPD-23 which\nmandated the National Cyber Investigative Joint Task Force to be the focal point for all government agencies and to coordinate, integrate, and share information related to all domestic cyber threat\ninvestigations.\n\n    NCIJTF Mission:  Ensure the U.S. Government is coordinating all its efforts to address national\nsecurity cyber intrusions, including intelligence operations and investigations.  The NCITF's\nfunctions are structured in three groups: the Information Operations Group, the Analysis Group, and the Law Enforcement Group.\n\n    For more information on the NCIJTF see <http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/investigate/cyber/ncijtf>\n_______________________\n\n\n## National Cyber Investigative Joint Task Force - Analytical Group (Ncijtf-Ag)\n\n\n    The Defense Cyber Crime Center (DC3) resources and manages the Analytic Group of the\nNCIJTF, which operates under overall FBI stewardship, joined by other national LE/CI organizations. Focused on nation-state threat actors, AG leads a collaborative analytical and technical exchange with subject matter experts from LE/CI, CND, IC, and IA agencies to build a\nthreat picture to enable proactive LE/CI cyber operations.\n National Defense Strategy (NDS).  A document approved by the Secretary of Defense for applying the Armed Forces of the United States in coordination with Department of Defense agencies and other instruments of national power to achieve national security strategy objectives. (JP 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States, 25 Mar 2013) National Detainee Reporting Center (NDRC).  National-level center that obtains and stores information concerning enemy prisoners of war, civilian internees, and retained personnel and their confiscated personal property. May be established upon the outbreak of an armed conflict or when persons are captured or detained by U.S. military forces in the course of the full range of military operations. Accounts for all persons who pass through the care, custody, and control of the U.S. Department of Defense. (JP 1-02 and JP 3-63, Detainee Operations, 30 May 2008) National Disclosure Policy (NDP-1).  A document that promulgates national policy and procedures in the form of specific disclosure criteria and limitations, definition of terms, release arrangements, and other guidance required by U.S. departments and agencies having occasion to disclose classified information to foreign governments and international organizations. NDP-1 establishes and provides for management of interagency mechanisms and procedures required for effective implementation of the national policy. National Disclosure Policy Committee.  Central authority for formulation, promulgation, administration, and monitoring of the NDP-1. National Emergency.  A condition declared by the President or the Congress by virtue of powers previously vested in them that authorize certain emergency actions to be undertaken in the national interest. (JP 1-02 and JP 3-28, Defense Support of Civil Authorities, 31 Jul 2013) National Essential Functions.  That subset of Government functions that are necessary to lead and sustain the Nation during a catastrophic emergency. (PDD-21, 12 Feb 2013) National Foreign Intelligence Program.  All programs, projects, and activities of the intelligence community, as well as any other programs of the intelligence community designated jointly by the Director of Central Intelligence and the head of a United States department or agency or by the President. Such term does not include programs, projects, or activities of the military departments to acquire intelligence solely for the planning and conduct of tactical military operations by US Armed Forces. (50 USC 401a)\nNational Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA).  A member of the US Intelligence Community, as well as a Combat Support Agency of the Department of Defense, that provides timely, relevant and accurate geospatial intelligence in support of national security objectives.\n\n\n\n    The term \"geospatial intelligence\" or \"GEOINT\" means the exploitation and analysis of imagery and\ngeospatial information to describe, assess and visually depict physical features and geographically referenced activities on the Earth. Geospatial intelligence consists of imagery, imagery intelligence and geospatial (e.g., mapping, charting and geodesy) information.\n\n       -- See NGA website at <https://www1.nga.mil/>\n________________________\n\n    The National Imagery and Mapping Agency (NIMA) transitioned to the National Geospatial-\nIntelligence Agency (NGA) in 2003.  NIMA established its internal CI element on 1 April 2002.\n    See the official history of the NGA and predecessors, Advent of the National Geospatial-\nIntelligence Agency, September 2011, by the Office of the NGA Historian, available at <www.nga1.mil>\n\n\nNational HUMINT Collection Directive (NHCD). A set of national-level strategic collection requirements for a particular country, geographic area, or transnational issue, prepared by the NHRTC in coordination with IC and other organizations. (DHE-M 3301.001, Vol I: Collection Requirement, Reporting, and Evaluation Procedures, 30 Jan 2009, w/ chg 2 dated 1 Feb 2012)\n-- Also, an integrated inter-agency mechanism for tasking human intelligence requirements to members of the Intelligence Community that have the best capability and probability of acquiring that information at the least cost and least risk.  A standing / enduring intelligence requirement. (National HUMINT Glossary) National HUMINT Requirements Tasking Center (NHRTC).  Congressionally mandated to integrate all HUMINT collection and reporting capabilities within the US Government.  [Staffed by] senior officers from the Department of State, Department of Defense, and CIA; the center produces National HUMINT Collection Directives (NHCDs) and Collection Support Briefs (CSBs). (National HUMINT Glossary)\n\n    The NHRTC reports to the National HUMINT Manager.  See DCID 3/7, National HUMINT\nRequirements Center (U), 1 Jun 1992 (classified CONFIDENTIAL).\n National Industrial Security Program (NISP).  National program established by EO 12829 for the protection of information classified under EO 12958 as amended, or its successor or predecessor orders, and the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended. The National Security Council is responsible for providing overall policy direction for the NISP.  The Secretary of Defense is the Executive Agent for the NISP.  The Information Security Oversight Office (ISOO) is responsible for implementing and monitoring the NISP and for issuing implementing directives that shall be binding on agencies. (DoD 5220.22-M, NISPOM, 28 Feb 2006)   Also see the *Defense Security Service (DSS); industrial security.*\n\n    The Defense Security Service (DSS) is designated as the DoD Cognizant Security Office (CSO)\nfor cleared contractors within the NISP.\n\n    For additional information see Information Security Oversight Office (ISSO) website at:\n<http://www.archives.gov/isoo/policy-documents/>\n\nNational Infrastructure Coordinating Center. The national physical critical infrastructure center, as designated by the Secretary of Homeland Security, which coordinates a national network dedicated to the security and resilience of critical infrastructure of the United States by providing 24/7 situational awareness through information sharing, and fostering a unity of effort. (www.dhs.gov) National Infrastructure Protection Center (NIPC). The FBI's NIPC is charged with detecting, preventing and responding to cyber and physical attacks on US critical infrastructure and overseeing computer crime investigation conducted by FBI field offices.\n\nNational Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP).  A plan developed by the Department of Homeland Security [DHS] to provide the unifying structure for the integration of a wide range of efforts for the enhanced protection and resiliency of the nation's critical infrastructure and key resources into a single national program. (Cyber Threats to National Security, Symposium Five, 2011)\n\n    See <http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/NIPP_Plan.pdf>\n\n    Copy of the NIPP 2013 also available at:  <https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=747827>\n National Infrastructure Sector.  One of the 18 national CI/KR [critical infrastructure and/or key resource] sectors identified in Homeland Security Presidential Directive 7, \"Critical Infrastructure Identification, Prioritization, and Protection,\" 17 December 2003. (DoDD 3020.40, DoD Policy and Responsibilities for Critical Infrastructure, 14 Jan 2010 w/ chg 2 dated 21 Sep 2012)\n\n\nNational Insider Threat Task Force (NITTF). National Task Force focused on Insider Threat issues under joint leadership of the Attorney General and the Director of National Intelligence; established IAW EO 13587, October 2011  The NCIX and FBI co-direct the daily activities of the NITTF.\n\n    The NITTF assists federal agencies develop insider threat programs to help prevent, deter, and\ndetect compromises of classified information by malicious insiders. Its goals is to prevent classified\ninformation from getting into the hands of people who can harm the national security of our country.\n\n       -- NITTF Fact Sheet, subj: NITTF External Communications Guidance, undated\n National Insider Threat Working Group (NISTWG). Interagency, cross-discipline working group established by the National Counterintelligence Policy Board to focus exclusively on insider threat issues. National Intelligence.  All intelligence, regardless of the source from which derived and including information gathered within or outside of the United States, which pertains, as determined consistent with any guidelines issued by the President, to the interests of more than one department or agency of the Government; and that involves (a) threats to the United States, its people, property, or interests; (b) the development, proliferation, or use of weapons of mass destruction; or (c) any other matter bearing on United States national or homeland security. (Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, 1012; also JP 1-02 and JP 2-01, Joint & National Intelligence Support to Military Operations, 5 Jan 2012)\n\n-- Also, intelligence which pertains to the interest of more than one department or agency of the US\nGovernment. (50 USC 401a)\n\n\n    The US Government uses intelligence to improve and understand the consequences of its national\nsecurity decisions.\n National Intelligence Board.  Serves as the senior Intelligence Community advisory body to the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) on the analytic judgments and issues related to analysis of national intelligence; functions include: production, review, and coordination of national intelligence; interagency exchanges of national intelligence information; sharing of IC intelligence products with foreign governments; protection of intelligence sources and methods; activities of common concern and other matters as may be referred to it by the DNI. (ICD 202, National Intelligence Board, 16 Jul 2007) National Intelligence Council (NIC).  The Intelligence Community's center for mid-term and long-term strategic thinking. Its primary functions are to: 1) Support the DNI in his role as head of the Intelligence Community; 2) Provide a focal point for policymakers to task the Intelligence Community to answer their questions; 3) Reach out to nongovernmental experts in academia and the private sector to broaden the Intelligence Community's perspective; 4) Contribute to the Intelligence Community's effort to allocate its resources in response to policymakers' changing needs; and 5) Lead the Intelligence Community's effort to produce National Intelligence Estimates (NIEs) and other NIC products. (ODNI website)\n\n\n    The NIC is responsible for the US Intelligence Community's most authoritative assessments of\nmajor issues affecting the national security.  By law [50 USC 403-3b(b)(1)], the NIC is to consist of \"senior analysts within the intelligence community and substantive experts from the public and private sector, who shall be appointed by, report to, and serve at the pleasure\" of the DNI.  The senior analysts are known as National Intelligence Officers (NIOs).\n\n    NIC responsibilities are set forth in ICD 207, *National Intelligence Council*, 9 June 2008.\n National Intelligence Coordination Center (NIC-C).  Provides a mechanism to strategically manage and direct collection across defense, foreign and domestic realms. [Interfaces with the Defense Intelligence Coordination Center (DIOCC]. (National Intelligence: A Consumer's Guide - 2009) National Intelligence Estimate (NIE).  The DNI's most authoritative written judgment concerning national security issues.  NIEs contain the coordinated judgments of the Intelligence Community regarding the likely course of future events. (ODNI website)\n-- Also, a strategic estimate of the capabilities, vulnerabilities, and probable courses of action of foreign nations produced at the national level as a composite of the views of the intelligence community. (JP 1-02 and JP 2-01, Joint and National Intelligence Support to Military Operations, 5 Jan 2012) National Intelligence Priorities Framework (NIPF).  The Director of National Intelligence's guidance to the IC on the national intelligence priorities approved by the President. (ODNI, U.S. National Intelligence - An Overview 2011) -- Also, the DNI's sole mechanism for establishing national intelligence priorities. The NIPF consists of: intelligence topics approved by the President; a process for assigning priorities to countries and nonstate actors relevant to the approved intelligence topics; and a matrix showing those priorities.  It is updated semi-annually. The NIPF is used by the ODNI and IC elements in allocating collection and analytical resources. (ICD 204, 13 Sep 2007)\n\n A key instrument for keeping the IC attentive to both policymaker concerns and potential shocks...\nThe NIPF process gathers the needs of senior decision makers across the US government on a semi-annual basis to support prudent allocation of both collection and analytical resources for the\nfollowing 6-to-12 months.\n\n        - DNI 2006 Annual Report of the US Intelligence Community (Feb 2007)\n National Intelligence Program (NIP).  All programs, projects, and activities of the IC, as well as any other programs of the IC designated jointly by the DNI and the head of a US department or agency or by the President. It does not include programs, projects, or activities of the military departments to acquire intelligence solely for the planning and conduct of tactical military operations by US Armed Forces. (National Security Act 3(6) and ICD 1, 1 May 2006)\n    Formerly known as the National Foreign Intelligence Program (NFIP), the NIP provides the\n\nresources needed to develop and maintain intelligence capabilities that support national priorities. The DoD Foreign Counterintelligence Program or FCIP is part of the NIP.\n________________________\n\n    The Federal Budget (FY 2012) disclosed for the first time the aggregate funding for NIP - $55\nbillion in 2012.  However, detailed funding requests for intelligence activities remain classified.  See White House Factsheet at: <http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/factsheet_department_intelligence>\n\nNational Intelligence Strategy.  A strategy document prepared by the ODNI in consultation with the relevant departments that establishes the strategic objectives for the Intelligence Community (IC); it sets forth the framework for a more unified, coordinated and effective IC [and] guides IC policy, planning, collection, analysis, operations, programming, acquisition, budgeting, and execution. (ODNI News release 4-05)\n\n\n    The National Intelligence Strategy (NIS) sets forth the framework for a more unified, coordinated,\nand effective US Intelligence Community (IC) and guides IC policy, planning, collection, analysis, operations, programming, acquisition, budgeting, and execution.  The strategy outlines strategic objectives that are referred to as either mission or enterprise objectives.  The unclassified National Intelligence Strategy (Aug 2009) is available at <http://www.dni.gov/reports/2009_NIS.pdf>\n\n CI is one of six mission objectives of the NIS (Mission Objective 4 is *Integrate Counterintelligence*).\nThis is the first time that CI was identified as a mission objective within the NIS; see NIS pp 8-9.\n\n\nNational Intelligence Support Plan (NISP).  The NISP, in conjunction with the Combatant Command's Annex B: [Intelligence Plan or IPLAN] supports COCOM operational plans directed by the President and the Secretary of Defense. The NISP defines the national Intelligence Community (IC) agencies' and related organizations' intelligence collection, and analysis & production support roles and responsibilities within the COCOM area of responsibility and the national IC to ensure integrated intelligence operations, synchronized with the COCOM operational plan. The NISP supports the COCOM's operational objectives during all phases of the operation and contributes to the achievement of the COCOM's desired operational effects. (CJCSM 3314.01, Intelligence Planning, 28 Feb 2007)  Also see Counterintelligence Functional Support Plan (CI FSP). National Joint Terrorism Task Force (NJTTF).  The NJTTF was established in July 2002 to serve as a coordinating mechanism with the FBI's partners on terrorism issues.  Over 40 agencies are represented in the NJTTF, which has become a focal point for information sharing and the management of large-scale projects that involve multiple partners.  Also see *Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF)*. (DoJ website: <http://www.usdoj.gov/jttf/>)\n\n-- Also, the NJTTF was created to act as a liaison and conduit for information on threats and leads from FBI Headquarters to the local JTTFs and to 40 participating agencies including representatives from members of the Intelligence Community; components of the departments of Homeland Security, Defense, Justice, Treasury, Transportation, Commerce, Energy, State, and Interior; NYPD; Nuclear Regulatory Commission; Railroad Police; U.S. Capitol Police; and others. (FBI)\n\n     See FBI web site at: <http://www.fbi.gov/news/stories/2008/august/njttf_081908> National Media Exploitation Center (NMEC).  A Director of National Intelligence (DNI) Center composed of DIA, CIA, FBI, NSA, and Defense Cyber Crime Center (DCCC) as partner organizations; DIA is the Executive Agent.  NMEC acts as a DOMEX [document and media exploitation] service of common concern and ensures prompt and responsive DOMEX support to meet the needs of intelligence, defense, homeland security, law enforcement, and other US Government Consumer's, to include provision of timely and accurate collection, processing, exploitation, and dissemination consistent with the protection of intelligence sources and methods. (ICD 302, Document and Media Exploitation, 6 Jul 2007)\n    Director DIA is the IC Executive Agent for the NMEC (para 2d, DoDD 3300.03). National Military Strategy (NMS).  A document approved by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff for distributing and applying military power to attain national security strategy and national defense strategy objectives. (JP 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States, 25 Mar 2013)  Also see national security strategy.\n\n    The NMS defines the national military objectives, establishes the strategy to accomplish these\nobjectives, and addresses the military capabilities required to execute the strategy. The Chairman\ndevelops the NMS by deriving overall security policy guidance from the President's NSS, and\nthrough consulting with the other JCS members and combatant commanders. The NMS describes the strategic landscape and includes a discussion of the potential threats and risks.\n\n       -- CJCSI 3100.01A, *Joint Strategic Planning System*, 1 Sep 1999\n\nNational Policy.  A broad course of action or statements of guidance adopted by the government at the national level in pursuit of national objectives. (JP 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States,\n25 Mar 2013)\nNational Reconnaissance Office (NRO).  Responsible for integrating unique and innovative space-based reconnaissance technologies, and the engineering development, acquisition, and operation of space reconnaissance systems and related intelligence activities. (JP 2-0, Joint Intelligence, 22 Oct 2013)\n\n    The NRO is responsible for research and development (R&D), acquisition, launch, deployment,\nand operation of overhead reconnaissance systems, and related data-processing facilities to collect\nintelligence and information to support national and DoD missions and other United States\n   Government (USG) needs (DoD Directive 5105.23, NRO, 28 June 2011).\n    The NRO designs, builds and operates the nation's reconnaissance satellites.  According to the\nNRO, their satellites provide constant global access to critical information otherwise unavailable\nto the President, his cabinet, other national leaders and numerous customers in the Defense and Intelligence communities.  These satellites provide services in three broad categories: GEOINT, SIGINT, and Communications.\n\n    In recent years, the NRO has implemented a series of actions declassifying some of its operations.\nThe existence of the organization was declassified in September 1992.\n\n    On 6 Sep 1961, the NRO was established as a joint CIA-Air Force operation. Throughout the\n1960s, U.S. operation of reconnaissance satellites was officially classified.  It was not until Jan 1971 that the NRO's existence was first disclosed by the media, when it was briefly mentioned in a New York Times article.  A more extensive discussion of the NRO appeared in the Washington Post (9 Dec 1973) as a result of the inadvertent disclosure in a Congressional report.\n\n    In September 1992 DoD acknowledged the existence of the NRO, an agency established in 1961\nto manage the development and operation of the nation's reconnaissance satellite systems.\n\n    See NRO website at <www.nro.gov/ >    For additional information see Jeffrey T. Richelson,\n\"Undercover in Outer Space: The Creation and Evolution of the NRO,\" International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence, 13, 3 (Fall 2000): pp. 301-344.\n National Security.  A collective term encompassing both national defense and foreign relations of the United States with the purpose of gaining:  a) a military or defense advantage over any foreign nation or group of nations; b) a favorable foreign relations position; or c) a defense posture capable of successfully resisting hostile or destructive action from within or without, overt or covert. (JP 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States, 25 Mar 2013) -- Also, the national defense or foreign relations of the United States. (EO 13526, Classified National Security Information, 29 Dec 2009) National Security Act.  The National Security Act of 1947 realigned and reorganized the United States' armed forces, foreign policy, and Intelligence Community apparatus in the aftermath of World War II. The Act merged the Department of War and the Department of the Navy into the National Military Establishment (NME) headed by the Secretary of Defense. It was also responsible for the creation of a separate Department of the Air Force from the existing United States Army Air Forces.  Initially, each of the three service secretaries maintained quasi-cabinet status, but the act was amended in 1949 to assure their subordination to the Secretary of Defense.  At the same time, the NME was renamed as the Department of Defense.  Aside from the military reorganization, the act established the National Security Council, a central place of coordination for national security policy in the Executive Branch, and the Central Intelligence Agency, the United States' first peacetime intelligence agency. (Public Law No. 235,\n80 Cong., 61 Stat. 496)\n\n\n    The cornerstone of the current national security system is the National Security Act of 1947 as\namended, designed to meet the challenges of the post-WWII, Cold War world. That legislation laid the foundations of a new national security regime, including the creation of the National Security Council, the Central Intelligence Agency, the Department of Defense, a separate Department of the Air Force, and a permanent Joint Chiefs of Staff. See National Security Act of 1947, P.L. 80-235.\n\n    The National Security Act has been amended numerous times since its enactment.  Reference to\nthe *\"National Security Act of 1947, as amended\"* indicates the legal authority cited is legislation passed after 1947 that replaced one or more provisions of the original act.\n        -- See <http://www.intelligence.gov/0-natsecact_1947.shtml>\n National Security Agency (NSA).  The U.S.'s cryptologic organization, with responsibility for protecting U.S. National Security information systems and collecting and disseminating foreign signals intelligence. Areas of expertise include cryptanalysis, mathematics, computer science, and foreign language analysis. (National Intelligence:  A Consumer's Guide - 2009)\n\n-- Also, a member of the US Intelligence Community, as well as a Combat Support Agency of the Department of Defense.  NSA/Central Security Service leads the community in delivering responsive, reliable, effective, and expert Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) and Information Assurance (IA) products and services, and enables Network Warfare operations to gain a decisive information advantage for the Nation and our allies under all circumstances. (www.nsa.gov)\n\n\n    NSA is the U.S. Government lead for cryptology, and its mission encompasses both Signals\nIntelligence (SIGINT) and Information Assurance (IA) activities. The Central Security Service (CSS) conducts SIGINT collection, processing, analysis, production, and dissemination, and other cryptologic operations as assigned by the Director, NSA/Chief, CSS.  NSA/CSS provides SIGINT and IA guidance and assistance to the DoD Components, as well as national customers.\n\n        -- DoDD 5100.20, *NSA/CSS*, 26 Jan 2010\n__________________\n\n    The Central Security Service (CSS) oversees the function of the military cryptologic system,\ndevelops policy and guidance on contributions of military cryptology to the Signals Intelligence / Information Security (SIGINT/INFOSEC) enterprise, and manages the partnership of NSA and the Service Cryptologic Components. NSA as a whole is known as \"NSA/CSS.\"\n\n        -- National Intelligence: A Consumer's Guide - 2009. p. 43\n__________________\n\n    The U.S. SIGINT effort... employs space and airborne collection ground stations, covert listening\nposts, surface ships, and submarines.\n\n         -- Jeffrey T. Richelson, *The US Intelligence Community* (2012, Sixth Edition)\n__________________\n\nI think it's fair to say that the demands on the Agency approach infinity.\n\nEverybody wants to know everything about everything.\n\n\n-- Louis Tordella, a longtime deputy director of NSA (1995)\n__________________\n\n    See *60 Years of Defending Our Nation*, National Security Agency, 2012; available at :\n\n<http://www.nsa.gov/about/cryptologic_heritage/60th/book/NSA_60th_Anniversary.pdf>\n\n    Also see -\n\n    Matthew M. Aid, The Secret Sentry: The Untold History of the National Security Agency.  New\nYork: Bloomsbury, 2009.\n\n    James Bamford, The Shadow Factory: The Ultra-Secret NSA from 9/11 to the Eavesdropping on\nAmerica. New York: Anchor Book, 2008.\n National Security Branch (NSB).  Major element of the FBI that executes the FBI's national security mission to lead and coordinate intelligence efforts that drive actions to protect the United States. The NSB is composed of the Counterterrorism Division (CTD), Counterintelligence Division (CD), Directorate of Intelligence (DI), Weapons of Mass Destruction Directorate (WMDD), Terrorist Screening Center (TSC), and High-Value Detainee Interrogation Group (HIG).  (www.fbi.gov; accessed 31 Jul 2013)\n\n    The FBI's national security and intelligence missions are unified under the authority of the\nExecutive Assistant Director (EAD) who reports to the Deputy Director FBI. The EAD-NSB has full operational and management authority over all FBI Headquarters and field national security programs, including the authority to initiate, terminate, or reallocate any of the investigations or other activities within the NSB.\n\n    The EAD-NSB is also responsible for the continued development  of a specialized national security\nworkforce and is the lead FBI official responsible for coordination and liaison with the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) and the Intelligence Community (IC).\n\n        -- See <http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/nsb/national-security-branch-brochure>\n\nNational Security Council (NSC).  A governmental body specifically designed to assist the President in integrating all spheres of national security policy. (JP 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States. 25 Mar 2013)\n\n    The NSC was established by the National Security Act of 1947 as the principal forum to consider\nnational security issues that require presidential decision. Congress envisioned that the NSC would allow military and civilian government departments and agencies to work more effectively together on national security matters.\n__________________________________\n\n   The National Security Council (NSC) is the President's principal forum for considering national\nsecurity and foreign policy matters with the senior national security advisors and cabinet officials.\nFor DOD, the President's decisions drive strategic guidance promulgated by the Office of the\nSecretary of Defense (OSD) and refined by the Joint Strategic Planning System (JSPS). To carry out Title 10, United States Code (USC), statutory responsibilities, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) utilizes the JSPS to provide a formal structure in aligning ends, ways, and means, and to identify and mitigate risk for the military in shaping the best assessments, advice, and direction of the Armed Forces for the President and SecDef.\n\n         -- JP 5-0, *Joint Operation Planning* (11 Aug 2011)\n National Security Council Intelligence Directive (NSCID).  A formal statement of policy by the National Security Council, binding upon those US Government agencies within the purview of NSC authority. (National HUMINT Glossary)\n\n Regarding counterintelligence, see NSCID 5, US Espionage and Counterintelligence Activities Abroad, 17 Feb 1972. National Security Crimes.  Crimes likely to impact upon the national security, defense, or foreign relations of the United States, including but not limited to espionage, spying, sabotage, treason, and sedition. National Security Division (NSD).  Element of the Department of Justice (DoJ) created by the reauthorization of the USA PATRIOT Act in March 2006, the Division merges the primary national security elements of DoJ, fulfilling a key recommendation of the March 2005 report of the Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD Commission). The Division consists of the Counterterrorism and Counterespionage Sections; the Office of Intelligence Policy and Review; and a Law & Policy Office. (DoJ website at <http://www.usdoj.gov/nsd/>)\n\n The Counterespionage Section (CES), NSD, DoJ, supervises the investigation and prosecution of\ncases affecting national security, foreign relations, and the export of military and strategic commodities and technology.\n\n    CES has executive responsibility for authorizing the prosecution of cases under criminal statutes\nrelating to espionage, sabotage, neutrality, and atomic energy. It provides legal advice to U.S. Attorney's Offices and investigative agencies on all matters within its area of responsibility, which includes 88 federal statutes affecting national security. It also coordinates criminal cases involving the application of the Classified Information Procedures Act (CIPA). In addition, the Section administers and enforces the Foreign Agents Registration Act of 1938 (FARA) and related disclosure statutes.\n\n    The Office of Intelligence Policy and Review (OIPR), NSD, DoJ,  prepares and files all applications\nfor electronic surveillance and physical search under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (FISA). The Office also advises the National Security Division and various client agencies, including the CIA, FBI, and the Defense and State Departments, on questions of law, regulation, and guidelines, as well as on the legality of domestic and overseas intelligence operations.\n National Security Emergency.  Any occurrence, including natural disaster, military attack, technological, or other emergency, that seriously degrades or threatens the national security of the United States. (DoDD 5111.13, ASD(HD&ASA), 16 Jan 2009)\n\n\nNational Security Information (NSI).  Any information that has been determined, pursuant to Executive Order 12958, as amended, or any predecessor order, to require protection against unauthorized disclosure and that is so designated. (IC Standard 700-1, 4 Apr 2008)\n\n    Note:  EO 12958 superseded by EO 13526, *Classified National Security Information*, 29 Dec 2009.\nFor additional information see Information Security Oversight Office (ISSO) website at: <http://www.archives.gov/isoo/policy-documents/ >\n National Security Interests.  The foundation for the development of valid national objectives that define United States goals or purposes. (JP 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States, 25 Mar 2013) National Security Letter (NSL).  An administrative demand for documents or records that are relevant to an authorized investigation to protect against international terrorism or clandestine intelligence activities. (FBI Domestic Investigations and Operations Guide, 15 Oct 2011) -- Also, a NSL seeks customer and consumer transaction information in national security investigations from communications providers, financial institutions, and credit agencies. Five statutory provisions vest government agencies responsible for foreign intelligence investigations with authority to issue written commands comparable to administrative subpoenas. (CRS Report RS22406, 27 Sep 2010)\n\n\n  National security letters, which are analogous to administrative subpoenas and are authorized by\nfive federal statutes. They are only available for authorized national security investigations (international terrorism or foreign intelligence/CI investigations), not general criminal investigations or domestic terrorism investigations. NSLs are issued directly by federal agency officials.\n\n    NSLs can only be used to seek certain transactional information permitted under the five NSL\nprovisions, and cannot be used to acquire the content of any communications. The scope of documents which may be obtained pursuant to a national security letter is more limited than that which might be authorized in a FISA order.  Statutory provisions at 18 USC 2709, 12 USC 3414, 15 USC 1681u, 15 USC 1681v and 50 USC 436; as amended by PL 109-177 and PL 109-178.\n_____________________\n\n\"FBI currently issues an average of nearly 60 NSLs per day.\"\n\n-- CRS Report RL 33320 (3 Jan 2014), p. 22, footnote 139\n_____________________\n\n\n    For additional information see <http://www.fbi.gov/pressrel/pressrel07/nsl_faqs030907.htm>\n\n    Also see CRS Report RS22406 at <http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/intel/RS22406.pdf> and CRS Report RL33320 at <https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/intel/RL33320.pdf>\n National Security Strategy (NSS).  A document approved by the President of the United States for developing, applying, and coordinating the instruments of national power to achieve objectives that contribute to national security. (JP 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States, 25 Mar 2013) National Special Security Event (NSSE).  A designated event that, by virtue of its political, economic, social, or religious significance, may be the target of terrorism or other criminal activity.  (JP 1-02 and\nJP 3-28, Defense Support of Civil Authorities, 31 Jul 2013)\n\n-- Also, major event considered to be nationally significant as designated by the President or his designated representative, the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security. Some events categorized as NSSE include presidential inaugurations, major international summits held in the United States, major sporting events, and presidential nominating. NSSE designation factors include: anticipated attendance by U.S. officials and foreign dignitaries; size of the event; and significance of the event.\n(CRS Report RS22752, updated 19 Mar 2008)\n The US Secret Service is the lead federal agency responsible for coordinating, planning, exercising, and implementing security for NSSEs. Designated the lead agency in PL 106-544.\n\nNational Threat Identification and Prioritization Assessment (NTIPA).  A strategic threat assessment produced by the Office of the National Counterintelligence Executive (ONCIX) that defines and prioritizes threats to the US posed by traditional and emerging foreign intelligence activities. It is designed to assist senior policymakers and officials with CI responsibilities focus on the current and emerging foreign intelligence threats that could cause unacceptable damage to US national security. The NTIPA fulfills the reporting requirement outlined in the Counterintelligence Enhancement Act  of 2002. (ONCIX)\n\n   \"The NTIPA informs the President if the United States of the gravest threats to our nation.\"\n\n        -- National Counterintelligence Strategy of the United States of America - 2012\n__________________________\n\n  \"The NTIPA is a compendium of foreign intelligence threat data, mandated by statute to be\nproduced annually by the Office of the National Counterintelligence Executive and submitted to the President for approval.... Community work on the NTIPA (the first of which submitted in 2004 and approved in 2005) revealed broad challenges in collection and analysis on these difficult targets. Prioritizing foreign intelligence threats is an even more demanding analytical task, depending as it does on the consumer's interests (for example, foreign threats to [CIA] DO operations in country X or to deployed forces in country Y may be far different from the rank ordering of country threats to U.S. national security information at home) and the national security context in which they arise (that is, threat priorities do not directly correlate to foreign intelligence capability alone but must be measured against the potential for harm or disruption to U.S. national security concerns and objectives, as prioritized by policy leadership).\"\n\n        -- Michelle K. Van Cleave (former NCIX), Counterintelligence and National Strategy, School for National\n            Security Executive Education, National Defense University, April 2007, footnote 36, pp. 33-34\n___________________\n\n    The NTIPA does not go into effect until approved by the President.  The NCIX submits each\napproved NTIPA or modification thereof to the congressional intelligence committees.\n\n    NTIPA *versus* NIPF - CI action is driven by the approved NTIPA and foreign intelligence (FI)\ncollection is driven by the NIPF (National Intelligence Priorities Framework).  Each has different focus and priorities, as well as a totally different operational dynamic.\n\nNeed for CI action is much different from the need for FI collection.\n National Virtual Translation Center (NVTC).  Provides timely and accurate translations of foreign intelligence for all elements of the IC. Its mission includes acting as a clearinghouse for facilitating interagency use of translators; partnering with elements of the U.S. Government, academia, and private industry to identify translator resources and engage their services; building a nationwide team of highly qualified, motivated linguists and translators, connected virtually to the program office in Washington, D.C.; and applying state-of-the-art technology to maximize translator efficiency. (National Intelligence: A Consumer's Guide - 2009)\n     The NVTC is a DNI Center and the FBI is the IC Executive Agent.\n\n\nNaval Criminal Investigative Service (NCIS).  The federal law enforcement agency charged with conducting investigations of felony-level offenses affecting the Navy and Marine Corps - that is, crimes punishable by confinement for more than one year.  NCIS also performs investigations and operations aimed at identifying and neutralizing foreign intelligence, international terrorist, and cyber threats to the Department of the Navy.  In addition, it provides warning of threats and specialized defensive force protection support to U.S. naval forces around the world.  Criminal investigation is at the foundation of virtually all the organization does, but the NCIS mission is broad.  Transnational terrorism has been and remains a key focus area for the agency. Today, NCIS' mantra is: Prevent Terrorism, Protect Secrets, and Reduce Crime. (www.ncis.navy.mil; accessed 28 Jun 2012)\n\n    Mission:  NCIS is a federal law enforcement agency that protects and defends the   DON\n[Department of Navy] against terrorism and foreign intelligence threats, investigates major criminal offenses, enforces the criminal laws of the United States and the UCMJ, assists commands in maintaining good order and discipline, and provides law enforcement and security services to the Navy and Marine Corps on a worldwide basis.\n\n   Director NCIS reports directly to the Secretary of the Navy and is the senior official for criminal\ninvestigations, counterintelligence, and security with the DON. Additionally, the Director NCIS is the senior official within DON for terrorism investigations and related operations designed to identify, detect, neutralize, or prevent terrorist planning and activities, and provides antiterrorism expertise and services to DON components.\n\n        -- SECNAV Instruction 5430.107, Mission and Functions of the NCIS, 28 Dec 2005\n\n    Also see SECNAV Instruction 3850.2C, *Department of the Navy Counterintelligence*, 20 Jul 2005\n\n\"Criminal investigation is at the foundation of virtually all the organization does...\"\n-- <http://www.ncis.navy.mil/AboutNCIS/Pages/default.aspx> (accessed 28 June 2012)\n NCIS.  Acronym, see *Naval Criminal Investigative Service*. Near Real Time.  Pertaining to the timeliness of data or information which has been delayed by the time required for electronic communication and automatic data processing. This implies that there are no significant delays. (JP 1-02 and TRADOC Pam 525-2-1, US Army Functional Concept for Intelligence,\n13 Oct 2010)  Also see *real time*. Need-to-know.  A criterion used in security procedures that requires the custodians of classified information to establish, prior to disclosure, that the intended recipient must have access to the information to perform his or her official duties. (JP 1-02 and JP 2-01.2, CI & HUMINT in Joint Operations, 16 Mar 2011 w/ chg 1 dated 26 Aug 2011)\n-- Also, a determination that a prospective recipient requires access to specific classified information in order to perform or assist in a lawful and authorized governmental function. (DoD Manual 5200.01- Vol 1, DoD Information Security Program, 24 Feb 2012) -- Also, a determination within the executive branch in accordance with directives issued pursuant\nto this order [EO 13526] that a prospective recipient requires access to specific classified information in order to perform or assist in a lawful and authorized governmental function. (EO13526, Classified National Security Information, 29 Dec 2009)\n\n## \"The Need-To-Know Principle Is Fundamental To The Intelligence Business.\"\n\n\n--  Duane R. Clarridge, *A Spy For All Seasons: My Life in the CIA* (1997), p. 310\n\n\n   The \"need-to-know\" principle, simply put, is that a person in authorized possession of classified\ninformation must determine that another person requires access to that information in order to perform a specific and authorized function and that such person has appropriate clearances and access approvals.\n\n    ...A major tightening up of the \"need-to-know\" practice is in order. It is particularly disturbing to\nsee the proliferation of detailed knowledge about intelligence sources and methods.\n\n         -- HPSCI Report (#100-5), \"United States Counterintelligence and Security Concerns - 1986,\"\n            100th Congress 1st session, 4 Feb 1987, p. 9\n Net-Centric.  The ability to provide a framework for full human and technical connectivity and interoperability that allows all DoD users and mission partners to share the information they need, when they need it, in a form they can understand and act on with confidence, and protects information from those who should not have it. (Joint Capability Areas Taxonomy & Lexicon, 15 Jan 2008) Network. [In critical infrastructure protection usage] a group or system of interconnected or cooperating entities, normally characterized as being nodes (assets), and the connections that link them. (DoDD 3020.40, DoD Policy and Responsibilities for Critical Infrastructure, 14 Jan 2010 w/ chg 2 dated 21 Sep\n2012) Network Operations (NetOps).  Activities conducted to operate and defend the Global Information Grid. (JP 1-02 and JP 6-0, Joint Communications, 10 Jun 2010)\n\n\nNeutralize. 1) As pertains to military operations, to render ineffective or unusable.  2) To render enemy personnel or material incapable of interfering with a particular operation.  3)  To render safe mines, bombs, missiles, and booby traps. 4) To make harmless anything contaminated with a chemical agent. (JP 1-02) Neutrality.  In international law, the attitude of impartiality during periods of war adopted by third states toward a belligerent and subsequently recognized by the belligerent, which creates rights and duties between the impartial states and the belligerent. (JP 1-02 and JP 3-0, Joint Operations, 11 Aug 2011) Neutral State.  In international law, a state that pursues a policy of neutrality during war. (JP 1-02) Nickname.  A combination of two separate unclassified words that is assigned an unclassified meaning and is employed only for unclassified administrative, morale, or public information purposes. (JP 1-02) Also see *codeword*.\n\nNon Attributable Internet Access.  Use of a commercial internet service provider to access publicly available information on the internet while protecting the unit's U.S. government affiliation, disclosing essential elements of friendly information, or exposing U.S. government information systems to intrusion or manipulation. (AR 381-20, Army CI Program, 25 May 2010) Noncustodial Interview.  Interview conducted when subjects are interviewed without depriving them of their freedom in any significant manner (e.g., arrest or detention). Subjects voluntarily consent to the interview and are advised that they may depart at any time. (Army FM 2-22.2, CI, Oct 2009) Non-Disclosure Agreement (NDA). An official authorized contract between an individual and the United States (U.S.) Government signed by an individual as a condition of access to classified national intelligence. The NDA specifies the security requirements for access and details the penalties for noncompliance. (DSS Glossary) Nongovernmental Organization (NGO).  A private, self-governing, not-for-profit organization dedicated to alleviating human suffering; and/or promoting education, health care, economic development, environmental protection, human rights, and conflict resolution; and/or encouraging the establishment of democratic institutions and civil society. (JP 1-02 and JP 3-08, Interorganizational Coordination During Joint Operations, 24 Jun 2011)\n-- Also, a legally-constituted organization created by persons having the legal authority to do so with no participation or representation of any government. (DoDD 3020.40, DoD Policy and Responsibilities for Critical Infrastructure, 14 Jan 2010 w/ chg 2 dated 21 Sep 2012)\nNon-Official Cover (NOC).  Term used by case officers who operate overseas outside the usual diplomatic cover. (Spy Book)\n\n-- Also, NOC, pronounced as \"knock,\" an acronym for \"nonofficial cover.\" Primarily a CIA term used where one is operating without cover of diplomatic protection or US government employment. (TOP\nSECRET: The Dictionary of Espionage and Intelligence, 2005)\n\n    Case officers that have no visible affiliation with the U.S. government.  NOCs, as they are called,\nmight typically operate as business executives, students, writers, or in some other nongovernmental capacity. They perform those jobs in addition to doing their espionage. If they are caught in the act of spying, they do not have diplomatic immunity and are subject to the full force of the local law, including prosecution for espionage and imprisonment. NOCs usually receive less scrutiny and surveillance from the local authorities than their official colleagues.\n\n        -- James M. Olson, *Fair Play: The Moral Dilemmas of Spying* (2006)\n________________________\n\n    According a Congressional Research Service report, placing U.S. intelligence officials in foreign\ncountries under \"nonofficial cover\" (NOC) in businesses or other private capacities is possible, but it presents significant challenges to U.S. agencies.  Administrative mechanisms are vastly more complicated [than those] for officials formally attached to the embassy; special arrangements have to be made... The responsibilities of operatives under nonofficial cover to the parent intelligence\nagency have to be reconciled with those to private employers, and there is an unavoidable potential for conflicts of interest...\n\n        -- CRS Report RL33539, *Intelligence Issues for Congress*, 14 Sep 2011, p. 6\n Non-Permissive Environment.  An operational environment in which host government forces, whether opposed to or receptive to operations that a unit intends to conduct, do not have effective control of the territory and population in the intended operational area (Uncertain Environment); or an operational environment in which hostile forces have control as well as the intent and capability to oppose or react effectively to the operations a unit intends to conduct (Hostile Environment). (National Military Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction, Feb 2006)\nNon-Title 50 (NT50).  Refers to those federal departments and organizations whose authorities derive from portions of United States Code other than Title 50, which addresses U.S. intelligence activities. NT50s are involved in many activities that affect national security, such as conducting foreign affairs; combating pandemic diseases; halting illicit trafficking; conducting scientific and medical research; regulating finance, commerce, and transportation; and protecting food, water and nuclear infrastructures. Notice of Intelligence Potential (NIP).  A document alerting consumers of a potential collection opportunity involving sources, It is often associated with travel by the source or attendance at some event. (DHE-M 3301.002, Vol II Collection Operations, 23 Nov 2010) Notional.  Fictitious; most commonly used to refer to a nonexistent agent but also used to refer to fictitious organizations, individuals, or sources of information. (FBI FCI Terms)\n\n-- Also, fictitious, imaginary, existing only in the perception of the target. Antonym of real, true,\ngenuine, or legitimate. (CIA, D&D Lexicon, 1 May 2008)\n\n-- Also, Notionals: fictious [sic], private commercial entities which exist on paper only. They serve as the ostensible employer of intelligence personnel, or as the ostensible sponsor of certain activities in support of clandestine operations. (Senate Report 94-755, Book I - Glossary, 26 Apr 1976) Notorious Individual.  Someone who is widely known and has an unfavorable public reputation. (DoDD S-5200.37, Management and Execution of Defense HUMINT (U), 9 Feb 2009 w/. chg 2)\n\nO ========================================== OFCO.  Acronym, see *Offensive Counterintelligence Operation*. Offensive Counterintelligence Operation (OFCO).  A clandestine CI activity conducted for military, strategic, DoD, or national CI and security purposes against a target having suspected or known affiliation with FISS [Foreign Intelligence & Security Service], international terrorism, or other foreign persons or organizations, to counter terrorism, espionage, or other clandestine intelligence activities that threaten the security of the Department or the United States. The two types of OFCO are double agent operations and Counterintelligence Controlled Source Operations (CSO). (DoDI S-5240.09, OFCO, 29 Oct 2008)\n\nIf defensive counterintelligence is checkers, then offensive counterintelligence is chess.\n\n\n-- Steven Aftergood, \"DIA Takes on Offensive Counterintelligence,\" *Secrecy News* (12 Aug 2008)\n_______________________\n\nAn ideal counterintelligence system anticipates the enemy's move, notionally\nsatisfies his needs, and indeed operates a notional intelligence service for him.\n\n\n -- Eric W. Timm, \"Countersabotage--A CI Function\" *Studies in Intelligence*, V7:2 (Spring 1963), p. 67\n_______________________\n\n\n    Offensive CI operations  - CI folks call OFCO - are clandestine CI activities run in support of DoD\nmilitary national security objectives and programs against individuals known or suspected to be foreign intelligence officers with connections to foreign intelligence or international terrorist activities. And they're run to counter the foreign intelligence operations, espionage, against DoD national activities and, of course, terrorist operations against DOD or national.  These are very tightly controlled departmental activities run by a small group of specially selected people within DoD. There are only four organizations in the department that can run these operations - Army\nCounterintelligence, Naval Criminal Investigative Service, Air Force Office of Special\n    *Investigations, and now DIA with the center [Defense CI & HUMINT Center].*\n       -- Toby Sullivan, Director of Counterintelligence for USD/I, 5 Aug 2008;\n            see Federal News Service transcript at <http://www.fas.org/irp/news/2008/08/dia-dchc.pdf>\n_______________________\n\n    Offensive counterintelligence could exploit knowledge of secret adversary infrastructures to keep adversaries off-balance and to force them to divert critical resources to defend against the offensive thrusts of well-informed enemies. Offensive counterintelligence can also deceive and manipulate the leaders of hostile coalitions, as Western governments did repeatedly in WWII, and in the Gulf War.\n\n       -- Roy Godson, *Dirty Tricks or Trump Cards: US Covert Action and Counterintelligence*, with new\n            introduction by the author (paperback 2001), p. xxx\n\n_______________________\n\n    For detailed information concerning DoD OFCO see DoDI S-5240.09, *OFCO (U),* 29 Oct 2008\n\nMany... offensive operations have changed history,\nbut remain a misunderstood, and even unappreciated, CI penetration methodology.\n\n\n-- CI Centre (www.cicentre.com)\n\n\n-- Also (previously defined in DoDD O-5240.02, dated 20 Dec 2007), an approved CI operation involving a formally recruited human source conducted for DoD or national purposes against a target having suspected or known foreign intelligence and security services affiliation, international terrorist affiliation, or other foreign persons or organizations, to counter terrorism, espionage, or other clandestine intelligence activities that threaten the security of the Department and/or the United States. Note:  this definition was deleted from DoDD O-5240.02 with change 1 dated 30 Dec 2010. Offensive Cyber Operations (OCO). Cyberspace operations intended to project power by the application of force in or through cyberspace.  (JP 1-02 and JP 3-12, Cyberspace Operations, 5 Feb 2013)\n-- Also, includes all US Government programs and activities that, through the use  of cyberspace, 1)\nactively gather information from computers, information systems or networks or 20 manipulate, disrupt, deny, degrade, or destroy targeted adversary computers, information systems, or networks. (NSPD-38)\n-- Also, offensive operations to destroy, disrupt, or neutralize adversary cyberspace capabilities both before and after their use against friendly forces, but as close to their source as possible.  The goal of Offensive Cyberspace Operations (OCO) is to prevent the employment of adversary cyberspace capabilities prior to employment. This could mean preemptive action against an adversary. (DSS Glossary) Official Information.  Information that is owned by, produced for or by, or is subject to the control of the United States Government. (JP 1-02 and JP 3-61, Public Affairs, 25 Aug 2010) Office of Foreign Missions (OFM).  An office in the Department of State, Bureau of Diplomatic Security that has three missions: 1) Protecting the interests of the US and its citizens from foreign diplomats' abuses of privileges and immunities; 2) Improving the treatment of US personnel assigned abroad by imposing reciprocal treatment on foreign diplomats assigned to the US; and 3) Services to the foreign diplomatic community in a variety of areas. Programs include the review of all notifications by foreign missions of any intent to acquire property in the US and monitoring of foreign diplomatic travel. Office of the National Counterintelligence Executive (ONCIX).  [The U.S. Government agency] charged with integrating the activities of all CI programs to make them coherent and efficient, coordinating CI policy and budgets to the same end, and evaluating the performance of the CI community against the [National CI] strategy. (National Intelligence: A Consumer's Guide - 2009)  Also see National Counterintelligence Executive. -- Also, ONCIX provides effective leadership and support to the counterintelligence and security activities of the US Intelligence Community, the US Government, and US private sector entities who are at risk of intelligence collection or attack by foreign adversaries. (www.ncix.gov; accessed 9 Jun 2014)\n\n\n The ONCIX is part of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence and is staffed by senior\ncounterintelligence (CI) and other specialists from across the national intelligence and security communities.  The ONCIX develops, coordinates, and produces:\n    -  Annual foreign intelligence threat assessments and other analytic CI products -  An annual national CI strategy for the US Government -  Priorities for CI collection, investigations, and operations -  CI program budgets and evaluations that reflect strategic priorities -  In-depth espionage damage assessments -  CI awareness, outreach, and training standards policies.\n\n            -- www.ncix.gov (accessed 9 Jun 2014)\n Office of Special Investigations (OSI).  See Air *Force Office of Special Investigations* (AFOSI).\n\n\n\nOne-Time Pad (OTP).  Sheets of paper or silk printed with random five-number group ciphers to be used to encode and decode enciphered messages. (CI Centre Glossary) -- Also, groups of random numbers or letters arranged in columns, used for encoding and decoding messages. Since the codes are only used once, a properly employed OTP is theoretically unbreakable. (Spycraft) -- Also, sheets of randomly generated numbers, usually formatted into four- or five-digit groups. Each party to the secret communication... uses the same one-time pad.  By a simple process of alphabetic substitution, along with \"false subtraction\" and \"false addition,\" the two sides can securely communicate with each other. (James M. Olson, *Fair Play: The Moral Dilemmas of Spying*, 2006) -- Also, manual one-time cryptosystem produced in pad form. (CNSSI No. 4009, National Information Assurance Glossary, 26 April 2010)\n\n## An Unbreakable Cipher When Used Properly\n\n    One-time pad (OTP), also called Vernam-cipher or the perfect cipher, is a crypto algorithm where\nplaintext is combined with a random key. It is the only known method to perform mathematically unbreakable encryption.  See <http://users.telenet.be/d.rijmenants/en/onetimepad.htm>\n One-Time Source.  A source who, may not reasonably be expected to provide information on a regular or continuing basis by reason of limited knowledgeability or circumstances of contact. (HDI Lexicon, April 2008)\n-- Also, a source of information of value that was, and will be, encountered only once. (US Army\nFM 2-22.3, HUMINT Collector Operations, 6 Sep 2006)\n\n    A one-time source cannot be tasked to collect information, but can be sensitized to information in\nwhich the collector is interested.\n\n    For more information see:  <http://users.telenet.be/d.rijmenants/en/onetimepad.htm>\n One-Way Radio Link (OWRL).  The method of transmitting over radio (by voice, key, or impulses) messages to intelligence personnel who, by prearrangement, are in possession of a time schedule, signal, code, or cipher that enables them to receive and decipher messages. (AFOSI Manual 71-142, OFCO, 9 Jun 2000) One-Way Voice Link (OWVL).  One-way radio link that transmits a coded voice message to intelligence personnel who, by prearrangement, are in possession of a time schedule, signal, code, or cipher that enables them to receive and decipher messages. (AFOSI Manual 71-142, OFCO, 9 Jun 2000)\n\n-- Also, shortwave radio link used to transmit prerecorded enciphered messages to an operative, who is usually working in place in a hostile area. (CI Centre Glossary)\nOpen.  Not classified or concealed. (CIA, D&D Lexicon, 1 May 2002) Open Source.  Any person or group that provides information without the expectation of privacythe information, the relationship, or both is not protected against public disclosure. (Army Techniques Publication   2-22.9, Open-Source Intelligence, 10 Jul 2012) Open Source Acquisition.  The act of gaining possession of, or access to open source information synonymous with \"open source collection.\"  The preferred term is acquisition because by definition, open sources are collected and disseminated by others[,] open source exploiters acquire previously collected and publicly available information second-hand. (ICD 301, National Open Source Enterprise, 11 Jul 2006)\nAlso see *open source information* and *open source intelligence*.\n\n\nOpen Source Center (OSC).  Advances the Intelligence Community's exploitation of openly available information to include the Internet, databases, press, radio, television, video, geospatial data, photos and commercial imagery; functions include collection, analysis and research, training and information technology management to facilitate government-wide access and use. The Director CIA will administer the Center on behalf of the DNI. (ODNI News Release 6-05, 8 Nov 2005)\n-- Also, the OSC acts as a service of common concern to advance the IC's exploitation of open source material and nurtures acquisition, procurement, analysis, dissemination, and sharing of open source information, products, and services throughout the USG; established at CIA and builds on the former Foreign Broadcast Information Service and will include personnel from across the IC and other USG organizations; Dir CIA serves as the DNI's Executive Agent for the Center. (ICD 310, National Open Source Enterprise, 11 Jul 2006) Open Source Collection.  See *Open Source Acquisition*.\n\nOpen Source Information.  Publicly available information which anyone can lawfully obtain by request or observation. (ICD 301, National Open Source Enterprise, 11 Jul 2006) -- Also, information that any member of the public could lawfully obtain by request or observation as well as other unclassified information that has limited public distribution or access. (JP 2-0, Joint Intelligence, 22 Oct 2013)\n\n## We Have No Need For Spies. We Have The Times.\n\n\n-- Tsar Nicholas I cited in Haswell, *Spies and Spymasters* (1977) Open Source Intelligence (OSINT). Intelligence produced from publicly available information that is collected, exploited, and disseminated in a timely manner to an appropriate audience for the purpose of addressing a specific intelligence requirement. (PL109-163  931 and ICD 1, 1 May 2006)\n\n   \"Ninety percent of intelligence comes from open sources. The other ten percent, the clandestine\nwork, is just the more dramatic. The real intelligence hero is Sherlock Holmes, not James Bond.\" -- Lieutenant General Samuel V. Wilson, USA (Ret.), Former Director, Defense Intelligence Agency\n\n-- Also, relevant information derived from the systematic collection, processing, and analysis of publicly available information in response to known or anticipated intelligence requirements. (JP 2-0, Joint Intelligence, 22 Oct 2013)\n-- Also, publicly available information appearing in print or electronic form, including information from radio, television, newspapers, journals, the Internet, commercial databases, and videos, graphics, and drawings used to enhance intelligence analysis and reporting. (ODNI, U.S. National Intelligence - An Overview 2011)\n-- Also, relevant information derived from the systematic collection, processing, and analysis of publicly available information in response to intelligence requirements. (Army FM 2-22.9, Open Source Intelligence, Dec 2006)\n\n-- Also, the discipline that pertains to intelligence produced from publicly available information that is collected, exploited, and disseminated in a timely manner to an appropriate audience for the purpose of addressing a specific intelligence requirement. (Army FM 2-0, Intelligence, 23 Mar 2010)\n\n\n OSINT generally falls into four categories:  1) widely available data and information; 2) targeted\ncommercial data; 3) individual experts; and 4) \"gray\" literature, which consists of written information produced by the private sector, government, and academe that has limited availability, either because few copies are produced, existence of the material is largely unknown, or access to information is constrained.\n\n    OSINT can include:  media such as newspaper, magazines, radio, television, and computer-based\ninformation; public data such as government reports, and official data such as budgets and demographics, hearings, legislative debates, press conferences, and speeches; information derived from professional and academic sources such as conferences, symposia, professional associations, academic papers, dissertations and theses, and experts; commercial data such as\ncommercial imagery; *gray literature* such as trip reports, working papers, discussion papers, unofficial government documents, proceedings, preprints, research reports, studies, and market surveys; and information, which although unclassified, could be considered company proprietary, financially sensitive, legally protected, or personally damaging, as well as information derived from Internet blogs.\n\n        -- CRS Report RL34270, 5 Dec 2007\n_______________________________\n\n    Clandestine technical and humint sources can be used to confirm this kind of special take from\nopen sourcesand open sources can be used to confirm the information from clandestine sources.\n\n        -- Roy Godson*, Dirty Tricks or Trump Cards: US Covert Action and Counterintelligence* (1995), p. 204\n\nOperation Order (OPORD).  A directive issued by a commander to subordinate commanders for the purpose of effecting the coordinated execution of an operation. (JP 5-0, Joint Operation Planning, 11 Aug 2011) Operation Plan (OPLAN).  1) Any plan for the conduct of military operations prepared in response to actual and potential contingences; 2) A complete and detailed joint plan containing a full description of the concept of operations, all annexes applicable to the plan, and a time-phased force and deployment data. (JP 5-0, Joint Operation Planning, 11 Aug 2011) Operational Control (OPCON).  The authority to perform those functions of command over subordinate forces involving organizing and employing commands and forces, assigning tasks, designating objectives, and giving authoritative direction necessary to accomplish the mission. (JP 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States, 25 Mar 2013) Operational Cycle (Ops Cycle).  See *recruitment cycle*. Operational Environment.  A composite of the conditions, circumstances, and influences that affect the employment of capabilities and bear on the decisions of the commander. (JP 1-02 and JP 3-0, Joint Operations, 11 Aug 2011) Operational Intelligence.  Intelligence that is required for planning and conducting campaigns and major operations to accomplish strategic objectives within theaters or operational areas. (JP 1-02 and JP 2-0, Joint Intelligence, 22 Oct 2013)  Also see *strategic intelligence; tactical intelligence*.\n\nOperational Interest (OI).  [Within HUMINT usage] exclusive contact with a source, as established by a HUMINT organization. Within DoD, established for all sources upon IDSRS Deconfliction and assignment of a NFN. Between DoD and other national agencies, granted for clandestine leads and sources by the Interagency Source Registry (ISR). (DHE-M 3301.002, Vol II Collection Operations, 23 Nov 2010)\n-- Also, see classified definition in AR 381-20, Army CI Program (U), 25 May 2010.\n\nOperational Level of War.  The level of war at which campaigns and major operations are planned, conducted, and sustained to achieve strategic objectives within theaters or other operational areas. (JP 1-02 and JP 3-0, Joint Operations, 11 Aug 2011)  Also see *tactical level of war; strategic level of war*. Operational Proposal.  A formal document prepared by DoD collection elements to outline a proposed activity or operation. (HDI Lexicon, April 2008) Operational Testing.  A continuing process of evaluation that may be applied to either operational personnel or situations to determine their validity or reliability. (JP 1-02)\n\n\n-- Also, any means or process employed to establish authenticity, reliability, or control. (HDI Lexicon, April 2008) Operational Warning. A warning to theater level or equivalent decision makers of developing situations or ongoing event which may initiate operational planning or trigger the execution or change in status of standing operations or contingency plans. (DoDD 3115.16, The Defense Warning Network,5 Dec 2013) Operations Officer - CIA.  A career track within the *Core Collector* profession of the National Clandestine Service (NCS), Central Intelligence Agency (CIA).  Operations Officers (OO's) are focused full time on clandestinely spotting, assessing, developing, recruiting, and handling individuals with access to vital foreign intelligence on the full range of national security issues.  OO's use their sound judgment, high integrity, strong interpersonal skills, and ability to assess the character and motivations of others to establish strong human relationships and trust that provides the foundation needed to acquire high-value intelligence from foreign sources. An OO's career can include assignments in the NCS's three key areas of activityhuman intelligence collection, counterintelligence, and covert actionon issues of  highest interest to US national security, such as international terrorism, weapons proliferation, international crime and narcotics trafficking, and capabilities and intentions of rogue nations. Operations Officers serve the bulk of their time in overseas assignments that range typically from 2-3 years. (CIA; see <https://www.cia.gov/careers/jobs/view-all-jobs/core-collector.html>; accessed 19 Mar 2009) Operations Security (OPSEC).  A process of identifying critical information and analyzing friendly actions attendant to military operations and other activities to: identify those actions that can be observed by adversary intelligence systems; determine indicators and vulnerabilities that adversary intelligence systems might obtain that could be interpreted or pieced together to derive critical information in time to be useful to adversaries, and determine which of these represent an unacceptable risk; then select and execute countermeasures that eliminate the risk to friendly actions and operations or reduce it to an acceptable level. (DoDD 5205.02E, DoD OPSEC Program, 20 Jun 2012)\n-- Also, a process of identifying critical information and subsequently analyzing friendly actions attendant to military operations and other activities to:  a) identify those actions that can be observed by adversary intelligence systems; b) determine indicators that adversary intelligence systems might obtain that could be interpreted or pieced together to derive critical information in time to be useful to adversaries; and c) select and execute measures that eliminate or reduce to an acceptable level the vulnerabilities of friendly actions to adversary exploitation. (JP 1-02 and JP 3-13.3, Operations Security, 4 Jan 2012)\n\n## Opsec's Most Important Characteristic Is That It Is A Process And Not A Collection Of Specific Rules And Instructions That Can Be Applied To Every Operation Or Activity\n\n\n    Although good operational security (Opsec) does not guarantee the success of any intelligence\noperation, faulty Opsec almost surely guarantees worse than failure.\n\n        -- Angelo Codevilla, *Informing Statecraft: Intelligence for a New Century* (1992), p. 33\n___________________________\n\n    OPSEC... is a systematic and proved process... [to] deny potential adversaries information about\ncapabilities and intentions by identifying, controlling, and protecting generally unclassified evidence of the planning and execution of sensitive Government  activities.\n\n       -- NSDD 298, *National Operations Security Program*, 22 Jan 1988, p.1\n___________________________\n\n    [T]here is a clear and compelling need for operational security in a military environment and in the\nconduct of sensitive operations.\n\n        -- Joint Security Commission, *Redefining Security*, 28 Feb 1994, p. 66\n___________________________\n\n    Director, DIA provides intelligence and counterintelligence threat analysis to support OPSEC\nplanning to all DoD Components. .\n\n        - DoDD 5205.02E, *DoD OPSEC Program*, 20 Jun 2012, p. 5\n\n\n## National Opsec Program\n\n    In 1988, President Ronald Reagan signed *National Security Decision Directive 298* (NSDD 298).\nThis directive established the \"National Operations Security Program\" as a means to identify,\ncontrol, and protect unclassified information and evidence associated with U.S. national security\n  programs and activities.\n    NSDD 298 named the Director, National Security Agency, as the Executive Agent for interagency\nOPSEC training and included in his responsibilities the establishment and maintenance of the\nInteragency OPSEC Support Staff (IOSS).\n\n    The primary responsibility of the IOSS is to act as a consultant to other U.S. government\ndepartments or agencies by providing technical guidance and assistance that will result in selfsufficient OPSEC Programs for the protection of U.S operations.  Members of the IOSS staff assess OPSEC programs, assist in OPSEC program development, conduct surveys, assessments and provide OPSEC training.\n\n    See IOSS web site at:  <https://www.iad.gov/ioss/>\n\nOperations Security Assessment (OPSEC Assessment).  An evaluative process, usually exercise, or support function to determine the likelihood that critical information can be protected from the adversary's intelligence.       (JP 1-02 and JP 3-13.3, Operations Security, 4 Jan 2012) Operations Security Countermeasures (OPSEC Security Countermeasures). Methods and means to gain and maintain essential secrecy about critical information. (JP 1-02 and 3-13.3, Operations Security, 4 Jan 2012) Operations Security Indicators (OPSEC Indicators).  Friendly detectable actions and open-source information that can be interpreted or pieced together by an adversary to derive critical information. (JP 1- 02 and JP 3-13.3, Operations Security, 4 Jan 2012) Operations Security Process (OPSEC Process).  A process that examines a complete activity to determine what, if any, exploitable evidence of classified or sensitive activity may be acquired by adversaries. It is an analytical, risk-based process that incorporates five distinct elements: 1) critical information identification; threat analysis; 3) vulnerability analysis; 4) risk assessment; and 5) OPSEC countermeasures. (DoD 5205.02-M, DoD OPSEC Program Manual, 3 Nov 2008)\n  The operations security process involves five steps:\n  identification of critical information, analysis of threats, analysis of vulnerabilities, assessment of risk, and application of appropriate countermeasures.\n\n   -- NSDD 298, *National Operations Security Program*, 22 Jan 1988\n\nOperations Security Survey (OPSEC Survey).  An application of the OPSEC process by a team of subject matter experts to conduct a detailed analysis of activities associated with a specific organization, operation, activity, exercise, or support function by employing the known collection capabilities of potential adversaries. (DoDD 5205.02E, DoD OPSEC Program, 20 Jun 2012)\n-- Also, a  collection effort by a team of subject matter experts to reproduce the intelligence image projected by a specific operation or function simulating hostile intelligence processes. (JP 1-02 and JP 3-13.3, Operations Security, 4 Jan 2012)\n\n\nOperations Security Vulnerability (OPSEC Vulberability).  A condition in which friendly actions provide operations security indicators that may be obtained and accurately evaluated by an adversary in time to provide a basis for effective adversary decisionmaking. (JP 1-02 and JP 3-13.3, Operations Security, 4 Jan 2012) Operations Support Element (OSE).  An element that is responsible for all administrative, operations support and services support functions within the counterintelligence and human intelligence staff element of a joint force intelligence directorate. (JP 1-02 and JP 2-01.2, CI & HUMINT in Joint Operations, 16 Mar 2011 w/ chg 1 dated 26 Aug 2011)  [Normally in the J2X] OPSEC,  See *Operations Security*, Organized Cyber Intruders/Attackers.  Those individuals, groups or organizations who violate international law or conventions relating to computer networks or who otherwise use the cyberspace domain to interfere with, disrupt, or deny computer network services. (OSD, Guidance for Employment\nof the Force) Original Classification Authority (OCA).  An individual authorized in writing, either by the President, the Vice President, or by agency heads or other officials designated by the President, to initially classify information. (DoD IG Evaluation Guide, 22 Jan 2013)\n\n-- Also, an individual authorized in writing, either by the United States (U.S.) President, or by agency heads or other officials designated by the President, to classify information in the first instance. OCAs must receive training to perform this duty. (DSS Glossary)\n\n\n    OCAs and other individuals delegated declassification authority in writing by the head of the IC\nelement may declassify information within their purview pursuant to EO 13526 and 32 CFR Part 2001 guidelines.  Only the DNI may declassify space-based national imagery, pursuant to EO 12951.\n        -- ICD 710, *Classification Management and Control Markings System*, 21 Jun 2013\n Other Government Agency (OGA).  Within the context of interagency coordination, a non Department of Defense agency of the United States Government. (JP 1-02) Overhead Reconnaissance. Activities carried out by space-based capabilities whose principal purpose is conducting and/or enabling intelligence collection. These activities are comprised of associated R&D, acquisition, test and evaluation, and system operations performed on or by satellites, communications, and facilities for data processing as well as command and control of spacecraft and payloads. (DoDD 5105.23, NRO, 28 Jun 2011) Overt.  Activities that are openly acknowledged by or readily attributable to the US Government, and include activities designed to acquire information through legal and open means without concealment.\nOvert information may be collected by observation, elicitation, or from knowledgeable human sources. (ICD 304, HUMINT, 6 Mar 2008; DoDD S-5200.37, 9 Feb 2009; JP 1-02; and JP 2-01.2, CI & HUMINT\nin Joint Operations, 16 Mar 2011 w/ chg 1 dated 26 Aug 2011)\n-- Also, refers to being in the open, without any attempt to deceive or mislead, with full knowledge\nof coordinating units or agencies; activity done without attempt to conceal it. (CI Community Lexicon)\n-- Also, methods of conducting DoD activities that may be acknowledged by or attributable to the U.S.\n\nGovernment. (HDI Lexicon, April 2008)\n\n\nOvert Collection.  Intelligence activities with the ultimate goal of intelligence information collection which are not designed or executed to conceal sponsorship, collection activity, identity of operators, or methodologies employed. (Previously in DoDI S-5240.17, CI Collection, 12 Jan 2009)  Also see open source intelligence.\n\n-- Also, the acquisition of intelligence information in the public domain. (CI Community Lexicon)\n\n\n  \"While the importance of clandestine collection should not be underestimated, many of the\npieces of the jigsaw puzzle which is 'finished foreign intelligence' can be overtly collected\nby a well-organized information gathering system.\"\n\n        -- Rockefeller Commission Report (June 1975), p. 209\n Overt Intelligence.  Information collected openly from public or open sources. (Senate Report 94-755, Book I - Glossary, 26 Apr 1976) Overt Operation.  An operation conducted openly, without concealment. (JP 1-02 and JP 2-01.2, CI &\nHUMINT in Joint Operations, 16 Mar 2011 w/ chg 1 dated 26 Aug 2011) Overt [HUMINT] Operations.  Openly acknowledged by, or are readily attributable to, the US Government. Overt HUMINT methods include: debriefing, interrogation, elicitation, and observation. (JP 2-01.2, CI &\nHUMINT in Joint Operations, 16 Mar 2011 w/ chg 1 dated 26 Aug 2011)\n\n\nP ========================================== Packet Sniffer.  Software that observes and records network traffic. (NIST, Glossary of Key Information Security Terms, May 2013) Parallel Investigative Jurisdiction.  One or more agencies with differing objectives having simultaneous authority to investigate a matter or incident. An example would be a criminal matter that has a national security implication, which might require investigation by both a CI organization and a criminal investigative organization. (AR 381-20, Army CI Program, 25 May 2010) Paramilitary Forces.  Forces or groups distinct from the regular armed forces of any country, but resembling them in organization, equipment, training, or mission. (JP 1-02 and JP 3-24, Counterinsurgency, 22 Nov 2013) Parole.  A prearranged verbal exchange used for recognition and identification between intelligence personnel. (AFOSI Manual 71-142, OFCO, 9 Jun 2000)\n-- Also, a prearranged verbal exchange used by intelligence personnel to identify themselves to each other. (FBI FCI Terms) Passive Source.  An individual recruited by a military CI agency to act as a listening post for CI purposes in a location associated with the individual's job or social status.  This source undertakes no actions unless associated with such status.  A passive source is recruited or placed in an area that foreign intelligence would consider a priority target and there is evidence of foreign intelligence spotting, assessing, or recruiting activities. (AFOSI Manual 71-119, CI Investigations, 27 Oct 2009) Pattern Recognition.  An inductive process of recognizing a commonality or trend in an aggregate of indications from which as plausible explanation or model can be developed. (Word of Intelligence, 2nd Edition, 2011) Patterns.  [In CI usage,] ...repeated incidents that may be similar in nature or dissimilar events that occur in a specific location or time span that may indicate potential FISS and ITO [international terrorist organization] targeting or information exploitation. (Army FM 2-22.2, CI. Oct 2009) Patriot Act (aka USA Patriot Act).  The official title is \"Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT) Act of 2001.\"  An act to deter and punish terrorist acts in the United States and around the world, to enhance law enforcement investigatory tools, and for other purposes. (PL 107-56, 26 Oct 2001; codified as amended at 50 USC  1861)\n\n\n The Patriot Act substantially expanded the authority of U.S. law enforcement agencies for the\nstated purpose of fighting terrorism in the United States and abroad.  Among its provisions, the Act:\n        -- increased the ability of law enforcement agencies to search telephone and e-mail\n           communications and medical, financial and other records;\n        -- eased restrictions on foreign intelligence gathering within the United States;\n        -- expanded the Secretary of the Treasury's authority to regulate financial transactions, particularly those involving foreign individuals and entities; and\n        -- enhanced the discretion of law enforcement and immigration authorities in detaining\n            and deporting immigrants suspected of terrorism-related acts.\n\n    The act also expanded the definition of terrorism to include \"domestic terrorism,\" thus enlarging the\nnumber of activities to which the Patriot Act's expanded law enforcement powers can be applied.\n\n\n\n The Patriot Act made a number of changes to U.S. law.  Key acts changed were the Foreign\nIntelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (FISA), the Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1968 (ECPA), the Money Laundering Control Act of 1986, and Bank Secrecy Act (BSA), as well as the Immigration and Nationality Act.\n\n    Additional information on the Patriot Act available on NCIX website at:\n<http://www.ncix.gov/publications/law/index.html>\n PCASS.  Acronym for \"Preliminary Credibility Assessment Screening System.\" (DoDI 5210.91, Polygraph and Credibility Assessment Procedures, 12 Aug 2010 with change 1 dated 15 Oct 2013)  Also see PCASS Instrument; polygraph examination. PCASS Instrument.  A diagnostic instrument used during an interview capable of monitoring, recording, and/or measuring electrodermal and vasomotor activity. The PCASS instrument uses an algorithm to evaluate the physiological responses recorded by the two components. (DoDI 5210.91, Polygraph and Credibility Assessment Procedures, 12 Aug 2010 with chg 1 dated 15 Oct 2013)  See *PCASS*.\n\n\n\n    The PCASS shall only be used as a field-expedient tool to screen persons of interest for\nintelligence and security purposes.  Only certified personnel may conduct PCASS examinations.\n\n    Per DoD policy, the PCASS will not be used to test U.S. persons (however does not apply to\nPCASS examinations conducted for training); see Enclosure 5, DoD Instruction 5210.91.\n Peace Operations (PO).  A broad term that encompasses multiagency and multinational crisis response and limited contingency operations involving all instruments of national power with military missions to contain conflict, redress the peace, and shape the environment to support reconciliation and rebuilding and facilitate the transition to legitimate governance.  Peace operations include peacekeeping, peace enforcement, peacemaking, peace building, and conflict prevention efforts. (JP 3-07.3 Peace Operations, 17 Oct 2007) Peace Building.  Stability actions, predominately diplomatic and economic, that strengthen and rebuild governmental infrastructure and institutions in order to avoid a relapse into conflict. (JP 3-07.3, Peace Operations, 17 Oct 2007) Peace Enforcement.  Application of military force, or the threat of its use, normally pursuant to international authorization, to compel compliance with resolutions or sanctions designed to maintain or restore peace and order. (JP 3-07.3, Peace Operations, 17 Oct 2007)\n\n\nPeacekeeping.  Military operations undertaken with the consent of all major parties to a dispute, designed to monitor and facilitate implementation of an agreement (cease fire, truce, or other such agreement) and support diplomatic efforts to reach a long-term political settlement. (JP 3-07.3, Peace Operations, 17 Oct 2007) Peacemaking.  The process of diplomacy, mediation, negotiation, or other forms of peaceful settlements that arranges an end to a dispute and resolves issues that led to it. (JP 3-07.3, Peace Operations, 17 Oct 2007) Pen Register.  A device which records or decodes electronic or other impulses which identify the numbers dialed or otherwise transmitted on the telephone line to which such device is attached, but such term does not include any device used by a provider, or customer of a wire or electronic communication service for billing, or recording as an incident to billing, for communications services provided by such provider or any devise used by a provider, or customer of a wire communication service for cost accounting or other like purposes in the ordinary course of its business; see 18 USC 3127(3).\n(AR 381-10, US Army Intelligence Activities, 3 May 2007)  Also see *trap and trace*. -- Also, [a device that] records or decodes dialing, routing addressing or signaling information transmitted by an instrument or facility from which a wire or electronic communication is transmitted, provided that such information must not include the contents of any communication. (FBI Domestic Investigations and Operations Guide, 15 Oct 2011)\n\n    A *pen register* captures all outgoing phone numbers a particular telephone has called.  A trap and\ntrace device identifies all incoming phone numbers to a particular telephone.\n\n    Pen register and trap and trace (PR/TT) devices enable the prospective collection on non-content\ntraffic information associated with wire and electronic communications, such as: the phone numbers dialed from or to a particular telephone, including electronic communications; messages sent from or to a particular telephone; or the internet protocol (IP) address of communications on the Internet and other computer networks.\n\n       -- FBI Domestic Investigations and Operations Guide, 15 Oct 2011, p. 18-123\n Penetration.  [In intelligence usage,] the recruitment of agents within or the infiltration of agents or technical monitoring devices in an organization or group for the purpose of acquiring information or of influencing its activities. (ICS Glossary)\n     Note:  This term was previously in JP 1-02, however rescinded by JP 2-01.2, 16 Mar 2011.\n\n-- Also, the recruitment of agents within, or the planting of agents or technical monitoring devices within, a target organization to gain access to its secrets or to influence its activities. (Senate Report\n94-755, Book I - Glossary, 26 Apr 1976) -- Also, a principal counterintelligence objective is penetration of an adversary, and this can be achieved by the recruitment of a key source within an opponent's organization. Ideally, the penetration will be the recruitment of a senior figure with sufficient access to compromise all the service's operations, but lower-level penetrations, such as the management of a double agent, may be sufficient to reveal the identities of case officers and their operational premises. (Historical Dictionary of Cold War Counterintelligence, 2007)\n\nThe best way to catch a spy is to recruit a spy\n\n-- Counterespionage Maxim\n\n(cited in Stuart A. Herrington, *Traitors Among US: Inside the Spy Catcher's World*, 1999, p. 255)\n\n\n## Penetration - A Time-Honored Espionage Practice ...Oh What A Tangled Web We Weave\n\n    The key to CI success is penetration. For every American spy, there are several members of the\nopposition service who know who he or she is. No matter what it takes, we have to have\npenetrations.\n\n       -- James M. Olson, \"The Ten Commandments of Counterintelligence,\" *Studies in Intelligence*, Vol. 54 No. 5; see <https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/kent-csi/vol45no5/html/v45i5a08p.htm>\n_______________________\n\n    Almost every spy that we have found, both in the CIA and FBI, has been found with the aid of\nrecruited sources of our own on other hostile intelligence services.\n\n       -- William Webster, Former FBI Director and DCI, in Senate testimony (9 Apr 2002)\n______________________\n\n    If the purpose of counterespionage is to manipulate enemy intelligence, as it is, then to have\ncontrolled agents in the staff of an enemy service is the most important objective of counterintelligence.\n\n      -- William R. Johnson, *Thwarting Enemies at Home and Abroad* (2009)\n______________________\n\n    ...[C]ounterespionage has one purpose which transcends all others in importance: **penetration.**\nThe only way to be sure that an enemy has been contained is to know his plans in advance and in detail. Moreover, only a high-level penetration of the opposition can tell you whether your own service is penetrated.\n\n ...Conducting CE without the aid of penetrations is like fighting in the dark.  Conducting CE with\npenetrations can be like shooting fish in a barrel. The famous case of Col. Oleg Penkovskiy... illustrates the great value of penetrations. There can never be enough of them.\n\n    -- Austin B. Matschulat, \"Coordination and Cooperation in Counterintelligence,\" *Studies in Intelligence*,\n           V13: 2 (Spring 1969), pp. 29-30.\n______________________\n\n    Penetrating an adversary's intelligence service, especially the counterintelligence units, is one of\nthe most valuable counterintelligence techniques. Often it is also notoriously difficult.\n\n       -- Roy Godson, *Dirty Tricks or Trump Cards: US Covert Action and Counterintelligence* (1995), p. 207\n______________________\n\n    All countries... strive hard to secure penetration agents; and they constitute the counterintelligence officer's worst nightmare.\n\n       -- Chapman Pincher. *Traitors: The Anatomy of Treason*, First U.S. Edition (1987), p. 29\n______________________\n\n    Penetrations - selected examples:\n\n    -- Colonel L Oleg V. Penkovsky was a British-US penetration of Soviet military intelligence (GRU). -- Harold A.R. \"Kim\" Philby was a Soviet penetration of British intelligence. -- Aldrich \"Rick\" Ames was a Soviet/Russian penetration of the CIA. -- Robert (Bob) Hanssen was a Soviet/Russian penetration of the FBI.\n Penetration Operation.  The recruitment of agents within, the infiltration of agents, or the introduction of technical monitoring devices into an organization or physical facility to acquire information or influence the organization's activities. (AR 381-47, OFCO, 17 Mar 2006)  Also see *recruitment-in-place*.\n\nPenetration Testing.  [In computer usage] a test methodology in which assessors, typically working under specific constraints, attempt to circumvent or defeat the security features of an information system.\n\n(CNSSI No. 4009, National Information Assurance Glossary, 26 April 2010) Pentagon Force Protection Agency (PFPA).  [DoD agency that] provides force protection, security, and law enforcement to safeguard personnel, facilities, infrastructure, and other resources for the Pentagon Reservation and designated DoD facilities within the National Capital Region (NCR). (DoDD 5105.68, PFPA, 5 Dec 2013) Perception Management*.  Within DoD:  None -- term removed from JP 1-02.*\nPeriodic Reinvestigation (PR). An investigation conducted every 5 years for the purpose of updating a previously completed background or special background investigation. The scope consists of a personal interview, National Agency Check (NAC), Local Agency Check (LAC), credit bureau checks, employment records, employment references, and developed character references, and normally will not exceed the most recent 5-year period. (DSS Glossary) Permissive Environment.  Operational environment in which host country military and law enforcement agencies have control as well as the intent and capability to assist operations that a unit intends to conduct. (JP 1-02 and JP 3-0, Joint Operations, 11 Aug 2011) PERSEREC.  See *Defense Personnel Security Research Center*.\n\nPersistent Conflict.  The protracted confrontation among state, nonstate, and individual actors that are increasingly willing to use violence to achieve their political and ideological ends. (Army FM 3-0, Operations, Feb 2008) Persistent Surveillance.  Within DoD: None -- term removed from JP 1-02.\n\n    Previously defined in JP 1-02 and JP 2-0, Joint Intelligence (22 Jun 2007) as:  a collection strategy\nthat emphasizes the ability of some collection systems to linger on demand in an area to detect, locate, characterize, identify, track, target, and possibly provide battle damage assessment and retargeting in near or real-time.  Persistent surveillance facilitates the prediction of an adversary's behavior and the formulation and execution of preemptive activities to deter or forestall anticipated adversary courses of action\n Persona.  The social facade or image a person projects in public. A persona may be true or false. (DoDI S-5105.63, Implementation of DoD Cover and Cover Support Activities, 20 Jun 2013) Persona Non Grata (PNG).  An international diplomatic term meaning \"person who is not acceptable or not welcome.\"  It is a legal status applied to diplomats who have been caught by the host country in espionage or other unlawful activities and are expelled and thereafter denied access to the host country. (CI Community Lexicon)\n    Latin for \"unwelcome person.\"  The provision for declaring a person *persona non grata* is codified\n\nin international law; see Article 9 of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations of 1961.\n\n-- Also, a diplomatic expulsion by flag accrediting country. (AFOSI Manual 71-142, OFCO, 9 Jun\n2000)\n\n-- Also, the official act of declaring a foreign national unwelcome in this country. (FBI FCI Terms) -- Also, in diplomatic usage and under international law, the official act of declaring a foreign national, usually an official of a foreign government, as no longer welcome and forcing his/her expulsion.  In tradecraft terminology, the undesirable individual is *PNG'd*. The most common use of PNG is for foreign diplomatic or official personnel caught in the act of engaging in illegal espionage activities. (The CIA\nInsider's Dictionary, 1996) Personal Meeting (PM).  Face-to-face contact between a handler and a lead or asset. (HDI Lexicon, April\n2008)\n\n\n-- Also, a clandestine meeting between two operatives, always the most desirable but a more risky form of communication. (CI Centre Glossary)\n\n    Personal meetings may be held to give an agent his next assignment and instructions for carrying\nit out, to train him in tradecraft or the use of technical or communications equipment, to transmit documents, reports, technical equipment, money, or other items, or to fulfill several of these\npurposes. In actual practice several purposes are usually served by a meeting. In addition to its particular objectives more general needs can be filled. A meeting held for training purposes may be a means for clarifying biographic data on the agent or his views on various subjects. At every meeting with an agent one should study him and obtain new data on his potential and talents, thereby providing a better basis for judging his sincerity and deciding how much trust to place in him.\n\n        -- L.K. Berrenev, 'Operational Contacts,\" *Studies in Intelligence*, Vol 9, Winter 1965, p.64\n            [declassified 18 Sep 1995; originally classified SECRET].\n Personal Protective Security Detail. Security personnel assigned to protect individuals who, by their grade, assignment, symbolic value, or relative isolation, are likely attractive or accessible terrorist targets.\n\nThese trained and armed personnel are capable of providing continuous protection for designated individuals. (DoDD 5105.68, PFPA, 5 Dec 2013) Personally Identifiable Information (PII).  Information which can be used to distinguish or trace an individual's identity, such as his or her name; social security number; date and place of birth; mother's maiden name; and biometric records, including any other personal information which is linked or linkable to a specified individual.  Includes information about an individual that identifies, links, relates, or is unique to, or describes him or her (e.g., a social security number; age; military rank; civilian grade; marital status; race; salary; home or office phone numbers; other demographic, biometric, personnel, medical, and financial information, etc). (DoDD 5400.11, DoD Privacy Program, 8 May 2007)\n-- Also, information that can be used to uniquely identify, contact, or locate a single person or can be used with other sources to uniquely identify a single individual. (DSS Glossary) Personnel Security.  The security discipline that assesses the loyalty, reliability, and trustworthiness of individuals for initial and continued eligibility for access to classified information or assignment in sensitive positions. (DoDD 5200.43, Management of the Defense Security Enterprise, 1 Oct 2012, w/ chg 1)\n-- A security discipline that assesses the loyalty, reliability, and trustworthiness of individuals for initial and continued eligibility for access to classified information. (IC Standard 700-1, 4 Apr 2008) -- Also, [with US Army] the application of standards and criteria to determine whether or not an individual is eligible for access to classified information, qualified for assignment to or retention in sensitive duties, and suitable for acceptance and retention in the total Army consistent with national security interests. (AR 380-67, Personnel Security Program, 24 Jan 2014)\n\n\n    The essence of personnel security is to determine that those who have access to secrets as a\nresult of their jobs are people of sufficient probity and responsibility who will safeguard that data.\n\n        -- Frederick L. Wettering, \"Counterintelligence: The Broken Triad.\" International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 13 (Fall 2000), pp. 265-299.\n\n## ______________________ Personnel SecurityThe First And Best Defense\n\n\n    The personnel security system is a the very heart of the government's security mission.  ...{The\nmain purpose of personnel security programs is to protect the national security interests of the United States by insuring the reliability and trustworthiness of those whom information vital to those interests is entrusted.\n______________________\n\n\n## For Additional Information See -- Personnel Security References\n\n\n    EO 12968,  *Access to Classified Information*\n\n    EO 13467,  Reforming Processes Related to Suitability for Government Employment, Fitness for\n *Contractor Employees, and Eligibility for Access to Classified National Security Information* DoD 5200.2-R,  *Personnel Security Program*\nFor Army policy see:  AR 380-67,  *Personnel Security Program*\n Personnel Security Investigation (PSI).  An inquiry into the activities of an individual, designed to develop pertinent information pertaining to trustworthiness and suitability for a position of trust as related to loyalty, character, emotional stability, and reliability. (JP 1-02 and JP 2-01, Joint and National Intelligence Support to Military Operations, 5 Jan 2012)\n\n\n    DoD generates 90% of the security investigation requirements in the Executive Branch....\n\n       -- Security and Suitability Process Reform: Strategic Framework, Feb 2010\n______________________\n\n    A PSI is an inquiry into an individual's loyalty, character, trustworthiness, and reliability to ensure\nthat he/she is eligible to access classified information, or for an appointment to a sensitive position or position of trust. DoD uses PSIs to determine an individual's eligibility for a security clearance.\n\n    In 2005, DoD transferred most of its PSI workload to U.S. Office of Personnel Management (OPM).\nAll PSIs are conducted by the designated investigative service provider. In the case of DoD, OPM is the designated investigative service provider.\n\n The types of PSIs vary based on the level of security clearance necessary for a given sensitive\nposition. The personnel security clearance process is governed primarily by EO 12968 (Access to Classified Information), EO 13467 (Reforming Processes Related to Suitability for Government Employment) and the Federal Investigative Standards. DoD Regulation 5200.2-R, \"Personnel Security Program,\" outlines criteria for sensitive positions and the corresponding clearance levels.\n\n-- Also, any investigation required for the purpose of determining the eligibility of DoD military and civilian personnel, contractor employees, consultants, and other persons affiliated with the DoD, for access to classified information, acceptance or retention in the Armed Forces, assignment or retention in sensitive duties, or other designated duties requiring such investigation. PSIs include investigations of affiliations with subversive organizations, suitability information, or hostage situations...conducted for the purpose of making personnel security determinations. They also include investigations of allegations that arise subsequent to adjudicative action and require resolution to determine an individual's current eligibility for access to classified information or assignment or retention in a sensitive position. (AR 380-67, Personnel Security Program, 24 Jan 2014)\n\nPharming.  Redirecting users from legitimate websites to fraudulent ones for the purpose of extracting confidential data, e.g., mimicking bank websites. (FBI; see <http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/investigate/counterintelligence/internet-social-networking-risks-1>) Phishing.  Deceiving individuals into disclosing sensitive personal information through deceptive computer-based means. (CNSSI No. 4009, National Information Assurance Glossary, 26 April 2010)\n\n-- Also, usually an email that looks like it is from a legitimate organization or person, but is not and contains a link or file with malware. Phishing attacks typically try to snag any random victim. Spear phishing attacks target a specific person or organization as their intended victim. (FBI; see\n<http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/investigate/counterintelligence/internet-social-networking-risks-1>)\n\n\n-- Also, a form of criminal activity using social engineering techniques through email or instant messaging. Phishers attempt to fraudulently acquire other people's personal information, such as passwords and credit card details, by masquerading as a trustworthy person or business in an apparently official electronic communication. (McAfee.com; accessed 15 Nov 2010)\n-- Also, Tricking individuals into disclosing sensitive personal information through deceptive computerbased means. (Words of Intelligence, 2nd Edition, 2011) Phreaking.  Gaining unauthorized access to telecommunication systems. (FBI; see\n<http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/investigate/counterintelligence/internet-social-networking-risks-1>) Physical Search.  Any intrusion upon a person or a person's property or possessions to obtain items of property or information.  The term does not include examination of areas that are in plain view and visible to the unaided eye if no physical trespass is undertaken, and does not include examinations of abandoned property left in a public place. (DoD 5240.1-R, Dec 1982)  Also see *search*.\n\n\n    Types include consented physical search, plain view search, search incident to a lawful\napprehension, and nonconsensual physical search.  See USC 1821(5).\n\n    For DoD CI see Chapter 7, Procedure 7-Physical Searches, DoD 5240.1-R, Procedures Governing\nthe Activities of DoD Intelligence Components that Affect United States Persons, 7 Dec 1982\n Physical Security.  The security discipline concerned with physical measures designed to safeguard personnel; to prevent unauthorized access to equipment, installations, material, and documents; and to safeguard them against espionage, sabotage, damage, and theft. (DoDD 5200.43, Management of the Defense Security Enterprise, 1 Oct 2012 w/ chg 1 dated 24 Apr 2013)\n   The physical protection of information, assets and personnel is fundamental to nay security system.\n\n\n       -- Joint Security Commission Report, *Redefining Security*, 28 Feb 1994, p. 56\n\n-- That part of security concerned with physical measures designed to safeguard personnel; to prevent unauthorized access to equipment, installations, material, and documents; and to safeguard them against espionage, sabotage, damage, and theft. (JP 1-02 and JP 6-0, Joint Communications Systems, 10 Jun 2010)\n-- Also, the security discipline concerned with physical measures designed to: protect personnel;\nprevent unauthorized access to facilities, equipment, material, and documents; and defend against espionage, terrorism, sabotage, damage, and theft. (IC Standard 700-1, 4 Apr 2008) Physical Security Investigation.  All inquires, inspections, or surveys of the effectiveness of controls and procedures designed to provide physical security; and all inquires and other actions undertaken to obtain information pertaining to physical threats to DoD personnel or property. (JP 1-02) Physical Surveillance.  A systematic and deliberate observation of a person by any means on a continuing basis, or the acquisition of a nonpublic communication by a person not a party thereto or visibly present thereat through any means not involving electronic surveillance. (DoD 5240.1-R, Dec 1982)  Also see *surveillance*.\n\n\n    Surveillance, the job of following and observing designated persons without being noticed, is\nintrinsic to counterintelligence.\n\n       -- William R. Johnson, *Thwarting Enemies at Home and Abroad* (2009)\n\n    For DoD CI see Chapter 9, Procedure 9 - Physical Surveillance, DoD 5240.1-R, Procedures\nGoverning the Activities of DoD Intelligence Components that Affect United States Persons, 7 Dec 1982\n\n\n-- Also, physical surveillance (not requiring a court order): the deliberate observation... of persons, places, or events, on either a limited or continuous basis, in areas where there may or may not be a reasonable expectation of privacy. (FBI Domestic Investigations and Operations Guide, 15 Oct 2011) -- Also, physical surveillance (with a warrant or court order): a physical search constitutes any physical intrusion within the United States into premises or property (including examination of the interior of property by technical means) that is intended to result in the seizure, reproduction, inspection, or alteration of information, material, or property, under circumstances in which a person has a reasonable expectation of privacy. (FBI Domestic Investigations and Operations Guide, 15 Oct 2011, p. 18-152)\n\nPiracy.  An illegal act of violence, depredation (e.g., plundering, robbing, or pillaging), or detention in or over international waters committed for private ends by the crew or passengers of a private ship or aircraft against another ship or aircraft or against persons or property on board such ship or aircraft. (JP 1-02) Pitch.  [In intelligence usage] the effort made to recruit a source. (HDI Lexicon, April 2008) Placement.  An individual's proximity to information of intelligence interest. (JP 1-02 and JP 2-01.2, CI & HUMINT in Joint Operations, 16 Mar 2011 w/ chg 1 dated 26 Aug 2011)  Also see access; placement & access.\n\n-- Also, the rationale for a HUMINT source or operational asset's presence in an operational area.\n\n(Defense HUMINT Enterprise Manual 3301.002, Vol II Collection Operations, 23 Nov 2010) Placement and Access (P&A).  An individual's proximity to and ability to collect information of intelligence interest. (HDI Lexicon, April 2008)  Also see *access.* Plain Text.  Unencrypted information. (CNSSI No. 4009, National Information Assurance Glossary, 26 April 2010) Planned Target.  Target that is known to exist in the operational environment, upon which actions are planned using deliberate targeting, creating effects which support commander's objectives. (JP 3-60, Joint Targeting, 13 Apr 2007) Planning.  The ability to establish a framework to employ resources to achieve a desired outcome or effect. (Joint Capability Areas Taxonomy & Lexicon, 15 Jan 2008)\n-- Also, the process by which commanders (and the staff, if available) translate the commander's visualization into a specific course of action for preparation and execution, focusing on the expected results. (Army FM 3-0, Operations, Feb 2008) Planning and Direction.  In intelligence usage, the determination of intelligence requirements, development of appropriate intelligence architecture, preparation of a collection plan, and issuance of orders and requests to information collection agencies. (JP 1-02 and JP 2-01, Joint and National Intelligence Support to Military Operations, 5 Jan 2012) Planning Order (PLANORD).  A planning directive that provides essential planning guidance and directs the initiation of execution planning before the directing authority approves a military course of action. (JP 5-0, Joint Operation Planning, 11 Aug 2011)  Also see *execute order (EXORD).* Plant.  [In intelligence usage,]   1) to insert information into a target's intelligence channel; 2) an individual infiltrated into a foreign organization (a penetration); 3) a forged document provided to a foreign organization. (CIA in D&D Lexicon, 1 May 2002)\n\n\nPlanted Information.  False or misleading information that the target has been permitted or helped to collect. (CIA in D&D Lexicon, 1 May 2002) Platform.  In collection parlance, the conveyance for collection sensors. Plausible Denial.  Official disclaimer supported by a believable cover story. (CIA in D&D Lexicon, 1 May 2002) Also see *plausible deniability*. Plausible Deniability.  The concept that allows the United States government, specifically the U.S. president himself, to claim no knowledge of or involvement in a covert action that goes public, particularly if it has gone badly. (James M. Olson, *Fair Play: The Moral Dilemmas of Spying*, 2006) Pocket Litter.  The usual litter found in pockets: coins, tickets, keys, etc.  In this case, pocket litter is planted so that if the agent is caught, incidental-looking items will reinforce his cover story. (TOP SECRET: The Dictionary of Espionage and Intelligence, 2005) Police Information.  All available information concerning known and potential enemy and criminal threats and vulnerabilities collected during police activities, operations, and investigations. Analysis of police information produces police intelligence. (ATTP 3-39.20, Police Intelligence Operations, Jul 2010) Police Intelligence.  Police intelligence results from the application of systems, technologies, and processes that analyze applicable data and information necessary for situational understanding and focusing policing activities to achieve social order. (ATTP 3-39.20, Police Intelligence Operations, Jul 2010) Political Intelligence.  Intelligence concerning foreign and domestic policies of governments and the activities of political movements. (JP 1-02) Polygraph and Credibility Assessment (PCA). The overarching term covering programs, research, training, and procedures that employ technologies to assess an individual's truthfulness with the aid of technical devices that measure physiological data or behavioral activity. (DoDI 5210.91, PCA Procedures, 12 Aug 2010 with chg 1 dated 15 Oct 2013)  Also see *polygraph examination*. Polygraph Examination.  A process that encompasses all activities that take place between a polygraph examiner and examinee during a specific series of interactions. (DoDD 5210.48, PCA Program, 25 Jan 2007 with change 2 dated 15 Nov 2013)  Also see *credibility assessment; polygraph instrument*.\n\n-- Also, a highly structure technique conducted by specialty trained CI personnel certified by proper authority as polygraph examiners. (Army FM 2-22.2, CI, Oct 2009)\n\n\n## Polygraph - Greek For \"Many Writings\"\n\n\n    The most significant contribution of the polygraph is its success in eliciting information and its value\nas a deterrent; however, the polygraph should be one of several investigative tools.\n\n        -- Webster Commission Report (*A Review of FBI Security Programs*), March 2002 (p. 68)\n________________________\n\n    The polygraph is a multichannel instrument that records changes in respiration, cardiovascular\nactivity, and skin resistance in response to questions. According to polygraph theory, when a\nsubject gives a false response to a relevant question..., the physiological reaction will be greater\nthan the reaction to others questions (control or irrelevant questions). However, contrary to popular belief, there is no physiological response that is unique to deception. The reactions measured by the polygraph can be caused by a variety of emotions. This fact underlies much of the controversy surrounding the polygraph. [...]\n    Two types of polygraphs are currently used in personnel security screening the counterintelligencescope( CI-scope) polygraph and the full-scope polygraph. The CI-scope polygraph focuses on espionage, sabotage, terrorism, mishandling classified information, and unauthorized contacts with\nrepresentatives of foreign governments. [...] Screening polygraphs arguably have a deterrent\neffect.\n\n        -- Joint Security Commission, Redefining Security: A Report to the Secretary of Defense and the Director\n           Central Intelligence, 28 Feb 1994, pp.61-70\n______________________________\n\n    The evidence is overwhelming that the polygraph, in the hands of a skilled examiner, is a very\nuseful tool to elicit information from an applicant or an employee that might otherwise be obtained only after lengthy and costly investigationor not at all.\n\n       -- DCI's Blue Ribbon Panel on the Polygraph, *CIA's Use of Polygraph in Personnel Screening*,\n           Redacted Copy approved for public release 29 May 2012.  Copy available at:\n    <http://www.nationalsecuritylaw.org/files/received/CIA/Poly_Use_of_Polygraphy_in_Personnel_Screening.pdf>\n______________________________\n\n    For additional information, see --\n\n    \"Your Polygraph Examination\" at:\n<http://www.cdse.edu/multimedia/polygraph_videos/polygraph.pdf>\n\n    Committee to Review the Scientific Evidence on the Polygraph, The Polygraph and Lie Detector\n(Washington, DC: National Academies Press, 2003).\n\n    Ken Alder, *The Lie Detector: The History of an American Obsession* (New York: Free Press, 2007)\n\n    John F. Sullivan, *Gatekeeper: Memories of a Polygraph Examiner* (Washington, DC: Potomac\nBooks, 2007)\n\n    Also see the American Polygraph Association (APA) web site at <http://www.polygraph.org/>\n Polygraph Instrument.  A diagnostic instrument to measure and record respiration, electrodermal, blood volume, and heart rate responses to verbal or visual stimuli. (DoDI 5210.91, Polygraph and Credibility Assessment Procedures, 12 Aug 2010 with chg 1 dated 15 Oct 2013) Also see *polygraph examination*. PORTICO.  The nickname for the DoD Counterintelligence Community's enterprise information capability that promotes information sharing and provides standardized CI activity reporting across the Department. PORTICO operates in a secure network environment and facilitates standardization of DoD CI business processes by providing a common interface for shared results of core CI functions (i.e., collection, investigations, analysis & production, operations, and functional services). Port Security.  The safeguarding of vessels, harbors, ports, waterfront facilities, and cargo from internal threats such as destruction, loss, or injury from sabotage or other subversive acts; accidents; thefts; or other causes of similar nature. (JP 1-02 and JP 3-10, Joint Security Operations in Theater, 3 Feb 2010) Positive Intelligence.  A term of convenience sometimes applied to foreign intelligence to distinguish it from foreign counterintelligence. (ICS Glossary, 1978) -- Also, information gathered concerning a foreign power that is significant to national security, foreign relations, economic interest, and other plans and policies of a government. (CI Community Lexicon)\n\n\n In the early 1900's military intelligence consisted of two separate fields of endeavor:  positive\nintelligence and negative intelligence.  Positive intelligence focused on \"seeking information on our enemies or potential enemies\" and negative intelligence focused on \"preventing enemies or\npotential enemies from acquiring information of value about the United States.\"  Following World\nWar I, the term *negative intelligence* was replaced by *counterintelligence*.\n\n     -- Source: Bruce W. Bidwell, *History of the MI Division... Army General Staff: 1775 - 1941* (1986)\nPosse Comitatus Act.  Prohibits search, seizure, or arrest powers [by] US military personnel [in civilian law enforcement matters in the US unless authorized by legislation].  Amended in 1981 under Public Law 97-86 to permit increased DoD support of drug interdiction and other law enforcement activities [Title 18, USC  1385]. (JP 1-02)\n\n    *Posse Comitatus Act* (PCA) places strict limits on the use of federal military personnel for law\nenforcement.  Enacted in 1878, PCA prohibits the willful use of the US Army (and later, the US Air Force) to enforce laws, except as authorized by the Congress or the US Constitution. Although the PCA, by its terms, refers only to the Army and Air Force, DoD policy extends the prohibitions of the Act to the US Navy and Marine Corps, as well.\n\n    Specifically prohibited activities include: interdiction of a vehicle, vessel, aircraft, or similar activity;\nsearch and/or seizure; arrest, apprehension, \"stop-and-frisk\" detentions, and similar activities; and use of military personnel for surveillance or pursuit of individuals, or as undercover agents, informants, investigators, or interrogators.  Additionally, federal courts have recognized exceptions\nto the PCA. These common law exceptions are known as the \"military purpose doctrine\" and the\n\"indirect assistance\" exceptions.\n\n Exceptions and/or circumstances not falling under PCA include:\n  1) Actions that are taken for the primary purpose of furthering a military or foreign affairs function\nof the United States;\n  2) Federal troops acting pursuant to the President's Constitutional and statutory authority to\nrespond to civil disorder;\n  3) Actions taken under express statutory authority to assist officials in executing the laws,\nsubject to applicable limitations; and\n  4) Civil Disturbance operations authorized by statute.\n\nThe PCA does not apply to National Guard forces operating in state active duty or Title 32 USC\nstatus, nor to the USCG, which operates under Title 14 USC authority.\n\n    For an overview of the Posse Comitatus Act, see CRS Report R42659, The Posse Comitatus Act\nand Related Matters: The Use of the Military to Execute Civilian Law (16 Aug 2012), by Charles Doyle and Jennifer K. Elsea; copy available at: <http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R42659.pdf>\n\n    Also see Craig T. Trebilcock, *The Myth of Posse Comitatus*, October 2000; copy available at:\n     < http://www.homelandsecurity.org/journal/articles/trebilcock.htm>\n    Also see DoDI 3025.21, *Defense Support of Civilian Law Enforcement Agencies*, 27 Feb 2013.\n Preliminary Credibility Assessment Screening System (PCASS) Instrument.  A diagnostic instrument used during an interview capable of monitoring, recording, and/or measuring electrodermal and vasomotor activity. The PCASS instrument uses an algorithm to evaluate the physiological responses recorded by the two components. (DoDI 5210.91, PCA Procedures, 12 Aug 2010 with change 1 dated 15 Oct 2013)\n\n    Only certified personnel may conduct PCASS examinations.   Also IAW current DoD policy the\nPCASS will not be used to test U.S. persons.\n\nPreliminary Inquiry.  An unobtrusive review of the facts and circumstances of an incident or allegation to determine if the preliminary information or circumstances is sufficient to warrant the initiation of an investigation or referral to an investigative entity. The limited objective will be determined by the policy\nof individual agencies and may include the collection of information from other agencies and/or other records such as travel, financial, HR, security, and badgeing [sic], etc.; which may be used to make an informed determination if the incident involved is part of a pattern. (ONCIX Insider Threat Detection - Glossary)  Also see counterintelligence investigation, counterintelligence inquiry,  investigation;\npreliminary counterintelligence investigation; Section 811 referral.\n\nPreliminary Investigation [counterintelligence related].  A limited scope inquiry into the circumstances surrounding a reported incident or matter of potential CI interest to determine if there are specific facts giving reason to believe that a threat to national security may exist or if a full field CI investigation is warranted. (AR 381-20, Army CI Program, 25 May 2010) Preparation of the Environment (PE).  An umbrella term for operations and activities conducted by selectively trained special operations forces to develop an environment for potential future special operations. (JP 3-05, Special Operations, 18 Apr 2011) President's Daily Brief (PDB).  An all-source, analytic document produced for the President of the United States and members of his/her Cabinet and senior staff.  Production is overseen by the ODNI with contributions from the Intelligence Community. Preventive Deployment.  The deployment of military forces to deter violence at the interface or zone of potential conflict where tension is rising among parties. Forces may be employed in such a way that they are indistinguishable from a peace operations force in terms of equipment, force posture, and activities. (JP 3-07.3, Peace Operations, 17 Oct 2007) Prisoner of War (POW or PW).  A detained person (as defined in Articles 4 and 5 of the Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War of August 12, 1949) who, while engaged in combat under orders of his or her government, is captured by the armed forces of the enemy. (JP 1-02 and JP 3-50. Personnel Recovery, 20 Dec 2011) Private Information.  Data, facts, instructions, or other material intended for or restricted to a particular person, group, or organization. (Army Techniques Publication 2-22.9, Open-Source Intelligence, 10 Jul 2012) Private Sector.  An umbrella term that may be applied in the United States and in foreign countries to any or all of the nonpublic or commercial individuals and businesses, specified nonprofit organizations, most of academia and other scholastic institutions, and selected nongovernmental organizations. (JP 3-57, Civil Military Operations, 8 Jul 2008) Privacy Act.  The Privacy Act of 1974 (5 U.S.C. 552a) establishes a code of fair information practices that governs the collection, maintenance, use, and dissemination of personally identifiable information about individuals that is maintained in systems of records by federal agencies. A system of records is a group of records under the control of an agency from which information is retrieved by an individual's name or by some other identifier assigned to the individual. The Privacy Act requires that agencies provide public notice of their systems of records through publication in the Federal Register. The Privacy Act prohibits the disclosure of information from a system of records absent the written consent of the individual who is the subject of the information search, unless the disclosure is pursuant to one of 12 statutory exceptions. The Privacy Act also provides individuals with a means by which to seek access to and amend their records and sets forth various agency record-keeping requirements. (ODNI, U.S. National Intelligence - An Overview 2011)\n\n    For DoD policy see DoD Regulation 5400.11-R, DoD Privacy Act Program.\n\n    The Privacy Act regulates the way certain types of information may be acquired and used by the\nFederal Government and provides certain rights to individuals whose information is acquired by the government. A 240-page overview of the Act can be found at: <http://www.justice.gov/opcl/1974privacyact.pdf>\n Proactive TSCM. CI-focused TSCM targeting using a risk-based approach with the goal of identifying and exploiting technical collection efforts targeting DoD interests. (DoDI 5240.05, TSCM, 3 Apr 2014)\n\n\nProbable Cause.   Would a prudent individual believe that a fact is probably true. (Congressional Research Memorandum, Subject: Probable Cause, Reasonable Suspicion, and Reasonableness Standards in the Context of the Fourth Amendment and the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, 30 Jan 2006; at <http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/intel/m013006.pdf>)  Also see *reasonable belief*.\n\n-- Also, 1) To search:  A reasonable belief that a crime has been committed and that the person, property, or evidence sought in connection with the crime is located in the place or on the person to be searched; and/or 2) To apprehend:  A reasonable belief that a crime has been committed and that the person to be apprehended committed it. (AR 190-20, Military Police Investigations, 1 Nov 2005)\n\n## Probable Cause / Reasonable Belief\n\n\n    The facts and circumstances are such that a trained and experienced reasonable person would\nhold the belief.\n       -  Fact Specific / Situation Dependant -  Must be based on facts and circumstances that can be articulated -  Can be based on experience, training and knowledge as it applies to the facts\n          and circumstances\n       -  \"Hunches\" and \"intuitions\" don't count -  Often requires education of non-intelligence personnel -- Briefing, *Legal Fundamentals for Counterintelligence Professionals*,\n                 Staff Judge Advocate, US Army Intelligence and Security Command, nd. circa 2012\n Probe.  In information operations, any attempt to gather information about an automated information system or its on-line users. (JP 3-13, Information Operations, 13 Feb 2006)  Also see information operations.\n\n-- Also, [In computer usage / information operations] a technique that attempts to access a system to learn something about the system. (CNSSI No. 4009, National Information Assurance Glossary, 26 April 2010) Processing.  A system of operations designed to convert raw data into useful information. (JP 2-0, Joint Intelligence, 22 Oct 2013) Processing and Exploitation.  In intelligence usage, the conversion of collected information into forms suitable to the production of intelligence. (JP 1-02 and JP 2-01, Joint and National Intelligence Support to Military Operations, 5 Jan 2012) Production.  The preparation of reports based on analysis of information to meet the needs of intelligence users (Consumer's) within and outside the Intelligence Community. (CIA, A Consumer's Guide to Intelligence, July 1995)  Also see *intelligence production*.\n\n-- Also, conversion of information into intelligence through the integration, analysis, evaluation, and interpretation of data from all available sources and the preparation of intelligence products in support of known or anticipated user requirements. (AR 381-20, Army CI Program, 25 May 2010)\n\n    Production results in the creation of intelligence, that is, value-added actionable information tailored\nto a specific customer.  In government parlance, the term 'finished intelligence\" is reserved for\nproducts issued by analysts responsible for synthesizing all available sources of intelligence, resulting in a comprehensive assessment of an issue or situation, for use by senior analysts or decision makers.\n        -- DIA, *Intelligence Essentials for Everyone*, June 1999\n___________________________\n\n    Production is the development of intelligence through the analysis of collected information and\nexisting intelligence. Analysts create intelligence products, conclusions, or projections regarding threats and relevant aspects of the operational environment to answer known or anticipated requirements in an effective format.\n\n       -- ADRP 2-0, Intelligence, Aug 2012, p. 3-7\n Production Requirement (PR).  A customer's formal request for analytic support, identifying the topic or issue  of interest, type of information or analysis required, date required, preferred format, and classification. (DoDI 5240.18, CI Analysis & Production, 17 Nov 2009 with change 1 dated 15 Oct 2013)\n-- Also, an intelligence requirement that cannot be met by current analytical products resulting in tasking to produce a new product that can meet this intelligence requirement. (JP 2-0, Joint Intelligence, 22 Oct 2013) Proliferation.  The transfer of weapons of mass destruction, related materials, technology, and expertise from suppliers to hostile state or non-state actors. (JP 1-02 and JP 3-40, Combating WMD, 10 Jun 2009) Program Protection Plan (PPP).  A risk-based, comprehensive, living plan to protect CPI that is associated with an RDA program. (DoDI 5200.39, CPI Protection within the DoD, 16 Jul 2008 with change 1 dated 28 Dec 2010)  Also see counterintelligence support plan (CISP); critical program information (CPI).\n\n    Note:  DoDI 5200.39 is under revision.  A proposed *draft* definition for PPP:  a risk-based,\ncomprehensive, living plan to identify and protect CPI and mission-critical functions and components associated with an RDA program.\n____________________\n\n    Program Protection is the integrating process for managing risks to advanced technology and\nmission-critical system functionality from foreign collection, design vulnerability or supply chain exploit/insertion, and battlefield loss throughout the acquisition lifecycle.\n\n    The **purpose of the PPP** is to help programs ensure that they adequately protect their technology,\ncomponents, and information.  The PPP is used to develop tailored protection guidance for dissemination and implementation throughout the program for which it is created. The layering and integration of the selected protection requirements documented in a PPP provide for the integration and synchronization of CPI protection activities throughout DoD.\n\n    Once a PPP is in place, it should guide program office security measures and updated as threats\nand vulnerabilities change or are better understood.  Appendix B to the PPP is the\nCounterintelligence Support Plan (CISP), which should be cited/referenced here.\n\n    See \"Program Protection Plan Outline & Guidance,\" Version 1.0, July 2011; copy available on line at:  < http://www.acq.osd.mil/se/docs/PPP-Outline-and-Guidance-v1-July2011.pdf >\n Prominent Individual.  Someone who is widely known and has a favorable public reputation. (DoDD S-5200.37, Management & Execution of Defense HUMINT, 9 Feb 2009)\nPropaganda.  Any form of adversary communication, especially of a biased or misleading nature, designed to influence the opinions, emotions, attitudes, or behavior of any group in order to benefit the sponsor, either directly or indirectly. (JP 1-02 and JP 3-13.2, Psychological Operations, 7 Jan 2010) Proprietaries.  A term used... to designate ostensibly private commercial entities capable of doing business which are established and controlled by intelligence services to conceal governmental affiliation of intelligence personnel and/or governmental sponsorship of certain activities in support of clandestine operations. (Senate Report 94-755, Book I - Glossary, 26 Apr 1976) Protection.  The ability to prevent, mitigate adverse effects of attacks on personnel (combatant /noncombatant) and physical assets of the United States, allies, and friends. (Joint Capability Areas Taxonomy & Lexicon, 15 Jan 2008)\n-- Also, preservation of the effectiveness and survivability of mission-related military and nonmilitary personnel, equipment, facilities, information, and infrastructure deployed or located within or outside the boundaries of a given operational area. (JP 1-02 and JP 3-0, Joint Operations, 11 Aug 2011)\n\n\nProtective Service Detail.  Trained and armed protective security officials capable of providing continuous protection for a designated individual. (DoDI 2000.12, DoD AT Program, 1 Mar 2012 w/ change 1 dated 9 Sep 2013) Protective Intelligence (PI). CRIMINT [criminal intelligence] used to identify, analyze, and provide leads for investigation into various direct and indirect threats to DoD personnel and property. It may provide further details about persons who may have the interest, motive, intention, and capability of mounting attacks against the DoD and its personnel. Additionally, it can aid DoD LEAs in gauging the potential threat to and vulnerability of a targeted individual or property and may be used in determining or preventing violence. (DoDI 5525.18, Law Enforcement Criminal Intelligence in DoD 18 Oct 2013)\nProtective Measures. Those actions, procedures, or designs implemented to safeguard protected information. (DSS Glossary) Provocation.  Activity designed to induce an individual, organization, intelligence service, or governments to take action damaging to itself. (FBI FCI Terms)   Also see *dangle; double agent.*\n-- Also, activity intended to cause an individual, organization, intelligence service, or government to take actions that can cause damage to itself. (Spy Book)\n\n\n## Provocation [Aka *Dangle*]\n\n\n\"A *provocation* is  an agent deployed by you to be recruited by an opponent and to perform his or her secret work *under your control* as a channel to and weapon against your opponent.\"\n\n          -- William R. Johnson, *Thwarting Enemies at Home and Abroad*, Georgetown University Press (2009), p.98 Prudent Risk. A deliberate exposure to potential injury or loss when the commander judges the outcome in terms of mission accomplishment as worth the cost. (ADRP 6-0, Mission Command, May 2012) Pseudonym.  A code name assigned to an individual, place, or activity to enhance operational, administrative, and communication security. (AFOSI Manual 71-142, OFCO, 9 Jun 2000)\n-- Also, an assigned identity that is used to protect an individual's true identity. (CNSSI No. 4009, National Information Assurance Glossary, 26 April 2010) Psychological Operations (PSYOP).  *Within DoD: None -- term rescinded.*  See Military Information Support Operations (MISO).\n\n    Term changed to MISO IAW SECDEF Memo dated 3 Dec 2010.\n\nPublic Affairs (PA).  Those public information, command information, and community relations activities directed toward both the external and internal publics with interest in the Department of Defense. (JP 1-02\nand JP 3-61, Public Affairs, 25 Aug 2010) Public Diplomacy.  1). Those overt international public information activities of the United States Government designed to promote United States foreign policy objectives by seeking to understand, inform, and influence foreign audiences and opinion makers, and by broadening the dialogue between American citizens and institutions and their counterparts abroad.  2). In peace building, civilian agency efforts to promote an understanding of the reconstruction efforts, rule of law, and civic responsibility through public affairs and international public diplomacy operations. Its objective is to promote and sustain consent for peace building both within the host nation and externally in the region and in the larger international community. (JP 1-02 and JP 3-07.3, Peace Operations, 17 Oct 2007)\nPublic Domain.  In open view; before the public at large and not in private or employing secrecy or other protective measures. (DSS Glossary)\n\n\nPublic Information.  Within public affairs, that information of a military nature, the dissemination of which is consistent with security and approved for release. (JP 1-02 and JP 3-61, Public Affairs, 25 Aug 2010) Publicly Available Information.  Information that has been published or broadcast for public consumption, is available on request to the public, is accessible on-line or otherwise to the public, is available to the public by subscription or purchase, could lawfully be seen or heard by any casual observer, is made available at a meeting open to the public, or is obtained by visiting any place or attending any vent that is open to the public. (Attorney General Guidelines for National Security Investigations and Foreign Intelligence Collection, 31 Oct 2003)\n--Also, data, facts, instructions, or other material published or broadcast for general public consumption; available on request to a member of the general public; lawfully seen or heard by any casual observer; or made available at a meeting open to the general public. (Army Techniques Publication 2-22.9, Open-Source Intelligence, 10 Jul 2012)\n\nQ ========================================== Questionable Intelligence Activity.  An intelligence activity, as defined in EO 12333, that may be unlawful or contrary to E.O., Presidential directive, or applicable DoD policy governing that activity. (DoDD 5148.11, ATSD/IO, 24 Apr 2013)  Also see *intelligence oversight*.\n\n    DoD Policy:  See DoD 5240 1-R, Procedures Governing the Activities of DoD Intelligence\nComponents that Affect United States Persons, 7 Dec 1982.\n\n    Also see DTM 08-052, DoD Guidance for Reporting Questionable Intelligence Activities and\nSignificant or Highly Sensitive Matters, 17 Jun 2009 with chg 4 dated 21 Aug 2013; copy at <http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/DTM-08-052.pdf>\n Quit Claim.  A document in which an asset acknowledges that all commitments due have been met by the handler's organization. (HDI Lexicon, April 2008)\n\nR ========================================== Rabbit.  [Tradecraft jargon] The target in a surveillance operation. (CI Centre Glossary) Radiogram.  Coded bursts of data sent by a radio transmitter that can be picked up by a radio receiver that has been set to the proper frequency; as transmitted, radiograms generally sound like the transmission of Morse code. (FBI Affidavit, 25 June 2010)\n\nRadicalization.  The process of acquiring and holding radical or extremist beliefs. (Congressional Research Service Report R42553, *Countering Violent Extremism in the United States,* 19 Feb 2014) Also see self-radicalization; *violent extremism, violent radicalization*.\n\n-- Also, the social and behavioral process whereby people adopt and embrace extremist attitudes, values or behaviors. It is a risk factor for involvement in terrorism, but involvement in terrorism does not always result from radicalization. JP1-02 does not include a definition for radicalization. (Defense Science Board Report, *Predicting Violent Behavior*, Aug 2012, citing Horgan's The Psychology of Terrorism 2nd Edition, 2012)\n\n    The FBI model describes the radicalization process - the \"way stations\" - as four incremental\nstages of development:  1) Preradicalization, 2) Identification, 3) Indoctrination, and 4) Action. Each one is distinct, and a radicalized individual may never reach the final stage.\n    See chart*The Radicalization Process*below...\n\n -- Also, the process by which an individual, group, or mass of people undergoes a transformation from participating in the political process via legal means to the use or support of violence for political purposes. (Army Tactical Reference Guide, Radicalization into Violent Extremism - A Guide for Military Leaders, April 2011\n\n\n   The growth in social media and the terrorist use of chat rooms, Facebook, Twitter, YouTube, and\nother sites has facilitated radicalization inside the United States.\n\n       -- Seth G. Jones, The RAND Corporation, \"The Extremist Threat to the U.S. Homeland,\" Testimony Before the Committee on Homeland Security United States House of Representatives, 15 January2014 (This testimony available at <http://www.rand.org/pubs/testimonies/CT403.html>)\n____________________\n\n   There is no easily identifiable terrorist-prone personality, no single path to radicalization and\nterrorism. Many people may share the same views, and only a handful of the radicals will go further to become terrorists. The transition from radical to terrorist is often a matter of happenstance. It depends on whom one meets and probably on when that meeting occurs in the arc of one's life.\n\n       -- Brian M. Jenkins*\n\n     * Brian Michael Jenkins, Would Be Warriors: Incidents of Jihadist Terrorist Radicalization in the United States Since September 11, 2001 (Santa Monica, CA: The RAND Corporation, 2010), p. 7.\n_____________________\n\n   Studies by the Department of Homeland Security's Office of Intelligence and Analysis indicate that\nthe radicalization dynamic varies across ideological and ethno-religious spectrums, different geographic regions, and socio-economic conditions. Moreover, there are many diverse \"pathways\" to radicalization and individuals and groups can radicalize or \"de-radicalize\" because of a variety of factors.\n        --  U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, Written Testimony\n             of Charles E. Allen, Assistant Secretary of Intelligence and Analysis and Chief Intelligence Officer, Department of Homeland Security, \"Threat of Islamic Radicalization to the Homeland,\" 110th Cong., 1st sess., March 14, 2007, p. 5.\n\n## __________________________\n\n\n    Also see US Army Asymmetric Warfare Group, Tactical Reference Guide, Radicalization into\nViolent Extremism, A Guide for Military Leaders, August 2011copy available at:\n    <http://www.wired.com/images_blogs/dangerroom/2012/10/Radicalization-FINAL090911.pdf>\n Raid.  An operation to temporarily seize an area in order to secure information, confuse an adversary, capture personnel or equipment, or to destroy a capability culminating with a planned withdrawal. (JP 1-02 and JP 3-0, Joint Operations, 11 Aug 2011) Rapport Building. Establishing a sense of connection between the interviewer and the interviewee to facilitate communication and information sharing. (Keats, 1993)\n\nRaw Data.  Bits of collected data that individually convey little or no useful information and must be collated, aggregated, or interpreted to provide meaningful information. (ODNI, U.S. National Intelligence -\nAn Overview 2011) Raw Intelligence.  A colloquial term meaning collected intelligence information that has not yet been converted into finished intelligence. (ODNI, U.S. National Intelligence - An Overview 2011)\n\nReachback.  The process of obtaining products, services, and applications, or forces, or equipment, or material from organizations that are not forward deployed. (JP 1-02 and JP 3-30, Command and Control for Joint Air Operations, 12 Jan 2010) Reactive Operation.  An operation initiated in response to a FIS personal contact. (AFOSI Manual 71-142, OFCO, 9 Jun 2000) Real Time.  Pertaining to the timeliness of data or information which has been delayed only by the time required for electronic communication. This implies that there are no noticeable delays. (Previously in JP 2-0, Joint Intelligence)  Also see *near real time*. Reasonable Belief.  A reasonable belief arises when the fact and circumstances are such that a reasonable person would hold the belief.  Reasonable belief must rest on the facts and circumstances that can be articulated; \"hunches\" or intuitions are not sufficient.  Reasonable belief can be based on experience, training, and knowledge in foreign intelligence or counterintelligence work applied to facts and circumstances at hand, so that a trained and experienced \"reasonable person\" might hold a reasonable belief sufficient to satisfy this criterion when someone unfamiliar with foreign intelligence or counterintelligence work might not. (DoD 5240.1-R, December 1982)  Also see *probable cause*;\nreasonable suspicion. Reasonable Expectation of Privacy.  In U.S. constitutional law the expectation of privacy is a legal test which is crucial in defining the scope of the applicability of the privacy protections of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution.\n\n    The extent to which a reasonable person in the particular circumstances involved is entitled to believe\nhis or her actions are not subject to outside observations. Must be both objectively and subjectively reasonable [as well as] very fact specific. (SJA Office, USAINSCOM)\n____________________\n\n\n    As a general matter the Supreme Court has held that there may be circumstances in which a\ngovernment employee has a legitimate expectation of privacy in the contents of governmental property that the employee uses or controls at work, such as an office or a locked desk drawer. See: O'Connor, 480 U.S. at 716-19 (1987) (plurality) (public employee has a reasonable expectation of privacy in personal items, papers, and effects in office, desk, and file cabinets provided by public employer); see id. at 730-31 (Scalia, J., concurring) (government employee has a legitimate expectation of privacy in the contents of his office).\n\n    Instead, whether, in a particular circumstance, a government employee has a legitimate expectation\nof privacy in his use of governmental property at work is determined by \"[t]he operational realities of the workplace\" and \"by virtue of actual office practices and procedures, or by legitimate regulation.\"\n    See: O'Connor, 480 U.S. at 717 (plurality); see United States v. Simons, 206 F.3d 392, 398 (4th Cir.\n2000) (\"[O]ffice practices, procedures, or regulations may reduce legitimate privacy expectations.\").\n Reasonable Suspicion.  Specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, evince more than an inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or hunch of criminal activity.\n\n(United States v. Mason, 628 F.3d 123, 128 - 4th Cir. 2010 [quoting United States v. Branch, 537 F.3d\n328, 336 - 4th Cir. 2008]) Recognition Signal.  Any prearranged signal by which individuals or units may identify each other.\n(JP 1-02 and JP 3-50. Personnel Recovery, 20 Dec 2011)\n-- Also, prearranged visual indicator used for recognition and identification between intelligence personnel. (AFOSI Manual 71-142, OFCO, 9 Jun 2000)\n\n-- Also, prearranged visual signal used by intelligence personnel to identify each other. (FBI FCI\nTerms)\n\nReconnaissance (RECON).  A mission undertaken to obtain, by visual observation or other detection methods, information about the activities and resources of an enemy or adversary, or to secure data concerning the meteorological, hydrographic, or geographic characteristics of a particular area. (JP 1-02 and JP 2-0, Joint Intelligence, 22 Oct 2013)\n\n\nRecords Check.  The process whereby a Special Agent obtains relevant information about Sources or Subjects from the records and information holdings of military, civilian or government agencies, as well as certain commercial companies and vendors, during the conduct of an investigation or operation. Types include military agency checks (MACs), local agency checks (LACs) and national agency checks (NACs).\n\n-- *Military Agency Check* (MAC): a records or files check conducted at any military agency within the\njurisdiction of the CI element conducting the check. -- *Local Agency Check* (LAC): a records or files check of official or publically available information\nretained by any local office or government agency within the jurisdiction of the CI element conducting the check. Records may include holdings and databases maintained by local and state law enforcement agencies, local courts, local offices of federal agencies, etc. -- *National Agency Check* (NAC): formal requests to federal agencies for searches of their records\nand supporting databases and files for information of investigative or operational interest. NACs\ninclude DoD agencies, as well as other federal agency holdings, e.g., FBI, CIA, DHS, ICE, IRS, OPM, State Department, FINCEN, etc.\n Recovery Operations.  Operations conducted to search for, locate, identify, recover, and return isolated personnel, human remains, sensitive equipment, or items critical to national security. (JP 1-02 and JP 3-50, Personnel Recovery, 5 Jan 2007) Recruitment.  The deliberate and calculating effort to gain control of an individual and to induce him or her to furnish information or to carry out intelligence tasks for an intelligence or CI service. (DoDI S-5240.17, CI Collection Activities, 14 Mar 2014)\n-- Also, authorized personnel establishing control over an foreign individual who, witting or unwitting of USG involvement, accepts tasking as a result of the established relationship; authorized personnel establishing control over a U.S. person who, fully aware of USG involvement, accepts tasking as a result of the established relationship. (DoDI S-5200.42, Defense HUMINT and Related Activities (U), 8 Dec 2009 w/ chg 1 dated 16 Aug 2010) -- Also, the acquisition of an individual's services who, witting or unwitting of U.S. Government involvement, accepts directions and control thus obligating both parties to an act in a prescribed manner. (HDI Lexicon, April 2008) -- Also, the establishment of a degree of control over an individual who, witting or unwitting of U.S.\n\nGovernment involvement accepts tasking as a result of the relationship established.  (Army TC 2-22.307, Aug 2009) -- Also, the process of enlisting an individual to work for an intelligence or counterintelligence service.\n\n(FBI FCI Terms) -- Also, term for the tradecraft process of enlisting a target individual to work for an intelligence or security service. (*The CIA Insider's Dictionary*, by Leo D. Carl, 1996)\n\n-- Also, the tradecraft process of enlisting a target individual to work for an intelligence servicein most cases against his own country. The process includes spotting, assessing, developing, and recruitment. Motivation may be ideological, financial, or other, such as revenge. (A Spy's Journey)\n\n## Recruitment... Is A Process Of Salesmanship, Almost Of Seduction.\n\n\n-- SSCI Report 99-522 (1986)\n\n\n    Agent recruiting is the most important task of both strategic and operational intelligence.  No real\nproblems can be solved without agent penetration in basic government, military and technological centres of the enemy.\n\n       -- Victor Suvorov, *Inside Soviet Military Intelligence* (1984); see Chapter 4 - Agent Recruiting.\n_____________________\n\n    Agent recruitment is a tedious process with a low rate of success and a high rate of return. Of\nevery ten agents recruited, eight will fall by the wayside because they lose their access or they tire of the commitment, one will be a problemmainly of securityand one will work as a productive agent, perhaps for decades.\n\n      -- Joseph W. Wippl (35 year CIA career with the National Clandestine Service), \"The Qualities That\n          Make a Great Case Officer,\"  *International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence*, Vol 25 No 3 (Fall 2012), p. 602\n\n## _____________________ Recruitment... Is An Art Form\n\n  How do you do recruitment?  \"How do you sell anything in life? You have to have a product, you\nhave to develop a relationship, and in that relationship you have to be able to identify people's\nstrengths and weaknesses. And then you have to be able to ask that tough question: Will you help\nme? There is a sense of timing in it. It's an art form, very frankly.\"\n\n      -- Jack Devine, 32-year CIA veteran in \"Ten Questions,\" *Time* Magazine, Vol. 183 No. 23, 16 June 2014. p. 60\n Recruitment Cycle.  The... process by which intelligence services recruit agents (aka the agent acquisition process). (James M. Olson, *Fair Play: The Moral Dilemmas of Spying*, 2006)\n\n\n                                    \"The recruitment cycle is the essence of spying\"\n\n    Seven steps of the recruitment cycle:  1) Spotting; 2) Assessing; 3) Developing; 4) Pitching; 5) Formalizing;\n   6) Producing; and 7) Terminating.\n         -- James M. Olson (CIA Retired), Former Chief CIA Counterintelligence\n\n-- Also, *Agent Recruitment Cycle* (ARC): the systematic method for acquiring agents HUMINT\nsources) who will satisfy intelligence collection requirements and meet intelligence needs.\n\n    The **Agent Recruitment Cycle** consists of six steps:\n\n\n      + Spotting (or identifying) individuals who can meet intelligence needs as identified by analyst or\npolicymakers.\n      + Assessing whether the spotted individuals have the placement and access to provide the\ndesired information as well as beginning the process of determining their motivations, vulnerabilities, and suitability.\n      + Developing a relationship with the individual to further assess the factors above and to explore\nwhether they will be responsive to initial tasking for intelligence information.\n      + The actual recruitment. + Training and handling meetings with the agent, including taskings and debriefings. + Either turning an agent over to another case officer or terminating the relationship.\n_____________________\n\n\n    Seven basic areas:  1) Spotting; 2) Evaluation; 3) Recruiting; 4) Testing; 5) Training; 6) Handling;\nand 7) Termination.\n\n       + Spotting:  the process of identifying foreigners or other persons who might be willing to spy... + Evaluation:  a thorough review of all information available... + Recruiting:  the recruitment \"pitch\"....  People volunteer or agree to spy on their governments for many reasons. It is the task of the recruiter to determine what reasonif one existsis most likely to motivate the potential agent. + Testing:  [testing the asset's] loyalty and reliability ...\n\n\n       + Training:  [tradecraft training]  instructed in one of several methods of covert communications... learn the use of clandestine contacts. And... will be given training on security precautions, such as the detection and avoidance of surveillance. + Handling:  Successful handling of an agent hinges on the strength of the relationship that the case officer is able to establish with the agent.  ....a good case officer must combine the qualities of a master spy, a psychiatrist, and a father confessor.  ...One of the\n          biggest problems in handling an agent is caused by the changeover of case officers. + Termination:  All clandestine operations ultimately come to an end. ...[need for] resettlement\n\n          -- Victor Marchetti and John D. Marks, *The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence*, 2nd Edition (1980), pp 215-228\n_______________________\n\n    Agent recruitment [cycle]:  1) Spot; 2) Assess; 3) Develop & Recruit; 4) Test; 5) Train; 6) Handle;\nand 7) Terminate.\n\n         -- Jefferson Mack, *Running a Ring of Spies* (1996)\n\n Recruitment-in-Place (RIP).  An official who overtly continues to work for his government and clandestinely provides information of intelligence value to a foreign government; will in many instances be connected with a foreign government's intelligence service. (CI Community Lexicon)  Also see penetration; penetration operation.\n\n-- Also, a person who agrees to become an agent and retain his position in his organization or government while reporting on it to an intelligence or security organization of a foreign country. (ICS Glossary)\n-- Also, inducement of a person to become an informant or agent of an intelligence service while he\nor she remains in the same position and status. This term applies to personnel of foreign establishments, diplomatic or other, who continue to occupy their regular posts instead of defecting. (AFOSI Instruction 71-101, 6 Jun 2000)\n-- Also, a foreign national who overtly continues to work for his government and covertly provides the U.S. with information of intelligence value. (FBI FCI Terms)\n\n    Recruitment-in-place, one of the most difficult and sensitive activities in counterintelligence.\n\n       -- William H. Webster, Director FBI, Speech on 22 March 1986\n____________________________\n\n    Recruiting anybody to be a spy is an act of seduction. Recruiting hostile intelligence officers\namounts to seducing seducersan art in itself.\n\n       -- Angelo Codevilla, *Informing Statecraft: Intelligence for a New Century* (1992), p. 337\n____________________________\n\n    A recruitment who stays on the job... is the ultimate prize, the crown jewel of any\ncounterintelligence operation. At great personal risk, a recruitment in place is in a position to provide continuous and up-to-date information. By contrast, a defector, while usually welcome, is of less value. Once debriefed of the information he or she knows, and with no further access to secrets, a defector has diminished worth.\n\n       -- David Wise, *Tiger Trap: America's Secret Spy War with China* (2011), p. 177\n____________________________\n\n    It is axiomatic in intelligence work that 'there is no better counterintelligence than recruiting the\nother side's intelligence officers.'\n\n       -- James M. Olson (CIA Retired), Former Chief CIA Counterintelligence\n Reconstitution. The process of restoring critical assets and their necessary infrastructure support systems (or their functionality) to pre-incident operational status. (DoDI 3020.45, DCIP Management, 21 Apr 2008)\n\n\nRED.  In cryptographic systems, refers to information or messages that contain sensitive or classified information that is not encrypted. (CNSSI No. 4009, National Information Assurance Glossary, 26 April 2010)   Also see *BLACK*. RED EYE.  The RED EYE Task Force, hosted by AFMC [Air Force Material Command]  and sponsored by Region 1 [AFOSI] is a multi-agency operation consisting of nine federal law enforcement and intelligence agencies working together to identify, exploit, neutralize and mitigate threats of illicit procurement and illegal export of sensitive U.S. technology to foreign adversaries. (AFOSI 2012 Fact Book) Red Team.  An organizational element comprised of trained and educated members that provide an independent capability to fully explore alternatives in plans and operations in the context of the operational environment and from the perspective of adversaries and others. (JP 1-02 and JP 2-0, Joint Intelligence, 22 Oct 2013)   Also see *red team analysis*.\n\n    A \"CI Red Team\" is a simulation of a foreign intelligence collection activities of a specified\nfriendly/Blue target, such as a RDA project/program, installation, military operation, etc. May\ninclude the identification of physical, electronic, acoustic, or visual patterns of the supported activity/agency as may be seen through the eyes of ad adversary.\n Red Team Analysis.  Models the behavior of an individual or group by trying to replicate how an adversary would think about an issue. (CIA, A Tradecraft Primer: Structured Analytical Techniques for Improving Intelligence Analysis, June 2005)   Also see *red team*.\n\n\n    Red Team analysis tries to consciously place the analyst in the same cultural, organizational, and\npersonal setting -- \"putting them in their shoes\" -- in which the target individual or group operates. Red Team analysis is not easy to conduct. It requires significant time to develop a team of qualified experts who can think like the adversary.\n\n    Contrarian methods and \"Red Teams\" should be a routine part of the analytical process.\n\n       -- Jeffrey R, Cooper, *Curing Analytical Pathologies*, Center for the Study of Intelligence (Dec 2005), p. 43\n Redaction.  For purposes of declassification, the removal of exempted information from copies of a document. (DoD Manual 5200.01-Vol 1, DoD Information Security Program, 24 Feb 2012) Refugee.  A person who owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his or her nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself or herself of the protection of that country. See also *dislocated civilian; displaced person; evacuee; expellee; stateless person*. (JP 1-02 and JP 3-29, Foreign Humanitarian Assistance, 17 Mar 2009) Regional Security Officer (RSO).  A security officer responsible to the chief of mission (ambassador), for security functions of all US embassies and consulates in a given country or group of adjacent countries.\n\n(JP 1-02 and JP 3-10, Joint Security Operations in Theater, 3 Feb 2010)\n\n-- Also, Diplomatic Security Special Agents of the U.S. Department of State (DoS), assigned to U.S.\n\ndiplomatic missions overseas as the personal advisor to the ambassador or chief of mission on all security issues and coordinate all aspects of a mission's security program. They develop and implement effective security programs to protect DoS employees from terrorist, criminal, and technical attack both at work and at home. The RSO serves as the primary liaison with foreign police and security services overseas in an effort to obtain support for U.S. law enforcement initiatives and investigations. (DoS)\n\nReid Technique.  A method of questioning subjects and assessing their credibility. The technique consists of a non-accusatory interview combining both investigative and behavior-provoking questions. If the investigative information indicates that the subject committed the crime in question, the Reid Nine Steps of Interrogation are utilized to persuade the subject to tell the truth about what they did. The Reid technique involves three different components - factual analysis, interviewing, and interrogation. (Wikipedia; accessed 21 Aug 2013)\n\n    The term *\"Reid Technique\"* is a registered trademark of the firm John E. Reid and Associates,\nwhich offers training courses in the method they have devised. The technique is widely used by numerous law-enforcement agencies. For more information see:  <http://www.reid.com/>\n Remediation.  Actions taken to correct known deficiencies and weaknesses once a vulnerability has been identified. (DoDD 3020.40, DoD Policy and Responsibilities for Critical Infrastructure, 14 Jan 2010 w/ chg 2 dated 21 Sep 2012)\n-- Also, the act of mitigating a vulnerability or a threat. (CNSSI No. 4009, National Information Assurance Glossary, 26 April 2010) Rendition.  An extra-territorial activity to apprehend and return a person to the US or another country, with or without permission from the country in which the subject is apprehended. (National HUMINT Glossary)\n\n    The term \"rendition\" in the counterterrorism context means nothing more than moving someone\nfrom one country to another, outside the formal process of extradition.\n\n       -- Daniel Benjamin, Former Director for Counterterrorism, National Security Council\n_________________________\n\n    For additional information see CRS Report (RL32890) Renditions: Constraints Imposed by Laws on Torture, 8 Sep 2009; copy available at:  <http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RL32890.pdf> Repatriate.  A person who returns to his or her country or citizenship, having left said native country either against his or her will, or as one of a group who left for reason of politics, religion, or other pertinent reasons. (JP 1-02) Repatriation.  1) The procedure whereby American citizens and their families are officially processed back into the United States subsequent to an evacuation. (JP 3-68, Noncombatant Evacuation Operations, 23 Dec 2010); and 2) The release and return of enemy prisoners of war to their own country in accordance with the 1949 Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War. (JP 1-0, Personnel Support to Joint Operations, 16 Oct 2006) Report of Investigation (ROI).  An executive summary of all results of investigative activity conducted in an investigation. (902d MIG Investigations Handbook, updated 17 Oct 2012) .\n\nReportable Incident.  Any suspected or alleged violation of Department of Defense policy or of other related orders, policies, procedures or applicable law, for which there is credible information. (JP 1-02 and JP 3-63, Detainee Operations, 30 May 2008)\nRequest For Assistance (RFA).  A request based on mission requirements and expressed in terms of desired outcome, formally asking for assistance. Request For Information (RFI). 1) Any specific time-sensitive ad hoc requirement for intelligence information or products to support an ongoing crisis or operation not necessarily related to standing requirements or scheduled intelligence production.  2) A term used by the National Security Agency/Central Security Service to state ad hoc signals intelligence requirements. (JP 2-0, Joint Intelligence, 22 Oct 2013)\n\n\nResearch, Development, and Acquisition (RDA).  All activities associated with research and engineering, acquisition, international transfers of technology, and disposal of defense-related technology. (DoDI O-5240.24,CI Activities Supporting RDA, 8 Jun 2011 with change 1 dated 15 Oct 2013) Residency.  An office or location in a country used by foreign intelligence officers from which to plan, coordinate, and execute intelligence activities. Also refers to the number of foreign intelligence agents present in a given area. (AR 381-20, Army CI Program, 25 May 2010) Resilience. The ability to prepare for and adapt to changing conditions and withstand and recover rapidly from disruptions; includes the ability to withstand and recover from deliberate attacks, accidents, or naturally occurring threats or incidents. (PPD-21, 2013) Resiliency.  The characteristic or capability to maintain functionality and structure (or degrade gracefully) in the face of internal and external change. (DoDI 3020.45, DCIP Management, 21 Apr 2008)\nResistance Movement.  An organized effort by some portion of the civil population of a country to resist the legally established government or an occupying power and to disrupt civil order and stability. (JP 1-02 and JP 3-05, Special Operations, 18 Apr 2011) Responsible Analytical Center (RAC).  The Intelligence organization that has responsibility for providing integrated all-source analysis, or application of analysis, to produce an intelligence product to answer a specific COCOM Intelligence Task List (ITL) task or sub-task. DoD organizations that qualify as RACs include: DIA analytical offices [including DAC-1C] and Intelligence Centers, the COCOM Joint Intelligence Operations Centers (JIOCs), and the Service intelligence production centers (MCIA, NASIC, NGIC, and ONI). (CJCSM 3314.01, Intelligence Planning, 28 Feb 2007) Restraint.  In the context of joint operation planning, a requirement placed on the command by a higher command that prohibits an action, this restricting freedom of action. (JP 1-02 and JP 5-0, Joint Operation Planning, 11 Aug 2011) Restricted Area.  An area (land, sea or air) in which there are special restrictive measures employed to prevent or minimize incursions and/or interference, where special security measures are employed to prevent unauthorized entry. Restricted areas may be of different types depending on the nature and varying degree of importance of the security interest, or other matter contained therein. Restricted areas must be authorized by the installation/activity commander/director, properly posted, and shall employ physical security measures. Additionally, Controlled Areas may be established adjacent to Restricted Areas for verification and authentication of personnel. (DoD 5200.08-R, Physical Security Program, 9 Apr 2007)\n-- Also, 1) An area (land, sea, or air) in which there are special restrictive measures employed to prevent or minimize interference between friendly forces; and 2) An area under military jurisdiction in which special security measures are employed to prevent unauthorized entry. (JP 1-02) Restricted Target.  A valid target that has specific restrictions placed on actions authorized against it due to operational considerations. Also see *restricted target list*. (JP 3-60, Joint Targeting, 13 Apr 2007)\nRestricted Target List (RTL).  A list of restricted targets nominated by elements of the joint force and approved by the joint force commander.  This list also includes restricted targets directed by higher authorities. Also see *restricted target*. (JP 3-60, Joint Targeting, 13 Apr 2007) Returnee.   A displaced person who has returned voluntarily to his or her former place of residence. (JP 3-29, Foreign Humanitarian Assistance, 17 Mar 2009) Revolution.  The overthrow or renunciation of one government or ruler and the substitution of another by the governed. (Army FM 3-24-2, Tactics in Counterinsurgency, April 2009)\n\n\nRisk.  Probability and severity of loss linked to threats or hazards and vulnerabilities. (DoDD 3020.40, DoD Policy and Responsibilities for Critical Infrastructure, 14 Jan 2010 w/ chg 2 dated 21 Sep 2012)\n-- Also, probability and severity of loss linked to hazards (JP 1-02 and JP 5-0, Joint Operation Planning, 11 Aug 2011)\n-- Also, a measure of consequence of peril, hazard or loss, which is incurred from a capable aggressor or the environment (the presence of a threat and unmitigated vulnerability). (DoD 5200.08-R, Physical Security Program, 9 Apr 2007)\n-- Also, a measure of the potential degree to which protected information is subject to loss through adversary exploitation. (DoD 5205.02-M, DoD OPSEC Program Manual, 3 Nov 2008) -- Also, a measure of the extent to which an entity is threatened by a potential circumstance or event, and typically a function of 1) the adverse impacts that would arise if the circumstance or event occurs;\nand 2) the likelihood of occurrence. (CNSSI No. 4009, National Information Assurance Glossary, 26 April 2010) -- Also, the potential for an unwanted outcome resulting from an incident, event, or occurrence, as determined by its likelihood and the associated consequences. (DHS, National Infrastructure Protection Plan - 2009)\n\n\n## When You Hear \"Calculated Risk,\" Don'T Ask To See The Calculations.\n\n\n-- Dr. Gus Weiss, Former Assistant Secretary of Defense for Space Policy\n(quoted in *Intelligence Analysis: A Target-Centric Approach*)\n\n\n Risk, in the context of critical infrastructure and terrorism, can be defined as the potential\nconsequence associated with a particular kind of attack or event against a particular target, discounted by the likelihood that such an attack or event will occur (threat) and the likelihood that the target will sustain a certain degree of damage (vulnerability).\n\n    Threat includes not only the identification of specific adversaries, but also their intentions and\ncapabilities (both current and future).  Consequences include lives and property lost, short term financial costs, longer term economic costs, environmental costs, etc.\n\n    Given this definition, risk is not threat, nor vulnerability to a threat, nor the estimated consequences\n   associated with a specific attack, but some integration of the three.\n     -- CRS Report, RL30153, 8 Jan 2007\n\nRisk Avoidance.  A security philosophy which postulates that adversaries are all-knowing and highly competent, against which risks are avoided by maximizing defenses and minimizing vulnerabilities.\n(DSS Glossary)  Also see *risk management*.\n\nRisk Analysis.  A method by which individual vulnerabilities are compared to perceived or actual security threat scenarios in order to determine the likelihood of compromise of critical information. (DSS Glossary)\n\n-- Also, examination of information to identify the risk to an information system. See risk assessment.\n\n(CNSSI No. 4009, National Information Assurance Glossary, 26 April 2010) Risk Assessment.  A systematic examination of risk using disciplined processes, methods, and tools.  A\nrisk assessment provides an environment for decision makers to evaluate and prioritize risks continuously and to recommend strategies to remediate or mitigate those risks. (DoDD 3020.40, DoD Policy and Responsibilities for Critical Infrastructure, 14 Jan 2010 w/ chg 2 dated 21 Sep 2012)\n-- Also, the identification and assessment of hazards (first two steps of risk management process).\n\n(JP 1-02 and JP 3-07.2, Antiterrorism, 24 Nov 2010)\n\n\n-- Also, a process of evaluating the risks to information based on susceptibility to intelligence collection and the anticipated severity of loss. (DoD 5205.02-M, DoD OPSEC Program Manual, 3 Nov 2008)\n-- Also, a defined process used to fuse the procedures of analyzing threat, risks, and vulnerabilities, into a cohesive, actionable product. (DoD 5200.08-R, Physical Security Program, 9 Apr 2007) -- Also, the process of evaluating security risks based on analyses of threats, vulnerabilities, and probable adverse consequences to a facility, system, or operation. (IC Standard 700-1, 4 Apr 2008)\n\n## Risk Assessment\n\n\n\n    The process of identifying, prioritizing, and estimating risks. This includes determining the extent to\nwhich adverse circumstances or events could impact an enterprise. Uses the results of threat and vulnerability assessments to identify risk to organizational operations and evaluates those risks in terms of likelihood of occurrence and impacts if they occur. The product of a risk assessment is a list of estimated, potential impacts and unmitigated vulnerabilities. Risk assessment is part of risk management and is conducted throughout the Risk Management Framework (RMF).\n\n       -- CNSSI No. 4009, National Information Assurance Glossary, 26 April 2010\n\nRisk Management (RM).  The process of identifying, assessing, and controlling, risks arising from operational factors and making decisions that balance risk cost with mission benefits. (JP 1-02 and JP 3-0, Joint Operations, 11 Aug 2011)\n\n    The basic concept for a cost effective security system is **risk management** rather than the\nunattainable and unaffordable goal of risk avoidance.\n\n       -- Joint Security Commission II Report, 24 August 1999, p.12\n\n-- Also, a process by which decision makers accept, reduce, or offset risk and subsequently make decisions that weigh overall risk against mission benefits. (DoDD 3020.40, DoD Policy and Responsibilities for Critical Infrastructure, 14 Jan 2010 w/ chg 2 dated 21 Sep 2012) -- Also, process and resultant risk of systematically identifying, assessing and controlling risks.\nCommanders/Directors are required to identify critical assets and their subsequent protection requirements, including future expenditures required for the protection requirements. (DoD 5200.08-R, Physical Security Program, 9 Apr 2007) -- Also, the process of selecting and implementing security countermeasures to accept or mitigate the risk of a known or suspected threat to an acceptable level based on cost and effectiveness. (IC Standard 700-1, 4 Apr 2008)\n-- Also, *Antiterrorism (AT) Risk Management*: the process of systematically identifying, assessing, and controlling risks arising from operational factors and making decisions that balance possible adverse outcomes with mission benefits. AT risk management is one of the five minimum elements of an AT program. The end products of the AT program risk management process shall be the identification of DoD\nelements and personnel that are vulnerable to the identified threat attack means. From the assessment of risk based upon the three critical components of AT risk management (threat assessment, criticality assessment, and vulnerability assessment), the commander or DoD civilian manager must determine which DoD elements and personnel are at greatest risk and how best to employ given resources and FP measures to deter, mitigate, or prepare for a terrorist incident. (DoDI 2000.12, DoD Antiterrorism Program, 1 Mar 2012 with change 1 dated 9 Sep 2013) Risk Mitigation.  Prioritizing, evaluating, and implementing the appropriate risk-reducing controls/\ncountermeasures recommended from the risk management process. (CNSSI No. 4009, National Information Assurance Glossary, 26 April 2010)\n\n\nRisk Response.  Actions taken to remediate or mitigate risk, or to reconstitute capability in the event of loss or degradation. (DoDD 3020.40, DoD Policy and Responsibilities for Critical Infrastructure, 14 Jan 2010 w/ chg 2 dated 21 Sep 2012) Romeo Spies.  Men whose task is to seduce women who have access to confidential material, in the hope that through pillow talk the women will reveal secrets. (Encyclopedia of Cold War Espionage, Spies, and Secret Operations, 3rd revised edition 2012) Rolling Car Pickup.  A clandestine car pickup executed so smoothly that the car hardly stops at all and seems to have kept moving forward. (CI Centre Glossary)   Also see *car pick-up*. Rule of the Least Intrusive Means.  The collection of information by a DoD intelligence component must be accomplished by the **least intrusive means** or lawful investigative technique reasonably available.\n\n(DIA Intelligence Law Handbook, Sep 1995)\n\n    This rule prescribes a hierarchy of collection techniques which must be considered before an\nintelligence component engages in collection of information about US persons. The methodologies\nbelow become progressively more intrusive as one proceeds through this hierarchical framework:\n\n -- First, to the extent feasible, information must be collected from publically available materials, or\nwith the consent of the person or persons concerned.\n\n -- Second, if collection from these sources is not feasible, then cooperating sources may be used.\n -- Third, if neither publically available information nor cooperating sources are sufficient or feasible,\nand then collection may be pursued using other lawful investigative techniques that require neither a judicial warrant nor the approval of the Attorney General of the United States.\n\n    -- Finally, when none of the first three approaches has been sufficient or feasible, then the\ncollecting intelligence component may seek approval for use of one of the techniques that require a warrant or approval of the Attorney General.\n\n    DoD Policy:  see DoD Regulation 5240.1-R, Procedures Governing the Activities of DoD\nIntelligence Components that Affect United States Persons, 7 Dec 1982 (para C2.4.2, page 18).\n Rules of Engagement (ROE).  Directives issued by competent military authority that delineate the circumstances and limitations under which United States forces will initiate and/or continue combat engagement with other forces encountered. (JP 1-02 and JP 1-04, Legal Support to Military Operations, 17 Aug 2011) Ruse.  In military deception, a trick of war designed to deceive the adversary, usually involving the deliberate exposure of false information to the adversary's intelligence collection system. (JP 1-02 and JP 3-13.4, Military Deception, 13 Jul 2006)\n\n\nS ========================================== Sabotage.  An act or acts with intent to injure, interfere with, or obstruct the national defense of a country by willfully injuring or destroying, or attempting to injure or destroy, any national defense or war materiel, premises, or utilities, to include human and natural resources. (JP 1-02 and JP 2-01.2, CI & HUMINT in Joint Operations, 16 Mar 2011 w/ chg 1 dated 26 Aug 2011)\n-- Also, the willful destruction of government property with the intent to cause injury, destruction, or defective production of national defense or war materials by either an act of commission or omission. (IC Standard 700-1, 4 Apr 2008)\n\nSabotage is a violation of Title 18 USC,  2151-2156.\n\n_______________________\n\n[S]abotage is the destruction of material by covert means in order to destroy the capability of a country to pursue its policies.\n\n\n-- Tucker, David. *Illuminating the Dark Arts of War*,\nNew York: Continuum International Publishing Group, 2012, p. 136 Safe House.  An innocent-appearing house or premises established by an organization for the purpose of conducting clandestine or covert activity in relative security. (JP 1-02 and JP 3-07.2, Antiterrorism, 24 Nov 2010)\n\n-- Also, a facility use to afford security for operations. (HDI Lexicon, April 2008)\n\n-- Also, house or premises controlled by an intelligence service that affords at least temporary security for individuals engaged in intelligence operations. (CI Community Lexicon)\n-- Also, any house, apartment, office, or other building or quarters used to afford security for persons engaged in clandestine activities or for intelligence collection purposes. Safe houses may be used as refuge for or holding of agents or defectors; lodging and feeding of couriers, escapees, or evaders; lodging and working space for agents; rendezvous training, briefing, or questioning; or storage of supplies and equipment. (National HUMINT Glossary) -- Also, a location controlled by an intelligence service that provides a secure place for individuals engaged in intelligence operations to meet. (FBI FCI Terms) -- Also, a secure facility, unknown to adversary intelligence and security services, used for agent meetings, defector housing or debriefing, and similar support functions. (CIA in D&D Lexicon, 1 May 2002) -- Also, [safehouse] a secure location used by intelligence services to meet with agents or for other clandestine purposes.  The renter or purchaser of a safehouse is usually a cutout, someone who has no visible connection with intelligence work or with any official organization. (James M. Olson, Fair Play: The Moral Dilemmas of Spying, 2006) -- Also, [safehouse] a sterile location, normally a house or apartmentbut could be a hotel room as wellused to meet agents securely. (A Spy's Journey)\n\nSafeguarding.  Measures and controls that are prescribed to protect classified information. (DoD Manual 5200.01-Vol 1, DoD Information Security Program, 24 Feb 2012)\n\n\nSanction Enforcement.  Operations that employ coercive measures to control the movement of certain types of designated items into or out of a nation or specified area. (JP 1-02 and JP 3-0, Joint Operations, 11 Aug 2011) Sanitization.  The editing of intelligence to protect sources, methods, capabilities, and analytical procedures to permit wider dissemination (IC Standard 700-1, 4 Apr 2008) Sanitize.  To revise a report or other document in such a fashion as to prevent identification of sources, or of the actual persons and places with which it is concerned, or of the means by which it was acquired. Usually involves deletion or substitution of names and other key details. (JP 1-02)\nSanitizing.  The removal of information from the media or equipment such that data recovery using any known technique or analysis is prevented. Sanitizing shall include the removal of data from the media, as well as the removal of all classified labels, markings, and activity logs. Properly sanitized media may be subsequently declassified upon observing the organization's respective verification and review procedures. (DSS Glossary) Satellite Reconnaissance Advanced Notice (SATRAN) Program.  Advanced warning of reconnaissance satellite orbits so military commanders can take appropriate action. (Center for Army Lessons Learned, http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/call/thesaurus/toc.asp?id=26671, accessed 4 Mar 2014)\n\n    In response to the intelligence threat from Soviet imagery satellites, the United States initiated the\nSatellite Reconnaissance Advanced Notice (SATRAN) program... in 1966.\n\n       -- Jeffrey T. Richelson, *The US Intelligence Community* (2012, Sixth Edition), pp. 270-271\n_________________\n\n    The mission of the SATRAN Program is to provide the US military, US Government agencies...\nwith warning of periods where their equipment or activities are vulnerable to reconnaissance by foreign spacecraft. The SATRAN program provides accurate overflight information in a timely manner so that foreign spacecraft are denied the opportunity to collect useful intelligence data.\n\n      -- Intellipedia (accessed 4 Mar 2014)\n SATRAN. Acronym, see *Satellite Reconnaissance Advanced Notice Program* above. Scams. [Cyber usage]  Fake deals that trick people into providing money, information, or service in exchange for the deal. (FBI; see <http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/investigate/counterintelligence/internetsocial-networking-risks-1>) Scattered Castles.  The IC [Intelligence Community] security clearance repository and the Director of National Intelligence's authoritative source for clearance and access information for all IC, military services, DoD civilians, and contractor personnel. DoD information is furnished by JPAS. (IC Standard 700-1, 4 Apr 2008) Scientific and Technical Intelligence (S&TI).  The product resulting from the collection, evaluation, analysis, and interpretation of foreign scientific and technical information that covers: a. foreign developments in basic and applied research and in applied engineering techniques; and b. scientific and technical characteristics, capabilities, and limitations of all foreign military systems, weapons, weapon systems, and materiel; the research and development related thereto; and the production methods employed for their manufacture. (JP 1-02 and JP 2-01, Joint and National Intelligence Support to Military Operations, 5 Jan 2012) Scientific Method.  [One of the four basic types of reasoning applied to intelligence analysis, it] combines deductive and inductive reasoning:  induction is used to develop the hypothesis, and deduction is used to test it. (DIA, *Intelligence Essentials for Everyone*, June 1999)  Also see abduction; *deduction; induction.*\n\n\n    For additional information see *Knowledge Management in the Intelligence Enterprise* by Edward\nWaltz (2003).\n\n Screening.  In intelligence, [the] evaluation of an individual; or a group of individuals to determine their potential to answer collection requirements or to identify individuals who match a predetermined source profile coupled with the process of identifying and assessing the areas of knowledge, cooperation, and possible approach techniques for an individual who has information of intelligence value. (JP 1-02 and JP 2-01.2, CI & HUMINT in Joint Operations, 16 Mar 2011 w/ chg 1 dated 26 Aug 2011)\n\n    For additional information see Chapter 6 \"Screening,\" FM 2-22.3, Human Intelligence Collection\nOperations.\n SCRM.  See *Supply Chain Risk Management*. Search.  An examination, authorized by law, of a specific person, property, or area for specified property or evidence, or for a specific person for the purpose of seizing such property, evidence, or person. (AR 190-20)  Also see physical search, search warrant, *seizure*.\n\nSearch Warrant.  An express authorization to search and seize issued by competent civilian authority. (AR 190-20)  Also see *search, seizure*.\n\n    A search warrant is a court order authorizing law enforcement to search a specified location and\nseize evidence.  Under the Fourth Amendment, searches must be reasonable and specific.\n\n    The Fourth Amendment prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures (U.S. Constitution.\nAmendment. IV). Searches and seizures are presumptively unreasonable, unless they are conducted pursuant to a warrant issued by a neutral magistrate upon a sworn showing of probable cause (*Terry v. Ohio*, 393 U.S. 1, 20, 1968).\n Sector-Specific Agency.  Federal departments and agencies identified in Homeland Security Presidential Directive 7, \"Critical Infrastructure Identification, Prioritization, and Protection,\" 7 December 2003 as responsible for CI/KR [critical infrastructure and/or key resource] protection activities in specified national CI/KR sectors. (DoDD 3020.40, DoD Policy and Responsibilities for Critical Infrastructure, 14 Jan 2010 w/ chg 2 dated 21 Sep 2012)\n-- Also, a Federal department or agency designated by PPD-21 with responsibility for providing institutional knowledge and specialized expertise as well as leading, facilitating, or supporting the security and resilience programs and associated activities of its designated critical infrastructure sector in the allhazards environment. (PPD-21, 2013)\n\n\n    PDD 21 identifies 16 critical infrastructure sectors and designates associated Federal SSAs.\nFor the critical infrastructure sector \"Defense Industrial Base\" the Department of Defense is the\ndesignated SSA by PDD 21.\n Secret,  Security classification that shall be applied to information, the unauthorized disclosure of which reasonably could be expected to cause serious damage to the national security that the original classification authority is able to identify or describe. (EO 13526)  Also see *security classification*. SECRET Internet Protocol Router Network (SIPRNet).  The worldwide SECRET-level packet switch network that uses high-speed internet protocol routers and high-capacity Defense Information Systems Network circuitry. (JP 1-02 and JP 6-0, Joint Communications, 10 Jun 2010) Secret Writing (SW).  Invisible writing. (FBI FCI Terms)\n\n-- Also, any tradecraft technique employing invisible messages hidden in or on innocuous materials.\n\nThis includes invisible inks and microdots, among many other variations. (CI Centre Glossary)\n\n\n-- Also, tradecraft term that describes the act of using special inks or special carbons papers\n(impregnated with chemicals) to write messages clandestinely.  The utilization of special inks is known as the \"wet system.\" The utilization of special carbon papers is known as the \"dry system.\" (Encyclopedia of the CIA, 2003]\n\n   The simplest secret writing uses organic inks:  milk, vinegar, lemon juice, even urine. These inks\ndry invisibly and can be developed by applying heat. Espionage agencies have produced many\ninks made of chemicals that could be developed only by a specific chemical.\n        -- Spy Book\n_____________________\n\n    The chief difficulty with secret inks was their inability to handle great volume of information that\n  spies had to transmit in a modern war.\n       -- David Kahn, *The Codebreakers* (1967)\n_____________________\n\n    The techniques of secret writing are the same the world over. First the spy writes his cover letter.\nThen he writes the secret message on top, using a special sheet of carbon paper treated with a colorless chemical. Tiny particles of the chemical; are transferred to the letter, which can then be developed by the recipient. Most developing agents make the chemical traces grow, so that the message becomes legible, and unless the correct agent is known, the message remains\nundetectable.\n\n       -- Peter Wright, *Spy Catcher* (1987), p.119\n_____________________\n\n    For an explanation of secret inks, see Robert Wallace and H. Keith Melton, Spycraft: The Secret\nHistory of the CIA's Spytechs from Communism to Al-Qaeda (2008), pp. 427-437.\n Section 603 Referral.  Section 603 of the \"Intelligence Authorization Act for FY 1990\" states: \"Subject to the authority of the Attorney General, the FBI shall supervise the conduct of all investigations of violations of the espionage laws of the United States by persons employed by or assigned to United States diplomatic missions abroad.  All departments and agencies shall report immediately to the FBI any information concerning such a violation.  All departments and agencies shall provide appropriate assistance to the FBI in the conduct of such investigations.  Nothing in this provision shall be construed as establishing a defense to any criminal, civil, or administrative action.\" (Public Law 101-193, 30 Nov 1989)  Also see *Section 811 Referral*.\n\n    See <http://www.intelligence.senate.gov/laws/pl101-193.pdf> Section 811 Referral.  Section 811 of the Intelligence Authorization Act of 1995 (50 USC 402a) is the legislative act that governs the coordination of counterespionage investigations between Executive Branch agencies and departments and the FBI.  Section 811 referrals are the reports - made by the Executive Branch agencies or departments to the FBI under Section 811(c)(1)(a) - that advise the FBI\nof any information, regardless of origin, which may indicate that classified information is being, or may have been, disclosed in an unauthorized manner to a foreign power or agent of a foreign power.\n(CI Community Lexicon)\n\n    Section 811 was enacted in response to the damage to US national security caused by the Aldrich\nAmes espionage case.  The Ames case led to a legislative call for agencies to share data in counterespionage investigations and for the FBI to be involved earlier in the process of evaluating information concerning the possible compromise of classified information.\n\n    Within DoD, all *811 Referrals* are considered \"significant CI activities\" and as such must also be\nreported to DIA Office of Counterintelligence - Counterespionage Division (OCI-2)\n\n    See <http://www.intelligence.senate.gov/laws/pl103-359.pdf>\n_________________________\n\n   \"811\" referrals...  allow our operational counterintelligence sections to concentrate solely  on\ndetecting and countering foreign intelligence operations, focus on emerging strategic threats, and protecting United States secrets from compromise.\n\n         -- Robert S. Muller, III, Director FBI\n             Before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary (6 June 2002)\n Security.  Proactive measures adopted to safeguard personnel, information, operations, resources, technologies, facilities, and foreign relations against harm, loss, or hostile acts and influences. (DoDD 5200.43, Management of the Defense Security Enterprise, 1 Oct 2012 w/ chg 1 dated 24 Apr 2013) Also see *operational security (OPSEC); security disciplines; security profession, security professional.*\n\n## Dod Policy\n\n\n    Security is a mission critical function of the DoD and its proper execution has a direct impact on all\nDoD missions and capabilities and on the national defense.\n\n    Security is the personal responsibility of all DoD personnel....\n\n       -- DoD 5200.43, Management of the Defense Security Enterprise, 1 Oct 2012\n\n-- Also, 1) Measures taken by a military unit, activity, or installation to protect itself against all acts designed to, or which may, impair its effectiveness.  2) A condition that results from the establishment and maintenance of protective measures that ensure a state of inviolability from hostile acts or influences. 3) With respect to classified matter, the condition that prevents unauthorized persons from having access to official information that is safeguarded in the interests of national security. (JP 1-02; JP 2-0, Joint Intelligence, 22 Oct 2013; and JP 3-10, Joint Security Operations in Theater, 3 Feb 2010) -- Also, the protection of information to assure it is not accidentally or intentionally disclosed to unauthorized personnel. (DSS Glossary)\n\n## Security Is Not Counterintelligence - Counterintelligence Is Not Security.\n\n\n   \"People like to confuse counterintelligence (CI) with security. In practice, the two are related\nbut not  identical.\"\n\n       -- William R. Johnson, *Thwarting Enemies at Home and Abroad* (2009)\n________________________\n\n   \"...[C]ounterintelligence measures deal directly with foreign intelligence service activities, while\nsecurity programs are indirect defensive actions that minimize vulnerabilities.\"\n\n       -- SSCI Report 99-522 (1986)\n________________________\n\n   \"Counterintelligence investigates the enemy, or if you will in the modern world, the opposition, to\nlearn their capabilities, intentions, methods and focus. It is not security work. Security protects.\nIt does not attack.  [Emphasis added]  CI attacks the actor. It attacks the opposition intelligence\nstructures. It is not speculative. CI feeds security because it helps them focus on meaningful measures and safeguards. Using CI to help security is just smart security.\"\n\n       -- Robert P Hanssen (Soviet Spy, Former FBI Agent and current Federal inmate) as quoted in\n           \"Diary of a Spy\" by Paul M. Rodriquez, *Insight on the News*, 16 July 2001.\n_______________________\n\n    Security vs. Counterespionage -- \"[T]he security effort seeks primarily to protect its assigned\nmaterial against compromise, deliberate or accidental, while the counter-espionage effort operates actively to identify, thwart. mislead, and destroy an opposing espionage capability.\"\n\n       -- George P. Morse, America Twice Betrayed: Reversing Fifty Years of Government\n           Security Failure (1995), p. 50\n_______________________\n\n   \"Counterintelligence... is often confused with securitythat is, merely with protecting secrets\nand protecting against subversion. Yet whereas the objective of security is to cut and prevent all contacts between hostiles and those who are to be protected the objective of CI is to engage hostile intelligence, control what it knows, and if possible control what it does. In principle, neither security people nor CI people deny the validity of the others approach, but CI people think of security as flatfooted cops, and the latter think of the former as game-playing spooks.\"\n\n        -- Angelo Codevilla, *Informing Statecraft: Intelligence for a New Century* (1992), p. 26\n _______________________\n\n   \"Security is a dimension of clandestinity in espionage, counterespionage, counterintelligence,\nadultery, and poker.  It is to these activities what style is to a writer, an athlete, or a musician, but it is not itself a work, a game, or a performance.  Its purpose is prophylactic:  it excludes toxic and infectious organisms and conserves vital fluids.\"\n\n       -- William R. Johnson, \"Clandestinity and Current Intelligence.\" *Studies in Intelligence*, vol 20, no. 3,\n           (Fall 1976), pp. 15-69. Originally classified \"Secret / No Foreign Dissem\" [declassified].\n\n   \"CI and security shall be regarded as interdependent and mutually supportive disciplines with\nshared objectives and responsibilities associated with the protection of secrets and assets.\"\n\n   \"Security programs establish appropriate personnel, physical, information, operations, industrial\nand technical security, safeguards, and countermeasures to protect information and information systems, personnel, operations, resources, technologies, and facilities from threats.\"\n\n       -- ICD 700, Protection of National Intelligence, 7 Jun 2012\n\n## Security Programs Are The Indirect Defensive Actions That Minimize Vulnerability\n\n-- Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Report 99-522 (1986)\n\n   \"Security is a vital element of the operational effectiveness of the national security activities of the\ngovernment and of military combat readiness.\"\n\n        -- President Ronald Reagan, NSDD-145, 17 Sep 1984\n    General functions and responsibilities performed by security professionals, including\ncommunications security, counterintelligence awareness, security systems, international programs, operations security, research and technology protection, sensitive compartmented information security, special access program security, and security program policy.\n\n        -- DoDI 3305.13, DoD Security Education, Training, and Certification, 13 Feb 2014\n________________________\n\n\n## Security--Four Basic Principles\n\n\n    According to the Joint Security Commission, security is a dynamic and flexible system guided by\nfour basic principles:\n\n    1) Security policies and services must be realistically matched to the threats we face. The\nprocesses we use to formulate policies and deliver services must be sufficiently flexible to facilitate\n      their evolution as the threat changes.\n    2) Security policies and practices must be consistent and coherent across the Defense and\nIntelligence Communities, thereby reducing inefficiencies and enabling us to allocate scare\n   resources efficiently.\n    3) Security standards and procedures must result in the fair and equitable treatment of the\n    members of our communities upon whom we rely to guard the nation's security.\n    4) Security policies, practices, and procedures must provide the security we need at a price we can\nafford.\n\n        -- Joint Security Commission, Redefining Security: A Report to the Secretary of Defense and the Director Central Intelligence, 28 Feb 1994, p. 3\n____________________\n\n    Security is a highly decentralized government function. [...]  Effectively addressing security\ngenerates costs that must be balanced against risk and threats. Security, as a discipline, has\nhistorically been dominated by \"police\" type management, processes, and enforcement approaches. Although the police function is still required, today's security vulnerabilities are\nincreasingly technical in nature and related to information technology systems, software, and hardware.\n\n       -- WMD Report (31 March 2005), p. 545\n Security Classification.  A category to which national security information and material is assigned to denote the degree of damage that unauthorized disclosure would cause to national defense or foreign relations of the United States and to denote the degree of protection required. (JP 1-02)\n\n    There are three categories of security classification:\n\n 1) *Top Secret*--National security information or material that requires the highest degree of\nprotection and the unauthorized disclosure of which could reasonably be expected to cause\nexceptionally grave damage to the national security. Examples of \"exceptionally grave damage\" include armed hostilities against the United States or its allies; disruption of foreign relations vitally affecting the national security; the compromise of vital national defense plans or complex cryptologic and communications intelligence systems; the revelation of sensitive intelligence operations; and the disclosure of scientific or technological developments vital to national security.\n\n 2) *Secret*--National security information or material that requires a substantial degree of protection\nand the unauthorized disclosure of which could reasonably be expected to cause serious damage to the national security. Examples of \"serious damage\" include disruption of foreign relations significantly affecting the national security; significant impairment of a program or policy directly related to the national security; revelation of significant military plans or intelligence operations; and compromise of significant scientific or technological developments relating to national security.\n\n 3) *Confidential*--National security information or material that requires protection and the\nunauthorized disclosure of which could reasonably be expected to cause damage to the national security.\n\n    For additional information see website at:  <http://www.archives.gov/isoo/policy-documents/>\nSecurity Classification Guide (SCG).  A documentary form of classification guidance issued by an OCA [original classification authority]  that identifies the elements of information regarding a specific subject that must be classified and establishes the level and duration of classification for each such element. (DoD Manual 5200.01-Vol 1, DoD Information Security Program, 24 Feb 2012)\n\nSecurity Clearance.  An administrative determination by competent authority that an individual is eligible, from a security stand-point, for access to classified information. (JP 1-02)\n\n\n Within DoD, a security clearance is a determination that a person is eligible under DoD policy for\naccess to classified information. Clearances allow personnel to access classified information categorized into three levels: top secret, secret, and confidential. The damage to national defense and foreign relations that unauthorized disclosure could reasonably be expected to cause ranges\nfrom \"exceptionally grave damage\" for top secret information to \"damage\" for confidential\ninformation.\n\n## ___________________\n\n\n   The security clearance process is designed to determine the trustworthiness of an individual prior to\ngranting him or her access to classified national security information. The process has evolved since the early 1950s, with antecedents dating to World War II.\n\n    A security clearance is a determination that an individualwhether a direct federal employee or a\nprivate contractor performing work for the governmentis eligible for access to classified national security information.\n\n    A security clearance alone does not grant an individual access to specific classified materials.\nRather, a security clearance means that an individual is eligible for access.  In order to gain access to specific classified materials, an individual should also have a demonstrated \"need to know\" the classified information for his or her position and policy area responsibilities.  In addition, prior to\naccessing classified information, an individual must sign an appropriate nondisclosure agreement.\n\n       -- CRS Report R43216, *Security Clearance Process: Answers to Frequently Asked Questions*, 9 Sep 2013 *\n\n          * Copy available at:  <http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/secrecy/R43216.pdf>\n\nSecurity Clearance Investigation.  An inquiry into an individual's loyalty, character, trustworthiness and reliability to ensure that he or she is eligible for access to national security information. (ONCIX, <http://www.ncix.gov/SEA/reform/secvssuit.php>; accessed 18 Sep 2012)  Also see suitability investigation.\n\n   \"The Director of National Intelligence shall serve as the **Security Executive Agent**. As the Security\nExecutive Agent the Director of National Intelligence shall direct the oversight of investigations and determinations of eligibility for access to classified information or eligibility to hold a sensitive position made by any agency; shall be responsible for developing uniform and consistent policies and procedures to ensure the effective, efficient, and timely completion of investigations and\nadjudications relating to determinations of eligibility for access to classified information or eligibility to hold a sensitive position.\"\n\n       - EO 13467, Reforming Processes Related to Suitability for Government Employment, Fitness for Contractor Employees, and Eligibility for Access to Classified National Security Information, 2 Jul 2008\n Security Compromise.  The disclosure of classified information to persons not authorized access thereto. (DSS Glossary) Security Countermeasures (SCM).  Actions, devices, procedures, and/or techniques to reduce security risks. (IC Standard 700-1, 4 Apr 2008)\n-- Also, those protective activities required to prevent espionage, sabotage, theft, or unauthorized\nuse of classified or controlled information, systems, or material of the Department of Defense. (JP 1-02; and in previous edition JP 2-01.2, dated 13 Jun 2006)\nSecurity Detainee.  Those detainees who are not combatants, but who may be under investigation or pose a threat to US forces if released. (Army FM 2-22.3, HUMINT Collector Operations, Sep 2006)\n\n\nSecurity Disciplines.  Core functions and responsibilities performed by security professionals with a concentration in personnel, physical, information, and industrial security. (DoDI 3305.13, DoD Security Education, Training, and Certification, 13 Feb 2014)  Also see *security; security professional*. Security Environment Threat List. A list of countries with United States Diplomatic Missions that is compiled by the Department of State and updated semi-annually. The listed countries are evaluated based on: transnational terrorism; political violence; human intelligence; technical threats; and criminal threats [and rated via] four threat levels: Critical, High, Medium and Low. (DSS Glossary)\n\n\n    Four Threat Levels:\n\n    *Critical* - defined as a definite threat to United States assets based on adversary's capability,\nintent to attack, and targeting conducted on a recurring basis;\n\n    High - defined as a credible threat to United States assets based on knowledge of an adversary's\n   capability, intent to attack, and related incidents at similar facilities;\n    Medium - defined as a potential threat to United States assets based on knowledge of an\nadversary's desire to  compromise the assets and the possibility that the adversary could obtain\n    the capability to attack through a third party who has demonstrated such a capability; and\n    Low - defined as little as no threat as a result of the absence of credible evidence of capability,\nintent, or history of actual or planned attack against United States assets.\n Security Executive Agent (SecEA).  The Director of National Intelligence shall serve as the Security Executive Agent. (EO 13467, 30 Jun 2008)\n    For additional information see Security Executive Agent Directive 1 \"Security Executive Agent\n  Authorities and Responsibilities,\" 13 Mar 2012.\n    Copy at:  <http://www.ncix.gov/SEA/docs/2012-03-13_SEAD-1_Directive.pdf> Security Incident.  A security compromise, infraction, or violation. (DSS Glossary) Security In-Depth.  A concept of security calling for layered and complementary controls sufficient to detect and deter infiltration and exploitation of an organization, its information systems and facilities. (IC Standard 700-1, 4 Apr 2008)\n-- Also, a combination of layered and complementary security controls sufficient to deter, detect, and document unauthorized entry and movement within the installation and/or facility and the ability to delay and respond with force. Examples include the use of perimeter fences, employee and visitor entry and/or exit controls, sensors and intrusion detection systems, closed circuit video monitoring, security patrols during working and non-working hours, or other safeguards that mitigate vulnerabilities. (DTM 09-012, 8 Dec 2009, w/ chg 2 dated 9 Sep 2012)\n\n-- Also, an array of security measures which, considered as a whole, provide a level of security greater that that by any one measure individually. Includes identification checks, perimeter fences, police patrols, motion detectors, and other security measures. (DoD Manual S-5240.09, OFCO Procedures and Security Classification Guide, 13 Jan 2011 w/ change 1 dated 16 Oct 2012)\nSecurity Infraction.  A security incident that is not in the best interest of security and does not involve the loss, compromise, or suspected compromise of classified information. (DSS Glossary) Security Measures: [Actions] taken by the government and intelligence departments and agencies, among others, for protection from espionage, observation, sabotage, annoyance, or surprise. With respect to classified materials, it is the condition which prevents unauthorized persons from having access to official information which is safeguarded in the interests of national defense. (Senate Report 94-755, Book I - Glossary, 26 Apr 1976)\n\n\nSecurity Profession. An occupation dedicated to the protection of people, facilities, information, operations, and activities. (DoDI 3305.13, DoD Security Education, Training, and Certification, 13 Feb 2014)  Also see *security; security disciplines; security professional*. Security Professional. An individual who is educated, trained, and experienced in one or more security disciplines and provides advice and expertise to senior officials on the effective and efficient implementation, operation, and administration of the organization's security programs. (DoDI 3305.13, DoD Security Education, Training, and Certification, 13 Feb 2014)  Also see *security; security profession*. Security Service.  Entity or component of a foreign government charged with responsibility for counterespionage or internal security functions. (JP 1-02 and JP 2-01.2, CI & HUMINT in Joint Operations, 16 Mar 2011 w/ chg 1 dated 26 Aug 2011; and CI Community Lexicon) Sedition.  Willfully advocating or teaching the duty or necessity of overthrowing the US government or any political subdivision by force or violence. (JP 1-02; also in previous edition JP 2-01.2, dated 13 Jun 2006)\n\n\n    Sedition and criminal subversion of military forces are violations of Title 18 USC,  2384-2390 and\nis a punishable offense under UCMJ Article 94.  It is a term of law which refers to overt conduct that is deemed by the legal authority as tending toward insurrection against the established order.  It is the crime of creating a revolt, disturbance, or violence against lawful civil authority with the intent to cause its overthrow or destruction. Sedition often includes subversion of a constitution and incitement of discontent (or resistance) to lawful authority.  A seditionist is one who engages in or promotes the interests of sedition.\n\n    The difference between sedition and treason consists primarily in the subjective ultimate object of\nthe violation to the public peace.  Sedition does not consist of levying war against a government nor of adhering to its enemies, giving enemies aid, and giving enemies comfort.  Nor does it consist, in most representative democracies, of peaceful protest against a government, nor of attempting to change the government by democratic means (such as direct democracy or constitutional convention).\n\n    Sedition is the stirring up of rebellion against the government in power. Treason is the violation of\nallegiance to one's sovereign or state, giving aid to enemies, or levying war against one's state. Sedition is encouraging one's fellow citizens to rebel against their state, whereas treason is actually betraying one's country by aiding and abetting another state.\n Seizure.  The taking or dispossession of property from the possessor by an authorized person or the restriction of the freedom of movement of an individual against his or her will by an agent of the Government. (AR 190-20)  Also see *search*. Self-radicalization.  Significant steps an individual takes in advocating or adopting an extremist belief system for the purpose of facilitating ideologically-based violence to advance political, religious, or social change. The self-radicalized individual has not been recruited by and has no direct, personal influence or tasking from other violent extremists. The self-radicalized individual may seek out direct or indirect (through the Internet for example) contact with other violent extremists for moral support and to enhance his or her extremist beliefs. (DoDD 5240.06, CIAR, 17 May 2011 with change 1 dated 30 May 2013) Also see radicalization; violent radicalization.\n\n-- Also, the process whereby people seek out opportunities for involvement in terrorist activity absent a formal involvement in a terrorist group and/or recruitment by others. (DSB Report, Predicting Violent Behavior, Aug 2012, citing Horgan's *The Psychology of Terrorism 2nd Edition*, 2012)\n\n-- Also, *self radicalization*: a phenomenon in which individuals become terrorists without joining an established radical group, although they may be influenced by its ideology and message. (DSB Report, Predicting Violent Behavior, Aug 2012)\n\n\nSenate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI).  Created pursuant to Senate Res. 400, 94th Congress: to oversee and make continuing studies of the intelligence activities and programs of the United States Government, and to submit to the Senate appropriate proposals for legislation and report to the Senate concerning such intelligence activities and programs.  Provides legislative oversight over US intelligence activities to assure that such activities are in conformity with the Constitution and laws of the United States. (www.intelligence.senate.gov)\n\n    The 1980 Intelligence Oversight Act charged the SSCI and the House Permanent Select\nCommittee on Intelligence (HPSCI) with authorizing the programs of US intelligence agencies and overseeing their activities.\n\n    It is IC policy that IC elements shall, in a timely manner, keep the Congressional intelligence\ncommittees fully informed, in writing, of all significant anticipated intelligence activities, significant intelligence failures, significant intelligence activities, and illegal activities.\n\n      -- ICD 112, *Congressional Notification*, 16 Nov 2011\n\n    See an interested article entitled \"Congressional Oversight of Intelligence: One Perspective,\" by\nMary Sturtevant, Senate Committee Staff, in *American Intelligence Journal*, Summer 1992; copy\navailable on line at:  <http://www.fas.org/irp/eprint/sturtevant.html>\n Senior Defense Official / Defense Attache (SDO/DATT).  Principal DoD official in a U.S. embassy, as designated by the Secretary of Defense. (DoDD 5105.75, DoD Operations at Defense Embassies, 21 Dec 2007)  Also see *Defense Attache Office*.\n\n    The SDO/DATT is the Chief of Mission's (COM's) principal military advisor on defense and national\nsecurity issues, the senior diplomatically accredited DoD military officer assigned to a US diplomatic mission, and the single point of contact for all DoD matters involving the embassy or DoD elements assigned to or working from the embassy.\n\n    All DoD elements assigned or attached to or operating from U.S. embassies are aligned under the\ncoordinating authority of the SDO/DATT.  See DoD Directive 5105.75, DoD Operations at U.S. Embassies.\n Sensitive.  Requiring special protection from disclosure that could cause embarrassment, compromise, or threat to the security of the sponsoring power. May be applied to an agency, installation, person, position, document, material, or activity. (JP 1-02 and JP 2-01, Joint and National Intelligence Support to Military Operations, 5 Jan 2012) Sensitive Activities [within DoD].  Operations, actions, activities, or programs that are generally handled through special access, compartmented, or other sensitive control mechanisms because of the nature of the target, the area of operation, or other designated aspects. Sensitive activities also include operations, actions, activities, or programs conducted by any DoD Component that, if compromised, could have enduring adverse effects on U.S. foreign policy, DoD activities, or military operations; or cause significant embarrassment to the United States, its allies, or the DoD. (DoDI O-5100.94, Oversight, Coordination, Assessment, and Reporting of DoD Intelligence and Intelligence-Related Sensitive Activities, 27 Sep 2011 w/ change 1 dated 15 Oct 2013) Sensitive Compartmented Information (SCI).  All information and materials bearing special community controls indicating restricted handling within present and future community intelligence collection programs and their end products for which community systems of compartmentation have been or will be formally established. (JP 1-02 and JP 2-01, Joint and National Intelligence Support to Military Operations, 5 Jan 2012)\n-- Also, classified information concerning or derived from intelligence sources, methods, or analytical processes requiring handling exclusively within formal access control systems established by the DNI.\n\n(National Intelligence: A Consumer's Guide - 2009).\n\n\n\n-- Also, classified national intelligence information concerning or derived from intelligence sources, methods, or analytical processes that is required to be handled within formal access control systems established by the DNI. (DoDI 5200.01, DoD Information Security Program and Protection of Sensitive Compartmented Information, 9 Oct 2008 w/ chg 1) Sensitive Compartmented Information Facility (SCIF).  An accredited area, room, group of rooms, or installation where sensitive compartmented information (SCI) may be stored, used, discussed, and/or electronically processed. SCIF procedural and physical measures prevent the free access of persons unless they have been formally indoctrinated for the particular SCI authorized for use or storage within the SCIF. (JP 1-02 and JP 2-01, Joint and National Intelligence Support to Military Operations, 5 Jan 2012)\n-- Also, a subset of CNI [Classified National Intelligence] concerning or derived from intelligence sources, methods or analytical processes that is required to be protected within formal access control systems established by the DNI [Director of National Intelligence]. (ICD 703, Protection of Classified National Intelligence, Including Sensitive Compartmented Information, 21 Jun 2013)\n-- Also, an accredited area where Sensitive Compartmented Information may be stored, used, discussed, and/or processed. Only those Intelligence Community Agencies with SCIF Accreditation Authority may officially accredit facilities to handle, process, and store SCI materials. (National Intelligence: A Consumer's Guide - 2009).\n\n    For additional information on SCIFs see Physical and Technical Security Standards for Sensitive\nCompartmented Information Facilities, IC Standard Number 705-1, 17 Sep 2010, and Standards for the Accreditation and Reciprocal Use of Sensitive Compartmented Information, IC Standard Number 705-2, 17 Sep 2010.\n Sensitive Information.  Information that the loss, misuse, unauthorized access, or modification could adversely affect the national interest, the conduct of Federal programs, or the privacy to which individuals are entitled under section 552a of Title 5, United States Code, but that has not been specifically authorized under criteria established by an Executive order or an Act of Congress to be kept secret in the interest of National defense or foreign policy. (DoD 5205.02-M, DoD OPSEC Program Manual, 3 Nov 2008) Sensitive Site.  A geographically limited area that contains, but is not limited to, adversary information systems, war crimes sites, critical government facilities, and areas suspected of containing high value targets. (JP 1-02 and JP 3-31, Command and Control for Joint Land Operations, 29 Jun 2010)\n-- Also, a designated, geographically limited area with special diplomatic, informational, military, and economic sensitivity for the United States. This includes factories with technical data on enemy weapon systems, war crimes sites, critical hostile government facilities, areas suspected of containing persons of high rank in a hostile government or organization, terrorist money-laundering areas, and document storage areas for secret police forces. (Army FM 2-0, Intelligence, 23 Mar 2010)\nSensitive Site Exploitation (SSE).  *Within DoD, term rescinded.*  See *site exploitation*.\n\n    This term was previously defined in JP 1-02 as:  a related series of activities inside a captured\nsensitive site to exploit personnel documents, electronic data, and material captured at the site,\nwhile neutralizing any threat posed by the site or its contents.\n\n    Note:  Army Tactics, Techniques and Procedures (ATTP) 3-90.15 [FM 3-90.15] (8 Jul 2010) also\nrescinded *\"sensitive site exploitation\"* as a doctrinal term.\n Sensitive Sources and Methods.  A collective term for those persons, organizations, things, conditions, or events that provide intelligence information and those means used in the collection, processing, and production of such information which, if compromised, would be vulnerable to counteraction that could reasonably be expected to reduce their ability to support US intelligence activities. (ICS Glossary) Sensemaking.  A set of philosophical assumptions, substantive propositions, methodological framings, and methods. (*Sensemaking: A Structure for an Intelligence Revolution* by David T. Moore)  Also see sensemaking.   Also see *intelligence sensemaking*.\n\n    Sensemaking goes beyond analysis, a disaggregative process, and also beyond synthesis, which\nmeaningfully integrates factors relevant to an issue. It includes an interpretation of the results of that analysis and synthesis. It is sometimes referred to as an approach to creating situational awareness \"in situations of uncertainty.\"\n\n    Copy of *Sensemaking: A Structure for an Intelligence Revolution* by David T. Moore available at\n<http://ni-u.edu/ni_press/pdf/Sensemaking.pdf>\n Serials.  Individual items of evidence in a counterintelligence case are known as serials. They may not necessarily reach a standard required for a criminal prosecution but the objective is not necessarily to achieve a public trial and conviction, but to develop an investigation to the point where some advantage can be achieved. While serials may include entirely circumstantial evidence, unsubstantiated allegations, and coincidence, until verified or dismissed through inquiry and research, they remain valid and may stay in a dossier for decades. (Historical Dictionary of Cold War Counterintelligence, 2007) Shape.  The ability to conduct activities to affect the perceptions, will, behavior, and capabilities of partner, competitor, or adversary leaders, military forces, and relevant populations to further U.S. national security or shared global security interests. (Joint Capability Areas Taxonomy & Lexicon, 15 Jan 2008) Shielded Enclosure.  Room or container designed to attenuate electromagnetic radiation, acoustic signals, or emanations. (CNSSI No. 4009, National Information Assurance Glossary, 26 April 2010) Short-Range Agent Communication (SRAC).  A device that allows agent and [case] officer to communicate clandestinely over a limited distance. (Spycraft) Signal.  A prearranged visual or audio sign that a dead drop has been filled or emptied or that an emergency meeting is needed. (FBI FCI Terms)  Also see *signals*. -- Also, prearranged visual or audio indicator having a designated significance for intelligence personnel involved.  For example, to signify that a dead drop has been filled or emptied or to call an emergency or unscheduled personal meeting. (AFOSI Manual 71-142, OFCO, 9 June 2000) Signal Flags.  The IC [Intelligence Community] database containing information used to assist security and counterintelligence professionals conducting National Agency Checks on individuals applying for positions with IC organizations. (IC Standard 700-1, 4 Apr 2008)\n\nSignal Security (SIGSEC).  A generic term that includes both communications security and electronics security. (JP 1-02)   Also see *security*. Signal Site.  A prearranged fixed location, usually in a public place, on which an agent or intelligence officer can place a predetermined mark in order to alert the other to operational activity. Such a mark may be made by, for example, chalk or a piece of tape. (FBI -- Affidavit:  USA vs. Robert Philip Hanssen,\n16 Feb 2001)\n\n   The operational activity signaled may be the fact that a dead drop has been \"loaded\" and is ready\nto be \"cleared.\"  A call-out signal may be used to trigger a contact between an agent and an intelligence officer.\n\n       - FBI:  Affidavit USA vs. Robert Philip Hanssen, 16 Feb 2001)\n\n-- Also, a covert means of communications using a nonalerting signal, such as a chalk mark on a lamppost, to either initiate or terminate a clandestine act, (Spycraft)  Also see *signals*.\n\n\n\nSignals.  Any form of clandestine tradecraft using a system of marks, signs, or codes for signaling between operatives. (CI Centre Glossary)  Also see *signal site*. Signals Intelligence (SIGINT). 1) A category of intelligence comprising either individually or in combination all communications intelligence [COMINT], electronic intelligence [ELINT], and foreign instrumentation signals intelligence [FISINT], however transmitted.  2) Intelligence derived from communications, electronic, and foreign instrumentation signals. (JP 1-02 and JP 2-0, Joint Intelligence, 22 Oct 2013)\n     For DoD policy see DoDI O-3115.07, Signals Intelligence (SIGINT), 15 Sep 2008 -- Also, intelligence gathered from data transmissions [signals intercepts], including Communications Intelligence (COMINT), Electronic Intelligence (ELINT), and Foreign Instrumentation Signals Intelligence (FISINT). SIGINT includes both raw data [collection] and the analysis of that data to produce intelligence. (ODNI, U.S. National Intelligence - An Overview 2011) -- Also, information derived from intercepted communications and electronic and data transmissions.\n\n(WMD Report, 31 Mar 2005)\n\n\n    The collection of signals intelligence is necessary for the United States to advance its national\nsecurity and foreign policy interests and to protect its citizens and the citizens of its allies and partners from harm.\n\n       -- PDD-28 Signals Intelligence Activities, 17 Jan 2014\n_______________________\n\n    The Intelligence Community refers to the collection and exploitation of signals transmitted from\ncommunication systems, radars, and weapon systems as signals intelligence or SIGINT.  SIGINT consists of Communications Intelligence (COMINT) - technical and intelligence information derived from intercept of foreign communications; Electronic Intelligence (ELINT) - information collected from systems such as radars and other weapons systems; and  Foreign Instrumentation Signals Intelligence (FISINT) - signals detected from weapons under testing and development.\n\n    SIGINT is collected in a variety of ways depending on the type of signal targeted. The National\nSecurity Agency (NSA) collects the raw SIGINT and then NSA translators, cryptologists, analysts,\n    and other technical experts turn the raw data into something that an all-source analyst can use.\nOnce the NSA has collected, processed, and analyzed SIGINT, it is passed on to CIA and Intelligence Community analysts who use it to complement information from other sources to produce finished intelligence.\n\n    The volume and variety of today's signals adds challenges to the timely production of finished\nintelligence for policymakers. It is a lot of work to track and analyze all the SIGINT collected.\n\n        -- www.cia.gov (accessed, 30 Nov 2010)\n______________________\n\n    Signals Intelligence (SIGINT):  The interception of signals, whether between people, between\nmachines, or a combination of both. The National Security Agency (NSA) is responsible for collecting, processing, and reporting SIGINT. Within the NSA, the National SIGINT Committee advises the Director, NSA, and the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) on policy issues and manages the SIGINT requirements system.\n       -- www.intelligence.gov (accessed 13 Aug 2012)\n______________________\n\n    Signals Intelligence (SIGINT)... comprises Communications Intelligence (COMINT) and Electronic\nIntelligence (ELINT) , and activities pertaining thereto....\n       -- NSCID 6, Signals Intelligence, 17 Feb 1972 (redacted copy, complete original version is TOP SECRET)\n           Available at:  <http://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB23/docs/doc05.pdf>\n Signature.  A recognizable, distinguishing pattern. See also attack signature or digital signature. (CNSSI\nNo. 4009, National Information Assurance Glossary, 26 April 2010)\n\n\nSignatures.  [In CI usage,] indicators of potential FISS and ITO [international terrorist organizations] methods of operations, including static surveillance of U.S. forces [and] installations.... (Army FM 2-22.2, CI, Oct 2009)\n\nSign-of-Life Signal.  A signal emitted periodically to signify that an agent is safe. (FBI FCI Terms)\n\nSilver Triangle.  The South American region consisting of Peru, Bolivia, and Colombia that is historically known to be a major illegal drug production area. (JP 3-07.4, Joint Counterdrug Operations, 13 Jun 2007) Single Scope Background Investigation (SSBI).  Investigation for individuals requiring a top secret clearance or working in a critical sensitive position; normally covers a 5-year period and consists of a subject interview, NAC, credit checks, character references, and employment records checks and references.\n\n-- Also, a personnel security investigation consisting of all the elements prescribed in Standard B of ICPG 704.1. The period of investigation for a SSBI varies, ranging from the immediate preceding 3 years for neighborhood checks to immediately preceding 10 years for local agency checks. (IC Standard 700-1, 4 Apr 2008) Singleton.  Intelligence operations conducted by a single intelligence officer or agent.  These operations include intelligence collection, servicing agents, and courier services. (Spy Book) Site Exploitation.  A series of activities to recognize, collect, process, preserve, and analyze information, personnel, and/or materiel found during the conduct of operations. (JP 1-02 and JP 3-31, Command and Control for Joint Land Operations, 29 Jun 2010)\n-- Also, systematically searching for and collecting information, material, and persons from a designated location and analyzing them to answer information requirements, facilitate subsequent operations, or support criminal prosecution. (Army Tactics, Techniques & Procedures 3-90.15 [FM 3-90.15], Site Exploitation Operations, 8 Jul 2010) Situation Report (SITREP).  A report giving the situation in the area of a reporting unit or formation. (JP 1-02 and JP 3-50, Personnel Recovery) Situational Awareness.  Immediate knowledge of the conditions of the operation, constrained geographically and in time. (Army FM 3-0, Operations, Feb 2008) Slammer.  Project Slammer was an Intelligence Community sponsored study of espionage to determine the motivation of the convicted spies and to learn the methods by which they committed their crimes.\n\n\n    In 1985 U.S. intelligence agencies embarked on a 10-year benchmark study named Project\nSlammer, which was focused on interviewing incarcerated spies. It examined \"espionage by interviewing and psychologically assessing actual espionage subjects Additionally, persons knowledgeable of subjects were contacted to better understand the subjects' private lives and how\nthey are perceived by others while conducting espionage.\"  Project Slammer sought to understand\nof the dynamics of espionage and to incorporate of that enhanced understanding into government and industry security programs.\n\n    Project Slammer research endeavor consisted of voluntary interviews with incarcerated spies and\nsubsequent analysis of the data. The effort was essentially de-funded in the early nineties and consequently lost impetus. Nevertheless, there are currently extant several Slammer papers and tapes which are used throughout the security community. Those analyses deal with the essential and multi-faceted motivational patterns underlying espionage.\n\n    Although dated, the study's findings remain significant, and the conclusions included:  No offender\nentered a position of trust with the intent to betray; and there were two prevalent sets of personality traits:  1) highly manipulative, dominant, and self-serving; and 2) passive, easily influenced, and lacking self-esteem.\n Sleeper.  [Tradecraft jargon] an illegal; or agent in a foreign country who does not engage in intelligence activities until told to do so. (FBI FCI Terms)\n-- Also, a spy placed in a target area but does not engage in espionage until he or she is activated at a future time. (Spy Book)\n-- Also, an illegal or agent residing in a foreign country under orders to engage in no intelligence activities. The inactive status, which can endure for a considerable time, serves to strengthen the legend and permit access by a foreign power to an individual in position to be ready for action under certain circumstances should a specific need arise.  (Word of Intelligence, 2nd Edition, 2011) SMADS.  See *Strategic Mission Assurance Data System*. Social Engineering,  An attempt to trick someone into revealing information (e.g., a password) that can be used to attack an enterprise. (CNSSI No. 4009, National Information Assurance Glossary, 26 April 2010)\n-- Also, the art of gaining access to buildings, systems or data by exploiting human psychology, rather than by breaking in or using technical hacking techniques. (The Ultimate Guide to Social Engineering, undated)\n\n    Copy of \"The Ultimate Guide to Social Engineering\" available on line at: <http://assets.csoonline.com/documents/cache/pdfs/Social-Engineering-Ultimate-Guide.pdf>\n Social Networking. Web-based services that allow individuals to create a public profile, to create a list of users with whom to share connection, and view and cross the connections within the system. (Wikipedia)\n\n    Most social network services are web-based and provide means for users to interact over the\nInternet, such as e-mail and instant messaging. Social network sites are varied and they incorporate new information and communication tools such as, mobile connectivity, photo/video/sharing and blogging.  Social networking sites allow users to share ideas, pictures, posts, activities, events, and interests with people in their network.\n\n    The main types of social networking services are those that contain category places (such as\nformer school year or classmates), means to connect with friends (usually with self-description pages), and a recommendation system linked to trust. Popular methods now combine many of these, with American-based services such as Facebook, Google+, YouTube, LinkedIn, Instagram, Pinterest, Tumblr and *Twitter* widely used worldwide; Nexopia in Canada; Badoo, Bebo, VKontakte (Russia), Delphi (also called Delphi Forums), *Draugiem.lv* (mostly in Latvia), *Hi5* (Europe), *Hyves* (mostly in The Netherlands*), iWiW* (mostly in Hungary), Nasza-Klasa, *Soup* (mostly in Poland),\nGlocals in Switzerland, *Skyrock, The Sphere, StudiVZ* (mostly in Germany), *Tagged, Tuenti* (mostly in Spain), and *XING* in parts of Europe; *Hi5* and *Orkut* in South America and Central America; *Mxit* in Africa; and *Cyworld, Mixi, Orkut, renren, weibo* and *Wretch* in Asia and the Pacific Islands.\n\n    Social networking services are increasingly being used in legal and criminal investigations.\nInformation posted on sites such as *MySpace* and *Facebook* has been used by police (forensic profiling), probation, and university officials to prosecute users of said sites. In some situations, content posted on *MySpace* has been used in court\n\n       -- Wikipedia at <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Social_networking> (accessed 11 Mar 2014)\n_________________________\n\n\n\n## \"Under Investigation: Social Media Use By Law Enforcement\"\n\n Socio-Cultural Dynamics.  Information about the social, cultural, and behavioral factors characterizing the relationships and activities of the population of a specific region or operational environment. (DoDD 3600.01, Information Operations, 14 Aug 2006 with Chg 1, 23 May 2011) Sociocultural Analysis (SCA). The analysis of adversaries and other relevant actors that integrates concepts, knowledge, and understanding of societies, populations, and other groups of people, including their activities, relationships, and perspectives across time and space at varying scales. (JP 2-0, Joint Intelligence, 22 Oct 2013) Sociocultural Factors.  The social, cultural, and behavioral factors characterizing the relationships and activities of the population of a specific region or operational environment. (JP 1-02 and JP 2-01.3, Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment) Software Assurance.  The level of confidence that software functions as intended and is free of vulnerabilities, either intentionally or unintentionally designed or inserted as part of the software throughout the lifecycle. (DoDI 5200.44, Protection of Mission Critical Functions to Achieve Trusted Systems and Networks, 5 Nov 2012) Source.  A person, thing, or activity from whom information or services are obtained. (DoDD S-3325.09, Oversight, Management, and Execution of Defense Clandestine Source Operations, 9 Jan 2013, with chg 1 dated 13 Jun 2013)   Also see agent; *asset, controlled source; human source; HUMINT source.*\n-- Also, 1) A person, thing, or activity from which information is obtained; 2) In clandestine activities,\na person (agent), normally a foreign national, in the employ of an intelligence activity for intelligence purposes; or 3) In interrogation activities, any person who furnishes information, either with or without the knowledge that the information is being used for intelligence purposes. In this context, a controlled source is in the employment or under the control of the intelligence activity and knows that the information is to be used for intelligence purposes.  An uncontrolled source is a voluntary contributor of information and may or may not know that the information is to be used for intelligence purposes. (JP 1-02 and JP 2-01.2, CI & HUMINT in Joint Operations, 16 Mar 2011 w/ chg 1 dated 26 Aug 2011)\n\n\n-- Also, a person from whom information or services are obtained.  (DoDD S-5200.37, Management &\nExecution of Defense HUMINT, 9 Feb 2009 w/ chg 2) -- Also, a person, device, system, or activity from which services or information are obtained.\n(Defense HUMINT Enterprise Manual 3301.02, Vol II Collection Operations, 23 Nov 2010)\n-- Also, a person from whom information or services are obtained. (DoDD 3600.01, Information Operations, 14 Aug 2006 with Chg 1, 23 May 2011 w/ chg 1 dated 26 Aug 2011)\n-- Also, a document, interview, or other means by which information has been obtained. From an intelligence perspective, sources are individuals (or HUMINT) who collect or possess critical information needed for intelligence analysis. (ODNI, U.S. National Intelligence - An Overview 2011) Source Directed Requirement (SDR).  A HUMINT collection requirement based upon the placement and access of a source to collect and report on a specific person, place, thing, or event. (DHE-M 3301.001, DIA HUMINT Manual, Vol I, 30 Jan 2009 w/ chg 2) Source Management.  The process of registering and monitoring the use of sources involved in counterintelligence and human intelligence operations to protect the security of the operations and avoid conflicts among operational elements. (JP 2-01.2, CI & HUMINT in Joint Operations, 16 Mar 2011 w/ chg 1 dated 26 Aug 2011) Source Registry.  A source record/catalogue of leads and sources acquired by collectors and centralized for management, coordination and deconfliction of source operations. (JP 1-02 and JP 2-01.2, CI & HUMINT in Joint Operations, 16 Mar 2011 w/ chg 1 dated 26 Aug 2011) Source Validation.  Vetting to determine if a source is who he/she claims to be, is free of external control, is capable of behaving in a secure manner, and possesses placement and access consistent with tasking. (HDI Lexicon, April 2008)  Also see *vetting* and *counterintelligence flags*.\n\n    All DoD human sources are vetted in accordance with National HUMINT Manager Directive 001.08\n(HUMINT Source Validation).\n\n    For DoD policy see DoDI S-3325.07, Guidance for the Conduct of DoD Human Source\nValidation (U), 22 Jun 2009.\n Special Access Program (SAP).  A program established for a specific class of classified information that imposes safeguarding and access requirements that exceed those normally required for information at the same classification level. (DoDD 5205.07, SAP Policy, 1 Jul 2010)\n-- Also, a program activity which has enhanced security measures and imposes safeguarding and access requirements that exceed those normally required for information at the same level. Information to be protected within the SAP is identified by an SCG [security classification guide]. (DoDI 5205.11, Management, Administration, and Oversight of DoD Special Access Programs, 6 Feb 2013)\n-- Also, a sensitive program, approved in writing by a head of agency with original top secret classification authority, that imposes need-to-know and access controls beyond those normally provided for access to confidential, secret, or top secret information. The level of controls is based on the criticality of the program and the assessed hostile intelligence threat. The program may be an acquisition program, an intelligence program, or an operations and support program. (JP 1-02 and JP 3-05.1, Joint Special Operations Task Force Operations, 26 Apr 2007)\n\n   DoD SAPs are established and maintained only when absolutely necessary to protect the Nation's\nmost sensitive capabilities; information; technologies; operations; and research, development, test and evaluation; or when required by statute pursuant to DoDD 5205.07, SAP Policy, 1 Jul 2010.\n_______________________\n\n\n\n## Acknowledged - Unacknowledged - Waived\n\n\n    Acknowledged SAP:  A SAP whose existence is acknowledged, affirmed, or made known to\nothers, but its specific details (technologies, materials, techniques, etc.,) are classified as specified in the applicable SCG.\n\n    Unacknowledged SAP:   A SAP having enhanced security measures ensuring the existence of\nthe program is not acknowledged, affirmed, or made known to any person not authorized for such information.\n\n    Waived SAP:  A SAP for which the Secretary of Defense has waived applicable reporting in\naccordance with DoD Manual 5200.01 following a determination of adverse effect to national security.  An unacknowledged SAP that has more restrictive reporting and access controls than other unacknowledged SAPs.\n______________________\n\n    Interestingly, the Joint Security Commission noted in its 1994 report (*Redefining Security*) that -- \"Special Access Programs are used to compensate for the fact that the classification\n          system is not trusted to protect information effectively and does not adequately enforce\n          the 'need to know' principle.\"\n Special Access Program Central Office (SAPCO).  The office within a DoD Component or OSD PSA that, when directed, executes, manages, administers, oversees, and maintains records on the SAPs for which it has been assigned CA. Responsibilities may also include developing and implementing policies and procedures for oversight, management, execution, administration, SAP security, IA for SAP IS, and records management of SAPs under their cognizance, as directed. (DoDD 5205.07, Special Access Program Policy, 1 Jul 2010)\n\n    The DoD SAPCO is the office charged by the Deputy Secretary of Defense with responsibility as\nthe designated proponent for developing and implementing policies and procedures for DoD SAP execution, management, and administration.\n_______________________\n\n    For special access programs pertaining to intelligence sources, methods, and activities (but not\nincluding military operational, strategic, and tactical programs), these functions shall be exercised\n  by the Director of National Intelligence.\n         -- EO 13526, *Classified National Security Information*, 29 Dec 2009\n Special Actions.  Those functions that due to particular sensitivities, compartmentation, or caveats cannot be conducted in normal staff channels and therefore require extraordinary processes and procedures and may involve the use of sensitive capabilities. (JP 1-02 and JP 3-05.1, Joint Special Operations Task Force Operations, 26 Apr 2007)\nSpecial Activities.  Activities conducted in support of national foreign policy objectives abroad which are planned and executed so that the role of the U .S. Government is not apparent or acknowledged publicly, and functions in support of such activities, but which are not intended to influence U .S. political processes, public opinion, policies, or media and do not include diplomatic activities, the collection and production of intelligence, or related support functions. (IC Standard 700-1, 4 Apr 2008)  Also see covert action.\n\n-- Also, within DoD: None -- term rescinded by JP 3-05, Special Operations, 18 Apr 2011.\n\n    As previously defined, it was a term synonymous with \"covert action\" -- see covert action. Special Agent.  Within DoD: None -- term rescinded by JP 2-01.2, CI & HUMINT in Joint Operations, 16 Mar 2011.  See *Counterintelligence Special Agent.*\n\n\n    Previously defined in JP 1-02 as:  a person, either United States military or civilian, who is a\nspecialist in military [law enforcement,] security or the collection of intelligence or counterintelligence information.\n\n\n-- Also, a United States military or civilian who is a specialist in military security or in the collection of intelligence or counterintelligence information. (Senate Report 94-755, Book I - Glossary, 26 Apr 1976) Special Area Clearance.  The required concurrence granted to DoD personnel by the Department of State and the Office of the USD(P) for travel to certain overseas areas designated by the Department of State as special areas. (DoDD 4500.54E, DoD Foreign Clearance Program, 28 Dec 2009) Special Collection Service (SCS). [According to open source,*] a joint CIA-NSA signals intelligence collection organization.\n\n-- Also, elite, highly secret U.S. electronic intelligence group that conducts eavesdropping operations in [foreign] countries. The service is controlled by the NSA... [also] CIA experts are often assigned. (Spy Book)\n\n    * See Jeffrey T. Richelson, *The US Intelligence Community*, Sixth Edition, 2012, pp. 224-226\n_______________________\n\n   \"According to a former high-ranking intelligence official, SCS was formed in the late 1970s after\ncompetition between the NSA's embassy-based eavesdroppers and the CIA's globe-trotting bugging specialists from its Division D had become counterproductive. While sources differ on how SCS works, some claim its agents never leave their secret embassy warrens where they perform close-quarters electronic eavesdropping, while others say agents operate embassy-based equipment in addition to performing riskier 'black-bag' jobs, or break-ins, for purposes of bugging....\"\n\n        -- Jason Vest & W. Madsen , \"A Most Unusual Collection Agency,\" *The Village Voice*, 24 Feb - 2 Mar 1999\n Special Collection Techniques.  Those lawful investigative techniques which are employed by a DoD intelligence component under the rule of the least intrusive means, after a determination has been made that the required information is not publicly available, available with the consent of the person or persons concerned, or available from cooperative sources. (DIA Intelligence Law Handbook, Sep 1995)  Also see rule of the least intrusive means.\n\n    *Special collection techniques* -- also commonly referred to as \"special investigative techniques\"\n\nwithin CI channels -- are addressed in DoD 5240.1-R, Procedures Governing the Activities of DoD Intelligence Components that Affect United States Persons, 7 Dec 1982,\n\n    Procedures 5-10:\n\n     * Procedure 5 - Electronic Surveillance * Procedure 6 - Concealed Monitoring * Procedure 7 - Physical Searches\n     * Procedure 8 - Searches and Examination of Mail * Procedure 9 - Physical Surveillance * Procedure 10 - Undisclosed Participation in Organizations\n Special Communication.  See definition provided in DTM 08-019, Establishment of the DoD Special Communication Enterprise Office (SCEO), 11 Jun 2008, marked FOUO. Special Event.  An international or domestic event, contest, activity, or meeting, which by its very nature, or by specific statutory or regulatory authority, may warrant security, safety, and/or other logistical support or assistance from the Department of Defense. (DODD 3025.18, Defense Support of Civil Authorities,\n29 Dec 2010) Special Event Management.  Planning and conduct of public events or activities whose character may them attractive targets for terrorist attack. (FBI Domestic Investigations and Operations Guide, 15 Oct 2011)\n\n\nSpecial Information Operations (SIO).  Information operations that by their sensitive nature and due to their potential effect or impact, security requirements, or risk to the national security of the United States, require a special review and approval process. (JP 3-13, Information Operations, 13 Feb 2006)  Also see information operations. Special Investigative Inquiry (SII).  A supplemental personnel security investigation of limited scope conducted to prove or disprove relevant allegations that have arisen concerning a person upon whom a personnel security determination has been previously made and who, at the time of the allegation, holds a security clearance or otherwise occupies a position that requires a personnel security determination. (IC Standard 700-1, 4 Apr 2008) Special Investigative Techniques.  See *Special Collection Techniques*. Special Limiting Criteria (SLC).  [Term used in document/media exploitation activities].  A narrowlydefined set of criteria intended to restrict access to data that, if compromised, could imperil planned operations, contain evidence of espionage or counterintelligence operations, identify sources and methods, and[/or] contain illegal or inappropriate material. (National Media Exploitation Center) Special Mission Unit (SMU).  A generic term to represent a group of operations and support personnel from designated organizations that is task-organized to perform highly classified activities. (JP 1-02 and JP 3-05.1, Joint Special Operations Task Force Operations, 26 Apr 2007) Special Operations (SO).  Operations requiring unique modes of employment, tactical techniques, equipment and training often conducted in hostile, denied, or politically sensitive environments and characterized by one or more of the following: time sensitive, clandestine, low visibility, conducted with and/or through indigenous forces, requiring regional expertise, and/or a high degree of risk. (JP 3-05, Special Operations, 18 Apr 2011) Special Operations Activities.  Activities that include each of the following insofar as it relates to special operations: direct action, strategic reconnaissance, unconventional warfare, foreign internal defense, civil affairs, psychological operations, counterterrorism, humanitarian assistance, theater search and rescue, and such other activities as may be specified by the president or the Secretary of Defense. (DoDD S-3325.09, Oversight, Management, and Execution of Defense Clandestine Source Operations, 9 Jan 2013, with chg 1 dated 13 Jun 2013) Special Reconnaissance (SR).  Reconnaissance and surveillance actions conducted as a special operation in hostile, denied, or politically sensitive environments to collect or verify information of strategic or operational significance, employing military capabilities not normally found in conventional forces. (JP 3-05, Special Operations, 18 Apr 2011)\n\nSpecial Security Center.  The Director of National Intelligence element responsible for developing, coordinating, and overseeing Director of National Intelligence security policies and databases to support Intelligence Community security elements. The Special Security Center interacts with other Intelligence Community security organizations to ensure that Director of National Intelligence equities are considered in the development of national level security policies and procedures. (DSS Security Glossary)\nSpecified Task.  In the context of joint operation planning, a task that is specifically assigned an organization by its higher headquarters. (JP 1-02 and JP 5-0, Joint Operation Planning, 11 Aug 2011) Spoofing.  [Tradecraft jargon] A ploy designed to deceive the observer into believing that an operation has gone bad when, in fact, it has been put into another compartment. (Spy Dust)\n\n-- Also, [cyber usage] deceiving computers or computer users by hiding or faking one's identity. Email spoofing utilizes a sham email address or simulates a genuine email address. IP spoofing hides or masks a computer's IP address. (FBI; see <http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/investigate/counterintelligence/internetsocial-networking-risks-1>) Spot.  [In intelligence usage,] to locate and recruit people demonstrated access to intelligence targets. (*TOP SECRET: The Dictionary of Espionage and Intelligence*, 2005)\n-- Also, to identify for consideration potential sources as candidates for recruitment. (AFOSI Manual\n71-142, OFCO, 9 Jun 2000) Spot Report.  A non-standard DoD HUMINT report (not an IR) used to report on actionable/perishable HUMINT of a non-CRITIC nature. (DHE-M 3301.001, Vol I: Collection Requirement, Reporting, and Evaluation Procedures, 30 Jan 2009, w/ chg 2 dated 1 Feb 2012)\n-- Also, a concise narrative report of essential information covering events or conditions that may have an immediate and significant effect on current planning and operations that is afforded the most expeditious means of transmission consistent with requisite security. Also called SPOTREP. (Note: In reconnaissance and surveillance usage, spot report is not to be used.) (JP 1-02 and JP 3-09.3, Close Air Support)\n\n    For CRITIC reporting see Chapter Three - Specialized Intelligence Reporting, DHE-M 3301.001, Vol I: *Collection Requirement, Reporting, and Evaluation Procedures* (U), 30 Jan 2009, w/ chg 2, dated 1 Feb 2012. Spotter.  In intelligence, an agent or illegal assigned to locate and assess individuals in positions of value to an intelligence service. (JP 1-02; JP 2-01.2, CI & HUMINT in Joint Operations, 16 Mar 2011 w/ chg 1 dated 26 Aug 2011; and CI Community Lexicon)   Also see *spotter / assessor.*\n-- Also, an agent or illegal assigned to locate and assess individuals who might be of value to an intelligence service. (FBI FCI Terms) Spotter / Assessor.  An asset assigned to locate and/or assess individuals of intelligence or operational interest. (HDI Lexicon, April 2008)   Also see *spotter; spotter assessor operation*. Spotter / Assessor Operation.  Those actions taken to identify persons who may be in contact with or placed in contact with opposition intelligence and counterintelligence services, and to determine the potential value of these persons as intelligence or counterintelligence sources.  (AR 381-47, OFCO, 17 Mar 2006) Spy.  A generic term that refers... to either a professional intelligence officer work works for an intelligence service, or to a foreign source or asset who steals secrets on behalf of that intelligence service. (James M. Olson, *Fair Play: The Moral Dilemmas of Spying*, 2006)\n\n-- Also, a person employed by or in the service of a foreign government, either with or without pay, to secure information considered vital to the waging of a shooting or economic war against another country. (Committee on Un-American Activities, U. S. House of Representatives, April 1949)\n\n[T]he spy is the greatest of soldiers. If he is the most detested\nby the enemy, it is only because he is the most feared.\n\n- King George V (1865-1936)\n_____________________\n\n\n    A  U.S, intelligence officer that handles clandestine human sources is normally referred to as a\n\"case officer (C/O)\" or \"operations officer (OO).\"  The people that case officers or OOs recruit as penetrations of foreign governments and organizations are their \"agents.\"  Agents have access to important information and pass that information secretly to their case officers/OOs.\n_____________________\n\nAn army without secret agents is exactly like a man without eyes or ears.\n\n-- Chia Lin, Chinese Strategist of the late eighth century\n_____________________\n\n\nOne spy in the right place is worth 20,000 men in the field.\n\n\n-- Napoleon\n_________________________\n\nIn the circumstances of espionage and betrayal, one county's heroic spy is another's traitor.\n\n\n-- Frederick P. Hitz, Former Inspector General of the CIA (1990 - 1998)\n_________________________\n\n\"What do you think spies are:  priests, saints, and martyrs?\n\nThey're a squalid procession of vain fools, traitors too, yes;\npansies, sadists and drunkards, people who play\ncowboys and Indians to brighten their rotten lives...\"\n\n-- Alec Leamas, the protagonist in LeCarre's *The Spy Who Came in From the Cold*. Spy Dust (also called METKA).  Chemical marking compound developed by the KGB to keep tabs on the activities of a target officer. The compound is made of nitrophenyl pentadien (NPPD) and luminol. (Spy Dust) Spying.  Under Article 106, UCMJ, in time of war, the act of clandestinely or under false pretences, collecting or attempting to collect, information with the intent to convey it to a hostile party.  (AR 381-20, Army CI Program, 25 May 2010)\n\nLike war, spying is dirty business. Shed of its alleged glory, a soldier's job is to kill.\nPeel away the claptrap of espionage and the spy's job is to betray trust.\n-- William Hood, *Mole* (1993)\n________________________\n\n\n    Spying is a major weapon in the state's exercise of power, according to Machiavelli.*  In his \"Art of\nWar.' He provides amazingly modern and sophisticated instructions on how to prevent spying by the enemy (counterintelligence), how to deceive the enemy (covert action), and how to learn its intentions (espionage).\n\n       -- James M. Olson, *Fair Play: The Moral Dilemmas of Spying* (2006), p. 23\n\n         * Niccolo Machiavelli (1469-1527), Florentine statesman and patriot.\n Spyware.  Software that is secretly or surreptitiously installed into an information system to gather information on individuals or organizations without their knowledge; a type of malicious code. (CNSSI No. 4009, National Information Assurance Glossary, 26 April 2010)\n-- Also, a wide range of unwanted programs that exploit infected computers for commercial gain.\n\nThey can deliver unsolicited pop-up advertisements, steal personal information (including financial information such as credit card numbers), monitor web-browsing activity for marketing purposes, or route HTTP requests to advertising sites. (McAfee.com; accessed 15 Nov 2010)\nStability Operations.  An overarching term encompassing various military missions, tasks, and activities conducted outside the United States in coordination with other instruments of national power to maintain or reestablish a safe and secure environment, provide essential governmental services, emergency infrastructure reconstruction, and humanitarian relief. (JP 1-02 and JP 3-0, Joint Operations, 11 Aug\n2011) Staff Judge Advocate (SJA).  A judge advocate so designated in the Army, Air Force, or Marine Corps, and the principal legal advisor of a Navy, Coast Guard, or joint force command who is a judge advocate. (JP 1-04, Legal Support to Military Operations, 17 Aug 2011)\nStake Out.  Stationary surveillance of a person, site, or facility. (AFOSI Manual 71-142, OFCO, 9 Jun 2000)\n\n\n-- Also, stakeout: a surveillance point or location that has been employed (or laid out) with the benefit of prior planning. Usually meant to be occupied for an extended period of time. (Words of Intelligence, 2nd Edition, 2011) Standard Operating Procedure (SOP).  A set of instructions covering those features of operations which lend themselves to a definite or standardized procedure without loss of effectiveness. The procedure is applicable unless ordered otherwise. (JP 1-02 and JP 3-31,Command and Control for Joint Land Operations, 29 June 2010) Star-Burst Maneuver.  A countersurveillance ploy in which more than one target car or target officer is being followed and they suddenly go in different directions, forcing the surveillance team to make instant choices about whom to follow. (CI Centre Glossary) Statement Analysis (also called Scientific Content Analysis or SCAN and Investigative Discourse Analysis). A technique for analyzing the words people use. Proponents claim this technique can be used to detect concealed information, missing information, and whether the information that person has provided is true or false. (Wikipedia, accessed 5 Mar 2014) Station.  A CIA operational center overseas... usually, but not always, located under cover in a U.S. official installation. The senior officer in charge of a station is known as the chief of station, or COS. (James M. Olson, *Fair Play: The Moral Dilemmas of Spying*, 2006) Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA).  An agreement that defines the legal position of a visiting military force deployed in the territory of a friendly state. Agreements delineating the status of visiting military forces may be bilateral or multilateral. Provisions pertaining to the status of visiting forces may be set forth in a separate agreement, or they may form a part of a more comprehensive agreement. These provisions describe how the authorities of a visiting force may control members of that force and the amenability of the force or its members to the local law or to the authority of local officials. (JP 1-02 and JP 3-16, Multinational Operations, 7 Mar 2007)\n-- Also, an accord, either bilateral or multilateral, that defines the legal position of a visiting military force deployed in the territory of a friendly state, usually delineating matters affecting the relationship between the military force and the civilian authorities and population. (AR 381-20, Army CI Program, 25 May 2010) Stay Behind [ aka sleeper].  Agent or agent organization established in a given country to be activated in the event of hostile overrun or other circumstances under which normal access would be denied. (JP 1-02)\nSteganography.  The art, science, and practice of communicating in a way that hides the existence of the communication. (CNSSI No. 4009, National Information Assurance Glossary, 26 April 2010)\n\n-- Also, the process of hiding information by embedding messages within other, seemingly harmless messages. The process works by replacing bits of useless or unused data in regular computer files (such as graphics, sound, text) with bits of different, invisible information. This hidden information can be plain text, cipher text, or even images. (US Army TRADOC DCSINT Handbook 1.02, 15 Aug 2007) -- Also, the art and science of writing hidden messages in such a way that no one, apart from the sender and intended recipient, suspects the existence of the message, a form of security through obscurity. (Wikipedia; accessed 4 April 2011)\n\n\n  Steganography (from the Greek root \"staganos,\" meaning covered or secret), or stego, is the\ntechnique of hiding data in a host file.  [...]  Simply put, stego is hiding a covert message within another file so that only the sender and receiver can access it.\n\n       -- Eric Cole, \"Steganography:  More than Meets the Eye, \" in *Information Security*, November 2006 (pp. 32-37)\n___________________________\n\n   Steganography is the process of secreting data in an image.  Moscow Center uses steganographic\nsoftware that is not commercially available.  The software package permits the SVR clandestinely to insert encrypted data in images that are located on publicly-available websites without the data being visible.  The encrypted data can be removed from the image, and then decrypted, using SVR-provided software.  Similarly, SVR-provided software can also be used to encrypt data, and\nthen clandestinely to embed the data in images on publicly-available websites.\n\n       -- FBI Affidavit, 25 June 2010\n__________________________\n\n   The advantage of steganography, over cryptography alone, is that messages do not attract\nattention to themselves.  Plainly visible encrypted messagesno matter how unbreakablewill arouse suspicion, and may in themselves be incriminating in countries where encryption is illegal. Therefore, whereas cryptography protects the contents of a message, steganography can be said to protect both messages and communicating parties.\n\n    With the advent of digital media, steganography has come to include the hiding of digital\ninformation within digital files. Media files are ideal for steganographic transmission because of their large size. As a simple example, a sender might start with an innocuous image file and adjust the color of every 100th pixel to correspond to a letter in the alphabet, a change so subtle that someone not specifically looking for it is unlikely to notice it.\n\n        -- Wikipedia (accessed 4 April 2011)\n__________________________\n\n   For additional information also see *--* <http://www.steganographypro.com/> and <http://www.citi.umich.edu/u/provos/papers/practical.pdf>\n Sterilize.  To remove from material to be used in covert and clandestine actions any marks or devices which can identify it as originating with the sponsoring organization or nation. (Senate Report 94-755, Book I - Glossary, 26 Apr 1976) Strategic Communication.  Focused United States Government efforts to understand and engage key audiences to create, strengthen, or preserve conditions favorable for the advancement of United States Government interests, policies, and objectives through the use of coordinated programs, plans, themes, messages, and products synchronized with the actions of all instruments of national power. (JP 1-02) Strategic Debriefing.  Debriefing activity conducted to collect information or to verify previously collected information in response to national or theater level collection priorities. (JP 2-01.2, CI & HUMINT in Joint Operations, 16 Mar 2011 w/ chg 1 dated 26 Aug 2011; and Army FM 2-22.3, HUMINT Collector Operations, 6 Sep 2006)\n    Sources for strategic debriefing operations include but are not limited to emigres, refugees,\n\ndisplaced persons, defectors, and selected U.S. personnel.\n Strategic Intelligence.  Intelligence required for the formation of policy and military plans at national and international levels. Strategic intelligence and tactical intelligence differ primarily in level of application, but may also vary in terms of scope and detail. (JP 1-02)  Also see intelligence; operational intelligence; tactical intelligence.\n\n\n    Sherman Kent defined *strategic intelligence* as \"high-level foreign positive intelligence.\" Strategic Intelligence Interrogation.  An intelligence interrogation of any person who is in the custody or under the effective control of the DoD or under detention in a DoD facility, conducted at a theater-level detention facility. (DoDD 3115.09, DoD Intelligence Interrogations, Detainee Debriefings, and Tactical Questioning, 11 Oct 2012 w/ chg 1 dated 15 Nov 2013)  Also see *intelligence interrogation*.\n\n\n\nStrategic Level of War.  The level of war at which a nation, often as a member of a group of nations, determines national or multinational (alliance or coalition) strategic security objectives and guidance, and then develops and uses national resources to achieve these objectives.  (JP 1-02 and JP 3-0, Joint Operations, 11 Aug 2011)  Also see also *operational level of war; tactical level of war.* Strategic Mission Assurance Data System (SMADS). A classified geospatially enabled Critical Infrastructure database with the capability to analyze potential national, strategic, and operational impacts resulting from the loss or disruption of Critical Infrastructure and Key Resources (CIKR).\n\n\n\n    Strongly recommended that all DoD CI personnel providing CI support to DCIP obtain an SMADS\naccount.\n\n    SMADS is a restricted database accessible on SIPRNet at:  <https://smads.stratcom.smil.mil> Access is only granted to end-users who have a valid user account (requires valid need-to-know).\nPermissions are granted based upon a user's mission and associated responsibilities.\n\n    SMADS is managed and maintained by the U.S Strategic Command (USTRATCOM) Mission\nAssurance Division (MAD).  It is the current Joint Staff program of record for Critical Infrastructure\nand Key Resources (CIKR).\n\n    Refer to the *SMADS User Manual* which serves as a general reference for end-users; it provides a\nstep-by-step guide to performing web-enabled database tasks, while incorporating some DCIP program information to help facilitate the completion of these tasks.\n\n    For other DCIP tools see web site at:  <http://dcip.dtic.mil/DCIPtools.html>\n Strategy.  A prudent idea or set of ideas for employing the instruments of national power in a synchronized and integrated fashion to achieve theater, national, and/or multinational objectives. (JP 1-02 and JP 3-0, Joint Operations, 11 Aug 2011)\n-- *Military Strategy*.  The art and science of employing the armed forces of a nation to secure the objectives of national policy by the application of force or the threat of force. (JP 1-02) -- *National Military Strategy*.  The art and science of distributing and applying military power to attain national objectives in peace and war; also called NMS. (JP 1-02)\n-- *National Strategy*.  The art and science of developing and using the diplomatic, economic, and informational powers of a nation, together with its armed forces, during peace and war to secure national objectives; also called national security strategy or grand strategy. (JP 1-02) Structured Analysis.  A distinct form of intelligence analysis methodology that provides a step-by-step process for analyzing the kinds of incomplete, ambiguous, and sometimes deceptive information that analysts must deal with.\n\n    Structured analysis is a mechanism by which internal thought processes are externalized in a\nsystematic and transparent manner so that they can be shared, built on, and easily critiqued by others.  Structured analysis helps analysts ensure that their analytical frameworkthe foundation upon which they form their analytical judgmentsis as solid as possible.\n\n    For in-depth information on structured analysis see Richards J. Heuer, Jr. and Randolph H.\nPherson, *Structured Analytical Techniques for Intelligence Analysis* (Washington, DC; CQ Press, 2011).\n\nSubject.  Person, place, or thing observed or under investigation. (AFOSI Manual 71-142, OFCO, 9 Jun 2000)  Also see *suspect.*\n\n-- Also, a person about whom probable cause exists to believe that the person committed a particular criminal offense. (AR 195-2, Criminal Investigation Activities, 15 May 2009)\n\n\nSubject Interview.  Interview with the subject of an investigation; it may be non-custodial or custodial.\n\n    Interviews of subjects of CI investigations are conducted to afford subjects the opportunity to refute,\nexplain, clarify or mitigate allegations of espionage, terrorism, and other acts that may constitute threats to national security.\n\n      -- AR 381-20, *Army CI Program*, 25 May 2010\n Subversion.  Actions designed to undermine the military, economic, psychological, or political strength or morale of a governing authority. (JP 1-02 and JP 3-24, Counterinsurgency, 22 Nov 2013)  Also see subversive activity.\n\n-- Also, actions designed to undermine the military, economic, political, psychological, or moral strength of a nation or entity. It can also apply to an undermining of a person's loyalty to a government or entity. (Senate Report 95-755, Book I - Glossary, 26 Apr 1976) -- Also, actively encouraging military or civilian personnel to violate laws, disobey lawful orders or regulations, or disrupt military activities with the willful intent thereby to interfere with, or impair the loyalty, morale, or discipline of the US military forces. Lending aid, comfort, and moral support to individuals, groups, or organizations that advocate the overthrow of the U.S. Government. (AR 381-20, Army CI Program, 25 May 2010)\n-- Also, the crime of creating a revolt, disturbance, or violence against lawful civil authority with the intent to cause its overthrow or destruction. (Dictionary.com)\n\n    Subversion refers to an attempt to overthrow structures of authority, including the state.  It is an\noverturning or uprooting.  Subversive activity is the lending of aid, comfort, and moral support to individuals, groups, or organizations that advocate the overthrow of incumbent governments by force and violence.  All willful acts that are intended to be detrimental to the best interests of the government and that do not fall into the categories of treason, sedition, sabotage, or espionage are placed in the category of subversive activity.\n_____________________\n\n    In the context of DoD investigative policy, subversion refers only to such conduct as is forbidden\nby the laws of the United States. Specifically, this is limited to information concerning the activities of individuals or groups that involve or will involve the violation of Federal law, for the purpose of: 1) Overthrowing the Government of the United States or the government of a State; and 2) Substantially impairing for the purpose of influencing U.S. Government policies or decisions.\n\n       -- DoD 5200.2-R, *Personnel Security Program*, Jan 1987 (w. chg 3), p.22\n Subversion of Department of Defense Personnel.  Actions designed to undermine the loyalty, morale, or discipline of DoD military and civilian personnel. (JP 1-02)\n\n-- Also, [previously defined in DoDI 5240.06, 7 Aug 2004] an act or acts inciting military or civilian personnel of the DoD to violate laws, disobey lawful orders or regulations, or disrupt military activities with the willful intent thereby to interfere with, or impair the loyalty, morale, [or] discipline, of the Military Forces of the United States.\n\n\n## Criminal Subversion Of Military Forces Is A Violation Of Title 18 Usc,  2384-2390.\n\n Subversive Activity.  Anyone lending aid, comfort, and moral support to individuals, groups or organizations that advocate the overthrow of incumbent governments by force and violence is subversive and is engaged in subversive activity.  All willful acts that are intended to be detrimental to the best interests of the government and that do not fall into the categories of treason, sedition, sabotage, or espionage will be placed in the category of subversive activity. (JP 1-02)\n\n\nSuitability Investigation.  An inquiry into a person's identifiable character traits and conduct sufficient to decide whether an individual's employment or continued employment would or would not protect the integrity or promote the efficiency of the service. (ONCIX, http://www.ncix.gov/SEA/reform/secvssuit.php; accessed 18 Sep 2012)  Also see *security clearance investigation*.\n\n   \"The Director of the Office of Personnel Management shall serve as the Suitability Executive Agent.\nAs the Suitability Executive Agent, the Director of the Office of Personnel Management will be responsible for developing and implementing uniform and consistent policies and procedures to ensure the effective, efficient, and timely completion of investigations and adjudications relating to determinations of suitability and eligibility for logical and physical access.\"\n\n       -- EO 13467 (30 June 2008)\n Superencryption.  Process of encrypting encrypted information. Occurs when a message, encrypted offline, is transmitted over a secured, on-line circuit, or when information encrypted by the originator is multiplexed onto a communications trunk, which is then bulk encrypted. (CNSSI No. 4009, National Information Assurance Glossary, 26 April 2010) Supply Chain.  The linked activities associated with providing materiel from a raw materiel stage to an end user as a finished product. (JP 1-02 and JP 4-09, Distribution Operations, 5 Feb 2010)   Also see adversarial supply chain operations, supply chain attack, supply chain risk, supply chain risk management.\n\n-- Also, the linked activities associated with providing materiel from a raw materiel stage to an end user as a finished product or system. Including design, manufacturing, production, packaging, handling, storage, transport, mission operation, maintenance, and disposal. (DoDI 4140.67, DoD Counterfeit Prevention Policy, 26 Apr 2013) -- Also, organizations, people, technology, information and associated resources involved in moving a product or service from supplier to customer. (National Counterintelligence Strategy of the United States of America, 2012)\n\n-- Also, a system of organizations, people, activities, information, and resources, possibly international in scope, that provides products or services to consumers. (CNSSI No. 4009, National Information Assurance Glossary, 26 April 2010)\n\n   Supply Chain: 1) Starting with unprocessed raw materials and ending with the final customer using\nthe finished goods, the supply chain links many companies together; 2) the material and informational interchanges in the logistical process stretching from acquisition of raw materials to delivery of finished products to the end user. All vendors, service providers, and customers are\nlinks in the supply chain.\n      -- CSCMP Glossary, Feb 2010, p. 179\n\n    See *Supply Chain Management Terms and Glossary*, Feb 2010. Available online at: <http://cscmp.org/sites/default/files/user_uploads/resources/downloads/glossary.pdf>\n Supply Chain Attack.  Attacks that allow the adversary to utilize implants or other vulnerabilities inserted prior to installation in order to infiltrate data, or manipulate information technology hardware, software, operating systems, peripherals (information technology products) or services at any point during the life cycle. (CNSSI No. 4009, National Information Assurance Glossary, 26 April 2010) Supply Chain Risk.  The risk that an adversary may sabotage, maliciously introduce unwanted function, or otherwise subvert the design, integrity, manufacturing, production, distribution, installation, or maintenance of an item of supply or a system so as to surveil, deny, disrupt, otherwise degrade the function, use or operation of the item or system.  (DoDI O-5240.24, CI Activities Supporting RDA, 8 Jun 2011 w/ chg 1 and DoDI 5200.44, Protection of Mission Critical Functions to Achieve Trusted Systems and Networks, 5 Nov 2012)  Also see supply chain risk management; supply chain risk mitigation; supply chain vulnerabilities.\n\n-- Also, the risk that adversaries will insert malicious code into or otherwise subvert the design, manufacturing, production, distribution, installation, or maintenance of ICT components that may be used in DoD systems to gain unauthorized access to data, to alter data, to disrupt operations, or to interrupt communications. (DTM 09-016, SCRM to Improve the Integrity of Components Used in DoD Systems, 25 Mar 2010 w/ chg 3 dated 23 Mar 2012)\n\n  \"The risk that an adversary may sabotage, maliciously introduce unwanted function, or otherwise\nsubvert the design, integrity, manufacturing, production, distribution, installation, operation, or maintenance of an item of supply or a system so as to surveil, deny, disrupt, or otherwise degrade the function, use, or operation of a system.\"\n\n       -- The Ike Skelton National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2011, (Section 806)\n\n    The increased dependence of the United States on global inputs in the manufacturing and service\nsectors, especially relating to information technology, opens the door to greater supply-chain vulnerabilities.  As international companies and foreign individuals play a greater role in the information-technology supply chain, the specter of persistent, stealthy subversion is raised particularly by foreign intelligence and military services, as well as international terrorists and criminal groups.\n\n        - ONCIX website <http://www.ncix.gov/sections/carc/index.html>\n________________________\n\n    Within DoD, see DoDI 52400.44 (Protection of Mission Critical Functions to Achieve Trusted\nSystems and Networks, 5 Nov 2012) which establishes policy to minimize the risk that DoD's warfighting mission capability will be impaired due to vulnerabilities in system design or sabotage or subversion of a system's mission critical functions or critical components by foreign intelligence, terrorists, or other hostile elements.\n\n    DoD computing systems, are a constant target of foreign exploitation.   A 2007 Defense Science\nBoard report noted that the software industry has become increasingly and irrevocably global. Much of the code is now written outside the United States, some in countries that may have\ninterests inimical to those of the United States.  The combination of DoD's profound and growing\ndependence upon software and the expanding opportunity for adversaries to introduce malicious code into this software has led to a growing risk to the Nation's defense.\n\n    See report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Mission Impact of Foreign Influence on\nDoD Software, Sep 2007.\n____________________________\n\n   \"A computer chip with a hidden, malicious flaw could sabotage a weapons system. And the\ncompromised hardware is almost impossible to detect....  A chip might even be embedded with a 'kill switch,' allowing the weapon to be disabled by remote control.   ...only about 2 percent of the integrated circuits purchased every year by the military are manufactured in the United States.\"\n\n        -- David Wise, *Tiger Trap: America's Secret Spy War with China* (2011), p. 233\n____________________________\n\n   \"The Defense supply chain is at risk: More than two-thirds of electronics in U.S. advanced fighter\naircraft are fabricated in off-shore foundries.\"\n\n        -- Dr. Kaigham J. Gabriel, Acting Director DARPA, DoD March 2012 - Testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee hearing on Emerging Threats and Capabilities\n____________________________\n\n   \"Interdependence of information technologies and integration of foreign technology in US\ninformation technology, telecommunications, and energy sectors will increase the potential scope\nand impact of foreign intelligence and security services' supply chain operations. The likely\ncontinued consolidation of infrastructure supplierswhich means that critical infrastructures and networks will be built from a more limited set of provider and equipment optionswill also increase the scope and impact of potential supply chain subversions.\"\n\n        -- James R. Clapper, DNI, Statement for the Record, Worldwide Threat Assessment of the US Intelligence Community, Senate Committee on Armed Services, 18 April 2013\n____________________________\n\n## Counterfeit Electronic Parts In The Dod Supply Chain...\n\n\n   \"In March 2001, the Senate Armed Services Committee initiated an investigation into counterfeit\nelectronic parts in the Department of Defense (DOD) supply chain. The investigation uncovered overwhelming evidence of large numbers of counterfeit parts making their way into critical defense systems. ...  The investigation... found overwhelming evidence that companies in China are the\nprimary source of counterfeit electronic parts in the defense supply chain.\"\n\n       -- Armed Services U.S. Senate  Report 112-167, 21 May 2012; copy of full report at:\n         <http://www.armed-services.senate.gov/Publications/Counterfeit%20Electronic%20Parts.pdf>\n Supply Chain Risk Management (SCRM).  The management of supply chain risk whether presented by the supplier, the supplied product and its sub-components, or the supply chain (e.g., packaging, handling, storage, and transport). (DoDI O-5240.24, CI Activities Supporting RDA, 8 Jun 2011 with change 1 dated 15 Oct 2013)   Also see adversarial supply chain operations, supply chain attack, supply chain risk;\nsupply chain risk mitigation; supply chain vulnerabilities.\n\n-- Also, the systematic identification, assessment, and quantification of potential supply chain disruptions with the objective to control exposure to risk or reduce its negative impact on supply chain performance.(DoDI 4140.01, DoD Supply Chain Materiel Management Policy, 14 Dec 2011) -- Also, a systematic process for managing supply chain risk by identifying susceptibilities, vulnerabilities and threats throughout DoD's \"supply chain\" and developing mitigation strategies to combat those threats whether presented by the supplier, the supplied product and its subcomponents, or the supply chain (e.g., initial production, packaging, handling, storage, transport, mission operation, and disposal). (DoDI 5200.44, Protection of Mission Critical Functions to Achieve Trusted Systems and Networks, 5 Nov 2012) -- Also, management of risk that an adversary may sabotage, malicious[ly] introduce unwanted functions, or otherwise subvert the design, manufacturing, production, distribution, installation, or maintenance of an item of supply or a system so as to surveil, deny, disrupt, otherwise degrade the function, use or operation of the item or system. (DoD FCIP Strategy FY 2013-2017) -- Also, [within the Intelligence Community] the management of risk to the integrity, trustworthiness, and authenticity of products and services within the supply chain. It addresses the activities of foreign intelligence entities and other adversarial attempts aimed at compromising the IC supply chain, which may include the introduction of counterfeit or malicious items into the IC supply chain. (ICD 731, Supply Chain Risk Management, 7 Dec 2013)\n\n\n    Supply chain risk management encompasses many disciplines and requires participation from\nsubject matter experts in acquisition, counterintelligence, information assurance, logistics, program offices, analysis, security, and other relevant functions as necessary.\n\n        -- ICD 731, Supply Chain Risk Management, 7 Dec 2013\n___________________\n\n    The President's Comprehensive National Cybersecurity Initiative (CNCI) 11 directs the\nimplementation of SCRM in information and communications technology (ICT) acquisition.\n___________________\n\n    Various SCRM References:\n\n    National Strategy for Global Supply Chain Security, White House, Jan 2012; copy available at\nwww.whitehouse.gov Committee on National Security Systems Directive (CNSSD) No. 505, Supply Chain Risk\nManagement (U), 7 Mar 2012; available at www.cnss.gov\n\n    For SCRM policy within the IC see Intelligence Community Directive (ICD) 701, Supply Chain Risk\nManagement, 7 Dec 2013. \"Supply Chain Risk Management Awareness\" by J. Filsinger, B. Fast, D. Wolf, et al; copy available\nat: <http://www.afcea.org/committees/cyber/documents/Supplychain.pdf>\n\nSupply Chain Risk Mitigation.  A process to ensure software and hardware commodity items are not compromised by malicious actions that disrupt or endanger military operations or provided an entry point for gaining access or control of DoD systems. (DoD Strategy for Operating in Cyberspace, May 2011) Also see *supply chain risk; supply chain risk management; supply chain risk vulnerabilities.*\n\n\n    Manage Supply Risk - Identify, assess, and prioritize efforts to manage risk by utilizing layered\ndefenses, and adapting our security posture according to the changing security and operational environment.\n\n       -- White House, *National Startegy for Global Supply Chain Security*, Jan 2012, p.1\n Supply Chain Vulnerabilities.  An assessment of the supply chain related to CPI [critical program information] to determine if an adversary has the capability and intent to affect it in a manner that compromises the military effectiveness of the given platform, weapon system, or network. (DoDI 5200.39, CPI within the DoD,16 Jul 2008 with change 1 dated 28 Dec 2010)  Also see supply chain risk; supply chain risk mitigation; supply chain risk management.\n\nSupplier Assurance.  Evidence demonstrating the level of confidence that a supplier is free from vulnerabilities. (DoDI 5200.39, CPI within the DoD,16 Jul 2008 with change 1 dated 28 Dec 2010) Support Agent.  An agent recruited to do support work, such as finding and living in safehouses, serving as a courier, or any of the other activities required to support a spy in place. In many cases, this support agent is a local citizen of the country in which the CIA operates. (A Spy's Journey) Support Asset.  An asset who acquires, maintains, and/or provides services. (HDI Lexicon, April 2008) Supported Commander.  1) The commander having primary responsibility for all aspects of a task assigned by the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan or other joint operation planning authority.  2) In the context of joint operation planning, the commander who prepares operation plans or operation orders in response to requirements of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.  3) In the context of a support command relationship, the commander who receives assistance from another commander's force or capabilities, and who is responsible for ensuring that the supporting commander understands the assistance required. (JP 1-02 and JP 3-0, Joint Operations, 11 Aug 2011)  Also see support; supporting commander. Supporting Commander.  1) A commander who provides augmentation forces or other support to a supported commander or who develops a supporting plan. Includes the designated combatant commands and Defense agencies as appropriate.  2) In the context of a support command relationship, the commander who aids, protects, complements, or sustains another commander's force, and who is responsible for providing the assistance required by the supported commander. (JP 1-02 and JP 3-0, Joint Operations, 11 Aug 2011)  Also see *support; supported commander*.\n\nSuspect Counterfeit.  Materiel, items, or products in which there is an indication by visual inspection, testing, or other information that it may meet the definition of counterfeit materiel provided herein.\n\n(DoDI 4140.67, DoD Counterfeit Prevention Policy, 26 Apr 2013)  Also see *counterfeit material*. Surreptitious Entry.  Entry by stealth. (Spycraft)\n\n-- Also, unauthorized entry in a manner which leaves no readily discernible evidence. (DSS Glossary and AR 381-14, Technical Counterintelligence, 30 Sep 2002) -- Also, any entry into a guarded or locked area or container and a departure therefrom without leaving a trace that such entry was made. (FM 30-17, Counterintelligence Operations, Jan 1972) Surreptitious Entry Unit.  Unit in OTS [CIA's Office of Technical Service] whose specialty was opening locks and gaining access to enemy installations for the purpose of supporting bugging operations. (Spy Dust) Surveillance.  The systematic observation of aerospace, surface, or subsurface areas, places, persons, or things, by visual, aural, electronic, photographic, or other means. JP 1-02 and JP 3-0, Joint Operations, 11 Aug 2011) Also see counter surveillance, electronic surveillance, physical surveillance, surveillance detection.\n\n## \"Surveillance Is A Valuable Investigative Tool [Emphasis Added]....\"\n\n\n   \"Investigators always should assume that subjects engaged in operational, terrorist, or criminal\nactivity will attempt to detect surveillance by employing a variety of methods and techniques.... During surveillances, participants must remain vigilant and alert to the possibility of countersurveillance techniques being employed against them.\"\n\n       -- John T. Nason, \"Conducting Surveillance Operations\" in *FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin*, May 2004\n -- Also, systematic observation of a target. (Senate Report 94-755, Book I - Glossary, 26 Apr 1976) -- Also, the continuous watching or listening (overtly or covertly) of people, vehicles, places, or objects to obtain information concerning the activities and identities of individuals.  (Peter Jenkins, Surveillance Tradecraft: The Professional's Guide to Covert Surveillance Training, 2010) -- Also, the tradecraft of undetected observation. Surveillance can be physical, electronic, or acoustic.\n\nIt may include audio or photographic observation and includes mail opening. (A Spy's Journey)\n-- Also, actively but unobtrusively observing a subject to gather information about their activities and whereabouts. (Webster's New World Law Dictionary, 2010)\n-- Also [as used within DoD concerning force protection], monitoring the activity of DoD personnel, facilities, processes, or systems including showing unusual interest in a facility, infrastructure, or personnel (e.g., observations through binoculars, taking notes, drawing maps or diagrams of the facility, and taking pictures or video of a facility, infrastructure, personnel, or the surrounding environment) under circumstances that would cause a reasonable person to perceive a threat to DoD personnel, facilities, or forces in transit. (DTM 08-007, DoD Force Protection Threat Information, 22 Jul 2008)\n\n## Ci Surveillance Operations Surveillance Assets Supporting Ci Investigations & Operations\n\n COL Mark L Reagan (USA Ret) - 25 Aug 2006\n\n## Surveillance, By Definition, Is Intrusion Into The Affairs Of Other People.\n\n\n-- William R. Johnson, *Thwarting Enemies at Home and Abroad* (2009)\n\n\n    The word surveillance comes from the French *surveiller*, to watch over.  The term is often used\nfor all forms of observation or monitoring, not just visual observation.\n\n    In order to be effective, surveillance must go unnoticed and be undetected.\n__________________\n\n    Surveillance can be used from a static point, on foot, from vehicle or by using technical devices.\nIn most cases a combination of all four are used, with targets even often taking public transport and even attempting to detect or avoid surveillance.\n\n        -- Peter Jenkins in an introduction to *Surveillance Tradecraft* (2010)\n__________________\n\n     *Surveillance, physical*:  term for the universal tradecraft of undetected observation conducted by\nhumans versus technical means.\n\n    *Surveillance, technical*:  generic term for surveillance using various forms of visual, auditory and\nelectronic aids in covering a designated target.\n\n    *Surveillance, close*:  tradecraft jargon term for surveillance maintained where the prevention of\nloss of the subject is paramount.\n\n    Surveillance, discreet:  tradecraft jargon term for surveillance maintained on a \"loose\" basis, the\nprevention of detection being paramount, even to the loss of the subject being tailed. Generally, the guiding rule is to discontinue surveillance rather than risk actions which make the subject aware of the surveillance.\n\n    Surveillance, fixed:  tradecraft jargon term for a stationary or static surveillance.  Also *stakeout*,\ntradecraft jargon for the static surveillance of a given target.\n\n    Surveillance, foot:  tradecraft jargon term for, as the words imply, a surveillance conducted on foot.\n\n    *Surveillance, mobile*:  tradecraft jargon term for surveillance conducted with the use of various\nmobile platforms, e.g., vehicles, aircraft, boats, etc.\n\n    -- Adapted from *The CIA's Insider's Dictionary* by Leo D. Carl (1996)\n______________________\n\nSurveillance... must be executed with maximum care lest its target become aware of it.\n\n-- Allen W. Dulles, *The Craft of Intelligence* (2006), p. 124 Surveillance Detection.  Measures taken to detect and/or verify whether an individual, vehicle, or location is under surveillance. (DoDI S-5240.15, FPRG, 20 Oct 2010 with change 1 dated 16 Oct 2013)  Also see counter surveillance, *surveillance*.\n\n-- Measures taken to determine if an individual is under surveillance. (HDI Lexicon, April 2008)\n\n-- Also, self-initiated actions taken by a target/subject to identify surveillance.  Conducted by taking advantage of screen and flow, couple with detailed route selection, and noting possible surveillance against time and distance relationships. (CI Community Lexicon) Surveillance Detection Route (SDR).  A carefully crafted route, of varying lengths and complexity depending on the operational environment, used by a case officer and/or agent to get to a meeting site, and after leaving the meeting site, [to] determine that the case officer and agent are not under surveillance before going to and after the ops meeting. (National HUMINT Glossary) -- Also, a preplanned route used to determine if an individual is under surveillance. (HDI Lexicon, April 2008)\n\n\n-- Also, a planned route taken by an agent or handler prior to conducting a clandestine act...\ndesigned to identify or elude surveillance. (Spycraft) -- Also*, surveillance detection run*; a route designed to erode or flush out surveillance without alerting them to an operative's purpose. (CI Centre Glossary)\n\n    Professional case officers of all services, conduct lengthy SDRs before engaging in operational\nacts.  A good SDR gives a case officer the opportunity to flush out surveillance if it is there and to make a determination of his or her surveillance status.  The CIA jargon for completing an SDR and verifying without any doubt that surveillance is not there is \"getting black.\"\n\n         -- James M. Olson, *Fair Play: The Moral Dilemmas of Spying* (2006)\n________________________________\n\n    Case officers posted to Moscow station underwent rigorous training in \"denied area tradecraft\"...\nThe primary discipline was the surveillance detection route (SDR). Case officers moved about on\nlong and circuitous routes planned in advance while searching for KGB \"tails.\" If they detected\nsurveillance, they aborted their missions. If no surveillance was detected, they would \"go black\" for brief periods and perform operational acts.\n\n        -- Benjamin B. Fischer, \"Spy Dust and Ghost Surveillance: How the KGB Spooked the CIA and Hid Aldrich Ames in Plain Sight,\" *International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence*, Vol 24 No 2 (Summer 2011), p. 275\n________________________________\n\n    See a brief discussion of \"Surveillance Detection Runs\" in an excellent article by Barry G. Royden,\nCIA, entitled \"Tolkachev, A Worthy Successor to Penkovsky: An Exceptional Espionage Operation\"\noriginally classified SECRET and published in CIA's *Studies In Intelligence*, Vol. 41, No. 4. 1997. Later declassified and published in *Studies In Intelligence*, Vol 47, No. 3, 2003, Unclassified Edition; available at:  <https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csipublications/csi-studies/studies/vol47no3/article02.html>\n Surveillance Device.  A piece of equipment or mechanism used to gain unauthorized access to and removal of information. (DoDI 5240.05, TSCM, 3 Apr 2014) Suspect.  A person about whom some credible information exists to believe that the person committed a particular criminal offense. (AR 195-2, Criminal Investigation Activities, 15 May 2009)  Also see *subject*. Susceptibility. The inherent capacity of an asset to be affected by one or more threats or Hazards. (DoDI 3020.45, DCIP Management, 21 Apr 2008) Suspension of Access. The temporary withdrawal of a person's eligibility for access to classified information. Access is suspended when information becomes known that casts doubt on whether continued access is consistent with national security interests. (AR 380-67, Personnel Security Program,\n24 Jan 2014) Suspicious Activity.  Observed behavior reasonably indicative of pre-operational planning related to terrorism or other criminal activity. (ISE-FS-200 v1.5 cited in DoDI 2000.26, SAR, 1 Nov 2011)  See suspicious activity report (SAR). Suspicious Activity Report (SAR).  Official documentation of behavior that may be indicative of preoperational planning related to terrorism or criminal intentions. (DoDI 2000.12, DoD AT Program, 1 Mar 2013, w/ change 1 dated 9 Sep 2013)\n\n-- Also, official documentation of observed behavior reasonably indicative of pre-operational planning related to terrorism or other criminal activity. (ISE-FS-200 v1.5 cited in DoDI 2000.26, SAR, 1 Nov 2011)\nSee *suspicious activity*.\n\n    **eGuardian** -- the FBI's law enforcement-centric threat reporting system -- rapidly disseminates\nSARs dealing with information regarding a potential threat or suspicious activity throughout the national law enforcement community to include DoD.\n\n    For DoD policy see DoDI 2000.26, *Suspicious Activity Reporting*, 1 Nov 2011.\n\n    Access to the eGuardian system is via Law Enforcement Online (LEO).  Only DoD law\n\nenforcement personnel or analysts within DoD law enforcement organizations will enter SARs into the eGuardian system.\n\n    Categories of Suspicious Activity (see encl 4, DoDI 2000.26):   Acquisition of Expertise; Breach or\nAttempted Intrusion; Eliciting Information; Expressed or Implied Threat; Flyover or Landing, Materials Acquisition or Storage; Misrepresentation; Recruiting; Sabotage, Tampering, or Vandalism; Surveillance; Testing of Security; Theft, Loss, or Diversion; Weapons Discovery; and Unexplained Absences of International Military Students. Information Sharing Environment (ISE) Functional Standard (FS) Suspicious Activity Reporting\nVersion 1.5  (ISE-FS-200 v1.5) available on line at:  <http://www.ise.gov/sites/default/files/ISE-FS- 200_ISE-SAR_Functional_Standard_V1_5_Issued_2009.pdf>\n\nSuspicious Contact. Efforts by any individual, regardless of nationality, to obtain illegal or unauthorized access to classified information or to compromise a cleared employee, all contacts by cleared employees with known or suspected intelligence officers from any country, or any contact which suggests the employee concerned may be the target of an attempted exploitation by the intelligence services of another country. (DSS Glossary) Swallow.  A female operative who uses sex as a tool. (Spy Dust)\n\n    The swallow's mission is to engage in sexual activity with the targeted person and gather the\nintelligence either through pillow talk or blackmail.   In order to be able to blackmail the targeted person into disclosing secrets, the sexual activity usually takes place in a prearranged room or residence equipped with hidden cameras and recording devices.\n\n       -- *Encyclopedia of the Central Intelligence Agency* (2003)\n_____________________\n\nA male operative who uses sex as a tool is referred to as a \"Raven.\"\n\nFor additional open source information see David Lewis, Sexpionage: The Exploitation of Sex by Soviet Intelligence (1976).\n Sweep. [Jargon] To electronically and/or physically examine a room or area in order to detect any clandestine devices; a search for \"bugs,\" i.e., concealed electronic listening devices at a specific location.\n\n(Words of Intelligence, 2nd Edition, 2011)\n\nSynchronization. 1) The arrangement of military actions in time, space, and purpose to produce maximum relative combat power at a decisive place and time.  2) In the intelligence context, application of intelligence sources and methods in concert with the operation plan to ensure intelligence requirements are answered in time to influence the decisions they support. (JP 1-02 and JP 2-0, Joint Intelligence, 22 Oct 2013) Synthesis.   In intelligence usage, the examining and combining of processed information with other information and intelligence for final interpretation. (JP 2-0, Joint Intelligence, 22 Oct 2013) Systems Administrator (SA).  Individual responsible for the installation and maintenance of an information system, providing effective information system utilization, adequate security parameters, and sound implementation of established Information Assurance policy and procedures. (CNSSI No. 4009, National Information Assurance Glossary, 26 April 2010) System Assurance.  The justified measures of confidence that the system functions as intended and is free of exploitable vulnerabilities, either intentionally or unintentionally designed or inserted as part of the system at any time during the life cycle. (DoDI 5200.39, CPI Protection within DoD, 16 Jul 2008 with change 1 dated 28 Dec 2010)\n\n\nT ========================================== Tactical Control (TACON). Command authority over assigned or attached forces or commands, or military capability or forces made available for tasking, that is limited to the detailed direction and control of movements or maneuvers within the operational area necessary to accomplish missions or tasks assigned. TACON is inherent in operational control. TACON may be delegated to, and exercised at any level at or below the level of combatant command. When forces are transferred between combatant commands, the command relationship the gaining commander will exercise (and the losing commander will relinquish) over these forces must be specified by the Secretary of Defense. TACON provides sufficient authority for controlling and directing the application of force or tactical use of combat support assets within the assigned mission or task. (JP 1, 25 Mar 2013 and JP 1-02)  Also see combatant command; combatant command (command authority); *operational control*.\n\nTactical Intelligence.  Intelligence required for planning and conducting tactical operations. (JP 1-02 and JP 2-01.2, CI & HUMINT in Joint Operations, 16 Mar 2011 w/ chg 1 dated 26 Aug 2011) Tactical Intelligence and Related Activities (TIARA).  Those activities outside the National Foreign Intelligence Program that accomplish the following: 1) respond to operational commanders' tasking for time-sensitive information on foreign entities; 2) respond to national intelligence community tasking of systems whose primary mission is support to operating forces; 3) train personnel for intelligence duties; 4) provide an intelligence reserve; or 5) are devoted to research and development of intelligence or related capabilities.  Specifically excluded are programs that are so closely integrated with a weapon system that their primary function is to provide immediate-use targeting data. (Previously in JP 1-02) Tactical Level of War.  The level of war at which battles and engagements are planned and executed to achieve military objectives assigned to tactical units or task forces.  (JP 1-02 and JP 3-0, Joint Operations, 11 Aug 2011)  Also see *operational level of war; strategic level of war*. Tactical Questioning (TQ).  The field-expedient initial questioning for information of immediate tactical value of a captured or detained person at or near the point of capture and before the individual is placed in a detention facility. Tactical questioning is generally performed by members of patrols, but can be done by any appropriately trained DoD personnel. Tactical questioning is limited to direct questioning. (DoDD 3115.09, DoD Intelligence Interrogations, Detainee Debriefings, and Tactical Questioning, 11 Oct 2012 w/ chg 1 dated 15 Nov 2013)\n\n    For DoD policy see DoDD 3115.09, DoD Intelligence Interrogations, Detainee Debriefings, and\nTactical Questioning, 11 Oct 2012\n\n-- Also, direct questioning by any Department of Defense personnel of a captured or detained person to obtain time-sensitive tactical intelligence, at or near the point of capture or detention and consistent with applicable law. (JP 1-02 and JP 3-63, Detainee Operations, 30 May 2008) -- Also, expedient initial questioning for information of immediate tactical value. (Army FM 2-22.3, Human Intelligence Collector Operations, Sep 2006)\n\nTag.  Something that is attached to the item to be located and/or tracked, which increases its ability to be detected or its probability of identification by a surveillance system suitably tuned to the tag. (Defense Science Board 2004 Summer Study, *Transition to and from Hostilities*, Dec 2004)\n\n    Tags can be either active (such as radio-emitting tags) or passive (such as radio frequency\nidentification [RFID] tags).  Passive tags can also be chemical (such as infrared fluorescent) or\nbiological in nature.\n\n\nTask.  A clearly defined action or activity specifically assigned to an individual or organization that must be done as it is imposed by an appropriate authority. (JP 1, 25 Mar 2013) Task Critical Asset.  An asset that is of such extraordinary importance that its incapacitation or destruction would have a serious, debilitating effect on the ability of one or more DoD Components or DISLA organizations to execute the task or mission-essential task it supports. Task critical assets are used to identify defense critical assets. (DoDD 3020.40, DoD Policy and Responsibilities for Critical Infrastructure, 14 Jan 2010 w/ chg 2 dated 21 Sep 2012)\nTarget. 1) An entity or object considered for possible engagement or other action; 2) in intelligence usage, a country, area, installation, agency, or person against which intelligence operations are directed... [emphasis added] (JP 1-02 and JP 3-60)\n\n-- Also, an individual, organization, or intelligence service against which intelligence operations are conducted. Also refers to documents or instruments which an intelligence service is trying to obtain, or the subject of a surveillance. (FBI FCI Terms) Target Audience (TA).  An individual or group selected for influence. (JP 1-02 and JP 3-13, Information Operations, 13 Feb 2006) Target Folder.  A folder, hardcopy or electronic, containing target intelligence and related materials prepared for planning and executing action against a specific target. (JP 1-02 and JP 3-60, Joint Targeting, 13 Apr 2007) Target Intelligence.  Intelligence that portrays and locates the components of a target or target complex and indicates its vulnerability and relative importance. (JP 3-60, Joint Targeting, 13 Apr 2007) Targeted Violence:  Pre-conceived violence focused on individuals, groups, or locations where perpetrators are engaged in behaviors that precede and are related to their attacks. These perpetrators consider, plan and prepare before engaging in acts of violence and are often detectable, providing an opportunity for disruption of the intended violence. (DSB Report, *Predicting Violent Behavior*, Aug 2012)\n\n\"There is no panacea for stopping all targeted violence.\"\n\n-- DSB Report, *Predicting Violent Behavior*, August 2012\n\n\n    Copy of Defense Science Board Report (DSB), *Predicting Violent Behavior*, Aug 2012 available at:\n<http://www.acq.osd.mil/dsb/reports/PredictingViolentBehavior.pdf> (accessed 10 Oct 2012)\n Targeting.  The process of selecting and prioritizing targets and matching the appropriate response to them, considering operational requirements and capabilities. (JP 3-0, Joint Operations, 11 Aug 2011)\n\n-- Also, the act of focusing on a country, organization, non-state actor, installation, system, or person to identify an operational or intelligence goal. (National HUMINT Glossary) -- Also, the process of selecting targets and matching the appropriate response to them, including operational requirements and capabilities.  The purpose of targeting is to disrupt, delay, or limit threat interference with friendly COAs [courses of actions]. (FM 2-22.2, Counterintelligence, Oct 2009)\n\n\n    CI support to the targeting process include the development of CI targets list to identify those FISS\nand ITO persons, organizations, facilities, or installations that must be exploited through raid and capture to gain additional intelligence or neutralization to disable or destroy, negate, mitigate, or degrade the adversary's ability to collect on U.S. forces.\n\n        -- FM 2.22-2, *Counterintelligence*, October 2009, p. 5-7\n______________________\n\n\n\n    See JP 3-60, *Joint Targeting*, for additional information.\n\n    Note:  The doctrinal targeting process that has been adopted by the Army is denoted by the\nacronym \"D3A,\" which stands for \"Decide, Deliver, Detect, and Assess\" and is covered in-depth in FM 6-20-10, *Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for the Targeting Process*, 8 May 1996.\n TARP.  Acronym for *Threat Awareness and Reporting Program*; see Army Regulation 381-12, TARP, 4 Oct 2012. Task Asset.  [In critical infrastructure usage] an asset that is directly used to support execution of one or more operations, tasks, activities, or mission essential tasks (METs). (DoDI 3020.45, DCIP Management, 21 Apr 2008)  Also see asset, defense critical asset, defense critical infrastructure program (DCIP), task critical asset. Task Critical Asset (TCA).  An asset that is of such extraordinary importance that its incapacitation or destruction would have a serious, debilitating effect on the ability of one or more DoD Components or DISLA organizations to execute the task or mission-essential task it supports. Task critical assets are used to identify defense critical assets. (DoDD 3020.40, Policy and Responsibilities for Critical Infrastructure, 14 Jan 2010 w/ chg 2 dated 21 Sep 2012)  Also see asset, defense critical asset, defense critical infrastructure program (DCIP), task asset.\n\n## Tier 1 - 3 Task Critical Assets\n\n\n    Tier 1 TCA. An asset the loss, incapacitation, or disruption of which could result in mission (or\nfunction) failure at the DoD, Military Department, Combatant Command, sub-unified command, Defense Agency, or defense infrastructure sector level.\n\n    Tier 2 TCA. An asset the loss, incapacitation, or disruption of which could result in severe mission\n(or function) degradation at the DoD, Military Department, Combatant Command, subunified command, Defense Agency, or defense infrastructure sector level.\n\n    Tier 3 TCA. An asset the loss, incapacitation, or disruption of which could result in mission (or\nfunction) failure below the Military Department, Combatant Command, sub-unified command, Defense Agency, or defense infrastructure sector level.\n\n   -- DoDM 3020.45-Vol 1, Defense Critical Infrastructure Program (DCIP): DoD Mission-Based  Critical\n          Asset Identification Process (CAIP), 24 Oct 2008\n Task Force Counterintelligence Coordinating Authority (TFCICA).  An individual that affects the overall coordination of counterintelligence activities (in a joint force intelligence directorate counterintelligence and human intelligence staff element, joint task force configuration), with other supporting CI organizations, and supporting agencies to ensure full CI coverage of the task force operational area. (JP 2-01.2, CI & HUMINT in Joint Operations, 16 Mar 2011 w/ chg 1 dated 26 Aug 2011)\n\nTasking.  Directing or requesting a source to perform in a specific manner to achieve an objective or conduct an activity. (DoDI S-5200.42, Defense HUMINT and Related Activities (U), 8 Dec 2009)\n\n-- Also, the process associated with acceptance of a validated collection requirement and assigning it to organic collection assets for action. (DHE-M 3301.001, Vol I: Collection Requirement, Reporting, and Evaluation Procedures, 30 Jan 2009, w/ chg 2 dated 1 Feb 2012)\n\nTear Line.  A physical line on an intelligence message or document separating categories of information that have been approved for foreign disclosure and release. (JP 2-0, Joint Intelligence, 22 Oct 2013)  Also see *tearline reporting*.\n\n\n The sanitized information below the tear line should contain the substance of the information above\nthe tear line, but without identifying the sensitive sources and methods.  This will permit wider dissemination, in accordance with \"need-to-know\", need-to-release, and write-to-release principles and foreign disclosure guidelines of the information below the tear line.\n -- Also, a physical line on an intelligence message or document separating categories of information that have been approved for foreign disclosure and release. Normally, the intelligence below the tear line is that which has been previously cleared for disclosure or release. (DoDI S-5240.17, CI Collection Activities, 14 Mar 2014) Tearline Reporting.  An automated or manual technique for separating an intelligence report into multiple portions separated by machine-or human-readable tearlines.  A tearline section is the area in an intelligence report or finished intelligence product where the sanitized version of a more highly classified and/or controlled report is located.  The sanitized information within the tearlines contains the substance of the more detailed information without identifying the sensitive sources and methods, allowing wider dissemination of substantive intelligence information to authorized users. (ICD 206, 17 Oct 2007)  Also see *tear line*.\n\n   Also see ICD 209, *Tearline Production and Dissemination*, 6 Sep 2012\n\nTechnical Counterintelligence (TCI).  A component of counterintelligence technical services.  TCI includes Technical Surveillance Countermeasures (TSCM) and the investigation, study, and control of compromising emanations from information systems, known as TEMPEST.  Also see technical penetration, Technical Surveillance Countermeasures, TEMPEST.\n\n\n    The essence of technical counterintelligence collection is learning through technical means what\nforeign intelligence services see, hear, and sense, what they know about one's own technical\nmeans, and how they are using this information.\n\n      -- Roy Godson, *Dirty Tricks or Trump Cards: US Covert Action and Counterintelligence* (1995), p. 224\n Technical Counterintelligence (TCI) Countermeasures.  Any action, device, procedure, technique, or other measure that reduces the vulnerability of any equipment or facility that electronically processes information to technical exploitation of classified and/or sensitive information. (AR 381-14, Technical Counterintelligence [U], 30 Sep 2002) Technical Intelligence (TECHINT).  Intelligence derived from the collection, processing, analysis, and exploitation of data and information pertaining to foreign equipment and materiel for the purposes of preventing technological surprise, assessing foreign scientific and technical capabilities, and developing countermeasures designed to neutralize an adversary's technological advantages. (JP 1-02 and JP 2-0, Joint Intelligence, 22 Oct 2013)\n-- Also, the identification, assessment, collection, exploitation, and evacuation of captured enemy materiel (CEM) in support of national and immediate technical intelligence requirements. TECHINT\nprovides rapid performance and vulnerability assessments of enemy equipment, giving a critical edge to US forces in current and future operations. (Army FM 2-22.401, TECHINT, 9 Jun 2006)\n\nTechnical Hazard.  An insecure condition that could permit the technical exploitation of an area with classified national security information, restricted data, and/or unclassified information requiring protection. (AR 381-14, Technical Counterintelligence, 30 Sep 2002)\nTechnical Penetration.  The use of technological means to conduct an intentional, unauthorized interception of information-bearing energy. (DoDI 5240.05, TSCM Program, 22 Feb 2006)\n-- Also, a deliberate, unauthorized, clandestine emplacement of a device or modification of existing government equipment, or the clandestine employment of a technique, which allows the technical monitoring within an area for the purpose of gaining information.  (Defense HUMINT Enterprise Manual 3301.002, Vol II Collection Operations, 23 Nov 2010)\n\n\n-- Also, *technical penetrations* include the employment of optical, electro-optical, electromagnetic, fluidic, and acoustic means as the sensor and transmission medium, or the use of various types of stimulation or modification to equipment or building components for the direct or indirect transmission of information meant to be protected. (Previously in JP 2-01.2, CI & HUMINT Support to Joint Operations, 13 Jun 2006)\n\n\n    \"...[I]t had been my experience that the most up-to-snuff secret audio and other clandestine\nmonitoring techniques always seemed to be a step ahead of the counter-surveillance teams.\"\n\n         -- Richard Helms with William Hood, *A Look Over My Shoulder* (2003), p. 449\n Technical Security.  A security discipline dedicated to detecting, neutralizing, and/or exploiting a wide variety of hostile and foreign penetration technologies. This discipline mandates training in various countermeasure techniques. (IC Standard 700-1, 4 Apr 2008) Technical Services.  The investigative use of video surveillance and interception of oral, electronic and wire communications. (AFPD 71-1, Criminal Investigations and Counterintelligence, 1 Jul 1999) Technical Surveillance.  The use of optical, audio, or electronic monitoring devices or systems to surreptitiously collect information. (DoDI 5240.05, TSCM, 3 Apr 2014)\n-- Also, surveillance accomplished through the use of electronic listening devices, vehicle trackers, and signaling devices. (CI Community Lexicon) Technical Surveillance Countermeasures (TSCM).  Techniques to detect, neutralize, and exploit technical surveillance technologies and hazards that permit the unauthorized access to or removal of information. (DoDI 5240.05, TSCM Program, 3 Apr 2014)\n-- Also, techniques and measures to detect and neutralize a wide variety of hostile penetration technologies that are used to obtain unauthorized access to classified and sensitive information. Technical penetrations include the employment of optical, electro-optical, electromagnetic, fluidic, and acoustic means as the sensor and transmission medium, or the use of various types of stimulation or modification to equipment or building components for the direct or indirect transmission of information meant to be protected. (JP 1-02 and JP 2-01.2, CI & HUMINT in Joint Operations, 16 Mar 2011 w/ chg 1 dated 26 Aug 2011)\n\n\n-- Also, physical, electronic, and visual techniques used to detect and counter technical security devices, technical security hazards, and related physical security deficiencies. (IC Standard 700-1, 4 Apr 2008)\n\n## Long History Of Adversary Technical Surveillance\n\ncollection and exploitation of sensitive U.S. facilities and activities...\n\n  \"*In 1944, the very first TSCM sweep uncovered 120 microphones in the Moscow Embassy* [U.S.\nEmbassy in Moscow].\"\n\n        -- Frederick L. Wettering, \"Counterintelligence: The Broken Triad.\" International Journal of\n           Intelligence and Counterintelligence 13 (Fall 2000), pp. 265-299.\n\n   TSCM identifies technically exploitable conditions and provides strategies to mitigate or remove\nthem.\n_____________________\n\n    TSCM represents the convergence of two distinct disciplines -- counterintelligence and security\ncountermeasures.  These techniques and countermeasures are designed to detect and nullify a wide variety of technologies used to gain unauthorized access to classified national security\n   information, restricted data, or otherwise sensitive information.\n      -- ICD 702, *TSCM,* 18 Feb 2008\n_____________________\n\n    TSCM involves the search for technical surveillance devices or \"bugs.\"  ...[T]he overwhelming\nnumber of technical attacks against US interests occur overseas. ... Scare resources should be directed both to specific threat-driven inspections and to the maintenance of an R&D and training effort,\n\n      -- Joint Security Commission, Redefining Security: A Report to the Secretary of Defense and the Director\nCentral Intelligence, 28 Feb 1994, p. 61\n_____________________\n\n    The TSCM Program includes four separate functions:  detection, nullification, isolation, and\neducation.\n\n      -- FM 2-22.2, *Counterintelligence*, October 2009, p. 6-5;\n          also AR 381-14, *Technical Counterintelligence (TCI)* (U), 30 Sep 2002, p. 7\n_____________________\n\n    TSCM: the systematic physical and electronic examination of a designated area by properly\ntrained, qualified and equipped persons in an attempt to discover electronic eavesdropping\ndevices, security hazards or security weaknesses.\n   -- www.dbugman.com\n___________________\n\n\n## Project Gunman\n\n\n    A most spectacular case of electronic espionage occurred in the 1980s, at the height of the Cold\nWar, when it was discovered that Soviet intelligence had successfully implanted very sophisticated bugs in a large number of electronic typewriters at the U.S. embassy in Moscow.  On 25 March 1985, the story of the Soviet bug of U.S. typewriters in the Moscow Embassy broke on the CBS nightly news.\n\n    For detailed information see  Sharon A. Maneki, *Learning From the Enemy: The GUNMAN Project*,\nNSA, 2012, 35 pages.  Available on line at: http://www.nsa.gov/about/_files/cryptologic_heritage/ center_crypt_history/ publications/Learning_From_the_Enemy_The_GUNMAN_Project.pdf\n Technical Surveillance Device (TSD).  A device covertly installed to monitor (visually, audibly, or electronically) sensitive activities and/or information processing within a target area. (ICS Glossary) Technical Threat Analysis.  A continual process of compiling and examining information on technical surveillance activities against personnel, information, operations, and resources. (DoDI 5240.05, TSCM Program, 3 Apr 2014)\n\nTechnology.  The application of scientific and technical information and know-how to design, produce, manufacture, use, adapt, reconstruct, or reverse-engineer goods. This includes technical information and data in all forms, including electronic form. The term does not include the goods themselves, nor does it include scientific information in the public domain. (DoDI 2040.02, International Transfers of Technology, Articles, and Services, 10 Jul 2008)  Also see *critical technology*.\n\nTechnology Readiness Level (TRL). A standard utilized in the scientific community to track the maturity of a technology. The readiness level is depicted on a numerical scale form one to nine, where one represents the initial idea stage and nine represents the final fielding and utilization of the technology. (DoD FCIP Strategy FY 2013-017)\n\n\nTechnology Targeting Risk Assessment (TTRA).  A country-by-country assessment conducted by the Defense Intelligence Community that quantifies risks to CPI [critical program information] and related enabling technologies for weapons systems, advanced technologies or programs, and facilities such as laboratories, factories, research and development sites (test ranges, etc.), and military installations. The TTRA evaluates five independent risk factors, each of which contributes to an overall risk factor. The five areas evaluated are:  Technology Competence, National Level of Interest, Risk of Technology Diversion, Ability to Assimilate, and Technology Protection Risk. (DoDI 5200.39, CPI within DoD, 16 Jul 2008 with change 1 dated 28 Dec 2010)\n\n    The TTRA and CI Assessment provide laboratory/technical directors and Program Managers with\ninformation required to establish a comprehensive security program for the protection of identified critical program information (CPI).\n Technology Transfer. The intentional communication (sharing) of knowledge, expertise, facilities, equipment, and other resources for application to military and nonmilitary systems. (DoDI 5535.8, DoD\nTechnology Transfer Program, 14 May 1999)\n\n-- Also, transferring, exporting, or disclosing defense articles, defense services, or defense technical data covered by the United States Munitions List (USML) to any foreign person or entity in the United States (U.S.) or abroad. (DSS Glossary) Telecommunications and Information Systems Security.  Protection afforded to telecommunications and information systems, in order to prevent exploitation through interception, unauthorized electronic access, or related technical intelligence threats, and to ensure authenticity. Such protection results from the application of security measures (including cryptosecurity, transmission security, emission security, and computer security) to systems which generate, store, process, transfer, or communicate information of use to an adversary, and also includes the physical protection of technical security material and technical security information. (National Security Directive 42, National Policy for the Security of National Security Telecommunications and Information Systems, 5 Jul 1990)\n    Copy of NSD 42 available at:  <http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nsd/nsd42.pdf> TEMPEST.  An unclassified term referring to technical investigations for compromising emanations from electrically operated information processing equipment; these investigations are conducted in support of emanations and emissions security. (JP 1-02)  Also see *compromising emanations; TEMPEST Test.*\n-- Also, an unclassified term that refers to the investigation and study of compromising emanations.\n\n(IC Standard 700-1, 4 Apr 2008)\n-- Also, a name referring to the investigation, study, and control of compromising emanations from telecommunications and automated information systems equipment. (CNSSI No. 4009, National Information Assurance Glossary, 26 April 2010) -- Also, Transient Electro Magnetic Pulse Emanation Standard (TEMPEST) the investigation, study, and control of compromising emanations from telecommunication and automated information systems equipment. (Defense HUMINT Enterprise Manual 3301.002, Vol II Collection Operations, 23 Nov 2010) -- Also, the evaluation and control of compromising emanations from telecommunications and automated information systems.  TEMPEST countermeasures are designed to prevent FISS and ITO\n[international terrorist organization] exploitation of compromising emanations by containing them within the space of the equipment or facility processing classified information. (Army FM 2-22.2, CI, Oct 2009)\n\n\n-- An unclassified term referring to technical investigations for compromising emanations from electrically operated, information processing equipment; they are conducted in support of emanations and emission security. (ICS Glossary, Jun 1989)\n\n\n    TEMPEST - the problem of compromising radiation.  Any time a machine is used to process\nclassified information electrically... that machine may emit radio frequency or acoustic energy.\nThese emissions, like tiny radio beacons, may radiate through free space for considerable\ndistances....  Or they may be induced on nearby conductors like signal lines, power lines,\ntelephones lines, or waste pipes and be conducted along those paths for some distance....  When these emissions can be intercepted and recorded, it is frequently possible to analyze them and recover the intelligence that was processed by the source equipment.  The phenomenon affects not only cipher machines buy any information-processing equipmentteletypewriters, duplicating equipment, intercoms, facsimile, computers....\n\n     -- Source: NSA, *TEMPEST: A Signal Problem*, undated [declassified/redacted version]\nsee <www.nsa.gov/public/crypt-spectrum.cfm>\nalso at:  http://www.nsa.gov/public_info/_files/cryptologic_spectrum/tempest.pdf\n\n ______________________ TEMPEST (an acronym for Transient Electromagnetic Pulse  Emanation Standard) is both a\nspecification for equipment and a term used to describe the process for preventing compromising emanations. The fact that electronic equipment such as computers, printers, and electronic typewriters give off electromagnetic emanations has long been a concern of the US Government. An attacker using off-the-shelf equipment can monitor and retrieve classified or sensitive information as it is being processed without the user being aware that a loss is occurring. ...\n\n    Given the absence of a domestic threat, any use of TEMPEST countermeasures within the US\nshould require strong justification.\n\n    [TEMPEST] attacks require a high level of expertise, proximity to the target, and\nconsiderable collection time. [emphasis added]\n\n    The commission recognizes the need for an active overseas TEMPEST program but believes the\ndomestic threat is minimal.\n\n       -- Joint Security Commission, Redefining Security:  A Report to the Secretary of Defense and the Director\nCentral Intelligence, 28 Feb 1994, pp. 60-61\n______________________\n\n     According to a declassified NSA publication:  \"There is no special meaning in the word\n'TEMPEST.' It was simply picked from a covername list by a NSA engineer in the early 1950s. However, TEMPEST has now become a generic word used throughout the US Government and industry to describe the unintentional emanation of classified information from an equipment.\"\n\n      -- NSA, *Crypotolog*, Nov 1983 [declassified], p. 1\n______________________\n\n    For a history of TEMPEST see declassified NSA publication, A History of U.S. Communications\nSecurity (U), [Vol I], revised July 1973, pp. 89-101; covers the timeframe through 1972.\n\n       This NSA report identified the main TEMPEST countermeasures as: \"low-level keying, shielding, filtering, grounding, isolation, and physical protective measures.\"  It also high- lighted that shielded enclosures \"provided not only the best means, but the only means we had come across to provide really complete TEMPEST protection in those environments where a large-scale intercept effort could be mounted at close range.\"\n TEMPEST Test.  A laboratory or on site (field) test to determine the nature and amplitude of conducted or radiated signals containing compromising information. (NSTISSI 7002, TEMPEST Glossary, 17 Mar\n1995)  Also see *compromising emanations; TEMPEST.* Temporary Refuge.  Protection afforded for humanitarian reasons to a foreign national in a DoD shore installation, facility, or military vessel within the territorial jurisdiction of a foreign nation or in international waters, under conditions of urgency in order to secure the life or safety of that person against imminent danger, such as pursuit by a mob. (DoDI 2000.11, Procedures for Handling Requests for Asylum and Temporary Refuge, 13 May 2010)\n\n\nTerrorism.  The unlawful use of violence or threat of unlawful violence to instill fear and coerce governments or societies. Terrorism is often motivated by religious, political, or other ideological beliefs and committed in the pursuit of goals that are usually political. (JP 1-02 and JP 3-07.2, Antiterrorism, 24 Nov 2010)  Also see homegrown terrorist, radicalization, violent extremism, violent radicalization.\n\n\nThere is no universally accepted definition of terrorism.\n\nIt remains the subject of continuing debate in international bodies.\n\n\n-- Lord Carlile of Berriew Q.C. (March 2007)\n\n\n-- Also, premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against non-combatant targets by sub-national groups or clandestine agents (22 USC 2656f(d) and the National Strategy for Combating Terrorism, Feb 2003)  [Definition used by Department of State, NCTC and CIA]. -- Also, the unlawful use of force and violence against persons or property to intimidate or coerce a government, the civilian population, or any segment thereof, in furtherance of political or social objectives.\n(28 CFR 0.85)  [Definition used by FBI, which reflects its mission, identifying a terrorist incident as a violation of the criminal laws of the United States and a suspected terrorist would, therefore, be subject to arrest and prosecution.] -- Also, [the federal crime of terrorism] an offense that is calculated to influence or affect the conduct of government by intimidation or coercion, or to retaliate against government conduct.  This includes terrorist acts committed within and outside U.S. national boundaries. (18 USC 2332b(g)(5)(A)). -- Also, violent or illegal action taken on the basis of radical or extremist beliefs. (CRS Report R42553, Countering Violent Extremism in The United States, 19 Feb 2014)\n\n    The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) is the lead agency for investigating the federal crime of\nterrorism.  If another federal agency identifies an individual who is engaged in terrorist activities or in acts in preparation of terrorist activities, the other agency is required to promptly notify the FBI. The extraterritorial jurisdiction for terrorism crimes is specified in 18 U.S.C. 2332b(e) and (f).\n\n    Pursuant to 28 C.F.R. 0.85(1), the Attorney General has assigned responsibility to the Director of\nthe FBI to \"Exercise Lead Agency responsibility in investigating all crimes for which it has primary\nor concurrent jurisdiction and which involve terrorist activities or acts in preparation of terrorist activities within the statutory jurisdiction of the United States. Within the United States, this would include the collection, coordination, analysis, management and dissemination of intelligence and criminal information as appropriate.\"\n\n       -- Congressional Research Service (CRS) Report R41780, 27 Apr 2011\n__________________________\n\n    For additional information on terrorism, see US Army TRADOC G2 Handbook No.1, A Military\nGuide to Terrorism in the Twenty-First Century, 15 Aug 2007.\n    Copy available at: <http://www.fas.org/irp/threat/terrorism/>\n Terrorism Threat Assessment.  The process used to conduct a threat analysis and develop an evaluation of a potential terrorist threat; [or] the product of a threat analysis for a particular unit, installation, or activity. (DoDI 2000.16, DoD Antiterrorism Standards, 2 Oct 2006)\nTerrorist.  One that engages in acts or an act of terrorism. (answer.com; accessed 27 October 2011)\n\n    Terrorists undertake criminal acts that involve the use or threat of violence against innocent\npersons. These acts are premeditated, intended to achieve a political objective through coercion or intimidation of an audience beyond the immediate victims.\n\n         - National Security Decision Directive 207, *The National Program for Combating Terrorism* (U),\n             originally TOP SECRET, declassified\n\n    Note:  *Within DoD; None -- the term \"terrorist\" removed from JP 1-02.*  Previously defined in\n\nTerrorist Extremist.  An extremist that uses terrorism -- the purposeful targeting of ordinary people -- to produce fear to coerce or intimidate governments or societies in the pursuit of political, religious, or ideological goals. Extremists use terrorism to impede and undermine political progress, economic prosperity, the security and stability of the international state system, and the future of civil society. (National Military Support Plan - War on Terrorism, 1 Feb 2006) Terrorist Group.  Any number of terrorists who assemble together, have a unifying relationship, or are organized for the purpose of committing an act or acts of terrorism.\n\n   Current list of Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTOs) at US Department of State web site: <http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/other/des/123085.htm> Terrorist Identities Datamart Environment (TIDE).  The U.S. Government's (USG) central repository of information on international terrorist identities. TIDE supports the USG's various terrorist screening systems or \"watchlists\" and the US Intelligence Community's overall counterterrorism mission. (NCTC)\n\n\n    The TIDE database includes, to the extent permitted by law, all information the USG possesses\nrelated to the identities of individuals known or appropriately suspected to be or to have been involved in activities constituting, in preparation for, in aid of, or related to terrorism (with the exception of purely domestic terrorism information). This information is available to counterterrorism professionals throughout the Intelligence Community, including the Department of Defense, via the web-based, read-only \"TIDE Online.\"\n\n       -- NCTC Fact Sheet at <http://www.nctc.gov/docs/Tide_Fact_Sheet.pdf>\n Terrorism Screening Center (TSC). A multi-agency center administered by the FBI with support from the Department of Homeland Security, the Department of State, the Department of Justice, the Department of Defense, the Department of the Treasury, and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence. The TSC maintains the U.S. government's consolidated Terrorist Watchlista single database of identifying information about those known or reasonably suspected of being involved in terrorist activity. (fbi.gov)\n\n    The TSC was created by HSPD-6 (16 Sep 2003) to consolidate the USG's approach to terrorist\nscreening by creating a single comprehensive database of known or appropriately suspected terrorists (KSTs), and to make the information from this consolidated list available to foreign, federal, state, local, territorial, tribal, regulatory and private sector entities through the TSC's 24/7 Terrorist Screening Operations Center (TSOC).\n\n    For additional information see FBI web site at: <http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/nsb/tsc>\n Terrorist Screening Database (TSDB). Under Homeland Security Presidential Directive-6, the TSDB is the master terrorist watchlist, for both international and domestic terrorists, maintained by the Terrorist Screening Center (TSC) for the U.S. Government.\n\n\nTerrorist Threat. An expression of intention, by an individual or group, to commit an act or acts of violence to inflict injury or damage in pursuit of political, religious, or ideological objectives. (DoDI 2000.12, DoD Antiterrorism Program, 1 Mar 2012, w/ change 1 dated 9 Sep 2013)\n\n\n    Terrorist threats emanate from a diverse array of terrorist actors, ranging from formal groups to\nhomegrown violent extremists (HVEs) and ad hoc, foreign-based actors.\n\n    US-based extremists will likely continue to pose the most frequent threat to the US Homeland.\n\n        -- DNI, Worldwide Threat Assessment of the US Intelligence Community, SSCI, 29 January 2014, p. 4\n Terrorists with Global Reach - Transnational Terrorists.  Terrorist organizations with an operational and support network in multiple countries that possess the capability to recruit, plan, resource, and execute terrorist acts worldwide. (National Military Support Plan - War on Terrorism, 1 Feb 2006) TFCICA.  See *Task Force Counterintelligence Coordinating Authority*.\n\n\n\nTheater.  The geographical area for which a commander of a geographic combatant command has been assigned responsibility. (JP 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States, 25 Mar 2013 and JP 1-02) Theater Clearance.  Clearance for official travel within a geographic combatant command area of responsibility granted by the responsible geographic combatant commander or other delegated authority. (DoDD 4500.54E, DoD Foreign Clearance Program, 28 Dec 2009) Theater of War.  Defined by the Secretary of Defense or the geographic combatant commander, the area of air, land, and water that is, or may become, directly involved in the conduct of the war. A theater of war does not normally encompass the geographic combatant commander's entire area of responsibility and may contain more than one theater of operations. (JP 1-02) Theater Strategy.  An overarching construct outlining a combatant commander's vision for integrating and synchronizing military activities and operations with the other instruments of national power in order to achieve national strategic objectives. (JP 1-02 and JP 3-0, Joint Operations, 11 Aug 2011) Thermal Imagery.  Imagery produced by sensing and recording the thermal energy emitted or reflected from the objects which are imaged. (JP 1-02) Third Agency Rule.  An agreement among the US Government agencies participating in the exchange of intelligence data forbidding one agency to disseminate to another agency information which originated with a third agency. (National HUMINT Glossary)\n-- Also, the tenet that information, usually classified or sensitive, originating in one U.S. agency not be disseminated by another agency to which the information has not been made available without the consent of the originating agency. (AR 381-20, Army CI Program, 25 May 2010) Threat.  The intention and capability of an adversary to undertake actions that would be detrimental to the interest of the U.S. (IC Standard 700-1, 4 Apr 2008)\n-- Also, the sum of the potential strengths, capabilities, and strategic objectives of any adversary that can limit or negate U.S. mission accomplishment or reduce force, system, or equipment effectiveness. (DoDD 5200.1-M, Acquisition Systems Protection Program, March 1994)\n-- Also, an adversary having the intent, capability, and opportunity to cause loss or damage. (DoDD\n3020.40, DoD Policy and Responsibilities for Critical Infrastructure, 14 Jan 2010 w/ chg 2 dated 21 Sep 2012)\n-- Also, the perceived imminence of intended aggression by a capable entity to harm a nation, a government or its instrumentalities, such as intelligence, programs, operations, people, installations, or facilities. (DoD 5200.08-R, Physical Security Program, 9 Apr 2007) -- Also, (1) A source of unacceptable risk; or (2) The capability of an adversary coupled with the adversary's intention to undertake actions that would be detrimental to the success of certain activities or operations. (ODNI, U.S. National Intelligence - An Overview 2011) -- Also, the capability of an adversary coupled with his intentions to undertake any actions detrimental to the success of program activities or operations. (IOSS OPSEC Glossary of Terms, 27 Aug 2003) -- Also, any combination of actors, entities, or forces that have the capability and intent to harm United States forces, United States national interests, or the homeland. (ADRP 3-0, Unified Land Operations, May 2012) -- Also see threat to national security; transnational threat; foreign intelligence collection threat;\ninsider threat. Threat Advisory.  An advisory is a one-time product or produced on a recurring schedule - daily, weekly, or monthly. The advisory informs authorized recipients of an immediate or the potential for a foreign intelligence or terrorist threat.  The advisory typically contains information of a perishable nature. (DoDI 5240.18, CI Analysis & Production, 17 Nov 2009 with change 1 dated 15 Oct 2013)\n\n    A threat advisory is distinguishable from an assessment and an analysis report in that it is prepared\nwhen there is an imminent or near-term intelligence or terrorist threat.  A threat advisory often contains perishable information with only limited study or research conducted prior to publication.\n Threat Analysis.  a process that examines an adversary's technical and operational capabilities, motivation, and intentions, designed to detect and exploit vulnerabilities. (DoDM 5205.02-M, DoD OPSEC Program Manual, 3 Nov 2008)\n-- Also, *terrorism threat analysis*, a continual process of compiling and examining all available information concerning potential terrorist activities by terrorist groups that could target the DoD\nComponents or DoD elements and personnel. A threat analysis shall review the factors of a terrorist group's operational capability, intentions, activity, and the security environment within which friendly forces operate. Threat analysis is an essential step in identifying probability of terrorist attack and results in a threat assessment. (DoDI 2000.12, DoD Antiterrorism Program, 1 Mar 2012 with change 1 dated 9 Sep 2013; also JP 1-02 and JP 3-07.2, Antiterrorism, 24 Nov 2010) Threat Assessment.  A resultant product of the defined process used to conduct a threat analysis and develop an evaluation of a potential threat.  Also, it is the product of a threat analysis for a particular unit, installation, or activity. (DoD 5200.08-R, Physical Security Program, 9 Apr 2007)\n-- Also, *DCIP Threat Assessment*:  [in Defense Critical Infrastructure Protection usage] a compilation of strategic intelligence information incorporating multi-faceted threats facing DCAs [Defense Critical Assets] and Tier 1 TCAs [Task Critical Assets].  DCIP threat assessments address threats posed to DCAs [and Tier 1 TCAs] from domestic and transnational terrorist elements, foreign intelligence and security services, and weapons of mass destruction. (DoDI 5240.19, CI Support to the Defense Critical Infrastructure Program, 31 Jan 2014)\n-- Also, an evaluation of the current or projected capability of a foreign intelligence service or international terrorist group to limit, neutralize, or negate the effectiveness of a friendly mission, organization, or material item through multidisciplined intelligence collection, espionage, or sabotage. (AR 381-20, Army CI Program, 25 May 2010) -- Also, in antiterrorism, examining the capabilities, intentions, and activities, past and present, of terrorist organizations as well as the security environment within which friendly forces operate to determine the level of threat. (JP 1-02 and JP 3-07.2, Antiterrorism, 24 Nov 2010) -- Also, [in antiterrorism usage] the process used to conduct a threat analysis and develop an evaluation of a potential terrorist threat; the product of a threat analysis for a particular unit, installation, or activity. (DoDI 2000.12, DoD Antiterrorism Program, 1 Mar 2012 with change 1 dated 9 Sep 2013)\nThreat Finance.  The covert movement of the profits of illicit acts or of funds that will support illicit acts.\n(*A Guide to Counter Threat Finance Intelligence* by Marilyn B. Peterson, 2009)   Also see counter threat finance (CTF).\n\n## The Covert Movement Of Money Is The Underlying Facilitator Of All Threat Activity.\n\n\nThreat Indicator.  Any observable action that displays violent behavior, abnormal disgruntlement, radicalization, or an extreme world view on religion or another type of ideology. (US Army, Asymmetric Warfare Group, Insider Threats in Partnering Environments: *A Guide for Military Leaders*, Jun 2011)\n\n    Copy of reference available at:  <https://rdl.train.army.mil/catalog/go/100.ATSC/883A3A74-A803-\n4CD5-B693-0D59B108E7EC-1326399638300>\n\n    Reference also at: <http://www.wired.com/images_blogs/dangerroom/2012/10/awsc-pdf-CDR-\n72811.pdf>\n Threat Warning.  The urgent communication and acknowledgement of time-critical information essential for the preservation of life and/or vital resources. (JP 1-02 and JP 2-01, Joint and National Intelligence Support to Military Operations, 5 Jan 2012) Threats to the National Security.  International terrorism; espionage and other intelligence activities, sabotage, and assassination, conducted by, for, or on behalf of foreign powers, organizations, or persons;\nforeign computer intrusion; and other matters determined by the Attorney General, consistent with Executive Order 12333 or a successor order. (FBI, Domestic Investigations and Operations Guide, 15 Oct 2011) Time Bomb.  Resident computer program that triggers an unauthorized act at a predefined time. (CNSSI No. 4009, National Information Assurance Glossary, 26 April 2010) Time-Sensitive Collection Requirement (TSCR).  A HUMINT collection requirement (HCR) needing immediate or time-specific action.  Those organizations tasked with the time sensitive collection requirement should provide initial intelligence reports or a report stating an inability to collect on the requirement with 48 hours of issuance. (DHE-M 3301.002, Vol II Collection Operations, 23 Nov 2010) Tosses (hand, vehicular) [e.g., hand toss, car toss].  Tradecraft techniques for placing drops by tossing them while on the move. (CI Centre Glossary) Traces. The product resulting from a name check. (AFOSI Instruction 71-101, 6 Jun 2000) Tracking.  Precise and continuous position-finding of targets by radar, optical, or other means. (JP 1-02 and JP 3-07.4, Joint Counterdrug Operations, 13 Jun 2007) Tradecraft.  Specialized methods and equipment used in the organization and activity of intelligence organizations, especially techniques and methods for handling communications with agents.  Operational practices and skills used in the performance of intelligence related duties. (JP 1-02; JP 2-01.2, CI & HUMINT in Joint Operations, 16 Mar 2011 w/ chg 1 dated 26 Aug 2011; DoDI S-5240.17, CI Collection Activities, 14 Mar 2014; and CI Community Lexicon)\n\n\n## Tradecraft The Methods Of The Clandestine Operator... Principles And Techniques Of Clandestine Operations Successful Espionage Is Impossible Without Good Tradecraft\n\n\n\n    In general, tradecraft is the sum total of the skills the Case Officer or agent must master in order\nto securely operate in the field and preserve security of operational activity.\n_____________________\n\n   \"Tradecraft is an arta combination of common sense and imagination....  [T]he art of tradecraft,\nthe methods employed to mange an intelligence operation. It is an art because of the nuances involved and it is not easy to learn. Some, lacking the personality traits, can never master it.\"\n\n        -- Richard L. Holm, The Craft We Chose (2011), pp 25 and 275\n_____________________\n\n\n\n    The techniques adopted by spies to conceal their activities are lumped together under the\ncatch-all term \"tradecraft.\"  It refers to a vast range of protective measures devised to preserve\nthe operational security of spying.\n\n        -- Frederick P. Hitz (Former CIA IG 1990-1998), *The Great Game* (2005)\n___________________\n\n    Pillars of Tradecraft: assessment; cover and disguise; concealments; clandestine surveillance;\nand covert communications.\n\n        -- *Spycraft* (p. 363)\n___________________\n\n    [T]he greatest danger... lay not in betrayal by a Soviet mole, as Angleton would have it, but by\nsimple mistakes in tradecraft and a failure to maintain proper compartmentation of information.\n\n         -- Benjamin Weiser, *A Secret Life* (2004)\n___________________\n\n\"The spy who does not take tradecraft seriously is unlikely to remain a spy for very long.\"\n\n-- H.H.A. Cooper and Lawrence J. Redlinger, Making Spies: A Talent Spotter's Handbook -- Also, the art, discipline and methodology of conducting secure clandestine operations and intelligence collection. (National HUMINT Glossary) -- Also, the tactics, techniques, and procedures used in executing HUMINT, counterintelligence,\nor related activities to obscure, protect, or otherwise frustrate detection. (HDI Lexicon, April 2008) -- Also, specialized techniques used in intelligence operations. (FBI FCI Terms)\n\n-- Also, the techniques, technology, and methodologies used in covert intelligence operations.\n\nTradecraft applies to both the procedures, such as surveillance detection routes, as well as the use of devices in covert audio and agent communications. (Spycraft) -- Also, the art, methodology, and know-how of conducting clandestine operations and intelligence collection techniques. Includes such things as dead drops, covert communications, how to recruit agents, secret writing and photography, surveillance, and surveillance detection. (A Spy's Journey)\n-- Also, the essential skills required to conduct successful clandestine operations. (Encyclopedia of Cold War Espionage, Spies, and Secret Operations, 3rd edition, 2012) -- Also, the techniques of the espionage trade, or the methods by which an agency involved in espionage conducts its business. Elements of tradecraft, in general terms, include the ways in which an intelligence officer arranges to make contact with an agent, the means by which the agent passes on information to the officer, the method for paying the agent, and the many precautions and tactics of deception applied along the way. (<http://www.espionageinfo.com/Te-Uk/Tradecraft.html>)\nTradecraft - Analytical.  The term \"tradecraft\" usually applied to espionage techniques, but there is also analytical tradecraft:  techniques, methods, and standards of the practice of analysis, e.g., framing questions, marshaling evidence, making concise arguments, identifying intelligence gaps, etc.  Analytical tradecraft affords some criteria by which to judge analytical products and analysts.\n\nTransmission Security.  The component of communications security that results from all measures designed to protect transmissions from interception and exploitation by means other than cryptanalysis.\n\n(JP 1-02 and JP 6-0, Joint Communications, 10 Jun 2010)   Also see *communications security*. Transnational Threat.  Any transnational activity (including international terrorism, narcotics trafficking, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and the delivery for such weapons, and organized crime) that threatens the national security of the United States. (50 USC 401a)\n\n-- Also, any activity, individual, or group not tied to a particular country or region that operates across international boundaries and threatens United States national security or interests. (JP 1-02 and JP 3-26, Counterterrorism, 13 Nov 2009)\n\n    DoD further defines a *transnational threat* as any activity, individual, or group not tied to a particular\ncountry or region that operates across international boundaries and threatens US national security or interests. These threats also include extremists who enter into convenient relationships that\nexploit each others' capabilities and cloud the distinction between crime and terrorism (e.g., violent\nextremist organizations and opportunists, drug trafficking organizations, transnational criminal organizations [TCOs], and those trafficking in persons).\n\n    Lawless and subversive organizations can take advantage of failed states, contested spaces, and\nungoverned areas by forging alliances with corrupt government officials and some foreign intelligence services, further destabilizing political, financial, and security institutions in fragile states, undermining competition in world strategic markets, using cyberspace technologies and other methods to perpetrate sophisticated frauds, creating the potential for the transfer of WMD to terrorists, and expanding narco-trafficking and human and weapons smuggling networks.\n\n      -- JP 3-27, Homeland Defense, 29 Jul 2013 (p. I-4)\n Transnational Organized Crime (TOC). Self-perpetuating associations who operate transnationally for the purpose of obtaining power, influence, monetary and/or commercial gains, wholly or in part by illegal means, while protecting their activities through a pattern of corruption and/ or violence, or while protecting their illegal activities through a transnational organizational structure and the exploitation of transnational commerce or communication mechanisms. (White House, Strategy to Combat Transnational Organized Crime, Jul 2011)\n\n\n## Transnational Criminal Organizations Pose A National Security Threat\n\n\n    TOC represent a globally-networked national security threat and pose a real and present risk to the\nsafety and security of Americans and our partners across the globe.\n\n    *Countering TOC* is defined as the means to detect, counter, contain, disrupt, deter, or dismantle\nthe transnational activities of state and non-state adversaries threatening U.S. and partner nation national security.\n\n    Copy of the *Strategy to Combat Transnational Organized Crime* (July 2011) *at:*\n<https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=682263>.\n\n    Also see The \"New\" Face of Transnational Crime Organizations (TCOs): A Geopolitical\nPerspective and Implications to U.S. National Security, March 2013 (a compendium of white papers on TCOs).\n__________________________\n\n  \"Transnational organized crime (TOC) networks erode good governance, cripple the rule of law\nthrough corruption, hinder economic competitiveness, steal vast amounts of money, and traffic millions of people around the globe. (Cybercrime, an expanding for-profit TOC enterprise....) TOC threatens US national interests in a number of ways: ...drug activity, facilitating terrorist activity, money laundering, corruption, human trafficking, and environmental crime.\"\n\n        -- James R. Clapper, DNI, Statement for the Record, Worldwide Threat Assessment of the US Intelligence\n           Community, Senate Committee on Armed Services, 18 April 2013\n Trap.  A hidden indicator to detect or confirm surreptitious tampering or search of items (e.g., documents, letters, packages, luggage, drawers, safes, rooms, film, equipment) by security or other personnel. (AFOSI Manual 71-119, CI Investigations, 27 Oct 2009)\nTrap and Trace.  A device which capture the incoming electronic or other impulses which identify the origination number of an instrument or device from which a wire or electronic communication was transmitted; see 18 USC 3127(4). (AR 381-10, US Army Intelligence Activities, 3 May 2007)  Also see pen register; trap and trace device.\n\n    A *trap and trace device* identifies all incoming phone numbers to a particular telephone.\n\nA *pen register* captures all outgoing phone numbers a particular telephone has called.\n\n Trap and Trace Device.  Captures the incoming electronic or other impulses that identify the originating number or other dialing, routing, addressing or signaling information reasonably likely to identify the source of a wire or electronic communication, provided that such information does not include the contents of any communication. (FBI Domestic Investigations and Operations Guide, 15 Oct 2011) Also see *pen register; trap and trace*. Trash Cover. The intentional search of a specific person's trash (that is located at the place of collection), whether from a home or business, designed to find information relevant to an ongoing investigation when no reasonable expectation of privacy exists. A trash cover is a targeted effort to gather information regarding a particular person or entity by reviewing that person or entity's refuse. (FBI Domestic Investigations and Operations Guide, 15 Oct 2011) Treason.  -- Violation of the allegiance owed to one's sovereign or state; betrayal of one's country. (JP 1-02)\n\n-- Also, [previously defined in DoDI 5240.06, *CI Awareness, Briefing, and Reporting Programs*, 7 Aug\n2004) Whoever, owing allegiance to the United States, levies war against them or adheres to their enemies, giving them aid and comfort within the United States or elsewhere, is guilty of treason [in war time, treason is a violation of Title 18 USC,  2381].\n\n## \"Treason Is The Ultimate Mid-Life Crisis.\" -- Dr. Marcus, Cia Psychiatrist In *Sira* By David Ignatius\n\n\n    Treason is the only crime specifically defined in the U.S. Constitution.  Article III Section 3\ndelineates treason as follows:  \"Treason against the United States, shall consist only in levying War against them, or in adhering to their Enemies, giving them Aid and Comfort. No Person shall be convicted of Treason unless on the Testimony of two Witnesses to the same overt Act, or on Confession in open Court.\"\n\n    The crime is prohibited by legislation passed by Congress; 18 U.S.C.  2381 states \"whoever,\nowing allegiance to the United States, levies war against them or adheres to their enemies, giving them aid and comfort within the United States or elsewhere, is guilty of treason and shall suffer death, or shall be imprisoned not less than five years and fined under this title but not less than $10,000; and shall be incapable of holding any office under the United States.\"  In the history of the United States there have been fewer than 40 federal prosecutions for treason and even fewer convictions.\n__________________________\n\n   \"Treason is the ultimate word of betrayal. Treason means stabbing your country on the back. But in\nlegal terms, treason, the only crime that is defined in the U.S. Constitution has a narrow meaning... The founding fathers, well aware of the political use of treason charges by the kings of England, wanted to restrict the crime to one that could not be used as an excuse for the elimination of political rivals.\"\n\n        -- Thomas B. Allen and Norman Polmar, *Merchants of Treason: America's Secrets for Sale* (1988), p. 176\n_________________________\n\n\n## \"Treason Is Loved Of Many, But The Traitor Is Hated Of All.\"\n\n-- Robert Greene\n\nTriple Agent.  An agent who serves three [intelligence] services in an agent capacity but who, like a double agent, wittingly or unwittingly withholds significant information from two services at the instigation of the third service. (FBI FCI Terms)\nTrojan.  A type of malware disguised or attached to legitimate or innocuous-seeming software, but that instead carries a malicious payload, most often opening a backdoor to unauthorized users. (Cybersecurity and cyberwar)   Also see *Trojan Horse*.\n\n\n\nTrojan Horse.  A computer program that appears to have a useful function, but also has a hidden and potentially malicious function that evades security mechanisms, sometimes by exploiting legitimate authorizations of a system entity that invokes the program. (CNSSI No. 4009, National Information Assurance Glossary, 26 April 2010)  Also see *Trojan.*\n-- Also, a computer program with an apparently or actually useful function that contains additional\n(hidden) functions that surreptitiously exploit the legitimate authorizations of the invoking process to the detriment of security (for example, making a \"blind copy\" of a sensitive file for the creator of the Trojan horse). (DoD 5220.22.22-M-Sup 1, NISPOM Supplement, Feb 1995)\n-- Also, a malicious program that pretends to be a benign application; it purposefully does something the user does not expect. Trojans are not viruses since they do not replicate, but they can be just as destructive. (McAfee.com; accessed 15 Nov 2010) True Name.  A genuine and accurate representation of an individual or organization name, that may involve alterations of other identity information (e.g., address, telephone number, credit score, employer) when used under an approved cover in order to conceal true identity, purpose, or organizational affiliation. (DoDI S-5105.63, Implementation of DoD Cover and Cover Support Activities, 20 Jun 2013) Trusted Foundry Program.  DoD program that provides a cost-effective means to assure the integrity and confidentiality of integrated circuits during design and manufacturing while providing the US Government with access to leading edge microelectronics technologies for both Trusted and non-sensitive applications. (DMEA web site)\n\n    Defense Microelectronics Activity (DMEA) is the program manager for the DoD Trusted Foundry\nprogram;  see website at:  <http://www.dmea.osd.mil/trustedic.html>\n\n    Also see NSA's Trusted Access Program Office (TAPO) web site at:\n<http://www.nsa.gov/business/programs/tapo.shtml>\n TSCM.  See *Technical Surveillance Countermeasures*. TSCM Practitioner.  An individual trained and certified to conduct all TSCM activities within DoD. (DoDI 5240.05, TSCM, 3 Apr 2014)   Also see *TSCM Technician*. TSCM Technician.  An individual trained to perform limited TSCM activities under the oversight of a TSCM practitioner. (DoDI 5240.05, TSCM, 3 Apr 2014)  Also see *TSCM Practitioner*. TSCM Equipment.  Equipment or mechanisms used to identify the presence of surveillance devices. TSCM includes general purpose, specialized, or fabricated equipment to determine the existence and capability of surveillance devices. (DoDI 5240.05, TSCM, 3 Apr 2014) Turnover.  The official changing of an agent from one case officer to the otheri.e., turning him over to another. (A Spy's Journey)\nTwo-Person Control (TPC).  the continuous surveillance and control of material at all times by a minimum of two authorized individuals, each capable of detecting incorrect or unauthorized procedures with respect to the task being performed and each familiar with established security requirements. (DoDI 5200.33, Defense Courier Operations, 30 Jun 2011) Also see *two-person integrity; two-person rule.*\n\n-- Also, continuous surveillance and control of positive control material at all times  by a minimum of two authorized individuals, each capable of detecting incorrect and unauthorized procedures with respect to the task being performed and each familiar with established security and safety requirements. (CNSSI No. 4009, National Information Assurance Glossary, 26 April 2010)\n\n\nTwo-Person Integrity.  A provision that prohibits one person from working alone. (DoD 5220.22.22-M- Sup 1, NISPOM Supplement, Feb 1995) Two-Person Rule.  A system designed to prohibit access by an individual to nuclear weapons and certain designated components by requiring the presence at all times of at least two authorized persons, each capable of detecting incorrect or unauthorized procedures with respect to the task to be performed. (JP 1-02)\n\n## U\n\n========================================== Umbrella Special Access Program (SAP).  An approved Department of Defense (DoD) Special Access Program (SAP) that contains compartments for specific projects within the overall program. While there is no formal requirement to obtain separate approval for each individual project under the umbrella SAP, each project must be consistent with the Special Access Program Oversight Committee (SAPOC)- approved scope of the umbrella SAP. The nickname, program description, and accomplishments of each significant project will be reported in the annual Special Access Program report. Note: An individual participant's access can be afforded across-the-board at the umbrella level or specific individual project access can be granted on a limited or non-umbrella level. (DSS Glossary)\nUnacceptable Risk.  Threat to the life, safety, or health of employees, contractors, vendors, or visitors; to the Government's physical assets or information systems; to personal property; to records, privileged, proprietary, financial, or medical records; or to the privacy of data subjects, which will not be tolerated by the Government. (DoDI 5200.02, DoD Personnel Security Program, 21 Mar 2014) Unacknowledged SAP.  A SAP [Special Access Program] having protective controls ensuring the existence of the program is not acknowledged, affirmed, or made known to any person not authorized for such information. (DoDD 5205.07, SAP Policy, 1 Jul 2010)  Also see *acknowledged SAP*. Unauthorized Access.  Any access that violates the stated security policy. (CNSSI No. 4009, National Information Assurance Glossary, 26 April 2010) Unauthorized Disclosure.  A communication or physical transfer of classified information to an unauthorized recipient. (EO 13526, Classified National Security Information, 29 Dec 2009 and DoDD 5210.50, Unauthorized Disclosure of Classified Information to the Public, 22 Jul 2005)\n\n    Unauthorized disclosures of classified information, including media leaks, may compromise\nsources and methods and pose a threat to national security.\n\n        -- ICD 701 Security Policy for Unauthorized Disclosures of Classified Information, 14 Mar 2007\n\n-- Also, a communication or physical transfer, usually of sensitive but unclassified information or\nclassified information, to an unauthorized recipient. (ODNI, U.S. National Intelligence - An Overview 2011)\n-- Also, an event involving the exposure of information to entities not authorized access to the information. (CNSSI No. 4009, National Information Assurance Glossary, 26 April 2010)\n\n-- Also, intentionally conveying classified documents, information, or material to any unauthorized person (one without the required clearance, access, and need to know). (AR 381-12, Threat Awareness and Reporting Program, 4 Oct 2010)\n\n    Unauthorized disclosures of classified information put at risk the success of the most sensitive\nclassified operations, plans, partnerships, and technologies of DoD and our mission partners.\n\n    Personnel who disclose classified information without authorization, in addition to having potentially\ncommitted a crime, breach the trust that we, as leaders, have placed in them.\n\n## Unauthorized Disclosure Of Classified Information Is An Increasingly Common Occurrence. The Harm Caused By... Frequent Unauthorized Disclosures Is Manifold.  Particular Items Of\n\ninformation appearing in the press provide valuable intelligence for our adversaries concerning the\ncapabilities and plans of the United States for national defense and foreign relations.... Disclosures\nabout US intelligence programs are particularly damaging, because they may cause sources to dry up. Lives of human agents are endangered and expensive technical systems become subject to countermeasures.\n\n        --*The Willard Report*, 31 March 1982\n\n\n## Leaking Sensitive Information Is Like Giving The Enemy Our Play Book.\n\n____________________\n\n    Each year, countless unauthorized leaks cause severe damage to our intelligence activities and\nexpose our capabilities. The fact of the matter is, some of the worst damage done to our intelligence community has come not from penetration by spies, but from unauthorized leaks by those with access to classified information....  The threat leaks pose to our national security is alarming, and it is imperative we do more to protect our national secrets.\n\n        -- Congressman Rep. Pete Hoekstra at the Heritage Foundation, 25 July 2005.\n            See full remarks at  <http://www.fas.org/sgp/news/2005/07/hoekstra072505.html>\n____________________\n\n    Intelligence requires secrets.  And secrecy is under assault....  When secrecy is breached, foreign\ntargets of US intelligencesuch as adversary countries and terroristslearn about, and then often develop countermeasures to, US intelligence techniques and operations.  As a result, the effectiveness of intelligence declines, to the detriment of the national security policymakers and warfighters, and the citizenry that it is meant to serve.\n\n       -- James B. Bruce, Former CIA Officer\n\n    See Bruce's excellent article, entitled \"The Consequences of Permissive Neglect: Laws and Leaks\nof Classified Intelligence\" in *Studies of Intelligence* (Vol 47 No 1), available online at:\n<https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/csistudies/studies/vol47no1/article04.html>\n____________________\n\n     Leaks are a problem that has plagued intelligence agencies throughout modern history - they can\nundermine intelligence operations, jeopardize intelligence sources and methods, and have a terrible impact on the lives of covert agents who are publicly exposed.\n\n        -- Senator Ron Wyden, cited in Senate Report 112-12, 4 April 2011, p. 12\n____________________\n\n    The unauthorized release of classified documents in 2010 by major newspapers and the Wikileaks\nwebsite underscore the risks of widespread dissemination of sensitive information.\n          -- CRS Report RL33539, *Intelligence Issues for Congress*, 20 Jun 2011\n____________________\n\n    In the secret operations canon it is axiomatic that the probability of leaks escalates exponentially\neach time a classified document is exposed to another personbe it an Agency employee, a member of Congress, a senior official, a typist, or a file clerk. Effective compartmentation is fundamental to all secret activity.... The potential leaksdeliberate or accidentalis vast.\n\n        -- Richard Helms with William Hood, *A Look Over My Shoulder* (2003), pp.184-185\n____________________\n\n    Every once in a while, there are people in the United States government who decide that they want\nto break federal criminal law and release classified information, and they ought to be imprisoned. And if we find out who they are, they will be imprisoned. Why people do it, I do not know.\n\n       -- Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld\n____________________\n\n\n\n    When information about our intelligence, our people, or our operations appears in the media, it\ndoes incredible damage to our nation's security and our ability to do our job of protecting the nation. More importantly, it could jeopardize lives. For this reason, such leaks cannot be tolerated.\"\n\n        -- CIA Director Leon Panetta, Nov 2010\n____________________\n\n    Leaks of classified information regarding intelligence sources and methods can disrupt intelligence\noperations, threaten the lives of intelligence officers and assets, and make foreign partners less likely to work with us. The culture of leaks has to change.\n\n        -- Senator Dianne Feinstein, Chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee, 25 July 2012\n Uncertain Environment.  Operational environment in which host government forces, whether opposed to or receptive to operations that a unit intends to conduct, do not have totally effective control of the territory and population in the intended operational area. (JP 1-02 and JP 3-0, Joint Operations, 11 Aug 2011)\nUncertainty.  Doubt resulting from awareness of imperfect knowledge. This may arise from information absence, perceived error, deception, unpersuasive nature of evidence, complexity, etc. (A Handbook of the Psychology of Intelligence Analysis, Richard L. Rees, Ph.D., Editor; n.d. - circa 2007)\n\n\n    In analysis, uncertainty can derive from seeing plausible alternatives to the truth (the latter of which\nmay be unknown or unknowable). Moreover, emotional and motivational factors attend cognitive uncertainty. Analysts can feel anxiety or discomfort if they lack confidence or self-esteem generally, feel an aversion to ambiguity, or have a need to please, or have a hypersensitivity to criticism. This affective element can exist even in the presence of sufficient evidence to make a reasonable judgment. Some analyst may well estimate the truth, butin contrast to the inscription on the wall of the CIA lobby (*John* 8:32)the truth.\n\n       *-- A Handbook of the Psychology of Intelligence Analysis*, Richard L. Rees, Ph.D., Editor; n.d., p. 375\n Unconventional Warfare (UW).  A broad spectrum of military and paramilitary operations, normally of long duration, predominantly conducted through, with, or by indigenous or surrogate forces who are organized, trained, equipped, supported, and directed in varying degrees by an external source. It includes, but is not limited to, guerrilla warfare, subversion, sabotage, intelligence activities, and unconventional assisted recovery. (DoDD 3000.07, Irregular Warfare, 1 Dec 2008)\n-- Also, activities conducted to enable a resistance movement or insurgency to coerce, disrupt, or overthrow a government or occupying power by operating through or with an underground, auxiliary, and guerrilla force in a denied area. (JP 3-05, Special Operations, 18 Apr 2011) Undeclared.  An officer, asset, agent, or action whose agency affiliation is not formally identified to a foreign intelligence or security service, government or organization, or other US Government entity.\n\n(National HUMINT Glossary)\n\n-- Also, an individual or action whose intelligence affiliation is not disclosed. (HDI Lexicon, April 2008) Undercover Activity.  Any investigative activity involving the use of an assumed identity by an undercover employee for an official purpose, investigative activity, or function. (FBI, Domestic Investigations and Operations Guide, 15 Oct 2011) Undercover  Employee.  An employee of the FBI, another federal, state, or local law enforcement agency, another entity of the United States Intelligence Community (USIC), or another foreign intelligence agency working under the direction and control of the FBI whose relationship with the FBI is concealed from third parties by the maintenance of a cover or alias identity for an official purpose, investigative activity, or function. (FBI, Domestic Investigations and Operations Guide, 15 Oct 2011)\n\n\nUndercover Operation. A phrase usually associated with the law enforcement community and which describes an operation that is so planned and executed as to conceal the identity of, or permit plausible denial by, the sponsor. (DSS Glossary) Understand.  The ability to individually and collectively comprehend the implications of the character, nature, or subtleties of information about the environment and situation to aid decision-making. (Joint Capability Areas Taxonomy & Lexicon, 15 Jan 2008) Unified Action.  The synchronization, coordination, and/or integration of the activities of governmental and  nongovernmental entities with military operations to achieve unity of effort. (JP 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States, 25 Mar 2013) Unified Command Plan (UCP).  The document, approved by the President, that sets forth basic guidance to all unified combatant commanders; establishes their missions, responsibilities, and force structure; delineates the general geographical area of responsibility for geographic combatant commanders; and specifies functional responsibilities for functional combatant commanders. (JP 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States, 25 Mar 2013 and JP 1-02)  Also see *Combatant Command*.\n\n Six Combatant Commands (COCOMs) have geographic area responsibilities: -- U.S. Northern Command (NORTHCOM) -- U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) -- U.S. European Command (EUCOM) -- U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM) -- U.S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM)\n        -- U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM)\n\n Three COCOMs that have worldwide functional responsibilities not bounded by geography: -- U.S. Special Operations Command (SOCOM) -- U.S. Strategic Command (STRATCOM) -- U.S. Transportation Command (TRANSCOM)\n\n    Note:  U.S. Joint Forces Command (JFCOM) was disestablished in August 2011.\n\n    For additional information, see CRS Report, The Unified Command Plan and Combatant\nCommands: Background and Issues for Congress, 3 Jan 2013, copy available at: <http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R42077.pdf>\n Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ).  The criminal code governing the Armed Services of the United States. (CI Community Lexicon)\n\n    UCMJ (10 USC Chapter 47), is the foundation of military law in the United States.  See UCMJ\nappendix in Manual for Courts-Martial (MCM): <http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/law/mcm.pdf>\n Unilateral Operation.  A clandestine activity conducted without the knowledge or assistance of a foreign intelligence or security service, host country, foreign organization, or non-state actor. (National HUMINT Glossary) United States (US). Includes the land area, internal waters, territorial sea, and airspace of the United States, including the following:  a) US territories, possessions, and commonwealths; and b) Other areas over which the US Government has complete jurisdiction and control or has exclusive authority or defense responsibility. (JP 1-02)\n-- Also, when used in a geographic sense, means all areas under the territorial sovereignty of the United States. (FBI Domestic Investigations and Operations Guide, 15 Oct 2011)\n\n\nUnity of Effort.  Coordination and cooperation toward common objectives, even if the participants are not necessarily part of the same command or organization - the product of successful unified action. (JP 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States, 25 Mar 2013 and JP 1-02) Unknown Subject (UNSUB).  The subject of an investigation, whose identity has not been determined, commonly referred to as an \"UNSUB.\"  Also see *DoD Unknown Subject*. Unknown Subject Lead.  [Within DoD,] information indicating an unidentified current or former DoD- affiliated individual may have passed information or provided support to an FIE. (DoD Manual 5240.26, CI Insider Threat Program, *draft* 20 Nov 2013) Unload Signal.  A visual signal to indicate the departure of an individual or removal of an object from a given locale. (HDI Lexicon, April 2008) Unsolicited Correspondence.  Request for information from a person which may range from direct inquiries by phone, e-mail, fax, or letter in which the recipient is asked to provide seemingly innocuous data. (AR 381-12, Threat Awareness and Reporting Program, 4 Oct 2010)\n\n    Typical requests include solicitation of research papers, requests for additional information after\na public presentation, suggestions for mutual research, requests for survey participation, and so forth; correspondence where the actual purpose may be to identify by name and position any individual who might be targeted later by a foreign intelligence service, and to elicit targeted information not readily obtainable by other means.\n Unwitting.  A person who is not aware of USG sponsorship of or affiliation with the cover. (DoDI S-5105.63, Implementation of DoD Cover and Cover Support Activities, 20 Jun 2013)  Also see *witting.*\n-- Also, not aware of US Government sponsorship or affiliation. (National HUMINT Glossary)\n-- Also, unaware of the true nature of the activities being conducted or of the intelligence connections of persons involved. (HDI Lexicon, April 2008) U.S. Coast Guard (USCG).  A military, multi-function, maritime service that is the principal Federal agency responsible for safety, security, and stewardship with the maritime domain. It has diverse missions: national defense, homeland security, maritime safety, and environmental & natural resources stewardship. In March 2003, pursuant to the Homeland Security Act, the USCG was transferred from the Department of Transportation to the Department of Homeland Security (DHS).\n\n    The CI component of the USCG is the Coast Guard Counterintelligence Service (CGCIS).\n\nU.S. Homeland.  The physical territory of the United States: the 50 states, District of Columbia, US territories and territorial waters; significant infrastructure linked to the United States; and major commercial air, land and sea corridors into the country.  Also see *homeland*. U.S. National.  US citizen and US permanent and temporary legal resident aliens. (JP 1-02)\nU.S. Person (USPERS; also USP).  For intelligence purposes, a US person is defined as one of the following: 1) a US citizen; 2) an alien known by the intelligence agency concerned to be a permanent resident alien; 3) an unincorporated association substantially composed of US citizens or permanent resident aliens; or 4)      a corporation incorporated in the United States, except for those directed and controlled by a foreign government or governments. (JP 1-02 and JP 2-01.2, CI & HUMINT in Joint Operations, 16 Mar 2011 w/ chg 1 dated 26 Aug 2011)\n\n\nU.S. Secret Service (USSS).  A federal law enforcement agency mandated by Congress to carry out dual missions:  protection of national and visiting foreign leaders, and criminal investigations.\n\n(www.secretservice.gov)\n\n    The Secret Service was established in 1865, solely to suppress the counterfeiting of U.S. currency.\nHeadquarters in Washington, D.C. and more than 150 offices throughout the United States and\nabroad. Congress transferred USSS to the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) in 2002.\n\n    Criminal investigation activities encompass financial crimes, identity theft, counterfeiting, computer\nfraud, and computer-based attacks on the nation's financial, banking, and telecommunications\ninfrastructure.\n\n    Protection mission is the most prominent of the two, covering the President, Vice President, their\nfamilies, former Presidents, and major candidates for those offices, along with the White House and\nthe Vice President's residence (through the Service's Uniformed Division). Protective duties of the\nService also extend to foreign missions in the District of Columbia and to designated individuals, such as the Homeland Security Secretary and visiting foreign dignitaries.\n\n    Separate from these specific mandated assignments, USSS is responsible for certain security\nactivities such as National Special Security Events (NSSEs), which include the major party quadrennial national conventions as well as international conferences and events held in the United States.\n U.S.A. Patriot Act.  USA Patriot Act of 2011 (Public Law 107-56); see *Patriot Act*.\n\n\n\nV ========================================== Validation.  [In intelligence usage], a process associated with the collection and production of intelligence that confirms that an intelligence collection or production requirement is sufficiently important to justify the dedication of intelligence resources, does not duplicate an existing requirement, and has not been previously satisfied.  (JP 1-02 and JP 2-01.2, CI & HUMINT in Joint Operations, 16 Mar 2011 w/ chg 1 dated 26 Aug 2011)\nVault.  A room(s) used for the storing, handling, discussing, and/or processing of Special Access Program\n(SAP) information and constructed to afford maximum protection against unauthorized entry. (DSS Glossary) Vehicle-Borne Improvised Explosive Device (VBIED).  A device placed or fabricated in an improvised manner on a vehicle incorporating destructive, lethal, noxious, pyrotechnic, or incendiary chemicals and designed to destroy, incapacitate, harass, or distract. Otherwise known as a car bomb. (JP 1-02 and JP 3-10, Joint Security Operations in Theater, 3 Feb 2010) VENONA.  Highly classified U.S. SIGINT (cryptanalysis) effort during World War II to decipher encoded Soviet intelligence messages transmitted to Moscow on espionage activity in the United States. VENOA traffic indicated that the Soviets had over 300 assets of various kinds inside numerous U.S. Government agencies.\n\n-- Also, code name for the U.S. codebreaking project that deciphered portions of the texts of Soviet intelligence messages between Moscow and other cities in the 1940s. Most messages concerned spy activities in the United States. (Spy Book)\nI stood in the vestibule of the enemy's house, having entered by stealth.\n\nI held in my hand a set of keys... and we were determined to use them.\n\n\n-- FBI Agent Robert J. Lamphere\n________________________\n\n\n    VENONA decryptions of Soviet intelligence messages in the 1940s, majority during WWII, identified\nnumerous agents with access to the White House, Congress, and political parties, as well as agents in the media and in high-tech defense industries, however 178 Russian code names have yet to be linked to the true names of the American spies.\n\n    Research in Soviet Archives has added to the corroboration of some VENONA material, including\nthe identities of many codenamed individuals\n\n    For additional information: <www.nsa.gov/public_info/declass/venona/index.shtml> <http://web.archive.org/web/20060614231955/http://www.nsa.gov/publications/publi00039.cfm>\n   Also see \"In the Enemy's House: Venona and the Maturation of American Counterintelligence\" at:\n   <http://web.archive.org/web/20061115021025/http://www.fbi.gov/libref/historic/history/foxpaper.htm>\n\n    Also see *The FBI-KGB War: A Special Agent's Story* by Robert J. Lamphere and Tom Shachtman.\n\nVetting.  A generic term to describe the full spectrum of asset evaluation for authenticity, reliability and hostile control.  It includes ops testing, caser officer and psychological assessment, polygraph, security, counterintelligence interview, production review and personal record questionnaires. (National HUMINT Glossary)  Also see *asset validation, source validation* and *counterintelligence flags*.\n\n-- Also, as related to *source validation*, an ongoing process the purpose of which is to continually determine, by means of specific operational acts and analytical assessments, the motivation, veracity, and control of a reporting source. (DoDI S-3325.07, Guidance for the Conduct of DoD Human Source Validation (U), 22 Jun 2009) -- Also, the complete process of investigating and testing a potential source or information to determine its ability and suitability for clandestine activities. (AFOSI Instruction 71-101, 6 Jun 2000) -- Also, a process of examination and evaluation, generally referring to performing a background check on someone before offering him or her employment, conferring an award, etc. In addition, in intelligence gathering, assets are vetted to determine their usefulness. (en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Vetting)\n\"Vetting\" literally means getting a sick animal examined by a veterinarian;\nit has evolved into a term  meaning to test or scrutinize.\n\n-- Spy Book\n__________________\n\n\n    Vetting is used in agent/source authentication.  The vetting process is one of testing and examining\nthe agent to determine the degree of the agent's/source's reliability and truthfulness in reporting information.  It is designed to weed out fabricators and double agents.\n Violent Behavior. The intentional use of physical force or power, threatened or actual, against a person or group that either results in or has a high likelihood of injury, death, or psychological harm to self or others. (DoDI 1438.06, DoD Workplace Violence Prevention and Response Policy 16 Jan 2014) Violent Extremism.  Individuals who openly express their religious, political, or ideological views through violence or a call for violence. (US Army Tactical Reference Guide,  Radicalization into Violent Extremism:  *A Guide for Military Leaders*, Aug 2011)  Also see radicalization, terrorism, violent radicalization.\n\n--Also, any ideology that encourages, endorses, condones, justifies, or supports the commission of a violent act or crime... to achieve political, social, or economic changes.... (FBI Counterterrorism Analytical Lexicon) -- Also, the process of adopting or promoting an extremist belief system for the purpose of facilitating ideologically based violence to advance political, religious, or social change. (House Bill 1955, 110th Congress, 24 Oct 2007)\n\n\n    Copy of Army reference cited above available at:\n<https://rdl.train.army.mil/catalog/go/100.ATSC/883A3A74-A803-4CD5-B693-0D59B108E7EC- 1326399638300>     Reference also at:\n    <http://www.wired.com/images_blogs/dangerroom/2012/10/awsc-pdf-CDR-72811.pdf>\n\n## _____________________ The Complexity Of Violent Extremism\n\n\n   The threat posed by violent extremism is neither constrained by international borders nor limited to\nany single ideology. Groups and individuals inspired by a range of religious, political, or other ideological beliefs have promoted and used violence against the homeland.\n\n    Increasingly sophisticated use of the Internet, mainstream and social media, and information\ntechnology by violent extremists adds an additional layer of complexity.\n\n       -- Department of Homeland Security See <http://www.dhs.gov/topic/countering-violent-extremism. (accessed 16 Jul 2013)\n_____________________\n\n\"Violent extremism presents one of the greatest threats to the citizenry of the United States and its allies.\"\n\n-- *Edges of Radicalization*, Combating Terrorism Center, Feb 2012, p. 6\n\nViolent Jihadist.  The term characterizes jihadists who have made the jump to illegally supporting, plotting, or directly engaging in violent terrorist activity. (CRS Report R41416, 23 Jan 2013)\n\n    American Jihadist Terrorism: Combating a Complex Threat, CRS Report R41416, 23 Jan 2013\navailable online at: <http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/terror/R41416.pdf>\n Violent Radicalization.  The process of adopting or promoting an extremist belief system for the purpose of facilitating ideologically based violence to advance political, religious, or social change. (House Bill 1955, 24 Oct 2007)  Also see *radicalization, terrorism, violent extremism*. Virus.  Malicious software; a form of Trojan horse that reproduces itself in other executable code. (DoD 5220.22.22-M-Sup 1, NISPOM Supplement, Feb 1995)  Also see *computer virus*.\n\n-- Also, a computer program that can copy itself and infect a computer without permission or knowledge of the user. A virus might corrupt or delete data on a computer, use e-mail programs to spread itself to other computers, or even erase everything on a hard disk. (CNSSI No. 4009, National Information Assurance Glossary, 26 April 2010)\n-- Also, a software program, script, or macro that has been designed to infect, destroy, modify, or cause other problems with a computer or software program. (US Army TRADOC DCSINT Handbook 1.02, 15 Aug 2007)\n\n    A virus is a computer program file capable of attaching to disks or other files and replicating itself\nrepeatedly, typically without user knowledge or permission. Some viruses attach to files so when the infected file executes, the virus also executes. Other viruses sit in a computer's memory and infect files as the computer opens, modifies, or creates the files. Some viruses display symptoms, and others damage files and computer systems, but neither is essential in the definition of a virus; a non-damaging virus is still a virus.\n\n        - McAfee.com; accessed 15 Nov 2010\n Volunteer.  A person who initiates contact with a government, and who volunteers operational or intelligence information and/or request political asylum; includes call-ins, walk-ins, virtual walk-ins, and write-ins. (National HUMINT Glossary) Vulnerability.  1) The susceptibility of a nation or military force to any action by any means through which its war potential or combat effectiveness may be reduced or its will to fight diminished; 2). The characteristics of a system that cause it to suffer a definite degradation (incapability to perform the designated mission) as a result of having been subjected to a certain level of effects in an unnatural (man-made) hostile environment; and 3) In information operations, a weakness in information system security design, procedures, implementation, or internal controls that could be exploited to gain unauthorized access to information or an information system. (JP 1-02 and JP 3-60, Joint Targeting,\n13 Apr 2007)\n-- Also, a situation or circumstance, which left unchanged, may result in the degradation, loss of life, or damage to mission-essential resources. (DoD 5200.08-R, Physical Security Program, 9 Apr 2007)\n-- Also, a weakness or susceptibility of an installation, system, asset, application, or its dependencies that could cause it to suffer a degradation or loss (incapacity to perform its designated function) as a result of having been subjected to a certain level of threat or hazard. (DoDD 3020.40, DoD Policy and Responsibilities for Critical Infrastructure, 14 Jan 2010 w/ chg 2 dated 21 Sep 2012)\n-- Also, a physical feature or operational attribute that renders an entity open to exploitation or susceptible to a given hazard. (DHS, National Infrastructure Protection Plan - 2009) Vulnerability Analysis.  A process that examines a friendly operation or activity from the point of view of an adversary, seeking ways in which the adversary might determine critical information in time to disrupt or defeat the operation or activity. (DoD 5205.02-M, DoD OPSEC Program Manual, 3 Nov 2008) Vulnerability Assessment (VA).  A Department of Defense, command, or unit-level evaluation (assessment) to determine the vulnerability of a terrorist attack against an installation, unit, exercise, port, ship, residence, facility, or other site. Identifies areas of improvement to withstand, mitigate, or deter acts of violence or terrorism. (JP 1-02 and JP 3-07.2, Antiterrorism, 24 Nov 2010) -- Also, [regarding infrastructure] a systematic examination of the characteristics of an installation, system, asset, application, or its dependencies to identify vulnerabilities. (DoDD 3020.40, DoD Policy and Responsibilities for Critical Infrastructure, 14 Jan 2010 w/ chg 2 dated 21 Sep 2012)\n-- Also, the comprehensive evaluation of an installation, facility, or activity to determine preparedness to deter, withstand, and /or recover from the full range of adversarial capabilities based on the threat assessment, compliance with protection standards, and risk management. (DoD 5200.08-R, Physical Security Program, 9 Apr 2007)\n-- Also, the process of identifying weaknesses in the protection of friendly operations and activities which, if successfully exploited by foreign intelligence, could compromise current or future plans, capabilities, or activities, including RDA [research, development and acquisition]. (AR 381-20, Army CI Program, 25 May 2010) Vulnerability Study.  An analysis of the capabilities and limitations of a force in a specific situation to determine vulnerabilities capable of exploitation by an opposing force. (JP 1-02)\n\nW =========================================\nWaived Special Access Program.  A SAP [Special Access Program] for which the Secretary of Defense has waived applicable reporting in accordance with [Section 119 of Title 10 US Code] following a determination of adverse effect to national security. An unacknowledged SAP that has more restrictive reporting and access controls. (DoDD 5205.07, SAP Policy, 1 Jul 2010) -- Also, an unacknowledged Special Access Program (SAP) to which access is extremely limited in accordance with the statutory authority of Section 119e of 10 United States Code (U.S.C), Reference b. The unacknowledged SAP protections also apply to Waived SAPs. Only the Chairman, Senior Minority member, and, by agreement, their Staff Directors of the four Congressional Defense Committees normally have access to program material.\n\n\nWaiver. An exemption from a specific requirement. (DSS Glossary) Walk-in.  An unsolicited contact who provides information. (JP 1-02; JP 2-01.2, CI & HUMINT in Joint Operations, 16 Mar 2011 w/ chg 1 dated 26 Aug 2011; DoDI S-5240.17, CI Collection Activities, 14 Mar 2014; and DHE-M 3301.002, Vol II Collections Operations, 23 Nov 2010)   Also see *volunteer*. -- Also, an individual who voluntarily offers his services or information to a foreign government.\n(FBI FCI Terms) -- Also, an individual who offer his/her services to an intelligence service without being solicited.\n(CIA, D&D Lexicon, 1 May 2002) -- Also, someone who has something to offer or sell to the intelligence service he is approaching:\na volunteer spy. (A Spy's Journey)\n\n\n    Individuals who walk-in and provide information or offer to assist are motivated by a wide range of\nfactors, including a sincere desire to help, pure greed, desire for revenge against some real or perceived grievance, etc.  Each walk-in interview is unique.\n__________________\n\n    In the real world of secret operations volunteers have produced some of the greatest coups.\n\"It's the walk-in trade that keeps the shop open\" is one of the first bits of operational wisdom impressed on newcomers to the business.\n\n         -- William Hood, *Mole: The True Story of the First Russian Intelligence Officer Recruited by the CIA* (1982)\n__________________\n\n    As always with a \"walk-in,\" as we irreverently referred to volunteer agents, the first\nconsideration is the possibility of provocation.\n\n        -- Richard Helms with William Hood, *A Look Over My Shoulder: A Life in the Central Intelligence Agency*\n            (2003), p. 219\n__________________\n\n    [Walk-in] applies universally to agents who volunteer their services to a hostile intelligence agency\nby making an approach to an adversary at its premises.  The KGB recognized that some of its best sources including John Walker, Aldrich Ames, and Robert Hanssen, acted in this way, but did not use the same term, preferring \"self-recruited agents.\n__________________\n\n   ...it should be emphasized once more that work with \"walk-ins\" is an important part of\nagent operations for strategic intelligence and when properly planned and conducted can\n  be very fruitful.\n         -- Ivan A. Serov, GRU General (1962) See Ivan A. Serov, \"Work with Walk-Ins,\"* *Studies in Intelligence*, Vol 8, No, 1. This article,\noriginally published in 1962, is adapted from one of several on Soviet intelligence doctrine written by high-ranking officers of the GRU (Soviet Military Intelligence).  The article shows that Soviet/Russian problems in assessing and handling the walk-in are not unlike our own.  The full article available at: <https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/kentcsi/vol8no1/html/v08i1a02p_0001.htm >\n\n    * Note: Russian term *dobrozhelatel* (\"well-wisher\") is virtually the same as our \"walk-in.\"\n Warning.  1) A communication and acknowledgment of dangers implicit in a wide spectrum of activities by potential opponents ranging from routine defense measures to substantial increases in readiness and force preparedness and to acts of terrorism or political, economic, or military provocation; and 2) operating procedures, practices, or conditions that may result in injury or death if not carefully observed or followed. (JP 1-02)  Also see *warning intelligence*.\n\n-- Also, a communication and acknowledgment of dangers implicit in a wide spectrum of activities by potential opponents ranging from routine defense measures to substantive increases in readiness and force preparedness and to acts of terrorism or political, economic, or military provocation. (DoDD 3115.16, The Defense Warning Network,5 Dec 2013)\n-- Also, to issue an advance notification of possible harm or victimization following the receipt of information or intelligence concerning the possibility of a crime or terrorist attack. (ODNI, U.S. National Intelligence - An Overview 2011) Warning Intelligence. Those intelligence activities intended to detect and report time sensitive intelligence information on foreign developments that forewarn of hostile actions or intention against United States entities, partners, or interests. (JP 2-0, Joint Intelligence, 22 Oct 2013) Watch List.  A list of words -- such as names, entities, or phrases -- which can be employed by a computer to select out required information from a mass of data. (Senate Report 94-755, Book I - Glossary, 26 Apr 1976) Weapon System.  A combination of one or more weapons with all related equipment, materials, services, personnel, and means of delivery and deployment (if applicable) required for self-sufficiency. (DoDI 5200.44, Protection of Mission Critical Functions to Achieve Trusted Systems and Networks, 5 Nov 2012)\n\nWeapons of Mass Destruction (WMD).  Chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear weapons capable of a high order of destruction or causing mass casualties and exclude the means of transporting or propelling the weapon where such means is a separable and divisible part from the weapon. (JP 1-02 and JP 3-40, Combating WMD, 10 Jun 2009)\n\n    Specifically defined in US Code as: (1) any explosive, incendiary, or poison gas, bomb, grenade,\nrocket having a propellant charge of more than 4 ounces, or missile having an explosive or incendiary charge of more than one-quarter ounce, or mine or similar device; (2) any weapon that is designed or intended to cause death or serious bodily injury through the release, dissemination, or impact of toxic or poisonous chemicals or their precursors; (3) any weapon involving a disease organism; or (4) any weapon that is designed to release radiation or radioactivity at a level dangerous to human life. (18 USC 18 2332a)\n\n\nWhite List.  The identities and locations of individuals who have been identified as being of intelligence or counterintelligence interest and are expected to be able to provide information or assistance in existing or new intelligence areas of interest. (CI Community Lexicon)  Also see Black List; *Gray List.*\n\n    White lists contain the identities and locations of individuals in enemy controlled areas. These\nindividuals are of intelligence or CI interest. They are expected to be able to provide information or\nassistance in the accumulation of intelligence data or in the exploitation of existing or new intelligence areas of interest. They are usually in accord with or favorably inclined toward U.S. policies. Their contributions are based on a voluntary and cooperative attitude. Decisions to place individuals on the white list may be affected by the combat situation, critical need for specialists in scientific fields, and such intelligence needs as indicated from time to time.\n    Examples of individuals included in this category are: 1)  Deposed political leaders of a hostile state. 2)  Intelligence agents employed by U.S. or allied intelligence agencies. 3)  Key civilians in areas of scientific research, including faculty members of universities and staffs of industrial or national research facilities whose credibility have been established.\n\n                       -- USMC, MCWP 2-6 (previously 2-14), Counterintelligence, 5 Sep 2000\n Wilderness of Mirrors.  The organizational culture of the secret services. In it deceptions are false, lies are truth, the reflections are illuminating and confusing. The phrase centers on the problem of the reliability of the secret information about espionage and the identity of spies. The mirrors comprise information from defectors, disinformation from the opposing sides in the Cold War, deviously covered false trails, and facts thought to be valid but incomplete (and later established as totally untrue). (Encyclopedia of Cold War Espionage, Spies, and Secret Operations, 3rd edition, 2012)\n\n-- Also, expression to sgnify the confusion of the world of intelligence and espionage. James Jesus Angleton, long-time head of counterespionage for the CIA, is generally credited with coining the term, having written that the Wilderness of Mirrors \"is that... myriad of strategms, deceptions, artifices and all other devices of disinformation which the Soviet bloc and its coordinated intelligence services use to confuse and split the West,\" thus producing \"an ever-fluid landscape where fact and illusion merge....\" (Spy Book)\n\n  \"*Wilderness of Mirrors\"* a description of counterintelligence attributed to James J. Angleton.  It\ncomes from T.S. Eliot's poem \"Gerontion\" (1920); also the title of a 1980 book authored by David C. Martin about CIA counterintelligence (New York: HarperCollins, First Edition, 1980).\n\n    Angleton was CIA's Chief of the Counterintelligence from 1954 until his retirement in 1974.  In\nDecember 1974, Angleton was basically forced into retirement by the Director of CIA (William\nColby), who became convinced that Angleton's \"labyrinthine\" approach to counterintelligence\nseverely hampered the Agency's primary mission -- clandestine HUMINT collection.\n\nWindow Dressing.  [Tradecraft jargon] Ancillary materials that are included in a cover story or deception operation to help convince the opposition or casual observers that what they are observing is genuine.\n(CI Centre Glossary) Witting.  A term of intelligence art that indicates that one is not only aware of a fact or piece of information but also aware of its connection to intelligence activities. (JP 1-02 and JP 2-01.2, CI & HUMINT in Joint Operations, 16 Mar 2011 w/ chg 1 dated 26 Aug 2011)  Also see *unwitting*.\n\n\n-- Also, a person is aware of USG sponsorship or affiliation. (National HUMINT Glossary)\n\n\n-- Also, aware of the true nature of the activities being conducted or of the intelligence connections\nof persons involved. (HDI Lexicon, April 2008)\n\n-- Also, knowledgeable as to certain aspects of a clandestine organization and its activities.\n(AFOSI Manual 71-142, OFCO, 9 Jun 2000)\n\nWorkplace Violence.  Any act of violent behavior, threats of physical violence, harassment, intimidation, bullying, verbal or non-verbal threat, or other threatening, disruptive behavior that occurs at or outside the work site. (DoDI 1438.06, DoD Workplace Violence Prevention and Response Policy 16 Jan 2014) Worm.  A self-replicating, self-propagating, self-contained program that uses networking mechanisms to spread itself. (CNSSI No. 4009, National Information Assurance Glossary, 26 April 2010)  See *worms*.\n\n-- Also, a type of malware that spreads automatically over a network, installing and replicating itself.\n\nThe network traffic from rapid replication and spread can cripple networks even when the malware does not have a malicious payload. (Cybersecurity and Cyberwar)\n\n    A worm is an unwanted software program secretly planted on a computer that enables (among\nother things) someone other than the owner to control it.\n\n    In 2009, cyber security analysts worldwide reported that a \"worm\" called Stuxnet had penetrated\nand, in all likelihood, damaged an Iranian nuclear facility.  The attack was apparently prosecuted\nthrough the facility's industrial control system.\n\n       -- RAND Report, *A Cyberworm that Knows No Boundaries*, 2011* (see Appendix B - Worms) * Copy at: <http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/occasional_papers/2011/RAND_OP342.pdf>\n Worms.  Parasitic computer programs that replicate, but unlike viruses, do not infect other computer program files.  Worms can create copies on the same computer, or can send the copies to other computers via a network. Worms often spread via Internet Relay Chat (IRC). (McAfee.com; accessed 15 Nov 2010)  See *worm*. Write for Maximum Utility (WMU).  An approach that guides the way that intelligence organizations conceive, format, produce, and disseminate intelligence products in order to increase their usability for the intended customers.  (ICD 208, 17 Dec 2008)  Also see *write-to-release*.\n\n    Utility is maximized when customers receive or are able to expeditiously discover and pull or\nrequest intelligence, information, and analysis in a form they are able to easily use and able to share with their colleagues, subordinates, and superiors.  WMU ensures intelligence, information, and analysis are produced in a manner to facilitate reuseeither in its entirety or in coherent portionsthereby enabling wider dissemination and enhancing its usability.\n\n    WMU shares certain goals as well as techniques with previous and ongoing IC WTR [write-torelease] efforts. WMU goes further than WTR in linking knowledge of the customer's operating\nenvironment to the intelligence production effort.  The resulting effort is not \"one size fits all\" or production of all intelligence products at the lowest classification, but products tailored to best meet a customer's requirements. This may mean producing the definitive assessment on a given topic\narea based on all available intelligence, regardless of classification.\n\n        -- ICD 208, *Write for Maximum Utility*, 17 Dec 2008\n Write-to-Release (WTR). A general approach whereby intelligence reports are written in such a way that sources and methods are protected so that the report can be distributed to customers or intelligence partners at lower security levels.  In essence, write-to-release is proactive sanitization that makes intelligence more readily usable by a more diverse set of customers.  The term encompasses a number of specific implementation approaches, including sanitized leads and tearline reporting. (ICD 208, 17 Dec\n2008)  Also see *tearline reporting* and *write for maximum utility*. Written Statement. Permanently record of pretrial testimony of accused persons, suspects, victims, complaints, and witnesses. (FM 19-20, Law Enforcement Investigations, Nov 1985)\n\n\n    Written statements may be used in courts as evidence attesting to what was told investigators.\nThey also are used to refresh the memory of the persons making the statements.\n\nY ========================================== Year of the Spy.  The year 1985 was labeled \"The Year of the Spy\" by the media because of the number of espionage-related incidents that came to light that year. Unbeknownst to the media and the CIA at the time, several other significant spying ventures started during this same year and would not come to light until years later. (Spy Dust)\n-- Also, the phrase, coined late in 1985, to summarize the activities among notable spies and defectors in the Cold War. (Encyclopedia of Cold War Espionage, Spies, and Secret Operations,\n3rd edition, 2012)\n\n\n## John A. Walker, Jr.              Sharon M. Scranage               Jonathan J. Pollard               Larry Wu-Tai Chin                Ronald W. Pelton\n\n                                              \"The Year of the Spy\" -- 1985\n\n Spring 1985, the John Walker Spy RingJohn A. Walker, Jerry Whitworth, Arthur Walker, and\nMichael Walkerarrested for passing classified material to the Soviet Union.\n\n    July 1985,  CIA employee Sharon Marie Scranage and boyfriend Michael Soussoudis arrested for\npassing material to Ghanian intelligence.\n\n    November 21, Navy intelligence analyst Jonathan Jay Pollard arrested for spying for Israel.\n\n    November 23, former CIA analyst Larry Wu-Tai Chin arrested on charges of spying for the People's\nRepublic of China since 1952.\n\n    November 25, former National Security Agency employee Ronald William Pelton arrested for\nselling military secrets to the Soviets.\n\n        -- FBI at <http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/investigate/counterintelligence/cases>\n\n    For general background on these cases see Thomas B. Allen and Norman Polmar,  Merchants of\nTreason: America's Secrets for Sale, New York: Delacorte Press, 1988. For additional background see  -\n    **Walker Spy Ring**:  Hunter, Robert W., with Lynn Dean Hunter, eds. Spy Hunter: Inside the FBI\nInvestigation of the Walker Espionage Case. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1999.\n\n    Other works on the Walker Espionage Ring: -- Barron, John.  *Breaking the Ring: The Bizarre Case of the Walker Family Spy Ring*. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1987. -- Blitzer, Wolf.  *Territory of Lies: The Exclusive Story of the Walker Family Spy Ring*. New York: Houghton Mifflin, 1987. -- Blum, Howard.  I Pledge Allegiance: The True Story of the Walkers:  An American Spy Family.  Simon & Schuster Books, 1987. -- Earley, Pete.  *Family of Spies: Inside the John Walker Spy Ring*.  Bantam Books, 1988. -- Kneece, Jack*.  Family Treason: The Walker Spy Case*.  New York: Stein & Day, 1986. -- Walker, John Anthony.  *My Life as a Spy*.  Amherst, New York: Prometheus, 2008.\n\n    **Pollard**:  Olive, Ronald J. Capturing Jonathan Pollard: How One of the Most Notorious Spies in\nAmerica History Was Brought to Justice.  Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2006.\n    **Chin**:  Hoffman, Tod.  *The Spy Within: Lary Chin and China's Penetration of the CIA.* Hanover,\nNH: Steerforth Press, 2008.\nZ ========================================== Zero Day.  [In computer usage] an attack that exploits a previously unknown vulnerability; taken from the notion that the attacks takes places on the zeroth day of awareness. Knowledge about zero-day exploits are valuable to both defenders and attackers.  (Cybersecurity and Cyberwar) Zombie.  [In computer usage] a computer that is infected with a virus or Trojan horse that puts it under the remote control of an online hijacker. The hijacker uses a zombie to generate spam or launch denial of service attacks. (McAfee Labs - Threat Glossary)\n-- Also, a computer that has been compromised by an outside party, for the purpose of exploiting its computational and network resources; frequently, lined into a botnet. (Cybersecurity and Cyberwar)\nZoning.  A method of surveillance in which the surveillance area is divided into zones, and surveillants are assigned to cover a specific area. (Words of Intelligence, 2nd Edition, 2011)\n\n\n\nCounterintelligence (CI) is probably the most misunderstood secret intelligence function.\n\nThe work itself has suffered as many definitions as there are intelligence services.\n\n-- Richard Helms, Former DCI and Director CIA\n\nRichard Helms with William Hood, *A Look Over My shoulder: A Life in the Central Intelligence Agency*\n(New York: Random House 2003), pp. 34-35 \"...[C]ountering the intelligence efforts of an adversary is the central function of counterintelligence.\"\n-- Roy Godson, Dirty Tricks or Trump Cards: U.S. Covert Action and Counterintelligence (Washington:  Brassey's 1995), pp. xii, 15 & 304\n\n\"[Counterintelligence is]...intelligence of a special kind, plus something else.... Counterintelligence collects, stores, analyzes and disseminates information about certain foreign threats to U.S. security and then acts to destroy or neutralize them.... Its end purpose is not the mere collection and analysis of information, but action, and successful action, against those who threaten the security of the United States.\"\n-- Francis McNamara, U.S. Counterintelligence Today, (Washington:  The Nathan Hale Institute1985), p. 18\n\n \"[Counterintelligence] ...must strive to know everything possible about an adversary's intelligence capabilities, including his sources, and methods of collection, his covert actions at influencing and managing our actions and perceptions, and even his culture and thought processes.\"\n-- S. Eugene Poteat, \"Counterintelligence Spy vs. Spy, Traitor vs. Traitor,\" *American Intelligence Journal*\n   (Winter 2000-2001), p. 62\n\n\"[Counterintelligence is] ...information about an adversary's intelligence operations, capabilities, agents, collection technology, and so on.  It is not security.  It is intelligence on which security policies should be based.  Nor is it intelligence about an adversary's policy making or military operations or other nonintelligence capabilities and activities.\"\n-- William E. Odom, Fixing Intelligence For a More Secure America (New Haven:  Yale University Press 2003), p. xxix\n\n\"...[E]fforts taken to protect one's own intelligence operations from penetration and disruption by hostile nations or their intelligence services.  It is both analytical and operational.  ...not a separate step in the intelligence process but an important function throughout the process.\"\n-- Mark M. Lowenthal, Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy (Washington:  CQ Press 2000), p. 98\n\n\"...[N]ational effort to prevent foreign intelligence services... from infiltrating our institutions and establishing the potential to engage in espionage, subversion, terrorism, and sabotage.\"\n-- Newton Miller, \"Counterintelligence at the Crossroads,\" Intelligence Requirements for the 1980's: Elements of Intelligence, ed. Roy Godson (Washington:  National Strategy Information Center, Inc., 1983), p. 50\n\n\n\"[Counterintelligence] ...involves the use of both offensive and defensive measures to: protect sensitive US information and operations from compromise and penetration by foreign intelligence services and other hostile entities; ensure the security and integrity of ongoing US diplomatic, military and intelligence operations; and penetrate, compromise and neutralize hostile operations mounted by foreign intelligence services, terrorist organizations and drug cartels.\"\n-- \"Richard L. Haver, \"The Ames Case: Catalyst for a National Counterintelligence Strategy,\" Defense Intelligence Journal, Vol. 4 No. 1 (Spring 1995), p. 12 \"[Counterintelligence] ...includes all information gathered and activities conducted by the government aimed at detecting, analyzing, and countering threat.  ...the term refers to active operations conducted to counter--through detection, assessment, neutralization, and manipulation--the intelligence operations of foreign countries and groups.  ...it includes recruitment of foreign intelligence officers, disruption of activities, prosecution of criminal espionage, and manipulation and deception.  ...it involves the use of surveillance, double agents, and other clandestine techniques.\"\n-- Kenneth E, deGraffenreid, \"Countering Hostile Intelligence Activities as a Strategic Threat,\" National Strategy\n   Information Center, Inc., Sep 1989, p. 3\n\n\"Counterintelligence is a term often associated with catching spies.  ...[It is also] information gathered and activities conducted with the purpose of disrupting and neutralizing the activities of hostile intelligence services.\"\n-- Jeffery Richelson, The US Intelligence Community, 2d ed. (Ballinger Publishing Co., Cambridge MA, 1989), pp. 317 - 330\n\n\"Counterintelligence is a critical part of nearly all intelligence activities.  When performed properly, the CI function is integral to the intelligence activity itself and part of the overall security of the organization.\"\n-- Aspin-Brown Commission Report, Preparing for the 21st Century: An Appraisal of U.S. Intelligence, 1 March 1996\n\n\"[Counterintelligence is] ...the most arcane and organizationally fragmented, the least doctrinally clarified, and legally, and thus politically, the most sensitive intelligence activity.\"\n-- William E. Odom, Fixing Intelligence For a More Secure America (New Haven: Yale University Press 2003), p. 167\n\n\"CI, the quality-control of intelligence, is the key to the struggle between states and armies for a favorable disparity of knowledge.  ...CI concerns all other aspects of intelligence; that it must use all of the elements of intelligence as part of itself, while at the same time CI as a whole must be part of the analysis, collection, and covert action practiced by intelligence services. In its inwardlooking perspective, CI is a double-check on one's own intelligence operations.  In its outwardlooking perspective, it is the sharpest weapon in the intelligence arsenal.\"\n-- Angelo Codevilla, Informing Statecraft: Intelligence for a New Century (1992), pp. 325-326\n\n\"Counterintelligence... is a strategic instrument available to states to protect themselves and advance their interests in the struggle for power, wealth, and influence.   ...the end product, the mission of counterintelligence, is actionaction to protect against foreigners and action to manipulate foreigners in the service of national goals.\"\n-- Roy Godson, Dirty Tricks or Trump Cards: U.S. Covert Action and Counterintelligence (Washington: Brassey's 1995), pp. 238-239\n\nAcross the profession, there are vast differences in\nunderstanding of what counterintelligence means, and how it is done,\nand even the basic terminology it employs.\n\n-- Hon. Michelle VanCleave (former NCIX 2003-2006)\n\nThe NCIX and the National Counterintelligence Mission: what has worked, what has not, and why,\nCase Study Prepared for the Project on National Security Reform, May 2008\n\n## Miscellaneous Thoughts...\n\n\"CI... the most secret of secret intelligence activities....\"\n-- Senate Report 94-755, Church Committee Report, 26 April 1976\n\n\"There are far too many in the Intelligence Community who either\ndo not understand counterintelligence or, who understanding its concepts, have climbed to the top of their career ladders by opposing it.\"\n-- Senator Malcolm Wallop, Senate Intelligence Committee (1985)\n\n\"...[T]he counterintelligence community is performing its wartime mission every day\nas agents counter foreign intelligence threats - that's why we call it the silent war.\"\n-- Colonel Stuart A. Herrington, USA (Ret)\nFormer Commander, US Army Foreign Counterintelligence Activity\n\n\n\n\"In the spy game, when you're penetrated - when someone is working\nfor the other side inside your security world - they own you.\"\n-- Richard Haver, Former Executive Director for IC Affairs and Former Special Asst to USD(I)\n\n\"...I became convinced that no intelligence service can be more\neffective than its counterintelligence component for very long.\"\n-- Richard Helms, Former DCI and Director CIA\nRichard Helms with William Hood, *A Look Over My shoulder: A Life in the Central Intelligence Agency* (2003), pp. 34-35\n\n\"In short, there appears to be no abatement in espionage either now or on the horizon.\"\n-- Eli Jacobs, Chairman, Jacobs Panel SSCI, S. Hrg. 101-1293, \"S. 2726 to Improve U.S. Counterintelligence Measures,\" 101st Congress 2nd session, 1991, p. 9\n(Testimony before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, 23 May 1980)\n\n\"No one can realistically expect that espionage will ever be totally eradicated.\nBut we can take steps to minimize its occurrence and lessen its impact.\"\n-- Senator David L. Boren, Chairman Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, 23 May 1990\nSSCI, S. Hrg. 101-1293, \"S. 2726 to Improve U.S. Counterintelligence Measures,\" 101st Congress 2nd session, 1991, p. 9\n_______________________________________________\n\n# Ci... A Never-Ending Necessity The Ten Commandments Of Counterintelligence*\n\n\n\n   -- James M. Olson, Former Chief of CIA Counterintelligence\n(served 31 years in the CIA)\n______________\nTo advance its interests, the United States will need to do what prudent statesmen have done in different ways for centuries:\nensure that counterintelligence is adequate to the task.\n\n\n-- Roy Godson, Dirty Tricks or Trump Cards: U.S. Covert Action and Counterintelligence\n(Washington: Brassey's 1995), pp. 238-239\n_______________________________________________\n\n## Need For Counterintelligence...\n\nt.\n\nBut there will always be espionage and there\nwill always be counter-espionage. Though\nconditions may have altered, though\ndifficulties may be greater..., there will\nalways be secrets which one side jealously\nguards and which the other will use every\nmeans to discover; there will always be men\nwho from malice or for money will betray\ntheir kith and kin and there will always be\nmen who, from love of adventure or a sense\nof duty, will risk a shameful death to secure\ninformation valuable to their country.\n\nW. Somerset Maugham, Ashenden: or the British Agent (1928)\n\nInescapable Truth... there will always be Spies\n\n\n\nWe must develop effective espionage and counterespionage services and must learn to subvert, sabotage and destroy our enemies by more clever, more sophisticated and more effective methods than those used against us.\n\n-- Doolittle Report (1954)*\n\n\n_______________________________________________\n\n\n____________\n\n## CounterintelligenceThe Wilderness Of Mirrors\n\n\n\nCounterintelligence officerspeople who specialize in catching spieswork in a part of the profession so labyrinthine that\nit is often referred to as a \"wilderness of mirrors\"...\n\n-- H. Keith Melton and Robert Wallace, *The Official CIA Manual of Trickery and Deception* (2009)\n______________________\n\n____________\n\n## The Challenge:  Thinking The Unthinkable\n\n\nMost fundamental to counterintelligenceas true today as everis the need to \"think the unthinkable.\"  Yet this is one of the most difficult attitudes to instill and maintain because it runs contrary to human nature, especially in open societies like the United States.  ...\n\nToday, thinking the unthinkable is not easier, but it is just as critical to our national security.\n\n\nAs we proceed to face the counterintelligence threat of the 21st century, we are faced with a host of challenges: some new, others ancient and deeply rooted in human weakness, and some not yet even invented.\n\n-- Honorable Richard Shelby, Chairman of the U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (2001)*\n\n\n_____________________________\n\n\nTo all Counterintelligence professionals --\nCombating adversarial intelligence threats is a demanding\nand challenging profession... CI is a strategic instrument\nof national security underappreciated by most.\nA sincere thank you for all you do!!!!!!\n\n\n-- COL Mark L. Reagan (USA Ret)\nEditor, *Terms & Definitions of Interest for Counterintelligence Professionals*\nCI a strategic enabler and a national asset...\nCritical to U.S. National Security\n\n\n## Key Sources\n\n\nA Spy's Journey: A CIA Memoir by Floyd L. Paseman.  Minneapolis, MN: Zenith Press, 2004 (Glossary pp.\n290-296) - cited as A Spy's Journey. Consumer's Guide to Intelligence (PAS 95-00010), CIA, Public Affairs Staff, July 1995; updated, 2d ed. 1996; replaced with *National Intelligence: A Consumer's Guide - 2009*, Office of Director National Intelligence (ODNI).\n\nCopy available online at:  <www.dni.gov/reports/IC_Consumers_Guide_2009.pdf>\nCounterintelligence Community Lexicon (CI Community Lexicon), National Counterintelligence Center,\nNACIC 2000-10004, June 2000 - cited as CI Community Lexicon.\nCyber Threats to National Security, Symposium Five: Keeping the Nation's Industrial Base Safe From Cyber Threats, co-sponsored by USNI, CACI and Center for Security Policy, 2011 -- cited as Cyber Threats to National Security, Symposium Five, 2011.  Copy available online at: <http://asymetricthreat.net>\nCybersecurity and Cyberwar: What Everyone Needs to Know by P.W. Singer and Allan Friedman.  New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2014 - cited as Cybersecurity and Cyberwar.\nDoD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, Joint Publication 1-02.  Copy available online at:\n<http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/dod_dictionary/> (also available at <https://jdeis.js.mil>) - cited as JP 1-02.\n\nDomestic Investigations and Operations Guide [Redacted Version], Federal Bureau of Investigation, 15 Oct 2011.\n\nCopy available on line at: <http://vault.fbi.gov/FBI%20Domestic%20Investigations%20and%20Operations%20Guide%20%28DIOG%29/fbidomestic-investigations-and-operations-guide-diog-2011-version>\nEncyclopedia of the Central Intelligence Agency by W. Thomas Smith, Jr. New York, NY: Checkmark Books,\n2003 - cited as Encyclopedia of the CIA.\n\nFBI Foreign Counterintelligence Terms in *Spy vs. Spy* by Ronald Kessler (1988) - cited as FBI FCI Terms. Fair Play: The Moral Dilemmas of Spying by James M. Olson. Washington, DC: Potomac Books, Inc., 2006. Glossary of Intelligence Terms and Definitions, The Intelligence Community Staff (ICS), Office of the Director\nof Central Intelligence, 1978; updated June 1989 - cited as ICS Glossary.\nGlossary of Key Information Security Terms, NISTIR 7298 Revision 2, May 2013.  Copy available at:\n<http://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/ir/2013/NIST.IR.7298r2.pdf>\nGlossary of Security Terms, Definitions, and Acronyms, Intelligence Community Standard - Number 700-1\n(previously numbered ICS 2008- 700-1), 4 April 2008 - cited as IC Standard 700-1 (33 pages).  Available on line at: <http://www.ncix.gov/publications/policy/docs/ICS_700- 01_Glossary_of_Security_Terms_Definitions_and_Acronyms.pdf>\nGlossary of Security Terms, Definitions, and Acronyms, Defense Security Service, November 2012 - cited as DSS Glossary (337 pages). Copy available <http://www.cdse.edu/documents/cdse/Glossary_Handbook.pdf>\nGlossary of Spy Terms, CI Centre - cited as CI Centre Glossary. Originally available online at <http://cicentre.com/\nLINKS_Reference_Material.htm> -- site now requires membership to access, see <http://www.cicentre.com/>\nHistorical Dictionary of Cold War Counterintelligence by Nigel West, Maryland: Scarecrow Press, Inc., 2007.\nHuman Derived Information Lexicon Terms and Definitions for HUMINT, Counterintelligence, and related Activities, April 2008 - cited as HDI Lexicon.\n\n\nIntelligence Essentials for Everyone, by Lisa Krizen, Occasional Paper Number Six, Washington DC: DIA Joint Military Intelligence College, June 1999.  Copy available online at:  <http://www.dia.mil/college/pubs/8342.htm>\nMcAfee Labs - Threat Glossary, undated.  Copy available online at:  <http://www.mcafee.com/us/mcafeelabs/resources/threat-glossary.aspx >\nNational Information Assurance (IA) Glossary, Committee on National Security Systems Instruction (CNSSI)\nNo. 4009, 26 Apr 2010.  Copy available on line at: <http://www.cnss.gov/Assets/pdf/cnssi_4009.pdf> Also at <http://www.ncix.gov/publications/policy/docs/CNSSI_4009.pdf>\nNational Intelligence: A Consumer's Guide - 2009.  Copy available online at:\n<http://www.dni.gov/reports/IC_Consumer's_Guide_2009.pdf>\nNational HUMINT Glossary, unclassified, 15 pages, undated.  Copy available on JWICS at:\n<http://jwc-nhb-nhc03.idiss.cia.ic.gov/intelink/NationalHUMINTGlossary.pdf>\nOPSEC Glossary of Terms. Interagency OPSEC Support Staff.  Copy available online at:\n<http://www.ioss.gov/docs/definitions.html>\nSpy Book - The Encyclopedia of Espionage by Norman Polmar and Thomas B. Allen, New York: Random House, revised edition, 2002 - cited as Spy Book.\nSpy Dust: Two Masters of Disguise Reveal the Tools and Operations that Helped Win the Cold War by\nAntonio and Jonna Mendez, with Bruce Henderson, New York: Atria Books, 2002; Glossary pp. 283-298 (copy of glossary available on line at: <http://www.themasterofdisguise.com/glossary.html>) - cited as Spy Dust.\nSpycraft:  The Secret History of the CIA's Spytechs from Communism to Al-Qaeda by Robert Wallace\nand H. Keith Melton, New York: Penguin Group, 2008 - cited as Spycraft.\nU.S. National Intelligence - An Overview 2011, Office of the Director of National Intelligence.  Copy available online at:  <http://www.odni.gov/IC_Consumers_Guide_2011.pdf>\nWords of Intelligence: An Intelligence Professional's Lexicon for Domestic and Foreign Threats, 2nd Edition, by Jan Goldman.  Lanham, MD: Scarecrow Press, Inc., 2011 - cited as Words of Intelligence.\n\n__________\n\nNotes:\n\n## Key Dod Counterintelligence Policy References Dod Regulations\n\n DoD 5240.1-R, Procedures Governing the Activities of DoD Intelligence Components that Affect\nUnited States Persons, 7 Dec 1982; supplemented by DTM 08-11, Intelligence Oversight Policy\nGuidance, 26 Mar 2008 (w/ change 3 dated 27 Jul 2012)*\n\n\n## Dod Directives\n\n DoDD 5240.01, DoD Intelligence Activities, 27 Aug 2007 (with change 1 dated 29 Jan 2013)  DoDD O-5240.02, Counterintelligence, 20 Dec 2007 (with change 1 dated 30 Dec 2010)*  DoDD 5240.06, Counterintelligence Awareness and Reporting (CIAR), 17 May 2011 (with change\n1 dated 30 May 2013)\n DoDD 5210.48, Polygraph and Credibility Assessment Program, 25 Jan 2007 (with change 2\ndated 15 Nov 2013)*\n DoDD S-3325.09, (U) Oversight Management, and Execution of Defense Clandestine Source\nOperations, 9 Jan 2013 (with change 1 dated 13 Jun 2013)\n\n## Dod Instructions\n\n DoDI 5240.04, Counterintelligence Investigations, 2 Feb 2009 (with change 1 dated 15 Oct 2013)*  DoDI 5240.05, Technical Surveillance Countermeasures (TSCM) Program, 3 Apr 2014\n DoDI C-5240.08, Counterintelligence Security Classification Guide (U), 28 Nov 2011\n DoDI S-5240.09, Offensive Counterintelligence Operations (OFCO) (U), 29 Oct 2008*  DoDI 5240.10, Counterintelligence in the Combatant Commands and Other DoD Components,\n5 Oct 2011 (with change 1 dated 15 Oct 2013)\n DoDI S-5240.15, Force Protection Response Group (FPRG) (U), 20 Oct 2010 (with change 1)  DoDI 5240.16, DoD Counterintelligence Functional Services (CIFS), 27 Aug 2012 (with change 1)  DoDI S-5240.17, (U) Counterintelligence Collection Acclivities (CCA), 14 Mar 2014  DoDI 5240.18, Counterintelligence Analysis and Production, 17 Nov 2009 (with change 1)  DoDI 5240.19, Counterintelligence Support to the Defense Critical Infrastructure Program (DCIP),\n31 Jan 2014\n DoDI O-5240.21, Counterintelligence Inquires, 14 May 2009 (with change 2 dated 15 Oct 2013)  DoDI 5240.22, Counterintelligence Support to Force Protection, 24 Sep 2009 (with change 1)  DoDI S-5240.23, Counterintelligence Activities in Cyberspace (U), 13 Dec 2010 (with change 1)  DoDI O-5240.24, Counterintelligence Activities Supporting Research, Development, and\nAcquisition (RDA), 8 Jun 2011 (with change 1 dated 15 Oct 2013)\n DoDI 5240.25, Counterintelligence Badge and Credentials, 30 March 2012 (with change 1)  DoDI 5240.26, Countering Espionage, International Terrorism, and the Counterintelligence Insider\nThreat, 4 May 2012 (with change 1 dated 15 Oct 2013)\n DoDI 5240.27, Joint Counterintelligence Training Academy (JCITA), 13 Nov 2013  DoDI 3305.11, DoD Counterintelligence Training, 19 Mar 2007 (with change 2 dated 15 Oct 2013)  DoDI 3305.12, Intelligence and Counterintelligence Training of Non-U.S. Persons, 25 Oct 2007\n(with change 2 dated 15 Oct 2013)\n DoDI 5210.91, Polygraph and Credibility Assessment (PCA) Procedures, 12 Aug 2010 (with chg 1)  DoDI 5200.39, Critical Program Information (CPI) Protection within DoD, 16 Jul 2008 (with chg1)*\n\n## Dod Manuals\n\n DoD Manual S-5240.09-M, OFCO Procedures and Security Classification Guide (U), 13 Jan 2011\n\nUnder Development\n\n DoD Manual S-5240.26-M, (U) DoD Counterintelligence Insider Threat Program (CIITP)*\n\n## Intelligence Community & Misc. Government Websites\n\n\nOFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE (ODNI):  www.dni.gov NATIONAL COUNTERINTELLIGENCE EXECUTIVE (NCIX):  www.ncix.gov\nNATIONAL COUNTERTERRORISM CENTER (NCTC):  www.nctc.gov DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE (DoD):  www.defense.gov   (also see:  www.defenselink.mil)\n\n- Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA):  www.dia.mil - Defense Security Service (DSS):  www.dss.mil - Army:  www.army.mil\n-- Intelligence & Security Command (INSCOM):  www.inscom.army.mil -- 902d Military Intelligence Group:  www.inscom.army.mil/MSC/902MIG.aspx\n-- Intelligence Knowledge Network (IKN):  https://www.ikn.army.mil/\n- Air Force:  www.af.mil\n-- Air Force Office of Special Investigations (AFOSI):  www.osi.andrews.af.mil\n-- Air Force ISR Agency: www.afisr.af.mil\n- Navy:  www.navy.mil\n-- Naval Criminal Investigative Service (NCIS):  www.ncis.navy.mil\n-- Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI): www.nmic.navy.mil\n- Marine Corp:  www.marines.mil\n-- USMC Intelligence:  www.hqinet001.hqmc.usmc.mil/DirInt/default.html\n\nNATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY (NSA):  www.nsa.gov NATIONAL GEOSPATIAL-INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (NGA):  www.nga.mil NATIONAL RECONNAISSANCE OFFICE (NRO):  www.nro.gov CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (CIA):  www.cia.gov DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE (DoJ): www.usdoj.gov -  Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI):  www.fbi.gov -  Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA):  www.dea.gov -  DoJ Office of Legal Counsel (OLC):  www.usdoj.gov/olc -  DoJ National Security Division (NSD):  www.usdoj.gov/nsd DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY (DHS):  www.dhs.gov\n\n-  U.S. Coast Guard (USCG):  www.uscg.mil -  Customs and Border Protection (CBP): http://cbp.gov/ -  Immigrations and Customs Enforcement (ICE):  www.ice.gov -  Transportation Security Administration (TSA):  www.tsa.gov\n-  U.S. Secret Service (USSS):  www.secretservice.gov -  DHS Office of Intelligence & Analysis:  www.dhs.gov/xabout/structure/gc_1220886590914.shtm\nDEPARTMENT OF STATE:  www.state.gov - Bureau of Diplomatic Security:  www.state.gov/m/ds DEPARTMENT OF TREASURY:  www.ustreas.gov -  Office of Terrorism and Financial Intelligence:  www.ustreas.gov/offices/enforcement/ -  Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN):  www.fincen.gov DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY: www.energy.gov INTERAGENCY OPSEC SUPPORT STAFF (IOSS):  www.ioss.gov WHITE HOUSE:  www.whitehouse.gov U.S. SENATE:  www.senate.gov -  Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI):  www.intelligence.senate.gov"
    },
    {
        "text": "## National Intelligence Council Foreign Threats To The 2020 Us Federal Elections\n\nThis document is a declassified version of a classified report. The analytic judgments outlined here are identical to those in the classified version, but this declassified document does not include the full supporting information and does not discuss specific intel1igence reports, sources, or methods.\n\nigence OJficer (NIO) jor *Cyber.* It\nigence Council under the auspices ojthe National *Inte*\nThis Intelligence Community Assessment was prepared by the National Inte\n.\n\nigence Council and CIA, DHS, FBJ. INR, and NSA, and coordinated with CIA, DHS, FBJ. INR, Treasury*, and NSA*\nwas drafted by the National Inte UNCLASSIFIED\nThis page intentionally bZank.\n\n## Background\n\nThis document is a declassified version of a classified report that the Intelligence Community provided to the President, senior Executive Branch offi.cials, and Congressionalleadership and intelligence oversight committees on 07 January\n2021. The Intelligence Community rarely can public1y reveal the full extent of its knowledge or the specific information on which it bases its analytic conclusions, as doing so could endanger sensitive sources and methods and imperil the Intelligence Community's ability to collect critical foreign intelligence. The analytic judgments outlined below are identical to those in the classified version, but this declassified document does not include the full supporting information and does not discuss specific intelligence reports, sources, or methods.\n\n## Scopenote\n\nThis Intelligence Community Assessment (ICA), as required by Executive Order (EO) 13848(1)(a), addresses key foreign actors' intentions and efforts to influence or interfere with the 2020 US federal elections or to undermine public confidence in the US election process. It builds on analysis published throughout the election cycle and provided to Executive Branch and Congressionalleaders. This ICA does not include an assessment ofthe impact foreign malign influence and interference activities may have had on the outcome ofthe 2020 election. The US Intelligence Community is charged with monitoring and assessing the intentions, capabilities, and actions offoreign actors; it does not analyze US political processes or actors, election administration or vote tabulation processes, or public opinion.\n\n- Pursuant to EO 13848(1)(b), after receiving this assessment, the Attomey General and the Secretary ofHomeland\nSecurity, in consultation with the heads of any other appropriate Federal, State, or local agencies, will evaluate\nthe impact of any foreign efforts on the security or integrity of election infrastructure or infrastructure pertaining\nto a political organization, campaign, or candidate in a 2020 US federal election, and document the evaluation in\na report.\n- Pursuant to EO 13848(3)(a), after reviewing this assessment and the report required by EO 13848(1)(b), the\nSecretary ofthe Treasury, in consultation with the Secretary ofState, the Attomey General, and the Secretary of\nHomeland Security, wi1l impose appropriate sanctions for activities determined to constitute foreign interference\nin a US election.\n\n## Definitions\n\nFor the purpose ofthis assessment, **election infIuence** includes overt and covert efforts by foreign govemments or actors acting as agents of, or on behalf of, foreign govemments intended to affect directly or indirectly a US electionincluding candidates, political parties, voters or their preferences, or political processes. **Election interference** is a subset of election influence activities targeted at the technical aspects of the election, including voter registration, casting and counting ballots, or reporting results.\n\n## Sources Oflnformation\n\nIn drafting this ICA, we considered intelligence reporting and other information made available to the Intelligence Community as of31 December 2020.\n\n## Foreign Threats To The 2020 Us Federal Elections\n\n10 March 2021\nICA 2020-00078D\nKey Judgment 1: We have no indications that any foreign actor attempted to a1ter any technica1 aspect of the voting process in the 2020 US elections, including voter registration, casting ballots, vote tabulation, or reporting results. We assess that it would be difficult for a foreign actor to manipulate election processes at scale without detection by intelligence collection on the actors themselves, through physical and cyber security monitoring around voting systems across the country, or in post-election audits. The IC identified some successful compromises ofstate and local govemment networks prior to Election Day-as well as a higher volume ofunsuccessful attempts-that we assess were not directed at altering election processes. Some foreign actors, such as Iran and Russia, spread false or inflated claims about alleged compromises of voting systems to undermine public confidence in election processes and results.\n\nKey Judgment 2: We assess that Russian President Putin authorized, and a range of Russian government organizations conducted, influence operations aimed at denigrating President Biden's candidacy and the Democratic Party, supporting former President Trump, undermining public confidence in the electora1 process, and exacerbating sociopolitica1 divisions in the US. Unlike in 2016, we did not see persistent Russian cyber efforts to gain access to election infrastructure. We have high confidence in our assessment; Russian state and proxy actors who all serve the Kremlin's interests worked to afi'ect US public perceptions in a consistent manner. A key element of Moscow's strategy this election cycle was its use of proxies linked to Russian intelligence to push influence narratives-including misleading or unsubstantiated allegations against President Biden-to US media organizations, US officials, and prominent US individuals, including some close to former President Trump and his administration.\n\nKey Judgment 3: We assess that Iran carried out a multi-pronged covert influence campaign intended to undercut former President Trump's reelection prospects-though without directly promoting his rivals-undermine public confidence in the electora1 process and US institutions, and sow division and exacerbate societal tensions in th~\nUS. We have high confidence in this assessment. We assess that Supreme Leader Khamenei authorized the campaign and Iran's military and intelligence services implemented it using overt and covert messaging and cyber operations.\n\nKey Judpnent 4: We assess that China did not deploy interference efforts and considered but did not deploy influence efforts intended to change the outcome ofthe US Presidentia1 election. We have high confidence in this judgment. China sought stability in its relationship with the United States, did not view either election outcome as being advantageous enough for China to risk getting caught meddling, and assessed its traditional influence toolsprimarily targeted economic measures and lobbying- would be sufficient to meet its goal of shaping US China policy regardless ofthe winner. The NIO for Cyber assesses, however, that China did take some steps to try to undermine former President Trump's reelection.\n\nKey Judgment 5: We assess that a range of additional foreign actors-including Lebanese Hizballah, Cuba, and Venezuela-took some steps to attempt to influence the election. In general, we assess that they were smaller in scale than the influence efi'orts conducted by other actors this election cycle. Cybercriminals disrupted some election preparations; we judge their activities probably were driven by fmancial motivations.\n\nPlease also see DNI memorandum: Views on Intelligence Community Election Security Analysis, dated January 7,\n2021.\n\n## Foreign Threats To The 2020 Us Federal Elections\n\nICA 2020-00078D\n10 March 2021\n\n## Discussion\n\nForeign govemments or other foreign actors ofien try to inf1uence the politics and policies of other countries.\n\nThey may, for example, advocate for and try to shape other countries' foreign policies in ways that benefit their political, economic, and military interests. These efforts range along a spectrum from public statements and foreign assistance efforts, to sanctions and other economic pressure such as boycotts, to covert or clandestine efforts such as covert messaging and recruiting agents of inf1uence. When such activities are intended to directly or indirectly affect an electionincluding candidates, political parties, voters or their preferences, or political processes-the IC characterizes it as election influence. If a foreign govemment, as part of its election inf1uence efforts, attempts or takes actions to target the technical aspects of elections-including voter registration, casting and counting ofballots, and reporting ofresults, the IC characterizes it as election interference.\n\n2020, the IC tracked a broader array of foreign I\nactors taking steps to influence US elections than in past election cycles, a development that may be explained by several factors. First, increased IC focus on this issue may have uncovered a higher percentage of efforts. Second, more actors may view inf1uence operations as important tools for projecting power abroad. The growth of intemet and social media use means foreign actors are more able to reach US\naudiences directly, while the tools for doing so are becoming more accessible. Third, some foreign actors may perceive inf1uence activities around US elections as continuations ofbroad, ongoing efforts rather than specially demarcated campaigns. They may also perceive that such a continuum makes it more difficult for the US to single out and respond to specifical1y election-focused inf1uence efforts. Finally, as more foreign actors seek to exert inf1uence over US elections, additional actors may increasingly see election-focused inf1uence efforts as an acceptable norm of international beha vior.\n\nGreater public and media awareness of inf1uence operations in 2020 compared to past election cycles probably helped counter them to some degree. US\nGovernment public messaging as well as Government and private sector actions probably also disrupted some activities. For example, proactive information sharing with social media companies faci1itated the expeditious review, and in many cases removal, of social media accounts covertly operated by Russia and Iran.\n\nAdditionally, public disclosure ofRussian and Iranian efforts and US Govemment sanctions on some of the responsible actors probably hindered their ability to operate deniably.\n\n## Election Interference\n\nWe have no indications that any foreign actor attempted to interfere in the 2020 US elections by altering any technical aspect ofthe voting process, including voter registration, ballot casting, vote tabulation, or reporting results. We assess that it would be difficult for a foreign actor to manipulate election processes at scale without detection by intelligence collection on the actors themselves, through physical and cyber security monitoring around voting systems across the country, or in post-election audits of electronic results and paper backups. We identified some successful compromises of state and local govemment networks prior to Election Day. We assess these intrusions were\n\n# ~ ,-\\ -1-1 () ~ .1\\ 1, 1 N -R' 1: 1 1. 1 (; 1: N (' 1: (_' () T 1 N ( ' 1 1.\n\n## N 1 C 111I111111\n\nparts ofbroader campaigns targeting US networks and not directed at the election. Some foreign actors, such as Iran and Russia, spread false or inflated claims about al1eged compromises of voting systems to try to undermine public confidence in election processes and results.\n\nOver the course ofthe election cycle, the IC, other US\nagencies, and state and local officials also identified thousands of reconnaissance or low-level, unsuccessful attempts to gain access to county or state govemment networks. Such efforts are common and we have no indications they were aimed at interfering in the election.\n\n- Some of these govemment networks hosted,\namong a variety of other govemment processes,\nelection-related elements like voter registration\ndatabases or state election results reporting\nwebsites. We have no indications that these\nactivities altered any election processes or data.\n- Defensive measures such as firewalls, up-to-date\npatching, cybersecurity training for govemment\npersonnel, and separation of election-specific\nsystems from other computer networks probably\nhelped to thwart thousands of compromise\nattempts. Such measures probably also would have\nhelped prevent the network intrusions we detected.\n\n## Russia's Efforts To Influence 2020 Election, Exacerbate Divisions In Us\n\nWe assess that President Putin and the Russian state authorized and conducted influence operations against the 2020 US presidential election aimed at denigrating President Biden and the Democratic Party, supporting former President Tmmp, undermining public confidence in tbe electoral process, and exacerbating sociopolitical divisions in the US. Unlike in 2016, we did not see persistent Russian cyber efforts to gain access to election infrastructure. We have high confidence in these judgments because a range of Russian state and proxy actors who all serve the Kremlin's interests worked to affect US public perceptions. We also have high confidence because of the consistency of themes in Russia's influence efforts across the various influence actors and throughout the campaign, as well as in Russian leaders' assessments of the candidates. A key element ofMoscow's strategy this election cycle was its use of people linked to Russian intelligence to launder influence narrativesincluding misleading or unsubstantiated allegations against President Biden-through US media organizations, US officials, and prominent US\nindividuals, some of whom were close to former President Tmmp and his administration.\n\n## Krem1In Direction Of Influence Activity\n\nWe assess that President Putin and other senior Russian officials were aware of and probably directed Russia's influence operations against the 2020 US\nPresidential election. For example, we assess that Putin had purview over the activities of Andriy Derkach, a Ukrainian legislator who played a prominent role in Russia's election influence activities. Derkach has ties to Russian officials as well as Russia's intelligence services.\n\n- Other senior officials also participated in Russia's\nelection influence efforts-including senior\nnational security and intelligence officials who we\nassess would not act without receiving at least\nPutin's tacit approval.\n\n## Actors, Methods, And Operations\n\nWe assess that Russia's intelligence services, Ukrainelinked individuals with ties to Russian intelligence and their networks, and Russian state media, trolls, and online proxies engaged in activities targeting the 2020\nUS presidential election. The primary effort the IC\nuncovered revolved around a nauative-that Russian actors began spreading as early as 20 14-alleging couupt ties between President Biden, his family, and other US officials and Ukraine. Russian intelligence services relied on Ukraine-linked proxies and these proxies' networks- including their US contacts- to spread this nauative to give Moscow plausible deniability of their involvement. We assess that the goals of this effort went beyond the US presidential campaign to include reducing the Trump administration's support for Ukraine. As the US presidential election neared, Moscow placed increasing emphasis on undermining the candidate it saw as most detrimental to its global interests. We have no evidence suggesting the Ukrainian Govemment was involved in any ofthese efforts.\n\n- A network ofUkraine-linked individualsincluding Russian influence agent Konstantin\nKilimnik-who were also connected to the Russian\nFederal Security Service (FSB) took steps\nthroughout the election cycle to damage US ties to\nUkraine, denigrate President Biden and his\ncandidacy, and benefit former President Trump's\nprospects for reelection. We assess this network\nalso sought to discredit the Obama administration\nby emphasizing accusations of corruption by US\nofficials, and to falsely blame Ukraine for\ninterfering in the 2016 US presidential election.\n- Derkach, Kilirnnik, and their associates sought to\nuse prominent US persons and media conduits to\nlaunder their narratives to US officials and\naudiences. These Russian proxies met with and\nprovided materials to Trump administration-linked\nUS persons to advocate for formal investigations;\nhired a US fmn to petition US officials; and\nattempted to make contact with several senior US\nofficials. They also made contact with established\nUS media figures and helped produce a\ndocumentary that aired on a US television network\nin late January 2020.\n- As part ofhis plan to secure the reelection of\nformer President Trump, Derkach publicly released\naudio recordings four times in 2020 in attempts to\nimplicate President Biden and other current or\nformer US Govemment officials in allegedly\ncorrupt activities related to Ukraine. Derkach also\nworked to initiate legal proceedings in Ukraine and\nthe US related to these allegations. Former\nUkrainian officials associated with Derkach sought\nto promote similar claims throughout late 2019 and\n2020, including through direct outreach to senior\nUS Govemment officials.\nWe assess that Russia' s cyber units gathered information to inform Kremlin decision-making about the election and Moscow's broader foreign policy interests. Through these operations, Russia probably gathered at least some information it could have released in influence operations. We assess Russia did not make persistent efforts to access election infrastructure, such as those made by Russian intelligence during the last US\npresidential election.\n\n- For example, shortly after the 2018 midterm\nelections, Russian intelligence cyber actors attempted to hack organizations primarily affiliated\nwith the Democratic Party. Separately, the GRU\nunsuccessfully targeted US political actors in 2019\nand 2020; this activity aligned with the tactics of a\nlarger intelligence-gathering campaign.\n- In late 2019, GRU cyber actors conducted a\nphishing campaign against subsidiaries of Burisma holdings, likely in an attempt to gather information related to President Biden's family and Burisma.\n\n- We judge that Russian cyber operations that\ntargeted and compromised US state and local\ngovemment networks in 2020- including\nexfiltrating some voter data-were probably not\nelection-focused and instead part of a broader\ncampaign targeting dozens of US and global\nentities.\nThroughout the election cycle, Russia's online infIuence actors sought to affect US public perceptions ofthe candidates, as well as advance Moscow's longstanding goals of undermining confidence in US\nelection processes and increasing sociopolitical divisions among the American people. During the presidential primaries and dating back to 2019, these actors backed candidates fi\"om both major US political parties that Moscow viewed as outsiders, while later claiming that election fi\"aud helped what they called\n\"establishment\" candidates. Throughout the election, Russia's online influence actors sought to amplify mistrust in the electoral process by denigrating mail-in\n\n## ~ ~ E (' () Ii N (_' 1 I ~ I 1.1 (; [ N (_ [ -:\\1 A T 1 0:\\1 .1\\ 1. 1 N I N 1 C 1111111111\n\nballots, highlighting al1eged i egularities, and accusing\n.\n\nthe Democratic Party ofvoter fraud\n\nThe Kremlin-linked inf1uence organization Project\n-\nLakhta and its Lakhta Intemet Research (LIR) troll\nfarm-commonly refe ed to by its former moniker\nIntemet Research Agency (IRA)-amplified\ncontroversial domestic issues. LIR used social\nmedia personas, news websites, and US persons to\ndeliver tailored content to subsets of the US\npopulation. LIR established short-lived trol1 farms\nthat used unwitting third-country nationals in\nGhana, Mexico, and Nigeria to propagate these\nUS-focused na atives, probably in response to\nefforts by US companies and law enforcement to\n.\nshut down LIR-associated personas\n,\nRussian state media, trolls, and online proxies\n-\nincluding those directed by Russian intelligence ,\npublished disparaging content about President\nBiden, his family, and the Democratic Party, and\nheavily amplified related content circulating in US\nmedia, including stories centered on his son. These\ninf1uence actors frequently sought out US\ncontributors to increase their reach into US\n, audiences. In addition to election-related content these online inf1uence actors also promoted conspiratorial na atives about the COVID-19\npandemic, made allegations of social media censorship, and highlighted US divisions\n.\n\nounding protests about racial justice\nsU\n\n- Russian online inf1uence actors generally promoted\nformer President Trump and his commentary,\nincluding repeating his political messaging on the\nelection results; the presidential campaign; debates;\nthe impeachment inquiry; and, as the election\nneared, US domestic crises. Inf1uence actors\nsometimes sought to discourage US left-leaning\naudiences from voting by suggesting that neither\ncandidate was a preferable option. At the same\ntime, Russian actors criticized former President\nTrump or his administration when they pursued\nforeign policies-such as the targeted killing of\nIranian General Qasem Soleimani in January\n2020--at odds with Russia's preferences.\n\n- LIR, which probably receives tasking and strategic\ndirection from the Kremlin, pushed stories\nsupporting former President Trump and\ndenigrating President Biden after he became the\npresumptive nominee in April.\n\n## Eva1Uating Moscow's Ca1Culus On The 2020 Election\n\nWe assess that Russian leaders viewed President Biden's potential election as disadvantageous to Russian interests and that this drove their efforts to undermine his candidacy. We have high confidence in this assessment.\n\n- Russian officials and state media frequently\nattacked President Biden for his leading role in the\nObama administration's Ukraine policy and his\nsupport for the anti-Putin opposition in Russia,\nsuggesting the Kremlin views him as part of a\nref1exively anti-Russia US foreign policy\nestablishment. Putin probably also considers\nPresident Biden more apt to echo the idea of\nAmerican \"exceptionalism,\" which he and other\nKremlin leaders have often publicly criticized as\nproblematic and dangerous.\n- Moscow's range ofinf1uence actors uniformly\nworked to denigrate President Biden after his\nentrance into the race. Throughout the prirnaries\nand general election campaign, Russian inf1uence\nagents repeatedly spread unsubstantiated or\nmisleading claims about President Biden and his\nfamily's alleged wrongdoing related to Ukraine. By\ncontrast, during the Democratic primaries Russian\nonline inf1uence actors promoted candidates that\nMoscow viewed as outside what it perceives to be\nan anti-Russia political establishment.\nEven after the election, Russian online inf1uence\n-\nactors continued to promote na atives questioning\nthe election results and disparaging President Biden\n\n## ('( [ '( :\\1 A T 1 () :\\1 .;\\ 1, 1 N T 1: 1_1, 1 (; 1: N N 1 C 1111111111\n\nand the Democratic Party. These efforts parallel plans Moscow had in place in 2016 to discredit a potential incoming Clinton administration, but which it scrapped after former President Trump's victory.\n\nWe assess Russian leaders preferred that former President Trump win reelection despite perceiving some ofhis administration's policies as anti-Russia.\n\nWe have high confidence in this assessment based in part on the Kremlin's public comments about him and the consistency and volume of anti-Biden messaging we detected from Russian online inf1uence actors.\n\nAs the election neared, Kremlin offi.cials took some steps to prepare for a Biden administration, probably because they believed former President Trump's prospects for re-election had diminished.\n\n- Putin- while praising former President Trump\npersonally during an interview in October-noted\nthat President Biden appeared willing to extend the\nNew START Treaty (NST) or negotiate a new\nstrategic offensive reduction treaty. The comments\nwere consistent with Russian officials' view that a\npotential Biden administration would be more\nopen to arms control negotiations.\nMoscow almost certainly views meddling in US\nelections as an equitable response to perceived actions by Washington and an opportunity to both undermine US global standing and influence US\ndecision-making. We assess that Moscow will continue election inf1uence efforts to further its longstanding goal ofweakening Washington because the Krern1in has long deemed that a weakened United States would be less likely to pursue assertive foreign and security policies abroad and more open to geopolitical bargains with Russia.\n\n-\nRussian officials are probably willing to accept\nsome risk in conducting inf1uence operations\ntargeting the US- including against US\nelections- because they believe Washington\nmeddles similarly in Russia and other countries\nand that such efforts are endemic to geostrategic competition.\n\n-\nRussian officials probably also assess that\ncontinued inf1uence operations against the United\nStates pose a manageable risk to Russia's image in\nWashington because US-Russia relations are\nalready extremely poor.\n\n## Iran's Infiuence Campaign Designed To Undercut Former President Trump's Reelection, Sow Discord\n\nWe assess with high confidence that Iran carried out an influence campaign during the 2020 US election season intended to undercut the reelection prospects of former President Trump and to further its longstanding objectives of exacerbating divisions in the US, creating confusion, and undermining the legitimacy of US elections and institutions. We did not identify Iran engaging in any election interference activities, as defined in this assessment. Tehran's efforts were aimed at denigrating former President Trump, not actively promoting his rivals. We assess that Tehran designed its campaign to attempt to inf1uence US\npolicy toward Iran, distract US leaders with domestic issues, and to amplify messages sympathetic to the Iranian regime. Iran's efforts in 2020-especially its emails to individual US voters and efforts to spread allegations ofvoter fraud- were more aggressive than in past election cycles.\n\n- We assess that Tehran's efforts to attempt to\ninf1uence the outcome of the 2020 US election and\nIranian officials' preference that former President\nTrump not be reelected were driven in part by a\nperception that the regime faced acute threats from\nthe US.\n- Iran's election inf1uence efforts were primarily\nfocused on sowing discord in the United States and\nexacerbating societal tensions- including by\ncreating or amplifying social media content that\ncriticized former President Trump-probably\nbecause they believed that this advanced Iran's\nlongstanding objectives and undercut the prospects for the former President's reelection without provoking retaliation.\n\n## Actors, Methods, And Operations\n\nWe assess that Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei probably authorized Jran's influence campaign and that it was a whole of government effort, judging from the involvement of mu1tiple Iranian Government elements. We have high confidence in this assessment.\n\n- Iran focused its social media and propaganda on\nperceived vulnerabilities in the United States,\nincluding the response to the COVID-19 pandemic,\neconomic recession, and civil unrest.\nDuring this election cycle Iran increased the volume and aggressiveness of its cyber-enabled influence efforts against the United States compared to past election influence efforts. This included efforts to send threatening e-mails to American citizens and to amplify concems about voter fraud in the election.\n\n- In a highly targeted operation, Iranian cyber actors\nsent threatening, spoofed emai1s purporting to be\nfrom the Proud Boys group to Democratic voters in\nmultiple US states, demanding that the individuals\nchange their party affiliation and vote to reelect\nformer President Trump. The same actors also\nproduced and disseminated a video intending to\ndemonstrate alleged voter fraud.\n- Since early 2020, Iranian actors created social\nmedia accounts that targeted the United States and\npublished over 1,000 pieces of online content on\nthe United States, though US social media\ncompanies subsequently removed many. Tehran\nexpanded the number of its inauthentic social\nmedia accounts to at least several thousand and\nboosted the activity of existing accounts, some of\nwhich dated back to 2012.\n\n## Post-Election Activity\n\nWe assess that Iran continues to use influence operations in attempts to inflame domestic tensions in the US. For example, in mid-December 2020, Iranian cyber actors were almost certainly responsible for the creation of a website containing death threats against US election officials.\n\n- We assess Iran is also seeking to exploit the\npost-election environment to collect\nintelligence.\nWe assess that Jranian actors did not attempt to manipuIate or attack any election infiastrocture.\n\n- In early 2020, Iranian cyber actors exploited a\nknown vulnerability to compromise US entities\nassociated with election infrastructure as a part of a\nbroad targeting effort across multiple sectors\nworldwide. Given the breadth and number of the\ntargets, we judge that Iran did not specifically\nintend to use the results of this effort as part of its\nelection influence campaign.\nWe assess that Jran primarily relied on cyber tools and methods to conduct its covert operations because they are low cost, deniable, scalable, and do not depend on physical access to the United States. Iranian cyber actors who focused on influence operations targeting the election adapted their activities and content based on political developments and blended cyber intrusions with online influence operations.\n\n- As part oftheir influence operations, Iranian cyber\nactors sought to exploit vulnerabilities on US\nstates' election websites, as well as news website\ncontent management systems.\nIranian cyber actors sent spearphishing emails to\n-\nner senior officials and members of\ncU ent and fO\npolitical campaigns, almost certainly with the\nintent to gain derogatory information or accesses for follow-on operations.\n\n## China Did N Ot Attempt To Influence Presidential Election Outcome\n\nWe assess that China did not deploy interference efforts and considered but did not deploy infIuence efforts intended to change the outcome of the US\npresidential eleetion. We ha ve high confidence in this judgment. China sought stability in its relationship with the United States and did not view either election outcome as being advantageous enough for China to risk blowback if caught. Beijing probably believed that its traditional influence tools, primarily targeted economic measures and lobbying key individuals and interest groups, would be sufficient to achieve its goal of shaping US policy regardless ofwho won the election. We did not identify China attempting to interfere with election infcastructure or provide funding to any candidates or parties.\n\n- The IC assesses that Chinese state media criticism\nofthe Trump administration's policies related to\nChina and its response to the COVID-19 pandemic\nremained consistent in the lead-up to the election\nand was aimed at shaping perceptions ofUS\npolicies and bolstering China's global position\nrather than to affect the 2020 US election. The\ncoverage of the US election, in particular, was\nlimited compared to other topics measured in total\nvolume of content.\n- China has long sought to influence US politics by\nshaping political and social environments to press\nUS officials to support China's positions and\nperspectives. We did not, however, see these\ncapabilities deployed for the purpose of shaping the\nelectoraloutcome.\n\n## Beijing Probably Judged Risk Of Interference Was Not Worth The Reward\n\nWe assess that Beijing's risk calculus against infIuencing the election was informed by China's preference for stability in the bilateral relationship, their probable judgment that attempting to infIuence the election could do lasting damage to US-China ties, and belief that the election of either candidate would present opportunities and challenges for China.\n\n- We judge that Chinese officials would work with\nformer President Trump if he won a second term.\nBeijing since at least 2019 has stressed the need to\nimprove bilateral ties after the election regardless of\nwhowon.\n- In addition, China was probably concemed the\nUnited States would use accusations of election\ninterference to scapegoat China. This may in part\naccount for Beijing waiting until13 November to\ncongratulate President Biden.\n\n## We Assess That Beijing Also Believes There Is A Bipartisan Consensus Against China In The United States That Leaves No Prospect For A Pro-China Administration Regardless Of The Election Outcome.\n\nChina probably expected that relations would suffer under a second term for former President Trump because he and his administration would press for further economic decoupling and challenge China's rise. It probably also believed that China in this scenario could increase its intemational clout because it perceived that some ofthe Trump administration's policies would alienate US partners.\n\n- Beijing probably expected that President Biden\nwould be more predictable and eager to initially\ndeescalate bilateral tensions but would pose a\ngreater challenge over the long run because he\nwould be more successful in mobilizing a global\nalliance against China and criticizing China's\nhuman rights record.\n- Beijing probably judged that Russia's efforts to\ninterfere in the 2016 election significantly damaged\nMoscow's position and relationship with the\nUnited States and may have worried that\nWashington would uncover a Chinese attempt to\n\n## :'-I :\\Ti(-)~ .;\\I . 1:'-I \"R[Ii. I(;[:--.I(' [ ( ' ()Tin(' Ii. N 1 C 1111111111\n\ndeploy similar measures to influence or interfere in the election and punish Beijing.\n\n## Beijing Probably Continued To Collect Intelligence On Election-Related Targets And Topics\n\nChina probably a1so continued longstanding efforts to gather information on US voters and public opinion;\npolitical parties, candidates and their staffs; and senior govemment officials. We assess Beijing probably sought to use this infounation to predict electoral outcomes and to infoun its efforts to influence US policy toward China under either election outcome, as it has during all election cycles since at least 2008 and considers an acceptable tool of statecraft.\n\n- We assess Beijing did not interfere with electjon\ninfrastructure, including vote tabulation or the\ntransmission of election results.\n\n## Minority View\n\nThe National Intelligence Officer for Cyber assesses that China took at least some steps to undeunine founer President Trump's reelection chances, primarily through social media and official public statements and media. The NIO agrees with the IC's view that Beijing was primarily focused on countering anti-China policies, but assesses that some of Beijing's influence efforts were intended to at least indirectly affect US candidates, political processes, and voter preferences, meeting the defmition for election influence used in this report.\n\nThe NIO agrees that we have no infounation suggesting China tried to interfere with election processes. The NIO has moderate confidence in these judgments.\n\nThis view differs from the IC assessment because it gives more weight to indications that Beijing prefeued founer President Trump's defeat and the election of a more predictable member ofthe establishment instead, and that Beijing implemented some-and later increased-its election influence efforts, especially over the summer of 2020. The NIO assesses these indications are more persuasive than other information indicating that China decided not to intervene. The NIO further assesses that Beijing calibrated its influence efforts to avoid blowback.\n\n## Other Actors\n\nA range of additional foreign actors took some steps to attempt to influence the election. In general, we assess that they were smaller in scale than those conducted by Russia and Iran.\n\nWe assess that Hizballah Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah supported efforts to undermine former President Trump in the 2020 US election. N asrallah probably saw this as a low-cost means to mitigate the risk of a regional conflict while Lebanon faces political, fmancial, and public health crises.\n\nWe assess Cuba sought to undermine former President Trump's electoral prospects by pushing anti-\nRepublican and pro-Democrat narratives to the Latin American community. Cuban intelligence probably conducted some low-level activities in support ofthis effort.\n\nThe Venezuelan regime of Nicolas Maduro had an adversarial relationship with the Trump administration and we assess that Maduro had the intent, though probably not the capability, to try to inf1uence public opinion in the US against the former President. We have no information suggesting that the cuuent or former Venezuelan regimes were involved in attempts to compromise US election infrastructure.\n\n## Foreign Cybercriminais Dismpted Some Election Preparation (' [ ( ' ()Ti .I\\L In Ci\"I:I_I.I(;I: ~ ~ Io \";\\\"~ N 1 C 1111111111\n\nProfit-motivated cybercriminals dismpted election preparations in some US states with ransomware attacks intended to generate profit. We have no indications that these actors sought to use these attacks to alter election functions or data, nor do we have indications that they were acting on behalf of any govemment.\n\n- For example, in late October, probably foreign\nransomware actors demanded payment from a\nNew York county after encrypting 300 computers\nand 22 servers on the network with Ragnarok\nmalware that prevented it from connecting to a\nstatewide voter registration system. County\nofficials directed voters who had applied via email\nfor an absentee ballot to call and verify their ballot\napplication had been received and processed.\n- We do not know whether cybercriminals\nspecifically targeted election\"related networks with\nprofit-making schemes or whether their activity\nreflected a general targeting of state and local\ngovemment networks that also happen to host\nelection-related processes.\n- We assess foreign cybercrirninals probably did not\nwork to interfere or influence the US elections on\nbehalf of or at the direction of a nation state. We\nhave low confidence in this assessment. We assess\nthat some cybercrime groups probably operate with\nat least the tacit approval oftheir nation state hosts.\n\n## F Oreign Hacktivists\n\nThe IC tracked a handful ofunsuccessful hacktivist attempts to influence or interfere in the 2020 US\nelections.\n\n- In November, hackers promoting Turkish\nnationalist themes breached and defaced a website\npreviously established for a candidate in the US\npresidential campaign, according to US\ncybersecurity press.\n- In October, a hacker briefly defaced a presidential\ncampaign website after gaining access probably\nusing administrative credentials.\n\n## Estimative Langoage\n\nEstimative language consists oftwo elements: judgment about the likelihood of developments or events occuuing and levels of confidence in the sources and analytic reasoning supporting the judgments. Judgments are not intended to imply that we have proofthat shows something to be a fact. Assessments are based on collected information, which is often incomplete or fragmentary, as well as logic, argumentation ,and precedents.\n\n## Judgments Of Likelihood\n\nThe chart below approximates how judgments oflikelihood couelate with percentages. Unless otherwise stated, the Intelligence Community's judgments are not derived via statistical analysis. Phrases such as \"we judge\" and\n\"we assess\"-and terms such as \"probably\" and \"likely\"---convey analytical assessments.\n\n## Our Judgments I Confidence\n\nConfidence levels provide assessments oftimeliness, consistency, and extent ofintelligence and open source reporting that supports judgements. They also take into account the analytic argumentation, the depth of relevant expertise, the degree to which assumptions underlie analysis, and the scope of information gaps.\n\n## We Ascribe High, Moderate, Or Low Confidence To Assessments:\n\n-\nHigh **confidence** generally indicates that judgments are based on sound analytic argumentation and highquality consistent reporting from multiple sources, including clandestinely obtained documents, clandestine\nand open source reporting, and in-depth expertise; it also indicates that we have few intelligence gaps, have\nfew assumptions underlying the analytic line, have found potential for deception to be low, and have\nexamined long-standing analytic judgements held by the IC and considered altematives. For most intelligence\ntopics, it will not be appropriate to claim high confidence for judgements that forecast out a number ofyears.\nHigh confidence in a judgment does not imply that the assessment is a fact or a certainty; such judgments\nmight be wrong even though we have a higher degree of certainty that they are accurate.\n-\nModerate confidence generally means that the information is credibly sourced and plausible but not of\nsufficient quality or couoborated sufficiently to wauant a higher level of confidence. There may, for example,\nbe information that cuts in a different direction. We have in-depth expertise on the topic, but we may\nacknowledge assumptions that underlie our analysis and some information gaps; there may be minor analytic\ndifferences within the IC, as well as moderate potential for deception.\n-\nLow **confidence** general1y means that the information's credibility and/ or plausibility is uncertain; that the\ninforation is fragmented, dated, or poorly couoborated; or that reliabi1ity of the sources is questionable. There\nmay be analytic differences within the IC, several significant infounation gaps,high potential for deception or\nnumerous assumptions that must be made to draw analytic conclusions. In the case oflow confidence, we are\nforced to use cuuent data to project out in time, making a higher level of confidence impossible."
    },
    {
        "text": "Department of Justice\n,\"'''''''''<11 Bureau of Investigation\n, Operational Technology Division\n\n## Wireless Evdlutidn In **This** Iselil-It:: .. Wireless Evolutidn I!I Tech Bytes\n\n- LONG TERM EVOLUTIQN ill CLDUD SERVICES\n- 4G TECHNOLOGY\nill GESTURE-RECOGNITION\n- FCC ON BROADBAND\n- ACTIVITY-BASED NAVIGATION\n'aw PUIi!\n\nI' -. q\n\n## Message From Management T\n\nhe bou~~aries of technology are constantly expanding.\n\nRecognizing the pathway of emerging technology is a key element to maintaining relevance in a rapidly changing technological environment.\n\nWhile this proficiency is fundamentally important in developing strategies that preserve long-term capabilities in the face of emerging technologies, equally important is delivering technical solutions to meet the operational needs of the law enforcement customer in a dynamic 'threat' environment. How can technical law enforcement organizations maintain the steady-state production of tools and expertise for technical collection, while infusing ideas and agility into our organizations to improve our ability to deliver timely, relevant, and cutting edge tools to law enforcement customers? Balancing these two fundamentals through an effective business strategy is both a challenge and an opportunity for the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and other Federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies.\n\nThis ~dition .of th~ Emerging Technr.::0.:,;:lo.li:i:;::;es:....:.:=:::.:.:::::.:....J.=.!!.!L., L-_______ **...Jln** the last decade, smartphone technology and the ability to communicate data over handheld and other portable devices have grown exponentially. Simple Personal Digital Assistants (PDAs) have been replaced with the iPhone, Android, and other Global Positionin System\n(GPS) enabled hybrid devices.\n\nWhen we consider strategies to mitigate risks posed by a......::-:-_~_~_~ ______ .....IThe concepts of innovation and collaboration focused on the customer's requirements are not limited to technology. These principles\n\nrm..;a.:..y_b;;.;e_a;;....;;.s.;;.;ou:.;;n;.;;;d...;:s:.::tr;.;;;at.::e;su...:.::.:.~:a..:;::::.:.:.:...:::.:~~.:.:.:::.:!IL_---J can help deliver relevant technical solutions successfully,\nL-________ .JAs an alternative, consider the opportunity to employ a customer-centric business strategy that combines technology, innovation, and collaboration. This strategy was recently incorporated into the FBI's efforts to develop technical tools to combat threats along the Southwest Border.\n\nThe customer-centric approach calls for a high degree of collaboration among engineers, subject matter experts (SMEs), and the investigator to determine needs and requirements.\n\nTo encourage innovation, the technologists gain a better understanding of the operational and investigative needs and tailor the technology to fit the end user's challenges.\n\nRather than developing solutions from scratch, the customercentric approach leverages and modifies the technoloe:v to fit the customer's nFlFlrt~.1\nOrganizations that have traditionally been successful in vertical lines of production (sometimes referred to as stovepipes)\ncan also benefit from an injection of this type of horizontal\n\"internal consultancy\" to jumpstart their capabilities. One way to implement this customer-centric business strategy is to empower a team of engineers and SMEs with the latitude to work across multiple departments, selecting those technologies that best fit the customer's needs. By setting the customer's requirements as the end goal, the internal and external collaboration is driven by the user's requirements.\n\nThe unique tool or capability derived from this process is the product of the collaboration.\n\nAs law enforcement moves forward into the 21st century, emerging technologies such ~.IoW.L\"\"\"'liiLLLL.W~.I.II.II.LJJ..LIOJ.-'I1.IiLol, other wireless tech nolo ies especially when the technology is changing at such a rapid pace. We can count on technology to change. Our strategy for dealing with this change can make a difference in the technical tools we provide our Federal, state, and local law enforcement customers.\n\n1. Message From, Management . . . - . -  . - . . - . -  -  -  -  - . . -  -  - . -  -  -  -  -  -  -  - . -  -  -  -  -  -  -  I\n2. The FCC's Net Neutrality Rules (CIU) ........ 2\n3. Wireless Evolution ........ 4.\n4. !,:ong Term Evolution ........\n~':I:\n5. 4G: Technology. ........ ' ..... \" .... '. -  . - . -  . - . -  -  - . -  -  . . - . -  . . . - . -  -  -   26\n6. WI.reless. Cell PhQnQ< TQQhnQlog,es: A; ShQrHuJQrlC!1.. . \" ........ \" . . . ...... 30\n7.\nOpera.tQt'~ l;>i1em.m~1 femtQcelt or'WHW' ........ , . ,  , .... 3~\n8. fCC's, P.Qsltion: Qn: SJQij,<1.Q.iYJd.l Whit~ SRC!~Q-.... \" - \",  \" ........ , .... '. \" ........ 3'4l\n9~ elou~ Ser.v.iQ~s ........ \" ...... \" . , ........ ' . ' ., . , . \" . , . , .. 3QJ\ntQ~ Wlreg;v.s. Wl.reles$, .. \" ........ \" .... ' . , , ....... \" , ...... , . ,  , 4?\n\nU. Qri<1~jn~:th~H~.~p., Wi-,lii, HQ.t$p-qts; . \" ........ \" - , ... 4:~\n~2.'. Fr.Qffl; Wl-f.1 tc)'. MiF,i, '.' ~ ... ' ........ \" . \" ........ 49;\nt3'. $lu,Fp. l;>i~itaL ~y'edrgeP'er ........ ,  , ........ 5(:)'\n:1.:41., Hu.ma,l)) 1;)Q.t.: Trantm!~~iqo~. - ........ , -  -  . - . . -  -  . . . . .. . . -  -  . . . . . . . . , . -  - . . . . - . -  s~\nt;S . G-e$tu.re.,r.e<;:qg,nitiQI1l ........ '. , ........ ~6J\n:!i.Q. Mlcr;QsQfi WIJfler - ' .. , ........ , ........ ~9:\n1;1. CQu.nt~r.t~it ~a(lgQts.. - . . . . - . -  -  . ........ , .... 6Q~\n~S'. A.<;:tiv.itY-basec;t; Naxig,atiQI1: ' ....... \" ........ , ........ 9~\nt9~ Tech Sytes ... ' ........ \" ........ , . \" . , ........ 6Q.\n~Q:. Patents; Qf.lnterest . \" ...... , ........ 6~.\n2:1;. GIQssar.y ..... , .. , ...... , ........ 69.\n~2. Teclt Insights ........ ' ........ , .. - 12\n6Qing Dark - A Rev.iew. QUhe NatiQnal' ~awful Int~rcept Strategy. ........ 7.3,\n23. FYI' ........ , ........ 76\n\nWhile this document is believed to contain correct information, neither the United States Government nor any agency thereof, nor any of their employees, makes any warranty, expressed or Implied, or assumes legal responsibility for the accuracy, completeness, Dr usefulness of any information, apparatus. product, service, or process disclosed or represents that its use would not infringe privately owned rights. Reference herein to any speCific commercial product, process, or service by its trade name, trademark, manufacturer, or otherwise, does not necessarily constitute or imply its endorsement, recommendation, or favoring by the United States Government or any agency thereof.\n\nThis document contains privileged, deliberative, sensitive information which relates to the.electronic surveillance procedures and capabilities, of law enforcement and other government agencies as well as their state of knowledge relating to such issues. The public or unauthorized and inappropriate disclosure of this document/information will, in fact facilitate the circumvention of the law. Circulation of this document, either physically or electronically is controlled and reserved exclusively to the FBI. Recipients of this document from the FBI may not publish, circulate or re-disclose this document or any information contained herein to any other person outside their agency without the express prior, written consent of the FBI. The only authorized methods of disposal are shredding or burning.\n\n## 2. The Fcc's Net Neutrality Rules\n\nthan fixed broadband. However, the FCC's rules prohibit mobile broadband providers from blocking lawful websites and applications that compete with their voice and video telephony services.\n\nEXECUTIVE SUMMARY\nOn December 21, 2010, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) approved new rules aimed at regulating how broadband service providers offer ifldividuals and organizations the ability to access the Internet.\n\nThe FCC's goal was to, \" ... provide greater clarity and certainty regarding the continued freedom and openness of the Internet.\" In doing so, it adopted four basic principles:\nTransparency A key purpose of the FCC's transparency rule is to enable third-party experts (e.g., independent engineers and consumer watchdogs) to monitor and evaluate network management practices, in order to surface concerns regarding potential open Internet violations. The rule itself reads:\n\n- Transparency. Fixed and mobile broadband providers\nmust disclose the network management practices,\nperformance characteristics, .and terms and conditions\nof their broadband services;\n- No Blocking. Fixed broadband providers may not block\nlawful content, applications, services, or non-harmful\ndevices; mobile broadband providers may not block\nlawful websites, or block applications that compete with\ntheir voice or video telephony services;\n\nUA person engaged in the provision of broadband\nInternet access service shall publicly disclose accurate\ninformation regarding the network management practices,\nperformance, and commercial terms of its broadband\nInternet access services sufficient for consumers to make\ninformed choices regarding use of such services and for\ncontent, application, service, and device providers to\ndevelop, market, and maintain Internet offerings.'t!\n\n- No Unreasonable Discrimination.\nRxed broadband\nproviders may not unreasonably discriminate in\ntransmitting lawful network traffic; and\n- Reasonable Network Management.\nReasonable\npractices employed by broadband Internet access\nservice providers that are consistent with open Internet\nprotections.\nHowever, critics warn the FCC's new rules could Include introduction of usage-based pricing for accessing the Internet at home and preferential treatment for companies that pay extra for faster access to the network. Another potential short coming of the rules as identified by critics is that service providers may choose which websites can run faster than others over their respective networks .. Still critics warn that the FCC's actions are an inappropriate over-reach of a Federal agency.\n\nThe FCC's reasoning for the transparency rule is based on five tenets. First, the FCC believes disclosure will ensure end users can make informed choices regarding the purchase and use of broadband service. Second, as end users'\nconfidence in broadband providers' practices increases, their adoption of broadband services will increase as well. Third, disclosure supports innovation, investment, and competition by ensuring that startups and other edge\nproviders have the technical information necessary to create and maintain online content, applications, services, and devices, and to assess the risks and benefits of embarking on new projects. Fourth, disclosure increases the likelihood that broadband providers will abide by open Internet principles, and that the Internet community will identify problematic conduct and suggest fixes.\n\nFifth, disclosure will enable the FCC to collect information necessary to assess, report on, and enforce the other open Internet rules.\n\nTHE FCC'S NET NEUTRALITY RULES\nThe FCC's rules come after its issuance of its \"Connecting America: The National Broadband Plan,\" as mandated by the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009\n(See ETR Bulletin Article entitled, \"FCC Broadb\"and Plan,\"\nJune 2010, Volume 7, Issue 1).\n\nThe FCC has largely restricted the application of its rules to fixed, or wired, broadband access services while only requiring mobile broadband providers to comply with the transparency rule.\n\nThe FCC's rationale, in part, is based on its assertion that mobile broadband is at an earlier stage in its development No Blocking The purpose behind the FCC's no blocking rule is to ensure the freedom of consumers to send and receive lawful content. In addition, it is intended for users and providers to use and provide applications and other services without fear of blocking that may otherwise inhibit the Internet's openness and competition in adjacent markets such as\n........\n\nuse the network less to pay less.\n\nvoice communications and video and audio programming.\n\nThe rule itself reads:\n\n'~ person engaged in the provision of fixed broadband\nInternet access service, insofar as such person is so\nengaged, shall not 'block lawful content, applications,.\nservices, or non- harmful devices, subject to reasonable\nnetwork management \"2\n\nIn sliort, the nO-blocking rule prohibits broadband service\nproviders from impairing or degrading particular content,\napplications, services, or non-harmful devices so as to\nrender them effectively unusable (subject to reasonable\nnetwork management).\n\nReasonable Network Management\nThe FCC's three above rules are all subject to a fourth,\nunderlying belief that broadband service providers should\nbe allowed to institute reasonable network management\nprotocols and practices. Legitimate network management\npurposes identified by the FCC are: ensuring network\nsecurity and integrity, including by addressing traffic that\nis harmful to the network; addressing traffic unwanted\nby end users (including by premise operators), such as\nby providing services or capabilities consistent with an\nend user's choices regarding parental controls or security\ncapabilities; and reducing or mitigating the effects of\ncongestion on the network. The rule itself reads:\n\n'~ network management practice is reasonable if it is\nappropriate and tailored to achieving a legitimate network\nmanagement purpose, taking into account the particular\nnetwork architecture and technology of the broadband\nInternet access service.'\"\n\nNo Unreasonable Discrimination\nIn the course of conducting the rulemaking, the FCC found\nthat fixed broadband service providers have incentives\nas well as the ability to discriminate in their handling\nof network traffic in ways that can harm innovation,\ninvestment, competition, end users, and free expression.\nThe FCC's rule attempts to strike a balance between\nrestricting harmful conduct and permitting beneficial forms\nof differential treatment. The rule itself reads:\n\n'~ person engaged in the provision of fixed broadband\nInternet access service, insofar as such person is so\nengaged, shall not unreasonably discriminate in transmitting\nlawful network traffic over a consumer's broadband\nInternet access service. Reasonable network management\nshall not constitute unreasonable discrimination.'13\n\nThe\n     FCC acknowledged that reasonable network\nmanagement practices may differ across service\nplatforms. For example, practices to manage congestion\non a fixed satellite network may be inappropriate for a\nfiber-to-the-home network. The FCC also recognized the\nunique network management challenges facing broadband\nproviders that use unlicensed spectrum to deliver service\nto end-users (i.e., unlicensed spectrum is shared among\nmultiple users and technologies and no Single user can\ncontrol or assure access to the spectrum).\n\nCONCLUSION\nThe FCC's Net Neutrality rules have sparked a large amount\nof controversy since they were issued in December 2010.\nDiverse interpretations of the rules characterize them as\neither having gone too far in a heavy-handed attempt\nto regulate the Internet or not having gone far enough in\nprotecting consumers' interests. The only thing on which\ncritics agree is that the rules are vague and subject to\ninterpretation and will likely lead to lawsuits as the FCC\nimplements them.\n\nThe FCC's primary purpose behind its \"no unreasonable\ndiscrimination\" rule can be summed up by its concern\nover the following three practices. First, the FCC prohibits\ndiscrimination that harms an actual or potential competitor\nto the broadband provider (such as by degrading certain\nVoice over Internet Protocol (VoIP) applications or services\nwhen the broadband provider offers telephone service).\nSecond, prohibit practices that harm end users (such\nas by inhibiting end users from accessing the content,\napplications, services, or devices of their choice). Third,\nprohibit practices that impair free expression (such\nas slowing traffic from a particular blog because the\nbroadband provider disagrees with the content of blogger's\nmessage).\n\n\"Intelligence provides the information we need,\n but technology further enables us to find the\npatterns and connections in that intelligence.\"\n\nHowever, the FCC's rule does not prohibit tiered or usage-\nbased pricing.\n                The rules adopted by the FCC do not\nprevent broadband providers from asking subscribers who\nuse the network more to pay more, and subscribers who\n\n~ FBI Director Robert S. Mueller, III\n........\n\n2 Ibid, para. 63.\n\n3 Ibid, para. 68.\n\n## 3. Wireless Evolution\n\ncompeting approaches, but has significantly extended the life of each of its member technologies.\n\nHSPA is strongly positioned to be the dominant mobile-data technology for the next five to ten years. To help leverage service provider investments in HSPA, the Third Generation\n. Partnership Project (3GPP) standards body has developed a series of enhancements to create \"HSPA Evolution\", commonly referred to as \"HSPA+\". HSPA+ represents a rational development of the Wldeband Code Division Multiple Access (WCDMA) approach, and it is the pathway to a totally new 3GPP radio platform called 3GPP LTE. LTE, which uses Orthogonal Frequency Division Multiple Access1\n(OFDMA), was initially deployed in 2010. At the same time,\n3GPP recognizes the significant worldwide investments in GSM networks, and has defined enhancements to drastically increase EDGE data capabilities through an effort called Evolved EDGE.\n\nINTRODUCTION\nThe vision of a robust mobile broadband capability has become a reality with millions of people actively using smartphones, tablets, netbooks, Personal Digital Assistants (PDAs) and laptops with wireless Third Generation (3G)/Fourth Generation (4G) access. But this is only the beginning of what is to come. This will be the decade of the \"anywhere/anytime\" social existenGe with mobile broadband being integrated into every aspect of life. Recent major developments include: 3G near ubiquity, expanded smartphone capabilities, the availability of hundreds of thousands of mobile user applications, the introduction of new form factors (e.g. tablets), projections of mobile data, bandwidth demand that exceeds current capacity, and industry and government acknowledgement of the need for more spectrum. Other developments include: implementation of data offload via Wi-Fi and Femtocells, dramatic performance increases through High Speed Packet Access (HSPA) enhancements, initial deployments of Long Term Evolution (LTE) technology, and significant progress on specifications that will meet \"true\"\n4G requirements. A lot is happening in the wireless sector.\n\nCombining these advances in radio-access technOlogy,\n3GPP has spearheaded the development of major core-network architectural enhancements (e.g., the IP\nMultimedia Subsystem (lMS)) [See IMS Mini Tutorial) and the Evolved Packet Core2 (EPC), formerly called System Architecture Evolution (SAE). These developments will make possible new types of services, effective integration of legacy and new networks, the convergence of fixed and wireless systems, and the transition from circuit-switched architectures for voice traffic to a fully packet-switched delivery solution. The result is a balanced portfolio of complementary technologies that includes both radio access and core networks, provides service providers maximum freedom in how they enhance their networks over time, and delivers unified voice and data services.\n\n3G technology has demonstrated the power and potential of always-on, anywhere network connectivity and has created a wave of industry innovation that spans devices, applications, Internet integration, and new business service delivery models. Currently used by hundreds of millions of people, mobile broadband connectivity is on the verge of becoming ubiquitous. It is doing so on a powerful foundation of networking technologies including Global System for Mobile Communications (GSM) with Enhanced Data Rates for GSM Evolution (EDGE), HSPA, and LTE. LTE, in a forthcoming release called LTE-Advanced, will be one of the first technologies to meet the new requirements of International Mobile Telecommunications Advanced (IMT-\nAdvanced), an International Telecommunications Union\n(ITU) project, and realize a true 4G technology.\n\nThis white paper focuses on the evolution of EDGE, HSPA enhancements, 3GPP LTE; the capabilities of these technologies, and their position relative to other primary competing technologies. It explains how these technologies fit into the ITU roadmap that leads to IMT-Advanced and the migration from 3G to 4G. The following are some important observations. (Subsequent ETR Bulletins will look at these technologies and new applications supported as they are rolled out onto the network.)\nThrough continuous innovation, Universal Mobile Telecommunications System (UMTS) with HSPA technology has established itself as a global, mobile-broadband solution. Building on the phenomenal success of GSM, the GSM-HSPA ecosystem has become the most successful communications technology family ever. Through a process of constant improvement, the GSM family of technologies has not only matched or exceeded the capabilities of\n\n- The wireless technology road map now extends to\nIMT-Advanced with LTE-Advanced being one of the\nfirst technologies specified to meet the IMT-Advanced\n........\n\n1;0\" EnE\" B' ,t S\n                           .,.\n                                 ; f\n                                           r\n                                                  5 QWl\"\n                                                                \"TT gIl) (WiG;'I*9Y9) Aetti!slosull fL.'\" 111111 ~ ~) FB' a\n                                                                                                                                      I;\n\n- LTE has become the technology platform of choice as\nrequirements. LTE-Advanced will be capable of peak throughput rates that exceed 1 Gigabit per second\n(Gbps).\n\nGSM-UMTS and Code Division Multiple Access (CDMA)/\nOne Carrier Evolved, Data Optimized (EV-DO) service\nproviders are making strategiC, long-term decisions to\ndeploy their next generation platforms.\n- Future networks will be networks otnetworks consisting\nof multiple-access technologies, multiple bands, widely\nvarying coverage areas, all self-organized and selfoptimized, and based on an IMS approach.\n- GSM-HSPN will comprise the large majority of\nsubscribers over the next five to ten *years,* even as new\nwireless technologies are developed. The deployment of\n- GSM-HSPA has a significant global lead in terms of\nsubscribers, deployment, and services. It will continue\nto dominate other wide-area wireless technologies.\nLTE and its coexistence with UMTS-HSPA will be similar\nto the deployment of UMTS HSPA and its coexistence\nwith GSM.\n- 3GPP has made considerable progress on how to\nenhance LTE to meet the requirements of IMT-Advanced\nin an activity referred to as LTE-Advanced. LTE-Advanced\nis expected to be the first true 4G system available.\nSpecifications are to be completed by March of 2011,\nand the earliest deployment may be in 2012.\nIn current deployments, HSPA users regularly experience throughput rates far in excess of 1 Megabit per second\n(Mbps), generally under favorable conditions, on both downlinks and uplinks, with 4 Mbps downlink speed commonly being observed. Planned enhancements such as dual-carrier operation3 will double user achievable peak throughput rates.\n\n- HSPA-LTE has significant economic advantages over\nother wireless technologies.\n- WiMAX has developed network speCifications supported\nby many providers, but it will likely represent only a very\nsmall percentage of wireless subscribers over the next\nfive years.\n- HSPA+ provides a strategic performance roadmap\nadvantage for incumbent GSM HSPA service providers.\nFeatures such as multi-carrier operation, Multiple InpuV Multiple Output (MIMO)4, and higher-order modulation\noffer service providers several options for upgrading\ntheir networks, with many of these features (e.g., multicarrier, higher order modulation) being available as\nnetwork software upgrades. With all planned features\nimplemented, HSPA+ peak rates will eventually reach\n168 Mbps.\n- EDGE technology has proven highly successful and is\nbroadly deployed on GSM networks globally. Advanced\ncapabilities with Evolve.d EDGE can double and ultimately\nquadruple current EDGE throughput rates, halve latency,\nand increase frequency spectral efficiency.\n- HSPA+ with 2x2 MIMO, successive interference\ncancellation,5 and 64 Quadrature Amplitude Modulation6\n(QAM) is more spectrally efficient than competing\ntechnologies including Worldwide Interoperability for\nMicrowave Access (Wi MAX) Release 1.0.\n- EPC will provide a new core network that supports both\nLTE and interoperability with legacy GSM-UMTS radioaccess networks and non-3GPP based radio access\nnetworks. Policy based billing and control provides\nflexible quality-of-service (QoS) management, enabling\nnew types of applications, as well as billing measures.\n- The 3GPP OFDMA technology used in LTE matches or\nexceeds the capability of any other OFDMA systems.\nPeak theoretical downlink rates are 326 Mbps in a 20\nMegahertz (MHz) channel bandwidth. LTE assumes a\nfull Internet Protocol (IP) network architecture, and it is\ndesigned to support voice in the packet domain.\n- Innovations such as EPC and UMTS one-tunnel\narchitectureS will \"flatten\". the network, simplify\ndeployment, and reduce latency. This is a significant\nbenefit for service providers that will impact lawful\nsurveillance methods.\n3 A mobile device in a dual-carrier communication system communicates with a network via first and second carriers by receiving data in the first cell via one\nof the first and second carriers on one carrier frequency, whilst receiving syst!lm information and/or downlink data from a second cell via the other of the\nfirst and second carriers on another carrier frequency.\n4 MIMO is the use of multiple antennas at both the transmitter and receiver to improve communication performance.\n5 Users are ordered by their chance of successful decoding and the packet of the strongest user is decoded first. After a packet is decoded, the signal is\nreconstructed and subtracted from the received signal. The rest of the users are ordered again for the next round of decoding. The procedure is performed iteratively over all users.\n6 QAM Is both an analog and a digital modulation scheme. It conveys two analog message signals, or two digital bit streams, by changing (modulating)\nthe amplitudes of two carrier waves, using the amplitudeshift keying (ASK) digital modulation scheme Dr amplitude modulation (AM) analog modulation\nscheme.\nconfusion. The following table highlights the generational characteristics.\n\n## Table 3-11G To 4G\n\n-\n,\n,I\nI Generation\nRequirements\nI'\nComments\nI\nNo official\nDeployed in the 1980s.\nlG\nrequirements.\nAnalog technology.\n\nTransition to 4G\nThere is some misunderstanding in the industry as to what technology falls into which cellular generation. Generally speaking, lG refers to analog cellular technologies; it was first available in the 1980s. 2G denotes initial digital systems, introducing services such as short messaging and lower (limited) speed data.9 CDMA2000 1xRTT and GSM\nare the primary 2G technologies, although CDMA2000\n1xRTT is sometimes called a 3G technology because it meets the 144 Kilobits (kbps) mobile throughput requirement for 3G. EDGE also meets this refluirement. 2G\ntechnologies became available in the 1990s.\n\n| No      | official      |\n|----------|---------------|\n| Digital  | Technology.   |\n| .        | requirements. |\n| First    | digital       |\n| Deployed | in           |\n| New      | services.such |\n| 2G       |               |\n| Short    | Mess!lge      |\n| (SMS)    | and           |\n| Primary  | technologies  |\n| include  | 'IS-95        |\n| GSM.     |               |\n| ITU's    | IMT-2000      |\n| Primary  | technologies  |\n| required | 144           |\n| include  | CDMA2000      |\n| 3G       |               |\n| mobile,  | 384           |\n| EVDO     | and           |\n\n3G requirements were specified by the ITU as part of the International Mobile Telephone 2000 (IMT-2000)\nproject, for which digital networks had to provide 144\nKbps of throughput at mobile speeds, 384 Kbps at pedestrian (walking) speeds, and 2 Mbps while stationary.\n\nUMTS-HSPA and CDMA2000 EV-DO are the primary\n3G technologies, although WiMAX was recently also designated as an official 3G technology. 3G technologies began deployment in the last decade (2000s).\n\n|          | pedestrian,    | 2    | Mbps     |\n|----------|----------------|------|----------|\n| WiMAX    | now            | an   | official |\n| indoors. |                |      |          |\n| 3G       | technology.    |      |          |\n\nITU's IMT-Advanced No technology meets requirements today.\n\nIEEE 802.16m and LTE Advanced being designed to meet requirements.\n\nThe ITU recently issued requirements for IMT-Advanced.\n\nThey constitute the only official definition of 4G. The requirements include operation in up to 40 MHz radio channels with extremely high spectral efficiency. However, the lTU recommends operation in up to 100 MHz radio channels and peak spectral efficiency of 15 bps/Hz, resulting in a theoretical throughput rate of 1.5 Gbps.\n\nPrevious to the publication of these requirements, 1 Gbps was frequently cited as the 4G goal.\n\nNo available technology meets these requirements, today.\n\nIt will require new technologies such as LTE-Advanced (with work already underway) and IEEE 802.16m. For marketing purposes, some have tried to label current versions of WiMAX and LTE as \"4G\", but this is only accurate to the extent that such designation refers to the general approach or platform that will be enhanced to meet the\n4G ITU requirements.\n\nWhile service providers are starting to deploy LTE networks today, it will be the middle of the next decade before a large percentage of subscribers will actually be using LTE\n(or LTE-Advanced). During this deployment period, most networks and devices will support the full scope of the\n3GPP family of technologies (GSM EDGE, HSPA, and LTE).\n\nThe history of wireless network deployment provides a useful perspective. GSM, which in 2009 was stili growing its user base, was specified in 1990 with initial networks deployed in 1991. The UMTS Task Force established itself in 1995, Release 99 specifications were completed in\n2000, and HSPA+ specifications were completed in 2007.\n\nAlthough it's been more than a decade since work began on the technology, only now is UMTS deployment and acceptance starting to take off. Figure 3-1 highlights the transition of wireless technology from early 2000.\n\nWith WiMAX and HSPA significantly outperforming current\n3G requirements, calling these technologies 3G clearly does not give them full credit, as they are a generation beyond existing technologies. But calling them 4G is not exactly correct either. Unfortunately, the generational labels do not properly capture the scope of available technologies and have resulted in some amount of market\n........\n\ninfrastructure. If an LTE picocell is serving a small number of houses using fiber backhaul, is this a wireline or wireless network? The answer is both.\n\nBandwidth Management Trends Given enormous growth in usage, mobile service providers are either employing or considering multiple approaches to manage their limited bandwidth:\n\n- More spectrum. Spectrum correlates directly to\ncapacity, and more spectrum is becoming available\nglobally for mobile broadband. Purchase of spectrum\nfrom the government. however, is expensive.\n- Increased spectral efficiency. Newer technologies are\nspectrally more efficient, meaning greater throughput in\nthe same amount of spectrum.\n- More cell sites. Smaller cell sizes result in more\ncapacity per subscriber, as fewer users are competing\nfor the frequency spectrum.\nWireless versus Wireline Advances Today. wireless technology assumes a dominant role in communications, even though wireline technology, with fiber links. has inherent capacity advantages.\n\nThe overwhelming global success of mobile telephony, and the growing demand for mobile data, conclusively demonstrates the desire for mobile communications.\n\n- Femtocells.l1 Ferntocells can significantly offload the\nmacro network. Pricing plans can encourage users to\nmove high-bandwidth activities (e.g., movie downloads\nand IPTV) to Femtocell connections.\n- Wi-Fi. Wi-Fi networks offer another means of offloading\nintense radio access traffic.\n- Off-peak hours. Service providers can offer lower rates\nor fewer restrictions on large data transfers that occur at off-peak hours such as overnight.\nMobile broadband combines robust high-speed data services with mobility and anytime, anywhere access.\n\nThus, the opportunities are endless when viewing the many diverse markets mobile broadband can effectively address:\nDeveloped countries continue to show incredible demand for. mobile broadband services. Additionally, in developing countries, there is no doubt that 3G technology will cater to both enterprises and their high end mobile workers and consumers, for whom 3G can be a cost effective solution, competing with digital subscriber line (DSL) or cable for at home access.\n\n- QoS. By prioritizing traffic. large downloads can occur\nwith lower priority, thus not affecting other active users.\n(See Article 2 on FCC's Net Neutrality Rules)\n- Innovative data plans. Creative new data plans that\ninfluence consumption behavior, including tiered pricing,\ncould make usage affordable for most subscribers, and could discourage excessive or abusive use.\nIt will take a creative blend of all of the above to make the mobile broadband market successful and to enable it to exist as a complementary solution to wired broadband.\n\nRelative to wireless networks, wireline networks have always had superior capacity, and historically have always delivered faster throughput rates. Wireless technologies have increased typical user throughput rates; however, wireline enjoys a consistent lOx advantage over wireless technologies. It is not throughput that makes wireless access attractive, it is mobility. Taking advantage of the .strengths of each technology leads to the efforts to support seamless mobility (e.g., roaming through multiple networks).\n\nEDGE/HSPA/HSPA+/LTE Deployment Most GSM networks today support EDGE, which represents more than 478 networks in approximately 190 countries.12\nMeanwhile, UMTS has established itself globally. Nearly all WCDMA handsets are also GSM handsets, so WCDMA\nusers can access the broad base of GSM networks and services.\n\nDespite some of the inherent limitations of wireless technology relative to wireline. its fundamental appeal of providing access from anywhere has fueled its market growth. As the decade progresses, the lines between wireline and wireless networks will blur. The fact is that wireless networks are mostly wireline in their transport\n........\n\n## F .... 1\n\nmodems, routers, laptops, media players, and cameras.\n\nThere are more than 500 million UMTS-HSPA customers worldwide spanning 347 commercial networks.13\n324\nservice providers in 137 countries offer HSDPA and 100 of these have deployed HSUPA. Almost all I:JMTS operators are deploying HSPA for two reasons:\n\n- The incremental cost of HSPA is relatively low, and\nService providers have begun deploying evolved HSPA\nfeatures. As of June 2010, 65 HSPA+ networks are in service in 35 countries.14\nAs the technology matures, upgrading to HSPA+ will likely represent a minimal investment for service providers in order to significantly boost their network performance.\n\n- HSPA makes such efficient use of spectrum for data\nthat it results in a much lower overall cost per Megabyte\n(MB) of data delivered.\nDemonstrating marketplace commitment to HSPA\ntechnology, at the close of 2010, there were ,more than\n2,350 commercial HSPA devices available worldwide from\n230 suppliers. Devices include handsets, data cards, LTE appears' to be the preferred choice for service providers as their next-generation wireless technology. It has also been selected by public~safety organizations as their broadband technology of choice. The Association of Public-Safety Communications Officials15 (APCO) and the National Emergency Number Association (NENA) have both endorsed LTE.is\n\n## Competitive Positioning Of Wireless Technologies Table 3-2 Competitive Position Of Major Wireless Technologies\n\n--\nI\n-\nII\nI\nTechnology\nEDGEjHSPAjLTE\nCDMA2000\nWiMAX\n-\nII\nSubscribers\nOver 4.4 billion\n518 million17 today; slower growth expected\n61 million anticipated by 2014\nthan GSM-HSPA\nMaturity\nExtremely mature\nExtremely mature\nEmerging\nAdoption\nCellular operators globally\nCellular operators globally\nUmited to date\nCoverage/Footprint\nGlobal\nGlobal with the general exception of Western\nUmited\nEurope\nDeployment\nFewer cell sites required at 700 Fewer cell sites required at 700 and 850 MHz\nMany more cell sites required at 2.5\nand 850 MHz\nDevices\nBroad selection of GSM/\nBroad selection of 1xRIT/EV-OO devices\nInitial devices emphasize data\nEDGE/UMTS/ HSPA devices\nRadio Technology\nHighly optimized TDMA for\nHighly optimized COMA for Rev 0/ A/B\nOptimized OFDMA in Release 1.0,\nEDGE, COMA for HSPA, OFDMA\nMore optimized in Release 1.5\nforLTE\nSpectral Efficiency\nVery high with HSPA, matches\nVery high with EVOO Rev AlB\nVery high, but not higher than HSPA+\nOFDMA approaches in 5 MHz\nfor Release 1.0, and not higher than\nwith HSPA+\nLiE for Release 1.5\nThroughput\nPeak downlink user-achievable\nPeak downlink user-achievable rates of over\n3 to 6 Mbps typical rates with bursts\nCapabilities\nrates of over 4 Mbps today\n1.5 Mbps, with significantly higher rates in the\nto 10 Mbps\nwith achievable rates of over 8\nfuture\nMbps today with HSPA+\nVoice CapablDty\nExtremely efficient circuit-voice\nExtremely efficient circuit-voice available today\nRelatively Inefficient VolP initially;\navailable today; smooth-\nEV-DO radio channels With VolP cannot support\nmore effiCient in later stages, but\nest migration to VolP of any\ncircuit-voice users\nlower than LTE Voice coverage will be\ntechnology\nmuch more limited than cellular\nSimultaneous Voice\nAvailable with GSM18 and\nNot available today. Available with VolP and\nPotentially available, though initial\nand Data\nUMTStoday\nfuture devices\nservices will emphasize data\nEfficient Spectrum\nEntire UMTS radiO channel\nRadio channel today limited to either voice/\nCurrently only efficient for data\nUsage\navailable for any mix of voice\nmedium speed data or high speed data only\ncentric networks\nand high speed data\n........\n\n13 CiSCO, Cisco Visual Networking Index: Global Mobile Data Traffic Forecast Update; February 10, 2010.\n\n14 3G Americas, June, 2010.\n\nIS APCO International Is the world's largest organization of public safety communications professionals, It serves the needs of public safety communications practitioners worldwide and the welfare of the general public as a whole by providing complete expertise, professional development, technical assistance, advocacy, and outreach.\n\ncombination of EPC and LTE is referred to as the Evolved Packet System (EPS).\n\n3GPP Evolutionary Approach\n3GPP standards development falls into three principal areas: radio interfaces, core networks, and services. With respect to'radio interfaces, rather than focusing on anyone wireless approach, 3GPP's evolutionary plan recognizes the strengths and weaknesses of every technology and consequently,exploits the unique capabilities of each one.\n\nNote that GSM, based on a Time Division Multiple Access19\n(TDMA) approach, is mature and broadly deployed.\n\nLTE is crucial to service providers since it provides the efficiencies and capabilities demanded by the rapidly growing mobile broadband marKet. The cost for service providers to deliver data (e.g., cost per MB) is almost directly proportional to the spectral efficiency of the technology. LTE has the highest spectral efficiency of any currently specified technology, making it an essential technology as market demand increases.\n\nAlready extremely efficient, there are nevertheless opportunities for additional optimization and enhancements. Standards bodies have already defined\n\"Evolved EDGE\", which was available for deployment in the 2009 to 2010 timeframe. Evolved EDGE more than doubles throughput over current EDGE systems, reduces latency by half, and increases spectral efficiency. By the end of the decade, due to total market momentum, the majority of worldwide subscribers will still be using GSM/\nEDGE technologies.\n\nLTE supports both FDO and TDD modes. Many deployments will be based on FDD in paired spectrum. The TOD mode, however, will be important in enabling deployments where paired spectrum is unavailable. LTE TDO will be deployed in China; it will be available for Europe at 2.6 GHz, and available for the U.S. Broadband Radio Service (BRS) 2.6\nGHz band. It is also being considered for the TOO portions of the U.S. Wireless Communications Service (WCS) band.\n\nOver the last year, LTE TOD has developed considerable market momentum, and Is emerging as a competitive threat to other OFDMA TOO technologies.\n\nITU's IMT-Advanced To address ITU's IMT-Advanced requirements, 3GPP is developing LTE-Advanced, a technology that will have peak rates of more than 1 Gbps.\n\nMeanwhile, CDMA was selected as the basis of 3G\ntechnologies including WCDMA for the Frequency Division Duplex20 (FDD) mode of UMTS and Time Division COMA\n(TD-CDMA) for the Time Division Duplex (TOD) mode of UMTS. The evolved data systems for UMTS, such as HSPA\nand HSPA+, introduce enhancements and simplifications that help CDMA based systems equal the capabilities of competing systems, especially with 5 MHz spectrum allocations.\n\nDevelopment of GSM and UMTS-HSPA happens in stages referred to as 3GPP releases. Equipment vendors' products support particular versions of each specification. It is important to realize that 3GPP releases address multiple technologies. For example, Release 7 optimizes Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP) for HSPA, but also significantly enhances GSM data functionality with Evolved EDGE. A\nsummary of the different 3GPP releases is as follows:22\n\n- Release 99: Completed. First deployable version of\nUMTS. Enhancements to GSM data (EDGE). Majority of\ndeployments today are based on Release 99. Provides\nsupport for GSMjEDGEjGPRS/WCDMA radio-access\nnetworks.\n- Release 4: Completed. Multimedia messaging support.\nFirststepstoward using IP transport in the core network.\n- Release 5: Completed. HSDPA. First phase of IMS.\nFull ability to use IP-based transport instead of just\nAsynchronous Transfer Mode (ATM).inthe core network.\nHSPA innovations such as dual-carrier21 HSPA, synchronizes the operation of HSPA on two adjacent 5 MHz carriers for higher throughput rates. In combination with MIMO, dualcarrier HSPA will achieve peak network speeds of 84\nMbps, and quad-carrier HSPA will achieve peak rates of\n168 Mbps. Given some of the advantages of an Orthogonal Frequency Division Multiplexing (OFOM) approach, 3GPP\nhas specified OFDMA as the basis of its LTE effort.\n\nLTE incorporates best-of radio techniques to achieve performance levels beyond what would be practical with CDMA approaches, especially in larger channel bandwidths. Similar to the way that 3G coexists with 2G\nsystems in integrated networks, LTE systems will coexist with both 3G systems and 2G systems. Multimode devices will function across LTE/3G or even LTEj3G/2G, depending on network circumstances. Beyond radio technology, EPC\nprovides a new core architecture that enables both flatter architectures and integration of LTE with both legacy GSM\nHSPA networks, as well as other wireless technologies. The\n\n- Release 6: Completed. HSUPA. Enhanced multimedia\n........\n\n## I Hi 'Ii\" Ii' Fi\" 15 .,. 'F Tis Elf Gfjilill \"18 Qai ,I \"\"Eo\"R) 9 ,. , , 1 - \" , Pe, \"\"Ly\n\nsupport through Multimedia Broadcast/Multicast Services (MBMS). Performance specifications for advanced receivers. Wireless Local Area Network\n(WLAN) integration option. IMS enhancements. Initial VolP capability.\n\nfor additional global harmonization of the 1.7/2.1GHz band. These new spectrum bands, allocated harmoniously across North, Central, and South America, are critical to efficiently meeting the growing needs of customers for mobile broadband applications.\n\n- Release 7: Completed. Provides enhanced GSM data\nThe Federal Communications Commission (FCC) auctioned the 700 MHz band23 in the United States in January\n2008. The availability of this band, the Advanced Wireless Services (AWS) band at 1710-1755 MHz with 2110-2155\nMHz in the U.S., and the forthcoming 2.6 GHz frequency band in Europe are providing service providers with wider deployment options. A growing number of providers are also deploying UMTS at 900 MHz, a traditional GSM band.\n\nfunctionality with Evolved EDGE. Specifies HSPA+,\nwhich includes higher order modulation and MIMO.\nPerformance\nenhancements,\nimproved\nspectral\nefficiency, increased capacity, and better resistance\nto interference. Continuous Packet Connectivity (CPC)\nenables efficient \"always-on\" service and enhanced\nuplink UL VolP capacity, as well as reductions in call\nset-up delay for Push-to-Talk Over Cellular (PoC). Radio\nenhancements to HSPA' include 64 QAM in the downlink\nDL and 16 QAM in the uplink. Also includes optimization\nof MBMS capabilities through the Multicast/Broadcast,\nSingle-Frequency Network (MBSFN) function.\nThe spectrum projection does not take into account that small (short) message traffic (e.g., e-mail queries and SMS) consumes a disproportionate amount of capacity, nor that providers need additional radio channels for infill coverage or to separate24 voice and data traffic on different channels.\n\n- Release 8: Completed. Includes further HSPA Evolution\nfeatures such as simultaneous use of MIMO and 64\nQAM. Includes dual-carrier HSPA (DC-HSPA) wherein two\nWCDMA radio channels can be combined for a doubling\nof throughput performance. Specifies OFDMA-based\n3GPP LTE. Defines EPC.\nSpectrum needs vary by service provider. Some may experience shortages well before others depending on multiple factors such as the amount of spectrum they have, cell site density relative to user demographics, type of devices they service, and their customer service plans. As the amount of available spectrum increases and as technologies simultaneously become spectrally more effiCient, total capacity rises rapidly, supporting more subscribers and making malJY new types of applications feasible.\n\n- Release 9: Completed. HSPA and LTE enhancements\nincluding HSPA dual-carrier operation in combination\nwith MIMO, EPC enhancements, Femtocell support,\nsupport for regulatory features such as emergency user\nequipment positioning and the Commercial Mobile Alert\nSystem (CMAS), and evolution of IMS architecture.\n- Release 10: Under development. Expected to be\ncomplete in 2011. Will specify LTE-Advanced that meets\nthe requirements set by ITU's IMT-Advanced project.\nAlso includes quad-carrier operation for HSPA+.\nDifferent countries have regulated spectrum more loosely than others. For example, service providers in the United States can use. either 2G or 3G technologies in cellular, Personal Communications Service (PCS), or 3G bands, whereas in Europe there are greater restrictions, although efforts are under way that will result in greater flexibility including the use of 3G technologies in current 2G bands.\n\nSpectrum Another important characteristic of UMTS-HSPA deployment is the expanding number of available radio bands and the subsequent support from infrastructure and mobile equipment vendors. The fundamental system design and networking protocols remain the same for each band;\nhowever the frequency dependent portions of the radios have to change.\n\nAs new frequency bands become available for deployment, standards bodies are adapting UMTS for these bands. This includes 450 and 700 MHz. The 1710-1770 MHz uplink was matched with the 2110-2170 MHz downlink to allow With the projected increase in the use of mobile-broadband technologies, the amount of spectrum required by the next generation of wireless technology could be substantial.\n\nIn the U.S., the FCC has committed itself to finding an additional 500 MHz of spectrum over the next 10 years as part of its National Broadband Plan. This would effectively double the amount of spectrum for commerCial mobile radio service. As regulators make more spectrum available, it is important that such spectrum be:\n........\n\n## Idn Hilsiiiistisii I'Si Schbial Yse E\"L> (Ii8;Tijwilj N I' I I I \"J  , If\n\n1.\nCoordinated on a regional or global basis.\n2.\nUnfettered by spectrum caps and other legacy voicecentric spectrum policies.\n3. Made available in the widest radio channels possible\n(e.g., 10 MHz, 20 MHz, and mor.e).\n4.\nUtilized efficiently without causing interference to\nexisting spectrum owners.\nnetwork performance is by using flatter architectures. The more hierarchical a network, the more effortlessly it can be managed centrally. The tradeoff, however, is reduced performance, especially for data communications, because packets must pass through and be processed by multiple nodes in the network. To enhance data performance and, in particular, to reduce latency (packet delays), 3GPP has defined a number of enhancements in Release 7 and Release 8 that decrease the number of processing nodes and result in a flatter architecture.\n\nEmerging technologies such as LTE benefit from wider radio channels. These wider radio channels are not only spectrally more efficient; they offer greater capacity, which is an important attribute because typical broadband usage contributes to a much higher load than voice applications.\n\nNote that watching a YouTubeTM video consumes 100 times as many bits per second on the downlink as a voice call.\n\nRelease 7 introduces an option called one-tunnel architecture that allows service providers to configure their. networks to allow user data to bypass a serving node and travel directly via a gateway node. There is also an option to integrate the functionality of the Radio Network Controller25 (RNC) directly into the base station.\n\nFor Release 8, 3GPP defined an entirely new core network called the EPC. The key features and capabilities of EPC\ninclude:\n\n- Reduced latency and higher data performance through\na flatter architecture\nOf some worry in this regard is that spectrum for LTE\nis becoming available in different frequency bands in different countries. Initial U.S. deployments will be at 700\nMHz, in Japan at 1500 MHz, and in Europe at 2.6 GHz.\n\nWith so many varying spectrum bands, roaming operations based on GSM or HSPA on common regional or global bands will likely be required.\n\n- Support for both LTE radio access networks and\ninterworking with GSM-HSPA radio access networks\n\n## Core-Network Evolution\n\n- The ability to integrate non-3GPP networks such as\nWi MAX\n- Optimization for all services provided via IP\n3GPP is defining a progression of enhancements to the core network to improve network performance and the range of services provided. Improvements will enable a shift to all IP architectures. One way to improve core\n\n- Comprehensive, network-controlled, QoS architecture\n\n## Evolution Of Toma, Coma, And Ofoma Systems\n\n........\n\n~-------------------------------------------------------\nService Evolution Not only do 3GPP technologies provide continual improvements in capacity and data performance, they also develop capabilities that expand the services available to subscribers. Important service advances include Fixed Mobile Convergence (FMC), IMS, and broadcasting\"\ntechnologies.\n\nit supports not only FMC, but also a much broader range of potential applications. In the United States, AT&T has committed to an IMS approach and has already deployed an IMS4Jased video sharing service. Although defined by\n3GPP, the Third Generation Partnership Project 2 (3GPP2),\n'CableLabs, and WiMAX have adopted IMS. IMS is how VolP\nwill (or could) be deployed in CDMA 2000 EV-DO, WiMAX, HSPA, and LTE networks.\n\nFMC refers to the integration of fixed selYices (such as telephony provided by wireline or Wi-Fi) with mobile cellular based services. Although FMC is still in its beginning stages of deployment, it promises to provide significant benefits to both users and service providers.\n\nFor users, FMC will simplify how they communicate, making it possible for them to use a single device (e.g., a smart cell phone) at work, on the go or at home where it might connect via a Wi-Fi network or a Femtocell\" as well as the macro-radio network.\n\nUsers will also benefit from single voice mailboxes and single phone numbers, as well as the ability to be in command of how and with whom they communicate. For service providers, FMC allows the consolidation of core services across multiple access networks. For instance, a service provider could offer complete VolP based voice service that supports access via DSL, cable, Wi-Fi, or 3G.\n\nFMC also offloads data intensive applications such as movie or video downloads from the macro network.\n\nIMS allows innovative amalgamation of different types of communications and information including voice, video, Instant Messaging (1M), presence information, location, multi-media messaging, and documents. It provides application developers the platform to create applications that have never before been possible. It allows people to communicate in entirely new ways by dynamically using multiple services, with the\" ability to move from one application to another depending on the communication needs, all in real-time. For example, during an interactive chat session, a user could launch a voice call, and then include another person in that call or chat. Or during a voice call, a user could suddenly establish a simultaneous video connection or start transferring files while still communicating via a voice connection. While browsing the Web, a user could decide to speak to a customer service representative and transfer data to assist in the communications. IMS will be a key platform for all IP\narchitectures for both HSPA and LTE.\n\nA new initiative called Rich Communications Suite (RCS), supported by many service providers and vendors, builds upon thelMS technology. It provides a consistent feature set, as well as implementation gUidelines, use cases, and reference implementations. RCS uses existing standards and specifications from 3GPP, OMA, and GSMA.\n\nCore RCS features include:\n\n- An enhanced phone book (device and/or network\nbased) that includes service capabilities and presence\nenhanced contact information\n- Enhanced\nmessaging (supporting text,\ninstant\nmessaging, and multimedia) with chat and messaging\nhistory\n- Enriched calls that include multimedia content (e.g.,\nvideo sharing) during voice calls\nThere are various approaches for FMC including Generic Access Network (GAN), previously called Unlicensed Mobile Access (UMA), femtocells, and IMS. With GAN, GSM-HSPA devices can connect via Wi-Fi or cellular connections for both voice and data. UMA/GAN is a 3GPP\ntechnology, and it has been deployed by a number of service providers including T-Mobile in the United States.\n\nA substitute for using Wi-Fi for the \"fixed\" portion of FMC\nis femtocells These are small base stations that cost little more than a Wi-Fi access point, and, like Wi-Fi, femtocells leverage a subscriber's existing wireline broadband connection (e.g., cable or DSL). Instead of operating on unlicensed bands, femtocells use the service provider's licensed bands at very low power levels. The significant advantage of the femtocells approach is that single mode, mobile communication devices can now operate using the femtocell.\n\nIMS is another key technology for convergence. It supports access to core services and applications via multiple access networks. IMS is more powerful than GAN, because Another important new service is support for mobile TV\nthrough what is called multicast or broadcast functions.\n\n3GPP has defined multicast/broadcast capabilities for both HSPA and LTE .\n\n. . . . . . . . .\n\napplications for information and control. Today, two widely deployed capabilities include location queries and SMS.\n\nVoice Support While 2G and 3G technologies were deployed from the beginning with voice and data capability, LTE networks can be deployed with or without voice support. Moreover, there are a number of methods available for voice support including fallback to 2G/3G and VolP operation. (See Long Term Evolution Article)\nDevice Innovation Computing is becoming more mobile, and notebook computers and smartphones are now prevalent. In fact, With location services, mobile devices or external applications (e.g., applications operating on computers outside of the network) can query the location of a user, subject to privacy restrictions. This can significantly enhance many applications including navigation, supplying location of nearby destinations (e.g., restaurants and stores), location of friends for social networking, and worker dispatch. With SMS, external applications can send user requested content such as flight updates.\n\naU mobile phones are becoming \"smart\", with some form of data capability. Also, leading notebook vendors are now offering computers with integrated 3G (e.g., HSPA)\ncapabilities. Modems are available in multiple formats including USB devices, Personal Computer (PC) cards, and Express cards.\n\n4\nShort Messaging Send and receive of SMS including delivery\nreceipts\n6\nPayment\n\nSmartphones are becoming extremely powerful mini computers with general purpose operating systems and sophisticated application development environments.\n\nSmartphones, originally targeted for the high-end of the market, are now available at much lower price points and thus, are affordable to a much larger market segment.\n\nIn the U.S., smartphones already account for some 25%\nof phones today, and they are on track to reach 50% by\n2011. 26 The continued success of the BlackBerry along witb the success of the iPhone and Android devices demonstrates the potential of this market. From a radio perspective, today's phones can support ever more bands and technologies. This makes phones that work across the world feasible. Increasingly, users expect their phones to work anywhere they go.\n\nComputer manufacturers are also delivering new form factors such as netbooks, tablet computers, mobile Internet devices (MID), and smartbooks. The movement to open networks allows a greater number of companies to develop products that use wireless networks in both vertical-market and horizontal-market scenarios. Cellular telephones are becoming more powerful and feature large color touch displays, graphics and video viewers, still cameras, movie cameras, music players, 1M clients, email clients, PoC, downloadable and executable content capabilities, and more powerful browsers. All of these capabilities consume data.\n\nNetwork Interfaces for Applications Another important development related to service evolution is service providers making interfaces available to external\n........\n\n| 'Send                | aiid    |\n|----------------------|---------|\n| i'e~ive              |         |\n| of                   |         |\n| niultime~ia,meSsages |         |\n| Prepald             | and     |\n| reservations         |         |\n\n- Eventual Market ConSOlidation. Though the market\nis currently fragmented, there are certain platforms\n(e.g., AndrOid, BlackBerry, and iPhone) that represent\na relatively dominant market share. Increasingly,\ndevelopers are choosing to develop for just a small\nnumber of these platforms using the development tools\nspecific to that environment.\nBroadband-Wireless Deployment Considerations Much of the debate in the wireless industry deals with the merits of different radio technologies. Yet, other factors are equally important in determining the services and capabilities of a wireless network. These factors include the amount of spectrum available, backhaul, and network topology.\n\nMobile Application Architectures Many applications used over wireless connections will be the same as those used over the Internet with desktop/laptop PCs. An increasing number of applications, however, will be developed specifically for mobile devices.\n\nThis can be a challenge for developers, because there are a number of different mobile platforms available including Android, Apple iPhone, liMo, Palm Pre, RIM BlackBerry, Symbian, and Windows Mobile. Unlike the desktop market, the mobile device market has become fragmented. Each of the device platforms comes with its own application development environment, and developers must face a learning curve to become adept at programming for any specific platform. Some developers may be content targeting specific platforms. Others, however, may need their applications to operate across multiple platforms.\n\nFortunately, there are various developments that address the fragmentation challenge. These include:\nSpectrum has always been a major consideration for deploying any wireless network, but it is particularly important when looking at high-performance broadband systems. HSPA and HSPA+ can deliver high throughput rates on the downlink and uplink with low latency in 5 MHz channels when deployed in single frequency (1/1) reuse.\n\nBy this, we mean that every cell sector (typically three per cell) in every cell uses the same radio channel(s).\n\n- Mobile Middleware. These are software infrastructures\nthat consist of a client component that operates on the\nmobile device, and a server component that acts as a\nproxy for the client. Vendors provide tools with which\ndevelopers can develop an application in a platformneutral manner, which enables the application to\noperate on multiple device types. Mobile middleware is\nmostly used for business applications.\nTo achieve higher data rates requires wider radio channels, such as 10 or 20 MHz wide channels, in combination with emerging OFDMA radio technologies. Very few operators today, however, have access to this much spectrum. It was challenging enough for GSM operators to obtain UMTS spectrum. If delivering very high data rates are the objective, then the system must minimize interference.\n\nThis result is best achieved by employing looser reuse, such as having every sector use only one-third of the available radio channels (1/3 reuse). The 10 MHz radio channel could now demand as much as 30 MHz of available spectrum.\n\n- Mobile Web 2.0. Mobile browsers are adopting many\nof the same sophisticated capabilities as desktop\nbrowsers. Combined with networks that have higher\nthroughputs and lower latency27, an increasing number\nof applications can be Web hosted, making the applications available from diverse platforms. Mobile\nWeb 2.0 technologies include items such as Ajax, offline\noperation, video capabilities, fast JavaScript execution,\nand mash-ups (combining data from multiple Web\nsources). Cloud computing, enabled by Mobile Web 2.0,\nwill play an important role for mobile systems and for\ndesktops.\n- Push Architectures. Many mobile applications are\nnotification oriented, meaning users want to know when\nnew information is available in applications like e-mail\nor social networking. \"Pushing\" small amounts of data\non a regular basis to large numbers of users, or having\ndevices poll on a regular basis, can impact network\ncapacity. In response, 3GPP has specified supporting\nmechanisms such as Paging Channel (PCH) states and\ntools for enabling rapid transitions between active and\ninactive states.\nBackhaul is another factor. As the throughput of the radio link increases, the circuits connecting the cell sites to the core network must be able to handle the increased load. With many cell sites today serviced by just a small number of T1/El circuits, each able to carry only 1.5/2.0\nMbps, operators are in the process'of upgrading backhaul capacity to obtain the full benefit of next-generation wireless technologies. Approaches include emerging wireline technologies such as VDSl and optical Ethernet, as well as point-to point microwave systems. An OFDMA\nsystem with 1.5 bps per hertz (Hz) of spectral efficiency in\n10 MHz on three sectors has up to 45 Mbps average cell throughput.\n\n........\n\nAdditionally, any technology's ability to reach its peak spectrum efficiency is somewhat contingent on the system's ability to reach the instantaneous peak data rates allowed by that technology. For example, 'a system claiming spectrum efficiency of 1.5 bps/Hz (as described) might rely on the anility to reach 100 Mbps instantaneously to achieve this level of spectrum efficiency. Any constraint on the transport system below 100 Mbps will restrict the range of achievable throughput and, in turn, impact the spectral efficiency of the system.\n\nWi-Fi has huge inherent capacity for two reasons. First, a large amount of spectrum (approximately 500 MHz)\nis available across 2.4 and 5 GHz bands. Second, the spectrum is used in small coverage areas, resulting in high frequency reuse. The result is much higher bps rates per square meter of coverage than with WANs. Various organizations are looking at integrating WLAN service with GSM Communications GSM-HSPA data services. The GSM Association has developed recommendations for Subscriber Identity Module (SIM) based authentication of hotspots, and 3GPP has multiple initiatives that address WLAN integration into its networks, including 3GPP System to WLAN interworking, UMA, IMS, and EPC.\n\nFinally, the overall network topology also plaY$ an important role, especially with respect to latency. Low latency is critical to achieving very high data rates, because of the way it affects Transmission Control Protocol (TCP)/\nIP traffic. How traffic routes through the core networkhow many hops and nodes it must pass through-can influence the overall performance of the network. One way to increase performance is by using flatter architectures, meaning a less hierarchical network with more direct routing from mobile device to end system. The core EPC network for 3GPP LTE emphasizes a flatter architecture.\n\nIntegration can either be loose or tight. Loose ihtegration means data traffic routes directly to the Internet and minimizes traversal of the service providers network. This is called local breakout. Tight integration means data traffic, or select portions, may traverse the service providers core network. This is beneficial in situations where the service providers offer value added services (e.g., internal portals)\nthat can only be accessed from within the core.\n\nIt can be misleading to say that one wireless technology outperforms another without a full understanding of how that technology will be deployed in. a complete system that also takes spectrum into account.\n\nEssential to successful data offload is providing a good subscriber experience. This mandates measures such as automatically provisioning subscriber devices with the necessary Wi-Fi configuration options and automatically authenticating subscribers on supported public Wi-Fi networks. Work in 3GPP Release 10 is defining some specific mechanisms for offloading traffic. One is called IP Flow and Seamless Offload (IFOM) used to carry select traffic over Wi-Fi instead of a Femto connection. Another is called Selected IP Traffic Offload (SIPTO) used to offload the mobile core network by separating traffic out early.\n\nData Offload As data traffic loads increase, operators are seeking to offload some of the data traffic to other networks, particularly Wi-Fi networks. In the future, once they are widely deployed, offload onto Femtocells will also play an important role. The IEEE 802.11 family of technologies has experienced rapid growth, mainly in private deployments.\n\nThe latest 802.11 standard, 802.11n, offers users throughputs in excess of 100 Mbps and improved range through use of MIMO. 802.11e provides QoS enabling VolP and multimedia, 802.11i enables robust security, and 802.11r provides fast roaming, which is necessary for voice handover across access points.\n\nFeature and Network Roadmap GSM service providers first enhanced their networks to support data capability through the addition of General Packet Radio Service (GPRS) infrastructure with the ability to use existing cell sites, transceivers, and interconnection facilities. Since installing GPRS, GSM service providers have largely upgraded data service to EDGE, and any new GSM network includes EDGE capability.\n\nService providers have deployed UMTS-HSPA worldwide.\n\nAlthough, UMTS involves a new radio access network, several factors facilitate deployment. First, most UMTS\ncell sites can be collocated in GSM cell sites enabled by multi-radio cabinets that can accommodate GSMjEDGE, as well as UMTS equipment. Second, much of the GSM/\nLeveraging this success, service providers-including cellular operators-are offering hotspot service in public areas such as airports, fast-food restaurants, and hotels.\n\nFor the most part, hotspots are complementary with cellular-data networks, because the hotspot can provide broadband services in extremely dense user areas and the cellular network can provide broadband services across much larger areas .\n\n. . . . . . . . .\n\nstation including using the same shelter, tower, antennas, power supply, and climate control.\n\nGPRS core network can be used. This means that all corenetwork elements above the Serving GPRS Support Node\n(SGSN) and Mobile SWitching Center (MSC}-the Gateway GPRS Support Node (GGSN), the Home Location Register\n(HLR), billing and subscriber administration systems, service platforms, and so forth-need, at most, a software upgrade to support 3G UMTS-HSPA.\n\nAnd while early 3G deployment used separate 2G/3G\nSGSNs and MSCs, all-new MSC and/or SGSN products are capable of supporting both GSM and UMTS-HSPA radio access networks. Similarly, new HSPA equipment will be upgradeable to LTE through a software upgrade.\n\nDifferent vendors have different so-called \"zero-footprine solutions allowing service providers to use empty space to enable reuse of existing sites without the need for any new floor space. A service provider can add LTE capability simply by adding a LTE baseband card. New multi-standard radio units (HSPA and LTE), as well as LTE only baseband cards, are mechanically compatible with existing building practices, so that operators can use empty space in an old base station for LTE baseband cards, thus enabling reuse of existing sites without the need for any new construction.\n\nBase station equipment is available for many bands including the 1.7/2.1 GHz AWS band and the recently auctioned 700 MHz bands in the U.S. In 2010, service providers and vendors began LTE deployment. On the device side, multi mode chipsets will enable devices to easily operate across UMTS and LTE networks. For example, one chipset vendor announced a series of chips that support the following combination of technologies:\nUMTS, HSPA+, and LTE; EVDO Rev B; and UMTS, HSPA+, EV-DO Rev Band LTE.28\nNew features are being designed so that the same upgraded UMTS radio channel can support a mixture of terminals. In other words, a network supporting Release\n5 features (e.g., HSDPA) can support Release 99, Release\n5, and Release 6 terminals (e.g., HSUPA) operating in a Release 5 mode. This flexibility assures the maximum degree of forward and backward compatibility. Note that most UMTS terminals today support GSM, thus facilitating use across large coverage areas and multiple networks.\n\nOnce deployed, operators can minimize the costs of managing GSM/EDGE and UMTS networks, because these networks share many of the same aspects including:\n\n- Packet-data architecture\nOne important and interesting aspect of technology deployment is that an advanced technology such as LTE\nenables service providers to upgrade prior technologies, such as HSPA. Examples include:\n\n- Cell. sites\n- Antenna systems - Backhaul circuits - Subscriber account management\n- VolP for HSPA: since LTE uses an IP core, once it is\ndeployed, supporting voice on HSPA via VolP will be\na much Simpler task as it can share the same core IP\nnetwork as LTE\n- Service platforms\n- Device processing power: supporting the high throughput\nrates with LTE (e.g., 50 Mbps or higher) will provide\nsufficient processing in the device to also support very\nhigh HSPA rates (e.g., 30 Mbps or higher)\nUsers largely don't even need to know what type of network they are connected to because their multimode GSM-HSPA (and eventually GSM-HSPA-LTE) devices can seamlessly hand off between networks.\n\n## The Gsm Family Of Technologies, Which Are Interchangeably Called The 3Gpp\n\nThe changes being planned for the core network are another aspect of evolution. Here, the intent is to reduce the number of nodes that packets must traverse. This will result in both reduced deployment costs and reduced latency. The key enabling technology is EPC, which is described in detail later in this paper.\n\nfamily of technologies, are all based on the evolution of standards developed for GSM, EDGE, UMTS-HSPA, HSPA+, LTE, and LTE-Advanced.\n\nThe upgrade to LTE will be relatively straightforward, with new LTE infrastructure having the ability to reuse a significant amount of the UMTS-HSPA cell site and base\n..., 4G Americas' Board of Governors\n........\n\n[-Year_\nr\n---- -\n-~ ----\n-\n-\n--\nFeatures\nL\n- --\n---- --\n-- --\nEvolved EDGE capabilities available to significantly increase EDGE throughput rates -and announced\ndeployments. HSPA+ peak speeds further increased to peak rates-of 42 Mbps based on Release 8. LTE\n2010\n. introduced for next-generation throughput performance using 2X2 MIMO. Advanqed core architectures\n, available through ~PC, primarily fo~ LT~, but aiso fo~ ~$PA+, ,providing benefits such as integration of\nmultiple antenl\"!as.,\n..\n. .\n'\n'\n2011\nLTE enhancements such as 4X2 MIMO and 4X4 MIMO available. LTE-Advanced specifications completed.\nHSPA+ with MIMO and dual-carrier available.\n--\n2012\n: i.TE-Adv~mced potentially deployed in initial'stages. HSPA+ with MIMO and quad-carrier avail~ble. M9st\n,ano'later\nn~w s~rvi(!es implemented in the packet domain.\n. '\n\nOver time, the separate GSM/EDGE Radio Access Network (GERAN), UTRAN, and core-infrastructure elements will undergo consolidation, thus lowering total network cost and improving integrated operation of the separate access networks. For actual users with multimode devices, the networks they access will be largely transparent Today, nearly all UMTS phones and modems support GSM/EDGE.\n\nService providers will deploy LTE in various configurations. Some will offer only data service on LTE. Others will offer data service 'on LTE in combination with voice over 2G or 3G. Yet others will provide both voice and data service on LTE.\n\nIndividual service provider configurations will also evolve over time.\n\n| I             | ----               | -         |  --     |\n|---------------|--------------------|-----------|---------|\n| II            |                    |           |         |\n| 'f            | -                  | -         |         |\n| I             |                    |           |         |\n| ,I            |                    |           |         |\n| II            |                    |           |         |\n| Peak          | and/or             | '         |         |\n| !             |                    |           |         |\n| i             |                    |           |         |\n| Peak Network  | Peak               | and/or    | Typical |\n| Ii            |                    |           |         |\n| Peak          | Network            | T'        |         |\n| I U           | R                  |           |         |\n| t :           |                    |           |         |\n| I'            |                    |           |         |\n| I             |                    |           |         |\n| I\"            |                    |           |         |\n| I             |                    |           |         |\n| yplca         | ser                | a         |         |\n| e             |                    |           |         |\n| _ _ _ J       |                    |           |         |\n| Speed         | (Down)             | ::        |         |\n| _us~~te       |                    |           |         |\n| -             |                    |           |         |\n| Down          |                    |           |         |\n| .l            |                    |           |         |\n| ~~e~d         | (UP~Lmk)           |           |         |\n| II            |                    |           |         |\n| (UP-Linkl_    |                    |           |         |\n| I             |                    |           |         |\n| 236.8         | kbps               |           |         |\n| EDGE          | (type              | 1         | MS)     |\n| Terminal)     |                    |           |         |\n| 200           | kbps               | peak      | 70      |\n| 135           | kbps               | typical   |         |\n| - .           | t':Mbps':peak.350' | ..        |         |\n| to            | 100                | kbps      | typical |\n| _             |                    |           |         |\n| expe<;~e_d    | ,(Qu,a~:C_arri~rk  |           |         |\n| Evolved       | EDGE               | (type     | 2       |\n| 1894.4        |                    |           |         |\n| 33            |                    |           |         |\n| kbps          |                    |           |         |\n| '             |                    |           |         |\n| ,             |                    |           |         |\n| -             |                    |           |         |\n| -UMTS'        | WCDMA              | -Release' | 99-     |\n| 2.048-Mbps    |                    |           |         |\n| ,             |                    |           |         |\n| ,             |                    |           |         |\n| 384           | kbps               |           |         |\n| UMTS          | WCDMA              | Release   | 99      |\n| (Practical    | Terminal)          |           |         |\n| 350           | kbps               | peak      |         |\n| 200           | to                 | 300       |         |\n| kbps          | typical            |           |         |\n| HSDPA         | Initial            | Devices   | (2Q06)  |\n| , >           |                    |           |         |\n| -1,MpP's:peak |                    |           |         |\n| i.8           |                    |           |         |\n| Mbps          |                    |           |         |\n| -             |                    |           |         |\n| -             |                    |           |         |\n| .             |                    |           |         |\n| HSDPA         |                    |           |         |\n| 14.4          | Mbps               |           |         |\n\n........\n\n29 A type 1 Evolved EDGE MS can receive on up to ten timeslots using two radio channels and can transmit on up to four t1meslots in one radio channel using\n32 QAM modulation (with turbo coding in the downlink),\n\n|             | 236.8    | kbps    |\n|-------------|----------|---------|\n| 200         | kbps     | peak    |\n| 70          | to       | 135     |\n| typical     |          |         |\n| ;           | 4Q():    |         |\n| kbpipeak' ' |          |         |\n| :           | 15.o-to  | 300     |\n| :           | typia! |         |\n| ~xpecteQ    |          |         |\n| ,           |          |         |\n| 947.2       | kb       |         |\n| pS          |          |         |\n| 34          |          |         |\n| .           |          |         |\n| -           |          |         |\n| -           |          |         |\n| ,768        |          |         |\n| kbps        |          |         |\n| - -         |          |         |\n| .           |          |         |\n| -           |          |         |\n| ,           |          |         |\n| .           |          |         |\n| ,           |          |         |\n| -           |          |         |\n| -           |          |         |\n| 384         | kbps     |         |\n| ~384        | kbi>~    |         |\n| 350         | kbps     | peak    |\n| 200         | to       | 300     |\n| kbps        | typical  |         |\n| $50:kbps    | peak     | -       |\n| ,           |          |         |\n| -           |          |         |\n| 384         | kbps     |         |\n| HSPA35      | Initiallmpleme'ntation    |\n|-------------|---------------------------|\n| 7,2         | Mbps                      |\n| >           |                           |\n| 5           | Mbps                      |\n| 2           | Mbps                      |\n| >           |                           |\n| 1,5         | Mbps                      |\n| 700         | kbps                      |\n| 500         | kbps                      |\n| typical     |                           |\n| 36          |                           |\n| Mbps        | typical                   |\n| HSPA        | Current                   |\n| 7,2         | Mbps                      |\n| HSPA        |                           |\n| ,14,4       | Mbps                      |\n| 5,76        | Mbps                      |\n| HSPA+       | (DL                       |\n| 21,6        | Mbps                      |\n| 1,9         | Mbps                      |\n| 11,5        | Mbps                      |\n| 1           | Mbps                      |\n| QAM,2       | X 5                       |\n| 13          | Mbps                      |\n| 8           |                           |\n| Mbps        |                           |\n| -HSPA+      | (2X2                      |\n| 28          | Mbps                      |\n| 11,5        | Mbps                      |\n| QAM,        | UL                        |\n| ..          |                           |\n| HSPA+       | (2X2                      |\n| 42          | Mbps                      |\n| 11,5        | Mbps                      |\n| DL          | 64                        |\n| 5           |                           |\n| MHz)        |                           |\n| .           | HSPA+                     |\n| 84          | Mbps                      |\n| 23          | Mbps                      |\n| :           | DL                        |\n| Carrier,    | 2 X                       |\n| -           |                           |\n| HSPA+       | (2X2                      |\n| 168         | Mbps                      |\n| DL          | 64                        |\n| Carrier,    | 2 X                       |\n| LTE         | (2X2                      |\n| 70          | Mbps                      |\n| 5,9         | to                        |\n| pS          |                           |\n| 39          |                           |\n| 35          | Mbps                      |\n| LTE         | (4X4                      |\n| 326         | Mbps                      |\n| 86          | Mbps                      |\n| CDMA2000    | 1XRlT                     |\n| 153         | kbps                      |\n| CDMA2000    | lXRTT                     |\n| 307         | kbps                      |\n| CDMA2000    | EV-DO                     |\n| >           |                           |\n| 1           | Mbps                      |\n| 153         | kbps                      |\n| 150         | kbps                      |\n| CDMA2000    | EV-DO                     |\n| >           |                           |\n| 1,5         | Mbps                      |\n| >           |                           |\n| 1           | Mbps                      |\n| 600         | kbps                      |\n| typical     |                           |\n| 40          |                           |\n| kbps        | typical                   |\n| CDMA2000    | EV-DO                     |\n| 14.741      | Mbps                      |\n| 5.4         | Mbps                      |\n| radio       | channels                  |\n| CDMA2000    | EV-DO                     |\n| 73.5        | Mbps                      |\n| Theoretical | (15                       |\n| WiMAX       | Release                   |\n| 46          | Mbps                      |\n| 1           | to                        |\n| 42          |                           |\n| 4           | Mbps                      |\n| MHzTDD,     | DLjUL-3,                  |\n| MIMO)       |                           |\n| Wi          | MAX                       |\n| TBD         |                           |\n| TBD         |                           |\n| IEEE        | 802.16m                   |\n| TBD         |                           |\n| TBD         |                           |\n| *Blue:      | indicates                 |\n|             |                           |\n\n3$ HSPA consists of systems supporting both HSDPA and HSUPA,\n38 Typical downlink and uplink throughput rates based on AT&T press release, June 4, 2008\n31 3G Americas analysis, Assumes Release 7 with 64 QAM and F-DPCH, Single user. 50% loading In neighboring cells. Higher rates expected with subsequent versions.\n\n38 Vodafone press release, Vodafone Trials HSPA+ Mobile Broadband at Speeds of Up To 16Mbps,\" January 15, 2009.\n\n3G Americas' member company analysis, Assumes single user with 50% load In other sectors, Verizon Is quoting average user rates of 5-12 Mbps on the downlink and 2-5 Mbps on the uplink for their network. https://www.lte.vzw.com/AboutlTE/VerizonWlrelesslTENetwork/tabld/6003/Default.aspx\n39 Assumes 64 QAM. Otherwise 22 Mbps with 16 QAM.\n\n40 Typical downlink and uplink throughput rates based on Sprint press release January 30, 2007.\n\nlarge economies of scale, widespread acceptance by service providers,' paired services like messaging and multimedia, and an incredible variety of competitive handsets and other mobile user devices. Currently, more than 347 commercial UMTS-HSPA networks are already in operation. UMTS~HSPA and/or LTE offers an excellent migration path for GSM service providers, as well as an effective technology solution for greenfield providers.\n\nCONCLUSION\nDuring 2010, the mobile broadband industry grew rapidly with data intensive smartphones on track to becoming the most common phone type used in developed countries and with innovative new devices such as the Apple iPhone4 and iPad. 3G is becoming ubiquitous in developed countries, and advanced wireless technologies such.as LTE\nare starting to see initial rollouts. The growing success of mo\"i:ii1e' broadband, however, has mandated the network requirement to increase capacity to which the industry has responded by using more efficient technologies, deploying more cell sites, and offloading. onto either Wi-Fi or Femtocells. Governments have also responded with supportive planning to supply more commercial spectrum.\n\nHSPA has significantly enhanced UMTS by providing a broadband data service with user rates that often exc~ed\n1 Mbps on the downlink in initial deployments and that now exceed 4 Mbps in some commercial networks.\n\nNumerous networks are being upgraded to' include HSUPA, providing users with uplink rates in excess of 1 Mbps.\n\nHSPA+ increases rates further, with typical rates between\n1.9 and *B.B* Mbps expected in initial versions of the technology (based on 64 QAM). Speeds will only increase as service providers implement other HSPA+ innovations such as Dual-Carrier, Multi-Carrier43, and MIMO.\n\nBy means of constant innovation, the EDGE/HSPA/\nLTE family of technologies has proven itself to be the predominant wireless network solution and offers service providers and subscribers a' true mobile broadband capability. Continued use of GSM and EDGE technology through ongoing enhancements allows service providers to .. Ieyerage existing network investments. UMTS-HSPA technologies' advantages provide broadband services that deliver increased data transport and provide a path to an all services IP architecture.\n\nContinual improvements in radio technology are expected. Improvements to the core network through flatter architectures, particularly EPC, that will reduce latency, speed applications, simplify deployment, enable all services within the IP domain, and allow a common core network to support both LTE and legacy architectures is a.lso anticipated.\n\nLTE is currently the most widely chosen technology platform for the coming decade and with deployment underway, the benefits include a best practice, long-term solution that meets or exceeds the performance of competing approaches. The migration to 4G, however, is a long-term one. Until the middle of this decade, most subscribers will still be using 2G and 3G. Significant uptake of LTE may not occur until the second half of this decade.\n\nNetworks are rapidly moving toward providing the \"always on, anywhere, anytime\", type of communications support, with corresponding increases in traffic demanded by users in developed countries. Network limitations are constantly being addressed with solutions that make this vision a reality. Users will expand to include deviceto-device applications, thus expanding pOint-to-point and point-to-multipoint cpmmunications. Smart homes, smart appliances, cars, and sensors are among the new communications devices that are a part of the communications explosion. The number and types of devices that communicate will grow rapidly once the network supports the volume at a reasonable cost. The way we communicate is set to change drastically.\n\nToday, HSPA offers the highest peak data rates of any widely available, wide-area wireless technology. With continued improvements, peak data rates will increase, spectral efficiency will improve, and latency will decrease.\n\nThe result will be support for more users and more data intensive applications. The scope of applications will also increase as new services, achieved through standardized network interfaces, become available such as location information, video, and user initiated call control. Greater efficiencies and capabilities translate to more competitive offers, greater network usage, and increased traffic.\n\n    \"What works on the net works\n   for people in general. The net has\n very little to do with technology, what\nmatters is how people use the technology.\"\n\nBecause of practical benefits and deployment momentum,\nthe migration path from EDGE to HSPA, and then to LTE is\nforeseeable. Benefits include the ability to roam globally,\n\n- Craig Newmark, Founder, Craigslist\n........\n\nIMS Mini Tutorial The benefits of using IMS include handling all communication in the packet domain, tighter integration with the Internet, and a lower cost infrastructure that is based on IP building blocks used for both voice and data services. This allows operators to potentially deliver data and voice services at a lower cost, thus providing these services at cheaper prices and further driving demand and usage.\n\nIMS applications can reside in the operator's network or in third-party networks including those of enterprises. By managing services and applications centrally-and independently of the access network-IMS can enable network convergence. This allows operators to offer common services across 3G, Wi-Fi, and wireline networks.\n\nIMS is one of the most likely methods that operators will use to provide voice service in LTE networks. Service Continuity, defined in Release 8, allows a user's entire session to continue seamlessly as the user moves from one access network to another. Release 9 expands on this concept to allow sessions to move across different device types. For example, the user could transfer a video call in midsession from a mobile phone to a large-screen TV, assuming both have an IMS\nappearance in the network.\n\nRelease 8 introduces the IMS Centralized Services (ICS) feature, which allows IMS controlled voice features to use either packet-switched or circuit-switched access .\n\n. . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . .\n\nEXECUTIVE SUMMARY\nThe Third Generation (3G) to Fourth Generation (4G)\nevolution m;:ly be the most dramatic change that has been intiated by the wireless industry. Carriers are deploying wireless networks that rely on an all-Internet Protocol (IP)\ncore that transmits information in the form of data traffic.\n\nThe new 4G network is evolving with fewer nodes and a flatter structure, thus providing lower latency. 4G improves on the limitations of 3G byincreasing access speeds and addressing network throughput, making better use of network resources, and improving Quality of Service (QoS).\n\nAccess Network (RAN)4, voice will be a basic service for the customer. However, voice service continuity is not guaranteed if a. Voice over IP (VoIP) subscriber roams between the LTE coverage area and other wireless networks, as it is a significant challenge to deliver voice over LTE networks. Unlike previous generations of mobile standards like Global' System for Mobile Communications\n(GSM), LTE does not have dedicated channels for circuitswitched (CS) telep~ony, and instead relies on an end-toend IP connection from the handset to the core network.\n\nTherefore, any form of voice service used on an LTE bearer, by definition, must be some form of VoIP.\n\nLong Term Evolution (LTE) is seen as the next technology for mobile networks. It incluc!es promising features such as semi-persistent scheduling1, Transmission Time Interval\n(TIl) bundling2, and high performance gains on Quality of end user Experience (QoE).3 The primary objective of LTE\nis to provide ultra-high speed mobile broadband service with peak data rates over 100 Mbps. One of the main selling pOints of LTE is that it is supposed to encourage and foster new business models for mobile operators, especially as certain aspects of the competing WiMAX\ntechnology are specifically intended to enhance flexibility.\n\nIn practical applications, however, LTE is challenged to provide the same capabilities as a 2G/3G network during the initial stages of trial deployments and during the service providers' initial broad network build out.\n\nThe industry is evaluating potential solutions to overcome the LTE voice issues. During this investigative process, two options are viewed with significant interest Circuit Switched Fall Back (CSFB)5 and LTE VolP-based Single Radio Voice Call CQntinuity (SRVCC). SRVCC provides the ability to transition a voice call from the VoIP/IMS\npacket domain to the legacy circuit domain, (the ability to transition from the circuit domain to the packet domain is not addressed in the current generation of LTE standards).\n\nIMS is a platform that permits data sessions to be supported across telecom networks. IMS architecture may potentially allow a call to begin in the home using a wired network, transfer seamlessly to a mobile device, and then move uninterrupted into a corporate wired or wireless environment. SRVCC is broadly supported in the industry and is recommended by the LTE OneVoice Initiative. It is also supported by some of the world's largest service and network equipment providers and has been endorsed by the GSM Association (GSMA).\n\nA major area of innovation and opportunity for telecom services is being termed \"Voice 2.0\", also known as\n\"voice mash ups\". This involves linking voice with other applications (e.g., embedding voice capabilities within a corporate application or game). A call might be invoked inside a browser or Web application, either residing on the handset or the network side. There is huge interest by service providers in monetizing their voice capabilities beyond mere \"person to person' telephony\". However, one of the concerns regarding LTE is the support for voice services. Wireless network architects see voice as just another application on the network. Voice continues to be the \"killer application\" for service providers because it continues to provide a significant portion of their revenue. Voice will remain the dominant critical service in the wireless network for years, and despite the technical challenges of providing service over an ail-iP Radio WHYSRVCC?\n\nMultimedia services with video sharing, video on demand, video telephony, video conferencing, VoIP, Push-To-\nTalk, broadband access to Personal Digital Assistants\n(PDAs), and many other applications are currently offered with the existing capabilities of the Universal Mobile Telecommunications System (UMTS) using High Speed Packet Access (HSPA), Evolved HSPA (HSPA+), Code Division Multiple Access (COMA), and IP MultiMedia Subsystems (lMS) technologies. Increased demand for these real-time mobile data services coupled with subscribers' requirements for always-on, high-quality\n........\n\nservices is driving the need for expanded network capacity and increased throughput.\n\nPacket System (EPS)8 with the 3GPP Universal Terrestrial Radio Access Network (UTRAN).\n\nHowever, along with added \"Voice 2.0\" services, another slowly emerging trend which could be extinguished by CSFB is that of the shift towards \"high definition\" voice.\n\nAlthough this has been widely used in the VolP community for years, it has taken a long time to penetrate the mobile marketplace, despite being technically feasible.\n\nFor dual-mode/single-standby mobile phones to simultaneously use dual-network services, the Inter Working Solution (IWS) node provides on-time message access. On the other hand, dual-mode/dual-standby mobile phones require fewer network chang~s to facilitate inter-working between two networks. Dual-mode handsets drain battery power quickly and- .need complex terminal customization.\n\nWith LTE's increased data transmission capacity, interworking with 3rd Generation Partnership Project (3GPP)\nand non-3GPP based networks, and all-IP core network elements, the converging services can be delivered effectively. Higher bandwidth for LTE means that more resource blocks6 can be \"allocated by the lIE system, which in turn provides higher performance gains.\n\nFor converging mobile and broadband wireless access technologies, SRVCC offers LTE-IMS based voice service within the LTE coverage area, and CS-based voice service outside the LTE coverage area. The following figure displays the reference architecture for SRVCC using EPS to 3GPP\nUTRAN.\n\nRecognizing this reality, CSFB is a 3GPP-defined standard that requires radio devices to be equipped with either dual-mode/single-standby or dual-mode/dual-standby capabilities. In addition to CSFB, a number of other interim technologies have been suggested:\n\n- Voice over LTE via GAN (VoLGA) encapsulates circuit\nvoice within an IP Protocol Security (IPsec) tunnel over\nthe LTE bearer. It is an evolution of the voice-over-\nWiFi standard UMA (standardized by 3GPP as Generic\nAccess Network (GAN)), which has existed for a few\nyears, however, with limited traction. It enables the\nnormal telephony and SMS7 application on the phone\nto connect over an IP connection to the existing Mobile\nSwitching Center (MSC), via a gateway and handset\nclient.\nFigure 4-1 displays the reference architecture for a CSFB\nnetwork using an Evolved Whenever the VolP subscriber moves out of LTE coverage, SRVCC ensures smooth handoff of voice from the LTE to the CS network, keeping upgrades of the network to a minimum. The IMS network that stores voice service link information during this time guides the target CS network to establish a link, thereby replacing the original VolP\nchannel.\n\n| I               | PARAMETER    |\n|-----------------|--------------|\n| SRVCC           | CSFB         |\n| Device/terminal |              |\n| Single          | radio        |\n| capability      |              |\n| single-standby  | or           |\n| Dualmode/dual-  |              |\n| standby         |              |\nTerminal\nLess complex\nComplex for single\ncustomization\nstandby\n| IMS       | anchoring    |\n|-----------|--------------|\n| Mandatory | Optional     |\n| Switching         | Only        | when    | the         |\n|-------------------|-------------|---------|-------------|\n| For               | every       | mobile  |             |\n| networks/mobility |             |         |             |\n| terminal          | roams       | out     | originating |\n| to                | CS          | network | of          |\n| mobile            | terminating |         |             |\n| area              |             |         |             |\n| voice             | call        |         |             |\n|                   |             |         |             |\n\n6 Resource blocks are groups of transport carriers (e.g. sub-carriers) or Intervals that are assigned to transport data. A resource block for UMTS lTE is 12 subcarriers when the subcarrier bandwidth is 15 kHz or 24 sub-carriers when the sub-carrier bandwidth Is 7.5 kHz.\n\nT I I 5 1F  tin rIP 9tHel.1 Yse e\"I, ttl!!8;'FtUtB) Rsdlc I\nd I J Lj 'II Qiilj\n\n-\n- --\ni PAR-AMETER\nr SRVCC\n_~_Il CSFB\n'--\n-\nJ,\n-\n-\n-\nJ\nCost\n..\n'less expensive\nExpensive due to\n\na VolP to a CDMA Ix network using SRVCC technology.\n\nThe existing inter-frequency/RAT gap pattern mechanism in E-UTRAN is therefore extended to support gap patterns suitable for lxRTT measurements.\n\nIncrea~ed netw.ork\nsi@aling:load\n\nWith this approach, the eNodeS is able to interwork with the 3GPP2 IXRTT MSC using the SI-MME interface with the Evolved Packet Core (EPC) Mobility Management Entity\n(MME).\n\n| Voice     | call     | setup    |\n|-----------|----------|----------|\n| Less,     | as       | time     |\n| More,     | as       | the      |\n| time      |          |          |\n| is        | required | only     |\n| terminal  | needs    | to       |\n| when      | the      | terminal |\n| establish | the      | voice    |\n| moves     | out      | of       |\n| call      | session  | with     |\n| coverage  | area     |          |\n| CS        | network  | for      |\n| every     | access   |          |\n\nMobility Management Entity (MME): The MME manages mobility. Some of MME's functions are:\n\n|            |                |              | -               | NAS        | signaling    | and          | related    | security     |\n|------------|----------------|--------------|-----------------|------------|--------------|--------------|------------|--------------|\n| -          | Inter          | CN           | node            | signaling  | for          | mobility     | between    | 3GPP         |\n| access     | networks       | (terminating | S3)             |            |              |              |            |              |\n| -          | Idle           | mode         | UE              | Tracking   | and          | Connectivity | (control   | and          |\n| execution  | of             | paging       | retransmission) |            |              |              |            |              |\n| -          | Tracking       | Area         | list            | management |              |              |            |              |\n| -          | Roaming        | (terminating | towards         | home       | HSS)         |              |            |              |\n| -          | Gateway        | (GW)         | selections      | (serving   | GW           | and          | PDN        | GW           |\n| selection) |                |              |                 |            |              |              |            |              |\n| -          | MME            | selection    | for             | handovers  | with         | MME          | change     |              |\n| -          | Serving        | GPRS         | Support         | Node       | selection    | for          | handovers  | to           |\n| 2G         | or             | 3G           | 3GPP            | access     | networks     |              |            |              |\n| -          | High           | Rate         | Packet          | Data       | (HRPD)       | access       | node       | (terminating |\n| reference  | point)         | selection    | for             | hand       | overs        | to/from      | HRPD       |              |\n| -          | Authentication |              |                 |            |              |              |            |              |\n| -          | Bearer         | management   | functions       | including  | dedicated    |              |            |              |\n| bearer     | establishment  |              |                 |            |              |              |            |              |\n| -          | Lawful         | interception | of              | Signaling  | traffic      |              |            |              |\n\nSRVCC from LTE\nSRVCC service for LTE is important when a single radio User Equipment (UE) accessing IMS anchored voice call services switches from the LTE network to the CS\ndomain, while it is able to transmit or receive on only one of these access networks at a given time. This basically removes the need for a UE to have multiple Radio Access Technology (RAT) capabilities. With single-radio terminals, measurement gaps are needed to allow the UE to switch onto the CS network and complete radio measurements.\n\nMeasurement gaps define the time periods when no uplink or downlink transmissions are scheduled so that the UE\nmay perform the measurements. However, it is understood that the idea of CSFS fits very poorly with LTE femtocells.\n\nAn LTE device camped onto a femto would either need to fallback to 2G/3G in the fernto itself, or look for a macro cell-site instead. Adding 2G into femtos is extremely complex, while adding 3G increases cost, complexity and time-to-market. Conversely, accessing the macro network is obviously dependent on coverage, and may have a huge performance gap with the femto for data services running in parallel.\n\n- Support for Single Radio VCC and CS Fallback for 2G/3G\nand 1xRTT CDMA\nA new Interworking Signaling (IWS) node is required and is responsible for the exchange of 3GPP 1XCS signaling messages with the MME and for establishing a CS session when the UE is in the process of switching over from the LTE network to the 3GPP lXCS network. Generally, this is a case of intersystem handover from the LTE perspective.\n\nThe Evolved NodeB (eNodeS), (i.e., LTE base station)\nis responsible for configuring the measurement gap pattern and provides it to the UE using Radio Resource Control (RRC) dedicated signaling. The UE assists the eNodeB by informing the network about its gap-related capabilities, at least mentioning if it has a dual or single receiver. This capability is transferred along with the other UE capabilities. The UE accessing the SRVCC service is assumed to have IMS Service continuity capabilities with single radio access only.\n\nA new S102 reference point or interface is defined between the LTE MME node and the 3GPP IXCS IWS node.\n\nSRVCC from LTE to 3GPP2 3.XCS\nThe 3GPP lXCS signaling messages are tunneled over In the case of VolP, when subscribers geographically roam this single link of S102 and thereafter, tunneled through from LTE+CDMA to CDMA, voice calls are switched from E-UTRAN/EPS tunneling messages to the UE .\n\n. . . . . . . . .\n\nr de en\",. Elf\n\"\n.,. 'f\n,.\n\n5\n\ne o,r'iat UI. QR'Y (laii}EioIlO) Pedhlss\n                                                                                                                                                                                                                    C\n                                                                                                                                                                                                                              tI\n                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                -\n                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                               I '1 FB' 9\n                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                \"\n\nEVOLVED PACKET SYSTEM (EPS) ACCESS\nThe following process identifies the actions taken by the network to seamlessly hand off voice calls from a VolP\nnetwork to a CS network:\n\n1.\nlxCS SRVCC UE sends measurement reports to the\neNodeB.\n2. The E-UTRAN makes a determination to initiate an\ninter-technology handover to CDMA2000 1xRTT.\n10. The 3GPP2 lxCS IWS creates a lx message and\nencapsulates it in a S102 Dire~t Transfer message (lx,\nHandover indication). If the 3GPP2 access was able\nto allocate resources successfully, the lx message is\na lx Handover Direction message and the handover\nindicator indicates successful resource allocation.\nOtherwise, the hand over indicator indicates to the MME\nthat handover preparation failed and the embedded\nlx message indicates the failure to the UE.\n11. The MME sends the lx message and CDMA2000\n3. The E-UTRAN signals the UE to perform an intertechnology handover by sending a Handover from\nE-UTRAN Preparation Request message with 3Glx\nOverhead Parameters.\nHO Status IE in a Downlink Sl CDMA2000 Tunneling\nmessage to the E-UTRAN. The CDMA2000 HO Status\nIE is set according to the handover indicator received\nover the S102 tunnel.\n4. The UE initiates signaling for establishment of the CS\naccess leg by sending an Uplink handover preparation\nmessage containing the lxRTT Origination message.\n5. The E-UTRAN sends an Uplink Sl CDMA2000\n12. If the CDMA2000 HO Status IE indicates successful\nhandover preparation, the E UTRAN forwards the lx\nHandoff Direction message embedded in Mobility\nfrom E-UTRA Command message to the UE. This\nis perceived by the UE as a Handover Command\nmessage.\nTunneling message with Mobile 'Equipment Identifiers\n(MElD), lx Origination, Reference Cell ID to the MME.\n\nThe eNodeB will also include CDMA2000 Handover Required Indication Information Element (IE) to Uplink Sl CDMA2000 Tunneling message, which indicates to the MME that the handover preparation has started.\n\n13. The UE tries to acquire the traffic channel with the\nlxRTT CS access as it becomes aware of the traffic\nchannel information from the CDMA2000 lxRTT\nsystem.\n6.\nOn receipt of the Uplink Sl CDMA2000 Tunneling\nmessage, the MME:\n14. The UE sends a lxRTI handoff completion message to\nthe lxRTT CS Access.\n15. The lxRTT CS Access sends a message to the lxRTT\n- Separates the voice bearer from the non-voice bearers\nbased on the QoS Class Identifier (QCI) associated with\nthe voice bearer (QCI 1) and CDMA2000 HO Required\nIndication.\n- Selects the 3GPP2 lxCS IWS based on Reference Cell\nMSC to indicate that the handoff is done. The traffic\naSSignment, that was done during the session/domain\ntransfer of the CS access leg, between the lxCS IWS\nand the lxRTT MSC, is released.\nID and encapsulates the lx Origination Message along\nwith the MElD and Authentication Challenge Parameter,\nRAND, in a Direct Transfer message (as \"ix Air Interface\nSignaling\") to the IWS, only for the voice bearer.\n16. An ongOing voice call over the CS access leg is\nestablished over lxRTT access. The UE continues to\ntransmit voice via the new access system. The voice\nbearer path is no longer carried by the EPC.\n7.\nThe traffic assignment is done between the IWS and\nRTT MSC, over the Al interface using the signaling\nprotocols to initiate the handoff to the lXRTT system.\n8. The traffic channel resources are established in the lx\nRTT system and 3GPP2 lxCS procedures for initiation\nof session transfer for CS access leg are performed.\n17. The eNodeB initiates the release of UE context on\nthe EPS; it sends an Sl UE Context Release Request\n(Cause) message to the MME. Cause indicates that Sl\nrelease procedure is due to handover from E-UTRAN\nto lxRTT.\n18. The MME exchanges Suspend Request and Suspend\n9. Whenthe lxRTTMSCreceivesa positive acknowledgment\nfrom the lxRTT radio for traffic allocation and from the\nIMS for successful domain transfer, it returns an IS-41\nhandoff message to the IWS to send to the UE via the\nestablished signaling tunnel.\nAcknowledge messages with the Serving Gateway\n(S-GW). With this, the Sl-U bearers are released for\nall EPS bearers and the Guaranteed Bit Rate (GBR)\nbearers are deactivated by the MME. The non-GBR\n........\nbearers are preserved and are marked as suspended in the S-GW. Upon receipt of downlink data, the S-GW\nshould not send a downlink data notification message to the MME.\n\nServing Gateway: The S-GW is the node that terminates the interface towards E-UTRAN. For each UE associated with the EPS, at a given pOint of time, there is a single S-GW. Serving GW functions include:\n\n- The local Mobility Anchor point for inter-eNodeB\nhandover\ncompetitive solutions, different service providers will likely choose to implement one or the other depending on many factors including existing network assets and the overall requirements for rolling out LTE. CSFB may be used by a subset of service providers as it requires less core network modification and changes can be focused primarily on the handset manufacturers. Due to the efforts of the LTE\n-OneVoice initiative and the capability to deliver SRVCC\nvia a subset of IMS functionality, it is forecasted that the majority of LTE voice service will be provided using an IMS-\nbased SRVCC architecture.\n\n- Mobility anchoring for inter-3GPI? 'mobility (terminating\nand relayingthe traffic between 2G/3G system and PDN\nGateway)\n- E-UTRAN idle mode downlink packet buffering\nand initiation of network triggered service request\nprocedure\n- Transport level packet marking in the uplink and the\ndownlink (e.g., setting the DiffServ Gode POint, based\non the QCI9 of the associated EPS bearer)\nIn current form, CSFB may be unsuitable as a broadlydeployed interim solution, especially for LTE service providers that do not expect a swift transition to IMS.\n\nWhile it may be made workable for certain service providers that retain control of handset software, and an entrenched business model that supports the ability to provide a highly-customized user experience, it has severe deficiencies for many others. While there are likely to be some work arounds and enhancements to CSFB to address some of the problems, it seems unlikely that these will solve all the concerns raised.\n\n- Accounting on user and QCI granularity for inter-operator\ncharging\n~'-----.......\n- Packet routing and forwarding\n- Some charging support\n19. UE Context in the eNodeB and MME are now released\nwith the normal E-UTRAN/EPS procedure.\nFor service providers that want to retain' control over in-house voice applications and which have robust CS platforms with several years working life and spare capacity left in them, VoLGA maybe a realistic option - or at least one worthy of formal investigation and testing, as well as greater attention from the standards bodies. It is certainly not without its own challenges. It also requires changes to handsets, as well as a mechanism for allowing the network to trigger LTE-to-3G/2G handovers for VoLGA\ncalls, originally defined as part of SRVCC. It is also purely a mechanism for delivering \"old school\" CS-type voice services rather than the more advanced types of Web/\nvoice integration, although potentially the voice traffic could be treated as a packet application/object available over IP.\n\nThe introduction of seamless high speed networking offers service providers the ability to customize billing specific to a customer usage. Blending pre and postpaid services, and a -per-use, (e. 0, billin for me a-b tes transmitted)\nCONCLUSION\nThe popularity of VolP applications, along with the absolute need for service providers to deliver voice over LTE, is causing the SRVCC to receive significant attention. Despite the fact that SRVCC is apparently more complex than CSFB due to the requirement of an IMS core network (or application tier), it continues to be the choice of the LTE\nOneVoice initiative due to the lack of need for complex and expensive dual-mode user devices. To combat the apparent cost and complexity of a full IMS network rollout, the industry is now focusing on simplifying the IMS\nprotocols and defining a specific IMS \"profile\" for providing seamless LTE VolP service.\n\nSRVCC will playa key role in handing over the UE from LTE\nto other CS-based networks by utilizing high performance technology capabilities of LTE and the EPC. When there are\n........\n\n## 5. 4G Technology\n\nINTRODUCTION\nFor some time now, marketers in the telecommunications industry have offered the promise of Fourth Generation\n(4G) networks bringing the full power of the Internet to the world of wireless. But what does 4G really mean? Is it more than just a promise? Most importantly, how will it impact Law Enforcement's (LE) ability to perform electronic intercepts? This article examines the evolving definition of 4G, describes what is really happening on the network, and identifies the specific challenges that the deployment of 4G networks could pose for LE.\n\nTHE GENERATION GAP\nGenerations represent major advances in technologies and services. As such, the term is often freely used by those who wish to portray their offerings as major improvements to what is currently considered state of the art. Often these changes prove to be incremental at best, and soon enough another company is touting their own products as part of the next generation. Such uses of Third Generation\n(3G), and now 4G, as marketing terms lead to confusion within the marketplace. Usually, it is only over time that the industry converges on an accepted definition of the characteristics of a generation of telecommunications technology. 4G is just reaching that stage. While there is much marketing hype, agreement on what technologies meet the definition of 4G is just now emerging.1\n1 http://www.fiercebroadbandwireless.com/story/ltu-declares-Ite.advanced-80216m4g-standards/2010-10-25\nTHE TECHNOLOGIES\nGlobal System for Mobile (GSM): The dominant mobile phone technology worldwide is GSM, which has over 85%\nof the three billion (and growing) subscriptions worldwide.\n\nUniversal Mobile Telecommunications System (UMTS):\nThis 3G mobile phone system evolved from GSM by replacing the radio subsystem with one based on Code Division Multiple Access (COMA), which offers higher capacity and performance than Second Generation (2G).\n\nBy squeezing more phone calls into the same spectrum, fewer cell sites are required or ,higher data rates can be aChieved. Almost all UMTS networks are owned by or directly interwork with an existing 2G GSM network'so that in areas with poor coverage, calls can be handeG over to and continue on the other network.\n\nHigh Speed Packet Access (HSPA): Often termed 3.5G, this is an improved version of UMTS that modifies the coding used on the radio transmissions to dramatically improve the data throughput Peak rates of 14 Megabits per second (Mbps) are achievable in lab conditions, with promises of even higher capacity. These systems are completely backward compatible with the original UMTS\nsystems, although, newer handsets or data dongles would be required to take advantage of the higher data rates.\n\nEarlier versions of (non-mobile) WiMAX are considered\n3-3.5G -\nLTE Advanced) is moving toward deployment in 2011 with LTE Advanced deployment projected to begin in 2012.\n\nWiMAX 1.x (based on IEEE 802.16e) has been deployed in the U.S. and worldwide, with WiMAX 2 deployments projected to begin before the end of 2011.4\n\nLTE EVOLUTION\n- The term LTE originally referred to the Evolved UMTS\nCode Division Multiple Access (COMA): Not to be confused with Wideband CDMA (WCDMA), this earlier technology was popular in the U.S., Japan, and Korea but did not achieve global deployment. The 2G version of CDMA\nis known as One times Radio Transmission Technology\n(lxRT.f) and is efficientfor voice and text services. The 3G\nversion, called Evolution-Data Optimized ot Evolution-Data Only (EV-DO), provides higH-speed data rates.\n\n## Terrestrial Radio Access Network (E-Utran)\n\n- LTE is now used as a 4G marketing term for the Evolved\nPacket System (EPS)\nLong Term Evolution (LTE): Both GSM and CDMA\ncommunities have agreed to move toward a common standard for their next step. LTE is their 4G standard, and radio interface has already demonstrated data rates over 100 Megabits per second (Mbps). The Orthogonal Frequency-Division Multiplexing (OFDM) scheme is particularly effective at combating multi-path and other aspects where radio propagation is difficult There will also be a major change to the core network standard, which is called System Architecture Evolution (SAE) and uses the Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) to setup sessions and voice calls.\n\n- Initial LTE deployments use the 700 Megahertz (MHz)\nband\n- LTE supports Voice (lP Multimedia Subsystems (IMS)\nVoIP) and data\nWorldwide Interoperability for Microwave Access (WiMAX):\nThis is also an OFDM technology and competes with LTE, although, there are talks to combine the two. It is marketed as a low-cost means of delivering broadband data services, is likely to be popular in areas where there are no land line alternatives, and is a competitor to HSPA and LTE.\n\nWI MAX EVOLUTION\n- 802.16d fixed Wi MAX; mobility added in 802.16e - Sprint's Xohm WiMAX offering ranges between 3.7 - 5\nMbps\nA summary of the key aspects of the four widely acknowledged generations of telecommunications technology is shown in Figure 5-1. The key aspects of\n4G wireless networks that distinguish them from widely deployed 3G networks are:\n\n- Developing 802.16m with average downlink speeds\ngreater than 100 Mbps\n- WiMAX initially supported data only\n- Gigabit (GB) wireless data rates - one to two orders of\nmagnitude faster than the most advanced 3G or 3.5G networks2\n- WiMAX currently developing WiMAX VolP Capability\n- All Internet Protocol (IP)-switched networks - rather than\nthe mixed circuit and packet nature of 3G networks\n- Multi-carrier transmission - allows more effiCient use of\navailable radio access network bandwidth\nWHO IS DEPLOYING LTE IN THE US?5\nVerizon conducted successful user LTE (not LTE Advanced)\nusability tests in five markets in June 2010. On December\n1, Verizon announced that it will roll out LTE service in 38\nU.S. markets by the end of 2010 and extend the network to reach all of its eXisting 36 coverage areas by 2013.6\nIn October2010, the ITU declared that only two technologies meet its definition of 4G3 - LTE Advanced and WiMAX\n2 (based on the IEEE 802.16m air interface standard), Neither of these technologies has been deployed. LTE (not\n........\n\n6 http://www.thetechherald.com/article.php/201048/6493/Hands-on-with-Verizon-s-speedy-lTE-4G-network i am eamm*\ni'\nI\nd\" lim .fHeial the Bal) (U!8,'FIUI, R dl I\nif FBi liiiip\n\n- E-UTRAN was designed to offer high-speed\nbroadband access equivalent to the higher\nend of Digital Subscriber Line (DSL) and cable\nconnections\n- EPS = E-UTRAN + the Evolved Packet Core (EPC)\n- EPC is the result of the SAE, which optimized an allpacket core network to accommodate higher access\nspeeds and larger volume data network sessions\n- Initial deployments may also support Circuit\nSwitched (CS) fallback for voice\n- VolP was provided by third-parties\nLTE Advanced are still in development and vendor and service provider implementation and deployment plans are not known in detail.\n\nCox Communications conducted LTE trials in Phoenix and San Diego beginning in January 2010. In November 2010, it announced the start of service in three areas: Hampton Roads, VA, Omaha, NE, and Orange County, CA?\n\nMetroPCS launched its LTE rollout in September 2010 in Las Vegas with promises to add at least 10 more markets\n\"soon\".8\nCentl,lrytel announced plans to roll out'lTE in 2010 for broadband, but not wireless.\n\nHigher Data Rates One notable impact is that Law Enforcement Agencies\n(LEAs) will need to deal with significantly higher data rates than in current wireless network intercepts. Managing this \"fire hose\" of data is complicated by the lack of buffering or reliable delivery requirements. In contrast to the CS environment, with packet-based communications, if critical packets are lost, entire streams of content can be rendered unintelligible. These higher data rates could place a greater emphasis on the filtering of data to identify specific content.\n\nAT&T plans a mid-2011 deployment and is conducting trials in Baltimore and Dallas.9 The company is deploying HSPA+ prior to its LTE launch. and is working out its LTE deployment strategy to ensure that voice and data services can work simultaneously on UMTS and LTE.\n\nDespite T-Mobile USA's ongoing partnership negotiations with Clear (formerly Clearwire), a T-Mobile USA statement made in October 2010 indicated that while there is no pressure to transition to LTE, the carrier prefers LTE over Wi MAX. T-Mobile did not make a definitive announcement on their future strategy.10 T-Mobile is continuing its HSPA+\nrollout; it currently has 55 markets on HSPA+ and plans to cover 100 major metropolitan areas by the end of 2010.\n\nAIIIP and Multi-media In the IP environment, all subject content will be embedded in a single packet stream. To perform VolP intercepts, voice packets will need to be extracted from the packet stream in near real-time. Voice packets also may not include voice, exclusively. 4G wireless networks will support multi-media applications that combine voice and video or other media.\n\nAnother aspect of the All IP network is that as users move, tunnels are used within the networks during handoffs to provide the mobile user's wireless communications (either voice or data sessions) with continuity. Tunnels within a network increase the complexity of lawful intercept (LI)\nsolutions. Challenges imposed by tunneling may include difficulty in identifying the traffic of a particular user\n(e.g., deep packet inspection may be needed), accessing the content of a tunnel at its end-points, and the use of encryption within tunnels.\n\nWHO IS DEPLOYING WIMAX IN THE US?U\nClear began WiMAX 1.x deployments in partnership with Sprint Nextel in 2008. Clear also has wholesale partnerships with Comcast and Time Warner Cable. By the end of June 2010, Clear had commercial WiMAX\nservices available in 36 U.S. cities including: Atlanta, Baltimore, Chicago, Las Vegas, Philadelphia, Honolulu, Seattle, Dallas/Ft. Worth, and central Washington, DC.\n\nBy the end of 2010, Clear plans to have service for: Los Angeles, Miami, New York City, Boston, Denver, and San Francisco amongst others.\n\nClear is also conducting LTE trials in Phoenix. If the company decides to switch from Wi MAX to LTE, it would not be until 2012, at the earliest.12 Reacting to changes in the market, Clear updated their agreement with Intel to allow either party to terminate their agreement with a\n30-day notice, increasing the carrier's flexibility.\n\nMultiple Subject Identifiers Since service-related functions are independent from transport-related technologies, applications can be defined independently (at the service level) from the network. This results in a variety of identifiers being used in 4G wireless networks; different networks may use different identifiers (or different types of identifiers) for the same subject's intercepted communications. For example, access networks are likely to continue using IP addresses, but various identities may be associated with IMS:\n\n- IP Multimedia Private Identity (IMPI) - IP Multimedia Public Identity (IMPU) - Globally Routable User Agent URI (GRUU)\nIMPACT OF 4G ON ELECTRONIC\nSURVEILLANCE\nThere are a number of w~ys in which 4G wireless technology could impact electronic surveillance. Many of these areas represent unknowns because standards for WiMAX 2 and\n\n- Wildcarded Public User Identity\n........\nthose identities mayor may not be mapped to SIP URIs.\n\nThese additional identifiers will also need to be addressed in 4G U solutions.\n\nThe use of these identifiers could pose challenges for identifying a target's traffic by the service provider and correlation of data received by the LEA. It is not clear if the timing of the assignment of these identifiers aligns well with existing reporting capabilities.\n\nBoth IMPI and IMPU are not phone numbers or other series of digits, but Uniform Resource Identifiers (URIs)\ncan be digits (a TEL URI, like tel: +1-555-123-4567) or alphanumeric identifiers (a SIP URI, like sip:john.doe@ example.com).\n\nAccess Level Interception May Not Be Sufficient\n4G wireless networks support a broad range of interworking and service continuity capabilities across both service providers and technologies. This will add to the complexity of correlating different parts of a communication. The access and connectivity (core network) services may be provided by different service providers, thus, the access network may not have access to all r.nntp.nt nr silmalimd IMS IDENTIFIERS\nIP Multlm~dla Private Identity The IMPlls a unique, permanently allocated global identity assigned by the home network operator and is used, for example, for registration, authorization, administration, and accounting purposes. Every IMS user has one or more IMPI. The IMPI is not accessible to the user and is only visible to control nodes inside the IMS.\n\nIP Multlm~dia Public Identity The IMPU is employed by a user to request communications with other users and takes the form of a SIP URI or a TEL\nURI. There can be multiple IMPU per IMPI. The IMPU\ncan also be shared with another phone so that both can be reached with the same identity (e.g., a single phone number for an entire family). This identity is visible outside of the network. In the case of more than one IMS\nsubscription, there may be a many-to-many mapping of Private User Identities to Public Users l1:>s.\n\nGlobally Routable User Agent URI\nGRUU is an identity that classifies a unique combination of IMPU arid UE instance. There are two types of GRUU:\nPublic-GRUU (P-GRUU) and Temporary GRUU (T-GRUU).\n\nP-GRUU reveals the IMPU and is very long lived. T-GRUU\ndoes not reveal the IMPU and is valid until the contact is explicitly de-registered or the current registration expires.\n\nGrowth of Machine-ta-Machine Communication Machine-to-machine\n(M2M)\ncommunications exist in earlier generations of wireless technology but are proliferating in 4G, particularly in WiMAX where they have become a significant focus area. M2M communications are used to support applications such as meter reading, tracking, building security and environmental control fleet management, and remote paymentj I\nI\n\n     \"As a result of the increase in digital\n      communications and the growing\nimportance of digital evidence in all types of\ninvestigations, Regional Computer Forensics\nLaboratories continue to develop and deploy\n    innovative digital forensics tools and\nservices to meet law enforcement's needs.\"\n\nWi/dcarded Public User Identity\nA wild carded Public User Identity expresses a set of IMPU\ngrouped together. The Home Subscriber Server (HSS)\nsubscriber database contains the IMPU, IMPI, IMSI, and\nMobile Subscriber ISDN Number (MSISDN), subscriber\nservice profiles, service triggers, and other information.\nAlthough already a challenge today, other applications\nsuch as Web-based VolP and instant messaging (1M), have\nintroduced closed identifier schemes. These providers\nproprietarily manage the subscriber's identities, though\n\n,.., Anthony P. DiClemente, Chief, Data AcquisitionlIntercept Section\n........\n\nlil~) (\"JjIi;'IiQ\"~ Raaiaalillifl 'uti . Id b; FII - I;\n\n## 6. Wireless Cell Phone Technologies: A Short Tutorial\n\nINTRODUCTION\nToday, wireless is not just a concept; it is a reality that is driving mobile technology to new levels of seamless mobility, With the emergence of higher bandwidth offered by the 802.11n standard and the explosion of mobile applications, there is a need for a new architecture to accommodate 802,11g's 54 Megabits per second (Mbps)\nto 802,11n's 300 Mbps and mobile cellular broadband.\n\nBACKGROUND\nWhat does wireless technology mean? And how did we arrive here?\n\nHISTORY\nHow are eel/phones Different from Smartphones?\n\nThe first cell phone was demonstrated 19 years ago.\n\nMotorola employee Dr. Martin Cooper on April 3, 1973\ncalled researcher Dr. Joel S. Engel of AT&T's Bell Labs using a prototype from Motorola called the DynaTAC.3\nIn 1980, the First Generation (1G) wireless analog technology was the 'brick or bag phone' or 1G. 1G was replaced by the second generation (2G) cell phone advancing the technology from analog to digital and the introduction of Global System for Mobile Communications\n(GSM) standard on the 2G network. 2G also utilizes the following digital protocols: Code Division Multiple Access\n(CDMA), Time Division Multiple Access (TDMA), Integrated Digital Enhanced Network (iDEN), and Primary Domain Controller (PDC). In order to bridge the gap between\n2G and the Third Generation (3G), the Interim Standard\n(2.5G) was created for marketing purposes. One major advance leading up to 3G is packet-switched systems. The transition from 2G to 3G enabled faster data transmission speeds and greater network capacity with more advanced services. The first commercial 3G launch was in Japan on October 1, 2001. Today, the future is looking to Fourth Generation (4G) or 'beyond 3G' with the cell phone evolving to replace 3G technology. The next generation promises higher data rates, and voice, data, and highquality multimedia In real-time (\"streamed\") anywhere and anytime. 4G networks are forecasted to launch between\n2012 and 2015.1\nThe Pew Research Center's Internet & American Life Project revealed that:2\n\n- 82 percent of American adults own a cell phone\n- Five percent of adult texters send more than 200 text\nmessages per day\n- Women tend to make slightly fewer calls than men; 26\npercent of men say they make or receive 6 to 10 calls a\nday, while 20 percent of women make the same claim\nCell phones can typically send and receive text, picture, and video messages, and some can email, too. Smartphones typically go a step further by syncing with the email server of your personal or corporate provider .\n\n. . . . . . . . .\n\n- 91 percent of cell phone owners say their phones make\nthem feel safer\n- 42 percent of cell phone owners say they feel irritated\nwhen a call or text interrupts them\n- 65 percent of adults say they have slept with their phone\n\"on or right next to\" their bed\n- 72 percent of adult cell phone \"Users send and receive\ntext messages\nLess than 20 years later, IBM designed the first smartphone in 1992. It was called Simon. The smartphone was presented that year as a concept device in Las Vegas at the computer industry trade show known as COMDEX.\n\nA smartphone is like a miniature computer that can place and receive calls. Smartphones use a mobile operating system (OS). A mobile operating system is much like what's powering your personal computer at home or at work. However, the software goes by different names. Cell phones don't have operating systems at all. Smartphones can ~e powered by:\n\n- Windows Mobile\n- iPhone as\n- Google's Android\n- Symbian as\n- RIM's BlackBerry\n- Palm's Web as\n- Linux\n\n| 3G           | 4G          |\n|--------------|-------------|\n| Frequency    | Band:       |\n| 1.B          |             |\n| -2.5         |             |\n| GHz          | 2-BGHz      |\n| Forward      | error       |\n| 3G           |             |\n| uses         | Turbo       |\n| error        | correction  |\n| Concatenated | codes       |\n| corrections  | in          |\n| 4G           |             |\n| Data         | Throughput: |\n| Up           | to'         |\n| 3.1          |             |\n| Mbps         |             |\n| Practically  | speaking,   |\n| 3            |             |\n| to           |             |\n| 5            |             |\n| Mbps         | but         |\n| potential    | estimated   |\n| at a         |             |\n| range        |             |\n| of           |             |\n| 100          |             |\n| to           |             |\n| 300          | Mbps        |\n| Services     | And         |\n| COMA         | 2000,       |\n| etc.         |             |\n\nRelevance The speed you ultimately experience on your mobile phone depends much more on factors other than \"3G\"\nor \"4G\". In theory, newer technologies offer performance improvements. However, 3G and 4G refer to the communication protocol between the mobile handset and the cell phone tower. So, it's only one piece of the puzzle.\n\nThe throughput rate and browsing speed also depends on factors such as:\n\n- How manycell phone towers are.in the vicinity? - How many users are sharing these towers?\n- The bandwidth available to these cell phone towers to\nconnect to the Internet or the carrier's network.\nSPEED OF 3G VS. 4G\nHow much faster is 4G compared to 3G? Unfortunately for consumers, the answer to this question is more nuanced than one would like. The speed of a 3G network depends upon how it is implemented. In the U.S., by 2010 Sprint and Verizon (both COMA networks) had reached the limits of how fast they could make their 3G networks. Upgrading to 4G networks allowed them to offer data transmission speeds up to four times faster than their 3G networks.\n\nHowever, the 3G networks of GSM carriers AT&T and T-Mobile were designed such that there was room to upgrade 3G speeds. As of mid-2010, it was anticipated that when AT&T and T-Mobile upgrade their 3G networks, their speeds will become comparable to 4G from Sprint and Verizon.\n\nDesign Principle and Applications The advances in the mobile arena allow users to not just Both 2G and 3G networks were designed primarily for have access to inform~J!m..aD~~~i.Jlai1i.W~1LD.UI..., voice communications rather than data. On the other hand, r-w::o~r~ld~w~id~e...;a~sw::w~el:!:.I...L ___________ -f\n4G is designed especially for data tr.ansmission rather than voice. So, 4G offers faster access to data using mobile phones. For example, streaming video works better with ~----,..---------------I\n4G, with less stuttering and a higher resolution. Similarly, video conferencing and multi-player online games work better with the faster data transmission offered by 4G.\n\n## 7. Operator's Dilemma! Femtocell Or Wi-Fi?\n\nINTRODUCTION\nThe growth of data centric devices is humongous and\nmobife data will roughly double each year from 2008 to\n2013 1\n\nAccording to Cisco, the average broadband connection\ngenerates 11.4 Gigabytes (GB) of Internet traffic per\nmonth, or 375 Megabytes (MB) per day. Reports from\nearly Fourth Generation (4G) Worldwide Interoperability for\nMicrowave Access (WiMAX)-based broadband networks\nfound that the average traffic per customer is analogous\nin Russia and the U.S., with 10GB of traffic per month.2\n\nData projections for next decade anticipate that Internet\ntraffic will grow at a compound annual rate of at least 50\npercent By 2020, the average mobile Internet connection\nfrom Third Generation (3G) and 4G handsets will generate\n22.5GB of traffic, and Internet-centric devices will generate\n171.7GB of traffic.\n\n## Data Growth In Internet-Centrlc Devices (Laptops)\n\nThe amount of traffic Internet will compel operators to offload data from their Macro Base station to indoor I https://www.cisco.com/en/US/netsol/ns827/networking_solutlons_sub_solutlon.html\n2 http://img.en25.com/Web/WiMaxBroadbandSolutions/SenzaFilLYotaWP.pdf\n3 http://www.beyond4g.orgfmanaging-data-networks base stations. At least two solutions are on the table for operators: Femtocells and Wi-Fi offloads. Both approaches solve the backhaul issue by using customer or third-partv links (e.g. DSL, MetroE, Ti/El, WISP, or others).\n\nFemto\nti\nModerate\ni\n-\n-\n-\n-\n----\n-I\n.,\n---\n-\n---\n-\n-\n!\ni Wi-Fi AP\n:!\n...L.'I\nLow\n;\n. ________ .. __ ---_ .. 1...._-- ____________ ....\n\nFemtocells are tiny mobile cell sites that use the mobile operators' licensed spectrum supporting all devices and all services. Femtocells are a great way to extend coverage and create higher capacity.\n\nTo extend data service in places where macro cell coverage is poor, a WiMAX\nFemtocell could be an ideal candidate. However, operators also have the option of extending indoor coverage through Wi-Fi access points. This article examines the various aspects of Femtocells and Wi-Fi for the purpose of indoor coverage.\n\nARCHITECTURE AND DEPLOYMENT\nFemtocell-based architecture requires that all management and data traffic be passed through an Access Service Network Gateway (ASN-GW) and a security gateway to perform handovers and security procedures defined in IEEE 802.16e. Wi-Fi based systems do not require data traffic to pass through any central location and have a much flatter architecture than Femtocells. Of course, there are advantages to using a Serving Gateway (S-GW) and ASN-GW in the case of Femtocells.\n\n## Sui.1 I R F 1I1H' I Un Linl, (Hl!S;'Fiy9! Rlllia.11I I 2 U . Ii 5 59' A Ij\n\nECONOMICS\nIntel is ready to ship 6250 Kilmer Peak chipsets, which will The current prices of femto access points are five to ten have 2x2 11 a/gin and 16e WiMAX in the 2.3/2.5 and times higher than the cost of Wi-Fi devices. Businesses\n3.5 GHz bands. The 11n version is capable of supporting using operator controlled Femtocells will likely face peak data rates up to 300Mbps. Intel's next Wi MAX\neconomic challenges as a result of high prices, and retail module, Evans Peak, is targeted for MIDs and will support customers may be deterred from buying Femtocells at one module of lX2 11 a/gin, 16e, Bluetooth, and Global current price levels. A huge demand for Femtocell access Positioning System (GPS) in the 2.3, 2.5, and 3.5 GHz points is not expected in near future, therefore, it would bands.\n\nbe very difficult for operators to push Femtocell-based solutions to their customers. In fact, businesses using operator controlled Femtocells to provide higher capacity and coverage would face severe return on investment challenges as the cost of femto access points and the associated infrastructure is way too expensive compared to Wi-Fi access pOints.\n\nROADMAP\nWiMAX release 1.5 will focus on a WiMAX/Wi-Fi/Bluetooth co-existence. A forum is also evaluating and addressing handovers between Wi-Fi and WiMAX.5\nSPECTRUM\nThe data growth expected in the next decade will keep operators hungry for spectrum. 83MHz of Wi-Fi spectrum in the 2.4GHz band is ideal for operators to manage the mobile data demand generated out of indoor locations.\n\nThe next version of Wi-Fi, 802.11n, supports Multiple Input/Multiple Output (MIMO) and data rates up to\n300Mbps. The cost of 11n devices is not significantly higher than 802.11b/g devices. Worldwide, operators are demanding at least 30MHz of spectrum for Broadband Wireless Access (BWA) application in the 2.3, 2.5, and\n3.5 GHz bands. Current deployments are mostly in reuse, and there is little spectrum left for operators to build Femtocells. Free Wi-Fi spectrum in 2.4 GHz band will help operators provide sufficient capacity for indoor use.\n\nSUMMARY\nPico Base Station and Repeaters will continue to play an important role in extending coverage and generating additional capacity in wireless networks.6 The economics of deploying Pico Base Stations in enterprise buildings and commercial hubs is encouraging. However, Femtocells appear challenging from a bUSiness and deployment perspective. There are numerous advantages associated with Wi-Fi for retail consumers and Wi-Fi will continue to complement wireless networks. WiMAX+WiFi router capabilities have already been demonstrated by Clearwire with its Clearspot, the Yota Egg, and UQ. Operators must keep Wi-Fi in their access strategy when building next generation mobile data networks.\n\n\"While this technology expands accessibility\n and productivity, it introduces complexity\nand security risks as wireless networks and\n  handheld mobile devices become a new\n     target for hackers and thieves.\"\n\nDEVICES\nThe primary sources of mobile data demand are laptops,\nnotebooks, and smartphones. Laptops and notebooks\nhave Wi-Fi connectivity. Wi-Fi chipsets are prevalent and\nis included in almost 100% of the laptops and other\nInternet-centric devices on the market. Wi-Fi is already\nwidely available and Wi MAX-embedded devices may reach\nthese levels in the next five to seven years. ABI research\nprojects that 1 billion Wi-Fi chips will be shipped in 2011\nand the global shipment of Wi-Fi enabled cell phones will\ndouble between 2009 and 2011. Wi-Fi is not only common\nin Internet-centric devices like laptops and notebooks. It\nis expected that 90% of smartphones will be embedded\nwith Wi-Fi modules by 2014. Current Wi-Fi chlpsets are\nvery competitively priced and Intel has plans to embed\nWiMAX+Wi-Fi into their Mobile Internet Devices (MIDs) and\nall future Internet-centric devices.4\n\n- Sarah Hicks, Vice President of Mobile and\nWireless Solutions, Symantec\n........\n\n## B. Fcc's Position On Broadband White Space\n\nWhy is this significant? Why is this important to consumers? Why is ttiis important to law enforcement (LE)?\n\nINTRODUCTION\nTechnology companies (e.g., Google, Motorola, Microsoft and Dell) have been lobbying the\n~~'0~\\CAT!OI\\( Federal Communications\n~~-\n\\S'\nCommission (FCC) for years\n11\n'b to open new spectrum to\n~ expand existing wireless\n;t s: services or create new\n~\nfii wireless broadband C\n~\nost? services. For the last two\n\"Like electricity a centur.y ago, broadband communications is a foundation for economic growth, job creation, global competitiveness and a better way of life. It is enabling entire new industries and unlocking vast new possibilities for existing ones. It is changing how we educate children, deliver health care, manage energy, ensure public safety, engage government, and access, organize and disseminate knowledge.\"3\nUnder the Omnibus Broadband Initiative (OBI), the plan outlines four ways that the Government can influence the broadband ecosystem:\n\n- Establish competition policies - Ensure effiCient allocation and use of Governmentowned' and Government-influenced assets\n'>'\n~ years the FCC has been\n- *US1\\.* \"\nsolicited by Congress to open the unused wireless spectrum that separates TV channels for use by unlicensed broadband networks. In November 2008, the FCC agreed to open up unused broadcast TV spectrum for unlicensed use, in the 300 Megahertz (MHz) to 400 MHz band of unused spectrum known- as 'white space'.\n\n- Create incentives for universal availability and adoption\nof broadband\n- Updating policies, setting standar.cts, and aligning\nincentives to maximize use for national priOrities\nLong-Term GoalS\"\nGoal No.1: At least 100 million United States (U.S.) homes should have affordable access to actual download speeds of at least 100 Megabits per second and actual upload speeds of at least 50 Mbps.\n\nBACKGROUND\n\"The FCC has been examining this issue for six years, and finished testing several proof-of~concept devices this summer to see if companies can develop products that use the buffer spectrum between licensed broadcast channels.\n\nThe' commission's Office of Engineering Technology (OET)\nfound that sensing technology alone was not 100 percent effective in preventing channel interference. But when coupled with geo-Iocation technology, which uses GPS\ntechnology along with a data base of known services using certain spectrum channels, interference was greatly reduced.\"l Goal No.2: The U.S. should lead the world in mobile innovation, with the fastest and most extensive wireless networks of any nation.\n\nGoal No.3: Every American should have affordable access to robust broadband service, and the means and skills to subscribe if they so choose.\n\nIn accordance with the rules, the FCC will require that all white space devices be tested and certified by the FCC\nLaboratory, as is required of all other wireless devices, including cell phones and wireless routers.\n\nGoal No.4: Every American community should have affordable access to at ieast 1 Gigabit per second broadband service to anchor institutions such as schools, hospitals and government buildings.\n\nGoal No.5: To ensure the safety of the American people, every first responder should have access to a nationwide, wireless, interoperable broadband public safety network.\n\nIn early 2009, Congress directed the FCC to develop a National Broadband Plan to ensure every American has \"access to broadband capability\". Congress also required that this plan include a detailed strategy for achieving affordability and maximizing use of broadband to advance \"consumer welfare, civic participation, public safety and homeland security, community development, health care delivery, energy independence and efficiency, education, employee training, private sector investment, entrepreneurial activity, job creation and economic growth, and other national purposes.\"2\nGoal No.6: To ensure that America leads in the clean energy economy, every American should be able to use broadband to track and manage their real-time energy consumption .\n\n. . . . . . . . .\n\n\"opportunistic use\" of underdeveloped spectrum. It doesn't plan to take up the issue of net neutrality or reclaSSifying broadband Internet services under TItle 11.\"6\nFCC Plan Opens 90 MHz of Satellite SpectrumS\nThe FCC wants to open mobile satellite spectrum in three bands for land-based services as part of its effort to free up an additional 500 Megahertz (MHz) of spectrum for mobile broadband.\n\nThe agency's proposed rulemaking wOuld open a total of 90 MHz in the 2 Gigahertz (GHz) band, Big LEO band and l-band for uses other than satellite-based broadband services.\n\nSpecifically, the proposal aims to add co-primary fixed and mobile allocations to the 2 GHz band and expand existing\nsecondary market policies and rules involving the use of satellite bands for terrestrial services. The FCC is also seeking comment on what actions the agency could take if the value of the spectrum increases.\n\nLAW ENFORCEMENT IMPACT\nThe challenges facing LE increase with the introduction of each new wireless device. In fact, reports state that\n\"wireless data traffic on the AT&T network has grown more than 5,000 percent over the past three years, largely attributed to today's advanced smartphones that are generating dramatically increasing volumes of network traffic.\"7 \"We're seeing advanced smartphones driving up to 10 times the amount of usage of other devices on average,\" according to Vice President and General Manager for AT&T Mobility and Consumer Markets in Minnesota.\"s Over 50 percent of homes have broadband connectivity. A\nsmartphone device with -Wi-R installed can automatically establish a dual connection while using the outdoor macro network for voice and mobile data services and the indoor CTIA President and CEO Steve Largent commended the FCC for opening up the spectrum. \"We are pleased the Commission and the Obama Administration have joined us in recognizing the critical importance of harnessing our spectrum resources to benefit the nation's wireless consumers,\" he said in a statement.\n\nGOOGLE-VERIZON NET NEUTRALITY DEAL\nAs of November 5, 2010, the FCC reported that, \"The agency plans to cover the UHF and VHF television bands, experimental licenses, and ways to accelerate\n........\n\n, \"j  , Ii\"' -\n\n## 9. Cloud Services\n\nfunctionality for uploading large files. It also lets the user automatically back up files to online space either on demand or at scheduled intervals.\n\nSecurity for business level service appears to be well implemented and thorough. All uploads are handled using\n128-bit SSL encryption, which is a current standard. Files can also be stored in encrypted form so that not even the data center managers can view them. This is very important when dealing with what may be critical business documents and sensitive information. The free option offers 1 Gigabyte (1GB) of storage space and 200 Mb of downloads per month, but you can only get a free account if you sign up and use the DriveHQ software.2\nINTRODUCTION\nWith mass volumes of information being exchanged and viewed by individuals on all types of devices from smartphones to iPads; the demand and need for storage capacity has become a big business for some companies, but for those who subscribe or use these services it is important to select ttie right provider.\n\nIn the past, companies in the technology, device and gadget industry strived to provide equipment that had the largest storage capacity and overall memory. Today, with the.vast number of companies focusing on how to provide storage to both individuals and business, acquiring a service that meets your personal needs or your business model. requirements is easy. As with any service provider there are guidelines and restrictions, along with risk and security issues. These services can be downloaded for free or a subscription can be purchased and utilized by the entire organization. Fees give value added-services over free and basic services.\n\nDropbox is basically an intelligent combination of Box.net, dot.mac, and Microsoft's FolderShare syncing service.\n\nIt makes online storage and sharing of files simple - as simple as dragging files into specially marked local folders.\n\nFiles are constantly being uploaded and downloaded to edit, and therefore requires some additional peer-topeer software. Dropbox .is available via a public beta for GigaOM readers.\"3\nWhat's In the Cloud?\n\nThere are several types of cloud services. This article will discuss some of the most popular services and uses.\n\nAs people acquire multiple digital devices, including tiny netbooks and super-smartphones, it becomes harder for them to coordinate all their documents, music and photos so, they have access from whichever device they're using at the moment.1 Using these digital devices requires that the industry create a means for users to store and access the information.\n\nIdeally, it would be convenient to go to one location and retrieve all of the information, but sometimes that is not feasible due to the size and amount of information.\n\nDriveHQ is an enterprise level online storage and backup provider. Although aimed at business users, DriveHQ also targets individuals with its free memberships and low cost subscription options. The service is professional and high quality but still easy enough to use for novice users. It offers many different services bundled into one package -\nonline storage, online backup, File Transfer Protocol (FTP)\nserver hosting and email server hosting.\n\nThe online storage service can be accessed through the downloadable desktop client, a Web-based interface, or an FTP client of your choice, although the desktop software is only available for Windows. Mac or Linux users only have the Web-based or FTP client options. Drive HQ's proprietary software for uploading files provides robust The software, once downloaded, is simple to install (it works on both Windows and Mac) and integrates with the file browser. It runs efficiently in the background. You create folders inside the DropBox folder and then just drag and drop them. The files are constantly synced with your online storage locker - any time a file is changed, the changes are sent to the online folders, which can be accessed via any Web browser even if your home machine is shut off. The system keeps revised versions of the files as backup, just in case the user aCCidentally erases or damages the \"live\" version of a document. Therefore, there is a file timeline that may be used to identify changes and dates. You can click and share the \"URLs\" of every file with anyone by simply sending them an email (a feature that opens up Viral growth opportunities for DropBox).4\n........\n\nDropbox, in a number of ways, goes beyond FolderShare's simple ease of use. You can access your files through the Web browser in addition to the desktop client. All files are version controlled so you can revert to an earlier version of a document, or restore it completely when lost. There are also two special folders within the local Dropbox folder: one for publicly sharing files (via distinct URL)\nand one for sharing photos (which gets distinct URLs for particular galleries that have been formatted online for easy viewing).8\nAt the very least, you can use Dropbox to automatically backup a subset of your files, and to access them when traveling. You can also use the service to easily share files with friends and associates. However, the service does not currently provide 'any' password protection on files or folders to limit public access. While Dropbox appears to be just another cloud storage service, it's actually a file synchronization service that will sync your files, remotely back them up and provide web and iPhone access at the same time.\n\n. Are images encrypted? \"Dropbox stores their data on Amazon S3 using AES-256 encryption. Dropbox employees don't have access to your data, and all traffic between your computer and their servers is encrypted using SSl.\"5\nThe encryption software that will allow you to secure your Dropbox is called \"EncFS\" .. lt works by creating a folder in which to store an encrypted version of each of your files and folders, and then making the unencrypted names and content available in a different folder.\n\nDropbox Locl:Ition Can files be stored only on the cloud file server and not on the computer? The cloud serves to keep your files up to date, but Dropbox uses a hosted virtual disk on your computer to store files.\n\n## ~Dropbox\n\nFolderShare provides a desktop client that syncs local folders across computers. But it's a bit like comparing Vista to MacOS; both get the job done, but one may be easy to use and appears designed for maximum customer satisfaction. FolderShare allows a private peer-to-peer network to be created that will help you to synchronize files across multiple devices and access or share files with colleagues and friends. The user no longer needs to send large files via email, burn them to CDsjDVDs and mail them, or upload them to a website. It allows the user to share and sync important information instantly with anyone who is invited, making it a good solution for file sharing.9\n\"Our industrY is going through quite a wave of innovation and it's being powered by a phenomenon which is referred to as the cloud.\"\nWhat information on the local PC points to the cloud (e.g.\n\nclient server)? Dropbox uses the drag and drop concept to move files from one location to another and creates a Dropbox folder on your hard drive which syncs with the Dropbox server on the Internet.7\n- Steve Ballmer, CEO, Microsoft\n........\n\nLa ihfUi2SmSiiZ CCiiSiUOC hhOii\"atloh 1'01 efffeis' tlse 8iilj (1!t!8; FIUI) n dt t .GIG\n01' \"NO fij' Fe. \"iiij'\n\n## ~ Foldershare\"\" ~ Mimi\".\n\nFrom the creators ofBOXSTr, a file-hosting and backup solution comes a new cloud-based storage solution, called Open Drive.\n\nPresently in public beta mode, Open Drive acts much like a typical redundancy device, but its downloadable software\n!;o')\\\nutility connects\n, 'OpenDriveo the users personal\n10 information to the Web more flUidly, with an especially smart syncing feature.\n\nOpenDrive recognizes which files are stored on a user's local machine and also with online accounts, and when edits are made on the user's local hard disk and subsequently saved, those changes can be registered automatically via OpenDrive.\n\nOpenDrive advertises a free storage limit of 1 GB, which is considerably less than the amount offered by BOXSTr.\n\nBut as an added plus if a user is already registered with BOXSTr, then registration with Open Drive is not necessary.\n\nOpenDrive also manages data via the Web through BOXSTr and it is only available for Windows XP or Vista users -\nThere is another client application that has been compared to SpiderOak and Dropbox called SugarSync. SugarSync is an interface for Windows, which integrates with Explorer to show the status of the synced folders with small colored indicators overlaid on the file/folder icons. SugarSync offers\n. . . . . . . . . , ........ .\n\n10 http://mashable.com/2008/07/15/opendrive/\nII http://mac,appstorm,net/how.to/utilities.how.to/how.to.back.up.your.data.with-splderoak/\n12 http://technologykills.com/2010/04/06/sugarsync-vs.spideroak/\nSPIDEROAK\nSpiderOak is an online backup, syncing and sharing service similar to Dropbox or SugarSync. It is powerful, versatile and free to use. for up to two GB\n/, of storage.ll SpiderOak is a strong,\n,- competitor in the arena of apps that backup, share and sync your data across multiple machines. Once signed on, users see the menu bar application with several tabs to select from:\n\n- Status - (Schedule Backups) Back Up\nView\nSync\nShare\nThere are two basic pricing plans for SpiderOak: the Free Account and the Plus Account. The Free Account gives access to all of the features and is only limited in the capacity or storage you receive, which is up to 2 GB( The Plus Account is $10 per month for every 100 GB increment.\n\nIf a user wants 300 GB of storage, it is $30 per month.\n\nAlternatively, if users choose to sign up for a year, the rate is lower: $100 per year for every 100 GB increment. So, if\n300 GB is purchased on a month-to-month basis it would cost $360 per year, but if the user signs up for a year it would only cost $300.\n\n## Sugarsync12 I Ail! Hunt\" Iii Aut, Li I F Mads.. Fbi Afraial Hac E\"L) (Le8;'F8Yi) Rad's I I I I! ] Rei Ii.\n\nclients for Windows, Mac, iPhone, Android, Blackberry, and stunning.\"14\nWindows Mobile, but there are no provisions for other Citrix boasts that GoToMeeting, \" .. .is the easiest and operating systems, such as Linux.\n\nmost cost-effective way to conduct an online meeting.D1s SugarSync implements share administration in the main Specifically, the GoToMeeting app for iPad allows users to:\n\n- Present to remote audiences\nWeb interface that is highly polished with similar features\n- Collaborate with remote colleagues in real-time to.SpiderOak. Files are transferred one at atime, at a high data rate. It supports file versioning, keeps deleted items until permanently removed while monitoring the file system\n- Demenstrate products to prospects and customers for changes and automatically uploads. SugarSync doesn't\n- Train customers and employees across the globe16\nrequire the user to be online to use the files it synchronizes.\n\nIt offers a Web Archive to store files without syncing them to a specific device. There is also file sharing,and files can be e-mailed to a SugarSync account. SugarSync data is SSL-secured, and encrypted once it hits the servers. Data is stored in \"geo-redundant, world class data centers.\"\nThe service offers 2 GB of free storage, allows use of all features, supports multiple devices, and syncs and share files up to the 2 GB limit. 30 GB from SugarSync costs $5\nper month, which is easily affordable.\n\nZUMODRIVE\nZumoDrive provides the convenience of home information away from home by allowing *tne* user to put any amount of media from Macs or PCs to a phone. Users can read all file types to include Word, Excel, PowerPoiot, and PDF, anywhere and anytime. It offers one of the better media capabilities out of all \"cloud apps\". ZumoDrive is not a stand-alone application; it works with a free PC, Mac, and Linux app that you can download from zumodrive.com. Get\n2 GB of storage for free and everything put on ZumoDrive is protected with encryption and stored on file servers.\n\nCitrix has also developed a GoToMeeting Corporate app, which is designed to provide online meeting services for multiple users. The GoToMeeting Corporate app for iPad includes unlimited online meetings as well as, \" ...\n\nfeatures to make it easy for you to manage multiple users, streamline usage, and maximize your cost savings.rll7\nAdditional GoToMeeting Corporate features include an:\n\n- Administration Center: Quickly deploy GoToMeeting to\nnew users, control feature access and track usage from\na convenient.online.Administration Center\n- Meet Now Buttons: Start meetings from the company's\nown website\n- XenApp Integration: Integrate GoToMeeting into the\nXenApp environment\n- Integrated TolIFree Audio Service: Purchase convenient\ntoll-free packages from Citrix Online Audio18\nCitrix 'GoToMeeting'\nCitrix recently announced the availability of a new Apple iPad app called Citrix GoToMeeting. Launched as a free app for download through Apple's App Store, \"The Citrix GoToMeeting App for iPad brings the same level of simplicity to the world of business meetin~s, making it easy for iPad owners to collaborate from anywhere via online meetings that are both effortless and visually GoToMeeting for Individuals provides an alternative online solution for the face-to-face meeting, which may require\n........\n\nU II Flila by FA' i 'Aiy business travel and is:\n\n- Easy to use. The streamlined interface makes it extremely easy for organizers and meeting attendees to start meeting\nright away on both pes and Mac computers.\n- Cost-effective. GoToMeeting's All You Can Meet subscription model provides unlimited meetings for one flat fee,\nwith no limits on meeting duration and no \"overage\" charges. Plus, VolP and toll-based phone options reduce audio\ncosts even further.\n- Secure. GoToMeeting uses industry-standard SSL and U.S. government-standard 128-bit AES encryption to ensure\nthat confidential meeting information remains private. Security is built-in and no configuration is required by users or\nadministrators.19 The following figures display how to host a GoToMeeting.\nGoToMeeting is a hosteq service, delivered via Web browsers, downloadable client executables and a network of multicast communication servers operated by Citrix Online. It has the following security features:\n\n- Powerful encryption: All GoToMeeting data is encrypted with industry-standard SSL and U.S. government-standard\n128-bit AES encryption, including screen-sharing data, keyboard and mouse data, and chat messages.\n- Privacy: Meeting information is only available to the organizer and invited participants.\n19.20.21.22.2] Ibid\n\n- Authentication and password security: Strong passwords, unique meeting IDs and optional meeting passwords\nprotect privacy and integrity. Through attendee authentication, GoToMeeting ensures that only authorized attendees\ncan join meetings to which they have been invited.\n- Firewall and network compatibility: Administrators don't need to reconfigure firewall ports, which could potentially\ncompromise security.\n- Role-based security: Organizers set the appropriate controls and rights based on user roles.\n- Endpoint system security: GoToMeeting creates a secure endpoint on each user's desktop with Web-downlo~dable\nexecutables that employ strong cryptographic measures.\nLAW ENFORCEMENT IMPACT\nWith the llrowth of cloud comDutinEt. the mai~r challenlles are not Dosed bv the technolollV tool anvmore.r\n\n## 10. Wired Vs. Wireless\n\nfor wired infrastructure such as desk phones and wired Internet links.\n\nBACKGROUND\n\"While the United States was built on the postpaid model\n(and relies heavily on consumers' use of credit) Europe's wireless industry has long thrived on the prepaid model, with less credit-dependent customers willing to shell out a little extra to get a premium device without having to sign a contract. As differentiation between postpaid and prepaid fades, more Americans will start to lean. towards adopting the European way when it comes to cell service.\n\nThe prepaid proposition has always been burdened with the 'you-get-what-you-pay-for' stigma. But that's changing as the smartphone playing field levels and device and data prices drop dramatically\".l The rollout of Verizon's Long Term \"Evolution (LTE) service sets the standard for future networks; it's due to launch at the end of 2010 and will bring coverage to more than\n.100 million people. \"We'll be announcing 4G modems first and support for cell phones by mid-2011.''4 The firm isn't building a cell-phone network but a data network, one just as fast as wired links. Sprint Nextel has been rolling out its\n4G service in major U.S. cities all year, and is now up to\n55 cities. That network is based on the Wi MAX standard, an alternative to LTE. Sprint is also working on the idea of packaging a set of 4G modems and other hardware into an off-the-shelf 'office in a box'. \"It would contain everything you need to set up a new branch and connect it up.\"\nThere are doubts that networks can keep pace with the demand for wireless data, a demand that's growing 55\npercent annually in North America. Predictions indicate that by 2013, there will INCREASING APPETITE\nbe more. North Americans The capabilities 01 new devices Inspire users to download more and more data.\n\nconnecting to the Internet via mobile broadband than via any other forin of INTRODUCTION\n\"Wireless technology is becoming increasingly popular. It has been said that wireless networks will possibly become more widely used than the wired networks\".2\nWith the booming demand for mobile access to multiple applications and services, the evolution and proliferation of Wireless Local Area Network devices and applications have outpaced the ability to scale networks efficiently. In fact, the prediction is that \"70% of new enterprise users by\n2013 will be wireless by default and wired by exception\". 3\nDuring the first wave of the wireless revolution, being out\nof the office didn't mean being out of action. BlackBerrys, iPhones, and 3G dongles for laptops let people stay connected on the move.\n\nThe era of flat pricing for wireless data looks to be ending and the next step might involve asking customers to pay for different tiers of service depending on their data demands.\n\nUltimately, the net neutrality policy may become the biggest practical distinction Figure 10-1 Monthly Data Usage between wired and wireless connections.\n\nThe second wave, ushered in by the development of 4G\nmobile broadband, will take the mobile revolution indoors.\n\nAlthough consumer excitement over apps and smartphones is high, and has attracted much of the attention of the press, the enterprise will be the first serious consumer of\n4G services. Cellular networks and other service providers ,-----------, ______ --.J\nare preparing services that will potentially elimate the need\n........\n\n1.2 http://www.lehman.edu/itr/wireless-n;~or:'p~;\n: http://resources.ldgenterprise.com/origlnaI/AST-0008746_Gartner_Newsletter~ug.pdf access-with enterprises expected to account for much of the demand.\n\nnumber of Wi-R devices can connect to the Wi-Fi PAN in order to share various resources and internet access.\n\nIn contrast to fixed and complicated corporate Wi-Fi networks, Wi-Fi PANs are easy to use and can be setup with little effort in any location. As an added benefit, Wi-Fi\n. PANs provide users with the same bandwidth and range as a corporate Wi-R network, which is typically larger than conventional wireless PAN technologies like Bluetooth and Infrared.\n\nINTRODUCTION\nWith the various wireless technologies that are.available today, people are able to conduct business, keep in touch with family, or simply spend a few minutes checking e-mails or social networking .websites all while on. the go.\n\nOver the years, the popularity of wireless devices such as laptops, netbooKs, notebooks, smartphones, MP.3\nplayers, and e-readers have facilitated the development of a \"constantly connected\" culture that continues to expand everyday.\n\nThe advantages of Wi-Fi over more conventional short range wireless technologies has resulted in the development of more devices equipped with Wi-Fi that can be easily integrated into a Wi-Fi PAN. Once integrated, devices including: digital cameras, digital projectors, printers, game consoles, HOTV, and digital photo frames can share resources at high data rates and across relatively long distances, wirelessly.\n\nThe potential benefits of using a Wi-Fi PAN include:\n\n- Sharing of Internet/Network access with other Wi-R\nusers and Wi-Fi devices\n- Sharing of data directly between two or more Wi-Fi\nusers\n- Enjoying content accessible on the user notebook (such\nas YouTube) on a HOTV wirelessly\nAlthough there are considerably more ways and places to connect to the Web than there were a decade ago, for some, publicly offered Wi-Fi hotspots.are not enough. This growing desire among consumers to have access to the Internet wherever they go has led to an increase in the number of businesses offering free 802.11 Wi-Fi including hotels and resorts, airports, popular coffeehouses, bus stations, and public libraries. For users that want to connect to the Web in areas where Wi-Fi is unavailable, or do not want to pay fees that may be charged for commercially providEld Wi-Fi, there is the mobile hotspot.\n\nWith a mobile hotspot device, a user no longer has to worry about how and where they will be able to connect to the Internet. With increasingly popular mobile hotspots, users now have the ability to create a personal Wi-Fi hotspot with the convenience of having the Internet available anytime, anywhere, with access to a wireless cellular network.\n\n- Transfer of pictures/video from a digital. camera/digital\ncamcorder directly to computer instantaneously over the air within the range of Wi-Fi PAN\n- Printing of user's documents on the printer over the air\n- 'Projection of user's content wirelessly through a\nprojector1\nToday, smartphones and personal mobile Wi-R hotspot devices are used to set-up Wi-Fi PANs, which allows users to create open or closed private networks.\n\nTYPES OF MOBILE HOTSPOT DEVICES\nThe following mobile hotspot devices are examples of popular portable WI-Fi products available to the public.\n\nMobile hotspots are not becoming more attractive to buyers solely because they are portable. They also offer a single paint of access for all of a user's wireless devices.\n\nEqually appealing is the mobile hotspot's ability to be shared among multiple users, allowing several people to benefit from Internet connectivity while only using one access interface. There are many options available for people interested in investing in a mobile hotspot. Today,\n\"You can buy a simple, slim unit that fits in a pocket or others that maximize throughput by shifting from 3G to speedier 4G networks.\" Additionally, \"You can convert some cell phones into hotspots, while a few new phones now come with hotspots included.\"\nWI-FI PERSONAL AREA NETWORKS\nWi-Fi Personal Area Networks (PANs) are setup and managed by a specific user, unlike corporate Wi-Fi networks that are established and administered by a corporate network administrator. Once arranged, a limited Novatel MiFI 2200\nMiR is a line of compact wireless routers that serve as mobile Wi-R hotspots. Through backconnections to a cellular data network, and frontconnections to local Wi-R\ndevices (up to 10 meters/30 feet distance), MiFi creates a local area of shared high-speed Internet connectivity.2\n........\n\nThe Novatel MiFi 2200 acts as a mobile Wi-R hotspot that has no screen and is powered on by a single button.3\nThe Clear Spot offers Wi-R connectivity .to Sprint's 4G\nnetwork, that is not currently available, nationally. The Clear Spot can support up to eight wireless devices within a 150 foot range. Plans are available that offer 3G speeds and unlimited 4G access.9\nMeasuring at 3.5\"x 2.3\"x 0.4\" and weighing approximately\n2.0 ounces, the Novatel MiFi 2200 is too large to fit in a typical wallet, but it is small enough to be considered pocket-sized. The MiFi 2200 creates a Wi-Fi hotspot using a 3G connection that can be shared among five devices.4\nLike a cell phone, -the Novatel MiR wirelessly connects to a 3G cellular network, but unlike a phone, the device broadcasts a Wi-Fi signal to its surrounding area. This capability allows devices within a 30-foot range to connect to the Internet CradlePoint PHS300\nThe Cradle Point PHS300, \" ... is a compact router device which connects to a user's laptop to create a Wi-R hotspot for up to 16 users.\" The self managing device is battery powered and can connect several users to a 3G/4G\nnetwork by simply inserting a wireless broadband card into a laptop. One of the CradlePoint PHS300's most important and unique features is the capability to support up to five broadband cards at the same time, regardless of the user's carrier or the services used. The CradlePoint PHS300's ports are load balanced and can be used to increase bandwidth and provide Wi-R service up to 150\nfeet.11\nOverdrive 3G/4G\nThe Overdrive 3G/4G, available from Sprint for $49.99\nis another mobile hotspot option that is small enough to fit in your pocket Although slightly bigger than the Novate I MiR '2200, the Overdrive\n3G/4G\nincludes more features such as the ability to connect to Sprint's 3G network as well as the faster 4G network, where available.\n\nOther features include, \" ... a bright screen that displays information like remaining battery life, signal strength, the hotspot's name, password and the number of connected devices.\"\nCLEAR iSpot The iSpot, made by CLEAR, is a mobile hotspot device designed specifically for use with Apple's iPad, iPhone, and iPod. iSpot allows up to eight Wi-A enabled devices to connect to the Internet in areas where CLEAR provides 4G\ncoverage. The password protected iSpot is small enough to' fit in your pocket and has a rechargeable battery that provides up to four hours of continuous use. In comparison to many of the other mobile hotspot devices on the market, it is relatively inexpensive and offers an unlimited 4G data plan.12\n\n## Vodafone Mobile Wi-Fi R201\n\nClearwire Clear Spot Clearwire's Clear Spot uses Sprint's 4G network to provide linternet connectivity. Larger than the Overdrive 3G/4G, the Clear Spot is not ideal for users wanting a pocket-sized device.\n\nClear Spot costs\n$49.99 and requires a modem ranging in price from $69.99 to\n$224.99, depending on desired features -\nVodafone recently launched the Mobile WI-Fi R201. This mobile hotspot device, which connects automatically once the user enters the Wi-Fi authentication key, supports the\n. . . . . . . . .\n\n3 http://www.nyUmes.com/2010/06/03/tecl1nology/personaltech/03basics.\n- http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/03/tecbnology/personaltech/03beslcs,html?_\nhtml?src-busln\nr-l&Slc-busin\n- http://www.networkworld.com/communlty/node/66583\nI. htlp:/Iposterous.com/getlile/files.posterous.com/temp2010.04-20/\n- http://www.quantum.wlreless.com/store/medla/catalog/p,oduct!cache,ll/lmage/500x\nIRoyjgJqJlnxdwhmutGqxFOlxarrbpwBvFjUbczJOfjlcxHECncHtHCIzi/C,adlePolnCPHS300.\n500/9df78eab33525d08d6e5fb8d27136e95/m/ilmifl-2200,jpg\njpg.scaledlOOO,jpg\nIhltp;//ecx.lmagesamazon.com/lmages/I/41UYWRBTteL.jpg It htlp;/Ibuslness-solutions.tmcnetcom/toplcs/business-soluUons/articles/87790-\n7 http://www.ubergizmo.com/photos/2010/1/sprinl-overdrive.jpgcradlepolnts-phs300-personal-wifl-hotspot-supports-up-16.htm\n- htlP:/lcdn.slashgear.com/wp-contenl/uploads/2009/04/clearwire_cleacspoC\n12 http://www.trendygadgetcom/wp-c:ontenl/uploads/2010/08/lspot.jpg personaLhotspot-480x295.jpg .\n\n..http:t/www.clear.com/spol/ispot\n\n## I Am EnfhtfFfiHi Sqiis' Iiii J Po Officiall!Lsu Bid) Ti:E8;'F8Yb) N Dis I ) E5' '''''9\n\nsystem includes a hotspot feature that allows some Android phone models to be turned into a mobile Wi-R\nhotspot without requiring a USB cableP\nDigital Living Network Alliance (DLNA) standard, which allows DLNA-compatible devices to share digital content among each other.\n\nThe Vodafone Mobile Wi-Fi R201 is the first mobile router to be deemed compatible with Windows 7. The device is approximately the size of a credit card and creates an For users that own cell phones without built in mobile hotspot capabilities, there is software available that can transform many cell phones into mobile hotspots. The WMWiflRouter software, which was created by Morose Media in the Netherlands, works with a variety of cell phones.ln'orderto tum a cell phone into a mobile hotspot, a user can download the WMWifiRouter software directly to the phone from the http://wmwifirouter.com/website for $19.99.\n\nAgpre 11-7 Vodafone WI-FI R20114 instant mobile hotspot for\nup to five wireless devices. Currently, Mobile Wi-Fi R201 is\nonly available in countries where Vodafone operates, which\ndoes not include the U.S.15\nCELL PHONES AS MOBILE HOTSPOTS\nOne of the most novel ways for a user to create a mobile hotspot is through the use of a cell phone. Using a smartphone as a mobile hotspot can help eliminate clutter by allowing the user to limit the number of devices that must be transported. Phones that offer this capability include Verizon's Palm Pre Plus, which is available for\n$49.99 with two-year contract. The Verizon Pixi Plus is free with a two-year contract and includes the mobile hotspot option. Using a cell phone as a mobile hotspot provides the same type of internet connectivity as other mobile Wi-Fi devices, although, this function is likely to drain a smartphone battery quicker than normal.\n\nA 21-day trial version of the software can be downloaded for free. In order to use the WMWifiRouter software, the user must have:\nSprint's HTC EVa 4G, which runs on the Sprint 4G network,_\n- Windows Mobile 5: AKU 3.3 or newer\n\n- Windows Mobile 6: 6.0, 6.1, 6.5 or 6.5.3 - Both a Wi-Fi and a cellular data connection - An installed and working version of Internet Sharing\nalso has mobile hotspot support. The mobile hotspot feature on the HTC EVa 4G device is available for $29.99\nin addition to the Sprint calling and data plan. AT&T is also allowing tethering for the iPhone to a computer for a monthly fee.16 Google's updated Android 2.2 operating\n........\n\ni Hi Ehi\"\" pmp'll\n, , ill\n!!ScS!\n\nThe JoikuSpot, available at jOikushop.com, supports many phones that use the Symbian operating system including several Nokia and Samsung models. Smartphones such as the iPhone and some Android phones can be hacked to operate as mobile hotspots, as well. Multiple methods can be used to root an Android phone to allow tethering.\n\nThey include:\n\n- Tether Android with Apps that Need Root (Free, heavy\nconfiguration)\n- Tether Android with Proxoid (Free, no root required,\nsome configuration)\n- Tether Android with PDAnet ($30, no root required,\nminimal configuration)\nFor more details on how to root an Android phone and install tethering apps such as PdaNet and Proxoid that allow an Android phone to operate as a mobile hotspot, visit the following webpage: http://lifehacker.\n\ncom/5447347/how-to-tether-your-android-phone.2D\nMyWi Mobile Hotspot App Once an iPhone has been jailbroken, it can be turned into Wi-Fi hotspot by downloading the MyWi app.\n\nMyWi is a jailbreak app that allows a user to tether and create a Wi-Fi hotspot on their iPhone.21 The MyWi app costs\n$9.99 to download, and users must pay a fee to use the service after the trial period expires. To turn an iPhone\n\"AT&T said that traffic on the 3G network has grown by\n5,000 percent over the past three years. The introduction this year of the Apple iPhone 4, which can shoot and upload high-definition video, and Apple's iPad, a whole new class of device, is likely to push that growth even faster.\"26\nAT&T's strategy to offer its customer base\n........\n\ninto a mobile hotspot, a user would first need to jailbreak their iPhone. Once the phone has been jailbroken, the user can then follow the instructions listed on ReadWriteWeb website at: http://www.readwriteweb.com/archives/turn_\nyouciphone_into_a_wi-fi_hotspot.php, to add the mobile hotspot capability.23\nPUBLIC WI-FI HOTSPOTS\nRetailers are becoming increasingly aware that the average customer enjoys the freedom of having Internet connectivity on the go. Therefore, many businesses have begun offering free Wi-Fi as a service to their patrons. Starbucks, a popular destination among coffee drinkers, launched a\n\" ... no-charge, registration-less and limitation-free Wi-Fi initiative ... \" in hopes of, \" ... introducing a seamless and entertaining Web experience for all mobile devices ... \"24\nMany other businesses are following the free Wi-Fi trend and have already begun or have plans in the works to provide free wireless Internet access to their customers.\n\nAT&T's Free WiFI Hotspots Wireless carriers, like AT&T, have also started offering free public Wi-Fi hotspots in metropolitan areas to help mitigate issues related to crowded wireless data networks.\n\nAT&T launched a completely free outdoor wireless hotspot in New York's Times Square that provides complimentary Wi-Fi access to AT&T customers. The company's broadband and wireless customers can take advantage of the wireless hotspot using their smartphones, laptops, and other wireless devices. AT&T launched the pilot program to determine how the free Wi-Fi hotspot can help to decrease wireless congestion on its network. AT&T has struggled to manage the demand for data services on its network due to the use of devices like the popular (Phone, and has seen extra traffic in major cities such as New York and San Francisco cause problems for users including dropped calls and sluggish Internet access.\n\nAs a reSUlt, \"AT&T\nhas also been using its more than 20,000 Wi-Fi hotspots throughout the country to offload some of the traffic. The company has offered free Wi-Fi access to its smartphone subscribers in the hopes that customers will use the Wi-Fi network when it's available rather than the slower 3G\nnetwork.\"25\n\n## Does Free Wi-Fi Effect Choice Of Venue?\n\naccess to free Wi-Fi hotspots appears to be working.\n\nAccording to the company, \"users \"are piling on to AT&Ts public Wi-Fi hotspots, racking up millions of connections in the second quarter.\" AT&T reported that a total of 68.1\nmillion connections were made through phones and other devices in the second quarter of 2010; a number that is more than four times the 15 million connections logged in the second- quarter of 2009. In 2010, subscribers used the network 121.2 million times; also up from the 85.5\nmillion reported in 2009. The number of connections has increased by 30% just from the first to second quarter of this year, alone.\n\nAT&T has stated that it intends to continue developing its Wi-Fi infrastructure, including the launch of more\n\"hotzones\", like the one piloted in Times Square. 3G iPad as well as iPhone subscribers can use AT&Ts hotspots, where available.\n\nA searchable database of free AT&T\nhotspots can be found by visiting the following webpage:\nhttp://www.att.com/gen/general?pid-13540.\n\nWI-FI on Choice of Venue28\nsignificant value in bringing customers to a venue. It's no wonder over 150 thousand cafe/retail venues have now deployed Wi-Fi hotspots, but not all of these are free.\n\nThat's in addition to the tens of thousands of travel-related installations (hotels, airports, in-flight) worldwide.\"\nOther conclusions made as a result of the research include:\n\n- Worldwide annual hotspot connects, or sessions, will\nreach over 2 billion by the end of 2010 with annual\nhotspot connects anticipated to grow to over 11 billion\nby 2014\n- Asia/Pacific will have about one quarter of the worldwide\nhotspot venues over the forecast period\n- Sbrbudcs\n- Bam .. & NobM\n- McDomIld'.\n\n- Fedb: Office\n\n- By 2012, handhelds are anticipated to account for half\nof hotspot connects\n- The total worldwide hotspot market size will swell to\n\n## Wi-Fi Hotspot Usage Statistics\n\n319,200 venues by year-end.29\nBased on the In-Stat study, it is apparent that the mobile Wi-Fi hotspot market is growing exponentially.\n\nThe marketplace can expect to see more mobile hotspot devices and venues that offer free Wi-Fi as consumer demand for complimentary Internet connectivity via Wi-Fi increases.\n\n## Wi-R Hotspot Resources\n\nStatistics show that the availability of free Wi-Fi hotspots for public use definitely influences consumer decisionmaking regarding which venues to visit. According to recent In-Stat's Wi-Fi Hotspot research, approximately two-thirds of those surveyed indicated that free Wi-Fi influences their choice of venue. 31% of the group indicated that free Wi-Fi access may potentially influence their decision, and only 5% said that it would have no impact on the choice of venue.\n\nThere are several online resources that provide information According to Amy \"Craven, Market Analyst, \" ... research on where to find publicly offered Wi-Fi by location including:\nshows that while revenue may not always be directly\n- WI-Fi Zone Finder - www.wi-fi.jiwire.com gleaned from the hotspot offering, free Wi-Fi has a - Wi-Fi Free Spot - www.wififreespot.com\n........\n\n- The Hotspot Haven - www.hotspothaven.com\n. - WiFinder - www.wifinder.com\n- WeFi - www.wefi.com\nThe Wi-Fi Finder app, powered by JiWire, Inc., can also be downloaded to an iPhone or iPod Touch from Apple's iTunes store.3D\n\n........\n\nThe MiFi allows online access to families who are travelling in a vehicle and using a variety of devices; colleagues on a business trip or corporate retreat and first responders at a disaster site. 'In the cell phone era where customers are trading a 'Iandline' for mobile phones, users could make the MiFi an at home family Internet service. One unique feature of the MiFi is the select location and mapping MiFi\n2200 GPS application.\n\nThe issue of 'Going Dark' has just been escalated to another .Ievel.\n\nWhile customers and field operators wrestle witl'l'finding hotspots to operate mobile devices via Wireless Fidelity (Wi-Fi) and Wireless-'Microwave Access\n(Wi MAX}; others are vying for space in coffee shops, bookstores or libraries to get online using cellul9r modems from :Verizon, Sprint, T-Mobile or AT&T. Not only do these devices drain your battery; they also limit your accessibility and options for use to basically being stationary.\n\nAs of October 28, 2010 to further encourage the use of portable devices and popular technology Verizon Wireless started selling a combo package (iPad and Wi-Fi + MiFi mobile hotspot).3\nLAW ENFORCEMENT IMPACT\nThe technology that comprises a MiFi and a personal area network (PAN) is not new. In fact, this is no different from connecting to the Internet via a Verizon DSL modem or\na wireless router. The key for users is the portability and single access to a network anywhere.\n\nService Providers are rapidly improving the speeds of their networks with fourth generation technology. MiFi could eventually replace wired broadband subscriptions in the same way that Americans are canceling home phone lines in favor of cell phones.4 When industry looks at developing new products to keep up with technology the last thing that a service p...,wIlolMl...I.LL.lLL,l,jIl.lW~OiI.II.I.t.II...I.lLlLliMOa, at is the securi as ect.\n\nTwo prevailing theories for how we will access the Internet in the future hinge on the success of small plastic gadgets called MiFis.l If National Aeronautics and Space Administration can send a man to the moon; and utility companies can provide water, electriCity, phone.and cable, why not have universal wireless Internet? Saygood-bye:to USB stick and card-slots, AT&T has introduced its first MiFi device, Sprint Nextel, has the 4G-enabled Overdrive and a thinner gadget called the ZTE Peel and Verizon Wireless offers the popular Novatel MiFi 2200 Intelligent Mobile Hotspot. The MiFi 2200\nhas the thickness of three credit cards, one power button, one status light and a swappable battery that looks like the one in a cell phone. Within little or no time after turning on your MiFi, wait 30 seconds, it provides a personal, portable, powerful, password-protected wireless hotspot.\n\nThe battery lasts for four hours per charge and offers 40 \"---------....\n\nhours of standby, and Verizon uses its 3G (high-speed)\ncellular data network to provide customers with an array of usage options.2\nAccording to Cisco, in 2010, total mobile The MiFi acts as a Hub creating a Wi-Fi cloud providing access and coverage for up to five people at one time. The MiFi is not only small and portable, with a range of 30 feet.\n\nJust like car the MiFi can be left in a pocket, purse or data traffic, including video, grew by\n159% -- more than three times faster than Internet traffic traveling over wired (\"fixed\")\ncommunications. Earlier, Cisco predicted that growth would be 149%, so this trend is moving faster than expected.\n\nlaptop bag and still fire up the mobile device.\n\nOnce connected, the box dials into the Verizon's network, it connects online via the personal hotspot.\n\n,... Doug Webster, Cisco Senior Director\n........\n\n## 13. Slurp Digital Eyedropper\n\ndevice to access it from.\" Slurp actually contains digital.\n\ninformation as opposed to working as a hyperlink. It also offers both haptic2 and visual feedback, thus eliminating tHe need for visible tags on accessed objects.\n\nSlurp is composed of two parts: the digital eyedropper, and the IR nodes.3 To use the device, a person would simply extract data by touching the screen with the Slurp device, pointing it at an object or remote display, and then squeezing the eyedropper's bulb; much like a regular dropper would be used to suck up a liquid. After the digital object is extracted, it can be \"squirted out\" or injected by touching the screen with the Slurp device, pointing it INTRODUCTION\nToday, there is no shortage in the number of wireless mechanisms that can be used to transfer data from one device to another. These capabilities come in many forms including portable hard drives, Digital Versatile .Discs\n(DVDs), Compact Discs (CDs), Zip discs, and Universal Serial Bus (USB) drives. Over the years, the devices that are used to transfer data have become more inconspicuous, like USB drives that resemble tubes of lipstick, double as a fancy designer necklace, or come attached to Swiss Army knives. Many of these devices also employ additional functionality like the ability to receive and transmit data wirelessly.\n\n~t a remote display, and once again' squeezing thebulb.\n\nEssentially, this process is facilitated by a small pOinter that is passed between the Slurp eyedropper and the IR\nnode. All related files are transferred, in the background, over the network in a process that is transparent to the user.\n\nA former MIT Media Lab student.has followed this trend by creating a gadget that at first glance seems like a simple eyedropper. The device, .called Slurp because of its ability to suck up information and its resemblance to a typical eyedropper, is another example of how objects that may be disregarded as common .items, can actually be tools used as a means to transfer data quickly and discretely.\n\nHOW SLURP WORKS\nSlurp was created as a, \"tangible interface for manipulating abstract digital information as if it were water.\" The eyedropper, which can, \"extract (slurp up) and inject (squirt out) points to digital objects,\" allows connected desktops and machines to facilitate a wireless data transfer from desktop-to-desktop, or from a desktop to another devlce.1\nSlurp is also used as a mechanism for storing data. It indicates that it is full when it is pOinted at an IR node and the stem lights vibrate, much like a liquid that is bubbling to be rEtleased. During the injection process, light travels from the Slurp's bulb to the stem, and then fades.\n\nGentle presses of a full Slurp's bulb will inject data into the targeted data object while still retaining the data in the bulb for future injections. The bulb remains illuminated while data is injected. A full Slurp that is pressed firmly will inject and clear all of the data.\n\nIR NODES\nIn the Slurp eyedropper, each IR node is connected to a display or object (auditory, visual, and so forth), that is powered by a Personal Computer (PC). Since they are selfcontained and less costly. IR nodes that operate from a microcontroller may also be used and potentially,. \" ... could be attached to computationally passive unidirectional objects such as buildings. artwork, or trees for locativemedia interactions.\"\nThe Slurp tool is said to be different from existing work done in the area of abstract digital media. As such, \"Slurp allows for the extraction of digital media from physical objects and the selection of an appropriate display MULTISENSORY FEEDBACK\nUsing a vibrotactile actuator, users can search for digital signals within any given space. This can be likened to a beeping metal detector or the sounds emitted from a Geiger counter4 indicating the presence of objects that are not visible to the user. When a digital object is targeted, the Slurp eyedropper displays a different feedback for a\n........\n\ndiscrete or a continuous object.5 Once an empty Slurp is pOinted towards an IR node, the Slurp's stem is illuminated and reflects the color of the targeted object, much like how an eyedropper assumes the color of the 'liE/uid that it is placed in. In the extraction process, light travels from the stem to the bulb, which remains in the bulb until information is injected. Wheninjection occurs; lightmoves from the Slurp's bulb to its stem, and then fades out.\n\nplatform based on multiple, small graphical displays,\" is a logical next step for the technology according to the inventor and other Slurp collaborators. This would provide userS'the capability to navigate through large video media libraries on a Graphical User Interface (GUI) and extract them straight from a monitor. Slurp could potentially be used to transfer video between devices, which would leverage a GUI's scalability and Siftables' spatial and tangible properties.7\nLAW ENFORCEMENT IMPACT\nIt is not only the large number of devices that are available that can be used by targets to obtain and transfer data that poses a threat to Law Enforcement (LE). New wireless data storalle technolollies.l\n'--___\n~J Devices like Slurp, designed to appear as an eyedropper and not a typical wireless storage device, LOCATIVE MEDIA\nLocative media, also known as location-based media, is the linking of digital objects to physical locations, and is achieved through the use of camera phones, text messages, and two-dimensional (20) barcodes. In locative media, 20 barcodes act as pointers, aimed at locations on the Web or a type of hyperlink. In the future, it is expected that media will be linked to physical objects, locations, and people; the Slurp eyedropper could be used to transfer data among them. When Slurp is pointed at a digitally active object (e.g., a music video), the eyedropper vibrates and is illuminated. Once this occurs, the user can extract, and then inject, the object into a container (e.g., a watch or cell phone) for later use.\n\nADDITIONAL SLURP FUNCTIONALITY\nSlurp functions in a' manner that is similar to a USB drive and has the ability to work remotely by pointing it in the direction of the display (e.g., an audio or video object). It also works with non-visual displays (e.g., speakers); this feature has yet to be implemented on most systems with multiple displays.\n\n## Potential Slurp Uses Adding Slurp To Siftables, \"A Tangible Sensor Network\n\n........\n\n## 14. Human Data Transmission\n\nshowed, \" ... two people having devices pocketed and sharing data',between the two via hand touching ... \"\nINTRODUCTION\nTechnology continues to explore several alternative means of communicating. In addition to already eXisting forms of voice, written, and electronie communication, new technologies are being created that allow users to communicate through less traditional means. Researchers are experimenting with human data transmission technology, a novel idea in the communication arena, which uses the human body to transfer data from one point to another.\n\n. The Electric-field Communication model is very small and\ncan only be powered by a button battery. It is anticipated\nthat in the future, the device may be used to advertise\nproducts and services, allowing people to touch a poster\nor sign to have information transferred directly to their\ncell phone. The Electric-field Communication model already\nhas the ability to conduct small data transmissions such\nas swapping phone numbers and addresses. According to\nan ALPS representative, \"high-capacity data transmission\ncan be done using multiple people in theory, but they have\nto be holding hands all the while so it sounds a bit too\nimpractical. Data can be transmitted by anyone regardless\nof age and sex .. \"\nALPS ELECTRIC-FIELD COMMUNICATION\nMODEL\nALPS has created an Electric-field Communication model expanding on the concept behind TransferJet, \" ... a 'Close Proximity Wireless Transfer technology featuring simple operation, safe connection, and efficient transfer of data,\"l and employing the use of the human body as a transport medium for transferring data between two devices. The mQdel, which ALPS unveiled at the latest Tokyo Gadget Fair, functions through electric field transmissions that are communicated through the human body.\n\nThe electric field transmissions in ALPS' Electric Field Communication model use the human body to transfer data through electric field modulation, which creates signals that are sent and received through it. Communication is initiated by simply placing the hand over a sensor. As a result of its easy usability, the ALPS model is thought to be suitable for applications such as ID cards or keyless automobile access.\n\nMICROSOFT SKINPUT\nA graduate student at Carnegie Mellon University and former intern at Microsoft Research, has developed a working prototype of a system called \"Skinput\" that essentially turns a person's hand and forearm into a keyboard and screen.\n\nWith this model, \"you can network various devices like a cellphone, camera, watch, tonometer, and pedometer just by touching them.\"\nIn a demo of the tool, \" ... one person held a mockup cell phone displaying one of three images. The user held the phone in one hand, picked one of those images,\n-..::t and then placed his or her other hand against a computer panel, whereby that image was displayed on an overhead machine.\"\nAnother demo\n\"Using Skinput, a person could tap their thumb and middle finger together to answer a call; touch their forearm to go to the next track on a music player; or flick the center of their palm to select a menu item. All of these signlanguage-like movements, which are customizable, would control a gadget In a person's pocket through a Bluetooth connection. When fitted with a pica-prOjector, the Skin put system could display an image of a digital keyboard on a person's forearm. So, using Skinput, someone could send text messages by tapping his or her arm in certain places\n-- without pulling the phone out of a pocket or purse.\"\n........\n\nI http://www.transferjet.orgjen/tj/tj_overview.html z hUp://en.gigazine.netjindex.php?/news/comments/20091006_alps_ceatec.,japan_2009/\nSkinput is a technology that aims to make communication more \"natural\" by, \" .. .Ietting people communicate with their gadgets by gesturing, using sign language or tapping on their hands, fingers, and forearms.\"\narm, and found that low-frequency electromagnetic waves were able to travel tnrough the skin easily and without any outside interference. The study, which improved on previous attempts that used tiny metal electrodes coated with a silicon-rich polymer, allowed the device to be bent at a gO-degree angle 700,000 times without incident, and proved that human skin can be used as a conduit for transferring data.\n\nTo use Skinput, a person must wear an armband with sensors (the prototype is an elbow brace lined with 10\nsensors), that are able to pick up low, but audible sounds with frequencies ranging from 25 to 78 hertz.\n\nOnce a Skinput user taps their thumb and middle finger together, the impact acts as a catalyst and sends ripples down the skin and through the bones in the person's arm. The arm band's receivers then read the sound waves and determine what gesture the person made, and then proceeds to pass that information on to a telephone.\n\nREDTACTON\nRedTacton is a technology designed to use the human body as a network transmission path. Considered a Human Area Network (HAN) technology, RedTacton is unlike wireless and infrared. It operates by forming a transmission path when part of the human body comes in contact with a RedTacton transceiver. Once the body part is separated from a RedTacton transceiver, communication ends. Communication through RedTacton is initiated when embedded devices or terminals carried by the user are linked in a variety of combinations according to a user's Skinput can differentiate whether a person tapped a middle finger or an index finger, as the movements each impart a unique sound to the receivers. Once the system becomes accustomed to the sound of a user's arm, a process that generally takes one to two minutes, the user can begin to use Skin put as desired. Skin put allows a user to tap their palm as a signal to unlock a door or to tap virtual buttons on an arm to power on a :rv and search through channels.4\nUSING S~IN TO TRANSFER BROADBAND\nSIGNALS\nAn experiment conducted by researchers at Korea University demonstrated that human skin is an energyefficient conduit for data transmission. Performed with small, flexible electrodes that are the approximate width of three human hairs, the experiment showed that data can be transmitted through skin at a rate of 10 Megabits per second (Mbps).\n\nphysical movements through hands, fingers, arms, feet, face, legs, torso, and so forth. RedTacton usability is not impacted when a user wears clothing or shoes. It can communicate data through the human body at speeds up to 10 Mbps.\n\nRedTacton has three primary functional features:\n\n- Touch: Touching, gripping, sitting, walking, stepping\nand other human movements can be the triggers for\nunlocking or locking, starting or stopping equipment, or\nobtaining data\nSouth Korean researchers that administered the test placed electrodes approximately 12 inches apart on the subject's\n\n- Broadband\nand Interactive:\nDuplex, interactive\ncommunication is possible at a maximum speed of 10\nMbps. Because the transmission path is on the surface\n........\nbail eiliOiUCli'Ci.CSe\"Sltloe '.afbil.laHUI. i O' OillCiS. ase **6'''9** (dS) , 060) iiCSIS6!6SSlS: iSliloriiie hi FBI 8111y of the body, transmission speed does not deteriorate in congested areas where many people are communicating at the same time\n\n- Any-media: In addition to the human body, various conductors and dielectrics can be used as transmission media.\nConductors and dielectrics may also be used in combination7\nHow RedTacton Operates The following steps detail how the RedTacton technology works:\n\n1. The RedTacton transmitter induces a weak electric field on the surface of the body.\n2. The electric field sensor (transistor or photonic electric field sensor) detects the electric ,field that reaches the\nRedTacton receiver.\n3. Signals are processed in the receiver circuit and the data is downloaded.\nThe RedTacton transmitter sends data based on fluctuations in the weak electric field induced in the human body. The electric field is then received using sensing technology that is highly sensitive to the body's electric field. RedTacton's super-sensitive electric field sensing technology is used to measure the weak electric fields induced by the ultra efficient alternating electric field induction technology, developed by RedTacton's creators, NIT (Japan).\n\nRedTacton Prototypes According to RedTacton, the following RedTacton security device and data transmission device prototypes have been developed, or are currently in development:\n........\n\n- Transmission rate: 230 Kbps\n- Protocol: Proprietary protocol\n- Transmission method:' Unidirectional\n\n## Embedded Receiver\n\n- Transmission rate: 230 Kbps\n- Protocol: Proprietary protocol\n- Transmission method: Unidirectional - External device interface: 10/100BASE-T, RS232C - TransmiSSion rate: 10 Mbps\n- Protocol: TCP/IP\n- Transmission method: Half-duplex - Terminal interface: PCMCI\n\n## Embedded Receiver\n\n- Transmission rate: 10 Mbps\n- Protocol: TCP/IP - Transmission method: Half-duplex - External device interface: 10BASE-T\nLAW ENFORCEMENT IMPACT\nHAN technology is responsible for. ground-breaking developments in the way that people communicate. In the future, conventional voice-to-voice calling and data transfer methods may no longer be required to pass information to a person or a device. Devices that are based on HAN technology allow people to communicate and initiate tasks with a simple handshake, tap on the arm, or b lacin a hand over a sensor. Such devices ot 0 I\niv\nf share information\n\n## 15. Gesture-Recognition\n\nsoftware uses eyesight's Touch Free Interface which,\n\" ... allows the user to interact with the mobile device easily and intuitively, without touching the keypad or touchscreen.\" The eye Can technology operates with any standard phone containing a bUilt-in camera, which it uses in combination with advanced real-time image processing algorithms to track a user's hand motions and translate them into user actions.2\neyeCan operates by recognizing the four basic hand gestures, that are then translated into various actions such as skipping tracks, volume control of a media player, scrolling through pages in an E~book viewer or Web browser, switching content channels in a media streaming application, and'so forth.3\nINTRODUCTION\nThe act of placing a telephone call or selecting a song to play on an MP3 player has gone through many changes over the years. Making a call on a cell phone is no longer limited to a user pressing buttons on a compact dial pad or touchscreen. Scrolling through an entire collection of music to find a specific song, which was once the only way for a user to pick and play their favorite tune, is now just one of many options. Voice-activated calling allows users to simply speak the name or number of the person with minimal or no physical contact with their phone, and users can utter commands on their smartphones or MP3 players to search for addresses, contacts, and other data. These examples are representative of a growing movement exploring the potential of gesture-based mobile device capabilities, and a progression toward touch-less telecommunication.\n\nUsing a mobile phone's front-facing camera, eyeCan provides users with the capability to navigate through picture galleries, send Short Message Service (SMS)\nmessages, and place phone calls using \"swipe\" gestures that are ex.ecuted a few inches in front of a mobile device.\n\nOther features include pause-and-play control of a music player using a temporary \"hold\" gesture.4\nExpanding on the idea of touch-less functions, a new technology known as gesture-recognition is the latest way that individuals use their cell phones and other mobile devices to perform tasks and communicate with each other. \"Gesture-recognition is a topic in computer science and language technology with the goal of interpreting human gestures, via mathematical algorithms.\n\nGestures can originate from any bodily motion or state but commonly originate from the face or hand.\" Gesturerecognition can be considered a means for computers to understand human body language, as well as a way to facilitate communication among humans and machines, which at present, is mostly limited to text and Graphical User Interfaces (GUls) such as the keyboard, mouse, and screens.1\nApplications with gesture-recognition capabilities are being integrated into mobile and gaming devices and have infiltrated the marketplace.\n\nAPPLICATIONS\nSeveral companies have begun advertising new gesturerecognition tools and software for mobile phones. A few of these technologies are described in the sections that follow.\n\neyeCan Developed by the company eyeSight, \"eyeCan is a pure software solution, which provides a unique interface to control mobile phone features and applications.\" eyeCan EyePhone The EyePhone, created by a team of researchers at Dartmouth College, is an eye tracking technology that,\n\"lets users browse through mobile phone menus with the blink of an eye.\"6 The EyePhone system works by creating a template of a user's open eye when the individual initially uses the system. Once a template is created, it is saved in the device's persistent memory and retrieved when the EyePhone is invoked. In the EyePhone's current implementation, the system is trained individually (e.g., an eye template is created for each user when the application is used for the first time). In future iterations, it is anticipated that the eye template training will be facilitated through the use of the EyeMenu, a customizable shortcut for accessing EyePhone functions.\n\n........\n\nThe EyePhone is designed to map the position of a user's eye to one of nine buttons, which are highlighted once the EyePhone detects the eye in the position mapped to the button. Once in the position of a corresponding 'button, a user then blinks their eye to launch the associated application?\n\nMicrosoft Klnect One of the highlights of the Electronic Entertainment Expo (E3) 2010 press conference was the unveiling of Microsoft's Kinect for Xbox 360, a motion control system formerly titled \"Project Natal\". Released on November 4,\n2010, the\"Kinect, \" ... can sense and respond to users' body motions as well as their voices ... \"l1\n\"EyePhone runs on a Nokia 810 smartphone\". The program tracks the position of an eye relative to the screen (rather than where a person is looking). A user must move the phone slightly so the icon is directly in front of the eye and then select an application\"by blinking. The program places an \"error box\" viitually around an eye, and can recognize the eye as long as it doesn't move outside of this box. The phone app divides the camera frame into nine regions and looks for the eye in one of these regions.\"s\n\"The slim black Kinect sensor plugs directly into any Xbox\n360. Despite its small size, the Kinect device contains a camera, audio sensors, and motion-sensing technology that tracks 48 pOints of movement on the human body.\n\nIt has the ability to recognize faces and voices.\"13 Kinect is able to conduct fullmotion human body tracking at 30\nframes per second, and is not affected by surroundings including furniture or what the user is wearing.\n\nMoove MP3 Player eyeSight is also the creator of the Moove MP3 player, an application that uses gesture-recognition technology to allow users to control an MP3 shuffler using hand motions.\n\nMoove works by having the user place their hand over the phone to initiate the playing of a song. A song can be paused by the user placing a hand over the phone a second time. With the ease of the Moove application and the phone's camera, \"a hand gesture above the phone will skip to the next song .. .wave again and skip to the next, and to the next ... \" A \"Sync\" button is also available to add new songs to a playlist9\nWith Kinect technology, \" ... users will be able to access and control Netflix movies or TVshows through Xbox Live with nothing more than a wave or two of their hands and a voice command to stop, pause, or play. They will be able to have video chats with friends, watch pro sports games via a Microsoft content partnership with ESPN and, of course, play games.\" Microsoft's Kinect will also contain,\n\"other features of Xbox Live, including the new content from ESPN, Facebook, Last.fm, and Twitter ... \"14\nTokyo~ Touch/ess Camera System Researchers at the University of Tokyo's Ishikawa Komuro Laboratory have produced a camera system that allows users to interact with their cell phones without actually touching them. The system was designed to attach to a mobile device and track suspended finger movements and then translate them into commands.\n\n\"The camera recognizes if the finger is moving toward it and away from it and at what speed. This lets a user move a mouse, zoom and scroll pictures, and digitally draw and type, without ever touching the screen.\"10\nGAMING\nGesture-recognition technology is a new trend that can be seen in the releases of popular gaming technology.\n\nAbandoning traditional remote controls, gamers have the opportunity to navigate through games and perform other functions with simple gestures and body movements.\n\nMorna for Windows Mobile Momo for Windows Mobile, created by the company GestureTek, is a new technology that uses a cell phone camera to track objects and motions within the camera's field of view. Momo's engine defines interfaces for two trackers. The first is a Motion tracker that determines interaction by following specific movements; the other is the Mosaic tracker, which tracks objects such as faces and hands. 'Momo makes possible groundbreaking mobile games that can respond to hand motions over menu items and even track the position of the user's head.' The tool allows users to control and direct actions on their phone using specific hand or body gestures and does not require\n........\n\nmovement of the device itself.\n\nUsers could also abuse gesture-recognition\n1-__\n--:-'\nto communicate with associates. Providing the capability to scroll through pictures, draw and type digitally, and peruse phone menus that can easil take a user to the e-mails and so forth EyeMo EyeMo, which uses a mobile device's camera to sense and report device motion, is now available for Android devices.\n\nFor people with camera-enabled Android phones, \"once the software is enabled, users can shake, rock or roll their phone to play games, answer calls, shuffle playlists, navigate maps, scroll, pan, zoom, turn pages and even . '-------------------'\nbrowse the Web - all without pressing a button or touching Gesture-recognition technology is clearly within the early the screen.\"15\n.\n\n- stages of development. It has the potential to alter how we ILAW ENFORCEMENT IMPACT\nexecute command and control functions, as well as how we interface with com uter and communication devices.\n\nL...-__________ ----ilThis technology is definitely one to watch -\n. . . . . . . . .\n\none soon. If the device is unable to find a hotspot within a\n. predicted maximum delay time it switches to 3G.\n\nINTRODUCTION\nMicrosoft Researchers have been working on a technology that would let mobile phones and other third generation\n(3G) devices automatically switch to public Wi-Fi even while the deviceis traveling in a vehicle. The technology is dubbed Wiffler and earlier this year, researchers took it for some test drives in Amherst, Massachusetts (MA), Seattle and San Francisco.1\n\"We try to ensure that application performance requirements are met. So, if ,data needs to be transferred rightaway (e.g., VoIP) we do not wait for Wi-Fi connectivity.\n\nBut, if some. data can wait for a few seconds for Wi-Fi instead of transmitting right away on 3G, this reduces 3G\nusage.\"\n\"The second feature is that both connections can be used in parallel instead of using only one. So, if some data cannot be transferred using Wi.:Fi alone within its latency requirement, both 3G and Wi-Fi are used simultaneously. This parallel use is different from a handoff from one technology to'the other, and it-better balances the sometimes conflicting goals of reducing 3G usage and meeting application constraints.\"3 It is similar to mUlitnetwork load balancing.\n\nWi-Fi is available only about 11 percent of the time for a mobile device-'in transit, compared to 87 percent of the time for 3G availability, .Wi-Fi was not designed as a mobile access technology. At best, mobile devices can use Wi-Fi for short periods of time. The Wiffler protocol allows devices to offload nearly half of its data from 3G to Wi-Fi. How does this work? Wiffler is smart about when to send the packets. It doesn't replace 3G, it augments it and transmits over Wi-Fi simultaneously, allowing users to set Wi-Fi as the delivery method of choice when it is available -- and when an application can tolerate it. Not every application can handle even a few seconds delay in the stream Voice-over-Internet Protocol {VoIP} -- and Wi-Fi tends to drop more packets than 3G does. But many apps can handle even a minutes-worth of delay perfectly well\n(e.g., messaging).2\nThe test consisted of running Wiffler units on 20 buses in Amherst, MA as well as in one car in Seattle and one at the San Francisco airport. The Wiffler unit itself was a proxy device that included a small-form factor computer, similar to a car computer (no keyboard), an 802.11b radio, a 3G\ndata modem, and a GPS unit. The 3G modem was using HSDPA-based service via AT&T. With today's smartphones, the Wi-Fi/3G combo tends to use Wi-Fi connectivity only when stationary; *the* Wifflertechnology provides automatic combo management that permits optimal application performance.\n\nWiffler uses what researchers call \"prediction based offloading\" in which it determines how likely it is to travel within the area of an acceptable Wi-Fi hotspot within a certain time frame. A car in an urban area discovers frequent hotspots and predicts finding another one quickly. If traveling on a highway and Wiffler does not locate a hotspot in a while, it figures it won't find another Currently, it is not known when the Wiffler will be available on the commercial market.\n\n........\n\n## 17. Counterfeit Gadgets\n\nand iPad or those that cannot afford the premium cost to buy these items.\n\nINTRODUCTION\nThe introduction of devices such as the iPod, iPhone, and iPad, Apple's recently released touchscreen tablet, have proven to be very popular among consumers. Because of their popularity, and the inability for some interested buyers to get their hands on the devices legitimately, a growing gray market has emerged in places like Beijing: China. The gray market provides options for users that cannot afford to pay the retail price for Apple's mobile devices, as well as individuals that live in areas where the iPad and the iPhone 4 just recently became available. These counterfeit devices often appear to look very Similar to the real iPad and iPhone sold in stores but are available for a much cheaper price. The functionality of fake iPhone 4 models available on the gray market varies and some phones even offer capabilities that Apple's licensed products do not.\n\nFor this reason, Law Enforcement (LE) should be aware that these phony mobile devices exist, and understand that they may be used to perform functions that Apple manufactured devices cannot.\n\nBACKGROUND\nThree Wi-Fi models of the Apple iPad went on sale in China on September 17, 2010. Apple first released the iPad in the United States back in April 2010, and in late May 2010 made the device available in Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Switzerland, and the U.K.l The iPhone 4 was officially released in China on September\n25, 2010, three months after the phone's initial launch in the United States.2\nA thriving Chinese gray market emerged in between the time that the iPhone 4 and iPad were released in the U.S. and when the devices were made available for legal purchase in China.\n\nDespite a significant portion of China's population living in poverty or on low income, the iPhone 4 can be sold for as much as $1,000 once it is unlocked.3 For many Chinese buyers, \"Apple is a sign of coolness,\" suggesting that the Before their official September 2010 release, the iPhone widespread popularity of both the real and counterfeit\n4 and iPad were readily available in China. Available in iPhone 4 is related to the status that It conveys. 125\nelectronics malls in major cities like Shanghai and Beijing,\n\"Most people in China can only dream of being able to the sale of fake Apple devices is so lucrative that it can afford an expensive phone. But millions of Chinese are be considered a serious competitor for Apple. Phones developing a taste for luxury goods, and Apple products sold on the gray market are smuggled from the United have joined Louis Vuitton bags as totems of wealth.1I4 The States and Hong Kong, where devices went on sale long.\n\nChinese gray market provides easy access to high-quality before their authorized release in China. The smuggled replicas of trendy Apple gadgets for consumers that were iPhone 4 sells in China for $800 to $1,700, depending on too anxious to wait for the official release of the iPhone 4\nthe storage size. An iPad with 64 gigabytes (GB) goes for\n........\n\n8 http://images.lntomobilthcom/wp-content/uploads/2010/10/white-iphone-4-bigJpg about $1,000.7 The expensive price tag was a deterrent for many Chinese consumers that wanted to purchase the iPad and iPhone produced by Apple. As a result, users that could not afford to buy the licensed Apple iPhone 4 opted for counterfeits that are virtually indistinguishable from the real one. These counterfeit Apple phones are known in China as \"Shanzhaiji\", which is loosely translated as\n\"Mountain Bandit Phones\".\n\nIn China, a country well known for its production of copycat jewelry, electronics, clothing, and accessories, the growing prevalence of smartphones and other mobile devices has introduced a new marketplace for the production and selling of counterfeit items. According to BOA China, a business advisory firm based out of Beijing, \" .. .illicit phones made up 38 percent of the handset sales in China in 2009.\"8 Arguably, the popularity of Taiwan's iPhone\n4 phone is based on its likeness to the real iPhone 4.\n\nComprising a significant portion of the market share, the popul~rity of \"Shanzhaiji\" is so vast that it has allowed the gray market t<? become a threat to legitimate smartphone and other mobile device manufacturers;\nPopular iPad alternatives such as Orphan Electronics' iPed were introduced on the gray market last summer. The iPed runs on Google's Android version 1.50 and includes 16\nGB of storage and 1 GB of RAM. It also comes with a 600\nMHz processor, and a 800 x 480 pixels screen resolution.\n\nThe Apple iPad is built with a 1 GHz Apple A4 processor and a 1024 x 768 pixel screen. The iPad's 9.7 inch display is significantly larger than the iPed's 7 inch screen. Priced at $150, the iPed is much more affordable than the real Apple iPad, which starts at $499 for an entry-level tabletP\nCOUNTERFEIT GADGET AVAILABILITY AND\nFEATURES\nMany illicit phones offer the same, and sometimes more, features than the real model. One Taiwanese version of the iPhone contains a removable battery and slots for two SIM\ncards, which allows a user to have two phone numbers ring for the same phone. According to a Chinese gray market vendor, users can't tell the difference between this and the real thing. Apple's signature logo is displayed on the back of the phone's case, and it works with legitimate iPhone accessories including chargers and earphones. The only major difference between the Taiwanese version and the real iPhone 4 is price. The counterfeit device sells for approximately $100.\n\nWith lower end iPhone 4 imposters such as the iPhooe, which reads \"iPhooe\" on the back, it is more obvious these devices are not the real thing. One of the cheapest versions of the counterfeit iPhone 4 models simply reads,\n\"Phone\" on the back of the case.9\n\nA lot of the newest wireless technologies come from\n the United States, but the market that always uses\ntechnology first is Japan, followed by other places like\nKorea. China, then Europe and the United States. \"\n\n- Scott Moody, Director of Authen Tee, Inc .\n\n                                          APPLE PEEL 520\n                                          The Chinese based company, Yosion Technology, is giving\n                                          users another alternative to the iPhone models available on\n                                          the market. The Apple Peel 520, a hack that can transform\n                                          any iPod Touch device into a cellular phone, attaches to\n                                          an iPod Touch like a protective case, works as a dock\n                                          connector, has an extended battery, and provides a slot for\n                                          a SIM card to allow voice calls. \"For less than $60, users\n                                          can jailbreak their iPods, install Yosion's calling and text-\n                                          messaging application, pop in SIM cards, and start making\n                                          calls through the device using a headset. Previously, iPods\n                                          could only be used for Voice-over-IP calls when connected\n                                          to the Internet via Wi-Fi.\" The device can be ordered from\n. . . . . . . . .. .\n\na premium to skip the AT&T contract They then sell the phones to middlemen, usually at electronics stores in Chinatown, for about $750.\" Once the phones are purchased from Apple, they are shipped to. China for distribution to local shops or are placed on e-commerce websites where they can sell for up to $1,000. Once an iPhone 4 is unlocked, it is no longer tied to AT&T, and therefore, is free to be used with any local carrier. Apple limits the number of iPhone purchases to two with the use of a credit card, but the manufacturer does not track phones purchased with cash, allowing people to buy multiple phones to be sold on the gray market.\n\nRetailers in China report that iPhones are usually smuggled into the country by people hiding them in bags or taping them to their bodies. More established smugglers are known to bring in a 100 or more iPhones a day by hiding them among other goods in shipping containers. The official release of the iPhone 4 in China has resulted in a drop in the price of counterfeit phones on the gray market, but it is not anticipated to end sales of illicit phones entirely.16\nOperating as an iPod turned phone, the device is made of soft plastic and claims to offer good signal strength and a battery talk time up to 4.5 hours. The low price of the Apple Peel 520 is one reason that the device is appealing to Chinese consumers that cannot afford to purchase a real iPhone. Comparatively, the Apple Peel 520, combined with an 8 GB iPod Touch, would cost less than $300, a fee that is lot more affordable than the iPhone 3GS, which sells for $738 with a minimum monthly fee of $33.14\nEMERGING COUNTERFEIT GADGET MARKETS\nThe popularity of counterfeit gadgets on the gray market has spread beyond China. Significant numbers of illicit cell phones are exported to countries in the Middle East and Africa, which have also proven to be successful markets for inexpensive imitation devices. According to vendors working in Beijing's electronics malls, many African customers buy fake phones in bulk to be sold in their home countries.\n\nThere is a small lag time when calls are made from the iPod Touch with the Apple Peel 520, and it does not allow text messages to be deleted and forwarded. Otherwise, people that have used the device are impressed with its functionality. The most important development of the Apple Peel 520 is that it, \" ... iIIustrates the evolution of China's massive 'Shanzhaiji', or black market, phone industry.\" The Apple Peel 520 is novel in the sense that, \"It is the first time there has been a hardware application that has changed the functionality in such a key way.\" \"Because the iPod Touch is very cheap, there is a value proposition for people who want to save money.\"\nThe second generation Apple Peel 520 is sleeker and less bulky than the previous model, and from a distance, could be mistaken for an iPhone 4. It also allows the use of General Packet Radio Service (GPRS) data. The device is not currently available for purchase.15\nHOW THE CHINESE GRAY MARKET WORKS\nThe Chinese gray market is facilitated by participants working in China and the u.s. \"People wait in line at an Apple store to buy the newest iPhone for $600, paying The Director of China research for iSuppli stated that fake phones are often purchased in China and then sold in other countries. \"When exported to some emerging market countries, the products are sold as the real ones.\"\nAccording to BOA reports, in the previous year, illicit phone-makers were China's largest handset exporter. Fake phone producers are set to become even more prevalent overseas due to inexpensive prices, well-established distribution networks, and the ability to customize clone phones for local users. Foreign countries are expected to replace China as the primary market for illicit phones produced in China. A BOA principal analyst, said that 2.5\nmillion smuggled iPhone handsets were sold in China in the first half of 2010, which is significantly more than the\n800,000 legitimate iPhones sold. Many buyers of cloned products are foreigners that travel to China to stock up on fake phones and other goods .\n\n. . . . . . . . .\n\n~--------------------------------------,\n\nThere is little regulation of the sale of counterfeit gadgets on the Chinese gray market. In fact, many smugglers 1r---------hIC:-o-u~nt-e..,.rfEe\n...\n\nit:\"\"'i~p~ho-n-e-s -a-nd\"l\"\"t~a\"l\"\"b~le\"!\"'\"ts.J\nand vendors appear to be apathetic about the idea that are widely available on the gray market at price pointsthat they are buying and trading devices illegally. One vendor are much more reasonable than the Ie itimate iPhone and stated, \"The police won't crack down us -- it's not guns ,.;i.:..;Pa:::.;:d:u... _____________\nT\"\"\" ____ .......\n\nor drugs, why bother? The cell phones aren't illegal. If it's illegal, why is such a big market still open here?\" A second ,:================----'1\nvendor concurred, asserting, \"If selling this violates the I W' h f t h t\n't t\n.\n\n_\n. It ea ures t a perml wo law, how come so many people are seiling cellphones here\n.\n\n.\n\nillegally? If it violates the law, how can such a big market\n~hone nu~b~rs to nng on the same device, m.any fake still exist?\"17 The lack of regulation over the development, IPhones eliminate the need for two hones; this allows trade, and sale of counterfeit gadgets can be problematic for LE. Without adequate overSight, counterfeit gadgets I-----,.-------________\n....J\ncan be easily produced traded and sold to users that '--_---'LE may find it difficult to keep up with the number\n,\n, of illiCit iPhones and iPads and their unlawful users w~fl seek to use them to conduct unlawful activities. Even though counterfeit devices must be registered with a the continuous introduction of new counterfeit devices.\n\nservice orovider's networkl I. http://www.latimes.com/business/ la -li-Ia ke -a pples-20 11 0207,0.4 342503.story\n\n## 18. Activity-Based Navigation '\n\nuser walks, thus garnering a path without any assistance from the user. One of the advantages of activity-based navigation over a positioning-based navigation system like GPS is that it does not require pre-existing knowledge like a map or 3D building model. One of activity-based navigation's greatest assets is that it can serve as a useful tool for navigating spaces where GPS is not available.2\nINTRODUCTION\nThe Global Positioning System (GPS) has become an integral part of how people navigate the world since it was made available for civilian use in the 1980s. GPS, ..... a satellite-based navigation system made up of a network of\n24 satellites placed into orbit by the U.S. Department of Defense,\" has no subscription fees or setup charges and can be used around the clock to aid navigation among travel destinations in all weather conditions anywhere in the world.1 For the most part, GPS is a reliable way for people to map their way from location-to-Iocation, but there are places where GPS signals are unavailable such as the inside of a building. Microsoft researchers are currently working on a technology, termed the Menlo Project, which is intended to function in places where GPS\ncannot.\n\nMICROSOFT MENLO\nMicrosoft is in the process of designing a mobile device that can collect trail data while a user walks indoors, underground, and in other spaces where GPS signals are not available or are too weak to be picked up like mUlti-level parking garages. The device would essentially facilitate the gathering of data used to create of a path of \"digital bread crumbs\". Comprised of a collection of sensors including, \"an accelerometer to detect movement, a side-mounted compass to determine direction, and a barometric pressure sensor to track changes in altitude,\"\nthe Menlo prototype phone is Microsoft's solution for users that need to navigate spaces that are incompatible with GPS.3\nBACKGROUND\nActivity-based navigation is based on the use of human activity derived from sensor data to help a user navigate and retrace a path traversed by themselves or another person.\n\nTrails can include, M ... step counts, walking up/down stairs or taking elevators, compass directions, and photos taken along a user's path, in addition to absolute positioning\n(GPS and maps) when available.\" This form of navigation is an alternative to the traditional map-based routing used in GPS road map systems and indoor localization systems, as activity-based navigation does not require the creation of a map and it is not reliant on absolute positioning that may not be available in all situations. Presently, activity-based navigation can be used for activities such as locating a lost object such as a car or finding an acquaintance in a large concert hall, cinema, or sports arena. In the future, activity-based navigation may be useful for performing more broad navigation tasks.\n\nNavigation based on human activity involves the guiding of a user to a specific destination through the use of an established path of human movement activities. These activities can include walking up a specific number of stairs or going up/down a particular number of floors.\n\nThe pattern of these activities can be acquired through sensor data from a trail previously traveled by the same or a different user that possessed a mobile device with sensors to track movement. Mobile tracking devices, such as Microsoft's Menlo, can intuitively infer and record a trail of activities based on sensor data gathered when a Greenfield App Several existing phones already have the sensors contained in Microsoft's prototype, although, Menlo also includes the Greenfield app, which works by harnessing data from its multiple sensors. The purpose of the Greenfield app is\n........\n\nto, \"\".count a user's sequence of steps, gauge direction changes, and even calculate how many floors the user has traversed by stairs or an elevator.\" The Greenfield app can also store trail data so that a user can access and accurately retrace their path at a later time. The Greenfield app is considered a type of activity-based navigation and is being presented as a useful method for navigating locations where maps are inaccessible or have yet to be produced.\n\nUses for the Greenfield App There are a number potential uses for the Greenfield app with Microsoft's Menlo. It is believed that, \"Greenfield could be used for new kinds of urban street games, to recover lost items, to find friends at a stadium, or to rescue hikers and mountain climbers.\" It could act as a compass in common situations, like when a person leaves the mall after shopping for several hours and forgets where they parked their vehicle. With a Menlo phone running the Greenfield app, losing one's car is no longer a problem because the device has the capability to record a user's activity trail, allowing them to retrace their route. The device may also enhance trail data with pictures taken along the course of the user's path.\n\n........\n\n## 19. Tech Bytes\n\nIPHONE 4 COMES TO VERIZON\nVerizon's COMA network doesn't support simultaneous voice and data like the GSM version. The big innovation is the five user Wi-Fi hotspot functionality, something that's standard on Android phones.\n\n1 http://www.engadget.com/apple/verizon-iphone/\nWINDOWS PHONE 7\nComes with a solid as and strikes a balance between Web-oriented and local storage, using the cloud for information like contacts and apps and tying itself to a PC (or Mac, with a basic client) for big updates, music, and video syncing.\n\nContacts from Facebook and Google sync and integrate perfectly, and finding your lost phone, photo uploading, and note syncing is built-in, automatic, and free.\n\n! http://gizmodo,com/5668738/windows-phone-7-review APPS TURN SMARTPHONES INTO\nWALLETS\nThe first Android Gingerbread apps supporting NFC technology have already sprung up, even though there's just one compatible handset - Samsung's Nexus S. Two of these apps are Taglet, an information-sharing system that allows phones to pass details to each other with a swipe, and EnableTable, which plants NFC chips inside restaurant menus.\n\nOther mobile companies are on the brink of launching handsets supporting NFC\nincluding Nokia and RIM.\n\nSMARTPHONES AND TABLETS\nTO GET EVEN FASTER WITH\nNVIDIA'S TEGRA 3 CHIP\nNvidia is set to roll out the nextgeneration Tegra 3 chip for smartphones and tablets, promising to be even faster than its current processor, the dualcore Tegra 2. The new chip is expected to have four cores inside, which can further speed up browsing and gaming on tablets and smartphones.\n\nIn addition, multiple cores can run at half speed to accomplish the same tasks that a single core would need to run at full speed, enhancing battery efficiency and generating less heat.\n\nClearly, multicore smartphones have arrived, with quad-core chips probably waiting in the wings.\n\n- http://www.technologyreview.com/\ncommunications/27125/?pl-A2\n, http://mashable.com/2011/0l/21/nvidiategra-3/\nGIVING HACKERS A PRINTED\nINVITATION\nReal attackers can mine printers for valuable information sitting inside the device. PrintFS automatically finds vulnerable printers via the Internet or in an internal network and turns them into a distributed storage network.\n\nStorage space could be used by hackers to store malicious programs or other material. According to an independent researcher, \"Depending on the devices, most of the time, you can find 20 to 30 unsecured devices\n[on a local network) and you can get a gig of storage to 30 gigs of storage.\"\n\" http://www.technologyreview.com/\ncomputing/27121/pagel/\nVIBER\nViber features deep integration with your native contacts, excellent call quality, and no registration. There's no assigned number and those that you call will see your own mobile number.\n\nHit the purple icon instead of the green icon every time a phone call is made.\n\ns http://www.wirelessweek.com/Reviews/2010/12/\nMobile-Content-Out-with-Old-in~withNew-Mobile\nApplications/\nMAGIC TRACKPAD\nMake your Magic Trackpad act like a multibutton mouse with the BetterTouchTool, The BetterTouchTool *utility* allows you to define your own gestures and actions. In addition to its not-yet-final support for the Magic Trackpad, BetterTouchTool works with many third-party trackpads and Apple's Magic Mouse. It even lets you assign various actions to keyboard shortcuts. The key feature is the ability to assign actions to newly-available gestures. This allows the user to replicate the functionality of the mUlti-button mouse while gaining the gesture features of the Magic Trackpad.\n\n- http//www.macworld.com/article/157058/2011/01/\ntrackpadtricks.html FACEVACS-VIDEOSCAN\nFaceVACS-VideoScan automatically scans incoming video streams, detects multiple faces, and checks for possible\n\"watch list\" matches, If a match is found, operators are notified - in real-time -\nallowing them to focus on the identified person instead of simultaneously observirig multiple video screens, The Cognitec facial-recognition system is used to continuously scan a croWd, The goal is to identify targeted individuals whose faces have already been captured as a digital image and stored in the facial-recognition system, When Face-\nVacs picks up a face that it recognizes through a facial biometrics match, it immediately pulls up the recorded face image and displays it with the live camera image of the scanned croWd,\n, hltp://www.cognitec-systems.de/FaceVACS-\nAlert.20.0.html\n\n## Mobile E-Mail Rises; Web E-Mail Dips\n\nMobile e-mail is growing in popularity while the use of Web-based e-mail seems to be waning, according to a new study from ComScore. Looking back at November 2010, ComScore found that the number of people sending e-mail via a dedicated client on a mobile device was up 36 percent from the prior November. Over the same period, the number of visitors to Web-based e-mail sites fell by six percent. \"From PCs to mobile devices, whether it's e-mail, social media, 1M, or texting, consumers have many ways to communicate and can do so at any time and in any place.\"\nASIAN CELLPHONES\nWhen it comes to cell phones, America is still trying. to catchup with countries such as Japan and Korea.\n\nAsians use their cell phones in more robust ways than the typical U.S. resident -\nas TVs, wallets. GPS devices, and music players. Japanese cell phones can double as a house key, a credit card, and an 10. Other cell phone functions include:\n\n- Reads Vital Signs - Environmental Awareness\n- Home Security Service - Internal Wi-Fi Spot - Send Money to Other\nSubscribers\n- Phones as Payment Systems\n- Free TV on the Phone\no Barcode Reader\n- Investigative Visits - Personal Butler\n9 http://www.technewsdaily.com/lO-coolasian-cell-phOnes-features-you-canthave-yet-0205/\n\n## 20. Patents Of Interest Locafbon-Basieil) Sieirvoces United States Patent Application 7,848,765 Abstract December 7, 2010\n\nProvided herein are methods and systems relating to location-based services such as social networking, providing demographic information, tracking mobile devices, providing business information, providing an adaptable user interface, remotely effecting a change on a portable electronic device, providing a geo-fence, outputting location-based information on a mobile device, varying transmissions to and from a mobile device, providing location-based alerts, verifying transactions and tailoring information to the behavior of a user.\n\n## Iexcllusovie Worleless Servdce Proposals United States Patent Application 7,853,244 Abstract December 14, 2010\n\nProvided herein are systems and methods for providing exclusive wireless service proposals to subscribers. A\nmethod for providing an exclusive wireless service proposal to a subscriber includes the steps of conducting measurements of at least one metric; sending measurement data acquired during the step of conducting to a measurement analysis machine (MAM), the MAM being configured to analyze the measurement data; analyzing the measurement data; predicting performance of at least one of wireless voice and wireless data services based upon the results of the analysis step; generating a proposal for exclusive wireless services based upon the measurement data and the performance prediction; and providing the proposal to a subscriber. Systems for performing this and additional or aiterrrative methods are also disclosed.\n\n## Controllldng A [Dociumient !Based On User Iseihiavooral Sdgnals Il)Ie1!'Ecleil) Ifrom A 31D Caip1L\"Ured Image Stream United States Patent Application 7,877,706 Abstract January 25, 2011\n\nA computer-implemented method, system, and program product comprises a behavior processing system for capturing a three-dimensional movement of a user within a particular environment, wherein the three-dimensional movement is determined by using at least one image capture device aimed at the user. The behavior processing system identifies a three-dimensional object properties stream using the captured movement. The behavior processing system identifies a particular defined behavior of the user from the three-dimensional object properties stream by comparing the identified three-dimensional object properties stream with multiple behavior definitions each representing a separate behavioral signal for directing control of the document. A document control system selects at least one document element to represent the at least one particular defined behavior and inserts the selected document element into the document.\n\n## La ... Iiiifiirurliiii\\ Sailbii\"! Jllteiiliai:E:I I Bi 6!Iic!Ai Ase Elll) (T!S/F6H8) Rcdisalssa:E I Leu I J ;\n\nGGSN: Gateway GPRS Support Node\n\n3GPP: Third' Generation Partnership\nEDGE: Enhanced Data for GSM\nProject\nEvolution\n\nGPRS: General Packet Radio System\n\neNB: Enhanced Node B\n\nGRE: Generic Routing Encapsulation\n\n| AGPS:          | Assisted    | Global     | Positioning    |\n|----------------|-------------|------------|----------------|\n| System         |             |            |                |\n| GSM:           | Global      | System     | for            |\n| ENUM:          | Telephone   | Number     | Mapping        |\n| from           | E.164       | NUmber     | Mapping        |\n| communication~ |             |            |                |\n| AMPS:          | Advanced    | Mobile     | Phone          |\n| System         |             |            |                |\n| EPC:           | Evolved     | Packet     | Core;          |\n| known          | as          | SAE        | (refers        |\n| AMR:           | Adaptive    | Multi-Rate |                |\n| compression    |             |            |                |\n| network)       |             |            |                |\n\nGTP-U: The part of GTP used for transfer of user data\n\n| API:        | Application    | Programming    |\n|-------------|----------------|----------------|\n| Interface   |                |                |\n| GTT:        | Global         | Text           |\n| Telepho~y   |                |                |\n| ARPU:       | Average        | Revenue        |\n| GW:         | Gateway        |                |\n| EPS:        | Evolved        | Packet         |\n| combination | of             | the            |\n| to          | flatter-IP     | core           |\n| LTE/E-UTRAN |                |                |\n| AS:         | Application    | Server         |\n\nHLR: Home Location Register\n\n| ETSI:     | European    | Telecommunication    |\n|-----------|-------------|----------------------|\n| Standards | Institute   |                      |\n| BGCF:     | Breakout    | Gateway              |\n| Function  |             |                      |\n\nHO: HandOverPage 38 HPLMN Home PLMN\n\n| EUTRA:      | Evolved    | Universal    | Terrestrial    |\n|-------------|------------|--------------|----------------|\n| Radio       | Access     |              |                |\n| BIP:        | Bearer     | Independent  | Protocol       |\n| HPCRF:      | Home       | PCRF         |                |\n| BTS:        | Base       | Transceiver  | Station        |\n| HSDPA:      | High       | Speed        | Downlink       |\n| Access      |            |              |                |\n| EUTRAN:    | Evolved    | Universal    |                |\n| Terrestrial | Radio      | Access       | Network        |\n| (based      | on         | OFDMA)       |                |\n| CAGR:       | Compound   | Annual       | Growth         |\n| Rate        |            |              |                |\n\nHSPA: High Speed Packet Access\n(HSDPA + HSUPA)\n\n| EV-DO:    | Evolution    | Data         | Optimized    |\n|-----------|--------------|--------------|--------------|\n| Data      | Only         |              |              |\n| CAMEL:    | Customized   | Applications | for          |\n| Mobile    | Enhanced     | Logic        |              |\n| CAPEX:    | Capital      | Expenses     |              |\n\nFCAPS: Fault, Configuration, Accounting, Performance & Security HSPA+: High Speed Packet Access Plus (also known as HSPA Evolution or Evolved HSPA)\nHSS: Home Subscriber Server CSoPS: Circuit-Switched over Packet-\nFDD: Frequency Division Duplex Switched FDM: Frequency Division Multiplex COM: Code Division Multiplexing HSUPA: High Speed Uplink Packet Access CN: Control Network FDMA: Frequency Division Multiple Access HTML: Hyper-Text Markup Language CPE: Customer premise Equipment FDS: Frequency Diverse Scheduling HTTP: Hyper Text Transfer Protocol CS: Circuit-Switched FMC: Axed Mobile Convergence CSFB: CS-Fallback HTTPS: Hyper Text Transfer Protocol Secure GAN: Generic Access Network CTM: Cellular Text Modem IMEI: International Mobile Equipment Identity GANC: Generic Access Network Controller DCH: Dedicated Channel IMPI: IMS Private Identity GBR: Guaranteed Bit Rate DCS: Digital Cellular System IMPU: IMS Public Identity GERAN: GSM EDGE Radio Access Network IPTV: Internet Protocol TV\nE-CSCF: Emergency Call Session Control Function\n\n15W EblnfE@mp'\" sP\"d\"II\n                        ! F\n                               \"\n                                    F Ii I I I tics 0.:1; (tli8\"F8~8) Rellillllbl'l 2 ll\",.,'. db) iii I I I;\n\nMIP: Mobile IP\nPDN: Packet Date Network IPV4: Internet Protocol Version 4 IPV6: Internet Protocol Version 6\nMMS: Multimedia Messaging Service PDP: Packet Data Protocol I-RAT: Inter-Radio Access Technology MMTel: Multimedia Telephony PIM: Passive Iner-Modulation MRFC: Multimedia Resource Function PLMN: Public Land M6bile Network ICS: IMS Centralized Services Controller PS: Packet-Switched\n1M: Instant Messaging'\nPSAP: PUblic Safety Answering Point IM-MGW: IMS Media GateWay MRFP: Multimedia Resource Function Processor QoE: Quality of Experience IMS IP: Multimedia Subsystem MMD: Multimedia Domain IN: Intelligent Networking QoS: Quality of Service MME: Mobility Management Entity RA: Routing Area '\nIP: nternet Protocol MMS: Multimedia Messaging Service RAU: Routing Area Update IP-CAN: Internet Protocol Connectivity ms: Milliseconds Access Network RAN: Radio Access Network IPSec: Internet Protocol Security MSC: Mobile Switching Center RAT: Radio Access Technology NAT-PT: Network Address Translation RB: Radio Bearer ISIM IP: Multimedia Services Identity\n_ Protocol Translation Module ISR: Idle Mode Signaling Reduction OFDMA: Orthogonal Frequency Division Multiplexing Access (air interface)\n\nREL-X: Release '99, Release\n4, Release 5, etc. from 3GPP\nstandardization\n\nITU: International Telecommunication Union\n\nRF: Radio Frequency\n\nOA&M: Operations, Administration and Management kHz: Kilohertz\n\nRIT: Radio Interface Technology\n\nLCS: LoCation Service\n\nRLT: Release Link Trunk\nOMA: Open Mobile ArchitecturePage\n39\n\n....\n\nL1: Lawful Intercept i OP: Organizational Partner\n\nS-CSCF: Serving- Call Session\nControl Function\nLNA: Low Noise Amplifier\nOPEX: Operating Expenses\nS-GW: Serving Gateway (LTE)\nLNP: Local Number Portability (for\nOR: Optimal Routing\nNo~h America)\nOS: Operating System\nLTE: Long Term Evolution\nOTA: Over-the-Air Activation\nMAC: Media Access Control\n\nSAE: System Architecture Evolution also known as Evolved Packet System\n(EPS) Architecture (refers to flatter-IP\ncore network)\n\n| Mbps:           | Megabitz        | per            | Second    |\n|-----------------|-----------------|----------------|-----------|\n| P-CSCF:         |                 |                |           |\n| Proxy-Call      | Session         | Control        |           |\n| Function        |                 |                |           |\n| see             |                 |                |           |\n| AS:             | Service         | Centralization |           |\n| Continuity      | Application     | Server         |           |\n| MF:             |                 |                |           |\n| Multi-Frequency |                 |                |           |\n| P-GW:           |                 |                |           |\n| PDN             | Gateway         |                |           |\n| SGs:            | Reference       | point          | between   |\n| MME             | and             | the            | MSC       |\n| MGCF:           |                 |                |           |\n| Media           | Gateway         | Control        |           |\n| Function        |                 |                |           |\n| PCC:            |                 |                |           |\n| Policy          | and             | Charging       |           |\n| Convergence     |                 |                |           |\n| SGSN:           |                 |                |           |\n| Serving         | GPRS            | Support        | Node      |\n| MHz:            | Megahertz       |                |           |\n| SIM:            |                 |                |           |\n| Subscriber      | Identity        | Module         |           |\n| MIM:            |                 |                |           |\n| Mobile          | Instant         | Messaging      |           |\n| PCS:            |                 |                |           |\n| Personal        | Communication   |                |           |\n| Service         |                 |                |           |\n| SIP:            |                 |                |           |\n| SeSSion         | Initiated       | Protocol       |           |\n| MIMO:           |                 |                |           |\n| Multiple-Input  | Multiple-Output |                |           |\n| PCRF:           |                 |                |           |\n| Policy          | Charging        | and            | Rules     |\n| SLR:            |                 |                |           |\n| Subscriber      | Location        | Register       |           |\n| MIB:            |                 |                |           |\n| Master          | Information     | Block          | Function  |\n\nsMs: Short Message Service TlsPAN: Telecoms & Internet UMTs: Universal Mobile sNs: Social Networking Site converged Services & Protocols Telecommunication System, also for Advanced Networks, a known as WCDMA\nsOA: Service-Oriented Architecture standardization body of ETSI\nUpPTs: Uplink Pilot Time Slot SON: Self Opitmizing Networks TP: Transport Protocol USB: Universal Serial Bus sRIT: Set.of Radio Interface TrFO: Transcoder Free OperationPage Technologies\n40\nUsIM: UMTS SIM\nU~sD: Unstructured Supplementary sRVCC: Single Radio Voice Call Ts: Technical Specification Continuity Service Data TsM: Transport Synchronous Module UTRA: Universal Terrestrial Radio SV Interface: Interface between the MME and MSC for performing SRVCC\nTTY: TeleTYpe writer Access Handover UDI: Unrestricted DigitiaJ Information UTRAN: UMTS Terrestrial Radio TA: Tracking Area UE: User Equipment Access Network TAU: Tracking Area Update UGC: User Generated Content VANC: VoLGA Access Network Controller T8: Transport Blocks UICC: Universal Identifier TCP-IP: Transmission Control Cryptographic Computer VCC: Voice Call Continuity Protocol/Internet Protocol UL: Uplink VoIP: Voice over Internet Protocol TDD: Time Division Duplex --\nULSCH: Uplink Shared Channel VoLGA: Voice over LTE via Generic Telecommunication Device for Deaf Access TDM: rime Division Multiplexing UM: Unacknowledged Mode VPCRF: Visiting PCRF\nTDMA: Time Division Multiplexing UMA: Unlicensed Mobile Access WCDMA: Wideband Code Division Access UMB: Ultra Mobile Broadband Multiple Access\n-----.\n\nContinued from nai!e I\n\n## 22. Tech Insights\n\nGOOGLE LAUNCHES VOICETOTWITTER\nSERVICE TO HELP PROTESTERS IN EGYPf1\nA. group of engineers from Google, Twitter, and Say Now\n(which Google acquired) were hard at work building a speak-to-tweet service for protesters in Egypt. The service, which is already live, enables users to send tweets using a voice connection. Anyone can tweet by leaving a voicemail on one of three international phone numbers:\n+16504i~4196 or +390662207294 or +91316199855.\n\nTweets sent using the service will automatically include the hashtag #egypt.\n\nG.722 VOICE CODER\nG.722 describes the characteristics of a wideband audio\n(50 to 7,000 Hz) coding system which may be used for a variety of higher quality speech applications including HD VoIP. The coding system uses sub-band adaptive differential pulse code modulation (SB-ADPCM) within a bit rate of 64 kbps. The system is referred as 64 Kilobits per second (Kbps)/(7 kHz) audio coding.\n\nG.722 is Wideband Audio. The G.722 codec gives much better audio quality than 'G.711, typically the standard codec used on LANs and T-l/E-1 Circuits. Now users can have better than toll quality audio on an IP phone system at around' 64 Kbps, the same bandwidth requirements as G.711. G.722 samples at 16 kHz instead of 8 kHz of G.711 resulting in much better audio quality. G.722 is an International Telecommunication Union standard.\n\nAlthough the wireless 802.11n standard has just recently been made official, IEEE has begun work on the next iteration of Wi-Fi. The coming upgrade may deliver speeds of up to 1 Gigabit per second (Gbps) by improving on the effeciency of existing technology. The IEEE 802.11ac\n\n## Android's Law: Manufacturing Cycles Are Getting Shorter 5\n\nstandard, set to be in draft form by 2011, will mainly work with the current technology powering 802.11a. The new standard will continue to work on the 5.0 GHz band, but will provide larger channels for data throughput. Whereas current technology uses 20 MHz-wide channels, 802.11ac will be using either 40 MHz or 80 MHz-wide (and possibly\n160 MHz) channels to deliver data. Files will be able to flow more freely on your home network come 2012.\n\nNone of these specs are standardized as yet and they may be drastically change in the next few years. On top of that, a fatter pipe for wireless data throughput does not increase our actual Internet connection speeds. For most home users, the relevancy of 802.11ac may depend on the expansion of robust fiber optic Internet infrastructure or an increase in large-file data streaming.2\n\"The goal of 802.11ac is to provide data speeds much faster thaA 802.11n, with speeds around 1 Gbps. The timeline for 802.11ac approval is to have a draft standard created by 2011 and the first 802.11ac products out by the end of 2012. The technology behind 802.11ac has not been finalized. However, it will likely involve bonding four or eight channels together with some tweaks to the modulation scheme.\"3\n802.11ac, slated to be the next release version of the Wi-Fi standard, hopes use advanced simultaneous transmission technology to increase data rates to 1 Gbps.\n\nNOKIA TRANSITIONS TO MICROSOFT MOBILE OS\nNokia, the world's largest-volume cell phone maker, and software giant Microsoft are joining forces.\n\nNokia will adopt Windows Phone as its choice smartphone platform and provide services (e.g., mapping programs), and Bing will become the default search engine.4\n\n## Executive Summary\n\nGreater Industry/taw Enforcement Cooperation\n-\nExpanding industry cooperation among law\nenforcement on new and emerging technology issues/\nsolutions.\n3. Enhanced Law Enforcement Coordination -\nEnhancing greater law enforcement lawful intercept mutual coordination/assistance.\n\nCourt-authorized lawful interception is a critical tool necessary to enforce the law, protect our citizens, and maintain our Nation's security. Maintaining a capability to lawfully and properly intercept communications content\n4.\n\nand communications-identifying information pursuant to court order forms the very foundation of law enforcement's National Lawful Intercept Strategy.\n\nEqually important\n\n5.\nNew Federal Resources - New Federal funding to\nbolster lawful intercept capabilities.\nis the balance maintained by existing laws between the interests of our citizen's privacy, the communication industry's competitiveness, and law enforcement's duty to protect our nation's people.\n\nAs detailed in a recent ETR Bulletinl, the variety and complexity of new communications technologies and services and the \"convergence\" of these technologies and services have increased dramaticall over recent ears.\n\nThe five components of the Strategy must be pursued in concert. Adopting one or more, but not all, of the prongs would be ineffective-that is, a partial fix is no fix.\n\nConsequently, the support of the Administration and the Congress is vitally important, especially with respect to-the legislative and appropriations funding components.\n\nSelf-help has always been a firstinstinctforlaw enforcement, but law enforcement is at a point where enhanced IMPORTANCE OF LAWFUL INTERCEPTION\nLawful interception is critically important and is relied on in many significant investigations -- a fact attested to repeatedly. In the House Report of the Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act (CALEA) of 1994, it states, \"Law enforcement officials have consistently testified, as Director Freeh did at the hearings of the bill, that court-authorized electronic surveillance is a critical law enforcement and public safety tool.\"3 Further, lawful interception produces vital intelligence and singular evidence, leading to the prevention of major terrorist attacks and prosecution of the leadership of major organized crime families and drug-trafficking cartels.\n\n~-o:--~~~~--~ ... _\nHence, law enforcement has developed a five-pronged National Lawful Intercept Strategy:2\n\nImpediments to Lawful Intercept\n- \"Access\" pertains to the first step in effecting lawful\ninterception, where a service provider or law enforcement\nseeks to identify an intercept access point (lAP) to\nisolate the lawful intercept subject's communications in\norder to intercept it\n-\n1. Modernization Of Lawfui Intercept Laws - Reviewing\ncurrent lawful intercept legislation, regulation, and\nassistance mandates, and identifying areas that need\nupdating.\n2. Lawful Intercept Authorities -Id~ntifying impediments\nto law enforcement's ability to protect and share\nlawful intercept technical equipment and expertise .\n. . . . . . . . .\nr II As part qf the National Strategy, a significant infusion of\n~\nlin tum, to funding is sought to assist state/local law enforcement needless additional lawful intercept costs. The proposed by increasing and leveraging national technical expertise, National Lawful Intercept Strategy, among other things, training, and assistance.\n\nis intended to bring about carriers' implementation of\n- Conducting lawful interception today with modem\nstandard commercial delivery formats-and protocols.\nmultimedia digital and IP services, applications, and\nThe FBI increaSingly has had to expend great sums in its lawful intercept ,program in order..w-.LiI.II.~w.u..I.I.IIj\n\n- While communications protocols are employed in voicenetworks is vastly more expensive than in the ast.\nbased telecommunications, the use of numerous diverse\nAs a result of reatl increased costs,\ncommunications protocols, especially bycommunications\napplication providers, is dramatically greater in an\nelectronic/data c.ommunications environment. For law\nenforcement, as well as for communications service and\napplication providers and end-users, communications\ncannot be handled, processed, and understood if one cannot identify and understand the communications\nprotocols involvedCJ\n- Prior to CALEA, most law enforcement could conduct\nlawful interception in analog voice networks by using\nstandard commercial intercept, collection, and recording\nequipment. There was very little need to \"process\" or\n\"view\" those intercepted voice communications. However,\nCountering Lawful Intercept Impediments -\npost-CALEA, more complex and much more expensive A National Lawful Intercept Strategy\nlawful intercept \"collection systems\" are now required in\nTo deal with existing and ever-emerging lawful intercept\norder to properly interface with the CALEA-grade voice\nchallenges, law enforcement has developed a five-pronged\nintercept solutions fielded by carriers.\nFurthermore,\nNational Lawful Intercept Strategy. Drawing on existing\nwith the growth in electronic communications, much\nlawful Intercept expertise from the FBI and other lawful\nmore complex and sophisticated law enforcement\nintercept leading agencies, a core purpose will be to\nmultimedia (e.g., voice, email, and imagery) collection\ncoordinate, integrate, and distribute lawful intercept\nplatforms are now required to g.al1Cal~.c.r.&~:II.....ii.I:U:&.., solutions among law enforcement, increasing their ability\nto strengthen lawful intercept capabilities and information\nsharing in a more effective and efficient way.\nAny change in the current paradigm of lawful interception will likely require an extensive, coordinated effort on behalf of the entire law enforcement community. Future progress of the National Lawful Intercept Strategy will require Congressional hearings, testimony, and meetings with\n\n- Until the early 1990s, law enforcement lawful intercept\nhigh-level- decision makers.\nSucc~ss will hinge upon law\ncapabilities were often limited to the installation of\nenforcement's ability to clearly illustrate case examples of\nrelatively inexpensive wiretap devices by technical\npersonnel.\nBut, with the communications revolution\nand the advent of digital and IP-based communications,\nprongs of the National strategy will be needed. Rnally, how law enforcement is capable. of leveraging existing capabilities (I.e., sharing capabilities among- agenCies) to solve a case that would have otherwise gone unSOlved will be instrumental.\n\nINFOGRAPHIC: AT&T'S WI-FI CONNECTIONS\nWi-Fi is increasingly taking the burden off already strained cell networks, and recent numbers issued by AT&T show just how huge Wi-Fi usage has become.\n\n- 77.3 percent of ASian-American households and 68\npercent of non-Hispanic white households subscribed\nto broadband last year, compared with 49.4 percent\nof African-American households and 47.9 percent of\nHispanic households\nIn the third quarter of last year, users made 106.9 million connections on AT&T's U.S. Wi-Fi network.\n\nQ3 2010\nconnections were more than 320 percent higher.\n\n- 65.9 percent of urban househOlds subscribed to\nbroadband in 2009, compared with 51 percent of rural households\nCORPORATIONS GOING TOTALLY WIRELESS3\nMobile broadband services are becoming competitive with\nfixed data links-which means businesses should be able\nto cut their wired connections.\nThe company's collective total value of signed Wi-Fi customer contracts is approximately $200 million. The company saw 228.1 million connections through the first nine months of 2010, and was estimated to break 300\nmillion connections.\n\nDuring the first wave of the wireless revolution, businesses realized that being out of the office didn't mean being out of action. BlackBerrys, iPhones, and 3G dongles for laptops let bUSinesspeople stay connected on the move.\n\n\"In addition to smartphones, we saw that more devices like tablets, eReaders and netbooks were becoming Wi-Fi enabled and realized that Wi-Fi would playa major part in our ability to mobilize everything for our customers. Now, our Wi-Fi services are a significant asset for AT&T and for the consumers and businesses we serve.\"l The second wave, ushered in by the development of 4G\nmobile broadband, will take the mobile revolution indoors.\n\nCellular networks and other service providers are preparing services for offices that will make wired infrastructure such as desk phones and wired Internet links obsolete.\n\nBROADBAND USAGE GROWING EVEN AS GAPS\nPERSIST2\nThe U.S. still faces a significant gap in residential broadband use that breaks down along incomes, education levels and other socio-economic factors, even as subscriptions among American households overall grew sevenfold between 2001 and 2009.\n\nVerizon's Long Term Evolution (LTE) service, a set of standards for future networks, was launched at the end of\n2010, bringing coverage to more than 100 million people.\n\n\"We'll be announcing 4G modems first and support for cell phones by mid-2011.\" The firm isn't building a cell phone network but a data network, one just as fast as wired links.\n\nKey socio-economic characteristics in the U.S. continues to confront a racial gap in residential broadband use, with non-Hispanic white Americans and Asian-Americans more likely to go online using a high-speed connection than African-Americans and Hispanics.\n\nMajor Findings\n- 94.1 percent of househOlds with income exceeding\n$100,000 subscribed to broadband in 2009, compared\nwith 35.8 percent of households with income of less\nthan $25,000\nSprint Nextel rolled out its 4G service in major U.S. Cities last year, and is now over 55 cities. That network is based on the Wi MAX standard, an alternative to LTE. Sprint is also working on the idea of packaging a set of 4G modems and other hardware into an off-the-shelf \"office in a box.\"\n\"It would contain everything you needed to set up a new branch and connect it up.\" There are doubts that networks can keep pace with the demand for wireless data, a demand that's growing by 55 percent annually in North America.\n\n- 84.5 percent of households with at least one college\ndegree subscribed to broadband last year, compared\nwith 28.8 percent of households without a high school\ndegree\nResearch firm Infinetics predicts that by 2013, there will be more North Americans connecting to the Internet via mobile broadband than via any other form of access-\n........\n\n, ....\n\ndetected; various functions of the electronic device can be restrict~d. For example, access to particular applications and sensitive information can be restricted and erased from the electronic device.\"\nwith enterprises -expected to account for much of the demand. The era of flat pricing for wireless data looks to be ending; the next step might involve asking customers to pay for different tiers of service depending on their data demands. Ultimately, net neutrality policy *may* become the biggest practical distinction between wired and wireless connections.\n\nThe patent targets a number of behaviors such as compromising or hacking a device, including removing the SIM card, unlocking, jail-breaking, and even moving. a predetermined distance from a synced device.\n\nIPHONE KILLSWITCH PATENT\nIn a move that seems Big Brother-ish, Apple has a patent in the works that could use voice and facial recognition technology to activate a \"kill switch\" on its popular iPhone, shutting it down when hackers \"jailbreak\" or unlock the phone to install unauthorized programs on it, or try to steal information from an unsuspecting iPhone user.\n\nThe application also identifies a number of methodologies for determining whether a user is legitimate, including photographing the user and applying facial recognition software, analyzing their voice, and analyzing a users'\nheartbeat using a \"heartbeat sensor\"-which, so far doesn't exist in *any* current Apple product. In addition to potentially shutting down the device if unauthorized users are detected, the technology could also be used to wipe sensitive information-address books, email, passwords, account details, and sensitive text messages-if it detects an unauthorized user.5\nApple would track \"suspicious behavior\", including comparing the \"identity of the current user to the identity of the owner of the electronic device,\" then notify the legal owner of the iPhone about the possible hack. There are some \"scary\" issues around the technology, including where data collected by Apple would stored, and who would have access to it \"Hopefully this would be entirely up to the consumer or user of the device whether or not they were going to buy into it at all. Apple's patent,\n\"Systems and Methods for Identifying Unauthorized Users of an Electronic Device,\" was filed in February 2009, but published August 19th by the U.S. Patent & Trademark Office. The \"kill switch\" would be part of a processor that Apple would create.4\nThe *ways* a registered owner uses the iPhone and where it's used could also be obtained, Apple said. \"For example, information such as the current's user's photograph, a voice recording of the current user, screenshots of the electronic device, key-logs the of electroniC device, communication packets (e.g., Internet packets) served to the electronic device, location coordinates of the electronic device, or geo-tagged photos of the surrounding area can be gathered.\"\n\"Unauthorized users\" could be detected, the company said, by monitoring, \"activities such as entering an incorrect password a predetermined number of times in a row, hacking the electronic device, jail-breaking the electronic device, unlocking the electronic device, removing a SIM card from the electronic device, or moving a predetermined distance away from a synced device.\"\nApple is proposing that when an \"unauthorized user is SAMSUNG OFFERS SMARTPHONE USERS\nISLAMIC APPS THIS RAMADAN6\nSamsung Electronics Co., Ltd., a market leader and awardwinning innovator in consumer electroniCS, announced the launch of a dozen customized Islamic apps for smartphones. The suite of applications includes a Prayer Time calculator that shows official prayer times in over\n400 cities and the only mobile Quran that is certified by AI Azhar. The applications can be downloaded for free and can be used across a variety of mobile phone platforms including Android, and Samsung's own Bada operating system.\n\nThe new applications are available to users of Android, Bada, and Java-based phones who can download them via shortcuts to the Samsung's App Store. Bada smartphone users can also download the applications directly from the App Store (www.samsungapps.com).\n\nUsers with online access through Wi-Fi or 3G can also use the built-in RSS Readers on their Galaxy S and Wave handsets to update the AI Sayan application with the latest Islamic and regional news.\" The smartphone has become a ubiquitous part of day-to-day life and it seems only fitting that it plays an important role during the month of Ramadan,\" said the General Manager of Samsung Egypt\n\"Ramadan is the holiest month in the Islamic calendar and we are keen to offer our customers the added functionality of Islamic smartphone applications.\" The new range of applications includes:\n........\n\n- A Hijri calendar that integrates with the smartphone's\ncalendar, and shows Islamic and national holidays\n- A Prayer Time calculator that shows official prayer times\nin over 400 cities with multiple Adhan voices. The\napplication also shows the pOSition of the Qibla to the\nuser\n- A Mobile Quran application that is AI-Azhar certified and\nfeatures popular Ottoman calligraphy\nOn GoGoStat Sync, you can synchronize contacts and photos across multiple social media sites, publish status updates across sites, and sync address books with social networks and email accounts. One feature of the Sync app is that synchronization occurs in the background, not just when users are logged in. Synchronization can be defined in any direction, and users can set-up their Sync rules using credentials from any of their social media sites, so it is not necessary to set up different credentials for GoGoStat Sync?\n\n- An AI-Doaa' application that shows Doaas and Ahadith\nQudsaya organized by situation. with comprehensive\nexplanations of origins and benefits\n- The AI-Sebha application which shows popular morning\nand nightly Tasabeeh with explanations\n- An AI-Sunna application, which automatically indexes\nall Muhammed Sunnahs for different situations and explains the rewards of each Sunna\n- The AI-Bayan application keeps users updated on the\nlatest Islamic and regional news with regional and\nIslamic RSS feeds\nSocialShield, is a service designed to help parents keep their kids safe while using online social networks. \"Since launching this summer, we've proven the technology works.\n\nSocialShield has identified suspicious friends, including a sex offender who had connected with a child on a social network, as well as helping one family with a suicidal teen after keywords were flagged in the child's stream.\"\nA cloud-based service, SocialShield has no software to download or install, and extracts information wherever Facebook, MySpace, or other social networks are being used, including cell phones.s\n\n- A Hajj & Umra Daily guide which features step-by-step\nexplanations of all the rituals and deeds\n- The Tazkerah application notifies users when and\nhow many times to recite the Zikr while explaining the\nbenefits and origins of each Zikr\n- The 99 Names application shows the 99 Divine names\nin beautiful graphics accompanied with explanations of\ntheir meaning\n- The Zakaty is an interactive Zakah calculator\naccompanied by explanations and Esnad\nGroup Texting, Going Beyond Mobile Texting is not just for kids anymore. Thanks to iPhones, Blackberrys, and new mobile apps, it is possible to text a group of people at once, opening the world of text to the novice. Group texting is a great tool for personal collaboration. It can be' used in almost every situation, from making plans to gathering opinions. Free smartphone apps like Fast Society (iPhone), textPlus 4 (Apple and Android devices), BrightKite (Apple, Android and BlackBerry), and GroupMe (iPhone and, next month, Android) are among the apps that have emerged, making it easier and smarter to group text.9\n\n- The Ramadaniat application contains a full description\nof Ramadan activities\n\n## The Reality Of Social Networking In A Currently, The Applications Can Be Downloaded And Used Wireless Agew\n\non a variety of Samsung smartphones including the Galaxy S, Wave, and Java-based models like Champ (C3303K).\n\nFacebook brings the Afghan War to Fort Campbell With each successive year of war, new technologies and social-media sites have narrowed the distance between the home front and the frontlines. In the early days of the Afghan war - before Facebook existed - troops typically e-mailed home a few times a week or called with a lesser frequency.\n\nSYNCING SOCIAL NETWORKS\nManaging your multiple different social network streams and accounts can be a time consuming task for some.\n\nA number of startups aim to help you publish to multiple social networks at the same time including Ping.fm and HelloTxt.\n\nGoGoStat Sync, a startup developed by a number of ex-Microsoft employees is hoping to make the syncing of social networks a bit easier today by allowing users to organize and update their profiles on Twitter, Facebook, MySpace, and Flickr .\n\nToday, spouses and troops; based in even the most remote areas of Afghanistan, can trade messages and phone calls dozens of times a day. In good times, the minute-by-\n. . . . . . . . .\n\nminute status updates provide peace of mind.\n\nIt was an agonizingly slow process. First the military had to track down the relatives of the deceased across the country. Then chaplains and officers trained to deliver the news drove to their doorsteps, a ritual that the military considers sacred.\n\nA massive roadside bombing had killed five soldiers from her husband's 120-man infantry company. The soldier was calling Franks, who was at the center of a wives' support network, in violation of a military~imposed communications blackout on the unit.\n\nShe waited there until midnight, the hour at which the Army Using an Afghan cellphone, he told Franks that her stops notifying next of kin of a fatality.\n\nhusband was safe, but that the company commander was Then s'he went inside and logged onto Facebook.\n\nprobably dead.\n\n.\n\nNews of his death hit Facebook before his wife was formally notified.\n\nThe Army relies on phone trees run by the wives to spread the word. Franks spent most of the day on the phone with spouses and parents. \"First off your soldier is safe,\" she began. \"However, I have some bad news I need to give you.\" At that point, Franks was supposed to read an official script listing the names of the dead before moving on to the next family.\n\nThe events 7,000 miles away in Afghanistan take on a different face when the windows of communications are temporarily closed or eliminated. The world of communications and the reliance on technology becomes abundantly clear when that resource is limited or nonexistent. Living behind the scenes as part of a military family is a story that often goes untold and is brought to life when tragedy occurs and is broadcasted as the\n'Breaking News' or come~ across as a Really Simple Syndication (RSS) News Feed.\n\nAs she was working through her call list, the blackout was lifted. Franks\"husband, Michael, contacted her via a Skype video call from Afghanistan. He looked physically and emotionally drained.\n\nTo ensure that a service member's family does not receive the news of a death bye-mail, phone, or an errant Facebook posting, the military temporarily shuts down Internet access to deployed units that suffer a fatality. In today's era of ever-present connections, such blackouts are rarely enough to cut off the flow of information.\n\nWI-FI DIRECT\nThe Wi-Fi Alliance unveiled a new standard it hopes will make Wi-Fi the de facto standard for peer-to-peer wireless.\n\nKnown as Wi-Fi Direct, it will turn any supporting device into an access point and let it auto-discover other compatible hardware nearby. The technique will not only simplify ad hoc networks, reducing the need for a dedicated router, but will let peripherals use Wi-FI where they couldn't have before; cameras, mice and other devices could work without needing any special setup.ll When the news comes that something terrible has happened, social-media sites become sluggish with the number of users Clnd text messages being sent at a rapid speed in a quest to get the latest update. Worried spouses search for news, post -pray~rs on Facebook and they scour the Internet for scraps of information about the fate of their loved ones.\n\nIn moments of crisis, the connectivity can make the looming possibility of death seem almost suffocating.\n\nSpouses jump with each phone call and ringing doorbells spark tremors of terror.\n\nThe Army funnels information to the spouses of deployed soldiers through volunteer-run Family Readiness Groups, which evolved from now-defunct officer and enlisted wives clubs.\n\nUsing Wi-Fi radios embedded in Wi-Fi Direct devices to form a connection between gadgets in the absence of a nearby hotspot or Internet connection, two or more individuals can share apps, play a video game together and more using Wi-Fi direct. Pictures can be wirelessly printed' from a camera at a kiosk, or display smartphone pictures on a TV. For security reasons, a pair of devices will communicate with one another, similar to forming a connection between two Bluetooth devices. Press a button on the first device and the subsequent devices open a window asking for permission to connect to the primary device.12\nMany of the spouses were accustomed to getting calls from their husbands via cellphone and Skype in the morning. No one received a call on the morning of June 7. None of the soldiers were on Facebook. The unit was in blackout.\n\nWi-Fi Direct is expected to be approved for new products\n........\n\nGSMA VOLTE16\nThe GSMA Voice over LTE (VoLTE) initiative was formally announced on February 15, 2010.\n\nIn establishing the by mid-2010, allowing devices to communicate with one another or other forms of hardware, or perform tasks like printing or sharing files. \"Wi-R Direct represents a leap forward for our industry. Wi-Fi users worldwide will benefit from a single-technology solution to transfer content and share applications quickly and easily among devices, even when a Wi-Fi access paint isn't available. The impact is that Wi-Fi will become even more pervasive and useful for consumers across the enterprise.\"13 Devices that meet the alliance's specifications can use the Wi-Fi Certified logo on their products.\n\nVoLTE initiative, GSMA has adopted the work of the One Voice Initiative* as the baSis of the work to lead the global mobile industry towards a standard way of delivering voice and messaging services for Long-Term Evolution (LTE).\n\nUsing lP Multimedia Subsystem specifications developed by 3GPP as its basis, GSMA expanded upon the original scope of One Voice work to address the entire end-to-end voice and SMS ecosystem by also focusing on Roaming and Interconnect interfaces, in addition to the interface between the customer and the network.\n\nThis is comprised of three sets of interfaces:\n\n- The User Network interface (UNI) between the customer's\nequipment and the service provider's network\n\"Empowering devices to move content and share applications without having to join a network brings even more convenience and utility to Wi-Fi-enabled devices. The new Wi-Fi Direct standard is intended for both consumer electronics and enterprise applications. It will include WPA2 security, and management features for enterprise environments.\"14\n\n- The Roaming Network Network Interface (R-NNI) between\nthe Home and Visited Network of a sUbscriber that is not\nattached to their normal Home network\n- The Interconnect Network Network Interface (I-NNI)\nbetween the networks of the two parties making a call\nANALOG CODECS16\nG.729 delivers call quality that is only marginally less than that of G.711 but uses approximately half the bandwidth.\n\nThis offers very significant benefits as we move to fully IP\nbased networks as it allows greater volumes of voice traffic to be carried. G.722 on the other hand uses a similar amount of bandwidth as G.711, but samples audio at 16\nKilohertz (kHz) which is double that of G.711 and delivers what many regard as far more natural sounding audio.\n\nNewer codecs such as Siren22, created by Polycom, take things a step further and sample audio at 22 kHz, resulting in audio that sounds even better but with the downside of using Significantly more bandwidth. G722-2 or AMR-WB is also slowly making it's presence felt in the mobile market with a number of mobile carriers having recently deployed this codec, which offers superior 16 kHz voice quality over a mobile connection when the end users both have handsets that support this co dec.\n\nTURN YOUR IPHONE INTO A FAKE WINDOWS\nPHONE 7 WITH THIS HACK17\nReleased as a public beta, a new hack transforms the interface ofthe iPhone to mimic the main screen of Windows Phone 7. The iPhone theme does not work the same. The authentic Windows Phone 7, uses tiles to represent \"Hubs\"\ncontaining the main experiences of the 'phone. The photo hub has a camera and after snapping a photo it brings up a feature to share the photo on social networks or via e-mail. This is called 'threaded' experiences. The iPhone hack does not replicate the threaded Hub functionality, it repurposes the individual apps into Windows Phone 7 like tiles and mimics the process of adding or removing tiles.\n\nJailbreaking is required -\n-  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  e\n13 http://www.appleinsider.com/articles/09/10/14/apple_endorses_wULdirecUor_nelworklnl!-withouLhotspots.html\n\n## Latest News 802.11Ac1\n\nof $1,000. This device wili cost just $100, and because both the software and hardware are open-source, you can build your own.\n\nAlthough the wireless 802.11n standard has just recently been made official, IEEE has begun work on the next iteration of Wi-Fi. The coming upgrade may deliver speeds of up to 1\nGigabit per second by improving the effeciency of existing technology.\n\nThe IEEE 802.11ac standard, set to be in draft form by 2011, will mainly work with the current technology powering 802.11a.\n\nThe new standard will continue to work on the 5.0 GHz band, but will provide larger channels for data throughput. Whereas current technology uses 20 MHz-wide channels, 802.11ac will be using either 40 MHz or 80 MHz-wide (and possibly 160 MHz)\nchannels to deliver data. Files will be able to flow more freely on your home network come 2012.\n\nANONYMOUS CREDENTIALS!\n\nAnonymous credential systems allow users to authenticate themselves in a privacy preserving manner. In a credential system, a user can obtain credentials from an organization, and then at some point later on prove to the organization (or ~ny other party) that they have been given appropriate credentials.\n\nIn an anonymous credential system, user can do this without revealing anything else about their identity. In fact, we can even guarantee that if the user credentials are used a second time, no one will be able to tell that the two interactions involved the same user. Not only is it impossible to identify the user; there will be no way anyone can trace the user's transactions.\n\nNone of these specs are standardized as of yet and they may be drastically changed in the next few years. On top of that, a fatter pipe for wireless data throughput does not increase our actual Internet connection speeds. For most home users, the relevancy of 802.11ac may depend on the expansion of robust fiber optic Internet infrastructure or an increase in large file data streaming.\n\nResearch has focused primarily on using new developments in proof systems (such as the pairing based constructions of Groth, Ostrovsky, and Sahai) to design credential schemes which rely on weaker assumptions, allow users to perform a wider range of transactions anonymously, or prevent users from abusing their privileges.\n\nSPRINT'S 4G STRATEGY4\nSprint's long-term 4G strategy to be presented later this year, indicates that Sprint might adopt the LTE technology that everyone else is using, and ditch Wi Max, which no one else is using.\n\nUBERTOOTH ONE: A BLUETOOTH NETWORK\nHACKING TOOL ON KICKSTARTER2\nUbertooth One is a cheap, open-source Bluetooth network sniffer. Unlike Wi-Fi, which has had a wide range of free network monitoring tools for years, Bluetooth has remained pretty closed. This is about to change with the Ubertooth Kickstarter project.\n\nSMARTER WI-FIB\nThere is a smarter way for mobile operators to leverage Wi-Fi.\n\nA smarter solution would actually use Wi-A to Improve indoor coverage while offloading Internet traffic from the macro network.\n\nIn effect, Wi-A access points in the home or office would be turned into mini-cell towers, indoor extensions to an operator's mobile network. Thus, mobile operators would improve indoor coverage while gaining additional capacity from Wi-Fi.\n\nA smarter Wi-Fi solution would provide a secure, trusted connection to smartphones over Wi-A so the operator's most valuable voice and SMS services can reach subscribers over any broadband network.\n\nThe Ubertooth One is a USB plug with an antenna, and ARM\nCortex-M3\nprocessor-based board in-between. Plug it into your computer and you can use it with various wireless monitoring tools like Kismet. The Ubertooth allows you to use Bluetooth in monitoring mode. This\n\"promiscuous\" mode makes the radio pass everything that it picks :up onto the host computer. Normally, wireless receivers will ignore anything not addressed to them. In \"promiscuous\"\nmode, you can sniff and gather data meant for other devices.\n\nFor subscribers, this smart Wi-Fi solution would result in dramatically improved indoor coverage, using the Wi-A which already exists in the home or office.\n\nThese tools can be used for testing network security, or for hacking. Kismet, for example (and derivatives like the Mac OS X version KisMac) can be used to crack Wi-Fi networks'\npasswords.\n\nThe technology has been standardized in the 3GPP's Release 6\nspecifications and is known as UMA/GAN. Commercial services Until now, Bluetooth monitoring hardware would cost upwards based on the UMA/GAN specifications are available today.\n\n## Next Issue: Tools For And Against Law Enforcem.Ent\n\nFBI, Operational Technology Division Acting Deputy Assistant Director FBI, Operational Technology Division ANTHONY P.DICLEMENTE\nUnit Chief FBI, CALEA Implementation Unit Section Chief FBI, Data Acquisition/Intercept Technical Researcher Technical Researcher"
    },
    {
        "text": "## La-Ur-15-26068 Approved For Public Release; Distribution Is Unlimited.\n\nTitle:\nA new method of passive counting of nuclear missile warheads -a white paper for the Defense Threat Reduction Agency\n\nAuthor(s):\n                  Morris, Christopher\n                  Durham, J. Matthew\n                  Guardincerri, Elena\n                  Bacon, Jeffrey Darnell\n                  Wang, Zhehui\n                  Fellows, Shelby\n                  Poulson, Daniel Cris\n                  Plaud-Ramos, Kenie Omar\n                  Daughton, Tess Marie\n                  Johnson, Olivia Ruth\n\nIntended for:\nReport\nIssued:\n2015-07-31\n\nDisclaimer:\nLos Alamos National Laboratory, an affirmative action/equal opportunity employer,is operated by the Los Alamos National Security, LLC for the National NuclearSecurity Administration of the U.S. Department of Energy under contract DE-AC52-06NA25396.  By approving this article, the publisher recognizes that the U.S. Government retains nonexclusive, royalty-free license to publish or reproduce the published form of this contribution, or to allow others to do so, for U.S. Government purposes.  Los Alamos National Laboratory requests that the publisher identify this article as work performed under the auspices of the U.S. Departmentof Energy.  Los Alamos National Laboratory strongly supports academic freedom and a researcher's right to publish; as an institution, however, the Laboratory does not endorse the viewpoint of a publication or guarantee its technical correctness.\n\n# A New Method Of Passive Counting Of Nuclear Missile Warheads -A White Paper For The Defense Threat Reduction Agency\n\nChris Morris, Matt Durham, Elena Guardincerri, Jeff Bacon, Zhehui Wang, Shelby Fellows, Dan Poulson, Kenie Plaud-Ramos, Tess Daughton, and Olivia Johnson Los Alamos National Laboratory, Los Alamos, NM 87544 Abstract  Cosmic ray muon imaging has been studied for the past several years as a possible technique for nuclear warhead inspection and verification as part of the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty between the United States and the Russian Federation. The Los Alamos team has studied two different muon imaging methods for this application, using detectors on two sides and one side of the object of interest.  In this report we present results obtained on single sided imaging of configurations aimed at demonstrating the potential of this technique for counting nuclear warheads in place with detectors above the closed hatch of a ballistic missile submarine.\n\n##\n\nThe problem Both the United States and the Russian Federation have deployed the bulk of their strategic nuclear weapons on missiles that have the capability to deliver multiple, independently targeted warheads. This poses a difficult problem for verification of the number of warheads mounted in each missile. For instance, an Ohio class ballistic missile submarine, Figure 1, has 24 Trident C4 SLBMs with up to 8 MIRVed nuclear warheads on each missile. The current method of verification is visual inspection. Inspectors are allowed to visually inspect the shrouded payload region of a small set of missiles in order to count the number of reentry bodies. START allows the use of radiation detection equipment to verify that an object declared to be non-nuclear is non-nuclear. This inspection procedure is complicated and expensive.  The missile launch tubes need to be opened, nose cones and heat shields need to be removed. All of the steps involve complicated procedures that protect classified data while insuring that all treaty partners are meeting their obligations.  Stringent safety requirements must be met during these inspections.\n\n##\n\nHere we demonstrate a potential method that allows imaging of active warheads using passive signals obtained from cosmic radiation. This technique uses single sided neutron tagged muon imaging. We demonstrate that this technique can see through 2.5 cm of steel and provide images of sufficient quality to count warheads in situ.  This method of warhead verification can considerably simplify and reduce the cost of the inspection regime while providing accurate verification data and protecting sensitive weapons design information.\n\n##\n\nTagged muon imaging Tagged imaging uses the incoming trajectory of neutron-tagged cosmic rays to create an image of material below a set of muon tracking detectors using a technique called laminography. The flux of cosmic ray muons at the earth's surface is composed of both positively and negatively charged muons. Muons are slowed down and eventually stopped as they move through matter. Free muons decay into positrons or electrons, depending on their charge, and neutrinos. In matter negatively charged muons are captured into bound atomic states by the Coulomb force, like electrons, but with much smaller radii.  In nuclei heavier than magnesium the predominant decay becomes muon capture on a bound proton, producing a neutron and a neutrino. In fissionable material this decay leaves an excited nucleus that subsequently fissions and produces more neutrons. In fissile assemblies, such as a nuclear warhead, there is additional gain due to neutron amplification. The neutrons can be detected and used to tag their parent muon. Both the muons and the neutrons are highly penetrating radiation that can pass through layers of steel. Even scattered neutrons are useful for the tagging so considerable steel overburden should not affect this technique much. The positions where the tagged muon trajectories intersect a plane at the location of the warheads can be tallied (histogrammed) in two dimensions to produce an image that is very sensitive to the fissile material in the warheads, as shown schematically in Figure 2.  The position resolution is not sufficient to reveal classified details of the weapon. Also, the strength of the image should be distinctive of a specific weapon type but should not reveal classified information because it depends on both the mass of fissile material and its geometry in a way that cannot be disentangled without further information.  The information barriers are inherent to this technique make it especially well-suited to international arms verification efforts.\n\nThis concept has recently been demonstrated using the mini muon tracker (MMT) in Los Alamos[1] with a single neutron counter and a muon tracker in a geometry optimized to detect tagged events.  Here we present the results from some recent tests approaching the geometry needed for warhead counting in a missile submarine, list the remaining risks, and estimate the costs of a deployable system.\n\n\nResults We show data taken in several configurations including in a shielded box and in a geometry approximating the one needed for imaging the MIRVed warheads in the nose cone of a missile in its launching tube through a closed hatch. Data were taken using 20 kg cubes of both depleted (DU) and low enriched uranium (LEU) as surrogates for the fissile material in a missile warhead. One of the setups is shown in Figure 3.   In Figure 4 we show the tagged muon rate as a function of the distance between the detectors and the LEU cube.  The solid line is a prediction of rate made using the MuonEstimator tool previously provided to DTRA.  The prediction is high at small distance because we have not taken the finite detector sizes into account but assume that the distances from all points at the detectors to the cube are equal to the normal distance between the detector planes and the cube.\n\nIn the next test the cube was placed inside of a shielding box with a three inch layer of polyethylene and a 1 inch layer of lead surrounding the cube on all sides.  This shielding would be sufficient shielding to defeat any passive neutron or gamma detection of a similarly sized piece of weapons grade uranium. Data were taken with both an empty shielding box (20 hours)\nand with the uranium cube in the shielding box (61 hours). The normalized rate was measured to be lower without the uranium but more data are needed to completely quantify the difference. It is important to note that a significant quantity of highly enriched uranium (HEU) or plutonium would generate many more neutrons than the cubes used here. This technique may provide an entirely passive method to inventory or search for shielded nuclear weapons or special nuclear materials (SNM).\n\n## Imaging War Heads Through A Missile Hatch\n\nIn order to test imaging through overburden, like that expected in submarine, we constructed the setup shown in Figure 6. Three 20 kg uranium cubes were placed on the concrete floor about 160 cm under the tracker.  The neutron detectors were placed on the floor approximately the same distance from the centroid of the cube positions. Steel was placed on a table just below the upper tracking detector to mockup the missile hatch.  The thickness of steel was chosen based on the assumption that the hatch would be as light as possible based on the pressure requirements for the submarine.  The cut away drawing, Figure 1, lists the diameter of the hull as 10 m and the thickness as 7.6 cm. The missile hatches appear to be spherical with a diameter of 2 m. The missile hatch could be as thin as 0.76 cm and still hold the same pressure as the hull.  A thickness of 2.5 cm of steel was chosen as a conservative estimate of the missile hatch thickness for these measurements. More research on the specifics of submarine design is needed to find the actual thickness. A sample counting geometry is illustrated in Figure 8.  The detectors are mounted on top of the closed hatch.  The diameter of the missile tube is 2 m.  Although the accuracy of these figures may be dubious, it appears that a two meter standoff should allow the warheads to be observed from the top of the hatch.  (It appears this is a French submarine).\n\n## Remaining Risks\n\n- The geometries could be different from the studies here, reducing the counting rates to\nan impractical level.\n- The neutron background expected from thermonuclear devices with plutonium pits\ncould produce large accidental coincidence backgrounds and obscure the signal.\n- The safety issues involved in mounting detectors above the submarine hatch could be\ninsurmountable.\n- The assumptions that the information from real systems is unclassified could be\nincorrect.\n\n## Path Forward\n\n- More research into the actual geometries encountered in treaty verification needed to\nverify the geometries used in this experiment.\n- Further measurements are needed using neutron sources to simulate the neutron\nbackground expected from thermonuclear devices with plutonium pits.\n- Large area neutron detectors that do not use low flashpoint solvents need to be tested.\n- Data should be taken in a realistic geometry with weapon trainers to ensure the data\nare unclassified.\nA rough estimate of the cost of this effort is $600k-6 months of the P-25 threat reduction team. This work can be completed in 1 year.\n\n## Cost Of A Deployable System\n\nA 1.81.8 m2 muon tracker used with a set of 100, 10 cm diameter, 10 cm long stilbene neutron detectors would provide rates about 40 times larger than in this experiment.  This would allow warhead imaging with sufficient statistical precision to count active warheads in place in times on the order of an hour. Since stilbene is an organic crystal, it poses no safety hazard. The current price for a tracker is about $250 k (est.). A set of 100 neutron detectors would cost about $600 k (est. based on quote for 100 bare stilbene crystals of $474 k). A rough estimate of the total cost of a scanner with data acquisition and mechanics is about $1M. An additional\n$550k is needed for engineering, construction and testing. This work can be completed in 1 year.\n\nSubmarine Demonstration Demonstration of warhead counting requires access to a submarine in port.  Assuming that both access and the costs associated with obtaining authorization and access are provided, this demonstration could be performed for about $450K. A demonstration could be made using the existing scanner and the results could be scaled to the larger detectors described in the previous section.\n\nPentagon demonstration The current system could be used for a demonstration at the Pentagon. Travel and set up would cost approximately $66k.\n\nSummary We have performed an experiment to evaluate tagged muon imaging for counting warheads in a MIRVed missile system in a submarine.  It appears from this simple experiment that sufficient rate can be obtained to identify and count warheads with about an hour of exposure without opening the missile hatch using equipment currently commercially available. 1.\n\nGuardincerri, E., et al., Detecting special nuclear material using muon-induced neutron emission. Nuclear Instruments and Methods in Physics Research Section A: Accelerators, Spectrometers, Detectors and Associated Equipment, 2015.\n\n2.\nMorris, C.L. and A. Saunders, *NewDisplay*, in *Los Alamos Computer Code*. 2004."
    },
    {
        "text": "## On Our Radar On Our Radar\n\nBy Nat Puffer The fight to secure information is being lost. This was at the center of a debate within In-Q-Tel's Infrastructure and Security Practice last summer. Every day we would hear about another epic breach of consumer data or critical company secrets. In an industry that uses analogies as a foundation, all of them have crumbled. The \"castle perimeter\" has crumbled. The \"hunters\" are not efficient enough to seek out the persistent and embedded foothold of determined adversaries. A 2013 article cited Mandiant as discovering a foothold in a network that went undiscovered for six years and three months.1\nThe same article cited the average time from initial breach to discovery as 229 days. If this isn't an indication of critical systemic failure, I'm not sure what is.\n\nOn the other side of the argument, \"losing\" means something is lost, and implies that there's some idea what winning would look like. But what if we haven't really lost anything? Perhaps breaches and data theft, like power outages or rush hour traffic, are just part of living in the modern world. While the numbers vary for effect, Target was reported to have lost 40 million payment cards in 2013; Home Depot lost 56 million payment cards in 2014; and Anthem lost 69 million patient records in 2015.2 Yet every time one of these breaches is announced, we go about our days like nothing has happened. We still use our credit cards at Target. We still use our health insurance. We've become accustomed to the idea that companies can't keep our information secure against a sophisticated attacker, and in some cases, even an unsophisticated one. If we get substantially more out of modern conveniences than they cost us, how is that a loss? Stated differently, isn't instantly streaming movies to a tablet worth having to change a credit card number from time to time? At the core of the tradeoff is that people on a day-today basis value convenience over security. We shouldn't be surprised that this extends to people who develop software; that security lags behind innovation. In 2011, Steve Yegge wrote a blog post at Google capturing this concept, and I cite this post frequently to demonstrate the nature of the information security problem. Yegge asserted that there are two competing forces as systems are developed. The first is how functional and useful the system is, dubbed accessibility. The second is security. Without any external influence, accessibility will always win at the cost of security. As stated in Yegge's post, \"[D]ialing Accessibility to zero means you have no product at all, whereas dialing Security to zero can still get you a reasonably successful product such as the PlayStation Network.\"3\nIt's a strange coincidence that it was also a Sony breach that brought lapses in security to the attention of the general public. Was the most recent breach of Sony Entertainment a game changer? If you are an information security professional, your likely answer is a jaded \"no.\" We have been here before. There was nothing extraordinary about the breach technically. The concept of nation-state attackers penetrating corporate systems has appeared in commercial penetration testing reports since 2004. The only change, if any, is the rate at which we have to respond to new threats with limited resources. If agility is defined as the ability\n\n## Without Any External Influence, Accessibility Will Always Win At The Cost Of Security.\n\nto minimize the time required to accomplish a different task, we're finding agility is critical.\n\nindicator of compromise with equal veracity, which is exhausting. That exhaustion bore little fruit, which bred complacency. That complacency, over time, led to the very thing you wanted to prevent. Going forward, companies will be faced with developing doctrine based on hard questions. What assets are priorities? Which systems would potentially be sacrificed for others? Is it okay to isolate and restore a user's desktop automatically based on a machine's determination of a threat? The user would lose his or her work, but you would limit chasing ghosts through the system. At the root of this are questions surrounding \"How?\" How do I know what to prioritize? How can I create the maximum effect with the minimal resources? Developing a sense of situational awareness to focus operations will be critical in answering those questions.\n\nHowever, if you haven't been living in information security or worried about operating system internals and the ways they can be exploited (i.e., the majority of people), your perspective may be that the Sony breach signals a major change. There is a wider awareness that system breaches aren't just about criminal gangs looking to steal credit cards anymore. There is a new world where countries use the Internet as a platform for attack or retribution. This was highlighted by the White House Press Corps asking the President directly about a computer breach of a private company, and being assured that appropriate action would be taken.4 Similar questions have been echoed in board rooms and C-suite conversations across the country: How would we fare? What's at risk? What are we doing differently today given these revelations?\n\n## Situational Awareness\n\nOver the past year and a half, IQT has been tracking the rise of the private threat intelligence market. State of the Internet and Annual Breach reports have existed for a long time, but this space was something new. Vendors were looking to increase the rate and specificity of intelligence into something actionable, forming two camps.\n\nThe next steps after those questions are even more interesting. If you believe that all the investment in current mitigation strategies has been working, something has changed and you need to adapt. If you think that all your investments have failed, it's time to change course. In either case, something needs to change. The constant stacking of security tools hasn't worked. The doctrine of Defense in Depth has to answer for its cost of complexity when measured against a lack of success. While we may not want to abandon the idea altogether, we need to adapt with a new way of operating. This will likely include variable response, situational awareness, and security orchestration.\n\n## Belief In Variable Response\n\nThe first camp produced finished products. These were full reports with in-depth analysis and attribution. Actors, campaigns, tools, techniques, and procedures are all tracked and discussed, with fun names created for many of them. There was a focus on attribution, which we weren't convinced would be useful for those without certain authorities. The fact that activity was supposedly part of a People's Liberation Army (PLA) initiative may be interesting, but the overall economics of a private company are more of a driving factor in dealing with China than an IT department's report for the CIO. However, as the Sony breach has raised awareness inside commercial enterprises, so has the Endless stacking of security safeguards is a flawed strategy and every asset cannot be protected equally. For a long time there was a belief that you could secure everything in a reasonably complex network if you put more resources and tools against the problem. This resulted in a limited staff chasing every possible value of attribution. Understanding the larger context of \"Who\" is suddenly as important as \"What\" or \"Why\" even if prosecution isn't an option. The second camp produced machine-readable Indicators of Compromise (IOC). This information was intended to enrich the detection systems within a network through a couple of mechanisms. First, IOCs could be fed into a central incident management solution. The goal was to correlate indicators like IP addresses with existing log data to determine if network traffic that would normally appear benign is something to worry about. The second use was to add IOCs to detection capabilities to search out new potential compromises.\n\nBoth are useful and have a place. We expect to see significant activity as vendors from one camp add capabilities from the other, collection biases in feeds are worked through, and infrastructure for delivery, consumption, and sharing is rolled out. The promise is that focus and prioritization will eventually result from the ability to put global context around local alerts. The reality is that it may be too early to tell if the intelligence is sustainable and provides efficiency, or becomes an overwhelming deluge of data. Ultimately, the indicators need to support and drive action in the organization.\n\n## Action Through Security Orchestration\n\nAwareness without the ability to act is useless. Action that consumes all your resources is limiting. The ability to make decisions on the intelligence we have and act with minimal resources in a timely manner is the goal, but has eluded most complex IT organizations. Networks of sufficient complexity are typically built by several generations of employees using products from a number of vendors spanning years. Legacy systems, acquisitions, new initiatives, and day-to-day break-fix cycles consume any available time personnel might Nat Puffer is a Senior Member of the Technical Staff within In-Q-Tel's Infrastructure and Security Practice. He has led investments in network security, data storage, and cloud computing. Prior to IQT, Puffer was with Knowledge Consulting Group, where he was responsible for growing the Cyber Attack and Penetration Division. He previously held consulting roles with Neohapsis and Symantec. Puffer earned a bachelor's degree in Integrated Science and Technology and a master's degree in Computer Science from James Madison University.\n\n## R E F E R E N C E S\n\nhave otherwise put towards automation on a systemwide scale. Vendors have added to the problem with protection of their market share by limiting centralized management solutions to work only with products in their portfolio. Bring your own device (BYOD) policies and the Internet of Things (IoT) pile on even more complexity and amplify the problem. Several third-party vendors are chasing this problem with fresh eyes. The core concept is more in line with a knowledge-based system or workflow management solution than something fully autonomous. Identify actions that are frequent and time consuming, streamline the decision making and sign-off process, and efficiently execute across the infrastructure. While limited, this ability to act, potentially in machine time, on identified threats that are based on a broad view and defined prioritization might begin to tilt the odds back in our favor. However, the ability to capture business process and maintain automation as vendors update their solutions and companies change their infrastructure has been the downfall of these solutions before. These solutions will succeed based on their ability to capture and keep pace with changes in doctrine and business processes.\n\n## Rebooting Cybersecurity\n\nPerhaps we need to restart, building upon what we have with variable response, situational awareness, and security orchestration in mind. Doctrine and awareness enable action that can drive up the cost for the attacker by constantly removing their footholds while keeping the defender's resources relatively flat. Tracking, identifying, and attributing attacks changes the political landscape. If winning in this context means establishing a livable equilibrium, changing the economics and politics of the attacker may be a good first step."
    },
    {
        "text": "# Managing The Private Spies: The Use Of Commercial Augmentation For Intelligence Operations\n\nBy Glenn James Voelz, Major, U.S. Army The views expressed in this work are those of the author\n    and do not refl ect the offi cial policy or position of the\n    Department of Defense or the U.S. Government\n\n## Contents\n\nAcknowledgment ........v Foreword ........vii\nIntelligence Commercialization: Private Sector Augmentation for Operational Support ........ 1 Historical Precedents for Commercialized Intelligence ........ 5\nJustifying Intelligence Outsourcing  ........11\nOvercoming Force Structure Challenges  ........13 Dealing with a Complex Threat Environment,  ........16 Integrating Advanced Technological and Analytical Tools ........18\nThe Legal and Regulatory Environment for Commercialized Intelligence Augmentation ........23\nInherently Governmental Functions  ........23 Personal Services Contracting  ........26 Legal Oversight  ........28 Other Legal Considerations  ........30 Evaluative Framework for Commercialized Intelligence Augmentation  ........ 32\nEvaluating Public-Private Intelligence Partnerships: Selected Examples  ........34\nPrivatized Personnel Security Investigations  ........34 Applying the Evaluative Criteria ........37 Commercial Remote Sensing  ........38 Applying the Evaluative Criteria ........41\nCommercialized Intelligence Support to the GWOT ........43\nThe Contract Award Process  ........44\nDeveloping Contract Language ........46 Management of Contract Personnel  ........49 Contractor Training and Integration  ........50 Contract Offi cer Representative Training and Responsibilities  ........52\nOther Issues of Concern  ........55\nApplying the Evaluative Criteria  ........56\nThe Future of Commercialized Intelligence Augmentation  ........57\nConsiderations for Reform  ........57\n\nOption One: A Conservative Approach  ........58\n\nOption Two: Incremental Reform  ........60\n\nOption Three: Radical Change  ........63\nConclusion   ........66 Appendix: Evaluative Criteria: Consolidated Case Study Overview ........67 Bibliography  ........69 About the Author ........79\n\n## Acknowledgment\n\nThe author thanks Mr. William Halpin and Mr. Tom Van Wagner for their assistance during the research for this paper and their helpful critiques through several draft versions.  Additionally, Admiral Tom Brooks provided invaluable perspective and numerous suggestions.  These were based on his extensive professional experience in the Intelligence Community, where he culminated his career as the Director of Naval Intelligence, and on his years of private sector work with government contracting.\n\n## Foreword\n\nThe Abu Ghraib prison scandal cast a spotlight on the use of contractors to perform functions normally associated with military personnel, and all the contracting, control, discipline, and training issues associated therewith. The sometimes-overheated rhetoric of the press created an impression that the use of contractor personnel to perform functions traditionally considered to be the realm of uniformed personnel was something new and extraordinary. It is neither, though the number of intelligence-related functions performed by contractors during combat operations in Iraq and Afghanistan may, indeed, be unprecedented.\n\nThe extensive use of contractor personnel to augment military intelligence operations is now an established fact of life and, occasional contracting \"scandals\" notwithstanding, any effective and effi cient design for intelligence support to operating forces must provide for their use.  The civilian sector can respond to rapidly changing requirements of the Global War on Terror with fl exibility and speed that the government sector does not possess.  And, in a number of cases, the civilian sector possesses technology, equipment, and technological know-how that the government sector could not acquire in any reasonable amount of time. Add to this the problem of end-strength limitations and recruiting and retention problems, and it is apparent that contractors are a permanent part of the intelligence landscape.\n\nBut this dependence on contractors comes with its own set of problems, most of which stem from inadequate planning and from lack of training of deployed uniformed personnel in the intricacies of contracting for and administering contractor personnel. The author points out certain steps that must be taken to provide for effective management of contractor personnel in the fi eld, and, indeed, the Army even has a Field Manual devoted to contractor administration which brings out many of the same points (FM 3-100.26, \"Contractors on the Battlefi eld\"). Yet uniformed intelligence personnel continue to be deployed without adequate training and preparation to handle contractors who will be supporting them.\n\nThe author suggests evaluation standards for the use of contractors and possible long-term initiatives to reduce dependence on traditional \"outside\" contractors. His suggestions are worthy of serious consideration. But in the meantime, contractors will continue to be a part of the Table of Organization and Equipment (TO&E) of deploying intelligence personnel engaged in counterterrorism operations. We have a responsibility to train our uniformed personnel in the use of contractors just as we would prepare and train them to use any other item on their deploying TO&E. Thomas A. Brooks Rear Admiral, U.S. Navy (ret) Former Director of Naval Intelligence\n\n## Intelligence Commercialization: Private Sector Augmentation For Operational Support\n\nThe end of the Cold War presented a paradoxical dilemma for the Intelligence Community (IC). The demise of the Soviet Union brought about a signifi cant downsizing of the nation's intelligence apparatus while concurrently necessitating a major reallocation of intelligence resources to cover a more complex array of trans-national threats such as counter-proliferation, terrorism, organized crime, drug traffi cking, and ethno-political confl ict.1 The combination of shrinking budgets and expanding analytical requirements placed enormous demands on the Community. Among the most pressing challenges was the need for an on-demand, surged intelligence capability for coverage over a diverse range of operational requirements.\n\nA key recommendation of a 1996 House Permanent Select Committee investigation of the nation's intelligence capabilities called for the creation of a dynamic surge capacity for crisis response. The Committee concluded that such resources \"need not be self-contained within the IC,\" but must be quickly marshaled \"without undue concerns about who owns the assets.\"2 Several other independent reform studies at the time proposed initiatives to satisfy surged collection demands by leveraging nongovernmental resources.3\nDespite these recommendations, during the 1990s there was little effort to create such a surge capacity. Bureaucratic inertia and lack of clear consensus on an intelligence reform agenda made major initiatives impossible. With the enormous intelligence demands of the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) the issue of surge capacity has reemerged as a critical issue for community leaders. Collection management, remote sensing, linguistic support, document exploitation, interrogation, and technical analysis are just some intelligence support functions currently being performed by private contractors.\n\ncapabilities. Examples include: The Commission on the Roles and Capabilities of the U.S. Intelligence Community, *Preparing for the 21st Century: An Appraisal of U.S. Intelligence* (Washington DC: U.S.\n\nGovernment Printing Offi ce, 1996), xxi, URL: *<http://www.access.gpo.gov/int/report.html>*, accessed 11 August 2004; The Council on Foreign Relations. Making Intelligence Smarter: The Future of U.S. Intelligence, *Report of an Independent Task Force* (1996) 3, URL: <http://www.copi.com/articles/intelrpt/\ncfr.html>, accessed 10 Aug 2004; Allan Goodman and others, In from the Cold: The Report of the Twentieth Century Fund Task Force on the Future of U.S. Intelligence (New York: The Twentieth Century Fund Press, 1996), 65.\n\nThis ad hoc response to meet the intelligence requirements of GWOT operations has produced mixed results. One report strongly recommended the permanent integration of commercial imagery products into the conventional collection management cycle for operational commanders.4 Conversely, a key fi nding of the Army Inspector General's report on OIF detainee operations in Iraq clearly identifi ed poor training and misuse of contract interrogators as a contributing factor in detainee abuse.5\nThese examples speak to both the promise and the liability of utilizing commercial augmentation for intelligence surge capacity. Given the current mismatch between operational requirements and intelligence force structure, there will be continuing reliance on commercial augmentation. As critical intelligence requirements are increasingly resourced through commercial augmentation, IC leaders must determine the appropriate roles for private sector fi rms and provide effective plans for legal oversight, operational integration, and management of contracted support.\n\nTo date, few studies have adequately considered the policy implications of integrating non-governmental providers into the operational intelligence cycle.6 GWOT operations have required signifi cant reliance on private sector resources for intelligence collection and analysis but have done so without suffi cient measures for effective acquisition, management and accountability over commercial providers.\n\nThis study assesses the value of current commercial activities used within DoD\nelements of the Intelligence Community, particularly dealing with operational functions such as analysis, collection management, document exploitation, interrogation, production, and linguistic support. These functions were selected due to the extensive use of commercial augmentation in these areas during recent GWOT operations.\n\nThe author conducted data collection and interviewed personnel assigned within DoD agencies, Combined Command, and Joint Task Force intelligence staffs. A holistic evaluation of current contract management practices was conducted using fi ndings from several recent government studies and critiques of ongoing commercialization initiatives. The evaluation focused primarily on the effi cacy of the contract development process, management procedures, and how commercial services were integrated into the operational intelligence cycle.\n\nintelligence and its impact on the government monopoly over sensitive information. This study considered the expanding role of private corporations in the collection, analysis and dissemination of intelligencerelated information and how this phenomenon challenges traditional government prerogatives as well as notions of public privacy. James R. Sutton, Subversion of a Government Monopoly: The Privatization of Intelligence Services (Erie, PA: Research Intelligence Consortium, Inc, February 2000).\n\n## Selected List Of Organizational Interviews And Questionnaire Respondents7\n\n|    |          | Army G2                       |  Plans and Operations          |\n|----|----------|-------------------------------|--------------------------------|\n|    |          |                               | Linguist/interrogation support |\n|    | Army G2  | Plans and Operations          |                                |\n|    |          |                               | Linguist/interrogation support |\n|    | INSCOM   | Contracting authority offi ce |                                |\n|    | SOUTHCOM | JTF-170/JTF Guantanamo        |                                |\n|    |          |                               |                                |\n|    | CENTCOM  | CJTF-180/CFC Afghanistan      |                                |\n|    |          |                               | CJTF-7/MNF-MNC Iraq            |\n|    |          |                               |                                |\n|    | EUCOM    | EUCOM, G2                     |                                |\n|    |          |                               | JTF-Eagle (Bosnia-Herzegovina) |\n|    |          |                               | JTF-Falcon (Kosovo)            |\n|    |          |                               | JAC (Molesworth)               |\n|    | SOUTHCOM | JTF-170/JTF Guantanamo        |                                |\n|    |          |                               |                                |\n|    | CENTCOM  | CJTF-180/CFC Afghanistan      |                                |\n|    |          |                               | CJTF-7/MNF-MNC Iraq            |\n|    |          |                               |                                |\n|    | EUCOM    | EUCOM, G2                     |                                |\n|    |          |                               | JTF-Eagle (Bosnia-Herzegovina) |\n|    |          |                               | JTF-Falcon (Kosovo)            |\n|    |          |                               | JAC (Molesworth)               |\n\n## Historical Precedents For Commercialized Intelligence\n\nIn all countries engaged in war, experience has sooner or later pointed out that contracts with private men of substance and understanding are necessary for the subsistence, covering, clothing, and moving of any Army.8\n- Robert Morris, Superintendent of Finance, 1781\nDespite increased public attention focused on the practice of \"outsourcing\"\nintelligence support functions, this phenomenon is certainly not unprecedented. Indeed, it was not until the early 20th century that the United States possessed a professionally trained, organic intelligence capability within the government. Prior to that time military intelligence was largely an improvised affair, conducted by cavalry scouts and managed by line offi cers with no formal intelligence training.9 Due to the lack of dedicated personnel, the collection and analysis of intelligence information was often delegated to civilian auxiliaries employed on short-term assignments for specifi ed tasks. In many respects, the current system of ad hoc commercial augmentation is similar to the earliest practices used by the military to satisfy short-term intelligence needs.\n\nDuring the American Revolution the absence of a professional intelligence staff required augmentation by civilian spy networks to supplement military reconnaissance. It is estimated that General Washington spent more than 10 percent of his wartime expenditures on intelligence related activities, much of this funding to support civilian agents collecting critical information on British operations.10 Among the most notable examples was Washington's use of the Culper spy ring in British-occupied New York City. This spy network was managed by offi cers under Washington's command but most of the actual collectors were civilian auxiliaries who were paid for services as required.\n\nFollowing the war most of the army's intelligence functions were informally delegated to topographic engineers, signal offi cers, or cavalry scouts, but throughout intelligence during the Spanish-American War and WWI, the Military Information Division remained a backwater assignment on the War Department's General Staff. The establishment of the Military Intelligence Division during WWII was the fi rst permanent, professionalized organization dedicated to such matters. A useful account is provided in John Patrick Finnegan, *Army Lineage Series: Military Intelligence* (Washington, DC: Center of Military History, 1998), URL: <http://www.army.mil/cmh-pg/books/Lineage/\nmi/mi-fm.html>, accessed 21 October 2004.\n\n10 P. K. Rose, *The Founding Fathers of American Intelligence* (Washington DC: CIA Center for the Study of Intelligence, 1999), URL: *<http://www.cia.gov/csi/books/940299/art-1.html>*, accessed 21 October\n2004.\n\nthe 19th century regular army assets were frequently supplemented by non-military specialists to provide unique skills or expertise. One such example from the Mexican American War was the so-called \"Mexican Spy Company,\" a quasi-military force contracted by American commanders to provide local intelligence, counter-espionage services, surveillance, and route reconnaissance in support of U.S. forces.11\nWhen military operations began in Mexico there was virtually no knowledge among American offi cers of the political intentions of the Mexican government or movements and capabilities of the enemy army. Lieutenant George G. Meade reported that among the 4,000 American troops serving in Northern Mexico at the time, none could speak Spanish.12 Locally hired augmentation was critical for providing intelligence support to military commanders and for effective counter-intelligence and counter-espionage operations. During U.S. military operations between Veracruz and Mexico City nearly 200 civilian augmentees were drawn from ranks of local bandits and Mexican army deserters. These contract collectors were organized into several operational companies under the direct command of Major General Winfi eld Scott.13 During the course of the campaign over $15,000 was distributed by local commanders for the hire of civilian augmentees to satisfy a wide range of intelligence functions and linguistic support.14\nDuring the Civil War intelligence support remained mostly a non-specialized discipline. The army's reliance on contracted civilian augmentation remained a common practice, perhaps mostly famously with General George McClellan's use of Allen Pinkerton's detective agency.15 Pinkerton's agency was a strictly private enterprise but served a quasi-governmental role as one of McClellan's primary intelligence gathering tools for the Union Army. Pinkerton's private agents conducted a wide range of intelligence functions including surveillance operations in the Confederate capital, counter-espionage investigations behind Union lines, exploitation of captured documents and fi eld reports, and interrogations of Confederate prisoners and deserters.\n\nPinkerton's efforts were supplemented by another intelligence entrepreneur named Lafayette Baker who operated a private company conducting counter-espionage investigations and military police work for the Union army.16 Baker worked directly for the War Department and focused his efforts primarily on intercepting contraband mail and merchandise moving into Confederate territory, as well as exposing disloyal Union businessmen engaging in illicit trade across enemy lines.\n\nThe exploits of these private intelligence services have been romanticized in\n13 Caruso, 153. 14 Caruso, 157.\n\npopular history though their actual contribution to the Union effort remains somewhat questionable.17 Pinkerton's erroneous intelligence reports are suspected of contributing to General McClellan's overestimation of Confederate forces during his timid peninsular campaign of 1862. Furthermore, these contract spies were generally weak at collecting timely and accurate intelligence on Confederate military intentions although they did enjoy limited success with counter-intelligence and counter-espionage operations.\n\nIn the post-Civil War era the Pinkerton Detective Agency expanded its operations to become a prototype for modern corporate intelligence and security, providing protective and investigative service for industry, railroads, and local law enforcement. Pinkerton's men revolutionized the use of \"mug shots\" and developed an extensive criminal database used by local law enforcement organizations. The agency also performed operational functions such as surveillance, as well as several high profi le \"manhunts\" like the legendary pursuit of Butch Cassidy and the \"Sundance Kid.\"\nDespite these successes, the agency's activities attracted signifi cant public scrutiny after a violent confrontation in 1892 with striking workers at the Carnegie Steel Mill in Homestead, Pennsylvania. In the aftermath of the bloody tragedy, public outcry by labor organizations led Congress to enact a law restricting government contracting with \"Pinkerton Detective Agencies or similar organizations.\"18 This statute remains a part of the Federal Acquisition Regulation to this day and prohibits the government contracting with \"quasi-military armed forces.\"19\nDespite the mixed results from the employment of commercial intelligence augmentation, the practice continued throughout the remainder of the 19th century. During the army's frontier operations, military commanders frequently employed civilian scouts, interpreters, and local informants when operating in unknown territory. These individuals provided military commanders with a base of local experience, as well as specialized linguistic and cultural knowledge that was invaluable for frontier detective services.\"\n19 FAR, Chapter 37.109. The \"Anti-Pinkerton Act\" resurfaced again in a 1977 case Weinberger v. Equifax, Inc., challenging the government's use of a private corporation for data collection on individual citizens. In this case, the plaintiff argued that Equifax used \"detective-like investigative techniques\" on behalf of the government. Although the court ruled that the defendant's actions were not illegal, it failed to clarify what actions or characteristics might constitute a \"quasi-military armed force.\" Given the courts' narrow interpretation of the Pinkerton Act, the statute has not yet resurfaced to challenge any of the government's recent contracting for intelligence-related services. Under existing legal interpretations the FAR restriction has not placed a signifi cant limitation on the government's authority to contract for intelligence related services. Additional legal issues concerning intelligence contracting are discussed in Chapter 3. For additional information on the legislative history and interpretations of the Pinkerton Act, see MAJ Gregory L. Bowman, USA, \"Transforming Installation Security: Where Do We Go from Here,\" *Military Law Review* 178 (Winter 2003), 50-93.\n\nconstabulary duties. Perhaps the most famous of these freelance scouts was Buffalo Bill Cody, who served on several occasions as an advisor to military commanders in the West.20 These short-term, contract scouts were assigned under the Quartermaster Department and generally classifi ed as \"laborers,\" without any formal rank or position of direct authority over troops.21\nIn 1866 Congress formally authorized the hiring of Native American augmentees for scouting and intelligence related services. The Indian scouts primarily conducted reconnaissance operations, \"locating the enemy and determining his strength, determining the tribal affi liations of unknown Indians, and all other duties connected with Military Intelligence.\"22 Indian scouts were not considered regular enlistees but were hired at the discretion of local commanders for short-term operational needs. The rationale for this approach was economical as well as tactical. In his work on the Indian scouts, historian Thomas Dunlay noted that, after the post-Civil War demobilization, \"the employment of Indian scouts may have seemed an economical measure, since it would increase the effectiveness of the small regular force, and Indian enlistments could be terminated in case of need, unlike the fi xed fi ve-year enlistments of white and black soldiers.\"23\nMuch like modern contractors, the Indian scouts were not organized into the Army's regimental system and were generally used only for short periods of duty based upon operational needs. The statute governing their employment stipulated that \"they shall be discharged when the necessity for their service shall cease, or at the discretion of the department commander.\"24 Acknowledging their irregular status, Congress established that the temporary scouts would \"furnish their own horses and horse-equipment, [and] shall be entitled to forty cents per day for their use and risk so long as thus employed.\"25\nThe Indian scouts provided intelligence, reconnaissance, and translation services supporting frontier campaigns into the 1890s and were used again during the army's Punitive Expedition against Mexico in 1916.26 The policies for short-term contracting of Indian scouts were modifi ed somewhat during the First World War, with the legislation revised to enlist Indian scouts for 7-year tours like other army soldiers, thus ending their irregular status.\n\n22 Thomas W. Dunlay, Wolves for the Blue Soldiers: Indian Scouts and Auxiliaries with the United States Army, 1860-90 (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press), 1982, 8.\n\n23 Dunlay, 44.\n\n## The Indian Wars - The Rest Of The Story 27\n\nThomas Dowling's *Intelligence in the Final Indian Wars, 1866-1887*\naddresses the U.S. government's ability to hire Indian Scouts and how this was done. Thomas Dowling's *Intelligence in the Final Indian Wars, 1866-1887*\naddresses the U.S. government's ability to hire Indian Scouts and how this was done.\n\nDowling's research focused on intelligence during the Final Indian Wars, and in one chapter gives an interesting accounting of the Army's challenge in the hiring of Indian Scouts and other contract employees. Unlike the British and French in their colonial empires, where they hired native troops and formed them into units, the Americans hired the Indians only for selected campaigns, and for six months at a time. Dowling explains the reasons for the differences.\n\nDowling's research focused on intelligence during the Final Indian Wars, and in one chapter gives an interesting accounting of the Army's challenge in the hiring of Indian Scouts and other contract employees. Unlike the British and French in their colonial empires, where they hired native troops and formed them into units, the Americans hired the Indians only for selected campaigns, and for six months at a time. Dowling explains the reasons for the differences.\n\nDuring this same period, Arthur L. Wagner, an offi cer with extensive service on the western frontier, wrote one of the army's fi rst doctrinal works on military intelligence.\n\nWagner made special note of the utility of temporary augmentation, specifi cally citing the use of private spies and Indian scouts as invaluable tools for intelligence gathering. Despite the advantages of using non-governmental augmentation, Wagner made particular mention of the liabilities of employing those motivated by profi t rather than \"driven by patriotism or a sense of military duty.\"28 Based upon his experience, Wagner cautioned that \"the services of a spy permanently attached to a command are likely to be much more valuable than those of one who is employed only for the single occasion, and whose efforts are not stimulated by a hope of profi table employment in the future.\"29\nBy the beginning of the 20th century, several factors lessened the army's reliance on non-governmental augmentation for intelligence-related tasks. Following the Spanish- American War the military's new expeditionary orientation awakened leaders to the necessity of a permanent and specialized corps of intelligence offi cers. As a result of this new strategic focus the War Department and Army General Staff fi nally developed a permanent, organic intelligence staff section.30 This change led to an expansion of the army's foreign attache program and the creation of the Military Information Division.\n\nThis movement toward greater professionalization of intelligence continued through World War Two and rapidly expanded during the Cold War era. By the post-war period intelligence had become primarily a governmental affair, dominated by trained experts, managed by guarded bureaucracies, and highly dependent upon technical collection capabilities. Large Cold War intelligence budgets and a narrowly defi ned collection focus on the Soviet Union fed the growth of an expansive federal infrastructure to support the nation's intelligence needs. This state-centered approach to Cold War intelligence found little use for the short-term employment of private wayfarers or commercial, humanintelligence entrepreneurs.\n\nThis government-centric approach to intelligence persisted until the mid-1990s when several factors fueled the reentry of commercial providers into fi elds previously reserved for military and permanent civil service employees. The fi rst event was the dramatic shift of intelligence emphasis away the Soviet Union following the end of the Cold War. The\n1990s brought about a broad diversifi cation of national security concerns with a rapid succession of contingency operations falling outside the traditional areas of intelligence focus. Supporting such diverse operational tasks, particularly for intelligence functions such as translation, debriefi ng, and document exploitation in target languages where the military did not maintain suffi cient levels of trained personnel, presented challenges.\n\nThe use of private sector linguist support was critical for operations in Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, and Kosovo.31 This only increased in the wake of 9/11. At present there are over 6,000 private contract linguists supporting various operations in the Global War on Terrorism at a total annual cost exceeding $250 million.32\nA second major catalyst was the Clinton administration's 1994 National Performance Review (NPR), an initiative intended to \"radically change the way government operates\nto shift from top down bureaucracy to entrepreneurial government.\"33 The Clinton reform agenda emphasized competition, privatization, and commercial outsourcing as methods for improving public sector effi ciency and performance. Congress actively supported this process through a broad liberalization of the Federal Acquisition Regulation, the streamlining of contracting procedures, and legislation designed to promote marketbased management strategies in governance.34\nscreening but no clearance. CAT 2: U.S. citizen hires with Secret level clearance. CAT 3: U.S. citizen hires with TS/SCI clearance. Only CAT 2 and CAT 3 hires are permitted to work on sensitive intelligence functions. Lynn McCann, Army Language Support Contracting Offi cer, Army G2, Intelligence Plans and Operations Directorate, interview by the author, 22 October 2004. Budget fi gures for GWOT contract language operations are cited in LTG Keith B. Alexander, USA, Army Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence (Army G-2), Statement before the Committee on Armed Services Subcommittee on Strategic Forces. 108th Cong., 2d sess., 7 April 2004. URL: <http://armed-services.senate.gov/statemnt/2004/April/Alexander.\n\npdf>, accessed 2 May 2005.\n\n33  A useful overview of the NPR and its implications is provided in George Nestercznk, \"Reviewing the National Performance Review,\" *Regulation* 19, no. 3 (1996), URL: <http://www.cato.org/pubs/regulation/\nreg19n3b.html>, accessed 10 November 2004.\n\n34 Most notable among these initiatives was the 1994 Federal Acquisitions Streamlining Act. This legislation eliminated or revised hundreds of statutes dealing with government acquisition and contracting. These changes were complemented by the 1996 Federal Acquisition Reform Act (Clinger-Cohen Act). Together, these reforms dramatically transformed the government's relationship with the private sector and encouraged a wide variety of public-private partnerships for product and service acquisition.\n\nConcurrent with the Clinton administration's NPR initiative was a signifi cant post-Cold War military downsizing and large reductions in Department of Defense intelligence personnel. Between 1992 and 1996, the Department of Defense experienced a 16 percent decrease in total personnel, with DoD reductions representing 75 percent of the overall federal government drawdown during the period.35 As a result, nearly all of the agencies within the Intelligence Community experienced sharp personnel declines throughout the decade.36\nWith signifi cant reductions in personnel authorizations, combined with the goal of\n\"reinventing government\" through entrepreneurial initiatives, DoD and other agencies aggressively sought to \"outsource\" many support functions to private sector providers. Initially, much of the commercial augmentation established after the NPR was aimed at administrative functions, clerical work, basic maintenance, and labor services. However, privatization efforts soon widened to include highly technical functions such as budgetary analysis, procurement, personnel services, and logistics.\n\nThis trend toward greater reliance on market-based management strategies continues today. The most recent guidance provided in the Quadrennial Defense Review states that \"only those functions that must be performed by DoD should be kept by DoD. Any function that can be provided by the private sector is not a core government function.\"37 The Bush administration has continued aggressive commercialization initiatives and actively pursued opportunities to privatize many DoD functions traditionally performed by military and civil service personnel. Consistent with this overall trend, in recent years DoD intelligence organizations have greatly expanded use of commercial resources to augment a wide range of operational requirements.\n\n## Justifying Intelligence Outsourcing\n\nBy some accounts the logistical support, security, and intelligence-related functions have essentially become an \"organic\" element of combat power. Indeed, over the past decade the growth of commercial support to military operations has been dramatic. The market for privatized military support is now nearly half of the Department of Defense total annual expenditures.38 Equally dramatic has been the major shift in Pentagon acquisition away from product procurement toward services contracting. In the mid-1980s approximately two-thirds of the Pentagon's contracting budget went for the purchase of goods and infrastructure. Today, over half of all DoD contract dollars a small increase in DIA personnel levels in 1992 and 1996 due to an inter-governmental transfer of functions. Actual personnel numbers are classifi ed but percentage changes are available in Preparing are used to acquire services.39 This fi gure represents a 90 percent increase in service contracting since 1993.40\nAccording to a Government Accountability Offi ce (GAO) report, overall spending on service contracts with military support providers amounted to $118 billion in 2003.41\nIt is estimated that nearly half of the entire 2004 U.S. intelligence budget was spent on the procurement of commercial systems and operational support services.42\nAlthough greatly expanded in recent years, this trend toward increasing privatization of intelligence support predates GWOT operations. Throughout the 1990s private sector intelligence and security fi rms provided signifi cant support to the Pentagon in the war on drugs in Colombia and for surveillance activities along the U.S. border.43 More recently, the Army's Intelligence and Security Command (INSCOM) announced a new $209 million contract for intelligence support services including information technology and force management, administrative support, and \"intelligence, security, and information operations.\" This contract provides support for a wide range of intelligence operations in DoD's major regional commands.44 Given recent trends, commercial augmentation for intelligence functions is likely to remain a signifi cant, if not expanding, element of the nation's operational capability.\n\nThere are three primary reasons for the government's expanding dependence upon private sector resources for intelligence augmentation. First, commercial augmentation has been used primarily as an ad hoc measure to mitigate critical intelligence\n41 Government Accountability Offi ce, Contract Management: Opportunities to Improve Surveillance on the Department of Defense Service Contracts, Report Abstract, Contract GAO-05-274, March 17, 2005 URL: *<http:www.gao.gov/docdblite/summary.php?rptno=GAO-05-274&accno=A19596>*, accessed 7\nMarch 2006.\n\n42 This fi gure marked a signifi cant increase from pre-9/11 estimates of approximately $71 billion.\n\nMichael J. Grinfeld, \"War Incorporated,\" *California Lawyer* (May 2005), 24. Estimate for the 2004 budget from Tim Shorrock, \"The Spy who Billed Me,\" *Mother Jones* (January-February 2005), URL: <http://www.\n\nmotherjones.com/news/outfront/2005/01/12_400.html>, accessed 8 March 2005.\n\n43 *Fortune* reported several companies under contract with DoD and the State Department for surveillance and intelligence-related activities in support of counter-drug operations in Colombia. Contractors included Airscan, Northrop Grumman and DynCorp. Nelson D. Schwartz and Noshua Watson, \"The Pentagon's Private Army,\" *Fortune*, 17 March 2003, 101.\n\n44 The INSCOM contract includes a team led by ManTech International, L-3 Communications Corp, SAIC, and Systex. The companies will provide intelligence support services for Pacifi c Command, European Command, Central Command, Southern Command, U.S. Forces Korea, and Northern Command. Tim Starks, \"ManTech Wins a Seat on Defense Intelligence and Security Contract,\" CQ.com Homeland Security, 25 January 2005, URL: <http://www.cqhls.com/hs/display.do?dockey/cqonline/prod/data/docs/\nhtml>, accessed 17 March 2005.\n\nmanpower shortages resulting from post-Cold War force structure reductions. Second, the increasing complexity of the threat environment has required a rapid recalibration of collection and analytical capabilities to acquire unique skill-sets currently underrepresented within the intelligence civil service. Third, the informational tools needed to combat trans-national terrorism have required exploitation of non-traditional intelligence methodologies and an increasing dependence on commercial technology and analytical systems. The following section addresses each of these issues in detail.\n\n## Overcoming Force Structure Challenges\n\nThe most fundamental reason for using contract support during recent contingency operations has been to mitigate acute shortages of military and civil service intelligence personnel. Since the beginning of GWOT operations there have been numerous reports of personnel shortfalls among forward-deployed intelligence organizations. These manpower shortages have had a detrimental impact on the collection and analytical capability of intelligence organizations.\n\nA major after-action review of Operation ENDURING FREEDOM (OEF) found that the \"demands on intelligence were never greater. Limitations on the number of personnel restricted the ability of organizations to analyze information and develop products using the processes and tools practiced in our training centers.\"45 These intelligence manning shortfalls in Afghanistan \"considerably raised the risk to operations...by forcing intelligence staff to operate on the margin between success and failure.\" Early in OEF, the intelligence Analysis and Control Element for the coalition forces command \"functioned at less that 30 percent strength.\" 46 In particular, military leaders cited signifi cant shortfalls in high-demand intelligence skills such as analysts, interrogators, and linguistic support. Commercial contracting was the only method available to acquire the needed manpower for support to these military operations.\n\n## Private Military Companies - What Role Do They Play?47\n\nIn his Peacekeeping for Hire? The Potential Role of Private Military Companies in Peace Operations, Scott Strohecker discusses whether private military companies (PMCs) are upscale mercenaries or the latest step in outsourcing, and whether they can be effective as peacekeepers. In his Peacekeeping for Hire? The Potential Role of Private Military Companies in Peace Operations, Scott Strohecker discusses whether private military companies (PMCs) are upscale mercenaries or the latest step in outsourcing, and whether they can be effective as peacekeepers.\n\nStrohecker wrote prior to American involvement in Afghanistan and Iraq, and his focus was particularly on the use of private armies and mercenaries in Africa and in the Balkans. Sometimes the line separating mercenary from military has been tenuous. In the Balkans the Americans supported contractors, often retired military, working for the U.S. Government to train the new militaries as new nations split off from the former Yugoslavia, and internal strife spread. In Africa, private concerns were hired by beleaguered governments to shore up their fragile control. Some of these mercenaries were considered thugs, and some were considered military professionals, hiring themselves out much as the contractors were in the Balkans. Strohecker wrote prior to American involvement in Afghanistan and Iraq, and his focus was particularly on the use of private armies and mercenaries in Africa and in the Balkans. Sometimes the line separating mercenary from military has been tenuous. In the Balkans the Americans supported contractors, often retired military, working for the U.S. Government to train the new militaries as new nations split off from the former Yugoslavia, and internal strife spread. In Africa, private concerns were hired by beleaguered governments to shore up their fragile control. Some of these mercenaries were considered thugs, and some were considered military professionals, hiring themselves out much as the contractors were in the Balkans. This study evaluates PMCs to determine their potential effectiveness in a peacekeeping role. Three industry leaders are examined: Executive Outcomes\n(EO) of South Africa, Sandline International of Britain, and Military Professional Resources Inc. (MPRI) from the United States. Study results indicate that although PMCs maintain several unique and useful capabilities, their role in peacekeeping/peace enforcement operations will be limited.\n\nThis study evaluates PMCs to determine their potential effectiveness in a peacekeeping role. Three industry leaders are examined: Executive Outcomes\n(EO) of South Africa, Sandline International of Britain, and Military Professional Resources Inc. (MPRI) from the United States. Study results indicate that although PMCs maintain several unique and useful capabilities, their role in peacekeeping/peace enforcement operations will be limited.\n\n Such manpower problems were not limited to the Afghanistan campaign. The after-action review for 3rd Infantry Division during the initial stages of Operation IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF) noted critical shortages of intelligence personnel, observing that units \"did not have suffi cient capability to man an enemy prisoner of war cage, to surge collection, or conduct general support operations, or provide experienced and comprehensive analysis and guidance to operational teams.\"48 These manpower shortages caused signifi cant delays in the tactical screening and interrogation of detainees during the early stages of the occupation. A separate OEF study group similarly observed that the \"demand for linguists (interrogators, interpreters, voice intercepts, document exploiters) continues to signifi cantly exceeded [sic] supply.\"49 Additionally, investigations of the Abu Ghraib abuse incidents made specifi c mention of acute shortages of personnel trained for human intelligence collection and analysis, noting that the \"lack of manning provided signifi cant challenges due to the increased mission work load and the environment.\"50\nOutside of the OEF and OIF theaters, soon after detainees began arriving at the Joint Detention Facility in Guantanamo Bay, several contracts were awarded to supplement intelligence operations, including linguist support, interrogation, document exploitation, and analytical functions. An on-site linguist contract manager observed that, \"the military just did not have enough personnel and couldn't keep them there long enough to take advantage of their experience, so contractors had to be hired to supplement the shortages.\"51\nAlthough GWOT operations have exacerbated intelligence personnel shortfalls, even routine, non-contingency operations have made extensive use of contract support in recent years. A 2003 General Accounting Offi ce report on DoD management procedures evaluated the use of contractors for analytical and linguistic support to intelligence operations in the Balkans and found that missions such as \"Task Force Eagle in Bosnia relies on contracted linguistic and intelligence analyst services... [and] if the contracted services were lost, it would mean an immediate critical loss would occur for the military because DoD does not have service personnel with these skills.\"52  A U.S. Army Europe Contracting Offi cer Representative concurred with this fi nding, stating that \"for watch jobs and other tactical-MI type jobs, we just don't have the soldiers we need to fi ll all the vacancies and had to contract the positions out.\"53\nWhile DoD has used commercial contracting primarily to mitigate critical personnel shortages, there are other considerations that make private sector augmentation operationally advantageous in certain circumstances. One issue is the challenge of active duty \"force caps\" in some operational environments. In the Balkans for example, NATO-imposed force structure limitations required that DoD supplement active duty forces with signifi cant numbers of civilian contract personnel to avoid host country legal restrictions on external military forces. Generally speaking, contract personnel do not count against the force structure caps imposed against active duty soldiers.54 The use of commercial contracting has enabled DoD to effectively \"outsource\" certain lower priority intelligence missions such as the Balkans while reserving the active duty force for more pressing contingency operations.\n\nreports/2004/800-mp-bde.htm>, accessed 2 May 2005.\n\n51 All general conclusions drawn from analysis of questionnaire responses will be hereafter cited as Operational Questionnaire. Identifi cation of individual respondents is cited as necessary. The names of some questionnaire respondents have been withheld upon request. A sample of the operational questionnaire can be found in the appendix from Voelz, *Managing the Private Spies*.\n\n52 Government Accountability Offi ce, Military Operations: Contractors Provide Vital Services to Deployed Forces but are Not Adequately Addressed in DOD Plans, GAO-03-695 (June 2003), 18, URL:\n<http://www.gao.gov/highlights/d03695high.pdf>, accessed 13 October 2004. Contracting Offi cer Representative for the U.S. Army Europe G2. Operational questionnaire conducted by author, November 2004.\n\nThe majority of respondents for this study indicated that their organizations used contractor support primarily to supplement shortages of government personnel rather than to augment for non-organic skills.55 In most cases contract personnel performed similar intelligence functions as their uniformed and civil service counterparts. This fact makes intelligence contracting unique as compared to other types of military outsourcing. Over the past decade much of the commercial privatization of logistical, transportation, and support functions was intended to entirely divest the active force structure of certain sustainment activities. Rather than serving as a supplement to active force capability, support contractors have fully taken over functions considered non-core war-fi ghting tasks such as meal preparation, laundry services, and routine logistics. Conversely, most intelligence-related contracting has been used to mitigate personnel shortfalls in core-skill area tasks, including some of the most mission-critical collection and analytical functions.\n\n## Dealing With A Complex Threat Environment\n\nA second factor encouraging the use of commercial augmentation has been the urgent demand for highly-specialized skills for collection and analysis against unconventional threats in peripheral regions. The dilemma of managing intelligence assets for a diverse and unpredictable range of contingencies has been a subject of concern for some time.\n\nThe 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review articulated this challenge, noting that \"the United States cannot predict with a high degree of confi dence the identity of the countries or the actors that may threaten its interests or security.\"56 Emerging threat scenarios of the past decade have extended far beyond the traditional intelligence focus on statebased confl ict and now encompass a diverse range of issues such as terrorism, weapons proliferation, trans-national crime, piracy, genocide, ethnic confl ict, environmental and resource disputes, and threats from pandemic disease and bio-warfare. As one intelligence community reform advocate explained, \"in the age of constant surprise and impossibleto-anticipate mutations of the threat, no bureaucracy can be effective.\"57\nAn important advantage of commercial augmentation is that it can provide bureaucratic organizations with the fl exibility to rapidly transform static organic capabilities by providing unique skills-sets for unanticipated requirements. Intelligence reform advocates Bruce Berkowitz and Allan Goodman have suggested that such market-based approaches are a preferred solution for satisfying unpredictable operational needs, noting that The intelligence community needs at least as much fl exibility as private corporations. Many of its requirements for specialized information are likely to change quickly. Traditional civil service tenure is probably suited only for employees with the most general, long-term skills....Intelligence organizations still need to be able to \"surge\" and add additional personnel on short-notice, but now the requirement has changed greatly. Today, surge capacity is needed not just to add more people with the same skills to handle a greater volume of work, but to fi nd and add people with different skills to meet rapidly changing requirements for analysis.58\nBerkowitz and Goodman suggest that a modernized intelligence personnel system must have capability to rapidly augment permanent staff with outside expertise that can be bought \"by the pound\" to help satisfy specifi c, short-term requirements.\n\nSeveral intelligence reform studies during the 1990s also urged the development of personnel management systems designed for rapid, ad hoc integration of nongovernmental resources for response to unanticipated crises. The 1996 Council on Foreign Relations task force on intelligence reform noted that \"analysis would be improved by increasing the fl ow of talented people into the intelligence community from outside the government.\"59 Such programs would provide a fl exible resource of non-governmental professional, academic, and subject-matter experts who could provide threat-focused expertise for short-term need. A key fi nding of the 1996 Aspin- Brown commission on intelligence reform called for a greater use of \"substantive experts outside the Intelligence Community\" as a tool for improving the quality of analytical products.60\nTo implement such a strategy, Robert David Steele, a noted open-source intelligence advocate, has called for the creation of a network of \"intelligence minutemen\" from outside the government bureaucracy - individuals mobilized for work on short-term intelligence projects or in response to unique operational requirements. To obtain the best tools for intelligence analysis, Steele suggests that \"the center of gravity for both national security and national prosperity lie now in the private sector and its intellectual property.\"61\nIn recent years, commercial contracting has been the primary tool by which intelligence organizations have developed this ad hoc adaptation capability to quickly leverage specifi c skills or expertise. The clearest articulation of this approach appears in the Army Language Master Plan, which explicitly states that \"training resources do not permit preparing military staff for a wide variety of unknown and hard-toforecast small-scale confl icts. With limited resources ... the balance of the Army's small-scale confl ict needs could be met with contract translators and interpreters.\"62 In the GWOT, short-term contracting has clearly become the primary mechanism by which intelligence organizations have built strategic fl exibility for unforeseen collection and analytical requirements.\n\nCommercial augmentation has permitted intelligence organizations to rapidly recalibrate their human capital base to meet changing analytical demands. Whereas the traditional Cold-War era intelligence bureaucracy focused primarily on technical collection and order of battle analysis, counter-insurgency operations in Iraq and Afghanistan have placed a premium on human intelligence, counter-intelligence, interrogation, and language specialists. But a 2002 GAO report on government foreign language resources noted signifi cant shortfalls in Army linguists qualifi ed as translators, interpreters, cryptologic specialists, and human intelligence collectors.63 The Intelligence Community has been critically short of these \"cultural intelligence\" skill-sets since the beginning of GWOT operations. The U.S. Army Central Command after-action review of OEF operations noted that \"unconventional, distributed warfare placed higher than normal demand on Human Intelligence, which is not resourced at the tactical level.\"64 The report found that \"the mission of screening and interrogating large numbers of important detainees demanded native-profi ciencylevel linguists in order to perceive cultural nuance, understand a variety of dialects, and accurately understand acquired information. The most effective means of acquiring native linguists was through contracting.\"65\nShortages of these critical-skill personnel have introduced signifi cant operational risk for U.S. operations in the GWOT. A recent Army investigation of operations at Abu Ghraib noted that \"as commanders at all levels sought operational intelligence, it became apparent that the intelligence structure was undermanned, under-equipped, and inappropriately organized for counter-insurgency operations....Technical intelligence collection means alone were insuffi cient in providing the requisite information on an enemy that had adapted to the environment and to a high-tech opponent.\"66\nThe rigidity of the Cold War era force structure has created a bureaucracy illequipped to rapidly adapt to changing intelligence requirements. As Steele suggests, \"intelligence community leadership is going to have to come to grips with the reality that most of the experts are going to be in the private sector and only available 'by the task' rather than as full-time employees.\"67 Until the intelligence bureaucracy is reformed to permit more fl exible market-based management, the ad hoc use of contract support will continue to be the primary mechanism for acquiring short-term augmentation of highly needed skills.\n\n## Integrating Advanced Technical And Analytical Tools\n\nA less-mentioned but increasingly important factor encouraging the use of nongovernmental augmentation is the fact of disproportionately rapid advances in commercial sector processing tools and analytical technology. A basic presumption of Cold War era intelligence was that government held a substantial edge in research and development of advanced collection and analytical systems. But over the past decade this advantage has largely eroded and - according to some - entirely vanished. This disparity is particularly true for high-end technical services such as communications networks, processing tools, automated population of databases, and distributed web-based dissemination - all areas where the private sector has considerably more capability than the legacy systems currently used by most intelligence organizations. As Berkowitz and Goodman have noted in their study on intelligence reform, \"the commercial sector will frequently have technology superior to that of government-bound intelligence organizations, and it will almost always be better in developing products and services, and delivering them quickly to users. In some cases, the commercial sector will also have better information.\"68\nSeveral recent examples demonstrate the extent to which private corporations have acquired advanced analytical tools that now exceed the capability of government systems. ChoicePoint Inc. is one such innovator in the fi eld of data processing and analysis that has found considerable work supporting government intelligence and security operations. As company vice president James A. Zimbardi explained, \"we do act as an intelligence agency, gathering data, applying analytics.\"69 Generally, the private sector is far ahead of government in developing tools for parsing open-source records, conducting automated database population, using identity verifi cation and advanced biometrics tools, computational linguistics and translation, and data-based mapping techniques. Additionally, companies such as LexisNexis Group have found a niche in providing powerful public records processing technology to assist in the analysis of voluminous amounts of non-classifi ed data.70\nSteele also notes that in recent years the Intelligence Community has generally\n\"failed to keep up with private sector advances in data visualization and organizational memory systems or in advances in collaborative work tools, information communication, and automated monitoring of online and internal information.\"71 In order to maintain the most up-to-date technology, the government must essentially become a \"customer\" of private sector providers. But generally, intelligence organizations have been slow to exploit the best commercial technologies. With the exception of quasi-governmental organizations such as In-Q-Tel, the community experienced high-profi le security breaches of their corporate databases. Concern over data security is a major unresolved issue that must be addressed as the government pursues public-private partnerships for intelligence. Certainly there are numerous, legitimate counterintelligence concerns as government relies has not aggressively sought the integration of commercial off-the-shelf technologies into its collection and analysis capabilities.72\nGiven current trends, it is unlikely that governmental intelligence organizations will ever regain a monopoly on the development of the most advanced technical tools, but Steele suggests that these resources may be exploited by developing \"a process for leveraging private sector commercial fee-for-service offerings.\"73 In fact, many commercialization advocates assert that certain \"open source\" functions may be better performed by the private sector than by government agencies. This might include such functions as wide-area surveillance, remote sensing, foreign broadcast transcription and translation, document exploitation, and Internet database exploitation. In many cases the technological capabilities and organizational structure of private sector providers are far better suited for performing these highly technical tasks than are governmental intelligence organizations.\n\nParticularly in the area of open source (OSINT) collection and processing, the government's best option may be to rely entirely on commercial providers while using dedicated organic resources only for the most diffi cult or sensitive tasks. One often used statistic is that 80 percent of useful intelligence information comes from \"open sources.\"74 OSINT advocates have long asserted that private enterprise should play a larger role in collection and analysis of these data. The thrust of their argument is that private enterprise is far better equipped with cutting-edge technology to collect, manage, and interpret large amounts of unformatted data. A recent article on OSINT processing argued that the \"Intelligence Community must organize its own technical resources and tap those of the private sector to exploit the latest technology for OSINT collection, analysis, production, and dissemination... [in order to] benefi t from smarter search engines, enhanced machine-assisted translation software, and better tools for incorporating audio and video streams into intelligence reports.\"75\nLikewise, many privatization advocates claim that the commercial sector is far better equipped to deal with the challenges of the new threat paradigm. Traditional military intelligence methodologies, with their focus on order of battle analysis, indications and warnings, and threat-based technical measures, are unable to gather the information needed to fi ght trans-national terrorism and other unconventional threats. For counterterrorism intelligence analysis much of the most useful information is likely to come from collection on fi nancial transactions, web-based communications, and analysis more active role in identifying and acquiring commercial technologies that could be effectively integrated into collection and analytical processes. Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction, Washington DC: GPO (31 March 2005), 326. URL: < http://www.\n\nstate.gov/t/np/rls/fs/29153.htm>. accessed 15 March 2005.\n\nof large volumes of unformatted and often unclassifi ed text and data. The advanced processing techniques needed for this type of collection and analysis is more highly refi ned in the day-to-day business of private sector enterprise.\n\nDon Goldstein, a technology researcher at the Institute for Defense Analysis, notes that commercial enterprise is generally far ahead of government in applying the automated, data processing techniques needed for counter-terrorism analysis.76 The fi nancial community in particular is better equipped to use analytical techniques for parsing large amounts of unformatted data, using automated information extraction methods, and conducting advanced link analysis. Private enterprise also leads in the development of new techniques for computational linguistics and machine automated translation that will be critical for cataloging and analyzing vast amounts of unformatted data from written and digital records. Very few governmental intelligence organizations will be capable of capitalizing on these specialized tools without the signifi cant integration of commercial support. Looking to the future of cutting edge analytical and processing tools, Goldstein notes, \"Google is the best thing out there.\" In order to meet the critical information needs of policymakers and military commanders, the Intelligence Community will increasingly need to exploit the best tools, technology, and services of private providers.\n\n## The Legal And Regulatory Environment For Commercialized Intelligence Augmentation\n\nSince the Revolutionary War era the U.S. government has made extensive use of private interests for the purpose of gathering and analyzing intelligence data, but governmental transformations of the last decade have brought a signifi cant expansion of the role that private enterprise plays in the collection, analysis, and production of intelligence information. This process has been encouraged by legislative and regulatory changes that have signifi cantly liberalized acquisition and procurement law and facilitated the entry of private enterprise into intelligence fi elds.\n\nThe legal precedents for contracting intelligence support services are clearly outlined in existing statutes and regulations. Executive Order 12333 provides intelligence agencies with broad authority to \"enter into contracts or arrangements for the provision of goods or services with private companies or institutions,\" and to conceal the sponsorship of these contracts for security purposes.77 These general contracting powers extend to military commanders by Title 10 of the U.S. Code and provide the Secretary of Defense with the authority to engage in commercial activities for support of intelligence-related collection activities abroad.78\nDespite these clear authorities, acquisition law and regulation remains somewhat vague on how such commercial enterprises should be employed and monitored. With the signifi cant expansion of commercial intelligence augmentation in support of GWOT operations, several key elements of contract law have recently come under increased scrutiny. Legal issues relating to the performance of inherently government functions, the use of personal services contracts, and legal oversight of contract personnel have all come into question as the IC has rapidly expanded private sector augmentation.\n\n## Inherently Governmental Functions\n\nAlthough the basic authority for the government to contract for intelligence services is clear, ambiguities in government acquisition policy leave many specifi cs open to broad interpretation. One of the most debated issues concerning intelligence contracting has been the policy regarding defi nitions of \"inherently governmental functions.\" For general government contracting, the statutory reference for commercial activities is Offi ce of Management and Budget (OMB) Circular A-76. This document sets forth guidelines for determining \"inherently governmental functions\" that must be performed only by federal employees. In general, those activities related to \"the act of governing\"\nand \"intimately related to the public interest\" are withheld from commercial activity.79 As described in OMB Circular A-76, these activities include the management of Government programs requiring value judgments, as in direction of the national defense; management and direction of the Armed Services; activities performed exclusively by military personnel who are subject to deployment in a combat support or combat service support role...[and the] direction of intelligence and counter-intelligence operations.80\nThough seemingly clear, the interpretation of this statute has been a matter of some debate within Congress, DoD, and among intelligence professionals.\n\nIn August of 2000, the Assistant Secretary of the Army attempted to clarify this restriction. At that time a determination was made to draw legal distinctions for different levels of war, fi nding that \"at the tactical level, the intelligence functions and the operational control of the Army performed by military in the operating forces is an inherently governmental function barred from private sector performance.\"81\nBut the memorandum stipulated that \"at the operational and strategic level, the intelligence function performed by military personnel and federal civilian employees is a non-inherently governmental function that should be exempted from private sector performance on the basis of risk to national security from relying on contractors to perform this function.\"82\nThis decision left open the possibility of the use of contract employees for nontactical functions but cited legal and security concerns, noting that the contract administration oversight exerted over contractors is very different from the command and control exerted over military and civilian employees. Therefore, reliance on private contractors poses risks to maintaining adequate civilian oversight of intelligence operations. Civilian oversight over intelligence operations and technologies is essential to assure intelligence operations are conducted with adequate security safeguards, and within the scope of law and direction of the authorized chain of command and offi cials.83\nThe equivocal wording of the policy ultimately left open the possibility of private sector providers \"to be used to facilitate the gathering or interpretation of intelligence information, in circumstances where contractors are the sole source of a particular capability.\"84\nAssistant Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence,\" 26 December 2000, 1\n82 Henry, 2. 83 Henry, 2. 84 Henry, 2\nWith the enormous intelligence demands related to GWOT operations, the policies governing private sector involvement have been broadly interpreted within DoD. Since 9/11, signifi cant shortfalls of intelligence personnel have led to the extensive use of contract employees for intelligence operations in Bosnia, Afghanistan, Iraq, and Guantanamo Bay. Compounding this policy dilemma, many contract employees are operating in environments where the distinctions between levels of war are either vague or entirely irrelevant. A clear example of the blurring of these lines was seen in the much-publicized use of contract interrogators at the Abu Ghraib detention facility in Iraq. In that setting, contract employees were performing similar tactical-level interrogation tasks as their uniformed counterparts. The subsequent Army investigation noted that \"the general policy of not contracting for intelligence functions and services was designed in part to avoid many of the problems that eventually developed at Abu Ghraib.\"85\nThe fallout from the incidents at Abu Ghraib has led to some reconsideration of the defi nitions of \"inherently governmental\" operational intelligence functions. A recent memorandum from the Army G-2 (Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence) clarifi ed this distinction for the conduct of counter-intelligence operations.86 The revised policy clearly defi nes the \"direction and control\" of CI operations as an inherently governmental function but leaves open several potential activities to commercial providers, including translation/interpretation, analysis, data input, and the production of CI related products.\n\nIn the aftermath of the Abu Ghraib revelations, the issue of contractors performing critical security and intelligence functions also gained attention in Congress. In April 2004, Senator Christopher Dodd (D-CT) was joined by several other senate Democrats expressing concern that private military fi rms were performing \"securityrelated functions\" but that \"these companies remain largely unregulated.\"87 Dodd sent an open letter to the U.S. Comptroller requesting a GAO report on the use, regulation, oversight, and accountability of contract personnel performing operational intelligence and security-related tasks in forward-deployed combat locations.\n\nLater in June Dodd proposed an amendment to bar the use of civilian contractors as military interrogators.88 The Senate voted against the amendment along party lines (54-43) but even some Republicans voting against the measure expressed their concern over the increasing role of private contractors working in sensitive intelligence related operations. Senator John McCain (R-AZ), stated \"ultimately, I believe that interrogations and other functions should be conducted by uniformed personnel, working directly for the United States government and subject to the web of rules that governs military personnel.\"89\nThe issue reemerged in the 2005 Defense Authorization Act. The fi nal legislation included language requiring the Secretary of Defense to report on DoD management practices for contractor personnel supporting deployed forces. Among the specifi c items addressed in the amendment was the establishment of categories of intelligence functions considered inherently governmental and those that \"although not inherently governmental functions, should not ordinarily be performed by contractors.\"90 A fi nal determination of DoD policy on these activities is forthcoming. One positive aspect of the recent controversy will presumably be some clarifi cation of the operational boundaries for deployed contractors performing these intelligence related activities.\n\n## Personal Services Contracting\n\nAnother area of concern relating to contract law and intelligence support is the expanding use of personal services contracting.91 Functions considered \"personal services\" are those contracts that create an employer-employee type relationship between the contractor personnel and government supervisor. They often include services that are applied directly in support of an organization's integral functions, any services requiring direct supervision to ensure adequate protection of government interest, or the performance of services directly comparable to that of permanent civil service personnel.92 Under most circumstances there are strict statutory restrictions on the government's use of these contract types.\n\nAn analysis of the intelligence support functions currently performed by many commercial providers suggests that most of these contracts are in fact providing \"personal services,\" but various exceptions to acquisition law have permitted their use. The Federal Acquisition Regulation provides for the case-by-case short-term contracting of \"individual experts or consultants\" in place of civil servants.93 Furthermore, many of the contracts for intelligence rose from 31 to 51 percent. Steven L. Schooner, \"Contractor Atrocities at Abu Ghraib: Compromised Accountability in a Streamlined, Outsourced Government\" *Stanford Law and Policy Review 16*, no. 2 (2005).\n\nAbstract available at URL: *<http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=605367>*, accessed 23 November 2004.\n\n92 For the case of DoD, this refers to civilian personnel governed under U.S. Code Title 10. 93 FAR, Chapter 37.104 (f) states, that \"Personal services contracts for the services of individual experts or consultants are limited by the Classifi cation Act. In addition, the Offi ce of Personnel Management has established requirements which apply in acquiring the personal services of experts or consultants in this manner.\"\nsupport have been written for services performed outside the United States, which provides other exceptions to domestic acquisition regulation. A recent FAR rule change has granted DoD much greater latitude in using these contract types, now permitting \"personal services contracts to be performed outside the United States or that directly support the mission of a DoD intelligence or counter-intelligence organization.\"94\nLegislative changes in acquisition law have come about in part to help DoD contend with critical shortages of intelligence personnel. The Senate Intelligence committee report on the 2004 Intelligence Authorization bill specifi cally cited the need for greater liberalization of contract authority in order for DoD to meet the unanticipated intelligence demands of the Global War on Terror, noting that Intelligence Community elements of DoD frequently have a temporary need for additional personnel with specifi c expertise to meet unanticipated, yet signifi cant, operational requirements that necessitate a bolstering of organizational and personnel efforts created by world events. Current examples include experts on al-Qa'ida, the countries of the Middle East, chemical and biological warfare, and Islamic militant personalities, along with linguists to support interrogation of detainees and review of captured documents. Under current law, U.S. Government agencies generally must choose between hiring additional personnel as government employees or contracting for their services under the restrictive provisions for the temporary or intermittent employment of experts and consultants under section 3109 of title 5, United States Code. The Committee provides relief from these more restrictive authorities by granting authority for Intelligence Community elements of DoD to award personal services contracts notwithstanding any other provision of law....This provision will optimize the capabilities of Intelligence Community elements of DoD in the performance of their roles in the global war on terrorism and in the execution of future national security missions.95\nWhile this liberalization of contract authority certainly helps to bolster shortterm capabilities beyond resources available within the permanent civil service, this type of contracting vehicle does present added challenges for contract management. As commercial providers increasingly fulfi ll an employee-like relationship to the government there is a much greater burden for close contract management by the operational chain of command. Even with personal services contracts there are signifi cant limitations governing the manner in which contract personnel are managed and supervised. Intelligence leaders are increasingly challenged by operational environments in which employees are subject to varying standards of conduct, accountability, and legal responsibility. This is particularly true since military commanders may possess far different legal authority in dealing with contract employees than government intelligence personnel. These supervisory challenges are important considerations as leaders consider the extent to which private sector services will be integrated into forward-deployed operational capabilities.\n\n## Legal Oversight\n\nIn addition to questions over inherently governmental functions and the use of personnel services contracts, there are important considerations regarding the legal oversight and jurisdiction over contract intelligence support. Previous legal decisions have challenged UCMJ jurisdiction over civilians in peacetime overseas environments. Generally these exceptions have been extended to government contractors thereby restricting the use of disciplinary trials by courts-martial and use of other non-judicial punishment.96\nTheoretically, the Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act (MEJA) places military contractors operating overseas under clear U.S. legal jurisdiction, but the incidents at Abu Ghraib have highlighted some important limitations of this law. Several of the contracts for intelligence support in Iraq were not awarded under DoD contracting authority and therefore not be subject to the MEJA.97 Furthermore, the MEJA only applies to U.S. citizens and at least two of the linguist contractors implicated in the abuse incidents at Abu Ghraib were non-U.S. citizens and therefore exempt from prosecution under the law. In the case of Iraq, the Coalition Provisional Authority also has an agreement with the interim Iraq government granting immunity to private contractors from prosecution under local law.\n\nThe combination of overlapping authorities has highlighted several defi ciencies in the MEJA recently raised in congressional debate over private contract support for coalition forces in Iraq. Responding to these concerns in May of 2004, Congressman Marty Meehan (D-MA) introduced the Contractor Accountability Act intended to tighten the government's jurisdiction over contractors working for the U.S. government overseas.98 Meehan, a member of both the House Armed Services and the Judiciary Committees, has been a vocal critic of the Iraq war and repeatedly called for strengthening accountability of DoD contractors and improving interrogation policies in light of the Abu Ghraib incidents. Although the exact language of Meehan's amendment was not included as part of the 2005 Defense Authorization Act, several additional provisions on contractor oversight were included in the fi nal legislation. The revised bill appears to have corrected the previous defi ciencies and now extends the MEJA to contractor employees working for all federal agencies supporting DoD missions overseas.99\nAlthough a strengthened MEJA should resolve clear-cut cases of criminal conduct with contract employees, there still is some concern over what powers a commander may utilize for corrective punishment and matters of non-criminal order and discipline. Contract employees are generally subject only to the terms and conditions of the contract language. In most cases this excludes contractors from UCMJ and non-judicial punishments that military commanders regularly apply to active duty soldiers and some deployed civil service employees. This exercise of command prerogative is even more critical for leaders directing combat operations or dealing with the performance of sensitive intelligence functions. The Army investigation of Abu Ghraib specifi cally cited the liability associated with limitations of such traditional command powers:\nPerforming the interrogation function in-house with government employees has several tangible benefi ts. It enables the Army more readily to manage the function if all personnel are directly and clearly subject to the chain of command, and other administrative and/or criminal sanctions, and it allows the function to be directly accessible by the commander/supervisor without going through a Contracting Offi cer Representative.100\nThe circumstances at Abu Ghraib are not unique. Several individuals interviewed for this study noted similar examples of ambiguities in legal status for deployed nongovernmental employees and frequent uncertainty as to the authority of the chain of command over contractors. A 2003 GAO report on DoD contract management procedures reinforced this fi nding. This review of overseas support contracts found signifi cant inconsistencies in contract language pertaining to the general discipline of contractor personnel, adherence to force protection requirements, and enforcement of published General Orders.101 These fi ndings highlight the pressing need for clear legal authority over contractors serving intelligence support missions. Ambiguous legal guidelines in contract language could be a particular liability for intelligence support personnel who may be subject to unique security, counter-intelligence, and force protection requirements.\n\nRecent rules changes in the applicable Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation\n(DFAR) have attempted to clarify some of these authorities, stipulating that contract employees are required to comply with U.S. and host-country law, as well as applicable treaties and international agreements. Likewise, a DFAR revision explicitly states that contractors must comply with all \"orders, directives, and instructions issued by the Combatant Commander relating to force protection, security, health, safety or relations and interactions with local nationals.\"102 The new rules also reinforce the existing authority of Contracting Offi cers to direct vendors to remove any personnel \"who jeopardize or interfere with mission accomplishment.\"103 Although this authority was established by previous regulation, several commanders involved with incidents of contractor misconduct at Abu Ghraib were apparently unaware of such authorities for dealing with violations by contract employees.\n\n## Other Legal Considerations\n\nThe previous discussion described just a few of the important legal issues relating to the management of commercial intelligence augmentation but several other potential concerns have not yet been suffi ciently addressed. As private corporations rush to provide support to intelligence and security operations there remain signifi cant questions concerning the control, retention, use, and proliferation of proprietary intelligence information that contractors may acquire while working for government organizations.\n\nThe Law of Armed Confl ict clearly establishes the concept of state monopoly on the application of deadly force but is less clear on how the government can extend such authority over the control of sensitive intelligence information. Of particular concern is how unmonitored subcontractors might potentially take their acquired knowledge to other commercial ventures or even to foreign employment. For many intelligence support contracts there appear to be few mechanisms for monitoring the use of proprietary data and knowledge after contract termination. These concerns also extend to the potential collection and retention of sensitive data on U.S. persons and foreign citizens by private fi rms. As Sen. Patrick Leahy (D-VT) observed in a recent public statement on the need for improved regulation of intelligence service providers, \"new technologies, new private-pubic domestic security partnerships, and the rapid rise of giant information brokers...have all combined to produce powerful new threats to privacy.\"104 Leahy noted that under current contract law and regulation \"very little is known about the integrity and handling of this information, and there are insuffi cient rules and oversight to protect public privacy.\"105\nAnother issue of potential legal concern is the status of intelligence contractors under international law. Commercial contractors are now involved in nearly every stage of the intelligence cycle, including critical collection management and technical analysis functions, yet the status of non-uniformed contract personnel remains somewhat unclear under international law.\n\n2005). URL: <http://frwebgate1.access.gpo.gov/cgibin/waisgate.cgi?WAISdocID=00205819834+0+0+0 &WAISaction=retrieve>, accessed 11 May 2005.\n\n103 \"Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement; Contractor Personnel Supporting a Force Deployed Outside the United States,\" 48 CFR Part 252.225-7040 (h).\n\n104 Roman Kupchinsky, \"*Information Revolution Feeds Alternative Intelligence Market*,'' Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 23 May 2005, URL: <http://www.rferl.org/featuresarticle/2005/05/e1dc62e7-504a- 4abb-a61f-008f7167bfab.html>, accessed 3 June 2005.\n\n105 Kupchinsky.\n\nGenerally speaking, civilians accompanying armed forces in declared wars are considered non-combatants but entitled to protected status as prisoners of war in case of capture. Contract employees are not entitled to take part in \"hostilities\" but may still be held liable under international law for participation in acts later determined to be war crimes. The DFAR stipulates that contract personnel \"shall not undertake any role that would jeopardize their status [as a non-combatant]\" and \"shall not use force or otherwise directly participate in acts likely to cause actual harm to enemy armed forces.\"106 This restriction may be clear enough for functions such as logistics but is somewhat more ambiguous for private contractors supporting operational intelligence functions. This ambiguity leaves open signifi cant questions regarding the personal liability of contractors performing intelligence functions that directly support interrogations, security operations, or offensive targeting decisions.107\nThere also remains some question as to the potential liability of the fi rms employing contract workers accused of criminal misconduct. There are currently two civil suits fi led on behalf of several Iraqi detainees against Titan Corporation and CACI, fi rms supplying contract interrogators at Abu Ghraib.108 One of the cases was fi led by the widow of a detainee who died in custody following an interrogation by a contract employee at the detention facility. The outcome of these cases may have signifi cant impact on the manner in which civilian contractors may be employed for future intelligence support missions.\n\nA fi nal concern is the matter of values. Certainly, great public trust and expectation are granted to intelligence professionals serving the public interest and protecting the nation's critical security operations. It is reasonable to consider whether private entrepreneurs may be expected to adhere to similar systems of values and conduct. A \"duty concept\" cannot easily be codifi ed into contract language, nor can an implicit ethical system be easily enforced through acquisition law. A basic question that must be considered by policymakers is whether the institutional values guiding the intelligence profession are consistent with the profi t motives of private corporations whose interests necessarily refl ect those of private shareholders. This inquiry does not presuppose a lack of dedication or values on the part of individual contractors but it does suggest some inherent risks associated with relying upon private corporations for critical intelligence functions.\n\nThese issues suggest that many critical questions regarding the use of contract intelligence support remain unanswered. Complex legal, regulatory, and ethical issues have yet to be suffi ciently addressed by policymakers, particularly as commercial activities become even more integrated into all aspects of intelligence operations.\n\n## Evaluative Framework For Commercialized Intelligence Augmentation\n\nIn order for Community leaders to make appropriate determinations concerning the use of commercial augmentation for intelligence support functions, careful consideration must be given to the suitability of private sector involvement. For operational needs to be satisfi ed and public interest adequately protected there must be assurance that certain baseline performance criteria can be met within the terms of the contract partnership. The following framework is offered to assist Intelligence Community leaders in decisions regarding the applicability of integrating commercial services into an organization's operational functions. These evaluative criteria are not intended to be a defi nitive guideline for determining the suitability of commercial integration but serve to highlight some fundamental elements that are necessary for the effective integration and management of commercial augmentation programs.\n\nThis framework offers some baseline evaluative criteria in three general areas:\nthe acceptability of private sector involvement, the suitability of vendor services, and accountability of contract management procedures. Each of these criteria must be satisfi ed to ensure the effective use of commercial augmentation. As demonstrated in the following case studies, shortfalls in any aspect of this framework can lead to ineffective integration of commercial services, poor contract administration, and compromise of government interest. Careful consideration of these criteria is necessary to establish an effective partnership between government and private sector providers.\n\n## Proposed Evaluative Criteria For Determining The Applicability Of Commercialized Intelligence Augmentation Acceptability Of Private Sector Involvement\n\nAcceptability of Private Sector Involvement\n\n\n\nContract service does not perform inherently governmental functions. Contract administration adheres to proper solicitation and award procedures. Contract service does not undermine operational security. Vendor offers a best value alternative (including price and performance standards).\nContract service does not perform inherently governmental functions. Contract administration adheres to proper solicitation and award procedures. Contract service does not undermine operational security. Vendor offers a best value alternative (including price and performance standards).\n\n## Suitability Of Vendor Services\n\nSuitability of Vendor Services\n\n\n\nVendor offers unique services or products unavailable in the public sector. Vendor offers scalability of service and fl exible output to meet mission requirements. Contract is negotiated in a mature market environment with in-sector competition. Bidder offers past performance record and known reliability.\n\nVendor offers unique services or products unavailable in the public sector. Vendor offers scalability of service and fl exible output to meet mission requirements. Contract is negotiated in a mature market environment with in-sector competition. Bidder offers past performance record and known reliability.\n\n## Accountability Of Contract Management Procedures\n\nAccountability of Contract Management Procedures\n\n\n\nContract language offers clear legal oversight and accountability measures. Contract offers clear Statement of Work (SOW) and evaluation procedures. Contract provides effective integration plan and clear performance measures. Government possesses suffi ciently trained, on-site contract management\npersonnel.\nContract language offers clear legal oversight and accountability measures. Contract offers clear Statement of Work (SOW) and evaluation procedures. Contract provides effective integration plan and clear performance measures. Government possesses suffi ciently trained, on-site contract management personnel.\n\n## Evaluating Public-Private Intelligence Partnerships: Selected Case Studies\n\nThe following case studies refl ect recent experiments with public-private intelligence support partnerships. These examples demonstrate a broad range of commercialization initiatives currently used within the Intelligence Community.\n\nThese examples are by no means an exhaustive list of intelligence privatization programs. They offer a broad overview of various commercialization efforts and test the utility of the evaluative framework by demonstrating the challenges associated with developing and administering effective contractual relationships with private sector providers.109\n\n## Privatized Personnel Security Investigations\n\nOne of the most important elements of the nation's counterintelligence effort is the investigation and screening of government employees and contractors. Traditionally, these investigative services have been performed by trained government agents employed by the Offi ce of Personnel Management (OPM) and the Defense Security Service (DSS). The DSS conducts the majority of the clearance investigations for Department of Defense civilian employees, military service members, and Pentagon contractors.\n\nLike other DoD organizations during the 1990s, the DSS experienced signifi cant staffi ng reductions amounting to a 40 percent overall cut in personnel levels in the decade after 1989.110 This personnel drawdown led to increasing backlogs of security investigations and growing concerns over the effectiveness of the nation's counterintelligence program in the wake of several high-profi le espionage cases during the 1990s. Responding to this crisis in 1996, the Deputy Secretary of Defense directed the use of commercial augmentation to improve effi ciency and quality of investigations and reduce backlogged caseload. As part of this program, OPM initiated a privatization initiative through the establishment of the U.S. Investigation Services (USIS), an Employee Stock Ownership Corporation chartered to conduct personnel security investigations on behalf of the government.\n\nThis privatization effort was intended to infuse greater fl exibility into the investigative labor pool, achieve savings through reductions in civil service benefi ts, and bring greater effi ciency through commercial automation.111 The fi nal clearance adjudication process was retained as a strictly governmental function within DSS and OPM but much of the investigative work was outsourced to private sector providers. The policy of contracting out for these investigations was intended to permit organizations like DSS and OPM to more easily \"right-size\" their personnel levels based upon variable demand for service, a task diffi cult to achieve under restrictive civil service employment regulations.\n\nThus far this transition to partial privatization has not produced all of the intended results. Several years into the privatization effort a 1999 GAO report found that signifi cant numbers of personnel security investigations remained incomplete or were not adjudicated in a timely manner.112 A subsequent Joint Military Intelligence College study on the privatization program cited security concerns with contract investigative support, suggesting that the system of commercial augmentation lacked suffi cient measures to ensure \"accountability, integrity and confi dentiality\" of critical counterintelligence functions.113 A concurrent GAO study of DSS investigations revealed repeated lapses in the thoroughness of background screenings, noting that the \"vast majority\" of examined investigations failed to comply with federal quality control standards. The GAO report concluded that \"in an effort to streamline operations and improve effi ciency [DSS] relaxed its investigative guidance, eliminated key quality control mechanisms, [and] inadequately trained its investigators.\"114 The study determined that these defi ciencies resulted from \"ineffective management reforms... undertaken as reinvention efforts ostensibly based on the National Performance Review, which called for improving government at less cost. However, DSS's actions did not achieve this result.\"115\n\n## Is Implementation Of The Npr Always Feasible?116\n\nIn a case study about the NPR, The Privatization of Personnel Security: The Effects of the National Performance Review on the Intelligence Community, William E. Colligan identifi es the arguments for and against the privatization of personnel security functions through the eyes of both the entrepreneurs and the public administrators. He analyzes action by the Clinton administration to privatize the Offi ce of Federal Investigations, an arm of the Offi ce of Personnel Management\n(OPM), which handled about 30 percent of all background investigations for the U.S. Government. The key point addressed: Should the government continue to privatize its personnel security functions and responsibilities? Colligan established a formula to consider a personnel security system, evaluating accountability, integrity, and **confi dentiality**. The specifi c example used is a case study of the operation of the newly created U.S. Investigative Services (USIS) to assess the feasibility and desirability of the government's efforts at personnel security privatization. Colligan found USIS weak in all these elements, and recommended against using private enterprise to conduct background investigations.\n\nSince that time, the outsourcing of investigations has signifi cantly increased. In July\n2004 OPM awarded a multi-million dollar blanket purchase agreement to fi ve separate private companies for investigative services.117 DSS also signifi cantly expanded its commercial augmentation program by shifting much of its excess caseload to several private sector providers.118  Yet this transition to privatized investigations has not resolved the persistent problem of caseload backlog. A recent 2004 GAO report on DSS operations estimated the current backlog of clearance applications to be approximately 188,000.119\nAdditionally, OPM and DSS earned repeated criticism for questionable investigative standards, processing ineffi ciency, and poor management oversight.120\nIronically, the GAO determined that the federal and private sector workforce itself was a primary factor causing investigative backlogs - precisely the problem the Government Services, ManTech-MSM, Omniplex World Services Corp., and Systems Application and Technology.\n\n118 Defense Security Service (DSS) Augmentation Programs, Web-only document, URL: <www.dss.\n\nmil/aboutdss/augmentation>, accessed 17 September 2004. In January 2003 DSS awarded three personnel investigation contracts to Dyncorp-CSC, ManTech-ISJV, and Omniplex World Services.\n\n119 Shane Harris, \"Defense Department Lacks Staff to Tackle Security Clearance Backlog,\" GOVEXEC.\n\ncom, online ed., 27 May 2004, URL: *<http://www.govexec.com/dailyfed/0504/052704h1.htm>,* accessed 21 September 2004.\n\n120 A sampling of recent GAO reports provides some idea of the ongoing issues. \"DOD Needs to Overcome Impediments to Eliminating Backlog and Determining Its Size,\" February 2004; \"More Consistency Needed in Determining Eligibility for Top Secret Security Clearances,\" April 2001; \"More Accurate Estimate of Overdue Security Clearance Reinvestigations Is Needed,\" September 2000; \"More Actions Needed to Address Backlog of Security Clearance Reinvestigations,\" August 2000; \"Inadequate Personnel Security Investigations Pose National Security Risks,\" February 2000.\n\nprivatization program was intended to resolve. Currently, most contracted investigators are employed on a part-time basis and are therefore not always available to satisfy surged caseload requirements. OPM's primary contractor recently reported the addition of nearly 100 investigators per month to address increased caseload demand but admitted a turnover in personnel amounting to 70 employees per month.121 Likewise, DSS's contract partners recently expressed reluctance to hire more permanent staff, stating \"that they would incur additional fi nancial risk if they were to use full-time investigators,\"122 in place of part-time labor.\n\nAlthough privatization was intended to infuse greater fl exibility into the labor force, the government is now facing the unintended consequence of not having an assured resource base of trained investigators to meet unanticipated increases in demand. A recent report noted that \"DSS has fallen so far behind because its investigators cannot accurately project the size of future workload, making it almost impossible to plan accurately for future budget and workforce size requirements.\"123\nThese persistent investigative delays and quality control issues were addressed in the\n2004 Intelligence Reform Act, which requires the selection of a single executive agency to direct the \"day to day oversight of investigations and adjudication for personnel security clearances.\"124 The new legislation stipulated a goal of 120 days for fi nal determination of 80 percent of all clearance applications, as well as the establishment of uniform investigative standards and requirements for all government background investigations. The effectiveness of these measures remains to be seen. Despite several years of experimentation with various privatization programs there remains a signifi cant backlog of investigations and a persistent shortage of investigators.125  There also remain questions about the accountability, training, management, and oversight of contract personnel conducting background investigations.\n\n## Applying The Evaluative Criteria\n\nThis mixed record of commercial outsourcing for personnel security investigations indicates that privatization is not always a panacea for government ineffi ciency. Thus far private vendors have fallen short in providing suffi cient scalability of service and\n123 Caitlin Harrington, \"Backlog of Pentagon Security Clearances Nearing 200,000,\" CQ.com Homeland Security, 26 May 2004, URL: <http://www.cqhls.com/hs/dislay.do?dockey/cqonline/prod/data/docs/html/\nhsnews/108>, accessed 17 March 2005.\n\n124 U.S. Congress, House, *Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004*. 108th Cong., 2d sess., 7 December 2004, section 3001, URL *<http://www.c-span.org/pdf/2004IntelAct.pdf>,* accessed 7 March 2005.\n\n125 *DoD Needs to Overcome Impediments to Eliminating Backlog and Determining Its Size.* Another recent report noted that adjudication time of DSS investigation for Pentagon contract employees has actually increased from 319 days in 2001 to 375 days in 2004. Caitlin Harrington, \"Backlog of Pentagon Security Clearances Nearing 200,000.\"\nassured output to meet the government's needs. These shortfalls have occurred in part because vendors have not yet demonstrated a long-term record of performance and reliability. Furthermore, there remains some question as to whether contract employees have received adequate training to satisfy government standards for quality control and operational security.\n\nThe government bears responsibility for generally poor integration of commercial services by not providing adequate oversight and contract management procedures. As this case suggests, effective commercial augmentation programs require clear plans for contract surveillance, defi ned standards for performance and delivery, and carefully considered evaluation metrics to protect government interests and adequately satisfy all operational needs.\n\n## Commercial Remote Sensing\n\nPrivatization of personnel security investigations evolved as a means for infusing greater fl exibility into the government's labor pool. Conversely, a privatization initiative for remote sensing came about primarily from rapid technological advancements in private sector imaging technology.126 For most of the Cold War the government held a tight monopoly on viable technology for operational-quality remote sensing platforms, but in recent years there has been a signifi cant erosion of this qualitative advantage. As private technology reached near-parity capability with some national collection platforms, there was much greater incentive for government exploitation of commercial products. The operational utility of private sector collectors became clear when commercial satellites recently achieved half-meter resolution for electrooptical imaging.127 This technical achievement opened the door for experimentation with various outsourcing initiatives to satisfy many intelligence-related requirements.\n\nAs a result of these technical advancements, in 2000 an independent commission for the National Imagery and Mapping Agency (now the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency or NGA) called for greater governmental exploitation of commercial imaging technology. Citing NIMA's laggardly movement on commercial integration, the commission called for \"a policy review and coherent strategic direction for the use of (and reliance upon) commercial products.\"128 The commission challenged the traditional notion that the production of visual overhead collection and analysis Military, and Commercial, CRS Report IB92011 (Washington, DC: Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, 2003), 5.\n\n128 The Information Edge: Imagery Intelligence and Geospatial Information in an Evolving National Security Environment, Report of the Independent Commission on the National Imagery and Mapping Agency (December 2000), URL: *<http://www.fas.org/irp/agency/nima/commission/article02.htm>*, accessed 16 September 2004.\n\nshould be a purely governmental function. The fi nal report encouraged NIMA to\n\"commercialize itself\" and adopt new business practices to integrate a wider range of private sector tools.129\nResponding to these recommendations, in 2003 the President's Executive Offi ce of Science and Technology Policy established a directive for the use of commercial remote sensing products. The directive committed the government to \"rely to the maximum practical extent on U.S. commercial remote sensing space capabilities for fi lling imagery and geospatial needs for military, intelligence, foreign policy, homeland security, and civil users.\"130 Refl ecting this new approach, the most recent Quadrennial Defense Review cited the use of commercial imagery as one of fi ve key emerging technologies that the DoD would exploit \"to signifi cantly increase U.S. advantage in intelligence collection, analysis, and security.\"131\nThis presidential policy initiative directed the development of an explicit strategy for integrating commercial products into military and intelligence applications. The strategy directed that the government determine what operational needs could be reliably met through commercial resources and then communicate these current and projected requirements to industry providers. The directive centralized the acquisition and dissemination process to make NGA the primary agency responsible for managing commercial support. Finally, the initiative encouraged the habitual use of commercial products in order to create \"a long-term, sustainable relationship\" between the government and private sector providers.132 Thus, rather than trying to restrict or limit the proliferation of advanced commercial remote sensing, the government became its primary consumer.\n\nWith this mandate, the NGA went from being an ad hoc user of commercial resources to a primary consumer. In 2003 the NGA awarded a $500 million contract under its NextView program to Digital Globe for their next generation, .5-meter resolution imaging system.133 Another NGA contract program, Project Clearview, recently awarded a 5-year agreement with several commercial providers for up to $500 million of imagery purchases.134\nThe value of this commercial integration was clearly demonstrated during the major combat operation phase of OIF. A Joint Lessons Learned study found that the \"synergy gained by skillfully combining intelligence from US with commercial space releases/2003/05/20030513-8.html>, accessed 2 May 2005.\n\n131 U.S. Department of Defense, *Quadrennial Defense Review: America's Security in the 21st Century*\n(Washington, DC: Government Printing Offi ce, 2001), 38.\n\n132 \"Remote Sensing Policy Fact Sheet,\" 2. 133 \"NGA Taps ORBIMAGE for Clearview,\" *GEO World, Government Connection*, May 2004, URL:\n<http://www.geoplace.com/uploads/georeport/040407.htm>, accessed 16 November 2004.\n\n134 Frank Sietzen, \"A Clearview of NIMA's Commercial Imagery Use,\" *Geospatial Solutions,* online ed.,\n1 March 2003, URL: *<http://www.geospatial-online.com/geospatialsolutions/content/jps?id=4>*, accessed\n16 September 2004.\n\nassets provided forces, especially CFSOCC (Combined Forces Special Operations Component Commander), with excellent intelligence.\"135 The report recommended that NGA continue development programs to acquire commercial products as part of the military's collection management process. The report concluded that \"commercial high-resolution, multi-spectral and radar satellite imagery proved to be a valuable, but still under-exploited, resource.\"136\nFrom the government's perspective there several distinct advantages of integrating commercial products into the intelligence planning cycle. The director of NGA, Lt Gen James Clapper (USAF, Ret.), noted that commercial resources are particularly useful as a \"gap mitigator\" when national technical measures are over-taxed or lack suffi cient coverage of a particular area of interest.137 Clapper explained that commercial augmentation can be used to shift many \"routine\" requirements away from national technical platforms and permit a focus on high-priority missions and the most technically challenging targets. Additionally, Clapper suggested that the unclassifi ed nature of commercial remote sensing products meant that the government has much greater fl exibility to share data with foreign national partners and third-party government entities for use in non-intelligence related applications.138\nCertainly the noteworthy success of integrating commercial remote sensing products for intelligence use provides optimism for the future of such public-private partnerships. Commercial augmentation holds a major advantage for the government as it may now opt to purchase products for some collection requirements rather than building costly systems for every need. This also has the benefi t of reducing capital expenditures from limited acquisition budgets and permitting organizations to utilize Operations and Maintenance funding to satisfy certain collection requirements, in effect \"changing the color of money\" that may be applied for short-term, high priority missions.\n\nDespite these clear advantages, the use of commercial remote sensing for intelligence operations raises several important questions. Firstly, high-quality commercial imagery products are also potentially available to non-U.S. governmental organizations and other private entities with suffi cient monetary resources. This issue of \"shutter control\" has already become a matter of some concern within the Intelligence Community and was addressed in the President's 2003 remote sensing directive. The policy determined that in some cases \"the United States government may restrict operations of the commercial systems in order to limit collection and/or dissemination of certain data and products.\"139 As part of its \"assured access\" agreement with commercial imagery providers,140 NIMA (NGA) paid $1.9 million over 2 months, plus an additional $5 million for other related products during early OEF operations. At the time some press reports accused the agency of using this method to restrict commercial products from public dissemination.141\nThe government has not repeated use of \"checkbook shutter control\" during OIF\nbut the OEF experience raises interesting questions regarding proprietary control of dual-use commercial technology. When commercial providers have access to sensitive intelligence information or unique technical capabilities there is a compelling government interest in maintaining security and control of that data. This case clearly illustrates the complex challenges for effective contract management as private sector enterprise becomes more and more integrated into U.S. intelligence operations. Clapper noted that as such public-private intelligence partnerships expand, \"we must retain a suffi cient workforce in the government to oversee what the contract providers do.\"142\nAnother issue of concern is the viability of commercial providers during periods of reduced government demand. The GWOT has been a boon for commercial remote sensing providers, as well as numerous other intelligence and security related fi rms. But most Intelligence Community observers suggest that current levels of operational spending will be unsustainable in the long term. As the security situation in Iraq and Afghanistan stabilize, there will be reduced demand for such commercial services and products. This inevitable reduction in demand will be less of a dilemma for servicebased providers who can quickly downsize their personnel levels. But for technically oriented, highly capitalized industries such as remote sensing providers, a signifi cant downturn in acquisition by the government may seriously jeopardize their commercial viability. As the government increasingly relies on private sector providers to fulfi ll critical operational requirements, careful consideration of market maturity and the long-term viability of providers will be appropriate.\n\n## Applying The Evaluative Criteria\n\nThe government's exploitation of cutting-edge private sector remote sensing technology is a prime example of the enormous potential benefi ts of public-private partnerships for commercialized intelligence augmentation. Through NGA's commercial acquisition program the government has used its contracting powers to acquire needed intelligence products that may be effectively supplied by private strongly denied the accusation that NGA's intent was to \"control\" access by purchasing all available commercial collection capability. Clapper indicated that the NGA purchases were made simply to meet sector providers. NGA's centralized management process has produced an effi cient and rationalized approach to commercial acquisition through established relationships with known and reliable private sector partners. This approach has enabled operational commanders to seamlessly integrate commercial products and technology into their intelligence mission cycle and permitted government resources to be applied elsewhere for mission requirements where commercial services are either unavailable or not suited to operational needs.\n\nBased upon the evaluative criteria there are two main areas of concern with the government's commercial remote sensing program. The fi rst issue is how the government will maintain suffi cient operational security over privately produced data in cases where unlimited public distribution may jeopardize U.S. military operations or national security. This issue will only become more problematic as high-resolution commercial imagery becomes widely available to non-governmental entities. The second issue is the viability of the commercial marketplace during periods of reduced government demand and whether the private sector will be able to provide fl exible levels of service to meet the variable requirements of the Intelligence Community. Much of the value of commercial augmentation will be lost if private sector providers do establish business models that can accommodate unpredictable government requirements only by maintaining a wider viability in the open marketplace.\n\n## Commercialized Intelligence Support To The Gwot\n\nThese two cases of commercial augmentation demonstrate several potential benefi ts and liabilities. The following analysis offers a somewhat different approach, examining the overall methodology of contract management across the broad range of commercial intelligence support services currently provided to deployed forces in the Global War on Terror. This structured analysis provides an opportunity to examine several key aspects of the acquisition process including contract development and award, management procedures, and quality control measures. This approach is intended to examine several specifi cally identifi ed shortfalls in current contract management procedures and shows how the evaluative framework may be applied for improved policy decisions on commercial augmentation.\n\nRecent government investigations and information gathered for this study have revealed numerous shortfalls in contract management procedures within the Intelligence Community, particularly the weak oversight of intelligence support contracts for GWOT operations. Some issues cited in recent reports are repeated violations of Federal Acquisition Regulation, misuse of the Federal Supply Schedule, signifi cant performance of out-of-scope activity by contractors, improper use of personal services contracts, and inadequate attention to contract delivery and performance.\n\nA 2004 DoD Inspector General report reviewed a sampling of contract awards for the Iraq Coalition Provisional Authority, including several vendors providing intelligence related support services in Iraq, and found \"signifi cant weaknesses\" in management procedures for 22 of the 24 contracts reviewed.143 Another recent review of Department of Interior contracts for intelligence support services in Iraq revealed \"a lack of effective management controls\" in 10 of 11 task orders worth a total of $66 million.144  A previous 2003 GAO report on DoD contracting practices, including intelligence operations in the Balkans, Afghanistan, and Iraq, determined that contract oversight was \"lacking in key areas, making it diffi cult for commanders to manage contractors effectively.\"145\nGenerally speaking, the record of contract management for intelligence support to contingency operations has been poor. While intelligence organizations have aggressively exploited a wide range of commercial augmentation, they have not dedicated suffi cient resources to effectively develop and manage these contracts. Signifi cant shortfalls have occurred in several key aspects of the management process, as noted below.\n\naccessed 30 September 2004. Orders to Support Military Operations, GAO-05-201 (April 2005), URL: <http://www.gao.gov/highlights/\nd05201high.pdf>, accessed 11 May 2005.\n\n## The Contract Award Process\n\nThe most critical element of any successful program of commercial augmentation is the establishment of effective contract management procedures beginning with the award process. This includes the tasks of identifying requirements, solicitation and circulating requests for proposals, market research and developing contract language. Shortfalls in any step of the development process can make management and surveillance of contract performance diffi cult, if not impossible, to achieve.\n\nThe enormous demands for intelligence support since 9/11 have placed IC organizations under signifi cant pressure to rapidly expand their collection and analytical capabilities. In the rush to provide critical support for contingency operations, there has been signifi cant modifi cation of the acquisition procedures used for many intelligence-related contracts. Several recent government investigations have noted the use of expedited awards procedures that have fallen outside the guidelines established by Federal Acquisition Regulation. This problem was cited as a contributing factor in the Department of the Interior Inspector General report on intelligence support contracts for both Iraq and the detention facility at Guantanamo Bay.146 These support contracts included commercial augmentation for human intelligence teams, linguistic support, strategic debriefi ng services, and interrogation support.\n\nAmong the issues cited in a recent Department of Interior IG report was the misuse of Blanket Purchase Agreements (BPA) under the GSA schedule to expedite contract awards and bypass an open bidding process.147 This episode arose as contracting offi cials misused the GSA schedule labor categories to acquire out-of-scope services for intelligence support activities.148 For example, the GSA schedule used to procure strategic debriefers, interrogators, counterintelligence agents, and analysts for work in Iraq was classifi ed for \"engineering\" and \"information technology services.\" A recent GAO review of these contract awards found that \"the labor category descriptions in the GSA contracts were, in most cases, signifi cantly different from the descriptions on DoD's statements of work and do not accurately represent the work the contractor performed.\"149\ndelivery requirements are not known in advance. This contract vehicle is particularly useful for the repeated procurement of individual services over a given period of time. This simplifi ed procurement process is particularly effective for habitual government service providers who offer a known price advantage and have an established performance record.\n\n148 For a general description of the procedures for GSA Federal Supply Schedule contracts see FAR 38.101.\n\n\"The Federal Supply Schedule program, pursuant to 41 U.S.C. 259(b)(3)(A), provides Federal agencies with a simplifi ed process of acquiring commercial supplies and services in varying quantities while obtaining volume discounts. Indefi nite-delivery contracts are awarded using competitive procedures to fi rms.\"\n149 *Interagency Contracting: Problems with DoD's and Interior's Orders to Support Military Operations,*\n8. The General Services Administration also awarded similar contracts for interrogation services at Guantanamo Bay detention facility on behalf of the U.S. Army Southern Command. These contracts were canceled in February 2004 when the improper use of the GSA schedule was revealed. Shane Harris, \"GSA Canceled Guantanamo Interrogator Contract,\" GOVEXEC.com. online ed., 16 July 2004, URL: < http:// www.govexec.com/dailyfed/0704/071604h1.htm>, accessed 9 May 2005.\n\nIn addition to the misapplication of GSA schedules, the IG report also determined that the contracts covering several intelligence-related services in Iraq and Guantanamo Bay lacked suffi cient market research and solicitation procedures. According to the IG\nreport, these contracts did not have \"an effective system of policies, procedures, and process controls to ensure an equitable and competitive contracting environment that complies with acquisition laws and regulations and protects the public interest.\"150 A\nseparate government investigation into the abuse incidents at Abu Ghraib also cited the misuse of the GSA Federal Supply Schedule and added that such \"contracts should be carefully scrutinized given the complexity and sensitivity connected to interrogation operations.\"151\nGenerally speaking, the GSA supply schedule process has many advantages for acquiring routine services from well-established markets. This system can greatly expedite the process of solicitation and market research. The major problems with these contracting vehicles arise because with the GSA system the government loses a signifi cant degree of oversight into how vendors may fulfi ll an individual task order.\n\nThe use of the GSA supply schedule generally limits the government's discretion over a vendor's screening and vetting of personnel. Additionally, GSA procedures provide little visibility into how a prime contractor may subcontract out various parts of the required services. Given such limitations on government overview of how such task orders are fi lled, the use of GSA schedules for sensitive intelligence services should be carefully scrutinized and monitored.\n\nInappropriately expedited awards also led to other discrepancies in the acquisition process for many support contracts with the Coalition Provisional Authority in Iraq. A separate DoD Inspector General report identifi ed several problems with vague requirements language, improper use of personal services contracts, and the lack of price reasonableness determinations prior to award.152 Additionally, other procedural irregularities surfaced during investigations of abuse incidents at Abu Ghraib. During the contract development process for interrogation support, the vendor assisted in the drafting of the requirements language and preparation of the Statement of Work (SOW) prior to the contract award. While there are some legal allowances for such collaboration, the subsequent contract award to the same vendor potentially presented a confl ict of interest in violation of FAR guidelines.153\nMany of the cited discrepancies in contracting award procedures may be attributed to the enormous unforeseen operational demands of GWOT operations. This situation placed signifi cant strain on a limited number of contracting offi cials, many of whom did not possess adequate knowledge of mission requirements or the specifi c tasks that the vendors would perform. Unfortunately, these shortcomings sometimes resulted in the use of questionable contract award procedures. During the initial phases of OEF, numerous deployed intelligence organizations reported critical shortfalls of key personnel, particularly for high-demand intelligence skills involving linguistic and interrogation support. A CENTCOM after-action review of OEF operations reported that \"the Army could not provide, and did not have an effective system in place to identify and contract for this support.\"154\n\n## Developing Contract Language\n\nAnother important shortfall affecting some intelligence service contracting has been the lack of standardized contract language and explicit Statements of Work (SOW). A recent GAO report on DoD contract management procedures observed that generally there is \"no standardization of necessary contract language for deployment of contractors.\"155 These problems have led to contractor personnel arriving at duty locations with insuffi cient training, equipment, or professional qualifi cations for their assigned tasks. In some cases this problem is compounded by the fact that task orders lack precise language describing the nature of services to be performed and the conditions of the work environment. One offi cial involved with OIF contracting commented that \"the demands that we asked of our contractors were not always written in the contracts that they were supporting.\"156\n\n## Outsourcing Signals Intelligence - Can The U.S. Army Do It?157\n\nIn How Can the U.S. Army Effectively Outsource Tactical EW/SIGINT to Retain Mission Effectiveness? Raymond Younger examines whether the Army can or cannot feasibly allow contracting of EW/SIGINT collection and analysis to private industry.\n\nThe research addressed the author's concern that outsourcing could have a detrimental effect on mission readiness. The Army intelligence modernization effort attempts to address the proliferation of technology including, for example, the rapid use of spread spectrum communications means. The Army's prescription for future EW/SIGINT capabilities centers on new systems and organizations.\n\nMost importantly for acquisition, Younger analyzes the pitfalls and advantages that outsourcing will have, pointing out private industry and Army considerations, weighing the effects of training, and describing how the Army can benefi t from private industry without giving up capabilities. He then examines outsource opportunities and how private industry can complement the current Army SIGINT architecture.\n\nThis issue of inadequate SOW language was cited as a compounding factor with contract interrogators serving in OIF. Particularly for sensitive intelligence functions, the report noted that \"requiring activities must carefully develop the applicable SOW to include technical requirements and requisite personnel qualifi cations, experience, and training.\"158 The Statement of Work for contract interrogation services used during OIF described a similar skill-set as military occupational specialty 97E, Human Intelligence Collector. Yet many of the contractor personnel were later determined to lack equivalent professional training possessed by their government and uniformed counterparts. Several of the contractors in question had experience in law enforcement or related civilian functions but lacked specifi c training in military interrogation techniques, the law of land warfare, Geneva Conventions, and applicable DoD intelligence oversight policy.159 This was also the case for OEF interrogation contractors operating at Bagram Air Base, Afghanistan where later investigations revealed that two of the four contractors had no prior military intelligence training.\n\narmy.mil/ocpa/reports/ArmyIGDetaineeAbuse/>, accessed 16 August 2004. Legislation now requires that the Secretary of Defense certify that all Federal employees and civilian contractors engaged in the handling or interrogation of detainees must receive training in the laws of war and the Geneva Convention. See U.S. Congress, House, *Ronald W. Reagan National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005*. 108th Cong.,\n2nd sess., 20 January 2004. H.R. 4200, SEC. 1092 (c). URL: <http://www.wifcon.com/dodauth05.htm>, accessed 11 November 2004.\n\nPart of the diffi culty in developing precise SOW language arises from a lack of communication between the contracting authority and the end user of the commercial service. In the case of the OIF interrogation contracts, the SOW did not specify the need for prior training in military interrogation procedures, policy, and doctrine. In some cases the contracting authorities did not possess a background in intelligence operations and therefore lacked familiarity with the specifi c needs of the receiving unit. These oversights resulted in the deployment of some contract personnel who were not properly screened or qualifi ed for their required duties.\n\nPoorly defi ned SOW language may also signifi cantly limit the range of labor that a contractor may perform once at their place of duty. On-site Contracting Offi cer Representatives (COR) are legally unable to revise SOW language based upon changing mission needs without explicit revisions to the contract. Thus, contract personnel will often be pressured by the receiving unit to perform out-of-scope activities for which they are not properly trained or which the contract does not stipulate. In the case of Abu Ghraib, several of the contract personnel performing interrogation and analytical functions were originally employed only for translation services.\n\nSeveral respondents to this study also noted problems with infl exible contract language limiting the utilization of contract personnel. Often when task orders did not refl ect the actual nature of work to be performed on site, there was pressure from the vendor's managers to \"grow the contract\" outside of the scope of the original proposal. This situation results in operational ineffi ciencies and unforeseen costs to the government as contracts are modifi ed to refl ect the actual conditions of performance.\n\nFor sensitive functions such as intelligence collection and analysis it is imperative that Statements of Work, performance standards, and technical qualifi cations be explicitly defi ned in the contract language. Effective development of SOW language requires that contracting offi cers without operational intelligence experience have close interaction with technical experts from the requiring unit and designated onsite CORs, but frequently this does not occur. A GAO report on contract management procedures for several intelligence support contracts in Iraq found that contracting offi cers \"had little to no communication with the CORs in Iraq and did not follow up to obtain monthly reports from them on the contractor's performance....[and] never verifi ed that the Army personnel serving as CORs had appropriate training.\"160\nCommunication between the contracting offi cer, the requiring unit, and the designated CORs must begin at the earliest stages of the request for proposal process so that effective market research may be conducted to determine the most suitable vendor, and appropriate contract language developed. Without signifi cant input from the requiring unit and awareness of the mission requirements it is nearly impossible for contracting offi cers to communicate clear performance expectations to potential vendors. The independent panel reviewing intelligence operations during OIF\nconcluded that the \"continued use of contractors will be required, but contracts must clearly specify the technical requirements and personnel qualifi cations, experience, and training needed.\"161\n\n## Management Of Contract Personnel\n\nOne of the major challenges of utilizing commercial augmentation is a lack of understanding of contract management procedures among intelligence leaders. A recent GAO report on army contract management procedures noted that there is generally \"inadequate training for staff responsible for overseeing contractors and limited awareness by many fi eld commanders of all contractor activities taking place in their area of operations.\"162 A separate report on management procedures for intelligence support in Iraq noted that \"the Army offi cials responsible for overseeing the contractor, for the most part, lacked knowledge of contracting issues and were not aware of their basic duties and responsibilities.\"163\nExisting doctrinal guidelines for managing deployed contractors were described in the GAO report as \"inconsistent and sometimes incomplete.\"164 Even the army's own doctrinal manual for Contractors on the Battlefi eld acknowledges that \"there is no specifi cally identifi ed force structure nor detailed policy on how to establish contractor management oversight within an AOR. Consolidated contractor management is the goal, but reality is that it has been, and continues to be, accomplished through a rather convoluted system\"165 An independent investigation of OIF interrogation operations reinforced this fi nding, noting that \"oversight of contractor personnel and activities was not suffi cient to ensure intelligence operations fell within the law and the authorized chain of command.\"166\nAlthough there is ample doctrinal literature on the generic issue of contract management, there is virtually no guidance specifi cally dealing with the oversight of commercial intelligence services.167 The Abu Ghraib investigations revealed that \"no doctrine exists to guide interrogators and their intelligence leaders in the contract Addressed in DOD Plans, 1.\n\n165 U.S. Army, Field Manual (FM) 3-100. *Contractors on the Battlefi eld (*Washington, DC: Department of the Army, January 2003).\n\n166 \"Final Report of the Independent Panel to Review DOD Detention Operations,\" 69. 167 The Army's major doctrinal references dealing with contractors in contingency operations are Army Regulation 715-9, Contractors Accompanying the Force; DA Pamphlet 715-16, Contractor Deployment Guide; and Field Manual 3-100.21, Contractors on the Battlefi eld. These documents are generally geared toward logistics-associated contracting services and offer no guidance on intelligence-specifi c management or legal issues.\n\nmanagement or command and control of contractors in a wartime environment.\" Furthermore, the report noted that the \"interrogators, analysts, and leaders were unprepared for the arrival of contract interrogators and had no training to fall back on in the management, control and discipline of these personnel.\"168 Overall, there was signifi cant confusion among military supervisors over their legal responsibilities for contractor personnel and their ability to dismiss employees for unsatisfactory performance.169\nThe investigations also determined that intelligence \"leaders faced numerous issues involving contract management: roles and responsibilities of....personnel with respect to contractors; roles, relationships, and responsibilities of contract linguists and contract interrogators with military personnel; and the methods of disciplining contractor personnel.\"170 Clearly, a proximate cause of the failures with OIF detention operations evolved from this lack of familiarity with contract management procedures and confusion over legal responsibilities and control over contract employees.\n\nBased upon respondent feedback for this study, these problems of poor contract management are not uncommon for many intelligence-related augmentation programs. Frequently leaders unfamiliar with their management responsibilities will leave performance evaluation, discipline, and contract oversight to the vendor's on-site manager. In the absence of a government-appointed COR, this approach essentially amounts to the vendors providing their own management and evaluation.\n\n## Contractor Training And Integration\n\nAnother signifi cant issue of concern with using commercial augmentation for sensitive intelligence operations is proper vetting, training and integration of contract support. Service contracting has several unique challenges that are distinct from engineering or product acquisition where performance specifi cations can be clearly defi ned. Performance measures for service contracting are inherently imprecise, but a well-written SOW can clearly articulate the level of training, expertise, and qualifi cations required of the vendor. Each operational situation is unique and the contracting authority must consider the skills and training that contract personnel may need in order to satisfy all potential mission requirements.\n\nThe Department of the Army Inspector General report noted that 35 percent of the contract interrogators at Abu Ghraib lacked any formal training as interrogators. Furthermore, prior to deployment, none of the contractor personnel had received training on Geneva Convention guidelines or the rules of engagement for treatment of detainees.171 The report found that \"the lack of specifi c training in military policies and techniques has the potential of placing these interrogators [contractors] at a higher\n168 AR 15-6 *Investigation of the Abu Ghraib Detention Facility,* 19.\n\nrisk of violating Army policies and doctrine, and decreasing intelligence yield.\"172 Several respondents in the present study also noted incidents of intelligence support contractors arriving at duty sites with insuffi cient pre-deployment training, a lack of proper equipment, or inappropriate skill-sets to satisfy mission requirements.\n\nAs discussed previously, a signifi cant limitation on the government's power to closely monitor the training and vetting of contractor personnel is the use of the Blanket Purchase Agreement. The Army investigation of Abu Ghraib noted that military supervisors had little or no control over the vetting and pre-training process for arriving contractors. The report found that leaders \"knew little of their individual backgrounds or experience and relied on higher headquarters to screen them before arrival. Such screening was not occurring.\"173 Several of the contractors were later determined to have little or no experience with intelligence operations, the report noting that the \"integration of some contractors without training, qualifi cations, and certifi cation created ineffective interrogation teams and the potential for noncompliance with doctrine and applicable laws.\"174\nSimilar problems were also cited in a review of early operations at the detention facility in Guantanamo Bay. Many of the contract linguists supporting the intelligence operations had no experience with military interrogation techniques or intelligence methods. Although contract linguists were screened for basic language profi ciency, some of their skills were not appropriately matched for their required duties as interrogators. The original contract SOW listed only generic language requirements but over time the operational demands became more specifi c as the mission requirements evolved.175\nAnother issue of concern is the deployment of intelligence support contractors. In several cited cases, deployed contractors with interim clearances were unable to serve in their assigned functions while awaiting fi nal clearances, a situation that wasted government resources and created work backlogs for the supported unit. This problem is partly attributable to unmonitored vendors who do not adequately pre-screen their employees and consequently deploy personnel who are later unable to pass the required background checks. In recent years approximately 30-40 percent of linguist candidates provided by DoD vendors never receive fi nal clearance for work on intelligence related missions.176 Recent rules changes to the DFAR now stipulate that \"all required security and background checks be complete and acceptable\" prior to deployment.177 But given the enormous backlog of contractor background investigations, this requirement could create an enormous challenge for contracting offi cers as they try to project support estimates for rapidly changing mission requirements.\n\nIn order to effectively utilize commercial augmentation, contracting authorities must have a clear understanding of the operational environment, mission requirements, skills, equipment, clearance, and training requirements of the gaining command. These details must be clearly outlined in the Request for Proposals and articulated in explicit SOW language so that vendors are able to pre-screen the personnel best suited for the requirement. Finally, contract language must clearly provide the government with the power to easily remove and replace any contractor that does not meet the performance expectations established in the SOW.\n\n## Contracting Officer Representative Training And Responsibilities\n\nOf the numerous issues that undermine effective contract management, perhaps the biggest challenge is providing quality contract surveillance and performance evaluation. The most frequently cited cause of this shortfall is the lack of properly trained on-site Contracting Offi cer Representatives (CORs).178 In many operational scenarios, COR\nresponsibilities are thrust upon intelligence specialists as an \"additional duty\" to be performed on top of their primary management, analytical, or collection tasks. Many intelligence specialists lack formal training in contract management procedures and are forced to learn through \"on the job training.\" As the Abu Ghraib investigation noted, \"if functions such as these [intelligence] are being contracted, MI [military intelligence] personnel need to have at least a basic level of contract training so they can protect the Army's interests.\"179 All too often this is not the case. Critical shortages of intelligence personnel have meant that many CORs frequently do not work in close proximity to the site of contract performance and do not have suffi cient personnel to effectively assure quality control.\n\nA sampling of several ongoing operational support missions suggests wide variance in the procedures and training for CORs managing intelligence support contracts. During the fi rst 18 months of operations at the joint detention facility in Guantanamo Bay there was no assigned on-site COR monitoring performance under the linguist and interrogation support contracts.180 Investigations of Abu Ghraib found that \"personnel acting as CORs did not, for the most part, have the requisite training and were unaware of the scope of their duties and responsibilities.\"181 Furthermore, there was no dedicated on-site COR monitoring contractor performance at the joint detention facility. The army investigation of detainee abuse incidents specifi cally noted that \"it is very diffi cult, if not impossible, to effectively administer a contract when the COR is not on site.\"182 Fortunately the situation for intelligence support contracts in the Balkans appears to be more closely monitored. Several respondents to this study indicated that multiple CORs were currently tasked to cover intelligence support contracts in the Balkans and all had received appropriate COR training prior to deployment.\n\nAn additional challenge for many organizations is that designated CORs will often serve only for short periods of time and are then relocated for operational duties elsewhere. Few intelligence support contracts are afforded dedicated longterm oversight by a single individual. Several respondents contacted for this study also mentioned a lack of good documentation on contract performance; thus, when a new COR arrives on site there is often little evidence of past performance or a sound basis for comparative analysis. Frequent rotations for intelligence personnel only exacerbate this challenge. Commonly the vendor's on-site manager will be the only individual with lengthy operational experience at a given site. All of these factors make it extremely diffi cult for intelligence specialists without specifi c contract experience to effectively fulfi ll their responsibilities as CORs. Ultimately good contract management and on-site surveillance are the only avenues for the government to assure quality of performance as described in the requirements language.\n\nAnother challenging aspect of intelligence-related service contracting is defi ning performance measures and developing effective surveillance methodologies. For many major DoD contracts, dedicated personnel from the Defense Contract Management Agency will oversee vendor performance and evaluation, but these oversight personnel are in short supply. Over the past decade DoD has reduced its acquisition personnel levels by nearly half while during the same time procurement of contract services has more than doubled.183 As a consequence, for the vast majority of intelligencerelated contracts, appointed organizational CORs will serve as the primary monitor. In most cases this COR will be an intelligence specialist rather than a contract specialist; therefore, it is critically important that contract language have clear and measurable performance standards to assist in quantifying vendor performance.\n\ncontractor personnel may engage in abuse of prisoner is to ensure that a properly trained COR is on-site.\n\nMeaningful contract administration and monitoring will not be possible if a small number of CORs are asked to monitor the performance of one or more contractors who have 100 or more employees in theater, and in some cases, perhaps in several locations.\" The report concluded that \"it is apparent that there was not credible exercise of appropriate oversight of contract performance at Abu Ghraib.\" AR 15-6 Investigation of the Abu Ghraib Detention Facility, 52.\n\nPerhaps the greatest challenge for monitoring intelligence service contracts is how to properly defi ne useful metrics for evaluation. Several respondents to this study noted that contracts for intelligence and linguistic services often contain initial qualifi cation criteria for contract personnel but typically will not provide any program for skills maintenance, developmental training, or periodic evaluation. Most of the criteria for work evaluation are informal at best, with little consideration given to developmental counseling or performance review. These tasks are generally left to the vendor's onsite contract manager but often without suffi cient government surveillance.\n\nThe challenge of defi ning effective evaluation metrics has become even more important as the government moves toward greater use of Performance-Based Service Acquisitions (PBSA). The PBSA contracting methodology focuses more on resultsbased evaluation rather than specifi c process description. With PBSA, the requiring activity defi nes specifi c performance goals, known as a Statement of Objectives, then provides the vendor signifi cant latitude in developing a work plan to satisfy the government's needs. The benefi t of this approach is that the vendor is not bound by a specifi c SOW description and is free to devise an optimal solution for meeting the government's needs. DoD established a goal to award 50 percent of all acquisition dollars utilizing PBSA methodology by FY 2005.184\nMost of the current intelligence-related contracts reviewed for this study still employ traditional SOW methodology in which specifi c labor functions are clearly defi ned for the vendor. It is uncertain how the PBSA will be employed for intelligence services as the government moves toward greater use of this contracting methodology. Although PBSA has clear advantages by leveraging vendor expertise to develop creative solutions, this system also places a much greater burden on contracting offi cers to clearly defi ne the mission objectives, conduct careful market research for appropriate vendors, closely manage performance, and evaluate standards of work and achievement of mission objectives. PBSA only increases the necessity for well-trained on-site intelligence professionals to closely monitor and evaluate the contractor's contribution to overall mission goals. Present defi ciencies in contract surveillance practices leave considerable doubt as to the government's ability to adequately utilize these management concepts for sensitive intelligence related missions. Indeed, there are currently signifi cant shortages of government contract offi cers trained in performancebased acquisition policy.185 Furthermore, the proper evaluation of performance for these contract vehicles places an even greater burden on the many untrained CORs who are likely to be unfamiliar with PBSA methodologies.\n\n## Other Issues Of Concern\n\nAside from the cited defi ciencies in contracting methodology and surveillance measures, several other intangibles must be considered as the government expands its use of commercial augmentation for intelligence functions. Issues of concern that have not been adequately addressed by intelligence policymakers are the long-term cost effectiveness of commercial augmentation, effects of labor competition on government retention, operational fl exibility of private sector providers, and equity considerations for government employees working with commercial partners.\n\nThe question of whether commercial augmentation is actually a cost-effective longterm management strategy for the government remains unresolved. A quantitative costbenefi t analysis is beyond the scope of this study, but numerous respondents noted that contract personnel are frequently paid several times what their government counterparts make for performing exactly the same intelligence functions. Admittedly, these complaints should be viewed with some skepticism. Short-term contract employees enjoy none of the extensive benefi ts and job security offered to civil service and military personnel. Furthermore, the vagaries of the marketplace necessitate a certain \"risk premium\" for contract employees who may be terminated by the government at any time. Additionally, many contract employees possess unique skills, experience, and qualifi cations that clearly justify differing levels of compensation.\n\nNevertheless, several respondents mentioned cases of perceived inequities in pay and privilege between contractor and civil service employees, such that some individuals felt a disincentive toward public sector service when they could perform similar functions in the private sector for improved benefi ts. To some degree, DoD\noutsourcing policy has exacerbated labor competition and created a \"sellers market\" for certain high-demand intelligence skills. There is strong indirect evidence suggesting that military and civil service employees already vetted in retirement programs are choosing to leave government service due to the lucrative opportunities in the private sector. This situation has led DoD to implement unprecedented retention bonuses of up to $150,000 for retirement-eligible intelligence specialists under the Critical Skills Retention Bonus Program.186 This program specifi cally targets service members serving in the intelligence specialties such as imagery analyst, unmanned aerial vehicle operator, HUMINT collector, and Arabic voice-intercept specialists.\n\nSeveral respondents to the present study also expressed concern over organizational cohesion and morale due to equity disputes between contractors and government employees working on various intelligence missions. Some respondents expressed the perception that contract workers lacked equivalent dedication to mission accomplishment as their government counterparts. One respondent mentioned a scenario in which several contractors, also military intelligence reservists, were using their deployed status as contractors to \"hide\" from activation with their respective reserve units. There is no easy way to ascertain the accuracy of these charges or to quantify the overall impact of such negative perceptions, but these factors must be taken into account if the government is to continue a strategy of substantial commercial augmentation of intelligence support services.\n\n## Applying The Evaluative Criteria\n\nAs these fi ndings suggest, present commercial augmentation programs for intelligence support to GWOT operations are far from optimized. The use of commercial augmentation has been applied primarily as a stop-gap measure to mitigate a signifi cant crisis in intelligence manpower. This situation has led to improper solicitation procedures, poor market research and ineffective contract management. In some cases, contracting practices have skirted the intent of the Federal Acquisition Regulation and lacked suffi cient oversight and accountability. Ineffective surveillance plans and a lack of performance metrics have made contract surveillance and evaluation extremely diffi cult. This mixed record of performance demonstrates serious shortfalls in several key areas of the evaluative criteria.\n\nOf all the diffi culties with current commercial augmentation programs for intelligence support, the most troubling aspect is the government's poor record of contract surveillance. Too frequently this important task has been left to untrained personnel, unaware of their responsibilities or simply too far removed from the activities to provide adequate management and control. CORs lack standardized training and the resources necessary to perform their jobs and frequently lack clear metrics to evaluate vendor performance. Compounding this situation, deployed intelligence offi cers, already heavily burdened with command or analytical responsibilities, are frequently assigned contract management responsibilities as \"additional duties.\" These tasks are not viewed as a core competency among intelligence professionals, and thus are inevitably neglected or simply misunderstood. Due to this generally poor record of contract management, many of the benefi ts of commercial augmentation are ultimately lost.\n\n## The Future Of Commercialized Intelligence Augmentation\n\nThe enormous intelligence demands of the Global War on Terrorism have forced the government into an unanticipated reliance on commercial augmentation. This situation has exposed signifi cant fl aws in DoD's contract management methodology.\n\nNevertheless, these short-term challenges should not be used as an excuse to dismiss entirely the potential benefi ts of commercial augmentation. The lessons of 9/11 and recent counterterrorism operations have demonstrated the inherent weakness of the traditional intelligence bureaucracy. As intelligence reform advocates have noted, the IC organization is \"characterized by centralized planning, routinized operations, and a hierarchical chain of command. All of these features leave the intelligence organization ill-suited for the information age.\"187\nTraditional bureaucratic structures produce the positive benefits of standardization, predictability, and accountability, but often at the expense of flexibility, innovation, and responsiveness. To succeed against current security challenges, intelligence organizations will need a healthy dose of each quality, enhancing the capabilities of government organizations by leveraging the best talent and technology of the private sector.\n\nEmerging security threats will require that intelligence organizations operate more like private sector entities and less like traditional bureaucracies. Some of this reform will be achieved by adopting the best management practices of successful corporate entities but also by exploiting the enormous potential of well-managed public-private partnerships to create a dynamic synergy of governmental and commercial talent. The challenge for Intelligence Community leaders will be to develop effective procedures for integrating commercial services and establishing safeguards to protect government interests while maximizing the potential benefi ts of private sector augmentation.\n\n## Considerations For Reform\n\nThis study concludes with three proposed models for future use of non-governmental resources to augment intelligence collection and analysis. These broadly outlined plans represent a range of policies designed to build a foundation for a dynamic IC surge capacity. The intent of each option is to infuse greater fl exibility into the IC talent pool and provide formalized mechanisms to rapidly integrate unique and specialized commercial tools, talent, and technology to satisfy an unpredictable range of operational needs. These proposals offer management strategies that will institutionalize the use of non-governmental resources to enhance the fl exibility and effectiveness of the intelligence bureaucracy.\n\n## Option One: A Conservative Approach To Modifi Cation Of Personnel Hiring Regulations And The Creation Of An Intelligence Community Reserve Corps\n\nAmong many policymakers within the Intelligence Community there remains signifi cant apprehension with the wholesale privatization of intelligence functions. Some observers cite concern with private corporations gaining too much infl uence over national security matters. Other critics suggest legitimate fears that privacy rights and civil liberties will be compromised as commercial entities gain greater purview over sensitive personal information or technical collection capabilities. Others argue that excessive privatization efforts will undermine the civil service system and jeopardize the status of government employees. All of these concerns raise valid points and should be considered in any commercial augmentation program.\n\nNotwithstanding these concerns, there remain several management options that support a conservative approach to diversifying the talent and capabilities of the Intelligence Community while still providing greater fl exibility for surged operations.\n\nAs the recent Presidential Commission Report on WMD Intelligence noted, the IC must think more creatively and strategically about tapping external resources, \"recognizing that the Community may simply not be the natural home for real expertise on certain topics.\"188\nOne recent initiative is the National Security Personnel System.189  This DoD program offers a modifi ed human resources management system permitting the fl exible hiring of \"highly qualifi ed experts from outside the civil service and uniformed services,\"\nexempt from the civil service restrictions established by U.S. Code Title 5.190 This exemption permits up to 5-year appointments with modifi ed compensation tables to hire individuals \"possessing uncommon, special knowledge or skills in a particular occupational fi eld beyond the usual range of expertise\" generally available within the Department but needed to satisfy short-term, non-permanent requirements.191 Although the current DoD program is capped at 2,500 personnel, it does provide a model for the short-term acquisition of unique talents from outside the traditional IC bureaucracy. If successful, this initiative could represent an important tool for the IC to tap resources from industry, academia, and non-governmental organizations to satisfy unanticipated short-term needs for surged collection.\n\nBesides the National Security Personnel System, there are several other models that would permit the IC to better exploit external resources for a more dynamic surge capacity. A 1998 Army War College study suggested a \"Civilian Intelligence Reserve\" program.192  This proposal envisioned a four-tiered intelligence reserve force for surged contingency operations. Tier One is similar to the current military reserve system with a cadre of former intelligence professionals on-call for organizational augmentation. Tier Two incorporates private U.S. citizens who are not intelligence specialists but vetted professionals with unique expertise in technical matters such as science, fi nance, or engineering. Tier Three would draw individuals from the private sector to work short-term contracts for more routine Community projects such as program analysis, budget, or administrative tasks. These individuals would be hired in a non-career employment status but in a fashion more formalized than under current commercial augmentation programs. A fi nal tier would comprise private sector and academic specialists who would maintain routine relationships with the IC for longterm analytical projects such as regional indications and warning, in-depth country studies, or specialized technical projects.\n\nA civilian intelligence reserve program offers a reasonable, if not conservative, approach for integrating non-governmental resources into an IC surge capacity. Yet even with this relatively modest proposal there are several potential obstacles such as security and legal oversight concerns, rapid integration of personnel in time of crisis, bureaucratic resistance to outsourcing certain intelligence functions, and the likely reluctance of many private sector and academic professionals to work with the Intelligence Community. Despite these potential shortcomings, a civilian intelligence reserve program is a promising compromise between the bureaucratic status quo and full-scale commercialization.193\nAnother potential model worth consideration is the current DoD feasibility study for the United States Civilian Linguist Reserve Corps (CLRC).194 The primary objective of the CLRC is to \"warehouse high-level expertise in languages that are currently or potentially critical to national security.\"195 The proposal identifi ed 47 languages of interest that were operationally relevant to national security, but \"where encumbering full-time federal positions is neither practical nor cost-effective.\" The study recommended that the CLRC \"draw from a wide range of civilian expertise both within and outside the federal sector including higher education, non-profi t, corporate,\n193 It should be noted that the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 provides the new Director of National Intelligence (DNI) with the authority to experiment with such initiatives. Section 1053 of the legislation outlines a \"National Intelligence Reserve Corps\" for \"the temporary reemployment on a voluntary basis of former employees of elements of the Intelligence Community during periods of emergency.\" This proposal would include any individual who previously served as a full-time employee within the Intelligence Community. U.S. Congress, House. Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004. 108th Cong., 2d sess., 7 December 2004, URL: <http://www.c-span.org/pdf/s2845confrept.\n\npdf>, accessed 7 March 2005.\n\n194 This feasibility study was ordered by the Secretary of Defense as part of the FY 2003 Intelligence Authorization Act, National Defense University, National Security Education Program. United States Civilian Linguist Reserve Corps Feasibility Study, 2004, URL: *<http://www.ndu.edu/nsep>*, accessed 12 August 2004.\n\n195 *United States Civilian Linguist Reserve Corps Feasibility Study*, 8.\n\nand heritage language community sectors... [and] non-traditional sources of expertise for the national security community.\"196 This study recommended administration, recruiting, vetting, training, and management of the CLRC be assumed by a quasifederal government agency or private contractor.\n\nThe CLRC concept supports several recent operational recommendations based upon critical language shortfalls identifi ed during GWOT operations. A key fi nding from after-action reviews of intelligence operations during OEF recommended\n\"establishing a pool of linguists, already granted security clearances and profi cient in the diversity of languages needed for short-notice contingencies. Similar to contracting in peacetime and paying a retainer fee to commercial airlines for their support in the war [OEF], the army should identify and begin a formal relationship with native linguists across the United States.\"197\nA variation of this program appeared in the January 2005 Defense Language Transformation Roadmap. This DoD proposal would formalize the critical language surge capacity through the use of privately contracted support and standardizing language contract management among all DoD elements under the control of a single executive agent.198 This proposed management structure would establish common guidelines for counterintelligence procedures, contractor security screenings, bidding and labor pricing, and centralized prioritization of community requirements. Such a program could potentially resolve many shortfalls of the language and intelligence support contracting program experienced during recent operations.\n\nFor the most part these proposals fall short of a true privatization program but they do offer a useful, though conservative, approach to establishing a formalized IC surge capacity. These proposals achieve the important goal of infusing greater organizational fl exibility into the IC talent pool without signifi cantly jeopardizing the basic bureaucratic structure of the Community. They offer a modest capacity for rapid diversifi cation of the analytical base without raising the signifi cant challenges associated with the management and oversight of extensive commercial augmentation. This conservative approach offers improved operational fl exibility while still retaining the accountability, predictability, and standardization of the traditional bureaucratic model.\n\n## Option Two: Incremental Reform In Commercial Integration And Contract Management As Core Competency\n\nA more ambitious model for reform takes into account the already extensive use of commercial augmentation and seeks to normalize this approach by strengthening contract management procedures and improving the integration of private sector resources. As this study has clearly articulated, there are numerous potential benefi ts of commercial augmentation but current contract administration procedures within the IC are woefully inadequate. In order for the Intelligence Community to reap the full benefi ts of commercial augmentation, contract management must become a core competency. This complex task cannot be delegated to untrained managers who are overwhelmed with demanding leadership or analytical responsibilities. Contract management cannot become just another \"additional duty\" for busy intelligence professionals.\n\nIn order for a robust program of commercial augmentation to be effective, IC leaders must adopt improved business practices and better management techniques. The effective exploitation of commercial augmentation requires three basic elements.199 First is the development of a clear business strategy outlining specifi c mission goals, required skills and services, defi ned performance standards, and a routinized contract development process. Second is the identifi cation of capable vendors able to provide suitable services and resources to satisfy mission goals. The third, and perhaps most challenging task, is a comprehensive program of contract administration and quality surveillance led by specialists trained in procurement policy and knowledgeable of intelligence operations. These major elements are addressed by the evaluative framework suggested in this paper and refl ect the minimum baseline requirements for any successful commercial augmentation program.\n\nThese goals are by no means unattainable but they will require the dedicated attention of leaders at the highest level of the Intelligence Community. Such reforms could begin with intelligence organizations adopting the best practices and procedures of the logistical community where there is a generally more well-developed doctrinal approach to contract management. Existing contracting regulations such as the DFAR should be adapted to the unique requirements of intelligence operations and refl ect the added challenges of monitoring service-type contracts.\n\nAdditionally, contracting offi cers must become better educated on IC mission requirements and receive improved technical support from intelligence professionals during the contract development process. One possible solution is to encourage an intelligence specialization at the Defense Contract Management Agency (DCMA) where acquisition experts are provided with professionalization opportunities within the Intelligence Community educational system. DCMA contract specialists might potentially attend continuing education programs at intelligence offi cer advanced schools or participate in programs offered at the Joint Military Intelligence College. After completing this educational immersion, these intelligence contract specialists would be assigned permanent duties at DIA or the J2 specifi cally to oversee intelligence-related contract management issues. Additionally, these contracting offi cers must develop a solid knowledge of industry providers and a resource listing of qualifi ed vendors.\n\nIn order for improved surveillance of contract performance, IC leaders must also make a dedicated effort to properly train Contracting Offi cer Representatives (CORs) and provide them the tools and resources for effective management. Realistically, intelligence contract management will never become a prestige assignment for IC professionals, but at the very least these individuals must be trained and provided with clear surveillance plans and performance metrics to evaluate vendor service. Outside contract administration, such as from the Defense Contracting Command, has generally not been suffi cient to meet IC needs due to manpower shortages and a lack of expertise with IC mission requirements. Given the unique demands of intelligence operations, good management practices will be best achieved if maintained as an internal function within Community organizations.\n\nA fi nal recommendation calls for the establishment of a centralized contracting authority for all IC-related missions. Typically, centralization proposals are greeted with great skepticism among Intelligence Community experts, but the current system of decentralized contracting authority, managed by non-intelligence specialists, has not produced satisfactory results. Under current practice, IC leaders have extremely limited oversight of the myriad commercial suppliers who support the Community as a whole. A more rationalized model might resemble an NGA-like acquisitions directorate establishing a centralized authority for procurement and management of all commercial providers.200\nThis consolidated \"clearinghouse\" approach would provide greater standardization of procurement processes, improved accountability and oversight, as well as more effi cient mechanisms for market research, cost comparisons, and evaluation of performance metrics among vendors. A recent IC reform proposal by Sen. Saxby Chambliss (D-GA) has called for the consolidation of the entire military intelligence community under an \"INTCOM\" unifi ed command structure.201 If such a proposal were adopted it would be the logical embryo for a unifi ed intelligence contracting command that would greatly strengthen management and oversight of commercial augmentation programs.\n\nThese reform proposals offer the baseline requirements needed for the effective management, integration, and oversight of commercial intelligence augmentation. With improved controls and management procedures it is possible to imagine a much wider range of future applications for commercialized intelligence support, particularly as private sector providers establish strong records of accountability and performance. Some observers have gone so far as to suggest that the IC should actively seek to \"offload\" certain operational responsibilities as soon as commercial entities are capable of handling them, noting that \"if intelligence consumers could use a commercial substitute whenever they found one that met their needs, intelligence managers would have more opportunity (and incentive) to concentrate on those highly specialized areas in which government has a comparative advantage.\"202\nThe potential scenarios for such a capability are easily imaginable. Routine surveillance duties or monitoring of demilitarized zones such as the Sinai or the Balkans could be adequately managed by properly equipped commercial enterprises. Intelligence support to United Nations missions or to non-governmental humanitarian relief efforts are other scenarios where specialized private sector corporations could provide surveillance functions, open-source collection, and mission-focused analysis. The integration of private corporations into these lower-priority missions could potentially free operational forces to concentrate on more diffi cult higher-priority contingency operations.\n\n## Option Three: Radical Change Into A Virtual Networked Intelligence Community\n\nThe fi nal proposal is a step beyond what current augmentation programs provide.\n\nIt offers an aggressive model for market-based governance that challenges the basic structure of the intelligence bureaucracy, replacing it with a \"networked\" organizational model that is highly responsive, adaptable, innovative, and scalable.203 Rather than simply consuming the products of commercialization, the IC would re-craft itself along a corporate model and become a strategic competitor for the best talent and technology in the private sector. As several IC reform advocates have observed, \"the Intelligence Community needs at least as much fl exibility as private corporations. Many of its requirements for specialized information are likely to change quickly. Traditional civil service tenure is probably suited only for employees with the most general, long-term skills.\"204 As one study of intelligence privatization has suggested the \"strength of non-governmental intelligence is partially based upon its high degree of operational fl exibility, a minimal need to acquiesce to political constituencies, a higher level of effi ciency and often, a better return on investment.\"205 The value of market-based governance models would permit IC organizations to capitalize on these inherent qualities of private sector enterprise.\n\nThe concept of networked governance is a somewhat ambiguous term but it has been used to describe a process whereby state agencies rely upon the collaboration of a variety of non-governmental providers to deliver a public good. The most attractive feature of this model is its enormous potential for dynamic collaboration as traditional bureaucracy is replaced by a consortium of independent providers. In essence, this has been the model for defense hardware procurement for some time - a directed partnership among strategic planners, government research and development programs, independent think tanks, and private industry.\n\nThe proposed system would create a dynamic, networked, virtual intelligence program based upon the model of the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency's management structure.206 As an agency focused on \"revolutionary, high-payoff research,\" DARPA's management model minimizes facilities, institutional structures, and permanent personnel. As a key element of this management philosophy, \"DARPA\ninvests about 90 percent of its funds at organizations outside of federal government, primarily at universities and in industry.\"207 The organizational goal is to build dynamic, innovative, short-term project management teams to solve DoD's most diffi cult technical problems.\n\nOf particular relevance to this study is DARPA's use of several special contracting authorities to build its project teams. The use of \"Experimental Personnel Authority\" provides DARPA with signifi cant latitude to acquire unique technical expertise and develop contractual relationships with the private sector entities and research universities. These authorities permit the Secretary of Defense to carry out programs under a special personnel management authority to hire temporary \"employees in the civil service, appoint scientists and engineers from outside the civil service and uniformed services...without regard to any provision of title 5, United States Code.\"208 These short-term, project-based management teams are able to avoid the formation of institutional interests that inhibit innovation and discourage collaboration with nongovernmental expertise.\n\nCertainly a DARPA-like program of \"networked government\" is not suitable or necessary for many routine intelligence functions, but it does offer a potential model for managing short-term surge requirements and providing an innovative structure for conducting the type of serious in-depth research that is often sacrifi ced to the daily demand for current intelligence products. Among the recommendations of the committee report on WMD intelligence failures was the creation of a not-for-profi t \"sponsored research institution\" to serve the Intelligence Community. Such an organization would be fi nanced by IC dollars but insulated from Community management in order to seek innovative and creative solutions to the nation's most demanding technical and analytical challenges. Although this type of virtual networked community is not suitable for most Intelligence Community organizations, the approach does offer a model for using the government's contracting power to develop focused, adaptable, and specialized teams to tackle a broad range of intelligence challenges that are not met by the traditional bureaucratic structure.\n\n## Are There Practical Examples Of \"Thinking Outside The Box?\"209\n\nCarolLyn Lewis's Technology Investment Agreements and the Technology Fellowship: A Case Study for Thinking Outside the Tool Box presents an example of contracting methods that take the Intelligence Community outside of a comfort zone, into new methods that may be more relevant to changed and radically improved communication and technological skills.\n\nCarolLyn Lewis's Technology Investment Agreements and the Technology Fellowship: A Case Study for Thinking Outside the Tool Box presents an example of contracting methods that take the Intelligence Community outside of a comfort zone, into new methods that may be more relevant to changed and radically improved communication and technological skills. In her research Lewis proposes that a Technology Fellowship Program (TFP) could inject future National Reconnaissance Offi ce (NRO) mission needs into current industry research and development (IR&D) programs, and that one-year research fellowships with experts in a particular technology may benefi t NRO long-term objectives. TFP\nobjectives include the participant's solving a research problem during the fellowship, and then taking lessons learned and ideas for supporting government initiatives back to industry. Using a Technical Investment Agreement (TIA) instead of a standard contract vehicle would improve the amount of participation from industry. Though commonly used in federal agencies, sectors of the Intelligence Community have been slow to embrace TIAs, apparently unaware they exist. Recognizing that her proposal will shift the type of participating commercial business away from the traditional consulting fi rms that held the majority of the fellowships, she is aware of the challenges in an arena that has not readily accepted rapid or radical changes.\n\nIn her research Lewis proposes that a Technology Fellowship Program (TFP) could inject future National Reconnaissance Offi ce (NRO) mission needs into current industry research and development (IR&D) programs, and that one-year research fellowships with experts in a particular technology may benefi t NRO long-term objectives. TFP\nobjectives include the participant's solving a research problem during the fellowship, and then taking lessons learned and ideas for supporting government initiatives back to industry. Using a Technical Investment Agreement (TIA) instead of a standard contract vehicle would improve the amount of participation from industry. Though commonly used in federal agencies, sectors of the Intelligence Community have been slow to embrace TIAs, apparently unaware they exist. Recognizing that her proposal will shift the type of participating commercial business away from the traditional consulting fi rms that held the majority of the fellowships, she is aware of the challenges in an arena that has not readily accepted rapid or radical changes.\n\n\n\n## Conclusion\n\nThe three proposed models provide a range of potential options for harnessing non-governmental and commercial resources to create a dynamic, fl exible, and responsive IC surge capacity. To varying degrees all three proposals require some basic reconsideration of the traditional IC bureaucracy, but it is important to note that none of the options relieves the government of responsibility for careful contract development, good management practices, and effective surveillance methodologies. Thus, the present study offers the baseline evaluative criteria that must be applied to any program of commercial augmentation.\n\nRegardless of the future direction of IC reform, some form of commercial augmentation will undoubtedly play a vital role in the collection, analysis, and production of intelligence support to national security policy. In order to meet the security challenges of the post-9/11 world, private industry must be viewed as a strategic partner of the Intelligence Community. Collaborative effort with nongovernmental entities offers a powerful mechanism to diversify and strengthen the IC's collection and analytical capabilities, but to fully realize the benefi t of these resources the management and oversight of commercial providers must become a core competency for all intelligence organizations.\n\n## Appendix Evaluative Criteria For Determining The Applicability Of Commercialized Intelligence Augumentation: Consolidated Case Study Overview\n\nEvaluative Criteria\nPersonnel\nSecurity\nInvestigations\nAcceptability of Private\nSector Involvement\nContract service does not perform inherently governmental functions\n\n\n?\nContract administration adheres to proper solicitation and award procedures\nContract service does not undermine operational security\n\n\n?\nVendor offers a best value alternative (price and performance standards)\n\n\n?\nSuitability of Vendor Services\nVendor offer-unique services or products unavailable in the public sector\n\n\n\nVendor offers scalability if service and fl exible output to meet mission requirements Contract is negotiated in a mature market environment with in-sector competition Bidder offers past performance record and known reliability\n\n\n?\nAccountability of Contract\nManagement Procedures\nContract language offers clear legal oversight and accountability\n\n\n\nContract offers clear Statement of Work (SOW) and evaluation procedures\n\n\n\nContract provides effective integration plan and clear performance measures\n\n\n\nGovernment possesses suffi ciently trained, on-site contract management personnel\nCommercial\nRemote\nSensing\nGWOT\nOperational\nSupport\n\n\n\n## Bibliography\n\n\"Abuse by Outsourcing.\" Editorial. *Washington Post*, online ed., 26 May 2004. 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Accessed 28 October 2004.\nFinnegan, John Patrick. *Army Lineage Series: Military Intelligence.* Washington, DC:\nCenter of Military History, 1998. URL: <http://www.army.mil/cmh-pg/books/\nLineage/mi/mi-fm.html>. Accessed 21 October 2004.\nFishel, Edwin C. The Secret War for the Union: The Untold Story of Military Intelligence\nin the Civil War. Boston: Houghton Miffl in Company, 1996.\nGansler, Jacques S., Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Technology.\n\"Guidebook for Performance-Based Services Acquisition (PBSA) in the Department of Defense.\" 2 January 2001. URL: <http://www.acq.osd.mil/dpap/\nDocs/pbsaguide010201.pdf>, accessed 2 May 2005.\n\nGeneral Services Administration. *Federal Acquisition Regulation,* September 2001.\nURL: *<http://www.arnet.gov/far/>.* Accessed 6 October 2004.\nGibson, Gail, and Scott Shane. \"Contractors Act as Interrogators.\" *Baltimore Sun,* online\ned., 4 May 2004. URL: <http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/nationworld/balte.contractors04may04,0,6476999.story>. Accessed 10 August 2004.\nGoodman, Allan, and others. In from the Cold: The Report of the Twentieth Century\nFund Task Force on the Future of U.S. Intelligence. New York: The Twentieth\nCentury Fund Press, 1996.\nGovernment Accountability Offi ce. DoD Needs to Overcome Impediments to\nEliminating Backlog and Determining Its Size. GAO-04-344, February 2004. URL: *<http://www.gao.gov/highlights/d04344high.pdf>.* Accessed 10 November 2004.\n________. Foreign Languages: Human Capital Approach Needed to Correct Staffi ng\nand Profi ciency Shortfalls. GAO-02-375, January 2002. URL: <http://www. gao.gov/new.items/d02375.pdf>. Accessed 13 October 2004.\n________. Inadequate Personnel Security Investigations Pose National Security Risks.\nGAO/NSIAD-00-12, October 1999. URL: <http://www.gao.gov/archive/2000/\nns00065t.pdf>. Accessed 13 November 2004.\n________. Inadequate Personnel Security Investigations Pose National Security\nRisks, Statement of Carol R. Schuster, Associate Director, National Security Preparedness Issues, National Security and International Affairs Division, Testimony before the Subcommittee on National Security, Veterans Affairs, and International Relations. GAO/T-NSIAD-00-65, 16 February 2000. URL: <http://www.gao.gov/archive/2000/ns00065t.pdf>. Accessed 9 March 2005.\n________. Interagency Contracting: Problems with DoD's and Interior's Orders to\nSupport Military Operations. GAO-05-201, April 2005. URL: <http://www.\ngao.gov/highlights/d05201high.pdf>. Accessed 11 May 2005.\n________. Intelligence Reform: Human Capital Considerations Critical to 9/11\nCommission's Proposed Reforms. GAO-04-1084T, September 2004. URL: <\nhttp://www.gao.gov/new.items/d041084t.pdf >. Accessed 13 November 2004.\n________. Military Operations: Contractors Provide Vital Services to Deployed\nForces but Are Not Adequately Addressed in DOD Plans. GAO-03-695, June\n2003. URL: *<http://www.gao.gov/highlights/d03695high.pdf >.* Accessed 13 October 2004.\n\n## Grinfeld, Michael J. \"War Incorporated.\" *California Lawyer,* May 2005: 22-28.\n\nGrossman, Elaine M. \"Possible Interrogation Contractor Infl uence Cited in Senate Vote.\"\nInside the Pentagon, online edition, 24 June 2004. URL: <http://www.d-n-i.net/ grossman/contractor_infl uence_cited.htm>. Accessed 22 October 2004.\nGuttman, Dan. \"The Shadow Pentagon.\" *The Center for Public Integrity* (September\n2004),\nonline\nstudy.\nURL:\n<http://www.publicintegrity.org/pns/report.\naspx?aid=386>. Accessed 30 September 2004.\nHarrington, Caitlin. \"Backlog of Pentagon Security Clearances Nearing 200,000.\"\nCQ.com Homeland Security, 26 May 2004. URL: <http://www.cqhls.com/hs/ dislay.do?dockey/cqonline/prod/data/docs/html/hsnews/108>. Accessed 17\nMarch 2005.\nHarris, Shane. \"Defense Department Lacks Staff to Tackle Security Clearance\nBacklog.\" *GOVEXEC.com.* online ed., 27 May 2004. URL: <http://www.\ngovexec.com/dailyfed/0504/052704h1.htm>. Accessed 21 September 2004.\n________. \"GSA Canceled Guantanamo Interrogator Contract.\" *GOVEXEC.com.*\nonline ed., 16 July 2004. URL: <http://www.govexec.com/dailyfed/0704/ 071604h1.htm>. Accessed 9 May 2005.\nHenry, Patrick T., Assistant Secretary of the Army. \"Intelligence Exemption\nMemorandum for the Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence,\" 26 December 2000.\n\"Interim Rule to the Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement (DFARS):\nPersonal Services Contracts.\" *Federal Register* 69, No. 180, 17 September 2004. URL: *<http://www.acq.osd.mil/dpap/dars/dfars/changenotice>.* Accessed 3\nNovember 2004.\nKupchinsky, Roman. \"Information Revolution Feeds Alternative Intelligence Market.''\nRadio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 23 May 2005. URL: <http://www.rferl. org/featuresarticle/2005/05/e1dc62e7-504a-4abb-a61f-008f7167bfab.html>. Accessed 3 June 2005.\nLewis, CarolLyn, Technology Investment Agreements and the Technology Fellowship:\nA Case Study for Thinking Outside the Tool Box, unpublished MSSI Thesis,\nWashington, DC: Joint Military Intelligence College, 2004.\nLowenthal, Mark. \"Open Source Intelligence: New Myths, New Realities.\" Defense\nDaily News Special Reports, 2004. URL: <http://www.defensedaily.com/\nreports/osintmyths.htm>. Accessed 10 August 2004.\nLowenthal, Mark, and Robert David Steele. \"Open Source Intelligence: Private Sector\nCapabilities to Support DOD Policy, Acquisition, and Operations.\" Defense\nDaily News Special Reports, 2004. URL: <http://www.fas.org/irp/eprint/\noss980501.htm>. Accessed 10 August 2004.\nMakinson, Larry. \"Outsourcing the Pentagon.\" The Center for Public Integrity,\n(September\n2004).\nURL:\n<http://www.publicintegrity.org/pns/report.\naspx?aid=386>. Accessed 30 September 2004.\nMarket-Based Governance: Supply Side, Demand Side, Upside, and Downside. Eds.\nJohn D. Donahue and Joseph S. Nye. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2002.\nMcCarthy, Ellen. \"Changes behind the Barbed Wire: New Standards are in Place for\nthe Oversight of Contract Workers at Abu Ghraib Prison.\" Washington Post,\nonline ed., 13 December 2004. URL: <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/articles/A59673-2004Dec12.html>. Accessed 13 December 2004.\n\"Measure Banning Private Sector Interrogations Fails in Senate.\" GOVEXEC.com\nDaily Briefi ng, online ed. 16 June 2004. URL: <http://www.govexec.com/\ndailyfed/0604/061604cdpm4.htm>. Accessed 22 October 2004.\nMercado, Stephen C. \"Sailing the Sea of OSINT in the Information Age,\" Studies\nin Intelligence: Journal of the American Intelligence Professional 48, no. 3 (2004): 45-55.\nNational Defense University, National Security Education Program. United States\nCivilian Linguist Reserve Corps Feasibility Study, 2004. URL: <www.ndu.edu/\nnsep>. Accessed 12 August 2004.\nNational Security Personnel System, NSPS Design and Implementation, Web-only\ndocument. URL: *<http://www.cpms.osd.mil/nsps>.* Accessed 23 November\n2004.\nNestercznk, George. \"Reviewing the National Performance Review.\" *Regulation* 19,\nNo. 3, 1996. URL: <http://www.cato.org/pubs/regulation/reg19n3b.html>. Accessed 10 November 2004.\n\"NGA Taps ORBIMAGE for Clearview.\" GEO World, Government Connection.\nMay 2004, URL: <http://www.geoplace.com/uploads/georeport/040407.htm>. Accessed 16 November 2004.\nOffi ce of Management and Budget. \"Federal Acquisition Regulation, Circular No.\nA-76.\" 4 August 1983, revised 1999. URL: <http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/ circulars/a076/a076.html>. Accessed 25 August 2004.\nO'Harrow, Robert. \"In Age of Security, Firm Mines Wealth of Personal Data.\"\nWashington Post, online ed., 20 January 2005. URL: <http://www. washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A22269-2005Jan19.html>. Accessed 20 January 2005.\nOPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM Study Group. \"Intelligence Battlefi eld Operating\nSystem Initial Observations.\" 19 June 2003. URL: <https://www.calldr. leavenworth.army.mil>. Accessed 13 November 2004.\nPerlak, Joseph R., MAJ, USA. \"The Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act of 2000:\nImplications for Contractor Personnel.\" *Military Law Review* 169, September\n2001, 93-141.\nPhillips, Zack. \"Performance-Based Contracts Gaining Popularitybut is the\nGovernment Ready to Use Them?\" *CQ.com Homeland Security,* 17 November\n2004. URL: <http://www.cqhls.com/hs/dislay.do?dockey=/cqonline/prod/data/ docs/html/hsnews/108>. Accessed 17 March 2005.\nReddy, Anitha, and Ellen McCarthy. \"CACI in the Dark on Reports of Abuse.\"\nWashington Post, online ed., 6 May 2004. URL: <http://www.washingtonpost.\ncom/ac2/wp-dyn/A5677-2004May5?language=printer>. Accessed 6 May 2004.\nRegalado, Antonio. \"U.S. Allows Dissemination of Satellite Photos of Iraq.\" The Wall\nStreet Journal, 21 March 2003. URL: <http://www.globalsecurity.org/org/\nnews/2003/030321-iraq-imagery01.htm>. Accessed 16 November 2004.\nRose, P.K. *The Founding Fathers of American Intelligence.* Washington DC: CIA,\nCenter for the Study of Intelligence, 1999. URL: <http://www.cia.gov/csi/ books/940299/art-1.html>. Accessed 21 October 2004.\nSchooner, Steven L. \"Contractor Atrocities at Abu Ghraib: Compromised Accountability\nin a Streamlined, Outsourced Government\" *Stanford Law and Policy Review*\n16, No. 2, 2005. URL: <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_ id=605367>. Accessed 23 November 2004.\nSchwartz, Nelson D., and Noshua Watson. \"The Pentagon's Private Army.\" Fortune,\n17, March 2003, 100-105.\nShorrock, Tim. \"The Spy Who Billed Me.\" *Mother Jones,* January-February 2005.\nURL:<http://www.motherjones.com/news/outfront/2005/01/12_400.html>. Accessed 8 March 2005.\nSietzen, Frank. \"A Clearview of NIMA's Commercial Imagery Use.\" Geospatial\nSolutions, online ed., 1 March 2003. URL: <http:www.geospatialonline.com/\ngeospatialsolutions/content/jps?id=4>. Accessed 16 September 2004.\nSinger, Peter. *Corporate Warriors: The Rise of the Privatized Military Industry.* Ithaca,\nNY: Cornell University Press, 2003.\n________. \"The Contract the Military Needs to Break.\" *Washington Post,* 12 September\n2004, B4.\nSmith, Eugene. \"The New Condottieri and U.S. Policy: The Privatization of Confl ict\nand Its Implications.\" *Parameters* 32, no. 4, Winter 2002 - 2003, 104-119.\nSmith, Marcia S. U.S. Space Programs: Civilian, Military, and Commercial.\nWashington, DC: Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, 2003.\nStarks, Tim. \"ManTech Wins a Seat on Defense Intelligence and Security Contract,\"\nCQ.com Homeland Security, 25 January 2005. URL: <http://www.cqhls.com/hs/ display.do?dockey/cqonline/prod/data/docs/html>. Accessed 17 March 2005\nSteele, Robert David. \"Relevant Information: A New Approach to Collection, Sharing\nand Analysis.\" Unpublished white paper by the OSS Academy, 15 March 1999.\nURL:\n<http://downloads.securityfocus.com/library/infowar/papers/\nISDoctrine.doc>. Accessed 10 May 2005.\n________. *The New Craft of Intelligence: Personal, Public and Political.* Oakton,\nVirginia: OSS International Press, 2002. URL: <http://www.oss.net/dynamaster/\nfi le_archive/020731/7e44d06d4268c8b030d47d58c01fca03/chapter15.doc>.\nAccessed 8 August 2004.\nStrohecker, Scott J. Peacekeeping for Hire? The Potential Role of Private Military\nCompanies in Peace Operations, MSSI Thesis, Washington, DC: Joint Military\nIntelligence College, 1999.\nSutton, James R. Subversion of a Government Monopoly: The Privatization of Intelligence\nServices. Erie, PA: Research Intelligence Consortium, Inc, February 2000.\nSwicker, Eileen G. Strategic Restructuring of the US Intelligence Community: A Civilian\nIntelligence Reserve. Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College Strategy Research Project, 1998. URL: <http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA342156>. Accessed 4 June 2005.\n\"The Information Edge: Imagery Intelligence and Geospatial Information in an Evolving\nNational Security Environment,\" Report of the Independent Commission on the\nNational Imagery and Mapping Agency, December 2000. URL: <http://www.fas. org/irp/agency/nima/commission/article02.htm>. Accessed 16 September 2004.\nTice, Jim. \"Critical-skills Bonus Program Expanding.\" *ArmyTimes.com,* 7 March 2005.\nURL:<http://www.armytimes.com/sgmlparse.php?f=archive2/20050307/ atpc19257836.sgml>. Accessed 10 March 2005.\nTiron, Roxana. \"Army Not Equipped to Manage Contractors on the Battlefi eld.\"\nTreverton, Gregory. Reshaping National Intelligence in an Age of Information.\nCambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2001.\n________. \"Intelligence and the Market State.\" *Studies in Intelligence* 45, no. 10,\nWinter-Spring 2001, 69-76.\nU.S. Army Central Command, Combined Arms Assessment Team (CAAT).\n\"OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM: CAAT Initial Impressions Report,\"\nSeptember 2002. Ft. Leavenworth, KS: Center for Army Lessons Learned, 2002. URL:\n<https://www.//call2.army.mil/products/iir/asp/BOSNIA/BHCAAT2/\nhtml/appc.asp>. Accessed 3 September 2004.\nU.S. Army Third Infantry Division. \"OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM Lessons\nLearned,\" May 2003. Ft. Leavenworth, KS: Center for Army Lessons Learned, 2003. URL: *<https: www.//call2.army.mil/products/on-point/asp/>.* Accessed 14 November 2004.\nU.S. Army. Pamphlet 715-16 (Procurement), *Contractor Deployment Guide,* 27\nFebruary 1998. URL: <http://www.army.mil/usapa/epubs/pdf/p715_16.pdf>. Accessed 5 November 2004.\n________. Regulation 381-10, *U.S. Army Intelligence Activities,* Washington, DC:\nDepartment of the Army, July 1984.\n________. Field Manual (FM) 3-100. *Contractors on the Battlefi eld.* Washington, DC:\nDepartment of the Army, January 2003.\n\"U.S. Commercial Remote Sensing Policy Fact Sheet,\" Offi ce of Science and\nTechnology Policy, Executive Offi ce of the President, 25 April 2003. URL: <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/05/20030513-8.html>. Accessed 17 September 2004.\nU.S. Congress, House. *IC21: Intelligence Community in the 21st Century,* 104th\nCong., 1996. URL: *<http://www.gpoaccess.gov/int/int017.html>,* accessed 6\nMarch 2006.\n________. *Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004.* 108th Cong., 2d\nsess., 7 December 2004. URL: <http://www.c-span.org/pdf/2004IntelAct.pdf>. Accessed 7 March 2005.\n________. Joint Inquiry into Intelligence Community Activities before and after the\nTerrorist Attacks of September 11, 2001. 107th Cong., 2d sess., December 2002, URL: *<http://www.gpoaccess.gov/serialset/creports/911.html>.* Accessed 15 August 2004.\n________. *Permanent General Laws Relating to Indian Affairs, Revised Statues.* 44th\nCong., 1st sess., 1876, Title XIV, Chapter 3, Sec. 1112 Indian Scouts. URL:\n<http://digital.library.okstate.edu/kappler/Vol1/HTML_fi les/p1_22img.html>.\nAccessed 29 October 2004.\n________. Ronald W. Reagan National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year\n2005. 108th Cong., 2nd sess., 20 January 2004. H.R. 4200. URL: <http://www.\nwifcon.com/dodauth05.htm>. Accessed 11 November 2004.\nU.S. Congress, Senate. Conference Committee Comments on Fiscal Year 2004\nIntelligence Authorization Bill and Other Matters, S. 108-044, 108th Cong.,\n2nd sess., 8 May 2003. URL: <http://www.fas.org/irp/congress/2003_rpt/ srpt108-44.html>. Accessed 17 March 2005.\n\nU.S. General Services Administration. *Federal Acquisition Regulation,* September\n2001. URL: *<http://www.arnet.gov/far/>.* Accessed 6 October 2004.\nU.S. Joint Forces Command. \"Joint Lessons Learned: Operation IRAQI FREEDOM\nMajor Combat Operations.\" Norfolk: Unpublished coordinating draft report dated 1 March 2004.\nU.S. President, Executive Order 12333, \"United States Intelligence Activities.\" 4\nDecember 1981.\nVerloy, Andre, and Daniel Politi. \"Contracting Intelligence: Department of Interior\nReleases Abu Ghraib Contract.\" *The Center for Public Integrity* (28 July 2003).\nURL: <http://www.publicintegrity.org/wow/report.aspx?aid=361&sid=100>. Accessed 8 August 2004.\nVoelz, Glenn, MAJ, USA. Managing the Private Spies: The Use of Commercial\nAugmentation for Intelligence Operations. MSSI Thesis, Washington, DC:\nJoint Military Intelligence College, 2005.\nWagner, Arthur L. *The Service of Security and Information.* Washington, DC: James\nL. Chapman, 1893.\nWayne, Lesie. \"Pentagon Spends without Bids, a Study Finds,\" *New York Times,* online\ned., 30 September 2004. URL: <http://query.nytimes.com/gst/abstract.html?res= F00B14F93E5C0C738FDDA00894DC404482>. Accessed 30 September 2004.\nWeisman, Jonathan, and Thomas E. Ricks. \"Increase in War Funding Sought: Bush\nSeeks Another $70 billion for Iraq and Afghanistan.\" *Washington Post,* online ed., 25 October 2004. URL: <http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn/ A62554-2004Oct25?language=printer>. Accessed 26 October 2004.\nYounger, Raymond. How Can the U.S. Army Effectively Outsource Tactical EW/SIGINT\nto Retain Mission Effectiveness? MSSI Thesis, Washington, DC: Joint Military Intelligence College, 2002.\nWitte, Griff. \"Contractors were Poorly Monitored, GAO Says.\" Washington Post,\nonline ed., 30 April 2005. URL: <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/\ncontent/article/2005/04/29/AR2005042901706.html>. Accessed 11 May 2005.\n\n## About The Author\n\nMajor Glenn J. Voelz was commissioned as an Infantry offi cer from the United States Military Academy at West Point in 1992. His previous assignments include service with two separate infantry battalions in Berlin, Germany and Vicenza, Italy. Assigned to the Army's World Class Athlete Program for the sport of Modern Pentathlon, he competed in the 1996 U.S. Olympic Trials.\n\nAfter transferring to Military Intelligence, Major Voelz served for two years as a budget and logistics officer, then company commander for a human intelligence and counterintelligence battalion in the Republic of Korea. Subsequent to this, he was appointed as an Assistant Professor in the Department of History at West Point, where he taught from 2001 to 2003.\n\nHe is currently an advisor to the Joint Intelligence Staff of the Saudi Arabian Ministry of Defense and Aviation as part of the U.S. Military Training Mission to the Kingdom. He manages industrial security oversight for the U.S. Security Assistance Program and Foreign Military Sales cases to the Kingdom, and provides technical assistance on intelligence training, education, and doctrinal development for staff of the Saudi Arabian Armed Forces.\n\nMajor Voelz holds a Master of Arts degree from the University of Virginia and a Master of Science of Strategic Intelligence degree from the Joint Military Intelligence College."
    },
    {
        "text": "CLEARED\nFor Open Publication\n\nOct 17, 2023\n\nDepartment of Defense OFFICE OF PREPUBLICATION AND SECURITY REVIEW\n\nUAP Attribution: The assessed natural or artificial source of the phenomenon and includes solar, weather, tidal events; U.S. Government, scientific, industry, and private activities; and foreign (allied or adversary) government, scientific, industry, and private activities.\n\nUAP Risk: A safety hazard to persons, materiel, or information (e.g., from collision).\n\nUAP Threat: A force-protection and/or national- security threat to persons, materiel, or information by UAP that demonstrate hostile intent."
    },
    {
        "text": "Spy the Lie Detecting Malicious Insiders March 2018\nCF Noonan Spy the Lie CF Noonan March 2018 Prepared for the U.S. Department of Energy under Contract DE-AC05-76RL01830 Pacific Northwest National Laboratory Richland, Washington  99352\n\n\n## Abstract\n\n\nInsider threat is a hard problem. There is no ground truth, there are innumerable variables, and the data is sparse. The types of crimes and abuses associated with insider threats are significant; the most serious include espionage, sabotage, terrorism, embezzlement, extortion, bribery, and corruption. Malicious activities include an even broader range of exploits, such as negligent use of classified data, fraud, cybercrime, unauthorized access to sensitive information, and illicit communications with unauthorized recipients. Inadvertent action or inaction without malicious intent (e.g., disposing of sensitive documents incorrectly) can also cause harm to an organization. This literature review paper will explore insider threat, specifically behaviors, beliefs, and current debates within the field. Additionally particular focus is given to deception, a significant behavioral component of the malicious insider. Finally, research and policy implications for law enforcement and the intelligence community are addressed. The cut-off date for literature reviewed for this report is July 2016.\n\n\n\n## Figures\n\nFigure 1. Typology of deviant workplace behavior  ........ 3.30\nFigure 2. The critical pathway to insider threat behavior  ........ 4.35\n\n\n## Tables\n\nTable 1. Psychosocial Indicators of Insider Threat  ........ 2.12\nTable 2. Motives for deception  ........ 3.15\nTable 3. Linguistic cues useful for testing deception models  ........ 3.21\nTable 4. Verbal techniques used by deceivers during an interview or interrogation  ........ 3.23\n\n## 1.0 Introduction\n\nAll organizations face security risks. In 2011, President Obama issued Executive Order 13587 -\nStructural Reforms to Improve the Security of Classified Networks and the Responsible Sharing and Safeguarding of Classified Information.1 This was quickly followed in 2012 by the National Insider Threat Policy and Minimum Standards for Executive Branch Insider Threat Programs.2\nThe Order and the Policy provide additional guidance for the development of insider threat programs in federal agencies that handle classified information. Despite the formulation of an insider threat strategy and policy, federal agencies nonetheless currently still grapple with how to implement their own programs and in the process, better understand the human and organizational issues surrounding the insider threat problem.\n\nInsider threat is a hard problem; there is no ground truth, innumerable variables, and sparse data. We often fail to acknowledge the impacts of socio-cultural and organizational influences on a person's capability, motivation, and opportunity to commit an insider crime. Edward Snowden is the most discussed public face of insider threat, who in 2013 leaked thousands of classified documents. Among other monikers, Snowden has been called a traitor, whistleblower, and patriot. Studies reveal younger generations (e.g. the Millennials1) believe him to be a political hero. Despite being charged with espionage, global polls conducted by the ACLU reveal that Millennials have a positive opinion of Snowden and view his actions favorably.2 This cult-hero status poses a significant challenge to agencies managing classified data. Studies show employees who feel valued and who identify with their employer's mission/vision work harder and maintain a firm workplace attachment.3, 4 The attachments made between an employee and\n\ntheir employer is referred to as organizational commitment.4, 5 However, the opposite can also happen. When an employee does not feel valued, they can exhibit a range of counterproductive work behaviors - everything from acts of violence to something as benign as calling in sick when not ill. These negative or maladaptive behaviors are used by employees against an organization and its representatives to exercise punishment (i.e., revenge) for perceived injustice.6, 7 A sizeable body of research has established the tie between individual differences in personality and workplace incivility when the individual is under stress. Specific volitional acts include aggression, deceit, hostility, sabotage, and theft among others.8, 9  This work will explore insider threat, specifically behaviors, beliefs, and current debates within the field. Additionally particular focus is given to deception, a significant behavioral component of the malicious insider.\n\n\n## 2.0 Insider Threat, Espionage And Spying\n\nThe insider threat refers to harmful acts that trusted insiders might carry outfor example, something that causes harm to the organization or an unauthorized act that benefits the insider. The insider is generally referred to as \"a current or former employee, contractor, or business partner who has or had authorized access to an organization's network, system, or data and has intentionally exceeded or intentionally used that access in a manner that negatively affected the confidentiality, integrity, or availability of the organization's information or information systems.\"10 Insiders are trusted individuals. They have been vetted by an organization and in many cases have been granted special privileges such as access to data, facilities, equipment and materials. Trust is established through a variety of mechanisms including a background check, security clearance investigation, credit checks, personal interviews, drug tests, polygraphs, and more.\n\nThe insider threat is manifested when human behaviors depart from established policies, regardless of whether it results from malice or disregard. The types of crimes and abuses associated with insider threats are significant; the most serious include espionage, sabotage, terrorism, embezzlement, extortion, bribery, and corruption.11, 12 Insider threat may also include intellectual property theft, purposely or unwittingly mishandling classified data, fraud, unauthorized access to sensitive information, and other forms of cyber offenses such as social engineering.\n\nInsider threat can be defined as a \"wicked problem;\" there is no readily available quantitative data for the development of ground truth. Wicked problems are defined as social or policy issues that are difficult or impossible to solve13 which is due to numerous variables, sparse data, incomplete or contradictory information, and the interconnectedness of one problem with another. In the case of insider threat, there is no one driver for why an individual resolves to commit acts of crime. The decision to engage in deviant behavior can be influenced by personal health predispositions, such as clinical depression, and manifestation of certain psychosocial behaviors. This is a multifaceted phenomenon encompassing personality, personal history, life events, and more. For all of these reasons, insider threat is difficult to model and therefore to predict.\n\nBy definition, cyber-crime is any crime committed via a computer network. Many insider abuses (e.g., unauthorized access to data, intellectual property theft) can be conducted via a computer as demonstrated in the recent classified data leakage cases involving Chelsea (nee, Bradley) Manning, Edward Snowden, and most recently, Harold Martin III. Cyber security firms indicate insider threats are on the rise, are hard to detect, expensive to mitigate, and take the longest amount of time to resolve.14  Computer technology cannot fundamentally alter human behavior; rather, computers are a means to manipulate the physical world and facilitate malicious activity. Deployment of security technologies is not the only way to address the problem. Criminal and psychological profiling are approaches by which organizations can detect and decrease abuse from the inside.15-17 However, there are serious limitations in this approach as there is no one accepted profile of an insider.\n\n## 2.1 Insider Threat Typology\n\nThe impact of insider threat activities largely depends on the type of activities an individual engages in and the intended outcome of those actions. Insiders vary greatly in their level of threat due to their role within an organization, their level of access (this includes computer access as well as physical access), and knowledge of resources (e.g., financial, intellectual property) and organizational policies/procedures. For example, a systems administrator has access to a larger number of computing resources than does a data entry clerk. In addition to an employee's role, access, and knowledge, insider activities can be influenced by people outside an organization.\n\nThis includes disgruntled employees collaborating with a competitor or cybercriminal.\nResearchers have extensively studied insiders' motivation to attack.11, 18-24  As discovered in the literature there are two major types of insider threat - malicious/intentional and unintentional. Malicious intent refers to a desire to cause harm to an organization or its assets.\n\nIntentional insider threat abuses are significant; the most serious include espionage, sabotage, terrorism, embezzlement, extortion, bribery, and corruption.25 Malicious activities include an even broader range of exploits, such as negligent use of classified data, fraud, unauthorized access to sensitive information, data or materials, and illicit communications with unauthorized recipients (ibid.).\nThe unintentional insider inadvertently causes harm to the confidentiality, integrity or availability of organizational resources. While not the specific focus of this research, it is beneficial to understand the differences between willful disregard for authority (intentional and malicious insider threat) and simple negligence or ignorance of policies/procedures (unintentional insider threat). Inadvertent action or inaction through poor performance can also cause harm to an organization. Unintentional insider threat has been referred to in the literature by a number of terms including accidental, inadvertent, innocuous, and unintended insider threat.19, 26, 27 Examples of unintentional insider threat behavior are disposing of sensitive documents incorrectly or being the victim of social engineering.26\n\n## 2.2 Modeling, Motives And Insider Crimes\n\nInsider theft is a crime and according to some criminologists, crimes are generally believed to be preventable and predictable.28 However, despite ample research into the psychology and motivation of insiders who engage in actions that harm their employer, the fact remains that it is very difficult to predict insider exploits.23, 29 Considerable anecdotal evidence and postincarceration interviews suggest the possibility of detecting warning signs of impending insider attacks.21, 29, 30 Warning signs can include changes in behavior, verbal outbursts, negativity, security breaches, confrontational, and deceitful behavior.7, 30, 31\nModeling and mitigating the insider threat has been explored for years and will not be discussed at length here. Major research groups such as the Software Engineering Institute at Carnegie Mellon University (CERT), various Universities, National Laboratories, law enforcement and intelligence agencies have all invested millions of dollars into understanding how to build a secure workforce and protect critical assets. Major forms of insider crimes are defined below.\n\nThe terms spying and espionage are used interchangeably and refer to the act of taking or obtaining information covertly and without permission of the owner. Industrial espionage is a form of espionage used to gather information about a company or organization and to acquire intellectual property or proprietary data/information.32 Competitive advantage can be achieved through the illegal acquisition of information. Espionage occurs in one of two ways - through the use of insiders or outright theft. Motivations for insiders vary and include experiencing a personal crisis (e.g., health, financial) or as an act of civil disobedience.33, 34\nEmployee behavior in the workplace intended to damage, disrupt, or subvert an organization's operations for personal purposes are considered sabotage.11 Acts of sabotage can include delays in production lines, damage to property, and physical or financial harm to an employer, its employees, or its customers. Sabotage has occurred in almost every critical infrastructure sector25 and is generally believed to be prompted by several motives including\n\nfrustration and a feeling of powerlessness prompted by perceived organizational injustice.11 The goal of sabotage in some sense is to restore equity, to compensate the individual for a supposed grievance.\nDeliberate deception to secure unlawful or unfair gain is referred to as fraud. Fraud can be committed through a variety of means including media, phone, in person, and via the internet. False representation, white collar crime, counterfeit prescription drugs, non-delivery of merchandise, identity theft and market manipulation are all forms of fraud.35 The motivation to commit fraud is typically financial or other personal gain (such as prestige). As pertains to insider threat, the most frequent target is personally identifiable information that can be obtained within the workplace and use of corporate credit cards for personal use.24, 36\nTaking another person's property without their permission is theft. Employee theft is widespread and occurs in all industries. Employers and employees vary in their definitions of theft and theft may be overlooked for various reasons including lack of policies dealing with the subject or fear of public perception. General theories on employee theft focus in two main theoretical camps - person theories and workplace theories.37 Person-based theories attempt to explain why some people would steal from an organization. The main areas of research focus on perceived need, deviant background, greed or temptation (opportunity), moral laxity (typically among younger staff), and marginality (e.g., low status/low rank). Work-based theories concentrate research on why specific organizations may suffer higher levels of theft and focus attention on three major characteristics; organizational climate, deterrence strategies (i.e., policies or lack thereof), and organizational fairness.\nIndividuals make a choice to engage in retaliatory behavior which can be rational or irrational.38 Identification of triggers and warning signs are often missed, overlooked or simply ignored. Triggers are negative events, often unexpected, which influence decision-making and can create or intensify motive. Examples of triggers include abusive supervision, negative performance evaluations, being passed over for a promotion, etc. Warning signs include outbursts in the workplace, aggressive behavior, absenteeism, etc. In each of the above discussed expressions of insider threat (spying and espionage, sabotage, fraud and theft) in the workplace, characteristics of an individual, organizational culture, and the social context in which they live and work play a key role in one's motive, intent, and opportunity to commit crime.\n\n## 2.3 Current Research And Debates On Insider Threat\n\nPractitioners in fields as diverse as criminology and computer science debate the topic of insider threat. The variety of literature on the topic ranges from predictive modeling to employee monitoring programs, psychological evaluations, more robust background checks, and technological monitoring solutions. All agree that the impacts of insider threat can be financially and politically devastating. Frequency of insider attacks is on the rise, with 62% of security professionals reporting increase in the number of insider threats in 2014-2015 and 40%\nexpecting a data breach by malicious insiders this year.14 In addition, the social consequences of personality and the resultant socially influenced relationships have direct impact on work-related behaviors.39\nIt is a widely-held belief that anyone has the potential to become an insider threat, given the right combination of internal and external pressures, opportunity, and ability to commit the crime. Understanding what goes on in the mind of an insider has traditionally been relegated a secondary role to that of investigating technical controls to prevent data leakage, etc.27 Research on psychology and motivation of insiders has been sporadic since the end of the Cold War. Motivation, opportunity and means are all required in order for an insider crime to occur. A wellknown acronym for explaining underlying motives of insiders is MICE: money, ideology, coercion and ego.40  The four MICE drivers are often said to lie at the heart of why insiders betray their employers or state secrets. Insiders don't commit crimes because they can (ability); they commit them because they want to. Hence, motive precedes opportunity.\n\nResearch on personality's influence on insider threat is gaining popularity. Psychometric tools such as the Myers-Briggs Type Indicator and Social Styles are commonly used in the workplace. However, they are criticized for poor validity and poor reliability.41 Personality inventories such as the Big Five and the Dark Triad are heavily used in insider crime studies. Recent research in psychology, organizational behavior, biosocial criminology, and linguistics all contribute to the growing body of knowledge on the study of cybercime and insider threat. However, many of these approaches have far-reaching social, ethical and legal ramifications.\n\n## 2.4 The Big Five\n\nAccording to the Five Factor Model (FFM), there are five dimensions of personality traits that account for all individual differences which can be attributed to genetic and non-shared environmental factors.42 Over fifty years of personality research, including multiple studies, confirms the robustness of this model.43 The five factors are - neuroticism, extraversion, and openness to experience, agreeableness, and conscientiousness. Neuroticism is expressed by a negative nature. Individuals who score high in neuroticism are believed to self-select themselves into situations which foster negative emotion.44 Extraverts, on the other hand, are predisposed to experience positive emotions. Individuals with extraverted tendencies tend to have more friends and spend more time in social situations. Openness to experience is related to creativity, divergent thinking, low religiosity and political liberalism. Agreeableness is characterized by altruism, nurturance, higher levels of intimacy, caring and emotional support. And finally,\n\nconscientiousness implies stronger work associations and rewards. Four of the five traits (altruism, extraversion, agreeableness, and conscientiousness) have positive relationships with overall job satisfaction. Neuroticism has been identified as the primary source of negative affectivity in the workplace. Openness to Experience predisposes individuals to feel both the good and the bad more deeply, making its relationship to overall job satisfaction unclear.\nEach of the five factors contains six constituent facets (i.e., narrow traits), meaning that six facets make up each of the five factors.45 As example, Extraversion contains facets related to friendliness as well as facets related to dominance and energy such as thrill-seeking and assertiveness which are also associated with deviance. While the factors present on a spectrum - positive to negative - research tends to neglect the narrow traits in the prediction of workplace deviance.45  While the FFM has been around for a long time it is not without reproach and has received criticism for failing to address all individual differences in personality, particularly antisocial behavior.42\n\n## 2.5 The Dark Triad\n\n\nDark personalities are those individuals characterized by socially offensive traits which fall into the \"normal\" range.46 The Dark Triad originally consisted of three traits - narcissism, Machiavellianism, and psychopathy. Recently a fourth trait, sadism, has been added leading to a new moniker, the Dark Tetrad.46 Narcissists crave attention and are grand self-promoters.\n\nMachiavellians are viewed as callous calculated manipulators. Classic psychopaths are the most malevolent, with low empathy and anxiety. In addition, they are reckless, thrill-seek impulsively, and lie for immediate rewards.47 Sadists may physically or verbally abuse others; the bully or Internet troll exhibiting predatory behaviors are classic examples. It is recognized that there are overlaps in key features of the four personalities, most importantly that of callousness, or lack of empathy towards others. Similar to the FFM, several questionnaires, scales, or surveys are used to test and evaluate individual responses.47 Dark personalities are almost always linked to deviant behavior which will be discussed in more depth later.\n\n## 2.6 Psychosocial Indicators\n\nVarious demographic, behavioral and psychological indicators reveal data about an individual which may provide insight into whether or not one has the tendency to commit crime. Studies in workplace aggression,11, 38, 48-50 entitlement,51 counterproductive work behavior,6, 7, 9, 38 Internet use,52 computer-use deviance in the workplace,12, 53, 54 information security,19, 55 and criminal profiling16, 56 all reveal psychosocial indicators of vulnerability or risk to insider crime behavior and/or tendencies. Behavioral precursors to IT sabotage cases include missing work, arriving late; leaving early, decline in job performance, etc.25 The Defense Personnel and Security Research Center conducts research on Department of Defense personnel suitability, security and policy. This includes, but is not limited to, espionage, cyber-psychology, insider threat, and personality disorders. Their findings indicate that personality disorders57 and vulnerabilities within organizations and industries impact the psychosocial behaviors of insiders.58 A recent study conducted with human resources professionals30 identified twelve leading psychosocial indicators (see Table 1) of behaviors that would cause enough alarm to elevate personnel monitoring. The study further revealed that low-risk indicators only became alarming when presented with one or more high-risk indicators. This study is important in that it illuminates the need for collection of multiple data types to inform risk mitigation processes. Additionally, this work reveals interesting parallels between descriptions of those who commit various insider crimes (e.g., theft, sabotage), the FFM and the Dark Tetrad. For example, self-centeredness is associated with narcissism from the Dark Tetrad.\n\n| Indicator                                                                         | Description                                             |\n|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------|\n| Disgruntlement                                                                    |                                                         |\n| Employee observed to be dissatisfied in current position; chronic indications of  |                                                         |\n| discontent, such as strong negative feelings about being passed over for a        |                                                         |\n| promotion or being underpaid, undervalued; may have a poor fit with current job.  |                                                         |\n| Not Accepting                                                                     |                                                         |\n| Feedback                                                                          |                                                         |\n| The employee is observed to have a difficult time accepting criticism, tends to   |                                                         |\n| take criticism personally or becomes defensive when message is delivered.         |                                                         |\n| Employee has been observed being unwilling to acknowledge errors; or              |                                                         |\n| admitting to mistakes; may attempt to cover up errors through lying or deceit.    |                                                         |\n| Anger Management                                                                  |                                                         |\n| Issues                                                                            |                                                         |\n| The employee often allows anger to get pent up inside; employee has trouble       |                                                         |\n| managing lingering emotional feelings of anger or rage. Holds strong grudges.     |                                                         |\n| Disengagement                                                                     |                                                         |\n| The employee keeps to self, is detached, withdrawn and tends not to interact with |                                                         |\n| individuals or groups; avoids meetings.                                           |                                                         |\n| Disregard for                                                                     |                                                         |\n| Authority                                                                         |                                                         |\n| The employee disregards rules, authority or policies. Employee feels above the    |                                                         |\n| rules or that they only apply to others.                                          |                                                         |\n| Performance                                                                       |                                                         |\n| The employee has received a corrective action (below expectation performance      |                                                         |\n| review, verbal warning, written reprimand, suspension, termination) based on      |                                                         |\n| poor performance.                                                                 |                                                         |\n| Stress                                                                            |                                                         |\n| The employee appears to be under physical, mental, or emotional strain or         |                                                         |\n| tension that he/she has difficulty handling.                                      |                                                         |\n| Confrontational                                                                   |                                                         |\n| Behavior                                                                          |                                                         |\n| Employee exhibits argumentative or aggressive behavior or is involved in          |                                                         |\n| bullying or intimidation.                                                         |                                                         |\n| Personal Issues                                                                   |                                                         |\n| Employee has difficulty keeping personal issues separate from work, and these     |                                                         |\n| issues interfere with work.                                                       |                                                         |\n| Self-Centeredness                                                                 |                                                         |\n| The employee disregards needs or wishes of others, concerned primarily with       |                                                         |\n| own interests and welfare.                                                        |                                                         |\n| Lack of                                                                           |                                                         |\n| Dependability                                                                     |                                                         |\n| Employee is unable to keep commitments /promises; unworthy of trust.              |                                                         |\n| Absenteeism                                                                       | Employee has exhibited chronic unexplained absenteeism. |\n\n## 2.7 Ethical And Legal Considerations\n\nWhile the FFM and Dark Triad psychometric tests provide personality dimensions measured with high reliability and validity, these tools are not without problems. First and foremost, the empirical study of antisocial behaviors is fraught with ethical complexities. For example, when conducting experiments on sadist behavior it is inappropriate to have individuals harm others so alternative means of study must be developed. Secondly, there are extensive time commitments required to perform comprehensive personality inventories on individuals - and very few individuals have been studied longitudinally.43 This has led to the development of short personality inventories which are less costly to administer.46 That being said, quantitative evidence fails to support individuals who exhibit the categorical psychological concepts described in both the Dark Tetrad and the FFM as clinically psychopathological. In other words, attitudes and personality traits have poor predictive validity on future expressions of behavior. While narcissists can be extremely attractive during a job interview, downstream they are highly likely to exhibit counterproductive work behaviors such as white collar crime or intellectual property theft.\nRecently, several lines of inquiry have been identified for future research on the social consequences of personality which are influenced by organizational/workplace factors, individual goals and values, and cultural components.39 Research shows that certain behaviors and disorders are influenced by genetic factors including antisocial personality disorder, impulsivity, and more.59 Biological or environmental factors (e.g., abusive or traumatic childhood experience) related to criminal behavior, specifically insider threat, is a nascent area of study which carries significant legal and ethical dilemmas. Stereotyping or profiling individuals who exhibit specific personality traits, neurological, or biological characteristics is not an acceptable means by which to discriminate in the workplace. They do, however, encourage employers to be more cognizant of acknowledging individual differences and addressing issues/situations before they escalate.\nCurrent practice for insider threat is largely reactive - dealing with problems after they are known to have taken place. In order to move towards a proactive approach for mitigating the\n\ninsider threat, organizations will have to balance technological solutions with effective monitoring of employees.60  This negotiation of cyber/physical security and modeling of human behavior follows an approach advocated in the early 2000s61 for the identification of clues\n(technical and social) to predict, detect and then interdict insider attacks. Computer-based monitoring technologies62 such as tracking web surfing behavior, remote desktop viewing to track job performance, and monitoring personal email opened on work computers can be viewed as profiling which is a highly sensitive topic. Access to confidential conversations, medical records, and remote desktop viewing may not only be legally questionable but have the potential to adversely affect or undermine employee morale when discovered. It could be argued that acknowledgement of such tools in the workplace may not serve as a deterrent to insider crimes, they may either exacerbate problems due to lack of trust or could immobilize staff for fear of organizational retribution. Either way, staff productivity and attitudes about security are bound to decline. Attitudes are precursors to intentional behavior. Strong negative emotion regarding security practices can lead to counterproductive or even subversive workplace behaviors ranging from apathy to absenteeism and retaliation, feelings of vulnerability, violation and shame, and deep seated feelings of alienation.63-65  It is therefore paramount that employee attitudes are important to understand. No amount of employee monitoring will deter highly motivated, narcissistic insiders who believe they are invincible and are excellent at covering their tracks through manipulation of others. This highlights a complementary problem, detecting when employees are intentionally dishonest.\n\n\n## 3.0 Deception Detection\n\nLike insider threat, there are many definitions of deception. Deception has been defined as a way\n\"to intentionally cause another person to have or continue to have a false belief that is truly believed to be false by the person intentionally causing the false belief by bringing about evidence on the basis of which the other person has or continues to have that false belief.\"66 This definition focuses on active intent which specifically excludes unintended actions which might lead to deception. Deception is an intentional act that occurs when a communicator tries to control information in a message meant to evoke a particular response or effect.67 In light of these definitions, deception can take a variety of forms ranging from explicit fabrication to halftruths, vagueness, and concealment.68 Deception occurs for a variety of reasons. Motives for deception are generally characterized as self-, partner- or relationship-focused. Table 2 identifies the most common motives reported.69\n\nI. Self-focused motives\nA. Protect, retain or gain resources\nB. Ensure continuation of rewards or services from target C. Protect or enhance self-image and self-esteem D. Avoid abuse, conflict, punishment, or negative repercussions  from target E. Maintain privacy/avoid disclosure of secrets and risky information F. Control conversational direction, length, or termination\nII. Partner-focused motives\nA. Protect target's image or self-esteem\nB. Protect target's mental and emotional state (e.g., avoiding worry, hurt, fear, embarrassment)\nC. Protect target's physical state D. Protect target's relationship with third party\nIII. Relationship-focused motives\nA. Avoid conflict B. Avoid relational trauma C. Avoid unpleasant, repetitive episodes D. Avoid violation of role expectations E. Avoid relational breakup\nF. Obligatory acceptance\n\nDeception is a part of everyday life. People tell an average of one to two lies per day, either in spoken or written form.70 Lying is a deliberate, conscious behavior, which many speculate leaves a trace or signal in its wake.71  And, despite the frequency with which we are exposed to lies, people's ability to discriminate lies from truth is equal to that of chance.72\nThe scientific study of deception has been around since the late 1800s. Deception is an intentional act, a deliberate attempt to mislead that occurs when a communicator tries to control information in a message meant to evoke a particular response or effect.73, 74 In light of these definitions, deception can take a variety of forms ranging from explicit fabrication to half-truths, vagueness, equivocation and concealment.68 Deception is interpersonal and includes practical jokes, forgery, imposture, consumer fraud, military and strategic deception, white lies, scams, hoaxes and more.75 Early studies among very young children concluded that they are horrible at deception. However, by the time children reach adolescence they achieve the requisite cognitive tools and capacity for intentional deception.75  There are two separate and distinct lines of inquiry in this area. The first includes research on polygraph testing and other physiological measurement tools. The second line of investigation focuses on behavioral cues, verbal and nonverbal, to detecting deception. Both areas of research are discussed.\nThe majority of studies in deception detection, regardless of approach or focus area, use human subjects in experimental settings. A recognized and significant limitation to research in this area is the focus on deception exhibited by a single suspect or deceiver.76 Humans are relatively poor performers at detecting lies and very little is known about social indicators of deception, though it is recognized that there are \"unique cues to deception that may occur between co-conspirators or accomplices.\"76 A pressing need in the law enforcement and intelligence communities is the development of tools and methods to collect reliable information\n\nduring interviewing or screening of individuals and groups. There is a disadvantage as there has been very little research focused on deception by collusion among two or more individuals.76\nThis can include recruitment of human sources overseas, vetting of employees, or screening people at security checkpoints.\n\nThere are emotional, mental, and physical challenges to deception which can also play a role in its detection. Telling lies and engaging in deceptive behavior are physiologically more challenging than being truthful. Deceit is emotionally challenging as deceivers may experience fear and threat of being caught, guilt and shame of deceiving someone, or even elation at having been successful in deceiving someone. It is mentally challenging as deceivers need to create a believable story and commit it to memory, stick to it. And, deceit is physically challenging as deceivers try to control the physical signs of deceptive behavior (nervousness, eye movement, body language, etc.). Deception cues are grouped into three main categories: (1) visual (nonverbal) - any physical behavior, (2) vocal (para-verbal) - pitch of voice, tone/tension, and rhythm (number and length of pauses), (3) verbal - anything said or written.77 This research reveals effective deception detection isn't just about what liars do but what they don't do that matters. In other words, motivated liars manipulate their body language and speech patterns in ways that are designed to make them appear more truthful than they actually are.\n\n## 3.1 Current Research And Debates On Deception Detection\n\nThe main concern with deception detection is that it is widely open for interpretation. The polygraph has a long and controversial history as a forensic tool and continues to be contested as an appropriate mechanism to judge an individual trustworthy of obtaining or maintaining a security clearance. And, while many states in the U.S. do not admit polygraph evidence, eighteen do but only if certain requirements are met.78 In past court cases, polygraph results were considered too unreliable to be admitted as evidence and have been found to infringe upon jurors role as triers of facts.78 Additionally, research in the late 1990s identified only four studies using the most common polygraph test (i.e., the Common Question Test) were rigorous enough to be accepted and published in peer reviewed scientific journals.79 Organizations such as AntiPolygraph.org find polygraphy so misleading and unethical that they publish advice on how to defeat the procedure and widely educate the public on countermeasures to include behavioral and chart-recording manipulation.\n\nVerbal cues to deception online are of significant interest for a variety of law enforcement and intelligence needs (e.g., recruitment and radicalization). Primary differences between in-person deceit and online deceit are difficult to tease apart. Deception occurs in a variety of settings and for a variety of purposes. Accordingly, the linguistic features relevant to one context do not necessarily hold in another context (e.g., in-person communication versus instant messaging). The majority of deception investigations has been conducted by researchers in the psychological domain and often relies upon laboratory or other controlled studies. However, more recent studies are addressing deception in online social media platforms and through social engineering.80\nThere are very few studies that explicitly address deception in instant messaging (IM), discussion boards and other forms of computer mediated communications. When trying to bridge the gap from in-person, verbal communications to email and IM, we must understand how the online \"modalities restrict, highlight or amplify certain [deception] cues and the ways that they impact the choices deceivers have available to them in managing their messages.\"68 As example, deceivers using IM can monitor the interaction as it occurs, and are not burdened by linguistic cues (i.e., hedging) or nonverbal mechanics (i.e., fidgeting, averting eyes) that might otherwise\n\nbe incriminating.81 Research conducted at MITRE on what is coined \"cyber-deception\" includes everything from deceptive online advertising, falsified user profiles on dating websites, cyberespionage, lying in email or via VoIP conversation, to manipulating online images, etc.82\nBasically, any form of deception of information transmitted via the Internet.\nTopics not investigated herein but which may be relevant to understanding deception detection and its application to the law enforcement and intelligence communities include:\n\n- Pathological liars (how they may be detected and if there are any core linguistic traits);\n- Cultural, gender and age based differences in the detection of deceit;\n- Studies involving varying degrees of deceit - 'white,' 'serious,' and 'high-stakes' lies;\n- And, the possible convergence of deception detection research with studies into\nmisinformation or disinformation.\n As mentioned previously, deceit at a group level is very rarely studied. Additional research on group deception may be valuable as it pertains to insider recruitment in discussion forums, the proliferation of deception, etc. This may also be relevant for identifying deflection or diffusion of responsibility for actions or events.83  Finally, it is widely known that the majority of deception detection research has been conducted on native English speakers (in particular, American English). It would therefore be valuable to identify (or conduct) specific studies on mixed-culture and mixed-native language groups to provide insight into this rather unbalanced area of inquiry.\n\n## 3.2 Linguistic Cues To Deception\n\nBecause deception occurs so frequently and can be quite consequential, there is a considerable body of work devoted to identifying which linguistic cues are related to deception and how to classify deceptive and non-deceptive speech using machine learning techniques.68, 84 While it is highly unlikely that scientific research will determine the one clue that without a doubt signifies deceit in verbal or written forms of communication, there are linguistic behaviors which provide a window into detecting deception. For example, several published studies investigate measures of quantity which have included assessment of the number of words/clauses/sentences produced;\nspeech rate, length of individual words, and number of words from particular grammatical categories such as noun or verb.74, 85 Other behaviors researched include expressivity, affect, causation, diversity, redundancy, informality and specificity.74, 85 In 1981, Zuckerman, et al. published the first comprehensive meta-analysis of cues to deception.73 Their search for all reports of the degree to which verbal and nonverbal cues occurred differentially during deceptive communications compared with truthful ones produced 159 estimates of 19 behavioral cues to deception from 36 independent samples. Two decades later DePaulo, et al. expanded this review to the results of 1,300 estimates of 158 cues to deception from 120 independent samples.73 While the majority of these focus on verbal behavior and non-verbal cues, many of the studies involving written deception are useful for linguistic analysis of deception in computer mediated communication. This work found that liars generally provide fewer details; make more negative statements; sound more uncertain, impersonal, evasive, and unclear; and produce more words that distance themselves from their statements and the person or people to whom they are lying when compared with truth-tellers.73 Hauch, et al85 concluded that liars use more words expressing negative emotions, positive emotions, more emotional words in general, more motion verbs, and more negation words. In contrast, truth-tellers make use of more self-references, other references, exclusive words, more tentative words, and time-related words than liars. There were no discernible differences between liars and truth-tellers in word count. In a recent publication researchers86 examined 30 verbal and non-verbal communication indicators previously used with automated linguistic analysis tools. Their work specifically analyzed linguistic cues extracted from 367 written statements prepared by suspects and victims of crimes on military bases and determined that only seven linguistic cues (see Table 3) proved useful for testing models of deception constructs with real-world, high-stakes data (versus controlled laboratory experiments).\n\n| Linguistic Cue                                                        |\n|-----------------------------------------------------------------------|\n| Quantity                                                              |\n| Number of words                                                       |\n| Specificity                                                           |\n| Words used which establish the context of the statement in space/time |\n| Affect                                                                |\n| Emotion                                                               |\n| Diversity                                                             |\n| Variation in language                                                 |\n| Uncertainty                                                           |\n| Avoidance of relevant information, providing generalizable data       |\n| Non-immediacy                                                         |\n| Use of words to create psychological closeness or distance            |\n| Activation                                                            |\n| Vividness or intensity of word choice                                 |\n|                                                                       |\n\nThe most frequently cited tools for analyzing linguistic content for deception are the Linguistic Inquiry and Word Count (LIWC) and Whissell's Dictionary of Affect in Language. In addition, natural language processing algorithms such as Coh-Metrix are utilized. Coh-Metrix has over 700 indices of computed language characteristics that have been validated across a variety of psychological domains and is unique in that it tracks linguistic features based on cognitive and social factors that are hypothesized to influence deception. Recent work87 utilizing the LIWC revealed individuals with word pattern usage linked to Big Five personality traits associated with an increased risk of insider threat behavior.\nLinguistic cues have been investigated from a law enforcement perspective.88, 89  When individuals provide verbal accounts of events they include important linguistic and structural features. These features can be examined for veracity and deception indicators. Oral accounts are coupled with written statements and various analytic methods are employed. These include criteria-based content analysis, behavioral assessment, scientific content analysis, and many more. The major distinction between oral and written accounts is the latter is a more deliberate and conscious process. Written discourse is longer, has more complex structure, and follows a linear pattern, requiring sequence and clear patterning. Oral accounts, on the other hand are often more free-form, more spontaneous and often change depending on situational cues including body language and other proxemics. Specific attributes of written text along with their frequency, use, and context have been identified as providing insight into truth or deceit.89  These include: equivocation, negation, prologue attributes, unique sensory details, emotions, and quoted discourse. A positive relationship between equivocation and deception are identified in oral statements and extend to written statements. The simple presence of negation may not be solely indicative of deception. The frequency, density and location of negation in a text may prove significant for determining the veracity or deception of a statement. Truthful, experienced memories contain more sensory information than do constructed memories. In addition, unusual details are strong indicators of veracity in oral statements. As far as emotions are concerned, their research found that \"memories of experienced events included more affective information, such as emotional reactions, than did memories of created events,\" and \"that in fabricated accounts references to emotions might be omitted altogether.\"89 Direct quotations also provide details not expected or typically provided in a fictitious or deceptive recounting of an event. Based on their work analyzing written statements produced by individuals who were party to police investigations in the United States, Adams and Jarvis determined that deceptive statements differ from truthful statements in both structure and content.89 In addition, former CIA officers identify several additional verbal techniques (see Table 4) used to indicate deception during an interview or interrogation.90 It is widely acknowledged that many of these techniques are used by truthful individuals; it is the context and number of verbal cues, or clustering, that will reveal a liar. Additionally, when linguistic cues are coupled with shifts in body language and facial expressions, the likelihood of identifying a liar increases dramatically.\n\n| Verbal Technique                                                              |\n|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------|\n| Failure to Answer                                                             |\n| Not responding to a direct question.                                          |\n| Denial Problems                                                               |\n| Absence of explicit denial of something.                                      |\n| Can be nonspecific denial or isolated delivery of denial.                     |\n| An expression used to dodge or evade responding to a question. Example:       |\n| I'm not sure I'm the right person to talk to. I'm not sure I can answer that. |\n| Reluctance or Refusal                                                         |\n| to Answer                                                                     |\n| Repeating the Question                                                        |\n| Repeating the question provides an individual with the opportunity to think   |\n| through their response, i.e., buy time.                                       |\n| Non-Answer                                                                    |\n| Statements                                                                    |\n| Provides an individual with the opportunity to avoid or think through their   |\n| response. Examples:                                                           |\n| That's a good question... I'm glad you asked that... I                          |\n| knew you were going to ask me that... That's a legitimate concern.              |\n|                                                                               |\n| Inconsistent Statements                                                       |\n| Inability to keep a story straight.                                           |\n| Attack Mode                                                                   |\n| When facts of a situation put strain on an individual the stress can force    |\n| them to attack. Typically the verbal response is coupled with other           |\n| behavioral cues to deception.                                                 |\n| Answering a question with a question that is unrelated.                       |\n| Inappropriate                                                                 |\n| Questions                                                                     |\n| Answering a question with too much technical detail or a very narrow          |\n| focus.                                                                        |\n| Overly Specific                                                               |\n| Answers                                                                       |\n| Sudden and uncharacteristic increase in politeness when responding to a       |\n| question with the purpose of increasing likeability.                          |\n| Inappropriate Level of                                                        |\n| Politeness                                                                    |\n| Inappropriate Level of                                                        |\n| Concern                                                                       |\n| Attempts to diminish the importance of an issue. May even joke about the      |\n| issue.  Examples:                                                             |\n| Why is this such a big deal? Why is everybody worried                         |\n| about that?                                                                   |\n| Process or Procedural                                                         |\n| Complaints                                                                    |\n| Offensive response to questioning. This may be a delay tactic, similar to     |\n| repeating the question or non-answer statements. May deflect. Examples:       |\n| Why are you asking me? How long is this going to take?                        |\n| Changing typical word use in response to a question to minimize the scope     |\n| or magnitude of impact.                                                       |\n| Failure to Understand a                                                       |\n| Simple Question                                                               |\n| Referral Statements                                                           |\n| Individual refers to a previous response to an answer. Example:               |\n| As I said                                                                     |\n| during our last meeting...Like I told the guy who asked that last time...As       |\n| we stated in our corporate filings.                                           |\n| Invoking Religion                                                             |\n| Dressing up a lie.                                                            |\n| Examples:                                                                     |\n| As God is my witness...I swear on a stack of Bibles.                            |\n| Selective Memory                                                              |\n| Claiming no recollection of an event. Examples:                               |\n| Not that I recall...As far                                                      |\n| as I know...To the best of my knowledge.                                        |\n| Exclusion Qualifiers                                                          |\n| Enable an individual to withhold certain information and respond              |\n| truthfully.                                                                   |\n| Examples:                                                                     |\n| Not really...Fundamentally...Basically...Probably.                                  |\n| Perception Qualifiers                                                         |\n| Enable an individual to enhance credibility. Examples:                        |\n| Frankly...To be                                                                 |\n| perfectly honest...Honestly.                                                    |\n\n\n\n## 3.3 Physiological Cues\n\nIn addition to linguistic cues, a wide range of techniques, including the polygraph have been developed to assist in the detection of liars. Traditional polygraphy uses an array of physiological measures like heart rate, blood pressure, and electrodermal response to detect deception. It should be noted that physiological responses measured by the polygraph are postulated to be associated with deception. When the polygraph is applied to populations not trained in countermeasures it works fairly well and can discriminate lying from truth telling at rates well above chance. However, this is simply not good enough when it comes to protecting intelligence and law enforcement assets.\nHistory of the polygraph dates to the early 1920s; the machine was invented by a forensic psychiatrist named John Larson.91 It was Leonarde Keeler, a protege of Larson's, who patented the first portable polygraph which is the prototype for all modern polygraph machines. Keeler went on to establish the first polygraph unit within a police department and his device was the first purchased by the Federal Bureau of Investigation.91 In the late 1930s there was a theoretical split between those who focused on standardized and objective approaches to the polygraph interview and use of the polygraph as an interrogation device with an emphasis on interviewer interpretation of an examinee's behavior. During World War II the polygraph was used by the government for screening German prisoners of war and was eventually implemented within the Manhattan Project facilities at Oak Ridge and elsewhere. In both instances criminal activity, security breaches, and unauthorized disclosures of classified information were uncovered through use of the polygraph. Throughout the 1960s and 70s more widespread use of the polygraph became standard within U.S. federal agencies as well as private industry. In 1983 President Reagan issued National Security Decision Directive 84 authorizing all federal agencies to polygraph employees to identify leaks of classified data. Directive 84 prompted an Office of Technology Assessment review of scientific evidence and validity of the polygraph's utility in a screening capacity.91  Within three months the Directive was rescinded. Since that time use of the polygraph in federal agencies has increased dramatically. But, debates about the accuracy and integrity of polygraphy resurfaced in 1999. This followed significant security breaches at Los Alamos National Laboratory which prompted Department of Energy Secretary Bill Richardson to order polygraph tests for all of the Laboratory's nuclear weapons scientists. When it was acknowledged that the polygraph was used to identify Wen Ho Lee as a spy at Los Alamos, public debates prompted the Department of Energy to retain the National Academy of Sciences to conduct a scientific review of the use of the polygraph. Their findings echo those previously discussed - accuracy rates for the polygraph in detecting lying were found at rates above chance but far less than perfect.92 Regardless of their findings, the polygraph continues to be used in all federal and many local law enforcement agencies for criminal investigations and employee screening.\nSeveral new areas of research in neurophysiological measures including functional magnetic resonance imaging (i.e., fMRI) have been explored to support traditional polygraphs, identify liars,93 detect terrorists,94 and reveal secret intentions.95 Findings from many of the predictive studies discussed by Monteleone96 reveal 70-90% accuracy which is comparable to the results of the traditional polygraph: well above chance, but definitely below perfection. Advances in magnetic resonance imaging and electroencephalography (EEG) can now measure changes in brain activity due to emotions and behavior.97  These measurements can allow scientists to associate brain activity to cognitive processes adding new perspectives to state of the\n\nart neuroscience research. The use of new technologies prompts ethics and privacy concerns, similar to those of employee monitoring discussed in the insider threat section.\n\nAn additional physiological mechanism adapted from the field of computer vision and computer mediated communication is eye tracking. Traditionally used as a mechanism to test content placement on websites and in usability studies, eye tracking studies reveal behavioral indicators (such as interest and emotion) due to cognitive load that can be used to optimize sales and product awareness and to positively increase knowledge retention and recall. In the field of visual cognition, studies have revealed conclusive evidence that eye-blinking behavior is related to cognitive processes such as deception.98-100  Through research on eye movements, including fixations (looking at the same place for a period of time), saccades (rapid eye movements) and pupil dilation response (change in pupil size), new non-intrusive commercial products such as EyeDetect from Converus have been launched. They assert an 85% accuracy to detect deception and are advocating for use of the technology in terrorist identification and combating fraud, theft and bribery. Neuro-ID's Neuro-ScreenTM solution, which claims to identify suspicious behaviors based on an individual's typing, scrolling or mouse movements is another example of a commercial product focused on physiological response to stress and cognitive load as exhibited on a computer or smartphone. Both tools are being marketed to private industry and government agencies as complements to the polygraph due to lower costs of administration and decreased time to interpret and adjudicate test results.\n\n## 3.4 Other Behavioral Cues\n\n\nStudies show that the most of the commonly acknowledged behavioral \"cue\" for detecting a liar is avoidance of eye contact. However, this and other cues such as fidgeting, face touching, clearing the throat, and speech rate are conducted by truth tellers and liars at a fairly equivalent\n\nrate. Body language alone is therefore an entirely unreliable mechanism for the detection of deception.\nThe majority of human communication is nonverbal; some studies indicate more than\n50% of all communication is nonverbal.101  This estimate varies depending upon the type of communication and its purpose, cultural variables, and to whom the communication is being addressed. Nonverbal communication includes several subcategories - haptics, kinesics, vocalics, chronemics, and proxemics.102  Nonverbal and verbal communication deception techniques are used in coordination during interviews or interrogations to determine guilt or innocence.\nHaptics, or communication through touch, is a form of interpersonal communication that conveys physical intimacy or aversion through lack of touch; hence, touch can be positive or negative. Touch is also believed to enhance or intensify emotional displays from other nonverbal communication modalities. Deceptive persons may experience a spike in cognitive load initiated by lying. This flood of hormones triggers the fight-or-flight response leading to an increase in self-soothing activities such as hand-to-face contact.103\nKinesics, or body language, is communicated through a variety of mechanisms including facial expressions, hand movements, manipulation of a body part or item of clothing (e.g., nail biting or rubbing hands together, playing with a button).104 Similarly to language, body language does not necessarily reveal deception. It may indicate nervousness or uncomfortableness with a situation, person, or line of questioning.\n\nParalanguage, or verbal style, includes rhythm, speed, volume, and pitch, which can aid in interpreting the accompanying body language.69  Rhythm and speed can reveal emotions such\n\nas apprehension or confidence. Volume provides insight into what is being said with a whisper or a shout. A rise in pitch can indicate fear; a drop in pitch may indicate sadness.\nChronemics, or the study of time, may be useful in the study of deception, specifically behavioral indicators in the workplace. The way a person perceives time and the role time-based concepts play in their lives are learned behaviors. There are four basic psychological time perspectives - past, time-line, present and future. For example, individuals who are present oriented are characterized as having low risk aversion, and being pleasure-seekers who live for the moment. In extreme cases this impulsivity can influence behavior regulation leading to aggression, destruction of property, problems with authority and compulsive lying.\nProxemics, or the study of human use of space, is another form of nonverbal communication. Hall105 breaks space into four areas to differentiate between public, social, personal, and intimate areas. The comfortable distance between people in each area varies culturally. Violating space norms can be a sign of aggression, emotional distancing, etc.\n\nThe study of micro expressions, popularized by the hit television show Lie to Me, focuses on the detection of very brief, involuntary facial expressions which last a fraction of a second.90,\n106 Micro expressions convey feelings such as anger, contempt or disgust and are revealed when an individual is deliberately or unconsciously concealing emotion. Commercial products such as EmotientTM and Affectiva detect emotion and analyze sentiment, translating facial expressions into actionable information which could potentially be used in conjunction with the polygraph, EEG, fMRI and more.\nThe interplay between verbal and nonverbal behaviors is significant. During human interactions, cognitive processes are expressed through language and the body; this enables us to see partial truths or outright deceit. Close relationships allow for recognition of truth, half-truths\n\nand lies. However, work relationships or casual acquaintances may lack the familiarity required to identify deceit or other aberrant behavior.\n\n## 3.5 Deviance And Betrayal\n\n\nDeviance is expressed in many forms including crime, drug addiction, alcohol abuse, pathological lying, etc. Acts of deviance are relative; they differ depending upon the culture and context. In general, deviant behavior is a departure from the norm for a society or group. Established rules or norms in many cases are codified into law, demarcating the good from bad, legal from the illegal and distinguishing behaviors, beliefs, and characteristics that are valued from those that are disvalued.107\nDeviance is understood in relation to group expectations or norms, social tolerance, and sanctions.107, 108 Norms are expectations of behavior which, when followed, are tolerated by a society. Sanctions are practices of social control to keep deviance within acceptable limits and define ways in which to deal with violations. Positive sanctions are rewards for acceptable behavior whereas negative sanctions yield punishments for violation of social norms (e.g., time off without pay).\nWorkplace deviance, also referred to as counterproductive work behavior, refers to behavior which is designed to protest or voice dissatisfaction in the workplace and results in actions that harm organizations or employees.109 Psychological contract breach, or an employee's belief that their organization has failed to fulfill terms of agreement believed to exist between the two parties, can lead to maladaptive, retaliatory or deviant behaviors to include theft of office supplies, disobeying direct instructions, wasting time, aggression towards co-workers, cyber loafing, and other forms of cyber deviancy.6, 53, 54 Employees who do not behave in a productive manner are deviating from work norms. Organizational deviance is defined as\n\"unsanctioned nonproductive use of an employer's time or property.\"53 In order to better understand the severity of deviant workplace behaviors, Robinson and Bennet12 provide a typology (see Figure 1) which addresses a range of organizational and inter-personal deviance.\n\nWhile not exhaustive, the quadrant provides a robust framework for studying a range of workplace offenses.\n\nActs of deviance and betrayal of workplace norms are often retaliatory and overt. The spectrum of these offenses may be minimal like practical jokes to the extreme such as sabotaging a production line. Studies suggest individuals with certain personality dispositions are more likely to engage in antisocial behaviors or to direct harmful actions against other people, groups, organizations or entities. The specific personality traits said to play a critical role in counterproductive work behaviors include narcissism, neuroticism, anxiety, anger, and the need\n\nto be in control.9, 110 This parallels recent research27, 31, 87 on the relationship of word use to personality traits indicative of known psychosocial indicators of insider threat such as the Big Five and the Dark Triad.111, 112 Individuals' behaviors are simultaneously influenced by multiple personality traits, situational factors, and the interactions between the two. The ability to understand the determinants of deviance, identify employee predisposition to behavioral and linguistic indicators of insider threat, and detect shifts in provocative or malicious activities serves as a warning sign to provide the opportunity for workplace intervention strategies.\n\n\n## 4.0 Discussion\n\nThis work explored insider threat, specifically behaviors, beliefs, and current debates within the field. In particular, detailed focus was given to deception, a significant behavioral component of the malicious insider. Historically, neither of the topics is new - insider threat and deceit have been taking place since time immemorial. Relatively recently, it has been publicly acknowledged that the federal agencies which deal with issues of national security lack robust programs or have serious deficiencies. Mandates for U.S. government agencies to develop insider threat programs exist. However, determining how insider threat and deception countermeasures reduce these national security risks is difficult at best to ascertain.\n\nInsider threat research has suffered from two main problems, limited data and validity of research conclusions. Modeling and simulation approaches from the social and behavioral sciences can be used to generate synthetic data and build in control groups and/or comparison groups.113 Additional modeling methodologies from military intelligence and counterterrorism have potential application to insider threat as well.114, 115 Both of these approaches may contribute to the development of a scientific discipline of insider threat to rigorously test hypotheses, confirm or refute existing theory, or lead to the development of new theory.\n\nSince computer networks are the mechanism by which insiders like Edward Snowden can steal secrets, there is a tendency for organizations to view insider threat as strictly a technology problem. This approach clearly negates the individual, organizational and industrial risks which influence insider threat. The variability in human motivation, intent and opportunity and its symbiotic relationship to the workplace makes solving the insider threat a 'wicked problem.'\nInsider threat is innately multidisciplinary. It requires the contributions of social scientists, statisticians, risk analysts, cyber security, physical and personnel security, human resources, legal staff and policymakers to understand, model and mitigate insider crime. This divergence of scientific fields and varying organizational charters makes it difficult to \"speak the same language.\" As example, a recent article discussed more than 40 unique definitions for insider and insider threat.116  This lack of standardization is a noted problem for researchers.\n\nDoes insider threat's 'wickedness' encourage a broader definition of what has traditionally been considered insider threat? Some of the more recent definitions of insider threat have been expanded to include acts of workplace violence, suicide and homicide, specifically in industries like aviation and mass transit117 and the connection between insider threat and terrorism.118\nPractitioners therefore, must be explicit when defining what an insider and insider threat are within their organization as this will have direct impact on insider threat mitigation strategies.\n\nEmpirical studies of insider acts, including espionage, demonstrate a comprehensive set of behavioral factors and patterns of individuals and the organizations in which they were affiliated.119  There are several risk factors identified in the literature including psychosocial/behavioral, organizational, and personal predisposition. Psychosocial and behavioral indicators include characteristics like difficulty accepting feedback, anger management issues, disengagement, disregard for authority, confrontational behavior, stress (work related, personal, financial, familial), among others. Organizational risk factors include complacency, things like allowing lapses in training, and a failure to follow and implement industry wide security policies and procedures. Familiarity can cause a manager to be blind to behavioral indicators exhibited by staff, choosing to ignore red flags rather than counsel the staff member. Internal politics distract management and administrators from the day to day work being conducted on their watch. In addition, the following factors can contribute to work-related stressors: downsizing and outsourcing, job insecurity, working long hours, and a poor work-life balance.120 Personal predispositions describe medical or psychiatric disorders, history of rule violations, maladaptive personality disorders (such as habitual lying) or a lack of social skills, and excessive travel, possibly indicative of divided loyalties.119\nPlaced into a critical path approach (see Figure 2), it is easy to see how a troubled employee's behavior can escalate over time in response to personal predispositions and stressors/triggers. If risk signs are not identified and responded to by an employer, intervention strategies are likely to be inadequate or too late within the cycle to be effective. As pointed out by Shaw and Sellers,119 research in the field supports the assertions of the likelihood individuals will commit hostile acts against their organizations increases with the accumulation of various factors acting on them over a period of time. Mitigation or successful organizational interventions can remove individuals from the path towards attack. Thus, at any point on the critical pathway, an individual may exit from the path and not commit a crime. Many factors influence the likelihood of an individual staying on the path, including the organization's policies and management practices that affect employee morale, economic/political influences, personal stressors (financial situation, medical crisis, family crisis, etc.). All individuals experience stressors, which can be both positive (e.g., marriage) and negative (e.g., divorce); the impact of stress is mitigated to the degree that an individual has access to resources (i.e., external resources such as money, social support, stable employment; and internal resources such as emotional stability, physical health, and emotional skills), but when stressors affect an individual who does not have adequate resources, distress occurs. Aberrant behavior (i.e., insider threat) is the individual's response to chronic distress.\n\nAt the Federal level, the National Counterintelligence and Security Center at the Office of the Director of National Intelligence runs the National Insider Threat Task Force (NITTF). The NITTF is tasked with the development of a national insider threat program with supporting policy, standards, guidance and training.121 Earlier this year the NITTF published a Best Practices document for the purpose of providing information on insider threat awareness, case examples and nine key steps for program implementation.122 The Best Practices document identified key components for successful insider threat programs such as computer security, systems vulnerabilities, employee vetting, screening and training, and termination procedures. However, it lacks discussion of the critical path model and how to lessen the impact of coworker deviance and incivility among employees. This is particularly important from a deterrence perspective. Future work in this area should include the development of employee education on the topics of social engineering, insider threat, and the identification of maladaptive\n\nor counterproductive workplace behaviors and how to do so while maintaining workplace privacy and ethics.\n\nWithin the workplace, coworkers may exert more influence over one another than do their superiors. In fact, an employee is more strongly impacted by negative coworker behavior than by positive coworker behavior. Deviant, dysfunctional or counterproductive work behaviors conducted by one disgruntled employee may therefore have direct and lasting impacts on colleagues. Workplace incivility can rapidly spiral out of control potentially leading to increasingly aggressive behaviors.38, 48 Robinson, Wang and Kiewitz123 report that coworker deviant behavior has been found to negatively impact others' attitudes, affect and actions by (a) direct impact (i.e., an employee is the target of a coworkers' deviant behavior), by (b) vicarious impact (i.e., an employee learns of or witnesses a coworkers' deviant behavior), or by (c) ambient impact (i.e., an employee works in an environment characterized by collective deviant behavior).\nCounterproductive workplace behaviors are crucial to identify, intercept, and alleviate.\n\nLeft unchecked workplace bullying, incivility, harassment, and verbal abuse can lead employees to perceive workplace injustice and lessen their organizational commitment. Mistreatment of coworkers has been shown to trigger emotional and behavioral responses directly related to varying forms of workplace deviance including higher rates of absenteeism, theft, workplace violence, and more.38, 123 In fact, Ambrose, Seabright, and Schminke11 found that injustice was the most common cause of sabotage in the workplace. A brief review124 of life-course development theories suggests that patterns of antisocial behavior, delinquency, crime, psychopathy and impulsivity may be disproportionately represented in groups of individuals who are referred to as having a \"dual diagnosis\" as being both victims and offenders of workplace\n\nincivility. These findings clearly indicate the impact of organizational injustice on dysfunctional work behaviors.\nIn order to mitigate potential insider threat, organizations should match the severity of punishment to the perceived seriousness of the deviant act. For example, bullying and time card fraud may yield the same punishment; whereas terse emails and chronic tardiness should receive less severe punishment. Penalties should be standardized and applied across the enterprise. This ensures policy, rules, and regulations are perceived as fair and just by employees to the extent that similar behaviors are punished in a comparable fashion. Organizational commitment will be reinforced or may even increase if employees feel safe, cared for and treated respectfully by coworkers and supervisors alike.\n\n## 4.1 Personnel Screening\n\n\nAs discussed in the body of the paper, background checks, security clearance investigations, credit checks, personal interviews, drug tests, and polygraphs are all used to some extent to screen current and prospective employees in law enforcement and intelligence positions who require access to classified data. Formalized adjudicative guidelines are used to evaluate each person careful weighing of a number of variables known as the whole-person concept.125\nAvailable, reliable information about the person, past and present, favorable and unfavorable, are considered in reaching a security clearance determination.\nTwo new approaches are being explored as complements to the traditional personnel screening process; use of publically available social media information, and physiological deception detection tools. Security Executive Agent Directive 5126 formally authorizes the use of social media by official investigators who are conducting background investigations for security clearances. Deception detection tools such as Converus are under consideration as\n\nenhancements to the polygraph. Application of both approaches within the personnel security regime will require higher levels of scrutiny to avoid undue infringements on privacy.\n\n## 4.2 Privacy And Ethics\n\n\nThe implementations of insider threat and deception detection programs are not without serious privacy and ethical considerations. Privacy is generally characterized in terms of the rights of an individual or group to determine when, how, and to what extent information about them is collected and disseminated. Issues of security and privacy are founded in law and argued in the study of ethics. In the U.S., there is no single source of privacy law. For those working on government computing systems there is no expectation of privacy. And, in many organizations employees must consent to various forms of monitoring including remote viewing, email harvesting, review of access logs, and the like.\n\nThe debate regarding ethics is largely centered on the concept of trust. A key ingredient in employee morale is maintenance of the psychological contract (i.e., implied and unspoken mutual expectations) between employer and employee.127  When personal information is collected, even in the workplace, it places employees in a vulnerable position that relies on trust. This trust may be challenged with extensive organizational monitoring which may happen after a serious breach such as WikiLeaks. If employees do not feel due care and data safeguards are in place to protect their personally identifiable information, employee trust will be challenged.64\n\n## 4.3 Next-Gen Workforce\n\n\nResearchers generally agree that three generations dominate today's workforce (i.e., Baby Boomers, Generation X, and Millennials). While labels and periods of year those labels encompass vary, Boomers were born between the early 1940s and the mid-1960s; Generation X\nwere born between 1965 and 1979; Millennials were born between 1980 and 2000. As Baby Boomers retire, Generation X (i.e., GenX) employees move up in the ranks and Millennials are being hired to backfill key positions. Law enforcement and intelligence agencies have serious challenges to negotiate a multi-generation workforce; these include work values, attitudes, motivation, motivation, organizational citizenship behaviors and more.128-132\nBoomers are typically stereotyped as lifers or long-term employees, hardworking and optimistic. GenX is characterized by competitiveness, skepticism, informality, and desire for work-life balance. The youngest generation, the Millennials or Generation Y, is influenced by the Internet, 9/11, the effects of social media on events like the Arab Spring, collaboration and the post-2008 global economic crisis. This generation is also more globally oriented, has higher levels of narcissism, is more likely to take risks, seeks instant gratification, and is generally found to be more defensive when receiving criticism than previous generations.130 Ramifications of these characteristics include overall lower levels of organizational commitment, conformity, and formality in dress, speech, and social distancing. Most important for the intelligence community is a study conducted by the ACLU in 2015. The multi-country study revealed Millennials have a positive opinion of Snowden and believe his actions will lead to increased levels of personal privacy rights and protections.133\nResearch on generational stereotypes is not always consistent with observed workplace behaviors129 which has implications for training programs, development of multi-generational teams, work values and attitudes. Caution is issued for human resource managers to avoid treating employees as members of a specific generation. Individual differences are likely to play a more prominent role in workplace behaviors than generational differences. Greater flexibility in work hours, locations and work-life balance may better address needs and values of all employees regardless of generation.\n\n## 5.0 Conclusion\n\nThis research explored the relationship between insider threat and detecting deceit in the workplace, two broad and interrelated topics. The impact of the malicious insider can be calculated by the severity of the event (e.g., theft of formula of new pharma product) and resultant economic ramifications (i.e., in real dollars and expected earnings) or impact on national security. Insider events may be categorized as malicious/intentional or unintentional.\n\nThe type of insider event does not necessarily have direct bearing on the level of consequence.\n\nFor example, the victim of an inadvertent social engineering attack may cause more financial damage to a company than an individual act of corporate espionage. Factors to consider when implementing insider threat programs are financial (i.e., cost to implement tools, policies), social (i.e., securing ethics and privacy), technological (i.e., firewalls, robust password requirements, etc.), and psychological (i.e., maintenance of the psychological contract between employer and employee).\n\nIndividuals commit acts of high-stakes lies, sabotage, treason, and cybercrime. While there are various internal and external factors which contribute to the detection of malicious insiders, at its core this is a human problem which must be addressed through robust research agendas in the human, cultural, behavioral, and social sciences. Eliminating the insider threat completely is impossible. Evidence-based approaches such as those reviewed in this paper can be coupled with effective personnel screening including robust background investigations, interviews, behavioral observations, technical monitoring and employee policies and training programs to lessen the likelihood of repeated Snowden-like affairs.\n\n\n## 6.0 References\n\n1.         Executive Order 13587: Structural Reforms to Improve the Security of Classified\nNetworks and the Responsible Sharing and Safeguarding of Classified Information. 2012. https://www.aclu.org/sites/default/files/field_document/snowden_poll_results.pdf\n2.\nObama B. National Insider Threat Policy and Minimum Standards for Executive Branch Insider Threat Programs. 2012. https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-pressoffice/2012/11/21/presidential-memorandum-national-insider-threat-policy-andminimum-stand\n3.\nCropanzano R, Rupp DE, Thornton M, Shao R. (2016) Organizational Justice and\nOrganizational Citizenship. In: Podsakoff P, Mackenzie SB, Podsakoff NP, eds. The\nOxford Handbook of Organizational Citizenship Behavior: Oxford University Press;\n2016.\n4.\nFornes SL, Rocco TS, Wollard KK. Workplace Commitment: A Conceptual Model Developed From Integrative Review of the Research. Human Resource Development Review. 2008; 7(3):339-57.\n5.\nHe H, Brown AD. Organizational Identity and Organizational Identification: A Review of the Literature and Suggestions for Future Research. Group & Organization\nManagement. 2013; 38(1):3-35.\n6.\nFolger R, Skarlicki DP. 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    },
    {
        "text": "Achieve and Maintain Cyberspace Superiority Command Vision for US Cyber Command\n\n## Us Challenge In Cyberspace Superiority In The Physical Domains In No Small Part Depends On Superiority In Cyberspace.\n\nMilitary superiority in the air, land, sea, and space domains is critical to our ability to defend our interests and protect our values. Achieving superiority in the physical domains in no small part depends on superiority in cyberspace. Yet we risk ceding cyberspace superiority. As the *2018 National Defense Strategy* explains, adversaries are increasingly capable of contesting and disrupting America's society, economy, and military. This is in part because of our growing reliance on cyberspace. Adversaries direct continuous operations and activities against our allies and us in campaigns short of open warfare to achieve competitive advantage and impair US interests. The cyberspace domain that existed at the creation of US\nCyber Command (USCYBERCOM) has changed. Our adversaries have exploited the velocity and volume of data and events in cyberspace to make the domain more hostile. They have raised the stakes for our nation and allies. In order to improve security and stability, we need a new approach.\n\n## We Can Influence And Shape Adversary Behavior Through Persistent, Integrated Operations.\n\nAs the nation's cyber warriors, USCYBERCOM operates daily in cyberspace against capable adversaries, some of whom are now near-peer competitors in this domain. We have learned we must stop attacks before they penetrate our cyber defenses or impair our military forces; and through persistent, integrated operations, we can influence adversary behavior and introduce uncertainty into their calculations. Our forces must be agile, our partnerships operational, and our operations continuous. Policies, doctrine, and processes should keep pace with the speed of events in cyberspace to maintain decisive advantage. Superior strategic effects depend on the alignment of operations, capabilities, and processes, and the seamless integration of intelligence with operations. Now we must apply this experience by scaling to the magnitude of the threat, removing constraints on our speed and agility, and maneuvering to counter adversaries and enhance our national security. This document is a roadmap for USCYBERCOM to achieve and maintain superiority in cyberspace as we direct, synchronize, and coordinate cyberspace planning and operations to defend and advance national interests in collaboration with domestic and foreign partners. As a Unified Combatant Command, we will demonstrate our resolve against cyberspace threats. We will unify cyberspace operations. We will secure networks, platforms, and data. We will expand the military options available to national leaders and operational commanders.\n\nThis document supports the *2018 National Defense Strategy* by posturing USCYBERCOM to counter increasingly aggressive competitors and builds on the Commander's Vision, *Beyond the Build: Delivering Outcomes through Cyberspace*\n(June 2015).\n\n## Strategic Context\n\nThe security of the United States and our allies depends on international stability and global prosperity. The spread of technology and communications has enabled new means of influence and coercion. Adversaries continuously operate against us below the threshold of armed conflict. In this \"new normal,\" our adversaries are extending their influence without resorting to physical aggression. They provoke and intimidate our citizens and enterprises without fear of legal or military consequences. They understand the constraints under which the United States chooses to operate in cyberspace, including our traditionally high threshold for response to adversary activity. They use this insight to exploit our dependencies and vulnerabilities in cyberspace and use our systems, processes, and values against us to weaken our democratic institutions and gain economic, diplomatic, and military advantages.\n\nCyberspace threats are growing. They transcend geographic boundaries and are usually trans-regional in nature. States possess resources and patience to sustain sophisticated cyber campaigns to penetrate even well-protected networks, manipulate software and data, and destroy data, computers, and systems. Russia, China, Iran, and North Korea invest in military capabilities that reduce our military's competitive advantages and compromise our national security. Some of these states have demonstrated the resolve, technical capability, and persistence to undertake strategic cyberspace campaigns, including theft of intellectual property and personally identifiable information that are vital to our defenses. Disruptive technologies will eventually accelerate our adversaries' ability to impose costs. Aggressive non-state actors like terrorists, criminals, and hacktivists pose lesser threats than states but can still damage our military capabilities and critical infrastructure, as well as endanger American lives. Violent extremist organizations, such as the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria, al-Qaida, and affiliated groups, are destabilizing whole regions, attacking our global interests, and endangering our homeland and citizens around the world. These groups use cyberspace to promote their ideology, inspire followers, and control operations that threaten our allies and us. Organized criminal groups provide cover for states and terrorists, and possess significant capabilities to steal data and disrupt government functions. Hacktivists work to expose classified information or impair government services. These malicious cyber actors frequently pose threats that law enforcement and diplomatic means cannot contain without military assistance.\n\n## Adversaries Operate Continuously Below The Threshold Of Armed Conflict To Weaken Our Institutions And Gain Strategic Advantages. Operating Environment\n\nCyberspace is a fluid environment of constant contact and shifting terrain. New vulnerabilities and opportunities continually arise as new terrain emerges. No target remains static; no offensive or defensive capability remains indefinitely effective; and no advantage is permanent. Well-defended cyber terrain is attainable but continually at risk. Adversary offensive activities persist because opportunity costs are low, and accesses, platforms, and payloads can remain useful for extended periods.\n\n## In Cyberspace, Well-Defended Terrain Is Continually At Risk And Adversary Offensive Activities Persist.\n\nThe underlying technologies and protocols of cyberspace enable both legitimate and malicious activities. Adversaries exploit and weaponize vulnerabilities to steal wealth and intellectual property, manipulate information, and create malicious software capable of disrupting or destroying systems. The constant innovation of disruptive technologies offers all actors new opportunities for exploitation. In this dynamic environment, the United States must increase resiliency, defend forward as close as possible to the origin of adversary activity, and persistently contest malicious cyberspace actors to generate continuous tactical, operational, and strategic advantage. We achieve success by seizing the initiative, retaining momentum, and disrupting our adversaries' freedom of action.\n\n## National Policy Framework\n\nAs the *2018 National Defense Strategy* emphasizes, our ability to prevail in strategic competition requires the seamless integration of all instruments of national power. US cyberspace operations can make positive contributions to diplomatic power by providing fast, temporary, and reversible sanctions or communicating discreetly to the adversary. Cyberspace capabilities are key to identifying and disrupting adversaries' information operations. They facilitate overmatch of adversary military capabilities in all domains, expanding options for our decision makers and operational commanders, and producing integrated effects. Insights and threat information gleaned from operating in cyberspace can make key elements of economic power more resilient and defensible.\n\n## Cyberspace Operations Can Make Positive Contributions To Our Diplomatic, Information, Military, And Economic Levers Of Power.\n\nWhole-of-government approaches for protecting, defending, and operating in cyberspace must keep pace with the dynamics of this domain. We should not wait until an adversary is in our networks or on our systems to act with unified responses across agencies regardless of sector or geography. We cede our freedom of action with lengthy approval processes that delay US responses or set a very high threshold for responding to malicious cyber activities. Our adversaries maneuver deep into our networks, forcing the US government into a reactive mode after intrusions and attacks that cost us greatly and provide them high returns. This reactive posture introduces unacceptable risk to our systems, data, decision-making processes, and ultimately our mission success. The Department of Defense (DOD) is building the operational expertise and capacity to meet growing cyberspace threats and stop cyber aggression before it reaches our networks and systems. We need a policy framework that supports and enables these efforts.\n\n                  Achieve and maintain superiority in the\n                  cyberspace domain to influence adversary\n                  behavior, deliver strategic and operational\n                  advantages for the Joint Force, and defend\n                  and advance our national interests.\nVISION\n\n## Whole Of Government Efforts Must Keep Pace With This Dynamic Domain. Superiority Through Persistence We Will Operate Seamlessly, Globally, And Continuously.\n\nSuperiority through persistence seizes and maintains the initiative in cyberspace by continuously engaging and contesting adversaries and causing them uncertainty wherever they maneuver.* It describes how we operatemaneuvering seamlessly between defense and offense across the interconnected battlespace. It describes where we operateglobally, as close as possible to adversaries and their operations. It describes when we operatecontinuously, shaping the battlespace. It describes why we operateto create operational advantage for us while denying the same to our adversaries. Cyberspace is an active and contested operational space in which superiority is always at risk. We sustain strategic advantage by increasing resiliency, defending forward, and continuously engaging our adversaries. Increased resiliency reduces our attack surface at home, anticipates adversary actions, and increases flexibility in our response. Defending forward as close as possible to the origin of adversary activity extends our reach to expose adversaries' weaknesses, learn their intentions and capabilities, and counter attacks close to their origins. Continuous engagement imposes tactical friction and strategic costs on our adversaries, compelling them to shift resources to defense and reduce attacks. We will pursue attackers across networks and systems to render most malicious cyber and cyber-enabled activity inconsequential while achieving greater freedom of maneuver to counter and contest dangerous adversary activity before it impairs our national power.\n\nWE SUSTAIN STRATEGIC ADVANTAGE BY\nINCREASING RESILIENCY, DEFENDING FORWARD, AND CONTINUOUSLY ENGAGING OUR\nADVERSARIES.\n\nThrough persistent action and competing more effectively below the level of armed conflict, we can influence the calculations of our adversaries, deter aggression, and clarify the distinction between acceptable and unacceptable behavior in cyberspace. Our goal is to improve the security and stability of cyberspace. This approach will complement the efforts of other agencies to preserve our interests and protect our values. We measure success by our ability to increase options for decision makers and by the reduction of adversary aggression.\n\n## Commander's Intent\n\nOur purpose is to achieve cyberspace superiority by seizing and maintaining the tactical and operational initiative in cyberspace, culminating in strategic advantage over adversaries. Our efforts will increase our freedom of maneuver, create friction for adversaries, and cause them to shift resources to defense. We will erode their belief that hostile activities in cyberspace against the United States and its allies are advantageous. We will meet the 2018 National Defense Strategy's mandate to hold adversaries accountable for cyber-attacks.\n\n## We Will Prepare, Operate, And Collaborate With Commands, Services, Departments, Allies, And Industry.\n\nUSCYBERCOM will contribute to our national strategic deterrence. We will prepare, operate, and collaborate with combatant commands, services, departments, allies, and industry to continuously thwart and contest hostile cyberspace actors wherever found. We will attract new partners and strengthen ties with critical mission partnersparticularly the Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA), the National Security Agency (NSA), and the rest of the Intelligence Community. We will enable and bolster our partners. We will share our insights in order to anticipate evolving cyberspace threats and opportunities. We will keep policymakers and commanders apprised of cyberspace threats, the operating environment, and changes needed in policies and processes to achieve superiority. We will execute our new responsibilities that accompany elevation to a Unified Combatant Command, emphasizing mission and operational outcomes and enhancing the readiness of the nation's cyberspace military forces.\n\nWe are one cyber enterprise.\n\n## The Following\n\nWe empower our workforce.\n\n## Principles\n\nWe champion integrated, scalable solutions.\n\n## Guide Us Cyber\n\nWe compete by employing a long-term,\ncampaign mindset.\n\n## Command\n\nWe are risk aware, not risk averse.\n\n## Imperatives\n\nThe following imperatives support this guidance. Our imperatives are mutually supporting, with success in one enhancing success in the others. They dictate what we must do in order to retain the initiative in cyberspace. Attaining and sustaining these imperatives creates uncertainty for our adversaries and makes them hesitate to confront the United States. We must identify obstacles to achieving our goals, develop and implement plans to overcome those obstacles, and establish meaningful metrics to gauge our progress.\n\nIMPERATIVE 1: **Achieve and sustain overmatch of adversary capabilities.** Anticipate and identify technological changes, and exploit and operationalize emerging technologies and disruptive innovations faster and more effectively than our adversaries. Rapidly transfer technologies with military utility to scalable operational capabilities. Enable our most valuable assetsour peoplein order to gain advantages in cyberspace. Ensure the readiness of our forces.\n\nIMPERATIVE 2: **Create cyberspace advantages to enhance operations in all domains.** Develop advantages in preparation for and during joint operations in conflict, as well as below the threshold of armed conflict. Integrate cyberspace capabilities and forces into plans and operations across all domains.\n\n## Imperatives\n\nPRINCIPLES\nONE ENTERPRISE\nEMPOWERED WORKFORCE\nIMPERATIVE 3: Create information advantages to support operational outcomes and achieve strategic impact. Enhance information warfare options for Joint Force commanders. Integrate cyberspace operations with information operations. Unify and drive intelligence to support cyberspace operations and information operations. Integrate all intelligence capabilities and products to improve mission outcomes for the Joint Force and the nation.\n\nIMPERATIVE 4: **Operationalize the battlespace for agile and responsive maneuver.** Facilitate speed and agility for cyberspace operations in policy guidance, decision-making processes, investments, and operational concepts. Ensure every processfrom target system analysis to battle damage assessment, from requirements identification to fielded solutions, and from initial force development concepts to fully institutionalized force-management activitiesaligns to the cyberspace operational environment.\n\nIMPERATIVE 5: **Expand, deepen, and operationalize partnerships.** Leverage the talents, expertise, and products in the private sector, other agencies, Services, allies, and academia. Rapidly identify and understand cyberspace advances wherever they originate and reside. Increase the scope and speed of private sector and interagency threat information sharing, operational planning, capability development, and joint exercises. Enable and bolster our partners.\n\n## Risk Mitigation\n\nThe approach described in this document entails two primary risks. The first concerns the employment of a high-demand, low-density maneuver force. The prioritization of highly capable states and violent extremists means the Command will devote comparatively fewer resources and less attention to other cyber actors. The Command will seek to mitigate this risk indirectly by increasing resiliency in DOD systems against all threats in order to render most malicious activity inconsequential, and directly by sharing intelligence and operational leads with partners in law enforcement, homeland security (at the federal and state levels), and the Intelligence Community. The second risk is diplomatic. We recognize that adversaries already condemn US efforts to defend our interests and allies as aggressive, and we expect they will similarly seek to portray our strategy as \"militarizing\" the cyberspace domain. The Command makes no apologies for defending US interests as directed by the President through the Secretary of Defense in a domain already militarized by our adversaries. To the maximum extent possible, we will operate in concert with allies and coalition partners. We will also explain to oversight entities and the public the nature of threats in cyberspace, the threatening conduct of our adversaries, the limitations of passive defenses, and our scrupulous regard for civil liberties and privacy. Mitigation of these primary risks will occur in parallel with the Command's assumption of unified combatant command status and, if directed, its conditions-based approach to termination of the current dual-hat command relationship with the NSA. Regardless of whether, when, or how the \"dual hat\" terminates, however, we will adopt a comprehensive risk management approach to maintain synergy between operational objectives and the intelligence required to inform and sustain effective cyberspace operations.\n\n## Implementation\n\nThis guidance informs our operations, structure, and resource requirements. The Functional Campaign Plan for Cyberspace operations (FCP-CO) constitutes the implementation plan for this guidance. The FCP-CO is a living document requiring regular updates to reflect changes in priorities, doctrine, capabilities, and the operating environment. The FCP-CO Assessment is the process for assessing implementation, and for discovering, validating, and approving changes to drive continuous improvement. The USCYBERCOM Chief of Staff will oversee the assessment function, and all campaign plan assessments are to be reported to the USCYBERCOM Commander. The key to  success is execution, and everyone has a part in this effort. Each Service cyber component, Joint Force headquarters, and staff directorate should embrace this guidance, communicate it to the workforce, work to implement it, and ensure all personnel understand their role and functionsall the while providing direct feedback on the effectiveness of its execution.\n\nThis Page Intentionally Left Blank"
    },
    {
        "text": "# Fy2017 Final Report Power Of The People: A Technical, Ethical And Experimental Examination Of The Use Of Crowdsourcing To Support International Nuclear Safeguards Verification\n\nZoe N. Gastelum Kari Sentz Meili C. Swanson Cristina Rinaudo Prepared by Sandia National Laboratories Albuquerque, New Mexico  87185 and Livermore, California  94550 Sandia National Laboratories is a multimission laboratory managed and operated by National Technology and Engineering Solutions of Sandia, LLC, a wholly owned subsidiary of Honeywell International, Inc., for the U.S. Department of Energy's National Nuclear Security Administration under contract DE-NA0003525.\n\n\nIssued by Sandia National Laboratories, operated for the United States Department of Energy by National Technology and Engineering Solutions of Sandia, LLC.\n\nNOTICE:  This report was prepared as an account of work sponsored by an agency of the United States Government. Neither the United States Government, nor any agency thereof, nor any of their employees, nor any of their contractors, subcontractors, or their employees, make any warranty, express or implied, or assume any legal liability or responsibility for the accuracy, completeness, or usefulness of any information, apparatus, product, or process disclosed, or represent that its use would not infringe privately owned rights. Reference herein to any specific commercial product, process, or service by trade name, trademark, manufacturer, or otherwise, does not necessarily constitute or imply its endorsement, recommendation, or favoring by the United States Government, any agency thereof, or any of their contractors or subcontractors. The views and opinions expressed herein do not necessarily state or reflect those of the United States Government, any agency thereof, or any of their contractors. Printed in the United States of America. This report has been reproduced directly from the best available copy.\n\nAvailable to DOE and DOE contractors from U.S. Department of Energy Office of Scientific and Technical Information P.O. Box 62 Oak Ridge, TN  37831 Telephone:\n(865) 576-8401\nFacsimile:\n(865) 576-5728\nE-Mail:\nreports@osti.gov Online ordering:\nhttp://www.osti.gov/scitech Available to the public from U.S. Department of Commerce National Technical Information Service 5301 Shawnee Rd Alexandria, VA  22312 Telephone:\n(800) 553-6847\nFacsimile:\n(703) 605-6900\nE-Mail:\norders@ntis.gov Online order:\nhttps://classic.ntis.gov/help/order-methods/\n\n# Fy2017 Final Report Power Of The People: A Technical, Ethical And Experimental Examination Of The Use Of Crowdsourcing To Support International Nuclear Safeguards Verification\n\nZoe N. Gastelum Meili C. Swanson International Safeguards & Engagements Sandia National Laboratories P. O. Box 5800\nAlbuquerque, New Mexico  87185-MS1371\nKari Sentz Christina Rinaudo Risk Analysis and Decision Support Systems Los Alamos National Laboratory P.O. Box 1663\nLos Alamos, NM 87545\n\n## Abstract\n\nRecent advances in information technology have led to an expansion of crowdsourcing activities that utilize the \"power of the people\" harnessed via online games, communities of interest, and other platforms to collect, analyze, verify, and provide technological solutions for challenges from a multitude of domains. To related this surge in popularity, the research team developed a taxonomy of crowdsourcing activities as they relate to international nuclear safeguards, evaluated the potential legal and ethical issues surrounding the use of crowdsourcing to support safeguards, and proposed experimental designs to test the capabilities and prospect for the use of crowdsourcing to support nuclear safeguards verification.\n\n## Acknowledgments\n\nThis work was sponsored by the Office of Nonproliferation and Arms Control (NPAC, NA-24), Office of International Nuclear Safeguards Concepts & Approaches portfolio. Thank you to Melissa Einwechter for her support of this work. Tucker Boyce (formerly SNL) supported early research in support of this project and Laura Matzen (SNL) contributed to experimental design brainstorming.\n\n## Executive Summary\n\nThis report reflects research conducted by Sandia National Laboratories (SNL) and Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) in assessing the feasibility of incorporating crowdsourcing to support international nuclear safeguards verification activities. The report was written in three parts, each part serving as a mid-term report on the evaluation of the use of crowdsourcing:\n\n\nPart 1 was led by LANL, and examines a taxonomy of crowdsourcing activities, breaking down into hierarchical structure related to purpose, players, type, motivation, and disclosures.\n\nPart 2 was led by SNL, and examines legal and ethical considerations of crowdsourcing activities in the context of international safeguards, examining from the perspectives of both collecting and using crowdsourced data.\n\nPart 3 was jointly written, with each lab developing its respective crowdsourcing for safeguards\nexperiments. LANL experiments focused on expert communities, and the SNL experiments focused on non-experts. Each lab took a different perspective on administering the experiments, with SNL focusing on micro-tasks completed via online platforms, and the LANL team focusing on in-person engagement and gamification.\n\n## Nomenclature\n\n| Abbreviation   | Definition                         |\n|----------------|------------------------------------|\n| BOG            | Board of Governors                 |\n| CSA            | Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement |\n| FY             | Fiscal Year                        |\n| IAEA           | International Atomic Energy Agency |\n| LOF            | Locations Offsite a Facility       |\n| SDT            | Self Determination Theory          |\n| TOS            | Terms of Service                   |\n| VOA            | Voluntary Offer Agreement          |\n\n## Part I A Technical Examination Of The Use Of Crowdsourcing To Support International Nuclear Safeguards Verification Activities 1. Introduction To The Technical Examination Of The Use Of Crowdsourcing\n\nWhile crowdsourcing seems like a recent phenomenon, the idea of crowdsourcing has been around for hundreds of years. Starting in the late 1500s major European seafaring nations were offering large cash prizes to inspire a solution to finding longitude at sea. The prize that was finally claimed was posted by the British Parliament for what would be close to $20 million today after nearly two thousand sailors were lost when four British warships ran aground. The successful claimant was John Harrison, an English clockmaker for his marine timekeeper H4 in\n1759 [Sovel (1994)]. In the 19th century, US Naval Officer Matthew Fontaine Maury provided free wind and current charts to sailors on the condition of the return of standardized logs of their voyages so that he could collect the experience of different navigators in different seasons and different vessels traveling the same routes that could serve as guide to future navigators. [Pinsel (1981)] In the last decade, crowdsourcing has become an emergent technology because of the recognition of the value of human sourced data, analysis, or ingenuity and the coincidence with technological enablers such as the internet, mobile technology, social media, and ways to motivate crowds. Because of the enormous resources it can bring to wicked and data impoverished problems, crowdsourcing technology attracts many researchers in the safeguards community [Lee, Zolotova (2013); Hartigan, Hinderstein (2013); Gerami (2013); Hinderstein et al. (2014)]. We all come with the question of how might we leverage the power of the people in crowdsourcing for nuclear safeguards? In this midterm report, we explore how to design a crowdsourcing experiment that satisfies safeguards objectives and goals, protects nuclear industry professionals, crowd participants, and stakeholders and addresses the standards of quality necessary for safeguards verification.\n\n## 2. Crowdsourcing Safeguards\n\nWe start with the high-level objectives of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) with regards to the implementation of safeguards. As summarized in [Board of Governors, IAEA (2014)], the generic objectives of safeguards are*:\nFor States with [comprehensive safeguards agreements] CSAs:\n\nTo detect any diversion of declared nuclear material at declared facilities or locations outside facilities where nuclear material is customarily used (LOFs)\n\nTo detection an undeclared production or processing of nuclear material at declared facilities or LOFs; and\n\nTo detect any undeclared nuclear material or activity in the State as a whole.\nFor States with item-specific safeguards agreements:\n\nTo detect any diversion of nuclear material subject to safeguards under the safeguards agreement; and\n\nTo detect any misuse of facilities and other items subject to safeguards under the safeguards agreement.\nFor States with [voluntary offer agreements] VOAs:\n\nTo detect any withdrawal of nuclear material from safeguards in selected facilities or parts thereof, except as provided for in the agreement\nWe can imagine this in terms of more specific detections such as discussed in [Hinderstein, Hartigan (2012)] looking for indicators of:\n\nAcquisition of or attempts to acquire specialized equipment\n\nAcquisition of or attempts to acquire materials through trade or diversion\n\nTransportation of specialized equipment and/or materials\n\nProduction of fissile material\n\nManufacturing of warhead\n\nPreparations for a nuclear test or missile launch\n\nNuclear test or missile launch\nWith the expansion of the use of nuclear technologies for peaceful purposes, the opportunities for diversion are increased and the challenge of distinguishing declared from undeclared activities becomes more arduous.\n\n## 3. Undertaking A Crowdsourcing Experiment\n\nWe characterize this as a *crowdsourcing experiment* to highlight the meaningful commonalities between these activities: both involve aspects that are controlled and uncontrolled and the management, the outcomes, and positive and negative consequences are very much determined by the tensions between these two types of factors. Experimentalists call out these factors explicitly in design of a scientific experiment and accordingly, a crowdsourcing investigator should carefully consider what is controllable and uncontrollable in the experimental setting and the range of possible consequences up front. In any crowdsourcing experiment involves key steps [from Grier (2017)]:\n1. Design the job in accordance with the goal and objectives and identify the crowd selection criteria\n2. Write clear instructions 3. Choose a platform to serve as the crowdmarket 4. Release the job and recruit the crowd 5. Listen to the crowd and manage the job 6. Assemble the work and create the final product While certainly these steps figure into the planning of a safeguards design of a crowdsourcing experiment, they fall short of the full breadth of things we need to consider.\n\n## 3.1. Planning Considerations For Safeguards Crowdsourcing Experiment\n\nTo help guide the design of a crowdsourcing experiment, we provide a framework summarized in Table 1. This is a taxonomy for crowdsourcing experimental design that endeavors to walk through different aspects of the planning considerations with an emphasis on specific concerns for safeguards. We contrast this with previous efforts in more generally applicable crowdsourcing taxonomies such as [Rouse (2010)] that organizes crowdsourcing by distribution of benefits and capabilities as well as [Cullina et al. (2015)] that are focusing on metrics.\n\nPURPOSE\nGoal\nObjectives\nData Collection or\nData Labeling or\nData or Analysis\nContent\nAnalysis\nVerification/Validation\nTechnological Solution\nGeneration\nTasks\nSelf-\nCrowdcontests\norganized\nMacrotasks\nMicrotasks\nCrowdfunding\ncrowds\nCROWDSOURCING TYPE\nActive\nPassive\nPOTENTIAL PLAYERS\nStakeholders\nIAEA\nState\nOther\n\nWe think of the **purpose** as the reason for the crowdsourcing experiment and the **goal** as what we are trying to achieve with the crowdsourcing experiment. The **objectives** are concrete actions in how the goal will be achieved. Here we identify four types of crowdsourcing objectives: data collection or content generation; data labeling or analysis; data or analysis verification/validation; and a *technological solution*.\n\nData collection or content generation can take many conceivable forms such as the collection of images, generation of text, generation of audio, collection of radioactivity data, seismic data, environmental data, etc. With the increasing sophistication of mobile devices, the reduction in footprint of memory stores as well as the diminishing size of sensors, the amount and type of data that can be collected and transmitted continues to increase. Data Labeling or Analysis is another activity that can take on a wide range of possible forms. Examples include labeling and searching image data, interpreting context, fusing disparate sources of information, anomaly detection, change detection, same detection. Data or analysis verification/validation may be the most important task a crowd can do for building confidence in both the experimental process and the outcome. This can stand-alone or be built into a *data collection* task or *data labeling/analysis* task. For example, many crowdsourcing experiments will require corroboration of data collects or findings. Technological solution crowdsourcing is also a very common and very successful form of crowdsourcing as metrics of success are frequently clear cut and verifiable through testing. In addition to challenges like the longitudinal problem in the introduction or the IAEA Technology Challenge [Createc (2016)] Open source code libraries are common example of successfully crowdsourced technical solutions.\n\nThe specific **tasks** are what we ask the crowdworkers to do and frame how to do it. We include the tasks and descriptions as suggested by Grier in [Grier (2017)]. While these are broader than might apply to safeguards we include them here for comprehensiveness:\nCrowdcontests: Challenge or single job description with many people proposing or answering the challenge and competing for a singular reward Self-organizing crowds: A crowdcontest where the crowd organizes itself into a team and teams compete for a singular reward Macrotask: A specialized single task that can be done independently in a fixed amount of time that requires special skills of a worker Microtask: A small or simple task, often a part of a larger more complicated job where members of the crowd can do tasks and all are rewarded. Crowdfunding: Ways of raising funds through crowdsourcing, often for humanitarian purposes or venture capitalism.\n\nAll of these previous tasks presume a specific **type of crowdsourcing** is being invoked, namely active crowdsourcing where the stakeholder or administrator plays an active role by posing a particular problem, soliciting information or solutions etc. Another type of crowdsourcing is passive crowdsourcing where the stakeholder or administrator assumes a passive role and collects and analyzes content on a specific topic that has been freely generated by citizens in various sources [Loukis, Charalabidis (2015)]. We deliberately separate the roles of **Stakeholders** and **Administrators** though often the players are conflated. The **Stakeholder** is the party who wants the product of the experiment and formulates the **Purpose** and the **Goal**. The **Stakeholder** can be an agency such as the *IAEA*, a State, or *Other* organizations that work in the area of safeguards. The **Administrator** is the party who performs and manages the crowdsourcing experiment. It can be useful to separate these parties for the purpose of logistics and qualifications but also public perception. For example a State can perform a crowdsourcing experiment on itself and share the results with other Stakeholders such as the *IAEA*. In the *Passive* crowdsourcing example, a commercial social media entity can perform a crowdsourcing experiment with no goal of safeguards but obtains relevant information that is freely available and of interest to a *State* or the *IAEA*. This relationship can be captured by the **Stakeholder**: State or *IAEA* and **Administrator**: *Third Party*. Second to the objective and task formulation, **Crowd Selection** is one of the more critical choices to the management and outcome of the experiment as it impacts the potential number of participants, the scale of the project to manage but also the quality of the task execution and the need for *post hoc* validation and verification. Here we consider three different options: General crowd (unrestricted); *Proximal* crowd (the people close in proximity to a location of interest); Expert crowd (people with specialized knowledge).\n\nWith *General* crowd recruitment and compelling motivation, we can see enormous numbers of people worldwide coming together to solve problems. For example, the Tomnod online search party for the Malaysian airline flight MH370 recruited 2.3 million people who scanned every pixel of 750,000 images at least 30 times within 5 days [Fishwick (2014)]. While this effort was not successful in recovering the lost airline, it is an astounding crowdsourcing design involving huge numbers of crowdworkers performing microtasks with multiple validations quickly. Proximal crowds require either a pre-selection criteria for participation, a geolocation filter on voluntarily collected data, or a voluntary disclosure of location through mobile devices. Good examples include Safecast (http://blog.safecast.org/) where radioactivity data is geolocated and mapped or the use of the Ushahidi platform to aid in emergency response after the Haitian earthquake in 2010 [Gerami (2013)]. Expert crowds will also require a pre-selection criteria or a success in a specialized task, competition, or challenge. While the expertise may help alleviate the burden on verification of results, that burden may simply be shifted to the assessment of expertise up front.\n\nCrowd Motivation: Sustaining crowd participation and interest over time is critical to a successful crowdsourcing experiment. This requires analysis into what motivates the crowd to engage in crowdsourcing activities and how to create an incentive mechanism to attract participants. A useful framework to understanding people's willingness to participate in crowdsourcing comes from Self Determination Theory (SDT), formulated by Ryan and Deci (1985). SDT has been used extensively in gamification research and game design and frames motivation as one of the fundamental bases of human behavior: it starts with a particular need and activates a consequent behavior aimed to reach a goal. Deci and Ryan describe three innate and psychological Needs: *Competence* (being competent in performing a task), *Autonomy* (being in control of own behaviors and goals) and *Psychological Relatedness* (experiencing a sense of belonging). When people experience these innate needs, they become self-determined and intrinsically motivated to pursue certain behaviors. We identify two main motivators: *Intrinsic* and *Extrinsic*:\nIntrinsic motivators are innate to humans and refer to the natural predisposition to explore, learn, and master new skills and abilities that are essential to cognitive and social development and the satisfaction provided by completing a task. Extrinsic motivators are related to attaining a goal (a promotion), or some kind of external outcome (a monetary reward) and are not usually related to the satisfaction derived from completing an activity.\n\nAccording to [Roberts et al. (2006)] internal and external motivation likely interact and both affect participation. For these reasons, a crowdsourcing experiment may carefully design intrinsic and extrinsic motivators in combination and perhaps to include changes over time in an attempt to sustain engagement. Categories of ways of motivating such as *quid pro quo* (rewards or compensation), *peer recognition* through point systems, contests and *challenges*, gamification, altruism. The next planning consideration in the taxonomy deals with the choices in **Disclosure** that we explore from the perspective of the **Goal**, the **Objective**, the **Stakeholder** and the Crowd Participants. The point over disclosures is to capture in the idea of \"experimenter effect\" that the knowledge of the goal of the experiment or the **Stakeholder** of the experiment can bias the outcome in both positive and negative ways. There may be an advantage to non-disclosed Goals and non-disclosed **Stakeholders** administrated through commercial third parties just to circumvent the disinformation that could be imagined in the fully disclosed case. The concern over disclosing the **Crowd Participants** relates to their protection. The anonymity of the crowd can yield better information on one hand, it allows for disinformation with impunity on the other.\n\n## 3.2. The Importance Of Validation And Verification Of Information\n\nThe challenge of crowdsourcing is the validation and verification of information and the discrimination of valid information from disinformation and misinformation. We have seen an example of built-in validation in the Tomnod Malaysian airliner search of cooperation and consensus over many crowdworkers before an area was tagged for follow up. We also identify Data or Analysis Verification/Validation as its own crowdsourcing task. Hinderstein et al. (2014) voice optimism on the successes of the private sector with Amazon Turk with feedback loops and Wikipedia moderators as well as tradecraft on vetting data and detecting bias. However with the number of intentional disclosures of disinformation seen over the internet in the last year, we can only expect that the validation and verification of information culled from crowdsourcing will be harder and previously successful methods may have to be evolved.\n\n## 4. Conclusions And Future Work\n\nIn this Midterm report, we outline a taxonomy for the design of a safeguards crowdsourcing experiment with a detailed discussion on each element of the taxonomy. In forthcoming work, we will discuss the legal and ethical considerations for crowdsourcing safeguards and the types of crowdsourcing experimental designs that positively adhere to those considerations. Finally we will discuss candidates for active crowdsourcing experiments for Phase 2. This is the first installment of the new collaborative effort on crowdsourcing safeguards with Los Alamos National Laboratory and Sandia National Laboratories.\n\n## Part Ii A Legal And Ethical Examination Of The Use Of Crowdsourcing To Support International Nuclear Safeguards Verification 5. Introduction To The Legal And Ethical Examination\n\nThe growth of the Internet and the Information Age has allowed the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Department of Safeguards to significantly expand its open source information collection, including new formats (such as multimedia [Barletta et al. (2016)]) and sources (such as social media [Lorenz, Feldman (2014) and Fowler et al. (2016)]) for potentially safeguardsrelevant information. The Agency's exploration of social media data has led some researchers in the nuclear nonproliferation community to consider the potential for the use of societal mobilization, also known as crowdsourcing, to support information collection and analysis efforts. For the purposes of this research, societal mobilization \"refers to an appeal that is broadcast to the public...requesting information, analysis, or opinion\" [Gastelum (forthcoming 2017)]. In this paper, we discuss the legal and ethical implications of the spectrum of crowdsourcing activities that may be available to support international nuclear safeguards. We define legal implications as the legal rights and permissions to collect and use information (which includes raw data, analyses, or even technologies) from crowdsourced activities. We examine ethics within the framework of the three basic principles defined in the Belmont Report [The National Commission for the Protection of Human Subjects of Biomedical and Behavioral Research (1978)] regarding research involving human subjects. While we recognize that crowdsourcing for international safeguards is distinct from biomedical or behavioral research using human subjects, we find that the protections for human life and well-being proscribed in the Belmont report are highly applicable to the potential collection or use of crowdsourced data to support international safeguards. We conduct this analysis with separate considerations for the collection and use of crowdsourced information (or technologies), and incorporate the taxonomy of the design of a safeguards crowdsourcing experiment presented in this project's midterm report (Part I) as framework for our examination. To better illustrate the connections between this analysis and the taxonomy presented in the midterm report, we **bold** the concepts defined in that paper. During the course of this research, the team also became aware of a number of best practices and considerations for the IAEA's use of crowdsourcing activities to support international safeguards verification. While these were neither legal nor ethical per se, they are critical to any IAEA implementation of crowdsourcing for safeguards and thus included in the last section of this report.\n\n## 6. Legal Collection Of Crowdsourced Data\n\nThere are two means to analyze the IAEA's legal rights and boundaries for collecting crowdsourced data. The first includes how the IAEA *collects* and *evaluates* all relevant information for its safeguards verification activities under Part I of the strengthened safeguards measures established by the 93+2 Commission. The second relates to how the crowdsourced data itself is collected from the various crowdsourcing platforms, for which legal terms regarding the collection and use of the data are defined in each platform's respective Terms of Use or Terms of Service.\n\n## 6.1. 93+2 Part I Measures\n\nThe IAEA has been routinely collecting and analyzing open source information in support of international nuclear safeguards verification since at least 1991 with the establishment of an open source information analysis unit within the Department of Safeguards [IAEA (2007)]. The Agency's collection and analysis of open source information was formalized in the 93+2 Part I measures [International Atomic Energy Agency (1995)]:\nThe proposed approach to a strengthened and more cost-effective safeguards system builds on the current system of material accountancy and control by integrating...[e]lements of increased access to information and its effective use by the Agency, including...improved analysis and evaluation of all relevant information available to the Agency.\n\nGOV/2784 describes three sources of that increased information as information provided by the state under an Expanded Declaration, information from strengthened safeguards measures, and \"information from all sources available to the Agency, including the public media, scientific publications and existing Secretariat databases...as well as other information made available by Member States\" [IAEA (1995) pp. 21]. Today, open sources of data collected and analyzed as part of the State Level Concept include, for example, press releases, news media, government and academic websites, trade information, scientific and technical journal publications, and satellite and groundbased imagery. In the past two decades, the visibility of open source information analysis in support of nuclear safeguards verification has grown considerably, providing context for traditional in-field safeguards activities and complementary access visits, raising important questions about state declarations or activities, and in some cases such as for states with Small Quantities Protocols, serving as the primary source on safeguardsrelevant information. GOV/2784 offers the following legal analysis regarding \"improved analysis of information\" including open source information [IAEA (1995) pp. 23]:\n\"Comprehensive safeguards agreements require the Agency to draw conclusions from its verification activities (INFCIRC/153, para. 90), which presupposes the analysis and evaluation of the results of such activities. Improvements in the Agency's analytical techniques would therefore be consistent with the overall objective of a strengthened and more cost-effective safeguards system, and can be pursued within the Agency's existing legal authority.\"\nThis appears to legally justify at least *some* use of some crowdsourced data. However, the means by which the IAEA gains access to that data may be interpreted differently. For this, must consider the **crowdsourcing type**: passive or active. Passive crowdsourcing is defined in the midterm report (Part I) as an activity in which \"the stakeholder or administrator assumes a passive role ad collects and analyzes content on a specific topic that has been freely generated by citizens in various sources.\" This could be interpreted as constituting any open source information, including information on the Internet and social media platforms. Active crowdsourcing is defined as an activity in which \"the stakeholder or administrator plays an active role by posing a particular problem [and] soliciting information or solutions.\"\nAssuming the consideration only of active crowdsourcing activities for this research, we must consider both the **stakeholders** and the **administrators** of the crowdsource activity. A stakeholder is defined in our mid-term report (Part I) as \"the party who wants the product of the experiment and formulated the purpose and goal.\" In cases where the IAEA is the primary stakeholder, the Agency would initiate a crowdsourcing activity and have direct interest in the resulting data (this type of activity may be either directly administered by the IAEA, or by an external administrator on behalf of the IAEA). However, given the various means by which the Agency might gain access to crowdsourced data, the Agency may also be a secondary stakeholder, in which the data was collected for another purpose or stakeholder but also interest to the IAEA. Examples of instances in which the IAEA is a secondary stakeholder include, for example, the IAEA accessing open source crowd-sourced data from a platform that collected the information for non-safeguards purposes, or a non-governmental organization or thirdparty providing information collected via crowdsourcing from their own activities to the IAEA if it was later determined that the results would be of interest to the Agency. In cases where the IAEA is a secondary stakeholder and accesses via open sources or is otherwise provided access to crowdsourced data, there appear to be no legal barriers for the Agency to treat that data any differently than it would other potentially safeguardsrelevant information. However, in cases where the IAEA is a primary stakeholder and is therefore responsible for initiating the collection of crowdsourced data, Member State buy-in would likely be required in any state for which data was being collected or analyzed in order to be considered \"other information made available by the Member State\" [International Atomic Energy Agency, (1995) pp. 21] If the IAEA were to be the primary stakeholder in a crowd-sourced activity that did not have buy-in from the host state, this could be considered espionage.\n\n## 6.2. Terms Of Service From Individual Platforms\n\nTerms of Service (TOS) are the legal agreement between platforms and their users regarding, among other things, how the data on their platform can be collected or used. TOS differ by platform, country, and by the crowdsource activities on that platform. If the IAEA were the primary stakeholder for a crowdsource activity, it would presumably administer the activity on its own site (in which it could define favorable terms of use that would enable the IAEA to collect and analyze data for safeguards purposes) or work with a platform (administrator) that had TOS that would be favorable to how the Agency wanted to collect the data. Most platforms include in their TOS that data harvesting should not be conducted in a way that results in a Denial of Service for the site. In addition to specifications regarding how the data from a specific platform is collected, some platforms terms of service explicitly prohibit the misrepresentation of an individual's identity for the purpose of data collection. This would prohibit the IAEA from collecting data under the guise of a non-IAEA identity.\n\n## 7. Legal Use Of Crowdsourced Data\n\nAs noted above, the IAEA's collection of crowdsourced data through and IAEA-administered or IAEA-stakeholder activity may face legal limitations via Terms of Service agreements and avoiding the appearance of espionage. However, once the data is available (for example, as provided by a third party and not collected directly by or for the IAEA), the legal use of that data to support safeguards verification originates from the same Board of Governors report which authorizes the collection and analysis of open source and other Member-State supplied information [International Atomic Energy Agency (1995)]. For cases in which the IAEA uses data collected from a commercial platform not administered by the Agency itself, care must be taken to follow the terms of use of the platform regarding use of the data. For instance, many platforms prohibit users from copying materials under an intellectual property rights clause. Additionally, specific countries have TOS agreements that prohibit users from copying data without authorization. However, since the IAEA would be unlikely to publish the data or use it for commercial gain, it would likely be able to use the data under a \"fair use\"** clause without violating intellectual property regulations.\n\n## 8. Ethical Collection Of Crowdsourced Data\n\nFor the purposes of this research, we found the ethical principles on the use of human subjects for biomedical and behavioral research from the 1978 Belmont Report to be highly applicable as ethical considerations for crowdsourcing. The Belmont Report outlines three main ethical principles: 1) respect for persons; 2) beneficence; and 3) justice, explained in the context of crowdsourcing below.\n\n## 8.1. Respect For Persons\n\nAccording to the Belmont report, respect for persons consists of two ethical principles: first, that individuals should be treated as autonomous agents (i.e., they can choose to participate or cease participating at any time), and second, that some individuals have diminished autonomy and must be protected. For crowdsourcing activities, this pertains to **crowd selection** and disclosure choices. Crowd selection can consist of the general public, proximal crowds (those in close physical proximity to an area of interest) or expert crowds (those with specialized knowledge). For crowdsourcing for safeguards, respect for persons means that individuals need to be given the explicit choice to participate in the verification activity (which could be terminated at any time), and that some individuals who are not able to make that choice should not be included as they may not have the full mental capacity to determine their participation (for example, children, those with reduced mental capacity or illness, or incarcerated persons). Any crowd selection activity should make explicit that participation is completely voluntary. For selection among the general public or proximal crowds, criteria for participation could include minimum age restrictions in order to protect children. Protecting those in other compromised situations such as incarcerated persons or those with mental illness is much more challenging, but efforts may be made in the design of a crowdsourcing activity to neither target not discriminate against these populations. The disclosure of a crowdsourced activity's stakeholder and goal can be an important determinant for participants to decide their own level of participation. For example, if an individual agrees with the mission of IAEA safeguards, disclosure of the IAEA as a stakeholder may increase the person's intrinsic motivation to participate. Alternatively, an individual who disagrees with the IAEA's mission may choose not to participate. In cases when the IAEA is a secondary stakeholder, the stakeholder and goal change from the point of original collection to the secondary use, and may be resource prohibitive to retroactively disclose.\n\n## 8.2. Beneficence\n\nUnder beneficence, people are treated ethically by respecting their decisions, protecting them from harm, and making efforts to secure their well-being. The two general rules under beneficence are: \"(1) do not harm and (2) maximize possible benefits and minimize possible harms\" [National Commission for the Protection of Human Subjects of Biomedical and Behavioral Research (1978)]. Abiding by the principles of beneficence for a crowdsourcing activity in support of safeguards would impact the activity's **objectives** (some objectives carry more risk for participants than others) and **disclosures** (specifically identification of crowd participants, which could threaten participants' identity or personal information).\n\n## 8.2.1. Do No Harm\n\nThe principle of doing no harm for human research subjects in biomedical and behavioral research stems from a history of experimentation in the 20th century in which participants were exposed to infectious disease, experienced psychological impacts of high-stress experiments, or experienced other side effects from participating in experiments that were ethically unsound. For a safeguards crowdsourcing activity's objectives, it is unlikely that participants would experience physical or psychological harm. However, depending on the activity, data collection or content generation may pose potential risk to participant safety. For safeguards verification purposes, we assume that collection refers to information or sample collection. Crowd-sourced data generation leverages the ubiquitous presence of sophisticated camera and monitoring equipment in the hands of citizens to provide data streams to the IAEA or societal mobilization platforms that could then be analyzed for safeguards-relevance. For safeguards, data collection or content generation may include taking photos, taking radiation measurements or environmental samples (if deemed acceptable by the BOG as part of wide area environmental monitoring), sending observations regarding facility status (presence/absence of a steam plume, presence/absence of equipment, or patterns of life such as fullness of the parking lot). In order to protect participants from safety hazards, the administrator should define the task so that it is not inherently dangerous, and so that participants are aware of potentially hazardous conditions. For example, if a crowdsourcing activity includes taking photos of a nuclear facility, participants should be advised to take photos only from publically accessible areas (i.e. not within a restricted area of the site).\n\n## 8.2.2. Maximize Benefits And Minimize Harms\n\nTo maximize benefits, only crowdsourcing activities for which the data can be reasonably expected to be used in support of safeguards verification activities should be collected (assuming IAEA as the primary **stakeholder**). That is to say, collecting data from crowdsource activities should not be collected for the sake of collecting data - there should be a defined data collection plan in which the collected data can be applied for a specific verification activity. To minimize harm, the most significant consideration is the disclosure of crowd participants' identities to protect them from potential retaliation (from the host state, from anti-nuclear groups, etc.). The fear is that participants in a crowdsourcing activity without Member State consent\ncould be viewed as whistleblowers or even as spies. As such, protection of participants' personal information and identities is an important consideration. For an IAEA-administered crowdsource activity, this would be the direct responsibility of the IAEA (and presumably would be described in the TOS). For activities administered by non-IAEA entities, it would be important that the IAEA only use, store, protect, and transmit the data in accordance with the original administrator's or stakeholder's specifications per their activity so as not to compromise any of the participants' privacy.\n\n## 8.3. Justice\n\nIn regards to the Belmont report and the ethical use of human subjects, justice refers to the distribution of the benefits of the research compared to who bears the burden. For crowdsourcing related to international safeguards, the benefit could be considered global (for those who consider nuclear proliferation to be a global good/benefit). However, the risks would likely be concentrated in specific populations depending on **crowd selection** and would vary depending on the **objective**. Understanding the potential burden of a crowdsourcing activity for safeguards also calls into question the **crowd motivation**. If the crowdsourcing activity was global in nature (e.g., send us pictures of all the cooling towers in the world), the burden would be fairly distributed, as there are cooling towers in countries with nuclear energy, as well as those used for coal power plants. However, if the activity was focused on a specific country or site of interest, the **proximal crowd** would bear a much larger role (and therefore risk, burden). In crowd analysis activities, an **expert crowd** could theoretically be unduly burdened by excessive requests on a highly specialized topic. However, these impacts are expected to be minimal given the non-discrimination principles imposed by IAEA safeguards as well as the voluntary nature of crowdsourcing activities. Regarding crowd motivation, the Mid-Term report describes **intrinsic motivation** (i.e. satisfaction derived from completing an activity) and **extrinsic motivation** (related to attaining a goal or external outcome such as a reward). Intrinsically motivated crowds who participate in crowdsource activities based on their own personal motivations pose little ethical challenge. However, there is significant debate in the crowdsourcing community regarding the use of monetary payment (an archetype of extrinsic motivation). Some crowdsource platforms, for example Amazon's Mechanical Turk, use small payments to motivate participants. While this was likely intended as a motivational tool and not as an employment opportunity, some have claimed that the use of small payments could exploit certain types of workers who rely on the payments as a source of income (these populations may also be in a state of diminished autonomy, for example undocumented immigrants). The issue of payment may be exacerbated under the **technological solution** objective, in which the crowd develops equipment, computer codes, or other solutions that can require significant investments of infrastructure, time and resources on behalf of the participants. While many crowdsource activities with technological solution objectives do offer a reward for the best solution, many participants receive no compensation for their time or supplies.\n\n## 9. Ethical Use Of Crowdsourced Data\n\nOnce crowdsourced data has been collected, its use poses minimal ethical concerns. However, as with ethical collection principles, participant identities and personal information should continue to be protected. In addition, it could be argued that the IAEA also has the responsibility to verify the data and to utilize the information in a non-discriminatory manner. However, because these responsibilities do not clearly fall within the definition of ethics, they will be discussed in more detail in the Best Practices section below. For instances in which the IAEA is the secondary stakeholder, they might consider if the activity was conducted ethically before determining if they will use the data. Data generated or collected in an unethical way, even if not initially for safeguards use, might be better avoided.\n\n## 10. Other Best Practices\n\nIn the process of analyzing legal and ethical issues for incorporating crowdsourcing activities into international nuclear safeguards verification, several concerns, issues, or recommendations for best practice emerged. While many of these were not explicitly legal or technical, the research team found them sufficiently pertinent to include here.\n\n## 10.1. Independent Verification\n\nRecent high-profile errors made in crowdsourcing efforts call out the potential fallibility of \"the crowd.\" Furthermore, the potential high visibility of a crowdsourcing activity in support of IAEA\nsafeguards may have increased susceptibility to sabotage*** or misinformation. As with all open source data the Agency collects, they have the responsibility to independently verify that information. This is currently standard practice in the Agency's analytical due diligence, and would need to extend to crowd-sourced data. Fortunately, many **data collection/generation** and data analysis crowdsourcing activities already include verification and validation within the activities themselves, requiring multiple users to submit similar responses before the data would be considered for use. A **technological solution** developed for safeguards via a crowdsourcing activity would be subject to the same vulnerability analysis and technology approval process used for any safeguards equipment.\n\n## 10.2. Protecting Sensitive Data\n\nData collection and generation about a state's nuclear facilities has the potential to generate or expose commercial proprietary, security, and safeguards information. Furthermore, data labeling or analysis activities could unintentionally expose, via the mosaic effect, states' sensitive information. As Oboler et al point out, \"the potential damage of multiple individually benign pieces of information being combined to infer, or a big dataset being analyzed to reveal, sensitive information\" is difficult to predict [Oboler et al. (2012)]. As with all safeguards activities conducted by the IAEA, the Agency has the responsibility to protect that data. Considerations regarding what information about a state would be exposed, collected, or analyzed in the course of a crowdsourcing activity to support safeguards verification would have to be carefully considered prior to the launch of an activity to ensure that the IAEA maintains its high standards for protecting sensitive information. This will involve careful cooperation between the IAEA and the state to ensure no sensitive data is being exposed, and that data collected is stored and analyzed according to the information security practices required for other safeguards data.\n\n## 10.3. Avoiding Undue Burden\n\nThough we have established that crowdsourced data may be legally permissible for the IAEA to use in support of its safeguards verification activities, any collection, generation, or analysis of that data must be done so in a way that does not unduly burden states or nuclear facility operators. Indeed, the IAEA's report GOV/2784, which describes strengthened safeguards measures under the 93+2 activities, notes that while the IAEA can collect and analyze additional information to support verification, it should not burden states with \"excessive costs or by cumbersome measures to facilitate verification\" [International Atomic Energy Agency (1995) pp. 1-2]. Regarding the application of crowd sourcing, this could be interpreted to include activities administered by, or with the primary stakeholder as, the IAEA. Such undue burdens resulting from an IAEA crowdsourcing activity could include, for example, crowding around a nuclear facility perimeter disrupting physical protection operations or trespassing by overeager participants wanting to collect data.\n\n## 10.4. Protection Of Iaea Interests\n\nWhile it may seem self-evident, a crowdsourcing activity undertaken by the IAEA to support safeguards verification should protect the Agency's own interests. In order to prevent potential obfuscation, the IAEA does not disclose details regarding areas of potential proliferation concern directly to a state, other than to ask follow-up questions or perhaps request a visit via complementary access. Thus, care must be taken in the construction of a crowdsourcing activity to ensure that IAEA safeguards questions regarding potential undeclared activities are not disclosed.\n\n## 10.5. Optics\n\nFinally, it is recognized that the IAEA safeguards mission operates in a politically sensitive environment. The Agency, if it chooses to adopt the use of crowdsourced data or analysis, should do so only in a manner that cannot be interpreted as intelligence collection or espionage. Any crowdsourcing activity conducted for the IAEA as the primary stakeholder should include Member State buy-in from all states which may be subject to information collection or analysis activities to alleviate this concern.\n\n## 11. Conclusions And Future Work\n\nOur analysis indicates that there are ways for the IAEA to utilize data from crowdsourcing activities to support safeguards verification. Some implementations of crowdsourcing for safeguards are legally or ethically uncertain, and must be carefully considered prior to adoption. In addition to compliance with legal and ethical norms for the use of crowdsourcing, there are other best practice considerations that would need to be accounted for in any IAEA-sponsored (i.e. as primary stakeholder) crowdsource activity. While crowdsourcing could theoretically provide data useful for the analysis of a state's nuclear activities, there has not been sufficient testing to conclude that 1) sufficient quantities of data could be collected; and 2) quality and veracity of data would be sufficient for safeguards use. As such, experimental testing is required to further assess the use of crowdsourcing for safeguards. A conceptual experimental plan will be delivered with this project's year-end report, with experiments to be conducted in FY18.\n\n# Part Iii Experimental Designs To Test Crowdsourcing In Support Of International Nuclear Safeguards\n\n## 12. Introduction To Experimental Design\n\nIn FY17, the Power of the People research team defined a taxonomy of crowdsourcing activities, and conducted a legal and ethical examination of how such activities could be conducted to support international nuclear safeguards verification as a foundation for a more in-depth examination of the potential to use crowdsourcing to support safeguards. The team plans to conduct a series of experiments in FY18 to more precisely evaluate the ability of the public or expert groups to provide relevant insight for safeguards-like problems. In this report, we describe conceptual experimental designs of activities to be conducted by Sandia National Laboratories and Los Alamos National Laboratory in FY18. In our FY17 work, we identified several types of crowdsourcing activity, including data collection/generation, data analysis and labeling, and the development of technological solutions for safeguards. The team decided to focus on analysis and labeling tasks, due to implementation challenges expected from other crowdsourcing activity types. In addition, analysis and labeling tasks appeared more feasible for the support of international safeguards based on the team's ethical and legal analysis. In order to test a wide range of types of analysis, the team split into expert analysis activities (led by LANL) and non-expert communities (led by SNL). Each laboratory designed a series of experiments, described in more detail below.\n\n## 13. Experiment 1 (Snl): \"Tag The Tower\" - Classification Of Cooling Tower Images\n\nIn this experiment, we will test non-expert crowds using a basic information analysis experiment in which participants will classify digital images based on whether or not they contain a hyperbolic cooling tower. Classifying cooling towers serves as a simplified proxy for recognition and tagging of photos of nuclear facilities, which could be used to draw analyst attention to a site of interest, or to train an algorithm to recognize them. This proxy problem will be used to determine if we can use non-experts with minimal training to classify photos of potential safeguards interest. If we are successful, more complex experiments such as assessments of multiple photos or determining the geolocation of a photograph may be further explored.\n\n## 13.1. Research Question\n\nThis experiment seeks to test the question: Can crowdsourcing be reliably used to classify photographs of safeguards interest among a non-expert community? To determine success, we will measure:\n\nAccuracy (compared to existing image labels);\n\nTimeliness (time to reach the desired number of labels per image on the complete image set);\n\nParticipant completion (the number of tags a unique user completes)\n\nParticipant diversity (number of unique participants); and\n\nParticipant agreement (% agreement on tagging, for data validation).\n\n## 13.2. Methodology\n\nIn this experiment, participants will be presented with a set of digital photographs, and asked to determine:\n1.\nIf there is a concrete, hyperbolic cooling tower such as those used at nuclear power stations and coal fired power plants; and\n2.\nWhether the cooling tower (if present) has a steam plume.\nParticipants will be presented with a set of images, consisting of both cooling tower (steam plume and not) and not cooling tower images that have been collected from the Flikr site in accordance with the Flikr API user agreement. The images were manually labeled as part of a NA-22 funded research project in FY17.\n\n## 13.3. Platform\n\nWe plan to conduct this experiment using the open source crowdsourcing platform Zooniverse. Because the Zooniverse platform selects which crowdsourcing activities to make public, we will be prepared to use an alternate platform if this experiment is not selected.\n\n## 13.4. Data Collection And Analysis Plan\n\nWe plan to collect three to five labels (from unique participants) for each image in our dataset. We intend to collect the following information in the course of the experiment:\n\nImage labels\n\n\nUnique identifier of the participant who provided each label\n\nTimestamp associated with the label\nGiven those data points, we will be able to assess the five measures (accuracy, timeliness, participant completion, participant diversity, and participant agreement) described above.\n\nParticipants will be recruited via standard practices on the selected crowdsourcing platform. No targeted recruitment is anticipated. All potential participants will be provided with a short description of the task, and an estimate of the time required to complete the task. Due to the online, open, and voluntary nature of the platform, we will neither target nor discriminate against vulnerable populations.\n\nUsers of online crowdsourcing platforms are generally recognized as agreeing to willfully participate in the activity (given there is sufficient explanation of the task on the site). Due to the ease in discontinuing use, especially for activities which offer no or limited compensation, continued participation can presume continued consent, and users can stop at any time.\n\nParticipant information will be collected in order to identify the number of unique participants, and to associate a participant with the labels they assigned to each image. This will be done through the collection of a user hash, user name, IP address, or other identifying information depending on the crowdsource platform. The research team will make efforts to limit the connection between a user identification method and association with actual identifying information of the user.\n\n## 14. Experiment 2 (Snl): Personnel Patterns Of Life\n\nThe personnel present at a nuclear facility (just as any location) can provide a secondary indicator of the type, or scale, of activity taking place at that site. The presence of construction workers, office workers, military personnel, first responders, or other types of individuals - and their respective density at a facility - are an important aspect of \"patterns of life\" analysis. In this experiment, we will test the ability of a non-expert crowd to identify:\n1.\nwhether an image contains people, and if so,\n2.\nif an image includes people wearing firefighter uniforms, and\n3.\nthe count of people (uniformed, and total count) in an image.\nThe purpose of this activity is two-fold. First, it establishes a more complex level of analysis to test the effectiveness of crowdsourcing activities with potential safeguards implications. Second, this activity will share data and results with an on-going NA22 project that will use the image labels to train an algorithm to automate the counting/density estimates of people in various uniforms for patterns of life analysis. The NA22 project will provide both the data and the funding for participant compensation. The roll-out of the experiment will be a shared-cost between the two projects, with this NA-241 project having access to the full dataset collected by the activity in order to assess crowdsourcing effectiveness.\n\n## 14.1. Research Question\n\nThis experiment will test the question: Can the public reliably identify uniforms and count the number of people in a photograph, to assist in patterns of life assessments? To determine success, we will measure:\n\nParticipant agreement (% agreement, to approximate accuracy);\n\nTimeliness (time to reach the desired number of labels per image on the complete image set);\n\nParticipant completion (the number of tags a unique user completes); and\n\nParticipant diversity (number of unique participants)\n\n## 14.2. 3.2 Methodology\n\nUsers will be presented with a set of photographs collected from the open source photography sharing website Flikr, that have been selected based on a series of search terms developed under the NA22 project described above to target people and firefighters. For each photograph, users will be asked:\n1.\nDoes the photograph contain people? (if not, this will complete the task)\n2.\nDoes the photograph contain images of people in a firefighter uniform? If yes, how many?\n3.\nHow many people total are in the photograph?\n\n## 14.3. 3.3 Platform\n\nThe experiment will utilize Amazon's Mechanical Turk platform.\n\n## 14.4. 3.4 Data Collection And Analysis\n\nThis experiment intends to provide approximately 15,000 images, with a goal of collecting three to five complete labels (i.e. answering the full question set above) for each. A user identifier such as an IP address or user name will be collected with each question set, along with a timestamp on the completion of the activity.\n\nParticipants will be recruited via standard practices on the selected crowdsourcing platform. All potential participants will be provided with a short description of the task, and an estimate of the time required to complete the task. Due to the online, open, and voluntary nature of the platform, we will neither target nor discriminate against vulnerable populations. The research team intends to provide minimal compensation ($0.01 to $0.10 per image) to encourage user completion.\n\nUsers of online crowdsourcing platforms are generally recognized as agreeing to willfully participate in the activity (given there is sufficient explanation of the task on the site). Due to the ease in discontinuing use, continued participation can presume continued consent, and users can stop at any time. Per the terms of Mechanical Turk, compensation will be provided on an imageby-image basis that a user completes. The minimal nature of compensation is not expected to inflict undue influence for users to continue participation if they are no longer willing.\n\nParticipant information will be collected in order to identify the number of unique participants, and to associate a participant with the labels they assigned to each image. The research team will make efforts to limit the connection between a user identification method and association with actual identifying information of the user.\n\n## 15. Experiment 3 (Snl): Audio And Video Transcription\n\nTime and resources permitting, Sandia would like to run a third experiment in which we evaluate a non-expert crowd's ability to transcribe audio and video files, from a variety of voices and accents. This will directly address a challenge currently being faced by the IAEA's State Factors Analysis section to collect and integrate multimedia information into their assessments. While efforts are currently underway to evaluate a suite of tools available for transcription, this activity will assess the ability of crowdsourcing to support that goal. While multi-lingual assessments would potentially provide the most value added for a safeguards use case, this assessment will start with English-language videos due to their availability to the research team.\n\n## 15.1. Research Question\n\nThis experiment will test the question: Can the public reliably transcribe English-language video and audio files across a number of voices and accents? To determine success, we will measure:\n\nAccuracy (scoring mechanism is pending);\n\nTimeliness (time to reach the desired number of transcriptions per audio or video file);\n\nParticipant completion (the number of transcriptions a unique user completes); and\n\nParticipant diversity (number of unique participants).\n\n## 15.2. Methodology\n\nUsers will be presented with a segment of an audio or video file. Files will vary in length, to determine if/how segment length impacts accuracy. Users will be asked to transcribe the audio or video files into English text. The mechanism for scoring the transcription is pending.\n\n## 15.3. Platform\n\nWe will conduct our experiment on an open source crowdsourcing platform, such as Mechanical Turk, Zooniverse, or CrowdFlower.\n\nThis experiment will cultivate (collect, or if needed, create) a body of publicly available audio and video files in the English language, and collect a minimum of three transcriptions into English-language text. The experiment will collect a single user identification, along with the user's transcription and timestamp for completion of each audio or visual file, in order to evaluate the measures (accuracy, timeliness, completion, and diversity) described above.\n\nParticipants will be recruited via standard practices on the selected crowdsourcing platform. All potential participants will be provided with a short description of the task, and an estimate of the time required to complete the task. Due to the online and open (anyone can participate) nature of the platform, we will neither target nor discriminate against vulnerable populations.\n\nUsers of online crowdsourcing platforms are generally recognized as agreeing to willfully participate in the activity (given there is sufficient explanation of the task on the site). Due to the ease in discontinuing use, continued participation can presume continued consent, and users can stop at any time.\n\nParticipant information will be collected in order to identify the number of unique participants, and to associate a participant with the labels they assigned to each image. The research team will make efforts to limit the connection between a user identification method and association with actual identifying information of the user.\n\n## 16. Experiment 4 (Lanl): Eliciting Topics: Concepts And Key Words 16.1. Research Question\n\nThe objective that drives the three related LANL experiments is to explore the efficacy of crowdsourcing methods to elicit and structure specialized expert knowledge quickly and efficiently that is very difficult to derive from data-driven methods alone and very expensive to solicit from a small cadre of experts. If successful, such resulting knowledge structures may be used for knowledge management systems, the basis for more refined ontology or Bayesian network construction, or become a key part of heterogeneous human-machine learning architectures. The first research question we want to test is: Can crowdsourcing elicit a comprehensive set of concepts and key words related to a topic of interest?\n\n## 16.2. Methodology 16.2.1. Gamified Version\n\nParticipants will be presented with a topic area of interest and asked to provide words associated with that topic within a specified time limit with the goal of providing the most words (that result in a score) in the allotted time period. As words are repeated, they will be added to a \"Taboo List\" in accordance with a predefined threshold and no longer help the player to accrue points. The player with the most points is the high scorer on a list. Players can only play once for each topic.\n\n## 16.2.2. Regular Version\n\nParticipants will be presented with a topic area of interest and asked to provide words associated with that topic within a specified time limit with the goal of providing the most words in the allotted time period. We may elect to take submitted words and present them as topics in a follow-on iteration of the experiment. Whether we execute the gamified version or the regular version will depend on the cost and mechanism for distribution for implementing the gamified version.\n\n## 16.3. Platform\n\nThere are a number of platforms we can take advantage of: For a predefined expert crowd, the gamification version can be executed in a mini-workshop setting ideally on a LANL-approved website on the green network. The regular version can be executed over email or through quick interviews. For a broader audience, online resources include: Crowdcrafting, Crowdflower, and Zooniverse but vary in the ability to put controls on participation based on the expertise of the crowd.\n\nIn addition to collecting concepts and key words associated with topics, we are also interested in the frequency of terms, and the sequence over which they accumulate. Here we want to identify the most strongly associated terms with a topic as defined by both frequency and time across users.\n\nWe plan to explore expert crowd recruitment as well as online resources. If we use the online platforms, participants will be recruited via standard practices on the selected crowdsourcing platform. All potential participants will be provided with a short description of the task, and an estimate of the time required to complete the task. We will neither target nor discriminate against vulnerable populations.\n\nWe will secure a written consent for any expert participation. If we use the online platforms, users of online crowdsourcing platforms are generally recognized as agreeing to willfully participate in the activity (given there is sufficient explanation of the task on the site). Due to the ease in discontinuing use, continued participation can presume continued consent, and users can stop at any time.\n\nParticipant information will be collected in order to identify the number of unique participants, and to associate a participant with their input. The research team will make efforts to limit the connection between a user identification method and association with actual identifying information of the user.\n\n## 17. Experiment 5 (Lanl): Establishing Relationships Between Concepts And Key Words For Knowledge Structuring 17.1. Research Question\n\nThe objective that drives the three related LANL experiments is to explore the efficacy of crowdsourcing methods to elicit and structure specialized expert knowledge quickly and efficiently that is very difficult to derive from data-driven methods alone and very expensive to solicit from a small cadre of experts. If successful, such resulting knowledge structures may be used for knowledge management systems, the basis for more refined ontology or Bayesian network construction, or become a key part of heterogeneous human-machine learning architectures. Once we have the set of concepts and keywords associated with a topic, the second research question we want to test: Can crowdsourcing help to structure the knowledge obtained in Experiment 4 and establish relationships in the predefined set of concepts and key words such as hierarchical relationships, causal relationships, etc.?\n\n## 17.2. Methodology\n\nHere we will present participants with either a complete list of the words we obtained in Experiment 4 or pairs ordered by priority based on their frequency. We ask participants to mark relationships between words with lines or arrows and the option to label the relationship between the two words. If the participant is provided the full set of words, the resulting structure does not need to be connected but rather a number of structures can be end result. There will be a \"parking lot\" for words that cannot be related to others with an option of adding them at any time in the process.\n\n## 17.3. Platform\n\nThere are a number of platforms we can take advantage of: For a predefined expert crowd, the version can be executed in a mini-workshop setting ideally on a LANL-approved website on the green network. For a broader audience, the same online resources as for Experiment 4 could be used: Crowdcrafting, Crowdflower, and Zooniverse.\n\nFor this experiment, we are looking to build the knowledge structure that leverages the input of all of the participants. We will track structural consensus by frequencies on arcs with the simple line as the primitive. Where there is conflict over structure, we will develop alternative structures to demonstrate alternative morphologies with frequencies attached to the arcs.\n\nWe plan to explore expert crowd recruitment as well as online resources. If we use the online platforms, participants will be recruited via standard practices on the selected crowdsourcing platform. All potential participants will be provided with a short description of the task, and an estimate of the time required to complete the task. We will neither target nor discriminate against vulnerable populations.\n\nWe will secure a written consent for any expert participation. If we use the online platforms, users of online crowdsourcing platforms are generally recognized as agreeing to willfully participate in the activity (given there is sufficient explanation of the task on the site). Due to the ease in discontinuing use, continued participation can presume continued consent, and users can stop at any time.\n\nParticipant information will be collected in order to identify the number of unique participants, and to associate a participant with their input. The research team will make efforts to limit the connection between a user identification method and association with actual identifying information of the user.\n\n## 18. Experiment 6 (Lanl): Validation Of The Knowledge Structure 18.1. Research Question\n\nThe objective that drives the three related LANL experiments is to explore the efficacy of crowdsourcing methods to elicit and structure specialized expert knowledge quickly and efficiently that is very difficult to derive from data-driven methods alone and very expensive to solicit from a small cadre of experts. If successful, such resulting knowledge structures may be used for knowledge management systems, the basis for more refined ontology or Bayesian network construction, or become a key part of heterogeneous human-machine learning architectures. If time and resources permit, we would like to pursue a third research question. Once we have a rudimentary crowd-created \"folksonomy\", the last research question we want to test: To what degree can crowdsourcing be used to validate the knowledge structure?\n\n## 18.2. Methodology\n\nWe will present participants with the knowledge structures built and allow for voting on the consensus structure.\n\n## 18.3. Platform\n\nThere are a number of platforms we can take advantage of: For a predefined expert crowd, the version can be executed in a mini-workshop setting ideally on a LANL-approved website on the green network. For a broader audience, the same online resources as for Experiment 4 could be used: Crowdcrafting, Crowdflower, and Zooniverse.\n\nFor this experiment, we will track the votes in favor of and against particular arcs to validate the structure. We will use these votes to come up with a candidate structure (and possibly alternates if votes are evenly split) and present to a knowledge structure expert for a final decision.\n\nWe plan to explore expert crowd recruitment as well as online resources. If we use the online platforms, participants will be recruited via standard practices on the selected crowdsourcing platform. All potential participants will be provided with a short description of the task, and an estimate of the time required to complete the task. We will neither target nor discriminate against vulnerable populations.\n\nWe will secure a written consent for any expert participation. If we use the online platforms, users of online crowdsourcing platforms are generally recognized as agreeing to willfully participate in the activity (given there is sufficient explanation of the task on the site). Due to the ease in discontinuing use, continued participation can presume continued consent, and users can stop at any time.\n\nParticipant information will be collected in order to identify the number of unique participants, and to associate a participant with their input. The research team will make efforts to limit the connection between a user identification method and association with actual identifying information of the user.\n\n## 19. Next Steps\n\nUpon review by NA-241, each laboratory will submit their proposed experiments to their respective Institutional Review Board for approval, and will commence deploying their experiments as appropriate. A final report of experimental design and outcomes will be provided at the end of the experimental period, no later than September 2018.\n\n## References\n\nM. Barletta, M. Fowler, J. Khaled (2016) \"Integrating Multimedia Information in IAEA Safeguards\" Proceedings of the American Nuclear Society Advances in Nuclear Nonproliferation Technology and Policy Conference. Santa Fe, NM, USA. N. Bilton, (2013) \"Knowing Where to Focus the Wisdom of Crowds\" *New York Times*, April 22, 2013 Createc \"Createc wins IAEA Technology Challenge\" (2016) https://www.createc.co.uk/createcwins-iaea-technology-challenge/ retrieved May 26, 2107. C. Fishwick (2014) \"Tomnod - the online search party looking for Malaysian Airlines flight MH370\" The Guardian https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/mar/14/tomnod-online-searchmalaysian-airlines-flight-mh370 M. Fowler, J. Khaled, T. Skold (2016) \"Using Social Media Information in Analysis for IAEA Safeguards\" Presented at the American Nuclear Society Social Media for Nuclear Nonproliferation Workshop. Santa Fe, NM, USA. Z.N. Gastelum (Forthcoming 2017) \"Societal Verification for Nuclear Nonproliferation and Arms Control\" Nuclear Non-proliferation and Arms Control Verification: Innovative Systems Concepts. Eds., M. Dreicer, I. Niehmeyer, G. Stein. Springer. N. Gerami (2013) \"Attracting a crowd and what societal verification means for arms control\" Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists v.63, no. 3, pp.14-18. D.A. Grier (2017) \"Crowdsourcing for Dummies-Cheat Sheet\" http://www.dummies.com/business/start-a-business/crowdsourcing-for-dummies-cheat-sheet/ retrieved May 26, 2017. K.L. Hartigan, C. Hinderstein (2013) \"The Opportunities and Limits of Societal Verification\" Proceedings of the Institute of Nuclear Materials Management Annual Meeting, Palm Desert, CA. C. Hinderstein et al. (2014) Innovating Verification: New Tools & and New Actors to Reduce Nuclear Risks: Redefining Societal Verification Nuclear Threat Initiative. International Atomic Energy Agency (1995) \"Strengthening the Effectiveness and Improving the Efficiency of the Safeguards System: A Report by the Director General\" GOV/2784, pp. 5. International Atomic Energy Agency (2007) \"IAEA: Staying Ahead of the Game\" https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/safeguards0707.pdf  retrieved January 30, 2017. B. Lee, M. Zolotova (2013) \"New Media Solutions in Nonproliferation and Arms Control Opportunities and Challenges\" James Martin Center for Proliferation Studies, Technical Report. M. I. Pinsel (1981) \"The Wind and Current Chart Series Produced by Matthew Fontaine Maury\" Navigation: Journal of the Institute of Navigation v. 28, no. 2, p.123-138. J M Leimeister, M Huber, U. Bretschneider, H. Krcmar (2009) \"Leveraging Crowdsourcing: Activation-Supporting Components for IT-Based Ideas Competition\" Journal of Management Information Systems. v.26 no.1. T. Lorenz and Y. Feldman (2014) \"The Efficacy of Social Media as a Research Tool and Information Source for Safeguards Verification\" Proceedings of the Institute of Nuclear Materials Management Information Analysis Technologies, Techniques and Methods for Safeguards, Nonproliferation and Arms Control Verification Workshop. Portland, OR, USA E. Loukis, Y. Charalabidis (2015) \"Active and Passive Crowdsourcing in Government\" in Policy and Practice and Digital Science: Integrating Complex Systems, Social Simulation and Public Administration in Policy Research. M. Janssen, M.A. Wimmer, A. Deljoo eds. New York: Springer. National Commission for the Protection of Human Subjects of Biomedical and Behavioral Research (1978) \"The Belmont Report: Ethical Principles and Guidelines for the Protection of Human Subjects of Research\" https://videocast.nih.gov/pdf/ohrp_belmont_report.pdf retrieved August 9, 2017. A. Oboler, K. Welsch, L. Cruz (2012) \"The Danger of Big Data: Social Media as Computational Social Science\" *First Monday*, Vol 17, Number 7, 2 July 2012. http://firstmonday.org/ojs/index.php/fm/article/view/3993/3269 retrieved March 23, 2017. R. Richard, M. Edward, L. Deci (2000) \"Self-Determination Theory and the facilitation of Intrinsic Motivation, Social development, and Well-Being\". *American Psychologist*, Vol.55, No. 1, 68-78. J. Roberts, I-H Hann, S. Slaughter (2006) \"Understanding the Motivations, Participation and Performance of Open Source Software Developers: A Longitudinal Study of the Apache Projects\". *Marshall School of Business Working Paper No. IOM 01-06*; Management Science July 2006,\n\n## Distribution\n\n1\nNational Nuclear Security Administration Attn: C. Stanuch U.S. Department of Energy 1000 Independence Ave., S.W. Washington, DC 20585 (electronic copy)\n1\nLos Alamos National Laboratory Attn: Kari Sentz P.O. Box 1663 Los Alamos, NM 87545 (electronic copy)\n\n|   1 | MS1371   | Tina Hernandez    | 06832 (electronic copy)   |\n|-----|----------|-------------------|---------------------------|\n|   1 | MS1371   | Zoe Gastelum      | 06832 (electronic copy)   |\n|   1 | MS0899   | Technical Library | 9536 (electronic copy)    |"
    },
    {
        "text": "OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE\n\n## 2022 Annual Report On Unidentified Aerial Phenomena\n\n\n\n## Table Of Contents\n\nEXECUTIVE SUMMARY ........ 2\nSCOPE AND ASSUMPTIONS ........ 3\nScope ........ 3 Assumptions ........ 3\nGOVERNMENTAL CHANGES TO MANAGE UAP ISSUES ........ 4\nEstablishment of the All-Domain Anomaly Resolution Office (AARO) ........ 4 ODNI Coordinating with AARO and Multi-Agency Partners, Seeking Opportunities to Assist in Collection, Reporting, and Analysis of UAP Incidents across the IC ........ 4\nCONTINUED REPORTING AND ROBUST ANALYSIS ARE PROVIDING BETTER\nFIDELITY ON UAP EVENTS, BUT MANY CASES REMAIN UNRESOLVED ........ 5\nUAP Reporting ........ 5 Partnerships and Collaboration ........ 5 Flight Safety Concerns and Health Implications ........ 6\nSUMMARY AND WAY AHEAD ........ 7 APPENDIX A: ANNUAL REPORT ON UAPFY 2022 NDAA ........ 8\nAPPENDIX B: AARO ESTABLISHMENT OF OFFICE AND DUTIESFY 2022 NDAA\n........ 10\nAPPENDIX C: INDEX OF KEY TERMS ........ 11\n\n## Executive Summary\n\nUnidentified Aerial Phenomena (UAP) reporting is increasing, enabling a greater awareness of the airspace and increased opportunity to resolve UAP events.  In addition to the\n144 UAP reports covered during the 17 years of UAP reporting included in the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) preliminary assessment, there have been 247 new reports and another 119 that were either since discovered or reported after the preliminary assessment's time period.  This totals 510 UAP reports as of 30 August 2022.  Additional information is provided in the classified version of this report.\n\nAARO and ODNI assess that the observed increase in the UAP reporting rate is partially due to a better understanding of the possible threats that UAP may represent, either as safety of flight hazards or as potential adversary collection platforms, and partially due to reduced stigma surrounding UAP reporting.  This increased reporting allows more opportunities to apply rigorous analysis and resolve events.\n\nThe establishment of the Department of Defense (DoD) All-Domain Anomaly Resolution Office (AARO) should facilitate more coordinated UAP efforts, resulting in greater attribution of UAP.  While limited data on UAP continues to be a challenge, the establishment of AARO with its broad scope of authorities and responsibilities, and its replacement of the Unidentified Aerial Phenomena Task Force (UAPTF)will allow for increased coordination of efforts against the UAP problem set.  AARO's authorities ensure that UAP detection and identification efforts will span across DoD and relevant interagency partners, as well as the Intelligence Community (IC), with the support and coordination of the National Intelligence Manager for Aviation (NIM-Aviation).  NIM-Aviation's and AARO's coordination efforts will improve U.S. Government awareness of objects in the airspace and resolution of UAP events (see Appendix B).\n\nUAP events continue to occur in restricted or sensitive airspace, highlighting possible concerns for safety of flight or adversary collection activity.  We continue to assess that this may result from a collection bias due to the number of active aircraft and sensors, combined with focused attention and guidance to report anomalies.  AARO, in conjunction with NIM-Aviation and the IC, will continue to investigate any evidence of possible foreign government involvement in UAP events.\n\n\n\n## Scope And Assumptions Scope\n\nThis annual report is provided by ODNI in response to a requirement established in Section 1683 of the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year (FY) 2022, Establishment of Office, Organizational Structure, and Authorities to Address Unidentified Aerial Phenomena.  Subsection (h) of that section states \"the Director [of National Intelligence DNI], in consultation with the Secretary [of DefenseSECDEF], shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report on unidentified aerial phenomena\" (See Appendix A).\n\nIn addition to responding to the required elements delineated in the NDAA, this report details the establishment and coordinating efforts between ODNI and the newly-created DoD\nAARO.  This report provides an overview for policymakers of UAP1 that have been reported since the 05 March 2021 information cut-off date for ODNI's preliminary assessment on UAP, published 25 June 2021.  Per the NDAA, AARO delivers quarterly reports on UAP to policymakers that contain greater detail regarding analysis and attribution of UAP events.\n\nThis report was drafted by ODNI's NIM-Aviation in conjunction with AARO.  It includes input from the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and Security (USD[I&S]), the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO), the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA), the National Security Agency (NSA), the U.S. Army, the U.S. Navy, the U.S. Marine Corps, the U.S. Air Force, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), the National Oceanographic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), the Department of Energy (DoE), ODNI/NIM-Emerging and Disruptive Technology (NIM- EDT), ODNI/National Counterintelligence and Security Center (NCSC), and ODNI/National Intelligence Council (ODNI/NIC).\n\n## Assumptions\n\nMultiple factors affect the observation or detection of UAP, such as weather, illumination, atmospheric effects, or the accurate interpretation of sensor data.  Regarding review or analysis of UAP events, ODNI and AARO operate under the assumption that UAP reports are derived from the observer's accurate recollection of the event and/or sensors that generally operate correctly and capture enough real data to allow initial assessments.  However, ODNI and AARO acknowledge that a select number of UAP incidents may be attributable to sensor irregularities or variances, such as operator or equipment error.\n\n\n\n## Governmental Changes To Manage Uap Issues Establishment Of The All-Domain Anomaly Resolution Office (Aaro)\n\nThe Deputy Secretary of Defense directed the USD(I&S) to establish an office with sufficient scope, authorities, responsibilities, and capabilities to continue the UAPTF efforts and meet the expanded criteria.  AARO was established as the UAPTF's successor entity on 20 July 2022.  Per its mandate, AARO has the authority to coordinate UAP efforts beyond DoD and is authorized to develop processes and procedures to synchronize and standardize collection, reporting, and analysis throughout not just DoD, but the IC as well, with the support and coordination of NIM-Aviation.  AARO will coordinate with other non-IC agencies such as the FAA, NASA, NOAA, and the non-IC elements of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the Department of Energy (DOE), as appropriate.  The broad scope of authority granted to AARO should enable them to leverage a multi-agency, whole-of-government approach to understanding, resolving, and attributing UAP in the future.\n\n## Odni Coordinating With Aaro And Multi-Agency Partners, Seeking Opportunities To Assist In Collection, Reporting, And Analysis Of Uap Incidents Across The Ic\n\nSince the June 2021 publication of ODNI's preliminary assessment on UAP, ODNI has developed strategic guidance to enhance further collection, which AARO and ODNI will leverage to prepare, collect, and report on UAP in a comprehensive manner for the IC.  NIM- Aviation will remain the IC's focal point for UAP issues, while AARO is the DoD focal point for these issues and related activities.  AARO will represent DoD to the interagency, Congress, media, and public, in coordination with the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Legislative Affairs and the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs (OSD[PA]).  AARO's mission and responsibilities are contained in Appendix B.\n\n\n## Continued Reporting And Robust Analysis Are Providing Better Fidelity On Uap Events, But Many Cases Remain Unresolved Uap Reporting\n\nThe ODNI preliminary assessment on UAP discussed 144 UAP reports and had an information cut-off date of 05 March 2021.  Since then, AARO received a total of 247 new UAP reports.  An additional 119 UAP reports on events that occurred before 05 March 2021, but were not included in the preliminary assessment, have been discovered or reported after the preliminary assessment's time period.  These 366 additional reports, when combined with the 144 reports identified in the preliminary assessment, bring the total UAP reports catalogued to date to 510.\n\nSince its establishment in July 2022, AARO has formulated and started to leverage a robust analytic process against identified UAP reporting.  Once completed, AARO's final analytic findings will be available in their quarterly reports to policymakers.  AARO's initial analysis and characterization of the 366 newly-identified reports, informed by a multi-agency process, judged more than half as exhibiting unremarkable characteristics:\n\n 26 characterized as Unmanned Aircraft System (UAS) or UAS-like entities;  163 characterized as balloon or balloon-like entities; and\n 6 attributed to clutter.2\nInitial characterization does not mean positively resolved or unidentified.  This initial characterization better enables AARO and ODNI to efficiently and effectively leverage resources against the remaining 171 uncharacterized and unattributed UAP reports.  Some of these uncharacterized UAP appear to have demonstrated unusual flight characteristics or performance capabilities, and require further analysis.\n\nThe majority of new UAP reporting originates from U.S. Navy and U.S. Air Force aviators and operators who witnessed UAP during the course of their operational duties and reported the events to the UAPTF or AARO through official channels.  Regardless of the collection or reporting method, many reports lack enough detailed data to enable attribution of UAP with high certainty.\n\n## Partnerships And Collaboration\n\nODNI and AARO are committed to the responsible sharing of UAP findings with interagency partners (such as FAA and NASA), other stakeholders, congressional oversight, international partners, and the public.  AARO is working closely with the OSD(PA) and mission partners to develop an information-sharing and messaging strategy that aims to maximize transparency, while maintaining appropriate protections of sensitive sources and methods.\n\nODNI and AARO have maintained communication with our allied partners regarding UAP, keeping them informed of developments and U.S. initiatives.  The DoD and IC enterprises are working collaboratively to report, identify, and resolve UAP events.  Agencies across the IC have established standard operating procedures that will streamline UAP resolution.  For example, AARO's analytic methodology requires a whole-of-government approach to resolving UAP events, to include analysts and science and technology specialists, to help resolve UAP events.\n\n## Flight Safety Concerns And Health Implications\n\nUAP pose a safety of flight and collision hazard to air assets, potentially requiring aircraft operators to adjust flight patterns in response to their unauthorized presence in the airspace, operating outside of air traffic control standards and instruction.  To date, there have been no reported collisions between U.S. aircraft and UAP.  Regarding health concerns, there have also been no encounters with UAP confirmed to contribute directly to adverse health-related effects to the observer(s).  Acknowledging that health-related effects may appear at any time after an event occurs, AARO will track any reported health implications related to UAP should they emerge.\n\n\n\n## Summary And Way Ahead\n\nUAP continue to represent a hazard to flight safety and pose a possible adversary collection threat.  Since the publication of the ODNI preliminary assessment in June 2021, UAP\nreporting has increased, partially due to a concentrated effort to destigmatize the topic of UAP and instead recognize the potential risks that it poses as both a safety of flight hazard and potential adversarial activity.  Whereas there were previously 144 UAP reports covered during the 17 years of UAP reporting included in the ODNI preliminary assessment on UAP, there have been 247 more UAP reports during the 17 months since.  Combined with another 119 reports either discovered or reported late that fell within the original 17 year period but were not included in the preliminary assessment, a total of 510 UAP reports are currently catalogued.\n\nAARO has been established as the DoD focal point for UAP.  In an effort to gain fidelity on the nature of UAP and the possible risk UAP represent, Congress required the establishment of a central office for all UAP matters in the FY 2022 NDAA.  That office formally became operational as the AARO, under the USD(I&S), in July 2022.  AARO is the single focal point for all DoD UAP efforts, leading a whole-of-government approach to coordinate UAP collection, reporting, and analysis efforts throughout DoD, the IC, and beyond, to include other government agencies not in the IC, as well as foreign allies and partners of the United States.\n\nCoordinated efforts between DoD, the IC, and other government agencies to collect and report UAP events have resulted in increased data sets, spanning multiple security domains.  AARO, in coordination with the IC, is focused on identifying solutions to manage and alleviate the resulting data problem, including the intake, indexing, visualization, and analysis of that data across multiple security domains.  We are confident that continued multi-agency cooperative UAP prosecution activities will likely result in greater awareness of objects in and across the air, space, and maritime domains, as well as the nature and origin of UAP in the future.  The establishment of AARO and application of AARO's new analytic process to this detailed reporting will increase resolution of UAP events.\n\n\n\n## Appendix A: Annual Report On UapFy 2022 Ndaa\n\nSubsection (h) of section 1683 (Establishment of Office, Organizational Structure, and Authorities to Address Unidentified Aerial Phenomena) of the FY 2022 NDAA (Public Law 117-\n81) listed requirements for an Annual Report on UAP matters.  In the subsection, the term \"the Director\" refers to the Director of National Intelligence (DNI), and the term \"the Secretary\"\nrefers to the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF).  The text of the subsection is below. (1) Requirement.  Not later than 31 October 2022, and annually thereafter until 31 October 2026, the Director, in consultation with the Secretary, shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report on unidentified aerial phenomena. (2) Elements.  Each report under paragraph (1) shall include, with respect to the year covered by the report, the following information:\n(A) All reported unidentified aerial phenomena-related events that occurred during the one-year period. (B) All reported unidentified aerial phenomena-related events that occurred during a period other than that one-year period but were not included in an earlier report. (C) An analysis of data and intelligence received through each reported unidentified aerial phenomena related event. (D) An analysis of data relating to unidentified aerial phenomena collected through:\n\n(i) Geospatial intelligence; (ii) Signals intelligence; (iii) Human intelligence; and (iv) Measurement and signature intelligence.\n(E) The number of reported unidentified aerial phenomena over restricted air space of the United States during the one-year period. (F) An analysis of such incidents identified under subparagraph (E). (G) Identification of potential aerospace or other threats posed by unidentified aerial phenomena to the national security of the United States. (H) An assessment of any activity regarding unidentified aerial phenomena that can be attributed to one or more adversarial foreign governments. (I) Identification of any incidents or patterns regarding unidentified aerial phenomena that indicate a potential adversarial foreign government may have achieved a breakthrough aerospace capability. (J) An update on the coordination by the United States with allies and partners on efforts to track, understand, and address unidentified aerial phenomena. (K) An update on efforts underway on the ability to capture or exploit discovered unidentified aerial phenomena.\n\n(L) An assessment of any health-related effects for individuals that have encountered unidentified aerial phenomena. (M) The number of reported incidents, and descriptions thereof, of unidentified aerial phenomena with military nuclear assets, including strategic nuclear weapons and nuclearpowered ships and submarines. (N) In consultation with the Administrator for Nuclear Security, the number of reported incidents, and descriptions thereof, of unidentified aerial phenomena associated with facilities or assets associated with the production, transportation, or storage of nuclear weapons or components thereof. (O) In consultation with the Chairman of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, the number of reported incidents, and descriptions thereof, of unidentified aerial phenomena or drones of unknown origin associated with nuclear power generating stations, nuclear fuel storage sites, or other sites or facilities regulated by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. (P) The names of the line organizations that have been designated to perform the specific functions under subsections (c) and (d), and the specific functions for which each such line organization has been assigned primary responsibility.\n\n## Notes:\n\n1. Subsection (c), referenced in subsection (h) (P) above, is titled Response to and Field\nInvestigations of Unidentified Aerial Phenomena.\n2. Subsection (d), referenced in subsection (h) (P) above, is titled Scientific,\nTechnological, and Operational Analyses of Data on Unidentified Aerial Phenomena.\n\n## Appendix B: Aaro Establishment Of Office And DutiesFy 2022 Ndaa\n\nSubsection (a) of section 1683 (Establishment of Office, Organizational Structure, and Authorities to Address Unidentified Aerial Phenomena) of the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2022 (Public Law 117-81) established an office designated to replace the Unidentified Aerial Phenomena Task Force (UAPTF), later identified as the Alldomain Anomaly Resolution Office (AARO).  AARO was established on 20 July 2022. Subsection (b) of section 1683 delineated that office's duties.  The text of these subsections is as follows:\n(a) Establishment of Office.  Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Defense, in coordination with the Director of National Intelligence, shall establish an office within a component of the Department of Defense and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, to carry out the duties of the Unidentified Aerial Phenomena Task Force, as in effect on the day before the date of enactment of this Act, and such other duties as are required by this section. (b) Duties.  The duties of the Office established under subsection (a) shall include the following:\n(1) Developing procedures to synchronize and standardize the collection, reporting, and analysis of incidents, including adverse physiological effects, regarding unidentified aerial phenomena across the Department of Defense and the Intelligence Community. (2) Developing processes and procedures to ensure that such incidents from each component of the Department and each element of the Intelligence Community are reported and incorporated in a centralized repository. (3) Establishing procedures to require the timely and consistent reporting of such incidents. (4) Evaluating links between unidentified aerial phenomena and adversarial foreign governments, other foreign governments, or nonstate actors.\n\n(5) Evaluating the threat that such incidents present to the United States. (6) Coordinating with other departments and agencies of the Federal Government, as appropriate, including the Federal Aviation Administration, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, the Department of Homeland Security, the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, and the Department of Energy. (7) Coordinating with allies and partners of the United States, as appropriate, to better assess the nature and extent of unidentified aerial phenomena. (8) Preparing reports for Congress, in both classified and unclassified form, including under section (i).\n\n\n\n## Appendix C: Index Of Key Terms\n\nThis report uses the following defining terms:\n\n **Range Fouler:** Defined by U.S. Navy aviators based on observations of UAP\ninterrupting pre-planned training or other military activity in military operating areas or restricted airspace.\n **Transmedium Objects or Devices:** Objects or devices that are observed to transition\nbetween space and the atmosphere, or between the atmosphere and bodies of water, that are not immediately identifiable.\n **Unidentified Aerial Phenomena (UAP):** Airborne objects not immediately\nidentifiable.  The acronym UAP represents the broadest category of airborne objects reviewed for analysis.\n **UAP Event:** A holistic description of an occurrence during which a pilot or aircrew\nwitnessed (or detected) a UAP.\n **UAP Incident:** A specific part of the event.  **UAP Report:** Documentation of a UAP event to include verified chains of custody\nand basic information such as the time, date, location, and description of the UAP. UAP reports include Range Fouler reports and other reporting."
    },
    {
        "text": "# A Guide To The Amerithrax Documents: I. Amount Of Attack Materials And Requirements For Production\n\nby Martin Furmanski MD, Member of the CACNP Scientists' Working Group on Chemical and Biological Weapons1 Abstract: A review of 2,750 pages of recently declassified FBI documents from the Amerithrax case is examined with special consideration to the question whether the 2001 Postal anthrax attack material could have originated from the United States Army Medical Research Institute for Infections Diseases (USAMRIID).  This assessment is hampered by the redactions present.   It is concluded that the amount of spores needed for the attack material was considerable, compared to the stocks usually produced and held at USAMRIID.  However, it is found that there were several possible avenues whereby sufficient quantities of virulent *Bacillus anthracis* (Ba) of the RMR1029 genomic pattern could have been grown or diverted for use in the attack letters.  It also is concluded that there were sufficient facilities and expertise at USAMRIID to allow for the purification and drying of the agent material used in the 2001 Postal attack letters.  Suggestions for additional investigations are offered. Author's Bio: Martin Furmanski MD holds a degree in microbiology from Stanford University and an MD from UCLA School of Medicine. He is a board-certified clinical and anatomic pathologist.  He is a member of the Center for Arms Control and Nonproliferation Scientist's Working Group on Chemical and Biological Weapons.  He has published on the history and effects of chemical and biological weapons.\n\n\n1 This document represents solely the work of Dr. Furmanski and is not a product of the CACNP Scientists' Working Group as a whole.\n\n# A Guide To The Amerithrax Documents: I. Amount Of Attack Materials And Requirements For Production\n\nby Martin Furmanski MD, Member of the CACNP Scientists' Working Group on Chemical and Biological Weapons2 Introduction:\nOn Feb 19, 2010, the US DOJ announced the closing of the Amerithrax case, and released a 96 page summary and 2,720 pages of declassified FOIA FBI documents.  The 96 page summary presented its scientific and technical conclusions but offered little elaboration or documentation.\n\nReview of the 2,720 pages of the declassified FOIA FBI documents reveals significant scientific and technical elements had been investigated but that were not addressed in detail in the DOJ Summary.   A fuller examination of these elements would appear to be of great significance in the resolution of the 2001 anthrax attacks.\n\n Since the NAS has been charged with investigating the scientific aspects of the Amerithrax investigation, identification of certain specific issues appears warranted.\n\nThis paper is an effort to identify one of these issues, and specifically to provide a framework for further documentary investigation to resolve them using references in the FBI FOIA documents.  Occasional reference to other documents will be made when appropriate.\n\nThis paper acknowledges that the DOJ has concluded that Dr Ivins was solely responsible for the anthrax letter attacks and that he prepared the attack material at his laboratory at the USAMRIID facilities at Ft Detrick MD.  It will assume that RMR-1029 was the seed stock of the attack material, pending the NAS study group investigation of this issue.  It will acknowledge the DOJ assertion that the attack material was not directly diverted from RMR-1029, based on the trace element findings of silicon, but will examine an alternate hypothesis, because significant amounts of RMR-1029 and other anthrax material at USAMRIID remain unaccounted for.\n\nAcknowledging the DOJ positions is not meant necessarily to accept its conclusion, but to act as a framework to determine what scientific information is available in the FBI FOIA documents to support or disprove this conclusion.  This paper will draw no conclusions regarding the guilt or innocence of Bruce Ivins.\n\n## Note On Materials Examined And Redactions:\n\n\nThis paper uses as its primary material the 96 page summary released 19Feb2010, officially available at: http://www.justice.gov/amerithrax/ and the 2,720 pages of DOJ/FBI declassified FOIA documents released on 19Feb2010 and officially available at: http://foia.fbi.gov/foiaindex/amerithrax.htm .\n\nThe FBI FOIA documents consists primarily of FBI generated reports of interviews or summaries of ongoing investigations, dating from late 2001 to late 2009. On occasion copies of supporting documents collected as part of the investigation are provided, but frequently they are mentioned but omitted.  The material originates essentially exclusively from investigations at the USAMRIID campus or in Fredrick, MD.  No materials originating from other facilities which were known to possess RMR1029 or its components, such as Dugway Proving Ground and Battelle, are present in the documents.  No scientific reports from any collaborating laboratories are present.\n\nEssentially all of the FBI generated documents are redacted to some extent, sometimes quite extensively.  By law, redactions need to be justified by citation of one or more exemptions under the FOIA statute.\n\n  It is clear that except for Ivins and two or three other individuals known to be deceased, all individual's names and all gender-specific pronouns, and other identifying information such as addresses and social security numbers have been redacted. These redactions are justified by marginal b6, b7C and b7D notations in the redacted documents, indicating the exemption.  Because the FBI reports exist in a typeface that has constant spacing, often the number of letters in a subject's surname can be determined. No attempt to identify the identity of individuals whose names have been redacted will be undertaken in this paper, but this fact will be used on one occasion to strengthen the association between two separate interviews involving the custody of a fermentor at USAMRIID.\n\nThere are often redactions involving text or entries evidently not involving only the identity of individuals.  Sometimes these are short and can be identified by context as specific locations within the USAMRIID campus and laboratories, though because this type of redaction is inconsistently applied between the BEI and USAMRIID series of files, one can often determine locations by cross-reference.  Quite frequently these redactions are noted with the b6, b7C and b7D \"personal privacy\" exemptions, which seems inappropriate.\n\nOften the redactions are quite extensive, involving most or all of a paragraph.\n\nGenerally, these carry the 'personal privacy' exemption notations, which seems unlikely. In some cases the redacted material can be reasonably surmised to be of scientific character from the context and the unredacted portions.  These redactions may have been made because of security issues at USAMRIID or sensitive technical or national security issues.    Examination of these redacted passages may be of importance scientifically, and the NAS should consider appeal of the FOIA redaction, or address the issue by examination of the original documents by NAS personnel with appropriate security clearances.\n\nThere is a larger issue regarding the robustness of the material in the FBI FOIA\ndocuments.  Although extensive, they are a selection of a much larger archive, estimated to be over 50,000 pages.  Many documents that would be of interest are mentioned in the available documents but are not included in them.  Also, many documents focus on investigations relating to Bruce Ivins, and these are predominantly dated after mid 2005 when he fell under increasing suspicion by the FBI. Amount of attack material and requirements for its production.\n\nOne example of a statement in the DOJ Summary that requires further scientific and technical elucidation is the statement: \"15. A leading anthrax researcher who assisted the investigation expressed his expert opinion that 100 ml would have been required to create sufficient material to be used in one letter, for a total of 500 ml for the five letters.  Nonetheless, we cannot say with certainty how much material was used in the letters.\"1\nThis unattributed statement is far from rigorous: for instance the attack material in Senate letters was qualitatively and quantitatively distinct from that in the NYC/FL media letters.  Moreover, no characterization of the nature of the \"500mls\" is given: it is not specified whether this relates to original media volume, or a product volume, and if so, after what degree of concentration or purification. Letter Payload It would appear that a rational estimate of the weight of the attack material can be made, based on the known concentrations of the attack material and the fact that representative examples of both mailings, the Leahy and *NY Post* letters, were apparently recovered unopened2. However, an official statement of the amount of powder in these letters has not been made.  The unopened Leahy letter has been reported as containing\n0.871 grams3 but no value for the *NY Post* letter has been made public.  The Canadian Letter Threat study determined a letter containing 1.0 gram of powder was a reasonable letter payload because it could not be detected by external palpation4. Other estimates of letter capacity have been in the 1-2 gram range.\n\nOne can conclude from the DOJ summary and other official characterizations of the letter material5 that the concentration of the Senate attack material was 2.10 x 10^12\nCFU/gm, and the NYC/FL attack material was 4.60 x 10^10 CFU/gm6.  This is a 45-fold difference.\n\nOne can calculate that the Senate mailings would have required at least 2 x\n0.871 gms =1.74 gms, or 3.64 x 10^12 CFUs. This estimate will be used in this paper as a reasonable approximation of the amount required.  It is recognized that the actual amounts used in the two Senate mailings might be slightly lower if the Leahy letter overestimated the payload of the Daschle letter, or slightly higher if the Leahy letter had lost significant material in the automated postal handling prior to its discovery and/or if it underestimated the payload of the Daschle letter.\n\nThe payload of the \"first mailing\" of the  NYC/FL \"media\" letters is less certain, firstly because the amount present in the NY Post Letter has not been released, and secondly because the total number of letters sent is uncertain.  Only two letters addressed to NYC media outlets were recovered (to Tom Brokaw of NBC, and to the *NY Post*), and a third letter to AMI Media in Florida is also officially assumed to have been sent because of the cases of inhalation anthrax and the extensive contamination at the AMI building.  The DOJ summary refers to five attack letters.  However, an independent epidemiological investigation has proposed that two additional letters to NYC media outlets may have been sent (to ABC News and Dan Rather of CBS News) because of cases of cutaneous anthrax that developed in an employee and an employee's child at those offices7.\n\nAssuming an average letter payload of 1 gram, the 'first mailings' to NYC/FL would have required between 3 and 5 grams, or between  1.4 and 2.3 x 10^11 CFUs.  The actual amount may be lower if only 3 letters were sent with less than 1 gram each, or higher if 5 letters were sent with more than 1 gram each.  But it appears that the first mailing to NYC/FL Media required at least an order of magnitude fewer spores than the second mailing to the US Senate. Production parameters for Bacillus anthracis (Ba) spores used in the mailings By the standards of anthrax material kept on hand at USAMRIID, the anthrax material used in the letter attacks was large.  The approximate 2 grams of pure Ba spores (roughly 3.8 x 10^12 spores) used in the letter attacks exceeded the largest single batch of pure Ba spores that USAMRIID had produced in house (the batch designated RMR1030),\nwhich took 13 weeks to produce8. An examination of how this much material might have been produced or diverted is appropriate. Solid Media  Ba Spore Production:\nAt USAMRIID virulent Bacillus anthracis (Ba) spores were occasionally produced by harvest from solid media (Petri dishes), typically Sheep Blood Agar (SBA). However, this method produced spores that were 'clumpy,' and contained vegetative cell and media debris that persisted on the spores despite procedures to purify and concentrate9.  Moreover, the amount of spores harvested per Petri dish was apparently small compared to those available from liquid culture.  No data on spore yield per plate is available in the FBI FOIA documents for calculation, but it was stated by Ivins that production of the letter attack material from solid media was impractical because of the large number of Petri dishes that would have been required10.\n\nHowever, plates containing virulent Ba were apparently abundant at USAMRIID.\nFBI FOIA documents indicate each aerosol challenge trial in building 1412 at USAMRIID produced approximately 180 Petri dishes growing RMR1029 per day and such challenge trials were often performed three days a week11.  These Petri dishes and other materials containing Ba from multiple challenge tests were frequently allowed to accumulate in the containment area and to grow-out for many days or weeks after examination and before the infectious waste was autoclaved12. The FBI calculated that the accumulated post-challenge material after aerosol testing for 3 or more animals would have been sufficient to create the letter fill material13, though the calculations for this determination are not explained or provided.  Since at most only about 24 ml of RMR1029 challenge material would be issued for a 3 animal test, and the letters would have required at least 100 ml of undiluted RMR1029 (see below) , the bulk of the requirements for the letter fill under this estimation would have been accounted for by the overgrown assay plates in this scenario.\n\nThe FBI devoted considerable efforts to determine if this material might have been diverted either in bulk to make the attack material or in smaller amounts to act as seed for further culture14.  This investigation revealed faults in the automated security system in building 1412, specifically that the key-card security system in building 1412 showed system faults and/or evidence that individuals 'piggy-backed' through the control points in about 50% of the cases, but concluded that access to the internal containment area could probably be determined for each entrant15.\n\nIn addition, it appears that on occasion 'hot' trash was not autoclaved before being removed from the containment area, and remained in the basement storage area before being autoclaved before leaving building 141216.  This basement area was also considered 'hot' but its access was apparently controlled by a single keycard access point and maintenance as well as technical/professional employees had access.  The FOIA documents do not present a detailed investigation of the security of this area.\n\nIt appears that on occasion 'anti-foam' agents were added to the aerosol generator in the aerosol challenge apparatus in building 1412, and the FBI undertook extensive questioning of USAMRIID employees about the frequency this occurred and the antifoam agents utilized.  Due to redactions, it is impossible to determine if silicon containing antifoam agents were used, and, if so, in what amounts and how frequently. No data is present in the current FBI FIOA documents regarding if silicon containing antifoam agents might influence the silicon content of the Ba organisms plated from the AGI material.\n\nLarge numbers of agar plates were handled in the main bacteriology division laboratories in building 1425 as well.  Single series of experiments could routinely generate hundreds of plates containing Ba17.\n\nLiquid Flask Ba spore Production Parameters: At USAMRIID virulent Bacillus anthracis (Ba) spores were routinely produced by harvest from solid media or by liquid media in shaker flasks.  For significant amounts, the shaker flask method was used because it produced a larger quantity of cleaner spores than solid medium. The standard production run at USAMRIID was made with 2-liters of liquid Leighton and Doi medium, shaken in eight 250 ml aliquots in eight flasks.  Good objective data on the yields of this method are available in documents recording the production of RMR1030, a batch of concentrated Ba spores used for aerosol challenge tests in the late 1990s, and produced by 2-liter liquid media batches at USAMRIID, in Ivins' lab. Yields were variable and not predictable, with 10% to 20% unsatisfactory runs produced even by experienced technicians including Ivins himself18.  Unsatisfactory runs were discarded.\nSome 2 liter flask runs yielded after gradient purification as much as  ~ 3.5 to 4.0 (3.46,3.97)  x 10^11 CFUs per 2 liter run, but based on a larger sample of 'acceptable' runs, (the yield of 13 individual runs that produced RMR1030), the average yield was 2.3\nx 10^11 spores per 2 liter run.19 Based on these numbers, if the Senate letters originated from 2-liter liquid medium runs, it would take about 16 (sixteen) successful 2-liter runs. These runs would have required a total of 32 liters of starting medium, and would have taken 16 to 19 weeks at the usual rate of one run per week, depending on how many unsatisfactory runs occurred.  After purification liquid flask produced spores could be concentrated to any desired volume, but they were typically stored in phenol in concentrations ~1.3 x\n10^10 cfu/ml (ie RMR 1030)20.  The Senate letters would have required 277 mls of purified, concentrated liquid flask produced spores, such as RMR 1030. RMR1030, the largest pool of liquid medium spores produced at USAMRIID, was originally only 250 ml in volume. If the NYC/FL letters originated from 2-liter liquid medium runs, it would take one 2-liter run (~2.3 x 10^11 spores). On several occasions Ivins addresses spore preparation and the requirements for the attack letters in interviews with the FBI.  These are rough estimates, based on 2.0 to 2.5 grams per letter, and do not specifically address the 45-fold difference in concentration between the NYC/FL and the Senate letters.  He concludes that it would take ~ 100 liters of liquid medium culture or ~ 300 ml of  \"Dugway material\" (ie RMR1029) to fill the five letters21.  These 'ballpark' estimates were echoed by another USAMRIID worker22. Fermentor production of Ba spores: Ba Spore production at Dugway Proving Grounds (DPG): Dugway Proving Grounds (DPG) produces Ba spores by fermentor.  Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) sent to USAMRIID for RMR1029 indicated they were produced in a counter top fermentor 10 liters or less in capacity23.  Ivins recalled that the DPG fermentors were 8-10 liter capacity24.  The DOJ summary refers to \"12 ten-liter fermentor grown lots.25\"  Ivins' logs for the production of RMR 1029 are heavily redacted, but from the available data, each fermentor run at DPG could produce at least 3 x 10^12 total spores with some runs achieving 5 x 10^12 spores26 before processing at USAMRIID.\nDue to redactions, the yield after processing at USAMRIID is uncertain, but one 5 x 10\n^12 run apparently produced 3.8 x 10^12 cfu after processing (76% yield)27.  The average yield per DPG run after processing cannot be determined because of the redactions. Therefore enough Ba spores for the two Senate letters might have been produced by a single production run of a counter-top fermentor of the size used at Dugway. Dugway spores were sent to USAMRIID to provide challenge material, beginning in 1997 for the creation of RMR 1029.  Seven shipments transferring a total of 13\nproduction runs were sent to USAMRIID.  The final (7th) Dugway shipment, containing the single 13th production run was received at USAMRIID in 1997 but was not included in the final RMR1029 product because Ivins reported it could not be purified to an acceptable degree.  Ivins reported he had 'set it aside' for destruction by autoclaving, but could not recall actually doing so, nor were records kept of such destruction28.  It was apparently common practice to retain samples of spores indefinitely at USAMRIID, so is possible that this material might have been retained and been available in 2001. It is doubtful that this final production run of spores from DPG could have been processed into the Senate letter attack material, even if, after having been found unsatisfactory for incorporation into RMR 1029, it could have been processed to the high concentration and purity of the Senate attack material.  It is uncertain if would have had the  polymorphic genetic signature of RMR1029, because it is not clear if this polymorphism was due to polymorphism in the seed culture used in the fermentors at DPG, or if (as seems more likely) it was the result of the admixing of multiple runs of DPG material with multiple single-colony origin 2-liter batches of Ba Ames grown at USAMRIID.  It would have a Carbon-14 (C-14) profile older than that reported for the attack material, which was officially reported as placing the age of the attack material as within 2 years of late 200129 (ie it would have had to have been grown after late 1999).\nHowever, the ability of the C-14 data to exclude dates of production in the 1997-1999 range may not have been robust, because the C-14 data, known in late 2001, did not prevent the FBI investigation from pursuing the possibility that RMR1029 itself may have been directly diverted to constitute the attack material as late as mid 200430, during a period when Steven Hatfill was suspected of diverting RMR1029 from the aerobiology building waste.  It may also be significant that the 2010 DOJ Summary does not include the C-14 data in its scientific characterization of the attack materials.  A clarification of the significance of the reported C-14 data should be undertaken. Although no sample of Ba spores yet reported had a silicon content as high as the attack material, the highest value reported was from a Dugway fermentation Ba product, so the\n13th batch may have had a high silicon content. Fermentor production of Ba at USAMRIID USAMRIID had several fermentors in the Bacteriology Division labs in Building 1425, though the exact location is unclear because of redactions in the FBI documents and the lack of a floorplan for reference.  It appears that they were located in or adjacent to the B3 suite BSL-3 containment facility31. USAMRIID workers did not produce virulent Ba spores in these fermentors, because it was considered too dangerous in a metropolitan area32.  These fermentors were used for producing attenuated strains of Ba and nonpathogenic organisms. Although equipment records are apparently incomplete, there were several fermentors of varying sizes at USAMRIID in 2001, including 150-liter, 20-liter and 5-liter New Brunswick models.  The 150-liter model occupied a dedicated room and was large, noisy, and could not have been operated in an unobtrusive fashion33. The 20-liter New Brunswick fermentor had been in use in 2000 in a vaccine project, which apparently did not involve Ivins34.  Little other information on this 20-liter fermentor appears in the documents. Considerable information is available regarding the 5-liter  New Brunswick Bio-Flo 3000 fermentor. This Brunswick Bio-Flo 3000 was a unit that had been acquired by USAMRIID in Jan 1990 and was on Bruce Ivins' personal 'hand receipt' indicating it was purchased for use by his laboratory team and was under his direct control35.  This fermentor was used by Ivins in the 1990s to grow genetically modified organisms for the production of the Recombinant Protective Antigen (rPA) anthrax vaccine that was his major professional endeavor at USAMRIID.  This fermentor is mentioned specifically in his patent for the rPA vaccine36. The patent specifies that antifoam C was added to the culture medium37.\nAntifoam C is a commercial antifoam agent manufactured by Dow Corning and contains silicone38. In the rPA vaccine work, Ivins did not use this fermentor to produce spores, since the genetically modified Sterne strain used to produce Protective Antigen (PA) for the rPA vaccine was non-sporogenic39. However, an entry in one of Ivins' laboratory notebooks seems to indicate he did use this fermentor to attempt to produce virulent Ba spores on at least one occasion 40.  Prior to the 2001 anthrax attacks, Ivins was the technical representative to DPG for the project where DPG produced virulent Ba Ames spores for RMR102941, and Ivins received the protocols for production of virulent Ba Ames in small fermentors42.\nThe 5-liter Brunswick fermentor produced little noise when running, and standard operating procedures for fermentors at USAMRIID included the automatic addition of Mazu, an anti-foam agent into the fermentors43. Mazu is a silicon-containing anti-foam agent44. The physical location of this 5-liter fermentor just prior to the 2001 letter attacks was investigated but due to extensive redactions in the available record, it is unclear what the FBI determined.  It appears that Ivins reported he had lent the instrument to an entity whose identity is redacted (presumably another investigator at USAMRIID) on an undisclosed date45.  It appears that the reported recipient of the instrument may have denied ever having possession of it46.  The location of this fermentor, its condition, and its capability of producing the attack material in late 2001 should be clarified by a suitable examination of the unredacted FBI record. Assuming that the final concentration that the 5-liter fermentor at USAMRIID could achieve was proportional to that of the 10 liter fermentors at DPG, it might produce ~ 1.9  x 10^12 spores per 5-liter run. Therefore enough material for the Senate letters might have been produced in two runs of the 5.0 liter fermentor at USAMRIID. Diversion of USAMRIID Ba for attack culture seed Prior to fall 2001, considerable amounts of Ba (hundreds but not thousands of containers) were stored at USAMRIID without inventory control in common storage areas accessible by all authorized workers at USAMRIID47.  Also, Ba challenge material, including significant volumes of RMR1029, which were normally held at the main USAMRIID building, 1425, was regularly transferred to the aerosol test building 1412, for use in aerosol testing. These transfers consisted of  concentrated or diluted RMR1029 material and there were significant unused portions of the challenge material that remained in building 1412 for extended periods of time under imperfect security.  This has been discussed above in the section of agar growth of Ba spores. Essentially all USAMRIID employees stated that, prior to the 9-11 attacks, it would not have been difficult for someone who worked at USAMRIID to clandestinely remove viable virulent pathogens from the containment labs and transport them off of the USAMRIID campus. Diversion and alteration of RMR1029 for attack material This paper will now examine the opportunities to divert significant proportions of RMR1029 for direct processing into the attack material.  This is because very significant amounts of RMR1029 and associated USAMRIID \"wild type\" Ames Ba spores appear to be unaccounted for. The DOJ contends that the attack material could not be a direct diversion of RMR 1029 itself because the attack material contained a high percentage (65 to 78%) of spores with high silicon content in the spore coat and RMR1029 showed essentially none (0 of 300\nspores examined)48. The report contends that this difference is due to growth of lowsilicon containing RMR1029 seed material in a cultural environment that resulted in the incorporation of high levels of silicon into a high percentage of the spores in the attack material.  Incorporation of silicon into the spore coat from growth medium is a process that has been shown to occur in Bacillus species including Ba. The identification of silicon in spores forming within vegetative cells in the attack material strongly supports the contention that the silicon was incorporated from the culture medium49. This scenario has two weaknesses.  The first is that it does not quantitatively explain either the very high percentage of high-silicon spores in the attack material, nor the apparent absence of high-silicon spores in RMR1029. Despite efforts to duplicate the attack material, no preparations of over 30% have been made or found in collected samples of Ba spores. Several samples of spores from DPG have been reported as containing from 11% to 29% high silicon spores.  RMR 1030, a preparation pooled from thirteen 2-liter liquid cultures of Ba grown at USAMRIID contained 6% high silicon spores50.  Since RMR1029 was originally pooled from both DPG and USAMRIID\nmaterial in approximately a 85%/15% ratio, one would have expected it should have had ~ 20% high silicon spores (range perhaps 10% to 25%).  Even if the DPG component of RMR1029 had no high-silicon spores, the USAMRIID component should have contributed ~ 1% to the final mixture, and been detectable in the 300 spores examined. The other weakness is that a sample of RMR 1029 suitable for silicon determination was apparently not obtained from USAMRIID by the FBI until 3Jun2004, and so may not have been representative of RMR 1029 in 2001 when the attack material was prepared. An alternative explanation for the wide discordance in silicon content between the attack material and the 2004 RMR1029 sample is that the original RMR1029 had a moderate percentage of high-silicon spores (10-25%) and in 2001 underwent a manipulation that selectively enhanced high-silicon spores in the attack material and depleted them in the residual RMR1029 container.  Such a differential purification may have been the unintended result of decanting or pipetting from a sedimented RMR1029 flask, or the result of centrifugation and division of a stratified pellet. Centrifuged pellets of Ba are known to demonstrate a banded appearance. A discussant at the 25Sep2009 NAS meeting suggested that graded manipulation of the number of high-silicon spores in a sample might be possible because a series of samples designated \"evidence\" showed progressive results from 18% to 1.2%51.  This series and any other similar data should be investigated for applicability to this hypothesis. The perpetrator may also have subjected the original RMR 1029 material to more sophisticated, deliberate manipulations, such as additional gradient purifications, to introduce 'red herrings' in the trace materials left on the Senate attack material. The perpetrator was skilled in avoiding leaving forensic traces (there were no significant hair, fiber or human DNA traces on the letters) and the NYC/FL material was clearly left crude (and possibly deliberately contaminated with *B subtillis*) to mimic an amateur's efforts.  It may be significant that Ivins spontaneously suggested to the FBI that they look for traces of gradient material in the attack material52. A novel manipulation may have inadvertently differentially separated the silicon bearing spores.  An inquiry into what trace materials were found in the attack material should be made. As long as a residual fraction of the original RMR1029 pool remained, the genetic polymorphisms that defined the qualitative genetic signature of RMR 1029 would be retained in both components despite an alteration of the profile of the silicon in the spore populations. It should be noted that RMR 1029 was maintained at a concentration of ~ 2.5 to 3.9 x\n10^10 cfu/ml53, and therefore would have required at least ~ 93-146 ml to be used to produce the material in the two Senate letters, and perhaps more if the process was inefficient or had failed runs.  Although the inventory of RMR 1029 provided by Ivins to the FBI is untrustworthy, it lists the volume of RMR1029 as being 369 ml prior to the\n2001 letter attacks54, though it may have been 100 ml more because of an arithmetical error.  Withdrawal of one or more 100-150 ml aliquots to prepare the attack material could have greatly depleted the component of high-silicon spores in the residual RMR1029 if that 100 ml aliquot was highly enriched in high-silicon spores. The above speculations would not be particularly compelling except that a very significant amount of RMR 1029 is unaccounted for, and significant amounts of 'wild type' Ames grown at USAMRIID are also unaccounted for. The inventory record of RMR1029 was imperfect.  Ivins had created RMR1029 and was its custodian.  He initially stated in early 2002 that he kept precise records of its creation and distribution and that it was completely accounted for55.  However, the log of RMR1029 distributions he provided to the FBI in February 200356 contained a 100 ml arithmetical error logged in a 22Feb2000 distribution that resulted in 100 ml of RMR 1029 being unaccounted for in this log. Later, Ivins maintained that the RMR 1029\ndistribution log was only an estimation and not a measured inventory57. This discrepancy resulted in an FBI investigation to trace the distribution of RMR1029 by cross-checking lab notebooks of the recipients of RMR 1029 with Ivins' log.  This determined that at the time of the 2001 mailings there was a total of 220 ml of RMR-\n1029 that was unaccounted for58.   This investigation is summarized in the DOJ summary but only fragmentary and redacted portions are present in the current collection of FBI FOIA documents, wherein Ivins addresses some of the specific  inconsistencies by invoking evaporation and stating in some instances he centrifuged and concentrated RMR1029 before shipping to Battelle59. Based upon the distribution log and the FBI investigation of distribution of RMR1029, there is a sufficient amount of RMR1029 unaccounted for at the time of the letter attacks to supply the attack letter material. If a substantial portion of the original RMR1029 had been diverted to produce the attack material in late 2001, Ivins would have potentially faced a significant shortfall of challenge material for the challenges anticipated for late 2001, 2002 and 2003, for which RMR1029 had been prepared.  In fact, Ivins sometime in 2001 requested additional spores be obtained from Dugway60.  According to Ivins' log of RMR1029, and correcting for the 100 ml arithmetical error, there should have been 469 ml of RMR1029 remaining at the time of the letter attacks in Sep/Oct 2001, nearly half of the original 1,000 mls.  A determination of the date and examination of the justification of this order for DPG spores should be made. Perhaps pertinent to this point, a further FBI investigation revealed that essentially all of what must have been a very substantial amount of Ba spore production by Ivins' two technicians at USAMRIID was also unaccounted for61.  Both of Ivins' technicians thought that their Ba spore production was to augment or replace an exhausted or dwindling supply of RMR1029, and one understood she had been hired primarily to make spores. In the 16 months between the letter attacks and the end of  the RMR1029 log, Ivins records a total of 281 mls of RMR1029 released. The 281 mls of RMR 1029 would amount to ~ 10^13 spores, which could be produced by 43 successful 2 liter liquid cultures of Ba, perhaps a year's production of Ivins' lab, considering the 10-20% rate of unsatisfactory cultures. It may be significant that the spore production in Ivins' lab may have just been sufficient to meet this demand. The DOJ summary states that RMR1029 never was modified from its creation by additions62, though it offers no supporting evidence.  The above scenario does not require additions to the RMR1029 flask, though additions to it of cultures containing few or no high silicon spores would dilute any residual concentration of high-silicon spores. Perhaps significantly, there is an episode in the FOIA documents that suggests that RMR may have been diluted and Ivins may have been altering RMR1029 by adding spores as late as mid 2004. The FBI obtained the entire RMR1029 flask on 3Jun2004 and it containing about 75\nml63.  The Naval Medical Research Center (NMRC) determined that its concentration was approximately tenfold lower than Ivins' log stated it should have been (~10^9 instead of ~10^10 cfu/ml).  A 25 ml portion of RMR1029 was then returned to Ivins for continued use at USAMRIID, and the remainder retained at NMRC64. Apparently the FBI\ninformed him of the low count from NMRC on 13Jan2005.  On 16Feb2005 Ivins replied that he had tested the returned portion, and that it was only about 20-30% less concentrated than usual, and the FBI report related that Ivins stated that it was not a problem because they added more spores for the aerosol challenge65.  While this is apparently an admission of adding spores to RMR1029, Ivins later denied he added spores to the returned RMR1029 material.  Since challenge material was typically diluted from RMR1029 before use, the FBI report may have misinterpreted Ivins referring to a lower dilution factor as a physical addition.  Or Ivins may have been untruthful.  The FBI confronted Ivins with the discordance in concentrations more forcefully on 31Mar2005, and suggested that a significant amount of RMR1029 might have been diverted and replaced with water. He denied adding spores to the returned RMR1029 material, and suggested the NMRC concentration value was in error. Ivins stated that since its return, he had provided 25ml in a successful animal challenge test, which would indicate it was not 10^9 cfu/ml66.  Ivins' RMR1029 stock was not exhausted, however, because Ivins and an FBI agent (apparently a trained microbiologist) immediately determined the concentration of  Ivins' RMR1029 stock in parallel assays, and confirmed Ivins' higher concentration67.  The FBI agent secured Ivins' residual RMR1029 stock at this point.\nFurther documents reveal additional studies were planned on all available samples of RMR1029 to resolve this issue, but no resolution is presented68.\n\nIvins stated in 2008 that the FBI accused him of diverting and/or altering RMR102969. Another factor to be considered is that Carbon-14 data from the attack material was reported as indicating it had been grown within 2 years of 2001.  As discussed above in the context of the unused 13th batch of  Dugway spores, the ability of the C-14 data to exclude origin in 1997-1999 needs clarification. Drying of Spores The attack spore material was dried and the Senate attack material was fine enough to be spontaneously aerosolized by the opening of the letter in Senator Daschle's office.  The DOJ summary states that the spores had a mass median diameter of between 22 and 38 microns, indicating that they commonly did form aggregates when aerosolized (individual spores are barrel shaped, roughly 1 x 1.5  microns).   The DOJ summary reports no indication of special treatment or 'weaponization' was identified70. Dry spores at USAMRIID Ba spore material was very seldom dried at USAMRIID.  Rare instances of drying very small amounts of virulent strains of Ba were noted, but these were dried only after sterilization by radiation, and were for antigen production for in vitro test systems71.  A\nhighly redacted entry suggests live Ba might have been dried in very small amounts72. When it was reported that Dugway Proving Grounds (DPG) produced dry, virulent Ba spores, that fact surprised many USAMRIID employees.  There is no direct information regarding the DPG spore drying process or program in the FBI FOIA materials. USAMRIID employees reported that it was thought that Battelle did work with dried Ba material73, but no details were offered and no additional information is present in the FBI\nFOIA documents regarding Battelle. USAMRIID had contemplated initiating aerosol challenges using dry, virulent Ba spore preparations, and this project had proceeded to initial laboratory work using dried nonpathogenic organisms, but the program was terminated before any dry virulent Ba spores were handled. The reason for the termination was stated by some USAMRIID employees as being 'dual use' concerns under the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) 74, but others offered different [redacted] explanations75.  There is no technical information available on the proposed method of drying or equipment used in this initial program, but it apparently some equipment was obtained and some activity took place in the aerobiology building, 1412, rather than at the main bacteriology department in building 1425.  This may have been a project of the Aerobiology Division rather than the Bacteriology Division of USAMRIID. Ivins' knowledge of this program, that contemplated use and possibly production of dry virulent Ba spores at USAMRIID, is unclear from the FOIA record.  Interviews regarding the history and organization of this project are highly redacted, but Ivins name, which generally is not redacted, does not appear in these documents. When asked he denied any knowledge of it76.  However, one of the USAMRIID employees who described the project at length stated it was initiated to test the 'breakthrough point' of the new rPA vaccine, and that discussions had addressed the options of obtaining dry Ba spores from DPG or producing them in-house at USAMRIID.  Although Ivins was an employee of the bacteriology division rather than the aerobiology division of USAMRIID, he was one of the essential personnel involved in  aerosol Ba challenges at USAMRIID, providing the challenge Ba material and personally participating in every challenge in the Aerobiology Division building 1412.  Moreover, the new rPA vaccine was his personal career project, and he was the technical liaison for spore procurement between USAMRIID and DPG. A CDC informant apparently informed about both DPG and USAMRIID procedures assumed that Ivins had knowledge about DPG's methods to dry Ba spores77. A further exploration of Ivins knowledge base on drying Ba spores should be undertaken. Methods of Drying Spores There are a variety of potential methods to dry Ba spores.  Some apparently can be done with minimal equipment, others require specialized instruments.  Industrial scale drying is often done with spray-dryers, but no spray-drying apparatus was present at USAMRIID.  Attention has focused on instruments called lyophilizers, which might be used to dry Ba spores, and were present at USAMRIID. Lyophilizers at USAMRIID Lyophilizers are also termed 'freeze dryers' and classically operate by freezing a sample and then allowing the water in the sample to sublimate away under a vacuum and be trapped in an adjacent 'cold trap' where the water vapor is again frozen.  Lyophilizers are often used in this mode to preserve some bacterial cultures and other biological samples. However, Ba spores are damaged by freezing.  Many large lyophilizers can be adjusted so that the sample compartment is kept at any desired temperature, and the liquid water vapor evaporated under reduced atmospheric pressure and trapped in an adjacent cold trap.  This mode might better be characterized 'vacuum drying'. Two types of lyophilizers were present at USAMRIID.  There were many small units generically termed 'Speed-Vacs' which are counter-top instruments for lyophilizing small volumes of material.  Typically they can accommodate  multiple small tubes holding 2 milliliters or less, freeze the contents and subject them to centrifugation under vacuum.  Because it is likely that the wet spore aliquots used to create the Senate letter fills would have been at least 50 or 100 ml in volume, were not frozen, and because centrifugation presents a significant aerosolization hazard, the use of Speed-Vacs has generally been discounted. The other type of lyophilizer is a large, batch lyophilizer capable of containing and evaporating several liters of fluid in a single run.  Present in the USAMRIID bacteriology division was a Vertis 12XL \"Freeze Mobile\" Condenser Trap Unit equipped with an attached Vertis HL600 3-shelf UniTop specimen chamber.  This is a mobile one-piece unit mounted on wheels and is the size and general appearance of a 'stacked' clothes washer/dryer appliance.  The specimen compartment can contain up to 15 liters of fluid to be dried in 125 ml bottles, and it temperature can be independently controlled.  The condenser is capable of evaporating ~8 liters of fluid in 24 hours. This large Vertis lyophilizer was on Dr Ivins' 'hand receipt' indicating it had been purchased for his laboratory in 1996 and was under his control.  It was apparently kept in the hallway between the B3 BSL-3 containment suite and the B5 BSL-2 general bacteriology laboratory in building 1425.  Ivins had used it in the rPA vaccine project in the 1990s to lyophilize non-viable biological products, and was trained and experienced in its use. Conclusions There appears to have been sufficient resources at USAMRIID to account for the production or diversion of sufficient material for the letter attack payloads. The NYC/FL letters might have been grown in a single, routine 2 liter batch at USAMRIID without attracting any attention.  The Senate material, although requiring an order of magnitude more material, had several potential sources.  A fermentor apparently existed in the USAMRIID lab that was capable of growing the attack material in two production runs. Unmonitored RMR 1029 waste from aerosol challenge tests in building 1412 was sufficient in quantity to be diverted into the attack material, and was not tightly secured. There was sufficient material unaccounted for in the RMR 1029 flask itself to account for the Senate attack materials, and sufficient Ba Ames material unaccounted for in the USAMRIID lab to account for the shortfall from such a diversion.\n\nThere appears to be adequate facilities for the drying of the attack material.  It\n\nmay be that little equipment would be required outside of normal laboratory facilities, but a large capacity versatile lyophilizer was present that might have been used.\n\n\nSuggestions 1. Official confirmation of the amount of letter material in the Leahy letter and *NYC Post* letters should be sought. 2. Examination of the record for scientific data relating to chemical traces on the attack material, such as residua from residual media, gradient purifications, or effects of drying methods.  Any trace residua should be correlated with established procedures and available reagents at USAMRIID and other laboratories of significance. 3. The results from (2) above should be correlated with the corresponding results from FBI sponsored attempts to duplicate the letter fill materials. 4. Further elucidation of the details of the quantitative distribution of high-silicon spores in various samples of interest, such as the attack materials, and the several samples of RMR1029 itself.  Particular attention ought to be made to procure as wide a selection of samples as possible to determine sampling errors. 5. Similar quantitative determinations of the incidence of high-silicon spores be made on the silicon distribution in representative samples of Dugway fermentor and USAMRIID 2-liter batches of spores. 6. Investigation of the possible differential partition of high and low silicon spores by various methods such as sedimentation, centrifugation, or division of centrifuged pellets. The origin of the graded series of Dugway materials alluded to in the NAS presentation be determined for its relevancy to this issue.\n\n\n7. The confidence values for C-14 age of the attack material and of other significant materials, such as RMR 1029 should be determined and clarified.  The significance of this data to the forensics of the attack material should be clarified. 8. The operational status and location of the 5-liter fermentor in late 2001 should be determined and clarified. 9. Location and operational status of the large Vertis 12XL 'Freeze Mobile\" in late 2001 be determined. 10. The alleged 'dilution' of RMR 1029 in mid 2004 be resolved by a full examination of the record. 11.  A review of the records of production of Ba Ames strain by Ivins' technicians to determine the amount of unaccounted for Ames and the dates of its production. 12. A determination of the date and examination of the justification for Ivins' 2001 order for additional DPG spores should be made. 13. A review of information regarding Ivins' knowledge of Ba drying techniques, and particularly his contact with the dry-spore challenge program at USAMRIID should be made. ENDNOTES\n1DOJ Summary, Footnote 15, page 29 (PDF page 33)\n\n2 UCLA Department of Epidemiology School of Public Health, Bioterrorism website:\n\n\"Exposure Letters\" states the *New York Post* letter was handled but not opened:\naccessed 11Apr2010 at: http://www.ph.ucla.edu/EPI/bioter/detect/antdetect_letters_a.htm\n3 Broad WJ and Johnston D. \"Anthrax Sent Through Mail Gained Potency by the Letter\"\nNYTimes 7May2002.\n\n4 Kournikakis B et al.  Risk Assessment of Anthrax Threat Letters. Defence R&D Canada Technical Report DRES-TR-2001-048 Sept 2001.  Available online at: http://www.anthraxinvestigation.com/canadiananthraxstudysep01.pdf\n5 United States Department of Justice Science Anthrax Press Briefing, Monday August\n18, 2008.  Transcript accessed 11 April 2010 at: http://www.fredericknewspost.com/media/pdfs/FBI_0818_afternoon_bfg.pdf\n6 DOJ summary pg 14 (PDFpg 19).\n\n7 UCLA Department of Epidemiology School of Public Health, Bioterrorism website:\n\n\"Exposure Letters: Seven Letters Sent\" gives details of this hypothesis: accessed\n11Apr2010 at: http://www.ph.ucla.edu/EPI/bioter/detect/antdetect_letters_a.htm\n8 USAMRIID #16 PDFpg 73, 74: FBI review Ivins' lab notebooks 15May2004: summary of Jan 1997 entry: \"The current batch of Ames spores (RMR 1030) took 13 production runs...He noted that 13 runs had yielded 3 x 10^12 spores.\"\n\n9 BEI#1 PDFpg4: 23Jan2002 interview with Bruce Ivins:\n\n\"..the spores in the DASCHLE letter were of fermentation quality.  The spores were very clean compared to Bacillus anthracis produced on agar which would contain messy residue.\" BEI#1PDFpg24: Ivins interview 12Feb2003:\n\"IVINS thinks that most of the people at USAMRIID use broth to grow Ba although he can't say for certain how everyone else there grows their spores.  Although Ba can be grown on agar, nicer spores are produced in broth, and they can be purified more easily and are \"hotter\". ...\nSpores grown up on agar are dirtier than broth grown.  IVINS does not know if this is because the spores pickup debris from the agar of if there are media components on the surface of the spore.  No matter how agar grown spores are washed, some agar always remains on the spores.\" BEI#2PDFpg 61: 1Mar2007 Interview with USAMRIID employee:\n\"SBA [Sheep Blood Agar] leaves blood residue on the spores, and liquid spore preparations are easier to clean.\"\n10 BEI#1PDFpg24: Ivins interview 12Feb2003:\n\n\"If one needs to purify more than a very small amount of Ba, it is difficult to use agar as you would need numerous plates.\"\n11 USARMIID#15 PDFpg 15: Interview with USAMRIID employee, 9Mar2004:\n\n\"Challenges were run three (3) days per week with thirty (30) rabbits per day.\nTwo (2) dilutions of anthrax were prepared per rabbit for each challenge, and three (3) Tryptic Soy Agar (TSA) plates were cultured per dilution. [redacted] noted that a total of approximately 180 TSA plates were cultured per day when animal challenges were being conducted.\"\n12 USARMIID#15 PDFpg 16: Interview with USAMRIID employee, 9Mar2004:\n\n\"After the plates had been left in the incubator overnight, they would be completely covered with growth.  The plates were then read in the morning following the challenge.  After the plates were read, they were placed into a bag and clearly marked with what pathogen was in the bag, what strain the pathogen was, and who the investigator was.  The bags would remain in room [redacted] until nearly overflowing, or until the number of bags in the room became an obstruction.  The bags often sat in room [redacted] for several days or weeks prior to being removed.  [redacted] noted that [he] was fascinated with how much growth appeared on the plates after several days or weeks.  The bags were then taken to the basement to be autoclaved.\" USAMRIID#8 PDFpg 77: Washington Field Office Summary Report 11Jan2006:\n\"It was documented during several interviews that Ivins' group did not keep room\n[redacted] very clean and tidy.  Post-challenge agar plates were left on counters, the incubators were left full of material, samples in the refrigerator were not disposed of in a timely manner, and \"hot\" trash was allowed to build up for weeks prior to being autoclaved.  One former military aerobiology technician [redacted] commented that [redacted] had to clean Ivins' trash himself out of safety concerns.  [redacted] said that the civilians at USAMRIID did not take safety seriously.  [redacted] commented that when [redacted] looked at the agar plates that had sat in the biohazard trash bags for several days or weeks in 115, they were covered with bacterial growth.\"\n13 USAMRIID#20 PDFpg 30: 20May2004 Report investigative project re access to postchallenge Ames from Aerobiology Division USARIID:\n\"It was estimated based on spore concentrations of material used that any aerosol challenge involving greater than or equal to three animals would constitute enough available Ba to have assemble the anthrax-laced letters.\"\n14 BEI#1 PDFpg 45: 17 April 2003: telephonic interview with Bruce Ivins:\n\n\"After his telephonic conversation with SA [redacted] on 4/15/2003, IVINS feels sick over the fact that the material used in the anthrax mailings cold have come from a stock made from the BA aerosol challenge trash.\"\n15 USAMRIID#4 PDFpg16: Summary of results of initiatives, 29Mar2006:\n\n\"For all of the days when access points were recorded for employees who used the containment area to work with aerosol challenges, at least three of the five access points were recorded together.  There was therefore always some indication that the employee used the change room or keypad to enter the containment area.  In approximately 50% of the cases, one or two of the access points were missing (ie 3 of 5, or 4 of 5 points recorded).  ... Never on a day when an employee was assigned to work in the containment area was he/she shown only to have entered and exited the building on that day.\" USAMRIID#4 PDFpg20: Summary of results of initiatives, 29Mar2006:\n\"Anomalies indicate that the employee may have piggybacked through a missing\n\naccess point with another individual, or the system might not have read a keycard swipe\nof keypad code properly.\"\n\n       \"The amount of anomalies evident on the spreadsheet imply that there were most\n\nlikely incidences of piggybacking and/or system faults through use of the change rooms into the containment area of Building 1412 on these dates.\"\n\"The initiatives described above demonstrate a significant difference between\nexpected keycard access data for employees using the containment area of Building 1412, and the actual data for employees during several Ba aerosol challenges between 9/1998 and 8/2001.\"\n16 USAMRIID#8 PDFpg81: Washington Field Office Summary Report 11Jan2006:\n\n\"Information obtained from interviews indicated that standard protocol is and\nwas for the post-challenge plates to be autoclaved in the challenge labs prior to disposal in the basement, meaning that this material should have been autoclaved twice.  Several technicians stated that this was not always the practice.  All material on the hot side of building [redacted] was considered to be 'hot', and it was the opinion of several technicians that the PIs and their staff were not concerned if material was autoclaved before leaving a room or lab for disposal.  The main concern was that material was autoclaved in the basement before leaving the hot side of the building.\"\n17 USAMRIID#15 PDFpg 45: Interview with previous USAMRIID employee 6Apr2004:\n\n\"There could have been large numbers of agar plates in labs at the given time without sending up a red flag.  In serial sacrifice experiments, a group of animal was exposed to a pathogen.  A few animals were removed and sacrificed on a time table to determine the bacterial load over time. [long redaction] Ten-fold dilution were prepared for each organ.  Five to seven plates were prepared per organ.  They would sacrifice three to five animals per time point, so there were hundreds of plates per serial sacrifice experiment.\"\n18 BEI#2 PDFpg15.\n\n19 FBI FOIA USAMRIID #16 PDFpg 73, 74: FBI review Ivins' lab notebooks\n15May2004: summary of Jan 1997 entry:\n \"The current batch of Ames spores (RMR 1030) took 13 production runs...He noted that 13 runs had yielded 3 x 10^12 spores.\" Also see USAMRIID#1PDFpg 64 for same info.\n\n20 FBI FOIA USAMRIID #16 PDF pg 73.\n\n21 BEI#1 PDFpg 14: (2/26/2002)  \"Ivins noted that the ratio of spores to media for B\nanthracis in a liquid preparation is approximately 10^8 spores per ml.  Therefore, it would take 20 liters of media to make two grams of spores.\" BEI#1 PDFpg 24: (2/12/2003) Ivins interview:\n\"IVINS did the following calculation estimates to determine how much of the Dugway spores would have been missing if they had been used in the anthrax mailings. 2.0-2.5 grams of material were present in each letter with a 10^8 spore concentration.  In order to achieve that spore concentration, 80-100 L of runs would have been necessary and approximately 300 ml of the Dugway material would have been required.  This amount of missing material would have been noticed.\"  [MF note: this takes above estimate and multiplies it by 4 or 5 for the 4 or 5 letters].\n\n22 USAMRIID#8 PDFpg 9: 18Aug2005 interview with ex-UAMRIID employee:\n\n\"...the individual would have needed to grow hundreds of liters in order to have\n\nthe amount of organism used in these mailings.  Someone would have noticed this happening.\"\n23 USAMRIID#17PDFpg 49: FBI summary of Ivins' lab notebooks 14July2004:\n\n\"Also contained within the notebook was a Dugway procedure for anthrax spore\npreparation in bench top fermenters.  This standard operating procedure (SOP) draft outlined the culture and processing methods used for preparation of Ba spores in less than 10 liter quantities.\"\n24 BEI#1 PDFpg 23.\n\n25 DOJ Amerithrax Investigation Summary, PDF pg 30, summary report pg 26.\n\n26 USAMRIID#16 pg 76: Dugway Shipments:\n\n5th shipment: 7/21/97 52 ml: 3 x 10^12 total spores\n\n\n8/2/97 51 ml;  3 x 10^12 total spores\n   USAMRIID#16 pg 77: Dugway Shipments: [date redacted]\n6th shipment: 8/4/97  5 x 10^12 total spores:\n   USAMRIID#16pg81: Dugway shipments:\n7/11/97 60ml: 5 x 10 ^12  total spores\n\n7/17/97  80ml:  3.25 x 10^12 total spores\n27 USAMRIID#16 pg 77: Dugway Shipments: [date redacted]\n\n6th shipment: 8/4/97  5 x 10^12 total spores:\n\n\nyield apparently 3.8 x 10^12 spores\n\n28 BEI#2 PDFpg12-13: Ivins interview 31Mar2005:\n\n29 United States Department of Justice Science Anthrax Press Briefing, Monday August\n18, 2008.  Transcript accessed 11 April 2010 at: http://www.fredericknewspost.com/media/pdfs/FBI_0818_afternoon_bfg.pdf\n30 USAMRIID#20 PDFpg 30: 20May2004 Report investigative project re access to postchallenge Ames from Aerobiology Division USARIID:\n\"Data from aerosol challenges involving Bacillus anthracis (Ba) from the time period August 1998 to Sep 1999 was analyzed to determine potential windows of opportunity for removal of post-challenge Ames during a ten day period following each aerosol challenge.  It was estimated based on spore concentrations of material used that any aerosol challenge involving greater than or equal to three animals would constitute enough available Ba to have assemble the anthrax-laced letters.\"\n31 BEI#1 PDFpg 86: Interview with IVINS 7May2004\n\n\"IVINS took the interviewing agents past the autoclave crash door for suite B3, showed how this suite connected to B4, and showed the fermentation room.  Two of the fermentors visible in the room have been purchased in the last 3 years or so.\"\n32 USAMRIID #8 PDFpage 27: interview with USAMRIID employee 3 Oct 21005:\n\n \"...Ba Ames has never been fermented at USAMRIID.  It would have been too dangerous to have grown Ba Ames in a fermentor.\" BEI#2 PDFpg 7-8: Ivins interview 31Mar2005:\n\"IVINS related that while USAMRIID had fermenters, to his knowledge they were never used to grow any virulent select agents, including Bacillus anthracis.  The fermenters were used only to grow non-virulent bacteria, such as Bacillus subtilis. ...\"\n\"...He explained that using a multi-gallon fermenter for this purpose would have been out of the question due to the potentially catastrophic results of an accidental spill of such a large quantity of anthrax.  IVINS believed it would be simply too dangerous to produce virulent anthrax in a metropolitan area using a fermenter because of the large quantity yielded.\"\n33 USAMRIID #5 PDFpage 2: FBI periodic report 29Sep2006:\n\"Fermentor:\nIdentification and tracking of fermentors in place at USAMRIID positively identified one fermentor as having been in place in Building [redacted] Room [redacted] around the time of the anthrax mailings.  Additional fermentors of interest have been identified for location, materials used, and operator with an undetermined final disposition date.  The fermentors ranged in volume from 150 liters to 5-liters.  The two largest fermentors were manufactured by New Brunswick Inc, and were not portable. These cold not likely have been used in a discreet manner.  The 5-L fermentor also manufactured by New Brunswick was lent to [redacted] by Bruce Ivins.  [redacted] indicated the New Brunswick fermentors were likely to predate 2001.  Further analysis would be required to determine which fermentors were up and running between 9/11/01 and 10/9/01.\" Also see: USAMRIID#3b PDFpage 91-96  09/07/2006 Status Report on Tracking and ID of Fermentors at USAMRIID.  For an update on fermenter tracking.\n\n34 USAMRIID#3b PDFpage 93  09/07/2006  Status Report on Tracking and ID\nFermentors:\n\"20-liter Fermentor: Room [redacted]:\n\n\nThe New Brunswick fermentor, no MMCN Number, no Stock Number was located\nin [redacted].  Operators included: [redacted] and [redacted]. [redacted] recalled that in 2000, [redacted] run a New Brunswick 20-liter fermentor which involved a vaccine study pertaining to the growth of delta-Ames or delta-Sterne.\"\n35 BEI#4PDFpg 8: materials recovered from Ivins' residence under search warrant\n1Nov2007 included a copy of a USAMRIID hand receipt from 1997 with this entry.\n\n36 USAMRIID #7 PDFpage 59: Patent # 6,387,665, patent page 5:\n\n\"The fermentations describe here were carried out using a New Brunswick Bio-\nFlo 3000 equipped with a 5.0 liter working volume glass vessel and stainless steel headplate and hemispherical bottom cooling dish. ...\"\n37 USAMRIID #7 PDFpage 60: Patent # 6,387,665, patent page 6:\n\n \"..fermentations were carried out ... with no pH control or additions other than antifoam C.\"\n38 Product Information: Silicone Antifoams: Dow Corning Antifoam C:\naccessed 11Apr2010 at: http://www3.dowcorning.com/DataFiles/090007c880012087.pdf\n39 USAMRIID #7 PDFpage 58: Patent # 6,387,665, patent page 4.\n\n40 USAMRIID#8 PDFpg 21: FBI report of 28Sep2005,  including review of Laboratory Notebook Review Project:\n\"On page four of notebook [redacted] Ivins detailed a procedure in which he grew five liters of Ba (strain unknown) to give to [redacted].  None of the rats died after being injected with this preparation and Ivins speculated he had harvested the Ba too early.\"\n41 USAMRIID#4 PDFpg 105: Interview with a USAMRIID employee 22Feb2008:\n\n\"[redacted] also recalled that prior to the Sept 11, 2001 time frame IVINS was USAMRIIDs technical representative to DPG pertaining to a project whereby DPG was contracted out to produce large quantities of wet Ba spores.\"\n42 USAMRIID#17PDFpg 49: FBI summary of Ivins' lab notebooks 14July2004:\n\n\"Also contained within the notebook was a Dugway procedure for anthrax spore preparation in bench top fermenters.  This standard operating procedure (SOP) draft outlined the culture and processing methods used for preparation of Ba spores in less than 10 liter quantities.\"\n43 USAMRIID#4 PDFpage 89, 90: 14Jan2008 interview at Ft Detrick:\n\n\"[redacted] advised that the 5 L fermentor, when operational, did not produce a whole lot of noise.\"\n\"When using the fermentors, [redacted] recalled that it was standard operating procedures when growing Ba to use anti-foam in order to reduce the buildup of bubbles or foam that would occur during the fermentation process.  [redacted] explained that anti-foam would be automatically pumped into the fermentor to reduce the amount of bubbles.  [redacted] recalled that the old brand name for anti-foaming agent was called Mazu and believed that Mazu may have been sold out or taken over by a newer company possibly called Sigma.\"\n44 BASF Technical Bulletin: MAZU DF 204 Defoamer.  Accessed 8April2010 at:\nhttp://www2.basf.us/businesses/chemicals/performance/pdfs/Mazu_DF_204.pdf\n45 USAMRIID #5 PDFpage 2: FBI periodic report 29Sep2006:\n\n\"The 5-L fementor also manufactured by New Brunswick was lent to [redacted]\nby Bruce Ivins.\" [MFnote: the name redacted in this quote appears to contain 6 letters].\n\n46 USAMRIID #5 PDFpage 67: Interview with USAMRIID employee [MF note: from length of redactions, probably male with a 6-letter surname].  1/8/2007\n\"[redacted] advised [redacted] spoke to [long redaction] concerning the five (5)\nliter fermentor.  Per [redacted] had previously told an interviewing Postal Inspector that USAMRIID employee BRUCE IVINS lent the 5L fermentor to [redacted] [WFO NOTE: see 279-WF-222936-POI, Serial 1487].  [redacted] clarified [redacted] at the time IVINS lent the fermentor was [long redaction] and not [redacted].  [redacted] did not work for [redacted] until after [redacted] left USAMRIID, circa [redacted].  [redacted reiterated IVINS never lent [redacted] the 5L fermentor, [redacted] has never seen it at USAMRIID, nor does [redacted] maintain any paperwork associated with same.\"\n47BEI#2 PDFpg 15-16: 31March2005 Interview with Bruce Ivins:\n\n\"IVINS advised that prior to the fall 2001 anthrax attacks, suite B3 contained an extensive number of tubes and flasks containing liquid anthrax spores.  When asked how many such containers were stored in the room, he advised there were 'hundreds of containers of all sizes, but probably not thousands.'  There was no common labeling scheme or protocol for these containers - they were labeled by the individual researchers to whom they belonged.  Each researcher had the discretion to label the containers as he/she saw fit.  Many of the containers which held Ames anthrax spores were labeled'Ames.'  As an example, IVINS noted the flask containing RMR 1029 was labeled as 'Ames.'  There was no inventory of the flasks and tubes.  The walk-in refrigerator in B3 contained shelves which were always filled with flasks and tubes of spores.\" USAMRIID#8 PDFpg 4: 18Aug2005 Interview with ex-USAMRIID employee:\n\"[redacted] noted that at [redacted] USAMRIID [redacted] there were no general logs maintained with would show how much organism was grown from the samples, or records to reflect how much of the grown organism was used in testing, and then subsequently destroyed. ...\"\n48 Yudhijit Bhattacharjee, \"Anthrax Investigation: Silicon Mystery Endures in Solved Anthrax Case\" (News of the Week) *Science* vol 327 no 5972 pg 1435, 19Mar2010.\n\n49 United States Department of Justice Science Anthrax Press Briefing, Monday August\n18, 2008. Briefing page 13: Transcript accessed 11 April 2010 at: http://www.fredericknewspost.com/media/pdfs/FBI_0818_afternoon_bfg.pdf\n\"DR MICHAEL: ...Again, in the letter materials the silicon and oxygen were colocated on the spore coat, within the spore.  In fact, we found some vegetative cells that were going through the sporulation process and the spore within the mother cell had this same signature.\"\n50 Joseph Michael (Sandia National Laboratory), \"Microscopy/Weaponization of Bacillus anthracis\" presented at: Scientific Review of FBI Anthrax Investigation: Second Committee Meeting, Friday September 25, 2009. Data on percentages of high-silicon spores in this paragraph taken from audio recording of Scientific Review of FBI Anthrax Investigation: Second Committee Meeting, Friday September 25, 2009, Day 2: Part 1: accessed 12Apr2010 at: http://nationalacademies.org/newsroom/nalerts/20090925.html\n51 Joseph Michael (Sandia National Laboratory), \"Microscopy/Weaponization of Bacillus anthracis\" presented at: Scientific Review of FBI Anthrax Investigation: Second Committee Meeting, Friday September 25, 2009. Discussion of this series of samples is taken from audio recording of: Day 2: Part 1: accessed 12Apr2010 at: http://nationalacademies.org/newsroom/nalerts/20090925.html\n52 BEI#1PDFpg 24: Bruce Ivins interview 12 Feb 2003:\n\n\"Double purified material needs to have a chromatogram done to determine whether it was run through a gradient.  A trace of the gradient would remain on the material and should be indicated by a peak on the chromatogram.  Some possible gradients include sucrose, hypaque, renografin (which became known as renocal but may not be manufactured any longer), or phycoll.\"\n53 The starting concentration of RMR1029 was 3 x 10^13 spores in 1,000 cc, or 3.0 x\n\n10^10 cfu/ml.\n\n   BEI#3 PDFpgs 97-108: Spore Preparation Forms  dated Oct 1997 to Apr 2001:\nStarting concentration for RMR1029 varies from 2.5 to 3.9 x 10^10 cfu/ml.\n\n54 BEI#1 PDFpg 39: Reference Material Receipt Record entry for 27Aug2001.\n\n55 BEI#1 DPFpg 7: Ivins interview 31Jan2002:\n\n\" Ivins stated that Dugway Proving Grounds in Utah usually makes the spore\npreparations used in animal challenges at USAMRIID. Ivins maintains a detailed inventory of all these spore production preparations that have been sent from Dugway. All of this inventory is accounted for.\"\n56 BEI#1 PDFpgs 38,39: Reference Material Receipt Record 22Oct1997 to 18Feb2003\n\n57 Ref: BEI#1: PDFpg 107-108: Ivins interview 13Jan2005:\n\n\"IVINS record of the dissemination of Reference Material Receipt (RMR) 1029, the Ames spores which were a combination of Dugway produced spores and the spores made by IVINS, was kept only for the purpose of allowing the researchers to estimate how much of the material was left so they would not run out of spores for aerosol challenges.  The record was not kept as any kind of precise inventory for security reasons.  The amounts of remaining material were only estimates and were not accurately measured for each entry.\"\n58 DOJ Amerithrax Investigation Summary, PDF pg 31, summary report pg 27 footnote\n10.\n\n59 USAMRIID#19 PDFpg 7,8: Ivins interview 8Sep2004:\n\n\"IVINS explained that the discrepancies between the volume removed from RMR1029 for the May and June 2001 shipments to Battelle [redacted] and [redacted] respectively) and the volume actually shipped in May and June 2001 [redacted and [redacted] respectively) were due to the fact that IVINS centrifuged the samples and reduced their overall volume prior to shipment to Battelle....\"\n\"When asked about a [redacted] discrepancy in this record, IVINS explained that evaporation over the years as well as math error would account for this missing volume. IVINS stated that RMR 1029 could have lost up to [redacted] a year and this would not be unusual because it is not stored in an air tight container...\"\n60 USAMRIID#19 PDFpg 8: Ivins interview 8Sep2004:\n\n\"When USAMRIID was getting low on RMR 1029 spores, they contracted Dugway in 2001 to produce additional spores.\"\n61 DOJ Amerithrax Investigation Summary, PDF pg 32, summary report pg 28 footnote\n11.\n\n62 DOJ Amerithrax Investigation Summary, PDF pg 32, summary report pg 28:\n\n\"In fact, the investigation revealed that there were never any additions to RMR1029 after its creation in October 1997.\"\n63 BEI#2 PDF pgs 29-32: 1Apr2005: Lab Check of Concentration of RMR1029 re Naval Lab discrepancy\n64 BEI#2 PDF pgs 29-32: 1Apr2005: Lab Check of Concentration of RMR1029 re Naval Lab discrepancy\n65 BEI#1 PDFpg 118: telephone call from Ivins 16Feb2005:\n\n\"On a separate issue, IVINS verified that he found RMR1029 to be 2.4 x 10^10\ncfu/ml and not 2.4 x 10^9 cfu/ml after it was returned to him from FBI custody. IVINS said that the viability was only down 20-30%, not 90%, and that they were able to fix the problem by adding more spores for the aerosol challenge for [redacted].\"\n66 BEI#2 PDFpg 14-15: Ivins Interview 31Mar2005:\n\"IVINS was questioned concerning the viability of RMR 1029 after the FBI returned RMR 1029 to IVNS due to a conflict between his earlier representations that its concentration was 10^10 colony forming units (cfu) per milliliter (ml) and the Navy Medical Research Center's (NMRC's) evaluation that the concentration was 10^9 cfu/ml.\n\n\"IVINS stated that the concentration of RMR 1029 was either 2.4 x 10^10 cfu/ml or 2.5 x 10^10 cfu/ml when he checked it after it was returned by the FBI.  IVINS advised that he has never observed RMR 1029 drop below approximately 3.5 c 10^10 cfu/ml during its existence.  He also said he did not add any more spores to the RMR 1029 material after the FBI returned it to him.  When asked whether it would have been possible for someone to take some of the anthrax slurry out of the RMR1029 flask and replace it with water without detection, he responded in the affirmative.\n\n\"IVINS could offer no explanation other than \"technical error\" for the discrepancy between his and NMRC's conflicting measurements of the concentration of RMR 1029.  When asked to opine as to what may have caused such  drop in viability, IVINS said he did not know.  IVINS was highly skeptical of the FBI's claim that the concentration of RMR1029 was really 10^9.  He explained that after the FBI gave RMR1029 back to him, he used 25ml for an animal challenge conducted by USAMRIID researcher [redacted].  IVINS said he would not have been able to perform this \"animal spray\" if the concentration of RMR 1029 had been 10^9 because this concentration would have been too low to challenge the vaccine.\"\n\n67 BEI#2 PDF pgs 29-32: 1Apr2005: Lab Check of Concentration of RMR1029 re Naval Lab discrepancy\n68 USAMRIID#20 PDFpg 82-85: 6Jan2005: FBI internal document:\n\nPlans for 'percentage viability' assay to be done on all RMR1029 samples.\n\n   BEI#2 PDFpg 88: 6/19/2007: Navy Lab report(? Or old report request?) of conc of\nRMR1029: Redacted data from 14Feb2005.\n\n69 BEI#6 PDFpg 39: 6Feb2008: Email to an FBI informant (identity redacted) from IVINS:\n\"They accuse me of diluting, altering or adulterating an important preparation of anthrax material.\"\n70 DOJ Amerithrax Summary PDFpg18, summary page 14.\n\n\n71 USAMRIID#3b PDFpg 51: Interview with USAMRIID employee 26Apr2006\n\n72 USAMRIID#4, PDFpg114: Interview with ex-USAMRIID employee 11Apr2008:\n\n\"[long redaction] did in fact dry/lyophilize very  small amounts of Ba but nothing remotely close to the quantity of Ba powder recovered from the anthrax-laced letter mailings.\"\n73 USAMRIID#3b PDFpg 50: Interview with USAMRIID employee 26Apr2006:\n\n\"[redacted] advised to [redacted] knowledge there was no 'dry work\" conducted at USAMRIID, rather it was well known that Battelle was involved in 'dry work.'\"\n74 USAMRIID#21 PDFpg 13: Interview 23Jan2007: USAMRIID employee\n\n\"Due to [redacted] previous experience with the [long redaction] was originally tasked by [long redaction] believes that [she] worked on this project for about [long redaction] that they had to stop working with dried powder aerosolization due to its duel [sic: FBI misspelling] use implications.\"\n\"[redacted] worked on this project alone in building 1412 suite [redacted] (only\n\nparts of this suite are classified as a containment area).\"\nFollows heavily redacted passages about duration of study and who was\nknowledgeable and where lab notebooks should be. USAMRIID#21 PDFpg 5-6: 16Jan2007 interview with USAMRIID employee.\n\"When referring to the dry aerosol study that was conducted by the [long\nredaction] described it as a side project which occurred over a relatively short period of time. [redacted] believed it was [long redaction] explained that [long redaction].  The purpose of this project was to bridge the gap between use of wet aerosolization techniques as the model for studying a disease which in the real world would be caused by a dry aerosol.  [redacted] elaborated that if conducting aerosol vaccine challenges using a wet suspension of Ba spores did not accurately reflect a disease (eg inhalational anthrax) caused by a dry aerosol then the results of the model had limited value.  The purpose of the bridging study was to demonstrate that a wet aerosol vaccine challenge was a suitable model.  [long reaction] USAMRIID [long redaction] was directed by [redacted] to attempt to aerosolize [redaction].  Work performed by [redacted] on this project was conducted in room [redacted] of building [long redaction] designated area at the time.\"\n\"[redacted] explained that during this project [redacted] inquired about possibility of using a dried biological agent.  However, the administration at USAMRIID denied the use of dried biological agents due to their dual use perception. [long redaction] considered this project just another of [long redaction].\"\n\"[redacted] convey that there were discussions [redacted] about attaining dried Bacillus anthracis (Ba).  Discussions detailed that [redaction] could be contracted to provide this material.  There was also discussion as to whether or not the material acquired would need to be milled, and if so, from where would a mill be obtained. [redacted] described that the use of dried agents was deemed out of the question by the administration due to its dual use implications.\"\n\"[redacted] has no recollection of discussions about dried agents between [long redaction] at USAMRIID.  [long redaction] spoke about the dry aerosol project, but to [redacted] knowledge this was the only individual from [redacted] spoke to about this project.  [redacted] believes the project was shut down [long redaction]...\"\n\"[redacted] does not recall there being a cease and desist order, however the project died on its own when the word came down that there would be no dried biological agents used.  [redacted] admitted that [long redaction] due to the applicability and relevance that this project had with actual threat dynamics.\"\n\n\n75 USAMRIID#1 PDFpg 25: Interview USAMRIID employee 15Feb2005:\n\n\"[redacted] concerns about the dried Bg work were not necessarily ethical concerns. [long redaction] The International Convention says that as long as the work is on pathogenesis or vaccine efficacy, the work is not considered offensive in nature\" USAMRIID#21 PDFpg 15: 31Jan2007 interview USAMRIID employee:\n\"[redaction] a project aimed at evaluating the feasibility of conducting a dry aerosol Bacillus anthracis (Ba) vaccine challenge was initiated.  The purpose of the study was to determine the breakthrough point for the recombinant protective antigen (rPA) Ba vaccine, in other words, what concentration of Ba spores would cause the vaccine to fail. Using the wet aerosol systems in place at the time, a high enough concentration of Ba spores could not be achieved.  However, generation of a dry aerosol of Ba spores was expected to provide a sufficient concentration of spores thus achieving this breakthrough point.  Additionally, a dry aerosol more closely resembles the type of Ba exposure a soldier on the battle field [sic: FBI spelling error] would likely encounter.  For these reasons, [redacted] felt that to demonstrate the true efficacy of the vaccine, they needed to evaluate it against this more applicable threat.\n\n\"[redacted] indicated that the dried aerosol project never got off the ground.\nSome equipment was purchased and only preliminary experiments were performed using inert dusts or avirulent simulants.  The project was ended because [very long redaction] and as a result, the dry aerosol work didn't need to be completed.  Discussions about possible sources for dried Ba took place.  Specifically, discussion as to whether spores would be produced at USAMRIID or obtained externally through DUGWAY PROVING GROUNDS ensued.  [redacted] recalled no discussion with other departments at USAMRIID about producing dried Ba. [long redaction].\"\n\"[long redaction] was good at \"playing with equipment\" and was interested in\n\ntrying to develop the capability to generate dry aerosols at USAMRIID. [remaining\nparagraph redacted].\"\n\n       \"[redacted] dried Bacillus globigii (Bg) from Dugway Proving Ground and\n\nindicated that [long redaction] indicated that some preliminary work may have been done with the Bg from Dugway.\"\n76 BEI#2 PDFpg 5: Ivins Interview 31Mar2005.\n\n\n77 BEI#7, PDFpg 132-133: 18Aug2008 Telephone interview with CDC employee re Ivins: Had been contacted previously 27Mar2008 but wanted to add info:\n\"[redacted] went on to discuss the several methods of drying that were possibly used by IVNS to dry the spores.  [redacted] suggested acetone drying as a possibility. Acetone drying was a common practice at Dugway Proving Ground (DPG).  IVINS, having worked closely with researchers at DPG, would have had knowledge of this practice.\""
    },
    {
        "text": "## La-Ur-12-24104 Approved For Public Release; Distribution Is Unlimited.\n\nTitle:\nStrengthened IAEA Safeguards-Imagery Analysis: Geospatial Tools for Nonproliferation Analysis\nAuthor(s):\nPabian, Frank V\n\nIntended for:\nNuclear Nonproliferation Safeguards and Security in the 21st Century, 2012-06-11/2012-06-29 (Brookhaven, New York, United States)\n\nStrengthened IAEA Safeguards  Imagery Analysis Frank Pabian Los Alamos National Laboratory\n\nAbstract\n\nThis slide presentation focuses on the growing role and importance of imagery analysis for IAEA\nsafeguards applications and how commercial satellite imagery, together with the newly available geospatial tools, can be used to promote \"all-source synergy.\"  As additional sources of openly available information, satellite imagery in conjunction with the geospatial tools can be used to significantly augment and enhance existing information gathering techniques, procedures, and analyses in the remote detection and assessment of nonproliferation relevant activities, facilities, and programs.  Foremost of the geospatial tools are the \"Digital Virtual Globes\" (i.e., GoogleEarth, Virtual Earth, etc.) that are far better than previously used simple 2-D plan-view line drawings for visualization of known and suspected facilities of interest which can be critical to:\n\n1) Site familiarization and true geospatial context awareness\n2) Pre-inspection planning 3) Onsite orientation and navigation 4) Post-inspection reporting 5) Site monitoring over time for changes 6) Verification of states' site declarations and for input to State Evaluation reports\n7) A common basis for discussions among all interested parties (Member States)\n\nAdditionally, as an \"open-source\", such virtual globes can also provide a new, essentially free, means to conduct broad area search **for undeclared nuclear sites and activities**...either alleged through open source leads; identified on internet BLOGS and WIKI Layers, with input from a \"free\" cadre of global browsers and/or by knowledgeable local citizens (a.k.a.: \"crowdsourcing\"), that can include ground photos and maps; or by other initiatives based on existing information and in-house country knowledge. They also provide a means to acquire ground photography taken by locals, hobbyists, and tourists of the surrounding locales that can be useful in identifying and discriminating between relevant and non-relevant facilities and their associated infrastructure.  The digital globes also provide highly accurate terrain mapping for better geospatial context and allow detailed 3-D perspectives of all sites or areas of interest.  3-D modeling software (i.e., Google's SketchUp6 newly available in 2007) when used in conjunction with these digital globes can significantly enhance individual building characterization and visualization (including interiors), allowing for better assessments including walk-arounds or flyarounds...and perhaps better decision making on multiple levels (e.g., the best placement for International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) video monitoring cameras).\n\n\nStrengthened IAEA Safeguards - Imagery Analysis Strengthened IAEA Safeguards - Imagery Analysis\n\n  Geospatial Tools for\nNonproliferation Analysis\n    p\n                     y\n\nFrank V. Pabian\n\n## Satellite Imagery Analysis\n\nSatellite Imagery Analysis A Growing Role in State Infrastructure Analysis in the IAEA Safeguards Division A Growing Role in State Infrastructure Analysis in the IAEA Safeguards Division LA-UR 09-03681\n19 June 2009\nhttp://ungiwg.ctbto.org/meetings/12th-ungiwg-plenary-meeting-0#tabs3\n\n## What Is Imagery Analysis? How Can It Help To Strengthen Iaea Safeguards?\n\n Imagery Analysis: Image analysis is the extraction of  meaningful\ninformation from images, which, for this review, is primarily commercial satellite imagery.   Imagery analysis is another means of assessing raw data that can be combined with other safeguards pertinent data, in a manner sometimes referred to\nas \"Data Fusion,\" that can often have significant synergistic results.\n\nFor IAEA Safeguards purposes, this means deriving: New, \"value-added,\" information from the raw un-annotated imagery, and then adding that  information to the overall existing body of knowledge with respect to a particular nuclear activity, facility, or program.\n\nImagery analysis provides answers not only to the questions of What? and Where?, but even more importantly\nWhy? How ? and What is the significance?\nbut even more importantly... Why?, How ?, and What is the significance?\n\nThis briefing will show  how the IAEA now routinely relies on imagery analysis for safeguards monitoring purposes with both Iran and Syria as examples, particularly as it applies to identifying \"Undeclared facilities and activities\".\n\nFinally, new \"Geospatial Tools\" have become available that can further facilitate the process of imagery analysis for Safeguards purposes.\n\n## Imagery Analysis: It's A Process\n\n\nImagery doesn't come with labels...it is just \"a pile of pixels\" that requires\nhuman interpretation to add meaning\n\nAmong the features of an image that lead to identification and aid in interpretation include:\n\nSize:  the true and relative scale of the objects in the image\n\nShape: the physical appearance (\"manmade\" is often angular vice \"natural\" amorphous)\n\nShape: the physical appearance ( manmade  is often angular, vice natural  amorphous)\n\nShadows:  silhouettes provide insights\n\nShade : brightness and contrast variations of one object compared to another\n\nSurroundings:  the textual and cultural context ...What is the Setting?\n\nSignatures: the *generally* consistent common functional characteristics (particularly when\nassociated with the nuclear fuel cycle)\n\nTime: Temporal changes  including construction history, activity levels, operations, etc.\n\n\"Convergence of Evidence\": If it looks like a duck....\n\nBeware of \"Signature Suppression\": Deception is a constant threat\n\nLearn to think in           even when only working with 2-D imagery\n\nEnlist collateral information:  All other available sources should be tapped,\nincluding \"the new Geospatial Tools\"  and always seek \"Peer Review\"\n\nKnow the nuclear fuel cycle inside and out (materials, processes, equipment, infrastructure)\n\nKnow your limitations: Use caveats to convey your confidence level\n\nTry a Quiz?  Go to: http://www.defence.gov.au/DIGO/Imagery_Analysis/imageryQuizT3.htm\n\n## Imagery Analysis: Shadows & Setting Exemplar Imagery Analysis: Shadows & Setting Exemplar\n\nWhat is this?\n\n(Without shadows, fairly easy)\n\n## Geospatial Tools: What Do We Mean?\n\n \"Virtual Globes\" See: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Virtual_globe\nProvide the means to virtual fly to any place on earth and gather information in a 3-D geospatial context and provide a platform for additional overlays\n BLOGs and WIKIs can provide critical tip-off, background, & locational info  Social Networks (Panoramio Flickr & Twitter for \"geotagged\" ground imagery)\n Social Networks (Panoramio, Flickr, & Twitter for geotagged  ground imagery)\n\n Geospatial Meta-search Engines/Viewers\n\n\"GeoHack\" (http://toolserver.org/~geohack/)\n\n\"GAIAGI\" (http://www.gaiagi.com/)\n Commercial Satellite Imagery  Media, Academia, & NGOs (locational information, ground photos, graphics, etc.)\nU N C L A S S I F I E D U N C L A S S I F I E D\nOperated by Los Alamos National Security, LLC for NNSA Operated by Los Alamos National Security, LLC for NNSA\nYou can access much of it on a Smart Phone!\n\nWhat is this?\n\n(Without shadows, fairly difficult)\n\n\"Basir\"?\n\"Basir\"?\n 2011\n 2011\n (Iran)\n (Iran)\n\n## Additional Thoughts On Imagery Analysis For Safeguards\n\n Imagery Analysis, employing the new\ngeospatial tools, should be viewed as just another form of  \"Open  Source Analysis\" to help strengthen IAEA Safeguards\nto help strengthen IAEA Safeguards Source: http://www.nro.gov/corona/cor-ab.html http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Corona_pentagon.jpg\n\n## Satellite Imagery For All: A New Era Of Global Transparency!\n\n\"Perhaps this is also a good moment to step back in awe at what modern technology has wrought the ability for any sufficiently concerned citizen or organization to scrutinize any desired spot on Earth within hours of making the request, and then being able to publish the result to a context-rich virtual globe that is universally available. That's a profound shift in favor of accountability, transparency and democracy. **Monitoring the planet has been crowdsourced**.\"\nStefan Geens of Ogle Earth\n\"*Clearly it has an effect on the way diplomacy will be carried out in the future*\", Einar Bjorgo (UNOSAT).\n\nApplications Include:\n- Emergency Response - Disaster Management /Humanitarian Assistance - Risk Prevention\n- Peace-keeping - Environmental Monitoring & Rehabilitation - Post Conflict Reconstruction - Social and Economic/Resource Development\n- Treaty Verification and Monitoring\nhttp://www.unspecial.org/UNS621/UNS_621_T32.html Sources: http://www.ogleearth.com/2009/09/qum_nuclear_sit.html#comments\n8. Iran's refusal to grant the Agency access to IR-40 could adversely impact the Agency's ability to carry out effective safeguards at that facility, and has made it difficult for the Agency to report further on the construction of the reactor, as requested by the Security Council. The completion of the containment str ct re o er the reactor b ilding and the roofing for the other b ildings on containment structure over the reactor building, and the roofing for the other buildings on the site, makes it impossible to assess further progress on construction inside the buildings without access to the facility. However, satellite imagery suggests that construction is continuing at the reactor site.EROS\nEROS--1B satellite imagery\n1B satellite imagery EROS EROS--1B satellite imagery\n1B satellite imagery\n\nImagery Type\nAdvantages\nOptical/Electro-Optical:\nthe visual spectrum in Panchromatic (B&W) and non-visual near-infrared bands\nVery high resolution possible. Near-infrared is optimal because it can penetrate haze and can be merged with true color for more natural appearance as an aid to interpretation.\nMulti-spectral:\n(Incl Hyper-spectral)*\nProvide the means to view sites in a more natural true color setting\nMay also\n(Incl. Hyper spectral) Includes both visual bands and non-visual bands\nnatural, true color setting.  May also\nprovide a means for determining material/chemical composition and material transfer, and for detecting camouflage and concealment activities\n| Thermal infrared                            |\n|---------------------------------------------|\n| Provides a quantifiable measure of heat     |\n| transfer as a basis for determining site    |\n| status such as reactor power operations.    |\n| When correlated with optical could          |\n| determine heat flow, both qualitatively and |\n| quantitatively, from waste ponds, steam     |\n| lines, vents, stacks, cooling towers, etc.  |\nRadar:\nProvides 24-hour monitoring capability, can Processing and interpretation of imagery is much\npenetrate clouds, and  is a useful complement to optical imagery.** Resolution  improved greatly in 2007 with successful launch of the 1-meter capable German built *TerraSAR-X* .\n\n* Irmgard Niemeyer, Satellite Imagery Analysis for Safeguards and Non-Proliferation, *Strengthening detection capability for safeguards*, Institute of Nuclear Materials Management (INMM), Changing The Safeguards Culture: Broader Perspectives And Challenges, Santa Fe, New Mexico, USA, October 30 - November 2, 2005 http://www.inmm.org/topics/contents/wgreport.htm#2; Christopher L. Stork, Heidi A. Smartt, Dianna S. Blair, and Jody L. Smith, \"Systematic Evaluation of Satellite Remote Sensing for Identifying Uranium Mines and Mills,\" Sandia National Laboratories, January 2006 http://www.prod.sandia.gov/cgi-bin/techlib/access-control.pl/2005/057791.pdf; and Q. S. Bob Truong, \"Road Map B&W and Colour Imagery,\"\n\n## Minimum Overhead Imagery Resolution (In Meters) Necessary For Analysis Of Nuclear Fuel Cycle Related Facilities\n\nDetection: Identify the location of a facility of activity of FMCT/NPT interest (locate and define outline of nuclear related facility in light of  other descriptive or geographically specific information) (Note: It can often be possible to detect and identify characteristic features, such as security fencing or power lines, despite the fact that any given section of such fencing may be of sub-pixel size, or below the given resolution of the image, because they are generally linear and span many pixels.)\nGeneral ID: Determination of general facility or activity type (Discriminate between research lab, mfg. facility, explosives prod, storage site) Precise Building ID: Precise determination of building function (i.e., reactor type/size, propellant mixing/casting, machine shop, administration)\nResolution and Availability\n5,5 1,5\nApproved for Public Release 09-114\nhttps://www1.nga.mil/About/WorkingWithUs/CooperativeAgreements/Documents/TOPS%2017%20Feb%20industry%20Day%20final%20Briefed%20Public.ppt VIEW  SLIDE MASTER TO ENTER CLASSIFICATION\nTerrasar-X\n\n## Commercial Satellite Imagery Is Becoming Ubiquitous\n\nU N C L A S S I F I E D U N C L A S S I F I E D\nOperated by Los Alamos National Security, LLC for NNSA Operated by Los Alamos National Security, LLC for NNSA\nKnow the cultural setting you are dealing with in order to separate wheat from chaff\n\n## Mistakes Do Happen\n\nhttp://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/library/news/iraq/2001/stirevnws01015.htm\n\n## Us Intelligence Imagery Analysis Of Nuclear Facilities Cold War Style\n\nSource: http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB186/doc01.pdf\n\n \"Exceptionally\"\n high resolution\n Gambit photos\nacquired in stereo\nmade it possible to\n\ni\n    3\n\n  build 3-D scale\nmodels to aid in the\nanalysis of key sites\n  \"STEREO  PAIRS  AVAILABLE\n IN  ALL  ROLL  POSITIONS  UP  TO\nMAXIMUM  ROLL  CAPACITY  OF  44.45\"\n\nPhotoanalyst using Stereo-microscope Photoanalyst using Stereo-microscope Sources: http://www.nro.gov/foia/declass/GAMHEX/Videos/1.mov And http://www.nro.gov/foia/declass/GAMHEX/GAMBIT/17.PDF\nFrom Photo to 3-D Model The best that the IAEA previously had for site visualization\n(circa mid-1990s)\nSource: http://www.iraqwatch.org/un/IAEA/s-1995-1003-a.jpg What has been available to the IAEA since late 1999\nTypical annotated near-nadir view Source: http://www.isis-online.org/images/iran/dg_jan2_2006_ann.jpg Typical plan-view line drawing used during IAEA\nsite i ti inspections in Iraq\n\n NOTE: U-2 and helicopter imagery\nwere also used in Iraq, but that was an\n exception not currently applicable to\n          IAEA Safeguards\n\n    \"2 D\"\n    \"2-D\"\n commercial\nsatellite images\n\n## 3--D Visualizations Can Support The Iaea D Visualizations Can Support The Iaea Inspection And Assessment Process Inspection And Assessment Process\n\nTraining Center Disputed Chinese/\nIndian Border\n\n## Googleearth Uncovers Concealment And Deception In Sweden Sweden's Spy Hq's Uncovered\n\nnot satellite\n\n## More Assessment Tools: \"Wikimapia\" Layer Exemplar\n\n   Another optional\n  Google Earth layer\n(most input is by locals,\nmost in native language\n\nmost in native language,\nbut only spotty vetting)\n\n## \"Panoramio\" And \"Flickr\"\" Layer Exemplars\n\nMoscow Engineering Physics Institute More optional Google Earth layers More optional Google Earth layers\n(Ground photos and maps)\n\nWEB LINKS FOR LAYERS:\nKML photos (Flickr)\nhttp://kmlphotos.metaltoad.com/kml_link.php?kmlphotos=85550f1\nbb7476ac3b0341b81b7e9d3df5ffdeee2\n\nPanoramio\nhttp://www.panoramio.com/panoramio.kml\nAnd\nhttp://www.panoramio.com/panoramio.kml?al\n\n\"SS-25 TELs and open single-bay garages, likely for START treaty verification purposes.\"\nSource: http://geimint.blogspot.com/2009/03/site-news.html More \"Crowd-Sourcing\" or using \"People as Ubiquitous Sensors\"\n\n## Georgetown University Makes Headlines\n\nStudents locate and describe nucleartipped ballistic missile forces and their concealment their concealment underground in China BLOGS & WIKIs with Google Earth provide synergistic results Other Links to check:\nAnd You Never Know What You May Find?\n\nDetected Next to the US Nevada Test Site & Area 51 ?...\n\nIt Could Be Just Art!\n\nGigantic Sculpture Created over 36 years!\n\nwhy not make one that competes with a 747, or the Empire State Building, or the Golden Gate Source: http://doublenegative.tarasen.net/city.html A Double-Edged Sword!\n\nSuch Tools Can Be Used by Anyone:\nAdversaries Can Use for Nefarious Purposes!\n\nhttp://www.cnn.com/2009/TECH/06/05/aerial.images.security/index.html#cnnSTCVideo A Local Law Enforcement Exemplar!\n\nhttp://www.gearthblog.com/blog/archives/2009/01/marijuana_field_found.html\n\nRight Fielder\n                                        With these new\n                                          commercial\n                                       satellite systems\n\nyou can y potentially identify individual people\n5?\n\nTunnel # 4\nLooking at a Syrian Nuclear Site with Open Sources Looking at a Syrian Nuclear Site with Open Sources\n\n## Bloggers Discuss Magnox Reactors\n\nSources: http://dni.gov/interviews/20080424_interview.pdf and http://www.armscontrolwonk.com/\nBoard of Governors GOV/2009/36\n\n## Implementation Of The Npt Safeguards Agreement In The Syrian Arab Republic Report By The Director General Paragraph 18.   Summary\n\n1)\nThe presence of the uranium particles at the Dair Alzour\n(aka Al Kibar) site, the imagery of the site available to the Agency and certain procurement activities remain to be clarified.\n\n2) The information provided by Syria to date does not adequately 2) The information provided by Syria to date does not adequately support its assertions about the nature of the site. 3) In order for the Agency to complete its assessment, Syria needs to be more cooperative and transparent.\n\n## Beware Of Imagery Data Manipulation (Aka:  \"Fauxtography\") As It Can Lead To Erroneous Conclusions!\n\nDate: 5 June 2009\n\nUsing the New Google Earth to Locate\nUsing the New Google Earth to Locate\n         a Newly Revealed\n         a Newly Revealed\n\nUnderground Plutonium Production Complex in China\n\"150-meter chimney\" ventilation stack Sandbag barricade Project 816 \"Reactor Hall with Nuclear Reaction Cauldron\"\nSource: http://www.china.org.cn/china/2010-05/24/content_20106476.htm Video Capture of Interior Layout \"Panorama\" Video Capture of Interior Layout \"Panorama\" Overlain on Google Earth Overlain on Google Earth\n(Not to be construed as definitive) (Not to be construed as definitive)\n\"150-meter chimney\"\nArea marked in yellow reported as\n\"open to the public\"\nVehicle Vehicle Entrance Entrance Geospatial \"Crowdsourcing\" North Korea http://gizmodo.com/5277184/north http://gizmodo.com/5277184/north--korea korea--secrets secrets--uncovered uncovered--in in--google google--earth earth--by by-amateur amateur--spies spies http://online.wsj.com/article/SB124295017403345489.html#project%3DNKGOOGLE0509%26articleTabs%3Dinteractive http://www.nkeconwatch.com/north-korea-uncovered-google-earth/\nExperimental Light Water Reactor Newly roofed Turbine Generator Hall Reactor containment structure LWR Reactor Dome Experimental Light Water Reactor Reactor containment structure Port for maintenance and replacement of equipment LWR Reactor Dome Newly roofed Turbine Generator Hall Exemplar Port for maintenance and replacement of equipment Reactor (shut down)\nGround photo showing complete context DPRK DPRK\nInteriors as reported by onsite observers Showing layout of control room Cascade Hall, Yongbyon NRC, DPRK\n(Just a place holder...items placed in Recovery Room are not meant to be realistic)\nDPRK\nWest Observation Window Initially, single exterior photo used to locate reported site of DPRK Strategic Rocket Forces Headquarters on Google Earth Earth http://www kcna kp/kcnadata/kor/photo/2012/3/311339 1 jpg Reported Strategic Rocket Forces HQ's Identified from photo\n(Located between Kangdong and So'ngch'o'n Counties)\nUnderground Entrance Mosaic composite of two images compared with Google Earth imagery Second Economic Committee Executive Offices now reportedly include Strategic Rocket Forces Headquarters Monument Big Evergreen Tree Tree Tree Bridge & Dam across river ( a tributary of the\n\nKim Jong Un being shown an historical\nsatellite image of the site from ~2005\n(Google Earth?)\non a large flat screen monitor!\n\nNearly Identical satellite Images Nearly Identical satellite Images\n\n## Final Ctbto Estimate Of The Location Of The Dprk Tests\n\nhttp://www.ctbto.org/press-centre/highlights/2009/homing-in-on-the-event/\nSupport Area Small buildings/trailers East Tunnel Portal must be near upper end of tailings spoil pile Small buildings/trailers\n2011 est.)\nDigital Globe Digital Globe tunnel\n~.5 Km tunnel\n~220 meters DoB\nFuture event?\n\nDerived Epicenters of North Korean Nuclear Tests from 2006 and 2009\n2009 event Pabian/Hecker est.\n\n(using Murphy, et al., relative location plot)\n~one to 1 1 Km tunnel one to 1.1 Km tunnel\n2009 event Pabian/Hecker est.\n\n(using Murphy, et al., relative location plot)\n2006 event Pabian/Hecker est.\n\n(using Murphy, et al., relative location plot)\n(Physically impossible, given that the relative location plot would place the 2009 event across the valley from the west portal)\n2006 event Pabian/Hecker est.\n\n(using Murphy, et al., relative location plot)\n~one to 1.1 Km tunnel ~one to 1.1 Km tunnel Derived Epicenters Relative to Predicted Future Event Location Using Google Earth\n~2.3  Kilometers\n2009 Event\n(Pabian/Hecker est.)\n~2.4  Kilometers West Portal Area South Portal Area Estimated Nuclear Yield based on Depth of Burial as Derived from Google Earth Topographic Elevation Data\n2006 Event\n(Pabian/\nHecker est.)\nEast Portal Area\n(under this mountain)\n\nTailings spoil pile\nTailings spoil pile\nTailings spoil pile\nTailings spoil pile\n\nMining carts train on a tailings spoil pile at a mine Vehicle Tracks on Tailings spoil pile rails Engine Mining carts train?\n\nSmall buildings/ trailers Tunnel Portal Nuclear device container on rails Mucking machine Mine carts Engine Flat car South Tunnel Portal Drainage ditch Mining carts train on a tailings spoil pile at a mine Unidentified object Vehicle Tracks on Tailings spoil pile rails Engine Mining carts train?\n\nTunnel Portal Nuclear device container on rails Mucking machine Mine carts Engine Flat car New Small building New Small building New Small building\n(since 18 April 2012)\nbuilding South Tunnel Portal Drainage ditch Small buildings Inside the Nuclear Test Tunnel, Ras Koh Nuclear Test Site, Pakistan Nuclear Test Tunnel, Ras Koh Nuclear Test Site, Five tests reportedly occurred simultaneously Tunnel Portal\n19 June 1998\nFresh Rockslides Support Camp\n19 June 1998\nInstrumentation/Fire control cabling\n19 June 1998\n(Note: This is not an accurate portrayal of the West Portal Area, as no buildings are shown nearby in the opening sequence)\nCabling Rail line Third Blast/debris Trap Door 5 Door 5\nDoor 8\nDoor 9\nDoor 7\nWest Portal & Door 10?\n\nSecond Blast/debris Trap Google Earth is a Growing Part of Global Pop-Culture https://plus.google.com/100156589101321820776/posts/NfaRHQgsmVP\nNuclear Test Device Emplacement Point Door 6\nFirst Blast/debr is Trap Door 4\nDoor 1\nDoor 2\nDoor 3\n\"Fauxtography\" is a potential problem:\nBut MUCH less so for satellite imagery than with ground imagery as there are: multiple satellites- from multiple vendors- and from multiple nations http://thelede.blogs.nytimes.com/2008/07/10/in-an-iranian-image-a-missile-too-many/\nOriginal Ground Image: Un-\"Photoshopped\"\nhttp://thelede.blogs.nytimes.com/2008/07/10/in-an-iranian-image-a-missile-too-many/\nJuly 2008 Iranian missile launch was \"Photoshopped\"\nhttp://thelede.blogs.nytimes.com/2008/07/10/in-an-iranian-image-a-missile-too-many/\nWhy Stop at Just Four?\n\nhttp://www.armscontrolwonk.com/1955/missile-palooza\n\n## Students Making A Difference With Ge Students Making A Difference With Ge\n\nwww.intelligenceonline Using the New Geospatial Tools: Putting All the Pieces Together Using the New Geospatial Tools: Putting All the Pieces Together Using the New Geospatial Tools: Putting All the Pieces Together Using the New Geospatial Tools: Putting All the Pieces Together Wikis Commercial Satellite I Imagery Open Source \"*Crowdsourcing*\" + Geospatial Tools = Global Transparency\n* Exemplars are NOT meant to be viewed as exhaustive * Exemplars are NOT meant to be viewed as exhaustive Blogs\n\n## Conclusions: Google Earth Is A Critical Tool For Monitoring & Verification\n\n You No Longer Have To Be a Super Power!\n Google Earth is a Great Starting Point for Any Assessments  Ideal Global Visualization Tool  Broad Area Search Tool  Historical Imagery Archive\n **Virtual Global Transparency**:\nFree \"Open Source\" \"Crowdsourcing\" cadre\n(>1.1 Billion downloads!)\n Ground-Based Imagery Layers:  Panoramio, Street View\n\n## Questions??\n\nhttp://blog.wired.com/defense/2008/07/attack-of-the-p.html"
    },
    {
        "text": "# The Department Of Defense Dna Registry And The U.S. Government Accounting Mission\n\nBrion C. Smith\n\n## Strategic Plan 2005-2010 Principal Goals:\n\n... according to AFDIL\n\n1. Expand and accelerate accounting efforts worldwide.\nOptimize case processing volume, turn-around time, and results integration\n2. Achieve unity of U.S. Government accounting efforts.\nPolicy, command/control and resource planning designed to meet requirement\n\n## 3. Maintain Personnel Recovery Capabilities That Meet Current And Future Joint, Interagency, And Coalition Requirements.\n\nIdentify future requirements, see Goal 2\n\n4. Reinforce confidence in U.S. Government personnel accounting with our national constituency.\nCredentials and visibility\n5. Develop and maintain a skilled, diverse workforce with the tools to succeed.\nCompetitive employer, stable work environment, develop a career track\n6. Leverage technology to enhance personnel accounting and recovery.\nScreen and focus efforts, *research* is not a \"dirty word,\" confidential disclosure agreements\n\n## Dod Dna Registry: History And Organization Mission(S) Facilities People Funding Dpmo Strategic Goals\n\n\" The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs is authorized to establish policies and requirements for the use of DNA analysis to aid in the identification of remains.  The Assistant Secretary may establish a registry to carry out those policies and meet those requirements.  The registry may include a DNA identification laboratory and an appropriate specimen repository.\"\nDonald .J. Atwood, DSD\n16 December 1991\n- 10 USC 176 and 177\n- DoDD 5154.24 and DoDI 5154.30\nIn December 1991, AFDIL sent a team to the U.S Army Central Identification Laboratory-Hawaii (CILHI) to develop a strategy for AFDIL support of CILHI casework. And in 1992, with the establishment of Joint Task Force - Full Accounting (JTF-FA), the CILHI requested through the U.S. Army Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel that AFDIL scale-up operations to increase case output . With approval from ASD (HA), initial funding was made available from the U.S. Army Casualty and Memorial Affairs Operations Center (CMAOC).\n\n## 1994 - Conflicting Mitochondrial Dna Test Results On Cilhi Cases Between Two Laboratories\n\n1.\nDASD (POW/MIA) chaired meeting to clarify potential problems encountered with mtDNA for human remains identification in Department of Defense in March 1994\n2.\nASD (Health Affairs) acknowledged as responsible for QA of mtDNA testing for human remains identification in February 1995\n3.\nWorking Group developed standards for mtDNA testing which were accepted by Defense Science Board in July 1995\n4.\nAs part of the Defense Science Board recommendations a DNA Quality Assurance Sub-Committee of the AFIP Scientific Advisory Board was created in August 1995 to meet annually.\nLTG Kevin Kiley, TSG EA for AFIP\n\n## Brac \"Dis-Establish Afip\" \"Afme To Dover Afb\"\n\nLTG Peach Taylor, TSG EA for AFME?\n\n## Personnel Accounting Armed Forces Medical Examiner\n\nJFAADD\nJoint Federal Agencies Antiterrorism DNA Database Humanitarian Mass Fatality Incidents Forensic Research\n\n## National Security Tedac Tedac Ngic Ngic\n\nArmed Forces Repository of Specimen Samples for the Identification of Remains The Repository now contains over\n4,500,000 cards Inside one of the 200 C freezers at AFRSSIR\n\n## - 1396 Samples In Fy2003 - 2414 Samples In Fy2004 - 2254 Samples In Fy2005* With A 99% Success Afmes Dna Casework Army Hrc Funding And Jpac Samples Joint Federal Agencies Antiterrorism Dna Database Joint Federal Agencies Antiterrorism Dna Database Joint Federal Agencies Antiterrorism Dna Database Jfaadd Jfaadd\n\n- 7,000 detainee samples processed\n- 10,000 inbound from OIF/OEF\n\nGillette Complex\n(AFDIL)\nThe AFRSSIR occupies 11,025 sq ft at the UPS\nBuilding.  This includes hallways, restrooms, and common areas.\n\n## 11,025 Sq Ft (Ups Bldg)\n\nThe AFDIL and DNA Division Administration currently occupies about 33,600 sq ft at the Gillette Building.\n30,000 sq ft (Bldg 101, 2nd Floor) 1,600 sq ft (Bldg 102, 2nd Floor)\n2,000 sq ft (Bldg 101, 1st Floor)\n\n## Ups Building (Afrssir) Dod Dna Registry Dod Dna Registry\n\nRepository AFMES Support Administrative & Logistics Support Facility Scientific Staff Software Development Equipment Facility\n\n## Accreditation\n\nAmerican Society of Crime Laboratory Directors\n(ASCLD - LAB Certification)\nCollege of American Pathologists\n(CAP Basic Laboratory and Molecular Biology)\nDoD DNA Oversight Committee\n(Part of DoD QA Program (DSB 1995) and reports to ASD(HA)\nAFIP Scientific Advisory Board\n\n# Target: National Association Of Medical Examiners\n\nSoftware Development\n\n## Facts:\n\n- The premier forensic DNA laboratory in the world combined with a creative information technology capacity to provide global connectivity and database management\n\n- Providing services to DoD and non-DoD federal agencies in\nsupport of personnel accounting, defense, law enforcement*, humanitarian, national security and intelligence missions - 97% contractor staff with ability expand and contract - All activities in leased facilities\n- The whole is greater than the sum of the parts - fragmentation would leave the nation less prepared for a major event.\n\n## Strategic Plan 2005-2010 Principal Goals: ... According To Afdil 1. Expand And Accelerate Accounting Efforts Worldwide.\n\nIs more sample processing necessary or is a more interactive casework relationship with JPAC required?\n\n## 2. Achieve Unity Of U.S. Government Accounting Efforts.\n\nAFDIL is a highly complex organization already serving multiple agencies and missions through-out the federal government - arguably a model for operational quality, scientific focus, and fiscal efficiency\n\n## 3. Maintain Personnel Recovery Capabilities That Meet Current And Future Joint, Interagency, And Coalition Requirements.\n\nAFDIL already provides services to most other federal agencies that would be involved in the development of a national personnel recovery architecture (NTSB, AFMES, CID, DHS/NTSB/HD, FBI).\n\n## 4. Reinforce Confidence In U.S. Government Personnel Accounting With Our National Constituency.\n\nRenew charter of DoD Oversight Committee without future reliance on AFIP Scientific Advisory Board*, support credentialing efforts at both organization level (ASCLD, NAME) and individual level (ABC).\n\n## 5. Develop And Maintain A Skilled, Diverse Workforce With The Tools To Succeed.\n\nEstablish pay parity with other federal laboratories, evaluate civil service versus contractor staffing models, consider impact of BRAC recommendations\n\n## 6. Leverage Technology To Enhance Personnel Accounting And Recovery.\n\nAFDIL is very successful in leveraging research funding and issues to address personnel accounting issues (NIJ, ARP, FBI, OGAs)."
    },
    {
        "text": "Supplementalto the 304th Ml Bn Periodic Newsletter Sample Overview: alQaida-Like Mobile Discussions & Potential Creative Uses By 304th Ml Bn OSINT Team October 16, 2008\nThis is a draft FOUO product The above examples of Nokia Map Functions are displayed in a Pro Islamic State of lraq (aI Qaida) Discussion thread at http ://www,muslm.nethb/showthread. ohp ? o= I 79747 3 with sofruare description and download instructions. Posting date March 24, 2008.\n\n## Overview\n\nTerrorists and persons sympathetic to terrorism recommend a variety of different mobile to web technologies, software, and Voice over Internet Protocol (VolP)r for their mobile phone use. Some of the tactics are old, some of the tactics are still emerging, and some tactics may emerge from hacker, activist, and criminal non-terrorist use. This paper briefly covers a few examples of terrorist use and potential use of mobile to web and web to mobile technologies and tactics from an open source perspective.\n\nThe paper includes the following five topics: Pro Tenorist Propaganda Mobile lnterfaces, Mobile Phone GPS for Movements, Ops, Targeting, and Exploitation, The Mobile Phone as a Surueillance Tool, Voice Changers for Terroist Phone Calls, a Red Teaming Perspective on the PotentialTerrorist Use of Twifter, and a sample of software that is recommended on one pro terrorist website for mobile phone activities. There are numerous possibilities that are not covered in this paper due to time and research constraints.\n\nFor example, Google Earth, Mobile GPS Mashups2\nand Mobile Phone Number Spoofing techniques are not addressed in this paper but are certainly worth Open Source Intelligence\n(OSINT) consideration and probably deserve a paper (if not a book) unto itself.\n\nPlease note the following caveats to this article. The first limitation is the discussed technologies were not independently verified in a red teaming scenario, so it is unclear whether some of the discussed tactics and methodologies would actually work. For example, extremist suggestions to include integrating a mobile phone camera into a missile warhead seem highly improbable. Second, a majority of the information was extracted from al Qaida-like websites from uncollaborated postings made by terrorists, persons sympathetic to terrorism, or honey pots3. Third, the research used to generate this paper was conducted from open sources only and has not been compared and/or contrasted with information in non-open source (classified)\nvenues. Fourth, each topic is merely an introduction into the subject and deserves further research and contemplation.\n\nFifth, the author is not a linguist, but used rudimentary Arabic language skills and the Google translating toolto extract website context. Finally, the potential for use of certain web to mobile technologies and tactics is dependent upon the mobile service available in different states and regions. For example, terrorists could theoretically use Twitter social networking in the U.S. as an operation tool. However, it is unclear whether that same theoretical use would be available to terrorists in other countries and to what extent.\n\nWhat did become clear from conducting research on this topic is that there are numerous different tactics, tools, and software services that can be used by terrorists to conduct activities that go well beyond the original intent of the mobile phone voice communications and that these burgeoning capabilities are available for OSINT\nexploitation. Further, there may be a possibility to profile a portion of particular cyber\n2 http://sea-eves.com/vb/t33O6.html t Honey Pot is defined as something (example a website) that is set up in order to allure select audience members so that they may be tracked and monitored.\n\nterrorist-like groups and their audiences based on the particular set of software and phones that the group recommends from OSINT exploitation.\n\n## Table Of Contents\n\n| PRO TERRORIST PROPAGANDA CELL PHONE INTERFACES                    |    2 |\n|-------------------------------------------------------------------|------|\n| CELL PHONE GPS FOR MOVEMENTS. OPS. TARGETING & EXPLOITATION 3     |      |\n| MOBTLE PHONE SURVEILLANCE                                         |    4 |\n| VOICE CHANGERS FOR TERRORIST TELEPHONE CALLS?                     |    5 |\n| POTENTIAL FOR TERRORIST USE OF TWITTER: A RED TEAMING PERSPECTM 7 |      |\n| SAMPLE OF OTHER MOBILE PHONE TOPICS & SOFTWARE RECOMMENDATIONS 9  |      |\n\nPro Terrorist Propaganda Cett ptrone Interfaces The mobile phone provides an active outlet for terrorist propaganda. Currently there are thousands of multimedia clips (audio, video, photo, Power Point, text, PDF)that may be up loaded to mobile phones from multiple websites and multimedia bunkers. In addition, mobile phone texting appears to be consistently and possibly increasingly popular among pro terrorist audiences (just as it is with non-terrorist audiences). Some terrorist organizations are further branded by a specific cell phone interface, which makes the actual phone a piece of propaganda.\n\nFollowing are two examples:\nArmy of the Mujahedeen Cell Phone Interface (Advertized cel Phone screen Appearance)\n\n| 293031    | t    | 2    | 3   |\n|-----------|------|------|-----|\n10\n\nThe software for the above interfaces is advertized as being available for download on select extremist websites, such as tamkeen.iraqserve.com.\n\nSource: Arabic Discussion Forum http://llvan.oro/vb/showthread.pho?t=5844\n(From Google Search Result Descriplion: \"Make your love for God, Eid and satisfaction and your obedience and Mwalatk and Zkirk and lslamic Jihad ....\n\nSailing fast and easy navigation system with A-GPS maps and the application of Nokia Maps.\"\nCompare the previous text with a vendo/s write-up \"Sailing fast and easy navigation sysfern with A-GPS and Nokia Maps application maps. Find your destination on foot or in the car with a compass for navigation Sena. Take pictures and video through the use of high-quality 3.2-megapixel camera with flash The advantage Panoramic 240 x 320QVGA See maps, pictures and videos on the screen QVGA stunning 2.4-inch size and the quality of 320 x 240\nBrowse the Internet, send e-mail your uploaded content quickly connect via high-speed 3.5G ''\nof Supplies.\" The following three Graphics were associated with this posting.\n\nOne response to the topic thread was that city images and pictures were not adequate because additional information, such as geocoordinates, was needed for deserts and forests\n(non-urban areas). A\nlater posting in the thread discussed the pros and cons of GPS under the title \"An lntensive Course in the Use of LG PSV GPS\" (Reference screen capture on next page) which briefly covered some of the benefits and detriments of using GPS. The article mentioned the use of geo coordinates for border crossings, item concealment, and for identifying enemy locations. The article also mentioned that GPS would be useful for identifying terrain and natural resources, such as water. In addition, the article mentioned that attained enemy GPS can be usefulfor information exploitation.\n\nCell Phone GPS for Movements, Ops, Targeting &\nExploitation Nokia 6210 Navigatorand other GPS cell phone services could be used by our adversaries for travel plans, surveillance and targeting.\n\nFollowing is an example of one extremist discussion thread surrounding the use of Mobile Phone GPS (there are multiple postings on this issue which could be a paper unto itself.) On May 3, 2008 a discussion topic was posted in the pro terrorist forum al Hebash at www.alhesbah.net\n(now defunct)\non the theoretical use of Nokia GPS for \"Specialist use in Marksmanship, Border Crossings, and in Concealment Mobile Phone Surveillance On September\n6, 2008 an individual using the pseudonym of \"Volcano\"\nprovided a theoretical discussion in the Mujahedeen Army of lraq Enabling lslamic Mobiles forum, www.tamkeen.iraqserve.com, on the use of mobile phones for target surveillance and attacks. Under the category of basic surveillance,\n\"Volcano\"\nrecommended using the phone/video camera for monitoring enemy activities and operations in theater. Of unique interest is that \"Volcano\"\nposed severaltheoretical examples of how to use the mobile phone video and camera options in tandem with conducting attacks. For example,\n\"Volcano\"\nsuggested that one could use the mobile phone for remote surveillance to tag the opportune time of attack. \"Volcano\" also hypothesized whether a mobile phone camera could be integrated into a missile head to film a target as it is being attacked. This recommendation probably would not work but provides insight into adversarial perspectives.\n\n(Reference the screen capture on the following page.)\n\n## Voice Changerc For Terrorist Telephone Calls?\n\nThe nome of God the merciful AVVolce Chanqer Dlamond 6.0.'10\nYou may have seen it in a movie, the villain calling the victim with an altered voice to hide his/her identity. In the movies, that theme is fairly common; the question really is whether our adversaries will consider voice changing technology for use in future operations. The answer could be yes. on September\n9, 2008 Abu Aisha the Moroccan, Technical Superuisor, of the TechnicalAudio Discussion of the Ansar al Jihad forum recommended voice changing software for making VOIP telephone calls. He mentioned that the software would be helpfulfor recommendation was posted most VOIP services including following public media repods Skype and Vonage. This of the Taliban using SKYPE.4 The timing was most likely coincidental and unrelated but the two concepts can complement one another. The Taliban and other like groups suspecting their VOIP\ncommunications are being be monitored could theoretically combine voice changing software with (or without) encryption and caller l.D. spoofing' in order to make basic detection more difficult. This tactic may or may not be effective to elude international intelligence agencies. However, it might be effective for calling in demands, interviews, and/or attack claims to media outlets. Abu Aisha the Moroccan specifically recommended AV Voice Changer Diamond 6.0.10 off a freeware download page. Audio for Fun, http://www.audio4fun.com/voice-over.htm, describes the software package as:\n\"The latest edition in the VOICE CHANGER SOFTWARE series which is dedicated to voice changing and voice manipulating for online and local computer-based programs.\n\nThe software is able to do a wide range of voice changing related tasks for many different purposes, such as voice-over and voice dubbing for audio/video clips, presentations, narrations, voice rnessages, voice mails, E-greeting cards, etc.; mimic the voice of any person, create animalsounds, change voices in songs, etc.\n\nThis Diamond edition also presenfs a fasfer voice morphing algorithm, a professional looking interface, background effects library and numerous ready-to-use nickvoices. The many packages of parody voices will help users fo talk in the voices of many Hollywood stars and other celebrities.\n\nVoice Changer Software Diamond works wellwith many common VolP programs such as Net2Phone, SkypeOut, Vonage, etc., and many lnstant Messenger programs such as Yahoo Messenger with Voice, Skype, Windows Live Messenger, AlM, etc.\n\nKEY FEATURES: Ready-to-use nickvoices, Parody Maker, Frequency Morpher, Audio Stream Recorder, Pitch and Timbre Morpher graph, Equalizers Background Effects.\n\nMAIN BENEFITS:\nVoice Changer Software Diamond is usefulfor users who want to be the Voice Master of Media in cyberspace. They can use it to have fun while chatting using instanf messenge r programs, do voice dubbing and voice-overs for their own video/audio clips, mimic the voice of their favorite ldol, and more.\"\nTerrorists may or may not be using Voice Changing software but it should be of open source interest that on line terrorists and/or terrorist enthusiasts are discussing it.\n\nTwitter is described as \"a free Social Networking and Micro Bloggingo service that lets members keep in touch with people using the web, their phone, or lM (instant messaging).\"'\nTwitter is similar to other social networking sites in that it allows people to create a community of interest and/or group of online friends.\n\nTwitter launched in July 2006 and has become an increasingly popular networking venue over the past two years.o On September\n26, 2008, there were 21,100,000\nGoogle Hits for doing a search on Twitter.com, which was advertised on a multitude of different language web pages, including English, Arabic, Armenian, Simplified Chinese, Croatian, Czech, Indonesian, Korean, Thai, and other languagese.\n\nWhat makes Twitter unique is that the member can send Tweets (messages)\nnear realtime to Twitter cell phone\n6 Search Mobile Computing Online defines Micro Blogging as\n\"Microblogging is the practice of sending brief posts to a personal blog on a microblogging Web site, such as Twitter or Jaiku.\n\nMicroposts can be made public on a Web site and/or distributed to a private group of subscribers. Subscrbers can read microblog posts online or request that updates be delivered in real time to their desktop as an instant message or sent to a mobile device as an SMS text message.\"\nhtto://searchmobilecomoutinq.techtaroet.com/sDef inition/0..sid40\noci1265620.00.htm1\n\"Flying to Bagram, Afghanistan ln 12 hourc. The journey ts about to beginl'\nExample Foft Huachuca Tweefs I Crunch Base, 'Twitter Company Profile,\" 2008, http ://www.cru nchbase. com/com panv/Twitte r e Google Search of Twitter.com, Sept. 27,2OOB\n\"Email I just got: -We are changing all of the PMs taslrs at Ft Huachuca. I hope fhis does not add a lot of extra work on your end.' HAI\"\n\"...is at Ft. Huachuca. ltwas great s*ing him last night passing through Tucson Intemational.\"\ngroups and to their online Twitter social networking page. They can also Mashup their Tweets with a variety of other tools including geo coordinates and Google Maps or other electronic files/artifacts. Members can direct and re-direct audience members to other websites and locations from \"Tweets\" and can engage in rapid-fire group social interaction. For example, the earthquake that occurred in Los Angeles on July 29,2008\nwas reported via a Twitter member approximately four minutes prior to the information being reported by the news and within minutes there were hundreds of Tweets from people experiencing the earthquake first hand.10 Twitter has also become a social activism toolfor socialists, human rights groups, communists, vegetarians, anarchists, religious communities, atheists, political enthusiasts, hacktivists and others to communicate with each other and to send messages to broader audiences.ll Twitter is already used by some members to post and/or support extremist ideologies and perspectives. For example, there are multiple pro and anti Hezbollah Tweets. In addition, extremist and terrorist use of Twitter could evolve over time to reflect tactics that are already evolving in use by hacktivisfs and activists for surveillance. This could theoretically be combined with targeting. Twitter was recently used as a countersurveillance, command and control, and movement tool by activists at the Republican National Convention (RNC). The activists would Tweet each other and their Twitter pages to add information on what was happening with Law Enforcement near realtime.\n\n## Activist Use Of Twitter For Law Enforcement Counter Surveillance And Movement Coordination At The Most Recent Republican National Convention (Rnc)\n\nThe following sample Tweets were collected and posted in a Computer World article\n'Twitter Helps Republican Convention Protestors Organize, Elude Police,\" on September 8, 2008 (htto://www.pcworld.ido.com.au/index.oho/id:7484771):\n\no \"Arrest teams are approaching\nseated protesters on Marion Bridge. Resisters\nare told they'll be met with force.\"\no \"Protestors\nare now fighting back. First reports of violence now\"\no \"Western Ave. Bridge, west of capitol can be safely crossed.\"\no 'City is on lockdown. Go to 14th and Jackson if you need help from tear gas\npepper spray.\" (http://www.linuxworld.com.au/index.php/id:7484771\n)\nThere are multiple red-teaming examples that could be created surrounding potential adversarial use of Twitter. Following are three red team scenarios:\nto Weaver, Matthew, \"Did the Earth Tweet For You,\" UK Guardian Blog, July 30, 2008, http://www.ouardian.co.ul</news/bloq/2008/iul/30/laearthquakehitsrealihltv tt 3o4tn Ml Bn OSINT Team Review of Member Twitter Pages Scenario 1:\nTerrorist operative\n\"A\" uses Twitter with (or without) using a cell phone camera/video function to send back messages, and to receive messages, from the rest of his cell.\n\nOperative\n\"A\" also has a Google Maps Twitter Mash Up of where he is under a code word for other members of his cell (if they need more in-depth directions)\nposted on the WWW that can be viewed from their mobiles. Other members of his cell receive near real time updates (similar to the movement updates that were sent by activists at the RNC) on how, where, and the number of troops that are moving in order to conduct an ambush.\n\nScenario 2:\nTerrorist operative\n\"A\" has a mobile phone for Tweet messaging and for taking images.\n\nOperative\n\"A\" also has a separate mobile phone that is actually an explosive device and/or a suicide vest for remote detonation. Terrorist operative \"8\" has the detonator and a mobile to view \"A's\" Tweets and images. This may allow \"B\" to select the precise moment of remote detonation based on near real time movement and imagery that is being sent by \"A.\"\nScenario 3:\nCyber Terrorist operative\n\"A\" finds U.S. Army Smith's Twitter account. Operative\n\"A\"\njoins Smith's Tweets and begins to elicit information from Smith. This information is then used for a targeting package (targeting in this sense could be for identity theft, hacking, and/or physical.) This scenario is not new and has already been discussed for other social networking sites, such as My Space and/or Face Book.\n\n## Sample Of Other Mobile Phone Topics & Software Recommendations\n\nSample Source: The mobile phone technology forum in www.tamkeen.iraqserve.com\n\nr\nRecommends\nand debates mobile phone brands (Samsung,\nNokia, etc.)\n.\nPropaganda\nmultimedia\ndownloads\nfor the phone (videos,\naudio clips, text files, PDF,\netc.)\n.\nMobile phone tips for surveillance\nactivities\n.\nUses of SMS text messaging\n.\nWindows Live Messenger\nfor the mobile\nr\nFree advanced\nmobile messages\nto your mobile from website Huda 76\n.\nMobile Phone GPS tracking options\no\nHow to upload software updates\n.\nReligious\nupload software,\nsuch as prayer times reminders\n.\nReligious\nand ideological\nbackground\nwall paper\no The Software\npackage-Mobile\nMaster Professional\n7.0.1 Build 2699\n.\nXilisoft 3GP Video Converter\no convert 3GP to avi or mpg, and vice versa, as well as 3gp mpg, mpeg2, mpeg4,\nwmv, mp4, 3gp, mov, rm, dv, yuv, h264 and MP3, WAV, AC3, WMA, m4a, ogg\n.\nEgo Share Software (data recovery)\n.\nHow to maintain\nand crack mobile phone security\ncodes\no How to make mobile software programs\n.\nDiscussions\non how to protect and penetrate Blue Tooth technology\n.\nPDA programs for the mobile phone (Some of the software downloads that were\nadvertized\nare sub-listed below)\no Best TaskMan v2.01\no emTube V1.06\no\nInstFast v0.01\no\nlslamic Organizer v2.00\no Blacklist v2.00\no ActiveFilev 1.25\no AnsweringMachine.vl.l0 o\nrotateMe v2.0.5\no Symbian.Guru.BT.Guard.vl.00.S60v3.SymbianO59.l.Unsigned.Arabic-ArabPDA\no Quick Office Premier Upgrade 4.5.25.0\no Tobias Stoger.S60Ticker.S60v3.SymbianOS9.\n1 .Arabic-ArabPDA\no CorePlayer.v1.1.2\no\nFlashlite v3.0\no Mobiola Media Player v2.1 o AudioNotes.v1.31\no S60SpotOn\nv0.7\no\nPocket.Quran.v0.96b\no Theme DIY v1.2 o\nFreeTones.vl\n.05.S60v3.SymbianOS9.\n1 .Unsigned.Arabic\no SmartGuard\nv2.00\no Total recall (advertized for wire tapping)\no Best Dictaphone\nv1.0\no Opera v8.65 (search engine)\no KavMobile 6.1.8 (Antivirus)"
    },
    {
        "text": "# Initiatives To Counter Fake News In Selected Countries\n\nArgentina - Brazil - Canada - China - Egypt - France Germany - Israel - Japan - Kenya - Malaysia Nicaragua - Russia - Sweden United Kingdom April 2019\nThe Law Library of Congress, Global Legal Research Directorate\n(202) 707-5080 (phone) - (866) 550-0442 (fax) - law@loc.gov - http://www.law.gov\n\n        This report is provided for reference purposes only.\nIt does not constitute legal advice and does not represent the official\nopinion of the United States Government. The information provided\n       reflects research undertaken as of the date of writing.\n                      It has not been updated.\n\n## Contents\n\n\nComparative Summary ........ 1 Argentina ........ 4 Brazil ........ 7 Canada ........ 11 China ........ 18 Egypt ........ 25 France ........ 29 Germany ........ 33 Israel ........ 41 Japan ........ 52 Kenya ........ 57 Malaysia ........ 67 Nicaragua ........ 78 Russia ........ 80\nSweden ........ 87 United Kingdom ........ 100\n\n\n## Comparative Summary\n\nPeter Roudik Director of Legal Research\n\n\nThis report examines the legal approaches of fifteen countries, representing all regions of the world, to the emerging problem of manipulation with \"fake news\" using mass and social media, especially the impact of fake news on ongoing political processes and elections, and the legislative measures undertaken to counteract the dissemination of false information.  Fake news as a phenomenon is not new and has been known since ancient times, but the present-day proliferation of digital and social media platforms, which allow for much broader distribution of information to a global audience, makes the need to counter fake news much more acute.  With the exception of Japan, which appears to be the only country in this study where fake news scandals are limited to newspapers and tweeted messages that have no outside influence, a fact explained by the difficulty of the Japanese language for foreigners, the widespread distribution of false information and its impact on decision making and democratic processes is becoming a challenge worldwide. In 2017, a parliamentary committee in Egypt identified the dissemination of 53,000 false rumors over a period of two months.  In Germany, 59% of survey participants stated that they had encountered fake news, and in some segments of the population this number was up to almost 80%. In Kenya, a country where 90% of the population has access to high-speed internet, 90% of surveyed users said that they received false or inaccurate information regarding the recent elections through social media. The countries included in this study are addressing the fake news problem through one or more of the following four approaches:\n\n-\nIn the absence of legislation that expressly addresses the objectivity of news posted on social media, some of the surveyed countries apply relevant provisions of existing civil, criminal, administrative, and other laws regulating the media, elections, and anti-defamation (Canada, Japan, Nicaragua, Sweden, and the United Kingdom), even though these laws, enacted in the pre-internet era, do not always reflect current technological and telecommunications developments.\n\n-\nOthers are choosing to enact new and more focused legislation that imposes sanctions on social media networks that spread false news, usually imposing fines and ordering the\nremoval of information identified as false (China, Egypt, France, Germany, Israel, Malaysia,\nand Russia). In Malaysia and Egypt these provisions apply extraterritorially.\n-\nAnother option reflected in the country surveys is to engage election authorities and digital\nplatforms to secure a well-informed electorate, either by identifying and blocking fake news,\nproviding fact-checking resources for the general public, or through the mass publication of\n\"real\" news during election season and beyond (Argentina, the UK, China, and Malaysia).\nArgentina, for example, is considering legislation that would create a Commission for the\nVerification of Fake News within the National Election Chamber.  During national election campaigns, the Commission would recognize, label, and prevent the distribution of news\nconsidered \"of doubtful credibility.\" Both the UK and China have programs in place to\nsystematically rebut fake news by publishing reliable information, while Malaysia provides a fact-checking portal.\n\n-\nSome of the countries are also addressing the issue in a more general way by educating citizens about the dangers of fake news (Sweden and Kenya).  Sweden starts at a young age,\nhaving enlisted a famous cartoon character to teach children about the dangers of fake news\nthrough a cartoon strip that illustrates what happens to the bear's super-strength when false rumors are circulated about him. The US Embassy in Kenya launched a media literacy campaign in 2018, initially aimed at the Kenya chapter of the Young African Leaders\nInitiative, with the specific goal of stopping the dissemination of fake news.\n Among the countries surveyed, there is no common position regarding the definition of \"fake news\" and its scope.  The UK government attempts to avoid use of the term altogether, instead using the words \"disinformation\" and \"misinformation.\" Countries with established anti-fake news laws have more elaborate terminology.  Malaysian legislation defines fake news as \"any news, information, data and reports, which is or are wholly or partly false, whether in the form of features, visuals or audio recordings or in any other form capable of suggesting words or ideas.\"  Russia passed a law penalizing the publication of fake news in March 2019, defining the term as \"socially-significant false information distributed under the guise of truthful messages if they create a threat of endangering people's lives, health, or property; create possibilities for mass violations of public order or public security; or may hinder the work of transportation and social infrastructure, credit institutions, lines of communications, industry, and energy enterprises.\"\nChina has made it a crime to \"fabricate false information on [a] dangerous situation, epidemic, disaster or alert and disseminate such information via [an] information network or any other media while clearly knowing that it is fabricated, thereby seriously disturbing public order.\" Relying on the 1881 Freedom of the Press Law, France has made it illegal to \"disturb public peace through the publication, dissemination, or reproduction of fake news in bad faith.\"  The bad-faith publication, dissemination, or reproduction of forged or altered items, or items falsely attributed to third parties, is also prohibited. Broad definitions are usually found in the laws of those countries that are rated low in indices related to freedom of speech, and such laws are often viewed by human rights organizations as government attempts to further restrict free speech and stifle opposition.  The new Malaysian government tried unsuccessfully to repeal a 2018 act under which the government is required to \"take measures to remove\" the publication of recognized false information and imprison the publisher for up to six years.  In Canada and Kenya courts have found anti-fake news provisions unconstitutional as a violation of freedom of expression and have thus suspended the implementation of such provisions. Following the events of the US 2016 election campaign, several countries introduced legal mechanisms aimed at protecting the integrity of the democratic process, although depending on country specifics these laws apply to varied actors. In Sweden, the focus was on self-regulation by professional organizations of journalists and other media providers and strengthening ethics rules. This solution followed the European Union's approach where an EU-wide voluntary Code of Practice on Disinformation has been introduced. However, in view of the inadequacy of voluntary measures taken by social media platforms, Germany enacted the Network Enforcement Act in 2017. While this Act does not create new obligations for social media, it imposes heavy fines for noncompliance with existing legislation and creates rules for the investigation and removal of illegal content hosted by networks with a very large number of registered users.  French law also provides for special preventive measures that need to be implemented by operators of large-scale online platforms.  Russian law distinguishes between news published by online media, news aggregators, and individual social network users.  There are specific rules for the removal of information and the liability of authors, publishers, and internet providers depending on the type of the online platform.\nSome countries are also taking steps to prevent foreign influence in their national elections. Interesting examples include an Israeli bill targeting foreign propaganda that, if passed, would allow the head of the Central Election Commission, who serves as a Supreme Court justice, to issue injunctions preventing the receipt of prohibited donations, monetary or otherwise, under current law.  Under French law, a judge may order any measures necessary to stop the online dissemination of misleading information during the three months preceding an election. During the same period, foreign television broadcasts may be suspended if they deliver false information.\nThe governments of several countries included in this report recognize that a substantive response to disinformation could be an effective way to tackle fake news.\nThe British government's position is that it is more important to inform citizens of the facts than to simply rebut false information.  For this purpose, a Rapid Response Unit within the executive branch monitors news and engages with the public online. In China, a government online platform called \"Refuting Rumors\" was launched to broadcast \"real\" news sourced from government agencies and state-owned media.  A similar web portal allowing the public to check the authenticity of news found online has been established in Malaysia.  In addition, Kenya and Sweden have general education campaigns aimed at young people in place to counter the fake news trend, as noted above.\n\nThe individual country surveys that follow analyze current and proposed initiatives to limit the spread of false information undertaken at the national level, each country's challenges associated with these efforts, and efforts undertaken by national governments to secure the validity and accuracy of legal information.\n\n## Argentina\n\nGraciela Rodriguez-Ferrand Senior Foreign Law Specialist SUMMARY\nArgentina is advancing some initiatives against fake news in advance of next year's presidential elections.  Proposed legislation would create a Comison de Verificacion de Noticias Falsas (CVNF) (Commission for the Verification of Fake News) within the Camara Nacional Electoral (CNE). The CVNF would be in charge of the detection,\nrecognition, labeling, and prevention of fake news exposed through digital media broadcasts during national election campaigns. The CNE has already created a National Registry of social media accounts and websites of candidates, political parties, and party leadership, which is intended to enable the detection of false accounts.  The accuracy of legal information is secured through the official publication of the national laws and regulations in an official portal online as well as in print.\nThe widespread manipulation of fake news through social media has become a serious concern in Argentina, particularly in light of next year's presidential elections.1 Of the two basic approaches governments have taken to address this problemregulating and applying sanctions to social media networks spreading fake news, and engagement between election authorities and digital platforms to secure a well-informed electorateArgentina has taken steps toward the second approach.2\nArgentina is considering proposed legislation to create a Comison de Verificacion de Noticias Falsas (CVNF) (Commission for the Verification of Fake News) within the Camara Nacional Electoral (CNE),3 which would be in charge of the detection, recognition, labeling, and prevention of fake news exposed through digital media broadcasts during national election campaigns.4 It would only operate during national election campaigns.5\nAccording to proposed legislation, the CVNF's aim would be to preserve the value of truth in broadcasting by digital media, the protection of freedom of expression, respect for the values and beliefs of news consumers via the internet, and the truthfulness of facts reported through social\n2018&tipo=LEY, *archived at* https://perma.cc/7YZX-AYMA.\n\nnetworks .6  The proposal recognizes the right to internet access as a human right, based on full respect for human dignity, freedom, equality, and diversity in all its expressions.7 Under the measure, all individuals and entities would have the right to create, transmit, and publish digital content via the internet and/or to receive such content without being subject to restraint, interference, or discrimination, except when the content is false information published as real and intentionally causes harm to another.8 The CVNF would operate by reviewing publications to verify the reality of the facts on which they are based, excluding those that are only based on ideological positions or reasoning expressed discursively.9 The CVNF would identify potentially fake news through the following methods:\n\nChecking the actual existence of the facts reported in the news by contrasting them with users' comments\n\n\nExcessive viralization of the news\n\nBy complaint made by persons, openly or anonymously, on the special website created by the CNE for this purpose\n\nOther evidence of false news in the opinion of the CNE10 The proposal provides for fake news verification procedures that would be triggered by a complaint filed with the CVNF.  Verification would encompass the identification of the source of\ninformation, verification of the actual facts on which the story is based, and cross-checking data\non the origin and development of the reported facts, among other measures.11 Once news was identified as false, the CVNF would report it to the CNE, which could take the\nfollowing measures:\n\nOrder internet providers to tag and label the information subject to verification under the\ncaption \"Notice of doubtful credibility\"\n\nRequire internet service providers to reduce the distribution of the labeled news\n\nRegister it on the public website created by the CNE as news of dubious credibility as determined by the Commission\nA secretariat of the CNE Chamber would be tasked with monitoring the entire process on the identification and labeling of false news.  Internet service providers would be required to comply with a CNE order within twelve hours.12 Violations of the law would be subject to a range of sanctions, including warnings, fines, disqualification as a government contractor/provider for up to ten years, loss of benefits or special tax regimes, and suspension for two years of the portal or network that failed to remove false or malicious content after being ordered to do so.13 In addition, the CNE has issued a resolution creating a registry of social media accounts and websites of candidates, political parties, and its leadership.14  The registration requirement is intended to allow the detection of false accounts.15 Under the resolution, the CNE will periodically publish the results of the monitoring of election campaign advertising on social media and websites.16 Registered political parties will be required to submit the audiovisual material that they broadcast on the internet and social media.17 With regard to securing the accuracy of legal information, the government provides free access to comprehensive national and provincial legislation through its portal infoleg.gov.ar, within the Ministry of Justice and Human Rights.18\n\nThe *Boletin Oficial* (Official Gazette) is the official publication of legislation in the country.19 Its content is considered authentic both in its printed and electronic editions.20 Currently, the National Directorate of the Official Registry depends functionally on the Legal and Technical Secretariat of the Presidency of the Nation, which is the entity in charge of publishing the Official Gazette.21\n\nBrazil Eduardo Soares Senior Foreign Law Specialist SUMMARY\nWith no laws regulating fake news, Brazil is making use of existing federal laws to try to mediate the problem.  Attempts were made by a Superior Court to curb the use of fake news during the 2018 general elections. In the meantime, Congress is analyzing several bills of law that have been introduced to criminalize the practice.  Law portals maintained by different branches of the government provide legal information to the population.\n\nI.  Introduction Brazil has yet to enact specific legislation aimed at protecting the objectivity of any type of news regardless of media and so far has no legal definition of \"fake news.\"  Currently, the Penal Code, Electoral Code, and federal law are being used to fight the phenomenon.  Furthermore, for the 2018 general elections, the Superior Electoral Tribunal enacted a resolution that targeted fake news viewed as hate speech in electoral advertising during the electoral campaign.  In an attempt to address the problem, several bills of law dealing with this subject are under discussion in Congress.\n\nII.  Legal Framework A.  Penal Code The Penal Code punishes with detention from six months to two years and a fine the slandering of someone (*calunia*) by falsely imputing to a person a fact defined as a crime.1  The same punishment applies to anyone who propagates or divulges the imputation, knowing it is false.2\nTo defame somebody (*difamacao*) by imputing to that person offensive facts to his or her reputation is punishable with detention from three months to one year and a fine.3  To injure someone (*injuria*) by offending his or her dignity is punishable with detention from one to six months or a fine.4  If the injury involves the use of elements referring to race, color, ethnicity, religion, origin, or the condition of an elderly person or person with disability, the punishment is imprisonment from one to three years and a fine.5\n\n\nB.  Electoral Code The Electoral Code determines that advertising meant to slander, defame, or injure any person or the organs or entities exercising public authority is not to be tolerated.6  The person, organ, or entity who has been slandered, defamed, or injured, without prejudice to and regardless of the competent criminal action, may demand compensation for moral damages in Civil Court.7  The offender and his or her political party may be jointly and severally liable for the offenses.8 Voting, when corrupted by falsehood, fraud, coercion, use of the means referred to in article 237 of the Electoral Code, or use of a process of advertising or obtaining votes  prohibited by law is voidable.9\nArticle 237 determines that the interference of economic power and the abuse of the power of authority, contrary to freedom of the vote, will be curbed and punished.10 Article 323 determines that to publicize through advertising facts known to be untrue in relation to parties or candidates that are capable of exerting an influence on the electorate is punishable with detention of two months to one year, or payment of a fine.11  The penalty is increased if the crime is committed through the press, radio, or television.12 C. Law No. 12,965 of April 23, 2014 Law No. 12, 965 of April 23, 2014, establishes principles, guarantees, rights, and duties for the use of the internet in Brazil and determines the guidelines for action by the Union, states, Federal District, and municipalities in relation to the matter.13  Article 7 of Law 12,965 determines that access to the internet is essential to the exercise of citizenship, and the user is guaranteed, among other things, the following rights:\n\nI - inviolability of intimacy and private life, their protection and compensation for material or moral damage resulting from their violation; II - inviolability and secrecy of the flow of their communications over the internet, except by judicial order, according to the law.14\n\n6 CODIGO ELEITORAL, Lei No. 4.737, de 15 de Julho de 1965, art. 243(IX), http://www.planalto.\n\nIn order to ensure freedom of expression and prevent censorship, providers of internet connections are normally not liable for damages arising from content generated by third parties.15\nHowever,  internet providers may be held liable for damages arising from content generated by third parties if they fail to comply with a specific court order to make infringing content unavailable, acting within the scope and technical limits of its service and within the deadline indicated, except where there are legal provisions to the contrary.16  The court order must contain, under penalty of nullity, a clear and specific identification of the content deemed to be infringing, allowing the unambiguous identification of the material.17 D.  Resolution TSE No. 23,551 of December 18, 2017 On December 18, 2017, the Superior Electoral Tribunal (Tribunal Superior Eleitoral, TSE) issued Resolution No. 23,551, which provides for electoral advertising, illicit campaign practices, and free election time.18  In regard to fake news viewed as hate speech, article 17(I) determines that advertising that conveys prejudices based on origin, race, sex, color, age, and any other forms of discrimination will not be tolerated.  The offender must respond for the use of prohibited advertising and, if applicable, for abuse of power.19\n\nIII.  Law Portals The Presidency of the Republic of Brazil maintains a national law portal,20 which provides access to federal laws and state constitutions.  The national press21 has a website that provides access to the federal official gazette (*Diario Oficial da Uniao*). The Federal Supreme Court (Supremo Tribunal Federal, STF) maintains a portal that makes available the electronic judicial gazette (*Diario da Justica Eletronico*), which is an instrument of official communication, publication, and dissemination of judicial acts of the STF.22 Official gazettes for the states are maintained by the respective state governments and provide access to state laws and regulations.\n\n\nIV.  Bills of Law Both the Chamber of Deputies (Camara dos Deputados) and the Federal Senate are currently analyzing proposals criminalizing the dissemination or sharing of false or incomplete information on the internet. A.  Chamber of Deputies In the Chamber of Deputies, several proposals have been attached to Bill of Law 6,812,23 which, in summary, would\n\naddress the criminalization of the dissemination or sharing of false or incomplete information on the internet,\n\n\nhold social networks liable when untrue materials are posted on the internet and the content is not\nremoved within twenty-four hours,\n\nforce social network websites to provide filters and tools to prevent the dissemination of harmful\ninformation, and\n\nhold providers of content and providers of internet services liable for damages caused by the dissemination of fake news on the internet.24 B.  Federal Senate In the Federal Senate, Bill of Law No. 473 of 2017 punishes with detention from six months to two years and a fine those who disclose false information that may distort, alter, or corrupt the truth about information related to health, public safety, the national economy, the electoral process, or relevant matters of public interest.25\n\n## Canada\n\nTariq Ahmad Foreign Law Specialist SUMMARY\nCurrently, there does not appear to be any law in Canada that prohibits the dissemination of incorrect information unless that information is defamatory, covered by libel laws, or within the ambit of Canada's broadcasting regulations. Section 181 of Canada's Criminal Code prohibits the spreading of false news, but that provision was declared unconstitutional in 1992 by the Supreme Court of Canada. No information was found specifically on fake legal news. The government provides a variety of official online sources of legal information that are publicly accessible, however.\n\nI.  Background Canadian lawmakers have been grappling with the issue of fake news and considering policy options in the aftermath of the 2017 mosque shooting in Quebec City. According to one news report, \"[f]alse information about the suspects in [that shooting] circulating on the internet has raised new questions about how to fight the explosion of 'fake news.' \"1 A national survey conducted by Nanos Research for the organization Canadian Journalists for Free Expression (CJFE) found that \"[m]ore than eight in ten Canadians agree or somewhat agree that search engines like Google should be forced to remove search results related to a person's name when they are inaccurate, incomplete, or outdated and that fake news is making it more difficult to find accurate sources of information. More than seven in ten Canadians agree or somewhat agree that government regulation is needed to prevent the proliferation of fake news.\"2 Canadian MPs and the federal Privacy Commissioner have shown great concern over the role of Facebook and the dissemination of fake news, as reflected in this excerpt from an article in The Guardian:\n\n\"What we want to hear from Mark Zuckerberg directly, is his response to the data breaches in Canada . . . and also the response to how they're going to handle fake news in the future,\" Bob Zimmer, chair of parliament's access to information, privacy and ethics committee, told reporters. He said the government is \"deeply concerned\" about the effect Facebook has on democracy and the extensive control it has over data and advertising. In September, the privacy commissioner said it would investigate Facebook over the harvesting of user data. \"The digital world, and social media in particular, have become\n\nentrenched in our daily lives and people want their rights to be respected,\" the commissioner, Daniel Therrien, said in a statement.3 On February 9, 2018, Prime Minister Trudeau warned Facebook that it needed to fix its \"fake news\" issues or face stricter federal regulations.4\n\nII.  National Approach to Countering Fake News\n\nA.  Policy Framework In February 2018 *Global News* reported that\n\n\"[t]he federal government doesn't believe it can do much on its own to stem the growing tide of fake news in Canada, according to briefing notes prepared for Canadian Heritage Minister Melanie Joly. The documents, obtained by The Canadian Press through an access-to-information request, highlight that even though the government recognizes that fake news could threaten Canada's democratic institutions at a time when traditional news outlets are facing cutbacks and financial challenges, there's not much they can do to stop it. The government's inability to decide for Canadians what should and shouldn't be considered fake news is one reason it can't take direct action, according to the briefing notes, prepared in November by deputy Heritage minister Graham Flack. Even if the government did attempt to publicly identify fake news stories, Flack said it could backfire, making readers more convinced the stories are true and increasing the likelihood they'd share the stories. Overall, the briefing notes concluded that the role of combating misinformation should not rest on the government's shoulders alone and that \"there is not likely one single, easy solution\"5 B.  Legislative Framework\n\nCurrently there does not appears to be any law that prohibits \"the dissemination of incorrect information unless it is defamatory and covered by libel laws.\"6  Section 181 of Canada's Criminal Code prohibits the spreading of false news:\n\n\n## Spreading False News\n\n181 Every one who wilfully publishes a statement, tale or news that he knows is false and that causes or is likely to cause injury or mischief to a public interest is guilty of an indictable offence and liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding two years.7 However, in *R v. Zundel* (1992),8 Canada's Supreme Court held that the offense is unconstitutional as it violates section 2(b) (freedom of expression) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.9 The section therefore appears to have no legal effect or force and the government appears to be in the process of removing this \"zombie\" provision.10 Canada has other laws that may be relevant to fake news that have been outlined by Canada's Department of Justice as follows:\n\n\nThe hate propaganda provisions in sections 318 and 319 of the *Criminal Code* can be\nused to deal with false news that promotes hatred.\n\nThe defamatory libel provisions in section 300 of the *Criminal Code* prohibit people\nfrom knowingly publishing false information that has been designed to insult or that is likely to harm the reputation of someone.\n\nFederal regulations such as section 8(1) of the Broadcasting Distribution Regulations\nprohibit radio and television broadcasters from broadcasting false or misleading news and abusive comments that are likely to expose persons to hatred based on listed grounds.\n\nSome provincial laws, such as section 14 of Saskatchewan's Human Rights Code,\nprohibit publications that are likely to expose groups to hatred.\n\nSome provincial laws provide civil means to deal with libel of racial, religious or other\ngroups (for example, section 19 of Manitoba's Defamation Act).\n\nVarious codes of practice direct certain professionals not to propagate false news or\nhate propaganda (for example, the Canadian Association of Journalist's Ethics Guidelines).11\n\narchived at https://perma.cc/7EDV-P7WF. 8 R. v. Zundel [1992] 2 SCR 731, https://scc-csc.lexum.com/scc-csc/scc-csc/en/item/904/index.do, *archived at* https://perma.cc/7LJS-GCDA. Z9AQ?type=image. 11 Id.\n\nFederal broadcasting regulations issued under the Broadcasting Act12 that deal with false or\nmisleading news include the following:\n\n\nsection 8(1)(d) of the *Broadcasting Distribution Regulations*;\n\nsection 3(d) of the *Radio Regulations, 1986*; [and]\n\nsection 5(1)(d) of the *Television Broadcasting Regulations, 1987*[.]13\n Generally \"these provisions prohibit licensees of radio and television programming undertakings and broadcasting distribution undertakings from broadcasting programs that contain false or misleading news.\"14 In 2011 the Parliament's Standing Joint Committee for the Scrutiny of Regulations (SJC), citing the SCC's *Zundel* judgment, raised concerns over whether  the \"existing false or misleading news provisions might not be in keeping with the freedom of expression provision under section 2(b) of the *Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms* (the Charter).\"15 To address these concerns, the Commission proposed \"to amend the relevant provisions such that the above-noted prohibition would be narrowed to 'news that the licensee knows is false or misleading and that endangers or is likely to endanger the lives, health or safety of the public.' \" According to one news report,\n\n[t]he proposed change sparked concerns that the CRTC was about to allow into Canada the more toxic - often grossly distorted - political discourse that pervades the American airwaves. Those suspicions were fuelled by the timing of the proposal, only weeks before next month's launch of a new, right-leaning all-news network, Sun TV.16 In March 2011, the Commission received a letter from the SJC \"in which it informed the Commission that it no longer saw the *Zundel* judgment as an impediment to the continued application of the current regulations\" and the Commission announced \"that it will not amend the false or misleading news provisions set out in various Commission regulations.\"17 In 2017, the Federal Heritage Committee published a report on the changing media landscape in Canada that noted the problems with fake news and observed the lack of guidelines for digital\n\nmedia. The Committee recommended that \"the vigilance of existing ethics guidelines and press councils must apply equally to digital media.\"18 The Standing Committee on Access to Information, Privacy and Ethics published a report in which it stated that \"changes to Canada's legislative and regulatory landscape are needed in order to neutralize the threat that disinformation and misinformation campaigns pose to the country's democratic process.\"19 C.  Elections\n\nIn December 2017 Canada passed an omnibus bill20 that amended the Canada Elections Act21 and other Acts to modernize its election laws. Among the changes included was \"a provision that makes it an offence to make false statements about a candidate for the purpose of influencing the outcome of an election.\"22 However, according to a news report, \"that provision applies quite narrowly to false statements about whether a candidate has broken the law or withdrawn from the election, as well as about a candidate's citizenship, place of birth, education, professional qualifications or membership in a group.\"23 The provision states as follows:\n\nPublishing false statement to affect election results 91 (1) No person or entity shall, with the intention of affecting the results of an election, make or publish, during the election period,\n(a) a false statement that a candidate, a prospective candidate, the leader of a political party or a public figure associated with a political party has committed an offence under an Act of Parliament or a regulation made under such an Act - or under an Act of the legislature of a province or a regulation made under such an Act - or has been charged with or is under investigation for such an offence; or (b) a false statement about the citizenship, place of birth, education, professional qualifications or membership in a group or association of a candidate, a prospective candidate, the leader of a political party or a public figure associated with a political party.\n\n## 18 Standing Committee On Canadian Heritage, Disruption: Change And Churning In Canada's Media Landscape 63 (June 2017), Http://Www.Ourcommons.Ca/Content/Committee/421/Chpc/Reports/Rp9045583/Chpcrp06/ Chpcrp06- E.Pdf, *Archived At* Https://Perma.Cc/G6F9-Ac7D.\n\n19 STANDING COMMITTEE ON ACCESS TO INFORMATION, PRIVACY AND ETHICS, DEMOCRACY UNDER THREAT: RISKS AND SOLUTIONS IN THE ERA OF DISINFORMATION AND DATA MONOPOLY 75 (Dec. 2018), http://www.ourcommons.ca/ Content/Committee/421/ETHI/Reports/RP10242267/ethirp17/ethirp17-\ne.pdf,  *archived at* https://perma.cc/BGS9-2BBY. 20 Bill C-76, First Session, Forty-second Parliament, 64-65-66-67 Elizabeth II, Statutes of Canada 2018, Ch. 31, http://www.parl.ca/DocumentViewer/en/42-1/bill/C-76/royal-assent, *archived at* https://perma.cc/HKT8-\nK8VW. 21 Canada Elections Act, S.C. 2000, c. 9, https://laws-lois.justice.gc.ca/eng/acts/E-2.01/FullText.html, archived at https://perma.cc/BSA3-R97Z. 22 *Not Much Elections Canada Can Do about Fake News Spread about Candidates*, NATIONAL POST (Feb. 7, 2019), https://nationalpost.com/pmn/news-pmn/canada-news-pmn/not-much-elections-canada-can-do-aboutfake-news-spread-about-candidates,  *archived at* https://perma.cc/YY44-Z7RT. 23 Id.\n\nClarification (2) Subsection (1) applies regardless of the place where the election is held or the place where the false statement is made or published. Publishing false statement of candidate's withdrawal 92 No person or entity shall publish a false statement that indicates that a candidate has withdrawn.24\n In January 2019, the federal government announced that it will implement a series of new measures aimed at \"further shoring up Canada's electoral system from foreign interference, and enhancing Canada's readiness to defend the democratic process from cyber threats and disinformation.\"25 One of the measures was to establish a \"Critical Election Incident Public Protocol\" that will \"monitor and notify other agencies and the public about disinformation attempts. That task force will be led by five non-political officials and is an addition to a 'rapid response mechanism' housed within the Department of Foreign Affairs.\"26\n\nIII.  Accuracy of Legal Information No information was located on Canada's efforts to deal with specifically fake legal news. However, Canada does provide a range of official, online sources of legal information that are accessible to the public. The Justice Laws Website provides an \"official consolidation, or updated version, of the federal Acts and regulations,\"27 which is maintained by the Department of Justice as a \"convenient way for the public to view the state of the law, without having to carry out research and put together the various amended provisions.\"28 As of June 1, 2009, \"all consolidated Acts and regulations on the Justice Laws Website are 'official', meaning that they can be used for evidentiary purposes.\"29 According to a note from the Department of Justice Canada,\n[a]mendments made to the *Statute Revision Act*, renamed the Legislation Revision and Consolidation Act by chapter 5 of the 2000 Statutes of Canada, in force on June 1, 2009, authorize the Minister of Justice to publish an electronic consolidation of statutes and regulations and provide that the consolidation is evidence of those statutes and\n\n24 Canada Elections Act  91 & 92.\nregulations. The Act also provides that, in the case of an inconsistency between the consolidated statute or regulation and the original or a subsequent amendment, the original or amendment prevails.30 In 1994, the Supreme Court of Canada began collaborating with the Universite de Montreal's research team Lexum, \"to make judgments, news releases and bulletins available on the Internet free of charge. The Judgments of the Supreme Court of Canada by Lexum continues to be the main public source for judgments, news releases and bulletins.\"31 According to the Department of Justice website, \"[w]ith the exception of the Canadian Charter of Rights Decisions, the Department does not publish court decisions. The Lexum Collection provides free access to all of the Supreme Court of Canada decisions since 1907, while the Office of the Commissioner for Federal Judicial Affairs provides access to Federal Court decisions.\"32 Lexum's website states that\n[t]he official version of a Supreme Court of Canada decision is the one published in the S.C.R.  Counsel may cite either the print or the PDF version of the S.C.R. in documents filed with the Supreme Court of Canada, and both versions should be cited in the same way.33 The official versions of decisions and reasons for decisions of the Supreme Court of Canada are published in the Supreme Court Reports (S.C.R.). An electronic version can be found in the \"Resources\" section.34\nThe *Canada Gazette* is the official newspaper of the Government of Canada. It contains \"new statutes, new and proposed regulations, administrative board decisions and public notices.\"35\nThe public can read or browse editions published since 199836 and access archives of gazette editions from 1841 (when the official publication began) to 1997.37\n\n\nRevision and Consolidation Act, R.S.C., 1985, c. S-20,  31 https://laws-lois.justice.gc.ca/eng/acts/S-\n20/section-31.html, *archived at* https://perma.cc/8G7K-EZT4.\n31 *Frequently Asked Questions (FAQ)*, SUPREME COURT OF CANADA, https://www.scc-csc.ca/contact/faq/qa-qreng.aspx#f27 (last updated Oct. 5, 2018), *archived at* https://perma.cc/4FE5-SE4W. 32 *Guide to Canadian Legal Information*, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, https://www.justice.gc.ca/eng/contact/ Comm2.html (last updated Feb. 20, 2019), *archived at* https://perma.cc/UV2E-FY22. 33 Id. Mar. 6, 2019), *archived at* https://perma.cc/6BKX-9VY2. eng.html (last updated Jan. 25, 2019), *archived at* https://perma.cc/5LUE-CGQK.\n\n## China\n\nLaney Zhang Foreign Law Specialist\n\nSUMMARY\nSpreading fake news that seriously disturbs public order through an information\nnetwork or other media is a crime under China's Criminal Law and is punishable by up\nto seven years in prison. The 2016 Cybersecurity Law prohibits manufacturing or\nspreading fake news online that disturbs the economic and social order. The Law also requires service providers, when providing services of information publication or\ninstant messaging, to ask the users to register their real names.\nAccording to the rules on internet news information services issued by the Cyberspace\nAdministration of China, entities providing such services must obtain a license. When reprinting news, internet news information service providers may only reprint what has been released by certain news organizations prescribed by the state. The service providers and users are prohibited from producing, reproducing, publishing, or spreading information content prohibited by laws and administrative regulations. Once service providers find any prohibited content, they must immediately stop transmitting the information, delete the information, keep the relevant records, and report the matter to competent government authorities. I.  Introduction\nIn China, despite strict regulation of the media and internet, fake news, or what Chinese laws and\ndomestic media often refer to as \"rumors,\" appears to be permeating the internet and social\nmedia. Tencent, the operator of China's biggest social media platform Wechat, released a report in January 2019 on its fight against rumors spread online. According to the report, Wechat\nintercepted over 84,000 rumors in 2018. The report said 3,994 anti-rumor articles were published through Wechat during the year by 774 entities, including the government internet information\nauthority, the police, the food and drug administration, and state media, and the articles were\nread by 294 million users. Popular fake news topics include food safety, health care, and other\nsocial issues.1 In an effort to fight fake news, in 2018, China launched a platform named \"Piyao\"a Chinese\nword meaning \"refuting rumors.\"2 The platform, which also has a mobile app and social media\n\n1 *2018 Report on Managing Online Rumors Published, 774 Institutions Refuted Rumors on Wechat*, PEOPLE.CN (Jan.\n\naccounts, broadcasts \"real\" news sourced from state-owned media, party-controlled local newspapers, and various government agencies.3 The spreading of fake news may not simply be due to the availability of technologies to circulate it. A *Foreign Policy* article points out that, in China, there are other factors propelling the phenomenon: a deep sense of societal insecurity, the increasing politicization and commercialization of information, and a craving for self-expression.4 The article argues that, \"the party-led campaigns against rumors have been seen as attempts to take out potential critics and enemies. When the government labels something a rumor, that information comes to be seen not as fake but as something the government doesn't want the public to know.\"5\n\nII.  Legal Framework\n\nA.  Criminal Law on Fake News On August 29, 2015, China's National People's Congress (NPC) Standing Committee adopted the Ninth Amendment to the Criminal Law of the People's Republic of China (PRC). 6  The Amendment added into the Law a crime of spreading fake news that seriously disturbs public order through an information network or other media. This offense is punishable by up to seven years in prison. Paragraph 2 of article 291a added by the Ninth Amendment states that\n\n[w]hoever fabricates false information on [a] dangerous situation, epidemic situation, disaster situation or alert situation and disseminates such information via information network or any other media, or intentionally disseminates above information while clearly knowing that it is fabricated, thereby seriously disturbing public order, shall be sentenced to fixed-term imprisonment of not more than three years, criminal detention or public surveillance; if the consequences are serious, he shall be sentenced to fixed-term imprisonment of not less than three years but not more than seven years.7\n\n\n\nB.  Cybersecurity Law 1. Manufacturing or Spreading Fake News Online On November 7, 2016, the PRC Cybersecurity Law was adopted by the NPC Standing Committee.8 Paragraph 2 of article 12 of the Law prohibits a series of activities from being conducted online, including manufacturing or spreading fake news online that disturbs the economic and social order. 9 Article 70 of the Law further provides that the publication or transmission of the information specified under article 12 paragraph 2, or information that is prohibited from publication or transmission under other laws or administrative regulations, is subject to penalties prescribed by relevant laws and regulations.10 2. Real-Name Registration Under the Cybersecurity Law, when providing services of information publication or instant messaging, service providers must ask users to register their real names. The service providers must not provide relevant services to any users who do not perform the identity authentication steps.11 Where service providers fail to authenticate users' identities, the competent authorities may order them to rectify their wrongdoings, suspend their businesses, shut down their websites, revoke relevant licenses, or impose a fine of 50,000 to 500,000 yuan (about US$7,500 to $75,000) on the service providers and/or 10,000 to 100,000 yuan (about US$1,500 to $15,000) on the responsible persons.12 C.  Administrative Measures on Internet Information Services On September 25, 2000, the State Council issued a regulation, the Administrative Measures on Internet Information Services, governing activities associated with providing internet information services within the territory of the PRC.13 The Measures prohibit internet information services providers from producing, reproducing, publishing, or spreading prescribed information content, including rumors that disrupt social order or undermines social stability.14 Whenever a service provider finds that prohibited content\n\nis being transmitted on their website, they must immediately stop the transmission, keep the relevant records, and report the matter to competent government authorities.15 D.  Provisions on Internet News Information Services On the basis of the PRC Cybersecurity Law and the Administrative Measures on Internet Information Services, on May 2, 2017, China's central internet information authority, the Cyberspace Administration of China, issued the Provisions on Administration of Internet News Information Services.16 1.  License Control Under the Provisions, any entities providing internet news information services to the public\nno matter whether that is through websites, apps, online forums, blogs, microblogs, social media public accounts, instant messaging tools, or live broadcastingsmust obtain a license for internet news information services and operate within the scope of activities of the license.17 The licenses are only issued to legal persons incorporated within the territory of the PRC, and the persons in charge and editors-in-chief must be Chinese citizens.18 Providing internet news information services without a proper license is punishable by a fine of\n10,000 to 30,000 yuan (about US$1,500 to $4,500).19 2.  Restrictions on Reprinting News When reprinting news, internet news information service providers may only reprint what has been released by official state or provincial news organizations, or other news organizations prescribed by the state. The original sources, authors, titles, and editors must be indicated to ensure that the sources of the news are traceable.20 State or local internet content authorities may issue a warning to violators of this provision, order them to rectify their wrongdoings, suspend their news services, or impose a fine of 5,000 to 30,000\nyuan (about US$750 to $4,500). Violators may also be criminally prosecuted, according to the Provisions.21\n\n\n3.  Prohibited Content The Provisions also prohibit internet news information service providers and users from producing, reproducing, publishing, or spreading information content prohibited by laws and administrative regulations.22 State or local internet content authorities may issue a warning to violators of this provision, order them to rectify their wrongdoings, suspend their news services, or impose a fine of 20,000 to 30,000 yuan (about US$3,000 to $4,500). Violators may also be criminally prosecuted, the Provisions state.23 4.  Obligations of Service Providers Once internet information service providers find any content prohibited by the Provision or other laws and administrative regulations, they must immediately stop transmitting the information, delete the information, keep the relevant records, and report the matter to competent government authorities.24 The Provisions also repeat the requirement of real-name registration under the Cybersecurity Law, providing that internet news information services providers must ask users of the internet news information publication platform services to register their real names.25 Violators of these provisions are punishable by the state or local internet information authority in accordance with the Cybersecurity Law.26\n\n\nIII.  Access to Accurate Legal Information A.  Online Publication of Laws and Regulations On March 15, 2015, the NPC revised the PRC Law on Legislation.27 In this revision, two websites were added into the Law to officially publish Chinese laws and regulations: the NPC website28\nand the Chinese Government Legal Information Network.29 The NPC website is designated by the Law to officially publish laws adopted by the NPC and its standing committee. The laws are also published in the official NPC gazette and nationallycirculated newspapers. 30 Local regulations made by local people's congresses must also be published on the NPC website, as well in the local people's congresses' gazettes and on their official websites, and in newspapers circulated within the regions.31 The Chinese Government Legal Information Network is designated by the Law to officially publish administrative regulations made by the State Council. 32 The website also publishes administrative rules made by the ministries and commissions under the State Council and by local governments.33 B.  Online Publication of Court Judgments Since 2013, courts in China at various levels have been requested by the Supreme People's Court\n(SPC) to publish their judgments on an SPC platform, China Judgments Online.34 According to the SPC, judgments must be posted on the platform within seven business days of taking\n\n28 *Homepage,* THE NATIONAL PEOPLE'S CONGRESS OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, http://www.npc.gov.cn/ (in Chinese, last visited Mar. 14, 2019), *archived at* https://perma.cc/B9EU-KBWJ. 29 *Homepage*, MINISTRY OF JUSTICE OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, CHINESE GOVERNMENT LEGAL INFORMATION NETWORK, http://www.chinalaw.gov.cn/ (in Chinese, last visited Mar. 14, 2019), *archived at* https://perma.cc/9RDG-8MMB. 30 Legislation Law art. 58. 31 Id. art. 79 32 Id. art. 71.\n\n\n33 Id. art. 86. 2019), *archived at* https://perma.cc/Y9NR-WYC5. See Laney Zhang, China: Rules of Online Publication of Court Judgments Revised, GLOBAL LEGAL MONITOR (Feb. 9, 2017), http://www.loc.gov/law/foreignnews/article/china-rules-of-online-publication-of-court-judgments-revised/, *archived at* https://perma.cc/KPJ3-T3K3.\neffect.35 Courts must redact names of certain people when publishing the judgments, including the names of all minors and their representatives.36 The SPC exempts certain types of cases from being published on the platform, such as those involving state secrets, crimes conducted by minors, divorce, or child custody, and the courts are also allowed to decide that other cases are not appropriate to be published.37 If a court decides not to publish a judgment online, it must still publish the judgment's case number, the name of the trial court, the judgment date, and the reasons for non-publication, except where publishing the information may reveal state secrets.38\n\n## Egypt\n\n    George Sadek\nForeign Law Specialist\n\n\nSUMMARY\n         In 2017, the Egyptian Parliament's Communication and Information Technology\n         Committee revealed that 53,000 false rumors had spread in Egypt in just sixty days.\n         The Egyptian authorities have adopted a number of measures to combat the\n         phenomenon of the dissemination of false information. The Egyptian government has\n         passed three domestic laws to regulate the distribution of information and its accuracy\n         in print and online media as well as online social networks. Those laws include Law\n         No. 180 of 2018 on Regulating the Press and Media, Law No. 175 of 2018 on Anti-\n         Cybercrime, and Law No. 58 of 1937 and its amendments on the Penal Code. To\n         facilitate the access to accurate legal information, the Court of Cassation, the Supreme\n         Constitutional Court, and the Administrative Court post on their websites laws and\n         regulations published in the official gazette and recent decisions issued by those\n         courts. There are no fees to access such legal information.\n\nI.  Government Measures\n\nIn 2017, the Communication and Information Technology Committee in the Egyptian Parliament\nrevealed that 53,000 false rumors had spread in Egypt in just sixty days. The Committee\nannounced that most of this false news had originated and circulated on social-media platforms.1\nIn an effort to combat the dissemination of false news, the Cabinet issues statements refuting false\ninformation circulated in the media or via online social networks.2 In September 2018 the\nAssociated Press also reported that the Egyptian authorities had suspended or blocked five\nhundred websites that were suspected by the authorities of distributing false information.3\n\nFurthermore, the Egyptian authorities have arrested a number of journalists and website\nadministrators suspected by the government of publishing false news.4 For instance, in April\n2018, State Security Prosecution summoned the editor-in-chief of the newspaper Al-Masry Al-\nYoum and seven correspondents, accusing them of distributing false information. In another\nexample, Adel Sabri, Editor-in-Chief of the Masr El-Arabiya website was detained and charged\n\n\n\nwith the dissemination of false news. The website was also fined 50,000 Egyptian pounds (about US$2,855) by the Supreme Council for Media Regulation for disseminating false information.5 In its efforts to combat the dissemination of false information on social media networks, the Egyptian authorities have detained some individuals, accusing them of the dissemination of false news on Facebook and Twitter. For example, Amal Fathi, Wael Abbas, and Haytham Mohammaden were all charged with using social media to spread false information.6 In an extra measure to prevent the dissemination of false news, the Egyptian Public Prosecutor has announced the creation of a new hotline for citizens to file complaints against false news posted by media outlets or by individuals on social medial networks.7\n\nII.  Legal Framework The Egyptian government has passed three domestic laws to regulate the distribution of information and its accuracy in print and online media including social networks. Those laws include Law No. 175 of 2018 on Anti-Cybercrime, 8 Law No. 180 of 2018 on Regulating the Press and Media,9 and Law No. 58 of 1937 and its amendments on the Penal Code.10 A.  Law 180 of 2018 Regulating the Press and Media Article 4 of Law No. 180 of 2018 stipulates that press institutions, media outlets, and news websites must not broadcast or publish any information violating the principles cited under the Constitution. Article 4 grants the Supreme Media Council the authority to ban or suspend the distribution, broadcast, or operation of any publications, newspapers, media outlets, or advertising materials containing information deemed to threaten national security; disturb the public peace; or promote discrimination, violence, racism, hatred, or intolerance.11 Article 19 of the Law authorizes the Supreme Media Council to suspend or block any personal website, blog, or social media account that has a high number of followersexceeding 5,000if it publishes fake news advocating and inciting the violation of a specific law or promoting violence or hatred.12\n\nArticle 21 prohibits news outlets from posting information in print or online concerning a specific court case if such information will negatively affect the defendant in the case or the trial proceedings.13 Article 22 requires media outlets to rectify any false information that was posted on their websites without any financial compensation. This is meant to prevent media outlets from demanding payment as a condition for withdrawing/correcting false information they publish. Such rectification must take place within three days from the date of being notified that the information posted was false.14 Article 101 sanctions the director of a media outlet or website administrator violating articles 21\nand 22 with a fine of between fifty thousand and one hundred thousand Egyptian pounds (about US$2,855$5,711).15 B.  Law No. 175 of 2018 on Anti-Cybercrime Article 7 grants the investigating authority the power to block or suspend Egyptian-based or foreign websites featuring content that is deemed threatening to national security or the national economy.16 Article 14, paragraph 2 punishes any individual who hacks a website in order to alter the information posted on such website or redistributes such information after altering it with a term of imprisonment of not less than two years and/or a fine of between one hundred thousand and two hundred thousand Egyptian pounds (about US$5,700$11,400).17 Article 20, paragraph 3 punishes individuals who hack a government website in order to erase or modify information posted on such website, or redistribute the information after modifying it, with a term of imprisonment and a fine of between one million and five millions Egyptian pounds\n(about US$57,000$285,000).18 Article 9 authorizes the public prosecutor to impose a travel ban on individuals suspected of committing any act considered a crime under Law 175 of 2018.19\n\n\nC.  Penal Code, Law No. 58 of 1937, and Its Amendments Article 80(d) of the Penal Code states that whoever deliberately spreads false information or rumors abroad about the internal conditions of the country that might weaken the country's financial credibility or harm the country's national interests is punishable by six months' to five years' imprisonment and a fine.20\n\nIII.  Access to Legal Information To facilitate access to accurate legal information, the Court of Cassation (the highest court of the land) posts domestic legislation and ministerial resolutions published in the official gazette online. There are no financial charges to use and obtain such online legal information.21\n\nSimilarly, the Supreme Constitutional Court22 and the Administrative Court23 publish on their official websites updated decisions issued by those courts. The purpose of publishing such legal information is to educate the public about recent cases and legal principles adjudicated by both courts.\nFrance Nicolas Boring Foreign Law Specialist\n\nSUMMARY\nFrance does not have a law prohibiting the dissemination of fake legal news specifically,\nbut it has legislation against fake news in general, which would be applicable to legal\ninformation.  The French government can rely on the 1881 Law on Freedom of the Press to stop the dissemination of fake news that could disturb public peace. Additionally, a provision of the Electoral Code prohibits the spread of fake news that could affect an election.  In light of the large scale at which fake news can now be disseminated on the internet, France recently adopted a new law that requires large-scale online platform operators to adhere to certain standards of conduct during the three months preceding\ngeneral elections.  These standards of conduct include the requirement to be transparent about sponsored content and the use of personal data in content promotion, and the requirement to publish the amount of payments received for the promotion of informational content.  The new law also provides that, during the three months preceding an election, a judge may order \"any proportional and necessary measure\" to stop the dissemination of fake or misleading information online.\nWith regard to specifically legal information, the French government promotes access\nto accurate information by maintaining a free legal database online.\nI.  Introduction France appears to have a fairly robust legal arsenal against the dissemination of fake news.1  Until\nrecently, the French government was able to rely on an 1881 statute against the publication of fake news, as well as a provision of the Electoral Code that prohibits the dissemination of fake\nnews in an electoral context.  While these provisions are still in effect, they were increasingly seen\nas inefficient to fight against fake and manipulative news disseminated on a large scale through\nthe internet.2 The provisions described below do not address legal information specifically, but would be applicable to fake legal information.  To ensure public access to accurate legal information, the\nFrench government maintains a free legal database online, which is described in Part IV, below.\n\n\nII.  1881 Law on Freedom of the Press and Article L.97 of the Electoral Code A 1881 law contains a provision, which is still in force, that makes it illegal to disturb public peace through the publication, dissemination, or reproduction of fake news in bad faith.3 In addition to fake news, this provision bars the bad-faith publication, dissemination, or reproduction of forged or altered items, or items falsely attributed to third parties.4  Such acts are punishable by a fine of up to 45,000 (approximately US$51,000), or 135,000 (US$153,000) if the fake news, forged or altered item, or item falsely attributed to another was of a nature to harm the discipline or morale of troops, or to impair the nation's war effort.5  Additionally, the Electoral Code prohibits the dissemination of \"fake news, defamatory rumors or other fraudulent schemes\" that affect the result of an election.6  Such acts are punishable by up to one year in jail and a fine of up to 15,000\n(US$17,000).7\n\nIII. New Legislation Against the Dissemination of Fake News During Election Periods In addition to previously existing legislation, the French government recently adopted a pair of new laws to deal more specifically with the large-scale dissemination of fake news through the internet before an election.8  This new legislation requires large-scale online platform operators to adhere to the following conduct during the three months preceding general elections:\n\n-\nProvide users with \"honest, clear and transparent information\" about the identity and corporate address of anyone who paid to promote informational content related to a \"debate of national interest\";\n\n\nhttps://perma.cc/2P43-E2D8.\n4 Id.\n\n5 Id. 6 CODE ELECTORAL [ELECTORAL CODE], art. L97, https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichCodeArticle.do? cidTexte=LEGITEXT000006070239&idArticle=LEGIARTI000006353232, *archived at* https://perma.cc/9QAN- 2KVC. 7 Id. 8 *Les enjeux de la loi contre la manipulation de l'information*, CULTURE.GOUV.FR, *supra*  note 1; Loi organique n 2018-\n1201 du 22 decembre 2018 relative a la lutte contre la manipulation de l'information [Organic Law No. 2018- 1201 of 22 December 2018 Regarding the Fight Against Information Manipulation], https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichTexte.do;jsessionid=3EA914DFE69980E3FBB01324A666B5D1.tplgfr22s_\n1?cidTexte=JORFTEXT000037847556&dateTexte=&oldAction=rechJO&categorieLien=id&idJO=JORFCONT000 037847553, *archived at* https://perma.cc/CS7C-FBAA; Loi n 2018-1202 du 22 decembre 2018 relative a la lutte contre la manipulation de l'information [Law No. 2018-1202 of 22 December 2018 Regarding the Fight Against Information Manipulation], https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichTexte. do;jsessionid=3EA914DFE69980E3FBB01324A666B5D1.tplgfr22s_1?cidTexte=JORFTEXT000037847559&categor ieLien=id, *archived at* https://perma.cc/9LD2-WWTW.\n-\nProvide users with \"honest, clear and transparent information\" about the use of personal data in the context of promoting content related to a \"debate of national interest\";\n-\nMake public the amount of payments received for the promotion of informational content when these amounts are above a certain threshold.9\n\nThe new legislation also provides that, during the three months preceding an election, a judge may order \"any proportional and necessary measure\" to stop the \"deliberate, artificial or automatic and massive\" dissemination of fake or misleading information online.10  A public prosecutor, a candidate, a political group or party, or any person with standing can bring a fake news case before the judge, who must rule on the motion within forty-eight hours.11 In addition to the above, the new legislation requires large-scale online platform operators to implement measures to prevent the dissemination of false information that could disturb public order or affect the validity of an election.12  Online platform operators must also put into place a visible and easily-accessible means for users to flag fake information, and they are required to provide a yearly statement to the Conseil superieur de l'audiovisuel (CSA, Superior Council on Audiovisual) detailing the measures they have taken to fight against the dissemination of fake information.13 Finally, the new legislation allows the CSA to suspend television broadcasting services that are controlled or influenced by a foreign government, if it finds that these services are deliberately broadcasting false information during the three months preceding a national election.14\n\nIV.  Free Online Legal Database The French government has long promoted the free access to official legal information online.\nAs early as 1994, it started publishing an online version of the \"Laws and Decrees\" section of the Journal official de la Republique francaise, the French official gazette.15  This database was later incorporated into a website called Legifrance, created in 2002, which represented a larger effort\n\n9 Loi n 2018-1202 du 22 decembre 2018, art. 1 (amending CODE ELECTORAL [ELECTORAL CODE], art. L163-1, to provide the public with free and accurate access to legal information.16  The Legifrance website, which is accessible at www.legifrance.gouv.fr, aims to provide the official version of all current legislative and regulatory texts, including the French Constitution, the legal codes, laws, and national regulations.17  It also includes international agreements to which France is a party, as well as directives and regulations of the European Union.  Additionally, Legifrance provides all the recent decisions of the country's highest courts: the Conseil constitutionnel (the Constitutional Council, which judges whether laws are constitutional), the Conseil d'Etat (Council of State, the highest jurisdiction for administrative law), the Cour de cassation (the highest jurisdiction for civil and criminal matters), and the tribunal des conflits (Tribunal of Conflicts, which resolves jurisdictional disputes).18  Legifrance does not publish all decisions of lower courts, but instead publishes a selection of the more significant ones.19\n\n## Germany\n\nJenny Gesley Foreign Law Specialist SUMMARY\nReports about the dissemination of fake news during the 2016 US election campaign fueled fears that the same could happen during the 2017 German federal elections. However, surveys conducted after the elections revealed that the fears were unfounded.\n\nNonetheless, the public perceived that fake news had played a major role.\n\nGermany has a number of civil and criminal law provisions that may be applicable to safeguard individuals or the public from fake news in social networks. In addition, in 2017, the Network Enforcement Act was passed with the specific aim of fighting  fake news on social networks by improving the enforcement of the current laws. Social networks that do not remove clearly illegal content may be fined up to 50 million (about US$57.8 million). Germany also tries to ensure that citizens have access to accurate legal information by providing free access to legislation and court decisions online.\n\nI. Introduction\n\nIn December 2016, the Parliamentary Research Services of the German Bundestag (parliament)\npublished a report on dealing with the dissemination of false information (\"fake news\"), including the current legal situation and reform proposals.1 The reason for the report was, among other things, a criminal complaint that the politician Renate Kunast from the Green Party had filed against the authors of fake news published on Facebook.2 According to news reports, several Facebook pages had posted a picture of the politician with a quote in which she allegedly commented on the recent highly publicized murder of a student and the arrest of a suspect in Freiburg, stating that \"[e]ven though the traumatized young refugee has killed, he should be helped nonetheless.\"3 The picture named the newspaper *Suddeutsche Zeitung* as a source for the quote. The politician filed a criminal complaint against the operators of a right-wing Facebook page and against unknown persons.4  She criticized the fact that it took Facebook three days to delete the false information.5 Around the same time, reports about the dissemination of fake news\n\n1 WISSENSCHAFTLICHE DIENSTE [PARLIAMENTARY RESEARCH SERVICES], DER UMGANG MIT FAKE-NEWS. RECHTSLAGE\nregarding the 2016 US elections on Facebook and other social media platforms were published and fueled fears that the same could happen in the upcoming German federal elections in 2017.6 A survey conducted in 2017 on behalf of the Media Authority of North Rhine-Westphalia\n(Landesanstalt fur Medien Nordrhein-Westfalen, LfM) found that 59% of survey participants have encountered fake news on the internet.7 Among fourteen- to twenty-four-year-olds, the number was 77%.8 It is unclear whether false information has had any influence on the democratic process in Germany, for example, on elections.9 Whereas some studies have found that it has had an influence, others see the phenomenon more limited in nature.10 A survey conducted after the last federal elections in Germany found that there were not nearly as many fake news reports as expected and that no major piece of fake news had any impact on the results, but that there was a difference between that reality and the perception of most voters.11 In total, 61% of voters said that they were under the impression that a lot of fake news was distributed by the media.12\nAmong survey participants that were critical of the media and among younger people, the numbers were 75% and 72% respectively.13 Thirty percent of participants overall thought that fake news also had a major influence on the results.14 One possible explanation for this distortion found in the survey was the omnipresence of the topic \"fake news\" in media coverage of the US and the ambiguous meaning of the term \"fake news.\"15 In addition, most fake news in Germany is used by right-wing populist parties and supporters to advance their agendas and believed by their supporters when it correlates with their world views.16 As a reaction to the spread of fake news, several initiatives have been started. In 2017, Germany passed the Network Enforcement Act (the so-called Facebook Act), which explicitly aims to Fake_News.pdf, *archived at* http://perma.cc/4ZDL-6LMS. 8 Id. at 2. 9 DEUTSCHER BUNDESTAG: DRUCKSACHEN UND PROTOKOLLE [BT-DRS.] 19/2224, at 1, http://dipbt.bundestag.de/\ndoc/btd/19/022/1902224.pdf, *archived at* http://perma.cc/Q4NX-BF2K.\n10 Id. at 1 (referencing the survey on behalf of the LfM, see *supra* note 7, and a study from 2017, see Simon Hegelich, Social Bots, Trolle, Fake-News [*Social Bots, Trolls, Fake-News*], in 62 DIE POLITISCHE MEINUNG 543 (2017), https://www.kas.de/c/document_library/get_file?uuid=fb6dc26f-b391-995a-263b-cae7ed108176&\ngroupId=252038, *archived at* http://perma.cc/7HTG-RFEG). 11 ALEXANDER SANGERLAUB, VERZERRTE REALITATEN. DIE WAHRNEHMUNG VON \"FAKE NEWS\" IM SCHATTEN DER USA UND DER BUNDESTAGSWAHL [DISTORTED REALITIES. PERCEPTION OF \"FAKE NEWS\" OVERSHADOWED BY THE USA AND THE FEDERAL ELECTIONS] (Oct. 2017), https://www.stiftung-nv.de/sites/default/files/fake_ news_im_schatten_der_usa_und_der_bundestagswahl_0.pdf, *archived at* http://perma.cc/SRK7-DKPR.\ncombat hate speech and fake news in social networks.17 However, it should be noted that the Network Enforcement Act did not enter into force until October 1, 2017, after the Federal Elections of September 24, 2017.18 Likewise, the European Union (EU) in 2018 published an EU-wide voluntary Code of Practice on Disinformation and is planning to create an independent European network of fact-checkers to combat the spread of disinformation (fake news) online.19 The EU\nCode of Practice on Disinformation is the latest among a series of initiatives that the EU has started with regard to countering the spread of disinformation.20\n\nII. Legal Framework In Germany, there is no general law that prohibits the creation and dissemination of fake news. However, depending on the facts of the case, there are a number of civil and criminal law provisions that may be applicable to safeguard individuals or the public from fake news in social networks. The aforementioned Network Enforcement Act did not create new duties to delete content and relies on the violation of enumerated criminal law norms.\n\nA. Criminal Law Under German criminal law, there are several provisions that prohibit the assertion or dissemination of personal information that is either false or cannot be proved to be true.21 A\n\n9C47B2608D12B014859D5FF786F29.2_cid289?__blob=publicationFile&v=2, *archived at* http://perma.cc/J86H- GTY4. 18 Gesetz zur Verbesserung der Rechtsdurchsetzung in sozialen Netzwerken [Netzwerksdurchsetzungsgesetz]\n[NetzDG] [Act to Improve the Enforcement of Rights on Social Networks] [Network Enforcement Act]\n[NetzDG], Sept. 1, 2017, BGBL. I at 3352, art. 3, http://www.bgbl.de/xaver/bgbl/start.xav?startbk=Bundesanzeiger_BGBl&jumpTo=bgbl117s3352.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/5QZR-TYVD. 19 EU Code of Practice on Disinformation (Sept. 2018), https://ec.europa.eu/newsroom/dae/document.cfm? doc_id=54454, *archived at* http://perma.cc/456J-N5HV; Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions. Tackling Online Disinformation: A European Approach, COM (2018) 236 final (Apr. 26, 2018), at 9, https://eur-lex. europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52018DC0236&rid=2, *archived at* http://perma.cc/MMP9-4VP7. 20 For an overview, see Jenny Gesley, European Union: Commission Proposes EU-Wide Code of Practice to Combat Fake News Online, GLOBAL LEGAL MONITOR (May 11, 2018), http://www.loc.gov/law/foreign-news/article/\neuropean-union-commission-proposes-eu-wide-code-of-practice-to-combat-fake-news-online/, *archived at* http://perma.cc/75EG-QUD7.\nrequirement is that the information is capable of defaming a person or of negatively affecting public opinion of the person.22 The crime of defamation is punishable with imprisonment not exceeding one year or a fine and, if it was committed publicly or through the dissemination of written materials, with imprisonment not exceeding two years or a fine.23 If the defamation was done intentionally, the term of imprisonment may not exceed two years or a fine; if it was committed publicly, in a meeting, or through the dissemination of written materials, it will be punished with imprisonment not exceeding five years or with a fine.24 If the defamation is directed towards a politician and it makes his or her public activities substantially more difficult, the punishment ranges from three months' to five years' imprisonment.25 Social networks are generally considered public places, except when information is posted in closed groups. Defamation and intentional defamation are only prosecuted upon the request of the victim.26 The Public Prosecutor, however, will only open an investigation if it is in the public interest.27 In addition to a criminal prosecution, a person who has been defamed may also sue for libel in civil court and request a preliminary injunction.28\n\nB. Media Law\n\nThe media law states that electronic information and communication services (\"telemedia\")29 that provide journalistic content must conform to recognized journalistic standards, in particular when they completely or partially reproduce texts or visual contents of periodical print media.30\n\nenglisch_stpo.pdf (English version updated through Apr. 23, 2014), *archived at* http://perma.cc/9V5G-GUDE. 28 ZIVILPROZESSORDNUNG [ZPO] [CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE], Dec. 5, 2005, BGBL. I at 3202; BGBL. 2006 I at 431;\nBGBL 2007 I at 1781, as amended,  935, 940, http://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/zpo/ZPO.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/MB6Z-7ZZ6, unofficial English translation available at http://www.gesetze-im-internet. de/englisch_zpo/englisch_zpo.pdf, *archived at* http://perma.cc/9TLR-A3VD. 29 Telemediengesetz [TMG] [Telemedia Act], Feb. 26, 2007, BGBL. I at 179, as amended,  1, para. 1, http://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/tmg/TMG.pdf, *archived at* http://perma.cc/3YJK-9N48, unofficial English translation available at https://www.huntonprivacyblog.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/28/2016/ 02/Telemedia_Act__TMA_.pdf (English version not updated), *archived at* http://perma.cc/77GL-8FNJ. 30 Staatsvertrag fur Rundfunk und Telemedien [Rundfunkstaatsvertrag] [RStV] [Interstate Treaty on Broadcasting and Telemedia] [Interstate Broadcasting Treaty], Aug. 31, 1991, as amended, art. 54, para. 2, https://www.die-medienanstalten.de/fileadmin/user_upload/Rechtsgrundlagen/Gesetze_Staats vertraege/Rundfunkstaatsvertrag_RStV.pdf, *archived at* http://perma.cc/U5GH-BE8V, unofficial English translation available at https://www.die-medienanstalten.de/fileadmin/user_upload/Rechtsgrundlagen/\nThis means that news must be \"verified by the provider prior to their [sic] transmission with the diligence appropriate to the circumstances concerning their content, source and truthfulness.\"31\nHowever, the law does not provide any consequences for a violation of journalistic standards.\n\nThe only sanctions available to the German Press Council (Deutscher Presserat) are public reprimands.32 In addition, the Press Code (Pressekodex) enforced by the German Press Council is only applicable to people who have voluntarily agreed to be bound by it, which is typically not the case for social media platforms or persons posting content on social media platforms.\n\nC. Host Provider Liability Host providers are generally not liable for false information published by third parties on their platforms as long as they do not have actual knowledge of the rights violation. 33 However, once they are notified of the rights violation, they must delete the content immediately in order to avoid liability.34 The notification itself must be so specific and provide enough information that the host provider has a basis to qualify and verify the illegality of the posted information.35\nHowever, in practice, host providers have regularly ignored notifications, which was one of the reasons for enacting the Network Enforcement Act, described below.\n\nD. Network Enforcement Act One of the objectives of the Network Enforcement Act, adopted in 2017, was to fight fake news in light of the events during the last US election campaign. The explanatory memorandum stated that fighting fake news on social networks [is] a priority. To do so requires improvements in law enforcement on social networks in order to promptly remove objectively criminal content, such as incitement to hatred, abuse, defamation or content that could lead to a breach of the peace by misleading authorities into thinking a crime has been committed.36\n\n\nGesetze_Staatsvertraege/Rundfunkstaatsvertrag_RStV_20_english_version.pdf (English version updated through Sept. 1, 2017), *archived at* http://perma.cc/7LF3-5D2W.\n31 Id. 32 Presserat [German Press Council], Publizistische Grundsatze [Pressekodex] [German Press Code] (2017), Complaints Procedure,  12, para. 5, in conjunction with Press Code,  16, https://www.presserat.de/\nfileadmin/user_upload/Downloads_Dateien/Pressekodex2017_web.pdf, *archived at* http://perma.cc/2S8C- CB3L, English translation available at https://www.presserat.de/fileadmin/user_upload/Downloads_ Dateien/Pressekodex2017english.pdf, *archived at* http://perma.cc/AA56-Z4K7. 33 Telemedia Act,  10. 34 Id. 35 Oberlandesgericht Hamburg [OLG Hamburg] [Higher Regional Court Hamburg, Mar. 2, 2010, docket no. 7\nU 70/09, 7 MULTIMEDIA UND RECHT [MMR] 490, 491 (2010).\n36 BT-Drs. 18/12356, at 1, http://dip21.bundestag.de/dip21/btd/18/123/1812356.pdf, *archived at* http://perma.cc/MD44-LD9G, English version available at http://ec.europa.eu/growth/tools-databases/ tris/en/index.cfm/search/?trisaction=search.detail&year=2017&num=127&dLang=EN, archived at http://perma.cc/BAE2-KAJX.\nSurveys conducted on the deletion practices of social networks revealed that the voluntary commitments of social media platforms were insufficient. The government concluded that\n\n[s]ince the current mechanisms and the voluntary measures agreed on by social networks are inadequate and given the significant problems in enforcing the current law, it is necessary to introduce rules to make social networks comply on pain of a fine in order to enable prompt, effective action against hate crime and other criminal content on the internet.37 The Network Enforcement Act has been very controversial and has been criticized as unconstitutional, in particular with regard to free speech.38 Several political parties have submitted proposals to amend the law.39 However, none of the proposals have yet advanced very far. As previously mentioned, the law in its current form does not create any new duties for social media platforms,40 but imposes high fines for noncompliance with existing legal obligations.41 1.  Scope of Application The Network Enforcement Act is only applicable to social media networks that have two million or more registered users in Germany.42 Social media networks are defined as \"telemedia service providers that operate online platforms with the intent to make a profit and on which users can share content with other users or make that content publicly available.\"43 The Act does not apply to platforms that post original journalistic content, or to email or messaging services.44 2.  Removal of Illegal Hosted Content The Act obligates the covered social media networks to remove content that is \"clearly illegal\"\nwithin twenty-four hours after receiving a user complaint.45 If the illegality of the content is not obvious on its face, the social network has seven days to investigate and delete it. The seven-day deadline may be extended if additional facts are necessary to determine the truthfulness of the information or if the social network hires an outside agency to perform the vetting process (a recognized \"Agency of Regulated Self-Regulation\"). In order to determine whether an act is \"illegal,\" the Network Enforcement Act refers to the Criminal Code, in particular to the provisions on dissemination of propaganda material or use of symbols of unconstitutional organizations, encouragement of the commission of a serious violent offense endangering the state, commission of treasonous forgery, public incitement to crime, incitement to hatred, and defamation, among others.46 3.  Complaint Mechanism and Biannual Reports The social media platforms are obligated to offer their users an easy and transparent complaint mechanism that is constantly available.47 The decisions taken with regard to the complaint and the reasoning behind accepting or rejecting it must be communicated to the complainant and the affected user without undue delay.48 Social media networks that receive more than one hundred complaints about illegal content in a calendar year are required to publish biannual reports in German on how they deal with these complaints. The report has to be published in the Federal Gazette and on the homepage of the social media network one month after the end of each half-year period.49 The report must be easily identifiable, immediately accessible, and permanently available.50 It must include information on the general efforts to prevent illegal actions on the platform, a description of the complaint procedure, the number of complaints received, the number and qualifications of employees who are handling the complaints, the network's association memberships, the number of times an external party has been used to decide the illegality of the content, the number of complaints that led to the content being deleted, the time it took to delete the content, and measures that were taken to inform the complainant and the member who posted the deleted content.51 4.  Fines A social media network that intentionally or negligently violates certain of the abovementioned obligations may be fined up to 50million (about US$57.8 million).52 If the Ministry of Justice wants to fine a company because it considers the content that was not deleted to be illegal, it must\n\nfirst obtain a court decision to this effect.53 The court decision is final and binding on the Ministry of Justice.54\n\nIII. Access to Accurate Legal Information The German federal and state governments as well as the courts provide free access to legal information online. The Federal Law Gazette as well as all the state law gazettes can be viewed online.55 The Federal Law Gazette is also available as a free app.56 The Federal Ministry of Justice publishes almost all laws online and provides English translations for selected laws.57 The same website provides links to administrative regulations of the Federal Ministries58 and to the jurisprudence of all federal courts.59 The Justice Portal of the Federation and the states provides links to the jurisprudence of all federal as well as state courts.60 It also provides access to various other online services, including links to all state legislation.61 On the website of the German Bundestag (parliament), citizens can access parliamentary documentation for the Bundestag and the Bundesrat, the constitutional body through which the states participate in the legislative process, including draft laws and explanatory memoranda, verbatim records of parliamentary sessions, and answers to parliamentary requests, among others.62\n\nJUSTIZ UND FUR VERBRAUCHERSCHUTZ [FEDERAL MINISTRY FOR JUSTICE AND CONSUMER PROTECTION], http://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/aktuell.html (last visited Feb. 27, 2019), *archived at*\nhttp://perma.cc/6BRW-3Z6Q. 58 Verwaltungsvorschriften nach Normgeber sortiert [*Administrative Regulations Sorted by Author*], BUNDESREGIERUNG [FEDERAL GOVERNMENT], http://www.verwaltungsvorschriften-im-internet.de/ erlassstellen.html (last visited Feb. 27, 2019), *archived at* http://perma.cc/WT9W-YA3Z. 59 Rechtsprechung im Internet [*Jurisprudence Online*], BUNDESMINISTERIUM DER JUSTIZ UND FUR VERBRAUCHERSCHUTZ [FEDERAL MINISTRY FOR JUSTICE AND CONSUMER PROTECTION], http://www.recht sprechung-im-internet.de/jportal/portal/page/bsjrsprod.psml (last visited Feb. 27, 2019), archived at http://perma.cc/PL37-WL7C. 60 JUSTIZPORTAL DES BUNDES UND DER LANDER [JUSTICE PORTAL OF THE FEDERATION AND THE STATES], https://justiz.de/onlinedienste/rechtsprechung/index.php (last visited Feb. 27, 2019), *archived at*\nhttp://perma.cc/4CU8-7ALM. 61 Onlinedienste [*Online Services*], JUSTIZPORTAL DES BUNDES UND DER LANDER, https://justiz.de/onlinedienste/\n\n## Israel\n\nRuth Levush Senior Foreign Law Specialist\n\n\nSUMMARY\nIsraeli legislators and officials have raised concerns over threats posed by the possible\ndissemination of false information by private individuals and foreign powers. These concerns have been heightened by the approaching 2019 elections and warnings by Israel's heads of security services.\nA high-level committee of experts appointed by the President to examine the current\nlaw on campaign advertising (\"propaganda\") issued its report in November 2017. The report recommended extending application of the substantive provisions of the Elections (Modes of Propaganda) Law to the internet and social platforms to ensure fairness and transparency, and to require disclosure of the identifying information of those persons on whose behalf the election advertisement was published. Bills based on the committee's recommendations, as well as other pending bills addressing threats\nposed by the dissemination of fake news, have not yet been adopted.\nOpponents of government control of the dissemination of information have opined that\nsuch control constitutes a threat to the democratic nature of the state because, among\nother things, it would violate freedom of expression.\nIn adjudicating fake news-related claims, judicial bodies have evaluated legal aspects\nof the dissemination of fake news based on general principles of law. The Israel Central Elections Committee has ordered the Ministry of Education to remove misleading information intending to serve as promotional material in violation of the Elections (Modes of Propaganda) Law. Addressing non-election-related misleading and defamatory information, the Tel Aviv District Court recognized liability for defamation\nunder the Prohibition on Defamation Law, 5725-1965 for sharing defamatory posts on Facebook.\nIsraeli media and international corporations active in Israel have, for their part, adopted\npolicies to confront threats posed by fake news. While one of Israel's leading newspapers has launched a fact-checking system, both Facebook and Google have announced the adoption of special measures designed to block certain types of electionrelated ads.\nI. Introduction Many in Israel have shared concerns about the dissemination of false information (\"fake news\"), especially in the digital era. These concerns are reflected in legislative developments as well as in\nmedia and academic reports. A 2017 report by the Knesset (Israel's parliament) Information and Research Center (KIRC)\nrecognized that dissemination of fake news as real facts was not a new phenomenon, as it had\napparently existed even before the invention of print.1 However, the availability of cyber technology in modern times might facilitate much larger-scale manipulation of political processes by both private individuals recruited by political rivals and by foreign powers.2 Concerns regarding the impact of technology on the dissemination of fake news have resulted in various legislative and judicial developments. Israel's Central Elections Committee has similarly engaged in attempts to protect the integrity of elections. Israeli media, Google, and Facebook, on their part, have also undertaken various commitments to fight the phenomenon. This report describes potential threats posed by fake news to the Israeli legal system and especially to the upcoming April 2019 elections. The report discusses legislative and administrative steps taken by Israeli government agencies and by the private sector to counter fake news.\n\nII. Means of Viral Dissemination of  Fake News KIRC's report surveys the potential means of cyber dissemination of fake news, including social bots, active measures, and hybrid warfare.\n\nA. Social Bots Social bots consist of digital algorithms that are designed to look like real social media users, thereby serving as a platform for the intentional dissemination of content for a variety of interests, including commercial, political, or criminal, all designed to use a fictitious identity to influence the flow of information and its dissemination.3\n\nB. Active Measures Active measures may include certain overt and covert techniques used to influence the policies of another government, undermine confidence in its leaders and institutions, disrupt international relations, and discredit and weaken governmental and nongovernmental opponents. Citing Professor Roy Godson's written testimony to the US Senate Select Committee on Intelligence on March 30, 2017, KIRC's report notes that active measures frequently involve attempts to deceive foreign governmental and nongovernmental actors or mass audiences, and to distort their perception of reality.4\n\nC. Hybrid Warfare Citing Christopher Chivvis's testimony before the US House Armed Services Committee on March 22, 2017, KIRC's report notes that one of the main characteristics of hybrid warfare is that it concentrates on the targeted country's population itself, including by cyberattacks and political influence.5\n\nIII. Government Publications\n\nFree access to legal information and services in Israel is available on a national law portal.6 The Ministry of Justice website routinely posts copies of legal publications published in *Rashumot* (the official gazette).7 The Israeli Judicial Authority website publishes Supreme Court decisions and provides access to a variety of services.8  Government ministries and the Prime Minister's office maintain websites and post information via such websites.\n\nIV. Specific Warning of Foreign Threats to the Integrity of the 2019 Elections Awareness of potential threats posed by false news has increased, particularly in the context of elections. According to Israeli scholars,\n[c]yber threats to the election process in democratic countries may be categorized as threats that aim to disrupt the process through technological tools designed to corrupt information systems and the polling and voting systems, and as material threats to democratic institutions by sullying their good name and by undermining the public's faith in them. While the first category of threats is well known and countries are well prepared to contend with them, the secondwhich is more abstractis a new type of threat that requires appropriate consideration and analysis.9\n\nConcerns over online dissemination of misleading information have been heightened in anticipation of the upcoming Israeli national elections scheduled for April 9, 2019.10  According to Israeli news reports, on January 7, 2019, Nadav Argaman, Israel's Shin Bet (General Security Service) Chief, said that a  foreign country intends to intervene in Israel's upcoming election via hackers and cyber technology, but that \"it remains unclear at this point what the foreign nation's political interests are.\"11 Erez Kriner, former head of the Shin Bet Agency for Cybersecurity, opined that there were several regional entities, in addition to Russia, that might be interested in influencing the Israeli elections:\nTurkey, Syria, Iran, the Palestinian Authority, and Hamas.12 An Israeli cybersecurity company, however, estimated that Iran, Russia, and China pose the biggest threats, as they seek \"to influence the outcome of elections or undermine confidence in the democratic process . . .  [and]\nhave the most money and people.\"13 Among threats to the conduct of fair elections are voter data breaches, the hacking of party systems, and denial-of-service attacks on official sites:\nIn the end, however, what might present the biggest threat comes from people trying to manipulate opinions by disseminating misleading information online; for example, by using fake Facebook profiles. . . . [T]he number of bots - fictitious social media users - could be enormous. Bots can be set up and maintained for three or four years and activated as an election gets underway. . . . The challenge is to maintain credibility and public trust in the process . . . . Sometimes it's enough to force down a government site for a few hours in order to instill public doubts about the cleanliness of the system.14\n\nAccording to Mossad (Israel's Secret Intelligence Service) Chief Tamir Pardo, \"what we've seen so far with respect to bots and the distortion of information is just the tip of the iceberg. It is the greatest threat of recent years, and it threatens the basic values that we sharedemocracy and the world order created since World War Two.\"15\n\n\nV. Committee for Examination of the Elections (Modes of Propaganda) Law Concerns for threats to the election process in Israel led to the appointment of a special committee to examine the threats and find ways to address them. On July 8, 2015, Israel's President Reuven Rivlin and Justice Salim Joubran, the Chairman of the Central Elections Committee (CEC) for the 20th Knesset, appointed the Committee for Examination of the   )  ,(\"- (Elections (Modes of Propaganda) Law, 5719-\n1959) (CEEMPL). 16 This Law governs the broadcasting of election messages in Israel.17 The CEEMPL was established in response to past CEC chairs' recommendations to reform the Law, and adjust its provisions to reflect technological changes. The CEEMPL included former President of the Supreme Court Dorit Beinish, former Minister of Justice Dan Meridor, former Knesset Member Itshak Levi, Professor Suzi Navot, and Professor Karin Nahon. The CEEMPL\nissued a comprehensive report and recommendations to the President on November 21, 2017.18\nThe report states that the Law was enacted in the pre-internet era. 19 It provides that the Supreme Court has called on a number of occasions for reformation of the Law in view of technological and telecommunication developments that have taken place over the years.20 One of the report's main recommendations was to extend the application of substantive provisions of the Law to the internet and to social platforms.21 An additional recommendation was to add to the Law a special provision specifying its objectives as the regulation of election propaganda, \"[i]n fairness and transparency and in accordance with principles of freedom of expression, equal opportunity among candidates in elections and the dignity of men.\"22 A draft bill proposed by the CEEMPL clarified that transparency required disclosure of identifying information of the person, candidate, or candidates' list on behalf of whom the election advertisement was published, including on the internet.23\n\n\nVI. Legislative Responses\n\nA. Bills Addressing Threats to Integrity of Election Process\n\nFollowing the issuance of the CEEMPL report, the Knesset Constitution, Law and Justice Committee drafted the Elections (Modes of Propaganda) (Amendment No. 34) Bill, 5778-2018.24\nThe bill proposes, among other things, adding a section 2A1 to the Propaganda Law.25  The proposed section would require an election ad to include the name and address of the person responsible for ordering it. If that person acted on the behalf of a competing person, party, or a Knesset candidates' list, or on behalf of another body, the election ad would need to identify them.26 The bill defines \"election ad\" as either \"election propaganda done by a person competing in the election, by a body connected to a party group, a body active in the elections or on their behalf,\"27\nor as \"the content of election propaganda that was written or disseminated for a fee.\"28 For the purpose of transparency of the latter, a fee includes monetary and nonmonetary payment, provision of service, or any other benefit.29 According to the bill's explanatory notes, the distribution of any election ad, including on internet platforms and social media, is subject to the requirement of transparency. This requirement does not apply to ads circulated by individuals acting on their own, who are not paid or who do not pay for writing or distributing the ads.30 Although the bill passed the first of the three readings required for adoption into legislation, there appears to have been no further progress regarding its adoption.31 An additional bill focusing on the transparency of election propaganda was proposed by six Knesset Members on November 5, 2018. This private members' draft bill does not appear to have yet been considered.32\n\n24 Elections (Modes of Propaganda) (Amendment No. 34), 5778-2018, HATSAOT HOK [HH] [KNESSET DRAFT\nhttps://perma.cc/S6GH-NJU5. 25 *Id.*  5.\n\nB. Bill Addressing Foreign Propaganda A private members bill targeting propaganda directed by foreign countries was submitted on December 3, 2018, by three Knesset Members. According to explanatory notes to this bill, its intention was \"to prevent advertising propaganda from abroad, or by corporations that are prohibited from donating to Knesset candidates' lists.\"33 The bill proposes to authorize the head of the CEC, who is a serving justice in the Supreme Court, to issue an injunction preventing the receipt of prohibited donations, monetary or otherwise, in accordance with the Parties Financing Law, 5733-1973.34\n\nC. \"Facebook Laws\" Two additional bills were submitted to the Knesset in December 2016. The bills, dubbed\n\"Facebook Laws,\" called for the removal of prohibited content from the internet. The first was a private members bill that required a webmaster to remove from a social platform content that incites the commission of terrorist acts and sought to impose fines on violators.35 The government submitted its own bill on December 28, 2016. The government bill called for authorizing the Administrative Matters Court, under conditions enumerated by law, to issue a decree requiring the removal or disabling of the identification of content that constitutes a criminal act where there was a real possibility that continued publication would harm the safety of a person, public safety, or state security.36 The bill was reportedly withdrawn per Prime Minister Netanyahu's request.37\n\n\nLaws/Pages/LawBill.aspx?t=lawsuggestionssearch&lawitemid=2074696 (click on link at left), *archived at* https://perma.cc/5PD8-FXWS. archived at https://perma.cc/S5YM-9HLN. 34 Id.; Political Parties (Financing) Law 5733-1973, SH,  5733 No. 680 p. 52. For information on the financing of national elections in Israel see Ruth Levush, *Campaign Finance: Israel*, LAW LIBRARY OF CONGRESS (Apr. 2009), https://www.loc.gov/law/help/campaign-finance/israel.php, *archived at* https://perma.cc/9L63-BLF2.\n\n35 Removal of Inciting Advertisement Published on a Social Network Platform, Bill, 5776-2016 (Private Members Draft Bill) (June 27, 2016), https://main.knesset.gov.il/Activity/Legislation/Laws/Pages/Law Bill.aspx?t=lawsuggestionssearch&lawitemid=577014 , *archived at* https://perma.cc/4GSB-RX8R. 36 Removal from the Internet of Content the Publication of which Constitutes an Offence, Bill 5777-2016, HATSAOT HOK (Government), Issue No. 1104 p. 741 (Dec. 28, 2016), *available at* https://www.justice.gov.il/\nUnits/Reshomot/publications/Pages/Bill.aspx (click on Issue No. 1104), *archived at* https://perma.cc/2UM2- UC2T. 37 Moran Azulai, *Netanyahu Ordered to Stop Legislative Procedure for Enactment of \"Facebook Law\"*, YNET (July 18,\n2018), https://www.ynet.co.il/articles/0,7340,L-5312098,00.html , *archived at* https://perma.cc/5WF4-GWB7;\nsee also Rafaela Goichman, *Facebook Law Returns: Arden Requests Netanyahu to Re-Promote the Bill*, THE MARKER\n(Dec. 4, 2018), https://www.themarker.com/technation/1.6719704, *archived at* https://perma.cc/8KT5-TDQJ.\n\nA private members bill combining the two 2016 Facebook Bills was submitted on July 17, 2018.\n\nThe 2018 bill called for facilitating, under relevant conditions, the issuance of content removal decrees within forty-eight hours from the filing of an application. It further authorized the issuance of decrees for the removal of content the publication of which constituted a basis for the conviction of a person for an offense. Under certain circumstances, the bill called for authorizing consideration of inadmissible evidence in evaluating the merits of content removal requests.38\nOpponents of the bill argued that it constituted a threat to the democratic nature of the state, as it would violate freedom of expression and allow censorship to be imposed ex parte, and would be based on inadmissible evidence.39\n\nVII. CEC and Court Decisions Involving \"False News\"\n\nA. Duty of Government to Distribute Accurate Information A decision rendered on January 20, 2019, by Hanan Melcer, Deputy Supreme Court President and Chairman of the CEC, addresses the dissemination of misleading information by government institutions in the guise of election propaganda.40 The case involves a petition filed with the CEC against Minister of Education Naftali Benet, who is a candidate in the upcoming election, and the Ministry of Education requesting a halt to the dissemination of an allegedly false message produced by the Ministry asserting that the Minister has been successful in reducing classroom size throughout Israel during Benet's tenure.41 Accepting the petition, Melcer recognized that the message constituted \"election propaganda\" within the meaning of the Election (Modes of Propaganda) Law, and could not be produced or broadcast with public money.42 Melcer's conclusion was based on an examination of the broadcast's \"dominant objective\" as reflected not only by the external circumstances of its publication, but also its substance:\nTherefore, the accuracy of the information presented in the publication, biased editing of material data, omission of details, which may affect the messages presented in the publication may also testify to the propaganda purpose which lies at the basis of the publication, and cast doubt on attempts to present it as useful [and] informative to the public.43\n\n\nThe broadcast of such a message, according to Melcer, violates the constitutional foundation for equality required in the Knesset elections process as it gives preference to the incumbent in relation to other candidates. This inequality, Melcer emphasized, was\n[r]einforced by the phenomenon of \"false news\" (Fake News), which has gained momentum in recent years. The need for publications to be accurate and devoid of any bias or political touch, and it constitutes another reason for imposing a duty on the public authority to adhere to the truth and accuracy in every detail given on its behalf to the public.44 The fear of dissemination of false information, justifies, in Melcer's opinion, a sharpening of the guidelines and directives relating to government publications, to ensure that the \"competent authority will fulfill its function only within the framework of its authority and will not obstruct public officials in activity in violation of . . . [election and government service laws].\"45 Melcer held that any publication intended to be produced or disseminated by a controlled body (generally state and local government and bodies receiving government funding) should be examined by its legal adviser for a determination of its accuracy and compliance with requirements under the Propaganda Law. Publications produced or disseminated in the absence of approval by the legal adviser will be deemed in violation of the prohibition on use of public assets in connection with election under the Propaganda Law.46 The petition was accepted and the respondents were ordered to refrain from publishing the message and to remove it from any internet sites under their control. The Ministry was also ordered to remove the name of the Minister from any references to the Ministry's programs.47\n\nB. Liability of Individual Facebook Users for Publication of Defamatory \"Fake News\" On January 16, 2018, the Tel Aviv District Court partially accepted an appeal over a decision of the Tel Aviv Circuit Court rejecting a suit to recognize liability under the Prohibition on Defamation Law, 5725-1965 (the Defamation Law)48 for the act of \"liking\" and sharing two defamatory posts on Facebook.49\n\n\nAnalyzing the differences between sharing and liking, the Court held that contrary to liking, sharing is based on the intention of a user to transmit content. It therefore complies with the requirement under the Defamation Law that defamatory content must be intended for a specific person other than the actual injured person and must in fact be delivered to the other person.50\n\nVIII. Nongovernmental Responses to Fake News\n\nA. Media Fact Checking Reflecting concerns over fake news, one of Israel's leading newspaper, *Globes*, established a fact checking system, the \"Whistle.\" According to *Globes*,\n[t]he whistle system deals with public statements made by public figures in order to provide the news consumers an essential tool for their informed and critical examination. Through a quick, comprehensive, balanced, and real-time examination of statements\nregarding the day's issues, the whistle seeks to lead a more credible, accurate and factual public and media discourse in Israel. The principles that guide the work of the whistle are precision, accuracy of facts and details, and the use of reliable and open sources (without the use of anonymous sources), regardless of the speaker's identity or the position presented in examined statement. The whistle system operates according to the Press Council Code of Ethics and the Ethics Code of the International Network of Fact-Finding Organizations (IFCN) . . . . The whistle system ranks the statements measured according to the following scores:\n\nThe statement is correct and accurate.\n\nFor the most part, the statement is correct, but it contains an incorrect or inaccurate component.\n\nPartly true - Part of the statement is correct and incomplete, or it does not contain any\nsignificant details that may change its meaning.\n\nFor the most part, a small part of the statement is false and incorrect, or it omits fundamental details in a way that creates a significant deception about its meaning.\n\nWrong statement is not at all true.\n\nDeceptive statement creates false representation or impression, although it is based on\nthe correct facts . . . .51\n\nB. Facebook's Blocking of Paid Election Ads and Fake News\n\nAccording to Israeli media, Facebook has announced that it will block anonymous paid Israeli political ads on its site prior to the April 9, 2019, Knesset election. According to its new policy,\n\"advertisers on Facebook will be required to provide a verified local contact person and\ndisclosure [sic] what was paid for the ad and by whom.\"52 Facebook's commitment to block anonymous ads might address fraudulent depiction of political parties' sponsored ads in the guise of private ads.53 In a January 31, 2019 press release,, Facebook announced that it had removed 783 Pages, groups and accounts for engaging in coordinated inauthentic behavior tied to Iran. There were multiple sets of activity, each localized for a specific country or region, including . . . Israel . . . . The Page administrators and account owners typically represented themselves as locals, often using fake accounts, and posted news stories on current events. This included commentary that repurposed Iranian state media's reporting on topics like Israel-Palestine relations.54\n\nC. Google's Blocking of  Personalized Advertising During the 2019 Election Period Google reportedly informed Israeli media companies in early February 2019 that they will not be able to execute personal advertising on the company's systems until after the April 9 elections.\n\nThis means that Google will block all advertising options related to segmentation (advertising to a segmented audience), retargeting, and using a list of names to anyone engaged in political advertising.55\nJapan Sayuri Umeda Foreign Law Specialist SUMMARY\nFake news has been of concern to the Japanese government and the public in recent years.  Several laws exist that can be utilized to counter fake news.  A study group of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications is deliberating measures to counter fake news.  The government also provides texts of laws and the official gazette online for free.\n\nI.   Overview of the \"Fake News\" Phenomenon Leading Japanese newspapers have become embroiled in a number of fake news scandals in recent years.  One such example involved a famous fake news case circulated by the Asahi Shimbun, one of the leading newspapers in Japan, which published many articles in the 1980s and 90s on the comfort women issue.  Among other things, some of its reports relied on an individual who falsely \"claimed he had forcibly taken Korean women to wartime Japanese military brothels.\"1  It took a long time for these articles to be corrected.  The *Asahi Shimbun* admitted that serious errors had been made in the articles and apologized in its print edition and on its website in 2014.2  Another leading newspaper, the *Mainichi*, published online vulgar articles that \"were sourced from unreliable Japanese tabloids\" from 2001 to 2008, when it admitted that many stories in the articles were untrue and ceased publishing the series.3 Fake news through social media is also becoming a serious issue, although it appears there are not as many extreme fake news cases in Japan as in other countries.  The difficulty of the Japanese language for foreigners prevents fake news postings from outside Japan, according to one expert in journalism.4\n\n2   [*Examination of Comfort Women Reports, Third Party Committee*], ASAHI SHIMBUN, http://www.asahi.com/shimbun/3rd/3rd.html (last visited Feb. 27, 2019), *archived at* https://perma.cc/K67E-UJX5.  The Committee's abridged report dated December 22, 2014, is available in English at http://www.asahi.com/shimbun/3rd/report20150728e.pdf, *archived at* https://perma.cc/H73R- WSU3. 3 Matthew Moore, *Japanese Newspaper Admits Infamous Sex Column Was Untrue*, TELEGRAPH (July 22, 2008), https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/newstopics/howaboutthat/2443937/Japanese-newspaper-admitsinfamous-sex-column-was-untrue.html, *archived at* https://perma.cc/33UX-6NVU. 4  [Hiroyuki Fujii],\n [Japanese Government Lacks the Sense of Impending Crisis of Fake News, At Issue Is News Literacy of Middle-aged and Older, Not Young People], YAHOO JAPAN NEWS (June 21, 2018), https://news.yahoo.co.jp/byline/fujisiro/20180621-00086295/, archived at https://perma.cc/72DH-8TAB.\nIt appears that the government and many people are particularly concerned about post-disaster fake news.  One such notable case involved a false tweet just after the 2016 Kumamoto earthquake by a person far from the City of Kumamoto stating, and appearing to depict via an attached photograph, that a lion in the Kumamoto Zoo was on the loose because of damage caused by the earthquake.  Many neighbors were scared and the Zoo received more than a hundred phone calls inquiring about the matter.5  After an earthquake in Hokkaido in 2018, many fake news reports concerning infrastructure, such as water and cell phone availability, were spread.6  Fake news circulated during elections for public office is also of concern to experts.7  The 2018 Okinawa gubernatorial election was the first public election in which an enormous volume of fake social media news was distributed.  Media outlets and experts are calling for countermeasures against fake news.8\n\nII.  Countering \"Fake News\" A.  Broadcasting Act Japanese law regulates broadcasters and establishes a system to keep broadcasting programs from distorting the facts.  The Broadcasting Act states that, when a broadcaster edits broadcast programs, it must ensure the reporting does not distort the facts.9  The Broadcasting Act also states that a broadcaster must establish a deliberative body for broadcast programs in order to ensure that those programs are appropriate.10  \"A broadcaster must set forth a basic plan relating to the program standards and editing of the broadcast programs and, when it intends to make amendments thereto, must consult with the deliberative body.\"11 In cases where the content of a broadcast is not factual, and the individual who was the subject of an infringement of rights owing to the broadcast complains within three months of the date of the broadcast, the broadcaster must, without delay, investigate whether the information broadcast was factual.  If it finds that the matters were not factual, it must, within two days of the\n\n5  ?? [*Fake News Special: Are You a Victim or Aggressor?*], CLOSE-\nUP GENDAI, NHK (Feb. 7, 2017), http://www.nhk.or.jp/gendai/articles/3930/1.html, *archived at*\nhttps://perma.cc/H5JQ-WDHH. 6  [Ryosuke Hattori],  [True Mechanism of Spreading False Rumors after Hokkaido Earthquake], IT MEDIA (Sept. 11, 2018), https://www.itmedia.co.jp/business/articles/ 1809/11/news036.html, *archived at* https://perma.cc/XG8X-\nPANY. 7  \"\"...[*Election Year: \"Fake News\" in Japan ...*], NHK NEWS WEB (Dec. 25,\n2018), https://www3.nhk.or.jp/news/html/20181225/k10011759211000.html, *archived at*\nhttps://perma.cc/7Z84-2Q7G. 8 ,   [Editorial, *Examination of Fake Information, New Responsibilities*], OKINAMA TIMES (Oct. 16, 2018), https://www.okinawatimes.co.jp/articles/-/330433, *archived at* https://perma.cc/K9V6-S37G. 9 Broadcasting Act, Act No. 132 of 1950, amended by Act No. 96 of 2014, art. 4, para. 1, item 3, http://www.japaneselawtranslation.go.jp/law/detail/?printID=&ft=2&re=02&dn=1&yo=broadcasting&ia=03\nday of making this finding, broadcast a correction or revocation using an appropriate method through the same broadcasting equipment as the broadcasting equipment used in the challenged broadcast.12  A violator is punishable by a fine of not more than 500,000 yen (approximately US$4,500).13  When a broadcaster discovers nonfactual particulars in its broadcasts on its own initiative, it must take the same measures.14 In addition, Nippon Hoso Kyokai (NHK), a government-affiliated public broadcasting corporation, was established based on the Broadcasting Act in order to provide quality programs for the public.15 B.  Penal Code The Penal Code has provisions that may be used to punish persons who post fake news. One provision concerns defamation.  A person who defames another by alleging facts in public is punishable by imprisonment for not more than three years or a fine of not more than 500,000\nyen, regardless of whether such facts are true or false.16  If such act is found to relate to matters of the public interest and to have been conducted solely for the benefit of the public, and if the alleged facts are proven to be true, the person is not punishable.17  Likewise, when the alleged facts concern a public officer or a candidate for election and are proven to be true, the person is not subject to punishment.18 Obstruction of business by spreading fake news is also punishable under the Penal Code.  A person who damages the credit or obstructs the business of another by spreading false rumors is punishable by imprisonment for not more than three years or a fine of not more than 500,000 yen\n(approximately US$ 4,500).  The person who falsely tweeted about a lion on the loose after the Kumamoto earthquake was arrested on the basis of this crime as he obstructed the business of the zoo, but he was not indicted.19\n\n\nC.  Election Law The Public Offices Election Act states that anyone who conducts an election campaign via the internet must make his/her online contact information available for viewers or recipients of the information. 20   The purpose of this provision is to reduce the circulation of defamatory information and\n\"spoofing\"\n(i.e., impersonating another device or user for a malicious purposes).21 A person who seeks to make a candidate win or not win during an election by using a false name or status is punishable by imprisonment for not more than two years or a fine of not more than\n300,000 yen (approximately US$2,700).22  Likewise, a person who publicizes false information about a candidate for the purpose of making the candidate win is punishable by imprisonment for not more than two years or a fine of not more than 300,000 yen.23  If a person publicizes false or distorted information about a candidate for the purpose of making the candidate lose, the person is punishable by imprisonment for not more than four years or a fine of not more than 1\nmillion yen (approximately US$9,000).24 D.  Internet Provider Law The Act on the Limitation of Liability of Internet Providers exempts internet providers from liability when they prevent distribution of the infringing information of others.  In cases where there is a reasonable ground for a provider to believe that the rights of others are infringed without due cause by distribution of the information via its service, the provider may block the information and is not liable for the conduct of the person who sent the information.25  In addition, when a person alleging that his/her rights have been infringed by information distributed via a provider's service asks the provider to take measures to prevent the infringing information from being transmitted, the provider must ask the sender of the infringing information whether he/she agrees with implementing the transmission prevention measures.  If the provider does not receive a notice from the sender indicating disagreement within seven days, the provider is not liable to the sender for any damages caused by the distribution prevention measure implemented regarding the information.26\n\n\nThe waiting period for the sender's reply is shortened from seven days to two days in cases where the request asking a provider to prevent distribution of defamatory information comes from an election candidate.27  If  the contact information of the sender of the defamatory information of the candidate is not available, the provider does not have to submit an inquiry to the sender.28 E.  Discussion of Countermeasures against Fake News in Government The Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications (MIC) formed the Platform Services Study Group and collected relevant agenda items from the public in October 2018.29  In December 2018, the Study Group added the issue of fake news to the agenda.30  In the Study Group's interim report, it stated that it would explore a self-cleaning mechanism for information, examine factchecking systems, and study the voluntary cooperation between platform services and factchecking organizations. The Study Group plans to issue its final report by the end of 2019.31\n\nIII.  Efforts to Provide Accurate Legal Information The Japanese government's e-Government website maintains an online database that includes laws, Cabinet orders, ordinances, and regulations.32  Government agencies' notifications and circulars are available on their websites, and also through e-Gov.33  The content of official gazettes, including the text of legislation, can be searched on the National Printing Bureau's website.34\n\nhttps://perma.cc/PG4U-PFMY. 30  [*Agenda of Platform Services Study Group*], MIC\n(Dec. 21, 2018), http://www.soumu.go.jp/main_content/000591109.pdf, *archived at* https://perma.cc/S2TK-\nZBLC. 31 MIC,  () [PLATFORM SERVICES STUDY GROUP INTERIM REPORT (draft)] 46 (Feb. 13, 2019), http://www.soumu.go.jp/main_content/000600599.pdf, archived at https://perma.cc/9HC7-APG9. 32 E-GOV  [LAW SEARCH], https://elaws.e-gov.go.jp/search/elawsSearch/elaws_search/lsg0100/.\n\n## Kenya\n\nHanibal Goitom Chief, Foreign, Comparative, and International Law Division I\n\nSUMMARY\n The spread of false information, particularly during election seasons, has recently\npresented challenges in Kenya.  Kenya's existing laws, particularly the Penal Code and\nthe Information and Communications Act, bar the dissemination of false information\nin different contexts.\nIn 2017, the Communications Authority of Kenya issued guidelines that include\nprovisions on the responsibility of mobile network operators and mobile virtual network operators to vet political messages they transmit.  The Guidelines also require political content authors to ensure the accuracy of the content they publish.  In addition, they direct social media platform administrators to moderate and control undesirable\ncontents and social media service providers to take down accounts used in the\ndissemination of undesirable political content.\nIn May 2018, Kenya enacted the Computer Misuse and Cyber Crimes Act, which\ncontains provisions that criminalize \"false publication\" and the \"publication of false information.\"  The constitutionality of various parts of the Act, including these two provisions, were immediately challenged before the Constitutional and Human Rights Division of the Kenyan High Court, which suspended the implementation of the provisions pending an outcome of the case.  It appears that the provisions remain suspended to date.\nIn March 2018, the United States Embassy in Kenya launched a one-year media literacy\ncampaign aimed at countering the spread of false information in Kenya.  The program has been expanded with the opening of an academic institution for the study of social media development and trends.\nKenya maintains an information portal, Kenya Law, for the dissemination of accurate\nand authoritative legal information, including legislation, parliamentary debates, and\ncase law. I.  Introduction The phenomenon of the spread of false news, primarily during election seasons, has been particularly challenging for Kenya in recent years.  Although not a new problem, the permeation\nof false information through social media channels during the last few election cycles, particularly\nin the 2013 and 2017 election seasons, has been among the most notable in recent history.1  One\nsource described the phenomenon as follows:\n\nFacebook, WhatsApp and Twitter are perhaps the three most popular social media platforms in Kenya, and have been used to share opinions, predictions and fabrications alike before and after the election. There have been websites as well, designed to give the impression that they are authoritative sources of news, that have carried all sorts of (mis)information and propaganda. As has been widely reported, fake news articles and videos bearing CNN, BBC and even NTV Kenya logos were also disseminated and shared widely on social media platforms.2\n\nThis was not just a case of isolated incidents of improvised individual actions spreading rumors and misinformation; there were allegedly concerted, highly organized efforts to disseminate false information and narratives.  The most notable example of this was the involvement of Cambridge Analytica, a United Kingdom-based political consultancy firm, as a prominent player in the 2013\nand 2017 presidential election seasons.  President Kenyatta of the Jublee Party retained Cambridge Analytica to help manage his 2013 and 2017 presidential runs, both of which he won.3\nAlthough the company denies any involvement in creating and pushing false information, Mark Turnbull, its managing director, was filmed boasting about his organization's influence over the Kenyan elections, stating \"[w]e have rebranded the entire [Jublee] party twice, written their manifesto, done two rounds of 50,000 surveys. . . Then we'd write all the speeches and we'd stage the whole thing. So just about every element of [President Uhuru Kenyatta's] campaign.\"4  On its website, the company is said to have presented its involvement in Kenya in the 2013 election as\n\"the largest political research project ever conducted in East Africa,\" which enabled the crafting of a campaign \"based on the electorate's real needs (jobs) and fears (tribal violence).\"5 The circulation of false information was enhanced due to a number of factors, including a high level of internet penetration in the country and a growing acceptance of social media as a trusted source of news.  Kenya ranks fourteenth in the world in internet speed and close to 90% of its population has internet access.6  A recent survey of two thousand Kenyans found that close to half of those surveyed received news about the general election through social media sources.7\n\n2 Nanjira Sambuli, *How Kenya Became the Latest Victim of 'Fake News'*, AL JAZEERA (Aug. 17, 2018), https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2017/08/kenya-latest-victim-fake-news-170816121455181.html, archived at https://perma.cc/62U4-XUGG.\n3 Eric Auchard, *Cambridge Analytica State-Managed Kenya President's Campaigns: UK TV*, REUTERS (Mar. 19, 2018), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-facebook-cambridge-analytica-kenya/cambridge-analytica-stagemanaged-kenyan-presidents-campaigns-uk-tv-idUSKBN1GV300, *archived at*  https://perma.cc/5ZA3-X7GD. 4 Nick Miriello et al., *Kenyans Face a Fake News Epidemic*, VICE NEWS (Mar. 14, 2019), https://news.vice.com/ en_us/article/43bdpm/kenyans-face-a-fake-news-epidemic-they-want-to-know-just-how-much-cambridgeanalytica-and-facebook-are-to-blame, archived at https://perma.cc/B462-LLBU; Justina Crabtree, Here's How Cambridge Analytica Played a Dominant Role in Kenya's Chaotic 2017 Elections, CNBC (Mar. 23, 2018), https://www.cnbc.com/2018/03/23/cambridge-analytica-and-its-role-in-kenya-2017-elections.html, archived at https://perma.cc/F386-VHXU.\n\nAccording to another source, during the 2017 election season, due in part to the loss of faith in mainstream media, growing number of Kenyans turned to social media for information.8  The source noted that the \"dominance [of mainstream media] has been violently disrupted. Social media burst onto the scene as a new regime of information production and dissemination, operating unencumbered by the structural and political limitations the country's mainstream media often face.\"9 According to the above-noted survey, 90% of the participants \"suspected having seen or heard false / inaccurate information [on social media] regarding the [2017] election.\"10 Adding further complications is the country's history of ethnic tension that often turns violent during election season.  For instance, following the 2007 election ethnic based violence erupted, which claimed 1,400 lives and displaced as many as 600,000 people.11  Although not at the scale of the 2007 post-election event, the 2017 election also saw some violence in which twenty-four people were killed.12 This report looks at existing and new initiatives to curb the spread of false information and the challenges associated with such endeavors.\n\nII.  Legal Framework A.  Existing Laws\n\n1.  Penal Code The Penal Code criminalizes what it calls \"alarming publications.\"  It states that \"[a]ny person who publishes any false statement, rumour or report which is likely to cause fear and alarm to the public or to disturb the public peace is guilty of a misdemeanor.\"13  A person found to have committed this offense is, on conviction, subject to a custodial sentence not exceeding two years and/or a fine.14  The Code further states that \"[i]t shall be a defence to a charge under [the\n\"alarming publications\" clause] if the accused proves that, prior to publication, he took such\n\nmeasures to verify the accuracy of the statement, rumour or report as to lead him reasonably to believe that it was true.\"15 The Code also criminalizes defamation.  The relevant provisions state:\n194. Definition of libel Any person who, by print, writing, painting or effigy, or by any means otherwise than solely by gestures, spoken words or other sounds, unlawfully publishes any defamatory matter concerning another person, with intent to defame that other person, is guilty of the misdemeanour termed libel. 195. Definition of defamatory matter. Defamatory matter is matter likely to injure the reputation of any person by exposing him to hatred, contempt or ridicule, or likely to damage any person in his profession or trade by an injury to his reputation; and it is immaterial whether at the time of the publication of the defamatory matter the person concerning whom the matter is published is living or dead. 196. Definition of publication\n(1) A person publishes a libel if he causes the print, writing, painting, effigy or other means by which the defamatory matter is conveyed to be so dealt with, either by exhibition, reading, recitation, description, delivery or otherwise, that the defamatory meaning thereof becomes known or is likely to become known to either the person defamed or any other person.\n(2) It is not necessary for libel that a defamatory meaning should be directly or completely expressed; and it suffices if such meaning and its application to the person alleged to be defamed can be collected either from the alleged libel itself or from any extrinsic circumstances, or partly by the one and partly by the other means. 197. Definition of unlawful publication Any publication of defamatory matter concerning a person is unlawful within the meaning of this Chapter, unless\n(a) the matter is true and it was for the public benefit that it should be published; or\n(b) it is privileged on one of the grounds hereafter mentioned in this Chapter.16 2.  Kenya Information and Communications Act This Act criminalizes the \"improper use\" of a telecommunication system, stating that anyone who, through a licensed telecommunication system,\n(a) sends a message or other matter that is grossly offensive or of an indecent, obscene or menacing character; or\n\n(b) sends a message that he knows to be false for the purpose of causing annoyance,\ninconvenience or needless anxiety to another person,\ncommits an offence and shall be liable on conviction to a fine not exceeding fifty thousand shillings, or to imprisonment for a term not exceeding three months, or to both.17 The Act also criminalizes unlawful the sending of misleading messages.  It states that\n[a]ny person who\n\n(a) by means of radio communication, sends or attempts to send any message which to his knowledge is false or misleading and is to his knowledge likely to prejudice the efficiency of any safety-of-life service or endanger the safety of any person, or of any vessel, aircraft or vehicle, and, in particular, any message which to his knowledge falsely suggests that a vessel or aircraft is in distress or in need of assistance or is not in distress or not in need of assistance; or\n\n(b) otherwise than under the authority of the Minister for the time being responsible for internal security\n\n(i) uses any radio communication apparatus with intent to obtain information as to the contents, sender or addressee of any message, (whether sent by means of radio communication or not) which neither the person using the station or apparatus nor any person on whose behalf he is acting is authorised to receive; or\n(ii) except in the course of legal proceedings or for the purposes of any report thereon, discloses any information as to the contents, sender or addressee of any such message, being information which would not have come to his knowledge but for the use of the radio communication station or radio communication apparatus by him or by any other person acting on his behalf, commits an offence and shall be liable on conviction to a fine not exceeding one million shillings, or to imprisonment for a term not exceeding five years, or both.18 3.  Guidelines on Prevention of Dissemination of Undesirable Bulk and Premium Rate Political Messages and Political Social Media Content via Electronic Communication Networks In July 2017, based on authority accorded to it under the Kenya Information and Communications Act and the Kenya Information and Communications (Consumer Protection) Regulations, the Communications Authority of Kenya, in collaboration with the National Cohesion and Integration Commission, issued the Guidelines on Prevention of Dissemination of Undesirable Bulk and Premium Rate Political Messages and Political Social Media Content via Electronic Communication Networks (the Guidelines).19\n\nThe Guidelines require that, before transmitting a political message,20 mobile network operators\n(MNOs) and mobile virtual network operators (MVNOs) must vet its content to, among others, ensure that it is not misleading or confusing.21  It further states that content service providers must \"take legal responsibility for the content of Political Messages and shall fully indemnify and keep indemnified MNOs and MVNOs against any claims that may arise out of those Political Messages.\"22 The Guidelines include a section on political social media guidelines.  The \"accuracy and accountability\" clause in the section states that \"[i]t shall be the responsibility of the political content author to authenticate, validate the source and truthfulness of their content prior to publishing to limit information that might spread rumors, mislead or cannot be supported by facts.\"23  The \"truthful posting and publishing\" clause states that \"[p]olitical content authors shall at all times maintain honesty and accuracy in their publications and shall be responsible for all their content as published.\"24 In addition to political content authors, the Guidelines also impose certain responsibilities on social media platform administrators and social media service providers.  The Guidelines state that \"[i]t shall be the responsibility of the Administrator of a social media platform to moderate and control undesirable contents and discussions that have been brought to their attention on their platform.\"25  The Guidelines further state that \"[s]ocial media service providers shall be required to pull down accounts used in disseminating undesirable political contents on their platform that have brought to their attention within 24 hours.\"26 Undesirable political content includes content containing information \"that is likely to mislead through inaccuracy, ambiguity, exaggeration, omission or otherwise and it should be clear to the consumers when time-sensitive information was last updated.\"27\n\n\nThe Guidelines state that anyone \"who knowingly spreads undesirable political content via social media networks shall be penalized according to the [National Cohesion and Integration Act],\nPenal Code and other relevant laws.\"28 B.  Recent Legislative Proposal\n\nIn May 2018, President Uhuru Kenyatta signed into law the Computer Misuse and Cyber Crimes\nAct.29  This law includes a provision criminalizing \"false publication,\" which states as follows:\n\n(1) A person who intentionally publishes false, misleading or fictitious data or misinforms\nwith intent that the data shall be considered or acted upon as authentic, with or without any financial gain, commits an offence and shall, on conviction, be liable to a fine not exceeding five million shillings or to imprisonment for a term not exceeding two years, or to both.\n\n(2) Pursuant to Article 24 of the Constitution, the freedom of expression under Article 33\nof the Constitution shall be limited in respect of the intentional publication of false, misleading or fictitious data or misinformation that -\n\n(a) is likely to -\n(i)\npropagate war; or\n(ii)\nincite persons to violence;\n\n(b) constitutes hate speech;\n\n(c) advocates hatred that -\n(i)\nconstitutes ethnic incitement, vilification of others or incitement to\ncause harm; or\n(ii)\nis based on any ground of discrimination specified or contemplated in Article 27(4) of the Constitution; or\n(d) negatively affects the rights or reputations of others.30 The Act also criminalizes the \"publication of false information,\" the elements of and punishment\nfor which are as follows:\n\nA person who knowingly publishes information that is false in print, broadcast, data or over a computer system, that is calculated or results in panic, chaos, or violence among citizens of the Republic, or which is likely to discredit the reputation of a person commits\n\nan offence and shall on conviction, be liable to a fine not exceeding five million shillings or to imprisonment for a term not exceeding ten years, or to both.31\n\nDuring the parliamentary debate on the Bill for this Act, Aden Duale, the Majority Leader of Kenya's National Assembly, proposed an amendment to insert the crime of \"publication of false information\" into the Bill.  He described the challenge of fake news, possible solutions to the challenge, and the sources of inspiration for the Bill language as follows:\nHon. Chair, I looked for the term \"fake news\" in law and I could not get it. There is nowhere in law I could find that term. This amendment proposes to introduce and define the scope of the offence of publication of false information to tackle emerging offences of fake news. The ingredients have been informed by the existing legislation from similar jurisdictions in the Philippines and Malaysia. The definition falls within the offences that relate to the scope of the offence within the Bill and that are conducted over a computer. If Members can remember, the late Hon. Biwott \"died\" 10 times through fake news. Mugabe [former president of Zimbabwe] died five times through fake news. When Mzee Moi just went for a knee surgery in Israel, people decided to kill him. There is serious fake news and false publications. I want the Members to support it. The amendment does not offend the provisions of Article 34 of the Constitution. We really looked at it with the Legal Department of Parliament. If you publish false information, the offence is so grave that you either pay Kshs5 million or get a prison sentence not exceeding 10 years or both. Those people who use gadgets to create alarm, false news and publish to harm others must be dealt with under this law.32\n\nCritics have panned the law as another opportunity for the government to clampdown on freedom of expression.  According to a university professor on democracy, \"[t]here is a serious risk that, as has happened in the past with issues such as anti-terror legislation, governments manipulate a genuine issue in order to push repressive changes that are really designed to strengthen their own power.\"33  James Wamathai, the Director of Partnerships at the Bloggers Association of Kenya (BAKE) noted that \"[i]n the past several years, there have been attempts by the government to clamp down on the freedom of expression online.  This Act is a testament of these efforts, especially after other sections were declared unconstitutional by the courts.\"34 This criticisms reflect Kenya's recent regression in the area of press freedom.  According to the\n2018 Press Freedom Index, published by Reporters without Borders (RSF), Kenya ranks ninetysixth in the world in press freedom.35  According to RSF,\n\nKenya has seen a slow erosion of media freedom in recent years. The political situation and security concerns have been used since 2016 as grounds for restricting the freedom to inform.  . . . Journalists can pay dearly for covering opposition events or for portraying President Uhuru Kenyatta's party and its flaws in a negative light. Four commercial TV channels were shut down at the start of 2018 for defying the president's ban on live coverage of opposition leader Raila Odinga's mock inauguration as president. The 2010\nconstitution guarantees freedom of information, but laws criminalize and gag the media.36 On May 30, 2018, in response to a petition from BAKE challenging the constitutionality of many of its provisions and seeking a temporary conservatory order to prevent its implementation, the Constitutional and Human Rights Division of the High Court of Kenya at Nairobi temporarily (until July 18, 2018) suspended various provisions of the Computer Misuse and Cyber Crimes Act pending a full hearing on the matter.37  The suspension order included the \"false publication\"\nand \"publication of false information\" clauses of the Act.38  On June 11, 2018, the government returned to court seeking to have the suspension lifted.  The Court rejected the government's petition to end the suspension.39  It appears that these provisions currently remain suspended. III.  Education Campaign On March 14, 2018, the United States Embassy in Kenya started a media literacy campaign known as \"YALI Checks: Stop.Reflect.Verify.\" to counter the spread of false information in Kenya.40\nLaunched with a mass email to the 47,000 members of the Kenya chapter of the Young African Leaders Initiative (YALI), the purpose of the campaign was described as follows:\n\nOver the course of the year, the campaign will provide a mix of online activities, including an email series, an online quiz, blog posts, online chats, public outreach, educational videos, and an online pledge. The Embassy's five American Spaces, which reach across Kenya, will also provide platforms for in-person and virtual discussions with experts on media literacy tools. Additional components of the campaign will include tapping\n\nFulbright and other professional exchange programs to provide training opportunities both in Kenya and in the United States on ways to stop the spread of fake news.41 In an October 2018 report, the Office of Inspector General of the US Department of State highlighted the program as a success, noting that \"[e]xpanding on the successes of the \"YALI\nChecks\" program, the [US] embassy launched Africa's first academic institution for the study of social media development and trends, in partnership with U.S. International UniversityAfrica in April 2018.\"42\n\nIV.  Government Legal Information Portals Kenya maintains a central, free legal database where citizens can locate case law and legislation. Administered by the National Council for Law Reporting, a semi-autonomous state corporation, which is the official publisher of the Kenya Law Reports and the Laws of Kenya, this database serves as the official online source for government material.43  Among other documents, it makes available case law, acts, subsidiary legislation, and records of parliamentary debates.44  Some courts in the country also publish a limited number of their decisions on the judiciary website.45\nvisited Mar. 18, 2019), *archived at* https://perma.cc/XKT3-MH5E; *Court of Appeal: Decisions*, JUDICIARY, https://www.judiciary.go.ke/courts/court-of-appeal/#decisions (last visited, Mar. 18, 2019), *archived at* https://perma.cc/W8LQ-ZBHH.\nMalaysia Kelly Buchanan Foreign Law Specialist SUMMARY\nMalaysia's Anti-Fake News Act 2018 was widely criticized when it was enacted in April 2018. Commentators and rights groups considered that the Act was vague and contained an overly broad definition of fake news, and the then-government was accused of seeking to stifle criticism of the administration. Following elections in May\n2018, the new government sought to repeal the Act, but the bill was defeated in the upper house of the Parliament in September 2018. It is unclear at this stage whether the government will again seek its repeal or introduce amendments. The government also undertook to review and possibly repeal several other laws that are considered oppressive and restrictive of free speech, including those that have been used to target what could be termed \"fake news.\" However, despite earlier announcing an enforcement moratorium, it has recently indicated a willingness to apply some of these laws in certain situations.\n\nA government agency operates a fact-checking portal and app, where people can search for and submit information being circulated online in order to check its accuracy. Agencies also use social media to correct false information related to government activities. In addition, legal information is available through government web portals, including statute law, regulations, bills and other parliamentary information, and court decisions.\n\nI.  Fake News and Freedom of Speech in Malaysia Malaysia has consistently received a low rating in global indices related to freedom of speech, including the World Press Freedom Index, in which it was ranked 145 out of 180 countries in\n2018,1 and the Freedom House Freedom of the Press report, in which it was given a \"not free\"\nrating in 2017.2 Freedom House also noted a decline in internet freedom in the country in 2018, primarily as a result of the passage and subsequent initial enforcement of the Anti-Fake News Act 2018.3\n\nThe Anti-Fake News Act 2018 was passed by the Malaysian Parliament in April 2018,4 a few weeks before national elections were to be held. The legislation was the subject of widespread\n\ncriticism by human rights organizations and there were accusations that it was passed to curtail speech that was critical of the government, including reporting on corruption investigations that implicated the then-Prime Minister.5 The current coalition government, which was formed following the elections held in May 2018\nand represents the first change in government in nearly sixty years,6 has undertaken to enhance human rights protections in Malaysia, including through the possible repeal or amendment of certain laws, including the Printing Presses and Publications Act 1984, Sedition Act 1948, Peaceful Assembly Act 2012,  Prevention of Crime Act 1959, Security Offences (Special Measures) Act 2012, Prevention of Terrorism Act 2015, and mandatory death sentence provisions.7 As a result, commentators expressed hope for a \"new dawn\" for freedom of the press in the country.8 The new Prime Minister also initially promised to review and amend the Anti-Fake News Act\n2018,9 but the government later introduced a bill for its full repeal.10 Explanatory information accompanying the bill states that its seeks to repeal the Act due to the change in the policy of the Government that fake news may be dealt with under existing laws such as the Penal Code [Act 574], the Printing Presses and Publications Act 1984 [Act 301] and the Communications and Multimedia Act 1998 [Act\n588]. As such, Act 803 is no longer relevant.11\n\n\nRIGHTS WATCH (Mar. 29, 2018), https://www.hrw.org/news/2018/03/29/malaysia-drop-proposed-fakenews-law, *archived at* https://perma.cc/R56R-XWXT. 6 *See Malaysia Election: Opposition Scores Historic Victory*, BBC NEWS (May 10, 2018), https://www.bbc.com/ news/world-asia-44036178, *archived at* https://perma.cc/4FKT-7FGW.\n7  *Malaysia to Review Seven 'Unsuitable' National Security Laws: Muhyiddin*, CHANNEL NEWSASIA (May 22, 2018), https://www.channelnewsasia.com/news/asia/malaysia-to-review-seven-unsuitable-national-security-laws-\n10257488, *archived at* https://perma.cc/EY9Q-2XQ4. 8 Scilla Alecci, *After Black Magic, Censorship and Detention Comes New Dawn for Malaysian Press*, INTERNATIONAl CONSORTIUM OF INVESTIGATIVE JOURNALISTS (June 6, 2018), https://www.icij.org/blog/2018/06/after-blackmagic-censorship-and-detention-comes-new-dawn-for-malaysian-press/, *archived at* https://perma.cc/HXK3- RQER. *See also* Kristian Porter, *Hope for Media Freedom in Malaysia?*, PUBLIC MEDIA ALLIANCE (Sept. 14, 2018), https://www.publicmediaalliance.org/hope-for-media-freedom-in-malaysia/, *archived at* https://perma.cc/ EJ4E-F9L4; David Boyle, *Malaysian Press Await Promised Reforms*, VOICE OF AMERICA (June 12, 2018), https://www.voanews.com/a/malaysian-press-await-promised-reforms/4435008.html, archived at https://perma.cc/3JMD-8Z6Z. 2018/DR/D.R. 14_2018 -ENG.pdf, *archived at* https://perma.cc/HH6E-Z9DQ.\n\nThe lower house of the Parliament voted in favor of a repeal bill in August 2018. However, the upper house, which is still controlled by supporters of the previous government, voted against the bill in September 2018.12 Under the Malaysian Constitution, the lower house can pass the bill again after a one-year period has elapsed and, should the upper house again fail to pass it, the bill can subsequently be presented for assent.13 It is unclear at this stage whether the government will propose amendments to the legislation or again seek its full repeal. In October 2018, the government instituted a moratorium on the enforcement of provisions in certain laws that affect freedom of speech and other human rights, including the Sedition Act\n1948, section 233 of the Communications and Multimedia Act 1998 (see below), and other laws that were subject to review.14 However, it has subsequently indicated that it could use these laws in response to emergency situations that threaten national security, public order, or race relations, such as riots that took place in November 2018 at a temple in Subang Jaya following the spread of information on social media regarding its possible relocation.15 In addition, the government recently announced that it had decided to retain two laws that had been under review, the Prevention of Crime Act 1959 and the Security Offences (Special Measures) Act\n2012,16 and has proposed a new law to protect the monarchy from insult and criticism.17 Given this context, the problem of \"fake news\" in Malaysia can be difficult to define and assess. On the one hand, the country's leaders have been accused of using similar terms and various laws to stifle dissent or criticism of the government.18 On the other, as in countries around the Bill Abolishing Anti-Fake News Law a Backwards Step, ARTICLE 19 (Sept. 13, 2018), https://www.article19.org/ resources/malaysia-senates-rejection-of-bill-abolishing-anti-fake-news-law-a-backwards-step/, *archived at* https://perma.cc/27NG-LSLF. 13 FEDERAL CONSTITUTION OF MALAYSIA, art. 68, http://www.agc.gov.my/agcportal/uploads/files/ Publications/ FC/Federal Consti (BI text).pdf, *archived at* https://perma.cc/F96H-K999. 14 *See* Shakira Buang, *Temple Riots: Cabinet Gives Approval to Enforce Sedition Act*, MALAYSIAKINI (Dec. 2, 2018), https://www.malaysiakini.com/news/454395, *archived at* https://perma.cc/G59H-DMA8.\n15 *Id. See also* Nadia Hamid & Mohamad Ridzuan Anwar, Moratorium on Draconian Laws Suspended on Issues Threatening National Security, Public Order, Race Relations, NEW STRAITS TIMES (Dec. 3, 2018), https://www.nst.\n\ncom.my/news/nation/2018/12/436806/moratorium-draconian-laws-suspended-issues-threatening-nationalsecurity; Press Release, Malaysian Bar, Don't Break Your Promise, Pakatan Told After 'Oppressive' Laws Allowed For Use (Dec. 7, 2018), http://www.malaysianbar.org.my/legal/general_news/dont_break_ your_promise_pakatan_told_after_oppressive_laws_allowed_for_use.html, *archived at* https://perma.cc/DF5J- BV6H. 16 *See* Press Release, Malaysian Bar, Government Must Fulfil Pledge to Abolish All Oppressive Laws (Jan. 5,\n2019), http://www.malaysianbar.org.my/press_statements/press_release_%7C_government_must_fulfil_\npledge_to_abolish_all_oppressive_laws.html, *archived at* https://perma.cc/2B7W-5VPX.\nworld, there does exist a potential threat to democracy and society from various actors, including those in other countries, creating fake news and disseminating this anonymously using social media. One commentator on the Malaysian situation recently noted that,\n[m]ore often than not, everyday fake news cases are relatively harmless. This points to an important fact to appreciate. The spectrum of harm caused by fake news is extremely broad, and legitimate questions abound on whether these cases need to be dealt with via the law. Regardless, this makes the case for delicate legislating - legislators need to be deliberate in approaching any regulation on fake news. Regulating fake news inevitably raises questions of censorship and potential infringement of the fundamental freedom of speech. Contextually, no freedom is limitless but the onus is on legislators to restrict freedoms only to the extent absolutely necessary to achieve the goal.19 As with others who raised concerns about the legislation, he opined that the Anti-Fake News Act 2018 does not meet such a test as it is overly vague, contains a \"problematically broad\"\ndefinition of fake news, and imposes \"disproportionately high\" punishments on creators, disseminators, and publishers of such information.20 II.  National Approach to Fake News A.  Anti-Fake News Act 2018 The Anti-Fake News Act 2018 defines \"fake news\" as including \"any news, information, data and reports, which is or are wholly or partly false, whether in the form of features, visuals or audio recordings or in any other form capable of suggesting words or ideas.\"21 The main offense provision in the Act states as follows:\nAny person who, by any means, maliciously creates, offers, publishes, prints, distributes, circulates or disseminates any fake news or publication containing fake news commits an offence and shall, on conviction, by liable to a fine not exceeding five hundred thousand ringgit [approx. US$122,702] or to imprisonment for a term not exceeding six years or to both, and in the case of a continuing offence, to a further fine not exceeding three thousand ringgit [approx. US$736] for every day during which the offence continues after conviction.22\n\n\n\nA court may also order that a person convicted under this provision issue an apology.23\nProviding financial assistance for the purpose of committing the above offense is punishable by the same penalties included in the above provision,24 while failure to immediately remove any publication containing fake news \"after knowing or having reasonable grounds to believe that such publication contains fake news\" is punishable by a fine of up to one hundred thousand ringgit (approx. US$24,540).25 The Act establishes a process for affected persons to seek a court order for the removal of a publication containing fake news.26 If the person who is the subject of such an order fails to remove the content, a police officer or other authorized officer may take \"necessary measures\"\nto remove the publication.27 The Act provides for its extraterritorial application, stating that where an offense is committed by any person, whether a Malaysian citizen or not, outside of Malaysia, and where the fake news concerns Malaysia or affects a Malaysian citizen, it may be dealt with as if it was committed within Malaysia.28 B.  Other Legislation Provisions under several other pieces of legislation may also be utilized to target those accused of publishing or disseminating fake news. The below are among the laws that the new government stated it would review. However, as noted above, the government has recently faced criticism for failing to abolish certain laws and for apparently lifting an enforcement moratorium. 1.  Communications and Multimedia Act 1998 Section 233 of the Communications and Multimedia Act 1998 states:\n(1)\nA person who (a)  by means of any network facilities or network service or applications service knowingly\n(i)  makes, creates or solicits; and (ii)  initiates the transmission of,\n\n\nany comment, request, suggestion or other communication which is obscene, indecent, false, menacing or offensive in character with intent to annoy, abuse, threaten or harass another person; or (b)  initiates a communication using any applications service, whether continuously, repeatedly or otherwise, during which communication may or may not ensue, with or without disclosing his identity and with intent to annoy, abuse, threaten or harass any person at any number or electronic address,\n\ncommits an offence.29 The penalty for an offense under this provision is a fine of up to fifty thousand ringgit (approx. US$12,270) or imprisonment for up to one year, or both, with a further fine of one thousand ringgit (approx. US$245) applying for every day that the offense is continued after conviction.30 2.  Printing Presses and Publications Act 1984 The Printing Presses and Publications Act 1984 requires the licensing of persons who use a printing press and prohibits the use of printing presses for unlawful purposes, including producing any publication or document \"which contains an incitement to violence against persons or property, counsels disobedience to the law or to any lawful order or which is or is likely to lead to a breach of the peace or to promote feelings of ill-will, hostility, enmity, hatred, disharmony or disunity.\"31 The relevant government minister also has the \"absolute discretion\"\nto prohibit the printing, importation, sale, distribution, or possession of a publication that contains anything that is, or is likely to be, prejudicial to \"public order, morality, security, or which is likely to alarm public opinion, or which is or is likely to be prejudicial to public interest or national interest.\"32 Furthermore, section 8A of the Act provides:\n\nWhere in any publication there is maliciously published any false news, the printer, publisher, editor and the writer thereof shall be guilty of an offence and shall, on conviction be liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding three years or to a fine not exceeding twenty thousand ringgit [approx. US$4,908] or to both.33\n\n3.  Sedition Act 1948 The Sedition Act 1948 criminalizes, among other acts, the printing, publishing, selling, offering for sale, distribution, or reproduction of any \"seditious publication.\"34 Such publications are\n\nthose with a \"seditious tendency,\" which includes, for example, having a tendency \"to bring hatred or contempt or to excite disaffection against any Ruler\" or \"to promote feelings of ill will, hostility or hatred between different races or classes of the population of Malaysia.\"35 The penalty under this provision, which was increased by amendments to the Act in 2015, is imprisonment of between three and seven years.36 Other changes to the Act in 2015 enabled the government, through the Malaysian Communications and Multimedia Commission (MCMC), to \"block electronic media that is deemed to be seditious.\"37 The Act now allows the public prosecutor to seek an order from a Sessions Court prohibiting the making or circulation of a seditious publication that is found to be likely to lead to bodily injury or damage to property; or that appears to promote feelings of ill will, hostility or hatred between different races or classes of people in Malaysia, or between persons or groups on the grounds of religion.38 Where such a publication is by electronic means, the order can\n(i)\nrequire the person making or circulating the prohibited publication to remove or cause to be removed wholly or partly the prohibited publication; and\n(ii) prohibit the person making or circulating the publication from accessing any electronic device.39 In addition, a new provision allows a court to make an order \"directing an officer authorized under the Communications and Multimedia Act 1998 [*Act 588*] to prevent access to such publication\" where the person making or circulating it by electronic means cannot be identified.40 4.  Penal Code The Penal Code contains the following offense of defamation:\nWhoever, by words either spoken or intended to be read or by signs, or by visible representations, makes or publishes any imputation concerning any person, intending to harm, or knowing or having reason to believe that such imputation will harm the reputation and shall also be liable to fine of such person, is said, except in the cases hereinafter excepted, to defame that person.41\n\nThe Code penalizes defamation with imprisonment for up to two years.42 Further provisions criminalize \"intentional insult with intent to provoke a breach of the peace,\"\nwhich is punishable with imprisonment for up to two years,43 and the publication or circulation of any statement, rumor, or report\n(b)  with intent to cause, or which his likely to cause, fear or alarm to the public, or to any section of the public where by any person may be induced to commit an offence against the State or against the public tranquillity; or\n(c)  with intent to incite or which is likely to incite any class or community of persons to commit any offence against any other class or community of persons[.]44 This offense is also punishable by imprisonment for up to two years. C.  Sebenarnya.my Portal and App In March 2017, the MCMC launched the \"sebenarnya.my\" portal to enable the public to \"check on the authenticity of news spread through social websites.\"45 In March 2018, the MCMC made the portal available as a smartphone app.46 According to the MCMC, the portal has over one hundred strategic partners comprising twenty-two government ministries and almost one hundred agencies \"that cover numerous sectors and fields.\"47 The portal remains active and publishes various fact-checking articles and statements in response to information being circulated online.48 In November 2018, for example, in light of the temple riots referred to above, the MCMC urged people not to share or spread information that has not been proven to be true and reminded the public to \"check and report on widely-shared fake news\" using the portal.49\n\nPress Release, Malaysian Communications and Multimedia Commission (MCMC), Sebenarnya.my Portal Launched, In Battle Against False News (Mar. 14, 2017), https://www.mcmc.gov.my/media/press-releases/\nsebenarnya-my-portal-launched,-in-a-battle-against, *archived at* https://perma.cc/GMR4-DSUB.\nD.  Education and Enforcement The MCMC reported that in 2017 it held 561 fake news awareness programs through eighteen strategic partners and conducted awareness campaigns through public service announcements broadcast on television and radio.50 It also \"took action against 3,721 fake accounts in various social media platforms in which 80% of the perpetrators' accounts were deleted for violating their terms and conditions.\"51 At that time, criminal enforcement activities were based on section 233 of the Communications and Multimedia Act 1998, with forty investigating papers related to fake news being opened in 2017 and four cases brought before the court.52 A\nspokesman for the MCMC stated that it had \"the capacity to prosecute individuals who spread false news within 24 hours after an offence is committed via social media.\"53 In April 2018, the MCMC reported that more than 50% of the instances of fake news that had been verified using the sebenarny.my portal were being investigated.54 By then, ten individuals had \"been convicted after a lengthy court process\" of breaching section 233 of the Communications and Multimedia Act in relation to spreading fake news. The MCMC noted that it was often difficult to detect the original publisher of fake news \"as some 30% of the cases were using fake social media accounts.\"55 During the previous administration, there were also multiple actions taken against individuals under the Sedition Act 1948, including in relation to online speech,56 although it is unclear to what extent these involved what might otherwise be considered \"fake news.\" In 2018, the current government dropped some Sedition Act prosecutions that had been brought by the previous government, and rights groups called for the remaining cases to also be withdrawn.57\nmalaysians.\nhttps://www.nst.com.my/news/nation/2018/03/343116/mcmc-can-catch-fake-news-spreaders-24-hours.\ndaily.my/archive/over-50-1500-fake-news-being-investigated-mcmc-CUARCH541166, *archived at* https://perma.cc/N2N2-YH7S.\nHowever, in January 2019, Malaysian police arrested three people for Sedition Act offenses after they posted comments on social media deemed insulting to Sultan Muhammad V.58 The current Prime Minister, Mahathir Mohamad, was one of the first people investigated under the Anti-Fake News Act 2018, with authorities stating that the investigation related to false claims that his plane was sabotaged ahead of the election.59 The first person convicted under the Act, in April 2018, was a Danish citizen who published a video on YouTube that made false claims about the length of time it took police in Kuala Lumpur to respond to a shooting incident. He was fined ten thousand ringgit (approx. US$2,454) but opted instead to spend one month in prison.60 More recent statistics and information regarding MCMC enforcement actions specifically related to fake news since the election of the new government have not been located. The MCMC website provides information to the public on complaint processes related to online content that refers to various laws and their respective enforcement agencies, including the Sedition Act and the Communications and Multimedia Act. It does not refer to the Anti-Fake News Act 2018.61 News reports on possible MCMC actions against individuals in relation to the November 2018 temple riots did not specify what legislation might be utilized for this purpose.62 In addition to the sebenaryna.my portal, it appears that government entities also use social media to inform and educate the public regarding fake news. For example, in January 2019 the Ministry of Women, Family and Community used Twitter and Facebook to inform the public that a viral message regarding a curfew on young people was fake news.63\n\n59 Emily Chow & Praveen Menon, Go Ahead, Charge Me Over Fake News, Says Malaysia's Mahthir of Plane Sabotage Claim, REUTERS (May 4, 2018), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-malaysia-election-fakenews/go-aheadcharge-me-over-fake-news-says-malaysias-mahathir-of-plane-sabotage-claim-idUSKBN1I50DS, *archived at* https://perma.cc/ZF68-QYLL. 60 *First Person Convicted Under Malaysia's Fake News Law*, THE GUARDIAN (Apr. 30, 2018), https://www.the guardian.com/world/2018/apr/30/first-person-convicted-under-malaysias-fake-news-law, *archived at* https://perma.cc/2DSR-3G8K. 61 *FAQS: 1. What Are the Steps Required for Me to Lodge Complaints Regarding Content on the Internet?*, MCMC, https://www.mcmc.gov.my/faqs/online-content-problems/what-are-the-steps-required-for-me-to-lodgecompla (last visited Feb. 28, 2019), *archived at* https://perma.cc/B6UC-ZJYV. 62 *See MCMC Acts Over False Info on Temple Riots (Updated)*, THE SUN DAILY (Nov. 28, 2018), https://www. thesundaily.my/local/mcmc-acts-over-false-info-on-temple-riots-updated-IX176280, archived at https://perma.cc/VX68-A4TU.\nIII.  Government Legal Information Portals The Malaysian government provides online access to legal information through the Laws of Malaysia portal on the website of the Attorney-General's Chambers64 as well as through the e-\nFederal Gazette portal (also maintained by the Attorney-General's Chambers).65 The Laws of Malaysia site contains federal statute law, while the e-Federal Gazette contains federal laws and regulations published in the official gazette, dating back to 2011.66 In addition, published judgments of the federal courts are made available online on the website of the Office of the Chief Registrar of Federal Courts,67 and bills, order papers, and records of parliamentary proceedings are published on the Malaysian Parliament website.68 The Official E-Syariah Portal provides access to information related to Islamic law in Malaysia, including state-level statutes, case status information, and court procedures.69 State-level law portals also include those of Sabah70 and Sarawak,71 which have a higher degree of legislative autonomy compared to other states. Court judgments are available on the website of the High Court in Sabah and Sarawak.72\n\n\nmain_faq.php (last visited Feb. 28, 2019), *archived at* https://perma.cc/5EJX-M6RB. 67 *Grounds of Judgment*, OFFICE OF THE CHIEF REGISTRAR, FEDERAL COURT OF MALAYSIA, http://www.kehakiman. gov.my/en/grounds-judgment (last updated Feb. 26, 2019), *archived at* https://perma.cc/428H-UPWV. 68 *Homepage*, PARLIAMENT OF MALAYSIA, https://www.parlimen.gov.my/ (last visited Feb. 28, 2019), *archived at* https://perma.cc/3SDH-WFWK. 69 *Homepage*, E-SYARIAH OFFICIAL PORTAL, http://www.esyariah.gov.my/ (last updated Jan. 1, 2019), *archived at* https://perma.cc/J97X-GUGV. 70 *Homepage*, SABAH LAWNET, SABAH STATE ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S CHAMBERS, http://www.lawnet.sabah. gov.my/ (last visited Feb. 28, 2019), *archived at* https://perma.cc/9NQB-UHN9. 71 *Homepage*, SARAWAK LAWNET, http://lawnet.sarawak.gov.my/lawnet/Law/TLnetPubHome.jsp (last visited Feb. 28, 2019), *archived at* https://perma.cc/8SFS-68YS. 72 *Homepage*, HIGH COURT IN SABAH & SARAWAK, https://judiciary.kehakiman.gov.my/portals/ (last visited Feb. 28, 2019), *archived at* https://perma.cc/EM63-GVPV.\n\n## Nicaragua\n\nNorma C. Gutierrez Senior Foreign Law Specialist I.  Introduction Nicaragua has not enacted a general law specifically aimed at protecting the objectivity of news regardless of the media source or prohibiting the creation and dissemination of \"fake news.\" However, some provisions can be found in the Penal Code protecting individuals from false news that affects their reputation, and the Election Law contains additional provisions regulating electoral advertisements.\n\nII.  Legal Framework A.  Penal Code The Nicaraguan Penal Code uses the concept of \"day fines\" to determine applicable fines, with each day fine calculated on the basis of a third of the daily income of the convicted person.  If that income cannot be determined, the minimum wage of the industrial sector in which the convicted person works will be taken as the basis for calculating the fine.1 The Penal Code punishes with day fines of one hundred to two hundred days anyone who falsely imputes to another the commission of or participation in a specific crime (*calumnia*).  A false imputation that is publicized is penalized with a day fine of 120 to three hundred days.2  Similarly, the crime of defamation (*injurias*) is penalized with a day fine of one hundred to two hundred days.  If the defamation was publicized, the fine is increased to two hundred to three hundred day fines.3 B.  Electoral Law The Electoral Law prohibits the dissemination of electoral advertising with a view to damaging the integrity of registered candidates or calling for abstention from voting or violence.  All such material must be withdrawn from circulation by the appropriate authority.4\n\n\nThe Law provides that political parties or alliances of parties must strictly respect the ethical standards, morals, and due consideration between them, the nominated candidates, and the Nicaraguan people. The Law prohibits denigrating, offending, or disqualifying political adversaries in the political organizations' advertising and states that any criminal action involving defamation and slander committed against political candidates will be heard in accordance with the general legislation,5 which is the Penal Code.\n\n\n\n## Russia\n\nAstghik Grigoryan Legal Research Analyst SUMMARY\nThe Russian Federation has been the subject of international criticism owing to its role in producing and disseminating fake news during and after the 2016 Presidential Elections in the US. Fake news is mostly distributed through social media networks, which are widely available to the population in the Russian Federation.\n\nRecently, the Russian Federation enacted legislation aimed at countering fake news.\n\nThis legislation complements the existing Federal Law on Information, Information Technologies and the Protection of Information, which is the main piece of legislation addressing the spread of inaccurate or false information. Anti-defamation and anti-libel provisions of the Criminal Code establish liability and punitive measures for spreading libelous news.\n\nLegislation of Russian Federation provides for access to legal information. Several official legal information portals provide free access to legal information and judicial acts.\n\nI.  Introduction The Russian Federation has been the subject of international criticism for creating and disseminating fake news during and after the 2016 US Presidential Elections. The internet has been used as the main medium for disseminating fake news. Internet penetration is at a relatively high level in the Russian Federation, and according to the statistics portal Statista, it is projected that the number of internet users will increase steadily through 2022.1  Social networks have been the main channels for disseminating fake news. Statistics show that in 2017, 47% of the Russian population had an active account or accounts with major social networks, with the most dominant networks being YouTube and VKontakte.2 The Russian Federation has created an infrastructure for the production and dissemination of fake news. One of the channels that produces and distributes fake news is the Internet Research Agency, a Russian entity created ostensibly to conduct internet research, but in reality serving as an internet troll-producing machine with the aim of shaping political landscapes internationally and domestically.3 According to the US Director of National Intelligence, the Internet Research\n\nAgency employs an army of \"content creators\" who in reality created and multiplied fake social media accounts to conduct a widespread disinformation campaign during the 2016 US\nPresidential Elections. Additionally, other media outlets such as *Russia Today* and the Sputnik Information Agency were implicated for producing and disseminating fake news through various social media and other channels.4 The topic of fake news has been the subject of heated debates in the political discourse of the Russian Federation. Recently, the State Duma (the lower chamber of the Russian legislature) had to publish on its website a rebuttal of the fake legal news concerning a supposed measure under consideration that would have banned Russian citizens from purchasing a car if they do not have a parking space.5 This example along with others was used by the group of deputies who introduced anti-fake news legislation that was later enacted. The enforcement of these laws, which are discussed in more detail below, remains problematic, as expressed by various government agencies and law enforcement bodies.\n\nII.  Legal Framework In March 2019, Russia adopted two anti-fake news laws, amending existing legislation governing the accuracy of information and prescribing monetary punitive measures for disseminating fake news.6 The Federal Law on Information, Information Technologies and the Protection of Information (Information Law) prescribes legal standards for the production and dissemination of trustworthy information.7 The Law is the main legislation in the information management field. Certain provisions of the Criminal Code prescribe punitive measures for the distribution of inaccurate, libelous, and false information, and for defamation.\n\nA. Federal Law on Information, Information Technologies and Protection of Information The Information Law contains provisions aimed at countering dissemination of inaccurate or untrue information.8 Article 3, paragraph 6 of the Law stipulates that the reliability and trustworthiness of information is one of the principles for the legal regulation of information. 9\nInformation Technologies and Protection of Information (hereinafter Law on Amending Article 15-3 of the Information Law), http://publication.pravo.gov.ru/Document/View/0001201903180031 (in Russian), archived at https://perma.cc/7YEP-QHU8; Federal Law No. 27-FZ of March 18, 2019 on Amending the Code of Administrative Violations, http://publication.pravo.gov.ru/Document/View/0001201903180021? index=1&rangeSize=1 (in Russian), *archived at* https://perma.cc/E3CL-H6KM.\n\nLaw on Information, Information Technologies and Protection of Information (hereinafter Information Law)]\nN149-FZ, July 27, 2006, available on the official legal information portal at http://pravo.gov.ru/proxy/ips/? docbody&nd=102108264, *archived at* https://perma.cc/M75Q-8EBC. 8 Id. 9 Id. art. 3 para. 6.\n\nThe Law guarantees freedom of dissemination of information unless it is aimed at \"propaganda of war, [or] incitement of national, racial, or religious hatred and enmity, as well as other information for the dissemination of which criminal or administrative responsibility is provided.\"10 If the news is distributed through a news aggregator, the owner of aggregator (only Russian physical or legal persons can own news aggregators) must be responsible for verifying the validity of socially significant facts, as well as preventing the use of the news aggregator to conceal or falsify socially significant information, and disseminate false socially significant news information under the guise of reliable messages.11 If any facts reflecting the falsification of socially significant information are found on the news aggregator, together with the distribution of unreliable information of social significance under the guise of reliable messages and distribution of news information in violation of the legislation of the Russian Federation, the authorized state bodies have the right to apply to the federal executive body exercising control and supervision functions in the field of mass media, mass communications, information technologies (Roskomnadzor) to take necessary measures to stop the distribution of such information.12 If the information is distributed in violation of the law, the Prosecutor General of the Russian Federation or his deputies may petition Roskomnadzor with a demand to cease the distribution of said information.13\n\nB. Criminal Code\n\nLibel and defamation are punished under the provisions of the Criminal Code. The Code defines libel as \"dissemination of knowingly false information, discrediting the honor and dignity of another person or undermining his reputation.\"14 The Code stipulates differentiated punishments for libel (monetary, compulsory public works, or imprisonment) based on its impact. Paragraph 2 of article 128.1 states that \"the libel contained in a public statement, a publicly displayed work or the media, is punishable with a fine of up to 1 million rubles (approximately US$15,000) or an amount equal to the salary or other income of the convicted person for a period of up to one year, or compulsory work for a period of up to 240 hours.\"15\n\nSpecial (more stringent) provisions of the Criminal Code aim to counter libel and defamation of persons involved in the administration of justice (judges, jurors, prosecutors, investigators, persons conducting an inquiry, and bailiffs).16 According to article 298.1 of the Criminal Code, libel and defamation of a judge, juror, or other person involved in the administration of justice is punishable by a fine of up to 2 million rubles (approximately US$30,000) or an amount equal to the salary or other income of the convicted person for a period of up to three years, or compulsory work for a period of up to 360 hours. Defaming the prosecutor, the investigator, or other person involved in the criminal investigation is punishable with a fine of up to 1 million rubles or in the amount of the salary or other income of the convicted person for a period of up to two years, or compulsory work for a period of up to 320 hours. Knowingly defaming persons engaged in the administration of justice and criminal proceedings involving the commission of grave crimes is punishable with a fine of up to 5 million rubles (approximately US$75,000) or an amount equal to the salary or other income of the convicted person for a period of up to three years, or by compulsory work for up to 480 hours.17\n\nC. Anti-Fake News Laws 1.  Overview In March 2019 two laws aimed at countering the creation and dissemination of fake news were adopted.18 The laws establish fines for knowingly spreading fake news, which is defined as socially-significant false information distributed under the guise of truthful messages if they create a threat of endangering people's lives, health, or property; create possibilities for mass violations of public order or public security; or may hinder the work of transportation and social infrastructure, credit institutions, lines of communications, industry, and energy enterprises.19\nAccording to a legislator who introduced this Law, the level of trustworthiness of information will be determined by Prosecutor General's office. 20 The latter will forward to Roskomnadzor a demand to take measures on limiting access to such an information.21 The Law on Amending Article 15-3 of the Information Law states that Roskomnadzor is to inform the editorial body of an on-line publication concerning removal of fake news. Upon receipt of a notice from Roskomnadzor, the editorial body must immediately take steps to remove such information and if it fails to do so Roskomnadzor must take steps to limit access to the online publication. In such cases the internet service provider must also immediately block access to the sites where the fake news is published. 22\n\nThe Law on Amending the Code of Administrative Violations prescribes the following monetary\npunishments for spreading fake news.\n\nFor implicated citizens: From 30,000 to 100,000 rubles (approximately US$458 to $1,528). For repeat violations the amount of fines will be from 100,000 to 300,000 rubles (approximately\nUS$1,528 to $4,580).\n\n\nFor implicated officials: From 60,000 to 200,000 thousand rubles (approximately US$916 to\n$3,000). For repeat violations the fines are set in the amount of 300,000 to 600,000 rubles (approximately US$4,580 to $9,100).\n\n\nFor implicated legal persons: From 200,000 to 500,000 rubles (approximately US$3,000 to $7,600) and confiscation of offending tools. For repeat violations the fines are set in the\namount of 500,000 to 1 million rubles.23 Should the dissemination of fake information cause the \"death of a person or harm to human health or property, a massive disturbance of public order and (or) public safety, the cessation of\nthe functioning of life support facilities, transport or social infrastructure, communications, credit institutions energy or industry,\" fines are as follows:\n\nFor implicated citizens: From 300,000 to 400,000 rubles (approximately US$4,580 $6,100);\n\nFor implicated officials: From 600,000 to 900,000 rubles (US$9,100 to $13,700); and\n\nFor implicated legal entities: From 1 million to 1.5 million rubles (approximately US$15,270\nto $22,900).24\n\n2.  Reactions to the Laws The laws were passed by the Federation Council (the upper house of the Russian legislature)\nnotwithstanding wide criticism from various government agencies and ministries, including the Ministry of Justice, Roskomnadzor, the Ministry of Communication, and the Office of the Prosecutor General.25 As noted by the representative of the Office of the Prosecutor General, the broad wording of the bills would require extensive and costly linguistic expertise. Additionally, she noted that bills do not specify sufficient criteria for extrajudicial blocking of sites. In her opinion, this may entail \"an unreasonable restriction of the constitutional rights of citizens to free dissemination of information.\"26 Similar concerns regarding proposed bills were expressed by the representatives of the Ministry of Justice, Ministry of Communication, and Roskomnadzor.27 The passage of the laws has been met with criticism from various nongovernmental organizations as well. For example, members of the Free Speech Association, PEN-Moscow Association, and St. Petersburg PEN Club issued an open letter expressing the opinion that the newly-passed laws restrict constitutional freedoms of free speech and \"establish the right of an official, at his own discretion, without investigation and trial, by his sole decision, to forbid the dissemination of any information\" and indefinitely and \"immediately\" block any media resources on the internet. Writers consider these bills as a manifestation of bureaucratic arbitrariness, a violation of the constitutional rights of citizens, and the creation of \"unbearable discriminatory conditions for the Russian media industry,\" as well as actual state repression against the entire journalistic and literary community.28 However, the spokesperson for the President of the Russian Federation expressed the opinion that a similar regulatory framework exists in many European countries, and that the reservations about the laws for being far-reaching in their scope are not justified based on past experience. 29\n\nIII.  Access to Legal Information The Information Law provides for the right to search, disseminate, produce, and transfer information. 30 Article 8 of the Law provides that citizens and organizations must have the right to access, *inter alia*, regulatory legal acts affecting the rights, freedoms, and duties of a person and citizens, as well as those governing the legal status of organizations and prescribing the powers of state bodies and those of local government.31 Information concerning the activities of state and local government bodies is provided free of charge.32 The Decree of the President of 1995 on Presidential Programs of Legal Informatization established the foundations for the digitization of legal information.33 Additionally, the Federal Law on Ensuring Access to Information on the https://perma.cc/R8P4-MMD9. 28 *Council of Federation Approves Anti-Fake News Law and Law Prohibiting Disrespectful Treatment of Authorities*, NEWSRU.COM (Mar. 13, 2019), https://www.newsru.com/russia/13mar2019/fake_accept.html (in Russian), archived at https://perma.cc/6CY6-Q24Q. 29 Id. 30 Information Law art. 3. 32 Id.\n\nActivities of State Bodies and Local Self-Government Bodies provides the legal framework for access to governmental information, based on the principles of transparency, accuracy, and accessibility.34\n\nCurrently, legal information is available through the official legal information portal.35 A\ncentralized internet portal provides information about court decisions and other judicial acts.36\nAdditionally, the State Duma provides a searchable database of bills.37\n\n## Sweden\n\nElin Hofverberg Foreign Law Specialist\n\nSUMMARY\nSweden has both state media and non-state media. State media are funded through a\nfee collected as part of the income tax system. Non-state media receive funding from the state, provided they have more than 1,500 subscribers.\nSweden protects free speech, access to public information, and the anonymity of sources\nin its Constitution. Types of speech that are not allowed include crimes against persons such as defamation, insults, threats, and hate speech (\"racial agitation\"), and crimes against the state such as the instigation of war. Information may also not be shared in the media when it violates secrecy provisions or endangers national security. All persons have a right to share information with the media without repercussions.\nMedia publications and broadcasts are bound by law, and media outlets must correct\nerroneous information. Several ethical boards enforce ethical compliance with media\nlaws.  The enforcement of laws and principles that forbid  the publication of erroneous\ninformation is done by the Chancellor for Justice, the Swedish Broadcasting\nCommission, and self-regulatory boards. Crimes such as defamation or war instigation are addressed through the regular court system with the Chancellor of Justice acting as the prosecutor. Such \"crimes against the freedoms of the press,\" as they are called, are subject to fines or imprisonment.\n\n\nThere are also self-regulatory and voluntary ethical guidelines both for media\npublishers and individual journalists. The punishment for publishers includes monetary fines, which are determined by the publication's circulation. Individual journalists may also be fined or excluded from the Union of Journalists.\nAll legislation must be made available free of charge. Laws are published online, and\nthe  online versions of laws are considered official. Legislative material from the Parliament and the government is also published online, as are some court cases,\nincluding Supreme Court precedent cases. In addition, the Supreme Court publishes most of its most recent cases, as well as leave for appeal decisions, on its website.\nNo new laws relating to fake news are currently pending before the Parliament. The\nmedia industry has voluntarily adopted several measures to combat fake\nnews, however.\nI.  Introduction A.  Swedish Media Landscape Sweden has three main state broadcasters of media contentSwedish Radio (Sveriges Radio, SR), Swedish Educational Radio (Sveriges Utbildningsradion, UR), and Swedish Television (Sveriges\nTelevision, SVT)that together are considered public services.1 Until January 1, 2019, they were funded through a separate TV and radio fee paid by all Swedish residents who had a television set or a TV receiver (certain computers included).2 Starting in fiscal year (calendar year) 2019, public services SR, UR, and SVT are now funded through the income tax.3 Swedish state media are independent of the government. They receive funding from the government, but must adhere to principles of impartiality and accuracy, and must not consult with the government or Parliament prior to producing content.4 They must also broadcast in a manner that is viewable by 99.8% of the Swedish population residing in Sweden.5 Answering a question from a member of Parliament, the then Minister for Culture Alice Bah Kuhne in 2018\nstated that because of this independence the government could not intervene in state media to ensure that they did not distribute fake news.6 All non-state media are eligible for a state grant provided that they have more than\n1,500 subscribers.7 B.  Reports of Fake News A number of reports of fake news have been circulating in Sweden and about Sweden abroad,8\nincluding locally produced fake news during the 2018 national election.9 Fake news was\n\nfinansiering-av-radio-och-tv-i_sfs-2018-1893, *archived at* https://perma.cc/SW2U-4WEA. 2 Elin Hofverberg, *Sweden: Public TV and Radio Service Fee System Reformed, New Tax Introduced*, GLOBAL LEGAL MONITOR (Dec. 14, 2018), http://www.loc.gov/law/foreign-news/article/sweden-public-tv-and-radioservice-fee-system-reformed-new-tax-introduced/, *archived at* https://perma.cc/482L-FCK4. 3 LAG OM FINANSIERING AV RADIO OCH TV I ALLMANHETENS TJANST. 4 13 REGERINGSBESLUT 83, *supra* note 1; 4 kap. 8  RADIO- OCH TV LAG [RADIO AND TV LAW] (SFS 2010:696), https://www.riksdagen.se/sv/dokument-lagar/dokument/svensk-forfattningssamling/radio--och-tv-lag-\n2010696_sfs-2010-696, *archived at* https://perma.cc/Z6E8-J9NH. 5 1  REGERINGSBESLUT 83, *supra* note 1. 6 Ku2018/00151/MF Fake news i SVT, Svar pa skriftlig fraga 2017/18:692 besvarad av Kultur- och demokratiminister Alice Bah Kuhnke (MP) (Feb. 7, 2018), http://www.riksdagen.se/sv/dokumentlagar/dokument/svar-pa-skriftlig-fraga/fake-news-i-svt_H512692, *archived at* https://perma.cc/Y9FA-SSVN. 7 *Applying for a Press and Media Subsidy*, MPRT (Aug. 3, 2018), https://www.mprt.se/en/applying-for-a-presssubsidy/, *archived* at https://perma.cc/469A-3T7G.\nreportedly prevalent during the 2018 election.10  SR also reported on fake news being disseminated by Russia.11\n\nC.  National Legislation 1.  Constitutional Protections of Free Speech, Press, Access to Information, and the Right to Inform Media a. Free Speech\n\nFree speech is protected in the Swedish Constitution.12 The Swedish Constitution consists of four Acts: the Instrument of Government (Regeringsformen, RF),13 the Fundamental Law on Freedom of Expression (Yttrandefrihetsgrundlagen, YGL),14 the Freedoms of the Press Act\n(Tryckfrihetsforordningen, TF),15 and the Succession Act (Successionsordningen, SO).16 The right to publish is guaranteed by the TF,17 the goal of which is to \"ensure a free exchange of ideas, free enlightenment, and free artistic expression.\"18\n\n12 2 kap. 1  REGERINGSFORMEN [RF] [INSTRUMENT OF GOVERNMENT] (SFS 1974:152), https://www.riksdagen.se/\nsv/dokument-lagar/dokument/svensk-forfattningssamling/kungorelse-1974152-om-beslutad-nyregeringsform_sfs-1974-152, *archived at* https://perma.cc/Z8N6-BKWX. 13 Id. 14 YTTRANDEFRIHETSGRUNDLAG [YGL] [FUNDAMENTAL LAW ON FREEDOMS OF EXPRESSION] (SFS 1991:1469), https://www.riksdagen.se/sv/dokument-lagar/dokument/svensk-forfattningssamling/yttrandefrihets grundlag-19911469_sfs-1991-1469, *archived at* https://perma.cc/G3GS-2WNL. sv/dokument-lagar/dokument/svensk-forfattningssamling/tryckfrihetsforordning-1949105_sfs-1949-105, archived at https://perma.cc/PU77-9KDG. 16 SUCCESSIONSORDNING [SUCCESSION ACT] (SFS 1810:0926), https://www.riksdagen.se/sv/dokumentlagar/dokument/svensk-forfattningssamling/successionsordning-18100926_sfs-1810-0926, archived at https://perma.cc/8EAE-JBV9; 1 kap. 3  RF.\nb.  Public Access to Information Everyone has a right to request documents from public agencies.19 The public has the right of public access to all documents held by the government and government agencies, subject to secrecy law.20 c.  Right to Inform Media The right to inform media (*meddelarfriheten*) is the right of public officials to leak information to the media.21 Under the Constitution individuals have the right to anonymously inform the media.22 This right may only be limited through law.23 The right to inform media is limited through the Public Access and Secrecy Act (Offentlighets- och Sekretesslagen, OSL).24 The government or a government agency may not investigate the identity of the person that informed the media,25 nor may the government or an agency take any measures against a person who has shared such information.26 The same applies to any organization that receives public funding or conducts public functionsi.e., private employees that work at privately run health clinics, homes for the elderly, etc.27 2.  Limits to Free Speech - Criminalization of Defamation, Insults, and Hate Speech Balancing constitutional freedoms, Sweden has specified limits on free speech in the TF that consist of crimes against persons and crimes against the state.28 They are nevertheless all called tryckrihetsbrott (crimes against the freedoms of the press) and are prosecuted by the Chancellor of Justice (Justitiekanslern, JK).29 These acts are also criminalized in the Penal Code.30\n\n\ndokument/svensk-forfattningssamling/brottsbalk-1962700_sfs-1962-700, *archived at* https://perma.cc/4FQE- Q8WA.\n\na. Crimes Against Persons\n\nSweden has criminalized printed (print or online), or broadcasted (over TV or radio) crimes against persons such as threats (hot),31 defamation (*arekrankning*),32 and insults (*forolampning*).33 In addition Sweden has criminalized \"hate speech\" when it can be considered \"racial agitation\" (hets mot folkgrupp), which is defined as \"a statement or other message that is spread/disseminated that threatens, or expresses condescension (*missaktning*) against, an ethnic group or another\ngroup of persons based on race, skin color, national or ethnic origin, faith, sexual orientation, gender, or gender identity or expression (*konsoverskridande*).\"34 The publication of untrue statements in itself is not considered hate speech. The truth of an insult or defamatory statement is generally not a legitimate defense against such crimes under Swedish law.35 Thus, if a truthful statement (e.g., person X has been convicted of rape) is spread with the intent of causing that person harm, or harming his or her standing in society, it is still defamation.36 These crimes are punishable with a fine or imprisonment of up to six months for insults37 and two years for defamatory statements.38 These crimes can also be committed against a deceased person, provided that it is hurtful to his or her family, or because of the time that has elapsed since the person's death.39 b.  Crimes against the State In addition to crimes against persons, Sweden has also criminalized crimes against the state, including spying.40  Information disseminated regarding the Swedish military is considered spying even if the information is false.41 Thus, publishing fake news about Swedish military operations, military holdings, etc. is a crime.42 Also, publishing certain documents that are deemed secret is criminalized, if publication risks the nation's security.43 The accuracy of the information is not relevant. Any publication of such information, true or false, is a crime.44 Other\n\n## 31 Id. 7 Kap. 1 .\n\ncrimes include instigation of war (*krigsanstiftan*)45 and upheaval (*uppror*),46 crimes against a citizen's freedoms (medborgerlig *frihet*),47 treason (*hogforraderi*),48 and threats against servants of the state (*hot mot tjansteman*).49 During times of war false rumors about the state are specifically criminalized.50 Thus, Swedish media corporations may not publish information that risks the security of the state.  It is the publisher (*ansvarig utgivare*) that is responsible for any violation.51\nIn addition unlawful depictions of violence (olaga *valdsskildring*) are a crime.52 3.  Legislation on Media In addition to the freedoms and limits on the press found in the Constitution and the Criminal Code, all Swedish broadcast media are governed by the Radio and TV Act (Radio-och TV lag).\n\nThat Act provides that broadcasters must adhere to the fundamental principles of a democratic society, all people's equal value, and each individual human's freedoms and dignity.53 The law also requires that if information has been incorrectly presented (i.e., is false) it must be corrected.54 4. Journalistic Rules of Conduct In addition to the rules above, journalists operating in Sweden are also bound by the professional ethical rules (*Journalistiska Yrkesregler*) published by the Swedish Union of Journalists (Svenska Journalist Forbundet, SJF).55  These rules do not include a specific duty of truthfulness, but do specify that a journalist should not falsify interviews or pictures.56 The rules currently in force were adopted in 2014;57 it is possible that future updates to these rules will address fake news.\n\nThe Swedish Union of Journalists Member Congress meets about every four years. It last met in 2018 and discussed the risk of letting creators of fake news become members as part of a discussion to open up membership to a wider network of writers.58\n\nII.  Enforcement of Legislation and Other Measures Undertaken to Fight Fake News A.  Self-Regulation of Media Content In addition to constitutional limits in the form of offenses against the freedoms of the press and the freedoms of expression (*tryckfrihetsbrott*), the Swedish Media are constrained by several voluntary codes of conduct, including that of the Press Council (Pressens Opinionsnamnd, PON).59 These all include provisions on publishing unfounded statements, and could thus be used in combatting fake news. 1.  Press Ombudsman and Press *Council* The Press Ombudsman (PO) (Allmanhetens pressombudsman) is responsible for investigating, at the request of an individual or on its own initiative, possible violations of \"the use of good publishing practices,\" which include accuracy of the information published.60 The PO refers cases to the PON when it finds that a violation has taken place.61 The PO review specifically includes social media content.62\n\nPON is responsible for determining what constitutes \"the use of good publishing practices.\"63\nExamples of established violations relating to the truthfulness of an article include a recent decision against *Aftonbladet* for publishing what PON deemed to be allegations without a proper basis.64 In addition, the publication had failed to give the person mentioned by name a chance to comment or defend himself against the allegations when it emailed numerous questions shortly before the publishing deadline.65 Moreover, *Aftonbladet* was criticized for not publishing any\n\n08/motioner_med_yttranden_journalistkongressen2018.pdf, *archived at* https://perma.cc/U5WM-LKAK. 59 E.g., Elin Hofverberg, Sweden: Swedish Media Criticized by Swedish Press Council for Publishing Names of #MeToo Accused Without Cause, GLOBAL LEGAL MONITOR (Oct. 4, 2018), http://www.loc.gov/law/foreign-news/\narticle/sweden-swedish-media-criticized-by-swedish-press-council-for-publishing-names-of-metoo-accusedwithout-cause/, *archived at* https://perma.cc/N4FN-SWTH.\nhttps://po.se/om-oss/instruktion-for-allmanhetens-pressombudsman-po/ (last visited Mar. 25, 2019), archived at https://perma.cc/S2C7-GZL4. 61 Id. 62 Id. 1  c. oss/stadgar-for-pressens-opinionsnamnd-pon/, *archived at* https://perma.cc/4QGG-JB7E. 64 *Aftonbladet falls for publicering om Stadsteaterns forre chef*, PON (Mar. 11, 2019), https://po.se/fallningar/ aftonbladet-falls-for-publicering-om-stadsteaterns-forre-chef/, *archived at* https://perma.cc/KY5G-7W2C. 65 Id.\ncomments from persons now working with the accused individual.66 Lastly, *Aftonbladet* was criticized for not validating the accuracy of the information it published.67 PON noted that \"[our conclusion] does not mean that the stories must be biased or false, only that the uncertainty surrounding them is considerable.\"68 Specifically, PON cited a reference to an alleged forced abortion, which from the sources seems to have been described as \"advised her to undergo an abortion.\"69 In another case decided on February 19, 2019, PON found that publication of incorrect information regarding a person's health was a violation of the ethical guidelines.70 PON has previously explained that \"[a] fundamental prerequisite for publishing must be that publishing is compatible with good publishing customs and that there is evidence to substantiate the information.\"71 Thus, the publication of false information violates the ethical rules. However, the maximum fine to be paid by the publisher for such violations is only SEK 32,000\n(about US$3,500).72 2. Journalistic Professional Ethical Board\n\nThe Journalistic Professional Ethical Board (Yrkesetiskanamnden)73 determines whether or not journalists should be criticized (*klandrade*) in relation to the Professional Code of Conduct (see above).74 Whether the Professional Ethical Board has received any requests for review in relation to recent fake news is unclear, as it has not published any decisions since May 2017.75\n\n66 Id. 67 Id. 68 Id. for-publishing-names-of-metoo-accused-without-cause/, *archived at* https://perma.cc/Y3BQ-K6KM. 72 *Hur gar det till?,* PO-PON, https://po.se/hur-gar-det-till/ (last visited Mar. 25, 2019), *archived at* https://perma.cc/7BCD-QYKE. 73 *Yrkesetiska namnden*, SJF (May 24, 2018), https://www.sjf.se/yrkesfragor/yrkesetik/yrkesetiska-namnden, archived at https://perma.cc/UXE8-L3FE. 74 See above, Part I(C)(4).\n3.  Proposed New System of Self-Regulation In 2018, the Swedish media corporations proposed an alternative self-regulatory system, the Ethics Committee of the Media (*Mediernas Etiska Namnd*), that would replace the PO and PON, but this system has yet to become a reality.76 B.  Other Review The Swedish Broadcasting Commission (Granskningsnamnden) is part of the Swedish Press and Broadcasting Authority (Myndigheten for press, radio och tv). It is responsible for ensuring compliance with the TV and Radio Act.77 The Commission specifically investigates whether media corporations adhere to the principles of impartiality, factuality, and respect for privacy\n(private life).78 Only state media must conform to the provisions on impartiality.79 In relation to fake news it is especially the provision on factuality that becomes relevant. News, as reported, must be factual, which means that it must be supported by sources. If the information turns out to be false the media provider must later rectify and clarify the information.80 For example, in a case regarding a radio program broadcast by the SR, the program did not mention that a person described as poor was the owner of a condominium (*bostadsratt*), which meant that the information was so misleading that it violated the principle of factuality.81 In another example, on March 18, 2019, the Broadcasting Commission criticized the SVT in airing a program lacking in factuality on gangs in a suburb of Gothenburg.82 However, it did not find that the transgression was so great as to be deemed a violation.83 In addition to providing fact-based written information, pictures used together with a program or news article must be factual and impartial. For example, the SVT used the party symbol and the picture of a representative for the populistic and anti-immigration party Swedish Democrats together with text stating that school principals wanted to ban Nazi parties from schools. That was deemed a violation of the rules on impartiality and factuality (*saklighet)*.84 In 2013 the board\n\nen.se/debatt/medierna-infor-ett-nytt-etiskt-system/, *archived at* https://perma.cc/DV6H-8ZZN. 78 *Krav och regler for medierna*, MPRT (Jan. 2, 2017), https://www.mprt.se/sv/att-sanda/krav-och-regler/, archived at https://perma.cc/45KJ-PRX8. 80 E.g., *Tillampning av regler*, MPRT, https://www.mprt.se/sv/att-sanda/krav-och-regler/tillampling-avregler/ (last visited Mar. 5, 2019), *archived at* https://perma.cc/JR37-Z2H8. 83 Id. 84 Id.\npublished a guide to its decisions on impartiality; considering that it is dated, it does not address recent controversies surrounding fake news.85 C.  Courts and Case Law\n\nAs mentioned above, violations of freedoms of the press (*tryckfrihetsbrott*) are generally prosecuted by the Chancellor of Justice and sanctioned with a monetary fine or a prison sentence.86 For example, in 1989, the Swedish Supreme Court sentenced a person to fifty day fines on the basis that he (as the responsible program director) had published defamatory statements against two persons that lacked sufficient factual basis.87 The Chancellor of Justice will not prosecute cases unless there is a public interest in doing so. For instance, in an April 2019 decision the Chancellor of Justice found that sixteen acts of publication constituted defamation, but as fourteen of the online publications had been removed or amended she decided to not press charges.88 The Chancellor of Justice is not the prosecutor of all crimes related to freedoms of the pressfor instance, crimes against the right to inform in cases where private corporations perform public functions such as providing education.89\n\nD.  Comments by the Government and Other Government Agencies Although government representatives and government agencies have made several statements against fake news, no actual legislation has been presented to the Swedish Parliament. However, the Nordic countries have collectively joined forces to combat fake news, proposing coordination of their national security strategies.90 In addition, the Swedish Defense Minister Peter Hultqvist has, together with the then Danish Defense Minister, publicly aired his fear about fake news in an op-ed piece, stating that fake news generated by Russia is a danger to Swedish security.91 Also,\n\n86 7 kap. TF; 5 kap. and 16 kap. BrB. *See* Part I(C)(2), above. 87 Nytt Juridiskt Arkiv [NJA](Swedish Supreme Court Reporter) 1987 s. 285, summary *available at*\nhttps://lagen.nu/dom/nja/1987s285, *archived at* https://perma.cc/A8NR-JJWW.\n88 Justitiekanslern lagger ned forundersokningen om yttrandefrihetsbrottet fortal [Chancellor of Justice drops investigation on violation of the press, defamation], Diarienr: 6677-18-3.2 /Apr. 1, 2019, https://www.jk.se/\nbeslut-och-yttranden/2019/04/6677-18-32/?Tryck-, *archived at* https://perma.cc/ 2W9B-7ADH. 89 See determination by the Chancellor of Justice in Justitiekanslern ar inte behorig aklagare vid brott mot lagen\n(2017:151) om meddelarskydd i vissa enskilda verksamheter [The Chancellor of Justice is Not the Appropriate Prosecutor for Crimes against the Law on Right to Inform in Certain Private Corporations] (Diarienr: 1137-18-\n3.2 / Beslutsdatum: 13 feb 2018), https://www.jk.se/beslut-och-yttranden/2018/02/ 1137-18-32/?Tryck-, archived at https://perma.cc/F3RN-J2TE. 90 Press Release, Nordic Council, Nordic Fightback against Fake News (Oct. 30, 2018), https://www.norden. org/en/news/nordic-fightback-against-fake-news, *archived at* https://perma.cc/W8YL-LABR.\nthe Swedish Civil Contingency Agency (Myndigheten for samhallsberedskap, MSB) is focusing on fake news,92 following an instruction by the government.93 E.  Nongovernmental Responses to Fake News In addition to government measures to increase public awareness of fake news, private entities, especially media corporations, are also trying to educate the public about the prevalence of fake news. For instance, during the 2018 election the two largest Stockholm-based media corporations, which own Dagens Nyhtere (DN) and Svenska Dagbladet (SCT), respectively, collaborated with public service companies SVT and SR to review the accuracy of election coverage and statements.94 In addition, the publishers of the Swedish cartoon *Bamse* are aiming to teach Swedish children about the consequences of fake news through cartoon strips, showing how a false rumor about Bamse (the cartoon bear) losing his powers (super-strength) is disseminated as part of an online news story.95\n\nIII.  Accuracy of and Access to Legal Material A.  Online Access to Legal Materials\n\nSweden provides free online access to laws, statutes, and certain court documents.96 As of April\n1, 2018, the online version of the Swedish gazette, *Svensk forfattningssamling*, is considered the official version.97 To guarantee its accuracy, the online law is provided with an electronic stamp.98\nHowever, to be able to view the stamp the user must use a computer that has software for the\n\nand Cybersecurity], Skr. 2016/17:213, https://www.regeringen.se/4a095b/contentassets/00a3e76fcee44f54\naf2399b82ee1307f/skr-201617-213-bilaga-uppdatering-om-genomforandet.pdf, *archived at*\nhttps://perma.cc/3UAA-BQRY.\n94 FAKTISKT, https://faktiskt.se (last visited Mar. 19, 2019), *archived* at https://perma.cc/XR8R-S6SM. 95 S. Rep. No. 115-21 (2018), at 111, https://www.foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/FinalRR.pdf (citing Lee Roden, *Why This Swedish Comic Hero Is Going to Teach Kids about Fake News*, THE LOCAL (Jan. 16, 2017), https://www.thelocal.se/20170116/why-this-swedish-comic-hero-is-going-to-teach-kids-about-fake-newsbamse, *archived at* https://perma.cc/M4DE-NEBY). Original *Bamse* cartoon on file with author. 96 SVENSK FORFATTNINGSSAMLING, https://svenskforfattningssamling.se/, *archived at* https://perma.cc/B965- YNS2; DOMSTOL.se, https://www.domstol.se, *archived at* https://perma.cc/4WA9-HS3H; LAGRUMMET, https://www.lagrummet.se, *archived at* https://perma.cc/D4UM-D2SR. 97 5  LAG OM KUNGORANDE AV LAGAR OCH ANDRA FORFATTNINGAR [ACT ON PROCLAMATION OF LAWS AND OTHER\nvalidation of certificates.99 The \"About\" section of the Swedish gazette's official website does not include information on how such software works, where a user may find the needed software, or how the user may use it.100  The stamp is thus not readily available to the layperson user. Online versions of laws are provided both on the gazette website and on the national Parliament\n(Riksdagen) website.101 Only the text on the gazette webpage is legally binding.102 According to an explanatory text in the bill preceding the adoption of the law governing electronic publication of laws, by making its laws official in the online version, Sweden has made itself more susceptible to internet attacks.103 Threats that are connected to online access include the manipulation of content, disruptions to access, and the online preservation of previous laws. Other risks also include natural disasters, power outages, and any failure to immediately recognize these threats.104 Safety measures include making backup copies of stored information and the possibility of issuing emergency proclamations in other forms (including broadcasting them on television).105 In addition to officially publishing all its legislation online, Sweden is legally required to maintain a legal database online.106 Information that must be provided in the database includes the following:107\n\n\nAn index of all government commissions (*statliga kommiteer*) with information on government decisions, members, and work plans\n\n\nCommittee directives\n\nExplanatory notes to government regulations\n\nGovernment reports that are published in the Swedish Government Official Reports (Statens\noffentliga utredningar, SOU) and the Department Series (*Departementsserien*, Ds)\n\nGovernment bills (Regerings *propositioner*)\n\n99 Id.\n\nvisited Mar. 19, 2019), *archived at* https://perma.cc/LKS4-B7CV. 102 5  LAG OM KUNGORANDE AV LAGAR OCH ANDRA FORFATTNINGAR. 103 Proposition [Prop.] 2015/16:157 Elektroniskt kungorande av forfattningar [Electronic Proclamation of Legislation], at 13, https://www.regeringen.se/496f5b/contentassets/cdb84f2bef484af58d845f2ac47a\n2408/151615700webb.pdf, *archived* at https://perma.cc/RGY8-F4KX. 104 Id. at 13-14. 106 1  Rattsinformationsforordning [Regulation on Legal Information] (SFS 1999:175), http://rkrattsbaser. gov.se/sfst?bet=1999:175, *archived at* https://perma.cc/F3Q2-6K2A. 107 Id. 3-8 .\n\n\nSwedish case law and legal precedent\n\nInternational agreements\n\nIn addition, information from municipalities may be included in the legal database.108 With regard to case law the courts may exercise their own discretion and judgment to determine which cases may be included in an online database; moreover, certain cases need only be made available in summaries (*referat*).109 However, all cases are subject to the access principle\n(*offentlighetsprincipen*), meaning that anyone has a right to access them.110 Court cases that are considered to include legal precedent are publicly available online at Lagrummet.se.111 In addition, many recent Supreme Court decisions, including leave for appeal decisions, are published on the Supreme Court's website.112 However, the official version is still the version published in the Supreme Court Reporter, *Nytt Juridiskt Arkiv*. As required by law, the Parliament makes all of its information (legislative materials such as committee reports, government reports, bills, and voting records) available for free online.113 It is unclear what it does to ensure that the information displayed is not altered. B.  Requirement that Legal Material Forming Basis of Violation Be Freely Available The Swedish Supreme Court in 2017 determined that referral in a law to a set of standards for lasers that were only available subject to a fee violated the principle of legality (*legalitetsprincipen*), and the provision could not constitute a basis for a violation, as a perpetrator could not be expected to know of the contents of the standard.114\n\nhogstadomstolen.se/Avgoranden/Vagledande-domar-och-beslut-prejudikat/, *archived at* https://perma.cc/ 593U-GC7Y. 113 5  Rattsinformationsforordning; *Dokument & lagar,* RIKSDAGEN, http://www.riksdagen.se/sv/dokumentlagar/ (last visited Mar. 21, 2019), *archived* at https://perma.cc/V6YC-EB87. 114 Supreme Court Decision O 4833-16, Mar. 15, 2017, HOGSTA DOMSTOLEN, http://www.hogstadomstolen.se/ Domstolar/hogstadomstolen/Avgoranden/2017/2017-03-15 O 4833-16 Beslut.pdf (in Swedish),  *archived* at https://perma.cc/72KN-HQFF; see *also* Elin Hofverberg, Sweden: Court Rules Legislation Must Be Made Available Free of Charge, GLOBAL LEGAL MONITOR (Mar. 29, 2017), http://www.loc.gov/law/foreign-news/article/ sweden-court-rules-legislation-must-be-made-available-free-of-charge/, *archived* at https://perma.cc/LKC4- 4J66.\n\n## United Kingdom\n\nClare Feikert-Ahalt Senior Foreign Law Specialist SUMMARY \"Fake news\" has been present in the UK for several centuries.  It has recently become an issue that poses a potential national security threat, with foreign actors seeking to influence UK citizens.  The UK does not currently have any legislation that regulates the validity of news posted by online platforms.  Several government reports have been issued on this subject that have recommended the introduction of a duty on tech companies to remove content identified as harmful or face fines.  The government is currently in the process of compiling a white paper that will set out a framework of how it will approach issues caused by fake news posted online.\n\nI.  Introduction \"Fake news\" is not a new phenomenon in the United Kingdom.  In 1688, the Privy Council issued a proclamation that prohibited spreading false information.1  With modern technology facilitating the distribution of information to a wide audience, and traditional channels of information being discarded for digital and social media platforms, the problem of false information being spread has become far more problematic than in 1688.2 The government has noted that,\n\n[i]n the era of fake news and concerted propaganda by hostile states, supporting a free media also means countering the incoming tides of disinformation. While it has never been easier to publish and receive information, it has also never been easier to spread lies and conspiracy theories. Social media offers a malign opportunity to whip up hatred and incite violence against vulnerable minorities.3 Over time, the term \"fake news\" has developed a variety of meanings. To help provide clarity and consistency, the Digital, Culture, Media and Sport Committee recommended that the 78EG.\ngovernment not use the term \"fake news\" and instead use, and define, the words \"misinformation\" and \"disinformation.\"4   The government has defined these terms as follows:\n\n[D]isinformation [i]s the deliberate creation and sharing of false and/or manipulated information that is intended to deceive and mislead audiences, either for the purposes of causing harm, or for political, personal or financial gain. 'Misinformation' refers to the inadvertent sharing of false information.5\n\nII.   Current Approach to Fake News While there is currently no legislation that prohibits the online publication of fake news, the government is taking the issue seriously and is carefully investigating the impact of such news and the possibility of introducing legislation:\nTraditional channels have been largely discarded in favour of digital and social media platforms. This is combined with a decline of trust in traditional sources of information and the era of so-called 'fake news'. In parallel, the rules of the game have changed. The democratization of information, and the means to exploit it, has allowed hostile actors to exert disproportionate influence in competition with the public interest.6\n\nIf 'fake news' is tolerated and becomes commonplace, there would be grave consequences for public attitudes, democratic processes and for the conduct of public life. The risks increase with the growth in the use of social media, but the associated problems would not be confined to such material. Without reassurance that the false and the genuine are being distinguished, there is a real risk of \"contamination\" across all sources - with public trust and confidence in public life declining further still, whatever the origin of the information or its channel of communication. As the problem gets worse, mere allegations will undermine the credibility of facts which actually are accurate.7 The government considers that misinformation and disinformation are \"fourth generation espionage\" and are taking action on multiple levels to help counter this threat.8  It notes that a\n\"whole-of-society approach to defensive and offensive measures in the information space is necessary to ensure protection against physical and cognitive attack and subversion of society,\n\nfor example, through legislation and execution.\"9  In the wake of Russian disinformation after the poisoning of Sergei Skripal and others in England,10 when the government \"judged the Russian state promulgated at least 38 false disinformation narratives around this criminal act,\"11 the Prime Minister announced that the intelligence services would be responsible for identifying social media platforms that distribute misinformation and disinformation under the recently introduced Fusion Doctrine.  This doctrine provides the Government must use the full suite of security, economic, diplomatic and influence capabilities to deliver our national security goals.  This means strategic communications are to be considered with the same seriousness as financial or military options.12 The UK already has considerable experience in strategic communications.  Until recently, these had been directed towards domestic campaigns, such as to promote road safety or help stop individuals from smoking.  The UK also has experience countering online propaganda and it, along with other international partners, launched the Counter-Daesh Communications Cell in 2015 with the aim of defeating Daesh (the so-called Islamic State).  In 2017, the government noted that its activities resulted in a drop in propaganda output of 75%.13  Given the influx of misinformation and disinformation campaigns, in 2018 the government announced that it \"will significantly expand the National Security Communications Team,\"14 and this is discussed further below.\n\n\nIII.  Legislation to Protect Objectivity of the News and Ensure Accuracy\n\nAs noted above, the UK currently does not have legislation directly applying to news provided exclusively online.  A number of government departments, including the Electoral Commission, the Office of Communications (Ofcom) and the Digital, Culture, Media and Sport Committee, as well as an independent review, have been tasked with investigating the impact of fake news, and to provide recommendations on how to ensure that citizens have access to accurate, factual information. The UK does not have a regulatory body that oversees the various social media platforms and online written content as a whole.  The closest regulatory body to address these types of issues is Ofcom, established under the Communications Act 2003 to enforce content standards across television and radio broadcasters, including rules that require accuracy and impartiality, and the\n\nUK's media and telecommunications companies.15  Ofcom has argued the regulation of television and radio broadcasting and lack of regulation of online content has led to \"a 'standards lottery'\nthat allows social media platforms to take advantage of lax regulation while traditional broadcasters have to follow tough rules on protecting audiences.\"16  Ofcom has called for more regulation over social media, specifically Facebook, YouTube, and Twitter, particularly regulation that would require the platforms to quickly and effectively remove inappropriate content or be fined.17  Ofcom has further proposed that transparency should be increased across all platforms to enable audiences to understand why they are being targeted by certain material.18\nBoth Ofcom and the Digital, Culture, Media and Sport Committee have proposed that \"the Government uses the rules given to Ofcom under the Communications Act to set and enforce contents standards for television and radio broadcasters, including rules relating to accuracy and impartiality, as a basis for setting standards for online content.\"19\n\nIV.  Reports into the Regulation of Online Content A number of government reports have recently been issued that, among other issues, consider whether the UK should introduce laws to regulate the accuracy of news on online platforms. Summaries of two of the most recent reports relating to fake news are provided below. The government is currently working on a white paper, entitled *Online Harms*, which \"will set out a new framework for ensuring disinformation is tackled effectively, while respecting freedom of expression and promoting innovation.\"20 A.   Cairncross Review In 2018, the Prime Minister requested that Dame Frances Cairncross undertake an independent investigation into \"the sustainability of the production and distribution of high quality journalism\n[considering that] significant changes to technology and consumer behaviour are posing problems for high-quality journalism, both in the UK and globally.\"21  The final report was published in 2019 and determined, among other things, that \"[i]nvestigative journalism and democracy reporting are the areas of journalism most worthy and most under threat [and] . . .\n\n\n15 Communications Act 2003, c. 21, https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2003/21, *archived at*\nhttps://perma.cc/5NAX-VJH7. 17 Id. 18 Id. assets/pdf_file/0022/120991/Addressing-harmful-online-content.pdf, *archived at* https://perma.cc/ZPN9- BWK7. 2019/02/18/home-office-in-the-media-blog-monday-18-february/, *archived at* https://perma.cc/3BJ4-QK8S.\nthat, given the evidence of a market failure in the supply of public-interest news, public intervention may be the only remedy.\"22  The Cairncross Review recommended that every online platform should have a quality obligation for any news on its platform and that the platform should be overseen by a regulator with investigative powers.23  The report made several other key recommendations, including the following:\n\nIntroducing \"codes of conduct to rebalance the relationship between publishers and online platforms\"24\n\n\nPlacing online platforms under regulatory supervision\n\nCreating a new, independent, Institute to help continue the future provision of publicinterest news\n\nLaunching a new Innovation Fund to improve the supply of public interest news\n\nIntroducing tax relief to encourage the payment for online news content\n\nDeveloping a media literacy strategy25 The report further recommended an Institute for Public Interest News be established to focus on ensuring a robust system of local and regional news.26\n\nB.  Digital, Culture, Media and Sport Committee: Fake News and Misinformation The Digital, Culture, Media and Sport Committee released their final report on fake news and misinformation in late February 2019.  The committee's chair, Damian Collins, stated,\n\n[w]e need a radical shift in the balance of power between the platforms and the people. The age of inadequate self regulation must come to an end. The rights of the citizen need to be established in statute, by requiring the tech companies to adhere to a code of conduct written into law by Parliament, and overseen by an independent regulator.27 The report recommended that laws be introduced to establish a legal duty of care for companies that host online content and to provide\n\n. . . for clear legal liabilities to be established for tech companies to act against harmful or illegal content on their sites, and calls for a compulsory Code of Ethics defining what constitutes harmful content.\n\n22 THE CAIRNCROSS REVIEW, A SUSTAINABLE FUTURE FOR JOURNALISM 7 (Feb. 2019), *available at* https://assets.\n\nAn independent regulator should be responsible for monitoring tech companies, backed by statutory powers to launch legal action against companies in breach of the code.\n\nCompanies failing obligations on harmful or illegal content would face hefty fines.28 The committee recommended that any new regulator be funded through a levy on tech companies operating in the UK.29  The committee further recommended that a new category be created for social media companies that would tighten the liabilities of tech companies that are\n\"not necessarily either a 'platform' or a 'publisher.'  This approach would see the tech companies assume legal liability for content identified as harmful after it has been posted by users.\"30  Ofcom responded positively to this recommendation of placing responsibility on platforms for the content that they host.31 The report touched upon the issue of the influence of information provided on social media platforms on the electoral process, noting that electoral law has failed to take into account new technologies and the move to online micro-targeted campaigning, which has rendered the current laws \"not fit for purpose.\"32  The committee recommended updating current electoral legislation to take into account current technology and include provisions that are \"explicit on the illegal influencing of the democratic process by foreign players.\"33  The committee called for electoral law to cover all political campaigning, and the inclusion of a legal definition of what constitutes digital campaigning and online political advertising, as well as requiring clear banners on all political advertisements and videos that identify the source of advertising and the advertiser.34\nThis echoes recommendations made by the Electoral Commission, which noted that, while electoral law covered the funding of online campaigning, the law should be updated to provide\n\"more clarity over who is spending what, and where and how, and bigger sanctions for those who break the rules.\"35\n\n\n\nV.  National Approach to Countering Fake News The government has stated it faces three challenges when tackling the spread of fake news:\n\nidentifying misinformation and disinformation;\n\nchoosing how to respond to such information; and\n\nensuring that government information is available and \"highly visible to the public\"36 to reassure citizens of the facts, rather than work to rebut the false information.37 Government strategy towards tackling \"fake news\" has two aspects: pre-emptive responses aimed to counter misinformation surrounding predictable events, such as elections, and responses that follow a predetermined plan for unforeseen events.38\n\nWhile the regulatory approach to countering misinformation is currently under consideration, and in the wake of a series of false stories posted online that were damaging to the Conservative Party and the government,39 the Cabinet Office established a Rapid Response Unit in April 2018\nto help the government meet its policy of \"reclaiming a fact based public debate.\"40 The Rapid Response Unit operates from within the executive branch of the government and is comprised of \"specialists including analyst-editors, data scientists, media and digital experts.\"41\nThe role of the Rapid Response Unit is to \"monitor[] news and information being shared and engaged with online to identify emerging issues with speed, accuracy and with integrity.\"42  The results of this monitoring \"helps government understand the current media environment and assess the effectiveness of their public communications.\"43\n\n\nhttps://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/whitehall-s-online-rapid-response-unit-will-block-fake-news-bjjkv8sqp, archived at https://perma.cc/CX64-EZX9. https://perma.cc/837J-UF2U.\nThe Rapid Response Unit has developed a model with the acronym FACT to help it identify and respond to misleading online content:\nFind: Constantly monitor online news sources and publicly available social media posts to identify themes/discussions/stories that promote false and misleading information relating to HMG [Her Majesty's Government]. This may be misinformation or disinformation. Assess: Assess the scale of engagement with the risk identified and establish whether it is appropriate to respond to the content. Flag to relevant press offices and advisors, with a recommended approach to response. This is almost never direct rebuttal.\nCreate: Create appropriate content with the aim of rebalancing the narrative and promoting official HMG information. This may be a press office line, a social media post, or the creation of a new asset. Target: Target content to ensure HMG information is highly visible and accessible to the public.44\n\nThe government has emphasized that the Rapid Response Unit is not a rebuttal, or fake news unit.45  Instead, it focuses on checking trends in new sources and, where certain search terms indicate a bias in results, it works to optimize government pages to appear higher in search results or will activate social media content to help \"rebalance the narrative and reassure those who were most engaged with the topic.\"46  An example provided from the government demonstrates action the Rapid Response Unit took after it detected misinformation:\n[F]ollowing the Syria airstrikes, the unit identified that a number of false narratives from alternative news sources were gaining traction online. These \"alt-news\" sources are biased and rely on sensationalism rather than facts to pique readers' interest. Due to the way that search engine algorithms work, when people searched for information on the strikes, these unreliable sources were appearing above official UK government information. In fact, no government information was appearing on the first 15 pages of Google results. We know that search is an excellent indicator of intention. It can reflect bias in information received from elsewhere. The unit therefore ensured those using search terms that indicated bias such as 'false flag'were presented with factual information on the UK's response. The RRU improved the ranking from below 200 to number 1 within a matter of hours. Information on UKAID's work in the region was also immediately amplified amongst audiences demonstrating the highest levels of interest in humanitarian issues affecting displaced Syrians.47\nThe Rapid Response Unit works closely with the National Security Communications Team, particularly in times of crisis, to provide highly visible public information.48  Examples of this action include countering misinformation on the origin of the nerve agent used to poison former Russian operatives in England, and the implementation of targeted digital communications to audiences during military action in Syria.49\n\nVI.  Ensuring Accurate Legal Information is Publicly Available The UK has a robust system in place of publishing government information online.  It provides its legislation free online via Legislation.gov.uk,50 and the courts and tribunals judiciary provide judgments online.51  Parliament also provides up-to-date copies of bills being debated before Parliament,52\nalong with the debates in Parliament53\nand committee and other government reports.54\n\nVII.   Conclusion The government is responding to the issues posed by fake news and is currently in the process of considering different approaches to regulating such information.  Reports from committees and an independent reviewer has recommended that legislation be introduced to place liability on technology companies in the UK to remove content that contains misinformation or disinformation, or face considerable fines.  The government will issue a white paper that will outline its approach on this subject in the fall of 2019."
    },
    {
        "text": "UNCLASSIFIED\n\n\n\nUNCLASSIFIED\n\nOFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE\n\n\n\nBest Practices to Protect Privacy, Civil\n\nLiberties, and Civil Rights of Americans of Chinese Descent in the Conduct of U.S.\n\nIntelligence Activities\n\n\n\nMay 2022\n\n\n\nUNCLASSIFIED\n\n\n\n2\n\n\nUNCLASSIFIED\n\nTable of Contents\n\nEXECUTIVE SUMMARY ........ 3\n\nREPORT SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY ........ 5\n\nINTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA ........ 7\n\nU.S. INTELLIGENCE AND RELATED SECURITY ACTIVITIES TO COUNTERACT\n\nAND MITIGATE INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF\n\nCHINA ........ .8\n\nCONCLUSION ........ 22\n\n\n\nUNCLASSIFIED\n\n\n\n3\n\n\nUNCLASSIFIED\n\nEXECUTIVE SUMMARY\n\nThis report responds to two congressionally directed actions concerning the potential effects on Americans of Chinese descent of activities conducted by the U.S. Intelligence\n\nCommunity (IC) to counteract national security threats posed by the People's Republic of China\n\n(PRC).  Specifically, Section 5712 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year\n\n2020, Pub. L. No. 116-92, required the Director of National Intelligence, acting through the\n\nOffice of Civil Liberties, Privacy, and Transparency (CLPT), to submit a report to Congress reviewing \"how the policies, procedures, and practices of the intelligence community that govern intelligence activities and operations targeting the People's Republic of China affect policies, procedures, and practices relating to the privacy and civil liberties of Americans of Chinese descent who may be targets of espionage and influence operations by China.\"  The law also requires that the report include recommendations \"to ensure that the privacy and civil liberties of\n\nAmericans of Chinese descent are sufficiently protected.\"  Subsequently, Section 620 of the\n\nIntelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2021, Pub. L. No. 116-260, made the previously described report an annual requirement for the Director of National Intelligence and requires the report to address the civil rights of Americans of Chinese descent in addition to earlier references to privacy and civil liberties.\n\nAs stated in the February 2022 Annual Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence\n\nCommunity, the IC assesses that the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) \"will work to . . . undercut\n\nU.S. influence, drive wedges between Washington and its partners, and foster some norms that favor its authoritarian system.\"1  As a component of these efforts, the Annual Threat Assessment states that the PRC \"will continue expanding its global intelligence and covert influence posture to better support the CCP's political, economic, and security goals, increasingly challenging U.S. influence.\"2  For this purpose, the PRC's foreign intelligence services have developed an aggressive human intelligence collection posture.  The CCP and the PRC pose these national security threats, however, not the people of China and emphatically not Americans of Chinese descent.\n\nThe Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) CLPT led an interagency examination of the privacy, civil liberties, and related civil rights controls used by the IC when conducting intelligence and counterintelligence activities to counter the national security threats posed by the PRC.  Specifically, the examination reviewed the privacy, civil liberties, and related civil rights controls, as well as related training, oversight, and avenues for the public to raise concerns regarding IC conduct.  The privacy, civil liberties, and civil rights protections embedded in these intelligence programs protect all Americans.  Consistent with the congressionally directed action, this examination reviewed the impact and efficacy of these privacy, civil liberties, and civil rights controls with respect to Americans of Chinese descent.\n\nBased on IC privacy, civil liberties, and civil rights offices' input, the ODNI CLPT focused the review on three broad categories of intelligence and related security activities\n\n\n1 See February 2022 Annual Threat Assessment of the Intelligence Community at 6, available at https://www.dni.gov/files/ODNI/documents/assessments/ATA-2022-Unclassified-Report.pdf.\n\n2 Id. at 8. https://www.dni.gov/files/ODNI/documents/assessments/ATA-2022-Unclassified-Report.pdf\n\n\nUNCLASSIFIED\n\n\n\n4\n\n\nUNCLASSIFIED conducted by IC agencies and components to counteract the national security threat posed by the\n\nPRC: (1) authorized foreign intelligence and counterintelligence collection by the IC that intentionally collects information regarding a particular U.S. person,3 (2) incidental collection of\n\nU.S. person information (including of Americans of Chinese descent) acquired in the course of authorized foreign intelligence and counterintelligence activities that do not target U.S. persons, and (3) processes related to the grant or revocation of a security clearance.  ODNI CLPT, in conjunction with the IC agencies' and components' privacy, civil rights, and civil liberties officers, examined the policies and procedures related to these three categories of intelligence and security related activities, as well as related training, oversight mechanisms, and redress processes as applicable.\n\nODNI CLPT's examination determined that IC agencies and components have policies and procedures designed to protect the privacy, civil liberties, and civil rights in the execution of these categories of intelligence and related security activities.  The IC has a solemn obligation to provide equal protection to all U.S. persons in accordance with the U.S. Constitution and applicable laws, policies, and regulations.  The law is clear: no IC agency or component may conduct an intelligence activity (to include the targeting or collection of information) or otherwise make an employment decision (to include the granting or revocation of a security clearance, or related investigatory steps) based upon the racial or ethnic background of any U.S. person.  Moreover, Executive Order 12968 makes clear that the U.S. Government \"does not discriminate on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, national origin, disability, or sexual orientation in granting access to classified information.\"\n\nIn addition to these binding legal obligations, the IC has a deep commitment to securing the nation while also exemplifying America's values.  Those values include equitable and fair treatment to persons of every race and ethnicity.\n\nConducting intelligence activities based upon race or ethnicity is also entirely inconsistent with the objective, fact-based criteria that underlie the tradecraft utilized by the IC.\n\nIn a manner authorized by law, the IC must ground its foreign intelligence and counterintelligence collection activities on fact-based determinations regarding whether individuals have access to the information needed for the IC to fulfill its mission.  Conducting intelligence activities or subjecting individuals to greater scrutiny during the security background process based upon race or ethnicity does not reflect the IC's commitment to objective intelligence collection.  Moreover, as discussed in this report, it is the IC's assessment that the\n\nPRC's foreign intelligence services prioritize other factors over race or ethnicity when those services evaluate the potential recruitment of human assets.\n\nStated clearly, the IC may not target an individual in an intelligence collection activity because they are Chinese American.  An American of Chinese descent must also not be\n\n\n3 Executive Order 12333 defines a U.S. person as \"a United States citizen, an alien known by the intelligence element concerned to be a permanent resident alien, an unincorporated association substantially composed of U.S. citizens or permanent resident aliens, or a corporation incorporated in the United States, except for a corporation directed and controlled by a foreign government or governments.\"  Executive Order 12333 at  3.5(k).  The Foreign\n\nIntelligence Surveillance Act contains a substantially similar definition of U.S. person.  See 50 U.S.C.  1801(i).\n\n\n\nUNCLASSIFIED\n\n\n\n5\n\n\nUNCLASSIFIED subjected to greater scrutiny in security clearance processes based on their race or ethnicity.\n\nIntelligence collection or security clearance actions based on such an unauthorized purpose violate the law, are inconsistent with the IC's values, and would not reflect the IC's fact and risk based approach to intelligence tradecraft.\n\nAlthough IC policies and procedures reflect an appropriate focus on the protection of privacy, civil liberties, and civil rights in the targeting and scope of intelligence and related security activities, ODNI makes four recommendations to IC agencies and components to further ensure the protection of the privacy, civil liberties, and civil rights of all Americans, including\n\nAmericans of Chinese descent.  First, ODNI recommends that IC agencies and components reemphasize the prohibition on conducting intelligence and related security activities based on race or ethnicity, to include those related to the granting or revocation of security clearances, in their training materials.4  Second, and relatedly, all IC agencies and components are encouraged to expand unconscious bias and cultural competency training to personnel involved in intelligence collection and security clearance processes.  Third, ODNI recommends that privacy, civil rights, and civil liberties officers further develop and, when relevant, highlight the potential for disparate impacts on historically disadvantaged groups of U.S. persons, including Americans of Chinese descent, when conducting analyses and making recommendations regarding intelligence and related security activities.  Fourth, ODNI will explore its ability to generate and make public demographic metrics regarding the length of time and the results of security clearance processes.  These metrics would be utilized to identify and help rectify processes that may have a disparate impact on specific racial or ethnic groups.  Actions consistent with these recommendations that have already been initiated are detailed in this report.\n\nThe ODNI will conduct an examination on an annual basis to monitor changes in IC practices based upon these recommendations and develop further recommendations as needed.\n\nODNI expects those reviews will build on the findings in this report and anticipates that further examination will provide valuable perspective on whether the IC's protections provide equitable outcomes for other persons of color as well.\n\nREPORT SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY\n\nSection 5712(a) of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2020\n\ncontained the following Sense of Congress with respect to the PRC and intelligence activities:\n\n(a) SENSE OF CONGRESS.It is the sense of Congress that\n\n(1) the People's Republic of China appears to be specifically targeting the\n\nChinese-American community for intelligence purposes;\n\n\n4 For example, with respect to security adjudications, ODNI has issued clear direction that discrimination on the basis of race or national origin is prohibited in national security eligibility determinations.  See Security Executive\n\nAgent Directive 4: National Security Adjudicative Guidelines (hereinafter, SEAD-4), Appendix A,  1(c) (effective\n\nJune 8, 2017) (\"The U.S. Government does not discriminate on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, national origin, disability, or sexual orientation in making a national security eligibility determination.\").  ODNI recommends reemphasizing this clear prohibition throughout training materials.\n\n\n\nUNCLASSIFIED\n\n\n\n6\n\n\nUNCLASSIFIED\n\n(2) such targeting carries a substantial risk that the loyalty of such Americans may be generally questioned and lead to unacceptable stereotyping, targeting, and racial profiling;\n\n(3) the United States Government has a duty to warn and protect all Americans including those of Chinese descent from these intelligence efforts by the People's\n\nRepublic of China;\n\n(4) the broad stereotyping, targeting, and racial profiling of Americans of Chinese descent is contrary to the values of the United States and reinforces the flawed narrative perpetuated by the People's Republic of China that ethnically Chinese individuals worldwide have a duty to support the People's Republic of China; and\n\n(5) the United States efforts to combat the People's Republic of China's intelligence activities should actively safeguard and promote the constitutional rights of all Chinese Americans.\n\n\n\nBased on these findings, the Act directed that:\n\n(b) ...the Director of National Intelligence, acting through the Office of Civil\n\nLiberties, Privacy, and Transparency, in coordination with the civil liberties and privacy officers of the elements of the intelligence community, shall submit a report to the congressional intelligence committees containing\n\n(c)\n\n(1) a review of how the policies, procedures, and practices of the intelligence community that govern the intelligence activities and operations targeting the People's Republic of China affect policies, procedures, and practices relating to the privacy and civil liberties of\n\nAmericans of Chinese descent who may be targets of espionage and influence operations by China; and\n\n(2) recommendations to ensure that the privacy and civil liberties of\n\nAmericans of Chinese descent are sufficiently protected.\n\n\n\n Subsequently, Section 620 of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2021\n\nPub. L. No. 116-260, modified this reporting requirement to also address the civil rights of\n\nAmericans of Chinese descent in addition to earlier references to privacy and civil liberties.\n\nODNI CLPT conducted its review of IC policies, procedures, and practices by working with IC privacy, civil rights, and civil liberties officers to identify the types of intelligence related activities most likely to impact the privacy and civil liberties of Americans of Chinese descent.  Having identified areas of potential privacy and civil liberties risk, the privacy, civil rights, and civil liberties officers then identified and detailed related policies and procedures (to include policies and procedures addressing the use of race and ethnicity and associated civil rights protections), training, compliance and oversight mechanisms, and redress processes designed to mitigate the identified risks.  ODNI CLPT also consulted with subject matter experts at the National Counterintelligence and Security Center (NCSC), the ODNI Office of IC,\n\n\n\nUNCLASSIFIED\n\n\n\n7\n\n\nUNCLASSIFIED\n\nDiversity, Equity, and Inclusion (DEI), and the ODNI Office of Equal Employment Opportunity\n\n(OEEO).  Additionally, ODNI CLPT engaged with non-governmental organization experts regarding Asian American civil rights and civil liberties protection.  These meetings provided valuable perspective and substantially informed the recommendations made in this report.\n\nINTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF\n\nCHINA\n\nIt is the IC's assessment that while the PRC promotes the false narrative that individuals of Chinese descent owe some allegiance to the PRC, neither race nor ethnicity is the primary criterion utilized by the PRC's intelligence services in their recruitment of intelligence assets.\n\nMore specifically, the February 2022 Annual Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence\n\nCommunity states that the CCP \"will work to . . . undercut U.S. influence, drive wedges between\n\nWashington and its partners, and foster some norms that favor its authoritarian system.\"5  As a component of these efforts, the Annual Threat Assessment states that the PRC \"will continue expanding its global intelligence and covert influence posture to better support the CCP's political, economic, and security goals, increasingly challenging U.S. influence.\"6\n\nIn order to support the CCP's global ambitions, the PRC's foreign intelligence services including the Ministry of State Security and intelligence components of the People's Liberation\n\nArmyhave developed an aggressive human intelligence collection posture.  These efforts have led to the PRC's recruitment of numerous foreign citizens and intelligence, military, and civilian officials, including from within the U.S. Government.  A U.S. person's individual race or ethnicity, however, is not assessed as primary to the PRC's U.S.-focused human intelligence recruitment rubric.  PRC intelligence services instead prioritize the following factors: (1) the potential intelligence asset's past, present, or future access to information of PRC interest; (2) the potential asset's susceptibility to recruitment by the PRC intelligence services; (3) the potential asset's affinity for and willingness to cooperate with the PRC; and (4) the potential asset's accessibility to PRC intelligence officers for recruitment and handling by the PRC intelligence services.  For example, legal travel to China has presented PRC intelligence services with opportunities for recruitment and handling, and such PRC intelligence activities have focused on\n\nU.S. business persons, retired U.S. Government officials, students, academics, scientists, and tourists, regardless of race or ethnicity.  While some of these factors may in individual cases be correlated with having personal, financial, or professional connections with individuals or groups located within the PRC, it is the IC's assessment that PRC intelligence services do not rely merely on race or ethnicity in assessing the recruitment potential of intelligence assets.\n\n\n\n5 See February 2022 Annual Threat Assessment of the Intelligence Community at 6, available at https://www.dni.gov/files/ODNI/documents/assessments/ATA-2022-Unclassified-Report.pdf.\n\n6 Id. at 8.\n\n\n\nUNCLASSIFIED\n\n\n\n8\n\n\nUNCLASSIFIED\n\n\n\nU.S. INTELLIGENCE AND RELATED SECURITY ACTIVITIES TO\n\nCOUNTERACT AND MITIGATE INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES OF THE\n\nPEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA\n\nThe IC's mission is to provide timely, insightful, objective, and relevant intelligence and support to inform national security decisions and to protect our Nation and its interests.  Based on the significant threat posed by the PRC, IC agencies and components conduct numerous activities that seek insight about PRC plans and intentions in order to defend against counterintelligence and security threats posed by the PRC.  U.S. intelligence activities are focused on the threat posed by the PRC and the CCP, including the threat posed by PRC intelligence services' recruitment of human intelligence assets.\n\nIt is important to note, however, that the CCP and the PRC pose these national security threats, not the people of China and, emphatically, not Americans of Chinese descent.  As stated above, the IC assesses that an individual's Chinese descent is not one of the primary criteria utilized by the PRC's intelligence services in identifying potential intelligence assets.\n\nConsistent with U.S. law and our shared values, the IC is not authorized to collect intelligence information, or conduct activities in support of security clearance processes, simply because an American is of Chinese descent.  The IC's activities, however, do have the potential to impact the privacy, civil liberties, and civil rights of Americans; and the bar on intentionally collecting information on an individual because of their race or ethnicity does not mean that the resulting privacy, civil liberties, and civil rights impacts are necessarily uniformly distributed across all demographics.  As described in the methodology section above, in the course of this review IC agencies and components identified intelligence and related security activities they engage in to combat threats posed by the PRC that have the greatest potential to impact\n\nAmericans of Chinese descent.  Based upon the IC agencies' and components' more detailed and classified input, ODNI CLPT identified the following three categories of relevant intelligence and related security activities, each of which is discussed in detail below: (1) authorized IC foreign intelligence and counterintelligence collection that intentionally collects information regarding a particular U.S. person, (2) incidental collection of U.S. person information (including of Americans of Chinese descent) acquired in the course of authorized foreign intelligence and counterintelligence activities that do not target U.S. persons, and (3) security investigations related to the grant or revocation of a security clearance.  Each of these categories of intelligence and related security activities is described in this section, followed by an analysis of the applicable privacy, civil liberties, and civil rights controls that guide and restrict these activities.\n\nRecommendations for improving the protection of privacy, civil liberties, and civil rights are embedded in this analysis.\n\nA. Intentional Foreign Intelligence and Counterintelligence Collection Regarding a\n\nParticular U.S. Person\n\n1. Intentional Collection Activities Potentially Impacting Americans of\n\nChinese Descent:\n\n\n\nUNCLASSIFIED\n\n\n\n9\n\n\nUNCLASSIFIED\n\nExecutive Order 12333, a foundational grant of Executive authority defining and delineating the authorities and structure of the IC, begins with the statement \"[t]imely, accurate, and insightful information about the activities, capabilities, plans, and intentions of foreign powers, organizations, and persons, and their agents, is essential to the national security of the United States.\"\n\n(emphasis added).  As described in a previous section and the April 2021 Annual\n\nThreat Assessment, PRC activities present a threat by such a foreign power to\n\nU.S. national security.  But although the threat itself emanates from a foreign power, it does not follow that the IC may only collect information regarding foreign individuals to counter this threat.  For example, a U.S. person may be assessed to be acting, unintentionally or intentionally, as an agent of a foreign power like the PRC, by collecting information on behalf of that foreign power.  In such cases, the IC may seek to intentionally collect information concerning the\n\nU.S. person in order to mitigate the national security threat posed by the foreign power.\n\n2. Privacy, Civil Liberties, and Civil Rights Protections for Intentional\n\nCollection:\n\nBecause intentional collection is directed at a particular U.S. person, intentional collection presents some of the most significant privacy and civil liberties risks.  To mitigate these risks, the IC's authority to intentionally collect information regarding U.S. persons is prescribed by statutes, Executive Order, and mandated agency policies.\n\nThe Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (FISA) governs and restricts the IC's authority to target a U.S. person through collection techniques such as electronic surveillance or the search of private property.7  Such electronic surveillance or searches targeting U.S. persons require a determination by a judge on a specialized court, the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC), that there is probable cause to believe that the U.S. person in question is an \"agent of a foreign power.\"8  In order to make this showing that a U.S. person is an \"agent of a foreign power,\" the government must provide facts to the FISC demonstrating that there is probable cause to believe that the U.S. person is engaged in knowing and intentional conduct in support of the foreign power.9  This is a determination that must be made based on the individual's conduct; the individual's race or ethnicity does not provide lawful basis for the court to determine that a U.S. person is an agent of a foreign power.\n\nOther intelligence collection activities are governed by Executive Order\n\n12333.  Executive Order 12333 describes the types of intelligence collection that\n\n\n7 See 50 U.S.C.  1801, et seq.\n\n8 See 50 U.S.C.  1801  1805, 1821  1824, 1881b  1881d.\n\n9 See 50 U.S.C.  1801(b)(2).\n\n\n\nUNCLASSIFIED\n\n\n\n10\n\n\nUNCLASSIFIED each IC agency or component may acquire.  Some IC agencies or components are limited to collecting overtly or from publicly available sources, while other IC agencies may also collect through clandestine or other means.  In all cases,\n\nExecutive Order 12333 requires that any acquisition of U.S. person information be collected only pursuant to procedures approved by the head of the IC agency or component and the Attorney General, after consultation with the Director of\n\nNational Intelligence.10  Collection efforts governed by such procedures include everything from the collection of \"information that is publicly available or collected with the consent of the person concerned,\" to \"information obtained in the course of a lawful foreign intelligence [or] counterintelligence . . . investigation,\" to \"information concerning persons who are reasonably believed to be potential sources or contacts for the purposes of determining their suitability or credibility.\"11\n\nEach of these Executive Order 12333 Attorney General procedures contains specific restrictions and requirements governing the intentional collection of information targeting a U.S. person.  The specific requirements, factual basis, and approval levels for such targeted collection activities vary based on each IC agency or component's authorities and mission and the sensitivity of the underlying collection effort (from less sensitive activities, such as the collection of publicly available information, to substantially more sensitive activities, such as the physical surveillance of a specific U.S. person).  A commonality, however, is that all intelligence activities conducted pursuant to\n\nExecutive Order 12333, including intentional collection of intelligence information regarding any U.S. person, may only be conducted for an authorized intelligence or counterintelligence purpose.  For example, ODNI's Attorney\n\nGeneral Procedures state that ODNI may only collect \"information concerning\n\nU.S. persons if done in the course of the ODNI's duly authorized intelligence activities and in fulfillment of the ODNI's national security responsibilities.\"12\n\nThe Attorney General-approved procedures of other IC agencies and components contain comparable provisions.13\n\n\n10 See Executive Order 12333  1, 2.3.\n\n11 See id.  2.3.\n\n12 See ODNI's Intelligence Activities Procedures Approved by the Attorney General Pursuant to Executive Order\n\n12333 (hereinafter, \"ODNI Procedures\"), Section 2.2.4, available at https://www.intel.gov/assets/documents/702%20Documents/declassified/AGGs/ODNI%20guidelines%20as%20app roved%20by%20AG%2012.23.20_OCR.pdf.\n\n13 See, e.g., Central Intelligence Agency Intelligence Activities:  Procedures Approved by the Attorney General\n\nPursuant to Executive Order 12333 (hereinafter, \"CIA Procedures\"), Section 2.3, available at https://www.cia.gov/static/54871453e089a4bd7cb144ec615312a3/CIA-AG-Guidelines-Signed.pdf; DHS's Office of\n\nIntelligence and Analysis Intelligence Oversight Guidelines (hereinafter, \"DHS Procedures\") at Section 2.1, available at available at https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/office-of-intelligence-and-analysis intelligence-oversight-program-and-guidelines.pdf. https://www.intel.gov/assets/documents/702%20Documents/declassified/AGGs/ODNI%20guidelines%20as%20approved%20by%20AG%2012.23.20_OCR.pdf https://www.intel.gov/assets/documents/702%20Documents/declassified/AGGs/ODNI%20guidelines%20as%20approved%20by%20AG%2012.23.20_OCR.pdf https://www.cia.gov/static/54871453e089a4bd7cb144ec615312a3/CIA-AG-Guidelines-Signed.pdf https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/office-of-intelligence-and-analysis-intelligence-oversight-program-and-guidelines.pdf https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/office-of-intelligence-and-analysis-intelligence-oversight-program-and-guidelines.pdf\n\n\nUNCLASSIFIED\n\n\n\n11\n\n\nUNCLASSIFIED\n\nTargeting intelligence collection to disadvantage an individual because they are an American of Chinese descentor any other race or ethnicityis never an authorized intelligence or counterintelligence purpose; to the contrary, targeting for such a purpose is unlawful.  U.S. intelligence activities must comply with all aspects of U.S. law, including the U.S. Constitution's guarantee of equal protection under the law.  These legal requirements are reflected in every IC agency and component's Attorney General-approved procedures.  For example, the Executive Order 12333 Attorney General Procedures for the Department of\n\nDefense (DoD) state that in carrying out intelligence activities, DoD components\n\n\"must carry out all activities in all circumstances in accordance with the\n\nConstitution and laws of the United States.\"14  The procedures of other IC agencies and components, such as the Central Intelligence Agency15 and the U.S.\n\nCoast Guard,16 take a comparable approach.  As stated in the ODNI Guidelines, but equally applicable to all IC agencies and components, \"[t]he United States\n\nGovernment, including the ODNI, has a solemn obligation to protect fully the legal rights of all U.S. persons, including freedoms, civil liberties, and privacy rights guaranteed by federal law, including in the conduct of intelligence activities.\"17  In addition, several IC agencies or components, particularly those with the most significant domestic authorities, have additional language that more specifically addresses race or ethnicity.  For example, the Executive Order 12333\n\nAttorney General Procedures for the Department of Homeland Security's Office of Intelligence and Analysis (I&A) state that \"I&A personnel are not permitted to engage in intelligence activities based solely on an individual's or group's race, ethnicity, gender, religion, sexual orientation, gender identity, country of birth, or nationality.\"18  Similarly, the Federal Bureau of Investigation's (FBI) Attorney\n\nGeneral Procedures make clear that the Department of Justice's policies restricting the use of race and ethnicity in law enforcement activities also apply equally to the FBI's conduct of intelligence activities.19\n\n Intentionally collecting intelligence information about individuals solely based on their race or ethnicity is also entirely inconsistent with the objective,\n\n\n14 Department of Defense Manual 5240.01: Procedures Governing the Conduct of DoD Intelligence Activities\n\n(hereinafter, \"DoD Procedures\"), Section 1.2(b), available at https://www.esd.whs.mil/Portals/54/Documents/DD/issuances/dodm/524001_dodm_2016.pdf?ver=2017-07-31\n143413-363.\n\n15 See CIA Procedures, Sections 1.1 and 3.3.\n\n16 See U.S. Coast Guard's Appendix A to COMDTINST M3820.12A:  Attorney General Guidance for Coast Guard\n\nNational Intelligence Element Activities (hereinafter Coast Guard Procedures), Procedure 1.A.2, available at https://www.intel.gov/assets/documents/702%20Documents/declassified/AGGs/CIM3820.12A_Final_26_JAN_21.p df%20(CG2%20Signature)_OCR.pdf.\n\n17 ODNI Guidelines, Section 1.2.\n\n18 DHS Procedures, Section 1.\n\n19 See The Attorney General's Guidelines for Domestic FBI Operations (hereinafter, \"FBI Procedures\"), Section\n\nI.C.3, available at https://www.justice.gov/archive/opa/docs/guidelines.pdf. https://www.esd.whs.mil/Portals/54/Documents/DD/issuances/dodm/524001_dodm_2016.pdf?ver=2017-07-31-143413-363\nhttps://www.esd.whs.mil/Portals/54/Documents/DD/issuances/dodm/524001_dodm_2016.pdf?ver=2017-07-31-143413-363\nhttps://www.intel.gov/assets/documents/702%20Documents/declassified/AGGs/CIM3820.12A_Final_26_JAN_21.pdf%20(CG2%20Signature)_OCR.pdf https://www.intel.gov/assets/documents/702%20Documents/declassified/AGGs/CIM3820.12A_Final_26_JAN_21.pdf%20(CG2%20Signature)_OCR.pdf https://www.justice.gov/archive/opa/docs/guidelines.pdf\n\n\nUNCLASSIFIED\n\n\n\n12\n\n\nUNCLASSIFIED fact-based criteria that underlie the tradecraft utilized by the IC.  In a manner authorized by law, the IC must focus its foreign intelligence and counterintelligence collection targeting specific U.S. persons based on fact-based determinations regarding whether individuals have access to the information the\n\nIC needs to fulfill its mission.  Targeting intelligence collection based upon invidious discrimination provides no such objective criteria.\n\n3. Recommendations and Actions\n\nWhile there is unanimity within the IC that race and ethnicity do not provide a basis for conducting an authorized intelligence activity to collect information on a U.S. person, ODNI recommends more clearly articulating this restriction in required privacy, civil liberties, and civil rights training programs to help ensure these restrictions are understood and enforced.  All IC agencies and components conduct training to ensure that intelligence activities comply with all aspects of U.S. law, but the amount of training specifically concerning non discrimination in intelligence collection decisions varied.  FBI, for example, incorporates into their basic training for all new FBI agents and analysts specific components on the restrictions of the use of race, ethnicity, religion, and national origin in the conduct of investigations.  This is a best practice.  Role-based and scenario-driven training provide personnel with specific and actionable information to help IC personnel identify, prevent, and report to oversight entities any intelligence collection that may be driven by impermissible considerations, to include the use of race or ethnicity as a justification for intelligence collection.\n\nEven when restrictions are fully understood, unintentional but still harmful bias can potentially affect operational decisions.  ODNI therefore recommends the expansion of existing unconscious bias training.  Such training is widely offered throughout the IC to address and minimize unlawful discrimination in the workplace.  Identifying and mitigating previously unidentified biases also plays an important role in the current training provided to intelligence analysts.  ODNI recommends more broadly offering comparable unconscious bias training in the intelligence operational context so those engaged in collecting intelligence information may more readily identify and mitigate unintentional bias that may impact their collection decisions.  IC agencies and components are encouraged to adequately resource such unconscious bias training for intelligence operators, as well as evaluate the most effective approaches to such training in the operational context.  The use of real world operational scenarios, for example, involving fact patterns featuring Americans of a variety of backgrounds may be one effective approach to conveying the importance of minimizing unconscious bias to reach more objective operational decisions.\n\nB. Incidental Collection of U.S. Person Information\n\n1. Incidental Collection Potentially Impacting Americans of Chinese\n\nDescent:\n\n\n\nUNCLASSIFIED\n\n\n\n13\n\n\nUNCLASSIFIED\n\nIn some forms of intelligence collection, authorized collection against a valid foreign intelligence or counterintelligence target also inherently results in the incidental collection of information regarding others who are not being targeted.  This incidental collection may include information concerning U.S. persons.  For example, pursuant to FISA or Executive Order 12333, the IC may target for collection the communications of a non-U.S. person outside the United\n\nStates for a valid foreign intelligence purpose.  Such collection could include collecting the telephone calls of that non-U.S. person.  If an American inside the\n\nUnited States calls the validly targeted non-U.S. person outside the United States, the IC collects not just the words spoken by the non-U.S. person overseas, but the whole telephone call, including the words spoken by the American in the United\n\nStates.  The IC refers to collection of such U.S. person information as \"incidental collection.\"20\n\nThe IC neither has, nor could realistically generate, demographic information regarding U.S. persons whose information has been incidentally collected.  Because these individuals are not targeted for collection, the IC often has little information regarding the identities of such Americans.  In addition, and for the reasons described above, even when incidental collection did provide information of foreign intelligence or counterintelligence interest, demographic information such as race or ethnicity would be generally irrelevant to the IC as it is not relevant to the authorized purpose for the collection.  Conducting additional and potentially invasive intelligence activities to acquire such demographic information would raise its own privacy and civil liberties concerns.\n\nDespite the lack of metrics, the IC does not presume that the impact of incidental collection is evenly distributed across the American public.  Because intelligence collections must be appropriately targeted and scoped to obtain information regarding foreign threats, an American's increased interaction with a foreign threat actor may increase the likelihood that their information may be incidentally collected.  As discussed above, IC agencies and components conduct numerous activities that seek insight about PRC plans and intentions in order to defend against counterintelligence and security threats from the PRC.  While many Americans have no interactions with the PRC, some Americans may have interactions with the PRC as a result of familial, social, or business ties to China.\n\nSuch interactions with the PRC do not in any way guarantee that the IC has collected information concerning their interactions with the PRC, but there may\n\n\n20 Targeting a non-U.S. person for the purpose of collecting information about a U.S. person without appropriate authorization to collect information about the U.S. person is referred to as \"reverse targeting.\"  Reverse targeting is prohibited.  See, e.g., 50 U.S.C.  1881a(b)(2) (stating that FISA Section 702 acquisitions \"may not intentionally target a person reasonably believed to be located outside the United States if the purpose of such acquisition is to target a particular, known person reasonably believed to be in the United States\");  50 U.S.C.  1881a(g) (requiring related Attorney General-approved guidelines to ensure compliance with the reverse targeting prohibition); and\n\n50 U.S.C.  1881c (providing an authorized process for targeting U.S. persons located outside the United States under circumstances in which a warrant would be required if the acquisition were conducted in the United States for law enforcement purposes).\n\n\n\nUNCLASSIFIED\n\n\n\n14\n\n\nUNCLASSIFIED be an increased risk of such incidental collection.  Insofar as some Americans of\n\nChinese descent may have greater interactions with the PRC, the risk of incidental collection increases for those individuals.  This increased risk is also true for\n\nAmericans not of Chinese descent with comparable connections to the PRC; the increased risk is therefore a function of actual relationships and not a function of race or ethnicity.  Some impact may be correlated with race or ethnicity, however, due to an increased likelihood for underlying familial, social, or business connections with individuals or entities located in China.\n\n2. Privacy, Civil Liberties, and Civil Rights Protections for Incidentally\n\nCollected Information\n\nThe privacy, civil liberties, and potential for related civil rights impacts of incidental collection have long been recognized and are accounted for and mitigated through specific procedures designed to minimize the collection, retention, and dissemination of incidental U.S. person information.  For collection conducted pursuant to Executive Order 12333, these restrictions are found within the Attorney General-approved procedures discussed above.21  Although these\n\nAttorney General procedures also cover the more limited instances in which intentional collection is appropriate, the majority of these procedures deal with the more frequent occurrence of incidental collection of U.S. person information in the process of gathering intelligence or counterintelligence information.  Under\n\nFISA, comparable rules for minimizing collection, retention, and dissemination of\n\nU.S. person information are required.22\n\nMore specifically, IC agencies' and components' Executive Order 12333\n\nAttorney General procedures have restrictions addressing the entire data lifecycle of incidental collection.  As with intentional collection, the procedures require that a collection activity may only be conducted for an authorized purpose.23\n\nCollection activities must also be properly scoped to this authorized purpose.  For example, the DHS Procedures permit incidental collection of U.S. person information only when \"the incidentally acquired information is not itself deliberately sought\" and \"it would create an unreasonable burden to collect the information about the target without collecting the additional, non-targeted information.\"24  Subject to exceptions, many of the procedures restrict the length\n\n\n21 See Executive Order 12333,  2.3.\n\n22 See, e.g., 50 U.S.C.  1801 (h) (defining minimization procedures) and 1804(a)(4) (requiring a statement regarding the proposed minimization procedures in any application for electronic surveillance).  As FISA procedures apply to a narrower swath of intelligence activities and the requirements of the FISA minimization procedures are generally comparable, or more restrictive, than those found in the Executive Order 12333 Attorney General procedures, the analysis that follows focuses on the IC agencies' and components' Executive Order 12333\n\nprocedures.\n\n23 See footnotes 12 and 13 and accompanying text.\n\n24 DHS Procedures, Section 2.1.3.2.  See also DoD Procedures at Section 3.2(f)(4) (limiting the collection of non publicly available U.S. person information to \"no more information than is reasonably necessary\" within the limits\n\n\n\nUNCLASSIFIED\n\n\n\n15\n\n\nUNCLASSIFIED of time unevaluated data that potentially contains incidental U.S. person information may be retained for evaluation by IC agencies or components.25\n\nAccess limitations, training requirements, and restrictions on queries to seek information concerning a specific U.S. person in unevaluated information provide further protections in many IC agency and component procedures.26  Permanent retention of U.S. person information, including incidentally acquired information, or the dissemination of U.S. person information outside the IC (for example, in an intelligence report) generally require specific findings with respect to the U.S. person information.27\n\nNone of these protections for incidental collection turns on the race or ethnicity of the individual whose information has been incidentally collected.\n\nThese rules apply equally to all Americans, including Americans of Chinese descent.  As with intentional collection, the race or ethnicity of a U.S. person does not provide an authorized justification for modifying the scope of collection, retaining information for a longer period of time, querying collected information, or disseminating intelligence information in a different manner.\n\n3. Recommendations and Actions\n\nFor the same rationale as was applicable to targeted collection, ODNI recommends that IC training more specifically focus on preventing discriminatory conduct in the collection, handling, and dissemination of incidental collection.\n\nExpanding the scope of unconscious bias training to those involved in the collection, handling, and dissemination of incidental collection will also help ensure that unintentional, but still harmful, bias plays no role in such important decisions.\n\nIn addition, while (as previously discussed) metrics regarding the demographics of those subject to incidental collection may be difficult or\n\n\nof practicality); CIA Procedures, Section 3.3 (\"In any collection activity, the CIA shall collect only the amount of information reasonably necessary to support that purpose.\") and 5.2(c) (requiring for collections of information in bulk or which cannot be promptly reviewed for retention that, among other requirements, the approving official document \"any reasonable steps that were or will be taken to limit the information to the smallest subset of data containing the information necessary to achieve the purpose of the collection.\").\n\n25 See, e.g., DoD Procedures, Section 3.3(c)(2) (generally limiting the evaluation period of incidental collection obtained from targeting a person in the United States to five years, with potential for an extension under prescribed procedures).\n\n26 See, e.g., Department of Energy Procedures for Intelligence Activities (hereinafter DOE Procedures), Section\n\nV.E.1 (detailing requirements for access, querying, and training) available at https://www.directives.doe.gov/files/department-of-energy-procedures-for-intelligence-activities/@@images/file.\n\n27 See, e.g., ODNI Procedures, Sections 6.1 (detailing standards for permanently retaining information concerning a\n\nU.S. person and requiring that any U.S. person personally identifiable information (USPII be retained only if that\n\nUSPII is \"necessary, or it is reasonably believed that the USPII may become necessary, to understand, assess, or act on the information\") and Section 7.2 (permitting dissemination of U.S. person information outside the Intelligence\n\nCommunity only when the retention standard has been met). https://www.directives.doe.gov/files/department-of-energy-procedures-for-intelligence-activities/@@images/file\n\n\nUNCLASSIFIED\n\n\n\n16\n\n\nUNCLASSIFIED inappropriate to obtain, there are instances when the potential for disparate impact on certain groups of Americans can and should be taken into account.  ODNI recommends that privacy, civil rights, and civil liberties officers further develop and, when relevant, highlight the potential for disparate impacts into their analyses and recommendations regarding intelligence programs.  For example, the\n\nDNI's 2020 Principles of Artificial Intelligence (AI) Ethics for the Intelligence\n\nCommunity28 requires the IC to \"take affirmative steps to identify and mitigate bias\" and the accompanying AI Ethics Framework for the Intelligence\n\nCommunity29 further defines steps that should be taken to minimize bias, including determining whether the AI will \"avoid perpetuating historical biases and discrimination.\"  While specific mechanisms for evaluating the potential for disparate impact will vary depending upon the nature of the intelligence activity and available data, privacy, civil rights, and civil liberties officers should use relevant tools and information to evaluate and, where practicable, mitigate privacy and civil liberties concerns that fall disproportionately on historically disadvantaged demographic groups.  The IC Civil Liberties and Privacy Council, which led the development of the AI Ethics Framework for the Intelligence\n\nCommunity, will take the lead in developing and sharing such best practices and tools for conducting disparate impact analysis.\n\nC. Security Clearances\n\n1. Security Clearance Investigatory and Adjudicatory Activities Potentially\n\nImpacting Americans of Chinese Descent\n\n All U.S. Government civilian and military personnel, consultants, contractors, and other individuals who require initial or continued eligibility for access to classified information are required to undergo an investigation and adjudication to determine their \"loyalty to the United States, strength of character, trustworthiness, honesty, reliability, discretion, and sound judgment, as well as freedom from conflicting allegiances and potential for coercion, and willingness and ability to abide by regulations governing the use, handling, and protection of classified information.\"30  Applicants for new or renewed access to classified information must provide extensive and sensitive information regarding their associations, financial interests, and personal conduct in the course of security clearance investigations.31  Security clearance investigations may entail interviews with the subject's past or present neighbors, associates, and co workers.  These interviews also may result in requests for, and receipt of,\n\n\n28 The Principles of Artificial Intelligence Ethics for the Intelligence Community are available at https://www.intelligence.gov/images/AI/Principles_of_AI_Ethics_for_the_Intelligence_Community.pdf.\n\n29 The Artificial Intelligence Ethics Framework for the Intelligence Community is available at https://www.intelligence.gov/images/AI/AI_Ethics_Framework_for_the_Intelligence_Community_1.0.pdf.\n\n30 Executive Order 12968,  3.1(b) (Aug. 2, 1995); see also SEAD-4, Appendix A,  1.\n\n31 Before security clearance background investigations are initiated, the applicant signs consent forms authorizing the U.S. Government to collect all the information required in a security clearance investigation.\n\n\n\nUNCLASSIFIED\n\n\n\n17\n\n\nUNCLASSIFIED sensitive information regarding the subject of the investigation.  As a result, these investigative activities impact the privacy of Americans of Chinese descent, and other U.S. citizens, seeking to obtain or retain a security clearance.\n\n\n\nInformation collected in the course of the security clearance investigation provides the basis for a security clearance adjudication.  Security clearance adjudications require the \"careful weighing of a number of variables of an individual's life to make an affirmative determination that the individual is an acceptable security risk.  This is known as the whole-person concept.\"32  In evaluating the \"whole person,\" the adjudicator is required to consider myriad factors, including but not limited to the subject's \"allegiance to the United States,\"\n\nthe potential for \"foreign influence\" on the subject, \"foreign preference\" by the subject, as well as the subject's \"sexual behavior,\" \"personal conduct,\" \"alcohol consumption,\" prior \"handling [of] protected information,\" and other factors.33\n\n\n\nThe stakes are high for all involved in the security clearance process.  For the U.S. Government, ensuring that individuals with access to properly classified information do not pose an unacceptable risk is a vital national security interest.34\n\nFor individuals, obtaining and maintaining a security clearance is a prerequisite for many positions within and outside the U.S. government; denial or even delay of a security clearance may have a significant impact on their careers, livelihoods, or personal reputations.  In addition, subjects of a security clearance investigation must entrust the U.S. government will appropriately collect, use, and protect the detailed and sensitive information needed to fully evaluate the security risk posed by the individual.\n\n\n\n2. Privacy, Civil Liberties, and Civil Rights Protections in Security\n\nClearance Investigations\n\nAll security clearance investigations and adjudications must be conducted according to requirements set forth in law and subject to common standards.\n\nSpecifically, security clearance investigations must be conducted pursuant to the\n\nFederal Investigative Standards, December 2012, adopted by the Security\n\nExecutive Agent and the Director of the Office of Personnel Management.35\n\nAdjudications must comply with the National Security Adjudicative Guidelines,\n\n\n32 SEAD-4, Appendix A,  2 (a).\n\n33 See SEAD-4, Appendix A, Guidelines A  M.\n\n34 See Executive Order 12968,  3.1(b) (\"Eligibility shall be granted only where facts and circumstances indicate access to classified information is clearly consistent with the national security interests of the United States, and any doubt shall be resolved in favor of the national security.\")\n\n35 See, e.g., Intelligence Community Policy Guidance 704.1  C.1 (requiring all background investigations for access to sensitive compartmented information comply with the Federal Investigative Standards).  In May 2022, the\n\nFederal Investigative Standards were updated in the Federal Personnel Vetting Investigative Standards.  Future reports will examine how these updates have affected and protected the privacy, civil liberties, and civil rights of\n\nAmericans of Chinese descent.\n\n\n\nUNCLASSIFIED\n\n\n\n18\n\n\nUNCLASSIFIED which establish \"the single, common adjudicative criteria for all covered individuals who require initial or continued eligibility for access to classified information.\"36  Uniform standards narrow the discretion of security clearance processes to help ensure the protection of privacy, civil liberties, and civil rights.\n\nIn addition, strict access and use limitations apply to information acquired in the course of security investigations in order to protect the privacy and civil liberties of both the subjects of security clearance investigations and individuals who provide information in the course of such investigations.37\n\nIn the course of this review, non-governmental organizations representing\n\nAsian Americans and Pacific Islanders and some individuals within the Federal government expressed concerns that Americans of Chinese descent were subject to longer and more invasive security clearance investigations, or that any associations or connections they may have with individuals in the PRC may have resulted in disparate results in the security clearance adjudicative process.\n\nDiscrimination in any aspect of the security clearance process is unlawful.\n\nExecutive Order 12968 explicitly bars discrimination \"on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, national origin, disability, or sexual orientation in granting access to classified information.\"38  The same explicit bar on such unlawful discrimination features prominently in the National Security Adjudicative Guidelines.39  As a result, an individual's race or ethnicity are never an acceptable or authorized basis for granting or withholding a security clearance or conducting related investigative activities with respect to that individual.\n\nStated clearly, the law prohibits an individual from being subjected to greater scrutiny because they are an American of Chinese descent.  Nor does their status as a Chinese American have any bearing on the adjudicative factors that may, or may not, make them eligible to hold a security clearance.\n\nIn contrast to impermissible factors such as race and ethnicity, the potential for a prospective or current security clearance-holder to be vulnerable to foreign influence is an important aspect of security clearance adjudications.\n\nUnder the National Security Adjudicative Guidelines, \"[f]oreign contacts and interests, including, but not limited to, business, financial, and property interests are a national security concern if they result in divided allegiance.  [Foreign contacts and interests] may also be a national security concern if they create\n\n\n36 SEAD-4  B.\n\n37 See, e.g., ODNI Systems of Record Notice -17, ODNI Personnel Security Records, 76 Fed. Reg. 42739 (July 19,\n\n2011) (requiring administrative, physical, and technical safeguards on ODNI security clearance records and limiting the sharing of such records).\n\n38 Executive Order 12968, Section 3.1(c).\n\n39 SEAD-4, Appendix A,  1(c) (\"The U.S. Government does not discriminate on the basis or race, color, religion, sex, national origin, disability, or sexual orientation in making a national security eligibility determination.\"\n\n\n\nUNCLASSIFIED\n\n\n\n19\n\n\nUNCLASSIFIED circumstances in which the individual may be manipulated or induced to help a foreign person, group, organization, or government in a way inconsistent with\n\nU.S. interests or otherwise made vulnerable to pressure or coercion by any foreign interest.\"40  Risk factors are not limited to instances in which a foreign adversary has affirmatively sought to compromise a U.S. citizen, but extend more broadly to a variety of potentially disqualifying conditions, including \"contact, regardless of method, with a foreign family member, business or professional associate, friend or other person who is a citizen of or resident in a foreign country if that contact creates a heightened risk of foreign exploitation inducement, manipulation, pressure, or coercion.\"41  Such security concerns can also be mitigated by a number of factors, including instances in which the subject \"has such deep and longstanding relationships and loyalties in the United States, that the individual can be respected to resolve any conflict or interest in favor of the U.S. interest.\"42\n\nForeign contacts and interests alone are not disqualifying factors to obtain a security clearance; to the contrary, in some instances they help provide the experiences and skills required by the IC.  The success of the IC's mission requires that each agency or component recruit personnel with a broad range of experiences to meet our national security challenges.  In particular, individuals with experience studying, living, and working abroad can provide unique and valuable skills, including knowledge of foreign languages and cultural competency, which are critical to providing objective and nuanced intelligence information and analysis.\n\nAdjudication of the risks posed by foreign contacts and interests is not country-agnostic.  The National Security Adjudicative Guidelines states that\n\n\"[a]ssessment of foreign contacts and interests should consider the country in which foreign contact or interest is located, including, but not limited to, considerations such as whether [the country] is known to target U.S. citizens to obtain classified or sensitive information.\"43  As discussed above, the IC assesses the PRC conducts extensive efforts to obtain access to classified information and, as a result, foreign contacts and interests with individuals located in the PRC receive greater scrutiny than contacts with individuals in other foreign countries that have been assessed to pose a lesser counterintelligence risk.\n\nAn individual's status as an American of Chinese descent is not a \"foreign influence.\"  Nor does a Chinese American's race or ethnicity have any bearing on their \"deep and longstanding relationships and loyalties in the United States.\"\n\nMany Americans of Chinese descent have no contacts with the PRC, while other\n\n\n40 SEAD-4, Appendix A, Guideline B (6).\n\n41 SEAD-4, Appendix A, Guideline B (7)(a) (emphasis added).\n\n42 SEAD-4, Appendix A, Guideline B (8)(b).\n\n43 SEAD-4, Appendix A, Guideline B (6).\n\n\n\nUNCLASSIFIED\n\n\n\n20\n\n\nUNCLASSIFIED\n\nChinese Americans have family or financial interests in China that present acceptably low risks.  For individuals of any race or ethnicity, only actual foreign contacts and interests qualify for potential scrutiny in the security clearance process.  The risks posed by those actual foreign contacts and interests, the intelligence practices of the particular foreign country in question, and the degree to which the individual's actions and loyalties mitigate these risks are the only relevant factors to determining whether the individual could be vulnerable to foreign influence.\n\n3. Recommendations and Actions\n\nThe Administration has prioritized the importance of a diverse national security workforce.  Executive Order 14035, Diversity Equity, Inclusion, and\n\nAccessibility in the Federal Workforce, requires all Federal entities to \"make advancing diversity, equity, inclusion, and accessibility a priority component of the agency's management and agency strategic planning.44  Specifically to national security, the President has stated that \"[i]t is the policy of my\n\nAdministration to prioritize diversity, equity, inclusion, and accessibility as a national security imperative, in order to ensure critical perspectives and talents are represented in the national security workforce.\"45  The following recommendations are consistent with, and a component of, the IC's broader implementation of these priorities.\n\nFirst, the opacity of the security clearance process, as well as the many factors required to be considered in the \"whole person\" review, may result in the subject of the security clearance process inferring that the length or outcome of their security investigation and adjudication has been affected by unlawful racial animus or bias.  Assessing whether this is the case in any particular security clearance process is a fact-intensive process.  On a more systemic scale, ODNI\n\nCLPT and NCSC are using existing data to investigate whether race or ethnicity of security clearance holders affects various points in the security clearance process, to include the length of security clearance investigations and the adjudicative results.  If the data demonstrates that security timelines, adjudicative decisions, or other aspects of the security clearance process differ by race or ethnicity, NCSC would attempt to determine potential root causes of these differences, such as whether individuals with relatively more foreign contacts of significant counterintelligence risk, like those from the PRC, experience comparable outcomes in the security clearance process.  If resulting metrics indicate such a difference, NCSC and CLPT would determine points in the investigative and adjudicatory process that could benefit from additional training, more granular guidance, or enhanced oversight.\n\n\n44 Executive Order 14035  4 (June 25, 2021).\n\n45 National Security Memorandum, Revitalizing America's Foreign Policy and National Security Workforce,\n\nInstitutions, and Partnerships,  1(c) (Feb. 4, 2021).\n\n\n\nUNCLASSIFIED\n\n\n\n21\n\n\nUNCLASSIFIED\n\nSecond, ODNI further recommends that IC agencies and components ensure that all individuals involved in the security clearance process receive effective training on the long-standing non-discrimination principles that undergird the security clearance process.  During the course of this review, representatives from non-governmental organizations provided examples of conduct that did not exhibit the professionalism and cultural competency expected of all personnel involved in the security clearance process.  In response to these concerns, NCSC's Acting Director issued a February 2021 memo to all IC agencies and components stating \"adjudicative and investigative elements must be educated on ethnic and cultural differences among Americans, consistent with existing law and policy, to ensure the fair and equal treatment of individuals in the security clearance process.\"46  In February 2022, the DNI issued the Federal\n\nPersonnel Vetting Engagement Guidelines, which among other things, provide specific guidance on the approach security personnel must use in engaging with the public in a manner that fosters public trust, enables the government to assist individuals in entering the workforce in a timely manner, and shapes a culture of personal accountability and shared responsibility.  Additionally, ODNI expects that forthcoming updates to the National Training Standards will reemphasize for personnel vetting background investigators and adjudicators the importance of ensuring that vetting processes promote equitable treatment of individuals in alignment with the DNI's stated objectives to recruit and retain a diverse and talented IC workforce.\n\nIn training to the non-discrimination requirements and the Federal\n\nPersonnel Vetting Engagement Guidelines, it is a best practice to incorporate real world scenarios in which these principles are applied.  For example, training for security clearance investigators should include preferred methods for verifying the U.S. citizenship status of associates of the clearance applicant without asking questions that would suggest an individual's race, ethnicity, or the languages spoken in their home are indicators that an individual is not a U.S. citizen.\n\nPrivacy, civil rights, and civil liberties officers and agency/component diversity and inclusion personnel should provide assistance in the development of such effective training.\n\n\n\n46 Memorandum, Acting Director Michael Orlando, National Counterintelligence Surveillance Center, Avoiding\n\nDiscrimination in Security Clearance Actions (Feb. 1, 2021).\n\n\n\nUNCLASSIFIED\n\n\n\n22\n\n\nUNCLASSIFIED\n\nCONCLUSION\n\nWhile continuing to combat the significant national security threat posed by the PRC, IC agencies and components must ensure that their intelligence activities and security clearance processes protect the privacy, civil liberties, and civil rights of Americans of Chinese descent and all other Americans.  Adherence to the law and policies that govern the IC, as well as the IC's values and professional tradecraft standards, help ensure equal protection and treatment to all\n\nAmericans."
    },
    {
        "text": "## Strategic Influence Operations - The Information Connection\n\nby COL BRAD M. WARD\nUNITED STATES ARMY\nThe views expressed in this academic research paper are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the U.S. Government, the Department of Defense, or any of its agencies.\n\nU.S. Army War College CARLISLE BARRACKS, PENNSYLVANIA 17013\n\n## Report Documentation Page\n\nPublic reporting burder for this collection of information is estibated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing this collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burder to Department of Defense, Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports (0704-0188), 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to any penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number. PLEASE DO NOT RETURN YOUR FORM TO THE ABOVE ADDRESS.\n\n1. REPORT DATE (DD-MM-YYYY) 07-04-2003\n\n| 2. REPORT TYPE                                              |\n|-------------------------------------------------------------|\n| xx-xx-2002 to xx-xx-2003                                    |\n| 4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE                                       |\n| Strategic Influence Operations - The Information Connection |\n| Unclassified                                                |\n| 6. AUTHOR(S)                                                |\n| Ward, Brad M. ; Author                                      |\n| 7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME AND ADDRESS                 |\n| U.S. Army War College                                       |\n| Carlisle Barracks                                           |\n| Carlisle, PA17013-5050                                      |\n| 9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME AND ADDRESS            |\n| ,                                                           |\n| 12. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT                     |\n| APUBLIC RELEASE                                             |\n| ,                                                           |\n| 13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES                                     |\n| 14. ABSTRACT                                                |\n| See attached file.                                          |\n| 15. SUBJECT TERMS                                           |\n| 16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF:                             |\n| 17. LIMITATION                                              |\n| OF ABSTRACT                                                 |\n| Same as Report                                              |\n| (SAR)                                                       |\n| a. REPORT                                                   |\n| Unclassified                                                |\n| b. ABSTRACT                                                 |\n| Unclassified                                                |\n| c. THIS PAGE                                                |\n| Unclassified                                                |\n| 5a. CONTRACT NUMBER                                         |\n| 5b. GRANT NUMBER                                            |\n| 5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER                                  |\n| 5d. PROJECT NUMBER                                          |\n| 5e. TASK NUMBER                                             |\n| 5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER                                        |\n| 8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT                           |\n| NUMBER                                                      |\n| 10. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S ACRONYM(S)                            |\n| 11. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S REPORT                                |\n| NUMBER(S)                                                   |\n| 19. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON                              |\n| Rife, Dave                                                  |\n| RifeD@awc.carlisle.army.mil                                 |\n| 18.                                                         |\n| NUMBER                                                      |\n| OF PAGES                                                    |\n| 41                                                          |\n| 19b. TELEPHONE NUMBER                                       |\n| International Area Code                                     |\n| Area Code Telephone Number                                  |\n| DSN                                                         |\n\nStandard Form 298 (Rev. 8-98)\nPrescribed by ANSI Std Z39.18\n\n## Abstract\n\nAUTHOR:\nCOL Brad M. Ward\nTITLE: Strategic Influence Operations - The Information Connection FORMAT:\nStrategy Research Project\nDATE:\n07 April 2003\n  PAGES: 41\nCLASSIFICATION:  Unclassified\nThe intent of this paper is to analyze and highlight the U.S. government's (USG) current approach to conducting strategic influence operations within the international envrionment. Strategic influence is the confluence of information entities integrated withing the interagency integration process concerning public diplomacy, public affairs and international military information (DOD Psychological Operations).  Specifically, this paper will conduct a comparative analysis of the fundamental approaches that the Department of Defense (DOD), the Department of State (DOS), and the National Security Council/White House (NSC/WH) utilize internationally, and provide recommendations that magnifies informational techniques to further U.S. strategic objectives.\n\n## Preface\n\nThis paper is a culmination of a life-long project to increase our countries influence capability abroad, through peacetime and crisis.  It became more focused when I was provided the opportunity to serve as the senior military advisor to the Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs and specifically to serve on the Presidentially mandated International Public Information Secretariat from 1999 through 2002. Over the past three years, the concept for strategic influence has matured and has begun to orchestrate the synergy required to further promote and explain our national goals and objectives to foreign audiences.\n\nI would like to thank William V. Parker and the members of the Department of State's International Public Information Secretariat for providing me the opportunity to expand my professional horizons and personal experience in the world of \"Washington Beltway\" politics and international public diplomacy.  Thanks are also due to all the former members of the Department of Defense's Office of Strategic Influence and specifically to BG Simon P. Worden for developing a strategic vision that created a safer America through the use of information and technology, and for his professional bravery in attempting to execute this strategy. Special kudos to Reggie Brown and members of the NIC's Perception Management Threat Panel; you did great work; hopefully someone will listen and learn. Special thanks to Mr. Frank Jones and the professionals within ASD-SOLIC for providing me the opportunity to experience strategic reality first hand. Thanks to COL (R) Tom Timmes, the U.S. government's premiere functional expert and historian on psychological and influence operations, for his knowledge and tutelage on the interagency process. Finally, I owe a special dept of gratitude to my wife Janet for putting up with my idiosyncrasies, terrible work hours and months deployed away from home.\n\n## Strategic Influence - The Information Connection Introduction\n\nThere is a battle in progress that is far subtler than strategic bombing missions, commando direct action raids against Al Qa 'ida camps or the partisan political wrangling connected to America's global war on terrorism. This battle is the \"war of the words,\" which is designed to capture the minds of the world's citizenry, influence their attitudes and behaviors and produce responses favorable to U.S. policy. In this world of globalization and instantaneous data dissemination, it is often said the human mind \"has no firewall.\"1 But in reality, there is a wall dividing the perceptions and beliefs of the West verses those of emerging nations, failing states and the radical Islamists from the Middle East/North Africa, Southwest Asia and the Pacific.  America is losing this \"war of the words\" because of our overdependence on technology, inability or interest to understand the ethnic driving forces and motivations of nonwestern populations and cultures, and our domestic culture of political correctness.  These shortfalls, coupled with a consensus-based, lethargic governmental process have resulted in ineffective governmental guidelines and \"cookie-cutting\" procedures that favor short-term, politically acceptable techniques and informational responses.\n\nAmerican leaders, in concert with our British allies, are working with the United Nations to develop and maintain favorable attitudes abroad concerning U.S. and coalition military actions in Afghanistan and other parts of the world.  Concurrently, the U.S. government is attempting to execute other national priorities such as potential regime change and disarmament in Iraq and a National Missile Defense System as well as minimize potential hostilities on the Korean peninsula simultaneously. But does our government have the political will and possess the informational capability to develop, coordinate, synchronize and then explain our national strategy to the world with favorable results, much less enter into an adversary's information decision cycle to minimize hostile acts against the United States?\n\nThis paper will address and compare historical and current informational and influence programs; examine the structures and inter-governmental approaches to strategic influence;\nand argue that their enduring values may not remain valid. It will conclude by discussing the derivative of strategic influence for the future.\n\n## Background\n\nStrategic influence operations have historically been a government's ability to further its national strategic goals and objectives internationally through an integrated, synchronized and Interagency-vetted information campaign using the tools of public diplomacy, public affairs and international Military Information (DoD Psychological Operations) as its media. This has been undertaken within the framework of the National Security Council and the Departments of Defense and State.  In our American form of democracy, strategic influence is and will remain the inherent responsibility of the President of the United States and his appointed cabinet to craft and execute the \"U.S. Grand Strategy\" directed at influencing foreign target audiences. This \"Grand Strategy\" is a combination of domestic and international objectives designed to accomplish both short and long-term policy objectives.\n\nSince the terrorist attack on September 11, 2001 (9-11), the United States has had to restructure its global strategy, transitioning to a \"capabilities based approach.\"2 Most significantly, the previous U.S. threat based strategy, has proved lacking due to the asymmetric threats posed by non-state actors who have demonstrated and continue to demonstrate that traditional diplomatic means and previously valued methods of deterrence are ineffective3 in ensuring American and allied security. In assessing our capabilities, the National Intelligence Community (NIC) and principally, Department of State's Office of Strategic Communication (OSC), has determined that the U.S. is severely lacking in the area of information and influence operations with respect to three major areas:  its ability to develop systematic informational approaches with central control and functional leadership; its ability to integrate technological innovations within government; and a dedicated interagency analytical structure or fusion cell with a dissemination capability.\n\nMost importantly, the USG lacks the political will to establish a single organization designed to serve as the conduit for USG informational policy development and dissemination within the globalized environment.  These critical shortfalls have become more visible since 9- 11 and the USG is attempting to correct these weaknesses through bold interagency coordination efforts and the establishment of a central communication mechanism. The nexus for these initiatives is the Strategic Communication Policy Coordinating Committee (SCPCC)\nwithin the National Security Council system, which tasked with analyzing and developing proactive a series of programmatic responses in support of the President's policies.\n\nIn the 2002 National Security Strategy, President Bush highlighted that \"the gravest threat our nation faces lies at the crossroads of radicalism and technology.4\" (WAYS) As the interagency process restructures and organizes for the War on Terrorism, it is essential that the USG review its capabilities and establish a doctrinal approach for information development and dissemination. Presently, the SCPPC has established a combined fusion cell which integrates various agencies' (State, Defense, CIA, USAID) analytical capabilities to conduct appropriate levels of target audience analysis prior to campaign and product development.  The fusion cell is chartered to develop both short and long-term informational based programs in support of current policy. These product based programs are then integrated into a synchronized informational strategy where key leaders provide information to domestic and foreign target audiences utilizing full spectrum media.  The key to success for future informational programs will be its analytical basis using a metric based approach for measuring of effectiveness both domestically and abroad.\n\nThe U.S. government has had limited strategic and operational informational successes in promoting its policies on the War on Terrorism internationally.  Those successes is has had have been when the interagency was able to completely integrate policy goals and objectives into a single information campaign, collectively executed within a specific timeline. While emphasis is being placed on establishing an operational capability within the SCPCC and Office of Global Communication-Coalition Information Center (OGC-CIC), certain key communicators within the interagency as still satisfied with the \"status quo\" and are reluctant to give up their limited power base.  During the President's State of the Union address on 3 February 2003, he highlighted specific funding which should address some of the shortfalls mentioned in this paper. One of the essential steps mentioned was allocating $3.384 billion to be used for such programs as hiring additional personnel, improving information technology and additional funding for educational and cultural exchange programs.  Additionally, $565.5 million will be allocated to the Broadcasting Board of Governors (BBG), including $30 million to initiate a new Arabic-language satellite TV network to counter the effects of Al Jazerra and other Islamic media.\n\nThe following sections will provide a historical prospective of information procedures within the USG, discuss control mechanisms and then touch upon current informational initiatives.\n\n## Historical Attempts At National-Level Information Coordination\n\nBetween World War I and 1986, there were, at least six instances where the USG created national level Information or Influence type committees. \"Communicators, unlike most military leaders, understood World War I was a totally new mechanized, mass conflict, requiring the use of mass communications to succeed.  Populations were mobilized and, \"taught\" to hate the enemy, and respond emotionally to atrocities, even if invented or exaggerated. Domestic and international opinion would be molded following the declaration of war in April 1917; President Woodrow Wilson authorized the Committee of Public Information, more popularly known as the Creel Committee for its leader George Creel.  Creel's inflammatory efforts and propagandizing rhetoric reshaped American public opinion on Germany, transforming a once highly respected ethnic group into one to be feared, and reviled.  Creel's committee used every means of communications available to shape opinion, as well as to control, centralize, and even censor information (1917-1919).  The committee's objectives were to encourage loyalty and unity at home while promoting understanding and support of U.S. foreign policy objectives abroad.  To accomplish its objectives, the Committee established \"country bureaus\" to focus its efforts and created numerous overseas offices to distribute literature and audio/visual products. The Committee employed motion pictures, sponsored tours, held mass rallies, and distributed millions of posters, leaflets, newspapers and sign boards. The most famous domestic product of the Creel committee's work was the \"four-minute men\" program which generated thousands of speeches in public theaters, schools and various organizations across the U.S. reaching an audience in excess of 314 million. 5 The \"four minute men\" was a series of politically designed speeches and addresses which were designed to garner favorable public opinion and could be completed in four minutes. Criticism of the committee's and Wilson's tactics may be justified, but these techniques proved highly effective in galvanizing forces to defeat the enemy.\"6\nIn 1919, with the end of World War I and the dissolution of the Creel Committee, the first and most ambitious attempt to develop a national security coordination system was proposed by Franklin D. Roosevelt, then Secretary of the Navy. The proposal met a quick death due to bureaucratic infighting and lack of \"perceived need\" in a time of peace.\n\nShortly before Pearl Harbor, now President Roosevelt established the Office of Coordinator of Information (COI) and designated Colonel William Donovan as its first director. The COI was responsible for espionage, propaganda and subversion.  Colonel Donovan established two separate divisions for his organization: Research and Analysis and Foreign Information Service (FIS). The FIS was a psychological warfare division charged with explaining the objectives and goals of the United States throughout the world with the exception of Latin America.  FIS used information from the wire services on its eleven commercial short-wave radio stations and broadcasted over 300 programs per week into Europe and Asia. In June 1942, the president by executive order dissolved the COI and created the Office of War Information (OWI) and the Office of Strategic Services (OSS). Major responsibility for overt psychological warfare shifted to OWI (which later became the United States Information Agency), while responsibility for covert psychological warfare belonged to the OSS - under the control of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. At the war's end, a newly established interagency organization, the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee became responsible for psychological warfare policy and planning for peacetime and wartime.7\nFollowing WW II, with U.S. national strategy transitioning to containment of the Soviet Union, the USG established three overlapping and similar national level boards and Committees that addressed foreign information programs and psychological planning as an outgrowth of the Cold War in general and the Korean War in particular.  The first, the Psychological Operations Coordinating Committee, was established by NSC59/1 in March 1950; the second was the Psychological Strategy Board created by executive order in April 1951 and headed by Mr. Gordon Gray, former Secretary of the Army; and the third was the Operations Coordinating Board which was established by executive order in September 1953 and continued until 1961. All three interagency organizations were responsible for the formulation of policies and plans for a USG information program directed at foreign governments in time of peace and the formulation of policies for a national-level psychological warfare program during peace, crisis, and the initial stages of war. 8\nThe conflict in Vietnam spawned no less than four national level psychological operations committees between 1955 and 1972, but the last instance was the short-lived Psychological Operations Committee created in July 1986 by the NSC pursuant to NSDD 130.  The committee was responsible for establishing national psychological operations (PSYOP) guidelines and to define the roles and relationships of the agencies involved.  The committee ceased meeting in early 1987. 9\n\n## Control Of The Informational Environment\n\nControl of the informational environment at the strategic level has always been the critical requirement for our national leaders. These efforts underscore all others in importance at the domestic level and internationally during time of crisis.  Various administrations have attempted to consolidate strategic information into a concise and executable strategy through various presidential directives, National Security Decision Directives (NSDD's), Presidential Decision Directives (PDD's) and most recently, National Security Presidential Directives (NSPD's). Numerous government entities, to include the White House (Executive Office of the President - EOP), National Security Council (NSC), Departments of State, Defense, Justice, the Central Intelligence Agency, Federal Bureau of Investigation, and most recently, the White House's Office of Global Communication (OGC) and Homeland Security, have attempted to establish mechanisms to develop, coordinate, synchronize and execute a proactive multi-dimensional information capability,10 but to no avail.\n\nAs the government restructures, it is essential that we review all previous practices, current directives and capabilities concerning the USG's ability to conduct influence operations across the informational spectrum. Primacy of effort must be directed towards effective management within the interagency process, and thereby affect and shape the international information environment to support the U.S. national strategy for the War on Terrorism and beyond.\n\n## Political Realities And Current Initiatives\n\nThe U.S. government consists of over forty separate and independent bureaus and agencies; each with separate charters, budgets, agendas, personalities and unique bureaucratic cultures.  These agencies often possess separate and distinct educational and training requirements, promotion criteria for advancement, and, with the exception of the Department of Defense, none attempt to formally initiate their personnel into the interagency process through advanced schooling and assignments.\n\nIs it naive to believe that the U.S. government is incapable of executing an interagency vetted influence campaign?  Is it possible, that the USG is not effective due to long standing bureaucratic ineptitudes, political correctness, historic jealousy or trivial differences between appointed officials?  Throughout the history of our government, key or select communicators have always retained levels of influence not necessarily equal to their rank or position within institutions.  These select individuals will continue to shape the informational environment to either the advancement or detriment of our policies until a formalized process is developed, where analysis is fully considered and integrated throughout the interagency and then executed collectively.\n\nThe combination of information development and distribution, social anthropological analysis, technological innovations, and influence present our nation it's most challenging mission in decades.  Since 9-11 we face a paradigm shift, requiring a restructuring of our government's ability to analyze and develop a grand strategy, and then concretize that strategy into concepts and policies designed to deal with the asymmetric challenges presented to us during this time of crisis.  Numerous USG studies, directives and proposed legislation such as the 2001 Defense Science Board Task Force Report on Managed Information Dissemination, Congressional proposals such as the Hyde-Lantos bill to provide the U.S. government with an enhanced strategic information and public diplomacy capability, DoD's formation and dissolution the Office of Strategic Influence (OSI) and previously initiated and presently revalidated presidential directives (e.g.,PDD-68,  International Public Information) continue to be inadequately supported.\n\nThe following sections will provide a overview concerning the development of the interagency process and briefly discuss current USG organizations and initiatives presently operating today.\n\n## National Security Council\n\nDuring World War II, President Roosevelt still controlled the information flow and policy development through ad hoc organizations and working groups for policy coordination.  The Congress identified this organizational shortfall and imposed upon President Truman by enacting the National Security Act, a coordination mechanism designed to assist the President in quickly addressing foreign and domestic national security issues.\n\n\"There is hereby established a council to be know as the National Security Council...the function of the Council shall be to advise the President with respect to the integration of domestic, foreign, and military policies relating to the national security so as to enable the military services and other departments and agencies of the Government to cooperate more effectively in matters involving national security.\"11\nThis act established two separate and distinct entities, the National Security Council and the Department of Defense. The Council's mission was to permanently synchronize and coordinate the USG's national defense and foreign affairs policies through the use of the elements of national power.  While the National Security Council has coordinated policy and provided various levels of oversight, it has never been granted full authority to direct policy independently.\n\nPresently, the National Security Council system consists of the NSC, the Principals Committee (consisting of the National Security Advisor, Secretaries of Defense, State and Treasury, Director, Central Intelligence Agency, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff and most recently, the Director, Homeland Security), the Deputies Committee (includes the deputies fore mentioned senior officials he feels required for the DC and the Deputy Attorney General, Deputy Director, Office of Management and Budget, Deputy Chief of Staff to the President for Policy, Chief of Staff to the Vice President and the Deputy Assistant to the President for International Economic Affairs), six regional policy coordinating committees, and eleven functional policy coordinating committees. Most recently, the Strategic Communications Policy Coordinating Committee was formed on 15 September of 2002,.  Under the National Security Presidential Directive -1, each Policy Coordinating Committee will be chaired by an official of Under or Assistant Secretary Rank.\n\nWithin all organizations of the NSC system and primarily the Policy Coordinating Committees, the greatest weakness lies in the system's ability to routinely transfer and coordinate information as well as develop a synchronized influence program.  While a department or agency may be assigned to chair a Policy Coordinating Committee, it possesses no tasking authority over the interagency or its resources for the accomplishment of his mission. Simultaneously, the chair may also possess neither tasking nor directive authority within his own organization. The lack of central tasking authority has always presented the greatest challenge for policy implementation. Numerous failures or ineffective actions have occurred when the chair is not capable of gaining or maintaining consensus among the interagency participants.\n\nSecondarily, the chair must understand those capabilities internal to the various bureaus and capitalize on their \"intra-agency\" strengths and weaknesses.\n\n## Interagency Process\n\nThe interagency process provides a means to facilitate policy coordination and development. \"The interagency process is designed to ensure that information and options are developed and passed up the line and that decisions and guidance are passed back down to staffs which must write orders and oversee their execution.\" 12\nWithin the U.S. government, the interagency process is a living organism, one which possesses no firm structure or doctrine and occasionally consumes its participants. The process itself is a direct reflection of the President, is emphasis, that is, his level of trust and comfort with the political appointees and his philosophy on government.  Under each administration, governmental agencies are provided general guidance through directives (e.g., PDDs, NSPDs) as to how the President would like national security policy to be conducted.  These documents establish basic guidelines for agency interoperability on specific subjects, but may fail to provide lead actors with interagency tasking authority and resources to accomplish the mission.\n\nDepending on the priority identified by senior leaders or by the placement of key personnel in charge of interagency working groups, individual agencies may not provide support to the process. Some agencies may not deem it to participate fully in the interagency process or key agencies may be left out completely due to the lead organization's lack of understanding of the value various agencies can contribute.\n\nWithin the interagency process, the NSC senior directors can be tasked by the National Security Advisor, Principals Committee (PC) or the Deputies Committee (DC) to establish exploratory working groups based on regional orientation or specific subjects such as terrorism, human rights or non-proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction/Effects (WMD/E).  Based on the group findings and importance, the PC/DC can elect to establish a Policy Coordinating Committee (PCC) with a functional lead identified in accordance with NSPD 113.\n\n## International Public Information (Ipi)\n\nWithin NSPD 1 was signed by President Bush, he revalidated and maintained select PDD's from the previous administration, one of which was PDD-68, International Public Information (IPI) and the organizations formal structure it created. One of the organizations created was the IPI Secretariat which was established on April 30th 1999, and which continues as PDD-68 has been revalidated under NSPD-1. The premise for the PDD was that dramatic changes in the global information environment (GIE) required the USG to implement a more deliberate and well-developed international public information strategy in promoting our American values and interests.\n\nIPI activities resulting from the PDD were undertaken to address only foreign target audiences because of Smith/Mundt Act restrictions as well as its informational and influence programs were designed to truthfully depict USG foreign policy. These activities were designed to enhance USG information efforts within the interagency, multilaterally and with NGOs while neither misleading nor compromising the integrity or independence of non-governmental organizations.  Within its charter, the IPI Secretariat's mission statement required it to \"improve our ability to coordinate independent public diplomacy, public affairs, and overt International Military Information (IMI) efforts, and to ensure that they are more successfully integrated into foreign and national security policy-making.\"14\nBefore to the PDD was signed by President Clinton, significant interagency turf battles were conducted to determine who would be the proponent for this Secretariat and maintain overall control and influence of its activities.  Initially, IPI was to be placed under the NSC due to the Clinton administration's philosophy of the NSC being more operational in nature.  However, during a series of PC and DC meetings, it was determined that the Department of State should be the lead agency since USIA had been dissolved and its personnel and responsibilities were incorporated into State.  Initially, IPI activities were placed under the functional control of the International Operations Bureau, but then were transferred to the Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs for direct control and resourcing.\n\nInitially, State was less than enthusiastic about filling the required slots in the Secretariat and providing resources to this organization primarily because of internal conflicts and philosophical differences between appointed officials even though an Interagency Working Group (IWG) at the NSC was established to execute the PDD. Eventually, State and DoD came to a joint agreement on IPI and allocated personnel and resources to the Secretariat in August 1999.\n\nThe five members of the Secretariat, augmented by personnel from ASD/SOLIC and the Joint Staff were immediately thrown into a diplomatic crisis and began facilitating interagency efforts to develop and execute a vetted influence campaign directed against Slobodan Milosevic and his government within the Former Yugoslavian Republic (FYR).  This influence campaign was designed to destabilize his regime and promote democracy and free elections within the FYR.  Numerous interagency activities were planned and coordinated to include establishing the \"Ring Around Serbia\" where State, DoD, the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), the Broadcasting Board of Governors (BBG) and other USG government agencies established a ring of independent news radio stations within the adjacent countries. This \"ring\" provided the FYR citizens with unbiased news and factual information on international activities.  Additionally, a series of \"internet cafes\" were funded by the IWG and established for anti-Miloshavic and pro-democracy supporters throughout the region to promote democratic values and support electoral reform within the region. A series of FYR key communicators were identified and provided equipment and passwords to protected IIP websites where they could download the most current information of USG and western policy pronouncements against Milosevic and disseminate it to local audiences.\n\nCapitalizing on these early achievements, a formalized series of IPI interagency templates were developed for conducting influence campaigns. These templates included time sequencing for Flexible Deterrent Options (FDO), mechanisms to coordinate and synchronize international public diplomacy and public affairs events, and a process to integrate U.S. government and non-governmental programs and activities in support of USG actions and objectives. Subsequent IPI facilitated information events were successful and because of this, IPI was immediately tasked by various NSC staff directorates to assist in the conduct of additional USG\ninformation programs. These programs crossed over both functional and regional equities and encompassed operations which included peacekeeping/peace enforcement, humanitarian assistance, immigration control, counter-drug, counter-terrorism, and refugee/detainee operations.  IPI worked within and facilitated several regional IWGs, assisted in the development and execution of USG-directed counter-propaganda and counter-hostile information campaigns and served as members in the National Intelligence Community (NIC) sponsored Perception Management Threat Panel (PMTP).\n\nAs the success and utility of the IPI Secretariat spread throughout the interagency,  it became the designated NSC IWG facilitator for the Serbian War Crimes Tribunal and the West African Peace Initiatives program. Using its experience and improved methodology, the Secretariat developed with appropriate funding and executed a US/UK bi-lateral influence campaign within West Africa to support efforts of the United Nations and UNAMSIL. Specifically, these influence programs were designed to magnify and synchronize UN and NGO sponsored humanitarian initiatives, promote the Disarmament, Demobilization Reintegration (DDR) process. Concurrently, IPI conducted a series of host nation and NGO coordinated multi-media informational programs that explained and promoted current USG and international policies using both traditional and non-traditional dissemination methods. Simultaneously, IPI developed and conducted a series of counter-disinformation programs against Liberia's President Charles Taylor and the criminal insurgent group, the Revolutionary United Front (RUF).  Overall, the influence campaign was very successful.  To date, the UN sponsored War Crimes Tribunal is being conducted within Sierra Leone and Guinea; over 50,000 insurgents surrendered to their West African governments and were integrated into the DDR process; and Charles Taylor and the RUF's power and influence has been minimized in the region and internationally.\n\nAfter the attack on 9-11, the Department of State has not fully capitalized on the proven capabilities of the IPI Secretariat and its methodology.  Previous lessons learned have been ignored and IPI's ability to influence activities within the interagency and around the world may have been lost.  IPI continues to be part of State's Office of Strategic Communications (OSC), and will now serve as the secretariat for the NSC's Strategic Communication Policy Coordinating Committee (SCPCC).  The IPI Secretariat continues to function, but the NSC and DoS need to capitalize on its personnel's experience and interagency communication methodology and reinforce its successes with adequate personnel and resources to effectively execute America's message.\n\n## Office Of Strategic Influence (Osi)\n\n\"If you know the enemy and know yourself; you need not fear the results in a hundred battles. If you know yourself, and not the enemy, for every victory gained you will also suffer a defeat. If you know neither the enemy nor yourself, you will succumb in every battle.15\nSun Tzu While the Office of Strategic Influence was primarily a DoD initiative, and should normally fall under the Department of Defense, it is key to mention it within the confines of the interagency because the history of the organization and the actions which occurred prior to OSI being dissolved may occur again.\n\nAfter 9-11, international sympathy was expressed for the innocent civilian loss of life, but world opinion concerning the United States, primarily from within the Muslim world, was at its lowest level in measurable history. In numerous governmental and independent surveys conducted, the consensus from the Muslim \"man on the street\" was that the U.S. deserved to be \"knocked off their pedestal\" because of its pro-Israeli and anti-Palestinian/Arab policies.  How could this have happened, why do they hate us and what we can do to change these perceptions became the buzz of the \"Beltway?\"\nFor weeks following the terrorist attacks on 9-11, the interagency process was in chaos and significant disagreements existed as to the informational mechanisms required, but most importantly, how to respond. Every government agency was scrambling, each had its own concept or approach for responding to the crisis, and in many cases key government agencies, working unilaterally, would have more than one approach, all uncoordinated at the intra-agency and interagency level.\n\nKey individuals within DoD and the USG understood the asymmetric threats directed against the United States, and the potential long-term implications of not only responding to the hostile foreign information environment, but the requirement to influence it through proactive informational programs and positive reinforcing actions. In November 2001, the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) stood up the Office of Strategic Influence under the direct supervision of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (USD-P).  OSI was designed to provide DoD with a series of information policy options and programs that conducted worldwide and target specific analysis and opinion polls. OSI was also tasked to initiate programs that countered hostile propaganda, misinformation and disinformation directed against the United States and its allies from foreign sources.  The organization was composed of civilian and military personnel with interagency, informational, technological and regional expertise and placed under the direction of Brigadier General Simon P. Worden, a highly experienced influence specialist, astro-scientist and technologist from USSPACECOM.\n\nFrom its inception, OSI did not have to contend with normal bureaucratic growth pains. Its organization had a robust operational budget, and its activities and programs were integrated and vetted in the interagency at the Under and Assistant Secretary level. The organization, working closely with the multiple government agencies developed new concepts for, and capitalized on, ongoing informational programs that promoted democratic values and initiatives, supported and highlighted international educational reform programs. It also participated in the conduct of international surveys to determine the root cause and effect for international perceptions of hate and distain directed against the United States.\n\nInformed speculation has it that while OSI was highly successful in determining its baseline mission requirement against the GWOT and beginning to execute pro-US influence programs abroad, it was not capable of protecting itself from political \"rice bowl\" issues and petty jealousies. When a series of coordinated press releases with intentionally leading disinformation hit the media on the February 20, 2002, a media feeding frenzy against OSI ensued. DoD decided to close the office rather than counter the internally spread disinformation and take corrective actions to eliminate leaks and security violations.\n\nSince OSI was dissolved, no other organization within the interagency has attempted to identify, coordinate, synchronize and conduct long-term, analytically based, influence programs in support of the U.S. government in the global environment.\n\n## Broadcasting Board Of Governors (Bbg)\n\nThe Broadcasting Board of Governors (BBG) is an independent organization authorized\n\"to direct and supervise\" all civilian broadcasting activities of the U.S. Government.16 The BBG\nviews this independence as \"an embrace of the idea that all of our broadcasted are journalists\" and a reaffirmation of broadcasting's role \"as a voice of human rights and democratic freedoms with new global challenges and priorities to address.\" 17 Components of the BBG include the federally funded International Broadcasting Bureau (IBB), Voice of America (VOA), Office of Cuba Broadcasting (Radio and TV Marti), WORLDNET Television and administration of appropriated funds for Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL) and Radio Free Afghanistan (RFA). Current BBG program funds exceed $450 million in 2002. Its multiple programs are transmitted in sixty-one languages to an estimated audience of over 100 million persons throughout the world.\n\nWhen it was part of USIA, the BBG leadership worked closely with Congress to design the International Broadcasting Act of 1994 (IBA) to include and provide the following:\n\n1. NEWS WHICH IS CONSISTENTLY RELIABLE AND AUTHORITATIVE, ACCURATE,\nOBJECTIVE, AND COMPREHENSIVE;\n2. A BALANCED AND COMPREHENSIVE PROJECTION OF THE UNITED STATES\nTHOUGHT AND INSTITUTIONS, REFLECTING THE DIVERSITY OF THE UNITED STATES CULTURE AND SOCIETY;\n3. CLEAR AND EFFECTIVE PRESENTATION OF THE POLICIES OF THE UNITED\nSTATES GOVERNMENT AND RESPONSIBLE DISCUSSION AND OPINION ON THOSE POLICIES;\n4. PROGRAMMING TO MEET NEEDS WHICH REMAIN UNSERVED BY THE TOTALITY\nOF MEDIA VOICES AVAILABLE TO THE PEOPLE OF CERTAIN NATIONS;\n5. INFORMATION ABOUT DEVELOPMENTS IN EACH SIGNIFICANT PART OF THE\nWORLD;\n6. A VARIETY OF OPINIONS AND VOICE WITHIN PARTICULAR NATIONS AND\nREGIONS PREVENTED BY CENSORSHIP OR REPRESSIONS FROM SPEAKING TO THEIR FELLOW COUNTRYMEN;\n7. RELIABLE RESEARCH CAPACITY TO MEET CRITERIA UNDER THIS SECTION; 8. ADEQUATE TRANSMITTER AND RELAY CAPACITY TO SUPPORT THE ACTIVITIES\nDESCRIBED IN THIS SECTION; AND\n9. TRAINING AND TECHNICAL SUPPORT FOR INDEPENDENT INDIGENOUS MEDIA\nTHROUGH GOVERNMENT AGENCIES AND PRIVATE UNITED STATES ENTITIES.\nThe independence the BBG gained from the 1994 legislation has caused considerable confusion and consternation among the interagency members responsible for influence and strategic information. While its goals and objectives are outlined in the IBA of 1994, the present organization has deviated from its statutory mission through the personal interpretations by a small body of its membership. These actions have caused the organization to be compelled to appear before Congress and explain its program of activities and how they are developed, its internal quality control mechanisms and approval mechanisms utilized prior to dissemination of product and most importantly, its justification for continued existence.\n\nMost of the problems associated with the IBA have been removed, but the underlying reason for confusion still exists. There is not a lead agency with tasking authority that develops the U.S strategy for promoting and magnifying the government's goals and objectives of fostering democratic principles worldwide and providing international target audiences with truthful and factual information on U.S. activities. Additionally, there is not an interagency organization that conducts appropriate target audience analysis while countering hostile disinformation, misinformation and hostile propaganda.\n\nFundamental to all these requirements is the question of how the BBG is related to and integrated with national security strategies and foreign policy. While credibility of information, journalistic integrity and accurate reporting are important for international acceptance, primacy of effort should be directed towards target audiences, types of languages to broadcast in, length of broadcast, dissemination techniques, area of coverage and measurements of effectiveness used to determine format and process.\n\nSimultaneously, the major problem which must be solved lies in the area of U.S. policy and law: who decides how and when the broadcasting assets are utilized during times of crisis, and how to define the appropriate relationships between the BBG, and the Departments of State and Defense, and other U.S. national security agencies. 18 The BBG has played a crucial role in disseminating the U.S. message to denied countries and target audiences where freedom of information is restricted.  This organization faces numerous difficult choices if it's going to remain a key entity within the USG influence arena for the 21st century.  The statutory authority under which it presently operates degrades the U.S. international broadcasting potential and limits it effectiveness for future influence activities. These shortfalls lie within the parameters of a interagency vetted information program where long-term, sustained and synchronized operations are required to influence international target audiences using traditional mediums and advanced technologies including internet based radio and direct broadcast satellites.\n\n## Strategic Communication Policy Coordinating Committee (Scpcc)\n\nThe Strategic Communication Policy Coordinating Committee, in accordance with NSPD-\n1, was established on 10 September 2002 with the specific mission coordinating all U.S.\n\ninformational policies and programs through an NSC directed interagency medium.  This group is designed to foster positive international and domestic public opinion on current USG strategic objectives and influence foreign audiences in ways favorable to USG goals and objectives.19\nThe Strategic Communication Policy Coordinating Committee is co-chaired by the Department of State's Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs and a the Special Assistant to the President for Democracy, Human Rights and International Operations. Its membership will consist of the chair of the Combating Terrorism Information Strategy PCC, the Deputy Assistant to the President and Counselor to the National Security Advisor for Communications, and the Director, White House of Global Communications. Relevant agencies will be represented at the Assistant Secretary level with the capability to expand or contract as required20.  The PCC possesses IA tasking authority for information as well as analytical capabilities required to develop future influence plans through the IPI Secretariat which is now integrated into State's Office of Strategic Communication (OSC).  Its primary mission will be to coordinate domestic and foreign releases and act as the single point of contact for USG information programs. Subsequently, this PCC is responsible for: coordinating interagency support for international broadcasting, foreign information programs, and public diplomacy: and promoting the development of strategic communications capabilities throughout government. 21\nConcurrently with the SCPCC structure, the OSC is tasked to develop and disseminate of a National Information Strategy (NIS) and are responsible for analyzing and responding to hostile propaganda and dis/misinformation directed against the USG.\n\nThe PCC will utilize the IPI Secretariat as its principal coordinating mechanism to facilitate the interagency process.  Even though the PCC was activated on 10 September 2002, it has only held three meetings.  Additionally, its members and potential interagency participants have not been fully utilized.  As with any PCC, the President or his agent of Influence will have to tell the interagency that informational programs and its secondary effects are critical to the successful conduct of influence activities throughout the world.  Hopefully, in the near-term, key communicators will understand the implications and act accordingly.\n\n## Department Of State And Public Diplomacy\n\n\"But if the watchman sees the sword coming and fails to blow the warning trumpet...I will hold the watchman responsible...\"\nEzekiel 33:6\nThe Department of State, one of America's oldest and most important instruments of statecraft is an antiquated agency whose level of performance and effectiveness has been questioned by numerous administrations and members of Congress.  While this organization has been led by some of our greatest leaders and diplomats, the rank and file consider themselves part of an elite organization within the U.S. government and are generally xenophobic when dealing outside of their bureaus.  The Department is broken down into multiple areas of specialization, but in actuality is organized into two main areas of responsibility; regional and functional bureaus.  These two separate entities also include a series of internal struggles between functional areas called cones (e.g., political, economic, counselor affairs, public diplomacy) or Foreign Service (FS) specialties.  The State Department is the government agency responsible for the conduct of diplomatic activities worldwide, but this paper will only concentrate on its public diplomacy responsibility.\n\nThe Reagan administration in 1983 produced the National Security Decision Directive\n(NSDD) -77,   which defined public diplomacy as those actions of the U.S. government designed to generate support among foreign audiences for our national security objectives.  While State remains the lead for public diplomacy efforts worldwide, other government agencies to include the Departments of Defense, Commerce, Transportation, Justice, Education and USAID conduct global activities with a significant public diplomacy impact, but the activities are usually uncoordinated and unsynchronized with DoS for maximum effect.\n\nThe United States Information Agency (USIA) had successfully told \"America's Story,\" for almost 50 years, deftly adapting each new successive technological advance in broadcasting, satellite communication, transportation, and finally, computers and the internet.  More than two generations of people around the world learned about the United States through USIA libraries, broadcasts, exhibits and publications and cultural exchanges. \"During the Cold War, USIA's diplomacy of information and ideas penetrated the Iron Curtain and projected America's message of freedom to audiences in both developing and industrial societies.\"22  USIA, created in 1953, was the brainchild of the Eisenhower administration. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, a stubborn and traditional diplomat who wanted to divorce \"information\" programs from the department's diplomatic efforts.   The world has experienced revolutionary changes since 1953, and the requirement to update diplomatic techniques has only increased due to the advent of technological achievements and globalization.  Nonetheless, in October 1999, USIA was integrated into the Department of State as part of the Foreign Affairs Reform and Restructuring Act of 1998, but its absence is being critically felt throughout the world.\n\nSecretary of State Madeleine Albright declared at the integration ceremony, \"the full integration of public diplomacy into American foreign policy will make it more agile and open and more convincing to the rest of the world.23\" Her statements were simultaneously being countered by John Reinhardt, a senior USIA official who stated: \"There is no one in this room who doesn't approach this merger with trepidation. We fear that public diplomacy will be swallowed and destroyed by the State Department, which practices formal diplomacy.24\" His fears have proven true, and to the detriment of public diplomacy, US foreign policy and international relations.\n\nFirst, one must understand that the elimination of USIA was a political concession by the Clinton Administration to Senator Jesse Helms who wanted to downsize government and thought the consolidation of USIA into DoS was a positive step.  USIA was independent from the State Department, and concentrated on long-term information, educational and cultural programs at the strategic level. Its members, while assigned to U.S. embassies, were somewhat independent from the \"Country Team\" since they possessed their own budgets, and conducted both strategic and regional information program. Most importantly, the final approval for their programs was the director of USIA and not the U.S. Ambassador or Secretary of State. USIA also controlled all USG strategic dissemination assets and produced government publications that told the \"American Story.\"  After the Cold War, USIA became an easy target for elimination because it lacked a domestic constituency since its focus was solely on foreign target audiences.\n\nPrior to the consolidation, USIA controlled and developed radio and television programs charged with telling America's story to foreign audiences. When Congress merged the U.S.\n\nInformation Agency with the Department of State, it also established the Broadcasting Board of Governors as an independent entity, which only furthered confused the direction and execution of public diplomacy strategy, programs and activities. The State Department integrated the majority of former USIA into the Office of International Information Programs (IIP) and dispersed the remainder of PD personnel into regional and functional bureaus where they became supporting members. While the integration may have been conceptually valid, the application and rational behind its focus is totally unjustified and the capability that USIA had to conduct long-term public diplomacy activities has been greatly reduced and not replicated.\n\n## International Information Programs (Iip)\n\nThe Office of International Information Programs (IIP) is on of three entities reporting to the Department of State's Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs. The others are the Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs and the Bureau of Public Affairs, both administered by Assistant Secretaries.  IIP is the supposed successor to the United States Information Agency, but is a replacement with limited public diplomacy resources, personnel and influence within the Department of State.\n\nIIP is presently in its eighth year of existence within the Department of State. It continues in its attempt to become an innovative, aggressive organization which produces vital public diplomacy programs and products for the USG.  Nonetheless, during the reorganization, its responsibilities and activities were splintered between the State Department and other government agencies and it has lost the holistic approach it needs for executing public diplomacy.\n\nIn addition to disbanding USIA, numerous key areas of strategic influence have been left neglected or partially split between agencies.  The Foreign Press Center has been transferred to State's Bureau of Public Affairs, which also assumed responsibility for the former WORLDNET interactive television productions, now labeled American Embassy TV.25  In addition to losing this key asset and influence node, responsibility for their state-of-the-art printing plant in Manila has been transferred to State's Office of Administration thereby greatly reducing overall efficiency of strategic dissemination assets.\n\nIIP operates with an annual budget of 40 million and a staff of 279, which is considerably smaller than the over 600-person staff of its predecessor a decade ago.26  Any student of bureaucracy fully understands that your capacity is lessened when your organization loses control of dedicated functional assets designed to support its primary mission, and that bureaucratic requirements significantly increase when required to task assets outside of an organization.  Nonetheless, the spirit of USIA continues to exist within IIP and the organization has successfully enhanced the internet capability within the U.S. government, providing the most comprehensive record of American foreign policy or of the U.S. Government's public record in the last decade.\n\nIIP's current programs, products and services include: strategic planning where both short and long-term public diplomacy strategies are designed to support State Department diplomatic initiatives; support the International Public Information Secretariat chartered by PDD-68 and revalidated by NSPD 1; and develop and execute a series of multi-language web sites (usinfo.state.gov) where information is provided on a wide variety of major policy issues - such as the War on Terrorism, the treatment of detainees, environmental regulations and initiatives in five languages, which are updated daily. It also conducts speaker programs where functional experts from the United State travel abroad and meet with foreign officials, media, academic, religious or other elites to address specific areas identified by the country team. Through enhanced technology, it provides Information Resource Centers (IRC) to over 170 countries worldwide. The IRCs are the successor to the USIA open shelf American libraries aboard. They are located at the American Center and use computer and digital technology to disseminate information to key audiences, train mission staff and mine electronic data bases.\n\nSince the State-USIA consolidation, IIP's public diplomacy initiatives have had mixed results.  While State respects the technological capabilities provided to them from IIP and understands the requirements for immediacy of dissemination, the greatest shortfall is the lack of an appreciation for IIP capabilities.  These neglected capabilities include: long-term information policy development, multi-media product production and non-computer dissemination, and non-diplomatic, face-to-face meetings at the American centers.\n\n## Department Of Defense\n\nThe real target in war is the mind of the enemy commander, not the bodies of his troops.\n\nCaptain Sir Basil Liddel Hart, Thoughts on War, 1944\nDuring the past ten years, the Department of Defense has attempted to define information operations (IO), organize forces, and develop acceptable and executable intra- and inter-service doctrine that incorporates and makes operational the functions constituting IO - Psychological Operations (PSYOPs), Computer-Network Attack/Defense (CNA/CND), Electronic Warfare\n(EW), Operational Security (OPSEC), Physical Destruction and Deception Operations,27  as well as connections to Public Affairs and Civil Affairs.\n\n## Information Operations (Io)\n\nIO has different meanings for different government agencies, but most importantly it even differs between services within DOD.  Presently each service has its own manual pertaining to IO which includes control and integration, and currently the joint doctrine writers are rewording its definition to one of consensus, which is causing additional confusion. The joint IO goal is to have information superiority: the capability to collect process and disseminate an uninterrupted flow of information while exploiting or denying an adversary's ability to do the same. The current IO organizational structure has caused significant planning, developing, coordination and dissemination problems within DoD due to the approval process for execution.  Multiple OSD organizations (e.g., USD-P, ASD-SOLIC, ASD-C3I, ASD-PA) possess specific and/or limited approval authority for portions of IO (CNA/CND, PSYOPs, Deception). Additionally, they have limited influence on the operational and tactical portions (Physical Destruction, Electronic Warfare and OPSEC) because the approval authority is granted to the Combatant Commanders' during time of crisis.  There is also ongoing confusion regarding the various DOD organizations such as Land Information Warfare Activity (LIWA), Naval Information Warfare Activity (NIWA), Joint Information Operations Center (JIOC), U.S. Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM) and U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) areas of responsibilities and authorities to conduct IO.  Additionally, IO is DoD-centric, and its applications limited in the interagency due to required security clearances, fears concerning sovereignty and privacy issues, and required presidential approval for Computer Network Attack (CNA). These interagency fears are primarily due to a concern about open-ended legal interpretations concerning CNA and the potential for crossing over departmental charters and responsibilities while potentially threatening a country's sovereignty.\n\nThe Department of Defense has had limited operational and tactical successes using IO in support of the GWOT in Afghanistan. What successes there were came from the Combined/Joint PSYOP Task Force (CJPOTF), a USSOCOM traditional functional command in support of the Combatant Commander, and not the Joint Information Operations Task Force (JIOTF). The JIOTF is an ad hoc organization, possessing no organic forces or functional staff in the Pentagon, and not under the control of either the Joint Staff or OSD (U/S-Policy)\n\n## Public Affairs (Pa)\n\nThe Department of Defense maintains very robust and relatively sophisticated influence mechanisms to inform and influence foreign audiences at the operational and tactical levels during peacetime and in war.  This organization is headed by Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs (ASD/PA) with public affairs offices and detachments located throughout the Department of Defense organization. Public affairs organizations usually disseminate information using short-term, action directed strategies for specific missions or periods. They do not incorporate regional analysis of foreign target audiences. Their primary means of communicating with foreign audiences are through this public affairs apparatus and in coordination with Department of Defense's overt military Psychological Operations (PSYOP) programs which expands Department of Defense's ability to reach foreign audiences. DoD PA activities are normally coordinated within the interagency process and should support DoS Public Diplomacy initiatives.\n\nThe Department of Defense public affairs activities in support of national strategic goals include traditional public affairs, that is, news releases, public announcements, briefings for foreign and domestic journalists, visits, tours, open houses, guest speaker programs, community relations programs, web site production, and regional command information programs. Additionally, it participates in interagency public affairs forums and the National Security Council's Strategic Communications Policy Coordinating Committee.\n\nThe primary purpose of public affairs within Department of Defense is to provide timely, free flowing and accurate information to commanders and staff, military and civilian members, Department of Defense family members and multiple U.S. internal audiences to include Congress and the civilian news media.  These efforts are performed under the provisions of the Secretary of Defense's \"Principles of Information.\"28 Additionally, Public Affairs Officers provide advice on matters pertaining to international media relations that affect DoD activities as well as missions with allied and friendly nations.\n\n## Psychological Operations (Psyop), Not Propaganda\n\nWhat is PSYOP and how can it help?  This question is best answered by first explaining what PSYOP is not.  PSYOP is often confused with propaganda, which is practiced by many of our adversaries, and in some cases, by selected U.S. agencies and politicians. Propaganda has connotations of deception and distortion.29 Propaganda has no rules and can be a mixture of the truth, incorrectly attributed truth (sometimes referred to as gray propaganda), or pure fiction, purposely misattributed (black propaganda or covert propaganda).30\nU.S. DoD PSYOP, on the other hand, are actions taken to influence the emotions, attitudes and ultimately the behavior of a target audience.31 The intent is to influence target audiences in ways that support USG national policy objectives at the strategic, operational and tactical levels.32  Additionally, DoD PSYOP programs are always based on truth in order to maintain local and regional credibility equal to or greater than that of public affairs activities and local journalists.  In many instances, PSYOP products and activities (newspapers, radio broadcasts, leaflets, hand bills and face-to-face communication) become the primary source of trusted information within an area of conflict or disaster. Another definition is provided in the United States Special Operations Forces Posture Statement which describes PSYOP as \"planned operations to convey selected information and indicators to foreign audiences to influence their emotions, motives, objective reasoning and, ultimately, the behavior of foreign government organizations, groups and individuals. The purpose of psychological operations is to induce or reinforce foreign attitudes and behavior favorable to the originator's objectives.\"33\nSome PSYOP principles, applied in all categories of PSYOP (strategic, operational, tactical and consolidation), include a credible message (based on truth), a message chosen and shaped to create a positive impression on the target audience, and a message integrated into the overall military, diplomatic or political program which it supports.34 All PSYOP products, programs and activities are intelligence-based, that is, an adversary's nation and culture are studied in detail to determine its vulnerabilities, susceptibilities, key communicators, media and methods of communication used to influence elites and various social and ethnic groups.\n\n## Defense Science Board Task Force On Managed Information Dissemination\n\nThe Defense Science Board is an advisory committee established to provide independent advice to the Secretary of Defense.  This board has been operating for over fifty years and consists of independent subject matter experts (SMEs) from government, industry and academia. Its purpose is to address independently a specific subject, analyze its perceived weaknesses and strengths from various viewpoints and methodologies and then provide unbiased recommendations to eliminate those deficiencies.\n\nThe 2001 Defense Science Board Task Force on Managed Information Dissemination is a follow-on effort from the May 2000 DSB study on the \"Creation and Dissemination of All Forms of Military Information in Support of Psychological Operations (PSYOP) in Time of Military Conflict.\"35 The Defense Science Board Task Force members were tasked with determining the requirements and feasibility for a coordinated U.S. information capability. 36  Specifically, the Task Force was asked to examine and compare existing USG strategic information activities and capabilities of the Departments of Defense (DOD) and State (DOS).  It is interesting to note, that this study was jointly sponsored by the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict (OASD/SO/LIC) and the Office of the Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs (DOS/R).37\nThe Task Force investigated a wide range of informational issues within the roles and missions of DoD, State, and other government agencies (OGA) such as the Broadcasting Board of Governors (BBG) nonmilitary information dissemination capability (Voice of America, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, Radio Marti) and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID).  During the course of its assessment, it expanded its investigative and analytical work and incorporated informational issues to include policy development, legal and resource limitations, and new and emerging technologies designed to further a coordinated USG\ninformation dissemination capability.38 The Task Force assessment expanded well beyond its original direction and eventually included multimedia corporations (CNN, AOL-Time Warner) as well as international and nongovernmental organizations and queried individuals skilled in leading edge media technology as well as strategic communications techniques and analytical capabilities.\n\nThroughout its investigations, the Defense Science Board's observations and empirical data continuously reflected that the U.S. Government requires a coordinated means to speak with a coherent voice abroad.\n\n## Recommendations\n\nThe USG and primarily the foreign affairs community should take a hard look at its informational capability during this period of governmental reorganization and transition.  The Executive Branch and Congress should jointly reevaluate the current capacity for our government to project America's message domestically and abroad, and if required, reestablish a USIA like organization to address these shortfalls.\n\nFor the USG to conduct informational programs successfully, it needs to expand its horizons using the SCPPC as the catalyst. Adequate interagency resources to include personnel, facilities and a robust budget are required immediately to support U.S. policy initiatives and objectives.  The SCPCC, in collaboration with PCC working groups needs to develop programs at the strategic level that address four target audiences separately: the U.S. domestic audience, coalition or multilateral countries, the international media, and specific target audiences in which the campaigns are being directed against (e.g., Iraq, North Korea, international terrorist and/or criminal organizations).  The developmental process alone will require the integration of multiple agencies to support the analytical and technical baselines required.  Concurrently, a significant increase in dissemination capability needs to be addressed to ensure the integration of state of the art technology with human factor variables.  Our capacity to influence must cover the spectrum from high-tech to no-tech and be executed using both traditional and asymmetric means.\n\nAdditionally, the SCPCC needs to establish a U.S. sponsored forum that allows for active participation of coalition partners/allies, United Nations and Non-governmental Organizations (NGOs) actors. This multilateral organization should be sub-divided into two parts: one which develops and coordinates internationally vetted strategies and programs which support USG/coalition initiatives; and a second sub-organization which actually deploys within a region and operationalizes this strategy through a multi-faceted information campaign..  These parallel organizations will greatly increase the overall effectiveness of U.S. informational programs by providing on-the-ground truth, increased or enhanced international acceptability through participation and increased legitimacy of action.\n\nWith any organizational increase in capability or mission change, adequate funding and manpower will be required.  The current restructuring of government in support of Homeland Defense is the perfect venue to incorporate these changes.  The ability to influence target audiences and project U.S. information is relatively cheap in comparison to using the other instruments of national power.  The personnel and capability is ready; only political emphasis will is required.\n\n## Conclusions\n\nAfter the events of 9-11, a significant event occurred within the government which greatly affected the USG's ability to develop and send a coherent message abroad: every senior official and political appointee became an \"expert\" in information and influence operations. Unfortunately, the interagency process looked like a soccer team composed of eight year olds, and when the whistle blew they all ran towards the ball; this ball was that of strategic information.\n\nControl of the information environment at the strategic level has always been a critical capacity for our government.  Not since the Creel Committee (1917-1919) has any government organization controlled both the foreign and domestic media, been funded adequately and had the approval authority to further U.S. national goals and objectives. Since that time, numerous government entities have been established to develop coordinate, synchronize and execute a proactive multi-dimensional information capability, however, the results have been meager. The Presidential authorization of the SCPPC seems to be a move in the right direction, but the interagency needs to cooperate to make it a viable entity.\n\nKnowledge, now more than ever, is power.   The U.S. needs to capitalize on its technological and economic advantages and begin selling American democracy again.  It worked for over fifty years, and is greatly needed now.\n\n\"Good understanding wins favor - Every prudent man acts out of knowledge, but the fool exposes his folly.\"\nProverbs 13:15-16\nWORD COUNT = 9,520\n\n## Endnotes\n\n1 Timothy L. Thomas, \"The Mind Has No Firewall,\" 22 July 98, Psychotronic War: IW and Bioeffects of DEW, Infowar.com, \"Infowar.com/wmd/wmd_062298a_j.html-ssi,\" accessed 27\nJuly 2001.\n\n2 Department of Defense, The National Military Strategy of the United States of America,\n(pre-decisional Draft, Washington, D.C.: The Pentagon, September 02),2.\n\n3 William V. Parker, Director, Office of Strategic Communication (DoS), telephonic interview by author, 15 January 2003.\n\n4 President George W. Bush, The National Security Strategy of the United States of America, (The White House; Washington D.C., September 2002),ii.\n\n5 Marion K. Pinsdorf, Woodrow Wilson's public relations: \"Wag the Hun,\" Public Relations Review, Greenwich; (Fall 1999),1.\n\n6 Ibid,2. 7Thomas Timmes, OASD-SOLIC Memorandum, Assessment of International Public InformationHistorical Perspective, The Pentagon, August 2001.\n\n8 President Harry Truman, National Security Council NSC 59/1, (Washington, D.C.,March\n1950).\n\n9 Thomas Timmes, OASD-SOLIC Memorandum, Assessment of International Public InformationHistorical Perspective, The Pentagon, August 2001.\n\n10 Jeffery Jones, Director, Counter-Terrorism PCC (NSC), telephonic interviewby author, 12\nJuly 2002.\n\n11 President Harry S. Truman, The National Security Act of 1947, (Washington, D.C.:\nGovernment Printing Office, 1947), 2.\n\n12 George T. Raach and Ilana Kass, \"National Power and the Interagency Process\"\nWashington D.C.: Joint Forces Quarterly, (Summer, 1995),10.\n\n13  President George W. Bush, National Security Presidential Directive 1 (NSPD 1), (The White House; Washington D.C., April 2001),3.\n\n14 President William J. Clinton, Presidential Decision Directive 68 - International Public Information, (The White House: Washington D.C., April 1999),2.\n\n15 Samuel B. Griffith, ed., Sun Tzu: The Art of War (London: Oxford University Press, 1971),\n84.\n\n16 Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics, Defense Science Board on Managed Information Dissemination, (Washington D.C., October 2001), 26.\n\n17 Ibid, 26. 18 Ibid, 1. 19 President George W. Bush, Establishment of the Strategic Communication Policy Coordinating Committee (SCPCC), (The White House; Washington D.C., September 10, 2002),1.\n\n20 William V. Parker, Director, Office of Strategic Communication (DoS), telephonic interview by author, 15 January 2003.\n\n21 Ibid. 22  Dell F Pendergrast, Institutional Shift Who Will Tell America's Story?, Chicago Tribune, Chicago Ill.; September 30 1999.\n\n23 Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, The Importance of Public Diplomacy to American Foreign Policy, (U.S. Department of State Dispatch; Washington, D.C., Oct 1999).\n\n24 Sarah Booth Conroy, The Last Word on USIA, The Washington Post; Washington;\nOctober 1999.\n\n25 Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics, Defense Science Board on Managed Information Dissemination, (Washington D.C., October 2001) 34.\n\n26 Ibid, 36. 27U.S.Department of Defense, Joint Publication for Information Operations (JP 3-13), Oct\n1998.\n\n28Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics, Defense Science Board on Managed Information Dissemination, (Washington D.C., October 2001) 17.\n\n29 Webster's New World Dictionary of the American Language, College Edition, 1964, under the term \"propaganda.\"\n30Psychological Operation Officer's Course (POOC) instruction, untitled lecture presented in the U.S. Army Officer Psychological Operations Course at the United States Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School, Fort Bragg, N.C., July 1992.\n\n31 U.S. Department of the Army, U.S. Army Psychological Operations, 3-05.30 (FM 33-1), June 2000. Cited hereafter as 3.05.30.\n\n32  Ibid, ,. 3-05.30, 1-1. 33Allen H. Holmes & General Wayne A. Downing, United States Special Operations Posture Statement, (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Special Operations Command, 1994).\n\n34 Curtis Glen, An Overview of Psychological Operations (PSYOP), Federal Research Division, Soviet Union-Eastern European Section (4A). (Washington D.C.:USIA, 1994).\n\n35Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics, Defense Science Board on Managed Information Dissemination, (Washington D.C., Oct 2001),68.\n\n36 Ibid,65.\n\n37 Ibid,1.\n\n38 Ibid, 65.\n\n## Bibliography\n\nAlbright, Madeleine., The Importance of Public Diplomacy to American Foreign Policy. U.S.\nDepartment of State Dispatch; Washington: Oct 1999.\nAaron, Christopher., A New Language of Terror. Jane's Intelligence Review, October 2001.\nAlter, Johnathan. The Media's 'Balancing' Act. Newsweek; October 2001.\nBardos, Arthur A., Public Diplomacy: A Old Art, A new Profession. The Virginia Quarterly\nReview, Charlottesville; Summer 2001. Bedlington, Stanley. Not Who You Think. The Washington Post; October 2001.\nBush, George W., National Security Decision Directive 1. Washington, D.C.: The White House,\nApril 2001.\nBush, George W., The National Security Strategy of the United States of America. Washington,\nD.C.: The White House, September 2002.\nBush, George W., Establishment of the Strategic Communication Policy Coordinating\nCommittee (SCPCC). The White House; Washington D.C., September 10, 2002.\nClinton, William J., Presidential Decision Directive 68 - International Public Information.\nWashington, D.C.: The White House, April 1999.\nClinton, William J., A National Security Strategy for a Global Age. Washington, D.C.: The White\nHouse, December 2000.\nConroy, Sarah Booth, The Last Word on USIA. The Washington Post; Washington; October\n1999.\nDepartment of the Army, U.S. Army Psychological Operations 3-05.30 (FM 33-1). June 2000. Department of Defense,  Quadrennial Defense Review Report. Washington, D.C.: The\nPentagon, September 2001.\nDepartment of State, Fact Sheet - International Affairs-FY 2004 Budget. Washington, D.C.,\nFebruary 2003.\nDobbs, Michael. Words and Images: Weapons of Other War. The Washington Post; October\n2001.\nEfron, Sonni, THE WORLD; America's Got and Image Problem, Panel Warns; Policy: A Study\nof how the world sees the nation has led to the creation of an office to counter anti-U.S. sentiments. Some wonder whether anything will help. The Los Angeles Times; Los Angeles, Ca; July 2002.\nGlen, Curtis (1990). An Overview of Psychological Operations (PSYOP). Federal Research\nDivision, Soviet Union-Eastern European Section (4A). Washington D.C.:USIA.\nGriffith, Samuel B. ed., Sun Tzu: The Art of War.  (London: Oxford University Press, 1971), 84. Hoffman, David. Beyond Public Diplomacy. Foreign Affairs; New York; March/April 2002. Holmes, Allen H.  &  Downing, Wayne A. General. (1994), United States Special Operations\nPosture Statement.\nHughes, John. Why America's story needs to be sent overseas. Christian Science Monitor;\nBoston, Mass.; April 2002.\nHughes, John. Bring back USIA, and let America tell its story. Christian Science Monitor;\nBoston, Mass.; December 2001.\nKaiser, Robert G. US Message Lost Overseas; Officials See Immediate Need for 'Public\nDiplomacy'. The Washington Post: Washington, D.C.: October 2001.\nLaffin, John. The Arab Mind: A Need For Understanding. London: Cassell and Company limited,\n1975.\nLeonard, Mark. Diplomacy By Other Means. Foreign Policy; Washington, D.C.:\nSeptember/October 2002.\nMroz, Jacqueline. Selling the War Effort. Sales and Marketing Management; New York;\nFebruary 2002.\nOffice of the Secretary of Defense, The National Military Strategy of the United States of\nAmerica. Pre-decisional draft, Washington, D.C.: The Pentagon, September 2002.\nOffice of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics, Report on\nthe Defense Science Board on Managed Information Dissemination. Washington D.C.: The Pentagon, October 2001.\nPayne, Kenneth B., The Fallacies of Cold War Deterrence and a New Direction. University of\nKentucky Press, Lexington, Kentucky, 2001.\nParker, William V., State Department, Director, Office of Strategic Communication. Telephonic\nInterview by author. September/December 2002, January/February 2003.\nPendergrast, Dell F., Institutional Shift Who Will Tell America's Story?. Chicago Tribune;\nChicago Ill.; September 30 1999.\nPinsdorf, Marion K., Woodrow Wilson's Public Relations: \"Wag the Hun.\" Public Relations\nReview; Greenwich; Fall 1999.\nReagan, Ronald., National Security Decision Directive 130 - US International Information\nPolicy. Washington, D.C.: The White House, March 1984.\nRaach, George T.  and Kass, Ilana., *National Power and the Interagency* Process .Washington\nD.C.: Joint Forces Quarterly, (Summer, 1995).\nThe Joint Staff, Joint Publication for Information Operations (JP 3-13). Washington, D.C.: The\nPentagon, October 1998.\nThe Joint Staff, Joint Vision 2020. Washington, D.C.: The Pentagon, June 2000. Thomas, Timothy L., The Mind Has No Firewall. 22 July 98, Psychotronic War: IW and\nBioeffects of DEW, Infowar.com, \"Infowar.com/wmd/wmd_062298a_j.html-ssi,\" accessed 27 July 2001.\nTimmes, Thomas. Department of Defense, OASD-SOLIC, POC for Psychological Operations,\nInformation Operations and interagency procedures. Telephonic interview by author.\nSeptember 2002.\nTruman, Harry S., The National Security Act of 1947. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing\nOffice, 1947."
    },
    {
        "text": "Aurhority ~/v ~ 9f:7 'f,b/\nI')._\n-. ~\nB~'- I  Y \\R\\ Dat~-/(t...l._\n\n## Telephone Call From :Mr Mc Cone\n\nM said he would be leaving to be away over the weekend unless there is reason for him to stay. Does Sec have anything he wants to review before he leaves. Sec asked if M went to Cabinet and M g said no. Sec said he thinks we should keep our eyes on the Profumo business - has impression the full story is not available to us. Sec said Fairbanks filed a report on the Ward business a while back so M might want to have his people check on this. Things will come out at the trial that will affect the govt. M agreed and said also the Philby thing has to be considered. Sec said there is a rumor he might be in Yemen. M said they are pretty sure he is behind the Iron Curtain.\n\nM said they sent someone to the Yemen and he got back to Jidda.\n\nChemical warfare experts are there and we will have some solid info in a day or two.\n\nM said they have for some time tried to determine whether the Soviets were actually photographing and the extent they were from satellites. M said it has been determined they have been and we have good reproductions of what they are getting. Sec saw that this a. m. M will brief the Pres Tues. 21,000 passes over the US since Sputnik I. M wants to build it up and see how we use it in the event they confront us.\n\nM mentioned no travel to Cuba- on the other hand nothing would please him more than to have insurance agents walking around -press people. Can't we have a little latitude. Sec wants to look at it and thinks we should - will look at it personally at M's request. M said Crimmons is the man here. Sec said it is hard for us to do more than we want others to do. Sec will be in touch. M back Sunday night.\n\nSec said the trip was tiring but the Pres was superb. M said Khrushchev's speech was interesting re test ban and he is having his people explore it. Sec thinks we are in the midst of events we don - t know all about. Sec said M should tell his fellows to consider why are not"
    },
    {
        "text": "United States Marine Corps\n             Command and Staff College\n               Marine Corps University\n                     2076 South Street\nMarine Corps Combat Development Command\n         Quantico, Virginia  22134-5068\n\n## Master Of Military Studies Title:\n\nGeorge Washington, America's First Director of Military Intelligence SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT\nOF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF\nMASTER OF MILITARY STUDIES\n\n## Author:\n\nLCDR MICHAEL S. PRATHER, USN, CG-7\n\n## Ay 2001-02\n\nMentor:  Dr. John B. Matthews Approved: Date: Mentor:  LtCol David A. Kelley, USMC Approved: Date:\n\n## Report Documentation Page\n\nPublic reporting burder for this collection of information is estibated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing this collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burder to Department of Defense, Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports (0704-0188), 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to any penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number. PLEASE DO NOT RETURN YOUR FORM TO THE ABOVE ADDRESS.\n\n1. REPORT DATE (DD-MM-YYYY) 01-07-2002\n\n2. REPORT TYPE Student research paper\n4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE George Washington, America's First Director of Military Intelligence Unclassified 6. AUTHOR(S) Prather, Michael S. ; 7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME AND ADDRESS USMC Command and Staff College 2076 South Street MCCDC Quantico, VA22134-5068 9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME AND ADDRESS USMC Command and Staff College 2076 South Street MCCDC Quantico, VA22134-5068 12. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT APUBLIC RELEASE , 13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES 14. ABSTRACT See report. 15. SUBJECT TERMS\n16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF:\n17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT Public Release\na. REPORT Unclassified\nb. ABSTRACT Unclassified\nc. THIS PAGE Unclassified\n3. DATES COVERED (FROM - TO) xx-xx-2001 to xx-xx-2002\n5a. CONTRACT NUMBER 5b. GRANT NUMBER 5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER 5d. PROJECT NUMBER 5e. TASK NUMBER 5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER\n8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER\n10. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S ACRONYM(S) 11. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S)\n19. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON EM114, (blank) lfenster@dtic.mil\n18. NUMBER OF PAGES 56\n19b. TELEPHONE NUMBER\nInternational Area Code Area Code Telephone Number 703767-9007 DSN 427-9007\n\nStandard Form 298 (Rev. 8-98)\nPrescribed by ANSI Std Z39.18\n\n## Report Documentation Page\n\npublic reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information.  Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington headquarters services, directorate for information operations and reports, 1215 Jefferson davis highway, suite 1204, Arlington, VA  22202-4302, and to the office of management and budget, paperwork reduction project (0704-0188)  Washington, dc  20503\n1.  AGENCY USE ONLY (LEAVE BLANK)\n2.  REPORT DATE\n3.  REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED STUDENT RESEARCH PAPER\n4.  TITLE AND SUBTITLE\n5.  FUNDING NUMBERS\n      N/A\nGEORGE WASHINGTON, AMERICA'S FIRST DIRECTOR OF MILITARY INTELLIGENCE 6.  AUTHOR(S) MICHAEL S. PRATHER, LCDR USN 7.  PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)\n8.  PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER\n     NONE\n    USMC COMMAND AND STAFF COLLEGE\n    2076 SOUTH STREET, MCCDC, QUANTICO, VA  22134-5068 9.  SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)\n10. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY REPORT NUMBER:\n     SAME AS #7.\n      NONE\n\n## 11.  Supplementary Notes\n\n      NONE\n12A.  DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT\n12B.  DISTRIBUTION CODE\n      NO RESTRICTIONS\n      N/A\n\nABSTRACT (MAXIMUM 200 WORDS)\nThesis:  George Washington, as Commander-in-Chief of the Continental Army led this nation to victory and independence in the American War for Independence.  Victory was facilitated by his direct and effective use of intelligence sources and methods.\n\nDiscussion:  During the American War for Independence, intelligence information regarding location, movement, and disposition of British forces allowed the Continental Army to fight on its own terms and stymie British efforts to quell the revolution.  General George Washington, as Commanding General of the Continental Army, was aware of the value of intelligence in the proper conduct of military operations.  Washington literally became America's first director of military intelligence.  He directed the intelligence operations that were conducted, and performed his own analysis.  The Continental Army's effectiveness in intelligence includes examples of the proper use of espionage, counterintelligence, communications security, codebreaking, deception, operational security, surveillance, reconnaissance, reporting and analysis.  Time after time, the Americans were properly prepared with good intelligence ultimately resulting in independence from the British.  These intelligence successes can be directly attributed to the direction of General George Washington and the actions of his operatives.\n\n## 15.  Number Of Pages: 54 14.  Subject Terms (Key Words On Which To Perform Search) George Washington, Intelligence, American Revolution, Spies, Espionage, Reconnaissance, Us History, Us Army 16.  Price Code:  N/A\n\n18.  SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE:\n19.  SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF ABSTRACT\n      UNCLASSIFIED\nUNCLASSIFIED\nUNCLASSIFIED\n\n## Disclaimer\n\nTHE OPINIONS AND CONCLUSIONS EXPRESSED HEREIN ARE THOSE OF\nTHE INDIVIDUAL STUDENT AUTHOR AND DO NOT NECESSARILY\nREPRESENT THE VIEWS OF EITHER THE MARINE CORPS COMMAND AND\nSTAFF COLLEGE OR ANY OTHER GOVERNMENTAL AGENCY.  REFERENCES\nTO THIS STUDY SHOULD INCLUDE THE FOREGOING STATEMENT.\n\nQUOTATION FROM, ABSTRACTION FROM, OR REPRODUCTION OF ALL OR\nANY PART OF THIS DOCUMENT IS PERMITTED PROVIDED PROPER\nACKNOWLEDGEMENT IS MADE.\n\n## Executive Summary\n\nTitle:\nGeorge Washington, America's First Director of Military Intelligence Author:\nLCDR Michael S. Prather, USN, CG-7\nThesis:\nGeorge Washington, as Commander-in-Chief of the Continental Army led this nation to victory and independence in the American Revolution.  Victory was facilitated by his direct and effective use of intelligence sources and methods.\n\nDiscussion:\nDuring the American War for Independence, intelligence information regarding location, movement, and disposition of British forces allowed the Continental Army to fight on its own terms and stymie British efforts to quell the revolution.  General George Washington, as Commanding General of the Continental Army, was aware of the value of intelligence in the proper conduct of military operations.  Washington literally became America's first director of military intelligence.  He directed the operations that were conducted, and performed his own analysis.  The Continental Army's effectiveness in intelligence includes examples of the proper use of espionage, counterintelligence, communications security, codebreaking, deception, operational security, surveillance, reconnaissance, reporting and analysis.  Time after time, the Americans were properly prepared with good intelligence ultimately resulting in independence from the British.  These intelligence successes can be directly attributed to the direction of George Washington and the actions of his operatives.\n\nConclusion(s) or Recommendations:  Military professionals, particularly intelligence professionals, can learn much about the basic necessities of conducting successful intelligence operations in support of military operations. Recommend that a short analysis of the history of intelligence operations be added to training programs for new intelligence personnel.\n\n## Introduction.\n\nDuring the American War for Independence, from Lexington and Concord in April, 1775, to Yorktown in October, 1781, intelligence information regarding location, movement, and disposition of British forces allowed the armed forces of the rebellious colonies to fight on their own terms and stymie British efforts to quell the revolution.  General George Washington, as Commanding General of the Continental Army, was acutely aware of the value of intelligence in the proper conduct of military operations.  Washington literally became America's first director of military intelligence.  However, Washington was also very careful not to divulge his sources or methods even late in his life.  Much of what we know today is reconstructed from what was revealed in later years by his various agents.  Although there were individuals who had been identified as responsible for intelligence operations, General Washington directed the operations that were conducted, and performed his own analysis.  The Continental Army's effectiveness in intelligence includes examples of the proper use of espionage, counterintelligence, communications security, codebreaking, deception, operational security, surveillance, reconnaissance, reporting and analysis.  Many of the major and minor engagements of the American War for Independence are punctuated by the intelligence successes or failures that contributed to their outcome.\n\nAccurate intelligence was crucial to Washington because of a poverty of resources with which to battle the British.  Unable to muster a large, well-trained army, he resorted to a strategy of surprise attacks and hit-and-run raids on British outposts, such as the Christmas night descent on the unwary Hessians.  Intelligence enabled him to perceive the strengths and weaknesses of both his own force and those of the enemy.  With this knowledge, he was able to mask his own weaknesses while exploiting those of his adversaries.1\nFortunately for the Colonies, time after time, the Americans were properly prepared with good intelligence ultimately resulting in independence from the British. These intelligence successes can be directly attributed to the direction of George Washington and the actions of his operatives.\n\n## Background.\n\nGeneral George Washington was reared in Northern Virginia on the edges of civilization.  He learned at an early age how to be an effective frontiersman.  This carried over to his youth when he was appointed adjutant of\n\nthe southern district in the Virginia Militia at the age of twenty-one.2  In 1753, it had become apparent that the French were encroaching into British territory in Pennsylvania and Ohio.  George Washington was sent to his destiny as a practitioner of intelligence.  He was ordered to scout the area in question and determine locations and strength of the French garrisons.  He located Fort Leboeuf\n(in today's northwestern Pennsylvania), scouted it, and provided startlingly detailed reports to the Royal Governor.  He was rewarded by being ordered to raise a force and build his own fort in the Ohio valley and was authorized to engage any French who opposed him.  This resulted in a minor skirmish won by Washington's forces (before his eventual withdrawal from that fort, Fort Necessity).  Thus, the opening acts of the French and Indian war were conducted by Washington and initiated by his intelligence collection mission.3  Later, during the French and Indian War, his appreciation for the value of intelligence was reinforced by his experiences while accompanying General Edward Braddock on the disastrous campaign to Fort Duquesne.  The British defeat is a direct\n\nresult of the complete lack of intelligence regarding the strength of the French garrison.  Washington learned this lesson and carried it with him as he barely escaped with his life.4\nWhen the American Revolution broke out, George Washington was appointed as the overall commander of the Continental Army in June, 1775.  He arrived on the outskirts of Boston and assumed command of the army besieging the British in July.  He likely inherited what was left of the pre-existing intelligence network established by Dr. Joseph Warren and Paul Revere and built upon it.5  As the war progressed, Washington became a true master of the intelligence trade.  He recognized the value of accurate intelligence and regarded it as one of his most important duties.6  Despite the fact that he had many other duties, he refused to delegate that responsibility (except for the actual field collection) to someone else.7\nWashington parlayed his ability to acquire accurate knowledge of the enemy into success on the battlefield.\n\nRealizing that his army was not going to be able to match the British in open battle, Washington adopted a strategy of picking his battles, avoiding most major engagements and outlasting the enemy.8  In order to pursue this strategy, it was necessary to know what the British plans were. Therefore, he developed an advanced network of operatives, spies, and surveillance and reconnaissance units. Intelligence gleaned from this apparatus served to place him in position to strike small portions of the British Army as at Trenton, Princeton, and Yorktown.  Ultimately this strategy worked, the British were tired, harried and much more concerned with the expanded war with France and Spain, than the recalcitrant colonies.\n\n## Intelligence Support To Operations:\n\nBoston (1775-1776).  Upon assumption of command of the Continental Army, Washington was anxious to ensure that he knew every intention of the enemy.  Recognizing this continuing need for information he almost immediately began building upon what was left of the pre-war operation organized by Dr. Joseph Warren operating in Boston.9\n$333 1/3 was the first large entry in his ledger and it was to fund an unknown agent's activities in Boston.10  For the safety of his sources, Washington was careful not to name his agents in his operational and expenditure reports.\n\nDespite British desires to keep spies from entering and exiting Boston, Washington was well informed of British activities.  Probably one of the most imaginative and easy ways in which agents entered and exited Boston was by way of fishing ships.  The British were not very diligent in policing who would depart and arrive in these ships.  The Americans would include a spy among the crew leaving port and then drop him off outside of town and pick up the next agent to enter Boston.11\nThe majority of reporting was of the routine sort regarding such things as British troop strength, resupply intentions, and defensive positions.  In early 1776, the Americans tightened the cordon around Boston by placing artillery on Dorcester Heights threatening the British positions in the city.  The British decided that the city was not defendable and evacuated to Halifax before descending on New York City.\n\nNew York (1776).  Washington was most certainly aware that the British intended to move to New York, however he seemed unprepared for that movement.  The British began the campaign for this strategic city in June, 1776.  Washington did not already have a spy network in place when the British arrived, and it showed.  Throughout the summer, the British defeated and outmaneuvered the Continentals time and again (at places such as Long Island, Harlem Heights and Fort Washington).  Washington seemed not to know when or where he would be attacked.  Only a familiarity with the local area and British inability to close in a timely manner prevented the Continental Army from being destroyed.\n\nDuring this time, Washington became quite frantic for intelligence on British strength and plans.  He began to repeatedly ask his subordinates for information.  At last, he asked his first unit designated for intelligence work, Knowlton's Rangers, to find a volunteer to enter the city and try to gain some valuable information.  Young Nathan Hale became that man.12\nNathan Hale was idealistic and enthusiastic, but not very well-suited for this mission.  He entered the city, conducted surveillance, was captured with incriminating evidence and promptly executed in September, 1776.13  This is when Hale uttered the famous words, \"I only regret, that I have but one life to lose for my country.\"14  George Washington became aware of Hale's sacrifice as stories filtered out of the city.  This was the final realization for Washington that a well-developed spy network was of the utmost value to him.  He slowly worked to build an effective network that began to pay dividends as he would be ready for the British when they moved to Philadelphia.\n\nTrenton & Princeton (1776-77).  Late in 1776, after securing the vicinity of New York City, the British had pushed into New Jersey.  Washington was forced to retreat across the colony and into eastern Pennsylvania.\n\nWashington had become desperate.  By mid-December, his army had shrunk to nearly 6,000 men.15  Most of his army's enlistments would expire on January 1, 1777.  Spirits in the rebellious colonies were flagging.  Washington realized that unless something drastic happened before the New Year, his army would disappear and the cause would probably be lost.  Washington needed some intelligence that would help the Continental strike a blow against the British and help bolster the flagging spirits of the revolution.\n\nAs Washington retreated he left many agents and spies across the New Jersey countryside.  Most of them remain unidentified, however they were local people or soldiers who rode though the countryside and loudly \"talked Tory\" while selling tobacco and other supplies to the British and Hessian soldiers.16  One such source was John Honeyman of Griggstown, New Jersey.\n\nJohn Honeyman, a veteran of the French and Indian War, probably first met Washington in Philadelphia when the Virginian was appointed as Commander-in-Chief.  He probably also offered his services as a spy at that time.  They met again as Washington began his retreat across New Jersey.17\nHoneyman began posing as a Tory butcher and had become well known to the British forces in New Jersey as he wandered in and out of the camps providing meat to the British while also collecting intelligence.\n\nTrenton, a small village on the Delaware River in New Jersey, was manned by a detachment of Hessian mercenaries numbering approximately 2,000 men.18  Honeyman noted that this outpost was not properly defended and was vulnerable to a surprise attack.19  He needed to get this information to Washington and the general knew that he needed to speak to his spy.  Washington made it be known that he wanted the Tory captured.  Honeyman then allowed himself to be captured.  The spy was taken to Washington and made his report.  Some time after that, Honeyman conveniently escaped (it seems probable that Washington facilitated Honeyman's escape) and reported back to the Hessian commander that the Continentals were in disarray and unlikely to attack.20  Washington corroborated the information received and determined that he should attack Christmas morning.  He daringly crossed the Delaware River and completely surprised the sleeping Hessians.\n\nThis victory is probably Washington's best known win and it was made possible by a thorough knowledge of the enemy's defenses and vulnerabilities to a surprise attack. As a result of their success at Trenton, many of his soldiers re-enlisted prior to the New Year and Washington was able to quickly follow the victory with another in Princeton on 3 January, 1777.  Victory at Princeton was aided by intelligence received from Colonel Cadwalader, who had been ordered to scout New Jersey.  Cadwalader provided a complete analysis of Princeton to include defensive positions, approaches to the town, and artillery locations that gave Washington the type of information that he needed to launch a successful attack for the second time in ten days.21  After these two striking victories, the American cause had been renewed.  Valuable intelligence, as well as some thoughtful deception by Honeyman, contributed greatly to these important victories.\n\nNew Jersey/Pennsylvania (1777-78).  Early 1777 saw the two armies consolidating and training.  As the campaign down the Hudson Valley by British General John Burgoyne began, Washington was concerned that General William Howe, the officer in overall command of British forces in the Colonies, would move north up the Hudson River and isolate New England from the rest of the Colonies.  Howe departed New York in late July.  Over the next month, Washington was kept guessing as to his actual intentions.  Eventually, Howe moved on Philadelphia.  Washington had been tipped off to this possibility as early as April, when a woman who had been sent into New York by one of Washington's spymaster's, Nathaniel Sackett, reported that the British were constructing flat-bottomed boats for use in the conquest of Philadelphia.22  Washington's reaction to this news was to order General Thomas Mifflin to set up a spy network in the Colonial capitol.23  Washington attempted to thwart the British advance to Philadelphia at Brandywine on September 11, 1777.  This battle was nearly a disaster and marks one of the few serious intelligence failures of the war. Washington's scouts (mostly militia) failed to notice the British flanking maneuver, nor the ford used by the British to complete the move.24  The British entered Philadelphia on September 26th, however, by the time the British captured it, the spy network was in place.  This time Washington had anticipated his opponent's eventual move and had assets waiting for his use when the British arrived.\n\nThis period of the war is marked by multiple intelligence successes that led to Howe's eventual frustration due to his inability to defeat Washington.  As John Blakeless states in his book Turncoats, Traitors, and Heroes:\nThe contrast with the situation in New York in 1776, only a year before, when Washington had been totally in the dark as to enemy intentions and capabilities, was positively startling.  By 1777, the Continental commander always knew what Howe *could* do.  He sometimes knew several days in advance exactly what Howe was going to do.  And the commander-in-chief himself evaluated the intelligence, as it came in, with unerring skill.25\nWashington truly knew his enemy during this period.\n\nWashington's spy-master in Philadelphia was Major John Clark.  He and his spies kept Washington and his staff informed of British intentions, swiftly reporting all plans to headquarters.  Major Clark worked so hard and diligently that he was forced to step down due to failing health in January, 1778, a potentially brilliant career cut short.26\nTwo occasions stand out in which Washington had warning and was able to avoid defeat.  The first was at Forts Mifflin and Mercer.  Major Clark's spies kept the Americans fully appraised of British intentions in November, 1777, and both forts were abandoned prior to their capture, saving men and materiel.27\nThe second significant instance involves a story of true bravery.  The British had commandeered the house of a local Quaker family, the Darraghs, for use as a headquarters.  The British frequently used the homes of Quakers because they were pacifists and were not expected to support the war effort.  Unfortunately for the British, the Darragh family had been recruited by Major Clark. During this time, Washington was encamped at Whitemarsh, a short distance outside the city.  On the night of 2 December, 1777, Lydia Darragh, the matron of the family, hid in a closet and overheard the British making plans to attack Washington on the 4th.  There was not enough time to use her normal round-about method of delivering her information.  She slipped out of the city under the guise of needing flour and contacted the American army.  This information confirmed other reports and the army was put on alert and the raid was thwarted.28  These are but two examples of the type of situation that Howe faced in Philadelphia.\n\nAlthough the Americans suffered greatly at Valley Forge during the winter, the British had had enough and decided to return to New York after General Howe was replaced by General Henry Clinton.  Washington was well aware of the British intentions to return to New York and began making plans to harass the retreating British. Unfortunately, Washington's spies were unable to ascertain the exact date that movement would begin.  Once movement did begin on 17-18 June, 1778, it was immediately reported to Washington, however, this report arrived too late to attack the British while they were crossing the Delaware (a move the British were expecting).29  Washington rushed to catch up to the British resulting in the battle of Monmouth on June 28, 1778.\n\nAmerican intelligence agents repeatedly reported to reconnaissance units throughout the entire region as the British retreated to New York.  Eventually, Washington found his place to strike the retreating British at Monmouth, where they had stopped for the night.  General Charles Lee was ordered to command the advance force and engage the British rear guard while Washington brought up the main body.  Washington received word that the British had begun their expected move the morning of 28 June.  He sent word for Lee to begin the attack.  Lee did not immediately attack.  Washington ordered Lee forward a second time.  Lee finally did order his units forward, but he didn't issue attack orders and did not properly coordinate his units.  Lee's Brigade commanders took it upon themselves to attack but due to lack of coordination from Lee were forced to fall back.  By that time, Washington had brought up his main body and fought a respectable engagement against a strengthened British attack.  Washington blamed Lee for failing to attack the rear guard in a timely manner.  This eventually led to Lee's court martial.  There have been many theories as to why Lee failed to properly execute Washington's orders.  In all likelihood, Lee merely didn't believe that it would succeed.  However, some have suggested that the recently exchanged Lee had switched sides while a prisoner of war and promised to help the British win a battle.30  After this battle, which had been a spirited exchange and showed that the abilities of the Continental Army had greatly improved, the British elected to continue on to New York rather than continue the fight.  The second time that the main British force occupied New York was to be quite different from the first.\n\nNew York (1778-81).  The war had now entered a new phase.\n\nThe British seemed content to hunker down in New York City and look to other areas to pursue what had now become a world war with the entry of France and, later, Spain.31  In the Spring of 1779, the British began the southern phase of the war with the conquest of Charleston, South Carolina. Washington remained in the New York area and continued harassment of the British there.  This was when Washington's spies really came into their own.  During the year in which the majority of British forces in the Colonies had been in the Philadelphia area, Washington worked to vastly improve his spy network in New York.  When Clinton returned to New York those agents went to work. The most important group was the \"Culper net\".  There were two primary agents.  Abraham Woodhull and Robert Townsend used the aliases \"Samuel Culper\" and \"Culper Junior\" respectively in their reporting.  They were managed by Major Benjamin Tallmadge of the 2d Dragoons (Sheldon's Horse), who used the alias \"John Bolton.\"32  Tallmadge reported directly to Washington.\n\nMajor Benjamin Tallmadge was a young man who had been a classmate of Nathan Hale's at Yale.33  He joined the Dragoons when they were formed in December 177634 and was particularly adept at light cavalry work.  Washington noticed his ability and recruited him to act as his spymaster.  Washington intentionally did not know the identities of many of Tallmadge's contacts.  The 2d Light Dragoons operated in Connecticut and Tallmadge received the reports from the \"Culpers\" from across the Long Island Sound.  Tallmadge then forwarded them directly to Washington.35  Tallmadge was very secretive, making little mention of his exploits throughout the rest of his life, but these exploits helped maintain the Revolution.\n\nWashington relied heavily on the steady flow of information that came from the \"Culpers.\"\nAbraham Woodhull, \"Samuel Culper,\" lived in New York, posing as a Tory.  He mucked about listening to British officers' conversations and corresponding with \"Bolton.\" He was never discovered, but as time went along, he became convinced that the British were on to him.  When he felt that he could no longer suffer the trials and tribulations of active espionage, he recruited Robert Townsend to take his place.  Townsend became \"Sameul Culper, Jr.\" or \"Culper Junior\".  Townsend was a merchant of dry goods, and was permitted to travel about freely.  Woodhull became the link between Tallmadge and the new Culper.36  Townsend had a different approach from the secretive eavesdropping Woodhull.  Townsend was a \"loud Tory\" who made submissions\n\nto the social section of a New York City Tory newspaper, The Royal Gazette.  \"British officers, eager to see their names in print, readily talked with Townsend.\"37  The\n\"Culpers\" had their own contacts, many of whom remain unidentified to this day, that they used to compile their reports.\n\nThe majority of intelligence collected by this spy ring was of the routine nature.  Reports on ship movements, morale, casualties, resupply, and warnings of British agents operating in the Continental Army were the normal types of reports received.38  Although unglamorous, it was the volume of this material that made them particularly valuable to Washington.\n\nThere was one instance of intelligence supplied by the\n\"Culpers\" that was particularly important.  The first major body of French troops, under the Comte de Rochambeau, was set to arrive at Newport, Rhode Island, in July, 1780.  The British knew and planned to strike the French before they could construct an adequate defense.  Townsend got word of the plan and immediately reported this to Tallmadge.\n\nBecause the raid was already forming Tallmadge was forced to act quickly.  Tallmadge forwarded this information to Washington, who quickly warned Rochameau. However, Washington did not have a strong enough force to interdict the raid nor attack a weakened New York City.\n\nBut Washington did have an active intelligence and counterintelligence net, and he made the British believe that he was prepared to attack New York.  The British took this threat seriously and withdrew the striking force.39\nThe French, and therefore the alliance too, were spared.\n\nThis ring continued its accurate reporting throughout the remainder of the war.  Because most of Tallmadge's spies were posing as Tories, the Major received permission from Washington to enter New York ahead of the main army when the British turned over control of the city to the Americans.  Tallmadge contacted his spies and was able to ensure that there was no retribution made against them by the local population.  Washington is said to have met with many of these people soon after the conquest of New York and gave his appreciation.40\nProbably the most famous case of espionage and counterespionage during the American War for Independence was the case of General Benedict Arnold's treasonous attempt to turn over the fortress at West Point, New York, to the British.  Major Benjamin Tallmadge had a large role in the disruption of the plan.\n\nArnold's contact was a British Major by the name of John Andre who was using the alias \"John Anderson.\"  Andre was the head of British intelligence in New York.  \"John Anderson\" was captured carrying a letter from Arnold and the plans for West Point hidden in his boot on September\n23, 1780.  Prior to this, Arnold had asked Tallmadge to escort a man named \"John Anderson\" to him if he (Tallmadge) was to come across him.  It is unclear whether Tallmadge had previously known the true identity of \"John Anderson.\" But, when he learned that this man had been captured it was enough to make him suspicious.  Tallmadge's superior, Lt. Col. John Jameson, unknowingly had decided to send Washington the documents that had been found and return the prisoner and a report to Arnold (the local commander to whom he was responsible for reporting).  Not fathoming that Arnold could be guilty, Jameson reasoned that Arnold would know best how to deal with someone who was \"spying on West Point.\"\nAppalled, Tallmadge was able to convince Jameson to have the prisoner returned, but wasn't able to stop the report.  Arnold received the report and, knowing that he had been discovered as a traitor, fled to the safety of the British in New York.  Major Andre was not so lucky.  He was convicted of espionage and executed.41  Tallmadge and the\n\"Culpers\" are but just a few of Washington's agents that contributed in keeping the British pent up in New York.\n\nYorktown (1781).  In 1779-80, the focus of the war effort moved to the south.  By July 1781, the British forces in the south, under General Charles Cornwallis, had moved out of the Carolinas and had relocated to Yorktown, Virginia. Cornwallis was hemmed in by American forces, commanded by the Marquis de Lafayette, but still large enough to be dangerous.  Washington quickly seized upon a plan as the situation developed.  In May, the French had indicated that a fleet would be available for use in aiding the war effort in America.  Washington's initial plan was to use this fleet and some accompanying French troops for an all-out assault on New York.  To Rochambeau, the French commander in America, this didn't seem to really be the best course of action, but it was the allies initial plan.42\nBy August, Washington's plan changed abruptly.  The Comte de Grasse, the French admiral, reported that he was ready to sail north from the West Indies to assist the allies.  The allies seized upon a plan to capture all of Cornwallis' force.  The French fleet was directed to go to Virginia and close the British escape route by sea.\n\nWashington and Rochambeau would move south to complete the siege of Yorktown.\n\nThis is when Washington pulled another trick out of his bag.  The general knew that his plan to attack New York had been captured.  Although, there doesn't appear to be any evidence to support it, given Washington's history with disinformation, it is possible that he allowed the plan to be captured.  Nevertheless, Clinton was convinced that the allies intended to attack New York, and Washington needed Clinton to continue to believe this while the French and American armies slipped away.  He began repositioning boats, improving roads, and conducting other tasks in New Jersey that would lead the British to believe that they were preparing to attack New York.43  In the meantime, the armies began to move south into New Jersey giving weight to the notion that they were preparing an attack from that direction.\n\nThe British were not aware that *some* troops were moving south until September 1st.  On September 2nd, they\n\nstill feared that Washington planned to double back and attack New York.  On the 4th, they received the report that French troops were reinforcing Lafayette at Yorktown.  On the 6th, they discovered that very few troops remained in the vicinity of New York.  Clinton still did not become convinced of the plan to attack Cornwallis until 8\nSeptember.44  By this time it was too late, the allied army had gotten away and Clinton would not be able to interfere with the move south.  In the meantime, the French Navy defeated the British relief at the Battle of the Virginia Capes.  Cornwallis' fate was sealed.\n\nBy the time Washington and Rochambeau reached Yorktown, they were well aware of Cornwallis' plight. Washington was intercepting many of Cornwallis' dispatches. Thanks to the skill of Mr. James Lovell at code breaking Washington was also able to read these messages.45  The deception plan allowed Washington to move south.  His constant knowledge of British intentions from his sources within New York City and intercepted communications allowed him to tighten the noose in Virginia.\n\nWashington knew that Clinton was unable and unwilling to attempt to come to the aid of Cornwallis.  Armed with\n\nthis knowledge, Washington was able to concentrate sufficient force in Yorktown without fear that Clinton would attack other locations that were less well defended.\n\nCornwallis surrendered his force on October 19, 1781.  The war was all but won.  Major fighting in the war had come to a conclusion.  After the completion of the Yorktown campaign, Washington resumed his \"siege\" of New York and intelligence continued to flow from his spies inside the city until the final evacuation in November, 1782, after the conclusion of the war.\n\nOther Theaters.  Even though Washington remained around the main body of the British army while some more important battles were fought in other theaters, he retained control of all Continental Army efforts.  Washington kept up a steady correspondence with his subordinate commanders.  He demanded that they provide him with detailed accounts of engagements and responses to his requests for information. At the same time that he was requesting information he was also using his knowledge of enemy plans and intentions to aid his subordinates in their operations.\n\nIn February 1777, Washington sent correspondence to General Phillip Schuyler, the commander of forces defending Fort Ticonderoga and northern New York from any attack from Canada.  In a letter dated on the twenty-third of that month, Washington informed Schuyler that he didn't anticipate that the British would attempt to move south until late spring.  Additionally, he informed him of anticipated reinforcements, estimated enemy troop strengths and that \"the intelligence communicated by the Express [probably a courier sent earlier], who delivered my Letter of the 9th Instt. was premature.\"46\nIn August of 1778, the first French aid provided to the Americans came in the form of a fleet under the Comte. D'Estaing.  It initially advanced to the Newport, RI, area before proceeding on to Boston.  In correspondence with Gen. Nathanael Greene dated 21 August, 1778, Washington advised him to be wary of attacks from the British.  He informed Greene that \"it appears certain, that Sixteen of Lord Howe's fleet entered the Hook on the 17th.\"47  The Hook was the area exiting New York Harbor.  Washington used the intelligence that he received from his coastal watchers to warn his subordinate of potential threat to allied and Continental forces operating in other areas than his own.\n\nAnother example can be found in correspondence between Washington and General Nathanael Greene.  In the summer of 1781, as Cornwallis had moved to Yorktown and Greene was consolidating his victory in South Carolina, Washington was in constant communication with Greene.  In a letter dated\n30 July, 1781, Washington informed Greene of Cornwallis' movement into Virginia and his intention to have Greene continue his efforts in South Carolina.48  In a later letter dated 27 September, he informed him of the victory at the Battle of the Virginia Capes and his movement to Yorktown.49\nIn addition to informing Greene of the current situation he continued to request reports from the commander in the southern sector.  Washington's intention with both letters was to keep his subordinate informed of the general situation while continuing to keep him engaged with his task at hand.  Washington continually communicated with his subordinates relaying and requesting important information.\n\n## Intelligence Methods:\n\nSun Tzu said it quite well: Now the reason the enlightened prince and the wise general conquer the enemy whenever they move and their achievements surpass those of ordinary men is foreknowledge.50\nWashington was successful because he had foreknowledge. Knowledge of the enemy's intentions and dispositions are paramount to a successful military campaign.  Washington was master of these techniques.  His foreknowledge of the enemy allowed him to avoid many engagements and attack when the time was right for battle.  Washington's use of intelligence information included the cornerstones of traditional intelligence analysis and operations: espionage; counterintelligence; communications security and code breaking; operational security and deception; and surveillance and reconnaissance.  Effective use of all of these methods allowed Washington to make analytical estimates and stymie British efforts to decisively engage the Continental Army.\n\nGeneral George Washington regarded intelligence accumulation and analysis as one of his primary responsibilities.  He hired spies, planted false reports with double agents, used codes and ciphers, and analyzed the reports he received for himself.  He used his cavalry units to conduct reconnaissance operations and act as intermediaries between himself and his spies.  He demanded that reports be in writing and delivered with utmost haste \"reminding his officers of those bits of intelligence he had received which had become valueless because of delay in getting them to him.\"51  He realized the value of multiple sources and used this method frequently to validate his information.  He even wrote a makeshift textbook for his army officers to use to conduct intelligence operations.52\nAdditionally, he used all the information gathered to create a decision-making process.53  Washington also created the first intelligence gathering units, the Light Dragoons. Their primary duties included reconnaissance, surveillance, capture of prisoners for interrogation, and harassment.54\nWashington directed all intelligence activities conducted by the Continental Army and truly was the focus of all intelligence reporting and analysis.\n\n## Espionage.  Espionage Was The Primary Method Of Collection Of Intelligence During The Eighteenth Century, With\n\nreconnaissance, prisoner interview, and courier interception being the others.  However, espionage provided General Washington with the wherewithal to succeed in his endeavors to lead a young nation to victory.  Spies were very prevalent on both sides during the war, and Washington was the best at using them.  As noted above, one of his very first expenditures after assuming command was to an agent to enter Boston,55 and the value of intelligence that came from spies such as the \"Culpers\" cannot be underestimated.\n\nThere are countless stories of intrigue from the war.\n\nPeople used disguises and cover stories to enter the British occupied areas and report back to the Americans. Frequently, as in the case of the Darraghs, they were ordinary citizens who were forced to house British officers.  Many were simple salesmen and hucksters like John Honeyman who plied their trade among the British and reported what they saw.  Still others were society people who mixed easily with the British Officers.56  Many military secrets leaked out.  One was Burgoyne's plan for the invasion of New York State and the capture of the Hudson Valley.  The reporting was highly accurate, predicting the\n\nmovements of Burgoyne and Howe during that campaign that ended in British defeat at Saratoga.  Burgoyne's plan was reported to the Continentals before it was even presented to King George.57\nMany spies, like Nathan Hale, were taken right from the ranks of the Continental Army.  Another soldier, Captain David Gray, was declared a deserter.  After\n\"deserting,\" he infiltrated Colonel Beverly Robinson's Tories and obtained the position as the courier for the Tory intelligence agent.  Gray then proceeded to turn over copies of all of Robinson's dispatches.  Eventually, Gray moved up to be a courier for Major Oliver DeLancey, Jr. DeLancey headed the British secret service in New York. Gray was responsible for the route between the city and Canada and passed his dispatches on to Washington for nearly two years.  After completing that assignment he returned to the ranks and his name was stricken from the list of deserters.58  Washington managed some of his own spies as well as delegating the management duties to various subordinates.\n\n## Counterintelligence.  Knowing The Value Of His Own Spies\n\nand how easy it was to infiltrate the enemy, Washington recognized that the British were finding it almost as easy to do the same to him.  This may be one reason that he performed much intelligence analysis himself rather than trust too many others with his sources.  He was constantly on the lookout for spies and directed his subordinates to be just as vigilant.  He called British spies \"the one evil I dread.\"59  Washington firmly believed that he should pay his agents as much as possible, but he remained wary of a spy who was purely in it for the money because he could just as easily be paid by the British with more than the Continentals could afford.60  Washington firmly believed that the best security for his army and cause was a strong sense of patriotism, which is probably why he found Benedict Arnold's betrayal so distressing.  Luckily it was discovered before any major damage had been done.\n\nPreviously, another instance of solid counterintelligence work involves the case of Dr. Benjamin Church.  Church was a trusted part of the circle of patriots in Boston prior to the start of the War.  Although the patriots knew that there was a mole in their organization, the doctor was above suspicion.  Later, after Washington had taken command, Church was made chief medical officer for the Continental Army.  In September, 1775, a letter written in cipher was intercepted.  After interrogating the young lady who had been entrusted to deliver the letter, it was revealed that the author of the letter was Dr. Church.  Church was immediately questioned and held until they could determine his guilt or innocence.61  After some work, the letter was decoded and Church's deception had been proven.  The doctor was found guilty and imprisoned because of a legal loophole that prevented his execution (the loophole was immediately fixed).  He was exchanged for American prisoners in 1777.62\nWashington found Dr. Church's disloyalty very sobering and began to take the threat of spies even more seriously than before.\n\n## Communications Security & Code Breaking.  Just As Ferreting\n\nout spies was important to the American cause, so was the need to protect the information that was being supplied to Washington.  Washington's most important spies were supplied with a \"sympathetic stain\" that had been invented\n\nby John Jay's brother, Sir James Jay.  This ink was more effective than traditional milk or lemon juice methods of invisible writing.  It could not be read by holding it up to light.  It required a solution to make the writing visible. Additionally, codes were developed so that names and locations could be protected even if the British discovered how to develop the stain.63  Washington's agents using the stain would write a standard letter and then use the stain in the margins and between the lines.  They would also write in the margins of the pages and inside the cover-leafs of books.\n\nAnother method of encryption was to create a cutout template.  Two examples included an hourglass shape or small blocks cut out of a plain sheet of paper.  When this sheet was placed over top of an otherwise normal looking letter a secret message was revealed.64\nJames Lovell was Washington's chief codebreaker.  As noted above, he provided a valuable service decoding British dispatches, particularly during the Yorktown campaign.  Once encryption methods had been determined they were provided directly to Washington and he spent hours analyzing the accumulated intelligence that was gleaned from intercepted communications.65  Intercepted communications provided a vast wealth of information and Washington recognized the need to protect his own as well.\n\n## Deception & Operational Security.  Washington Was A Master\n\nat the art of deception.  The British were frequently left guessing as to his exact intentions.  Washington achieved these results through a series of deliberate plants of disinformation, operational security, and deceptive acts by his forces.  There are numerous instances of deception during the War for Independence.  Washington's withdrawal from around New York and movement south to Yorktown is one example.  Construction of boats and road improvement coupled with deliberate disinformation, making Clinton believe that New York was about to be attacked, allowed the French and Americans to move south without interference from the British.\n\nAnother interesting case of deception happened in winter quarters at Morristown, NJ, in 1777.  Washington's army had dwindled to only about 4,000, so he billeted them by twos and threes in the various buildings giving the impression that his army was much larger.  Then when a known British spy arrived in the camp, Washington allowed him to steal greatly inflated unit strength reports. General Howe was led to believe that the Continental Army was three times its actual strength.66  Washington's spies were frequently ordered to provide false information to the British, which was very effective in keeping the British guessing as to American intentions.\n\nWashington was also very concerned about operational security.  Due to the nature of the war, secrets were hard to keep.  Because spies and double agents were rampant, Washington did his best to ensure that his plans remained secret as long as possible.  The troops usually didn't know where they were headed when a march was ordered. Washington was also quick to punish operational and security leaks.  Many violators were given the lash.67  On one occasion some of Major Benjamin Tallmadge's confidential papers, operational funds, and his personal trunk were captured by the British during a raid in 1779. A spy was compromised, but was warned in time to escape. Although there is no evidence that Tallmadge was given the lash, he was admonished by Washington.68  After this incident, the spies were required to write in code and use the \"sympathetic stain\" as well.69  Without effective deception tactics and operational security the Continental Army could have been engaged and destroyed on numerous occasions.\n\n## Surveillance & Reconnaissance.  The Operations Of Light\n\ncavalry as surveillance, reconnaissance, and guide assets was as important to the armies of the Eighteenth Century as reconnaissance units are today.  Washington was initially unimpressed with the need for such units.  The first cavalry unit that was assigned to the Continental Army was dismissed by Washington in July, 1776, due in part to his belief that they were too expensive to maintain and his distaste for their military bearing.70  Their presence was missed just a month later when the British easily outflanked Washington's position at the Battle of Long Island.  Later that year, Washington established the first Light Dragoon units to accomplish these tasks.  As the war progressed these units became very valuable to him.\n\nThe Dragoons truly were the intelligence organization of the American War for Independence.  After failures in and around New York City in 1776, Washington asked Congress to fund four light cavalry, or Dragoon, units late in that year.71  The \"Dragoons were a light, mobile force, operating ahead and on the flanks of the main force, scouting out the enemy's movements, gathering other intelligence, and thwarting the enemy cavalry's similar efforts.\"72  There were four Dragoon units; all had significant impact on the course of the war.  However, the 2d Continental Light Dragoons (Sheldon's Connecticut Horse) stood out for its effectiveness as an intelligence gathering unit.  Major Benjamin Tallmadge was part of this unit.\n\nThe second dragoons exceeded the personification of the ideal type of Dragoon.  They not only fought and won victories on horse and foot but on the water as well.  They were also the key to Washington's espionage service.  None of the four Light Dragoon regiments surpassed Sheldon's Horse for uniquely active and effective service.  Too little has been written of the impact that \"Sheldon's Connecticut Horse\" had in the American Revolution.73\nWhen the armies were encamped, the Dragoons remained active, ranging between the armies intercepting enemy units and agents and conducting hit and run raids on militarily\n\nsignificant targets.  Military and intelligence operations conducted by the Continental Army greatly improved with the creation of the Dragoons.\n\nDuring the Battle of Brandywine, although the British flanking maneuver had been missed earlier, it was these units that discovered it in time to alert Washington and prevent a catastrophe.74  In addition to traditional Dragoon units, Washington also used the local populace and soldiers from his army familiar with the area to scout the surrounding terrain and guide his army to battle.  Three Continental soldiers from the Trenton area scouted the area looking for Tories carrying warning to the Hessians and guided Washington's army from the Delaware river crossing to the town enabling Washington's army to surprise the enemy.75  There were other units created for the express purpose of conducting surveillance.  One such unit was a New Jersey militia unit formed in 1777 for the purpose of watching and reporting British naval and shipping movements.76  As Sun Tzu tells us, \"Those who do not use local guides are unable to obtain the advantages of the ground.\"77  Washington was fully aware of this and used the capabilities of his army for local knowledge to great effect, staying a step ahead of the British on many occasions.\n\n## Reporting & Analysis. Raw Collected Data Is Of Little\n\nvalue if it is not properly reported and analyzed.  As stated previously, Washington performed most of his intelligence analysis himself.  We will never know the extent of his intelligence apparatus because neither Washington, nor many of his sources, ever revealed that information.  However, we do know that Washington preferred his reports to be in writing, in detail, and delivered as swiftly as possible.  His instructions were precise when requesting \"details on British military and naval movements, the location and condition of fortifications and bases, and not least, the health and morale of enemy troops.\"78  Washington used this data to help him make the assessments of British strength and capabilities.  He was very meticulous and resolutely believed in the value of validating intelligence by confirmation from another source.  Although the exploits of John Honeyman are well known, Washington confirmed his spy's reports through intelligence gathered from other sources before deciding to launch the attack on Trenton.79\nReports continued to flow immediately after the attack on Trenton.  Colonel John Cadwalader had been assigned the task of scouting Princeton, and his report included the type of detailed information that Washington repeatedly desired.  It was a complete \"intelligence preparation of the battlefield.\"  It pointed out approaches to the town, artillery locations, defenses, and exact quartering locations.80  Washington used this information to defeat elements of the British army at Princeton on January 3, 1777.\n\nWashington also desired timely reporting, and more than once he admonished his agents and units for not supplying information quickly enough before it had become irrelevant.  However, he also frequently received reporting in almost no time.  British casualty reports from the Battle of Germantown in October, 1777, were received approximately thirty-six hours after the conclusion of the battle.81  Washington was gifted at analyzing the information that was provided to him.  Proper analysis requires sound collection methods, multiple sources, and detailed and timely reporting, all of which Washington received.\n\nOrganization.  Because General Washington maintained control of intelligence operations there was little formal organizational structure for intelligence in the Continental Army.  Potentially, Washington could have relieved himself of these duties and they may very well have been accomplished satisfactorily.  However, Washington believed that intelligence analysis was too important to be left to a subordinate.  In this way he was able to delegate other responsibilities and reduce the chance of compromise by limiting the number of personnel involved in his secret operations.\n\nAlthough the primary intelligence collection units were the light cavalry, or Dragoons (as discussed above), there was another unit that was expressly created for the conduct of intelligence operations.  In 1776, Washington selected Lieutenant Colonel Thomas Knowlton to head an elite unit that became known as \"Knowlton's Rangers.\"  This unit was created to conduct reconnaissance and intelligence collection.  Because it was the first such unit in the Continental Army, today's Army's Military Intelligence Corps traces its origins here.82  However, Knowlton's Rangers was more of a light infantry unit that conducted special operations and not the same sort of unit that the Dragoons became.  Thomas Knowlton himself was a charismatic leader who always led his men in battle, epitomizing today's Intelligence Corps' Motto \"Always Out Front.\"83\nUnfortunately, Knowlton himself was killed at the battle of Harlem Heights on September 16, 1776.  Two months later, the unit was captured at Fort Washington and ceased to exist.84  Nathan Hale was a member of this unit when he volunteered for his fateful mission.  Washington made great use of his units expressly created for collection of intelligence while limiting the number of personnel who would be privy to that information collected, thus maintaining a high level of security.\n\n## Conclusion.\n\n\"Over the Revolutionary War as a whole, Washington's grasp of military intelligence and deception comfortably exceeded that of his British opponents.\"85   Accurate and timely intelligence is the key to successful military operations.  General George Washington understood this quite well.  His most brilliant military successes were due in part to good intelligence.  Trenton was made possible by the daring feats of a butcher who posed as a Tory so that he could enter the British camp.  Washington came to realize exactly how vulnerable Cornwallis was through intercepted communications and used sound deception tactics to move away from New York and force the British capitulation at Yorktown.  Although intelligence methods have changed quite a bit in the last two centuries, the basic principles remain valid today.  Washington used these functions to great success.\n\nEspionage was the primary method available to gather valuable information regarding one's adversary in the Eighteenth Century.  Washington had many spies placed throughout the country and behind the British lines.\n\nToday, espionage has become more dangerous and somewhat less important with the advent of new technologies to monitor enemy operations and communications.  However, espionage (one of the functions of human intelligence or HUMINT) is still capable of providing some of the most valuable information.  While espionage was frequently conducted by members of the army in Washington's time, today we rely on non-Department of Defense organizations to provide that information.  Today technology has replaced many of the old-fashioned espionage tactics.  However, the threat posed by terrorism may require that we readdress the role of espionage in our intelligence apparatus.  One of the major concerns regarding espionage is the fear of compromise and the need for solid counterintelligence practices.\n\nWashington regarded counterintelligence as one of the most dangerous threats to his army.  Today, the threat of infiltration of our intelligence organizations is less than it was during the American Revolution, but still remains valid (with potentially devastating results).  Washington tasked his personnel to remain vigilant for the actions of enemy agents.  The best counterintelligence method is vigilance and questioning suspicious activity.  One of the reasons that the counterintelligence threat has changed is for the same reason that we do not conduct as much espionage as we did in the past.  Technology has improved.\n\nMost intelligence collection today can be done from long range.  Communications can now be intercepted by electronic means.  With the increase in capability to intercept electronic communications, an increase in the requirement for proper communications security has become necessary.  Washington's primary methods of communications security were limited to invisible ink, embedded messages, and codes.  Today, invisible ink is no longer necessary, but codes are paramount.  As codebreaking methods have become more sophisticated so have methods of encrypting messages.  Washington realized the value of proper communications security especially as he became adept at intercepting and decoding British messages.\n\nThe comprehension of the value of communications security led to his respect for the need for good operational security and the ability to deceive his enemy. Operational security remains one of our primary areas of concern.  With expanded ability to read and distribute information it has become even easier to piece together what a nation or force intends to do.  Sound operations security and good deception tactics can prevent the enemy from knowing their adversary's intentions.  Washington was a master at deception.  The best way to defeat an adversary is to keep him guessing as to your intentions.\n\nSurveillance and reconnaissance were important aspects of Washington's ability to remain a step ahead of the British.  Washington was limited to information that could be obtained by someone actually viewing an event.  Today we can conduct these activities from long range through the use of imaging capabilities and listening devices.  Eyeson-target surveillance and reconnaissance has not completely gone away and can still be some of our most effective intelligence collection assets when combined with radio communications and on-call weapons delivery.\n\nAs Sun Tzu tells us: And therefore only the enlightened sovereign and the worthy general who are able to use the most intelligent people as agents are certain to achieve great things.  Secret operations are essential in war; upon them the army relies to make its every move.86\nWashington knew the value of intelligence and carried his lessons into his presidency when he \"took personal responsibility for foreign intelligence.\"87  Whether it was analysis of multiple sources of information or management of far ranging spy networks, Washington always displayed an adept ability to use intelligence for the successful conduct of the war and the attainment of independence for the United States of America.\n\n## Annotated Bibliography\n\nProposed Topic:  Gen. George Washington made great use of intelligence during the American War for Independence.  His use of intelligence had great effect on the outcome of the war and holds lessons that can be applied today.\n\n## Primary Sources:\n\nThe Library of Congress has scanned the majority of George Washington's correspondence and placed it online (http://memory.loc.gov/ammem/gwhtml/gwhome.html).  This can be a very valuable source.  However, many of the letters have not been transcribed and are difficult to read. Additionally, the volume of data is also difficult to wade though for the nuggets of information that are contained within.\n\n## Secondary Accounts:\n\nChristopher Andrew's For the President's Eyes Only, Secret Intelligence and the American Presidency from Washington to Bush, (New York:  Harper Perennial, 1995.) is a book that looks at how U. S. Presidents have used intelligence information in the execution of their duties.  The first chapter discusses Washington's involvement in intelligence throughout his career as a military officer and President. John Blakeless' Turncoats, Traitors, and Heroes (Philadelphia:  J. B. Lippencott Company, 1959) is an analysis of American and British military intelligence methods and activities employed during the American Revolution.  This source is invaluable to the writing of this paper. The CIA's pamphlet, Intelligence in the War of Independence, (n. p., n. d.) is a 45-page overview of all intelligence operations and activities during the Revolution.  It contains quite a bit of useful information and areas to look for further reference.  Of note, it contains a listing of suggested readings which includes an article titled \"George Washington, Manager of Intelligence,\" published in *Studies in Intelligence*, vol. 27, no. 4 (Winter 1983) which should have some valuable information.\n\nWashington's Eyes, The Continental Light Dragoons (Fort Collins, Colorado:  The Old Army Press, 1977) by Burt Garfield Loescher is a book about the operations and organization of the four Continental Light Dragoon units. This book outlines the exploits of these units that were vital to gaining information regarding the activities of the British army for the Continental Army. Nathan Miller's Spying For America, The Hidden History of U. S. Intelligence (New York:  Paragon House, 1989) is a review of spying throughout the history of the United States.  The first chapter is about George Washington and describes some of his activities and sources.  The second and third chapters focus on activities performed by Washington's agents. The periodical, *Studies in Intelligence* [24, no. 4 (Winter 1983):  1-10], published an article by Edward F. Sayle titled \"George Washington:  Manager of Intelligence.\"  This article outlines Washington's actions in the field of intelligence in support of the war effort. Samuel B. Griffith's translation of Sun Tzu's The Art of War (Oxford:  Oxford University Press, 1963) and Carl von Clausewitz's *On War,* (Princeton, New Jersey:  Princeton University Press, 1976) contain useful insight into the value and impact of accurate intelligence on military operations and planning. Edmund R. Thompson edited Secret New England, Spies of the American Revolution (Kennebunk, Maine, USA:  The David Atlee Phillips New England Chapter Association of Former Intelligence Officers, 1991).  This book contains a series of articles about intelligence and espionage operations conducted in the New England colonies during the Revolution. This Week in History broadcast by The History Channel aired a segment titled \"American Spy\" on 14 January, 2002 (Robert Sharenow and Harlan Reiniger, prods. and narrated by Josh Lebowitz).  This program expanded on much information that had already been identified through research.  However, it did contain one new nugget on the use of cutout templates when encrypting messages. The United States Army Center of Military History posted a short article on their web site titled Rangers in Colonial and Revolutionary America (4 Jan. 2002. <http://www.army.mil/cmh-pg/documents/revwar/revra.htm>). It provided information on the history of Knowlton's Rangers.\n\n## Biography:\n\nTrevor Nevitt Dupuy's The Military Life of George Washington: American Soldier (New York:  Franklin Watts, Inc., 1969) is a brief biography of George Washington as a soldier and provides a good snapshot of his battles and how they were conducted.\n\n2d Lieutenant Lila Faint, USA, wrote a short biography titled Lieutenant Colonel Thomas Knowlton, A Short Biography (n.d.  Military Intelligence Corps Association. 4 Jan 2002.  <http://www.micorps.org/knowlton/knowltonbio.htm>.).  It contains details of his life and the formation of his unit, Knowlton's Rangers."
    },
    {
        "text": "# Climate Change And International Responses Increasing Challenges To Us National Security Through 2040\n\nNIC-NIE-2021-10030-A\n\n# Climate Change And International Responses Increasing Challenges To Us National Security Through 2040\n\n## Key Takeaway\n\nWe assess that climate change will increasingly exacerbate risks to US national security interests as the physical impacts increase and geopolitical tensions mount about how to respond to the challenge.  Global momentum is growing for more ambitious greenhouse gas emissions reductions, but current policies and pledges are insufficient to meet the Paris Agreement goals.  Countries are arguing about who should act sooner and competing to control the growing clean energy transition.  Intensifying physical effects will exacerbate geopolitical flashpoints, particularly after 2030, and key countries and regions will face increasing risks of instability and need for humanitarian assistance.\n\n- As a baseline, the IC uses the US Federal Scientific community's high confidence in global projections of\ntemperature increase and moderate confidence in regional projections of the intensity of extreme weather and other effects during the next two decades.  Global temperatures have increased 1.1 C since pre-industrial times and most likely will add 0.4 C to reach 1.5 C around 2030.\n- The IC has moderate confidence in the pace of decarbonization and low to moderate confidence in how\nphysical climate impacts will affect US national security interests and the nature of geopolitical conflict, given the complex dimensions of human and state decisionmaking.\nKey Judgment 1: Geopolitical tensions are likely to grow as countries increasingly argue about how to accelerate the reductions in net greenhouse gas emissions that will be needed to meet the Paris Agreement goals.  Debate will center on who bears more responsibility to act and to payand how quicklyand countries will compete to control resources and dominate new technologies needed for the clean energy transition.  Most countries will face difficult economic choices and probably will count on technological breakthroughs to rapidly reduce their net emissions later.  China and India will play critical roles in determining the trajectory of temperature rise.\n\nKey Judgment 2: The increasing physical effects of climate change are likely to exacerbate cross-border geopolitical flashpoints as states take steps to secure their interests.  The reduction in sea ice already is amplifying strategic competition in the Arctic over access to its natural resources.  Elsewhere, as temperatures rise and more extreme effects manifest, there is a growing risk of conflict over water and migration, particularly after 2030, and an increasing chance that countries will unilaterally test and deploy large-scale solar geoengineeringcreating a new area of disputes.\n\nKey Judgment 3: Scientific forecasts indicate that intensifying physical effects of climate change out to 2040 and beyond will be most acutely felt in developing countries, which we assess are also the least able to adapt to such changes.\nThese physical effects will increase the potential for instability and possibly internal conflict in these countries, in some cases creating additional demands on US diplomatic, economic, humanitarian, and military resources.  Despite geographic and financial resource advantages, the United States and partners face costly challenges that will become more difficult to manage without concerted effort to reduce emissions and cap warming.\n\n## Scope Note\n\nThis National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) is in response to a Presidential tasking to assess the national security impacts of climate change.  While climate change effects are forecast to intensify in the latter half of the 21st\ncentury and continue well beyond 2100, based on current emissions trends and technologies, this NIE assesses the near- (510 years) and medium-term (1020 years) geopolitical implications abroadwe do not assess impacts to\nthe homeland or DOD facilities.  We assume the following during the next 20 years:\n\n- No precipitating world event that would devastate industrial activity will occur that sharply and permanently\nreduces greenhouse gas emissions.\nThe scientific content of this NIE, both the observed climate effects to date and the modeled future impacts, were reviewed by the US Federal science agencies on the Climate Security Advisory Council (CSAC).  The CSAC is a partnership between the IC and the Federal science community established by Congress to better understand and anticipate the ways climate change affects US national security interests.  It includes the Environmental Protection Agency, the Department of Energy, the Department of the Interior/US Geological Survey, the Office of Naval Research, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, and the National Science Foundation.\n\nThe IC relies on the broad consensus of scientific studies, modeling, and forecasts from the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, the US National Climate Assessment, and US Federal science agencies as the baseline to assess the geopolitical implications of climate change.  We are aware of, but in this estimate do not rely on, the small minority scientific perspectives on climate change ranging from those who consider it nonexistent to those who view it as a near-term existential threat to humanity.\n\n## Confidence Levels\n\nThe IC uses as a baseline the US Federal scientific community's high confidence in global projections of temperature increase and moderate confidence in regional projections of the intensity of extreme weather and other effects during the next two decades.\n\nThe IC has moderate confidence in the pace of decarbonizing the energy sector, given how historically entrenched and slow moving energy systems have been to change and the difficulty of predicting technological breakthroughs.  Our confidence decreases after 2030 because government and private sector policies and investments have the potential to drive a more rapid transition.\n\nThe IC has low to moderate confidence in assessing how climate change effects could cascade in ways that affect US national security interests as well as the timing and location of potential geopolitical tension, given the complex dimensions of human and state decisionmaking and the challenge of connecting climate, weather, and sociopolitical models.\n\n# Climate Change And International Responses Increasing Challenges To Us National Security Through 2040\n\n## Discussion\n\nReports from US Federal science agencies and the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) indicate that the burning of fossil fuels has increased the concentration of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere and raised global average surface temperatures about 1.1 degrees Celsius (C) over pre-industrial levels.\nTemperature rise has accelerated, and every decade since the 1960s has been hotter than the previous one, according to the National Aeronautics and Space Administration.\n\nInternational diplomatic efforts since the late 1980s have centered on understanding and mitigating the effects a changing climate poses to human security.  The 2015\nParis Agreement for the first time established a global goal of limiting temperature rise to \"well below 2 C above pre-industrial levels and pursuing efforts to limit the temperature increase to 1.5 C\" by 2100, concluding that this would \"significantly reduce the risks and impacts of climate change.\"  US Government and other scientists argue that the risks grow as the temperature rises and could be catastrophic and nonlinear after 2 C if there are tipping points in the Earth's system.  (*See Annex B.*)\n\n- In the Paris Agreement, more than 190 countries\nagreed to submit updated plansknown as Nationally Determined Contributions (NDC)\nevery five years that should outline increased commitments to peak and reduce their emissions.\nNDCs are voluntary and have no enforcement mechanism for non-compliance.\n- Developing countrieswhich have long argued\nthat they should not have to limit emissions because they were late in industrializing, need to use fossil fuels to grow economically, and have historically emitted fewer greenhouse gases\n\n## Trajectory Of Climate Change\n\nThe current trajectory of growing global CO2\nemissions would cause global temperaturesat 1.1 C over pre-industrial levels nowto add 0.4 C and cross the 1.5 C threshold by about 2030, according to modeling from the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), and surpass 2 C by around mid-century.  Many of the physical effects are projected to increase in intensity, frequency, and speed. To change that trajectory, the IPCC estimates that global emissions would have to drop sharply in the next decade and reach net zero by around 2050 to limit warming to 1.5 C, or reach net zero by about 2070 to limit warming to 2 C.\n\nsigned on to the Paris Agreement in part because it did not require country-specific emissions reduction targets.  In addition, developed countries pledged to mobilize $100 billion a year by 2020 to help developing countries mitigate and adapt to climate change.\n\n## Pressure To Decarbonize Will Increase Geopolitical Tensions\n\nKey Judgment 1: Geopolitical tensions are likely to\ngrow as countries increasingly argue about how to\naccelerate the reductions in net greenhouse gas\nemissions needed to meet Paris Agreement goals.\nDebate will center on who bears more responsibility to\nact and to payand how quicklyand countries will\ncompete to control resources and dominate new\ntechnologies required for the clean energy transition.\nMost countries will face difficult economic choices and\n\nprobably will count on technological breakthroughs to rapidly reduce their net emissions later.  China and India will play critical roles in determining the trajectory of temperature rise.\n\n## Policies Not Driving Decarbonization Fast Enough\n\nGiven current government policies and trends in technology development, we judge that collectively countries are unlikely to meet the Paris goals because high-emitting countries would have to make rapid progress toward decarbonizing their energy systems by transitioning away from fossil fuels within the next decade, whereas developing countries would need to rely on low-carbon energy sources for their economic development.  Quickening the pace and trajectory of the energy transition will depend on reducing key countries' continued dependence on fossil fuels; investing in research, development, and deployment of low-carbon technologies for specific sectors that are hard to decarbonize; and enacting policies to incentivize renewable energy sources.\n\nThe current pace of transition to low- or zero-emission clean energy sources is not fast enough to avoid temperatures rising above the Paris goal of 1.5 C.\nGlobal energy demand is expected to increase by more than 18 percent by 2040, according to the International Energy Agency's (IEA) modeling of current policies, with fossil fuel use also growing and continuing to account for only a modestly smaller share of supply even though solar, wind, and other clean sources will grow more quickly, particularly after 2030.\n\n- To achieve the 1.5 C goal through shifts in energy,\ncoal use would need to decline, oil use would need to fall immediately rather than plateau in the 2030s, and natural gas consumption would have to peak this decade, according to IEA data and modeling.\n- Fossil fuels will be difficult to replace because the\nlarge sunk costs of established production systems make them competitively priced, existing\ndistribution networks offer advantages of flexibility and reach, and scaling alternatives to the level\nnecessary to replace them is difficult.  Industrial and transportation sectors will struggle to reduce their reliance on fossil fuels because these sectors are the most dependent on the high energy density that fossil fuels provide.\n\n- Solar photovoltaic and wind generation almost\ncertainly will increase worldwide because they are on average the cheapest form of energy to add to an electricity grid in many countriesparticularly when\nfactoring in installation and lifetime operating expenses.  Accelerating the speed and scale of their\ndeployment would require new manufacturing capacity, changes to electricity grids and markets, and development of more advanced batteries to provide power when there is no sun or wind.\n- Nuclear and hydropower are forecast to maintain,\nat most, their current modest shares of energy supply.  Some countries are planning to expand\n\nnuclear power generation, but others plan to reduce it because of safety concerns and high costs.  The development of small modular nuclear reactors may lead to renewed expansion; given long lead times in production, any notable increase in capacity would occur during the latter part of the period of this estimate.\n\nWorld leaders are increasingly concerned that a window is closing on the opportunity to reduce emissions before irreversible damage to the climate occurs, and many are responding to public and global pressure to act more ambitiously.  A growing number of countries are imposing or increasing carbon taxes to discourage emissions and increase the cost competitiveness of clean energy sources and carbon dioxide removal.  In addition, private and public investment in these areas is rapidly increasing.\n\n- By summer 2021 more than 90 countriescovering\nmore than 40 percent of global emissionshad submitted updated NDCs.  Several had pledged to\n\n## Carbon Dioxide Removal Key To Meeting Paris Goals\n\nMost countries are delaying major emissions cuts until closer to their net-zero target year, which means that breakthroughs, commercialization, and incentives related to carbon dioxide removal (CDR) technologies will be critically important for meeting their goals.  Australia, China, the EU, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United States are leading R&D efforts and pilot projects, according to the Global Carbon Capture Sequestration Institute, but deployment sufficient to meet the goals of the Paris Agreement is contingent on either technological breakthroughs that sharply reduce costs or government support through subsidies and taxes that raise the costs of fossil fuels.  Currently, there is no large-scale market use for CO2.\n\n- Major hydrocarbon producing countries in Europe, led by Norway and the United Kingdom, probably are\nbest positioned for large-scale CDR deployment during the next decade because of government policy and regulatory regimes to support its growth, including carbon-pricing schemes.\n- The United States has several advantages that position it to become a leader in CDR.  US companies are investing\nheavily and have experience using CDR to enhance oil and gas yields.  In addition, the United States is home to almost half the world's operating carbon capture facilities and has large geologic storage capacity, including natural gas reservoirs and saline aquifers, according to the US Geological Survey (USGS).\n- More countries probably will invest in and tout CDR as key to offsetting their emissions and prolonging fossil\nfuel production and consumption.  Oil and gas companies are increasing their R&D in CDR for similar reasons.\nreach net zero emissions, including Brazil, Chile, the EU, Japan, South Korea, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom by 2050, and China by 2060.\n\n- In March, the European Central Bank announced\nplans for new capital requirements for banks that\nhave high levels of climate risks on their accounts, and in April, the United Kingdom passed legislation codifying its emissions target.  In July, the EU unveiled its emissions reduction roadmap.\n- However, few other countries have enshrined these\ntargets into law or have detailed plans on how to get there.  For example, industry analysts estimate a carbon price as high as $100 per ton would be needed\nto accelerate a shift to clean energy.  In addition, we assess that some countries are using a pledge to mask a lack of seriousness.\nChina and India will play critical roles in determining the trajectory of temperature rise.  They are the firstand fourth-largest emitters, respectively, and both are growing their total and per capita emissions, whereas the United States and EUas the second- and thirdlargestare declining.  Both China and India are incorporating more renewable and low-carbon energy sources, but several factors will limit their displacement of coal.  They need to modernize their grids, have sunk costs that make it relatively cheaper to use coal compared with other energy sources, want to minimize reliance on fuel imports for national security reasons, and are trying to appease domestic constituencies who rely on the coal industry for jobs.\n\n- China accounts for about 30 percent of global\nemissions and has pledged to peak before 2030, but modest emissions reduction targets in its 14th Five Year Plan (20212025) in 2021 put that into question.  China has not publically articulated detailed plans for meeting its 2060 net-zero-emissions target; to do so, we assess that\nBeijing would need to follow through on President Xi Jinping's pledge at the US Climate Summit in April to phase out coal consumption.\n- India almost certainly will increase its emissions as it\ndevelops economically. Indian officials have not\ncommitted to a net-zero target date and have instead called on countries with larger economies to reduce emissions.\n\n## Arguing About Who Bears Responsibility To Act\n\nThe cooperative breakthrough of the Paris Agreement may be short lived as countries struggle to reduce their emissions and blame others for not doing enough.  The Paris Agreement allows countries to self-report emissions data, which means that increased transparency, monitoring, and consistency in reporting will be necessary to accurately measure and assess which countries are meeting their commitments.\n\n- We assess that the longstanding diplomatic divide\nbetween expected contributions from developed versus developing countries will persist.  Most developing countries almost certainly will continue\nto submit conditional targets, arguing that developed countries must provide substantial financial assistanceas called for in the Paris Agreement technology transfers, and aid in capacity building for\nthem to reach their NDC goals.\n- Developing countries will continue to press for\nmore money to mitigate and adapt to climate change, arguing that developed countries' failure to mobilize $100 billion a year starting in 2020 has hampered their ability to take serious action.\n\nFinancial needs will grow as the physical effects intensify; the UN estimates that developing countries will need upwards of $300 billion in annual investment by 2030 just to adapt.\n\n- In addition, countries probably will continue to\npresent favorable data or compare their reductions against a chosen baseline year to their benefit.\nRussia's target is baselined to 1990 levelsat the height of the Soviet Union's economic activity and before Russia's economic collapse in the 1990s\nwhich allows it to appear ambitious in meeting its goal.  Brazil updated its NDC in 2020 by\nrecalculating its 2005 baseline number upwards, allowing it to claim it is still on track to meet its goal.\n\n## Growing Competition Over Key Minerals And Technologies\n\nCompetition will grow to acquire and process minerals and resources used in key renewable energy technologies.  China is in a strong position to compete;\nit currently controls more than half the global processing capacity for many of these minerals, according to the USGS and industry reporting, including rare earths for wind turbines and electric vehicle motors; polysilicon for solar panels; and cobalt, lithium, manganese, and graphite for electric vehicle batteries.  China is able to process these at reduced cost mainly because of its lower\n\nenvironmental standards, lower labor costs, and inexpensive power.\n\nCountries will increasingly compete over developing\nrenewable energy technologies to become leading\nexporters and gain market share as the energy\ntransition picks up speed.  This competition\npotentially will enable technological breakthroughs\nthat could speed up decarbonization.\n\n- The decarbonization of the electricity sector,\ncombined with the electrification of transportation, will require countries to upgrade and expand their grids.  Under current policies, the global electric vehicle stock is projected to grow twentyfold by 2030 and account for 7 percent of the global fleet, according to the IEA.\n- Deployment of utility-scale solar and wind\ntechnologies in remote areas is likely to require\nultra-high-voltage transmission lines to move the\npower to cities.  China is the world's leading supplier of advanced grid components for ultrahigh-voltage systems, such as transformers, circuit breakers, and inverters, which we assess creates\ncyber vulnerability risks.\n- Private firms and governments in China, the EU,\nJapan, Russia, and the United States are increasing R&D efforts on emerging energy technologies to\n\n## Petrostates Fear Transition Risk In International Decarbonization Efforts\n\nWe assess that most countries that rely on fossil fuel exports to support their budgets will continue to resist a quick transition to a zero-carbon world because they fear the economic, political, and geopolitical costs of doing so.  US and Western efforts to push these countries to speed up the energy transition could complicate bilateral relations and force tradeoffs with other national security priorities.\n\n- Russian President Vladimir Putin only recently acknowledged the economic damage from climate change.\nRussia generated almost 30 percent of state revenue in 2020 from fossil fuel companies, including $40 billion in gas sales to Europe.\n- More than 20 countries rely on fossil fuels for greater than 50 percent of total export revenues, and most will\ncontinue to struggle to diversify their sources of export revenue because of entrenched political interests, endemic corruption, and the lack of economic and legal institutions.  Most already face major governance and instability challenges, with Algeria, Chad, Iraq, and Nigeria most at risk from falling fossil fuel prices because they have higher break-even prices, according to industry reporting.\n- A decline in fossil fuel revenue would further strain Middle Eastern countries that are projected to face more\nintense climate effectssuch as very high heat and extended droughtsbecause it will reduce available resources needed to adapt or build more resilient infrastructure.\nprovide additional zero- to low-carbon options, such as green hydrogen, floating offshore wind, and small modular nuclear reactors.  The potential to gain an edge in markets that could be worth hundreds of billions to trillions of dollars is fueling increasingly intense competition.\n\n## Use Of Contentious Economic Tools To Advance Climate Interests\n\nCountries most likely will wield contentious financial and economic tools to advance climate policies and defend their national economies.  Some countries are looking to impose costs on foreign goods produced in countries with relatively weak carbon reduction standards to protect domestic producers who are complying with more stringent standards.\n\n- The EU plans to propose a new Carbon Border\nAdjustment Mechanism for implementation as early as 2023, to protect EU firms in certain sectors\nfrom competing with companies from countries\nwith weaker climate rules and emissions prices, according to open-source reporting.\n\n- Australia, China, India, Russia, South Africa, and\nUkraine have criticized the use of such mechanisms as a disguised form of protectionism.\n\n## Climate Change Effects Exacerbating Geopolitical Flashpoints\n\nKey Judgment 2: The increasing physical effects of climate change are likely to exacerbate cross-border geopolitical flashpoints as states take steps to secure their interests.  The reduction in sea ice already is amplifying strategic competition in the Arctic over access to its natural resources.  Elsewhere, as temperatures rise and more extreme effects manifest, there is a growing risk of conflict over water and migration, particularly after 2030, and an increasing chance that countries will unilaterally test and deploy large-scale solar geoengineeringcreating a new area of geopolitical disputes.\n\n## Growing Strategic Competition In The Arctic\n\nWe assess that Arctic and non-Arctic states almost\ncertainly will increase their competitive activities as\nthe region becomes more accessible because of\nwarming temperatures and reduced ice.  Competition\nwill be largely economic but the risk of\nmiscalculation will increase modestly by 2040 as\ncommercial and military activity grows and\nopportunities are more contested.\n\n- Diminishing sea ice probably will increase access to\nshipping routes that can reduce trade times between Europe and Asia by about 40 percent for some vessels.  In addition, onshore oil and natural gas deposits, as well as an estimated $1 trillion\nworth of precious metals and minerals will become more available, but some high-cost offshore oil and gas projects could become unprofitable if the energy transition speeds up.\n- Warming ocean temperatures probably will push\nBering Sea fish stocks northward into the Arctic Ocean, according to a NOAA study, which could increase commercial and illegal fishing activity in the region and exacerbate regional disputes between Arctic and non-Arctic states over fishing rights.\n- Coastal erosion and thawing permafrost will\ndamage critical infrastructure.  Massive investment in infrastructure would be needed to maximize the\neconomic potential of the region, ranging from new ports to mining, offering foreign powers an\nopportunity to gain a foothold by investing in new infrastructure and rebuilding and hardening existing infrastructure.\n\nMilitary activity is likely to increase as Arctic and non-\nArctic states seek to protect their investments, exploit\nnew maritime routes, and gain strategic advantages\nover rivals.\n\nThe increased presence of China and other non-Arctic states very likely will amplify concerns among Arctic states as they perceive a challenge to their respective security and economic interests.  China, France, India, Japan, South Korea, and the United Kingdom have released Arctic strategies mostly focused on economic opportunities, but some address security issues, which has prompted Russian policymakers to repeatedly state since 2018 that non-Arctic countries do not have a military role in the region.\n\nContested economic and military activities will increase the risk of miscalculation, and deescalating tensions is likely to require the adaptation of existing or creation of new forums to address bilateral or multilateral security concerns among Arctic states.  Although the scope of the Arctic Councilthe leading intergovernmental forum promoting cooperation among Arctic statesspecifically excludes military security, Russia intends to broach security concerns with the other Arctic states while chairing the council from 2021 to 2023, according to Russian officials' public statements, and may propose alternate forums to discuss those issues.\n\n## Increased Strains Over Water And Migration\n\nOutside the Arctic, we judge that transboundary tensions probably will increase over shared surface and groundwater basins as increased weather variability exacerbates preexisting or triggers new water insecurity in many parts of the world.  Forecasted climate change effects on local and regional weather\nincluding loss of glaciers and more frequent and extreme droughts and floodswill make water management, resource allocation, and service provision more complex and difficult, and probably more contentious.  Although scientific forecasts are not precise enough to pinpoint likely flashpoints, we assess that several areas are at high risk.\n\n- Pakistan relies on downstream surface water from\nheavily glacier-fed rivers originating in India for\nmuch of its irrigation, and requires frequent data\nfrom India on river discharges in order to provide advanced warning to evacuate villages and prepare for flooding.\n- The Mekong River basin already is an area of\ngrowing dispute over dam building, largely by China, that threatens the smooth flow of water for agriculture and fishing on which other countries rely heavily, particularly Cambodia and Vietnam.\n- In the Middle East and North Africa, about\n60 percent of surface water resources are transboundary and all countries share at least one aquifer, according to the World Bank.  Several\naquifers are also vulnerable to salt water intrusion, even from minor rises in sea levels, increasing the potential for conflict.\n- Some key bodies for resource management, such as\nthe Nile Basin Initiative, will increasingly become sidelined unless they develop enforcement\nmechanisms to cajole cooperative behavior among states.  Nearly half the world's 263 international\nriver basinsencompassing about half the global populationlack cooperative management agreements to help defuse tensions in shared\nbasins, according to the UN, and most existing agreements are not flexible enough to address\ndisruptions in weather patterns and reduced water flow caused by climate change.\n\nWe judge that cross-border migration probably will increase as climate effects put added stress on internally displaced populations already struggling under poor governance, violent conflict, and environmental degradation.  Triggers for increased migration are likely to include droughts, more intense cycloneswith accompanying storm surgesand floods.  Given the multiple factors that drive migration and the uncertainties in regional climate models, we are unable to project total numbers of climate migrants.\nHowever, countries and displaced people will increasingly see climate change as a driver, and it will contribute to instability when it upsets socioeconomic, political, and demographic dynamics, and strains ties between originating and receiving countries.\n\n- Around 10 percent of the population of Bangladesh\nlives along exposed coastal areas vulnerable to sea level rise and saltwater intrusion, and the country is projected to add more than 20 million people by 2040.  Since 1993, India has been erecting a fence along its 4,000-kilometer border with Bangladesh.\n- Displaced populationsespecially from small\nisland nationswill increasingly demand changes\nto international refugee law to consider their claims and provide protection as climate migrants or refugees, and affected populations will fight for\nlegal payouts for loss and damages resulting from climate effects.\n- The need for investments in adaptation technologies\nto manage water stress and reduce a potential driver\nof migration could create expanded markets for advanced technologies, such as water storage and reuse systems.  The UN's Global Commission on Adaptation calculates that a $1.8 trillion investment\nby 2030 in early warning systems, resilient infrastructure, dryland agricultural crop production, mangroves, and water resource management would yield more than $7 trillion of benefits in avoided costs from climate change effects.\n\n## Risk Of Unilateral Geoengineering Increasing\n\nWe assess there is a growing risk that a country would unilaterally test and possibly deploy large-scale solar geoengineering technologies as a way to counter intensifying climate effects if it perceived other efforts to limit warming to 1.5 C had failed.  Without an international agreement on these technologies, we assess that such a unilateral effort probably would cause blowback.  Geoengineering intentionally cools the planet by reflecting a fraction of solar radiation back to space or allowing thermal radiation to escape, but it does not address other climate effects such as ocean acidification.  A large-scale deployment of stratospheric aerosol injection (SAI)which mimics the natural cooling effect of a volcanic eruption by adding small reflective particles to the upper stratospherecould have a global impact.  Another technologymarine cloud brighteninguses aerosols to increase cloud reflectivity to cool ocean temperatures on a more localized scale.\n\n- Large-scale geoengineering could be internationally\ndisruptive because of its potential to substantially affect the Earth's biosphere, which would change global weather patterns and provide climate benefits to some regions at the expense of others. Depending on the scale and location of deployment, it could change weather systems in the United States.\n- Researchers in several countries, including\nAustralia, China, India, Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States, as well as several\nEU members, are exploring geoengineering techniques.  We assess that the lack of any countrylevel dialogue or governance body to set regulations and enforce transparency over research increases the\npossibility that state or nonstate actors will independently develop or deploy the technology possibly covertlyin a manner that risks conflict if other nations blame them for a weather disaster they believe was caused by geoengineering.\n\n## Highly Vulnerable Countries Of Concern\n\nKey Judgment 3: Scientific forecasts indicate that intensifying physical effects of climate change out to 2040 and beyond will be most acutely felt in developing countries, which we assess are also the least able to adapt to such changes.  These physical effects will increase the potential for instability and possibly internal conflict in these countries, in some cases creating additional demands on US diplomatic, economic, humanitarian, and military resources.  Despite geographic and financial resource advantages, the United States and partners face hard and costly challenges that will become more difficult to manage without concerted efforts to reduce emissions and cap warming.\n\n- The IC identified 11 countries and two regions of\ngreat concern from the threat of climate change.\nThese countries of concern are highly vulnerable to\nthe physical effects and lack the capacity to adapt, suggesting that building resilience to climate change in these countries would be especially helpful in mitigating future risks to US interests.\n- Five of the 11 countries are in South and East Asia\nAfghanistan, Burma, India, Pakistan, and North Korea; four countries are in Central America and the Caribbean**Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras,** and Nicaragua; **Colombia** and **Iraq** round out the list.\n- Climate change is also likely to increase the risk of\ninstability in countries in Central Africa and small island states in the Pacific, which clustered together form two of the most vulnerable areas in the world.\n\n\n- More broadly, developing countries are likely to\nneed to adapt to a mix of challenges that climate change will exacerbate.  Ineffective water governance in developing countries will increase their vulnerability to climate effects, undermining livelihoods and health.  Some will face new or more\nintense diseases and lower yields from existing staples of their agriculture.  In addition, insurgents and terrorists may benefitwe assess that most of\nthe countries where al-Qa'ida or ISIS have a\npresence are highly vulnerable to climate change.\n\n## Select Countries Of Concern\n\nWe assess that the 11 countries especially are likely to face warming temperatures, more extreme weather, and disruption to ocean patterns that will threaten their energy, food, water, and health security.\nIntensifying and more frequent heat waves and droughts will create water supply volatility and probably strain their electric utility operations, while growing economies and populations will increase electricity demands to handle rising temperatures.\n\n- Warm countries that rely on thermoelectric\npower plants for electricity generation are\nparticularly vulnerable because more frequent and intense droughts and higher evaporation rates from rising temperatures are likely to interrupt their access to water to cool power plants.  Rising temperatures also make the plants\nless efficient and more costly to operate.\n- For the fifth consecutive year, prolonged dry spells\nand excessive rains have devastated maize and bean crops in Central America's dry corridor.  Yields for these and other crops in Guatemala, Honduras, and\nNicaragua are projected to decline significantly because of climate change, according to a UN study, raising the prospect of food insecurity and a drop in crucial export commodities.\n- More frequent and intense cyclones are likely to\ncontaminate water sources and increase vector populations and the diseases they transmit in\nseveral of the 11 countries.  Models suggest dengue\nincidence probably will increase in Afghanistan,\nGuatemala, Haiti, Honduras, India, Iraq, and Pakistan, according to scientific studies.\n- Rising temperatures and increased precipitation\nprobably will amplify mosquito and diarrheal disease outbreaks in South Asian and Central American countries, worsening health outcomes and causing additional loss of life, according to\nscientific studies and the WHO.\n- Climate change probably will accelerate the loss\nof biodiversitythe variability among all living\norganismsfaster than at any point in human history, leading to more extinctions of plants and animals that can no longer survive in their traditional habitats and risking ecosystems that global populations rely on for food and medicinal production.\nWe judge that the 11 countries especially will lack the financial resources or governance capacity to adapt to climate change effects, heightening the risk of instability-induced migration and displacement flowsincluding to the US southern borderand increasing their already substantial needs for foreign aid and humanitarian assistance.  Foreign governments, international institutions, and private investment can offer financial aid, technical expertise, and climate adaptation technologies to alleviate some of these difficultiessuch as food and water insecurity and urban povertybut in the 11 countries, these efforts are likely to be hindered by poor governance, weak infrastructure, endemic corruption, and a lack of physical access.\n\n- Several factors have made an outsized contribution\nto countries' declining adaptive capacity, including\nbeing heavily dependent on imported energy and external resources for health services, and having low electricity access.\n- Climate change is likely to contribute to economic\nand social stress and become an increasing\nmigration push factor, especially for poor farmers in Central America, who make up 30 percent of the\n\nworking population.  Climate-induced population movements into cities are likely to compound factors of social or political instability, such as uncontrolled urbanization, high rates of unemployment, and growing slums.\n\n- Diminished energy, food, and water security in the\n11 countries probably will exacerbate poverty, tribal or ethnic intercommunal tensions, and dissatisfaction with governments, increasing the risk of social, economic, and political instability.\n\n## Regional Arcs Of Vulnerability\n\nClimate change is likely to increase the risk of instability in countries in Central Africa and small island states in the Pacific.  These countries are all highly exposed to climate change and have little adaptive capacity.  In addition, they are clustered together to create regions in which the United States or its allies may be called upon to provide humanitarian aid, settle disputes, or accept migrants. Climate change most likely will slow economic and human development in **Central Africa**, a region that already is conflict-prone and heavily reliant on humanitarian assistance.  Countries in the region are highly exposed to increased droughts, flash flooding, and related environmentally driven diseases, and also rank among the lowest in the world in access to education, electricity, health, and sanitation.\n\n- Under-resourced and ill-equipped militaries will\nface severe strains when they are called upon to\nrespond to more natural disasters in their own and neighboring countries.\nLow-lying **Pacific Islands** are highly vulnerable to climate change because of their minimal adaptive capacity and high exposure to tropical storms and rising sea levels.  Although no island nation is forecast to disappear by 2040, about 20 percent of their landmass is projected to face annual wave flooding from higher seas that will damage infrastructure and threaten food and water security because of saltwater intrusion of\n\ngroundwater resources, according to a 2018 study by NOAA and USGS.\n- Climate change also may hasten the collapse of\ncommercial fisheries that already are under severe\nstrain from overfishing, according to the Pacific\nCommunity, which will harm local diets and economies.  Regional fish consumption is three-tofive times the global average, foreign fishing\nlicenses make up a large share of government revenue, and onshore processing provides jobs,\naccording to a UN study.\nFinally, we assess that many other countries are comparatively more exposed and have fewer resources to adapt to climate change effects, although some probably will experience opportunities that mitigate their challenges.1 The following are illustrative examples:\n\n- More variable precipitation is likely to widen\nChina's southnorth water disparity, challenging its ability to irrigate agricultural areas in its waterdeficient northeast and further drive its dam construction on rivers upstream from neighboring countries.  However, it is likely to have the financial and technological resources to compete successfully in markets for solar and other clean energies and limit the damage from climate impacts, such as more intense cyclones and river flooding.\n- North Korea's poor infrastructure and resource\nmanagement probably will weaken its ability to cope with increased flooding and droughts, exacerbating the country's chronic food shortages. Increasing extremes in seasonal weather variations may reduce reservoir water stores during droughts while damaging infrastructure during the rainy monsoon season.\n- Saudi Arabia will face moderate exposure and has\nsome ability to adapt, while Iran probably will face more frequent droughts, intense heat waves, and expanding desertification that, combined with poor water management, will lower food production and\n\n##\n\nincrease import costs during the coming decades, increasing the risk of instability, localized conflict, and displacement.\n\n- Egypt is less exposed to climate change effects than\nmany countries, and Brazil and Mexico have\ngreater capacity to adapt to such changes.\n- Russia is likely to experience infrastructure damage\nfrom permafrost thaw, more frequent and intense\nwildfires, and increased erosion.  Moreover, existing agricultural regions probably will experience longer and more frequent droughts. Russia, however, will benefit from the opening of Arctic trade routes and may benefit from longer\ngrowing seasons to increase crop production in other regions.\nThe United States and others, however, are in a relatively better position than other countries to deal with the major costs and dislocation of forecasted change, in part because they have greater resources to adapt, but will nonetheless require difficult adjustments.  Climate impacts such as excessive heat, flooding, and extreme storms will prove increasingly costly, require some military shifts, and increase demands for humanitarian assistance and disaster relief operations.  Adjusting to such changes will often be wrenching, and populations will feel negative effects in their daily lives that will become more difficult to reverse without successful efforts to reduce net emissions and cap warming temperatures.  The impacts will be massive even if the worst human costs can be avoided. The energy transition is already rapidly shifting investment, creating new industries while devastating others.\n\n- The United States and key states in the developed\nworld have greater technological capability and financial resources to adapt to climate change, and are likely to realize some benefits in terms of technological competitiveness and agriculture.\nShould warmer temperatures and longer growing seasons yield lower heating costs and increased\nagricultural production, most of the beneficiaries outside Russia are likely to be in the high latitudes,\nsuch as Canada and Scandinavian countries.\n- Climate effects are likely to compel militaries in\nareas prone to coastal flooding and saltwater\ninundation to alter operations, and changes to\nocean temperature and chemistry probably will require changes to maritime requirements and sensors, according to a National Defense\nUniversity report.2\n- Affected militaries also probably will have to adapt\nacquisition requirements and expend resources to harden or rebuild critical infrastructure.  The\nUnited Kingdom is expecting increased calls to respond to humanitarian disasters and is preparing equipment and designing its forces for a world that is 2-4 C warmer than it was in the late 19th\ncentury, according to a UK Ministry of Defense\nstudy released in March.3  Although militaries will\nabsorb these expenses in normal recapitalization programs spread over decades, the costs to adapt will force tradeoffs with other modernization priorities.\n\n## . Annex A: Events That Would Change Our Assessment\n\nThis NIE's key judgments are based on assessments regarding the speed of the energy transition away from fossil fuels and deployment of CDR technologies, the trajectory of intensifying physical effects from climate change, and countries' responses to these effects in ways that increase tension and affect US national security.  The following four scenarios highlight some of the developments that could alter our main judgments and their underlying assumptions.\n\nA major breakthrough in and large-scale deployment of zero-carbon energy or CDR technologies would alter our assessment that the global energy transition is not on pace to meet the Paris Agreement goal of limiting warming to 1.5 C.  Multiple venture-backed startup companies could utilize their capitalcombined with improved computational and materials scienceto develop a breakthrough in nuclear fusion, a near endless source of energy that governments have been researching since the 1950s without success.  In addition, the discovery of a cheap CDR technique or a new and highly profitable use for CO2 could create a market incentive for companies and countries to remove CO2 from the atmosphere on a large enough scale to spur a deep decarbonization pathway that results in the globe reaching net zero emissions well before 2050.\n\nA global climate disaster that mobilizes massive collective action from all countries and populationssuch as clear evidence that we are nearing a tipping point in the Earth's system faster than expectedwould alter our assessment that countries are going to argue about who bears more responsibility to act.  New observations could indicate the irreversible and significantly faster than expected melting of Greenland and the West and East Antarctic glacierswhich currently are modeled to raise sea levels by upwards of a quarter meter by 2040, and more than one meter by 2100 under a high emissions scenariocould threaten hundreds of millions of people living in coastal communities.  Alternatively, new evidence could emerge indicating the near term collapse of the Atlantic Meridional Overturning Circulation (AMOC) that risks altering North Atlantic air temperatures in excess of 7 C; current observations give scientists high confidence that climate change is weakening the AMOC, a critical part of Earth's climate system that transfers warm water northward and cold water southward.\n\nOvert military action, especially by a non-Arctic state, that significantly escalates tension in the region and results in a sidelining of Arctic diplomacy would challenge our judgment that increased activity in the Arctic, while raising the possibility of miscalculation, is unlikely to result in outright conflict because of the harsh operating environment and existing mechanisms for cooperation.  Persistent challenges to Russia's supremacy of the Northern Sea Route by a non-Arctic state's military could result in armed conflict with Russia if diplomatic negotiations had stalled and foreign militaries continued to operate in what Moscow views as its territorial waters.  Alternatively, if a non-Arctic state, especially China, were to begin regular, large-scale military operations in the area to protect an economic foothold in the region, the risk of conflict with Arctic states could increase and contribute to a buildup of forces.\n\nA successful geoengineering deployment at scale that results in global cooling without negatively disrupting weather patterns would challenge our judgment that unilateral deployment without global consensus would raise international tensions and risk blowback.  A country fearing the existential threat from sea level rise could initiate a geoengineering program that begins to dim the planet and artificially reduces global temperatures.  After witnessing the successful demonstration, other states might support increased geoengineering, both to avert the worst aspects of climate impacts and to avoid having to transition away from fossil fuels.  Given the lingering environmental impact of emissions and the risk of a massive climate shock from accumulated emissions if the geoengineering program suddenly ceased, countries probably would continue to gradually decarbonize energy production and pursue CDR so they could wean off geoengineering.\n\n##\n\n# Annex B: The Progress Of Climate ModelingView From The Chair Of The Us Interagency Group On Integrative Modeling\n\nScope Note: DOE's Director of Earth and Environmental Sciences Division authored this annex because he is a member of the Climate Security Advisory Council (CSAC) and chairs the Interagency Group on Integrative Modeling, which coordinates US\nGovernment modeling efforts in support of the US Global Change Research Program.\n\nToday's computer climate models trace their origins to the 1950s and the development of prototype atmospheric circulation models to estimate the distribution of nuclear fallout after an explosion.  In 1967, NOAA established a climate group that produced the first model-based simulations showing that a doubling of CO2 could lead to significant warming of the Earth's climate.  Ultimately, projections from these and other early modeling capabilities led to the formation of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). As of this year, more than 30 major climate-modeling centers worldwide make multi-decadal projections, each with access to a supercomputer of at least 10-petaflop capacity.  The United States and Europe have the most advanced models, the most notable being NSF's National Center for Atmospheric Research, NOAA's Geophysical Fluid Dynamics Laboratory, NASA's Goddard Institute for Space Studies, DOE's national laboratoryled modeling efforts, Germany's Max Planck Institute for Meteorology, and the UK Met Office's Hadley Center.  Australia, Canada, China, Japan, and Switzerland also have modeling centers. Climate modeling is coordinated worldwide by the World Climate Research Programme (WCRP), which is sponsored by the UN World Meteorological Organization, International Council for Science, and UNESCO.  WCRP helps scientists exchange information on various model capabilities and strategies.  The IPCC produces a climate assessment every seven years using the 'all inclusive' approach by combining predictions from all modeling centers worldwide.\nThe US Global Change Research Program (USGCRP), on the other hand, produces the National Climate Assessment every four years using only US models.  The USGCRP coordinates efforts across the US climate modeling community to learn from each other and avoid unnecessary duplication.\n\n## Increasing Complexity And Fidelity\n\nThe evolution of climate models has been one of increasing complexity run on faster and larger computers.  The first climate models examined how the Earth's energy balance and atmosphere might vary over time, and only considered atmospheric physics and rudimentary representations of the oceans and land.  In time, scientists added more detail, such as ocean and land chemistry and biology. By 1990, better computers meant models could run at 400-kilometer (km) spatial resolutions and make generalized projections showing that rising levels of atmospheric CO2 increased regional and global temperatures.  However, these models could not display extreme weather eventssuch as hurricane impacts on citiesbecause of coarse resolutions, and they did not include other complicated feedbacks caused by other greenhouse gases or changes in the biosphere, such as permafrost thaw, ice sheet melt, or deforestation.\n\nClimate models have advanced remarkably in the past 15 years.  By 2005, faster computers allowed climate models to run at 150-km resolution, enabling the representation of some details of human activities such as large-scale energy infrastructure and agriculture impacts.  By 2010, the first petaflop-scale supercomputers and new scientific findings from field experiments allowed the inclusion of biogeochemical and hydrological processes.  By 2015, melting of glaciers and shelving were included, allowing for better sea level rise predictions, along with greater detail on marine fisheries.\n\nIn 2018, climate models began to include the role of humans and human systemsa major step forward in assessing climate effects on human securityallowing them to examine the connections between climate, socioeconomics, global agriculture, infrastructure, and trade on targeted resolutions of 50 km or less.  By 2020, US researchers were testing various methodologies to evaluate the risks and benefits of climate interventions, such as geoengineering.\n\n## Evaluating For Accuracy\n\nScientists are continually testing models for their accuracy in predictions.  Climate models operate by solving a very large set of sophisticated equations for three-dimensional grids in the atmosphere and oceans.  The land surface is more difficult because of the incredible variety of watersheds, ecosystems and glaciers, but modeling centers with the world's fastest computers are incorporating variable grid sizes for land features, like glaciers, to obtain more accurate sea level rise projections. Scientists use a 'hindcasting' technique to test and evaluate the accuracy of models.  They run the model from several decades in the past and compare its projections to real world and long-term observable data from NASA's remote sensing satellites, NOAA's ground-based monitors, and many other US and international agencies.  Hindcasting has shown that models are robust in describing climate warming on continental scales, but not as accurate in projecting regional phenomena, such as the details of Arctic sea ice retreat, evolving coastal precipitation patterns, and impacts of storms on human systems.  In general, there is reduced accuracy when models project more localized.\n\n## Reducing Uncertainty\n\nCurrent research on reducing uncertainty out to 2050 focuses on two key areas, those caused by overly simplistic or missing representation of processes and interrelationships, and spatial grids that are not yet small enough to address key questions.  The first set of uncertainties includes: (a) cloudaerosol interactions; (b) medium-term modes of variability such as El Nino/La Nina that influence global precipitation patterns and severe droughts; (c) cryosphere changes such as permafrost thaw, sea ice coverage, and land ice melt that influence methane release and sea-level rise; and (d) extreme events that impact built infrastructures and populations.  Longer-term projections are also sensitive to scenarios of future policies to reduce greenhouse gas emissions.\n\nScientists target the second source of uncertainty about spatial resolution by adding details to heterogeneous systems within smaller grids and porting the models to increasingly powerful computers.  In general, the more powerful the computer, the higher the possible resolution.  Most modeling centers are currently operating with 25-km resolution, with the exception of a DOE model that will operate at 3-km resolution by the end of this year.  With the understanding of key questions from policymakers, warfighters, and the IC, science agencies steer their investments to tackle and reduce one or more of these uncertainties.\n\nClimate scientists perform tens to hundreds of ensemble runs for each climate simulation, where each run has slight perturbations on the same initializing data or small changes in parameterizations, in order to reduce the uncertainty that comes with incorporating larger numbers of complicated and uncertain equations.  A modeling center will then produce an average of all the ensemble runs and compile a best estimate of the future climate.  Each modeling center has a slightly different approach in how they construct their modelsuch as parameterizations, grid size, and number of ensemble runswhich means the climate projections from one modeling center may differ from another center.\n\n## Future Work On Attribution And Tipping Points\n\nSince climate change is increasing extreme weather event trends, a growing field is trying to answer the question of what fraction of an individual event can be attributed to climate change.  Improvements in big data collection and processing, along with more advanced computers, most likely will advance our knowledge of attribution.  In addition, scientists are working to improve models to better answer the question of when a given component of either the regional or global climate system will approach or pass a tipping point, an area of high importance given the risks associated with itthe state of science currently is still unable to adequately answer this question.\n\n\n## Annex C: Challenges Of Projecting The Macroeconomic Impacts Of Climate Change\n\nThe macroeconomic impacts of climate change out to 2040 are highly uncertain because of the divergent estimates and methodological approaches employed in a wide range of economic models, including different assumptions, baselines, time horizons, and variables.  The future economic impacts of climate change will also depend in large part on the extent to which policies and actions mitigate these potential impacts, further complicating longer-term estimates of costs and benefits.\n\nA key variable is the potential for technological breakthroughs that substantially favor varying mixes of energy production and distribution and of carbon removal and storage.  In recent years, a growing number of studies have argued that pursuing mitigation and adaptation measures can also provide opportunities to spur economic growth, potentially by more than the dislocations and disruptions projected for some economic sectors, such as oil and gas.\n\n- Other economic and many climate experts argue that existing assessments of the potential future economic risks\nof climate change underestimate many of these risks, possibly greatly.  In particular, they argue that widely used models omit many factors that are difficult to quantify, discount future costs and benefits, and fail to consider climate thresholds, tipping points, or the dynamic impact of numerous shocks.\n- Some researchers argue that the physical impacts of climate change, including the destruction of infrastructure\nand physical capital, disruptions in global supply chains, and more unpredictable food commodity supply\ncycles, could lead to more output and price variability and pose significant additional challenges in forecasting\nmacroeconomic impacts.\nAs a result, we judge that state and nonstate actors will increasingly push for regulations mandating climate change related risk disclosure in the financial system to protect against these macroeconomic impacts.  The United States will have opportunities to influence regulatory frameworks and reporting standards.\n\n\nThis page intentionally left blank.\n\n\nclimate change; www. Atalnticcouncil.org/blogs/energysource/a-new-security-challenge-the-geopolioticalimplications-of-climate-change/.com, Accessed 6 April 2021.\n\n2 Academic report, National Defense University; Richard Pittenger and Robert Gagoisan; OCT 2003; Global Warming Could Have a Chilling Effect on the Military.\n3 UK Ministry of Defence, \"Ministry of Defence: Climate Change and Sustainability Strategic Approach,\" March\n2021."
    },
    {
        "text": "# Naval Postgraduate School\n\n\n\n# Monterey, California\n\n\n# Thesis\n\nDEVELOPING A RELIABLE METHODOLOGY FOR\nASSESSING THE COMPUTER NETWORK OPERATIONS\nTHREAT OF NORTH KOREA\nby\n\nChristopher Brown\n\nSeptember 2004\n Thesis Advisor:\nDorothy Denning Second Reader:\nJoanne Kim Approved for release; distribution is unlimited\n\n## This Page Intentionally Left Blank\n\nPublic reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instruction, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project (0704-0188) Washington DC 20503.\n\nthe Computer Network Operations Threat of North Korea.\n\n## 11. Supplementary Notes: The Views Expressed In This Thesis Are Those Of The Author And Do Not Reflect The Official Policy Or Position Of The Department Of Defense Or The U.S. Government. 12A. Distribution / Availability Statement Approved For Release; Distribution Is Unlimited 13. Abstract (Maximum 200 Words)\n\nComputer network operations (CNO) can be considered a relatively new phenomenon being encount modern warfare.  Computer network operation is comprised of three components, computer network attack computer network exploitation (CNE), and computer network defense (CND).  Computer network attack is def operations to disrupt, deny, degrade, or destroy information resident in computer networks, or the computers and ne themselves.  Computer network exploitation is the intelligence collection and enabling operations to gather data from adversary automated information systems (AIS) or networks.  Finally, computer network defense are those me internal to the protected entity, taken to protect and defend information, computers, and networks from disruption, degradation, or destruction. No longer is warfare limited to the use of kinetic weapons and conventional methods of war.  Computer network operations have become an integral part of our adversary's arsenal and more attention must be paid to the effects of CNO activities, particularly CNA and CNE being conducted by our adversaries.  Of the many states suspected of conducting active CNO activities against the United States and other nations, none warrants more attention than North Korea. This thesis presents the development of methodology using information available from open sources.\nThis work is intended to prove that a useful methodology for assessing the CNO capabilities and limitations of North Korea can be developed using only open source information.\n\n## 14. Subject Terms Computer Network Operations (Cno), Computer Network Exploitation (Cne), Computer Network Attack (Cna), Computer Network Defense (Cnd), North Korea, And Dprk.\n\n16. PRICE CODE\n20. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT\n17. SECURITY\nCLASSIFICATION OF\nREPORT\n18. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE\n19. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF ABSTRACT\nUnclassified\nUnclassified\nUnclassified\n\nNSN 7540-01-280-5500\nStandard Form 298 (Rev. 2-89)\n\nPrescribed by ANSI Std. 239-18\n\n\nTHIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK\nApproved for release; distribution is unlimited\n\n# Developing A Reliable Methodology For Assessing The Computer Network Operations (Cno) Threat Of North Korea\n\n\nChristopher A. Brown Lieutenant, United States Navy B.S., College of Aeronautics, 1993\nSubmitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of\n\n# Master Of Science In Computer Science From The Naval Postgraduate School September 2004\n\n\nAuthor:\n\nChristopher Brown Approved by:\nDr. Dorothy Denning Thesis Advisor Professor Joanne Kim Second Reader/Co-Advisor Dr. Peter Denning Chairman, Department of Computer Science\n\n\nTHIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK\n\n## Abstract\n\n Computer network operations (CNO) can be considered a relatively new phenomenon being encountered in modern warfare.  Computer network operation is comprised of three components: computer network attack (CNA), computer network exploitation (CNE), and computer network defense (CND).  Computer network attack is defined as operations to disrupt, deny, degrade, or destroy information resident in computer networks, or the computers and networks themselves.  Computer network exploitation is the intelligence collection and enabling operations to gather data from target adversary automated information systems (AIS) or networks.  Finally, computer network defense are those measures, internal to the protected entity, taken to protect and defend information, computers, and networks from disruption, denial, degradation, or destruction.\nNo longer is warfare limited to the use of kinetic weapons and conventional methods of war.  Computer network operations have become an integral part of our adversary's arsenal and more attention must be paid to the effects of CNO activities, particularly CNA and CNE being conducted by our adversaries. Of the many states suspected of conducting active CNO activities against the United States and other nations, none warrants more attention than North Korea.\nThis thesis presents the development of methodology using information available from open sources.  This work is intended to prove that a useful methodology for assessing the CNO capabilities and limitation of North Korea can be developed using only open source information.\n\n\nTHIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK\n\n## List Of Figures\n\n\n| Figure 2.1:                        | Cellular phone models being sold in the DPRK 7                              |\n|------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------|\n| Figure 2.2:                        | Cellular users in the city of Pyongyang 8                                   |\n| Figure 2.3:                        | International email users are becoming more popular in Pyongyang 10         |\n| Figure 2.4:                        | Researchers using the Kwang Myong Network 11                                |\n| Figure 2.5:                        | Satellite picture of Southeast Asia at night 12                             |\n| Figure 2.6:                        | Power availability comparison of ROK and DPRK 13                            |\n| Figure 2.7:                        | North Korea's first locally produced Personal Data Assistant 15             |\n| Figure 2.8:                        | FVS IV Biometric System 15                                                  |\n| Figure 2.9:                        | \"Tamjing\", Korean-Japanese Translation Program 16                           |\n| Figure 2.10:                       | Dinga Animation Software Developed in the DPRK 17                           |\n| Figure 2.11:                       | Visitors observe new software demos at student programming contest 17       |\n| Figure 2.12:                       | North Korean software exhibits at the World PC Expo in September 2001 ...18 |\n| Figure 3.1:                        | Users of the Kwang Myong Network in Pyongyang 22                            |\n| Figure 3.2:                        | North Korean Grade Level Students in an IT Lab 24                           |\n| Figure 3.3:                        | Computer Classroom in the Mangyongdae School Children's Palace 25           |\n| Figure 3.4:                        | Instructional Aid for Microsoft Windows in a North Korean Classroom at      |\n| the Pyongyang 6.9 Middle School 26 |                                                                             |\n| Figure 3.5:                        | Kim Chaek University of Technology and Syracuse University Officials 27     |\n| Figure 3.6:                        | The DPRK's hopeful engineers and scientists being produced at the Kim       |\n| Chaek University of Technology 29  |                                                                             |\n| Figure 3.7:                        | War-damaged Kim Il Sung University in 1953 30                               |\n| Figure 4.1:                        | Basic Chinese IT Rankings 41                                                |\n| Figure 4.2:                        | A Message Reportedly Used by Chinese Hackers 42                             |\n| Figure 5.1:                        | Pyongyang Informatics Center 46                                             |\n| Figure 5.2:                        | Programmers at the Pyongyang Informatics Center 47                          |\n| Figure 5.3:                        | Korea Computer Center 48                                                    |\n| Figure 5.4:                        | Programmers inside the Korea Computer Center 49                             |\n| Figure 5.5:                        | KCNA Website 53                                                             |\n| Figure 5.6:                        | The People's Korea Website 54                                               |\n| Figure 5.7:                        | DPRKorea Infobank website 55                                                |\n| Figure 5.8:                        | Naenara-DPRK website 56                                                     |\n| Figure 6.1:                        | Components of Network Readiness 61                                          |\n\n\nTHIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK\n\n## List Of Tables\n\n\n| Table 2.1:    | ROK and DPRK Telephone Diffusion Rate Comparison 6            |\n|---------------|---------------------------------------------------------------|\n| Table 2.2:    | ROK and DPRK Main Telephone Lines and Cellular Subscriber     |\n| Comparison 6  |                                                               |\n| Table 2.3:    | Sample Main Telephone Line Comparison 6                       |\n| Table 2.4:    | Information Technology Items Requested by the DPRK from UNIDO |\n| (May 1992) 14 |                                                               |\n| Table 4.1:    | Major Foreign PC Companies Activities in China 40             |\n|               |                                                               |\n\n\n\n## This Page Intentionally Left Blank Acknowledgments I Would Like To Express My Sincere Gratitude To Dr. Dorothy Denning And\n\nProfessor Joanne Kim for their inspiration, motivation, and support throughout this meticulous study.  I thank you all for your guidance and wisdom in developing this study.\nThis has truly been an invaluable educational experience.\nI would like to thank Peter Hayes of the Nautilus Institute for Security and Sustainability for his assistance during the initial stages of my research.  Thanks to Mr.\n\nAndrew Choi of the Korean Information Security Agency (KISA) for providing access to South Korean CNO subject matter experts.\n\nTo my loving wife Karla and my wonderful son Tristan, thank you both for your patience, enthusiasm, and continued understanding throughout this project.  Without the both of you the completion of this study would not have been possible.\n\n\n\n## This Page Intentionally Left Blank I. Introduction A. Problem Statement\n\nAssessing a foreign country's Computer Network Operations (CNO) activities is of high priority in the Intelligence Community (IC), particularly activities relating to Computer Network Attack (CNA) and Computer Network Exploitation (CNE).\nAlthough there is extensive classified analysis and reporting in this area, unclassified Internet-oriented research is likely to provide a number of key analytical insights that cannot be obtained from classified work alone.\n\nModern warfare is changing, and network warfare or cyber-warfare is increasingly becoming more vital to our nation's national interests.  With most of the country's infrastructure becoming more automated and network-centric, our adversaries could potentially provide a crippling blow to our nation's infrastructure via the Internet.\nAlthough the United States is the world leader in preparing and seriously thinking about cyber-warfare, we should not fall into a level of complacency.  We should continue to focus on Computer Network Defense (CND) in an attempt to stay one step ahead of our adversaries.\n\n## B. Motivation\n\nInformation technology is now an integral part of modern culture and industry.\n\nUnfortunately this modernization leaves us vulnerable to cyber attacks.  With these weapons of mass disruption, irreparable damage could be inflicted on a country's critical information technology (IT) and civil infrastructures. Several of our nation's critical infrastructure system to include electric power generation, transmission and distribution, mass transit, and oil and gas refining are now being monitored and controlled by networked systems using supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) devices [GAO 04].  These SCADA systems are vulnerable to attack as they are often bridged with other IT systems in order to provide remote access to the networks and instant access to critical data regarding the status of systems.\n\nCyber attacks on critical government and civilian computer systems are becoming more prevalent as more systems are joining the \"information superhighway\" [Connole\n98].  Several foreign states are suspected of conducting CNO against the United States and other nations' IT infrastructures.  North Korea has long been suspected of conducting or sponsoring various CNO activities.  A methodology for assessing a foreign country's CNO activities could provide invaluable insight into North Korea's CNO capabilities, limitations, and modus operandi.\n\n\n\n## C. Objectives\n\nThis thesis serves to develop a standard research methodology necessary to assess North Korea's CNO activities from open sources.\n\nGiven the history of high diplomatic and political tensions between the United States and North Korea it is most prudent that the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) be the focus of this research.  For years it has been reported that the DPRK has expressed great interest in the research and development of CNA capabilities.\n\nThe goal of this study is to assess North Korea's CNO activities using open sources, including those available through the Internet.  This research will identify and analyze relationships between key people and organizations involved in CNO activities, including CNO planning, operations, research, and education.  This study will examine CNO activity in government, civilian and military organizations, non-government entities including educational institutions and private industry, non-state organizations the foreign country may be supporting, and CNO-oriented relationships with other foreign countries.\n\nOften times the key indicators and precursors to CNO activities that are state sponsored are unclassified and available on the Internet.  This thesis intends to carefully examine several categories of information that directly or indirectly contribute to our understanding of the CNO capabilities, limitations, and intentions of North Korea.  This research will develop a methodology for assessing a foreign country's CNO activities.\nThe methodology will identify the critical information points necessary to assess North Korea's CNO capabilities, limitations, and intentions.  The Internet is the primary source of information.\n\n\n\n## D. Thesis Organization\n\nSeven chapters comprise this thesis:\n\n- *Chapter I - Introduction:* Establishes the goals for the thesis.  Identifies the\nmotivation and purpose behind conducting this research.\n\n- *Chapter II - Background:* Provides information on North Korea's IT\ninfrastructure, capabilities, and limitations.  Briefly discusses laws and regulations associated with Internet use.\n\n- *Chapter III - Academic Activity and Public Community:* Discusses the\ninvolvement of North Korean academia with respect to CNO activities. Discusses the IT educational opportunities made available to students and the military.\n\n- *Chapter IV - External Information Technology Aid:* Discusses the IT aid\nprovided to North Korea.  Briefly discusses the export restrictions that apply\nto North Korea.\n\n- *Chapter V - Government Activity:* Examines whether North Korea is training\ncyberwarriors and whether it has incorporated CNA/E in its military doctrine.\n\n- *Chapter VI - Computer Network Attack/Exploitation Activity:* Examines and\ndiscusses suspected or reported CNA/E activities associated with North Korea.\n\n- *Chapter VII - Conclusions and Recommendations:* Explains the conclusions\nand provides recommendations with regard to possible future research.\n\nTHIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK\n\n\n## Ii. Background A. Introduction\n\nThis chapter provides a detailed overview of North Korea's information technology infrastructure, along with a brief discussion of the laws and regulations associated with Internet use in North Korea.\n\n\n## B. Information Technology Infrastructure\n\nInformation technology is still relatively new to North Korea.  Kim Il Sung first introduced the technology in the early 1980s when the DPRK took the initiative of establishing an integrated circuit (IC) factory that later led to the development of its first indigenous personal computer (PC), the Bongwha 4-1[Hayes 02].  By the mid 1980s the DPRK had established the Pyongyang Informatics Center (PIC) with the primary objective of software research and development.  The PIC successfully developed several Korean based software products to include word processing and desktop publishing applications.  Fast-forward 16 years to April 2002 when at the Computer Software Expo of DPRKorea in Beijing the DPRK unveiled its domestically developed operating system along with a mix of speech recognition and character recognition software [ITWorld 02].\nThere have been significant developments in the hardware sector since the development of the 8-bit Bongwha 4-1 PC prototype in 1982.  The DPRK is now reported to be manufacturing 16-bit and 32-bit PCs and to have successfully developed 16-megabit IC chips.  An IC pilot plant was constructed at the Electronics Research Institute of the Academy of Science and the PIC is currently conducting research and development of a 64-bit microcomputer.\n\n## 1. Telecommunications\n\nAutomatic switching networks were introduced in North Korea in the 1970's with limited use in Pyongyang, Siniju, Hamhng, and Hyesan.  In 1985 there were a reported 30,000 telephones in use in the DPRK compared to the 1.1 million in use today [CIA 04].\nThese telephones were primarily available at factories, government offices, cooperatives, and other workplaces [LOC 93].  Satellite communication was also introduced in the mid 1980's with the construction of a satellite ground station near Pyongyang utilizing the International Telecommunications Satellite Corporation (Intelsat) Indian Ocean satellite and one Russian satellite, with the French providing most of the technical support [LOC\n93].  Due to the close monitoring and control by the government, many ordinary citizens do not have the privilege of a private telephone line.  International connections routed through Moscow and Beijing were available to high-ranking party officials and by 1989\ninternational direct dialing via Hong Kong became available.  By 1990 a few public phone booths began appearing in Pyongyang and an agreement had been reached with Japan to share Japan's telecommunications satellites.\n\n| Title                     | The Number of Telephone    |\n|---------------------------|----------------------------|\n| Lines (Unit: 10,000)      |                            |\n| Telephone Lines Diffusion |                            |\n| Rate (Unit: %)            |                            |\n| Year                      |                            |\n| 1983                      | 1992                       |\n| North Korea (DPRK)        | 54.0                       |\n| South Korea (ROK)         | 481.0                      |\n|                           |                            |\n[From: Ho-Song 01]\n\n| Title                                   |   The Number of Telephone Lines and  |\n|-----------------------------------------|--------------------------------------|\n| Cellular Subscribers per 100 Population |                                      |\n| Year                                    |                                      |\n| 1990                                    |                              1999    |\n| North Korea (DPRK)                      |                                 2.46 |\n| South Korea (ROK)                       |                                30.78 |\n\nComparison\n[From: UN 04]\n\nYear\nCountry\nThe Number of Main Telephone Lines and\nCellular Subscribers per 100 Population\n2002\nSouth Korea (ROK)\n                          116.80\n2002\nNorth Korea (DPRK)\n                              2.11\n2002\nChina\n                            32.78\n2002\nJapan\n                          119.49\n2002\nRussia\n                            36.23\n2002\nUnited States (USA)\n                          113.40\n\n\nUntil banned (see below), cellular telephones were becoming more prolific in North Korea, especially in Pyongyang and Rason where they were initially introduced in November 2003.  Mobile phone users are reported to be approximately 3,000, as the cellular infrastructure is still in its early stages of development and the costs associated with the sign up and usage fees are extremely high.  According to Hwang Chol Pung, president of the Korea Communications Company, plans are underway to extend cellular phone service to all the provinces.  The company currently offers various service plans for cellular phones including those for a prepaid system, homepage, and E-mail services connected to computer websites.  The cellular phone infrastructure in the DPRK follows the Global System for Mobile Communication (GSM) system, which is a mainstream in Europe. There are plans to introduce the Code Division Multiple Access (CDMA) system, which is currently being used in South Korea [Beal 03].\nAs of May 25, 2004 all mobile phones were banned in North Korea [AFP 04].  It is widely believed that North Korean officials eager to introduce mobile technology to the reclusive country did not foresee North Koreans being exposed to foreign culture and influences.  We have not seen any discussion as to the reinstatement of mobile technology in North Korea.\n\n\n\nIn 1997 a 27-year contracted joint venture between the Thai company Loxley Public Co. and the Korea Post and Telecommunication Corporation (KPTC) created the Northeast Asia Telephone and Telecommunications Company Limited (NEAT&T) to provide telecommunication services to the Rajin-Sonbong area.  NEAT&T intended to provide telecommunication services that covered all ranges of frequencies, communication lines, and media formats in the Raijin-Sonbong Free Economic and Trade Zone.  These services include a projected 15,000 user lines, an international gateway, mobile phone services, cross border China and Russia connections, and DPRK long distance services via Chongjin/Pyongyang.  The company also planned on the installation of 5,000 new telephone lines, 80 payphones, and cellular service.  Although cellular phones and payphones were becoming more popular in Pyongyang, it is still unclear whether NEAT&T completed all their objectives given the embargoes on certain technical equipment, the shortage of power supplies and fuel, and the lack of international banking facilities.  In addition, the ban imposed on cellular phones in May 2004 could adversely affect future expansion.\n\n\n## 2. The Internet And The Dprk\n\nWith a population of approximately 22.5 million, the reported number of North Koreans currently connected to the Internet remains unknown.  As of the year 2000, the DPRK was reported to have only one Internet Service Provider (ISP) and it was state run. Although the DPRK has two assigned Class C Internet Protocol (IP) address blocks with\n131,072 addresses and a registered top-level domain (kp), no activity has been reported to originate from these assigned IP addresses.  In July 2003 the website http://www.stic.ac.kp was reported to be up [Williams 03].  However, when we attempted to connect to it on several occasions we found it inaccessible.\nThe majority of the websites associated with the DPRK on the Internet are hosted in Japan, China, and Australia.  The DPRK has only a handful of officially state sponsored published websites, all of which are hosted on servers in China and Japan. The DK Lotto (http://www.dklotto.com) and the Jupae Lotto (http://www.jupae.com)\nwebsites are the most sophisticated of these websites [McWilliams 03].  Both websites were developed by South Korean entrepreneur Kim Beom Hoon of Hoonnet Co., Ltd, and the DK Lotto website is the only website to have its server physically located in Pyongyang.  Other sites are used solely to spread the Party's \"juche\" message to the masses, with the Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) (http://www.kcna.co.jp) being the most popular. The Korean Central News Agency is the state-run agency of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea that speaks for the Workers' Party of Korea and the DPRK government [KCNA 03].\nIn May 2002, a South Korean information technology firm operated by businessman Kim Beom Hoon and the state-owned entity Jangsaeng opened the DPRK's first Internet cafe in Pyongyang.  The approximate cost of sending and receiving email is estimated at $10.00 per hour in June 2002, down from $100.00 per hour previously charged in May 2002.  Because the average North Korean earns less than $50.00 per month, mainly visiting businessmen, tourists, and diplomats utilize the cafe's Internet services.  Internet service is also provided in some hotels in Pyongyang; again tourists and diplomats are the main users.\n\n## 3. The Dprk Intranet\n\nNorth Korea today remains one of the most disconnected and isolated countries in the world.  Notwithstanding the DPRK's disconnect from the Internet, it is reported to possess an extensive and well-developed intranet providing connectivity to government offices throughout the country.\n\nThe computer became more prevalent in the DPRK in the early 1990's, with local area networks (LANs) being installed in the Party's Headquarters, research laboratories, and several educational institutions.  In 1996 the DPRK began developing the Kwang Myong (Bright Star) network using locally developed software that seems to have striking similarities to the Japanese version of Microsoft's Windows operating system.  In June 1997 the network was installed at the Central Scientific and Technological Information Agency (CSTIA) and was brought online shortly after.  The network features a sophisticated search engine, an electronic information system, a Japanese based web browser, a homepage search engine, television program guides, email functions, a language translation system, and a data transmission system [Conner 01].  The Kwang Myong Network or Intranet contains mostly scientific and technological information and is reported to have more than 30 million documents posted [Conner 01]. In 2001 it was reported that North Korea's Pyongyang Information Center (PIC)\nhad begun testing a firewall system installed between the Internet and the Intranet in order to screen and control the information being transmitted between the two networks in anticipation of a permanent linking of the two networks in the future.  These tests were facilitated by the installation of a superhighway communication device using a \"T-Line\" installed by Gigalink Limited at PIC.  It was also reported that test emails utilizing \"kp\" email addresses were also conducted [Kwan 01].  In addition, researchers have begun encrypting information being transmitted via the Intranet.  It is believed that the encoding is aimed at blocking outside hacking once the Intranet is finally connected to the Internet\n[Kwan 01].\n\n## 4. Dprk Electrical Infrastructure\n\nNorth Korea's electrical infrastructure is so antiquated and in such a state of disrepair that it is difficult to conceive formidable and sustained computer network operations being conducted in the DPRK.  Judging from its current state, it is hard to imagine that North Korea had one of the most developed electrical networks in Asia during calendar year 1980.  At the time it could generate 25 billion kilowatt hours (kwh)\nannually with a capacity of 5.4 million kilowatts (kw).  Today the system is obsolete and operates at less than 50% capacity, falling way short of the demand being dictated by the population [FAS 00].\nThe DPRK's electrical grid is comprised of 62 power plants, 58 sub-stations, and\n11 regional transmission and dispatching centers, all operating without the aid of computer systems or automation.  As a result, the power system suffers from poor frequency control, poor power factors, and frequent power outages [Hayes 95].  In Pyongyang the power received is usually weak and intermittent, often times dropping from 220 volts to 140-150 volts [Dubrovin 03].  The DPRK has been soliciting additional electrical power from South Korea since the year 2000, but this effort could prove to be futile given the antiquated electrical grid of the DPRK.\nStable and reliable power is needed not only to conduct computer network operations, but also to manufacture the IT systems and components needed to carry out such operations.  Until North Korea solves its electricity supply problems, it will be unable to conduct sustained active computer network operations.\n\n## C. Computer Hardware Industry\n\nNorth Korea pilot-tested the production of 4-bit computers in the late 1960's.\nFrom the 1980's to early 1990's, the Academy of Sciences and the Kim Il Sung University assembled PC-level 8-bit computers.  North Korea's hardware production all but stopped when the Pyongyang Electronic Calculator Factory (built in the mid-1990's) was shut down.  The hardware sector is technologically dated, with most hardware such as computer systems and communications equipment being imported from China and Southeast Asia [NIS 02].\n\nAlthough North Korea now spends approximately 3-4% of its Gross National Product (GNP) on science and technology, it still lacks sufficient resources to fully fund a complete computer hardware industry, including large-scale semiconductor production. In May 1992, the DPRK requested funding through the United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO) to augment the cost of IT research and development.  The request for electronic computers in the amount of US$2.4M was used to produce approximately 20,000 units of 32-bit PCs per year.\n\n| UNIDO Project Number    | Project Description        | Requested Funds    |\n|-------------------------|----------------------------|--------------------|\n| DRK/020/V/92-05         | Semiconductor parts        | US$1.5M            |\n| DRK/021/V/92-05         | Electronic computers       | US$2.4M            |\n| DRK/021/V/92-05         | Digital controller devices | US$6.0M            |\n|                         |                            |                    |\n(May 1992)\n\n## [From: Atip 97]\n\nIt is almost impossible to ascertain the exact types and quantity of computers the DPRK currently possesses.  However, the case can be made that large-scale imports of computers would be extremely difficult to conduct due to the current Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls (COCOM) and Wassenaar regulations on dual-use technology imports.  The Intel Pentium family of microprocessor and most\n80xxx microprocessor-based computers are restricted by these regulations.  In 1997, it was reported that the Korean Computer Center (KCC), PIC, and the Kim Chaek Technical University all had Digital Equipment Corporation (DEC) computer workstations and PCs imported through Japan and Singapore [ATIP 97].\n\nThe COCOM and Wassenaar restrictions helped to precipitate North Korea's development and production of indigenous hardware and software.  The DPRK has successfully developed a Personal Data Assistant (PDA), the Hana-21.  Development of the Hana-21 began in 1998 at the Industrial and Technical Corporation (ITC) in cooperation with the North Korean Academy of Science and the Korea Computer Center. The first prototype was a system called \"Koryo\" which was simply an English-Korean and Korean-English translator taking its input from a pen [TPK 03].  The Hana-21 uses an original Korean operating system (OS) and offers the choice of either Chinese or Korean at startup, which insinuates that the product is also intended for the large Chinese market.   The PDA features such applications as a word processor, several dictionaries, and translators, with all characters corresponding to Unicode for greater interoperability.\nAccording to the North Korean website The People's Korea, the DPRK released the Hana-21 for sale in late April 2003 and it is priced overseas at 200 Euros [TPK 03].  The local price of the PDA was not available.\n\n## D. Software Industry\n\nSmall and medium-sized research institutions such as the KCC, the Pyongyang Programming Center (PPC), and Kim Il Sung University develop a significant portion of North Korea's computer software.  Major research and development areas are biometric technology, voice recognition, automated translation programs, game programs such as the Go Game, and multimedia educational programs for children and students.  With the exception of the biometric systems, which could be used for CND, none of the publicly disclosed software programs developed by North Korea's software industry is germane to the area of CNO.  North Korea is believed to have achieved a certain level of technological capability, although it seems to be unsophisticated in terms of screen composition and appearance [NIS 02].\nThe DPRK sponsors the Nation Program Contest that encourages programmers from academia, industry, and the public sector to enter their applications for review and judging.  Applications such as a patent information retrieval system that is able to retrieve inventions and patent information from a national computer network and a data storage compression program were among the many contest entries in the past years.  Special incentive programs were offered to the award-winning programmers.  For example, a high school student receiving the highest award is given the opportunity to enter the college of choice.\n\nIn 2002, North Korea once again unveiled a plethora of locally developed software at an exhibition in a Beijing hotel.  Software ranged from translation applications to video games and were developed using Western software standards for use on Microsoft Windows and Apple Macintosh systems [Artyukov 02]. North Korea is also attempting to market its software to the rest of the world through shell companies.  PIC-International (http://www.pic-international.com) is a company in Singapore that offers a wide range of DPRK developed software for both the PC and MAC operating systems on its website [Hoff 01].  PIC is and continues to be the primary information technology research institute in North Korea.\n\n## E. Laws And Regulations\n\nThe Internet interface is still in its infancy stage of development in North Korea, and as most of the Western world struggles to reach some consensus on the uniformity of laws and regulations pertaining to Internet use, the DPRK may have a distinct advantage. The  DPRK  being  a  communist  state  has  established  a  plethora  of  censorship  laws\nregarding telecommunications.  It is assumed that all telecommunications are monitored by the state, and the institutes currently conducting Internet research warrant special attention by censors.\n\nNo established laws regarding the use of the Internet were found during the course of this research.  Government offices, state research facilities, and state officials utilize almost all of North Korea's computers.  All international telephone connections are facilitated through a state run exchange operator, which is also closely monitored. Until individual citizens begin to own personal computers and telephones in greater numbers, there is probably little or no major cause for concern on the part of the state, hence the lack of laws and regulations.\n\n\n\n## F. Summary\n\n\nThis chapter provided information on the North Korean information technology infrastructure and related services.  Additionally, the North Korean IT industry was discussed in great detail.  An analysis of the data points gleaned from this portion of the research reveals that North Korea recognizes the importance of IT in a modern world. However, it is readily apparent that North Korea does not possess the necessary infrastructures needed to pose a formidable CNO threat.  Although the DPRK has an emerging hardware and software industry, the overall effectiveness of the software and the systems being developed on computer network operations remains questionable.\n\nTHIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK\n\n\n## Iii. Academic Activity And Public Community A. Introduction\n\nThis chapter will examine the involvement of North Korean academia in CNO\nactivities.  Educational opportunities made available to civilian students and military members with regard to information technology will also be carefully examined.\n\n\n\n## B. Information Technology Infrastructure\n\nWith the assistance of academia, in 2001 North Korea began publishing and distributing a substantial quantity of publications related to information technology and the sciences.  This was an attempt by officials to broaden the knowledge of the average worker and young person with respect to information technology.  Information technology was quickly becoming a vital national interest to the DPRK; this realization led to the creation of the Bright Star Network (Kwang Myong), maintained by the Central Scientific and Technological Information Agency (CSTIA).  This computer network is dedicated to science and technology.  Recent publications applicable to cutting-edge technological developments with commercial value are posted on the network.\n\nThe Comprehensive Kumsung Youth Publishing House published a tome entitled\n\"Solving Problems of Computer Intelligence Development\" in order to familiarize readers with basic computer terminology and operation.  This and many other IT related books were published with the aid of academia aimed at stimulating the minds of young students and increasing the general information technology awareness throughout the regions of the DPRK.  However, the vast majority of these publications were simply introductory books and provided no real in depth knowledge of information technology.\n\n\n\n## C. Kwang Myong (Bright Star Network)\n\nWhen computers began to become popular in North Korea in the early 1990's, research institutions and academia were the first to have them installed.  By mid-decade sophisticated LANs were being developed and installed at these institutions.  The Bright Star Network was developed in 1996 with the objective of linking the various regional research facilities and academia LANs throughout North Korea.  This was the genesis of what is now the North Korean Intranet, which now reaches more than just academia and research institutions.  The government and military are now heavily connected to the Intranet.\nThe Kwang Myong Network's data is transmitted via fiber optic cable with a backbone capacity of 2.5 GB between the CSTIA and each province.  The Central Information Company of Science and Technology, the Invention Offices of Scientific Academies and the People's Study Grand Palace are among the many North Korean government entities that maintain databases on the network.  The sign-up fee is free in Pyongyang in order to promote the spread of computer networks [TPK 03].\n\nPrior to becoming the national Intranet, the Kwang Myong's content was limited to science and technology with over 30 million scientific documents posted on the network [Conner 01].\n\n\n\n## D. Information Technology Publications\n\nNorth Korea first embarked on publishing and distributing considerable volumes of science and technology literature in 2001, with the objective of aiding its workers and young people acquire a broad knowledge in the field of information technology.  The May 2001 issue of the state-published youth magazine *Vanguard Youth* reported that the future of the science, technology, and information industries hinges on the performance of the young students.  The magazine was quoted to say, \"Young people must study, study, and study to meet the requirements of the times and to improve the standard of science and technology development.\" [NIS 02]\n\nThe Comprehensive Science Encyclopedia Publishing House (CSEPH) published The Basics of Windows Programming and Beginners Visual Basics of Programming Language aimed at motivating young students to express an interest in computers and increase the general awareness of information systems throughout the country.   The Comprehensive Manufacturing Publishing House (CMPH) has also published books such as Computer Common Sense, *Glossary of Computer Terminology*, and Computer Manual.  In addition to the basic computer publications, information science and technology tomes such as *Numerical-Type Integrated Circuits and their Applications*, Optical Fiber Communications, and *Electronic Material Handbook* were published by the CMPH.  The Comprehensive Kumsung Youth Publishing House (CKYPH) published computer beginner's guides.  These guides included Solving Problems of Computer Intelligence Development, a guide intended to familiarize its readers with computers.\nThe Information Technology Forum for Unification, which consists of 110 South Korean IT professionals, was established in August 2001 to facilitate the exchange of ideas and technical publications with North Korean IT civilians.  In late 2001 civilian researchers at the Pyongyang Informatics Center (PIC) requested 250 IT books from South Korea [Soo-min 01].  The majority of the books requested were published between\n1999 and 2001 and focused primarily on graphics and virtual animation.   Publications on common operating systems and communication methods were also requested, in addition to the books on the multimedia sector and Motion Pictures Experts Group (MPEG) technology.  The North Koreans also requested a large quantity of books on language fonts and codes as the DPRK is committed to \"Koreanizing\" as much information as possible [Soo-min 01].  Conspicuously absent from the list of requested publications were books relevant to cyber security, suggesting that North Korea was more interested in commercial IT development rather than developing an offensive cyber force.\nThere are also a few technical periodicals available in North Korea.  The scientific magazine *Science World* is a government-sponsored publication that features all the latest information technology and scientific innovations of North Korean scientists and researchers.  It was *Science World* that boasted the most recent developments and testing of the country's Intranet.\n\n## E. Information Technology Education\n\nIn 1975 an eleventh grade education became mandatory, and in the early 1990's a primary and secondary education became compulsory.  In the 1990's the majority of the instruction provided to students consisted of mathematics, Korean language, physical education, drawing, and music.  Today there seems to be an emphasis placed on computer related subjects being taught in the DPRK starting at the grade school level.\n\nIt has been stated several times by Kim Jong Il that information technology is the future of North Korea and those who are not actively educating themselves will be left behind.  Kim Jong Il himself is known to be an avid user of the Internet and realizes the importance of information technology in today's global arena.\n\n\n\nIn an effort to emphasize the importance of IT, North Korea began opening computer science colleges with the Kimilsung University and at the Kimchaek Industrial University in 1999. In April 2001 the Mankyongdae Student Palace, Pyongyang Student Boy's Palace, and Kumsung First and Second Junior High Schools established specialized curricula designed specifically for young Koreans who demonstrated an aptitude for computer science [Seong-in 01].  Kids at the Mankyongdae Student Palace are being taught basic programming skills with such tools as Visual Basic.  In a recent visit to North Korea, former CNN correspondent and Beijing Bureau Chief Rebecca Mackinnon observed students using programming software written in English.  It was unclear whether they actually understood the software being demonstrated or whether the entire event was staged for the benefit of the foreigners in keeping with the DPRK propaganda machine.\nKim Jong Il has now made computer education mandatory in North Korea.  Jong Il has stated that there are three basic types of fools in the 21st century: people who smoke, people who do not appreciate music, and people who cannot use the computer\n[Choe 03].  Today in the DPRK, possessing a computer-related job is a sign of privilege. According to  Tak Eun Hyok, a North Korean army defector to the South, \"everyone wants to learn the computer, believing they can get good jobs.\"   Computer science now tops the lists of curricula that young military officers and college students wish to study [Choe 03]. Plans were being made by a South Korean nonprofit organization to open an information technology college in Pyongyang in cooperation with the DPRK's Education Ministry in 2002.  The International Foundation for Northeast Asia Education and Culture says that it had reached a tentative agreement with the DPRK to open the institution but details still remain sketchy and the status of the institution is unknown [Cohen 01].\nIn 2001 officials at Syracuse University in New York State developed a scholarly exchange program in conjunction with the DPRK's Kim Chaek University of Technology (KUT) to have seven North Korean civilians study information technology at Syracuse University [Snyder 03].  The bilateral program focuses on the general area of information technology that supports the civilian sector IT infrastructure in the DPRK.  Researchers from KUT studied various programs which included secure fax programs, digital libraries, machine translation programs, decision support, watermarking programs, graphic communication via personal digital assistants, and the implementation of IT in various public sectors on their most recent visit to Syracuse [ASPAC 03].  Computer security was not among the list of topics studied by the visiting North Korean students. This collaboration is the first of its type between the two countries and Syracuse University intends on continuing the student exchange program.  Officials in charge of the program were contacted for further comment, however they refused to release any additional information associated with the exchange program.\n\n\n\nThe IT education of the KPA is shrouded in more secrecy than public IT\neducation.  Very little is known about the IT education of the KPA, however, the Asia- Pacific Center for Security Studies (APCSS) reported that the KPA is rapidly evolving into a \"modestly digitized\" army [APCSS 02].\n\n\n## F. North Korean Academia And It Research\n\nThere are three major academic research institutions in the DPRK actively involved in the discipline of information technology.   The three institutions are the Pyongyang University of Computer Technology (PUCT), Kim Chaek University of Technology (KUT), and Kim Il Sung University.\n\n## 1. Pyongyang University Of Computer Technology (Puct)\n\nPyongyang University of Computer Technology was founded in 1985 and since its inception has produced over 4,000 Computer and IT engineers.  The three-year university has a faculty that specializes in computer and information technology and its graduates are now playing a vital role in the development and production of information technology in various sectors of the DPRK's national economy [KCNA 02].\n\n## 2. Kim Chaek University Of Technology (Kut)\n\nKim Chaek University of Technology (KUT) was originally part of the Kim Il Sung University before it was established as the Pyongyang College of Technology in\n1948.  The university boasts 10 research institutes and 54 laboratories with a student body of approximately 10,000 and a faculty of approximately 2,000 [MIIS 03].  KUT is well known for its development of various software and artificial intelligence.  Faculty members are often solicited to provide information technology lectures to high-ranking Party officials [TPK 01]. The North Korean website *The People's Korea* reported in 2001 that KUT has been training engineers who will contribute to the future development of the DPRK's information technology.  The Computer Engineering department at KUT is planning on the introduction of state-of-the-art technology needed to modernize computer facilities related to economic construction.  The present task at KUT is to upgrade its voice recognition technology to a world-class level [TPK 01].\n\n\n## 3. Kim Il Sung University\n\nKim Il Sung University was established in October 1946 at the foot of Moran Hill.  It is the DPRK's first university and today it serves as a model for other universities throughout North Korea.  It has approximately 10 institutes consisting of electronic computers, cell engineering, and atomic energy with more than 1200 distinguished faculty members [KCNA 96].\n\n\n\nKim Il Sung University has an extensive and challenging computer science curriculum offering a plethora of computer programming courses.  The faculty has developed and produced several software products, including the program protection software Intelligent Locker, Worluf Anti-Virus, a Chinese character editing program, War Game, and Simanas, a simulation and analysis program for engineering problems [ATIP 97].\n\n\n\n## G. Summary\n\nThis chapter examined the extent of North Korean academia's participation in the development of information technology and CNO activity.  Although at times it was difficult to discern the distinction between academia and state agency, it was determined that several academic institutions play an integral role in the accomplishment of the DPRK's overall IT strategic objectives.  Many of these institutions are developing and producing state-of-the-art software for both the domestic and international market.  It was unclear whether or not these institutions were actively participating in CNO activities sponsored by the DPRK.  It was also unclear whether or not these institutions were engaged in the development of software relevant to CNO.  There is strong evidence that North Korea academia is heavily involved in information technology development but nothing conclusive to suggest that these institutions are involved in CNO activities.\n\n\nTHIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK\n\n\n## Iv. External Information Technology Aid A. Introduction\n\nThis chapter explores the information technology aid provided to North Korea.  It also briefly discusses the export restrictions that apply to North Korea.\n\n## B. Dprk's Major It Contributors\n\nDespite the technological advances being made in the area of information technology, much of North Korean current information technology is acquired from other nations willing to provide the neo-isolated state with the technology.\n\n## 1. India\n\nIndia has been one of the DPRK's largest contributors of information technology, providing training to North Korean information technology professional at the Indian Institute of Technology in Dehli [Hayes 02].  The Indian technology firm Electronic Trade and Technology Development Corporation (ETTDC) was awarded a $5.9 million contract by UNIDO in 1981 to supply information technology equipment to North Korea. The firm was primarily selected for the contract because it had experience circumventing COCOM restrictions and was planning on using western suppliers [Hayes 02].  The bulk of ETTDC's UNIDO contract was to build North Korea's first IC plant and provide the required training needed to operate the plant.  However, due to a language barrier the training was grossly insufficient and the plant was only able to produce limited numbers of ICs.  Our research did not uncover any IT contributions from India beyond those of ETTDC.\n\n## 2. China\n\nChina continues to be one of North Korea's staunchest allies and provides a significant amount of information technology aid to the DPRK.  North Korea's limited email service provided by www.silibank.com is being facilitated through an Internet connection in China.  Kim Jong Il was reported to have visited China twice to closely study China's information technology reforms.  He was also reported to have visited Legend Computers, Ltd. in Shanghai [KN 01].\n\nNorth Korea proudly exhibited its newly developed software products at the North Korea Computer Software Expo in Beijing in April 2002.  The DPRK is also a regular participant in the Chinese annual computer trade show Comdex.\n\n## 3. Russia\n\nOur research did not find any information with regard to the type and quantity of information technology aid officially provided by Russia.  However, after more than a decade of strained diplomatic relations, North Korea has resumed a dialogue with Russia.\nIn 2001 a North Korean Defense Ministry delegation visited Russia to discuss military cooperation and military industrialization [PD 01].\n\n## 4. Japan\n\n\nThe aid provided by Japan is more indirect in nature.  Although trade talks between Japan and the DPRK have resumed, Japan continues to honor the COCOM and Wassenaar regulations.  However, Japan hosts a large number of the DPRK's official websites used to spread the Party's message.  Several of the DPRK's official websites originate from websites with a .jp top-level domain name.  As noted earlier, the KCNA, which is North Korea's most prominent website, is hosted in Tokyo by the Korea News Service (KNS).  Japanese officials must be aware of the IT services being provided to the DPRK, however this research has not been able to uncover any evidence that Japan is taking steps to prevent such actions.\n\n## 5. South Korea\n\nSouth Korea has one the world's highest computer diffusion rates.  Although tensions still exist between the DPRK and the ROK stemming from North Korean Internet gambling sites being fed into the South, South Korean IT businesses are eager to invest in the underdeveloped North Korean IT industry.  Several South Korean businesses have made major investments in the North Korean IT infrastructure.\n\n\nIn 2001 construction began on the first inter-Korean IT facility in North Korea, Koryo Business Town.  The South Korean IT firm, Ntrack, in cooperation with the North, planned on building a 17,820 square meter IT complex in Pyongyang, with enough space for over 2,500 North Korean IT workers.  The complex will be home to a 1,650 square meter IT research facility specializing in animation and web products [Nautilus 01].  An inter-Korean joint venture company was also launched in 2001 in Dandong, China.  The Hana Program Center was established on May 10, 2001.  This was reported as the first time that workers from both North and South Korean IT industries met to market software [Seong-in 01].\nThe South Korean multimedia and IT firm BIT Computer Corporation announced in June 2001 that the company would be providing a satellite Internet link between the shut-in country and the rest of the world.  As part of the inter-Korean deal, BIT Computer Corporation will be the sole supplier of satellite Internet equipment in North Korea for five years.  In addition, BIT was also in the process of providing IT training to North Korean personnel via the Internet at www.bitcampus.com.  According to BIT president Cho Hyun-jung, the company will also provide the Choson Computer Center with IT\nbooks and manuals and emphasize that the entire venture is being conducted with the expressed approval of Kim Jong Il [CDES 01].\n\nIn June 2004 at the request of North Korea, a group of North Korean officials toured SK Telecom, South Korea's largest mobile carrier, and Samsung Electronics, South Korea's largest manufacturer of memory chips.  This visit would imply that the North is looking to the South for ideas in expanding its own fledgling IT sector given the South's success with IT growth in the last decade.  Computer technology has been a top priority in the North for several years now, and Kim Jong Nam, the eldest son of Kim Jong Il, is leading the campaign to arm its military with state of the art information technology [WT 04].\n\nOfficially, South Korea still bans the export of Pentium class computers to North Korea.  Many in Seoul fear the possibility of equipping the enemy with equipment and skills that could be easily directed at them.\n\n## C. Cocom And Wassenaar Restrictions\n\nIn an attempt to restrict trade with the former Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact countries, the United States and its allies created the Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls (COCOM) in 1949.  By November 1993 COCOM had outlived its usefulness and had become inadequate.  At a meeting in The Hague, the 17 COCOM\nmembers agreed to terminate COCOM and establish a new multilateral arrangement. The Wassenaar Arrangement (WA) formerly replaced COCOM in July 1996 [UNVIE 04]. The 33 founding members of the Wassenaar Arrangement are: Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Republic of Korea, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, the Russian Federation, the Slovak Republic, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, Ukraine, the United Kingdom, and the United States.  The WA restrictions were considered to be a more proficient tool to deal with the export of both conventional munitions and dual-use goods and technology to non-member nations.\nAccording to a U.S. State Department release in 1996, the purpose of the Arrangement reflected in the Initial Elements agreed to at the meeting is to contribute to regional and international security. This is accomplished by promoting transparency and greater responsibility with regard to transfers of conventional arms and dual-use goods and technologies, thus preventing destabilizing accumulations; seeking, through national policies, to ensure that transfers of these items do not contribute to the development or enhancement of military capabilities which undermine these goals and are not diverted to support such capabilities; complementing and reinforcing, without duplication, the existing control regimes for weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems, as well as other internationally recognized measures designed to promote transparency and greater responsibility, by focusing on the threats to international and regional peace and security which may arise from transfers of armaments and sensitive dual-use goods and technologies where risks are judged greatest; and, enhancing cooperation to prevent the acquisition of armaments and sensitive dual-use items for military end-uses, if the situation in a region or the behavior of a state is, or becomes, a cause for serious concern to the Participating States [USDOS 96].\nThis arrangement will not be directed against any particular state or group of states and will not impede bona fide civil transactions. Nor will it interfere with the rights of states to acquire legitimate means with which to defend themselves pursuant to Article\n51 of the Charter of the United Nations [USDOS 96].\n\nNorth Korea and its staunch ally to the North, China, are noticeably not signatories to the WA, which bars IT-related export to North Korea.  The WA classifies North Korea as a terrorism-sponsoring nation, prohibiting the export of dual-use technologies to the nation.  Under the current guidelines of WA the export of digital computers to North Korea having a composite theoretical performance (CTP) exceeding 190,000 millions of theoretical operations per seconds (MTOPS) is strictly prohibited without the issuance of a license.  Additionally, the licenses are not issued to military or state entities in the DPRK and are routinely denied [WA 03].  The U.S. Department of Commerce (DOC) enforces even stricter guidelines regarding the export of computer technology to North Korea.  The DOC mandates that a license be issued for the export of digital computers having a CTP exceeding 6 MTOPS or microprocessors with a clock frequency rate exceeding 25 MHz.  Furthermore, the DOC restricts the export of the very technology needed to manufacture microprocessors and computers.  Any computer containing U.S. technology is also restricted [DOC 04].   Despite both COCOM and WA\nrestrictions and countless U.S. sanctions on dual-use technologies, North Korea has managed to acquire more basic computing power than the United States possessed during the Manhattan Project.  The restrictions and sanctions have merely slowed the quantity and timing of production of computer and related equipment provided to economic actors throughout the country.  The leading members of the Party and various high-level government officials have always had access to current or next generation computers [Seong-in 01].  The level of advancement made in such areas as nuclear power, satellite, and missile technologies indicated that the DPRK possesses sufficient computing power to accomplish complex operations.  This should not come as a surprise as the Asia- Pacific Center for Security Studies reported in 2001 that Chinese-made Pentium computers are already in North Korea [Seong-in 01].\n\n## D. The North Korea-China Relationship\n\nThe relationship between North Korea and China has evolved over time.  China has long been an outspoken ally of North Korea and supported them during the Korean War.  During the period of 1973-1984, China's support for North Korea increased steadily amidst a significant decline in Soviet support [LOC 04].\n\nIn the aftermath of the Tiananmen Square incident in 1989, Pyongyang supported Beijing's response to the incident.  By the early 1990s, the relationship between North Korea and China had grown much warmer.  However, although Pyongyang and Beijing become closer allies, Beijing has not transferred any major weapons systems to North Korea.\n\nKim Jong Il has made several visits to China in the recent years in an effort to bolster the relationship between the two countries.  North Korea recognizes the magnitude of the Chinese IT market and as a result most software programs developed in the DPRK target the vast Chinese market.  North Korea is a regular participant in the Chinese IT expos and Beijing played host to a North Korean software exhibition in 2002.\nIn 2004 North Korea established a software development facility in the Chinese province of Shenyang.\n\nAlthough it was reported by the Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies that Chinese-made Pentium computers were present in North Korea, the quantity is unknown. It is also unclear as to the type and quantity of IT equipment exported from China to North Korea.  Given the fact that China is not a participating member of WA, it would not be unfair to speculate that China has provided North Korea with the necessary IT equipment and training needed to improve its IT infrastructure and CNO prowess.\nChina's IT sector is considered comparable to the United States' and following the assumption that China and North Korea are engaged in the free trade of information technology, the WA is not dramatically hindering North Korea's IT development and growth.\n\n## E. The Chinese It Industry At A Glance\n\nAccording to the State Development and Reform Commission (SDRC), China has developed the world's third largest manufacturing industry of electronic and IT products surpassing that of Japan.   In 2003, China's IT manufacturing industry reported sales revenues totaling US$227 billion, a 34 percent increase from the previous year.  China's export of desktop computers is estimated to reach 20 million units by 2007, rising from\n2003's exports of 11.21 million units [China 04].\n\nChina built its first computer based on a Soviet model in 1958.  In the late 1970s, China began producing computers for commercial and industrial uses soon after microcomputers were in production.  The newly manufactured computers relied heavily on imported components and were developed in small quantities [Kraemer/Dedrick 02]. Today, China's IT sector is relatively advanced and produces a wide range of products for both export and domestic use. PDA's, PC's, monitors, CPU's, and a myriad of peripheral devices are among the many IT products being produced by China.  With such a large and cheap labor market, several PC manufacturers have established several joint ventures with Chinese IT companies.  Hewlett-Packard, Toshiba, and Compaq have formed joint ventures with local companies to market their own products and gain access to local distribution channels [Kraemer/Dedrick 02].  Companies like IBM, Dell, Acer, and Siemens have launched IT ventures of their own in China, manufacturing desktop and notebook PCs, monitors, storage products, motherboards, servers, networking equipment, and various peripheral devices.  Table 4.1 lists the major foreign PC makers, their Chinese joint venture partners, and their products.\n\n\n\nNine years ago the Asian Technology Information Program (ATIP) reported that computer applications were still in an early stage in China.  China had managed to develop some supporting software and applications software, such as spread sheets, accounting software, word processors, desktop publishing, CAD/CAM, multimedia, Chinese operating systems, and antivirus applications [ATIP 95].  Today China is concentrating its software research and development in machine translation, Chinese character recognition, voice composition, automatic code generation, distributed processing systems, parallel processing, and pattern recognition [Joseph 02].  In 2001, Chinese government officials projected that the country's software exports would be approximately US$1.5-2 billion by 2005 [AU 03].  We were unable to find any evidence that China is engaged in the research and development of software programs pertinent to computer network operations.   The fact that there is no evidence of such CNO tools does not negate the fact that China has been accused of conducting CNO activities against other states, nor does it mean that China may not be developing CNO tools that we did not uncover.  Moreover, there is ample evidence that Chinese military theorists are well aware of the potential value of CNO [Thomas 00].\n\n## F. Chinese Cno Activities\n\nAlthough the U.S. and China officially deny the idea of Chinese state sponsored cyber warfare against Taiwan or the U.S., the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) believes that the Chinese military is currently researching ways to disrupt targeted civilian and military computer and infrastructure systems using virus attacks.  A CIA assessment likened China's virus attack abilities to those of technically advanced hackers, however, these abilities are currently limited to temporarily disabling sectors of Internet users [Lyman 02].\n\nChina has never publicly stated its involvement in CNO activities against its adversaries.  However, the exploits of Chinese hackers are well known on the Internet.\n\nSoon after the 1999 accidental bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade, Chinese hackers unleashed a barrage of computer network attacks and exploitation against various U.S. government systems.  Intruders claiming to be from Mainland China defaced the websites of the U.S. Departments of Energy and Interior, among others.  The webpages displayed the message \"We are Chinese hackers who take no care about politics\". Officials reported that the hack of the Interior Department was definitely traced back to China [Messmer 99].  In 2001, Business Week reported that Chinese hackers had infiltrated several U.S. government websites to express their outrage regarding the collision of a U.S. EP-3 surveillance aircraft with a Chinese fighter.  The U.S. Labor and Health and Human Services Departments were both victims of website defacement [France 01].  The Chinese hacker group Honker Union of China claimed responsibility for several of the webpage defacements [Ward 01].\n\n\n\nIn July 2004, South Korea's spy agency the NIS confirmed the identities of Chinese hackers who were suspected of attacking the computer systems of 10 South Korean government agencies.  According to the NIS, one of the Chinese hackers was enrolled in a Korean language class at a foreign language school in China that has been run by the Chinese People's Liberation Army since 1986 [Song-wu 04].  The Japanese newspaper Mainichi Shimbun reported in August 2004 that a group of Chinese hackers had launched an attack on about 200 Japanese and Taiwanese websites.  The group reported posted messages on its website calling for people to attack Japanese servers\n[MDN 04].\n\nChinese hackers are becoming more imaginative with their activities and are now offering made to order virus services.  The Chinese anti-virus software firm Rising PR\nreported that Chinese hackers are upgrading existing viruses enabling them to subvert anti-virus applications [CCRC 04].  North Korea could very well be taking advantage of these services being offered by Chinese hackers.\n\n\n## G. Summary\n\nThis chapter examined the information technology aid provided to North Korea.\nThe COCOM and Wassenaar restrictions and their effectiveness were also examined highlighting the restrictions placed on North Korea's import of dual-use technology. Additionally, an overview of China's IT industry was discussed as China is not a signatory of the COCOM and Wassenaar restrictions.  Hence, North Korea would potentially have access to Chinese IT products.\n\nTHIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK\n\n\n## V. Government Activity A. Introduction\n\nThis chapter examines whether North Korea includes CNA/E in its military doctrine and whether it is training cyberwarriors.  It also examines the state run companies involved in information technology and state propaganda on the Internet.\n\n\n\n## B. Government Entities Involved In Dprk It Development\n\nWithin the last decade, North Korea has expressed a keen interest in the IT sector.\nNorth Korea's interest in the IT sector is directly related to its goal in constructing Kangsong Taeguk, a powerful nation [Seong-in 01].  More focus has been placed on IT\ndevelopment since Kim Jong Il assumed power and according to the North Korean Central Television Broadcasting Station in May 2001, \"Kim Jong Il promises a bright future for the IT industry\".\nIn March 2004, North Korea established the \"Korea 615 Service Office in Shenyang\" in the Liaoning Province of China.  The software producer is the first of its kind in Shenyang, and the home offices of the \"Korea 615 Editing Corporation\" in the DPRK closely control its operation.  The company plans on developing programs for the printed media and will offer specially tailored software based on its customer's requests. Korea 615 announced that it would provide software that satisfies the demand from Chinese consumers at competitive prices [LKD 04].\n\nToday in the DPRK there are seven key research institutions focusing on information technology.  These institutions are primarily responsible for the significant progress made by North Korea in the information technology sector.  The four primary research institutions actively pursuing information technology are Pyongyang Informatics Center (PIC), Korea Computer Center (KCC), DPRK Academy of Sciences, and Silver Star Laboratories (UNBYOL).\n\n## 1. Pyongyang Informatics Center (Pic)\n\nThe PIC was established on July 15, 1986 with the purpose of developing computer-based modern management techniques.  The PIC was also to aid in the formation of a Computer Group, whose purpose was to promote the use of computers by government and industry [Hayes 02].  Today the PIC employs over 200 qualified software engineers whose average ages is 28 years with 1.5 computers per person [Park\n01].  The PIC primarily focuses on software development and is responsible for the development of the General Korean Electronic Publication Systems, 3D CAD, embedded Linux software, web applications, interactive programs, accounting software, and more recently virtual reality software.  It is reported that the PIC is responsible for developing the filters to be used between the Kwang Myong Intranet and the Internet. The PIC was described as well endowed with computer hardware and strong in software generation [Hayes 02].  In 2001, the PIC's primary software programs were highlighted at the Pyongyang Computer Program Expo.\n\n\n## 2. Korea Computer Center (Kcc)\n\nThe KCC was established in 1990 by Kim Il Sung to promote computerization in the DPRK.  At its inception, the KCC employed approximately 800 employees who appeared to have an average age of 26 [Larmer 04].  Today Kim Jong Il's son Kim Jong Nam, who also heads North Korea's intelligence service, the State Security Agency (SSA), heads the KCC.  Kim Jong Nam is also the chairman of North Korea's Computer Committee.  In May 2001 the South Korean newspaper *The Chosun Ilbo* reported that Kim Jong Nam had moved the SSA's overseas intelligence gathering unit, which operates primarily by hacking and monitoring foreign communications, into the KCC building.  In 2001, South Korean media reported that the KCC was nothing less than the command center for Pyongyang's cyber warfare industry, masquerading as an innocuous, computer geek-filled software research facility [Larkin 01]. The KCC now develops some of North Korea's cutting edge software, which includes voice recognition systems, fingertip identification systems, and artificial intelligence systems.  In the year 2000, researchers at the KCC successfully created a Korean version 1.0 of the Linux operating system.  The KCC has also developed a Korean typewriting program that interfaces with Windows and Mac operating system for use in offices throughout the country.  The program was named \"Our Company\" and enables North Koreans to input Korean text in Windows and Mac OS applications [TPK 01].\nFor the past several years the KCC has dominated Japan's annual FOST\ncompetition, a tournament for computers playing Chinese chess [AP 03].  The KCC exports much of its software through its Beijing office and is currently contracted by several South Korean companies to provide a wide range of software.  It was reported by an official at South Korea's Samsung, who paid $730,000 for five KCC-developed programs, that the KCC programmers do not have a lot of access to the outside world, but their fundamentals i.e., basic knowledge in computing and software are very strong\n[Larimer 04].\n\n\n## 3. Dprk Academy Of Sciences\n\nEstablished in 1952 as the Ministry of Science and Technology, the Academy of Sciences provides leading scientific research work and unified guidance on national scientific and technical administrative work [UNDP 00].  Located in the Eunjong District of Pyongyang, the Academy of Sciences' most basic mission is to produce scientific and technologies research and development.  The Academy has produced such software programs as Pidulgi, a multilingual conversation study program; Mae a Korean language optical character recognition (OCR) program; Mangnami-kong, an artificial intelligence development program; and Mujigae, a Japanese-English translation program [TPK 00]. Due to a lack of research funding, the Academy of Sciences research has become dismally limited with more of an emphasis being place on physics and mathematics instead of information technology [NIS 02].\n\n## 4. Silver Star Laboratories (Unbyol)\n\nThe Silver Star Laboratories (SSL) was established in 1995 under the Korean Unbyol General Trading Corporation.  According to Kang Yong Jun, the director of SSL, the average age of the researchers at SSL is 26 years, with most graduating from Kim Il Sung University and other distinguished universities across the country.  Prospective employees are usually graduates of the Pyongyang Senior Middle School No.1, a geniustraining center.\n\nSSL has developed such programs as Silver Mirror, a remote control program, communications, and artificial intelligence software.  SSL also produces several language recognition programs and multimedia software, in addition to taking special orders from foreign companies [KCNA 98].  The SSL won the championship at the fourth and fifth annual FOST Cup World Computer Go Championship competitions held in 1998 and 1999, respectively [Park 01].\n\n## C. Military Doctrine\n\nIn order to provide an accurate representation of the CNO threat posed by North Korea, a careful analysis of the DPRK's current military doctrine should be conducted.\nThe Korean People's Army (KPA) has long had ties to China and the former Soviet Union.  China is well known for developing a capable cyber attack program.  It is presumed that the KPA and the myriad of North Korean intelligence gathering agencies have an understanding of their adversaries' capabilities if not a rudimentary information warfare (IW) capability [BBC 02].  It was reported in 2002 by Richard Clarke, Special Advisor to the President for Cyberspace Security under the Clinton and Bush administrations, that North Korea was one of the nations \"developing information warfare units, either in their military, or in their intelligence services, or both\" [Clarke 02].\n\nThe quantity of the information on North Korea's military doctrine is sparse, however, the KPA's reported overall objective is to \"disturb the coherence of South Korean defenses in depth including its key command, control and communications, and intelligence infrastructure\" [GS 02].  Although the DPRK has no published official doctrine specifically addressing its CNO capabilities or intentions, information gleaned from several open source data points implies that CNO is of great interest to the North Korean military.  The KPA has expressed a desire to upgrade its existing force infrastructure to support the existing strategic objectives of credible deterrence.  This was a result of the KPA analyzing recent U.S. military operations in which IT played a major role [Minnich 01].  After more than 10 years North Korea resumed high-level military talks with Moscow, a move that suggests that the DPRK is attempting to acquire Russian hardware and software upgrades.  Kim Jong Il is also an outspoken proponent of information technology and is fully aware of the implications associated with the use of CNO.\n\n## D. Training Cyberwarriors\n\nDetermining a state's participation in CNO activities can prove to be a daunting task often times producing dubious results.  Proving the North Korean government's direct or indirect involvement in CNO could prove to be even more difficult given the level of secrecy exercised by the Kin Jong Il regime.\n\nIn 1984 during what can be considered as North Korea's technological revolution, the Mirim Academy was established in Pyongyang's Sadong district.  The academy matriculated the top students from the Air Force Academy and other military services for an intense two-year program in information technology and electronics warfare.  In 1986\nMirim Academy officially became a five-year college and was renamed the Mirim College and relocated to a new location in the mountainous Hyungjaesan district.  Instead of admitting only military service members, the newly formed Mirim College now admitted highly intellectual enlisted servicemen and the top percentile high school students from each of the country's provinces.  The North Korean populace now knows Mirim College as the Automated Warfare Institute (AWI) or the University of the Gifted. It offers such curriculums as command automation, computers, programming, automated reconnaissance, and electronic warfare.  Sub-specialties such as computer calculation, information transmission, and development of codes are also offered [NIS 02].\n\nSouth Korean officials have long speculated that the Automated Warfare Institute was being used to train and produce a new type of soldier, the cybersoldier.  Since the mid 1990's South Korean military and intelligence officials have been sounding the alarm as to the activities at the Automated Warfare Institute.  Since its inception in 1984, the Automated Warfare Institute allegedly has been steadily producing up to 100\ncybersoldiers each year, trained in such disciplines as virus creation and network penetration [AP 03].  Given the fact that North Korea spends 31.3% of its gross domestic product (GDP) on defense, and is working arduously to modernize and digitize its military, cyber-warfare does not seem so far fetched.\n\nIn early 2003 South Korea's Internet service was brought to a near standstill due to the introduction of a virus-like computer infection into its network [AP 03].  South Korea lacked credible evidence that North Korea was responsible for the denial of service attack, but still suspected that the DPRK was responsible.\nIt has long been suspected that the Chinese military has been researching ways to disrupt targeted military and civilian computer and infrastructure systems using virus attacks [Lyman 02].  To assume that China's technical knowledge of CNA/E was passed on to North Korea is not an unfair assumption.  However, we did not uncover any evidence of China supplying North Korea with any weapons systems.  China is now actively involved in negotiations to halt North Korea's nuclear weapon development.\n\n\n## E. The Internet And North Korean Propaganda\n\n\nThe North Korean government is fully aware of the implication the Internet has on modern society.  As it is often reported, Kim Jong Il is a prolific Internet surfer and fully understands the impact of getting his message out on the information superhighway.\n\nThere are several websites dedicated to disseminating the Party's message all of which are hosted outside of the DPRK.  The most prominent would be that of the Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) (http://www.kcna.co.jp).  Founded in 1946, the news agency developed its official website in 2002 for the distribution of North Korean news and events.  Although the website is hosted by the Korean News Service (KNS) in Tokyo, the KCNA website states that the state-run agency is located in the capital city of Pyongyang with branches located all over North Korean and some foreign countries\n[KCNA 03].  The website is overwhelmingly anti-U.S., which is evident by numerous articles posted representing the DPRK's version of world events involving the U.S.  The KCNA website also features an extensive archive of articles organized by month dating back to December of 1996.   It is readily apparent that the purpose of this website is to spread the DPRK's propaganda to the rest of the free world as the overwhelming majority of the country citizenry has no access to the KCNA website.\n\n\n\nThe People's Korea (http://210.145.168.243/pk) is another North Korean sponsored website that spreads the country's propaganda abroad.  Located in Tokyo, The People's Korea provides an extensive collection of articles on a wide range of topics. There were several important data points gleaned from this website with regard to North Korean IT innovations and new products.\n\n\nThe People's Korea website also contained a link to the DPRK's sponsored information website, the DPRKorea Infobank (www.dprkorea.com).  The DPRKorea Infobank website was launched with the assistance of the Hong Kong based Pan Economic Development Association of Korean Nationals in October 1999.  The launch was timed to coincide with the 51st anniversary of the founding of the Worker's Party of Korea.  The website provides instant access to government related news on the economy, culture, sports, and tourism.  The site also claims to provide an online shopping service for Korean books, stamps, and goods. Although the site has been under construction for several months there are signs of service improvement. In November 2003 North Korea unveiled its newly developed official website, Naenara-DPRK (http://www.kcckp.net/external_e/).  The website was created and is managed by the Korean Computer Center (KCC).  Further investigation revealed that the website was registered to PSI-USA, Inc., however the location of the web-server was unknown.\n\n\n## F. Summary\n\nThis chapter examined the involvement of the North Korean government in the IT\nsector along with its participation or sponsorship of CNA/E activities.  In addition, North Korea's military doctrine with regard to CNO was examined.  Although no credible evidence was found indicating the direct involvement of the DPRK's government or military in CNA/E activities, it would be fair to assume that the DPRK senior leadership considers CNO to be an integral component of modern warfare.\n\nThis chapter also discussed the various North Korean government research institutions conducting research and development of modern IT products and systems. The growth of IT in North Korea was examined and it was found that North Korea's IT sector is growing at a phenomenal rate.\n\n\n## Vi. Computer Network Attack/Exploitation Activity A. Introduction\n\nThis chapter examines the CNA/E activities of North Korea.  There have been several reports of suspected CNA/E activities being sponsored by North Korea.  This chapter aims to verify the validity of these allegations and examine the reported cases of CNA/E.\n\n\n\n## B. Computer Network Attack (Cna)\n\nCNA is a relatively new weapon in the modern warfighter's arsenal, and can be used to inflict significant damage at the speed of light.  CNA is defined as operations to disrupt, deny, and degrade information resident in computers and computer networks, or the computers and networks themselves.  CNA relies on the data stream to execute an attack, for example, the transmission of malicious code to a central processing unit (CPU)\nthat causes the computer to short out the power supply thereby rendering the computer useless [FM 03].   CNA includes attacks stemming from viruses, worms, and distributed denial of service.\n\n\n\n## C. Computer Network Exploitation (Cne)\n\n\nThe first step in carrying out a successful computer network attack is identifying the prospective system's vulnerabilities and then exploiting those vulnerabilities.\nTherefore, CNE is an integral operation in the execution of CNA against an adversary.\nCNE is defined as enabling operations and intelligence collection to gather data from target or adversary automated information systems or networks [FM 03].\n\n\n\n## D. Difficulties Of Identifying North Korean Hackers\n\nGiven the ubiquitous and anonymous nature of the Internet, it is becoming unceasingly difficult for law enforcement to properly identify computer attackers and the origin of their attacks.  Three techniques used by hackers to cover their tracks are:\n\n\n## 1. Ip Spoofing\n\nA sophisticated attacker will undoubtedly attempt to conceal his source IP address in the performance of an attack. IP spoofing is a technique used to gain unauthorized access to computers, whereby the intruder sends messages to a computer with an IP\naddress indicating that the message is coming from a trusted host. To engage in IP\nspoofing, a hacker must first use a variety of techniques to find an IP address of a trusted host and then modify the packet headers so that it appears that the packets are coming from that host [Webop 04].  Therefore, an attacker in North Korea could spoof or hide his true IP address making it nearly impossible to verify his true origin.\n\n\n## 2. Communication Bouncing\n\nA North Korean attacker might intentionally bounce his communications through several computers in numerous unsuspected countries before reaching his target.  This creates a problem for computer forensic investigators in that they will have to re-trace and identify all the bounce points to determine the origin of the attack.  In some cases,\nthese communications bounce through countries that do not consider computer hacking a crime or that are not willing to assist in an investigation.\n\n\n\n## 3. Manipulation Of Event Logs\n\nMost critical systems are usually protected by an intrusion detection system (IDS)\nand maintain an event log of the systems activities.  However, these protection mechanisms are far from perfect and an attacker might be able to alter logs after gaining unauthorized access to systems, concealing all evidence of their attack.\n\n\n\n## E. North Korean Hacking Activity\n\nNorth Korea has long been suspected of conducting computer network operations against other nations, especially South Korea.  However, because North Korea is such a closed country, very little is known of the country's CNO activities.\n\nNot much is known in the unclassified realm of North Korea's exploits either attempted or succeeded.  There has been widespread speculation that North Korea possesses a credible CNO capability, but evidence of such activity is almost non-existent.\nSouth Korea, however, is taking the North Korean hacking threat seriously and announced in June 2003 that the Defense Security Command (DSC) will be establishing a special intelligence-protecting office to cope with the rising threat posed by North Korean hackers [APAN 03].\nLT. General Song Young-guen, the commanding general of South Korea's DSC\nhas long been an outspoken voice warning of the North's cyber warfare capabilities.  In early 2003, Young-guen reported that the DPRK was found to be operating a highly skilled military unit with the specific mission of hacking into South Korea's networks seeking secret information.  In May 2004 at the 2004 Defense Information Security Conference, Young-guen reported that the highly skilled contingent of North Korean hackers had been set up under orders from the Supreme Leader Kim Jong Il.  This is the first time a South Korean official has publicly confirmed the existence of hacking units in the DPRK.  According to Young-guen, the hacking capability of the elite North Korean hacking unit is assessed as equivalent to that of the CIA [Jin 04].\n\nIn March 2003 the Weekly Post (www.weeklypost.com) reported that North Korea had approximately 2,000 strategic units comprised of skilled computer hackers whose mission is to destroy computer information and communication networks. The Weekly Post stated that the 2,000 North Korean cyber terrorists were scattered in South Korea, Hong Kong, Russia, and Japan.  According to the Weekly Post, the Japanese suspect that the DPRK was involved in a January 25, 2003 cyber attack on South Korean and Japanese networks [WP 03].\n\nWorldNet Daily alleged that the infamous hacker Kuji who hacked into the Rome Air Development Center at Griffiss Air Force Base in New York in 1994 was actually a highly trained North Korean hacker [LoBaido 2000].  These allegations proved to be false, however, as the true perpetrators of the Rome Air Development Center break-in were two young British hackers with no affiliation to North Korea [Ungoed-Thomas 98].\n\nDuring the course of this research no credible evidence was discovered to indicate that North Korea was actively participating in any CNA/E activities whether covertly or overtly.  However, there was plenty of conjecture and speculation as to the actual CNO capabilities and intentions of the DPRK.\n\nIn an April 2004 telephone interview with Director Baek of South Korea's National Intelligence Service (NIS), Director Baek stated that his organization had no knowledge of confirmed CNA/E activities originating from within North Korea.  He also stated that the NIS had no evidence of North Korea sponsoring CNA/E activities against South Korea or any other country.  Officials at the Korea Information Security Agency\n(KISA), who disclosed that very little is known on the computer network activity of their neighbor to the north, also echoed Director Baek's comments.\n\n## F. Obstacles Associated With The Dprk's Cna/E Activites\n\nComputers are available in minute numbers to the general population of North Korea.  Most of the computing power available in the DPRK is hoarded by state run research facilities.  In addition, the technical knowledge needed to carry out CNA/E\nactivities is not widely possessed outside of the state's laboratories scattered all over the country.\nAccording to a Nautilus Institute study conducted in October 2002, the DPRK's network access was almost zero due to its lack of a functioning telecommunication infrastructure [Hayes 02].  Today, connectivity speeds remain slow and the quality remains poor; these factors are certainly not conducive to effectively conducting CNA/E operations.  The DPRK is conspicuously absent from a systematic accounting of national networked readiness.  North Korea possesses almost none of the factors required for achieving a favorable network policy.  Even with the aid of South Korean enterprises, the DPRK's connectivity level remains low due to censorship and limited access to computers.\n\nThe absence of stable and continuous electricity throughout the country is a major obstacle for North Korea.  North Korea's electrical grid is antiquated and stretched way beyond capacity.  The country spends most of the time in the dark without electricity.  It would be extremely difficult to conduct CNA/E operations without reliable power. Given the level of sophistication and complexity of the protection software on modern computers systems, it often takes hours before an exploitation or attack is successfully completed.\n\nIt does not take a lot of processing power to conduct CNA/E operations, although supercomputers or high-end Pentium processors can be useful for cracking passwords and keys.  However, if North Korea wishes to test the effectiveness of its CNA/E tools on computer systems running modern operating systems such as Windows XP or Windows 2000, it is a requisite that North Korea possesses similar systems running similar software.  It has long been suspected that North Korea possesses a limited number of Pentium machines.\nIn a recent visit to South Korea, North Korean officials demanded the unrestricted export of South Korean made Pentium processors to North Korea.  This would suggest that the North's attempt at producing a Pentium equivalent processor has not yet been fully achieved.  Several reports have stated that the core of North Korea's computing base is centered on the use of 80386 and 80486 processors.\n\n\n## G. Summary\n\nThis chapter discussed the CNA/E activities of North Korea along with some of the difficulties associated with determining the source of the activity.  It was determined that despite technological advances in the area of IT, North Korea did not pose a serious CNO threat given its lack of network readiness.  This chapter also examined the reported cases of North Korean CNO activities.\n\n\n\n## Vii. Conclusions And Recommendations A. Conclusion 1. State Sponsored Cno Activities Are Often Not Overt\n\nResearching the activities of a closed society such as North Korea was a difficult task.  Additionally, this research was limited to open source information, and the quality and quantity of pertinent information was sparse.  When dealing with a country shrouded in secrecy such a North Korea, many of the conclusions drawn from available open source information is merely speculative.  However, being eager to prove to the world that they will not be left behind, North Korea has made publicly available some of its current IT research and development projects on state sponsored websites.  It is unclear exactly how much of this information is fact or fiction.\n\nThe CNO activities of North Korea are not well documented in open sources.\nAlthough there has been much speculation by South Korea, we were unable to confirm any CNO activity originating in North Korea or sponsored by the government of North Korea.  Allegations of computer hacking by North Korea were discovered on the Internet, however, the sources failed to mention the specifics of the allegations and these allegations proved inconclusive.\n\nWe did not expect to find a \"smoking gun\" indicating North Korea was actively involved in state sponsored cyber warfare.  However, there was an expectation that specific data items gleaned from the research conducted would indicate that North Korea was at the very least able to conduct CNO, if so desired.  Specifically, the data points examined included those of North Korea's IT infrastructure, electrical infrastructure, and the level and pervasiveness of IT education. Evidence was uncovered indicating North Korea has a strong desire to conduct research and testing of its CNO capabilities at its various research laboratories and universities.  Whether or not the DPRK is ready to deploy or have deployed such capabilities remains unknown.  It is important to note however, that regardless of whether North Korea possesses the capability to conduct CNO against its adversaries, CNO does not appear to be the primary concern among the North Korean leadership.  North Korea seems to be developing its IT capability to promote economic growth rather than to attack an adversary's network.  North Korea's recent request of IT publications from South Korea did not include any publications germane to CNO; rather they focused on commercial applications associated with fielding IT, such as design, graphics, and animation.  Additionally, the subjects being studied by visiting North Korean students at Syracuse University do not include CNO.\nWe have shown that North Korea has integrated IT education into its educational system, and we have also shown that its military IT education includes virus creation and network penetration.  Despite stringent export restrictions, North Korea possesses the basic technology needed to conduct CNO.  Furthermore, North Korea possesses the connectivity needed to conduct limited CNO against an adversary.  Although no direct evidence was uncovered to suggest that North Korea is actively involved in CNO activities, we believe that enough credible evidence was uncovered to indicate that North Korea possesses the wherewithal to conduct CNO against its adversaries.\n\n## 2. Technology Is A Factor In Cno\n\nNorth Korea has developed several computer systems over the years and despite import restrictions on dual-use technology has managed to acquire such technologies from its allies.  However, the lethality of the CNO activity is not directly proportional to the processing power of the systems used in the attacks.  The fact is, very little processing power is needed to develop and deploy a lethal virus or worm.  North Korea currently possesses sufficient processing capability to develop and deploy such mechanisms.\nHowever, its limited connectivity and unreliable electrical system could be obstacles to deployment.\n\nNorth Korea need not develop its own hacking tools, as they are available for sale or even for free on the Internet.   However, if North Korea's CNO capabilities are limited to deploying the typical hacker attacks found openly on the Internet, the CNA/E threat from North Korea may be of little national interest.  On the other hand, if North Korean researchers are developing native viruses and worms for use in their CNO program, the threat will be greater.\n\n## 3. Education Is The Foundation\n\nThe North Korean leadership, particularly Kim Jong Il, recognizes the importance of IT education in North Korea.  Starting at the grade level IT education has become compulsory throughout North Korea.  In order to produce capable cyber warriors IT\neducation has to be an integral part of the overall plan.  The North Korean government has impressed upon its populace the importance of IT to the future of the country.  Today, being an IT professional is North Korea is viewed as a job of prestige.\n\nThe idea of IT education has not escaped the North Korean military and the potential use of CNO as a weapon of mass disruption.  As reported, the Mirim College allegedly has been steadily producing at least 100 cybersoldiers each year, trained in such areas as virus creation and network penetration.  This highlights the fact that North Korea acknowledges the importance of CNO in modern warfare.  However, we did not find any evidence of other North Korean schools teaching CNO.\n\n## B. Recommendations For Future Work 1.         China-North Korea Relationship\n\nFurther examination of the relationship between China and North Korea should be conducted in order to assess exactly how much IT aid is being provided to North Korea. To assume that Chinese developed dual-use technology and IT products are prevalent in North Korea is not an unfair assumption.  It is this trade relationship that should be further examined.  A determination as to whether Chinese hackers are actively training North Koreans should also be made.\n\nTHIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK\n\n\n## List Of References\n\n[AFP 04] Agence France Presse, \"North Korea Recalls Mobile Phones, June 2004.\n\n\n[AP 03] Associated Press, \"North Korea May Be Training Hackers\", http://miami.com/mld/miamiherald/news/world/5877291.htm, May 2003.\n\nLast accessed on August 13, 2004.\n\n[AP 03] Associated Press, \"North Korea Suspected Of Training Hackers\", http://smh.com.au/articles/2003/06/10/1055010959349.html, June 2003.\n\nLast accessed on August 13, 2004.\n\n[APAN 03] Asia-Pacific Area Network, Associated Press, \"Korean Military To Create Units Against Hacking, Terrorism\", June 2003.\n\n\n[APCSS 02] Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies, \"Bytes and Bullets: Impact if IT\nRevolution on War and Peace in Korea\", October 2002.\n\n\n[ATIP 97] Asian Technology Information Program, \"IT - In the North (DPRK)\", http://atip.org/ATIP/public/atip.reports.97/atip-97-060-ext-03.html, 1997.\n\nLast accessed on August 13, 2004.\n\n[Artyukov 02] Artyukov, Oleg, \"North Korea May Become Hi-Tech Leader\";\nhttp://english.pravda.ru/world/2002/04/24/27943.html, April 2002.\n\nLast accessed on August 13, 2004.\n\n[ASPAC 03] Asian Studied on the Pacific Coast, \"Bilateral Research Collaboration Between Kim Chaek University of Technology (DPRK) and Syracuse University (US) in the Area of Integrated Information Technology\", June 2003.\n\n[AU 03] American University, \"Country Analysis: China\"\nhttp://www.american.edu/initeb/js5518a/Country-analysis-china.html, December 2003.\n\nLast accessed on August 17, 2004.\n\n\n[BBC 02] British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) Monitoring, Asia Pacific, \"Chinese Military Delegation Visits North Korea, Discusses Friendship\", November 2002.\n\n[Beal 03] Beal, Tim, \"Pyongyang Report Volume 3 No. 1\", http://www.vuw.ac.nz/~caplabtb/dprk/pyr3_1.html, February 2001.\n\nLast accessed on August 13, 2004.\n\n\n[CCRC 04] Computer Crime research Center, \"Chinese Hackers Advertise Made-to-\nOrder Virus Service\", http://crime-research.org/news/13.07.2004/487, July 2004.\n\nLast accessed on August 17, 2004.\n\n\n[CDES 01] Canada DPR Korea E-Clipping Service, \"ROK Firm To Set Up Satellite For DPRK\", June 01.\n\n\n[China 04] China.org, The People's Daily, \"China Becomes World's Third Biggest Hitech Producer\", http://www.china.org.cn/english/2004/Feb/86226.htm, February 2004.\n\nLast accessed on August 17, 2004.\n\n\n[Choe 03] Choe, Sang-Hun, \"North Korea Takes Fitful Steps into Computer Era\", http://www.mercurynews.com/mld/mercurynews/business/7590144.htm, December\n2003.\n\nLast accessed on August 13, 2004.\n\n\n[CIA 04] The Central Intelligence Agency, \"The World Factbook\", http://www.odci.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/kn.html, May 2004.\n\nLast accessed on August 17, 2004.\n\n[Clarke 02] Clarke, Richard, Testimony for the US Senate Judiciary Committee, Administrative Oversight and the Courts Subcommittee, \"Administrative Oversight: Are We Ready For A Cyber Terror Attack?\", February 2002.\n\n\n[Cohen 01] Cohen, David, \"In Cyberuniversities, a Place for South Korea's Women\", http://chronicle.com/free/v47/i30/30a04101.htm, April 2001.\n\nLast accessed on August 15, 2004.\n\n [Conner 01] Conner, Michael, H., \"North Korea's Homegrown Web for Elite Only\", March 2001.\n\n\n[Connole 98] Connole, Patrick, \"US Cyber Law Chief Reports 'Substantial' Cyber attack\", June 1998.\n\n\n[Crowcroft 04] Crowcroft Genealogy, \"DPRK - Third Visit April 13-20, 2004\", April\n2004.\n\n\n[DPRKI 04] Democratic People Republic of Korea Infobank Website, http://www.dprkorea.com/, July 2004.\n\nLast accessed on August 17, 2004.\n\n\n[DPRKNTA 02] Democratic People Republic of Korea National Tourism Administration, \"In Korea Portable Telephone Communication Possibly\", May 2002.\n\n\n[DPRKNTA 02] Democratic People Republic of Korea National Tourism Administration, \"The Pyongyang Internet Coffee\", October 2002.\n\n\n[DPRKNTA 04] Democratic People Republic of Korea National Tourism Administration, \"Business Trade Investment Exhibition News\", January 2004.\n\n\n[Dubrovin 03] Dubrovin, Denis, \"I See Suffering in the Streets of Pyongyang\", http://telegraph.co.uk/news/main.jhtml?xml=/news/2003/01/05/wkor05.xml. 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But If You Need Computer Talent, It's Ready To Do Business\", http://www.time.com/time/asia/news/magazine/0,9754,99027,00.html, February 2001.\n\nLast accessed on August 17, 2004.\n\n\n\n[Larkin 01] Larkin, John, \"North Korea Preparing For Cyberwar\", http://archive.infopeace.de/msg00464.html, October 2001.\n\nLast accessed on August 15, 2004.\n\n\n[LKD 04] Liaoning Korea Daily, \"North Korea Established a Software Developing Company in Shenyang\", March 2004.\n\n\n[LoBaido 00] LoBaido, Anthony, WorldNetDaily, \"Hello Kitty Battles in Cyberwars, International Hackers Sell Skills to Governments, private Sector\", September 2000.\n\n\n[LOC 93] Library of Congress, \" World Studies: North Korea\", http://lcweb2.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/r?frd/cstdy:@field(DOCID+kp0090), June 1993.\nLast accessed on August 17, 2004.\n\n\n[LOC 04] Library of Congress, \" World Studies: North Korea\", http://reference.allrefer.com/country-guide-study/north-korea/north-korea155.html, July\n2004.\nLast accessed on August 17, 2004.\n\n\n\n[Lyman 02] Lyman, Jay, \"Report: U.S. Expecting Chinese Hack Blitz\", http://www.newsfactor.com/perl/story/17465.html, April 2002. Last accessed on August 17, 2004.\n\n[McWilliams 03] McWilliams, Brian, \"North Korea's School for Hackers\", http://www.wired.com/news/conflict/0,2100,59043,00.html, June 2003.\n\nLast accessed on August 17, 2004.\n\n\n[MDN 04] Mainichi Daily News, \"Chinese Hackers Attack Japanese Websites\", http://mdn.mainichi.co.jp/news/20040807p2a00m0dm003000c.html, August 2004.\n\nLast accessed on August 17, 2004.\n\n\n[Messmer 99] Messemer, Ellen, Cable News Network (CNN), \"Kosovo Cyber-war Intensifies: Chinese Hackers Targeting U.S. Sites, Government Says\", May 1999.\n\n\n[Minnich 01] Minnich, James, M., \"North Korea Tactics\", September 2001.\n\n\n[NASA 00] National Aeronautics and Space Administration, \"Earth at Night\", November\n2000.\n\n\n[Nautilus 01] The Nautilus Institute, \"Inter-Korean Economic Cooperation\", August\n2001.\n\n\n[NIS 02] National Intelligence Service, Republic of Korea, \"North Korea\", http://www.nis.go.kr/eng/north/, 2002.\n\nLast accessed on August 16, 2004.\n\n\n[NKZONE 04] North Korea Zone, \"Studying Programming\", http://nkzone.typepad.com/nktech/2004/03/studying_progra.html, March 2004.\n\nLast accessed on August 16, 2004.\n\n\n[Park 01] Park, Chan-Mo, \"Current Status of Software Development in DPRK and Collaboration between the South and North\", August 2001.\n\n\n[PD 01] People's Daily, \"DPRK Defense Chief Arrives in Moscow for Military Cooperation\", April 2001.\n\n[Seong-in 01] Seong-in, Bae, \"North Korea's Policy Shift Toward the IT Industry and Inter-Korean Cooperation\", East Asian Review, January 2001.\n\n\n[Song-wu] Song-wu, Park, The Korea Times, \"NK Hands Suspected in Cyberattacks\", July 2004.\n\n\n[Soo-min 01] Soo-min, Seo, \"NK Asks ROK Expert Group to provide IT Books\", May\n2001.\n\n\n[Thomas 00] Thomas, Timothy, L., Foreign Military Studies Office, \"Like Adding Wings to the Tiger: Chinese Information War Theory and Practice\", http://fmso.leavenworth.army.mil/fmsopubs/issues/chinaiw.htm, November 2000. Last accessed on August 29, 2004.\n\n\n[TPK 00] The People's Korea, \"Selected Items of Computer Programs Developed by the National Academy of Sciences\", http://210.145.168.243/pk/152th_issue/2000112909.htm, November 2000.\n\nLast accessed on August 14, 2004.\n\n\n[TPK 01] The People's Korea, \"Computer Education Intensified in DPRK\", http://210.145.168.243/pk/154th_issue/2001012508.htm, November 2000.\n\nLast accessed on August 14, 2004.\n\n\n[TPK 01] The People's Korea, \"Computer Network Rapidly Expanding in DPRK\",\nhttp://210.145.168.243/pk/156th_issue/2001022104.htm, February 2001.\n\nLast accessed on August 14, 2004.\n\n[TPK 01] The People's Korea, \"Strategic Plan for IT Revolution in DPRK\",\nhttp://210.145.168.243/pk/167th_issue/2001082504.htm, August 2001.\n\nLast accessed on August 14, 2004.\n\n\n[TPK 01] The People's Korea, \"DPRK to Enter World PC Market\",\nhttp://210.145.168.243/pk/168th_issue/2001100502.htm, October 2001.\n\nLast accessed on August 14, 2004.\n\n[TPK 01] The People's Korea, \"Training of IT Specialists in Full Swing\",\nhttp://210.145.168.243/pk/171st_issue/2001120202.htm, December 2001.\n\nLast accessed on August 14, 2004\n\n[TPK 03] The People's Korea, \"DPRK Spreading Computer Networks\",\nhttp://210.145.168.243/pk/189th_issue/2003030118.htm, March 2003.\n\nLast accessed on August 14, 2004.\n\n\n[TPK 03] The People's Korea, \"Modernization of Communication Networks Promoted in DPRK\", http://210.145.168.243/pk/199th_issue/2003121304.htm, March 2003.\nLast accessed on August 14, 2004.\n\n[TPK 03] The People's Korea, \"DPRK Developed PDA Hana 21\", http://210.145.168.243/pk/191th_issue/2003041201.htm, April 2003.\n\nLast accessed on August 14, 2004.\n\n\n[TPK 03] The People's Korea, \"DPRK-made Pocket Computer Popularized in DPRK\", http://210.145.168.243/pk/198th_issue/2003112906.htm, April 2003.\n\nLast accessed on August 14, 2004.\n\n[TPK 04] The People's Korea Website, http://210.145.168.243/pk, July 2004.\n\nLast accessed on August 17, 2004.\n\n\n[UNDP 00] United Nations Development Program, Biodiversity Planning Support Program, \"1st Workshop on National Biodiversity Strategies and Action Plans in Northeast and East Central Asia, Experiences and Lessons\", April 2000.\n\n\n[UNIDO 92] United Nations Industrial Development Organization, May 1992.\n\n\n[UN 04] United Nations Statistical Database, December 2003.\n\n[USDOC 04] United States Department of Commerce, \"Export Administration Regulations, Category 3 - Electronics\" http://w3.access.gpo.gov/bis/ear/ear_data.html, May 2004.\n\nLast accessed on August 23, 2004.\n\n[USDOS 96] United States Department of State, \"Wassenaar Export Control Regime\", July 1992.\n\n\n\n[Ungoed-Thomas 98] Ungoed-Thomas, Jonathan, The Toronto Star, \"How 'Datastream Cowboy' Took the U.S. to the Brink of War\", April, 1998.\n\n\n[UNVIE 04] United States Mission to International Organization in Vienna, \"Brief History of the Wassenaar Arrangement\" May 2004.\n\n\n[WA 03] Wassenaar Arrangment , \"Dual-Use List, Category 4 Computers\", http://www.wassenaar.org/list/wa-list_03_tableofcontents.html, December 2003.\n\nLast accessed on August 23, 2004.\n\n[Ward 01] Ward, Mark, British Broadcasting Corporation, \"US and Chinese Hackers Trade Blows\", May 2001.\n\n\n[Williams 03] Williams, Martyn, \"North Korean Internet Takes A Step Forward\", July\n2003.\n\n[WP 03] Weekly Post, \"North Korean Cyber Terrorist\", http://www.weeklypost.com/030324/030324a.htm, March 2003.\n\nLast accessed on August 17, 2004.\n\n\n[WT 04] World Tribune.com, \"North Korean Officials Tour Heart of South Korea's IT\nIndustry\", June 2004.\n\n\n\n## Initial Distribution List\n\n\n1.\nDefense Technical Information Center Ft. Belvoir, Virginia\n2.\nDudley Knox Library Naval Postgraduate School Monterey, California\n3.\nDorothy Denning\nNaval Postgraduate School\nMonterey, California\n4.\nJoanne Kim Naval Postgraduate School Monterey, California\n\n5.\nCathy Azallion FGGM OSIS Fort George Meade, MD\n\n6.\nBrian Steckler Naval Postgraduate School Monterey, California\n\n7.\nDartmouth College Institute for Security Technology Studies Hanover, New Hampshire\n\n8.\nPeter Hayes Nautilus Institute for Security and Sustainability University of San Francisco\n\nSan Francisco, California"
    },
    {
        "text": "# The Efficient Utilization Of Open Source Information\n\nSamuel R. Baty A-2, Intelligence & Systems Analysis August 11, 2016\nUNCLASSIFIED\nLA-UR-16-26273\n\n## Primary Considerations\n\n- Open source information consists of a vast set of\ninformation from a variety of sources.\n- World news - Unclassified documents and reports - Maps and Satellite imagery - Patents, scientific papers etc.\n- Not only does the quantity of open source\ninformation pose a problem, the *quality* of such information can hinder efforts.\n- Usually difficult to verify\n\n## The Method Of Solving Problems\n\n- In many cases, limitations in content prevents\nanalysts from finding an exact answer to a question.\n- One important problem solving strategy is to bound\na system's capability or technologies.\n- By using additional valuable information, more\nrefined bounds can be built, allowing for more\nprecise estimates.\n- Two example problems are found in examinations\nof Iran and North Korea\n\n## Case Study: Iran\n\n- Consider the Iranian space program.\n- Iran has demonstrated a satellite launch capability\nusing the domestically produced Safir rocket family.\n- Given the success of Safir launches, could Iran\nutilize or modify existing satellite launch vehicles (SLVs) into ICBMs?\n- What are key factors to consider when analyzing a\nballistic missile?\n- Size of deliverable\n- Range\n- Using these parameters, a v for the missile\nsystem can be defined for a given mass.\n- What is a good estimate for the mass of a reentry\nvehicle (RV)?\n- How can we arrive at that estimation?\nSelection of US RVs (L to R: Mk 6, Mk 12a, Mk 21). Not great analogies for a first Iranian RV (3,4,5).\n\nUNCLASSIFIED\n\n- We can estimate materials and sub-systems, using\nrelatively small (in volume) US systems.\n- Safing, arming, fuzing, firing (SAFF) - Special nuclear material - High explosives - RV shell - plastics/foams/etc. - Others?\n- Using these, and weighting by volume, a lower\nmass bound was estimated at 740-1150 lbs.\n- Minuteman III throw weight is ~2400 lbs\nUNCLASSIFIED\nMinuteman III with 3 Mk 12a RVs (6)\n\n- Using this mass, a Safir system does not have the\nrequired v needed to reach necessary apogee to be considered an ICBM.\n- A comparison with western missiles of the same\ncapability yields a bounded estimate (in time) of\nwhen Iran could have a nuclear capable ICBM.\n\n## Case Study: North Korea\n\n- Consider the naval capabilities of the DPRK.\n- How long would it take for the DPRK to successfully\ndevelop a reliable SLBM capability?\nNK-11 Missile ejection and estimate of Sinpo-Class SSB (7,8).\n\nUNCLASSIFIED\n\n- In similar fashion to the Iran case, what does the\nDPRK need to achieve its goal?\n- A nuclear weapon. (Deliverable/miniaturized) - Reliable SLBM system - SSB(N) - Supporting technology for SLBMs and SSB(N)s\n- How long would it take for the DPRK to successfully\ndevelop a reliable SLBM capability?\n- North Korea has made some fairly substantial\nclaims...\n- Claim of \"Hydrogen Bomb\" test, Jan 2016 (BBC). - Claim of being about to fully \"cope with America\nwith nuclear weapons at any time\" (CNN).\n- North Korean rhetoric alone will not provide an\naccurate understanding of capabilities.\n- Important to consider that posturing can be geared\nboth for domestic propaganda or foreign\nintimidation.\n- Reality: Primarily using maps and satellite imagery\nas the source of information:\n- ~ One Sinpo Class submarine (assumed\noperational)\n- Testing of SLBMs initially only platform based.\n- Check through tracking tech transfers (Golf II, R-27)\n- Similarly to the Iran case, a comparison to Western\ndevelopment provides a minimum bound for the time needed to have a credible SLBM capability.\n- What is the difference between a \"usable\"\ncapability and a \"reliable\" capability?\n- SSBNs, instead of SSBs, allow for a more flexible\ndeterrent for several reasons\n- Quiet - Long(er) deployment times - Longer effective range\n- However, all of the required infrastructure for a\nnaval nuclear reactor is certainly not trivial.\n- The domestic production timeframe on an SSBN\nclass likely exceeds a decade.\n\n## Conclusions\n\n- The huge breadth and depth of open source\ninformation can complicate an analysis, especially because open information has no guarantee of\naccuracy\n- Open source information can provide key insights\neither directly or indirectly:\n- Looking at supporting factors (flow of scientists,\nproducts and waste from mines, government budgets, etc.)\n- Direct factors (statements, tests, deployments)\n\n## Conclusions (Cont.)\n\n- Fundamentally, it is the independent verification of\ninformation that allows for a more complete picture to be formed.\n- Overlapping sources allow for more precise bounds\non times, weights, temperatures, yields or other\nissues of interest in order to determine capability.\n- Ultimately, a \"good\" answer almost never comes\nfrom an individual, but rather requires the utilization of a wide range of skill sets held by a team of people.\n\n## Picture And Graph Credits\n\n1.\nhttp://www.spacelaunchreport.com/slr2015q1.html\n2.\nhttp://www.spaceflight101.net/irans-safir-rocket-successfully-launches-fajr-satelliteinto-orbit.html\n3.\nhttp://defenceforumindia.com/forum/threads/agni-v-missile-test-launch.33457/page-\n20\n4.\nhttps://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Titan_II_Reentry_Vehicle_and_Warhead_C\nasing_%288562940163%29.jpg\n5.\nhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/LGM-118_Peacekeeper\n6.\nhttp://nsarchive.gwu.edu/nsa/NC/mirv/mirv.html\n7.\nhttp://www.hisutton.com/Analysis%20- %20Sinpo%20Class%20Ballistic%20Missile%20Sub.html\n8.\nhttp://www.ncnk.org/resources/briefing-papers/all-briefing-papers/an-overview-ofnorth-korea-s-ballistic-missiles\n9.\nhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Golf-class_submarine\n\n## Additional References\n\nA.\nhttp://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-pacific-11813699\nB.\nhttp://www.cnn.com/2015/09/15/asia/north-korea-nuclear-program/"
    },
    {
        "text": "The Honorable Avril Haines Director of National Intelligence Washington, DC 20511 Dear DNI Haines:\n(U) With this letter, we transmit our 90-day report on commercially available information (CAI).\n\nWe appreciate your commissioning the report and the assistance of your office and other Intelligence Community (IC) elements in this time-sensitive undertaking. (U) As prescribed in our terms of reference (TOR), the report attempts to \"(1) describe the role of CAI in intelligence collection and analysis; (2) reflect on the existing framework for ensuring the protection of privacy and civil liberties; and (3) make[] recommendations to the IC regarding how and under what circumstances an IC element should collect, use, retain, and disseminate CAI.\" These three issues, preceded by a background description and explanation of CAI, are addressed in the four main parts of our report.\n\n(U) Our report does not attempt \"an independent legal analysis\" of the issues involved with CAI, as set forth in our TOR, but instead follows the IC's own approach in considering questions of CAI policy. (U) Our report addresses CAI that is available for purchase by the general public and as such is treated as a subset of publicly available information (PAI). Unless otherwise indicated in context, we use the term \"CAI\" in this report to refer to CAI that is also PAI. (U) Highlights of our report include the following:\n\n1. (U) There is today a large and growing amount of CAI that is available to the general public,\nincluding foreign governments (and their intelligence services) and private-sector entities, as well as the IC. 2. (U) CAI clearly provides intelligence value, whether considered in isolation and/or in combination with other information, and whether reviewed by humans and/or by machines. It also raises significant issues related to privacy and civil liberties. The widespread availability of CAI regarding the activities of large numbers of individuals is a relatively new, rapidly growing, and increasingly significant part of the information environment in which the IC must function.\n3. (U) Under IC elements' rules and procedures, CAI (because it is also PAI) is less strictly regulated than other forms of information acquired by the IC. In our view, however, profound changes in the scope and sensitivity of CAI have overtaken traditional understandings, at least as a matter of policy. Today's publicly available CAI is very different in degree and in kind from traditional PAI. 4. (U) We have three recommendations concerning the acquisition and treatment of CAI by the IC. (U) First, the IC should develop a multi-layered process to catalog, to the extent feasible, the CAI that IC elements acquire. This will be a complex undertaking requiring attention to procurement contracts, functionally equivalent data acquisition processes, data flows, and data use. The IC cannot understand and improve how it deals with CAI unless and until it knows what it is doing with CAI. (U) Second, based on the knowledge gained from that process, the IC should develop a set of standards and procedures for CAI, governing and requiring regular re-evaluation of acquisition and use decisions, including as to the use of CAI. We offer several points that can be included in those standards and procedures, but also recognize that they will need to be adapted for different IC elements with different CAI needs and missions. (U) Third, as part of this set of policies and procedures, and/or as a complement to it, the IC\nshould develop more precise guidance to identify and protect sensitive CAI that implicates privacy and civil liberties concerns. Again, we offer several suggestions for the development of such guidance. (U) The single most important point in our report is this: CAI is increasingly powerful for intelligence and increasingly sensitive for individual privacy and civil liberties, and the IC\ntherefore needs to develop more refined policies to govern its acquisition and treatment. Our report does not prescribe those policies (in keeping with our timeline and role as outside advisors) but we hope that it will assist the IC with their development.\n\n(U) We appreciate the opportunity to be of service. Respectfully submitted,\n\n\n## (U) Table Of Contents (U) Executive Summary 1. (U) Background On Cai\n\n1.1. (U) What is CAI?\n1.2. (U) CAI Sellers 1.3. (U)  Examples of CAI 1.4. (U) Origins & Evolution of CAI 1.5. (U)  Commercial Value of CAI 1.6. (U) Deanonymization/Reidentification\n\n## 2. (U) The Role Of Cai In Intelligence Collection And Analysis\n\n2.1. (U) CAI as a Source for OSINT 2.2. (U) Examples of CAI Contracts 2.3. (U) Examples of CAI Value 2.4. (U) Non-Analytic Uses of CAI 2.5. (U) Counter-Intelligence Risks in CAI 2.6. (U) Sensitivity of CAI\n2.6.1. (U)  CAI Includes Sensitive and Intimate Information 2.6.2. (U) Defining Sensitivity Categorically 2.6.3. (U) CAI Can Be Misused 2.6.4. (U) CAI Increases the Power of the Government 2.6.5. (U) Aggregation of CAI Raise the Risk of Mission Creep 2.6.6. (U) Public, Media, and Political Scrutiny 2.6.7. (U) Need for Thoughtful Approach\n2.7. (U) Summary\n\n## 3. (U) The Existing Policy Framework For Cai\n\n3.1. (U) PAI\n3.1.1. (U) Constitutional Provisions 3.1.2. (U) Federal Statutes 3.1.3. (U) Pending Legislation 3.1.4. (U) IC Policy 3.1.5. (U) IC Guidance\n3.2. (U) CAI 3.3. (U) CAI Under IC Guidelines\n3.3.1. (U) Authorized Purpose 3.3.2. (U) Publicly Available 3.3.3. (U) Scope of Collection\n3.3.3.1. (U) Clarification of Current Guidelines\n3.3.4. (U) Volume, Proportion, Sensitivity (VPS) of USPI\n3.4. (U) CAI & *Carpenter*\n\n## 4. (U) Recommendations\n\n4.1. (U) Recommendation #1: The IC Should Learn How It Acquires and Uses CAI\n4.1.1. (U) The Value of Understanding 4.1.2. (U) Prospective Cataloguing Effort 4.1.3. (U) Multi-Layered Cataloguing Effort 4.1.4. (U) Common Taxonomy and Understanding\n4.2. (U) Recommendation #2: The IC Should Develop a Set of Adaptable Standards and (U) Procedures for CAI\n4.2.1. (U) Issues 4.2.2. (U) Examples of Current CAI Approaches\n4.2.2.1. (U) Treasury 4.2.2.2. (U) Department of Homeland Security (DHS) 4.2.2.3. (U)\n\n4.2.3. (U) Assessment of CAI Examples\n4.3. (U) Recommendation #3: The IC Should Develop More Precise Sensitivity (VPS)\nGuidance for CAI\n4.3.1. (U) Structural and Procedural Issues 4.3.2. (U) Substantive Issues 4.3.3. (U) Examples of VPS Guidance\n4.3.3.1. (U) DIA 4.3.3.2. (U)  NSA 4.3.3.3. (U) CIA\n4.3.4. (U) Assessment of VPS Examples and Possible Areas of Future Focus\n\n## 5. (U) Conclusion 6. (U) Appendices\n\n6.1. (U) Letter and Terms of Reference 6.2. (U) IC Elements' Materials Governing CAI 6.3. (U) IC Elements' Materials on VPS and/or CAI Collection\n\n## (U) Executive Summary\n\n(U) There is today a large and growing amount of what the U.S. Intelligence Community (IC) refers to as \"Commercially Available Information\" (CAI). As the acronym indicates, and as we use the term in this report, CAI is information that is available commercially to the general public, and as such, is a subset of publicly available information (PAI). We do not use the term CAI to include, and we do not address in this report, commercial information that is available exclusively to governments. The volume and sensitivity of CAI have expanded in recent years mainly due to the advancement of digital technology, including location-tracking and other features of smartphones and other electronic devices, and the advertising-based monetization models that underlie many commercial offerings available on the Internet. Although CAI may be \"anonymized,\" it is often possible (using other CAI) to deanonymize and identify individuals, including U.S. persons.\n\n(U//FOUO) CAI clearly provides intelligence value, whether considered in isolation and/or in combination with other information, and whether reviewed by humans and/or by machines.\n\nThe IC currently acquires a significant amount of CAI for mission-related purposes, including in some cases social media data\n\n and many other types of information. As a resource available to the general public, including adversaries, CAI also raises counter-intelligence risks for the IC. It also has increasingly important risks and implications for U.S. person privacy and civil liberties, as CAI\ncan reveal sensitive and intimate information about individuals. Without proper controls, CAI\ncan be misused to cause substantial harm, embarrassment, and inconvenience to U.S. persons.\n\nThe widespread availability of CAI regarding the activities of large numbers of individuals is a relatively new, rapidly growing, and increasingly significant part of the information environment in which the IC must function. That is the core of why it was necessary and appropriate for the IC to recognize the complex issues inherent in modern CAI and to commission this report.\n\n(U//FOUO) Under the U.S. Constitution, federal statutes, and IC elements' internal procedures, CAI is generally less strictly regulated than other forms of information acquired by the IC, principally because it is publicly available. In our view, however, changes in CAI have considerably undermined the historical policy rationale for treating PAI categorically as nonsensitive information, that the IC can use without significantly affecting the privacy and civil liberties of U.S. persons. For example, under *Carpenter v. United States*, acquisition of persistent location information (and perhaps other detailed information) concerning one person by law enforcement from communications providers is a Fourth Amendment \"search\"\nthat generally requires probable cause. However, the same type of information on millions of Americans is openly for sale to the general public. As such, IC policies treat the information as PAI and IC elements can purchase it. While IC policies regulate such information based on the volume, proportion and sensitivity of USPI it contains, those policies may not accord sufficient protection to information that is now broadly understood to be sensitive. It is not sufficient as a matter of policy simply to say that CAI is PAI; and saying so without more may be affirmatively confusing to intelligence professionals. (U) We have three recommendations. (U//FOUO) **First**, the IC should develop a multi-layered approach to catalog, to the extent feasible, the acquisition and use of CAI across its 18 elements. This cataloging process will be complex and should include formal contracts and procurement decisions, as well as functionally equivalent agency-specific data acquisition processes, because these will help identify CAI when it first arrives at (or becomes available to) an IC element. But the process also should include detection efforts at later stages of the information lifecycle, including in the process of planning for and initially using data. In particular, key inputs to the process may include (1)\ndocumentation reflecting the purchase, license, or other acquisition of a CAI dataset; (2) audits by chief information officers (CIOs) and chief data officers (CDOs) responsible for monitoring data flows across agency systems and repositories; and (3)\n\n We recommend this multi-layered approach because prior retrospective efforts focused on procurement have not been successful, and because the dynamic nature of the CAI\nenvironment will require ongoing review. This first recommendation is foundational for our remaining two recommendations. (U//FOUO) **Second**, as it gains knowledge into its own use of CAI, the IC should develop a set of standards and procedures for CAI, governing and requiring regular re-evaluation of acquisition and other decisions. This can be done centrally, for the IC or the Defense Intelligence Enterprise (DIE) as a whole, and/or at individual IC elements (where the approaches could vary from one element to another as long as they are consistent in principle). Either way, as the IC develops approaches to CAI, it will need to keep in mind IC elements' authorities and needs. Among the issues that should be considered in developing IC standards and procedures are the following: Mission analysis to identify need/value; Fit between mission and CAI data set, Proposed use;\nVendor and data quality; Acquisition mechanics; Data security; Sensitivity and legal review;\nAuditing use of CAI; Periodic re-evaluation; and Other structural and procedural issues. We review several examples of IC elements' approaches to these issues, including the\n\n##\n\n (U//FOUO) **Third**, as part of this set of standards and procedures, and/or as a complement to it, the IC should **develop more precise sensitivity and privacy-protecting guidance for CAI**. PAI is no longer a good proxy for non-sensitive information. Today, in a way that far fewer Americans seem to understand, and even fewer of them can avoid, CAI includes information on nearly everyone that is of a type and level of sensitivity that historically could have been obtained, if at all, only through targeted (and predicated) collection, and that could be used to cause harm to an individual's reputation, emotional well-being, or physical safety. The IC therefore needs to develop more refined approaches to CAI. Among the structural and procedural issues that should be considered in developing such approaches are the following: Required involvement of relevant parties at all stages; VPS assessments generally being made prior to acquisition, or at least prior to analytic use of CAI, and ideally integrated or coordinated with CAI acquisition reviews discussed in Recommendation #2; Approval requirements, with higher levels of approval required for more sensitive cases; Documentation, retention, and availability to relevant personnel of assessments, approvals, and mitigation measures adopted; Re-evaluation of VPS assessments and measures; Forwarding of assessments and other documentation to ODNI and/or other central authorities, with a formal mechanism for periodic review to allow comparisons and discussion of best practices across IC elements and related purposes. (U//FOUO) Apart from the structural and procedural issues above, we recommend that IC\nelements also consider the following substantive issues in developing VPS guidance for CAI:\nSensitivity of the CAI, in keeping with the discussion of sensitivity in Part 2 of this report; Deanonymization/reidentification issues; Importance of mission served by CAI (to balance against sensitivity of CAI); Strength of nexus between CAI and mission, and availability, feasibility, costs, and risks of alternatives; Ability to filter USPI prior to ingestion; Traditional minimization approaches and techniques; Availability of other privacy-protective measures in light of the need and anticipated use of CAI. (U//FOUO) Some IC elements have already made progress towards developing new VPS guidance, and we review several specific approaches that are in effect or are in the process of being developed. We offer four specific areas, drawn from the longer list above, in which such development would be particularly helpful. First, distinctions between types of CAI, including between historical CAI (e.g., newspapers) that are generally less sensitive, and newer forms of CAI that are generally more sensitive. Second, quantitative issues, because CAI that is acquired in bulk will almost always be more sensitive than CAI in smaller data sets. Third, special protections for USPs and USPI. Fourth and finally, issues raised by CAI that can easily be deanonymized, including implications for the definition of USPI as applied in this context. (U) In **conclusion**, if some or all of our recommendations are agreeable, the IC will need a mechanism for putting them into effect - e.g., a traditional working group of IC senior officials.\n\nSuch a working group might decide to proceed within the framework of our three recommendations, or it might adopt and build on their substance within a different framework - e.g., substantive principles; tools and procedures; and processes and approval requirements. We hope that our 90-day report provides a helpful foundation for developing more refined approaches, we believe that continued efforts will be necessary, and we appreciate the opportunity to be of service.\n\n## 1. (U) Background On Commercially Available Information\n\n(U) There is today a large and growing amount of what the U.S. Intelligence Community (IC) refers to as \"Commercially Available Information\" (CAI). As the acronym indicates, and as we use the term in this report, CAI is information that is available commercially to the general public, and as such, is a subset of publicly available information (PAI). We do not use the term CAI to include, and we do not address in this report, commercial information that is available exclusively to governments. The volume and sensitivity of CAI have expanded in recent years mainly due to the advancement of digital technology, including location-tracking and other features of smartphones and other electronic devices, and the advertising-based monetization models that underlie many commercial offerings available on the Internet. Although CAI may be \"anonymized,\" it is often possible (using other CAI) to deanonymize and identify individuals, including U.S. persons.\n\n1.1. (U) What is CAI? One of the challenges faced by the IC in dealing with CAI is defining the term, and hence the scope of any new guidance or policies that may be developed to address it. As the acronym indicates, and as we use it in this report, \"CAI\" is information that is available commercially, through a commercial transaction with another party. The acquisition may occur on a one-time or subscription basis, and may involve the IC directly ingesting the CAI or obtaining a license agreement that affords a continuing right of access. CAI typically is acquired for a fee, but as we use the term it also includes information offered at no cost if it is the type of information that is normally offered for sale - e.g., a free trial offering of CAI.\n\n(U) As we use the term in this report, CAI does not include information that is stolen or otherwise misappropriated and then acquired from a black market or otherwise via traditional HUMINT acquisition methods (e.g., espionage). Nor does it include information obtained through traditional SIGINT acquisition methods (e.g., wiretapping) that does not involve a commercial transaction at all. As such, it does not necessarily include all information acquired from commercial entities, such as information acquired via lawful process (e.g., a search warrant or subpoena) served on a communications service provider or financial institution. (U) In taking this approach to CAI, we generally follow the definition in the Intelligence Community Data Management Lexicon:\n(U) Any information that is of a type customarily made available or obtainable and sold, leased, or licensed to the general public or to non-governmental entities for purposes other than governmental purposes. Commercially Available Information also includes information for exclusive government use, knowingly and voluntarily provided by, procured from, or made accessible by corporate entities at the request of a government entity, or on their own initiative.\n\n##\n\n (U) Although some CAI is available only to governments, as the Lexicon notes, we use the term to mean, and this report addresses, only the subset of CAI that is generally available and is therefore also publicly available information (PAI). Under IC guidelines, PAI is defined as\n\ninformation that has been published or broadcast for public consumption, is available on request to the public, is accessible online or otherwise to the public, is available to the public by subscription or purchase, could be seen or heard by any casual observer (but not amounting to physical surveillance), is made available at a meeting open to the public, or is observed by visiting any place or attending any event that is open to the public.\n\n(U) Office of the Director of National Intelligence, Intelligence Activities Procedures Approved by the Attorney General Pursuant to Executive Order 12333 (ODNI Guidelines)  10.17 (emphasis added); see also Central Intelligence Agency Activities: Procedures Approved by the Attorney General Pursuant to Executive Order 12333 (CIA Guidelines)  12.20; DOD Manual 5240.01: Procedures Governing the Conduct of DOD Intelligence Activities (DOD Manual)  G.2\nat page 53.\n\n(U) To repeat for emphasis and clarity, unless otherwise indicated in context, we use the term\n\"CAI\" to refer to CAI that is also PAI, and our report addresses only CAI that is also PAI. Nonpublic CAI raises distinct legal and policy questions and is beyond the scope of our current efforts.\n\n(U//FOUO) Our discussions with IC elements included a heavy emphasis on defining CAI, a valuable and foundational effort for this report and any future regulation of CAI. Focus on a formal definition, however, should not obscure the functional perspective that animates our recommendations. As discussed in the balance of this report, CAI merits special attention today because of its increasing importance for intelligence as well as for privacy and civil liberties (as discussed in Part 2), and because it has, at least in part, overtaken current IC policies that address it (as discussed in Part 3). Those concerns should inform efforts to apply, and if necessary to modify, the formal definition of CAI in the many, varied and evolving contexts that the IC does and will face. Cf. Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board, Report to the President on Implementation of Presidential Policy Directive 28: Signals Intelligence Activities at 12, 24 (noting the absence of a formal definition of \"signals intelligence\" under PPD-28). 1.2. (U) CAI Sellers. A key feature of CAI is that it is often sold or otherwise made available by commercial entities. Sellers of CAI are often referred to as \"data brokers\" or \"information resellers.\" As the Government Accountability Office (GAO) reported in December 2013, these sellers of CAI\n\nmaintain large, sophisticated databases with consumer information that can include credit histories, insurance claims, criminal records, employment histories, incomes, ethnicities, purchase histories, and interests. Resellers largely obtain their information from public records, publicly available information (such as directories and newspapers), and nonpublic information (such as from retail loyalty cards, warranty registrations, contests, and web browsing). Characterizing the precise size and nature of the reseller industry can be difficult because of limited publicly known information about the industry.\n\n(U) In testimony before the Senate Banking Committee in June 2019, a GAO official repeated the substance of those observations from 2013 and provided the following graphic to illustrate the development of and market for CAI:\nGraph is Unclassified\n\n\n(U) A May 2014 report from the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) provides a similar account: (U) Data brokers collect data from commercial, government, and other publicly available sources. Data collected could include bankruptcy information, voting registration, consumer purchase data, web browsing activities, warranty registrations, and other details of consumers' everyday interactions. Data brokers do not obtain this data directly from consumers, and consumers are thus largely unaware that data brokers are collecting and using this information. While each data broker source may provide only a few data elements about a consumer's activities, data brokers can put all of these data elements together to form a more detailed composite of the consumer's life.\n\n\n(U) Civil society groups in the United States have also described data brokers and the market for CAI in the context of their public advocacy efforts. A recent example is the report from the Center for Democracy and Technology (CDT), *Legal Loopholes and Data for Dollars*, released in December 2021. As of this writing, major data brokers include Accenture, Acxiom, CoreLogic, Epsilon, Intelius, LexisNexis, Oracle (Datalogix), Thomson Reuters, and Verisk (these companies, and the ones further discussed below, are listed solely for purposes of illustration, and references to the work of civil society groups are similarly for descriptive purposes only). In general, CAI sellers include those focused on marketing and advertising, fraud detection, risk mitigation, and identity resolution (people finders). Purchasers of CAI include other data brokers, various private-sector and non-governmental entities, and governments worldwide, including the IC.\n\n1.3. (U) Examples of CAI. We do not attempt a comprehensive description of the scope and scale of data that are available as CAI, or the relevant markets, in part because they are so large and so dynamic. However, a few examples of CAI offerings will illustrate the current nature of available offerings:\n\n\n- (U) \"Thomson Reuters CLEAR is powered by billions of data points and leverages\ncutting-edge public records technology to bring all key content together in a customizable dashboard.\"\n\n- (U) LexisNexis offers more than \"84B records from 10,000+ sources, including\nalternative data that helps surface more of the 63M unbanked/underbanked U.S. adults.\"\n\n- (U) Exactis has \"over 3.5 billion records (updated monthly)\" in its \"universal data\nwarehouse.\"\n\n- (U) PeekYou \"collects and combines scattered content from social sites, news sources,\nhomepages, and blog platforms to present comprehensive online identities.\"\n\n(U) As these examples show, there is a large and growing amount of CAI in existence and offered for sale, some of it sensitive with respect to privacy. The market for CAI, including analysis and exploitation of CAI for insight, is evolving both qualitatively (e.g., as to types of data available) and quantitatively (as to amounts of data available) - see, for example, this March 2021 summary from Gartner. It includes significant information on U.S. persons, much of which can be acquired in bulk. As discussed below, moreover, certain CAI that is \"anonymized\" and available in bulk can readily be reidentified to reveal information about individuals.\n\n1.4. (U) Origins & Evolution of CAI. In substantial part, the vast and growing amount of available CAI results from evolving digital technology, and the proliferation of digital dust created by individuals in their daily lives. As our TOR explain, \"[t]he digital revolution has placed an incredible amount of information into the hands of private actors, many of whom seek to sell the data.\" For example, CAI can be obtained from public records, sometimes digitized from paper originals, such as information about real estate transactions that can be found in local title offices or courthouses. It can be obtained from smartphone and other software applications, often in the form of software development kits (SDK), that collect information from devices in the U.S. and abroad. And CAI can be obtained from cookies and other methods, sometimes associated with real-time bidding (RTB) for sales of online advertising, that track end users as they browse the Internet. In April 2021, a bipartisan group of U.S. Senators raised questions about \"the sharing of Americans' data through 'real time bidding' - the auction process used to place many targeted digital advertisements.\" The details of these digital developments are beyond the scope of this report; it is sufficient for our purposes, and widely understood among intelligence professionals and policymakers, that they have significantly contributed to the profound increase in CAI.\n\n1.5. (U) Commercial Value of CAI. Various forms of CAI can be combined to synergistic effect in service of various commercial interests. For example, according to an October 2020 press release from Gartner, the \"internet of behaviors (IoB) is emerging as many technologies capture and use the 'digital dust' of peoples' daily lives. The IoB combines existing technologies that focus on the individual directly - facial recognition, location tracking and big data for example - and connects the resulting data to associated behavioral events, such as cash purchases or device usage.\" As the FTC explained in its May 2014 report:\n(U) Data brokers rely on websites with registration features and cookies to find consumers online and target Internet advertisements to them based on their offline activities. Once a data broker locates a consumer online and places a cookie on the consumer's browser, the data broker's client can advertise to that consumer across the Internet for as long as the cookie stays on the consumer's browser. Consumers may not be aware that data brokers are providing companies with products to allow them to advertise to consumers online based on their offline activities. Some data brokers are using similar technology to serve targeted advertisements to consumers on mobile devices. (U) The commercial value of CAI is plainly high, which is why the market for CAI is large and growing.\n\n\n1.6 (U) Deanonymization/Reidentification. CAI can also be combined, or used with other non-\nCAI data, to reverse engineer identities or deanonymize various forms of information. As the New York Times reported in December 2019, \"[i]f you own a mobile phone, its every move is logged and tracked by dozens of companies ... The Times Privacy Project obtained a dataset with more than 50 billion location pings from the phones of more than 12 million people in this country. It was a random sample from 2016 and 2017, but it took only minutes - with assistance from publicly available information - for us to deanonymize location data.\" The Times was able to track the movements of President Trump via a member of his Secret Service detail. Deanonymized data may be useful for commercial and/or intelligence purposes.\n\n\n## 2. (U) The Role Of Cai In Intelligence Collection And Analysis\n\n (U//FOUO) CAI clearly provides intelligence value, whether considered in isolation and/or in combination with other information, and whether reviewed by humans and/or by machines. The IC currently acquires a significant amount of CAI for mission-related purposes, including in some cases social media data\n\n and many other types of information. As a resource available to the general public, including adversaries, CAI also raises counter-intelligence risks for the IC. It also has increasingly important risks and implications for U.S. person privacy and civil liberties, as CAI can reveal sensitive and intimate information about individuals. Without proper controls, CAI can be misused to cause substantial harm, embarrassment, and inconvenience to U.S. persons.\n\nThe widespread availability of CAI regarding the activities of large numbers of individuals is a relatively new, rapidly growing, and increasingly significant part of the information environment in which the IC must function. That is the core of why it was necessary and appropriate for the IC\nto recognize the complex issues inherent in modern CAI and to commission this report.\n\n2.1. (U) CAI as a Source for OSINT. For the IC, CAI provides intelligence value as a form of publicly available information used to create Open Source Intelligence (OSINT), as well as for other purposes including force protection and enrichment of information in other INT\ndisciplines. Many recent commissions and reports have focused on the value of CAI and other PAI as OSINT. For example, in 2005, the WMD Commission's report concluded (pages 22-23) that \"analysts who use open source information can be more effective than those who don't,\" and urged creation of an \"entity that collects, processes, and makes available to analysts the mass of open source information that is available in the world today.\" Similarly, the January\n2019 \"AIM Initiative\" from the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI), which is a strategy for augmenting intelligence using machines, explained \"the IC must develop both the capability and capacity to take advantage of available data across all INTs and open source, and develop AI solutions that process and relate information from multiple modalities.\" A January\n2021 report from the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) notes that the IC\nmust \"encourage IC agencies to integrate OSINT into collection and analytic tradecraft,\" because the \"combination of cloud, cloud-based AI and analytics tools, and commercial GEOINT\nand SIGINT collection means that high-quality, multi-source intelligence analysis can be produced at the unclassified level from anywhere equipped to do so.\" 2.2. (U) Examples of CAI Contracts. The IC currently acquires a large amount of CAI. Unclassified IC and other contracts for CAI can be found at Sam.Gov, a U.S. government website that allows searching by agency or sub-agency and by keywords, among other things. By way of example only, this website shows that the following agencies have, have had, have considered, or are considering the following contracts or proposals related to CAI:\n\n- (U) The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) with ZeroFox for social media alerting\n(15F06721P0002431)\n\n##\n\n- (U) The Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) for social media reports on individuals who\nare seeking a security clearance (HHM402-16-SM-CHECKS), and with LexisNexis for\n\"retrieval of comprehensive on-line search results related to commercial due diligence from a maximum number of sources (news, company, public records, legal, regulatory financial, and industry information),\" among other things (HHM402-21-Q-0094)\n- (U) The U.S. Navy with Sayari Analytics, Inc. for access to its database that \"contains tens\nof thousands of previously-unidentified specific nodes, facilities and key people related to US sanctioned actors including '2+3' threats to national security\" (N0001518PR11212)\n- (U) Various offices within the Treasury Department for access to Banker's Almanac\n(RFQ-FIN-55100-21-0010)\n\n- (U) The Department of Defense (DOD) for access to Jane's online (W31P4Q17T0009)\n\n- (U) The Coast Guard with Babel Street for \"Open Source Data Collection, Translation,\nAnalysis Application\" (70Z08419QVA044).\n (U) In addition, DIA has provided the following information about a CAI contract in an unclassified and publicly-available paper sent to Congress on January 15, 2021:\n(U) DIA currently provides funding to another agency that purchases commercially available geolocation metadata aggregated from smartphones. The data DIA receives is global in scope and is not identified as \"U.S. location data\" or \"foreign location data\" by the vendor at the time it is provisioned to DIA. DIA processes the location data as it arrives to identify U.S. location data points that it segregates in a separate database. DIA personnel can only query the U.S. location database when authorized through a specific process requiring approval from the Office of General Counsel (OGC), Office of Oversight and Compliance (OOC), and DIA senior leadership. Permission to query the U.S. device location data has been granted five times in the past two-and-a-half years for authorized purposes. (U) In the process of preparing this report, DHS described for us three ways in which CAI is generally used by its Office of Intelligence and Analysis (I&A):\n\n\n- (U//FOUO) Web of Science is a powerful targeting tool, as it allows DHS I&A analysts to\nquickly and efficiently search and triage a large repository of academic publications and filter according to funding sources, affiliations, co-authors, and other key terms. This\nservice provides critical insight into academic publications that are not easily found elsewhere or are hidden behind paywalls when searched via other means, such as Google Scholar. For example, using Web of Science, DHS I&A analysts have identified foreign researchers studying in the United States with previously unknown associations with their home country's military. Additionally, through the currently OSDLS-managed subscriptions, we are also able to access the Web of Science API, which allows us to apply data analytics to the database.\n\n\n- (U//FOUO) CLEAR enables DHS I&A to resolve identities and also provides leads for\nfurther analysis in DHS systems, thereby focusing resources on threat actors and not innocent persons. Commercial databases like CLEAR often have current location and contact information as well. Often, given the target set we focus on - non-traditional\ncollectors - intelligence collection is not sufficient to resolve identities of subjects of\ninterest. Data available in a commercially available datasets enables identity resolution by comparing it to what's in DHS systems and also reduces the risk of misidentification.\n\n- (U//FOUO) Dun and Bradstreet and similar tools enable DHS I&A to resolve private\ncompanies' primary enterprises with their subsidiaries/affiliates and provides leads for\nfurther analysis in DHS systems and classified databases. Access to this information is critical to countering malign foreign investment that may threaten the security and resiliency of U.S. critical infrastructure.\n\n2.3. (U) Examples of CAI Value. In our classified briefings with IC elements, we discussed the intelligence value of CAI, including how it can be used to reduce cost and risk of acquisition that might otherwise occur through clandestine means. The IC is strongly of the view that it will be at a significant disadvantage vis a vis foreign adversaries and competitors if it does not enjoy certain access to CAI. We urge the IC to make available several unclassified examples showing the value of CAI because we believe it will help inform the policy debate, in keeping with Principles of Intelligence Transparency for the IC. The IC has done this in the past in other contexts, including for Section 702 of the FISA Amendments Act. (U) Here are two unclassified examples provided by the IC in response to our request while we were preparing this report:\n\n- (U//FOUO) \"NSA's Cybersecurity Collaboration Center leveraged commercial and SIGINT\nsources to expand the community sight picture on the advanced persistent threat Cobalt Strike actor. Analysts used enterprise access from\n\n and others to identify a pattern in the registration of the\nseed nodes shared by the 370 domains - of which 19 were tagged by\nand of\nthose, 7 resolved to CobaltStrike infrastructure. A pattern in uniform resource locators (URLs) was also discovered to be associated with CobaltStrike using CAI which led to the\ndiscovery of an additional 49 internet protocol (IP) addresses.\"\n- (U//FOUO) \"CAI allows the IC to create valuable products for excluded missions like\nHADR [humanitarian assistance and disaster response]. These products are similar to those created by the commercial and academic community. These types of use cases focus on providing strategic level analytic outputs on how events affect human mobility at-scale or the country level. Examples include but are not limited to, how natural\ndisasters and the spread of disease affect the movement of humans and vice versa.\"\n(U) We expect that the IC will be able to provide additional unclassified examples over time. If necessary, moreover, classified examples should be made available to appropriate audiences. We believe that CAI is extremely and increasingly valuable and important for the conduct of modern intelligence activity, both as a source of OSINT and to support, enrich and enable other INT disciplines.\n\n2.4. (U) Non-Analytic Uses of CAI. It is important to recognize that in some cases, CAI may also be used for purposes other than intelligence collection and analysis. At the outset, of course, the FBI uses CAI under its law enforcement authorities, as authorized in AG Guidelines and FBI\npolicy, for the investigation of criminal matters, and non-intelligence elements of DOD may also use CAI for their missions. We also briefly consider three non-analytic intelligence use cases of CAI.\n\n(U//FOUO) First, CAI may be useful in supporting compliance with legal or policy requirements.\n\nFor example, geolocation CAI might be able to support compliance with 50 U.S.C.  1881a\n(Section 702 of the FISA Amendments Act), which generally applies only to collection targeting non-U.S. persons reasonably believed to be located outside the United States. CAI can help determine location for compliance with this core requirement of Section 1881a. It may also be useful in complying with requirements established by Congress for situations in which non-U.S.\n\npersons abroad who are under surveillance travel into the United States. See 50 U.S.C.  1805(f). More generally, CAI may also help establish the \"foreignness\" of SIGINT or other collection targets as necessary to meet legal or policy requirements. (U//FOUO) Second, CAI may also be used in support of clandestine and HUMINT operations. CAI\nutilized in support of operations uniquely enables activities like cover development and operations planning. These activities are tightly held within the IC and subject to extremely restrictive operations access and handling rules. Further, CAI data obtained to support operations is outside the IC's classic analysis and intelligence reporting streams - it is not disseminated. (U) Third, CAI may be useful in building and training artificial intelligence models. Although nonanalytical in the strict sense, such models themselves can then be used to gain analytic insight or for other purposes.\n\n(U) We do not mean to suggest a policy outcome in these particular use cases. Our only point is that policy questions concerning CAI are not one-dimensional. The importance and nature of the need, the absence of viable alternatives for meeting it, restrictions on access to and use and dissemination of data, should all be considered in reaching an appropriate policy judgment in each case - assuming, as always, that outcomes are not dictated by law. It may be, for example, that certain privacy-protecting methods, such as encrypting, masking, and use of differential privacy, may be viable for some mission needs even if not for others.\n\n2.5. (U) Counter-Intelligence Risks in CAI. There is also a growing recognition that CAI, as a generally available resource, offers intelligence benefits to our adversaries, some of which may create counter-intelligence risk for the IC. For example, the January 2021 CSIS report cited above also urges the IC to \"test and demonstrate the utility of OSINT and AI in analysis on critical threats, such as the adversary use of AI-enabled capabilities in disinformation and influence operations.\" Additional risks are developed in this April 2021 Lawfare article and this August 2021 report from Duke University. (U) The Duke University report describes certain counter-intelligence risks from CAI. It finds, for example, that of 10 major data brokers surveyed, three advertise that they can provide data to identify U.S. military personnel. The report goes on to note (as summarized in a Lawfare article by its author): \"Foreign actors could use this data to bolster their influence campaigns to interfere in U.S. electoral processes. Criminal organizations could use this data to build profiles on and subsequently target prosecutors and judges. Foreign intelligence organizations could acquire this data through a variety of meansincluding through front companies that could legally purchase the data from U.S. brokers and through simply hacking a data broker and stealing it allto build profiles on politicians, media figures, diplomats, civil servants, and even suspected or secretly identified intelligence operatives.\" (U) We have not necessarily validated these examples with the IC, meaning that they should not necessarily be taken as unresolved risks; but they illustrate the types of risk that CAI can create in the hands of our adversaries.\n\n2.6. (U) Sensitivity of CAI. CAI can reveal sensitive and intimate information about the personal attributes, private behavior, social connections, and speech of U.S. persons and non-U.S.\n\npersons. It can be misused to pry into private lives, ruin reputations, and cause emotional distress and threaten the safety of individuals. Even subject to appropriate controls, CAI can increase the power of the government's ability to peer into private lives to levels that may exceed our constitutional traditions or other social expectations. Mission creep can subject CAI collected for one purpose to other purposes that might raise risks beyond those originally calculated. The IC's use of CAI is also the subject of intense scrutiny and speculation by political leaders, the news media, and civil society.\n\n2.6.1. (U) CAI Includes Sensitive and Intimate Information. CAI can contain information that is deemed sensitive, meaning information that is not widely known about an individual that could be used to cause harm to the person's reputation, emotional well-being, or physical safety. As a primary justification for finding precise cell-site location information subject to Fourth Amendment protection in *Carpenter v. United States*, 138 S. Ct. 2206 (2018), the Supreme Court focused on how the \"data provides an intimate window into a person's life, revealing not only his particular movements, but through them his 'familial, political, professional, religious, and sexual associations.' These location records 'hold for many Americans the 'privacies of life.'\" Id. at 2217. CAI can also contain intimate information, meaning information that reveals private details about how people relate to one another.\n\n2.6.2. (U) Defining Sensitivity Categorically. Many statutes, rules, and privacy policies describe information sensitivity categorically, listing types of information that tend to raise risks of harm. To give a comparative example, the European General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) identifies as sensitive:\n\n(U) personal data revealing racial or ethnic origin, political opinions, religious or philosophical beliefs, or trade union membership., and the processing of genetic data, biometric data for the purpose of uniquely identifying a natural person, data concerning health or data concerning a natural person's sex life or sexual orientation. (U) Similarly, an internal data call from ODNI listed several categories of CAI as potentially sensitive, including:\n\n(U) persistent location information, medical (to include mental health) information, travel records, attorney-client information, information concerning ... religion or religious practices, information containing data on sexual activity, records regarding purchases, library records [as well as information] regarding individuals'\ncommunications [metadata and content] [and] information concerning individuals' expression of ideas or political views or the groups or individuals with whom they associate.\n\n\n2.6.3. (U//FOUO) CAI Can Be Misused. Studies document the extent to which large collections of sensitive and intimate information about individuals, CAI or not, can be subject to abuse. Documented examples of LOVEINT abuses (government officials spying on actual or potential romantic partners) involving other intelligence collections demonstrate the potential for comparable abuse of CAI held by the IC. In the wrong hands, sensitive insights gained through CAI could facilitate blackmail, stalking, harassment, and public shaming. Concerns like these are why, as detailed in Part 4, several IC elements require a \"volume, proportion, and sensitivity\" analysis of certain data practices that considers, among other things, the \"potential for substantial harm, embarrassment, inconvenience, or unfairness to U.S. persons if the information is improperly used or disclosed.\" 2.6.4. (U) CAI Increases the Power of the Government. The government would never have been permitted to compel billions of people to carry location tracking devices on their persons at all times, to log and track most of their social interactions, or to keep flawless records of all their reading habits. Yet smartphones, connected cars, web tracking technologies, the Internet of Things, and other innovations have had this effect without government participation. While the IC cannot willingly blind itself to this information, it must appreciate how unfettered access to CAI increases its power in ways that may exceed our constitutional traditions or other societal expectations.\n\n(U) CAI also implicates civil liberties. CAI can disclose, for example, the detailed movements and associations of individuals and groups, revealing political, religious, travel, and speech activities. CAI could be used, for example, to identify every person who attended a protest or rally based on their smartphone location or ad-tracking records. Civil liberties concerns such as these are examples of how large quantities of nominally \"public\" information can result in sensitive aggregations.\n\n\n2.6.5. (U) Aggregation of CAI Raise the Risk of Mission Creep. CAI collected for one purpose may be reused for other purposes. An assessment of the risk to privacy of data collected at one point in time may differ materially from a reassessment of the risk as applied to new purposes.\n\n2.6.6. (U) Public, Media, and Political Scrutiny. The public seems to care about the risk to personal privacy posed by the accumulation and sale of personal information by online platforms, smartphone apps, connected devices, and other commercial entities. A steady string of public controversies including Cambridge Analytica, the revelations by the *New York Times*\nabout data brokers that sell location information, the use of app usage data to identify a priest who was using the Grindr app, and the revelation of the sale of usage data by a Muslim prayer app, among many other examples, demonstrate the keen interest in CAI, at least on the part of the media, civil society groups, and political leaders. The possible future revelation that any component of the IC has gathered CAI without a proper accounting for the costs and benefits raises the risk of significant media attention and political fallout and could jeopardize other forms of CAI collection and use.\n\n2.6.7. (U) Need for Thoughtful Approach. None of this is to suggest that CAI should be categorically off-limits to the IC; the CAI that we address is publicly available, including to friendly and adversarial foreign governments (and their intelligence services), nongovernmental organizations, commercial entities of many kinds, and individuals. It is only to say that the privacy and civil liberties concerns that underlie judicial decisions like *Carpenter*, and possible legislation restricting access to CAI, are real and important, and that the IC should therefore take responsibility to develop a thoughtful and balanced approach in this area.\n\n(U) As noted above, we think it is insufficient as a matter of policy to treat all CAI as PAI, without more, because modern CAI is so different from traditional PAI. Today's CAI is more revealing, available on more people (in bulk), less possible to avoid, and less well understood than traditional PAI. It is only a little oversimplified to say that when Executive Order 12333 was adopted, U.S. persons generally understood that the White Pages and the *New York Times* were public, but also understood that it was possible to choose an unpublished telephone number and (usually) to keep oneself out of the newspaper. Today, in a way that far fewer Americans seem to understand, and even fewer of them can avoid, CAI includes information on nearly everyone that is of a type and level of sensitivity that historically could have been obtained, if at all, only through targeted (and predicated) collection. As a matter of policy, therefore, asserting that modern CAI is materially indistinguishable from traditional PAI \"is like saying a ride on horseback is materially indistinguishable from a flight to the moon.\" *Riley v. California*, 573 U.S.\n\n373, 393 (2014). These new qualitative and quantitative aspects of CAI, particularly of or concerning U.S. persons and as discussed in Section 4.3.4, are key sensitivity concerns that animate the need for a new approach.\n\n2.7. (U) Summary. We have no doubt that CAI can provide significant intelligence value, both to the IC and to our adversaries, whether standing alone or in combination with other information that is collected using classified sources and methods, and whether analyzed by humans and/or by machines. It also clearly raises significant issues of privacy and sensitivity, including for U.S.\n\npersons. CAI is a relatively new, rapidly growing, and increasingly significant part of the information environment in which the IC must function. That is the core of why this report is necessary.\n\n\n\n## 3. (U) The Existing Policy Framework For Cai\n\n (U) Under the U.S. Constitution, federal statutes, and IC elements' internal procedures, CAI is generally less strictly regulated than other forms of information acquired by the IC, principally because it is publicly available. In our view, however, changes in CAI have considerably undermined the historical policy rationale for treating PAI categorically as non-sensitive information, that the IC can use without significantly affecting the privacy and civil liberties of U.S. persons. For example, under Carpenter v. United States, acquisition of persistent location information (and perhaps other detailed information) concerning one person by law enforcement from communications providers is a Fourth Amendment \"search\" that generally requires probable cause. However, the same type of information on millions of Americans is openly for sale to the general public. As such, IC policies treat the information as PAI and IC elements can purchase it. While IC policies regulate such information based on the volume, proportion and sensitivity of USPI it contains, those policies may not accord sufficient protection to information that is now broadly understood to be sensitive. It is not sufficient as a matter of policy simply to say that CAI is PAI; and saying so without more may be affirmatively confusing to intelligence professionals.\n\n3.1. (U) PAI. Historically, PAI has not been considered sensitive, as reflected in both U.S. law and policy. In keeping with our TOR, we do not offer an independent legal analysis of this issue;\ninstead, we review the legal background governing PAI solely as context for our policy discussion of CAI.\n\n3.1.1. (U) Constitutional Provisions. As a general matter, under the Fourth Amendment, \"[w]hat a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection.\" *Katz v. United States*, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967). To be sure, more recent decisions, most notably *Carpenter v. United States*, 138 S. Ct. 2206 (2018), raise questions about the extent to which providing information to certain third parties can extinguish a reasonable expectation of privacy in that information. In keeping with our TOR, we do not attempt to answer those questions; it is enough for our purposes to recognize the general rule that PAI is not deemed sensitive. To take an obvious example, the Justices' signed opinions in *Carpenter* are clearly not protected by the Fourth Amendment and are available in searchable CAI data sets from Lexis, Westlaw, and other providers. Historically, PAI also generally was not considered sensitive under the First Amendment; but PAI today, including CAI, may implicate First Amendment rights.\n\n3.1.2. (U) Federal Statutes. Resting on the constitutional understanding discussed above, many federal statutes expressly decline to protect, and assume the absence of Fourth Amendment protection for, PAI. The federal Wiretap Act, 18 U.S.C.  2511(2)(g)(i), provides that it \"shall not be unlawful . . . for any person . . . to intercept or access an electronic communication made through an electronic communication system that is configured so that such electronic communication is readily accessible to the general public.\" Similarly, the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act defines \"electronic surveillance\" in ways that expressly incorporate Fourth Amendment principles and law enforcement standards, 50 U.S.C.  1801(f), and requires \"minimization\" of \"nonpublicly available information,\" 50 U.S.C.  1801(h). To be sure, the Privacy Act, 5 U.S.C.  552a, also places certain restrictions on the IC when it collects and retrieves USPI, including when the USPI is also PAI. The IC must have clear authority and mission need to collect this PAI; must provide a notice to the public about the collection (system of records notices), and generally may not maintain a record describing how an individual exercises First Amendment rights. Some PAI can include protected speech (e.g., social media posts) or associational information, and the Privacy Act would need to be considered before collecting such information.\n\n3.1.3. (U) Pending Legislation. We are aware that there are federal legislative efforts underway that might affect the treatment of CAI, at least as acquired by the IC or other governmental entities. We do not express an opinion on the merits of any particular pending or contemplated legislation, but as an institutional matter we believe that legislation could address policy concerns with the current regulatory framework governing CAI.\n\n3.1.4. (U) IC Policy. The foundational document governing the IC also treats PAI as relatively unprotected. Section 2.3 of Executive Order 12333 authorizes IC elements \"to collect, retain, or dissemination information about U.S. persons\" in accordance with procedures established by the head of the IC element and the Attorney General, and provides that these procedures \"shall permit collection, retention, and dissemination of . . . [i]nformation that is publicly available or collected with the consent of the person concerned.\" The term \"publicly available\" is defined in the procedures of several IC elements. For example, the procedures for the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) define \"publicly available information\" is as follows: (U) [1] information that has been published or broadcast for public consumption, [2] is available on request to the public, [3] is accessible online or otherwise to the public, [4]\nis available to the public by subscription or purchase, [5] could be seen or heard by any casual observer (but not amounting to physical surveillance), [6] is made available at a meeting open to the public, or [7] is obtained by visiting any place or attending any event that is open to the public. (U) Information is publicly available only if it is made available to the CIA under conditions or on terms generally applicable to the public. For example, certain commercially acquired data may be considered publicly available if a non-U.S. government person or corporation could acquire that same data in that same way from that same commercial source; however, other commercial acquisitions of data may be so tailored and specialized for government use, and unavailable to a similarly situated private-sector purchaser, that the data cannot be considered publicly available.\n\n(U) CIA Guidelines  12.20 (emphasis added). The corresponding guidance for DOD intelligence elements adopts a similar definition and adds the clarification that \"Publicly available information includes information generally available to persons in a military community even though the military community is not open to the civilian general public.\" DOD Manual 5240.01  3.2.b and G-2 at page 53.\n\n(U) Under Executive Order 12333, moreover, some IC elements are authorized to collect information (mainly or exclusively) \"overtly or through publicly available sources.\" EO 12333  1.7(i)-(j), 1.8, 1.9, 1.12(c). The expansion of PAI to include modern CAI is highly consequential for the work of these IC elements. 3.1.5. (U) IC Guidance. In July 2011, ODNI issued Civil Liberties and Privacy Guidance for Intelligence Community Professionals: Properly Obtaining and Using Publicly Available Information. This guidance included a \"shorthand, non-exhaustive list of factors to consider for properly obtaining and using\" PAI, including that the PAI is (1) available to the general public; (2) lawfully obtained by the IC (e.g., if a hacker posts instructions on a blog for how to penetrate a bank's online security, the bank's data does not become lawfully available as a result); (3) the IC purchaser has complied with any requirements to disclose IC affiliation, which is often addressed through guidelines on \"undisclosed participation\" and similar rules; (4) requirements for U.S. person information, including as to purpose, retention, and dissemination, are met; and (5) there are safeguards in place to ensure that the information is used in a manner that satisfies IC standards for \"information accuracy, quality, and reliability,\" including those in ICD\n203. Although this guidance is more than a decade old, we believe that it is valuable and could be updated as discussed further below. 3.2. (U) CAI. As discussed above, the definition of PAI in modern IC guidelines includes CAI to the extent that it \"is available to the public by subscription or purchase.\" That description applies to much CAI, and as previously noted it is the focus of our report, to the exclusion of CAI\nproducts that are available only to governments. As noted above, IC elements' guidelines recognize that while some CAI is PAI, other commercial acquisitions of data may be so tailored and specialized for government use, and unavailable to a similarly situated private-sector purchaser, that the data cannot be considered publicly available. Approaching the issue from the other side, there are certain legal restrictions on providing CAI to the U.S. government as opposed to other purchasers (see, e.g., 18 U.S.C.  2702(a)(3)), as well as potential limits on those restrictions (see, e.g., 18 U.S.C.  2511(2)(F)). In substantial part, however, CAI is available to the IC much as it is to the general public, other private-sector entities and non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and foreign governments.\n\n3.3. (U) CAI Under IC Guidelines. As we understand it, here is the process, in the form of issues and questions, that the CIA and DOD Attorney General guidelines (issued under Section 2.3 of Executive Order 12333) prescribe for potential acquisition and treatment of CAI (other IC elements have their own guidelines, some of which at this writing are in the process of being revised).\n\n3.3.1. (U) Authorized Purpose. This is required for all activity under the IC guidelines. For example, as a general matter, the CIA may collect information, including information concerning U.S. persons and U.S. Person Identifying Information (USPI or USPII, depending on the agency), only if the collection has \"a purpose consistent with [lawful] CIA authorities and responsibilities.\" CIA Guidelines  3.3. Similarly, as a general matter the DOD Manual permits intentional acquisition of USPI \"only if the information sought is reasonably believed to be necessary for the performance of an authorized intelligence mission or function assigned to the [DOD] Component\" conducting the acquisition. DOD Manual  3.2.c; see id.  3.2.f(2). These baseline requirements preclude, for example, intelligence collection for domestic political purposes. See, e.g., CIA Guidelines  3.3 (\"CIA is not authorized to and shall not collect or maintain information concerning U.S. persons solely for the purpose of monitoring (1) activities protected by the First Amendment or (2) the lawful exercise of other rights secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States ... CIA is not authorized to and shall not engage in any intelligence activity, including dissemination of information to the Executive Office of the President, for the purpose of affecting the political process in the United States\"); see also The Attorney General's Guidelines for Domestic FBI Operations. These limitations are themselves derived from and consistent with Sections 2.3 and 2.4 of Executive Order 12333 and other provisions of law.\n\n3.3.2. (U) Publicly Available. Where the IC has an authorized intelligence purpose, and the information it seeks is reasonably believed to be necessary for that purpose, it generally may collect information, including USPI, if the information is publicly available. See, e.g., DOD Manual  3.2.c.(1); CIA Guidelines  4.2(a), 4.21.\n\n\n3.3.3. (U) Scope of Collection. The CIA's guidelines permit the use of a collection technique\n\"only if a less intrusive technique cannot acquire intelligence of the nature, reliability, and timeliness required,\" and they treat collection of publicly available CIA as a \"basic\" collection technique, generally the least intrusive category. CIA Guidelines  4.1-4.2. However, the CIA Guidelines also require ( 3.3) that in \"any collection activity, the CIA shall collect only the amount of information reasonably necessary to support [an authorized] purpose.\" Where a collection exceeds the agency's ability promptly to evaluate all of the collected information for retention, the CIA guidelines require the approving official to document \"the collection technique(s) employed, including any reasonable steps that were or will be taken to limit the information to the smallest separable subset of data containing the information necessary to achieve the purpose of the collection,\" such as the use of \"filters or similar technology\" that \"should be applied as early as practicable in the course of the collection activity.\" Id.  5.2(c).\n\nThe CIA Guidelines explicitly address and require additional documentation for bulk collection (information collected without discriminants). See id.  5, 12.2. The DOD Manual provides that in addition to using the \"least intrusive means\" of collection,  3.2.(f)(3)(a), \"in collecting nonpublicly available USPI,\" DOD components \"will, to the extent practicable, collect no more information than is reasonably necessary.\" DOD Manual  3.2.f.(3)(a), 3.2.f.(4). By its terms, this last requirement does not apply to PAI, although DOD's rules on the volume, proportionality, and sensitivity (VPS) of USPI, discussed immediately below, do apply if the CAI includes USPI. Current understandings of CAI as a subset of PAI mean that IC elements are essentially encouraged to acquire CAI, when it is PAI, over other sources of information.\n\n\n3.3.3.1. (U) Clarification of Current Guidelines. The IC may want to recalibrate, clarify or consider its understanding of whether and how the preference for collection using the \"least intrusive means\" relates to a preference to collect information that is necessary for an authorized purpose. The increasing availability of CAI means that potentially sensitive information on large numbers of persons may be PAI. In some cases, therefore, collecting a large dataset using commercial means might invade privacy more than a narrower collection using means that target a specific individual or smaller group. New guidance from some IC\nelements addresses some of these issues (see, e.g., discussion of DIA procedures below).\n\n3.3.4. (U) Volume, Proportion, Sensitivity (VPS) of USPI. The DOD Manual defines a category known as \"Special Circumstances Collection\" according to the \"volume, proportion, and sensitivity of USPI likely to be acquired, and the intrusiveness of the methods used to collect the information,\" including when the information is PAI. DOD Manual  3.2.e. When \"special circumstances exist, the DOD component head or delegee must determine whether to authorize the collection and, if so, whether enhanced safeguards are appropriate.\" Id. The CIA\nGuidelines address \"volume proportion, and sensitivity\" of USPII in \"exceptional handling requirements\" that apply to unevaluated data sets and might require \"additional access approvals or additional training requirements,\" among other things. CIA Guidelines  6.2. Some IC elements have established, or are in the process of developing, more detailed VPS guidance, as discussed in Part 4.\n\n\n3.4. (U) CAI & *Carpenter*. Although to our knowledge the IC has not arrived at a communitywide formal position on the issue, at least one IC element, the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), has advised Congress in writing that, as of January 15, 2021, it \"does not construe the Carpenter decision to require a judicial warrant endorsing purchase or use of commerciallyavailable data for intelligence purposes.\" We do not express a view on the legal merits of this position, in keeping with our TOR, but in an effort to provide context for readers of this report, we believe that it may rest on one or more of the following theories: (1) certain forms of CAI do not implicate the privacy or Fourth Amendment rights of any data subject (e.g., topographical maps); (2) some CAI involves data and other factors that bring the acquisition outside the scope of *Carpenter*, meaning that normal third-party doctrine (e.g., *United States v. Miller*, 425 U.S. 435 (1976)) extinguishes any rights in the data subject; (3) for data types and acquisition modes that are subject to *Carpenter*, the decision does not apply to the \"special need\" of intelligence collection conducted by the IC; (4) even if *Carpenter* does apply, it would at most create a shared Fourth Amendment interest among the data seller and the data subject, meaning that the seller may consent unilaterally to sell the CAI, at least where the subject is not present and objecting to the sale (e.g., *United States v. Matlock*, 415 U.S. 164 (1974); Fernandez v. California, 571 U.S. 292 (2014) - a consent-based Fourth Amendment doctrine that is orthogonal to and unchanged by *Carpenter*. (U//FOUO) At the same time, however, ODNI has taken the position in writing that, while Carpenter's reach remains uncertain, the IC will collect persistent location data under FISA's provisions requiring probable cause and applicable to collection of communications \"contents\" rather than metadata, which is a clear effort to hedge against the possible application of Carpenter to foreign intelligence collection. This is not meant to suggest internal legal disagreement within the IC, but only to say that IC elements can and have made policy judgments designed to hedge against the possibility that *Carpenter* applies beyond its facts, or otherwise to address the concerns that underlie it.\n\n\n\n## 4. (U) Recommendations\n\n (U//FOUO) We have three recommendations. **First**, the IC should develop a multi-layered process to catalog, to the extent feasible, the CAI that IC elements acquire. This will be a complex undertaking requiring attention to procurement contracts, functionally equivalent data acquisition processes, data flows, and data use. The IC cannot understand and improve how it deals with CAI unless and until it knows what it is doing with CAI. **Second**, based on that knowledge, the IC should develop a set of adaptable standards and procedures for CAI, governing and requiring regular re-evaluation of acquisition and other decisions. **Third**, as part of this set of standards and procedures, and/or as a complement to it, the IC should develop more precise sensitivity and privacy-protecting guidance for CAI. PAI is no longer a good proxy for non-sensitive information; today, much CAI is very sensitive, and the IC therefore needs to develop more refined approaches.\n\n4.1. (U//FOUO) Recommendation #1: The IC Should Learn How It Acquires and Uses CAI. As discussed in Part 1, changes in digital technology and related factors have created a large and growing market for CAI that includes significant VPS of USPI but remains PAI under current IC guidelines. CAI is very valuable as a source of intelligence insight and creates significant risks to privacy. But the IC does not currently have sufficient visibility into its own acquisition and use of CAI across its 18 elements. Accordingly, our first recommendation is for the IC to implement a process that affords it better insight, on a going-forward basis, as to that acquisition and use.\n\n\n4.1.1. (U//FOUO) The Value of Understanding. Given the increasing importance of CAI, and the highly dynamic nature of available offerings and markets, the IC is rightly focused on understanding its own collection and use of CAI. Insight gained from 18 IC elements could inform community-wide best practices in several areas, including means and terms of acquisition, analysis and other approaches to use and exploitation (e.g., increased awareness of the intelligence value of CAI to the IC and to our adversaries), awareness of privacy and other sensitivities, and applicable legal and policy rules and frameworks. Cf. ICD 501. Logically inconsistent approaches to CAI (as opposed to mere differences in approach, which properly may result from differences in mission, authorities, and other factors) can be found and addressed. In addition, overseers will rightly pose questions about the IC's approach to CAI, and the IC should be able to answer those questions with high fidelity and confidence. 4.1.2. (U) Prospective Cataloguing Effort. For three main reasons, we recommend that the IC pursue a forward-looking and recurring effort to understanding its own use of CAI. As part of that process, of course, the IC will need to navigate security and counterintelligence concerns.\n\n\n(U) First, prior retrospective data calls have not fully succeeded. An attempt from the beginning of 2021 did not return comprehensive and reliable results, and - in part for that reason - the data call underlying our report sought only representative samples of CAI. That data call has served us well, and when combined with insights from our discussions with IC elements we believe it provides a suitable foundation for our report and recommendations. Our report is not, however, based on anything approaching a complete survey of the use of CAI by the IC, and difficulties in accessing historical information about the use of CAI informs our recommendation for a new, forward-looking approach. Depending on what is revealed by that forward-looking approach, significant new work may be required. For example, as noted throughout this report, our report addresses CAI that is publicly available; if it turns out to be the case that the IC acquires and uses a significant amount of CAI that is not PAI (e.g., because it is sold only to governmental customers, not to the general public), then further analysis on that issue probably would be necessary. (U) Second, we believe that a prospective effort will be valuable. The IC's acquisition and use of CAI, as well as the overall market for CAI, is very dynamic, making a retrospective survey less informative and useful for developing new approaches. (U)Third, and relatedly, a forward-looking process that recurs could capture both current and future states of affairs concerning CAI, allowing the IC to keep up with what we expect will be significant developments over time.\n\n4.1.3. (U) Multi-Layered Cataloguing Effort. We recommend that the IC's forward-looking process for cataloguing CAI be multi-layered. (U) At the outset, the cataloguing effort should include formal contracts and procurement decisions, as well as functionally equivalent agency-specific data acquisition processes, because these will help identify CAI when it first arrives at (or becomes available to) an IC element. By \"functionally equivalent agency-specific data acquisition processes,\" we mean to cover acquisition of CAI that occurs without a formal procurement decision, such as when CAI is provided (for ingestion or via a licensed right of access) to an IC element from a non-IC element, including U.S. Title 10 elements, law enforcement, foreign governments, and non-governmental organizations. These processes may vary from one IC element to another and over time within an IC element. Even within an explicit procurement setting, the role of CAI may not always be apparent - e.g., when a contract is for services, rather than for provisioning of CAI *per se*, but the services in question require the use of CAI by the service-provider. (U) Given these complexities in the acquisition of CAI, we also recommend that the IC focus detection efforts at later stages of the information lifecycle, including in the process of planning for and actually using data. We assess that this multi-layered approach is the best way efficiently to begin capturing CAI acquisitions and use, including CAI acquired in bulk (or otherwise in substantial amounts). (U) In particular, key inputs to the cataloguing process may include (1) documentation reflecting the purchase, license, or other acquisition of a CAI dataset; (2) audits by chief information officers (CIOs) and chief data officers (CDOs) responsible for monitoring data flows across agency systems and repositories; and (3) sourcing, citation and survey data from collection officers and intelligence analysts reflecting the exploitation of specific CAI sources to support tipping, queuing, finished intelligence (FINTEL), and other intelligence products. (U) If the IC finds that it acquires CAI through mechanisms outside the scope of what we have described in this report, then of course those mechanisms should be examined as well. Here, as in the definition of CAI, attempts to describe a formal scope of effort should not obscure the functional focus on gaining the best possible understanding of the CAI that is actually being acquired and used by the IC.\n\n4.1.4. (U) Common Taxonomy and Understanding. A central goal of the forward-looking process should be to develop an IC-wide common taxonomy and understanding of CAI, to permit meaningful comparisons and analysis at the scale of current and anticipated future CAI operations. Of course, different IC elements will naturally and rightly adopt different standards and procedures for CAI, according to their missions, authorities, need for CAI (and the sensitivity and other attributes of the CAI they need), and other factors. But our assessment is that current practices vary more, and more unsystematically, than is best. Put differently, the IC's approach to CAI so far has been mainly federated, with individual elements operating as what might be called laboratories of CAI governance. Cf. *New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann*, 285\nU.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). We think it is now time for the IC to assemble and identify best practices from the range of current practice, addressing both operational and risk/sensitivity frameworks, as discussed in our second and third recommendations, below.\n\n4.2. (U) Recommendation #2: The IC Should Develop a Set of Adaptable Standards and Procedures for CAI. The IC should adopt an end-to-end approach for CAI. The IC does not currently have, and in our view should develop, a set of adaptable standards and procedures for CAI that can be applied across the community. This can be done centrally, for the IC or the Defense Intelligence Enterprise (DIE) as a whole, and/or at individual IC elements (where the approaches could vary from one element to another as long as they are consistent in principle). Either way, as the IC develops approaches to CAI, it will need to keep in mind IC elements'\nauthorities and needs, and the ways in which they approach related issues. There is a wellunderstood tension, and need to balance, between consistency of approach across IC elements for any single data type, and consistency of approach within an IC element for related data types. We discuss immediately below the main issues of substance, structure, and process that we recommend be included in CAI standards and procedures, and then review and assess examples of such standards and procedures that are currently in effect at certain IC elements. Our third recommendation, discussed further below, addresses the need for enhanced sensitivity guidance for CAI, which overlaps in part with the issues discussed here.\n\n\n4.2.1. (U) Issues. The IC should develop standards and procedures for CAI that address, among other things, the following issues:\n\n\n- (U) Mission Analysis to Identify Need/Value. What problem is the acquisition of CAI\ndesigned to solve? How important is the problem, and how difficult is it to solve?\n\n- (U) Fit Between Mission and CAI Data Set, Proposed Use. How will the CAI data set solve\nor address the problem? What other possible approaches are there for addressing the problem or meeting the need?\n\n- (U) Vendor and Data Quality. This includes vendor capacity and longevity as well as\nquality/reliability issues pertaining to the vendor and its data sources and personnel.\nThese factors may be more applicable to domestic commercial information acquisitions than foreign acquisitions. Can the vendor reliably meet the IC element's needs over time? What assurances of quality are available? Can the vendor adapt if circumstances or needs change?\n\n- (U) Acquisition Mechanics. This includes where, how, and when CAI will be acquired;\nwhether it will be ingested or accessed at the vendor; whether acquisition is overt or\ncovert; whether USPI and other US data will be excluded at the vendor, at initial ingest\nby the IC element, in query returns, and/or not at all. It also includes ways in which acquisition mechanics may affect the IC's ability to use the data towards the mission need, including through the end user interface and application programming interfaces (APIs) if applicable. The USA Freedom Act illustrates the importance of the policy and\nengineering issues raised by acquisition mechanics.\n\n- (U) Data Security. This involves potential counter-intelligence risk in the vendor and/or\nthe method of acquisition, and in data storage within the IC element (it overlaps to some degree with the vendor and data quality review described above).\n\n- (U) Sensitivity and Legal Review. This is focused on privacy protection and VPS of USPI\nand addressed further in Recommendation #3 below.\n\n- (U) Auditing Use of CAI. This involves keeping copies of queries and similar uses of the\nCAI, and also finding ways to measure actual use and value over time.\n\n- (U) Periodic Re-Evaluation. Finally, there should be a process to reconsider CAI\nacquisition and other decisions, to avoid inertial automatic renewal of contracts, and to\ntake note when CAI data sources, or the use of CAI within the IC, change materially over\ntime. Cf. ICD 203 and ICD 206, and more general principles of information integrity supporting standards of analytic tradecraft. In Recommendation #3, discussed below,\nwe address re-evaluation to address VPS and sensitivity issues, a similar process with a different purpose than the re-evaluation discussed here.\n- (U) Other Structural and Procedural Issues. Some IC elements have a dedicated unit or\nsub-unit focused on acquisition of CAI. Others have committees or working groups drawn from personnel in relevant sub-units. Both approaches are potentially viable, but\nIC elements should develop a regular process for addressing all of the issues listed above\nin regular order and with the benefit of relevant personnel. Results of decisions should\nbe documented and provided to a central authority and assessed together periodically to discern best practices.\n\n4.2.2. (U) Examples of Current CAI Approaches. Several IC elements have established standards and procedures to guide decisions on the acquisition and use of CAI. We review below the approaches taken by three agencies (relevant source materials are in the appendices). Some IC\nelements also have electronic Data Handling Forms (or the equivalent) governing acquisition of CAI that helpfully standardize aspects of the process for making CAI procurement decisions (or their functional equivalent).\n\n4.2.2.1. (U)  Treasury. The Treasury Department has chartered the Office of Terrorism and Financial Intelligence Data Governance Board. We have three main observations on the charter. First, the statement of objective and scope in Part B of the charter, and the statement of the Board's responsibilities in Part C, are general but broad enough to embrace the acquisition and handling of CAI, and it is our understanding that they are applied to CAI. But they do not explicitly apply to such acquisition and handling, and as Treasury advised, the Board was not created to address CAI *per se*, but rather to facilitate data integration and information sharing among all TFI components (one of which, OIA, is a member of the IC).\n\n(U//FOUO) Second, while the Board allows for subject-matter experts to participate at the Chair's discretion under Part D.8 of the charter, the Board's regular members do not include representatives from privacy/civil liberties, which means that it may not be well positioned to address issues including VPS. We understand that privacy experts are, at least in some cases, invited to the Board's sessions, and Treasury has advised that privacy considerations do factor into the board's decision. (U) Third, while the Board has an objective and responsibilities, it does not appear to have any explicit authority over CAI or other matters.\n\n4.2.2.2. (U) Department of Homeland Security (DHS). Like the Treasury Department's Data Governance Board charter, the charter for the DHS Data Access Review Council (DARC) could be adapted explicitly to address issues with CAI, and it is our understanding that DHS currently uses the DARC to review bulk CAI acquisitions. (U) The DARC's members explicitly include representatives from DHS legal, policy, privacy and civil liberties elements. (U//FOUO) The DARC charter calls for \"automatic review\" in cases involving an internal or external \"bulk data transfer\" of PII, and \"discretionary review\" of other transfers upon the nomination of any DARC member with concurrence of other members, unless the transfer in question has already been approved by higher authority after a review for \"legal and policy sufficiency and privacy and civil rights and civil liberties adequacy.\" (U//FOUO) Highlighting an issue about common use of vocabulary across IC elements, the DARC\ncharter uses \"bulk data transfer\" to refer to the transfer of \"large quantities of intelligence or information, a significant portion of which is not reasonably likely to have any ultimate intelligence or operational value to the recipient.\" This is similar to how CIA defines and treats \"unevaluated data\" (see CIA Guidelines  12.22 (definition) and 6.2 (rules)), as discussed above. 4.2.2.3. (U)\nThe most mature set of standards and processes governing CAI that we reviewed came from\n\n\n(U) Among the documents we saw, these best represent the kind of end-to-end process for CAI that we think is desirable.\n\n\n\n4.2.3. (U) Assessment of CAI Examples. As the foregoing examples show, there is considerable variation in the approaches to CAI that are currently in effect at IC elements. Some of this variation makes sense in light of varying missions, authorities, and uses for CAI, and much of it is explainable in light of differences in historical experience with CAI. The use of PAI in general, and of CAI in particular, that includes detailed information concerning large numbers of individuals is a relatively new intelligence discipline and still evolving rapidly. We certainly do not mean to say that every IC element must adopt a version of very detailed procedures.\n\nAs noted above, however, we think that IC elements should now come together, review best practices and approaches, and adopt standards that reflect their collective experience, as well as the recommendations in this report. We believe that such an effort will result in more uniform (albeit not identical) approaches to CAI across the IC.\n\n(U) Almost all of the IC elements' acquisition procedures governing CAI that we reviewed are focused on operational and counter-intelligence concerns rather than privacy and sensitivity. To be sure, some of the procedures focus on governance and include legal personnel in decisionmaking, and some make explicit reference to civil liberties and legal review. But the documents memorializing approaches to CAI do not address privacy and sensitivity with the same level of rigor and focus that they devote to other issues. That leads to our third and final recommendation.\n\n4.3. (U) Recommendation #3: The IC Should Develop More Precise Sensitivity (VPS) Guidance for CAI. As noted above, CAI can include sensitive information with a high volume, proportion, and sensitivity (VPS) of USPI. Many IC elements' guidelines have provisions that are designed to address VPS concerns in the acquisition, retention, and dissemination of information, including but not limited to CAI. We think those VPS provisions are sound and point in the right direction.\n\nAs set forth in IC guidelines, however, the VPS provisions are general, in the sense that they afford considerable discretion both on when they apply and how they apply (e.g., what they require to protect privacy). We believe that the IC should develop guidance that refines and applies VPS standards more precisely and explicitly to CAI. Again, the guidance and approach need not be identical at each IC element. We discuss immediately below the main issues of structure, process, and substance that we recommend be included in the guidance, and then review and assess three examples of VPS guidance that are currently in effect (or in development) at certain IC elements. Some of the issues discussed here overlap with our second recommendation, discussed above.\n\n4.3.1. (U) Structural and Procedural Issues. In developing VPS guidance for CAI, IC elements should consider, among other things, the following structural and procedural issues:\n\n\n- (U) Required involvement of relevant parties at all stages, for the most sensitive cases\nincluding legal, privacy, and civil liberties personnel within IC elements.\n- (U) VPS assessments generally being made prior to acquisition, or at least prior to\nanalytic use of CAI (with a traditional emergency exception allowing prompt postacquisition assessing and reporting, with an adequate explanation), ideally integrated or coordinated with CAI acquisition reviews discussed in Recommendation #2 (to avoid VPS\nconcerns being raised as an afterthought or too late in the process).\n\n- (U) Approval requirements, with higher levels of approval required for more sensitive\ncases, including the possibility of approvals by IC element heads in the most sensitive\ncases.\n- (U) Documentation, retention, and availability to relevant personnel of assessments,\napprovals, and mitigation measures adopted, in keeping with need-to-know and related security principles, to enhance institutional memory.\n\n- (U) Re-evaluation of VPS assessments and measures, both on a regular basis (e.g.,\nannually) and as circumstances change (e.g., in some cases where material, new\ninformation sources are added by the vendor to a purchased CAI data set, or significant\nnew uses are found for previously collected CAI). In Recommendation #2, discussed above, we address re-evaluation to address mission needs, a similar process with a different purpose than the re-evaluation discussed here.\n\n\n\n- (U) Forwarding of assessments and other documentation to ODNI (and/or other central\nauthorities, such as USDI or elsewhere in DOD), and a formal mechanism for periodic review to allow comparisons and discussion of best practices across IC elements, to inform refinements and other development of new guidance, consistent with need-toknow and related security and counterintelligence requirements.\n\n4.3.2. (U) Substantive Issues. Apart from the structural and procedural issues above, we recommend that IC elements also consider the following substantive issues in developing VPS\nguidance for CAI:\n\n\n- (U) Sensitivity of the CAI - e.g., concerning protected constitutional rights (including\nreligion, speech, reading, association, and political activities), precise and persistent location, sexual activity, and embarrassment and risk to USPs if CAI is disclosed, in keeping with the discussion of sensitivity in Part 2 of this report. How do general VPS principles apply in these specific contexts?\n- (U) Deanonymization/reidentification issues. To what extent are data that have been\nanonymized less sensitive if the IC element can, without undue difficulty, reverse the anonymization or otherwise identify individuals?\n\n- (U) Importance of mission served by CAI (to balance against sensitivity of CAI). IC\nelements should conduct an explicit analysis and balance of sensitivity risks and mission\nbenefits.\n\n- (U) Strength of nexus between CAI and mission, and availability, feasibility, costs, and\nrisks of (less intrusive) alternatives.\n\n- (U) Ability to filter USPI prior to ingestion (e.g., at the vendor or through an\nintermediary, before it is made available for operational or analytic use at an IC element), recognizing that because the USIC is very likely the only consumer of CAI that\nwould want or need to eschew USPI, this may be inconsistent with covert acquisition.\n\n- (U) Traditional minimization approaches and techniques, including ability to acquire CAI\nvia access to data at the vendor rather than ingestion of data in bulk, limits on retention, access, querying, other use, and dissemination of CAI, and possible requirements for\nspecial training of relevant personal and auditing of queries and other uses of CAI.\n\n- (U) Availability of other privacy-protective measures in light of the need and anticipated\nuse of CAI (e.g., masking, differential privacy techniques, homomorphic or other forms of encryption) that may not be available or appropriate for all missions and anticipated\nuses.\n\n4.3.3. (U) Examples of VPS Guidance. Several IC elements have established, or are developing, more refined VPS guidance, including for use with CAI. These efforts also represent a step in the right direction. We review below the approaches taken by three agencies (relevant source materials are in the appendices).\n\n4.3.3.1. (U) DIA. The Defense Intelligence Agency published Procedures for Special Circumstances Collection in DIA Guide 5148.1-2 (February 23, 2021). These procedures provide \"guidance to DIA personnel for evaluating whether a collection opportunity should be considered a special circumstances collection.\" Id.  2. Where a special circumstances collection is found and authorized, \"the collecting DIA element in consultation with [the DIA Office of Oversight and Compliance] must also consider whether enhanced safeguards are required to protect access to the information.\" Id.  4.3. Apart from legal and policy restrictions, the following factors are to be considered (id.  4.3.1-4.3.5, sub-section numbering omitted):\n\n\n- (U) Civil liberties and privacy implications of the collection;\n\n- (U) Potential for substantial harm, embarrassment, inconvenience, or unfairness to U.S.\npersons if the information is improperly used or disclosed;\n\n- (U) Potential future use of the information being retained and the types of queries or\nsearches expected to be conducted;\n\n- (U) Length of time the information will be retained; and\n\n- (U) Practical and technical difficulties associated with implementing any enhanced\nsafeguards.\n (U) If enhanced safeguards are deemed necessary under these factors, one or more of the following measures can be used (id.  4.4.1-4.4.5, sub-section numbering omitted):\n\n\n- (U) Procedures for approval for access to and audit of any searches;\n\n- (U) Procedures to restrict access or dissemination including limiting the number of\npersonnel with access or authority to search; establishing a requirement for higher-level approval or legal review before or after access or search; or requiring higher-level approval or legal review before or after U.S. person information is unmasked or disseminated;\n\n- (U) Use of privacy-enhancing techniques, such as information masking that indicates the\nexistence of U.S. person information without providing the content of the information, until the appropriate approvals are granted;\n- (U) Use of access controls, including data segregation, attribute-based access, or other\nphysical or logical access methods;\n- (U) Additional protective retention measures or training as required.\n (U) Before collection occurs (or as soon as possible after it begins, with an explanation of why collection began before authorization and why continued retention of any previously collected information should be authorized), the \"DIA collecting element routes a written summary of the results of its evaluation in paragraphs 4.2 through 4.4 ... in a staff package to the appropriate delegated decision authority.\" Id.  5. The package is then coordinated with the Office of General Counsel and other appropriate DIA elements. Id. If and when collection is approved, OOC notifies the DOD Senior Intelligence Oversight Officer. Id.  6.2. (U) In addition to agency-specific guidance, it is our understanding that DOD is nearing completion of a Department-wide policy on enhanced safeguards which will impose restrictions on the use of certain sensitive forms of CAI.\n\n4.3.3.2. (U//FOUO) NSA. The National Security Agency (NSA) adopted NSA/CSS Policy Memorandum 2021-01, Special Circumstances: Guidance for Intelligence Collection of U.S.\n\nPerson Information, effective for a one-year period beginning March 10, 2021. The NSA memo resembles the DIA Guidance in that it \"prescribes the implementation of NSA/CSS procedures for considering whether an intelligence collection opportunity may constitute Special Circumstances Collection requiring enhanced safeguards under paragraph 3.2.e. of\" the DOD Manual. NSA Memo  1. Covered collection opportunities under the NSA memo expressly include those involving information that is \"commercially acquired or voluntarily provided,\" as well as SIGINT, whenever the information in question \"is to be retained in a repository for operational purposes.\" Id.  1-2. The NSA memo expressly does not apply to \"collection decisions regarding individual foreign intelligence targets,\" as opposed to, e.g., collection of unevaluated or bulk data; \"nor does it apply to analyst queries or disseminations of lawfully collected intelligence information,\" or to efforts under NSD 42 to secure U.S. government systems (see DOD Manual  3.1.a.(3)). Id.  1-2. The NSA memo explains that it is not a substitute for consultation with NSA lawyers. Id.  3. All approved Special Circumstances collections are to be reported annually to DOD. Id.  10.\n\n(U//FOUO) Under the NSA memo, an element of NSA/CSS that is \"considering an intelligence collection opportunity\" must generally conduct a \"Special Circumstances Collection Assessment\" (SCCA) \"to determine whether [the collection opportunity] includes the acquisition of USPI that raises special circumstances.\" Id.  11. In general, NSA's guidance emphasizes measures that prevent such acquisition, by requiring that to \"the extent practicable, before collection ... organizations will reduce the risk of acquiring USPI that is not responsive to the [mission] purposes of the collection.\" Id.  18. The NSA memo explains that \"post-collection mitigations do not affect\" whether special circumstances are found to exist, but \"may affect the appropriate decision level for approval of Special Circumstances Collection.\" Id. It is clear that NSA would prefer to filter out unnecessary USPI before collection, a laudable goal. (U) Where USPI cannot be filtered before collection, an SCCA is generally required with respect to CAI and other non-SIGINT collection opportunities but is expressly not required in four defined situations (id.  13.b.):\n\n1) (U) The collection is limited to data or information that is not reasonably anticipated to include USPI, such as statistics or machine-to-machine data (e.g., network infrastructure interactions, netflow, internet routing information); 2) (U) The collection is limited to data or information that is available to the public at large (e.g., telephone listings, technical journals, newspapers, and books), provided that such collection is not reasonably anticipated to include information concerning USPs resulting from negligence or theft (e.g., hacked or stolen data) and is also not reasonably anticipated to include highly sensitive USPI as further described in paragraph 15; 3) (U) The collection is provided with consent of an individual or organization in\naccordance with [the DOD Manual]; or 4) (U) The collection is not expected to include USPI or is not otherwise governed by [the DOD Manual].\n(U) The first two of these four exclusions raise significant questions centered on the application and meaning of the definition of USPI. (U//FOUO) The second exclusion depends largely on how NSA applies the definition of USPI to (publicly available) CAI. The second exclusion generally covers such CAI because it applies to\n\"information that is available to the public at large,\" including by paid subscription, but it expressly does not include CAI that is \"highly sensitive\" as defined in paragraph 15. Thus, under Paragraph 13.b. of the NSA memo, an SCCA is required for the collection of \"highly sensitive\" CAI (that is not subject to the other exclusions). (U) The definition of \"highly sensitive\" in paragraph 15 of the NSA memo refers back to the VPS\ndefinition of \"special circumstances\" in the DOD Manual but develops further the meaning of \"sensitivity.\" Paragraph 15 explains that the \"sensitivity of USPI\" depends on \"the potential for substantial harm, embarrassment, inconvenience, or unfairness to any USP if the information is improperly used or disclosed,\" which is very similar to Section 4.3.2. of the DIA Guidance discussed above, and relevant to some of the concerns raised in Part 2 of this report. Paragraph\n15.b.1. of the NSA memo goes on to provide:\n\n\n(U) Special circumstances exist if the type of information to be collected relates to or\naggregates many data types concerning sensitive activities of any identifiable USP. Sensitive activities include political participation, practice of religion, medical information, membership or participation in organizations or associations, financial data, protected speech, location over time, and protected class demographics. Special circumstances also include publicly available data concerning identifiable USPs that the originator did not intend to be made accessible online or otherwise available to the public (e.g., hacked or stolen data).\n (U) Standing alone, this language in Paragraph 15.b.1. appears to mean that an SCCA is required, and that sensitive circumstances exist, when NSA collects (a significant volume of) CAI that is \"sensitive,\" hacked, or stolen USPI (and that is not subject to the other exclusions in paragraph 13.b.). (U//FOUO) Under paragraph 15.b.2., special circumstances \"do not exist if the type of information to be collected is limited to USPI that people have chosen to share publicly about themselves, unless such information relates to the sensitive activities of any identifiable USP as further addressed above.\" As we understand it, NSA does not consider metadata associated with app downloads or website visits to be data that \"people have chosen to share publicly about themselves\" within the meaning of this provision. In any case, even if that were not so, paragraph 15.b.2. would require an SCCA, and sensitive circumstances would exist, when NSA collects CAI that includes \"sensitive,\" hacked, or stolen USPI or that relates to an identifiable USP (again assuming the other exclusions in Paragraph 13.b. do not apply). We are not aware of any further guidance from NSA on this question, although as noted above it is our understanding that NSA is currently working to institute additional compliance guidance regarding the handling of publicly available information. We think it may be helpful for such forthcoming guidance to address these issues explicitly. (U//FOUO) Netting out the many layers of guidance in NSA's memo, as we understand it, much turns on whether information, including \"sensitive\" CAI, is \"USPI\" (or information that \"relates\" to \"any identifiable USP\"). As discussed above, the first exclusion in Paragraph 13.b. turns expressly on whether machine-to-machine data is determined to contain USPI (and again, our understanding from NSA is that it does not). And the second exclusion ultimately turns on a similar question under paragraph 15.b.1.-2. We believe that further guidance is needed on both issues, and as noted above it may be currently in development.\n\n4.3.3.3. (U//FOUO) CIA. As of this writing, CIA is in the process of developing principles to govern the acquisition and use of commercial data.\n\n## (U//Fouo)\n\n\n(U) 4.3.4. Assessment of VPS Examples and Possible Areas of Future Focus . We appreciate and support the effort reflected in the examples reviewed above from DIA, NSA, and CIA. Although VPS guidance for CAI should follow from VPS guidance in general, we believe that CAI presents a sufficiently significant and growing phenomenon to merit specific guidance, as CIA is currently developing in its principles. We support the processes for assessments and approvals in the guidance from DIA and NSA and believe that CIA should develop a similar approach to ensure the proper application of its CAI principles. Although it has made progress, particularly with respect to bulk (or bulky) collection of CAI, further progress needs to be made in developing visibility into and control of the channels through which CIA acquires CAI.\n\n\n(U) The single most important point, in our view, is that the existing VPS-CAI guidance should be further developed, ideally with examples illustrating the application of standards to cases. We offer four specific areas, drawn from the longer list above, in which such development would be particularly helpful. (U) First, some IC elements seem to be embracing a relatively binary model, in which CAI is non-sensitive if the government could and/or historically did overtly and lawfully acquire it directly, and sensitive if the government could not or historically did not do so. Cf. Part 2 of this report. In the former category, for example, would be a database of newspaper and magazine articles, while the latter category would include bulk, persistent cell site location information (CSLI), which would normally require a warrant (under *Carpenter*), or\n. This binary model may not satisfactorily classify every possible case involving CAI, but it appears to be at least a good beginning. (As noted above, a third category of CAI, that is not PAI at all because it is available only to governments, is beyond the scope of this report, but worthy of further attention in its own right.) We recommend the IC test and refine the model against the known use cases to develop guidance. Cf. DOD 3115.12 (2010). The basic point is that the qualitative nature of CAI may help determine its sensitivity. (U) Second, in addition to qualitative differences in CAI, quantitative differences are also relevant. CAI that is acquired in bulk will almost always be more sensitive than CAI in smaller data sets. Where bulk acquisition can be avoided, and the volume of acquired data is reduced, it is generally helpful both for intelligence purposes and for the protection of privacy and civil liberties, and it may simplify CAI procedures. (U) Third, subject to the policy concerns underlying PPD-28's approach to SIGINT, U.S.\n\nintelligence law and policy emphasize the protection of USPI, and approaches to CAI should be developed consistent with that emphasis. In general, foreign CAI data sets concerning foreign persons and entities may raise fewer, or at least different, concerns than analogous data sets focused on the United States and/or U.S. persons. (S//REL TO USA, FVEY) Fourth, as discussed with respect to the NSA principles, the IC should develop guidance on how the definition of USPI, and the definition of information that pertains to a known USP, apply in the context of CTD and other CAI. If the *New York Times* can easily deanonymize persistent location data on U.S. persons, and similar efforts are possible and/or may be undertaken by the IC for AdTech and other CAI, is the information therefore USPI? The question arises, and the guidance is needed, because the term USPI is defined in IC policies as\n\"either a single item of information or information that, when combined with other information, is reasonably likely to identify one or more specific U.S. persons,\" with a recognition that the definition as applied \"in a particular context may require a case-by-case assessment by a trained intelligence professional.\" CIA Guidelines  12.25; DOD Manual\n5240.01  3.2, G-2. We noted inconsistencies between how different IC elements define and treat USPI, with some treating data as non-USPI because they did not possess other data sets that could be used to reidentify (deanonymize) or because they did not intend to reidentify the individuals in the data. This strikes us as unacceptably narrow; at a minimum, the issue of readily-available deanonymization should be considered closely and more precise guidance provided in the context of CAI. (U) Beyond these areas, we think that the IC also should at least begin working on assessing and developing more specific guidance for various forms of existing or emerging CAI, including from social media, biometrics, augmented reality/virtual reality (AR/VR), and the Internet of Things. (U) Even if designed for specific areas, of course, this guidance should be consistent with the principles discussed above. (U//FOUO) We are agnostic as to whether the guidance should be set out in a stand-alone document devoted to VPS issues in CAI\n added to broader CAI processes\n(of the sort discussed in our second recommendation above), added as an amendment to existing procedures governing intelligence activities of IC elements, or included in guidance addressing VPS concerns in general (not limited to CAI). The main point is that the guidance be sufficiently clear and specific.\n\n## 5. (U) **Conclusion**\n\n (U//FOUO) We tried, in Part 1 of this report, to describe CAI for those who are not already familiar with it. Part 1 therefore included a working definition of CAI (and an explanation of why it is important to define); a list of the main sellers of CAI and a brief description of the types of information they make available; an effort to trace the origins and evolution of CAI in the rise of digital data; and a review of how \"anonymized\" CAI can be reidentified and linked to individuals. (U) Part 2 explained why the DNI was right to commission our report. It described how CAI can provide intelligence value and identified several examples of IC contracts for CAI. It also addressed non-analytic uses of CAI and counter-intelligence risks in CAI, and the risks that CAI\npresents for privacy and civil liberties. As we observed at the end of Part 2, CAI is a relatively new, rapidly growing, and increasingly significant part of the information environment in which the IC must function, deserving of focused attention. (U) Part 3 reviewed in detail the current IC policy and regulatory framework governing CAI, under which, as information that is available to the general public, it is treated as PAI. Part 3\ntried to describe the current state of CAI regulation as a baseline for our recommendations. (U) Part 4 set out our three main recommendations: (U) First, the IC should develop a forward-looking and recurring process to catalog the acquisition and use of CAI across its 18 elements. The IC cannot understand and improve how it deals with CAI unless and until it knows what it is doing with CAI. (U) Second, based on the knowledge gained from that process, the IC should develop a set of adaptable standards and procedures for CAI, governing and requiring regular re-evaluation of acquisition and other decisions. We offer several elements that can be included in those standards and procedures, but also recognize that they will need to be adapted for different IC elements with different CAI missions. (U) Third, as part of this set of policies and procedures, and/or as a complement to it, the IC\nshould develop more precise sensitivity and privacy-protecting guidance for CAI. Again, we offer several suggestions for the development of such guidance. (U) If some or all of these recommendations are agreeable, the IC will need a mechanism for putting them into effect, and for making any other changes suggested by continued attention to CAI. One possibility, which we believe is worth considering, would be a traditional working group of IC senior officials. This group would be charged with implementing our recommendations (to the extent approved), sharing best practices, collecting and assessing additional information about the IC's use of CAI, and recommending additional improvements\n\n##\n\nover time. The group might decide to proceed within the framework of our three recommendations, or it might adopt their substance within a different framework. For example, the working group might focus on developing (1) principles, such as utility, privacy, and quality of data; (2) tools and procedures for implementing those principles, such as technological methods for filtering and limiting data before its ingestion or use; and (3) processes and approval requirements for applying those tools and procedures. As noted above, CAI is both increasingly powerful for intelligence and increasingly sensitive for individual privacy, and while we hope that our 90-day report provides a helpful foundation for developing more refined approaches, we believe that continued efforts will be necessary. We appreciate the opportunity to be of service\n\n## 6. (U) Appendices\n\n6.1. (U) Letter and Terms of Reference\n6.2. (U) IC Elements' Materials Governing CAI\n6.3. (U) IC Elements' Materials on VPS and/or CAI Collection"
    },
    {
        "text": "# Naval Postgraduate School Monterey, California Thesis The A. Q. Khan Network: Causes And\n\n## Implications\n\n\nby\n\nChristopher O. Clary\n\nDecember 2005 Thesis Co-Advisors:\nPeter R. Lavoy\n\nFeroz Hassan Khan Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited\n\nTHIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK\nPublic reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instruction, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project (0704-0188) Washington DC 20503.\n\n## 11. Supplementary Notes  The Views Expressed In This Thesis Are Those Of The Author And Do Not Reflect The Official Policy Or Position Of The Department Of Defense Or The U.S. Government. 12A. Distribution / Availability Statement\n\n13. ABSTRACT (maximum 200 words)\n      The A. Q. Khan nuclear supplier network constitutes the most severe loss of control over nuclear technology ever.  For the first time in history all of the keys to a nuclear weaponthe supplier networks, the material, the enrichment technology, and the warhead designswere outside of state oversight and control.  This thesis demonstrates that Khan's nuclear enterprise evolved out of a portion of the Pakistani procurement network of the 1970s and 1980s.  It presents new information on how the Pakistani state organized, managed, and oversaw its nuclear weapons laboratories. This thesis provides extensive documentation of command and control challenges faced by Pakistan and argues that Khan was largely a rogue actor outside of state oversight.  The A. Q. Khan affair refutes more optimistic theories about the effects of nuclear proliferation.  This case study indicates that states have a difficult time balancing an abstract notion of safety against pressing needs for organizational speed and flexibility.  This thesis enumerates enabling institutional factors in Pakistan, which allowed Khan's enterprise to continue and flourish, and which might also be generalizable to other states of proliferation concern.\nStandard Form 298 (Rev. 2-89)\nPrescribed by ANSI Std. 239-18\n\nCLASSIFICATION OF ABSTRACT\nOF ABSTRACT\n\n\nTHIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK\nApproved for public release; distribution is unlimited\n\nTHE A. Q. KHAN NETWORK: CAUSES AND IMPLICATIONS\n\nChristopher Oren Clary Civilian, Department of the Navy B.A., Wichita State University, 2001\nSubmitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of\n\n\nMASTER OF ARTS IN NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS\nfrom the NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL\nDecember 2005\nAuthor:\n\nChristopher O. Clary Approved by:\nPeter R. Lavoy Thesis Co-Advisor Feroz Hassan Khan Thesis Co-Advisor Douglas Porch Chairman, Department of National Security Affairs\n\n\nTHIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK\nABSTRACT The A. Q. Khan nuclear supplier network constitutes the most severe loss of control over nuclear technology ever.  For the first time in history all of the keys to a nuclear weaponthe supplier networks, the material, the enrichment technology, and the warhead designswere outside of state oversight and control.  This thesis demonstrates that Khan's nuclear enterprise evolved out of a portion of the Pakistani procurement network of the 1970s and 1980s.  It presents new information on how the Pakistani state organized, managed, and oversaw its nuclear weapons laboratories. This thesis provides extensive documentation of command and control challenges faced by Pakistan and argues that Khan was largely a rogue actor outside of state oversight.  The A. Q. Khan affair refutes more optimistic theories about the effects of nuclear proliferation.  This case study indicates that states have a difficult time balancing an abstract notion of safety against pressing needs for organizational speed and flexibility.  This thesis enumerates enabling institutional factors in Pakistan, which allowed Khan's enterprise to continue and flourish, and which might also be generalizable to other states of proliferation concern.\n\n\nTHIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK\n\nLIST OF FIGURES\n\nFigure 1.\nPAEC and KRL Areas of Responsibility........31\nFigure 2.\nIndividuals Implicated in Khan's Nuclear Network ........83\nTHIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK\n\n## I. Introduction A. Introduction\n\nThe A. Q. Khan nuclear supplier network constitutes the most severe loss of control over nuclear technology ever.  For the first time in history all of the keys to a nuclear weaponthe supplier networks, the material, the enrichment technology, and the warhead designswere out of state oversight and control.  This thesis examines how Pakistan's nuclear safety and security measures failed to prevent the transfer of secret nuclear technology.  It places this command and control breakdown in the larger context of Pakistan's nuclear history and the diffusion of nuclear technology and expertise more generally.  It examines the implications of this episode for how we think about new nuclear states and the dangers of nuclear proliferation.\nA. Q. Khan was largely a free actor, conducting nuclear commerce without authorization of the Pakistani state.  This thesis provides evidence, where it exists, of possible Pakistani state knowledge or consent for Khan's nuclear enterprise.  However, there is no proof that the Pakistani state was aware of the nuclear transfers from Pakistan to Iran, North Korea, Libya, and perhaps others.  The dangers to Pakistan were too great, the benefits too small.  Instead, the most easily identifiable beneficiary was Khan, and the individuals that work with him, as evidenced in bank accounts in Pakistan, Dubai, Switzerland, and elsewhere.\nKhan's ability to forge a non-state network to transfer closely held nuclear secrets to pariah regimes is disturbing on multiple levels.  First, Khan's activities call into question the ability of Pakistan to safeguard and secure its nuclear arsenal.  More generally, how well can new nuclear states gauge the internal and external threats to their new arsenals?  Previous arguments that new nuclear states could control their precious nuclear assetsprecisely because they were preciousmay have been overly optimistic.\nSecond, Khan's continued operation for decades, first as an importer of nuclear technology and subsequently as an exporter, reveal weaknesses in the ability of the international community to identify and halt illicit nuclear commerce.  The ability of the same individuals in Europe to operate with impunity is a costly embarrassment to Western governments.  Finally, Khan's network may reveal a more general loss of control over nuclear technology that will be difficult to reverse.  Nuclear components are in the hands of many states.  They were transferred through many middlemen.  They were manufactured in factories from Libya to South Africa to Malaysia.  Nuclear weapons designs were copied and transferred haphazardly.  The barriers to entry into the nuclear world have been high.  If they are lowering, we ought to be worried. Understanding Khan's nuclear commerceand policy responses to itare crucial to ensure that we all do better.\n\n## B. Background\n\nIn many ways, Pakistan's acquisition of nuclear weapons was exceptional. N. M.\n\nButt, a retired Pakistani nuclear physicist, recounts that the nuclear development took place in \"an ocean of ignorance\" in a country that possessed \"lame high technology.\"1  A.\n\nQ. Khan, the Pakistani metallurgist who played a pivotal role in Pakistan's uranium enrichment program, boasted, \"A country, which could not make sewing needles, good bicycles or even ordinary durable metalled roads was embarking on one of the latest and most difficult technologies.\"2\nPakistan's commitment to its nuclear course was steadfast despite a tumultuous political scene: in which one civilian prime minister was executed by the military, in which one military dictator died under mysterious circumstances, and in which civilian governments are frequently deposed by presidential or military intervention.   Western audiences view Pakistan's domestic politics with understandable concern.  Radical religious parties hold or share power in two of Pakistan's four provinces.  There are regular bombings, terrorist attacks, and sectarian feuds.   In December 2003, President Pervez Musharraf narrowly survived two assassination attempts in a two-week period.3\nHand in hand with internal challenges, Pakistan also lives in a dangerous neighborhood. To its east, it shares a 2,000-kilometer border with a nuclear-armed India that has population, economic, and military advantages, and with which it has fought three or four wars, depending on who is counting.  To its west is Iran, which harbors nuclear ambitions, and with which Pakistan has a less than cordial relationship.  To the north is a literal war zone after two decades of a Pakistani policy to cultivate \"strategic space\" in Afghanistan collapsed on September 11, 2001.  It has an unsteady alliance with the world's remaining superpower, which already has pre-empted one Muslim country with nuclear aspirations.\n\nComplicating matters further, Pakistan continues to weather an international imbroglio concerning the sale of nuclear weapons technology to other states.  It appears that from 1987 to 2003, A. Q. Khan, head of one of Pakistan's key nuclear organizations, was overseeing a nuclear supply network, which sold or attempted to sell to Iran, Iraq, North Korea, Libya, and perhaps others.4\nPakistan's rocky domestic landscape, precarious security environment, and the\nA. Q. Khan scandal have led many to seriously question Pakistan's capability and will to safeguard its nuclear arsenal.  Jim Hoagland, Pulitzer-winning columnist for the Washington Post, was unabashed in expressing his concerns: \"Pakistan continues to be the most dangerous place on Earth because of its mix of nuclear weapons, unstable politics, religious fanaticism and the involvement of senior military and intelligence officials in terrorist networks, including al Qaeda and the Taliban.\"5  Leonard Weiss, former staff director of the Senate Committee on Government Affairs, was equally blunt: \"Pakistan lied, stole, and conned its way to becoming a nuclear weapons power.  Now it's doing the same as a nuclear broker.\"6\nThe controversy about Pakistan's character, institutions, and intentions fits in a broader academic debate about nuclear proliferation. The discussion has organized into an argument between those who think that the spread of nuclear weapons may be a positive development for international stability and those who believe that proliferation will have a deleterious impact.  These contending camps are often labeled deterrence optimists and *proliferation pessimists*.  As Peter R. Lavoy noted in his survey of this literature, \"Debate over the strategic consequences of the spread of nuclear weapons is more than an academic exercise.  It affects the price officials should be willing to pay for nonproliferation.  This in turn influences the number and identity of states which might some day acquire nuclear weapons.\"7\nThe academic debate has been theory-driven.  Lavoy laments, \"No thorough effort is made to test the power of either theory against the observed conduct of the actual leaders and organizations responsible for managing the nuclear forces of new nuclear states.\"8  This is unfortunate, for the optimism-pessimism debate can be tested.  Peter D.\n\nFeaver has noted that while a good theory does *not* have to explain everything, we lose confidence in a theory if it consistently fails to predict the \"observable implications\" of its logic.9  For better or worse, Khan's prolific nuclear dealings provide extensive opportunities to test such arguments.\n\n## C. The Optimism-Pessimism Debate\n\nThe entirety of the nuclear age has been dominated by debates about whether these destructive weapons are a force of stability or a source of danger.  These earlier nuclear debates were disproportionately focused on the relationship between established nuclear powers, though they had clear implications for the proliferation of nuclear explosive technology.  This section draws out these implications. It concludes by arguing that we are now in the midst of a new nuclear debate.  Today, the primary focus is, and ought to be, about the ability of new nuclear states to adequately safeguard and secure their nuclear deterrents.\n\nwe think that if we relax, numerous states will begin to make nuclear weapons?\"  Waltz, \"More May Be Better,\" in *The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A Debate Renewed* (New York: W. W. Norton, 2003), 42.\n\nWithin weeks of the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, Jacob Viner argued that the destructive impact of nuclear weapons would deter even potentially victorious states from attacking a nuclear-armed adversary.  As a consequence, the spread of such weapons might deter conflict and be a force of stability in international politics.10\nSeveral commentators either extended or independently developed Viner's argument.11\nKenneth N. Waltz presented the model argument for this optimistic view of nuclear weapons.  Even a few nuclear warheads could deliver devastating damage on any target against which they were employed. An adversary's nuclear force is likely to be relatively invulnerable to a disarming strike, even a strike using nuclear forces.  The mere possibility that such a deterrent force would survive and be used by a defender would outweigh any potential gains an attacker might seek.12  Waltz and other deterrence optimists emphasized the clarity that nuclear weapons generate in cost-benefit calculations for any rational actor, anywhere.\nOther commentators had a narrower focus.  Some advocated permitting or facilitating the acquisition of nuclear weapons by U.S. allies to dispel any confusion about the U.S. ability to honor its extended deterrence guarantees.13  More recently, using similar logic, some regional analysts began to muse that the introduction of nuclear weapons into conflict-ridden regions might stabilize them.14\nThe deterrence optimists' lack of concern about proliferation is intimately tied up with their faith that deterrence is almost automatic once a state achieves a survivable second strike.  They argue that for any state with the technical capabilities to acquire and maintain nuclear weapons, creating such a second-strike force will be possible.  In the United States competition with the Soviet Union, however, this relaxed view was not held by a majority of nuclear policymakers or analysts.  Deterrence was viewed as somewhat fragile, and new nuclear states complicated this already difficult superpower competition.  Each new nuclear state complicated the picture moreand analysts labeled this \"the Nth country problem.\"15  Additionally, each Nth state set the stage for an N+1\ncountry, which would complicate the deterrence calculations further.16  If new nuclear entrants could be kept at bayperhaps through a legally binding nuclear nonproliferation treatystrategists could focus on stabilizing the U.S.-Soviet competition.\n\nAs Bradley Thayer has noted, the nuclear debate in the United States passed through three stages.17  Initially, it focused on the vulnerability of nuclear forces to counterforce strike.  This debate dominated the theoretical literatureand was reflected in U.S. nuclear force structurefrom roughly 1960 to 1980.18  In the last decade of the Cold War, the \"second debate on nuclear stability\" focused increasing attention to the susceptibility of the United States command and control system to a decapitation strike.19\nFinally, after the Cold War had largely concluded, the third wave of research concluded that the solutions the United States and the Soviet Union had put into place to solve counterforce and countercontrol vulnerabilities had significantly increased the risks of nuclear accidents and inadvertence.20\nTo put it another way, for nuclear deterrence to generate stability, an adversary must believe that its opponent will retain a second strike capability that can inflict\n\n19 While Herman Kahn had noted the risks of a \"splendid first strike\" as early as 1960, he had judged the risks to be relatively minor.  Herman Kahn, *On Thermonuclear War* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1961), 36-37.  Early works expressing concern about countercontrol strikes include Gary D. Brewer and Paul Bracken, \"Some Missing Pieces of the C3I Puzzle,\" *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 28, no. 3\n(September 1978): 451-469; John D. Steinbruner, \"Nuclear Decapitation,\" *Foreign Policy*, no. 45 (Winter\n19811982): 16-28; and Jonathan B. Tucker, \"Strategic Command-and-Control Vulnerabilities: Dangers and Remedies,\" *Orbis* 26, no. 4 (Winter 1983): 941-63.\n\n20 Bruce G. Blair, *The Logic of Accidental Nuclear War* (Washington, DC: Brookings, 1993); Peter Douglas Feaver, *Guarding the Guardians: Civilian Control of Nuclear Weapons in the United States*\n(Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1992); Scott D. Sagan, The Limits of Safety: Organizations, Accidents, and Nuclear Weapons (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993).\n\nunacceptable damage even after a first strike is launched.  Secondly, a nuclear weapons state must believe that it will not be able to limit damage to itself by launching a decapitating countercontrol first strike.  (The converse of these first two conditions is also important: if a state believes it is susceptible to a disarming or decapitating strike, it may respond with a dangerous nuclear \"hair trigger\" posture.)21  Finally, nuclear deterrence is only stable if the risks of nuclear inadvertence and accidentsand as a consequence accidental nuclear warare low.\n\nThe literature of the \"third\" nuclear debate focused on accidents and inadvertence.\nDominated by Bruce G. Blair, Peter D. Feaver, and Scott D. Sagan, it reframed the command and control issue away from rational deterrence theory and towards organization theory.  Rational deterrence theorya natural outgrowth of structural realist expectations of state behaviorargues that the chance of nuclear retaliation will moderate state conflict and prevent nuclear war.  Nuclear war is devastatingly irrational and, hence, will not occur.  As Feaver has noted, rational deterrence theory viewed nuclear operations as epiphenomenalnuclear operations will flow naturally and completely from the rationality of the nuclear weapons states.22  In Kenneth N. Waltz's famous phrase, \"We do not have to wonder whether they will take good care of their weapons.  They have every incentive to do so.\"23\nHowever, in the early 1990s, the \"proliferation pessimists\" argued that nuclear weapons states would have \"bounded rationality.\"24  There were inherent limitations to the ability of organizations to learn, and these limitations were possibly more pronounced in the military commands entrusted with nuclear weapons stewardship.  They induced from their understanding of U.S. near-failures during the Cold War that nuclear weapons are significantly less likely to produce strategic stability than rational deterrence theory counterforce threat would also generate the same reaction.  Such fears over a potential counterforce strike are precisely what motivated Wohlstetter to write, \"Delicate Balance of Terror.\"\nwould indicate.  These problems would be at least equally pronounced and likely greater in new nuclear states.  As Thayer has summarized:\nFirst, the emerging nuclear states will have the same trouble the superpowers had in building safe forces: the United States continued to have many accidents long after it had built a sophisticated force.  Second, the nuclear forces of emerging nuclear states will be less safe than the forces of superpowers: new nuclear states will not be able to afford modern safety and warning systems, and therefore will be more prone to false warning and nuclear accidents.  Also, emerging nuclear states have militaries that are more powerful relative to civilian authorities than is the case in the United States and have more turbulent civil-military relations.\nThis will inhibit organizational learning because the incentives to protect the military will be valued over the accurate processing of information.\nThird, emerging nuclear states will face immediate security threats which will necessitate keeping the arsenal on a high state of alert.  The tight coupling of the command and control system with the nuclear forces of the state will make the arsenal susceptible to accidents.25\nFeaver has framed the debate over appropriate command and control in terms of two principal dilemmas: (1) What is the proper mix of *positive* and *negative* controls?  (2)\nWhat is the proper degree of assertive or *delegative* control for central authorities to exercise?26  Positive control is the ability to launch a nuclear weapon when demanded.\nNegative control is the ability to prevent weapons from being launched when they are not commanded to be.  The tension between positive and negative control is reflected in Feaver's always/never problem: \"Leaders want a high assurance that the weapons will always work when directed and a similar assurance the weapons will never be used in the absence of authorized direction.\"27\n\nThe mix of positive and negative controls chosen directly impacts the degree to which central authorities (in Feaver's case, civilian leaders) assert control over the nuclear arsenal or delegate that control to military authorities.  The more assertive control that the leadership exercises, the higher the chances are that a decapitation strike will be successful.  In other words, higher assertive control carries with it the possibility that nuclear command and control will \"fail-impotent,\" or, more pleasantly, \"fail-safe.\"  The\n\ngreater delegative control that is given to the military commanders, the higher the risk of accidental, unauthorized, or third-party use.  The system can \"fail-deadly.\"\nIn 1997, this critique of deterrence optimism faced its own critique from a new generation of \"neo-optimists.\"28  Implicitly, they accepted that the manner in which nuclear operations are executedthe minutiae that were largely irrelevant to earlier optimistsmattered in assessing stability.29  But, they turned the proliferation pessimists'\nargument on its head: \"Just as minor states have disadvantages that make duplication of advanced methods of negative command and control difficult, they also have certain advantages that enable them to employ different, but comparable methods of negative command and control.\"30\nNew nuclear states are primarily concerned with regional adversaries and, as a consequence, they can capture two advantages that were denied to the superpowers, precisely because of the stunning military capabilities that the Cold War enemies had. First, these \"minor proliferators\" will have arsenals that are smaller and simpler than the United States and Soviet Union possessed.  This significantly reduces the scale of the command and control problem.  Secondly, their forces can be protected from counterforce strikes through simple methods of concealment.31  A necessary corollary to this is that they are protected from countercontrol attacks if individuals in control of the dispersed, concealed arsenal have been *de facto* predelegated to launch in the event of a decapitation strike.32\nThis outline of the optimism-pessimism debate allows us to extrapolate to specific predictions of how new nuclear states are likely to arrange their command and control systems.  Pessimists fear that new nuclear states will create nuclear forces that are Inadvertence,\" foreshadows several \"neo-optimist\" arguments.\n\nNuclear Proliferation,\" *Security Studies* 6, no. 4 (Summer 1997): 93-125.\n\nsusceptible to counterforce or countercontrol strikes.33  As a consequence, they worry that such nuclear newcomers will be forced to place nuclear forces on a high state of alert. Given poor early warning and command and control technology, these new nuclear states are likely to encounter grave dangers from such a \"tight coupling\" between the system's stimulus and response.34  Because of the significant command and control challenges, pessimists believe that nuclear decisions may be predelegated to lower level commanders, raising the risk of accidental nuclear war if one of those commanders determines the conditions of his predelegated authority have arisen or from the \"crazy colonel\" problem.35  Finally, pessimists worry about safety and security issues.  They are concerned that the relative ignorance of new nuclear states increases the chance for nuclear accidents, particularly during crisis and conflict.36  Further, they worry that the domestic instability of new nuclear states may weaken controls the government has over its nuclear arsenal.37\nOptimists, on the other hand, predict that relatively simple concealment and mobility measures can ensure the survivability of new nuclear arsenals.38  Because such arsenals can ride-out an adversarial first strike, they will not face the lose-them-or-usethem situations that led the superpowers to launch-on-warning postures during the Cold War.  Further, they would not have the necessary early warning or command and control capabilities to launch-on-warning even if they did so desire.39  The smaller size of the arsenal will decrease, ceteris parabis, the chance of accidents compared to the huge arsenals of the superpowers.40  This smaller size and lower sophistication is also likely to effects, see \"Neo-optimists and the Enduring Problem of Nuclear Proliferation,\" 112-5.\n\n38 Waltz, \"More May Be Better,\" 20-26; Seng, \"Less is More,\" 68-71.\n\n39 Ibid., 67-8; Michael Quinlan, \"Book review of Escalation Control and the Nuclear Option in South Asia,\" *Survival* (Spring 2005): 190.  Quinlan might not place himself in the optimists' camp, but on this specific issue, he concurs with them.\n\n40 Seng, \"Less is More,\" 70.\n\ndampen the \"tight coupling\" that might lead to dangerously rapid action-reaction cycles.41\nAdditionally, the smaller size will mean less individuals will have to guard the arsenals, and that those individuals can be more closely screened.  Ensuring the loyalty of the nuclear guardians will be further helped by more relaxed views of domestic espionage likely to be held in new nuclear weapons states.42\nThe pessimists appear to be worried about the wrong thing.  Their concerns about command and control in new nuclear weapons states were principally based on their concerns about command and control during the U.S.-Soviet confrontation.  The dangers of a launch-on-warning posture for South Asia are presently non-existent because neither Pakistan nor its principal adversary, India, have developed such a posture.  Both states have undeniably increased readiness levels since the 1998 nuclear tests, but not nearly to the extent predicted by the most pessimistic observers.  The optimists were correct that new nuclear states would be able to develop survivable basing modes.  It would be nearly impossible for India to eliminate all of Pakistan's mobile missile platforms in any prospective first strike.  However, the mobility \"solution\" to the survivability \"problem\"\nsignificantly compounds the command and control challenge, something the optimists do not fully acknowledge.\n\nThis thesis explores one portion of the optimism-pessimism debate: that relating to the ability of new nuclear states to secure their nuclear arsenals from insider threats.\nThe academic debate has not ignored the challenges posed by bad actors.  Herbert L. Abrams has examined the dangers posed by mentally unstable individuals with access to nuclear weapons.43  Jessica Stern and Gregory Koblentz have observed the potential tension between measures designed to improve stability between states and measures designed to secure weapons from insider threats.44  This stability-security tradeoff is a reflection of Feaver's broader always-never dilemma.  Scott D. Sagan has described\n\"how efforts to improve nuclear security can inadvertently backfire, increasing the risks they are designed to reduce.\"45  For instance, by increasing the number of guards at a nuclear facility, there are more opportunities for a terrorist to become a guard.\n\nThe A. Q. Khan affair provides a particularly significant case study of an insider threat.  The optimist argument recognized that state institutions in new nuclear states were likely to have greater relative power over a normal individual.  Authoritarian or semi-authoritarian regimes would be able to exert greater control over individuals that had access to nuclear secrets, they argued, in part because these regimes could dispense with niceties like due process and civil liberties.46  While this insight is correct, the Khan episode indicates that senior officials may have greater autonomy in authoritarian or semi-authoritarian regimes.  Institutional checks-and-balances may not function, particularly in the context of secret and sensitive national security issues.\nAs will be discussed in greater detail below, the extent of state authorization of\nA. Q. Khan's nuclear dealings is debatable.  The available evidence seems to indicate that Khan was largely a rogue actor, acting without the approval of the state writ large.  State knowledge and authorization is not a binary issue, however.  The available evidence is scant and ambiguous.  This thesis will necessarily be forced to resort to educated conjecture at points.  Nevertheless, there does appear to be evidence that key Pakistani officials may have been predisposed to authorize *limited* nuclear cooperation with Iran in the late 1980s.  Further, nuclear transactions with North Korea may not have been strongly opposed in the context of a much broader strategic relationship between Islamabad and Pyongyangeven if such transactions were not explicitly authorized by the state.  However, it is Khan's nuclear dealings with Libya that indicate the highest degree of nuclear free-lancing.  The benefits to the Pakistani state are unclear, while the benefits to Khan as an individual are obvious.\nThis set of facts leads us toward the pessimist's camp for three reasonsand it leads us to the pessimists' camp even when we consider multiple interpretations of the Khan episode.  First, if there was state knowledge of Khan's nuclear dealings,\n\nassumptions of state rationality by Waltz and Seng may not be as binding as the optimists had hoped.  The Pakistani state, if it were aware of Khan, would have held a remarkably narrow view of Pakistan's national interest.  A rational nuclear weapons state does not offer to transfer nuclear technology to likely adversaries (Iran) or the adversaries of key allies (Iran and Iraq) or to countries of marginal importance (Libya).  Such behavior is certain to draw the ire of friend and foe alike.  The transfer of nuclear technology to Tehran, in particular, has significantly complicated Pakistan's regional security picture. This scenario ought to be troubling for optimists, because under it, Pakistan would not have appeared to take particularly good care of their nuclear technology, despite having every incentive to do so.\nIf the state did not know or authorize Khan's nuclear moonlighting, this also reinforces the pessimist argument.  Realist assumptions of state rationality are rendered moot because of the key role of the non-state actor.  The ability and willingness of the Pakistani state to safeguard and secure its nuclear technology are called into deep question.  By implication, the ability and willingness of other new nuclear states is also challenged.\nFinally, under either scenario, the optimist argument is indirectly challenged.\nSuch nuclear transfers have the potential to significantly ease the path of nuclear aspirants to an explosive device.  A key plank of the optimist argument is that the difficulty of acquiring a nuclear device will sort out the most chaotic and unreliable states.  In other words, the ability to adequately secure nuclear technology was viewed by optimists as only a moderately challenging task.  The far more challenging task of acquiring a nuclear arsenal would screen out those technologically and organizationally deficient states.  To the extent that proliferation supplier networks ease the path to a nuclear arsenalan open question for surethe screening mechanism is weakened. Waltz has argued that even this weaker threshold will not qualitatively change the situation: \"Although some of the new nuclear states may be economically and technically backward, they will either have expert and highly trained scientists and engineers or they will not be able to produce nuclear weapons.  Even if they buy or steal the weapons, they will have to hire technicians to maintain and control them.\"47  Waltz is stretching, however.  Competent technicians and scientists are readily availablewitness the number of competent members of the Japanese cult Aum Shinrikyo.  The difficulties of manufacturing a nuclear explosive device are not the personnel with knowledge, but the huge engineering and industrial challenge of creating fissile material.  To the extent the challenges of that task are lessened, less capable, less competent, and less stable states will be able to enter the nuclear business.\nExamining the A. Q. Khan affair also points to six different conditions that enabled or eased his illicit nuclear activities.  Many of these conditions could be replicated in other new nuclear states.\n\n## 1. The Norm Of Norm Defiance\n\nNew nuclear states are likely to have actively opposed or circumvented the nuclear nonproliferation regime for decades.  Though the process of norm creation is poorly understood, it seems likely that actively challenging a norm is likely to lead to the creation of counter-narratives among key actors in the acquiring state.  Internalizing nonproliferation logic would de-legitimize the nuclear enterprise for a nuclear aspirant. Evidence of such a counter-narrative can be found in Khan's stated desire to pierce the\n\"clouds of so-called secrecy\" that the non-proliferation regime sought to create.48 India's statement that its test was a blow \"against nuclear apartheid\" also captures this sentiment, even if Delhi's actions did not attack the nuclear regime from as many directions as Khan's subterranean nuclear dealings.49\n\n## 2. The Uranium Route\n\nThere are two routes to the acquisition of fissile material necessary to develop nuclear weapons: uranium enrichment or plutonium production.  Plutonium production requires the acquisition of large-scale facilities: most importantly a nuclear reactor and a plutonium reprocessing plant.  These facilities can only be acquired from a few sources globally.  They are large, difficult to construct, and easy to observe.  There are a number of ways to enrich uranium: gaseous diffusion, gas centrifuge, aerodynamic nozzle, chemical, laser, and electromagnetic.50  Pakistan was one of the first developing countries to employ gas centrifuge technology to enrich uranium.  This technology uses thousands of centrifuges spinning at extremely high speeds to separate uranium isotopes of different density.  The key point is that rather than the few large facilities of the plutonium route, a country pursuing gas centrifuge technology would need to acquire nearly a hundred components each for thousands of centrifuge.  Since a majority of these components cannot be easily manufactured, and because a majority of these components are proscribed by export control regimes, this necessitates a massive illicit procurement effort.  States that successfully develop gas centrifuge enrichment must develop a network to funnel cash, often through middlemen, to shady businessmen.  They then must transport the components from their point of origin, often relying on false end-user certificates and other techniques to deceive law enforcement and intelligence agencies. These goods are often transported through multiple third-party countries to further confuse watchful eyes before finally arriving in their destination.  All of these techniques to procure can be used to proliferate.  Further, bureaucrats and scientists involved with large, poorly documented cash transactions may quickly be corrupted by the process. When playing in mud, one gets dirty.  This problem is present in all illicit procurement, but seems to be particularly acute because of the logistical challenges of assembling a centrifuge cascade.\n\n## 3. Covert Weapons Programs\n\nPakistan sought to acquire nuclear weapons by circumventing an increasingly elaborate global nonproliferation regime and in defiance of potential U.S. sanctions.  All the while Islamabad faced significant military threats from India, a neighbor that had already tested nuclear weapons, and perceived a potential military threat from extraregional actors, particularly Israel.  It was critical that the Pakistani nuclear program remain largely hidden from public scrutiny.  Throughout the 1980s, the existence of the Pakistani nuclear weapons program became a more open secret.  Nevertheless, the political classes in Islamabad and Rawalpindi could not publicly acknowledge a nuclear weapons infrastructure that their leadership denied existed.  Their ability to regulate this\n\nprogram was significantly constrained during these most guarded years.  As Peter D. Feaver has noted, \"Organizational theorists have long maintained that knowledge is power.  By restricting knowledge, power is also restricted.\"51  This secrecy still imbues most aspects of the Pakistani program.  Even today, few military officers or civilian officials have a detailed understanding of Pakistan's nuclear weapons infrastructure or its operational planning.  Even fewer are willing to question the procedures put in place to safeguard the nation's nuclear secrets.  One imagines that nuclear decisions are also closely guarded in Tehran, Pyongyang, and perhaps other capitals, with similarly stultifying effects on potential regulators.\n\n## 4. Weak Institutions And Personalized Rule\n\nPower in Pakistan remains highly personalized.  Power is distributed unevenly between the prime minister, president, and chief of army staff.  The nuclear weapons program was initiated under President Zulfikar Ali Bhutto in January 1972.  During his tenure, first as president and then as prime minister, the nuclear weapons program was under his direct control, through a few trusted aides in the military, foreign office, and strategic organizations.  Upon his ouster in 1977, Gen. Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq attempted to institutionalize nuclear control.  He established a committee composed of select cabinet members, a military representative, and the heads of the strategic organizations themselves.  Even so, it appears this committee was a largely *ad hoc* body, with a rotating membership, few if any staff, and very circumscribed institutional memory.  The longest serving members on the committee appear to have been the heads of the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission (PAEC) and Khan Research Laboratories (KRL), who had strong bureaucratic reasons to skew the institutional memory they shared with their counterparts. After Zia's death in 1988, the military retained primary responsibility for the nuclear weapons program, selectively informing presidents and prime ministers about the program based on their perceived trustworthiness and the political alignment of the day. Within the military, more formal organizations were created to examine the details of nuclear development and operations.  After the May 1998 nuclear tests, it was possible to more openly discuss the nuclear weapons program.  Organizational growth followed the May tests, leading to the creation of the Strategic Plans Division (SPD) in 1999 and the\n\nannouncement of a National Command Authority in 2000.  It was not until the creation of SPD in 1999 that a competent and persistent institution could encroach on the institutional autonomy of the PAEC and, to an even larger extent, KRL.  Complicating matters further, all of this was occurring in an environment of intense politicization.  An increase in civilian influence meant a loss of authority by the military.  An increase in responsibilities for PAEC was viewed in zero-sum terms by KRL.  Other new nuclear states are likely to have anarchic domestic political institutions, accompanied with intense bureaucratic rivalries.52\n\n## 5. A Weak Shadow Of The Future\n\nThroughout the 1970s and 1980s, Pakistani strategic planners worried about an existential threat from neighboring India.  Having lived through the vivisection of Pakistan in 1971, Pakistani elites may have focused on today's threat rather than on potential future risks.  As noted previously, oversight institutions may not have had the institutional capacity to accurately judge risks and were overly reliant on the organizations they were supposed to regulate.  This only further weakened the shadow of the future, as the organizations had strong bureaucratic reasons to downplay the risk. Strategic organizations, particularly Khan Research Laboratories, were given greater autonomy and flexibility so that they could deploy a credible nuclear deterrent more quickly.\n\n## 6. The Limits Of Vicarious Learning\n\nSagan has extensively demonstrated the limitations that organizations face as they attempt to learn from past trial-and-errors.53  In a way, the Khan affair is a more challenging problem than imperfect learning.  Pakistani elites had to anticipate that a national hero would betray vital secrets for personal gain.  In order to prevent Khan's nuclear dealings, they would have had to restrict significantly Khan's autonomy over personnel, finances, logistics, and transport.  The ability of Pakistani strategic planners to learn from the experience of other nuclear states would have been constrained for three reasons: (1) the secrecy that surrounded nuclear operations, even in the United States,\n\nuntil the mid-1980s; (2) the lack of institutional capability within Pakistani state structures to carry out such vicarious learning attempts; and (3) the poor analogy of outside experiences to the type of threat Khan would pose.  In other words, the mistakes others made were largely secret, Pakistan was not actively seeking to learn from those mistakes, and the mistakes Pakistan was about to make were quite unique!\n\n## D. Preview\n\nThis thesis examines the interplay of these six conditions in the confusing, disturbing, and fascinating tale of A. Q. Khan. It places A. Q. Khan in the context of the Pakistani nuclear weapons procurement effort.  It examines three case studies in an attempt to understand different aspects of Khan's proliferation enterprise.  Finally, it concludes with an examination of policy implications for the United States.\n\n## 1. From Illicit Procurement To Proliferation\n\nThis chapter examines the overall Pakistani nuclear weapons effort, and A. Q.\n\nKhan's role in it.  Khan returned to Pakistan from Europe in 1976.  He brought back knowledge of uranium enrichment technology and suppliers at an auspicious time for Khan and the Pakistani state.  The Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission had undergone prolonged, multi-year negotiations for a plutonium reprocessing plant, and the Pakistani leadership was increasingly concerned with the ability of the PAEC to deliver.  Khan prodigiously set about creating a procurement system to gather nuclear-relevant components and materials from around the world in order to construct a scientific and engineering infrastructure that would provide fissile material for Pakistan and fame to Khan.  Further, Khan was able to operate with fewer bureaucratic constraints, because the Pakistani state was wary of hobbling Khan as it had with the PAEC.  This chapter highlights how Khan was able to establish a network for procurement that he would subsequently use for proliferation.  It also emphasizes how Khan's institutional autonomy, gained in these early years, allowed him to avoid oversight and control during two decades of illicit nuclear deals.\n\n## 2. The First Time Is Special: Khan's Assistance To Iran\n\nKhan's first nuclear sale appears to have been to Iran.  Chapter 2 discusses a unique constellation of actors within the Pakistani leadership who may have been predisposed to give Khan wide autonomy, particularly when it came to his dealings with Iran.  It explores the scope and timeframe of Khan's cooperation with Iran.  Finally, it assesses how significant Khan's transfers were to Tehran's broader nuclear effort.\n\n## 3. The Problem Of Background Noise: Khan's Assistance To North Korea\n\nThis chapter summarizes the publicly available information about what was transferred to North Korea and how significant such transfers might be.  Many analysts assume that given Pakistani-North Korean cooperation on missile technology, any nuclear cooperation must have occurred with the knowledge of Pakistani state authorities.\nThis chapter demonstrates that a nuclear-for-missile technology exchange, while possible, is not the only way to read the Pakistani-North Korean relationship.  It offers alternative, but unproven, explanations.  It examines the prospect that North Korea might have provided plutonium or plutonium expertise to Pakistan.  It looks at evidence suggesting Pakistan may have assisted North Korea with uranium conversion, suggesting broad state-to-state nuclear cooperation.  It concludes by arguing that none of the statelevel explanations are entirely compelling, and more weight should be given to individual or institutional rationales for Khan's assistance to Pyongyang.\n\n## 4. Tragic Ambition: Libya And Nuclear Off-Shoring\n\nThis chapter describes Khan's growing network of friends, collaborators, and middlemen.  It discusses how Khan launched his most ambitious effort yet: his attempt to\n\"off-shore\" the production of key nuclear components to assist Libya.  Such an attempt would be a massive manufacturing and logistical challenge.  Firms from as far away as Turkey, South Africa, and Malaysia were involved in the effort.  The audacious plan opened up Khan's network to penetration by foreign intelligence agencies, and prepared the way for Khan's downfall.\n\nThis thesis concludes by discussing U.S. policy and intelligence failures in confronting the Khan network.  It examines the degree to which Khan was unique or representative of a growing pernicious threat.  Finally, it provides specific indicators to U.S. policymakers and analysts as they assess the risk that other nuclear procurement programs will have Khan-like entrepreneurs.\n\nFormer Director of Central Intelligence George Tenet has described Khan as being \"at least as dangerous as Osama bin Laden.\"54  Yet for almost two decades, Khan's danger was hiding in plain sight.  Beginning in the early 1990s, reports were percolating through the U.S. intelligence community that Khan was assisting other countries with their nuclear programs.  Alarm bells should have been going off in Islamabad as Khan ventured to foreign capitals and amassed more wealth.  This thesis chronicles the story of one man's remarkable ability to avoid getting caught, and lessons all of us should learn to prevent the recurrence of such a danger.\n\n## Ii. From Illicit Procurement To Proliferation A. Introduction\n\nAbdul Qadeer Khan's proliferation network is a corrupted portion of a procurement system created by Pakistan in the 1970s and 1980s.  Neighboring India significantly complicated Pakistan's nuclear effort.  India's 1974 \"peaceful nuclear experiment,\" where it detonated a nuclear explosive device at the Pokhran test site, alerted the world to the dangers of a free flow of nuclear information.  Led by the United States, the Western supplier cartels significantly strengthened the controls on the spread of key technologies.  At the same time, India's test made Pakistan's quest for the bomb even more desperate.\nThis chapter highlights how Pakistan recovered from serious setbacks in its bomb-making enterprise, circumvented Western export controls, established a procurement system, and slowly developed an indigenous infrastructure to create an atomic bomb.  It introduces several themes that appear subsequently in this thesis.  It emphasizes how the same skills necessary to illicitly procure are used in illegal proliferation.  It discusses how even motivated Western bureaucracies were slow to respond to an increasingly visible threat.  Finally, it introduces a fierce rivalry between Khan's organization and the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission.\nIn order to succeed, Pakistan felt that it was necessary to give Khan Research Laboratories greater autonomy and flexibility than was the bureaucratic norm.  Illicit procurement is a complicated and corrupting enterprise.  In the end, the flexibility essential for the success of Pakistan's acquisition efforts also enabled Khan's exports. This is the tragedy of the A. Q. Khan affair.  It also indicates that a state may value speed, secrecy, and success over more abstract concepts of safety and control.\n\n## B. Outracing The Nonproliferation Regime\n\nKhan did not create the world marketplace for dual-use and proscribed goods, but he was the most successful individual ever to tap into it. Perhaps an Indian magazine was more correct than it could have known when in 1987 it described Khan as a cross between Dr. Strangelove and \"an Islamic James Bond.\"55  Khan had been enmeshed in the European nuclear scene during the 1960s and 1970s.56  He studied briefly in Germany at West Berlin's *Technische Universitat*, received a master's degree in metallurgical engineering at the *Technische Hogeschool* in Delft, the Netherlands, and received his doctorate in metallurgy from the Catholic University of Leuven in Belgium.  His professors and fellow graduate students were a helpful resource to Khan throughout the 1970s, though many of them cut off contact with Khan after formal government investigations were launched.  Some of his contacts, however, would continue to associate profitably with Khan until quite recently.\nFrom May 1972 to December 1975, Khan worked for Fysisch Dynamisch Onderzoekslaboratorium (FDO, or Physical Dynamic Research Laboratory), a subsidiary of Verenigde Machinefabrieken (VMF, or United Machine Factory).   FDO was a major subcontractor to Ultra-Centrifuge Nederland (UCN), which itself was the Almelo-based contractor to the Anglo-Dutch-German uranium enrichment consortium, URENCO.\nWhile at FDO, though only cleared to have access to \"confidential\" information, he regularly had access to materials of higher classification at FDO, UCN, and Fijn Mechanische Afdeling (FMA, or Fine Machine Department), another VMF subsidiary. In fact, he spent several days translating classified German reports on ultracentrifuge developments into Dutch.  He was permitted to take entire files home from work, so that his wife, a Dutch-speaking South African, could assist him in translations.  In at least one instance, he was observed writing notes in Urdu, which he explained away as a personal letter, unrelated to his work.\nBy early fall 1975, however, the Dutch authorities had grown concerned about the number of suspicious incidents involving Khan.  He was removed from work on gas\n55 \"Pakistan's Nuclear Bombshell,\" *India Today*, March 31, 1987, reproduced in John G. Dean, U.S.\n\ncentrifuge development in October and, shortly thereafter, went home to Pakistan on vacation.  He never returned to work, and resigned his position in March 1976.  Khan had been asked by Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, Pakistan's prime minister, to stay in Pakistan and assist in the nuclear weapons effort.57  He brought with him stolen centrifuge designs and, perhaps more importantly, a list of dozens of companies that supplied centrifuge parts and materials.  After a brief stint within the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission structure, he moved to the Engineering Research Laboratories, setting up a uranium enrichment plant in Kahuta. Within four years of returning home, his progress was significant enough that then-President Zia ul-Haq renamed the facility.  Khan Research Laboratories (KRL) was born.\nAs head of KRL, A. Q. Khan would report directly to the president.58  Initially, KRL would be in charge of one component of the larger nuclear puzzle: enriching gaseous uranium hexafluoride into weapons-grade material.  The rest of the process from mining to yellowcake to gasification and back again from gas to metal to milling and weapons fabricationwas under the control of the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission.59   As will be discussed in more detail later in this chapter, both organizations competed fiercely for resources.  As KRL pushed out, it inevitably bumped into PAEC's area of responsibility, only raising the stakes of the bureaucratic infighting.\nOver time, KRL would gain a sanctioned role in developing delivery vehicles for the nuclear device as well as increasing (and possibly unsanctioned) involvement in the machining, fabrication, and assembly of a nuclear device.\n\nAlmost immediately upon his return to Pakistan, Khan began to gather as many components and as much information as he could from the network he had established during his decades abroad.  He contacted former co-workers, inquiring about difficult technical processes and urging them to visit Pakistan, where he could arrange for technical consulting.60  One FDO employee reportedly did travel to Pakistan in 1976.61\nPakistani firms or embassy personnel contacted several Dutch firms about purchasing specialized components. Many of these goods were shipped to Pakistan, slipping through the porous export controls of several European countries.  Even as the Dutch government was investigating the A. Q. Khan affair, one Dutch company was manufacturing and shipping thousands of tubes made of a \"special hard type of steel.\" The frustration and impotence of the Dutch authorities is evident in the government report to the national legislature: \"The great majority of it has been exported... despite repeated oral and written warnings not to do so.\"62  Other Dutch firms sold more tubes to Pakistani firms.  Some were made out of aluminum.  More blatantly, a large order was made for high-carbon, low-corrosion martensitic steel, an alloy used almost exclusively for jet engines and gas centrifuges.\nThis was part of a broader and clear Pakistani strategy.  Khan later said, \"I took full advantage of the willingness of western companies to do business and decided to make purchases from the open market.\"63  In Switzerland, Pakistan purchased key components for a uranium enrichment capability, including a massive unit to gasify and solidify uranium hexafluoride so they could be fed into the centrifuges, as well as highvacuum valves.  In Germany, Pakistani diplomats purchased vacuum pumps and gas purification equipment, along with rolled rods and thousands of specially welded aluminum parts.  In France, Pakistani buyers may have been able to buy bellows for ultracentrifuges by routing the shipment through Belgium and away from stricter French customs officials.  In Britain, Pakistan purchased high-frequency inverters through a British front company, sometimes using a West German commission agent.64\nKhan's timing could hardly have been better.  When Zulfikar Ali Bhutto initiated the nuclear weapons program in 1972, he also appointed a new head for the Pakistan\n\n61 Weissman and Krosney, *The Islamic Bomb*, 201.\n62 \"Dutch Government Report,\" *Pakistan's Bomb*, 136.\n63 Malik, *Dr. A. Q. Khan*, 75.\n64 Weissman and Krosney, *The Islamic Bomb*, 199-206.\nAtomic Energy Commission (PAEC).  Dr. Munir Ahmad Khan had worked for the International Atomic Energy Agency on nuclear power projects since 1958an association that would be used occasionally to question his support of the Pakistani nuclear weapons effort.  Munir Ahmad Khan's PAEC initiated Pakistan down a plutonium route for nuclear weapons production.  But after India's nuclear test in 1974, the international community took decisive action to ensure that Pakistan would not follow India's lead.  Canada refused to supply nuclear fuel, heavy water, or spare parts for the continued operation of the Karachi Nuclear Power Plant (KANUPP).65  The Ford administration put intense pressure on Germany and France to stop cooperation with Pakistan, leading quickly to a Germany agreement to halt construction of a heavy-water production facility.  After initially delaying, France also abandoned an agreement to build a plutonium reprocessing facility for Pakistan in 1978.\n\nMany in the Pakistani government were angry and upset over the failure along the plutonium route.  They were angry with the international community, first and foremost.\nPakistan was being punished for India's sins.  Further, they argued that Canada's refusal to supply KANUPP was a violation of its agreement with Pakistan, an agreement that had been validated by the International Atomic Energy Commission.  If Canada could defy its commitments to the agreement, Pakistanis argued, then Pakistan could ignore the safeguards to which it had agreed.  The line of analysis remained theoretical, since Pakistan was wary of the international response to such a course of action.  Finally, though, the Pakistani establishment was upset at PAEC for failing to succeed.  The negotiations had been interminable with France, and the price had been escalating constantly.  Bureaucrats at PAEC and in the Finance Ministry were blamed for dithering and nitpicking.  Next time, the lesson was learned, Pakistan must do it more quickly, before the window closes.\nThe three body blows to the PAEC occurred at the same time that A. Q. Khan returned to Pakistan with his centrifuge designs and connections.  As Ashok Kapur has noted,\n\nA. Q. Khan's approach was innovative.  In the reprocessing route, Pakistan's approach was to acquire a major facility, e. g. a reprocessing plant, and to deal with the major nuclear suppliers.  A. Q. Khan's approach was entirely differentviz. to get bits and pieces (components)\nof enrichment technology and equipment from small, high technology Western firms who deal with individual components; to bring the components together so as to achieve mastery over the enrichment cycle from acquisition of yellowcake, gasification/solidification units and centrifuges to their operation; and to do the design work and the assembly of imported components in Pakistan by Pakistanis with some foreign technological assistance by selected foreign personnel from Europe and North America.66\nMartin J. Brabers, Khan's old professor from the University of Leuven, explained Khan's success.  \"[I]n buying equipment, he knew all the companies, he knew so many people abroad in many countries....  Why, he knew so many languages, and he is so charming [that] he managed to buy many things that other Pakistanis would not manage to buy.\"67\nKhan and his network were working against time.  The export control system was initially ignorant of the threat and then lethargic in reacting against it. From the beginning of Pakistan's buying spree, the red flags were raised one by one.  In Switzerland, the Pakistani buyers asked specifically for high-vacuum valves for a centrifuge enrichment plant.  There was no attempt to hide the intent, but the London Club of nuclear exporters had not placed such high-vacuum valves on the \"trigger list\" of restricted exports, and so their sale proceeded.  The gasification and solidification unitagain with a clear nuclear intent and again not controlled by the supplier cartelalso left Switzerland, without even the requirement of an export permit.  The unit was so large it had to be hauled away in three specially chartered C-130 transport planes.  As mentioned above, the Dutch government attempted to stop a large order of hardened steel tubes, only to be ignored by the Dutch supplying firm.  After the first shipment of British high-frequency inverters, Pakistani engineers sent an extended message requesting extensive and complex modifications to the finished product.  This sophistication only further undermined\n\nPakistan's cover story that the inverters were for a textile factory.68  Reflecting back, Khan noted the eagerness of European firms to do business with the Pakistani program and to respond to its needs: \"They literally begged us to buy their equipment.  We bought what we considered suitable for our plant and very often asked them to make changes and modifications according to our requirements.\"69\nPakistan's supply of luck was large, but not limitless.  People were starting to notice.  As governments were pressed from inside and out to control this trade in nuclear sensitive goods, they slowly roused themselves to the task.  A British member of parliament, Frann Allaun, raised the issue of inverters in the press and on the floor of parliament.  He noted, \"These converters are of the same kind, and have the same frequency, as those ordered by the British Atomic Energy Authority....  They are unsuitable as a control system in a textile factory.\"70  The shipment of inverters, however, took place after Allaun had first voiced his concern.  The British government could not re-examine its export controls in time to stop the shipment.\nBut the doors were closing for Pakistani procurement agents.  While British inverters were on their way to Pakistan, the U.S. branch of the same company denied the sale of similar inverters to a Pakistani buyer.  A Pakistani request to a German firm to purchase ten to fifteen tons of uranium yellowcake from South Africa was turned down both by Germany and South Africa.  The Dutch government launched an investigation into Khan's employment with FDO and the selling practices of Dutch companies to Pakistani buyers.  They recommended strengthening security in nuclear industry, refashioning export controls, and launching a criminal prosecution against Khan.  The British, once roused, launched an extensive investigation, and reported their findings to the other URENCO partners (France and the Netherlands) and to the London Group of\nMalik, *Dr. A. Q. Khan and the Islamic Bomb*, 96.\n\n69 Khan, \"Uranium Enrichment at Kahuta,\" in Malik, *Dr. A. Q. Khan and the Islamic Bomb,* 96.\n\n70 Weissman and Krosney, *The Islamic Bomb*, 206.\n\nnuclear supplying countries.  The United States re-examined its own export controls and also put pressure on other Western countries, as well as applying mild pressure directly on Pakistan.71\nThe supplier cartels were battling horizontally and vertically.  Bilaterally and through multilateral organizations, states slowly harmonized export controls to prevent Pakistan and others from seeking and exploiting the weakest national regulations. Simultaneously, state regulators had to seek to control further and further down on the chain of production.  Initially, Pakistanis were buying entire systems (as in the massive Swiss gasification and solidification unit), then they were buying sub-systems, then major components, then materials useful in engineering the components themselves.  As the U.S. journalists Steve Weissman and Herbert Krosney note, \"The clever Pakistanis were staying a step ahead of the game by buying the individual parts and assembling more and more of the equipment themselves in Pakistan itself.\"72\nKhan's procurement network was paying important dividends.  To create the internal infrastructurethe roaring cascades of centrifuges gradually enriching the uranium gasthis external procurement network was critical.  In the early years, Pakistan's desire for a nuclear weapon as soon as possible was tearing Khan's cascade of whirling centrifuges apart.  Shortcuts, limited diagnostics, and an emphasis on speed over precision meant that centrifuges were breaking down.  Within five years, according to one Western intelligence official, their first cascades had been devastated from the loss of machines.  Pakistan would have to expend significant resources just to replace the lost capacity.73  But the cost had been worth it.  By the mid-1980s, within a decade of Khan leaving his URENCO offices for the last time, Pakistan had produced enough highly enriched uranium for a weapon.74\n\n## C. If You Play In The Mud\n\nIn many ways, the story of A. Q. Khan is reminiscent of an \"Indiana Jones\"\nmovie.  Our protagonist is racing down a long corridor, with nonproliferation barriers rising in front of him, and he has to quickly navigate these obstacles lest he be crushed.\nAfter Khan overcomes each hurdle, a new one emerges in front of him that he must circumvent to avoid failure.  In a very real sense, Khan was in a race against the most powerful governments around the world.  While their resources are massive, their bureaucracies were slow to respond to new proliferation practices and had an even more difficult time cooperating with one another to stem the rising tide of illicit nuclear exports.  Khan stayed one step ahead of the competition for almost three decades.\n\nTo succeed, Khan had to deal with nefarious characters all around the world. He gained access to enormous amounts of poorly accounted for money, and gained control over contracts worth millions that would not be audited.  Weary that the bureaucratic lethargy of PAEC would be replicated, the Pakistani state had given Khan broad autonomy to run his research laboratories.  This meant less oversight, and greater potential for corruption.  This was a very slippery slope on which Khan traversed.\nGraham Allison, a former Clinton administration defense official, has commented, \"You don't find people of integrity who operate in that zone.\"75\nIn defending KRL, Gen. Aslam Beg inadvertently indicates how an atmosphere of impropriety can slowly develop:\nIf a scientist is given 10 million dollars to get the equipment how would he do it?  He will not carry the money in his bag.  He will put the money in a matters.  Centrifuges rotate at such high speeds that they must remain carefully balanced.  Earthquakes have the potential to disrupt catastrophically the operation of a centrifuge cascade. Jones, Pakistan: Eye of the Storm (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 2002), 201.  Also see Mark Hibbs, \"Pakistan's quest for UF6 sensors underlines limits of NSG controls,\" *Nuclear Fuel*, March 28, 2005.\n\n74 Jones quotes Khan as saying that he had sufficient highly enriched uranium by 1982, only six years after he returned to Pakistan.  Jones, *Pakistan*, 201.\nforeign bank account in someone's name.  The money lies in the account for some time, and the mark-up that fetches may probably have gone into his account.  It is a fringe benefit.  It is very logical that somebody contacts a scientist telling him that ARY Gold determines gold [prices] in the region, so why not invest a million dollars or have it invested on his behalf?  This may have happened.  Is it a crime?  No.76\nIn this sort of environment, no one raised serious objections when Khan's former son-in-law and Khan's uncle received profitable contracts to procure materials significantly over market rates.77  Or, if objections were raised, Pakistan's national security mangers were quick to silence them, lest Khan's \"legitimate\" work be put into jeopardy.\n\n## D. An Unhealthy Rivalry\n\nAbdul Qadeer Khan is often referred to as the father of the Pakistani nuclear weapons program.78  But he is not.  A more accurate, but less grandiose, description would be that Khan is the father of the Pakistani uranium enrichment program.  In this role, Khan had a crucial but circumscribed mission: to generate sufficient quantities of fissile material for a Pakistani nuclear weapons arsenal.  Khan was part of a broader Pakistani nuclear weapons effort, where most requirements were tasked to a rival organization: the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission (see Figure 1, next page).\n\nKhan continually sought to expand the responsibilities entrusted to his laboratories.  As his nuclear transactions demonstrate, Khan apparently gained expertise in fields other than uranium enrichment.  He may have achieved competency in designing the bomb, developing a trigger mechanism, converting uranium gas into a metal, and perhaps work on design assembly itself.79  This expanded workload may have received some sanction by the Pakistani state, it may have been developed independently at Khan's own initiative, or it likely was some combination of both.  In any event, by the Pakistan's atomic bomb.\"\nlate 1980s, Khan had knowledge of nuclear activity beyond just uranium enrichment and was able to transfer some of that knowledge and technology to other states.\nThe rivalry manifested itself in two visible ways: a public relations battle to win popular esteem (and discredit the opposing laboratory) and a competition over responsibilities and resources between the two organizations.  The public rivalry was particularly vicious, with both parties spreading allegations about the patriotism, competence, and integrity of the other.  Munir Ahmad Khan did less to harness journalists to attack Khan, though PAEC officials did leak concerns about corruption and malfeasance at KRL to favored members of the media.80  Both PAEC and KRL officials cooperated with media accounts to ensure their achievements would receive favorable coverage.  They authored long op-eds describing their achievements in the Englishlanguage newspapers.\n\nA. Q. Khan patronized perhaps 20 journalists throughout Pakistan, and had a particularly close relationship with his \"biographer\" Zahid Malik.81  This was part of a broader effort by A. Q. Khan to give noticeably to charities and educational institutions, perhaps over Rs. 2 billion in total.82  A. Q. Khan at the minimum condoned a smear campaign by journalists, like Malik, to discredit Munir and his work.  In Malik's book, there is a chapter entitled, \"The Myth of Munir's Atom Bomb.\"83  Elsewhere in the book, Malik claims to quote Zulfikar Ali Bhutto calling Munir \"a bastard, a traitor, and a cheat.\"84  Malik also \"reports\" that Zia-ul-Haq was of a similar opinion about Munir: \"He is a bastard, a CIA agent.\"85  For his trouble, Malik alleges that Munir reported his hagiographic effort to the security services, which proceeded to seize the journalist's draft manuscript.86\nThis public battle was an extension of a fierce bureaucratic rivalry occurring behind the scenes.  The uranium enrichment effort was initially placed within the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission hierarchy.  As A. Q. Khan achieved successes in his effort to create a gas centrifuge cascade, he asked and received increasing autonomy, culminating in the re-naming of Engineering Research Laboratories after Khan in 1981.87\nEven after gaining autonomy as head of Khan Research Laboratories, Khan chafed at having to be dependent on PAEC.  He blamed Munir Ahmad Khan, PAEC's director, for shortages and quality control issues with the uranium hexafluoride gas.88  A. Q. Khan claimed that PAEC also was lagging behind in its development of the nuclear weapon design itself.89\nwas written), the figure would amount to a hefty $36 million.  In fact, the figure could be far higher since this total includes only three of Khan's largest donations to the Ghulam Ishaq Khan Institute of Technology, the Mianwali Institute of Technology, and the Institute for Behavioral Sciences.\n\n83 Zahid Malik, *Dr. A. Q. Khan and the Islamic Bomb* (Islamabad: Hurmat, 1992), 100-120.\n\n84 Ibid., 121.\n\n85 Ibid., 9.\n\n86 Ibid., 5.\n\n87 Rehman, *Long Road to Chagai*, 102-3.\n\n88 Rehman, *Long Road to Chagai*,72-4.\n\n89 Ibid., 103.\n\nAs a consequence, according to Pakistani reporter Shahid-ur-Rehman, Khan claimed that Zia gave KRL sweeping new responsibilities.  Rehman is the author of one of the only book-length examinations of the Pakistani nuclear weapons program, though one that suffers from a sensational and hastily crafted style.  On this issue, Rehman's text is packed with allegations, so it is best to quote from it at length:\nAccording to Dr A Q Khan, sometimes in 1982, President Zia invited him to the Presidency and directed in the presence of Lt. General A. Zamin Naqvi, Advisor to the President on Nuclear Affairs to start work \"all the way,\" on the manufacture of a nuclear device.  This meant that KRL had been commissioned, in addition to uranium enrichment, to design the bomb, develop [the] trigger mechanism, convert enriched uranium into metal, work on the nitty gritty of the device, and assemble it.\n\nDr Khan claimed that he was instructed by President Zia not to mention his new responsibilities to any body, \"not even to Finance Minister Ghulam Ishaq Khan, Foreign Minister Sahibzada Yakub Khan, and his Chief of Staff Lt. General K. M. Arif\".  As regards funds, he was asked to make use of his own budget or write directly General Zia. PAEC scientists questioned the veracity of Dr Khan's claim.  However, it explained a host of unanswered questions relating to Pakistan's nuclear program, e.g. [the] PAEC complain that Lt. General Zamin Naqvi passed on PAEC design of the device to KRL and [a] similar complaint by KRL\nagainst LT General K M Arif.90\nIf Rehman's account is accurateor, at a minimum, reports Khan's statement accuratelyit highlights several of the themes of this study: the Pakistan nuclear weapons program was characterized by an *ad hoc* division of labor, limited governmental oversight, very personalized decision-making, and intense bureaucratic rivalries.  The fact that PAEC and KRL scientists were complaining about leaks of senior military officials to opposing laboratories is indicative of a command and control system in disarray.\nDid Zia really ask Khan not to reveal information to Ghulam Ishaq Khan, Sahibzada Yakub Khan, and Lt. Gen. K. M. Arif?  If so, this is particularly significant because all three were senior members of a committee charged with planning and oversight of the strategic organizations.91  Zia would be subverting the one nuclear oversight body that existed.  Perhaps, Zia was concerned about American intelligence. Strict compartmentalization might deny the United States information about the existence of Khan's parallel effort.  One imagines that there were hundreds of instances in the history of the Pakistani nuclear program where the competing goals of secrecy and oversight were in conflict.  It also seems likely that secrecy won more often than oversight.  Another possibility is that Khan did not receive instructions from Zia, but claimed a secret instruction to justify unsanctioned expansion into new areas of research and development.  That possibility is not comforting either.  The only comforting thought is that Rehman made up the entire story or misrepresented it, but the number of details\n(particularly of crucial names) gives the story a ring of authenticity.\nElsewhere in Rehman's book, he states, \"For reasons of security and some other considerations, enriched uranium is now converted into metal by KRL itself.\"92  Later in the volume, Rehman describes KRL's competency in slightly more expansive terms than just re-conversion into metal: \"[At Kahuta], uranium gas is enriched to weapon grade level and at a nearby facility converted into metallic cores for uranium devices.\"93\nRehman implies that KRL had gained skills in casting and fabricating cores, as well.\n\nRehman's account is substantiated by information from Iran and Libya that indicate that Khan did offer assistance with re-conversion and casting of uranium metal and with creating a nuclear weapons device.  At the minimum, we know that Khan had access to extensive nuclear design blueprints and instructions, which were transferred to Libya and perhaps others.  As is discussed in chapter four, the situation has been confused somewhat by recent statements by President Pervez Musharraf arguing that\n92 Rehman, *Long Road to Chagai*, 67.\n\n93 Ibid., 94.\n\nKhan's expertise was restricted to centrifuge enrichment, something that does not appear born out by open Pakistani sources or information gathered on the Iranian or Libyan programs.94\n\nKhan was able to keep ahead of the global export control regime from the mid-\n1970s to the mid-1980s.  His success in nuclear procurement had earned him fame and commendation at home.  By the mid-1980s, he had created a network of middlemen, financiers, importers, and front companies that would supply his nuclear enterprise.\nKhan's geniusand his dangerwas to turn this organization from importing into exporting.  The next three chapters explore Khan's two decades of nuclear moonlighting through case studies of his assistance to Iran, North Korea, and Libya.\n\n\n\n## This Page Intentionally Left Blank Iii. The First Time Is Special: Khan's Assistance To Iran A. Introduction\n\nFrom 1987 to 1999, the Islamic Republic of Iran received nuclear assistance from Dr. Abdul Qadeer Khan, head of Pakistan's Khan Research Laboratories.  This assistance included designs, components, technical consulting, and uranium shipments.  These transfers significantly aided Iran in its efforts to enrich uranium.  If Iran is able to acquire sufficient quantities of fissile material, it will have overcome the most difficult challenge in constructing a nuclear explosive device.\nThe nuclear assistance from Khan to Iran is remarkable because it dramatically complicated Pakistan's threat environment.  Pakistan-Iran relations have been periodically turbulent, and growing Indo-Iranian entente is disconcerting to Islamabad.  A nuclear Iran is not a comforting thought to Pakistani leaders in Islamabad or Rawalpindi, who are preoccupied already with threats on their eastern (India) and northern (Afghanistan) borders.  Out of all of Khan's nuclear transfers, this challenges the nuclear optimists most directly.  Kenneth N. Waltz's argument about good nuclear stewardship is premised on a realist faith in the rationality of a state not to diminish its security.  Much of Waltz's analysis is based on an understandable assumption that \"[s]tates are not likely to run major risks for minor gains.\"95  However, Khan's assistance to Tehran provided few if any benefits to Pakistan's security, while risking a nuclear neighbor on Islamabad's doorstepnot to mention international opprobrium from close friends\n(Saudi Arabia) and allies (the United States).96\nThis chapter places Khan's nuclear assistance to Iran in the context of loose safety and security arrangements within the Pakistani nuclear weapons program.  As discussed\n\"almost everything\" necessary for a nuclear weapons program to the Peoples' Republic of China in a burst of nuclear collaboration from 1957 to 1960.  The technology transfer was ultimately halted as the Soviet leadership became convinced of the unreliability of the Chinese as a partner, but not before greatly assisting Beijing's nuclear program.  See John Wilson Lewis and Xue Litai, *China Builds the Bomb* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1988), 60-72.\n\nin the previous chapter, the failure of the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission in the 1970s to secure a plutonium reprocessing plant had been partially blamed on bureaucratic red tape and fiscal straight jackets.  Khan Research Laboratories was granted autonomy and flexibility, and delivered results that seemingly validated this bureaucratic freedom. This autonomy necessarily meant that oversight was diminished, providing Khan with the space to conduct his nuclear entrepreneurship.  This chapter also provides evidence that a unique constellation of Pakistani policymakers in the late 1980s may have been predisposed to permit Khan to provide limited nuclear assistance to Iran.  It argues, however, that Khan likely exceeded any policy opening provided by Pakistani authorities. It concludes by assessing how significant Pakistani assistance has been in a larger potential effort by Iran to acquire nuclear weapons.\nThis chapter demonstrates that Khan's assistance advanced the Iranian nuclear program.  This provision of nuclear technology to a potential adversary should cause nuclear optimists considerable discomfort.  Their faith is based on a belief that nuclear secrets will be held tight and states will do so because of concerns about their own security.  The assistance to Iran is evidence that Pakistan was either unable or unwilling to prevent such transfers.  In either event, the optimists should worry.\n\n## B. A Nuclear Offer\n\nAs discussed in the previous chapter, Khan had spent the decade since he left the Netherlands constructing an impressive nuclear organization for Pakistan.  He developed a system to identify, pay for, procure, and ship nuclear-related components, technologies, and materials from Europe to Pakistan.  These foreign-acquired items were then integrated into an increasingly sophisticated indigenous nuclear infrastructure, supported by a growing cadre of nuclear scientists.  Sometime in the mid-to-late 1980s, Khan appears to have diverted the flow.  He was still bringing in material and components for his nuclear enrichment process, but he seems to have been ordering more than Pakistan needed.97  At the same time, Khan Research Laboratories was maturing.  KRL scientists published papers starting in 1987 on constructing more difficult centrifuges of maraging steel, rather than the earlier aluminum-based designs.  In 1991, KRL scientists published\n\ndetails of how to etch special grooves into the bottom bearing of the centrifuge to incorporate lubricants.98  Both trendsover-ordering and technological innovationleft Khan with excess inventory.  An anonymous American official marveled at the accomplishment: \"First, he exploits a fragmented market and develops a quite advanced nuclear arsenal.  Then he throws the switch, reverses the flow and figures out how to sell the whole kit, right down to the bomb designs, to some of the world's worst governments.\"99\nThe first country that Khan sold to was Iran.  Reportedly, in 1987, three Iranian officials met several members of Khan's network in Dubai, perhaps including an unclenephew team of Sri Lankan businessmen, Mohamed Farouq and Buhary Syed Ali Tahir, and a German engineer named Heinz Mebus.100  Tahir would gain international notoriety in 2003 when President George W. Bush called him the Khan network's chief financial officerthough in 1987 he would have been fairly young.101  An Iranian exile group has claimed that one of the Iranian representatives was then-Brig. Gen. Mohammad Eslami, at the time in charge of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard's research center.  If Eslami was present, it would indicate that even at this early stage the cooperation was viewed as having military utility.102  Khan's intermediaries apparently presented a one-page the outlines of the story: Pierre Goldschmidt, IAEA Deputy Director General, \"Statement to the Board of Governors,\" March 1, 2005, http://www.iaea.org/NewsCenter/Statements/DDGs/2005/goldschmidt01032005.html (accessed March 7,\n2005).  For some reason, the Goldschmidt statement is no longer available on the IAEA website, though excerpts are available at http://www.iranwatch.org/international/IAEA/iaea-goldschmidt-statement-\n030105.htm (accessed April 5, 2005).   Mohamed Farouq should not be confused for Muhammad Farooq, a centrifuge expert at KRL, who was involved extensively with Khan's nuclear smuggling.  Kamran Khan,\n\"Dr. Qadeer's Future Still Uncertain,\" *The News* (Islamabad), January 31, 2004.\n\n101 \"President Announces New Measures to Counter the Threat of WMD,\" Remarks by the President to the National Defense University, Washington, D.C., February 11, 2004, http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/02/20040211-4.html.\n102 \"Iranian Dissident Fires Ukraine, Iran Charges on Tehran's Nuclear Program,\" Agence France Presse, August 26, 2005.\n\nhandwritten note outlining a five-point, phased nuclear weapons development plan.\nThough this was Khan's first offer, he apparently hit the ground running.  According to the IAEA,\nThis document suggests that the offer included the delivery of: a disassembled sample machine (including drawings, descriptions, and specifications for production); drawings, specifications and calculations for a \"complete plant\"; and materials for 2000 centrifuge machines.  The document also reflects an offer to provide auxiliary vacuum and electric drive equipment and uranium re-conversion and casting capabilities.103\nKhan apparently also provided Iran with information on circumventing existing export controls.  According to one anonymous Pakistani source, \"We confided in them about the items needed to construct a nuclear bomb, as well as the makes of equipment, the names of companies, the countries from which they could be procured and how they could be procured.\"104  The Iranians may have outsmarted Khan, however.  Using Khan's document as a shopping list, IAEA employees reportedly believe that Iran instead went to European, Russian, and Chinese firms to purchase the equipment and technology at lower prices.105 Iran's ability to continue to purchase from Western companies is a key indicator that efforts to improve export controls were only partially successful.106\nEven if the Iranians did not purchase Khan's \"package deal,\" they apparently did buy centrifuges, designs, and centrifuge technology.  Cooperation began in 1987,107\nhttp://www.armscontrolwonk.com/GOV_2005_67.pdf\n106 Jack Boureston has said that Iran was able to receive \"high-strength aluminium, maraging steel, electron beam welders, balancing machines, vacuum pumps, computer-numerically controlled machine tools, and flow-forming machines for both aluminium and maraging steel\" from Europe, as well as training for the use of the equipment.  Boureston, \"Fuel Cycle: Tracking the Technology,\" Nuclear Engineering International, September 30, 2004.\n\nthough Khan reportedly visited the Bushehr nuclear facility in February 1986.108 At that time, in addition to inadvertently providing a shopping list, Khan apparently provided Iran with designs for the P-1 aluminum rotor centrifuge and sample components for that centrifuge.109  Between 1994 and 1996, Iran received an apparently duplicate set of P-1\ndesigns along with components for 500 centrifuges.110  It seems that these components were from models that Pakistan had used previously to enrich uranium, perhaps explaining mostif not allof the enriched uranium contamination found on Iran equipment.111  Iran claimed that it had difficulty setting up the centrifuge cascades, and blamed this difficulty on \"poor quality components.\"112  At least once, in 1997, Khan's network replaced previously supplied bellows because of their inferior performance.113\nAlso between 1994 and 1996, Iran received designs for the more advanced P-2\ncentrifuge, though Iran claims it did not work on this design until early 2002.114 Though the Pakistani P-2 uses maraging steel for the spinning rotors that separate different densities of uranium, Iran claims it had difficulty manufacturing those components.\nInstead, Iran attempted to use a \"shorter, sub-critical carbon composite rotor.\"115\nNetworks,\" *Washington Quarterly* 28, no. 2 (Spring 2005): 115; also on contamination see\n\"Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran,\" November 29, 2004,\n9-10, 23.\n\n112 International Atomic Energy Agency, \"Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran,\" Report by the Director General to the Board of Governors, November 10, 2003, GOV/2003/75, 8.\n\n113 \"Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran,\" November\n29, 2004, 8.\n\n114 Ibid., 10-11; also see John Bolton, Undersecretary of State for Arms Control and International Security, \"Statement to the House Committee on International Relations Subcommittee on the Middle East and Central Asia on Iranian Proliferation,\" June 24, 2004.  Early in his testimony Bolton says that Iran procured P-2 components, but subsequently in a longer discussion of the P-2, he seems to only suggest that Iran was procuring materials for the P-2.\n\n115 \"Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran,\" November\n29, 2004, 10-11.  Sub-critical rotors operate below their first natural frequency of resonance.  Super-critical rotors operate above that frequency.\n\nAnonymous IAEA officials have been quoted in the press saying they also suspect that Iran received a nuclear weapons design from the Khan network.116\n\n## C. A Unique Constellation Of Personalities\n\nWhy would A. Q. Khan sell nuclear technology to the western neighbor of Pakistan?  The Iranian case appears to be an odd and ambiguous confluence of a misguided sense of national interest, an ideological opposition to the Western export control regime, and the personal greed of A. Q. Khan and his cronies.  First, Khan may have received permission from Pakistan's national leadership to begin nuclear cooperation with Iran.  Once the door for limited nuclear collaboration was open, even a crack, Khan may have used such policy approval to barge through it.\nPakistani journalist Kamran Khan has quoted retired Pakistani scientists saying that President and Army chief Zia ul-Haq had opened the door to both peaceful and \"nonpeaceful\" nuclear cooperation before his death in 1988. One anonymous scientist described Zia's intent as \"to play around but not to yield anything substantial at any cost.\" 117  This seems somewhat dubious given Zia's pro-Sunni, anti-Shi'a credentials, and the general souring of Pakistani-Iranian relations after the Iranian Revolution.\nKhan's opening to Iran does seem to coincide with the elevation of Mirza Aslam Beg to the position of Vice Chief of Army Staff in March of 1987 and his subsequent tenure as Army chief from 1988 to 1991.  Beg held peculiar views of a Pakistani-Afghan-\nIranian (and possibly Turkish) alliance that could act in \"strategic defiance\" of the West. Strategic defiance was never a very clear notion, but it seemed to involve \"strengthening collective defenses of regional Muslim countries\" through joint training, defense production, and perhaps formal agreements.  In particular, Beg seemed to hold particular regard for Iranian thinking on matters of international security.118\nThere are more reasons than just old security views to implicate Beg.  Former U.S. Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, Henry Rowen, has claimed that in January 1990 Beg presented Rowen with a very clear threat: \"if Pakistan was cut off [from U.S. military assistance] it might be forced to share nuclear technology with Iran.\"119  According to Rowen's recounting, Beg's threat did not explicitly mention weapons technology, but focused on nuclear technology more generally.\nRobert Oakley, the U.S. Ambassador to Pakistan at the time of Beg's tenure, also has implicated Beg.  Steve Coll referenced a 2002 interview with Oakley as the source behind Coll's claim that Beg\nopened discussions in Tehran with the Iranian Revolutionary Guard about the possibility of Pakistani nuclear cooperation with Iran.  Beg discussed a deal in which Pakistan would trade its bombmaking expertise for Iranian oil.  Oakley met with the Pakistani general to explain 'what a disaster this would be, certainly in terms of the relationship with the United States,'\nand Beg agreed to abandon the Iranian talks.120\nAn unnamed \"Pakistani investigator\" has claimed that Beg was \"in the picture\"\nregarding Khan's assistance to Iran, though he most likely did not know how extensive such cooperation was.  Pakistani investigators reportedly have found evidence that Khan informed Beg of the transfer of outdated equipment to Iran in 1991.121\nMore recently, Beg wrote an op-ed in one of Pakistan's leading English newspapers floating the bizarre notion that Pakistan and India should jointly provide nuclear weapons to Iran under some sort of custodial arrangement similar to that used within the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.122 Beg has denied any wrongdoing, but his denials have focused more on the lack of evidence against him than in denying support for such a policy.  In fact, he pointedly refused to say that what occurred was illegal.123\nOther Pakistani press accounts have noted the important role of Ghulam Ishaq Khan, chairman of Pakistan's Senate from 1985 to 1988 and president from 1988 to 1993.  As one anonymous Pakistani official put it, \"If A. Q. Khan is the father of Pakistan's nuclear bomb, Ghulam Ishaq Khan was the grandfather.\"124  Ghulam Ishaq Khan worked closely with A. Q. Khan in the 1970s, 1980s, and early 1990s.125  For instance, as finance minister in 1981, Ghulam Ishaq Khan gave tax-free status to the BCCI Foundation, the non-profit branch of a particularly complex and corrupt financial empire.  In the late 1980s, BCCI returned the favor by funneling $10 million dollars worth of grants into the Ghulam Ishaq Khan Institute of Engineering Sciences and Technology, which at that time was directed by A. Q. Khan and widely considered to be a front for Khan Research Laboratories.126\nFinally, at least one press account places blame on the now deceased Maj. Gen.\n\nImtiaz Ali for pressuring Khan into supplying enrichment equipment and designs to Iran.127  Imtiaz, who is referred to by his first name, was military secretary to Zulfikar Ali Bhutto's government when A. Q. Khan returned to Pakistan and had a key role in liaising with Khan as he set up Pakistan's enrichment facility.128  Later, he was military advisor to Benazir Bhutto during her first term as civilian prime minister from December 1988 to August 1990.\n\nThis unique constellation of political personalitiesBeg, Ghulam Ishaq Khan, and Imtiazall may have been inclined to give Khan permission to proceed with some\n124 Khan, \"Dr Qadeer's Fate Hangs in Balance,\" January 24, 2004.\nsort of cooperation with Iran.  While there is no definitive evidence, it seems plausible that Zia, perhaps at Beg's behest, allowed for very limited, non-substantive nuclear cooperation with Iran in 1987 or 1988.  It also seems likely that Beg permitted or ordered expanded cooperation with Iran, as part of a broader policy of strategic defiance.  Perhaps Ghulam Ishaq Khan or Maj. Gen. Imtiaz, having worked intimately with Khan for over a decade, did not oppose such cooperation if they even learned about it.  And there is at least one press report that Imtiaz actually encouraged such cooperation.\n\n## D. Motivations For Nuclear Cooperation\n\nA number of things do not make sense about the cooperation with Iran.  First, why was Khan's opening bid so largeessentially offering the Iranians a \"turnkey\"\nnuclear program?  It seems unlikely, though not impossible, that even this group of policymakers would want a fourth nuclear-armed neighbor on Pakistan's border.129  If the scale of the cooperation was not approved by top officials, then Khan's nuclear moonlighting began almost the moment he had an opportunity to sell.  This may explain the second incongruity with the Pakistan-Iran cooperation: its more than a decade-long persistence.  Iran admits to meeting thirteen times with \"the clandestine supply network\"\nbetween 1994 and 1999.130  Strategic defiance was never a national policy, more of a fuzzy idea being hawked by Beg and his close associates.  After Beg, Ghulam Ishaq Khan, and Imtiaz left the scene, one would have expected the cooperation to whither away.  Instead, starting in 1994, it was reinvigorated, with another set of P-1 designs and components as well as designs for the P-2.  This expanded relationship occurred precisely as the Pakistani-Iranian relationship was growing more troubled over the conduct of the Afghan civil war.131  The persistence of cooperation in spite of changes in Pakistani leadership and the broader Iran-Pakistan relationship may indicate that A. Q. Khan was the primary motivator behind the assistance to Tehran.\nThe 1990s were a tumultuous time for Pakistan as it experimented with varying levels of democratic rule.  Khan, an adroit bureaucratic operator, may have been able to\n\nuse the in-fighting amongst political leaders to create space in which his burgeoning nuclear enterprise could expand and prosper.132  It seems that while the initial opening to Iran may have had the approval or acquiescence of a few key policymakers, Khan dramatically went beyond his mandate in his cooperation with Iran.\nKhan may have continued his nuclear dealings with Iran for money and, to a lesser extent, ideology.  Khan's \"money man,\" B. S. A. Tahir has admitted that he was paid $3 million worth of United Arab Emirates' *dirhams* for two containers of used centrifuges, and that he then delivered two briefcases full of the money to A. Q. Khan's guest house in Dubai.133  The international investigations of the Khan network reportedly have demonstrated that millions of dollars went from Iran into the bank accounts of Pakistani nuclear scientists and that these nuclear scientists, including Khan, held tens of millions of dollars of undisclosed assets in Pakistan and abroad.134  Some of these investigations are reminiscent of Captain Renault's shock that gambling is occurring in Rick's Cafe in \"Casablanca.\"135  After all, Khan's lavish home, regular foreign travel, and extensive charitable giving were well known around Islamabad.136  However, Pakistanis say with some credibility that they expected Khan earned his extra income from corruption, and many are still upset that he was not content with skimming from the top of KRL's books and instead supplemented his income with nuclear smuggling that damaged Pakistani security.137\nKhan also had lesser ideological motivations.  He was intensely opposed to the Western export control regime.  He sought to pierce the \"clouds of so-called secrecy\" that\n134 Khan, \"Foreign Accounts Having Proceeds From N-Technology Transfer Found,\" *The News*.\n\n135 Having thought of this analogy, I was disappointed to find it was unoriginal.  Animesh Ghoshal,\n\"Shock! And Then the Case Is Closed,\" *Financial Times*, April 12, 2004.\n136 Kamran Khan, \"Business in Timbuktu: Conflict Views about Army's Awareness of Qadeer's Engagements,\" *The News* (Islamabad), February 1, 2004.\n137 Massoud Ansari, \"Nuclear Scientists from Pakistan Admit Helping Iran with Bomb-Making,\" The Telegraph (U.K.), January 25, 2004.\nsuch a regime sought to create.138  These views appeared to have been amplified as they related to Muslim countries.  In a 1995 speech, Khan lamented Western \"efforts to curtail the development of the Muslim World which the Western powers unjustifiably see as a potential threat to their monopoly.  Development made by certain Muslim states in the restricted technologies does not trickle down to others because of international pressure and lack of coordination and cooperation among the Muslim countries.\"139  Khan continued by calling for greater collective efforts amongst Muslim countries, and in particular for increased joint defense research and development.  Together, Khan's greed and ideological inclinations may have pushed him to assist other countries, with or without formal approval from policymakers.\n\n## E. Significance Of Pakistani Assistance\n\nPakistan's assistance to Iran should not be exaggerated, nor should it be understated.  Iran is unlikely to have made as much progress on its centrifuge enrichment program as it has without Khan's assistance.  Three significant bottlenecks remain: (1) sufficient quantities of uranium feedstock; (2) engineering challenges of running a largescale centrifuge cascade; and (3) the re-conversion and casting from uranium gas to metal and the production of a warhead.140  Briefly, there are reasons to suspect that each of the bottlenecks will present some difficulties to the Iranians if they are attempting to create a nuclear weapon.  In all of these areas, the broader point is the same: Khan's assistance was largely limited to uranium enrichment.  Developing an atomic weapon, however, has a number of other steps, many of which were outside of KRL's mandate.  Significantly, however, if Khan transferred a nuclear warhead design to Iran, as he did to Libya, it may have diminished potential delays Iran might experience in weaponization.\nIslamic Polity in the Twenty-First Century from March 26 to 30, 1995 in Islamabad, Pakistan, reprinted in Dr. A. Q. Khan on Science and Education, S. Shabbir Hussain and Mujahid Kamran, eds. (Lahore: Sang-e-\nMeel, 1997), 169-82.\n\nFirst, Iran's centrifuges are only useful with sufficient quantities of uranium feedstock.  In 1993-1994, the Iranians had contracted with the Chinese to build a facility to convert uranium metal into uranium gas (hereafter a UCF, or Uranium Conversion Facility) at Esfahan.  Under intense pressure from the United States, however, the Chinese began negotiations to pull out from the contract in 1996, and finished their negotiated withdrawal from the work in 1998.141  Apparently, the Iranians had obtained\n\"extensive UCF design documentation\" from the Chinese prior to their pullout, which Iran claims to have used in creating a quasi-indigenous UCF.  The IAEA experts that examined the facility and the documentation have judged Iranian claims to be credible.142\nNevertheless, Iran may still face challenges in its uranium conversion efforts.  A recent Arms Control Today report quotes an anonymous State Department official describing suspicions of Iranian difficulties in the conversion, storage, and handling of the highly corrosive uranium hexafluoride gas. In the same report, however, another Western diplomatic source argues that any such difficulties could potentially be overcome in short-term.143\nA recently leaked IAEA report indicates that Iran has managed to convert 6,800\nkg of uranium hexafluoride, which would be enough for perhaps one nuclear explosive device.144  Quantity is not necessarily quality, however.  One anonymous diplomat told Reuters, \"The [Iranian] UF6 is crap.\"  Another was more circumspect, saying, \"I wouldn't say it's garbage. But the UF6 produced at Isfahan is of such poor quality that if it were fed into centrifuges it could damage them.\"145\nNovember 29, 2004, 5.\n\n143 Paul Kerr, \"Iran's Nuclear Activities Limited,\" *Arms Control Today* (September 2005), http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2005_09/IranLimits.asp.\n144 International Atomic Energy Agency, \"Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran,\" Report by the Director General to the Board of Governors, GOV/2005/67, September 2, 2005, 13; the leaked report is available at http://www.armscontrolwonk.com/GOV_2005_67.pdf; also George Jahn, \"UN Report Says Iran Has Basic Stock for 1 Weapon,\" *Chicago Tribune*, September 3, 2005.\n145 Francois Murphy and Louis Charbonneau, \"Iran's Uranium Gas Unusable for Atomic Fuel-\nDiplomats,\" *Reuters*, September 27, 2005.\n\nSecond, even if Iran were able to manufacture sufficient quantities of feedstock, it would have to process it through a large cascade of centrifuges running at high speeds and efficiencies.  The IAEA has reported that Iran has 1274 assembled rotors at Natanz, though David Albright and Corey Hinderstein have estimated that only about 500 of these are functional.146  Assuming Iran is able to bring additional rotors online at 70-100\ncentrifuges per month, Albright and Hinderstein argue that Iran could have a nuclear weapon by early 2007.  They admit that this would be the best-case scenario, and indicate that Iran may have difficulty keeping the cascade running.  The anonymous State Department official in the *Arms Control Today* report indicates that Iran may be experiencing just such problems.147  A recent U.S. National Intelligence Estimate reportedly concluded that Iran was at least ten years from having sufficient fissile material for a nuclear weapon, implying that a bottleneck exists in either the uranium conversion or enrichment phases, or possibly both.148\nThird, after Iran acquires sufficient quantities of fissile material, it would have to convert the enriched uranium gas into metal and manufacture the components for a nuclear warhead.  Albright and Hinderstein argue that this process might only take a few more months.149  According to press reports on the most recent U.S. government estimate, there is no consensus within the intelligence community on when Iran would be ready with an implosion device.150  It is possible that Khan provided Iran with blueprints of a tested implosion design, as he did with the Libyans.  If so, that could significantly ease Iran's task.  Even if this were the case, it is unclear if such a device would be small or light enough to be delivered aboard Iran's present ballistic missiles.151  While this\n2004), 67-72.\n\n147 Kerr, \"Iran's Nuclear Activities Limited.\"\n148 Dafna Linzer, \"Iran Is Judged 10 Years from Nuclear Bomb,\" *Washington Post*, August 2, 2005, A1.\n\n149 Albright and Hinderstein, \"Countdown to Showdown.\"\n150 Linzer, \"Iran is Judged 10 Years from Nuclear Bomb.\"\nwould certainly reinforce the credibility of an Iranian nuclear deterrent, even a difficultto-deliver nuclear device would cause all but the most determined hawks to pause before contemplating the use of force against Iran.\n\nIran appears to represent Khan's first nuclear sale.  A unique confluence of policymakers combined with loose safeguards may have allowed Khan to get his nuclear enterprise off of the ground.  His cooperation with Iran continued even after those policymakers who might have approved such a venture had left the seen.  His cooperation with Iran continued even after Pakistani-Iranian relations had soured in the mid-1990s.  It appears that Khan was in control, and continued cooperation largely for his own benefit.\nKenneth Waltz argued in his support for nuclear optimism, \"We do not have to wonder whether they will take good care of their weapons.  They have every incentive to do so.\"  Pakistan had every incentive not to assist Iran with its nuclear program.  It risked a direct loss of security, by gaining a nuclear neighbor, and an indirect threat, caused by a loss of faith in its nuclear stewardship.  At best, it could hope that Iran would be so pleased by the nuclear exchange that the Iranian-Pakistani relationship would be transformed into a permanent alliance.  Perhaps, it could hope that the assistance would be sufficient to cement friendship, but insufficient to provide Iran with a real nuclear weapon.  Risk-taking based on shaky beliefs is not predicted by the optimist argument.\nThe optimists' faith is further shaken if we assume that the state did not authorize the transfer.  If rogue actors can make significant decisions with nuclear technology, then the faith of optimists that states are sensitive to their own demise instead devolves into a faith that individuals will make good choices.  Khan is proof that individuals often take decisions that are very dangerous for themselves and others.\nThe above narrative also demonstrates that viewing the state as a unitary actor has its limits.  Pakistan and other states are characterized by personalized rule.  To argue that the Pakistani state approved Khan's nuclear cooperation with Iran is almost certainly an overstatement.  It is possible that the state authorized some very limited cooperation, that a small group of like-minded individuals approved broader cooperation, and that Khan himself used that policy opening to pursue extensive and lucrative assistance.  Secret decisions made without outside inputs may be dangerously wrong.  In this case, a unique constellation of individualswhere some had inclinations to cooperate with Iran, where others were predisposed to give Khan autonomy, and where still others were inclined to look the other waymay have approved the cooperation tacitly.\nThe next case, North Korea, may provide a different story.  Nuclear assistance to North Korea occurred in the context of a broader strategic partnership between Islamabad and Pyongyang, where sensitive nuclear technology was often shared.  Was Khan's cooperation with North Korea for the benefit of Pakistan, for the benefit of Khan Research Laboratories, or to benefit Khan?  The next chapter explores some of these possibilities.\n\n\nTHIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK\n\n## Iv. The Problem Of Background Noise: Khan's Assistance To North Korea A. Introduction\n\nThe previous chapter discussed Khan's first known transfer of nuclear knowledge to a non-nuclear weapons state.  Iran had little to offer Pakistan except for political support and cash.152  While evidence of tangible political support from Iran is scarce\n(which might indicate a greater degree of involvement by the Pakistani state), there is evidence of cash flows from Tehran to Khan and his associates.153  Khan's next nuclear transfer appears to have been to North Korea.  Pyongyang had more to offer Pakistan that might be of strategic interest to Islamabad and Rawalpindi.  In particular, North Korea's experience with liquid-fueled missiles and handling plutonium might have been useful to the Pakistani state.  This has led to understandable speculation that some sort of nuclear barter might have been arranged between Pyongyang and Islamabad, with Khan acting as the middleman for the deal.154\nThe North Korean case also differs from Iran (the previous chapter) and Libya\n(the next case study) because of the paucity of information about the status of the North Korean program.  In the Iranian and Libyan examples, significant data has been made available to the public because of IAEA inspections in both countries and the Libyan decision to completely, verifiably, and irreversibly dismantle its program.  With regards to the North Korean program, the limited information available in open sources has been a combination of statements by Pakistani officials regarding the Khan investigation and leaks from government officials to the press.\nThis chapter has modest objectives in light of the meager data available.  It summarizes the publicly available information about what was transferred to North Korea and how significant such transfers might be.  It demonstrates that a nuclear-for-missile technology exchange, while possible, is not the only way to read the Pakistani-North Korean relationship.  It offers alternative, but unproven, explanations.  It examines the prospect that North Korea might have provided plutonium or plutonium expertise to Pakistan.  It looks at evidence suggesting Pakistan may have assisted North Korea with uranium conversion, suggesting broad state-to-state nuclear cooperation.  It concludes by arguing that none of the state-level explanations are entirely compelling, and more weight should be given to individual or institutional rationales for Khan's assistance to Pyongyang.\n\n## B. The Nature And Significance Of Khan's Assistance\n\nPakistani officials have discussed the nature of Khan's nuclear assistance with North Korea, both directly to the press and with U.S. officials.  A. Q. Khan, in a signed statement, reportedly accepted responsibility for \"supplying old and discarded centrifuge and enrichment machines together with sets of drawings, sketches, technical data and depleted Hexaflouride (UF6) gas to North Korea.\"155  Khan also may have provided North Korea with the \"shopping list\" of all of the equipment necessary to produce the machines.156  One can wonder whether it is the same list that Iran used to avoid paying the high prices in Khan's package deal and go directly to the European, Chinese, and Russian suppliers.  The timing of the cooperation has been somewhat uncertain.  Thirdhand reportsKhan supposedly told Pakistani investigators who then informed U.S.\n\nofficials who then leaked it to the presshave said that Khan first approached North Korea in the late 1980s, but did not begin major shipments until the late 1990s.157  This\n\"Musharraf Named in Nuclear Probe,\" *Washington Post*, February 3, 2004.  The Lancaster and Khan article imply that the Kidwai briefing occurred on February 2.  While the dateline in the *Dawn* article is for February 4, in the text of the article it indicates that the official spoke \"here on Wednesday (partly covered in Monday issue.)\"\n156 David E. Sanger, \"Pakistani Says He Saw North Korean Nuclear Devices,\" *New York Times*, April\n13, 2004.\n\n157 Ibid.\n\ncoincides with Pakistani statements that the first \"orders were placed for the production of components for centrifuge machines\" starting in 1997, with the first shipments occurring a year later.158\nIn September 2005, President Musharraf said that Khan exported \"probably a dozen\" centrifuges to North Korea.  He also claimed there was no evidence that Khan had passed \"bomb designs to others\" besides the Libyans.159  A dozen centrifuges would have been insufficient to produce enough highly enriched uranium for a nuclear bomb. However, they could be used as a template from which copies could be made.  Musharraf also indicated that Khan might have sent uranium hexafluoride to North Korea.160  At the same time, the Pakistani president argued that since Khan's responsibility was uranium enrichment he could not have assisted North Korea in overcoming other challenges to the bomb.  He said, \"Dr. A.Q. Khan's part is only enriching the uranium to weapons grade. He does not know about making the bomb, he does not know about the trigger mechanism, he does not know about the delivery system.\"  If North Korea had developed the bomb, they \"must have got it themselves or somewhere elsenot from Pakistan.\"161\nMusharraf's description of Khan's capabilities was erroneous.  As noted in chapter two, KRL competencies had expanded significantly beyond uranium enrichment, though centrifuge enrichment certainly remained its primary mission.  There are indications that in the 1980s, Khan also had gained proficiency in developing the trigger mechanism, uranium re-conversion, and bomb design and assembly.162  Interestingly, Musharraf's statements to the press may not have been intentionally disingenuous.  It seems equally possible that even at this late date there is confusion at the highest levels of the government of Pakistan about the activities of the nuclear labs during the compartmentalized and covert 1980s.  Khan may have transferred nuclear know-how in these other areas to North Korea, though it is also possible that Khan transferred\n\n2005.\n160 Salman Masood and David Rohde, \"Pakistan Now Says Scientist Did Send Koreans Nuclear Gear,\" *New York Times*, August 25, 2005.\n\n161 Rehman and Alam, \"More on Musharraf Says Khan Offered Centrifuges, Designs To N. Korea.\"\n\n162 Shahid-ur-Rehman, *Long Road to Chagai* (Islamabad: Print Wise, 1999), 6.\ntechnology and expertise only relating to his specialty of centrifuge enrichment.\nMusharraf admitted he had no evidence regarding whether Khan transferred the bomb designs to North Korea.163\nThe U.S. government is concerned that North Korea has gained centrifuge technology, providing it with a much less detectible path to fissile material.  Mitchell B.\n\nReiss and Robert L. Gallucci, who occupied senior State Department positions in the Bush and Clinton administrations respectively, have written that North Korea has imported at least some of the components necessary to assemble a large centrifuge cascade.  They cite evidence of North Korean efforts to acquire the materials necessary for a significant number of centrifuges and uranium hexafluoride feed and withdrawal systems.  They refer specifically to an intercepted 22-ton shipment of high-strength aluminum tubes destined for North Korea from a German firm.  Ostensibly, these tubes were for use in a centrifuge programthough such assumptions have caused problems for U.S. intelligence in the past.  Most significantly, they claim not just North Korean efforts, but apparent successes in procurement: \"In mid-2002, the Bush administration obtained clear evidence that North Korea had acquired material and equipment for a centrifuge facility that, when complete, could produce enough weapons-grade uranium for two or more nuclear weapons per year.\"164\nWith that said, as Corey Hinderstein of the Institute for Science and International Security has noted, intercepting a large number of materials does not necessarily indicate a large program, just as intercepting a small number of materials is not necessarily evidence of a small program.  Further, procurement success must still be converted into a technological capability.165  Such caveats are necessary following erroneous U.S.\n\nintelligence estimates regarding Iraqi weapons of mass destruction.166\nUnlike the Iranian case discussed in the previous chapter, Pakistani assistance did not overcome a key barrier between North Korea and a nuclear weapon.  Indeed, if North Korea has reprocessed its 8,000 spent nuclear fuel rods, it would have sufficient fissile material for four to six nuclear devices irrespective of what Khan might have provided.167\nBefore 1992, North Korea also produced enough plutonium for perhaps two additional nuclear devices.168  So, even without a uranium program, North Korea would have the potential to produce up to eight nuclear explosive devices, though difficulties in reprocessing might decrease the weapons-grade plutonium available for bomb making.\nUnder the best-case scenario (for the United States), these reprocessing difficulties could mean that North Korea only has sufficient weapons-grade material for 1 or 2 devices.169\nSuch a low figure is supported by at least one prominent North Korean defector.170\nPast Pakistani assistance is significant because it increases dramatically the challenge of verifying the status of the North Korean nuclear program.  The United States and its allies apparently have had great difficulty in locating North Korean nuclear facilities, and in particular any centrifuge cascades the North might have assembled.171\nAs noted in the introduction of this thesis, the plutonium route required large facilities that could be easily observed.  By introducing centrifuge technology onto the Korean peninsula, A. Q. Khan's transfers have improved the ability of North Korea to conceal its RoK and Makes Important Testimonies on the Nuclear Development,\" *Chosun* (Seoul), 120-3, FBIS\nTranslated Text, report no. KPP20050718000019; also see discussion in Jeffrey Lewis, \"How Much Pu in North Korean Bomb?\" (July 30, 2005), http://www.armscontrolwonk.com/709/how-much-pu-in-a-northkorean-bomb.\n171 David E. Sanger and William J. Broad, \"U.S. Asking China to Increase Pressure on North Korea to End Its Nuclear Program,\" *New York Times*, February 9, 2005; also see Robert S. Norris and Hans M.\n\nKristensen, \"Nuclear Notebook: North Korea's Nuclear Program, 2005,\" *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*\n(May-June 2005), 64-7.\n\nnuclear activities.  This fact has complicated greatly the ability of the parties to come to a diplomatic and peaceful solution to the North Korean nuclear problem.172\n\n## C. A Nuclear Barter?\n\nKhan's transfers appear to have eased North Korea's nuclear effort.  They have impinged upon U.S. national interests in a region of vital concern.  Further, such assistance, if revealed, would certainly draw the ire of Japan, a key foreign aid provider for Pakistan.  Islamabad faced significant risks if such assistance was discovered.  Why did Khan assist a non-Muslim country, thousands of miles away?  Did Pakistan enter into a nuclear-for-missile technology barter?  Was their broader nuclear cooperation between Islamabad and Pyongyang?  Or was this the case of Khan acting to benefit himself or his laboratory?  Simply put, there is not sufficient information to answer any of these questions definitively.  The available evidence appears to lean, however, toward Khan acting as an individual or as a laboratory head, rather than as an agent of the Pakistani government.  The proof of state involvement does not yet outweigh signs that Khan was a rogue actor.  This chapter lists potential indicators that would support (or rebut) each scenario.  As more evidence is available in the public domain, future analysts may be able to draw firmer conclusions about the level of state complicity in transfers to North Korea.\n\n## 1. A Nuclear-For-Missile Technology Swap\n\nIn the 1980s, Pakistan had secured F-16s from the United States in exchange for its cooperation against the Soviets in Afghanistan.  In October 1990, after 40 F-16s were delivered, less than half of the total order, U.S. aid to Pakistan was halted out of concern over Pakistan's nuclear weapons efforts.173  The ability of Pakistan to deliver its nuclear weapon was called into question.  The task to develop a delivery vehicle was made all the more urgent since India had tested the Agni ballistic missile in May 1989.  From the highest levels of the Pakistani government, a call was issued for the strategic organizations to develop or procure a delivery vehicle.  As with other strategic missions, PAEC and KRL competed to be the first to deliver.  The winner of this technological race would benefit from significant public prestige.\n\nIn the missile race, the PAEC sought to continue a historic partnership with the Chinese military and scientific establishments.  Some sources suggest that agreement was reached between Pakistan and China to cooperate on solid-fueled missiles as early as\n1987.174  If correct, this would indicate Sino-Pakistani cooperation early in the life of the M-9 and M-11 programs, before the first Chinese flight test of either missile.175  Gordon Oehler, former head of the Director of Central Intelligence's Center for Weapons Intelligence, Nonproliferation, and Arms Control, testified that Pakistan acquired a\n\"training M-11 ballistic missile\" in 1990 and received 34 M-11s in November 1992.176\nIn the mid-1990s, it appears that China also assisted Pakistan in constructing a facility to manufacture M-11 missile components.177\nIf Pakistan did receive complete M-11s, it was slow in brandishing them.  Given South Asia's culture of one-upmanship, this is somewhat confusing.  However, fears of sanctionssanctions that might embarrass Beijingcould have delayed Pakistan from publicly testing the M-11, or indigenous derivatives.  The M-11 is widely believed to be the basis for the Pakistani Hatf-III.178  However, the first reported \"Hatf-III\" test in July\n1997 is doubly confusing.  While referred to as the Hatf-III in contemporary press accounts, those same accounts list it as having a much greater range800 kilometers\nJune 8, 2005).\n\ninstance, Jim Mann, \"China Said to Sell Pakistan Dangerous New Missiles,\" *Los Angeles Times*, December\n4, 1992.\n\nthan the standard M-11.179  Indian press accounts argue that this missile is an M-9\nderivative.180  More authoritative Pakistani sources, like that of Brigadier Naeem Salik, director of Arms Control and Disarmament Affairs for Pakistan's SPD, do not take note of the July 1997 test.181\nIt appears that the July 1997 test was not a flight test, but rather a ground-based test firing of the engine.182  Non-governmental analysts and the press, however, have confused the situation considerably by misinterpreting what was meant by the word\n\"test.\"183  This timeline is important.  If Pakistan already had conducted a test flight of a nuclear-capable, solid-fuel medium-range ballistic missile, why would it be so desperate to acquire liquid-fueled North Korean technology?  The point is that Pakistan had not successfully flight-tested a solid-fueled alternative when the alleged nuclear assistance to North Korea began.  The first \"real\" Hatf-III flight test occurred on May 26, 2002, in the midst of the tense Indo-Pakistani military standoff of 2001-2002.  The Ghaznavi missile, as the Hatf-III was called at the time of the test, had an announced maximum range of 290 kilometers, almost exactly equal to open-source reports of the M-11's range (300\nkilometers).184  The slightly shorter announced range was likely a modest attempt not to flout the Missile Technology Control Regime's ban on transferring missiles with ranges\n\nhttp://defencejournal.com/may98/pakmissiletech.htm.\n180 \"Delhi Reports Pakistan Test Fired Medium-Range Missile,\" *All India Radio Network* (Delhi), July\n2, 1997, *FBIS Transcribed Text,* FTS19970702000584; Ranjit Kumar, \"And if the Pakistani Missile is Chinese?\" *Navbharat Times* (Delhi), July 4, 1997, *FBIS Translated Text* FTS19970706000165; and K.N.\n\nDaruwalla, \"Missile or a Mirage?\" *The Economic Times* (Delhi), July 12, 1997, FBIS Transcribed Text, FTS19970712000201.\n181 Brig. Naeem Salik, \"Missile Issues in South Asia,\" *Nonproliferation Review* (Summer 2002): 52.\n182 Conversations with retired senior Pakistani military official.  Some Indian press accounts also reflect this understanding: \"[C]redible reports suggested that the \"Hatf-III\" test was actually an engine test.\"  Amit Baruah, *The Hindu* (Chennai), April 7, 1998.\n183 For instance, \"A History of Pakistan's Missile Program,\" *Associated Press Worldstream*, October\n4, 2002, says, \"In July Pakistan tests the Hatf-III with a range of 800 kilometers (480 miles).\"  It uses the same \"test\" verb to describe the flight test of the Hatf-V/Ghauri a year later.  Gaurav Kampani, who argues that the test in 1997 was of a M-9 derivative, nonetheless implies that the July test was a flight test.  He notes that while the first Chinese flight test was in 1988, there was no Pakistani \"test\" until 1997.\nKampani, \"Pakistan: Missile Overview.\"\n184 \"Missile Tests,\" *Pakistan Newswire*, May 26, 2002.\n\nat or above 300 kilometers.  The M-11, while nuclear-capable in terms of its potential payload, is limited as a delivery vehicle by its relatively short range.185  Significantly, it cannot deliver a warhead onto New Delhi from Pakistani territory, though its greater accuracy improves its utility against closer military targets.186\nThroughout the 1990s, the PAEC was working simultaneously with China on longer range, solid-fuel missile technology for Pakistan, perhaps deriving from the M-9\nmissile.  The M-9 can hold more distant targets at risk, with a significantly longer range of approximately 600 kilometers with a payload of 500 kilograms.187  There remains some debate about whether entire M-9s or just M-9 technology was transferred to Pakistan.  Machinery for the production of M-9s may also have been received during the mid-1990s.188  The July 1997 rocket test was probably for this development program.189\nThe first flight test of the Hatf-IV, however, did not occur until April 14, 1999.  The Shaheen, the name given to the Hatf-IV, was announced with a range of 600 kilometers and a payload of 1,000 kilograms.190\nSo PAEC worked throughout the 1990s to acquire a delivery vehicle.  It only was able to flight test a credible candidate missile by April 1999.  Khan and KRL beat PAEC by more than a year.  On April 6, 1998, the 1500-km range Ghauri-1, a liquid-fueled, Nodong-derivative, was flight-tested.  A contemporary Pakistan television broadcast captures the mood: \"In his message to Dr. A. Q. Khan, Prime Minister Mohammad Nawaz Sharif has warmly congratulated Dr. Khan and his team of scientists and\n188 Kampani, \"Pakistan: Missile Overview\"; also \"Indian Journal Reports Pakistan Soon to Have Hi-\nTech Missile Facility,\" *BBC Summary of World Broadcasts*, June 2, 1996.\n189 For instance, Lt. Gen. Lodi says that the missile tested in July 1997 had a 600-km range with a\n500-kg warhead and a circular error probable (CEP) of 0.1 percent.  The first two figures are identical to open-source reports on the M-9.  Jane's lists the M-9's CEP as 300 meters, which is the same order of magnitude as Lodi's figure.  See \"CSS-6 (DF-15/M-9),\" in *Jane's Strategic Weapon Systems*; and Lodi,\n\"Pakistan's Missile Technology.\"  Gaurav Kampani also draws this conclusion.  Kampani, \"Pakistan:\nMissile Overview.\"\n190 Sami Zubeiri, \"Pakistan Test Fires Second Ballistic Missile within 24 Hours,\" Agence France Presse, April 15, 1999.  There is considerable variability in the listed range of the Hatf-IV.  This may be from different assumptions of warhead weight and/or because of improvements or modifications made to the initial airframe.\nengineers, as well as the entire nation on this historic achievement.\"191  Looking back, Brigadier Naeem Salik of Pakistan's Strategic Plans Division discussed the strategic significance: \"The test firing... was a major breakthrough because this missile...\nprovided Pakistan with a real deterrent against India's growing missile capability.\"192\nKhan had won the race, and had won popular acclaim.  Had Khan's Ghauri been part of a broader deal?  Had Pakistan provided North Korea with centrifuge technology in order to field a tested missile sooner?\nPakistani-North Korean cooperation on ballistic missile technology began perhaps as early as 1992.193  Benazir Bhutto has admitted publicly that she obtained guarantees of missile technology during her December 1993 visit to Pyongyang.  But she has denied any missile for nuclear technology swap occurred: \"We did not obtain missiles in exchange for nuclear technology.  Whatever the technology was, we bought it with money,\" she said.194  Bhutto is savvy and self-serving politician, whose statements should be taken with a grain of salt.  Nevertheless, there is scant evidence to contradict her version of events.  One anonymous Bush administration official described the nuclearfor-missile technology swap as a proliferation \"urban legend.\"195  In fact, Bhutto's event is somewhat bolstered for her willingness to admit that Pakistan acquired Nodong missile technology from North Korea, when officially the Ghauri missile relies only on indigenous technology.\n\nAnalysts suspect a swap rather than just Khan's malfeasance for four reasons, none wholly convincing.  First, it is intuitive.  North Korean-Pakistani cooperation on Calif.: Monterey Institute for International Studies, Center for Nonproliferation Studies, November 1999), 21-24; also Kampani, \"Second Tier Proliferation,\" 110.\n\n194 Eishiro Takeishi, interview with Benazir Bhutto, \"Pakistan's Secret Deal: Obtained Technology, but Lost Trust,\" July 18, 2004, translated in \"Asahi: Ex-Premier Bhutto Says Pakistan Bought Missile Technology From DPRK,\" *FBIS Report no. JPP20040718000011*; also \"Missile Technology Bought from N. Korea: Benazir,\" *Dawn* (Karachi), July 19, 2004; and Gary Thomas, \"Former Prime Minister Says Pakistan Had Nuclear Capability Long Before Nuclear Tests,\" *Voice of America*, March 3, 2005, http://www.voanews.com/english/2005-03-03-voa4.cfm.\nmissiles was well known by every key Pakistani policymakerseveral of whom traveled to Pyongyang to ensure its continuation.  It seems likely, analysts reason, that if nuclear cooperation was occurring it would also occur with the approval of the Pakistani civilian and military leadership. Second, perhaps Pakistan could not pay outright for the nuclear missiles.  Daniel A. Pinkston of the Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies suggests that Pakistan's lack of foreign reserves in 1996\nled to a decision to pay for the delivery of the Nodong missile system.196  Third, Khan and his friends have reportedly said that the Pakistan military was aware of the nuclear assistance.  Khan has claimed, according to the anonymous \"investigators\" and \"friends of Khan\" that dot the press reports out of Islamabad, that three different Army chiefs were aware of his nuclear deals with Pyongyang: Gen. Abdul Waheed (1994-1996), Gen.\n\nJehangir Karamat (1996-1998), and Gen. Pervez Musharraf (1998-present).197\nThis is related to the fourth and final rationale: the military has had a dominant role in nuclear oversight since Zia ousted Zulfikar Ali Bhutto in 1977.  It seems inconceivable that Khan would undertake such a venture without approval from authorities.  As Gaurav Kampani, formerly of the Center for Nonproliferation Studies, argues, \"[A]lthough the nuclear establishment enjoys a high degree of internal autonomy in decisionmaking, that autonomy is not absolute; the nuclear scientists operate within the confines of a mandate, which makes them subject to supervision by the national command authority.\"  Kampani concludes that such rogue action is even more unlikely given the stakes involved: \"[I]t is difficult to imagine how Dr. A. Q. Khan could have made such a momentous decision independently without the benefit of a debate, albeit a limited one, at the highest levels of Pakistani government.\"198\nIt is impossible to say with certainty whether decision-makers in Islamabad and Rawalpindi a nuclear-for-missile technology exchange with Pyongyang.  There are five reasons to think that they did not.  First, as noted above, Benazir Bhutto has claimed that the missile cooperation was based on cash payment, rather than nuclear barter.\n\nSecond, while it is true that foreign reserves sank to dire levels in 1996, it is a long leap to assume that Pakistan could find no other way to finance missile acquisitions than by a technology exchange.  It is difficult to quantify what North Korean missile technology was transferred to Pakistan.  Joseph Bermudez has referred to an agreement in November 1995 \"to provide Pakistan with key components from either the No-dong or Taep'o-dong programs, about 12-25 No-dong missiles, and at least one [transporter erector launcher] TEL or [mobile erector launcher] MEL.\"199  Bermudez further asserts that \"a majority\" of the items were delivered by the spring of 1996.200  While estimates of the cost of Nodong missiles are not available, the shorter range Hwasong 5 and 6 have been estimated to cost around $1.5 to $2 million each, while the longer range Taepodong I has been priced at $6 million apiece.201  Assuming, say, a $4 million price tag for each Nodong would value the missile transfer at between $48 and $100 million.  To put that figure in context, estimates by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute value Pakistan's arms imports in the 1995-1996 timeframe at $819 million.202  The overall defense budget in the mid-1990s was around $3 billion annually.203  While purchasing the Nodong missiles would have been a non-trivial expenditure for Pakistan, it does not appear unachievable given Pakistan's overall defense spending.\nThird, even if Pakistan's ability to compensate North Korea was limited monetarily, Pakistan did not have to trade the nuclear \"crown jewels\" for decades-old liquid-fuel missiles.  It was not as if Pyongyang was stingy with its missile technology. Egypt, Iran, Libya, Syria, and Yemen were able to reach agreement to purchase missiles of North Korean origin.204  North Korea apparently offered missile technology to Nigeria.205  Joseph Bermudez notes that prior to the nuclear revelations, \"the general\n\nconsensus [was] that North Korea had received a small amount of hard currency, access to Pakistani missile technology and a venue to continue flight-testing the No Dong.\"206\nThis non-monetary compensation of North Korea almost certainly did take place, irrespective of whether centrifuge technology was in the mix.  If Pakistan did pay cash, as Benazir Bhutto has claimed, and if it provided North Korea with assistance on missile technology and flight-testing, why throw centrifuge technology into the mix?\nFourth, evidence of Pakistani-North Korean transactions are not evidence of Pakistani-North Korean nuclear collaboration.  For instance, cargo flights between Pyongyang and Rawalpindi are often cited as proof of some sort of conspiracy.207  There was broader Pakistani-North Korean cooperation.  In addition to ballistic missiles and their components, which alone could explain shipments back and forth, North Korean and Pakistani scientists collaborated on other military equipment, including surface-to-air missiles and artillery.208  This creates a \"signal-to-noise\" problem (for both foreign intelligence analysts and Pakistani overseers).  The conventional trade could have masked nuclear trafficking.  Distinguishing the contents of crates on the tarmac is an unenviable task.  For foreign intelligence agencies, only human intelligence assets at the point of origin or the destination could report that information.  For Pakistani overseers, they would have needed to search cargo bound for North Korea.\n\nFifth, and finally, Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence did apparently raid a North Korea-bound chartered aircraft in 2000 and did not find anything proving Khan's malfeasance.209  The fact there was an unannounced search would seem to indicate that Pakistani authorities did not regularly screen such cargo.  Further, a raid seems to be a Proliferation,\" 110.\n\n208 Musharraf has noted Pakistani-Korean cooperation on artillery technology. Rehman and Alam,\n\"More on Musharraf Says Khan Offered Centrifuges, Designs To N. Korea.\"  KRL also produced a number of conventional weapons systems, particularly in the realm of missiles, mines, electronics, and artillery.\nSee \"Dr. A. Q. Khan Research Laboratories, Kahuta: Twenty Years of Excellence and National Service,\" in Dr. A. Q. Khan on Science and Education, ed. S. Shabbir Hussain and Mujahid Kamran (Lahore: Sang-E- Meel, 1997), 222-9.\n\nfeared,\" *Dawn*, February 5, 2004.\n\nstrange exercise to go through if authorities were well aware of Khan's cooperation with North Korea.  If one were going to have a staged raid to find evidence, it would be best if one actually found evidence.\nWhat indicators might be helpful to prove or disprove whether a missile-fornuclear technology swap occurred?  Unfortunately, few if any of the indicators will be observable in open sources.  Perhaps only a few if any indicators will be available even through classified intelligence sources.  Nevertheless, it is still useful to present the potential indicators, if for no other reason than intellectual honesty.\nThere may be an observable money trail of the North Korea-Pakistani relationship.  It seems likely the money trail would be concealed thoroughly by both North Korea and Pakistan through the use of front companies, anonymous bank accounts, and other means of deception.  Is there evidence of a significant transfer of currency from Pakistan to North Korea?  If so, does such evidence point to a transaction in the ballpark of $50 to $100 million, the back-of-the-envelope value of the estimated Nodong transfer. If the evidence indicates a much smaller transaction, this could point to the uranium barter hypothesis.  Alternatively, is there evidence of a significant transfer of currency from North Korea to Khan or his associates?  The more cash flowed into Khan's personal coffers, the less it looks like a government-to-government deal.\nAnother set of indicators relates to the Pakistani safety and security procedures.\nAvailable indications are that Khan and his senior colleagues had broad independence in their handling of sensitive nuclear technology and components.  However, if there were evidence that cargo shipments in and out of Pakistan were screened thoroughly by the military, then military complicity in the nuclear trade would seem more likely.  If there were evidence that centrifuges and their components were tightly controlled and inventoried, then official involvement would seem probable.\n\n## 2. A Uranium-For-Plutonium Technology Swap\n\nAssuming that Pakistan received liquid-fueled missile technology and provided North Korea with cash, a testing site, and indigenous technological expertise, the above discussion argued that a centrifuge-for-missile barter does not make sense.  Providing centrifuge technology seems gratuitous in such an exchange.  There have been two press reportsvery few given the number of articles generated by print media globallythat have suggested another possibility: Pakistan used plutonium in the May 30, 1998 nuclear test device.210  Given limitations in Pakistani plutonium reprocessing capability, one of these stories has suggested that perhaps North Korean plutonium was used in the May 30\ntest.211  Assistance with plutonium expertisenot to mention the potential physical provision of the plutonium for a joint nuclear explosive testwould have been much more worthwhile for Pakistan.  It might be worth the risk of getting caught assisting Pyongyang.\nThe May 30 test was figuratively and physically distinct from the earlier Pakistani tests.  The test site was located 60 miles from the May 28 testing site.  It was conducted in a vertical rather than a horizontal shaft.  Pakistan claimed a yield of 15-18 kilotons for the test, while Western experts estimated a yield of 2-6 kilotons.212  U.S. aircraft apparently collected air samples after the May tests and brought them back to U.S. laboratories for analysis.  Reportedly, Los Alamos National Laboratory's analysis concluded that the air sample \"contained low levels of weapons-grade plutonium.\"213\nThe sample used by Los Alamos appears to have been lost.  There may also have been questions raised about the accuracy of the analysis, including concerns that Los Alamos contaminated the air sample.214  A more recent news account has reported that a new consensus has emerged that the sample was not contaminated, and probably had its origin with the May 30 test, perhaps as a plutonium experiment on the side of a uranium-based nuclear explosive device.  Quoting an anonymous senior intelligence official, that accounts argues, \"[The plutonium] could only have come from one of two places: China or North Korea... and it seemed like China had nothing to gain\" by providing the plutonium to Pakistan.215  The potential North Korean lineage of the plutoniumlineage Test,\" *New York Times*, February 27, 2004.\n\n211 Sanger and Broad, \"Pakistan May Have Aided North Korea A-Test.\"\n212 Ibid.; David Albright, \"Pakistan: The Other Shoe Drops,\" *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* (July-\nAugust 1998): 24-25; and Terry C. Wallace, \"The May 1998 India and Pakistan Nuclear Tests,\" Seismological Research Letters 69 (September 1998): 386-393.\n\n213 Priest, \"U.S. Labs at Odds on Whether Pakistani Blast Used Plutonium.\"\n214 Ibid.\n\n215 Sanger and Broad, \"Pakistan May Have Aided North Korea A-Test.\"\nderived by process of eliminationis sometimes combined with reports of North Korean scientists being present at the test cite.216  At least one account, with the typical anonymous U.S. and Pakistani official sources, discusses \"a 20-member delegation of North Korean engineers and scientists whom Khan had invited to witness Pakistan's first underground nuclear tests on May 28, 1998.\"217\nAs the above discussion indicates, the available evidence is very thin and highly circumstantial.  After seven years to analyze the data, it seems odd that there would still be as much confusion as the articles seem to indicate.  For an open-source analyst, however, there are at least three reasons to be suspicious.  First, as was noted earlier, there are apparently questions about the air sample and how it was analyzed.  Second, the paucity of the stories seems to indicate the lack of consensus on the issue within government.  The diversity of opinions in the anonymous quotes in the articles reinforces the possibility that there is little certainty about the data.  The 2004 *New York Times* article also reported that then-National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice and then-\nSecretary of State Colin Powell \"had no recollection of theories of a joint test.\"218  Senior policymakers would probably have been informed if a joint test were considered a likely possibility.  Third, the presence of plutonium by no means indicates the presence of North Korean plutonium.  One anonymous analyst quoted in the 2004 New York Times article indicated that there was evidence that the plutonium detected in the sample was\n\"older than the North Korean program.\"219  It is possible that the plutonium was provided by China, though providing fissile material would be a risky move on Beijing's behalf.\nFinally, it is possible that the plutonium was home grown.  Pakistan has a pilot-scale, unsafeguarded plutonium reprocessing capability in Rawalpindi, at the Pakistan Institute of Nuclear Science and Technology (PINSTECH).  The hot cell facility, called New Labs, reportedly has a nominal reprocessing capacity of about one kilogram of plutonium per year, though likely with a smaller actual throughput.220  The limiting function, however, is probably not reprocessing capability as much as the small quantity of unsafeguarded plutonium available to Pakistan in 1998.221  If Pakistan conducted a smallscale \"plutonium experiment\" along with the May 30 test, it may have been possible that the plutonium was of domestic origin.\n\n## 3. Other Possible Nuclear Collaboration\n\nAs the next chapter discusses, Libya received a total of 1.87 tons of uranium hexafluoride from the Khan network.  The source of that material is significant.  If it came from North Korea, it would imply that the regime in Pyongyang had less than stellar nuclear stewardship, something of intense concern to policymakers in Washington and Asian capitals as they struggle to deal with the Korean nuclear crisis.  If it came from Pakistan, it would imply real difficulties with the ability of Pakistan to protect and account for fissile material, something more serious than losing track of used centrifuge components.  The origin of the uranium might also point to the scope Pakistani-North Korean nuclear cooperation.\n\nAccording to press reports, there seems to be consensus that the cask containing the uraniumthe container itselforiginated in Pakistan.222  The debate centers on where the cask has been and where the material inside the cask originated.  Apparently, U.S. intelligence officials detected plutonium isotopes on the container that were indicative of plutonium produced at Yongbyon, North Korea.223  IAEA tests on the same container apparently did not yield the same plutonium traces.224  Tests on the uranium hexafluoride itself seem to have concluded that the uranium did not originate in Pakistan\n222 Glenn Kessler and Dafna Linzer, \"Nuclear Evidence Could Point to Pakistan,\" *Washington Post*, February 3, 2005.\n\n223 Ibid.; and Kessler, \"North Korea May Have Sent Libya Nuclear Material, U.S. Tells Allies,\"\nWashington Post, February 2, 2005.\n\n224 Kessler and Linzer, \"Nuclear Evidence Could Point to Pakistan.\"\nor other suspect countries.225  However, there is no evidence that North Korea has a uranium conversion facility.  In other words, there is no evidence that North Korea could create the uranium gas by itself.  One possibility is that North Korea sold the raw material to Pakistan, which then converted it and transferred it Libya.226  B.S.A. Tahir told Malaysian investigators that uranium hexafluoride was shipped onboard a Pakistani plane to Libya in 2001.227\nHere again we are confronted with scant public information, some of it contradictory.  If North Korean uranium were converted by Pakistan into uranium hexafluoride, it would indicate a broad degree of nuclear cooperation.  While Khan Research Laboratories appears to have had capabilities to convert uranium gas into uranium metal, there is no evidence that Khan had the expertise and equipment to turn yellowcake into uranium tetrafluoride and then onto uranium hexafluoride.  If Khan had such a capability, it seems likely he would have offered it to his other clients (Iran and Libya) or potential clients (Iraq).  In the public discussions of Khan's proposed assistance to all three countries, there is no evidence that Khan offered assistance with uranium conversion.  If Pakistan were assisting North Korea in making uranium hexafluoride, it would likely indicate the involvement of the PAEC, the organization responsible for Pakistan's uranium conversion capability.  PAEC involvement would signal broad stateto-state cooperation on nuclear weapons technology.\n\n## D. Individual And Institutional Explanations\n\nThe previous section explored three potential state-to-state strategic transactions with North Korea.  It found none of these scenarios to be definitive or compelling. Analysts have been too quick to conclude with certainty that Pakistani leadership condoned Khan's assistance to North Korea.  The missile barter seems like a bad value for Pakistan.  The evidence of plutonium during the May 30th nuclear explosive test appears to be questionable, and even if there was plutonium it might not have originated in North Korea.  Public information about the uranium hexafluoride delivered to Libya is\n\n225 David E. Sanger and William J. Broad, \"Tests Said to Tie Deal on Uranium to North Korea,\" New York Times, February 2, 2005.\n\n226 Kessler and Linzer, \"Nuclear Evidence Could Point to Pakistan.\"\n227 David E. Sanger and William J. Broad, \"Using Clues from Libya to Study a Nuclear Mystery,\"\nscarce and contradictory.  The previous section also outlined indicators that would point toward greater state knowledge and authorization.  If Pakistan paid less than is assumed for North Korean missile technology, we should be suspicious.  If there were routine searches of KRL shipments leaving the country or if there were tight (non-KRL) controls on centrifuges and uranium hexafluoride, it would indicate state complicity.  If North Korean plutonium were used in the May 30th test, it would demonstrate much broader nuclear cooperation than assumed here.  Finally, if Pakistan was converting North Korean uranium yellowcake into uranium hexafluoride, the problem clearly extends beyond KRL and into other organs of the Pakistani state.\nWithout that evidence, perhaps a more parsimonious explanation is possible.\nKhan had broad autonomy as head of Khan Research Laboratory.  In all likelihood, there was poor state control of critical nuclear technologies and components, including centrifuges.  Khan could ship things into and out of the country with little oversight, particularly before the creation of the Strategic Plans Division in 1999.  In this scenario, Khan began to assist North Korea in the late 1990s for personal gain.  His own importance was diminishing since PAEC, not KRL, was responsible for weaponizing Pakistan's deterrent.  Khan might have assisted North Korea for personal benefit, solely in order to enrich himself and his associates.  Alternatively, Khan might have assisted North Korea to speed up deliveries of liquid-fuel missile technology, allowing Khan to test the Ghauri a full year before the PAEC could field a solid-fuel alternative.\n\n## E. Conclusion: Thinking About Responsibility\n\nGaurav Kampani, in his discussion of the Pakistani-North Korean relationship, concludes, \"[E]ven in the unlikely scenario that Dr. A. Q. Khan made the trade independently, it does not absolve the Pakistani state of the responsibility of safeguarding its nuclear technology.\"228  Kampani is absolutely correct.  This chapterand this thesis more broadlyshould not be seen as an apologist tract justifying Khan and his network.\nThe Pakistani state should be judged harshly for its recklessness.  Nevertheless, the arguments marshaled by those who assume Pakistani state complicity are unimpressive. The North Korean case is problematic for analysts on both sides of the argument.  The broad cooperation between Pyongyang and Islamabad created significant background noise, which has often been interpreted (somewhat lazily) as if it were automatic proof of state knowledge of nuclear cooperation.  This \"static\" is further complicated by the profound lack of information about the North Korean uranium program, let alone Khan's assistance to it.  The next chapter discusses a very different case.  Khan's assistance to Libya occurs in the context of a weak Libyan indigenous nuclear effort, a minor relationship between Islamabad and Tripoli, and significant evidence of profit to Khan and his associates.\n\n## V. Tragic Ambition: Libya And Nuclear Off-Shoring A. Introduction\n\nFrom 1997 to 2003, A. Q. Khan assisted Libya in a bizarre nuclear effort, which Tripoli ultimately traded away for re-integration into the global community.  Libya's decision to completely, verifiably, and irreversibly dismantle its nuclear effort spelled the end of Khan's nuclear enterprise. By pulling on the exposed Libyan thread, the whole network came unraveled.  The components, materials, and reams of data turned over by Libya would prove indisputably Khan's involvement in a scheme to create a \"turn key\"\nnuclear facility.  This audacious plan would import and manufacture all the physical capital necessary to make a nuclear bomb and train the technical personnel necessary to craft and maintain such an infrastructure.  Khan would be rewarded richly for his daring concept.  Libya was willing to pay $100 million for such a capability.\n\nKhan's boldness had served him for decades, allowing him to rise to the highest levels of society and earning him a cult of personality in Pakistan.  In Greek tragedy, the protagonist's exaggerated self-confidence (hubris) results in retribution, and the character's downfall.  Khan's Libyan effort was overreaching.  The plan's ambition was necessitated not just by the size of the rewards, but by the erosion of Khan's position at home in Pakistan.\n\n## B. Pakistan's Reassertion Of Control At Home\n\nAfter the May 1998 nuclear tests, the Government of Pakistan began to think seriously about how to operationalize its nuclear arsenal.  A \"bomb in the basement\" had required impressive scientific and technical efforts, but Pakistan had thought little about how to structure a system to command and control an operational nuclear deterrent. When Pervez Musharraf was promoted to the rank of general and made chief of army staff, he re-organized those portions of the military that had nuclear competency.  He ordered the creation of a new Strategic Plans Division (SPD), which became functional in\n1999.\nFor the first time, the military had an organization that could develop the organizational competency necessary to oversee Pakistan's sizeable nuclear weapons complex.  For the first time, it had senior military officers whose job it was to control strategic organizations, not just support them in an urgent race to the bomb.  With the military coup in October 1999, the divided power of the 1990s was replaced by unitary rule.  Though this may have been a setback for democracy, it eliminated the multiple power centers that Khan had relied upon to maneuver.  By late 1999, lines of nuclear control in Pakistan were much clearer.  There was one leader, Musharraf, to whom the heads of the strategic organizations reported to directly, and who also had access to a growing military bureaucracy whose mission was to implement his nuclear orders. Previously, Pakistani leaders had to rely on the strategic organizations for expertise and implementation.\n\nAlmost immediately, Khan clashed with SPD over his travels, statements to the media, and sales of KRL military equipment to foreign governments without official approval.229  Rumors of corruption at KRL, which had been around since the late 1980s, grew louder.  By 2000, the National Accountability Bureau, an organization created by Musharraf after the coup, had built up a damning 700-page dossier on Khan's illicit wealth, though apparently it was not pursued.230  The Pakistan Inter-Services Intelligence also was growing more suspicious.  Around this time, the ISI raided an aircraft chartered by KRL that was bound for North Korea.  Though the search turned up nothing apparently because other senior military officials warned Khan in advancethe search was representative that the tide had shifted against Khan.231  Reportedly, the ISI\nexpressed further concerns about Khan's travels and corruption at KRL to Musharraf in\n2004.  John Lancaster and Kamran Khan quote Lt. Gen. Khalid Kidwai (who may be the official referenced in the *Dawn* article) saying the raid occurred in 2000. Lancaster and Khan, \"Musharraf Named in Nuclear Probe,\" *Washington Post*, February 3, 2004.  Paul Watson and Mubashir Zaidi referenced Musharraf in a briefing to Pakistani journalists as saying early 2001.  Watson and Zaidi, \"Musharraf Pardons Scientist,\"\nLos Angeles Times, February 6, 2004.  However, the FBIS translation of the televized portion of the press conference includes no discussion of a raid.  See \"Text of President Musharraf's News Conference 05 Feb,\"\nPTV World (Pakistan), February 5, 2005, FBIS Translated Text SAP20040209000072.  Musharraf appears to confirm the 2000 date in an interview with the *New York Times*.  However, the 2000 date is provided by a questioner, and initially Musharraf erroneously tells a story about an event that occurred in 2002 as if it had occurred in 2000.  See \"Interview with Pakistan President Pervez Musharraf, February 15,\" transcript of interview with *New York Times* staff, February 15, 2004, available online at http://www.acronym.org.uk/docs/0402/doc23.htm.\nlate 2000 and early 2001.232  The Bush administration had also raised its rhetoric when talking to Pakistani officials.  Robert Einhorn, U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for Nonproliferation, was reported to have told Lt. Gen. Khalid Kidwai, head of Pakistan's SPD, \"Either you are not on top of this or you are complicit. Either one is disturbing.\"233\nSome combination of these factorsclashes with SPD, reports of corruption, and louder concern by the United Statesled Musharraf to force Khan's retirement in March 2001.  A constellation of state forces was now arrayed against Khan.  Khan had dealt with challenges from the PAEC and other \"anti-Kahuta elements\" for years, but this challenge was larger.  If Khan's nuclear enterprise was to continue it would have to function with diminished support from Khan Research Laboratories and would require avoiding detection at home.  Khan already had a vast network of international contacts upon which he could call.  Perhaps the answer was to shift overseas.\n\n## C. Khan's Assistance To Libya\n\nStarting in 1997, Khan launched his most ambitious program of cooperation with Libya.  Unlike Iran, Iraq, or North Korea, Libya had a limited indigenous nuclear infrastructure.  In the early to mid-1980s, Libya had shopped around to European, Soviet, and Japanese suppliers for a uranium conversion facility, and eventually received a modular pilot-scale facility from a Japanese firm in 1986.  From the late 1970s until the mid-1980s, Libya also received nuclear material, including over 2000 metric tons of uranium yellowcake and relatively small quantities of uranium hexafluoride, and equipment and training from European firms and the Soviet Union. The program lay relatively dormant throughout the late 1980s, but in July 1995, according to the IAEA, \"Libya made the strategic decision to reinvigorate its nuclear activities, including gas centrifuge enrichment.\"234\n2004.\n\n233 Barton Gelman and Dafna Linzer, \"Unprecedented Peril Forces Tough Calls,\" *Washington Post*, October 26, 2004.\n\nSocialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya,\" Report by the Director General to the Board of Governors, GOV/2004/12, February 20, 2004, 2-4; International Atomic Energy Agency, \"Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement of the Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya,\" Report by the Director General to the Board of Governors, GOV/2004/33, May 28, 2004, 2-4; also George Jahn, \"Diplomats: Japanese Company Sold Uranium Conversion Plant to Libya,\" *Associated Press*, March 12, 2004.\nIn 1997, two Libyans met with A. Q. Khan and B. S. A. Tahir in Istanbul, Turkey to ask Khan to supply centrifuge units to the Libyan nuclear program.235  Starting that year, Libya imported twenty complete L-1 aluminum centrifuges from Khan's network, along with most of the components for an additional 200 L-1 centrifuges.  Significantly, the network apparently was unable or unwilling to provide the aluminum rotors and magnets necessary for these 200 unassembled units.  At least one of these centrifuges had been used previously in Pakistan until 1987.  In 2000, Libya imported two test L-2\nmaraging steel centrifuges from Pakistan.  Both of these centrifuges had been used in the Pakistani nuclear program, and both were contaminated with highly enriched uranium particles.  Libya placed an order for 10,000 additional L-2 centrifuges, with the first deliveries of the order arriving in December 2002.236\nAs discussed in the previous chapter, Khan's network apparently also transferred a total of 1.87 tons of uranium hexafluoride to Libya.  B. S. A. Tahir told Malaysian police that a \"certain amount\" of uranium hexafluoride was shipped onboard a Pakistani plane to Libya in 2001.237  The fact that Khan was able to transfer nearly two tons of uranium hexafluoride in 2001two years after SPD's creationwould seem to indicate there were still serious weaknesses in Pakistan's material protection, control, and accounting (MPC&A) practicesif the uranium came from Pakistan.  If the uranium came from North Korea, it would raise questions about the responsible nuclear stewardship of the Pyongyang regime.\n\nThe complexityand audacityof the Libyan centrifuge order has been captured by David Albright, who notes that 10,000 centrifuges with 100 components each, means that a supplier network would have to procure or manufacture over a million components and ship them all to Libya.238  Some of these components must have been difficult for\n\nof Alleged Production of Components for Libya's Uranium Enrichment Programme,\" February 20, 2004.\n\n236 \"Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement of the Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya,\" May 28, 2004, 5-7.\n\n237 Polis Diraja Malaysia, \"Press Release by Inspector-General of Police in Relation to Investigation of Alleged Production of Components for Libya's Uranium Enrichment Programme,\" February 20, 2004; also David E. Sanger and William J. Broad, \"Using Clues from Libya to Study a Nuclear Mystery,\" New York Times, March 31, 2005.\n\n238 Albright quoted in Victoria Burnett and Stephen Fidler, \"Animal Lover, Egoist, and National Hero,\" *Financial Times*, April 7, 2004.\n\nKhan to procure through his traditional means.  After all, in the Iranian, Iraqi, and North Korean cases, Khan had only supplied designs, a few hundred used components, and perhaps quantities of uranium hexafluoride.  This was a problem that was literally orders of magnitude more difficult.  Khan and Tahir responded by turning the existing front companies and procurement vehicles into more robust organizations with a capability to train foreign scientists and manufacturer certain products.  Khan's biggest innovation and his downfallwas to establish factories in third-party states and Libya to procure, assemble, and manufacture the necessary components and resources.\nWorkshops in Turkey served as European mini-hubs, from which Khan's network could procure and supply centrifuge motors, power supplies, and ring magnets from partially within the web of pan-European export controls.  Importing subcomponents from Europe and elsewhere, these facilities assembled centrifuge motors and frequency converters necessary to spin the centrifuge at the high speeds necessary to separate different uranium isotopes.239  Interestingly, a shipment of these components was sent with false end-user certificates to Dubai, and was placed aboard a German-owned vessel, the *BBC China*, en route to Libya.  As will be discussed below, when loaded onto the ship, it joined a larger shipment of centrifuge components from Malaysia that would gain notoriety when seized by Western governments in Taranto, Italy in October 2003. Highlighting the difficulties of interdiction, authorities removed the shipment from Malaysia, while the components from Turkey proceeded to Libya.  Libyan authorities were kind enough to hand over the nuclear-related items to international inspectors upon their arrival in Tripoli.240\nhttp://www.isis-online.org/publications/libya/cent_procure.html; and David Albright, \"International Smuggling Networks: Weapons of Mass Destruction Counterproliferation Initiatives,\" Statement to the Senate Committee on Government Affairs, June 23, 2004, http://hsgac.senate.gov/index.cfm?Fuseaction=Hearings.Testimony&HearingID=185&WitnessID=\n673&suppresslayouts=true;\n240 William J. Broad and David E. Sanger, \"After Ending Arms Program, Libya Receives a Surprise,\"\nNew York Times, May 29, 2004; Ian Traynor, \"Western Agents Let Nuclear Equipment Slip Past to Libya,\"\nGuardian (London), May 29, 2004.\n\nIn South Africa, Khan's network was able to draw upon firms and individuals with connections to the now-defunct South African nuclear program.  This latent nuclear knowledge was retained even after South Africa made a strategic decision to abandon its nuclear weapons program in the early 1990s.  Apparently, Gerhard Wisser, a Germannational living in South Africa, stumbled into the Khan network.  He met B. S. A. Tahir at a dinner party in Dubai in 1999, who offered Wisser a lucrative commission if he could arrange for the manufacture of \"certain pipe work systems.\"  Wisser had previously done work for the South African nuclear program, and also had previously supplied vacuum pumps and other equipment to Pakistan in the 1980s.  Wisser contacted an old business associate of his, Johan Meyer, who owned a South African engineering firm, Tradefin, and had previously worked for the South African nuclear program.  Wisser and Meyer set about creating a massive steel system to feed and withdraw uranium hexafluoride gas into a centrifuge cascade.  The massive system, referred to as \"the beast\" by Meyer, would have been two-stories in height, and filled eleven 40-foot shipping containers.  The firm also attempted and failed to produce maraging steel rotors for the L-2 centrifuge.  They received a specialized lathe from Gulf Technical Industries in Dubai in late 2000, but were unable to acquire the maraging steel necessary to make the rotors.  As a result, they returned the lathe to GTI in December 2001.  The lathe was later discovered in Libya.241\nThe most publicized facility, however, was located in Shah Alam, Malaysia.  The factory, established in 2001, only employed about thirty people.  The plant was operated by Scomi Precision Engineering (SCOPE), a subsidiary of Scomi Group Berhad, a Malaysian oil and gas firm.  Scomi claims with some credibility that they were unaware they had become part of the nuclear black market.242 Starting in April 2002, Urs Tinner, son of a longtime Khan associate Friedrich Tinner, began consulting for SCOPE's factory at Tahir's request.  Tinner arranged for the importation of lathes as well as cutting, turning, and grinding machines.  The company made progress in machining some of the components necessary for a centrifuge.  Between December 2002 and August 2003, 14\ntypes of components were manufactured and shipped to Dubai.  One should not overstate, however, the capabilities of the plant.  After all, only fourteen of the approximately one hundred types of components in a centrifuge were manufactured in the plant.  As the Malaysian police bluntly state, \"As of now, no factory in Malaysia is capable of manufacturing a complete centrifuge unit, what more, the construction of hundreds or thousands of centrifuges.\"243\nThere were limits to what the network could acquire abroad.  Khan also decided to establish a facility within Libya to manufacture components difficult to procure elsewhere, and also to repair centrifuges that were damaged in the development and operation of an enrichment plant.244  Two British nationals, Peter Griffin and his son Paul, were implicated in the establishment of a workshop, called Project Machine Shop\n1001.  They were accused of purchasing and delivering furnaces and lathes to assist in the manufacturing of centrifuge components and arranging training in Europe for Libyan personnel.245\nWhat is disconcerting is that after the interdiction of the *BBC China*, it became apparent that the Khan network had been compromised.  Individuals associated with the network began a mad scramble to destroy evidence of wrongdoing, or possibly to sell it quickly to other interested customers.  Centrifuge components, precision tools and parts for lathes, and perhaps seven valuable maraging steel rotors disappeared in 2003, as the network was collapsing.  They may have been sold, or held in reserve for a \"rainy day,\" in the words of IAEA Director-General Mohammad ElBaradei, by members or states associated with the network.246\nFor his part, Griffin has vehemently denied a role in the endeavor and successfully sued the Guardian under Great Britain's burdensome libel law.  See Jan Colley, \"Libel Damages for Engineer,\" Press Association, May 3, 2005.\n\nYork Times, December 26, 2004; and Douglas Frantz, \"Vital Nuclear Parts Missing,\" *Los Angeles Times*, April 22, 2005.\n\nWhile the network of non-state actors is the most analytically interesting portion of the Libya story, it may not be the most significant aspect of Khan's cooperation with Libya.  Libya received nuclear-weapons designs from the Khan networksupposedly as\n'a bonus'which were transferred inside of an Islamabad dry cleaner bag.247\nReportedly, Khan delivered the warhead plans to Libya in late 2001 or 2002.248  Many of the blueprints, designs, sketches and instructions found in Libya appear to have been copies of copies of copies.  If the copies were passed on through middlemen, control of the information may have been irrevocably lost.  As one European diplomat told the Los Angeles Times, \"There is no limitation on a copy machine.\"249\n\n## D. Motivations For Assistance\n\nWhy Libya?  In the Iran case study, we could point to a doctrinestrategic defianceto which influential policymakers subscribed, which might explain state approval for limited cooperation.  In North Korea, there was a multi-year strategic relationship on ballistic missile development that could perhaps justify nuclear bartering.\nBut in Libya, analysts were able to come up with few reasons the Pakistani state would want to assist Tripoli.  People often refer to Libya's early support of Pakistan's nuclear program as a potential explanation for Pakistani technology transfer.  However, there are two reasons this seems implausible.  First, such support occurred in the mid-to-late 1970s, and beginning repayment in the late 1990s seems somewhat tardy. Second, and more importantly, after military dictator Zia ul-Haq hanged deposed Prime Minister Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto in 1979, relations between Libya and Pakistan soured.  Bhutto and Libyan President Moammar Gadhafi had formed a close relationship.\n\nEstimates of Libyan payments to KRL of between $50 and $100 million seem insufficient for the risk the Pakistani government would be taking.  In comparison, Saudi Arabia reportedly paid $3 billion for between 36 and 40 Chinese CSS-2s.250  If the February 9, 2004.\n\n248 Douglas Frantz, \"A High-Risk Nuclear Stakeout,\" *Los Angeles Times*, February 27, 2005.\n\n249 Douglas Frantz and Josh Meyer, \"For Sale: Nuclear Expertise,\" *Los Angeles Times*, February 22,\n2004.\n\n250 Erika Pontarelli, \"U.S. Hails Libyan Nuclear Weapons Recovery as 'Important Victory,'\" Agence France Presse, March 16, 2004; Reuters, \"Libya paid Khan $100m for nuclear technology,\" *FT.com*, March 16, 2004.\n\nPakistani state was trying to supplement its defense and nuclear budget, it was getting chump change.  The timeline of transactions only reinforces the point.  Much of the cooperation began after 2001.  In other words, collaboration and payments increase after\n9/11, just when huge volumes of U.S. aid began flowing to Pakistan to reward its role in the Global War on Terrorism.  It seems unlikely that the leadership in Islamabad and Rawalpindi would endanger that new relationship in exchange for a relatively small payout from Tripoli.  The timeline is also important because cooperation began increasing just after Khan was removed as head of KRL.\nIt appears that Khan was primarily motivated by greed, and perhaps to a lesser extent out of some misguided desire by Khan for pan-Muslim comity.  His Swiss, South African, Turkish, and British partners seem to have been squarely and solely motivated by personal greed.  This should make us reflect back, however.  Analysts may push for larger, strategic rationales, when instead, micro-level, individual decisions and motivations may have decisive strategic effect.\n\n## E. Old Friends And New Customers\n\nThe Libyan episode revealed a nuclear underworld that Khan was able to draw upon to launch his ambitious scheme.  What is so disconcerting is that Western governments knew of many of these individuals and entities, and their potential illicit operations.  National and international regulators had at least a partial picture of many of the key nodes in the Khan network by the 1980s.\nFriedrich Tinner, father of Urs Tinner, first came under U.S. Defense Department scrutiny in the 1970s while working at a Swiss firm specializing in vacuum technology, and throughout the 1980s and 1990s firms connected with Tinner were suspected of illicit sales to Iraq.251  Peter Griffin, alleged to have been involved in setting up the Libyan workshop to manufacture and repair difficult centrifuge components, was investigated for the first time in the 1970s.  Similar tales could be told about others.  Concerns had been raised during the 1980s for three Germans suspected of proliferation activities: Heinz Mebus, Otto Heilingbrunner, and Gotthard Lerch.252\nPerhaps the most egregious case involved the Dutch national Hank Selbos.\nSlebos went to school with Khan in the 1960s, first traveled to Pakistan in 1976, was first warned about exports to Pakistan in 1980, was first caught with illegal exports in 1983, was imprisoned for one year for those illegal exports in 1985, was noticed meeting with Khan in the Netherlands in 1988 (Khan was in the Netherlands illegally), continued to have difficulties with Dutch regulators for repeated sales to Pakistan in the late 1990s, and was a sponsor of a Khan Research Laboratory symposia in 2003.  He has been implicated of working with the Turkish and Malaysian firms supplying the Libyan program, and apparently met with Libyan officials along with Khan at least once in Casablanca in 1998.253  Despite the four-decade-long association between Slebos and Khan, Dutch and international authorities were not able to stop the flow of controlled technology.  David Albright and Corey Hinderstein have noted, \"The failure of these NSG [Nuclear Suppliers Group] countries to stop the illicit manufacturing of centrifuge components is one of the most embarrassing aspects of this scandal.\"254\nMany of these individuals had been involved with the Pakistani program from the beginning.  Khan's effort to craft an elaborate network to procure proscribed items had paid an extra dividend.  Khan had simultaneously crafted a network capable of nuclear exports, as well as imports.  The same skill set (engineering, manufacturing, logistics, and finances) was needed to do both jobs.  And characters willing to assist a rising nuclear state for a profit, would likely be willing to assist other motivated buyers achieve their objectives.  As the following figure demonstrates, the procurement network created in Europe in the 1970s and 1980s became the backbone of the proliferation network of the\n1990s and 2000s (see figure 2, next page).\n\ndifferent company, CES Kalthoff GmbH. 20; Mark Hibbs, \"European Suspects in KRL Case May Have Previous Involvement,\" *Nucleonics Week*, February 5, 2004; Mark Hibbs, \"Dutch Prosecutors to Charge Slebos with Violations Involving KRL,\" Nucleonics Week, May 13, 2004; \"Pakistan's Nuke Scientist Khan, Colleagues Met Libyans,\" Japanese Economic Newswire, March 18, 2005.\n\n## F. Going Down With The Ship: The *Bbc China*\n\nBy 2000, in the early stages of Khan's assistance to Libya, the U.S. and British intelligence agencies had evidence of shipments of centrifuge technology from Khan's network to Libya.255  By 2002, the British Joint Intelligence Committee had concluded that Khan had moved his operations base from Pakistan to Dubai, and also noted the use of production facilities in Malaysia.  More importantly, the British had concluded, \"A. Q.\n\nKhan's network was central to all aspects of the Libyan nuclear weapons program.\"256\nAt some point, the United States attained evidence that Libya had acquired a nuclear weapons design from Khan, apparently through covert operational daring.257\nU.S. and British intelligence agencies had penetrated the network by this point.\nThey were probing, seeking to learn the extent of the enterprise.  In a September 2004 speech, Director of Central Intelligence George Tenet reportedly told an audience,\n\"Working with British colleagues, we pieced together his subsidiaries, his clients, his front companies, his finances and manufacturing plants.  We were inside his residence, inside his facilities, inside his rooms.  We were everywhere these people were.\"258\nKhan's network was not just being bugged, it also had been infiltrated by human spies.259 There has been some speculation that B. S. A. Tahir might have been a U.S. informant.260\nThe British Butler Commission noted the tension between observing and disrupting.  \"Action to close down the network had until this stage been deferred to allow the intelligence agencies to continue their operations to gather further information on the full extent of the network. This was important to gain a better understanding of the nuclear programs of other countries which Khan was supplying. But Khan's activities had now reached the point where it would be dangerous to allow them to go on.\"261  This determination to act was made in early 2003.\nA decision was made to interdict the centrifuge and other components coming from the Shah Alam facility in Malaysia on their way to Libya.  On October 4, 2004, the German-flagged vessel, the *BBC China*, was diverted to port in Taranto, Italy, in an action coordinated by U.S., British, German, and Italian authorities.  Five containers full of sensitive componentscomponents that had been tracked from their point of origin by U.S. and British intelligence agencieswere off-loaded in Italy.262  As noted earlier in this chapter, other containers aboard the *BBC China* were also full of nuclear-related components, this time from Turkish companies, and continued their journey to Tripoli.\n\n260 Bill Powell, et al, \"The Man Who Sold the Bomb,\" *Time*, February 14, 2005.\n261 *Butler Commission Report*, 18.\nThe U.S. and Britain had been engaged for months in talks with Libya, seeking for Tripoli to forgo its weapons of mass destruction programs.  The interdiction of the BBC China, combined with other signals from U.S. and British interlocutors, demonstrated to the Libyans that their nuclear effort had been compromised considerably.\nTwo months after authorities removed the containers from the *BBC China*, Libya made a strategic decision to verifiably, comprehensively, and irreversibly dismantle its weapons of mass destruction programs.  In doing so, Libya provided U.S. and international investigators with significant new data that could be used to attack Khan's network.  In the words of U.S. Undersecretary of State for Arms Control and International Security Robert Joseph, \"Interdiction of the *BBC China*, followed by cooperation from the United Arab Emirates, South Africa, Malaysia, Turkey and several European countries led to the destruction of the Khan network and the on-going investigation, prosecution or imprisonment of many of its leading members.\"263\nPulling on the Libyan thread led to Pakistan and Khan, the individual.  In January\n2004, U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell called President Pervez Musharraf.  In Powell's words, he told Musharraf, \"We know so much about this that we're going to go public with it, and within a few weeks, okay? And you need to deal with this before you have to deal with it publicly.\"264  Khan and his close associates were brought into custody by the Pakistan government.\nDr. A. Q. Khan appeared on television screens across Pakistan on February 4,\n2004.  The tone of his highly choreographed presentation was immediately clear to the audience at home and around the world.  \"It is with the deepest sense of sorrow, anguish, and regret that I have chosen to appear before you in order to atone for some of the anguish and pain that has been suffered by the people of Pakistan on account of the extremely unfortunate events of the last two months.\"265  Khan was pardoned the\n\n263 Joseph, \"Applying the Bush Administration's Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction to following day by President Musharrafa pardon conditional on his continued cooperation with the investigation.266  Musharraf's government placed Khan under virtual house arrest.  Khan had reached his denouement.\n\nWith Khan's arrest, confession, and pardon, the A. Q. Khan network ceased operations.  In Secretary of State Powell's words, \"All I know is A.Q. Khan is not doing what A.Q. Khan was doing last year.  And that is a major, major achievement.\"267\nKhan's network of operatives, middlemen, technicians, and logisticians was thoroughly disrupted by the wave of interdictions, investigations, raids, and arrests that became first publicly visible when the *BBC China* was diverted in October 2003.  Many were arrested, but some of his associates have almost certainly escaped capture.  Some of Khan's knowledge, expertise, and physical components almost certainly remains available for the right price.  Nuclear weapons designs may still be accessible to motivated buyers.  We all must live with the legacy of A. Q. Khan.  The next, and concluding, chapter more fully considers the implications of the Khan network for how we think about new nuclear states and the policies that we fashion to deal with past, present, and future proliferation.\n\n## Vi. Conclusion A. Introduction\n\nFrom 1976 to 2004, Dr. Abdul Qadeer Khan was at the center of the global nuclear black market.  He was not the first to benefit from the illicit trade in destructive technologies, but he accelerated the consolidation of the market.  He did much to spread nuclear weapons technology.  He removed key obstacles in Pakistan's successful quest for nuclear weapons.  He provided assistance to Iran, North Korea, and Libya. Significantly, he allowed Iran and North Korea to continue their pursuit of nuclear ambitions after they encountered dead ends in their attempt to acquire unsafeguarded plutonium.  He may have allowed Tehran and Pyongyang to continue with nuclear efforts that were not readily visible by Western intelligence agencies.  He offered nuclear assistance to Iraq, and perhaps others.\nThis conclusion reviews the factual arguments made throughout the thesis.  Next, it provides theoretical observations on the importance for the Khan nuclear network for the academic debate on nuclear proliferation.  It provides policy implications and recommendations for a post-Khan world.  Finally, it concludes by offering indicators that might point to the next \"A. Q. Khan.\"\n\n## B. Research Summary 1. What Technology And Material Did Khan Provide To His Clients?\n\nA. Q. Khan and his network did not have access to the entirety of a nuclear weapons program.  Khan did control, however, more components than any non-state actor in history.  The list of items available to Khan and his network approaches, but does not quite reach, the level of a \"turnkey\" nuclear program.  He had access to uranium hexafluoride, which he provided to Libya and perhaps North Korea.  His specialty was centrifuge technology, components, and designs.  He provided used centrifuge parts to Iran, North Korea, and Libya.  With regards to Iran, he provided significant quantities of disassembled centrifuges.  Often, these sample centrifuges were more useful for the target state as a template than as a functioning device.  In addition to the sample machines, Khan and his network provided detailed blueprints and designs of centrifuges.  Khan also provided valuable information about which components, parts, and materials to purchase in order to create a successful centrifuge program.  This \"shopping list\" appears to have allowed Iran and North Korea to go directly to European and Asian firms to obtain key nuclear-related goods, circumventing the global export control regime in the process.\nSignificantly, in at least the Libyan case, he provided nuclear weapons designs and instructions.  The material Khan provided on nuclear warhead design was not a simple blueprint, but a detailed \"how to\" packet, apparently with descriptions of both manufacturing processes as well as design specifications.  Finally, Khan provided consulting services, to at least his Iranian and Libyan clients.\nIn the Libyan case, the consulting reached profoundly ambitious heights.  Khan was at the center of virtually all aspects of the Libyan nuclear program. Khan moved beyond just the provision of discarded centrifuges and designs.  Libya did not have the nuclear infrastructure to utilize them.  Khan would have to create the infrastructure, both in Libya and also in off-shore factories in Turkey, South Africa, Malaysia, and other countries.  He appears to have encountered bottlenecks in his scheme.  The numbers of ring magnets and centrifuge motors provided to Libya were quite small.  Some aspects of nuclear know-how appear quite difficult for non-state (and non-Western) actors to manufacture.\n\n## 2. How Significant Was Khan's Assistance?\n\nKhan was not selling nuclear weapons.  None of his clients have successfully constructed highly enriched uranium-based nuclear explosives based on Khan's assistance.  What Khan did was to shorten timelines, perhaps dramatically.  In the Iranian and North Korean cases, Khan provided seed technology.  Khan probably could not have acquired centrifuge technology for Pakistan without information from URENCO and other European firms.  Khan passed that URENCO-based technology onto Tehran, Pyongyang, and Tripoli.  These states may have developed centrifuge technology without Khan.  After all, Brazil has a centrifuge effort quite distinct from Khan.  Khan almost certainly shortened the research and development timelines of his clients: probably by years rather than months.  These states did not have to go through the trial-and-error process of centrifuge design.  Instead, they had a validated design that they could seek to duplicate and manufacture on mass scale.\n\nEven successful construction of a centrifugeor a hundred, or a thousand centrifugesis only one crucial part of the puzzle.  First, uranium hexafluoride must be created by the ton.  There is not evidence that Iran, North Korea, or Libya had mastered this step, though Iran and Libya had previously acquired non-Khan foreign assistance on a uranium conversion facility.  Second, centrifuges must be constructed into a large cascade of machines, slowly enriching U-235 from U-238.  These cascades must operate for months to create sufficient material for a nuclear device.  Their operation draws huge quantities of power from the electric grid.  Flawed centrifuges may break, spinning at thousands of rotations per minute, launching shrapnel into the cascade.  Poor quality uranium hexafluoride will slow the cascade in its functioning.  The cascade may also be discovered by outside groups, as occurred with the nascent Iranian facility at Natanz.\nFinally, once a state has acquired sufficient quantities of fissile material, it must be reconverted into uranium metal and machined into a nuclear explosive device.  Khan apparently provided, or at least offered, both re-conversion and nuclear weapons design assistance.  None of his clients appear to have gone this far down the nuclear path.\n\n## 3. To What Degree Was Khan A Rogue Actor, Or An Agent Of The Pakistani State?\n\nOne of the most challenging questions has been ascertaining the degree of knowledge or complicity of Pakistani leaders in Khan's nuclear enterprise.  Key leaders, most significantly army chief Gen. Mirza Aslam Beg, may have been predisposed toward nuclear cooperation, particularly with Iran.  These leaders may have provided a policy opening for Khan in the late 1980s to begin his profitable nuclear assistance.  This thesis has argued, however, that Khan likely exceeded whatever mandate he received from Pakistani leadership.  In particular, it is confusing that Khan's nuclear assistance continued after these individuals left the scene.  It is confusing, for instance, that Khan's nuclear trade with Iran was increasing at the same time as Pakistan's relationship with Iran was souring.\nOpen closer examination, the \"proof\" of state authorization for Khan's assistance to North Korea appears much less definitive.  Images of Pakistani C-130s on a North Korean runway are insufficient.  The extensive cooperation on conventional and ballistic missile technologies created a high \"signal-to-noise\" problem, for both foreign intelligence analysts and, perhaps, for the Pakistani overseers themselves.  The strategic rationales for cooperation are also less convincing when examined in detail.  Why would Pakistan be forced to barter sensitive nuclear technologies for decades-old liquid-fuel missile technology?  Why just Pakistan, when North Korea was selling the same technology to states all around the globe?\nFinally, what strategic rationale justified Khan's Libyan trade?  If the Pakistani state was seeking income, it was selling its services fairly cheaply.  It was also engaged in a very risky business.  As Khan's Libyan sales were increasing, Pakistan was receiving massive amounts of aid for its role in the global war on terrorism.  Selling nuclear technology to Tripoli could endanger that aid, and the interests of the Pakistani state.\nKhan's nuclear off-shoring was an attempt to provide Libya with sensitive nuclear technology, while simultaneously avoiding strengthening military oversight at home.\nKhan appears to have been motivated by personal profit and pride.  He wanted to demonstrate that he could defy the global nonproliferation regime, that he could defy the United States, and that he could defy the weak controls at home.  For nearly three decades, Khan was a force unto himself.\nThe Pakistani state shares significant responsibility in Khan's nuclear enterprise.\nIts decision in 1976 to provide Khan with broad autonomy and financial control allowed for Khan to create his nuclear fiefdom.  The Pakistani state apparently had weak control of its centrifuges, centrifuge designs, nuclear weapons designs, and perhaps uranium hexafluoride.  Pakistan always felt that this man who had given Pakistan so much would not betray Pakistan.  The controls around him were always weaker than the controls around anyone else.  The controls on the rival Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission were much stricter, and perhaps as a result the PAEC has not been implicated in the nuclear black market.268\n\n## C. Theoretical Observations\n\nThe A. Q. Khan network provides a wealth of data for the optimism-pessimism debate.  The optimist argument was always premised on rationality, the unitary nature of\n\na nuclear weapons state, and a relative ease of control of nuclear technology.  The stakes were so high, the optimists argued, that reasonable states would expend the necessary effort to control their nuclear technology.  The three cases studied in this thesis, however, should cause even the most ardent optimist to pause.  In the Iranian case, for instance, Khan provided significant nuclear assistance to a neighbor with which Pakistan has had troubled relations.  There are two possible ways to read this assistance.  If this was a realist attempt to cement an alliance, it appears to have been unsuccessful.  Indo-Iranian relations are better than Indo-Pakistani relations.  If Iran does acquire a nuclear device, Pakistan will be responsible for its own deterioration in security.  Alternatively, perhaps it was Khan acting as an individual for personal profit.  This would call into question the optimist argument that states can relatively easily control sensitive nuclear technology and will do so because of the potential costs involved.\nAs this study of the Khan network indicates, there are limits to how useful \"the state\" is as an analytical concept.  What does it mean that the Pakistani state was aware of Khan's commerce?  In particular, decision-making about the Pakistani nuclear program has been highly personalized since its inception.  The Pakistani state, per se, did not make nuclear decisions.  Individual Pakistani leadersZulfikar Ali Bhutto, Mohammad Zia-ul-\nHaq, Ghulam Ishaq Khan, Mirza Aslam Beg, and Abdul Qadeer Khanmade nuclear decisions.  They often made them quietly.  They sometimes circumvented the rudimentary oversight bodies that did exist.  More research should be done on decisionmaking in such personalized and de-institutionalized environments.  The Khan episode sensitizes us to the fact that states are not \"ping pong balls\" bouncing around in reality. The internal workings, down to personality disputes between key individuals, can have dramatic impacts on the observed behavior.\nThe Khan episode appears to erode the optimist argument in three ways.  First, it underlines that states have other motivations besides minimizing nuclear risks.  A state will often have to balance very concrete security concerns against hypothetical nuclear safety.  This is particularly true in the early years of a nuclear program.  The program was likely initiated as the result of a fairly intense security threatif not, the need to internal balance would not have been felt in the first place.  Simultaneously, the state will probably want to keep information about the nuclear weapons program very tightly held and compartmentalized, to prevent secret information from reaching the adversary and other interested outsiders.  Secrecy and speed are in conflict with safety.  National security managers, particularly in the early years of the program, are likely to have significant experience with cultures of secrecy and cultures of results, but may have much less experience with cultures of safety.\nThe second challenge to the optimist argument has to do with the ease of control.\nOptimists had argued that the state security apparatus could easily control the relatively small weapons programs of new nuclear states.  But how does a state establish a personnel reliability program when it never has had one in the past?  How does a state police its nuclear establishment when the program is so sensitive that perhaps the regular intelligence agencies cannot be entrusted with program details?  How does it establish export controls, particularly when the scientific competency resides in the scientific organizations that need to be regulated?  Pakistan confronted these challenges and it made several mistakes.  Khan and his top associates at the laboratory were not screened by security services.  Khan's travels were not closely scrutinized.  Shipments into and out of the country appear not to have been searched.  Key security personnel at Khan Research Laboratory reported to Khan directly, and their financial well being depended on Khan's approval.\nThe third challenge is largely theoretical at this point.  Khan's network lowered the barriers to entry into the nuclear business.  He cut years of the research and development timetables of his client states.  Libya would not have had a nuclear weapons program without Khan's assistancehe was involved in all key aspects of the effort.  He enabled a state with limited infrastructure and scientific expertise to become a nuclear aspirant.  The optimist argument argues that the barriers to entry of nuclear acquisition will screen out the least stable states.  While the obstacles to nuclear possession are still quite high, as they are lowered, the self-selection optimist argument will be weakened.\n\n## D. Policy Implications\n\nThis study has highlighted a number of policy challenges that will confront decision-makers for some time.  First, the technological piece of the nonproliferation puzzle is growing more complicated.  Precision manufacturing capabilities are available in more and more countries.  Information about controlled technologies is also more widely available.  Globalization eases travel and commerce.  Specialists from the developed world can travel to the developing world with blueprints on a hard disk.  They might program a lathe for a few days, and then return home to their cottage for the weekend.  A firm in Malaysia could and did manufacture parts for a subsidiary in Dubai that turned out to be controlled centrifuge components.  The subsidiary in Dubai did not know the ultimate consumer for the products, only a front company.  The shipping firm carrying the parts from Dubai to Tripoli did not realize it had sensitive cargo.  The intelligence agencies that pulled the containers off of the ship did not realize that there were other containers on the same ship, carrying sensitive components from a Turkish company that were also destined for the same Libyan bomb program.\n\nGlobalization and technological diffusion have complicated the problem, but the old problem did not go away.  European firms and some of the same individuals are still selling proscribed technologies to nuclear programs.  This is partially because of increased sophistication by client statesusing front companies, false end-user certificates, and other deception techniques.  It is partially because of the lethargy of bureaucracies and the problem of out-of-date export control lists.  And it is also partially caused by the high profits that can be made in selling controlled technologies.\nGovernments that learn of illicit procurement are confronted with a policy challenge: do they watch or do they act?  There is a tension between action and observation.  In other words, policymakers aware of the transfer of WMD technology, expertise, or material have the choice of watching that transfer to gain a better understanding of both the suppliers and consumers, or they can move to prevent or interdict the transaction.  The principle challenge is that premature action is unlikely to have decisive effect on either a proliferation network or a procurement effort.  Greater understanding of the structure of a networkachievable only through watchingis often necessary to impair its function. Of course, waiting too long could allow a potential threat to mature, risking the security of the United States and other countries.\n\nTaking action is also challenging.  Intelligence that is collected about an unscrupulous merchant, for instance, has to be converted into something usable.  If the merchant is in the United States, the intelligence might have to meet legal standards, or lead to other evidence that does meet such standards.  This might delay action for months.  If the merchant operates in a foreign country, the problem is complicated further. Will sharing intelligence with a foreign government endanger the source?  Will that government take action?  Will that government value its own commercial interests over a hypothetical risk, particularly a risk that is likely to be more acutely felt by the United States than the foreign government?\n\nThis thesis wrestled with Pakistani state complicity because it has significant policy implications.  Some policymakers intuitively divide the world into good and bad states.  Good states do good things and bad states to bad things.  Many analysts look at Pakistan as an archetypical \"bad state,\" admittedly one that gets away with it.  The policy recommendations that flow from that conclusion are about changing the nature of the state.  They might be punitive, hoping to the raise the costs of bad behavior.  For instance, many believe Pakistan should be sanctioned for its proliferation record, particularly if access to A. Q. Khan is not provided to U.S. investigators.  Alternative policy proposals might seek to reform Pakistan, hoping to change the nature of the state from the inside.  Most Indians and many others believe that Pakistani behavior will not conform to global norms so long as the military dominates Pakistani politics.  These same analysts blame the military for Pakistan's dismal proliferation record.\n\nThis thesis has presented evidence of a less Manichean world.  If Khan's network flourished because of failures of Pakistani command and control, the policy solutions are very different.  Policymakers must look more closely at assisting new nuclear states with their safety and security arrangements.  This will be tricky.  New nuclear states, who prize secrecy so much, are unlikely to share extensive data with outsiders, particularly outsiders who might be direct threats to new nuclear programs.  Assistance with personnel reliability programs may provide new nuclear states with greater certainty about their positive and negative control.  Hypothetically, such confidence might lead states to deploy their nuclear forces at a higher state of readiness.  Given the significant other costs of such deployment, however, it seems unlikely that concerns about personnel are the only obstacle to deployed and ready nuclear arsenals.  This potential risk must be weighed against the proven risk of what insiders can do when they operate outside of state oversight and control.\n\n## E. Conclusion: The Next A. Q. Khan?\n\nThe A. Q. Khan affair was a significant failure for all involved.  The Pakistan government provided Khan too much authority, it had minimal nuclear oversight, and was slow to react to internal and external warnings that Khan was up to no good.  The United States was too slow in realizing Khan's growing danger, despite having intimations of his nuclear trade by the early 1990s.  Europe was too slow in policing its own individuals and firms, which supplied Khan from 1976 until 2004.  There is enough blame to go around.  By outlining those mistakes, and examining the causes of those failures, I hope that they will not be repeated.  The problem is not going away, however.\nIf anything, globalization and the diffusion of WMD-relevant technology have only complicated the policy problem.  Each new WMD program could hold another potential A. Q. Khan.\nWhat indicators or characteristics should concern policymakers and intelligence analysts in the future?  Khan had broad financial autonomy.  He had great flexibility in how he operated his procurement network.  He could acquire and ship components with little external oversight.  He had good connections with foreign suppliers.  He was not personally screened by intelligence services, nor were his close associates.  He was a proud and greedy man.  His wealth was well known, despite his relatively modest government salary.  He had strong rivalries with other program mangers.  He jockeyed with them for public esteem, esteem which he coveted deeply.  The public esteem also insulated him from political pressure and oversight.  His independence was reinforced further by the turbulent nature of Pakistani politics, particularly during the troubled\n1990s.  Finally, he was deeply proud of being able to defy the discriminatory and Western-led export control regime.  Do these conditions apply elsewhere?  If so, the next A. Q. Khan may already be out there.\n\n\nTHIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK\n\n## List Of References A. Government Documents\n\nLord Butler. Chairman. Report of a Committee of Privy Counselors. Review of\nIntelligence on Weapons of Mass Destruction. London:  The Stationary Office, 2004.\nCommission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons of\nMass Destruction. *Report to the President of the United States*. Washington, D.C.:\nGPO, March 31, 2005.\nInternational Atomic Energy Agency. \"Implementation of the NPT Safeguards\nAgreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran.\" Report by the Director General to the Board of Governors. GOV/2003/75. November 10, 2003.\n______. \"Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of\nIran.\" Report by the Director General to the Board of Governors. GOV/2005/67. September 2, 2005.\n______. \"Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement of the Socialist People's\nLibyan Arab Jamahiriya.\" Report by the Director General to the Board of Governors. GOV/2004/12. February 20, 2004.\n_______. \"Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement of the Socialist People's\nLibyan Arab Jamahiriya.\" Report by the Director General to the Board of\nGovernors. GOV/2004/33. May 28, 2004.\nOffice of the Secretary of Defense. U.S. Department of Defense. Proliferation: Threat\nand Response. Washington, D.C.: GPO, January 2001.\nRoyal Malaysian Police. \"Press Release by Inspector-General of Police in Relation to\nInvestigation of Alleged Production of Components for Libya's Uranium\nEnrichment Programme.\" February 20, 2004,\nhttp://www.rmp.gov.my/rmp03/040220scomi_eng.htm.\nSquassoni, Sharon A. \"Weapons of Mass Destruction: Trade Between North Korea and\nPakistan.\" *CRS Report for Congress*, no. RL31900 (updated March 11, 2004).\n\n## B. Interviews, Press Releases, Speeches, And Testimony\n\nAlbright, David. \"International Smuggling Networks: Weapons of Mass Destruction\nCounterproliferation Initiatives.\" Statement to the Senate Committee on\nGovernment Affairs. June 23, 2004, http://hsgac.senate.gov/index.cfm?Fuseaction\n=Hearings.Testimony&HearingID=185&WitnessID=673&suppresslayouts=true.\nBolton, John. Undersecretary of State for Arms Control and International Security.\n\"Statement to the House Committee on International Relations Subcommittee on\nthe Middle East and Central Asia on Iranian Proliferation.\" June 24, 2004.\nBush, George W. \"President Announces New Measures to Counter the Threat of WMD.\"\nRemarks by the President to the National Defense University. Washington, D.C., February 11, 2004, http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/02/20040211-\n4.html.\n\"Interview with Abdul Qadeer Khan.\" *The News* (Islamabad), May 30, 1998. Reproduced\nat http://nuclearweaponarchive.org/Pakistan/KhanInterview.html.\nGoldschmidt, Pierre. Deputy Director General of the International Atomic Energy\nAgency. \"Statement to the Board of Governors.\" March 1, 2005, http://www.iaea.org/NewsCenter/Statements/DDGs/2005/goldschmidt01032005.h\ntml (accessed March 7, 2005).\nJoseph, Robert.  Undersecretary of State for Arms Control and International Security.\n\"Applying the Bush Administration's Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction to Today's Challenges.\" Prepared Remarks to the Fletcher School Conference on the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction. Federal News\nService. October 21, 2005.\nKerry, John and Hank Brown. *The BCCI Affair*. A Report to the Committee on Foreign\nRelations, United States Senate (December 1992), http://www.fas.org/irp/congress/1992_rpt/bcci/05foreign.htm.\nOehler, Gordon. Testimony to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Hearing on\n\"Proliferation of Chinese Missiles.\" June 11, 1998.\nPowell, Colin.  Secretary of State.  Remarks En Route to Kuwait. March 18, 2004,\nhttp://www.state.gov/secretary/former/powell/remarks/30562.htm.\n______.  Interview at the Christian Science Monitor's Newsmaker Press Briefing\nLuncheon. December 21, 2004, http://www.state.gov/secretary/former/\npowell/remarks/39999.htm.\nScomi Group Berhad, \"SCOPE's Press Statement on Its Contract in Dubai,\" news\nrelease, February 4, 2004, http://www.scomigroup.com.my/publish/\n04news008.shtml.\n \"Text of Dr Abdul Qadeer Khan's Statement Seeking Public Apology.\" Transcribed text\nfrom Pakistan TV 1 (Islamabad). February 4, 2004. FBIS Report no. SAP2004020400069.\n\"Text of Musharraf's TV News Conference.\" Translated text from PTV World\n(Islamabad). February 5, 2004. FBIS Report no. SAP20040209000072.\n\n## C. Books\n\nBlair, Bruce G. *The Logic of Accidental Nuclear War.* Washington, D.C.: Brookings,\n1993.\nBoer, Joop, et al. A. Q. Khan, Urenco, and the Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons\nTechnology. New York: Greenpeace International, May 2004.\nCheema, Pervaiz Iqbal and Imtiaz H. Bokhari, eds. Arms Race and Nuclear\nDevelopments in South Asia. Islamabad, Pak.: Islamabad Policy Research Institute, 2004.\nColl, Steve. *Ghost Wars.* New York: Penguin, 2004.\n\nCloughley, Brian. *A History of the Pakistan Army: Wars and Insurrections*. New York:\nOxford University Press, 1999.\nFeaver, Peter D. Guarding the Guardians: Civilian Control of Nuclear Weapons in the\nUnited States. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1992.\nFreedman, Lawrence. *The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy*. 3rd ed. New York: Palgrave\nMacmillan, 2003.\nHussain, S. Shabbir and Mujahid Kamran, eds. Dr. A. Q. Khan on Science and\nEducation. Lahore: Sang-e-Meel, 1997.\nJones, Owen Bennett. *Pakistan: Eye of the Storm*. New Haven, Conn.: Yale University\nPress, 2002.\nKahn, Herman. *On Thermonuclear War.* Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1961.\nKapur, Ashok. *Pakistan's Nuclear Development*. New York: Croom Helm, 1987.\nKrass, Allan S., et al. *Uranium Enrichment and Nuclear Weapon Proliferation*. London:\nTaylor & Francis, 1983.\nKux, Dennis. *The United States and Pakistan, 1947-2000: Disenchanted Allies.*\nWashington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2001.\nLewis, John Wilson and Xue Litai. *China Builds the Bomb.* Stanford, Calif.: Stanford\nUniversity Press, 1988.\nMalik, Zahid. *Dr. A. Q. Khan and the Islamic Bomb*. Islamabad, Pak.: Hurmat, 1992. Rashid, Ahmed. *Taliban: Militant Islam, Oil and Fundamentalism in Central Asia*. New\nHaven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 2000.\nRehman, Shahid-ur. *Long Road to Chagai*. Islamabad: Print Wise, 1999. Sagan, Scott D. *The Limits of Safety: Organizations, Accidents, and Nuclear Weapons.*\nPrinceton: Princeton University Press, 1993.\nSreedhar, ed. *Pakistan's Bomb: A Documentary Study*. 2nd ed. New Delhi: ABC\nPublishing, 1987.\nWaltz, Kenneth N. and Scott D. Sagan, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A Debate\nRenewed. New York: W. W. Norton, 2003.\nWeissman, Steve and Herbert Krosney. *The Islamic Bomb*. Delhi: Vision Books, 1983.\n\n## D. Journal Articles\n\nAbrams, Herbert L. \"Human Reliability and Safety in the Handling of Nuclear\nWeapons.\" *Science and Global Security* 2 (1991): 325-349.\nAlbright, David. \"Pakistan: The Other Shoe Drops.\" *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*\n(July-August 1998): 24-25.\n______ and Mark Hibbs. \"Pakistan Bomb: Out of the Closet.\" Bulletin of the Atomic\nScientists 48, no. 6 (July-August 1992): 38-43.\n______ and Corey Hinderstein. \"Iran: Countdown to Showdown.\" Bulletin of the Atomic\nScientists (November-December 2004): 67-72.\n______ and Corey Hinderstein. \"Unraveling the A. Q. Khan and Future Proliferation\nNetworks.\" *The Washington Quarterly* 28, no. 2 (2005): 111-128.\nBermudez, Joseph S., Jr. \"Lifting the Lid on Kim's Nuclear Workshop.\" Jane's Defence\nWeekly, November 27, 2002.\nBrewer, Gary D. and Paul Bracken, \"Some Missing Pieces of the C3I Puzzle.\" Journal of\nConflict Resolution 28, no. 3 (September 1978): 451-469.\nClary, Christopher. \"Dr. Khan's Nuclear Walmart.\" *Disarmament Diplomacy*, no. 76\n(March-April 2004): 31-6.\nDoty, Paul. \"The Role of the Smaller Powers.\" *Daedalus* 89 (1960): 818-30.\nFeaver, Peter D. \"Command and Control in Emerging Nuclear Nations.\" International\nSecurity 17, no. 3 (Winter 1992-1993): 165.\n______. \"Optimists, Pessimists, and Theories of Nuclear Proliferation Management.\"\nStrategic Studies 4, no. 4 (summer 1995): 766.\n______. \"Neo-optimists and the Enduring Problem of Nuclear Proliferation.\" Security\nStudies 6, no. 4 (Summer 1997): 93-125.\nHuber, George P. \"Organizational Learning: The Contributing Processes and the\nLiteratures.\" *Organization Science* 2, no. 1, Special Issue: Organizational\nLearning: Papers in Honor of (and by) James G. March (1991): 88-115.\nIkle, Fred C. \"Nth Countries and Disarmament.\" *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* 16\n(1960): 391-94;\nKampani, Gaurav. \"Second Tier Proliferation: The Case of Pakistan and North Korea.\"\nNonproliferation Review 9, no. 3 (Fall-Winter 2002): 107-16.\nKarl, David J. \"Proliferation Pessimism and Emerging Nuclear Powers.\" International\nSecurity 21, no. 3 (Winter 19961997): 87-119.\nKerr, Paul. \"Iran's Nuclear Activities Limited.\" *Arms Control Today* (September 2005),\nhttp://www.armscontrol.org/act/2005_09/IranLimits.asp.\nLavoy, Peter R. \"The Strategic Consequences of Nuclear Proliferation: A Review Essay.\"\nStrategic Studies 4, no. 4 (summer 1995): 696.\n______ and Feroz Hassan Khan, \"Rogue or Responsible Nuclear Power? Making Sense\nof Pakistan's Nuclear Practices.\" *Strategic Insights* 3, no. 2 (February 2004),\nhttp://www.ccc.nps.navy.mil/si/2004/feb/lavoyFeb04.asp.\nLevitt, Barbara and James G. March, \"Organizational Learning.\" Annual Review of\nSociology 14 (1988): 319-40.\nLodi, Sardar F. S. \"Pakistan's Missile Technology.\" *Pakistan Defence Journal* (May\n1998), http://defencejournal.com/may98/pakmissiletech.htm.\nNorris, Robert S. and Hans M. Kristensen, \"Nuclear Notebook: North Korea's Nuclear\nProgram, 2005.\" *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* (May-June 2005): 64-7.\nQuinlan, Michael. \"Book review of Escalation Control and the Nuclear Option in South\nAsia.\" *Survival* (Spring 2005): 190.\nReiss, Mitchell and Robert Gallucci, \"Red-Handed.\" *Foreign Affairs* (March-April 2005). Salik, Naeem. \"Missile Issues in South Asia.\" *Nonproliferation Review* (Summer 2002).\nSagan, Scott D. \"The Problem of Redundancy Problem: Why More Nuclear Security\nForces May Produce Less Nuclear Security.\" *Risk Analysis* 24, no. 4 (2004).\nSeng, Jordan. \"Less is More: Command and Control Advantages of Minor Nuclear\nStates.\" *Security Studies* 6, no. 4 (Summer 1997): 50-92.\nSingh, Jaswant. \"Against Nuclear Apartheid.\" *Foreign Affairs* (September-October\n1998): 41-52.\nSteinbruner, John D. \"Nuclear Decapitation.\" *Foreign Policy*, no. 45 (Winter 1981\n1982): 16-28.\nThayer, Bradley. \"The Risk of Nuclear Inadvertence: A Review Essay.\" Security Studies\n3, no. 3 (Spring 1994).\nTucker, Jonathan B. \"Strategic Command-and-Control Vulnerabilities: Dangers and\nRemedies.\" *Orbis* 26, no. 4 (Winter 1983): 941-63.\nWallace, Terry C. \"The May 1998 India and Pakistan Nuclear Tests.\" Seismological\nResearch Letters 69 (September 1998): 386-393.\nWeiss, Leonard, \"Pakistan: It's Deja Vu All Over Again.\" The Bulletin of the Atomic\nScientists 60, no. 3 (May-June 2004): 52-59.\nWohlstetter, Albert. \"The Delicate Balance of Terror.\" *Foreign Affairs* 37, no. 2 (January\n1959): 211-34.\n\n## E. Occasional Papers, Presentations, And Reports\n\nAlbright, David. \"North Korea's Current and Future Plutonium and Nuclear Weapon\nStocks.\" *ISIS Issue Brief*. January 15, 2003, http://www.isisonline.org/publications/dprk/currentandfutureweaponsstocks.html.\n_______ and Corey Hinderstein, \"Libya's Gas Centrifuge Procurement: Much Remains\nUndiscovered.\"\nISIS\nIssue\nBrief,\nMarch\n1,\n2004,\nhttp://www.isisonline.org/publications/libya/cent_procure.html.\nBermudez, Joseph S., Jr. *A History of Ballistic Missile Development in the DPRK*.\nOccasional Paper, no. 2. Monterey, Calif.: Monterey Institute for International Studies, Center for Nonproliferation Studies, November 1999.\nPinkston, Daniel A. \"When Did WMD Deals between Pyongyang and Islamabad Begin.\"\nResearch Story of the Week. Monterey, Calif.: Center for Nonproliferation\nStudies, Monterey Institute for International Studies (October 21, 2002), http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/week/021028.htm.\n\nRussell, James and Christopher Clary. \"Globalization and WMD Proliferation Networks:\nChallenges to U.S. Security.\" June 29-July 1, 2005 Conference Report, http://www.ccc.nps.navy.mil/events/recent/WMDConferenceAug05_rpt.asp.\nStern, Jessica and Geoffrey Koblentz. \"Preventing Unauthorized Access to and Use of\nNuclear Materials and Weapons: Lessons from the United States and Former\nSoviet Union.\" Paper presented to the CISAC Workshop on Preventing Nuclear\nWar in South Asia, Bangkok, August 4-7, 2001.\n\n## Initial Distribution List\n\n1.\nDefense Technical Information Center Ft. Belvoir, Virginia\n2.\nDudley Knox Library Naval Postgraduate School Monterey, California\n3.\nMichael Krepon The Henry L. Stimson Center\nWashington, DC\n4.\nStephen P. Cohen The Brookings Institution Washington, DC\n5.\nAshley Tellis Carnegie Endowment for International Peace Washington, DC\n6.\nScott D. Sagan CISAC Stanford University Stanford, California"
    },
    {
        "text": "## On Our Radar Cloud Computing Is Here; Now What?\n\nBy Greg Shipley In the fall of 2011, the *IQT Quarterly* tackled some of the issues surrounding the promise and hype of cloud computing. While the discussion is far from over, three years later we find ourselves with a bit more insight into some of the key questions. How secure is cloud-based infrastructure? Answer: about as secure (and insecure) as the IT infrastructure that preceded it. Does using cloud-based services save money? Answer: it depends - in some cases, yes, but in many others, no. Does cloud computing have an impact on the IT labor force? Answer: definitely, but that impact is often more about change, and less about reduction.\n\nMost debates regarding the long-term viability of cloud computing are over; the movement has become \"the new normal\" in corporate America. We believe that the changes related to the rise of cloud computing will continue to have a profound impact on the future of enterprise computing. However, both questions and misconceptions remain, and much work lies ahead.\n\n## The Evolution Of Enterprise It\n\nThe story is all too familiar: a business unit or mission group has specific technology needs, becomes frustrated with its enterprise IT organization, and decides to use some of its coveted budget dollars to stand up pieces of its own IT infrastructure - independent of enterprise IT. While not often discussed, these secondary IT teams, or \"shadow IT,\" exist in both government and corporate contexts, and in some cases have been around as long as the IT departments themselves. Their presence is not new; however, there is a rising trend in corporate America of using cloud-based service providers as a third option - another path around enterprise IT organizations. The trend raises an interesting question: have cloud-based service providers simply become the latest incarnation of shadow IT? There's little doubt that a more \"frictionless\" IT environment is the end state that developers, IT\noperations personnel, and end users alike are all seeking. Who doesn't dream about resources on-demand, provisioning within minutes, and lower barriers to use? This is the lure of a cloud-enabled world and the reason Amazon Web Services' revenue is now measured in billions. These are achievable goals, but understanding the broader story is essential to executing against this vision. For the technology portion of the tale, much of what drives the largest cloud providers remains a blend of traditional approaches and technology combined with some modern and significant shifts. For example, technology vendors like Cisco and Juniper continue to supply IT teams with significant quantities of network infrastructure. However, some of the largest providers are now embracing software-defined networking (SDN) concepts running on top of more generic \"white box\" switches; both cost and functionality are driving this change. Dell, HP, and IBM may still be selling thousands of servers into data centers, but companies like Facebook - now one of the largest purchasers of server hardware on the planet - claim to be using 100 percent Open Compute-based hardware. Cost reduction was a driver here, too: Facebook credits its Open Compute initiative with saving the company over a billion dollars in the last three years.\n\nincreasingly relevant to their total delivery costs. This realization resulted in a re-engineered approach to data centers, and has saved them billions of dollars. Yet even today, most large organizations lack teams populated by facilities managers, building engineers, and IT personnel; the groups certainly communicate, but the disciplines remain far from integrated. But perhaps the most relevant human component to the story will be the acute and growing need for cloud technology advisors, translators, and educators. Many IT personnel will need to transform into cloud ambassadors: advisors who help consult about when, where, and how services should be migrated or delivered. It's not just greater understanding of the technical \"big picture\" that will be important - it is the ability to help teams make the best choices and effectively serve as service brokers and enablers.\n\n## The Next Chapter\n\nVMware remains the dominant virtualization player in the traditional enterprise infrastructure space, but the growing popularity and momentum behind the open source OpenStack project is undeniable. Configuration management and orchestration technologies from projects like Ansible, Chef, Puppet Labs, and SaltStack are far more prevalent in the cloud space than equivalents from the larger, legacy software vendors. These technologies also influence how new applications are developed, deployed, and scaled as the lines between developers and system administrators continue to become less defined. Finally, traditional relational database technologies are still powering thousands of cloud applications, but NoSQL-based counterparts offering graph and document-based alternatives continue to gain popularity. So does the use of object-based storage systems (e.g., Amazon S3, OpenStack Swift, Cleversafe) by a growing group within the development community. These significant shifts in technology usage will have lasting effects.\n\nThere has historically been much discussion around when, where, and why to deploy cloud related technologies, and debate about whether cloud computing models will eventually consume all of IT. Similar discussions occurred regarding the mainframe, as well as the migration to \"client-server\" computing models. Decades later, these technologies remain active in our computing environments, and perhaps regrettably, the domain of \"legacy IT\" does not appear to be leaving any time soon. As time goes on, it appears less likely that the question will be, \"do we move to the Cloud?\" and more likely to be, \"which applications do we move, and to which cloud do we move them?\" Savvy IT personnel will build out the criteria to answer these and related questions.\n\nCloud-enabled IT teams are facing new considerations and skill set requirements. For example, understanding resource constraints, and specifically bandwidth usage requirements, is even more essential. If the dynamic capabilities of cloud-enabled applications are realized, applications and workloads have the potential to be resized or moved. In a traditional model where static resources (e.g., servers) reside in a single physical data center with relatively static network connections, there are a number of variables that can affect performance. In a cloud-enabled world, that number of variables increases substantially. In effect, moving a 500 GB image file between two systems within the same data center is one thing, moving it between two data centers is quite another, and having it moved automatically is even more complicated. In some cases, having cloudenabled applications will actually *increase* complexity; a counter-intuitive notion to some, but a harsh reality for those who are already living in the world of dynamic resource allocation.\n\nFrom lowering the cost and resources required to launch companies to inspiring entrepreneurs to build cloud-enabling technologies, the impact of public and private cloud technologies has been profound in the startup community. Questions relating to the security, cost, and functionality of the shift to Cloud will soon be replaced by more specific inquires relating to the security/cost/functionality delta between Cloud Provider X and existing infrastructure. Transparency has never been more important.\n\nThe need for greater collaboration between facilities teams and IT personnel is another area in which organizations are becoming more mindful. For example, both Facebook and Google realized early on that their power, space, and cooling footprints would become The answers to these questions will determine how much cloud, and how much computing, lies ahead.\nInfrastructure Practice, where he is responsible for cloud and next generation infrastructure investments. Shipley also helps guide IQT's investments in information security areas. Prior to joining IQT, he was the founder and Chief Technology Officer for Neohapsis, an industry leader in information security and IT risk management. Shipley also ran the Chicago test lab for Network Computing magazine, was a contributing editor for Information Week magazine, and spent over a decade testing and reviewing technology on behalf of Fortune 500 companies."
    },
    {
        "text": "Biometric Collection, Transmission and Storage Standards Technical Reference\n\n\n24 July 2006\n Version 1.1\nDepartment of the Army Biometrics Task Force Executive Agent for Biometrics\n\n## Report Documentation Page Omb No. 0704-0188\n\nPublic reporting burden for the collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to a penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number.\n\n1. REPORT DATE\n24 JUL 2006\n2. REPORT TYPE\nN/A\n3. DATES COVERED\n  -\n5a. CONTRACT NUMBER\n4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE\nBiometric Collection, Transmission and Storage Standards\n5b. GRANT NUMBER 5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER\n6. AUTHOR(S)\n5d. PROJECT NUMBER REPORT NUMBER\n\n7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)\nDepartment of the Army Biometrics Task Force Executive Agent for\nBiometrics Arlington, VA\n\nNUMBER(S)\n\n## 12. Distribution/Availability Statement Approved For Public Release, Distribution Unlimited 13. Supplementary Notes The Original Document Contains Color Images.\n\n14. ABSTRACT\n\n15. SUBJECT TERMS\n\n16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF:\n17. LIMITATION OF\nABSTRACT\nSAR\n18. NUMBER\nOF PAGES\n29\n19a. NAME OF\nRESPONSIBLE PERSON\na. REPORT\nunclassified\nb. ABSTRACT\nunclassified\nc. THIS PAGE\nunclassified\n\n## Document History\n\n| Version                              | Date        | Document Status    | Participants/Comments                      |\n|--------------------------------------|-------------|--------------------|--------------------------------------------|\n| 0.1                                  | 25 Apr 2006 | Working Draft      | Internal Reviews                           |\n| 0.2                                  | 23 May 2006 | Working Draft      | Presented to BSWG; editorial changes       |\n| 0.3                                  | 26 May 2006 | Working Draft      | Editorial changes                          |\n| 0.4                                  | 05 Jun 2006 | Working Draft      | Editorial changes and additional comments  |\n| from peer review integrated          |             |                    |                                            |\n| 0.5                                  | 06 Jun 2006 | Working Draft      | CBEFF concerns resolved, sent to technical |\n| editor                               |             |                    |                                            |\n| 0.6                                  | 07 Jun 2006 | Working Draft      | Distributed to BSWG for two-week review;   |\n| technical edits integrated           |             |                    |                                            |\n| 1.0                                  | 21 Jul 2006 | Working Draft      | Incorporated comments from BSWG based on   |\n| the approved disposition of comments |             |                    |                                            |\n| 1.1                                  | 24 Jul 2006 | Released version   | Edition includes comments from BTF         |\n| technical editor                     |             |                    |                                            |\n\n##\n\n\nContact Information For comments or questions, please contact:\nDale Hapeman, DoD Biometrics Task Force Standards Team, 304-326-3029\nJames B. Hutchinson, DoD Biometrics Task Force Standards Team, 703-984-0430\nExecutive Summary\n\nThis document provides a comprehensive technical reference that lists published biometric standards and describes their applicability to the biometric functions described in the Capstone Concept of Operations (CONOPS) for Department of Defense (DoD) Biometrics in Support of Identity Superiority.  It was prepared by the DoD Biometrics Standards Working Group (BSWG)\nto assist in the development of future system-specific policy and technical documents, such as standard operating procedures, architecture technical views, and application profiles.  This document provides support for a number of biometric modalities, including:  fingerprints, face images, iris images, signature/sign data, hand geometry, and palm prints.  It also describes the status of biometric standards in the DoD Information Technology Standards Registry.  The appendices of this document contain a brief overview of the criteria for DoD adoption of standards and information on the collection of non-standardized biometric data, including DNA\nand voice recording samples.  The DoD BSWG will update this document on a regular basis as new biometric standards emerge and to maintain consistency with the CONOPS.\n\n## 1 Introduction\n\n1.1\nAuthority\n\nThis document is developed by the DoD Biometric Standards Working Group (BSWG).  The BSWG is chartered to champion the development of biometric standards at the national and international levels, to coordinate and advocate DoD interests, and to build a consensus on standards development, evaluation, adoption, and implementation issues across the DoD and in coordination with other federal agencies.  Members of this working group include: U.S. Army U.S. Air Force Department of the Navy DoD Biometrics Task Force DoD Program Manager, Biometrics Defense Manpower Data Center Defense Information Systems Agency Defense Information Technology Standards Registry Information Assurance Technical Working Group Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Networks & Information Integration National Institute of Standards and Technology National Biometrics Security Project Intelligence Community Department of Transportation Federal Aviation Administration Federal Bureau of Investigation Department of Homeland Security U.S. Coast Guard West Virginia University\n1.2\nScope and Purpose This document serves as a technical reference that lists published biometric standards and describes their applicability to the \"Collect,\" \"Store,\" and \"Share\" functions defined in the CONOPS document.  It also describes the status of biometric standards in the DoD Information Technology Standards Registry (DISR).  This document follows the CONOPS capabilities-based approach and does not address any specific system, application, or platform.  Figure 1 depicts the Biometric Process defined in the CONOPS.\n\n## 1.3 Document Structure\n\nThe remainder of Section 1 describes this document's structure and its intended use.  Section 2\nlists the meanings of acronyms and terms used in this document.  Section 3 lists published\nstandards and specifications for collecting biometric data, including any requirements pertaining\nto that collection.  The biometric modalities included in Section 3 are:\n\n- Fingerprints - Face Images\n- Iris Images\n- Signature/Sign Data\n- Hand Geometry\n- Palm Prints\n For each modality, a subsection describes related equipment, image or sample capture, quality control (where applicable), and formatting.  Section 4 addresses standards and specifications for the transmission of biometrics and related data between systems and organizations.  Standards concerning the storage and archival of biometric data are listed in Section 5. This document is structured to correspond to a generic collection, transmission, and storage process as illustrated in Figure 2.\n\n\n\n1.4\nIntended Use of Document This document should be used as a reference to assist in the development of future systemspecific policy and technical documents, such as standard operating procedures, architecture technical views, and application profiles.  The selection of appropriate biometric standards for a particular biometric system implementation is based on the unique circumstances of the system, including the business need, system requirements, and applicable DoD system interfaces. For example, an application may be required to collect 10 rolled fingerprints, face, and iris samples.  The application may also be required to store the fingerprint data in a local database but transmit all biometric data to a remote database, such as DoD Automated Biometric Identification System (ABIS).  Figure 3 demonstrates how various sections of this document may be applied to identify standards that may be implemented to support the collection, transmission, and storage functions of the application.\n\n\n\n## 1.5 Published Biometric Standards And Disr Status\n\nIn 2004, the DISR officially replaced the Joint Technical Architecture in compliance with the\n2004 *Memorandum for DoD Executive Agent for Information Technology Standards* and in accordance with DoD Directives 4350.5 and 5101.7.  The DISR serves as a central repository for DoD-approved information technology standards, including biometric standards.  Use of the DISR is mandated for the development and acquisition of new or modified fielded IT and National Security Systems throughout the DoD. The following Table 1 contains descriptions of published biometric standards and their status in DISR.  More information about standards adoption criteria and process can be found in Appendix A.\n\n## Table 1:  Published Biometric Standards And Disr Status\n\n|                                                                                  |               | Category of    | DISR    |\n|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------|----------------|---------|\n| Standards                                                                        | Standard Name | Description    | Status  |\n| ANSI/NIST ITL 1-2000 Data Format for the                                         |               |                |         |\n| Interchange of Fingerprint, Facial, & Scar Mark &                                |               |                |         |\n| Tattoo (SMT) Information                                                         |               |                |         |\n| This standard defines the content, format, and units of measurement for the      |               |                |         |\n| exchange of fingerprint, palm print, facial/mug shot, and SMT full-image         |               |                |         |\n| information that may be useful in identifying a subject.                         |               |                |         |\n| Mandated                                                                         |               |                |         |\n| Fingerprint Image                                                                |               |                |         |\n| ANSI INCITS 381-2004 Finger Image-Based Data                                     |               |                |         |\n| Interchange Format                                                               |               |                |         |\n| This standard specifies an interchange format for the exchange of image-         |               |                |         |\n| based fingerprint and palm print recognition data.  It defines the content,      |               |                |         |\n| format, and units of measurement for such information.  This standard is         |               |                |         |\n| intended for those identification and verification applications that require the |               |                |         |\n| use of raw or processed image data containing detailed pixel information.        |               |                |         |\n|                                                                                  |               |                |         |\n| Pending                                                                          |               |                |         |\n| (Change                                                                          |               |                |         |\n| Request (CR)                                                                     |               |                |         |\n| Submitted as                                                                     |               |                |         |\n| Mandated                                                                         |               |                |         |\n| Standard)                                                                        |               |                |         |\n| ISO/IEC 19794-4 Biometric Data Interchange                                       |               |                |         |\n| Formats - Part 4:  Finger Image Data                                             |               |                |         |\n| This standard specifies a data record interchange format for storing,            |               |                |         |\n| recording, and transmitting the information from one or more finger or palm      |               |                |         |\n| image areas within an ISO/IEC 19785-1 Common Biometric Exchange                  |               |                |         |\n| Formats Framework (CBEFF) data structure.  This can be used for the              |               |                |         |\n| exchange and comparison of finger image data.                                    |               |                |         |\n| Pending (CR                                                                      |               |                |         |\n| Submitted  as                                                                    |               |                |         |\n| Emerging                                                                         |               |                |         |\n| Standard)                                                                        |               |                |         |\n| ANSI INCITS 378-2004 Finger Minutiae Format                                      |               |                |         |\n| for Data Interchange                                                             |               |                |         |\n| This standard defines a method of representing fingerprint information using     |               |                |         |\n| the concept of minutiae.  It defines the placement of the minutiae on a          |               |                |         |\n| fingerprint, a record format for containing the minutiae data, and optional      |               |                |         |\n| extensions for ridge count and core and delta information.                       |               |                |         |\n| Pending (CR                                                                      |               |                |         |\n| Submitted as                                                                     |               |                |         |\n| Mandated                                                                         |               |                |         |\n| Standard)                                                                        |               |                |         |\n| Fingerprint Template                                                             |               |                |         |\n| ANSI INCITS 377-2004 Finger Pattern-Based                                        |               |                |         |\n| Interchange Format                                                               |               |                |         |\n| This standard specifies an interchange format for the exchange of pattern-       |               |                |         |\n| based fingerprint recognition data.  It describes the conversion of a raw        |               |                |         |\n| fingerprint image to a cropped and down-sampled finger pattern                   |               |                |         |\n| followed by the cellular representation of the finger pattern image to create    |               |                |         |\n| the finger pattern interchange data.                                             |               |                |         |\n|                                                                                  |               |                |         |\n| Pending (CR                                                                      |               |                |         |\n| Submitted as                                                                     |               |                |         |\n| Mandated                                                                         |               |                |         |\n| Standard)                                                                        |               |                |         |\n| ISO/IEC 19794-2 Biometric Data Interchange                                       |               |                |         |\n| Formats - Part 2:  Finger Minutiae Data                                          |               |                |         |\n| This standard specifies a concept and data formats for representation of         |               |                |         |\n| fingerprints using the fundamental notion of minutiae.  It is generic in that it |               |                |         |\n| may be applied and used in a wide range of application areas where               |               |                |         |\n| automated fingerprint recognition is involved.  ISO/IEC 19794-2:2005             |               |                |         |\n| contains definitions of relevant terms, a description of how minutiae shall be   |               |                |         |\n| determined, data formats for containing the data for both general use and for    |               |                |         |\n| use with cards, and conformance information.                                     |               |                |         |\n| Pending (CR                                                                      |               |                |         |\n| Submitted as                                                                     |               |                |         |\n| Emerging                                                                         |               |                |         |\n| Standard)                                                                        |               |                |         |\n| Category of                                                                      | DISR        |\n|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------|\n| Standards                                                                        |             |\n| Standard Name                                                                    | Description |\n| Status                                                                           |             |\n| ANSI INCITS 385-2004 Face Recognition Format                                     |             |\n| for Data Interchange                                                             |             |\n| This standard specifies definitions of photographic environment, subject         |             |\n| pose, focus, digital image attributes, and a face interchange format for         |             |\n| relevant applications, including human examination and computer-                 |             |\n| automated face recognition.                                                      |             |\n| Pending (CR                                                                      |             |\n| Submitted as                                                                     |             |\n| Mandated                                                                         |             |\n| Standard)                                                                        |             |\n| Face                                                                             |             |\n| ISO/IEC 19794-5 Biometric Data Interchange                                       |             |\n| Formats - Part 5:  Face Image Data                                               |             |\n| This standard specifies scene, photographic, digitization, and format            |             |\n| requirements for images of faces to be used in the context of both human         |             |\n| verification and computer automated recognition.  The format is designed to      |             |\n| allow for the specification of visible information discernible by an observer    |             |\n| pertaining to the face, such as gender, pose, and eye color.                     |             |\n| Pending (CR                                                                      |             |\n| Submitted as                                                                     |             |\n| Emerging                                                                         |             |\n| Standard)                                                                        |             |\n| ANSI INCITS 379-2004 Iris Image Interchange                                      |             |\n| Format                                                                           |             |\n| This standard describes a format for the exchange of iris image information.     |             |\n| It contains a definition of attributes, a data record format, sample records,    |             |\n| and conformance criteria.  Two alternative formats for iris image data are       |             |\n| describedone based on a Cartesian coordinate system and the other on a          |             |\n| polar coordinate system.                                                         |             |\n| Mandated                                                                         |             |\n| Standard                                                                         |             |\n| Iris                                                                             |             |\n| ISO/IEC 19794-6 Biometric Data Interchange                                       |             |\n| Formats - Part 6:  Iris Image Data                                               |             |\n| This standard specifies two alternative image interchange formats for            |             |\n| biometric authentication systems that use iris recognition.  The first is based  |             |\n| on a rectilinear image storage format and the second is based on a polar         |             |\n| image specification.                                                             |             |\n| Pending (CR                                                                      |             |\n| Submitted as                                                                     |             |\n| Emerging                                                                         |             |\n| Standard)                                                                        |             |\n| ANSI INCITS 396-2005 Hand Geometry Format                                        |             |\n| for Data Interchange                                                             |             |\n| This standard specifies an interchange format for the exchange of hand           |             |\n| geometry data in a silhouette format.  It defines the content, format, and units |             |\n| of measurement for such information.  This standard is intended for those        |             |\n| identification and verification applications that require the use of an          |             |\n| interoperable hand geometry template.                                            |             |\n| Other                                                                            |             |\n| Modalities                                                                       |             |\n| Pending (CR                                                                      |             |\n| Submitted as                                                                     |             |\n| Mandated                                                                         |             |\n| Standard)                                                                        |             |\n| ANSI INCITS 395-2005 Biometric Data                                              |             |\n| Interchange Formats - Signature/Sign Data                                        |             |\n| This Standard specifies a data interchange format for representation of          |             |\n| digitized sign or signature data, for the purposes of biometric enrollment,      |             |\n| verification, or identification through the use of Raw Signature/Sign Sample     |             |\n| Data or Common Feature Data.  The data interchange format is generic in          |             |\n| that it may be applied and used in a wide range of application areas where       |             |\n| electronic signs or signatures are involved.  No application-specific            |             |\n| requirements or features are addressed in this standard.                         |             |\n| Signature                                                                        |             |\n| Sign Data                                                                        |             |\n| N/A                                                                              |             |\n| Category of                                                                    | DISR        |\n|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------|\n| Standards                                                                      |             |\n| Standard Name                                                                  | Description |\n| Status                                                                         |             |\n| Electronic Fingerprint Transmission Specification                              |             |\n| (EFTS) (v7.1)                                                                  |             |\n| The purpose of this document is to specify certain requirements to which       |             |\n| agencies must adhere to communicate electronically with the FBI's              |             |\n| Integrated Automated Fingerprint Identification System (IAFIS).  This          |             |\n| specification is based on ANSI/NIST ITL 1-2000 and covers the IAFIS            |             |\n| electronic transmissions involving fingerprints.                               |             |\n| N/A                                                                            |             |\n| Transmission                                                                   |             |\n| Electronic Biometric Transmission Specification                                |             |\n| (EBTS) (v1.1)                                                                  |             |\n| This specification describes customizations of EFTS transactions that are      |             |\n| necessary to use the DoD ABIS.                                                 |             |\n| Pending (CR                                                                    |             |\n| Submitted as                                                                   |             |\n| Mandated                                                                       |             |\n| Standard)                                                                      |             |\n| ANSI INCITS 358-2002 BioAPI Specification                                      |             |\n| (v1.1)                                                                         |             |\n| This standard provides a high-level generic biometric authentication model     |             |\n| suited for any form of biometric technology.  It covers the basic functions of |             |\n| enrollment, verification, and identification and includes a database interface |             |\n| to allow a biometric service provider to manage the identification population  |             |\n| for optimum performance.                                                       |             |\n| Mandated                                                                       |             |\n| Standard                                                                       |             |\n| Technical Interfaces                                                           |             |\n| ANSI INCITS 398-2005 [NISTIR 6529-A]                                           |             |\n| Common Biometric Exchange Formats                                              |             |\n| Framework (CBEFF)                                                              |             |\n| This standard describes a set of data elements necessary to support biometric  |             |\n| technologies in a common way.  These data elements can be placed in a          |             |\n| single file used to exchange biometric information between different system    |             |\n| components or between systems.  The result promotes interoperability of        |             |\n| biometric-based application programs and systems developed by different        |             |\n| vendors by allowing biometric data interchange.                                |             |\n| Mandated                                                                       |             |\n| Standard                                                                       |             |\n| OASIS (Organization for the Advancement of                                     |             |\n| Structured Information Standards) eXtensible                                   |             |\n| Markup Language (XML) Common Biometric                                         |             |\n| Format 1.1                                                                     |             |\n| This specification defines a common set of secure XML encodings for the        |             |\n| patron formats specified in CBEFF (NISTIR 6529).  Much of the                  |             |\n| information included in this standard has been incorporated into a more        |             |\n| recent standard, ANSI X9.84-2003.                                              |             |\n| Emerging                                                                       |             |\n| Standard                                                                       |             |\n| NIST Special Publication 800-76 - Biometric Data                               |             |\n| Specification for Personal Identity Verification                               |             |\n| Special Publication 800-76 (SP 800-76) is a companion document to Federal      |             |\n| Information Processing Standard 201.  It describes technical acquisition and   |             |\n| formatting specifications for the biometric credentials of the Personal        |             |\n| Identity Verification (PIV) system, including the PIV card itself.  The        |             |\n| primary design objective behind these particular specifications is high        |             |\n| performance universal interoperability.                                        |             |\n|                                                                                |             |\n| Application                                                                    |             |\n| Profiles                                                                       |             |\n| Pending (CR                                                                    |             |\n| Submitted as                                                                   |             |\n| Mandated                                                                       |             |\n| Standard)                                                                      |             |\n\n## 2 Terms And Acronyms 2.1 Terms\n\nThe following terms are used in this document as indicated.\n\n- Application Profile - a document that identifies a set of two or more existing prerequisite\nbiometric standards and identifies the classes, subsets, options, and parameters of those\nbase standards that are necessary for accomplishing a particular function.\n- Collection Personnel - the DoD-authorized individual collecting biometric data from\nanother person.\n- Electronic Fingerprint Sensors - also referred to as live scan devices.\n- Person - the individual from whom biometric data are being collected.\n\n2.2\nAcronyms\nABIS - DoD Automated Biometric Identification System\nANSI - American National Standards Institute\nBioAPI - Biometrics Application Programming Interface\nBIR - Biometric Identification Record\nBTF - U.S. Army Biometrics Task Force BSWG - Biometric Standards Working Group\nCBEFF - Common Biometric Exchange Formats Framework\nCJIS - Criminal Justice Information Services\nCONOPS - Concept of Operations\nDISR - Defense Information Technology Standards Registry\nDNA - deoxyribonucleic acid\nDoD - Department of Defense EBTS - Electronic Biometric Transmission Specification\nEFTS - Electronic Fingerprint Transmission Specification\nESP - Encapsulating Security Payload\nFBI - Federal Bureau of Investigation\nFIQM - Finger Image Quality Measurement\nIAFIS - Integrated Automated Fingerprint Identification System\nIEC - International Electrotechnical Commission\nIETF - Internet Engineering Task Force\nIKE - Internet Key Exchange INCITS - International Committee for Information Technology Standards\nIP - Internet Protocol\nIPSEC - Internet Protocol Security\nISO - International Organization for Standardization\nITL - Information Technology Laboratory\nNFIQ - NIST Finger Image Quality\nNIST - National Institute of Standards and Technology\nNISTIR - NIST Interagency Reports\nOASIS - Organization for the Advancement of Structured Information Standards\nPIV - Personal Identity Verification\nppi - pixels per inch\nSMT - Scar, Mark, & Tattoo S/MIME - Secure/Multipurpose Internet Mail Extensions SOP - Standard Operating Procedure SSH - Secure Shell TLS - Transport Layer Security VPN - Virtual Private Network XML - eXtensible Markup Language\n\n\n## 3 Collection 3.1 Rolled Live Scan Fingerprints\n\n3.1.1 Equipment\n- All electronic fingerprint sensors, commonly known as live scan devices, shall be certified\nby the FBI to conform to Appendix F of the EFTS (Reference a) and shall appear on the\nFBI-certified devices list (Reference b).\n\n3.1.2 Image Capture\n- Collection of samples from each person shall include the following images:\no 10 separately rolled fingers.\no Combined plain impression of the four fingers on the right hand (no thumb).\no Combined plain impression of the four fingers on the left hand (no thumb).\no Left thumb plain impression.\no Right thumb plain impression.\n- Rolled impressions shall be rolled from one side of the fingernail to the other.\n- Images shall be captured at a resolution of either 500 or 1,000 pixels per inch (ppi).\n\n3.1.3 Quality Control\n- Rolled live scan fingerprint images shall be evaluated with an automated tool that\nimplements one of the following DoD-approved quality algorithms:\no National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) Finger Image Quality (NFIQ)\nTool (Reference q).\no DoD Finger Image Quality Measurement (FIQM) Tool (Reference r).\n\n3.1.4 Formatting\n- Rolled live scan fingerprint images shall be formatted in, and in conformance with, one of\nthe following formats:\no EBTS Type-4 logical records (Reference k).  Only 500-ppi images shall be stored in\nType-4 records.  Note that EBTS Type-4 records are identical to EFTS and American\nNational Standards Institute (ANSI)/NIST Type-4 records.\no EBTS Type-14 logical records (Reference k).  500-ppi and 1,000-ppi images may be\nstored in Type-14 records.  Note that EBTS Type-14 records are identical to EFTS and\nANSI/NIST Information Technology Laboratory (ITL) 1-2000 Type-14 records.\no ANSI International Committee for Information Technology Standards (INCITS) 381-\n2004 Finger Image standard (Reference d).\no ANSI INCITS 378-2004 Finger Minutiae standard (Reference h).\no ANSI INCITS 377-2004 Finger Pattern standard (Reference i).\no International Organization for Standardization (ISO)/International Electrotechnical\nCommission (IEC) 19794-4 Biometric Data Interchange Formats - Part 4:  Finger\nImage Data (Reference hh).\no ISO/IEC 19794-2 Biometric Data Interchange Formats - Part 2:  Finger Minutiae Data\n(Reference ii).\n- ANSI INCITS- and ISO/IEC-formatted rolled live scan fingerprint data shall be embedded\nin a CBEFF Patron Format (Reference j).\n- EBTS-formatted rolled live scan fingerprint data may be embedded in a CBEFF Patron\nFormat (Reference j).\n- Rolled live scan fingerprint data embedded in a CBEFF Patron Format should make use of\none of the CBEFF Patron Formats that are being commonly used or are required by the\nspecific application.  Special consideration should be given to the Patron Format specified\nin section 6 of NIST Special Publication 800-76 (Reference l) or to the Biometrics\nApplication Programming Interface (BioAPI) 1.1 storage format (Format C - The BioAPI\nBiometric Identification Record (BIR)) specified in Annex C of CBEFF (Reference j).\n\n3.2\nPlain Live Scan Fingerprints\n3.2.1 Equipment\n- All electronic plain scan fingerprint sensors shall be certified by the FBI to conform to\nAppendix F of the EFTS (Reference a) and shall appear on the FBI-certified devices list\n(Reference b).\n\n3.2.2 Image Capture\n- Plain live scan fingerprints may be either \"segmented\" or \"unsegmented.\"\n- Collection of segmented plain live scan finger samples shall include the following 14\nimages:\no 10 individual plain impressions of separate fingers.\no Combined plain impression of the four fingers on the right hand (no thumb).\no Combined plain impression of the four fingers on the left hand (no thumb).\no Left thumb plain impression.\no Right thumb plain impression.\n- Collection of unsegmented plain live scan finger samples shall include the following three\nimages:\no Combined plain impression of the four fingers on the right hand (no thumb).\no Combined plain impression of the four fingers on the left hand (no thumb).\no Combined plain impression of the two thumbs.\n- Images shall be captured at a resolution of either 500 or 1,000 ppi.  Special consideration\nshould be given to the Patron Format specified in section 6 of NIST Special Publication\n800-76 (Reference l) or to the BioAPI 1.1 storage format (Format C - The BioAPI BIR)\nspecified in Annex C of CBEFF (Reference j).\n\n3.2.3 Quality Control\n- Plain live scan fingerprint images shall be evaluated with an automated tool that\nimplements one of the following DoD-approved quality algorithms:\no NFIQ Tool (Reference q).\no DoD FIQM Tool (Reference r).\n\n3.2.4 Formatting\n- Plain live scan fingerprint images shall be formatted in and in conformance with one of the\nfollowing formats:\no EBTS Type-4 logical records (Reference k).  Only 500-ppi images shall be stored in\nType-4 records.  Note that EBTS Type-4 records are identical to EFTS and\nANSI/NIST Type-4 records.\no EBTS Type-14 logical records (Reference k).  500-ppi and 1,000-ppi images may be\nstored in Type-14 records.  Note that EBTS Type-14 records are identical to EFTS and\nANSI/NIST ITL 1-2000 Type-14 records.\no ANSI INCITS 381-2004 Finger Image standard (Reference d).\no ANSI INCITS 378-2004 Finger Minutiae standard (Reference h).\no ANSI INCITS 377-2004 Finger Pattern standard (Reference i).\no ISO/IEC 19794-4 Biometric Data Interchange Formats - Part 4:  Finger Image Data\n(Reference hh).\no ISO/IEC 19794-2 Biometric Data Interchange Formats - Part 2:  Finger Minutiae Data\n(Reference ii).\n- All ANSI INCITS- and ISO/IEC-formatted plain live scan fingerprint data shall be\nembedded in a CBEFF Patron Format (Reference j).\n- All EBTS-formatted plain live scan fingerprint data may be embedded in a CBEFF Patron\nFormat (Reference j).\n- Plain live scan fingerprint data embedded in a CBEFF Patron Format should make use of\none of the CBEFF Patron Formats that are being commonly used or are required by the\nspecific application.  Special consideration should be given to the Patron Format specified\nin section 6 of NIST Special Publication 800-76 (Reference l) or to the BioAPI 1.1 storage\nformat (Format C - The BioAPI BIR) specified in Annex C of CBEFF (Reference j). 3.3\nSingle Fingerprints\n3.3.1 Equipment\n- All electronic single-fingerprint sensors shall implement a software interface that complies\nwith BioAPI 1.1 (Reference c).\n\n3.3.2 Image Capture\n- Image capture requirements shall be stated using the \"Image Acquisition Settings Levels\"\nin Table 1 of Clause 6, \"Image Acquisition Requirements,\" of ANSI INCITS 381-2004,\n\"Finger Image-Based Data Interchange Format\" (Reference d).\n\n3.3.3 Quality Control\n- Rolled live scan fingerprint images shall be evaluated with an automated tool that\nimplements one of the following DoD-approved quality algorithms:\no NFIQ Tool (Reference q). o DoD FIQM Tool (Reference r).\n\n3.3.4 Formatting\n- Single fingerprint images shall be formatted in, and in conformance with, one of the\nfollowing formats:\no ANSI INCITS 381-2004 Finger Image standard (Reference d).\no ANSI INCITS 378-2004 Finger Minutiae standard (Reference h).\no ANSI INCITS 377-2004 Finger Pattern standard (Reference i).\no ISO/IEC 19794-4 Biometric Data Interchange Formats - Part 4:  Finger Image Data\n(Reference hh).\no ISO/IEC 19794-2 Biometric Data Interchange Formats - Part 2:  Finger Minutiae Data\n(Reference ii).\n- Single fingerprint images embedded in a CBEFF Patron Format should make use of one of\nthe CBEFF Patron Formats that are being commonly used or are required by the specific\napplication.  Special consideration should be given to the Patron Format specified in\nsection 6 of NIST Special Publication 800-76 (Reference l) or to the BioAPI 1.1 storage\nformat (Format C - The BioAPI BIR) specified in Annex C of CBEFF (Reference j).\n\n3.4\nLatent Fingerprints\n\n## 3.4.1 Equipment\n\nThere is no further guidance related to equipment.\n\n3.4.2 Image Capture\n- It is highly recommended that latent fingerprint images be captured at 1,000-ppi or higher\nresolution.\n- Grayscale digital imaging should be at a minimum of 8 bits per pixel.\n- Color digital imaging should be at a minimum of 24 bits per pixel.\n\n3.4.3 Formatting\n- Latent fingerprint images shall be formatted in, and in conformance with, one of the\nfollowing formats:\no EBTS Type-4 logical records (Reference k).  Only 500-ppi images shall be stored in\nType-4 records.  Note that EBTS Type-4 records are identical to EFTS and\nANSI/NIST Type-4 records.\no EBTS Type-7 logical records (Reference k).  500-ppi and higher resolution images\nmay be stored in Type-7 records.  Note that EBTS Type-7 records are identical to\nEFTS and ANSI/NIST ITL 1-2000 Type-7 records.\no EBTS Type-9 logical records (Reference k).  Note that EBTS Type-9 records are\nidentical to EFTS and ANSI/NIST ITL 1-2000 Type-9 records.\n\n\n## 3.5 Rolled Ink-On-Card Fingerprints\n\n3.5.1 Equipment\n- Rolled ink fingerprints shall be captured on DoD-acceptable fingerprint cards (examples\nare FBI Criminal Justice Information Services (CJIS) Forms FD-249 (Criminal Card) and\nFD-258 (Applicant Card)).\n- All electronic fingerprint scanners shall be certified by the FBI to conform to Appendix F\nof the EFTS (Reference a) and shall appear on the FBI-certified devices list (Reference b).\n\n3.5.2 Image Capture\n- Collection of samples from each person shall include the following images:\no 10 separately rolled fingers.\no Combined plain impression of the four fingers on the right hand (no thumb).\no Combined plain impression of the four fingers on the left hand (no thumb).\no Left thumb plain impression.\no Right thumb plain impression.\n- Rolled impressions shall be rolled from one side of the fingernail to the other.\n- Images taken from the fingerprint cards shall be captured at a resolution of either 500 or\n1,000 ppi.\n\n3.5.3 Formatting\n- Rolled ink-on-card fingerprint images shall be formatted in, and in conformance with, one\nof the following formats:\no EBTS Type-4 logical records (Reference k).  Only 500-ppi images shall be stored in\nType-4 records.  Note that EBTS Type-4 records are identical to EFTS and\nANSI/NIST Type-4 records.\no EBTS Type-14 logical records (Reference k).  500-ppi and 1,000-ppi images may be\nstored in Type-14 records.  Note that EBTS Type-14 records are identical to EFTS and\nANSI/NIST ITL 1-2000 Type-14 records.\n\n\n## 3.6 Face Images\n\n3.6.1 Equipment\n- All photographs shall be taken using color cameras.\n- All facial image capture equipment shall implement a software interface that complies with\nBioAPI 1.1 (Reference c).\n\n3.6.2 Image Capture\n- The camera lens orientation shall be pointed to the front of the person, aligned\napproximately in the center of the face, and taken from a distance of approximately five\nfeet.\n- The orientation(s) of the person for facial photos shall be taken from the following\npositions:\no Frontal view (also known as full-frontal pose).\no 90 degrees left side.\no 45 degrees left side. o 90 degrees right side. o 45 degrees right side.\n- When photographed, the person shall not be allowed to wear any glasses, sunglasses,\nheadgear, headdress, or other items obscuring the area photographed.  There are no\nconstraints on cosmetics.\n- The full frontal pose shall conform to the requirements of ANSI INCITS 385-2004, \"Face\nRecognition Format for Data Interchange\" (Reference e), clauses 8.2, 8.3, and 8.4 (The\nFull Frontal Image Type).\n\n3.6.3 Formatting\n- Facial images shall be formatted in, and in conformance with, one of the following\nformats:\no EBTS Type-10 logical records (Reference k).  Note that EBTS Type-10 records are\nidentical to EFTS and ANSI/NIST Type-10 records.\no ANSI INCITS 385-2004 Face Recognition Format standard (Reference e).\no ISO/IEC 19794-5 Biometric Data Interchange Formats - Part 5:  Face Image Data\n(Reference jj).\n- ANSI INCITS- and ISO/IEC-formatted facial image data shall be embedded in a CBEFF\nPatron Format (Reference j).\n- EBTS-formatted facial image data may be embedded in a CBEFF Patron Format\n(Reference j).\n- Facial image data embedded in a CBEFF Patron Format should make use of one of the\nCBEFF Patron Formats that are being commonly used or are required by the specific\napplication.  Special consideration should be given to the Patron Format specified in\nsection 6 of NIST Special Publication 800-76 (Reference l) or to the BioAPI 1.1 storage\nformat (Format C - The BioAPI BIR) specified in Annex C of CBEFF (Reference j).\n\n\n## 3.7 Iris Images\n\n3.7.1 Equipment\n- All iris image capture equipment shall implement a software interface that complies with\nBioAPI 1.1 (Reference c).\n- All iris image capture equipment shall collect separate images of the left and right irises of\neach person.  Note:  This does not imply that two images must be collected.  The\nrequirement is that, if both the left and right eyes are captured, the process must result in\ntwo images.\n\n3.7.2 Image Capture\n- Images should be captured in accordance with Annex A, Iris Image Capture Best Practices,\nof ANSI INCITS 379-2004, the Iris Image Interchange Format (Reference f).\n\n3.7.3 Formatting\n- Iris images shall be formatted in, and in conformance with, one of the following formats:\no EBTS Type-16 logical records (Reference k).  Note that there are no EFTS or\nANSI/NIST Type-16 records that are equivalent to EBTS Type-16 records.\no ANSI INCITS 379-2004 Iris Image Format standard (Reference f).\no ISO/IEC 19794-6 Biometric Data Interchange Formats - Part 6:  Iris Image Data\n(Reference kk).\n- ANSI INCITS- and ISO/IEC-formatted iris image data shall be embedded in a CBEFF\nPatron Format (Reference j).\n- EBTS-formatted iris image data may be embedded in a CBEFF Patron Format (Reference\nj).\n- Iris image data embedded in a CBEFF Patron Format should make use of one of the\nCBEFF Patron Formats that are being commonly used or are required by the specific\napplication.  Special consideration should be given to the Patron Format specified in\n\n## Section 6 Of Nist Special Publication 800-76 (Reference L) Or To The Bioapi 1.1 Storage Format (Format C - The Bioapi Bir) Specified In Annex C Of Cbeff (Reference J). 3.8 Signature/Sign Data\n\n3.8.1  Equipment\n- All signature/sign data capture equipment shall implement a software interface that\ncomplies with BioAPI 1.1 (Reference c).\n\n3.8.2  Data Capture\nThere is no further guidance related to data capture.\n\n3.8.3 Formatting\n- Signature/sign data shall be formatted in, and in conformance with:\no ANSI INCITS 395-2005 Biometric Data Interchange Formats - Signature/Sign Data\n(Reference nn).\n- Signature/sign data shall be embedded in a CBEFF Patron Format (Reference j).\n- Signature/sign data embedded in a CBEFF Patron Format should make use of one of the\nCBEFF Patron Formats that are being commonly used or are required by the specific\napplication.  Special consideration should be given to the Patron Format specified in\nsection 6 of NIST Special Publication 800-76 (Reference l) or to the BioAPI 1.1 storage\nformat (Format C - The BioAPI BIR) specified in Annex C of CBEFF (Reference j).\n\n\n## 3.9 Hand Geometry Samples\n\n3.9.1 Equipment\n- All hand geometry capture equipment shall implement a software interface that complies\nwith BioAPI 1.1 (Reference c).\n\n3.9.2 Data Capture\nThere is no further guidance related to data capture.\n\n3.9.3 Formatting\n- Hand geometry data shall be formatted in, and in conformance with:\no ANSI INCITS 396-2005 Hand Geometry Format standard (Reference n).\n- Hand geometry data shall be embedded in a CBEFF Patron Format (Reference j).\n- Hand geometry data embedded in a CBEFF Patron Format should make use of one of the\nCBEFF Patron Formats that are being commonly used or are required by the specific\napplication.  Special consideration should be given to the Patron Format specified in\nsection 6 of NIST Special Publication 800-76 (Reference l) or to the BioAPI 1.1 storage\nformat (Format C - The BioAPI BIR) specified in Annex C of CBEFF (Reference j).\n\n## 3.10 Palm Prints\n\n3.10.1 Equipment\n- All palm print capture equipment shall meet the equipment requirements contained in\nANSI/NIST ITL 1-2000 Section 22 (Reference p).\n\n3.10.2 Image Capture\n- All palm print capture equipment shall meet the image capture requirements contained in\nANSI/NIST ITL 1-2000 Section 22 (Reference p).\n\n3.10.3 Formatting\n- Palm print images shall be formatted in, and in conformance with:\no ANSI/NIST ITL 1-2000 Type-15 records.\n- ANSI/NIST ITL 1-2000 formatted palm print image data may be embedded in a CBEFF\nPatron Format (Reference j).\n- Palm print data embedded in a CBEFF Patron Format should make use of one of the\nCBEFF Patron Formats that are being commonly used or are required by the specific\napplication.  Special consideration should be given to the Patron Format specified in\nsection 6 of NIST Special Publication 800-76 (Reference l) or to the BioAPI 1.1 storage\nformat (Format C - The BioAPI BIR) specified in Annex C of CBEFF (Reference j).\n\n\n## 4 Transmission 4.1 Format\n\n4.1.1 EBTS Transactions\n- May be used for transmitting the following:\no finger images in Type-4 or Type-14 logical records.\no latent images in Type-7 logical records.\no finger minutiae in Type-9 logical records.\no facial images in Type-10 logical records.\no SMT images in Type-10 logical records.\no iris images in Type-16 logical records.\n- Shall conform to EBTS Version 1.1 (Reference k).\n- May be used to transmit to the DoD ABIS.\n\n4.1.2 EFTS Transaction\n- May be used for transmitting the following:\no finger images in Type-4 or Type-14 logical records.\no latent images in Type-7 logical records.\no finger minutiae in Type-9 logical records.\no facial images in Type-10 logical records.\no SMT images in Type-10 logical records.\n- Shall conform to EFTS (Reference a).\n- May be used to transmit to DoD ABIS and FBI IAFIS.\n\n4.1.3 CBEFF Patron Format\n- Any CBEFF Patron Format may be used for transmitting any biometric data that have a\nFormat Type value assigned by a registered Format Owner (see CBEFF, Section 6.3\n(Reference j)).\n- CBEFF-formatted data should make use of one of the CBEFF Patron Formats, preferably\none of those that are being commonly used or are required by the specific application.\nSpecial consideration should be given to the Patron Format specified in section 6 of NIST\nSpecial Publication 800-76 (Reference l) or to the BioAPI 1.1 storage format (Format C -\nThe BioAPI BIR) specified in Annex C of CBEFF (Reference j).\n\n4.2\nTransport\n\n4.2.1 Transport to DoD ABIS\n- Accepts transactions submitted via:\no E-mail on NIPRNet. o E-mail on SIPRNet.\no FTP on NIPRNet.\no Computer media (CD-ROM, DVD).\n\n4.2.2 Transport to FBI IAFIS\n- Accepts transactions submitted via:\no E-mail on the CJIS Wide Area Network\n\n4.3\nProtection\n\n4.3.1 File Security\n- CBEFF\no X9.84 specifies the minimum security requirements for effective management of\nbiometric data (Reference gg).  The application profile will detail the specific\nimplementation of X9.84 to avoid possible incompatibility with CBEFF.\no PIV Patron Format (Reference l).\n- Data Protection\no Cryptographic Message Syntax (1999) - Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF)\nRequest for Comments (RFC) 2630 (Reference t).\no Cryptographic Message Syntax (2004) - IETF RFC 3852 (Reference u).\n\n4.3.2 Message Security\n- Secure e-mail\no Secure/Multipurpose Internet Mail Extensions (S/MIME) Version 3, Message\nSpecification - IETF RFC 2633 (Reference v).\no S/MIME Version 3.1 Message Specification - IETF RFC 3851 (Reference w).\n\n4.3.3 Transport Security\n- Secure Socket\no Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.0 - IETF RFC 2246 (Reference x).\no TLS Protocol Version 1.1 - IETF RFC 4346 (Reference y).\n- Secure File Transfer\no File Transfer Protocol (FTP) Security Extensions - IETF RFC 2228 (Reference z).\no Secure Shell (SSH) File Transfer Protocol - IETF Internet Draft (Reference mm).\n\n- Virtual Private Network (VPN)\no Internet Protocol Security (IPSec) with Internet Key Exchange (IKE) (1998).\n Internet Protocol (IP) Authentication Header - IETF RFC 2402 (Reference aa).\n IP Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP) - IETF 2406 (Reference cc).\n The IKE - IETF RFC 2409 (Reference ee).\no IPSec with IKE (2005)\n IP Authentication Header - IETF RFC 4302 (Reference bb).\n ESP - IETF 4303 (Reference dd).\n IKE v2 Protocol - IETF RFC 4306 (Reference ff).\n\n\n## 5 Storage 5.1 Format\n\n5.1.1 PIV Card\n- The storage format for data on the PIV card is in NIST Special Publication 800-76\n(Reference l).\n5.1.2 PIV Enrollment Agency\n- The storage format for data saved by the agency executing a PIV card enrollment is in\nNIST Special Publication 800-76 (Reference l).\n5.1.3 Other Biometric Repository\n- The internal storage format of biometric data in a repository should be specified\nbased on system requirements.  However, the biometric repository shall be capable of\nconstructing at least one of the standardized data interchange and transmission\nformats listed in this document.  This construction capability shall enable the system\nto format biometric files according to the standards listed in this document for the\npurpose of successfully sharing those files with other standardized DoD-recognized\nsystems.  Each biometric modality listed in this document contains published\nstandardized formats for performing successful transmissions.\n\n\n## 5.2 Archiving\n\n5.2.1 DoD ABIS\n- Data transmitted to the DoD ABIS may indicate that data be retained or not retained.\n5.2.2 FBI IAFIS\n- Data transmitted to the IAFIS may indicate that data be retained or not retained.\n\n5.3\nProtection\n5.3.1 File Security\n- CBEFF\no X9.84 specifies the minimum security requirements for effective management of\nbiometric data (Reference gg).  The application profile will detail the specific\nimplementation of X9.84 to avoid possible incompatibility with CBEFF.\no PIV Patron Format (Reference l).\n- Data Protection\no Cryptographic Message Syntax (1999) - IETF RFC 2630 (Reference t).\no Cryptographic Message Syntax (2004) - IETF RFC 3852 (Reference u).\n\nAppendix A:  Adoption of Biometric Standards\n\nPublished standards should be adopted and used whenever possible to permit the development of open systems and avoid use of vendor-specific, proprietary solutions.  Standards provide structure and a framework by which development, interoperability, interchange, and functionality may be achieved. Adoption is a process by which an organization expresses formal acceptance of a standard for use in direct procurement, as a reference in another document, or as guidance in its design, manufacturing, testing, or support activities.  Adoption of biometric standards is a crucial component of a successful implementation of biometric technologies.  Common biometric standards should be used throughout DoD to facilitate interoperability and data sharing within DoD, the federal government, and foreign partners.  As new standards are published, these standards must be evaluated and possibly adopted by DoD.\n\nA.1  DoD DISR Overview In 2004, the DISR officially replaced the Joint Technical Architecture in compliance with the\n2004 *Memorandum for DoD Executive Agent for Information Technology Standards* and in accordance with DoD Directives 4350.5 and 5101.7.  The DISR serves as a central repository for DoD-approved information technology standards, including biometric standards.  Use of the DISR is mandated for the development and acquisition of new or modified fielded IT and National Security Systems throughout the DoD. To support the adoption of biometric standards, the BSWG selects published standards based on priorities identified by the DoD Biometrics Community of Interest and submits formal Change Requests to the DISR. A.2  Criteria for Submission of Standards to the DISR\nStandards must successfully satisfy the following criteria for submission and acceptance into the DISR:  net-centricity, interoperability, technical maturity, implementability, publicly available, consistent with authoritative sources, and applicability to DoD.  The standards selection criteria focus on mandating only those items critical to net-centricity and interoperability (Reference s).\n\n-\nNet-centric Interoperability - How does this technology provide users the ability to access\napplications and services through Web services (an information environment composed\nof interoperable computing and communication components)?\n-\nTechnical Maturity - How technically mature and stable is the standard?  Does it have\nstrong support in the commercial marketplace?  What commercial products exist for this\nstandard?  How long has this standard been used?  Is a follow-on standard in\ndevelopment?  When is its estimated completion date?  Should the sunset status be added\nto the current mandated status?\n-\nPublic Availability - To what URL can a system developer go to get a copy of the\nstandard?  Is a copy of the standard free, or must it be purchased?\n-\nImplementability - Who specifically in DoD or the Intelligence Community is using this\nstandard?  What specific commercial organizations have developed implementations of\nthis standard?\n-\nAuthoritative - What standards body developed and now maintains this standard?  Is it an\ninternational, national, or military standard?  What is the process for maintaining and\ndeveloping this standard?  Is the process open or closed?\n-\nApplicability - Is the standard applicable to the entire DoD?  The standard must have\nDepartment-wide applicability since, under the Clinger-Cohen Amendment, the DoD\nChief Information Officer has authority to \"ensure that information technology and\nnational security systems standards that will apply throughout the Department of Defense\nare prescribed.\"  This would preclude mandates for Component-unique standards or\nduplicate standards for the same capability that are not interoperable.\nEach standard accepted to the DISR is assigned a status, which is one of the following:\n\n-\nEmerging standards - candidate standards to help the program manager determine\nthose areas likely to change within three years and to suggest those areas in which\n\"upgradeability\" should be a concern.  They may be implemented, but shall not be\nused in lieu of a mandated standard without a waiver.  An emerging standard is\nexpected to be elevated to mandatory status within three years.  Those that continue\nin an emerging status for longer than three years will require justification.\n-\nMandated standards - essential for providing interoperability and net-centric services\nacross the DoD enterprise.  They are the minimum set of essential standards for\nimplementation in the acquisition of all DoD systems that produce, use, or exchange\ninformation and, when implemented, facilitate the flow of information in support of\nthe warfighter.  These standards are mandated for the management, development, and\nacquisition of new or improving systems throughout the DoD.\nAppendix B:  Data Collection for Non-Standardized Modalities\n\nCurrently, there are no published national or international standards for voice or DNA biometric\ndata.  The following sub-sections provide recommendations based on the practices existing\nwithin the DoD.\nB.1  Voice Recording Samples B.1.1  Equipment\n- A dedicated microphone(s) shall be used.  Microphones built in to a laptop, personal\ndigital assistant, or similar device shall not be used.\n- Voice sample capture equipment should implement a software interface that complies with\nBioAPI 1.1 (Reference c).\n\nB.1.2  Sample Capture\n- Microphone(s) shall be positioned 6 to 12 inches from the person.\n- The person shall read a prepared script no less than 30 seconds in length in his native\nlanguage and speaking style.\n- If possible, multiple voice samples should be collected from each person on different days\nand at differing times of the day (e.g., morning, mid-day, and evening).\n- Voice samples shall be collected in an indoor location relatively free of background noise.\nThe room used for voice data collection shall use materials such as carpeting, cubicle\nwalls, blankets, or similar materials to suppress reflective noise and echo effects.\n\nB.1.3  Formatting\n- Captured voice files shall be formatted in a .wav file format defined in ISO/IEC 13818 -\nGeneric coding of moving pictures and associated audio information (Reference m).\n- Formatted voice files shall be embedded in a CBEFF Patron Format (Reference j).\n- Voice files embedded in a CBEFF Patron Format should make use of one of the CBEFF\nPatron Formats that are being commonly used or are required by the specific application.\nSpecial consideration should be given to the Patron Format specified in section 6 of NIST\nSpecial Publication 800-76 (Reference l) or to the BioAPI 1.1 storage format (Format C -\nThe BioAPI BIR) specified in Annex C of CBEFF (Reference j).\n\nB.2  DNA Samples\nThis section describes the requirements for the collection of biological material suitable for transfer, temporary storage, and DNA analysis for use in federal counter-terrorism investigations and operations, to include military support for the Global War on Terrorism.  These samples may be tested by short tandem repeat marker systems that include the 13 Combined DNA Index System loci.  These samples may also undergo mitochondrial DNA analysis, Y-chromosomal analysis, or other forensic testing as deemed appropriate by the Joint Federal Agencies Antiterrorism DNA Database working group, which consists of members drawn from the DoD\nand federal law enforcement and intelligence communities.  The FBI DNA Advisory Board,\n\"Quality assurance standards for Forensic DNA Testing Laboratories and for Convicted\n\nOffender DNA Databasing Laboratories\" (Reference g) provides additional information on\nrequirements and quality assurance metrics for DNA testing. U.S. military units shall collect two buccal (intra-oral cheek) swabs from each person.\nCollection Personnel shall collect one swab from the inside of each cheek (right and left).  The\nperson must not have consumed food or drink; chewed gum; or chewed, dipped, or smoked\ntobacco or any other products for at least 15 minutes prior to the DNA sample being collected. B.2.1  Collection and Labeling\n- DoD personnel shall label each container of two swabs with the person's name, the date\nand location of acquisition, and the name and unit of the individual responsible for the\ncollection.  The containers must be labeled using a permanent marker or pen.\n- DoD personnel shall collect DNA samples using a sterile cotton-tipped applicator for the\nbuccal swabs.  Briskly rub the inside of the person's inner cheek up and down 10 times\nwith the buccal swab, concentrating on scraping cells from the oral mucosa, (inner cheek)\nnot just collecting saliva.\n- The two swabs should be air dried for at least thirty minutes when possible prior to\nrepackaging and transport.  DoD personnel shall place the dried oral swabs in a properly\nlabeled paper envelope or paper box (never plastic) and seal with evidence tape.  Gloves\nshould be worn when packaging the swabs.\n\nB.2.2  Transfer to Laboratory\n- U.S. military units shall maintain a chain of custody for each pair of swabs using\nappropriate documentation and procedures or similar document.\n- It is important that all individuals handling the DNA samples use gloves and avoid direct\nskin, hair, or breath contact that might contaminate the samples.\n- Combatant Commands shall establish written procedures to transfer persons' swabs to the\nFBI.  DoD and the federal law enforcement and intelligence communities cooperatively\nprocess the swabs.\n- The DoD shall maintain DNA profiles in a joint database that shall be traceable to the\nperson's other biometric information.\n\n## Appendix C:  References\n\na. Electronic Fingerprint Transmission Specification (EFTS), version 7.1, May 2, 2005,\nhttp://www.fbi.gov/hq/cjisd/iafis/efts71/efts71.pdf.\nb. \"Products certified for compliance with the FBI Integrated Automated Fingerprint Identification\nSystem image quality specifications,\" http://www.fbi.gov/hq/cjisd/iafis/cert.htm.\nc. ANSI INCITS 358-2002, \"BioAPI Specification (Version 1.1).\"\nd. ANSI INCITS 381-2004, \"Finger Image Based Data Interchange Format\" (This standard is\ncopyrighted, and licensed copies are available from the Biometrics Task Foce (BTF)).\ne. ANSI INCITS 385-2004, \"Face Recognition Format for Data Interchange\" (This standard is\ncopyrighted, and licensed copies are available from the BTF).\nf. ANSI INCITS 379-2004, \"Iris Image Interchange Format\" (This standard is copyrighted, and\nlicensed copies are available from the BTF).\ng. Federal Bureau of Investigation DNA Advisory Board, \"Quality assurance standards for Forensic\nDNA Testing Laboratories and for Convicted Offender DNA Databasing Laboratories,\" Jul 00,\nhttp://www.fbi.gov/hq/lab/fsc/backissu/july2000/codispre.htm.\nh. ANSI INCITS 378-2004, \"Finger Minutiae Format for Data Interchange.\"\ni. ANSI INCITS 377-2004, \"Finger Pattern Data Interchange Format.\"\nj. ANSI INCITS 398-2005/NISTIR 6529-A, \"Common Biometric Exchange Framework Format\n(CBEFF).\"\nk. DoD Electronic Biometric Transmission Specification (EBTS), version 1.1, 23 Aug 05,\nhttp://www.biometrics.dod.mil/Documents/DoD_ABIS_EBTS.pdf.\nl. NIST Special Publication 800-76, http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-76/sp800-76.pdf. m. ISO/IEC 13818, \"Generic Coding Method of Moving Pictures and of Associated Sound\" for\nvarious applications such as digital storage media, television broadcasting, and communication.\nn. ANSI INCITS 396-2005, \"Hand Geometry Format for Data Interchange.\"\no. \"Capstone Concept of Operations For DoD Biometrics In Support Of Identity Superiority,\"\n(version 1.0).\np. ANSI/NIST ITL 1-2000, American National Standards Institute/National Institute of Standards\nand Technology (ANSI/NIST), \"Data Format for the Interchange of Fingerprint, Facial, & Scar\nMark & Tattoo (SMT) Information,\" Sep 00,\nftp://sequoyah.nist.gov/pub/nist_internal_reports/sp500-245-a16.pdf.\nq. NIST Finger Image Quality (NFIQ) Tool, NISTIR 7151, \"Fingerprint Image Quality,\" Aug 04, by\nElham Tabassi, Charles L. Wilson, and Craig I. Watson.\nr. DoD Finger Image Quality Measurement (FIQM) Tool, \"Fingerprint Image Quality Measurement\nAlgorithm,\" Jan 06, by Dr. Joseph Guzman and Robert Yen.\ns. Department of Defense, \"Standard Operating Procedures for the Information Technology\nStandards Committee (ITSC) and Its Technical Working Groups (TWGs),\" Dec 04.\nt. IETF RFC 2630 Cryptographic Message Syntax, R. Housley, June 1999.\nu. IETF RFC 3852 Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS), R. Housley, July 2004.\nv. IETF RFC 2633 S/MIME Version 3 Message Specification, B. Ramsdell, Ed., June 1999.\nw. IETF RFC 3851 Secure/Multipurpose Internet Mail Extensions (S/MIME) Version 3.1\nMessage Specification, B. Ramsdell, Ed., July 2004.\nx. IETF RFC 2246 The TLS Protocol Version 1.0. T. Dierks, C. Allen, January 1999.\ny. IETF RFC 4346 The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.1, T. Dierks, E.\nRescorla, April 2006.\nz. IETF RFC 2228 FTP Security Extensions, M. Horowitz, S. Lunt, October 1997.\naa. IETF RFC 2402 IP Authentication Header, S. Kent, R. Atkinson, November 1998.\nbb. IETF RFC 4302 IP Authentication Header, S. Kent, December 2005.\ncc. IETF RFC 2406 IP Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP), S. Kent, R. Atkinson, November\n1998.\ndd. IETF RFC 4303 IP Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP), S. Kent, December 2005.\nee. IETF RFC 2409 The Internet Key Exchange (IKE), D. Harkins, D. Carrel, November 1998.\nff. IETF RFC 4306 Internet Key Exchange (IKEv2) Protocol, C. Kaufman, Ed., December\n2005.\ngg. ANSI X9.84-2003, \"Biometric Information Management and Security for the Financial\nServices Industry\"\nhh. ISO/IEC 19794-4 \"Biometric Data Interchange Formats - Part 4:  Finger Image Data\"\nii. ISO/IEC 19794-2 \"Biometric Data Interchange Formats - Part 2:  Finger Minutiae Data\"\njj. ISO/IEC 19794-5 \"Biometric Data Interchange Formats - Part 5:  Face Image Data\"\nkk. ISO/IEC 19794-6 \"Biometric Data Interchange Formats - Part 6:  Iris Image Data\"\nll. \"National Science and Technology Council (NSTC) Biometrics Standards (BS) Interagency\nCoordination Plan (ICP),\" Current copies of this document are obtained by request at the\ndiscretion of the Director of the BTF.\nmm.\nT. Ylonen and S. Lehtinen, SSH File Transfer Protocol, draft-ietf-secsh-filexfer-00.txt,\nJanuary 2001, work in progress material.\nnn. ANSI INCITS 395-2005 \"Biometric Data Interchange Formats - Signature/Sign Data\""
    },
    {
        "text": "# Directorate General For Internal Policies Policy Department C: Citizens' Rights And Constitutional Affairs Civil Liberties, Justice And Home Affairs\n\n\n\n# Parliamentary Oversight Of Security And Intelligence Agencies In The European Union\n\n## Study\n\nAbstract\n\nThis study evaluates the oversight of national security and intelligence agencies by parliaments and specialised non-parliamentary oversight bodies, with a view to identifying good practices that can inform the European Parliament's approach to strengthening the oversight of Europol, Eurojust, Frontex and, to a lesser extent, Sitcen. The study puts forward a series of detailed recommendations (including in the field of access to classified information) that are formulated on the basis of indepth assessments of: (1) the current functions and powers of these four bodies; (2) existing arrangements for the oversight of these bodies by the European Parliament, the Joint Supervisory Bodies and national parliaments; and (3) the legal and institutional frameworks for parliamentary and specialised oversight of security and intelligence agencies in EU Member States and other major democracies.\n\nThis document was requested by the European Parliament's Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs.\n\nAUTHORS\nAidan WILLS, Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF)\nMathias VERMEULEN, European University Institute (EUI) Hans BORN, Project Leader, DCAF Martin SCHEININ, Project Leader, EUI Micha WIEBUSCH, Research Assistant, DCAF\nAshley THORNTON, Language Consultant RESPONSIBLE ADMINISTRATOR\nAndreas HARTMANN Policy Department C: Citizens' Rights and Constitutional Affairs European Parliament B-1047 Bruxelles E-mail: andreas.hartmann@europarl.europa.eu LINGUISTIC VERSIONS\nOriginal: EN\nABOUT THE EDITOR\nTo contact the Policy Department or to subscribe to its newsletter please write to:\npoldep-citizens@europarl.europa.eu Manuscript completed in June 2011.  European Parliament, Brussels, 2011. This document is available on the Internet at: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/activities/committees/studies.do?language=EN http://www.ipolnet.ep.parl.union.eu/ipolnet/cms DISCLAIMER\nThe opinions expressed in this document are the sole responsibility of the authors and do not necessarily represent the official position of the European Parliament. Reproduction and translation for non-commercial purposes are authorized, provided the source is acknowledged and the publisher is given prior notice and sent a copy.\n\n## Contents\n\n\n\nCONTENTS\n3\nLIST OF ABBREVIATIONS\n7\nLIST OF TABLES\n14\nEXECUTIVE SUMMARY\n15\nCHAPTER 1.\nINTRODUCTION\n38\n1.1. Mandate\n38\n1.2. Aim and structure of the study\n39\n1.3. Methodology\n40\n1.4. Relevance of parliamentary oversight of security sector agencies\n41\n1.5. Defining oversight\n41\n1.6. National intelligence agencies v. the EU's AFSJ bodies\n42\nCHAPTER 2.\nTHE EUROPEAN UNION'S AREA OF FREEDOM, SECURITY AND\nJUSTICE BODIES\n44\n2.1. Europol\n44\n2.1.1.\nLegal basis and main tasks\n44\n2.1.2.\nPowers\n46\n2.1.3.\nRelationships with third parties\n48\n2.2. Eurojust\n49\n2.2.1.\nLegal basis and main tasks\n49\n2.2.2.\nPowers\n50\n2.2.3.\nRelations with third parties\n51\n2.3. Frontex\n52\n2.3.1.\nLegal basis and mandate\n52\n2.3.2.\nPowers\n52\n2.3.3.\nRelations with third parties\n53\n2.4. The EU's Situation Centre (Sitcen)\n54\n2.4.1.\nLegal basis and main tasks\n54\n2.4.2.\nPowers\n56\n2.4.3.\nRelationship with third parties\n57\n2.5. Conclusion\n57\nCHAPTER 3.\nPARLIAMENTARY AND SPECIALISED OVERSIGHT OF THE\nEU's AFSJ BODIES\n60\n3.1. The Joint Supervisory Bodies for Europol and Eurojust\n60\n3.1.1.\nComposition\n61\n3.1.2.\nPowers\n62\n3.2. National parliaments' role in overseeing the AFSJ bodies\n64\n3.2.1.\nLegal framework at the EU level\n64\n3.2.2.\nLegal framework at the national level\n65\n3.3. The role of the European Parliament in overseeing the AFSJ bodies\n67\n3.3.1.\nThe European Parliament's access to classified information\n68\n3.3.2.\nOversight mechanisms of the European Parliament\n74\n3.4. Conclusion\n80\nCHAPTER 4.\nPARLIAMENTARY AND SPECIALISED OVERSIGHT OF\nNATIONAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES\n84\n4.1. Introduction\n84\n4.1.1.\nThe rationale for oversight of intelligence agencies\n85\n4.2. Systems for intelligence oversight\n86\n4.2.1.\nGeneral parliamentary committees\n87\n4.2.2.\nSpecialised parliamentary committees\n87\n4.2.3.\nSpecialised non-parliamentary oversight bodies\n90\n4.3. Organisation of specialised oversight bodies\n96\n4.3.1.\nComposition of parliamentary oversight committees\n96\n4.3.2.\nChairpersonship of parliamentary oversight committees\n97\n4.3.3.\nComposition of non-parliamentary oversight bodies\n97\n4.3.4.\nSelection of members of specialised oversight bodies\n98\n4.3.5.\nResources\n100\n4.4. Mandate and functions of specialised oversight bodies\n101\n4.4.1.\nGeneral mandate\n101\n4.4.2.\nSpecific oversight functions\n106\n4.4.3.\nOversight of selected activities of intelligence agencies\n109\n4.5. Access to classified information by parliaments and specialised oversight bodies\n\n117\n4.5.1.\nAccess to information by parliaments\n117\n4.5.2.\nAccess to classified information by specialised oversight bodies\n121\n4.5.3.\nRestrictions on access to information\n123\n4.5.4.\nProactive disclosure of information to oversight bodies\n129\n4.6. Methods and powers of specialised oversight bodies\n131\n4.6.1.\nOwn-initiative investigations\n132\n4.6.2.\nPowers to ensure access to classified information by overseers\n133\n4.7. Protection of information handled by specialised oversight bodies\n137\n\n4.7.1.\n\nMeasures to ensure appropriate persons are appointed to oversight bodies 138\n\n4.7.2.\nPenalties\nfor\nunauthorised\ndisclosure\nof\nclassified\nor\notherwise\nconfidential information\n142\n4.7.3.\nPhysical measures to protect classified information\n143\n4.8. Conclusion\n144\n\n## Chapter 5. Recommendations For Strengthening Oversight Of The Afsj Bodies By The European Parliament 146\n\n5.1. Introduction\n146\n5.2. Limitations on the scope of the European Parliament's oversight of the AFSJ\nbodies\n147\n5.3. The European Parliament's oversight mandate and functions\n148\n5.3.1.\nOversight of the finances of the AFSJ agencies\n149\n5.3.2.\nKeeping the European Parliament informed about security threats\n150\n5.3.3.\nThe European Parliament's relationship with the Joint Supervisory Bodies\n\n151\n5.3.4.\nStandardisation of the European Parliament's right to summon the\ndirectors of AFSJ agencies\n152\n5.3.5.\nOversight of the appointment of agency directors\n152\n5.3.6.\nA role for the European Parliament in providing assessments on the\nhuman rights records of AFSJ bodies' cooperation partners\n154\n5.3.7.\nA role for the European Parliament in reviewing the AFSJ bodies'\ninformation sharing agreements and memoranda of understanding\n155\n5.4. Access to and the protection of classified information\n155\n5.4.1.\nImproving the European Parliament's access to classified information in\nthe AFSJ\n156\n5.4.2.\nThe protection of information handled by the European Parliament\n161\n5.5. Oversight mechanisms\n162\n5.5.1.\nThe performance of additional oversight functions by the LIBE Committee\n\n164\n5.5.2.\nSpecial committee options for the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice\n(AFSJ) 165\n5.5.3.\nCreation of a LIBE Sub-Committee for the oversight of the AFSJ agencies\n\n169\n5.5.4.\nStrengthening cooperation between the European Parliament and\nnational parliaments in the oversight of AFSJ agencies\n172\n5.6. Summary of recommendations\n175\nREFERENCES\n177\nANNEX A: COUNTRY CASE STUDIES ON PARLIAMENTARY AND\nSPECIALISED OVERSIGHT OF SECURITY AND INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES IN EU MEMBER STATES AND OTHER MAJOR DEMOCRACIES\n190\nANNEX B: THEMATIC STUDIES ON OVERSIGHT OF THE EUROPEAN UNION'S\nAREA OF FREEDOM, SECURITY AND JUSTICE (AFSJ) BODIES\n350\nANNEX C: QUESTIONNAIRE FOR OVERSIGHT INSTITUTIONS OF CIVILIAN\nSECURITY AND INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES IN EU MEMBER STATES\n412\nANNEX D: MEMBERS OF THE PROJECT ADVISORY BOARD\n440\nANNEX E: AUTHORS OF THE ANNEXED BACKGROUND STUDIES\n441\n\n\n## List Of Abbreviations\n\nAAI *Autorites Administratives Independantes* (France)\nAFET Committee on Foreign Affairs, Fundamental Rights and Common\nSecurity and Defence Policy (EU)\nAFSJ Area of Freedom, Security and Justice (EU)\nAIC Australian Intelligence Community\nAISE External Information and Security Agency (Italy)\nAISI Internal Information and Security Agency (Italy)\nANAO Australian National Audit Office\nASIO Australian Security Intelligence Organisation\nASIS Australian Secret Intelligence Service\n\n## Awfs Analysis Work Files\n\nBfV *Bundesamt fur Verfassungsschutz*/Federal Office for the Protection\nof the Constitution (Germany)\nBND *Bundesnachrichtendienst*/Federal Intelligence Service (Germany)\nBNDG *Gesetz uber den Bundesnachrichtendienst*/Federal Intelligence\nService Act (Germany)\nBVerfSchG *Bundesverfassungsschutzgesetz*/Federal Protection of the\nConstitution Act (Germany)\nBUDG EP's Committee on Budgets\nCATS Article 36 Committee (EU)\nCBO Congressional Budget Office (USA)\nCCSDN Commission consultative du secret de la defense nationale\n(France)\nCEPOL European Police College\nCFSP Common Foreign and Security Policy (EU)\nCIA Central Intelligence Agency (USA)\nCIC Civilian Intelligence Cell (EU)\nCIS Customs Information System\n\nCISR Inter-Ministerial Committee for the Security of the Republic (Italy)\nCJEU Court of Justice of the European Union\nCMS Case Management System\nCNCIS Commission nationale de controle des interceptions de securite\n(France)\nCNI National Intelligence Centre (Spain)\nCNIL *Commission nationale de l'informatique et des libertes* (France)\nComCen Communications Unit (EU)\n\nCONT Committee on Budgetary Control (EU)\nCOPACO Parliamentary Control Committee (Italy)\nCOPASIR Parliamentary Committee for the Security of the Republic (Italy)\nCOSAC Conference of national parliaments' European Affairs Committees\nCOSI Standing Committee on Operational Security (EU)\nCPC Commission of Public Complaints (Canada)\nCRS Congressional Research Service (USA)\nCSDP Common Security and Defence Policy\nCSIS Canadian Security Intelligence Service\nCTIVD Dutch Review Committee on the Intelligence and Security Services\nCUTA Coordination Unit for Threat Assessment (Belgium)\nCTIVD Intelligence and Security Services Review Committee\n(Netherlands)\nDCAF Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces\nDCRI *Direction centrale du renseignement interieur* (France)\nDGPN French National Police DGSE *Direction generale de la securite exterieure* (France)\nDHS Department of Homeland Security (USA)\nDIGO Defence Imagery and Geospatial Organisation (Australia)\nDIO Defence Intelligence Organisation (Australia)\nDIS Department of Security Intelligence (Italy)\nDPO Data Protection Officer (EU)\nDPR *Delegation parlementaire au renseignement* (France)\nDSD Defence Signals Directorate (Australia)\nEASO European Asylum Support Office ECHR European Convention on Human Rights ECtHR European Court of Human Rights EDPS European Data Protection Supervisor\nEEAS European External Action Service EIRAN European Intelligence Review Agencies Knowledge Network EP European Parliament EPP European Public Prosecutor's Office ESDP European Security and Defence Policy ETA *Euskadi Ta Askatasuna* (Spain)\nEU European Union EUCI European Union Classified Information EUI European University Institute\nEURODAC European Dactyloscopy (fingerprint database)\nEurojust EU's Judicial Cooperation Unit Europol European Police Office FBI Federal Bureau of Investigation (USA)\nFRA Defence Radio Establishment (Sweden)\n\nFrontex European agency for the coordination of operational cooperation at\nthe external borders of the EU\nFUD Defence Intelligence Court (Sweden)\nG10 Gesetz zur Beschrankung des Brief-, Post- und\nFernmeldegeheimnisses/Article 10 Act (Germany)\nGAO Government Accountability Office (USA)\nGCHQ Government Communications Headquarters (UK)\nGG *Grundgesetz*/the Basic Law (Germany)\nGISS General Intelligence and Security Service (Netherlands) GISS General Intelligence and Security Service of the Armed Forces\n(Belgium)\nGOU General Operations Unit (EU)\nHB Herri Batasuna (Spain)\nIGIS Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security (Australia)\nISA Intelligence Services Act 1994 (UK)\nIPEX Interparliamentary EU Exchange Information Network\nIPT Investigatory Powers Tribunal (UK)\nIS Europol Information System\nISC Intelligence and Security Committee (UK)\nITAC Integrated Threat Assessment Centre (Canada)\nJHA Justice and Home Affairs\nJITs Joint Investigation Teams (EU)\nJSB Joint Supervisory Body (EU)\nJTAC Joint Terrorism Analysis Centre (UK)\nJuU Committee on the Administration of Justice (Sweden)\nKU Committee on the Constitution (Sweden)\nLIBE Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs (EU)\n\nMI5 Security Service (UK)\nMI6 Secret Intelligence Service (UK)\nMAD *Militarischer Abschirmdienst*/Military Counterintelligence Service\n(Germany)\nMADG *Gesetz uber den Militarischen Abschirmdienst*/Military\nCounterintelligence Service Act (Germany)\nMEP Member of the European Parliament\nMISS Defence Intelligence and Security Service (Netherlands)\nMP Member of Parliament\nNATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization\nNCTb National Coordinator for Counterterrorism (Netherlands)\nNICC National Intelligence Coordination Committee (Australia)\nNPB National Police Board (Sweden)\nNSC National Security Committee (Hungary)\nNSA National Security Agency (USA)\nNSB National Supervisory Body (EU)\nNSC National Security Committee of the Department of Prime Minister\nand Cabinet (Australia)\nOCHA Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs\nOC Organised Crime\nOCTA Organised Crime Threat Assessment (EU)\nOCTA-WA Organised Crime Threat Assessment on West Africa (Europol)\nOLAF European Anti-Fraud Office\nONA Office of National Assessments (Australia)\nPDA Police Data Act (Sweden)\nPJCIS Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security\n(Australia)\nPKGrG Gesetz uber die parlamentarische Kontrolle nachrichtendienstlicher\nTatigkeit des Bundes/Parliamentary Scrutiny of Federal Intelligence\nActivities Act (Germany)\nRCMP Royal Canadian Mounted Police\nRIPA Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 (UK)\nROCTA Organised Crime Threat Assessment on Russia (Europol)\nRoP Rules of Procedure\nSAKINT Swedish Committee on Security and Integrity Protection\nSCAN Europol's Scanning, Analysis & Notification System\nSDECE Service de documentation exterieure et de contre-espionnage\n(France)\nSEDE Committee on Foreign Affairs Sub-Committee of Defence (EU)\nSIN Commission on Security and Integrity Protection (Sweden)\nSIRC Security Intelligence Review Committee (Canada)\nSIS Schengen Information System\nSIS II Second generation Schengen Information System\nSitcen Situation Centre (EU)\nSIUN Defence Intelligence Inspection (Sweden)\nSNE Seconded National Experts\nSOCTA Serious and Organised Crime Threat Assessment\nSWIFT Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication\nTDIP Temporary Committee on the alleged use of European countries by\nthe CIA for the transport and illegal detention of prisoners\nTESAT Terrorism Situation and Trend Reports (EU)\nTFEU Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union\nTFTP EU Terrorist Finance Tracking Programme\nToR Terms of Reference\nUMP Union for a Popular Movement\n__________________________________________________________________________________________\nUN United Nations UNHCR United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees UNICEF United Nations Children's Fund\nUNICRI United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute UNODC United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime VIS Visa Information System\n\n\n## ___________________________________________________________________________________ List Of Tables Table 1\n\nSpecialised committees responsible for the oversight of intelligence agencies ..... 92\n\n\n## Table 2\n\nActivities and processes of intelligence agencies that are overseen by specialised committees........ 115\n\n\n## Table 3\n\nParliamentary access to classified information in the field of national security ... 119\n\n\n## Table 4\n\nThe scope of access to classified information by specialised oversight committees\n........ 127\n\n\n## Table 5\n\nThe powers and methods available to specialised oversight committees........ 134\n\n\n## Table 6\n\nSecurity clearance for members and staff of specialised oversight committees.. 140\n\n\n## Executive Summary\n\n The European Parliament's Directorate-General for Internal Policies mandated the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF) and the European Union Institute (EUI) to carry out a study on 'parliamentary oversight of intelligence agencies in relevant EU Member States and other major democracies'. This study was expected to 'identify democratic standards and best practice as well as a proper balance between the demands of secrecy and the need for scrutiny which can be used by the European Parliament (EP) when it sets up its own oversight body'. Following consultations with the EP's Directorate General for Internal Policies, it was decided to interpret this mandate against the backdrop of four important trends and developments which have prompted a discussion on how the EP can strengthen oversight of the EU's AFSJ agencies, as well as the European Union's Situation Centre (Sitcen)1 which plays a role in the Area of Freedom Security and Justice (AFSJ): (1) The Treaty of Lisbon gives the EP and national parliaments a mandate to strengthen their oversight of two AFSJ bodies: Europol and Eurojust. It explicitly provides for the new regulations on Europol and Eurojust to include provisions on parliamentary 'scrutiny' (in the case of Europol) and 'evaluation' (in the case of Eurojust). Within the next two years, the Commission will put forward proposals for these regulations; the EP will have the opportunity to ensure that this legislation includes appropriate provisions on parliamentary oversight. In addition, the fact that the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice is now subject to the standard legislative procedure means that the EP is now better placed to ensure that new or revised legal frameworks for the AFSJ agencies include provisions on parliamentary oversight. Indeed, it has already done so in a draft regulation on Frontex, which, at the time of writing, was under discussion. (2) The EP may have some opportunities to address the work of Sitcen, which performs a number of functions pertaining to internal security, because it is now part of the European External Action Service (EEAS). While the EEAS (and thus Sitcen) falls under the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), which is an intergovernmental policy area, the Treaty of Lisbon gives the EP some new powers in this area. (3) There have been important developments in the area of access to information, which are intrinsically linked to strengthening oversight of the AFSJ bodies. In 2010, the EP and Commission concluded a new inter-institutional agreement, which significantly improves the EP's access to information from the Commission. In addition, the EP is currently considering the revision of the EU's legislation on access to information, as well as the possibility of a new inter-institutional agreement with the Council, which would include provisions on parliamentary access to classified information. The trajectory of these ongoing discussions will have profound implications for the EP's oversight of AFSJ bodies. (4) More generally, over the past decade, the EP has developed a growing interest in both national security agencies and AFSJ bodies. This has been evidenced by its strong interest in the development of the new regulation on Frontex, the Europol and Eurojust decisions, as well as two temporary committees that examined the activities of national security agencies and made important recommendations in regard to oversight. On the basis of this interpretation of the mandate, the primary aim of this study is to provide a comparative assessment of the oversight of intelligence agencies in European Union member states and other democracies, with the aim of identifying good practices that can inform the debate on strengthening oversight of the AFSJ bodies by the European Parliament. This study focuses on Europol, Frontex and Eurojust as well as Sitcen. Broadly speaking, the role of these AFSJ bodies is to facilitate, coordinate and strengthen cooperation between national authorities with the aim of promoting security and justice within the EU.\n\nArguably the defining feature of the national intelligence agencies2 is their power to use what are known as 'special powers' to collect information, such as the powers to intercept communications, conduct covert surveillance, use secret informants, and even enter dwellings surreptitiously. The AFSJ bodies do not possess such powers, and when juxtaposed alongside this description, it is evident that the EU's AFSJ bodies are not intelligence agencies in the way that they are conceptualised at the national level. In view of the fact the EP is interested in strengthening oversight of these bodies, a mandate to study and draw lessons from the oversight of national 'intelligence agencies' may appear to be an unusual choice. Nevertheless, the AFSJ bodies and national intelligence agencies share a number of characteristics. They perform 'intelligence functions' of national intelligence agencies, albeit not necessarily in the same way or for the same purpose. Notably, they collect (though without recourse to special powers), analyse and disseminate information to a range of decision makers. Another important similarity between the AFSJ bodies and national intelligence agencies is that they too receive, produce and disseminate classified information. This has important implications for oversight because overseers need access to classified information in order to scrutinise the work of agencies whose activities are\n'classified' and/or entail the use of classified information, which is an area where the EP can learn much from national systems of oversight. We should, however, remain cautious about the 'portability' of oversight models and practices from the national to the EU level given that national overseers and the EP scrutinise agencies with very different mandates and powers. Oversight has to be understood in the context of the organisations which are being overseen. This study is comprised of five chapters. The first discusses the aims, mandate and methodology of the study. The second chapter provides an overview of the legal basis, mandate and current powers of Europol, Eurojust, Frontex and Sitcen, and identifies several areas of these bodies' work that might raise concerns from the point of view of oversight. The third chapter anaylses the EP's existing role and powers for overseeing the AFSJ bodies, as well as the scope of its access to information from (and pertaining to) these bodies. This chapter also examines the role of national parliaments in overseeing the AFSJ bodies, as well as the role of the Joint Supervisory Bodies (JSBs) of Europol and Eurojust in scrutinising these agencies' use of personal data. Chapter four provides a detailed comparative assessment of how parliamentary and specialised non-parliamentary oversight is organised and carried out on a national level. This section will pay particular attention to access to information by parliamentary and non-parliamentary oversight bodies. The final chapter of the study outlines a series of options for consolidating and strengthening oversight of Europol, Eurojust, Frontex and Sitcen by the European Parliament. This executive summary will focus on providing an overview of this chapter, including its twenty-two recommendations to the European Parliament.\n\n## Recommendations For Strengthening The European Parliament's Oversight Of The Afsj Bodies\n\n This study provides detailed recommendations which might be useful for the forthcoming debate on how the European Parliament's oversight of the AFSJ bodies could be strengthened. Some of these recommendations apply to the EP's oversight of all AFSJ bodies discussed in this study (i.e. Europol, Eurojust, Frontex and Sitcen); however, most focus exclusively on the AFSJ agencies (i.e. Europol, Eurojust, Frontex). This is because the EP has an explicit treaty mandate to oversee Eurojust and Europol, and will be a colegislator for new regulations on these agencies and Frontex. The development of parliamentary oversight of the Sitcen will have to proceed along a different track because Sitcen falls under the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), an area in which the EP has fewer powers. The recommendations pertain to the oversight of the AFSJ bodies as they exist in May 2011. It is essential that oversight arrangements are developed in tandem with any changes to the mandates and powers of these bodies, and should remain commensurate with the activities being overseen. In developing legal and institutional frameworks for parliamentary oversight of the AFSJ bodies the EP and other relevant stakeholders should remain mindful that oversight arrangements should not have the effect of dissuading member states from using these bodies to cooperate in the AFSJ.  Most EU member states are now convinced of the added value that agencies such as Europol and Eurojust can have in supporting their own work. Yet, there is a risk that if oversight arrangements place too great a burden on the AFSJ\nbodies and/or national authorities, some member states may simply revert to bilateral channels of cooperation, which are less heavily regulated and perhaps not subject to the same levels of scrutiny. Any moves in this direction would undermine the capacity of the AFSJ bodies to contribute successfully to promoting freedom, justice and security in the EU.\n\nRecommendation 1: The European Parliament should ensure that any new arrangements for the oversight of the AFSJ bodies do not serve to dissuade member states from using these bodies as platforms for cooperation.\n\n\n## Limitations On The Scope Of The European Parliament's Oversight Of The Afsj Bodies\n\n This study highlights several factors which should serve to limit the scope of the EP's oversight of the AFSJ bodies. These primarily relate to oversight of the AFSJ bodies'\noperational activities. Firstly, the intergovernmental nature of the AFSJ bodies and the relationship between actions of the AFSJ bodies and Member States has important implications for oversight. Member States' police, prosecutorial, border (and to a much lesser extent) intelligence agencies are both the principal suppliers and the main customers of the AFSJ bodies. The AFSJ bodies function primarily on the basis of information provided by national agencies and their principal output is information and analysis that is sent to these agencies. National agencies may take action, including the use of coercive powers, on the basis of such information, including within the context of operations coordinated by an AFSJ body such as Europol or Frontex. As is discussed in chapter two of the study, such action remains the exclusive responsibility of national authorities. The implication of this is that both the inputs to AFSJ bodies and actions taken on the basis of the outputs of these bodies are regulated by national law and should be overseen by appropriate national authorities. It is generally accepted inside the EP and in Member States that it is not the prerogative of the EP to oversee how national agencies collect information that might be shared with AFSJ bodies and/or action undertaken on the basis of information provided by AFSJ bodies.\n\nSecondly, the AFSJ bodies consist of a mix of personnel seconded by the Member States and EU staff members. National liaison officers at Europol, national border guards that participate in a Frontex-coordinated operation, or seconded intelligence officers at Sitcen are paid by Member States and cooperate with the agencies in accordance with national laws. As such, their cooperation with and contributions to an AFSJ body are more appropriately overseen by national oversight mechanisms. This intergovernmental element of the AFSJ bodies requires that the EP works closely with national parliaments in ensuring that appropriate oversight arrangements are in place. Thirdly, Europol and Eurojust are authorised to process, store and transfer personal data within the parameters of their mandates. These are activities which interfere with the right to privacy and may serve as the basis for use of coercive or special powerswhich have particularly significant human rights implicationsby member or third states' authorities. In view of this, these activities clearly need to be subject to oversight by an independent body. Accordingly, the EU has established specialised non-parliamentary oversight bodies the Joint Supervisory Bodies (JSBs) of Europol and Eurojustfor this purpose. The JSBs have access to all files and premises related to the processing of personal data and are in a strong position to ensure that any practices which violate data protection regulations are corrected. In our view, the JSBs are an appropriate oversight mechanism for scrutinising the use of personal data by the AFSJ agencies. Accordingly, their activities do not need to be duplicated by the EP. Equally, the EP would not need to oversee Frontex's future role in processing personal data because it is envisaged that the European Data Protection Supervisor would perform a similar function to the JSBs. There are several other arguments against involving the EP in the oversight of the AFSJ\nbodies' operational activities on an ongoing basis. First, as is noted in chapter four, this is extremely time consuming and requires specialised expertise and resources which many parliaments do not possess. A number of the MEPs and staffers interviewed for this study indicated that the EP would not have the time, resources, or inclination to scrutinise the operational activities of the AFSJ bodies. Oversight can be conducted more effectively by a\n'professional' oversight body, such as the JSBs, that focuses exclusively on the oversight of an agency's operational activities. Second, giving the EP a mandate to oversee information processing would require the parliament to have access to personal data in these files, which would raise significant privacy concerns. Finally, parliamentary scrutiny of the operational aspects of the AFSJ bodies' work might adversely impact upon the effectiveness of these bodies. This is because many states are opposed to giving the EP a role in this regard and may reduce information sharing with the AFSJ bodies if the EP was given such a role.\n\n## The European Parliament's Oversight Mandate And Functions\n\n There was widespread agreement among our interlocutors at various EU institutions and bodies that the EP should play a role in overseeing the AFSJ bodies. Oversight of the AFSJ bodies by parliament and bodies created by parliament is important for reasons that are outlined in chapters one and four. Perhaps most importantly, the EP is now a co-legislator in the AFSJ and will have a pivotal role in defining the future mandate and powers of the AFSJ agencies in particular. Therefore, it is essential that the EP plays a role in ensuring that these agencies fulfil their mandates effectively and in a manner which complies with relevant legislation. In addition, the AFSJ agencies are funded to a large extent with EU funds that are appropriated to them by the EP. As the budgetary authority, the EP must have a role in ensuring that such money is used both correctly and efficiently.\n\nThese rationales for parliamentary oversight of the AFSJ agencies do not, however, imply that the EP should play a role in their management. When discussing the EP's role in the oversight of AFSJ bodies, we should remain mindful of the separation of powers and responsibilities in this regard. This is particularly important in relation to Eurojust because it works with judicial bodies. Oversight of the AFSJ bodies should also not be conflated with controlling or co-managing an agencythis is not the role of a parliament. The AFSJ bodies are meant to serve as repositories of expertise which exist to provide a professional service to the EU and its Member States. It is not the role of parliamentarians to meddle in the management of this work; such functions are primarily the prerogative of the agencies' directors and their management boards. Meanwhile, the Commission and/or Council provide political direction to AFSJ bodies and assume political responsibility for them. For these reasons, the involvement of the EP in matters such as the appointment of management board representatives, or even as part of the management boards of the AFSJ\nagencies is not recommended. Indeed, the involvement of the EP in these decision-making processes would obfuscate its oversight functions, making it extremely difficult to subsequently review independently the actions of agencies and their management boards.\n\nRecommendation 2: The European Parliament should not be part of the management boards of Europol or Frontex, or of the College of Eurojust.\n\nIn chapter four we argue that it is difficult to advocate a 'best' approach or practice in regard to the subject(s) of an oversight body's mandate. Ultimately, what matters is that all dimensions of an intelligence agency's work are overseen by a body which is independent from the agencies and the executive. In the case of the EU, this means independent from the AFSJ bodies, the Council and the Commission. Chapter four of the study illustrates that the 'subject' of oversight can be broadly divided into four areas: operations, policy, administration and finance. In view of the foregoing comments on the role of the JSBs and national authorities in overseeing the operational activities of the AFSJ\nbodies, it is clear that the EP should focus on overseeing the policies, administration and finance of these bodies. This is, however, without prejudice to the EP's powers of inquiry\n(discussed in chapter three), under which the EP could, of course, examine allegations that any activities of these agencies violate EU law.\n\nRecommendation 3: The European Parliament's oversight of the AFSJ agencies should focus on their policies, administration and finance.\n\n## Oversight Of The Finances Of The Afsj Agencies\n\n The EP can make better use of its budgetary appropriation and discharge powers in its oversight of the AFSJ agencies by ensuring a continued link between the oversight of agencies' policies and administration and the approval and discharge of the agencies' budgets. The entire budget cycle requires close cooperation between the LIBE Committee (or any newly created body with a mandate to oversee the AFSJ agencies), the Committee on Budgets (BUDG) and the Committee on Budgetary Control (CONT. There are four main ways in which the EP can effectively continue and improve the use of its budgetary oversight powers in this regard. First, the EP needs to continue to strengthen the cooperation between CONT, BUDG and the LIBE Committee throughout the budget cycle to ensure that there are links between the oversight of the AFSJ agencies' finances and other areas of their work. Second, some members of the LIBE Committee need to be made more aware of the formidable budgetary and discharge powers at the EP's disposal and how LIBE\ncan work with the BUDG and CONT committees to more effectively use these powers in the fulfilment of its mandate. Third, the powers of the purse (both the reserve procedure and the power to withhold or delay discharge of a budget) can be used as a tool for requesting a change in the policies, procedures or activities of the AFSJ agency concerned. Finally, as we mentioned in chapter three, the reserve procedure may, in some exceptional circumstances, be used as a tool to persuade an AFSJ agency to disclose information in any area that is financed from the EU budget. This should not, however, be necessary if a new legal framework for access to classified information by the EP is adopted (see below).\n\n\nRecommendation 4: The European Parliament should ensure its budgetary appropriation and discharge functions are fully linked to other aspects of its oversight of AFSJ agencies.\n\n## Keeping The European Parliament Informed About Security Threats\n\n The European Parliament needs to be informed about threats to the security of the EU and its member states in order to fully evaluate the measures that are needed to counter such threats. Without this information, it is hard for the EP to fully assess whether the AFSJ bodies may, for example, need new powers (i.e., requiring legislative amendments), additional resources or new cooperation agreements with particular third states. Indeed, this is an excellent example of an area in which the EP should ensure that there is a close relationship between its role as a legislator, budgetary authority and overseer. Making the EP aware of pertinent threats may also be in the interests of the agencies because in this way they can make MEPs aware of their need for additional legal powers or resources;\nMEPs may be useful allies in this regard (see chapter four). The EP could, for instance, be provided risk assessments and threat analyses from Frontex, the full version of Europol's Organised Crime Threat Assessment, or terrorist threat assessments from the Sitcen (see chapter two). Such assessments are classified and would therefore, need to be provided to the body within the EP designated to receive classified information. In this context, the responsible body could hold in camera discussions with relevant officials from the AFSJ\nbodies.\n\nRecommendation 5: The European Parliament should receive threat assessments from the AFSJ bodies.  This would enable Parliament to better assess whether these bodies have the necessary legal mandate, powers and financial resources to address such threats.\n\n\n## The European Parliament's Relationship With The Joint Supervisory Bodies\n\n The EP currently has very limited engagement with the two JSBs. Closer engagement with the JSBs could begin with inviting their chairpersons to discuss their biennial and thematic reports with the relevant body within the EP (see below). This dialogue would allow the chairs of the JSBs to express any concerns about their mandate, powers or the resources available to them. Meetings between the EP and JSBs could also serve as a forum to discuss the implementation of JSBs' recommendations. On this basis, the EP could use its political clout to raise any concerns with agency directors or management boards, and it could use its budgetary powers to address such matters. More regular engagement with the JSBs could also benefit MEPs in the carrying out of their work. The JSBs are repositories of significant amounts of knowledge and expertise which could benefit MEPs when, for example, preparing for hearings with agency directors or drafting own-initiative or legislative reports on Europol and Eurojust. MEPs and their staffers may benefit from this expertise not only through periodic hearings but also by reviewing the JSBs' reports and holding informal discussions with members of the JSBs and their secretariat. In the context of closer engagement between the EP and the JSBs (or any other specialised non-parliamentary oversight bodies that are created), a body of MEPs may need to be given access to the inspection reports of the JSBs. What the EP will not need is access to data inputted into Europol's databases or Eurojust's CMS, and/or personal data shared with national authorities or third states. Access to this data would give rise to serious privacy concerns. If, in the context of its oversight functions, the EP does have access to documents which contain personal data, personal data should be deleted from these documents, as is foreseen under Annex Two of the 2010 Framework Agreement between the Commission and the Parliament. The EP could consider adopting the practice used in some Member States whereby parliament can request a non-parliamentary oversight body to examine a particular matter\n(see chapter four). This is a more direct means by which a parliament can take advantage of both the expertise and independence of a non-parliamentary oversight body in order to examine particular aspects of an agency's work. To our knowledge, the EP cannot currently make such requests to the JSBs. Any provisions of this nature would need to be carefully formulated to ensure that the independence of a non-parliamentary oversight body, such as the JSBs, could not be compromised by such requests from the EP. Accordingly, much can be learned from the good practice on a national level, namely that non-parliamentary oversight bodies have the final decision on whether or not they will examine an issue at the request of parliament or any other entity (see chapter four).\n\nRecommendation 6: The European Parliament should engage in regular dialogue with the Joint Supervisory Bodies (JSBs) of Europol and Eurojust, and should make use of the reports and expertise of the JSBs in its own oversight of the AFSJ agencies.\n\n\n## Standardisation Of The European Parliament's Right To Summon The Directors Of Afsj Agencies\n\n The EP currently has the power to require the Director of Europol and the Chairperson of the Europol Management Board to appear before it. This power should be extended to Frontex (the Director and Chair of the management board) and Eurojust (the Administrative Director and President of the college). While the European Parliament does not have these powers with respect to Eurojust and Frontex, it needs to be stressed that, in practice, directors of the AFSJ agencies often appear before the parliament upon its request and are aware that refusing to appear before parliament would make for bad publicity. The power to summon agency directors and chairpersons of the management boards/college could be particularly useful outside the context of agency directors presenting an agency's annual report. It would, for example, enable the EP to require the appearance of a director in the event of a particular problem or scandal coming to light. However, the right to summon the director of an AFSJ body may be of limited value unless the MEPs involved have the right to discuss classified matters. Under existing procedures, directors cannot or choose not to answer questions which would entail disclosing classified information. This further illustrates the need to formulate a proper framework for parliamentary access to classified information before developing other oversight mechanisms (see below). We have opted to confine this recommendation to the AFSJ agencies, i.e., not to include the director of Sitcen. It is difficult to envisage how this formal power could be extended to the director of Sitcen because it is not an autonomous agency. The EP can, however, request the High Representative for Foreign and Security Policy, under whom Sitcen falls, to appear before it.\n\nRecommendation 7: The European Parliament's power to summon the director of Europol and the chairperson of the Europol Management Board should be extended to the equivalent persons at Eurojust and Frontex.\n\n\n\n## Oversight Of The Appointment Of Agency Directors\n\n Currently, the EP does not play any role in the appointment of AFSJ agency directors or the director of Sitcen. Yet, the EP has long expressed a desire to be involved in the appointment of directors of these bodies. Chapter four's survey of the role of national parliaments in the appointment of directors of intelligence agencies demonstrates that the majority of parliaments are not involved in the appointment of the directors of intelligence agencies. There are a number of drawbacks associated with involving the EP in the appointment of directors; these are broadly similar to arguments relating to the role of national parliaments in this regard, outlined in chapter four. First and foremost, involving the EP in the appointment of directors risks politicising the work of agencies which are meant to be non-political. This concern would be magnified if parliament's role in the appointment of directors were to include the power to approve or reject a nominee. Secondly, the current process for selecting the directors/president of Europol, Frontex and Eurojust is already protracted and cumbersome because it involves representatives of 27 Member States seeking to find a compromise candidate. Adding the EP to this process would serve to further complicate and drag out an already lengthy process. Moreover, the fact that 27\nstates are already involved in the selection of directors ensures that there are inbuilt checks and balances, which prevent any single party appointing a director to promote their interests. This removes one of the main reasons for which national parliaments are involved in the appointment of the directors of intelligence agencies: to prevent the incumbent government appointing someone to promote and protect partisan political interests. All things considered, the authors are not persuaded that the European Parliament should be given a role in the appointment of directors of the AFSJ bodies. The parliament should, however, be kept informed regarding appointment processes. This should include information on the identity and credentials of proposed candidates.\n\nRecommendation 8: The European Parliament should not be given a role in the appointment of the directors/president of the AFSJ bodies.\n\n\n## A Role For The European Parliament In Providing Assessments On The Human Rights Records Of Afsj Bodies' Cooperation Partners\n\n While the JSBs provide an opinion on the legal and institutional frameworks for data protection in third states, they do not examine the broader human rights record of particular foreign partners, such as a police agency in a third state. There is, therefore, no independent assessment of whether or not agencies with which AFSJ bodies share information use techniques which violate human rights. As is discussed in chapter four, this is relevant to both incoming and outgoing information. Foreign partners may collect information through e.g., torture or arbitrary detention and then share this information with AFSJ bodies. Equally, they may use information provided by AFSJ bodies as part of activities which violate human rights. These concerns are primarily relevant to the sharing of personal data. Although the AFSJ bodies' own due diligence processes should prevent this from happening, it is good practice for an independent oversight body to provide some form of human rights assessment of the general human rights record/compliance of partner agencies in third states. There is precedence for this at the national level (see chapter four) and this is a role which could be performed by the EP or another independent body. If the EP were to assume this role, it would make sense to involve the AFET Committee's Sub-Committee on Human Rights, which has expertise in examining human rights matters outside the European Union. Such assessments would not be binding but could serve to inform the Council and AFSJ agencies' management boards in the context of entering into information sharing agreements with third states.\n\nRecommendation\n9:\nThe European Parliament should ensure that either a\n(sub)committee of parliament or a specialised non-parliamentary body provides independent assessments of the general human rights records/compliance of agencies in third states with which the AFSJ bodies cooperate. Such assessments could take place before an information sharing or other cooperation agreement is signed with a third state, and during the implementation of these agreements.\n\n\n\n## A Role For The European Parliament In Reviewing The Afsj Bodies' Information Sharing Agreements And Memoranda Of Understanding\n\n Information sharing agreements are an important part of agencies' policy and should therefore, be subject to review by the EP. Indeed, it is important that the EP is aware of the terms upon which the AFSJ bodies cooperate with each other, and with foreign entities. In our view, the EP should not play a role in the formulation or approval of agency to agency information sharing agreements or memoranda of understanding (which are distinct from agreements between the EU and third states, such as the SWIFT agreement). However, a designated body of parliament should be able to review, ex post, agreements that have been concluded and to raise questions or concerns regarding, inter alia, the content and implementation of such agreements. It is not sufficient for the EP to be simply made aware that such agreements exist. Accordingly, the AFSJ bodies should be required to forward agreements and memoranda of understanding to relevant bodies in parliament, even if such agreements are considered to be classified.\n\nRecommendation 10: The European Parliament should have access to information sharing agreements and other memoranda of understanding concluded between AFSJ\nbodies within the European Union, as well as between AFSJ bodies and third states or organisations.\n\n\n\n## Access To And The Protection Of Classified Information By The European Parliament\n\n As this study's analysis of oversight of intelligence agencies at the national level demonstrates, information is the oxygen that sustains oversight; a mandate to oversee an agency's work is of limited use unless it is accompanied by access to the relevant information. It will be extremely difficult to strengthen parliamentary oversight of the AFSJ bodies without clear and predictable rules and procedures for the EP to access relevant information from these bodies, the Commission and the Council. While access to relevant information is fundamental to oversight, the professional handling of this information by overseers is also crucial for effective oversight. Accordingly, improved access to classified information by the EP will need to be accompanied by the development of appropriate procedures for the protection of this information, as well as an ongoing commitment from MEPs to handle classified information in a professional manner.\n\n## Improving The European Parliament's Access To Classified Information In The Afsj\n\n The development of an appropriate legal and institutional framework for parliamentary access to classified information is of fundamental importance to strengthening the EP's oversight of the AFSJ bodies. The discussion of the EP's access to classified information must take place alongside deliberations on the evolution of the EP's mandate to oversee the AFSJ bodies; indeed, we have argued throughout this study that an oversight body's information needs are inextricably linked to its mandate. Yet, regardless of which aspects of the AFSJ bodies' work the EP wishes to oversee and which institutional mechanism is chosen to carry out this oversight (see below for a discussion of these mechanisms), access to relevant classified information will be crucial. This is because various aspects of the work of AFSJ bodies are classified and/or involve the processing or creation of classified information. Parliamentary access to classified information is currently being discussed in the context of deliberations regarding the revision of Regulation 1049legislation which is ostensibly about public access to information from EU entities. The EP's rapporteur on this matter, Michael Cashman, has opted to include provisions on parliamentary access to information in the broader draft legal framework for public access to EU documents. This approach has several advantages. First, it is aimed at ensuring that there is a general framework for the EP's access to classified information from all EU entities and across all policy domains. This may be preferable to a fragmented legal framework for parliamentary access to information based on inter-institutional agreements across different fields. The effects of this current framework are that the EP has access to classified information from, e.g., the Council, in some fields but not others and that different modalities apply to access classified information in different policy domains. Second, the inclusion of provisions on the EP's access to classified information as part of broader legislation on public access to information could help to ensure that these rules have the status of legislation rather than being enshrined in inter-institutional agreements, which are of a subordinate legal status. In spite of these advantages, we are of the view that parliamentary access to classified information should be decoupled from provisions on public access to information. This is supported by practice on the national level, where freedom of/access to information laws are separated entirely from regulations on parliamentary access to information. Parliamentary access to classified information implies access to the specific categories of information which are justifiably exempt from public access, e.g., information regarding the work of intelligence agencies. It is precisely because such information is beyond the reach of public access that it must be available to certain parliamentarians and institutions established by parliaments for overseeing, inter alia, intelligence agencies. In almost every state analysed in this study, parliaments have privileged access to classified information to, among other things, enable to them oversee intelligence activities. This is premised on the notion that parliamentarians are elected by a population to hold governments and their agencies to account. In order to do this, they require privileged access to information which is not necessarily available to members of the public. Therefore, rules governing parliamentary access to classified information are set out in law and are disconnected for general freedom of/access to information laws.\n\nRecommendation 11: New regulations on the European Parliament's access to classified information should be decoupled from legislation on public access to information.\n\n## The Legal Basis For Access To Information By The European Parliament\n\n The EP could pursue a number of options with regards to developing a new legal framework for parliamentary access to classified information in the AFSJ and beyond. First, provisions on parliamentary access to classified information could be integrated in the new regulations on Europol, Eurojust and Frontex. Such provisions would be developed alongside regulations on parliamentary oversight of these agencies, thus ensuring that the EP's access to classified information from and relating to each agency is clearly tied to its oversight mandate and functions with regards to each agency. It is important to note that these regulations would need to extend to the EP's access to classified information from the Council because the Council has 'ownership' of a significant amount of information relating to the AFSJ agencies. Second, the EP could attempt to negotiate a specific inter-institutional agreement with the Council covering the AFSJ. An agreement with the Council covering the AFSJ could help to ensure a uniform set of regulations on parliamentary access as well as one mechanism for such access (e.g., the special committee or sub-committee options discussed in chapter five). It is not clear, however, whether an agreement with the Council could extend to parliamentary access to information from the agencies themselves. There may therefore be a need for some form of agreement between the EP and each of these three agencies regarding parliamentary access to information. This would likely require some form of amendment to the existing legislation on each agency, which is unlikely to happen given that the legislative basis for all three agencies is due to change within the next three years. Third, as noted above, the EP's access to classified information in all policy areas could be regulated by overarching legislation that also deals with public access to EU documents.\n\nUnder the current proposals, the EP could request access to classified information through, inter alia, the chair of the committee with responsibility for a given subject, e.g., LIBE for the AFSJ. If granted, the information would be made available to a special committee composed of seven members appointed by the EP's Conference of Presidents. The membership of the committee could consist of a corecomprised, for instance, of the leaders of the political groupsbut it would not be a committee with a fixed membership. The merits of this particular institutional mechanism are discussed in more detail below. However, for reasons stated above, regulations on the EP's access to classified information should not be included in legislation on public access to information.\n\nRecommendation 12: New legislation on the AFSJ agencies (Europol, Eurojust and Frontex) should include provisions on the European Parliament's access to classified information from and pertaining to these agencies. Such provisions should be anchored to the EP's mandate to oversee these agencies, which will be outlined in the same legislation. In chapter three, it is argued that the legal framework regulating the EP's access to information relating to the Sitcen needs to be examined separately. This is becausein spite of Sitcen performing some functions which are relevant to the AFSJit falls in a different policy domain (the CFSP) in which the EP has fewer powers. Unlike the AFSJ agencies, it does not have its own legislative basis and there are no plans to 'Lisbonise' its legal basis. The EP's existing special committee for the CSFP field may be able to access information pertaining to Sitcen but, to our knowledge, has never made use of this opportunity. The\n2002 inter-institutional agreement between the Council and EP will probably need to be renegotiated in view of the fact that the Lisbon Treaty has made profound changes to the CSFP field. For the purposes of this study, the most relevant change is that Sitcen is no longer exclusively a creature of the Council because it now falls under the EEAS structure. While the High Representative has declared that the existing inter-institutional agreement between the Council and EP, which regulates the EP's access to classified information in the CFSP field, will continue to apply, the modalities of the EEAS are so different that it seems likely there will be a need for a new agreement between the EP and EEAS, which would include provisions on parliamentary access to classified information. Yet, in view of the inter-governmental character of Sitcen, the Council may continue to be the gatekeeper to any parliamentary access to information regarding this body. Hence, the existing 2002\nagreement between the EP and Council or an updated version thereof may continue to apply.\n\nRecommendation 13: The European Parliament should consider negotiating an interinstitutional agreement with the European External Action Service, which would include provisions on parliamentary access to classified information.\n\nThe scope of the European Parliament's access to classified information from the AFSJ\nagencies Rather than enumerating a specific list of the types of information the EP could have access to, it would be preferable for legislation to grant the EP a general right to request access to classified information which it deems to be relevant to its (new) oversight mandate and functions. In chapter four it is argued that this is a common good practice on the national level and helps to ensure that the responsibility for determining what information is relevant should, in the first instance, be the prerogative of the overseer. In the context of the EP's oversight of the AFSJ agencies, classified information would be requested by and made available to one of the institutional mechanisms outlined below. Access to classified information on the basis of requests would, however, be subject to appropriate limitations such as those outlined in Annex Two of the 2010 Framework Agreement between the EP\nand the Commission.\n\nRecommendation 14: Legislative provisions on the oversight of the AFSJ agencies by the European Parliament should include a general right for a designated body of Parliament to access classified information it deems to be relevant to its oversight mandate and functions.\n\n While the EP needs a general right to request access to classified information relevant to its\nmandate to oversee the AFSJ agencies, access to relevant information may be better\nensured by requirements for the agencies to make proactive disclosures of particular\ncategories of information. On the basis of what is advocated in chapter five, the following\ntypes of information could, for example, be subject to proactive disclosure:\n\nAnnual work plans of the AFSJ agencies\n\nThreat assessments produced by the agencies\n\nCooperation and information sharing agreements between the AFSJ agencies.=\n\nCooperation and information sharing agreements between the AFSJ agencies and\nthird states\n\nAll information pertaining to budgeting and past expenditure\n\nThe proactive disclosure of these types of information is broadly in line with similar provisions which apply to proactive disclosures to oversight bodies on the national level\n(see chapter four).\nRecommendation 15: New legislative provisions on the oversight of the AFSJ agencies by\nthe European Parliament should enumerate specific categories of information, including classified information that must be proactively disclosed to a designated body of\nparliament. The protection of information handled by the European Parliament\n Improved access to classified information by the European Parliament will have to be accompanied by the concomitant development of rules and procedures pertaining to the protection of classified information handled by the EP. Chapter four outlines three principal mechanisms used to ensure that members of oversight bodies do not disclose classified information without proper authorisation. The EP may wish to consider each of these. Firstly, measures need to be taken to ensure that appropriate persons are selected for positions in which they will have access to classified information.\n\nOne very simple way of doing this, which can be applied within the EP, is by group leaders carefully selecting MEPs to be members of bodies with access to classified information. The EP could follow the practice used in some national parliaments whereby members of committees that have access to classified information are selected by their peers, thus ensuring cross-party support (see chapter four). There is however, no precedent for this at the EP. Vetting and security clearance processes are also used by some oversight bodies. While EP staffers should certainly be subject to security clearance before being granted access to classified information, the situation for MEPs is more complex. Chapter four illustrates that in the majority of (but not all) EU states, MPs are not subject to vetting and security clearance processes. This divergence in national practices has posed a problem for the EP because security clearance processes (of MEPs) have to be conducted by national authorities and, in many EU states, parliamentarians cannot be subject to security clearance. For this reason, the 2010 Framework Agreement between the EP and Commission left some scope for divergent Member State practices by inserting the phrase\n'appropriate personal security clearance'. In view of the sensitivities associated with security clearing parliamentarians, it would be advisable for the EU institutions to follow this approach in developing the legal framework for access to classified information by MEPs from other EU institutions and bodies. However, it should be stressed that security clearance can be seen as a confidence building measure which can make it easier for overseers to gain access to classified information. In view of this, MEPs who are part of bodies that have access to classified information may wish to consider obtaining a security clearance, even when MPs in their state are not normally subject to security clearance processes. Secondly, most states criminalise unauthorised disclosure of classified information by MPs and other overseers. At the EU level, penalties for unauthorised disclosure are complicated by the fact any prosecution of an MEP would have to take place under national law. The EP does, however, have its own disciplinary procedures which could be used in the event of an MEP making unauthorised disclosures of classified information. An assessment of the adequacy of these procedures is beyond the scope of this study. Indeed, more research is required on whether or not these procedures are effective, as well as on how national criminal law provisions would apply to unauthorised disclosures of classified information by MEPs or staffers. Ideally, there should be pan-EU consistency in this regard, in order to avoid the problem that MEPs are treated differently depending on their nationality. Finally, physical protection measures and procedures play an important role in ensuring that classified information is not disclosed either accidentally or deliberately. At the time of writing, in May 2011, an EP working group was drafting new security procedures which will enable the EP to receive and handle classified information. This is taking place within the context of the implementation of Annex Two of the 2010 Framework Agreement between the EP and the Commission. While the development of these security procedures has been driven by an agreement that will facilitate the EP's access to classified information from the Commission, these procedures could be applied to information received from the Council, EEAS and AFSJ bodies. Given the highly technical nature of information protection procedures, the EP may benefit from discussions with national parliaments and nonparliamentary oversight bodies with experience in dealing with these matters.\n\nIt is important to note that these procedures alone will not be sufficient to persuade the AFSJ bodies, the Council, Commission and Member States that the European Parliament can be trusted with classified information. A relationship based on trust will need to gradually develop over time and will be greatly assisted by MEPs demonstrating that they will not disclose information without proper authorisation.\n\n## Oversight Mechanisms\n\n In chapter five we put forward different options regarding the mechanisms or bodies within parliament that could undertake the oversight functions discussed here. These are also the mechanisms through which the EP should be able to access classified information in the AFSJ.\n\nIt is preferable for the body that is given primary responsibility for the oversight of the AFSJ agencies to be the same body which has access to classified information in the AFSJ.\n\nChapter four demonstrates that on the national level, specialised oversight committees are almost always one of the bodies (or the only body) in parliament that have access to classified information in the security domain (see Table 3). Having one mechanism for parliament to access information relating to AFSJ agencies and a separate bodywithout the same level of access to such informationfor overseeing such bodies would seriously undermine oversight of these agencies. The reasons for this are self evident: bodies with a mandate to conduct oversight need access to relevant information, and bodies that have access to information relating to particular agencies but no clear mandate to oversee such agencies cannot make effective use of their privileged access to information.\n\nRecommendation 16: The European Parliament body responsible for the oversight of the AFSJ agencies should also be the body of Parliament which has access to classified information in the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice. It would be preferable for the EP to have one body (e.g., the LIBE Committee or a newly created sub-committee) that plays the lead role in the parliament's oversight of the AFSJ\nagencies. In order to ensure that the EP takes a coherent and coordinated approach to the oversight of the AFSJ agencies, there should be one body which has primary responsibility for all oversight functions vis-a-vis all AFSJ agencies. This responsibility should include not only the EP's own oversight mandate and functions but also cooperation with national parliaments and non-parliamentary oversight bodies such as the JSBs. An important exception to this is the financial oversight of the agencies which will, of course, remain the responsibility of the Budgets and Budgetary Control Committees. Nevertheless, whichever body has primary responsibility for the oversight of the AFSJ agencies should be closely involved in the work of the BUDG and CONT committees with respect to these agencies. It should be stressed that the 'body' discussed in this paragraph cannot be given primary responsibility for the oversight of Sitcen because it is situated in the Common Foreign and Security Policy field, under the High Representative.\n\nRecommendation 17: The European Parliament should ensure that there is one body within parliament that has primary responsibility for the oversight of the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice (AFSJ) agencies.\n\n\n## The Performance Of Additional Oversight Functions By The Libe Committee\n\nThe development of a new body or mechanism within the EP is likely to be a complex and protracted process requiring the agreement of numerous other actors. Depending on which type of mechanism the EP opts to establish, it may not be possible until new legislation on Europol and Eurojust is drafted and there is a legal framework in place which regulates the EP's access to classified information in the AFSJ area. In view of this, it is necessary for the LIBE Committee to develop procedures that make it better suited to serving as a forum for the oversight of AFSJ agencies, at least on an interim basis. One relatively straightforward option is for the bureau of the LIBE Committee to hold offthe-record briefings with directors/president of the AFSJ agencies and/or representatives of the management board (in the case of Europol & Frontex) and the College (in the case of Eurojust). This option could be utilised to permit MEPs to discuss sensitive matters with these individuals in small, private meetings. Matters under discussion could include anything which falls within the broader mandate of the LIBE Committee. For example, directors could use such meetings to brief bureau members on sensitive strategic issues or problems in the operation of their agency. During the course of our interviews, it became clear that some MEPs and the directors of the agencies would welcome the opportunity for more confidential meetings when particularly sensitive matters need to be discussed. Such meetings could be initiated at the request of the chair of the LIBE Committee, by directors/president of the AFSJ agencies, and/or by relevant figures from the management boards/college. While small, off-the-record meetings could be a useful option for ad hoc discussions on some issues, they could not serve as a mechanism for many of the oversight functions discussed above.\n\nRecommendation 18: The European Parliament's LIBE Committee should develop procedures that make it better suited to serving as a forum for the oversight of AFSJ\nagencies, at least on an interim basis. For this purpose, the LIBE Committee could use offthe-record meetings between its Bureau and directors (or president in the case of Eurojust)\nof the AFSJ agencies and/or representatives from the agencies' management boards (or the College of Eurojust) to address sensitive issues which cannot be discussed in meetings of the full committee.\n\n\n\n## Special Committee Options For The Area Of Freedom, Security And Justice (Afsj)\n\n\nChapter three of the study examines the role of the European Parliament's 'Special Committee'a small group of MEPs drawn primarily from the AFET Committeeused to enable the parliament to address matters which involve classified information in the CFSP field (hereafter, the 'Common Foreign and Security Policy - CFSP Special Committee').\n\nThere are a number of options for extending this committee's remit or using a similar model for the oversight of the AFSJ bodies. The remit of this Special Committee could potentially be extended, through an amended inter-institutional agreement, to the AFSJ field in order to allow the EP to address matters involving classified information relating to, inter alia, the AFSJ agencies. Alternatively, the EP and the Council could agree to create a special committee in the AFSJ along the lines of the CFSP special committee model. Both special committee options have a number of significant drawbacks. A first problem is that a special committee of this nature is ultimately only a vehicle for its parent committee to have some access to classified information. Neither the existing special committee nor the proposed special committee for the AFSJ (as conceived of here)\nwould have a specific oversight mandate. If it were to be given a specific mandate, it would make sense to pursue the option of a security cleared permanent sub-committee instead\n(see below). Moreover, given that a special committee would be a small group of MEP's without its own secretariat and meeting on an occasional basis, it is difficult to see how it could undertake the various oversight functions outlined in chapter five, and summarised here. Secondly, there are doubts about whether a special committee could make effective use of the classified information to which it had access in the context of discussions with Council and/or agency officials. Given that the special committee would not have a specific mandate or the capacity to produce reports, it is unclear what purpose would be served by it having access to classified information. Furthermore, members would obviously be prohibited from transmitting or referring to classified information in discussions with their colleagues in the LIBE Committee. This would make it difficult for the LIBE Committee to make use of the special committee's privileged access to classified information in its own work. For this reason, the use of a special committee in the AFSJ would be inconsistent with Recommendation 16 which stresses the need for the body responsible for oversight of the AFSJ agencies to be same body that has access to classified information relating to these agencies. Thirdly, if members of a special committee for the AFSJ were not experts on the subjects and agencies being discussed, they may not have the relevant knowledge to ask the most relevant questions and/or seek access to relevant information. The risk of a special committee possessing insufficient specialised knowledge would be significantly increased if the EP and Council selected the option of extending the mandate of the existing CFSP\nspecial committee. This is because its members and staffers are primarily drawn from the AFET Committee and may not have specific knowledge or expertise relevant to the AFSJ. Finally, a special committee arrangement for the AFSJ (and similar arrangements in other policy areas) would not obviate the need for a comprehensive legal framework on the EP's access to information in the AFSJ field and beyond. There is a risk that by granting access to classified AFSJ information to a special committee of MEPs, the Council may attempt to bypass the need for a fundamental reconsideration of the framework for parliamentary access to information.\n\nRecommendation 19: The European Parliament should not seek to extend the existing Special Committee's mandate to include the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice (AFSJ), or to create a new special committee for the AFSJ. The EP's existing CFSP Special Committee may address CFSP matters that include the discussion of classified information with the High Representative. Given that Sitcen falls under the purview of the High Representative, the CFSP Special Committee could use its meetings with her to address issues relating to Sitcen. Members of the CFSP Special Committee could, for example, seek to learn more about the composition of Sitcen, its current priorities, or the role it plays in providing assessments on threats to the EU's internal security. Once again, the use of a special committee has a number of significant drawbacks. First, giving a very select group of MEPs access to information on the work of Sitcen may do little to raise broader awareness of the role of Sitcen amongst MEPs and staffers. The potential for such discussions to contribute to broader awareness of Sitcen's role would also depend on how much of the information discussed in a special committee meeting on Sitcen is deemed to be classified. Second, the success of this option would depend on the willingness of the chair of the AFET Committee to take up the issue of Sitcen's internal security functions with the High Representative; this may be unlikely given that the AFET does not deal with internal security matters and has numerous other priorities to be addressed with the High Representative. Finally, there is, of course, no guarantee that the High Representative would be willing to discuss these issues given that Sitcen's work remains highly sensitive due to the presence of seconded officers from national intelligence agencies. Yet, in spite of these drawbacks, the CFSP special committee is currently the only mechanism available to the EP for discussions about the work of Sitcen. As we have consistently stated, the EP is in a weaker position vis-a-vis Sitcen than it is with regards to the AFSJ agencies for a variety of reasons: e.g., Sitcen is not an autonomous agency funded from the EU budget, the EP doesn't have powers of co-legislation in the CFSP, and it doesn't have a clear treaty-based mandate to directly oversee Sitcen. The CFSP Special Committee is therefore, the only mechanism through which the EP may be able to conduct some limited oversight of the Sitcen.\n\nRecommendation 20: The European Parliament should use its existing Special Committee to examine the work of the European Union's Situation Centre. The Special Committee could use its privileged access to classified information to address the role played by the Situation Centre in the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice.\n\n\n\n## Creation Of A Libe Sub-Committee For The Oversight Of The Afsj Agencies\n\n The EP could consider establishing a sub-committee of the LIBE Committee to oversee the AFSJ agencies. This would be a permanent body, established in accordance with the EP's Rules of Procedure. We shall first put forward some suggestions regarding the modalities of such a sub-committee before outlining the reasons for which we believe this may be an effective mechanism for developing the EP's oversight of the AFSJ agencies. Mandate The mandate of any sub-committee would need to remain within the broad parameters of the LIBE Committee's mandate, which states that 'the Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs Committee is responsible for [...] Europol, Eurojust, Cepol and other bodies and agencies in the same area'. Within this context, the sub-committee would assume primary responsibility for the oversight of AFSJ agencies by the European Parliament. We envisage that the sub-committee's jurisdiction would extend to all of the AFSJ agencies which currently fall under the remit of the LIBE Committee. Under the current division of responsibilities in the EP, the sub-committee of the LIBE could not directly oversee the Sitcen because it is part of the EEAS, which falls under the jurisdiction of the AFET Committee. It could nevertheless cooperate closely with the AFET Committee, its Sub-Committee on Defence and the CFSP Special Committee on matters relating to the activities of the Sitcen which are relevant to the AFSJ. The sub-committee could, for example, be given the task of performing the oversight functions outlined in chapter five and any other functions which the EP deems to be relevant. If the functions and powers of the AFSJ agencies were to evolve, the subcommittee's mandate would be amended accordingly. On the basis of the oversight\n\nmandate and functions outlined earlier in this study, the sub-committee's mandate may\ninclude, but should not be limited to:\ni.\nServing as the forum for periodic and ad hoc meetings with, inter alia, the directors/president of the AFSJ agencies; representatives of the management\nboards/college; relevant officials from the Commission and Council;\nii.\nReceiving and reviewing the annual work plans and reports of the AFSJ agencies;\niii.\nReceiving threats assessments from the AFSJ agencies;\niv.\nRelations with the Joint Supervisory Bodies and any other specialised nonparliamentary oversight bodies which are created to oversee the AFSJ agencies. This\nrole would include reviewing the annual and thematic reports of the JSBs and\nmaintaining regular dialogue with them;\nv.\nDrafting the LIBE Committee's own initiative and legislative reports on matters\nrelating to the AFSJ agencies;\nvi.\nPerforming the advisory functions of the LIBE Committee with regards to the appropriation and discharge of the budgets for the AFSJ agencies, thereby providing\nexpert opinions to support the work of the Budgets and Budgetary Control Committees;\nvii.\nCooperation with other committees of the European Parliament which have jurisdiction over matters related to the AFSJ agencies. Notably, the sub-committee could maintain dialogue with the AFET and the CFSP Special Committee regarding the Sitcen. If the EP decides to take up the option of drafting opinions on the human rights record of the AFSJ agencies' partners in third states, the sub-committee should consult with the AFET's Sub-Committee on Human Rights on this matter;\nviii.\nReviewing certain aspects of the AFSJ agencies' cooperation with third states and\ninternational\norganisations,\nincluding\nscrutinising\nthe\ninformation\nsharing\nagreements concluded in this context;\nix.\nReviewing relationships between AFSJ agencies, including their memoranda of understanding; and\nx.\nCoordinating relations with national parliaments and representing the European Parliament in inter-parliamentary meetings which are relevant to the AFSJ. In line with our earlier comments regarding the role of the EP in overseeing the AFSJ\nagencies, we do not believe that the sub-committee should duplicate the work of the JSBs\nin examining the legality of the use of personal data by certain AFSJ agencies. Moreover, it would not play a role in examining other operational activities of the agencies, e.g., their work files or the joint operations which they coordinate. Equally, the sub-committee should not encroach upon the jurisdiction of national parliaments and other oversight bodies\nresponsible for scrutinising the work of national authorities that is connected to the AFSJ agencies. Membership The membership of the sub-committee would need to be determined in accordance with the\nguidelines established under Rules 186 and 190 of the European Parliament's Rules of Procedure. The existing sub-committees (of the Foreign Affairs Committee) on Security and\nDefence, and Human Rights have 28 members and 28 substitutes, and 30 members and 21\nsubstitutes, respectively. These MEPs generally (but not necessarily) hold concurrent\nmembership in the Foreign Affairs Committee. It is our view that these numbers are too large considering the fact that two of the principal\nreasons for proposing a sub-committee are: (1) the need for a small, confidential forum for\ndiscussions with the heads of the agencies and management boards; and (2) the need for MEPs to have access to some classified information relating to the agencies. A committee with as many as 50 members and substitutes would not fulfil these needs. Indeed, many of the aforementioned concerns which the agencies (and the Council and Commission) have about the confidentiality of discussions and protection of classified information would not be addressed if the sub-committee contained so many MEPs. Aside from concerns about the protection of classified information, a sub-committee arrangement would need to create conditions in which, inter alia, agency directors would feel confident that they could raise concerns or sensitive issues with a group of MEPs, without the content of such deliberations being further disseminated. Ultimately, agency directors and officials from the Council, Commission and JSBs are likely to abstain from discussing sensitive issues with the EP if they are not confident that discussions will remain confidential.\n\nOn the national level, the overwhelming majority of specialised parliamentary oversight committees include five to fifteen MPs (see Table 1 in chapter four). As is discussed in chapter four, such committees are normally smaller than other parliamentary committees for reasons of maintaining confidentiality. Accordingly, it is our view that a sub-committee should contain no more than 15 MEPs (including substitutes). This may, however, be difficult to accomplish in view of the requirement that the composition of EP committees and sub-committees reflects the overall composition of the parliament. It would be beneficial if members of the sub-committee were either full or substitute members of the LIBE Committee. This would increase the likelihood that sub-committee members would have sufficient knowledge of the AFSJ agencies to enable them to contribute effectively to the sub-committee's functions. Finally, the EP could consider including some MEPs that are members of other (sub)-committees that deal with matters related to the AFSJ agencies and/or have other expertise which is relevant to the oversight of AFSJ agencies. These MEPs could include members of the Budgetary Control Committee, the Foreign Affairs Committee and its Sub-Committee on Human Rights. Chapter four illustrated that there is precedence for the inclusion of ex officio members (of other parliamentary committees) in national parliamentary oversight committees. This can help to ensure that there is proper coordination between committees that deal with related matters.\n\nAccess to information All members of the sub-committee and its staffers would have the right to access classified information within the parameters of the sub-committee's mandate. In addition, certain categories of information could be subject to proactive disclosure to the sub-committee by the agencies, their management boards/college and, where appropriate, the Council and Commission (see above). The sub-committee would not, however, need to have access to information held in the agencies' databases or any personal data. The sub-committee would be required to implement the measures to protect information, which are discussed in chapter five. Resources The sub-committee would need to be supported by full-time security cleared staff. This is particularly essential in view of the fact that MEPs are frequently members of several committees and have to divide their time between work in their own states, Brussels and Strasbourg. Staffers are also essential to developing the parliament's institutional knowledge and expertise on the AFSJ agencies; they ensure that such knowledge is retained even when MEPs move to other committees or leave the EP.\n\nAssessment Whether or not the European Parliament needs to establish a LIBE sub-committee to oversee the work of the AFSJ agencies depends to a large extent on how its mandate to oversee these agencies is defined in the forthcoming legislation on Europol, Eurojust and Frontex. If the EP's oversight mandate and functions remain broadly similar to the way they are now, i.e., relatively limited, it is not clear that a sub-committee would be necessary. If, however, the EP assumes additional oversight functions along the lines of the options presented in chapter five, there is a strong case for the establishment of a sub-committee.\n\nThere are four main reasons for which we believe a sub-committee could be created. First, we have argued there is a need for the EP to have access to classified information from and pertaining to the AFSJ agencies, as well as the possibility of holding confidential, off-the-record discussions with agency directors and other relevant stakeholders. Yet, the EP's existing institutional arrangements for oversight are not well suited to such functions because too many MEPs are involved and there is no precedent for smaller, confidential discussions with the agencies. We have cautioned against solving this problem by using a mechanism or body which simply has access to classified information regarding the AFSJ agencies without an accompanying mandate to use this information as part of oversight processes. It is worth reiterating that access to information by a body of parliament is not an end in itself: it must be a means to enable parliament to oversee particular agencies. For this reason, we were critical of the possible use of a special committee model for the AFSJ. The need to link access to classified information with a clear mandate for oversight is one of the main arguments in favour of creating a sub-committee. A second argument in favour of the creation of a sub-committee is that the LIBE Committee might not have the time to engage in many of the proposed oversight functions outlined in chapter five. If the EP wishes to play an increased role in the oversight of the AFSJ agencies, the creation of a sub-committee could be a persuasive choice. Third, a sub-committee would correspond with our earlier recommendation that the EP\nshould have one body which has primary responsibility for all areas of parliamentary oversight of the AFSJ agencies. The sub-committee would be able to draw together its findings from various oversight functions and ongoing dialogue with the agencies, Council, Commission, JSBs and national parliaments. This would enable the EP to produce recommendations which can improve the work of the agencies, while also providing inputs to feed into other aspects of its own work. Notably, the insights of the sub-committee could help to ensure that the various roles which the EP plays vis-a-vis the AFSJ agencies are fully connected. For example, the EP's co-legislation functions would be closely informed by the findings and recommendations of its oversight work, and the sub-committee's oversight would also inform the use of the EP's budgetary powers. Finally, the creation of a sub-committee would enable the EP to gradually develop more detailed knowledge and expertise on the AFSJ agencies. In our view, this is something which is currently lacking within the EP, and yet is crucial if the EP is to play a more active role in scrutinising the work of the AFSJ agencies.\n\nRecommendation 21: The European Parliament should create a LIBE Sub-Committee for the oversight of the AFSJ agencies. The precise scope and content of the sub-committee's mandate would be defined in accordance with the Parliament's rules of procedure but would be closely tied to the oversight functions given to the EP by new legislation on Europol, Eurojust and Frontex.\n\n\n\n## Strengthening Cooperation Between The European Parliament And National Parliaments In The Oversight Of Afsj Agencies\n\n The Lisbon Treaty specifically requires that national parliaments should be involved in the oversight of Europol and Eurojust. While the precise nature and scope of national parliaments' role differs between states, this study highlighted three main ways in which national parliaments already exercise some oversight of these agencies (see chapter three).\n\nFirstly, some national parliaments oversee the work of their own government's representatives at the Council and on agency management boards, i.e., they scrutinise national inputs to AFSJ agencies. Secondly, national parliaments can engage with AFSJ agencies directly by, for example, holding hearings with directors and other senior officials, and producing reports on the agencies. This engagement has typically been aimed at generating awareness of the agencies' work rather than any direct review or scrutiny of the agencies' activities. Moreover, parliaments are part of national systems of oversight which scrutinise actions taken by national authorities such as the police. The modalities of such oversight are the prerogative of national bodies, and it is beyond the scope of this study to issue recommendations in this regard. A third dimension of national parliamentary involvement in the oversight of the AFSJ agencies is cooperation with other parliaments and the EP (see chapter three); this will be our focus here. In our view, the aims of inter-parliamentary cooperation should primarily focus on strategic matters rather than any specific operations of the AFSJ agencies. There are three areas in which inter-parliamentary cooperation could be particularly useful. Firstly, national parliaments and the EP could benefit from further discussions, as well as exchanges of information, experiences and good practices, on their oversight of national authorities' activities that are connected with the AFSJ agencies. For example, there is a clear need for further information on how, if at all, national parliaments and other relevant national oversight bodies (such as judicial bodies) oversee: (a) national contributions or inputs to the AFSJ agencies, such as information sent to AFSJ agencies; and (b) the actions of national authorities taken on the basis of information provided and/or operations coordinated by these bodies, such as arrests and questioning of persons suspected of involvement in serious criminal activity. National overseers could use such information to inform their own approaches to scrutinising activities of, for example, the police or border agencies, which have a nexus with the AFSJ agencies. Secondly, national parliaments and the EP could, insofar as national law would allow, exchange information about particular problems (within their jurisdictions) related to aforementioned activities of national authorities' activities that are linked to the work of AFSJ agencies. Finally, national parliaments and the EP could work together to evaluate whether new and existing regulations relating to the AFSJ agencies comply with the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality. There are different views as to whether this cooperation should be institutionalised through some form of permanent inter-parliamentary body or whether it should proceed more informally through existing inter-parliamentary fora. For example, in its communication of December 2010, the Commission made proposals for involving national parliaments in the oversight of Europol. The Commission proposed setting up a joint or permanent interparliamentary forum in which both national and European members of parliament would be represented, along the lines of Articles 9 and 10 of the Protocol on the Role of National Parliaments in the European Union. It furthermore suggested that such a forum could establish a sub-group to liaise directly with Europol. The forum would be able to invite the Europol director and it could meet regularly and establish a sub-group responsible for liaising with Europol directly. The Commission's proposals have received some support from national parliaments. However, the added value of the creation of such an interparliamentary forum has been questioned by a number of EU member states and national parliaments. All of the forms of cooperation discussed above could potentially take place within the context of existing forums for inter-parliamentary dialogue. Perhaps more significantly, it is highly doubtful that a permanent body including representatives from all national parliaments could be workable. National parliaments' positions on, levels of interest in, and knowledge of AFSJ related matters vary greatly across the EU. It would therefore, be very challenging to reach consensus on issues such as an agenda for oversight, let alone on more substantive questions. A forum which included so many actors with different agendas could be unworkable and yet, it would be difficult to devise a formula for a smaller forum because it would inappropriate to exclude any national parliaments. In addition national parliaments have both different levels of access to information - from national authorities - and access to different types of information on the AFSJ agencies. They may therefore, be starting from very different positions in terms of their awareness of particular matters. In view of these challenges, we do not recommend the establishment of a permanent forum for inter-parliamentary cooperation on oversight of the AFSJ agencies. It would be preferable for national parliaments and the EP to address the AFSJ agencies in the context of existing inter-parliamentary forums. These include joint meetings/hearings between the LIBE Committee and relevant committees of national parliaments, as well as the COSAC. In fact, the AFSJ, the political monitoring of Europol and the evaluation of Eurojust's activities have become regular items on the COSAC agenda. A majority of COSAC's members have supported the idea of COSAC debates on Europol and Eurojust to be preceded by a hearing of the directors of the respective agencies and experts. A potential role for COSAC in the political monitoring of JHA agencies is founded on Article 10 of TFEU Protocol No 1 on the role of national parliaments. This article stipulates that COSAC should promote the exchange of information and best practices between national parliaments and the European Parliament, including their special committees, and may organise inter-parliamentary conferences on specific topics. COSAC could continue to provide a useful venue for the types of cooperation discussed above.\n\nRecommendation 22: Inter-parliamentary cooperation on the oversight of the AFSJ\nagencies should take place within the context of existing forums for cooperation between the European Parliament and national parliaments. The European Parliament does not need to establish a new permanent inter-parliamentary body.\n\n## Chapter 1. Introduction\n\n This study provides a comparative assessment of the oversight of intelligence agencies in European Union member states and other democracies. Its aim is to identify good practices that can inform the debate surrounding the development of parliamentary oversight of the EU Area of Freedom, Security and Justice (AFSJ) agencies and the Situation Centre\n(Sitcen). For the purposes of this study, we will use the term 'AFSJ bodies' to refer to the AFSJ agencies (Europol, Eurojust and Frontex) and Sitcen.3 In this introductory chapter we will outline the objectives, structure and rationale of the study. In the first section, we will explain our interpretation of the mandate for this study. On this basis, the second section will outline the aim and structure of the study. In section three we outline the methodology used for this study. This will be followed, in section four, by a brief discussion of the main rationale for parliamentary oversight of security sector agencies. The fifth section will define 'oversight', which is a key term that will be used throughout the study. The final section in this chapter will highlight the differences and similarities between national intelligence agencies and the EU's AFSJ bodies.\n\n## 1.1. Mandate\n\n The European Parliament's Directorate-General for Internal Policies mandated the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF) and the European Union Institute (EUI) to carry out a study on 'parliamentary oversight of intelligence agencies in relevant EU Member States and other major democracies'. This study was expected to 'identify democratic standards and best practice as well as a proper balance between the demands of secrecy and the need for scrutiny which can be used by the European Parliament (EP) when it sets up its own oversight body'.4 The tender did not specify which oversight body it was referring to or indeed, precisely what such a body would oversee.\n\nHowever, after consultation with the EP's Directorate General for Internal Policies, it was decided to interpret this mandate against the backdrop of four important trends and developments which have prompted a discussion on how the EP can strengthen oversight of the EU's AFSJ agencies, as well as Sitcen, which plays a role in the AFSJ. (1) The Treaty of Lisbon gives the EP and national parliaments a mandate to strengthen their oversight of two AFSJ bodies: Europol and Eurojust.5 It explicitly provides for the new regulations on Europol and Eurojust to include provisions on parliamentary 'scrutiny' (in the case of Europol) and 'evaluation' (in the case of Eurojust). Within the next two years, the Commission will put forward proposals for these regulations; the EP will have the opportunity to ensure that this legislation includes appropriate provisions on parliamentary oversight. In addition, the fact that the area of freedom, security and justice is now subject to the standard legislative procedure means that the EP is now better placed to ensure that new or revised legal frameworks for the AFSJ agencies include provisions on parliamentary oversight. Indeed, it has already done so in draft regulation on Frontex, which is currently under discussion.6 (2) The EP may have some opportunities to address the work of Sitcen, which performs a number of functions pertaining to internal security, because it is now part of the European External Action Service (EEAS). While the EEAS (and thus Sitcen) falls under the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), which is an intergovernmental policy area, the Treaty of Lisbon gives the EP some new powers in this area. (3) There have been important developments in the area of access to information, which are intrinsically linked to strengthening oversight of the AFSJ bodies. In 2010, the EP and Commission concluded a new inter-institutional agreement, which significantly improves the EP's access to information from the Commission. In addition, the EP is currently considering the revision of the EU's legislation on access to information, as well as the possibility of a new inter-institutional agreement with the Council which would include provisions on parliamentary access to classified information. The trajectory of these ongoing discussions will have profound implications for the EP's oversight of AFSJ bodies. (4) More generally, over the past decade, the EP has developed a growing interest in both national security agencies and AFSJ bodies. This has been evidenced by its strong interest in the development of the Frontex Regulation, and the Europol and Eurojust decisions, as well as two temporary committees that examined the activities of national security agencies and made important recommendations in regard to oversight.7\n\n## 1.2. Aim And Structure Of The Study\n\n On the basis of this interpretation of the mandate, the primary aim of this study is to provide a comparative assessment of the oversight of intelligence agencies in European Union member states and other democracies, with the aim of identifying good practices that can inform the debate on strengthening oversight of the AFSJ bodies by the European Parliament. In order to identify practices which are relevant for the EP, we will first provide a clear picture regarding the current mandates and powers of the AFSJ bodies, as well as existing arrangements for the oversight of these bodies by the EP and other relevant actors. Accordingly, chapter two will provide an overview of the legal basis, mandate and current powers of Europol, Eurojust, Frontex and Sitcen, and will identify several areas of their work that might raise concerns from the point of view of oversight. Chapter three will critically analyse the EP's existing role and powers for overseeing the AFSJ bodies, as well as the scope of its access to information from these bodies. This chapter will also analyse the role of national parliaments in overseeing the AFSJ bodies, and the role of the Joint Supervisory Bodies of Europol and Eurojust in overseeing these agencies' processing and transferring of personal data. This assessment is necessary in order to identify any weaknesses in the EP's current oversight functions which could be addressed through the adoption of practices from national approaches to oversight of intelligence agencies.\n\nChapter four will provide a detailed comparative assessment of how parliamentary and specialised non-parliamentary oversight is organised and carried out on a national level. This chapter will pay particular attention to access to information by parliamentary and non-parliamentary oversight bodies. Finally, chapter five will draw together the analysis from the foregoing chapters in order to outline a series of options for consolidating and strengthening oversight of Europol, Eurojust, Frontex and Sitcen. This will include suggestions on improving the use of current oversight arrangements and proposals on developing new legal and institutional frameworks for parliamentary or specialised oversight of the AFSJ bodies.\n\n## 1.3. Methodology\n\n The methodology for this study has four main components. The first two were used to gather information on parliamentary and specialised oversight of intelligence agencies on a national level. We distributed a detailed questionnaire (see Annex C) to all national parliaments in EU member states and, where applicable, non-parliamentary oversight committees. The results are used extensively in chapter four and are presented in the tables that are included in this chapter. We also commissioned experts to draft case studies on the oversight of intelligence agencies in nine EU member states (Belgium, France, Germany, Hungary, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom), as well as Australia, Canada and the United States. The case studies of oversight on a national level (see Annex A) provide in-depth insights into national oversight institutions and practices. We selected these case studies to provide geographical and systemic diversity.\n\nThey were drafted in accordance with standardised terms of reference in order to facilitate comparison. The questionnaires and expert case studies were supplemented by extensive desk research on national laws, the reports of oversight institutions, national jurisprudence, the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights, reports of the Council of Europe's Venice Commission and relevant UN standards on the oversight of intelligence agencies.8 The third and fourth components of our methodology focused on generating information about the current role of the EP in the oversight of the EU's AFSJ bodies and, to a lesser extent, the role played by the joint supervisory bodies of Europol and Eurojust. We conducted interviews with almost 35 individuals from the EP (including both staffers and MEPs), the AFSJ bodies, the Joint Supervisory Bodies, the Commission and the Council.\n\nThese interviews served to provide invaluable information on both the political context of the development of oversight arrangements for the AFSJ bodies and the current work of these bodies.9 In addition, we commissioned a number of expert studies on role of the EP in the AFSJ, Europol and Eurojust, and a general overview of the EU's AFSJ architecture (see Annex B). Finally, we reviewed pertinent EU legislation, EP reports, agency documents and academic articles. The authors also benefited greatly from the inputs of the Project Advisory Board, which has reviewed and provided comments on this study, including the annexes.\n\n## 1.4. Relevance Of Parliamentary Oversight Of Security Sector Agencies\n\n In seeking to strengthen its oversight of the EU's AFSJ bodies, the EP is building upon the internationally accepted norm that security sector agencies (i.e., the police, intelligence services, border agencies and the armed forces) should be subject to democratic oversight.10 The rationale for democratic oversight can be distilled into two key points.\n\nFirstly, parliaments legislate on behalf of a population to give security sector agencies a mandate and powers to provide a public service. Parliaments should therefore hold these institutions to account for their fulfilment of their mandates and use of their powers. This should include ensuring security sector agencies' policies and practices are lawful, effective and respect the fundamental values of the societies they serve, including democracy and human rights.11 Secondly, parliaments approve the allocation of public money to fund security providers and should therefore hold these organisations to account for the use of this money.12 Parliaments do not necessarily assume these responsibilities alone; indeed, they frequently legislate to establish specialised non-parliamentary bodies to oversee particular security sector agencies.\n\n## 1.5. Defining Oversight\n\n The term *oversight* is central to this study. For the purposes of this work, oversight refers to an actor scrutinising an organisation's (or individual's) activities with the aim of evaluating its compliance with particular criteria and on this basis, issuing recommendations or orders to the organisation concerned. Oversight may cover all aspects of an organisation's work or may be confined to specific areas, such as an organisation's finances, policies or use of personal data. Equally, overseers may scrutinise these activities in accordance with very general criteria or may focus on, inter alia, their compliance with the law or effectiveness. Oversight is closely tied to the notion of 'accountability' as oversight processes may contribute to holding an organisation or individual to account;\nhowever, being overseen is not necessarily tantamount to being held accountable. Indeed, the aims of oversight are often broader than holding actors to account; for example, oversight contributes to improving the performance of a given organisation, informing the public about an organisation's activities, and building public confidence. For the purposes of this study, oversight is not 'time sensitive', meaning that a body may oversee a given activity at any point from its planning, to ongoing implementation or once it is completed. Accordingly, oversight is a catchall term which can encompass processes such as monitoring, evaluation, *scrutiny* and *review*at various points in this study oversight will be used interchangeably with these terms. Oversight should, however, be seen as distinct from concepts such as 'management' and 'control', which imply direct involvement in decision making regarding an organisation's policies or practices. Many of the bodies which are involved in oversight of intelligence agencies also manage or control these bodies in various ways.\n\nIt should be stressed that access to information, and particularly classified information held by and pertaining to organisations being overseen, is another key concept in this study. Access to information is an integral dimension of oversight because without such information, it is extremely difficult to scrutinise the work of any organisation. In a democratic polity, a range of actors are involved in the oversight of intelligence agencies, including: parliament, autonomous bodies, political executives, judicial bodies, the media and civil society, and internal mechanisms within intelligence agencies. While each of these actors fulfil important and often mutually complimentary oversight functions, this study will, in line with the mandate outlined in the tender, focus on the oversight of intelligence agencies by parliaments and autonomous oversight bodies. The term\n'*specialised oversight body/committee*' will be used (interchangeably with oversight body)\nto refer to: (a) parliamentary (sub-) committees responsible for the oversight of intelligence agencies, and (b) autonomous non-parliamentary bodies that are responsible for the oversight of these agencies, and not part of the executive, parliament or the agencies they oversee.\n\n## 1.6. National Intelligence Agencies V. The Eu's Afsj Bodies\n\n Broadly speaking, the role of the AFSJ bodies is to facilitate, coordinate and strengthen cooperation between national authorities with the aim of promoting security and justice within the EU. This study will focus on three key agencies: Europol (which performs this role with respect to law enforcement), Frontex (which focuses on improving the management of the EU's external borders) and Eurojust (which focuses on judicial cooperation), as well as the Situation Centre (which, in the realm of internal security, provides threat assessments to relevant decision makerssee chapter two). In view of the fact the EP is interested in strengthening oversight of these bodies, a mandate to study and draw lessons from the oversight of national 'intelligence agencies'\nmay appear to be an unusual choice. The term 'intelligence agency' generally refers to a state body that collects, analyses and disseminates informationon threats to national security or other national intereststo policy-makers and other executive bodies.13\nIntelligence agencies may perform these 'intelligence functions' exclusively outside of their state's territorial jurisdiction (e.g., the UK's Secret Intelligence Service), exclusively within their state's territory14 (e.g., Germany's Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution), or both inside and outside their territory (e.g., the Dutch General Intelligence Service or AIVD). In a few states (e.g., in Sweden and Denmark), these bodies may also possess police powers and are therefore sometimes called 'police security services'. However, arguably the defining feature of the national intelligence agencies is their power to use what are known as 'special powers' to collect information, such as the powers to intercept communications, conduct covert surveillance, use secret informants, and even enter dwellings surreptitiously. Please note that for reasons of consistency, we will use the term *'intelligence agency'* to refer to all of the aforementioned bodies, e.g., organisations which are variously labelled as 'security services', 'domestic intelligence agencies' or\n'intelligence services'. This study will not, however, address military intelligence agencies or agencies whose mandates focus exclusively on foreign intelligence, i.e., matters outside of their state's territory. The reason for this is that this study focuses on the EU's AFSJ, which relates to 'civilian' internal securityit is beyond the scope of this study to scrutinize the\n\noversight of national agencies that are not civilian bodies or do not play a role in internal security. The AFSJ bodies do not possess the powers discussed in the previous paragraph and, when juxtaposed alongside this description, it is evident that the EU's AFSJ bodies are not intelligence agencies in the way that they are conceptualised at the national level. Indeed, the AFSJ bodies might be seen as more closely analogous to their counterparts of national level police services (Europol), border agencies/border police (Frontex), judges and prosecutors (Eurojust) and joint analysis or fusion centres (Sitcen). Nevertheless, the AFSJ bodies perform the aforementioned 'intelligence functions' of national intelligence agencies, albeit not necessarily in the same way or for the same purpose. Notably, they collect (though without recourse to the abovementioned special powers), analyse and disseminate information to a range of decision makers. Another important similarity between the AFSJ\nbodies and national intelligence agencies is that they too receive, produce and disseminate classified information. This has important implications for oversight because overseers need access to classified information in order to scrutinise the work of agencies whose activities are 'classified' and/or entail the use of classified informationthis is an area in which the EP can learn much from national systems of oversight. We should nevertheless remain cautious about the 'portability' of oversight models and practices from the national to the EU level given that national overseers and the EP\nscrutinise agencies with very different mandates and powers. Oversight has to be understood in the context of the organisations which are being overseen. And, as we have noted, there are major differences between national agencies that primarily exist to inform the executive about threats to national security and AFSJ bodies that exist to coordinate, support and inform relevant actors in 27 states, across fields ranging from law enforcement to border management. The AFSJ do not only have multiple 'customers' for their outputs and their work is founded upon the inputs of multiple contributors. These contributors are national authorities in 27 different jurisdictions, all of which have their own legal framework, mandate and oversight arrangements. In addition to differences between national agencies and AFSJ bodies, the EU has manifestly different constitutional arrangements than states. We shall highlight just a few of these differences that have important implications for the transferability of practices from the national to the EU level. First, while states have a single executive branch that is responsible for intelligence agencies, and accountable to parliament in this regard, the EU has a split executive with the Council and Commission both having responsibility in the ASFJ. Second, national executives generally exercise much more direct control of national intelligence agencies than the Commission and Council in regard to AFSJ bodies. This has important implications for parliamentary oversight because at a national level, national executives are more clearly accountable for the actions of intelligence agencies. Finally, national intelligence agencies may be overseen by one parliament but the AFSJ bodies are subject to oversight by the EP and multiple national parliaments that have different powers and approaches to oversight. We should remain mindful of these differences when considering transplanting national practices to the EU level.\n\n\n\n## Chapter 2. The European Union's Area Of Freedom, Security And Justice Bodies\n\n This chapter outlines the legal basis, mandate and current powers of the AFSJ bodies as of April 2011 in order to provide an overview of the tasks and powers of these bodies which are or could be subject to oversight. The AFSJ bodies' 'operational powers' primarily consist of two elements: 1) coordinating and supporting the work of national agencies; and 2)\nprocessing, storing and transferring personal data. As we will see in chapter four, oversight bodies on the national level are predominantly concerned with overseeing the correct use of special powers by national agencies. Therefore, we will assess whether the AFSJ bodies have any special powers that need to be overseen. Another dimension of the work of intelligence agencies on the national level is the sharing of information with each other, and with third countries. This sharing of information, particularly the sharing of personal data, can give rise to human rights concerns because recipients may undertake actions on the basis of this information that might result in the limitation of human rights. Consequently, we also describe in this chapter how, and with whom, the AFSJ bodies are sharing information.\n\n## 2.1. Europol 2.1.1. Legal Basis And Main Tasks\n\n\nThe Europol Convention of 26 July 199515 established Europol as an international organisation in 1995 and entered into force on 1 October 1998. In order to provide Europol with a more flexible legal basis16, its legal basis was changed into a Council Decision that was formally adopted by the JHA Council of 6 April 2009.17 With the new Decision, Europol was changed into an EU Agency. Europol is likely to be given again a new legal basis within the next three years because Article 88 of the Treaty of Lisbon provides that the European Parliament and the Council, by means of regulations adopted in accordance with the ordinary legislative procedure, shall determine Europol's structure, operation, field of action and tasks. In response, the European Commission has stated, in its Action Plan Implementing the Stockholm Programme, that a Proposal for a Regulation on Europol will be put forward in 2013.18 Europol's formal objective as the EU's law enforcement agency is to support and strengthen action by the competent authorities of the Member States and their mutual cooperation in preventing and combating organised crime, terrorism and other forms of serious crime affecting two or more Member States. Its six principal tasks are: (a) to collect, store, process, analyse and exchange information and intelligence; (b) to notify the Member States without delay of information concerning them and of any connections identified between criminal offences; (c) to aid investigations in the Member States, in particular by forwarding all relevant information to the national units; (d) to ask the competent authorities of the Member States concerned to initiate, conduct or coordinate investigations, and to suggest the setting up of joint investigation teams in specific cases; (e) to provide intelligence and analytical support to Member States in connection with major international events; and (f) to prepare threat assessments,\n\nstrategic analyses and general situation reports relating to its objective, including organised crime threat assessments.19 Europol's two main 'strategic intelligence' products are the EU Terrorism Situation and Trend Reports (TESAT) and the European Organised Crime Threat Assessment (OCTA)20.\n\nThe OCTA is especially important since it is the document on which the Council of the EU\nbases its priorities and recommendations for the fight against organised crime in Europe.21\nThis analytical report is produced by the strategic analysts in Europol's Analysis and Knowledge Unit, which draws on contributions from the Analytical Work Files,22 Europol's SCAN Team23 and external partners, including Eurojust and third countries. The full version of OCTA is classified as 'restricted'24 and therefore not generally available to MEP's, but there is a public version of the document available. Additional tasks include: (a) developing specialist knowledge of the investigative procedures of the competent authorities of the Member States and to provide advice on investigations; and (b) providing strategic intelligence to assist and promote the efficient and effective use of the resources available at the national and Union levels for operational activities and the support of such activities. In 2010, Europol sent a mobile office with analysts to the Member States in order to provide them with on-the-spot assistance to analyse information on 31 occasions.25 Since March 2007, Europol has had a mandate to participate in a 'support capacity' in the activities of 'joint investigation teams' (JITs).26 Joint investigation teams consist of judicial and police authorities of at least two Member states, which are responsible for carrying out criminal investigations into specific matters for a limited period of time. In 2010, Europol participated in 7 JIT's and it supported other JIT's as well.27 Within the limits provided for by the law of the Member States where the JIT operates, Europol officials are allowed to assist in 'all' activities and exchange information with all the members. In practice, this means that Europol's assistance is limited to giving expert advice in setting up the JIT, and providing analytical support during the investigations. Investigators are able to share information on the spot without formal requests. Even as part of a JIT, Europol cannot take part in any coercive measures.28 Europol's staff also do not have immunity when they participate in joint investigation teams.29 In 2009, Europol received another task after the EU-US agreement on the processing and transfer of financial messaging data for purposes of the US Terrorist Finance Tracking Programme (TFTP Agreement) was adopted.30 This agreement regulates the transfer of bulk data from the 'Designated Provider' of international financial payment messaging services in Europe to US authorities (US Department of the Treasury) in order to support the prevention, investigation, detection, or prosecution of terrorism or terrorist financing.\n\nEuropol was given the task of verifying whether requests from the US to obtain financial messaging data stored in the EU by the Designated Provider comply with a number of data protection related criteria that were outlined in Article 4.2 of the TFTP agreement. After this verification procedure, Europol is required to notify the designated provider that it has verified these requests; the requests then have binding legal effect in the US and the EU. MEPs, national parliamentarians and national data protection authorities initially voiced concern over the secrecy surrounding the implementation of this agreement.31 When the TFTP Agreement entered into force on 1 August 2010, Europol classified the handling of US requests at the level of 'RESTREINT UE/EU RESTRICTED', partly in view of technical limitations in the secure information exchange system between Europol and the US. After a leak of a document describing the 'technical modalities' of how Europol would exercise its verification role, the US demanded that Europol classify these requests as 'SECRET UE/EU\nSecret', which it has done since November 2010.32 Later, the Europol Joint Supervisory Body (see chapter three) and several members of the European Parliament criticised Europol for agreeing to the requests from the US on the basis of too little information.33 It is interesting to note that Europol has received so much criticism about a task it never asked for and which is not part of its core mandate.\n\n## 2.1.2. Powers\n\n Europol currently has 698 personnel, including 100 analysts and 129 seconded liaison officers from the competent national agencies at Europol.34 Europol also hosts liaison officers from 10 third countries and organisations who work together with Europol on the basis of cooperation agreements.35 These liaison officers are subject to the national law of the seconding Member States and they are sent to Europol to represent the interests of the state within Europol.36 In 2010, Europol's total budget was 92.8 million euro. From the description of its tasks, it is clear that Europol performs almost exclusively coordination and support functions. It shall 'support and strengthen' operational actions of the Member States, which predominantly means that it can make suggestions, provide analytical support or forward information to the Member States. It should be stressed that Europol officials do not have coercive powers, which are usually given to national intelligence agencies. Notably, Europol personnel cannot conduct searches of property, intercept communications, or conduct surveillance; nor can they question, arrest or detain suspects.37 Equally, Europol cannot ask member states' authorities to use such powers against a person. Finally, Europol doesn't have its own informants; information from private persons may only be processed by Europol if it is received via a national unit or via the contact point of a third state with which Europol has concluded a cooperation agreement.38 Since its inception, questions have been raised as to whether Europol will eventually be an\n'FBI style' international police force which has coercive powers in dealing with serious crime with a cross-border element in Europe.39 This concern returned with every amendment to the original Europol Convention40 and it is likely to come up again in the run-up to the adoption of a Europol Regulation. In this context, it is important to note that Article 88 (3) of the TFEU clearly states that 'any operational action by Europol must be carried out in liaison and in agreement with the authorities of the Member State or States whose territory is concerned. The application of coercive measures shall be the exclusive responsibility of the competent national authorities'. Equally, several interviewees pointed out that it is very unlikely that Member States will ever allow a European Agency to use coercive powers on their territory, against their citizens.41\n\nEuropol relies predominantly42 on Member States when it comes to 'collecting' intelligence on serious crimes.43 Europol may of course directly retrieve and process data, including personal data, from publicly available 'open sources' such as media and public data and commercial intelligence providers.44 The only other two sources from which it receives intelligence seem to be third states and international organisations. Europol National Units in the Member States and liaison officers have the right to put personal data into the Europol Information System; the primary purpose of this system is to collate data contributed by different Member States and third parties with the aim of identifying patterns. This data relates to two categories of persons. The first category consists of those persons that are suspected of having committed a criminal offence in respect of which Europol is competent or who have been convicted of such an offence.\n\nMember States can lower this initial threshold of inserting information by also adding information on a second category of persons regarding whom there are 'factual indications or reasonable grounds under the national law of the Member State concerned to believe that they will commit criminal offences in respect of which Europol is competent'.45 Article\n13.6 of the Europol Decision states that 'competent authorities designated to that effect by the Member States' can also provide intelligence to Europol, which could include state security and/or civilian and military intelligence agencies. In practice, however, this rarely happens. The bulk of data consists of criminal intelligence coming from national police authorities.46 In December 2010, the EIS contained information about more than 35,000\npersons.47 It is important to note that liaison officers assist in the exchange of information with liaison officers of other Member States under their responsibility in accordance with national law. Such bilateral exchanges may also cover crimes which fall outside the competence of Europol, as far as allowed by national law.48 According to one observer, it is\n'tragic' that 'four fifths of the information exchanged by national liaison officers stationed at Europol is exchanged without actually going through Europol, and hence without being stored in Europol's information systems and without being accessible to Member States other than those directly involved'.49 The Analysis Work Files (AWFs) also contain sensitive data on potential witnesses, victims, informants, and contacts and associates of a suspected criminal. This data can reveal racial or ethnic origin, and information relating to political opinions, religious or philosophical beliefs, trade union membership, health or the sex life of a person. Only Member States with a need to know have access to a case-related AWF. If an analysis is of a general nature and of a strategic type, all Member States, through liaison officers and/or experts, shall be fully cognizant of the findings thereof.50 Europol's dependence on criminal intelligence from national law enforcement agencies is often regarded as its biggest weakness.51 In many EU states, national police agencies still remain to be convinced of the added value of Europol and have concerns about the further dissemination of information they share with Europol. In addition, national police forces may decline to provide information, if doing so would, for instance, harm national security interests or jeopardise the success of ongoing investigations and/or the safety of individuals.52 Consequently, they do not necessarily share information through Europol and cannot be compelled to do so. Indeed, bilateral and informal exchanges of information and data is still the preferred *modus operandi* for many agencies, as much less stringent data protection regulations apply when information is exchanged through bilateral channels rather than through Europol. 53\n\n\n## 2.1.3. Relationships With Third Parties 2.1.3.1. Other Eu Agencies\n\n Europol and Eurojust concluded a first operational agreement in 2004, which was revised in 2009. The main purpose of this agreement is 'to make the investigation and prosecution of crimes within the [agencies'] respective mandates as efficient as possible and to avoid duplication of effort wherever possible'. This agreement provides for the exchange of operational, strategic or technical information, and even personal data. In 2008, a secure communication link was established to facilitate the exchange of information between Europol and Eurojust. Europol and Eurojust have also agreed on a table of equivalence to exchange classified information above the level of 'restricted'. In addition to information sharing, a staff exchange programme between Europol and Eurojust started in 2011.\n\nEuropol and Eurojust write joint press releases54 and joint documents, for instance, on judicial-police cooperation in operational cases for the EU's Standing Committee on operation cooperation on internal security (COSI).55 Point III.2.3 of the Hague Programme\n('Police cooperation'), Annex I of the Presidency Conclusions of the Brussels European Council (4/5 November 2004),56 provides that Eurojust and Europol '...should report annually to the Council on their common experiences and about specific results...'. These reports are not sent to the EP.\n\nEuropol has had a cooperation agreement with Frontex since 2008.57 This agreement is of a strategic nature and allows only for the exchange of strategic and technical information,58\nexplicitly excluding the exchange of personal data. This includes, for instance, information on new methods used in committing offences, routes and changes in routes used by smugglers, threat assessments, risk analysis and crime situation reports. Technical information includes police working methods as well as investigative procedures and results, training methods, criminal intelligence analytical methods and identification of law enforcement expertise. Experts of Eurojust and Frontex may be invited to the analysis of work files, provided that the conditions of Article 14.8 of the Europol Decision are fulfilled.\n\nEuropol and Frontex have also produced joint reports to the Council.59 Europol has had a strategic agreement in the form of a memorandum of understanding with Sitcen since 2005 (see below). It is not available to the European Parliament.\n\n## 2.1.3.2. Agreements With Third States And Organisations\n\n Europol can conclude cooperation agreements with third states and international organisations. Such agreements may concern the exchange of operational, strategic or\n\ntechnical information, including personal data and classified information.60 Agreements with third states and organisations may be concluded only after receiving the approval of the Council, which has to consult the Europol Management Board and, as far as it concerns the exchange of personal data, obtain the opinion of the Joint Supervisory Body via the Management Board (see below). Europol currently has operational agreements with Interpol, Australia, Canada, Croatia, Iceland, Norway, Switzerland and the United States, including a 'supplemental agreement'\non exchange of personal data with the US. It has strategic agreements with Albania, Bosnia\n& Herzegovina, Colombia, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Moldova, Russia, Turkey, Serbia, Montenegro, Ukraine and the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) and the World Customs Organisation. Before the adoption of the Lisbon Treaty, the European Parliament rejected the draft Council decision determining the list of third States and organisations with which Europol could conclude agreements.61 MEP's also criticised the agreement that was concluded in\n2001 between Europol and the US. This agreement was supplemented by another agreement on 20 December 2002 to allow the exchange of personal data. Members of the European Parliament expressed concern at the time about these agreements since the US\ndid not afford an equal level of data protection to its citizens and was, furthermore, unable to provide a list of all the agencies that could request or have access to data provided by Europol. One observer noticed that this measure was being 'rushed through' and provided 'no realistic opportunity for national and European parliaments or civil society to subject the proposal to proper scrutiny.62 The new Europol Regulation to be adopted is likely to address this issue.\n\n## 2.2. Eurojust 2.2.1. Legal Basis And Main Tasks\n\n The decision to create Eurojust was taken in October 1999 at the Council in Tampere in order to improve, simplify and speed up the coordination and cooperation between the judicial authorities of the Member States in investigations and prosecutions of serious organised crime cases.63 The Nice Treaty of 26 February 200164 provided an explicit treaty basis for a new EU agency. This was given effect by the Eurojust Council Decision of February 2002, which finally established Eurojust as a 'body of the Union' with legal personality.65 Eurojust's Council Decision was subsequently amended in 200366 and 2008.67\nThe new Eurojust Decision strengthened Eurojust's operational capabilities and enhanced its relationship with third parties; it entered into force on 4 of June 2009.68 The Treaty of Lisbon (Article 85) provides for the development of a new legal basis for Eurojust, in accordance with the ordinary legislative procedure. The European Parliament and the Council, by means of legislation adopted in accordance with the ordinary legislative procedure, shall determine Eurojust's structure, operation, field of action and tasks in the future, which might include, according to Article 85 of the TFEU: (a) the initiation of criminal investigations, as well as proposing the initiation of prosecutions conducted by competent national authorities, particularly those relating to offences against the financial interests of the Union; (b) the coordination of investigations and prosecutions referred to in point (a); and (c) the strengthening of judicial cooperation, including by resolution of conflicts of jurisdiction and by close cooperation with the European Judicial Network. The European Commission has stated in its Action Plan Implementing the Stockholm Programme that a Proposal for a Regulation on Eurojust will be brought forward in 2012.69 The objectives of Eurojust are to 'stimulate and improve' the coordination of investigations and prosecutions in the Member States by facilitating the execution of international mutual legal assistance and the implementation of extradition requests, or by any other form of support to the competent authorities of the Member States in order to render their investigations and prosecutions more effective.70 In 2009, Eurojust held 141 coordination meetings, which dealt with 1,222 'standard' cases and 150 'complex cases'. Forty-five per cent of the cases dealt with fraud, 17% with drug trafficking, 14% with terrorism, 6% with murder and 5% with trafficking in human beings. At these coordination meetings, representatives of judicial and police authorities of the involved countries can meet each other and discuss the state of proceedings, verify the requirements for mutual legal assistance or decide upon the strategy on how to solve a case (who prosecutes what where). Eurojust financially supports these meetings by paying the travel, accommodation and translation costs of these meetings. Each member state sends a prosecutor, judge or 'police officer of equivalent competence'\nwho has his/her regular place of work at the seat of Eurojust.71 Eurojust can act through these national members72 or as a 'college'. The College consists of all the national members and each national member has one vote.73 Eurojust will act as a college in three main situations: when a Member State requests that a case is dealt with by Eurojust, when the case involves investigations or prosecutions which have repercussions at the Union level or which might affect Member States other than those directly concerned, or when a general question relating to the achievement of its objectives is involved. Under the current legal framework, Eurojust's mandate and powers are clearly focussed on coordination, the provision of advice and support. Eurojust does not prosecute cases and does not have any enforcement powers of its own.\n\n## 2.2.2. Powers\n\n Eurojust consists of the College composed of 27 National Members. They are judges, prosecutors or police officers with equivalent powers (in line with the legal system of the Member State). Besides the College, there are approximately 140 staff members, including administrative staff and the Case Management Team that are paid by the EU, as well as the deputies, secretaries and seconded national experts that assist the National Members of the College. EU officials may also be seconded to Eurojust as temporary staff. In 2010, Eurojust had a budget of 30.2 million euro. The budget does not cover the salaries of national members. Initially, the powers of the national members were defined on the basis of national law, which contributed to both a lack of clarity and substantial discrepancies regarding the extent of the powers of Eurojust in Member States.74 The 2008 amendment to Eurojust's Decision made it clear, however, that all Member States in their capacity as competent national authorities are entitled to receive, transmit, facilitate, follow up and provide supplementary information in relation to the execution of requests for, and decisions on, judicial cooperation, including regarding instruments giving effect to the principle of mutual recognition.75 All the Member States had to implement this amendment by June 2011. Eurojust, both acting as a College and through its national members, may ask (but not compel) the competent authorities in Member States to: (i) undertake an investigation or prosecution of specific acts; (ii) accept that a specific member state may be in a better position to undertake an investigation or to prosecute specific acts; (iii) coordinate between the competent authorities of the Member States concerned; (iv) set up a joint investigation team; (v) provide it with any information that is necessary to carry out its tasks; (vi) take special investigative measures; and (vii) take any other measure justified for the investigation or prosecution. Eurojust created an EU-wide judicial database called the Case Management System (CMS), which contains sensitive information on all investigations and prosecutions reported to Eurojust. The rapporteur of the European Parliament on the revision of the Eurojust Decision stated that it is important for Eurojust 'to maintain closed lists of data (on persons who are the subjects of a criminal investigation) and data which should be allowed being processed by Eurojust'.76 National judicial authorities also have access to the CMS of Eurojust through the Eurojust national coordination system.\n\n\n\n2.2.3.\nRelations with third parties\n\n2.2.3.1.\nOther EU agencies\n Eurojust shall establish and maintain 'cooperative relations' with Europol, Frontex and the Council, in particular its Situation Centre, according to Article 26.1 of the Eurojust Decision. As was noted above, Eurojust has concluded a cooperation agreement with Europol (see above). Eurojust will commence negotiations for cooperation with Frontex in 2011.77 It is not known whether a working agreement or arrangement exists between Eurojust and Sitcen. Article 26.3 of the Council Decision just stipulates that Eurojust may directly receive and use information from an entity included in Section 26.1, 'in so far as this is necessary for the legitimate performance of its tasks', and it may directly transmit information, including personal data, to these entitites 'in so far as this is necessary for the legitimate performance of the recipient's tasks and in accordance with the rules on data protection provided in this Decision'. This wording suggests at least that any arrangement between Sitcen and Eurojust would not involve the sending of personal data from Eurojust to Sitcen, since Sitcen does not have a mandate to process personal data. Such agreements or working arrangements may only be concluded after consultation by Eurojust with the Joint Supervisory Body (see chapter three).\n\n## 2.2.3.2. Third States And Organisations\n\n Like Europol, Eurojust may conclude agreements with third states and international organisations.78 Such agreements facilitate the coordination of investigations and prosecutions in other countries. Eurojust has concluded agreements with Norway, Iceland, Romania, the United States of America, Croatia, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and Switzerland. It has concluded further memoranda of understanding with UNODC, CEPOL, the European Judicial Training Network and the Iberoamerican Network of\n\nInternational Legal Cooperation.79 In 2010, it continued the negotiation of an agreement with the Russian Federation, as well as with Moldova, Liechtenstein, Albania, Cape Verde, Montenegro, Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Israel.80 Eurojust may only conclude the agreements after approval by the Council, acting by qualified majority. Such agreements may include sharing of personal data. Eurojust has to inform the Council of any plans it has for entering into any such negotiations and the Council may draw any conclusions it deems appropriate.81\n\n2.3. Frontex\n\n\n## 2.3.1. Legal Basis And Mandate\n\n\nIn contrast to Europol and Eurojust, Frontex was created by a Council Regulation82 in order to improve the 'integrated management' of the external borders of the European Union by coordinating the operational cooperation of EU Member States, Schengen Associated Countries and other partners. The Agency became operational in October 2005. Currently, a new Regulation is in the final stages of being developed; this section addresses Frontex's legal framework as it stands in April 2011 when the new regulation was not yet adopted.83 Frontex's responsibilities fall into two principal categories. The first one is providing technical and informational assistance to Member States by training of national border guards, following up on the development of research relevant for the control and surveillance of external borders and delivering risk analyses to Member States. The agency's tasks as regards risk analysis are to 'develop and apply a common integrated risk analysis model' to 'prepare both general and tailored risk analyses to be submitted to the Council and the Commission' and to 'incorporate the results of' its risk analysis model in its development of a training curriculum for border guards.84 The second responsibility is the coordination of operational activities between Member States in the field of management of external borders. This includes assisting Member States when they need increased technical and operational assistance at external borders; providing Member States with the necessary support in organising joint return operations; and deploying Rapid Border Intervention Teams to Member States in accordance with Regulation (EC) No 863/2007.85\n\n\n## 2.3.2. Powers\n\n Currently, 286 people are working for Frontex, of which 73 persons are seconded national experts (SNE). Frontex seconded officers come from a national, regional or local public administration or an intergovernmental organisation and must possess a security clearance.\n\nThese SNE's assist the Frontex staff, including by participating in Frontex missions. SNEs 'acting alone' will not exercise any of the responsibilities that belong to Frontex by virtue of the powers conferred upon it, unless the Executive Directors have explicitly empowered the SNE in writing.86 The agency's budget in 2010 was 92.8 million euro.87 Frontex is first and foremost a coordination agency whose task is to enable and facilitate the exchange of operational information between the border guards of Member States and the pooling of technical and human assets.88 Frontex has a situation centre which gathers and collates information from partner countries, within and beyond the EU's borders, as well as from open sources such as academic publications and the press, in order to monitor the day-to-day situation at the EU's external borders. Member States provide Frontex with information on illegal border crossings, illegal stays, refusals of entry, asylum applications, facilitation, false documents and returns of illegal stayers. Until now, Frontex has not had the opportunity to process personal data. It is important to note that Frontex does not have its own border guards. All officials that participate in a border operation or a 'returns operation' remain national border guards who exercise their tasks in accordance with their national laws.89 Members of Rapid Border Intervention Teams (RABIT) are paid by the Member States but receive a daily subsistence allowance from Frontex. These border guards may only perform tasks and exercise powers for border checks or border surveillance in accordance with the Schengen Borders Code.90\nWhile performing their tasks and exercising their powers, members of the teams may carry service weapons, ammunition and equipment as authorised according to the home Member State's national law. However, the host Member State may prohibit the carrying of certain service weapons, ammunition and equipment, provided that its own legislation applies the same prohibition to its own border guards. All actions of a Frontex-coordinated operation happen, as a general rule, in the presence of border guards of the host Member State. The host state's command officer has the operational responsibility for the team and has the power to give instructions to his assigned team. Frontex also appoints one or more Coordinating Officers who may express the views of the Agency on the instructions of the host state, which is obliged to take these views into consideration.91\n\n\n2.3.3.\nRelations with third parties\n\n2.3.3.1.\nOther EU agencies\n Frontex has a cooperation agreement with Europol (see above), which authorises the exchange of classified information at a 'restricted' level. Frontex is currently implementing a Secure Area Network that will allow it to handle classified information up to the level of EU 'restricted'. Frontex's to be adopted new regulation (see below) will allow the agency to exchange personal data with Europol.92 As stated before, Frontex and Eurojust are currently preparing a cooperation agreement. It is not clear if and how Frontex is cooperating with Sitcen.\n\n## 2.3.3.2. Third Countries And International Organisations\n\n According to Frontex, the establishment of operational cooperation with third countries is valued as 'an indispensable tool' for effective management of the global fight against illegal migration and cross-border crime.93 The agreements are concluded with law enforcement authorities with operational responsibility for border control, as well as regional border control cooperation structures. Frontex has signed other 'working agreements' on the establishment of operational cooperation with the competent authorities of 13 third countries.94 These working agreements typically include that Frontex and the third state will develop 'activities in the field of information exchange and risk analyses', and the coordination of 'certain joint operational measures and pilot projects for maintaining and improving border control' between EU member states and the third country. The Council, Commission and the Parliament have little to say in the formulation and signing of these agreements. The Regulation merely states that Frontex may cooperate with the authorities of third countries and international organisations through working arrangements concluded with these authorities 'in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Treaty'. De Witte and Rijpma find it problematic that these arrangements take the form of bilateral international agreements or non-binding memoranda of understanding, since often the non-binding legal nature of these bilateral agreements means that they are not published and are kept secret from the public.95 Along the same lines, Peers further notes96 that the texts of these agreements are not online and little is known about their application in practice.\n\n## 2.4. The Eu's Situation Centre (Sitcen) 2.4.1. Legal Basis And Main Tasks\n\n The EU's Joint Situation Centre (Sitcen) was created in 2000 by an administrative decision of the first High Representative of the Union for the Common Foreign and Security Policy, Javier Solana, as a distinct entity that would support the EU's response to crisis situations outside the Union. Sitcen was attached to the Office of the High Representative and, as an integral part of the General Secretariat of the Council, its legal basis was the same as the General Secretariat of the Council, i.e., Article 207(2) of the Treaty of the European Communities. As the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) became operational in\n2001, and after the 9/11 attacks of that same year, the Member States asked Solana to draw up proposals of how a broader intelligence analysis structure could be put in place. Solana decided to use Sitcen as the institutional framework in which to embed a broader range of analysis and assessment functions.97 After the 2004 Madrid bombings, the Council gave Sitcen the additional task of providing the Council with strategic terrorist threat assessments, based on intelligence from national services, and the improved exchange of information with Europol.98 For this purpose, in January 2005 Sitcen's Analysis Unit established links with the Counter-Terrorism Group, which is an informal gathering of the heads of EU Member States' security services, plus\n__________________________________________________________________________________________\nthose of Switzerland and Norway.99 Whenever there is a significant event with a possible terrorism aspect, the EU counter-terrorism coordinator is also instantly alerted and kept informed throughout the crisis about the situation by Sitcen.100 Accordingly, it began to play a role as an actor that influences the EU's internal security policies. After it was given this task, Sitcen started to host seconded intelligence officials from the Member States to assist it with this task. With the establishment of the European External Action Service in 2010, the Situation Centre has been transferred to the EEAS.101 In the new structure of the European External Action Service, Sitcen reports to three main actors: the Chair of the Political and Security Committee, the Managing Director for Crisis Response and Operational Coordination, and the EEAS 'Crisis Management Structures'. These structures consist of other former staff of the General Secretariat of the Council, including EU Military Staff and its 'Watchkeeping Capability' and the Crisis Management and Planning Directorate (including the 'Crisis Room') of the Commission. The Commission had a 'crisis room' of six people which maintained a platform for exchange of information between the Commission and EU\nDelegations during acute crises.102 The integration of Sitcen's operations unit, the Watchkeeping Capability and the Crisis Room will allow a larger unit of people to work 24/7 to support the EU Delegations' network worldwide, and Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) Operations.103 These structures are placed under the direct authority and responsibility of the High Representative. This set-up suggests that Sitcen's main role will continue to be that of serving as the EU's information provider in crisis management situations, especially with regard to conflicts and the political dimension of natural disasters. In talks with Member States, Catherine Ashton has labelled Sitcen as the 'single crisis response centre'.104 Sitcen provides situationassessments during five phases of activity where such info is needed, which are: early warning, policy development, decision support, conduct of operations and mission evaluation.105 Sitcen aims to identify and analyse threats (as defined in the European Security Strategy) with the aim of providing early warning to policymakers responsible for the EU's prevention of and response to conflicts. Sitcen can even provide this assistance on the spot, since it has a small team of officials ready to deploy to a crisis location 'in order to assist the Presidency with coordination and communication functions'.106 Accordingly, the High Representative sent two Sitcen officials to Haiti in the aftermath of the earthquake in order to gather information, assist with consular issues, evacuate EU citizens, set up communications between Haiti and Brussels and set up a temporary EU office in the logistical base of the UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti.107 Recently, it was reported that a Sitcen official accompanied a European External Action Service (EEAS) fact-finding mission to Libya.108 While it is clear that Sitcen will primarily support decision making in the CFSP\nfield and thus focus on events outside the Union's borders, it will continue to provide the aforementioned assessments regarding terrorist threats within the Union. This means that it plays a role in the internal security of the EU. It is for this reason that it is of interest for this study, which as we noted in chapter one will not focus on the oversight of external intelligence gathering activities. It is important to note that Sitcen is the least well known and least understood of the AFSJ\nbodies discussed in this study. This is largely because it remains non-transparant in a\n\nnumber of respects: its founding document and mandate has not been made public. It does not issue public reports on its activities, or on the agreements it has concluded with EU bodies or other external actors. This lack of transparency has been counterproductive and has led to considerable misunderstanding regarding its functions and powers, including the misconception in some quarters of the European Parliament that Sitcen is the EU's equivalent of the CIA. The High Representative has stated to the European Parliament that neither Sitcen nor any other components of the EEAS is an 'intelligence service', and stressed that she has no intention of establishing one as part of the EEAS.109\n\n\n## 2.4.2. Powers\n\n The Council Decision on the EEAS states that the 'specificities' of the new Crisis Management structures shall be respected, as well as 'the particularities of their functions, recruitment and the status of the staff'.110 This is of particular relevance to Sitcen, which consists of around 120 officials, including a substantial number of seconded officials coming from national intelligence agencies. These officials were attached to Sitcen in the aftermath of the Madrid Bombings in 2004, when it was tasked with delivering strategic terrorist threat assessments to the European Union. A result of the presence of these seconded officials, the composition of the SitCen is considered classified information.111 The seconded officers are funded by the Member States and Sitcen's budget is not known. Sitcen does not have recourse to information collection powers that are generally possessed by national intelligence agencies. Its staff cannot, inter alia, engage in covert surveillance, intercept communications, or use human agents to gather information. Indeed, as the former Director of the Sitcen William Shapcott has stated, Sitcen has had\n'no operational role'112 and it is not likely to get such a role in the future. Its powers are\n'limited essentially to sharing assessed intelligence' with a view to producing evaluations to support policymakers in Brussels.113 Sitcen can therefore best be described as a fusion centre, in the sense that it fuses open source information, diplomatic reporting, military and civilian intelligence to produce all-source situation assessments. Sitcen conducts its work largely on the basis of open source information and 'assessed'\nintelligence from a variety of sources, including its seconded intelligence analysts and shared diplomatic reports. Sitcen does not have access to personal data or raw information from national agencies. Information from national intelligence agencies is provided at their discretion and on a strictly 'need to know' basis. Besides information coming from Member States and open sources, Sitcen also receives information 'which [is] not in the open source field but that [is] not in the intelligence field either', such as the EU monitoring mission in the Balkans, or the Aceh Monitoring Mission.114 Sitcen also has access to images from EU\ngovernment-owned satellites, namely France's Helios and Pleiades systems, Germany's SAR-Lupe and Italy's Cosmo-SkyMed, on top of existing data from US-owned commercial satellites.115 Sitcen receives some diplomatic information from all 135 EU delegations in the world,116 which consists of approximately 5000 officials and a continuous stream of political reports on the situations unfolding on the ground,117 which helpinter aliato inform it about the terrorist threats the EU is facing.\n\n## 2.4.3. Relationship With Third Parties\n\n In September 2009, the Council stated that the following actors received Sitcen products:\nthe Presidency, the Member States, the Council's civilian and military authorities, CFSP, ESDP and third-pillar structures, Commission DGs and partner agencies (RELEX, DEV, JLS, EUROPOL), and national civilian and military contributors.118 It has also provided briefings to MEPs in advance of visits by EP delegations to certain states outside the EP.119\nNevertheless, former Sitcen director William Shapcott has stated that Sitcen 'not often'\nprovided info to actors outside the Council. Sitcen has a memorandum of understanding for exchanging information with Europol. There are no details known about this arrangement, except that Europol and Sitcen only exchange 'finished products'.120 The main analytical reports from Frontex are regularly shared with Sitcen.121 Sitcen also cooperates with NATO and the UN (including the World Food Programme, UNHCR, UNICEF, OCHA) and the African Union.122\n\n\n## 2.5. Conclusion\n\n This chapter has provided an overview of the legal bases, mandates and powers of the four AFSJ bodies addressed in this study. We have shown that the AFSJ bodies' mandates and powers primarily consist of two elements: coordinating and supporting the work of national agencies, and in the case of Europol and Eurojust, processing, storing and transferring personal data. However, these bodies do not have recourse to any coercive or special powers as they exist on a national level. Europol and Eurojust are the agencies that are currently authorised to process, store and transfer personal data within the parameters of their respective mandates. These are activities which interfere with the right to privacy and may serve as the basis for use of coercive or special powers which have particularly significant human rights implications by member or third states' authorities. These concerns are amplified when information is shared between AFSJ bodies and third countries that may not respect international standards of human rights and data protection. In view of this, these activities clearly need to be subject to oversight by an independent body. It is a point of concern that often, the agreements upon which such sharing takes place, are not available to the EP, for example, the working agreements between Frontex and third countries, and the agreement between Sitcen and Europol. This chapter also made it clear that the EP does not seem to have access to all threat assessments which the AFSJ bodies produce. Without this information, it is hard for the EP to fully assess whether, in order to counter these threats, the AFSJ bodies may, for example, need new powers (i.e. requiring legislative amendments), additional resources or new cooperation agreements with particular third states. An additional matter of concern relates to the lack of transparency of the Sitcen. As mentioned above, its founding document and mandate have not been made public. It does not issue public reports on its activities, or on the agreements it has concluded with EU bodies or other external actors. This lack of transparency has led to the creation of counterproductive myths on the nature of Sitcen's activities. It is in the interests for both Sitcen and the EP that Sitcen becomes more transparent. This chapter has also shown that Member States' police, prosecutorial, border and (to a much lesser extent) intelligence agencies are both the principal suppliers and the main customers of the AFSJ bodies. Indeed, the AFSJ bodies function primarily on the basis of information provided by national authorities, such as police and prosecutorial services, and their principal output is the information and analysis which is sent to these agencies. National authorities may take action unilaterally or as part of joint operations coordinated by an AFSJ agency, on the basis of such information. These actions may range from inserting information into a database to arresting and detaining individuals. They are undertaken by employees of national authorities, in accordance with national law and are therefore, more appropriately overseen by national oversight mechanisms, including the judicial bodies and parliamentary committees. In the following chapter, we will discuss how national parliaments can oversee the decisions and actions of their state's representatives in the AFSJ.\n\n## Chapter 3. Parliamentary And Specialised Oversight Of The Eu's Afsj Bodies\n\n\nThis chapter consists of three sections. The first section will examine the specialised nonparliamentary oversight bodiesthe Joint Supervisory Bodiesthe EU has created to oversee how Europol and Eurojust process and transfer personal data. Since the oversight of the AFSJ bodies, especially of Europol and Eurojust, is a shared responsibility of the EP\nand the national parliaments, the second section of this chapter will outline how national parliaments oversee the AFSJ bodies. Since the Treaty on the Functioning of European Union (TFEU) gives the EP and national parliaments an explicit mandate to oversee Europol and Eurojust, we will focus on these two bodies. In the last section of this chapter we will assess which powers and tools the EP has at its disposal to oversee the AFSJ bodies. This assessment is necessary in order to identify any weaknesses in the EP's current oversight of the AFSJ bodies, which could be addressed through the adoption of practices from national systems of oversight of intelligence agencies, which will be discussed in chapter four. Given that access to relevant information is an important foundation of oversight, we will pay particular attention to the legal framework for access to AFSJ-related information by the EP. Since the focus of this study is on oversight by parliament and specialised oversight bodies, a detailed discussion on how the AFSJ bodies are subject to executive oversight (by the Council or the Commission), judicial oversight (by the European Court of Justice), internal oversight (by the Management Boards) or of the European Ombudsman and the European Anti-Fraud Office is outside the scope of this study.\n\n## 3.1. The Joint Supervisory Bodies For Europol And Eurojust\n\n Chapter two made clear that some of the few operational powers Europol and Eurojust have are the processing, storing and transfer personal data. The EU created two independent\n'joint supervisory bodies' (JSBs) for Europol and Eurojust,123 which review the activities of these agencies in order to ensure that the processing of personal data is carried out in accordance with the applicable legal framework.124 Since Regulation (EC) 45/2001 would apply to the future processing of personal data by Frontex, the European Data Protection Supervisor monitors the application of the provisions of this Regulation to all processing operations carried out by Frontex. Sitcen is not used for the exchange or analysis of personal data.125 The JSB's mandate includes reviewing the permissibility of the transmission of data to third parties. Europol and Eurojust have to guarantee a level of data protection which corresponds at minimum with the principles of the 1981 Council of Europe Convention for the Protection of Individuals with regard to Automatic Processing of Personal Data.126 The JSBs must give their opinion at two stages when agreements on information sharing with third countries are concluded. First, they give an opinion on a draft agreement. Secondly, they have to ensure that the third party maintains an adequate level of data protection in the implementation of the agreement. This is an extremely important role since the European Parliament is not informed and does not play any formal role in the drafting of such agreements or, indeed, their review once they have been signed. Both bodies also serve as an appellate body for persons who request access, correction or deletion of data held by Europol and Eurojust.127 To lodge an appeal, a person should write to the JSB within three months of receiving an unsatisfactory reply from Europol or Eurojust. Persons may also refer to the Europol JSB if they have submitted a request to Europol for access to their own personal data or for this information to be checked, corrected or deleted and have not received a reply after more three months. It is hard to assess the effectiveness of these complaint mechanisms as both JSB's have addressed a very limited amount of cases. Eurojust's JSB has, since its inception, only dealt with two appeals, while Europol's JSB has handled nine cases since it was established.\n\nBoth JSBs have additional tasks beyond these core functions. Since 2010, the Europol JSB\nhas been responsible for monitoring whether Europol respects the personal data protection principles in the Terrorist Financing Tracking Programme (TFTP) Agreement when deciding on the admissibility of the US' requests to the Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication (SWIFT). (see below) The Eurojust JSB is also a body to which the Eurojust Data Protection Officer (DPO) may appeal in the event that in her/his view Eurojust has failed to comply with applicable data processing rules. The DPO can refer the matter to the JSB if the Eurojust College has not resolved a finding of non-compliance with these rules within a reasonable time.128 The Eurojust JSB also supervises the activities of Eurojust liaison magistrates abroad.129\n\n\n## 3.1.1. Composition\n\n Europol's JSB is composed of a maximum of two members or representatives of each of the independent national supervisory bodies. These national bodies have the task to monitor independently, in accordance with their national law, the permissibility of the input, the retrieval and any communication to Europol of personal data by the Member State concerned, and to examine whether such input, retrieval or communication violates the rights of the data subject.130 In comparison, Eurojust's JSB is quite small; it is composed of one representative from each Member State, three of whom are permanent members. The three permanent members meet four times per year in The Hague and they are joined by one or more ad hoc judges for the examination of an appeal concerning personal data from the Member State that appointed them. Europol's JSB also meets four times per year.131\nThe JSBs are supported by a small secretariat in Brussels that advises the JSB, prepares their meetings and assists with inspections.132\nThe meetings of the JSBs are not public and the members are bound by a confidentiality agreement.133 This confidentiality is necessary given that individual cases, and thus personal data, may be under discussion. While Europol's JSB issues 'public minutes' that summarise the items that were discussed at a meeting, Eurojust's JSB does not follow this practice. Documents of the JSBs are, in principle, accessible to the public but access can be refused where it is necessary to protect any one of a broad range of public interests. For example, Europol's JSB shall refuse access to a document where such refusal is necessary: (a) to protect security and public order in the Member States or to prevent crime; (b) to protect the rights and freedoms of third parties; (c) to enable Europol to fulfil its tasks properly; and/or (d) to enable the Joint Supervisory Body to fulfil its tasks properly. These considerations 'cannot be overridden by the interests of the applicant'.134 The Eurojust JSB\ncan refuse public access to a document where disclosure would undermine the protection of: (1) the public interest as regards: (a) public security and criminal investigations; (b) defence and military matters; (c) international relations; (d) the financial, monetary or economic policy of the Community or a Member State; (e) the fulfilment of Eurojust's tasks in reinforcing the fight against serious crime; (f) national investigations in which Eurojust is assisting; and (2) privacy and the integrity of the individual, in particular in accordance with the rules regarding the protection of personal data.135 In addition, the Eurojust Joint Supervisory Body shall refuse access to a document where, among other things, disclosure would undermine court proceedings, the purpose of inspections, investigations and audits,\n'unless there is an overriding public interest in disclosure'.136 Where the Joint Supervisory Body holds a document received from a third party or which contains information on a third party, it shall consult with that third party with a view to assessing whether an exception is applicable, unless it is clear that the document shall or shall not be disclosed.\n\n\n\n## 3.1.2. Powers\n\n In order to fulfil their tasks, both JSBs have access to all files and premises where personal data is being processed. Europol and Eurojust have to supply all documents, paper files or data stored in Europol's or Eurojust's data files. Both JSBs have free access to all Europol and Eurojust premises at any time, and they carry out inspections *in situ*. In practice, the JSBs notify the agencies in advance of their visit. Europol's JSB visits Europol once a year for a full inspection, while Eurojust's JSB inspects Eurojust 'fully' every two years with a follow-up visit the next year. Where necessary, additional inspections dedicated to specific issues are carried out. This has not happened at Eurojust yet but the Europol JSB carried out an inspection in November 2010 to evaluate Europol's implementation of the TFTP Agreement. The Europol JSB has issued a three page summary on the eight inspections it did at Europol between 2005 and 2008 but there is no information available on any of the annual inspections it carried out after 2008. The JSB provided a helpful public version of its additional TFTP inspection in November 2010. Europol's JSB issues non-binding opinions on Europol's activities that have a data protection dimension; indeed, Europol's Management Board is obliged to consult with the JSB in this regard. Europol's Joint Supervisory Body has, for instance, issued opinions on implementing rules, such as 'the draft Management Board rules on receipt of information from private parties', and it also gives its opinion on draft agreements with third countries.137 The JSB has binding powers only in appellate cases (discussed above) covered by Article 32.4 of the Europol decision. Acting on the basis of a two-thirds majority, the JSB can overrule Europol's decision not to give access to data input by Europol in the Europol Information System, data stored in the analysis work files or in any other system established by Europol. Failure to comply with a final decision of the Appeals Committee is best regarded as a violation of the Europol Decision. If the JSBs discover violations of the provisions of the Eurojust or Europol Decision with regard to the storage, processing or utilisation of personal data, it shall inform Eurojust or the Director of Europol accordingly and shall request a reply within a given period. Failure to comply with a decision of the Eurojust Joint Supervisory Body taken in accordance with its Rules of Procedure shall be regarded as a violation of the Eurojust Decision. Decisions of the Joint Supervisory Body shall then be final and binding on Eurojust.138 If the Europol Joint Supervisory Body considers that a reply is insufficient, not submitted in a timely manner, or if any other difficulty arises, it can refer the matter in writing to the Management Board. Equally, if the JSB is not satisfied with the director of Europol's response to a complaint regarding a violation of data protection standards by Europol, it can refer the matter to the Management Board. The fact that the JSBs have never resorted to this 'conciliation procedure' may indicate that the JSBs have sufficient power to ensure that Europol and Eurojust comply with data protection rules. According to several persons interviewed for this research, the JSBs' work has been well received by the agencies and other relevant actors, and their recommendations are nearly always implemented.139\nMoreover, the European Data Protection Supervisor has applauded the JSB for its input in the Europol-US agreement, where 'pressure of the JSB' led to a 'number of crucial safeguards with respect to the transfer of personal data to the US'.140 It is noteworthy that the work of the JSBs has attracted surprisingly little interest from the EP. Since 2003, Europol's JSB has sent its biennial activity reports to the EP. Eurojust's JSB\nhas done the same with its annual activity report. However, to the best of our knowledge, neither chair has been formally invited to the EP in order to discuss issues raised in their reports. One interviewee suggested that the EP rapporteurs on Europol have never consulted the JSB when drafting their reports, in spite of the JSBs' unique insight into Europol's activities.141 It should, nevertheless, be noted that there are signs this may be changing. At the time of writing, the Europol JSB's report on the Terrorist Financing Tracking Programme was generating significant interest from MEPs. In this context, the chair of the Europol JSB presented to Parliament the conclusions of its first inspection of Europol's role in the implementation of the TFTP agreement.142 Further dialogue of this nature should be strongly encouraged. When the director of Europol and the President of Eurojust present their annual reports, Parliament might use this opportunity to ask questions about if/how the agencies have followed up the recommendations of their respective JSBs.143 This is especially important in the context of the conclusion of draft agreements which are scrutinised by the JSB's.\n\n\n## 3.2. National Parliaments' Role In Overseeing The Afsj Bodies\n\n\nArticles 85 and 88 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) state specifically that the new regulations on Eurojust and Europol respectively have to 'determine arrangements for involving the European Parliament and national Parliaments in the evaluation of Eurojust's activities' and should 'lay down the procedures for scrutiny of Europol's activities by the European Parliament, together with national Parliaments'. Since the TFEU gave the EP, and national parliaments, an explicit mandate in the oversight of these two agencies, we will focus our attention on how national parliaments have overseen these two particular bodies. The Lisbon treaty does not specify a similar task for Frontex simply because the Treaty does not explicitly refer to Frontex. According to Peers, this omission may be because when the Constitutional Treaty (the precursor to the Treaty of Lisbon) was originally drafted and signed in 2002 to 2004, Frontex was not yet established.\n\n144 The different references to the role of the EP and national parliaments in Articles 85(1) and\n88(2) of the TFEU (i.e., 'the *evaluation* of Eurojust's activities' as distinct from the 'scrutiny of Europol's activities') are not explained in the *travaux* of the Convention which drew up the text of the Constitutional Treaty. Steve Peers points out that the difference might possibly be explained by the fact that judicial bodies are seen to need more independence from political control.145 This difference is also partly reflected in the fact that in those cases where national parliaments have been involved in scrutinising AFSJ Bodies, they have primarily been interested in scrutinising the work of Europol. As we have seen in chapter two, the AFSJ bodies consist of a mix of seconded personnel from the Member States and EU staff members. This unique intergovernmental feature of the AFSJ bodies requires that the EP works closely together with national parliaments. National staff members are paid by the Member States and cooperate with the agencies in accordance with national laws. As such, their cooperation with and contributions to an AFSJ body are more appropriately overseen by national parliaments and, where appropriate, non-parliamentary mechanisms on a national level. Eurojust is, however, different in this context because its national members benefit from a large degree of independence, which reflects the independent character of the judicial nature of the work they carry out. National parliaments play two other important roles in regard to the oversight of AFSJ bodies. First, they are responsible for ensuring that institutions respect the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality, and thus they play a role in assessing whether the AFSJ\nbodies are set up and acting in accordance with those principles. Second, in accordance with the constitutional rules of each member state, parliaments may hold their national governments and agencies to account for their policy on the EU and the AFSJ bodies in particular.\n\n## 3.2.1. Legal Framework At The Eu Level\n\n\nThe relevant legal framework that regulates the involvement of national parliaments in the oversight of AFSJ bodies can be found in the (1) Treaty on the European Union (TEU), (2)\nthe Protocol on the role of national parliaments in the European Union, (3) the TFEU and (4) the Rules of Procedures of the European Parliament. Article 12.c of the TEU sets out the different ways in which national parliaments may 'contribute actively to the good functioning of the Union', including through involvement in 'the political monitoring of Europol and the evaluation of Eurojust's activities'. Further detailed arrangements can be found in the 'Protocol on the role of national parliaments in the European Union'.146 Most importantly, Article 9 of the Protocol prescribes that 'the European Parliament and national Parliaments shall together determine the organisation and promotion of effective and regular inter-parliamentary cooperation within the Union'. The protocol sets out the various means through which this can be done. These include a requirement for the Commission to forward consultation documents (green and white papers and communications) to the national parliaments upon publication (Article 1). Secondly, draft legislative acts are sent to national parliaments (Article 2) and national parliaments may give a reasoned opinion to the EP, Council and Commission on whether such acts comply with the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality (Article 3). Thirdly, the Court of Auditors is required to forward its annual reports to national parliaments (Article 7). Lastly, in the context of interparliamentary cooperation, a conference of parliamentary committees for Union affairs (COSAC) may submit any contribution to the EP, Council and Commission, and it may organise inter-parliamentary conferences on specific topics, including AFSJ bodies (Article 10). A last set of rules concerning the role of national parliaments can be found in the Rules of Procedures (RoP) of the EP.147 The RoP of the EP sets out various ways of exchange of information, contacts between the EP and national parliaments (Rule 130), the functioning of the Conference of European Affairs Committees (COSAC, Rule 131) and the Conference of Parliaments (Rule 132).\n\n## 3.2.2. Legal Framework At The National Level\n\n\nIt needs to be underlined that national parliaments are sovereign in determining howand indeed, ifthey wish to oversee the EU in general, and the AFSJ bodies in particular. National parliamentary oversight of the AFSJ bodies is determined by the constitutional rules and statutory law of each Member State. Three levels of national parliamentary oversight of the AFSJ bodies can be distinguished: (1) holding national governments accountable for their actions concerning AFSJ bodies; (2) direct engagement with AFSJ bodies; and (3) participating in inter-parliamentary cooperation concerning AFSJ bodies. First, in accordance with the constitutional rules of each member state, national parliaments may participate in national decision making on EU affairs by monitoring and directing their own government's EU policy in the Area of Freedom, Justice and Security. In this context, national parliaments can scrutinise draft EU legislation and could hold their ministers in the Justice and Home Affairs Council to account when it approves changes to the mandates of the AFSJ bodies, gives (new) priorities to these bodies, or comments on the reports of these bodies.148 Some national parliaments have actively scrutinised the work of their national government in this regard. The UK's House of Lords for instance has given recommendations to the UK Government on its policy towards these bodies. It encouraged the Home Office to encourage the Serious Organised Crime Agency (SOCA) to insert more info into Europol's database.149 Another example is the Dutch Second Chamber's request that the Dutch government make necessary resources available for specific operations of Frontex in guarding the Southern borders of the EU.150 National parliaments are in a position to express such opinions when they approve the national financial contributions to the AFSJ bodies but little or no comparative research has been done on whether national parliaments have actually used this power frequently. However, this power is now less relevant since the EU agencies are primarily funded by the EU budget. De Witte and Rijpma note that national parliaments have experienced difficulty in scrutinising Europol's work through the national representatives on the Management Board, in finding information and in coordinating their effortsinternally amongst national parliaments and with the European Parliament.151 Some national parliaments (e.g., Latvia, Lithuania and the Czech Republic) invite their national liaison officer to Europol to attend meetings of the relevant parliamentary committee(s) but this practice does not seem to be widespread. From the COSAC questionnaire, it also is not clear to which extent national parliamentary committees examine the role of personnel seconded to the AFSJ bodies. 152 Second, national parliaments have shown interest in scrutinising the AFSJ bodies. Roughly two out of three national parliaments have exercised some form of monitoring of Eurojust and Europol through their respective Committee on EU Affairs.153 Importantly, the UK\nHouse of Lords has published reports on all three AFSJ agencies under discussion.154 While national states have conducted this type of scrutiny on an ad hoc basis, we are not aware of any national parliament having adopted specific procedures to scrutinise these agencies on a more systematic basis, or indeed, any specific benchmarks to monitor the performance of Europol and Eurojust.155 Parliaments may engage with AFSJ bodies directly by inviting their directors to attend parliamentary hearings or by visiting the premises of the AFSJ bodies. For example, the UK's House of Lords EU Select Committee visited the headquarters of Europol in The Hague and received evidence from the Director of Europol as well as representatives of the Commission, a Member of the European Parliament and the EU Counterterrorism Coordinator report on Europol. This took place in the context of an inquiry into the role of Europol in coordinating the fight against serious and organised crime.156 The President of Eurojust also has visited and delivered speeches to national parliaments.157 Third, while the previous two forms of national parliamentary oversight of AFSJ bodies are conducted without coordination with the parliaments of other Member States, national parliaments may also participate in various forms of inter-parliamentary cooperation dealing with AFSJ bodies. Firstly, the Conference of Community and European Affairs Committees of Parliaments of the European Union (COSAC) may deal with AFSJ bodies. For example, the XLIII COSAC conference specifically dealt with the role of national parliaments in the political monitoring of Europol and the evaluation of activities of Eurojust after the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty in December 2010.158 Secondly, the Conference of Speakers of the Parliaments may also address issues directly relevant to AFSJ bodies, as happened at its conference in Brussels in April 2011. At this conference, it discussed the role of parliaments in monitoring the European Area of Freedom, Security and Justice and the participants agreed that that closer and deeper parliamentary oversight of Europol is necessary.159 Thirdly, the LIBE committee may convene inter-parliamentary meetings on the issue of AFSJ bodies. For example, in 2010, the LIBE Committee hosted an interparliamentary committee meeting on the evaluation of Europol, Eurojust, Frontex and Schengen with participation of national parliaments.160 National parliaments and the European Parliament exchange information through the Interparliamentary EU Exchange Information Network (IPEX), a website for the electronic exchange of information.161 There are also informal contacts between national and European parliamentarians and within trans-European political groups also on AFSJ issues. As early as 2001, recommendations for the creation of a 'Parlopol' Committee were made; this would have consisted of a joint committee of members of the European Parliament and national Parliaments to oversee Europol but it was not established as a formal parliamentary committee.162\n\n\n## 3.3. The Role Of The European Parliament In Overseeing The Afsj Bodies\n\n In this section, we assess which tools and powers the European Parliament has at its disposal to scrutinise and evaluate the AFSJ bodies. The Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs (LIBE Committee) is the logical venue to undertake such activities as it is responsible for the protection within the territory of the Union of citizens' rights, human rights and fundamental rights; legislation in the areas of transparency and the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data; and the development of an area of freedom, security and justice, in particular measures relating to police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters.163 The only body discussed in this study whose activities would not directly fall within the mandate of the LIBE Committee is the Sitcen. Technically, the Sitcen falls under the purview of the Committee on Foreign Affairs (AFET) and its Sub-Committee of Defence (SEDE). This is because these committees are responsible for the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), including the EEAS within which Sitcen is located. In practice, however, neither of these committees has taken a clear interest in overseeing the work of Sitcen. While AFET and SEDE have primary responsibility for matters concerning Sitcen, aspects of its work may also fall under the jurisdiction of the LIBE committee. As we have already noted in chapter two, Sitcen provides strategic assessments on terrorist threats within the EU and thus plays a role in internal security.\nThe general responsibility of these committees is to examine questions referred to them by Parliament. Any committee may, with the agreement of Parliament's Bureau, instruct one or more of its members to undertake a study or fact-finding mission. Additionally, the committee may, subject to approval by the Bureau, organise a hearing of experts if it considers such a hearing essential to the effective conduct of its work on a particular subject. A Committee of the European Parliament can also draw up 'own initiative reports' on issues that fall within the scope of its competence. The Conference of Presidents, the body responsible for the organisation of Parliament's work, authorises the forwarding of 'own initiative reports' to the plenary.164 The LIBE Committee has frequently prepared such own initiative reports on JHA related issues, including on the role of the various JHA agencies. The EP issued such a report on the evaluation and future development of Frontex and EUROSUR in 2008,165 and on the future development of Europol in 2003.166 Currently, own initiative reports are being prepared on organised crime in Europe167 and on the European Internal Security Strategy,168 which also take into account the role of Europol and Eurojust.\n\nThese reports provide a useful outlook on the future directions of JHA policies and they serve as an evaluation of the given agency.\n\n\n## 3.3.1. The European Parliament's Access To Classified Information\n\n A mandate to oversee particular dimensions of an AFSJ body's work is of limited use unless it is accompanied by access to the necessary information. Similarly, oversight powerssuch as the right to summon the Director of an agency to appear before a committeeare likely to be ineffective unless the body with recourse to such powers has the right to access particular information in the context of these hearings. Since there is no single clear legal framework in place for the EP to access AFSJ-related information, including threat analyses from the AFSJ bodies,169 it is useful to elaborate upon the different rules that regulate the EP's access to (classified) information in the hands of these agencies. Members of the EP are able to ask questions and request information to assess Parliament's access to information in the hands of the Commission and the Council as well. A cursory look into the register of the European Parliament revealed that the in the 6th and 7th Parliamentary Term, MEP's asked seven written questions about Sitcen, 27 about Eurojust, 105 on Europol and 158 on Frontex. Most responses to these questions came from the Commission. Questions for oral answers with debate may be put to the Council or the Commission by a committee, a political group or at least 40 Members with a request that they be placed on the agenda of Parliament,170 but it seems that this specific type of debate has not really touched upon the subjects discussed in this study.\n\n## 3.3.1.1. Regulation 1049/2001\n\n\nRegulation 1049/2001 defines the principles, conditions and limits governing the right of public access to documents of the EP, the Council and the Commission. Article 15.3 of the TFEU extended the public right of access to documents of all Union institutions, bodies, offices and agencies. The Commission foresaw this development and in 2008 it\n\npromulgated proposals to revise Regulation 1049; these proposals were further updated in early 2011.171 The Commission's proposals have been the subject of heated discussion in the EP and several committees have issued reports or opinions on this matter. At present, there is a significant gulf between the Commission's proposals and the counter-proposals put forward by the EP, led by the LIBE Committee's Michael Cashman. As a general rule, Regulation 1049 stipulates that 'all documents of the institutions should be accessible to the public'. However, this default rule is limited by Articles 4 and 9 of the Regulation, which contain extensive exceptions to this rule. Article 4 states that European institutions can refuse access to documents where disclosure would undermine, inter alia, public interests such as public security, defence and military matters, international relations and the privacy of individuals. It also codifies the so-called 'third party rule', which stipulates that an institution receiving a request to access information must seek the permission of the party from which the document originated before granting access. Article 9 of Regulation 1049 regulates access to 'sensitive documents' that are classified as top secret, secret or confidential. While Article 9.1 states that these documents 'protect essential interests' of the Union and the Member States, in particular in the areas of public security, defence and military matters, the regulation does not specify the general principles regarding the classification of 'sensitive' documents.172 It is important to note that Regulation 1049 stipulates that the legal basis for the European Parliament's access to\n'sensitive documents' from the Commission and Council should be arranged through interinstitutional arrangements.173 Both the Commission and the Council currently have such an inter-institutional agreement with the Parliament (see below) which covers some aspects of parliamentary access to sensitive information. The application of Regulation 1049, including its exceptions, has been extended to the AFSJ agencies by virtue of a specific provision in their respective founding acts. Article 28 of the Frontex Regulation states that Frontex shall be subject to Regulation 1049 'when handling applications for access to documents held by it'. Article 45 of the Europol Decision and Article 39 of the Eurojust Decision state that the Management Board or the College shall adopt rules concerning access to Europol/Eurojust documents on the basis of a proposal of the Director (for Europol) and the Administrative Director (for Eurojust), taking into account 'the principles and limits set out' in Regulation 1049. As the EU's AFSJ bodies are not formally 'institutions', there are no specific inter-institutional agreements between Parliament and these agencies to regulate access to information. One of the most fundamental questions under discussion is whether or not the revised version of Regulation 1049 should address access to classified information by parliament, as well as for access by the general public. Indeed, many people inside and outside the European Parliament argue that differences of opinion on this issue are one of the main stumbling blocks stalling the adoption of a revised regulation.174 The Commission's proposal largely follows the approach taken in the existing Regulation 1049; namely, that the regulation addresses access to documents by the general public and that access to information by the EP should be regulated by inter-institutional agreements.175 By contrast, the EP Rapporteur on the revision of 1049 has drafted a detailed set of amendments to the Commission's proposal which would see the new regulation address access to information for both Parliament and the general public.176 The Commission, Council and some in the European Parliament (largely from the EPP group) remain opposed to this approach and would like to confine the discussion on Parliament's access to classified information through a reference to inter-institutional arrangements.177 (See chapter five).\n\n\n\n3.3.1.2.\nInter-institutional\nagreements\nbetween\nthe\nParliament\nand\nthe\nCommission/Council on access to classified information\n\nAs we have already noted, Regulation 1049 stipulates that the legal basis for the European Parliament's access to 'sensitive documents' of the Commission and the Council should be arranged through inter-institutional arrangements.178 Proponents of having an overarching regulation that deals with access to information for both the Parliament and the general public have pointed out that these inter-institutional agreements are hierarchically inferior to treaty principles, such as the principle of 'mutual sincere' cooperation179 or regulations, and that it is inappropriate to use such inter-institutional agreements to regulate general principles, such as access to classified information.180 The Parliament concluded most recently such arrangements with the Council in 2002181 and with the Commission in 2005\nand 2010.182 While the 2010 agreement between the Parliament and the Commission provides a comprehensive legal framework for parliamentary access to information from the Commission, the inter-institutional agreement with the Council focuses on access to information in the ESDP field only. Several similar agreements are currently being discussed, including a draft 'Inter-institutional Agreement between the European Parliament and the Council concerning access by the European Parliament to classified parts of international agreements subject to its consent'.\n\n3.3.1.2.1. The 2002 inter-institutional agreement and the special committee An inter-institutional agreement between the EP and the Council regulates the access of the EP to 'sensitive' information held by the Council in the ESDP area.183 In the event of a crisis or at the request of the President of the European Parliament or the chairman of the AFET\ncommittee, the Presidency of the Council or the High Representative shall inform the President of the EP and a 'special committee' of the content of the sensitive information\n'where it is required for the exercise of the powers conferred on the European Parliament by the Treaty on the European Union'.184 In practice, it has always been the head of AFET\nwho requested access to information. This 'special committee' is chaired by the Chairperson of the AFET committee and includes four additional members who are designated by the\n\nConference of Presidents, as well as four substitutesthese MEPs do not have to be members of the AFET committee but often have been.185 Consultation of sensitive documents by the members of the Special Committee of the European Parliament has to take place in a secured room on the Council premises. Its members and substitutemembers are meant to have appropriate security clearance from their national governments. However, in practice, not all members of the committee had such a clearance and, yet they had access to classified information. This was the result of delays and, more importantly, the fact that in some EU states it is not seen as appropriate to subject parliamentarians to a vetting process.186 Security-cleared staffers can be present but sometimes had to be excluded from the briefings, which took place approximately four times per year. Often no documents were provided during these meetings and many meetings only consisted of an oral briefing or, as one interviewee put it, 'a coffee with Solana'.187 Members of this Special Committee could have used these meetings to ask questions about Sitcen but have not done this in the past mainly because its members didn't see it as a priority issue.188 The High Representative has suggested that the modalities of the 2002 Agreement will apply to the EEAS as well but there is a lot of confusion among and within the institutions about whether this is the case. However, at the time of writing, no meetings of the Special Committee have taken place since the creation of the EEAS. The possible revision of this agreement is being discussed within the institutions, especially since the creation of the European External Action Service, which will play a pre-eminent role in the policy area covered by the 2002 agreement.\n\n3.3.1.2.2. Draft inter-institutional agreement between the Parliament and the Council on access to information relating to international agreements According to Article 218.10 of the TFEU, the European Parliament needs to be 'immediately and fully informed at all stages' of the formulation of agreements between the Union and third countries that involve the EP's consent procedure, which now includes agreements in the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice. This obligation affects the Council and the Commission when the latter is presenting draft negotiating guidelines to the Council or negotiating on the Council's behalf with third countries. Some in the EP argue that the Council regularly fails to comply with this article by not providing enough information to the EP,189 or by not providing information in due time for the EP to exercise its tasks. In the SWIFT case, for example, the President of the EP complained that the Council gave the EP\nonly one week to approve the SWIFT agreement before it was due to enter into effect. The President suggested that, ideally, the EP needs at least three months in order to reflect whether to give its consent to any agreement. In response to this controversy, the Council proposed that an 'Inter-institutional Agreement between the European Parliament and the Council concerning access by the European Parliament to classified parts of international agreements subject to its consent' would be drawn up and that this proposal would be submitted to the Parliament for discussion between the two institutions.190 The text of this document is not yet publicly available.\n\n3.3.1.2.3. The 2010 Framework agreement between Parliament and the Commission Annex 2 of the 2010 Framework agreement between Parliament and the Commission regulates the 'forwarding to Parliament and the handling of confidential information' from the Commission 'in connection with the exercise of Parliament's prerogatives and competences'. This annex contains the most comprehensive provisions on parliamentary access to classified information that have ever been formulated between the EP and another EU entity. The annex covers all policy areas and provides the President, the chairs of the parliamentary committees, the Bureau and the Conference of Presidents of the European Parliament with a fairly broad right to request and receive 'EU Classified Information' (EUCI) that is 'required for the exercise of Parliament's prerogatives and competences'.191\n\nSuch requests can include all levels of EUCI. The agreement also provides a basis for the Commission to forward EUCI to the EP on its own initiative. While the agreement gives the EP the possibility of accessing a broad range of EUCI, its access to information may be limited by the third party rule, which is clearly enshrined in the agreement: 'confidential information from a State, an institution or an international organisation shall be forwarded only with its consent'.192 The agreement also stipulates the information security standards that the Parliament needs to take into account when it receives EUCI from the Commission. MEPs and parliamentary staffers can only have access to information classified as 'secret' or above if they have an\n'appropriate' security clearance.193 MEPs without the requisite national security clearance can still access information up to and including information classified as 'confidential' (the second of the four levels of EUCI) in accordance with 'practical arrangements defined by common accord, including signature of a solemn declaration that they will not disclose the contents of those documents to any third person'.194 Staffers can be given access to all levels of EUCI if they are 'designated in advance by the parliamentary body/office-holder' as having a need to know the information concerned and have security clearance. The arrangement specifies further measures for access to and the handling of confidential information.195 Interestingly, the arrangement provides for an option to hold a meeting of a relevant committee *in camera*, with cleared staffers, where numbered documents can be\n'distributed at the beginning of the meeting and collected again at the end'. No notes of those documents and no photocopies thereof may be taken.196 Before transmission, all personal data may be expunged from the documents. It is important to note that Annex 2 of the agreement has not yet been fully implemented because it requires parliament to establish security rules and procedures that are equivalent to those of the Commission. At the time of writing, an EP working group is continuing to work on the formulation of these rules and procedures, which will enable the EP to receive classified information on its own premises. Although this agreement represents a significant advancement in terms of the EP's access to information from the Commission, its application is limited to Commission documents.\n\nThis is a significant limitation in the AFSJ field because much of the information, which might be relevant to the EP, resides with the AFSJ agencies and/or is contained within Council documents.\n\n\n\n## 3.3.1.3. Access To Information From The Eeas\n\n The High Representative has suggested that the modalities of the Framework agreement with the Commission could be applied to the EEAS as well but we have observed that there is no agreement among and within the institutions about whether this will indeed be the case. This is important in order for the EP to get access to information related to Sitcen since Sitcen is now a part of the EEAS (see above, chapter two). What seems clear is that the High Representative's Declaration on Political Accountability should not be automatically read as committing the EEAS to apply Annex 2 of the framework agreement between the EP and the Commission.197 Rather, it is far more likely that the EEAS will try to apply the\n2002 agreement between the EP and the Council to EEAS documents.198 This would be highly problematic, however, since the 2002 Agreement with the Council only relates to 'sensitive' information related to ESDP issues, while the EEAS deals with a range of issues that go beyond security and defence policy. Since the EEAS has a hybrid status, it was also suggested that different rules might apply to different parts of the EEAS.199 It was also submitted that if a document is under discussion by the Council, it automatically becomes a\n'Council' document and not an EEAS document.200 It seems to be clear that there needs to be a new separate inter-institutional agreement between the EEAS and the Parliament, which regulates access to classified information by the EP.\n\n## 3.3.1.4. Pro-Active Disclosure Of Non-Classified Information To The European Parliament\n\n Oversight is facilitated through a number of reporting and evaluation obligations that are laid down in the founding instruments of Europol, Eurojust and Frontex. Each year, the agencies are obliged to adopt a work programme and to prepare a general report on their activities in the previous year. Europol's Management Board sends its work programme and annual report to the Council, who forwards it to the Parliament. Frontex's Management Board on the other hand sends its annual report and the work programme directly to the EP, while Article 32.1 of the Eurojust Decision states that the President, on behalf of the Eurojust College, has to issue in writing an annual report to the Council on the activities and management, including budgetary management, of Eurojust. Article 20 of Eurojust's Rules of Procedure further states that Eurojust shall 'maintain the necessary channels of communication with the EP in accordance with this decision'. Needless to say, this proactive disclosure of information to the EP does not extend to classified information.\n\nNeither Sitcen nor the EEAS more generally have similar obligations to report to the EP. Pursuant to Article 13.2 of the EEAS Decision, the High Representative only has to submit a report to the EP on the functioning of the EEAS by the end of 2011. This report might cover some activities of Sitcen but this remains to be seen. The agencies discussed in this study are all subject to independent evaluations, which are available to the Parliament as well. Every four years, Europol's Management Board has to commission an independent external evaluation of the implementation of the Europol Decision and of the activities carried out by Europol.201 The objective of such an evaluation is to assess, in an independent and objective manner, the impact of the Europol Council Decision on Europol's performance, and to determine the areas where new legal provisions and/or practical operational arrangements would render Europol 'more effective'.202\nEurojust's College and Frontex's Management Board have to commission such an evaluation every five years.203 The independent external evaluations of Eurojust and Europol are sent to the European Parliament. The Frontex Regulation stipulates that the Management Board shall receive these findings and issue recommendations regarding changes to this Regulation, the Agency and its working practices to the Commission, which shall forward them together with its own opinion as well as appropriate proposals to the Council. 'An action plan with a timetable shall be included, if appropriate. Both the findings and the recommendations of the evaluation shall be made public'.204 They can be consulted on the Frontex website.205\n\n\n## 3.3.2. Oversight Mechanisms Of The European Parliament 3.3.2.1. Summon Agency Directors\n\n Currently, the Parliament does not have uniform powers to summon AFSJ agency directors to the Parliament to engage in a debate with them. Article 48 of the Europol Council Decision provides that the Europol Director, the Chairperson of the Management Board and the Presidency of the Council are obligedinstead of permittedto appear before the European Parliament at its request.206 By contrast, the President of Eurojust, on behalf of the College, is only expected to 'report to the Council every year on the activities and management, including budgetary management, of Eurojust'. Still, the President has presented the annual report every year to the LIBE Committee. The Frontex Regulation states in Article 25(2) that both the Parliament and the Council may invite the Executive Director of the Agency to report on the carrying out of his/her tasks. However, Frontex's refusal to attend a public hearing on the 'Tragedies of Migrants at Sea' organised by the LIBE Committee in July 2007, caused considerable consternation amongst some Members of the European Parliament,207 and clearly showed that the Director of Frontex did not consider this an obligation.208 Yet, in its amendments to the new Frontex Regulation, the Parliament has not recommended making it a requirement for the Director of Frontex to appear before it. The EP simply suggested that the new Frontex Regulation would clarify this reporting duty to focus 'on the general report of the Agency for the previous year, the work programme for the coming year and the Agency's multi-annual plan'. The EP has no formal power to summon the director of Sitcen to appear before Parliament but recently, the new head appeared before the parliament together with the Executive Secretary General of the EEAS.209 Additionally, the former director of Sitcen occasionally appeared before the Sub Committee on Defence to give MEPs briefings on its work on an ad hoc basis.210 Since Sitcen is placed under the direct authority and responsibility of the High Representative, it should be noted that, in accordance with Article 36 of the TEU, the High Representative will 'regularly consult' the European Parliament on the main aspects and the basic choices of the CFSP and will ensure that the views of the European Parliament are 'duly taken into consideration'. In the preamble of the 'Declaration on Accountability', High Representative Ashton has said that she will 'build on' the 'consultation, information and reporting engagements' of the former three main foreign policy actors in the Union: the former Commissioner for external relations, the former High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy, and the rotating Council Presidency. She adds, however, that 'where necessary' 'these engagements will be adjusted in light of Parliament's role of political control and the redefinition of the role of the High Representative as set out by the Treaties and in accordance with Article 36 [of the] TEU'.\n\nIt is important that the Parliament can engage with the directors of the agencies in a public debate as this allows for the initiation of a dialogue between MPs and directors on general policies of their agencies or specific cases, in which MPs can ask questions and directors can defend or explain the actions of the agencies. However, a number of interviewees questioned the public nature of these meetings on the basis that directors cannot (or are unlikely to) say anything profound or critical of their agency in a public forum.211 A second point of criticism voiced in connection with the hearings with agency directors was the disappointingly low number of members that were actually present to question the directors.212 Interest and participation on the part of MEPs in these hearings is essential to make such hearings work but the reality seems to be that many MEPs do not have the time to engage properly in scrutinising the documents they receive from the agencies and are, therefore, ill-prepared to ask pertinent questions of the agencies.213\n\n\n## 3.3.2.2. Informal Meetings\n\n It should be stressed that several interviewees pointed out that there existed a substantial amount of informal contact between members or staffers of the LIBE committee and the agencies, which allowed for an ongoing informal dialogue between the EP and the agencies.214 Also, the AFET committee has developed a custom of organising informal meetings with staffers of the AFSJ bodies in order to be briefed on certain issues, but this didn't necessarily involve meetings on the work of Sitcen.215 Another type of informal contact between the EP and the agencies is through sending delegations to the relevant agencies. The LIBE committee has sent delegations to visit the premises of Eurojust, Europol and Frontex. Such missions have greatly contributed to make MEPs and their staffers aware of the mandates, powers and working methods of these organisations.216\nIndeed, Europol has stated that the LIBE committee's visit to Europol in June 2010 could already 'serve as a practical example of the strengthening of Europol's democratic accountability and transparency'.217 Finally, it is noteworthy that the directors and senior member staff of Europol, Frontex and Eurojust regularly attend conferences and hearings organised by the LIBE Committee and political groups. These are informal meetings and do not constitute oversight but nonetheless help to strengthen contacts between the EP and the agencies, as well as MEP's knowledge of the agencies' work.\n\n## 3.3.2.3. Budgetary Powers Of The European Parliament\n\n The European Parliament is the budgetary authority for the AFSJ agencies (i.e., Europol, Eurojust and Frontex), as well as its discharge authority.218 The EP's powers to oversee the EU budget are based on Articles 310324 of the TFEU, which empowers the EP to adopt the annual budget administered by the Commission (TFEU, Article 310), the multi-annual financial framework (Article 312), as well as to give a discharge to the Commission in respect of the implementation of the budget (TFEU, Article 317319). As a budgetary authority, the EP can, together with the Council, decide on the amount of money that the agencies can spend from the budget of the European Union. However, it has no say over contributions of the EU Member States to the AFSJ agencies and Sitcen. As the sole discharge authority, the EP evaluates how the agencies have spent the budget that was allocated to them. This discharge procedure may give rise to three situations: the granting, postponement or refusal of discharge by a Resolution of the European Parliament. The refusal of discharge may lead to the freezing of an agency's funding.\n\n3.3.2.3.1. The EP as a budgetary authority\n\nEach year, the Management Board of the AFSJ agencies (or the College, in Eurojust's case)\nadopts a draft estimated budget together with a draft work programme. This is forwarded to the Commission by 31 March, which in turn forwards it to the Council and Parliament. On the basis of this estimate of the agency, the Commission enters the amounts necessary into the draft EU budget.219 Within the EP, the Committee on Budgets (BUDG) is responsible for drafting the EP's position on the annual EU budget. It produces a report on all sections of the budget, including the part related to the Area of Freedom, Justice and Security and the Union's decentralised bodies.220 The LIBE Committee provides input to the BUDG committee by means of an opinion. In addition, MEPs, political groups or Committees as a whole can table amendments that will be voted upon in the BUDG committee. During this process, the Management Boards of the agencies adopt their budgets, but this only becomes final after adoption of the general EU budget and, where necessary, it will be adjusted. In order to properly exercise financial scrutiny over the agency's budgets, the BUDG\ncommittee needs to have proper access to information about the activities of the agencies that are funded by the EU budget. As a general rule, the BUDG committee has easier access to information than the Committee on Budgetary Control (CONT) and specialised committees such as LIBE because it has more powers than these committees. The BUDG committee has 'the power of the purse', meaning that money can only be apportioned to an agency once the BUDG committee has passed the EU budget. It can also threaten to use the 'reserve procedure' if the Commission is not prepared to hand over requested information about the activities of the agencies.221 The reserve procedure involves the BUDG committee 'blocking' a given amount of an agency's funding and making its release contingent upon the fulfilment of particular criteria established by the committee. In 2008, for example, the EP put 30% of the administrative budget of Frontex 'in reserve', only to be released when the EP was satisfied that the agency had improved its effectiveness and accountability.222 It is important to note that the BUDG Committee can use this procedure upon the recommendation of the LIBE committee for instance, which has happened in the past.223 Using the reserve procedure as a means to get information from the agencies is not an ideal way of accessing information but the fact that the EP has tried to use (or abuse) this procedure is symptomatic of the fact that there is not a proper framework for the European Parliament's access to information.224 Cooperation between the LIBE and BUDG committees suggests that the LIBE can influence, inter alia, policy priorities by proposing budgetary amendments, which the BUDG committee may or may not take account of. Or, in other words, the LIBE Committee can take advantage of the powers of BUDG in support of the fulfilment of its mandate to oversee AFSJ bodies. However, there are two notable obstacles in this regard. Firstly, the expenditures of the EU budget for the AFSJ bodies are grouped according to functional categories of expenditures. For example, the 2011 budget for Europol represents the expenditures on the basis of the following categories: staff, other administrative expenditures (e.g., rental of buildings, IT, postal and telecommunications) and operational activities.225 These expenditures are not linked to policy objectives or outputs of the agency concernedthe budget is input rather than output focussed. This makes it very difficult for the EP to approve budget proposals according to policy priorities. Instead, the current budget format only allows for incremental budgeting, i.e., to increase or decrease the planned budget vis-a-vis the previous year(s). Secondly, according to some interviewees, MEPs are often not aware of the potential of the budgetary oversight powers at their disposal and sometimes lack the assertiveness to use these powers in a more 'technocratic'\nprocedure of the BUDG committee.226\n\n3.3.2.3.2. The EP as a discharge authority\n\nWhile the ultimate discharge authority lies with the plenary of the EP,227 the EP Committee on Budgetary Control (CONT) scrutinises how the EU budget is spent; how well goals are met, in terms of efficiency; and whether or not an organisation's performance represents value for money. The Committee investigates problems raised by the Court of Auditors or the Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF) and suggests improvements to the system in order to ensure legality and to fight against fraud and possible corruption in the use of EU funds.228 While the adoption of the EU budget is a power that the EP shares with the Council, the discharge authority lies exclusively with the EP. LIBE provides the Committee on Budgetary Control (CONT) with an opinion on the discharge in respect of the implementation of the agencies that fall under its purview. In these opinions, the LIBE makes suggestions to CONT regarding what should be incorporated in its motions for a resolution on discharge of the AFSJ agencies' budgets. The CONT also publishes a yearly overall report on the performance, financial management and control of EU agencies.229\n\n The threat to refuse or delay the discharge of a budget can be used as a tool for requesting changes to the policy, procedures or activities of the agency concerned through its discharge recommendations. By contrast, the CONT may use its discharge reports and resolutions to commend an agency's work. For example, in its report for the discharge of\n2009, the CONT complimented Eurojust on its initiative to include 'Key Performance Indicators' in its 2010 plans and recommended this as best practice for the other agencies, allowing relevant stakeholders to better evaluate agencies' performance. It furthermore encouraged agencies to establish multi-annual work programmes.230 The refusal to discharge a budget can have major implications, including forcing the relevant director/executive responsible from office.231 In 2010, parliament refused discharge for the implementation of the European Police College (CEPOL) 2008 budget. This decision was taken on the basis of a negative opinion from the CONT, which was influenced by the LIBE Committee.232 As a result, the agency's funding was frozen and new management put in place. Discharge for the implementation of CEPOL's 2009 budget was also delayed on the advice of CONT, which deemed the reporting 'insufficient to allow a clear understanding of implementation of concrete actions'.233\n\n## 3.3.2.4. Ad Hoc Powers Of The European Parliament\n\n On a proposal from the Conference of Presidents, Parliament may at any time set up special committees (formerly known as 'temporary committees'), whose powers, composition and term of office shall be defined at the same time as the decision to set them up is taken; their term of office may not exceed twelve months, except where Parliament extends that term on its expiry.234 These committees have less powers and less impact when compared to (temporary) committees of inquiry (discussed below).\n\n3.3.2.4.1. Special Committees Since 1979, thirteen temporary committees have been set up to look into a wide variety of issues ranging from budgetary resources to the impact of the German Unification or the problems and opportunities offered in the area of human genetics. Two temporary committees have, however, dealt with security and intelligence matters. The Temporary committee on the ECHELON interception system was created in 2000 and the Temporary Committee on the alleged use of European countries by the CIA for the transport and illegal detention of prisoners (TDIP) was set up by the EP in 2006.235 Both inquiries undertook a process of fact-finding to verify whether given activities had taken place and evaluated, among other things, the legality of these activities. It is important to note that these temporary committees primarily dealt with the activities of national intelligence agencies and, to a lesser extent, the Council's knowledge of such activities.236 They did not, however, address the work of any of the AFSJ bodies as there was no suggestion that they had any involvement in the matters examined by these temporary committees. Indeed, to date, no temporary/special committee has addressed the work of any AFSJ body.\n\nThe temporary committees on Echelon and the TDIP were created by resolutions of the EP\nin response to allegations that illegal activities had taken place which implicated a number of European states. Both committees were seriously hampered by the fact that they were unable to access all necessary information due to a lack of cooperation from many national governments and the Council, and the fact that temporary committees do not have investigatory powers, e.g., subpoena powers and the ability to hear witnesses under affirmation. Consequently, they had to rely on a combination of whistleblowers, work that had already been done by investigative journalists and NGOs, and the goodwill of some national governments and officials.237 Ultimately, both the TDIP and the temporary committee on Echelon were unable to fully address the issues within their mandates and could not reach definitive conclusions due to a lack of access to information. Moreover, the committees were not able to hold officials in Member States to account because they lacked the powers to compel their appearance before them, as well as to issue binding orders.238\nIn spite of these limitations, the temporary committees helped to generate awareness of important concerns on a pan-European level by virtue of their location within international parliamentary assemblies, their multinational composition, and reporting in numerous European languages.239\n\n3.3.2.4.2. Committees of inquiry The European Parliament can also set up committees of inquiry (sometimes known as 'temporary committees of inquiry', which are distinct from temporary committees) to investigate 'alleged contraventions of Union law or alleged maladministration in the application of Union law'.240 Since the Maastricht Treaty, only three committees of inquiry have been established. These were the inquiry into the Community Transit Regime\n(TRANSIT),241 the inquiry into the BSE crisis (ESB1)242 and an inquiry into the crisis of the equitable life assurance society (EQUI).243 The requirement that committees of inquiry can only be created to investigate alleged contraventions of Union law has been seen as limiting the potential range of issues which a committee of inquiry could examine, particularly when compared to temporary/special committees which can examine almost anything.\n\nNevertheless, the activities of an AFSJ agency could fall under this category, particularly since the Lisbon Treaty moved the AFSJ from the intergovernmental third pillar into the general framework for EU integration. While the EP has never used a committee of inquiry to examine AFSJ matters, the parliament's power of inquiry is an important tool that could be used to investigate serious problems pertaining to an AFSJ agency. The Treaty of Maastricht provided the legal basis for the right of the EP to establish such committees of inquiry.244 Their *modus operandi* are subject to a detailed inter-institutional agreement that governs the exercise of the EP's right to inquiry.245 Hearings and testimony ordinarily take place in public but proceedings can take place *in camera* if requested by one quarter of the members of the committee of inquiry, by the Community or national authorities, or where the committee of inquiry is considering secret information.246\nIn comparison to temporary/special committees, committees of inquiry have more powers at their disposal. While committees of inquiry do not have a general power of summons, they may invite an institution or a body of the European Communities or the Government of a Member State to designate one of its members to take part in its proceedings.247\nFurthermore, EU authorities and Member States shall provide a committee with the\n'documents necessary for the performance of its duties, save where prevented from doing so by reasons of secrecy or public or national security arising out of national or Community legislation or rules'.248 Further limitations may apply to a committee's access to documents, since EU bodies 'shall not supply the temporary committee of inquiry with documents originating in a Member State without first informing the State concerned'.249 Needless to say, these provisos could significantly limit their capacity to examine matters relating to the AFSJ bodies because, as was noted in chapter two, much of the information utilised by these bodies comes from Member States.\n\n\n## 3.4. Conclusion\n\n\nThis chapter has discussed the role played by the two Joint Supervisory Bodies of Europol and Eurojust in overseeing the processing of personal data by these agencies on an ongoing basis. While it is beyond the scope of this study to conduct a detailed evaluation of the JSBs, indications are that they have the necessary powers in order to fulfil their current mandates. Crucially, the JSBs have access to all files and premises related to the processing of personal data. The JSBs are, moreover, in a strong position to ensure that any practices which violate data protection regulations are corrected. In our view, the JSBs are an appropriate oversight mechanism for scrutinising the use of personal data by the AFSJ agencies. Accordingly, their activities do not need to be duplicated by the EP. Equally, the EP would not need to oversee Frontex's future role in processing personal data because it is envisaged that the European Data Protection Supervisor would perform a similar function to the JSBs. Sitcen cannot process personal data. In chapter two, we noted that the AFSJ bodies combine intergovernmental and supranational features. On the one hand, these bodies (particularly the AFSJ agencies) are EU entities regulated by EU law and staffed primarily by EU employees. On the other hand, these bodies rely to a large extent on information provided by national authorities, parts of their work are carried out by seconded employees of Member States, and ultimately, it is national authorities that implement measures on the basis of their work all of these activities are primarily regulated by national law. This has important implications for oversight. Given that national law regulates, inter alia, the sending of information to AFSJ\nbodies, the use of coercive powers on the basis of information from and/or operations coordinated by AFSJ bodies, it is primarily the prerogative of national judicial bodies and/or other oversight and control mechanisms to ensure that these powers are used lawfully.\n\nCurrently, it is not clear if and to what extent national bodies, including parliaments, oversee activities of their own state's authorities and employees that have a connection with the AFSJ bodies. In view of the human rights implications of these activities, it would be beneficial for the EP to have more information about this matter from both the perspective of AFSJ bodies and national parliaments. In chapter five we will discuss different options on how the EP can work together with national parliaments in overseeing the AFSJ bodies. This chapter has shown that the EP already has various oversight mechanisms and powers to oversee the AFSJ bodies. However, we have demonstrated that these mechanisms and powers are not available with regards to all of the AFSJ bodies. For example, the EP does not have uniform powers to summon AFSJ agency directors to engage in a debate with them. The Europol Director is obliged to appear before the EP. By contrast, the President of Eurojust, on behalf of the College, is only expected to 'report to the Council every year on the activities and management, including budgetary management, of Eurojust'.\n\nFurthermore, the Frontex Director can only be invited - but not required - to report to the EP. Similarly, the EP has no formal power to summon the director of Sitcen to appear before Parliament. The EP has formidable budgetary powers vis-a-vis the AFSJ agencies. It can, together with the Council, decide on the amount of money that the agencies can spend from the budget of the European Union. The European Parliament's Committee on Budgets has 'the power of the purse', meaning that money can only be apportioned to an agency once the BUDG committee has passed the EU budget. The EP Committee on Budgetary Control (CONT)\nscrutinises how the EU budget is spent. The threat to refuse or delay the discharge of a budget can be used as a tool to request changes to the policy, procedures or activities of the agency concerned through its discharge recommendations. Finally, in case of allegations of serious wrongdoing relating to the AFSJ bodies, Parliament can consider the setting up of a committee of inquiry. Such committees are temporary and may be established on the request of one-quarter of Parliament's Members in the case of alleged infringements of EU law or maladministration in the application of EU law by inter alia EU bodies. This chapter has illustrated that the lack of comprehensive rules on the EP's access to classified information in the AFSJ (and beyond) is perhaps the greatest impediment to effective oversight of the AFSJ bodies. A mandate for the European Parliament to evaluate or scrutinise the performance of AFSJ bodies is of limited use unless it is accompanied by access to the necessary information. Currently, it is clear that there is no single legal framework in place for the EP to access AFSJ-related information (and particularly classified information) from the bodies themselves, the Council, the Commission, and the External Action Service. The AFSJ bodies also lack a uniform system for disclosing classified information. For example, the EP does not have access to threat assessments from Europol or risk analyses from Frontex, which would enable it to understand better the kind of threats faced by the EU and thus the resources and legal powers they may require to counter such threats. Equally, the EP does not have access to evaluation reports of joint operations organised by Europol or Frontex. The situation regarding Sitcen is even more problematic; there is very limited awareness within the EP about the general mandate and powers of Sitcen, let alone more specific information. The EP only has access to classified information related to the policies of the AFSJ bodies from the Council and the Commission on an ad hoc basis. In chapter five we will discuss options on how the EP's access to (classified) information related to the AFSJ bodies could be improved. While a lack of access to classified information hampers the ability of the EP to oversee the AFSJ bodies. It is important to note, however, that the EP has not yet adopted the necessary information security standards or institutional arrangements in the AFSJ field that would make it easier for relevant committees and MEPs to receive classified information. In the following chapter we will discuss in detail the scope of national parliaments' access to classified information. This will be discussed within the context of a\n___________________________________________________________________________________\ncomparative analysis of the role of specialised oversight bodies in scrutinising national intelligence agencies, with a view to identifying good practices that could be used on the EU level.\n\n## Chapter 4. Parliamentary And Specialised Oversight Of National Intelligence Agencies 4.1. Introduction\n\n\nThis chapter will analyse oversight of national intelligence agencies250 by parliaments and specialised non-parliamentary bodies.251 This comparative analysis will examine how oversight is organised and conducted in EU Member States, Australia, Canada and the United States, with a view to identifying common standards and good practices that can inform the EP's approach to the oversight of the AFSJ bodies. As was mentioned in chapter one, there are profound differences between the role and powers of national intelligence agencies and the EU's AFSJ bodies. Most relevant among these is the fact that while AFSJ bodies cannot use special powers to collect information, this is a crucialeven definingcharacteristic of national intelligence agencies. These differences have very important implications for oversight; most significantly, national oversight bodies were primarily established and remain calibrated to ensure that intelligence agencies use special powers in a way that does not violate human rights or compromise legitimate democratic processes. In view of these differences, this chapter will not focus on the oversight of the use of special powers. Equally, it will not focus on the oversight of the use of coercive powers because the majority of intelligence agencies in EU\nMember States and other democracies do not possess such powers. We will nevertheless, examine the national oversight bodies' scrutiny of certain activities of intelligence agencies that are similar to some of the activities of the EU's AFSJ bodies, namely: information sharing, the collection of open source information, joint analysis and fusion centres, and the use of personal data. This chapter will, however, primarily focus on the institutional characteristics of national parliamentary and non-parliamentary oversight bodies. The following six aspects of oversight will be addressed: (1) the configuration of these systems; (2) the organisation of specialised parliamentary and non-parliamentary oversight bodies; (3) specialised oversight bodies' mandate and functions; (4) access to classified information by parliaments and specialised oversight bodies; (5) oversight bodies' methods and powers; and (6) protection of classified information handled by these bodies. These issues were identified as being the most pertinent dimensions of national systems of oversight in view of the objective of providing the EP relevant findings to inform its own approach to the oversight of the AFSJ bodies. Before proceeding with an evaluation of these dimensions of oversight, this chapter will first outline a number of reasons for which oversight of national intelligence agencies matters and, indeed, why specialised oversight bodies were created. This discussion is important because it helps to contextualise oversight, which can serve as the basis for a discussion about the rationale for oversight of the AFSJ bodies in chapter five.\n\nThis chapter includes six tables which present various aspects of specialised oversight of intelligence agencies on the national level. These tables were developed on the basis of a questionnaire that was administered to national parliaments in all EU Member States.252\nThe information included in the tables is presented as it was provided by national parliamentsit presents their interpretation of, inter alia, the mandate and powers of parliamentary and non-parliamentary oversight bodies. It has not been possible to independently verify the information provided.\n\n## 4.1.1. The Rationale For Oversight Of Intelligence Agencies\n\n\nMany states created parliamentary and other specialised bodies to oversee intelligence agencies in light of revelations about their involvement in illegal and/or improper activities, e.g., Canada, the Czech Republic, Norway, Poland, South Africa, and the US. Notably, during or immediately after the Cold War, it became clear that in many Western states, governments had used intelligence agencies to surveil and disrupt persons involved in legitimate expressions of the rights to freedom of association, assembly and expression.253\nElsewhere, intelligence agencies were found to have exceeded their legal mandates and powers in tackling domestic terrorism.254 Perhaps the egregious violations of human rights by intelligence agencies took place in communist/authoritarian regimes, where intelligence agencies were an integral part of the repressive state apparatuses which permeated all areas of society.255 Against this backdrop, effective oversight (and legal regulation) of intelligence agencies came to be seen as essential for ensuring that they contribute to the security of the populations they serve without undermining democratic processes and human rights. That is, to 'secure democracy against internal and external enemies without destroying democracy in the process'.256 Needless to say, the development of oversight of the EU's AFSJ bodies is taking place in a vastly different climate from the types of conditions that led to the establishment of oversight bodies on the national level. Arguments for robust oversight of intelligence agencies can be distilled into five main areas. First, and perhaps most importantly, the law gives most intelligence agencies powers that permit them to restrict human rights and which, if misused, could result in the violation of human rights. Indeed, as Canada's Justice O'Connor stated in the Arar Inquiry: 'national security activities involve the most intrusive powers of the state: electronic surveillance;\nsearch, seizure and forfeiture of property; information collection and exchange with domestic and foreign security intelligence and law enforcement agencies; and, potentially, the detention of and prosecution of individuals'.257 Intelligence agencies are necessarily given a considerable amount of discretion in their use of intelligence collection powers, which increases the scope for such powers to be misused.258 In view of this, oversight is necessary to help ensure that such powers are used in accordance with national and international law.259\nSecond, on a national level, the political misuse of intelligence agencies has always been a risk, primarily because these agencies can be used to unlawfully gather information about political opponents.260 Oversight is seen to be an essential safeguard against incumbent governments using intelligence agencies to protect or promote party political interests. This is less of a concern at the EU level because there is not the same direct relationship of control between the executive and the agencies. Perhaps more importantly, the fact that 27\nMember States, the Commission and Council are all involved in the political control of these agencies means that there are in-built checks and balances against there (mis)use by any one party or interest group. Third, the secrecy surrounding national intelligence agencies shields them from the processes of public accountability which apply to public bodies in democracies. For example, these agencies are not usually particularly open with the media and are often exempt from freedom of information legislation.261 This makes it difficult for the media, civil society organisations and the public more generally to scrutinise the intelligence agencies'\nwork.262 This further increases the need for oversight by independent bodies that have access to information not available to the general public. Fourth, in common with all public bodies, intelligence agencies are funded with public money and should therefore be held to account for their use of this money. There is particular need for oversight given that intelligence agencies are normally authorised to make secret payments to covert agents. The potential for the inappropriate use of money is heightened in this area. Robust oversight is necessary to ensure that intelligence agencies use public money lawfully and efficiently.263 Finally, while oversight is often seen as necessary to guard against the misuse of, and abuse by, intelligence agencies, it also helps to ensure that these agencies fulfil their mandates effectively.264 Intelligence agencies are, inter alia, entrusted with collecting, analysing and disseminating information about very serious threats to national security and public safety, such as terrorism. The executive and other agencies, such as the police, rely on the information provided by intelligence agencies to take action to combat these threats.\n\nFailures by intelligence agencies to perform such functions effectively, e.g., by missing information indicating a terrorist attack, can have catastrophic consequences.265\nIndependent oversight of the work of intelligence agencies helps to ensure that they are as effective as possible.\n\n## 4.2. Systems For Intelligence Oversight\n\n\nOn a national level, there are generally six actors involved, in some way, in the oversight of intelligence agencies: the internal management of these agencies, the political executive, the judiciary, parliament, autonomous institutions such as ombudsmen and supreme audit institutions, and the media and civil society.266 While each of these actors fulfil important and often mutually complementary oversight functions, this study will only address the oversight of intelligence agencies by parliaments (particularly specialised parliamentary oversight committees), and specialised bodies created by parliament with a specific mandate to oversee intelligence agencies. The rationale for this focus is the mandate given to us by the EP, which is outlined in chapter one. Most states have a range of parliamentary and specialised oversight bodies that are responsible for scrutinising various aspects of the work of intelligence agencies. These bodies can be divided into three main categories, which will be discussed in this section: (1) general parliamentary committees; (2) specialised parliamentary oversight committees;\nand (3) specialised non-parliamentary oversight bodies.\n\n\n\n## 4.2.1. General Parliamentary Committees\n\n In most states, a number of parliamentary committees are competent to oversee some aspects of intelligence agencies' work. For example, committees responsible for policy areas such as home affairs, security, justice and defence may take an interest in intelligence agenciesin many cases, such committees have overlapping jurisdictions. Similarly, committees on cross-cutting issues, such as human rights, may review aspects of intelligence agencies' work on an ad hoc basis.267 In addition, committees responsible for budgets and public accounts are competent to oversee the finances of intelligence agencies. However, the committees discussed above provide only perfunctory oversight of intelligence agencies because they typically handle numerous other issues and often lack the time, resources, access to classified information and/or knowledge to focus on these agencies.\n\n## 4.2.2. Specialised Parliamentary Committees\n\n In view of the fact that parliamentary committees with broad mandatesin areas such as home affairs, homeland security and justiceare not well suited to overseeing intelligence agencies, many democratic states have opted to establish specialised oversight committees within parliament to oversee intelligence agencies (see Table 1, below). Such committees are normally full committees of parliament rather than sub-committees of committees which have broad mandates that may encompass intelligence matters. The parliaments of Canada and Sweden are examples of exceptions to this trendthey have no specialised committee for the oversight of intelligence agencies.268 Specialised parliamentary oversight committees are often mandated to oversee one or more intelligence agencies in general terms (see section 4.4. Mandate and functions of specialised oversight bodies) but may also be given a mandate to oversee a specific aspect of an agency such as its finances. Parliamentary oversight committees are normally established through a statute (e.g., Spain and Italy) but may also be based on parliament's own rules of procedure (e.g., the Netherlands), and in some cases specialised parliamentary oversight committees may even be grounded in the constitution (e.g., Germany).269 In many democratic states there is one specialised parliamentary oversight body responsible for scrutinising all intelligence agencies, or specific intelligence functions regardless of which public bodies perform them.270 Such committees are often joint\n\ncommittees, drawing members from both houses of bicameral parliaments, e.g., the Italian parliament's oversight committee (COPASIR) and the Australian parliament's Permanent Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security.271 In some states, committees that oversee several agencies and activities are only located with one house of a bicameral parliament, e.g., the German *Bundestag's* Parliamentary Control Panel and the Dutch Tweede Kamer's Committee on Intelligence and Security Services. A variation of this approach is to have one specialised oversight committee in both houses of a bicameral parliament, each with responsibility for overseeing a broad gamut of agencies and functions. The US Congress is the best example of this with the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, and the House of Representatives Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence. Finally, some parliaments have opted to create several parliamentary committees, each with an agency-based mandate meaning that they are exclusively responsible for the oversight of a specific agency. The Czech Republic, Romania and Slovakia are examples of states that follow this approach.272 Due to the secrecy that surrounds many oversight bodies, it is difficult to evaluate an oversight body's work with any degree of certainty therefore it is hard to compare the performance of two bodies or models. However, it is often regarded as good practice to have one single committee responsible for the oversight of all intelligence agencies and functions as this helps to ensure 'seamless' oversight, avoiding the risk that certain issues fall between the purviews of two or more committees.273 Oversight may become fragmented if too many committees are involved.274 On the other hand, one may argue that having several committees which each focus on one intelligence agency allows overseers to focus their time and resources on a smaller range of issues, as well as to specialise in the work of a particular agency. Specialised parliamentary committees for the oversight of intelligence agencies have a number of advantages in comparison to non-parliamentary oversight bodies (which are discussed in the next sub-section). Most notably, they can be viewed as providing the most\n'democratic' approach to oversight because oversight is performed by directly elected representatives of the population.275 Oversight involving a number of political parties can help to ensure that intelligence agencies serve the interests of society as a whole rather than an incumbent governmentthe involvement of opposition parties in oversight committees can serve as a valuable counterweight to a governing party's position in the intelligence domain. In addition, parliaments are well placed to ensure that oversight processes have an impact, i.e., the findings and recommendations of a committee acted upon by the executive and intelligence agencies. Indeed, parliaments have numerous tools in this regard including their budgetary appropriation and discharge powers, as well as the possibility of amending the legislation which regulates intelligence agencies. There are, however, a number of significant drawbacks to vesting intelligence oversight agencies in a specialised parliamentary committee. First, parliaments are, by definition, forums for pursuing partisan political interests; in most parliaments, MPs seek to further the interests of their political party/group to the detriment of the interest of other parties. These aims are often not necessarily compatible with the demands of conducting effective, independent oversight, which requires parliamentary committees to scrutinise the work of the executive and its agencies according to objective, legally defined criteria.276 For example, MPs that are part of the governing party may not be inclined to shed light on issues or events that are likely to be damaging to the government. By contrast, MPs from opposition parties sometimes seek to use their position on an oversight committee for political gain, e.g., by using the powers of their committee position to compel testimony from government ministers on issues wherein they hope to derive a partisan advantage. The (in)stability of parliamentary politics is another drawback to parliamentary oversight of intelligence agencies; notably, where there are newly started 'maverick' populist parties, the risks of leaking of information for political or other gain may be greater. Second, parliamentarians have numerous demands on their time. They are often members of several committees, have to spend time in plenary debates, and have to combine this with the responsibility of engaging with and representing their constituents. These demands on parliamentarians' time make it difficult for members of intelligence oversight committees to spend significant time conducting detailed oversight of intelligence agencies.277 This is particularly evident when one compares the amount of time members of parliamentary oversight committees spend scrutinising the work of intelligence agencies with time available to 'professional' overseers, i.e., members of non-parliamentary oversight bodies. Time constraints on oversight are further increased when members of specialised parliamentary oversight bodies are also party/group leaders or spokespersons within a chamber. This is the case, for example, with the Dutch parliament's Intelligence and Security Services Committee, the Spanish parliament's Secret Funds Committee, and some members of the French parliament's *Delegation parlementaire au reseignement*.278 An inevitable consequence of the numerous demands on MPs' time is that parliamentary oversight committees meet less often than their counterparts in non-parliamentary oversight committees. For example, the German *Bundestag's* Parliamentary Control Panel\none of the strongest examples of a specialised parliamentary oversight committeemeets only once per month.279 While this frequency of meetings is entirely understandable in view of the competing demands on MPs' time, the lack of continuity can have a detrimental impact upon the quality and consistency of democratic oversight. A third drawbackwhich is largely related to the fact that MPs cannot devote much time to oversightis that MPs often lack the expertise that is necessary to understand intelligence agencies.280 Intelligence agencies utilise methods for collecting information which are likely to be unfamiliar to most MPs; indeed, this is particularly true given that these agencies now make use of a vast array of advanced technologies.281 MPs are unlikely to have significant knowledge of such matters when they take up their positions on an oversight committee, and may not have the time to spend learning about them. This problem is further compounded by the relatively short tenures of committee membership, due to frequent elections or the desire of party leaderships to rotate their members between committees in parliament.282 A lack of knowledge of intelligence matters can make it very difficult for MPs to conduct effective oversight and increases the risk that agencies may exploit overseers'\nlack of knowledge of the agencies to conceal particular issues. Some states have sought to address this problem by ensuring that members of parliamentary oversight committees have security-related expertise, e.g., by virtue of being a former minister with a security or intelligence portfolio.283 Parliaments can also compensate for MPs' lack of knowledge of intelligence agencies by ensuring that committees are supported by an expert staff (see section 4.3.5).\n\n## 4.2.3. Specialised Non-Parliamentary Oversight Bodies\n\n An increasing number of states have established specialised non-parliamentary bodies to oversee intelligence agencies; these are sometimes referred to as 'expert' oversight bodies.284 These bodies are usually committees (such as the Belgian Standing Intelligence Agencies Review Committee - Committee I) or individual commissioners supported by a staff (e.g., the UK's Intelligence and Interception of Communications Commissioner).\n\nSpecialised non-parliamentary oversight bodies are permanent bodies, established through legislation, which conduct oversight on an ongoing and even full-time basis. They may be created in addition to some form of parliamentary oversight committee (e.g., in the Netherlands). Other states (e.g., Canada) have opted to almost entirely 'outsource'\noversight to a specialised autonomous body and do not have any specific parliamentary committee for the oversight of intelligence agencies.285 These bodies are generally organisationally and operationally independent from parliament and the political executive. Accordingly, they act autonomously in decision-making processes, including deciding which matters to investigate and report on, and often have their own budgets approved by parliament. It should be noted that there are examples of 'hybrid' bodies which combine features of parliamentary and non-parliamentary oversight committees (see below, section 4.3.3). Specialised non-parliamentary bodies have a number of advantages in comparison to parliamentary oversight committees, which are the inverse of the drawbacks associated with parliamentary oversight that were discussed above. First, they are normally professional bodies whose members do not have other occupations. This means that they have more time to dedicate to oversight.286 Second, members of non-parliamentary oversight bodies usually have a much longer tenure of membership which gives them the opportunity to develop expertise over time.287 They also have fixed tenures of office, which means that their position is not normally dependent upon changes in government or changes in the balance of power in parliament.288 Oversight by non-parliamentary bodies is continuous: it does not halt when parliament is in recess or dissolve for elections.289 Third, in many cases, members are selected on the basis of their qualifications rather than their positions within a political party or parliamentary caucus.290 Frequently, it is a requirement that members possess particular qualifications (see below section 4.3.4 for more details). This helps to ensure that members have the requisite expertise to conduct effective oversight of intelligence agencies. Fourth, members of specialised non-parliamentary oversight bodies are generally regarded as being more independent than members of parliamentary bodies because they do not\n__________________________________________________________________________________________\nhold political office and/or operate in an environment where oversight can be used for political gain.291 In fact, there are often strict safeguards to ensure that members do not engage in any other activities which could compromise their position. For example, they may be barred from holding elected office and/or having private business interests for the duration of their membership.292 Nevertheless, the independence of non-parliamentary specialised bodies still depends, to a large extent, on the individuals appointed by parliament and/or the executive. Indeed, in states where such oversight bodies are appointed exclusively by the executive, it is potentially easier to ensure that overseers are 'government friendly' than with parliamentary oversight committees, which must include representation from a number of parties (see section 4.3.4). An additional drawback to non-parliamentary oversight bodies is that they may be perceived to lack democratic legitimacy. Unlike members of parliamentary oversight committees, members are not directly elected. Consequently, overseers are further removed from the public on whose behalf they conduct oversight.293\n\n\nSTATE\nType of\nOversight\nCommittee\nNumber of\nMembers\nNumber of\nStaff\nRules on\nmembership\nMandate\nAppointed\nby\nAgencies overseen\nAustria\n-\nStanding\nSubcommittee of the Interior\nAffairs\nCommittee\nParliamentary\nCommittee\n16\n2\n Proportional\nrepresentation\n Guaranteed\nrepresentation of opposition or minority parties\n Oversees policies; completed and ongoing\noperations; and administration and management of the agency\nParliament\nFederal Agency for State Protection and\nCounter Terrorism\nBelgium - Standing\nIntelligence\nAgencies\nReview Committee\nNonparliamentary\ncommittee\n3\n10\n Members cannot hold\nelected office\n Requirement that\nsome members are members of the legal profession\n Oversees policies; completed and ongoing\noperations; administration and management; and budgets and expenditure of the agencies\n Investigates complaints from the public  Advises on draft legislation or statutory\namendments\nBulgaria\n-\nForeign\nAffairs\nand\nDefence\nCommittee\n(Standing\nsubcommittee)\n Oversees policies; completed and ongoing\noperations; administration and management; and budgets and expenditure of the agencies\nParliament\nNational Intelligence Service, the National\nService for Protection and the Military\nInformation Service of the Ministry of Defence\nParliamentary\nCommittee\n22\n5\n Proportional\nrepresentation\nCyprus\n\nCzech\nRepublic\n-\nPermanent Commission\non\nOversight\nover\nthe\nwork of the Security Information\nService\n(BIS)\n Proportional\nrepresentation, elected by the Chamber of Deputies\n Oversees policies; completed operations;\nadministration and management; and budgets and expenditure of the agency\nParliament\nSecurity Information Service (BIS)\nParliamentary\nCommittee\n7\n1\nDenmark\n-\nThe\nFolketing's Committee on\nthe\nDanish\nIntelligence Services\n\n Subject of the committee's oversight not\nspecified\n Receives briefings on the work of the services\nParliament\nThe Danish Security and Intelligence Service\n(PET) and the Danish Defence Intelligence\nService (FE)\nParliamentary\nCommittee\n5\n2\n Every party has one\nmember\nEstonia\n-\nSecurity\nAuthorities Surveillance\nSelect\nCommittee\nParliamentary\nCommittee\n6\n2\n Proportional\nrepresentation\n Oversees policies; completed and ongoing\noperations; administration and management; and budgets and expenditure of the agencies\n Investigates complaints from the public  Draft legislation or statutory amendments\n Issue opinions on draft legislation\nFinland\n-\nThe\nAdministration\nCommittee\nParliamentary\nCommittee\n17\n5\n Proportional\nrepresentation\n Oversees policies; completed and ongoing\noperations; administration and management; and budgets and expenditure of the agency\n Draft legislation or statutory amendments\nFrance - Commission des Lois\nParliamentary\nCommittee\n73\n18\n Proportional\nrepresentation\n Oversees policies; administration and\nmanagement; and budgets and expenditure of the agencies\n Draft legislation or statutory amendments\n\nState Security (the civil intelligence and\nsecurity service) and the General Intelligence\nand Security Service of the Armed Forces (the\nmilitary intelligence and security service)\nCoordination Unit for Threat Assessment\n(CUTA) (joint analysis centre/fusion centre)\nParliament\nParliament\nSecurity Police Board and the Information\nBoard\nParliament\nThe Finnish Intelligence Service (= The\nFinnish Security Police)\nParliament\nServices du Ministere de l'Interieur\nSTATE\nType of\nOversight\nCommittee\nNumber of\nMembers\nNumber of\nStaff\nRules on\nmembership\nMandate\nAppointed\nby\nAgencies overseen\nGermany\n-\nParliamentary Control\nPanel (PKGr),\nParliamentary\nCommittee\n11\n9\n Proportional\nrepresentation\n Change of chairman\nbetween majority and minority party every year\n Oversees policies; completed and ongoing\noperations; administration and management\n Investigates complaints from the public\nParliament\nFederal Office for the Protection of the\nConstitution, the Military Counter-Intelligence\nService and the Federal Intelligence Service\nGermany\n-\nG10\nCommission\nNonparliamentary\ncommittee\n8\n9\n Proportional\nrepresentation\n Membership can\ninclude parliamentarians\n Oversight and authorisation of surveillance\nmeasures restricting the privacy of correspondence, posts and telecommunications\n Investigates complaints from the public\nGreece\n-\nSpecial\nStanding\nCommittee\nfor\nInstitutions\nand\nTransparency\n Proportional\nrepresentation\n Two Vice-Chairpersons\nand one Secretary of the Committee are elected from the first, second and third, respectively, parliamentary parties of the opposition\n Oversees policies; administration and\nmanagement; and the legitimacy of the activities of the agency\nParliamentary\nCommittee\n13\n(Information\nnot provided)\nGreece -\nAuthority\nfor\nCommunication Security and Privacy (ADAE)\n Requirement that\nmembers have \"broad social acceptance\" and specific legal and technical expertise\n Oversees the lawful interception of\ncommunications activities\n Investigates complaints from the public\nNonparliamentary\ncommittee\n14\n52\nHungary - Committee on National Security\n Guaranteed\nrepresentation of opposition or minority parties\n Committee is chaired\nby a member of an opposition party\n Oversees policies; completed operations;\nadministration and management; and budgets and expenditure of the agencies\n Investigates complaints from the public\nParliamentary\nCommittee\n12\n2\nIreland\n\nItaly - *COPASIR*\n Committee is chaired\nby a member of an opposition party\n Majority and opposition\nparty have same number of members\n Oversees policies; completed operations;\nadministration and management; and budgets and expenditure of the agencies\n Investigates complaints from the public  Draft legislation or statutory amendments\n Advises on draft legislation\nParliamentary\nCommittee\n10\n6\nLatvia\n-\nNational\nSecurity Committee\nParliamentary\nCommittee\n5\n1\n One member from\neach political group\n Oversees policies; completed and ongoing\noperations; administration and management; and budgets and expenditure of the agency\n Draft legislation or statutory amendments\n Investigates complaints from the public\nFederal Office for the Protection of the\nConstitution, the Military Counter-Intelligence\nService and the Federal Intelligence Service\nand selected law enforcement agencies\nParliamentary\nControl Panel\n(PKGr)\nPresident of\nParliament\nThe National Intelligence Service\nDesignated by\nParliament and\nappointed by\nthe Minister of\nJustice,\nTransparency\nand Human\nRights\nThe National Intelligence service (NIS),\nMinistry of Citizen Protection - Hellenic Police,\nMinistry of Citizen Protection - State Security\nDivision\nInformation Office, Constitution Protection\nOffice, Military Intelligence Office, Military\nSecurity Office, Specialised National Security\nOffice  and National Security Authority\nParliament\nSpeaker of the\nChamber of\nDeputies and\nthe Speaker of\nthe Senate\nSecurity Intelligence Department (DIS),\nExternal Intelligence and Security Agency\n(AISE) and  Internal Intelligence and Security\nAgency (AISI)\nParliament\nNational  Security Defense Agency\nSTATE\nType of\nOversight\nCommittee\nNumber of\nMembers\nNumber of\nStaff\nRules on\nmembership\nMandate\nAppointed\nby\nAgencies overseen\nLithuania\n-\nCommittee on National Security and Defence\nParliamentary\nCommittee\n10\n6\n Proportional\nrepresentation\n Oversees policies; administration and\nmanagement; and budgets and expenditure of the agencies\n Draft legislation or statutory amendments\nLuxembourg Malta\n\nThe\nNetherlands\n-\nReview Committee on the\nIntelligence\nand\nSecurity\nServices\n(CTIVD)\n Requirement that\nsome members are members of the legal profession\n Members are not\nparliamentarians\n Oversees policies; completed and ongoing\noperations of the agencies\n Investigates complaints from the public\nNonparliamentary\ncommittee\n3\n6\nPoland\n(Sejm)\n-\nSpecial\nServices\nOversight Committee\nParliamentary\nCommittee\n7\n9\n Proportional\nrepresentation\n Guaranteed\nrepresentation of opposition or minority parties\n Oversees policies; completed operations;\nadministration and management; and budgets and expenditure of the agencies\n Investigates complaints from the public\n Draft legislation or statutory amendments\nPoland\n(Senate)\n-\nHuman Rights, Rule of Law\nand\nPetitions\nCommittee\n Guaranteed\nrepresentation of opposition or minority parties\n Investigates complaints from the public  Draft legislation or statutory amendments\nParliament\nAgency of Internal Security, Intelligence\nAgency, Central Anti-Corruption Bureau\nParliamentary\nCommittee\n7\n2\nPortugal - Council for\nthe Oversight of the Intelligence System of the\nPortuguese\nRepublic\n Oversees policies; administration and\nmanagement; and budgets and expenditure of the agencies\n Investigates complaints from the public  Issues opinions on draft legislation\nNonparliamentary\ncommittee\n3\n1\n Members are elected\nby a qualified majority in Parliament\nRomania\n-\nThe\nCommittee\nfor\nDefence, Public Order\nand National Security\n Oversees policies; completed and ongoing\noperations; administration and management; and budgets and expenditure of the agencies\n Investigates complaints from the public  Draft legislation or statutory amendments\nParliamentary\nCommittee\n24\n7\n Proportional\nrepresentation\nRomania - The Joint\nStanding\nCommittee\nfor\nthe\nexercise\nof\nparliamentary\ncontrol\nover the activity of the\nSRI\n Oversees completed operations;\nadministration and management; and budgets and expenditure of the agency\n Investigates complaints from the public  Draft legislation or statutory amendments\nParliamentary\nCommittee\n9\n3\n Proportional\nrepresentation\nSlovakia - Committee\nfor the oversight of the Slovak\nInformation\nService\nParliamentary\nCommittee\n13\n2\n Proportional\nrepresentation\n Guaranteed\nrepresentation of opposition or minority parties\n Committee is chaired\nby a member of an opposition party\n Oversees policies; administration and\nmanagement; and budgets and expenditure of the agency\n Investigates complaints from the public  Draft legislation or statutory amendments\nThe State Security Department (SSD), The\nSecond Investigation Department (SID) under\nthe Ministry of Defense (military intelligence\nand counter-intelligence)\nParliament\nCombination of\nParliament,\nHead of\nGovernment\nand  responsible\nMinister\nAIVD (General Intelligence and Security\nService)  and MIVD (Defence Intelligence and\nSecurity Service)\nThe Counter-Terrorism Infobox (joint analysis\ncentre/fusion centre)\nIntelligence Agency, Defense Intelligence\nAgency, National Security Agency, the Military\nCounterintelligence Services, Central\nAnticorruption Bureau\nCentrum Antyterrorystyczne (CAT) (joint\nanalysis centre/fusion centre)\nParliament\nParliament\nSecurity Intelligence Service (SIS), Defence\nStrategic Intelligence Service (SIED) and\nMilitary Intelligence Center (CISMIL)\nThe Special Communications Service, the\nProtection and Guard Service, the Defence\nIntelligence General Directorate within MoD,\nand the General Directorate for Intelligence\nand Internal Protection within MoI\nParliament Parliament\nThe Romanian Intelligence Service (SRI)\nSTATE\nType of\nOversight\nCommittee\nNumber of\nMembers\nNumber of\nStaff\nRules on\nmembership\nMandate\nAppointed\nby\nAgencies overseen\nSlovakia - Committee\nfor the oversight of the National\nSecurity\nAuthority of  Slovak\nRepublic\nParliamentary\nCommittee\n13\n2\n Proportional\nrepresentation\n Guaranteed\nrepresentation of opposition or minority parties\n Committee is chaired\nby a member of an opposition party\n Oversees policies; administration and\nmanagement; and budgets and expenditure of the agency\n Investigates complaints from the public  Draft legislation or statutory amendments\nSlovenia\n-\nCommission\nfor\nthe\nSupervision\nof\nIntelligence\nand\nSecurity Services\nParliamentary\nCommittee\n7\n2\n Guaranteed\nrepresentation of opposition or minority parties\n Committee is chaired\nby a member of an opposition party\n Opposition parties\nhave a majority of members\n Oversees policies; budgets and expenditure\nof the agencies\n Investigates complaints from the public\nParliament\nSpain\n\nSweden\n-\nThe\nCommittee on Justice\nParliamentary\nCommittee\n17\n7\n Proportional\nrepresentation\n Oversees policies; budgets and expenditure\nof the agency\n Draft legislation or statutory amendments\nParliament\nThe Swedish Security Service\nSweden\n-\nThe\nCommission\non\nSecurity and Integrity\nProtection\nNonparliamentary\ncommittee\n10\n7\n Requirement that\nsome members are members of the legal profession\n Membership can\ninclude parliamentarians\n Oversees completed and ongoing operations\nof the agencies\n Investigates complaints from the public\nGovernment\nThe UK - Intelligence\nand\nSecurity\nCommittee (ISC)\nNonparliamentary\ncommittee\n9\n6\n Proportional\nrepresentation\n Members are\nparliamentarians\n At least one Member\nfrom the House of Lords\n Oversees policies; administration and\nmanagement; and budgets and expenditure of the agencies\nParliament\nNational Security Authority\nCivil Intelligence and Security Service (SOVA\n- the Slovene Intelligence and Security\nAgency), Military Intelligence and Security\nService (OVS - the Intelligence and Security\nService of the Ministry of Defence) and\nCriminal Investigation Police (the internal\nsecurity service, part of the General Police\nDirectorate within the Ministry of the Interior)\nThe Swedish Security Service (the Security\nPolice), The Commission also supervises the\nuse of crime fighting agencies' use of secret\nsurveillance and qualified assumed identities\nand associated activities.\nSecurity Service (MI5), Secret Intelligence\nService (MI6), Government Communications\nHeadquarters (GHCQ), Defence Intelligence,\nJoint Intelligence Committee (JIC); Joint\nTerrorism Analysis Centre (JTAC) (joint\nanalysis centre/fusion centre)\nParliament/\nHead of\nGovernment\n\n## 4.3. Organisation Of Specialised Oversight Bodies\n\n This section will analyse the organisation of specialised parliamentary and nonparliamentary oversight bodies. We will begin by looking at the characteristics of oversight bodies' membership and will then examine the different processes through which members are selected. This section will also address the resources required by specialised oversight bodies.\n\n## 4.3.1. Composition Of Parliamentary Oversight Committees\n\n\nSpecialised parliamentary oversight committees are, of course, made up of MPs.\n\nLooking at Table 1, it is evident that the size of these committees varies from 5 to\n24, with most committees having between 10 and 15 members.294 Oversight committees are generally smaller than other parliamentary committees. This may be explained by the fact that these committees are responsible for a relatively narrow set of issues. However, smaller committees may also be better suited for dealing with highly sensitive issues and classified information. A smaller group of MPs may find it easier to garner the trust and acceptance of the executive and intelligence agencies when it comes to handling sensitive information. That being said, in most parliaments it is seen to be necessary to ensure that all parties are represented on committees. Most specialised parliamentary oversight committees are full committees rather than sub-committees and can theoretically contain any member of parliament. There are, however, two other notable approaches to the composition of such committees. In the Dutch parliament, the *Tweede Kamer's* Intelligence and Security Services Committee is composed of the leaders of all parties in parliament.295 The Spanish *Cortes Generales* has a similar model which applies to its Secret Funds Committee. The plenary of parliament elects, by a 3/5 majority, one MP from each group in parliament to have full access to classified information; this group of MPs (and the speaker) constitutes the Secret Funds Committee which oversees various aspects of the intelligence agencies' work.296\nWhile the MPs selected through this process are not necessarily the party leaders, in practice they have been what Susana Sanchez describes as party\n'spokespersons' in parliament.297 The involvement of party leaders or other senior MPs in oversight committees may help to raise the profile of oversight of intelligence agencies, ensuring it remains on parliament's 'radar'. However, as was already noted, senior MPs may not have the time to dedicate to the work of an oversight committee and, as a result, oversight may be perfunctory. A third approach is to combine MPs selected for an oversight committee with ex officio members who are either drawn from other committees or part of the\n___________________________________________________________________________________\n_______\ncommittee by virtue of their position as speaker (e.g., the French parliament's Delegation parlementaire au renseignement).298 For example, in the US Congress, members of the Judiciary, Appropriations, Armed Services and Foreign Relations Committees (from both chambers) are included in the US congressional intelligence committees.299 This practice of including MPs from several relevant committees may help to ensure better coordination between an oversight committee and committees dealing with related issues, e.g., budgetary oversight or home affairs.\n\n## 4.3.2. Chairpersonship Of Parliamentary Oversight Committees\n\n With regards to the chairpersonship, parliamentary oversight committees typically adopt one of three approaches. Most commonly, the committee is chaired by a member of the largest or governing party in parliament, e.g., the US Congressional Intelligence Committee and the French parliament's Delegation parlementaire au renseignement. An alternative approach is for a member of an opposition party to chair parliamentary oversight committees; this is a requirement in a number of EU Member States including Italy, Hungary, Slovakia and Slovenia.300 This practice can provide a counterweight to government control of intelligence agencies. If the opposition chairs an oversight committee, the governing party(ies) cannot use its (their) majority to impede the oversight of intelligence agencies if, for example, they wish to prevent the examination of potentially embarrassing issues.301 A final approach, which is used in the German Bundestag's Parliamentary Control Panel, is for the chairpersonship to rotate between the governing and an opposition party.302\n\n\n## 4.3.3. Composition Of Non-Parliamentary Oversight Bodies\n\n Non-parliamentary oversight bodies normally have fewer members than their parliamentary counterparts, e.g., the Dutch Review Committee on the Intelligence and Security Services (CTIVD) has three members, the Belgian Committee I (three), and the Council for the Oversight of the Intelligence System of the Portuguese Republic (three) (see Table 1). The members of these bodies typically include senior figures who are (semi)-retired from other vocations. Given that these bodies often have a mandate to scrutinise, among other things, the legality of the agencies' work, there is often a requirement that at least one member is a senior lawyer or a member of the judiciary.303 Elsewhere, there are requirements for the membership to include people from other vocations, for example, members of the Greek Authority for Communication Security and Privacy must be 'distinguished scientists and professionals in the legal and technical sector of communications'.304 Similarly, Croatian law requires that members of the Council for the Civilian Oversight of the Security Intelligence Agencies have a background in political science, electro-technical sciences, as well as law.305 These requirements are intended to ensure that oversight bodies include persons with the relevant expertise to both understand and evaluate the activities of intelligence agencies. The composition of non-parliamentary oversight bodies differs in terms of whether or not they can include parliamentarians. In most cases, sitting parliamentarians are not permitted to serve on specialised non-parliamentary oversight bodies.306 A second possibility is what Iain Cameron describes as a\n'hybrid body', which can include both parliamentarians and nonparliamentarians.307 The Swedish Commission on Security and Integrity Protection, the German G10 Commission, and the Norwegian EOS-Utvalget Committee are examples of bodies with a hybrid composition. Finally, and somewhat paradoxically, a non-parliamentary oversight body may be made up exclusively of parliamentarians. For example, the UK's Intelligence and Security Committee states that it is a non-parliamentary body but its members must be members of the House of Commons or the House of Lords.308 Given that nonparliamentary oversight is generally intended to provide impartial, independent oversight, it may seem odd that parliamentarians can be members. Yet, there can be advantages to inclusion of parliamentarians in what are ostensibly nonparliamentary bodies as it balances legitimacy with expertise. The Norwegian and Swedish examples show that this model can work where the separation of powers is not an important concern and constitutional controls mean that the risk of 'political policing' is low. However, the authors are of the view that political oversight involving parliamentarians is generally best located within parliament, and should be supplemented by a committee of apolitical experts outside parliament.\n\n## 4.3.4. Selection Of Members Of Specialised Oversight Bodies\n\n The process through which members of oversight bodies are selected is important because in order for oversight to be effective it is necessary to select overseers who: a) have the necessary knowledge of and interest in intelligence matters; b)\nhave the will to engage in oversight in an impartial manner; and c) can command the respect and trust of the intelligence agencies. Members of parliamentary oversight committees are, of course, selected through parliament but there are a number of different methods for doing sothese are often different to those which apply to the selection of members for other parliamentary committees. One approach is for members to be appointed by a simple majority in parliament; this is, for example, the case for the German *Bundestag's* Parliamentary Control Panel. According to Hans De With and Erhard Kathmann, this is an important check which helps to ensure that only the most professional and trusted members\n_______\nof the *Bundestag* are elected to the Panel.309 This selection method also helps to ensure that members of oversight committees enjoy broad support from their peers. The Spanish *Cortes Generales* uses a similar approach: the plenary of parliament elects one MP by a 3/5 majority from each party to have access to the highest levels of classified information and thus, by default, to serve as a member of the Secret Funds Committee. This high threshold is considered to be particularly important in Spain due to concerns about giving members of the political group associated with the terrorist group ETA access to classified information regarding the intelligence agencies.310 Elsewhere, members of parliamentary oversight committees are selected by the party leadership within parliament, e.g., in the US Congressional intelligence committees and the Hungarian National Security Committee.311 Another approach is for the speaker of parliament to select members of oversight committees, as in the case for the French parliament's Commission de verification des fonds speciaux and the Italian parliament's COPASIR.312 Finally, in some Westminster systems, e.g., Australia, the prime minister appoints members of parliamentary oversight committees following consultation with opposition parties.313 The latter three methods of selection are all means to ensure that only parliamentarians that are deemed to be 'appropriate' and sufficiently senior are appointed to oversight committees. However, they can all be manipulated by governing parties to ensure that members of oversight committees are, inter alia, sympathetic to the government on matters of security and unwilling take a very critical approach towards intelligence agencies. In other words, members may not necessarily be selected on the basis of their knowledge of intelligence matters or any particular interest in being involved in oversight. The processes for selecting members of specialised non-parliamentary oversight bodies vary significantly between states. As Table 1 shows, a significant majority of the non-parliamentary oversight bodies featured in this study are appointed by parliament. Appointments are normally made by the plenary of parliament but may also be the prerogative of a particular committee. For example, in Germany, the *Bundestag's* Parliamentary Control Panel elects members of the G10\nCommission, which is a non-parliamentary body that oversees, among other things, information collection and the use of personal data by the German intelligence agencies. The appointment of overseers by parliament has the advantage that it helps to maintain a link between members of the public and overseers, as directly elected representatives elect overseers. On the other hand, the main drawback of parliamentary involvement is that it politicises the selection process. Prospective memberswho are not meant to represent any political interestsmay see the need to pander to particular political parties in order to be (re)elected. This clearly undermines the purpose of having a non-parliamentary body to provide apolitical oversight.\n\nAlternatively, the executive may appoint non-parliamentary overseers. By way of example, the incumbent government appoints the Canadian Security Intelligence Review Committee (SIRC), the Swedish Committee on Security and Integrity Protection (SAKINT) and the Australian Inspector General for Intelligence and Security (IGIS).314 While in these cases we are not aware of any evidence to suggest that the executive has used its power of appointment to select people who will not scrutinise particular matters and/or criticise the intelligence agencies, this could undoubtedly occur in some contexts.\n\nAn interesting alternative to the appointment of non-parliamentary overseers by either parliament or the executive is to include several branches of government in the appointment process. For example, the judiciary, parliament and executive are all involved in the process for appointing members of the Dutch Review Committee on Intelligence and Security Services. In this case, a panel, which includes the ombudsman and senior judicial figures, recommends possible candidates to parliament, which may or may not take these suggestions into account. Parliament must then present the responsible minister with a list of three candidates from which to choose.315 This approach has the advantage that it increases the likelihood that members will be selected on the basis of their competences and includes a number of checks against the appointment of persons who not properly qualified or are otherwise inappropriate candidates.\n\n\n## 4.3.5. Resources\n\n It is axiomatic that both parliamentary and non-parliamentary oversight bodies need adequate financial and human resources in order to be effective.316 The precise requirements will, of course, depend on the size of the intelligence agencies they oversee, as well as the type of mandate they have (see section 4.4. for a discussion of oversight bodies' mandates). For example, an oversight body that is mandated to handle complaints and/or conduct in-depth scrutiny of the legality of an agency's activities is likely to require far greater resources than a body whose mandate is to oversee an agency's policies.\n\nStaffers are particularly essential to the functioning of an oversight body because it is generally them who carry out most of the detailed scrutiny of an agency's work (see Table 1 for the number of staffers selected specialised oversight bodies have). Members of oversight bodies are often not full-time; this is particularly true of parliamentary oversight bodies whose members have numerous other commitments. It is therefore essential that an oversight body has its own fulltime members of staff.317 In addition, it is helpful if members can engage their own staff to support them with their oversight work. The German *Bundestag's*\nParliamentary Control Panel has a useful mechanism in this regard; members can employ their own staff for committee work, as long as such persons receive\n___________________________________________________________________________________\n_______\nsecurity clearance and the approval of the committee.318 In addition to permanent staff, it is good practice for oversight bodies to be able to engage the services of an external expert on an ad hoc basis, on for instance, highly technical matters.319\n\n\n## 4.4. Mandate And Functions Of Specialised Oversight Bodies\n\n\nThis section will begin by looking at the general mandates of oversight bodies, focussing on the subject of oversight, the criteria used to undertake oversight, and the temporal dimension of oversight. This will be followed by a discussion of two functions of parliamentary oversight bodies, and indeed, parliaments more generally, which may be of particular interest to the EP: the oversight of the appointment of agency directors and the oversight of non-parliamentary oversight bodies. Finally, we will examine the oversight of four aspects of national intelligence agencies' work which are similar to some of the functions of the EU's AFSJ bodies: information sharing, the collection of open source of information, joint analysis or fusion, and the use of personal data by intelligence agencies.\n\nTable 2, at the end of this section, provides an overview of some of the activities of intelligence agencies that are overseen by specialised oversight bodies in EU Member States\n\n## 4.4.1. General Mandate\n\n\nThe mandates of both parliamentary and non-parliamentary oversight bodies are generally outlined in legislation. Provisions on oversight are commonly included in the same legislation that regulates the intelligence agency(ies)but in some states there is specific legislation for oversight bodies, e.g., for the German Bundestag's Parliamentary Control Panel, Norway's *EOS Utvalget Committee*, and Sweden's *SAKINT*. Mandates for the oversight of intelligence agencies can be broken down into three components:\n\n1) The subject of oversight, the areas of an intelligence agency's work that are overseen;\n2) The criteria for oversight, that is, the terms of reference or assessment used for overseeing particular areas of an agency's work; and\n3) The temporal focus of oversight; that is, whether oversight focuses on ex post review of an agency's activities or also includes an *ex ante* role and/or ongoing monitoring of an agency's activities.\n\nIn many instances these three dimensions of oversight are not explicitly defined in law. Where legal mandates do provide more detail, oversight bodies' mandates are usually defined according to one of the first two components, i.e., overseers are either mandated to focus on particular aspects of an agency's work or scrutinise an agency's fulfilment of particular criteria.\n\n## 4.4.1.1. Subject Of Oversight\n\n Table 1 illustrates that, in practice, specialised oversight bodies in EU Member States oversee a broad spectrum of the activities of intelligence agencies. The majority of the oversight bodies listed in Table 1 oversee the policies, administration and finance of intelligence agencies. A slightly lower number of oversight bodies stated that they oversee completed operations and fewer still monitor ongoing operations. In this context, the term 'operations' primarily refers to intelligence collection measures using, inter alia, the interception of communications, covert surveillance and use of human sources, as well as the sharing of information with domestic and foreign entities. There are two main explanations for the fact that some oversight bodies, primarily of the parliamentary variety, do not oversee intelligence agencies' operations. Firstly, executives and their agencies are highly sensitive about these activities and are very reluctant to open them to the scrutiny of parliamentarians (see sections\n4.5.3. and 4.7 for further discussion).320 Secondly, in many states the oversight of operations is the prerogative of a (quasi-)judicial body and therefore it may be seen as unnecessary for parliaments to delve into these matters.321 While this sub-division of the subject of oversight may be analytically useful, the statutory mandates of oversight bodies rarely make reference to these categories. In fact, they are often conspicuous for their lack of specificity. By way of example, the *Bundestag's* Parliamentary Control Panel's mandate is codified in the following way:\nWith respect to the activities of the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution, the Military Counter-Intelligence Service and the Federal Intelligence Service, the Federal Government shall be subject to the supervision of the Parliamentary Control Panel.322\n\nThe mandate of the French parliament's Delegation parlementaire au renseignement is similarly general:\n\nla delegation parlementaire au renseignement a pour mission de suivre l'activite generale et les moyens des services specialises a cet effet places sous l'autorite des ministres charges de la securite interieure, de la defense, de l'economie et du budget.323 There are notable exceptions to this approach, such as the UK's Intelligence and Security Committee, which has an explicit mandate 'to examine the expenditure, administration and policy of' the UK's intelligence services, and Australia's Parliamentary Joint Standing Committee on Intelligence and Security, which has a mandate to examine the 'administration and expenditure' of the Australian intelligence agencies.324 While the mandates of many oversight bodies do not\n_______\nspecify which aspects of agencies' activities should be overseen, they sometimes contain explicit prohibitions on overseeing particular aspects of an agency's work.\n\nFor example, the French *Delegation parlementaire au renseignement* and the Parliamentary Joint Standing Committee on Intelligence and Security are explicitly barred from examining any operational matters.325 It is difficult to advocate a 'best' approach or practice in regards to the subject(s)\nof an oversight body's mandate. Ultimately, what matters is that all of the abovementioned dimensions of an intelligence agency's work are overseen by a body which is independent from the agencies and the executive.326 Such bodies could include a combination of the institutions discussed in this chapter, as well as judicial bodies. Nevertheless, a clear delineation of the areas of an intelligence agency's work that should be overseen helps provide overseers with a clear focus for their work and should assist them in allocating time and resources for scrutinising particular matters. On the other hand, a lack of clarity in terms of the 'subject' of oversight may have some advantages. Notably, it may give an oversight body a greater margin of discretion in deciding which aspects of a intelligence agency to examine. A mandate which is too precise might be narrowly interpreted by the executive and/or agencies as grounds for resisting oversight of particular matters. In addition, it may be difficult to disentangle subjects such as operations and policy given that they are intrinsically linked: operations take place on the basis of policy and yet, operations also inform policy.\n\n4.4.1.2.\nCriteria for oversight\n Oversight is normally conducted according to terms of reference that indicate the criteria according to which an intelligence agency's work should be scrutinised. Such criteria should be an integral part of an oversight body's mandate because they indicate how an agency's work is assessed. Criteria for oversight can be divided into three main areas: compliance with the law, effectiveness, and efficiency.327 The majority of EU national parliaments that responded to the DCAF-EUI questionnaire indicated that a specialised parliamentary and/or nonparliamentary committee oversees intelligence agencies in accordance with all of these criteria. However, in common with the foregoing discussion on the oversight of particular aspects of intelligence agencies' work, national law does not always provide any specific guidance to oversight bodies on which criteria they should assess.328 We shall briefly describe each of the three criteria. A mandate to assess *compliance with the law* typically involves scrutinising an agency's activity to assess whether or not they have complied with applicable constitutional, statutory, subsidiary and, sometimes, international law.329 This focus is sometimes defined more broadly as 'propriety', which goes beyond the law to include the ethicality of particular activities. A number of the oversight bodies examined in this study have mandates which focus exclusively on\n___________________________________________________________________________________\nevaluating intelligence agencies' compliance with the law, e.g., the Dutch CTIVD, the Swedish Commission on Security and Integrity Protection, and the Council for the Oversight of the Intelligence System of the Portuguese Republic.330 It is notable that these bodies are exclusively non-parliamentary specialised oversight bodies. Parliamentary bodies are normally required to examine a broader range of criteria (see below). Overseers whose mandate includes scrutinising an intelligence agency's compliance with the law, such as the Dutch CTIVD and Belgian Committee I, are generally empowered to make this assessment with respect to a broad range of 'subjects of oversight' outlined above (sub-section 4.4.1.1), e.g., operations, policies and administration.331 In other cases, oversight bodies are mandated to oversee the legality of a very specific aspect of an agency's work. For example, the UK Intelligence and Interception of Communications Commissioners are mandated to examine whether the process for authorising the use of certain special powers to collect intelligence comply with the law.332 It is the opinion of the authors of this study that a mandate to oversee an agency's compliance with the law should include the examination of operations because it is in this area that agencies leave the largest legal footprint: they perform functions which restrict and may violate human rights. A mandate to oversee the *effectiveness* or efficacy of agencies' work entails an assessment of if and how agencies' fulfil their statutory tasks, as well as the extent to which they meet the expectations of their customers, i.e., the executive and other government agencies.333 This assessment is critically important for ensuring that agencies contribute effectively to the security of the state and its population. Several specialised oversight bodies examined in this research have an explicit legal mandate to assess both the lawfulness and the effectiveness of the agencies.334 Finally, the oversight of the *efficiency* of the work of intelligence agencies implies an assessment of the relationship between the financial resources expended on particular initiatives and their outcomes. A focus on efficiency is usually linked to a mandate to oversee the finances of these agencies.\n\n## 4.4.1.3. The Temporal Dimension Of Oversight\n\n The mandates of oversight bodies also vary according to the point in time at which they scrutinise given activities of intelligence agencies. In theory, an overseer could scrutinise a particular action or policy at any point in timefrom the planning discussions, to the implementation phase, as well as after it has been completed. The mandates of oversight bodies rarely specify the point in time at which oversight should take place. In practice, most oversight bodies take an *ex post* approach to scrutinising intelligence agencies.335 That is, they look at documents which have been finalised, decisions that have been made and actions which have taken place. An *ex post* approach may be applied to issues ranging from specific intelligence collection operations, to internal regulations and policy, information sharing agreements, and sharing of information with other domestic or foreign entities. It should be noted that the fact that overseers take an ex post approach to scrutinising particular activities does not necessarily imply that oversight is reactive, i.e., on the basis of a response to a particular complaint or scandals raised in the media. Overseers can take an *ex post* approach but still scrutinise particular issues or activities proactively, without being prompted by media reports etc.\n\nThere are three main areas in which oversight bodies sometimes play a role in examining policies or actions before they are implemented and/or while they are ongoing. First, and perhaps most commonly, parliamentary oversight bodies often have a role in scrutinising and (through the plenary of parliament) approving proposed expenditure by intelligence agencies.336 Within this context, parliaments may examine (*ex ante*) proposed programmes, priorities for the forthcoming period and, in some cases, specific operations. Second, some specialised oversight bodies (usually non-parliamentary bodies of a quasi-judicial nature) have a specific mandate to control intelligence agencies' use of special powers to collect information. For example, Germany's G10\nCommission plays a role in authorising the interception of communications, monitors the implementation of such measures and may order their termination.337 Third, certain oversight bodies play an *ex ante* role by virtue of their being briefed\n(by the executive) on particular operations before they take place. The US\nCongress is the main example of this practice. The executive is required to brief ex ante select groups of congressmen (the so-called Gang of Four and Gang of Eight) on specific types of operation.338 The Gang of Four is an informal customary mechanism made up of the chairman and ranking members (most senior member of the opposition party) on the House and Senate intelligence committees. This group often receives briefings on 'sensitive non-covert action intelligence programs', such as highly sensitive intelligence collection programmes. The Gang of Eightwhich, in contrast to the Gang of Four, does have a statutory basisis made up of the same four individuals plus the speaker and opposition leader in each house.339 The law requires the executive to report to this group on forthcoming 'covert actions', which are defined in US law as 'an activity or activities of the United States Government to influence political, economic, or military conditions abroad, where it is intended that the role of the United States Government will not be apparent or acknowledged publicly'.340\nThese processes are aimed at keeping Congress informed and allowing members to raise concerns but this *ex ante* involvement does not imply that Congress has either approval power with regards to such operations or that it can veto them.341\nFor the purposes of the EP, it is important to note that we are not aware of examples, in the US or elsewhere, where *ex ante* briefings on operations extend to cooperation or information sharing agreements between intelligence agencies and foreign entities. Finally, oversight bodies may be briefed on work plans and priorities and have the opportunity to raise concerns (this issue is discussed in more detail in section 4.5.4. on proactive disclosures). This does not, however, imply a veto on such plans or a role in decision making about an agency's programmes and policies. From this assessment it is evident that there is a clear difference between overseers receiving information about particular programmes or actions before they are implemented, and overseers playing a role in decision making relating to particular activities. While it is standard practice for parliaments to appropriate funds to intelligence agencies (thus, exerting control over an agency), concerns arise when a specialised oversight body exerts control over decisions to undertake particular actions. Such involvement may compromise the capacity of an oversight body to subsequently review an agency's activities. This is because the oversight body has played a direct role in the decision making relating to the given activityit would have to effectively review its own work. For this reason, many states ensure that any independent body involved in making ex ante decisions about particular actions is not the same body as the one which later reviews such actions.\n\n\n4.4.2.\nSpecific oversight functions\n\nWithin the framework of their general mandates, oversight bodies perform a broad range of specific functions. These functions include: the aforementioned role in authorising the use of special powers to collect information, e.g., surveillance, or the use of assumed identities;342 supervising the use of such powers; handling complaints from members of the public about intelligence agencies;343 handling disclosures made by whistleblowers from within these agencies; and serving as appeals bodies for denials of security clearance.344 The country case studies in Annex A provide additional detail on these functions. They will not, however, be discussed here because they are of limited salience for the EP given that, among other things, the AFSJ bodies do not posses special powers\n_______\nto collect information and the EU does not administer security clearances.\n\nInstead, this sub-section will highlight two functions of oversight bodies (and parliaments more generally) which are likely to be of particular interest to the EP:\nthe oversight of the appointment of agency directors, and what may be termed\n'overseeing the overseers'parliamentary oversight of specialised nonparliamentary oversight bodies.\n\n## 4.4.2.1. Oversight Of The Appointment Of Agency Directors\n\n\nParliamentary oversight bodies sometimes play a role in the appointment of the directors of intelligence agencies. They are involved in one of three ways. First, the government may simply be required to inform oversight committees of their intention to appoint a particular person as director of an agency.345 Second, and most commonly, oversight committees are able to hold a hearing with a nominee and can issue a non-binding opinion or recommendation on the proposed appointment. By way of example, the Estonian *Riigikogu's* (parliament) Security Authorities Surveillance Committee is entitled to give an opinion on proposed appointments, and the Hungarian Parliament's National Security Committee must hold hearings and issue opinions on nominees' suitability for the position.346\nAlternatively, this role may be performed by several committees of parliament, e.g., in Portugal, where nominees are heard before the Committee on Constitutional Affairs, Rights, Freedoms and Guarantees; the Foreign Affairs Committee; and the National Defence Committee.347 Finally, a parliamentary oversight committee (or the plenary of parliament, acting upon their recommendation) may be required to approve the appointment of agency directors, thereby giving them a de facto veto on nominees. For example, the Romanian parliament's\n'Joint Standing Committee for the exercise of parliamentary control over the activity of the Romanian Intelligence Service' conducts hearings and reports on the president's nomination for the director of the service; on this basis, the plenary of parliament votes on whether to approve the nomination.348 The US Senate performs a similar role; the intelligence committee holds a hearing which is followed by a vote in the plenary.349\n\nGiving oversight committees a role in scrutinising the appointment of the directors intelligence agencies has three main advantages. Firstly, it provides a safeguard against the appointment of persons likely to promote the political interests of the incumbent government. Requiring a committee to hear and issue an opinion on nominees may help to ensure that persons ultimately appointed enjoy broad support.350 While the power to veto appointments can be an important power of last resort, in practice governments are unlikely to push through nominations which are strongly opposed by parliament. Secondly, hearings with prospective directors may be used to extract commitments from the nominee and/or the government on, inter alia, commitments to oversight, respect for human rights and the prioritisation of particular security issues.351 An oversight committee can subsequently monitor a director's adherence to such commitments. Finally, a hearing with, and even approval by, parliament may serve to give the director legitimacy which may help to increase public confidence in an agency. In spite of these advantages, the majority of EU Member States have opted not to involve parliament in the appointment of agency directors.352 Several arguments can be made for this. At a most basic level, it may be submitted that the executive is politically responsible for intelligence agencies and should therefore retain control of the decision on who should run such agencies. In addition, parliamentary involvement may serve to transform the selection of a director, who should be appointed on the basis of expertise, into a partisan matter.\n\nIndeed, if incumbent directors need to secure the support of a parliamentary majority to be re-appointed, this is a risk that they may take decisions in order to garner the support of particular partiesthe politicisation of intelligence agencies is clearly something that should be avoided. These concerns are less likely to arise if parliament's role in the selection of directors is limited to a specialised committee holding a hearing and issuing a non-binding opinion.\n\n4.4.2.2.\n'Overseeing' the overseers\n\nThe relationship between parliament and any specialised non-parliamentary oversight body is fundamental to the success of a system of oversight. Beyond their role in legislating to establish such bodies, parliaments engage with them in four main ways. First, parliaments often play a role in selecting the members and sometimes senior staffers of non-parliamentary oversight bodies (see section 4.3.4 for further information).353 A parliament can use its role in the appointment process to ensure that people with appropriate expertise are appointed and that incumbent members who fail to perform their functions are not reappointed.354 Second, parliaments are responsible for appropriating funds for nonparliamentary oversight bodies. The amount of influence parliament can bring to bear on the resources available to an oversight body depends on whether the body has its own budget or is subsumed under the budget of the executive branch or even the agency which it oversees. If a non-parliamentary oversight body has an autonomous budget, or at the very least a separate budget line, it is easier for parliament to play a direct role in ensuring that overseers have sufficient resources. The responsible parliamentary committee(s) can use hearings with non-parliamentary oversight bodies to determine whether it needs additional resources. Third, in a number of parliaments that responded to the questionnaire, parliament can request a non-parliamentary oversight body to examine a particular issue.355\n___________________________________________________________________________________\n_______\nThis enables parliament to make use of the bodies to investigate matters which it may not have the time or specialised expertise to address. Finally, non-parliamentary oversight bodies are usually required to report to parliament either directly or through the executive.356 This typically includes both periodic reports and reports on thematic issues. Such reporting is usually done to a particular committee of parliament, which is responsible for scrutinising the reports and taking the necessary action within parliament.357 For example, legislative amendments may be put forward on the basis of the findings of a nonparliamentary oversight body, or parliament may decide to stop funding a particular area of an intelligence agency's work. Parliamentary committees often hold hearings as a follow up to reports from non-parliamentary overseers.358\nThese meetings can serve to inform MPs about particular problems concerning intelligence agencies, and may help to inform parliamentary debate on matters of concern.359 MPs can also use this dialogue to ensure that such bodies are fulfilling their mandates effectively and have sufficient powers and resources in order to do so.\n\n## 4.4.3. Oversight Of Selected Activities Of Intelligence Agencies\n\n\nIn order to ensure that the analysis of national oversight bodies' mandates and functions is of relevance to the EP, we identified four broad categories of activity that are performed by the AFSJ bodies, and subsequently examined how specialised oversight bodies scrutinise intelligence agencies' performance of comparable activities on the national level. These activities are: information sharing; the collection of open source information; joint analysis and fusion; and the use of personal data.\n\n## 4.4.3.1. Information Sharing\n\n\nSharing information with domestic and foreign bodies is a key dimension of intelligence agencies' work. On a national level, agencies share information with, inter alia, the police, customs and border agencies, prosecutors and other similar agencies. The sharing of information, particularly personal data, can give rise to human rights concerns because recipients may take action resulting in the limitation of human rights on the basis of information provided by an intelligence agency.360 In view of this, overseers scrutinise both the agreements upon which information is shared and, where necessary, examine the content of information shared with other domestic bodies.361 Specialised oversight bodies typically examine information sharing on a national level through, inter alia, random\n___________________________________________________________________________________\nchecks on or sampling of an agency's files on the basis of complaints and in the context of in-depth investigations into particular files or programmes.362\nOverseers do not, however, play a role in the drafting or approval of information sharing agreements between intelligence agencies and other domestic entities. Intelligence agencies' sharing of information with foreign entities has given rise to significant concern in recent years.363 This is largely because established democracies have exchanged an ever increasing amount of information with states that do not respect the same standards on human rights, the rule of law and democratic accountability.364 In view of this, information sharing with foreign entities clearly needs to be carefully regulated and overseen.365 Yet, many national oversight bodies are ill equipped to perform this task. Most notably, many oversight bodies do not have a legal mandate to examine information sharing with foreign entities. They are often prohibited from accessing information about agreements and information transfers (see section 4.5.3.). The\n'third party rule' is a major obstacle in this regard because overseers are often viewed as third parties and thus barred from viewing information provided by foreign entities.366 Finally, overseers' jurisdiction is normally limited to their own state's territory, information and personnel.367 When investigating a particular matter, they cannot usually secure the cooperation of foreign officials.368 Oversight bodies have, nevertheless, dedicated significant attention to cooperation with foreign partners and many have conducted thematic investigations in this regard.369 A number of the specialised oversight bodies examined in this research can scrutinise information sharing with foreign entities on an ongoing basis. In this context, oversight takes four main forms. First, an overseer can review the agreements upon which information sharing and other forms of cooperation are based.370 The Canadian system is a good example in this regard; the law requires that information sharing agreements between the Canadian Security Intelligence Service and foreign (or domestic) agencies must be copied to the Security Intelligence Review Committee (SIRC, a nonparliamentary body).371 This practice gives the overseer the opportunity to raise concerns about, e.g., an agreement's safeguards on the use of shared information or data protection guarantees, as well as to evaluate an agency's sharing practices against the criteria established in an agreement. It is important\n\nItaly, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Slovenia, Sweden, Romania and the UK.\n\nto note, however, that neither specialised oversight bodies nor parliaments play a role in the negotiation or adoption of these agreements. In fact, we are not aware of any example where specialised (non)parliamentary oversight bodies review, let alone approve, agency to agency agreements before they are signedthis is seen as the exclusive prerogative of the executive and its agencies. Second, an oversight body may be able to review the human rights record or data protection standards of the state or agency in question. For example, the SIRC\nhas also reviewed the human rights records of partner countries and flagged information sharing/cooperation relationships which require a high degree of vigilance.372 Third, in some states the executive and/or intelligence agencies have an obligation to inform an oversight body about information exchanged with foreign entities. In Germany, for example, the Federal Intelligence Service is required to inform (on a periodic basis) both the Parliamentary Control Panel and the G10 Commission about the transfer of certain forms of information to foreign entities.373 Finally, some oversight bodies review outgoing and/or incoming information from foreign entities, insofar as this is relevant to their mandate.374 By examining this information, overseers can try to ensure that key safeguards are observed, i.e., information sharing complies with applicable agreements and national law.375\nSome overseers have stated that they focus on examining outgoing information,376 while others have explicitly stated they examine incoming information from foreign entities.377 Scrutiny of such information does not normally entail examining every piece of information exchanged. More commonly, overseers examine information shared with or by foreign entities in the context of an investigation into a particular case or relationship. What matters is that overseers have the authority to examine such information if they deem it to be necessary (see section 4.5).\n\n## 4.4.3.2. Collection Of Open Source Information\n\n Most national intelligence agencies are authorised to use special powers to collect information, e.g., covert surveillance, the interception of communications and surreptitious removal of objects. However, they collect a far greater proportion of their information through so-called 'open sources'. That is, information which is public and freely available, such as media articles, online blogs and academic studies. Information collected from open sources may include 'strategic'\ninformation on particular themes but it may also include personal data which are available in the public domain. It is primarily for this reason that the collection of open source information can have important implications for individuals. Information gleaned from open sources may serve as the basis for opening files or investigations on individuals, leading to the use of the aforementioned 'special powers', which directly restrict human rights.378 Twelve of the national parliaments that responded to the DCAF-EUI questionnaire indicated that, in their state, a specialised oversight body does examine the collection of open source information by intelligence agencies.379 Such scrutiny normally takes place indirectly; for example, when overseers examine the use of special powers, e.g., the interception of communications, which may have been initiated on the basis of information collected through open sources. Another example is when overseers examine requests regarding access to personal data held in agencies' files, they may review information that was collected through open sources.380 Finally, some oversight bodies, e.g., Denmark's Wamberg Committee, have a role in overseeing the creation of files by intelligence agencies.381 In this context, they may examine whether or not a file can be created on the basis of information gathered through open sources. However, oversight bodies' scrutiny of information collected through open sources remains indirect and it is clear from the national case studies (see Annex A) that oversight bodies do not dedicate much attention to this issue.\n\n4.4.3.3.\nJoint analysis and fusion centres\n In the past decade, many states have created what are known as 'fusion' or 'joint analysis' centres. These are hubs that draw together information from a number of domestic security, intelligence, law enforcement agencies and other relevant executive bodies with the aim of producing comprehensive analyses of particular threats.382 Fusion centres usually contain representatives from each of the bodies that contribute information; these individuals work together to produce analysis to support policymaking and their own agencies' work. It is important to note that fusion centres rely upon inputs from other agencies; they do not undertake their own intelligence collection using special powers. From this description it is evident that, in terms of their functions, fusion centres are the national entities which are the most similar to the EU's AFSJ bodies.\n\nRelatively few oversight bodies scrutinise the activities of fusion centres. In fact, only seven EU Member States indicated that their specialised oversight bodies play a role in this regard.383 Belgium's Standing Intelligence Review Committee\n(Committee I) is perhaps the best example of an oversight body which scrutinises the work of a fusion centre. In fact, the applicable oversight law was amended to\n___________________________________________________________________________________\n_______\nrequire Committee I to examine both the effectiveness and its compliance with the law by the Coordination Unit for Threat Assessment.384 There are two possible explanations for the lack of oversight of fusion centres. First and foremost, oversight bodies scrutinise the activities that lie behind the inputs to fusion centres: that is, they oversee the information collection by agencies and, in some cases, information received from foreign entities.\n\nAccordingly, there is already a check on the activities that are deemed to entail the greatest restrictions on human rights. It may not be seen as a priority to carry out oversight of analysis and reporting processes. Indeed, Iain Cameron explains that there is no direct oversight of Sweden's Counter Terrorism Cooperation because it is seen as performing advisory rather than operational functions.385 A second explanation is that fusion centres are often subsumed within intelligence agencies and thus may be overseen within the context of the oversight of these agencies.386\n\n\n## 4.4.3.4. Use Of Personal Data\n\n Given that information is the lifeblood of intelligence agencies, it is inevitable that use of personal data is one of the main areas in which they restrict and, without proper controls, may violate human rights. The oversight of the use of personal data is therefore essential for ensuring that agencies comply with applicable law on, inter alia, privacy, data protection and non-discrimination.387 Broadly speaking, overseers assess whether agencies have complied with applicable law on the use of personal data in one or more of the following areas of activity: (1)\nthe collection of information using special powers; (2) the retention and deletion of personal data in agencies' files; (3) the handling of requests to access personal data held by agencies; and (4) the transfer of personal data to domestic and foreign partners (discussed above).388 We will highlight just some of the situations in which oversight bodies scrutinise the use of personal data across these areas in order to ensure that intelligence agencies comply with the law. Firstly, overseers may check agencies' files on a given person upon receipt of a query or complaint, including requests from members of the public to access their own personal data.389 Secondly, oversight bodies may scrutinise personal data held in an agency's files, as well as the basis upon which it was included in the files, in the context of a thematic investigation of a particular issue. For example, oversight bodies may review an agency's work relating to a particular terrorist group, the sharing of information with foreign partners, or transfers of personal data to immigration authorities.390 Thirdly, overseers may conduct checks on samples of certain processes involving the use of personal data, such as the insertion of data into a particular category of work file or the sharing of\n___________________________________________________________________________________\ninformation with other agencies. Fourthly, an oversight body, such as Denmark's\n'Wamberg Committee', may be required to scrutinise and approve the proposed establishment of a file on a given person.391 Finally, some oversight bodies review all information collected from the use of special powers and may order its deletion if, for example, its retention is not absolutely necessary or the process through which it was collected did not comply with the law.392 Oversight of the use of personal data by intelligence agencies is generally considered to be highly skilled, time-consuming work.393 In view of this, oversight normally is carried out by non-parliamentary oversight bodies. Indeed, the oversight of the use of personal data is a key part of the mandate of many nonparliamentary oversight bodies which deal exclusively with intelligence agencies.394 Some non-parliamentary oversight bodies focus exclusively on the use of personal data by intelligence agencies.395 While non-parliamentary oversight bodies generally play a role in this regard, they sometimes share jurisdiction with a data protection supervisor/commission, e.g., in Germany.396 By contrast, in some states, e.g., Portugal, the oversight of the use of personal data by intelligence agencies is the exclusive prerogative of a data protection supervisor/commission, which has jurisdiction far beyond intelligence agencies.397\nWhile it is difficult to advocate any best practice in terms of the precise division of labour for the oversight of intelligence agencies' use of personal data, it is important that there is at least one institution that has the requisite powers, expertise and access to information to do so. Oversight bodies that focus exclusively on intelligence agencies are often well placed in this regard and, unlike data protection bodies with a general mandate, they can draw links between their oversight of the use of personal data with their scrutiny of other aspects of agencies' work.\n\nSharing of\ninformation\nbetween\nagencies on a\ndomestic level\nCollection of\ninformation\nusing special\npowers\nCollection of\ninformation\nfrom open\nsources\nUse of personal\ndata\nSTATE\nAustria\n-\nStanding\nSubcommittee\nof\nthe\nInterior\nAffairs\nCommittee\nNo distinction is made/Relevant information may be provided\nBelgium\n-\nStanding\nIntelligence\nAgencies\nReview Committee\nO\nO\nO\nO\nO\nO\nO\nO\n\nBulgaria\n-\nForeign\nAffairs\nand\nDefence\nCommittee\n(Standing\nsubcommittee)\nO\nO\nO\nO\nO\nO\nO\n\n\nCyprus\n\nCzech\nRepublic\n-\nPermanent\nCommission\non Oversight over the work\nof\nthe\nSecurity\nInformation\nService\n(BIS)\n\n\nO\n\n\nDenmark\n-\nThe\nFolketing's Committee on the Danish Intelligence\nServices\n\n\nO\n\n\nO\n\n\nEstonia\n-\nSecurity\nAuthorities\nSurveillance\nSelect Committee\n\nO\n\nO\n\n\nO\nO\nO\nFinland\n-\nThe\nAdministration\nCommittee\nO\nO\nO\nO\nO\nO\nO\nO\nO\nFrance\n-\nCommission\ndes Lois\n\n\nO\nO\n\n\nGermany\n-\nParliamentary\nControl\nPanel (PKGr)\nO\nO\nO\nO\nO\nO\nO\n\n\nGermany\n-\nG10\nCommission\nO\nO\nO\nO\nO\nO\nO\n\n\nGreece\n-\nSpecial\nStanding Committee for Institutions\nand\nTransparency\nNo distinction is made/Relevant information may be provided\nGreece -\nAuthority\nfor\nCommunication Security and Privacy (ADAE)\nO\n\nO\n\n\nHungary - Committee on National Security\nO\n\n\nO\n\n\nO\n\nInformation\nsharing and\ncooperation\nagreements\nsigned with\nforeign\ngovernments\nand agencies\nSharing of\ninformation\nwith foreign\nentities\nAnalysis of\ninformation and\nproduction of\nreports\nAppointments of\noversight bodies\nwithin agencies\nAppointments of\nsenior staff\nSharing of\ninformation\nbetween\nagencies on a\ndomestic level\nCollection of\ninformation\nusing special\npowers\nCollection of\ninformation\nfrom open\nsources\nUse of personal\ndata\nSTATE\nIreland\n\nItaly - *COPASIR*\nO\nO\nO\nO\n\n\nO\n\n\nLatvia\n-\nNational\nSecurity Committee\nO\nO\nO\nO\nO\nO\nO\nO\n\nLithuania - Committee on\nNational\nSecurity\nand\nDefence\n\n\nO\n\n\nO\nO\n\nLuxembourg Malta\n\nThe Netherlands - Review\nCommittee\non\nthe\nIntelligence and Security Services (CTIVD)\nO\nO\nO\nO\nO\nO\nO\n\n\nPoland (Sejm) - Special\nServices\nOversight\nCommittee\nO\n\nO\nO\nO\nO\nO\nO\n\nPortugal - Council for the\nOversight\nof\nthe\nIntelligence System of the\nPortuguese Republic\n\nO\nO\nO\n\n\nO\n\n\nRomania\n-\nThe\nCommittee\nfor\nDefence,\nPublic Order and National\nSecurity\nO\nO\nO\nO\nO\nO\nO\n\n\nRomania\n-\nThe\nJoint\nStanding\nCommittee\nfor\nthe\nexercise\nof\nparliamentary control over\nthe activity of the SRI\nO\nO\nO\nO\nO\nO\nO\n\n\nSlovakia - Committee for\nthe oversight of the Slovak Information\nService\n-\nCommittee\nfor\nthe\noversight of the National Security\nAuthority\nof\nSlovak Republic\nO\n\nO\nO\n\n\nO\n\nSlovenia - Commission for\nthe\nSupervision\nof\nIntelligence and Security\nServices\nO\n\n\nO\n\n\nO\n\n\nSpain\n\nSweden - The Committee on Justice\n\n\nO\n\n\nSweden - The Commission\non Security and Integrity\nProtection\nO\nO\nO\nO\nO\nO\nO\n\n\nThe UK - Intelligence and Security Committee (ISC)\n\nO\n\nO\nO\nO\nO\n\n\nInformation\nsharing and\ncooperation\nagreements\nsigned with\nforeign\ngovernments\nand agencies\nSharing of\ninformation\nwith foreign\nentities\nAnalysis of\ninformation and\nproduction of\nreports\nAppointments of oversight bodies\nwithin agencies\nAppointments of\nsenior staff\n\n## 4.5. Access To Classified Information By Parliaments And Specialised Oversight Bodies\n\n Access to relevant information underpins the oversight of intelligence agencies. Given the secretive nature of these agencies' activities, this implies that overseers need access to classified information in order to scrutinise their work.\n\nThis section will begin by examining national parliaments' access to information in general terms. This intends to provide the EP with an overview of parliamentary access to information across the EU. This overview will be followed by a detailed analysis of the modalities pertaining to access of information for specialised parliamentary and non-parliamentary oversight committees. This will include a comparative assessment of the types of information overseers need for scrutinising particular activities of intelligence agencies; the scope of oversight bodies' access to information; and common limitations on overseers' access to information. While information is the lifeblood of oversight bodies, access to information by overseers should never be viewed as an end in itself. Access to relevant information is a means which helps overseers to fulfil their mandates. However, access to information alone does not ensure effective oversight; members and staffers of oversight bodies must also have the willingness, capacity and expertise to identify and make use of this information.398\n\n\n## 4.5.1. Access To Information By Parliaments\n\n\nTable 3 outlines the extent and modalities of parliamentary access to security related classified information in EU Member States that responded to this questionnaire. This table needs to be read with caution because it does not imply that parliaments/MPs which may access classified information of a particular level of classification can do so in regards to all information all of the time. Regardless of the scope and modalities of a parliament's access to classified information, a number of conditions and/or restrictions normally apply. First, the so-called 'need to know' principlemeaning that persons can only access information if their official functions necessitate access to particular informationapplies in most parliaments.399 Second, access to information by parliaments and nonparliamentary oversight bodies is often subject to restrictions (see below, section\n4.5.3.) and a significant amount of executive discretion. Indeed, only five parliaments (Finland, Hungary, Lithuania, Slovakia and Sweden) stated that no restrictions can be imposed upon their access to information which would ordinarily be available to them.400 Finally, while parliamentarians may have the right to access classified information, such access is sometimes subject to the individual concerned having signed a non-disclosure agreement and/or having received security clearance. For example, MPs in Romania must sign a confidentiality agreement before being given access to classified information; and MPs in Lithuania require a security clearance before they can access classified\n___________________________________________________________________________________\ninformation.401 In practice, such conditions can serve to limit MPs' access to classified information. Some MPs may not wish to be vetted because, for example, they feel this violates the separation of powers, or may not want aspects of their private life examined.402 The responses to the DCAF-EUI questionnaire demonstrate that there are four main approaches to parliamentary access to information in EU Member States. For an overview, please refer to Table 3 (below).\n\n## Table 3: Parliamentary Access To Classified Information In The Field Of National Security\n\nSTATE\nTOP SECRET\nSECRET\nCONFIDENTIAL\nRESTRICTED\nAustria\nMembers of Particular Committees\n(Standing Subcommittee of the Interior Affairs\nCommittee and Standing Subcommittee of the\nNational Defence Committee)\nMembers of Particular Committees\n(Standing Subcommittee of the Interior Affairs\nCommittee and Standing Subcommittee of the\nNational Defence Committee)\nBelgium\nNo Members\nNo Members\nNo Members\nMembers of Particular Committees\n(Monitoring Committee)\nBulgaria\nAll Members\nAll Members\nAll Members\nAll Members\nCyprus\nNo information provided on access according to level of classification. Classified information available to Members of Parliament in some circumstances.\nCzech Republic\nAll Members\nAll Members\nAll Members\nAll Members\nDenmark\nNo Members\nMembers of Particular Committees\n(The Committee on Danish Intelligence Services)\nMembers of Particular Committees\n(various committees)\nAll Members\nEstonia\nAll Members\nAll Members\nAll Members\nAll Members\nFinland\nMembers of Particular Committees\n(various committees)\nMembers of Particular Committees\n(various committees)\nMembers of Particular Committees\n(various committees)\nMembers of Particular Committees\n(various committees)\nFrance\nChairs of Particular Committees\n(Commission des Lois/ Commission de la Defense)\nChairs of Particular Committees\n(Commission des Lois/ Commission de la Defense)\nChairs of Particular Committees\n(Commission des Lois/ Commission de la Defense)\nChairs of Particular Committees\n(Commission des Lois/ Commission de la Defense)\nGermany\nAll Members\nAll Members\nAll Members\nAll Members\nGreece\nNo information provided on access according to level of classification. Classified information available to Members of Parliament in some circumstances.\nHungary\nMembers of Particular Committees\n(Committee on National Security, Defense and Law\nEnforcement Committee)\nMembers of Particular Committees\n(Committee on National Security, Defense and Law\nEnforcement Committee)\nIreland\nNo Members\nNo Members\nNo Members\nNo Members\nItaly\nMembers of Particular Committees\n(Parliamentary committee for the security of the\nRepublic (COPASIR))\nMembers of Particular Committees\n(Parliamentary committee for the security of the\nRepublic (COPASIR))\nLatvia\n Classified information available to some Members of Parliament. Detailed internal rules determine which Members of Parliament have access to specific levels of classified information.\nLithuania\nAll Members\nAll Members\nAll Members\nAll Members\nLuxembourg Malta The Netherlands\nGroup Leaders\nGroup Leaders\nGroup Leaders\nAll Members\nPoland (Sejm)\nMembers of Particular Committees\n(Special Services Oversight Committee)\nPresident/Speaker\nAd hoc parliamentary committees inquiry\nAll Members\nAll Members\nAll Members\nPoland (Senat)\nPresident/Speaker\nMembers designated by the Speaker\nAll Members\nAll Members\nAll Members\nPortugal\nMembers of Parliament often have access to classified information, but no specific rules have formally been established\nRomania\nAll Members\nAll Members\nAll Members\nAll Members\nSlovakia\nAll Members\nAll Members\nAll Members\nAll Members\nSlovenia\nAll Members\nAll Members\nAll Members\nAll Members\nSpain\nAd hoc parliamentary inquiry committees\nChairs of Particular Committees\nPresident/Speaker of parliament\nSweden\n(Information not provided)\nThe UK\nMembers of Particular Committees\n(Intelligence and Security Committee (ISC))\nMembers of Particular Committees\n(Intelligence and Security Committee (ISC))\nMembers of Particular Committees\n(Intelligence and Security Committee (ISC))\nMembers of Particular Committees\n(Standing Subcommittee of the Interior Affairs\nCommittee and Standing Subcommittee of the\nNational Defence Committee)\nMembers of Particular Committees\n(Standing Subcommittee of the Interior Affairs\nCommittee and Standing Subcommittee of the\nNational Defence Committee)\nMembers of Particular Committees\n(Committee on National Security, Defense and Law\nEnforcement Committee)\nMembers of Particular Committees\n(Committee on National Security, Defense and Law\nEnforcement Committee)\nMembers of Particular Committees\n(Parliamentary committee for the security of the\nRepublic (COPASIR))\nMembers of Particular Committees\n(Parliamentary committee for the security of the\nRepublic (COPASIR))\n\nChairs of Particular Committees\nParty/Group Leaders\nPresident/Speaker of parliament\nParty/Group Leaders\n\n## 4.5.1.1. Access By All Mps\n\n There are a surprisingly large number of national parliaments (8) in which any MP can, in principle, have access to classified information up to and including information classified as 'Top Secret.' In a slightly higher number of parliaments (10) all MPs may access information classified  'Secret' (or lower) and in 12 parliaments all MPs may access information classified as 'Restricted' (see Table 3). However, these statistics need to be read with caution; it does not mean that all MPs can access any classified information at will. Conditions and caveats cited above normally apply to access to information by parliamentarians (see also, section 4.5.3.).403\n\n\n## 4.5.1.2. Access By Designated Committee(S)\n\n It is common practice for classified information (or certain levels thereof) to only be made available to certain parliamentary committees. These are generally the committees responsible for the oversight of intelligence agencies. For example, in Hungary, classified information (of any level) is only accessible to the National Security Committee, which is the committee mandated to oversee the intelligence agencies. Similarly in Italy, the Parliamentary Committee for the Security of the Republic (COPASIR) is the only committee of parliament that can access classified information. Elsewhere, e.g., in the Danish parliament, access is only limited to a designated committee if it is classified as\n'Secret', that is, not one of the two lower levels of classified information 'Restricted' and 'Confidential'. It is axiomatic that if access to classified information is limited to particular committees, this must include any committee which oversees intelligence agencies. In a number of states, e.g., France, access to classified information is further restricted because it is only made available to the chairs of designated parliamentary committees.\n\nThis approach is problematic from the point of view of oversight because a committee chair alone cannot easily conduct oversight on the basis of such information. Information given exclusively to a committee chair can obviously not be used by the rest of the committee and is, therefore, of limited value for a committee's functions. Fortunately, such limitations do not generally apply to specialised parliamentary oversight committees.\n\n\n## 4.5.1.3. Access By Speakers And/Or Party Leaders\n\n In a number EU Member States access to classified information is restricted to party leaders or even the speaker of parliament. This is the case in the Dutch Tweede Kamer, where only party leaders are entitled to take part in meetings where information classified above 'Restricted' is discussed. Another example is the Polish *Senat,* where only the speaker can access information classified as 'Top Secret'. However, in this case the speaker is entitled to designate other MPs to receive access to the given information.404 Restricting access to classified information to the speaker and/or party leaders in parliament limits the utility of such information from the point of view of oversight. Speakers and group leaders are unlikely to be the MPs that are best placed to use the\n\ninformation to oversee intelligence agencies. This is because they deal with numerous other parliamentary affairs and do not have time to focus on oversight of intelligence agencies. A restriction of this nature means that these individuals are not permitted to discuss the information concerned with their colleagues and yet, they cannot be expected to make effective use of it on their own.\n\n## 4.5.1.4. No Access To Classified Information For Parliamentarians\n\n The parliament of Ireland is the only EU member state national parliament in which no MPs have access to classified information of any level. Elsewhere, there are absolute restrictions on any MP accessing classified information beyond particular levels of classification. In Denmark, for example, no MP can access information classified as 'Top Secret', while in Belgium, no MP can access information classified above the level of\n'Restricted'. The impact of such restrictions on parliamentary access to higher levels of classified information likely depends on the extent to which higher levels of classification are used by a given intelligence agency. Classification practices vary greatly between states and the fact that a parliament cannot access any information classified as 'Top Secret' may not affect parliamentary oversight if, for example, most of the information relevant to oversight is classified at levels below 'Top Secret'.\n\n## 4.5.2. Access To Classified Information By Specialised Oversight Bodies\n\n Having discussed parliamentary access to information in general terms, we will now turn to examine access to information by specialised parliamentary and non-parliamentary oversight bodies in more detail. Access to classified information by non-parliamentary oversight bodies is almost always regulated by the legislation upon which they are based;\nin the case of parliamentary oversight bodies, these provisions are usually distinct from those which apply to parliament as a whole.405 For the purposes of this study, and the ongoing debate about the revision of Regulation 1049 at the EU level, it is imperative to note that regulations on access to information by oversight bodies are entirely decoupled from laws on public access to government documents (e.g., freedom of information legislation). The framework for access to classified information by specialised oversight institutions can be broadly divided into four components: (1) the right of these bodies to request intelligence agencies, executives and other relevant parties to provide information relevant to their mandate; (2) an accompanying obligation for the executive and agencies to comply with such requests; (3) possible limitations on this right of access to classified information; and (4) a requirement for intelligence agencies and governments to proactively disclose certain types of information to overseers, without being requested to do so. It must be stressed that access to classified information by oversight bodies is inextricably linked to their mandate. Indeed, overseers' information needs should be defined by their mandate because in the absence of this anchorage there is a risk that overseers will either be unable to effectively fulfil their mandates due to a lack of information or will attempt to access information that may be unrelated to their work. A number of the specialised parliamentary and non-parliamentary oversight bodies examined for this research have virtually unlimited access to classified informationheld by the executive, intelligence agencies, and other public bodieswhich they deem to be relevant to the fulfilment of their mandate. This includes all information regardless of its form, level of classification, author or addressee. This can include information from foreign entities, sources and methods; see Table 4 for an overview of the scope of access to classified information by specialised oversight committees.406 Oversight bodies that have full access to information can request access on their own initiative, as and when they deem necessary.407 In some states, overseers have recourse to investigate powers and can call upon law enforcement authorities to enforce their right to access all information they deem to be necessary (see section 4.6). A failure to furnish an oversight body with requested information might be criminalised. These formidable powers provide overseers with predictability regarding access to information they need for their investigations, and can save them from having to indulge in endless legal battles to acquire information. The following provisions from the laws on the Dutch CTIVD and the Canadian SIRC are excellent examples of a legal foundation for access to classified information by overseers:\n\nThe relevant Ministers, the heads of the services, the co-ordinator and furthermore everyone involved in the implementation of this act and the Security Investigations Act will, if requested, furnish all information to the supervisory committee and will render all other assistance the supervisory committee deems necessary for a proper performance of its duties (Article\n73(1) of the Dutch Intelligence and Security Services Act 2002). [...] the Review Committee is entitled [..] to have access to any information under the control of the Service or of the Inspector General that relates to the performance of the duties and functions of the Committee and to receive from the Inspector General, Director and employees such information, reports and explanations as the Committee deems necessary for the performance of its duties and functions (Section 39(2), Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act 1984). These examples highlight that it is oversight bodies, not the executive or the agencies being overseen, that should determine what information is relevant for their functions.408\nIndeed, this prerogative is fundamental to the effectiveness and independence of an oversight institution. The above examples also illustrate a legitimate circumscription on overseers' access to information: the requirement that the information is necessary for the performance of their functions or mandate. This helps to prevent 'fishing expeditions' by oversight bodies, whereby they cast around for (and gather) information which is irrelevant to their functions. Such provisions also help to guard against the acquisition of information for political purposes. Finally, it should be stressed that a legal right of access does not mean that insisting on access is always appropriate. There can be good grounds for self-restraint.\n\n## 4.5.3. Restrictions On Access To Information\n\n\nWhile it is good practice for oversight bodies to have access to all information which they deem to be necessary to the fulfilment of their mandate, many specialised parliamentary and non-parliamentary oversight bodies are faced with legal and practical restrictions on their access to classified information. In view of this reality, it is important to analyse these restrictions, evaluate the impact they have on the work of oversight bodies, and to consider how any restrictions on overseers' access to information can be limited to the greatest extent possible. Table 4 provides an overall picture of whether restrictions apply to access to particular types of classified information by specialised oversight bodies in EU Member States. This section will outline a number of these restrictions and briefly explain how they might impact on an oversight body's work.\n\n4.5.3.1.\nGeneral provisions granting the executive broad discretion to restrict access to information\n In some states, the law contains very broad provisions which enable the executive and/or directors of intelligence agencies to deny oversight bodies access to information. The following extracts are illustrative of the breadth and vagueness of such provisions:\n\nIn Italy, the executive can deny the Parliamentary Committee for the Security of the Republic access to information if it might 'jeopardise the security of the Republic'. 409\n\nIn the UK, the directors of the intelligence services can refuse to disclose information because (among other reasons) 'the Secretary of State (responsible minister) has determined that it should not be disclosed'.410\n\nWhile acknowledging that there can be legitimate reasons for limiting access, provisions of this nature grant the executive too much discretion in deciding what an oversight body can and cannot access. There is a risk that a particular minister may interpret provisions very broadly to deny an oversight body access to information, and there may be limited or no recourse to challenge such decisions. It is important to note that the executive is part of the national intelligence system; ministers establish the priorities for the agencies involved, they may be responsible for authorising the use of special powers, and are ultimately the 'customers' for the assessments drawn-up by intelligence agencies.\n\nTherefore, the executive forms an important part of the system that is subject to scrutiny by oversight bodies. There is inevitable potential for conflicts of interest if the 'overseen'\nis also the 'gate-keeper' for access to information by overseers. One way of meeting executive concerns regarding revealing particularly sensitive information is to provide that, in specific cases where such concerns have been expressed, the oversight body may require that specified information may be divulged to it only after a decision by a special qualified majority. For example, in Hungary, two thirds of the parliament's National Security Committee can vote to require the executive/an agency to disclose specific information concerning an intelligence agency's methods.411  This reduces the risk of inappropriate divulging of information, insisted upon by an individual member of the oversight bodyperhaps from a 'maverick' political party.\n\n## 4.5.3.2. Information Pertaining To Operations\n\n As Table 4 illustrates, it is relatively common for oversight bodies to be barred from accessing classified information pertaining to the operations of intelligence agencies.412\nSuch restrictions are sometimes formulated in general terms, as is the case in France and Australia, where the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security, 'must not require a person or body to disclose to the Committee operationally sensitive information [...]'.413 Elsewhere, e.g., in Italy, Lithuania and Slovakia, restrictions apply specifically to ongoing operations,414 meaning that, in theory, an oversight body can access information about operational activities once they have been completed.415\nHowever, there are problems with this distinction that can make it difficult for overseers to access the necessary information. First, it may be difficult to determine when an operation has finished; some operations might be 'ongoing' for many years, meaning that they remain impermeable to an oversight body.416 Second, overseers invariably have to defer to an agency's assessment of whether an operation is ongoing or completed; this margin of discretion could be manipulated to shield a particular matter from the gaze of an oversight body. Finally, there is a risk that the area between 'policy' and 'operations', e.g., patterns of targeting and targeting priorities, falls outside the scrutiny.417 More commonly, national laws explicitly bar overseers from accessing information relating to the sources418 and/or methods419 used by intelligence agencies. Bars on overseers' access to information pertaining to sources are based on the fact that identities and roles of human sources are among the most sensitive aspects of an agency's work. Intelligence agencies are rightly concerned that any leak of a source's identity could jeopardise their personal safety. Information concerning an agency's methods is also extremely sensitive because agencies fear that the dissemination of such information could render methods ineffective, give an advantage to adversaries and/or endanger human sources. Whether or not specialised oversight bodies have a legitimate need to access information about sources and methods, and operations more generally, depends to a large extent on their mandate. An oversight body with a mandate to oversee an intelligence agency's policies or administrative practices may have little need for this information. By contrast, if an oversight body is required to examine the legality and/or effectiveness of an agency's activities, it may need access to this information, at least on occasion. This is particularly true of methods. Notably, an oversight body may need to check whether a particular method falls within the parameters established by statutory law. While in most instances an oversight body with this type of mandate is unlikely to need to know the identities of sources, there may be some circumstances involving suspected serious criminality, e.g., corruption or human rights violations, in which overseers might need information about sources as part of an investigation.\n\n## 4.5.3.3. Information From Foreign Entities\n\n The majority of specialised oversight bodies are faced with either restrictions or absolute bars on their access to information received from foreign entities.420 Restrictions on oversight bodies' access to information intelligence agencies received from foreign entities are founded upon the 'third party rule', which underpins the sharing of information on domestic and international levels. This rule dictates that, before passing on information received from another entity to a third party, an institution must request permission from this entity. This is based on the notion that the originating party should retain control of information shared with another institution: the principle of 'originator control'.421 Oversight bodies are often viewed as third parties and cannot therefore be given access to information received from foreign entities without the consent of these entities.422 In theory, oversight bodies could access information received from foreign entities by demanding that intelligence agencies request permission from the originating entity. However, there is, to the best of our knowledge, no data available on how often such requests are made or indeed whether they are successful.423 Restrictions or absolute bars on overseers' access to the information that agencies receive from foreign entities can have profound implications for oversight. As we have already noted, the sharing of information between intelligence agencies on an international level has increased exponentially over the past decade. Intelligence agencies are increasingly reliant upon foreign entities for information and, consequently, an ever greater amount of information in their databases originates from foreign entities. As a result, more and more of the information held by intelligence agencies is deemed to be off-limits to overseers due to the aforementioned restrictions or absolute bars.424\nNeedless to say, this has profound implications for the oversight of intelligence agencies.425 Some oversight bodies with extensive powers to access information from intelligence agencies have interpreted the third party rule in such a way that it does not prevent them from accessing information which the agencies receive from foreign bodies.426 They assert that a legal right to access all relevant information leaves no room for exceptions.427 Nevertheless, where overseers do access information from foreign entities, they exercise caution, mindful of the fact that intelligence agencies are extremely sensitive about their relations with foreign entities.428\n\n## 4.5.3.4. Information Relating To Judicial Proceedings Or Criminal Investigations\n\n It is fairly common for oversight bodies to be barred from accessing information pertaining to ongoing judicial proceedings or criminal investigations.429 These restrictions are applied in order to safeguard both the right to a fair trial and the state's ability to investigate and prosecute crime. They also serve ensure that oversight bodies abstain from examining matters that are subject to criminal or judicial investigations until such investigations have been completed.\n\n\n## 4.5.3.5. Jurisdictional Limitations On Access To Information\n\n Oversight bodies are limited by the fact that their authority to access information only extends to agencies and officials of their own state. This has been a significant problem in the context of overseers examining various aspects of cooperation between their own state's agencies and foreign bodies. International intelligence cooperation, such as information sharing and joint-operations, leaves a 'footprint' in at least two states. Yet, oversight bodies can only examine the role played by their own state's agencies. For example, they might be able to see what information was sent to a foreign entity but may have no access to information regarding what the foreign entity requested or what it did with the information received. Equally, oversight bodies cannot require foreign officials to appear before them and have generally been unsuccessful with invitations to appear voluntarily. As a result of these limitations, oversight bodies often have an incomplete view of activities involving their own state's agencies.430\n\n\n## 4.5.3.6. Practical Limitations\n\n Beyond legal restrictions on access to information by overseers, there are a number of practical limitations on their access. Firstly, overseers do not always know what information exists within an intelligence agency; this is perhaps unsurprising given the vast quantities of information held by agencies. This problem may range from not knowing about an entire programme, to not knowing that a particular email was sent or telephone call made. Regardless of their legal powers to access information, oversight bodies cannot access what they do not know about. It is for this reason that the proactive disclosure of certain categories of information is so important (see the following section 4.5.4.). Secondly, overseers cannot obviously access information which was never recorded or was destroyed, e.g., information from face-to-face discussions, telephone calls or notes taken by a field officer. To prevent this from happening, national law should be strict on the need for agencies to record everything and not to delete information without proper supervision.431 Finally, it can be very hard for overseers to access information which is remotely located. This is particularly pertinent when information is held oversees, e.g., in a liaison office. Many oversight bodies do not have the resources to carry out inspections at all facilities within their own country, let alone overseas. Perhaps more importantly, overseers are unlikely to travel to a location where the agencies they are to oversee are working under cover, as this would obviously increase the likelihood of an agency's work being exposed.\n\nAgreements\nwith foreign\ngovernments,\nagencies, and\ninternational\norganizations\nInformation\nreceived from\nforeign\ngovernments\nand security\nagencies\nInformation\nreceived from\ninternational\norganizations\n(e.g.  the UN,\nEU or NATO)\nMinisterial\ninstructions/\ndirectives\nissued to\nagencies\nBudget and\nprojected\nexpenditure of\nagencies\nInformation\nreceived from\nother domestic\nagencies\nSTATE\nFuture\noperations\nOngoing\noperations\nCompleted\noperations\nPast\nexpenditure\nAustria\n-\nStanding\nSubcommittee of the Interior\nAffairs Committee\nNo distinction is made/Relevant information may be provided\nBelgium\n-\nStanding\nIntelligence Agencies Review\nCommittee\nUnlimited\nUnlimited\nUnlimited\nRestricted\nUnlimited\nUnlimited\nUnlimited\nRestricted\nUnlimited\nUnlimited\nBulgaria - Foreign Affairs and\nDefence Committee (Standing\nsubcommittee)\nUnlimited\nUnlimited\nUnlimited\nUnlimited\nUnlimited\nUnlimited\nUnlimited\nUnlimited\nUnlimited\nUnlimited\nCyprus Czech Republic - Permanent\nCommission on Oversight over the\nwork\nof\nthe\nSecurity\nInformation Service (BIS)\n\nDenmark - The Folketing's\nCommittee\non\nthe\nDanish\nIntelligence Services\n\nRestricted\nRestricted\nRestricted\nRestricted\nNo\nNo\nNo\nNo\nNo\nNo\nEstonia - Security Authorities Surveillance Select Committee\nUnlimited\nRestricted\nUnlimited\nUnlimited\nUnlimited\nUnlimited\nUnlimited\nUnlimited\nRestricted\nRestricted\nFinland - The Administration Committee\nRestricted\nRestricted\nRestricted\nUnlimited\nRestricted\nRestricted\nRestricted\nRestricted\nNo\nRestricted\nFrance - *Commission des Lois*\nNo\nNo\nNo\nNo\nNo\nNo\nNo\nNo\nNo\nNo\nGermany\n-\nParliamentary\nControl Panel (PKGr)\nRestricted\nRestricted\nRestricted\nRestricted\nUnlimited\nRestricted\nRestricted\nRestricted\nRestricted\nRestricted\nGermany - *G10 Commission*\nRestricted\nRestricted\nRestricted\nRestricted\nNo\nNo\nRestricted\nRestricted\nRestricted\nRestricted\nGreece - Special Standing\nCommittee for Institutions and\nTransparency\nNo\nNo\nRestricted\nRestricted\nNo\nNo\nNo\nNo\nNo\nNo\nGreece\n-\nAuthority\nfor\nCommunication Security and\nPrivacy (ADAE)\nRestricted\nRestricted\nRestricted\nRestricted\nRestricted\nRestricted\nRestricted\nRestricted\nRestricted\nRestricted\nHungary\n-\nCommittee\non\nNational Security\nNo\nNo\nUnlimited\nUnlimited\nUnlimited\nUnlimited\nNo\nUnlimited\nUnlimited\nUnlimited\nIreland\n\nItaly - *COPASIR*\nNo\nNo\nRestricted\nUnlimited\nUnlimited\nRestricted\nNo\n(information not\nprovided)\nNo\nNo\nLatvia - National Security Committee\nUnlimited\nUnlimited\nUnlimited\nUnlimited\nUnlimited\nUnlimited\nUnlimited\nUnlimited\nUnlimited\nUnlimited\nAgreements\nwith foreign\ngovernments,\nagencies, and\ninternational\norganizations\nInformation\nreceived from\nforeign\ngovernments\nand security\nagencies\nInformation\nreceived from\ninternational\norganizations\n(e.g.  the UN,\nEU or NATO)\nMinisterial\ninstructions/\ndirectives\nissued to\nagencies\nBudget and\nprojected\nexpenditure of\nagencies\nInformation\nreceived from\nother domestic\nagencies\nSTATE\nFuture\noperations\nOngoing\noperations\nCompleted\noperations\nPast\nexpenditure\nLithuania - Committee on\nNational Security and Defence\nNo\nRestricted\nRestricted\nRestricted\nUnlimited\nUnlimited\nRestricted\nRestricted\nNo\nRestricted\nLuxembourg\n\nMalta The Netherlands - Review\nCommittee on the Intelligence and Security Services (CTIVD)\nUnlimited\nUnlimited\nUnlimited\nUnlimited\nRestricted\nRestricted\nUnlimited\nUnlimited\nUnlimited\nUnlimited\nPoland\n(Sejm)\n-\nSpecial\nServices Oversight Committee\nRestricted\nRestricted\nRestricted\nRestricted\nUnlimited\nUnlimited\nRestricted\nRestricted\nRestricted\nRestricted\nPortugal - Council for the\nOversight of the Intelligence System\nof\nthe\nPortuguese\nRepublic\nNo\nUnlimited\nUnlimited\nN/A\nUnlimited\nUnlimited\nNo\nUnlimited\nNo\nNo\nRomania - The Committee\nfor Defence, Public Order and\nNational Security\nRestricted\nRestricted\nRestricted\nUnlimited\nUnlimited\nUnlimited\nUnlimited\nUnlimited\nRestricted\nRestricted\nRomania - The Joint Standing\nCommittee for the exercise of parliamentary control over the\nactivity of the SRI\nRestricted\nRestricted\nUnlimited\nUnlimited\nUnlimited\nUnlimited\nUnlimited\nUnlimited\nUnlimited\nUnlimited\nSlovakia - Committee for the\noversight\nof\nthe\nSlovak\nInformation Service - Committee for the oversight of the National Security Authority\nof  Slovak Republic\nNo\nNo\nNo\n(Information not\nprovided)\nUnlimited\nUnlimited\nNo\nNo\nNo\nNo\nSlovenia - Commission for\nthe Supervision of Intelligence\nand Security Services\nNo\nUnlimited\nUnlimited\nUnlimited\nUnlimited\nUnlimited\nUnlimited\nUnlimited\nNo\nNo\nSpain\n\nSweden - The Committee on Justice\nNo\nNo\nRestricted\nUnlimited\nUnlimited\nUnlimited\nNo\nNo\nNo\nNo\nSweden - The Commission on\nSecurity\nand\nIntegrity\nProtection\nRestricted\nRestricted\nRestricted\nUnlimited\nRestricted\nRestricted\nRestricted\nRestricted\nRestricted\nRestricted\nThe UK - Intelligence and Security Committee (ISC)\nRestricted\nRestricted\nRestricted\nRestricted\nRestricted\nRestricted\nRestricted\nRestricted\nRestricted\nRestricted\n\n## 4.5.4. Proactive Disclosure Of Information To Oversight Bodies\n\n In many states, the power of oversight bodies to request information that they deem necessary is supplemented by a requirement for the executive and its intelligence agencies to proactively provide certain information to overseers. Proactive disclosures contribute to oversight in a number of ways. First, receiving information without having to request it and/or scour electronic and paper archives saves overseers' time; this is particularly valuable for parliamentary oversight committees, which have little time available and may have the detailed knowledge to know what to look for and where to look.432 Second, proactive disclosures help to focus overseers' attention on particular issues or concerns. Otherwise, overseers may be forced to rely on complaints, whistleblowers or the media to make them aware of issues in the intelligence agencies.\n\nThird, intelligence agencies can benefit from proactively informing oversight bodies about threats to national security. This is particularly relevant with regards to parliamentary oversight committees where intelligence agencies can seek the support of MPs to ensure they have the necessary resources and legal powers to meet such threats. Finally, a clear legal provision on the proactive disclosure of information relating to intelligence agencies helps to provide overseers with a level of predictability regarding the information they will receive. We will highlight five types of information which are commonly subject to proactive disclosure.\n\n## 4.5.4.1. Internal Regulations Of Intelligence Agencies And Ministerial Directives\n\n In a number of the jurisdictions examined in this study, the executive and/or intelligence agencies are required to proactively disclose regulations and directives relating to the work of the agencies.433 Such documents form part of the regulatory framework for agencies and their staff but are often classified and thus not widely available. An example of a requirement to disclose subsidiary regulations can be found in Belgian law which states that:\nThe intelligence services, the Coordination Unit for Threat Assessment, and the other supporting services shall, on their own initiative, send to the Standing Committee I the internal rules and directives, as well as all documents regulating the conduct of the members of these services.434 Access to such documents is important for overseers for several reasons. First, it helps them to ensure that subsidiary regulations and instructions comply with the statutory framework adopted by parliament. Second, these documents provide overseers with additional criteria against which they can evaluate the work of intelligence agencies.\n\nFinally, in the case of ministerial directives or instructions, overseers may be able to check whether the executive is making appropriate use of intelligence agencies and not, for example, requiring them to undertake tasks to promote political interests.\n\n## 4.5.4.2. Information Sharing And Cooperation Agreements\n\n The second category of information which may be proactively disclosed to overseers is information sharing and cooperation agreements signed between intelligence agencies and other domestic or foreign entities (see also, sub-section 4.4.3.1.). These agreements regulate, among other things, when, how and under what conditions information may be shared, and the safeguards which apply to the use of shared information.435 Canada provides one of the few examples of an intelligence agency being required to proactively disclose all such agreements to a specialised oversight body (see section 4.5.4.).436\nReceiving these agreements does not give overseers a say in the negotiation of such agreements or indeed a veto power. It does, however, enable them to (a) ensure that agreements (particularly with foreign entities) comply with statutory requirements, and (b) evaluate which entities an agency is sharing information or otherwise cooperating with. Accordingly, overseers can raise concerns about issues such as the human rights safeguards (or lack thereof) in these agreements. Indeed, several important authorities have recommended that oversight bodies review all international sharing and cooperation agreements in order to ensure improved accountability and human rights compliance.437\n\n\n## 4.5.4.3. Information On The General Activities Of Agencies And Threat Assessments\n\n Information on the general activities of security and intelligence agencies is the category of information most commonly subject to proactive disclosure to overseers by governments and their intelligence agencies. This information typically includes an overview of the agencies' priorities, notable operations, and identified threats to national security and public safety.438 The proactive disclosure of such information, on a periodic basis (typically every six months), is intended to keep overseers up-to-date on the work of security agencies, and thus to give them some idea as to whether the agency is fulfilling its statutory functions properly. Additionally, the disclosure of information about any major threats to national security can serve as an early warning mechanism to alert parliament to issues which require a response, such as the appropriation of additional resources or possible amendments to the law. This practice is used in Hungary where the relevant minister and/or director of the intelligence agency concerned provides a written report on such matters in advance of a hearing with the parliament's Committee on National Security.439 While the proactive disclosure of general information about the activities of security/intelligence agencies can be useful for overseers, Susana Sanchez cautions against these obligations being vaguely defined.440 The law should provide some clear guidance on what information must be disclosed within the context of reports or briefings on agencies' activities.\n\n\n\n## 4.5.4.4. Information On The Use Of Particular Measures Or Powers\n\n In some states, the responsible minister or agency director must proactively disclose ex post information about specific categories of activities and the use of particular powers.\n\nIn Germany, for example, the federal government is required to disclose to the Bundestag's Parliamentary Control Panel the intelligence services'\nuse of a comprehensive list of powers. Notably, it must inform the Panel (every six months) on, inter alia, the implementation of surveillance measures, requests for information made to private companies, alerts entered into the police information system and certain information sent to foreign public authorities.441 Furthermore, the law specifies that disclosures to the Panel must include information on the scope, duration and costs of such measures. Elsewhere, in Italy, the government must inform (within 30 days) the Parliamentary Committee for the Security of the Republic on any operations which authorised the intelligence services to commit an illegal act.442 The proactive disclosure of information on the use of specific measures is primarily relevant when an oversight committee has a specific mandate to assess the legality or efficiency of such measures.\n\n\n\n## 4.5.4.5. Budgetary Information\n\n Governments are often legally required to make proactive disclosures to specialised oversight committees about expenditure. These disclosures normally take place in addition to the annual budgetary appropriation and discharge process and are, for example, required by law in Italy and Spain.443 Similarly, US intelligence agencies are required to make numerous proactive disclosures of financial information; notably, the Director of National Intelligence is required to report to Congress any findings on illegality pertaining to the implementation of the agencies' budgets.444 Such disclosures can help to strengthen the financial oversight of intelligence agencies by responsible committees in parliament aware of matters that need to be addressed in future budgetary appropriation and discharge processes.\n\n## 4.6. Methods And Powers Of Specialised Oversight Bodies\n\n\nOversight bodies use a range of methods to conduct oversight and require certain statutory powers in order to do so. For the purposes of this section, these powers will divided into the power to initiate investigations and powers that ensure access to classified information, which are of course intrinsically linked to an oversight body's access to classified information (see section 4.5).\n\nOversight bodies use many different methods for scrutinising the work of security/intelligence agencies. While a detailed examination of all of these methods would be highly technical and unnecessary for the purposes of this study, we shall highlight some of the main methods that are used before discussing the power of own-initiative investigation, which is of fundamental importance. Firstly, for some oversight bodies, and particularly parliamentary oversight committees, scrutiny is largely based around periodic hearings or meetings, at which agencies' reports or forthcoming plans are discussed.445 Second, overseers often examine particular issues in light of a tragedy or a scandal that has surfaced in the media, e.g., the UK Intelligence and Security Committee's work on the 2005 London bombings and the UK services' role in rendition.446 It is, of course, important that oversight bodies can provide this type of reactive oversight. Yet, it is also important that oversight bodies do not wait for major problems to arise before scrutinising particular aspects of an agency's work. Third, oversight may take place on the basis of requests from other institutions; it is very common for parliament, the executive and even the agencies themselves to be able to refer matters to both parliamentary and non-parliamentary oversight bodies.447 In this way, parliament, the executive and the agencies can utilise the expertise of an oversight body to get independent assessment of a particular issue. However, in order to preserve the independence of oversight bodies, they should retain the final say on whether or not to examine a particular matter at the request of another institution. Finally, some oversight bodies, particularly non-parliamentary bodies, have a mandate to handle complaints and therefore conduct oversight of the basis of concerns raised by members of the public or employees of intelligence agencies.448\n\n\n## 4.6.1. Own-Initiative Investigations\n\n While the aforementioned mechanisms form an important basis for oversight, the position of an oversight body is greatly strengthened if, within the parameters of its mandate, it is empowered to initiate its own investigations as and when it deems necessary.449 This power is widely regarded as being integral to the independence of oversight bodies and helps to ensure that oversight cannot be constrained by incumbent governments or their agencies.450 This power extends not only to decisions on what to examine, but also how such investigations will be carried out.451 It should be noted that overseers' own-initiative powers are sometimes limited by prerequisites, such as the need for the overseer to have evidence of illegal activities before launching an investigation.452 In our view, it is good practice for no such conditions to be imposed on the right to initiate investigations, so long as the issues examined fall within an oversight body's mandate. Own-initiative investigations may concern particular events or persons but more commonly are thematic investigations. This means that an oversight body undertakes a detailed examination of a particular aspect of an intelligence agency's work, such as its use of undercover informants, relations with foreign entities, or compliance with its obligation to excise old data.453 Overseers generally select the subjects for thematic investigations on the basis of a combination of matters that have arisen through the\n\ntypes of oversight mentioned in the introduction to this section, as well as on the basis of concerns raised by civil society groups and the media.454 Thematic investigations by security/intelligence overseers were pioneered by Canada's Security Intelligence Review Committee and have become an integral component of many specialised oversight bodies' work, e.g., Sweden's SAKINT, the Dutch CTIVD, the Belgian Committee I, and the Norwegian *EOS-Utvalget* Committee.455 The use of thematic investigations is seen to be necessary in view of the fact that overseers cannot scrutinise everything which agencies do and must therefore focus on particular issues.456 Thematic investigations are, however, highly resource intensive. Consequently, they are more commonly conducted by non-parliamentary oversight bodies which, as we have noted, tend to be better resourced and have more time (see section 4.3.5.).\n\n## 4.6.2. Powers To Ensure Access To Classified Information By Overseers\n\n The previous section (4.5) outlined the scope of access to classified information by specialised oversight bodies. As was mentioned, overseers require certain powers and tools at their disposal in order ensure access to classified information from intelligence agencies and executives (see Table 5). Recourse to such powers varies greatly between oversight bodies; this sub-section will outline a number of these.\n\nInvite\nmanagement\nto give\ntestimony at\nother times\nReceive and\nreview annual\nreports of\nagencies\nPeriodic\nmeetings with\nmanagement\nof agencies\nInvite\nexternal\nexperts\nSTATE\nAustria\n-\nStanding\nSubcommittee of the Interior\nAffairs Committee\n\n\nO\nO\n\n\nBelgium\n-\nStanding\nIntelligence Agencies Review\nCommittee\nO\nO\nO\nO\nO\nO\n\n\nO\nBulgaria - Foreign Affairs\nand\nDefence\nCommittee\n(Standing subcommittee)\nO\nO\nO\nO\n\n\nO\nO\nCyprus Czech\nRepublic\n-\nPermanent Commission on Oversight over the work of the\nSecurity\nInformation\nService (BIS)\nO\nO\nO\nO\n\n\nO\nDenmark - The Folketing's\nCommittee on the Danish\nIntelligence Services\n\nO\nO\n\n\nEstonia\n-\nSecurity\nAuthorities\nSurveillance\nSelect Committee\nO\nO\nO\nO\nO\n\n\nO\nFinland - The Administration Committee\nO\nO\nO\nO\nO\n\n\nFrance - Commission des Lois\n\nO\n\n\nGermany - Parliamentary Control Panel (PKGr)\nO\nO\nO\nO\nO\n\n\nO\nGermany - *G10 Commission*\n\nO\nO\nO\nO\n\n\nGreece - Special Standing\nCommittee for Institutions\nand Transparency\n\n\nO\n\n\nGreece -\nAuthority for Communication\nSecurity and Privacy (ADAE\n\n\nO\nO\nO\n\n\nHungary - Committee on National Security\nO\nO\nO\nO\nO\n\n\nO\nO\nThe Irish Republic Italy - *COPASIR*\nO\nO\nO\nO\n\n\nO\nO\n\nSubpoena\nmembers of\nthe executive\nbranch to\ntestify\nSubpoena\n intelligence\nofficers to\ntestify\nSubpoena\nagencies to\nprovide\nevidence\nInspect\npremises of\nintelligence\nagencies\nInvite\nmembers of\nthe public\n\n\nPeriodic\nmeetings\nwith\nmanagement\nof agencies\nInvite\nmanagement\nto give\ntestimony at\nother times\nSubpoena\nmembers of\nthe executive\nbranch to\ntestify\nReceive and\nreview annual\nreports of\nagencies\nSubpoena\n intelligence\nofficers to\ntestify\nSubpoena\nagencies to\nprovide\nevidence\nInspect\npremises of\nintelligence\nagencies\nInvite\nexternal\nexperts\nInvite\nmembers of\nthe public\nSTATE\nLatvia - National Security Committee\nO\nO\nO\nO\nO\n\n\nLithuania - Committee on\nNational\nSecurity\nand\nDefence\n\nO\nO\nO\nO\nO\n\n\nLuxembourg Malta\n\nThe Netherlands - Review\nCommittee\non\nthe\nIntelligence\nand\nSecurity\nServices (CTIVD)\nO\nO\nO\nO\nO\nO\nO\nO\nO\nPoland (Sejm) - Special\nServices\nOversight\nCommittee\nO\nO\nO\nO\nO\n\n\nPoland (Senate) - Human\nRights, Rule of Law and\nPetitions Committee\nO\nO\nO\nO\n\n\nPortugal - Council for the\nOversight of the Intelligence System of the Portuguese\nRepublic\nO\nO\nO\nO\nO\n\n\nO\nRomania - The Committee\nfor Defence, Public Order\nand National Security\nO\nO\nO\nO\nO\n\n\nO\nRomania\n-\nThe\nJoint\nStanding Committee for the exercise\nof\nparliamentary\ncontrol over the activity of\nthe SRI\nO\nO\nO\nO\nO\n\n\nO\nSlovakia - Committee for\nthe oversight of the Slovak Information\nService\n-\nCommittee for the oversight of\nthe\nNational\nSecurity\nAuthority of  Slovak Republic\nO\nO\n\nO\nO\n\n\nO\nSlovenia - Commission for\nthe\nSupervision\nof\nIntelligence\nand\nSecurity\nServices\nO\nO\nO\nO\n\n\nO\nSpain\n\nSweden - The Committee on Justice\nO\n\n\nSweden - The Commission\non Security and Integrity\nProtection\nO\n\nO\nO\n\n\nThe UK - Intelligence and Security Committee (ISC)\nO\nO\nO\nO\nO\n\n\nO\n\n## 4.6.2.1. Meetings With Directors And Other Employees Of Intelligence Agencies\n\n As Table 5 indicates, almost all of the specialised oversight bodies examined in this study can invite directors of intelligence agencies, as well as the relevant ministers, to appear before them. Such meetings take place on a scheduled, periodic basis, as well as on an ad hoc basis when the oversight body deems a meeting to be necessary. This is perhaps the most basic way that an oversight body can get information about the work of intelligence agencies and discuss, inter alia, reports issued by agencies. In many instances, overseers cannot require directors or ministers to appear before them but, in practice, these individuals are unlikely to refuse to meet an oversight body because it would make for extremely bad publicity. Some oversight bodies, however, have the power to subpoena officials to appear before them (see below).\n\nSome oversight bodies can also interview or invite agency employees below the director to appear before them.457 However, overseers' access to rank and file employees is often more limited and subject to certain conditions, such as a requirement for political approval. For example, the Italian parliament's COPASIR can only invite such persons to appear before the committee after receiving the permission of the prime minister.458 The French parliament's DPR is not permitted to invite anyone below director level to appear before it.459 Such limitations can interfere with the capacity of an oversight body to determine how it wishes to examine particular issues, and a 'political filter' on access to rank and file employees could be abused to block access to persons whose information the executive or agency wishes to conceal.\n\n\n## 4.6.2.2. Subpoena Powers\n\n While most oversight bodies can invite directors and even rank and file employees of intelligence agencies to appear before them, a select few have the power to subpoena relevant persons and/or documents in order to enforce their right to access information\n(see Table 5).460 That is, they can require someone to appear before them to answer questions or require an agency to provide a document. Accordingly, non-cooperation with oversight bodies may be criminalised and the oversight body concerned can normally have recourse to law enforcement bodies in order to require a person appear before them or otherwise furnish information.461 Furthermore, many of these oversight bodies can require that persons testify before them on oath or affirmation.462 These formidable powers are most commonly held by oversight bodies which have a mandate to oversee the legality of an agency's operational activities. This is partly because operations are among the most secretive and closely guarded aspects of intelligence agencies' work and they may be reluctant to disclose information about these activities, particularly when they have violated the law. Having the option of using subpoena powers is also necessary in the context of investigating complaints about possible violations of an individual's\n\nrights, where it is clearly imperative that an overseer has access to all relevant information.463 However, in spite of this, specialised oversight bodies rarely need to use the powers described in this paragraph. These powers are best viewed as an option of last resort, in the event that an agency or the executive fails to cooperate with an investigation.\n\n## 4.6.2.3. Inspections\n\n\nMany specialised oversight bodies have the power to inspect installations under the control of intelligence agencies.464 They can often do so on their own initiative, without the permission of the agencies but, in practice, overseers announce inspections to agencies as a matter of courtesy. Inspections are often used as an opportunity to speak to rank and file staff, carry out checks on physical files and, more generally, to improve overseers' awareness of the work of intelligence agencies.\n\n## 4.6.2.4. Direct Access To Electronic And Paper Files\n\n Some oversight institutions, with very extensive access to information, have direct, independent access to the files of intelligence agencies. For example, the Dutch CTIVD\nand Belgian Committee I both have their own facilities on the premises of the intelligence agencies, which permit them to log in directly to an agency's files.465 This means that they examine information as and when they deem necessary without any kind of\n'filtering' by the agencies. Such powers are only likely to be necessary if an oversight body has a mandate to conduct in-depth oversight of operational activities, as is the case for both the specialised non-parliamentary oversight bodies mentioned above.\n\n\n## 4.7. Protection Of Information Handled By Specialised Oversight Bodies\n\n It has been firmly established that overseers of intelligence agencies need access to classified information in order to perform their functions. However, this access comes with obligations regarding the security of information. Oversight bodies have to take steps to ensure that classified information, to which they have privileged access, is handled in a way that does not lead to leaks or other forms of unauthorised disclosure. A\nfailure to handle classified information correctly may, among other things, lead to violations of the right to privacy; compromise the effectiveness of intelligence agencies; put at risk persons working for these agencies; and, ultimately, jeopardise the capacity of the agencies to tackle threats to security and public safety. Equally, unauthorised or accidental disclosures of information by an oversight body may significantly undermine oversight of intelligence agencies. This is because such disclosures are likely to compromise an oversight body's relationship with the agencies it oversees, and may lead to agencies withholding cooperation on access to classified information and/or failing to\n\ntake account of future recommendations by the oversight body.466 As Canada's Justice O'Connor stated in the Arar Inquiry: 'the ability to maintain secrecy is viewed as vital to the ability of a review agency to gain the trust of the agencies that it reviews and the executive branch of government'.467 That said, on the national level there is little evidence that oversight bodies are the source of unauthorised disclosures of information relating to intelligence agencies. 468 This section will outline the procedures that specialised oversight bodies put in place to ensure that classified information is handled correctly and not accidentally or intentionally disclosed. We will focus on three main mechanisms in this regard: (1) measures to ensure that appropriate persons are appointed as members and staffers of oversight bodies; (2) penalties for unauthorised disclosure of classified information; and\n(3) physical measures to protect information.\n\n\n\n## 4.7.1. Measures To Ensure Appropriate Persons Are Appointed To Oversight Bodies\n\n Security clearances are one of the cornerstones of policies to prevent the unauthorised disclosure of information. A security clearance process involves an intelligence agency or the police vetting a prospective member or staffer of an oversight body to check whether there are any underlying affiliations, interests or vulnerabilities which could lead them to disclose classified information for, inter alia, money, political and business interests, or through blackmail. This vetting procedure provides a risk assessment and it is usually the prerogative of another institution, such as the executive or the oversight body itself, to decide whether, on the basis of the assessment, someone should be granted security clearance and appointed. It is good practice (as is the case for the Hungarian parliament's National Security Committee) for the oversight body itself to take the final decision on whether to appoint someone on the basis of a vetting report.469 This serves to prevent the intelligence agencies or the executive from using security clearance processes as a means for controlling the membership of oversight bodies which scrutinise their work. It is, however, important to be mindful that granting a person security clearance does not mean that they will not make an unauthorised disclosure of classified information.\n\nNevertheless, security clearance can be viewed as a confidence building mechanism which builds trustand probably encourages the flow of informationbetween oversight bodies and the intelligence agencies they oversee. In fact, it has been argued that oversight bodies whose members are subject to security clearance receive better access to information. 470 There is a notable divergence in practice between parliamentary and non-parliamentary oversight bodies with regards to security clearance (see Table 6). With the exception of some post-authoritarian EU Member States (e.g., Estonia, Hungary, Lithuania and Poland) members of parliamentary oversight bodies in the EU (and parliamentarians more generally) are not subject to security clearance.471 This is can be explained by the fact that in many states, the security clearance of parliamentarians would be considered to be a violation of the separation of powers.472 It may be argued that it is inappropriate for an executive branch agency to delve into the private affairs and past activities of a democratically elected representative, particularly if there are concerns that information derived from these processes may be used for political purposes, e.g., to smear political opponents. Moreover, parliamentarians are often considered to be security cleared by virtue of their position as elected representatives; Kate Martin and Charlotte Lepri explain that this is the case in the US Congress and French parliament, respectively.473 By contrast, members of non-parliamentary oversight bodies are generally required to have security clearance irrespective of their status as, e.g., former judges and even incumbent parliamentarians (see Table 6). While practices regarding the vetting and security clearance of members of oversight bodies vary, it is a near universal requirement for staffers of both parliamentary and non-parliamentary oversight bodies to require security clearance before being appointed. Another measure for ensuring that appropriate persons are appointed to oversight bodies\n(and thus given access to classified information) is the selection processes outlined in section 4.3.4. of this chapter. For example, when overseers (both parliamentary and non-parliamentary) are appointed by a majority of parliament, this helps to ensure that only persons deemed to be suitable are appointedthe majority of parliament is unlikely to appoint someone who is viewed as a security risk. Equally, in systems where party leaders in parliament and/or the speaker of parliament select MPs for parliamentary oversight committees, it is likely that they will choose people who are viewed as being responsible and acceptable to other parties and the executive. Finally, when the executive appoints members of oversight bodies, it can be reasonably assumed they will not select anyone who is seen to be a security risk.474\n\n\n## ___________________________________________________________________________________ Table 6: Security Clearance For Members And Staff Of Specialised Oversight Committees\n\n\nMembers\nStaff\nSTATE\nType of Oversight\nCommittee\nAccess to Classified\nInformation\nSecurity Clearance Required\nAccess to Classified\nInformation\nSecurity Clearance Required\nAustria - Standing Subcommittee of the Interior Affairs Committee\nParliamentary Committee\nYES\nNO\nYES\nNO\nBelgium - Standing Intelligence Agencies Review Committee\nNon-parliamentary\ncommittee\nYES\nYES\nYES\nYES\nBulgaria - Foreign Affairs and Defence Committee (Standing subcommittee)\nParliamentary Committee\nYES\nNO\nYES\nYES\nCyprus\n\nCzech Republic - Permanent Commission on Oversight over the work of Military Intelligence\nParliamentary Committee\nYES\nNO\nYES\nNO\nCzech Republic - Permanent Commission on\nOversight over the work of the Security Information\nService (BIS)\nParliamentary Committee\nYES\nNO\nYES\nNO\nDenmark - The Folketing's Committee on the Danish Intelligence Services\nParliamentary Committee\nYES\nNO\nYES\nYES\nEstonia - Security Authorities Surveillance Select Committee\nParliamentary Committee\nYES\nYES\nYES\nYES\nFinland - *The Administration Committee*\nParliamentary Committee\nYES\nNO\nNO\nNO\nFrance - *Commission des Lois*\nParliamentary Committee\nNO (only the Chair)\nYES\nNO\nNO\nGermany - *Parliamentary Control Panel (PKGr)*\nParliamentary Committee\nYES\nNO\nYES\nYES\nGermany - *G10 Commission*\nNon-parliamentary\ncommittee\nYES\nYES (if they are not Members of\nParliament)\nYES\nYES\nGreece\n-\nSpecial\nStanding\nCommittee\nfor\nInstitutions and Transparency\nParliamentary Committee\nYES\nNO\nNO (only the Committee\nsecretary and the minute  clerks\nof the Parliament)\nNO\nGreece -\nAuthority for Communication Security and Privacy\n(ADAE\nNon-parliamentary\ncommittee\nYES\nNO\nYES\nNO\nHungary - *Committee on National Security*\nParliamentary Committee\nYES\nYES\nYES\nYES\nIreland\n\n\n__________________________________________________________________________________________\n\n\nMembers\nStaff\nSTATE\nType of Oversight\nCommittee\nAccess to Classified\nInformation\nSecurity Clearance Required\nAccess to Classified\nInformation\nSecurity Clearance Required\nItaly - *COPASIR*\nParliamentary Committee\nYES\nNO\nYES\nNO\nLatvia - *National Security Committee*\nParliamentary Committee\nYES\nYES\nYES\nYES\nLithuania - Committee on National Security and\nDefence\nParliamentary Committee\nYES\nYES\nYES\nYES\nLuxembourg Malta\n\nThe Netherlands - Review Committee on the\nIntelligence and Security Services (CTIVD)\nNon-parliamentary\ncommittee\nYES\nYES\nYES\nYES\nPoland\n(Sejm)\n-\nSpecial\nServices\nOversight\nCommittee\nParliamentary Committee\nYES\nYES\nYES\nYES\nPoland (Senate) - Human Rights, Rule of Law and Petitions Committee\nParliamentary Committee\nYES\nNO\nYES\nYES\nPortugal - Council for the Oversight of the Intelligence System of the Portuguese Republic\nNon-parliamentary\ncommittee\nYES\nNO\nNO\nNO\nRomania - The Committee for Defence, Public Order and National Security\nParliamentary Committee\nYES\nNO\nYES\nYES\nRomania - The Joint Standing Committee for the\nexercise of parliamentary control over the activity of\nthe SRI\nParliamentary Committee\nYES\nNO\nYES\nYES\nSlovakia - Committee for the oversight of the Slovak Information Service - Committee for the\noversight of the National Security Authority of Slovak Republic\nParliamentary Committee\nYES\nNO\nYES\nYES\nSlovenia - Commission for the Supervision of Intelligence and Security Services\nParliamentary Committee\nYES\nNO\nYES\nYES\nSpain\n\nSweden - *The Committee on Justice*\nParliamentary Committee\nYES\nNO\nYES\nYES\nSweden - The Commission on Security and Integrity Protection\nNon-parliamentary\ncommittee\nYES\nYES\nYES\nYES\nThe UK - *Intelligence and Security Committee (ISC)*\nNon-parliamentary\ncommittee\nYES\nNO\nYES\nYES\n\n4.7.2.\nPenalties for unauthorised disclosure of classified or otherwise confidential information\n In the vast majority of states, the law provides for the same sanctions for unauthorised disclosures of classified information by members and staffers of oversight bodies as apply to any other person with access to such information.475 In at least 23 of EU Member States whose parliaments responded to the questionnaire for this study, unauthorised disclosures of information by oversight bodies are criminalised.476 This applies to both parliamentary and non-parliamentary oversight bodies. While members of oversight bodies may be prosecuted for making unauthorised disclosures, we are not aware of any recent examples of the prosecution of such persons. It is important to note that in most states parliamentarians do not normally enjoy immunity from prosecution for unauthorised disclosures of informationthere is strict liability for such disclosures. However, possible immunity may be assessed on a case-by-case basis because some disclosures may fall within the scope of actions for which parliamentarians have immunity from prosecution.477 Alternatively, parliament may have to waive an MP's immunity before any prosecution can proceed; this is the case, for example, in Poland.478\nThe application to parliamentarians of criminal law provisions on unauthorised disclosure remains a highly contentious issue. Indeed, the possibility of criminal penalties for unauthorised disclosures may be seen as interfering with parliamentarians' right to free speech, as well as the parliamentary privilege which ordinarily provides immunity for anything which is said in the context of parliament.479 There is evidence that in the U.S.\n\nCongress, the threat of sanctions for disclosing classified information has led some members to abstain from accessing it altogether.480 This is clearly undesirable from the point of view of promoting effective oversight. Beyond criminal penalties, there are a number of other sanctions which may be applied to members and staffers of oversight bodies in the event that they disclose classified information without proper authorisation. Firstly, members of both parliamentary and nonparliamentary oversight bodies may have their membership suspended or revoked.481\nSecondly, a person's security clearance may be revoked meaning that they can no longer access classified information.482 Thirdly, some parliaments, such as the Spanish *Cortes*, can dock parliamentary allowances or even deny a member the right to vote for breaches of rules of procedure, such as the unauthorised disclosure of classified information.483 Finally, some parliaments, e.g., the Lithuanian *Seimas*, have the power to impeach MPs for the unauthorised disclosure of classified information.484 Such sanctions may, for example, be used if the disclosure is not deemed to be sufficiently serious to warrant criminal proceedings or if there are doubts about whether a case can be successfully prosecuted due to immunities such as the parliamentary privilege.\n\n\n\n## 4.7.3. Physical Measures To Protect Classified Information\n\n It is beyond the scope of this study to provide a detailed overview of the technical measures which oversight bodies take to protect classified information. Instead, we will provide an overview of a number of the principal mechanisms which are used.\n\n## 4.7.3.1. In Camera Meetings\n\n\nPerhaps the most basic measures which most oversight bodies take is to hold most, if not all, of the meetings *in camera*.485 Such meetings are not accessible to the public and, in the case of parliamentary oversight bodies, MPs who are not members of the committee are excluded. This is often regarded as being necessary in order to protect classified information and to ensure that the identities of intelligence agency employees who testify before oversight bodies are kept secret. However, it may be seen as particularly problematic for parliamentary oversight committees to have a policy of holding all meetings behind closed doors. This is because secret meetings militate against the principle of transparency which is meant to pervade parliaments. Parliamentarians represent their constituents and are accountable to the public for their work in parliament. It is difficult for the public to monitor the work of their representatives if this work takes place entirely behind closed doors. The US Congress' intelligence committees are notable for taking a more open approach to their meetings. They have managed to strike a balance between the competing demands of protecting classified information and transparency by adopting a policy that meetings should be open unless it is necessary to 'close' them because classified matters are under discussion. As Kate Martin argues, this is a very good policy because it ensures that hearings attract media interest, and enable civil society groups to engage in particular issues.486 Conversely, holding public meetings risks politicising oversight; as Martin observes, public meetings provide an opportunity for members of an oversight committee to make statements or take positions for political gain.487 *In camera* meetings do not give overseers the opportunity to 'play' to an audience and therefore it is perhaps more likely that they will focus on scrutinising the work of intelligence agencies. If oversight bodies hold all of their meetings *in camera*, it is essential that they issue comprehensive public reports on their work. In the absence of public meetings, reporting and/or some form of public minutes are the only ways that overseers can inform the general public about their work, and the principal means for them to engage with the media and civil society.488\n\n\n## 4.7.3.2. Other Measures To Protect Information\n\n A significant number of parliamentary and non-parliamentary oversight bodies can have access to classified information on their own premises, rather than having to view it on the premises of intelligence agencies.489 This applies to both 'physical' documents and information in an electronic format. Accordingly, oversight bodies use a raft of different measures to protect information. These measures range from secure meeting rooms which have controlled access to measures designed to shield premises from remote communication devices, highly secure IT systems, and encrypted communications channels. Broadly speaking, the measures used to protect information are similar to those used by intelligence agencies themselves. In order to build confidence regarding the protection of information, some oversight bodies, such as the Australian parliament's Joint Standing Committee on Intelligence and Security, are required to consult with the agencies in order to ensure that their security of information arrangements meet appropriate standards.490 This type of consultation is a good idea given that intelligence agencies have significant expertise in these matters.\n\n## 4.8. Conclusion\n\n\nThis chapter has provided a detailed insight into the oversight of intelligence agencies by national parliaments and specialised non-parliamentary bodies. We have focussed on six important issues in this regard, including: the rationale for oversight of intelligence agencies; the configuration of systems for oversight of these agencies; the mandates of specialised parliamentary and non-parliamentary oversight bodies; access to classified security related information by these bodies and parliaments more generally; the powers and methods of specialised oversight bodies; and the protection of information handled by overseers. Our analysis has demonstrated that the legal and institutional frameworks for oversight by parliamentary and non-parliamentary oversight bodies vary greatly between states. There is no single 'best' approach to organising and conducting parliamentary and specialised oversight of intelligence agencies. Yet, this chapter has shown that there are practices which are notable for promoting comprehensive and robust scrutiny of intelligence agencies, thus helping to ensure that these agencies not only comply with applicable law but also perform their statutory functions effectively. It must be stressed that not all of the practices discussed in this chapter are of relevance to the European Parliament in the development of its oversight of the EU's AFSJ bodies. We shall however, conclude by underlining several of the principles and practices discussed in this chapter, which may be particularly salient for the EP; chapter five will draw on many of these points to formulate recommendations for developing the EP's oversight of the AFSJ bodies. Throughout this chapter we alluded to a number of general principles of successful oversight of intelligence agencies, we shall reiterate just three of these. Firstly, oversight bodies - be they parliamentary or non-parliamentary - require access to information that is relevant to their mandate, as well as recourse to appropriate powers and methods to gain access to such information. This is fundamental to both the effectiveness and credibility of oversight bodies. Secondly, oversight requires an appropriate balance between the demands of transparency and the need to protect classified information. This is essential for, on the one hand, ensuring that the work of oversight bodies is relevant beyond the\n'ring of secrecy,' and on the other, ensuring that oversight bodies are both trusted and accepted by the agencies they oversee. Finally, oversight must be based on an appropriate respect for the separation of the roles and responsibilities of oversight bodies, and those of agencies and the executive branch. Notably, it is not the prerogative of the agencies or the executive to determine what should be overseen or which information is relevant to the\n\nscrutiny of particular matters. Equally, it is not the role of oversight bodies to meddle in the management or direction of the activities of intelligence agencies. In addition to these general principles, this chapter identified a number of specific practices\nand findings that may be of interest to the EP:\n\nMany national parliaments have opted to establish specialised oversight committees\nbecause committees with jurisdiction over broad policy areas such as justice and home affairs do not have the time or resources to engage in ongoing oversight of intelligence\nagencies;\n\nIn many states there is one specialised parliamentary oversight body responsible for\nscrutinising all intelligence agencies, or specific intelligence functions regardless of which public bodies perform them;\n\nIt is difficult to advocate a 'best' approach or practice in regard to the subject(s) of an\noversight body's mandate. Ultimately, what matters is that all dimensions of an intelligence agency's work are overseen by a body which is independent from the\nagencies and the executive;\n\nIn some Member States, parliaments can request a non-parliamentary oversight body\nto examine a particular matter, but the latter body has the final decision on whether or\nnot they will examine an issue at the request of parliament or any other entity;\n\nIt is standard practice for specialised oversight committees of national parliaments to be\nable to summon the member of the executive responsible for a particular intelligence agency;\n\nSome national parliamentary oversight committees include of *ex officio* members of\nother parliamentary committees that have jurisdiction over related matters;\n\nThe majority of parliaments are not involved in the appointment of the directors of\nintelligence agencies;\n\nThe review of information sharing agreements by oversight bodies is seen as a good\npractice which has been adopted by several states;\n\nRegulations on parliamentary access to information are almost always separated from\nregulations on public access to information;\n\nIn almost every state analysed in this study, parliaments have privileged access to\nclassified information to enable them to, inter alia, oversee intelligence agencies;\n\nOn the national level, specialised committees responsible for the oversight of\nintelligence agencies are almost always one of the bodies (or the only body) in parliament which has access to classified information in the security domain;\n\nIt is preferable for the law to provide oversight bodies with a general right to request\naccess to classified information which it deems to be relevant to its mandate and\nfunctions, rather than promulgating a specific list of the types of information an oversight body can have access to;\n\nIt is common practice for intelligence agencies and/or the executive to be required to\nproactively disclose information on threats to national security to parliament;\n\nIn the majority of European Union states, MPs are not subject to security clearance;\n\nMost states criminalise unauthorised disclosure of classified information by MPs and\nother overseers.\n\n\n## Chapter 5. Recommendations For Strengthening Oversight Of The Afsj Bodies By The European Parliament 5.1. Introduction\n\n The final chapter of this study will formulate recommendations which might be useful for the forthcoming debate on how the European Parliament's oversight of the AFSJ bodies could be strengthened. These recommendations are developed on the basis of the main findings from chapters two (on the current mandates and powers of the AFSJ bodies), three\n(on the oversight of AFSJ bodies by the EP, JSBs and national parliaments) and four (on the role of national parliaments and non-parliamentary bodies in overseeing intelligence agencies). This chapter is divided into four main sections. The first addresses appropriate limitations on the EP's mandate to oversee the AFSJ bodies, that is, the aspects of their work that should not be directly overseen by the EP. The second section outlines the general parameters of the EP's oversight mandate of the AFSJ bodies and, on this basis, highlights a number of specific oversight functions which the EP could perform. In the third section of this chapter, we will discuss two essential conditions for strengthening the EP's oversight of the AFSJ agencies: the development of a legal framework for access to classified information by the EP, and the adoption of appropriate procedures to protect classified information handled by the EP. The final section of this chapter will consider some of the institutional mechanisms that the EP could use to fulfil its oversight mandate and functions. This discussion includes the option of creating a sub-committee of the LIBE Committee, which responds to the EP's explicit request for this study to provide recommendations on the establishment of its own 'oversight body' (see chapter one). While the national practices discussed in chapter four have been used extensively to inform the recommendations to the EP, we have also drawn upon past proposals put forward by the EP and the Commission, as well as extensive interviews with officials at EU institutions and AFSJ bodies. Although much can be learned from studying the oversight of intelligence agencies at the national level, we should remain cautious about transplanting practices from the national level (examined in chapter four) to the European level. This is because there are important differences between national intelligence agencies and the AFSJ bodies, as well as between national parliaments and non-parliamentary oversight bodies and the EP. Unlike national intelligence agencies, the AFSJ bodies do not have recourse to special powers to collect information. They cannot, for example, use covert agents to gather information, intercept communications or conduct surveillance operations. Equally, the AFSJ agencies do not perform the same functions or possess the same coercive powers as their contemporaries on a national level: police services, prosecutors and border agencies. Notably, they cannot question, arrest or detain suspects. The AFSJ bodies' 'operational powers' primarily consist of two elements: 1) coordinating and supporting the work of national agencies; and 2) processing, storing and transferring personal data. Some of the recommendations outlined in this chapter apply to the EP's oversight of all AFSJ bodies discussed in this study (i.e. Europol, Eurojust, Frontex and Sitcen); however, most focus exclusively on the AFSJ agencies (i.e. Europol, Eurojust, Frontex). This is because the EP has an explicit treaty mandate to oversee Eurojust and Europol, and will be a co-legislator for new regulations on these agencies and Frontex. The development of parliamentary oversight of the Sitcen will have to proceed along a different track because Sitcen falls under the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), an area in which the EP has fewer powers. The recommendations pertain to the oversight of the AFSJ bodies as they exist in May 2011. Oversight arrangements should be developed in tandem with any changes to the mandates and powers of these bodies, and should remain commensurate with the activities being overseen. In developing legal and institutional frameworks for parliamentary oversight of the AFSJ bodies the EP and other relevant stakeholders should remain mindful that oversight arrangements should not have the effect of dissuading member states from using these bodies to cooperate in the AFSJ.  Most EU member states are now convinced of the added value that agencies such as Europol and Eurojust can have in supporting their own work.491\nYet, there is a risk that if oversight arrangements place too great a burden on the AFSJ\nbodies and/or national authorities, some member states may simply revert to bilateral channels of cooperation, which are less heavily regulated and perhaps not subject to the same levels of scrutiny.492 Any moves in this direction would undermine the capacity of the AFSJ bodies to contribute successfully to promoting freedom, justice and security in the EU.\n\n\nRecommendation 1: The European Parliament should ensure that any new arrangements for the oversight of the AFSJ bodies do not serve to dissuade member states from using these bodies as platforms for cooperation.\n\n\n## 5.2. Limitations On The Scope Of The European Parliament's Oversight Of The Afsj Bodies\n\n Before going on to discuss the scope of the EP's oversight mandate and functions, we will highlight several factors which should circumscribe the EP's oversight of the AFSJ bodies. These primarily relate to oversight of the AFSJ bodies' operational activities.  Firstly, the intergovernmental nature of the AFSJ bodies and the relationship between actions of the AFSJ bodies and Member States has important implications for oversight. Member States'\npolice, prosecutorial, border and (to a much lesser extent) intelligence agencies are both the principal suppliers and the main customers of the AFSJ bodies. The AFSJ bodies function primarily on the basis of information provided by national agencies and their principal output is information and analysis that is sent to these agencies. National agencies may take action, including the use of coercive powers, on the basis of such information, including within the context of operations coordinated by an AFSJ body such as Europol or Frontex. As we noted in chapter two, such action remains the exclusive responsibility of national authorities. The implication of this is that both the inputs to AFSJ bodies and actions taken on the basis of the outputs of these bodies are regulated by national law and should be overseen by appropriate national authorities. It is widely accepted inside the EP and in Member States that it is not the prerogative of the EP to oversee how national agencies collect information that might be shared with AFSJ bodies and/or action undertaken on the basis of information provided by AFSJ bodies. Secondly, the AFSJ bodies consist of a mix of personnel seconded by the Member States and EU staff members. National liaison officers at Europol, national border guards that participate in a Frontex-coordinated operation, or seconded intelligence officers at Sitcen are paid by Member States and cooperate with the agencies in accordance with national laws. As such, their cooperation with and contributions to an AFSJ body are more appropriately overseen by national oversight mechanisms. It was outside the scope of the mandate of this study to examine in detail how Member States oversee national authorities' performance of these activities. Indeed, this topic would merit an in-depth study of its own. Nevertheless, these institutional realities are a crucial factor that should be taken into account in developing an oversight mechanism at the European Parliament. Indeed, this intergovernmental element of the AFSJ bodies requires that the EP works closely with national parliaments in ensuring that appropriate oversight arrangements are in place. Thirdly, Europol and Eurojust are authorised to process, store and transfer personal data within the parameters of their mandates. These are activities which interfere with the right to privacy and may serve as the basis for use of coercive or special powerswhich have particularly significant human rights implicationsby member or third states' authorities. In view of this, these activities clearly need to be subject to oversight by an independent body. Accordingly, the EU has established specialised non-parliamentary oversight bodies the Joint Supervisory Bodies (JSBs) of Europol and Eurojustfor this purpose. The JSBs have access to all files and premises related to the processing of personal data and are in a strong position to ensure that any practices which violate data protection regulations are corrected. In our view, the JSBs are an appropriate oversight mechanism for scrutinising the use of personal data by the AFSJ agencies. Accordingly, their activities do not need to be duplicated by the EP. Equally, the EP would not need to oversee Frontex's future role in processing personal data because it is envisaged that the European Data Protection Supervisor would perform a similar function to the JSBs. There are several other arguments against involving the EP in the oversight of the AFSJ\nbodies' operational activities on an ongoing basis. First, as we noted in chapter four, this is extremely time consuming and requires specialised expertise and resources which many parliaments do not possess. A number of the MEPs and staffers interviewed for this study indicated that the EP would not have the time, resources, or inclination to scrutinise the operational activities of the AFSJ bodies.493 Oversight can be conducted more effectively by a 'professional' oversight body, such as the JSBs, that focuses exclusively on the oversight of an agency's operational activities. Second, giving the EP a mandate to oversee information processing would require the parliament to have access to personal data in these files, which would raise significant privacy concerns. Finally, parliamentary scrutiny of the operational aspects of the AFSJ bodies' work might adversely impact upon the effectiveness of these bodies. This is because many states are opposed to giving the EP a role in this regard and may reduce information sharing with the AFSJ bodies if the EP was given such a role.494\n\n\n## 5.3. The European Parliament's Oversight Mandate And Functions\n\n There was widespread agreement among our interlocutors at various EU institutions and bodies that the EP should play a role in overseeing the AFSJ bodies. Oversight of the AFSJ bodies by parliament and bodies created by parliament is important for the reasons outlined in chapters one and four. Perhaps most importantly, the EP is now a co-legislator in the AFSJ and will have a pivotal role in defining the future mandate and powers of the AFSJ agencies in particular. Therefore, it is essential that the EP plays a role in ensuring that these agencies fulfil their mandates effectively and in a manner which complies with relevant legislation. In addition, the AFSJ agencies are funded to a large extent with EU funds that are appropriated to them by the EP. As the budgetary authority, the EP must have a role in ensuring that such money is used both correctly and efficiently. These rationales for parliamentary oversight of the AFSJ agencies do not, however, imply that the EP should play a role in their management. When discussing the EP's role in the oversight of AFSJ bodies, we should remain mindful of the separation of powers and responsibilities in this regard. This is particularly important in relation to Eurojust because it works with judicial bodies. Oversight of the AFSJ bodies should also not be conflated with controlling or co-managing an agencythis is not the role of a parliament. The AFSJ bodies are meant to serve as repositories of expertise which exist to provide a professional service to the EU and its Member States. It is not the role of parliamentarians to meddle in the management of this work; such functions are primarily the prerogative of the agencies'\ndirectors and their management boards. Meanwhile, the Commission and/or Council provide political direction to AFSJ bodies and assume political responsibility for them. For these reasons, the involvement of the EP in matters such as the appointment of management board representatives, or even as part of the management boards of the AFSJ agencies is not recommended. Indeed, the involvement of the EP in these decision-making processes would obfuscate its oversight functions, making it extremely difficult to subsequently review independently the actions of agencies and their management boards. Recommendation 2: The European Parliament should not be part of the management boards of Europol or Frontex, or of the College of Eurojust.\n\nIn chapter four we argued that it is difficult to advocate a 'best' approach or practice in regard to the subject(s) of an oversight body's mandate. Ultimately, what matters is that all dimensions of an intelligence agency's work are overseen by a body which is independent from the agencies and the executive. In the case of the EU, this means independent from the AFSJ bodies, the Council and the Commission. In chapter four, we showed that the subject of oversight can be broadly divided into four areas: operations, policy, administration and finance. In view of the foregoing comments on the role of the JSBs and national authorities in overseeing the operational activities of the AFSJ bodies, it is clear that the EP should focus on overseeing the policies, administration and finance of these bodies. This is, however, without prejudice to the EP's powers of inquiry (discussed in chapter three), under which the EP could of course examine allegations that any activities of these agencies violate EU law.\n\nRecommendation 3: The European Parliament's oversight of the AFSJ agencies should focus on their policies, administration and finance.\n\n\n## 5.3.1. Oversight Of The Finances Of The Afsj Agencies\n\n Chapter three demonstrated that the EP has considerable powers with regards to the appropriation and discharge of the AFSJ agencies' budgets. The EP can make better use of these powers in its oversight of the AFSJ agencies by ensuring a continued link between the oversight of agencies' policies and administration and Parliament's budgetary appropriation and discharge functions. The entire budget cycle requires close cooperation between the LIBE Committee (or any newly created body with a mandate to oversee the AFSJ agencies),\n\nthe Committee on Budgets (BUDG) (with a mandate to approve the budget of the AFSJ\nbodies) and the Committee on Budgetary Control (CONT), which is mandated to discharge the budgets of the AFSJ bodies. There are four main ways in which the EP can effectively continue and improve the use of its budgetary oversight powers in this regard. First, the EP\nneeds to continue to strengthen the cooperation between CONT, BUDG and the LIBE Committee throughout the budget cycle to ensure that there are links between the oversight of the AFSJ agencies' finances and other areas of their work. Second, some members of the LIBE Committee need to be made more aware of the formidable budgetary and discharge powers at the EP's disposal and how LIBE can work with the BUDG and CONT committees to more effectively use these powers in the fulfilment of its mandate. Third, the power of the purse (both the reserve procedure and the power to withhold or delay discharge of a budget) can be used as a tool for requesting a change in the policies, procedures or activities of the AFSJ agency concerned. Finally, as we mentioned in chapter three, the reserve procedure may, in some exceptional circumstances, be used as a tool to persuade an AFSJ agency to disclose information in any area that is financed from the EU budget. This should not however, be necessary if a new legal framework for access to classified information by the EP is adopted (see below).\n\nRecommendation 4: The European Parliament should ensure its budgetary appropriation and discharge functions are fully linked to other aspects of its oversight of AFSJ agencies.\n\n## 5.3.2. Keeping The European Parliament Informed About Security Threats\n\n The European Parliament needs to be informed about threats to the security of the EU and its member states in order to fully evaluate the measures that are needed to counter such threats. Without this information, it is hard for the EP to fully assess whether the AFSJ bodies may, for example, need new powers (i.e., requiring legislative amendments), additional resources or new cooperation agreements with particular third states. Indeed, this is an excellent example of an area in which the EP should ensure that there is a close relationship between its role as a legislator, budgetary authority and overseer. Making the EP aware of pertinent threats may also be in the interests of the agencies because in this way they can make MEPs aware of their need for additional legal powers or resources; MEPs may be useful allies in this regard (see chapter four). The EP could, for instance, be provided risk assessments and threat analyses from Frontex, the full version of Europol's Organised Crime Threat Assessment, or terrorist threat assessments from the Sitcen (see chapter two). Such assessments are classified and would therefore, need to be provided to the body within the EP designated to receive classified information (see section 5.5). In this context, the responsible body could hold *in camera* discussions with relevant officials from the AFSJ bodies. Chapter four indicated that, on the national level, it is common practice for intelligence agencies and/or the executive to be required to proactively disclose - to a designated committee - information pertaining to security threats. This usually takes place on a periodic basis (typically every 6 months), and is intended to keep overseers up-to-date on the threats intelligence agencies are facing, and to give them some idea as to whether an agency is fulfilling its functions effectively.\n\nRecommendation 5: The European Parliament should receive threat assessments from the AFSJ bodies.  This would enable Parliament to better assess whether these bodies have the necessary legal mandate, powers and financial resources to address such threats.\n\n\n## 5.3.3. The European Parliament's Relationship With The Joint Supervisory Bodies\n\n As we noted in chapter three, the EP currently has very limited engagement with the two JSBs. Closer engagement with the JSBs could begin with inviting their chairpersons to discuss their biennial and thematic reports with the relevant body within the EP (see the options discussed in section 5.5.). This dialogue would allow the chairs of the JSBs to express any concerns about their mandate, powers or the resources available to them. Meetings between the EP and JSBs could also serve as a forum to discuss the implementation of JSBs' recommendations. On this basis, the EP could use its political clout to raise any concerns with agency directors or management boards, and it could use its budgetary powers to address such matters. More regular engagement with the JSBs could also benefit MEPs in the carrying out of their work. Indeed, on a national level, the expertise of non-parliamentary oversight bodies is to be of great value to parliaments, which can use their reports to inform their own oversight and legislative work.495 The JSBs are repositories of significant amounts of knowledge and expertise which could benefit MEPs when, for example, preparing for hearings with agency directors or drafting owninitiative or legislative reports on Europol and Eurojust. MEPs and their staffers may benefit from this expertise not only through periodic hearings but also by reviewing the JSBs'\nreports and holding informal discussions with members of the JSBs and their secretariat. In the context of closer engagement between the EP and the JSBs (or other specialised non-parliamentary oversight bodies that are created), a body of MEPs may need to be given access to the inspection reports of the JSBs. What the EP will not need is access to data inputted into Europol's databases or Eurojust's CMS, and/or personal data shared with national authorities or third states. Access to this data would give rise to serious privacy concerns.496 If, in the context of its oversight functions, the EP does have access to documents which contain personal data, personal data should be deleted from these documents, as is foreseen under Annex Two of the 2010 Framework Agreement between the Commission and the Parliament.497 The EP could consider adopting the practice used in some Member States whereby parliament can request a non-parliamentary oversight body to examine a particular matter\n(see chapter four). This is a more direct means by which a parliament can take advantage of both the expertise and independence of a non-parliamentary oversight body in order to examine particular aspects of an agency's work. To our knowledge, the EP cannot currently make such requests to the JSBs. Any provisions of this nature would need to be carefully formulated to ensure that the independence of a non-parliamentary oversight body, such as the JSBs, could not be compromised by such requests from the EP. Accordingly, much can learned from the good practice on a national level, namely that non-parliamentary oversight bodies have the final decision on whether or not they will examine an issue at the request of parliament or any other entity (see chapter four).\n\nRecommendation 6: The European Parliament should engage in regular dialogue with the Joint Supervisory Bodies (JSBs) of Europol and Eurojust, and should make use of the reports and expertise of the JSBs in its own oversight of the AFSJ agencies.\n\n\n## 5.3.4. Standardisation Of The European Parliament's Right To Summon The Directors Of Afsj Agencies\n\n The EP currently has the power to require the Director of Europol and the Chairperson of the Europol Management Board to appear before it.498 This power should be extended to Frontex (the Director and Chair of the management board) and Eurojust (the Administrative Director and President of the college). While the European Parliament does not have these powers with respect to Eurojust and Frontex, it needs to be stressed that, in practice, directors of the AFSJ agencies often appear before the parliament upon its request and are aware that refusing to appear before parliament would make for bad publicity.499 The power to summon agency directors and chairpersons of the management boards/college could be particularly useful outside the context of agency directors presenting an agency's annual report. It would, for example, enable the EP to require the appearance of a director in the event of a particular problem or scandal coming to light. However, the right to summon the director of an AFSJ body may be of limited value unless the MEPs involved have the right to discuss classified matters. Under existing procedures, directors cannot or choose not to answer questions which would entail disclosing classified information.500 This further illustrates the need to formulate a proper framework for parliamentary access to classified information before developing other oversight mechanisms (see below). As chapter four illustrated, it is standard practice for specialised oversight committees of national parliaments to be able to summon the member of the executive responsible for a particular intelligence agency. Similarly, most oversight committees can summon the director of an intelligence agency. In Chapter four, we noted that in some cases this power also extends to any member of an intelligence agency's staff. This can help to ensure overseers are able to speak to the member of an agency's staff best qualified to discuss a particular issue. The power to summon members of staff below the directors is, however, normally attached to oversight institutions that oversee the operational activities of agencies and it is most commonly available to oversight bodies responsible for examining the legality of particular actions (see chapter four). In view of the oversight role the EP is likely to play, we do think that it would be necessary for it to posses this power. We have opted to confine this recommendation to the AFSJ agencies, i.e., not to include the director of Sitcen. It is difficult to envisage how this formal power could be extended to the director of Sitcen because it is not an autonomous agency. The EP can, however, request the High Representative for Foreign and Security Policy, under whom Sitcen falls, to appear before it. Recommendation 7: The European Parliament's power to summon the director of Europol and the chairperson of the Europol Management Board should be extended to the equivalent persons at Eurojust and Frontex.\n\n\n\n## 5.3.5. Oversight Of The Appointment Of Agency Directors\n\n Currently, the EP does not play any role in the appointment of AFSJ agency directors or the director of Sitcen. Yet, the EP has long expressed a desire to be involved in the appointment of directors of these bodies. Chapter four's survey of the role of national parliaments in the appointment of directors of intelligence agencies demonstrated that the majority of parliaments are not involved in the appointment of the directors of intelligence agencies. However, chapter four also showed that some parliaments do play a role in this regard; we shall highlight two approaches to involving parliaments in the appointment of agency directors, which may be of interest to the EP. Firstly, some parliamentsthrough their specialised oversight committeesare able to hold a hearing with a nominee and can issue a non-binding opinion or recommendation on the proposed appointment (see chapter four). This is an option which has periodically been proposed in various contexts at the EU level. As far back as 2002, the Commission proposed making formal appointments of candidates for the post of the Europol director dependent upon a hearing before the EP.501 However, it is noteworthy that the Commission later rejected the idea of giving the EP this role in its 2010 communique on Europol.502 The EP has also recommended this option in the context of past discussions on Europol's legal framework.503 Moreover, in 2004 the EP proposed amendments to the Council Decision on Frontex, which would have required candidates for the position of executive director to appear before the EP.504 In both cases, the EP's suggestions were dismissed and not included in the final Council decisions. Finally, there is precedent for the EP's AFET\nCommittee holding an exchange of views with proposed candidates in the context of the selection of delegation heads for the newly established EEAS.505 This format could be extended to prospective directors of Sitcen. This option would entail the EP holding a hearing with the proposed candidate in order to solicit their views on pertinent issues such as the priorities of the AFSJ body and/or the body's relations with third states. The responsible committee could draft an opinion on the suitability of a proposed candidate on the basis of such discussions. These hearings could be held by the LIBE Committee or the LIBE Sub-committee discussed below (in the case of the directors/president of Europol and Frontex and the president of Eurojust), and by the AFET Committee (in the case of Sitcen). The right to hold a hearing and issue a report/opinion on prospective directors would not entail a veto power but would nevertheless influence the Council's (or High Representative's in the case of Sitcen) final decision on whom to appoint.\n\nA second way in which a few national parliaments are involved in the appointments of the directors of intelligence agencies is through a vote to approve (or reject) nominees. This, of course, gives parliament a veto in the appointment process (see chapter four). It is interesting to note that the EP has requested this power with respect to the appointment of the director of Sitcen but not in regard to the AFSJ agencies.506 This procedure would operate in much the same way as the first option with the difference being that the EP would vote on whether or not to approve a nominee, rather than simply issuing a nonbinding recommendation. There are a number of drawbacks associated with involving the EP in the appointment of directors; these are broadly similar to arguments outlined in chapter four. First and foremost, involving the EP in the appointment of directors risks politicising the work of agencies which are meant to be non-political. This concern would be magnified if parliament's role in the appointment of directors were to include the power to approve or reject a nominee. This concern was expressed by a number of persons interviewed for this study and was cited by the Commission in its 2010 Communique on Europol.507 Secondly, the current process for selecting the directors/president of Europol, Frontex and Eurojust is already protracted and cumbersome because it involves representatives of 27 Member States seeking to find a compromise candidate. Adding the EP to this process would serve to further complicate and drag out an already lengthy process. Moreover, the fact that 27 states are already involved in the selection of directors ensures that there are inbuilt checks and balances, which prevent any single party appointing a director to promote their interests. This removes one of the main reasons for which national parliaments are involved in the appointment of the directors of intelligence agencies: to prevent the incumbent government appointing someone to promote and protect partisan political interests. All things considered, the authors are not persuaded that the European Parliament should be given a role in the appointment of directors of the AFSJ bodies. The parliament should, however, be kept informed regarding appointment processes. This should include information on the identity and credentials of proposed candidates.\n\nRecommendation 8: The European Parliament should not be given a role in the appointment of the directors/president of the AFSJ bodies.\n\n\n5.3.6.\nA role for the European Parliament in providing assessments on the human rights records of AFSJ bodies' cooperation partners\n While the JSBs provide an opinion on the legal and institutional frameworks for data protection in third states, they do not examine the broader human rights record of particular foreign partners, such as a police agency in a third state. There is, therefore, no independent assessment of whether or not agencies with which AFSJ bodies share information use techniques which violate human rights. As was discussed in chapter four, this is relevant to both incoming and outgoing information as foreign partners may collect information through e.g., torture or arbitrary detention and then share this information with AFSJ bodies. On the other hand, they may use information provided by AFSJ bodies as part of activities which violate human rights. These concerns are primarily relevant to the sharing of personal data. Although the AFSJ bodies' own due diligence processes should prevent this from happening, it is good practice for an independent oversight body to provide some form of human rights assessment of the general human rights record/compliance of partner agencies in third states. There is precedence for this at the national level (see, for example, the role played by Canada's Security Intelligence Review Committee) and this is a role which could be performed by the EP or another independent body. If the EP were to assume this role, it would make sense to involve the AFET Committee's Sub-Committee on Human Rights, which has expertise in examining human rights matters outside the European Union. Such assessments would not be binding but could serve to inform the Council and AFSJ agencies' management boards in the context of entering into information sharing agreements with third states.\n\n\nRecommendation\n9:\nThe European Parliament should ensure that either a\n(sub)committee of parliament or a specialised non-parliamentary body provides independent assessments of the general human rights records/compliance of agencies in third states with which the AFSJ bodies cooperate. Such assessments could take place before an information sharing or other cooperation agreement is signed with a third state, and during the implementation of these agreements.\n\n\n\n5.3.7.\nA role for the European Parliament in reviewing the AFSJ bodies' information sharing agreements and memoranda of understanding\n While we do not believe that the EP should play a role in overseeing the content of information sharing between the AFSJ bodies and/or between AFSJ bodies and third states or organisations, it is important for the EP to have access to the agreements upon which such sharing is based. Chapter two indicated that the European Parliament has access to some information sharing agreements concluded between the AFSJ bodies and third states, notably Europol's and Eurojust's agreements with third states. It does not, however, have access to, for example, the memoranda of understanding Frontex has concluded with foreign entities, or any agreement of Sitcen. Information sharing agreements are an important part of agencies' policy and should therefore, be subject to review by the EP. Indeed, it is important that the EP is aware of the terms upon which the AFSJ bodies cooperate with each other, and with foreign entities. In our view, the EP should not play a role in the formulation or approval of agency to agency information sharing agreements or memoranda of understanding (which are distinct from agreements between the EU and third states, such as the SWIFT agreement). However, a designated body of parliament should be able to review, ex post, agreements that have been concluded and to raise questions or concerns regarding, inter alia, the content and implementation of such agreements. It is not sufficient for the EP to be simply made aware that such agreements exist. Accordingly, the AFSJ bodies should be required to forward agreements and memoranda of understanding to relevant bodies in parliament, even if such agreements are considered to be classified (see section 5.4.1.2). Chapter four identified the review of information sharing agreements by oversight bodies as being a good practice which has been adopted by several states, and endorsed in UN standards on intelligence oversight.\n\nRecommendation 10: The European Parliament should have access to information sharing agreements and other memoranda of understanding concluded between AFSJ\nbodies within the European Union, as well as between AFSJ bodies and third states or organisations.\n\n\n\n## 5.4. Access To And The Protection Of Classified Information\n\n As our analysis of oversight of intelligence agencies at the national level demonstrated, information is the oxygen that sustains oversight; a mandate to oversee an agency's work is of limited use unless it is accompanied by access to the relevant information. It will be extremely difficult to strengthen parliamentary oversight of the AFSJ bodies without clear and predictable rules and procedures for the EP to access relevant information from these bodies, the Commission and the Council. While access to relevant information is fundamental to oversight, the professional handling of this information by overseers is also crucial for effective oversight. Accordingly, improved access to classified information by the EP will need to be accompanied by the development of appropriate procedures for the protection of this information, as well as an ongoing commitment from MEPs to handle classified information properly. This section will address these two issues in turn.\n\n## 5.4.1. Improving The European Parliament's Access To Classified Information In The Afsj\n\n The development of an appropriate legal and institutional framework for parliamentary access to classified information is of fundamental importance to strengthening the EP's oversight of the AFSJ bodies. The discussion of the EP's access to classified information must take place alongside deliberations on the evolution of the EP's mandate to oversee the AFSJ bodies; indeed, we have argued throughout this study that an oversight body's information needs are inextricably linked to its mandate. Yet, regardless of which aspects of the AFSJ bodies' work the EP wishes to oversee and which institutional mechanism is chosen to carry out this oversight, access to relevant classified information will be crucial. This is because various aspects of the work of AFSJ bodies are classified and/or involve the processing or creation of classified information. This section will outline a number of options for improving the EP's access to classified information in the AFSJ; the modalities and mechanisms for granting the EP access will be discussed later in this chapter (see section 5.5). It should be noted that the following discussion relates to the access to classified information on an ongoing basis in the context of the EP's 'regular' oversight functions; this is without prejudice to the EP's access to information under its powers of inquiry, which may be used on an ad hoc basis to investigate alleged breaches of EU law (see chapter three). In chapter three, we argued that the current framework for granting the EP access to classified information in the AFSJ field (and beyond) is inadequate: it is characterised by ad hoc mechanisms and uncertainty. There is no clear legal framework in place for the EP to access AFSJ-related information from the Council, Europol, Eurojust, Frontex or the EEAS.\n\nInstead, access to classified information by the EP tends to take place on an ad hoc basis and pursuant to exchanges of letters between the chair of the LIBE Committee and the General Secretariat of the Council.508 Frequently, the LIBE Committee cannot be certain if and when it will be given access to documents it deems to be relevant to its functions - this is a very weak basis for oversight. The EP has already made some important progress regarding its access to classified information. Notably, the 2010 Framework Agreement (Annex Two) between the EP and the Commission represents significant progress in terms of extending the EP's right to access classified information (including in the AFSJ field) from the Commission, as well as setting out detailed modalities for such access. However, the progress made with the Commission has not yet been matched by similar advances in codifying rules for parliamentary access to classified information from the AFSJ bodies or the Council. As discussed in chapter three, parliamentary access to classified information is currently being discussed in the context of deliberations regarding the revision of Regulation 1049\nlegislation which is ostensibly about public access to information from EU entities. The EP's rapporteur on this matter, Michael Cashman, has opted to include provisions on parliamentary access to information in the broader draft legal framework for public access to EU documents.509 This approach has several advantages. First, it is aimed at ensuring that there is a general framework for the EP's access to classified information from all EU\nentities and across all policy domains. This may be preferable to a fragmented legal framework for parliamentary access to information based on inter-institutional agreements across different fields. The effects of this current framework are that the EP has access to classified information from, e.g., the Council, in some fields but not others and that different modalities apply to access classified information in different policy domains. Second, the inclusion of provisions on the EP's access to classified information as part of broader legislation on public access to information could help to ensure that these rules have the status of legislation rather than being enshrined in inter-institutional agreements, which are of a subordinate legal status. In spite of these advantages, we are of the view that parliamentary access to classified information should be decoupled from provisions on public access to information. This is supported by practice on the national level, where freedom of/access to information laws are separated entirely from regulations on parliamentary access to information.\n\nParliamentary access to classified information implies access to the specific categories of information which are justifiably exempt from public access, e.g., information regarding the work of intelligence agencies. It is precisely because such information is beyond the reach of public access that it must be available to certain parliamentarians and institutions established by parliaments for overseeing, inter alia, intelligence agencies. In almost every state analysed in this study, parliaments have privileged access to classified information to, inter alia, enable to them oversee intelligence activities. This is premised on the notion that parliamentarians are elected by a population to hold governments and their agencies to account. In order to do this, they require privileged access to information which is not necessarily available to members of the public. Therefore, rules governing parliamentary access to classified information are set out in law and are disconnected for general freedom of/access to information laws.\n\nRecommendation 11: New regulations on the European Parliament's access to classified information should be decoupled from legislation on public access to information.\n\n## 5.4.1.1. The Legal Basis For Access To Information By The European Parliament\n\n The EP could pursue a number of options with regards to developing a new legal framework for parliamentary access to classified information in the AFSJ and beyond. First, provisions on parliamentary access to classified information could be integrated in the new regulations on Europol, Eurojust and Frontex. Such provisions would be developed alongside regulations on parliamentary oversight of these agencies, thus ensuring that the EP's access to classified information from and relating to each agency is clearly tied to its oversight mandate and functions with regards to each agency. It is important to note that these regulations would need to extend to the EP's access to classified information from the Council because the Council has 'ownership' of a significant amount of information relating to the AFSJ agencies.510 This is the approach most commonly used at the national level, where provisions on overseers' access to classified information are often enshrined in legislation regulating intelligence agencies and their oversight. One notable drawback to this approach is that the EP will need improved access to classified information from and about all three AFSJ agencies; however, new legislation on each agencyand the EP's role in overseeing themwill not be dealt with at the same time. Consequently, there is a risk that the extent of the EP's access to classified information, as well as the mechanisms for such access, would not be uniform across the AFSJ. In addition, new legislation on these agencies will not be adopted for several years, yet there is a need for improved parliamentary access to classified information in the short-term. Second, the EP could attempt to negotiate a specific inter-institutional agreement with the Council covering the AFSJ. An agreement with the Council covering the AFSJ could help to ensure a uniform set of regulations on parliamentary access as well as one mechanism for such access (e.g., the special committee or sub-committee option mentioned in section\n5.5). It is not clear, however, whether an agreement with the Council could extend to parliamentary access to information from the agencies themselves. There may therefore be a need for some form of agreement between the EP and each of these three agencies regarding parliamentary access to information. This would likely require some form of amendment to the existing legislation on each agency, which is unlikely to happen given that the legislative basis for all three agencies is due to change within the next three years. Third, as noted above, the EP's access to classified information in all policy areas could be regulated by overarching legislation that also deals with public access to EU documents. Under the current proposals, the EP could request access to classified information through, inter alia, the chair of the committee with responsibility for a given subject, e.g., LIBE for the AFSJ. If granted, the information would be made available to a special committee composed of seven members appointed by the EP's Conference of Presidents. The membership of the committee could consist of a corecomprised, for instance, of the leaders of the political groupsbut it would not be a committee with a fixed membership.511\nThe merits of this particular institutional mechanism will be discussed in more detail below. However, for reasons stated above, regulations on the EP's access to classified information should not be included in legislation on public access to information.\n\nRecommendation 12: New legislation on the AFSJ agencies (Europol, Eurojust and Frontex) should include provisions on the European Parliament's access to classified information from and pertaining to these agencies. Such provisions should be anchored to the EP's mandate to oversee these agencies, which will be outlined in the same legislation. As discussed in chapter three, the legal framework regulating the EP's access to information relating to the fourth AFSJ body addressed in this study, Sitcen, needs to be dealt with separately. This is becausein spite of Sitcen performing some functions which are relevant to the AFSJit falls in a different policy domain (CFSP) in which the EP has fewer powers. Unlike the AFSJ agencies, it does not have its own legislative basis and there are no plans to 'Lisbonise' its legal basis. The EP's existing special committee for the CSFP field may be able to access information pertaining to Sitcen but has never made use of this opportunity.512 The 2002 inter-institutional agreement between the Council and EP will probably need to be re-negotiated in view of the fact that the Lisbon Treaty has made profound changes to the CSFP field. For the purposes of this study, the most relevant change is that Sitcen is no longer exclusively a creature of the Council because it now falls under the EEAS structure. Chapter three noted that the High Representative envisages that, inter alia, the existing inter-institutional agreement between the Council and EP, which regulates the EP's access to classified information in the CFSP field, will continue to apply. However, the modalities of the EEAS are so different that it seems likely there will be a need for a new agreement on the EP and EEAS, which would include provisions on parliamentary access to classified information. Yet, in view of the inter-governmental character of Sitcen the Council may continue to be the gatekeeper to any parliamentary\n____________________________________________________________________________________________\naccess to information regarding this body. Hence, the existing 2002 agreement between the EP and Council or an updated version thereof may continue to apply.\n\nRecommendation 13: The European Parliament should consider negotiating an interinstitutional agreement with the European External Action Service, which would include provisions on parliamentary access to classified information.\n\n\n5.4.1.2.\nThe scope of the European Parliament's access to classified information from the\nAFSJ agencies\n Rather than enumerating a specific list of the types of information the EP could have access to, it would be preferable for legislation to grant the EP a general right to request access to classified information which it deems to be relevant to its (new) oversight mandate and functions. In chapter four, we noted that this is a common good practice on the national level and helps to ensure that the responsibility for determining what information is relevant should, in the first instance, be the prerogative of the overseer. In the context of the EP's oversight of the AFSJ agencies, classified information would be requested by and made available to one of the institutional mechanisms outlined below (see section 5.5). Access to classified information on the basis of requests would, however, be subject to appropriate limitations such as those outlined in Annex Two of the 2010 Framework Agreement between the EP and the Commission.\n\nRecommendation 14: Legislative provisions on the oversight of the AFSJ agencies by the European Parliament should include a general right for a designated body of Parliament to access classified information it deems to be relevant to its oversight mandate and functions. While the EP needs a general right to request access to classified information relevant to its mandate to oversee the AFSJ agencies, access to relevant information may be better ensured by requirements for the agencies to make proactive disclosures of particular categories of information. Chapter four highlighted that proactive disclosure is a common practice on the national level and helps to ensure that oversight bodies have consistent and predictable access to information. This approach would be particularly advantageous in the context of the EP's oversight of AFSJ agencies because it would reduce the need for MEPs and staffers to expend time identifying and requesting relevant information. Perhaps more importantly, it would reduce the continuous inter-institutional battles that have characterised access to classified information by the EP. Again, the precise nature of proactive disclosure obligations would need to be tailored to the specific oversight mandate and functions outlined in forthcoming legislation. On the basis of what is advocated in this chapter, the following types of information could, for example, be subject to proactive disclosure:\n\nAnnual work plans of the AFSJ agencies\n\nThreat assessments produced by the agencies\n\nCooperation and information sharing agreements between the AFSJ agencies\n\nCooperation and information sharing agreements between the AFSJ agencies and third states\n\nAll information pertaining to budgeting and past expenditure The proactive disclosure of these types of information is broadly in line with similar provisions which apply to proactive disclosures to oversight bodies on the national level (see chapter four).\n\nRecommendation 15: New legislative provisions on the oversight of the AFSJ agencies by the European Parliament should enumerate specific categories of information, including classified information that must be proactively disclosed to a designated body of parliament.\n\n## 5.4.2. The Protection Of Information Handled By The European Parliament\n\n\nImproved access to classified information by the European Parliament will have to be accompanied by the concomitant development of rules and procedures pertaining to the protection of classified information handled by the EP. The failure to handle classified information in an appropriate manner may not only harm particular security interests but may also undermine the work of oversight bodies (see chapter four). Unauthorised disclosure of information by oversight bodies causes agencies to lose trust in them and may result in a withdrawal of cooperation, i.e., a failure to grant overseers access to information in future. There will be a need to limit the number of MEPs who have access to classified information in AFSJ. In this chapter, we will recommend two main mechanisms through which access could be limited to relatively small groups of MEPs: special committees and a subcommittee. This takes account of the 'need to know' principle which was discussed in chapter four and is also enshrined in the 2010 Framework Agreement between the Commission and the EP; this means that MEPs are only given access to classified information if they have a demonstrable need to know the information in order to fulfil their functions, e.g., as a member of a particular committee. In chapter four, we explained that there are three principal mechanisms used to ensure that members of oversight bodies do not disclose classified information without proper authorisation. The EP may wish to consider each of these. Firstly, measures need to be taken to ensure that appropriate persons are selected for positions in which they will have access to classified information. One very simple way of doing this, which can be applied within the EP, is by group leaders carefully selecting MEPs to be members of bodies with access to classified information. The EP could follow the practice used in some national parliaments whereby members of committees that have access to classified information are selected by their peers, thus ensuring cross-party support (see chapter four). There is however, no precedent for this at the EP. Vetting and security clearance processes are also used by some oversight bodies. While EP staffers should certainly be subject to security clearance before being granted access to classified information, the situation for MEPs is more complex. Chapter four illustrated that in the majority of (but not all) EU states, MPs are not subject to vetting and security clearance processes. This divergence in national practices has posed a problem for the EP because security clearance processes (of MEPs) have to be conducted by national authorities and, in many EU states, parliamentarians cannot be subject to security clearance. For this reason, the 2010 Framework Agreement between the EP and Commission left some scope for divergent Member State practices by inserting the phrase\n'*appropriate* personal security clearance'.513 In view of the sensitivities associated with security clearing parliamentarians, it would be advisable for the EU institutions to follow this approach in developing the legal framework for access to classified information by MEPs from other EU institutions and bodies. However, it should be stressed that security clearance can be seen as a confidence building measure which can make it easier for overseers to gain access to classified information.514 In view of this, MEPs who are part of\n\nbodies that have access to classified information may wish to consider obtaining a security clearance, even when MPs in their state are not normally subject to security clearance. Secondly, most states criminalise unauthorised disclosure of classified information by MPs and other overseers. At the EU level, penalties for unauthorised disclosure are complicated by the fact any prosecution of an MEP would have to take place under national law. The EP\ndoes, however, have its own disciplinary procedures which could be used in the event of an MEP making unauthorised disclosures of classified information. An assessment of the adequacy of these procedures is beyond the scope of this study. Indeed, more research is required on whether or not these procedures are effective, as well as on how national criminal law provisions would apply to unauthorised disclosures of classified information by MEPs or staffers. Ideally, there should be pan-EU consistency in this regard, in order to avoid the problem that MEPs are treated differently depending on their nationality. Finally, physical protection measures and procedures play an important role in ensuring that classified information is not disclosed either accidentally or deliberately. An EP working group is currently drafting new security procedures which will enable the EP to handle classified information. This is taking place within the context of the implementation of Annex Two of the 2010 Framework Agreement between the EP and the Commission. While the development of these security procedures has been driven by an agreement that will facilitate the EP's access to classified information from the Commission, these procedures could be applied to information received from the Council, EEAS and AFSJ bodies. Given the highly technical nature of information protection procedures, the EP may benefit from discussions with national parliaments and non-parliamentary oversight bodies with experience in dealing with these matters. It is important to note that these procedures alone will not be sufficient to persuade the AFSJ bodies, the Council, Commission and Member States that the European Parliament can be trusted with classified information. A relationship based on trust will need to gradually develop over time and will be greatly assisted by MEPs demonstrating that they will not disclose information without proper authorisation.\n\n## 5.5. Oversight Mechanisms\n\n The foregoing sections of this chapter outlined recommendations on how the EP's oversight of AFSJ bodies could be strengthened, as well as the need for oversight to be founded upon both access to and the protection of information. In this final section, we will put forward different options regarding the mechanisms or bodies within parliament that could undertake the oversight functions discussed in this chapter. These are also the mechanisms through which the EP should be able to access classified information in the AFSJ. As we noted in chapter three, the EP's LIBE Committee's mandate covers the AFSJ agencies and the Sitcen falls under the jurisdiction of the AFET Committee. These committees are analogous to the 'general parliamentary committees' which exist on the national level and were briefly discussed in chapter four. The EP does not, however, have the equivalent of the specialised oversight committees discussed in chapter four. The terms of reference for this study imply that some elements in the EP are considering the creation of such a committee. Accordingly, this section will consider the creation of a sub-committee which would serve as the EP's  specialised body for the oversight of the AFSJ agencies. However, this is not the only mechanism which the EP could use to perform many of the oversight functions envisaged in this chapter. We will also consider the option of giving these responsibilities to the LIBE committee, as well as using various 'special committee' options along the lines of the special committee which currently exists for the CFSP field. Lastly, we will discuss options for strengthening cooperation between the EP and national parliaments in the context of overseeing the AFSJ agencies. Before embarking on a discussion of these various options, two general points should be stressed. First, it is preferable for the body that is given primary responsibility for the oversight of the AFSJ agencies to be the same body which has access to classified information in the AFSJ. Chapter four demonstrated that on the national level, specialised oversight committees are almost always one of the bodies (or the only body) in parliament that have access to classified information in the security domain (see Table 3). Having one mechanism for parliament to access information relating to AFSJ agencies and a separate bodywithout the same level of access to such informationfor overseeing such bodies would seriously undermine oversight of these agencies. The reasons for this are self evident: bodies with a mandate to conduct oversight need access to relevant information, and bodies that have access to information relating to particular agencies but no clear mandate to oversee such agencies cannot make effective use of their privileged access to information.\n\nRecommendation 16: The European Parliament body responsible for the oversight of the AFSJ agencies should also be the body of Parliament which has access to classified information in the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice. Second, it is preferable for the EP to have one body (e.g., the LIBE Committee or a newly created sub-committee) that plays the lead role in the parliament's oversight of the AFSJ\nagencies. In order to ensure that the EP takes a coherent and coordinated approach to the oversight of the AFSJ agencies, there should be one body which has primary responsibility for all oversight functions vis-a-vis all AFSJ agencies. This responsibility should include not only the EP's own oversight mandate and functions but also cooperation with national parliaments and non-parliamentary oversight bodies such as the JSBs. An important exception to this is the financial oversight of the agencies which will, of course, remain the responsibility of the Budgets and Budgetary Control Committees. Nevertheless, whichever body has primary responsibility for the oversight of the AFSJ agencies should be closely involved in the work of the BUDG and CONT committees with respect to these agencies. It should be stressed that the 'body' discussed in this paragraph cannot be given primary responsibility for the oversight of Sitcen because it is situated in the Common Foreign and Security Policy field, under the High Representative. The practice of vesting all or most (parliamentary) oversight functions in one body was highlighted (in chapter four) as being a good practice on the national levelthe German *Bundestag's* Parliamentary Control Panel is a useful example in this regard.515\n\nRecommendation 17: The European Parliament should ensure that there is one body within parliament that has primary responsibility for the oversight of the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice (AFSJ) agencies.\n\n\n## 5.5.1. The Performance Of Additional Oversight Functions By The Libe Committee\n\n The EP's LIBE Committee is the committee which is currently responsible for overseeing the AFSJ agencies, and is a logical starting point when considering which body within the EP should assume the oversight mandate and functions outlined in this chapter. Vesting such responsibilities in the LIBE Committee would perhaps be the most straightforward solution because it would not require the creation of any new bodies or mechanisms. Moreover, the LIBE Committee in the current parliament includes some MEPs with considerable interest and expertise in various matters relating to the AFSJ agencies, and the Committee's secretariat houses the parliament's 'institutional memory' in this field. The Committee also has the advantage that it has developed relationships with its contemporaries in national parliaments, which are useful for inter-parliamentary cooperation in the oversight of AFSJ agencies. There are, however, a number of reasons why the LIBE Committee is not well suited for many of the oversight functions we have discussed. By far the most significant problem from which other difficulties ariseis that it is not an ideal forum for accessing and/or discussing classified or otherwise sensitive information. In common with most committees of the EP, the LIBE Committee is very large and consequently the agencies and the Council are reluctant to share or discuss classified information (particularly of higher levels of classification) with the full committee.516 These concerns exist not only when LIBE meetings are public but also when they are held behind closed doors.517 With so many MEPs involved, it is difficult to control the use of information and agencies are concerned that information discussed within the Committee may be further disseminated. Equally, LIBE Committee meetings are not seen as an ideal setting for open, frank exchanges about sensitive matters. Several persons interviewed for this study suggested that agency directors are very unlikely to make candid statements about failures of their agency or serious problems facing their agency in the context of a full committee meeting, regardless of whether or not it is held *in camera*.518 Holding committee meetings *in camera* does not seem to be a sufficient measure to assuage the concerns which the AFSJ agencies and the Council may have about confidentiality. A second reason for which the LIBE Committee may not be an ideal body for conducting the oversight functions outlined in this section is that it has a mandate to address a wide range of other important issues that it may not have time to engage in additional oversight of the AFSJ agencies. In chapter four, we explained that many national parliaments have opted to establish specialised oversight committees because committees with jurisdiction over broad policy areas such as justice and home affairs do not have the time or resources to engage in ongoing oversight of intelligence agencies. If the EP wishes to follow suit, the logical outcome would likely be the creation of a sub-committee of the LIBE (see below). Whether or not this is necessary will likely depend on the nature and scope of any extension of the EP's oversight of the AFSJ agencies. Ultimately, the LIBE Committee will need to determine whether or not it has sufficient time and resources to assume additional oversight functions.\n\nThe development of a new body or mechanism within the EP is likely to be a complex and protracted process requiring the agreement of numerous other actors. Depending on which type of mechanism the EP opts to establish, it may not be possible until new legislation on Europol and Eurojust is drafted and there is a legal framework in place which regulates the EP's access to classified information in the AFSJ area. In view of this, it is necessary for the LIBE Committee to develop procedures that make it better suited to serving as a forum for the oversight of AFSJ agencies, at least on an interim basis. One relatively straightforward option is for the bureau of the LIBE Committee to hold offthe-record briefings with directors/president of the AFSJ agencies and/or representatives of the management board (in the case of Europol & Frontex) and the College (in the case of Eurojust). This option could be utilised to permit MEPs to discuss sensitive matters with these individuals in small, private meetings. Matters under discussion could include anything which falls within the broader mandate of the LIBE Committee. For example, directors could use such meetings to brief bureau members on sensitive strategic issues or problems in the operation of their agency. During the course of our interviews, it became clear that some MEPs and the directors of the agencies would welcome the opportunity for more confidential meetings when particularly sensitive matters need to be discussed.519\nSuch meetings could be initiated at the request of the chair of the LIBE Committee, by directors/president of the AFSJ agencies, and/or by relevant figures from the management boards/college. While small, off-the-record meetings could be a useful option for ad hoc discussions on some issues, they would not serve as a mechanism for many of the oversight functions discussed above.\n\nRecommendation 18: The European Parliament's LIBE Committee should develop procedures that make it better suited to serving as a forum for the oversight of AFSJ\nagencies, at least on an interim basis. For this purpose, the LIBE Committee could use offthe-record meetings between its Bureau and directors (or president in the case of Eurojust)\nof the AFSJ agencies and/or representatives from the agencies' management boards (or the College of Eurojust) to address sensitive issues which cannot be discussed in meetings of the full committee.\n\n\n\n## 5.5.2. Special Committee Options For The Area Of Freedom, Security And Justice (Afsj)\n\n\nIn chapter three, we introduced the European Parliament's 'Special Committee'a small group of MEPs drawn primarily from the AFET Committeeused to enable the parliament to address matters which involve classified information in the CFSP field (hereafter, the\n'Common Foreign and Security Policy - CFSP Special Committee'). There are a number of options for extending this committee's remit or using a similar model for the oversight of the AFSJ bodies.\n\n## 5.5.2.1. Extending The Existing Special Committee's Remit To The Afsj\n\n The EP's existing special committee established on the basis of an inter-institutional agreement between the EP and the Council for the exclusive purpose of enabling the EP to access classified information in the CFSP field (see chapter three) from the High Representative. The remit of this special committee could potentially be extended, through an amended inter-institutional agreement, to the AFSJ field in order to allow the EP to address matters involving classified information relating to, inter alia, the AFSJ agencies.\n\nThe same MEPs could discuss AFSJ matters involving classified information with relevant persons from the Council and, potentially, the agencies' directors. Such meetings would take place upon the request of the chair of the LIBE Committee rather than the chair of the AFET who, under the current arrangements, can request meetings between the High Representative and the special committee. The main advantage of this approach is that there is already an arrangement in place and all of the MEPs on the existing special committee have now received their security clearances insofar as this is permissible under their states' national law and practice.520 Accordingly, it would not be necessary to endure lengthy waits for selected members of the LIBE Committee to be security cleared. There are, however, several major drawbacks to this option; these will be discussed below.\n\n\n## 5.5.2.2. The Establishment Of A Special Committee For The Afsj\n\n\nThe EP and the Council could agree to create a special committee in the AFSJ along the lines of the CFSP special committee model. Accordingly, a small, ad hoc committee or grouping would be created, drawn primarily from the membership of the LIBE Committee. The special committee could include approximately six members (and substitutes)\nrepresenting each political group, who would be security cleared by their national authorities insofar as this is permitted by national law.521 If an AFSJ special committee followed the example of the existing CFSP Special Committee, the membership would be fixed, i.e., it would not change on an issue-by-issue basis. The membership selection process would need to be determined by the LIBE Committee but it seems likely that members would be nominated by their political groups on the basis of their seniority.\n\nHowever, it may be preferable to select LIBE members with expertise on the agencies whose work would be discussed by the committee. This could help to ensure that committee members would have the necessary knowledge to enable them to ask relevant questions and seek access to pertinent information. The special committee would need to be supported by security-cleared members of the LIBE secretariat. A 'special committee' in the AFSJ could hold discussions with both the relevant authority within the Council and the director/president of the AFSJ agency concerned. The special committee's meetings could take place on a periodic basis or upon a request from the chair of the LIBE Committee to the relevant party. Members of the special committee would be given the right to request access to classified information in the form of briefings or by viewing particular documents. They would also be able to ask questions and receive answers to questions which could entail agency and Council officials revealing classified information, which they may not do in the context of hearings with the LIBE Committee. As is the case with the CFSP Special Committee, this arrangement would likely be used on an ad hoc basis to enable the LIBE Committee, through its special committee, to discuss matters that are considered to require the discussion of classified information. For example, members could be briefed on negotiations with third states, problems relating to information sharing with third states, or could discuss threat assessments pertaining to issues such as terrorism. It is noteworthy that the EP's Rapporteur on the revision of Regulation 1049 has proposed a slight variation to the special committee option discussed here. Under his proposals, the EP would establish a 'special oversight committee composed of 7 members appointed by its Conference of Presidents' to access classified information across all policy areas.522 We were informed that the Rapporteur foresees that this committee would have a flexible membership which could change depending on the issue under discussion.523 This committee would presumably be able to discuss such information with relevant officials from the Council, Commission or agencies. Both special committee options have a number of significant drawbacks. Several individuals with experience of the CFSP special committee counselled against exporting the model to other fields such as the AFSJ.524 A first problem is that a special committee of this nature is ultimately only a vehicle for its parent committee, in this case the LIBE Committee, to have some access to classified information. Neither the existing special committee nor the proposed special committee for the AFSJ (as conceived of here) would have a specific oversight mandate. If it were to be given a specific mandate, it would make sense to pursue the option of a security cleared permanent sub-committee instead (see below). Moreover, given that a special committee would be a small group of MEP's without its own secretariat and meeting on an occasional basis, it is difficult to see how it could undertake the various oversight functions outlined in this chapter. Secondly, there are doubts about whether a special committee could make effective use of the classified information to which it had access in the context of discussions with Council and/or agency officials. Given that the special committee would not have a specific mandate or the capacity to produce reports, it is unclear what purpose would be served by it having access to classified information. Indeed, as we pointed out in chapter four, access to classified information is not an end in itself; it should serve as a means to conduct oversight. In this context, information is of limited use unless it can serve as a basis for performing specific oversight functions. It is noteworthy that this was highlighted as one of the main weaknesses of the CFSP special committee.525 Furthermore, members would obviously be prohibited from transmitting or referring to classified information in discussions with their colleagues in the LIBE Committee. This would make it difficult for the LIBE Committee to make use of the special committee's privileged access to classified information in its own work. For this reason, the use of a special committee in the AFSJ would be inconsistent with Recommendation 16 which stresses the need for the body responsible for oversight of the AFSJ agencies to be same body that has access to classified information relating to these agencies. Thirdly, if members of a special committee for the AFSJ were not experts on the subjects and agencies being discussed, they may not have the relevant knowledge to ask the most relevant questions and/or seek access to relevant information. According to one respondent, this has been a major weakness of the CFSP special committee.526 This eventuality seems likely if members were to be selected on the basis of their seniority within political groups. The risk of a special committee possessing insufficient specialised knowledge would be significantly increased if the EP and Council selected the option of extending the mandate of the existing CFSP special committee. This is because its members and staffers are primarily drawn from the AFET Committee and may not have specific knowledge or expertise relevant to the AFSJ.\n\nFinally, a special committee arrangement for the AFSJ (and similar arrangements in other policy areas) would not obviate the need for a comprehensive legal framework on the EP's access to information in the AFSJ field and beyond.527 There is a risk that by granting access to classified AFSJ information to a special committee of MEPs, the Council may attempt to bypass the need for a fundamental reconsideration of the framework for parliamentary access to information.\n\nRecommendation 19: The European Parliament should not seek to extend the existing Special Committee's mandate to include the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice (AFSJ), or to create a new special committee for the AFSJ.\n\n\n\n## 5.5.2.3. Oversight Of The European Union's Situation Centre By The Existing Common Foreign And Security Policy Special Committee\n\n As we have already discussed, the EP's existing CFSP Special Committee may address CFSP matters, which include the discussion of classified information with the High Representative. Given that Sitcen falls under the purview of the High Representative, the CFSP Special Committee could use its meetings with her to address issues relating to Sitcen. Such discussions could be initiated by a request from the chair of the AFET\nCommittee.528 Members of the CFSP Special Committee could, for example, seek to learn more about the composition of Sitcen, its current priorities, or the role it plays in providing assessments on threats to the EU's internal security. There is, of course, no guarantee that the High Representative would be willing to discuss these issues given that Sitcen's work remains highly sensitive due to the presence of seconded officers from national intelligence agencies. To date, the special committee has not discussed the Sitcen with either the former High Representative (Javier Solana) or the current High Representative (Catherine Ashton).529 This can probably be explained by the fact that the work of Sitcen has not been viewed as a priority for the AFET Committee.530 Once again, the use of a special committee has a number of significant drawbacks. First, giving a very select group of MEPs access to information on the work of Sitcen may do little to raise broader awareness of the role of Sitcen amongst MEPs and staffers. The potential for such discussions to contribute to broader awareness of Sitcen's role would also depend on how much of the information discussed in a special committee meeting on Sitcen is deemed to be classified. Second, the success of this option would depend on the willingness of the chair of the AFET Committee to take up the issue of Sitcen's internal security functions with the High Representative; this may be unlikely given that the AFET does not deal with internal security matters and has numerous other priorities to be addressed with the High Representative. In spite of these drawbacks, the CFSP special committee is currently the only mechanism available to the EP for discussions about the work of Sitcen. As we have consistently stated, the EP is in a weaker position vis-a-vis Sitcen than it is with regards to the AFSJ agencies for a variety of reasons: e.g., Sitcen is not an autonomous agency funded from the EU budget, the EP doesn't have powers of co-legislation in the CFSP, and it doesn't have a clear treaty-based mandate to directly oversee Sitcen. The CFSP Special Committee is therefore, the only mechanism through which the EP may be able to conduct some limited oversight of the Sitcen.\n\nRecommendation 20: The European Parliament should use its existing Special Committee to examine the work of the European Union's Situation Centre. The Special Committee could use its privileged access to classified information to address the role played by the Situation Centre in the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice.\n\n\n\n## 5.5.3. Creation Of A Libe Sub-Committee For The Oversight Of The Afsj Agencies\n\n The EP could consider establishing a sub-committee of the LIBE Committee to oversee the AFSJ agencies. This would be a permanent body, established in accordance with the EP's Rules of Procedure. We shall first put forward some suggestions regarding the modalities of such a sub-committee before outlining the reasons for which we believe this may be an effective mechanism for developing the EP's oversight of the AFSJ agencies. Mandate The mandate of any sub-committee would need to remain within the broad parameters of the LIBE Committee's mandate, which states that 'the Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs Committee is responsible for [...] Europol, Eurojust, Cepol and other bodies and agencies in the same area'.531 Within this context, the sub-committee would assume primary responsibility for the oversight of AFSJ agencies by the European Parliament. We envisage that the sub-committee's jurisdiction would extend to all of the AFSJ agencies which currently fall under the remit of the LIBE Committee. Under the current division of responsibilities in the EP, the sub-committee of the LIBE could not directly oversee the Sitcen because it is part of the EEAS, which falls under the jurisdiction of the AFET Committee. It could nevertheless cooperate closely with the AFET Committee, its Sub-Committee on Defence and the CFSP Special Committee on matters relating to the activities of the Sitcen which are relevant to the AFSJ. The sub-committee could, for example, be given the task of performing the oversight functions mentioned in this chapter and any other functions which the EP deems to be relevant. If the functions and powers of the AFSJ agencies were to evolve, the subcommittee's mandate would be amended accordingly. On the basis of the oversight mandate and functions outlined earlier in this chapter, the sub-committee's mandate may include, but should not be limited to:\nxi.\n\nServing as the forum for periodic and ad hoc meetings with, inter alia, the directors/president of the AFSJ agencies; representatives of the management boards/college; relevant officials from the Commission and Council;\nxii.\n\nReceiving and reviewing the annual work plans and reports of the AFSJ agencies;\nxiii.\n\nReceiving threats assessments from the AFSJ agencies;\nxiv.\n\nRelations with the Joint Supervisory Bodies and any other specialised nonparliamentary oversight bodies which are created to oversee the AFSJ agencies. This role would include reviewing the annual and thematic reports of the JSBs and maintaining regular dialogue with them;\nxv.\n\nDrafting the LIBE Committee's own initiative and legislative reports on matters relating to the AFSJ agencies;\nxvi.\n\nPerforming the advisory functions of the LIBE Committee with regards to the appropriation and discharge of the budgets for the AFSJ agencies, thereby providing expert opinions to support the work of the Budgets and Budgetary Control Committees;\nxvii.\n\nCooperation with other committees of the European Parliament which have jurisdiction over matters related to the AFSJ agencies. Notably, the sub-committee could maintain dialogue with the AFET and the CFSP Special Committee regarding the Sitcen. If the EP decides to take up the option of drafting opinions on the human rights record of the AFSJ agencies' partners in third states, the sub-committee should consult with the AFET's Sub-Committee on Human Rights on this matter;\nxviii.\n\nReviewing certain aspects of the AFSJ agencies' cooperation with third states and international organisations, including scrutinising the information sharing agreements concluded in this context;\nxix.\n\nReviewing relationships between AFSJ agencies, including their memoranda of understanding; and xx.\n\nCoordinating relations with national parliaments and representing the European Parliament in inter-parliamentary meetings which are relevant to the AFSJ. In line with our earlier comments regarding the role of the EP in overseeing the AFSJ\nagencies, we do not believe that the sub-committee should duplicate the work of the JSBs in examining the legality of the use of personal data by certain AFSJ agencies. Moreover, it would not play a role in examining other operational activities of the agencies, e.g., their work files or the joint operations which they coordinate. Equally, the sub-committee should not encroach upon the jurisdiction of national parliaments and other oversight bodies responsible for scrutinising the work of national authorities that is connected to the AFSJ agencies. Membership The membership of the sub-committee would need to be determined in accordance with the guidelines established under Rules 186 and 190 of the European Parliament's Rules of Procedure. The existing sub-committees (of the Foreign Affairs Committee) on Security and Defence, and Human Rights have 28 members and 28 substitutes, and 30 members and 21 substitutes, respectively. These MEPs generally (but not necessarily) hold concurrent membership in the Foreign Affairs Committee.\n\nIt is our view that these numbers are too large considering the fact that two of the principal reasons for proposing a sub-committee are: (1) the need for a small, confidential forum for discussions with the heads of the agencies and management boards; and (2) the need for MEPs to have access to some classified information relating to the agencies. A committee with as many as 50 members and substitutes would not fulfil these needs. Indeed, many of the aforementioned concerns which the agencies (and the Council and Commission) have about the confidentiality of discussions and protection of classified information would not be addressed if the sub-committee contained so many MEPs. Aside from concerns about the protection of classified information, a sub-committee arrangement would need to create conditions in which, inter alia, agency directors would feel confident that they could raise concerns or sensitive issues with a group of MEPs, without the content of such deliberations being further disseminated. Ultimately, agency directors and officials from the Council, Commission and JSBs are likely to abstain from discussing sensitive issues with the EP if they are not confident that discussions will remain confidential. On the national level, the overwhelming majority of specialised parliamentary oversight committees include five to fifteen MPs (see Table 1 in chapter four). As we have seen, such committees are normally smaller than other parliamentary committees for reasons of maintaining confidentiality. Accordingly, it is our view that a sub-committee should contain no more than 15 MEPs (including substitutes). This may, however, be difficult to accomplish in view of the requirement that the composition of EP committees and sub-committees reflects the overall composition of the parliament. It would be beneficial if members of the sub-committee were either full or substitute members of the LIBE Committee. This would increase the likelihood that sub-committee members would have sufficient knowledge of the AFSJ agencies to enable them to contribute effectively to the sub-committee's functions. Finally, the EP could consider including some MEPs that are members of other (sub)-committees that deal with matters related to the AFSJ agencies and/or have other expertise which is relevant to the oversight of AFSJ agencies. These MEPs could include members of the Budgetary Control Committee, the Foreign Affairs Committee and its Sub-Committee on Human Rights. Chapter four illustrated that there is precedence for the inclusion of *ex officio* members (of other parliamentary committees) in national parliamentary oversight committees. This can help to ensure that there is proper coordination between committees that deal with related matters. Access to information All members of the sub-committee and its staffers would have the right to access classified information within the parameters of the sub-committee's mandate. In addition, certain categories of information could be subject to proactive disclosure to the sub-committee by the agencies, their management boards/college and, where appropriate, the Council and Commission (see above). The sub-committee would not, however, need to have access to information held in the agencies' databases or any personal data. The sub-committee would be required to implement the measures to protect information, which were discussed earlier in this chapter. Resources The sub-committee would need to be supported by full-time security cleared staff. This is particularly essential in view of the fact that MEPs are frequently members of several committees and have to divide their time between work in their own states, Brussels and Strasbourg. Staffers are also essential to developing the parliament's institutional knowledge and expertise on the AFSJ agencies; they ensure that such knowledge is retained even when MEPs move to other committees or leave the EP. Assessment Whether or not the European Parliament needs to establish a LIBE sub-committee to oversee the work of the AFSJ agencies depends to a large extent on how its mandate to oversee these agencies is defined in the forthcoming legislation on Europol, Eurojust and Frontex. If the EP's oversight mandate and functions remain broadly similar to the way they are now, i.e., relatively limited, it is not clear that a sub-committee would be necessary. If, however, the EP assumes additional oversight functions along the lines of the options presented in this chapter, there is a strong case for the establishment of a subcommittee. There are four main reasons for which we believe a sub-committee could be created. First, we have argued there is a need for the EP to have access to classified information from and pertaining to the AFSJ agencies, as well as the possibility of holding confidential, off-the-record discussions with agency directors and other relevant stakeholders. Yet, the EP's existing institutional arrangements for oversight are not well suited to such functions because too many MEPs are involved and there is no precedent for smaller, confidential discussions with the agencies. We have cautioned against solving this problem by using a mechanism or body which simply has access to classified information regarding the AFSJ\nagencies without an accompanying mandate to use this information as part of oversight processes. It is worth reiterating that access to information by a body of parliament is not an end in itself: it must be a means to enable parliament to oversee particular agencies. For this reason, we were critical of the possible use of a special committee model for the AFSJ. The need to link access to classified information with a clear mandate for oversight is one of the main arguments in favour of creating a sub-committee. A second argument in favour of the creation of a sub-committee is that the LIBE Committee might not have the time to engage in many of the proposed oversight functions outlined in this chapter. If the EP wishes to play an increased role in the oversight of the AFSJ\nagencies, the creation of a sub-committee could be a persuasive choice. Third, a sub-committee would correspond with our earlier recommendation that the EP\nshould have one body which has primary responsibility for all areas of parliamentary oversight of the AFSJ agencies. The sub-committee would be able to draw together its findings from various oversight functions and ongoing dialogue with the agencies, Council, Commission, JSBs and national parliaments. This would enable the EP to produce recommendations which can improve the work of the agencies, while also providing inputs to feed into other aspects of its own work. Notably, the insights of the sub-committee could help to ensure that the various roles which the EP plays vis-a-vis the AFSJ agencies are fully connected. For example, the EP's co-legislation functions would be closely informed by the findings and recommendations of its oversight work, and the sub-committee's oversight would also inform the use of the EP's budgetary powers. Finally, the creation of a sub-committee would enable the EP to gradually develop more detailed knowledge and expertise on the AFSJ agencies. In our view, this is something which is currently lacking within the EP, and yet is crucial if the EP is to play a more active role in scrutinising the work of the AFSJ agencies.\n\nRecommendation 21: The European Parliament should create a LIBE Sub-Committee for the oversight of the AFSJ agencies. The precise scope and content of the sub-committee's mandate would be defined in accordance with the Parliament's rules of procedure but would be closely tied to the oversight functions given to the EP by new legislation on Europol, Eurojust and Frontex.\n\n\n\n5.5.4.\nStrengthening cooperation between the European Parliament and national parliaments in the oversight of AFSJ agencies\n The Lisbon Treaty specifically requires that national parliaments should be involved in the oversight of Europol and Eurojust. While the precise nature and scope of national parliaments' role differs between states, this study highlighted three main ways in which national parliaments already exercise some oversight of these agencies (see chapter three). First, some national parliaments oversee the work of their own government's representatives at the Council and on agency management boards, i.e., they scrutinise national inputs to AFSJ agencies. Secondly, national parliaments can engage with AFSJ agencies directly by, for example, holding hearings with directors and other senior officials, and producing reports on the agencies. This engagement has typically been aimed at generating awareness of the agencies' work rather than any direct review or scrutiny of the agencies' activities. Moreover, parliaments are part of national systems of oversight which scrutinise actions taken by national authorities such as the police. The modalities of such oversight are the prerogative of national bodies, and it is beyond the scope of this study to issue recommendations in this regard. The third dimension of national parliamentary involvement in the oversight of the AFSJ agencies is cooperation with other parliaments and the EP (see chapter three); this will be our focus here. In our view, the aims of inter-parliamentary cooperation should primarily focus on strategic matters rather than any specific operations of the AFSJ agencies. There are three areas in which inter-parliamentary cooperation could be particularly useful. Firstly, national parliaments and the EP could benefit from further discussions, as well as exchanges of information, experiences and good practices, on their oversight of national authorities'\nactivities that are connected with the AFSJ agencies. For example, there is a clear need for further information on how, if at all, national parliaments and other relevant national oversight bodies (such as judicial bodies) oversee: (a) national contributions or inputs to the AFSJ agencies, such as information sent to AFSJ agencies; and (b) the actions of national authorities taken on the basis of information provided and/or operations coordinated by these bodies, such as arrests and questioning of persons suspected of involvement in serious criminal activity. National overseers could use such information to inform their own approaches to scrutinising activities of, for example, the police or border agencies, which have a nexus with the AFSJ agencies. Secondly, national parliaments and the EP could, insofar as national law would allow, exchange information about particular problems (within their jurisdictions) related to aforementioned activities of national authorities' activities that are linked to the work of AFSJ agencies. Finally, national parliaments and the EP could work together to evaluate whether new and existing regulations relating to the AFSJ agencies comply with the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality. There are different views as to whether this cooperation should be institutionalised through some form of permanent inter-parliamentary body or whether it should proceed more informally through existing inter-parliamentary fora. For example, in its communication of December 2010, the Commission made proposals for involving national parliaments in the oversight of Europol. The Commission proposed setting up a joint or permanent interparliamentary forum in which both national and European members of parliament would be represented, along the lines of Articles 9 and 10 of the Protocol on the Role of National Parliaments in the European Union. It furthermore suggested that such a forum could establish a sub-group to liaise directly with Europol. The forum would be able to invite the Europol director and it could meet regularly and establish a sub-group responsible for liaising with Europol directly.532 The Commission's proposals have received some support from national parliaments.533 However, the added value of the creation of such an interparliamentary forum has been questioned by a number of EU member states and national parliaments.534 All of the forms of cooperation discussed above could potentially take place within the context of existing forums for inter-parliamentary dialogue.\n\nPerhaps more significantly, it is highly doubtful that a permanent body including representatives from all national parliaments could be workable. National parliaments'\npositions on, levels of interest in, and knowledge of AFSJ related matters vary greatly across the EU. It would therefore, be very challenging to reach consensus on issues such as an agenda for oversight, let alone on more substantive questions. A forum which included so many actors with different agendas could be unworkable and yet, it would be difficult to devise a formula for a smaller forum because it would inappropriate to exclude any national parliaments. In addition national parliaments have both different levels of access to information - from national authorities - and access to different types of information on the AFSJ agencies. They may therefore, be starting from very different positions in terms of their awareness of particular matters. In view of these challenges, we do not recommend the establishment of a permanent forum for inter-parliamentary cooperation on oversight of the AFSJ agencies. It would be preferable for national parliaments and the EP to address the AFSJ agencies in the context of existing inter-parliamentary forums. These include joint meetings/hearings between the LIBE Committee and relevant committees of national parliaments, as well as the COSAC. In fact, the AFSJ, the political monitoring of Europol and the evaluation of Eurojust's activities have become regular items on the COSAC agenda.535 A majority of COSAC's members have supported the idea of COSAC debates on Europol and Eurojust to be preceded by a hearing of the directors of the respective agencies and experts.536 A potential role for COSAC in the political monitoring of JHA agencies is founded on Article 10 of TFEU Protocol No 1 on the role of national parliaments. This article stipulates that COSAC should promote the exchange of information and best practices between national parliaments and the European Parliament, including their special committees, and may organise inter-parliamentary conferences on specific topics. COSAC could continue to provide a useful venue for the types of cooperation discussed above.\n\nRecommendation 22: Inter-parliamentary cooperation on the oversight of the AFSJ\nagencies should take place within the context of existing forums for cooperation between the European Parliament and national parliaments. The European Parliament does not need to establish a new permanent inter-parliamentary body.\n\n\n## 5.6. Summary Of Recommendations\n\n\nRecommendation 1: The European Parliament should ensure that any new arrangements for the oversight of the AFSJ bodies do not serve to dissuade member states from using these bodies as platforms for cooperation.\n\nRecommendation 2: The European Parliament should not be part of the management boards of Europol or Frontex, or of the College of Eurojust.\n\nRecommendation 3: The European Parliament's oversight of the AFSJ agencies should focus on their policies, administration and finance.\n\nRecommendation 4: The European Parliament should ensure its budgetary appropriation and discharge functions are fully linked to other aspects of its oversight of AFSJ agencies.\n\nRecommendation 5: The European Parliament should receive threat assessments from the AFSJ bodies.  This would enable Parliament to better assess whether these bodies have the necessary legal mandate, powers and financial resources to address such threats.\n\nRecommendation 6: The European Parliament should engage in regular dialogue with the Joint Supervisory Bodies (JSBs) of Europol and Eurojust, and should make use of the reports and expertise of the JSBs in its own oversight of the AFSJ agencies.\n\nRecommendation 7: The European Parliament's power to summon the director of Europol and the chairperson of the Europol Management Board should be extended to the equivalent persons at Eurojust and Frontex.\n\nRecommendation 8: The European Parliament should not be given a role in the appointment of the directors/president of the AFSJ bodies.\n\nRecommendation\n9:\nThe European Parliament should ensure that either a\n(sub)committee of parliament or a specialised non-parliamentary body provides independent assessments of the general human rights records/compliance of agencies in third states with which the AFSJ bodies cooperate. Such assessments could take place before an information sharing or other cooperation agreement is signed with a third state, and during the implementation of these agreements.\n\nRecommendation 10: The European Parliament should have access to information sharing agreements and other memoranda of understanding concluded between AFSJ\nbodies within the European Union, as well as between AFSJ bodies and third states or organisations.\n\nRecommendation 11: New regulations on the European Parliament's access to classified information should be decoupled from legislation on public access to information.\n\nRecommendation 12: New legislation on the AFSJ agencies (Europol, Eurojust and Frontex) should include provisions on the European Parliament's access to classified information from and pertaining to these agencies. Such provisions should be anchored to the EP's mandate to oversee these agencies, which will be outlined in the same legislation.\n\n\nRecommendation 13: The European Parliament should consider negotiating an interinstitutional agreement with the European External Action Service, which would include provisions on parliamentary access to classified information.\n\nRecommendation 14: Legislative provisions on the oversight of the AFSJ agencies by the European Parliament should include a general right for a designated body of Parliament to access classified information it deems to be relevant to its oversight mandate and functions.\n\nRecommendation 15: New legislative provisions on the oversight of the AFSJ agencies by the European Parliament should enumerate specific categories of information, including classified information that must be proactively disclosed to a designated body of parliament. Recommendation 16: The European Parliament body responsible for the oversight of the AFSJ agencies should also be the body of Parliament which has access to classified information in the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice.\n\nRecommendation 17: The European Parliament should ensure that there is one body within parliament that has primary responsibility for the oversight of the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice (AFSJ) agencies.\n\nRecommendation 18: The European Parliament's LIBE Committee should develop procedures that make it better suited to serving as a forum for the oversight of AFSJ\nagencies, at least on an interim basis. For this purpose, the LIBE Committee could use offthe-record meetings between its Bureau and directors (or president in the case of Eurojust)\nof the AFSJ agencies and/or representatives from the agencies' management boards (or the College of Eurojust) to address sensitive issues which cannot be discussed in meetings of the full committee.\n\nRecommendation 19: The European Parliament should not seek to extend the existing Special Committee's mandate to include the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice (AFSJ), or to create a new special committee for the AFSJ.\n\nRecommendation 20: The European Parliament should use its existing Special Committee to examine the work of the European Union's Situation Centre. The Special Committee could use its privileged access to classified information to address the role played by the Situation Centre in the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice.\n\n\nRecommendation 21: The European Parliament should create a LIBE Sub-Committee for the oversight of the AFSJ agencies. The precise scope and content of the sub-committee's mandate would be defined in accordance with the Parliament's rules of procedure but would be closely tied to the oversight functions given to the EP by new legislation on Europol, Eurojust and Frontex.\n\nRecommendation 22: Inter-parliamentary cooperation on the oversight of the AFSJ\nagencies should take place within the context of existing forums for cooperation between the European Parliament and national parliaments. 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(2009), 'Principles and procedures for dealing with European Union classified information in the light of the Lisbon Treaty', Study for the European Parliament's LIBE Committee, European Parliament. Lords Hansard,\n25\nJun\n2009:\nColumn\n1756, available at http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld200809/ldhansrd/text/90625-\n0013.htm#090625490007.\n\n\nLund Commission (1996), 'Report to the Storting from the commission which was appointed in order to investigate allegations of illegal surveillance of Norwegian citizens', Oslo. Management Board of Europol (29 March 2007), 'Decision of The Management Board of 20\nMarch 2007 laying down the rules governing the arrangements regulating the administrative implementation of the participation of Europol officials in Joint investigation Teams',\n2007/C\n72/16, available at\n(http://eur-lex.\n\neuropa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2007:072:0035:0036:EN:PDF). 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The Netherlands (1994), *Rules of Procedure of the Dutch Second Chamber 1994*. OECD DAC Guidelines and Reference Series (2005), 'Security System Reform and Governance', OECD, Paris. Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (2005), 'Democratic oversight of the security sector in member states', Resolution 1713(2005). Regulation (EC) No 863/2007 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 July\n2007 establishing a mechanism for the creation of Rapid Border Intervention Teams and amending Council Regulation (EC) No 2007/2004. ('Rabit Regulation'), available at\n(http://www.frontex.europa.eu/gfx/frontex/files/rabit_regulation-863-2007.pdf). Regulation (EC) No 562/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 March 2006 establishing a Community Code on the rules governing the movement of persons across borders (Schengen Borders Code), OJ L 105/1, 13.4.2006. Rettman Andrew (12 April 2011), 'EU Intelligence bureau sent officers to Libya', EU\nObserver, available at (http://euobserver.com/9/32161?print=1).\n\n____________________________________________________________________________________________\nRettman Andrew (14 September 2010), 'Competition heating up for EU intelligence chief job', *EU Observer*, available at (http://euobserver.com/9/ 30794). Roberts Alasdair (2006), *Blacked Out: Government Secrecy in an Information Age,* CUP, Cambridge. Roberts Alasdair (2004), 'ORCON Creep: Information Sharing and the Threat to Government Accountability', *Government Information Quarterly* Vol. 21, No 3, p. 263. Sanchez Javier Moreno (11 November 2008), 'Report on the evaluation and future development of the FRONTEX Agency and of the European Border Surveillance System (EUROSUR)',\n2008/2157(INI), A6-0437/2008, available at\n(http://www.\n\neuroparl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?language=EN&reference=A6-0437/2008). Shapcott William (2007), 'Taking EU intelligence into the 21st century' in A .Ricci and Eero Kytoemaa, eds., Faster and more united? The debate about Europe's crisis response capacity, Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, Brussels. South African Ministerial Review Commission on Intelligence (2008), Intelligence in a Constitutional Democracy, Pretoria. South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission, *Report*, Vol. 5, Chap. 8. Spain (6 May 2002), *Ley 11/2002, Reguladora del Centro Nacional de Inteligencia*. Peers Steve (2002), 'The exchange of personal data between Europol and the USA', available at (http://www.statewatch.org/news/2002/nov/analy15.pdf). Statewatch (20 December 2002), 'EU-USA Proposed exchange of personal data between Europol and USA evades EU data protection rights and protections', available at\n(http://www.statewatch.org/news/2002/nov/12eurousa.htm). Sweden (22 November 2007), Act on Supervision of Certain Crime Fighting Activities, SFS 2007:980. Treaty of Nice (10.3.2001), OJ C 80/1, available at (http://eur-lex.europa.eu/en/\ntreaties/dat/12001C/pdf/12001C_EN.pdf). United Kingdom (1994), Intelligence Services Act 1994, available at (http://www.\n\nlegislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1994/13/contents). United Nations Human Rights Council (17 May 2010), 'UN compilation of good practice on the legal and institutional framework for intelligence agencies and their oversight', A/HRC/14/46, available at (http://www.fas.org/irp/eprint/unhrc. pdf). United States (1947), *National Security Act of 1947*, PL 235 - 61 Stat. 496; U.S.C. 402 United States Code, *Title 50War and National Defense*. United States Senate (1976), 'Intelligence activities and the rights of Americans, Book II, Final report of the select committee to study governmental operations with respect to intelligence'., U.S Government Printing Office, Washington DC.\n\n____________________________________________________________________________________________ Whitaker Reg and Stuart Farson (2009), 'Accountability in and for National Security', IRPP\nChoices, Vol. 15, No 9. Williams Kieran and Dennis Deletant (2001), Security Intelligence Services in New Democracies: The Czech Republic, Slovakia and Romania, Palgrave MacMillan, London. Wills Aidan (2010), *Understanding Intelligence Oversight*, DCAF, Geneva. Wills Aidan (2010b), 'European Parliament and Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe inquiries into intelligence and security issues' in Stuart Farson and Mark Phytian, eds., Commissions of Inquiry and National Security, Praeger, Santa Barbara.\n\n\nWills Aidan and Hans Born (2011), 'International Intelligence Cooperation and Accountability: Formidable Challenges and Imperfect Solutions' in Hans Born, Ian Leigh and Aidan Wills, eds., *International Intelligence Cooperation and Accountability*, Routledge, London. Wright, Andrea (2011), '\"Fit for purpose\": Accountability challenges and paradoxes of domestic inquiries' in Hans Born, Ian Leigh and Aidan Wills, eds.,  International Intelligence Cooperation and Accountability, Routledge, London.\n\n## Annexes\n\n\nANNEX A:\n\nCOUNTRY\n                   CASE\n                               STUDIES\n                                                 ON\n                                                          PARLIAMENTARY\n                                                                                          AND\nSPECIALISED\n                             OVERSIGHT\n                                                       OF\n                                                                  SECURITY\n                                                                                          AND\nINTELLIGENCE AGENCIES IN EU MEMBER STATES AND\nOTHER MAJOR DEMOCRACIES\n\nANNEX B:\n\nTHEMATIC STUDIES ON OVERSIGHT OF THE EUROPEAN\nUNION'S AREA OF FREEDOM, SECURITY AND JUSTICE\n(AFSJ) BODIES\n\nANNEX C:\n\nQUESTIONNAIRE\n                               FOR\n                                         OVERSIGHT\n                                                                INSTITUTIONS\n                                                                                            OF\nCIVILIAN SECURITY AND INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES IN EU\nMEMBER STATES\n\nANNEX D:\n\nMEMBERS OF THE PROJECT ADVISORY BOARD\n\nANNEX E:\n\nAUTHORS OF THE ANNEXED BACKGROUND STUDIES\n\n\nANNEX A: COUNTRY CASE STUDIES ON PARLIAMENTARY AND SPECIALISED OVERSIGHT OF SECURITY AND INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES IN EU MEMBER STATES AND\nOTHER MAJOR DEMOCRACIES537 EU MEMBER STATES I.\nBelgium by Wauter Van Laethem\n\nII.\nFrance by Charlotte Lepri III.\nGermany by Hans De With & Erhard Kathmann IV.\nHungary by Gabor Foldvary V.\nItaly by Federico Fabbrini & Tommaso F. Giupponi VI.\nThe Netherlands by Nick Verhoeven VII.\nSpain by Susana Sanchez Ferro VIII. **Sweden** by Iain Cameron IX.\nUnited Kingdom by Ian Leigh OTHER MAJOR DEMOCRACIES X.\nAustralia by Nicola McGarrity XI.\nCanada by Craig Forcese XII.\nUnited States by Kate Martin\n\n## Annex A: Country Case Studies I. Parliamentary And Specialised Oversight Of Security And Intelligence Agencies In Belgium Wauter Van Laethem538 1. Introduction\n\n\nIn 1991, exactly twenty years ago, the Belgian legislature created an independent body to\npermanently review the functioning of the intelligence and security services539: the\nStanding Intelligence Agencies Review Committee, also known as Standing Committee I. With the passing years, Standing Committee I was entrusted with various additional assignments with regard to more specific aspects of the functioning of the intelligence\nservices. In the present contribution, we detail the initial review assignment of the Committee, together with the role of the Belgian Parliament and its specific Monitoring Commissions. However, the Belgian external oversight landscape is far richer. There are numerous other external institutions that can (directly or indirectly) supervise (specific aspects) of the\nfunctioning of the Belgian intelligence community:\n-\nThe Appeal Body for Security Clearances, Certificates and Advice acts as an\nindependent administrative court where one can appeal when his/her security clearance or certificate is refused or withdrawn, or if negative security advice is issued;540\n-\nThe Federal Ombudsman can conduct investigations after receipt of complaints from individuals or on the request of the House of Representatives against any 'federal administrative service', and thusin theorythe intelligence services;\n-\nThe Commission for the Protection of Privacy can examine whether or not the requirements of the Data Protection Act are met by the intelligence services when\nprocessing personal data;\n-\nThe Court of Audit supervises the use of financial resources541 and canon its own\ninitiative or at the request of Parliamentinitiate an investigation of the good financial governance of departments;\n-\nThe Administrative Commission for Monitoring Specific and Exceptional Intelligence Collection Methods controls the legality of methods such as telephone tapping,\nsearching, and computer system intrusions;542\n-\nThe Council of State, the highest administrative court in Belgium, indirectly reviews\nthe activities of the intelligence services in some specific cases; and\n-\nThe Judiciary can intervene if a fundamental right is violated or if somebody has suffered harm as a result of unlawful or careless acts of intelligence services.\n\nGiven the scope of this study, these elements are not developed further.\n\n2. THE BELGIAN PARLIAMENT AND THE MONITORING COMMISSIONS OF THE SENATE AND THE HOUSE OF\nREPRESENTATIVES\n\nThe Belgian Constitution vests the Legislative branch (i.e., the House of Representatives, the Senate and, to a limited extent, the King) with the power to elaborate general legal norms. Besides this, it exerts political control over the Executive branch. Various tools are put at the legislator's disposal in order to fulfil this double assignment. He can ask questions to the Ministers, introduce motions of distrust, (dis)approve the annual budgets and expenditures and conduct parliamentary inquiries. These instruments also apply to parliamentary control on the intelligence services. In the late 1980s, however, it became clear that such a general control on this specific area would no longer suffice. A first legislative initiative was taken in this respect in 1988: a 'permanent parliamentary monitoring commission' of five Deputies and five Senators was to be established. The Minister of Justice would hold the chair. The Commission was to advise both the Minister and the Parliament on the functioning of the intelligence services. But the Council of State found the bill unconstitutional: the political control of the Parliament has indeed to be exerted through the competent ministers and not through direct control on the services.\n\nThe bill was thus removed. The debate was reopened barely two years later. At that time, the results of a parliamentary inquiry commission into the functioning of the police and intelligence services in the fight against terrorism and organised crime were made public.543 This commission concluded that Parliament did not exert any real control over these services and that an external review became more than necessary because the efficiency of these services and the manner in which they coordinated their activities were far from optimal. The government perfectly captured the conclusions of the inquiry commission. In its famous 'White Sunday Plan' dated 5 June 1990,544 it foresaw a series of measures. They were first aimed at ensuring better efficiency and coordination of the police and intelligence services. But in return, the rights and freedoms of the citizens had to be safeguarded.545\nAlso, the trust of the public in the intelligence services had to be restored. One of the measures taken was the creation of two external review bodies which, differently from the Parliament itself, could permanently and directly follow up this complex matter: Standing Committee P and Standing Committee I were born.546 Ad hoc commissions were established simultaneously within the House and the Senate. These commissions were responsible for monitoring the functioning of the Committees. Yet in 1999, the assignments were somehow divided up: the commission of the House would monitor Standing Committee P and the commission of the Senate was converted into a 'Monitoring Commission responsible for monitoring the Standing Committee I'. This Senatorial Monitoring Commission consists of five Senators. The Speaker of the Senate chairs the Commission; the Senate appoints the four other members. The opposition is, surprisingly enough, not necessarily represented. In the Monitoring Commission of the Housewhich consists of eight membersthere is, however, proportional representation.\n\nBut the role that this Commission de jure and de facto performs with regard to the monitoring of Standing Committee I and the intelligence services is significantly less important. What are the competences of the Senatorial Commission? Firstly it can give Standing Committee I an investigation assignment into the intelligence services or ask to issue advice on a draft bill relating to intelligence work. The Commission in the House has the same competences.547 Importantly, only the Senatorial Commission is entitled to examine all investigation reports that Standing Committee I produces. Although monitoring the intelligence services is not the first task of this parliamentary Commission, its members can obviously better perform their political control by systematically perusing all the reports drafted by Standing Committee I. Secondly, both Commissions can in theory have any investigation file of Standing Committee I sent for the purpose of preparing their work. 'In theory' because since the Classification Act of 1998, one assumes that also the MPs from the Monitoring Commission must hold a security clearance and have a need to know in order to consult classified data.548 Most investigation files contain such data. None of the current (and former)\nmembers of the Commission hold such a clearance because they refuse(d) to submit to a vetting procedure. They generally put forward two main reasons: the disclosure of classified information is punishable and therefore, according to some MPs, not compatible with their freedom of speech. Others raise objections to the fact that the vetting procedure is precisely carried out by the intelligence services. Moreover, there is apparently no political consensus to amend the Classification Act. Consequently, it can be concluded that today no classified information can appear in the reports handed over by the Committee, whereas the competent ministerswho hold a security clearanceand the reviewed intelligence services are allowed to read the reports *in extenso.* But do the MPs really need access to classified information? Their legislative work seems not to require access to such information: the Committee can substantiate its recommendations without disclosing secrets. But to be able to monitor the Committee and to control the Executive Branch, the removal of certain information can become an impediment. Several 'mechanisms', however, do exist to remedy this. On request of the Committee, the services or the Minister can declassify some information. Although they sometimes accede to this request, the Committee is totally dependent upon the services and the Minister.549 Standing Committee I can also be somehow more explicit about certain aspects of an investigation during meetings with the members of the Senatorial Commission.550 This happens quite regularly. Finally, the MPs can directly ask the competent minister to declassify certain information. Any refusal can be subject to standard political control and might put the responsibility of the Minister at risk. The members of the Senatorial Commission can thus, in practice, have access to sensitive information. But can they freely use such information within the framework of their political and parliamentary work? The answer is definitely negative. According to Parliament's internal procedures, violation of confidentiality or secrecy leads to exclusion from the Commission.551 Only information appearing in approved reports or communications can be made public and thus used to elaborate legislative work and exert political control. The investigation reports, which have been made public by Standing Committee I itself, can of course be used as well (see 3.12). Let's return to the different assignments of the Monitoring Commissions. Both Commissions jointly discuss and examine joint investigations of Standing Committees P and I,552 the annual activity report of Standing Committee I (see 3.12) and its draft budget. The actual monitoring of the functioning of Standing Committee I, on observance of the provisions of the Review Act of 18 July 1991 and its internal rules, belongs exclusively to the Monitoring Commission of the Senate.553 In theory, the Commission has to meet with Standing Committee I at least once per quarter. Finally, the plenary session of the Senate keeps a specific but important prerogative: it appoints the three members of Standing Committee I\nand its Secretary. It can dismiss them in case of serious shortcomings.\n\n\n## 3. Standing Committee I\n\n\nStanding Committee I was set up by the Review Act of 18 July 1991 and has been operational since May 1993. The Committee is a permanent, independent, *sui generis* body, responsible for reviewing the activities and functioning of State Security554, which is the civil intelligence service, and the General Intelligence and Security Service of the Armed Forces (GISS), its military counterpart. Since 2006 the Committee, together with Standing Committe P, also monitors the Coordination Unit for Threat Assessment555 (CUTA) and, to some extent, the services that are obliged to pass on their information to this fusion centre. In principle, the review relates to the protection of the rights conferred to individuals, the effectiveness of the intelligence services, and the way they coordinate their activities. The supervision primarily aims at detecting any structural malfunctions within the intelligence services and making recommendations to enable Parliament to perform its legislative work with knowledge of the facts. It is thus a form of indirect parliamentary control over the Executive. But this is only part of the story. The Committee also works on demand of the Executive and even of the Judiciary. Nevertheless, the Committee is not part of any of those branches. It is an independent body that is at the service of the three branches. The Committee is composed as follows: the Committee *stricto sensu* (i.e., two members and one Chairman appointed by the Senate), an administrative staff headed by a Secretary and finally an Investigation Service headed by a Director. The Committee performs its reviewing role through investigations that it initiates on its own initiative, on the request of the Monitoring Commissions of Parliament, the Ministerial Committee for Intelligence and Security556, a competent minister or authority, or on the request of a citizen or a civil servant who lodges a complaint. It has been given extensive powers. Before developing this review competence, the seven other assignments of the Committee are enumerated. It should be noted that the legal competences of the Committee differ strongly according to the assignment. Since 2003, the Committee has been responsible for controlling interceptions of communications from abroad by the military intelligence service. Since the Special Intelligence Methods Act of 4 February 2010, the Committee has also been responsible for controlling all special intelligence collection methods used by State Security and GISS. The Committee acts here as a judicial body. If necessary, it will order to stop the method and to annihilate the illegally collected data. Since 1 September 2010, Standing Committee I can give written advice to the judicial authorities on the legality of the way in which information added to criminal proceedings was collected by the intelligence services. Furthermore, the Committee can, on request, advise on a bill, draft Royal decree, ministerial instructions or any other document expressing the political orientations of the competent ministers regarding the functioning of the intelligence services or the CUTA. The Committee ensures the chairmanship and the registry of the Appeal Body for Security Clearances, Certificates and Advice (see 1). The Investigation Service of Standing Committee I also plays a judicial role: when instructed by the judicial authorities, it investigates the members of the reviewed services who are suspected of having committed an offence. Finally, the Committee can be requested to carry out an investigation in the framework of a parliamentary enquiry. This competence has not been used yet. Needless to say, these supplementary assignments can be enriching for the review role of the Committee. However, attention must be paid in this respect to possible role conflicts. In order to explain the review assignment conferred to Standing Committee I, a series of key words will be used, which are characteristic of the manner in which the legislator has conceived the review and the way the Committee puts it into practice.\n\n3.1 Legal basis A first important characteristic is that the legislature has provided the Committee with a legal basis in the Act of 18 July 1991 governing the Review of the Police and Intelligence Services and the Coordination Unit for Threat Assessment. It is certainly not unimportant. So the review performed by the Committee is strongly anchored in our democracy.\n\n3.2 Independent Standing Committee I is an oversight body, which on an organisational level and in its functioning is independent of Parliament, the Executive and the agencies that it oversees, and the Judiciary. In principle, none of the three branches of the State can give any instructions to the Committee on the manner in which it organises its work, carries out its review investigations, outlines its recommendations and disseminates its reports. Even when the Executive orders an investigation, the Committee acts totally independent. This independence is, for example, emphasised as follows: the Committee is an autonomous organisation, which receives an endowment;557 the members are appointed by the Senate and can be dismissed only in exceptional circumstances; the duration of the mandate enables them to develop their own policy558 and the Committee can initiate investigations on its own initiative. Yet this independence does not mean that the Committee has a free hand and remains uncontrolled. As mentioned above, Parliament supervises the operation of Standing Committee I and ensures observance of the legal provisions, approves or amends the internal rules of procedure, examines the draft budget and can instruct the Committee to carry out a certain review investigation (see Section 2).\n\nFinally, there is another case where Standing Committee I does not act fully autonomously: within the framework of joint investigations together with Standing Committee P, the Committees must come up with a common report.\n\n3.3 Impartial The form and functioning of the Committee reveals not only independence but also impartiality. It emerges from the fact that the Committee *sensu stricto* is composed of experts in security related matters who are not parliamentarians,  current members of the intelligence agencies or CUTA. Moreover, they may not hold a public elected office nor perform a public or private function or activity that could jeopardise the independence or dignity of the office. Finally, the Review Act stipulates that members of the Committee are prohibited from attending the deliberations on affairs in which they or their relatives have a direct or personal interest. All these elements contribute to the fact that the investigations can be carried out with complete objectivity without party political or personal interests filtering through in the conclusions and recommendations.\n\n3.4 Broad mandate\n\nStanding Committee I can supervise all activities,559 methods, documents and directives of the two intelligence services and CUTA,560 regardless of the fact that it is related to administration and management, resources, policies of the agencies, completed or ongoing operations, cooperation with other (foreign) services, information flows, products of intelligence work and its dissemination, etc.561\nIn principle, the review relates to 'the protection of the rights of people guaranteed by the Constitution and the law' (including the rights mentioned in human rights conventions), and to 'the coordination and efficiency... of the intelligence and security services'. But the Committee must not confine itself to those three approaches so it can also investigate 'the effectiveness' andas in many investigations'the compliance with the applicable law and regulations' without the rights of people being questioned. The investigation mandate of the Committee is thus certainly 'broad'. But it does not obviously mean that everything is possible. There are three (more or less clear) limits. The Committee has no power to review services other than the aforementioned ones, even if they sometimes engage in intelligence activities.562 However, the Committee can ask questions to those services on their interaction (operational cooperation or exchange of information) with the intelligence services. In that respect the judiciary, the police services and other administrative authorities are often being questioned within the context of specific review investigations, not to assess their functioning but to assess the functioning of State Security, GISS or CUTA. In additionand this is essential to understanding the Belgian systemthe review does not involve the political level. This means that the Committee is not allowed to initiate any investigation or make any judgment on a policy decision taken by the Ministerial Committee for Intelligence and Security or by the competent ministers. Standing Committee I can only assess whether the reviewed services have correctly and efficiently followed the Minister's instructions, supposing, of course, that these are not manifestly illegal. It is not always easy to observe this restriction because the actions of intelligence services are often politically directed. But if a decision by the Minister or the Ministerial Committee contravenes human rights, or the law would impede the efficiency of the services, other control mechanisms apply. In the last case, the political control exerted by Parliament (see Section 2) has to take over from the review performed by the Committee.563 In the first two cases, the Committee could report the facts to the judicial authorities. Finally, it was not the intention of the legislature that the Committee would investigate purely criminal or disciplinary incidents that do not indicate any structural problems. This restriction relates to the ultimate goal of Standing Committee I: advising the legislature or other branches and authorities in order to achieve better functioning and better protection of rights and freedoms. But this limit cannot always be observed either. This is certainly the case with complaints lodged by individuals that are not always based on structural problems.\n\n3.5 Directly The Committee performs its review directly by the services, via formal or informal contacts and written or oral consultations of staff members, irrespective of their rank or function.\n\nConversely, all staff members of the services can contact the Committee at any time. This direct form of review differs fundamentally from the political control performed by Parliament. This control is indeed always performed indirectly, i.e., via the competent minister. This 'political filter' does not apply to the Committee.\n3.6 Complementary The review performed by the Committee is complementary to existing control mechanisms; it does not replace them. So the Committees' review does not rule out normal parliamentary control. The same applies for internal control within the services and hierarchic control by the competent minister. Also, the control of individual dossiers by the Commission for the Protection of Privacy and the control of expenditures by the Court of Audit (see Section 1) remain unaltered. But this does not mean that the Committee must stay on the sidelines. It can carry out similar investigations on its own. Thus the Committee often consults individual dossiers and assesses the relevance and legitimacy of the processing of personal data in its review investigations. And just like the Court of Audit, the Committee can supervise the use of financial resources564 and initiate an investigation of the financial governance of departments. Evaluating the efficiency or effectiveness of a service is indeed impossible without consulting the financial resources and the manner in which they are spent.565 In that sense, complementarity sometimes leads to overlapping competences.\n\n3.7 Permanently The Committee is not a temporary review authority, such as parliamentary inquiry commissions. In order to enable an efficient review, the legislature has opted for a permanent body of which the (staff) members have no other duties. This means that this kind of democratic control continues when Parliament is in recess, when the Chambers are dissolved or during negotiations prior to the formation of a government. The 'permanent' character of the review was initially expressed by the fact that the Committee was conferred only one role and therefore could completely focus on the review of State Security and GISS. However, as explained above, the Committee has been entrusted with many additional assignments throughout the years (see Section 3). Considering that these new duties are related to the functioning of the intelligence services and that the Committee's staff has been beefed up accordingly, this certainly is enriching for the review role of the Committee.\n\n3.8 Specialised The review of intelligence services has not been conferred to an existing authority.\n\nConsidering the particular nature of the matter, a specific body has been created. The legislature opted for a 'commission of wise men' with its specific Investigation Service. In order to be appointed, the three members of the Committee have to demonstrate at least seven years of relevant experience. Moreover, they must have held positions requiring a high level of responsibility. The Investigation Service, which mainly carries out the fieldwork, is multidisciplinary in its composition so as to ensure a wide range of expertise.566 Furthermore, the Committee can always call for the cooperation of external experts. The review investigations being carried out by a specialised authority must be an important guarantee of the value of the conclusions and recommendations for the 'clients'\nof the Committee.\n\n3.9 Powerful The fact that the Committee is in many aspects a very 'powerful' organisation is perhaps one of the most important characteristics. Its annual budget amounts to 4 million; it employs 22 fulltime equivalents but above all it is entrusted with far-reaching legal competences in order to collect information and carry out credible investigations. First of all, the services reviewed are obliged, on their own initiative, to provide the Committee with all documentseven classified onesgoverning the conduct of the members of the service. Secondly, the judicial authorities must inform the Committee of the opening of a criminal investigation against a member of an intelligence service. Thirdly, and this is very important, the Committee may request any document567 that is deemed necessary for the performance of its legal assignment. Information is thus gathered regardless of any specific investigation; it enables the Committee to be aware of the ins and outs of the services. The one exception is for the administrative authorities concerned (e.g., the Ministerial Committee for Intelligence and Security or the competent minister) to decide whether it is relevant to provide Standing Committee I with their policy documents.568 As soon as an investigation is officially opened, the Committee has many additional possibilities at his disposal. Again it may request any document in possession of the intelligence services.569 It can thus request complete individual files on citizens and examine the way in which the services have collected, processed and analysed personal data. Information from these files originating from other authorities also has to be passed on to the Committee. These 'other authorities' include foreign (intelligence) services. According to the Law, the third party rule does not apply in relation to the Committee. But of course the Committee is extremely cautious and requests such information only if it is essential to the investigation. The Committee mostly receives photocopies of the requested information and documents. They are attached to the investigation dossier that the Committee archives. They can sometimes be useful for new investigations. The reviewed services obviously do not always systematically follow (completely) the Committee's requests. But the Committee has more than one trick up its sleeve: it can ask other authorities what information they exchanged with the controlled services; it can check the content of the databases of the services with its own login; it can at all times enter and inspect the premises where members of the services perform their duties; it can confiscate any objects and documents useful to the investigations.570 Nevertheless, those means of coercion are rarely used. Besides the request of documents, the Committee can also decide to audition any person working in or outside the services reviewed. Nobody is obliged to submit to this hearing, with one important exception: members and even former members of the services reviewed may be summoned to testify under oath.571 In this case, they are obliged to answer all questions. Any refusal is liable to punishment.572 Furthermore, members of the intelligence services (but also citizens and civil servants of other services) can directly contact the Committee in order to make a statement. If asked, their anonymity is preserved. From every hearing, 'minutes' are drafted and added to the investigation dossier. Finally, the Committee can demand the assistance of experts, interpreters and even the police. The Committee has already resorted to external experts especially with regard to very technical matters, but not so with interpreters and the police.\n\n3.10 Investigator The review performed by the Committee essentially takes the form of well-defined review investigations. These investigations can be descriptive or take the form of an audit; they can be reactive or prospective; they can be extensive or very brief. But the exercise always comes down to describing the situation 'as is' as accurately as possible. The findings, conclusions and recommendations of each investigation are drafted in a report. In principle, these reports are sent to the competent ministers andin a declassified versionto the Senatorial Monitoring Committee. Although it can be argued that the Committee is more an 'investigator' than a 'monitor', this is not the case in practice. The Committee closely follows the functioning of the services in order to select relevant investigation themes. It studies the documents it receives, attends working groups, organises informal hearings, maintains contact with members of the services in the field, organises periodic meetings with the management of agencies, keeps itself up-to-date with regard to specialist literature, legislation, the media etc. However, the Committee does not decide alone what should be investigated: if the Commission within the Senate or within the House of Representatives, one of the competent ministers, the Ministerial Committee for Intelligence and Security or the director of CUTA deems it necessary, they can order the Committee to open an investigation. The Committee *must* perform this investigation. Even if a citizen or a civil servant lodges a complaint, an investigation has to be initiated, unless the complaint is manifestly unfounded. Several actors are thus interfering in the agenda of the Committee.\n\n3.11 Advisor The Committee has already been described as a 'powerful' organisation (see Section 3.9).\n\nBut this characteristic is restricted to investigation possibilities. Indeed, within the framework of its review role, the Committee cannot take any binding decisions; it only makes recommendations or gives advice to its 'clients'.573 The authoritiesand we approve this approachdecide whether or not they take these recommendations into account. Yet the recommendations with respect to the Executive Branch are not completely free of obligations: the competent minister must inform the Committee of his or her response to these conclusions. Furthermore, the Committee can report to the Parliament when no appropriate action has been taken.\n\n3.12 Transparency A raison d'etre of the Committee was/is to restore/keep the confidence of the citizen in the intelligence services. The Committee tries to do this in various ways. It produces very detailed annual reports that are widely disseminated and are available for consultation on the website of the Committee. Moreover, reports of high public interest are, as far as possible, fully posted on the website. What is more important is that the Committee will investigate all complaints lodged by the citizens, even if there seems to be no underlying structural problem. The complainant will be notified of the conclusions of the investigation.\n\nOnly manifestly unfounded complaints are dismissed. Even then, the person concerned will be informed of this in writing.\n\n3.13 Secrecy There are naturally significant limits to transparency. This is obvious for all those involved in the intelligence community. In this way, all employees of the Committee hold a topsecret level security clearance, regardless of their position within the organisation.\n\nClassified documents are available only on a need to know basis. Unauthorised disclosures of classified information can lead to withdrawal of the security clearance, dismissal from the Committee and even penal sanctions. The premises of the Committee are considered a classified area where all the security regulations required and strict procedures apply. The Secretary of the Committee is specifically responsible for the protection of the secrecy of the documentation and archives.\n\n4. CONCLUSIONS Many authorities (can) control one or more aspects of the functioning of the Belgian intelligence services. In this way, Belgium certainly complies with Practice 6 of Special UN\nRapporteur Scheinin: intelligence services should be supervised by 'a combination of internal574, executive, parliamentary, judicial and specialised oversight institutions whose mandates and powers are based on publicly available law' and 'the combined remits of oversight institutions cover all aspects of the work of intelligence services'.575 This is to be applauded. Yet the multiplicity of overlapping control modalities can indeed have negative effects, not only for the intelligence services576 but also for the quality of the control itself577\nand for the citizen as it is unclear which authority s/he is supposed to address in a specific case. Yet it must be clear that these reasons cannot be an excuse to avoid performing\n\nthorough external control of all aspects of the functioning of the intelligence services. Besides, practice proves that most of the control authorities do not really exploit their legal\ncompetences. There is of course one major exception: Standing Committee I. In the\nexistence of this independent, permanent and powerful body certainly lies the strength of\nthe democratic control of the intelligence services in Belgium. To conclude, we could say that the good practices, procedures and standards that should\nbe taken into account when considering effective oversight on the overall functioning of\nintelligence services are reflected in the abovementioned key words. However, if some\nsignificant elements would have to be picked out, they would certainly be the following:\n\nSet up an independent body of 'wise men'which has as few links as possible\nwith the reviewed services and the political classso that its conclusions,\nanalyses and recommendations cannot be considered unacceptable in advance\nby the legislature, the executive power, the reviewed services or citizens.\n\nGive the review body all the necessary competences and resources so that it\ncan investigate all aspects of a case, leaving no 'blind spots' and countering all\npossible doubt about the results.\n\nFind a fair balance between 'transparency' in order to perform a meaningful\ninvestigation for the different stakeholders and 'secrecy' in order to avoid jeopardising the functioning of the intelligence services.\n\nDesign a system in which the classification made by the intelligence services can\nbe rectified if it does not comply with the legal provisions.\n\nSee to it that in a parliamentary commission the opposition is represented.\n\nREFERENCES\n\nDelepiere J.-Cl. (2005), 'Le Comite Permanent de controle des service de renseignement', De Staatsveiligheid: Essays over 175 jaar Veiligheid van de Staat, Cools M. e.o. (eds.), Politeia, Brussels, pp. 225240. Fijnaut C.\n\nand K.\n\nLauwaert\n(1995), Het Belgische Politiewezen, Kluwer Rechtswetenschappen Belgie, Diegem, pp. 195211. Matthijs H. (2008), 'Intelligence services in Belgium', *Intelligence and National Security*, Vol. 23, No 4, pp. 552576. Rapaille G. and W. Van Laethem (forthcoming), 'La nouvelle Loi sur les methodes particulieres de renseignement: une revolution pour les services de renseignement belges', Revue de Droit Penal et de Criminologie. Rapaille G. and J. Vanderborght (2010), 'L'herbe est toujours plus verte ailleurs. Sur le controle belge des services de renseignement et de securite', *Cahiers de la Securite*, No 13, pp. 122133. Schuermans F. (2000a), 'Nogmaals een wetswijziging betreffende het comite P en het comite I: de Wet van 20 juli 2000 tot wijziging van de Wet van 18 juli 1991 tot regeling van het toezicht op politie- en inlichtingendiensten', *Tijdschrift voor Strafrecht*, pp. 241251. Schuermans F. (2000b), 'Controle op politie en inlichtingendiensten: de krachtlijnen van de wet van 1 april 1999 houdende wijziging van de wet van 18 juli 1991 tot regeling van het toezicht op politie- en inlichtingendiensten', *Tijdschrift voor Strafrecht*. Standing Committee I, *Code des Services de Renseignements. Fonctionnement*, competences et controle, Bruges, die Keure. Standing Committee I (2010a), *Activity Report 2008 - Activity Report 2009*, Intersentia, Antwerp, available at (www.comiteri.be).\n\nStanding Committee I (ed.) (2010b), Fusion Centres throughout Europe - All Source Threat Assessments in the Fight against Terrorism, Intersentia, Antwerp.\n\n\nStanding Committee I (2008), *Activity Report 2006 - Activity Report 2007*, Intersentia, Antwerp, available at (www.comiteri.be).\n\nUN Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms while Combating Terrorism (2010), Compilation of good practice on legal and institutional and measures that ensure respect for human rights by intelligence agencies, UN General Assembly, A/HRC/14/46.\n\n\nVandoren A., Van Laethem W. and L. Verheyden (2010), 'Belgium - The Coordination Unit for Threat Assessment', Fusion Centres throughout Europe - All Source Threat Assessments in the Fight against Terrorism, Standing Committee I (ed.), Intersentia, Antwerp, pp. 117. Van Laethem W. (2008a), 'Remedies against an unreliable reliability-check', Stockholm International Symposium on National Security and the European Convention on Human Rights, The Commission on Security and Integrity Protection (ed.), *sine loco*, pp. 125133, available at (www.comiteri.be). Van Laethem W. (2008b), 'The Belgian civil intelligence service: roles, powers, organisation and supervision', *European Journal of Intelligence Studies*, Vol. 2, pp. 129. Van Laethem W., Van Daele D. and B. Vangeebergen (eds.) (2010), De Wet op de bijzondere inlichtingenmethoden, Intersentia, Antwerp.\n\n\nVan Outrive L. (2003), 'Intelligence Services in Belgium: A Story of Legitimation and Legislation', *Democracy, Law and Security*, Brodeur J.-P., Gill P. and D. Tollborg (eds.), Aldershot, UK, pp. 3159. Van Outrive L. (1991), 'La loi organique du controle des services de police et de renseignements: un grand defi', *Journal des Juristes Democrates*, Vol. 80, pp. 911.\n\n## Annex A: Country Case Studies Ii. Parliamentary And Specialised Oversight Of Security And Intelligence Agencies In France Charlotte Lepri\n\n\nIn fall 2007, the French Parliament passed a law establishing a parliamentary intelligence committee (*Delegation parlementaire au renseignement*, DPR),578 whose purpose is to allow members of the National Assembly and senators to 'follow the general activity and the means of the specialized services',579 thus helping the French intelligence services to gain greater recognition while preserving the confidentiality of their actions. Passed almost unnoticed, this law is at first glance quite a revolution in France. It ends the French exception because France was one of the last democratic countries without a parliamentary committee dedicated to the monitoring and controlling of intelligence services. This law aims to facilitate the information Parliament gets on the activity of intelligence services according to the requirements of any democracy, while ensuring the safety of agents who perform an essential mission for French national security and for the defence of French interests in the world. Along with the Parliament monitoring intelligence, this text aims to legitimise these intelligence services in the eyes of French citizens and our political leaders while promoting the emergence of a genuine French culture of intelligencea phrase that was considered an oxymoron until recently. For a long time, intelligence has been neglected in France, both at the political and academic levels. France lags behind for mainly five reasons: the cult of secrecy, the lack of interest from political leaders, distrust of the French citizens (due to lack of knowledge about its usefulness), the lack of 'prestige' of intelligence activities that are regarded as disgraceful and despicable, and the reluctance of academic fields to go into intelligence studies. As stated in a parliamentary report, intelligence activities have only been perceived\n'through the distorting prism of caricature, or even scandals'.580 For many people in France, intelligence means lies, manipulation, deception and theft. As a result, intelligence has become a 'cultural taboo', a victim of the mistrust from both public opinion and political leaders. Due to the lack of a French culture of intelligence, French officials have always tended to keep their distance from activities related to intelligence, quickly forgetting that these services cannot act independently from the Executive Branch, which provides the orders directly. This approach is a stark contrast to the ones in other countries and accounts for the French delay in establishing a parliamentary committee in charge of intelligence related matters. The French political system of the Fifth Republic, established in 1958, also explains the French exception. France is a semi-presidential regime.581 The President of the Republic is popularly elected (since 1962) and is not merely a head of state without political authority:\n\nhe is the Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces, he can dissolve the National Assembly, but he is not responsible to the Parliament. Defence, foreign policy and intelligence matters are part of the President's so-called *domaine reserve* (reserved domain). The Prime Minister heads the cabinet and is subject to the Parliament's confidence. The Parliament is weaker than in other Western democracies582 and, despite some oversight powers, they are hardly used by its members. Until the constitutional reform of 2000, the presidential and the parliamentary terms were disconnected, leading to 'cohabitation' periods in which the President and the Prime Minister are from opposing political parties.583 Since 2000, the parliamentary term coincides with the presidential term (5 years) but, as chosen by the Cabinet at that time, the presidential elections are held a few weeks ahead of the parliamentary ones. As a result, the Parliament now gets its legitimacy from the President, whose election lines the path to the parliamentary majority. In such a situation, control is less effective with members of Parliament (MPs) being dependent on the President. Despite what this new law introduced, this text is a modest first step: the DPR will not have the means to exercise real control over the services and its role will be rather symbolic.\n\n\n1.\n\nTHE\nGENESIS\nOF\nPARLIAMENTARY\nCONTROL\nOF\nINTELLIGENCE SERVICES IN FRANCE The establishment of parliamentary oversight of intelligence has encountered many obstacles. It is the result of a long battle that began in the 1970s, then was further developed by Paul Quiles and Arthur Paecht in 1999. It was taken up again in late 2005 by MPs such as Alain Marsaud, which led to a promise by Nicolas Sarkozy during the presidential campaign. The reform has long been met with refractory political authorities, highlighting the complex relationship between policy makers, public opinion and intelligence matters. In the 1970s, the idea of establishing parliamentary control of intelligence services was discussed. But bills were mainly proposed by minority parties that wanted to control the use of intelligence services by the majority party, following a drug trafficking scandal.584 In\n1971, a socialist senator585 as well as communist senators586 presented 'proposals of resolution' to set up a Committee of parliamentary oversight of the SDECE (Service de documentation exterieure et de contre-espionnage, former name of the external intelligence agency). In general, MPs were afraid of being manipulated by intelligence services and accused of connivance with them in case of a scandal - when they were not, as was usually the case, indifferent to those matters.\n\nIn September 1985, in the context of the Rainbow Warrior scandal,587 then Prime Minister Laurent Fabius declared that the French government wanted to set up a parliamentary investigation committee regarding this scandal.588 However, the request was not pursued.\n\nAlthough the Communist group twice proposed a law to set up a committee on intelligence\n\n(in 1985 and in 1988), the Socialist Party refused to put this proposal on the Parliament's\nagenda. President Francois Mitterrand, as well as President Jacques Chirac, saw intelligence as a\n'necessary evil' and an executive branch's prerogative. Besides, the Ministries of Defence\nand Interior were reluctant to share 'secret' information with MPs. Similarly, the intelligence services were afraid of widening the 'secret circle' and talking with MPs, who were considered unfamiliar with intelligence issues. Despite those failures of direct attempts to oversee intelligence questions, some indirect efforts are worth noting:\n\nFrom 1971 to 1999, 7 out of 18 attempts to set up investigation committees on\ndirectly or indirectly intelligence-related matters succeeded.589\n\nIn 1978, the CNIL (*Commission nationale de l'informatique et des libertes*) was\ncreated as an independent authority590 to protect 'information technology, files\nand liberties'.591\n\nIn 1991, a law regarding telephone surveillance for security reasons was\npassed.592 It set up judicial monitoring on the interception of domestic\ncommunications through an independent authority, the Commission nationale de\ncontrole des interceptions de securite (CNCIS).593\n\nIn 1998, the Parliamentary Commission on Rwanda chaired by Paul Quiles was\nthe first parliamentary inquiry commission to examine issues related to the\nPresident's *domaine reserve* and to extend parliamentary oversight on security\nand defence matters.594\n\nIn 1998, the law on national defence secrets created another independent\nauthority (*Commission consultative du secret de la defense nationale* or\nCCSDN),595 which was in charge of the declassification of documents.596\n\nThe 2002 Finance Law597 created a committee to oversee the allotment of secret\nfunds (*Commission de verification des fonds speciaux*).\n\nTo a great extent, there have been growing informal relations between MPs and\nintelligence services, as well as hearings of heads of intelligence services (in the\nNational Defence and Armed Forces Committee and the Foreign Affairs Committee). In 1999, two new bills were proposed: one in the Senate by Nicolas About (from the rightwing party), establishing a parliamentary delegation of intelligence responsible for assessing the 'national intelligence policy' and another one, significant to the National Assembly, by Paul Quiles (from the Socialist Party) 'for the establishment of a parliamentary delegation for intelligence matters,' to monitor the activities of intelligence services 'by examining their organization and general duties, skills and means'. This last proposal was the subject of a background report conducted by Arthur Paecht, from the\ncentrist party.598 However, this proposal was never put on the agenda of the Assembly: in\nthe cohabitation period, both the President (Jacques Chirac) and the Prime Minister (Lionel Jospin) were reluctant to widen parliamentary oversight on intelligence matters. In November 2005, during the discussion in open session of the bill on the fight against\nterrorism, the National Assembly considered three amendments (submitted by Jacques Floch, Alain Marsaud and Pierre Lellouche) designed to create a delegation that provides\noversight of intelligence. These amendments were justified by the fact that the bill was giving important powers to the intelligence services, including access to databases. They\nhave not been adopted but the Minister of Interior at the time, Nicolas Sarkozy, promised\nto set up a working group to develop a text on the subject.599 Preparatory work was carried\nout quickly and a bill was proposed in the National Assembly on 8 March 2006. This bill was not included in the agenda of the XII legislative term, which at that time was\ncoming to an end. After the 2007 presidential and legislative elections, Law n326\nestablishing a parliamentary delegation for intelligence (identical to the text of 2006)was submitted on 5 June 2007 and passed on 25 September 2007. It was finally published on 9\nOctober 2007. This development matched the new environment:\n\nIntelligence has become much more prominent since the Cold War and means of\ncollection have increased significantly;\n\nFrench intelligence services were less reluctant to parliamentary involvement in intelligence matters. The Parliament votes on the budget, so they realise the\nnecessity of having 'allies' in the Parliament (i.e., MPs familiar with intelligence concerns). Intelligence services also realised that too much secrecy lead to suspicion\nand that a parliamentary committee would help to defend them in case of misinformation (especially from foreign intelligence services);\n\nParliamentary oversight of intelligence services is finally considered by policymakers\nas the best way to both upgrade the role and image of these services (more visibility and greater accountability to make it more effective) and to enhance the role of Parliament in monitoring intelligence activities (services having finally qualified\ninterlocutors on these issues);600\n\nSince 2008 and the release of the French White Paper on Defense and National\nSecurity, greater emphasis has been put on intelligence. Intelligence has been recognised as a necessary tool (and no more as a 'necessary evil') to protect the\nhomeland and to combat today's diverse, dangerous and global threats. This White Paper was followed by 'the first global reform of France's intelligence structure since\nWorld War II':601 the merging of two traditional security services of the Ministry of\nInterior into a *Direction centrale du renseignement interieur* (DCRI), the setting up\nof the National Intelligence Council (*Conseil National du Renseignement*) within the\nDefense and National Security Council (chaired by the President of the Republic),\nand the establishment of the National Intelligence Coordinator (advisor to the\nPresident of the Republic for intelligence-related matters, in charge of coordinating the activities of the various intelligence services); and\n\nThe demand for the respect of democratic standards (rule of law, human rights, and\ncivil liberties) is growing and covers intelligence matters as well.\nTimes have changed and advancements were unavoidable. Indeed, the creation of the DPR, besides the fact that it aims to establish trusted relationships between intelligence agencies and Parliament, and therefore with citizens, also enables our country to fill a deficiency in the French democratic system. The DPR wishes to establish a link between intelligence services and the Parliament: the French parliamentary intelligence committee becomes the dedicated contact, able to better understand the challenges and needs of intelligence services (and thus pass the budget with sound knowledge of the ins and outs). However, since currently only non-operational activities are being consideredcoinciding with the apparent indifference of most French MPs to make the executive more accountableto what extent will the DPR actually be able to exert control on intelligence services?\n\n\n2.\n\nTHE\nDELEGATION\nPARLEMENTAIRE\nAU\nRENSEIGNEMENT: AN INNOVATIVE BUT POWERLESS TOOL The DPR is a semi-permanent body, composed of eight members of the Senate and the National Assembly. Among them, four are ex-officio members, as chairmen of the permanent committees of Laws and National Defence (both at the Senate and at the National Assembly).602 Four other members are chosen by the Chairman of the Senate (one Senator from the majority party and another from the minority party) and the Chairman of the National Assembly (one member of the National Assembly from the majority party and another from the minority party), from propositions of the political groups. In practice, the chosen members are MPs familiar with intelligence issues. At the National Assembly, Jean-Michel Boucheron of the Socialist Party and member of the Foreign Affairs Committee, as well as member of the Committee of national defence secrets\n(*Commission consultative du secret de la defense nationale*), and Jacques Myard of the Union for a Popular Movement (UMP) and member of the Foreign Affairs Committee, were selected to be part of the DPR. At the Senate, Didier Boulaud, Vice-Chairman of the National Defence and Armed Forces Committee and member of the White Paper Commission on Defense and National Security in 2008, and Jean-Patrick Courtois, member of the Law Committee and board member of the National Institute of Higher Studies on Security and Justice (Institut national des hautes etudes de la securite et de la justice), were selected. Members of the DPR have ex officio secret defence clearance, without undergoing a clearance process (MPs are granted access to classified information because they belong to the DPR). On the other hand, staffers must conform to the secret defence clearance process. According to the 'need to know' rule, and despite their clearance, members of the DPR can only access certain information necessary for the conduct of their mission.\n\n\n2.1 The original mission of the DPR According to the 2007 law, the DPR's mission is to 'follow the overall activity and the means of specialized services'. The law does not mention a mission of oversight or accountability of the activities and means of the services. The Executive Branch has to 'provide for the committee background information related to intelligence services' budget, overall activity\n\n\nand organisation'. The committee can hold hearings of 'the Prime Minister, Ministers and the\nGeneral Secretary of National Defence', as well as 'current heads of the services'.603 But it\nhas no right to conduct investigations and is not involved in confirmation hearings of new or potential heads of services. The law states that the DPR cannot be informed of 'operational activities of those services, directives from public institutions and funding, as well as\nexchanges with foreign or international intelligence services'.604 The work of the committee\nis classified and meetings and documents are held in a room equipped with secure\ncommunication equipment and limited access. Every year, the DPR publishes a public report regarding its activity, without releasing classified information. Even if the law does not forbid it, the DPR has not issued any thematic report so far and members of the DPR do not\nseem to be inclined to do so. The 2007 Law is limited and shows modest ambitions, both because of the necessity to\nmaintain the confidentiality of information and the lack of oversight culture in France. It bans scrutiny of past or current operations and limits the possibility of hearings to the\ncurrent heads of the services. If the members of the DPR follow the book, the room for manoeuvre is quite narrow. Other practical aspects that may tend to restrain the DPR's\nrole:\n\nThe presence of ex-officio members (namely, chairmen of the Law and Defence committees in the Senate and the National Assembly) may rein in the activity of\nthe DPR. Those members give legitimacy to the committee but prevent it from working effectively due to their lack of availability and their overwhelming amount of work (and perhaps a lack of interest).\n\nThe level of knowledge of the members of the committee is quite variable, even\nthough they are all familiar with intelligence issues.\n\nThe lack of dedicated staff (only four part-time staffers for administrative\nmatters) limits de facto activity of the DPR.\n\nThe members of the DPR may show empathy, or even sympathy, towards\nintelligence services. By trying to gain the trust of the intelligence services, MPs\nmay be tempted to adopt a supportive attitude and to limit their criticisms.\n\nThe first two annual public reports605 were not very detailed.606 The 16-page\n2009 report only mentions the legal framework and the general activity of the\nDPR. The 11-page 2010 report is even less informative, describing the\ncomposition of the DPR, its mission (as stated in the 2007 law) and its general activity. Those reports failed to reveal anything new and passed by unnoticed. A public report on secret intelligence is intrinsically a difficult balancing act. The members of the DPR chose not to scare intelligence services in limiting the information released in the report as much as possible (as a matter of fact, the\nannual public report was not initially in the law and was then added during the debate session of the law-making process). But in doing so, it prevents\nimproving the general knowledge of their colleagues in the Parliament on\nintelligence matters (the classified report is only sent to the President, the Prime\nMinister and the two Chairmen of the two chambers of the Parliament).\nUltimately, the DPR has not enhanced Parliament's information on intelligence issues: the overall knowledge of MPs regarding intelligence activities has not improved:607 members of the DPR do not communicate with the rest of the Parliament and do not teach other MPs about intelligence. Because of the lack of contents in the DPR reports, the press has paid little attention to the functioning of the DPR and its work remains mainly unnoticed.\n\n\nThe lack of connection with other committees dealing with intelligence questions obstructs the proper performance of the DPR. For instance, the DPR has no prerogative over budgetary accountability and is not allowed to read the annual report of the *Commission de verification des fonds speciaux*, which oversees the allotment of secret funds.\n\n\nThe French law prohibits any legislative inquiry into facts leading to ongoing legal proceedings).608\n\nA question remains unresolved: the French penal code states that every public officer or civil servant who hears about any offense or crime while carrying out his duties must report it to the prosecuting attorney without any delay. A priori, this rule applies to the members of the DPR. But will they report to the prosecuting attorney if they hear about misdemeanours from intelligence services, thus violating the 'national defence secrets' rule? Will they prefer not to reveal what they know, thus becoming a party to intelligence services? Or will they prefer not to know about it, thus asking few and limited questions to intelligence services?\n\n\n2.2 Practical evolution of the role of the DPR During its first year, the DPR's main activity was holding hearings with the main intelligence players in order to 'get to know each other'.609 During the two following years, the DPR\nwent beyond its legal role: it held hearings with senior officials of the services (on behalf of the heads of the services) and other key players on intelligence-related questions (as the National Intelligence Coordinator, whose position was created after the 2007 law and is not listed in the law) and visited intelligence service compounds. It also dealt with current matters (e.g., when a French weekly satirical newspaper, the *Canard Enchaine*, revealed in November 2010 that French journalists investigating 'sensitive' cases were wiretapped by the DCRI to identify the sources of leaks, Bernard Squarcini, head of the DCRI, and Frederic Pechenard, head of the national police (DGPN), who were already scheduled to be heard by the DPR, were questioned about this alleged ongoing operation). A member of the DPR acknowledged that despite the restrictive mandate of the DPR, past and even ongoing operations are somehow or other discussed with respect to hot topics. Moreover, most of the intelligence services did not really suffer from budgetary constraints.\n\nFor instance, the DGSE (General Directorate for External Security or Direction generale de la securite exterieure) has even benefited from a rise in its funding since 2007 (from 450\nmillion euros in 2007 to 543.5 million euros in 2011).\n\nMore generally, most people agree to say that trust between MPs (at least the members of\nthe DPR) and the intelligence services has improved. But some other developments would be necessary to make the DPR more effective, such as:\n\nThe end of ex-officio members;\n\nMerging with the Commission de verification des fonds speciaux, which oversees\nthe allotment of secret funds;\n\nUpgrading the annual public report to improve public knowledge on intelligence\nissues (for instance, following up on the 2008 intelligence reform);\n\nCoordination between the DPR and an independent authority dealing with\nintelligence issues;\n\nTaking into account the issue of intelligence privatisation;\n\nImprovement of intelligence studies, to question the role of intelligence services\nand of the DPR;\n\nThe possibility to look into former operations. The DPR has no investigative powers but some of its members think that in case of a scandal, the National Assembly is likely to set up an inquiry commission within the DPR; and\n\nThe incorporation of intelligence activities within a legal framework to 'define the missions of intelligence services and the modalities for the protection of national\ndefense'.610\n\n3. EXTRA-PARLIAMENTARY OVERSIGHT: THE ORIGINALITY OF THE FRENCH APPROACH As stated in a parliamentary report, 'even though the protection of top secret information has justified the French refusal to create an oversight body in the Parliament, it has not made impossible the setting up of other kinds of oversight. None of them, however, covers all the intelligence services, as they are limited to a certain aspect of intelligence activities'.611 Generally speaking, three kinds of oversight exist:\n\n\nHierarchical oversight;\n\nExternal oversight through independent administrative authorities; and\n\nBudgetary oversight.\n\n\n3.1 Hierarchical scrutiny As for every other public body, oversight and monitoring of the intelligence activities are undertaken by the supervisory ministry through internal scrutiny. However, this issue is not relevant to this study.\n\n3.2 External oversight through independent administrative authorities France has created an original system of independent administrative authorities (AAI, Autorites Administratives Independantes).612 They are administrative bodies acting on behalf of the State by fulfilling a public prerogative but without coming under the government's authority. AAI are usually set up in order to depoliticise important specialised functions of the State, isolating them from political influences or a potential conflict of interests. These agencies do not report to any public authority of other institutions but enjoy varying degree of independence. They prevent too much concentration of power in the hands of the Executive Branch. Whereas direct attempts to oversee French intelligence services were failing, indirect attempts were increasing through the setting up of AAI. 3.2.1 The *Commission nationale de l'informatique et des libertes* (CNIL) CNIL was created in 1978. As stated on its website, it 'supervises the implementation of the January 6, 1978 Act, as amended by the August 6, 2004 Act relating to 'information technology, files and liberties'. CNIL's general mission consists of ensuring that the development of information technology remains at the service of citizens and does not breach human identity, human rights, privacy or personal or public liberties'.613 It was created after a public controversy over a governmental plan called SAFARI, which 'aimed at identifying each citizen with a number and, using that unique identifier, to interconnect all government files'. It is composed of 17 members: four members of Parliament (two Senators and two members of the National Assembly), two members of the Economic and Social Council, six Supreme Court Judges (two members of the *Conseil d'Etat*, the Administrative Supreme Court, two members of the Judicial Supreme Court (Cour de cassation) and two members of the National Accounting Office (Cour *des comptes*)) and five qualified personalities appointed by the Cabinet (three), the Chairman of the National Assembly (one) and the Chairman of the Senate (one). According to Article 39 of the 1978\nLaw, CNIL can name one of its members to be granted access to classified information in order to fulfil its mission. 3.2.2 The *Commission nationale de controle des interceptions de securite* (CNCIS) The CNCIS was created by Law n 91-646 of July 10, 1991, after the condemnation of France on wiretapping by the European Court of Human Rights. The objective was to put administrative wiretaps by security agencies within clear guidelines,614 allowing for administrative wiretapping with a warrant. The rule is the secret of correspondence and the only exception is related to national security purposes. This law both legalised administrative wiretaps for security reasons and set up oversight through the CNCIS. The CNCIS is composed of three judges and two MPs (one Senator and one member of the National Assembly).615 Its Chairman is appointed for six years (to guarantee his independence). The CNCIS meets every seven weeks. Its mission is to judicially monitor the interception of domestic communications (wiretaps related to security matters), given that 12 intelligence services within three ministries (Interior, Defense, Budget) can ask for security interceptions. It is an a priori control, both on style (check who is asking for such an interception and on whether or not the application is completed) and on substance\n(purposes of the interception, principles of subsidiarity and proportionality, etc.). The CNCIS is granted access to classified information. 3.2.3 The *Commission consultative du secret de la defense nationale* (CCSDN) Created in 1999, the CCSDN is in charge of expressing its opinion regarding the release of classified documents. As a result, the CCSDN is granted access to classified information. It is composed of two MPs (one member of the National Assembly and one Senator)616 and three Supreme Court Judges (one member of the *Conseil d'Etat*, the Administrative Supreme Court, one member of the Judicial Supreme Court (*Cour de cassation*) and one member of the National Accounting Office (*Cour des comptes*)). They are appointed for six years to guarantee their independence. Two staffers assist the CCSDN with administrative matters. The CCSDN is not a permanent committee: meetings depend on the agenda (usually, one meeting every two months). The CCSDN acts as an interface between the judiciary branch (which wants to access classified documents) and the executive branch, notably through intelligence services (which classify documents). This committee has strengthened oversight of the intelligence services, although the control remains marginal (the CCSDN mostly provides non-binding remarks and opinions to the executive branch). It is worth noting that the new Military Planning Law (20092014) has extended the possibility of classification to strategic places for five years. As a result, magistrates will not be allowed to enter classified places without the presence of the Chairman of the CCSDN.\n\n\n3.3 Budgetary oversight Budgetary oversight mainly relies upon: 3.3.1 The annual vote of the French Finance Law The defence budget includes the budget of the DGSE, the DSPD and the DRM. The budget of the DCRI is included in the national police budget. The following table shows figures related to the DGSE and DPSD: EVOLUTION DE L'ACTION  RENSEIGNEMENT DE SECURITE  (en millions d'euros)\n\nAutorisations d'engagement\n\n\n2010\n2011\n%\n2010\n2011\nDGSE DPSD\n476,5 96,6\n543,5 94,0\n+ 14,1 - 2,7\n527,4 96,6\n559,0 93,1\nTotal\n573,1\n637,5\n+ 11,2\n624,0 **652,0**\n426,2 68,2\n157,6\n393,1 49,9\n181,0\n+ 8,4 + 38,1\n+ 9,4\n426,2 69,0\n142,3\n393,1 49,9\n130,1\ndont personnel\nfonctionnement\ninvestissement\n\n\n3.3.2 The role of the *Cour des comptes* (National Accounting Office) The *Cour des comptes* is in charge of conducting financial audits of most public institutions, including intelligence services. As stated on its website, 'the missions of the Cour des comptes are defined by the Constitution in paragraph 1 of article 47-2: \"The Cour des comptes shall assist Parliament in monitoring Government action. It shall assist Parliament and the Government in monitoring the implementation of Finances Acts and of Social Security Financing Acts as well as in assessing public policies. By means of its public reports, it shall contribute to informing citizens\". As an administrative jurisdiction, the Cour des comptes fulfils these missions in full independence'.617 Its audits concern 'the quality and regularity of management, the efficiency and effectiveness of the actions pursued in the eyes of the objectives set by the authorities or the entity considered. This mission therefore refers to performance audit practices, i.e., auditing of the results achieved. The Cour does not only criticise but presents recommendations. The Cour releases its conclusions by transmitting them to the Ministry or to the controlled entity'. Theoretically, the *Cour des comptes'* monitoring can go into the smallest details. 3.3.3 The Commission de verification des fonds speciaux Originally created in 1947, this committee was reformed by the 2002 Finance Law (passed in 2001). Since 2001, the *Commission de verification des fonds speciaux* has been composed of two members of the *Cour des comptes* and four MPs (two Senators appointed by the Chairman of the Senate and two members of the National Assembly appointed by the Chairman of the National Assembly). Before 2001, secret funds were devoted to the functioning of the executive branch but were usually misused for illegal political party funding, electoral campaigns or private needs. Since 2001, most of the secret funds (80%)\nhave been dedicated to special action of the intelligence services and are subject to the Commission de verification des fonds speciaux's oversight. The committee oversees the use of the funds but its powers of investigation and oversight have been limited by the Constitutional Council, which banned oversight of ongoing operations.\n\n4. CONCLUSION: LESSONS LEARNED FROM THE FRENCH\nEXPERIENCE A priori, French parliamentary oversight is too recent and underdeveloped to be held up as an example. The DPR is a symbolic step ahead but cannot be considered a real oversight body yet. The lack of information sharing between the various bodies in charge of monitoring or overseeing intelligence activities remains a challenge. However, the French experience demonstrates that it has admitted that matters of intelligence concern the Parliament. The French delay, both in terms of establishing real democratic control over intelligence, its image or even education and the publication of reference books or reflection on matters of this nature, contrast with other democratic countries. All these aspects are apparently linked to each other: better recognition of intelligence activities at the political or academic level would have a significant impact on their reputation. It is also admitted that there is a link between efficiency and legitimacy.\n\nThe existence of parliamentary control on intelligence services is the norm in most democracies and seems to go hand-in-hand with better consideration (and efficiency) of the services. The French experience shows that other ways do exist to make intelligence accountable, through hierarchical, budgetary and external oversight (through AAI, independent administrative authorities). Finally, the French experience implicitly demonstrates the 'need to share'. Members of the DPR are inclined to imitate the secret functioning of intelligence services, jealously guarding their expertise and privileged access to intelligence services. Even though they have to preserve the confidentiality of their work, members of the DPR must also educate their colleagues about intelligence to improve the Parliament's understanding on that issue. It would seem that French oversight of intelligence services obviously needs a doctrine to expand and improve. According to many observers, a future scandal related to intelligence services would be the test of the efficiency and the usefulness of the DPR.\n\nREFERENCES Commission nationale de l'informatique et des libertes website, available at\n(www.cnil.fr/english/the-cnil/).\n\nCour des Comptes website, available at (www.ccomptes.fr/en/JF/CA.html). Courriere A. and the members of the socialist group (2 December 1971), 'Proposition de resolution n54 instituant une Commission de controle parlementaire sur le fonctionnement du Service de documentation exterieure et de contre-espionnage (SDECE).' Duverger M. (1996), *Le systeme politique francais*, PUF, Paris, 21st edition.\n\n\nFabius L. (22 September 1985), 'Declaration', Soir 3, FR3, available at (http://\nwww.ina.fr/politique/gouvernements/video/CAC85103391/declaration-fabius.fr.html).\n\n\nGarrec R. (20 June 2007), 'Rapport n 337 (20062007) sur le projet de loi portant creation d'une delegation parlementaire pour le renseignement', Commission des Lois, Senat. Government of France (2008), *White Paper on Defence and National Security*, available at\n(http://www.ambafrance-ca.org/IMG/pdf/Livre_blanc_Press_kit_ english_version.pdf). Government of France (9 October 2007), 'Loi n2007-1443 portant creation d'une delegation parlementaire au renseignement'. Government of France (28 December 2001), 'Loi n2001-1275 portant loi de finances pour 2002', Article 154. Government of France (8 July 1998), 'Loi n98-567 instituant une Commission consultative du secret de la defense nationale'. Government of France (10 July 1991), 'Loi n91-646 relative au secret des correspondances emises par la voie des communications electroniques'. Government of France (6 January 1978), 'Loi 78-17 relative a l'informatique, aux fichiers et aux libertes'. Government of France (17 November 1958), 'Ordonnance n58-1100 relative au fonctionnement des assemblees parlementaires', Article 6. Guyot R., Duclos J., Boucheny S., Lefort F., Talamoni L., Bardol J., Namy L., Eberhard J. and the members of the communist group (2 December 1971), 'Proposition de resolution n51 tendant a la creation d'une Commission de controle parlementaire sur le fonctionnement du Service de documentation exterieure et de contre-espionnage. Hayez P. (2010), 'Renseignement: The New French Intelligence Policy', International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence, Vol. 23, No 3, pp. 474486. Hyest Jean-Jacques (17 December 2009), 'Rapport fait au nom delegation parlementaire au renseignement n 181 (2009-2010)', Assemblee Nationale and Senat, available at\n(http://www.senat.fr/rap/r09-181/r09-1811.pdf).\n____________________________________________________________________________________________ Laurent S. (2010), 'Les parlementaires face a l'Etat secret et au renseignement sous les IV\net V Republiques: de l'ignorance a la politisation', *Cahiers de la Securite*, No 13: Les defis du renseignement, pp. 134144. Paecht A. (23 November 1999), 'Rapport n 1951 au nom de la Commission de la defense nationale et des forces armees sur la proposition de loi (n 1497) de M. Paul Quiles et plusieurs de ses collegues tendant a la creation d'une delegation parlementaire', Assemblee Nationale. Quiles P., Brana P., and B. Cazeneuve (12 September 1998), 'Rapport d'information n 1271, sur les operations militaires menees par la France, d'autres pays et l'ONU au Rwanda entre 1990 et 1994', Commission de la Defense nationale et des forces armees and Commission des affaires etrangeres, Assemblee nationale. De Rohan J. and J.L. Warsmann (17 December 2010), 'Rapport fait au nom delegation parlementaire au renseignement n 188 (2010-2011)', Assemblee Nationale and Senat, available at (http://www.senat.fr/rap/r10-188/r10-1881. pdf). Time (29 November 1971), 'Drugs: The French Connection', available at (http://\nwww.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,877429,00.html).\n\n\n\n## Annex A: Country Case Studies Iii. Parliamentary And Specialised Oversight Of Security And Intelligence Agencies In Germany Hans De With & Erhard Kathmann 1. Scrutiny By The Parliamentary Control Panel\n\n\nParliamentary scrutiny of federal intelligence activities in Germany is enshrined in constitutional law by Article 45d *Grundgesetz* (GG or the Basic Law). That provision served as the legal basis for the adoption of the Gesetz uber die parlamentarische Kontrolle nachrichtendienstlicher Tatigkeit des Bundes (PKGrG or Parliamentary Scrutiny of Federal Intelligence Activities Act), under which the federal government is subject to scrutiny by the Parliamentary Control Panel of the Bundestag with respect to the activities of the Bundesamt fur Verfassungsschutz (BfV or the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution), the *Militarischer Abschirmdienst* (MAD or the Military Counterintelligence Service) and the *Bundesnachrichtendienst* (BND or the Federal Intelligence Service). Like the G10 Commission (see section 2 below) and the Confidential Committee (see section 3), the Parliamentary Control Panel devotes itself exclusively to scrutiny of the intelligence services and is not responsible for scrutinising any other security organisations.\n\nThis means that police activities are not subject to scrutiny by the Parliamentary Control Panel. There is strict separation in Germany between the intelligence services and the police authorities.\n\n1.1 Development of the Parliamentary Control Panel From 1956, the Parliamentary Group Chairmen's Panel was initially responsible for scrutiny of the German intelligence services. It comprised the chairs of the political groups in the Bundestag. Its activity was based entirely on an agreement between the Federal Chancellor and the parliamentary groups. The year 1978 saw the adoption of the Parliamentary Scrutiny of Federal Intelligence Activity Act, which replaced the informal Group Chairmen's Panel with the Parliamentary Control Commission. In 1999, the Commission was renamed the Parliamentary Control Panel. In 2009, the activity of the Panel was placed on a constitutional basis by virtue of its enshrinement in Article 45d GG, and its powers were extended.\n\n1.2 Membership of the Parliamentary Control Panel The number of members of the Parliamentary Control Panel (hereafter the Panel), its partypolitical composition and its working methods are determined by the Bundestag by means of an appointment decision. Since 2009, the Panel has comprised eleven members; before then it had nine members.\n\nThe members of the Panel are elected from among the Members of the Bundestag at the start of each electoral term. The votes of a majority of the Bundestag membershipknown as a *Kanzlermehrheit* or 'chancellor majority'are required for election. This procedure emphasises the particular trustworthiness of the Panel members, for the Panel is intended to comprise only Members of Parliament who, in the firm opinion of a majority of the House, are personally trustworthy, professionally competent and discreet. At the present time, all the parliamentary groups in the Bundestag are represented on the Panel. Membership of the Panel is relinquished when a member leaves the Bundestag, resigns from his or her parliamentary group or becomes a member of the federal government or a parliamentary state secretary. It does not expire automatically at the end of an electoral term. For the sake of continuity of parliamentary scrutiny of the intelligence services, the Panel from the term that has just ended continues to perform its duties until the newly elected Bundestag has chosen a new Panel.\n\n1.3 Human and material resources The Panel is assigned the requisite number of staff from the Bundestag Administration. The human and material resources to be made available to the Panel must be earmarked as a separate item in the Bundestag budget. In addition, members of the Panel are entitled to employ staff of their parliamentary group to help them in their work after consulting the federal government and obtaining the approval of the Panel. The staff must have been cleared to handle classified material and formally sworn to secrecy.\n\n1.4 Rules of procedure, chairmanship, meetings and confidentiality The Panel adopts rules of procedure. Chairmanship of the Panel alternates from year-toyear between a representative of the parliamentary majority and a representative of the opposition. The Panel is bound by law to meet at least once every quarter. In practice, it meets monthly behind closed doors. Any Panel member and the federal government may require that the Panel be convened. In principle, meetings of the Panel may be attended only by its members, staff of the secretariat with security clearance and the competent representatives of the federal government and of the intelligence services.\n\n1.5 Disclosure obligations to the Panel One of the main elements of the Panel's scrutiny of the intelligence services is the disclosure obligation of the federal government. In practice, this duty of disclosure places the onus on the federal government to volunteer certain information. By disclosing such information, the federal government does not absolve itself of political responsibility.\n\nUnder section 4(1) of the PKGrG, the federal government is bound to inform the Panel of:\n\n\nthe general activity of the intelligence services;\n\nprocedures of particular importance; and\n\nother procedures if the Panel so requests. In addition, there are a number of special notification requirements which are prescribed by instruments such as the *Bundesverfassungsschutzgesetz* (BVerfSchG or the Federal\nProtection of the Constitution Act) and the Gesetz zur Beschrankung des Brief-, Post- und\nFernmeldegeheimnisses or G 10, also known as the Article 10 Act (Act Restricting the Privacy of Correspondence, Mail and Telecommunications). These include the disclosure of information regarding:\n\nSurveillance of postal and telecommunications traffic on the basis of the G 10 (half-yearly);\n\nRequests for information made to airlines, banks and providers of postal,\ntelecommunication and online services and requests for information on IMSI- catcher operations (half-yearly);\n\nAll other covert gathering of data which 'corresponds in nature and gravity to a restriction of the privacy of correspondence, mail and telecommunications',\n\nAlerts concerning a person or vehicle in the police information system serving as\nnotification of arrival in the Schengen area (these are known as Schengen alerts\nand are reported half-yearly);\n\nForwarding of personal data to foreign public authorities, such as the intelligence\nservices\nof\nfriendly\nstates,\nand\nto\nsupranational\nand\nintergovernmental agencies, if the data were originally transmitted to the intelligence services by the Federal Office for Migration and Refugees or the aliens authorities of the Lander or were gathered by means of strategic\ntelecommunications surveillance (half-yearly);\n\nCertain service regulations, namely those governing the use of intelligence resources, the transmission of data acquired in the performance of border guard duties and assistance given to the BfV by the Federal Police in the field of radio technology; and\n\nForthcoming\nmissions\nabroad\nto\nbe\nundertaken\nby\nthe\nMilitary\nCounterintelligence Service in the framework of out-of-area Bundeswehr missions and, in that context, the mandatory agreement between MAD and the\nBND laying down details of their cooperation.\n\n1.6 Right to seek information and other information sources The Panel is empowered to require the federal government and the intelligence services to hand over files and transmit electronic data files to the Panel. The latter has access to all departments of the intelligence services. Moreover, it may interview members of the intelligence services, staff of government departments, members of the federal government and employees of other public authorities or obtain written information from them. Courts of law and public authorities are required to provide the Panel with official assistance. This means that the Panel has far more extensive powers to procure information than the specialised committees of the Bundestag. Although the latter can invoke Article 43(1) GG to require the presence of any member of the federal government at their committee meetings, they do not, in contrast to the Panel, have the right to seek information by means such as inspecting files, interviewing staff of government departments or visiting the seats of public authorities.\n\n1.7 Limits to the Panel's right to obtain information The Panel's right to obtain information does not extend to items or information over which the intelligence services of the Federal Republic have no right of disposal. This applies particularly to information transmitted to the intelligence services by foreign authorities. The federal government may also refuse to disclose information if such refusal is necessary for compelling reasons of intelligence acquisition, such as the protection of sources, if disclosure would infringe the personal rights of third parties or if the matter in question relates to the core area of sole responsibility of the executive. If this right to withhold information is exercised, however, the reason for doing so must be communicated to the Panel by the member of the federal government with responsibility for the relevant intelligence service.\n\n1.8 Appointment of an expert In order to pursue particular issues systematically, the Panel may, after consulting the federal government, appoint an expert in a specific case to conduct investigations that will enable it to perform its duty of scrutiny. The appointment decision must be adopted by two-thirds of the Panel members. The expert may hear individuals or consult files on processes involving the intelligence services. The expert's rights do not extend, however, beyond those of the Panel. The expert must report to the Panel on the outcome of his or her investigations. The Panel, acting by a two-thirds majority of its members, may decide that a written report on the investigations is to be made to the Bundestag.\n\n1.9 Submissions\n\nLastly, members of the intelligence services may approach the Panel directly in official matters, though not in their own interest or in the interests of other members of the services. They are not bound to use official channels for this purpose but the submission must be copied to the head of the relevant intelligence service. The Panel transmits these submissions to the federal government for its comments. Submissions addressed to the Bundestag by members of the public regarding conduct of the intelligence services that affects them may be copied to the Panel for information.\n\n1.10 Informing the Bundestag and the public The Panel reports regularly to the Bundestag:\n\nIn the middle and at the end of each electoral term on its scrutiny activities in general;\n\nOnce a year on its telecommunication and mail surveillance under the G 10; and\n\nOnce a year on information requests from the intelligence services to banks, airlines and providers of postal, remote and telecommunication services and on IMSI-catcher operations. The reports are distributed as Bundestag printed papers to all Members of Parliament and are therefore publicly accessible. Confidentiality requirements are taken into consideration when reports are being prepared. The Panel retains the right to approach the public directly for the purpose of assessing certain procedures. This divergence from the precept of strict confidentiality requires a decision to be taken by the Panel, acting by a two-thirds majority of the members in attendance. In this case, each individual member of the Panel is permitted to publish a dissenting opinion.\n\n2. SCRUTINY BY THE G10 COMMISSION\n\n2.1 Remit The G10 Commission of the Bundestag (hereafter the Commission) scrutinises activities of the federal intelligence services involving the use of intelligence resources that impinge on the fundamental right to privacy of correspondence, posts and telecommunications enshrined in Article 10 GG. The main legal basis for the scrutiny effected by the Commission is the G 10. Following a procedure that is similar to judicial proceedings, the Commission decides on the admissibility and necessity of measures taken by intelligence services which restrict the privacy of correspondence, mail and telecommunications. The powers of scrutiny of the Commission extend to the entire collection, processing and use of acquired personal data, including the decision whether or not to notify the persons concerned.\n\n2.2 Composition, chairmanship and rules of procedure The Commission comprises the chairman, who must be qualified as a judge, and three associate members. There are also four substitute members who can attend the meetings and have the right to speak and to ask questions. The members of the Commissionnot necessarily members of Parliamentare appointed by the Panel after it has consulted the federal government. Their appointment is for one electoral term, although their period of office does not end until the appointment of their successors or three months after the end of the electoral term, whichever is earlier. The members of the Commission are independent in performing the duties of their office and are not bound by instructions. They hold their office in an honorary capacity. From among its members, the Commission elects a chairman and a vice-chairman. The chairman convenes its meetings, unless the Commission has set its meeting dates in advance. The Commission has a quorum if four full and/or substitute members are present. The Commission adopts its own rules of procedure, subject to the approval of the Panel and prior consultation of the federal government. The Commission meets at least once a month. Its members, like those of the Panel, are sworn to secrecy regarding matters that come to their attention in the course of their activity in the Commission. This obligation continues to apply after they leave the Commission.\n\nThe Commission must be provided with the human and material resources it needs for the performance of its tasks, and these resources are to be posted separately in the institutional budget of the German Bundestag. They include staff with technical know-how.\n\n2.3 Scope of scrutiny and procedures The Commission is responsible only for intelligence surveillance measures which relate to the privacy of correspondence, mail and telecommunications protected by Article 10 GG. In particular, this includes the traditional surveillance of telecommunications and of postal operations, and correspondence by the intelligence services. 2.3.1 Individual measures Intelligence surveillance measures may take the form of what are known as individual restrictions or individual measures. The individual restriction under Section 3 of the G 10\ninvolves ordering the surveillance of a particular telephone line or a particular postal address with the aim of discovering something about a particular person's communications.\n\nOn the basis of this order, which the competent Ministry must justify in writing, the measure may be taken, but not until the Commission, which must be notified once a month of all restriction measures that have been ordered, has authorised implementation. Only in exceptional cases where there is imminent danger is it possible to commence implementation prior to notification and authorisation. Retrospective notification and authorisation must then be obtained without delay. The Commission assesses the\n'admissibility and necessity' of the prescribed measure. This entails examining whether the legal conditions for the measure are satisfied as well as verifying the proportionality of the measure. The written justification of the order is not the only decision making basis that is available to the Commission. It may also, for example, ask representatives of the intelligence services and of government ministries for information relating to any of its enquiries. Moreover, the Commission must be allowed to inspect all documentation on the restriction measure and be granted access to all official premises. The same applies to its staff who peruse the files on behalf of the Commission prior to its meetings. If the Commission concludes that the legal conditions for a measure are not satisfied, it declares the measure to be inadmissible or unnecessary. The order must then be cancelled without delay and the measure must not be implemented. If, in a case of imminent danger, implementation has already begun, the measure is to be discontinued forthwith. If, on the other hand, the Commission concludes that a measure is admissible and necessary, it can be implemented. No order, however, remains valid beyond a maximum period of three months. Should the intelligence service wish to prolong the measure beyond that period, it must apply for an extension, and once again it is the task of the Commission to decide on the application. 2.3.2 Strategic surveillance measures Besides individual measures, an order may be made, on application from the Federal Intelligence Service, for the implementation of strategic restriction measures with regard to international telecommunication links (Sections 5 and 8 of G 10). In strategic restrictions, information is filtered with the aid of search terms out of numerous bundled calls and messages carried by certain transmission media, such as satellite links and fibre optic cables. Because strategic restriction measures arouse no suspicion and have a broad spread, they are subject to tight legal restrictions. Strategic measures for the surveillance of telecommunications or postal traffic are prescribed in the form of a two-stage procedure. In the first stage, the telecommunication or mail links to be subject to surveillance in a particular area of risk are defined.\n\nResponsibility for this lies with the Federal Ministry of the Interior, which must obtain the consent of the Panel. Where a strategic surveillance measure is ordered in the event of a danger to life or limb of a person abroad, and where this particularly affects the interests of the Federal Republic of Germany, the consent to the definition of the target telecommunication links requires a two-thirds majority of the members of the Panel. In the event of a need for urgent action because of imminent danger, as in cases of kidnapping or abduction, provisional consent may be given by the Chairman and Vice-Chairman of the Panel and the Chairman of the Commission. The consent of the Panel and the Commission must be obtained thereafter. If the Panel gives its consent, the Federal Ministry of the Interior may, at the request of the BND, order telecommunications surveillance within the framework authorised by the Panel with the aid of particular search terms. Before the order is executed, its legality is verified by the Commission. In other words, no strategic surveillance can take place without the consent of the Panel and of the Commission. 2.3.3 IMSI-catcher operations and information requests The Commission also scrutinises the use by the intelligence services of an IMSI catcher to pinpoint the location of a mobile phone or to find out phone and SIM card numbers. Moreover, the Commission checks the intelligence services' acquisition of information from providers of postal, telecommunication or online services under Section 8a (2)(3) to (2)(5) of the BVerfSchG; for example, their requests for the telephone numbers of lines used in particular telecommunication links. The purpose of the latter measures is often to make appropriate preparations for telephone surveillance.\n\n2.4 Notifications If a measure is discontinued, because the time limit has expired, the Commission has ruled it inadmissible or unnecessary or the executive has decided not to pursue it any further, the law prescribes that the targeted person must be notified of the cessation of the measure. The notification is not to be made 'as long as any prejudice to the purpose of the restriction cannot be ruled out or as long as the occurrence of wider detrimental effects on the wellbeing of the Federal Republic or any of its constituent states is foreseeable'. Notification is incumbent on the authority at whose request the order was issued. The Commission is informed once a month of notifications or of the reasons why, in the view of the intelligence service, notification should not take place. In the latter case, the Commission considers whether it shares the view of the intelligence service that notification should not occur. If the Commission, contrary to the view of the intelligence service, considers notification to be necessary, it must be effected without delay. If, on the other hand, it agrees with the assessment made by the intelligence service, no notification takes place until such time as any prejudice to the purpose of the measure can be ruled out or for as long as the occurrence of wider detrimental effects on the well-being of the Federal Republic or any of its constituent states is foreseeable. If these conditions for the absence of notification still apply after five years, a final decision may be taken to refrain from notification, provided there is a likelihood bordering on certainty that these conditions will continue to apply in the future. A unanimous decision of the Commission is needed in this instance because the final absence of notification deprives the person concerned of any right to judicial recourse.\n\n2.5 Scrutiny of the use of data The powers of scrutiny of the Commission also extend to verifying whether the legal requirements have been satisfied in the processing and use of personal data collected with the aid of measures taken under the G 10, information requests under Section 8a(2)(3) to (2)(5) of the BVerfSchG and an IMSI catcher.\n\nThe first of these legal requirements is that data affecting the core areas of private life must not be utilised at all but are to be deleted immediately. Moreover, without delay following the collection of data and at six-monthly intervals thereafter, the intelligence services must check whether, in the context of their tasks, the data not affecting these core areas are essential for the purposes for which such collection is generally admissible, either on their own or together with other data that are already available. If the data are not essential, and if they are not required for transmission to other authorities, they must be deleted without delay. If they are essential, they must, as a matter of principle, be labelled so as to ensure particularly after transmission to another authoritythat they are used only for admissible purposes. These purposes are defined exhaustively in law. The same applies to the conditions in which they may be transmitted to other authorities. Where certain data are transmitted to foreign authorities, the Commission is to be notified monthly of such transmissions.\n\n2.6 Complaints The Commission is empowered to decide on complaints regarding the admissibility and necessity of restriction measures under the G 10 and information requests under Section\n8a(2)(3) to (2)(5) of the BVerfSchG or IMSI-catcher operations under Section 9(4) of the BVerfSchG. After the completion of the Commission's review, the complainant receives a notice setting out its findings.\n\n3. THE CONFIDENTIAL COMMITTEE OF THE BUDGET COMMITTEE The Confidential Committee is a body comprising members of the Bundestag Budget Committee to which the budgets of the intelligence services must be submitted for approval\n(see Section 10a(2) of the *Bundeshaushaltsordnung* (Federal Budget Code)).\n\n\n3.1 Function of the Confidential Committee The members of the Confidential Committee are elected by the Bundestag for the duration of an electoral term. The rules that apply to the Panel also apply, *mutatis mutandis*, to the Confidential Committee. The Confidential Committee currently comprises ten members of the Budget Committee, who are legally bound to secrecy. The Confidential Committee discharges budgetary responsibility for the intelligence services. It deliberates on their budgets behind closed doors. The Confidential Committee communicates the final figures it has approved for the intelligence services' budgets to the Budget Committee. The latter accepts the figures without debate, incorporating them into its recommendation for a decision on the federal budget to the House, which then adopts them together with the other parts of the budget. There is no plenary debate on the budgets for the intelligence services. The final budget merely contains the total expenditure figures for the intelligence services as approved by the Confidential Committee. As far as scrutiny of the execution of the budget and of the discharge procedure are concerned, the Confidential Committee likewise acts on behalf of the Budget Committee or Public Accounts Committee. The Confidential Committee has similar information-seeking powers to those of the Panel. It can, for example, require the surrender of files, interview staff of the intelligence services, enter their official premises at any time and, in individual cases, commission experts to conduct investigations. In addition, at least in the middle and at the end of each electoral term, it must present a report to the Bundestag on its scrutiny activity to date.\n\n\n3.2 Consultative role of the Parliamentary Control Panel The Panel is involved in the discussion of the budgets of the intelligence services. The draft budgets must be transmitted to the Panel for its opinion, the federal government must inform it of the execution of the budgets, and the result of the audit by the Federal Court of Audit of annual accounts and of financial and economic management must be sent to it. Members of the Panel may take part in a consultative role in the Confidential Committee's deliberations on the budgets of the intelligence services and their execution. Conversely, members of the Confidential Committee may likewise attend the corresponding meetings of the Panel in a consultative capacity. The Confidential Committee, however, still has the last word when it comes to approving the budgets of the intelligence services.\n\n4. OTHER INSTRUMENTS OF PARLIAMENTARY SCRUTINY Scrutiny of the intelligence services by the Parliamentary Control Committee is without prejudice to the rights of the Bundestag and its committees, which means that traditional instruments of parliamentary scrutiny remain applicable to the sphere of activity of the intelligence services. Foremost among these instruments are:\n\n\nDeliberations of the specialised committees and plenary sittings, which any government member may be summoned to attend;\n\nParliamentary questions from political groups or individual Members; and\n\nCommittees of inquiry, which must be appointed at the request of a quarter of the Members of Parliament and which can gather evidence in accordance with the provisions governing criminal proceedings. Particularly in the cases of committees of inquiry and parliamentary questions, privacy issues are often raised in connection with intelligence matters. In this respect, the Bundesverfassungsgericht (Federal Constitutional Court) has acknowledged that refusal to testify to a committee of inquiry is generally something that would not occur if effective precautions were taken against the disclosure of state secrets. Similar principles apply to parliamentary questions. In particular, it is not permissible to refuse to answer them by invoking a report that has been made or is to be made to the Panel. On the contrary, the reasons why the government believes that the question cannot be answered must be set out in detail.\n\n5. FORMS OF EXTRAPARLIAMENTARY SCRUTINY\n\n5.1\nFederal Commissioner for Data Protection and Freedom of Information The intelligence services' compliance with data protection legislation is monitored by the Bundesbeauftragter fur den Datenschutz und die Informationsfreiheit\n(Federal Commissioner for Data Protection and Freedom of Information), who is based at the Federal Ministry of the Interior but is independent in the discharge of his office and subject only to the law. The Commissioner's duties include monitoring observance by the federal public authorities of the provisions of the *Bundesdatenschutzgesetz* (Federal Data Protection Act) and other data protection provisions. He/she acts of his/her own motion but can also be petitioned by any person or persons who believe that their rights have been infringed upon by federal public authorities in the collection, processing or use of their personal data. This also applies to the specific provisions on data protection contained in the BVerfSchG, the Gesetz uber den Militarischen Abschirmdienst (MADG or the Military Counterintelligence Service Act) or the *Gesetz uber den Bundesnachrichtendienst* (BNDG or the Federal Intelligence Service Act). It is only in the area covered by the G 10in other words, where data have been collected by the intelligence services by means of telecommunication and mail surveillancethat the Commissioner for Data Protection has no powers and sole responsibility lies with the G10 Commission. The Commission may, however, ask the Data Protection Commissioner to monitor compliance with data protection provisions in connection with specific procedures or in specific areas and to report its findings solely to the Commission. It may also give the Commissioner a general opportunity to comment on data protection matters. The intelligence services are bound to assist the Federal Commissioner for Data Protection and Freedom of Information in the performance of his monitoring duties. When so doing, they are to be given information in answer to their questions as well as access to all documentation relating to the scrutiny of data protection, especially stored data and data processing programs. Should infringements of data protection provisions be detected, the Federal Commissioner for Data Protection and Freedom of Information must, in principle, query them with the competent government ministry. Every two years, the Federal Commissioner for Data Protection and Freedom of Information presents an activity report to the Bundestag in which he also addresses issues of data protection law relating to the intelligence services.\n\n5.2 Federal Court of Audit The *Bundesrechnungshof* (Federal Court of Audit) audits the federal account and determines whether public finances have been properly and efficiently administered. Within the Court of Audit, a body known as the *Dreierkollegium* or College of Three, performs these duties with respect to the intelligence services. The Federal Court of Audit informs the Confidential Committee and the Panel of the result of its audit. If the findings of the College of Three are liable to be relevant to the granting of discharge to the federal government, the College sums up the result of its audit in a set of observations, which it presents to the Bundestag and the Bundesrat.\n\n6. CONCLUSION The statutory basis for parliamentary scrutiny of the intelligence services in Germany has been regularly improved and supplemented over the past few decades. As was mentioned above, the last fundamental reform of parliamentary scrutiny of the intelligence services was made in 2009. The new provisions essentially extended the powers of the Parliamentary Control Panel as well as increasing its human and material resources. It is still too early to make a detailed assessment of the practical effects of this latest reform of parliamentary scrutiny of the intelligence services.\n\nANNEX A: COUNTRY CASE STUDIES\n\nIV. PARLIAMENTARY AND SPECIALISED OVERSIGHT\nOF SECURITY AND INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES\nIN HUNGARY\n\nGABOR FOLDVARY 1. INTRODUCTION\n\nAfter the Second World War, the constitutional development of Hungary was forced to diverge from the mainstream of European democratic states for almost half a century. Although during this time sometimes heroic efforts were made to create democracy, these periods could last only for some years immediately after the war and only for a few weeks in the autumn of 1956. Every time, the real reason for the defeat was the international geopolitical situation, which had serious consequences for politics and society in Hungary.\n\nIn the end, it was the change of these external forces which made it possible for the recovery of four-and-a-half decades of belated development to begin in 198990. When laying the foundations of a democratic state, Hungarian legislation used several foreignmainly Western Europeanmodels. In the field of legal regulation (particularly the external control) of the National Security Services' activity, however, it was difficult to find full-fledged models with a history going back decades, even in the 1990s. The Hungarian Parliamentafter a provisory regulation in 1990passed a law in 1995 on the activity of secret Services, devoting a separate chapter to the parliamentary control of the Services. The depositary of this control was the National Security Committee of the Parliament. Its activitybesides other legal counterweights (courts, ombudsman)still constitutes an extensive, primarily political guarantee against the necessarily restrictive activity of the National Security Services, directed by the government of the day.\n\n\n2.\n\nCOMPOSITION\n(OFFICERS, MEMBERS)\nOF\nTHE\nNATIONAL SECURITY COMMITTEE Primarily, the same general rules apply to the creation of the National Security Committee\n(NSC) as to all other Parliamentary Committees. According to these rules, the interests of the larger parliamentary factions are safeguarded by their right of participation in committees in proportions similar to the composition of the Parliament of the day,618 while the presence of all factions in all Committees must be ensured to protect the interests of smaller factions. As a consequence of the abovementioned rules, the membership of the Committee during the past two decades has been modified almost every four years, moving between 9 and 15 members. The single regulation related to the composition of the Committee can be found in the National Security Act. According to this, 'the Chairman of the Committee may only be a member of the opposition at all times'.619 What gives real significance to this regulation is that during the organisation of the activity of the Committee, the Chairman has a number of additional rights. Among others rights, the Chairman of the Committee proposes the agenda of the next meeting and can summon and preside over the sessions. In many other cases, it is also the Chairman who represents the Committee towards other institutions and the public. There are no similar political or professional regulations concerning the members of the Committee.\n\nProfessional expectations of the Chairman prevail without written requirements. During the past almost twenty years, there has not been any Chairman of the Committee who had not previously taken part in the control of the interior, national security or defence area either as Undersecretary of State or even as Minister.\n\n2.1\nNational security clearing of candidates for membership\n\nRegarding membership, the Hungarian National Security Act prescribes that 'only those Members of Parliament may be elected as members of the Committee who have been cleared in terms of national security as specified in this Act'.620 In theory, it is also possible to nominate even a Member of Parliament about whom the national security clearing has found some risk factor. It depends on the decision of the concerned parliamentary faction's leader, who can maintain the candidature of this Member of Parliament to the Committee even if a risk factor has been found. In this case, however, it is the President of the Parliament or the National Security Committee as a whole that has the right to make a decision. If the Committee is not yet formed (typically at the beginning of a parliamentary cycle), the President of the Parliament decides 'on the further validity of the nomination',621\ni.e., s/he can invalidate it. In the other case, when the Committee is already functioning and it is necessary to elect a new member into a vacant position, the National Security Committee itself decides about the validity of the candidature.\n\n3. OPERATION OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY COMMITTEE\n\nExamining the various types of procedures of the National Security Committee, we can conclude that they can be divided into two large groups: procedures prescribed by the Act (without deliberation) and procedures whose initiation is subject to a previous decision of the Committee. The (mandatory) procedures prescribed by the Act can be divided once again into two groups: procedures whose subject is the Committee itself and those which oblige the executive power to undertake some activity. The most essential feature of optional procedures is that the Committee decides on their necessity on an ad hoc basis. In what follows, the above listed groups of options of parliamentary control are described in detail.\n\n## 3.1 (Mandatory) Procedures Prescribed By The Act\n\n3.1.1 Obligatory tasks of the Committee In the chapter on 'parliamentary control' of the Act, we can find two points which specify tasks expressly assigned to the National Security Committee. These are:\n\n1. reporting on the budget of the National Security Services; and\n2. hearing the nominees for General Director of the National Security Services before\ntheir appointment.\n\n\n## 3.1.2 Reporting On The Budget Of The National Security Services\n\n\nThe first obligatory task can be found in paragraph 14(4)(g) of the Act, which claims that the Committee:\n...shall give its opinion on the detailed draft budget of the national security services, the items of the budget of other organisations entitled to gather intelligence related to such activities, and the draft of the detailed report on the execution of the Act on the Budget of the year, and shall make a proposal during the debate on the bills to Parliament to adopt the bill in question. According to the above passage of the Act, the Committee has to receive each year the detailed plan of the Services' budget, as well as the related opinion of the State Audit Office. These documents naturally contain classified information therefore neither the whole of Parliament nor any other committees can have access to these budget figures and documents. On these occasions, the National Security Committee meets in closed session, asking the leader of the Ministry of Finance in charge of this area, the competent personnel of the Minister responsible for the National Security Services and the financial-economic leaders of the Services to answer any possible questions in connection with the budget. During the parliamentary cycle of 20062010, the National Security Committee dealt with the economic activity of the Services 13 times, as defined by paragraph 14(4)(g) of the National Security Act. This average of three occasions per year cover the Committee discussion of the budget bill, the discharge bill and the amendments submitted to the bill.\n\n3.1.3 Pre-nomination hearing of the candidates for General Directors The other obligatory task is laid down in paragraph 14(4)(h). The regulation prescribes that the Committee, 'prior to their appointment, shall hear the persons nominated to the offices of directors general, and shall take position on their suitability therefor.' In order to understand the proper place of this act in the complete appointment process, it is necessary to quote paragraph 12(1) of the National Security Act: 'The National Security Services shall be headed by directors general, appointed and discharged by the Prime Minister upon the nomination of the Minister'. The Hungarian legal solutionapart from the abovementioned presumption of the Prime Minister's agreementbrings another branch of power into the nomination process: the National Security Committee of the legislature. The legislative intentfive years after the democratic changeswas to enact a complex selection process. The essence of this process is the nomination of such persons whose recognition and professional support goes beyond the circle of the political leadership. In practice, the votes supporting the nominees come from the government representatives in the Committee, which usually has a majority from the governing party. However, it would be wrong to think that the decision on the suitability of the candidate is always a 'fixed' game. This is not true for two reasons. On the one hand, even if they have majority support, it is not indifferent for the nominator and the nominee whether the minority is completely negative or they abstain from voting with a 'well-meaning' attitude. This says a lot about the careful selection of the Director General, as well as about the quality of the future cooperation between the Committee and the Service to be directed by them. On the other hand, a Minister who takes for granted the support of the ruling party members of the Committee may easily get an unpleasant surprise. A good example was the nomination for Director General of the National Security Bureau in December 2007. From the beginning, there were serious doubts about the suitability of the candidate in political circles as well as in public opinion. The Chairman of the Committee kept postponing the placement of the hearing on the agenda for several weeks in the hope that another candidate would be named instead of the highly controversial one, but to no avail. The Minister was unswerving, with the consequence that the candidatein a so far unprecedented mannerdid not receive the support of the majority. The cooperation between the Committee and the government reached a historical low when it turned out that the Prime Minister appointed the candidate all the same.\n\n3.1.4 Obligations of the executive As we have seen above, in the chapter dealing with parliamentary control, the Act prescribes obligations not only for the Committee. The details of the regulation discussed below refer to an automatic obligation to provide information, to be performed without any request or special order. The bodies bound to fulfil this obligation are the institutions of the executive, mostly the Minister in charge or some of the Services. The performance must be automatic since the most important criterion for carrying out parliamentary control is a sufficient amount of detailed information provided at an appropriate time at the disposal of the Committee. The Act determines four types of this obligation.\n\n3.1.5 'Half-yearly' report on the Services' activities\n\n'The Minister shall inform the Committee about the general activities of the National Security Services on a regular basis, but at least twice a year'' [Paragraph 14(2)] According to the provisions of the Act, information on the general activities of the national security services has to be provided at least every half year. The established practice is that the Minister sends a written report to the Committee every half year. The Ministers responsible for the control of the civilian and the military National Security Services will obviously send separate reports to the Committee. During the discussion of the reports, the presence of the Minister and all directors general provides Committee Members with an opportunity to ask further questions on the basis of the written material they are already familiar with, or independent of that. On these occasions, there is no time limit for the inquiry of Committee Members or for the answers given by the Minister or the directors.\n\n\n\n## 3.1.6 Information About The Government's Decisions Relating To The National Security Services\n\n 'The Government shall inform the Committee about its decisions on the National Security Services through the Minister'. [Paragraph 14(3)] For the efficient control of the Services, the Committee has to be aware of the framework determined by the Government for the Services to perform their tasks (competences, rules of cooperation, main directions of the activities, provision of information by other state organs, facilities to protect).622 One copy of these  mostly qualified Government decisions has to be sent to the Committee.\n\n3.1.7 Report on intelligence gathering about Members of Parliament or their relatives\n\n'If the National Security Services begin (pursue) intelligence gathering activities concerning a Member of Parliament or his relative living in the same household, the Minister shall immediately inform the Committee thereof. The Member of Parliament affected in the matter shall not receive information on such activities'. [Paragraph 15(3)] The information collection of the Services concerning a Member of Parliament or their relative is worthy of attention because it may involve activities by a governmental body that restrict the rights of a Member of Parliament. In certain justified cases, the Act authorises the National Security Services to restrict fundamental rights such as personal freedom, privacy of home, personal privacy, privacy of correspondence, personal data, property, etc.623 It is hardly necessary to emphasise what a serious violation of the fundamental democratic principles might arise if the Servicesabusing their authority could use these means against the members of political parties without proper justification. Nevertheless, since the necessity of such however delicate information gathering may arise, it seems to be justifiable to inform the Committee immediately in the event of a procedure concerning any Member of Parliament.\n\n3.2 (Optional) tasks to carry out by the decision of the Committee The optional tasks of the National Security Committee are the cases when there is no statutory obligation to act but the Committeeat its own discretion or majority decision can initiate a procedure. Although these powers of the Committee are listed in the National Security Act in a different order, on the basis of their content they can be divided into two groups: entitlement for information and entitlement for inquiry.\n\n3.2.1 Entitlement of the National Security Committee for 'requesting information'\n\nThe Hungarian National Security Act mentions that when listing the entitlements for controlling, the Committee 'may request information from the Minister, and, with the simultaneous information of the Minister, from the directors general of the National Security Services on the national security situation of the country, as well as on the operation and activities of the National Security Services'.624 This entitlement for requesting information is similar to the half-yearly reporting obligation of the Minister. However, there is a difference between the contents of the two paragraphs as the statutory obligation of the Minister refers to the (at least) half-yearly report on the general activities of the Services. The Minister, on the other hand, is compelled to give more targeted, or more indepth and detailed informationabout the national security situation of the country or about the activities and operation of the Servicesonly at the particular request of the Committee. Another difference is that the Committee may directly turn to the directors general as well and, with the simultaneous information of the Minister, may request information from them if they consider that in the given case the interposition of a political level is not necessary. The National Security Committee regularly uses the opportunity to inquire about some current national security case through the Minister or the directors general. During the parliamentary cycle of 20062010, there were 24 occasions when the Committee, besides the regular half-yearly reports of the Services, requested detailed information from the Ministers in charge of the civilian or military services or from the directors general. With the intention to carry out its legal controlling function in its entirety, the Committee sometimes deems necessary to complement the information received from the National Security Services by the hearing of persons possessing relevant information in a given case. In such a situation, the Committee may also request the hearing of the leaders of other state institutions (e.g., Data Protection Ombudsman, Commander of the Customs and Finance Guard, Chief Commissioner of the Police, etc.) Paragraph 14(4)(b) of the Act refers to the normal (paragraph 56) and the exceptional (paragraph 59) authorisation procedure of the intelligence gathering requiring outside authorisation. The report on the authorisation generally takes place during the half-yearly hearing of the Ministers and the Services.\n\n3.2.2 Entitlement of the National Security Committee for inquiry\n\nThe Committee's intent to receive information is not self-serving. The parliamentary control of the Services is necessary because the secrecya prerequisite of efficient national security activitydoes not allow for the press or the general public to fulfil its traditional controlling role. This, however, serves as even stronger justification for the creation of efficient and thorough mechanisms when controlling the Services. The above discussed entitlement of the Committee for requesting information will only find its proper place if the body may use further tools as well, if necessary. In this way, in the event of suspicion of illegal operation, these means make it possible to make actual, effective progress in a case. The National Security Committee is not an investigating authority but in order to achieve effective controlling power, it was necessary that in the event of some anomaly concerning the operation of the Services, the Committee could get at least relatively convincing evidence. The National Security Act empowers the Committee to conduct the inquiry if it is necessary. The Committee orders such an inquiry when it receives information about the unlawful activity of the Services.\n\n3.2.3 Investigation of complaints about the unlawful activity of the Services\n\nAmong the possible reasons for an inquiry, the Act handles separately the situation when the Committee receives a complaint in connection with the activity of the Services.\n\nAccording to the Act, a complaint in connection with the national security investigation may refer to statements in the expert opinion which the person concerned considers untrue.625\nFor the complainant, the National Security Act provides a two-level legal remedy process.626 The first level is the Minister in charge of the Service which carried out the investigation, while the second level is the National Security Committee of the Parliament. The Minister is obliged to conduct an investigation in the event of a complaint against the activities of the Services. The complainant must be informed about the findings of the inquiry and the measures taken. The requirements of the inquiry regarding form and content are not regulated by the Act. Based on the authorisation of the Act, the Committee:\n...may conduct inquiries about complaints implying the illegal activities of the National Security Services, if the complainant does not accept the findings of the inquiry specified in paragraph 11(5), and the weight of the complaint, according to one third of the votes of the Committee members, justifies the inquiry; the Committee shall inform the person concerned about its findings. [Paragraph 14(4)(c)] In this way, the Act on the one hand binds the examination of the complaint to a condition (previous ministerial inquiry) but on the other hand makes it easier with the introduction of the one-third rule. The codification of this regulation is a guarantee to ensure that the inquiry into a complaint concerning the investigation conducted by a Service or the Minister may not be prevented by the governmental majority in itself. The National Security Act does not give details of the procedure of the inquiry into complaints by the Committee, and neither does it describe the ministerial examination. The National Security Committee felt the urgent need to fill these deficiencies, at least concerning its own operation, only when the amount of the complaints significantly increased its workload.627 For the year 2009, the National Security Committee introduced a multi-stage procedure:\n\n1. Members of the Committee may familiarise themselves with the complaint and may express a claim to familiarise themselves with the documents prepared by the Service concerned regarding the complainant.\n\n2. If there is a demand for an inquiry into the complaint, the Chairman will propose to put it on the agenda of the next session. If the initiative earns the support of at least one-third of the members of the Committee, the examination begins.\n\n3. The Minister as well as the complainant are invited to this session. They present their case and answer the questions of the members separately, one after the other, without hearing each other.\nThe Act leaves several other parts of the above process of the Committee unregulated.\n\nContrary to the regulation of the ministerial examination, the Act does not determine a deadline for the examination.\n\n3.2.4 Inquiry initiated by the Committee at its own discretion The National Security Committee itself may notice a phenomenon which suggests the unlawful or inappropriate activity of a National Security Service, or on the basis of which the Committee may assume that such an activity is undertaken by a Service. Points (4)(d)(e)(f) in paragraph 14 of the Act apply to this case.\n\n3.2.5 Ministerial inquiry initiated by the Committee\n\nIt is not necessary to deal with the inquiry defined in paragraph 14(4)(d) of the Act in detail when describing the tasks of the Committee because this type of examination is only initiated by the Committee. Conducting the examination and reporting on its findings are ministerial tasks.\n\n3.2.6 Fact-finding inquiry\n\nParagraph 14(4)(e) of the Act gives a real authorisation to the Committee to conduct an inquiry. The prerequisite for this processcalled a fact-finding inquiry by the Actis that the Committee notices the unlawful operation of any of the National Security Services or that the Committee considers it necessary on the basis of a deficiency that a previous inquiry disclosed or failed to disclose. This type of former primary process may be an inquiry into a complaint by the Committee, a ministerial inquiry requested by the Committee or any unlawfulness reported to the Minister by a member of a Service which was investigated by the Minister and the Committee was informed about its findings. Therefore if the Committee decides that it is justified to conduct a fact-finding inquiry, it means in fact that the Committee decides to conduct or repeat an examination in its own competence, although that would otherwise belong to the authority of the Minister or the Directors General. The scope of such an inquiry is, however, considerably wider than the traditional sphere of activity of the Committee. The reason why a fact-finding inquiry may be efficient is precisely the wide variety of measures, which allows the Committee to 'step over' the obligatory communication channels between the Committee and the Minister or between the Committee and the Director General. As it stands, in this procedure the Committee may make direct contact with the staff members of the Services (see 'hears the staff members of the National Security Services') and may look into the related documents of the Services. After 12 years, the National Security Committee decided in the autumn of 2009 to initiate again a fact-finding inquiry. (We may presume that the Committee uses this measure very rarely since the fact of the initiation of such an examination already sends a message to the public that some grave anomaly has come to light in the activity of the Services). The subject of the inquiry launched in September 2009 was Evaluation of the national security activity assisting the investigation into the serial murders of Romani persons.\n\n\n\n3.2.7 Example for fact-finding inquiry in connection with the serial murders of Romani\npersons\n\nThe circumstances and the way the inquiry was conducted shall probably serve as an example for a long time regarding the parliamentary control of the National Security Services. First of all, it is important to underline the well-organised, fast and efficient conduct of the inquiry. This may most certainly be explained by the fact that the Committee adopted a detailed plan of the examination right at the beginning. This examination plan (work plan) specified the purpose of the inquiry (matters to be examined), the deadline for the completion of the work, together with the intention that after the completion of the inquiry, the Committee would make a report about the work carried out to inform those concerned. To carry out the inquiry, the Committee set up a three-member working group, with members of different party affiliations. The group leader was authorised to act on behalf of the working group (to request documents, to call persons to hearings). Learning from negative experiences of the past628 and to avoid controversy, the Committee specified that the working group could exercise its right to look into documents and call persons for hearings only on the location of the inquiry, i.e., in the buildings or branch offices of the National Security Services. During the almost two months of the inquiry, the working group held formal hearings six times, which lasted for almost 18 hours, with the participation of 25 persons, ranging from the former and the acting Ministers to active and retired operational officers. During the examination, four institutions made several thousand pages of documents available to the acting representatives. Using its authority specified in paragraph 14(5) of the Act, the Committee asked a retired member of a National Security Service to provide expert consulting. On completion of the work, the Committee accepted the classified report of the working group which closed the inquiry and contained its main findings, as well as its short extract629 that could be made public. Based on paragraph 14(4)(f) of the National Security Act, the report proposed some ministerial measures and further inquiry regarding responsibility. In connection with the examination, there was a continuous fear that the whole process could result in discrediting the National Security Services in the eyes of the public. The experience, however, demonstrated that cases smelling of scandal gave considerable ammunition to the press but that on the whole, the examination of the cases had a reassuring effect on public opinion.\n\n4.\n\nLIMITATIONS\nFOR\nTHE\nCOMMITTEE\nTO\nGAIN\nINFORMATION\n\nTaking stock of the entitlements of the Committee to gain information, we must not avoid reflecting on the statutory constraints imposed on them. These limitations are necessary to understand the precise extent to which secrecy is essential for the efficient operation of the National Security Services. This secrecy is not absolute or inviolable because it is also necessary to satisfy another, somewhat contrary demand, namely the demand of the Parliamentary parties and the public, which laid its trust in them, for the external control of the Services. In an ideal situation, the national security risk caused by the insight would be counterbalanced by the legal security created by the control. As we have seen above, in order to create this balance the National Security Act places mainly obligations to provide information on the side of the Services (and the Minister) who possess information, while it endows the Committee, which is 'outside the information circle', with a variety of means to request information. It is precisely these fields of obligations and entitlements whose borderlines are defined in paragraph 16 of the Act. According to this, the law protects the anonymity of persons cooperating with the Services, together with the ways the operational devices are used during the national security activity. These data are considered to be protected to such an extent that the Services cannot share them even with the controlling parliamentary Committee. According to the Act, however, there is an exception to this restriction on data communication. It needs the agreement of two thirds of the members of the National Security Committeei.e., a majority exceeding that of the ruling faction. In this case, the Committee has to decide with a qualified majority whether this data requirement concerning the method of internal information gathering is indispensable for the Committee to make its resolution concerning the unlawfulness.\n\n\n5. SUMMARY\n\nAct No 125/1995 on the Hungarian National Security Services deals mainly with the activities of the National Security Services but in its attitude is a step forward when compared with the former regulations that focused only on the efficiency of the Services. The main depositary of control is the National Security Committee, which possesses considerably more rights than a consultative parliamentary body. Its role as counterweight is guaranteed by such statutory provisions as the election of its Chairman from the parliamentary opposition, the extensive right of access to information, and the one-third decision about the acceptance of complaints or the possibility to carry out direct examinations. In the past one-and-a-half decades, the Committee has often proved that in its practice it is capable of finding answers to questions (expectations from the Chairman, inquiry into complaints, report on the findings of an examination) that are not regulated by the law. Good practices in the parliamentary control of the Hungarian National Security Services are:\n\n1. Considering that the National Security Services operate under the control of the government, the Chairman of the National Security Committee can only be a member of the opposition, to ensure tighter control.\n2. The Committee may request information from the Minister and the directors general at any time, regarding any case that concerns the national security situation of the country or the operation of the Services.\n\n3. If the Committee takes notice of the unlawful operation of the National Security Services, it can decide on initiating a fact-finding investigation, which gives it broad and direct authorisation of examination in relation to the Services.\n\n4. In order to investigate a complaint about the unlawful activities of the Services, the Committee only requires the agreement of one-third of its members, providing that the complainant has previously filed their complaint with the Minister.\n\n5. The Directors General of the Services are appointed by a complex process. The nomination for the position is made by the Minister in charge. The suitability of the candidate is decided by the National Security Committee. The subsequent appointment is within the competence of the Prime Minister. Deficiencies in the Hungarian regulation are:\n____________________________________________________________________________________________\n\n\n1. The Act does not set a deadline for the investigation or the refusal of complaints. 2. The National Security Committee is not obliged to report on its own activities or\nfindings either to the plenary of the Parliament or to the public. Even if they do\nreport in certain cases, e.g., following a more significant session or examination, the\nCommittee is under no such regular obligation.\nREFERENCES Act No 125/1995 on the National Security Services Fact-finding inquiry report ('Tenymegallapito vizsgalati jelentes') (17 November 2009), Evaluation of the Fact-finding Working Group of the National Security Committee about the national security service activity assisting the investigation of the serial murders of Romani persons, available at (http://www.parlament.hu/ internet/plsql/ogy_biz.keret_frissit?p_\nszerv=896). Republic of Hungary (30 November 1994), Resolution No 46/1994 on the Standing Orders of the Parliament of the Republic of Hungary. Riba I. (5 April 1997), 'Secret Service Scandal: Wood for a Birch Tree' ('Titkosszolgalati botrany: Nyirfatol az erdot'), *Heti Vilaggazdasag* No 14.\n\n\nANNEX A: COUNTRY CASE STUDIES\n\nV. PARLIAMENTARY AND SPECIALISED OVERSIGHT\nOF SECURITY AND INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES\nIN ITALY\n\nFEDERICO FABBRINI & TOMMASO F. GIUPPONI 1.\n\nINTRODUCTION:\nTHE\nITALIAN\nPARLIAMENTARY\nOVERSIGHT COMMITTEE (COPASIR) The Italian legal framework for the oversight of intelligence agencies is provided by the recently enacted Law 124/2007.630 This piece of legislation has overhauled the previous regime, based on Law 801/1977, reforming both the organisation of the intelligence agencies and the mandate and functions of the parliamentary oversight body. Law\n124/2007 has preserved a separation between two intelligence agencies: AISI (Agenzia Informazioni e Sicurezza Interna or the 'Internal Information and Security Agency')whose mandate is to gather intelligence inside the national borders (internally) and AISE (Agenzia Informazioni e Sicurezza Esterna or the 'External Information and Security Agency')\nwhose mandate is to gather intelligence outside the national borders (externally). Law 124/2007 has also explicitly provided that each intelligence agency can operate outside their sphere of functional/territorial competences only in cooperation with the other agency and pursuant to an explicit authorisation of the Executive Branch.631 Both AISI and AISE are coordinated by a special division set up within the executive branchthe Department of Security Intelligence (DIS). In addition, whereas under the previous legal framework the two agencies were under the control of the Ministry of Interior and the Ministry of Defence, on the basis of Law 124/2007 both AISI and AISE are now under the direct control of the Prime Minister,632 or of the ad hoc Minister (or Secretary of State) to whom this task has been specifically delegated. Law 124/2007, therefore, has clearly centralised in the Prime Minister the power and accountability for the management of intelligence. Law 124/2007 has also replaced the Parliamentary Control Committee\n(COPACO) established by Law 801/1977 with a new Parliamentary Committee for the Security of the Republic (COPASIR), entrusted with more detailed and pervasive powers of oversight on the activities of intelligence agencies.\n\n2. THE GENERAL MANDATE AND FUNCTIONS OF COPASIR The institutional task of COPASIR is to verify 'systematically and continuously that the activities of the intelligence agencies comply with the Constitution and the rule of law, in\nthe exclusive interest of the defence of the Republic and its institutions'.633 To this end:\n\n1.\nCOPASIR has a *control function*:634 it shall review the activity of the DIS, AISI\nand AISE, subjecting the conduct of the Executive Branch in the field of security\nintelligence to parliamentary control.\n2.\nCOPASIR has an *advisory function*:635 it needs to be consulted before the\nadoption by the Prime Minister of regulations concerning the organisation of the intelligence apparatus and before the appointment of the directors of the DIS, AISI and AISE.\n3.\nCOPASIR has a *warning function*:636 it shall at all times inform the Prime Minister\nand the Presidents of the two chambers of Parliament if, in its oversight function, it identifies any irregularities by the intelligence agencies.\n4.\nCOPASIR has a *reporting function*:637 it shall present a yearly report to\nParliament to give information about the activities that were carried out and to\nformulate proposals on the issues of its competence. In addition, in order to allow COPASIR to fully exercise its functions, Law 124/2007 makes\nCOPASIR the addressee of several mandatory communications by the government.638 The\ngeneral budget of the DIS must also be submitted every six months to COPASIR to keep it informed of the financial management of the agencies. COPASIR, on the contrary, does not\nhave a complaint function although nothing prevents it from activating its control powers after having received a communication or a complaint from members of the public or employees of the intelligence agencies.\n3. PRACTICAL OVERSIGHT\n\n\nWhereas the legal framework setting up the methods for oversight of the activities of the\nintelligence agencies is very detailed,639 it is not easy to assess critically how COPASIR\nscrutinises a number of specific activities performed by the intelligence agencies. This is\nlargely connected with the secrecy which characterises the internal functioning of\nCOPASIR.640 Also, the periodic reports that the government presents to COPASIR are\nundisclosed. The limited information that is available in this regard is derived only from the yearly reports that COPASIR presents to Parliament and from the short and summary\nminutes that COPASIR publishes on its website641 after each meeting (reporting, e.g., what\nactivities it has performed or who spoke).\ni.\nInformation sharing. Within the Italian intelligence apparatus, it is the task of\nthe DIS to coordinate the activities of all intelligence agencies642 and the sharing\nof information among them (as well as among them and the military, the regular\npolice forces and other public administrations).643 International information\nsharing, instead, is exercised by AISE. As indicated in the yearly reports,\nCOPASIR often scheduled hearings with the Director of the DIS as well as with the Directors of AISE and AISI to ascertain the dynamics of cooperation between the agencies. However, it is impossible to assess whether during these hearings\nCOPASIR was in the position to receive information about possible agreements concluded between the Italian and foreign intelligence agencies and to approve\nor reject them. From the data available on COPASIR's website,644 it appears that\nfrom June 2008 to April 2011 COPASIR summoned the Director of the DIS 10\ntimes, the Director of AISE 15 times and the Director of AISI 11 times.\nInterestingly, from the same data, it appears that COPASIR has also held meetings with the former US Secretary of State, Mr. Henry Kissinger, as well as\nwith personnel of international bodies such as the EU Central Bank and the UN Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute (UNICRI). The President and\nother member of COPASIR then participated in meetings with members of oversight bodies of other EU countries in 2009 and met with their US\ncounterparts in 2010.\nii.\nProcessing and use of personal data. In the report that the Prime Minister\npresents to COPASIR every six months, there must be information concerning\nthe criteria for the processing of the personal data gathered by the intelligence\nagencies.645 In addition, the data available on COPASIR's website646 reveal that\nthe Italian independent authority for the protection of personal data (set up in\ncompliance with the EU Directive 95/46/EC) has been heard twice by COPASIR from June 2008 to April 2011 and that meetings have been set up in order to be briefed by the chief executive officers of the main telecom corporations operating within Italy.\niii.\nJoint analysis and dissemination of information. In the Italian legal framework,\nthis task is also mainly exercised by the DIS, which  conducts strategic\nanalyses647 and disseminates them among the intelligence community.648\nCOPASIR often summons the Director of the DIS.649 From the data available,650 it\nappears that COPASIR periodically hears the Ministers of Interior, Foreign Affairs\nand Defence, which participate together with the Prime Minister and the Minister\n(or Secretary of State) delegated to intelligence affairs in the Inter-Ministerial\nCommittee for the Security of the Republic (CISR)651an advisory body whose\npurpose is to channel communication among the various intelligence and security forces. COPASIR also hears the Head of the Police, the General of the\nCarabinieri and the Commander of the Armed Forces, presumably to assess threats to national security and the strategic responses planned.\niv.\nCollection of open source information. No data appears to be available on this\nactivity.\n\nv.\nFinance of intelligence agencies. COPASIR mainly exercises an ex post review of\nthe financial management of the intelligence agencies. In the periodic reports of the Prime Minister, information is provided on the budget assigned to the DIS,\nAISE and AISI during the previous six months and on its use.652 The Prime\nMinister also informs COPASIR about the allocation of resources (or variation in\nthe allocation of resources) assigned to ordinary and secret budgets.653\nCOPASIR, in addition, can always review the documentation concerning\nexpenditures for intelligence operations archived by the DIS.654 COPASIR,\nhowever, does not have any a priori control on the resources assigned the\nintelligence apparatus, which is provided by the yearly budgetary law.655\nPursuant to an explicit constitutional provision, the budgetary bill, drafted by the Minister of the Treasury, needs to be approved yearly by Parliament first in the budget committee and then in chamber, which can reallocate the resources or\nset up new expenses by providing the financial means to cover them.656 De\nfacto, the dynamics of the parliamentary system make it extremely difficult for Parliament to modify the budgetary bill presented by the government and there is no evidence that Parliament has ever attempted to modify the intelligence budget. Moreover, the budgetary bill only specifies the resources allocated to the\nintelligence apparatus in their aggregate amount,657 leaving then to the Prime\nMinister, after hearings with the Directors of the DIS, AISI and AISE, to decide how to reallocate the budget among the agencies and whether to allocate funds\nin secret budgets.658 A judicial review of the financial management of the budget\nfor the intelligence agencies is instead exercised by a special division of the\nCourt of Auditors, set up within the DIS.659\n\n4. COMPOSITION AND SET UP COPASIR is composed of five Deputies (i.e., members of the lower chamber of Parliament) and five Senators (i.e., members of the higher chamber of Parliament) appointed within\ntwenty days from each general election by the Presidents of the two chambers of\nParliament.660 Each parliamentary group is allotted a number of seats in COPASIR\nproportional to its size: however, 'bearing in mind its specific functions',661 COPASIR can\nensure the equal representation of both the members of the majority party or coalition\nparties in Parliament and of the opposition party or coalition parties. In addition, to guarantee a meaningful involvement of the minority party and an effective check on the\nactivity of the government, Law 124/2007 requires the President of COPASIR to be chosen among the members of the opposition.662 The President of COPASIR is elected among the members of COPASIR by absolute majority with a secret ballot. If no candidate reaches this threshold at the first ballot, a second turn is provided between the two candidates who have obtained the majority of the votes. In case of a further tie, the elder candidate is elected President. The President of COPASIR is assisted by a Vice-President and a Secretary General, who are also elected by majority vote by the members of COPASIR. The three compose the COPASIR's Presidency Office. To perform its tasks, COPASIR uses the premises and the administrative personnel assigned to it by the Presidents of the two Chambers of Parliament. The costs and expenditures of COPASIR are entirely covered by the annual internal budget of Parliament.663\n\nThe functioning of COPASIR is set up by an internal regulation,664 which integrates the provisions of Law 124/2007 and may be modified by COPASIR with an absolute majority vote.665 The President represents COPASIR, convenes its meetings and chairs them.666 The President decides the working days on which COPASIR meets and sets the items on the agenda.667 For its operation, COPASIR requires the participation of six members.668\nDeliberations are adopted by simple majority vote: in case of a tie vote, the deliberation is rejected.669 The Secretary verifies the result of the votes and drafts the minutes of the meeting.670 Nevertheless, the meetings, the decisions and all the acts of COPASIR are secret unless COPASIR decides otherwise.671 Only a summary report of the activities of COPASIR is published on the COPASIR website. Members of COPASIR are bound by a strict duty of secrecy, the violation of which may be liable to prosecution.672 Since the mandate of COPASIR tracks the mandate of Parliament (i.e., a maximum five years)673 the members of COPASIR have only a limited period of time to acquire expertise in the field of intelligence oversight. Otherwise, the frequent turn-over among the members of COPASIR due to reasons of party politics, makes continuity of service even more difficult.\n\nAs a matter of fact, this does not seem to be perceived as a problem by the relevant institutional actors. By the same token, no specific step appears to have been taken to ensure that the staff permanently assigned by the Presidents of the two Chambers of Parliament to COPASIR be adequately prepared for the task of intelligence oversight. It is not possible, however, to make an accurate assessment of the know-how and professional qualifications of the personnel of COPASIR.\n\n5. METHODS OF OVERSIGHT COPASIR exercises its oversight function through several methods, which are specifically provided by Law 124/2007:\na. *Examining reports*. Every six months, the Prime Minister must submit to COPASIR a\nreport on the activities of the intelligence agencies, including a strategic assessment\nof threats to national security and the responses planned.674 All regulations\nconcerning the intelligence agencies adopted by the Prime Minister and the Ministers of Interior and Defence must be communicated to COPASIR. COPASIR must be informed within 30 days of any special operation by the intelligence agencies in which the authorisation to commit an unlawful act has been granted by the Chief\nExecutive.675 The Prime Minister must then swiftly inform COPASIR of any decision\nto invoke the State secret privilege in court,676 as well as of the handling of personal\ndata acquired in the gathering of intelligence.677\n\nb. *Scrutinising the budget*. COPASIR may directly review the expenditures relating to\nthe special operations of the intelligence agencies by accessing the archive of the\nDIS.678 Every six months, the Prime Minister shall inform COPASIR about the\nmanagement of the budget allocated to the intelligence apparatus during the\nprevious six months.679 This includes a summary, based on a homogeneous typology\nof expenditures, of the budget for the DIS, AISI and AISI and of its employment.680\n\nc. *Holding hearings*. Periodically, COPASIR summons the Prime Minister, the Minister or\nSecretary of State delegated to intelligence affairs, the Ministers of Interior, Foreign\nAffairs, Justice and Defence and the Directors of the DIS, AISI and AISE.681 It may\nalso hear individuals, who are not members of the intelligence apparatus but may\nprovide useful information for its oversight function.682 Finally, COPASIR can\nexceptionally decide to summon intelligence officers: this requires, however, the prior consent of the Prime Minister, who can oppose the request for justified\nreasons.683 From the data available, in any case, it appears the COPASIR has never\nmade use of this possibility in the past. All individuals heard by the COPASIR 'shall\nrefer, in a complete and faithful way, the information they have concerning issues of\ninterest to the [COPASIR]'.684\n\n\nd. *Requesting documents*. COPASIR can acquire documents from the judicial authority,\neven derogating from the ordinary rules of the Code of criminal procedure.685 The\njudiciary, however, may postpone the disclosure of the requested documents for\nreasons relating to the secrecy of investigations. COPASIR, then, can acquire\ndocuments directly from the intelligence agencies.686 Nonetheless, disclosure can be\nopposed when it could 'jeopardize the security of the Republic, the relationship with foreign States, the course of ongoing operation or the security of sources of\ninformation and agents of the secret services'.687 If COPASIR insists on the\ndisclosure of these documents by deeming the refusal unjustified, a special decision\nhas to be taken by the Prime Minister who can resort to the State secret privilege.\nIn any case, no refusal to disclose documents can be made to COPASIR when the\nlatter, by unanimous decision, is investigating institutional misconduct by\nintelligence officers.688 When COPASIR deems a decision of the Prime Minister\nunwarranted, however, it can only raise the issue before Parliament for\nconsequential political evaluation,689 following a 'traditional' logic of parliamentary\ncontrol whose effectiveness, however, is rather uncertain.690\n\ne. *Accessing premises*. COPASIR can access and make inspections of premises and\nbuildings which belong to the intelligence apparatus.691 The Prime Minister needs,\nhowever, to be informed beforehand and he can postpone access when this might\ninterfere with ongoing operations.692\n\nf.\nThematic studies. COPASIR can prepare and present to Parliament thematic studies on issues of particular relevance for national security. From the data available, it\nappears that COPASIR has presented three such reports to Parliament:693 the first\nconcerning the problem of the acquisition by local offices of the public prosecutor sensitive data regarding intelligence officers and the lack of destruction thereof\n(delivered on February 13, 2009); the second dealing with human trafficking\n(delivered on April 29, 2009); and the third concerning the possible national security\nthreat generated by cyber crime (delivered on July 15, 2010).\n\n6.\nINVESTIGATIVE\nPOWERS\nAND\nACCESS\nTO\nINFORMATION\n\nLaw 124/2007 has created an Office of the Inspector General within the DIS to ensure the\ncontinuous internal review of the activities of the intelligence agencies and with the power\nto undertake, subject to the authorisation of the Prime Minister, internal investigations of\npossible misconduct by officers of the intelligence agencies.694 Nevertheless, no specific\ndata are available on this issue, since the composition, the internal organisation and the operational tasks of the Office of the Inspector General within the DIS are regulated by two\ndecrees enacted by the Prime Minister which are currently classified.695\nBesides the internal review of the Office of the Inspector General, a further external review on the activity of the intelligence agencies is exercised by COPASIR.696 It is within the purview of COPASIR697 to commence specific investigations to ensure that the conduct of intelligence officers conforms to the institutional tasks assigned to AISE and AISI.698 The power of COPASIR to activate an investigation, however, is subject to the general rule that requires any decision by COPASIR to be adopted by a majority vote of the members present and no specific rule is in place to allow a minority in COPASIR to activate an investigation.699 In addition, as mentioned,700 when COPASIR has decided by unanimous decision to exercise its investigative powers, the Prime Minister cannot invoke the State secret privilege or assert other reasons of confidentiality to prevent COPASIR from accessing relevant documents and information.\n\nHaving said this, because of the secrecy that surrounds the internal activities of COPASIR,701 there are no data available concerning the effective exercise by COPASIR of its investigative powers. The only data are those contained in the yearly report that COPASIR\npresents to Parliament,702 which may be evaluated both by the legislature and by the public at large. Equally, it is impossible to ascertain whether COPASIR has requested access to information from the intelligence apparatus or the public administration and the judiciary more generally. From the analysis of the yearly reports presented by COPASIR in 2009 and\n2010,703 it can be understood that COPASIR has sought further clarifications from other institutional actors on specific critical issues and reported to Parliament about them: for instance in 2009, COPASIR released a report on the problems created by the acquisition by a local Office of the Public Prosecutor of sensitive data regarding intelligence officers.704\n\nFrom the data currently available, it appears that COPASIR has never officially informed the Prime Minister or the Presidents of the two chambers of Parliament about possible misconduct committed by intelligence officers, which it might have discovered during its review.705 Nothing excludes the possibility, however, that COPASIR has made such warnings in an informal and confidential way, either during or after its oversight functions.\n\n7. PROTECTION OF INFORMATION BY OVERSIGHT BODIES\n\nSince COPASIR, in the exercise of its functions, has to handle sensitive information, Law\n124/2007 has codified a specific duty for all the members of COPASIR to maintain secret all information they obtain.706 In addition, a duty of non-disclosure binds all persons who, by reason of their office or job (e.g., the administrative personnel of COPASIR), gain knowledge of information or activities about COPASIR. The prohibition to disclose information persists even after the termination of the office or of the professional collaboration. Law 124/2007 allows COPASIR to resort to collaboration with external personnel, where a specific professional and technical expertise is needed for the\n\nperformance of its functions.707 However, external personnel are also bound by the duty of secrecy, even after the termination of the professional collaboration.708 If a violation of the non-disclosure duties occurs, the President of COPASIR is legally required to denounce the fact to the judicial authorities,709 which shall prosecute the suspected person for the crime of disclosure and use of secret information, codified in Art.\n\n326 of the Criminal code.710 From the data available from June 2008 to April 2011, however, it appears that the President of COPASIR has never denounced such a violation. If the violation of the non-disclosure duties is made by a member of COPASIR, not only the sentencing can be increased711 but also a special, parallel parliamentary procedure shall be opened as an ad hoc investigation committee, composed in equal numbers by parliamentarians of the majority and of the opposition.712 If the investigation reveals a responsibility of a parliamentarian in the disclosure of the information, the President of the chamber of Parliament to which the said parliamentarian belongs shall dismiss him/her from COPASIR and replace the individual with another parliamentarian of the same political group.713 To foster the confidentiality of the activities of COPASIR, Law 124/2007 requires all meetings of COPASIR to remain secret unless COPASIR decides otherwise.714 As mentioned,715 for each meeting COPASIR discloses only the items on the agenda but the detailed minutes remain secret.716 The acts and documents acquired by COPASIR are archived as confidential if the administration that produced them had decided so.717 The acts and documents produced by COPASIR itself, instead, can be disclosed if COPASIR\ndecides this.718 All acts and documents received, acquired or produced by COPASIR are stored in a special archive, which is organised according to the level of confidentiality of each document.719 Members of COPASIR and, with a previous authorisation, external collaborators may access this archive;720 but they may not pull out documents from it\n(except when the document is already public).721\n\n8. REPORTING BY OVERSIGHT BODIES\n\nLaw 124/2007 requires COPASIR to present each year to Parliament a report on the activities that were carried out and containing specific recommendations and warnings.722\nThe two yearly reports released since the establishment of COPASIR (published on July 30,\n\n2009 and July 29, 2010) contain detailed information and represent the most relevant instruments to assess the activities of COPASIR. Reports are structured thematically and include a summary of: a) the general oversight activities that were undertaken; b) the opinions that were delivered; c) the issues that were addressed through specific thematic studies; d) the status of the State secret privilege and its assertion by the government. Besides the yearly report to Parliament, COPASIR can discretionally decide to approve and present to Parliament other reports on specific thematic issues that COPASIR considers of compelling relevance for national security.723 From the data available, it appears that COPASIR has presented three such reports to Parliament:724 the first concerns the acquisition of sensitive data regarding intelligence officers and the lack of destruction thereof by local Offices of the Public Prosecutor (delivered on February 13, 2009);725 the second dealing with human trafficking (delivered on April 29, 2009);726 and the third concerning the possible national security threat generated by cybercrime (delivered on July\n15, 2010).727 The public reports that COPASIR presents to Parliament highlight the direct and privileged relationship between the two institutions. As already mentioned, however, COPASIR has many exchanges of information with the government and the intelligence apparatus (DIS, AISE, AISI) in the exercise of its institutional functions.728 As the law now stands, it does not seem that COPASIR has any involvement in the governmental decisions concerning the declassification of secret information. As indicated,729 however, COPASIR can decide the disclosure or classification of the documents that it has itself generated.\n\n9. GOOD PRACTICES\n\nThe analysis of the role of COPASIR as the parliamentary body which oversees the activities of Italian security and intelligence agencies highlights several positive features, although a major (and perhaps largely unavoidable) hurdle is represented by the difficulties in accessing data and information which is often classified or secret. These limitations notwithstanding, the assessment of the two yearly reports presented so far underlines a positive trend. The choices of legislative drafting made by Law 124/2007 look particularly significant in this regard. This Law, contrary to Law 801/1977, provides a detailed and precise regulation of the powers, activities and functions of COPASIR. As the data available in the yearly reports reveal, this carefully drafted regulatory framework has allowed COPASIR to effectively review the activity of the intelligence agencies. Nevertheless, as the new legislative regulation has only recently entered into force, it seems necessary to acknowledge that the role of COPASIR is still a work in progress: as such, it is too early to identify in the Italian system of parliamentary oversight consolidated and precise good practices which can be taken as a model in comparative perspective.\n\nFrom this point of view, perhaps, the best practice that can be identified in the Italian legal regime for the oversight of intelligence agencies is the definition of a clear and precise regulatory framework for the exercise of power by COPASIR.\n\nREFERENCES Barbera A. And C. Fusaro (2010), *Corso di diritto pubblico*, Il Mulino, Bologna. Campanelli G. (2007), 'Commento agli Artt. 3038 della L. 3.8.2007 n. 124', Legislazione penale, No 4. COPASIR (2010), Relazione sulle possibili implicazioni e minacce per la sicurezza nazionale derivanti dallo spazio cibernetico, available at\n(http://www.\n\nparlamento.it/service/PDF/PDFServer/DF/234494.pdf). COPASIR\n(2009), RELAZIONE\nSUI\nRISCHI\nPER\nL'EFFICIENZA\nDEI\nSERVIZI\nDI\nINFORMAZIONE PER LA SICUREZZA DERIVANTI DALL'ACQUISIZIONE E MANCATA\nDISTRUZIONE DI DATI SENSIBILI PER LA SICUREZZA DELLA REPUBBLICA, available at (http://www.parlamento.it/documenti/repository/commissioni/\nbicamerali/COMITATO%20SICUREZZA/34-1.pdf). Gambacurta S. (2008), 'Il sistema dei controlliIl controllo parlamentare' in Mosca C., Gambacurta S., Scandone G. And M. Valentini (eds.), I servizi di informazione e il segreto di Stato, Giuffre, Milan. Giupponi T.F. (2010), 'La riforma del sistema di informazione per la sicurezza della Repubblica e la nuova disciplina del segreto di Stato' in Illuminati G. (ed.), Nuovi profili del segreto di Stato e dell'attivita di intelligence, Giappichelli, Turin. Giupponi T.F. and F. Fabbrini (2010), 'Intelligence Agencies and the State Secret Privilege: the Italian Experience', *International Constitutional Law Journal*, No 3. Government of Italy (22 November 2007), Regulations of the Parliamentary Committee for the Security of the Republic\n(COPASIR), available at\n(http://www.\n\nsicurezzanazionale.gov.it/web.nsf/documenti/Regolamento_Copasir.pdf). Government of Italy (3 August 2007), *Law No 124/2007*, available at (http://\nwww.sicurezzanazionale.gov.it/web.nsf/documenti/law_124_2007.pdf). Government of Italy (27 December 1947), *La Costituzione della Repubblica Italiana*, available at (http://www.sicurezzanazionale.gov.it/web.nsf/documenti/ Costituzione.pdf). Italian Parliament website, 'Comitato parlamentare per la sicurezza della Repubblica: Competenze, composizione e funzionamento', available at\n(http://www.parlamento.it/bicamerali/43775/43777/43783/44438/paginabicamerali.htm). Nardone C. (2008), 'Il controllo parlamentare sui servizi di informazione e sicurezza e sul segreto di Stato' in Dickmann R. Ans S. Staiano (eds.), Funzioni parlamentari non legislative e forma di governo. L'esperienza dell'Italia, Giuffre, Milan.\n\nANNEX A: COUNTRY CASE STUDIES\n\nVI. PARLIAMENTARY AND SPECIALISED OVERSIGHT OF\nSECURITY AND INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES\nIN THE NETHERLANDS\n\nNICK VERHOEVEN730\n\n1. INTRODUCTION\n\nPursuant to the Dutch Intelligence and Security Services Act 2002, the Netherlands has two intelligence and security services: the General Intelligence and Security Service (GISS) and the Defence Intelligence and Security Service (MISS).731 The core business of both services consists of processing information for example, collecting and disseminating information. This sets them apart from other more executory or coordinating services, such as the police or the National Coordinator for Counterterrorism (NCTb). Another important characteristic of the intelligence and security services is the use of surreptitious powers that invade personal privacy. The services use such powers to collect information. In the Netherlands, a distinction is made between intelligence collection and criminal investigation. When the police use special powers in the course of an investigation, this leads to criminal proceedings and is subject to review by the courts; this is not the case for intelligence collection. Consequently, oversight of the activities of intelligence and security services is necessary. Since the terms of reference for this chapter include an express request to leave out the military component, I will only deal with the oversight of GISS, the Dutch civil intelligence and security service.\n\n2. THE OVERSIGHT BODIES\n\nOversight in the Netherlands is exercised by parliament as well as specialised bodies. One of these specialised bodies, the Intelligence and Security Services Review Committee\n(CTIVD), has even been established specifically to exercise oversight over the intelligence and security services.\n\n2.1 Parliamentary oversight\n\nThe Dutch Parliament is composed of a First Chamber and a Second Chamber.732 The First Chamber (the Senate) does not exercise (direct) oversight over the activities of GISS. Two committees in the Second Chamber are concerned with the oversight of GISS: the Committee on the Intelligence and Security Services (ISS Committee) and the Committee on Home Affairs and Kingdom Relations (Home Affairs/KR Committee).733 The ISS Committee is constituted of the chairpersons of all the political parties represented in the Second Chamber.734 This is the only standing parliamentary committee which is authorised to discuss matters involving state secrets. Yet the members of this committee are not screened. This is an exception to the statutory rule on the handling of state secret information: normally speaking, access to state secret information is restricted to persons having security clearance, which is given to persons who have successfully passed security screening.735 In the Netherlands, however, it is considered incompatible with the principle of the separation of powers to screen members of the ISS Committee, and so they are not screened. Members of the ISS Committee affirm that they will observe confidentiality; this is the (sole) guarantee that the matters discussed in the committee will not be shared with non-members. The meetings of the ISS Committee are closed. The Committee does, however, render account for its activities in a public annual report. The Home Affairs/KR Committee is constituted of the subject experts of all the political parties represented in the Second Chamber. This Committee does not discuss matters involving state secrets. Its meetings with the Minister are public. The Home Affairs/KR Committee addresses matters falling under the responsibility of the Minister of Home Affairs and Kingdom Relations: these include GISS but also matters such as the integrity of public administration and democracy. The Committee has the same powers. Both Committees derive their mandate from the Constitution and more specifically from the Rules of Procedure of the Second Chamber. Both have authority to exercise parliamentary oversight of GISS, in principle over all aspects: efficiency, effectiveness, lawfulness and budget. In practice, the oversight primarily handles general issues. Both committees can ask the Minister concerned to provide all documents it deems necessary to examine in order to discharge its duties. It may also consult with a Minister either orally or in writing, or convene a round-table meeting. In addition, the Committees may hold hearings, make working visits, obtain information from advisory bodies, engage external experts or propose to the full Lower House to designate a large project.736 The abovementioned means that the Home Affairs/KR Committee takes the lead in the parliamentary oversight of GISS. The guiding principle, and a gentlemen's agreement between government and Parliament, is that as far as possible all matters are dealt with by the subject experts of the parliamentary groups. The ISS Committee is only brought in for matters unsuitable for being discussed in public. Consequently, the public annual report of GISS and its public reports are considered in the Home Affairs/KR Committee. The same applies to matters concerning GISS that have attracted media attention. And lastly, the public reports of the specialised oversight body CTIVD (see the next section) are discussed in the first place by the ISS Committee. In 2004, the Committee for the Administrative Evaluation of GISS, established by order of the Minister of the Interior and composed of specialists, issued a study report which not only dealt with the functioning of GISS but also how it was directed and supervised.737 The report concluded that even though the ISS Committee was a useful, confidential link between GISS and the Second Chamber, it hardly got around to an in-depth debate on the functioning of the service. It is generally recognised that this is partly due to the busy\n\nagendas of the chairpersons of the political groups in parliament and the fact that they are not specialists in the field of intelligence and security services. The two parliamentary committees in practice do not carry out investigations of their own and do not issue reports.\n\n2.2 Other oversight bodies\n2.2.1 The CTIVD The Intelligence and Security Services Review Committee (CTIVD) is the main specialised oversight body of GISS. It was established by statute (ISS Act 2002). The CTIVD is an independent government body whose main task is to review whether the ISS Act 2002, the law pertaining to the activities of GISS (and DISS), is implemented lawfully.738 The scope of this task not only covers the activities of GISS but also those of officers of other services who perform tasks for GISS pursuant to Article 60, ISS Act 2002. These are the Regional Intelligence Services which form part of the police force, the Tax and Customs Administration, the Fiscal Information and Investigation Service, the Customs, and the Royal Netherlands Military Constabulary. The CTIVD has three members, working part-time, one of whom acts as chairperson. Members are appointed after an extensive procedure, laid down in Article 65, ISS Act 2002.\n\nA group of three individuals selected from the highest spheres of the judiciary and the public service announce a vacancy and prepare a list containing at least three candidates. This serves as a list of recommendation to the Second Chamber, which may take it into account insofar as it deems it useful to do so. The Second Chamber may adopt the list, change the order of recommendation or reject the list and take the procedure in hand itself.\n\nThe Second Chamber prepares a list of three persons and sends it to the ministers concerned, namely the Prime Minister, the Minister of Home Affairs and Kingdom Relations and the Minister of Defence. After the ministers have agreed on a candidate, he or she is referred to GISS for a security screening. When the result of the security screening is positive, the person can be appointed. So the judiciary, the legislature and the executive are all represented in the procedure. This arrangement was chosen in an attempt to embed the independent nature of the committee in the appointment procedure. The CTIVD has a secretariat (Section 69, ISS Act 2002), which provides substantive support to the Committee. At present the secretariat is composed of a secretary and four investigators. They, too, have all been security screened. Since the CTIVD concentrates on lawfulness, it is not surprising that the Committee is made up predominantly of qualified lawyers. Article 65(4), ISS Act 2002, even requires that two of the members be qualified lawyers. In practice, all investigators have been qualified lawyers so far. The CTIVD has an annual budget of around a million euro. The CTIVD has several tasks. Its main task is that of reviewing whether the ISS Act 2002 and the Security Screening Act are implemented lawfully, in other words: oversight of the activities of GISS and DISS. So its oversight does not cover the efficiency and effectiveness of the services' activities. In practice, the CTIVD performs its oversight task in two ways: it conducts in-depth investigations resulting in review reports that are made public, and it monitors a number of activities of the services. In addition to its main task, the CTIVD also has an advisory task: it can give advice to the ministers concerned, both on request and on its own initiative. This task is not limited to lawfulness alone. Finally, the CTIVD has the task of advising the ministers on complaints relating to the conduct of GISS or DISS. In this case, it acts as an internal complaints advisory committee within the meaning of Article 9:15(4) of the General Administrative Law Act and assumes the task of dealing with the substance of the complaint. The advice of the CTIVD is sent to the Minister, but ultimately the Minister gives an independent decision on the complaint. If the Minister does not adopt the advice of the CTIVD, s/he must enclose the advice when sending his/her decision to the complainant. If the complainant disagrees with the decision given by the Minister, he or she may lodge the complaint once again, this time with the National Ombudsman (see section 2.2.2). The CTIVD handles about 1015 complaints each year, of which the lot are manifestly ill-founded. The CTIVD has been given far-reaching statutory powers for the purposes of performing its main review task (Sections 74 through 77, ISS Act 2002). For example, the CTIVD has access to all relevant (state secret) information of the services and it may hear all employees of the services, who are then required to give the CTIVD all the relevant information. There are no restrictions in this area. Furthermore the CTIVD has power to hear witnesses under oath and to summon expert witnesses. Finally, it has the authority to enter any and all places when it deems it necessary, except dwellings. Whenever the CTIVD has conducted an in-depth investigation, it prepares a review report based on this investigation (Section 79, ISS Act 2002). The report must in any case comprise a public part and sometimes it also has a secret part. Both parts are drawn up by the CTIVD and sent to the minister concerned, the Minister of Home Affairs/KR in the case of GISS. The minister may then send his comments on the report to the CTIVD, stating among other things whether the public part of the report contains passages that ought not to be made public. The CTIVD incorporates the minister's comments at its discretion and subsequently adopts the report, which is then again sent to the minister. The minister must forward the report, with an accompanying note, to both chambers of parliament within six weeks. The minister sends the secret part to the aforementioned Parliamentary ISS\nCommittee, under strict confidentiality. The CTIVD publishes the public parts of the reports on its website. The CTIVD also issues a public annual report, in which it reports on its activities. Generally the reports are of a juridical nature and cover the theoretical framework involved, the facts and conclusions and recommendations. The CTIVD tries to say as much as possible in the reports, and has set its own rule that irregularities will always be mentioned, however brief or abstract, in the report itself and not only in the secret part. The CTIVD publishes 24 reports each year. The CTIVD also conducts (systematic) monitoring activities. These include official messages, telephone taps, signals intelligence, security screenings, applications for inspection of files and the obligation to notify. The monitoring is done by random inspections. In this way the CTIVD obtains a picture of the key activities of the services.\n\nThe monitoring findings do not result in a report to parliament, but they can lead to the CTIVD writing a letter to the GISS or starting an in-depth investigation. Since the CTIVD both receives and produces state secret information, it has an office of its own at its disposal which fully satisfies the highest security standards. The CTIVD, among other things, makes use of fingerprint access, a secure internal network and a vault. It also has a secured connection with GISS and has its own workspace and computers at the service. There, the CTIVD has direct access to the digital system of GISS. 2.2.2 To complete the picture: non-specialised oversight bodies A number of organisations exercise some form of oversight of GISS with regard to specific aspects. These organisations do not focus on GISS only but on public bodies in general. Oversight of the financial aspect of the activities of GISS in a broad sense is exercised by the Netherlands Court of Audit and the National Audit Service. The Court of Audit has the power to check whether revenue and expenditure are balanced and in addition has the duty of reviewing whether policies are implemented as intended. In doing so, it may also scrutinise state secret information. The duties and powers of the Court of Audit are laid down in the Government Accounts Act 2001. The National Audit Service is part of the national government and can do audits of a more financial nature. Both agencies have a number of employees who have been screened specifically for doing this work. Both the Court of Audit and the National Audit Service may issue public reports. The audits are done yearly. The last specific report about the GISS however dates from before the ISS Act of\n2002. The National Ombudsman deals with complaints from citizens and can make non-binding recommendations based on its investigation. A person having a complaint about GISS must first lodge the complaint with the Minister of Home Affairs/Kingdom Relations, who will call in the CTIVD in its capacity as complaints advisory committee. If the complainant disagrees with the Minister's decision on the complaint, he or she can lodge the complaint once again, this time with the National Ombudsman. The latter has the power to inspect state secret documents in the possession of the service. A number of employees of the National Ombudsman have been screened for this purpose. The activities of the National Ombudsman are based on the National Ombudsman Act.\n\n3. OVERSIGHT ON THE PROCESSING OF INFORMATION\n\n3.1 Information processing 3.1.1 General As was stated in the introduction, processing information is the core business of any intelligence and security service. The ISS Act 2002 does in fact acknowledge this. Pursuant to Article 1.f of the Act, processing information covers just about everything that can be done with information: 'any action or any set of actions regarding information, including in any case collecting, recording, arranging, storing, updating, altering, retrieving, consulting or using information, providing information by forwarding it, disseminating or making information available in any other way, assembling, interrelating, protecting, exchanging or destroying information'. Division 3 of the Act sets a number of requirements for information processing. Processing information may take place exclusively for a specific purpose and only in so far as necessary for the proper implementation of the law. It must also be done with due and proper care. In addition, the information processed must be accompanied by an indication of the degree of reliability or a reference to the document or source from which the information has been derived. In the case of the processing of personal data, additional provisions apply regarding the categories of data that may be processed and restrictions are imposedfor example, with respect to data processing solely based on religion or sexual orientation. These requirements apply to any form of information processing, including therefore the internal analysis or circulation of information. Some forms of information processing are subject to additional requirements. These will be discussed below. Thanks to the existence of all these provisions, there is a manageable legal review framework available to the persons exercising oversight of this aspect of the activities of GISS. There is no real parliamentary oversight of information processing, since parliamentary oversight is restricted to general issues, while information processing is predominantly a matter of detail. Since the CTIVD is a specialised oversight body with a staff of its own, while its main task is reviewing the lawfulness of activities, it is pre-eminently equipped to exercise oversight over the conduct of GISS in this area. The findings of the CTIVD can then serve as the basis for a debate between government and parliament. The fact that the oversight of GISS is exercised by the CTIVD and not by another oversight body is decisive for the form the oversight takes. This is due to the fact that the CTIVD\nreviews for lawfulness. This implies that the law is the guiding principle for the selection of matters to be investigated and also for the assessment of actual cases. So, where the law does not provide a (clear) review framework for a specific matter, review of this matter will necessarily be minimal or even absent. The CTIVD has not explicitly designated information processing as one of its focus areas. It is indeed not necessary to do so. In many of the review reports issued so far by the CTIVD, the information processing that took place in the specific case under review was tested against the aforementioned review framework. The guiding questions in all reviews are: did the retrieving and sharing of information satisfy the requirements of, inter alia, purpose, necessity and proper and due care? Naturally, the CTIVD always restricts itself to testing for reasonableness: it is not the intention for the CTIVD to repeat the work of GISS but to review whether the service could reasonably have made the decisions it made and made the decisions with proper and due care. Two arrangements are included in the law that give citizens a possibility to take note or become aware of the attention GISS has given them: they concern the application for inspection of files and the obligation to notify. Both are monitored by the CTIVD. A citizen may file an application for inspection of his own data file or of the data file concerning an administrative matter (for example in the context of journalistic or historic research). The CTIVD conducts random inspections of such applications and assesses whether GISS interpreted the application correctly and has actually released the data qualifying for release. The obligation to notify means that five years after an investigation into a person is terminated, GISS must inform this person that certain special powers have been used if this does not conflict with the interest of keeping it secret. The CTIVD also conducts sample inspections with respect to this obligation and has published a report on an in-depth investigation concerning the obligation.739 3.1.2 National sharing of information For the purposes of the ISS Act 2002, information sharing is understood as a form of information processing. Consequently, whenever GISS requests or receives information from other agencies or shares information with others this falls under the provisions pertaining to information processing, as set out in part 3.1.1 above. Some additional requirements apply, moreover, to the external sharing of (personal) data by GISS with other agencies.\n\nAs was discussed above, the CTIVD has selected a number of the services' activities for structural monitoring. One of these activities is that of issuing official messages. It is a statutory requirement that when personal data are provided to other agencies, while these agencies may take action based on such data, the provision of the data must be effected in writing. This happens in the form of official messages. Every six months the CTIVD\nexamines whether the official messages issued in the preceding six months arebriefly statedcovered by the underlying documentation. In fact, the CTIVD thus monitors every piece of information disclosed by the services which may have consequences for a citizen; for example, in an asylum or deportation procedure or in criminal proceedings. The CTIVD has also issued a report on an in-depth investigation into the official messages issued by GISS, which presents a clear picture of the review framework.740 When the CTIVD, in the process of monitoring the official messages, comes across things which it holds to be incorrect, it can inform the head of GISS, the Minister of Home Affairs/Kingdom Relations or, as a last resort, the Second Chamber. It can also decide to start an in-depth investigation. 3.1.3 International sharing of information Traditionally, the international sharing of information between intelligence and security services has always been a sensitive subject. Parliament has shown a certain amount of interest in the subject, particularly because of the controversy entailed in the cooperation with countries that are not very particular about human rights. Parliament is confronted, however, with the fact that the services will not say publicly with whom and how they cooperate. The subject can be raised in the ISS Committee, but this happens only occasionally and not in-depth because of the committee's set-up. So in regard to this aspect as well, the oversight exercised by the CTIVD plays an important role. The official rules laid down in the ISS Act 2002 give some guidance but certainly not complete clarity. Here, too, the general framework for information processing applies but in practice the additional provisions are the most important. These are stated in general terms, however. Considered in connection with the exchanges between government and Parliament while the bill was being debated, it can be deduced, for example, that cooperation may not be contrary to the interests to be protected by GISS; for example, the protection of human rights. In 2009, the CTIVD issued a report on the cooperation between GISS and foreign services.741 Obviously, the report assessed only the actions of GISS, that is: only one side of the cooperation. The CTIVD examinedamong other thingsthe agreements with foreign services, whether GISS' sharing of information with foreign partners, requesting and rendering assistance and carrying out joint operations fit within the parameters set by law, parliamentary history and its internal policy (which is based on the former). It was no obstacle to the proper conduct of the investigation that for its examination only the information present at GISS was available to the CTIVD, and not the information at the foreign services. The CTIVD was concerned with the actions of GISS, as documented by GISS. It should be noted that the investigation resulted in critical findings, causing GISS to tighten its procedures. The CTIVD has the impression that both the assessment framework (with whom may GISS cooperate?) and the procedures (what form is the cooperation to take?) have gained in quality as a result. The investigation also covered the cooperative groups formed with international and European organisations. The cooperation in these groups is, however, always cooperation at a more abstract level; not the level of personal data but of analytical, strategic products.\n\nThis makes it straightaway a less interesting form of cooperation from the perspective of lawfulness. The CTIVD has little to review in regard to these forms of cooperation. Due to the limited resources of the CTIVD, sharing information with foreign services is not part of the structural monitoring. The subject, however, deserves attention since it plays a major role in the work of GISS and can potentially have grave consequences for individuals. 3.1.4 Joint analysis Since 2005, the Netherlands has had the Counter-Terrorism Infobox (CT Infobox), a cooperative group comprising GISS and a number of other bodies (police, INS, Royal Netherlands Military Constabulary etc.) and set up for the purposes of sharing information to combat terrorism and radicalisation. Since very strict secrecy requirements and a closed system for providing such information apply to the information in the possession of GISS, it was decided to locate the CT Infobox at GISS while furthermore the ISS Act 2002 must be applied to the activities of the cooperative group. This means that the CTIVD has the authority to exercise oversight over the activities of the CT Infobox. In 2007, the CTIVD issued a report on the CT Infobox in which all sorts of aspects of the cooperative group were considered after in-depth review: including persons in the box, removing persons from the box, access to systems of the participating organisations, the legal basis for the phenomenon and the status of the recommendations issued by the box.742 In the case of the CT Infobox, there is again no direct oversight by Parliament. But the CTIVD report has been very useful in providing Parliament with information, enabling it to have an informed discussion with the Minister. For some time now we have had the National Coordinator for Counterterrorism in the Netherlands. It does not fall under the ISS Act 2002 and does not have a separate oversight body. This is not considered necessary because, as far as information processing is concerned, the service merely acts as a coordinator and an intermediary. It does not itself collect information nor disseminate information of its own, and it does not make use of special powers.\n\n3.1.5 Collection of open source information The collection of open source information is governed by the same provisions as were set out above with regard to the processing of information, on the understanding that the ISS\nAct 2002 considers the collection of open source information to be the lightest form (as regards privacy infringement) of collecting information. In this perspective, it is in fact worthy of praise when the service can manage solely by collecting open source information.\n\nFor this reason, the CTIVD subjects the collection of open source information to very minimal review.\n\n3.2 Finances As was already stated above in part 2.2.2, budgetary oversight has not been vested in the regular oversight body, the CTIVD, but in the authorities that audit the expenditure of the central government in general: the Netherlands Court of Audit and the National Audit Service. These bodies conduct an annual audit of the financial picture of GISS. If the occasion arises, however, the CTIVD may take financial aspects into account. For example, when the CTIVD examines whether an operation was carried out within the parameters of the service's internal guidelines, it may also examine whether the internal control of expenditure was performed correctly. This is a very infrequent examination which the CTIVDbecause the CTIVD is no expert on these issuesnecessarily performs with restraint.\n\n4. GOOD/BAD PRACTICES It is important to have a clear grasp of the objective of oversight and what is therefore the task of an oversight body. Does the oversight serve the purpose of establishing whether the service performs its numerous activities in compliance with the law, for example because the service has far-reaching powers which are used secretly? In 2002, this latter circumstance was the reason for establishing the CTIVD: it was expressly linked to the case law of the ECHR requiring that in case of secret privacy intrusions, citizens must in certain circumstances have an opportunity to address the intrusions: this called for an oversight body which could exercise in-depth oversight of the lawfulness of the activities of the services. Or does the oversight serve to enable Parliament to monitor whether the service does what government and Parliament have agreed? In this case, oversight of lawfulness is too limited a tool and Parliament might itself have to assume greater responsibility for the oversight.\n\nIn the Netherlands, the limited scope of the CTIVD (the accent on legality) has been criticised. It has been argued though that this limited scope enables the CTIVD to look at all important issues while still maintaining a sound distance from purely operational matters.\n\nIt is of overriding importance that the committee charged with the oversight, whether parliamentary or specialised, is supported by staff members working fulltime at exercising oversight. In the Dutch system, the choice has been to establish a specialised committee that is supported by a secretariat. Parliamentary committees do not have a supporting secretariat. Thus a system has developed in which the CTIVD rather quietly conducts indepth investigations that result in public reports, which provide Parliament with a basis for questioning the government about the activities of its intelligence and security services. This appears to work well: experience has taught that members of parliamentand certainly the chairpersons of parliamentary groups constituting the ISS Committeehave little time, capacity for, or interest in conducting detailed investigations. Partly because of the elaborate appointment procedure of its members and the emphasis in its tasks on lawfulness, the CTIVD does not have a political profile. This means that the government, the services and Parliament can be confident that its investigations are conducted objectively and with great care. In this way, the system provides for well-balanced public information in a domain which, because of its secrecy, can be a playing field for unverifiable rumours and political fireworks. Since the CTIVD cannot issue binding decisions, it is the responsibility of parliament to induce the government to act on the basis of the information provided by the CTIVD. In this sense, the decision of how to weigh conclusions regarding the actions of the intelligence and security services remains with the elected parliament and not with the CTIVD: the primacy lies with politics. The consequences of the findings of the specialised oversight body are determined in the debate between government and Parliament. This system of a division of tasks between Parliament and the specialised oversight body will only function well if Parliament can make effective use of the information provided by the CTIVD. Dutch law does not say anything about the contacts between the CTIVD and Parliament, so these contacts have been given an informal shape. Perhaps it would do no harm to safeguard the process in some way or other (by law), so as to ensure cooperation between Parliament and the specialised oversight body. Some other good practices appear to be rather self-evident: in any case, there must be an oversight body which 'can dive into' the services on its own initiative to investigate. This body must have access to all information. Some oversight systems make an exception for, e.g., operational information or information concerning cooperation with foreign services.\n\nSuch restrictions may sound reasonable to some but they are disastrous for the credibility of an oversight body. Operations or cooperation with foreign services make up a large and complex part of the activities of intelligence and security services. Passing over these activities practically turns the oversight into mere window dressing. Following on from this, the oversight body must be able to determine itself which information it does or does not consider relevant: in this sense, the oversight body determines its own procedure. Of course the oversight body may pay heed to (legitimate) wishes of the service being investigated, like how the information should be handled, but in the end the oversight body must be able to determine itself how it performs its taskswithin the parameters of legislation and regulations. This will prevent the need for repeated discussions or negotiations between the oversight body and service. Finally, the oversight body must be able to issue reports that are public and this must also be the basic principle. Secret information cannot be debated and it would then be impossible to make a contribution to the public reporting on the activities of the services.\n\nREFERENCES\n\nAct on the constitution of the Kingdom of the Netherlands 1815, *Stb.* 2008, 348. CTIVD (2010), *Review report on the performance of the GISS on the obligation to notify*, Kamerstukken II 2009/10, 29 924, No 49 (attachment), available at (www.ctivd.nl). CTIVD (2009), Review report on the cooperation of GISS with foreign intelligence and/or security services, *Kamerstukken II* 2009/10, 29 924, No 39 (attachment), available at\n(www.ctivd.nl). CTIVD (2007), Review report on the Counter-Terrorism Infobox, *Kamerstukken II* 2006/07,\n29 924, No 16 (attachment), available at (www.ctivd.nl). CTIVD (2006), Review report on the official reports issued by GISS in the period from January 2004January 2006, *Kamerstukken II* 2005/06, 29 924, No 13 (attachment), available at (www.ctivd.nl). Havermans Commissie (2004), *De AIVD in verandering*, Van Langen Drukwerk, Rijswijk.\n\n\nIntelligence and Security Services Act 2002, *Stb.* 2002, 148.\n\n____________________________________________________________________________________________ Rules of Procedure of the Second Chamber 1994. *Kamerstukken II* 1991/92 and 1992/93,\n22 590, *handelingen II* 1992/93, Nos 31 and 33.\n\n\nSecurity Screening Act 1996. *Stb.* 1996, 525.\n\n\n\n## Annex A: Country Case Studies Vii. Parliamentary And Specialised Oversight Of Security And Intelligence Agencies In Spain Susana Sanchez Ferro\n\n 1. INTRODUCTION\n\nThe Spanish oversight system of its security743 and intelligence services744 has improved in recent yearsmainly as a reaction to various scandals revealed by the Spanish pressbut there is still a long way to go. When it comes to the fight against terrorism, there is a tacit pact (broken from time-to-time) among the main Spanish political parties to let the government lead this fight and show the country's unity on its anti-terrorism policy, preferring to keep any disaccord over the policy under wraps. Regarding the oversight of the intelligence agency, since 2002 there has been a specialised committee in place to oversee its activities, which is a clear improvement. A culture of oversight is emerging but there are still some flaws in the mechanisms of oversight that will need significant effort to remedy.\n\n2. VALUABLE TOOLS FOR PARLIAMENTARY OVERSIGHT OF\nTHE SECURITY SERVICES: A STRICT DEFINITION OF THE\nLEGAL MANDATE OF THE INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES AND A REDUCTION OF THE SCOPE OF SECRECY\n\n2.1 The National Intelligence Centre (CNI) legal mandate\n\nThe first way to diminish the danger posed to democracy by intelligence and security services is for Parliament to limit their powers through detailed legal provisions.745 The absence of a clear and explicit legal basis for intelligence agencies 'may bring a state into conflict with constitutional or human rights norms, especially in the case of powers affecting individuals'746 and will hinder the oversight of intelligence agencies as there will be no set limit to their activities. A mandate for the intelligence agencies that is strictly compatible with the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights would be an essential tool to allow the Parliamentary Committees in charge of oversight to carry out their functions.747\n\n\nIn 2002, the Spanish Parliament passed two acts applicable to the CNI: the National Intelligence Centre Act (2002)748 and the Act on Ex Ante Judicial Oversight of the National Intelligence Centre (2002).749 The new legal regime implied a new legitimacy for the activities of the CNI.750 Unfortunately, however, Parliament did not take this opportunity to improve the legal framework: the definition of the functions and activities of the Centre is too broad. Though the law in this field is usually quite vague, the National Intelligence Centre Act of 2002 is too vague. Article 1(a) of the Act, for example, reads that the Centre shall gather, analyse and interpret information, and disseminate the intelligence needed to promote the political, economic, industrial, commercial and strategic interests of Spain. Intelligence services can exercise their functions in order to enhance the economic well-being of the population. But to allow them to gather, analyse and interpret the information, as well as disseminate the intelligence needed to promote commercial and industrial strategic or economic interests goes beyond just protecting the economic well-being of the country. On the other hand, the law provides that the Centre will act in accordance with the goals fixed by the government in the Intelligence Directivebut this Intelligence Directive is secret (see Articles 2 and 3 in the National Intelligence Centre Act).\n\n2.2 The scope of secrecy in Spain as an obstacle to the parliamentary oversight of the Intelligence Agency The scope of secrecy in Spain is too broad. The government can classify any object, information or document whose publicity could pose a risk to defence or national security as secret (see Articles 2 and 4 of the Official Secrets Act).751 The information can be classified in two different categories, 'secret' or 'confidential', depending on the degree of protection required. The government passed two resolutions classifying different categories of information so that any information that falls within these categories must be considered classified.752 There is no proper system of declassification for the documents, no automatic declassification of the documents after a certain number of years, nor any systematic review of the documents.753 The competent classifying authorities have to mark the document, when possible, with a date for declassification but there are no time limits for a document to be declassified.754 The government is the only competent authority to declassify official secrets. Of course, it does not have the time to review every document classified as secret. There is too much classified information and this can have a negative impact on the control of the security services by Parliament. Even if Parliament has access to secret information, Parliament can get lost in the countless secret documents.\n\n3. ACCESS TO (SECRET) GOVERNMENT INFORMATION BY\nPARLIAMENT Article 109 of the Spanish Constitution gives Parliamentary Committees a right to request, through their respective Speaker, any kind of information or help they may need from the government, government departments and any authorities of the state. This right is not given to individual members of Parliament (MPs).755 The Committees may request, through the Speaker:\ni) Such information and documentation as they may require from the government and administrative bodies;\nii) The attendance of members of the government to report on matters relating to their respective department;\niii) The attendance of authorities and civil servants competent in the subject matter of the debate so that they report to the committee; and iv) The attendance of persons competent in the subject matter of the debate for the purposes of reporting to and advising the committee.756\n\nArticle 10.2 of the Official Secrets Act determines that Parliament will have access to classified information in the way established by the Parliament Standing Orders and in secret sessions. The Standing Orders did not say anything about access to classified information. This omission was solved by the President of Congress through the Resolution of 18 December 1986, amended by the Resolution of 2 June 1992757 and the Resolution of\n11 May 2004. Therefore, only Congress has ruled on access to secret information by members of Congress. According to the 1986 Resolution, one or more political groups amounting to at least threequarters of the Members of the House (263 MPs from a total of 350) were empowered to request access to classified information via the House President. Secret information would then be given to three MPs belonging to different political groups, elected by a three-fifths majority (210 MPs) for the whole term. When the information was classified as confidential, it would be given to the Spokespersons of the different parliamentary groups (Article 2 of the Resolution). The government, exceptionally and only by justifying it, could ask the House's Bureau to share the information with the President of Congress alone. The Bureau would have to decide on this. He could then ask to share the information with the Committee involved in the matter under discussion, in secret session and with attendance only of the members of the Committee (see Article 2, Section 3 of the 1986 Resolution). On the other hand, Parliamentary Committees, through the President of the House, could also ask for access to classified information. When the information was classified as secret, the government would share the information with the three MPs as stated in Article 2. If the information was classified as confidential, the government would share the information with the MPs that act as spokesmen for their political groups in the Committee. The government, exceptionally and only by justifying it, could also ask the House's Bureau to share the information with the President of the Committee alone or to share the information with the Committee, in secret session, and with attendance only of the members of the Committee (see Article 3 of the 1986 Resolution). With this regulation, no member of Herri Batasuna (HB)later illegalised for being the political branch of the ETA (*Euskadi Ta Askatasuna)*would ever have access to secret information as they would never get the necessary votes to be elected to have access to that information. The 1992 Resolution changed the majority needed to request classified information to 'only' one-fourth (88) of the MPs in Congress (see Article 2). On the other hand, instead of sharing the information with three MPs, the government would share the information classified as secret with one MP from each political group in Congress as established under Article 23.1 of the Standing Orders of the House (elected by a three-fifths majority for the whole term).758 HB could not form its own political group in the House and had to join the non-attached political group. The non-attached group is not constituted following Article 23 so the non-attached group (with HB) would be excluded from the access to secret information.\n\nHB was declared illegal in 2003 by the Supreme Court759 in accordance with the Spanish Political Parties Act of 2002.760 Probably because of this, in 2004 the President of Congress made a new resolution by which any reference to Article 23.1 of the Standing Orders disappeared. Now, when information is classified as secret, the government will share the information with one MP for every political group of the House. The MPs will be elected for this by a three-fifths majority in the House. When the information is classified as confidential, the government will share the information with the Chairmen of the political groups or their representatives at the Committee when the request came from it (Articles 3\nand 4 of the Congress Resolution). Thus there is a representative of each political group in the House that has access to secret information.\n\n4. HANDLING OF CLASSIFIED INFORMATION BY MPs When the information concerns a particular document, MPs with access to classified information can ask the relevant authority to show them the document (the original or a photocopy) if they believe their knowledge of the information would be incomplete without seeing it (see the Resolutions mentioned above). The MPs are allowed to see the documents for themselves and take notes under the supervision of the authority that shows them the document but they cannot copy or reproduce them. The MPs examine the document in the House, unless the House President thinks that it will be better to improve access to particular information to see documents in the place where they are kept (see, in this regard, Articles 7 and 8 of the 2004 Resolution). Secret documents cannot be reproduced or kept by the MPs (see Article 11.3 of the CNI Act). Access by parliamentary staff to these documents is not envisaged by the law. In a case where some MPs from the Catalonian Parliament wanted to be accompanied by their parliamentary staff in the analysis of some bank statements of the Government of Catalonia, the Spanish Constitutional Court said that although the right of access to the documents belonged to the MPs they could be accompanied by experts from their parliamentary groupstaff of their group in Parliament (registered as such in the House)as otherwise they would not be able to exercise their functions as MPs and carry out real oversight of the Government of Catalonia (right to representation of Article 23.1 of the Spanish Constitution).761 It does not seem that this doctrine could also be extended to access to classified documents by MPs as even individual MPs cannot access secret information themselves. All those MPs with access to secret information must refrain from disclosing any proceedings which may be of a secret nature (Article 16 of the Standing Orders of Congress). The sanction for breaching this obligation is disciplinary. A Member may be deprived, by resolution of the Bureau, of some or all of the rights granted to him/her under Sections 6 to 9 of these Standing Orders (Articles 99.1 and 101 of the Standing Orders of Congress), which include the right to vote, the right to sit in at least in one committee, to request information or to be paid a financial allowance; the MP can even be suspended for a time.762 If the cause behind the penalty may, in the opinion of the Bureau, constitute a criminal offence, the Speaker shall convey the incriminating facts to the judicial authority with jurisdiction (Article 101.3 of the Standing Orders of Congress). This being said, is the disclosure by an MP of information that he or she has received in secret session to the press or citizens a criminal offence? Articles 584 and 598 to 603 of the Spanish Criminal Code dealing with crimes related to revealing classified information seem to apply to MPs that have access to official secrets.\n\nArticle 598 provides that he who reveals or renders useless information classified as secret or confidential, related to national security, will be sanctioned with imprisonment from one to four years. Article 584 provides that the Spanish national who reveals secret or confidential information that may harm national security with the intention to benefit a foreign nation will be considered a traitor and sanctioned with six to twelve years imprisonment. Despite this, we could argue that the Resolution of the Supreme Court No\n921/2006 of 26 September opens a window to reinterpret these norms. In its sentence of 4 April 1997, the Supreme Court held that classified information does not lose its classified character, not even in a case when it is made public by the press: this information is protected until the government decides to declassify it (although the Supreme Court could review the secret documents in private and tell the government to declassify them if there is no harm for national security). In its Resolution of 2006, the Supreme Court affirms that the activities of the Centre that clearly exceed the aims to which the declaration of secrecy is made, cannot automatically be covered by secrecy. Information about illegal interception of communications could not be considered classified because the classification was made in broad categories, that is, in abstract, without referring to particular facts (e.g., methods and operations of the Intelligence Service), and its revelation, as it covered criminal offences, did not affect the national security of the nation. We could think, then, that an MP revealing criminal offences covered by the veil of secrecy would not being condemned by the judges as they could consider that this information would not be really classified. Despite this, it would be better for the legislature to foresee a mechanism to allow MPs to reveal this kind of information, minimising the dangers of leaving MPs to be judges of the secret nature of information.\n\n5. THE OVERSIGHT OF THE SECURITY AND INTELLIGENCE SERVICES BY PARLIAMENTARY COMMITTEES\n\n5.1 Introduction Undoubtedly, access to secret information by Parliament is essential to carry out effective oversight of the information services and departments763 but it is not enough. Different abuses uncovered by the Spanish press committed by the Intelligence Agency were clear proof that a specialised body was needed to oversee the Intelligence Agency.764 Because of this, the CNI Act of 2002 gave a committee, the so-called Secret Funds Committee, the special task of controlling the activities of the CNI (but not those of the Police and the Guardia Civil). The Committee was created as a consequence of a case of embezzlement of secret funds by the Director of the Guardia Civil.765 When it comes to the oversight of the Security Forces, the Standing Orders of Congress and the Senate contemplate a Permanent Home Affairs Committee to control internal affairs so that any questions related to the subject are supposed to be dealt with by these two Committees.766 The Parliament Home Affairs Committees are in charge of the oversight of the Security Forces and have access to secret information through the channels established by the Standing Orders of Congress. These Committees are in charge of a mixture of tasks, including those of a legislative nature.\n\n5.2 Oversight of the use of secret funds by the Security Forces and the CNI and oversight of the budget of the CNI The law provides that secret funds of the Security Forces and the CNI must only be used to cover expenses necessary to protect national security (Article 1, 11/1995 Act). The power to authorise expenditures of these funds and the special means by which these expenditures have to be justified is vested in the Ministers of Defense, Home Affairs, Foreign Affairs and Justice. Secret expenditures must be included in the budget. The departments that handle secret funds must report to the Secret Funds Committee on the use of the money every six months (Articles 2 and 7.2 of the Secret Funds Act) and on the internal rules that these departments approved to make sure that credits are handled by the authorities of their department in accordance with the legal ends established by the 1995 Act (Article 6 of the Secret Funds Act). The Parliamentary Oversight Committee must send a report to Congress whenever the Ministers ask for an increase in the amount of secret funds.\n\nSince 2002, the Secret Funds Committee must also oversee the use of the budget by the CNI and every aspect of the activities of the Intelligence Agency (Article 11.1 of the CNI\nAct). When it comes to the budget of the CNI, the CNI has the power to make a preliminary draft of it (Article 8.2, Act 11/2002) and the government will incorporate this into the total budget. Parliament has the power to approve the final budget. The use made of the budget by the CNI is overseen by the Court of Exchequer, whose components are appointed by Parliament (Article 30 of the Exchequer Court Act 2/1982, of 12 May).\n\n5.3 The oversight of CNI activities The Secret Funds Committee, in charge of oversight of the CNI, is made up of the President of Congress and the Congressmen that have access to official secrets in accordance with the rules of the House (Article 7.1 of the Secret Funds Act). The spokesmen of every political group in the House have been elected to be part of this Committee. On the one hand, this is positive as it reflects that Parliament gives the utmost importance to this matter but, on the other hand, these MPs are involved in everyday business of Parliament and do not have much time to focus on the CNI, aside from the fact that they do not seem to have parliamentary support staff to carry out their job in this Committee. The Committee will not have access to any classified information from a foreign secret service (Article 11.2 of the CNI Act). This is an important exception in an interconnected world. The CNI Act also excludes access by the Committee to information on the methods and sources of the intelligence service. Under Article 1.2 of the Spanish Constitution, citizens are the source of legitimacy of all powers and the MPs are their representatives. They must know what the executive does and judge for themselves whether these activities merit the secrecy with which they are surrounded. Why must we trust our security services and government but not our MPs to keep secret the sources and methods of the CNI and the information coming from other foreign intelligence agencies? The Government is obliged by law to send information to the Committee annually about intelligence aims. The Committee will also receive the annual report evaluating the activities of the Centre and the degree of accomplishment of the aims fixed by the government (Article 11.2 of the CNI Act). Of course, the sessions of the Committee are secret (Article 11.1 of the CNI Act). Until 2002, Spanish law did not envisage an obligation by the Intelligence Agency of reporting to Parliament on its activities. Because of this, and because of the breadth of secrecy, Parliament was half blinded when it wanted to ask for information that could be relevant to control the Intelligence Agency. Fortunately, the CNI\nAct established the obligation by the CNI to inform the Parliamentary Committee about its activities annually and, despite the vague character of the information, it can always give clues to Parliament on what to ask for (Article 11.4 of the CNI Act, 11/2002, of 6 May). Obviously, the Director will have the means to hide what he does not want Parliament to know and an annual report can be too general or vague. The Committee usually develops more *ex post* oversight than *ex ante* control. The avoidance of possible abuses demands an active Committee with time to devote to its task, which uses all available means, and a law that obliges the security services to report more often. Until now, the Committee seems to have acted only after the press raised the alarm rather than at its own initiative. The population already knew about wrongdoings by the CNI before the Committee acted upon them. We ignore whether the activity of the Committee has produced any change in the way these services operate, as the activities of the Committee are too secretive. There has been no real discussion about the value of these ad hoc investigations by parliamentary committees on security matters.\n\n6. OMBUDSMAN CONTROL The Spanish Ombudsman is appointed by Parliament and his task is to protect the fundamental rights of the people. To accomplish its tasks, the Ombudsman has the power to supervise any activity of the Spanish Administration (Article 54 of the Spanish Constitution and Articles 1, 2, 9 and 10.2 of the Ombudsman Act of 6 April 1981 [Act 3/1981]). Article 22 of the Ombudsman Act provides that the Ombudsman can request public authorities to send him any document that he considers necessary for his/her work, even those classified according to the Official Secrets Act. Only the Ombudsman and his deputy will have access to official secrets.767 The Ombudsman must ask the government for authorisation to access the classified documents and establish the mechanisms to protect the secret documents. The government can decide that the documents should not be sent to the Ombudsman, in a written agreement. The Ombudsman and his Deputy do not have to go through a vetting process or a security clearance; the key element here is whether the government grants them access to the documents. If they are granted access, no reference can be made in the Ombudsman's annual report to the content of secret documents or in response to the complainant. The Ombudsman considers whether to give information about the classified documents to Congress and the Senate or not. When the Ombudsman thinks that the denial of access can seriously affect the development of his investigations, he must notify the Congress-Senate Committee of relations with the Ombudsman, and then Parliament can act. The investigation by the Ombudsman, if the complaint is upheld, concludes with a recommendation for putting matters right (Articles 23, 28.2 and 30.1 of the Ombudsman Act).768 The Ombudsman can, if s/he thinks that the abuse committed by the administrative authorities or personnel amounts to a criminal offence, inform the Public Prosecutor. The activity of the ombudsman in the field of intelligence and the security forces has not been great (see his Annual Reports of 1993, 1995, 1999 and 2002).769 There are some recommendations about police files and their handling by the police, mainly about how to keep secret the personal data of the citizens discussed in police files. The Ombudsman, at least, has the tools to initiate investigations when he receives complaints about the Intelligence Services and departments of law enforcement agencies, but has not made much use of them.\n\n## 1. Good Practices\n\n\n\nThere is an MP for every political group of the House represented in the Committee that controls the CNI.\n\nThe Special Rules establish control over secret funds. Money can many times tell\nbetter than any general annual report what exactly the intelligence services are\ndoing.\n\nControl of the use of secret funds extends not only to the CNI but also to the Police and the Guardia Civil.\n\nThe Committee that controls secret funds is the same that controls the CNI.\n\nThere is continuity of the members of the Committee for the whole term and the way they are elected, which requires a high consensus in Parliament.\n\nThe Ombudsman can access secret documents to help carry out his/her\ninvestigations. The people have direct access to the Ombudsman and can complain of any activity infringing their fundamental rights carried out by the Administration and the Executive Power. The Ombudsman has better access than Parliament to particular cases of violation of rights.\n\nEven if the Ombudsman cannot access secret information when the government\nrefuses access, it can notify parliament, which has complete access to the classified information and can follow up the investigations begun by the Ombudsman.\n\nREFERENCES Aba Catoira A. (2002), 'El secreto de Estado y los servicios de inteligencia', Cuadernos Constitucionales de la Catedra Fadrique Furio Ceriol, Nos 38/39, pp. 133168. Bajo Fernandez M. (1982), 'Proteccion del honor y de la intimidad' in Comentarios a la legislacion penal, Vol. I, EDERSA, Madrid. Barata I Mir J. (1997), 'Secretos oficiales y jurisdiccion: cronica y analisis de un largo recorrido. De la sentencia del Tribunal de Conflictos de Jurisdiccion de 14 de diciembre de\n1995 a las sentencias del Tribunal Supremo de 4 de abril de 1997 (1)', Revista Vasca de Administracion Publica, No 48, pp. 207249. Barcelona Llop J. (1998), 'El secreto policial. Acceso a archivos y registros de la policia. Los ficheros automatizados de las fuerzas y cuerpos de seguridad' in Acceso judicial a la obtencion de datos, Consejo General del Poder Judicial, Madrid, pp. 157222. Blay Villasante F. (1989), 'El delito de traicion mediante espionaje' in Comentarios a la legislacion penal, TX ('La reforma de los delitos contra la defensa nacional'), M. Cobo del Rosal (dir.) and M. Bajo Fernandez (coord.), EDERSA, Madrid, pp. 141. Born H., Johnson L. and I. Leigh (eds.) (2005), Who is Watching the Spies? Establishing Intelligence Service Accountability, Potomac Books, Washington, D.C. Bueso J. (1997), 'Informacion parlamentaria y secretos oficiales', Working Paper No 133, Barcelona.\n\n____________________________________________________________________________________________\nCasas Nombella J.J. (1989), 'Breve consideracion sobre la proteccion penal de materias clasificadas', *Boletin de informacion del Ministerio de Justicia e Interior*, Vol. II, pp. 974\n980. Cousido Gonzalez P. (1995), *Comentarios a la Ley de Secretos Oficiales y su Reglamento*, Bosch, Barcelona. Defensor del Pueblo (26 June 1996), Informe del Defensor del Pueblo correspondiente a la gestion realizada durante el ano 1995, Boletin oficial de las Cortes Generales, Series A, No 7. Diez-Picazo L.M. (1998), 'Publicidad y secreto en la Constitucion' in Acceso Judicial a la obtencion de datos, *Cuadernos de Derecho Judicial*, Consejo General del Poder Judicial, Madrid, pp. 4362; (also available in *Sobre secretos oficiales* (1998), Civitas, Madrid). Escobar Roca G. (2010), 'Interpretacion y garantia de los derechos fundamentales por el defensor del pueblo', *Teoria y Realidad Constitucional*, No 26, pp. 229257. Fernandez Alles J.J. (25 March 1999), Los secretos de Estado en Espana: jurisprudencia y teoria constitucional (I) in *Diario La Ley*, No 4762, Vol. II, D-82. Fernandez Alles J.J. (26 March 1999), Los secretos de Estado en Espana: jurisprudencia y teoria constitucional (II) in *Diario La Ley*, No 4763, Vol. II, D-83. Garcia-Trevijano Garnica E. (1996), 'Materias clasificadas y control parlamentario', *REDC*, No 48, pp. 145178. Gomez Orfanel G. (1996), 'Secretos de Estado: algo mas de lo mismo', Jueces para la democracia, No 27, pp. 79. Gomez-Reino Y Carnota E. (1976), 'El principio de publicidad de la accion del Estado y la tecnica de los secretos oficiales', *REDA*, No 8, pp. 115133. Leigh I. and L. Lustgarten (1994), In From the Cold: National Security and Parliamentary Democracy, Clarendon Press, Oxford. Luna Abella C. (2002), 'Articulo 22' in Comentarios a la Ley Organica del Defensor del Pueblo, A. Rovira (dir.), Aranzadi (ed.), pp. 561585. Masso Garrote M.F. (2001), Poderes y Limites de la investigacion parlamentaria en el Derecho Constitucional espanol, Monografias Congreso de los Diputados, Madrid. Perez Villalobos M.C. (2002), Derechos Fundamentales y Servicios de Inteligencia (un estudio a la luz de la nueva legislacion), Grupo Editorial Universitario. Revenga Sanchez M. (2001a), 'Servicios de Inteligencia y Derecho a la intimidad', Revista Espanola de Derecho Constitucional, No 61. Revenga Sanchez M. (2001b), 'Servicios de Inteligencia. La Ley imprescindible', Claves de Razon Practica, No 110.\n\n____________________________________________________________________________________________\nRevenga Sanchez M. (1998), 'Razonamiento judicial, seguridad nacional y secreto de Estado', *REDC*, No 53, pp. 5774. Rodriguez-Villasante Y Prieto J.L. (1989), 'Proteccion penal de la informacion relativa a la defensa nacional (Comentario a los articulos 135 bis, a), b), c) y d) del Codigo penal)' in Manuel Cobo del Rosal (dir.) and Miguel Bajo Fernandez (coord.), Comentarios a la legislacion penal, TX ('La reforma de los delitos contra la defensa nacional'), EDERSA, Madrid, pp. 43372. Ruiz Miguel C. (2002), *Servicios de Inteligencia y Seguridad del Estado Constitucional*, tecnos. Sainz Moreno F. (1991), 'Secreto e informacion en el Derecho Publico' in Estudios sobre la Constitucion espanola. Homenaje al Profesor Eduardo Garcia de Enterria, Vol. III, Civitas, Madrid, pp. 28632981. Sanchez Ferro, S. (2006), *El Secreto de Estado,* Centro de Estudios Politicos y Constitucionales, Madrid. Santamaria Pastor J.A. (1995), 'Secreto oficial' in *Enciclopedia Juridica Basica*, Civitas, Madrid, Vol. IV, pp. 60886090. Santaolalla Lopez F. (2002), 'Actos politicos, inteligencia nacional y Estado de Derecho', REDC, No 65. Santolaya Machetti P. (1995), 'El control de los secretos de Estado. La experiencia en Derecho comparado', *Poder Judicial*, No 40, pp. 5783. Scheinin M. (4 February 2009), Report of the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms while countering terrorism, Human Rights Council, Tenth session, A/HRC/10/3. Segrelles de Arenaza I. (1994), Proteccion penal del secreto de Estado (articulo 135 bis a) al 135 bis d)) del Codigo penal, EDERSA, Madrid. Vila Ramos B. (2004), *Los sistemas de comisiones parlamentarias,* Centro de Estudios Politicos y Constitucionales, Madrid.\n\nANNEX A: COUNTRY CASE STUDIES\n\nVIII. PARLIAMENTARY AND SPECIALISED OVERSIGHT OF\nSECURITY AND INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES\nIN SWEDEN\n\nIAIN CAMERON\n\n1. THE GENERAL MANDATE AND FUNCTIONS OF RELEVANT\nOVERSIGHT BODIES\n\nThis chapter gives an overview of the relevant bodies involved in oversight in Sweden and a very brief contextual and historical background. Sweden does not have a separate internal civilian security agency. Internal security is instead exclusively a matter for the Security Police, which is organised as an autonomous part of the National Police Board (NPB). The NPB is under the leadership of a National Police Commissioner appointed by the government, with the head of the Security Police as Vice Chairman and a Board of Directors representing the political parties in the Parliament (*Riksdag*). Neither the NPB nor the government is allowed to make decisions in operational police work. Sweden is unusual in having a constitutional provision (Instrument of Government, Chapter 12, Section 2) which prohibits the government from interfering in administrative agencies' decision making in individual cases. It is still possible, however, to steer decision making more generally in a number of ways, for example by means of rules set out in government ordinances and policies and priorities in the annual budget instruction to the agency. Sweden does not have a system of ministerial responsibility so formally speaking the police are not accountable to the Minister of Justice as such but to the government as a whole.\n\nThe Security Police has full police powers.770 The major mechanism of control over the Security Police has been until relatively recently prosecutorial involving judicial control over Security Police operations involving certain particularly serious infringements of privacy, namely surveillance, arrest and search and seizure. The chief government law officer, the Chancellor of Justice, exercises general control over government departments and administrative agencies. The Chancellor of Justice can be tasked by the government to investigate an agency and may prosecute civil servants for misuse of office. Although an 'internal' mechanism of control, the Chancellor of Justice tends to operate with a high degree of independence. S/he has on occasion investigated the Security Police. There are two standing parliamentary committees that have the competence to investigate the police, including the Security Policethe Committee on the Administration of Justice\n(JuU) and the Committee on the Constitution (KU). These committees can hear witnesses in camera but this is very unusual. They do not take evidence under oath. Both committees have on occasion investigated the Security Police. KU in particular is a useful mechanism for discovering and highlighting alleged governmental abuse of power. Another method of providing a degree of parliamentary insight into the work of the Security Police that has occasionally been used is consultations with leaders of political parties represented in the Riksdag. This, in my opinion, is not satisfactory: it can work instead as cooption rather than meaningful oversight. Besides, as explained further below, historically the problems in this area have been not so much governmental abuse of power but a relative lack of effective governmental (and parliamentary) insight into the work of the Security Police. Another form of scrutiny is the Parliamentary Ombudsman. The jurisdiction of the Ombudsman extends to the police, including the Security Police. The Ombudsman has in fact criticised the Security Police on occasion. However, the Ombudsman will usually refrain from investigating what can loosely be called 'operational decisions'. The Swedish system of oversight of the Security Police data files was the subject of the scrutiny of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) in the Leander case.771 The majority of the ECtHR, wrongly as it transpired, accepted that the forms of oversight sketched out above were adequate. However, none of them in practice examined the important issues: the reliability of the intelligence gathered, the adequacy of the routines for filing and the proportionality of a decision to release it in vetting cases. None of these bodies consisted (or today consist) of experts in security matters, their staff resources are limited and they have limited time to devote to investigations of security matters.772 In 1996, a new oversight body, the Register Board (*Registernamnden*) was established.\n\nThe main impetus behind this was the Swedish ratification of the Europol treaty, which resulted in the enactment of the Police Data Act (PDA).773 However, revelations regarding the inadequacy of the oversight functions, an aftermath of the Leander case, was also a factor in its establishment. The Register Board was given the task, which was previously performed by the NPB, of deciding whether or not to release intelligence from the Security Police files to employers in vetting cases.774 It thereby also exercised an indirect supervisory role over intelligence filing routines. The Register Board had judges as Chair and Vice Chair and Representatives from the two major Parties in parliament. It took seriously its mandate to weigh possible gains to security against losses to personal integrity involved in releasing speculative or otherwise unreliable intelligence. At around about the same time, the Security Police itselflargely to increase efficiencyweeded out a large number of unnecessary or unreliable personal files and improved its routines for starting, and adding to, files. Senior staff changes following the errors made and illegal activities during the investigation of the murder of PM Olof Palme can also be assumed to have had some significance here. In any event, the combined number of occasions in which security intelligence was released in vetting cases dropped dramatically, from around 70% to between 1.5 per cent to 10 per cent.775 Moreover, cases in which the vetted person was communicated part of, or the essence of, the allegations against him/her increased considerably.\n\nIn the later case of Segerstedt-Wiberg and others v. Sweden,776 a violation was found of Article 13 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) because the applicant did not have access to a legal remedy which was capable, in law and practice, of erasing or rectifying data.777 In 2007, the Register Board was replaced by the Commission on Security and Integrity Protection (*Sakerhets- och integritetsskyddsnamnden* or SIN).778 There were several reasons for this. Increased investigative powers had been, or were in the process of being, granted to the police and the Security Police.779 There was also a realisation that prosecutorial and judicial control only checked if there was reasonable cause to initiate surveillance, and there was no post hoc monitoring. SIN was thus given a follow-up oversight function over surveillance. SIN consists of, first, two self-contained delegations (Security Screening and Secret Identities), which have authorising functions over, respectively, the release of intelligence in vetting cases and over the use of secret (assumed) identities by the police, and second, a monitoring/complaints body. This construction was chosen because SIN acts as both a control and a remedies body. However, the components are not totally sealed off from each other: the delegations can inform the monitoring/complaints body of information of interest and vice versa. SIN's mandate is 1) to ensure that surveillance activities by the police, including the Security Police, are conducted in accordance with laws and other regulations and 2) that the Security Police filing of personal data is 'conducted in accordance with laws and other regulations'. These laws etc. include the limits set out on the filing of sensitive data in the constitution (Instrument of Government Chapter 2, Section 6; ECHR Article 8) and in the Police Data Act,780 as well as the Security Police's own regulations on initiating, adding to, correcting and terminating personal files. Although the mandate is only framed in terms of ensuring compliance with the law, a proportionality test is a fundamental part of this.\n\nProposals have recently been made to extend SIN's mandate to follow-up supervision of police/Security Police access to teledata and police/Security Police use of infiltration methods.781 While much of the sensitive work of the Security Police falls within SIN's supervision, not all of it does. SIN has no overall mandate to supervise the work of the Security Police generally, to scrutinise its budget, or to be involved in its management or efficiency (except insofar as these matters overlap its specific mandate). Nor does SIN, as an agency answerable to the government, have oversight over government instructions or security priorities to the Security Police. This is a matter for the parliamentary select committees, KU and JuU.\n\nThe final issue to be mentioned in this introductory section is oversight of the civilian strategic surveillance (or signals intelligence) agency, the Defence Radio Establishment\n(*Forsvarets Radio Anstalt* or FRA).782 I will deal only briefly with this, as it is not a focus of the present report. However, occasional comparisons are instructive and will be made between this and the system for oversight of the Security Police. The proposal in 2008prepared by the Ministry of Defence, not the Ministry of Justiceto extend the power of FRA from monitoring only ether-borne communications to also monitoring international telecommunications borne by cable caused a major political controversy in Sweden. Although a statute providing for this Act was passed,783 the government conceded the protections for integrity were inadequate and later added a complicated battery of safeguards.784 A Defence Intelligence Court was established\n(*Forsvarsunderrattelsedomstolen* or FUD) together with a control and monitoring body, the Defence Intelligence Inspection (*Statens inspektion for forsvarsunderrattelseverksamheten*\nor SIUN).785 Basically, the system is that the government, the Cabinet office and the defence forces may task FRA to produce foreign intelligence on a particular issue. FRA then requests a warrant from FUD, which sets out what search streams can be used and which signal bearers (i.e., which cables, going to which destinations) can be monitored. The raw intelligence is then delivered by telecom operators to a location physically under the control of SIUN, which monitors whether the conditions set by FUD have been complied with. Communications originating, transiting or terminating in Sweden can be monitored, as well as communications having no connection with Sweden (e.g., satellites passing overhead). The raw intelligence is then transferred for analysis to FRA, which then delivers the product to the body that requested it. The system is thus a control rather than oversight system, although SIUN also has oversight functions in that it is to monitor whether FRA complies with requirements on handling personal data.786\n\n2. ANALYSIS OF OVERSIGHT OF PARTICULAR ACTIVITIES\nPERFORMED BY SECURITY AND INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES\n\n2.1 Information sharing The Security Police, being part of the NPB, have automatic access to the other centrally kept police data files. The Swedish Police is organised into 21 separate county authorities and, at the present time, county data registers are kept organisationally separate. If for some reason the Security Police wish intelligence kept by county police forces, it must formally request access to these files, which is likely to be granted without any problems. The same applies to information held by other administrative authorities: the Security Police must prove to the satisfaction of the agency in question that the information is necessary for its investigations. As regards exchanges of data between the Security Police and FRA, a major part of the political compromise on improved safeguards for strategic surveillance (above section A)\nwas that the Security Police would no longer have the power to task FRA to collect specific intelligence. However, as is well known, internal and external threats can be inextricably linked in a number of ways. Nonetheless, giving the Security Police direct power to task FRA will involve a paradigm shift in surveillance, which in the long run may risk making law enforcement/security telecommunications surveillance less important or even obsolete\n(and, incidentally, sidelining the elaborate safeguards applying to this). The first head of SIN was requested by the government to investigate the issue and propose some sort of compromise solution. His proposalpermitting the Security Police itself to engage in strategic surveillancewas regarded by all political parties (and the Ministries of Defence and Justice) as unacceptable. He, his Deputy and the Staff Director of SIN later resigned. The issue has, however, emerged again after the failed suicide bombing in Stockholm in December 2010 and discussions are ongoing between the government and opposition on how to solve it. As regards transfers to and from foreign and EU agencies, the Public Access to Information and Secrecy Act 2009:400 permits the revealing of security intelligence to a foreign police or intelligence service or an international organisation.787 It would appear that the absence of an adequate level of protection for this data in the receiving state does not constitute an insurmountable obligation to transfer of personal data, though it would be a factor to take into account in determining whether it is in Sweden's interest to do so.788 The government has delegated powers to the NPB to enter into treaties with foreign authorities governing transfer of data.789 This is an important area which has hitherto been neglected in Sweden\n(as in many other countries).790 SIN has, however, recently begun a thematic study on these data transfers and the general arrangements made to protect personal integrity, etc.\n\nOther statutes require that conditions set by foreign and EU agencies on the use of data transferred to Sweden be respected.791\n\n2.2 Processing and use of personal data\n\nThis issue has already been largely examined in sections A and B.i. One point can be added here. The normal rule, designed both to promote efficiency and protect integrity, is that personal data files should normally be terminated (weeded out)  ten years after the information came to light that justified registration.792 However, it is the Security Police that determines whether an incident has occurred, or circumstances exist, which justify continued retention of a personal file. Some security threats (particularly espionage) are of a long-term nature and so the security agencies have a natural tendency to retain older material on the off-chance that this will later turn out to be relevant. SIN has recently initiated a thematic study of the routines of the Security Police in this regard.\n\n2.3 Joint analysis/fusion and dissemination of information There is a standing working group on threat assessment consisting of representatives from the Security Police, the Military Intelligence Agency (MUST) and FRA. In 2004, the Security Police also established a Counter Terrorism Cooperation Council consisting of representatives from other agencies in law enforcement, etc. The Council's tasks include producing common threat assessments, identifying areas of responsibility and producing a national strategic plan for combating terrorism. There is no body charged with oversight of this Council. However, it is an advisory, not an operative body.\n\n2.4 Collection of open source information As is well known, a large amount of security intelligence comes from open sources. As mentioned, the Swedish Security Police has greatly expanded its civilian analytical capability since 1990. No special oversight arrangements are provided for Security Police that use open source information. Open source material can admittedly cause problems for individuals, e.g., where it is uncritically used to justify opening, or adding to, personal files. But thresholds for file opening, etc. are within SIN oversight.\n\n2.5 Finances of security and intelligence agencies Control of the budget of the Security Police and FRA falls formally within the competence of the parliamentary committees on justice and defence. However, the lack of expertise of these bodies and their lack of access to secret information or any operational detail mean that this control is minimal.\n\n3. COMPOSITION Under Section 5 of the Act on Supervision of Certain Crime-Fighting Activities, SIN shall have a maximum of ten members. These are appointed by the government for a\n(renewable) fixed period of no more than four years. The members are to be 'suitable for the assignment in terms of judgment, independence, obedience to the law and other circumstances'. The Chair and Vice Chair shall be, or have been, a tenured judge or have other equivalent legal experience. Experience from the Register Board showed that the integrity and competence of the Chair and Vice Chair were vital to the success of oversight. Appointment of the Chair is preceded by consultations with the heads of the other parties represented in the *Riksdag*. Unlike the case with the Register Board, all the parties in the *Riksdag* can propose a member of the Commission. Most of the parties have appointed experienced politicians who are nonetheless not active MPs. The main problem is that most of these lack experience in security issues. In these circumstances, a steep learning curve is likely during the first two years.\n\nDecisions are taken by majority vote: there is a quorum when the Chair and half of the other members are present. Any member may request that a meeting should be held but the Chair decides.793 SIN as a monitoring/complaints body meets around once a month, as do its delegations. Experience from Canada, inter alia, has shown that the staff of a part-time oversight body can be very important. They get to know the right questions to ask and how to ask them.\n\nThe staff is also crucial to building a cooperative as opposed to confrontational relationship with the agency. Finally, the staff plays an important role in maintaining continuity of expertise when the membership of the oversight body changes. SIN is assisted by a legally qualified director (appointed by the government) and four to five legally qualified desk officers, as well as administrative staff.\n\nThe members of the two delegations are appointed by the government for a fixed period. The Chair and Vice Chair shall be, or have been, a tenured judge or have other equivalent legal experience.794 The same point about learning curves applies here. As regards the Security Screening Delegation, information may normally be released only if all members of the Delegation are agreed on the decision.\n\n4. METHODS Section 2 of the Supervision Act provides that SIN exercises its supervision through inspections and other investigations. It takes up a number of cases of its own motion every year. It has adopted a practice of investigating themes or patterns of activity, which can involve scrutinising a large number of individual cases.795 In this it has been influenced by the positive experiences of the Norwegian oversight committee (which, in turn, has been influenced by the experience of the Canadian body, SIRC). SIN has no role in confirming the appointment of the head of the Security Police. This official has the status of 'General Director' and is, like other heads of administrative agencies, appointed directly by the government after consultations with political parties in the *Riksdag*.796\n\n5. INVESTIGATIVE POWERS\n\nSection 3 of the Supervision Act provides that, at the request of an individual, the Commission is obliged to check whether he or she has been the subject of secret surveillance or subject to processing of personal data and whether the use of secret surveillance and associated activities or the processing of personal data was in accordance with laws and other regulations. The Commission has received a large number of complaints from individuals alleging that the Security Police improperly have files on them, all of which require investigation.797 So far, only one case has been referred to the Chancellor of Justice for a decision as to whether to pay damages. In the long-run, the low level of upheld complaints can naturally create a legitimacy problem for the Commission, even if the vast majority of these complaints are groundless.\n\nRegarding the standing oversight work of SIN, Section 4 of the Supervision Act provides that it is entitled to obtain the information and assistance it requests from agencies subject to SIN's supervision. Even courts and agencies that are not subject to its supervision are also obliged to supply it with the information it requests. While SIN cannot compel witnesses to appear before it, failure to cooperate with SIN can, ultimately, be seen as misuse of office and reported as a criminal offence (Criminal Code, Chapter 20, Section\n1).798 However, SIN members must know the right questions to ask. In practice, the main problem is not likely to be outright refusal to cooperate but rather unwillingness on the part of the Security Police to go out of its way to volunteer all the relevant information. Having said this, the Security Police are likely to inform SIN of anything that is seriously wrong, even without a positive statutory duty to do so, on the basis that SIN will probably, and eventually, find out anyway. It can be noted here that SIN is entitled to employ an expert when it considers that specialist knowledge is necessary, and may also invite a person who can provide information in a case to attend a meeting.799 The present leadership of the Security Police appears to take a cooperative approach to SIN's investigations. This is sensible as SIN can provide it with both a relatively informed sounding board and extra legitimacy. In some states, access to security data of foreign origin has been problematic. Where such data enters into personal files, this falls clearly under SIN's mandate. Having said this, as already mentioned, a transferring state may impose restrictions on access to dataeven for an oversight bodyand, under Swedish law, these restrictions are to be respected. It has not (yet) been put to the test whether this provision can justify refusing SIN access to foreign origin data. Another restriction is that SIN's mandate in relation to monitoring surveillance applies to the law enforcement agencies (i.e., the police, including the Security Police and the prosecutors). It does not, as such, extend to the courts which authorise the use of such measures. Scrutiny of the adequacy of the reasoning of a court thus is not within SIN's mandate. This restriction is to preserve judicial independence. However, satisfactory oversight here really involves matching the initial suspicions justifying the surveillance against the product of the surveillance. Where a pattern emerges of weighing losses to integrity too lightly against alleged gains to an investigation, SIN should criticise this and demand improvements in routines. This must, reasonably, involve implicit criticism of the body which has authorised the surveillancethe courts.\n\n6. PROTECTION OF OFFICIAL INFORMATION SIN members and staff are bound by secrecy. The Public Access to Information and Secrecy Act, Chapter 15, Sections 1 and 2, deals with maintaining secrecy for purposes of protection of national security and foreign relations. Chapter 18, Sections 1 and 2 deals with secrecy in the prevention and investigation of crime and in intelligence gathering. As SIN is an administrative agency, its members (even if they are serving MPs) can be and are security vetted. The same applies to SIUN and FUD (which is regarded as a court).\n\nCriminal sanctions for breach of the Act are to be found in the Criminal Code, Chapter 20, Section 3. Other security crimes in Chapter 19 of the Code (espionage, unlawful revealing of secret information, reckless revealing of secret information) may also be applicable. To protect the physical security of data files, the Security Screening Delegation tends to meet in the premises of the Security Police. The case-officers who present cases to the Delegation are Security Police staff, who are appointed by SIN for a fixed period. SIN, SIUN and FUD have secure meeting rooms.\n\n7. REPORTING\n\nSection 2 of the Supervision Act provides that SIN 'may make statements on established circumstances and express its opinion'. It can decide to publish special reports, something which is an important feature of oversight. So far, what has been published on its website is mainly information about how it works, in particular its thematic investigations. Parliament may not formally task SIN to look at a particular issue but the fact that the composition of SIN consists mainly of politicians means that the same thing can be achieved informally: where there is a majority for investigating a particular issue, SIN will do so.\n\nSIN reports annually to the government.800 The report is published. SIN itself decides what information to reveal (albeit applying its duty to keep confidential secret information). If SIN considers that laws or regulations are deficient, it may express its opinion on this, if need be confidentially. Again, both these powers are important features of oversight.801 If SIN considers that a criminal offence has been committed, it is to refer the case to the Prosecutor-General. If it considers that errors have been committed in handling of personal data which should be rectified, or which might entitle an individual to damages, it is to refer the case to the Data Inspection Board or the Chancellor of Justice (or both). These bodies make an independent assessment of the need for rectification/damages, so SIN's decision in this regard should be seen as only the first stage in the obtaining of an effective remedy. As mentioned, so far, only one referral has been made to the Chancellor of Justice. SIN's annual reports tend to be relatively short (1215 pages of substantive text). They are relatively informative as far as vetting is concerned. Its thematic reporting practices have only just begun and these have, so far, not been presented in any detail as SIN, like any other oversight/complaints body, can always be subject to attack on the basis that it never (or seldom) upholds complaints. One method of countering this difficulty in the future and maintaining public confidence is to reveal as much as it can of its standing oversight activities.\n\n8. CONCLUDING REMARKS Comments have already been made on good practices. Only four remarks will be made here. The first is that the Swedish oversight system is focused on special investigative powers and data protection. As such, the system is of limited direct relevance for the European Parliament in devising its oversight arrangements. Second, having said this, the Swedish experience is interesting because it supports the view that a pure parliamentary system of oversight is of limited value. To engage in meaningful oversight requires the oversight body to be within the 'ring' of secrecy, to be able to scrutinise operations, not simply policy, and to be sufficiently expert to pose the right questions. Politicians have the democratic legitimacy to question executive action but neither the time, the patience nor the expertise to penetrate adequately the arcane world of security. The solution then, is either a purely expert oversight body, if need be with some form of special briefing/consultation relationship to a parliamentary body, or like the Swedish system, some form of hybrid body. The fact that the political parties choose the members of SIN gives it political legitimacy. The fact that the Director, Chair and Vice Chair are lawyers trained for judicial office is important for the integrity of SIN. Thirdly, the *proprio motu* investigative, reporting and publication powers of SIN are important: a yearly report to the government is not adequate to allay public fears of misuse. Finally, SIN is both a control body and a remedies body. The latter function is necessary to fulfil the requirements of the ECHR.\n\n\nREFERENCES Act on Supervision of Certain Crime-Fighting Activities (22 November 2007), SFS 2007:980\n('Supervision Act'), available at (http://www.sweden.gov.se/sb/d/ 5806/a/95172). Cameron I. (2000), *National Security and the European Convention on Human Rights*, Iustus/Kluwer, Uppsala/Dordrecht. Cameron I. and D. Tollborg (2002), 'Internal Security in Sweden' in Brodeur J.P., Gill P. and D. Tollborg (eds.), Democracy, Law and Security: Internal Security Services in Contemporary Europe, Ashgate, Farnham. Defence Intelligence Activity Act (2000), SFS 2000:130. Defence Intelligence Activity Ordinance (2000), SFS 2000:131. Police Data Act (1998), SFS 1998:622. Public Access to Information and Secrecy Act (2009), SFS 2009:400. Sakerhets- och integritetsskyddsnamnden, Arsredovisning (annual report) 2009, available at (www.sakint.se). Sakerhets- och integritetsskyddsnamnden, Arsredovisning (annual report) 2010, available at (www.sakint.se). Security Protection Act (1996), SFS 1996:627. Security Protection Ordinance (1996), SFS 1996:633. Ordinance containing instructions for SIN, (2007) SFS 2007:1141 Segerstedt-Wiberg and others v. Sweden (6 June 2006), No. 62322/00. Tollborg D. (1986), *Personalkontroll*, Symposium, Gothenburg. Tollborg D. (1999), *Medborgerligt palitlig?, Norstedts juridik*, Stockholm.\n\n\n____________________________________________________________________________________________\nVenice Commission (2007), *Report on the democratic oversight of the security services*, Study No 388/2006.\n\n## Annex A: Country Case Studies Ix. Parliamentary And Specialised Oversight Of Security And Intelligence Agencies In The United Kingdom Ian Leigh\n\n1. INTRODUCTION\n\nSince the 1970s, the United Kingdom has, in common with many other countries, exchanged the tradition of exclusive executive control over the security and intelligence agencies for a measure of parliamentary and judicial scrutiny.802\n\nA series of legal challenges in the 1980s under the European Convention on Human Rights\n(ECHR) forced a modernisation of the legal regime governing the agencies because at that time, interferences with privacy by the agencies were not 'authorised by law' (i.e., in legislation) in the sense required by Article 8 of the ECHR. Moreover, the Convention system required there to be some legal mechanisms for dealing with complaints about abuses and violations of rights. The Security Service Act 1989 established a legal basis for the Security Service and for supervision of the ministerial powers to authorise interference with property by a commissioner, together with a tribunal, to which complaints could be brought. The government estimated correctly that these mechanisms would satisfy the Convention system in the then outstanding cases involving alleged surveillance and recording of personal details by the Security Service.803 This statutory model was followed in the Intelligence Services Act 1994extending it to the Secret Intelligence Service (MI6) and the Government Communications Headquarters (or GCHQ, the UK's signals intelligence agency). Legal reform did not initially result in greater parliamentary oversight. It was not until 1994\nthat legislation was enacted for scrutiny by a committee representing a cross-section of parliamentary opinion. The Intelligence and Security Committee, established under Section 10 of the Intelligence Services 1994 Act (ISA), comprises nine members drawn from both the House of Commons and the House of Lords. Its task is to examine the expenditure, policy and administration of the three main security and intelligence agencies (the Security Service, the Secret Intelligence Service and the GCHQ).\n\n2. THE GENERAL MANDATE AND FUNCTIONS OF THE RELEVANT OVERSIGHT BODIES\n\n2.1The Intelligence and Security Committee804 Oversight of the intelligence and security agencies outside the executive branch now takes place through review by a committee of parliamentarians (the Intelligence and Security Committee) and, in relation to specific surveillance techniques, by judicial commissioners.\n\nNeither have a role in advance approval of the agencies' actions nor, in the case of the Committee, is there any legal duty on the services to inform them of major operations or programmes in a timely fashion.\n\nThe role of the Intelligence and Security Committee (ISC) is 'to examine the expenditure, administration and policy' of the three services that fall under its jurisdiction.805 These terms mirror the usual remit given to a departmental parliamentary select committee, despite the fact that the ISC has a different constitutional status. What they apparently omit is the jurisdiction to review security and intelligence operations. Nor does the legislation specify the standard according to which expenditure, administration and policy are to be examined; for example, whether to a standard of propriety, efficiency or legality. As regards expenditure of the services, although the ISA does not explicitly mention efficiency or value for money, the ISC has in practice regularly criticised expenditure by the services (notably construction and information technology projects) with reference to these measures. From time-to-time, parliamentary select committees also examine matters related to specific areas of work of the intelligence and security agencies. In 200809, for example, the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Human Rights (a Select Committee comprised of members from both Houses) examined the question of alleged complicity of the agencies in torture.806\n\n2.2 Jurisdiction of the Commissioners and Tribunal Ministers are responsible for issuing warrants to the security and intelligence agencies for interception of communications and authorisations for interference with property. The use of these powers is reviewed by judicial commissioners. This arrangement began in the\n1980s with the appointment of successive senior judges as judicial monitors for the interception of communications and was then, in effect, put on a statutory basis under the Security Service Act 1989 and the Intelligence Services Act 1994. The current legislation covering the Commissioners is the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 (RIPA). The Intelligence Services' Commissioner is responsible for reviewing and reporting upon the issue and authorisation by the relevant minister of warrants for operations involving interference with property (for example, covert searches and placing of surveillance devices) by the agencies.807 The Interception of Communications Commissioner\n(established under Section 57 of RIPA) reviews the issue and authorisation of warrants to intercept mail and telecommunications by the intelligence and security agencies and law enforcement organisations. The Commissioners report annually to the Prime Minister on their work and their reports are in turn laid before Parliament, subject to deletions on grounds of national security. There is also a tribunal, the Investigatory Powers Tribunal (IPT), which is established to investigate public complaints against the agencies or allegations of illegal interception by them.808 Members of the Tribunal must hold or have held high judicial office or be qualified lawyers of at least ten years' standing. Any person may bring a claim and the IPT must determine all claims brought before it, except those it considers to be vexatious or frivolous.809 The IPT is specified as the only appropriate forum for proceedings against any of the intelligence services concerning alleged incompatibility with European Convention rights and for complaints by persons who allege to have been subject to the investigatory powers of the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act.810 It has, for example, been held to be the appropriate forum for a challenge to a refusal by the intelligence services to authorise publication of the memoirs of a former officer811 and for challenges to the decision by any of the agencies to issue a 'Neither Confirm Nor Deny' response to an information or access request.812 The IPT has jurisdiction to investigate any complaint that a person's communications have been intercepted and, where interception has occurred, to examine the authority for such interception. The IPT is required to follow the principles applicable by a court on an application for judicial review.813 The IPT can require anyone involved in the authorisation and execution of an interception warrant to disclose or provide documents and information814 and to require a relevant Commissioner to provide it with all such assistance as it thinks fit.815 At the conclusion of proceedings, the IPT is required to give a simple statement either that they have found in favour of the complainant (i.e., that there has been unlawful action against him or her) or that 'no determination has been made in his favour'.816 In this way, the Tribunal safeguards information about interception of communications and about the agencies so that its proceedings cannot be used to discover whether or not a person is lawfully under surveillance. The Tribunal has, however, determined that this provision and procedural rules requiring oral hearings to be in private817 do not prevent it from giving public reasons on preliminary matters of pure legal principle in a way necessary to comply with Article 6 of the ECHR.818 In the event of a successful claim, the IPT is also required to submit a report to the Prime Minister.819 The IPT has the power to award compensation and to make such other orders as it thinks fit, including orders quashing or cancelling interception warrants and requiring the destruction of any records so obtained.820 There is no appeal from a decision of the IPT.821 The system of Commissioners and tribunal has been found to satisfy Articles 6, 8 and 13 of the European Convention on Human Rights. In a challenge where the act's complaints machinery had been used unsuccessfully by an applicant, the Commission of Human Rights found that the scheme struck a reasonable compromise between the requirements of defending democracy and the rights of the individual. Accordingly, it held that the complaint was manifestly ill-founded.822 There are reasons, however, to doubt their overall effectiveness as instruments of accountability or for instilling public confidence due to the tightly prescribed legal jurisdiction within which each operates. There are only four reported examples of findings in favour of complainants by the IPT823 and it is unclear (since they are unpublished) if these were made against the security and intelligence services (against whom several hundred cases have been brought over nearly two decades).824 The Commissioners have never found that a warrant or authorisation has ever been improperly issued, although in several dozen instances the agencies have admitted to minor breaches such as entering the wrong phone number or address.\n\n2.3 Deficiencies of the Oversight Regime There are several gaps in this general oversight scheme. Firstly, some bodies handling intelligence are not included in the legal mandate of the Intelligence and Security Committee, although in practice the ISC has examined their work: the Joint Intelligence Committee, the Assessments Staff and the Defence Intelligence Staff are outside the statutory remit. (It should be noted, however that in practice the ISC has had free access to these bodies on the basis that they are the principal consumers of intelligence produced by the agencies that it oversees without any hindrance or resistance on the part of the government).825 Secondly, there is no formal link between the Commissioners who review warrants and authorisations issued to the agencies and the ISC. In particular, the ISC has no access to the confidential unpublished parts of the Commissioners' reports to the Prime Minister. In this respect they are outside the barrier of secrecy as regards the oversight of these powers. Thirdly, non-statutory processes have been established by which staff from the agencies can raise ethical concerns arising from their work with the Staff Counsellors for the Security and Intelligence Services (currently a retired Ministry of Defence official).826\nAgain, there is no link between these administrative procedures and the legal jurisdiction of the Committee. Even where such ethical points may touch on 'policy', the ISC has shown no interest in its public reports in concerns raised by staff or by whistle-blowers. Fourthly, as discussed further below, the Committee is ill-equipped to oversee international cooperation by UK agencies.\n\n2.4 Oversight of Information Sharing by the Security and Intelligence Agencies Under the current legal framework, only partial and inadequate oversight of information sharing exists. Cooperation between the police and the Security Service is partially addressed by the Security Service Act 1996, which gives the Service a subsidiary role in investigating serious crime. A domestic fusion centre for counterterrorism work (the Joint\n\nTerrorism Analysis Centre or JTAC) was created in June 2003 as the UK's centre for the analysis and assessment of international terrorism. It is housed within the Security Service (since this is the lead agency for counterterrorism in the UK) and is responsible to the Director-General of the Service.827 Its role is to analyse and assess all intelligence relating to international terrorism, whether domestic or abroad, and to produce threat assessments for other government departments and agencies. Although originally created to improve cooperation between MI5 and the police, following September 11 JTAC membership has broadened to include representatives from 11 government departments. JTAC operates with departmental representation under the wing of the Security Service and without affecting the responsibilities of other departments and agencies. Officers from the police and security and intelligence agencies work within it cooperatively with each bound by their respective mandates. Oversight of the JTAC as an entity in its own right does not fall clearly under legislation governing either the security and intelligence agencies or the police.\n\nBearing in mind, however, the limited nature of its functions, the case for oversight of JTAC\nis less pressing than for agencies with operational capacity. Where international cooperation is concerned, the oversight position is even less satisfactory.828 At a general level, the procedure for political approval of international cooperation agreements between the UK and overseas agencies is opaque at best. Unlike legislation in some of its partner countries, UK law does not stipulate that ministerial approval is necessary or that it require agreements to be shown to an outside review body. It also does not expressly protect the interests of UK citizens under such arrangements. The legislation does not contain clear safeguards against the avoidance of the controls that apply in domestic law through cooperation with foreign agencies or concerning the types of information that may be shared or the purpose of doing so (beyond the statements of the broad statutory aims of the services). The Intelligence and Security Committee's 2007 investigation into extraordinary renditions has highlighted the limits of existing oversight in this field. In its report, the UK Intelligence and Security Committee concluded, inter alia, that conditions imposed on information given by the Security Service (MI5) and the Secret Intelligence Service (MI6) to the CIA\nconcerning two businessmen resident in the UK subsequently rendered to Guantanamo Bay had been ignored by the CIA.829 The Committee's published findings were based upon information from UK agencies only.\n\n2.5 Oversight of the Use of Specific Forms of Data Section 2(2) of the Security Service Act 1989 requires the Director-General to ensure that there are arrangements limiting the collection of information by that Service to that necessary for the proper discharge of the Service's role or for preventing or detecting serious crime. There are equivalent provisions for MI6 and the GCHQ.830 The Intelligence Services Commissioner has general oversight of these arrangements. There is no oversight of the use by the agencies of personal data by the Information Commissioner since the security and intelligence agencies are effectively exempted from the Data Protection Act 1998 by a ministerial certificate relating to national security.831 It is possible, however, to challenge such certificates in the Information Tribunal which, applying\n\nthe principles of judicial review, may allow the appeal and quash the certificate.832 The Information Tribunal did exactly this in 2001 in a challenge brought by Norman Baker MP\nconcerning an alleged file held by the Security Service.833 The agencies' expenditure is audited under arrangements with the Comptroller and Auditor General.834 Review of expenditure of the Services is also explicitly within the jurisdiction of the Intelligence and Security Committee.835 The Committee and the government have in the past had a long-running disagreement concerning publication of the budgets for the individual agencies (rather that a total 'Single Intelligence Vote'). The Committee has consistently argued that publication of the information is not sensitive, at least provided it is not done every year.836\n\n2.6 Composition and Setup of Oversight Bodies At present, the ISC remains a committee of nine parliamentarians (but not a Select Committee) whose members are appointed from both Houses of Parliament by the Prime Minister after consulting the Leader of the Opposition.837 Current Minsters of the Crown are legally debarred from being members of the Committee.838 Certain additional practices have supplemented the statutory provisions, however. The composition has usually been eight members of the House of Commons and one member of the House of Lords. Members have frequently included past holders of ministerial office with experience of responsibility for security and intelligence (including past Foreign, Defence and Home Secretaries) and retired senior civil servants. Unlike a Select Committee, the ISC is governed by legislation, rather than the standing orders of Parliament. This affects the appointment of its members, the procedure it adopts, its powers over witnesses and hearings, and the publication of its reports. Since 2008, however, Parliament has been consulted over the choice of members, although the final decision remains the Prime Minister's. The ISC appears to work by consensus, perhaps because it meets in private. The Intelligence Services Act 1994 does not prescribe the process for the ISC to reach decisions. The published reports do not record formal disagreement or voting among members of the Committee and nor have there been any published minority reports.\n\nAlthough the existence of the ISC has done much to redress the democratic deficit concerning security and intelligence in the UK, the Committee is arguably hampered in its work by being too closely associated with the executiveparticularly when it tackles controversial topics such as intelligence before the Iraq war, the 7 July 2005 bombings in London and allegations of complicity in torture. The result has been a series of ad hoc inquiries into topics that the ISC has already investigated and published reports on; for example, the Butler review, the special inquest into the 7/7 bombings and the Gibson torture inquiry. The inability of the ISC to produce definitive reports that allay public concern and mistrust surrounding these topics shows that the current oversight regime is now failing in one of its core objectivesproviding public assurance that the agencies are acting efficiently and with propriety.\nThe future of the ISC is under review, with a Green Paper on security expected to be published by the government in summer 2011. Other parliamentarians have continued to call for it to be replaced with a Parliamentary Select Committee (Joint Committee on Human Rights 2009). Members of the current ISC are known to favour the same option. It is noteworthy that the last act of the ISC before the 2010 election was to make a series of suggestions for strengthening its own independence by visibly separating itself from the Cabinet Office (it has since moved to separate premises), staffing and ensuring budgetary independence (Intelligence and Security Committee 2010, Appendix A).\n\n2.7 Methods of Oversight The Committee is proactive in seeking information. In an early report it warned that it expected to be 'properly and promptly informed' by the agencies of their activities, rather than merely responding to requests for information. In this, the Committee was consciously following the congressional oversight model, rather than the more responsive mode contemplated in the legislation.839\nThe Committee conducts both incident-based and thematic studies. The ISC publishes an annual programme of work which it follows from year-to-year, as well as considering topics that may emerge between annual reports in ad hoc reports. It has also on several occasions conducted investigations at government invitation. The ISC does not, however, receive or investigate complaints from individuals. The ISC has tended to meet frequently (often weekly during the parliamentary session). Typically, it interviews several dozen witnesses each year, visits intelligence establishments and engages in liaison and exchange, both by visiting oversight agencies abroad and receiving such visits. The ISC sees the budgets of the services but does not publish them, except in general terms intermittently. The ISC does not conduct confirmation hearings of senior officials.\n\n2.8 Investigative Powers and Access to Information\n\nThe agency heads may refuse to disclose to the ISC 'sensitive information'.840 This is defined in the 1994 Act to include information that might lead to the identification of sources, other forms of assistance given to the agencies, or operational methods. A second category of 'sensitive information' concerns past, present or future specific operations. Within these categories, refusal of information is discretionary. The head of one of the three agencies may disclose the information if satisfied that it is safe to do so.841 Moreover, the responsible Minister may order disclosure to the Committee the public interest notwithstanding,842 overruling the agency head concerned. From a certain point of view, however, the status of the Committee's requests for information is greater than a conventional parliamentary committee since its demands have statutory backing. There are other limits to the Committee's information gathering powers. It may request\n'information' but does not have the power to demand particular documents, even those referring to the policy, administration or expenditure of the agencies. Moreover, the ISC\nhas no right to examine as witnesses officials from the security and intelligence agencies at a level lower than the Director or Director-General. For the most part, the weak legal entitlements to information are not a major obstacle in the Committee's work because the government and the agencies also have a considerable stake in the public credibility of oversight. All actors are aware that the withholding of information or undermining the ISC would be counterproductive and would likely result in public and parliamentary calls for increased investigative powers. A key issue in the development of the Committee's work was the acquisition of a proactive investigative capacity. Without this facility, the Committee would be able to hear evidence from witnesses but have no way in which to dig deeper into the performance of the agencies. The 1994 Act made no provision for investigations of this kind, whether by the Committee or any independent official, such as an Inspector-General. It might be argued that in view of the Committee's limited remit, investigation as such was unnecessary since it would venture into operational matters. Nevertheless, the Committee took the view that investigative capacity was necessary since a power of independent verification would give added authority to its findings and so strengthen public confidence in the oversight system.843 The government agreed to cooperate but without formally changing the powers of the Committee.844 A retired Deputy Chief of Defence Intelligence was appointed to this role part-time.845 The Investigator was 'tasked' by the Committee as part of its annual programme of work to investigate and report to it on certain topics. The use of the Investigator ended, however, in July 2004 when the incumbent, John Morrison, gave an extended interview to the BBC's *Panorama* television programme relating to his previous responsibilities as Deputy Chief of the Defence Intelligence Staff. Following this, the ISC decided not to renew the contract because the agencies had indicated they could no longer have trust in their dealings with him.846 A spokeswoman announced that the ISC did not intend to appoint another investigator.\n\n2.9 The Protection of Information The ISC has (until now at any event) met only in private session, although this is not a legal requirement and the current Chairman has indicated there may be a place for occasional public hearings in future.847 In practice, however, most of the evidence and briefings it receives are from the agencies and the other officials and ministers who work with them. An exception was the evidence taken from newspapers over their liaison with the agencies.848 As parliamentarians, the members of the Committee do not undergo formal security clearance before appointment, although (in view of the Prime Minister's power to appoint) presumably any imputation of a security risk against a prospective member would act as an informal bar to appointment. The ISC staff, however, are security-cleared. Moreover, members of the Committee and the staff are 'notified' persons under Section 1(1)(b) of the Official Secrets Act 1989 in the same way as officials working with the agencies, so that strict criminal liability for unauthorised disclosure of security intelligence information applies to them. The Committee meets in secure premises. Incidents of leaking by the ISC have been almost non-existent and relatively minor in any event.\n\n\n2.10 Reporting The ISC is legally required to produce an annual report. From time-to-time it also publishes ad hoc reports. Nothing prevents it from also conducting unpublished investigations and there is good reason to believe that it has done so occasionally. The ISC's reports are delivered to the Prime Minister and, thereafter, published with any deletions agreed to on security grounds.849 The Prime Minister is able to exclude material from a report, after consulting the ISC, if its publication 'would be prejudicial to the continued discharge of the functions of the agencies'.850 In the event of disagreement between the Committee and the Prime Minister over material to be deleted from the report, the Prime Minister can insist on excluding material, although to do so would probably be counterproductive if it led to public dissent from the members of the Committee or their resignation en masse. The ISC has stated that in practice, consultation over redactions is extensive and that there has never been an instance in which agreement could not be reached.851 Despite this, the published reports are regularly criticised in parliament and by commentators for the extent to which material is redacted on security grounds. The timing of publication is in the hands of the Prime Minister rather than the Committee.\n\nThe practice has been to publish the government's response at the same time as ISC reports. The reports are debated in Parliament. Nevertheless, the Prime Minister retains control over the timing of publication and the Committee has on occasion criticised delays by the government in publishing its report, in particular the delay before the 2010 general election in publishing its findings on the controversial question of guidance over possible complicity by officers of the agencies into mistreatment of detainees in the hands of foreign agencies.\n\n3. CONCLUSION\n\nBroadly speaking, the UK arrangements conform to the pattern for oversight advocated by the UN Special Rapporteur in that they involve a combination of different institutions with legally-based mandates and include 'civilian' elements independent of the executive.852\nThere are, however, some gaps in oversight of compliance with the law because of the focus of the Commissioners and Tribunals on narrow questions concerning specifically approved activities. The ISC fares reasonably well in practice against the standards for implementation of its mandate in terms of freedom of action, access to information and cooperation from the agencies, despite formal limits to its information gathering powers and the lack of an Inspector-General within the UK system.853\nConcerning redress for complaints against the services by individuals,854 the Investigatory Powers Tribunal has a wide jurisdiction to hear complaints and to grant remedies. The deficiencies are more in the vagueness of the powers granted to the agencies (which make a finding of illegality unlikely in the first place) and in the secrecy restrictions placed on the process, which mean it is impossible for a complainant to distinguish between a Tribunal finding based on justifiable use of legal powers and lack of evidence of the services'\ninvolvement.\n\nIn the case of oversight of information sharing, it is doubtful if the current UK\narrangements satisfy the standards proposed by the UN Special Rapporteur.855 Domestic legislation fails to outline 'clear parameters for intelligence exchange, including the conditions that must be met for information to be shared, the entities with which intelligence may be shared, and the safeguards that apply to exchanges of intelligence'.856 Nor does it explicitly prohibit the use of foreign intelligence services to circumvent national legal or institutional controls.857 The history of the ISC, which has now operated for some 15 years, contains both positive and negative lessons. Positively speaking, working behind closed doors may help to strengthen the bipartisanship and trust that are essential to oversight. The ISC\nwas well ahead of its time in oversight not only of security but also intelligence and signals intelligence. There is a clear need for a holistic approachreflected in the ISC's practicethat all the relevant agencies and components of the intelligence cycle should fall under oversight. The practice of the committee (contradicting the strict legal position) also shows that trust and cooperation may allow an oversight body to investigate sensitive operational details without damaging leaks. Negatively, however, the UK experience underlines the need for critical distance from the executive to be woven into oversight arrangements (especially in such procedural questions as appointment of overseers and reporting) if public confidence is to be retained. Moreover, in the current climate such is the importance of intelligence sharing that any effective oversight scheme must be designed from the start with this firmly in view.\n\nREFERENCES A v. B (Investigatory Powers Tribunal: Jurisdiction) (2009), UK SC 12.\n\n\nBorn H., Johnson L. and I. Leigh, eds. (2005), Who's Watching the Spies: Establishing Intelligence Service Accountability, Potomac Books, Dulles, Virginia. Born H. and I. Leigh (2007), 'Democratic Accountability of Intelligence Services' in Armaments, Disarmament and International Security: Yearbook of the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute 2007, Oxford University Press, Oxford. Data Protection Act\n1998\n(1998), available at\n(http://www.legislation.gov.uk/\nukpga/1998/29/contents). Defty A. (2008), 'Educating parliamentarians about intelligence: The role of the British Intelligence and Security Committee', *Parliamentary Affairs*, Vol. 61, No 4, pp. 621641. Esbester v. UK (2 April 1993), App. No. 18601/91.\n\nEuropean Commission for Democracy through Law (2007), Report on Democratic Oversight of the Security Services in Council of Europe States, Study 388/2006 (CDL_DEM 2007-\n001), Strasbourg. G, H, and I v. UK (1993), 15 EHRR CD 4. Gill P. (2007), 'Evaluating Intelligence Oversight Committees: The Case of the UK Intelligence Security Committee and the \"War on Terror\"', Intelligence and National Security, Vol. 22, No 1, pp. 1437. Gill P. (2009), 'The ISC and the challenge of international security networks', Review of International Studies, Vol. 35, pp. 929941. Glees A., Davies P. and J. Morrison (2006), The Open Side of Secrecy: Britain's Intelligence and Security Committee, Social Affairs Unit, London. Gosling v. SSHD (2003), UKIT NSA4. Hilton v. Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs (2005), UKIT NSA1. Hitchens v. SSHD (2003), UKIT NSA5. Intelligence and Security Committee (1996), *Annual Report for 1995,* Cm. 3198. Intelligence and Security Committee (1998), *Annual Report for 19971998,* Cm. 4073. Intelligence and Security Committee (1999), *Annual Report for 19981999,* Cm. 4532. Intelligence and Security Committee (2000), *Annual Report for 19992000*, Cm. 4897. Intelligence and Security Committee (2005), *Annual Report for 20042005,* Cm. 6510. Intelligence and Security Committee (2007), *Rendition*, Cm. 7171. Intelligence and Security Committee (2010), Annual Report for 200910, Cm. 7844.\n\nIntelligence Services Act\n1994\n(1994), available at\n(http://www.legislation.gov.\n\nuk/ukpga/1994/13/contents). Interception of Communications Commissioner (2010), *Annual Report for 2009,* HC 341. Investigatory Powers Tribunal Rules\n2000\n(2000), SI\n2000/2665, available at\n(http://www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/2000/2665/contents/made).\n\nJoint Committee on Human Rights (2009), 23rd *Report for 20089*, HL 152/HC 230. Kennedy v. UK (18 May 2010), Application no. *26839/05*, E CtHR. Leigh I. (2009), 'Changing the Rules of the Game: Some Necessary Legal Reforms to UK\nIntelligence', *Review of International Studies*, Vol. 35, pp. 112. Leigh I. (2007), 'Parliamentary Oversight of Intelligence in the UK: A Critical Evaluation' in H. Born and M. Caparini (eds.), Democratic Control of Intelligence Services: Containing Rogue Elephants, Ashgate, Aldershot.\n\n____________________________________________________________________________________________ Lustgarten L. and I. Leigh (1994), In From the Cold: National Security and Parliamentary Democracy, Oxford University Press, Oxford. National Intelligence Machinery (2006), HMSO, London. Phythian M. (2007), 'The British Experience with Intelligence Accountability', Intelligence and National Security, Vol. 22, No 1, p. 81. Prime Minister (1998), Government Response to the Intelligence and Security Committee Annual Report for 19971998, Cm. 4089. Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 (2000), available at (http://www.\n\nlegislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2000/23/contents). Rifkind Sir Malcolm (2010), 'Intelligence Oversight in the UK: the Intelligence and Security Committee', Royal United Services Institute. UN Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms while Combating Terrorism (2010), Compilation of good practice on legal and institutional and measures that ensure respect for human rights by intelligence agencies, UN General Assembly, A/HRC/14/46.\n\n## Annex A: Country Case Studies X. Parliamentary And Specialised Oversight Of Security And Intelligence Agencies In Australia Nicola Mcgarrity\n\n1. INTRODUCTION\n\nThe oversight framework for the Australian Intelligence Community (AIC) is extensive and\nsubstantially effective in scrutinising the activities of the AIC. However, one of the main\ncriticisms that could be levelled against this framework is that it is *too* extensive. There are\nsix members of the AIC (see Appendix 1):\n\nOffice of National Assessments (ONA);\n\nAustralian Security Intelligence Organisation (ASIO);\n\nAustralian Secret Intelligence Service (ASIS);\n\nDefence Signals Directorate (DSD);\n\nDefence Imagery and Geospatial Organisation (DIGO); and,\n\nDefence Intelligence Organisation (DIO). The functions of overseeing the members of the AIC are shared across a large number of governmental, parliamentary, judicial and independent bodies and this is further\ncomplicated by the fact that, in addition to the formal statutory arrangements, there are also informal arrangements between these bodies as to which should exercise what\nfunctions.\n2. MINISTERIAL OVERSIGHT\n\nWhile this is outside the terms of reference for this case study, it is nevertheless important to note that:\n...the key accountability mechanism applying to intelligence agencies is their\nrelationship to ministers.... Ministers, individually and collectively, oversee agencies' activities, approve their budgets and, in many cases, ministerial approval is required for individual operations. The sense of accountability to\nministers is deeply embedded in the culture of the intelligence agencies.\nThere is no hint in Australia of the semi-detachment from governmental\nstructures and lines of authority that is a feature of some intelligence\nsystems.858 There are a number of government committees that oversee and coordinate the activities of the AIC. The National Security Committee of the Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet (NSC) is the focal point of decision making on national security and sets broad\npolicy and priorities for Australia's intelligence agencies. The NSC is chaired by the Prime\n\nMinister and consists of a number of other relevant Ministers. The other key government committee is the National Intelligence Coordination Committee (NICC). The NICC was established in 2009 and ensures that Australia's national intelligence efforts are fully and effectively integrated and accord with Australia's national security priorities.\n\n3. PARLIAMENTARY OVERSIGHT\n\n3.1 Responsible Government The principle of 'responsible government' means that the minister overseeing each of the members of the AIC is accountable to Parliament for his or her agency on a day-to-day basis. For example, the Attorney-General (who is a member of both the executive and legislative branches of government) may at any time be asked questions in Parliament regarding the budget or activities of ASIO. In *Church of Scientology v Woodward*,859\nMurphy J of the High Court of Australia stated:\nAs part of the executive government, ASIO and its members are subject to the administrative control of the Executive Council and Ministers envisaged by the Constitution: ss 61, 64. The Constitution vests the executive power in the Governor-General and Minister who (except for a three months' period of grace) must be members of the Senate or the House of Representatives. This is the mechanism by which responsible government is secured.860\n\n3.2 Annual Reports ASIO is the only member of the AIC to directly make an annual report to the Parliament. ASIO produces an unclassified annual report for tabling in Parliament, as well as providing a classified annual report to the Attorney-General, the Prime Minister and the Leader of the Opposition on its activities.861 The annual unclassified report of the Department of Defence and the annual report of the Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security (IGIS) make broad references to the activities of the DIGO, DSD and the DIO.862 The heads of ASIS and the Office of National Assessments (ONA) provide the responsible minister with an annual report on their operations.863 These reports are not made public.\n\nHowever, both ASIS and the ONA also produce unclassified budget documents.864\n\n3.3 Opposition Briefing Section 21 of the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation Act 1979 (Cth) requires that the Director-General of Security brief the Leader of the Opposition for the purpose of keeping him or her informed on matters relating to security. Similarly, the Director-General of ASIS must consult regularly with the Leader of the Opposition in the House of Representatives for the purpose of keeping him or her informed on matters relating to ASIS.865\n\n3.4 Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security (PJCIS)\n\n3.4.1 Oversight Responsibilities Section 29 of the Intelligence Services Act 2001 (Cth) sets out the oversight responsibilities of the PJCIS. The key ongoing responsibility of the PJCIS is to review the administration and expenditure of the AIC on an annual basis. This avoids any significant overlap with the functions of the IGIS (discussed below), which are chiefly to review operational matters and investigate complaints. However, the PJCIS may review any matter in relation to the AIC referred to it by the responsible minister or a resolution of either House of Parliament. This may include scrutinising Bills, such as those subject to a sunset clause, or, more rarely, reviewing substantive operational matters, such as the 20034 Parliamentary Inquiry into Intelligence on Iraq's Weapons of Mass Destruction. 3.4.2 Composition Part 3 of Schedule 1 to the Intelligence Services Act 2001 (Cth) sets out the procedures for the appointment of members of the PJCIS. The PJCIS is made up of five members from the lower house of Parliament (House of Representatives) and four members from the upper house of Parliament (Senate). These members are nominated by the governing party, after consultation with the leaders of any other recognised political party represented in the Parliament. The governing party 'must have regard to the desirability of ensuring that the composition of the Committee reflects the representation of recognised political parties in the Parliament'.866 3.4.3 Investigatory Powers The PJCIS may require a person to give evidence before it or to produce documents.867 This includes the heads of the AIC and the IGIS. It may not, however, require a person to disclose operationally sensitive information or information that would or might prejudice Australia's national security or the conduct of Australia's foreign relations.868 The Minister relevant for a particular agency may certify that a person is not to give evidence or produce documents to the PJCIS if he or she is of the opinion that it is necessary to prevent the disclosure of operationally sensitive information. Such a certificate is binding on the PJCIS\nand may not be challenged in any court or tribunal.869 In a report of June 2010, the PJCIS said that it had been provided with 'significant and meaningful information' by the members of the AIC. It did, however, suggest that it would be useful to create a statutory requirement for the members of the AIC to provide the PJCIS with broad information about 'their activities, operations, skills, methods and the product they create'. The availability of this information 'is critical to the capacity of the Committee to fulfil its obligations and to meet the expectations of the Parliament and the wide community'.870\n\n3.4.4 Security of Information\n\nBy convention, members of Parliament are not required to have security clearances. They should, however, handle security classified resources (such as those which may be revealed in evidence before the PJCIS) in accordance with the requirements of the Australian Government's Protective Security Policy Framework (January 2011). The ordinary staff of the PJCIS must have security clearances to the same level and at the same frequency as staff members of ASIS (Top Secret Positive Vet).871 Part 2 of Schedule 1 to the Intelligence Services Act 2001 sets out a number of offences relating to the unauthorised disclosure of information. For example, it is an offence for a current or former staff member of the PJCIS to make a record, disclose or communicate information acquired as a result of holding the employment, except where the action is carried out for the purposes of enabling the PJCIS to perform its functions.872 The PJCIS must make arrangements acceptable to all the heads of the AIC for the security of information held and any records made by PJCIS. It must also ensure that any documents having a national security classification are returned as soon as possible after the members of the PJCIS have examined them.873 3.4.5 Reporting Section 31 requires the PJCIS to prepare and table an Annual Report as soon as practicable after each year ending 30 June. The PJCIS may not, however, disclose to Parliament the identity of a person who is or has been a member of the AIC, any information from which the identity of such a person could reasonably be inferred, or operationally sensitive information or information that would or might prejudice Australia's national security, the conduct of Australia's foreign relations or the performance by an agency of its functions. The PJCIS must comply with the advice of the responsible Minister as to whether the report or part of the report would or might disclose such a matter.874\n\n3.5 Senate Estimates In addition to the oversight of the AIC's finances and administration by the PJCIS, there is an additional budget estimates process. This process involves the twice-yearly referral of estimates of government expenditure to Senate committees as part of the annual budget cycle.875 This opportunity to examine the operations of government plays a key role in the parliamentary scrutiny of the executive. Senate Standing Order 26(5) provides that the estimates committees 'may ask for explanations from ministers in the Senate, or officers, relating to the items of proposed expenditure'. This may include the heads of the members of the AIC.876\nThe Legal and Constitutional Affairs Committee deals with the Attorney-General's Department (which includes ASIO). The Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Committee deals with the Department of Defence (which includes DIGO, DIO and DSD) and the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (which includes ASIS). The Finance and Public Administration Committee deals with the Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet (which includes the ONA). The IGIS is also accountable to the Senate Finance and Public Administration Committee.\n\n4. OVERSIGHT BY INDEPENDENT BODIES\n\n4.1 Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security (IGIS) The IGIS is not part of any government department or agency. It is an independent statutory office established under the Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security Act 1986 (Cth). 4.1.1 Oversight Responsibilities The IGIS is responsible for ensuring that each member of the AIC conducts their activities legally, behaves with propriety, complies with any directions and guidelines from the responsible minister and has regard for human rights.877 The focus is not, at least in a direct sense, on efficiency or effectiveness or financial management. The responsibilities of the IGIS vary in respect of each of the six members of the AIC and are broadest in respect of ASIO. 4.1.2 Composition The Inspector-General is appointed by the Governor-General878 on the advice of the Prime Minister. Before the Prime Minister makes a recommendation to the Governor-General, he or she must consult with the Leader of the Opposition in the House of Representatives.879 To ensure the independence of the office, the IGIS is appointed for a fixed term of five years and can be dismissed only on limited grounds.880 An IGIS cannot be appointed more than twice.881 He or she is directly accountable to the Prime Minister. 4.1.3 Methods of Oversight 4.1.3.1 Inspections Inspections usually involve visiting agencies and reviewing selected files or other records or searching on agency systems. Some inspections are regular, for example, ASIO requests for special power warrants are examined each month. Other inspections are done as projects. For example, in 2008 the IGIS searched ASIO records to determine what, if any, information was held relating to currently serving politicians. Currently, a project is being undertaken by the IGIS to examine the policies, procedures and practices of the members of the AIC relating to the exchange of information with foreign organisations. 4.1.3.2 Inquiries The scope for the IGIS to conduct inquiries is significantly greater than that of the PJCIS. An inquiry may be initiated in one of three ways.\n\nFirst, the IGIS may conduct inquiries at his or her own motion.882 For example, in 2007, an inquiry was conducted into the independence and integrity of ONA's strategic assessments.883 Second, the IGIS is empowered to receive and investigate complaints about the members of the AIC.884 Many of these complaints are handled by administrative rather than investigative means. Other complaints are dealt with by way of a preliminary inquiry885 or by escalation to a full inquiry.886 In 2005, a number of complaints were made to the IGIS\nabout the treatment of Scott Parkin, a US citizen in Australia on a temporary visa who had been detained and removed from Australia after ASIO issued an adverse security assessment and his visa was cancelled. Similarly, in 2006, a member of the public complained about an adverse security assessment made of Rhuhel Ahmed and the consequential denial of a visa to visit Australia. Ahmed had planned to visit Australia to promote the release of a new film, *The Road to Guantanamo*. The IGIS conducted inquiries into both of these cases. Finally, inquiries may be conducted at the request of the Prime Minister or responsible Minister. The Prime Minister or responsible Minister may request the IGIS to inquire into a matter relating to an intelligence agency.887 A former IGIS noted that such requests were not common in practice 'because the office is vigilant and proactive about issues which warrant an inquiry'.888 One example of such an inquiry was the request in April 2000 by the Minister for Defence that the IGIS inquire into allegations that intelligence information relevant to the deaths of five men at Balibo on 16 October 1975 had not been acted upon.889 The powers of the Prime Minister to request an inquiry be conducted were expanded in late 2010. The Prime Minister may now request the IGIS to inquire into an intelligence and security matter relating to any Commonwealth agency (as opposed to the IGIS being limited to inquiring into the activities of members of the AIC).890 4.1.4 Inquiry Powers Section 17 specifies that inquiries should be conducted in such manner as the IGIS thinks fit. However, inquiries must be conducted in private. In all other respects, the IGIS has investigatory powers similar to those of a Royal Commission. These include powers to compulsorily obtain information and documents, to enter premises occupied or used by an AIC agency, to issue notices to persons to appear before the IGIS to answer questions relevant to the matter under inquiry, and to administer an oath or affirmation when taking such evidence.891 4.1.5 Security of Information The IGIS may obtain documents with a national security or protective security classification for the purposes of an inquiry. However, before removing these documents from the possession of the agency, the IGIS must make arrangements with the head of the relevant agency for the protection of those documents while they remain in the IGIS' possession, and for their return.892 Section 34 imposes obligations of secrecy on the IGIS and his or her staff. It is prohibited to make a record of, or divulge or communicate to any person any information acquired by reason of being employed as part of the Office of the IGIS.893 There are very limited exceptions for disclosure of information to a court and to a Royal Commission.894 4.1.6 Annual Reports The IGIS is required to provide an annual report to the Prime Minister of the operations undertaken during that year, including any inquiry or inspection.895 Before tabling the report in the Parliament, which he or she must do as soon as practicable,896 the Prime Minister may delete any parts of the report as he or she considers necessary in order to avoid prejudice to security, the defence of Australia, Australia's relations with other countries, law enforcement operations or the privacy of individuals.897 The full report must be shown to the Leader of the Opposition in the House of Representatives; however, he or she is required to treat as secret any part of the report that is not tabled in a House of the Parliament.898 4.1.7 Reports of Inquiries and/or Inspections There are additional provisions regarding reports of inquiries containing (either expressly or implied) critical views of an individual or Commonwealth agency. In particular, the IGIS must give the individual or the head of the Commonwealth agency an opportunity to make either written or oral submissions in relation to the matter that is the subject of the inquiry.899 If the views are critical of a Commonwealth agency, the IGIS must also give the responsible minister a reasonable opportunity to discuss the proposed report with him or her.900 Even if there are no critical views expressed in a report, the IGIS must nevertheless prepare a draft report setting out his or her conclusions and recommendations and give a copy to the head of the relevant agency or, if the conclusions and recommendations relate to the head of the relevant agency, to the responsible Minister. If the head of the agency or responsible Minister makes comments on the draft report, the IGIS must include such of those comments as are relevant to the final report.901 Once the final report has been prepared, it must be provided to the head of the agency and/or the responsible Minister\n(depending upon who the draft report was provided to). If the inquiry was conducted as a result of a request by the Prime Minister, the final report must also be provided to him or her.902 If the IGIS completes an inspection of an intelligence agency, the IGIS may report on the inspection to the responsible Minister or the head of the relevant agency.903\n\n4.2 Commonwealth Ombudsman The Ombudsman is an independent statutory office established by the Ombudsman Act\n1976. The Act provides that the Ombudsman is to investigate the administrative actions of Australian Government departments and prescribed authorities in response to complaints or on the Ombudsman's own motion.904 ASIO and the IGIS are excluded from the operation of the Ombudsman Act 1976 (Cth).905 ASIS, the ONA, the DSD, the DIO and the DIGO fall within the Ombudsman's jurisdiction but, in practice, people seeking to make complaints about them are referred to the IGIS.906\n\n4.3 Australian National Audit Office (ANAO) The ANAO is a specialist public sector agency responsible for auditing the activities of most Commonwealth agencies,907 including each of the members of the AIC.908 The head of the ANAO, the Auditor-General, is an independent officer of the Commonwealth Parliament. The extensive powers of the Auditor-General to compel a person to give evidence or produce a document, or to order staff of the ANAO to enter premises, are set out in Part 5 of the Auditor-General Act 1997 (Cth). The ANAO undertakes annual audits of the financial statements of ASIO, ASIS and the ONA; audits of the Department of Defence that include a consideration of the financial operations of the DIO, the DSD and the DIGO; and occasional performance audits of programs relevant to the intelligence and defence intelligence agencies, usually as part of a wider cross-government consideration of security issues.909 For example, in July 2010, the ANAO announced that one potential audit was of ASIO's performance in providing security assessments of individuals.910 These reports must be tabled in the Commonwealth Parliament, as well as being provided to the relevant Minister and to the head of the agency concerned.\n\n4.4 Independent National Security Legislation Monitor The Independent National Security Legislation Monitor Act 2010 (Cth) established a new office to review the operation, effectiveness and implications of Australia's counterterrorism\n\nand national security legislation. The Monitor's role in relation to the AIC is limited. The Monitor may assess legislation relating to the exercise by the AIC of counterterrorism and\nnational security powers. However, it is not permitted to:\n(1) Review the priorities of, and use of resources by, agencies that have functions\nrelating to, or are involved in the implementation of, Australia's counterterrorism and national security legislation.\n\n(2) Consider any individual complaints about the activities of Commonwealth agencies\nthat have functions relating to, or are involved in the implementation of, Australia's counterterrorism and national security legislation. These provisions are intended to minimise any overlap between the functions of the Monitor\nand those of the IGIS.\n5. AD HOC INQUIRIES The majority of ad hoc inquiries concerning the AIC have been conducted according to the procedures contained in the Royal Commissions Act 1902 (Cth). The power to initiate a Royal Commission lies with the Governor-General (on the advice of the Prime Minister).\nSome of the most significant inquiries have been:\n(1) Royal Commission on Espionage (1954) (Justices WFL Owen, RFB Philp and GC\nLigertwood) This inquiry was established following the defection of two Soviet diplomats, Vladimar and Evdokia Petrov, to Australia. The terms of reference required the Royal\nCommission to examine whether any acts of espionage had been conducted in Australia by the Soviet Union.\n(2) Royal Commission on Intelligence and Security (197477) (Justice Robert Hope)\n\nThe terms of reference required Hope to report on: the history of the AIC; make\nrecommendations about the future of the AIC to enable them to serve Australia in\nthe most efficient and effective way; recommend procedures for the review of\nadverse security decisions against individuals; and make recommendations about the machinery for ministerial control, direction and coordination of the security and\nintelligence services.\n\n(3) Royal Commission on Australia's Security and Intelligence Agencies (198384)\n(Justice Robert Hope)\n\nThis inquiry arose out of allegations that David Combe, former National Secretary of the Australian Labor Party, had compromised Australia's national security in his relationship with the First Secretary for the USSR Embassy in Canberra, Valery Ivanov. The Royal Commission found that Combe had been targeted by the Soviets but there was no evidence of intelligence breaches or security threats to Australia.\n\n(4) Commission of Inquiry into the Australian Secret Intelligence Service (199495)\n(Justice Samuels and Michael Codd)\nThe terms of reference for this inquiry required the Commissioners to enquire into the effectiveness and suitability of existing arrangements for the control and accountability of ASIS, the organisation and management of ASIS, the protection of ASIS intelligence sources and methods, and the resolution of grievances and complaints relating to ASIS, and to consider whether any changes in existing arrangements were required or desirable.\n\n(5) Inquiry into Australian Intelligence Agencies (2004) (Philip Flood) The focus of this inquiry was on Australia's foreign intelligence agencies, as well as any linkages between these organisations and ASIO.\n\n\n(6) Independent Review of the Intelligence Community (2011) (Robert Cornall and Rufus Black)\n\nThis review is being conducted in accordance with a recommendation of the Inquiry into Australian Intelligence Agencies (2004) that the AIC undergo further examination every five to seven years.\n\n6. ANALYSIS Given the highly intrusive nature of the powers possessed by the members of the AIC, particularly the domestic intelligence agencies in the counterterrorism context, it is imperative that clear avenues should be apparent for laypersons to make complaints. The IGIS is the key body to whom laypersons may make complaints. However, the IGIS has been strongly criticised for both its lack of transparency and the potential for the government to influence outcomes. Such criticisms were particularly pronounced in the context of a recently announced inquiry into claims that the Australian government was complicit in the rendition to Egypt of Australian citizen and former Guantanamo Bay detainee, Mamdouh Habib. Barrister Greg Barns commented:\nThe contrast between an IGIS inquiry and an open judicial inquiry could not be starker. If the allegations made about the treatment of Mr Habib were the subject of a royal commission or some other independent judicial inquiry then it would be entirely up to the head of that inquiry as to how much of the inquiry's proceedings were open to the public, and the report would be his or hers alone and not subject to government editing. One would have thought that an allegation of Australian involvement, passive or active, in the illegal and notorious rendition activities undertaken by the CIA under the auspices of the war on terror should be subjected to public scrutiny given they involve serious matters of public policy, the rule of law and respect for human rights.911 The nature of the powers vested in the members of the AIC make it imperative that any claims of abuses of power should be carefully and openly scrutinised. It is, of course, undeniable that there will be some instances in which it is necessary to keep material relating to the operational activities of intelligence agencies secret. However, there should not be a blanket rule that complaints about intelligence agencies should be heard in private. The onus should rest upon the director of the intelligence agency affected to justify why such secrecy is necessary. Similar arguments could be made in relation to the reporting obligations of the members of the AIC. Each member of the AIC should be required, so far as possible, to produce an unclassified report of its activities for the relevant year. As already noted above, the IGIS has also been criticised for being beholden to the government of the day or at least too cautious in criticising the AIC. Associate Professor Andrew Lynch commented in relation to the IGIS' inquiry into the Ul-Haque case:912\n\nWithout doubt, ASIO will have been relieved by the IGIS report. Despite the judge's remarks [that ASIO officers had committed a number of criminal offences], it found against referring the actions of the two agents to prosecuting authorities, saying there was insufficient evidence of their intention to commit an offence. That may be the case, but even so the IGIS report is surprisingly mild in tone. No direct criticism of the agents' conduct is among the inspector's formal findings - and yet their actions unquestionably distorted the investigation of Mr Ul-Haque, leading to the botched attempt to prosecute him.913 This suggests that even if the formal framework of oversight is adequate, the effectiveness of this framework is strongly dependent upon the attitude of those enforcing it. In any event, oversight by independent and parliamentary bodies is not sufficient to ensure public confidence in the activities of the AIC. Effective judicial supervision and review is also required. The difficulties with holding intelligence agencies to account for their activities in the judicial arena again centre upon the secrecy that attaches to these activities. Notably, Australia's freedom of information legislation does not apply to the members of the AIC or to the IGIS.914 The obvious consequence of this is that many persons will be unable to discover whether there are grounds for challenging a decision made by a member of the AIC. Furthermore, even if court proceedings are initiated, the cases of Sheik Mansour Leghaei and Scott Parkin, who both attempted to challenge adverse security assessments made by ASIO, demonstrate how difficult it is to obtain a court order requiring ASIO to produce relevant documents.915\n\n\n\n## 7. Appendix 1: Members Of The Australian Intelligence Community (Aic) Body Statutory Basis Functions Minister\n\nPrime Minister\nONA\nOffice\nof\nNational\nAssessments Act 1977 (Cth)\n(1) Assessing and reporting on international matters that are of\npolitical,\nstrategic\nand\neconomic\nsignificance\nto\nAustralia. (2) Co-ordinating the foreign intelligence\nactivities\nthat\nAustralia engages in. (3) Evaluating and reporting on\nthe\nforeign\nintelligence\nactivities\nthat\nAustralia\nengages in having regard to Australia's foreign intelligence priorities and requirements.\nAttorney General\nASIO\nASIO Act 1979 (Cth)\nASIO is Australia's domestic\nintelligence agency. Its main role is to gather information and produce intelligence that will enable it to warn the government about activities or situations that might endanger Australia's\nsecurity.\nThis\nincludes\nproviding\nsecurity\nassessments\nand\nprotective\nsecurity advice, and collecting foreign intelligence in Australia.\nForeign Affairs Minister\nASIS\nIntelligence\nServices\nAct\n2001 (Cth)\n(1)\nCollecting\nhuman\nintelligence\nabout\nthe\ncapabilities,\nintentions\nor\nactivities\nof\npeople\nor\norganisations outside Australia. (2)\nConducting\ncounterintelligence activities. (3) Liaising with intelligence or security\nservices\nof\nother\ncountries.\nDefence Minister\nDSD\nIntelligence\nServices\nAct\n2001 (Cth)\n(1) Collecting geospatial and imagery intelligence about the capabilities,\nintentions\nor\nactivities\nof\npeople\nor\norganisations outside Australia from\nthe\nelectromagnetic\nspectrum or other sources. (2)\nProviding\ninformation\nsecurity products and services to the government and the Australian Defence Force.\nDefence Minister\nDIGO\nIntelligence\nServices\nAct\n2001 (Cth)\n(1) Obtaining intelligence about the capabilities, intentions or activities\nof\npeople\nor\norganisations outside Australia in the form of electromagnetic energy or electrical, magnetic or acoustic energy. (2)\nProviding\nassistance\nto\nCommonwealth\nand\nState\nauthorities\nin\nrelation\nto\ncryptography,\nand\ncommunication and computer technologies.\nDefence Minister\nDIO\nNo statutory basis\n(1)\nProviding\nall-source\nintelligence\nassessments\nto\nsupport Department of Defence decision\nmaking\nand\nthe\nplanning\nand\nconduct\nof\nAustralian\nDefence\nForce\noperations. (2) Maintaining databases for use by the Department of Defence and the Australian Defence Force.\n\n\nREFERENCES Please note that this does not purport to be an exhaustive list of the books, articles etc dealing with the AIC. In particular, there is a wealth of material dealing with the expanded powers of ASIO post-9/11 that I have not included because this topic is outside the scope of this country report. Auditor-General Act\n1997\n(Cth), available at\n(http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/\ncth/consol_act/aa1997157/). Australian Law Reform Commission (2004), Keeping Secrets: The Protection of Classified and Security Sensitive Information, ALRC Report No. 9. Australian National Audit Office (July 2010), *Audit Work Program - July 2010*, Commonwealth of Australia, available at\n(http://www.anao.gov.au/uploads/\ndocuments/Audit_Work_Program_July2010.pdf). Australian Security Intelligence Organisation (2010), *ASIO Report to Parliament 200910*. Australian Security Intelligence Organisation Act 1979 (Cth). Australian Parliament, Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security (June 2010), Review of Administration and Expenditure No. 8 - Australian Intelligence Agencies\n[1.48]-[1.53].\n\n____________________________________________________________________________________________\nBarns G. (17 January 2011), 'Secret Inquiries into Secret Crimes', Australian Broadcasting Corporation Online, The Drum Unleashed, available at\n(http://www.\n\nabc.net.au/unleashed/43038.html). Born H., Johnson L.K., I. and Leigh, eds. (2005), Who's Watching the Spies: Establishing Intelligence Service Accountability, Potomac Books Inc., United States. Cain F. (2004), 'Australian Intelligence Organisations and the Law: A Brief History', University of New South Wales Law Journal, Vol. 27(2), pp. 296318. Cain F. (1994), *The Australian Security Intelligence Organisation: An Unofficial History*, Spectrum Publications, Australia.\n\nCarnell Ian (24 October 2006), 'Accountable Intelligence Agencies - Not an Oxymoron', Paper delivered at the National Security and Counter-Terrorism Summit. Carnell I. and N. Bryan (March 2006), 'Watching the Watchers: How the Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security Helps Safeguard the Rule of Law', *Administrative Review*, No\n57, pp. 3348. Chalk P. and W. Roseanau (2004), Confronting 'The Enemy Within': Security Intelligence, the Police and Counterterrorism in Four Democracies, Rand Corporation, United States. Church of Scientology v Woodward (1982) 154 CLR 25, available at (http://www.\n\naustlii.edu.au/au/cases/cth/high_ct/154clr25.html). Cotton J. and J. Ravelhill (eds) (2007), Trading on Alliance Security: Australia in World Affairs, 20012005, Oxford University Press, United Kingdom (especially James Cotton, 'After the Flood: Foreign Policy and the Management of Intelligence', pp. 329351). Flood P. (July 2004), *Report of the Inquiry into Australian Intelligence Agencies.* Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Cth), available at (http://www.austlii.edu.au/\nau/legis/cth/consol_act/foia1982222/). Gordon S. (November 2005), 'Re-shaping Australian Intelligence', *Security Challenges*, No\n1(1), pp. 2758. Gyngell A. and M. Wesley (2003), *Making Australian Foreign Policy*, Cambridge University Press, United Kingdom. Hocking J. (2004), *Terror Laws: ASIO, Counter-Terrorism and the Threat to Democracy*, University of New South Wales Press, Australia. Hubbard P. (December 2005), 'Freedom of Information and Security Intelligence: An Economic Analysis in an Australian Context', Open Government: A Journal on Freedom of Information, No 1(3), pp. 422. Inspector General of Intelligence and Security (May 2009), Submission on Issues Paper 35:\nReview of the Royal Commissions Act.\n\n____________________________________________________________________________________________\nInspector General of Intelligence and Security (2008), Report of Inquiry into the Actions Taken by ASIO in 2003 in Respect of Mr Izhar Ul-Haque and Related Matters. Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security (December 2007), Report on the Independence and Integrity of ONA Assessments. Inspector General of Intelligence and Security (September 2001), Balibo Inquiry - Balibo Killings 1975 and Intelligence Handling - A Report of an Inquiry by the Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security. Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security Act\n1986\n(Cth), available at\n(http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/cth/consol_act/ioiasa1986436/).\n\nIntelligence Services Act\n2001\n(Cth), available at\n(http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/\nlegis/cth/consol_act/isa2001216/). Lee H. P. (October 1989), 'The Australian Security Intelligence Organisation - New Mechanisms for Accountability', *International and Comparative Law Quarterly*, No 38, pp.\n\n890905. Lynch A. (21 November 2008), 'AFP and ASIO Under Spotlight Over Terrorism Cases', The Australian. McGarrity N. (2008), 'Review of the Proscription of Terrorist Organisations: What Role for Procedural Fairness?', *Australian Journal of Administrative Law*, Vol. 16, pp. 4566. McKnight D. (1994), *Australia's Spies and Their Secrets*, Allen and Unwin, Australia. Marr D. and M. Wilkinson (2003), *Dark Victory*, Allen and Unwin, Australia. Office of National Assessments (2006), The Australian Intelligence Community: Agencies, Functions, Accountability and Oversight.\n\n\nOffice of National Assessments Act 1977 (Cth), available at (http://www.austlii.\n\nedu.au/au/legis/cth/consol_act/oonaa1977298/). Ombudsman Act\n1976\n(Cth), available at\n(http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/cth/\nconsol_act/oa1976114/). Ombudsman Regulations\n1977\n(Cth), available at\n(http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/\nlegis/cth/consol_reg/or1977223/). Richelson J. and D. Ball (1985), The Ties that Bind: Intelligence Cooperation between the UK/USA Countries, the United Kingdom, the United States of America, Canada, Australia and New Zealand, Allen and Unwin, Australia. Swieringa M. (Autumn 2006), 'Intelligence Oversight and the War on Terrorism', Australasian Parliamentary Review, No 21(1), pp. 135142. Toohey B. and W. Pinwill (1989), Oyster: The Story of the Australian Secret Intelligence Service, William Heinemann, Australia.\n\n____________________________________________________________________________________________\nWeller G. R. (1999), 'Oversight of Australia's Intelligence Services', International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence, No 12(4), pp. 484503. Wright-Neville D. (2010), 'The Australian Intelligence Community', Democratic Oversight of Intelligence Services, pp. 3358.\n\nWEBSITES Much of the basic information contained in this country report has been taken from the websites of the members of the AIC and the IGIS. These websites are:\n\nONA - www.ona.gov.au ASIO - www.asio.gov.au ASIS - www.asis.gov.au DIGO - www.defence.gov.au/digo DIO - www.defence.gov.au/dio/\nDSD - www.dsd.gov.au\n\nIGIS - www.igis.gov.au\n\n## Annex A: Country Case Studies Xi. Parliamentary And Specialised Oversight Of Security And Intelligence Agencies In Canada Craig Forcese\n\n1. OVERVIEW\n\nThe Canadian civilian national security sector contains a large number of agencies. Given the mandate of this project, in this paper I shall focus on the two most important civilian national security agencies. These bodies are: the Canadian Security Intelligence Service\n(CSIS) and the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP).\n\n1.1 Canadian Security Intelligence Service\n\nThe Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act916 created CSIS and charged it with several functions, the most important of which is listed in Section 12: collecting, analysing and retaining information and intelligence on 'threats to the security of Canada'.917 CSIS is, therefore, principally a 'security intelligence' agency. It does not conduct law enforcement functions. The expression 'threats to the security of Canada' is carefully defined in Section 2 of the statute. Probably by necessity, each of the categories of threat found in Section 2 is broad and vague, and thus capable of expansive definition. Reduced to its core, the concept of 'threat' includes espionage and sabotage, detrimental foreign-influenced activities, political violence and terrorism, and subversion. CSIS's Section 12 security intelligence function is not geographically limited. It may and does operate abroad in performing this function. However, unlike some allied agencies, CSIS is not principally concerned with extracting foreign intelligence; that is, intelligence relating to something other than threats to the security of Canada.\n\n1.2 The Royal Canadian Mounted Police A second key agency is the Royal Canadian Mounted Police. Constituted by the Royal Canadian Mounted Police Act,918 the RCMP is Canada's national police force and performs policing functions in relation to drugs and organised crime, financial crimes and border integrity. While primarily a law enforcement body, the RCMP has historically also played an important national security function.\n\n\nMost obviously, the RCMP performs a protective policing role, providing security for federal political leaders, judges and internationally protected persons, such as diplomats, and acting as aircraft protective officers on select flights.919 The RCMP is also charged with investigating criminal acts of sufficient gravity to be a national security threatthat is, conduct that is both criminal and falls within the definition of a 'threat to the security of Canada' as that term is used in the CSIS Act. More than that, the Security Offences Act charges the RCMP with 'apprehension of the commission' of these offences, tasking the police force with a pre-emptive function and not simply a reactive role.\n\n2.\n\nTHE\nMANDATE\nAND\nFUNCTIONS\nOF\nRELEVANT\nOVERSIGHT AND REVIEW BODIES It is important to note at the outset that Canada does not possess an overarching, specialised national security or intelligence review body. Instead, most review is conducted by review bodies focused on specific security or intelligence agencies, subject to occasional involvement by other bodies whose subject matter jurisdiction is general and may occasionally implicate intelligence agencies (e.g., data protection agencies).\n\n2.1 The Question of a Parliamentary Role It is also notable that Canada does not have a statutorily-created 'committee of parliamentarians' involved in national security accountability. Nevertheless, both the Senate and the House of Commons have national security and defence committees.920 In principle, these regular parliamentary committees could play a key role in holding Ministers (and, de facto, their officials) to account. It is true that members of these parliamentary committees are not security cleared and in the regular course are not provided with protected information, whether of Canadian or foreign origin. Research assistance may be provided by the Library of Parliament, but these individuals are not themselves security cleared, given access to protected information or necessarily subject matter experts. Nevertheless, Parliament has powers to summon and even compel the appearance of officials,921 including Ministers,922 and parliamentary committees may 'send for persons, papers and records'.923 Parliament and its committees may administer oaths requiring truthful responses,924 a rarely utilised power. Parliament (and by extension, its committees)\nalso possesses contempt powers925that is, the power to impose a sanction for noncooperation.\n\nOf note in relation to these powers is recent controversy over Parliament's capacity to extract protected information from the executive over Canada's military deployment in Afghanistan. In April 2010, the House of Commons Speaker ruled that the House of Commons can, as a matter of parliamentary privilege, compel the government to produce uncensored documents relating to the transfer of Afghan detainees to Afghan authorities by the Canadian Forces. He also opined that Parliamentarians and the executive branch might wish to concoct a compromise solution rather than compel the documents that could truly prejudice national securityindeed, that was the ultimate outcome with documents now being vetted by a panel of former judges prior to being supplied to a special, ad hoc parliamentary committee. This is the only time in Canadian parliamentary history in which Parliament insisted on viewing protected information, and persisted to the point of compelling a ruling of the Speaker on parliamentary privilege, and the Speaker's ruling on this point represents the first intervention by that official in such a matter. The more typical pattern is for parliamentary committeesand Parliament as a wholenot to play a systemic or concentrated role in reviewing the activities of Canada's security agencies. Indeed, some critics describe their performance in this area as utterly inadequate.926 The shortcomings of parliamentary review extend to what should be a pre-eminent parliamentary role: examining (at least) security agency financing. In practice, in this as in other areas, Parliament's scrutiny has been modest (and, in some cases, close to token). At least for the last two budgetary cycles, the House of Commons Standing Committee on Public Safety and National Security has apparently dealt with the total budget of not only CSIS and the RCMP but also other (very large) agencies that fall within the Department of Public Safety in a single two-hour meeting.927\n\n2.2 CSIS Oversight and Review 2.2.1 Oversight\n\nInstitutionally, CSIS is headed by a Director, charged with the 'control and management of the Service' under the direction of the Minister of Public Safety.928 The latter is specifically empowered to 'issue to the Director written directions with respect to the Service'.929 The Director, meanwhile, is obliged to consult the Deputy Minister of Public Safety on 'the general operational policies of the Service' and on any other matter that the Minister directs.930 These and other provisions in the Act create a more aggressive level of political oversight than exists for law enforcement (which enjoys greater 'police independence' in Canadian law).\n2.2.2 Composition of Review Bodies\n\nCSIS is also subject to several layers of review by specialised review agenciesthat is, bodies that conduct post hoc assessment of past actions. First, the CSIS Director is obliged to prepare reports on the operational activities of CSIS on an annual basis, or more frequently on demand of the Minister of Public Safety, and to submit these documents to the Minister and the CSIS Inspector General.931 This latter official is appointed by the Governor-in-Council (essentially, the federal Cabinet) and is responsible to the Deputy Minister of Public Safety. Described as the minister's 'eyes and ears' in the Service, the Inspector General monitors compliance by the Service with its operational policies and examines its operational activities.932 To this end, the Inspector General is given full access to CSIS's information, except Cabinet confidences.933 The Inspector General certifies whether the reports provided by the Director are adequate and whether they reveal any action of the Service that the Inspector General views as an unauthorised, unreasonable or unnecessary exercise of its powers.934 The Minister transmits the Inspector General's report and certificate to a second body, the Security Intelligence Review Committee (SIRC).935 The executive appoints the members of SIRC for five-year terms, after consultation with the leaders of official parties in the House of Commons. 2.2.3 Investigative Powers and Access to Information Like the Inspector General, SIRC has broad rights to CSIS information.936 It may not see Cabinet confidences but is entitled to all other information in the Service's possession, including data supplied to CSIS by foreign governments and agencies.937 In SIRC's words,\n'SIRC has the absolute authority to examine all of the Service's activities, no matter how sensitive and no matter how classified that information may be'.938 Members of SIRC and its employees must comply with all security requirements under the CSIS Act and take an oath of secrecy.939 They are also 'persons permanently bound to secrecy' under the Security of Information Act940 (Canada's official secrets law) and are therefore subject to that statute's criminal penalties for wrongful disclosure of sensitive information. SIRC researchers generally review sensitive CSIS materials in secure SIRC offices at CSIS facilities. There will be some instances, however, when information is moved to SIRC's own facilities, not least in instances where that information is at issue in complaints adjudicated before SIRC. 2.2.4 Functions SIRC is tasked with, among other things, reviewing the performance by the Service of its duties and functions, including reviewing reports of the Director and certificates of the Inspector General.941 SIRC may order the Inspector General to complete a review or may conduct its own review, where deemed more appropriate than a review by CSIS or the Inspector General, '[f]or the purpose of ensuring that the activities of the Service are carried out in accordance with this Act, the regulations and directions issued by the Minister... and that the activities do not involve any unreasonable or unnecessary exercise by the Service of any of its powers'.942 For example, in examining operational matters (such as targeting, management of human sources and information-sharing with other foreign and domestic agencies), SIRC ascertains whether 'the Service had reasonable grounds to suspect a threat to the security of Canada; the level and intrusiveness of the investigation was proportionate to the seriousness and imminence of the threat; and the Service collected only that information strictly necessary to fulfil its mandate to advise the Government of a threat'.943 In essence, SIRC is principally concerned with reviewing CSIS\nactivities for legality and compliance with prescribed policies and procedures. In the last two years, however, SIRC has adopted a broader approach, going beyond compliance review to inquire as to whether, for instance, CSIS has effectively allocated resources to such things as investigations and relationships with partners. In describing its review process, SIRC notes that:\n\nSIRC's researchers consult multiple information sources to examine specific aspects of the Service's work. As part of this process, researchers may arrange briefings with CSIS employees, as well as examine individual and group targeting files, human source files, intelligence assessments and warrant documents, plus files relating to CSIS's cooperation and operational exchanges with foreign and domestic agencies and partners, among other sources that vary between reviews. The goal is to create a diverse pool of information so that SIRC can ensure it has thoroughly reviewed and completely understood the issues at hand.944\n\nAmong the specific matters that the CSIS Act charges SIRC with reviewing are the information-sharing arrangements entered into by CSIS with domestic Canadian and foreign agencies and police services. In fact, SIRC has conducted semi-regular reviews of international945 and, in the more distant past, domestic information-sharing.946\n\nSIRC has also reviewed the Integrated Threat Assessment Centre (ITAC),947 a body created in 2004 and hosted by CSIS. ITAC's primary function 'is to produce comprehensive threat assessments, which are distributed within the intelligence community and to relevant firstline responders, such as law enforcement, on a timely basis'.948 It is staffed with personnel from various government security-related agencies. SIRC reports of this sort are confidential and are not released publiclyalthough redacted versions are sometimes acquired by members of the public and press through the Access to Information Act, discussed below. SIRC also has a complaints function. The most generic complaint concerns 'any act or thing done by the Service'.949 Examples include allegations of unreasonable delays in CSIS\nsecurity screening and of improper investigation of lawful activities.950 Any person may make such a complaint concerning CSIS, directed first to the CSIS Director. SIRC may investigate non-frivolous, good faith complaints if the Director fails to respond in a period of time the committee views as reasonable, or provides an inadequate response.951 These investigations are held in private, subject to a right by the parties to make representations on at least an *ex parte* basis (that is, in private, without the complainant).952 In balancing national security and fairness, SIRC may disclose summaries of evidence produced on an ex parte basis to the other parties.953 In *ex parte* proceedings, a senior SIRC counsel (or in some instances, an outside legal agent retained by SIRC) 'will cross-examine witnesses on [the complainant's] behalf and may provide [the complainant] with a summary of the information presented in [the complainant's] absence'.954 In performing its investigative functions, the committee has broad powers to subpoena persons and documents.955 The outcome of the SIRC investigation is conveyed to the Minister and the CSIS Director, along with SIRC's recommendations. SIRC recommendations are not binding on the government.956 The complainant is also notified of the committee's finding,957 subject to security requirements on disclosure of information.958 SIRC also has more general reporting functions. It prepares special reports where requested by the Minister or at any other time959 and an annual report, tabled by the Minister in Parliament,960 which in practice contains summaries of the committee's investigations and is a public document.\n\n2.2.5 Financing In discussing its review function, SIRC notes '[b]ecause of the small size of SIRC in relation to CSIS, the Committee operates on the basis of risk management. Since it is not capable of examining all of the Service's activities in any given period, it must carefully choose which issues to examine'.961 It is perhaps significant that while CSIS has increased in size and budget since 9/11, SIRC has not grown proportionately (although it has grown in absolute terms). SIRC had a staff of 20 and a total budget in 200809 of CAD$2.4 million. Its budget in 200001 was CAD$1.8 million, with a staff of 16. In comparison, CSIS had\n2910 full time personnel in 200809, up from 2091 in 200001, and a budget of CAD$430 million in 200809, up from CAD$248 million in 200001. Put schematically, the comparison of CSIS and SIRC resources is as follows:\n\nBudget Personnel\n\n| CSIS    | +173%    | +133%    |\n|---------|----------|----------|\n| SIRC    | +139%    | +125%    |\n\n 2.2.6 Concerns Critiques of SIRC are relatively muted, and indeed SIRC has a relatively low profile and its reports generally attract little attention in the media. To summarise, however, the complaints of which this author is aware from discussions with the policy and legal community:\n1. SIRC's public, annual reports are generally opaque and anodyne. In many instances, they may provide insufficient bases for parliamentarians or members of the public to assess independently CSIS activities.\n2. SIRC critiques of CSIS performance are often reactive rather than proactive; that is, they respond to behaviour or instances already raised by others rather than independently unearthing doubtful activities.\n3. The SIRC complaints process is a frustrating and time-consuming expenditure of effort, with little appreciable gain for the complainant given SIRC's lack of meaningful powers to compel a change of CSIS or government behaviour.\n\n\n2.3 RCMP Oversight and Review For its part, the RCMP is headed by a Commissioner who, 'under the direction of the Minister [of Public Safety], has the control and management of the Force'.962 In reality, however, the level of ministerial direction is constrained by the concept of police independence.\n\nPolice independence is a common law construct, now with a constitutional imprimatur.963 At its core, it means that the police (in performing at least their criminal investigation role) are not agents of the Crown or under the direction of the political executive. This doctrine attempts to remove political influence from ordinary police decision making. Perhaps because of concerns about police independence, the RCMP is also subject to a much less robust form of 'review'that is, after-the-fact assessment of performancethan is CSIS. Unlike CSIS, the RCMP had no specialised national security review mechanism at the time of this writing. At best, review was conducted through the Commission of Public Complaints (CPC) against the RCMP.964 The CPC does not perform the sort of auditing function undertaken by SIRCthat is, it does not conduct reviews of the sort discussed above. Instead, it addresses complaints concerning RCMP conduct. Even in relation to complaints, however, the CPC does not have the same powers as do SIRC to view secret information. The CPC's former chairs have repeatedly underscored the body's failings as an effective review body in the national security area965 and these persons have recommended an enhanced CPC, a call echoed by other bodies.966 By the time of this writing, however, the government had tabled a bill in Parliament that would strengthen the CPC but would still not give it SIRC-like powers.967 In essence, the new bill would make the RCMP itself competent to decide whether the national security information being sought by the Commission is relevant and necessary to that body's work, subject to a subsequent assessment by a former judge that is not binding.\n\n2.4 Officers of Parliament\n\n'Officer of parliament' is the term given to a series of special review bodies established in a select area whose members are appointed jointly by the executive and Parliament, enjoy substantial security of tenure and report directly to Parliament rather than to Parliament via the executive. Three of these officers perform functions of potential relevance in national security matters. 2.4.1 Information and Privacy Commissioners First, Canada has a freedom of information lawthe Access to Information Actthat permits Canadian citizens and residents to request information in the possession of government. Not surprisingly, there are numerous exceptions allowing the government to deny access to this information, including several related to national security. In most instances where a provision of the Act is invoked to deny access, the requester may complain to a special 'officer of parliament' created by the Actthe Information Commissioner. This Commissioner has extensive powers to conduct investigations, but has no power to compel the release of the information to the requester if the Commissioner feels that such release is warranted. Instead, to compel disclosure, the Information Commissioner, or any requester dissatisfied with the outcome of the Commissioner's investigation, must bring an application in the Federal Court.968 The Privacy Commissioner performs a function analogous to the Information Commissioner in relation to personal information held by the government. A Canadian citizen or resident may request personal information about themselves from the government, subject to exceptions (including several related to national security) whose use may be scrutinised after a complaint by the Privacy Commissioner. The Privacy Commissioner is also charged with policing the use to which personal information is put by the government. The government must generally keep a record of the use to which personal information is put, as well as any reason for which this information is disclosed within and between governments. Where the government uses or discloses personal information in a fashion inconsistent with the Act, an individual may make a complaint to the Privacy Commissioner, triggering significant investigative powers. The Privacy Commissioner may also initiate an investigation on his or her own where he or she concludes that there are reasonable grounds.969 Where the Commissioner concludes that a government institution has failed to comply with these protections, he or she provides the head of that institution with a report setting out findings from the investigation and the Commissioner's recommendations.970 This report may subsequently be included in the Privacy Commissioner's annual report to Parliament.971 2.4.2 Auditor General Lastly, Canada also has a federal Auditor General. The Auditor General is 'the auditor of the accounts of Canada, including those relating to the Consolidated Revenue Fund'972 (that is, the government's income). The Auditor General is also charged with reviewing the government's annual financial statement.973 The Auditor General tables an annual report in Parliament974 and may file other reports on matters of pressing urgency. The Auditor General Act indicates that the 'Auditor General is entitled to free access at all convenient times to information that relates to the fulfillment' of his or her responsibilities and he or she 'is also entitled to require and receive from members of the federal public administration such information, reports and explanations as he deems necessary for that purpose', except where this authority is expressly excluded in another statute.975 The Auditor General has occasionally performed these auditing functions in relation to security agencies. In a report issued in March 2004, the Auditor General examined Canadian antiterrorism spending since 9/11 through 2003.976 That study noted a lack of coordination and information-sharing on public security issues between government departments as they then existed, with various security-related agencies reporting to an array of different ministers.\n\n2.5 Commissions of Inquiry Occasionally, the government may also create ad hoc independent commissions to probe particular public policy issues or scandalous events, employing its powers to do so under the Inquiries Act.977 Recent examples in the national security area include the 2004\nO'Connor inquiry978 (Arar inquiry), the 2006 Major inquiry979 (Air India inquiry), and the\n2006 Iacobucci internal inquiry.980 In recent practice, these Commissions have been an important means of holding security agencies to account. Commissions generally have extensive powers to compel the attendance of witnesses and the production of information. Even so, government national security confidentiality claims were endemic in the Arar, Iacobucci and Major inquiries.\n\nIndeed, in the Arar inquiry, the Commission itself was forced to seek a court order permitting it to issue certain paragraphs in its final report that the government considered prejudicial to national security. Moreover, the executive establishes these inquiries and their terms of reference Parliament has no role under the Inquiries Act. As such, inquiries are relatively uncommon and mandates are confined to matters that the executive views as desirable. Inquiries are not, in other words, open-ended judicial investigations triggered via actors other than the executive.\n\n3. CONCLUSION The Canadian system of accountability compares reasonably well to the standards expressed by the United Nations Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms while countering terrorism.981 There are, however, obvious shortcomings:\n\nMandate and powers of review institutions: SIRC is an appropriate model that, on paper, has substantial powers to review CSIS activities. It is, however, a very small operation, one whose growth has not kept pace with the expansion of CSIS and which, by its own account, must be selective in its review functions. In these circumstances, questions should be asked about how effective it is able to be (compared to what might be the case if it were more amply resourced), and the extent to which it can independently identify shortcomings in CSIS practices. The RCMP has no review body close in function or form to SIRC, and the model proposed by the government in a recent bill tabled in Parliament revamps the RCMP public complaints commission, but without according that body SIRC-like powers to see secret information.\n\n\nComplaints and effective remedy: SIRC is only competent to make recommendations, and has no binding powers. The RCMP public complaints commission has no binding powers, or capacity to see secret information. The key lesson of design to be taken from the Canadian experience is this: First, empower a single body with competence to review and make binding orders (including with respect to compensation) and charge that body with functions in relation to all security and intelligence bodies, rather than establishing separate bodies with different powers for different agencies. The latter approachthe one pursued by Canadaleaves too much to\n'fall between the cracks' and go without remedy. Second, government must resource that body appropriately so that it can properly perform its mandate.\n\n____________________________________________________________________________________________\nREFERENCES Access to Information Act, RSC 1985, c A-1, available at (http://www.canlii.org/en/ ca/laws/stat/rsc-1985-c-a-1/latest/rsc-1985-c-a-1.html). Auditor General Act, RSC 1985, c A-17, available at (http://www.canlii.org/en/\nca/laws/stat/rsc-1985-c-a-17/latest/rsc-1985-c-a-17.html). Bland D. & R. Rempel (2005), 'A Vigilant Parliament: Building Competence for Effective Parliamentary Oversight of National Defence and the Canadian Armed Forces', Institute for Research on Public Policy, Vol. 5.\n\nCanada Border Services Agency Act, SC 2005, c 38, available at (http://www.canlii.\n\norg/en/ca/laws/stat/sc-2005-c-38/latest/sc-2005-c-38.html). Canada Evidence Act, RSC 1985, c C-5, available at (http://www.canlii.org/en/ca/\nlaws/stat/rsc-1985-c-c-5/latest/rsc-1985-c-c-5.html). Canadian Air Transport Security Authority Act, SC 2002, c 9, available at (http://\nwww.canlii.org/en/ca/laws/stat/sc-2002-c-9-s-2/latest/sc-2002-c-9-s-2.html). Canadian Security Intelligence Service (July 2006), Backgrounder No. 13: The Integrated Threat Assessment Centre *(ITAC)*. Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act, RSC 1985, c C-23, available at (http:// www.canlii.org/en/ca/laws/stat/rsc-1985-c-c-23/latest/rsc-1985-c-c-23.html). Heafey, S. (3 October 2005), *Civilian Review of the RCMP's National Security Activities*, CACOLE Conference 2005, Montreal, Quebec. Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (IRPA), SC 2011, c 27, available at (http://\nwww.canlii.org/en/ca/laws/stat/sc-2001-c-27/latest/sc-2001-c-27.html).\n\nInquiries Act, RSC 1985 c I-11, available at (http://www.canlii.org/en/ca/ laws/stat/rsc-\n1985-c-i-11/latest/rsc-1985-c-i-11.html). Lee D. (1999), The Power of Parliamentary Houses to Send for Persons, Papers and Records, University of Toronto Press, Toronto. Maingot J. (1997), *Parliamentary Privilege in Canada,* McGill-Queen's Press, Montreal. National Defence Act (NDA), RSC 1985, c N-5, available at (http://www.canlii.\n\norg/en/ca/laws/stat/rsc-1985-c-n-5/latest/rsc-1985-c-n-5.html). O'Connor Dennis R. and the Commission of Inquiry into the Actions of Canadian Officials in Relation to Maher Arar (2006), A New Review Mechanism for the RCMP's National Security Activities, Publishing and Depository Services, Ottawa, available at (http://www.sirccsars.gc.ca/pdfs/cm_arar_rcmpgrc-eng.pdf). Office of the Auditor General of Canada (March 2004), 'Chapter 3: National Security in CanadaThe 2001 Anti-Terrorism Initiative' in Report of the Auditor General of Canada to\n____________________________________________________________________________________________\nthe House of Commons, available at\n(http://www.oag-bvg.\n\ngc.ca/\ninternet/docs/20040303ce.pdf). Parliament of Canada, Order-in-Council (2004-02-05), P.C. 2004-0048. Parliament of Canada, Order-in-Council (2006-05-01), P.C. 2006-0293. Parliament of Canada, Order-in-Council (2006-12-11), P.C. 2006-1526. Parliament of Canada, House of Commons, Standing Committee on Public Safety and National Security\n(18\nMarch\n2010), Minutes of Proceedings, available at\n(http://www2.parl.gc.ca/HousePublications/Publication.aspx?DocId=4360754&Language=E\n&Mode=1&Parl=40&Ses=3). Parliament of Canada, House of Commons (May 2011), Standing Orders of the House of Commons:\nIncluding the Conflict of Interest Code for Members, available at\n(http://www.parl. gc.ca/About/House/StandingOrders/toc-f.htm). Parliament of Canada Act, RSC 1985 c P-1, available at (http://www.canlii.org/en/ca/\nlaws/stat/rsc-1985-c-p-1/latest/rsc-1985-c-p-1.html). Privacy Act, RSC 1985, c P-21, available at (http://www.canlii.org/en/ca/ laws/stat/rsc-\n1985-c-p-21/latest/rsc-1985-c-p-21.html). Proceeds of Crime (Money Laundering) and Terrorist Financing Act, SC 2000, c 17, available at\n(http://www.canlii.org/en/ca/laws/stat/sc-2000-c-17/latest/sc-2000-c-\n17.html). R v. Campbell (1999), 1 SCR 565 (Supreme Court of Canada). Royal Canadian Mounted Police, *Protective Policing*, available at (http://www.rcmpgrc.gc.ca/pp/protect-policing-police-eng.pdf). Royal Canadian Mounted Police, *Organizational Structure,* available at (http://www. rcmpgrc.gc.ca/about-ausujet/organi-eng.htm). Royal Canadian Mounted Police Act, RSC\n1985, c R-10, available at\n(http://www.canlii.org/en/ca/laws/stat/rsc-1985-c-r-10/latest/rsc-1985-c-r-10.html). Security Intelligence Review Committee (2010), *Annual Report 2009/2010*, available at\n(http://www.sirc-csars.gc.ca/pdfs/ar_2009-2010-eng.pdf). Security Intelligence Review Committee (2004), *Annual Report* 20032004, available at\n(http://www.sirc-csars.gc.ca/anrran/2003-2004/pgi-eng.html). Security Intelligence Review Committee (2010), 'Frequently Asked Questions', available at\n(http://www.sirc-csars.gc.ca/faqfqs/index-eng.html). Security Intelligence Review Committee (2010), 'Complaints,' available at (http://www.sirccsars.gc.ca/cmpplt/index-eng.html).\n\n____________________________________________________________________________________________\nSecurity Intelligence Review Committee (2010), 'List of SIRC Reviews', available at\n(http://www.sirc-csars.gc.ca/opbapb/lsrlse-eng.html). Security Intelligence Review Committee (June 2006), Review of CSIS's collaboration and exchanges of intelligence post-9/11 (TOP SECRET). Security Intelligence Review Committee (June 2005), Review of Foreign Arrangements with Countries Suspected of Human Rights Violations (TOP SECRET). Security Intelligence Review Committee (March 2005), Review of the Integrated Threat Assessment Centre (TOP SECRET). Security Intelligence Review Committee (August 2004), Review of CSIS's Exchanges of Information with Close Allies (TOP SECRET). Security Intelligence Review Committee (January 2000), Domestic Exchanges of Information 19992000 (TOP SECRET). Security Intelligence Review Committee (1985), Rules of Procedure of the Security Intelligence Review Committee in Relation to its Function under Paragraph 38(C) of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act, Section 48, available at (http://www.sirccsars.gc.ca/cmpplt/rulreg-eng.html). Security of Information Act, RSC 1985, c O-5, available at (http://www.canlii.org/en/\nca/laws/stat/rsc-1985-c-o-5/latest/rsc-1985-c-o-5.html). Special Senate Committee on the Anti-terrorism Act (February 2007), Fundamental Justice in Extraordinary Times: Main Report of the Special Senate Committee on the Anti-terrorism Act, available at\n(http://www.parl.gc.ca/Content/SEN/Committee/391/\nanti/rep/rep02feb07-e.pdf). Thomson v. Canada (Deputy Minister of Agriculture) (1992), 1 SCR 385 (Supreme Court of Canada).\n\nUN Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms while Combating Terrorism (2010), Compilation of good practice on legal and institutional and measures that ensure respect for human rights by intelligence agencies, UN General Assembly, A/HRC/14/46.\n\n## Annex A: Country Case Studies Xii. Parliamentary And Specialised Oversight Of Security And Intelligence Agencies In The United States Kate Martin982\n\n\n1. SCOPE OF STUDY\n\nThis chapter outlines the ways in which legislative oversight is exercised over those federal agencies that engage in domestic intelligence activities in the United States.\n\n1.1 Federal departments and agencies covered United States government entities engaged in domestic intelligence activities as defined in the Terms of Reference (ToR) include the following:\n\nThe Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), which has the lead on these activities and which also conducts law enforcement activities;\n\nThe Department of Justice, of which the FBI is formally a component;\n\nThe National Counter Terrorism Center, part of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence;\n\nThe Department of Homeland Security (DHS); and\n\nBoth the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the National Security Agency (NSA), while primarily concerned with foreign intelligence, have some authority to gather and analyse domestic intelligence. Per the ToR, this paper will not examine oversight of strictly law enforcement activities.\n\nInstead, it will highlight general approaches to oversight and provide some specific examples; a comprehensive listing of oversight activities would be much longer.\n\n1.2 Domestic intelligence activities covered We understand that this study is intended to inform the European Parliament's approach to establishing oversight of EU security agencies, which do not have the power to intercept communications, question individuals or search private property. Their domestic intelligence activities reportedly consist of sharing information and personal data, joint analysis and dissemination of information, as well as the collection of open source information. There is no exact analogue for this division of powers among US government agencies. The major domestic intelligence agencies have the authorities listed above, as well as the authority to collect personal data and arrest individuals.  The FBI, for example, is the lead federal law enforcement agency and also the lead domestic intelligence agency. The CIA is the exception because it has no arrest powers and its domestic intelligence activities are\n\nmore limited, although it does have the authority to collect information on individuals in the US, both citizens and others. This difference in agency powers affects how oversight is conducted in the United States because many civil liberties concerns about domestic intelligence activities involve either arrests or the collection of information by intelligence agencies about individuals or organisations. In many instances, the legal restraints on domestic intelligence activities are stronger at the initial collection stage than the subsequent use or dissemination stages. Thus, issues relating to the sharing and analysis of information have more often been the province of technical discussions and reviews focused on implementation rather than broader policy discussions concerning what rules should apply.\n\n2.\n\nTHE\nGENERAL\nMANDATE\nAND\nFUNCTIONS\nOF\nOVERSIGHT COMMITTEES\n\nOversight is conducted by individual committees in each house of Congress.  Some agencies are subject to oversight by more than one committee in the same legislative chamber. The congressional committees, which are mainly responsible for conducting oversight of domestic intelligence activities in addition to the relevant subcommittees of the Appropriations Committees, include the Judiciary Committees, the Homeland Security Committees and the Select Intelligence Committees in each house.983 As a general matter, Congress has the authority to conduct oversight of all activities by domestic intelligence agencies.\n\nThere are some unresolved, mostly theoretical disagreements between the Executive Branch and Congress on the scope of Congress' authority, but those disagreements are mostly about oversight of intelligence, diplomacy and military activities abroad. In practice, what activities are reviewed and how extensively they are reviewed varies widely.  Many different factors influence the focus, extent and usefulness of congressional oversight at any particular time.\n\n2.1 Authorising authority Congress' real oversight power derives from its authority to create agencies and authorise their activities. The Congress as a whole votes to authorise the activities of the intelligence agencies and to fund existing agencies. It has the sole authority to create, abolish and reorganise the intelligence agencies and to assign or reassign functions to specific agencies.984 A basic constitutional principle in the United States is that, with one exception not relevant here, US government agencies must find positive authority in legislative enactments for each and every activity, which authority can be found in very specific or very general language.\n\n2.2 Spending authority All monies spent for domestic intelligence activities must be appropriated by Congress.\n\nCongress enacts yearly funding measures, in which it can define the exact purposes for which money may be spent and may prohibit expenditures for other purposes.985\n\n2.3 Specific oversight/investigative authority Congress, usually through its committees, also has the power to oversee and to investigate specific domestic intelligence programs or activities. It has authority to conduct oversight of agencies' administration and management issues, operations and finances.\n\n3. CRITICAL EXAMINATION OF OVERSIGHT ACTIVITIES\n\n3.1 Some general comments Legislative oversight of domestic intelligence activities must be understood as a species of congressional oversight more generally. Congressional oversight has evolved into a highly complex set of rules and practices, focused on an enormous number of activities by an extremely large Executive Branch workforce, which itself is organised in a highly complex way. Domestic intelligence activities frequently involve certain features, which while not unique to domestic intelligence activities, pose additional challenges to oversight. They frequently involve classified information and joint or inter-agency activities; such activities also frequently include interaction with state and local law enforcement authorities, and they involve issues related to the protection of privacy and civil liberties. On the one hand, an enormous amount of information and analysis is generated by oversight practices, which is available both to the legislature and in many cases to the public. On the other hand, the breadth and complexity of both oversight mechanisms and domestic intelligence activities make it a challenge both to 'see the big picture' and to determine what aspects are most in need of oversight and legislative attention. The most basic oversight challenge is the need for adequate resources, but even plentiful oversight resources do not resolve how to balance the competing demands on the legislature's time and attention.  Increased partisanship in the past few years has also complicated the task of oversight. Since the 9/11 attacks, there has been extensive attention to and oversight of the sharing of information, including personal data, among intelligence agencies, between federal agencies and state and local law enforcement and with international partners. Oversight of these activities is carried out in the same ways as oversight of any domestic intelligence activity. Oversight has been successful in producing important reports and analyses of the issue; it has been less successful in illuminating potential problems or solutions.\n\n3.2\nPurposes/functions of oversight of domestic intelligence activities\n\nScholars have outlined the functions of congressional oversight as the following:986\n\n\nImprove the efficiency and effectiveness of government operations;\n\nEvaluate programs and performance;\n\nDetect and prevent waste, abuse, or illegal conduct;\n\nProtect civil liberties;\n\nGather information to develop legislative proposals;\n\nEnsure administrative compliance with legislative intent; and\n\nPrevent executive encroachment on legislative authority and prerogatives.\n\nCongressional oversight also plays an important role in keeping the public informed. Most fundamentally, the purpose of legislative oversight is to determine the mission, organisation, authorities, resources of and limitations on domestic intelligence activities.\n\n4. CONGRESSIONAL METHODS OF OVERSIGHT Members of Congress and their staff obtain and analyse information about domestic intelligence activities in many different ways. They include the following:\n4.1 Committee and Subcommittee Hearings There are frequent hearings where Members ask questions of agency personnel or outsiders. Such hearings scrutinise the annual budget request for the agency; conduct general oversight of the agency; consider proposed legislation; or examine any specific subject that the Committee or Subcommittee Chair determines is deserving of a hearing. If agency personnel are testifying, the Committee requests either a specific official or the official most knowledgeable about the subject and they may be required to testify under oath. Committee staff members usually prepare background materials for the Members and draft possible questions. Members of the public may also suggest possible questions for consideration by the Member, usually by private correspondence without public notice. Such hearings are open to the public and can be watched live on the web. A public transcript is also prepared. However, if classified information is discussed the entire hearing or a portion will be closed to the public. After the formal hearing is finished, Members are usually allowed additional time to submit written questions to the witnesses. However, agency witnesses may delay their answers or never respond at all. Such questions and answers are also publicly available unless marked classified, although members of the public may have to know to ask a legislative staff member. Public hearings signal to agencies that the subject is one of importance to the Committee. They can be very useful in requiring agency officials to answer questions and to do so on the public record. They also work well to focus public and media attention on a problem. In recent years, however, they have not proved very useful in providing an in-depth examination of complex issues. All too often, Members use the time to make statements, rather than pursue real inquiries and obtain information.\n\n4.2 Informal communications with agency officials There may also be informal communications between Members or their staff and agency officials. Agency personnel also conduct informal non-public briefings on specific subjects, usually for Committee staff, but sometimes for Members. Usually, there are no public records, or sometimes records at all, of such communications. Members may also write letters requesting information at any time. Such letters are apt to receive a much quicker response if they are from the Chair or Ranking Member of a Committee with jurisdiction over agency activities. Letters from an agency are generally publicly available unless they contain classified information. Such communications are an important means for staff to understand how the agencies actually work. They are not useful in educating the public. They may also contribute to confusion about the role of the legislative committees and a view that they function as proxies for the intelligence agencies with the rest of Congress and the public, rather than overseers.\n\n4.3 Reports done by congressional support agencies Congress has established three semi-independent organisations to provide objective nonpartisan analysis and information to Members. The reports issued by these entities are an invaluable resource for congressional staff and the public seeking to understand the specifics of complicated issues or track various controversies. They include: i. The Congressional Budget Office (CBO), which provides monetary estimates of government programs.987 The CBO is the least important for oversight of domestic intelligence activities.\n\nii. The Congressional Research Service (CRS).988 CRS reports are not classified but are publicly available only as a result of NGO efforts.989 They are an invaluable resource for understanding the legal frameworks and issues regarding information sharing.\n\niii. The Government Accountability Office (GAO) is the most important support agency in terms of providing information, analysis and reports on domestic intelligence activities, including sharing of personal data.\n\n4.4 GAO oversight The Government Accountability Office is the largest of the three agencies that provide staff support, research, review and analysis for Congress. It is deemed a congressional rather than executive branch entity, although the Director is appointed by the President, with the advice and consent of the Senate, for a 15-year non-renewable term.990 It has been reported that as of March 2008, 'there were 1,000 GAO employees with Top Secret security\n\nclearances out of 3,153 total staff. Of those, 73 held even higher clearances for access to intelligence information'.991 In its own words, GAO's mission is to 'provide Congress with timely information that is objective, fact-based, nonpartisan, non-ideological, fair and balanced'. It performs audits, investigates allegations of illegality, reports on how well government programs are meeting their objectives, and writes policy analyses and options for congressional consideration.992 The GAO has produced an extensive library of reports on sharing intelligence information and personal data among federal agencies and between the federal, state and private sectors.993 Its reports are essential reading for doing effective oversight. They provide a roadmap of activities as well as an analysis of how to measure successful implementation of legislative requirements. The one weakness in GAO oversight activities has been the resistance of the CIA to allow GAO staffers to review its most sensitive information.994\n\n4.5 Legislatively required reports by agencies to Congress 4.5.1 Congress sometimes creates offices within agencies with responsibility to make direct reports to Congress of that office's observations and recommendations. For example, Congress created a Chief Privacy Officer and an Office for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties within the Department of Homeland Security. Congress requires the DHS Privacy Office to report quarterly regarding the advice it has provided concerning Department actions and the Department's response, and on the complaints received by the DHS and their nature.995 However, an extensive body of law has been generated on how much independence such an officer can have in relaying reports to Congress without reflecting the views of the Cabinet Secretary in charge of the agency. The Executive Branch takes the position that such personnel are ultimately subordinate to the President and the Congress may not intrude on the President's constitutional authority by requiring reports that are not reviewed in advance by higher level agency officials and at a minimum acknowledge and include their views.996 Nevertheless, in practice, this process can still work to provide a somewhat independent view to the Congress. Whether it does so will depend on a variety of factors, such as the character of the individual serving as Privacy Officer, the politics of the particular controversy, and the potential political and public fall-out if it were to become known that the agency was attempting, in essence, to censor a report by the Privacy Officer. 4.5.2 Congress by law may also require other kinds of reporting by agencies to aid in oversight. Congress may require one-time reports on a particular matter either by the intelligence agency itself or sometimes by the Inspector General of the agency (Inspectors General provide internal Executive Branch oversight, but have some degree of independence).997\n\nThe Congress may also require periodic ongoing reports by agencies. It has done so, for example, with regard to data-mining programs used by agencies to analyse personal information on Americans. Such reports can be invaluable information compilations, which would otherwise be unavailable. But there are many complaints that Congress requires too many reports, which results in some reports not being completed on time, if completed at all.998 Agencies also publish reports not specifically required by Congress, which may be useful for oversight. For example, DHS reports include many relating to the sharing of personal data, including ones on data-mining and passenger records.999 There are several excellent government websites that contain expansive libraries of such reports and other materials, including the Homeland Security Digital Library and a library of Issues, Resources, and Training for Fusion Centers.1000\n\n4.6 Reports by independent commissions From time-to-time, Congress may establish an independent commission to prepare an indepth report. This usually happens only on matters of great importance, such as the 9/11 attacks. Congress can choose the method of appointment of the commissioners, provide funding for staff and other resources, and direct the objects of study. Congress created two prominent commissions in the wake of the 9/11 attacks, whose recommendations were then seriously debated by the Congress. Their recommendations enacted into law included new mechanisms for sharing intelligence information, both domestic and foreign, which are called the Information Sharing Environment.1001 On the other hand, Congress frequently establishes study commissions, whose recommendations are simply ignored. Sometimes, it is understood from the beginning that establishment of a commission is simply a way for Congress to defer a problem with the hope that it will disappear.\n\n4.7 Congressional staff investigations In addition to regularly held hearings, congressional committees may also undertake extensive investigations of particular matters. These investigations may be triggered by anything from confidential disclosures of government employees or former employees to rumours and reports in the news media. Public controversy is most likely to result in investigations. Whether such investigations are conducted is up to the Chair(s) of the relevant Committee(s). However, Chairs may be dependent upon the leadership of the respective chamber to provide sufficient resources, depending on the extent of the investigation. On rare occasions, more than one Committee may decide to undertake a joint investigation or both houses of Congress may conduct a joint investigation. After the 9/11 attacks, but before the establishment of the independent commission mentioned above, both houses of Congress undertook a 'Joint Inquiry into Intelligence Community Activities before and after the Terrorist Attacks of September 11, 2001'. The report of that investigation is publicly available and provides a wealth of detail about the rules and actual practices of the intelligence agencies. Such investigations usually result in publication of a comprehensive and detailed report, which may contain recommendations for administrative or legislative reforms. Sometimes, such reports also result in referrals to the Department of Justice for further civil or criminal investigation. If, however, the report is kept classified, it will be difficult to know what actions if any are taken in response to the report.\n\nIf staff resources are available, such reports may be as in-depth and extensive as those undertaken by the GAO. A key difference is that the direction and conclusions of staff reports are ultimately within the control of the Members of the Committee. This sometimes results in reports signed only by the majority with the minority writing a dissenting report.\n\n4.8 Congressional confirmation/impeachment of senior officials Under the Constitution, the President nominates agency heads, which must be approved by the Senate.1002 The relevant Senate committee usually holds a public hearing on a nomination. If the committee votes favourably on the nomination, it is then sent to the entire Senate for a vote. These confirmation hearings serve an important role in determining a nominee's vision for the agency; sometimes they are also used to obtain a commitment from a nominee to respect the congressional oversight process itself. Withholding a vote on the President's nominee is also sometimes used as leverage by Senators to obtain information from the Executive Branch. The rules of the Senate permit this leverage to be exercised by one Senator and there is widespread criticism of the practice. Most agency heads serve at the pleasure of the President. However, the Constitution also gives the Congress the power of impeachment, a process by which Congress can remove from office Executive Branch officials. This power is rarely used. In some cases, most notably, the FBI Director, Congress has provided for a set term of years and that an individual may not serve more than one term.1003 While the President may still fire the FBI\nDirector, the law is intended to minimise the political nature of the office.\n\n4.9 Establishing oversight structures within agencies or organising bureaucracies to increase oversight Congress frequently uses its law-making authority to provide for greater oversight, especially regarding domestic intelligence activities. Thus, the laws regulating collection, use and sharing of domestic intelligence are frequently evaluated in terms of their potential to assure oversight, for example by requiring judicial or high-level official approval for certain activities.\n4.10\nStatutory regulation of domestic intelligence activities Finally, drawing a clear line between legislative oversight and legislative law-making may be overly formalistic. Since the 9/11 attacks, the US Congress has devoted much time and attention to issues relating to the sharing of intelligence information among agencies, starting with provisions of the 'Patriot Act'.1004 The current rules concerning use and sharing of domestic intelligence sharing are almost as complex as the existing mechanisms for exercising oversight over compliance with those rules. Other 'fixes' have been much simpler; for example, setting up offices where FBI and CIA personnel work side-by-side to overcome the agencies' historical reluctance to share information.\n\n4.11 Summary There is no lack of information available to congressional overseers. However, the success of oversight efforts depends upon the capability and willingness of the overseers first to review and synthesise what is likely to be lengthy, detailed and sometimes technical reporting. Effective oversight also requires a detailed understanding of the complexity of the applicable legal regimes and bureaucratic organisations. All this requires well-informed professional staff with the necessary background and expertise, and time and resources.\n\nFinally, it requires Members of Congress with an interest in and commitment to conducting real oversight and following through on conclusions or recommendations. This process is also likely to be complicated by public opinion and media reporting, which can serve either as an incentive for effective oversight or make such oversight more difficult by making it a subject of partisan attacks.\n\n5. PRIVACY AND CIVIL LIBERTIES OVERSIGHT BOARD The only formal oversight entity, which is not part of Congress, is the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board. Its creation was recommended by the 9/11 Commission's Report. In August 2007, Congress created the Board as an independent agency within the Executive Branch. The Board is intended to serve as an advisory body to assist in ensuring that privacy and civil liberties concerns are appropriately considered in counterterrorism laws and policies, specifically including information sharing. The Board consists of five Members appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate, including a full-time Chair and a small staff. The Board has subpoena power and must provide periodic reports. As of this writing, Members of the new Board have not yet been appointed and it has not yet started to function. When it does, it is likely that it will focus on government surveillance of Americans, including the collection, use and sharing of personal data.\n\n6. COMPOSITION OF OVERSIGHT COMMITTEES The membership and jurisdiction of the Committees in each House of Congress are determined by the Rules of that House, which are adopted by the Members at the beginning of each two-year congressional term. A member of the majority party in that house always serves as the Chair of each Committee and the majority party always has more members on any Committee than does the minority. Decisions are made by majority vote after more or less formal or informal discussion. As 'Select' Committees, Members and leaders on the Intelligence Committees are handpicked by the Congressional leadership, rather than by a vote of their colleagues, as is the case for other Committees. Both Intelligence Committees have term limits for their Members, designed to ensure a steady rotation of membership. For the House Intelligence Committee, the majority political party gets a substantial majority on the Committee as well. In the Senate Intelligence Committee, by contrast, the majority party gets only a one-vote advantage. The membership structure of both Intelligence Committees allows for the inclusion of Members (at least one from each political party) who also serve on each of several other committees that have an interest in intelligence matters: the Appropriations Committees, the Armed Services Committees, the Judiciary Committees, and the Committees on Foreign Relations (in the Senate) and Foreign Affairs (in the House of Representatives). This can be especially useful when particular matters come within the jurisdiction of more than one committee, although it can also result in those Members who sit on both committees wielding greater influence than their colleagues. In the Senate, one mechanism to foster bipartisanship has been to have the minority party's leading member on the committee serve as the vice chair and, in the chair's absence, as acting chair. This set-up deters both parties from partisan politicking since, on any given day, the absence of the chair could result in the minority party's exercising of the chair powers. This arrangement can result in a close working relationship between the chair and the vice chair, especially when the two handle extremely sensitive matters, which are sometimes not shared with the full committee. The House of Representatives Intelligence Committee, on the other hand, has no such formal procedure for shared leadership.\n\n7.\n\nINVESTIGATIVE\nPOWERS\nAND\nACCESS\nTO\nINFORMATION\n\nThere has been a continual tug of war between Congress and the Executive Branch over Congress' access to information held by the Executive, especially information which is classified and relates to intelligence activities.1005 Note that not all information concerning domestic intelligence activities discussed herein is classified. By and large, disagreements are resolved through negotiation and Congress usually obtains the information that it requests. It is less clear how fully the Executive Branch complies with legislated requirements to keep the Congress currently and fully informed of all intelligence activities when it is not asked specific questions.1006 As a matter of both principle and law, the more prevalent view held by the Congress is that there is no permissible limitation on its access to intelligence informationincluding that which reveals sources and methods. The constitutional argument is that Congress needs classified national security information in order to carry out its constitutional responsibilities and that the Constitution vests shared responsibilities in the Congress and the President for making decisions about national security and foreign policy matters. This view is reflected in the House and Senate Rules governing the Intelligence Committees that have set up a procedure whereby, after giving the President an opportunity to register his disagreement and state his views, the House or the Senate as a whole may vote to declassify and publicly release classified information. At times, the Executive Branch has resisted providing highly classified information to staff on the Judiciary Committees and sought to limit its distribution to staff from the Intelligence or sometimes the Armed Services Committees. In recent years, this issue has been addressed when some Judiciary Committee staff have been given the highest level clearances and then allowed access to such information.\n\nThe Executive Branch may also resist turning over information to the Congress that pertains to individual Americans either on the basis of their privacy rights or because the information is part of an ongoing law enforcement investigation or prosecution and as such should not shared outside the Executive branch. It is unlikely that there will be a definitive resolution to the ongoing disagreement between the Congress and the Presidentas well as among constitutional scholarsas to whether Congress is in fact entitled to all information or whether the President has the right to withhold more than a small amount of information concerning his personal deliberations with his personal advisors. In addition to the leverage that Congress may exercise through appropriations, confirmations, etc., it may also subpoena officers of the Executive Branch. That power is rarely although sometimes used and its scope is also the subject of disagreement. The GAO\nalso has the authority to file suit to compel an agency to turn over records. Finally, congressional oversight efforts frequently use public or media reports not only as a basis for asking questions, but sometimes also as evidence of particular practices. They may also rely upon expert studies by academics or other institutions outside of government.1007\n\n8. PROTECTION OF INFORMATION Protections for classified information by the legislative body mirror in many respects the protections and procedures applicable to the Executive Branch. Members of the House and Senate, like the President, are deemed to have the necessary clearance for access to classified information by virtue of their election.  They are not subject to background checks. After a Member of the House allegedly disclosed classified information in a public speech on the floor of the House, the House adopted a rule requiring its Members to sign an oath not to disclose classified information. Nevertheless, there are deliberate and inadvertent disclosures by Members from time-to-time, which are treated either as a matter for discipline by the legislative chamber itself or ignored (these individual disclosures are outside the procedures for legislative disclosures discussed in the previous section). The usual penalty for disclosure of classified information is being removed from the Intelligence Committee.  Members are immune from prosecution for any statements, including disclosures of classified information, made on the floor of the Congress, but not for other types of statements. Congressional staff who are selected by Members to serve in positions requiring access to classified information are required to undergo background checks in order to be granted a security clearance. They are also obliged to sign non-disclosure agreements. Violation of such agreements may result in loss of clearance, loss of job and in some instances criminal prosecution. The Intelligence and Armed Services Committees operate both publicly and in secret. The Intelligence Committees have extensive physical security facilities, including secure meeting rooms. The Judiciary Committees rarely hold *in camera* non-public hearings. Witnesses from the intelligence agencies sometimes testify in open public hearing and sometimes in closed sessions. Non-government witnesses usually testify in public. Sometimes the written record of a closed hearing is later declassified and made public.\n\n\n9. REPORTING BY OVERSIGHT BODIES As outlined above, congressional committees and the other oversight bodies regularly publish reports on their inquiries and investigations. The Intelligence Committees regularly publish a report outlining their activities for the past year or two.1008 Such reports are frequently based on examination of classified information.  When the report itself contains mostly classified information, it will not be released. More often, the initial version of a report may contain both classified and unclassified information. The committee or other oversight body will then engage in a process of negotiation and discussion with the Executive Branch to allow release of the report, through declassification, substitution of unclassified material for classified material, or sometimes issuance of a public report with a classified annex.\n\n10. CONCLUSION\n\nCommittee and GAO investigations, agency reporting requirements, and committee hearings are all effective oversight mechanisms. Public reporting, when possible, is very helpful. Legislative power to compel oversight when necessary, for example, through funding authority, is also key. Effective oversight ultimately depends on a shared understanding with the Executive that the legislature is entitled to classified information and that oversight is a good thing for the agencies. Devotion of adequate resources, in particular professional and experienced staff, who become experts on intelligence matters (while not becoming too identified with the agencies), is critical.\n\n\nREFERENCES\n\nAftergood Steven (2 March 2011), 'Public Access to CRS Reports Urged', Secrecy News:\nSecrecy News from the FAS\nProject on Government Secrecy, available at\n(http://www.fas.org/blog/secrecy/2011/03/crs_access.html). Aftergood Steven (21 October 2010), 'GAO Role in Intel Oversight to be Determined', Secrecy News: Secrecy News from the FAS Project on Government Secrecy, available at\n(http://www.fas.org/blog/secrecy/2010/10/gao_role_tbd. html). Aftergood Steven (4 August 2008a), 'GAO and Intelligence Oversight', Secrecy News: Secrecy News from the FAS\nProject on Government Secrecy, available at\n(http://www.fas.org/blog/secrecy/2008/08/gao_and_intel.html). Aftergood Steven (3 March 2008), 'GAO Oversight Office at NSA Lies Dormant', Secrecy News: Secrecy News from the FAS Project on Government Secrecy, available at\n(http://www.fas.org/blog/secrecy/2008/03/gao_oversight_office_at_ nsa_li.html). Armed Services Committee, US Senate (20 November 2008), 'Inquiry into the Treatment of Detainees in US\nCustody', available at\n(http://armed-services.\n\nsenate.gov/Publications/Detainee%20Report%20Final_April%2022%202009.pdf). Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction (31 March 2005), 'Report of the Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction', available at\n(http://www.gpoaccess.gov/wmd/index.html). Congressional Budget Office website, 'Congressional Budget Office's (CBO's) Role and Work', available at (http://www.cbo.gov/aboutcbo/budgetprocess.cfm). Congressional Report (December 2002), 'Joint Inquiry into Intelligence Community Activities before and after the Terrorist Attacks of September 11, 2001', US Government Printing Office, Washington DC, available at\n(http://www.\n\ngpoaccess.gov/serialset/creports/911.html). Congressional Report (October 1994), 'Legislative Oversight of Intelligence Activities: the U.S. Experience', US Government Printing Office, Washington DC. Congressional Research Service (CRS) (6 January 2011), 'Congressional Oversight Manual', Report RL30240, available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/ misc/RL30240.pdf. Congressional Research Service (CRS) (19 March 2010), 'The Department of Homeland Security Intelligence Enterprise: Operational Overview and Oversight Challenges for Congress', Report R40602, available at\n(http://www.fas.org/sgp/\ncrs/homesec/R40602.pdf). Congressional Research Service (CRS) (27 January 2010), 'Protection of Classified Information by Congress: Practices and Proposals', Report RS20748, available at\n(http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/secrecy/RS20748.pdf).\n\n____________________________________________________________________________________________\nCongressional Research Service (CRS) (17 September 2009), 'Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board: New Independent Agency Status', Report RL34385, available at\n(http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RL34385.pdf). Congressional Research Service (CRS) (updated 10 September 2008), 'GAO: Government Accountability Office and General Accounting Office', Report RL30349, available at\n(http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RL30349.pdf). Congressional Research Service (CRS) (updated 17 March 2005), 'Nomination and Confirmation of the FBI Director: Process and Recent History', Report RS20963, available at\n(http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RS20963.pdf). Congressional Research Service website, 'About the Congressional Research Service (CRS)', available at (http://www.loc.gov/crsinfo/about/). Davidson Roger (August 1990), 'The Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946, Legislative Studies Quarterly, Vol. XV, No 3. Department of Homeland Security (December 2010), 'DHS Privacy Office: 2010 Data Mining Report to Congress', available at\n(http://www.hsdl.org/?view&doc=\n136066&coll=limited). Department of Homeland Security (26 March 2010), 'Privacy Office Second Quarter Fiscal Year\n2010\nReport to Congress', available at\n(http://www.dhs.gov/\nxlibrary/assets/privacy/privacy_report_803_qtr_2_2010.pdf).\n\nDepartment of Homeland Security (December 2009), 'DHS Privacy Office: 2009 Data Mining Report to Congress', available at\n(http://www.hsdl.org/?view&doc=\n120307&coll=limited). Department of Homeland Security (December 2008), '2008 Report to Congress: Data Mining:\nTechnology and Policy', available at\n(http://www.hsdl.org/?view&\ndoc=105590&coll=limited).\n\nDepartment of Homeland Security (6 July 2006), 'Data Mining Report: Report to Congress on the Impact of Data Mining Technologies on Privacy and Civil Liberties', available at\n(http://www.hsdl.org/?view&doc=68698&coll=limited). Department of Homeland Security and Bureau of Justice Assistance in the Department of Justice, 'Issues, Resources, and Training for Fusion Centers and State, Local, and Tribal Justice and Public Safety Agencies', available at\n(http://\nwww.it.ojp.gov/default.aspx?area=privacy). Department of Homeland Security Inspector General (October 2010), 'Information Sharing With Fusion Centers Has Improved, but Information System Challenges Remain', available at (http://www.dhs.gov/xoig/assets/mgmtrpts/ OIG_11-04_Oct10.pdf). Department of Justice Office Legal Counsel memo (29 January 2008), 'Constitutionality of Direct Reporting Requirement in Section 802(e)(1) of the Implementing Recommendations of the\n9/11\nCommission Act of\n2007', available at\n(http://www.justice.gov/olc/2008/privacy-officer-report.pdf).\n\n\n____________________________________________________________________________________________\nDe Rosa M., Dinh V. and K. Martin (6 July 2005), 'Section 203: Authority to Share Criminal Investigative Information' in *Patriot Debates*, Stewart A. Baker and John Kavanagh, eds., American Bar Association Standing Committee on Law and National Security, available at\n(http://apps.americanbar.org/natsecurity/ patriotdebates/section-203). Fisher Louis (2003), *The Politics of Executive Privilege*, Carolina Academic Press, Durham NC. Fisher Louis (1997), Constitutional Conflicts Between Congress and the President, 4th edition, revised, University Press of Kansas, Lawrence KS. Fisher Louis (1981), *The Politics of Shared Power: Congress and the Executive*, Congressional Quarterly Press, Washington DC. Fisher Louis (1972), *President and Congress: Power and Policy*, The Free Press, New York. Government Accountability Office (16 December 2010), 'Quadrennial Homeland Security Review: 2010 Reports Addressed Many Required Elements, but Budget Planning Not Yet Completed', GAO-11-153R, available at (http://www.gao.gov/ new.items/d11153r.pdf).\n\n\nGovernment Accountability Office (29 September 2010), 'Information Sharing: Federal Agencies Are Helping Fusion Centers Build and Sustain Capabilities and Protect Privacy, but Could Better Measure Results', GAO-10-972, available at\n(http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d10972.pdf).\n\nGovernment Accountability Office (5 May 2010), 'Terrorist Watchlist Screening: FBI Has Enhanced Its Use of Information from Firearm and Explosives Background Checks to Support Counterterrorism Efforts', GAO-10-703T, available at\n(http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d10703t.pdf). Government Accountability Office (17 March 2010), 'Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance: Overarching Guidance Is Needed to Advance Information Sharing', GAO-\n10-500T, available at (http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d10500t. pdf).\n\nGovernment Accountability Office (27 January 2010), 'Homeland Security: Better Use of Terrorist Watchlist Information and Improvements in Deployment of Passenger Screening Checkpoint Technologies Could Further Strengthen Security', GAO-10-401T, available at\n(http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d10401t.pdf). Government Accountability Office (18 December 2009), 'Information Sharing: Federal Agencies Are Sharing Border and Terrorism Information with Local and Tribal Law Enforcement Agencies, but Additional Efforts Are Needed', GAO-10-41, available at\n(http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d1041.pdf). Government Accountability Office (25 September 2009), 'Interagency Collaboration: Key Issues for Congressional Oversight of National Security Strategies, Organizations, Workforce, and Information Sharing', GAO-09-904SP, available at\n(http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d09904sp.pdf). Government Accountability Office (30 September 2008), 'USA Patriot Act: Better Interagency Coordination and Implementing Guidance for Section 311 Could Improve US\n____________________________________________________________________________________________\nAnti-Money Laundering Efforts', GAO-08-1058, available\n(http://\nwww.gao.gov/new.items/d081058.pdf). Government Accountability Office (23 July 2008), 'Information Sharing: Definition of the Results to Be Achieved in Terrorism-Related Information Sharing Is Needed to Guide Implementation and Assess Progress', GAO-08-637T, available at\n(http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d08637t.pdf).\n\n\nGovernment Accountability Office (17 April 2006), 'Information Sharing: DHS Should Take Steps to Encourage More Widespread Use of Its Program to Protect and Share Critical Infrastructure Information', GAO-06-383, available at\n(http://\nwww.gao.gov/new.items/d06383.pdf).\n\n\nGovernment Accountability Office (17 March 2006), 'Information Sharing: The Federal Government Needs to Establish Policies and Processes for Sharing Terrorism-Related and Sensitive but Unclassified Information', GAO-06-385, available at\n(http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d06385.pdf).\n\nGovernment Accountability Office (21 October 2002), 'IRS and Terrorist-Related Information Sharing', GAO-03-50R, available at\n(http://www.gao.gov/new.items/\nd0350r.pdf).\n\nGovernment Accountability Office (15 October 2001), 'Information Sharing: Practices That Can Benefit Critical Infrastructure Protection', GAO-02-24, available at\n(http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d0224.pdf). Government Accountability Office website, 'About the Government Accountability Office\n(GAO)', available at (http://www.gao.gov/about/index.html). Government Accountability Office website, 'Government Accountability Office (GAO) Careers:\nHomeland Security and Justice', available at\n(http://www.gao.\n\ngov/careers/hsj.html). Government Accountability Office website, 'Topic Collection: Homeland Security Products', available at (http://www.gao.gov/docsearch/featured/ homelandsecurity.html). Harvard Law Policy Review (Winter 2007), 'Congressional Power: A Dialogue', Vol. 1, No 1. Homeland Security Digital Library collection website, The Naval Postgraduate School Center for Homeland Defense and Security, available at\n(http://www.hsdl.org/?search=&placeholder=&offset=0&all=report+to+congress&any=&ex act=data+mining&without=&begindate=&enddate=&advanced=&searchfield=title&collectio n=limited&submitted=Search). Kaiser Frederick (10 October 1997), 'Congressional Oversight', CRS Report 97-936 GOV.\n\nMartin Kate (2004), 'United States of America' in Transparency and Accountability of Police forces, Security Services and Intelligence Agencies, Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces and the Centre for European Security Studies, Sofia. McDonough Denis, Rudman Mara and Peter Rundlet (June 2006), 'Congressional Oversight of Intelligence is Broken', Center for American Progress, available at\n(http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2006/09/no_mere_oversight.pdf). Mullen Patrick R. (2006), 'Dissertation on Congressional Reporting: A Management Process to Build a Legislative-Centered Public Administration', Dissertation, Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University, available at (http://scholar.lib.vt.edu/theses/available/etd-\n04202006-104259/). National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (2004), 'Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, Official Government Edition', Government Printing Office, Washington DC, available at http://www.gpoaccess.gov/911/index.html. Office of the Director of National Intelligence (15 February 2008), 'Data-mining report required to Congress: Data Mining Report as defined by Congress under Section 804 of the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007', available at\n(http://www.dni.gov/reports/data_mining_report_feb08. pdf). Office of the Inspectors General (10 July 2009), 'Report on the President's Surveillance Program', available at (http://www.justice.gov/oig/special/s0907. pdf). Richelson Jeffrey T. (2007), *The US Intelligence Community*, Westview Press, Boulder CO. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (17 March 2011), 'Report of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence,\n20092011', available at\n(http://intelligence.\n\nsenate.gov/pdfs/1123.pdf). US Code, Title 28 Section 533, 'Investigative and other officials; appointment'. US Code, Title 31 Section 712, 'Investigating the use of public money'. US Code, Title 31 Section 716, 'Availability of information and inspection of records'. US Code, Title 50 Section 413, 'General Congressional oversight provisions'. US Constitution, Article I, Sections 8, 9 and Article II, Section 2. United States, Public Law 108458 (17 December 2004), The Intelligence and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004.rDate United States, Public Law 11053 (3 August 2007), The Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007. United States House of Representatives, 'House Rules', available at (http://clerk.\n\nhouse.gov/committee_info/commfaq.aspx). United States Senate,\n'Senate Rules', available at\n(http://www.senate.gov/\ngeneral/common/generic/committee_faq.htm#committee_assignment).\n\nWalker David M. (February 2008), 'GAO Can Assist the Congress and the Intelligence Community on Management Reform Initiatives', Testimony before the Subcommittee on Oversight of Government Management, the Federal Workforce, and the District of Columbia, Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, US Senate,\n____________________________________________________________________________________________\navailable at (http://www.fas.org/irp/congress/2008_hr/ 022908walker.pdf), quoted in Aftergood 2008a. White House, 'Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board', Bush Administration website, available at (http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/ privacyboard/).\n\n\n\nANNEX B: THEMATIC STUDIES ON OVERSIGHT OF THE EUROPEAN UNION'S AREA OF FREEDOM, SECURITY AND\nJUSTICE (AFSJ) BODIES1009 I.\nParliamentary Scrutiny of Justice and Home Affairs\nAgencies by Bruno De Witte & Jorrit J. Rijpma II.\nEuropol and Eurojust by Alexandra De Moor & Gert Vermeulen III. The European Union's Area of Freedom, Security and\nJustice Architecture after the Lisbon Treaty by Steve Peers\n\n## Annex B: Thematic Studies I. Parliamentary Scrutiny Of Justice And Home Affairs Agencies Bruno De Witte And Jorrit J. Rijpma\n\n1. INTRODUCTION With the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice\n(AFSJ) has taken the last step towards becoming an area of EU competence as any other. The removal of the pillar structure and the extension of the ordinary legislative procedure to all matters pertaining to justice and home affairs (JHA) have granted the European Parliament important new powers. Still, the AFSJ retains two of its characteristic features. First, the competences grouped under Title V of the TFEU touch upon the core of Member States' sovereign powers: migration, family and criminal law. Even more importantly, EU action in this area may impact on fundamental rights. Both factors call for sound democratic oversight. A characteristic of the AFSJ has been its focus on practical cooperation arrangements rather than, or in addition to, harmonising national legislation. This has resulted in the establishment of 'light' institutional governance structures, such as agencies, whose task is to facilitate, coordinate and strengthen the cooperation between national authorities.1010\nAgencies have been given a degree of autonomy from the institutions and Member States in order to shield the exercise of 'technical' tasks from the political institutions, both European and national.1011 The two most prominent agencies in the AFSJ are Europol and Eurojust. Both originate under the former third pillar of the EU.1012 The Lisbon Treaty has provided them with a legal basis in the TFEU. Although classified by the Commission as 'operational' agencies, a more correct description would be 'coordination' agencies. They coordinate joint law enforcement operations carried out by Member States' authorities, yet they do not have autonomous executive powers. Their intergovernmental background, structure and strong links to the Councilrather than the Commissionset them apart from the regulatory agencies established under the former Community pillar.1013 At the same time, one can observe a gradual alignment with other EU agencies.1014 Europol and Eurojust are complemented by a number of other JHA agencies: the European agency for the coordination of operational cooperation at the external borders of the EU\n(Frontex), the European Police College (CEPOL) and the European Asylum Support Office\n(EASO).1015 A proposal for the establishment of an agency for the operational management of large-scale IT systems in the AFSJ (SIS, VIS and EURODAC) is pending.1016 Whilst the CEPOL, EASO and the future IT Agency are not involved in the coordination of law enforcement activities, part of Frontex's tasks is exactly that and it may therefore be considered an 'operational' or 'coordination' agency.1017 This study will look at the accountability mechanisms available to the European Parliament to control the work and functioning of Frontex, Europol and Eurojust. The findings for Frontex can, *mutatis mutandis*, be applied to the remaining JHA agencies as the latter follow the more or less standard structure for EU 'regulatory' agencies. The study will evaluate the legal and practical arrangements that have been put in place to provide the Parliament with the information it requires to carry out its supervisory tasks. Finally, the role of the Council's Standing Committee on Internal Security Committee (COSI) and the importance of parliamentary scrutiny of this body will be highlighted.\n\n2. POLITICAL ACCOUNTABILITY\n\n2.1 Management Board Primary democratic control over agencies is exercised by the Member States and the Commission through their representatives in the administrative board, normally called the Management Board. Amongst the most important powers of the Management Board are the yearly adoption of the work programme, the general report and the budget. It may exercise disciplinary control over the Executive (or Administrative) Director and his deputy. The organisational structure of Eurojust is somewhat different in view of its judicial tasks.\n\nIts governing board, the College, consists of national members who have their regular place of work at the agency's seat in The Hague.1018 The European Parliament does not have a representative on the Management Board. This is generally considered undesirable as it would confuse the legislative and controlling function of the Parliament with that of the Executive.1019 The Management Board members that represent Member States are responsible to their respective governments, which in turn are controlled by national parliaments. The members appointed by the Commission answer to the Commission, which in turn is controlled by Parliament. More generally, the influence of the Commission over agencies is considerable because of its representation on the Management Boards, its role in drafting the EU budget, its resources and frequent contacts with the agency's administration.1020\nHowever, the semi-autonomous status of agencies makes it hard to hold the Commission directly accountable for their actions. Therefore, Parliament's power to censure the Commission does not seem to constitute an effective or even appropriate means of control on EU agencies. A comparable problem can be observed in the Member States as regards ministerial responsibility for independent agencies.1021\n2.2 Agency Director The Executive (or Administrative) Director is the key official of an EU agency, being its legal representative and responsible for its management. S/he prepares and implements the agency's work plans and budget.1022 The European Parliament does not have a role in the appointment procedure of agencies' directors. In view of the important role of the Agency Director, involvement of the European Parliament could be a useful tool for ex-ante democratic control. The Commission seemed to endorse this view when in 2002 it proposed to make formal appointment of candidates for the post of Director dependent on a hearing before Parliament.1023 However, in its 2010 Communication on Europol, it argued against involvement of Council or Parliament as this could render the appointment a political issue.1024 Still, it would seem that the appointment is inevitably a political matter, even where the appointing body is the Management Board. In fact, hearings in EP committees could be held prior to the appointment of an agency's Executive Director without the need to amend the founding acts of those agencies. The question is which consequences should be attached to such hearings. The recognition of a veto right for Parliament would probably require legislative amendment. At the time of the adoption of the Europol Decision, Parliament was unsuccessful in obtaining the right to hear candidates and provide the Management Board with an order of preference. One could also contemplate an arrangement that is currently being tested as regards the European External Action Service (EEAS), under which the Committee on Foreign Affairs, Fundamental Rights and Common Security and Defence Policy (AFET) may invite newly appointed Heads of Delegation for an informal 'exchange of views' before taking up their posts, but only after their appointment.1025\n\nAgency Director Commissioners\n\n| JHA Agency         | Europol    | Eurojust    |\n|--------------------|------------|-------------|\n| Appointment        |            |             |\n| Art.               | 38(1),     |             |\n| Council,           | QMV,       |             |\n| on proposal MB     |            |             |\n| Art.               | 26(2),     |             |\n| MB,                | 2/3rds     |             |\n| majority,          | on         |             |\n| proposal Com       |            |             |\n| Art. 17(7) TFEU,   |            |             |\n| EP                 | RoP        | (Rule       |\n| 106),              | European   |             |\n| Council,           | QMV,       |             |\n| after consent EP   |            |             |\n| Art.               | 29,        |             |\n| College, 2/3rds    |            |             |\n| majority, Com      |            |             |\n| participates       | in         |             |\n| selection          |            |             |\n| procedure          |            |             |\n| Art.               | 26(2),     |             |\n| MB,                | 2/3rds     |             |\n| majority           |            |             |\n| Art.               | 29(4),     |             |\n| College,           |            |             |\n| 2/3rds majority    |            |             |\n| Dismissal          |            |             |\n| Art.               | 38(7),     |             |\n| Council,           | QMV,       |             |\n| after              | opinion    |             |\n| MB                 |            |             |\n| Art. 17(8) TFEU,   |            |             |\n| EP                 | RoP        | (Rule       |\n| 107),              | 2/3rds     |             |\n| majority of votes  |            |             |\n| cast, representing |            |             |\n| majority of MEPs   |            |             |\n| 5                  | years,     |             |\n| renewable          |            |             |\n| Term               | of         |             |\n| Office             |            |             |\n| 4                  | yrs        |             |\n| renewable once     |            |             |\n| 5                  | yrs,       |             |\n| renewable once     |            |             |\n| 5                  | yrs,       |             |\n| renewable          |            |             |\n| once               |            |             |\n\n\n2.3 The European Parliament's Instruments Despite the semi-autonomous status, MEPs make important use of their power to ask questions to the Commission and the Council regarding JHA agencies. The most important committee for the political monitoring of these agencies' activities is the Committee for Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs (LIBE). Within LIBE, a number of MEPs have developed an expertise on specific files and agencies. Interestingly, most questions have been addressed to the Commission, which seems to reflect the increasing importance of this institution in the AFSJ and the level of control it is believed to exercise over JHA\nagencies.1026 Parliament may invite the directors of JHA agencies for questioning. For Europol, this option has been phrased as an obligation for the Executive Director ('shall appear').1027 The Frontex Regulation merely states that the Council and Parliament 'may invite' the Executive Director.1028 The Eurojust Decision is silent on the matter. However, 'accountability practices' have developed and even in the absence of any obligation to do so the director of Europol, the President of the College of Eurojust as well as Frontex's Director have appeared in hearings before the Parliament.1029\n\nParliamentary Committees may issue own-initiative reports.1030 LIBE has frequently prepared such own-initiative reports on JHA related issues, including on the role of different JHA agencies. For instance, 2008 and 2009 reports discussed the role of Frontex.1031\nCurrently, own-initiative reports are being prepared on organised crime in Europe and on the European Internal Security Strategy, which also take into account the role of Europol and Eurojust.1032 Own-initiative reports have mainly been used to evaluate and influence policy directions and not so much as a means of direct control over JHA agencies, although they could be used for the latter purpose as well. However, such reports remain one-off events and do not provide for the 'comprehensive, constant and clear' monitoring of EU\npolicies which Parliament felt to be lacking in the area of criminal justice.1033 In its 2009\nrecommendation, it called for the establishment of 'an objective, impartial, transparent, comprehensive, horizontal and continuous monitoring and evaluation system of the implementation of EU policies and legal instruments in this area', which should include both a technical and a political dimension.1034 In case of serious structural problems, Parliament could consider the setting up of a Committee of Inquiry, also as a means of pressuring the Management Board to exercise its powers of control.1035 Such committees are temporary and may be established on the request of one-quarter of Parliament's Members in the case of alleged infringements of EU law or maladministration in the application of EU law by, inter alia, EU bodies. This seems to be a heavy measure and past Committees of Inquiry have been set up to investigate issues of major concern such as the BSE crises, climate change and the social, economic and financial crisis. At the same time, they lack formal powers to summon witnesses and hear them under oath.1036\n\n2.4 Reporting and Evaluation Obligations Democratic oversight is facilitated through a number of reporting and evaluation obligations laid down in the founding instruments of Europol, Eurojust and Frontex.1037 Each year, agencies are obliged to adopt a work programme and prepare a general report on the previous year. The general reports, with the exception of that of Europol, are made public and translated into all official languages. Frontex and Eurojust make their work programmes available on their website. All founding acts provide for a periodical evaluation of the agency's functioning over a period of 45 years. These external and independent evaluations may provide valuable input for improvements and possible legislative amendments. The reports of the evaluation are either forwarded to Parliament or made public. The adoption of the Europol Decision made an important improvement to Parliament's position which, under the Europol Convention, only received a specially adopted version of the annual report. In its 2010 Communication on procedures for the democratic scrutiny of Europol, the Commission proposed a debate in LIBE on Europol's multiannual strategy and annual work program.1038 If this were to be done by all agencies, it would allow Parliament to have greater influence on the setting of JHA agencies' priorities. The Commission also advocates a more pro-active communication strategy. Europol should, for instance, systematically inform Parliament of its operational achievements and the results of its bi-annual 'user survey'.1039 Similar measures could also enhance the transparency of other JHA agencies. Frontex, for instance, now only reports on its joint operations in overall terms in its general report, whilst the individual evaluation reports of single operations is often not publicly available.\n\n2.5 Oversight of Data Collection Frontex, the only JHA agency originally set up as a Community body, is subject to Regulation (EC) No 45/2001, which provides for supervisory powers of the European Data Protection Supervisor (EDPS) and the appointment of a data protection officer within the Agency. Europol and Eurojust have their own data protection regime incorporated in their founding act. Both have a data protection officer and a Joint Supervisory Body (JSB)\ncomposed of representatives of the Member States' national supervisory bodies, which fulfils tasks comparable to that of the EDPS. Framework Decision 2008/977/JHA on the protection of personal data processed in the framework of police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters does not apply to these agencies.1040 Moreover, Article 28 states that the Framework Decision leaves specific data\n\nprotection rules adopted prior to the Framework Decision unaffected. A general overhaul of the data protection regime is foreseen in the Commission's Communication of 2010 on data protection, in which the Commission states the objective of establishing a comprehensive and coherent system in the EU and vis-a-vis third countries. This would 'entail the need to consider a revision of the current rules on data protection in the area of police cooperation and judicial cooperation in criminal matters'.1041 It has been argued that the 'specific nature and sensitivity of the processing operations in the fields of police and justice' calls for tailor-made rules, potentially leaving co-existing supervisory systems in place.1042 Indeed, any reform should take account of the experience and expertise of existing supervisory bodies. However, a single legal framework seems preferable in terms of transparency, legal certainty and cost-efficiency.1043 It would form a strong signal that JHA policies no longer are governed by intergovernmental exceptionalism but by generally applicable EU standards.\n\n2.6 Oversight of 'External Relations' JHA agencies have the power to conclude agreements or so-called working arrangements with their counterparts in third countries and with international organisations within their respective field of competence.1044 Europol and Eurojust may only conclude the agreements after approval by the Council, which in the case of Eurojust has to act by qualified majority. Parliament is not informed and does not play any role, formal or informal, in the conclusion of such agreements. In view of Parliament's increased role in the AFSJ after Lisbon, including its external dimension, this would require urgent attention and correction. With the exception of Frontex, which for the time being does not have the power to process personal data, agreements concluded by the JHA agencies may cover the exchange of personal information.1045 In such a case, the Joint Supervisory Body of the agency must give its opinion and will have an important role in ensuring an adequate level of data protection in the implementation of the agreement. In the case of Frontex, it is problematic that the Agency often cooperates with third countries on the basis of bilateral international agreements or non-binding memoranda of understanding between an individual Member State and the third country in question. Often the non-binding legal nature of these bilateral agreements means that they are not published. Moreover, access to these documents by the public has been denied. In addition, there is the need for the EP to monitor the role assigned to JHA agencies in\n'real' international agreements of the EU. For instance, the SWIFT Agreement on bank data transfers states that Europol will verify and approve requests for data from the US.1046\nMEPs, national parliamentarians and national data protection authorities have already voiced their concern over the secrecy surrounding the implementation of this agreement.\n\nThe German Federal Commissioner for Data Protection and Freedom of Information has denounced in strong terms the lack of effective auditing of the Agreement. 1047 Similarly, MEPs have voiced loud discontent over the classification of all documents concerning the Agreement as 'top-secret'.1048 Here there is an obvious role for the JSB to ensure Europol offers an adequate level of data protection.1049 The problem of the lack of access to confidential information will be discussed further in Section 5.\n\n2.7 Cooperation with National Parliaments Articles 85 and 88 of the TFEU provide that the founding acts of Eurojust and Europol should be recast as regulations. These should include provisions on their evaluation by the European Parliament and national parliaments. Both the importance of national parliaments as a source of legitimacy and the nature of JHA competences call for joint supervision of JHA policies and agencies.1050 In 2010, the Commission published its Communication on procedures for the democratic scrutiny of Europol.1051 According to the Stockholm Programme's Action Plan a similar Communication for Eurojust will follow in 2011.1052 In its 2010 Communication, the Commission considered that most of Parliament's concerns as regards its role in scrutinising Europol had been addressed by the 2009 Europol decision. Outstanding issues related primarily to the role of national parliaments' involvement in the democratic scrutiny of Europol. National parliaments have experienced difficulty in scrutinising Europol's work through the national representatives on the Management Board, in finding information and in coordinating their efforts, internally amongst national parliaments and with the European Parliament.1053 This is likely to apply also to Eurojust and Frontex. The absence of a well-structured framework does not mean that national parliaments have showed a lack of interest in the scrutiny of JHA policies and agencies. Roughly two out of three national parliaments have exercised some form of monitoring of Eurojust and Europol.1054 Importantly, the UK House of Lords has published reports on all three JHA\nagencies under discussion.1055 National parliaments and the European Parliament exchange information through the Interparliamentary EU Exchange Information Network (IPEX), a website for the electronic exchange of information.1056 There are informal contacts between national and European parliamentarians and within European political families also on JHA\nissues. In addition, there have been a number of hearings, joint committee meetings and joint parliamentary meetings held on the role of Europol and Eurojust. As early as 2001, recommendations for a 'Parlopol' Committee were made, but it was not established as a formal parliamentary committee.1057 In 2010, the Conference of the Speakers of the Parliaments of the EU held in Brussels endorsed the proposal for the setting up of a European Intelligence Review Agencies Knowledge Network (EIRAN), implemented through a website.1058 Finally, the Conference of national parliaments' European Affairs Committees (COSAC)\nmust be mentioned. The AFJS and the political monitoring of Europol and evaluation of Eurojust's activities have become regular items on the COSAC agenda.1059 A majority of COSAC's members have supported the idea of COSAC debates on Europol and Eurojust to be preceded by a hearing of the directors of the respective agencies and experts.1060 The potential for COSAC in the political monitoring of JHA agencies finds its expression in Article 10 of Treaty Protocol No 1 on the role of national parliaments. COSAC is to promote the exchange of information and best practice between national Parliaments and the European Parliament, including their special committees, and may organise interparliamentary conferences on specific topics. The Commission, in its 2010\nCommunication, proposed the setting up of a permanent joint or interparliamentary forum in which both national and European members of parliament are represented. It furthermore suggested that such a forum could establish a sub-group to liaise directly with Europol. Interestingly, it did not explicitly refer to COSAC.1061 The idea for increased inter-parliamentary cooperation must be applauded. However, a concern that was voiced at the strategic seminar organised by Eurojust and the Belgian Presidency should be repeated here. Increased parliamentary scrutiny should not result in additional administrative burdens on JHA agencies. Evaluation should take into account the specific nature of the tasks of these agencies and the purpose, criteria and scope of any form of scrutiny should be well-established in advance. The Council has questioned the added value of the interparliamentary forum.1062 However, if such a forum would take the form of a permanent interparliamentary committee, it could very well enable more structural political supervision of Europol and Eurojust. Preferably, such a committee would also scrutinise other JHA agencies, allowing for a common approach towards JHA agency supervision. If such a forum is to be prevented from becoming a talking shop, it would have to be able to count on sufficient administrative support and consistency in its membership and frequency of meetings. Importantly, the EP and the national parliaments would have to react to the forum's conclusions and recommendations.\n\n2.8 Conclusion Busuioc has found that the European Parliament's political oversight of agencies is often incident-driven, focusing on a limited number of politically salient issues.1063 An analysis of parliamentary questions on Frontex, Eurojust and Europol in the current and previous term seems to confirm this observation for JHA agencies. Busuioc has argued that such 'firealarm' oversight may be preferable for a high-level political forum, as full-time supervision would be too burdensome.1064 Although indeed LIBE would lack the resources for full-time supervision, its members would certainly have the expertise. A more long-term reflection on JHA related policies can be found in LIBE's own-initiative reports, which provide the Parliament's outlook on the future directions of these policies. The establishment of an inter-parliamentary forum with members from both LIBE and its national counterparts would constitute a more structural means of parliamentary scrutiny. There are diverging views as to the intensity of parliamentary scrutiny of JHA agencies. The Commission and Council advocate supervision that is limited to an overall assessment of the JHA agencies' performance. It can be argued that Parliament is not to enter into the assessment of specific joint operations coordinated by JHA agencies. These activities are not carried out by JHA agencies themselves but by national authorities under national law. For this reason, they are also outside the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU).1065 The Commission and Council correctly note that the level of parliamentary control over Europol is already higher now than that exercised by national parliaments on their national police services.1066 At the same time, knowledge of agencies'\nspecific operational activities, or rather the coordination thereof, may be necessary to be able to successfully evaluate the agencies' overall functioning, and also because it is in the context of joint operational activity that concerns may arise regarding the safeguarding of fundamental rights. Currently, Parliament is merely informed of JHA agencies' work plans and does not have a direct say over the setting of priorities, other than through its budgetary powers. On the one hand, this does justice to the semi-independent status of agencies and the idea that the setting of objectives should be based on non-political considerations based on independent expert analysis. On the other hand, the conclusions drawn from technical assessmentsthe risk managementare very much a political balancing act. Yet, the prioritisation of JHA agencies' work is determined by their Management Boards, the Commission and the Council. As noted by Mitsilegas in relation to the EU's Internal Security Strategy, 'scrutiny which is confined to the examination of EU legislative proposals and calling EU officials to give evidence may not provide the most effective way of parliamentary control [...] if not combined with scrutiny at the level of strategy and operations'.1067 Parliamentary debates on the JHA agencies' multi-annual and annual work programmes could form a first step in involving Parliament.\n\n3. FINANCIAL ACCOUNTABILITY The financial accountability of JHA agencies is twofold. First, there is a political financial accountability towards the Parliament as regards the setting of the agencies' budgets and the discharge. Secondly, the EU's financial regulations, as well as internal and external audits, ensure that the budget is implemented in accordance with the basic principles of sound accounting.\n\n3.1 Adoption of the Budget Until the adoption of the Europol Decision in 2004, Europol was funded through national contributions. Today, a subsidy from the general EU budget forms the main source of income for all JHA agencies, including Europol. Parliament has a final say on all expenditure on the general budget, including the amount of funds made available to the JHA agencies.\n\nThrough this 'power of the purse', it can exercise considerable influence over agencies. In\n2008, for instance, the Parliament increased Frontex's funds but put thirty per cent of the administrative budget in reserve only to be released when the Parliament was satisfied that the agency had improved its performance and accountability.1068 Each year the Management Board of the agency adopts a draft estimate, including a draft establishment plan, together with a draft work programme. This is forwarded to the Commission by 31 March, which in turn forwards it to the Council and Parliament. On the basis of this estimate, the Commission enters the amounts necessary into the draft budgets. The EP's Committee on Budgets (BUDG) will produce a report on all sections of the draft budget, including Justice and Home Affairs.1069 LIBE will give its input for this report in an opinion. In addition, MEPs, political groups or Committees as a whole can table amendments that will be voted upon in the Committee on Budgets. The Management Board adopts the agency's budget, but this only becomes final after adoption of the general EU budget and, where necessary, it will be adjusted.\n\n3.2 Implementation The Financial Regulation that lays down the rules for the establishment and implementation of the general Community budget refers expressly to agencies.1070 Although Europol and Eurojust were not initially set up as Community bodies, their founding instruments make the 'Community' Financial Regulation applicable. On the basis of Article 185(1) of the Financial Regulation, the Commission has adopted a Framework Financial Regulation for bodies set up by the Communities, having legal personality and receiving grants charged to the Community budget.1071\n\n3.3 Discharge Procedure By 1 March following each financial year, the agency's accounting officer communicates the provisional accounts to the Commission's accounting officer together with a report on the agency's budgetary and financial management. The Commission's accounting officer forwards the Agency's provisional accounts to the Court of Auditors, together with its own report on the budgetary and financial management. This report is also forwarded to the Parliament and the Council. Upon receipt of the observations of the Court of Auditors, the Agency's Executive Director draws up the final accounts and forwards these to the Management Board for an opinion. By 1 July of the following year, the Executive Director sends the final accounts to the Commission, Council, Parliament and the Court of Auditors. These are public. By 30 September, s/he also sends a reply to the observations of the Court of Auditors to the Court of Auditors itself and the Management Board. LIBE will provide the Committee on Budgetary Control (CONT) with an opinion on the discharge with respect to the implementation of the specific agencies, as well as the implementation of the general budget of the EU. In these opinions, LIBE will make suggestions for CONT to incorporate in its motion for a Resolution. CONT also publishes a yearly overall report on the performance, financial management and control of EU agencies. In its report for the discharge of 2009, CONT complimented Eurojust on its initiative to include Key Performance Indicators in its 2010 plans and recommended this as best practice for the other agencies, allowing stakeholders to better evaluate agencies'\nperformance. It furthermore encouraged agencies to establish multiannual work programmes.1072 After a negative opinion of CONT in 2010, Parliament refused discharge\n\nfor the implementation of the European Police College (CEPOL) 2008 budget. The agency's funding was frozen and a new management put in place. Discharge for the implementation of CEPOL's 2009 budget was also delayed on the advice of CONT, which deemed the reporting 'insufficient to allow a clear understanding of implementation of concrete actions'.1073 In case of a positive opinion, Parliament will give a discharge to the Executive Director with respect to the implementation of the budget upon recommendation from the Council before\n30 April (Frontex and Europol) or 15 May (Eurojust) of the discharge year + 2.\n\n3.4 Conclusion The Union's general financial rules and regulations constitute an important instrument for the transparent and sound financial management of the agencies' budgets. Still, the Commission Communication on the future of Regulatory Agencies rightly notes that the small size of agencies compared to institutions would seem to justify 'appropriate adaptations'.1074 Indeed, there is a concern that multiple audits and financial controls may lead to cumbersome proceedings, distracting the agencies from their core tasks. LIBE\nprovides important input for the reports of BUDG and CONT and the latter committee has proven willing to act in case of serious mismanagement, advising against discharge for the implementation of CEPOL's budget of 2008.\n\n4. JUDICIAL ACCOUNTABILITY The possibility for the European Parliament to hold JHA agencies accountable before the CJEU is limited. The CJEU has long held that, in accordance with Article 263 of the TFEU, the Court can only review the legality of measures intended to produce legal effects vis-avis third parties,1075 which will seldom be the case. Moreover, no person on the staff of JHA\nagencies is endowed with autonomous law enforcement powers, let alone powers of coercion. For Europol, this is explicitly stated in Article 88 of the TFEU. There has been some discussion as to the extent to which Eurojust could be given the power under Article\n85(1)(c) of the TFEU to order or initiate an investigation. It is submitted that Article 85(1) must be read restrictively on the basis of Article 85(2) of the TFEU, which states that formal acts of judicial procedure shall be carried out by the competent national officials.1076 Operational activity at the EU level remains limited to the coordination of operational activities of national law enforcement agencies by EU bodies and institutions, whichsince it does not entail decision makingescapes review before the CJEU. Therefore, the extension of the Court's jurisdiction by the Lisbon Treaty to review the acts of bodies, offices and agencies of the Union does not change anything in relation to JHA agencies'\ncoordinating activities.1077\n\n5. ACCESS TO INFORMATION Despite the numerous information and evaluation obligations of JHA agencies, in practice the access by MEPs and their staff to information emanating from the JHA agencies, as well as information relating to the AFSJ policy field in general, has proven problematic. There is a tendency for JHA agencies and the other institutions to invoke the specific nature of JHA agencies' tasks in order to withhold access to information that would help the Parliament to exercise its supervisory powers. The classification of all documents relating to the implementation of the SWIFT Agreement, referred to above, is a case in point. MEPs have also voiced strong disapproval over the lack of information and evaluation of the EU's Counter-Terrorism Policy and Internal Security Strategy.1078\n\n5.1 Access to documents The founding acts of both Eurojust and Europol refer to the need for confidentiality of the information held by the agency.1079 These acts also oblige the governing bodies to adopt a decision on access to documents, taking into account the limits and principles of Regulation\n(EC) No 1049/2001 on access to documents.1080 The Frontex regulation contains an obligation of transparency, making Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001 applicable in full to the Agency. In the course of the current procedure for the revision of the Access to Documents Regulation, LIBE Rapporteur Michael Cashman (PES) has proposed an amendment to the Commission's draft, which would bring all EU agencies within the scope of the Regulation.1081 Article 4 of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001 contains important exceptions, in particular for reasons of public security, defence and military matters, and international relations. These exceptions are likely to cover sensitive documents, classified as such by the institution or agency under their respective security regulations and covered by Article 9 of the Regulation.1082 There are four secrecy levels: restricted, confidential, secret and top secret. Without the consent of the originator, these sensitive documents are not released.1083\nArticle 9(7) obliges the Commission and the Council to inform Parliament on sensitive documents in accordance with arrangements agreed between the institutions. The fact that some of the major cases decided by the CJEU on access to documents that were brought by MEPs shows that this provision does not work well in practice.1084 The Cashman report proposes amendments which would grant Parliament access to classified documents through a special oversight committee composed of seven MEPs appointed by the Conference of Presidents. These members would have to comply with a specific clearance procedure and solemnly swear not to reveal in any way the content of the information accessed. 1085\n5.2 Access to information in the CFSP A 2002 Interinstitutional agreement between the Parliament and Council applies to the access by Parliament of information classified as top secret, secret or confidential in the field of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP).1086 Under this agreement, read in conjunction with the 2010 Declaration by the High Representative on Political Accountability, Parliament's President or the AFET Committee may request information from the Presidency of the Council or the High Representative. In case of sensitive information, documents will be made available for inspection at the Council's premises. Where possible, the information is made available to the President of Parliament who has a choice between three options: granting access to the Chair or members of the AFET Committee, a discussion in the AFET Committee meeting *in camera,*\nor communication of documents from which information has been expunged. The High Representative can provide access to other documents in the CFSP area on a need-to-know basis to other MEPs, who, for classified documents, are duly security cleared by their home Member State's competent authority in accordance with applicable security rules. This is done at the request of the AFET Chair and, if needed, the President of the Parliament. The 2002 Agreement specifically mentions that it may serve as an example for other areas.\n\nThe AFSJ is particularly concerned by this precedent. In the AFSJ, the situation has potentially improved with the extension of the ordinary legislative procedure to matters of JHA, making Parliament a co-legislator. Prior to the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, ad hoc agreements between Parliament and the Council provided for access to sensitive documents, if necessary, in *huis clos* sessions in the margins of LIBE.1087 There is no general agreement on the exchange of sensitive information between the Council and Parliament. Closed meetings have taken place for instance to grant Members of LIBE access to documents regarding the negotiations on international agreements for the exchange of PNR data.\n\n5.3 The 2010 Framework Agreement The Framework Agreement between the Commission and Parliament, newly concluded in\n2010, contains an Annex II dealing in detail with the exchange of sensitive information. As a general rule, the Commission will provide Parliament at its request with all information necessary in order for it to exercise its prerogatives and competences but confidential information from a state, an institution or an international organisation will only be forwarded with the originator's consent. This is likely to apply also to documents stemming from the JHA agencies, as Article 9(3) of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001 refers to 'the originator' in general. Access to information that is classified as confidential, secret or top secret can only be given to Parliament officials or employees working for political groups for whom it is strictly necessary, who have been designated in advanced and who have received a security clearance by their home Member State's competent authority in accordance with applicable security rules. MEPs who have not received such clearance will be granted access only to confidential information on the basis of arrangements adopted by common accord, including signature of a solemn declaration of non-disclosure. MEPs with a personal security clearance may have access to documents classified as secret.\n\nThe actual consultation of documents takes place in a secure reading room if the information is classified as confidential. Other sensitive information may be divulged by holding a meeting *in camera*, attended only by the members of the Parliament's Bureau, the members of the Conference of Presidents or full members and substitute members of the competent parliamentary committee and those employees working for political groups, who have been designated and security cleared in advance. Documents may be numbered and collected after the meeting, and the minutes of the meeting shall not report any discussion of the item. Although the Council has publicly voiced its disagreement with these rules,1088 they seem to strike a fair balance between maintaining adequate confidentiality and enabling MEPs to exercise their supervisory functions. The system will now have to be tested in practice. An evaluation is foreseen for the end of 2011. Unlike the agreement with the Commission, the Parliament has currently no framework for the exchange of sensitive information between the Parliament and the JHA agencies. JHA\nagencies do exchange classified information amongst themselves on the basis of an agreement that considers their security regulations as equivalent. This is also the case for the exchange of sensitive information between the JHA agencies on the one hand and the Council and Commission on the other.1089 Members of LIBE have in the past been granted access to sensitive documents on an ad hoc basis, largely following the procedure for in camera meetings described above. There are, however, no specific structural arrangements in place. Of course, individual MEPs may put forward a request for documents under Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001 but this is obviously a cumbersome procedure. If the experience with access to documents under the Framework Agreement between the Commission and Parliament proves positive, it could well serve as an example for the exchange of information between Parliament and JHA agencies. The principle of sincere cooperation applies to the relation between Member States and institutions, as well as between institutions, and works both ways. It has been described by the CJEU as an overarching principle which finds specific expression in Article 4(3) of the TEU.1090 This principle could be invoked by Parliament also against the JHA agencies in order to gain access to sensitive information. A stronger obligation on the JHA agencies to provide sensitive information to Parliament will force it to critically assess whether there is an actual need for classification of documents. Again, this may help to foster a culture of transparency in these agencies and do justice to the mainstreaming of JHA policies after the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty.\n\n6. THE ROLE OF THE COUNCIL'S COSI Article 71 of the TFEU provides for the setting up of a Standing Committee on Internal Security (COSI) within the Council. COSI should promote and strengthen operational cooperation on internal security and 'facilitate' the coordination of the activities of Member States' competent authorities. COSI was established by a Council decision of November 2009, although already prior to its entry into force various bodies and working groups worked together towards its establishment.1091 Its membership consists of high-level officials from Member States' Interior Ministries.1092 The EU's JHA agencies and other bodies, such as the SitCen, may be invited to attend as observers.1093 COSI does not have a legislative role. It is also not involved in conducting operations, something which is explicitly left to the Member States. Despite these limitations, COSI has the potential to become an important actor. It has primary responsibility for the EU's internal security strategy, which covers the whole AFSJ.1094 At the first bi-monthly COSI\nmeeting in June 2010, the 'Member states identified five key objectives: a partly operational and partly strategic role; coordinating the various agencies in the EU; assuming the functions of the police chiefs' task force; assessing the effectiveness of existing legislative instruments; and providing the Council with regular reports on internal security.'1095\n\nCOSI is likely to have an indirect yet substantial impact on the EU's priority-setting in the AFSJ and by implication on national police activities.1096 In this manner, the Council has retained important influence over operational cooperation in JHA. Moreover, the JHA agencies have increased their importance through their preparatory work for the Internal Security Strategy.1097 Again, there is a lack of involvement of Parliamentary actors in a priority setting. The Council decision merely states that the European Parliament and national Parliaments will remain informed of the proceedings of COSI. This seems an insufficiently strong obligation in order for Parliament to successfully scrutinise the work of COSI. Already in its resolution of 25 November 2009, it called for 'the creation of the evaluation system to give Parliament and national parliaments access to information related to the policies and activities of the internal security committee'. It is indeed important that initiatives for greater involvement of parliamentary actors in the work of JHA agencies are not undermined by a shift of agency activity towards COSI. The proposed joint or inter-parliamentary forum proposed by the Commission for the scrutiny of Europol's powers should therefore extend its remit to the activities of COSI.\n\n7. CONCLUSION\n\nThis paper has laid out and evaluated the instruments available to the European Parliament for the democratic oversight of JHA agencies. Whilst there are many formal and informal arrangements which allow Parliament to effectively scrutinise JHA agencies, some important deficiencies have been observed. The entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty now brings the AFSJ squarely within the Treaties' single legal framework. As regards Europol and Eurojust, the Treaty explicitly requires increased control of these agencies by both the European Parliament and national parliaments. It is now up to the EU Commission to present proposals to bring about the necessary legal changes to reflect this new situation.\n\nParliament should not merely be part of the legislative work in the AFSJ but should also be able to actively scrutinise the governance in this policy area.\nThere are a number of very concrete areas in which Parliament should be given greater involvement in the functioning of JHA agencies: the nomination of their Director, their activity in external relations, and the setting of their priorities. In addition, Parliament and JHA agencies should aim to cooperate with each other in a spirit of mutual trust and cooperation. Real and timely access to information, with due regard for the sensitive nature of JHA agencies' activities, is indispensable. The rules on access to documents held by the Commission contained in the 2010 Framework Agreement could serve as an example.\n\nMoreover, it would contribute to transparency if all JHA agencies were covered by a single overarching legal framework for access to documents, as well as for data protection. Although European parliamentary scrutiny of JHA agencies seems to exceed the level of control by national parliaments on national law enforcement agencies, this does not in itself form an argument against strong democratic oversight. The fact that this remains a relatively young and politically sensitive policy area, with a huge transformative potential and possible impact on fundamental rights pleads for an intensive concerted control by European Parliament and national parliaments. This control could take the form of a joint or interparliamentary forum. Such a forum should not merely oversee the JHA agencies but also examine broader institutional arrangements for the coordination of operational cooperation, in particular COSI.\n\nREFERENCES Agreement between the European Union and the United States of America on the processing and transfer of Financial Messaging Data from the European Union to the United States for the purposes of the Terrorist Finance Tracking Program, 13 July 2010, OJ 2010, L195/5. Alonso Blas D. (2010), 'Ensuring effective data protection in the field of police and judicial activities: some considerations to achieve security, justice and freedom', *ERA Forum*, Vol. 11, pp. 233250. Busuioc M. (September 2009), 'Accountability, Control and Independence: The Case of European Agencies', *European Law Journal*, Vol. 15, No 5, pp. 599615. Busuioc M. (2010), The Accountability of European Agencies: Legal Provisions and Ongoing Practices, Eburon, Delft, 2010. Chiti E. (2009), 'An important part of the EU's institutional machinery: Features, problems and perspectives of European agencies', *Common Market Law Review*, Vol. 46, No 5, pp.\n\n13951442. CJEU, Opinion of AG Poiares Maduro in Case C-380/05, *Centro Europa 7* [2008] ECR I-349, delivered on 12 September 2007. CJEU, Joined Cases C-39/05 P and C-52/05 P*, Sweden and Turco v Council* [2008] ECR I-\n4723. CJEU, Case C-266/05 P Sison *v Council* [2007] ECR I-1233. CJEU, Case C-353/99 P, *Hautala* v Council [2001] ECR I-9565. CJEU, Case C-57/59, *France v Commission* [1997] ECR I-1627. CJEU, Case 230/81, *Luxembourg v European Parliament* [1983] ECR 255. CJEU, Case 22/70, *Commission v Council* [1971] ECR 263. COM (2010), 776 final, Commission Communication on the procedures for the scrutiny of Europol's activities by the European Parliament, together with national Parliaments, 17\nDecember 2010. COM (2010), 609 final, Commission Communication on a comprehensive approach on personal data protection in the European Union, 4 November 2010. COM (2010), 171 final, Commission Communication Delivering an area of freedom, security and justice for Europe's citizens Action Plan Implementing the Stockholm Programme, 20\nApril 2010. COM (2010), 93 final, Commission Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and the Council on establishing an Agency for the operational management of large-scale IT systems in the area of freedom, security and justice, 19 March 2010. COM (2010), 61 final, Commission Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and the Council amending the Frontex Regulation, 24 February 2010. COM (2008), 135 final, Commission Communication on 'European Agencies - The Way forward', 11 March 2008. COM (2002), 718 final, Commission Communication on the operating framework for the European regulatory agencies, 11 December 2002. Commission Regulation (EC, Euratom) No 2343/2002 on the framework Financial Regulation for the bodies referred to in Article 185 of the general Financial Regulation, OJ\n2002, L357/72. COSAC (2526 October 2010), 'Fourteenth Bi-annual Report: Developments in European Union Procedures and Practices Relevant to Parliamentary Scrutiny', Brussels. COSAC (31 May1 June 2010), 'Thirteenth Bi-annual Report: Developments in European Union Procedures and Practices Relevant to Parliamentary Scrutiny', Madrid. Council Act drawing up the Convention based on Article K.3 of the Treaty on European Union, on the establishment of a European Police Office ('Europol Convention'), OJ 1995, C316/1. Council Decision 2009/371/JHA of 6 April 2009 establishing the European Police Office\n(Europol), OJ 2009, L121/37 ('Europol Decision'). Council Decision 2005/681/JHA of 20 September 2005 establishing the European Police College (CEPOL) and repealing Decision 2000/820/JHA, OJ 2005, L256/63. Council Decision 2002/187 of 28 February 2002 setting up Eurojust with a view to reinforcing the fight against serious crime, OJ 2002, L63/1 ('Eurojust Decision').\n\nCouncil Decision 2001/264/EC of 19 March 2001 adopting the Council's security regulations, OJ 2001, L101/1. Council Decision on setting up the Standing Committee on operational cooperation on internal security. Council Document 6847/11 (22 February 2011), Outcome of proceedings CATS, on 10 & 11\nFebruary 2011. Council Document 6266/11 of 8 February 2011, Europol's role in the framework of the EU-\nUS TFTP Agreement and state of play of operational and strategic agreements of Europol\n(specific focus: the agreement on exchange of personal data and related information that Europol has with the US)EU information policy on the TFTP Agreement. Council Document 15018/10 (18 October 2010), Framework Agreement on relations between the European Parliament and the Commission. Council Document 17625/10 (2010), 'Eurojust and the Lisbon Treaty: Towards more effective actions', Conclusions of the strategic seminar organised by Eurojust and the Belgian Presidency, Bruges, 2022 September 2010.\n\n\nCouncil Document 12964/1/10 (17 September 2010), Opinion of the Legal Service, Draft Framework Agreement between the European Parliament and the Commission. Council Document 5524/10 (19 January 2010), Annex II, Draft Declaration by the Council and the Commission on the protection and handling of EU classified information (EUCI) by EU agencies, bodies or offices. Council Document 16515/09 (27 November 2009). Council Document 7542/06 of 20 March 2006, Draft Interinstitutional Agreement concerning access by the European Parliament to classified information of the Council [and of the Commission] in the field of Freedom, Security and Justice.\n\nCouncil Framework Decision of 13 June 2002 on joint investigation teams, OJ 2002, L162/1. Council Regulation (EC) No 168/2007, OJ 2007, L53/1. Council Regulation (EC) No 2007/2004 of 26 October 2004 establishing a European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of the European Union, OJ 2004, L 349/1 ('Frontex Regulation'). Council Regulation (EC, Euratom) 1605/2002 on the Financial Regulation applicable to the General Budget of the European Communities, OJ 2002, L248/1. Curtin D. (2006), 'European Legal Integration: Paradise Lost?' in Smits, J. et al., eds., European Integration and Law, Intersentia, Antwerp. De Capitani E. (2009), 'The Possible Role of the European Parliament in evaluating EU\njudicial cooperation in criminal matters' in: Dane, M. and A. Klip, eds., An additional evaluation mechanism in the field of EU judicial cooperation in criminal matters to strengthen mutual trust, Tilburg, Celsus Legal Publishers, 5172. Decision No 574/2007/EC establishing the External Borders Fund for the period 2007 to\n2013 as part of the General programme 'Solidarity and Management of Migration Flows', OJ\n2007, L144/22. Decision of the European Parliament, the Council and the Commission of 19 April 1995 on the detailed provisions governing the exercise of the European Parliament's right of inquiry, OJ 1995, L113/2. Declaration of Brussels by the Parliamentary Committees for the Oversight of Intelligence and Security Services of the European Union Member States (30 September1 October\n2010). De Hert P. and R. Bellanova (March 2009), 'Data Protection in the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice: A system still to be fully developed?', Study requested by LIBE. EU Observer (16 March 2011), 'MEPs decry \"breach of trust\" in EU-US data deal'. European Council (2010), 'The Stockholm Programme: An open and secure Europe serving and protecting the citizens', (OJ 2010, C115/1). European Parliament (7 February 2011), 'Draft Report on the 2009 discharge: performance, financial management and control of EU agencies', Rapporteur Georgios Stavrakakis (S-D). European Parliament (8 March 2010), 'Report on Priorities for the 2011 budget - Section III\n- Commission (A7-9999/2010)', Rapporteur Sidonia Elzbieta Jedrzejewska (EPP). European Parliament (6 April 2009), 'Report on a Common Immigration Policy for Europe: Principles, actions and tools', Rapporteur Simon Bussutil (PPE). European Parliament (11 November 2008), 'Report on the evaluation and future development of the FRONTEX Agency and of the European Border Surveillance System\n(EUROSUR)', A6-0437/2008, Rapporteur Javier Moreno Sanchez (PSE). European Parliament (7 September 2006), Meeting Document: 'What Future for Europol? Increasing Europol's Accountability and Improving Europol's Operational Capacity', Brussels. European Parliament (2002), 'Final Report of the European Convention Working Group X on Freedom, Security and Justice', CONV 426/02. European Parliament Press Release (11 April 2011), 'EU Police College and Medicines Agency management not good enough'. European Parliament Recommendation of 7 May 2009 to the Council on development of an EU criminal justice area. European Parliament Resolution of 13 December 2007 on the draft general budget of the European Union for the financial year 2008 as modified by the Council (P6_TA(2007)0616).\n\n\nEuropean Parliament Working Document of 14 February 2011 on the European Union's internal security strategy Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs, Rapporteur Rita Borsellino (S-D). Framework Decision 2008/977/JHA of 27 November 2008 on the protection of personal data processed in the framework of police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters, OJ 2008, L350/6. Groenleer M. (2009), The Autonomy of European Union Agencies: A Comparative Study of Institutional Development, Eburon, Delft. High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy 20 July 2010), Declaration on Political Accountability at the Adoption of a Council Decision establishing the organisation and functioning of the EEAS, Brussels. Hillebrand C. (December 2010), 'Written Evidence for the House of Lords EU Sub- Committee F (Home Affairs) on The EU Internal Security Strategy'. House of Lords Select Committee on the EU (12 November 2008), 'EUROPOL: coordinating the fight against serious and organized crime', HL Paper 183, Session 200708, 29th Report.\n\n\nHouse of Lords Select Committee on the EU (5 March 2008), 'FRONTEX: the EU external borders agency', HL Paper 60, Session 2007-08, 9th Report. House of Lords Select Committee on the EU (21 July 2004), 'Judicial Cooperation in the EU:\nthe role of Eurojust', HL Paper 138, Session 2003-04, 23rd Report. Interinstitutional Agreement of 20 November 2002 between the European Parliament and the Council concerning access by the European Parliament to sensitive information of the Council in the field of security and defence policy, point 3.3, OJ 2002, C298/1. Justice and Home Affairs Post-Council Statement (5 March 2010), Parliamentary Under-\nSecretary of State for the Home Department (Meg Hillier), Hansard, Column 121WS. Maggetti M. (2010), 'Legitimacy and Accountability of Independent Regulatory Agencies: A Critical Review', *Living Reviews in Democracy*, No 2. Mitsilegas V. (5 January 2011), 'Written Evidence for the House of Lords EU Sub-Committee F (Home Affairs) on the EU Internal Security Strategy. Mitsilegas V. (2007), 'Interparliamentary Co-operation in EU Justice and Home Afffairs', paper prepared for the conference 'Fifty Years of Interparliamentary Cooperation', Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, Berlin, 13 June 2007. Monar J. (2006), Specific Factors, Typology and Development Trends in Modes of Governance in the EU JHA Domain, New Gov Project, Strasbourg. Regulation (EC) No 45/2001 of 30 May 2001 on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data by the Community institutions and bodies and on the free movement of such data, OJ 2001, L8/1.\n\n____________________________________________________________________________________________\nRegulation (EU) No 439/2010 of 19 May 2010 establishing a European Asylum Support Office, OJ 2010, L132/11. Rijpma, J. (2010), 'Justice and Home Affairs Agencies: governing the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice after Lisbon', paper presented at the ECPR fifth Pan-European Conference, Porto, 2425 June 2010. Rijpma, J. (forthcoming 2012), 'Hybrid agencification in the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice and its inherent tensions: the case of Frontex' in Busuioc, M., Groenleer, M. and J. Trondal, eds., The Agency Phenomenon in the European Union:\nEmergence, Institutionalisation, and Everyday Decision Making, Manchester University Press, Manchester.\n\nRuiz de Garibay D. (2010), 'Interparliamentary Cooperation in the EU: A case study of Justice and Home Affairs', paper presented at the 60th Political Studies Association Annual Conference 'Sixty Years of Political Studies: Achievements and Futures', Edinburgh, 29 March1 April 2010. Shackleton M. (2002), 'The European Parliament's New Committees of Inquiry: Tiger or Paper Tiger?', *Journal of Common Market Studies*, Vol. 36, No 1, pp. 115130. Van Buuren J. (June 2010), 'Spin in het Europese politieweb: het Comite', Internationale Spectator, Vol. 64, No. 6, pp. 332335.\n\n## Annex B: Thematic Studies Ii. Europol And Eurojust Alexandra De Moor & Gert Vermeulen\n\n\n1. INTRODUCING EUROPOL AND EUROJUST An examination of the oversight mechanisms for Europol and Eurojust has to begin with an examination of these agencies. In the first part of this study, Europol and Eurojust are introduced as two police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters agencies. Their changing legal basis, competence and tasks are assessed, with a particular focus on the Lisbon Treaty. The relationship between Europol and Eurojust is also examined, as it is by no means an accountability relationship between an actor (Europol) and a forum (Eurojust).\n\n1.1 Europol Based in The Hague (NL), the European Police Office (Europol) is the EU law enforcement agency that handles criminal intelligence. Its objective is to support and strengthen action by the competent authorities of the Member States and their mutual cooperation in preventing and combating organised crime, terrorism and other forms of serious crime affecting two or more Member States. 1.1.1 Legal basis Europol commenced full activities on 1 July 1999 after ratification of the 1995 Europol Convention (OJ C 316, 27.11.1995), which was amended by three Protocols: the 2000\nMoney Laundering Protocol (OJ C 358, 13.12.2000), the 2002 Joint Investigation Teams Protocol (OJ C 312, 16.12.2002) and the 2003 Danish Protocol (OJ C 2, 6.1.2004). The Europol Decision was adopted on 6 April 2009 (OJ L 121, 15.5.2009). As decisions are more easily adaptable than conventions, Member States hoped to increase Europol's flexibility. On 1 January 2010, Europol became a formal agency of the European Union\n(EU).1098 Under the Lisbon Treaty (OJ C 306, 17.12.2007), Europol will find its legal basis as stated in Article 88 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU): the European Parliament and the Council shall determine Europol's structure, operation, field of action and tasks by means of regulations, which also lay down the procedures for scrutiny of Europol's activities by the European Parliament, together with national Parliaments. While the Commission, in its Action Plan Implementing the Stockholm Programme (COM\n(2010) 171 of 20.4.2010), only foresees the Proposal for a Europol Regulation for 2013, the European Parliament called for a proposal to be submitted six months after the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty (OJ C 41E, 19.2.2009). 1.1.2 Competence A visible trend in Europol's competence is the shift from specific crimes towards more general crime.1099 Drug trafficking provided the main rationale for Europol in the pre-\nConvention era. In the Convention era, organised crime became the primary rationale for\n\nEuropol. The organisation was made competent to support law enforcement action against a list of crimes (see Annex Europol Convention), where an organised criminal structure was involved and two or more Member States were affected (Article 2 of the Europol Convention). In the Europol Decision, the organised criminal structure is no longer a limiting element. This makes serious crime the dominant theme. Article 88 of the TFEU is an affirmation as now it also mentions 'serious crime affecting two or more Member States, terrorism and forms of crime which affect a common interest covered by a Union policy'. 1.1.3 Tasks Europol's core task has always been to support the competent national authorities in their criminal intelligence work. National units and liaison officers liaise between Europol and national police forces, immigration and customs authorities. For its supply of information, Europol depends on the Member States. It is tragic that 80% of the information exchanged by national liaison officers stationed at Europol is exchanged without actually going through Europol, and hence without being stored in Europol's information systems.1100 The Europol Information System (IS) is a central EU repository for serious organised crime. The Analysis Work Files (AWFs) offer more sensitive information, with limited access only, and allow Europol to provide analysis for ongoing investigations and operations in the Member States. The Europol Decision continues to stress Europol's information-related tasks. Article 88 of the TFEU also gives prominence to 'the collection, storage, processing, analysis and exchange of information (...)'. Europol staff lack executive powers: they cannot carry guns, conduct home searches or tap wires, nor can they question, arrest or detain suspects. However, the Member States have over time endowed Europol with powers that enable it to do more than collect and analyse information. Since March 2007, Europol has the mandate to participate in 'joint investigation teams' (JITs), albeit in a support capacity.1101 A JIT can be described as a team consisting of representatives of law enforcement and other authorities of different states jointly investigating cases of international or cross-border crime. Within the limits provided for by national law, Europol officials are allowed to assist in all activities and exchange information with all the members. However, they are not allowed to take part in any coercive measures. Europol's semi-operational tasks undergo no significant changes in the Europol Decision. The Lisbon Treaty is more ambitious in its wording. There is but one restriction: 'The application of coercive measures shall be the exclusive responsibility of the competent national authorities' (Article 88 (3) of the TFEU). A development of this kind is thus excluded. A further extension of Europol's operational tasks will make it all the more necessary to have counterbalancing forms of accountability and control, as both are 'intrinsically interlinked'.1102 This has given rise to a 'chicken and egg' debate1103whether improved forms of control should come before more operational powers for Europol, or should be introduced afterwards to avoid undermining the effectiveness of the organisation by burdening it with too heavy accountability procedures. The second part of this study elaborates further on the question of Europol's accountability and control.\n\n1.2 Eurojust The EU's Judicial Cooperation Unit (Eurojust) is also based in The Hague (NL). In addition to stimulating the coordination and improving the cooperation between the competent authorities of the Member States in investigations and prosecutions, Eurojust shall otherwise support these authorities in making their investigations and prosecutions more efficient. 1.2.1 Legal basis Eurojust was established by the Decision of 28 February 2002 (OJ L 63, 6.3.2002), which was amended in 2003 (OJ L 245, 29.9.2003) and 2008 (OJ L 138, 4.6.2009). Under the Lisbon Treaty, Eurojust will find its legal basis as stated in Article 85 of the TFEU: the European Parliament and the Council shall determine Eurojust's structure, operation, field of action and tasks by means of regulations, which also determine arrangements for involving the European Parliament and national Parliaments in the evaluation of Eurojust's activities. The Commission, in its Action Plan Implementing the Stockholm Programme, foresees the Proposal for a Eurojust Regulation for 2012. It is difficult to understand the different timetables for Europol (2013) and Eurojust (2012), notably for settling the procedures for parliamentary oversight. As suggested in the second part of this study, these procedures should be very similar. 1.2.2 Competence Eurojust has always had a general competence for serious crime, particularly when it is organised. Eurojust is thus competent for the same crimes as Europol. Upon request of a national prosecutor, Eurojust can provide assistance in case of any other type of offence. Limitations to Eurojust's competence include the requirement that an investigation or prosecution shall concern two or more Member States (Articles 3 and 4 of the Eurojust Decision). Article 85 of the TFEU also refers to 'serious crime affecting two or more Member States, *or requiring a prosecution on common bases*'. The latter phrase is an important change in formulation, suggesting that Eurojust could initiate coordination in areas where a common criminal policy strategy is needed. 1.2.3 Tasks It is important to consider Eurojust's 'double nature' for the analysis of its tasks.1104 Under the current legal framework, these are only tasks of a coordinating, recommending and supporting nature. They differ according to whether Eurojust acts through one of its 27 national members (judges, prosecutors or police officers of equivalent competence) or as a College, consisting of all national members (Articles 6 and 7 of the Eurojust Decision). The 2008 Eurojust Decision introduced a number of significant changes, in particular with regard to the powers of Eurojust national members in their capacity as competent national authorities acting in accordance with national lawas opposed to acting on behalf of Eurojust. The original Eurojust Decision had set very low minimum standards.\n\nConsequently, the powers of national members varied considerably. Once the new provisions are implemented (before June 2011), all national members of Eurojust should be granted certain minimum powers (Article 9b to 9e of the Eurojust Decision). National members are also formally entitled to participate in JITs concerning their own Member State, either as a national competent authority or on behalf of Eurojust (Article 9f of the Eurojust Decision). An area where the remit of Eurojust is extended considerably is the collection, processing and exchange of personal data, including the establishment of a Case Management System\n(CMS) (Article 16 of the Eurojust Decision). The CMS is as an EU-wide judicial database containing information on all investigations and prosecutions reported to Eurojust.1105 A\nEurojust national coordination system is also established (Article 12 of the Eurojust Decision), thereby closing the gap between The Hague and the national capitals.1106 The 2008 amendment refrains from introducing changes with regard to the character of Eurojust's requests to national authorities to initiate investigations and prosecutions. Although currently non-binding, in practice they can have a great influence on the way cases are dealt with. Therefore, the impact of Eurojust's activities on the position of the citizens, in particular with regard to the protection of fundamental (defense) rights, should be kept in mind. Eurojust is also empowered to process personal data, which leads to the issue of data protection. The second part of this study elaborates further on the question of Eurojust's accountability and control. Concerning Eurojust's tasks, the Lisbon Treaty clearly goes further than the current legal framework, allowing for granting Eurojust certain binding powers with regard to the national authorities. Article 85 of the TFEU offers concrete possibilities to transform Eurojust from a simple mediator at a horizontal cooperation level to a player with binding operational powers at a vertical integration level. Nevertheless, the changes remain limited because, unlike Article 86 of the TFEU, the centre of gravity for investigations and prosecutions would not be transferred at the EU level. Article 86 of the TFEU paves the way for the establishment, by means of regulations, of a European Public Prosecutor's Office (EPP). The creation of Eurojust had always been intimately connected to the EPP, which has its origins in the *Corpus Iuris* Project.1107 The EPP resurfaced in thestillborn\nConstitutional Treaty (2004) (OJ C 310, 16.12.2004) and in the Lisbon Treaty. Although the EPP is to be established by unanimity, there is a possibility for at least nine Member States to use enhanced cooperation. It may only concern 'offences against the Union's financial interests'. An extension with 'serious crime having a cross-border dimension' again requires unanimity. As the competence of the EPP, at least in the beginning, will be limited, Eurojust will remain in its (possibly changed) structure. Article 86\nof the TFEU provides that the EPP will be created '*from* Eurojust'. There are different scenarios as to how both bodies could function alongside one another.1108 The EPP could become a 28th national member and sit in the College every time the protection of the financial interests of the Union is discussed. An alternative is that the College of Eurojust itself would become the EPP. The European Commission will prepare the establishment of the EPP, starting with a Communication in 2013. This exercise demands a real impact assessment, in the light of how Eurojust works and how judicial cooperation in the protection of the financial interests of the Union works.\n\n1.3\nTHE\nRELATIONSHIP\nBETWEEN\nEUROPOL\nAND\nEUROJUST One of the basic visions for Eurojust involved granting it the role of Europol's supervisor. This view stressed that the rule of law requires police to be subject to judicial oversight, and that in most Member States police investigations in criminal matters are under judicial or prosecutorial supervision and control. The creation of Eurojust, however, did not provide in a power to exercise supervision and control of Europol's activities.1109 The situation in the EU anno 2011 is not equivalent to the relations between the police and the judiciary in the Member States. However, the relationship between Europol and Eurojust may change fundamentally in the future if an EPP is established. Depending on the place of the various European criminal justice agencies in the future institutional architecture of the EU, the issue of supervision of Europol may have to be revisited. The present relationship between Europol and Eurojust is based on the principle of complementarity. The two agencies concluded a cooperation agreement in 2004, which was revised in 2009. The negotiations of the 2004 Agreement were difficult as some members of the Europol Management Board were reluctant to agree to any wording that would imply supremacy for Eurojust of Europol.1110 The practical relations between the two agencies have been rather complicated. In the area of Eurojust's access to AWFs, significant progress was made only in the past couple of years. The 2003 Danish Protocol created the possibility for Europol to invite third experts to be associated with the activities of an analysis group. Eurojust eventually became associated with the first AWFs in June 2007.1111 Europol promotes Eurojust's participation in AWFs, but the final decision lies with the Member States. In 2008, a secure communication link was established to facilitate the exchange of information (including personal data)\nbetween Europol and Eurojust.1112 Cooperation recently received a new boost, triggered by the 2009 Agreement, as well as by the 2009 Swedish Presidency's request to CEPOL, Eurojust, Europol and Frontex to improve their cooperation. The latter resulted in a jointly drafted Report (CEU 8387/10 of 9.4.2010) and a Scorecard to track the implementation\n(CEU 5676/11 of 25.1.2011). A staff exchange programme, starting in 2011, has been agreed between Europol and Eurojust. Both agencies have improved their cooperation regarding the promotion of JITs. Europol and Eurojust have also agreed on a table of equivalence to exchange classified information above the level of 'restricted'.\n\n2. THE ACCOUNTABILITY AND CONTROL OF EUROPOL AND EUROJUST Governance, control, accountability, oversight, scrutiny, evaluation... are very popular terms often used interchangeably. The meaning of these concepts is by no means agreed.\n\nRather than feeding semantic discussions, this paper uses a pragmatic operationalisation of accountability and control. As opposed to direct control, accountability amounts to information, explanation and justification ex post facto. Accountability is a non-intrusive dimension of control in the sense that it does not amount to direct interference in the agent's zone of discretion or a limitation of the agent's statutory autonomy as granted by the mandate.1113 Thus, accountability is in essence retrospective, whereas control mainly concerns forward-looking mechanisms. Nevertheless, systems of control often include accountability mechanisms. This implies that accountability is part of the broader concept of control. Others, however, see control as one element of an overarching concept of accountability.1114 This study draws on Bovens' conceptual framework and advocates a narrow concept of accountability defined as 'a relationship between an actor and a forum, in which the actor has an obligation to explain and to justify his or her conduct, the forum can pose questions and pass judgment, and the actor may face consequences'.1115 A general distinction between internal and external accountability is maintained.1116 There are different mechanisms through which accountability is achieved (managerial, political, legal, administrative and democratic). This analysis takes into account every single forumboth European and nationalwhich oversees the functioning of Europol and Eurojust. The implications of the Lisbon Treaty are again considered, in particular in relation to parliamentary oversight, and some concrete recommendations are made.\n\nAccording to Fijnaut,1117 'Europol is perhaps the most controlled police agency in Europe'.\n\nAlthough this is exaggerated, the office is certainly subject to extensive controls, at least on paper. Nevertheless, the control of Europol has remained a source of concern in academia and civil society.1118 To a lesser extent, this also holds true for Eurojust.\n\n\n2.1 Internal mechanisms of accountability and control 2.1.1 Management boards Management boards are referred to by different names across EU agencies. For Europol, it is the Management Board. For Eurojust, it is the College. 2.1.1.1 Europol Management Board The Europol Management Board (Article 37 of the Europol Decision) is to meet at least twice a year but de facto meets six times a year. It is composed of 27 national (police and/or ministerial) representatives and one representative of the Commission, each having one vote and acting by a two-thirds majority. The composition of the Management Board is not public, whereas this is common for other agencies (including Eurojust). The Management Board is mandated to oversee the Director's performance. Similarly, it is provided that the Director is accountable to the Management Board. The Europol Director\n(Article 38 of the Europol Decision), who is responsible for the day-to-day management of Europol, gives a written and oral report at every Management Board meeting. Moreover, in addition to the annual report, he submits a yearly internal evaluation report on the performance of Europol. Most EU agencies are required to commission an independent audit every few years. Now that Europol has been transformed into an agency, it is also subject to external evaluation (Article 37(11) of the Europol Decision). The evaluation report, commissioned by the Management Board, is forwarded to the European Parliament, the Council and the Commission. The quality of the accountability process is seriously impaired by the size of the Board, which allows little time for interventions and in-depth discussion.1119 Moreover, the Management Board gets almost completely sidetracked into administrative and technical details, as opposed to considering the status of AWFs or the agency's strategy. Given the strategic and operational output of Europol, this casts doubts on the extent to which the Management Board is successful in holding the agency accountable.1120 The Europol Decision now specifically demands that the Management Board adopt a strategy for Europol and that the Chairperson ensures a specific focus on strategic issues. 2.1.1.2 Eurojust College The Eurojust College (Article 28 of the Eurojust Decision) is 'a collective organ of European character deciding in principle by majority vote'.1121 As the 27 College members are also the drivers of operational work, they meet twice a week. Eurojust is assisted by a Secretariat, which is headed by the Administrative Director (Article 29 of the Eurojust Decision). The Director is responsible for the day-to-day administration of Eurojust and for budget and staff matters. This is different from most other EU agencies, where the director is not only in charge of the administrative but also the operational side of the organisation.1122 The dual mandate of the College as the operational arm of the Member States and the management board of an EU agency affects internal coherence. Ideally, the College would only be involved in strategic aspects. However, representatives with smaller operational caseloads have involved themselves deeply in the management of the Eurojust administration.1123 The 2008 Eurojust Decision introduced an evaluation clause (Article 41a of the Eurojust Decision). The evaluation report, commissioned by the College, is again forwarded to the European Parliament, the Council and the Commission. Unlike the Europol evaluation report, it is also made public. 2.1.1.3 Data Protection Officer The function of a Data Protection Officer (DPO) had been successfully introduced with Community institutions and bodies by Regulation (EC) No 45/2001 (OJ L 8, 12.1.2001), before its creation at Europol and Eurojust. However, the Europol and Eurojust DPOs are not part of the existing network of DPOs. 2.1.1.4 Europol The formal establishment of a Europol DPO has enhanced data protection at Europol\n(Article 28 of the Europol Decision). The function was already being exercised, however, but without legal basis. The DPO is a member of the Europol staff but acts independently. The DPO has the principal task to ensure the lawfulness and compliance of Europol's processing of personal data, also relating to Europol staff. To this end, the DPO cooperates with the Europol Joint Supervisory Body (JSB).\n\n2.1.1.5 Eurojust A Eurojust DPO (Article 17 of the Eurojust Decision) started work already in November\n2003. Although a member of the Eurojust staff, the DPO has an independent role in ensuring the lawfulness and compliance of Eurojust's processing of personal data. The DPO also cooperates with the Eurojust Joint Supervisory Body (JSB).\n\n2.2 External mechanisms of accountability and control 2.2.1 EU institutions Both Europol and Eurojust are primarily creatures of the Council. To varying degrees, the Commission, the Court of Justice and the Parliament also embody the accountability and control of Europol and Eurojust. 2.2.2 Council 2.2.2.1 Europol\n\nThe Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) Council1124 is responsible for the political steering of Europol, although the overall supervision resides under the Article 36 Committee (CATS), which is in fact *under* the Council.1125 The Council has a number of responsibilities towards Europol.1126 The Council, and on its behalf the Management Board, lays down strategic priorities for Europol, taking particular account of Europol's strategic analyses and threat assessments. These priorities have not always been clear. Europol's annual work programme has been described as an 'aggregate of wish lists'.1127 The Council disposes of several sanctioning instruments. The Council appoints the Director and the Deputy Directors of Europol. The Europol Decision introduces a direct link between performance and reappointment but it remains to be seen how this will be implemented in practice. No dismissals have ever been undertaken by the Council. This would amount to a highly sensitive, political issue, likely to come at high costs for the agency as a whole. A strong reluctance to resort to formal sanctions has been voiced in other European agencies as well.1128 A more implicit sanctioning instrument of the Council is the possibility to amend Europol's legal basis.1129 With the Europol Decision, this process becomes less cumbersome and the Council can make amendments through the adoption of new decisions. Last but not least, Europol's financing is made subject to an agreement by the European Parliament and the Council, co-acting as Europol's new budgetary authority. The Council also exercises control over Europol's agreements with third States and organisations.1130 The Director can only start negotiations with third States and organisations with the authorisation of the Council. Moreover, the draft agreement can only be concluded once the Council has given its approval and, as far as it concerns the exchange of personal data, only after receiving the opinion of the JSB. This is an instance of controlas opposed to accountabilityfor the Council not only retrospectively demands explanations from Europol but remains in the driver's seat during the whole process. Europol's room for manoeuvre is still significant. Moreover, the control exercised by the Council is by no means a substitute for oversight by a democratic, directly elected European Parliament, which leads to the conclusion that there is a serious accountability deficit in Europol's external relations.1131 2.2.2.3 Eurojust Eurojust is directly accountable to the JHA Council, to which it is required to provide regular reports (Article 32 of the Eurojust Decision). In addition to an annual report, the President should submit any report or any information on the operation of Eurojust required by the Council. The examination of the Eurojust annual report results in direct Council follow-up.\n\nThe Council reacts with conclusions, which contain an assessment of the performance during the previous year as well as future directions. The picture for Europol is different.\n\nThe general report on Europol's activities is merely submitted to the Council 'for endorsement' (Article 37(10)(c) of the Europol Decision). To this extent, the accountability process is more comprehensive and better developed from an institutional learning perspective in the case of Eurojust than it is for Europol.1132 Compared to Europol, however, the Council lacks sanctioning powers in relation to the Eurojust President and the Administrative Director. The role of the Council in Eurojust's external relations is minimal. Although agreements with third States and organisations can only be concluded after consultation with the Eurojust JSB and after the approval by the Council, Eurojust merely has to inform the Council of any plans it has for entering into such negotiations (Art. 26a Eurojust Decision).\n\nEurojust has considerably more leeway than Europol. This is further exacerbated by the lack of any democratic oversight, which leads to the conclusion that there is a massive accountability deficit. 2.2.3 Commission\n2.2.3.1 Europol1133\n\nThe Member States had always been reluctant to grant the Commission a role with regard to Europol. It used to have one observer seat on the Europol Management Board, without voting rights (Article 28(4) of the Europol Convention). With Europol's change of status the Commission became a full voting member. It is also for the Commission to propose the agency's annual budget,1134 which is then subject to approval by the two arms of the EU's budgetary authority, the Council and the Parliament. Reportedly, the presence of the Commission in the Management Board with voting rights has given rise to concerns among Member State representatives that 'Europol will become a Commission organ' through attempts of the Commission to over-influence decision making.1135 However, there is no indication of the Commission playing a misbalanced role.\n\nMoreover, a drastic shift in the balance of power in the Management Board is unlikely given the mandate of Europol and the fact that the main 'clients' of Europol are national law enforcement authorities, not the Commission or other EU institutions.1136\n\n2.2.3.2 Eurojust1137 The Commission is to be fully associated with the work of Eurojust (Article 11 of the Eurojust Decision). Even though during the negotiations of the Eurojust Decision the Commission tried to obtain a seat, the Member States considered that the Commission should not be part of the College given the operational nature of much of the College's work.1138 The fact that the operations of Eurojust remain apolitical is seen as important to safeguard its legitimacy and acceptability among Member States.1139 The Commission has affirmed that it does not want to be involved in concrete investigations, 'but we definitely need to follow very closely what the needs and the loopholes in criminal prosecutions at the European level are so we can exert our right of initiative to pass over those difficulties'.1140 By fixing the Eurojust budget, the Commission can minimally influence the agency's activities. Eurojust is also funded through the EU budget, although salaries of the national members are still borne by their Member State of origin, revealing the intergovernmental features of Eurojust. Eurojust staff are EU staff, subject to EU Staff Regulations. 2.2.4 Court of Justice 2.2.4.1 Europol Judicial control over Europol is fragmented, since the Court of Justice shares its minimal responsibilities with the national courts. It is the primary duty of the national courts to decide on cases brought before them by the national prosecution authorities. A judgment on the activities of Europol and its staff is barred by the Protocol on the Privileges and Immunities of the EU, which is annexed to the Lisbon Treaty. A narrow field of accountability remains, as there is an exception for Europol's participation in JITs (OJ C 70, 19.3.2010). Another possibility for (indirect) national supervision is through the rules of evidence: national courts which are, for example, confronted with illegally gathered Europol data may exclude these pieces of evidence.1141\n\nUnder the Lisbon Treaty the entire field of JHA comes under the general jurisdiction of the Court of Justice of the European Union (Article 251-281 of the TFEU). There is, however, a five-year transitional period, during which the picture remains as follows: the Court of Justice has jurisdiction to give preliminary rulings on the validity and interpretation of the Europol Decision, where the Member State concerned has made a declaration (facultative jurisdiction). It should be noted that no national court has ever sent questions to the Court of Justice. Europol's new legal basis, a decision instead of a convention, also gives the Court of Justice jurisdiction in relation to annulment actions. Moreover, Europol's transformation into an EU agency and the consequent application of EU Staff Regulations to Europol staff (Article 39 of the Europol Decision) increases judicial control. In fact, several staff cases against Europol have been brought before the Court since 2002.1142 The principal mechanism to guarantee judicial accountability of agencies is a review of the legality of the agencies' acts. Under the Lisbon Treaty, the Court of Justice is explicitly granted jurisdiction over agencies' acts, including those of Europol and Eurojust, on par with those of the European Parliament, the Council, the Commission, the European Council and the European Central Bank.1143 It remains to be seen how the jurisprudence will address this. In any case, the Lisbon Treaty still excludes the jurisdiction of the Court when it comes to reviewing the validity or proportionality of operations carried out by the police or other law enforcement services of a Member State (Article 276 of the TFEU). The Court of Justice may also not address possible infringements of fundamental rights by Europol.1144 In this regard the future accession (cf. Article 6 of the Treaty on European Union) of the EU to the European Convention for the protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR) is important, as it would dispel remaining doubts about the right of citizens to bring possible violations of human rights by the EU to the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg. 2.2.4.2 Eurojust As the national members of the Eurojust College are not EU staff, they remain subject to national law. This implies that the supervision over and the accountability of these national members will vary according to the national criminal justice system to which they belong.\n\nThe different mechanisms of accountability with regard to the national prosecutors and judges in the Member States are way beyond the scope of this paper. The Eurojust Decision contains no reference to the Court of Justice. Due to its legal basis, the Court has some jurisdiction in the terms of legality review (cf. Europol). The five-year transitional period also applies to the Eurojust Decision. Here and now, violations of human rights under the horizontal cooperation model, as facilitated by Eurojust, may only give rise to applications against the Member States, not against the relevant EU agencies (e.g., Europol, Eurojust, OLAF). The EU's accession to the ECHR would make it directly accountable for acts emanating from one of its institutions.1145 2.2.5 Parliament Parliamentary oversight of Europol and Eurojust is split between the European Parliament1146 and the 27 National Parliaments. The main challenge is to find the right balance between a high level of democratic accountability and the need for confidentiality and discretion of police and judicial cooperation agencies working in a highly sensitive area.1147 In the case of Europol, much has been made about the lack of parliamentary accountability. Although there has been less critique in relation to Eurojust, the problems and the solutionsare very much alike. 2.2.5.1 Europol The Europol Decision and the Lisbon Treaty significantly improve the situation of the European Parliament. The European Parliament is confronted with real legislative powers. The reference to the 'ordinary legislative procedure' in Article 88 of the TFEU means that the former co-decision procedure shall apply. Experience with Community agencies shows that once the European Parliament gained co-decision powers, it introduced new procedures of parliamentary scrutiny.1148 A similar development is likely in the case of Europol, particularly as the European Parliament has long attempted to extend its powers and has been unable to do so. The European Parliament issued a number of reports, asking for:\n\nBudgetary powers: involvement in the Europol budget procedure and Europol funding through the Community budget;\n\nAppointment powers: involvement in the appointment and dismissal of Europol's (Deputy) Director(s) and two European Parliament elected representatives to take part in the Management Board meetings;\n\nInformation and consultation rights: an extension of the documents on which the European Parliament shall be consulted; and\n\nThe strengthening of judicial control by the Court of Justice, and ultimately communitarisation (see in great detail COM (2010) 776, 17.12.2010, 7, footnote\n16). Another significant change introduced by the Europol Decision is precisely that Europol's budget has been 'communitarised' into the EU budget. The European Parliament's powers increase as a result as it becomes the budgetary authority for Europol, as well as its discharge authority, politically endorsing Europol's implementation of the budget. It remains to be seen how the European Parliament will make use of it. Furthermore, Article 48 of the Europol Decision provides that the Europol Director, the Chairperson of the Management Board and the Presidency of the Council are obligedinstead of permittedto appear before the European Parliament at its request. So while there have been some welcome developments, there is still room for improvement in a future Europol Regulation. The European Parliament should also have a proper say in Europol's agreements with third States and organisations. The extremely late and inadequate involvement of Parliament in the controversial agreements between Europol and the United States in 2001 and 2002 doesn't bear repeating. This concern is, however, absent from the recent Commission Communication (COM (2010) 776, 17.12.2010), which serves as a reflection document on the procedures for scrutiny of Europol's activities. The recommendations focus on the setting up of a permanent joint or interparliamentary forum.\n\nThe Commission also stresses the importance of separating roles. Hence, the Commission would not recommend that the European Parliament designates members to the Management Board. The Commission is a voting member of the Management Board, which creates an imbalance between both EU institutions. Although the Europol Management Board is largely a strategic body, it also deals with operational matters (e.g., the status of AWFs). Even an observer status for the European Parliament is delicate in this respect. However, a compromise could be to have an agenda with and without representatives of the European Parliament. Equally, the Commission takes the view that the European Parliament should not have a say in the appointment of the Europol Director, to avoid turning the appointment into a political issue. Of course, this appointment already is a largely politicised decision. A careful examination of the appointment powers of the EP in relation to other EU agencies1149 could be very helpful. 2.2.5.2 Eurojust The legislative role of the European Parliament in relation to Eurojust is very similar to what has just been outlined for Europol, with a shift from consultation towards co-decision. In addition, Eurojust was the first third pillar agency ever to be financed from the Community budget. The European Parliament was involved in budgetary control of Eurojust way before Europol. In terms of general parliamentary control, however, the influence of the European Parliament is fairly limited. There is no direct line of accountability between Eurojust and the European Parliament. Article 32 of the Eurojust Decision merely states that 'Each year the Presidency of the Council shall forward a report to the European Parliament on the work carried out by Eurojust and on the activities of the JSB'. There is no formal provision for hearings with the President of the College or the Administrative Director before the European Parliament. The European Parliament does not have access to the same reports as the Council, with the exception of the periodic external evaluation reports. Moreover, the external relations of Eurojust suffer from an accountability deficit in terms of democratic oversight. Europol clearly serves as the negative example here. Article 85 of the TFEU opens up new prospects for enhanced democratic accountability through 'involving the European Parliament and national Parliaments in the evaluation of Eurojust's activities'. The wording of this provision leaves a lot of room for interpretation. What does 'Eurojust's activities' mean? It is important to bear in mind Eurojust's 'double nature'. Should the evaluation be limited to an overall assessment of the functioning of Eurojust, or should it also cover operational activities? There is no need for parliamentary scrutiny to involve oversight of individual operations, if only for security reasons. Parliamentarians should first and foremost look at the performance of the agency, comment on its strategies and ensure the European citizens that there is 'value for money'. It is desirable to mirror the procedures for scrutiny of Europol's activities as much as possible, as the analysis in the second part of this study shows that the lines of managerial, political, legal, administrative and democratic accountability are very alike for both agencies. At the Strategic Seminar on Eurojust and the Lisbon Treaty (September 2010)\n(CEU 17625/10, 8.12.2010), there were voices of concern about the possibility that Eurojust would be subject to multiple assessments, not only by the European Parliament. The conclusion was that the evaluation of Eurojust by different forums should be coordinated and implemented in such a way as not to be too cumbersome and time consuming. The EU political masters should take this into account. 2.2.6 EU bodies and agencies The European Ombudsman and the European Data Protection Supervisor, two EU bodies, and the European Anti-Fraud Office, an EU agency, also qualify as accountability mechanisms, though only marginally. 2.2.6.1 European Ombudsman The European Ombudsman (Article 288 of the TFEU and Article 43 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU) is an independent EU body, appointed by the European Parliament, which has the power to investigate cases of maladministration in EU agencies, including Europol and Eurojust. He increasingly safeguards the administrative accountability of these agencies.1150 Poor or failed administration occurs if an institution fails to act in accordance with the law, fails to respect the principles of good administration or violates human rights. The European Ombudsman applies the European Code of Good Administrative Behaviour, which explains in more detail what the Charter's right to good administration (Article 41) means in practice. The Ombudsman usually conducts inquiries at the basis of complaints but can also launch inquiries on his own initiative. So far, the cases in relation to alleged maladministration by Europol (10 cases) and Eurojust (two cases) can be divided into two categories: public access to documents and recruitment and dismissal practices. Public access to documents is very important in terms of public accountability. Both Europol and Eurojust have established rules for public access to documents (cf. Article\n45 of the Europol Decision and Article 39 of the Eurojust Decision). The European Ombudsman acts as an additional watchdog.\n\n\n## 2.2.6.2 European Data Protection Supervisor\n\n\nThe European Data Protection Supervisor (EDPS) is an independent supervisory authority devoted to protecting personal data and privacy and promoting good practice in the EU\ninstitutions and bodies.1151 The EDPS' general objective is to ensure that the European institutions and bodies respect the right to privacy when they process personal data and develop new policies. A number of specific duties of the EDPS are laid down in Regulation (EC) No 45/2001. The three main fields of work are: supervision, consultation and cooperation. In relation to Europol and Eurojust, the EDPS has been active predominantly in the field of consultation and cooperation. The EDPS has, for example, delivered opinions on both the Europol and Eurojust Decisions. The EDPS also continues to cooperate with the Europol and Eurojust JSBs. Unlike other Community institutions and bodies, Europol and Eurojust are still subject to a specific, tailor-made system for the protection of personal data with external independent supervision.1152 However, the 'agentification' of Europol leads to limited involvement of the EDPS relating to the Europol staff. Europol applies the provisions of Regulation (EC) No 45/2001 to the processing of personal data relating to Europol staff (Article 39(6) of the Europol Decision). This includes monitoring by the Europol DPO and the EDPS. The Eurojust Decision remains silent on this matter.\n\n2.2.6.3 European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF) Europol's accountability has been given a brand new, administrative aspect as yet another consequence of its 'agentification'. In the prevention of fraud, the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF) can carry out so-called internal investigations, i.e., within EU structures. The rules laid down by Regulation (EC) No 1073/1999 concerning investigations conducted by OLAF (OJ L 136, 31.5.1999) have been made applicable to Europol (Article 49 of the Europol Decision). OLAF has the power to carry out administrative investigations within Europol and has the right to immediate and unannounced access to any information held by Europol, excluding operational data. It covers investigations by OLAF on fraud, corruption, money laundering and other irregularities affecting the financial interests of the European Community. From the very beginning, Article 38 of the Eurojust Decision made Regulation (EC) No 1073/1999 applicable to Eurojust. The College of Eurojust adopted the necessary implementing measures in 2004. Case related information generated in the context of investigations and prosecutions is explicitly excluded from the scope of OLAF's internal investigations. 2.2.7 Other mechanisms 2.2.7.1 Joint Supervisory Bodies Administrative accountability also addresses quasi-legal forums and independent supervisory authorities.1153 This form of accountability bears particular importance with regard to data processing, which is a core activity of both Europol and Eurojust. The supervision mechanisms of the data processing by Europol and Eurojust are generally regarded as solid and sufficient to guarantee an adequate level of protection.\n\n2.2.7.2 Europol Joint Supervisory Body Europol handles large amounts of sensitive information about individuals and it is vital that Europol takes account of their fundamental rights. As a safeguard, the Europol Decision contains provisions relating to data protection, including the supervision by an independent Joint Supervisory Body (JSB) (Article 33 of the Europol Decision). The JSB is an intergovernmental structure, for it comprises two members of each of the national supervisory bodies.1154 The exercise of quasi-judicial tasks by the JSB has been criticised because its members are not eligible judges and because their independence would be compromised by also advising Europol on other issues.1155 The JSB reviews the activities of Europol to ensure that the rights of the individual are not violated by the storage, processing and use of the data held by Europol. The JSB carries out regular inspections at Europol. In addition, the JSB is responsible for upholding the right of access, as well as the right to correction and deletion of data. If, after an attempt to exercise one of these rights, one is not satisfied with Europol's response, there is an appeal to the JSB (Articles 3032 of the Europol Decision). The JSB is also responsible for considering whether Europol follows the principles of data protection in a number of specific areas (e.g., examining and commenting on the opening of AWFs; monitoring the transmission of personal data by Europol to Union institutions, bodies, offices and agencies, third States and organisations; and drawing up proposals for common solutions to existing problems). For reasons of transparency, the JSB is required to draw up regular activity reports. These reports are forwarded to the European Parliament and to the Council. Current practice is that the JSB issues its activity report every two years. So far, four activity reports have been presented to the EU institutions and to the public. The Europol JSB website also features inspection reports and opinions (for example, on agreements with third States and organisations). The JSB is complemented by National Supervisory Bodies (NSBs), with the task to monitor, independently and in accordance with national law, the permissibility of the input, the retrieval and any communication to Europol of personal data by the Member State concerned. For that purpose, the NSB has access to the data input by the Member State in Europol's information systems. The NSB is one of the two authorities from which citizens may request a check on data concerning themselves (see Article 33 of the Europol Decision). 2.2.7.3 Eurojust Joint Supervisory Body Given the very sensitive nature of the information processed by Eurojust (data on persons who are subject to an investigation or prosecution, victims, witnesses and convicted people), it is crucial to ensure that the rights of the data subjects are properly protected.\n\nThe Eurojust Decision contains several provisions with regard to data protection, including the supervision of data processing by Eurojust. The Eurojust Joint Supervisory Body (JSB) is an independent external supervisor (Article 23 of the Eurojust Decision). It is composed of three members who are elected by the plenary meeting of Member States' appointees (judges or persons with an equal level of independence). The JSB monitors Eurojust's activities involving the processing of personal data and ensures that they are carried out in accordance with the Eurojust Decision. The JSB is a redress instance for the Eurojust DPO in cases of non-compliance with the Eurojust Decision, which the College has not resolved within a reasonable time (Article 17(4) of the Eurojust Decision). The JSB also examines appeals, if the applicant is not satisfied with Eurojust's decision (Articles 19(8) and 20(2) of the Eurojust Decision). Furthermore, the JSB carries out controls. There is a yearly study visit, as well as regular on-the-spot inspections. If the JSB considers that a decision taken by Eurojust or the processing of data by it is not compatible with the Eurojust Decision, the matter is referred to Eurojust, which shall accept the decision of the JSB. The JSB also provides its obligatory opinion concerning the provisions on data protection in agreements or working arrangements with EU bodies or cooperation agreements with third States (Articles 26 and\n26a of the Eurojust Decision). The JSB submits an annual report to the Council (Article 23(12) of the Eurojust Decision), which is also made public on the Eurojust JSB website. 2.2.7.4 National Parliaments The national Parliaments of the EU Member States have a mission to monitor the activities of Europol and Eurojust. This is because Europol is increasingly involved in the criminal procedures of the Member Statesalbeit in a support capacity. For Eurojust, which can act through national members, this is even more so. The national parliaments enjoyed certain rights associated with the ratification of the Europol Convention and its amending Protocols (Article 34(3) of the Europol Convention).\n\nWith the Europol and Eurojust Decisions, these powers have now gone. What remains is the general right to hold JHA Ministers to account for the activities of Europol and Eurojust. Whether national Parliaments have information, consultation or control powers is a purely national matter. Consequently, current practices in parliamentary scrutiny of Europol and Eurojust differ considerably.1156 With the Lisbon Treaty, the national Parliaments have everything to gain as they shall be involvedtogether with the European Parliamentin the scrutiny of Europol's activities and in the evaluation of Eurojust's activities. In addition, both are able to contribute to the shaping of the Europol and Eurojust Regulations. Thanks to the Protocols on the Role of National Parliaments and the Application of the Principles of Subsidiarity and Proportionality, which are both annexed to the Lisbon Treaty, Europol- and Eurojust-related measures are subject to the scrutiny of the national Parliaments.1157 To be effective, parliamentary control cannot just be the sum of 27 fragmented and diversified national parliamentary controls. Therefore, parliamentary control of JHA\nagencies is an area in which interparliamentary cooperation between the national Parliaments and the European Parliament is likely to have real added value. Empowering the national parliaments together with the European Parliament is an old idea.\n\n'Parlopol', a joint committee of members of the European Parliament and national Parliaments to oversee Europol, was first suggested at the Interparliamentary conference on democratic control on Europol (June 2001) and taken over by the Commission Communication on Democratic Control over Europol (COM (2002) 95 final). The Lisbon Treaty provides a fresh opportunity to put the idea into practice. The Commission made it tangible in its recent Communication:1158 'An interparliamentary forum could consist of both the national Parliaments' and the EP's committees responsible for police matters. This joint body could meet at regular intervals and invite the Director of Europol to discuss questions relating to the agency's work. It could establish a special subgroup, for instance, to liaise directly with Europol. The Commission recommends that the Chairman of the Management Board should also be invited to appear before this body'. The proposal to establish a joint parliamentary committee is also applicable in the context of Eurojust. It would only make sense if it were the same forum overseeing the activities of both Europol and Eurojust, and perhaps also extending to the other JHA agencies. The Commission has foreseen a Communication on the arrangements for involving the European Parliament and national Parliaments in the evaluation of Eurojust's activities for\n2011. It remains to be seen whether it will mirror the 2010 Communication on Europol. Whatever procedure is adopted, it has to be kept simple. To have a forum in which every Chamber of every Parliament is represented would result in a body of over 100 members.\n\nThat is unrealistic or, to quote Lord Peter Bowness (UK) at the Interparliamentary Committee Meeting devoted to the evaluation of Europol, Eurojust, Frontex and Schengen\n(October 2010): 'We don't want a good idea to be buried in bureaucracy'. Using the existing structures as much as possible clearly is the preferable option. We don't need yet another body to oversee Europol and Eurojust. The fundamental choice is where the centre of gravity should lie, with the European Parliament or at the national-interparliamentary level (COSAC).1159 There are sound arguments for unifying parliamentary control at the EU\nlevel, without prejudice to national parliamentary procedures.\n\nREFERENCES Anderson M. and J. Apap (2002), Striking a balance between freedom, security and justice in an enlarged European Union, Brussels, Centre for European Policy Studies. Andoura S. and P. Timmerman (October 2008), Governance of the EU: The Reform Debate on European Agencies Reignited, EPIN\nWorking Paper N\n19, available at\n(http://www.ceps.eu/files/book/1736.pdf). Apap J. (7 September 2006), 'What Future for Europol? Increasing Europol's Accountability and Improving Europol's Operational Capacity', Brussels, available at\n(http://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2004_2009/documents/nt/630/\n630339/630339en.pdf).\n\n\nBovens H. (2006), 'Analysing and Assessing Public Accountability: A Conceptual Framework', European Governance Papers *(EUROGOV)*, N C-06-01, available at\n(http://www.connex-network.org/eurogov/pdf/egp-connex-C-06-01.pdf).\n\n\nBovens H. (2007), 'Analysing and Assessing Accountability: A Conceptual Framework', European Law Journal, Vol. 4, pp. 447468. Bruggeman W. (2006), 'What are the options for improving democratic control of Europol and for providing it with adequate operational capabilities', *Studia Diplomatica*, Vol. 1, pp.\n\n163181. Bruggeman W. (2002), 'Policing and accountability in a dynamic European context', Policing and Society, Vol. 4, pp. 259273. Bures, O. (2010), 'Eurojust's Fledgling Counterterrorism Role', Journal of Contemporary European Research, Vol. 6, Issue 2, pp. 236-256. Busuioc M. (2010), 'European Agencies: Pockets of Accountability' in Bovens, M., Curtin, D. and P. 't Hart, eds., *The Real World of EU Accountability: What Deficit?*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp. 87116. Busuioc M. (2010), The Accountability of European Agencies: Legal Provisions and Ongoing Practices, Eburon, Delft. Busuioc M. (2009), 'Accountability, Control and Independence: The case of European Agencies', *European Law Journal*, Vol. 5, pp. 599615. Busuioc M., Curtin D. & M. Groenleer (2010), 'Living Europol: Between Autonomy and Accountability', Paper prepared for the ECPR fifth Pan-European Conference on EU Politics, Porto\n(Portugal),\n2426\nJune\n2010, available at\n(www.jhubc.it/ecprporto/virtualpaperroom/058.pdf). COSAC Secretariat (May 2009), Eleventh Bi-annual Report: Developments in European Union Procedures and Practices Relevant to Parliamentary Scrutiny, available at\n(http://www.cosac.eu/en/documents/biannual/).\n\n\n____________________________________________________________________________________________\nCouncil Act of 27 November 2003 drawing up, on the basis of Article 43 (1) of the Convention on the Establishment of a European Police Office (Europol Convention), a Protocol amending that Convention (OJ C 2, 6.1.2004). Council Act of 28 November 2002 drawing up a Protocol amending the Convention on the establishment of a European Police Office (Europol Convention) and the Protocol on the privileges and immunities of Europol, the members of its organs, the deputy directors and the employees of Europol (OJ C 312, 16.12.2002). Council Act of 30 November 2000 drawing up on the basis of Article 43 (1) of the Convention on the establishment of a European Police Office (Europol Convention) of a Protocol amending Article 2 and the Annex to that Convention (OJ C 358, 13.12.2000).\n\n\nCouncil Act of 26 July 1995 drawing up the Convention based on Article K.3 of the Treaty on European Union, on the establishment of a European Police Office (Europol Convention)\n(OJ C 316, 27.11.1995). Council Decision of 6 April 2009 establishing the European Police Office (Europol) (OJ L\n121, 15.5.2009). Council Decision 2009/426/JHA of 16 December 2008 on the strengthening of Eurojust and amending Decision 2002/187/JHA of 28 February 2002 setting up Eurojust with a view to reinforcing the fight against serious crime (OJ L 138, 4.6.2009). Council Decision 2003/659/JHA of 18 June 2003 amending Decision 2002/187/JHA of 28 February 2002 setting up Eurojust with a view to reinforcing the fight against serious crime (OJ L 245, 29.9.2003). Council Decision 2002/187/JHA of 28 February 2002 setting up Eurojust with a view to reinforcing the fight against serious crime (OJ L 63, 6.3.2002). Council of the European Union (25 January 2011), Draft Scorecard: Implementation of the JHA Agencies Report (Document 5676/11).\n\nCouncil of the European Union (8 December 2010), Eurojust and the Lisbon Treaty:\nTowards more effective actionConclusions of the strategic seminar organised by Eurojust and the Belgian Presidency (Document 17625/10). Council of the European Union (9 April 2010), Final report on the cooperation between JHA\nagencies (Document 8387/10). Council Resolution of 26 February 2010 on a Model Agreement for setting up a Joint Investigation Team (JIT) (OJ C 70, 19.3.2010). Curtin D. (2005), 'Delegation to EU Non-majoritarian Agencies and Emerging Practices of Public Accountability' in Geradin, D., Munoz, R. and N. Petit, eds., Regulation through Agencies in the EU: A New Paradigm of European Governance, Edgar, Cheltenham, pp. 88 119. De Capitani E. (2010), 'The Democratic Accountability of the EU's Area of Freedom, Security and Justice Ten Years On' in Guild, E., Carrera, S. and A. Eggenschwiller, eds., The\n____________________________________________________________________________________________\nArea of Freedom, Security and Justice Ten Years On: Successes and Future Challenges Under the Stockholm Programme, CEPS, Brussels, 2330.\n\nDe Moor A. (2009), 'The role of Europol in joint investigation teams. A foretaste of an executive European Police Office?' in Cools, M. et al., eds., Governance of Security Research Paper Series, Maklu, Antwerpen, pp. 329358.\n\n\nDe Moor A. & G. Vermeulen (2010a), 'The Europol Council Decision: Transforming Europol into an Agency of the European Union', *Common Market Law Review*, Vol. 4, pp. 1089\n1121.\n\n\nDe Moor A. & G. Vermeulen (2010b), 'Shaping the competence of Europol. An FBI\nperspective' in Cools, M. et al., eds., *Governance of Security Research Paper Series*, Maklu, Antwerpen, pp. 6399. den Boer M. (2001), 'Towards a European Framework for Police Accountability: the Case of Europol' in X., From Europol to Parlopol: Interparliamentary conference on democratic control of Europol, Boom, Amsterdam, pp. 2641. den Boer M. & W. Bruggeman (2007), 'Shifting gear: Europol in the contemporary policing era', *Politique europeenne*, Vol. 3, pp. 7791. den Boer M., Hillebrand C. and A. Nolke (2008), 'Legitimacy under Pressure: The European Web of Counter-Terrorism Networks', *Journal of Common Market Studies*, Vol. 1, pp. 101 124. Eurojust\n(February\n2009), Eurojust Annual Report\n2008, available at\n(http://\nwww.eurojust.europa.eu/press_releases/annual_reports/2008/Annual_Report_2008_EN.pdf\n). Eurojust (January 2008), *Eurojust Annual Report 2007*, available at (http://www.\n\neurojust.europa.eu/press_releases/annual_reports/2007/Annual_Report_2007_EN.pdf). European Commission (17 December 2010), Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on the procedures for the scrutiny of Europol's activities by the European Parliament, together with national Parliaments (COM (2010) 776 of 17.12.2010). European Commission (20 April 2010), Action Plan Implementing the Stockholm Programme (COM (2010) 171 of 20.4.2010). European Parliament legislative resolution of 17 January 2008 on the proposal for a Council Decision establishing the European Police Office (OJ C41E, 19.2.2009). Fijnaut C. (2004), 'Police Co-operation and the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice' in N.\n\nWalker, ed., *Europe's Area of Freedom, Security and Justice*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp. 241282.\n\nGless S. (2002), 'What kind of judicial control do the new protagonists need? The accountability of the European Police Office (Europol)' in De Kerckhove, G. and A.\n\nWeyembergh, eds., *L'espace penal europeen: enjeux et perspectives*, Editions de l'Universite de Bruxelles, Brussels, pp. 3145.\n\n____________________________________________________________________________________________ Gless  S., Grote R. & G. Heine (30 April 2004), Justitielle Einbindung und Kontrolle von Europol durch Eurojust, Gutachten erstattet im Auftrag des Bundesministeriums der Justiz, available at (http://www.bmj.de/media/archive/ 399.pdf).\n\nGroenleer M. (2009), The Autonomy of European Union Agencies. A Comparative Study of Institutional Development, Eburon, Delft.\n\n\nHayes B. (2002), The activities and development of Europoltowards an unaccountable FBI\nin Europe, Statewatch, available at (www.statewatch.org/ news/2002/feb/eufbi.pdf).\n\nHeimans D. (2008), 'The External Relations of EuropolPolitical, Legal and Operational Considerations' in Martenczuk, B. & S. van Thiel, eds., Justice, Liberty, Security: New Challenges for EU External Relations, VUB Press, Brussels, pp. 367392.\n\n\nHijmans H. (2006), 'The European Data Protection Supervisor: The institutions of the EC\ncontrolled by an independent authority', *Common Market Law Review*, Vol. 5, pp. 1313\n1342.\n\n\nHijmans H. & A. Scirocco (2009), 'Shortcomings in EU data protection in the second and third pillars. Can the Lisbon Treaty be expected to help?', *Common Market Law Review*, Vol. 5, pp. 14851525. House of Lords, European Union Committee (2008), Europol: coordinating the fight against serious and organised crime, London, available at\n(http://www.\n\npublications.parliament.uk/pa/ld200708/ldselect/ldeucom/183/183.pdf). House of Lords, European Union Committee (2004), Judicial Cooperation in the EU: the role of Eurojust, London, available at\n(http://www.publications.\n\nparliament.uk/pa/ld200304/ldselect/ldeucom/138/138.pdf). Joint Action of 10 March 1995 adopted by the Council on the basis of Article K.3 of the Treaty on European Union concerning the Europol Drugs Unit (OJ L 62, 20.3.1995).\n\nNilsson H. (2010), 'Judicial cooperation in the EU: Eurojust and the European Public Prosecutor' in Guild, E., Carrera, S. and A. Eggenschwiller, eds., The Area of Freedom, Security and Justice Ten Years On: Successes and Future Challenges Under the Stockholm Programme, CEPS, Brussels, pp. 7378. Peers S. (2005), 'Governance and the Third Pillar: The Accountability of Europol' in Curtin, D. and R. Wessel, eds., Good Governance and the European Union. Reflections on concepts, institutions and substance, Intersentia, Antwerpen, pp. 253276.\n\n\nPuntscher Riekman S. (2008), 'Security, Freedom and Accountability' in Guild, E. and F.\n\nGeyer, eds., *Security versus Justice? Police and Judicial Cooperation in the European Union*, Ashgate, Aldershot, pp. 1934. Ramboll Eureval & Matrix (December 2009), Evaluation of the EU decentralised agencies in 2009:\nFinal Report Volume III\n-\nAgency level findings, available at\n(http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/secretariat_general/evaluation/docs/decentralised_agencies_200\n9_part3_en.pdf).\n\n____________________________________________________________________________________________\nRegulation (EC) No 45/2001 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 December 2000 on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data by the Community institutions and bodies and on the free movement of such data (OJ L 8, 12.1.2001). Regulation (EC) No 1073/1999 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 May 1999 concerning investigations conducted by the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF) (OJ L\n136,  31.5.1999). Ruiz de Garibay D. (2010), Interparliamentary Cooperation in the EU: A case study of Justice and Home Affairs, Paper 60th Political Studies Association Annual Conference, Edinburgh,\n29\nMarch1\nApril\n2010, available at\n(http://www.psa.ac.\n\nuk/journals/pdf/5/2010/1634_1490.pdf). Treaty of Lisbon amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty establishing the European Community (OJ C 306, 17.12.2007). Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe (OJ C 310 of 16.12.2004). Van den Wyngaert C. (2004), 'Eurojust and the European Public Prosecutor in the Corpus Iuris Model: Water and Fire?' in N. Walker, ed., Europe's Area of Freedom, Security and Justice, Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp. 201239. Venice Commission (11 June 2007), Report on the democratic oversight of the security services, (CDL-AD(2007)016). Vlastnik J. (2008), 'Eurojust: A Cornerstone of the Federal Criminal Justice System in the EU?' in Guild, E. and F. Geyer, eds., Security versus Justice: Police and Judicial Cooperation in the European Union, Ashgate, Aldershot, pp. 3549. Wagner W. (2004), Stop, Europol! Problems of European Police-Cooperation for Parliamentary Control and Civil Rights, HSFK-Report No 15, available at (http://\nwww.hsfk.de/downloads/report1504.pdf).\n\nWagner W. (2006), 'Guarding the guards: The European Convention and the communitization of police co-operation', *Journal of European Public Policy*, pp. 12301246.\n\n\nWolff S. (30 September 2009), 'From The Hague to Stockholm: the Future of EU's Internal Security Architecture and Police Cooperation', Overview Paper, Clingendael European Studies Programme Round Table Seminar, available at\n(http://www.clingendael.nl/publications/2009/20090930_cesp_paper_swolff_police_cooper ation.pdf).\n\n\n## Annex B: Thematic Studies Iii. The European Union's Area Of Freedom, Security And Justice Architecture After The Lisbon Treaty Steve Peers\n\n1. INTRODUCTION\n\nThis paper provides information and analysis on the 'new intelligence architecture' of the European Union after the Lisbon Treaty, particularly with regard to Europol, Eurojust, Frontex and the European External Action Service (EEAS). It looks at the overall legal framework of these bodies and the specific issues that arise from their intelligence activities, including the regime relating to classified documents, relations with third countries and their accountability to national parliaments, and the European Parliament (EP).\n\n2.\n\nLEGAL\nFRAMEWORK\nAND\nCURRENT\nPOWERS\nOF\nEUROPOL, EUROJUST, FRONTEX AND THE INTELLIGENCE COMPONENTS OF THE EEAS 2.1 Mandate, functions and powers of each body 2.1.1 Europol On 1 January 2010, the basic legal acts governing Europol (the previous Convention and Protocols) were replaced by a third-pillar Council Decision (the 'Europol Decision') adopted in 2009.1160 A parallel Regulation specifies that Europol staff do not have immunity when they participate in joint investigation teams.1161    The Europol Decision is supplemented by a number of implementing measures.1162    The Decision differs from the prior Convention and Protocols not only with regard to its legal form and effect but also the application of the EU budget and staff rules, and the modest extension of Europol's tasks (for instance, to establish information systems). Europol's chief organ is a Management Board, made up of one representative from each Member State with one from the Commission, and taking most decisions by a two-thirds vote,1163 although day-to-day management is in the hands of a Director and Deputy Directors.1164 The Board must report annually to the Council on both the previous year's\n\nactivities and plans for the upcoming year, and the Council forwards these reports to the European Parliament.1165 Europol's main tasks are to: 'collect, store, process, analyse and exchange information and intelligence'; inform national authorities of information about criminal activities; aid national investigations; ask national authorities to begin or coordinate investigations; provide intelligence and support as regards major events; and draw up threat assessments and strategic analyses.1166 These tasks include analysis of internet information. Europol has the additional tasks of developing knowledge of investigative procedures, advising on investigations and providing strategic intelligence.1167 Europol has competence over 'organised crime, terrorism and other forms of serious crime' listed in the Annex to the Europol Decision, as long as those crimes '[affect] two or more Member States in such a way as to require a common approach by the Member States owing to the scale, significance and consequences of the offences'.1168 It also has competence over specified 'related criminal offences'.1169 Europol is also the supervisory body when it comes to transfers of financial data to the US.1170 It has been given or will be given access to the data in a number of EU information systems:1171 the Schengen Information System (SIS);1172 the second generation Schengen Information System (SIS\nII);1173 the Visa Information System (VIS);1174 the Customs Information System (CIS);1175\nand possibly Eurodac, the database of fingerprint data of asylum seekers and irregular border crossers.1176 There are relatively strict rules on the use of data by Europol, including time limits for the storage of data and provisions on data protection rights of individuals, involving a data protection officer and a Joint Supervisory Body.1177\n1169 Article 4(3) of the Decision. 1170 Article 4 of the 'Swift' treaty on the terrorist finance tracking programme, or TFTP (OJ 2010 OJ L 195/1). 1171 See Article 21 of the Decision. 1172 See Article 101A of the Schengen Convention, as inserted by a Decision (OJ 2005 L 68/44), which was applied from 1 Oct. 2006 (OJ 2006 L 256/18). Europol was given access to the data concerning extradition or arrest warrant requests, persons and objects to be placed under surveillance and objects to be seized or used as evidence in criminal proceedings. Europol is not able to enter or delete data in the SIS. The use of the information, including its transfer to a third State, is subject to the consent of the Member State concerned. Europol may request further information from a Member State. It is striking that Europol's annual reports do not contain any information on Europol's use of the SIS in practice.\n1173 See Article 41 of the Decision establishing SIS II (OJ 2007 L 205/63), which applies the same rules as in the Schengen Convention (as amended). At present, SIS II is scheduled to become operational in the first quarter of 2013.\n\n1174 The VIS was established by Reg. 767/2008 (OJ 2008 L 218/60) and access to the VIS by Europol and national law enforcement agencies is set out in a related Decision (OJ 2008 L 218/129). Europol will have access to VIS data for the purposes of a specific analysis and for general or strategic analyses (Article 7, VIS Decision). The VIS\nwill consist of extensive information on applicants for Schengen visas and is scheduled to become operational as regards the first region from June 2011.\n1175 The CIS was established by a Convention (OJ 1995 C 316/33) and several Protocols, which were replaced by a Decision (OJ 2009 L 323/20), which will apply from 27 May 2011 (Articles 3336 of the Decision). Europol will get access to CIS data once that Decision applies; its access will be regulated by rules similar to those governing its access to SIS and SIS II data (Article 11 of the Decision). CIS contains many different types of data, including eleven items of information on persons for use in 'preventing, investigating and prosecuting serious contraventions of national [customs] laws' as defined in the Decision, and for the purposes of 'sighting and reporting, discreet surveillance, specific checks and strategic or operational analysis' (Articles 15 of the Decision).\n\n1176 Eurodac was established by Reg. 2725/2000 (OJ 2000 L 316/1) and became operational in 2003 (OJ 2003 C\n5/2). Currently, Europol has no access to the data concerned. The Commission proposed a Decision which would give Europol and national law enforcement bodies access to this data (COM (2009) 344, 10 Sep. 2009; see particularly Article 8) but this proposal lapsed with the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon. The Commission's subsequent revised proposal on Eurodac omitted to include access by Europol and national law enforcement agencies: COM (2010) 555, 11 Oct. 2010. However, the Commission has now agreed to table a proposal to this end (see press release of the JHA Council, 1112 April 2011).\n\nEuropol can participate in joint investigation teams, request national authorities to begin investigations, establish information systems (in particular the Europol Information System) and open analysis work files.1178 An example of Europol's contribution to intelligence gathering and analysis is TE-SAT, the annual report on terrorism in the EU, which is derived from the processing of national information.1179 As for the accountability of Europol, admittedly the agency does not have powers as extensive as those of national police authoritiesfor example, the power to arrest, question and detain suspects. Nevertheless, there is still a need for national and European parliamentary accountability regarding the powers Europol does exercise. Concerning data protection, such accountability would be supplementary to the oversight of Europol's Joint Supervisory Body, which is not an elected body; for example, the parliaments could question Europol as to whether or not it has implemented the recommendations of the Joint Supervisory Board. As regards Europol's tasks of support and coordination, parliaments could have a role questioning the effectiveness of these activities; they could also examine issues relating to Europol's accounts. While Europol's annual reports are somewhat informative, they inevitably reflect the position of the agency and some issues are not discussed in the reports (for instance, as noted above, the use which Europol makes of the Schengen Information System in practice).    Although there are some national parliamentary reports on Europol, an additional collective accountability mechanism would disseminate the results of the parliamentary scrutiny process more widely. Finally, the position regarding judicial control of Europol is not clear at present, although it would perhaps be clearer once a post-Lisbon Regulation re-establishing Europol was adopted. 2.1.2 Eurojust Eurojust was definitively established by a Council Decision in 2002, which was subsequently amended because of the financial rules governing Eurojust and then amended again more substantially in 2008, inter alia, in order to strengthen Member States' support for Eurojust\n(regarding the powers of national members), to give Eurojust a greater role settling conflicts of jurisdiction, to increase the flow of information to Eurojust, and to overhaul the external relations rules.1180 Eurojust should be considered part of the EU's 'intelligence architecture'assuming that this concept encompasses law enforcement intelligence\nbecause it processes personal data derived from police intelligence, including in terrorism cases. Eurojust is a 'body' of the EU made up of one member seconded by each Member State who may be a prosecutor, judge or police officer depending on the national legal system and whose place of work must be at Eurojust. Each member must be assisted by one deputy and one assistant, and may be assisted by more people. The deputy must be able to replace the national member.1181 National Members must have, *inter alia*, access to the national registers on criminal records, arrested persons, investigations and DNA.1182\nThe activities of Eurojust are threefold: to coordinate national investigations and prosecutions; to improve cooperation between national authorities, in particular by facilitating judicial cooperation and mutual recognition; and to support in other ways the effectiveness of national investigations and prosecutions.1183 Eurojust may also become involved in assisting investigations and prosecutions involving only one Member State and a non-Member State, once Eurojust has concluded an agreement with the relevant non-\nMember State or where there is an 'essential interest' in specific cases.1184 It may also become involved in investigations involving only one Member State and the EU.1185 Eurojust's competence encompasses the crimes which Europol is competent to address, plus other offences committed in conjunction with any of the crimes over which it is competent.1186 Eurojust may also assist in other investigations at the request of a Member State's authorities.1187 It has established an 'on-call coordination centre' to deal with urgent requests.1188 When it acts through its individual members, it can, inter alia, request Member States' authorities to begin investigations or prosecutions, to accept that one of them is in a better position to undertake a prosecution, to coordinate between authorities, to set up a joint investigation team, or to take special investigative measures.1189\n\nAlso, Member States must exchange extensive information with Eurojust.1190 In particular, Member States must ensure that their national members are aware of: the setting up of a joint investigation, 'and of the results of the work' of such teams; of 'any case in which at least three Member States are directly involved and for which requests for or decisions on judicial cooperation, including regarding instruments giving effect to the principle of mutual recognition, have been transmitted to at least two Member States', where the offence in question is 'punishable in the requesting or issuing Member State by a custodial sentence or a detention order for a maximum period of at least five or six years, to be decided by the Member State concerned', if the offence in question is one of the following: '(i)\ntrafficking in human beings; (ii) sexual exploitation of children and child pornography; (iii) drug trafficking; (iv) trafficking in firearms, their parts and components and ammunition; (v) corruption; (vi) fraud affecting the financial interests of the European Communities;\n(vii) counterfeiting of the euro; (viii) money laundering; (ix) attacks against information systems'. Member States must also inform their national members of cases where: 'there are factual indications that a criminal organisation is involved'; 'there are indications that the case may have a serious cross-border dimension or repercussions at the European Union level or that it might affect Member States other than those directly involved'; 'conflicts of jurisdiction have arisen or are likely to arise'; 'controlled deliveries' (subject to certain conditions); and 'repeated difficulties or refusals regarding the execution of requests for, and decisions on, judicial cooperation', including also mutual recognition measures.    The types of information concerned are listed in an Annex. There is an exception where supplying information would mean 'harming essential national security interests' or 'jeopardising the safety of individuals'. Eurojust must then provide 'competent national authorities with information and feedback on the results of the processing of information'. As for access to EU databases, Eurojust was given access to the SIS by means of a measure adopted in 2005, which gave its national members and their assistants access to the SIS alerts concerning extradition and persons who are wanted to assist with a judicial procedure.1191 Eurojust access to the SIS has been operational since December 2007.1192 In future, Eurojust will have access to SIS II1193 and to the CIS.1194 However, there are no plans to give Eurojust access to VIS or Eurodac data.    In practice, in 2008 there were 229 SIS queries by Eurojust national desks. The Eurojust annual report for that year stated that operational information is checked in the SIS, and that information supplied to national authorities has facilitated the finding and arrest of some persons subject to a European Arrest Warrant. The SIS is also used to decide on which European Arrest Warrant to execute, where there are competing warrants. Finally, the report states that the SIS is useful as it permits a quick search to be carried out without having to make formal requests to other national members.1195\n\nThere are also detailed rules on data protection,1196 including individual rights for data subjects, restrictions on the processing of personal data, the existence of a Joint Supervisory Body and a data protection officer.1197 The involvement of the EP and national parliaments in evaluating Eurojust's activities (as now provided for in Article 85 TFEU) could entail assessment of the effectiveness of Eurojust activities in practice and the adoption of recommendations for the agency to improve its functioning and to focus its operations on certain areas of lawmuch as the Council has been adopting conclusions on Eurojust's annual reports for some time. 2.1.3 Frontex Frontex was established in 2004 by a Council Regulation,1198 in place of an informal system of coordination of national border guards' operations managed by the Council Secretariat, which had developed ad hoc over the previous two years.1199   The main tasks of Frontex, according to Article 2 of its founding Regulation, are to 'coordinate operational cooperation between Member States' regarding the management of external borders', to 'assist Member States on training of national border guards, including the establishment of common training standards', to 'carry out risk analyses', to 'follow up on the development of [relevant] research', to 'assist Member States in circumstances requiring increased technical and operational assistance at external borders', to 'provide Member States with the necessary support in organising joint return operations' and to 'deploy Rapid Border Intervention Teams'.1200 In particular, the agency's tasks as regards risk analysis are to\n'develop and apply a common integrated risk analysis model', to 'prepare both general and tailored risk analyses to be submitted to the Council and the Commission' and to\n\n'incorporate the results of' its risk analysis model in its development of a training curriculum for border guards.1201 According to the proposed amendments to the Frontex Regulation tabled in February\n2010,1202 the Agency's tasks regarding risk analysis would be amended to include an\n'evaluation of the capacity of Member States to face threats and pressure at the external borders'.1203 Furthermore, there would be two new relevant tasks: to 'develop and operate information systems that enable swift and reliable exchanges of information regarding emerging risks at the external borders', and to 'provide the necessary assistance to the development and operation of a European border surveillance system and, as appropriate, to the development of a common information sharing environment, including interoperability of systems'.1204 More specifically, the provisions relating to risk analysis would elaborate upon the task of evaluating Member States, and also require Member States to 'provide the Agency with all necessary information regarding the situation and possible threats at the external borders', for the purposes of risk assessment.1205 Currently, Frontex 'may take all necessary measures to facilitate the exchange of information relevant for its tasks with the Commission and the Member States';1206 the\n2010 proposal would supplement this with an obligation to 'develop and operate an information system capable of exchanging classified information with the Commission and the Member States', although this system 'shall not include the exchange of personal data'.1207 The EP's proposed amendments to the Commission's proposal would require the risk analyses of Frontex to be sent also to the EP, and would change some of the rules relating to the evaluation of Member States' capacity.1208 As for the exchange of personal data, the Council's version of the text would insert two new provisions into the Regulation, first of all concerning the processing of personal data in the context of joint return operations and, secondly, concerning personal data collected during joint operations, pilot projects and the deployment of rapid border intervention teams.1209 In the first case, Frontex 'may process personal data of persons who are subject to such joint return operations' where it coordinates such operations. The data would have to be deleted ten days after collection at the latest, although Frontex could transfer that data to a carrier if a Member State had not done so. In the second case, Frontex could 'further process personal data collected by the Member States during such operational activities and transmitted to the Agency in order to contribute to the security of the external borders of the Member States of the European Union.' But such data could only cover 'persons who are suspected, by the relevant authorities of Member States, on reasonable grounds of involvement in cross-border criminal activities, in facilitation of illegal migration activities or in human trafficking activities' as defined in EU legislation concerning the facilitation of irregular entry. That personal data could only be used for risk analysis or for transmission to Europol or other EU law enforcement bodies. At that point, or at any rate within three months, the personal data would have to be deleted. The onward transmission of the data to anyone else would be prohibited. In either case, the data processing would have to\n'respect the principles of necessity and proportionality' and 'shall be strictly limited to' use for the relevant purposes. The EP's proposed amendments are broadly similar as regards the second type of processing of personal data but do not address the first type of processing.1210 As for the functioning and accountability of Frontex, a key institution is the Management Board, which appoints the Executive Director (proposed by the Commission) and adopts Frontex's annual general reports and work programmes.1211 It is made up of one representative of each Member State and two representatives of the Commission.1212  The Executive Director has the general power to manage Frontex and either the EP or the Council 'may invite' him or her 'to report on the carrying out of his/her tasks'.1213 He or she has the general power to prepare the Agency's activities. A particular parliamentary accountability gap regarding Frontex arises from the lack of detailed rules or arrangements on the reporting of Frontex operations. This includes (in future) the exchange of information by Frontexand the important issue of the compatibility of Frontex actions with human rights obligationsin conjunction with the question of whether Frontex would be judicially accountable for its operational actions. 2.1.4 The EEAS The EU's foreign policy intelligence unit, Sitcen, which was previously situated in the Council General Secretariat, was transferred to the EEAS in accordance with the Decision establishing the EEAS.1214 There are no formal rules governing the establishment or operations of Sitcen. However, it is known that it is staffed by 'diplomats from the Policy Unit, secretariat personnel, and seconded intelligence analysts from the Member States'\nand works closely with the Intelligence Directorate of the EU Military Staff.1215 It gathers information from open sources and compiles replies to requests for information sent out to national agencies, making its own assessments based on this information. Sitcen is divided into three units: a Civilian intelligence Cell (CIC), which comprises civilian intelligence analysts working on political and counterterrorism assessment; a General Operations Unit (GOU), which provides operational support, research and non-intelligence analysis; and a Communications Unit (ComCen), which handles communications security issues and running the Council's communications centre. Since 2005, it has sought to develop an anti-terrorist capability.1216 2.1.5 The Standing Committee on Operational Security (COSI) Article 71 TFEU, as inserted by the Treaty of Lisbon, provides for the creation of a standing committee on internal security (known as COSI) to 'facilitate coordination of the action of Member States' competent authorities'; representatives of the relevant EU bodies and agencies are involved in the proceedings of this committee. The EP and national Parliaments must be 'kept informed of the proceedings'.\n\nThis committee was established by a Council Decision adopted in 2010,1217 which made it clear that COSI would not conduct operations but rather 'shall facilitate, promote and strengthen coordination of operational actions of the authorities of the Member States competent in the field of internal security' and 'shall also evaluate the general direction and efficiency of operational cooperation; it shall identify possible shortcomings or failures and adopt appropriate concrete recommendations to address them'. While COSI does not itself have an intelligence capability, it has an important role coordinating the operations of those bodies which do and should therefore be subject to sufficient oversight. 2.2 Major legal developments & impact of the TFEU The EEAS was itself established recently pursuant to new provisions of the Treaties introduced by the Treaty of Lisbon thus its legal framework has not yet been amended. As for Frontex, the Treaty of Lisbon did not as such make amendments to its legal framework because Frontex was not (and still is not) specifically mentioned in the Treaties. However, as mentioned above, the legal framework of Frontex was amended in 2007 and will be amended further pursuant to the 2010 proposal to this end, which is likely to be agreed and adopted by summer 2011. As for Eurojust and Europol, as mentioned above, the legal framework of Eurojust was altered by a Decision adopted in 2008. The original legal framework for Europol (a Convention adopted in 1995) was amended first by a series of Protocols (adopted in 2000,\n2002 and 2003) and then by a Decision, adopted in 2009, which replaced the previous legal measures. The framework relating to Europol and Eurojust was also altered by the Treaty of Lisbon, which amended the basic legal provisions in the Treaties that referred to these bodies. First of all, the previous legal provision relating to Eurojust (Article 31(2) TFEU) provided for the Council to 'encourage cooperation through Eurojust' by 'enabling' it to 'facilitate... coordination between... national prosecuting authorities', to promote its support for\n'criminal investigations in cases of serious cross-border crime', taking account of Europol analyses, and to facilitate 'close cooperation between Eurojust and the European Judicial network'; for instance, to assist with executing letters rogatory and extradition requests. Following the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon, Article 85 of the TFEU now provides that the agency's mission is 'to support and strengthen coordination and cooperation between national investigating and prosecuting authorities..., the basis of operations conducted and information supplied by the Member States' authorities and by Europol'.   EU Regulations 'shall determine Eurojust's structure, operation, field of action and tasks, which 'may include' the 'initiation of criminal investigations' and proposals to national authorities to initiate prosecutions, the 'coordination of' such investigations and prosecutions and strengthening judicial cooperation, 'including by resolution of conflicts of jurisdiction and by close cooperation with the European Judicial Network'. However, 'formal acts of judicial procedure shall be carried out by the competent national officials' as regards the prosecutions concerned. Finally, the legislation establishing Eurojust must also 'determine arrangements for involving the European Parliament and national Parliaments in the evaluation of Eurojust's activities'. As for Europol, the previous Article 30(2) of the TFEU stated that the Council had to\n'promote cooperation through Europol' and had to adopt measures to: 'enable Europol to facilitate and support the preparation, and to encourage the coordination and carrying out, of specific investigative actions by the competent authorities of the Member States, including operational actions of joint teams comprising representatives of Europol in a support capacity' and to allow Europol 'to ask the competent authorities of the Member States to conduct and coordinate their investigations in specific cases and to develop specific expertise which may be put at the disposal of Member States to assist them in investigating cases of organised crime'. Article 88 of the TFEU now provides that Europol's mission is to 'support and strengthen action by the Member States' police authorities and other law enforcement services and their mutual cooperation in preventing and combating serious crime' and terrorism. As with Eurojust, EU Regulations will 'determine Europol's structure, operation, field of action and tasks', which may include 'the collection, storage, processing, analysis and exchange of information' and 'the coordination, organisation and implementation of investigative and operational action carried out jointly with the Member States' competent authorities or in the context of joint investigative teams'. However, 'any operational action by Europol must be carried out in liaison and in agreement with the authorities of the Member State or States whose territory is concerned' and 'coercive measures shall be the exclusive responsibility of the competent national authorities.'\nFinally, similarly to Eurojust, the EU legislation concerned must 'also lay down the procedures for scrutiny of Europol's activities by the European Parliament, together with national Parliaments'. As compared to the previous Article 31(2) of the TFEU, Article 85 of the TFEUthe new legal base regarding measures concerning Eurojustrefers to the initiation of investigations and the proposal for initiation of prosecutions, as well as the resolution of conflicts of jurisdiction. It also refers specifically to the role of the EP and national parliaments, and provides for a reservation of national competence as regards 'formal acts of judicial procedure'. Furthermore, it is clear that the three tasks for Eurojust listed in Article 85(1)\nare not an exhaustive list of such tasks (see the words 'shall include'). However, the Treaty provisions concerning Eurojust can only take effect when the Eurojust Decision is amended or replaced by a Regulation, to be adopted pursuant to the ordinary legislative procedure. On this point, the Stockholm programme and the action plan on implementing the Stockholm programme call for a proposal on Eurojust in 2012.1218 As for Europol, compared to the previous Article 30(2) of the TFEU, there is an express exclusion from exercising 'coercive measures' and a requirement to act in liaison and agreement with each Member State as regards 'operational action'.   More specifically,\n'investigative and operational action' has to be carried out either 'jointly' with Member States or 'in the context of joint investigative teams'.   The reference to specific rules concerning the EP and national parliamentary scrutiny of Europol is new. Overall, Europol is no longer assigned a role supporting, facilitating and requesting action by national police forces but rather (implicitly) has a role in partnership with national forces. But the partnership is not fully equal since Europol cannot have the capacity to apply coercive measures. Moreover, the Treaty does not refer to any independent role for Europol to act fully by itself, although since the listed powers are non-exhaustive ('may include'), it would be possible to adopt rules to that effectas long as Europol would not thereby carry out operational action independently, or exercise coercive powers, in light of the limits on its powers set out in Article 88(3).\n\nFor the future, the Commission plans to propose further legislation on Europol in 2013.1219\nOnly at this point would the provisions on scrutiny by national parliaments and the EP referred to in Article 88 be invoked. In the meantime, the Commission has released a communication on this issue.1220 The different references to the role of the EP and national parliaments in Articles 85(1) and\n88(2) of the TFEU (i.e., 'the *evaluation* of Eurojust's activities' as distinct from the 'scrutiny of Europol's activities', emphasis added) are not explained in the *travaux* of the Convention, which drew up the text of the Constitutional Treaty. However, the difference might possibly be due to the principle that judicial bodies need more independence from political control. As for Frontex, it can be presumed that the Treaty does not refer to similar oversight powers for the EP as regards Frontex simply because, as noted already, the Treaty does not explicitly refer to Frontex. This omission may be simply because when the Constitutional Treaty (the precursor to the Treaty of Lisbon) was originally drafted and signed in 2002\n2004, Frontex was not yet established.1221\n\n3. CLASSIFIED INFORMATION IN THE JUSTICE AND HOME\nAFFAIRS FIELD The basic legal framework for accessing and processing classified information in the European Union is the security rules of the Commission and the Council.1222   These sets of rules will soon be made rather more equivalent and they will also be accompanied by an agreement between Member States on the sharing of classified information within the framework of the EU. This is meant to 'constitute a more comprehensive and coherent general framework within the European Union for the protection of classified information originating in the Member States, in institutions of the European Union or in EU agencies, bodies or offices, or received from third States or international organisations.'1223 There are also rules on the transfer of confidential information between the Commission and the EP in the EP/Commission framework agreement, which contains a specific Annex (Annex II) on this issue.1224 The standard classification of classified information within these rules is as follows: EU\nclassified information (EUCI) is defined as 'any information and material, classified as \"TRES SECRET UE/EU TOP SECRET\", \"SECRET UE\", \"CONFIDENTIEL UE\" or \"RESTREINT UE\" or bearing equivalent national or international classification markings, an unauthorised disclosure of which could cause varying degrees of prejudice to Union interests, or to one or more Member States, whether such information originates within the Union or is received from Member States, third States or international organisations'. The relevant categories are further defined as follows: (a) TRES SECRET UE/EU TOP SECRET: this classification shall be applied only to information and material the unauthorised disclosure of which could cause exceptionally grave prejudice to the essential interests of the Union or of one or more of its Member States. (b) SECRET UE: this classification shall be applied only to information and material the unauthorised disclosure of which could seriously harm the essential interests of the Union or of one or more of its Member States. (c) CONFIDENTIEL UE: this classification shall be applied to information and material the unauthorised disclosure of which could harm the essential interests of the Union or of one or more of its Member States. (d) RESTREINT UE: this classification shall be applied to information and material the unauthorised disclosure of which could be disadvantageous to the interests of the Union or of one or more of its Member States. Eurojust has been required to apply the Council security rules from 2009, following the adoption of the amendments to its founding Decision.1225 The same is true of Europol, following the adoption of the 2009 Decision re-establishing that body.1226 There are no specific rules on the sharing of classified information with the EP. As for Frontex, a new provision in the proposed amendments to the founding Frontex Regulation would require Frontex to apply the Commission's security rules on classified information, as well as the Commission's security principles on non-classified sensitive information.1227 There would be no special rule as regards the transfer of classified information to the EP, although this issue might be affected by the EP's amendments (discussed above) on the relationship between the Agency and the EP. Finally, Article 10 of the EEAS decision provides that the High Representative will, inter alia, 'decide on the security rules for the EEAS', which will 'apply to all EEAS staff, and all staff in Union Delegations, regardless of their administrative status or origin'. Pending that decision, the EEAS had to apply the Council security rules as regards the protection of classified information, and the Commission's rules on 'other aspects of security'. It also has a 'department responsible for security matters', which is 'assisted by the relevant services of the Member States'. More generally, the High Representative has the power to 'take any measure necessary in order to implement security rules in the EEAS, in particular as regards the protection of classified information'. There is an inter-institutional agreement between the Council and the EP on the sharing of classified foreign policy and defence information1228 but it does not apply to JHA matters.1229\n\n The concept of 'classified' information is not further defined in the relevant legislative texts, except as regards Europol, where the Decision includes a number of detailed rules to this effect.1230 However, the cross-references to the Council and Commission rules presumably mean that the classification described above is applicable.\n\n4. INFORMATION SHARING In the case of Eurojust, the founding Decision has specific provisions on relations with the European Judicial Network, other EU bodies (Europol, OLAF, Frontex and the Council as regards foreign policy), and third States and bodies, including   provisions on sending and receiving liaison officers and executing requests for judicial cooperation from third States.1231 In practice, an agreement with Europol came into force in 2004 and was revised in 2009. A memorandum with OLAF was agreed in 2003, although the relationship with OLAF was considered unsatisfactory until a formal agreement was negotiated in 2008. Treaties with Norway, Iceland, Romania, the US, Croatia, Switzerland and several international bodies are in force,1232 a treaty with the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia has applied since 2010, and further treaties are planned with Russia, Ukraine, Moldova, other Western Balkan States, Liechtenstein, Cape Verde and Israel. The Europol Decision sets out separate rules for information sharing with EU bodies, offices and agencies, third States and bodies, and private entities.1233 In practice, Europol has:\noperational agreements with Australia, Canada, the US, Croatia, Iceland, Norway and Switzerland; strategic agreements with other Western Balkan States, Russia, Ukraine, Moldova and Colombia; operational agreements with Eurojust and Interpol; and strategic agreements with several EU bodies (including Frontex and Sitcen), as well as two UN\nbodies.1234 As for Frontex, Article 13 of the founding Regulation provides that it 'may cooperate with Europol' and other competent international organisations 'in the framework of working arrangements concluded with those bodies, in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Treaty and the provisions on the competence of those bodies'. Article 14 of that Regulation in turn provides that '[i]n matters covered by its activities and to the extent required for the fulfilment of its tasks', Frontex 'shall facilitate the operational cooperation between Member States and third countries, in the framework of the European Union external relations policy'.   Again, it can do this by means of 'working arrangements' with the third countries concerned. At present, Frontex has arrangements with Western Balkan States, Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova, Georgia, the US, Canada and Cape Verde, along with the with the CIS Border Troop Commanders Council and the MARRI Regional Centre in the Western Balkans. It is negotiating arrangements with eight other States: Turkey, Libya, Morocco, Senegal, Mauritania, Egypt, Brazil and Nigeria. However, the texts of these agreements are not online and little is known about their application in practice.1235 There is an obvious accountability gap here, particularly from a human rights perspective. The Commission's proposal to amend the founding Regulation would simply add references in Article 13 to the European Asylum Support Office and the EU's Fundamental Rights Agency. The Council's version of the proposal would specify that '[o]nward transmission or other communication of personal data processed by the Agency to other European Union agencies or bodies shall be subject to specific working agreements regarding the exchange of personal data and subject to the prior approval of the European Data Protection Supervisor'. The EP's version of the proposal would insert key provisions on accountability, requiring Frontex to inform the EP of such arrangements. It would also permit Frontex to invite other EU bodies and international organisations to participate in certain Frontex activities, including risk assessment, subject (in most cases) to the consent of the Member States concerned. The Commission's proposals to amend Article 14 of the Regulation (as regards cooperation with third States) are more far reaching. They would first specify that such cooperation must take place 'in the framework of the European Union external relations policy, including with regard to human rights.' The EP version would add a specific reference to the European Neighbourhood Policy, would specify that no operation could take place 'under the jurisdiction of any third country', and would note that cooperation with third countries would have to 'promote European border management standards, also covering respect for fundamental rights and human dignity'. Next, the proposal would permit Frontex to send liaison officers to third States, but only where 'border management practices respect minimum human rights standards', with priority for third States 'which on the basis of risk analysis constitute a country of origin or transit regarding illegal migration'. Frontex could also receive liaison officers posted by those States. The Frontex Management Board would adopt an annual list of priorities to this end. Furthermore, Member States would also have to include in their bilateral treaties with third States, 'where appropriate', 'provisions concerning the role and competencies of the Agency'. The Council's version of the proposal would make this provision optional for Member States, while the EP's version would require Frontex to inform the EP about such treaties, and about the deployment of liaison officers and its arrangements with third States. Finally, the Commission's original proposal would require the Commission's consent for Frontex's deployment of liaison officers and its arrangements with third States. The Council's version would delete this requirement. In the Council's version, Frontex's external relations would not as such be accountable to anyone, other than in the general context of Frontex accountability. A significant development in the near future will be the likely development of an EU Terrorist Finance Tracking Programme (TFTP) to parallel the established US system, which is regulated by an EU/US agreement.1236 The Commission is due to make proposals to this end by summer 2011. Questions will inevitably arise about the architecture of sharing the financial information concerned, along with further related information concerning terrorist operations, as between EU bodies and national law enforcement and intelligence agencies, and important data protection issues will also have to be addressed.\n\n5. FUTURE POWERS As we have seen, the roles of Europol and Eurojust have yet to be developed pursuant to the Stockholm programme following the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon, and the proposed amendments to the Frontex legislation have yet to be agreed. However, the EEAS is now operational, including Sitcen and the amendments to the Frontex legislation will likely be agreed shortly and will certainly develop Frontex's intelligence role. Similar developments are likely in the foreseeable future as regards Europol and Eurojust. The particular concerns that could arise with Frontex relate to the use of personal information for risk analysis, and the possible transfer and subsequent use of that information by national agencies. To what extent could inaccurate or misleading information about a particular individual be used without an adequate remedy in place?\n\nWhile the legislation establishing the EU's JHA databases contains systematic rules governing the exchange and processing of personal data, the more informal process envisaged by the proposed amendments to the Frontex legislation is not so detailed. It is therefore important to ensure that the mechanisms for accountability of Frontex to the EP include a focus on this particular issue, inter alia. As for the EEAS, it is notable that the TFEU (as revised by the Lisbon Treaty) contains a specific rule on the processing of personal data by Member States within the framework of EU foreign policy (Article 39 of the TFEU):\nIn accordance with Article 16 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and by way of derogation from paragraph 2 thereof, the Council shall adopt a decision laying down the rules relating to the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data by the Member States when carrying out activities which fall within the scope of this Chapter, and the rules relating to the free movement of such data. Compliance with these rules shall be subject to the control of independent authorities. No such measure has yet to be adopted. However, this exception only applies to Member States and Article 11(3) of the EEAS Decision specifies that '[t]he EEAS shall protect individuals with regard to the processing of their personal data in accordance with the rules laid down' in EU legislation, and that '[t]he High Representative shall decide on the implementing rules for the EEAS'. It remains to be seen what specific implementing rules are adopted. Nonetheless, the problem still remains that there is no specific mechanism in the EEAS Decision as regards the accountability of the EEAS intelligence capability to the EP. More generally, there is little information available concerning the functioning of Sitcen and, as noted above, there are no formal rules concerning its establishment.1237 This omission necessarily hinders its accountability.\n\n6. CONCLUSION The EU is lacking a systematic framework governing the parliamentary oversight of intelligence activity. In particular, there are significant gaps in EP (and national parliamentary) access to classified information held by Europol and Eurojust, and such access as regards JHA documents held by the Council. The agreements concerning access\n\nto classified information between the EP and the Commission, and between the EP and the Council on foreign policy documents, do not apply to national parliaments, although the latter agreement will shortly be replaced by arrangements on EEAS documents. In order to ensure accountability of the relevant EU bodies, these gaps have to be filled. The EP is also lacking a systematic internal framework for the oversight of classified information. A key issue here is whether this framework should be developed by the EP autonomously, or whether it should be developed in conjunction with national parliaments collectively, given the latter's explicit role as regards oversight of Europol, Eurojust and COSI as set out in the Treaties. An alternative approach would be to devise two (perhaps similar) systems for oversight: an autonomous system for the EP alone where the Treaties do not require national parliaments' involvement (for example, Frontex and the EEAS), and a specific system regarding Europol, Eurojust and COSI where the Treaties do require such involvement. This suggestion begs the question, however, of whether the EP should seek to involve national parliaments in oversight activities even in cases where the Treaties do not require it. In either case, the EP (with or without national parliaments) needs to adopt internal rules governing the sharing and analysis of this information in order to ensure that its access to this information can contribute to its assessment of EU policies and can be evaluated in the context of guaranteeing the accountability of the relevant bodies. A particular topic for the EP (and national parliaments) to focus on is the potential overlap between EU bodies in general and with regard to particular areas of crime or incidents (certain terrorist attacks, for instance). Does this entail a duplication of resources or a useful synergy? Finally, while examining the accountability of EU action in this area, parliaments will have to draw a distinction between the operation of the EU bodies generally (i.e., the effectiveness of their organisation and management) and supervision of individual operations, given the confidentiality issues that arise.\n\nREFERENCES Fagersten B. (2008), European Intelligence Cooperation: Drivers, Interests and Institutions, SIIA Papers No 6. Hertzberger E. (2007), *Counter-Terrorist Intelligence cooperation in the EU*, UNICRI. Hinarejos A. (2009), 'The Lisbon Treaty versus Standing Still: A View from the Third Pillar',\n5 EUConst, 299. House of Lords European Scrutiny Committee (20072008a), EUROPOL: Coordinating the fight against serious and organised crime, 29th report. House of Lords European Scrutiny Committee (20072008b), FRONTEX: the EU external borders agency, 9th report. Ladenburger C. (2008), 'Police and Criminal Law in the Treaty of Lisbon: A New Dimension for the Community Method', 4 EUConst, 20. Mitsilegas V. (2009), *EU Criminal Law*, Hart Publishing, Oxford.\n____________________________________________________________________________________________ Muller-Wille B. (2004), For our eyes only? Shaping an intelligence community within the EU, WEU Security Studies Institute. Peers S. (2005), 'Governance and the Third Pillar: The Accountability of Europol' in D.\n\nCurtin and R. Wessel, eds., *Good Governance and the European Union*, Intersentia. Peers S. and N. Rogers (2006), EU Immigration and Asylum Law: Text and Commentary, 1st edition, Martinus Nijhoff. Rijken C. (2001), 'Legal and Technical Aspects of Cooperation Between Europol, Third States and Interpol' in V. Kronenberger, ed., The European Union and the International Legal Order: Discord or Harmony?, Asser.\n\n\n\n## Annex C: Questionnaire For Oversight Institutions Of Civilian Security And Intelligence Agencies In Eu Member States\n\n Methodological Note: The questionnaire drafted by DCAF-EUI was addressed to all national parliaments in the European Union member states and, where applicable, specialised non-parliamentary oversight committees. The questionnaire aimed to gather more information from these entities on the oversight of security and intelligence agencies. From the information provided by the EU member states, common standards and good practices were identified.\n\n\nThe questionnaire was set up in two parts. The first part concerned parliaments as a whole.\n\nThe second part related to specialised parliamentary committee(s) or, where applicable, specialised non-parliamentary oversight committees which are responsible for overseeing security and intelligence agencies. Out of 27 Member States of the European Union, 13 have a bicameral parliament and 14 have a unicameral parliament. In total there are 40 national parliamentary chambers in the 27 Member States of the European Union. While the national parliaments of Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, and Romania have a bicameral system, they each sent a single set of responses to the questionnaire. This was done because in some member states the oversight of security and intelligence agencies is exercised by a Joint Committee, in which members of both Chambers are represented. This is the case in Italy, Romania, and the United Kingdom. Furthermore, in some member states one of the two Chambers has a paramount role in overseeing security and intelligence agencies, for instance the German *Bundestag,* Belgian *Senaat,* Dutch *Tweede Kamer,* Czech Poslanecka snemovna (Chamber of Deputies), and the French *Assemblee Nationale*.\n\n\nDCAF-EUI received responses from 28 national parliaments or chambers to the first part of the questionnaire, and 28 responses to the second part from specialised parliamentary committees and/or specialised non-parliamentary committees responsible for overseeing security and intelligence agencies.\n\n## Questionnaire  For  Oversight  Institutions  Of  Civilian  Security  And Intelligence Agencies In Eu Member States Introduction\n\nThis  questionnaire  forms  part  of  a  comparative  study  on  the  oversight  of  civilian  security  and intelligence  agencies  and  relevant  activities  in  all  European  Union  member  states  and  other  major democracies.  The  study  was  commissioned  by  the  European  Parliament  (DG  Internal  Policy)  and  is being undertaken jointly by the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF) and the European University Institute (EUI);1238 it will be published by the European Parliament.\nThe study will examine the oversight of security and intelligence agencies at the national level with the aim of identifying models and practices that can inform the European Parliament's (EP's) approach to the  establishment  of  parliamentary  oversight  of  EU's  internal  security  agencies,  i.e.  EUROPOL, EUROJUST, FRONTEX, and some intelligence components of the European External Action Service.  The Lisbon Treaty has given the European Parliament a mandate to strengthen parliamentary oversight of these EU agencies  this study should be seen within this context.\n\nThis questionnaire aims to gather more information on common standards and good practices relating to the oversight of security and intelligence agencies by parliaments, as well as specialised institutions outside parliament. The European Parliament is particularly interested in the division of responsibilities for overseeing security and intelligence agencies; national parliaments' access to classified information in the security field; and the mandates, functioning and powers of specialized oversight committees both within parliament and outside. The questionnaire provides an opportunity for EU member states to demonstrate how security and intelligence agencies are overseen in their state, and thus to provide examples  which  will  inform  the  European  Parliament  in  strengthening  its  oversight  of  EU  security agencies.\n\n## Terminology\n\nFor  the  purposes  of  this  questionnaire,  \"security  and  intelligence  agencies\"  are  broadly  defined  to include all civilian government agencies which perform any of the following activities in  the area of national security: handling and processing of classified information; information sharing domestically and with foreign entities; processing and use of personal data; collection of information covertly and from  open  sources.  We  are  primarily  interested  in  domestic  intelligence  agencies,  security  police, special  branch  police  services,  border  security  services  and  joint  analysis/fusion  centers.  The  term\n\"committee\"  is  used  throughout  the  questionnaire  to  denote  the  overseer(s)  of  security  and intelligence agencies, whether they be parliamentary, or nonparliamentary entities.\n\n## Structure\n\nPART I: QUESTIONS FOR NATIONAL PARLIAMENTS ON THE OVERSIGHT OF SECURITY AND INTELLIGENCE\nAGENCIES\nSection A: General questions on the oversight of security and intelligence agencies Section B: Parliament and access to classified information in the area of national security Section C: Managing Classified Information PART  II:  QUESTIONS  FOR  SPECIALISED  COMMITTEES  RESPONSIBLE  FOR  OVERSEEING  SECURITY  AND\nINTELLIGENCE AGENCIES\nSection A: Organisational Structure Section B:  Legal basis and Mandate Section C: Investigations & Powers Section D: Access to Classified Information Section E: Protecting Classified Information Section F: Reporting and FollowUp Section G: Challenges and Strengthening Oversight\n\n## Instructions\n\nThis questionnaire contains 43 questions.\nPart  I  of  this  questionnaire  is  addressed  to  parliaments  as  a  whole.  It  should  take  20  minutes  to complete Part II should be answered by the parliamentary  committee(s)  or (where applicable)  the  specialised institution(s) outside parliament that are responsible for overseeing security and intelligence agencies in your state. This part may be completed by more than one committee if required. These questions should take approximately 30 minutes to complete.\n\nIf  the  main  institution  responsible  for  overseeing  security  and  intelligence  agencies  is  outside parliament, please complete Part I and then kindly provide us with the contact details of this institution, we will ask them to complete the questions in part two.\nWe kindly request that you write your answers to the open questions in English in the space provided or attach an additional sheet of paper if necessary.\n\n## Part  I:  Questions  For  National  Parliaments  On  The  Oversight  Of Security And Intelligence Agencies\n\nYour contact details:\nName:\n\n_________________________________________________________\nOrganisation:   _________________________________________________________ Function:\n_________________________________________________________\nEmail:\n\n_________________________________________________________\nTelephone:\n_________________________________________________________\n(This information will only be used to contact you in case we have questions about your responses; the results of the survey will be processed anonymously)\n\n\n## Section  A:  General  Questions  On  The  Oversight  Of  Security  And  Intelligence Agencies\n\n1. Which committee(s) of parliament and/or institutions outside of parliament oversee the\nfollowing aspects of the security and intelligence agencies?\nPlease write the name (in the original language and in English) of the relevant committee(s) in each box.\n\nFor parliamentary committees please indicate if it belongs to one chamber of parliament or is a joint committee. If the responsible oversight body differs depending on the security agency being overseen, please indicate this.\n\n|                | Parliamentary committee(s)    |\n|----------------|-------------------------------|\n| parliament     |                               |\n|                |                               |\n| Budget &       |                               |\n| Expenditure    |                               |\n|                |                               |\n|                |                               |\n|                |                               |\n| Administration |                               |\n| & Management   |                               |\n|                |                               |\n\nCompliance\n\nwith the law\nPolicies\n\n\nOperations (future, ongoing\nand completed) Delete as\nappropriate\n\n\nSecurity agencies' relations\nwith\nforeign\ngovernments and international organisations\nComplaints about the agencies\n\n\n2. Does parliament play a role in appointing senior staff of security and intelligence agencies?\n No\n\n  Yes (please explain):\n\n\n\n3. Does  parliament  play  any  of  the  following  roles  visavis  external  institutions  which  oversee\nsecurity and intelligence agencies  (such as information commissioners, ombudsman institutions,\nspecialised intelligence oversight institutions)?\nPlease tick all boxes that apply\n\n Appointing members  Approving budget  Requesting investigations or reports on given matters\n Receiving and scrutinising reports\n\n Other (please specify):\n\n\n\n## Section  B:  Parliament  And  Access  To  Classified  Information  In  The  Area  Of National Security\n\n\n4. Please  indicate  the  extent  of  parliament's  access  to  the  following  four  levels  of  classified\ninformation in the field of national security:\nFor each level of classified information, please select only one of the three options provided\n\n## A) Information Classified As \"Top Secret\"\n\n All members of parliament have access to all relevant information\n\n Access is limited to one or more of the following categories of MPs *(please tick all which apply)*\n Access is limited to the chairs of particular committees\n\n(please specify):\n\n\n Access is limited to members of particular committees\n\n(please specify):\n\n\n\n Access is limited party or group leaders in parliament\n  Access is limited to the president/speaker of parliament\n  Access is limited to ad hoc parliamentary committees inquiry\n  No members of parliament have access\n\n\n## B) Information Classified As \"Secret\"\n\n All members of parliament have access to all relevant information\n Access is limited to one or more of the following categories of MPs (please tick all which apply)\n\n Access is limited to the chairs of particular committees\n\n(please specify):\n\n\n\n Access is limited to members of particular committees\n(please specify):\n\n\n\n Access is limited party or group leaders in parliament\n  Access is limited to the president/speaker of parliament\n\n  Access is limited to ad hoc parliamentary committees inquiry\n  No members of parliament have access\n\n\n## C) Information Classified As \"Confidential\"\n\n All members of parliament have access to all relevant information\n Access is limited to one or more of the following categories of MPs (please tick all which apply)\n Access is limited to the chairs of particular committees\n\n(please specify):\n\n\n\n Access is limited to members of particular committees\n(please specify):\n\n\n\n Access is limited party or group leaders in parliament\n\n  Access is limited to the president/speaker of parliament\n  Access is limited to ad hoc parliamentary committees inquiry\n  No members of parliament have access\n\n\n## D) Information Classified As \"Restricted\"\n\n All members of parliament have access to all relevant information\n Access is limited to one or more of the following categories of MPs (please tick all which apply)\n\n\n Access is limited to the chairs of particular committees\n\n(please specify):\n\n\n Access is limited to members of particular committees\n\n(please specify):\n\n\n\n Access is limited party or group leaders in parliament\n  Access is limited to the president/speaker of parliament\n  Access is limited to ad hoc parliamentary committees inquiry\n  No members of parliament have access\n\n\n5. Which  of  the  following  types  of  frequently  classified  information  can  be  accessed  by  the\ncategories of MPs indicated in your responses to question 4?\nPlease check all that apply\n Information on ongoing operations of security and intelligence agencies\n\n Information on past operations of security and intelligence agencies\n Budgets for future spending by security and intelligence agencies\n Information on past expenditure by security and intelligence agencies\n Internal guidelines of security and intelligence agencies\n Information shared domestically between security and intelligence agencies\n  Information  shared  between  security  and  intelligence  agencies  and  foreign  governments  and international organizations\n  Information  on  negotiations  between  the  executive  and  foreign  governments  and  international organisations in the area of internal and external security (e.g. the Passenger Name Records Agreement with the USA)\n International agreements between security /intelligence agencies and foreign entities\n\n Other (please specify):\n\n\n\n6. Does  your  state's  access  to  information  or  information  security  legislation  make  a  distinction\nbetween  parliament  as  an  institution,  MPs  and  the  general  public  in  terms  of  access  to\ninformation?\n  No\n\n Yes (please explain):\n\n\n\n7. Can  the  government  and/or  the  security  and  intelligence  agencies  lawfully  deny  access  to\nclassified  information  which  MPs  could  normally  access  in  accordance  with  the  terms  you\noutlined in question 4?\n  Yes\n\n\n No (go to question 9)\n\n(b) If yes, on what grounds can access to classified information be denied?\n\n\n\n(c) Who can take the decision to deny access to classified information?\n\n\n\n8. Do any procedures exist for parliament to challenge a refusal to grant relevant MPs access to\nclassified information?\n No\n Yes (*Please explain)*\n\n\n\n9. (a)  Do  staffers  employed  by  parliament  have  access  to  classified  information  in  the  field  of\nnational security?\n Yes\n\n No (b) Do staffers employed by MPs/political parties have access to classified information in the field of national security?\n\n Yes\n\n No\n\n\n## Section C: Managing Classified Information\n\n\n\n10. (a)  Are  members  of  parliament  vetted/required  to  obtain  a  security  clearance  before\nbeing granted access to classified information?\n Yes\n\n No (b) Are parliamentary staffers vetted/required to obtain a security clearance before being granted access to classified information?\n\n Yes\n\n No\n\n(c) If yes, who administers security clearances?\n\n\n\n(d). Which institution takes the final decision on whether security clearance is granted?\n\n___________________________________________________________________\n\n\n\n11. Are  members  of  parliament  required  to  sign  a  confidentiality  agreement  before  being\ngiven access to classified information?\n Yes\n\n No\n12. What  action  can  be  taken  against  members  of  parliament  who  make  unauthorised\ndisclosures of classified information?\n Criminal prosecution\n Disciplinary action according to parliament's internal procedures\n\n Other (please explain):\n\n\n\n13. By which of the following means are members of parliament able to access to classified\ninformation?\n(Please tick all boxes which apply)\n Information can be viewed in a secure reading room in parliament\n Information can be viewed on the premises of the executive\n  Information can be viewed on the premises of the security and intelligence agencies\n\n  Information can be viewed on secure computer system in parliament\n Information can be viewed in the context of committee meetings\n\n Other (please explain):\n\n\n\n## Part  Ii:  Questions  For  Specialised  Committees  Responsible  For Overseeing Security And Intelligence Agencies\n\nYour contact details:\nName:\n\n__________________________________________________________\nOrganisation:   __________________________________________________________\n\nFunction:\n__________________________________________________________\n\nEmail:\n\n__________________________________________________________\n\nTelephone:\n _________________________________________________________\n\n(This information will only be used to contact you in case we have questions about your responses; the results of the survey will be processed anonymously)\n\nNAME OF COMMITTEE:\n\n\n\n## Section A: Organisational Structure\n\n14. Which of the following models best describes your committee?\n\n  A parliamentary committee\n    An  oversight  body  which  is  independent  of  parliament,  the  executive  and  the  agencies  that  it oversees\n\n  Other (*please specify*)\n\n\n\n15.   How many members and staffers does your institution have?\n\n|    |          | Members      |     |\n|----|----------|--------------|-----|\n|    | Staffers |              |     |\n|    |          |              |     |\n\n## 16.  Who Appoints The Members Of Your Committee?\n\n(Please tick one box, or indicate if a combination of these actors is involved)\n   The head of government/state    The minister(s) responsible for the security and/or intelligence agencies\n   Parliament\n\n   Other (*please specify*):_____________________________________\n\n\n\n## 17.  Do Any Of The Following Rules Apply To Membership Of Your Committee?\n\n  Proportional representation\n  Guaranteed representation of opposition or minority parties\n  A requirement that members are not parliamentarians\n  A requirement that members are not members of political parties\n A requirement that members are not current/former members of the intelligence/security agencies\n  A requirement that members are members of the legal profession\n A requirement that the committee is chaired by a member of an opposition party\n\n  Other (please specify)\n\n\n\n## 18. (A) What Is Your Approximate Annual Budget?\n\n_______________\n\n## (B) Which Body Allocates The Budget For Your Committee?\n\n\n## Section B:  Legal Basis And Mandate 19.  What Is The Legal Basis For Your Committee?\n\n(Please select one or more of the following options and list the relevant document(s))\n  Constitution\n\n  Statute:\n\n\n\n  Executive decree:\n\n\n\n  Ministerial directive:\n\n\n\n Parliamentary rules of procedure:\n\n\n\n  Other (*please specify*):\n\n\n\n## 20. Which Security/Intelligence Agencies Does Your Committee Oversee?\n\n(Please provide the names of these institutions)\n\n\n\n## 21.  Does Your Committee Oversee The Work Of Any Joint Analysis Or Fusion Centre?\n\n  Yes\n\n              No\n\n|    |    |    |    |    |    | Please specify which bodies these are:      |     |     |     |     |     |      |     |\n|----|----|----|----|----|----|---------------------------------------------|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|------|-----|\n|    |    |    |    |    |    |                                             |     |     |     |     |     |      |     |\n|    |    |    |    |    |    |                                             |     |     |     |     |     |      |     |\n|    |    |    |    |    |    |                                             |     |     |     |     |     |      |     |\n\n22. (a) Is your committee mandated to address complaints about security/intelligence agencies from\nmembers of the public?\n Yes\n\n No\n\n\n(b) If no, which institution is responsible for this?\n\n\n23. (a)  Which  of  the  following  areas  of  the  intelligence/security  agencies'  activities  does  your\ncommittee oversee?\nPlease select all that apply\n  The policies of the agencies\n\n  Completed operations/investigations of the agencies\n  Ongoing operations/investigations of the agencies\n  The administration and management of the agencies\n The budgets and expenditure of the agencies\n\n Other\n\n\n\n(b). Which of the following criteria are used when overseeing the matters referred to in 23 (a)?\n\nPlease select all that apply\n Effectiveness\n Efficiency\n Compliance with national law\n Compliance with international law\n\n Other\n\n\n\n24. Which  of  the  following  specific  activities  of  the  security/intelligence  agencies  does  your\ncommittee oversee, and how does the committee oversee these activities?\nPlease tick all boxes which apply; if you do not oversee a particular function leave the box blank. For each of the activities you oversee please briefly explain this is done. For example, your committee may examine  these  activities  through  random  sampling  of  information  held  by  security  agencies,  by investigating complaints made about agencies, or by examining reports produced by the agencies.\n\n Collection of information using special powers (such as the interception of communications)\n\n\n\n Collection of information from open sources\n\n\n\n Use of personal data (including the processing, storage, deletion and transfer of personal data)\n\n\n\n  Sharing of information between agencies on a domestic level (e.g. between security services and  the police)\n\n\n\n  Sharing of information with foreign entities\n\n\n\n  Information sharing and cooperation agreements/memoranda of understanding signed with foreign governments and agencies\n\n\n\n Analysis of information  and production of reports (e.g. intelligence or threat estimates for policy\nmakers)\n\n\n\n  Appointments of senior staff\n\n\n\n  Appointments of agencies' oversight bodies within security and intelligence agencies (e.g. inspectors general within security agencies)\n\n\n\n Other\n\n\n\n## Section C: Investigations & Powers\n\n\n25. What can trigger an investigation by your committee into the activities of intelligence/security\nagencies?\nPlease select all options which apply\n\n A decision by the committee itself (e.g. an own initiative investigation)\n A request from the plenary of parliament\n A request from the minister(s) responsible for security and/or intelligence agencies\n A request from the head of state/government\n A request from the judiciary\n Complaints raised by members of the public\n A request from the intelligence/security agencies themselves\n\n Other (please specify)\n\n\n\n## 26.  Which Of The Following Powers Or Methods Are Available To Your Committee?\n\n Periodic meetings with senior management of agencies (e.g. annual meetings)\n Right to invite senior management to give testimony at other times\n Right to receive and review annual reports of agencies\n Right to invite external experts (e.g. academics) and members of civil society to give testimony\n Right to invite members of the public the give testimony\nSubpoena powers\n\n Subpoena intelligence/security officers to testify under oath before committee\n\n Subpoena members of the executive branch to testify under oath before committee\n  Subpoena  intelligence/security  agencies  to  provide  documents  or  other  forms  of\nevidence\n Right to inspect the premises of intelligence/security agencies\n\n Other (please specify):\n\n\n\n## Section D: Access To Classified Information\n\n\n27. Do members/staffers of your committee have access to classified information?\n\nMembers\n Yes\n\n No Staffers\n Yes\n\n No\n\n28.  Please indicate whether your committee has unlimited, restricted or no access to the categories\nof information listed in the table below.\nPlease check one box for each type of information and explain any restrictions\n\n| Type of information     | Unlimited                             | No  Access    | Restricted Access     |\n|-------------------------|---------------------------------------|---------------|-----------------------|\n| Access                  | (please briefly explain restrictions) |               |                       |\n| Security agencies'      |                                       |               |                       |\n| files and databases     |                                       |               |                       |\n|                         |                                       |               |                       |\n|                         |                                       |               |                       |\n|                         |                                       |               |                       |\n|                         |                                       |               |                       |\n| Information             | about                                 | future        |                       |\n| operations              |                                       |               |                       |\n|                         |                                       |               |                       |\n|                         |                                       |               |                       |\n|                         |                                       |               |                       |\n| Information about       |                                       |               |                       |\n| ongoing operations      |                                       |               |                       |\n|                         |                                       |               |                       |\n|                         |                                       |               |                       |\n|                         |                                       |               |                       |\n| Information about       |                                       |               |                       |\n| completed operations    |                                       |               |                       |\n|                         |                                       |               |                       |\n|                         |                                       |               |                       |\n|                         |                                       |               |                       |\n| Internal                | regulations                           | or            |                       |\n| guidelines              |                                       |               |                       |\n|                         |                                       |               |                       |\n|                         |                                       |               |                       |\n|                         |                                       |               |                       |\n\n\nMinisterial instructions/directives\nissued  to  the  security  &\nintelligence agencies\n\n\nInformation on the budget and\nthe  projected  expenditure  of\nagencies\nInformation\non\npast\nexpenditure\n\n\nAgreements\nwith\nforeign\ngovernments,  agencies,  and international organisations\nInformation received from\n\n\nother domestic agencies\nInformation\nreceived\nfrom\n\n\n| foreign                    | governments    | and    |\n|----------------------------|----------------|--------|\n| security agencies          |                |        |\n|                            |                |        |\n|                            |                |        |\n|                            |                |        |\n|                            |                |        |\n|                            |                |        |\n|                            |                |        |\n| Information                | received       | from   |\n| international              | organizations  |        |\n| (e.g.  the UN, EU or NATO) |                |        |\n|                            |                |        |\n|                            |                |        |\n|                            |                |        |\n| Other (                    | please specify | )      |\n|                            |                |        |\n|                            |                |        |\n|                            |                |        |\n|                            |                |        |\n|                            |                |        |\n\n29.  (a) Are the intelligence/security agencies or the government legally entitled to refuse requests\nfor information from your committee?\n\n Yes\n\n\n No\n\n\n## (B) Who Can Take The Decision To Refuse To Provide The Information To Your Committee?\n\n The minister(s) responsible for the security and/or intelligence agencies\n The head of state/government\n The head of the intelligence/security agencies\n  Other (please specify)\n\n\n\n## 30. (A) Does A Decision To Deny The Committee Access To Information Need To Be Justified?\n\n No\n\n\n Yes\n\n\n(b)  If  yes,  which  of  the  following  justifications  can  be  used  to  deny  access  to  requests  for information? Please tick all boxes which apply\n The requested information relates to ongoing operations\n Disclosing the information to an oversight institution could jeopardize national security\n  Disclosure  of  the  information  could  reveal  sources  and  methods  used  by  intelligence/security agencies\n  The  requested  information  was  provided  by  a  third  party  (e.g.  another  state  or  international organisation)\n Disclosure would violate the privacy of individuals concerned\n\n Other (please explain)\n\n\n\n31.  In the event that a request for information is denied, are there any procedures for challenging\nthe decision taken by the executive and/or the intelligence/security agencies?\n No\n\n Yes\nPlease explain\n\n\n\n32.  What are the most significant restrictions on your committee's access to information and what\nimpact, if any, do they have on your work?\n\n\n\n## Section E: Protecting Classified Information\n\n33. (a). Are members and staffers of your committee required to obtain security clearance\nand/or required to sign a nondisclosure agreement?\n(Select all that apply)\n\n## Members\n\n Security Clearance  Nondisclosure agreement\n\n\n## Staffers\n\n Security Clearance  Nondisclosure agreement\n\n\n## 34. Which Of The Following Measures Are Used To Protect Classified Information?\n\n Meetings are held behind closed doors  Members and staffers are only permitted to access classified information on the premises of the intelligence and security agencies.\n\n Secure reading room for committee members and staffers to view documents  Secure computer system for committee members and staffers\n\n Other(s):\n\n\n\n35. What  action  can  be  taken  against  members/staffers  of  your  committee  who  make\nunauthorized disclosures of classified information?\n\n\n\n## Section F: Reporting And FollowUp 36.  Is Your Institution Empowered To Issue:\n\n(Please check all that apply)\n  Binding orders\n  Recommendations\n\n Draft legislation or statutory amendments\n\n Other (please indicate)\n\n\n\n## 37. Who Does Your Committee Report To?\n\n(If your institution reports to more than one body please indicate the principal one)\n  Head of state/government\n  Parliament\n  The minister(s) responsible for the security and/or intelligence agencies\n  The intelligence/security agencies\n Complainants\n\n  Other: (*please specify)*\n\n\n\n## 38. Are Your Reports Made Public?\n\ni). Periodic reports\n Yes\nNo  Sometimes (*please explain*) ______________________________________________\n\n\n___________\n\nii). Reports on specific activities or events\n Yes\nNo\n Sometimes (*please explain*) ________________________________________________\n\n\n\n39. Are the institution's reports vetted and/or redacted by another institution before they are made\npublic?\n\n Yes\n\n              No\n\nIf yes, which institution(s)?\n\n\n\n## 40.  Does Your Committee Monitor The Implementation Of Its Recommendations?\n\n Yes.\n\n  No.\n\nIf yes, how is this done?\n\n\n\n41.  What action, if any, can you take if the intelligence/security agencies or the government fail to\nimplement your order and/or recommendations:\n(Please tick all boxes which apply)\n  Report nonimplementation to parliament\n  Report nonimplementation to the responsible minister(s)\n Publicise a failure to implement recommendations\n Seek to reduce an agency's budget in subsequent years\n  Seek a court order compelling compliance\n\n  Other (*please specify)*:\n\n\n\n## Section G: Challenges And Strengthening Oversight\n\n42. Please briefly outline two or three changes to your institution and/or its mandate which would\nstrengthen its capacity to perform its functions.\n\n1.\n\n\n\n2.\n\n\n\n3.\n\n\n\n43. Please identify two or three strengths of your committee.\n\n1.\n\n\n\n2.\n\n\n\n3.\n\n\n\n## Additional Comments\n\nPlease feel free to add any additional comments which you deem to be relevant.\n\n\nTHANK YOU VERY MUCH FOR TAKING THE TIME TO COMPLETE THIS QUESTIONNAIRE\n\n## Annex D: Members Of The Project Advisory Board\n\n Steven Aftergood is Project Director at the Federation of American Scientists, USA.\n\nMonica den Boer is Academic Dean at the Police Academy of the Netherlands and Professor of Comparative Public Administration at the VU University of Amsterdam.\n\n\nIain Cameron is Professor of Public International Law at Uppsala University, Sweden.\n\n\nDeirdre Curtin is Professor of European Law at the University of Amsterdam and Director of the Amsterdam Centre for European Law and Governance.\n\nPeter De Smet is a member of the Belgian Standing Intelligence Agencies Review Committee.\n\n\nPhilippe Hayez is Adjunct Professor of Intelligence Policy at the Paris School of International Affairs (PSIA), Sciences Po, Paris.\n\n\nHelga Hernes is the former Chair of the Norwegian Parliamentary Intelligence Oversight Committee (EOS-Utvalget) and is a Senior Advisor at the International Peace Research Institute (PRIO), Oslo.\n\n\nA. H. (Bert) van Delden is Chair of the Review Committee for the Intelligence and Security Services, the Netherlands.\n\n## Annex E: Authors Of The Annexed Background Studies\n\n Iain Cameron is Professor of Public International Law at Uppsala University, Sweden.\n\nAlexandra De Moor is Academic Assistant of Criminal Law and Internal member of the Institute for International Research on Criminal Policy (IRCP) at Ghent University, Belgium.\n\n\nHans De With is Chairman of the G 10 Commission of the German Bundestag.\n\n\nBruno De Witte is Professor of European law at Maastricht University, and parttime Professor at the Robert Schuman Centre of the European University Institute.\n\nFederico Fabbrini is a PhD researcher in the Law Department at the European University Institute, Italy.\n\nGabor Foldvary is Head of the Office of the State Secretary for Parliamentary Affairs of Defence, Hungary.\n\nCraig Forcese is Vice Dean and Associate Professor in the Faculty of Law\n(Common Law Section) at the University of Ottawa, Canada.\n\nTommaso F. Giupponi is Professor of Constitutional Law at the Faculty of Law, University of Bologna, Italy.\n\nJorrit J. Rijpma is Assistant Professor of EU Law at the *Europa Instituut* of Leiden University.\n\nErhard Kathmann is Ministerial Counselor in the Administration of the German Bundestag.\n\nIan Leigh is Professor at the School of Law, Durham University, UK.\n\n\nCharlotte Lepri is a Research Fellow at the Institute de Relations Internationales et Strategiques (IRIS), France.\n\n\nKate Martin is Director of the Center for National Security Studies, Washington DC, USA.\n\nNicola McGarrity is a Lecturer and Director of the Terrorism and Law Project at the Gilbert + Tobin Centre of Public Law at the University of New South Wales, Sydney, Australia.\n\n____________________________________________________________________________________________\n\nSteve Peers is Professor at the School of Law, University of Essex, UK.\n\n\nSusana Sanchez Ferro is Lecturer in Constitutional Law, Universidad Autonoma de Madrid, Spain.\n\nWauter Van Laethem is Legal Advisor to the Belgian Standing Committee I on intelligence.\n\nNick Verhoeven is the Secretary of the Intelligence and Security Services Review Committee (CTIVD) in the Netherlands.\n\nGert Vermeulen is Professor of Criminal law and Director of the Institute for International Research on Criminal Policy (IRCP) at Ghent University, Belgium."
    },
    {
        "text": "THIS PAGE LEFT INTENTIONALLY BLANK\n\n# The Department Of Defense Cyber Strategy\n\n\nApril 2015\nTHIS PAGE LEFT INTENTIONALLY BLANK\n\n\nTHE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE\n1000 DEFENSE PENTAGON\nWASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000\nWhen researchers at the Advanced Research Projects Agency first invented the precursor to the Internet in 1969, there's no way they could have imagined how their creation would change our world. What began as a tool for scientists to share information grew quickly into the global network of computers, systems, and data that we now call the Internet. An engine of innovation and wonder, today the Internet connects nearly every person on the planet, helps deliver goods and services all over the globe, and brings ideas and knowledge to those who would otherwise lack access.\n\nThe United States relies on the Internet and the systems and data of cyberspace for a wide range of critical services. This reliance leaves all of us - individuals, militaries, businesses, schools, and governments - vulnerable in the face of a real and dangerous cyber threat. As we have seen, today state and non-state actors plan to conduct disruptive and destructive cyberattacks on the networks of our critical infrastructure and steal U.S. intellectual property to undercut our technological and military advantage.\n\nWorking with other agencies of the U.S. government, the Department of Defense (DoD) is responsible for defending the U.S. homeland and US. interests from attack, including attacks that may occur in cyberspace. The purpose of this cyber strategy, the Department's second, is to guide the development of DoD's cyber forces and strengthen our cyber defense and cyber deterrence posture. It focuses on building cyber capabilities and organizations for DoD's three cyber missions: to defend DoD networks, systems, and information; defend the U.S. homeland and U.S. national interests against cyberattacks of significant consequence;\nand support operational and contingency plans.\n\nThese\n        are\n             significant\n                          responsibilities\n                                           and\n                                                 require\n                                                           focused\n                                                                     and\n                                                                           timely\n                                                                                    action\n                                                                                            by\norganizations across DoD as well as the support of other agencies of the U.S. government. A\n\ntool for management and communications, this strategy puts us on course to capitalize on\nour strengths, meet our challenges, and fulfill our missions.\n                                                                                      It therefore sets clear and\nspecific objectives for the Department to achieve over the next five years and beyond. We\nseek to be open and transparent with the American people and the world about our\ncapabilities and plans.\n\n[ am invested in the success of this strategy and I will hold the Department accountable for meeting each goal and objective. Working with our partners - in the U.S. government, the private sector, and around the world - we will move quickly and efficiently to build the capabilities we need to defend the United States and its interests in the digital age.\n\nTHIS PAGE LEFT INTENTIONALLY BLANK\nTHIS PAGE LEFT INTENTIONALLY BLANK\n\n\n We live in a wired world. Companies and countries rely on cyberspace for everything from financial transactions to the movement of military forces. Computer code blurs the line between the cyber and physical world and connects millions of objects to the Internet or private networks. Electric firms rely on industrial control systems to provide power to the grid. Shipping managers use satellites and the Internet to track freighters as they pass through global sea lanes, and the U.S. military relies on secure networks and data to carry out its missions. The United States is committed to an open, secure, interoperable, and reliable Internet that enables prosperity, public safety, and the free flow of commerce and ideas. These qualities of the Internet reflect core American values - of freedom of expression and privacy, creativity, opportunity, and innovation. And these qualities have allowed the Internet to provide social and economic value to billions of people. Within the U.S. economy alone, anywhere from three to 13 percent of business sector value-added is derived from Internet-related businesses. Over the last ten years Internet access increased by over two billion people across the globe.. Yet these same qualities of openness and dynamism that led to the Internet's rapid expansion now provide dangerous state and non-state actors with a means to undermine U.S. interests. We are vulnerable in this wired world. Today our reliance on the confidentiality, availability, and integrity of data stands in stark contrast to the inadequacy of our cybersecurity. The Internet was not originally designed with security in mind, but as an open system to allow scientists and researchers to send data to one another quickly. Without strong investments in cybersecurity and cyber defenses, data systems remain open and susceptible to rudimentary and dangerous forms of exploitation and attack. Malicious actors use cyberspace to steal data and intellectual property for their own economic or political goals. And an actor in one region of the globe can use cyber capabilities to strike directly at a network thousands of miles away, destroying data, disrupting businesses, or shutting off critical systems. State and non-state actors conduct cyber operations to achieve a variety of political, economic, or military objectives. In conducting their operations, they may strike at a nation's values as well as its interests or purposes. As one example, in November, 2014, likely in retaliation for the planned release of a satirical film, North Korea conducted a cyberattack against Sony Pictures Entertainment, rendering thousands of Sony computers inoperable and breaching Sony's confidential business information. In addition to the destructive nature of the attacks, North Korea stole digital copies of a number of unreleased movies, as well as thousands of documents containing sensitive data regarding celebrities, Sony employees, and Sony's business operations. North Korea accompanied their cyberattacks with coercion, intimidation, and the threat of terrorism. The North Korean attack on Sony was one of the most destructive cyberattacks on a U.S. entity to date. The attack further spurred an already ongoing national discussion about the nature of the cyber threat and the need for improved cybersecurity. The increased use of cyberattacks as a political instrument reflects a dangerous trend in international relations. Vulnerable data systems present state and non-state actors with an enticing opportunity to strike the United States and its interests. During a conflict, the Defense Department assumes that a potential adversary will seek to target U.S. or allied critical infrastructure and military networks to gain a strategic advantage. Beyond the attacks described above, a sophisticated actor could target an industrial control system (ICS) on a public utility to affect public safety, or enter a network to manipulate health records to affect an individual's well-being. A disruptive, manipulative, or destructive cyberattack could present a significant risk to U.S. economic and national security if lives are lost, property destroyed, policy objectives harmed, or economic interests affected. Leaders must take steps to mitigate cyber risks. Governments, companies, and organizations must carefully prioritize the systems and data that they need to protect, assess risks and hazards, and make prudent investments in cybersecurity and cyber defense capabilities to achieve their security goals and objectives. Behind these defense investments, organizations of every kind must build business continuity plans and be ready to operate in a degraded cyber environment where access to networks and data is uncertain. To mitigate risks in cyberspace requires a comprehensive strategy to counter and if necessary withstand disruptive and destructive attacks.\n\n## Defending The United States In Cyberspace\n\nIn concert with other agencies, the United States' Department of Defense (DoD) is responsible for defending the U.S. homeland and U.S. interests from attack, including attacks that may occur in cyberspace. In a manner consistent with U.S. and international law, the Department of Defense seeks to deter attacks and defend the United States against any adversary that seeks to harm U.S. national interests during times of peace, crisis, or conflict. To this end the Defense Department has developed capabilities for cyber operations and is integrating those capabilities into the full array of tools that the United States government uses to defend U.S. national interests, including diplomatic, informational, military, economic, financial, and law enforcement tools.\nThe May 2011 *Department of Defense Strategy for Operating in Cyberspace* guided the Defense Department's cyber activities and operations in support of U.S. national interests over the last four years. This new strategy sets prioritized strategic goals and objectives for DoD's cyber activities and missions to achieve over the next five years. It focuses on building capabilities for effective cybersecurity and cyber operations to defend DoD networks, systems, and information; **defend the nation against cyberattacks of significant consequence;** and support operational and contingency plans. This strategy builds on previous decisions regarding DoD's Cyber Mission Force and cyber workforce development and provides new and specific guidance to mitigate anticipated risks and capture opportunities to strengthen U.S. national security. As a matter of first principle, cybersecurity is a team effort within the U.S. Federal government. To succeed in its missions the Defense Department must operate in partnership with other Departments and Agencies, international allies and partners, state and local governments, and, most importantly, the private sector.\n\n## Cybersecurity Activities\n\nTo support its missions in cyberspace, the Defense Department conducts a range of activities outside of cyberspace to improve collective cybersecurity and protect U.S. interests. For example, the Defense Department cooperates with agencies of the U.S government, with the private sector, and with our international partners to share information, build alliances and partnerships, and foster norms of responsible behavior to improve global strategic stability.\n\n\nInformation sharing and interagency coordination. To secure and advance U.S. interests in cyberspace, DoD seeks to share information and coordinate with U.S. government agencies in an integrated fashion on a range of cyber activities. For example, if DoD learns of malicious cyber activities that will affect important U.S. networks and systems that are vital for U.S. national and economic security or public safety, DoD supports agencies like the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) as they reach out to U.S. entities, and often other countries, to share threat information such as technical indicators of a potential attack. Such information sharing can significantly improve an organization's ability to defend itself against a broad range of cyberattacks. In addition\nto\nsharing\ninformation,\nDoD\npartners with other agencies of the U.S. government to synchronize operations and to share lessons-learned and cybersecurity bestpractices. This includes incident management and network defense response.\n\n\nBuild bridges to the private sector. From application developers to Internet Services Providers, private companies provide the goods and services that make up cyberspace. The Defense Department relies on the private sector\nto\nbuild\nits\nnetworks,\nprovide\ncybersecurity services, and research and\ndevelop advanced capabilities. The Defense Department has benefited from private sector innovation throughout its history. Going forward, DoD will work closely with the private sector to validate and commercialize new ideas for cybersecurity for the Department.\n\n\n\nBuilding alliances, coalitions, and partnerships abroad. The Defense Department engages\nin a broad array of activities to improve cybersecurity and cyber operations capacity abroad. DoD helps U.S. allies and partners to understand the cyber threats they face and to build the cyber capabilities necessary to defend their networks and data. Allies and partners also often have complementary capabilities that can augment those of the United States, and the United States seeks to build strong alliances and coalitions to counter potential adversaries' cyber activities. Strategically, a unified coalition sends a message that the United States and its allies and partners are aligned in collective defense. In addition to the Five Eyes treaty partners, DoD works closely with key partners in the Middle East, the Asia-Pacific, and Europe to understand the cybersecurity environment and build cyber defense capacity.\n\n## Three Primary Missions In Cyberspace\n\nThe President has established principles and processes for governing cyber operations. The purpose of these principles and processes is to plan, develop, and use U.S. capabilities effectively, and to ensure that cyber operations occur in a manner consistent with the values that the United States promotes domestically and internationally. The Defense Department has three primary cyber missions. First, DoD must defend its own networks, systems, and information. The U.S. military's dependence on cyberspace for its operations led the Secretary of Defense in 2011 to declare cyberspace as an operational domain for purposes of organizing, training, and equipping U.S. military forces. The Defense Department must be able to secure its own networks against attack and recover quickly if security measures fail. To this end, DoD conducts network defense operations on an ongoing basis to securely operate the Department of Defense Information Network (DoDIN). If and when DoD detects indications of hostile activity within its networks, DoD has quick-response capabilities to close or mitigate vulnerabilities and secure its networks and systems. Network defense operations on DoD networks constitute the vast majority of DoD's operations in cyberspace. In addition to defense investments, DoD must prepare and be ready to operate in an environment where access to cyberspace is contested. During the Cold War, forces prepared to operate in an environment where access to communications could be interrupted by the adversary's advanced capabilities, to include the potential use of an electromagnetic pulse that could disrupt satellite and other global communications capabilities. Commanders conducted periodic exercises that required their teams to operate without access to communications systems. Through years of practice and exercise, a culture of resilience took root in the military and units were ready and prepared to operate in contested environments. Since the end of the Cold War, however, a younger generation has grown increasingly more accustomed to an environment of connectivity. The generation of military men and women that grew up since the end of the Cold War have had near constant access to information and communications, and the information revolution has led to a more agile and globally adaptive force.  In the face of an escalating cyber threat, the lessons of the previous generations must now be passed down. The Defense Department must be able to carry out its missions to defend the country. Organizations must exercise and learn to operate without the tools that have become such a vital part of their daily lives and operations. For its second mission, DoD must be prepared to defend the United States and its interests against cyberattacks of significant consequence. While cyberattacks are assessed on a case-by-case and factspecific basis by the President and the U.S. national security team, significant consequences may include loss of life, significant damage to property, serious adverse U.S. foreign policy consequences, or serious economic impact on the United States. If directed by the President or the Secretary of Defense, the U.S. military may conduct cyber operations to counter an imminent or on-going attack against the U.S. homeland or U.S. interests in cyberspace. The purpose of such a defensive measure is to blunt an attack and prevent the destruction of property or the loss of life. DoD seeks to synchronize its capabilities with other government agencies to develop a range of options and methods for disrupting cyberattacks of significant consequence before they can have an impact, to include law enforcement, intelligence, and diplomatic tools. As a matter of principle, the United States will seek to exhaust all network defense and law enforcement options to mitigate any potential cyber risk to the U.S. homeland or U.S. interests before conducting a cyberspace operation. The United States government has a limited and specific role to play in defending the nation against cyberattacks of significant consequence. The private sector owns and operates over ninety percent of all of the networks and infrastructure of cyberspace and is thus the first line of defense. One of the most important steps for improving the United States' overall cybersecurity posture is for companies to prioritize the networks and data that they must protect and to invest in improving their own cybersecurity. While the U.S. government must prepare to defend the country against the most dangerous attacks, the majority of intrusions can be stopped through relatively basic cybersecurity investments that companies can and must make themselves. Third, if directed by the President or the Secretary of Defense, DoD must be able to provide integrated cyber capabilities to support military operations and contingency plans. There may be times when the President or the Secretary of Defense may determine that it would be appropriate for the U.S. military to conduct cyber operations to disrupt an adversary's militaryrelated networks or infrastructure so that the U.S. military can protect U.S. interests in an area of operations. For example, the United States military might use cyber operations to terminate an ongoing conflict on U.S. terms, or to disrupt an adversary's military systems to prevent the use of force against U.S. interests. United States Cyber Command (USCYBERCOM) may also be directed to conduct cyber operations, in coordination with other U.S. government agencies as appropriate, to deter or defeat strategic threats in other domains.\nTo ensure that the Internet remains open, secure, and prosperous, the United States will always conduct cyber operations under a doctrine of restraint, as required to protect human lives and to prevent the destruction of property. As in other domains of operations, in cyberspace the Defense Department will always act in a way that reflects enduring U.S. values, including support for the rule of law, as well as respect and protection of the freedom of expression and privacy, the free flow of information, commerce, and ideas. Any decision to conduct cyber operations outside of DoD networks is made with the utmost care and deliberation and under strict policy and operational oversight, and in accordance with the law of armed conflict.  As it makes its investments and builds cyber capabilities to defend U.S. national interests, the Defense Department will always be attentive to the potential impact of defense policies on state and non-state actors' behavior.\n\n## A New Cyber Mission Force\n\nThe Defense Department requires the commitment and coordination of multiple leaders and communities across DoD and the broader U.S. government to carry out its missions and execute this strategy. Defense Department law enforcement, intelligence, counterintelligence, and policy organizations all have an active role, as do the men and women that build and operate DoD's networks and information technology systems. Every organization needs to play its part. For example, network service providers across DoD must be adaptive and active to follow cybersecurity best-practices and cyber defense orders. U.S. Cyber Command must synchronize its activities with other DoD organizations, particularly combatant commands, to respond to emerging challenges and opportunities. Installation owners and operators must partner with the Military Departments' Computer Emergency Response Teams (CERTs), DHS, and USCYBERCOM to build adaptive defenses and continuity plans for mission-critical systems and the civil systems that support them. Success requires creative and strong intra-Departmental and interagency partnerships. Among DoD's cyber personnel and forces, the Cyber Mission Force (CMF) has a unique role within the Department. In 2012, DoD began to build a CMF to carry out DoD's cyber missions. Once fully operational, the CMF will include nearly 6,200 military, civilian, and contractor support personnel from across the military departments and defense components. The Cyber Mission Force represents a major investment by the Department of Defense and the United States as whole, and a central aim of this strategy is to set specific goals and objectives to guide the development of the Cyber Mission Force and DoD's wider cyber workforce to protect and defend U.S. national interests. The Cyber Mission Force will be comprised of cyber operators organized into 133 teams, primarily aligned as follows: Cyber Protection Forces will augment traditional defensive measures and defend priority DoD networks and systems against priority threats; National Mission Forces and their associated support teams will defend the United States and its interests against cyberattacks of significant consequence; and Combat Mission Forces and their associated support teams will support combatant commands by generating integrated cyberspace effects in support of operational plans and contingency operations. Combatant commands integrate Combat Mission Forces and Cyber Protection Teams into plans and operations and employ them in cyberspace, while the National Mission Force operates under the Commander of USCYBERCOM.  Outside of this construct, teams can also be used to support other missions as required by the Department.\nIn 2013 the Department began to integrate the CMF into the larger multi-mission U.S. military force to achieve synergy across domains, assure the CMF's readiness within the force, and restructure the military and civilian workforce and infrastructure to execute DoD's missions. During the course of implementing this strategy, DoD will continue to build the CMF, and will continue to mature the necessary command, control, and enabling organizations required for effective operations. DoD will focus on ensuring that its forces are trained and ready to operate using the capabilities and architectures they need to conduct cyber operations, continue to build policy and legal frameworks to govern CMF employment, and integrate the CMF into DoD's overall planning and force development. This strategy recognizes that effective cybersecurity will require close collaboration within DoD and across the federal government, with industry, with international allies and partners, and with state and local governments. The pursuit of security in cyberspace requires a whole-of-government and international approach due to the number and variety of stakeholders in the domain, the flow of information across international borders, and the distribution of responsibilities, authorities, and capabilities across governments and the private sector. For each of DoD's missions, DoD must continue to develop routine relationships and processes for coordinating its cyber operations. Specific risks and opportunities inform this new strategy. For example, DoD's own network is a patchwork of thousands of networks across the globe, and DoD lacks the visibility and organizational structure required to defend its diffuse networks effectively. The Defense Department must further develop adequate warning intelligence of adversary intentions and capabilities for conducting destructive and disruptive cyberattacks against DoD and the United States. Beyond its own networks, DoD relies on civil critical infrastructure across the United States and overseas for its operations, yet the cybersecurity of such critical infrastructure is uncertain. To mitigate these and other risks and improve U.S. national security, this strategy sets strategic goals for the Department to achieve, and prescribes objectives and metrics for meeting each goal. All of the goals and objectives within this strategy reflect the goals of the 2015 United States *National Security Strategy* and the 2014 *Quadrennial Defense Review*.\n\n## Dod Sets Five Strategic Goals For Its Cyberspace Missions:\n\n1. Build and maintain ready forces and capabilities to conduct cyberspace operations;\n\n2. Defend the DoD information network, secure DoD data, and mitigate risks to DoD\nmissions;\n\n3. Be prepared to defend the U.S. homeland and U.S. vital interests from disruptive or\ndestructive cyberattacks of significant consequence;\n\n4. Build and maintain viable cyber options and plan to use those options to control conflict\nescalation and to shape the conflict environment at all stages;\n\n5. Build and maintain robust international alliances and partnerships to deter shared threats\nand increase international security and stability.\n\nKey Cyber Threats From 2013-2015, the Director of National Intelligence named the cyber threat as the number one strategic threat to the United States, placing it ahead of terrorism for the first time since the attacks of September 11, 2001. Potential state and non-state adversaries conduct malicious cyber activities against U.S. interests globally and in a manner intended to test the limits of what the United States and the international community will tolerate. Actors may penetrate U.S. networks and systems for a variety of reasons, such as to steal intellectual property, disrupt an organization's operations for activist purposes, or to conduct disruptive and destructive attacks to achieve military objectives. Potential adversaries have invested significantly in cyber as it provides them with a viable, plausibly deniable capability to target the U.S. homeland and damage U.S. interests. Russia and China have developed advanced cyber capabilities and strategies. Russian actors are stealthy in their cyber tradecraft and their intentions are sometimes difficult to discern. China steals intellectual property (IP) from global businesses to benefit Chinese companies and undercut U.S. competitiveness. While Iran and North Korea have less developed cyber capabilities, they have displayed an overt level of hostile intent towards the United States and U.S. interests in cyberspace. In addition to state-based threats, non-state actors like the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) use cyberspace to recruit fighters and disseminate propaganda and have declared their intent to acquire disruptive and destructive cyber capabilities. Criminal actors pose a considerable threat in cyberspace, particularly to financial institutions, and ideological groups often use hackers to further their political objectives.  State and non-state threats often also blend together; patriotic entities often act as cyber surrogates for states, and non-state entities can provide cover for state-based operators. This behavior can make attribution more difficult and increases the chance of miscalculation.\n\n## Malware Proliferation\n\nThe global proliferation of malicious code or software (\"malware\") increases the risk to U.S. networks and data. To conduct a disruptive or destructive cyber operation against a military system or industrial control system requires expertise, but a potential adversary need not spend billions of dollars to develop an offensive capability. A nation-state, non-state group, or individual actor can purchase destructive malware and other capabilities on the black market. State and non-state actors also pay experts to search for vulnerabilities and develop exploits. This practice has created a dangerous and uncontrolled market that serves multiple actors within the international system, often for competing purposes.  As cyber capabilities become more readily available over time, the Department of Defense assesses that state and non-state actors will continue to seek and develop cyber capabilities to use against U.S. interests. Risk to DoD Networks and Infrastructure The Defense Department's own networks and systems are vulnerable to intrusions and attacks. In addition to DoD's own networks, a cyberattack on the critical infrastructure and key resources on which DoD relies for its operations could impact the U.S. military's ability to operate in a contingency. DoD has made gains in identifying cyber vulnerabilities of its own critical assets through its Mission Assurance Program - for many key assets, DoD has identified its physical network infrastructure on which key physical assets depend - but more must be done to secure DoD's cyber infrastructure. In addition to destructive and disruptive attacks, cyber actors steal operational information and intellectual property from a range of U.S. government and commercial entities that impact the Defense Department. Victims include weapons developers as well as commercial firms that support force movements through U.S. Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM). State actors have stolen DoD's intellectual property to undercut the United States' strategic and technological advantage and to benefit their own military and economic development. Finally, the Defense Department faces a risk from the U.S. government's continued budgetary uncertainty.  Although DoD has prioritized the allocation of resources in its budget to develop cyber capabilities, continued fiscal uncertainty requires that DoD plan to build its cyber capabilities under a declining overall defense budget. DoD must continue to prioritize its cyber investments and develop the capabilities required to defend U.S. interests at home and overseas.\n\n## Deterrence In The Future Security Environment\n\nIn the face of an escalating threat, the Department of Defense must contribute to the development and implementation of a comprehensive cyber deterrence strategy to deter key state and non-state actors from conducting cyberattacks against U.S. interests. Because of the variety and number of state and non-state cyber actors in cyberspace and the relative availability of destructive cyber tools, an effective deterrence strategy requires a range of policies and capabilities to affect a state or non-state actors' behavior. As DoD builds its Cyber Mission Force and overall capabilities, DoD assumes that the deterrence of cyberattacks on U.S. interests will not be achieved through the articulation of cyber policies alone, but through the totality of U.S. actions, including declaratory policy, substantial indications and warning capabilities, defensive posture, effective response procedures, and the overall resiliency of U.S. networks and systems. The deterrence of state and non-state groups in cyberspace will thus require the focused attention of multiple U.S. government departments and agencies. The Department of Defense has a number of specific roles to play in this equation.\nDeterrence is partially a function of perception. It works by convincing a potential adversary that it will suffer unacceptable costs if it conducts an attack on the United States, and by decreasing the likelihood that a potential adversary's attack will succeed. The United States must be able to declare or display effective *response* capabilities to deter an adversary from initiating an attack; develop effective defensive capabilities to *deny* a potential attack from succeeding; and strengthen the overall *resilience* of U.S. systems to withstand a potential attack if it penetrates the United States' defenses. In addition, the United States requires strong intelligence, forensics, and indications and warning capabilities to reduce anonymity in cyberspace and increase confidence in attribution.\n\n\nResponse: The United States has been clear that it will respond to a cyberattack on U.S. interests through its defense capabilities. The United States has articulated this declaratory policy in the 2011 United States *International Strategy for Cyberspace*, in the Department of Defense Cyberspace Policy Report to Congress of 2011, and through public statements by the President and the Secretary of Defense.  The United States will continue to respond to cyberattacks against U.S. interests at a time, in a manner, and in a place of our choosing, using appropriate instruments of U.S. power and in accordance with applicable law.\n\n\nDenial: While DoD has made progress in building the Cyber Mission Force, DoD must increase its defensive capabilities to defend DoD networks and defend the nation from sophisticated cyberattacks, and must work with other departments, agencies,\ninternational\nallies\nand\npartners, and the private sector to strengthen deterrence by denial through improved cybersecurity.\n\n\nResilience:\nBecause\nthe\nDefense\nDepartment's\ncapabilities\ncannot\nnecessarily\nguarantee\nthat\nevery\ncyberattack will be denied successfully, the Defense Department must invest in resilient and redundant systems so that it may continue its operations in the face of disruptive or destructive cyberattacks on DoD networks. The Defense Department cannot, however, foster resilience in organizations that fall outside of its authority. In order for resilience to succeed as a factor in effective deterrence, other agencies of the government must work with critical infrastructure owners and operators and the private sector more broadly to develop resilient and redundant systems that can withstand a potential attack. Effective resilience measures can help convince potential adversaries of the futility of commencing cyberattacks on U.S. networks and systems.\nAttribution is a fundamental part of an effective cyber deterrence strategy as anonymity enables malicious cyber activity by state and non-state groups. On matters of intelligence, attribution, and warning, DoD and the intelligence community have invested significantly in all source collection, analysis, and dissemination capabilities, all of which reduce the anonymity of state and non-state actor activity in cyberspace. Intelligence and attribution capabilities help to unmask an actor's cyber persona, identify the attack's point of origin, and determine tactics, techniques, and procedures.  Attribution enables the Defense Department or other agencies to conduct response and denial operations against an incoming cyberattack.\nPublic and private attribution can play a significant role in dissuading cyber actors from conducting attacks in the first place. The Defense Department will continue to collaborate closely with the private sector and other agencies of the U.S. government to strengthen attribution. This work will be especially important for deterrence as activist groups, criminal organizations, and other actors acquire advanced cyber capabilities over time. Finally, cyber capabilities present state and non-state actors with the ability to strike at U.S. interests in a manner that may or may not necessarily warrant a purely military response by the United States, but which may nonetheless present a significant threat to U.S. national security and may warrant a non-military response of some kind. In response to certain attacks and intrusions, the United States may undertake diplomatic actions, take law enforcement actions, and consider economic sanctions. For example, the United States used verifiable and attributable data to engage China about the risks posed by its economic espionage. The attribution of this data allowed the United States to express concerns regarding the impact of Chinese intellectual property theft on U.S. economic competitiveness, and the potential risks posed to strategic stability by Chinese activity. Because they broke the law and to deter China from conducting future cyber espionage, the Justice Department indicted five members of the People's Liberation Army for stealing U.S. intellectual property to directly benefit Chinese companies. The Defense Department will support the Justice Department and other agencies in exploring new tools and capabilities to help deter such activity in cyberspace.\n\n\n## Iii. Strategic Goals To Mitigate Risks And Defend U.S. Interests In The Current And Future Security Environment, The Defense Department Outlines Five Strategic Goals And Specific Objectives For Its Activities And Missions. Strategic Goal I: Build And Maintain Ready Forces And Capabilities To Conduct Cyberspace Operations. To Operate Effectively In Cyberspace, Dod Requires Forces And Personnel That Are Trained To The Highest Standard, Ready, And Equipped With Best-In-Class Technical Capabilities. In 2013 Dod Initiated A Major Investment In Its Cyber Personnel And Technologies By Initiating The Cmf; Now Dod Must Make Good On That Investment By Training Its People, Building Effective Organizations And Command And Control Systems, And Fully Developing The Capabilities That Dod Requires To Operate In Cyberspace. This Strategy Sets Specific Objectives For Dod To Meet As It Mans, Trains, And Equips Its Forces And Personnel Over The Next Five Years And Beyond. Strategic Goal Ii: Defend The Dod Information Network, Secure Dod Data, And Mitigate Risks To Dod Missions. While Dod Cannot Defend Every Network And System Against Every Kind Of Intrusion - Dod's Total Network Attack Surface Is Too Large To Defend Against All Threats And Too Vast To Close All Vulnerabilities - Dod Must Take Steps To Identify, Prioritize, And Defend Its Most Important Networks And Data So That It Can Carry Out Its Missions Effectively. Dod Must Also Plan And Exercise To Operate Within A Degraded And Disrupted Cyber Environment In The Event That An Attack On Dod's Networks And Data Succeeds, Or If Aspects Of The Critical Infrastructure On Which Dod Relies For Its Operational And Contingency Plans Are Disrupted. Finally, Dod Must Raise The Bar On Technology And Innovation To Stay Ahead Of The Threat By Enhancing Its Cyber Defense Capabilities, Including By Building And Employing A More Defendable Network Architecture In The Joint Information Environment (Jie). Outside Of Dod Networks, Dod Must Work With The Private Sector To Help Secure Defense Industrial Base Trade Data, And Be Prepared To Assist Other Agencies In Hardening U.S. Networks And Data Against Cyberattacks And Cyber Espionage. Strategic Goal Iii: Be Prepared To Defend The U.S. Homeland And U.S. Vital Interests From Disruptive Or Destructive Cyberattacks Of Significant Consequence.\n\nThe Department of Defense must work with its interagency partners, the private sector, and allied and partner nations to deter and if necessary defeat a cyberattack of significant consequence on the U.S. homeland and U.S.\n\ninterests.\n\nThe Defense Department must develop its intelligence, warning, and operational capabilities to mitigate sophisticated, malicious cyberattacks before they can impact U.S. interests. Consistent with all applicable laws and policies, DoD requires granular, detailed, predictive, and actionable intelligence about global networks and systems, adversary capabilities, and malware brokers and markets. To defend the nation, DoD must build partnerships with other agencies of the government to prepare to conduct combined cyber operations to deter and if necessary defeat aggression in cyberspace. The Defense Department is focused on building the capabilities, processes, and plans necessary to succeed in this mission.\n\n## Strategic Goal Iv: Build And Maintain Viable Cyber Options And Plan To Use Those Options To Control Conflict Escalation And To\n\nSHAPE THE CONFLICT ENVIRONMENT AT ALL STAGES. During heightened tensions or outright hostilities, DoD must be able to provide the President with a wide range of options for managing conflict escalation. If directed, DoD should be able to use cyber operations to disrupt an adversary's command and control networks, military-related critical infrastructure, and weapons capabilities. As a part of the full range of tools available to the United States, DoD must develop viable cyber options and integrate those options into Departmental plans. DoD will develop cyber capabilities to achieve key security objectives with precision, and to minimize loss of life and destruction of property. To ensure unity of effort, DoD will enable combatant commands to plan and synchronize cyber operations with kinetic operations across all domains of military operations.\n\n## Strategic Goal V: Build And Maintain Robust International Alliances And Partnerships To Deter Shared Threats And Increase\n\nINTERNATIONAL SECURITY AND STABILITY.\n\n\nAll three of DoD's cyber missions require close collaboration with foreign allies and partners. In its international cyber engagement DoD seeks to build partnership capacity in cybersecurity and cyber defense, and to deepen operational partnerships where appropriate. Given the high demand and relative scarcity of cyber resources, the Department of Defense must make hard choices and focus its partnership capacity initiatives on areas where vital U.S. national interests are stake. Over the next five years, in addition to ongoing partner capacity building efforts in other regions, DoD will focus its international engagement on: the Middle East, the Asia-Pacific, and key NATO allies. Through the course of this strategy DoD will constantly assess the international environment and develop innovative partnerships to respond to emerging challenges and opportunities.\n\nTHIS PAGE LEFT INTENTIONALLY BLANK\n\n\n## Iv. Implementation Objectives Each Of Dod's Strategic Goals Requires Specific, Measurable Objectives For The Department To Achieve. The Office Of The Principal Cyber Advisor To The Secretary Of Defense, The Office Of The Under Secretary Of Defense For Acquisition, Technology, And Logistics, And The Joint Staff Will Work With Dod Components To Prioritize And Oversee The Implementation Of This Strategy And Its Objectives And To Assign Offices Of Primary And Support Responsibility For Managing Each Objective. The Office Of Primary Responsibility Will Develop A Project Plan For Each Objective; The Principal Cyber Advisor Will Track Progress In Achieving Each Objective And Ultimately The Success Of Each Strategic Goal. Strategic Goal I: Build And Maintain Ready Forces And Capabilities To Conduct Cyberspace Operations.\n\n\nBuild the cyber workforce. To make good on DoD's significant investment in cyber personnel, and to help achieve many of the objectives in this strategy, DoD's first priority is to develop a ready Cyber Mission Force and associated cyber workforce. This workforce will be built on three foundational pillars: enhanced training; improved military and civilian recruitment and retention; and stronger private sector support.\n\no *Maintain a persistent training environment.* DoD requires an individual and collective\ntraining capability to achieve the goals outlined in this strategy and to meet future operational requirements. U.S. Cyber Command will work with other components, agencies, and military departments to define the requirements for and create a training environment that will enable the total cyber force to conduct joint training (including exercises and mission rehearsals), experimentation, certification, as well as the assessment and development of cyber capabilities and tactics, techniques, and procedures for missions that cross boundaries and networks.\n\no *Build viable career paths.* Throughout the course of this strategy, and following the\nCMF decisions of 2013, DoD will continue to foster viable career paths for all military personnel performing and supporting cyber operations.\n\no *Draw on the National Guard and Reserve.* Throughout the course of this strategy, DoD\nwill draw on the National Guard and Reserve Components as a resource for expertise and to foster creative solutions to cybersecurity problems. The Reserve Component offers a unique capability for supporting each of DoD's missions, including for engaging the defense industrial base and the commercial sector. It represents DoD's critical surge capacity for cyber responders.\n\no *Improve civilian recruitment and retention.* In addition to developing highly-skilled\nmilitary personnel, DoD must recruit and retain highly-skilled civilian personnel, including technical personnel for its total cyber workforce. Civilians must follow a welldeveloped career development and advancement track and be provided with best-inclass opportunities to develop and succeed within the workforce.\no *Develop and implement exchange programs with the private sector.* To supplement\nDoD's civilian cyber workforce, DoD must be able to employ technical subject matter experts from the best cybersecurity and information technology companies in the country to perform unique engineering and analytic roles within DoD. The Defense Department will implement successful private sector exchange programs to bring measurable benefits to the Department of Defense through the design and development of new operational concepts for DoD's cyberspace missions.\no *Support the National Initiative for Cyberspace Education.* DoD will develop policies to\nsupport the National Initiative for Cybersecurity Education. Working with interagency partners, one or more educational institutions, as well as state and private sector partners, DoD will continue to support innovative workforce development partnerships focused on both the technical and policy dimensions of cybersecurity and cyber defense.\n\n\nBuild technical capabilities for cyber operations. In 2013, DoD developed a model for achieving CMF readiness and for developing viable cyber military options to present to the President and Secretary of Defense. DoD must have the technical tools available to conduct operations in support of combatant command missions. Key initiatives include the following:\n\no *Develop the Unified Platform.*  On the basis of planning requirements, DoD will\ndevelop the detailed requirements for integrating disparate cyber platforms and building an interoperable and extendable network of cyber capabilities. This Unified Platform will enable the CMF to conduct full-spectrum cyberspace operations in support of national requirements.\n\no *Accelerate research and development.* The Defense Department will continue to\naccelerate innovative cyber research and development to build cyber capabilities. The\nDoD research and development community as well as established and emerging private sector partners can provide DoD and the nation with a significant advantage in developing leap-ahead technologies to defend U.S. interests in cyberspace. In addition to supporting current and planned investments, DoD will focus its basic and applied research agenda on developing cyber capabilities to expand the capacity of the CMF and the broader DoD cyber workforce.\n\n\n\nValidate and continually refine an adaptive command and control mechanism for cyber operations. DoD has made significant progress in recent years in developing command and control for all three of its missions, but its command and control model must be finalized, resourced, and tested to ensure effectiveness. The command and control model must support USCYBERCOM and the combatant commands.  It must be efficient and practical, and must promote unity of effort of effort across all three cyber missions.\n\nEstablish an enterprise-wide cyber modeling and simulation capability. DoD will work in collaboration with the intelligence community to develop the data schema, databases, algorithms, and modeling and simulation (M&S) capabilities necessary to assess the effectiveness of cyber operations.\n\nAssess Cyber Mission Force capacity. Assess the capacity of the projected Cyber Mission\nForce\nto\nachieve\nits\nmission\nobjectives when confronted with multiple contingencies.\no The Joint Staff, with support from\nUSCYBERCOM\nand\nother\nDoD\ncomponents,\nwill\npropose,\ncollect,\nanalyze, and report a set of appropriate metrics to the Principal Cyber Advisor to measure the operational capacity of the CMF. These metrics will include updates on\nthe\nstatus\nof\nUSCYBERCOM\ncontingency\ncapabilities,\nto\ninclude\ncapability development and proficiency as well as accesses and tools that may be required in a contingency. In response to this analysis, DoD will develop a plan for ensuring that the CMF has the appropriate capacity and flexibility available to respond to changes in the strategic environment.\n\n## Strategic Goal Ii: Defend The Dod Information Network, Secure Dod Data, And Mitigate Risks To Dod Missions.\n\n\nBuild the Joint Information Environment (JIE) single security architecture. The Defense Department will build DoD information networks to meet the JIE's single security\narchitecture. The single security architecture will adapt and evolve to mitigate cyber threats; it will help DoD to develop and follow best-in-class cybersecurity practices, and its small network footprint will allow USCYBERCOM, combatant commands, and DoD components to maintain comprehensive situational awareness of network threats and mitigations.\n\n\no The JIE's single security architecture will enable a robust network defense and shift the\nfocus from protecting service-specific networks and systems to securing the DoD enterprise in a unified manner. The JIE's single security architecture must be developed with enhanced cyber situational awareness, deployed in response to validated requirements, and able to accommodate future defensive measures.\no As a part of JIE planning DoD will develop a framework for developing and integrating\nnew defensive techniques into DoD's cybersecurity architecture, to include anomalybased detection capabilities, data analytics to identify vulnerabilities and threats, and advanced encryption methods.\n\n\nAssess and ensure the effectiveness of the Joint Force Headquarters for DoD information network (DoDIN) operations. Operating under USCYBERCOM, the Joint Force Headquarters-DoDIN will coordinate network defense and mitigate cyber risks to DoD operations and missions across the defense enterprise. DoD will assess, validate, and fully implement the Joint Force Headquarters-DoDIN concept to operate DoD networks securely, defend DoD networks, and mitigate cyber risks to DoD missions.\n\n\nMitigate known vulnerabilities. The Defense Department will implement a capability to mitigate all known vulnerabilities that present a high risk to DoD networks and data. In addition to zero-day vulnerabilities, one of the greatest threats to DoD networks and systems lies in known, high-risk vulnerabilities that potential adversaries can exploit. DoD often finds itself rushing to close vulnerabilities once an adversary has penetrated a system. The DoD Chief Information Officer (CIO) will lead an effort to implement an automated patch management capability to distribute software and configuration patches, updates, and fixes to mitigate known, major vulnerabilities on DoD networks and systems against threats.\n\nAssess DoD's cyber defense forces. The Defense Department will assess its cyber defense forces' ability to conduct integrated, adaptive, and dynamic defensive operations. Enterprise-level and Cyber Protection Team (CPT) network defenders must be able to discover, detect, analyze, and mitigate threats and vulnerabilities to defend the DoD information network.\n\nImprove the effectiveness of the current DoD Computer Network Defense Service Provider (CNDSP) construct in defending and protecting DoD networks. Computer network defense service providers deliver cybersecurity solutions for DoD networks, to include monitoring, detection, and protection capabilities. The Defense Department will determine whether current CNDSP processes are sufficient to defend networks against known and projected threats in cyberspace and whether current CNDSP forces are adequately trained and equipped to defend against advanced threats. Finally, DoD will\ndetermine whether its CNDSP forces can integrate into the broader cyberspace command and control construct and how that integrated construct will perform in the face of cyber threats that span CNDSP and CPT protected networks and data.\n\n\n\nPlan for network defense and resilience. The Defense Department must identify and plan to defend the networks that support key DoD missions. The Department must make a careful assessment of the priority assets that it must defend in cyberspace to assure DoD missions and exercise to defend those assets effectively.\no *Integrate cyber into mission assurance assessments.* The Defense Department will\nintegrate cybersecurity requirements and assessments into the DoD Mission Assurance program and update DoD policy appropriately. Currently DoD components take varying approaches to measuring and assessing\ncyber\nrisks\nfor\nmission\nassurance. DoD will develop a Joint Mission Assurance Assessment Program that\nincludes\nthe\nintegration\nof\ncybersecurity assessments, cybersecurity requirements, and cyber operations' requirements.\no Assess Cyber Protection Team (CPT)\ncapabilities. DoD will complete an assessment of CPT capacity, capability, and employment model in regard to mission assurance priorities as set by combatant command requirements.\n\no *Improve weapons systems cybersecurity.* DoD will assess and initiate improvements to\nthe cybersecurity of current and future weapons systems, doing so on the basis of operational requirements. For all future weapons systems that DoD will acquire or procure, DoD will mandate specific cybersecurity standards for weapons systems to meet. Acquisition and procurement policy and practice will be updated to promote effective cybersecurity throughout a system's life cycle.\no *Build and exercise continuity plans.* All DoD components will identify and build\nresiliency plans to maintain continuity of their most critical operations in the event of network disruption and degradation. Military campaign plans must fully incorporate the ability to operate in a degraded cyber environment; military forces must exercise and be able to conduct military campaigns in a degraded cyber environment where access to networks and data is uncertain. Components must balance cyber risks effectively to ensure that they can continue to carry out their missions in the physical world.\n\n\nRed team DoD's network defenses. The Defense Department has developed mature red team capabilities to test vital networks and mission systems for vulnerabilities and to better\nprepare its cyber defense forces. Going forward, DoD must focus its red team capabilities on priority networks and mission systems to assure DoD's ability to carry out its most critical missions. As a part of this work, every major DoD exercise should include a cyber red team to test DoD's cyber defenses in a realistic scenario where the Department could have its operations disrupted by an adversary. Components will be audited regularly to ensure progress in incorporating red team findings and improving their cybersecurity posture.\n\n\n\nMitigate the risk of insider threats. The nation's defense depends upon the fidelity of those entrusted with the nation's secrets. The Defense Department has invested in the technological and personnel solutions necessary to identify threats before they can impact U.S. national security. The Defense Department continues to deploy and implement these solutions through continuous network monitoring, improved cybersecurity training for the workforce, and improved methods for identifying, reporting, and tracking suspicious behavior.\n\n\no This work extends beyond information technology and includes matters of personnel\nand reliability. Mitigating the insider threat requires good leadership and accountability throughout the workforce. Beyond implementing policies and protocols, leaders will strive to create a culture of awareness to anticipate, detect, and respond to insider threats before they have an impact.\n\nExercise to provide Defense Support of Civil Authorities. Under its existing and planned force structure, DoD will develop a framework and exercise its Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA) capabilities in support of DHS and other agencies and with state and local authorities to help defend the federal government and the private sector in an emergency if directed.\n\n\no DoD's annual exercise program, to include Cyber Guard, will include exercising with\nDHS and the FBI for contingencies that may require emergency allocation of forces to\nhelp\nprotect\ncritical\ninfrastructure,\nunder\npartner agencies' lead. This framework will describe how combatant commands and combat support agencies can partner with DHS and FBI and other agencies to improve integration, training and support.\n\nDefine and refine the National Guard's\n\nrole\n        in\n              supporting\n                              law\n                                     enforcement,\n\nHomeland Defense, and Defense Support of\nCivil Authorities missions. DoD will work\nwith the National Guard to define the\ncoordinate, train, advise, and assist (C/TAA)\nroles of the National Guard force and refine\nimplementation through Cyber Guard 16-1.\nUnder its existing and planned force structure,\n\nNational Guard forces will exercise to coordinate, train, advise, and assist state and local agencies and domestic critical infrastructure and to provide support to law enforcement, Homeland Defense, and Defense Support of Civil Authorities activities in support of national objectives.\n\n\n\nImprove accountability and responsibility for the protection of data across DoD and the DIB. The Defense Department will ensure that policies and any associated federal rules or contract language requirements have been implemented to require DIB companies to report data theft and loss to the Defense Cyber Crime Center.\n\no DoD will continue to assess Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement\n(DFARS) rules and associated guidance to ensure they mature over time in a manner consistent with known standards for protecting data from cyber adversaries, to include standards promulgated by the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST).\n\no DoD will continue to expand companies' participation in threat information sharing\nprograms, such as the Cyber Security/Information Assurance program.\n\no As the certification authority for DIB cleared defense contractor sites, the Defense\nSecurity Service will expand education and training programs to include material for DoD personnel and DIB contractors to enhance their cyber threat awareness.\no In addition, the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence will review the\nsufficiency of current classification guidance for critical acquisition and technology programs to protect information on contractor networks.\n\n\nStrengthen DoD's procurement and acquisition cybersecurity standards. To defend DoD networks, DoD must strengthen the cybersecurity requirements of DoD's network acquisition and procurement items by integrating cybersecurity standards into contract vehicles for research, development, and procurement. DoD will specify additional cybersecurity standards for industry to meet for components of any DoD procurement item.\n\nBuild collaboration between the acquisition, intelligence, counterintelligence, law enforcement, and operations communities to prevent, mitigate, and respond to data loss. DoD will establish a Joint Acquisition Protection and Exploitation Cell (JAPEC) to link intelligence, counterintelligence, and law enforcement agents with acquisition program managers to prevent and mitigate data loss and theft. DoD will conduct comprehensive risk and damage assessments of cyber espionage and theft to inform requirements, acquisition, programmatic, and counterintelligence courses of action.\no The DoD CIO, in collaboration with the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for\nAcquisition, Technology, and Logistics, will assess and update specific information system security controls that underpin the DFARs for defense contractors within the NIST and DFARS standards.\n\n\no To safeguard critical programs and technologies DoD will work with companies to\ndevelop alert capabilities and build layered cyber defenses.\no Finally, the Defense Cyber Crime Center, the Principal Cyber Advisor to the Secretary of\nDefense, and the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics will collaborate with the Services' Damage Assessment Management Offices to streamline risk and damage assessment processes to better inform decisions to maintain, modify, or cancel penetrated programs.\n\nUse DoD counterintelligence capabilities to defend against intrusions. The Military Departments and the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence, in consultation with the Principal Cyber Advisor, will develop a strategy for the Secretary of Defense's approval that maximizes the capabilities and authorities of the military departments' counterintelligence agencies to identify, attribute, and defend against cyber intruders.\n\n\no Counterintelligence authorities are uniquely positioned to improve our insight into and\nfrustrate and defeat cyber espionage. The strategy will specify how DoD's counterintelligence agencies will collaborate more effectively with the broader U.S. intelligence and law enforcement communities on investigations and human and technical operations to thwart cyber-enabled intellectual property theft against the United States and its allies and partners.\n\n\n\nSupport whole-of-government policies and capabilities to counter intellectual property theft. The Defense Department will continue to work with other agencies of the U.S. government to counter the threat posed by intellectual property theft through cyberspace.\n\n## Strategic Goal Iii: Be Prepared To Defend The U.S. Homeland And U.S. Vital Interests From Disruptive Or Destructive Cyberattacks Of Significant Consequence.\n\n\nContinue to develop intelligence and warning capabilities to anticipate threats. To defend the nation against cyberattacks of significant consequence, DoD will work with the broader intelligence community to develop intelligence capabilities about adversary activities and prepare to disrupt cyberattacks before they can impact the U.S. homeland and U.S. interests. To meet combatant command contingency requirements, DoD will expand its intelligence of key adversary human and technical networks. To operate effectively in cyberspace DoD requires cyber intelligence and warning and shared situational awareness through all phases of a potential operation. All intelligence collection will follow the law and guidance outlined in executive orders.\n\n\n\nDevelop and exercise capabilities to defend the nation. The National Mission Force and other relevant DoD components will train and partner with key interagency organizations\nto prepare to conduct cyber operations to defend the nation from cyberattacks of significant consequence. In addition, DoD will practice emergency procedures through regular exercises at all levels of the Department and support interagency exercises to practice emergency and deliberate cyber action procedures.\n\n\no Build partnerships to defend the nation.\nDoD will have a framework in place to cooperate\nwith\nother\ngovernment\nagencies to conduct defend the nation operations. DoD will work with FBI, CIA, DHS\nand\nother\nagencies\nto\nbuild\nrelationships and integrate capabilities to provide the President with the widest range of options available to respond to a cyberattack of significant consequence to the United States.\no Conduct\nan\nannual\ncomprehensive\nThe Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) Plan X program is a foundational cyber warfare program that is developing platforms for the Defense Department. DARPA uses advanced touch-table displays to use finger gestures and motions to advance the state of the art in cyber operations. (Photo courtesy of DARPA)\n\nreview of DoD's defend the nation capabilities. The Defense Department's requirements and capabilities for its mission to defend the nation against cyberattacks of significant consequence will evolve over time. On an annual basis, DoD will conduct an in-depth review of the capabilities available and required for the mission. As a part of this review, DoD will validate new requirements and identify gaps and initiatives to pursue.\n\n\nDevelop innovative approaches to defending U.S. critical infrastructure. DoD will work with DHS to improve the Enhanced Cybersecurity Services program and encourage additional critical infrastructure entities to participate, with a particular emphasis on increasing the number of defense critical infrastructure participants.\n\n\nDevelop automated information sharing tools. To improve shared situational awareness DoD will partner with DHS and other agencies to develop continuous, automated, standardized mechanisms for sharing information with each of its critical partners in the U.S. government, key allied and partner militaries, state and local governments, and the private sector. In addition, DoD will work with other U.S. government agencies and Congress to support legislation that enables information sharing between the U.S. government and the private sector.\n\nAssess DoD's cyber deterrence posture and strategy.  Building off of the Defense Science Board's Task Force on Cyber Deterrence, U.S. Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM), in coordination with the Joint Staff and the Office of the Secretary of Defense, will assess the Department of Defense's ability to deter specific state and non-state actors from conducting cyberattacks of significant consequence on the U.S. homeland and against U.S. interests, to\ninclude loss of life, significant destruction of property, or significant impact on U.S. foreign and economic policy interests.\n\no In conducting its analysis, USSTRATCOM must determine whether DoD is building the\ncapabilities required for attributing and deterring key threats from conducting such attacks and recommend specific actions that DoD can take to improve its cyber deterrence posture.  Careful attention should be devoted also to deterring non-state actors that may fall outside of traditional deterrence frameworks but which could pose a considerable threat to U.S. interests.\n\n## Strategic Goal Iv: Build And Maintain Viable Cyber Options And Plan To Use Those Options To Control Conflict Escalation And To Shape The Conflict Environment At All Stages.\n\n\nIntegrate cyber options into plans. To meet strategic end-states as defined by the Guidance for the Employment of the Force, combatant command plans, and other strategic guidance documents, DoD will work with agencies of the U.S. government as well as U.S. allies and partners to integrate cyber options into combatant command planning.\no *Accelerate the integration of cyber requirements into plans.* The Defense Department\nwill accelerate the integration of cyber requirements into combatant command plans. Plans must outline and define specific cyberspace effects against targets. To facilitate this work, the Joint Staff will work with USSTRATCOM to synchronize and integrate requirements into planning and provide recommendations to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the alignment, allocation, assignment, and apportionment of Cyber Mission Forces.\n\n## Strategic Goal V: Build And Maintain Robust International Alliances And Partnerships To Deter Shared Threats And Increase International Security And Stability.\n\n\nBuild partner capacity in key regions. Under its existing and planned force structure, DoD will work with key allies and partners to build partner capacity and help secure the critical infrastructure and key resources on which DoD missions and U.S. interests depend.  The Defense Department will work regularly with other agencies of the U.S. government, to include the Department of State, in building partner capacity. Priority regions include the Middle East, Asia-Pacific, and Europe.\n\n\no Support the hardening and resiliency of Middle Eastern allies' and partners' networks\nand systems. As a part of its cyber dialogue and partnerships, DoD will work with key Middle Eastern allies and partners to improve their ability to secure their military networks as well as the critical infrastructure and key resources upon which U.S. interests depend. Key initiatives include improved information sharing to establish a\nunified understanding of the cyber threat, an assessment of our mutual cyber defense posture, and collaborative approaches to building cyber expertise.\n\n\no Support the hardening and resiliency of\nNortheast Asian allies' networks and systems. As a part of its broader cyber dialogue with Asian allies, DoD will work with key allies and partners to improve their ability to secure their military networks and critical infrastructure and key resources upon which U.S. and allied interests depend.\no Build new strategic partnerships in the\nAsia-Pacific\nregion.\nThe\nDefense\nDepartment will work with key states across the Asia-Pacific to build cyber capacity and minimize risk to U.S. and allied interests, in a manner consistent with\nDoD's\nInternational\nCyberspace\nSecurity Cooperation Guidance.\no *Work with key NATO allies to mitigate cyber risks to DoD and U.S. national interests.*\nThe Defense Department will develop these partnerships through the defense consultations that DoD holds with its key NATO allies.\n\no DoD will remain flexible and agile as it builds alliances and partnerships to best respond\nto shifts in the strategic environment.\n\n\nDevelop solutions to counter the proliferation of destructive malware. State and non-state actors seek to acquire destructive malware. The uncontrolled spread of destructive malware to hostile actors presents a significant risk to the international system. Working with the Department of State and other agencies of the U.S. government as well as U.S. allies and partners, the Defense Department will draw on best-practices to counter the proliferation of destructive malware within the international system.  In addition to international regimes and best-practices, the U.S. government has a range of domestic export control regimes for governing dual-use technologies that can be used to prevent proliferation.\n\n\nWork with capable international partners to plan and train for cyber operations. Throughout the course of this strategy, DoD will strengthen its international alliances and partnerships to develop combined capabilities to achieve cyber effects in support of combatant command plans.\n\n\nStrengthen the United States cyber dialogue with China to enhance strategic stability. Through the course of this strategy, as part of the U.S.-China Defense Consultative Talks and related dialogues, such as the Cyber Working Group, DoD will continue to hold discussions with China to bring greater understanding and transparency of each nation's\nmilitary doctrine, policy, roles and missions in cyberspace. The goal of this work is to reduce the risks of misperception and miscalculation that could contribute to escalation and instability. DoD will support U.S. government efforts to strengthen confidence-building measures to bring a greater level of trust to the U.S.-China relationship. In addition, DoD will continue to raise concerns about China's cyber enabled theft of U.S. intellectual property, trade secrets, and confidential business information.1\n\nV. MANAGING THE STRATEGY To achieve the goals and objectives outlined in this strategy will require hard choices regarding cyber forces and personnel, organizations, and capabilities. The financial choices that DoD makes in the course of implementing this strategy will have national and global implications for years to come, and DoD must operate in an effective and cost-efficient manner to guarantee the best return on its investments. To that end, DoD will pursue the following management objectives to govern its cyber activities and missions.\n\n\nEstablish the Office of the Principal Cyber Advisor to the Secretary of Defense. In the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) of 2014, Congress required the Defense Department to designate a Principal Cyber Advisor to the Secretary of Defense to review military cyberspace activities, cyber mission forces, and offensive and defensive cyber operations and missions. In addition, the Principal Cyber Advisor will govern the development of DoD cyberspace policy and strategy for the DoD enterprise.\no The 2014 NDAA also stipulated that this Principal Cyber Advisor integrate the cyber\nexpertise and perspectives of key organizations to build an intradepartmental team of key players to ensure effective governance of cyber issues within DoD.  The Principal Cyber Advisor responsibilities assigned by the FY14 NDAA shall not be interpreted to affect the existing responsibilities and authorities of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics; the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy; the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence; the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness; or any other Principal Staff Assistant (PSA) in the office of the Secretary of Defense in cyber-related responsibilities and authorities.\no *An intradepartmental team.* The Principal Cyber Advisor will work with DoD\ncomponents through the Cyber Investment and Management Board (CIMB) to review DoD's cyber management. The CIMB will be a forum for synchronization, coordination, and project management. It will not replicate existing programmatic and budgetary mechanisms or interfere with previously defined Principal Staff Assistant roles and authorities, nor will it interfere in any way with the military chain of command; rather, it will provide a single forum to integrate cyber initiatives, it will manage projects through\ncompletion, and streamline DoD's cyber governance structures.  The PCA will work with the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics and the Joint Staff to build an intradepartmental team of DoD representatives to support the CIMB in this work.\n\n\n\no *A senior executive forum.* Subordinate and reporting to the CIMB, a senior executive\nforum will provide initial senior-level coordination on key cyber issues.  The senior executive forum will recommend courses of action to the CIMB and will coordinate with other OSD and Joint Staff governance bodies to facilitate unity of effort and resolve management issues at appropriate levels.\no If and when a budgetary or financial matter comes into play during the Program and\nBudget Review process, the Principal Cyber Advisor will use the senior executive forum and the CIMB to coordinate recommendations for the Deputy's Management Action Group or other financial and budgetary organizations, vetting options and alternatives through the issue teams as appropriate.\n\nImprove cyber budgetary management. DoD will develop an agreed-upon method to more transparently and effectively manage the DoD cyber operations budget. Today cyber funding is spread across the DoD budget, to include the Military Intelligence Program (MIP), in multiple appropriations, budget lines, program elements, and projects. In addition, the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence, on behalf of DoD, ensures that all National Intelligence Program (NIP) investments are aligned to support DoD missions. The diffuse nature of the DoD cyber budget presents DoD with a challenge for effective budgetary\nmanagement; DoD must develop a new method for managing cross-program funding to improve mission effectiveness and achieve management efficiencies.\n\nDevelop DoD's cyber operations and\ncybersecurity policy framework. Consistent with Presidential guidance, DoD will align and simplify its cyber operations and cybersecurity policy management and identified gaps, overlaps, seams, conflicts, and areas in need of revision in current documentation. This effort will help translate national and departmental guidance and policy into tactical operations. It is essential to clarifying conflicts in existing documentation that currently complicate cyber operations and cybersecurity governance.\n\n\nConduct an end-to-end assessment of DoD's cyber capabilities. U.S. Cyber Command will lead a comprehensive operational assessment of its posture. In coordination with the Principal Cyber Advisor to the Secretary of Defense, the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, and the Office of the Director of Coast Assessment and Program Evaluation, USCYBERCOM will provide short- and long-term recommendations through the CIMB to provide to the Secretary of\nDefense regarding organizational structure, command and control mechanism, rules of engagement, personnel, capabilities, tools, and potential operational gaps. The goal of this posture assessment will be to provide a clear understanding of the future operational environment; key stakeholder views; as well as strategic priorities, choices, and resources for planning and operations.\n\n\n\nTHIS PAGE LEFT INTENTIONALLY BLANK\n\n## Conclusion\n\nWe live in a time of growing cyber threats to U.S. interests. State and non-state actors threaten disruptive and destructive attacks against the United States and conduct cyber-enabled theft of intellectual property to undercut the United States' technological and military advantage. We are vulnerable in cyberspace, and the scale of the cyber threat requires urgent action by leaders and organizations across the government and the private sector. Since developing its first cyber strategy in 2011, the Defense Department has made significant progress in building its cyber capabilities, developing its organizations and plans, and fostering the partnerships necessary to defend the country and its interests. More must be done. Stemming from the goals and objectives outlined in this strategy, appropriate resources must be aligned and managed to ensure progress. This strategy presents an aggressive, specific plan for achieving change. For DoD to succeed in its mission of defending the United States and its interests in cyberspace, leaders from across the Department must take action to achieve the objectives outlined in this document. They must also hold their organizations accountable. Because of the nature of networks and computer code, no single organization can be relied upon to do this work. Success requires close collaboration across DoD, between agencies of the U.S. government, with the private sector, and with U.S. allies and partners. The strategic environment can change quickly. That is especially true in cyberspace. We must be dynamic, flexible, and agile in this work. We must anticipate emerging threats, identify new capabilities to build, and determine how to enhance our partnerships and planning.  As always, our women and men - both uniformed and civilian personnel - will be our greatest and most enduring strength and a constant source of inspiration. By working together we will help protect and defend the United States and its interests in the digital age."
    },
    {
        "text": "# I N T E L L I G E N C E  A S S E S S M E N T\n\n(U//FOUO)  Sovereign Citizen Extremist Ideology Will Drive Violence at Home, During Travel, and at Government Facilities\n5 February 2015\nOffice of Intelligence and Analysis IA-0105-15\n(U)  **Warning:** This document is UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (U//FOUO).  It contains information that may be exempt from public release under the Freedom of Information Act (5 U.S.C. 552).  It is to be controlled, stored, handled, transmitted, distributed, and disposed of in accordance with DHS policy relating to FOUO information and is not to be released to the public, the media, or other personnel who do not have a valid need to know without prior approval of an authorized DHS official. State and local homeland security officials may share this document with authorized critical infrastructure and key resource personnel and private sector security officials without further approval from DHS.\n(U)  This product contains US person information that has been deemed necessary for the intended recipient to understand, assess, or act on the information provided.  It has been highlighted in this document with the label **USPER** and should be handled in accordance with the recipient's intelligence oversight and/or information handling procedures.  Other US person information has been minimized.  Should you require the minimized US person information, please contact the I&A Production Branch at IA.PM@hq.dhs.gov, IA.PM@dhs.sgov.gov, or IA.PM@dhs.ic.gov.\n\n# (U//Fouo)  Sovereign Citizen Extremist Ideology Will Drive Violence At Home, During Travel, And At Government Facilities\n\n(U//FOUO)  Prepared by the Office of Intelligence and Analysis (I&A).\n\nCoordinated with FBI.\n\n## (U)  Scope\n\n(U//FOUO)  This *Assessment* is based on an I&A review of 24 law enforcement investigations into acts and threats of sovereign citizen extremist (SCE) violence since 2010, detailing locations, targets of violence, and their statements about the violence, when available.*  It is intended to inform law enforcement at the federal, state, and local levels about the nature and circumstances of SCE violence to help officers prepare for, anticipate, and ultimately avoid violent incidents. Most sovereign citizens are non-violent, and this assessment applies only to those that use violence to advance their goals. This *Assessment* stems from law enforcement feedback on a 2013 analysis of the geographic distribution of SCE violence (see \"(U//FOUO) Limited Reporting Suggests Sovereign Citizen Extremist Violence Most Common in Southern and Western United States,\" dated 27 February 2014). (U//FOUO)  For this review, I&A counted only violence perpetrated by identified SCEs for ideological reasons that involved shootings, assaults, plots to commit violence, and credible violent threats against law enforcement, government personnel, and public officials.  All incidents were reviewed by multiple I&A analysts to validate ideological motives.  This data set may not be comprehensive of all SCE violence and threats of violence, and is limited by the difficulty in discerning the ideological motivations behind some crimes, which could increase the number of violent incidents by SCEs that were not recognized or reported as stemming from ideological reasons.  Additional information from state and local partners could assist efforts to better understand the nature and breadth of these activities.\n* (U//FOUO)  DHS defines SCEs as groups or individuals who facilitate or engage in acts of violence directed at public officials, financial institutions, and government facilities in support of their belief that the legitimacy of US citizenship should be rejected; that almost all forms of established government, authority, and institutions are illegitimate; and that they are immune from federal, state, and local laws.\n\n## (U)  **Key Judgments**\n\n(U//FOUO)  I&A assesses that SCE violence during\n2015 will occur most frequently during routine law\nencounters at a suspect's home, during\nenforcement stops and at government offices.\n\n(U//FOUO)  I&A assesses that SCE violence over the\nnext year will remain at the same sporadic level,\nconsisting primarily of unplanned, reactive violence\ntargeting law enforcement officers during active\nenforcement efforts.\n\n(U//FOUO)  SCE Ideology Will Prompt Violence\nin Specific Circumstances and Locations\n\n(U//FOUO)  I&A assesses that most SCE violence will\ncontinue to occur most frequently at SCE homes, during\nroutine traffic stops, or at government offices due to their\nperception that their individual rights are being violated.\nSCE violence took place in these three circumstances in 19\nof the 24 instances of SCE violence since 2010.  SCEs\nperceive that law enforcement efforts and judicial actions\ninfringe upon key personal rights and individual\nsovereigntysuch as the right to travelmost strongly\nduring these circumstances.  SCEs believe they personally\ncan ignore laws and act according to their own sovereign\ncitizen ideology.  Consequently, when SCEs perceive\ngovernment representatives directly infringing on their\nrights and freedoms in an irrevocable waysuch as police\nserving a warrant or a judge ruling against legal filings\nintended to tie up court proceedingsSCEs resort to\nviolence.\n\n\n(U)  Victor WhiteUSPER, an Odessa, Texas SCE, engaged\nin a 22-hour armed standoff and gun battle with police in 2010 and was convicted of shooting two officers and a utility worker.  White initiated the violence because the police officer was escorting the utility worker onto\nWhite's property.  White claimed he was \"defending\nand protecting my dignity and the sovereignty of my domain\" in a jailhouse interview with media.\n\n(U)  A SCE father and son claimed police had no authority over them and refused to produce identification when stopped for a traffic violation in\nLouisiana in 2012.  The son then allegedly shot and wounded the police officer who stopped them with an AK-47 assault rifle before fleeing the scene.  Later that day, police officers located the suspects at a residence in a mobile home park.  The son emerged from the home and allegedly started shooting, killing two police officers and wounding two others, according to media reports.\n\n(U)  A Denver-based SCE threatened a state employee who handled his unresolved tax dispute with a hoax terrorism letter in 2012.  He was convicted after sending an envelope containing white powder specifically to the employee, resulting in the evacuation of a Colorado Department of Revenue building,\naccording to media reports.\n\n## (U)  Sovereign Citizen Extremist Ideology\n\n(U//FOUO)  SCEslike their non-violent sovereign citizen counterpartsbelieve they are immune from federal, state, and local laws and that many Constitutional amendments are false.  They reject the authority of the government, law enforcement, and the courts because they think these entities are actually commercial entities that cannot compel participation in a commercial contract (although many sovereign citizens recognize the law enforcement authority of the elected sheriff).  Many believe that US born citizens can use their birth certificates to access secret US Treasury bank accounts to pay debts and fines.  SCEs believe they have unfettered authority to travel \"on the land\" and avoid paying taxes and fees.  Sometimes they create their own parallel government institutions, such as courts and grand jurieswhich have no legal authorityto support their claims.\n\n## (U//Fouo)  Sce Violence Is Personal, Not Symbolic\n\n(U//FOUO)  I&A assesses that SCE tactics differ from most violent extremists in that their attacks are reactive and personal, rather than symbolic.  Other domestic terrorists typically attack symbolic targets to oppose laws and policies they disagree with rather than certain individuals.*  By contrast, even when SCEs plot their violence over time or threaten attacks, it is often in direct response to an ongoing personal grievance, such as an arrest or court order.\nIn almost all of the 24 incidents we reviewed, the targets were the specific individuals who the SCE perceive violated their rights, rather than public symbols or anonymous representatives of the government.  While other domestic terrorists may be motivated by personal grievances as well as ideology, rarely do they target a specific individual.\n\n\n(U)  A Washington-based SCE was convicted in\nDecember 2011 for threatening to arrest and kidnap specific law enforcement and government officials involved in giving him a traffic citation, according to the Department of Justice.\n\n(U)  Francis Shaeffer CoxUSPER, an Alaska-based SCE, conspired to kill a US district court judge and an\nintended to intimidate or coerce a civilian population, to influence the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion, or to affect the conduct of a government by mass destruction, assassination, or kidnapping.  A domestic terrorist differs from a homegrown violent extremist in that the former is not inspired by, and does not take direction from, a foreign terrorist group or other foreign actor.\n\nInternal Revenue Service officer in March 2011.  He targeted them in retaliation for their involvement in law enforcement and judicial actions against him, according to media reports of his trial and conviction.\n\n\n(U//FOUO)  Other recent domestic terrorism attacks\ncommitted by individuals motivated by anti-government ideologies but who are not SCEs targeted random law enforcement and government employees due to their symbolic value as targets rather than a personal grievance against those individuals, according to case documents.  These cases include the shooting attack on three TSA agents at Los\nAngeles International Airport in November 2013 (killing one); the murder of two Las Vegas policemen\nand a civilian in May 2014 by Jerad and Amanda Miller (who were killed during the attack); and Eric Michael FreinUSPER, who allegedly shot and killed a policeman and injured another in September 2014.\n\n## (U//Fouo)  Sces Will Continue To Attack Police Officers Because Of Their Enforcement Role\n\n(U//FOUO)  I&A assesses law enforcement officers will remain the primary target of SCE violence over the next year due to their role in physically enforcing laws and regulations.  While judges and other government officials often earn SCE ire, SCEs typicallythough not alwaysrespond to judicial decrees and regulatory actions by disputing them on paper through extensive legal claims before engaging in violent plots, and rarely attack symbolic targets.  By contrast, law enforcement actions often involve direct personal (and physical) confrontations that SCEs perceive as provoking an immediate physical response for \"self-defense.\"\n\n\n(U//FOUO)  Law enforcement officers were targeted in 83 percent (20 of 24) of violent sovereign citizen\nincidents between 2010 and 2014, according to a review of DHS, law enforcement, and open source data.\n\n(U)  An alleged SCE shot two federal and state law enforcement officers in California in June 2014.  He justified his actions in a local media interview by claiming that the law enforcement officers were there \"to provoke me\" and \"murder me if possible.\"\n\n(U)  Earl Cranston Harris, an Oregon SCE, was shot\nand killed after threatening to shoot deputies who came to his home to enforce an eviction order stemming from a long-running, but previously peaceful, property dispute in June 2014, according to media accounts.\n\n(U//FOUO)  An alleged SCE made a series of verbal and written threats to CBP and other law enforcement officials at a port of entry between 2010-2013, including mailing threatening statements and manifestos, simply for processing him at the international border.  He threatened to retaliate\nagainst law enforcement if they continued to stop and question him during border crossings, according to DHS reporting.\n\n## (U)  Outlook\n\n(U//FOUO)  Barring any significant change in SCE ideology, a major event, or a charismatic leader that advocates for more assertive violence in support of SCEs' perceived rights, I&A assesses the sporadic pattern and level of violence at homes, traffic stops, and government sites will continue through 2015.  However, each individual is unique and may have different interpretations of SCE ideology, especially since there is no agreed-upon dogma or national leader.  Some domestic terrorists may combine elements of SCE ideologies with other, more aggressive violent antigovernment perspectivessuch as militia extremism.*\nConsequently, such individuals likely pose a greater threat of proactive violence than other SCEs.\n\n## (U)  Source Summary Statement\n\n(U//FOUO)  This Assessment is based on a large body of law enforcement and open source reporting from DHS, state and local law enforcement, the FBI, court documents and the media.  The law enforcement reports and court documents typically have high credibility and rely on witness testimony and facts established through law enforcement investigation. The media reports range in reliability from moderate to high, but all incidents have also been reviewed by either FBI or local fusion center analysts, giving us **high confidence** in the factual reporting of these cases.  We have **high confidence** in our judgment that SCE violence during 2015 will continue to occur most frequently during routine law enforcement stops and encounters at a suspect's home, followed by government offices, because it is based on our review of these incidents and the consistency of basic sovereign citizen ideology that has been established over many years.  We also have high confidence in our assessment that most SCE violence over the next year will remain at the same sporadic level and will consist primarily of unplanned, reactive violence targeting law enforcement officers during active enforcement efforts.  We have seen no changes in basic SCE ideology and the trends displayed since 2010 stem from this ideology.  Additional FBI reporting on plotting by SCE groups could alter our assessment, but existing reporting supports our assessments above.\n\n## (U)  Report Suspicious Activity\n\n(U)  To report suspicious activity, law enforcement, Fire-EMS, private security personnel, and emergency managers should follow established protocols; all other personnel should call 911 or contact local law enforcement.  Suspicious activity reports (SARs) will be forwarded to the appropriate fusion center and FBI Joint Terrorism Task Force for further action.  For more information on the Nationwide SAR Initiative, visit http://nsi.ncirc.gov/resources.aspx.\n\n(U)  Tracked by: HSEC-8.2, HSEC-8.5, HSEC-8.6, HSEC-8.8, HSEC-8.10\n\n## Office Of Intelligence And Analysis Customer Feedback Form Product Title: (U//Fouo)  Sovereign Citizen Extremist Ideology Will Drive Violence At Home, During Travel, And At Government Fa\n\n1. Please select partner type:                                                           and function: 2. What is the highest level of intelligence information that you receive? 3. Please complete the following sentence: \"I focus most of my time on:\" 4. Please rate your satisfaction with each of the following:\n5. How do you plan to use this product in support of your mission?  (Check all that apply.)\n\n## 6. To Further Understand Your Response To Question #5, Please Provide Specific Details About Situations In Which You Might Use This Product. 7. What Did This Product Not Address That You Anticipated It Would? 8. To What Extent Do You Agree With The Following Two Statements?\n\nThis product will enable me to make better decisions regarding this topic.\n\nThis product provided me with intelligence information I did not find elsewhere.\n\n## 9. How Did You Obtain This Product? 10. Would You Be Willing To Participate In A Follow-Up Conversation About Your Feedback?\n\nTo help us understand more about your organization so we can better tailor future products, please provide:\n                  Name:\n      Organization:\nContact Number:\n\nInitiate your own regional-specific analysis Initiate your own topic-specific analysis\nDevelop long-term homeland security strategies\n\n\nSubmit Request"
    },
    {
        "text": "# National Cyber Strategy Of The United States Of America\n\nS E P T E M B E R  2 0 1 8\nTHE W HITE HOUSE\nW A S H I N G T O N ,  D C\nMy fellow Americans: Protecting America's national security and promoting the prosperity of the American people are my top priorities. Ensuring the security of cyberspace is fundamental to both endeavors. Cyberspace is an integral component of all facets of American life, including our economy and defense. Yet, our private and public entities still struggle to secure their systems, and adversaries have increased the frequency and sophistication of their malicious cyber activities. America created the Internet and shared it with the world. Now, we must make sure to secure and preserve cyberspace for future generations. In the last 18 months, my Administration has taken action to address cyber threats. We have sanctioned malign cyber actors. We have indicted those that committed cybercrimes. We have publicly attributed malicious activity to the adversaries responsible and released details about the tools they employed. We have required departments and agencies to remove software vulnerable to various security risks. We have taken action to hold department and agency heads accountable for managing cybersecurity risks to the systems they control, while empowering them to provide adequate security. In addition, last year, I signed Executive Order\n13800, *Strengthening the Cybersecurity of Federal Networks and Critical Infrastructure*. The work performed and reports created in response to that Executive Order laid the groundwork for this National Cyber Strategy.\n\nWith the release of this National Cyber Strategy, the United States now has its first fully articulated cyber strategy in 15 years. This strategy explains how my Administration will:\n\n- Defend the homeland by protecting networks, systems, functions, and data; - Promote American prosperity by nurturing a secure, thriving digital economy and fostering\nstrong domestic innovation;\n- Preserve peace and security by strengthening the ability of the United States - in concert\nwith allies and partners - to deter and, if necessary, punish those who use cyber tools for malicious purposes; and\n- Expand American influence abroad to extend the key tenets of an open, interoperable,\nreliable, and secure Internet.\nThe National Cyber Strategy demonstrates my commitment to strengthening America's cybersecurity capabilities and securing America from cyber threats. It is a call to action for all Americans and our great companies to take the necessary steps to enhance our national cybersecurity. We will continue to lead the world in securing a prosperous cyber future.\n\nSincerely,\n\n## Table Of Contents\n\nIntroduction\n1\nHow Did We Get Here?\n1\nThe Way Forward\n2 6 6\n\n## Pillar I:  Protect The American People, The Homeland, And The American Way Of Life\n\nSecure Federal Networks and Information\n6\nFurther Centralize Management and Oversight of Federal Civilian Cybersecurity\n6\nAlign Risk Management and Information Technology Activities\n7\nImprove Federal Supply Chain Risk Management\n7\nStrengthen Federal Contractor Cybersecurity\n7\nEnsure the Government Leads in Best and Innovative Practices\n8\nSecure Critical Infrastructure\n8\nRefine Roles and Responsibilities\n8\nPrioritize Actions According to Identified National Risks\n8\nLeverage Information and Communications Technology Providers as Cybersecurity Enablers\n9\nProtect our Democracy\n9\nIncentivize Cybersecurity Investments\n9\nPrioritize National Research and Development Investments\n9\nImprove Transportation and Maritime Cybersecurity\n9\nImprove Space Cybersecurity\n10\nCombat Cybercrime and Improve Incident Reporting\n10\nImprove Incident Reporting and Response\n10\nModernize Electronic Surveillance and Computer Crime Laws\n11\nReduce Threats from Transnational Criminal Organizations in Cyberspace\n11\nImprove Apprehension of Criminals Located Abroad\n11\nStrengthen Partner Nations' Law Enforcement Capacity to Combat Criminal Cyber Activity\n11\n14\n\n## Pillar Ii:  Promote American Prosperity\n\nFoster a Vibrant and Resilient Digital Economy\n14\nIncentivize an Adaptable and Secure Technology Marketplace\n14\nPrioritize Innovation\n14\nInvest in Next Generation Infrastructure\n15\nPromote the Free Flow of Data Across Borders\n15\nMaintain United States Leadership in Emerging Technologies\n15\n| Promote Full-Lifecycle Cybersecurity                                              |   15 |\n|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------|\n| Foster and Protect United States Ingenuity                                        |   16 |\n| Update Mechanisms to Review Foreign Investment and Operation in the United States |   16 |\n| Maintain a Strong and Balanced Intellectual Property Protection System            |   16 |\n| Protect the Confidentiality and Integrity of American Ideas                       |   16 |\n| Develop a Superior Cybersecurity Workforce                                        |   17 |\n| Build and Sustain the Talent Pipeline                                             |   17 |\n| Expand Re-Skilling and Educational Opportunities for America's Workers            |   17 |\n| Enhance the Federal Cybersecurity Workforce                                       |   17 |\n| Use Executive Authority to Highlight and Reward Talent                            |   17 |\n| 20                                                                                |      |\n\n## Pillar Iii:  Preserve Peace Through Strength\n\n20\nEnhance Cyber Stability through Norms of Responsible State Behavior\n20\nEncourage Universal Adherence to Cyber Norms\n21\nAttribute and Deter Unacceptable Behavior in Cyberspace\n21\nLead with Objective, Collaborative Intelligence\n21\nImpose Consequences\n21\nBuild a Cyber Deterrence Initiative\n21\nCounter Malign Cyber Influence and Information Operations\n24\n\n## Pillar Iv:  Advance American Influence\n\n24\nPromote an Open, Interoperable, Reliable, and Secure Internet\n24\nProtect and Promote Internet Freedom\n25\nWork with Like-Minded Countries, Industry, Academia, and Civil Society\n25\nPromote a Multi-Stakeholder Model of Internet Governance\n25\nPromote Interoperable and Reliable Communications Infrastructure\nand Internet Connectivity\n25\nPromote and Maintain Markets for United States Ingenuity Worldwide\n26\nBuild International Cyber Capacity\n26\nEnhance Cyber Capacity Building Efforts\n\n## Introduction\n\nAmerica's prosperity and security depend on how we respond to the opportunities and challenges in cyberspace.  Critical infrastructure, national defense, and the daily lives of Americans rely on computer-driven and interconnected information technologies.  As all facets of American life have become more dependent on a secure cyberspace, new vulnerabilities have been revealed and new threats continue to emerge.  Building on the National Security Strategy and the Administration's progress over its first 18 months, the National Cyber Strategy outlines how the United States will ensure the American people continue to reap the benefits of a secure cyberspace that reflects our principles, protects our security, and promotes our prosperity.\n\n## How Did We Get Here?\n\nwould be self-evident.  Large parts of the world have embraced America's vision of a shared and open cyberspace for the mutual benefit of all. Our competitors and adversaries, however, have taken an opposite approach.  They benefit from the open Internet, while constricting and controlling their own people's access to it, and actively undermine the principles of an open Internet in international forums.  They hide behind notions of sovereignty while recklessly violating the laws of other states by engaging in pernicious economic espionage and malicious cyber activities, causing significant economic disruption and harm to individuals, commercial and non-commercial interests, and governments across the world.  They view cyberspace as an arena where the United States' overwhelming military, economic, and political power could be neutralized and where the United States and its allies and partners are vulnerable.\n\nThe rise of the Internet and the growing centrality of cyberspace to all facets of the modern world corresponded with the rise of the United States as the world's lone superpower.  For the past quarter century, the ingenuity of the American people drove the evolution of cyberspace, and in turn, cyberspace has become fundamental to American wealth creation and innovation.\n\nCyberspace is an inseparable component of America's financial, social, government, and political life.  Meanwhile, Americans sometimes took for granted that the supremacy of the United States in the cyber domain would remain unchallenged, and that America's vision for an open, interoperable, reliable, and secure Internet would inevitably become a reality.  Americans believed the growth of the Internet would carry the universal aspirations for free expression and individual liberty around the world.  Americans assumed the opportunities to expand communication, commerce, and free exchange of ideas Russia, Iran, and North Korea conducted reckless cyber attacks that harmed American and international businesses and our allies and partners without paying costs likely to deter future cyber aggression.  China engaged in cyber-enabled economic espionage and trillions of dollars of intellectual property theft.  Non-state actors - including terrorists and criminals - exploited cyberspace to profit, recruit, propagandize, and attack the United States and its allies and partners, with their actions often shielded by hostile states.  Public and private entities have struggled to secure their systems as adversaries increase the frequency and sophistication of their malicious cyber activities.  Entities across the United States have faced cybersecurity challenges in effectively identifying, protecting, and ensuring resilience of their networks, systems, functions, and data as well as detecting, responding to, and recovering from incidents.\n\n## The Way Forward\n\nNew threats and a new era of strategic competition demand a new cyber strategy that responds to new realities, reduces vulnerabilities, deters adversaries, and safeguards opportunities for the American people to thrive.  Securing cyberspace is fundamental to our strategy and requires technical advancements and administrative efficiency across the Federal Government and the private sector.  The Administration also recognizes that a purely technocratic approach to cyberspace is insufficient to address the nature of the new problems we confront.  The United States must also have policy choices to impose costs if it hopes to deter malicious cyber actors and prevent further escalation.\n\nThe Administration is already taking action to aggressively address these threats and adjust to new realities.  The United States has sanctioned malign cyber actors and indicted those that have committed cybercrimes.  We have publicly attributed malicious activity to the responsible adversaries and released details of the tools and infrastructure they employed. We have required departments and agencies to remove software vulnerable to various security risks.  We have taken action to hold department and agency heads accountable for managing the cybersecurity risks to systems they control, while empowering them to provide adequate security. The Administration's approach to cyberspace is anchored by enduring American values, such as the belief in the power of individual liberty, free expression, free markets, and privacy.  We retain our commitment to the promise of an open, interoperable, reliable, and secure Internet to strengthen and extend our values and protect and ensure economic security for American workers and companies.  The future we desire will not come without a renewed American commitment to advance our interests across cyberspace.\n\nThe Administration recognizes that the United States is engaged in a continuous competition against strategic adversaries, rogue states, and terrorist and criminal networks.  Russia, China, Iran, and North Korea all use cyberspace as a means to challenge the United States, its allies, and partners, often with a recklessness they would never consider in other domains.  These adversaries use cyber tools to undermine our economy and democracy, steal our intellectual property, and sow discord in our democratic processes.  We are vulnerable to peacetime cyber attacks against critical infrastructure, and the risk is growing that these countries will conduct cyber attacks against the United States during a crisis short of war.  These adversaries are continually developing new and more effective cyber weapons. This National Cyber Strategy outlines how we will (1) defend the homeland by protecting networks, systems, functions, and data; (2) promote American prosperity by nurturing a secure, thriving digital economy and fostering strong domestic innovation; (3) preserve peace and security by strengthening the United States' ability - in concert with allies and partners - to deter and if necessary punish those who use cyber tools for malicious purposes; and (4) expand American influence abroad to extend the key tenets of an open, interoperable, reliable, and secure Internet. The Strategy's success will be realized when cybersecurity vulnerabilities are effectively managed through identification and protection of networks, systems, functions, and data as well as detection of, resilience against, response to, and recovery from incidents; destructive, disruptive, or otherwise destabilizing malicious cyber activities directed against United States interests are reduced or prevented; activity that is contrary to responsible behavior in cyberspace is deterred through the imposition of costs through cyber and non-cyber means; and the United States is positioned to use cyber capabilities to achieve national security objectives.\n\nThe articulation of the National Cyber Strategy is organized according to the pillars of the National Security Strategy.  The National Security Council staff will coordinate with departments, agencies, and the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) on an appropriate resource plan to implement this Strategy.  Departments and agencies will execute their missions informed by the following strategic guidance.\n\n## Protect The American People, The Homeland, And The American Way Of Life P\n\nbilities, and accountability within and across departments and agencies for securing Federal information systems, while setting the standard for effective cybersecurity risk management. As part of this effort, the Administration will centralize some authorities within the Federal Government, enable greater cross-agency visibility, improve management of our Federal supply chain, and strengthen the security of United States Government contractor systems.\n\nFURTHER\n          CENTRALIZE\n                       MANAGEMENT\n                                     AND\n\nOVERSIGHT OF FEDERAL CIVILIAN CYBERSECURITY:\n\n      rotecting the American people, the\n    American way of life, and American\n              interests is at the forefront of the National\nSecurity Strategy.  Protecting American infor-\nmation networks, whether government or\nprivate, is vital to fulfilling this objective.  It will\nrequire a series of coordinated actions focused\non protecting government networks, protecting\ncritical infrastructure, and combating cybercrime.\nThe United States Government, private industry,\nand the public must each take immediate and\ndecisive actions to strengthen cybersecurity,\nwith each working on securing the networks\nunder their control and supporting each other as\nappropriate.\n\nOBJECTIVE:  Manage cybersecurity risks to increase the security and resilience of the Nation's information and information systems.\n\n## Secure Federal Networks And Information\n\nThe responsibility to secure Federal networks - including Federal information systems and national security systems - falls squarely on the Federal Government.  The Administration will clarify the relevant authorities, responsi-\nThe Administration will act to further enable the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to secure Federal department and agency networks, with the exception of national security systems and Department of Defense (DOD) and Intelligence Community (IC) systems.  This includes ensuring DHS has appropriate access to agency information systems for cybersecurity purposes and can take and direct action to safeguard systems from the spectrum of risks.  Under the oversight of the OMB, the Administration will expand on work begun under Executive Order (E.O.) 13800 to prioritize the transition of agencies to shared services and infrastructure.  DHS will have appropriate visibility into those services and infrastructure to improve United States cybersecurity posture. We will continue to deploy centralized capabilities, tools, and services through DHS where appropriate, and improve oversight and compliance with applicable laws, policies, standards, and directives.  This will likely require new policies and architectures that enable the government to better leverage innovation. DOD and the IC will consider these activities as they work to better secure national security systems, DOD systems, and IC systems, as appropriate.\n\n## Align Risk Management And Information\n\nbetter ensure the technology that the Federal Government deploys is secure and reliable.\n\nThis includes ensuring better information sharing among departments and agencies to improve awareness of supply chain threats and reduce duplicative supply chain activities within the United States Government, including by creating a supply chain risk assessment shared service.  It also includes addressing deficiencies in the Federal acquisition system, such as providing more streamlined authorities to exclude risky vendors, products, and services when justified.  This effort will be synchronized with efforts to manage supply chain risk in the Nation's infrastructure.\n\n## Strengthen Federal Contractor Cyber-\n\nTECHNOLOGY ACTIVITIES:  E.O. 13833, Enhancing the Effectiveness of Agency Chief Information Officers, empowers Chief Information Officers\n(CIOs) to more effectively leverage technology to accomplish agency missions, cut down on duplication, and make information technology (IT) investment more efficient.  Department and agency leaders will empower and hold their CIOs accountable to align cybersecurity risk management decisions and IT budgeting and procurement decisions.  The Administration, through OMB and DHS, will continue to guide and direct risk management actions across Federal civilian departments and agencies, and CIOs will be empowered to take a proactive leadership role in assuring IT procurement decisions assign the proper priority to securing networks and data.\n\nIMPROVE\n          FEDERAL\n                     SUPPLY\n                              CHAIN\n                                      RISK\n\nMANAGEMENT: The Administration will integrate\nsupply chain risk management into agency\nprocurement and risk management processes\nin accordance with federal requirements that\nare consistent with industry best practices to\n\nSECURITY: The United States cannot afford\nto have sensitive government information or\nsystems inadequately secured by contractors.\nFederal contractors provide important services\nto the United States Government and must\nproperly secure the systems through which\nthey provide those services.  Going forward,\nthe Federal Government will be able to assess\nthe security of its data by reviewing contractor\nrisk management practices and adequately\ntesting, hunting, sensoring, and responding\nto incidents on contractor systems.  Contracts\nwith Federal departments and agencies will\nbe drafted to authorize such activities for the\npurpose of improving cybersecurity.  Among the\nacute concerns in this area are those contractors\nwithin the defense industrial base responsible for\nresearching and developing key systems fielded\nby the DOD.  Further, as recommended in the\nE.O. 13800 Report to the President on Federal IT\nModernization, the Administration will support\n\nadoption of consolidated acquisition strategies to improve cybersecurity and reduce overhead costs associated with using inconsistent contract provisions across the Federal Government.  It will also act to ensure, where appropriate, that Federal contractors receive and use all relevant and shareable threat and vulnerability information to improve their security posture.\n\n## Ensure The Government Leads In Best And\n\nsector, we will collectively use a risk-management approach to mitigating vulnerabilities to raise the base level of cybersecurity across critical infrastructure.  We will simultaneously use a consequence-driven approach to prioritize actions that reduce the potential that the most advanced adversaries could cause large-scale or long-duration disruptions to critical infrastructure.  We will also deter malicious cyber actors by imposing costs on them and their sponsors by leveraging a range of tools, including but not limited to prosecutions and economic sanctions, as part of a broader deterrence strategy.\n\nREFINE ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES: The Administration will clarify the roles and responsibilities of Federal agencies and the expectations on the private sector related to cybersecurity risk management and incident response.  Clarity will enable proactive risk management that comprehensively addresses threats, vulnerabilities, and consequences.  It will also identify and bridge existing gaps in responsibilities and coordination among Federal and non-Federal incident response efforts and promote more routine training, exercises, and coordination.\n\n## Prioritize Actions According To Identified\n\nINNOVATIVE PRACTICES: The Federal Government will ensure the systems it owns and operates meet the standards and cybersecurity best practices it recommends to industry.  Projects that receive Federal funding must meet these standards as well.  The Federal Government will use its purchasing power to drive sector-wide improvement in products and services.  The Federal Government will also be a leader in developing and implementing standards and best practices in new and emerging areas.  For example, public key cryptography is foundational to the secure operation of our infrastructure.  To protect against the potential threat of quantum computers being able to break modern public key cryptography, the Department of Commerce, through the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), will continue to solicit, evaluate, and standardize quantum-resistant, public key cryptographic algorithms.  The United States must be at the forefront of protecting communications by supporting rapid adoption of these forthcoming NIST standards across government infrastructure and by encouraging the Nation to do the same.\n\n## Secure Critical Infrastructure\n\nThe responsibility to secure the Nation's critical infrastructure and manage its cybersecurity risk is shared by the private sector and the Federal Government.  In partnership with the private NATIONAL RISKS: The Federal Government will work with the private sector to manage risks to critical infrastructure at the greatest risk.  The Administration will develop a comprehensive understanding of national risk by identifying national critical functions and will mature our cybersecurity offerings and engagements to better manage those national risks.  The Administration will prioritize risk-reduction activities across seven key areas:  national security, energy and power, banking and finance, health and safety, communications, information technology, and transportation.\n\n## Leverage Information And Communications Technology Providers As Cybersecurity\n\nprotect the election infrastructure.  The Federal Government will continue to coordinate the development of cybersecurity standards and guidance to safeguard the electoral process and the tools that deliver a secure system.  In the event of a significant cyber incident, the Federal Government is poised to provide threat and asset response to recover election infrastructure.\n\nINCENTIVIZE CYBERSECURITY INVESTMENTS: Most cybersecurity risks to critical infrastructure stem from the exploitation of known vulnerabilities. The United States Government will work with private and public sector entities to promote understanding of cybersecurity risk so they make more informed risk-management decisions, invest in appropriate security measures, and realize benefits from those investments.\n\n## Prioritize National Research And Devel-\n\nENABLERS: Information and communications technology (ICT) underlies every sector in America.  ICT providers are in a unique position to detect, prevent, and mitigate risk before it impacts their customers, and the Federal Government must work with these providers to improve ICT security and resilience in a targeted and efficient manner while protecting privacy and civil liberties.  The United States Government will strengthen efforts to share information with ICT providers to enable them to respond to and remediate known malicious cyber activity at the network level.  This will include sharing classified threat and vulnerability information with cleared ICT operators and downgrading information to the unclassified level as much as possible.  We will promote an adaptable, sustainable, and secure technology supply chain that supports security based on best practices and standards.  The United States Government will convene stakeholders to devise cross-sector solutions to challenges at the network, device, and gateway layers, and we will encourage industry-driven certification regimes that ensure solutions can adapt in a rapidly evolving market and threat landscape.\n\nOPMENT INVESTMENTS: The Federal Government will update the National Critical Infrastructure Security and Resilience Research and Development Plan to set priorities for addressing cybersecurity risks to critical infrastructure.  Departments and agencies will align their investments to the priorities, which will focus on building new cybersecurity approaches that use emerging technologies, improving information-sharing and risk management related to cross-sector interdependencies, and building resilience to large-scale or long-duration disruptions.\n\nIMPROVE TRANSPORTATION AND MARITIME CYBER-\nSECURITY: America's economic and national security is built on global trade and transportation.  Our ability to guarantee free and timely movement of goods, open sea and air lines of communications, access to oil and natural gas, and availability of associated critical infrastructures is vital to our economic and national security.  As these sectors have modernized, PROTECT\nOUR\nDEMOCRACY:\nSecuring our democratic processes is of paramount importance to the United States and our democratic allies.  State and local government officials own and operate diverse election infrastructure within the United States.  Therefore, when requested we will provide technical and risk management services, support training and exercising, maintain situational awareness of threats to this sector, and improve the sharing of threat intelligence with those officials to better prepare and they have also become more vulnerable to cyber exploitation or attack.  Maritime cybersecurity is of particular concern because lost or delayed shipments can result in strategic economic disruptions and potential spillover effects on downstream industries.  Given the criticality of maritime transportation to the United States and global economy and the minimal risk-reduction investments to protect against cyber exploitation made thus far, the United States will move quickly to clarify maritime cybersecurity roles and responsibilities; promote enhanced mechanisms for international coordination and information sharing; and accelerate the development of next-generation cyber-resilient maritime infrastructure.  The United States will assure the uninterrupted transport of goods in the face of all threats that can hold this inherently international infrastructure at risk through cyber means.\n\nation with state, local, tribal, and territorial government entities, play a critical role in detecting, preventing, disrupting, and investigating cyber threats to our Nation.  The United States is regularly the victim of malicious cyber activity perpetrated by criminal actors, including state and non-state actors and their proxies and terrorists using network infrastructure in the United States and abroad.  Federal law enforcement works to apprehend and prosecute offenders, disable criminal infrastructure, limit the spread and use of nefarious cyber capabilities, prevent cyber criminals and their state sponsors from profiting from their illicit activity, and seize their assets.  The Administration will push to ensure that our Federal departments and agencies have the necessary legal authorities and resources to combat transnational cybercriminal activity, including identifying and dismantling botnets, dark markets, and other infrastructure used to enable cybercrime, and combatting economic espionage.  To effectively deter, disrupt, and prevent cyber threats, law enforcement will work with private industry to confront challenges presented by technological barriers, such as anonymization and encryption technologies, to obtain time-sensitive evidence pursuant to appropriate legal process.  Law enforcement actions to combat criminal cyber activity serve as an instrument of national power by, among other things, deterring those activities.\n\nIMPROVE SPACE CYBERSECURITY: The United States considers unfettered access to and freedom to operate in space vital to advancing the security, economic prosperity, and scientific knowledge of the Nation.  The Administration is concerned about the growing cyber-related threats to space assets and supporting infrastructure because these assets are critical to functions such as positioning, navigation, and timing (PNT); intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR); satellite communications; and weather monitoring.  The Administration will enhance efforts to protect our space assets and support infrastructure from evolving cyber threats, and we will work with industry and international partners to strengthen the cyber resilience of existing and future space systems.\n\n## Combat Cybercrime And Improve Incident Reporting\n\nIMPROVE INCIDENT REPORTING AND RESPONSE:\nThe United States Government will continue to encourage reporting of intrusions and theft of data by all victims, especially critical infrastructure partners.  The prompt reporting of cyber incidents to the Federal Government is essential to an effective response, linking of Federal departments and agencies, in cooperrelated incidents, identification of the perpetrators, and prevention of future incidents.\n\n## Modernize Electronic Surveillance And\n\nand other efforts with countries to promote cooperation with legitimate extradition requests.\n\nWe will push other nations to expedite their assistance in investigations and to comply with any bilateral or multilateral agreements or obligations.\n\nSTRENGTHEN\n              PARTNER\n                         NATIONS'\n                                    LAW ENFORCEMENT CAPACITY TO COMBAT CRIMINAL\n\nCOMPUTER CRIME LAWS: The Administration will\nwork with the Congress to update electronic\nsurveillance and computer crime statutes to\nenhance law enforcement's capabilities to\nlawfully gather necessary evidence of criminal\nactivity, disrupt criminal infrastructure through\ncivil\n     injunctions,\n                 and\n                       impose\n                               appropriate\nconsequences upon malicious cyber actors.\n\n## Reduce Threats From Transnational\n\nCYBER ACTIVITY: The United States should also aid willing partner nations to build their capacity to address criminal cyber activity.  The borderless nature of cybercrime, including state-sponsored and terrorist activities, requires strong international law enforcement partnerships.  This cooperation requires foreign law enforcement agencies to have the technical capability to assist United States law enforcement effectively when requested.  It is therefore in the interest of United States national security to continue building cybercrime-fighting capacity that facilitates stronger international law enforcement cooperation.\n\nCRIMINAL\nORGANIZATIONS\nIN\nCYBERSPACE:\nComputer hacking conducted by transnational criminal groups poses a significant threat to our national security.  Equipped with sizeable funds, organized criminal groups operating abroad employ sophisticated malicious software, spearphishing campaigns, and other hacking tools - some of which rival those of nation states in sophistication - to hack into sensitive financial systems, conduct massive data breaches, spread ransomware, attack critical infrastructure, and steal intellectual property.  The Administration will advocate for law enforcement to have effective legal tools to investigate and prosecute such groups and modernized organized crime statutes for use against this threat.\n\n## Improve Apprehension Of Criminals Located\n\nThe United States will strive to improve international cooperation in investigating malicious cyber activity, including developing solutions to potential barriers to gathering and sharing evidence.  The United States will also lead in developing interoperable and mutually beneficial systems to encourage efficient cross-border information exchange for law enforcement purposes and reduce barriers to coordination.  The Administration will urge effective use of existing international tools like the United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime and the G7 24/7 Network Points of Contact.  Finally, we will work to expand the international consensus favoring the Convention on Cybercrime of the Council of Europe (Budapest Convention), including by supporting greater adoption of the convention.\n\nABROAD: Deterring cybercrime requires a credible threat that perpetrators will be identified, apprehended, and brought to justice.  However, some foreign nations choose not to cooperate with extradition requests, impose unreasonable limitations, or actively interfere in these efforts. The United States will continue to identify gaps and potential mechanisms for bringing foreignbased cyber criminals to justice.  The United States Government will also increase diplomatic\n\n## Promote American Prosperity Priority Actions Incentivize An Adaptable And Secure\n\nT\nhe Internet has generated tremendous\n      benefits domestically and abroad, and it helps to advance American values of freedom, security, and prosperity.  Along with its expansion have come challenges that threaten our national security.  The United States will demonstrate a coherent and comprehensive approach to address these and other challenges to defend American national interests in this increasingly digitized world.\n\nOBJECTIVE:  Preserve United States influence in the technological ecosystem and the development of cyberspace as an open engine of economic growth, innovation, and efficiency.\n\n## Foster A Vibrant And Resilient Digital Economy\n\nTECHNOLOGY MARKETPLACE: To enhance the resilience of cyberspace, the Administration expects the technology marketplace to support and reward the continuous development, adoption, and evolution of innovative security technologies and processes.  The Administration will work across stakeholder groups, including the private sector and civil society, to promote best practices and develop strategies to overcome market barriers to the adoption of secure technologies. The Administration will improve awareness and transparency of cybersecurity practices to build market demand for more secure products and services.  Finally, the Administration will collaborate with international partners to promote open, industry-driven standards with government support, as appropriate, and risk-based approaches to address cybersecurity challenges to include platform and managed service approaches that lower barriers to secure practice adoption across the breadth of the ecosystem.\n\nEconomic security is inherently tied to our national security.  As the foundations of our economy are becoming increasingly rooted in digital technologies, the United States Government will model and promote standards that protect our economic security and reinforce the vitality of the American marketplace and American innovation.\nPRIORITIZE INNOVATION: The United States Government will promote implementation and continuous updating of standards and best practices that deter and prevent current and evolving threats and hazards in all domains of the cyber ecosystem.  These standards and practices should be outcome-oriented and based on sound technological principles rather than point-in-time company specifications.  The Administration will eliminate policy barriers that inhibit a robust cybersecurity industry from developing, sharing, and building innovative capabilities to reduce cyber threats.\n\n\"The National Cyber Strategy\n  is a call to action for all\n  Americans and our great\n   companies to take the\n necessary steps to enhance\nour national cybersecurity.\"\n\nINVEST IN NEXT GENERATION INFRASTRUCTURE:\nThe Administration will facilitate the accelerated development and rollout of next-generation telecommunications and information communications infrastructure here in the United States, while using the buying power of the Federal Government to incentivize the move towards more secure supply chains.  The United States Government will work with the private sector to facilitate the evolution and security of 5G, examine technological and spectrum-based solutions, and lay the groundwork for innovation beyond next-generation advancements.  The United States Government will examine the use of emerging technologies, such as artificial intelligence and quantum computing, while addressing risks inherent in their use and application.  We will collaborate with the private sector and civil society to understand trends in technology advancement to maintain the United States technological edge in connected technologies and to ensure secure practices are adopted from the outset.\n\nPROMOTE THE FREE FLOW OF DATA ACROSS\nBORDERS: Countries are increasingly looking towards restrictive data localization and regulations as pretexts for digital protectionism under the rubric of national security.  Those actions negatively impact the competitiveness of United States companies.  The United States will continue to lead by example and push back against unjustifiable barriers to the free flow of data and digital trade.  The Administration will continue to work with international counterparts to promote open, industry driven standards, innovative products, and risk-based approaches that permit global innovation and the free flow of data while meeting the legitimate security needs of the United States.\n\n## Maintain United States Leadership In\n\nEMERGING TECHNOLOGIES: The United States'\ninfluence in cyberspace is linked to our technological leadership.  Accordingly, the United States Government will make a concerted effort to protect cutting edge technologies, including from theft by our adversaries, support those technologies' maturation, and, where possible, reduce United States companies'\nbarriers to market entry.  The United States will promote United States cybersecurity innovation worldwide through trade-related engagement, raising awareness of innovative American cybersecurity tools and services, exposing and countering repressive regimes use of such tools and services to undermine human rights, and reducing barriers to a robust global cybersecurity market.\n\nPROMOTE FULL-LIFECYCLE CYBERSECURITY:  The United States Government will promote full-lifecycle cybersecurity, pressing for strong, default security settings, adaptable, upgradeable products, and other best practices built in at the time of product delivery.  We will identify a clear pathway toward an adaptable, sustainable, and secure technology marketplace, encouravailability of United States telecommunications networks are essential to our economy and national security.  We must be vigilant to safeguard the telecommunications networks we depend on in our everyday lives so they cannot be used or compromised by a foreign adversary to harm the United States.  The United States Government will balance these objectives by formalizing and streamlining the review of Federal Communications Commission referrals for telecommunications licenses.  The United States Government will facilitate a transparent process to increase the efficiency of this review.\n\n## Maintain A Strong And Balanced Intellectual\n\naging manufacturers to differentiate products based on the quality of their security features.\n\nThe United States Government will promote foundational engineering practices to reduce systemic fragility and develop designs that degrade and recover effectively when successfully attacked.  The United States Government will also promote regular testing and exercising of the cybersecurity and resilience of products and systems during development using best practices from forward-leaning industries.  This includes promotion and use of coordinated vulnerability disclosure, crowd-sourced testing, and other innovative assessments that improve resiliency ahead of exploitation or attack.  The United States Government will also evaluate how to improve the end-to-end lifecycle for digital identity management, including over-reliance on Social Security numbers.\n\n## Foster And Protect United States Ingenuity\n\nPROPERTY PROTECTION SYSTEM: Strong intellectual property protections ensure continued economic growth and innovation in the digital age.  The United States Government has fostered and will continue to help foster a global intellectual property rights system that provides incentives for innovation through the protection and enforcement of intellectual property rights such as patents, trademarks, and copyrights. The United States Government will also promote protection of sensitive emerging technologies and trade secrets, and we will work to prevent adversarial nation states from gaining unfair advantage at the expense of American research and development.\n\n## Protect The Confidentiality And Integrity\n\nFostering and protecting American invention and innovation is critical to maintaining the United States' strategic advantage in cyberspace.  The United States Government will nurture innovation by promoting institutions and programs that drive United States competitiveness.  The United States Government will counter predatory mergers and acquisitions and counter intellectual property theft.  We will also catalyze United States leadership in emerging technologies and promote government identification and support to these technologies, which include artificial intelligence, quantum information science, and next-generation telecommunication infrastructure.\n\nUPDATE\n        MECHANISMS\n                      TO\n                          REVIEW\n                                   FOREIGN\n\nINVESTMENT AND OPERATION IN THE UNITED\nOF AMERICAN IDEAS: For more than a decade, malicious actors have conducted cyber intrusions into United States commercial networks, targeting confidential business information held by American firms.  Malicious cyber actors from other nations have stolen troves of trade secrets, technical data, and sensitive proprietary internal communications.  The United States Government will work against the illicit appro-\nSTATES:\nThe confidentiality, integrity, and opportunities to re-train into cybersecurity careers.\npriation of public and private sector technology and technical knowledge by foreign competitors, while maintaining an investor-friendly climate.\n\n## Enhance The Federal Cybersecurity Develop A Superior Cybersecurity Workforce\n\nA highly skilled cybersecurity workforce is a strategic national security advantage.  The United States will fully develop the vast American talent pool, while at the same time attracting the best and brightest among those abroad who share our values.\n\nWORKFORCE: To improve recruitment and retention of highly qualified cybersecurity professionals to the Federal Government, the Administration will continue to use the National Initiative for Cybersecurity Education (NICE) Framework to support policies allowing for a standardized approach for identifying, hiring, developing, and retaining a talented cybersecurity workforce. Additionally, the Administration will explore appropriate options to establish distributed cybersecurity personnel under the management of DHS to oversee the development, management, and deployment of cybersecurity personnel across Federal departments and agencies with the exception of DOD and the IC.  The Administration will promote appropriate financial compensation for the United States Government workforce, as well as unique training and operational opportunities to effectively recruit and retain critical cybersecurity talent in light of the competitive private sector environment.\n\nUSE\n     EXECUTIVE\n                  AUTHORITY\n                               TO\n                                    HIGHLIGHT\n\nAND REWARD TALENT:  The United States\nGovernment will promote and magnify excel-\n\nBUILD AND SUSTAIN THE TALENT PIPELINE: Our peer competitors are implementing workforce development programs that have the potential to harm long-term United States cybersecurity competitiveness.  The United States Government will continue to invest in and enhance programs that build the domestic talent pipeline, from primary through postsecondary education.  The Administration will leverage the President's proposed merit-based immigration reforms to ensure that the United States has the most competitive technology sector.  This effort may require additional legislation to achieve the sought after goals.\n\nEXPAND RE-SKILLING AND EDUCATIONAL OPPOR-\nlence by highlighting cybersecurity educators and cybersecurity professionals.  The United States Government will also leverage publicprivate collaboration to develop and circulate the NICE\nFramework, which provides a standardized approach for identifying cybersecurity workforce gaps, while also implementing actions to prepare, grow, and sustain a workforce that can defend and bolster America's critical infrastructure and innovation base.\n\nTUNITIES FOR AMERICA'S WORKERS: The Administration will work with the Congress to promote and reinvigorate educational and training opportunities to develop a robust cybersecurity workforce.  This includes expanding Federal recruitment, training, re-skilling people from a broad range of backgrounds, and giving them\n\n## Preserve Peace Through Strength\n\nC\nresponsible state behavior in cyberspace built upon international law, adherence to voluntary non-binding norms of responsible state behavior that apply during peacetime, and the consideration of practical confidence building measures to reduce the risk of conflict stemming from malicious cyber activity.  These principles should form a basis for cooperative responses to counter irresponsible state actions inconsistent with this framework.\n\nENCOURAGE UNIVERSAL ADHERENCE TO CYBER\nNORMS:\nInternational law and voluntary hallenges to United States security and\n      economic interests, from nation states and other groups, which have long existed in the offline world are now increasingly occurring in cyberspace.  This now-persistent engagement in cyberspace is already altering the strategic balance of power.  This Administration will issue transformative policies that reflect today's new reality and guide the United States Government towards strategic outcomes that protect the American people and our way of life. Cyberspace will no longer be treated as a separate category of policy or activity disjointed from other elements of national power.  The United States will integrate the employment of cyber options across every element of national power.\n\nOBJECTIVE:  Identify, counter, disrupt, degrade, and deter behavior in cyberspace that is destabilizing and contrary to national interests, while preserving United States overmatch in and through cyberspace.\n\n## Enhance Cyber Stability Through Norms Of Responsible State Behavior\n\nThe United States will promote a framework of non-binding norms of responsible state behavior in cyberspace provide stabilizing, security-enhancing  standards that define acceptable behavior to all states and promote greater predictability and stability in cyberspace.  The United States will encourage other nations to publicly affirm these principles and views through enhanced outreach and engagement in multilateral fora.  Increased public affirmation by the United States and other governments will lead to accepted expectations of state behavior and thus contribute to greater predictability and stability in cyberspace.\n\n## Attribute And Deter Unacceptable Behavior In Cyberspace\n\nwhich we will impose consistent with our obligations and commitments to deter future bad behavior.  The Administration will conduct interagency policy planning for the time periods leading up to, during, and after the imposition of consequences to ensure a timely and consistent process for responding to and deterring malicious cyber activities.  The United States will work with partners when appropriate to impose consequences against malicious cyber actors in response to their activities against our nation and interests.\nAs the United States continues to promote consensus on what constitutes responsible state behavior in cyberspace, we must also work to ensure that there are consequences for irresponsible behavior that harms the United States and our partners.  All instruments of national power are available to prevent, respond to, and deter malicious cyber activity against the United States. This includes diplomatic, information, military (both kinetic and cyber), financial, intelligence, public attribution, and law enforcement capabilities.  The United States will formalize and make routine how we work with like-minded partners to attribute and deter malicious cyber activities with integrated strategies that impose swift, costly, and transparent consequences when malicious actors harm the United States or our partners.\n\nLEAD WITH OBJECTIVE, COLLABORATIVE INTELLI-\nBUILD A CYBER DETERRENCE INITIATIVE: The imposition of consequences will be more impactful and send a stronger message if it is carried out in concert with a broader coalition of like-minded states.  The United States will launch an international Cyber Deterrence Initiative to build such a coalition and develop tailored strategies to ensure adversaries understand the consequences of their malicious cyber behavior.  The United States will work with like-minded states to coordinate and support each other's responses to significant malicious cyber incidents, including through intelligence sharing, buttressing of attribution claims, public statements of support for responsive actions taken, and joint imposition of consequences against malign actors.\n\n## Counter Malign Cyber Influence And Infor-\n\nGENCE: The IC will continue to lead the world in the use of all-source cyber intelligence to drive the identification and attribution of malicious cyber activity that threatens United States national interests.  Objective and actionable intelligence will be shared across the United States Government and with key partners to identify hostile foreign nation states, and non-nation state cyber programs, intentions, capabilities, research and development efforts, tactics, and operational activities that will inform whole-of-government responses to protect American interests at home and abroad.\n\nIMPOSE CONSEQUENCES: The United States will develop swift and transparent consequences, MATION OPERATIONS: The United States will use all appropriate tools of national power to expose and counter the flood of online malign influence and information campaigns and non-state propaganda and disinformation.  This includes working with foreign government partners as well as the private sector, academia, and civil society to identify, counter, and prevent the use of digital platforms for malign foreign influence operations while respecting civil rights and liberties.\n\n## Advance American Influence\n\nT\nhe world looks to the United States,\n            where much of the innovation for today's Internet originated, for leadership on a vast range of transnational cyber issues.  The United States will maintain an active international leadership posture to advance American influence and to address an expanding array of threats and challenges to its interests in cyberspace.  Collaboration with allies and partners is also essential to ensure we can continue to benefit from the cross-border communications, content creation, and commerce generated by the open, interoperable architecture of the Internet.\n\nries-old battles over human rights and fundamental freedoms are now playing out online. Freedoms of expression, peaceful assembly, and association, as well as privacy rights, are under threat.  Despite unprecedented growth, the Internet's economic and social potential continues to be undermined by online censorship and repression.  The United States stands firm on its principles to protect and promote an open, interoperable, reliable, and secure Internet.  We will work to ensure that our approach to an open Internet is the international standard.  We will also work to prevent authoritarian states that view the open Internet as a political threat from transforming the free and open Internet into an authoritarian web under their control, under the guise of security or countering terrorism.\n\nOBJECTIVE:  Preserve the long-term openness, interoperability, security, and reliability of the Internet, which supports and is reinforced by United States interests.\n\n## Priority Actions Promote An Open, Interoperable, Reliable, And Secure Internet\n\nThe global Internet has prompted some of the greatest advancements since the industrial revolution, enabling great advances in commerce, health, communications, and other national infrastructure.  At the same time, centu-\nPROTECT AND PROMOTE INTERNET FREEDOM:\nThe United States Government conceptualizes Internet freedom as the online exercise of human rights and fundamental freedoms - such as the freedoms of expression, association, peaceful assembly, religion or belief, and privacy rights online - regardless of frontiers or medium.  By extension, Internet freedom also supports the free Internet governance is characterized by transparent, bottom-up, consensus-driven processes and enables governments, the private sector, civil society, academia, and the technical community to participate on equal footing.  The United States Government will defend the open, interoperable nature of the Internet in multilateral and international fora through active engagement in key organizations, such as the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers, the Internet Governance Forum, the United Nations, and the International Telecommunication Union.\n\nflow of information online that enhances international trade and commerce, fosters innovation, and strengthens both national and international security.  As such, United States Internet freedom principles are inextricably linked to our national security.  Internet freedom is also a key guiding principle with respect to other United States foreign policy issues, such as cybercrime and counterterrorism efforts.  Given its importance, the United States will encourage other countries to advance Internet freedom through venues such as the Freedom Online Coalition, of which the United States is a founding member.\n\nPROMOTE\n          INTEROPERABLE\n                         AND\n                               RELIABLE\n\nWORK WITH LIKE-MINDED COUNTRIES, INDUSTRY,\n\nCOMMUNICATIONS\n                  INFRASTRUCTURE\n                                    AND\n\nINTERNET CONNECTIVITY: The United States\nwill promote communications infrastructure\nand Internet connectivity that is open, interop-\nerable, reliable, and secure.  Such investment\nwill provide greater opportunities for American\nfirms to compete while countering the influence\nof statist, top-down government interventions\nin areas of strategic competition.  It will also\nprotect America's security and commercial\ninterests by strengthening United States indus-\ntry's competitive position in the global digital\neconomy.  The Administration will also support\nand promote open, industry-led standards activ-\nities based on sound technological principles.\n\nPROMOTE\n          AND\n                MAINTAIN\n                          MARKETS\n                                    FOR\n\nACADEMIA, AND CIVIL SOCIETY: The United\nStates will continue to work with like-minded\ncountries, industry, civil society, and other\nstakeholders to advance human rights and\nInternet freedom globally and to counter author-\nitarian efforts to censor and influence Internet\ndevelopment.  The United States Government\nwill continue to support civil society through\nintegrated support for technology development,\ndigital safety training, policy advocacy, and\nresearch.  These programs aim to enhance the\nability of individual citizens, activists, human\nrights defenders, independent journalists, civil\nsociety organizations, and marginalized popula-\ntions to safely access the uncensored Internet\nand promote Internet freedom at the local,\nregional, national, and international levels.\n\nPROMOTE A MULTI-STAKEHOLDER MODEL OF\n\nINTERNET GOVERNANCE: The United States will continue to actively participate in global efforts to ensure that the multi-stakeholder model of Internet governance prevails against attempts to create state-centric frameworks that would undermine openness and freedom, hinder innovation, and jeopardize the functionality of the Internet.  The multi-stakeholder model of UNITED STATES INGENUITY WORLDWIDE: American innovators and security professionals have contributed significantly in designing products and services that improve our ability to communicate and interact globally and that protect communications infrastructure, data, and devices worldwide.  The United States will continue to promote markets for American ingenuity overseas, including for emerging technologies that can lower the cost of security.  The United States will also advise on infrastructure deploypartners to implement policies and practices which allow them to be effective partners in the United States-led Cyber Deterrence Initiative.\n\nments, innovation, risk management, policy, and standards to further the global Internet's reach and to ensure interoperability, security, and stability.  Finally, the United States will work with international partners, government, industry, civil society, technologists, and academics to improve the adoption and awareness of cybersecurity best practices worldwide.\n\n## Build International Cyber Capacity\n\nENHANCE CYBER CAPACITY BUILDING EFFORTS:\nMany United States allies and partners possess unique cyber capabilities that can complement our own.  The United States will work to strengthen the capacity and interoperability of those allies and partners to improve our ability to optimize our combined skills, resources, capabilities, and perspectives against shared threats. Partners can also help detect, deter, and defeat those shared threats in cyberspace.  In order for international partners to effectively protect their digital infrastructure and combat shared threats, while realizing the economic and social gains derived from the Internet and ICTs, the United States will continue to address the building blocks for organizing national efforts on cybersecurity.  We will also aggressively expand efforts to share automated and actionable cyber threat information, enhance cybersecurity coordination, and promote analytical and technical exchanges.  In addition, the United States will work to reduce the impact and influence of transnational cybercrime and terrorist activities by partnering with and strengthening the security and law enforcement capabilities of our partners to build their cyber capacity.\n\nCapacity building equips partners to protect themselves and assist the United States in addressing threats that target mutual interests, while serving broader diplomatic, economic, and security goals.  Through cyber capacity building initiatives, the United States builds strategic partnerships that promote cybersecurity best practices through a common vision of an open, interoperable, reliable, and secure Internet that encourages investment and opens new economic markets.  In addition, capacity building allows for additional opportunities to share cyber threat information, enabling the United States Government and our partners to better defend domestic critical infrastructure and global supply chains, as well as focus whole-ofgovernment cyber engagements.  Our leadership in building partner cybersecurity capacity is critical to maintaining American influence against global competitors.  Building partner cyber capacity will empower international\n\n## Notes Notes"
    },
    {
        "text": "# Insight Into Foreign Thoughtworlds For National Security Decision Makers\n\nJ. W. Barnett January 2004\nApproved for public release;\ndistribution unlimited.\n\nIDA Document D-2665\nLog:  H  01-002007\nThis work was conducted under IDA's independent research program, CRP 1075. The publication of this IDA document does not indicate endorsement by the Department of Defense, nor should the contents be construed as reflecting the official position of that Agency.  2001, 2004 Institute for Defense Analyses, 4850 Mark Center Drive, Alexandria, Virginia 22311-1882  -  (703) 845-2000. This material may be reproduced by or for the U.S. Government.\n\nIDA Document D-2665\n\n# Insight Into Foreign Thoughtworlds For National Security Decision Makers\n\nJ. W. Barnett\n\n## Preface\n\nThis paper is the product of a research project funded internally by the Institute for Defense Analyses (IDA).  Originally conceived as an exploration of ways to improve the effectiveness of so-called \"shaping\" activities conducted in support of U.S. national security objectives, the study came to focus on the more general topic of how to achieve improved understanding of the perspectives, motivations, and, more generally, thought of people in other societies and cultures.  Since 11 September 2001 it has become even more clear that improvements in such understanding are essential to U.S. national security. This work follows and builds on themes developed by the author in a series of inquiries and writings that began in 1992 in the context of directing a program in Global Security at Rocky Mountain Institute.\n\nThe author would like to thank the readers of the draft paper for their comments and criticisms, with apologies that some suggestions were not adopted in the final text. MG David Baratto, USA (Ret.); Mr. William J. Barlow; Dr. Charles W. Cook; and RADM Grant A. Sharp, USN (Ret.) all contributed thoughtful and incisive comments.\nDr. William J. Hurley was especially supportive and helpful during several iterations of this work.  In 2001, MG Baratto facilitated a series of interviews at the U.S. Army's Special Operations Command at Fort Bragg, NC, where LTG Doug Brown, MG William Boykin, BG Frank Toney, COL Al Aycock, COL Mike Kershner, COL Eugene Thompson, COL Kevin Keenan, COL James Treadwell, Dr. Robert Jenks, and other staff were generous with their time.  Many thanks also to Dr. Kevin Avruch, Dr. Robert L. Bovey, Ms. Sunjin Choi, Ms. Lisa Howard Grabman, the Rev. Glenn Hoburg, Mr. Charles H. Lyman, Ms. Patricia G. Phillips, Mr. John F. Sandoz, Mr. Edward F. Smith, Mr. James L. Wilson, Ms. Anne Wolf and Dr. Caroline F. Ziemke for discussion and comments related to their areas of expertise and experience.  The support of Mr. Philip L. Major for this project is greatly appreciated.\n\nFinally, special thanks to Dr. Alfred I. Kaufman, whose contributions to the author's education in the subject area have extended over many years.  It has been a pleasure to benefit from his cultivated intellect, complex multi-cultural life experience, and characteristically Balkan approach to the serious discussion of ideas.\n\n## Summary\n\nPresent national security concerns invite critical attention to the way the United States deploys its unparalleled political, economic, and military power.  A strategy of using superior national power to compel desired outcomescommon in recent decades is poorly suited to many present challenges, notably in the strategic war against terror, a number of taxing regional crises, and in countering a global wave of anti-U.S. sentiment.\nThere are alternative strategies that, instead of seeking to compel or force, actively engage foreign partners or adversaries in a way that recognizes their interests, perspectives, will, and energies and that seek to effectively communicate, influence, channel extant dynamics, or sometimes affect more fundamental changes in thought or action.  Such strategies, not without their own limitations, should now receive relatively more consideration and emphasis in U.S. national security affairs because they may better address many current challenges that are, at best, ineffectively addressed by efforts to compel.\nWe note among these alternative strategies a distinct reliance on a nuanced understanding of how people in other societies thinktheir thoughtworldsthat is more demanding than that required to compel.  Such a degree of understanding has not been commonly reflected in U.S. national security affairs, and is not prominent in U.S. society generally.  A well-focused effort is needed to organize a suitable knowledge base of foreign thought and to make consideration of the insights it enables a standard feature of national security decision making.\n\nThe study of foreign thoughtworlds can best be approached through comparative, inherently multi-disciplinary study based on understanding others *on their own terms*.\nU.S. society proves to be rich with the resources needed to implement this approach: the perspectives of indigenous thought, available through direct international communication or through emigre communities; the expertise resident in diverse fields of academic and less formally organized study; and the experience of practitioners involved in a host of international and domestic activities, some less obviously relevant to U.S. national security affairs.  Leveraged in an organized, sustained manner, these resources can provide pragmatic insights for the formulation and assessment of national security strategy, policy, plans, and actions.\n\nOperationalizing insights into foreign thoughtworlds will require considerable leadership commitment to achieve a few key objectives, especially raising decision makers' awareness of the need for, and benefits of, such insights; establishing a dedicated institution to serve as a national focal point; and integrating consideration of such insights into the institutional processes that support national security decision making.\n\n## I.  National Power, Global Commitments\n\nThe United States justifiably claims political, economic, and especially military power unparalleled not only in the modern world, but in history.  We have generally deployed our power with similarly unique restraint, very often in aid of others.  We find ourselves, then, in unexpected circumstances: engaged in protracted battle with a network of vicious irregulars committed to the destruction of our (and all of Western) civilization;\ndrawn into a number of regional crisessome seemingly intractablethat dissipate our attention and energies as their intensity cycles; and encountering a global wave of negative sentiment, even from erstwhile allies who are often reluctant to join in what would seem to be common cause.  Our immense power has come to appear limited in its ability to guarantee our national security.\nIn the disorienting early days after 11 September 2001, our experience had some resonance with that of Tolstoy's young Count Rostov in his first battlefield engagement, his horse shot from beneath him and facing advancing enemy troops:\nHe stared at the approaching Frenchmen, and though only a moment before he had been galloping ahead to reach these men and cut them down, their proximity now seemed to him so awful that he could not believe his eyes.  \"Who are they? Why are they running? Can they be coming to me? Really coming to me? And why? To kill me? Me whom everyone loves?\"... He stood for more than ten seconds, not moving from the spot, not understanding his position.1\nWe have since had some time to think about our position in what seems in many ways a new world.  Our circumstances particularly invite critical attention to the way we deploy our national power:  Do present deployments seem well-matched to the international security environment, or could other approaches more effectively support U.S. national security objectives?\nThis question is addressed below, beginning with a discussion of the possibilities and limitations of one prominent use of U.S. national power:  to compel.\n\n\n\n## A. Compellance In National Security Affairs\n\nU.S. national security objectives aim to preserve a vibrant U.S. society based on individual liberty, a democratic form of government, and a free market economy, and to extend the benefits of  this model to other nations.  The war against terrorism now has the highest priority, but President Bush's national security strategy also prioritizes regional conflict resolution, promoting development abroad, and building relationships with other powers. 2\nIn global pursuit of such a broad set of objectives, one clear option for so powerful a nation as the United States is compellance: to force a leader or regime or nation to accede to U.S. preferences, like it or not, by the implicit or explicit threator useof superior power in political, economic, and/or military forms.  Conceptually supported by the established realist model of international relations, this deployment of national power has many essential advantages.  First, some threats to national security require it: stopping armed aggression against the United States and its allies, responding to immediate threats of terrorism, stopping the use of weapons of mass destruction. Second, it circumvents the time needed for possibly unproductive negotiations or diplomatic encounters, which can be used as a stalling tactic by adversaries. Compellance may preclude the need for compromises that fall short of the intended result. If overwhelming power is readily available and employable, results may be achieved relatively quickly.\n\nThere are, however, some obvious limitations to the use of superior power to compel outcomes.  The blunt use of political, economic, or military power is not uniformly effective in achieving the full range of U.S. national security objectives.  Of course, compellance is never likely to be effective in support of peaceful objectives: strengthening alliances, promoting prosperity, and the like.  But even in conflict, its effectiveness is limited when the level of applied power is restricted by the nature of the adversary or the setting.  For example, overwhelming military power is harder to apply against adversaries employing guerilla tactics (especially in urban settings, where there is great U.S. concern for collateral casualties) or organizing themselves after the *al Qaeda* model with its globally mobile fluid membership.  There are also applications of economic power, but these may be of relatively little use against a committed adversary: Saddam Hussein's regime (and palace construction) seemed to suffer little from economic sanctions, while the effect on Iraqi children became an international cause.\nA second limitation is that compellance often requires continued presence, or its effect may be undone.  This is seen today in Iraq and Afghanistan as it was in the Balkans. Particularly if actions are undertaken with few or no allies, a point will be reached in the proliferation of intensive political, economic, and military commitments where U.S. power will become dissipated to the point of ineffectiveness.  This consequence brings to mind the ironic slogan used in the past by activists in criticism of a national energy strategy centered on the quick depletion of all known oil reserves: \"Strength through Exhaustion.\"\nFinally, frequent recourse to superior power to compel engenders antipathy, and not only among those compelled.  Decades ago, the late Mexican author and diplomat Octavio Paz expressed a frustration not limited to Mexican elites:\nThe United States, smiling or angry, its hand open or clenched, neither sees nor hears us but keeps striding on, and as it does so, enters our lands and crushes us.  It is impossible to hold back a giant; it is possible, though far from easy, to make him listen to others; if he listens, that opens the possibility of coexistence.  Because of their origins (the Puritan speaks only with God and himself, not with others), and above all because of their power, the North Americans are outstanding in the art of the monologue: they are eloquent and they also know the value of silence.  But conversation is not their forte: they do not know how to listen or reply.3\nAs a natural result of envy and resentment of U.S. power, and also because of some ways that power has been deployed in the international arena, the United States is perceived in many quarters as arrogant, uncaring of others' interests, and hypocritical due to perceived inconsistencies between actions and the ideals our nation espouses.  And bent on global hegemony:  as if Americans' main comfort in life was to await the day when  \"the United States will be able to impose its pluralist-democratic ideology on a grateful world....\"4\nMost Americans may find these kinds of perceptions ill-informed at best, but a climate of\n\n\ncritical, negative, or hostile world opinion nonetheless aids our adversaries and fuels a dynamic that counters our global leadership.  Kissinger observed in mid-2001 that \"[t]he matter-of-fact acceptance of our hegemony is wearing off.\"5  This trend is accelerated by the image of arrogance.\n\nCompellance, then, appears as a useful and sometimes essential strategy, but not by itself a wholly effective way to pursue present U.S. national security objectives. Central, for example, to the tactical war on terrorism, it has also sounded as a sometimes dissonant overtone in settings where it is less well suited: in international legal, environmental, and trade negotiations, in relations with less friendly but not explicitly hostile governments, and less overtly even in the conduct of interactions with allies and friends.\n\n## B. Complements To Compellance\n\nU.S. power can also be deployed in a number of ways that are based not on compelling or imposing a behavior, but rather on engaging partners or adversaries in a way that recognizes their interests, perspectives, will, and energy, and either finding a way to channel their dynamic in a direction congenial to U.S. interests, or of affecting more fundamental changes in foreign perception, thought, or action.  Power deployed in this way is intended to achieve desired results less directly than by coercion; it leverages rather than imposes.  Examples of non-compulsive approachesall standard if less emphasized deployments of national powerinclude strengthening relationships; building international community; affecting views of the United States held by foreign leaders, elites, or populations, including through public diplomacy; engaging and influencing perceptions that impede regional conflict resolution; negotiating; and encouraging political, economic, or social changes toward adoption of such goals as representative government, economic or legal reform, environmental sustainability,6 and broader individual liberties, especially when such changes promise to weaken threats against the United States.  In military context, alternatives to compellance include psychological operations and deception.\nCertain of these alternatives may strike some readers as undesirable or distasteful, since intentional efforts to change others' thoughts or behavior in peacetime interactions may seem to violate the sanctity of individual cultures or personalities.  But there is no such thing as a static culture (the North Korean border probably most closely, but imperfectly, approximates an hermetic seal) or personality.  People around the world are influenced all the time, to some degree, by a constantly modulating input of images and ideas from other local or foreign people, the media, entertainment, or the internet.  In this dynamic situation, the real question is whether the United States is content to deploy its political, economic, and military power without thoughtfully engaging peoples of interest with serious attempts at communication, letting American intentions and positions be interpreted abroad by vocal, hostile locals or inferred by foreign populations from, for example, Gov. Schwarzenegger's old movies or Baywatch reruns.\n\nThe complements to compellance have their own limitations: they too are not effective in every circumstance.  They may take longer to achieve objectives than compellance (although the results may be longer lasting) so they may not be as effective in situations where time is critical.  But in contrast with compellance, they apply more readily to peacetime interactions with friends and adversaries alike; they can, in some cases, ease the demand for constant U.S. presence by engaging the intentions and energies of local people; and they are much more likely to minimize negative sentiment against the United States and to be effective in long-term conflicts, such as the strategic war against terror.  It is notable that the limits of compellanceits applicability to a limited range of U.S. national security objectives and types of threats, its ultimate straining of U.S. strategic resources when applied to numerous simultaneous engagements, and the resentment it fuelsseem likely to apply for the foreseeable future. Therefore, the argument is that non-compulsive approaches should now receive relatively more emphasis in U.S. national security affairs because they are suited to many current challenges that are, at best, ineffectively addressed by compellance.\nNon-compulsive approaches are related to the theme articulated, under the Clinton administration, by the unfortunately chosen word \"shaping.\"   This word brings to mind a sculptor imposing his design on an unprotesting, inert lump of clay (Pygmalion sculpting Galatea?).  In the present report, non-compulsive approaches are instead seen as supportive of international strategy executed, as it were, more as if there were people on the other end.  Successful implementation of such approaches tends to involve three competencies:\n\n- Interpreting foreign intentionsUnderstanding the basis for positions and\nactions, the dynamics driving foreign motivations\n- Communicating\nclearly\nto\nforeign\naudiencesDeveloping\nmessages\nrespectful of foreign sensibilities that communicate U.S. positions, reasoning, or experience\n- Crafting strategies to advance U.S. objectivesStrategic approaches that\nemploy the intellectual access provided by improved interpretation and\ncommunication, perhaps leading to the engagement or channeling of existing\nenthusiasms and energies, or, in some cases, to changes in foreign thoughts or actions brought about by new perceptions or realizations.\nCompared with efforts to compel through superior power, these activities share a greater reliance on a comprehensive and nuanced understanding of how people in other societies think,7 a degree of understanding that cannot be said to be commonly reflected in U.S. national security affairs or to be prominent in U.S. society generally.8\n\n## C. Enabling Insights\n\nNon-compulsive efforts to pursue national security objectives require familiarity with foreign perspectives, motives, attitudes, apprehensions, aspirations, mindsets, and ways of thinking, not only on the level of individual leaders, but also as such features of individual thought are manifested in collectives, e.g., elites, clans, professional affiliations, communities of belief, ethnic groups, and whole cultures or societies.  The term *thoughtworld* is used in this paper to describe in summary fashion the complete mental environment, to include language; emotions; character (personality, disposition, tendencies of action); cultural/historical context; memories and life experience; beliefs (religion, ideology, worldview); motivations; and reasoning and other thought processes.\n\n8\nThe United States is far from alone in this regard; there are some impressive counter-examples, but, in\ngeneral, nuanced attention to how others think appears to be a rarity worldwide.\nIt is important to note that the goal here is to develop helpful insights into foreign thoughtworlds, not to attempt anything so comprehensive as a total understanding of them.  As will be illustrated in the following chapters, differences in how people think are so complex and unpredictable that the best that can be hoped for are insights to help interpret foreign statements or positions, cast U.S. messages for foreign ears, or inform approaches toward encouraging desired changes in thought or behavior.  Subtle understanding of foreign thoughtworlds is needed for planning, carrying out, and assessing these efforts.\n\nSome may take issue with the charge of national deficiency in this area, pointing out that concern for how others think is a part of daily life for people in many professions, notably those in diplomatic and intelligence services.  This is true and, in fact, means that there are many resourcessome largely untappedavailable to national security decision makers.  But the needed depth of insight is not common in the ranks of professional diplomats for reasons that include the geographic diversity of postings that has been an established requisite to promotion even though it limits expertise in particular cultures, as well as the (not baseless) fear of \"clientitis\" and \"going native.\" Nor are the insights of interest here within the core assignments of those in the national intelligence community who might seem to be so tasked.  Intelligence analysts produce for senior decision makers a certain type of finished intelligence, which is critically important and typically professionally done; but the development of insights such as will be discussed in succeeding chapters is neither their tasking nor their institutional forte. And to be fair, diplomats and intelligence analysts are not usually national security decision makers: the people (often political appointees) filling those ranks, with all respect for their intelligence, drive, and experience, tend to be even further removed from real insight into foreign minds.\nThe historical record is dense with examples of national security efforts seemingly conducted without much consideration of such insight.  A few examples from recent decades include efforts to win hearts and minds in the Vietnamese countryside; the surprising (to the U.S.) Iranian revolution; the even more surprising sequence of events in eastern Europe during the collapse of the Soviet Union; the awkward effort to choose sides in the cultural melee during the war in the former Yugoslavia, leading to a decision to actively side with the Albanian faction; the failed efforts to gain French, German, and Turkish support for the war with Iraq, early experience with the Shiites in post-Saddam Iraq, and continuing resentment from the same Iraqi people who were expected by some to welcome U.S. liberators with flowers; and, more generally, the negativity directed toward the United States in populations around the world.  And the perennial lack of language and cultural expertise every time an incident arises in some less-attended-to corner of the world is also indicative of a national deficiency: recall the recent (ongoing) scramble for Arabic, Pashtu, Urdu, Uzbekh, and Farsi speakers.\nOf course, better understanding of how others think will not always lead to a positive realization or to unexpectedly peaceful or cooperative outcomes.  In his science fiction/social satire work, *The Hitchhiker's Guide to the Galaxy*, British author Douglas Adams wrote of a small fish that, when inserted into the ear, enabled immediate understanding of any language.  The result: \"[The] Babel fish, by effectively removing all barriers to communication between different races and cultures, has caused more and bloodier wars than anything else in the history of creation.\"9  So may insight into foreign thought instead reveal the true intractability of a conflict or an insurmountable gulf in values or intentions, situations that may mandate the use of compelling power.\nBut this is the main point: insight into foreign thoughtworlds is not proposed as a cure-all, but instead as a unique, richbut presently underemphasizedcomplement to the other input informing U.S. national security strategy, policy, plans, and actions.  It will not lead to always getting other countries \"right,\" but should help us get them \"wrong\" less often.  And at best, if it can be properly operationalized in support of U.S.\n\ndecision makers, it may lead in some cases to the identification of new approaches to achieving national security objectives, bases for new agreements, or even foundations for conciliation.  The following chapters explore the nature of human thoughtworlds, sources of insight into them, and ways to foster the employment of such insights by decision makers to the benefit of U.S. national security.\n\n\n\n## Ii.  The Unimaginable Diversity Of Human Thoughtworlds\n\nOur intuition and imagination are poor guides to figuring out how other people think. This is because of the amazing, unpredictable diversity of human thought and also because our own assessments of others are limited by difficult-to-eliminate filters.  This diversity is demonstrated below with several examples and is followed by the identification of several filters commonly active in contemporary Americans.\n\n## A. The Chinese Encyclopedia And Other Examples\n\nIn a \"certain Chinese encyclopedia\" it is written that \"animals are divided into: (a) belonging to the Emperor, (b) embalmed, (c) tame, (d) suckling pigs, (e) sirens, (f) fabulous, (g) stray dogs, (h) included in the present classification, (i) frenzied, (j) innumerable, (k) drawn with a very fine camel hair brush, (l) *et cetera*, (m) having just broken the water pitcher,\n(n) that from a long way off look like flies.\"1\nWhether the encyclopedia ever really existed or was a creation of Argentine writer Jorge Luis Borges, it is a striking example of the human possibilities of even such a potentially mundane activity as grouping animals.  French author Michel Foucault comments on the passage: \"In the wonderment of this taxonomy, the thing that is demonstrated in the exotic charm of another system of thought, is the limitation of our own, the stark impossibility of thinking *that*.\"2\nIn fact, it would seem that the most important, revealing differences aren't ones that strike us as interesting or quaint or a little strange. They're the things that revolt, shock, or anger us, that we find outrageous or unbelievable, untenable as thoughts or actions of sane people.  They challenge our bedrock beliefs about what is true, right, good, expected, acceptable, forgivable, rational, or honest.  The following few examples\n\nAugsburger, *op. cit.*\nmanifest ways of thinking that rangeviewed with typical American sensibilitiesfrom the startlingly different to the nearly, but not quite, familiar (which in some cases can be even more jarring).\n\n## 1. Propriety\n\nThe sense of what constitutes proper, acceptable behavior is one of the most frequently encountered differences between people, noticeable even in casual travel. Examples range from physical comportment (don't offer your left hand or show the bottoms of your shoes in an Arab country) to eating habits (belching to express gratitude for a good meal, or not) to body language (when, how much, and how to smile).  There are usually differences in accepted behavior between the sexes and also discriminations based on social standing and other factors.\nEvidence of differing notions of propriety may be found in private and public settings alike.  In public context, for example, we might consider religious gatherings of various sorts (a relaxed family visit to a Hindu temple, the simplicity and silence of a traditional Quaker meeting, men prostrate on prayer rugs at a mosque, the unison chanting of a Buddhist ceremony) or sports events (golf, soccer, a fox hunt, a bull fight). A society's sense of propriety may be deliberately violated as a protest: in 2001, women from Nigeria's ruling party threatened to walk through Lagos naked and then to camp in the same condition for a week because some of their ranks had been arrested in a political demonstration.3   Seen as a shameful and embarrassing violation of a national taboo against nudity of mature women, one can imagine that such a gesture would be greeted differently in, say, western Europe (witness the recent nude protests against U.S. military action in Iraq) or San Francisco.\n\n## 2. Communication\n\nCommunication through speech, writing, body language, images, symbols, or symbolic acts is the intentional flow of ideas between two or more minds via inherently limited channels.  It is a very rich area of inquiry and clearly at the heart of international interactions.  Arjun Appadurai's remarks about global communication in a political context apply broadly:\n\n...the political narratives that govern communication between elites and followers in different parts of the world involve problems of both a semantic and pragmatic nature: semantic to the extent that words (and their lexical equivalents) require careful translation from context to context in their global movements, and pragmatic to the extent that the use of these words by political actors and their audiences may be subject to very different sets of contextual conventions that mediate their translation into public politics.4\nThe translation of meaning from context to context, whatever the medium, stands as an imposing challenge due not only to differences in the thinking of originator and receiver, but with additional complexity introduced by subtleties of particular languages and styles of expression.\nWithin the limits of the present work, we will only briefly reference some differences in styles of verbal communication, which can range from direct to elliptical to parabolic as suited to different peoples, purposes, and contents.  Contrast a typical linear U.S. exposition of information, say in a corporate briefing, an academic lecture, or a nightly news report, with the Japanese zen tradition (shared by the Sufi tradition among others) of leading students to enlightenment using parables whose meaning may not be apprehended intellectually.  For example,\nNansen saw the monks of the eastern and western halls fighting over a cat. He seized the cat and told the monks: \"If any of you say a good word, you can save the cat.\"  No one answered.  So Nansen boldly cut the cat in two pieces.  That evening Joshu returned and Nansen told him about this. Joshu removed his sandals and, placing them on his head, walked out.\nNansen said: \"If you had been there, you could have saved the cat.\"5\nSomething is being transmitted here, but try putting it into words! Another example of indirect language:  the use of the metaphorical Aesopian language (patterned after Aesop's fables) and of poetry by Russians in Soviet times to communicate criticisms of Party leaders and other dangerous messages.\n\n## 3. Reality\n\nWhat individuals are willing to accept as a normal part of reality, an important factor across the spectrum of national security affairs, is a complex result of personality, beliefs, cultural environment, and life history.  Even people we interact with on a daily basis at home or at work may be operating in a perceived reality greatly divergent from our own. Many years ago the author had a conversation with a young Army officer from Arizona.  Talk turned to life on the Navajo reservation where she had grown up.  While describing some aspects of everyday life, she spoke matter-of-factly about people transforming into animals, consistent with traditional Navajo belief.   Her remarks, describing experience outside the author's own, were an effective reminder that we usually know little about what goes on in the minds even of people around us who we generally accept as \"like\" us.\n\nEqually striking differences in perceptions and expectations of reality may be found among commonly encountered belief systems, including the religions (e.g., Buddhism, Christianity, Hinduism, Islam, Judaism, Sikhism, Taoism, their variants, and a host of less widespread traditional and syncretic systems); mystical practices (New Age, witchcraft); secular philosophies (e.g., Confucianism, objectivism, *juche*); positivism and empiricism (including science, with its attendant fiduciary acts); agnosticism and atheism; and nihilism.  The language of Western philosophy gives us some concepts that are helpful in beginning to compare the essential differences among these systems of belief (ontology, concerning the nature of being; epistemology, concerning the nature and origin of knowledge; and teleology, concerning the purpose of natural phenomena), but there are pragmatic consequences perhaps more relevant to national security affairs. Differences in fundamental beliefs contribute (along with other factors) to such important characteristics of people and societies as social cohesion, industriousness, views of conflict and forgiveness, charity toward others, attachment to material comforts, capacity for suffering, and willingness to die for a given cause.\n\n## 4. Justice\n\nThere is a rich diversity of interpretations of justice and its implementation, many quite far from American notions.  Strict interpretations of Islamic *shariah*, with stonings and amputations, seem barbaric to most Americans.  The Albanian blood feud tradition, based on the Kanun Law developed in oral tradition over many centuries, sanctions revenge killings by family members.  Traditional Hawaiian culture featured a City of Refuge (*pu uhonua*), in which transgressors against tribal laws could be ceremonially purified and prepared again for life in the community...if they could make it safely to the gates.\nAn outrageous recent example of foreign justice was the June 2002 case in Pakistan where a rural tribal council punished a 12-year-old boy for having an affair by ordering the gang rape of his older sister.6  On the other hand, American support for the death penalty is viewed as uncivilized in many European nations.\n\n## 5. Time\n\nTime is conceived and experienced differently in various cultures.  Characteristic Swiss precision regarding measuring time and living a temporally ordered life contrasts with the less precision-oriented Mexican norm, where showing up \"on time\" for a meetingrather than latecan offend.  On a grand scale, consider the cyclical notion of time found in Hindu or Aztec culture, compared with the linearity of the Judeo-Christian cultural scheme, where a directionality of time (toward the anticipated establishment of God's kingdom on earth) supports a globally unusual concept of progress.\nThere is also the weight of time past, that is, history, so prominent in many societiesbut not in the United States, where an almost ahistorical attitude is more common.  People in the Balkans, the eastern Mediterranean countries, and in Islamic societies (to name a few) continue in dynamics of conflict established many centuries ago, in times that pre-date the American historical memory.\n\n## 6. Identity And Social Groups\n\nThere is a stark difference between the individualism and nationalism dominant in the United States with the social affiliations dominant in many other countries. These might include extended family, clan, or broader ethnic origin, or such geographic divisions as city or region.  The American notion of patriotism, that is, having a good part of individual identity oriented toward a national affiliation unrelated (mostly) to ethnic or extended family ties, is globally rare.\n\nAn alternative emphasis is found in traditional Chinese culture, well-known for its emphasis on the family and particularly on the Confucian concept of filial piety (*hsiao*), or \"inherent love-and-respect toward parents.\"7  Filial piety actually extends to one's departed ancestors, as well as living parents.  This fundamental virtue extended from the family context into broader social, religious, and political life in China. Tseng Tzu, a disciple of Confucius, said, \"Those who lack propriety in private life, loyalty in serving the sovereign, seriousness in discharging official duties, faithfulness in treating friends, or bravery in waging war are all found wanting in filial piety.\"8 Here the proper identification with one's family and demonstrated attitude toward one's parents were portrayed as essential to a good and worthy life.\nA culture's norms of identity and social groupings may also influence such national characteristics as stability or economic success.  The economist W. Arthur Lewis, a native of the West Indies, considered (along with others) that \"the extended family is often an impediment to progress because it gets in the way of national cohesion,\" 9 in Lewis' view, a requirement for economic development.\n\n## 7. Freedom\n\nAmericans have an almost proprietary sense about freedom, as interpreted to imply freedom of personal expression, freedom of the press, freedom to enjoy life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness.  But there are different concepts of freedom in other countries.  For example, hear how the poet Alexander Pushkin, highly regarded by Russians as a unique interpreter of the Russian soul, depicted freedom in his 1838 poem From Pindemonti:\nI have little use for those loudly proclaimed rights That sent many a head spinning. And I do not regret that gods denied me\n\n\nPress, 1967), p. 170.\nLawrence E. Harrison, *Underdevelopment is a State of Mind*, Madison Books, Lanham, MD, 1985, p.\n21.\nThat precious opportunity to dispute taxes Or interfere with struggles of rulers.\n\nI could not care less if the press is free to fool the idiots Or if a censor limits the empty talk of the newspaper pages. All this talk of rights is but meaningless words. I cherish very different rights, the ones that are much better. I sorely need another kind of freedom: To depend on the rulers or to depend on people - What difference does it make? I do not care for either. To report to no one, to serve and cater to no one but myself; To never compromise my conscience, change my plans, or bend my neck For powers-that-be or to get a position.\n\nTo roam here and there as I please, enjoying the beauty of nature, Becoming ecstatic from seeing art, appreciating fruits of inspiration -\nHere is what I call happiness, here is what I call rights.10\n\nHere is an extremely individualistic view of freedom that even rejects the very kinds of measures established in the United States to preserve individual rights as we think of them.\nAlthough a sound majority of people throughout the world seem to like the idea of doing what they want to do, when they want to do it, significant variations arise when individual desires are aggregated into local cultural infrastructures.  Historically, individual rights have simply been afforded less priority in, for example, Asian and Islamic societies.  Freedom can instead be considered from group, rather than individual, perspectives.\n\n## 8. Truth\n\nTruth is an inherently difficult concept, tied as it is to subjective experience as well as to sources of knowledge, and therefore liable to a range of interpretation in different localities.  The  objective \"fact\" as it is known in contemporary U.S. society is a concept not equally rooted in all societies.\nMany regimes have seen truth as an independent variable.  For example, there was the Soviet practice of editing history by airbrushing fallen individuals out of photographs (e.g., the discredited prominent revolutionary Bukharin).  This sometimes\n\n\ntook a macabre twist when sloppy censors would leave disembodied hands or other evidences.  The Soviet government also strictly controlled science,  including research directions and experimental results, particularly, for example, in biology.\nIn Sufism, considered by some to be a mystical form of Islam, there is a view that finding (ultimate) truth involves discovering that peoples' truth is relative.  This point is illustrated in a story about the sage Mulla Nasrudin:\nOne day Nasrudin was sitting at court.  The King was complaining that his subjects were untruthful.  \"Majesty,\" said Nasrudin, \"there is truth and truth.  People must practice real truth before they can use relative truth.\n\nThey always try the other way around.  The result is that they take liberties with their man-made truth, because they know instinctively that it is only an invention.\" The King thought that this was too complicated. \"A thing must be true or false.  I will *make* people tell the truth, and by this practice they will establish the habit of being truthful.\" When the city gates were opened the next morning, a gallows had been erected in front of them, presided over by the captain of the royal guard. A herald announced: \"Whoever would enter the city must first answer the truth to a question which will be put to him by the captain of the guard.\" Nasrudin, who had been waiting outside, stepped forward first.  The captain spoke: \"Where are you going? Tell the truththe alternative is death by hanging.\"  \"I am going,\" said Nasrudin, \"to be hanged on those gallows.\"  \"I don't believe you!\"  \"Very well, then.  If I have told a lie, hang me!\"  \"But that would *make* it the truth!\"  \"Exactly,\" said Nasrudin,\n\"*your* truth.\"11\n\n## 9. Aesthetics And Tastes\n\nAesthetics and tastes are concerned with subjective perception and reactions to subjects that may include sensory input (color, smell, taste, sound, feel), surroundings, or situations.  Many gaffes in intercultural interactions are based on such differences.  For example, once when a prominent airline initiated an Asian route, passengers embarking on the maiden flight were unsettled when they received white carnations.  This wouldn't have been unusual in the U.S., where white might have been perceived as a somewhat lackluster choice, but in Asia the color is associated with death and misfortune.\nSocieties offer different degrees of cultivation regarding aesthetics. Japanese aesthetics, with such concepts as sabi, *wabi*, and *shibui* to express or process complex responses to certain situations and settings, must be at the most nuanced, sophisticated end of the spectrum.  But more easily comprehensible examples may be found in tastes for food (e.g., for certain animals or animal parts or even insects; consider the Maasai consumption of cow blood mixed with milk); music (contrast Albanian techno-folk, Tuvan multi-harmonic throat singing, cool jazz, baroque fugues, Indian ragas, and rap); or the preferences evidenced in ornamentation worldwide (how people accent their physical appearance with jewelry or makeup, what clothing they imagine they look good in, as well as artistic ornamentation of furniture, dwellings, and a variety of daily-use possessions).\n\n## 10. Death\n\nA recent on-line article seemed to herald the logical conclusion of trends in popular American attitudes toward death converged with our national ethos of individualism and consumerism.12  Given a distancing from death that has led, for example, to death more often in clinical settings than at home and memorial services without casket or urn present, Americans are now invited to \"put the 'fun' back into funeral services.\"  Art caskets (\"Last Hole\" for golfers, or \"Return to Sender\" for jokesters), pop music favorites to set the tone, ashes shot into space or embedded in an underwater eternal reef:  death can be viewed as an occasion for celebration, statement, and choice.  Witness also the growth in popular support for euthanasia and assisted suicide.\nOther nations, in most of which disease and death are a more visible part of life than in the United States, have naturally developed their own unique responses and rituals.  In many cultures, not long after death, open caskets are hand-carried to the grave and buried as a communal undertaking.  Grief is very openly displayed, not so suppressed as it can be in the United States.  Many Asian cultures venerate departed ancestors,\n\ndisplaying their likenesses in the home rather like icons.    The Mexican festival called the Day of the Dead, with its roots in Aztec times, celebrates the dead, children, and the continuity of life in activities including graveside picnics.13  A globally notable attitude toward death and the dead is found in the ritual \"turning of the bones\" of the Malagasy people, a ritual exhumation of recently departed family members' remains performed at certain intervals after death.\n\nThese few examples begin to suggest the diversity of human thoughtworlds. It would be hard enough to approach understanding of such complex and often surprising differences if we did so with open minds. Instead, we carry with us a number of mental filters that complicate the task.\n\n## B. Perceptual Predispositions\n\nOur ability to imagine how people in other societies think is limited by a number of difficult-to-overcome filters.  Here we consider predispositions associated with human nature, U.S. domestic culture, and American views of the world.\n\n1.\nHuman Nature\nFive senses; an incurably abstract intellect; a haphazardly selective memory; a set of preconceptions and assumptions so numerous that I can never examine more than a minority of themnever become even conscious of them all.  How much of total reality can such an apparatus let through?\n\n - C. S. Lewis 14\nLewis clearly identifies limits of the human organism as it considers itself and others.  Compounding our incomplete awareness of people in other societies is the way we process that which we do perceive.  At a fundamental level, as embodied beings we separate ourselves (as individuals or in identification with some group) from others; and we operate differently on either side of that divide.  This may be manifested by ignoring others' existence, vilifying them, or in the extreme by actually relegating them to sub-\n\n(Amityville, NY: Baywood Publishing Company, 2003), pp. 75-76.  Available online at www.public.\niastate.edu/~rjsalvad/scmfaq/muertos.html.\n14\nC. S. Lewis, *A Grief Observed* (New York: Bantam Books, 1976), p. 74.\nhuman status.  This last has aided the pogroms and programs of genocide that fill history books.\n\nPsychological studies on personality, performed on American subjects, have suggested consistent differences between the way individuals interpret their own behavior and the way they interpret that of others.  For example, in some studies people tended to explain their own behavior with reference to external, situational factors (i.e., \"circumstances made me do that\") while explaining others' behaviors in terms of internal traits (i.e., \"they have an evil nature\").  A belief in one's own uniquenessperhaps particularly strong in the United States on both individual and national levelswas found to lead to marginalization of situational and other factors, and to constitute a limiting factor both in self-understanding and in understanding others. 15\n\n## 2. Influences Of U.S. Domestic Culture\n\nThe experience of the local domestic environment also strongly influences our understanding of foreign thinking, and even our basic orientation to learning beyond a superficial level how any other person thinks.   In mainstream U.S. society today,16 and perhaps particularly among elite groups such as the East Coast community dominant in national security affairs, better-than-superficial interactions with othersespecially those very different from usare becoming rarer due to affluence, the pace of life, and the way \"free\" time is deployed.\n\nThe affluence of U.S. society means that people can often afford what they want to have and what they want to do.  More importantly, it means that they typically have to rely on each other less, avoiding dependent relationships but diminishing the sense of community. Schedules are saturated, especially in metropolitan areas such as the one centered on Washington, D.C., and often reflect a lot of transit time between activities. Across the range of ages, the combination of contemporary entertainment (e.g.,\n\n\nOthers,\" pp. 191-220.\n16\nSome stimulating perspectives on contemporary U.S. culture are available in Peter Menzel, Material\nWorld (San Francisco: Sierra Club Books, 1995); John DeGraaf, David Wann, Thomas H. Naylor, Affluenza:  The All-Consuming Epidemic (San Francisco: Berret-Koehler Publishers, 2001);  Lloyd Kahn and Bob Easton (eds.), *Shelter* (Bolinas, CA: Shelter Publications, 1973);  Neil Postman,\nAmusing Ourselves to Death (New York: Penguin Books, 1986).\ntelevisioneven in public waiting rooms, DVDs, the Walkman, the Gameboy) and communications (cell phones, wireless portable computing with internet access)\nreinforces spending less time with other people, claims of the virtues of  electronically enabled communities of interest notwithstanding.\n\nAll of this encourages shallower interactions between people even in the same ethnic group (since we're addressing the national security affairs community, this would be primarily people of western European descent), without even factoring in the physical and economic separations that further impede close interactions among Americans from different ethnic backgrounds.17  Beyond the level of such works of popular psychology as Men are from Mars, Women are from Venus, the U.S. cultural climate doesn't appear particularly supportive either of understanding how other people think, or even of much interest in the question.\n\n## 3. Americans View The World\n\nBeyond inherent human tendencies and aspects of our domestic culture that affect our approach to foreign thoughtworlds, as Americans we tend to carry a number of assumptions about the international situation, our place in it, and how others out there think.\n\nMany Americans hold the belief that people in many other societies think like we do and value what we value, that they like Americans and want to be like us.  (This sort of mirror-imaging became less prominent after 9-11 but is still applied, perhaps especially to non-Arab peoples.)  Extensions of this theme include the idea that the Western scientific way of knowing/understanding reality is universally shared; that technology is viewed and employed the same way everywhere; and that a completely secular model of interstate relations adequately accommodates reality.18\nMany specific concepts and values are often assumed to be commonly interpreted and used worldwide.  Language is seen as a neutral tool: U.S. concepts of peace, justice, freedom, rights, honor, and war are thought to be shared, or at least understood,\n\neverywhere.  Human life is taken to be valued the same way in all societies, and U.S. notions of unlimited progress and modernity are thought to be understood and desired globally.\n\nFinally, there are common views of the possibilities and consequences of the spread of U.S. political, economic, and legal forms abroad.  It is frequently assumed that all other societies have a cultural infrastructure suited to the ready adaptation of a U.S.- style democracy, free market economy, and legal system, and that we simply have to catalyze the transformation.  Some believe that the reason some countries haven't yet implemented a free market democracy is that the leaders just haven't received enough exposure to American processes, as if a broader educational outreach would bring success.  Some hold the view that if all countries were free market democracies, then international war would become rare because of the restraining effect of economic ties and the natural aversion of citizens in a democracy to war.19 And the cultural purpose and implementation of law is assumed to be the same worldwide.\nThese myths about the international community hinder understanding of actual foreign thoughtworlds, the subject of the next chapter.\n\n(This page is intentionally blank.)\n\n\n## Iii.  Opportunities For Insight\n\nHow can we approach the study of human thoughtworlds in a way that, despite the immensity of the challenge posed by the extensive and complex differences among them, as well as our own embedded predispositions, will lead to the identification of insights useful to national security decision makers?\nThis chapter addresses the question of methodology and identifies a preferred analytic approach.   A number of sources useful for developing insights into foreign thought are identified.  The concluding section summarizes five case studies that illustrate the kinds of insights available from diverse sources, some largely untapped for national security purposes.\n\n## A. Apprehending Foreign Thoughtworlds:  Analytic Approaches\n\nAs we look for models of insight into foreign cultures and thought, a number of outstanding, often groundbreaking, observers and interpreters of foreign cultures come to mind:  Alexis de Toqueville (*Democracy in America*1), Ruth Benedict (The Chrysanthemum and the Sword,2 *Patterns of Culture*3), Gunnar Myrdal (Asian Drama:\nAn Inquiry into the Poverty of Nations4), Hajime Nakamura (Ways of Thinking of Eastern Peoples5), and Hedrick Smith (*The Russians*6), to name only a few.\nThese examples, while suggestive of the general level of understanding we might aspire to,  include a mix of eclectic, highly personal approaches and methodologies that would be difficult to replicate.  Since our intent is to support the government\n\n\n1968).\n6\nHedrick Smith, *The Russians* (New York: Ballantine Books, 1981).\norganizations involved in national security decision making, here we seek to articulate an approach that can be institutionalized.  The basic analytic challenge is therefore to identify a methodology that can be employed in response to a particular question of interest from national security decision makers, providing useful insights to inform along with political, economic, and other inputsstrategy, policy, planning, and actions.\n\n## 1. Survey Of Selected Approaches\n\nAs an introduction to a discussion of analytic possibilities, three common elementary approaches to thinking about foreign thoughtworlds may be noted.  The first is simply to ignore them, a tacit denial of their existence or relevance.  Mirror imaging, the assumption that \"they're pretty much like us,\" is barely more sophisticated or useful. Real differences begin at least to be acknowledged at the level of crude characterizations, generalizations, or stereotypes.\n\nA number of more serious and thoughtful approaches have been proposed and developed.  Many researchers in contexts ranging from international studies to business management have worked to develop sets of dimensions or parameters that capture essential features of differences between people in distinct societies.  Geert Hofstede, of Tilburg University in the Netherlands, has proposed five independent dimensions of national cultural differences7:\n\n- Power distance, an indicator of inequality in a society from the perspective of\nthe less powerful\n- Individualism (versus collectivism), an indicator of individual integration into\ngroups\n- Masculinity (versus femininity), an indicator of relative assertiveness and\ncompetitiveness\n- Uncertainty avoidance, an indicator of tolerance for ambiguity in life - Long-term orientation (versus short-term),  an indicator of temporal outlook\nthat impacts core values.\nFons Trompenaars and Charles Hampden-Turner, business management consultants, examined cultural differences from the perspective of three categories: relations between\npeople, attitudes toward time, and attitudes toward the surrounding environment.\nRelations between people are viewed in terms of five orientations8:\n\n- Universalism versus particularism: Are behaviors more responsive to unique\ncircumstances or to rules and codes?\n- Individualism versus communitarianism:  Are individuals tightly integrated\ninto groups? Is priority placed on individuals or the group?\n- Neutral versus emotional:  Are interactions emotional or more reserved? - Specific versus diffuse:  Is an interaction limited to the requirements of  a\nspecific function (e.g., a business deal), or does it extend to a broader personal contact?\n- Achievement versus ascription:  Is a person judged by specific recent\naccomplishments  or by attributed status?\nThe late Farid Elashmawi, working with Phillip Harris in the business context, compared cultures by examining how representatives prioritize 20 values: group harmony, competition, seniority, cooperation, privacy, openness, equality, formality, risk-taking, reputation, freedom, family security, relationship, self-reliance, time, group consensus, authority, material possession, spiritual enlightenment, and group achievement.9\nFrom more of a psychological perspective, Florence Kluckhohn approached the differentiation of cultures by identifying a set of questions based on the common human experience whose answers indicated a value orientation.  The questions were:  \"What is the character of innate human nature? The relation of man to nature? The temporal focus of human life? The modality of human activity? The modality of man's relationship to other men?\"10  The answers of individuals to these questions were used to identify a dominant value orientation that would characterize a given culture.  More recently, an effort to apply the popularly familiar Myers-Briggs personality indicators to the\n\ninteractions are based on the work of American sociologist Talcot Parson.\n9\nFarid Elashmawi and Phillip Harris, *Multicultural Management* (Houston: Gulf Publishing Company,\n1993).\n10\nCited in Alex Inkeles, *National Character: A Psycho-Social Perspective* (New Brunswick (US) and\nLondon (UK): Transaction Publishers, 1997), p. 35.\ncharacterization of strategic (national) personalities was performed by Caroline Ziemke, with assessments developed referencing local history and culture.11\nFinally, Glen Fisher, with the perspective of a career foreign service officer, suggests that quick-turnaround assessments of foreign mindsets might be focused on questions in five areas12: situation and context; knowledge and information base; images;\ncultural and social determinants; and individual personality and group dynamics.\n\nThese examples, suggestive of a broad range of systematic approaches, are based on the idea of developing a universally valid set of categories or questions that can be used to investigate and even, in some cases, semi-quantitatively assess differences in people from various cultures, or between entire societies and cultures.  Systematic approaches may help promote familiarity with the fact of certain basic differences among peoples, but even an arbitrarily large number of set categories or questions imposes limitations on this kind of inquiry that obstruct insight and, if acted upon in the national security context, may bring undesirable or even disastrous results.  While aiming for universal applicability and a relative simplicity that moderates the intellectual and time demands on decision makers, such approaches cannot provide the insight and fidelity generally needed to effectively support national security decisions.  The enterprise of understanding how others think should be made \"as simple as possible, but not simpler\"13; it is no less complex than, for example, playing a sport, treating a sick person, repairing a car, tending a garden, or performing on a musical instrument, none of which can be satisfactorily reduced to a system or checklist. 14  A more comprehensive approach is required for our present purpose.\n\ninto the problems associated with the tendency to systemize and also into the nature of knowledge and the process of acquiring wisdom.  An overview of Polanyi's life and work may be found in \"Tacit Knowing, Truthful Knowing,\" a Mars Hill Audio Report (ca. 2001), Mars Hill Audio, Quinque, VA.\n\n## 2. Proposed Analytic Approach\n\nThe methodology recommended here is based on the life work of Prof. Adda Bozeman.15  Rejecting the notion of a systematized approach to understanding cultures and ways of thinking, she advocated and performed comparative, inherently multidisciplinary study with the objective of identifying differences between one's own culture and way of thinking, and others'.   Key to this comparative approach are a solid selfunderstanding and an effort to understand others *on their own terms.*16  The comparative emphasis stems from the difficulty of imagining any universal system or set of metrics up to the task, while the call for multidisciplinary research reflects the inadequacy of describing foreign thinking using the political, economic, and military categories of information typically encountered in the U.S. national security studies context.\n\nImplementation of this methodology begins with the statement of a specific issue, the identification of the foreign person, group, or society of interest, and a clear understanding of one's own principles, values, attitudes, and goals relevant to the interaction.  The research may be guided by several high-level questions, developed and addressed by people with expertise in many aspects of the subject society and, usually, with advanced language skills.  Comparison with the United States is the sustained theme of the inquiry.  While no set of questions can be appropriate to every issue, the conceptual level and tone of such an inquiry are suggested by Bozeman.17  While arguing the need for a comparative approach, in this case in the context of trying to understand the relation between covert action and foreign policy as these are carried out in diverse societies, she posed dozens of questions intended to elicit information about a nation's foreign affairs and the domestic features that influence them.  A few examples illustrate the difference between this approach and one based on a checklist:\n\n\n16\nSee, for example, Adda B. Bozeman, Strategic Intelligence and Statecraft, *op. cit*., pp. 180-182 and pp.\n87-92.  In the language of cultural anthropology, this is an emic, versus etic, emphasis; in Kevin Avruch's book *Culture and Conflict Resolution* (Washington D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1998), see Part III: \"Frames for Culture and Conflict Resolution,\" pp. 57-72.\n17\nA. Bozeman, from the essay \"Covert Action and Foreign Policy in World Politics,\" in Strategic\nIntelligence and Statecraft, *op. cit.*, pp. 88-89.\n- Which fundamental beliefs, ideas, and values seem to sustain the society in\ntime?\n- Which purposes and meanings are assigned to life? - What are the sources of the basic beliefs, norms, and commitments? Religion?\nEthnic\nor\nnational\ncustoms?\nIdeology?\nPragmatism?\nEconomic\nacquisitiveness?\n- How free and self-directed is the individual? - Which personality types are trusted and expected? - Do members of special groups communicate through the use of special\npolitically or socially significant metaphors and symbols?\n- Which precepts make up the moral order of a society? - What do men regard as \"law\"? - Which political units or organisms should be recognized for purposes of\nforeign policy and intelligence assessments?\n- What is the prevalent worldview? - How are relations with other independent societies conceptualized? - Is war accepted as a norm or way of life, and if so, what do people fight for? - How do people think about peace?\nNote that these questions are intended to set the tone for research, not to limit or define it.\nTo apply a comparative methodology to the national security decisions of interest here, one might begin by recalling from Chapter I the three types of activities proposed as typical of non-compulsive implementations of national power: interpreting foreign intentions, developing messages for foreign audiences, and crafting strategies to advance U.S. objectives.  For these enterprises one can readily see the importance of understanding, for starters, fundamental motivations and aspirations of the society at large, and of its elites and leaders; communication patterns, symbols, and popular modes of information transfer; and the dynamics of influence and change in the society, including identification of external as well as internal drivers.  The process of developing accurate and useful insights will naturally lead in quite different directions as it is implemented in the context of the numerous diverse societies important to the conduct of U.S. national security affairs.\n\nThis intellectually challenging work requires considerable and diverse resources, and time. The emphasis on people as resources for carrying out the research prompts a comment about a dominant theme in the contemporary American analytic community: the use of computer-based modeling and simulation, even to simulate minds and predict human actions.  As an example, during the development of a computer model intended for defense applications, consideration was given to simulating the actions of enemy commanders by ascribing a four-factor Myers-Briggs personality assessment.  There are, of course, many applications for which modeling and simulation are well-suited;  in the context of developing insights into foreign thoughtworlds, given the state of present U.S.\n\ninstitutional practices in this regard, they could not be further from helpful.   Here a metaphoric reflection on Austrian mathematician Kurt Godel's theorem may be useful. In its original context, it basically says that \"all consistent axiomatic formulations of number theory include undecidable propositions\"18;  considered in the present context, it suggests that the project of trying to simulate peoples' thinkingeven more so people from foreign culturesusing a computer model has inherent, fatal limitations.  Douglas Hofstadter comments:\n\"The other metaphorical analogue to Godel's theorem which I find provocative suggests that ultimately, we cannot understand our own mind/brains...[T]he age-old goal of knowing yourself in some profound waylet us call it \"understanding your own psychic structure\"has a ring of plausibility to it.  [But] just as we cannot see our faces with our own eyes, is it not inconceivable to expect that we cannot mirror our complete mental structures in the symbols which carry them out? All the limitative theorems of mathematics and the theory of computation suggest that once the ability to represent your own structure has reached a certain critical point, that is the kiss of death: it guarantees that you can never represent yourself totally.\"19\nWe should be careful not to convince ourselves that we can understand others well enough to predict what they will do, or that we can create a computer model that does.  On the other hand, through careful programs of research emphasizing the\n\napplication of *human* resources, we can surely learn to understand present thinking of other peopleand respond to itmuch better than we do.20\nFinally, a word about attitude in approaching other peoples' thoughtworlds: the general desire for \"objective\" insights notwithstanding, a certain degree of engagement with one's subject is essential.    Author and farmer Wendell Berry, discussing the limitations of scientific reductionism, writes:\nThe uniqueness of an individual creature is inherent, not in its physical or behavioral anomalies, but in its *life*.  Its life is not its \"life history,\" the typical cycle of members of its species from conception to reproduction to death.  Its life is all that happens to it in its place.  Its wholeness is inherent in its life, not in its physiology or biology.  This wholeness of creatures and places together is never going to be apparent to an intelligence coldly determined to be empirical or objective.  It shows itself to affection and familiarity.21\nThose considering foreign thoughtworlds cannot always be expected to have affection for all of them, the thoughtworlds of *al Qaeda* members being an obvious example.  The point is that an attempt at cold objectivity will not be as fruitful as one that strives for familiarity and that can warm enough to its subject to identify at least some points of appreciation.\n\n## B. Sources Of Insight\n\nU.S. society turns out to be rich with sources of insight, and in most cases with ready access, into most societies and cultures in the world, including those dozens of greatest current importance to U.S. national security.  We may consider three major types of sources: indigenous, established areas of study, and practitioners.\n\nIndigenous sources include native people or emigres, and print and broadcast media (official, popular, academic) produced in the society of interest or in emigre communities.\nEstablished areas of study include established academic disciplines as well as the subjects of less formal *ad hoc* communities of interest, professional organizations, enthusiasts, friendship societies, grassroots movements, and the like, many of which produce publications.  Areas relevant to a given issue may include:\n\n\n-\nHistory (first and foremost)\n-\nPhilosophy\n-\nThe modern/post-modern discourse\n-\nReligion\n-\nCultural and area studies (\"high\" culture, popular culture; global, regional, national, and local areas)\n-\nEthics\n-\nLiterature\n-\nAnthropology (cultural, developmental)\n-\nLiterary criticism\n-\nSociology\n-\nLanguage and linguistics\n-\nPsychology (especially cultural and cross-cultural)\n-\nSemiotics\n-\nInternational relations\n-\nAesthetics\n-\nLaw\n-\nSports, recreation, entertainment\n-\nPolitical science\n-\nScience and technology\n-\nMilitary and intelligence studies\n-\nHumor\n-\nStories, legends, myths\n-\nConflict\nresolution\nand\npeace\nstudies\n-\nArt\n-\nEconomics\n-\nArchitecture and design\n-\nInternational development (classical, sustainable)\n-\nGlobalization\n-\nBusiness (including international marketing, multicultural management)\n-\nCommunication and media studies.\n-\nEnvironmental and natural resource studies (energy, water, agriculture)\n Finally, practitioners here refer to people with experience in foreign contexts, for example in diplomacy, international development, health, intelligence, environmental issues, human rights, conflict resolution, business, science and technology, sports, entertainment, the arts, and religion.  Although not always obviously relevant to U.S. national security affairs, such practitioners may offer valuable insights into foreign thoughtworlds, and their experience may also provide pragmatic advice for understanding, communicating with, and strategizing for interactions with people in other societies.\nConcerning the organization of  information and insights as they are generated: it is possible to generate a catalog of sources, data, stories, impressions, and so on, using a topical organization scheme perhaps drawing on the areas of study listed above. Alternatives may be more effective, especially given the organic, interwoven nature of human societies.  Remaining portions of the nearly 1,000-year record of diplomatic affairs of  the Venetian republic may offer helpful organizational examples.22  As another more contemporary example, a book from the field of architecture, A Pattern Language,23 details a creative way to discuss and plan architectural projects that might be extended to the present purpose.  The organization scheme is based on the physical scale of a series of topics, ranging from regions and towns, to neighborhoods, clusters of buildings, buildings, rooms, and finally to construction details.  The topics themselves are organically related to one another and are taken to be a living set, open to change by those employing them.  The organizational taxonomy is inherently suited to the society of interest, in the case of *A Pattern Language*, reflecting Western life.  One can imagine a similar approach for organizing and structuring information about foreign thoughtworlds into a form that maintains important local cultural linkages, but is useable by Americans seeking focused insights for practical applications.\n\n## C. Insights From Diverse Practices:  Five Case Studies\n\nThe experience of practitioners engaged in diverse enterprises stands as a rich\nand often untapped by those outside the particular fieldsource of insight into how other people think.  In addition to direct insight into interpreting and understanding foreign minds, these practices also often provide details concerning successful (and, equally valuable, unsuccessful) communication methods and of strategies for influencing views or promoting some kind of action or effect.  They also give insight into the process of preparation for successful foreign interactions.\n\nAs part of the present study, five case studies out of many other worthy possibilities were explored and are summarized below.  Even from these few examples, some broad themes applicable to national security objectives are evident.  First, in each case, the successful practitioner understands others well enough to engage them on their\n\nown terms, without losing a firm grounding in the practitioner's own core values, intention, and goals.  Second, human contact, that is the development of some kind of relationship, is key to the search for ways to portray one's own goals in a way that resonates with others' energies and enthusiasms.  Finally, there is frequently a paradoxical element of the practitioner's approach:  by approaching the other in an unexpected way, stereotypes can be broken and opportunities for new modes of interaction created.\n\n## 1. The Soldier Diplomats\n\nThe regular Army trains soldiers to compel adversaries, usually through the use of deadly force, to accede to U.S. wishes.   A typical soldier's orientation to another country may consist of a briefing on the way to the battlefield:  they may learn fast once on the ground, but generally lack language and cultural training that are helpful in peacetime actions and perhaps even more so in stressing conditions such as immediately after a war.\n\nArmy Special Operations Forces, together with special forces of the other Services, seem a contradiction.  Our nation's most elite, highly trained warriors, who \"achieve operational and tactical superiority through surprise, speed, and violence of action\"24 and are often the first responders in international crises, turn out also to be our military's pre-eminent diplomats.  Special operations forces are in demand to serve as liaisons with foreign militaries,  building military and political contacts, and to influence situations on the ground in war and peace on the strength of the relationships they build with locals.  Beyond employing compelling force, they are called to train foreign military forces, perform civil affairs functions, and conduct psychological operations.\nThat the skill sets of a superb warrior are consistent with those of an effective diplomat reflects the basic SOF emphasis on people.  As the first of four \"SOF Truths,\" or principles, puts it:  Humans are more important than hardware.  SOF credibility and effectiveness is not based on intellectual posturing, but on a human connection arising from physical presence and the evidence of integrity underlying capability.\nThis emphasis on people is also reflected in the SOF understanding of how to be effective abroad in the long term.  In a series of  interviews conducted for this research at\n\nthe John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center at Fort Bragg, NC,25 one soldier asserted that the key to success in a foreign environment is not sticking a flag in the ground and saying \"We're here!\" but instead cultivating relationships that over time will forward the interests of the United States in a more permanent way.  Another soldier pointed out that this kind of personal engagement has to be done by people, not by robots or satellites.\nHow are SOF skills developed?  The groundwork is laid with a rigorous training sequence that includes military, political, cultural, and language skills.  As intensive as this formal training is, SOF skills really become mature on the job in deployments, through immersion and real experience in living and working in foreign cultures.\nThe final result of such training and experience are men who, in addition to their warfighting capabilities, can help advance U.S. national security objectives by acting during their deployments in a way that contradicts many foreign stereotypes of Americans, who are sometimes seen abroad as spoiled and weak, primarily driven by lust for money and a desire to dominate the rest of the world, possessed of short attention spans that preclude commitment, and, in any case, uncaring about the ways and especially the people of other cultures.\n\n## 2. Taking Environmentalism To Corporate America\n\nThe cultural gulf between the United States and some other nations may seem monumental, but here are two domestic communities whose members have seemed irreparably hostile: the environmental movement and businesses.  Environmentalists have characteristically sought to impose rules and regulations on corporations to prevent further despoiling of the natural environment from, as they see it, business run rampant: polluted air and water,  farmland destroyed by chemical agriculture practices, deforestation, accelerated extinction of species, and global warming.  Businesses, for their part, have resisted mightily such measures, trashing environmentalists' naive idealism and claiming that the economy couldn't survive the changes needed to produce, for example, cleaner cars, reduced pollution from industrial processes, sustainable forestry or agriculture, or far less solid waste.\n\nFor more than 20 years, Rocky Mountain Institute (RMI), located in Snowmass, Colorado, has bridged this gap by recasting the environmentalist-business debate into a\n\ndiscussion of efficiency that can seem reasonable to both sides.26  As developed by Amory and Hunter Lovins, RMI's approach was informed by Taoist thought, the principles of Jeffersonian democracy, and a belief in the benefits of whole systems thinking.  The key importance of this last emphasis is well represented in the following true story, which has served as a kind of founding parable for RMI:\nIn the early 1950s, the Dayak people in Borneo suffered from malaria. The World Health Organization had a solution: they sprayed large amounts of DDT to kill the mosquitoes that carried the malaria.  The mosquitoes died, the malaria declined; so far, so good.  But there were side-effects.  Among the first was that the roofs of the peoples' houses began to fall down on their heads. It seemed that the DDT was killing a parasitic wasp that had previously controlled thatch-eating caterpillars. Worse, the DDT-poisoned insects were eaten by geckoes, which were eaten by cats.  The cats died, the rats flourished, and people were threatened by outbreaks of sylvatic plaque and typhus.  To cope with these problems, which it had itself created, the World Health Organization was obliged *to parachute 14,000 live cats into Borneo*.27\nRMI has sought to demonstrate from a system-level perspective that the efficient use of natural resources not only achieves many goals of the environmental movement, but also is great for  businesses' bottom line: free market economics is seen not as something to be overcome, but as something to be leveraged.  Instead of strident opposition, sabotage, or vilifying the business community, RMI staff have successfully argued the economic benefits of the efficient use of energy and natural resources using approaches, language, and presentation forms tailored to decision makers, appealing to their intelligence, good intentions, and business sense.  By taking its arguments around the world to corporate boards, heads of state, members of city councils, and students, RMI has influenced the more efficient use of energy, water, and farmland; the production of fuel-efficient cars, especially the hybrid electric cars that have now entered the U.S.\n\nmarket; and the construction of energy-efficient buildings in the United States and abroad.\n\n\n## 3. Harmony Through Martial Conflict\n\nMartial arts, as they have developed around the world, tend to focus on subjecting an opponent to compelling, usually damaging force.  The Japanese martial art aikido (\"eye-key-doh\") operates under a different paradigm: at its heart is creating harmony between the attacker and the attacked.  Developed in the 20th century, aikido emphasizes calm, centered relaxation and a non-combative attitude toward the attacker (whose aggression is taken as evidence of fundamental imbalance). Leading the attacker's mind is an essential element of technique.  When an attack comes, the aikido response is to blend with its direction and energy, redirect the energy to take the attacker's balance, and disarm, restrain, and/or throw the attackerall the while taking care for his or her safety.\nIn many situations, the attacker can't be distinguished from the defender until someone falls or goes flying.  Aikido doesn't work well with all attacks; a gun at 10 feet would be difficult.  But it is very successful with a range of basic armed and empty-handed attacks and also promotes, among its practitioners, a mental outlook helpful in responding to conflict in everyday life.\n\nAs an example, imagine that an assailant approaches you and attacks with a straight punch to your stomach.  In many traditional martial arts, you might block or deflect the punch, perhaps by sweeping your forearm, then step forward to counterattack with a punch or a kick.  One aikido approach to the same attack would be to turn slightly to the side just before the punch connects, even allowing it to graze its intended target. If you have turned to the outside of the attacker, you could now add a bit of energy to the punch, not only letting it continue on its path, but actually encouraging it.  This small addition of unexpected energy, however, can be enough to disrupt the attacker's balance, who until this point has felt the attack was progressing as anticipated.  Once in control of the attacker's balance, you can throw or pin the attacker in a surprising number of ways, many of which needn't necessarily cause injury.  The resolution of the attack is hopeful: while there are many opportunities in the application of techniques to injure, blind, or kill, there is also hope that an attacker who is repeatedly met in this way may change his mind.\nAikido training includes stretching, meditation, and centering exercises, and partner or group practice of techniques, including work with weapons.  The ability to respond fluidly to an attacker is promoted not by thinking through the variety of possible attacks and how specifically to move in response to any of them, but by training the body to respond instinctively.  Awareness of the attacker's intention and energy is heightened by relaxation and a clear mind, unfettered by worry about the attack or pre-occupation with self.\n\nAikido applies metaphorically to the national security context at hand:  it suggests the benefits of exploring how to become so familiar with other peoples' intentions that they can be met and possibly redirected in an efficient and effective way that is supportive of national objectives.\n\n## 4. Promoting Healthcare In Developing Countries\n\nA frequently encountered approach to providing aid in foreign countries, in healthcare as well as in agriculture and other contexts, is to arrive on the scene with an answer in mind, then try to implement it in some program of education intended to quickly change the way things are done.  The work of Lisa Howard-Grabman for the nongovernmental organization (NGO) Save the Children exemplifies another approach centered on understanding foreign perspectives and practices.\n\nHoward-Grabman's work is based partly on the Appreciative Inquiry approach,28\ndeveloped in the context of organizational change research by David Cooperrider and associates at Case Western Reserve University, and is also influenced by the ideas of Pablo Freire29 and Kurt Lewin.30  Simply put, rather than entering a village and telling the people what, for example, their healthcare problems are and what they need to change to fix them, she instead spends time in the local setting to find out *what already works*.  By building on local perceptions, ideas, dynamics, and practices, approaches to helping communities improve the health of their own citizens have been crafted that are demonstrably more effective than trying to apply a one-size-fits-all approach.  Save the Children has successfully facilitated improvements in women and children's health care in rural parts of Peru, the Philippines, and in other countries.\n\nlearning and group dynamics.\nIn a book co-authored by Howard-Grabman and Gail Snetro,31 this approach is detailed and demonstrated with examples from around the world.  In Bolivia, community mobilization and the bridging of local class differences were at the center of a successful program in which dozens of poor communities cut newborn mortality by more than half in 3 years; American program managers were cast as facilitators, not educators.32    In Senegal, examination of how the society worked identified grandmothers as \"key decision-makers and very influential in maternal and child health practices\"; one NGO\nleveraged this insight and involved grandmothers in the promotion of health practices.33\nAnd in Vietnam, workers in the Poverty Alleviation and Nutrition program observed deviances in how some residents in local communities fed their children. This led to the identification of readily available, inexpensive supplements to the normal diet that improved childrens' health.\n\nHoward-Grabman stresses the importance of community participation in the definition of a successful effort's goals, and of transparency of the outsiders' intentions. She writes, \"We clearly state from the beginning the goal of any community mobilization effort and we invite participation around that goal.  There are important elements of transparency and partnership based on respect for local ownership of the program and the process.  Programs that have tried to co-opt local participation by presenting what the outsiders perceive to be a locally favored goal while secretly (or sometimes overtly) manipulating community members toward other unstated and not agreed upon goals often lead to conflict, lack of sustainability of the outcomes desired by the outsiders and ultimately distrust of the outsiders' motives and methods.\"34\n\n## 5. Evangelism In Post-Christian New York City\n\nThe historical record of religious evangelism, naturally focusing on the primary evangelical religions, Christianity and Islam, is an important source for insights into foreign cultures, approaches to influencing foreign minds, and the pitfalls of crosscultural encounters.  For the example of Christian evangelism, there is a long history of portraying the gospel message in local terms, or \"contextualizing\" it: Matteo Ricci in 17th century China35 or Bishop Lesslie Newbigin in 20th century India and Britain36 come to mind.  At present, the Christian message and efforts to spread it are seen in many U.S. urban settings as out of cultural context, irrelevant in a society that emphasizes the free individual pursuit of happiness and the legitimacy of almost any kind of worldview, and often as something to be avoided.\n\nDr. Timothy Keller, a Presbyterian minister, approached establishing a church in Manhattan with an unusual set of premises.37  His approach stemmed from the realization that American culture is no longer Christian; that is, peopleespecially young people can no longer be assumed to carry a common set of core values inspired by the Christian Bible.  In addition to believers in a host of denominations and religious systems, there are in the United States large populations both of secular modern people who hold a basically materialist scientific worldview, and also of relativistic post-modern people who believe that there are no privileged absolutes.  In short, Keller saw the need in New York City not for an evangelical church preaching the Christian gospel to a basically Christian society, but for a \"missional\" church that approaches Manhattanites the same basic way one would approach people in any non-Christian community in the world, i.e., beginning with a process of familiarization with local culture, and leading to a contextual portrayal of the gospel message that assumes no prior knowledge of its concepts, meaning, or consequences.\n\nEmphasizing accessible communication patterns, Keller employs local vernacular.\nHe avoids religious jargon and stylized forms of speech and prayer, and explains Biblical terms perhaps unfamiliar to his listeners.  He prefers a joyful irony based on humility over sentimental \"inspirational\" talk.  His sermons are peppered with references to the New York Times and other local media,  the latest in the Manhattan arts and theater\n\nscene, and to works of history, philosophy, and literature.  Musical styles include traditional hymns as well as newer music in more modern pop and jazz styles.\n\nKeller also stresses the effectiveness of entering and retelling the local culture's stories with the gospel.  As opposed to exhortation and invoking guilt in an attempt to get people to \"do what they know they should,\" he calls for deep familiarity with local culture, its \"hopes, dreams, epic narratives, fears.\"  For example, in contemporary urban areas such as Manhattan, many people resonate with themes of freedom, self-creation, authenticity, and justice rather than the thememore effective in an earlier Americaof being a good person.  Sermons are oriented to where people are in their culture and place and age, rather than assuming that a single rendition of the gospel  is suited to all places and times.\n\nFinally, Keller seeks to create a Christian community that is counter-cultural and counter-intuitive.  The counter-cultural aspect speaks to the real divergence of Christian community as portrayed in the Bible from contemporary U.S. society in such areas as the role and use of sex, money, and power.  A counter-intuitive quality based on  a demonstrably sincere enactment of Biblical principles can confound the preconceptions of those investigating the church, who may be jaded from experience with hypocritical \"church people.\"  He wants his  church to be \"more deeply and practically committed to deeds of compassion and social justice than traditional liberal churches, and more deeply and fundamentally committed to evangelism and conversion than traditional fundamentalist churches.\"\nFollowing this approach, the church Keller pastors has become very successful in reaching Manhattanites and is a recognized model for churches, particularly in urban settings, around the country.  His approach to contextualizing his message for the people he wants to serve is a model with broad implications for national security affairs.\n\n\n\n## Iv.  Operationalizing Insight Into Foreign Thoughtworlds\n\nWe now turn to the challenge of making insights into foreign thoughtworlds routinely available to national security decision makers and making their consideration a normal part of strategy and policy development, planning, and actions.  This process will require considerable leadership commitmentas well as creative management approachesto be focused on a few key priorities and should be propelled by advocacy based on a clear picture of how such insights can benefit U.S. national security.  We first turn to priority actions.\n\n## A. Priority Actions\n\nIn order for serious consideration of foreign thoughtworlds to become prominent in the culture of U.S. national security affairs, the highest priority of attention and resources are required to raise decision makers' awareness, to establish a dedicated institutional resource to provide insights when needed, and to integrate such consideration into existing institutional processes.\n\n## 1. Raise Decision Maker Awareness\n\nThe first priority is to raise decision-maker awareness of the extent of differences in thoughtworlds and their effect on national security affairs and also of the possibilities of requesting and leveraging insights into them.  In his work on the resolution of conflicts fueled by ethnic (and other) differences, Croatian theologian Miroslav Volf emphasized\n\"fostering the kind of social agents\" who can enable a given objective.1  This is a broader, likely more effective approach than simply focusing on a curriculum.  So rather than immediately proceeding to the usual \"toolkit\" of bureaucratic education (readings, Powerpoint presentations, seminar series, retreats, continuing education subsidies\nuseful as these may be), we may first benefit from thinking about the characteristics of people who are successful in apprehending and working with foreign thoughtworlds, that is, a description of the kind of awareness we seek to promote.  Especially in combination with an appreciation of what makes individual decision makers \"tick,\" a characterization of the kind of people who can appreciate and employ insights into foreign thinking may inform more effective approaches to raising awareness.\nInitial development of such a characterization might be based on work done by the Canadian Foreign Service Institute's Center for Intercultural Learning.  The Center has published a book, *A Profile of the Interculturally Effective Person,*2 which identifies 9\nmajor and 30 core competencies that were developed to help evaluate training effectiveness for international development advisors.  Many of the competencies suggest desirable skills for decision makers concerned with international issues.  Example competencies include:\n\n- Self-knowledge: Knowledge of one's own background, motivations,\nstrengths, and weaknesses.\n- An understanding of the concept of culture: An understanding of the\nconcept of culture and the pervasive influence it will have on their life and work....\n- Knowledge of [the specific] country and culture: Possess knowledge\nof the ...country and culture and try constantly to expand that knowledge.\n- An attitude of modesty and respect:  Demonstrate modesty and respect\nabout their own culture's answers to problems and a respect for the ways of the local culture, are humble about their knowledge of the local context, and are therefore willing to learn much and consult with locals before coming to conclusions on issues.\n- Relationship-building: Possess good relationship-building skills, both\nsocial/personal and professional.3\nOf course, people in decision-making positions will likely possess all of these attributes to some degree.  An expanded set of such attributes can be used to inform approaches to raising awareness of the existence and significance of differences in thoughtworlds.   Such a characterization might also be considered in personnel selection, or in writing job descriptions that lead to self-selection by the desired type(s) of individual; examples of this latter strategy may be found in recruiting efforts run by the military services, the intelligence agencies, and businesses.\n\n## 2. Establish A Dedicated Institution\n\nUnder White House leadership, a new institute dedicated to the study of foreign thought should be chartered.  It should be located in the Washington, D.C., area to facilitate ready access by national security decision makers.  The institute should be intellectually independent, stable in order to provide continuity, and independent of the intelligence community.  It might best take the form of a Federally Funded Research and Development Center (FFRDC) but could also be a wholly governmental entity.  Funding could be divided among several federal departments and agencies, including the State Department and DoD.\nThe institute should have a permanent staff that addresses, at a minimum, on the order of 100 different societies and cultures (out of thousands in the world); such a base must be maintained because, as should be clear, this kind of capability cannot be suddenly created or surged.  Each should have a core full-time staff of 5-10 people academics and/or practitioners with diverse backgrounds, strong language skills, incountry experience, and many experienced in national security strategy, policy, planning, and real-world actions.  Long-term core staff commitment would be most desirable.\n\nThe purpose of the institute would be to serve decision makers as an intellectual resource, not to train workers for the international field (after the imperial British colonial service).4  It should be able to respond with answers, insights, background briefs, and contributions to specific questions, on time scales suited to decision processes, i.e., not prolonged academic exercises.  Two features are key to the institute's responsiveness: being prepared to field a wide range of unexpected questions by maintaining continuous topical inquiries, and augmenting the permanent staff with external contributors who become part of a virtual team.  Some of the team's activities might be conducted via a running internet-based chat-room that could be conducted at various levels of security.\n\nSuch an institute could also stimulate interest and training in foreign languages, a monumental U.S. deficiency that obstructs development of a strong national capability to understand foreign thought.  At first perhaps among neighboring high schools, the institute might be a good channel for scholarships and other incentives to encourage young people to be more attentive to foreign languages, and more adventuresome in their choice of languages.  Assistance in identifying teachers of rarer languages would be needed.  This effort might also leverage connections with the languages of young peoples' ethnic backgrounds (especially rich in the Washington D.C. and other metro areas), although there are always surprising outliers, e.g., someone of western European descent independently interested in, say, Uighur or Amharic.\n\n## 3. Integrate Into National Security Processes\n\nConsideration of foreign thought must also be formally integrated into the existing institutional processes associated with national security affairs, including within the National Security Council;  the relevant Congressional committees; and the State, Defense, and Commerce Departments.  Designated individuals should cover foreign thought in the development and reviews of national security strategy, policy, plans, and action.  In some cases, formal requirements may help ensure that consideration of such input is made a routine part of the decision-making process.\n\n## B. The Basis For Advocacy\n\nDecision makers should be made aware of the pragmatic benefits of the priorities articulated above.  They should understand the valuable perspective to be added to their deliberations the next time the United States responds to a pop-up crisis in an unfamiliar country; undertakes to convince allied leaders to band with us in a decision potentially unpopular with their constituencies; seeks to establish post-conflict stability, foster national reconciliation, or rebuild or reinvigorate local institutions in another country; wants a nation's population to understand our true respect for the integrity of their culture or religion; is prompted to apologize for mistakes made by our military or government; would like to be seen as the global champion of freedom or a world leader in economic, environmental, or legal arenas; needs to understand the pluses and minuses of backing a given local faction; or seeks to correct foreign audience misconceptions about American motives and intents.\n\nThe basis of advocacy for better understanding foreign thoughtworlds may be summarized as follows:\n\n1. The relative importance to U.S. national security of understanding how people\nin diverse foreign societies think has increased in recent years.  This reflects the post-Cold War necessity of U.S. interactions with a much larger number of distinctand more assertivecultures and nations, and, more importantly, the evident limitations of approaching national security objectives with a strategy favoring the use of compelling power in political, economic, or military forms.\n2. At the same time, our national capability to provide understanding of foreign\nthoughtworlds in a form useful to decision makers has failed to be developed\nto meet this need, due primarily to the fact that attention to how others think cannot be said to have been a consistently prominent interest of American decision makers or a strength of the U.S. population at large.\n3. No one-size-fits-all system of understanding, no database of critical\ninformation, and no single area of academic expertise can provide sufficient knowledge of foreign ways of thinking to inform effective, non-compulsive, national security policies, strategies, plans, and actions.\n4. The need instead is for sustained, inherently comparative, multidisciplinary\nefforts whose scope and content reflects the reference frames of specific\nsocieties or cultures of interest.\n5. Fortunately the United States possesses outstanding, if often untapped, access\nto sources of knowledge about foreign thoughtworlds; these sources are indigenous to foreign societies as well as distributed throughout the U.S. in a multitude of relevant academic disciplines and non-academic practices.\n6. Given the clear advantages to our national interests, the U.S. Government\nshould, therefore, take steps to raise decision-maker awareness, establish a dedicated institution to serve as the focal point for national attention, and integrate consideration of insights into foreign thoughtworlds into the processes of national security affairs.\n\n(This page is intentionally blank.)\n\n\n## Bibliography\n\nAdams, Douglas, *The More Than Complete Hitchhiker's Guide to the Galaxy*.  New\nYork: Wings Books, 1989.\nAlexander, Christopher, Sara Ishikawa, Murray Silverstein, *A Pattern Language.*  New\nYork: Oxford University Press, 1977.\nAppadurai, Arjun, *Modernity at Large: Cultural Dimensions of Globalization*, Public\nWorlds, Vol. 1.  Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, 1996.\nAugsburger, David, *Conflict Mediation Across Cultures: Pathways and Patterns*.\nLouisville, KY:Westminster/John Knox Press, 1992.\nAvruch, Kevin, *Culture and Conflict Resolution.*  Washington DC: United States\nInstitute of Peace Press, 1998).\nBenedict, Ruth, *Patterns of Culture.*  New York: Mentor Books, 1957.\nThe Chrysanthemum and the Sword.  Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1989.\nBerry, Wendell, *Life is a Miracle.*  Washington, DC: Counterpoint, 2000.\nBozeman, Adda B., \"Time Warp in American Politics,\" *Society*, July/August 1994.\nFuture of Law in a Multicultural World.  Cambridge: Princeton University Press,\n1971.\nPolitics and Culture in International History, Second Edition.  New Brunswick NJ:\nTransaction Publishers, 1994.\nStrategic Intelligence and Statecraft.  Washington: Brassey's, 1992.\nBrooks, David, \"People Like Us,\" *Atlantic Monthly*, September 2003. Bush, President George W., The National Security Strategy of the United States of\nAmerica, September 2002.\nDavis, Jeanie Lerche, \"Designer Funerals: the Final Getaway,\" WebMD feature on\nMSN.com, 29 October 2003.\nde Toqueville, Alexis, *Democracy in America*.  New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1994. DeGraaf, John, David Wann, Thomas H. Naylor, Affluenza: The All-Consuming\nEpidemic.  San Francisco: Berret-Koehler Publishers, 2001.\nElashmawi, Farid and Phillip Harris, *Multicultural Management*.  Houston: Gulf\nPublishing Company, 1993.\nFisher, Glen, *Mindsets*.  Yarmouth, ME: Intercultural Press, 1988.\nFoucault, Michel, *The Order of Things.*  New York: Vintage Books, 1994.\nHammond, Sue Annis, *The Thin Book of Appreciative Inquiry*, Second Edition.  Plano,\nTX: Thin Book Publishing Company, 1998.\nHarrison, Lawrence E. Harrison, *Underdevelopment is a State of Mind*.  Lanham, MD:\nMadison Books, 1985.\nHsieh, Yu-Wei, \"Filial Piety and Chinese Society,\" in The Chinese Mind: Essentials of\nChinese Philosophy and Culture, Charles A. Moore (Ed.). Honolulu: University of Hawaii, East-West Center Press, 1967.\nHofstadter, Douglas, Godel, Escher, *Bach: An Eternal Golden Braid*.  New York: Basic\nBooks, 1979.\nHofstede, Geert, Culture's Consequences: Comparing Values, Behaviors, Institutions\nand Organizations Across Nations, 2nd Edition.  Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage\nPublications, 2001.\nHoward, Sir Michael, \"The World According to Henry: From Metternich to Me,\"\nForeign Affairs, May/June 1994.\nHoward-Grabman, Lisa and Gail Snetro, How to Mobilize Communities for Health and\nSocial Change.  Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public Health, Center for Communication Programs, 2003 (also available online at\nwww.hcpartnership.com).\nInkeles, Alex, *National Character: A Psycho-Social Perspective*.  New Brunswick (US)\nand London (UK): Transaction Publishers, 1997.\nJacinto, Leela, \"Licensed to Kill: Social Sanction and State Indifference Makes Honor\nKillings an All Too Frequent Occurrence in Pakistan,\" an ABC news report posted on ABCNEWS.com, August 5, 2002.\nJohnston, Douglas and Cynthia Sampson (eds.), ReligionThe Missing Dimension of\nStatecraft.  Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994.\nKahn, Lloyd and Bob Easton, (eds.), *Shelter*.  Bolinas, CA: Shelter Publications, 1973. Keller, Timothy, \"Preaching to the Secular Mind,\" *The Journal of Biblical Counseling*,\nVol. 14, No. 1, Fall 1995.\n\"The Missional Church,\" posted online at www. Redeemer.com\n\nKleinke, Chris, *Self-Perception: The Psychology of Personal Awareness*.  San Francisco:\nW. H. Freeman and Company, 1978.\nLewis, C. S., *A Grief Observed*.  New York: Bantam Books, 1976.\nLovins, L. Hunter and Amory Lovins, \"How Not to Parachute More Cats,\" Rocky\nMountain Institute, Snowmass, Colorado.  Published online at www.rmi.org.\nMaly, Matthew, *Understanding Russia*, independently published in Moscow, 1998\nMars Hill Audio Report, \"Tacit Knowing, Truthful Knowing: The Life and Thought of\nMichael Polanyi,\" Mars Hill Audio, Quinque, VA.\nMenzel, Peter, *Material World*.  San Francisco: Sierra Club Books, 1995.\nMyrdal, Gunnar, *Asian Drama: An Inquiry into the Poverty of Nations.*  New York:\nPantheon, 1968.\nNakamura, Hajime, *Ways of Thinking of Eastern Peoples*.  Honolulu: University of\nHawaii Press, 1968.\nPaz, Octavio, *The Labyrinth of Solitude and Other Writings*.  New York: Grove\nWeidenfield, 1985.\nPostman, Neil, *Amusing Ourselves to Death*.  New York: Penguin Books, 1986. Reps, Paul Reps and Nyogen Senzaki (compilers), Zen Flesh, Zen Bones: A Collection\nof Zen and Pre-Zen Writings.  New York: Shambhala, 1994.\nReuters News Agency, \"Nigerian party's women threaten nude protest,\" Reuters report\nposted on CNN.com, 19 July 2001.\nShah, Idries, *The Sufis*.  Garden City, NY:Anchor Books, 1979.\nSmith, Hedrick, *The Russians.*  New York: Ballantine Books, 1981.\nTolstoy, Leo, *War and Peace*.  New York: Signet Classic, New American Library, 1968. Trompenaars, Fons and Charles Hampden-Turner, Riding the Waves of Culture:\nUnderstanding Diversity in Global Business.  New York: McGraw Hill, 1998.\nUSSOCOM Special Operations Forces Posture Statement 2003. Volf, Miroslav, Exclusion and Embrace: A Theological Exploration of Identity,\nOtherness, and Reconciliation.  Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1996.\nVulpe, Thomas, Daniel Kealey, David Protheroe, and Doug MacDonald, A Profile of the\nInterculturally Effective Person, Second Edition. Canadian Foreign Service Institute, 2001.\nZakaria, Fareed, \"America's New Balancing Act,\" *Newsweek*, 8/6/2001, Vol. 138, Issue\n6.\nZiemke, Caroline, Phillipe Loustaunau, and Amy Alrich, Strategic Personality and the\nEffectiveness of Nuclear Deterrence.  IDA Document D-2537, Institute for Defense Analyses, November 2000.\n\n(This page is intentionally blank.)\n\nPublic reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing this collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden to Department of Defense, Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports (0704-0188), 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to any penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number**. PLEASE DO NOT RETURN YOUR FORM TO THE ABOVE ADDRESS.**\n\n1 .\nR E P O R T  D AT E  ( D D - M M - Y Y )\n2 .\nR E P O R T  T Y P E\n3 .\nD AT E S  C O V E R E D  ( F R O M  -  T O )\n\n| January 2004    | Final    | October 2000January 2004    |\n|-----------------|----------|------------------------------|\n\n4 .\nT I T L E  AN D  S U B T I T L E\n5 A.  C O N T R AC T  N O .\nInsight Into Foreign Thoughtworlds for National Security Decision Makers\nDASW01-98-C-0067/DASW01-04-C-0003\n5 B .  G R AN T  N O . 5 C .  P R O G R AM  E L E M E N T  N O ( S ) .\n6 .\nAU T H O R ( S )\n5 D .  P R O J E C T  N O .\nJohn W. Barnett\n5 E .  T AS K  N O .\nCRP 1075\n5 F .  W O R K  U N I T  N O . 8 .\nP E R F O R M I N G  O R G AN I Z AT I O N  R E P O R T  N O .\nIDA Document D-2665\n7 .\nP E R F O R M I N G  O R G AN I Z AT I O N  N AM E ( S )  AN D  AD D R E S S ( E S )\nInstitute for Defense Analyses 4850 Mark Center Drive Alexandria, VA 22311-1882\n9 .\nS P O N S O R I N G  /  M O N I T O R I N G  AG E N C Y  N AM E ( S )  AN D  AD D R E S S ( E S )\n1 0 .  S P O N S O R ' S  /  M O N I T O R ' S  AC R O N Y M ( S )\n1 1 .  S P O N S O R ' S  /  M O N I T O R ' S  R E P O R T  N O ( S ) .\n\nIDA Contracting Officer's Representative 4850 Mark Center Drive Alexandria, VA  22311-1882\n1 2 .  D I S T R I B U T I O N  /  AV AI L AB I L I T Y  S T AT E M E N T Approved for public release; distribution unlimited.\n\n1 3 .  S U P P L E M E N T AR Y  N O T E S\n\n1 4 .  AB S T R AC T\n The importance to U.S. national security of understanding how people in diverse foreign societies think has increased in recent years, particularly due to the evident limitations of strategic reliance on compelling power.  Our national capability to provide decision makers with sufficiently nuanced insights into foreign thoughtworlds has lagged this need due to a variety of perceptual, institutional, and broader social factors.  A multi-disciplinary approach to achieving pragmatic insights into foreign thoughtworlds is described in this paper.  In order to realize the benefits such insights offer to national security, the U.S. Government should act to raise decision maker awareness, establish a dedicated institution to serve as a national focal point, and formally integrate consideration of foreign thoughtworlds into national security processes.\n\n1 5 .  S U B J E C T  T E R M S\nnational security strategy, foreign policy, decision making, foreign thoughtworlds, international studies, cultural studies, multidisciplinary studies\n1 8 .  N O .  O F  P AG E S\n1 6 .  S E C U R I T Y  C L AS S I F I C AT I O N  O F:\n1 9 A.  N AM E  O F  R E S P O N S I B L E  P E R S O N\n1 7 . L I M I T AT I O N\nO F  AB S T R AC T\n\nMr. David A. Erickson\n\nUnlimited\n\nA.  R E P O R T\nB .  AB S T R AC T\nC .  T H I S  P AG E\n1 9 B .  T E L E P H O N E  N U M B E R  ( I N C L U D E  AR E A\nC O D E )\n703-845-2202\n\n| Unclassified    |\n|-----------------|\n|                 |"
    },
    {
        "text": "# Slang Terms And Code Words:  A Reference For Law Enforcement Personnel Dea\n\nDEA\nIntelligence\nDEA-HOU-DIR-022-18\nJuly 2018\nIntelligence\nBrief Report\n\n## Executive Summary\n\nThis Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) Intelligence Report contains new and updated information on slang terms and code words from a variety of law enforcement and open sources, and serves as an updated version to the product entitled \"Drug Slang Code Words\" published by the DEA in May 2017.  It is designed as a ready reference for law enforcement personnel who are confronted with hundreds of slang terms and code words used to identify a wide variety of controlled substances, designer drugs, synthetic compounds, measurements, locations, weapons, and other miscellaneous terms relevant to the drug trade.  Although every effort was made to ensure the accuracy and completeness of the information presented, due to the dynamics of the ever-changing drug scene, subsequent additions, deletions, and corrections are inevitable. Future addendums and updates to this report will attempt to capture changed terminology to the furthest extent possible.  This compendium of slang terms and code words is alphabetically ordered, with new additions presented in *italic text*, and identifies drugs and drug categories in English and foreign language derivations.\n\n## Drug Slang Terms And Code Wordsa Acetaminophen And Oxycodone Combination (Percocet)\n\n512s; Bananas; Blue; *Blue Dynamite;* Blueberries; Buttons; Ercs; Greenies; Hillbilly Heroin; Kickers; M-30s; Paulas; Percs; Rims; Tires; Wheels\n\n## Alprazolam (Xanax)\n\nBars; *Benzos;* Bicycle Handle Bars; Bicycle Parts; *Bricks*; Footballs; *Handlebars*; Hulk; L7; Ladders; *Palitroque*; Planks; School Bus; Sticks; Upjohns; White Boys; *White Girls*; Xanies; *Yellow Boys*; Zanbars; Zannies; Z-Bars\n\n## Amphetamine\n\nAcelerador; Amy; Amps; Bam; B-Bombs; Beans; Bennies; Benz; Black and Whites; Black Beauties; Black Birds; Black Bombers; Black Mollies; Blacks; Blue Boys; Bombita; Brain Ticklers; Brownies; Bumblebees; Cartwheels; Chalk; Chicken Powder; Chochos; *Chocolates*; Christina; Chunk; Co-Pilot; Coast-to-Coasts; Crisscross; Cross Roads; Cross Tops; *Crosses*; Debs; Dexies; Diablos; Diamonds; Diet Pills; Dolls; Dominoes; Double Cross; Drivers; *Dulces*; Fives; *Flour*; Footballs; French Blues; *Geeked Up*; Goofballs; Greenies; Head Drugs; Hearts; Horse Heads; In-Betweens; Jelly Babies; Jelly Beans; Jolly Beans; Jugs; *LA Turnaround*; Leapers; Lid Poppers; Lightening; Little Bombs; Marathons; Mini Beans; Mini Bennies; Morning Shot; Nuggets; Oranges; *Pastas*; Pastillas; Peaches; Pep Pills; Pepper; *Pingas*; Pink Hearts; Pixies; Pollutants; Purple Hearts; Rhythm; Rippers; Road Dope; Roses; Rueda; Snaps; Snow Pallets; Sparkle Plenty; Sparklers; Speed; Splash; Sweeties; Sweets; Tens; Thrusters; TR-6s; Truck Drivers; Turnabouts; Uppers; Wake Ups; West Coast Turnarounds; Wheels; Whiffle Dust; White Crosses; Whites; Zoomers\n\n## Amphetamine And Dextroamphetamine Combination (Adderall)\n\nA-Train; Abby; Addy; Amps; Christmas Trees; Co-Pilots; Lid Poppers; Smart Pills; Smarties; Study Buddies; Study Skittles; Truck Drivers; Zing\n\n## Buprenorphine And Naloxone Combination (Suboxone)\n\nBoxes, Bupes; Oranges; Sobos; Stop Signs; Stops; Subs\n\n## Clonazepam (Klonopin)\n\nBenzos; K; K-Pin; Pin; Super Valium; Tranks\n\n## Cocaine\n\n7; 62; 77; 777; 921; A-1; *Adidas*; All-American Drug; *Ancla*; Angel Powder; Angie; Animals; Apache; *Apodo*; Arriba; Audi; Aunt Nora; Azucar; Baby Powder; Barrato; Basuco; Bazooka (cocaine paste mixed with marijuana); Beach; Belushi (cocaine mixed with heroin); *Bernice*; Bernie's Flakes; Bernie's Gold Dust; *Big Bird*; Big Bloke; Big C; Big Flake; Big Rush; Billie Hoke; Bird; Birdie Powder; Blanca Nieves; Blanco; Blast; Blizzard; Blonde; Blocks; Blow; BMW; *Board*; Bobo; Bolitas; Bolivian Marching Powder; Bombita (cocaine mixed with heroin); Booger Sugar; *Bose*; Bouncing Powder; Brisa; *Bump*; C-Dust; *Caballo*; Caca; Cadillac; California Pancakes; Calves; *Canelon*; Candy; Car; Carney; Carrie Nation; Cars; Case; Cebolla; Cecil; Cement; Charlie; Chevy; Cheyenne; Chica; *Chicanitas*; Chinos; Chiva; *Cielo*; Clear Kind; Clear Tires; Coca; Coca-Cola; Cocazo; Coconut; Coke; Cola; Colorado; Comida; *Comida Dulce*; Connie; Cookie; *Cosa; Coso; Cosos;* Crow; Crusty Treats; Cuadro; Death Valley; Designer Jeans; Devil's Dandruff; *Diamonds*; Diente; Dienton; Diesel; Diosa Blanca; Dona Blanca; Double Bubble; *Double Letters*; Dove; Dream; Dulces; Duracell; Durazno; *Duro*; Dust; Escama; Escorpino; Falopa; Fef1; Fichas; Fiesta; *Fire (cocaine base)*; Fish (liquid cocaine); *Fish Scale*; Flake; Flea Market Jeans; Florida Snow; Flour; Food; Foolish Powder; Fox; Freeze; Friskie Powder; Frula; Funtime; Gabacho; Galaxy; Gallos; Gato; Gift of the Sun; Gin; Girl; Girlfriend; Glad Stuff; Gold Dust; Green Gold; Gringa; *Gringito*; Grout; *Guerillo*; Gueros; Guitar; H1; *Hai Hit*; Hamburger; Happy Dust; Happy Powder; Happy Trails; Heaven; Heaven Dust; Heavy One; Hen; Henry VIII; HH; HHJ; High Heat; HMH; Hooter; Hundai; Hunter; *Ice Cream*; Icing; Inca Message; Izzy; Jam; Jaime Blanco; *Jaula*; Jeep; Jelly; John Deere; Joy Flakes; Joy Powder; Juguetes; *Jump Rope*; Junk; K13; King's Habit; Kordell; *La Familia*; Lady; Lady Snow; Late Night; Lavada; Leaf; *Libreta*; Line; Loaf; Love Affair; LV; Maca Flour; *Madera*; Mama Coca; Mandango; *Manita*; Maradona; Marbol; Material; *Mayback (62 grams)*; Mayo; Melcocha; *Media Lata*; Mercedes; Milk; Milonga; Mojo; Mona Lisa; Monte; *Morro*; Mosquitos; Movie Star Drug; Muchacha; *Muebles*; Mujer; Napkin; Nieve; Nina; Normal; Nose Candy; Nose Powder; Old Lady; Oyster Stew; Paint; Paloma; *Paleta*; Palomos; Pantalones; Papas; Paradise; Paradise White; Parrot; Pearl; Pedrito; Perico; *Personal*; Peruvian; Peruvian Flake; Peruvian Lady; Pescado; *Peta*; Pez; *Pichicata*; Pillow; Pimp; Pingas; Pingos; Pintura Blanca; *Poli*; Pollo; Polvo; Powder; Powder Diamonds; *Puma*; Puritain; *Quadros*; Queso Blanco; Racehorse Charlie; Rambo; Refresco; Refrescas; Regular Kind; *Regular Work*; Reindeer Dust; *Richie*; Rims; Rocky Mountain; Rolex; *Rolex HH*; Rooster; Scale; Schmeck; Schoolboy; Scorpion; Scottie; Seed; Serpico; Sierra; Shirt; Ski Equipment; Sleigh Ride; *Sneeze*; Sniff; Snow; Snow Bird; Snow Cone; Snow White; Snowball; Snowflake; Society High; Soda; Soditas; Soft; Space (cocaine mixed with PCP); *Special*; Speedball (cocaine mixed with heroin); Stardust; Star Spangled Powder; Studio Fuel; Suave; Sugar; Superman; Sweet Stuff; Tabique; *Tablas*; Talco; Talquito; Tamales; Taxi; Tecate; Teenager; Teeth; Tequila; Thunder; Tire; Tonto; Toot; Tortes; *Tortuga*; Toyota; T-Shirts; Tubo; Tucibi (pink variety); Turkey; Tutti-Frutti; Vaquita; Wash; Wet; Whack (cocaine mixed with PCP); White; White Bitch; White Cross; *White Dove*; White Girl; White Goat; White Horse; White Lady; White Mercedes Benz; White Mosquito; White Paint; White Powder; *White Rock*; White Root; White Shirt; White T; *White Wall Tires*; Whitey; Whiz Bang; Wings; Wooly; Work; Yayo; Yeyo; Yoda; *Zapato*; Zip\n\n## Crack Cocaine\n\n51s; 151s; 501s; Apple Jack; Baby T; Base; Baseball; Bazooka; Beam Me Up; Beautiful Boulders; Beemer; Bill Blass; Bings; BJ; Black Rock; Blowcaine; Blowout; Blue; Bobo; Bolo; Bomb; Bone Crusher; Bone; Boo- Boo; Boulder; Boy; Breakfast of Champions; Bubble Gum; Bullion; Bump; Candy; Caps; Casper the Ghost; Caviar; CD; Cheap Basing; Chewies; Chingy; Clicker; Climax; Cloud; Cloud Nine; Cookies; CRC; Crib; Crunch and Munch; Devil; Devil Smoke; Dice; Dime Special; Dirty Basing; Dirty Fentanyl (crack cocaine mixed with fentanyl); Double Yoke; Durin; Eastside Player; Egg; Eye Opener; Famous Dimes; Fat Bags; Fifty-One; Fish Scales; Freebase; French Fries; Garbage Rock; Geek; Glo; Gold; Golf Ball; Gravel; Great White Hope; Grit; Groceries; Hail; Hamburger Helper; Hard; Hotcakes; Hubba; Ice; Ice Cubes; Issues; Jelly Beans; Johnson; Kangaroo; Kokoma; Kryptonite; Love; Mixed Jive; Moon Rock; Nickle; Nuggets; One-Fifty-One; Paste; Pebbles; Pee Wee; Piedras; Pile; Pony; Primo; Quarters; Raw; Ready Rock; Red Caps; RIP (Rest in Peace);\nRoca; Rock; Rock Attack; Rocks of Hell; Rocky III; Rooster; Rox; Roxanne; Roz; Schoolcraft; Scotty; Scramble; Scruples; Seven-Up; Sherms; Sight Ball; Slab; Sleet; Smoke; Speed Boat; Square Time Bomb; Stone; Sugar Block; Takeover (crack cocaine mixed with fentanyl); Teeth; Tension; Tissue; Top Gun; Troop; Ultimate; Up; Uzi; Wave; White Ball; White Ghost; White Sugar; White Tornado; Wrecking Crew; Yahoo; Yale; Yimyom\n\n## Ecstasy/Mdma/Molly\n\n Adam; Baby Slits; Beans; Blue Kisses; Blue Superman; *Bombs*; Booty Juice (dissolved in liquid); Candy; Chocolate Chips; Clarity; Dancing Shoes; Decadence; *Disco Biscuits*; Doctor; Domex (ecstasy mixed with PCP); Drop; E; E-Bomb; Essence; Eve; Go; Goog; Green Apple; Happy Pill; Hug; *Hug Drug*; Kleenex; Love Doctor; Love Drug; *Love Flip (taken with mescaline)*; Love Potion #9; Love Trip (ecstasy mixed with mescaline); Lover's Speed; *Malcolm X*; Moon Rock; Peace; Pingaz; *Pingers*; Rolls; Rolling; Running; Scooby Snacks; Skittle; *Smacks*; Slits; Smarties; Speed for Lovers; Sweets; Tacha; *Thizz*; Vitamin E; Vowels; White Mercedes; X; XTC; Yokes\n\n## Fentanyl And Fentanyl Derivatives\n\nApache; Birria (fentanyl mixed with heroin); Blonde; Blue Diamond; Blue Dolphin; *Blues*; Butter; China Girl; China Town; China White; Chinese; *Chinese Buffet*; Chinese Food; Crazy; Crazy One; Dance Fever; Dragon; Dragon's Breath; F; Food; Freddy; *Fuf (furanyl fentanyl)*; Facebook (fentanyl mixed with heroin in pill form); Fent; Fenty; Fire; Friend; Girl; Goodfella; Great Bear; *Gray Stuff*; He-Man; *Heineken*; Huerfanito; *Humid*; Jackpot; King Ivory; Lollipop; Murder 8; Nal; Nil; Nyl; Opes; *Pharmacy;* Poison; Shoes; *Snowflake*; Tango and Cash; TNT; Toe Tag Dope; White Girl; White Ladies\n\n## Flunitrazepam (Rohypnol)\n\n542; Circles; Date Rape Drug; Forget Pill; La Rocha; Lunch Money; Mexican Valium; Mind Eraser; Pingus; R2; Reynolds; Roach; Roapies; Rochas; Roofies; Rope; Rophies; Ro-Shay; Trip-and-Fall; Wolfies\n\n## Ghb (Gamma-Hydroxybutyric Acid)\n\nBlowout; Bruno Mars; Cherry Meth; Easy Lay; Everclear; *Fantasy*; G; *Gamma Oh*; GEEB; Georgia Home Boy; Goop; *Great Hormones at Bedtime*; Grievous Bodily Harm; *G-Riffic*; Gina; Jib; Liquid E; Liquid X; Monkey Juice; Organic Quaalude; *Salty Water*; Scoop; Soap; Water\n\n## Heroin\n\nAbajo; A-Bomb (heroin mixed with marijuana); Achivia; Adormidera; Amarilla; Anestesia de Caballo (heroin mixed with the horse anesthetic xylazine); Antifreeze; Apodo; *Arpon*; Aunt Hazel; Avocado; Azucar; Bad Seed; Baja Corte (diluted heroin); Ballot; Basketball; Basura; Beast; Beyonce; Big Bag; Big H; Big Harry; Bird; Birdie Powder; Birria; *Birria Blanca*; Black; Black Bitch; Black Goat; Black Olives; Black Paint; Black Pearl; Black Sheep; *Black Shirt*; Black Tar; Blanco; Blue; Blow Dope; Blue Hero; Bombita (heroin mixed with cocaine); Bombs Away; Bonita; Boy; Bozo; Brea Negra; Brick Gum; Brown; Brown Crystal; Brown Rhine; Brown Sugar; Bubble Gum; Burrito; *Butter*; Caballo; Caballo Negro; Caca; Cafe; *Cajeta*; Capital H; *Cardio (white heroin)*; Carga; Caro; Cement; *Certificada (pure heroin)*; Chapopote; Charlie; Charlie Horse; *Chavo*; Cheese; Chicle; Chiclosa; China; China Blanca *(white heroin)*; China Cat; China White; *Chinese Buffet (white heroin)*; Chinese Food; Chinese Red; Chip; Chiva; Chiva Blanca; Chiva Loca (heroin mixed with fentanyl); *Chiva Negra*; Chivones; Chocolate; Chocolate Balls; *Chocolate Shake*; Choko; Chorizo; *Churro Negro*; Chutazo; Coco;\nCoffee; *Cohete*; Comida; Crown Crap; Curley Hair; Dark; Dark Girl; *Dark Kind*; Dead on Arrival (DOA); Diesel; Dirt; Dog Food; Doggie; Doojee; Dope; Dorado; Down; Downtown; *Dragon*; Dreck; Dynamite; Dyno; El Diablo; Engines; Enrique Grande; Esquina; *Esquinilla*; Fairy Dust; Flea Powder; *Food (white heroin)*; Foolish Powder; Galloping Horse; Gamot; Gato; George Smack; Girl; Globo (balloon of heroin); *Goat*; Golden Girl; Good and Plenty; Good H; *Goofball (heroin mixed with methamphetamine)*; Goma; Gorda; Gras; Grasin; Gravy; Gum; H; H-Caps; Hairy; Hard Candy; *Hard One*; Harry; Hats; Hazel; Heaven Dust; Heavy; Helen; Helicopter; Hell Dust; Henry; Hercules; Hero; Him; Hombre; Horse; Hot Dope; *Huera*; Hummers; Jojee; Joy Flakes; Joy Powder; Junk; Kabayo; Karachi; Karate; King's Tickets; *La Tierra*; Lemonade; Lenta; Lifesaver; Manteca; Marias; *Marrion*; Mayo; Mazpan; Meal; Menthol; Mexican Brown; *Mexican Food (black tar heroin)*; Mexican Horse; Mexican Mud; Mexican Treat; Modelo Negra; Mojo; Mole; Mongega; Morena; Morenita; Mortal Combat; Motors; Mud; Mujer; *Murcielago*; Muzzle; Nanoo; Negra; Negra Tomasa; Negrita; Nice and Easy; Night; Noise; Obama; Old Steve; Pants; Patty; Peg; P-Funk; Piezas; Plata; Poison; Polvo; Polvo de Alegria; Polvo de Estrellas; *Polvo Feliz*; Poppy; Powder; Prostituta Negra; Puppy; Pure; Rambo; *Raw (uncut heroin)*; Red Chicken; Red Eagle; Reindeer Dust; Roofing Tar; *Ruby*; Sack; Salt; Sand; Scag; Scat; Schmeck; Scramble (uncut heroin); Sheep; Shirts; Shoes; Skag; *Skunk*; Slime; Smack; Smeck; Snickers; *Soda*; Speedball (heroin mixed with cocaine); Spider Blue; Sticky Kind; Stufa; Sugar; Sweet Jesus; Tan; Tar; Tecata; *Thunder*; Tires; Tomasa; Tootsie Roll; Tragic Magic; Trees; Turtle; Vidrio; *Weights*; Whiskey; White; White Boy; White Girl; White Junk; White Lady; White Nurse; White Shirt; White Stuff; Wings; Witch; Witch Hazel; Zapapote\n\n## Hydrocodone (Norco, Vicodin, Lorcet)\n\n357s; Bananas; *Dones*, Dro; *Droco*; Fluff; Hydros; Idiot Pills; Lemonade; Lorries; *Scratch*; Tabs; Triple V (Vicodin taken with Valium and Vodka); *Veeks*; Vics; Vikes; Watsons\n\n## Hydromorphone (Dilaudid)\n\nD; Dillies; K4; Needle Candy\n\n## Ketamine (Ketalar)\n\nBarry Farrell; Blind Squid; *Cat Food*; Cat Valium; *Donkey*; Green; *Green K*; Honey Oil; Jet; *Jet K*; K; Keller; Kelly's Day; K-Hold; Kit Kat; *Kitty Flip*; K-Ways; *Purple*; Special K; Special La *Coke*; Super Acid; *Super C*; Vitamin K; Wobble; Wonky\n\n## Khat\n\nAbyssian Tea; African Salad; Catha; Chat; Kat; Oat\n\n## Lsd (Lysergic Acid Diethylamide)\n\nAceite; *Acelide*; Acid; Acido; Alice; Angels in a Sky; Animal; *Avandaro*; Backbreaker (LSD mixed with strychnine); Barrel; Bart Simpson; Battery Acid; Beast; Big D; Black Acid (LSD mixed with PCP); Black Star; Black Sunshine; Black Tabs; *Blanco de Espana*; Blotter Acid; Blotter Cube; Blue Acid; Blue Barrel; Blue Chair; Blue Cheer; Blue Heaven; Blue Microdots; Blue Mist; Blue Moon; Blue Sky; Blue Star; Blue Tabs; *Bomba*; Brown Bomber; Brown Dots; California Sunshine; Cherry Dome; Chief; Chinese Dragons; Cid; Coffee; Colorines; Conductor; Contact Lens; Crackers; Crystal Tea; *Cubo*; Cupcakes; Dental Floss; Dinosaurs; *Divina*; Domes; Dots; Double Dome; El Cid; Electric Kool Aid; *Elefante Blanco*; Ellis Day; Fields; Flash; Flat Blues; Ghost; Golden Dragon; Golf Balls; Goofy; Gota; Grape Parfait; Green Wedge; Grey Shields; Hats; Hawaiian Sunshine; Hawk; Haze; Headlights; Heavenly Blue; Hits; Instant Zen; Jesus Christ Acid; Kaleidoscope; Leary; Lens; *Lentejuela*; Lime Acid; Live, Spit and Die; Lluvia de Estrellas; Looney Tunes; Lucy; *Maje*; Mellow Yellow; Mica; Microdot; Micropunto Azul (white tablet with drop of blue LSD); Micropunto Morado (white tablet with drop of purple LSD); Mighty Quinn; Mind Detergent; Mother of God; Mureler; *Nave*; Newspapers; Orange Barrels; Orange Cubes; Orange Haze; Orange Micros; Orange Wedges; Owsley; Paper Acid; Pearly Gates; Pellets; Phoenix; Pink Blotters; Pink Panthers; Pink Robots; Pink Wedges; Pink Witches; Pizza; Pop; Potato; Pure Love; Purple Barrels; Purple Haze; Purple Hearts; Purple Flats; Recycle; Royal Blues; Russian Sickles; Sacrament; Sandoz; Smears; Square Dancing Tickets; Sugar Cubes; Sugar Lumps; Sunshine; *Superman*; Tabs; Tacatosa; Tail Lights; Teddy Bears; Ticket; Uncle Sid; Valley Dolls; Vodka Acid; Wedding Bells; Wedge; White Dust; White Fluff; White Lightening; White Owsley; Window Glass; Window Pane; Yellow Dimples; Yellow Sunshine; Zen\n\n## Marijuana\n\n420; A-Bomb *(marijuana mixed with heroin)*; Acapulco Gold; Acapulco Red; Ace; African Black; African Bush; Airplane; *Alfalfa*; Alfombra; Alice B Toklas; All-Star; *Almohada*; Angola; Animal Cookies (hydroponic); Arizona; Ashes; Aunt Mary; AZ; Baby; Bale; Bambalachacha; Barbara Jean; Bareta; Bash; Bazooka (marijuana mixed with cocaine paste); BC Budd; Bernie; Bhang; Big Pillows; Biggy; *Bionic (marijuana mixed with PCP)*; Black Bart; Black Gold; Black Maria; Blondie; Blue Cheese; Blue Crush; *Blue Dream*; Blue Jeans; Blue Sage; Blueberry; Bobo Bush; Boo; Boom; *Branches*; Broccoli; Bud; Budda; Burritos Verdes; Bush; Cabbage; Cafe; *Cajita*; Cali; *Camara*; Canadian Black; Catnip; Cheeba; Chernobyl; Cheese; Chicago Black; Chicago Green; Chippie; Chistosa; Christmas Tree; Chronic; Churro; Cigars; Citrol; Cola; Colorado Cocktail; Cookie (hydroponic); Cotorritos; Crazy Weed; Creeper Bud; Crippy; Crying Weed; Culican; Dank; *Devils's Lettuce*; Dew; Diesel; Dimba; Dinkie Dow; *Diosa Verde*; Dirt Grass; Ditch Weed; Dizz; Djamba; Dody; Dojo; Domestic; Donna Juana; Doobie; Downtown Brown; Drag Weed; Dro (hydroponic); Droski (hydroponic); Dry High; Elefante Pata; Endo; Escoba; *Fattie*; Fine Stuff; Fire; Flower; Flower Tops; Fluffy; Fuzzy Lady; *Gallina*; Gallito; Garden; *Garifa*; Gauge; Gangster; Ganja; Gash; Gato; Ghana; Gigi (hydroponic); Giggle Smoke; Giggle Weed; Girl Scout Cookies (hydroponic); Gloria; Gold; Gold Leaf; Gold Star; Gong; Good Giggles; Gorilla; Gorilla Glue; Grand Daddy Purp; Grass; Grasshopper; Green; *Green Crack*; Green-Eyed Girl; Green Eyes; Green Goblin; Green Goddess; Green Mercedes Benz; Green Paint; Green Skunk; *Greenhouse*; Grenuda; Greta; Guardada; Gummy Bears; Gunga; Hairy Ones; Hash; Hawaiian; Hay; Hemp; Herb; Hierba; Holy Grail; Homegrown; Hooch; *Hoja*; Humo; Hydro; Indian Boy; Indian Hay; Jamaican Gold; Jamaican Red; Jane; Jive; Jolly Green; Jon-Jem; Joy Smoke; Juan Valdez; Juanita; Jungle Juice; Kaff; Kali; Kaya; KB; Kentucky Blue; KGB; Khalifa; Kiff; Killa; Kilter; King Louie; Kona Gold; Kumba; Kush; Laughing Grass; Laughing Weed; Leaf; Lechuga; Lemon-Lime; *Lena*; Liamba; Lime Pillows; Little Green Friends; Little Smoke; *Llesca*; Loaf; Lobo; Loco Weed; Loud; Love Nuggets; Love Weed; *Lucas*; M.J.; Machinery; Macona; Mafafa; Magic Smoke; Manhattan Silver; Manteca; Maracachafa; Maria; Marimba; Mariquita; Mary Ann; Mary Jane; Mary Jones; Mary Warner; Mary Weaver; Matchbox; Matraca; Maui Wowie; Meg; Method; *Mersh*; Mexican Brown; *Mexicali Haze*; Mexican Green; Mexican Red; MMJ; Mochie (hydroponic); Mona; Monte; Moocah; Mootie; Mora; Morisqueta; Mostaza; Mota; Mother; Mowing the Lawn; Muggie; *My Brother*; Narizona; Northern Lights; Nug; O-Boy; OG; O.J.; Owl; Paja; Palm; Paloma; *Palomita*; Panama Cut; Panama Gold; Panama Red; Pakalolo; Parsley; Pasto; *Pasture*; Peliroja; Pelosa; Phoenix; Pine; Pink Panther; Pintura; *Plant*; Platinum Cookies (hydroponic); Platinum Jack; Pocket Rocket; Popcorn; *Porro*; Pot; Pretendo; *Prop 215*; Puff; Purple Haze; *Purple OG*; Queen Ann's Lace; Red Hair; Ragweed; Railroad Weed; Rainy Day Woman; Rasta Weed; Red Cross; Red Dirt; Reefer; Reggie; Repollo; Righteous Bush; Root; Rope; Rosa Maria; Salt and Pepper; Santa Marta; Sasafras; Sativa; *Shoes*; Sinsemilla; Shmagma; Shora; Shrimp; Shwag; Skunk; Skywalker (hydroponic); Smoke; Smoochy Woochy Poochy; Smoke Canada; *Sour OG*; Spliff; Stems; *Sticky*; Stink Weed; Sugar Weed; Sweet Lucy; Tahoe (hydroponic); Tangy OG; Terp; *Terpenes*; Tex-Mex; Texas Tea; *Tigitty*; Tila; Tims; *Top Shelf*; Tosca; Train Wreck; Trees; *Trinity OG*; Tweeds; *Valle*; Wake and Bake; Weed; Weed Tea; Wet (marijuana dipped in PCP); Wheat; White-Haired Lady; Wooz; Yellow Submarine; Yen Pop; Yerba; Yesca; Young Girls; Zacate; Zacatecas; Zambi; Zip; Zoom (marijuana mixed with PCP)\n\n## Marijuana Concentrates/Hash Oil\n\n710; *BHNO*; BHO; Black Glass; *Bubble Hash*; Budder; Butane Hash Oil; Butane Honey Oil; Caviar; CBD; CBD oil; Crystalline; *Crumble*; Dabs; *Dipper*; Ear Wax; Edibles; *ENail*; Errl; Extract; Full Melt; Glob; Gorilla Glue;\nHeady; Honey Oil; IWE; Ice Water Hash; Klear; Live Resin; Moon Rocks; Rosin; *Rosin Tech*; SAP; Sauce; Shatter; Solventless; Terp Sauce; THCA; THCA Crystal; THCA Crystalline; THCA Powder; *Trichrome*; Wax\n\n## Mescaline/Peyote\n\nBig Chief; Black Button; Blue Caps; Britton; Buttons; Cactus; Green Button; Half Moon; Hikori; Hikuli; Hyatari; Love Flip (taken with Ecstasy); Media Luna; Mescal; *Mescapade*; Mezcakuba; *Microdot*; Moon; Nubs; San Pedro; Seni; Shaman; Topi; Tops\n\n## Methamphetamine\n\nAccordion; Amp; Aqua; Arroz; *Assembled (crystal meth)*; Batu; Begok; *Biker's Coffee*; Blue; Blue Bell Ice Cream; Beers; Bottles; *Bucio*; Bud Light; Bump; Cajitas; Chalk; *Chandelier*; Chavalone; Chicken; Chicken Feed; Chicken Powder; *Chris*; Christine; Christy; Clear; Clothing Cleaner; Cold; *Cold One*; Colorado Rockies; Crank; Cream; Cri-Cri; Crink; Crisco; Crissy; *Christy*; Crypto; Crystal; Cuadro; Day; Diamond; *Dunk*; El Gata Diablo; Evil Sister; Eye Glasses; Fire; Fizz; Flowers; *Foco*; Food; Frio; Fruit; Gak; *Garbage*; G-Funk; Gifts; Girls; Glass; Go-Fast; Go-Go; *Goofball (methamphetamine mixed with heroin)*; Groceries; Hard Ones; Hare; Hawaiian Salt; Hielo; *Hiropon*; Hot Ice; *Hubbers*; Ice; Ice Cream; Ice Water; Icehead; *Jale*; Jug of Water; L.A. Glass; L.A. Ice; Lemons; Lemon Drop; Light; Light Beige; Livianas; Madera; *Mamph*; Meth; *Methlies Quick*; Mexican Crack; Mexican Crank; Miss Girl; Montura; Motor; Muchacha; Nails; One Pot; No-Doze; *Paint*; Pantalones; *Patudas*; Peanut Butter Crank; Pinata; Pointy Ones; Pollito; Popsicle; Purple; Raspado; Rims; Rocket Fuel; Salt; Shabu; Shards; Shatter; Shaved Ice; Shiny Girl; *Small Girl*; Soap Dope; Soft Ones; *Speed*; Speed Dog; Spicy Kind; *Spin*; Stove Top; Stuff; Super Ice; Table; Tina; Tires; *Trash*; Truck; Tupperware; Tweak; Unassembled (powder meth); *Uppers*; Ventanas; Vidrio; Walking Zombie; Water; *Wazz*; White; *Whizz*; Windows; Witches Teeth; *Yaba*; Yellow Barn; *Yellow Cake*; Yellow Kind; Zip\n\n## Methylphenidate (Ritalin, Concerta, Daytrana)\n\nDiet Coke; Jif; *Johnny*; Kibbles and Bits; Kiddie Cocaine; Kiddie Coke; MPH; Pineapple; *Poor Man's Cocaine*; R-Ball; R-Pop; Rids; Rittys; Skippy; Skittles; Smarties; Study Buddies; Truck Drivers; Vitamin R\n\n## Morphine\n\nDreamer; First Line; God's Drug; Joy Juice; Miss Emma; Monkey; Mister Blue; Morpho; Unkie; White Stuff\n\n## Opium\n\nAh-Pen-Yen; Auntie; Aunt Emma; Big O; Black; *Black Pill*; Black Russian (opium mixed with hashish); Chandoo; China; Chinese Molasses; Chinese Tobacco; Chocolate; Cruz; Dopium; Dover's Powder; Dream Gum; Dream Stick; Dreams; Easing Powder; Fi-Do-Nie; Gee; God's Medicine; Goma; Gondola; Goric; Great Tobacco; Gum; *Guma*; Hocus; Hops; Incense; Joy Plant; Midnight Oil; Mira; Ope; Opio; Pen Yan; Pin Gon; Pin Yen; Pox; Skee; Toxy; Toys; When-Shee; Zero\n\n## Oxycodone (Oxycontin, Roxicodone, Oxaydo)\n\n30s; 40s; *512s*; Beans; Blues; Buttons; *Cotton*; Greens; Hillbilly Heroin; Kickers; Killers; Muchachas; *Mujeres*; OC; Oxy; Oxy 80s; Roxy; *Roxy Shorts*; Whites\n\n## Pcp (Phencyclidine)\n\nAce; Alien Sex Fiend (PCP mixed with heroin); Amoeba; Angel; Angel Dust; Angel Hair; Angel Mist; Angel Poke; Animal Tranquilizer; *Ashy Larry*; Aurora Borealis; *Bionic (PCP mixed with marijuana)*; Black Acid (PCP mixed with LSD); Black Whack; Blue Madman; Blue Star; Boat; Busy Bee; Butt Naked; Cadillac; Cliffhanger; Columbo; Cozmos; Crazy Coke; Crazy Eddie; Cucuy; Cyclones; Detroit Pink; Dipper; Domex (PCP mixed with MDMA); Dummy Dust; Dust; Dust Joint; Dust of Angels; Elephant; Elephant Tranquilizer; Embalming Fluid; Energizer; Fake STP; Flakes; Goon; Gorilla Tab; Gorilla Biscuits; Green Leaves; Green Tea; Heaven and Hell; Hog; Horse Tracks; Horse Tranquilizers; Jet Fuel; Juice; Kaps; K-Blast; Killer; Kools; Leaky Leak; Lemon 714; Lethal Weapon; Love Boat; Mad Dog; Mad Man; Magic Dust; Mean Green; Mint Leaf; Mint Weed; Mist; Monkey Dust; Monkey Tranquilizer; New Acid; New Magic; Orange Crystal; Ozone; Paz; Peace Pill; Peep; Peter Pan; Pig Killer; Puffy; Purple Rain; Red Devil; Rocket Fuel; Rupture; Scuffle; Sheets; Sherms; Shermstick; Space (PCP mixed with cocaine); Spores; Stardust; STP; Super Grass; Super Kools; Super Weed; Surfer; Synthetic Cocaine; Taking a Cruise; T-Buzz; Tic Tac; Tish; Trank; Venom; Wack (PCP mixed with cocaine); Water; Wet (marijuana dipped in PCP); White Horizon; Wobble Weed; Wolf; Worm; Yellow Fever; Zombie; Zoom (PCP mixed with marijuana)\n\n## Promethazine\n\nAct; Drank; *Juice*; Lean; *Orange Crush*; Purple; Purple Drank; *Rojo*; Sizurup; Sizzurp; *Skittles*; Syrup; Velvet\n\n## Psilocybin Mushrooms\n\nAlice; *Blue Meanies*; Boomers; Buttons; Caps; Champinones; Cubes; *God's Flesh*; Hongos; Lazers; *Liberties*; Liberty Caps; *Little Smoke*; Magic; Mushies; *Musk*; Pizza Toppings; Psilly Billy; Purple Passion; *Silly Putty*; Simple Simon; *Stemmies*; Tweezes\n\n## Synthetic Cannabinoids\n\n4-20; Abyss; Ace of Spades; AK-47; Amnesia; Atomic Blast; Big Bang; Black Magic Smoke; Black Mamba; Blaze; *Bliss*; Blue Cheese; *Bombay Blue*; Brain Freeze; Buzz Haze; Cherry Bomb; Chill; Chrome; Clockwork Orange; Cloud 10; Cowboy Kush; Crystal Skull; Dead Man; Devil's Venom; Dr. Feel Good; Dragon Eye; Earth Blend; Exodus; Extreme; Fake Bake; *Fire*; Fruit Candy Flavors; Funky Buddha; Funky Monkey; *Garden Salad*; Genie; G-Force; GI Joe; Green Dream; Green Peace; Hammer Head; Helix; Hipster; Hysteria; Ice Dragon; Joker; Juicy Leaf; Jungle Juice; Just Chill; K2; Kaos; Karma; Kong; Krazy Kandy; Kryp2nite; Kush; Layer Cake; Limitless; Mad Hatter; Mile High; Mystique; Ninja; Odyssey; OMG; Pandora's Box; Phoenix; Pineapple Express; Posh; Potpourri; Pow; Rapture; Red Magic; Rewind; Scooby Snax; Sexy; Sky High; Snake Bite; Solar Flare; Spice; Spike Diamond; Storm; Sweet Leaf; Synthetic Marijuana; Terraband; Time Traveler; Top Gear; Train Wreck; Ultimate; Viper; Voodoo Child; Wazabi; Wicked; Wizard; Xtreme; Yucatan; *Yucatan Fire*; Zero Gravity; *Zohai*; Zombie\n\n## Synthetic Cathinones\n\nBath Blow; Bath Salts; Bliss; Bloom; Blow; Blue Silk; *Bubbles*; Cloud 9; *Cosmic Beast*; Drone; Energy-1; Explosion; Flakka (Alpha-PVP); Gravel (Alpha-PVP); Insect Repellent ; Ivory Wave; Jewelry Cleaner; Lunar Wave; M-Cat; Meow-Meow; Ocean Burst; Phone Screen Cleaner; *Plant Feeder*; Plant Food; Pure Ivory; Purple Wave; Recharge; Red Dove; *Salting*; Scarface; Snow Leopard; Stardust; Vanilla Sky; White Dove; White Knight; White Lightening; White Magic; *Wicked X*; Zoom\n\n## Steroids\n\nArnolds; Gear; Gym Candy; Juice; Pumpers; Roids; Stackers; Weight Gainers\n\n## U-47700\n\nPink; Pinky; U4\n\n## Additional Slang Terms And Code Words Measurements\n\n One-Quarter Gram: Cuartito One-Half Gram: 50 One Gram: Bump; Gangster Two Grams: Two Wholes Ten Grams: Finger; Pencil One-Quarter Kilogram: Recamara One Kilogram: Big Tire; Brick; Can of Paint; Cuadro; Ladrillo; Llave; Loki; Loqui; Pelican; Pillow; Short; Square Five Kilograms: Manita Twenty Kilograms: Ventilador Fifty Kilograms: Fardo One-Quarter Ounce: 7s One Ounce: Loaf; Oh; Pie; Small Tire; Small Window; Zip One Pound: Bowl; California Roll; Large Window; Libreta; Libruca; Notebook; Plate; Roll; T-shirt Quantity of Twenty: Ventana; Window\n\n## Locations\n\n Bogota, Colombia: La Fria; La Nevera Border Between Guatemala And Mexico: La Raya Calexico: Calecia Cali, Colombia: La Salsa California: Califa Chicago: Chica; Vientos Costa Rica: Costa; Costicos; CR; Rica; Ticos Dominican Republic: Republica Guadalajara, Mexico: Guanatos; La Perla; Mariachi Guatemala: Guarne; Guate; La G Honduras: La H La Tola, Colombia: La T Las Vegas: Luces Limones, Ecuador: La Isla; Lima; Limo Los Angeles: Los Shorts; Uncle Angel Medellin, Colombia: La Arepa Mexicali: Calor; Chicali Mexico: Afuera, El Sombrero; La M Mexico City: DF; El Humo New York: Towers; Up Top Panama: La P; Palmira Phoenix: La Tia Fina San Diego: Diego Tijuana: Tomate Tumaco, Colombia: La T\n\n## Weapons\n\n AK-47: Chivo; Chopper; Cuerno de Chivo Firearms: Straps Handgun: Cuete; Rofi; Shorts Knife: Filero Long Weapon: Pantalon Rifles: Cuernos Weapon: Bracelet; Fierro\n\n## Miscellaneous\n\n Border Patrol Police: Moscas Bulk Money In US Currency: Verdes; F; Los Americanos Checkpoints: Jalapenos Cocaine About To Be Delivered: Ya terminaron de jugar futbol Cocaine Shipment: Vuelta Contacts To Get Something Done: El Tiene Manejo Coordinates Of Maritime Rendezvous Sites And Smuggling Route: Las Direcciones; Frecuencia Crossing: Cheap Jump Cutting Agent: Cortina Dispatch of a Cocaine Shipment: Encomienda Drug Courier: Burrero; Burrito; Burro; Camello; Correo; Estafeta; Mochilero; Pasador Drug Dealer: Arreador; Enviciador, Pinguero Drug Loads: Ninos Drug Potency: Alcance Drug Proceeds: Invoices; Jabon; Papel; Paper; Phones; Rent; Tickets Drug Source of Supply: Fuente; Plug Drug Stash: Alijo; Canuto; Clavo, Planta Gang Member: Cholo Hidden Compartment: Clavo Hideout for Criminals: Aguantadero Informant: Alcaucil; Batidor; Madrina Impression Marking On a Kilogram Of Cocaine: Marquilla Jail: Churo; Condado; Escuela Kidnappers: Levantadores Large Truck Used To Transport Drugs: Mula Law Enforcement: Cochis, Pitufo Load Vehicles: Muebles Maritime Voyage Of 100 Miles: 100 Ida Maritime Voyage Of 100 Miles to Return: 100 de Regreso Mexican Soldiers: Wachos Mexican State Police: Pepos Mexicans: Mejias Money: Alguita; Bolas; Bread; Feddy; Feria; Food Stamps; Lana; Luz; Paper Murder: Boleta One Million Colombian Pesos: Palo Overdose: Doblar Overdosed on heroin (but was revived by EMS): Blew Up a Bag Person Watching Over Stored Cocaine: La Seguridad Police: Bandera; Chota; Jura; Paco; Zorillos Police Car: Licuadora Poor Quality Product: Chafa Prison: Cachucha; Gayola Naval Reconnaissance Aircraft: Ave; Pajaro Refueling Boat: Camion Refueling Cocaine Transporting Boats At Sea: Tomar Agua Sailing A Maritime Vessel Near The Coast Of Central America To Guatemala: Costeando hasta Guatemala Semi-Truck: Gusano Shooting Gallery (where drugs are injected): Aguaje Small Boats: Taxis Speed Boats About To Be Dispatched Or Arrive With A Cocaine Shipment: Ya empieza la fiesta; Ya termino la fiesta Speed Boats Used As Lookouts: Campana; Cantantes; Barredoras; Mosca Speed Boats Used To Transport Cocaine: Bicicleta; Canoa; Carro; Carro Pequeno; Eduardono; Paloma Staged Transfer of Cocaine Between A Boat Near The Coast And A Vessel At Sea: Prene Structure of a TCO: Lineas Weight Scales: Gameboy; Romanas; Tool Box Work is coming: Party Time\n\n## Appendix A.  Alphabetized List Of Slang Terms And Code Words For Common Drugs\n\n| Slang/Code Word                                   | Associated Drug(s)                |\n|---------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------|\n| 7                                                 | Cocaine                           |\n| 30s                                               | Oxycodone (Oxycontin              |\n|                                                  |                                   |\n| , Roxicodone                                      |                                   |\n|                                                  |                                   |\n| , Oxaydo                                          |                                   |\n|                                                  |                                   |\n| )                                                 |                                   |\n| 40s                                               | Oxycodone (Oxycontin              |\n|                                                  |                                   |\n| , Roxicodone                                      |                                   |\n|                                                  |                                   |\n| , Oxaydo                                          |                                   |\n|                                                  |                                   |\n| )                                                 |                                   |\n| 51s                                               | Crack Cocaine                     |\n| 62                                                | Cocaine                           |\n| 77                                                | Cocaine                           |\n| 151s                                              | Crack Cocaine                     |\n| 357s                                              | Hydrocodone (Norco                |\n|                                                  |                                   |\n| , Vicodin                                         |                                   |\n|                                                  |                                   |\n| , Lorcet                                          |                                   |\n|                                                  |                                   |\n| )                                                 |                                   |\n| 420                                               | Marijuana; Synthetic Cannabinoids |\n| 501s                                              | Crack Cocaine                     |\n| 512s                                              |                                   |\n| Acetaminophen and Oxycodone Combination (Percocet |                                   |\n|                                                  |                                   |\n| ); Oxycodone                                      |                                   |\n| (Oxycontin                                        |                                   |\n|                                                  |                                   |\n| , Roxicodone                                      |                                   |\n|                                                  |                                   |\n| , Oxaydo                                          |                                   |\n|                                                  |                                   |\n| )                                                 |                                   |\n| 542                                               | Flunitrazepam (Rohypnol           |\n|                                                  |                                   |\n| )                                                 |                                   |\n| 710                                               | Marijuana Concentrates/Hash Oil   |\n| 777                                               | Cocaine                           |\n| 921                                               | Cocaine                           |\n| A-1                                               | Cocaine                           |\n| Abajo         | Heroin                                                  |\n|---------------|---------------------------------------------------------|\n| Abby          | Amphetamine and Dextroamphetamine Combination (Adderall |\n|              |                                                         |\n| )             |                                                         |\n| A-Bomb        | Heroin mixed with Marijuana                             |\n| Abyss         | Synthetic Cannabinoids                                  |\n| Abyssian Tea  | Khat                                                    |\n| Acapulco Gold | Marijuana                                               |\n| Acapulco Red  | Marijuana                                               |\n| Accordion     | Methamphetamine                                         |\n| Ace           | Marijuana; PCP (Phencyclidine)                          |\n| Ace of Spades | Synthetic Cannabinoids                                  |\n| Aceite        | LSD (Lysergic Acid Diethylamide)                        |\n| Acelerador    | Amphetamine                                             |\n| Acelide       | LSD (Lysergic Acid Diethylamide)                        |\n| Achivia       | Heroin                                                  |\n| Acid          | LSD (Lysergic Acid Diethylamide)                        |\n| Acido         | LSD (Lysergic Acid Diethylamide)                        |\n| Act           | Promethazine                                            |\n| Adam          | Ecstasy/MDMA/Molly                                      |\n| Addy              | Amphetamine and Dextroamphetamine Combination (Adderall   |\n|-------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------|\n|                  |                                                           |\n| )                 |                                                           |\n| Adidas            | Cocaine                                                   |\n| Adormidera        | Heroin                                                    |\n| African Black     | Marijuana                                                 |\n| African Bush      | Marijuana                                                 |\n| African Salad     | Khat                                                      |\n| Ah-Pen-Yen        | Opium                                                     |\n| Airplane          | Marijuana                                                 |\n| AK-47             | Synthetic Cannabinoids                                    |\n| Alfalfa           | Marijuana                                                 |\n| Alfombra          | Marijuana                                                 |\n| Alice             | LSD (Lysergic Acid Diethylamide); Psilocybin Mushrooms    |\n| Alice B Toklas    | Marijuana                                                 |\n| Alien Sex Fiend   | PCP mixed with Heroin                                     |\n| All-American Drug | Cocaine                                                   |\n| All-Star          | Marijuana                                                 |\n| Almohada          | Marijuana                                                 |\n| Amarilla          | Heroin                                                    |\n| Amnesia                                                    | Synthetic Cannabinoids           |\n|------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------|\n| Amoeba                                                     | PCP (Phencyclidine)              |\n| Amp                                                        | Methamphetamine                  |\n| Amps                                                       |                                  |\n| Amphetamine; Amphetamine and Dextroamphetamine Combination |                                  |\n| (Adderall                                                  |                                  |\n|                                                           |                                  |\n| )                                                          |                                  |\n| Amy                                                        | Amphetamine                      |\n| Ancla                                                      | Cocaine                          |\n| Anestesia de                                               |                                  |\n| Caballo                                                    |                                  |\n| Heroin mixed with the horse anesthetic Xylazine            |                                  |\n| Angel                                                      | PCP (Phencyclidine)              |\n| Angel Dust                                                 | PCP (Phencyclidine)              |\n| Angel Hair                                                 | PCP (Phencyclidine)              |\n| Angel Mist                                                 | PCP (Phencyclidine)              |\n| Angel Poke                                                 | PCP (Phencyclidine)              |\n| Angel Powder                                               | Cocaine                          |\n| Angels in a Sky                                            | LSD (Lysergic Acid Diethylamide) |\n| Angie                                                      | Cocaine                          |\n| Angola                                                     | Marijuana                        |\n| Animal                                                     | LSD (Lysergic Acid Diethylamide) |\n| Animal Cookies                                             | Hydroponic Marijuana             |\n| Animal Tranquilizer   | PCP (Phencyclidine)                                     |\n|-----------------------|---------------------------------------------------------|\n| Animals               | Cocaine                                                 |\n| Antifreeze            | Heroin                                                  |\n| Apache                | Cocaine; Fentanyl and Fentanyl Derivatives              |\n| Apodo                 | Cocaine; Heroin                                         |\n| Apple Jack            | Crack Cocaine                                           |\n| Aqua                  | Methamphetamine                                         |\n| Arizona               | Marijuana                                               |\n| Arnolds               | Steroids                                                |\n| Arpon                 | Heroin                                                  |\n| Arriba                | Cocaine                                                 |\n| Arroz                 | Methamphetamine                                         |\n| Ashes                 | Marijuana                                               |\n| Assembled             | Crystal Meth                                            |\n| Asshy Larry           | PCP (Phencyclidine)                                     |\n| Atomic Blast          | Synthetic Cannabinoids                                  |\n| A-Train               | Amphetamine and Dextroamphetamine Combination (Adderall |\n|                      |                                                         |\n| )                     |                                                         |\n| Audi                  | Cocaine                                                 |\n| Aunt Emma       | Opium                            |\n|-----------------|----------------------------------|\n| Aunt Hazel      | Heroin                           |\n| Aunt Mary       | Marijuana                        |\n| Aunt Nora       | Cocaine                          |\n| Auntie          | Opium                            |\n| Aurora Borealis | PCP (Phencyclidine)              |\n| Avandaro        | LSD (Lysergic Acid Diethylamide) |\n| Avocado         | Heroin                           |\n| AZ              | Marijuana                        |\n| Azucar          | Cocaine; Heroin                  |\n| Baby            | Marijuana                        |\n| Baby Powder     | Cocaine                          |\n| Baby Slits      | Ecstasy/MDMA/Molly               |\n| Baby T          | Crack Cocaine                    |\n| Backbreaker     | LSD mixed with Strychnine        |\n| Bad Seed        | Heroin                           |\n| Baja Corte      | Diluted Heroin                   |\n| Bale            | Marijuana                        |\n| Ballot                                            | Heroin                           |\n|---------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------|\n| Bam                                               | Amphetamine                      |\n| Bambalachacha                                     | Marijuana                        |\n| Bananas                                           |                                  |\n| Acetaminophen and Oxycodone Combination (Percocet |                                  |\n|                                                  |                                  |\n| ); Hydrocodone                                    |                                  |\n| (Norco                                            |                                  |\n|                                                  |                                  |\n| , Vicodin                                         |                                  |\n|                                                  |                                  |\n| , Lorcet                                          |                                  |\n|                                                  |                                  |\n| )                                                 |                                  |\n| Barbara Jean                                      | Marijuana                        |\n| Bareta                                            | Marijuana                        |\n| Barrato                                           | Cocaine                          |\n| Barrel                                            | LSD (Lysergic Acid Diethylamide) |\n| Barry Farrell                                     | Ketamine (Ketalar                |\n|                                                  |                                  |\n| )                                                 |                                  |\n| Bars                                              | Alprazolam (Xanax                |\n|                                                  |                                  |\n| )                                                 |                                  |\n| Bart Simpson                                      | LSD (Lysergic Acid Diethylamide) |\n| Base                                              | Crack Cocaine                    |\n| Baseball                                          | Crack Cocaine                    |\n| Bash                                              | Marijuana                        |\n| Basketball                                        | Heroin                           |\n| Basuco                                            | Cocaine                          |\n| Basura                                            | Heroin                           |\n| Bath Blow                                         | Synthetic Cathinones             |\n| Bath Salts                                            | Synthetic Cathinones                              |\n|-------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------|\n| Battery Acid                                          | LSD (Lysergic Acid Diethylamide)                  |\n| Batu                                                  | Methamphetamine                                   |\n| Bazooka                                               | Cocaine paste mixed with Marijuana; Crack Cocaine |\n| B-Bombs                                               | Amphetamine                                       |\n| BC Budd                                               | Marijuana                                         |\n| Beach                                                 | Cocaine                                           |\n| Beam Me Up                                            | Crack Cocaine                                     |\n| Beans                                                 |                                                   |\n| Amphetamine; Ecstasy/MDMA/Molly; Oxycodone (Oxycontin |                                                   |\n|                                                      |                                                   |\n| ,                                                     |                                                   |\n| Roxicodone                                            |                                                   |\n|                                                      |                                                   |\n| , Oxaydo                                              |                                                   |\n|                                                      |                                                   |\n| )                                                     |                                                   |\n| Beast                                                 | Heroin; LSD (Lysergic Acid Diethylamide)          |\n| Beautiful Boulders                                    | Crack Cocaine                                     |\n| Beemer                                                | Crack Cocaine                                     |\n| Beers                                                 | Methamphetamine                                   |\n| Begok                                                 | Methamphetamine                                   |\n| Belushi                                               | Cocaine mixed with Heroin                         |\n| Bennies                                               | Amphetamine                                       |\n| Benzos                                                | Alprazolam (Xanax                                 |\n|                                                      |                                                   |\n| ); Amphetamine; Clonazepam (Klonopin                  |                                                   |\n|                                                      |                                                   |\n| )                                                     |                                                   |\n| Bernice                                               | Cocaine                                           |\n| Bernie              | Marijuana                        |\n|---------------------|----------------------------------|\n| Bernie's flakes     | Cocaine                          |\n| Bernie's Gold Dust  | Cocaine                          |\n| Beyonce             | Heroin                           |\n| Bhang               | Marijuana                        |\n| BHNO                | Marijuana Concentrates/Hash Oil  |\n| BHO                 | Marijuana Concentrates/Hash Oil  |\n| Bicycle Handle Bars | Alprazolam (Xanax                |\n|                    |                                  |\n| )                   |                                  |\n| Bicycle Parts       | Alprazolam (Xanax                |\n|                    |                                  |\n| )                   |                                  |\n| Big Bag             | Heroin                           |\n| Big Bang            | Synthetic Cannabinoids           |\n| Big Bird            | Cocaine                          |\n| Big Bloke           | Cocaine                          |\n| Big C               | Cocaine                          |\n| Big Chief           | Mescaline/Peyote                 |\n| Big D               | LSD (Lysergic Acid Diethylamide) |\n| Big Flake           | Cocaine                          |\n| Big H               | Heroin                           |\n| Big Harry        | Heroin                             |\n|------------------|------------------------------------|\n| Big O            | Opium                              |\n| Big Pillows      | Marijuana                          |\n| Big Rush         | Cocaine                            |\n| Biggy            | Marijuana                          |\n| Biker's Coffee   | Methamphetamine                    |\n| Bill Blass       | Crack Cocaine                      |\n| Billie Hoke      | Cocaine                            |\n| Bings            | Crack Cocaine                      |\n| Bionic           | Marijuana mixed with PCP           |\n| Bird             | Cocaine; Heroin                    |\n| Birdie Powder    | Cocaine; Heroin                    |\n| Birria           | Fentanyl Mixed with Heroin; Heroin |\n| Birria Blanca    | Heroin                             |\n| BJ               | Crack Cocaine                      |\n| Black            | Heroin; Opium                      |\n| Black Acid       | LSD mixed with PCP                 |\n| Black and Whites | Amphetamine                        |\n| Black Bart        | Marijuana                       |\n|-------------------|---------------------------------|\n| Black Beauties    | Amphetamine                     |\n| Black Birds       | Amphetamine                     |\n| Black Bitch       | Heroin                          |\n| Black Bombers     | Amphetamine                     |\n| Black Button      | Mescaline/Peyote                |\n| Black Glass       | Marijuana Concentrates/Hash Oil |\n| Black Goat        | Heroin                          |\n| Black Gold        | Marijuana                       |\n| Black Magic Smoke | Synthetic Cannabinoids          |\n| Black Mamba       | Synthetic Cannabinoids          |\n| Black Maria       | Marijuana                       |\n| Black Mollies     | Amphetamine                     |\n| Black Olive       | Heroin                          |\n| Black Paint       | Heroin                          |\n| Black Pearl       | Heroin                          |\n| Black Pill        | Opium                           |\n| Black Rock        | Crack Cocaine                   |\n| Black Russian    | Opium mixed with Hashish                     |\n|------------------|----------------------------------------------|\n| Black Sheep      | Heroin                                       |\n| Black Shirt      | Heroin                                       |\n| Black Star       | LSD (Lysergic Acid Diethylamide)             |\n| Black Sunshine   | LSD (Lysergic Acid Diethylamide)             |\n| Black Tabs       | LSD (Lysergic Acid Diethylamide)             |\n| Black Tar        | Heroin                                       |\n| Black Whack      | PCP (Phencyclidine)                          |\n| Blacks           | Amphetamine                                  |\n| Blanca Nieves    | Cocaine                                      |\n| Blanco           | Cocaine; Heroin                              |\n| Blanco de Espana | LSD (Lysergic Acid Diethylamide)             |\n| Blast            | Cocaine                                      |\n| Blaze            | Synthetic Cannabinoids                       |\n| Blind Squid      | Ketamine (Ketalar                            |\n|                 |                                              |\n| )                |                                              |\n| Bliss            | Synthetic Cannabinoids; Synthetic Cathinones |\n| Blizzard         | Cocaine                                      |\n| Blocks           | Cocaine                                      |\n| Blonde                                            | Cocaine; Fentanyl and Fentanyl Derivatives     |\n|---------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------|\n| Blondie                                           | Marijuana                                      |\n| Bloom                                             | Synthetic Cathinones                           |\n| Blotter Acid                                      | LSD (Lysergic Acid Diethylamide)               |\n| Blotter Cube                                      | LSD (Lysergic Acid Diethylamide)               |\n| Blow                                              | Cocaine; Synthetic Cathinones                  |\n| Blow Dope                                         | Heroin                                         |\n| Blowcaine                                         | Crack Cocaine                                  |\n| Blowout                                           | Crack Cocaine; GHB (Gamma-Hydroxybutyric Acid) |\n| Blue                                              |                                                |\n| Acetaminophen and Oxycodone Combination (Percocet |                                                |\n|                                                  |                                                |\n| ); Crack                                          |                                                |\n| Cocaine; Heroin; Methamphetamine                  |                                                |\n| Blue Acid                                         | LSD (Lysergic Acid Diethylamide)               |\n| Blue Barrel                                       | LSD (Lysergic Acid Diethylamide)               |\n| Blue Bell Ice Cream                               | Methamphetamine                                |\n| Blue Boys                                         | Amphetamine                                    |\n| Blue Caps                                         | Mescaline/Peyote                               |\n| Blue Chair                                        | LSD (Lysergic Acid Diethylamide)               |\n| Blue Cheer                                        | LSD (Lysergic Acid Diethylamide)               |\n| Blue Cheese                                       | Marijuana; Synthetic Cannabinoids              |\n| Blue Crush     | Marijuana                                             |\n|----------------|-------------------------------------------------------|\n| Blue Diamond   | Fentanyl and Fentanyl Derivatives                     |\n| Blue Dolphin   | Fentanyl and Fentanyl Derivatives                     |\n| Blue Dream     | Marijuana                                             |\n| Blue Dynamite  | Acetaminophen and Oxycodone Combination (Percocet     |\n|               |                                                       |\n| )              |                                                       |\n| Blue Heaven    | LSD (Lysergic Acid Diethylamide)                      |\n| Blue Hero      | Heroin                                                |\n| Blue Jeans     | Marijuana                                             |\n| Blue Kisses    | Ecstasy/MDMA/Molly                                    |\n| Blue Madman    | PCP (Phencyclidine)                                   |\n| Blue Meanies   | Psilocybin Mushrooms                                  |\n| Blue Microdots | LSD (Lysergic Acid Diethylamide)                      |\n| Blue Mist      | LSD (Lysergic Acid Diethylamide)                      |\n| Blue Moon      | LSD (Lysergic Acid Diethylamide)                      |\n| Blue Sage      | Marijuana                                             |\n| Blue Silk      | Synthetic Cathinones                                  |\n| Blue Sky       | LSD (Lysergic Acid Diethylamide)                      |\n| Blue Star      | LSD (Lysergic Acid Diethylamide); PCP (Phencyclidine) |\n| Blue Superman                                           | Ecstasy/MDMA/Molly                                |\n|---------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------|\n| Blue Tabs                                               | LSD (Lysergic Acid Diethylamide)                  |\n| Blueberries                                             | Acetaminophen and Oxycodone Combination (Percocet |\n|                                                        |                                                   |\n| )                                                       |                                                   |\n| Blueberry                                               | Marijuana                                         |\n| Blues                                                   |                                                   |\n| Fentanyl and Fentanyl Derivatives; Oxycodone (Oxycontin |                                                   |\n|                                                        |                                                   |\n| ,                                                       |                                                   |\n| Roxicodone                                              |                                                   |\n|                                                        |                                                   |\n| , Oxaydo                                                |                                                   |\n|                                                        |                                                   |\n| )                                                       |                                                   |\n| BMV                                                     | Cocaine                                           |\n| Board                                                   | Cocaine                                           |\n| Boat                                                    | PCP (Phencyclidine)                               |\n| Bobo                                                    | Cocaine; Crack Cocaine                            |\n| Bobo Bush                                               | Marijuana                                         |\n| Bolitas                                                 | Cocaine                                           |\n| Bolivian Marching                                       |                                                   |\n| Powder                                                  |                                                   |\n| Cocaine                                                 |                                                   |\n| Bolo                                                    | Crack Cocaine                                     |\n| Bomb                                                    | Crack Cocaine                                     |\n| Bomba                                                   | LSD (Lysergic Acid Diethylamide)                  |\n| Bombay Blue                                             | Synthetic Cannabinoids                            |\n| Bombita                                                 | Amphetamine; Heroin mixed with Cocaine            |\n| Bombs                                                   | Ecstasy/MDMA/Molly                                |\n| Bombs Away     | Heroin                                           |\n|----------------|--------------------------------------------------|\n| Bone           | Crack Cocaine                                    |\n| Bone Crusher   | Crack Cocaine                                    |\n| Bonita         | Heroin                                           |\n| Boo            | Marijuana                                        |\n| Boo-Boo        | Crack Cocaine                                    |\n| Boom           | Marijuana                                        |\n| Boomers        | Psilocybin Mushrooms                             |\n| Booty Juice    | Ecstasy/MDMA/Molly dissolved in liquid           |\n| Bottles        | Methamphetamine                                  |\n| Boulder        | Crack Cocaine                                    |\n| Boxes          | Buprenorphine and Naloxone Combination (Suboxone |\n|               |                                                  |\n| )              |                                                  |\n| Boy            | Crack Cocaine; Heroin                            |\n| Bozo           | Heroin                                           |\n| Brain Freeze   | Synthetic Cannabinoids                           |\n| Brain Ticklers | Amphetamine                                      |\n| Branches       | Marijuana                                        |\n| Brea Negra     | Heroin                                           |\nBreakfast of Champions\nCrack Cocaine\nBrick Gum\nHeroin\nBricks\nAlprazolam (Xanax)\nBrisa\nCocaine\nBritton\nMescaline/Peyote\nBroccoli\nMarijuana\nBrown\nHeroin\nBrown Bomber\nLSD (Lysergic Acid Diethylamide)\nBrown Crystal\nHeroin\nBrown Dots\nLSD (Lysergic Acid Diethylamide)\nBrown Rhine\nHeroin\nBrown Sugar\nHeroin\nBrownies\nAmphetamine\nBruno Mars\nGHB (Gamma-Hydroxybutyric Acid)\nBubble Gum\nCrack Cocaine; Heroin\nBubble Hash\nMarijuana Concentrates/Hash Oil\nBubbles\nSynthetic Cathinones\nBucio\nMethamphetamine\n| Bud                                               | Marijuana                                        |\n|---------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------|\n| Bud Light                                         | Methamphetamine                                  |\n| Budda                                             | Marijuana                                        |\n| Budder                                            | Marijuana Concentrates/Hash Oil                  |\n| Bullion                                           | Crack Cocaine                                    |\n| Bumblebees                                        | Amphetamine                                      |\n| Bump                                              | Cocaine; Crack Cocaine; Methamphetamine          |\n| Bupes                                             | Buprenorphine and Naloxone Combination (Suboxone |\n|                                                  |                                                  |\n| )                                                 |                                                  |\n| Burrito                                           | Heroin                                           |\n| Burritos Verdes                                   | Marijuana                                        |\n| Bush                                              | Marijuana                                        |\n| Busy Bee                                          | PCP (Phencyclidine)                              |\n| Butane Hash Oil                                   | Marijuana Concentrates/Hash Oil                  |\n| Butane Honey Oil                                  | Marijuana Concentrates/Hash Oil                  |\n| Butt Naked                                        | PCP (Phencyclidine)                              |\n| Butter                                            | Fentanyl and Fentanyl Derivatives; Heroin        |\n| Buttons                                           |                                                  |\n| Acetaminophen and Oxycodone Combination (Percocet |                                                  |\n|                                                  |                                                  |\n| ); Mescaline/                                     |                                                  |\n| Peyote; Oxycodone (Oxycontin                      |                                                  |\n|                                                  |                                                  |\n| , Roxicodone                                      |                                                  |\n|                                                  |                                                  |\n| , Oxaydo                                          |                                                  |\n|                                                  |                                                  |\n| );  Psilocybin                                    |                                                  |\n| Mushrooms                                         |                                                  |\n| Buzz Haze                                         | Synthetic Cannabinoids                           |\n| Caballo             | Cocaine; Heroin                             |\n|---------------------|---------------------------------------------|\n| Caballo Negro       | Heroin                                      |\n| Cabbage             | Marijuana                                   |\n| Caca                | Cocaine; Heroin                             |\n| Cactus              | Mescaline/Peyote                            |\n| Cadillac            | Cocaine; PCP (Phencyclidine)                |\n| Cafe                | Heroin; Marijuana                           |\n| Cajeta              | Heroin                                      |\n| Cajita              | Marijuana                                   |\n| Cajitas             | Methamphetamine                             |\n| California Sunshine | LSD (Lysergic Acid Diethylamide); Marijuana |\n| Camara              | Marijuana                                   |\n| Canadian Black      | Marijuana                                   |\n| Candy               | Crack Cocaine; Ecstasy/MDMA/Molly           |\n| Capital H           | Heroin                                      |\n| Caps                | Crack Cocaine; Psilocybin Mushrooms         |\n| Cardio              | White Heroin                                |\n| Carga               | Heroin                                      |\n| Caro             | Heroin                                         |\n|------------------|------------------------------------------------|\n| Cartwheels       | Amphetamine                                    |\n| Casper the Ghost | Crack Cocaine                                  |\n| Cat Food         | Ketamine (Ketalar                              |\n|                 |                                                |\n| )                |                                                |\n| Cat Valium       | Ketamine (Ketalar                              |\n|                 |                                                |\n| )                |                                                |\n| Catha            | Khat                                           |\n| Catnip           | Marijuana                                      |\n| Caviar           | Crack Cocaine; Marijuana Concentrates/Hash Oil |\n| CBD              | Marijuana Concentrates/Hash Oil                |\n| CBD Oil          | Marijuana Concentrates/Hash Oil                |\n| CD               | Crack Cocaine                                  |\n| C-Dust           | Cocaine                                        |\n| Cecil            | Cocaine                                        |\n| Cement           | Cocaine; Heroin                                |\n| Certificada      | Pure Heroin                                    |\n| Chalk            | Amphetamine; Methamphetamine                   |\n| Champinones      | Psilocybin Mushrooms                           |\n| Chandelier       | Methamphetamine                                |\n| Chandoo       | Opium                            |\n|---------------|----------------------------------|\n| Chapopote     | Heroin                           |\n| Charlie       | Cocaine; Heroin                  |\n| Charlie Horse | Heroin                           |\n| Chat          | Khat                             |\n| Chavalone     | Methamphetamine                  |\n| Chavo         | Heroin                           |\n| Cheap Basting | Crack Cocaine                    |\n| Cheeba        | Marijuana                        |\n| Cheese        | Heroin; Marijuana                |\n| Chernobyl     | Marijuana                        |\n| Cherry Bomb   | Synthetic Cannabinoids           |\n| Cherry Dome   | LSD (Lysergic Acid Diethylamide) |\n| Cherry Meth   | GHB (Gamma-Hydroxybutyric Acid)  |\n| Chevy         | Cocaine                          |\n| Chewies       | Crack Cocaine                    |\n| Cheyenne      | Cocaine                          |\n| Chica         | Cocaine                          |\n| Chicago Green   | Marijuana                                       |\n|-----------------|-------------------------------------------------|\n| Chicantas       | Cocaine                                         |\n| Chicken         | Methamphetamine                                 |\n| Chicken Feed    | Methamphetamine                                 |\n| Chicken Powder  | Amphetamine; Methamphetamine                    |\n| Chicle          | Heroin                                          |\n| Chiclosa        | Heroin                                          |\n| Chief           | LSD (Lysergic Acid Diethylamide)                |\n| Chill           | Synthetic Cannabinoids                          |\n| China           | Heroin; Opium                                   |\n| China Blanca    | White Heroin                                    |\n| China Cat       | Heroin                                          |\n| China Girl      | Fentanyl and Fentanyl Derivatives               |\n| China Town      | Fentanyl and Fentanyl Derivatives               |\n| China White     | Fentanyl and Fentanyl Derivatives; Heroin       |\n| Chinese         | Fentanyl and Fentanyl Derivatives               |\n| Chinese Buffet  | Fentanyl and Fentanyl Derivatives; White Heroin |\n| Chinese Dragons | LSD (Lysergic Acid Diethylamide)                |\n| Chinese Food     | Fentanyl and Fentanyl Derivatives; Heroin   |\n|------------------|---------------------------------------------|\n| Chinese Molasses | Opium                                       |\n| Chinese Red      | Heroin                                      |\n| Chinese Tobacco  | Opium                                       |\n| Chingy           | Crack Cocaine                               |\n| Chinos           | Cocaine                                     |\n| Chip             | Heroin                                      |\n| Chippie          | Marijuana                                   |\n| Chistosa         | Marijuana                                   |\n| Chiva            | Cocaine; Heroin                             |\n| Chiva Blanca     | Heroin                                      |\n| Chiva Loca       | Heroin mixed with Fentanyl                  |\n| Chiva Negra      | Heroin                                      |\n| Chivones         | Heroin                                      |\n| Chochos          | Amphetamine                                 |\n| Chocolate        | Heroin; Opium                               |\n| Chocolate Balls  | Heroin                                      |\n| Chocolate Chips  | Ecstasy/MDMA/Molly                          |\n| Chocolate Shake   | Heroin                                                  |\n|-------------------|---------------------------------------------------------|\n| Chocolates        | Amphetamine                                             |\n| Choko             | Heroin                                                  |\n| Chorizo           | Heroin                                                  |\n| Chris             | Methamphetamine                                         |\n| Christina         | Amphetamine                                             |\n| Christine         | Methamphetamine                                         |\n| Christmas Tree    | Marijuana                                               |\n| Christmas Trees   | Amphetamine and Dextroamphetamine Combination (Adderall |\n|                  |                                                         |\n| )                 |                                                         |\n| Christy           | Methamphetamine                                         |\n| Chrome            | Synthetic Cannabinoids                                  |\n| Chronic           | Marijuana                                               |\n| Chunk             | Amphetamine                                             |\n| Churro            | Marijuana                                               |\n| Churro Negro      | Heroin                                                  |\n| Chutazo           | Heroin                                                  |\n| Cid               | LSD (Lysergic Acid Diethylamide)                        |\n| Cielo             | Cocaine                                                 |\n| Cigars           | Marijuana               |\n|------------------|-------------------------|\n| Circles          | Flunitrazepam (Rohypnol |\n|                 |                         |\n| )                |                         |\n| Citrol           | Marijuana               |\n| Clarity          | Ecstasy/MDMA/Molly      |\n| Clear            | Methamphetamine         |\n| Clear Kind       | Cocaine                 |\n| Clear Tires      | Cocaine                 |\n| Clicker          | Crack Cocaine           |\n| Cliffhanger      | PCP (Phencyclidine)     |\n| Climax           | Crack Cocaine           |\n| Clockwork Orange | Synthetic Cannabinoids  |\n| Clothing Cleaner | Methamphetamine         |\n| Cloud            | Crack Cocaine           |\n| Cloud 10         | Synthetic Cannabinoids  |\n| Cloud 9          | Synthetic Cathinones    |\n| Cloud Nine       | Crack Cocaine           |\n| Coast-to-Coasts  | Amphetamine             |\n| Coca             | Cocaine                 |\n| Coca-Cola         | Cocaine                                  |\n|-------------------|------------------------------------------|\n| Cocazo            | Cocaine                                  |\n| Coco              | Heroin                                   |\n| Coconut           | Cocaine                                  |\n| Coffee            | Heroin; LSD (Lysergic Acid Diethylamide) |\n| Cohete            | Heroin                                   |\n| Coke              | Cocaine                                  |\n| Cola              | Cocaine; Marijuana                       |\n| Cold              | Methamphetamine                          |\n| Cold One          | Methamphetamine                          |\n| Colorado          | Cocaine                                  |\n| Colorado Cocktail | Marijuana                                |\n| Colorado Rockies  | Methamphetamine                          |\n| Colorines         | LSD (Lysergic Acid Diethylamide)         |\n| Columbo           | PCP (Phencyclidine)                      |\n| Comida            | Heroin; Cocaine                          |\n| Comida Dulce      | Cocaine                                  |\n| Conductor         | LSD (Lysergic Acid Diethylamide)         |\n| Connie                                                     | Cocaine                           |\n|------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------|\n| Cookie                                                     | Cocaine; Hydroponic Marijuana     |\n| Cookies                                                    | Crack Cocaine                     |\n| Co-Pilot                                                   |                                   |\n| Amphetamine; Amphetamine and Dextroamphetamine Combination |                                   |\n| (Adderall                                                  |                                   |\n|                                                           |                                   |\n| )                                                          |                                   |\n| Cosa                                                       | Cocaine                           |\n| Cosmic Beast                                               | Synthetic Cathinones              |\n| Coso                                                       | Cocaine                           |\n| Cosos                                                      | Cocaine                           |\n| Cotorritos                                                 | Marijuana                         |\n| Cotton                                                     | Oxycodone (Oxycontin              |\n|                                                           |                                   |\n| , Roxicodone                                               |                                   |\n|                                                           |                                   |\n| , Oxaydo                                                   |                                   |\n|                                                           |                                   |\n| )                                                          |                                   |\n| Cowboy Kush                                                | Synthetic Cannabinoids            |\n| Cozmos                                                     | PCP (Phencyclidine)               |\n| Crank                                                      | Methamphetamine                   |\n| Crazy                                                      | Fentanyl and Fentanyl Derivatives |\n| Crazy Eddie                                                | PCP (Phencyclidine)               |\n| Crazy Oke                                                  | PCP (Phencyclidine)               |\n| Crazy One                                                  | Fentanyl and Fentanyl Derivatives |\n| Crazy Weed                                                 | Marijuana                         |\n| CRC              | Crack Cocaine                   |\n|------------------|---------------------------------|\n| Cream            | Methamphetamine                 |\n| Creeper Bud      | Marijuana                       |\n| Crib             | Crack Cocaine                   |\n| Cri-Cri          | Methamphetamine                 |\n| Crink            | Methamphetamine                 |\n| Crippy           | Marijuana                       |\n| Crisco           | Methamphetamine                 |\n| Crisscross       | Amphetamine                     |\n| Crissy           | Methamphetamine                 |\n| Cross Roads      | Amphetamine                     |\n| Cross Tops       | Amphetamine                     |\n| Crosses          | Amphetamine                     |\n| Crow             | Cocaine                         |\n| Crown Cap        | Heroin                          |\n| Crumble          | Marijuana Concentrates/Hash Oil |\n| Crunch and Munch | Crack Cocaine                   |\n| Crusty Treats    | Cocaine                         |\n| Cruz          | Opium                                            |\n|---------------|--------------------------------------------------|\n| Crying Weed   | Marijuana                                        |\n| Crypto        | Methamphetamine                                  |\n| Crystal Skull | Synthetic Cannabinoids                           |\n| Crystalline   | Marijuana Concentrates/Hash Oil; Methamphetamine |\n| Cuadro        | Methamphetamine; Cocaine                         |\n| Cubes         | Psilocybin Mushrooms                             |\n| Cucuy         | PCP (Phencyclidine)                              |\n| Culican       | Marijuana                                        |\n| Curley Hair   | Heroin                                           |\n| Cyclones      | PCP (Phencyclidine)                              |\n| D             | Hydromorphone (Dilaudid                          |\n|              |                                                  |\n| )             |                                                  |\n| D.O.A.        | Heroin                                           |\n| Dabs          | Marijuana Concentrates/Hash Oil                  |\n| Dance Fever   | Fentanyl and Fentanyl Derivatives                |\n| Dancing Shoes | Ecstasy/MDMA/Molly                               |\n| Dank          | Marijuana                                        |\n| Dark          | Heroin                                           |\n| Dark Girl        | Heroin                  |\n|------------------|-------------------------|\n| Dark Kind        | Heroin                  |\n| Date Rape Drug   | Flunitrazepam (Rohypnol |\n|                 |                         |\n| )                |                         |\n| Day              | Methamphetamine         |\n| Dead Man         | Synthetic Cannabinoids  |\n| Dead on Arrival  | Heroin                  |\n| Death Valley     | Cocaine                 |\n| Debs             | Amphetamine             |\n| Decadence        | Ecstasy/MDMA/Molly      |\n| Designer Jeans   | Cocaine                 |\n| Detroit pink     | PCP (Phencyclidine)     |\n| Devil            | Crack Cocaine           |\n| Devil Smoke      | Crack Cocaine           |\n| Devil's Dandruff | Cocaine                 |\n| Devil's Lettuce  | Marijuana               |\n| Devil's Venom    | Synthetic Cannabinoids  |\n| Dew              | Marijuana               |\n| Dexies           | Amphetamine             |\n| Diablos      | Amphetamine                                          |\n|--------------|------------------------------------------------------|\n| Diamond      | Methamphetamine                                      |\n| Diamonds     | Amphetamine; Cocaine                                 |\n| Dice         | Crack Cocaine                                        |\n| Diente       | Cocaine                                              |\n| Dienton      | Cocaine                                              |\n| Diesel       | Cocaine; Heoin; Marijuana                            |\n| Diet Coke    | Methylphenidate (Ritalin                             |\n|             |                                                      |\n| , Concerta   |                                                      |\n|             |                                                      |\n| , Daytrana   |                                                      |\n|             |                                                      |\n| )            |                                                      |\n| Diet Pills   | Amphetamine                                          |\n| Dillies      | Hydromorphone (Dilaudid                              |\n|             |                                                      |\n| )            |                                                      |\n| Dimba        | Marijuana                                            |\n| Dime Special | Crack Cocaine                                        |\n| Dinkie Dow   | Marijuana                                            |\n| Diosa Blanca | Cocaine                                              |\n| Diosa Verde  | Marijuana                                            |\n| Dipper       | Marijuana Concentrates/Hash Oil; PCP (Phencyclidine) |\n| Dirt         | Heroin                                               |\n| Dirt Grass   | Marijuana                                            |\n| Dirty Basing   | Crack Cocaine                     |\n|----------------|-----------------------------------|\n| Dirty Fentanyl | Crack Cocaine mixed with Fentanyl |\n| Disco Biscuits | Ecstasy/MDMA/Molly                |\n| Ditch Weed     | Marijuana                         |\n| Dizz           | Marijuana                         |\n| Djamba         | Marijuana                         |\n| Doctor         | Ecstasy/MDMA/Molly                |\n| Dody           | Marijuana                         |\n| Dog Food       | Heroin                            |\n| Doggie         | Heroin                            |\n| Dojo           | Marijuana                         |\n| Dolls          | Amphetamine                       |\n| Domestic       | Marijuana                         |\n| Domex          | Ecstacy mixed with PCP            |\n| Dominoes       | Amphetamine                       |\n| Dona Blanca    | Cocaine                           |\n| Dones          | Hydrocodone (Norco                |\n|               |                                   |\n| , Vicodin      |                                   |\n|               |                                   |\n| , Lorcet       |                                   |\n|               |                                   |\n| )              |                                   |\n| Donkey         | Ketamine (Ketalar                 |\n|               |                                   |\n| )              |                                   |\n| Donna Juana    | Marijuana                        |\n|----------------|----------------------------------|\n| Doobie         | Marijuana                        |\n| Doojee         | Heroin                           |\n| Dope           | Heroin                           |\n| Dopium         | Opium                            |\n| Dorado         | Heroin                           |\n| Dots           | LSD (Lysergic Acid Diethylamide) |\n| Double Bubble  | Cocaine                          |\n| Double Cross   |                                  |\n| Drivers        |                                  |\n| Amphetamine    |                                  |\n| Double Dome    | LSD (Lysergic Acid Diethylamide) |\n| Double Letters | Cocaine                          |\n| Double Yoke    | Crack Cocaine                    |\n| Dove           | Cocaine                          |\n| Dover's Powder | Opium                            |\n| Down           | Heroin                           |\n| Downtown       | Heroin                           |\n| Downtown Brown | Marijuana                        |\n| Dr. Feel Good  | Synthetic Cannabinoids           |\n| Drag Weed               | Marijuana                                 |\n|-------------------------|-------------------------------------------|\n| Dragon                  | Fentanyl and Fentanyl Derivatives; Heroin |\n| Dragon Eye              | Synthetic Cannabinoids                    |\n| Dragon's Breath         | Fentanyl and Fentanyl Derivatives         |\n| Drank                   | Promethazine                              |\n| Dream                   | Cocaine                                   |\n| Dream Gum               | Opium                                     |\n| Dream Stick             | Opium                                     |\n| Dreamer                 | Morphine                                  |\n| Dreams                  | Opium                                     |\n| Dreck                   | Heroin                                    |\n| Dro                     | Hydrocodone (Norco                        |\n|                        |                                           |\n| , Vicodin               |                                           |\n|                        |                                           |\n| , Lorcet                |                                           |\n|                        |                                           |\n| ); Hydroponic Marijuana |                                           |\n| Droco                   | Hydrocodone (Norco                        |\n|                        |                                           |\n| , Vicodin               |                                           |\n|                        |                                           |\n| , Lorcet                |                                           |\n|                        |                                           |\n| )                       |                                           |\n| Drone                   | Synthetic Cathinones                      |\n| Drop                    | Ecstasy/MDMA/Molly                        |\n| Droski                  | Hydroponic Marijuana                      |\n| Dry High                | Marijuana                                 |\n| Dulces                  | Amphetamine; Cocaine                      |\n| Dummy Dust      | PCP (Phencyclidine)             |\n|-----------------|---------------------------------|\n| Dunk            | Methamphetamine                 |\n| Duracell        | Cocaine                         |\n| Durazno         | Cocaine                         |\n| Durin           | Crack Cocaine                   |\n| Duro            | Cocaine                         |\n| Dust            | Cocaine; PCP (Phencyclidine)    |\n| Dust Joint      | PCP (Phencyclidine)             |\n| Dust of Angels  | PCP (Phencyclidine)             |\n| Dynamite        | Heroin                          |\n| Dyno            | Heroin                          |\n| E               | Ecstasy/MDMA/Molly              |\n| Ear Wax         | Marijuana Concentrates/Hash Oil |\n| Earth Blend     | Synthetic Cannabinoids          |\n| Easing Powder   | Opium                           |\n| Eastside Player | Crack Cocaine                   |\n| Easy Lay        | GHB (Gamma-Hydroxybutyric Acid) |\n| E-Bomb          | Ecstasy/MDMA/Molly              |\n| Edibles             | Marijuana Concentrates/Hash Oil   |\n|---------------------|-----------------------------------|\n| Egg                 | Crack Cocaine                     |\n| El Cid              | LSD (Lysergic Acid Diethylamide)  |\n| El Diablo           | Heroin                            |\n| El Gata Diablo      | Methamphetamine                   |\n| Electric Kool Aid   | LSD (Lysergic Acid Diethylamide)  |\n| Elefante Blanco     | LSD (Lysergic Acid Diethylamide)  |\n| Elefante Pata       | Marijuana                         |\n| Elephant            | PCP (Phencyclidine)               |\n| Elephant            |                                   |\n| Tranquilizer        |                                   |\n| PCP (Phencyclidine) |                                   |\n| Ellis Day           | LSD (Lysergic Acid Diethylamide)  |\n| Embalming Fluid     | PCP (Phencyclidine)               |\n| Enail               | Marijuana Concentrates/Hash Oil   |\n| Endo                | Marijuana                         |\n| Energy-1            | Synthetic Cathinones              |\n| Engines             | Heroin                            |\n| Enigizer            | PCP (Phencyclidine)               |\n| Enrique Grande      | Heroin                            |\n| Ercs        | Acetaminophen and Oxycodone Combination (Percocet   |\n|-------------|-----------------------------------------------------|\n|            |                                                     |\n| )           |                                                     |\n| Errl        | Marijuana Concentrates/Hash Oil                     |\n| Escama      | Cocaine                                             |\n| Escoba      | Marijuana                                           |\n| Escorpino   | Cocaine                                             |\n| Esquina     | Heroin                                              |\n| Esquinilla  | Heroin                                              |\n| Essence     | Ecstasy/MDMA/Molly                                  |\n| Eve         | Ecstasy/MDMA/Molly                                  |\n| Everclear   | GHB (Gamma-Hydroxybutyric Acid)                     |\n| Evil Sister | Methamphetamine                                     |\n| Exodus      | Synthetic Cannabinoids                              |\n| Explosion   | Synthetic Cathinones                                |\n| Extract     | Marijuana Concentrates/Hash Oil                     |\n| Extreme     | Synthetic Cannabinoids                              |\n| Eye Glasses | Methamphetamine                                     |\n| Eye Opener  | Crack Cocaine                                       |\n| F           | Fentanyl and Fentanyl Derivatives                   |\n| Facebook     | Fentanyl mixed with Heroin in pill form   |\n|--------------|-------------------------------------------|\n| Fairy Dust   | Heroin                                    |\n| Fake Bake    | Synthetic Cannabinoids                    |\n| Fake STP     | PCP (Phencyclidine)                       |\n| Falopa       | Cocaine                                   |\n| Famous Dimes | Crack Cocaine                             |\n| Fantasy G    | GHB (Gamma-Hydroxybutyric Acid)           |\n| Fat Bags     | Crack Cocaine                             |\n| Fattie       | Marijuana                                 |\n| Fef1         | Cocaine                                   |\n| Fent         | Fentanyl and Fentanyl Derivatives         |\n| Fenty        | Fentanyl and Fentanyl Derivatives         |\n| Fichas       | Cocaine                                   |\n| Fi-Do-Nie    | Opium                                     |\n| Fields       | LSD (Lysergic Acid Diethylamide)          |\n| Fiesta       | Cocaine                                   |\n| Fifty-One    | Crack Cocaine                             |\n| Fine Stuff   | Marijuana                                 |\nFire\nCocaine Base; Fentanyl and Fentanyl Derivatives; Marijuana; Methamphetamine; Synthetic Cannabinoids\nFirst Line\nMorphine\nFish\nLiquid Cocaine\nFish Scale\nCocaine\nFish Scales\nCrack Cocaine\nFives\nAmphetamine\nFizz\nMethamphetamine\nFlake\nCocaine\nFlakes\nPCP (Phencyclidine)\nFlakka\nSynthetic Cathinones - Alpha- PVP\nFlash\nLSD (Lysergic Acid Diethylamide)\nFlat Blues\nLSD (Lysergic Acid Diethylamide)\nFlea Market Jeans\nCocaine\nFlea Powder\nHeroin\nFlorida Snow\nCocaine\nFlour\nAmphetamine; Cocaine\nFlower\nMarijuana\nFlower Tops\nMarijuana\n| Flowers                                                   | Methamphetamine                   |\n|-----------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------|\n| Fluff                                                     | Hydrocodone (Norco                |\n|                                                          |                                   |\n| , Vicodin                                                 |                                   |\n|                                                          |                                   |\n| , Lorcet                                                  |                                   |\n|                                                          |                                   |\n| )                                                         |                                   |\n| Fluffy                                                    | Marijuana                         |\n| Foco                                                      | Methamphetamine                   |\n| Food                                                      |                                   |\n| Cocaine; Fentanyl and Fentanyl Derivatives; White Heroin; |                                   |\n| Methamphetamine                                           |                                   |\n| Foolish Powder                                            | Cocaine; Heroin                   |\n| Footballs                                                 | Alprazolam (Xanax                 |\n|                                                          |                                   |\n| ); Amphetamine                                            |                                   |\n| Forget Pill                                               | Flunitrazepam (Rohypnol           |\n|                                                          |                                   |\n| )                                                         |                                   |\n| Fox                                                       | Cocaine                           |\n| Freddy                                                    | Fentanyl and Fentanyl Derivatives |\n| Freebase                                                  | Crack Cocaine                     |\n| Freeze                                                    | Cocaine                           |\n| French Blues                                              | Amphetamine                       |\n| French Fries                                              | Crack Cocaine                     |\n| Friend                                                    | Fentanyl and Fentanyl Derivatives |\n| Frio                                                      | Methamphetamine                   |\n| Friskie Powder                                            | Cocaine                           |\n| Fruit                                                     | Methamphetamine                   |\n| Fruit Candy Flavors   | Synthetic Cannabinoids          |\n|-----------------------|---------------------------------|\n| Frula                 | Cocaine                         |\n| Fuf                   | Furanyl Fentanyl                |\n| Full Melt             | Marijuana Concentrates/Hash Oil |\n| Funky Buddha          | Synthetic Cannabinoids          |\n| Funky Monkey          | Synthetic Cannabinoids          |\n| Funtime               | Cocaine                         |\n| Fuzzy Lady            | Marijuana                       |\n| Gabacho               | Cocaine                         |\n| Gak                   | Methamphetamine                 |\n| Galaxy                | Cocaine                         |\n| Gallina               | Marijuana                       |\n| Gallito               | Marijuana                       |\n| Galloping Horse       | Heroin                          |\n| Gallos                | Cocaine                         |\n| Gamma Oh              | GHB (Gamma-Hydroxybutyric Acid) |\n| Gamot                 | Heroin                          |\n| Gangster              | Marijuana                       |\n| Ganja            | Marijuana                       |\n|------------------|---------------------------------|\n| Garbage          | Methamphetamine                 |\n| Garbage Rock     | Crack Cocaine                   |\n| Garden           | Marijuana                       |\n| Garden Salad     | Synthetic Cannabinoids          |\n| Garifa           | Marijuana                       |\n| Gash             | Marijuana                       |\n| Gato             | Cocaine; Heroin; Marijuana      |\n| Gauge            | Marijuana                       |\n| Gear             | Steroids                        |\n| Gee              | Opium                           |\n| GEEB             | GHB (Gamma-Hydroxybutyric Acid) |\n| Geek             | Crack Cocaine                   |\n| Geeked Up        | Amphetamine                     |\n| Genie            | Synthetic Cannabinoids          |\n| George Smack     | Heroin                          |\n| Georgia Home Boy | GHB (Gamma-Hydroxybutyric Acid) |\n| G-Force          | Synthetic Cannabinoids          |\n| G-Funk             | Methamphetamine                                    |\n|--------------------|----------------------------------------------------|\n| Ghana              | Marijuana                                          |\n| Ghost              | LSD (Lysergic Acid Diethylamide)                   |\n| GI Joe             | Synthetic Cannabinoids                             |\n| Gift of the Sun    | Cocaine                                            |\n| Gifts              | Methamphetamine                                    |\n| Giggle Smoke       | Marijuana                                          |\n| Giggle Weed        | Marijuana                                          |\n| Gigi               | Hydroponic Marijuana                               |\n| Gin                | Cocaine                                            |\n| Gina               | GHB (Gamma-Hydroxybutyric Acid)                    |\n| Girl               | Cocaine; Fentanyl and Fentanyl Derivatives; Heroin |\n| Girl Scout Cookies | Hydroponic Marijuana                               |\n| Girlfriend         | Cocaine                                            |\n| Girls              | Methamphetamine                                    |\n| Glad Stuff         | Cocaine                                            |\n| Glass              | Methamphetamine                                    |\n| Glo                | Crack Cocaine                                      |\n| Glob           | Marijuana Concentrates/Hash Oil   |\n|----------------|-----------------------------------|\n| Globo          | Balloon of Heroin                 |\n| Gloria         | Marijuana                         |\n| Go             | Ecstasy/MDMA/Molly                |\n| Goat           | Heroin                            |\n| God's Drug     | Morphine                          |\n| God's Flesh    | Psilocybin Mushrooms              |\n| God's Medicine | Opium                             |\n| Go-Fast        | Methamphetamine                   |\n| Go-Go          | Methamphetamine                   |\n| Gold           | Crack Cocaine; Marijuana          |\n| Gold Dust      | Cocaine                           |\n| Gold Leaf      | Marijuana                         |\n| Gold Star      | Marijuana                         |\n| Golden Dragon  | LSD (Lysergic Acid Diethylamide)  |\n| Golden Girl    | Heroin                            |\n| Golf Ball      | Crack Cocaine                     |\n| Golf Balls     | LSD (Lysergic Acid Diethylamide)  |\n| Goma            | Heroin; Opium                              |\n|-----------------|--------------------------------------------|\n| Gondola         | Opium                                      |\n| Gong            | Marijuana                                  |\n| Good and Plenty | Heroin                                     |\n| Good Giggles    | Marijuana                                  |\n| Good H          | Heroin                                     |\n| Goodfella       | Fentanyl and Fentanyl Derivatives          |\n| Goofball        | Heroin mixed with Methamphetamine          |\n| Goofballs       | Amphetamine                                |\n| Goofy           | LSD (Lysergic Acid Diethylamide)           |\n| Goog            | Ecstasy/MDMA/Molly                         |\n| Goon            | PCP (Phencyclidine)                        |\n| Goop            | GHB (Gamma-Hydroxybutyric Acid)            |\n| Gorda           | Heroin                                     |\n| Goric           | Opium                                      |\n| Gorilla         | Marijuana                                  |\n| Gorilla Glue    | Marijuana; Marijuana Concentrates/Hash Oil |\n| Gorilla Tab     | PCP (Phencyclidine)                        |\n| Gorrilla Biscuits               | PCP (Phencyclidine)                              |\n|---------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------|\n| Gota                            | LSD (Lysergic Acid Diethylamide)                 |\n| Grand Daddy Purp                | Marijuana                                        |\n| Grape Parfait                   | LSD (Lysergic Acid Diethylamide)                 |\n| Gras                            | Heroin                                           |\n| Grasin                          | Heroin                                           |\n| Grass                           | Marijuana                                        |\n| Grasshopper                     | Marijuana                                        |\n| Gravel                          | Crack Cocaine; Synthetic Cathinones - Alpha- PVP |\n| Gravy                           | Heroin                                           |\n| Gray Stuff                      | Fentanyl and Fentanyl Derivatives                |\n| Great Bear                      | Fentanyl and Fentanyl Derivatives                |\n| Great Hormones at               |                                                  |\n| Bedtime                         |                                                  |\n| GHB (Gamma-Hydroxybutyric Acid) |                                                  |\n| Great Tobacco                   | Opium                                            |\n| Great White Hope                | Crack Cocaine                                    |\n| Green                           | Ketamine (Ketalar                                |\n|                                |                                                  |\n| ); Marijuana                    |                                                  |\n| Green Apple                     | Ecstasy/MDMA/Molly                               |\n| Green Button                    | Mescaline/Peyote                                 |\n| Green Crack     | Marijuana                                         |\n|-----------------|---------------------------------------------------|\n| Green Dream     | Synthetic Cannabinoids                            |\n| Green Eyes      | Marijuana                                         |\n| Green Goblin    | Marijuana                                         |\n| Green Goddess   | Marijuana                                         |\n| Green Gold      | Cocaine                                           |\n| Green K         | Ketamine (Ketalar                                 |\n|                |                                                   |\n| )               |                                                   |\n| Green Leaves    | PCP (Phencyclidine)                               |\n| Green Mercedes  |                                                   |\n| Benz            |                                                   |\n| Marijuana       |                                                   |\n| Green Paint     | Marijuana                                         |\n| Green Peace     | Synthetic Cannabinoids                            |\n| Green Skunk     | Marijuana                                         |\n| Green Tea       | PCP (Phencyclidine)                               |\n| Green Wedge     | LSD (Lysergic Acid Diethylamide)                  |\n| Green-Eyed Girl | Marijuana                                         |\n| Greenhouse      | Marijuana                                         |\n| Greenies        | Acetaminophen and Oxycodone Combination (Percocet |\n|                |                                                   |\n| ); Amphetamine  |                                                   |\n| Greens          | Oxycodone (Oxycontin                              |\n|                |                                                   |\n| , Roxicodone    |                                                   |\n|                |                                                   |\n| , Oxaydo        |                                                   |\n|                |                                                   |\n| )               |                                                   |\n| Grenuda                         | Marijuana                        |\n|---------------------------------|----------------------------------|\n| Greta                           | Marijuana                        |\n| Grey Shields                    | LSD (Lysergic Acid Diethylamide) |\n| Grievous Bodily                 |                                  |\n| Harm                            |                                  |\n| GHB (Gamma-Hydroxybutyric Acid) |                                  |\n| G-Riffic                        | GHB (Gamma-Hydroxybutyric Acid)  |\n| Gringa                          | Cocaine                          |\n| Gringito                        | Cocaine                          |\n| Grit                            | Crack Cocaine                    |\n| Groceries                       | Crack Cocaine; Methamphetamine   |\n| Grout                           | Cocaine                          |\n| Guardada                        | Marijuana                        |\n| Guerillo                        | Cocaine                          |\n| Gueros                          | Cocaine                          |\n| Guitar                          | Cocaine                          |\n| Gum                             | Heroin; Opium                    |\n| Guma                            | Opium                            |\n| Gummy Bears                     | Marijuana                        |\n| Gunga                           | Marijuana                        |\n| Gym Candy        | Steroids               |\n|------------------|------------------------|\n| H                | Heroin                 |\n| H1               | Cocaine                |\n| Hai              | Cocaine                |\n| Hail             | Crack Cocaine          |\n| Hairy            | Heroin                 |\n| Hairy Ones       | Marijuana              |\n| Half Moon        | Mescaline/Peyote       |\n| Hamburger        | Cocaine                |\n| Hamburger Helper | Crack Cocaine          |\n| Hammer Head      | Synthetic Cannabinoids |\n| Handlebars       | Alprazolam (Xanax      |\n|                 |                        |\n| )                |                        |\n| Happy Dust       | Cocaine                |\n| Happy Pill       | Ecstasy/MDMA/Molly     |\n| Happy Powder     | Cocaine                |\n| Happy Trails     | Cocaine                |\n| Hard             | Crack Cocaine          |\n| Hard Candy       | Heroin                 |\n| Hard Ones         | Methamphetamine                          |\n|-------------------|------------------------------------------|\n| Hardy One         | Heroin                                   |\n| Hare              | Methamphetamine                          |\n| Harry             | Heroin                                   |\n| Hash              | Marijuana                                |\n| Hats              | Heroin; LSD (Lysergic Acid Diethylamide) |\n| Hawaiian          | Marijuana                                |\n| Hawaiian Salt     | Methamphetamine                          |\n| Hawaiian Sunshine | LSD (Lysergic Acid Diethylamide)         |\n| Hawk              | LSD (Lysergic Acid Diethylamide)         |\n| Hay               | Marijuana                                |\n| Haze              | LSD (Lysergic Acid Diethylamide)         |\n| Hazel             | Heroin                                   |\n| H-Caps            | Heroin                                   |\n| Head Drugs        | Amphetamine                              |\n| Headlights        | LSD (Lysergic Acid Diethylamide)         |\n| Heady             | Marijuana Concentrates/Hash Oil          |\n| Hearts            | Amphetamine                              |\n| Heaven          | Cocaine                           |\n|-----------------|-----------------------------------|\n| Heaven and Hell | PCP (Phencyclidine)               |\n| Heaven Dust     | Cocaine; Heroin                   |\n| Heavenly Blue   | LSD (Lysergic Acid Diethylamide)  |\n| Heavy           | Heroin                            |\n| Heavy One       | Cocaine                           |\n| Heineken        | Fentanyl and Fentanyl Derivatives |\n| Helen           | Heroin                            |\n| Helicopter      | Heroin                            |\n| Helix           | Synthetic Cannabinoids            |\n| Hell Dust       | Heroin                            |\n| He-Man          | Fentanyl and Fentanyl Derivatives |\n| Hemp            | Marijuana                         |\n| Hen             | Cocaine                           |\n| Henry           | Heroin                            |\n| Henry VIII      | Cocaine                           |\n| Herb            | Marijuana                         |\n| Hercules        | Heroin                            |\n| Hero                                              | Heroin                           |\n|---------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------|\n| HH                                                | Cocaine                          |\n| HHJ                                               | Cocaine                          |\n| Hielo                                             | Methamphetamine                  |\n| Hierba                                            | Marijuana                        |\n| High Heat                                         | Cocaine                          |\n| Hikori                                            | Mescaline/Peyote                 |\n| Hikuli                                            | Mescaline/Peyote                 |\n| Hillbilly Heroin                                  |                                  |\n| Acetaminophen and Oxycodone Combination (Percocet |                                  |\n|                                                  |                                  |\n| ); Oxycodone                                      |                                  |\n| (Oxycontin                                        |                                  |\n|                                                  |                                  |\n| , Roxicodone                                      |                                  |\n|                                                  |                                  |\n| , Oxaydo                                          |                                  |\n|                                                  |                                  |\n| )                                                 |                                  |\n| Him                                               | Heroin                           |\n| Hiopon                                            | Methamphetamine                  |\n| Hipster                                           | Synthetic Cannabinoids           |\n| Hit                                               | Cocaine                          |\n| Hits                                              | LSD (Lysergic Acid Diethylamide) |\n| HMH                                               | Cocaine                          |\n| Hocus                                             | Opium                            |\n| Hog                                               | PCP (Phencyclidine)              |\n| Hoja                                              | Marijuana                        |\n| Holy Grail                         | Marijuana                         |\n|------------------------------------|-----------------------------------|\n| Hombre                             | Heroin                            |\n| Homegrown                          | Marijuana                         |\n| Honey Oil                          | Ketamine (Ketalar                 |\n|                                   |                                   |\n| ); Marijuana Concentrates/Hash Oil |                                   |\n| Hongos                             | Psilocybin Mushrooms              |\n| Hooch                              | Marijuana                         |\n| Hops                               | Opium                             |\n| Horse                              | Heroin                            |\n| Horse Heads                        | Amphetamine                       |\n| Horse Tracks                       | PCP (Phencyclidine)               |\n| Horse Tranquilizers                | PCP (Phencyclidine)               |\n| Hot Dope                           | Heroin                            |\n| Hot Ice                            | Methamphetamine                   |\n| Hotcakes                           | Crack Cocaine                     |\n| Hubba                              | Crack Cocaine                     |\n| Hubbers                            | Methamphetamine                   |\n| Huera                              | Heroin                            |\n| Huerfanito                         | Fentanyl and Fentanyl Derivatives |\n| Hug            | Ecstasy/MDMA/Molly                |\n|----------------|-----------------------------------|\n| Hug Drug       | Ecstasy/MDMA/Molly                |\n| Hulk           | Alprazolam (Xanax                 |\n|               |                                   |\n| )              |                                   |\n| Huma           | Marijuana                         |\n| Humid          | Fentanyl and Fentanyl Derivatives |\n| Hummers        | Heroin                            |\n| Hyatari        | Mescaline/Peyote                  |\n| Hydro          | Marijuana                         |\n| Hydros         | Hydrocodone (Norco                |\n|               |                                   |\n| , Vicodin      |                                   |\n|               |                                   |\n| , Lorcet       |                                   |\n|               |                                   |\n| )              |                                   |\n| Hysteria       | Synthetic Cannabinoids            |\n| Ice            | Crack Cocaine; Methamphetamine    |\n| Ice Cream      | Methamphetamine                   |\n| Ice Cubes      | Crack Cocaine                     |\n| Ice Dragon     | Synthetic Cannabinoids            |\n| Ice Water      | Methamphetamine                   |\n| Ice Water Hash | Marijuana Concentrates/Hash Oil   |\n| Icehead        | Methamphetamine                   |\n| Idiot Pills    | Hydrocodone (Norco                |\n|               |                                   |\n| , Vicodin      |                                   |\n|               |                                   |\n| , Lorcet       |                                   |\n|               |                                   |\n| )              |                                   |\n| In-Betweens       | Amphetamine                       |\n|-------------------|-----------------------------------|\n| Incense           | Opium                             |\n| Indian Boy        | Marijuana                         |\n| Indian Hay        | Marijuana                         |\n| Insect Repellent  | Synthetic Cathinones              |\n| Instant Zen       | LSD (Lysergic Acid Diethylamide)  |\n| Issues            | Crack Cocaine                     |\n| Ivory Wave        | Synthetic Cathinones              |\n| IWE               | Marijuana Concentrates/Hash Oil   |\n| Jackpot           | Fentanyl and Fentanyl Derivatives |\n| Jale              | Methamphetamine                   |\n| Jamaican Gold     | Marijuana                         |\n| Jamaican Red      | Marijuana                         |\n| Jelly             | Cocaine                           |\n| Jelly Babies      | Amphetamine                       |\n| Jelly Beans       | Amphetamine; Crack Cocaine        |\n| Jesus Christ Acid | LSD (Lysergic Acid Diethylamide)  |\n| Jet               | Ketamine (Ketalar                 |\n|                  |                                   |\n| )                 |                                   |\n| Jet Fuel        | PCP (Phencyclidine)             |\n|-----------------|---------------------------------|\n| Jet K           | Ketamine (Ketalar               |\n|                |                                 |\n| )               |                                 |\n| Jewelry Cleaner | Synthetic Cathinones            |\n| Jib             | GHB (Gamma-Hydroxybutyric Acid) |\n| Jif             | Methylphenidate (Ritalin        |\n|                |                                 |\n| , Concerta      |                                 |\n|                |                                 |\n| , Daytrana      |                                 |\n|                |                                 |\n| )               |                                 |\n| Jive            | Marijuana                       |\n| John Deere      | Cocaine                         |\n| Johnny          | Methylphenidate (Ritalin        |\n|                |                                 |\n| , Concerta      |                                 |\n|                |                                 |\n| , Daytrana      |                                 |\n|                |                                 |\n| )               |                                 |\n| Johnson         | Crack Cocaine                   |\n| Jojee           | Heroin                          |\n| Joker           | Synthetic Cannabinoids          |\n| Jolly Beans     | Amphetamine                     |\n| Jolly Green     | Marijuana                       |\n| Jon-Jem         | Marijuana                       |\n| Joy Flakes      | Cocaine; Heroin                 |\n| Joy Juice       | Morphine                        |\n| Joy Plant       | Opium                           |\n| Joy Powder      | Cocaine; Heroin                 |\n| Joy Smoke            | Marijuana                                   |\n|----------------------|---------------------------------------------|\n| Juan Valdez          | Marijuana                                   |\n| Juanita              | Marijuana                                   |\n| Jug of Water         | Methamphetamine                             |\n| Jugs                 | Amphetamine                                 |\n| Juguetes             | Cocaine                                     |\n| Juice                | PCP (Phencyclidine); Promethazine; Steroids |\n| Juicy Leaf           | Synthetic Cannabinoids                      |\n| Jump Rope            | Cocaine                                     |\n| Jungle Juice         | Marijuana; Synthetic Cannabinoids           |\n| Junk                 | Cocaine; Heroin                             |\n| Just Chill           | Synthetic Cannabinoids                      |\n| K                    | Clonazepam (Klonopin                        |\n|                     |                                             |\n| ); Ketamine (Ketalar |                                             |\n|                     |                                             |\n| )                    |                                             |\n| K13                  | Cocaine                                     |\n| K2                   | Synthetic Cannabinoids                      |\n| K4                   | Hydromorphone (Dilaudid                     |\n|                     |                                             |\n| )                    |                                             |\n| Kabayo               | Heroin                                      |\n| Kaff                 | Marijuana                                   |\n| Kaleidoscope   | LSD (Lysergic Acid Diethylamide)   |\n|----------------|------------------------------------|\n| Kali           | Marijuana                          |\n| Kangaroo       | Crack Cocaine                      |\n| Kaos           | Synthetic Cannabinoids             |\n| Kaps           | PCP (Phencyclidine)                |\n| Karachi        | Heroin                             |\n| Karate         | Heroin                             |\n| Karma          | Synthetic Cannabinoids             |\n| Kat            | Khat                               |\n| Kaya           | Marijuana                          |\n| KB             | Marijuana                          |\n| K-Blast        | PCP (Phencyclidine)                |\n| Keller         | Ketamine (Ketalar                  |\n|               |                                    |\n| )              |                                    |\n| Kelly's Day    | Ketamine (Ketalar                  |\n|               |                                    |\n| )              |                                    |\n| Kentucky Blue  | Marijuana                          |\n| KGB            | Marijuana                          |\n| Khalifa        | Marijuana                          |\n| K-Hold         | Ketamine (Ketalar                  |\n|               |                                    |\n| )              |                                    |\n| Kibbles and Bits                                  | Methylphenidate (Ritalin          |\n|---------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------|\n|                                                  |                                   |\n| , Concerta                                        |                                   |\n|                                                  |                                   |\n| , Daytrana                                        |                                   |\n|                                                  |                                   |\n| )                                                 |                                   |\n| Kickers                                           |                                   |\n| Acetaminophen and Oxycodone Combination (Percocet |                                   |\n|                                                  |                                   |\n| ); Oxycodone                                      |                                   |\n| (Oxycontin                                        |                                   |\n|                                                  |                                   |\n| , Roxicodone                                      |                                   |\n|                                                  |                                   |\n| , Oxaydo                                          |                                   |\n|                                                  |                                   |\n| )                                                 |                                   |\n| Kiddie Cocaine                                    | Methylphenidate (Ritalin          |\n|                                                  |                                   |\n| , Concerta                                        |                                   |\n|                                                  |                                   |\n| , Daytrana                                        |                                   |\n|                                                  |                                   |\n| )                                                 |                                   |\n| Kiddie Coke                                       | Methylphenidate (Ritalin          |\n|                                                  |                                   |\n| , Concerta                                        |                                   |\n|                                                  |                                   |\n| , Daytrana                                        |                                   |\n|                                                  |                                   |\n| )                                                 |                                   |\n| Kiff                                              | Marijuana                         |\n| Killa                                             | Marijuana                         |\n| Killer                                            | PCP (Phencyclidine)               |\n| Killers                                           | Oxycodone (Oxycontin              |\n|                                                  |                                   |\n| , Roxicodone                                      |                                   |\n|                                                  |                                   |\n| , Oxaydo                                          |                                   |\n|                                                  |                                   |\n| )                                                 |                                   |\n| Kilter                                            | Marijuana                         |\n| King Ivory                                        | Fentanyl and Fentanyl Derivatives |\n| King Louie                                        | Marijuana                         |\n| King's Habit                                      | Cocaine                           |\n| King's Tickets                                    | Heroin                            |\n| Kit Kat                                           | Ketamine (Ketalar                 |\n|                                                  |                                   |\n| )                                                 |                                   |\n| Kitty Flip                                        | Ketamine (Ketalar                 |\n|                                                  |                                   |\n| )                                                 |                                   |\n| Klear                                             | Marijuana Concentrates/Hash Oil   |\n| Kleenex                                           | Ecstasy/MDMA/Molly                |\n| Knoa Gold                                         | Marijuana                         |\n| Kokoma        | Crack Cocaine                     |\n|---------------|-----------------------------------|\n| Kong          | Synthetic Cannabinoids            |\n| Kools         | PCP (Phencyclidine)               |\n| Kordell       | Cocaine                           |\n| K-Pin         | Clonazepam (Klonopin              |\n|              |                                   |\n| )             |                                   |\n| Krazy Kandy   | Synthetic Cannabinoids            |\n| Kryp2nite     | Synthetic Cannabinoids            |\n| Kryptonite    | Crack Cocaine                     |\n| Kumba         | Marijuana                         |\n| Kush          | Marijuana; Synthetic Cannabinoids |\n| K-Ways        | Ketamine (Ketalar                 |\n|              |                                   |\n| )             |                                   |\n| L.A. Glass    | Methamphetamine                   |\n| L.A. Ice      | Methamphetamine                   |\n| L7            | Alprazolam (Xanax                 |\n|              |                                   |\n| )             |                                   |\n| La Familia    | Cocaine                           |\n| La Rocha      | Flunitrazepam (Rohypnol           |\n|              |                                   |\n| )             |                                   |\n| La Tierra     | Heroin                            |\n| LA Turnaround | Amphetamine                       |\n| Ladders        | Alprazolam (Xanax                |\n|----------------|----------------------------------|\n|               |                                  |\n| )              |                                  |\n| Lady           | Cocaine                          |\n| Lady Snow      | Cocaine                          |\n| Late Night     | Cocaine                          |\n| Laughing Grass | Marijuana                        |\n| Laughing Weed  | Marijuana                        |\n| Lavada         | Cocaine                          |\n| Layer Cake     | Synthetic Cannabinoids           |\n| Lazers         | Psilocybin Mushrooms             |\n| Leaf           | Cocaine; Marijuana               |\n| Leaky Leak     | PCP (Phencyclidine)              |\n| Lean           | Promethazine                     |\n| Leapers        | Amphetamine                      |\n| Leary          | LSD (Lysergic Acid Diethylamide) |\n| Lechuga        | Marijuana                        |\n| Lemon 714      | PCP (Phencyclidine)              |\n| Lemon Drop     | Methamphetamine                  |\n| Lemonade       | Heroin; Hydrocodone (Norco       |\n|               |                                  |\n| , Vicodin      |                                  |\n|               |                                  |\n| , Lorcet       |                                  |\n|               |                                  |\n| )              |                                  |\n| Lemon-Lime                                                 | Marijuana                        |\n|------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------|\n| Lemons                                                     | Methamphetamine                  |\n| Lena                                                       | Marijuana                        |\n| Lens                                                       | LSD (Lysergic Acid Diethylamide) |\n| Lenta                                                      | Heroin                           |\n| Lentejuela                                                 | LSD (Lysergic Acid Diethylamide) |\n| Lethal Weapon                                              | PCP (Phencyclidine)              |\n| Liamba                                                     | Marijuana                        |\n| Liberties                                                  | Psilocybin Mushrooms             |\n| Liberty Caps                                               | Psilocybin Mushrooms             |\n| Libreta                                                    | Cocaine                          |\n| Lid Poppers                                                |                                  |\n| Amphetamine; Amphetamine and Dextroamphetamine Combination |                                  |\n| (Adderall                                                  |                                  |\n|                                                           |                                  |\n| )                                                          |                                  |\n| Lifesaver                                                  | Heroin                           |\n| Light                                                      | Methamphetamine                  |\n| Light Beige                                                | Methamphetamine                  |\n| Lightening                                                 | Amphetamine                      |\n| Lime Acid                                                  | LSD (Lysergic Acid Diethylamide) |\n| Lime Pillows                                               | Marijuana                        |\n| Limitless            | Synthetic Cannabinoids            |\n|----------------------|-----------------------------------|\n| Line                 | Cocaine                           |\n| Liquid E             | GHB (Gamma-Hydroxybutyric Acid)   |\n| Liquid X             | GHB (Gamma-Hydroxybutyric Acid)   |\n| Little Bombs         | Amphetamine                       |\n| Little Green Friends | Marijuana                         |\n| Little Smoke         | Marijuana; Psilocybin Mushrooms   |\n| Live                 | LSD (Lysergic Acid Diethylamide)  |\n| Live Resin           | Marijuana Concentrates/Hash Oil   |\n| Livianas             | Methamphetamine                   |\n| Llesca               | Marijuana                         |\n| Lluvia de Estrellas  | LSD (Lysergic Acid Diethylamide)  |\n| Loaf                 | Cocaine; Marijuana                |\n| Lobo                 | Marijuana                         |\n| Loco Weed            | Marijuana                         |\n| Lollipop             | Fentanyl and Fentanyl Derivatives |\n| Looney Tunes         | LSD (Lysergic Acid Diethylamide)  |\n| Lorries              | Hydrocodone (Norco                |\n|                     |                                   |\n| , Vicodin            |                                   |\n|                     |                                   |\n| , Lorcet             |                                   |\n|                     |                                   |\n| )                    |                                   |\n| Loud           | Marijuana                           |\n|----------------|-------------------------------------|\n| Love           | Crack Cocaine                       |\n| Love Affair    | Cocaine                             |\n| Love Boat      | PCP (Phencyclidine)                 |\n| Love Doctor    | Ecstasy/MDMA/Molly                  |\n| Love Drug      | Ecstasy/MDMA/Molly                  |\n| Love Flip      | Mescaline/Peyote taken with Ecstasy |\n| Love Nuggets   | Marijuana                           |\n| Love Potion #9 | Ecstasy/MDMA/Molly                  |\n| Love Trip      | Ecstasy mixed with Mescaline        |\n| Love Weed      | Marijuana                           |\n| Lover's Speed  | Ecstasy/MDMA/Molly                  |\n| Lucas          | Marijuana                           |\n| Lucy           | LSD (Lysergic Acid Diethylamide)    |\n| Lunar Wave     | Synthetic Cathinones                |\n| Lunch Money    | Flunitrazepam (Rohypnol             |\n|               |                                     |\n| )              |                                     |\n| LV             | Cocaine                             |\n| M.J.           | Marijuana                           |\n| M-30s            | Acetaminophen and Oxycodone Combination (Percocet   |\n|------------------|-----------------------------------------------------|\n|                 |                                                     |\n| )                |                                                     |\n| Maca Flour       | Cocaine                                             |\n| Machinery        | Marijuana                                           |\n| Macona           | Marijuana                                           |\n| Mad Dog          | PCP (Phencyclidine)                                 |\n| Mad Hatter       | Synthetic Cannabinoids                              |\n| Mad Man          | PCP (Phencyclidine)                                 |\n| Madera           | Methamphetamine; Cocaine                            |\n| Mafafa           | Marijuana                                           |\n| Magic Dust       | PCP (Phencyclidine); Psilocybin Mushrooms           |\n| Magic Smoke      | Marijuana                                           |\n| Maje             | LSD (Lysergic Acid Diethylamide)                    |\n| Malcolm X        | Ecstasy/MDMA/Molly                                  |\n| Mama Coca        | Cocaine                                             |\n| Mamph            | Methamphetamine                                     |\n| Mandango         | Cocaine                                             |\n| Manhattan Silver | Marijuana                                           |\n| Manita           | Cocaine                                             |\n| Manteca     | Heroin; Marijuana   |\n|-------------|---------------------|\n| Maracachafa | Marijuana           |\n| Maradona    | Cocaine             |\n| Marathons   | Amphetamine         |\n| Marbol      | Cocaine             |\n| Maria       | Marijuana           |\n| Marias      | Heroin              |\n| Marimba     | Marijuana           |\n| Mariquita   | Marijuana           |\n| Marrion     | Heroin              |\n| Mary Ann    | Marijuana           |\n| Mary Jane   | Marijuana           |\n| Mary Jones  | Marijuana           |\n| Mary Warner | Marijuana           |\n| Mary Weaver | Marijuana           |\n| Matchbox    | Marijuana           |\n| Material    | Cocaine             |\n| Matraca     | Marijuana           |\n| Maui Wowie    | Marijuana                        |\n|---------------|----------------------------------|\n| Mayback       | Cocaine - 62 grams               |\n| Mayo          | Cocaine; Heroin                  |\n| Mazpan        | Heroin                           |\n| M-Cat         | Synthetic Cathinones             |\n| Meal          | Heroin                           |\n| Mean Green    | PCP (Phencyclidine)              |\n| Media Lata    | Cocaine                          |\n| Media Luna    | Mescaline/Peyote                 |\n| Meg           | Marijuana                        |\n| Melcocha      | Cocaine                          |\n| Mellow Yellow | LSD (Lysergic Acid Diethylamide) |\n| Menthol       | Heroin                           |\n| Meow-Meow     | Synthetic Cathinones             |\n| Mercedes      | Cocaine                          |\n| Mersh         | Marijuana                        |\n| Mescal        | Mescaline/Peyote                 |\n| Mescapade     | Mescaline/Peyote                 |\n| Meth              | Methamphetamine                                    |\n|-------------------|----------------------------------------------------|\n| Methlies Quick    | Methamphetamine                                    |\n| Method            | Marijuana                                          |\n| Mexicali Haze     | Marijuana                                          |\n| Mexican Brown     | Heroin; Marijuana                                  |\n| Mexican Crack     | Methamphetamine                                    |\n| Mexican Crank     | Methamphetamine                                    |\n| Mexican Green     | Marijuana                                          |\n| Mexican Red       | Marijuana                                          |\n| Mexican Valium    | Flunitrazepam (Rohypnol                            |\n|                  |                                                    |\n| )                 |                                                    |\n| Mezcakuba         | Mescaline/Peyote                                   |\n| Mica              | LSD (Lysergic Acid Diethylamide)                   |\n| Microdot          | LSD (Lysergic Acid Diethylamide); Mescaline/Peyote |\n| Micropunto Azul   | White tablet with drop of blue LSD                 |\n| Micropunto Morado | White tablet with drop of purple LSD               |\n| Midnight Oil      | Opium                                              |\n| Mighty Quinn      | LSD (Lysergic Acid Diethylamide)                   |\n| Mile High         | Synthetic Cannabinoids                             |\n| Milk           | Cocaine                          |\n|----------------|----------------------------------|\n| Milonga        | Cocaine                          |\n| Mind Detergent | LSD (Lysergic Acid Diethylamide) |\n| Mind Eraser    | Flunitrazepam (Rohypnol          |\n|               |                                  |\n| )              |                                  |\n| Mini Beans     | Amphetamine                      |\n| Mini Bennies   | Amphetamine                      |\n| Mint Leaf      | PCP (Phencyclidine)              |\n| Mint Weed      | PCP (Phencyclidine)              |\n| Mira           | Opium                            |\n| Misk           | Psilocybin Mushrooms             |\n| Miss Emma      | Morphine                         |\n| Miss Girl      | Methamphetamine                  |\n| Mist           | PCP (Phencyclidine)              |\n| Mister Blue    | Morphine                         |\n| Mixed Jive     | Crack Cocaine                    |\n| MMJ            | Marijuana                        |\n| Mochie         | Hydroponic Marijuana             |\n| Moisqueta      | Marijuana                        |\n| Mojo                | Cocaine; Heroin                   |\n|---------------------|-----------------------------------|\n| Mole                | Heroin                            |\n| Mona                | Marijuana                         |\n| Mona Lisa           | Cocaine                           |\n| Mongega             | Heroin                            |\n| Monkey              | Morphine                          |\n| Monkey Dust         | PCP (Phencyclidine)               |\n| Monkey Juice        | GHB (Gamma-Hydroxybutyric Acid)   |\n| Monkey Tranquilizer | PCP (Phencyclidine)               |\n| Monte               | Cocaine; Marijuana                |\n| Montura             | Methamphetamine                   |\n| Moocah              | Marijuana                         |\n| Moon                | Mescaline/Peyote                  |\n| Moon Rock           | Crack Cocaine; Ecstasy/MDMA/Molly |\n| Moon Rocks          | Marijuana Concentrates/Hash Oil   |\n| Mootie              | Marijuana                         |\n| Mora                | Marijuana                         |\n| Morena              | Heroin                            |\n| Morenita        | Heroin                           |\n|-----------------|----------------------------------|\n| Morning Shot    | Amphetamine                      |\n| Morpho          | Morphine                         |\n| Morrow          | Cocaine                          |\n| Mortal Combat   | Heroin                           |\n| Mosquitos       | Cocaine                          |\n| Mostaza         | Marijuana                        |\n| Mota            | Marijuana                        |\n| Mother          | Marijuana                        |\n| Mother of God   | LSD (Lysergic Acid Diethylamide) |\n| Motor           | Methamphetamine                  |\n| Motors          | Heroin                           |\n| Movie Star Drug | Cocaine                          |\n| Mowing the Lawn | Marijuana                        |\n| MPH             | Methylphenidate (Ritalin         |\n|                |                                  |\n| , Concerta      |                                  |\n|                |                                  |\n| , Daytrana      |                                  |\n|                |                                  |\n| )               |                                  |\n| Muchacha        | Cocaine; Methamphetamine         |\n| Muchachas       | Oxycodone (Oxycontin             |\n|                |                                  |\n| , Roxicodone    |                                  |\n|                |                                  |\n| , Oxaydo        |                                  |\n|                |                                  |\n| )               |                                  |\n| Mud             | Heroin                           |\n| Muebles      | Cocaine                           |\n|--------------|-----------------------------------|\n| Muggie       | Marijuana                         |\n| Mujer        | Cocaine; Heroin                   |\n| Mujeres      | Oxycodone (Oxycontin              |\n|             |                                   |\n| , Roxicodone |                                   |\n|             |                                   |\n| , Oxaydo     |                                   |\n|             |                                   |\n| )            |                                   |\n| Murcielago   | Heroin                            |\n| Murder 8     | Fentanyl and Fentanyl Derivatives |\n| Mureler      | LSD (Lysergic Acid Diethylamide)  |\n| Mushies      | Psilocybin Mushrooms              |\n| Muzzle       | Heroin                            |\n| My Brother   | Marijuana                         |\n| Mystique     | Synthetic Cannabinoids            |\n| Nails        | Methamphetamine                   |\n| Nal          | Fentanyl and Fentanyl Derivatives |\n| Nanoo        | Heroin                            |\n| Napkin       | Cocaine                           |\n| Narizona     | Marijuana                         |\n| Nave         | LSD (Lysergic Acid Diethylamide)  |\n| Needle Candy | Hydromorphone (Dilaudid           |\n|             |                                   |\n| )            |                                   |\n| Negra           | Heroin                            |\n|-----------------|-----------------------------------|\n| Negra Tomasa    | Heroin                            |\n| Negrita         | Heroin                            |\n| New Acid        | PCP (Phencyclidine)               |\n| New Magic       | PCP (Phencyclidine)               |\n| Newspapers      | LSD (Lysergic Acid Diethylamide)  |\n| Nice and Easy   | Heroin                            |\n| Nickle          | Crack Cocaine                     |\n| Nieve           | Cocaine                           |\n| Night Noise     | Heroin                            |\n| Nil             | Fentanyl and Fentanyl Derivatives |\n| Nina            | Cocaine                           |\n| Ninja           | Synthetic Cannabinoids            |\n| No-Doze         | Methamphetamine                   |\n| Normal          | Cocaine                           |\n| Northern Lights | Marijuana                         |\n| Nose Candy      | Cocaine                           |\n| Nose Powder     | Cocaine                           |\n| Nubs          | Mescaline/Peyote                  |\n|---------------|-----------------------------------|\n| Nug           | Marijuana                         |\n| Nuggets       | Amphetamine; Crack Cocaine        |\n| Nyl           | Fentanyl and Fentanyl Derivatives |\n| O.J.          | Marijuana                         |\n| Oat           | Khat                              |\n| Obama         | Heroin                            |\n| O-Boy         | Marijuana                         |\n| OC            | Oxycodone (Oxycontin              |\n|              |                                   |\n| , Roxicodone  |                                   |\n|              |                                   |\n| , Oxaydo      |                                   |\n|              |                                   |\n| )             |                                   |\n| Ocean Burst   | Synthetic Cathinones              |\n| Odyssey       | Synthetic Cannabinoids            |\n| OG            | Marijuana                         |\n| Old Lady      | Cocaine                           |\n| Old Steve     | Heroin                            |\n| OMG           | Synthetic Cannabinoids            |\n| One Pot       | Methamphetamine                   |\n| One-Fifty-One | Crack Cocaine                     |\n| Ope           | Opium                             |\n| Opes             | Fentanyl and Fentanyl Derivatives                             |\n|------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------|\n| Opio             | Opium                                                         |\n| Orange Barrels   | LSD (Lysergic Acid Diethylamide)                              |\n| Orange Crush     | Promethazine                                                  |\n| Orange Crystal   | PCP (Phencyclidine)                                           |\n| Orange Cubes     | LSD (Lysergic Acid Diethylamide)                              |\n| Orange Haze      | LSD (Lysergic Acid Diethylamide)                              |\n| Orange Micros    | LSD (Lysergic Acid Diethylamide)                              |\n| Orange Wedges    | LSD (Lysergic Acid Diethylamide)                              |\n| Oranges          | Amphetamine; Buprenorphine and Naloxone Combination (Suboxone |\n|                 |                                                               |\n| )                |                                                               |\n| Organic Quaalude | GHB (Gamma-Hydroxybutyric Acid)                               |\n| Owl              | Marijuana                                                     |\n| Owsley           | LSD (Lysergic Acid Diethylamide)                              |\n| Oxy              | Oxycodone (Oxycontin                                          |\n|                 |                                                               |\n| , Roxicodone     |                                                               |\n|                 |                                                               |\n| , Oxaydo         |                                                               |\n|                 |                                                               |\n| )                |                                                               |\n| Oxy 80s          | Oxycodone (Oxycontin                                          |\n|                 |                                                               |\n| , Roxicodone     |                                                               |\n|                 |                                                               |\n| , Oxaydo         |                                                               |\n|                 |                                                               |\n| )                |                                                               |\n| Oyster Stew      | Cocaine                                                       |\n| Ozone            | PCP (Phencyclidine)                                           |\n| Paint            | Cocaine; Methamphetamine                                      |\n| Paja           | Marijuana                        |\n|----------------|----------------------------------|\n| Pakalolo       | Marijuana                        |\n| Paleta         | Cocaine                          |\n| Palitroque     | Alprazolam (Xanax                |\n|               |                                  |\n| )              |                                  |\n| Palm           | Marijuana                        |\n| Paloma         | Cocaine; Marijuana               |\n| Palomita       | Marijuana                        |\n| Palomos        | Cocaine                          |\n| Panama Cut     | Marijuana                        |\n| Panama Gold    | Marijuana                        |\n| Panama Red     | Marijuana                        |\n| Pandora's Box  | Synthetic Cannabinoids           |\n| Pantalones     | Cocaine; Methamphetamine         |\n| Pants          | Heroin                           |\n| Papas          | Cocaine                          |\n| Paper Acid     | LSD (Lysergic Acid Diethylamide) |\n| Paradise       | Cocaine                          |\n| Paradise White | Cocaine                          |\n| Parrot              | Cocaine                                           |\n|---------------------|---------------------------------------------------|\n| Parsley             | Marijuana                                         |\n| Pastas              | Amphetamine                                       |\n| Paste               | Crack Cocaine                                     |\n| Pastillas           | Amphetamine                                       |\n| Pasto               | Marijuana                                         |\n| Pasture             | Marijuana                                         |\n| Patty               | Heroin                                            |\n| Patudas             | Methamphetamine                                   |\n| Paulas              | Acetaminophen and Oxycodone Combination (Percocet |\n|                    |                                                   |\n| )                   |                                                   |\n| Paz                 | PCP (Phencyclidine)                               |\n| Peace               | Ecstasy/MDMA/Molly                                |\n| Peace Pill          | PCP (Phencyclidine)                               |\n| Peaches             | Amphetamine                                       |\n| Peanut Butter Crank | Methamphetamine                                   |\n| Pearl               | Cocaine                                           |\n| Pearly Gates        | LSD (Lysergic Acid Diethylamide)                  |\n| Pebbles             | Crack Cocaine                                     |\n| Pedrito        | Cocaine                                           |\n|----------------|---------------------------------------------------|\n| Pedro Martinez | Crack Cocaine                                     |\n| Pee Wee        | Crack Cocaine                                     |\n| Peep           | PCP (Phencyclidine)                               |\n| Peg            | Heroin                                            |\n| Peliroja       | Marijuana                                         |\n| Pellets        | LSD (Lysergic Acid Diethylamide)                  |\n| Pelosa         | Marijuana                                         |\n| Pen Yan        | Opium                                             |\n| Pep Pills      | Amphetamine                                       |\n| Pepper         | Amphetamine                                       |\n| Percs          | Acetaminophen and Oxycodone Combination (Percocet |\n|               |                                                   |\n| )              |                                                   |\n| Perico         | Cocaine                                           |\n| Personal       | Cocaine                                           |\n| Peruvian       | Cocaine                                           |\n| Peruvian Flake | Cocaine                                           |\n| Peruvian Lady  | Cocaine                                           |\n| Pescado        | Cocaine                                           |\n| Peta                 | Cocaine                                                             |\n|----------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------|\n| Peter Pan            | PCP (Phencyclidine)                                                 |\n| Pez                  | Cocaine                                                             |\n| P-Funk               | Heroin                                                              |\n| Pharmacy             | Fentanyl and Fentanyl Derivatives                                   |\n| Phoenix              | LSD (Lysergic Acid Diethylamide); Marijuana; Synthetic Cannabinoids |\n| Phone Screen         |                                                                     |\n| Cleaner              |                                                                     |\n| Synthetic Cathinones |                                                                     |\n| Pichicata            | Cocaine                                                             |\n| Piedras              | Crack Cocaine                                                       |\n| Piezas               | Heroin                                                              |\n| Pig Killer           | PCP (Phencyclidine)                                                 |\n| Pile                 | Crack Cocaine                                                       |\n| Pillow               | Cocaine                                                             |\n| Pimp                 | Cocaine                                                             |\n| Pin                  | Clonazepam (Klonopin                                                |\n|                     |                                                                     |\n| )                    |                                                                     |\n| Pin Gon              | Opium                                                               |\n| Pin Yen              | Opium                                                               |\n| Pinata               | Methamphetamine                                                     |\n| Pine              | Marijuana                        |\n|-------------------|----------------------------------|\n| Pineapple         | Methylphenidate (Ritalin         |\n|                  |                                  |\n| , Concerta        |                                  |\n|                  |                                  |\n| , Daytrana        |                                  |\n|                  |                                  |\n| )                 |                                  |\n| Pineapple Express | Synthetic Cannabinoids           |\n| Pingas            | Amphetamine; Cocaine             |\n| Pingaz            | Ecstasy/MDMA/Molly               |\n| Pingers           | Ecstasy/MDMA/Molly               |\n| Pingos            | Cocaine                          |\n| Pingus            | Flunitrazepam (Rohypnol          |\n|                  |                                  |\n| )                 |                                  |\n| Pink              | U-47700                          |\n| Pink Blotters     | LSD (Lysergic Acid Diethylamide) |\n| Pink Hearts       | Amphetamine                      |\n| Pink Panther      | Marijuana                        |\n| Pink Panthers     | LSD (Lysergic Acid Diethylamide) |\n| Pink Robots       | LSD (Lysergic Acid Diethylamide) |\n| Pink Wedges       | LSD (Lysergic Acid Diethylamide) |\n| Pink Witches      | LSD (Lysergic Acid Diethylamide) |\n| Pinky             | U-47700                          |\n| Pintura           | Marijuana                        |\n| Pintura Blanca   | Cocaine                                   |\n|------------------|-------------------------------------------|\n| Pixies           | Amphetamine                               |\n| Pizza            | LSD (Lysergic Acid Diethylamide)          |\n| Pizza Toppings   | Psilocybin Mushrooms                      |\n| Planks           | Alprazolam (Xanax                         |\n|                 |                                           |\n| )                |                                           |\n| Plant            | Marijuana                                 |\n| Plant Feeder     | Synthetic Cathinones                      |\n| Plant Food       | Synthetic Cathinones                      |\n| Plata            | Heroin                                    |\n| Platinum Cookies | Hydroponic Marijuana                      |\n| Platinum Jack    | Marijuana                                 |\n| Pocket Rocket    | Marijuana                                 |\n| Pointy Ones      | Methamphetamine                           |\n| Poison           | Fentanyl and Fentanyl Derivatives; Heroin |\n| Poli             | Cocaine                                   |\n| Pollito          | Methamphetamine                           |\n| Pollo            | Cocaine                                   |\n| Pollutants       | Amphetamine                               |\n| Polvo              | Cocaine; Heroin                  |\n|--------------------|----------------------------------|\n| Polvo de Alegria   | Heroin                           |\n| Polvo de Estrellas | Heroin                           |\n| Polvo Feliz        | Heroin                           |\n| Pony               | Crack Cocaine                    |\n| Poor Man's Cocaine | Methylphenidate (Ritalin         |\n|                   |                                  |\n| , Concerta         |                                  |\n|                   |                                  |\n| , Daytrana         |                                  |\n|                   |                                  |\n| )                  |                                  |\n| Pop                | LSD (Lysergic Acid Diethylamide) |\n| Popcorn            | Marijuana                        |\n| Poppy              | Heroin                           |\n| Popsicle           | Methamphetamine                  |\n| Porro              | Marijuana                        |\n| Posh               | Synthetic Cannabinoids           |\n| Pot                | Marijuana                        |\n| Potato             | LSD (Lysergic Acid Diethylamide) |\n| Potpourri          | Synthetic Cannabinoids           |\n| Pow                | Synthetic Cannabinoids           |\n| Powder             | Cocaine; Heroin                  |\n| Powder Diamonds    | Cocaine                          |\n| Pox                | Opium                            |\n|--------------------|----------------------------------|\n| Pretendo           | Marijuana                        |\n| Primo              | Crack Cocaine                    |\n| Prop 215           | Marijuana                        |\n| Prostituta Negra   | Heroin                           |\n| Psilly Billy       | Psilocybin Mushrooms             |\n| Puff               | Marijuana                        |\n| Puffy              | PCP (Phencyclidine)              |\n| Puma               | Cocaine                          |\n| Pumpers            | Steroids                         |\n| Puppy              | Heroin                           |\n| Pure               | Heroin                           |\n| Pure Ivory         | Synthetic Cathinones             |\n| Pure Love          | LSD (Lysergic Acid Diethylamide) |\n| Puritain           | Cocaine                          |\n| Purple             | Ketamine (Ketalar                |\n|                   |                                  |\n| ); Methamphetamine |                                  |\n| Purple             | Promethazine                     |\n| Purple Barrels     | LSD (Lysergic Acid Diethylamide) |\n| Purple Drank      | Promethazine                                  |\n|-------------------|-----------------------------------------------|\n| Purple Haze       | LSD (Lysergic Acid Diethylamide); Marijuana   |\n| Purple Hearts     | Amphetamine; LSD (Lysergic Acid Diethylamide) |\n| Purple OG         | Marijuana                                     |\n| Purple Passion    | Psilocybin Mushrooms                          |\n| Purple Rain       | PCP (Phencyclidine)                           |\n| Purple Tickets    | LSD (Lysergic Acid Diethylamide)              |\n| Purple Wave       | Synthetic Cathinones                          |\n| Quadros           | Cocaine                                       |\n| Quarters          | Crack Cocaine                                 |\n| Queen Ann's Lace  | Marijuana                                     |\n| Queso Blanco      | Cocaine                                       |\n| R.I.P.            | Crack Cocaine                                 |\n| R2                | Flunitrazepam (Rohypnol                       |\n|                  |                                               |\n| )                 |                                               |\n| Racehorse Charlie | Cocaine                                       |\n| Ragweed           | Marijuana                                     |\n| Railroad Weed     | Marijuana                                     |\n| Rainy Day Woman   | Marijuana                                     |\n| Rambo       | Cocaine; Heroin             |\n|-------------|-----------------------------|\n| Rapture     | Synthetic Cannabinoids      |\n| Raspado     | Methamphetamine             |\n| Rasta Weed  | Marijuana                   |\n| Raw         | Crack Cocaine; Uncut Heroin |\n| R-Ball      | Methylphenidate (Ritalin    |\n|            |                             |\n| , Concerta  |                             |\n|            |                             |\n| , Daytrana  |                             |\n|            |                             |\n| )           |                             |\n| Ready Rock  | Crack Cocaine               |\n| Rechard     | Synthetic Cathinones        |\n| Red Caps    | Crack Cocaine               |\n| Red Chicken | Heroin                      |\n| Red Cross   | Marijuana                   |\n| Red Devil   | PCP (Phencyclidine)         |\n| Red Dirt    | Marijuana                   |\n| Red Dove    | Synthetic Cathinones        |\n| Red Eagle   | Heroin                      |\n| Red Hair    | Marijuana                   |\n| Red Magic   | Synthetic Cannabinoids      |\n| Reefer      | Marijuana                   |\n| Refrescas                                         | Cocaine                  |\n|---------------------------------------------------|--------------------------|\n| Refresco                                          | Cocaine                  |\n| Reggie                                            | Marijuana                |\n| Regular Kind                                      | Cocaine                  |\n| Regular Work                                      | Cocaine                  |\n| Reindeer Dust                                     | Cocaine; Heroin          |\n| Repollo                                           | Marijuana                |\n| Rest In Peace                                     | Crack Cocaine            |\n| Rewind                                            | Synthetic Cannabinoids   |\n| Reynolds                                          | Flunitrazepam (Rohypnol  |\n|                                                  |                          |\n| )                                                 |                          |\n| Rhythm                                            | Amphetamine              |\n| Richie                                            | Cocaine                  |\n| Rids                                              | Methylphenidate (Ritalin |\n|                                                  |                          |\n| , Concerta                                        |                          |\n|                                                  |                          |\n| , Daytrana                                        |                          |\n|                                                  |                          |\n| )                                                 |                          |\n| Righteous Bush                                    | Marijuana                |\n| Rims                                              |                          |\n| Acetaminophen and Oxycodone Combination (Percocet |                          |\n|                                                  |                          |\n| ); Cocaine;                                       |                          |\n| Methamphetamine                                   |                          |\n| Rippers                                           | Amphetamine              |\n| Rittys                                            | Methylphenidate (Ritalin |\n|                                                  |                          |\n| , Concerta                                        |                          |\n|                                                  |                          |\n| , Daytrana                                        |                          |\n|                                                  |                          |\n| )                                                 |                          |\n| Roach                                             | Flunitrazepam (Rohypnol  |\n|                                                  |                          |\n| )                                                 |                          |\n| Road Dope      | Amphetamine                          |\n|----------------|--------------------------------------|\n| Roapies        | Flunitrazepam (Rohypnol              |\n|               |                                      |\n| )              |                                      |\n| Roca           | Crack Cocaine                        |\n| Rochas         | Flunitrazepam (Rohypnol              |\n|               |                                      |\n| )              |                                      |\n| Rock           | Crack Cocaine                        |\n| Rock Attack    | Crack Cocaine                        |\n| Rocket Fuel    | Methamphetamine; PCP (Phencyclidine) |\n| Rocks of Hell  | Crack Cocaine                        |\n| Rocky III      | Crack Cocaine                        |\n| Rocky Mountain | Cocaine                              |\n| Roids          | Steroids                             |\n| Rojo           | Promethazine                         |\n| Rolex          | Cocaine                              |\n| Rolex HH       | Cocaine                              |\n| Rolling        | Ecstasy/MDMA/Molly                   |\n| Rolls          | Ecstasy/MDMA/Molly                   |\n| Roofies        | Flunitrazepam (Rohypnol              |\n|               |                                      |\n| )              |                                      |\n| Roofing Tar    | Heroin                               |\n| Rooster      | Cocaine; Crack Cocaine          |\n|--------------|---------------------------------|\n| Root         | Marijuana                       |\n| Rop          | Flunitrazepam (Rohypnol         |\n|             |                                 |\n| )            |                                 |\n| Rope         | Marijuana                       |\n| Rophie       | Flunitrazepam (Rohypnol         |\n|             |                                 |\n| )            |                                 |\n| Rosa Maria   | Marijuana                       |\n| Roses        | Amphetamine                     |\n| Ro-Shay      | Flunitrazepam (Rohypnol         |\n|             |                                 |\n| )            |                                 |\n| Rosin        | Marijuana Concentrates/Hash Oil |\n| Rosin Tech   | Marijuana Concentrates/Hash Oil |\n| Rox          | Crack Cocaine                   |\n| Roxy         | Oxycodone (Oxycontin            |\n|             |                                 |\n| , Roxicodone |                                 |\n|             |                                 |\n| , Oxaydo     |                                 |\n|             |                                 |\n| )            |                                 |\n| Roxy Shorts  | Oxycodone (Oxycontin            |\n|             |                                 |\n| , Roxicodone |                                 |\n|             |                                 |\n| , Oxaydo     |                                 |\n|             |                                 |\n| )            |                                 |\n| Roxyanne     | Crack Cocaine                   |\n| Roz          | Crack Cocaine                   |\n| R-Pop        | Methylphenidate (Ritalin        |\n|             |                                 |\n| , Concerta   |                                 |\n|             |                                 |\n| , Daytrana   |                                 |\n|             |                                 |\n| )            |                                 |\n| Ruby         | Heroin                          |\n| Rueda        | Amphetamine                     |\n| Running         | Ecstasy/MDMA/Molly              |\n|-----------------|---------------------------------|\n| Rupture         | PCP (Phencyclidine)             |\n| Sack            | Heroin                          |\n| Salt            | Heroin; Methamphetamine         |\n| Salt and Pepper | Marijuana                       |\n| Salting         | Synthetic Cathinones            |\n| Salty Water     | GHB (Gamma-Hydroxybutyric Acid) |\n| San Pedro       | Mescaline/Peyote                |\n| Sand            | Heroin                          |\n| Santa Maria     | Marijuana                       |\n| SAP             | Marijuana Concentrates/Hash Oil |\n| Sasafras        | Marijuana                       |\n| Sativa          | Marijuana                       |\n| Sauce           | Marijuana Concentrates/Hash Oil |\n| Scag            | Heroin                          |\n| Scale           | Cocaine                         |\n| Scarface        | Synthetic Cathinones            |\n| Scat            | Heroin                          |\n| Schmeck       | Cocaine; Heroin                 |\n|---------------|---------------------------------|\n| School Bus    | Alprazolam (Xanax               |\n|              |                                 |\n| )             |                                 |\n| Schoolboy     | Cocaine                         |\n| Schoolcraft   | Crack Cocaine                   |\n| Scooby Snacks | Ecstasy/MDMA/Molly              |\n| Scooby Snax   | Synthetic Cannabinoids          |\n| Scoop         | GHB (Gamma-Hydroxybutyric Acid) |\n| Scorpion      | Cocaine                         |\n| Scottie       | Cocaine                         |\n| Scotty        | Crack Cocaine                   |\n| Scramble      | Crack Cocaine; Uncut Heroin     |\n| Scratch       | Hydrocodone (Norco              |\n|              |                                 |\n| , Vicodin     |                                 |\n|              |                                 |\n| , Lorcet      |                                 |\n|              |                                 |\n| )             |                                 |\n| Scruples      | Crack Cocaine                   |\n| Scuffle       | PCP (Phencyclidine)             |\n| Seed          | Cocaine                         |\n| Seni          | Mescaline/Peyote                |\n| Serpico       | Cocaine                         |\n| Seven-Up      | Crack Cocaine                   |\n| Sexy       | Synthetic Cannabinoids                               |\n|------------|------------------------------------------------------|\n| Shabu      | Methamphetamine                                      |\n| Shaman     | Mescaline/Peyote                                     |\n| Shards     | Methamphetamine                                      |\n| Shatter    | Marijuana Concentrates/Hash Oil; Methamphetamine     |\n| Shaved Ice | Methamphetamine                                      |\n| Sheep      | Heroin                                               |\n| Sheets     | PCP (Phencyclidine)                                  |\n| Sherms     | Crack Cocaine; PCP (Phencyclidine)                   |\n| Shermstick | PCP (Phencyclidine)                                  |\n| Shiny Girl | Methamphetamine                                      |\n| Shirt      | Cocaine                                              |\n| Shirts     | Heroin                                               |\n| Shmagma    | Marijuana                                            |\n| Shoes      | Fentanyl and Fentanyl Derivatives; Heroin; Marijuana |\n| Shora      | Marijuana                                            |\n| Shrimp     | Marijuana                                            |\n| Shwag      | Marijuana                                            |\n| Sierra          | Cocaine                  |\n|-----------------|--------------------------|\n| Sight Ball      | Crack Cocaine            |\n| Silly Putty     | Psilocybin Mushrooms     |\n| Simple Simon    | Psilocybin Mushrooms     |\n| Sinsemilla      | Marijuana                |\n| Sizurup         | Promethazine             |\n| Sizzurp         | Promethazine             |\n| Skag            | Heroin                   |\n| Skee            | Opium                    |\n| Ski Equipment   | Cocaine                  |\n| Skippy          | Methylphenidate (Ritalin |\n|                |                          |\n| , Concerta      |                          |\n|                |                          |\n| , Daytrana      |                          |\n|                |                          |\n| )               |                          |\n| Skittle         | Ecstasy/MDMA/Molly       |\n| Skittles        | Methylphenidate (Ritalin |\n|                |                          |\n| , Concerta      |                          |\n|                |                          |\n| , Daytrana      |                          |\n|                |                          |\n| ); Promethazine |                          |\n| Skunk           | Heroin; Marijuana        |\n| Sky High        | Synthetic Cannabinoids   |\n| Skywalker       | Hydroponic Marijuana     |\n| Slab            | Crack Cocaine            |\n| Sleet           | Crack Cocaine            |\n| Sleigh Ride                                             | Cocaine                                                 |\n|---------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------|\n| Slime                                                   | Heroin                                                  |\n| Slits                                                   | Ecstasy/MDMA/Molly                                      |\n| Smack                                                   | Heroin                                                  |\n| Smacks                                                  | Ecstasy/MDMA/Molly                                      |\n| Small Girl                                              | Methamphetamine                                         |\n| Smart Pills                                             | Amphetamine and Dextroamphetamine Combination (Adderall |\n|                                                        |                                                         |\n| )                                                       |                                                         |\n| Smarties                                                |                                                         |\n| Amphetamine and Dextroamphetamine Combination (Adderall |                                                         |\n|                                                        |                                                         |\n| );                                                      |                                                         |\n| Ecstasy/MDMA/Molly; Methylphenidate (Ritalin            |                                                         |\n|                                                        |                                                         |\n| , Concerta                                              |                                                         |\n|                                                        |                                                         |\n| , Daytrana                                              |                                                         |\n|                                                        |                                                         |\n| )                                                       |                                                         |\n| Smeck                                                   | Heroin                                                  |\n| Smoke                                                   | Crack Cocaine; Marijuana                                |\n| Smoke Canada                                            | Marijuana                                               |\n| Smoochy Woochy                                          |                                                         |\n| Poochy                                                  |                                                         |\n| Marijuana                                               |                                                         |\n| Snake Bite                                              | Synthetic Cannabinoids                                  |\n| Snaps                                                   | Amphetamine                                             |\n| Sneeze                                                  | Cocaine                                                 |\n| Snickers                                                | Heroin                                                  |\n| Sniff                                                   | Cocaine                                                 |\n| Snow                                                    | Cocaine                                                 |\n| Snow Bird    | Cocaine                                          |\n|--------------|--------------------------------------------------|\n| Snow Cone    | Cocaine                                          |\n| Snow Leopard | Synthetic Cathinones                             |\n| Snow Pallets | Amphetamine                                      |\n| Snow White   | Cocaine                                          |\n| Snowball     | Cocaine                                          |\n| Snowflake    | Cocaine; Fentanyl and Fentanyl Derivatives       |\n| Soap         | GHB (Gamma-Hydroxybutyric Acid)                  |\n| Soap Dope    | Methamphetamine                                  |\n| Sobos        | Buprenorphine and Naloxone Combination (Suboxone |\n|             |                                                  |\n| )            |                                                  |\n| Society High | Cocaine                                          |\n| Soda         | Cocaine; Heroin                                  |\n| Soditas      | Cocaine                                          |\n| Soft         | Cocaine                                          |\n| Soft Ones    | Methamphetamine                                  |\n| Solar Flare  | Synthetic Cannabinoids                           |\n| Solventless  | Marijuana Concentrates/Hash Oil                  |\n| Sour OG      | Marijuana                                        |\n| Space            | Cocaine mixed with PCP           |\n|------------------|----------------------------------|\n| Sparkle Plenty   | Amphetamine                      |\n| Sparklers        | Amphetamine                      |\n| Special          | Cocaine                          |\n| Special K        | Ketamine (Ketalar                |\n|                 |                                  |\n| )                |                                  |\n| Special La Coke  | Ketamine (Ketalar                |\n|                 |                                  |\n| )                |                                  |\n| Speed            | Amphetamine; Methamphetamine     |\n| Speed Boat       | Crack Cocaine                    |\n| Speed Dog        | Methamphetamine                  |\n| Speed for Lovers | Ecstasy/MDMA/Molly               |\n| Speedball        | Cocaine mixed with Heroin        |\n| Spice            | Synthetic Cannabinoids           |\n| Spicy Kind       | Methamphetamine                  |\n| Spider Blue      | Heroin                           |\n| Spike Diamond    | Synthetic Cannabinoids           |\n| Spin             | Methamphetamine                  |\n| Spit and Die     | LSD (Lysergic Acid Diethylamide) |\n| Splash           | Amphetamine                      |\n| Spliff           | Marijuana                                          |\n|------------------|----------------------------------------------------|\n| Spores           | PCP (Phencyclidine)                                |\n| Square Time Bomb | Crack Cocaine                                      |\n| Stackers         | Steroids                                           |\n| Star Spangled    |                                                    |\n| Powder           |                                                    |\n| Cocaine          |                                                    |\n| Stardust         | Cocaine; PCP (Phencyclidine); Synthetic Cathinones |\n| Stemmies         | Psilocybin Mushrooms                               |\n| Stems            | Marijuana                                          |\n| Sticks           | Alprazolam (Xanax                                  |\n|                 |                                                    |\n| )                |                                                    |\n| Sticky           | Marijuana                                          |\n| Sticky Kind      | Heroin                                             |\n| Stink Weed       | Marijuana                                          |\n| Stone            | Crack Cocaine                                      |\n| Stop Signs       | Buprenorphine and Naloxone Combination (Suboxone   |\n|                 |                                                    |\n| )                |                                                    |\n| Stops            | Buprenorphine and Naloxone Combination (Suboxone   |\n|                 |                                                    |\n| )                |                                                    |\n| Storm            | Synthetic Cannabinoids                             |\n| Stove Top        | Methamphetamine                                    |\n| STP              | PCP (Phencyclidine)                                |\n| Studio Fuel                                             | Cocaine                                                 |\n|---------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------|\n| Study Buddies                                           |                                                         |\n| Amphetamine and Dextroamphetamine Combination (Adderall |                                                         |\n|                                                        |                                                         |\n| );                                                      |                                                         |\n| Methylphenidate (Ritalin                                |                                                         |\n|                                                        |                                                         |\n| , Concerta                                              |                                                         |\n|                                                        |                                                         |\n| , Daytrana                                              |                                                         |\n|                                                        |                                                         |\n| )                                                       |                                                         |\n| Study Skittles                                          | Amphetamine and Dextroamphetamine Combination (Adderall |\n|                                                        |                                                         |\n| )                                                       |                                                         |\n| Stufa                                                   | Heroin                                                  |\n| Stuff                                                   | Methamphetamine                                         |\n| Suave                                                   | Cocaine                                                 |\n| Subs                                                    | Buprenorphine and Naloxone Combination (Suboxone        |\n|                                                        |                                                         |\n| )                                                       |                                                         |\n| Sugar                                                   | Cocaine; Heroin                                         |\n| Sugar Block                                             | Crack Cocaine                                           |\n| Sugar Cubes                                             | LSD (Lysergic Acid Diethylamide)                        |\n| Sugar Lumps                                             | LSD (Lysergic Acid Diethylamide)                        |\n| Sugar Weed                                              | Marijuana                                               |\n| Sunshine                                                | LSD (Lysergic Acid Diethylamide)                        |\n| Super Acid                                              | Ketamine (Ketalar                                       |\n|                                                        |                                                         |\n| )                                                       |                                                         |\n| Super C                                                 | Ketamine (Ketalar                                       |\n|                                                        |                                                         |\n| )                                                       |                                                         |\n| Super Grass                                             | PCP (Phencyclidine)                                     |\n| Super Ice                                               | Methamphetamine                                         |\n| Super Kools                                             | PCP (Phencyclidine)                                     |\n| Super Valium          | Clonazepam (Klonopin                      |\n|-----------------------|-------------------------------------------|\n|                      |                                           |\n| )                     |                                           |\n| Super Weed            | PCP (Phencyclidine)                       |\n| Superman              | Cocaine; LSD (Lysergic Acid Diethylamide) |\n| Surfer                | PCP (Phencyclidine)                       |\n| Sweet Jesus           | Heroin                                    |\n| Sweet Leaf            | Synthetic Cannabinoids                    |\n| Sweet Lucy            | Marijuana                                 |\n| Sweet Stuff           | Cocaine                                   |\n| Sweeties              | Amphetamine                               |\n| Sweets                | Amphetamine; Ecstasy/MDMA/Molly           |\n| Synthetic Cocaine     | PCP (Phencyclidine)                       |\n| Synthetic Marijuana   | Synthetic Cannabinoids                    |\n| Syrup                 | Promethazine                              |\n| Tabique               | Cocaine                                   |\n| Tablas                | Cocaine                                   |\n| Table                 | Methamphetamine                           |\n| Tabs                  |                                           |\n| Hydrocodone (Norco    |                                           |\n|                      |                                           |\n| , Vicodin             |                                           |\n|                      |                                           |\n| , Lorcet              |                                           |\n|                      |                                           |\n| ); LSD (Lysergic Acid |                                           |\n| Diethylamide)         |                                           |\n| Tacatosa              | LSD (Lysergic Acid Diethylamide)          |\n| Tacha           | Ecstasy/MDMA/Molly                |\n|-----------------|-----------------------------------|\n| Tahoe           | Hydroponic Marijuana              |\n| Tail Lights     | LSD (Lysergic Acid Diethylamide)  |\n| Takeover        | Crack Cocaine mixed with Fentanyl |\n| Taking a Cruise | PCP (Phencyclidine)               |\n| Talco           | Cocaine                           |\n| Talquito        | Cocaine                           |\n| Tamales         | Cocaine                           |\n| Tan             | Heroin                            |\n| Tango and Cash  | Fentanyl and Fentanyl Derivatives |\n| Tangy OG        | Marijuana                         |\n| Tar             | Heroin                            |\n| Taxi            | Cocaine                           |\n| T-Buzz          | PCP (Phencyclidine)               |\n| Tecata          | Heroin                            |\n| Tecate          | Cocaine                           |\n| Teddy Bears     | LSD (Lysergic Acid Diethylamide)  |\n| Teenager        | Cocaine                           |\n| Teeth            | Cocaine; Crack Cocaine          |\n|------------------|---------------------------------|\n| Tens             | Amphetamine                     |\n| Tension          | Crack Cocaine                   |\n| Tequila          | Cocaine                         |\n| Terp             | Marijuana                       |\n| Terp Sauce       | Marijuana Concentrates/Hash Oil |\n| Terpenes         | Marijuana                       |\n| Terraband        | Synthetic Cannabinoids          |\n| Texas Tea        | Marijuana                       |\n| Tex-Mex          | Marijuana                       |\n| THCA             | Marijuana Concentrates/Hash Oil |\n| THCA Crystal     | Marijuana Concentrates/Hash Oil |\n| THCA Crystalline | Marijuana Concentrates/Hash Oil |\n| THCA Powder      | Marijuana Concentrates/Hash Oil |\n| Thizz            | Ecstasy/MDMA/Molly              |\n| Thrusters        | Amphetamine                     |\n| Thunder          | Cocaine; Heroin                 |\n| Tic Tac          | PCP (Phencyclidine)             |\n| Ticket                                            | LSD (Lysergic Acid Diethylamide)   |\n|---------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------|\n| Tigitty                                           | Marijuana                          |\n| Tila                                              | Marijuana                          |\n| Time Traveler                                     | Synthetic Cannabinoids             |\n| Tims                                              | Marijuana                          |\n| Tina                                              | Methamphetamine                    |\n| Tire                                              | Cocaine                            |\n| Tires                                             |                                    |\n| Acetaminophen and Oxycodone Combination (Percocet |                                    |\n|                                                  |                                    |\n| ); Heroin;                                        |                                    |\n| Methamphetamine                                   |                                    |\n| Tish                                              | PCP (Phencyclidine)                |\n| Tissue                                            | Crack Cocaine                      |\n| TNT                                               | Fentanyl and Fentanyl Derivatives  |\n| Toe Tag Dope                                      | Fentanyl and Fentanyl Derivatives  |\n| Tomasa                                            | Heroin                             |\n| Tonto                                             | Cocaine                            |\n| Toot                                              | Cocaine                            |\n| Tootsie Roll                                      | Heroin                             |\n| Top Gear                                          | Synthetic Cannabinoids             |\n| Top Gun                                           | Crack Cocaine                      |\n| Top Shelf              | Marijuana                         |\n|------------------------|-----------------------------------|\n| Topi                   | Mescaline/Peyote                  |\n| Tops                   | Mescaline/Peyote                  |\n| Tortes                 | Cocaine                           |\n| Tortuga                | Cocaine                           |\n| Tosca                  | Marijuana                         |\n| Toxy                   | Opium                             |\n| Toyota                 | Cocaine                           |\n| Toys                   | Opium                             |\n| TR-6s                  | Amphetamine                       |\n| Tragic Magic           | Heroin                            |\n| Train Wreck            | Marijuana; Synthetic Cannabinoids |\n| Tranks                 | Clonazepam (Klonopin              |\n|                       |                                   |\n| ); PCP (Phencyclidine) |                                   |\n| Trash                  | Methamphetamine                   |\n| Trees                  | Heroin; Marijuana                 |\n| Trichrome              | Marijuana Concentrates/Hash Oil   |\n| Trinity OG             | Marijuana                         |\n| Trip-and-Fall          | Flunitrazepam (Rohypnol           |\n|                       |                                   |\n| )                      |                                   |\n| Triple V                                                   | Vicodin                               |\n|------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------|\n|                                                           |                                       |\n| taken with Valium                                          |                                       |\n|                                                           |                                       |\n| and Vodka                                                  |                                       |\n| Troop                                                      | Crack Cocaine                         |\n| Truck                                                      | Methamphetamine                       |\n| Truck Drivers                                              |                                       |\n| Amphetamine; Amphetamine and Dextroamphetamine Combination |                                       |\n| (Adderall                                                  |                                       |\n|                                                           |                                       |\n| ); Methylphenidate (Ritalin                                |                                       |\n|                                                           |                                       |\n| , Concerta                                                 |                                       |\n|                                                           |                                       |\n| , Daytrana                                                 |                                       |\n|                                                           |                                       |\n| )                                                          |                                       |\n| T-Shirts                                                   | Cocaine                               |\n| Tubo                                                       | Cocaine                               |\n| Tucibi                                                     | Cocaine - Pink Variety                |\n| Tupperware                                                 | Methamphetamine                       |\n| Turkey                                                     | Cocaine                               |\n| Turn Abouts                                                | Amphetamine                           |\n| Turtle                                                     | Heroin                                |\n| Tutti Fruitti                                              | Cocaine                               |\n| Tweak                                                      | Methamphetamine                       |\n| Tweeds                                                     | Marijuana                             |\n| Tweezes                                                    | Psilocybin Mushrooms                  |\n| U4                                                         | U-47700                               |\n| Ultimate                                                   | Crack Cocaine; Synthetic Cannabinoids |\n| Unassembled                                                | Powder Methamphetamine                |\n| Uncle Sid    | LSD (Lysergic Acid Diethylamide)   |\n|--------------|------------------------------------|\n| Unkie        | Morphine                           |\n| Up           | Crack Cocaine                      |\n| Upjohns      | Alprazolam (Xanax                  |\n|             |                                    |\n| )            |                                    |\n| Uppers       | Amphetamine; Methamphetamine       |\n| Uzi          | Crack Cocaine                      |\n| Valle        | Marijuana                          |\n| Valley Dolls | LSD (Lysergic Acid Diethylamide)   |\n| Vanilla Sky  | Synthetic Cathinones               |\n| Vaquita      | Cocaine                            |\n| Veeks        | Hydrocodone (Norco                 |\n|             |                                    |\n| , Vicodin    |                                    |\n|             |                                    |\n| , Lorcet     |                                    |\n|             |                                    |\n| )            |                                    |\n| Velvet       | Promethazine                       |\n| Venom        | PCP (Phencyclidine)                |\n| Ventanas     | Methamphetamine                    |\n| Vics         | Hydrocodone (Norco                 |\n|             |                                    |\n| , Vicodin    |                                    |\n|             |                                    |\n| , Lorcet     |                                    |\n|             |                                    |\n| )            |                                    |\n| Vidrio       | Heroin; Methamphetamine            |\n| Vikes        | Hydrocodone (Norco                 |\n|             |                                    |\n| , Vicodin    |                                    |\n|             |                                    |\n| , Lorcet     |                                    |\n|             |                                    |\n| )            |                                    |\n| Viper        | Synthetic Cannabinoids             |\n| Vitamin E                                             | Ecstasy/MDMA/Molly               |\n|-------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------|\n| Vitamin K                                             | Ketamine (Ketalar                |\n|                                                      |                                  |\n| )                                                     |                                  |\n| Vitamin R                                             | Methylphenidate (Ritalin         |\n|                                                      |                                  |\n| , Concerta                                            |                                  |\n|                                                      |                                  |\n| , Daytrana                                            |                                  |\n|                                                      |                                  |\n| )                                                     |                                  |\n| Vodka Acid                                            | LSD (Lysergic Acid Diethylamide) |\n| Voodoo Chils                                          | Synthetic Cannabinoids           |\n| Vowels                                                | Ecstasy/MDMA/Molly               |\n| Wack                                                  | PCP mixed with Cocaine           |\n| Wake and Bake                                         | Marijuana                        |\n| Wake Ups                                              | Amphetamine                      |\n| Walking Zombie                                        | Methamphetamine                  |\n| Wash                                                  | Cocaine                          |\n| Water                                                 |                                  |\n| GHB (Gamma-Hydroxybutyric Acid); Methamphetamine; PCP |                                  |\n| (Phencyclidine)                                       |                                  |\n| Watsons                                               | Hydrocodone (Norco               |\n|                                                      |                                  |\n| , Vicodin                                             |                                  |\n|                                                      |                                  |\n| , Lorcet                                              |                                  |\n|                                                      |                                  |\n| )                                                     |                                  |\n| Wave                                                  | Crack Cocaine                    |\n| Wax                                                   | Marijuana Concentrates/Hash Oil  |\n| Wazabi                                                | Synthetic Cannabinoids           |\n| Wazz                                                  | Methamphetamine                  |\n| Wedding Bells                                         | LSD (Lysergic Acid Diethylamide) |\n| Wedge          | LSD (Lysergic Acid Diethylamide)                  |\n|----------------|---------------------------------------------------|\n| Weed           | Marijuana                                         |\n| Weed Tea       | Marijuana                                         |\n| Weight Gainers | Steroids                                          |\n| Weights        | Heroin                                            |\n| West Coast     |                                                   |\n| Turnarounds    |                                                   |\n| Amphetamine    |                                                   |\n| Wet            | Cocaine; Marijuana dipped in PCP                  |\n| Whack          | Cocaine mixed with PCP                            |\n| Wheat          | Marijuana                                         |\n| Wheels         | Acetaminophen and Oxycodone Combination (Percocet |\n|               |                                                   |\n| ); Amphetamine |                                                   |\n| When-Shee      | Opium                                             |\n| Whiffle Dust   | Amphetamine                                       |\n| Whisky         | Heroin                                            |\n| White          | Cocaine; Heroin                                   |\n| White Ball     | Crack Cocaine                                     |\n| White Bitch    | Cocaine                                           |\n| White Boy      | Heroin                                            |\n| White Boys     | Alprazolam (Xanax                                 |\n|               |                                                   |\n| )              |                                                   |\n| White Cross      | Cocaine                                                |\n|------------------|--------------------------------------------------------|\n| White Crosses    | Amphetamine                                            |\n| White Dove       | Cocaine; Synthetic Cathinones                          |\n| White Dust       | LSD (Lysergic Acid Diethylamide)                       |\n| White Fluff      | LSD (Lysergic Acid Diethylamide)                       |\n| White Ghost      | Crack Cocaine                                          |\n| White Girl       | Heroin; Fentanyl and Fentanyl Derivatives              |\n| White Girls      | Alprazolam (Xanax                                      |\n|                 |                                                        |\n| ); Cocaine       |                                                        |\n| White Goat       | Cocaine                                                |\n| White Horizon    | PCP (Phencyclidine)                                    |\n| White Horse      | Cocaine                                                |\n| White Junk       | Heroin                                                 |\n| White Knight     | Synthetic Cathinones                                   |\n| White Ladies     | Fentanyl and Fentanyl Derivatives                      |\n| White Lady       | Cocaine; Heroin                                        |\n| White Lightening | LSD (Lysergic Acid Diethylamide); Synthetic Cathinones |\n| White Magic      | Synthetic Cathinones                                   |\n| White Mercedes   | Ecstasy/MDMA/Molly                                     |\nWhite Mercedes Benz\nCocaine\nWhite Mosquito\nCocaine\nWhite Nurse\nHeroin\nWhite Owsley\nLSD (Lysergic Acid Diethylamide)\nWhite Paint\nCocaine\nWhite Powder\nCocaine\nWhite Rock\nCocaine\nWhite Root\nCocaine\nWhite Shirt\nCocaine; Heroin\nWhite Stuff\nHeroin; Morphine\nWhite Sugar\nCrack Cocaine\nWhite T\nCocaine\nWhite Tornado\nCrack Cocaine\nWhite Wall Tires\nCocaine\nWhite Whizz\nMethamphetamine\nWhite-Haired Lady\nMarijuana\nWhites\nAmphetamine; Oxycodone (Oxycontin, Roxicodone, Oxaydo)\nWhitey\nCocaine\n| Whiz Bang              | Cocaine                          |\n|------------------------|----------------------------------|\n| Wicked                 | Synthetic Cannabinoids           |\n| Wicked X               | Synthetic Cathinones             |\n| Window Glass           | LSD (Lysergic Acid Diethylamide) |\n| Window Pane            | LSD (Lysergic Acid Diethylamide) |\n| Windows                | Methamphetamine                  |\n| Wings                  | Cocaine; Heroin                  |\n| Witch                  | Heroin                           |\n| Witch Hazel            | Heroin                           |\n| Witches Teeth          | Methamphetamine                  |\n| Wizard                 | Synthetic Cannabinoids           |\n| Wobble                 | Ketamine (Ketalar                |\n|                       |                                  |\n| )                      |                                  |\n| Wobble Weed            | PCP (Phencyclidine)              |\n| Wolfies                | Flunitrazepam (Rohypnol          |\n|                       |                                  |\n| ); PCP (Phencyclidine) |                                  |\n| Wonky                  | Ketamine (Ketalar                |\n|                       |                                  |\n| )                      |                                  |\n| Wooly                  | Cocaine                          |\n| Wooz                   | Marijuana                        |\n| Work                   | Cocaine                          |\n| Worm             | PCP (Phencyclidine)              |\n|------------------|----------------------------------|\n| Wrecking Crew    | Crack Cocaine                    |\n| X                | Ecstasy/MDMA/Molly               |\n| Xanies           | Alprazolam (Xanax                |\n|                 |                                  |\n| )                |                                  |\n| XTC              | Ecstasy/MDMA/Molly               |\n| Xtreme           | Synthetic Cannabinoids           |\n| Yaba             | Methamphetamine                  |\n| Yahoo            | Crack Cocaine                    |\n| Yale             | Crack Cocaine                    |\n| Yayo             | Cocaine                          |\n| Yellow Barn      | Methamphetamine                  |\n| Yellow Boys      | Alprazolam (Xanax                |\n|                 |                                  |\n| )                |                                  |\n| Yellow Cake      | Methamphetamine                  |\n| Yellow Dimples   | LSD (Lysergic Acid Diethylamide) |\n| Yellow Fever     | PCP (Phencyclidine)              |\n| Yellow Kind      | Methamphetamine                  |\n| Yellow Submarine | Marijuana                        |\n| Yellow Sunshine  | LSD (Lysergic Acid Diethylamide) |\n| Yen Pop      | Marijuana              |\n|--------------|------------------------|\n| Yerba        | Marijuana              |\n| Yesca        | Marijuana              |\n| Yeyo         | Cocaine                |\n| Yimyom       | Crack Cocaine          |\n| Yoda         | Cocaine                |\n| Yokes        | Ecstasy/MDMA/Molly     |\n| Young Girls  | Marijuana              |\n| Yucatan      | Synthetic Cannabinoids |\n| Yucatan Fire | Synthetic Cannabinoids |\n| Zacate       | Marijuana              |\n| Zacatecas    | Marijuana              |\n| Zambi        | Marijuana              |\n| Zanbars      | Alprazolam (Xanax      |\n|             |                        |\n| )            |                        |\n| Zannies      | Alprazolam (Xanax      |\n|             |                        |\n| )            |                        |\n| Zapapote     | Heroin                 |\n| Zapato       | Cocaine                |\n| Z-Bars       | Alprazolam (Xanax      |\n|             |                        |\n| )            |                        |\n| Zen          | LSD (Lysergic Acid Diethylamide)                        |\n|--------------|---------------------------------------------------------|\n| Zero         | Opium                                                   |\n| Zero Gravity | Synthetic Cannabinoids                                  |\n| Zing         | Amphetamine and Dextroamphetamine Combination (Adderall |\n|             |                                                         |\n| )            |                                                         |\n| Zip          | Cocaine; Marijuana; Methamphetamine                     |\n| Zohai        | Synthetic Cannabinoids                                  |\n| Zombie       | PCP (Phencyclidine); Synthetic Cannabinoids             |\n| Zoom         | Marijuana mixed with PCP; Synthetic Cathinones          |\n| Zoomers      | Amphetamine                                             |\n\nFor media/press inquiries call (202) 307-7977."
    },
    {
        "text": "## Unclassified Classification Changes\n\nTO\nconfidential\n31 May 1966,\nDoDD 5200.10,\nGroup-4,\nper\ndocument marking.\n\n## This Page Is Unclassified 'Security - \\'. Marking\n\nThe classitied or limited status of this report applies te each page, unless otherwise marked,\n\n\"\n.\nSeparate page printouts MUST bo marked accordingly.\nA\ne B\nT\nR\ni B\nS\nS\ns B\n*This doetmene' cofiiains info rmation affecting the Na.{. nal within the meaning of the S.\n\nC., Section 793 and\n|Defeneo of the United States Esplonsge Laws, Title 18, U,\n794.\n\nYts transmission op th\n@ revelation of its coatents in any manner to an unauthorised persen is prokidited by lav,s\n\n# Helassifed O\n\n## Research Paper P-88\n\nStudy FAIR Volume V\n\n# Ervation Satellites For Arms Control: Some Implications And Policy Choices (U)\n\nRosemary Klineberg MAY 1963\nDDC CONTROL\nN0 53264\nm INSTITUTE FOR DEFENSE ANALYSES\n'\nECONOMIC AND POLITICAL STUDIES DIVISION\nThis moterial contains information affecting the nationol defemse of the United States within the meaning of the Espioncge Laws (Title 18, U.S.C., Sections 793 and 794), the transmission or revelation of which in any monner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.\n\n# 31 Als V 3Y Aiatrivation O This Pepory 1G Oontrolled,  Quaified W Ngz\\Uon Shall Request Through Arpa/T10.\n\nThe views expressed hereinare not nacessorily those of the institute for Deferse Analyses or of any agency of the United States Government.\n\nThe institute for Defense Anclyses mm kinds of pub~-\nlication for dictribution, entitled Report, Study, ond Research Paper.\n\nA\nReport embodies the results of a mojor ressarch project under~\ntoken by and is intended to be on authoritative contribution on its subject.\n\nscope o Report.\n\nIt may be the resvit of @ smaller and more narrowly defined resecrch project or it moy be o supporting technical paper prepared in connecrion with\n0 major (soject.\n\nA Ressarch represents the work of one or more nomed outhors oct to revisw comparable to that for publicotion in o professional journal .\n\n## Research Paper P-S8\n\nl Srudy FAIR Volumc v\n\n## K Observation Satellites For Arms Control: | Some Implications And Policy Choices (U)\n\nRosemary Klincberg INSTITUTE FOR DEFENSE ANALYSES\nECONOMIC AND POLITICAL STUDIES DI VISION\n\n## Foreword\n\nThe following paper on the policy implications of an observation satellite system represents cne part of Study I-'AIR:F\nFocus on Arms Information and Reassurance, The author, Rosemary Xlineberg, is a former member of this division and a specialist in international relations.\n\nPartial financial support for Study FAIR has come from the US Arms Control aud Disarmament Agency, the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, and Project Michelson of the US Naval Ordnance Test Station, as well as from IDh Central Research funds.\n\n- Acting Director N\nBoonomic and Politicay Studies Division\n\n## Rreviows Page Was Blank, Ti.Refore Not Filmed. Preface\n\nThe five principal parts of Study FAIR are entitled: Studies on Information and Arms Control;\nStudies on hccidental War; Unilateral Arms Control:\nA_Survey; Observation Satellites ifor Arms Control:\nTechnical Capabilities, Concepts, and Applications (U);\nand Observation Satellites for Arms Control:\nSome Implications and Policy Choices (U).\n\nThe first three papers are not classified, the latter two are classified \"Confidential\" and \"Secret,\" respectively.\n\nAll five papers are based on unclassified sources.\n\nThe paper which follows examines implications of an observation satellite system for general United States pdlicy.\n\n.\n\nJOHN PHELPFS\ng Leader, Study FAIR\n\n## Contents\n\nJage\nI.\nINTRODUCTIONANDBACYGROUND........\n1\nHistory\nPresent Policy\nTT.rt.'ACt:k'L'LAPPLICATIONS........o......\n7\nArea Coverage\nPossible Fields\n;.III.\nMILI'MRY CONSIDRRATIONS\n\n&\no\n0\n8\n0\ns\n4\no\no\n\n\no\ne\n@\n12\nThe Targeting Question\nPhysical Vulnerability of Satellites\nIV.I.EGALISSUES........-......\n20\nSpace Fhotogvrajx, J/\nOuter Space nd the High Seas\nSatellites and U-2s\nScvereignty,\nS2crecy,\nand Satellites\nV.\nPOLITICALPSYC!DIDGICALFACTORS.\n\ns\n0\ne\ns\n0\n00\ne\n27\nUS Image Abroad\nThe Public Press\nVI.THECI'DICBS........;.....-....\n313\nMaintenance of Secrecy\nlegitimization of Observation from Outer Space\netion and Control\nVII.\nStmssnONs\n\n[\n]\n[ ]\nL ]\nL ]\n.\nL\nL\n[\n)\n[\n*\n[ ]\nL]\nL]\nL]\nL)\n[\n]\n.\nL ]\n[ ]\n*\n41\nFirst Steps\nGeneral Climate of Cpinion\ni\ne\n\n## Observation Satellites For Arms Control: Some Implications And Pol1Cy Choices I. Introduction And Background ''______--\n\nits full potential for usefulness may be realized.\n\nafter a brief review of the history of the satellite program and the nature of present US\npPolicy towerd it, we first examine the little-kn own peaceful applications of observation satellj\n'\nbenefits, gram.\n\nFinally, we ces open to pPolicy-makers, and make certain\n1.\n\nThe other \"wo wnake up tudy PAIR Volume 4, Observation Satellites fopr Arms Control:\nTechnical Ca abilities, Conce ts, a ligations\n-\nsuggestions fdr Specific action, The effect of a Us observation satellite pregram on the mairtenance of Soviet Secrecy--potentially\n4 highly significant aspect of the program--is analyzed under the other headings as it relates to them, His togz It has been generally, if unofficially, known for several years that the United States has been developing a reconnaissance satellite program.\n\nIn the early stages, daunchings were announced Thus, the first two MIDAS /Missile Defense in some detail, Alarm System/ launchings (26 February and 24 May,\n\" successors to the U-2.\n\nIn March of 1962\n4 new policy was introduced aimed at reducin; the information about all satellite launchings to the same common denominator.\n\ntime, the booster rccket were identiover-all space program, but a1l else was considered classified information, In April 1963, there was a further publicity clampdown requiring all satellite launchings by\n1.\n\nTh\n:\n1\nthe m:llitary services to be done in secnf.\n\n%his move came about despite the virtual imposribility of hiding an orbiting satellite from a modern tracking ne!:work.l In any case, the earlier, more specific press releases remain on the public record, forming a history of actisity which the press consistently integraces in some fashion, not necessarily accurate, into its current articles.\n\nThus a Teperter may speculate that a Satellite launched with an Atlas-Agena booster combimation \"known to have been used in previous SAMOS-MITAS shotsTM must be one or the other,2 and a British aeronautical weekly may announce that of\n\"twenty unidentified satellites\" launched by the US Air Force between November 1961 and August 1362 six were probably SAMDS reconnaissance satellites, twelve were Discoverer-type safellites Ybresumably carrying SAMDS or MIDAS equipment, TM and one was = MIDAS\nearly-warning ntonito.a Careful perusal of the wblicy press and the more knowledgeable aeros;;ace journals mny therefore suffice to keep the interested citizen moderately well informed of the extent of US observation satellite activity.\n\n1.\n\"Clampdown,\" Newsweek, April 22, 1963, p. 67.\n2, The Wash on _Post,\n6 August 1962, p, A-1.\n\nSAMOS stands for SateJHEW%flT'ofisewation Syscem.,\n'\n3.\n\nFlizgt International (Official Organ of the Royal Aero Club), voI.\n\n87, No, ugust 1962), p.\n\n253.\n\nThe twentieth of the group was described as \"either a SAMOS or a MIDAS\n. -\npossibly unsuccessful.\"\n\n## Present Policz\n\nIn response to specific queries about tha obscrvation satellite program, which (except for low=resolution metecrolcgical satellites)l continues to be the exclueive responsibility of the armed services, Us spokesmen now restrict th\n2ir commments to a Statement that the Air Force is endeavoring to develcp a capability to conduct military reconnzissance from space.\n\nThey neither deny nor confirm that the United States may have such an operational capability at the presant time, Conducting the satellite program in total secrecy--thereby mitigating public Speculation--Zoes not appear to be practical in the \"open socizty\" of the United States, since it is impossible to conceal the visibiliey of launrhings altoyether.\n\nFurthermore, compliance with UN General Assembly Resolution 1721\n(XVI)\nof the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space.\n\nThis the United States has bean doing since mid-February 1962,\n-The earlier reports included T\n\nl.\n\nResolution is a measure of the ability of an cptical or photographic System to distinguish detail, Roughly,\n& resolution object cannot be.\n\nLow resolution s high r2solution, that small objects aad W\ni S ._.,...,_,,_m,a-'rw'\"_m\n-\nr\n.ification only of those satellites which were still in orbit at the end of the two-week reporting period; thcse which had been launched but were no longer in Space were not mentioned.\n\nThe information given included orbital characteristics, the name of the launch vehicle, the launch date, and a general description of the kind of space program being undertaken, Another limitation on the mifitemnco of secrecy was manifested when the Soviets claimed to be giving full information in the registration reports, whereas it was evident that the United States was not reporting all its launchings, as called for by th'e General fissembly resolution.\n\nComparing the US reports with the briaf Air Force releases regarding satellite launchings, the Soviets noticed that 'the latter were not always reflected in the reports to the-United Nations, The US position was that the'\nsatellites in question were no longer in orbit at the time of the reports and therefore did not need to be registered.\n\nHowever,\n\n_\nin order to be consistent, the reports would not have been able\nto cover vtho :J.igh': by Lt.\nCoul, John Glern on 20 February 1962,\nsince his capsule was orbited and returned to earth in the middie\nof a repoiting period.\nTherefore, a new scheme of reporting ves\ndeveloped and put into effect shortly thereafter.\n|\nNow the U3 repurts give the same information for both ecivil-\n\" ian and milivary launchings, viz:\nthe name of the launch vehicle,\n5\nRREF\nA T\nT S\nP NN\nL T\nN D\nthe date, and the Satellite's nodal period, inclination, apogee, and perigee.\n\nIn addition, they disclose into which of four main categories the funetion of the satellite falls:\ndevelopment of\n\n## Ii. Peaceful Appl1Cations W\n\nWith one exception, public and official interest in observation satellites seems to have centered on their military intel.\n\nligence applications.\n\nThe exception is the TIROS [l'clevision and Infra-Red Observation Systeg] weather satellito;\nthe firsc of which was launched on\n1 April 1960.\n\nThe TIROS system--using very low-resolution photography, high altitudes, and picture transmission by television--has been notably suecesaful in providing large-area cloud cover data  helping to identify and track dangerous starms, ard generally advancing the science of metnorology.\n\nBy 1964 the mone advanced Nimbus system is expected to take over some of the functions of TIROS.\n\nBut observation satellites may be applied to a varicty of other important pezceful purposes, and these shculd figure prominently in any consideration of the futu-o i0le of observation satellites and the policies ussociated with them.\n\nIt should be noted, by the way, that the term \"peacoful\" is not necessarily to be equated with \"non-mintary' as in the Antarc\":lc Treaty.\n\nm:u:lt:agz act::l.vitiu in space, some or which, at least in the opinicn of US officials, may well have a long-run \"peaceful\" effect.\n\nCommunicaticns satellites, morecover, have obvious military and non~-military\n\n## Area Covecage\n\neven compared with the highestflying airplenes, is its coverage of very large areas (hundreds o\n4 single Picture, interest, and also\n\n## These Surveys Of The Earth! $ Suppliesof\n\nl.\n\nSee the ac COmpanying paper\n\"Observation Satellites for Arms Contral:\nConcepts andingppnca::ions.\"\n2.\n\nSee the accol\n \"Observation Satellites for Arms Contro]:\nTechnical Capabilities,\" for documentation and elaborstion,\n'\nnations, some with burgeoning populations, strive to develop as rapidly as possible, A satellite photograph neot Only covers a large area;\nit captures the area at a known instant of time in a picture which can be studied at leisure.\n\nStereo pictures lend themselves to topographic mapping and other applications where depth is important to photo-interpretation,\n\n## Possible Fialds\n\nDespite the almost exclusive emphasis on the utility of observation satellites for military intelligence and weather information, it is inscructive to note that there are as many as thirteen additional fields, not counting arms control, where satellites may be useful.\n\nThese are:\ncartography, geography, geology, soil science, engineering, forestry, wildlife management, hydrology, agriculture, urban and regional planning, archa-ology, publie\n3dministration, and disaster analysis.l In cartography, satellite. offer the grut advantage of bridging over relatively unknown regions and plotting accurate pPusitions in relation to known points for shorelines, islands, Within the broad area of geology, glaciers, and ships.\n\n-\n1, We are grateful to the Itek Corporation for this listing, R\n.\n\nR\nLy cmmel AN e PP OHE\npw MYy e R\nglacial geology, lithouogy, structural geology, and mineral exploration, Satellites can help contruction engincers take a regional Plished with one or two satellice Pictures, esyecially in relatively inaccessible areas, In hydrology;\nSnow cover and glaciers can be seen \"at a glance\" from satellites, Optical and infrared forestry, wildlife management, urban Planning, photography, we may judge that, once the Satellites were operating and the pictures widely available, important new applications would be discovered and new benelits realized, Tt is often assumed chut satellite photuyraphs have the great advantage of large area coverage, but that they cannot match conventional aerial photos when high resolution and detail coverage are clesired.:l So far as the limiting capabilities of the two systems are concerned, this is true.\n\nBut it is not generally realized that the satellite resolutions achievable now are as good as those of a laige fraction of useful aerial photogfadn made so far.\n\nOne informed st:udy2 indicates that satelarea alone of the earth is about S0 million square miles), If either (a) the cost of launch vehicies is paid by governments, or (b) economies associated with frequent launchings become possible, or (c) the areas of interest are particularly inaccessible (like Antarctica), this cost comparison shifts strdngly in favor of satellites.\n\n.\n\nTt seems evident that realization of the peaceful advantages of observation satellites depends more on overcaming some political l.\n\nWe may note, however, that, given reasonzble technological progress, by 1970 the maximum achievable satellite resolution should be limited only by the turbulence of the atmosphere, a problem with which very high<flying aircraft also must contend.\n\nSee the accompanying paper,\n\"Observation Satellites for Arms Control:\nTechnical Capabilities,\"\nCoe T\n\n2,\nConducted by the Itek Corporation.\nb problems and making the right policy choices than it does on technical capabilities,\n\"Because they cover the whole earth and all nations can benefit from them, observation satellites should ideally be operated, and the data obtained from them .distributed, on an international basis, The United Nations might, for instance,\n~.\n\nOperate a central repository for sa.tel:iitc photographs which would be available to a1 nations, But as a practical matter it may be fecessary for the United States, initially at least, to undertake some applications and establish some precedents through unilateral actions.\n\nOn this score we have some suggestions toward the end of this paper (see below, pp. 41\n-\n45).\n\n## Iti. Military Considerations\n\nIt is clear that obscrvation satellites can provide intelligence informatiocn of military value, and it seems reasonable to assume that gathering such intelligence has been their main mission so far, Within the scope of Study FAIR, one additional point: relating to the military intelligence role of satellites stands out:\nthere is often not much difference between the type\n-.\n\n## The_Targeting Question\n\nThere is, however, one type of intelligence information which seems to require special attention here, viz:\nstrategic targeting data, particularly on missile sites and bomber bases, which figure importantly in the over-all strategic equation.\n\nIn the context of US attempts to retain some kind of counterforce Cepability, it is conceivable that, if the United States had accurate targeting data, and the mathematics of force sizes and exchange ratios were sufficiently in its favor, it could launch\n4 preventive strike against the Soviet Union (presumably in the hope of forestalling a Soviet attack) and destroy its forces sufficiently to save US cities from retaliation.\n\nFrom a military standpoint the United States might indeed want such a capability;\non the other hand, the Soviets would most certainly Prefer that the US not have it and from their standpoint the situation would seem very dangerous.\n\nIt is possible that they might eventually be frightered into reckless action, perhaps in the form of a preventive strike of their own.\n\nThis the United States would surely not want.\n\nA more J.ikely outmme to the situation may be Soviet efforts to make their forces less vulnerable.\n\nSteps toward less vulnerability could include hardening and dispersal of Soviet forces, or concealment of them, or an but it woulg be made difficult ig there were Operating Even if the missiles could System went into OPeration, concealment were nNecessary, forces increas:\nFrom the US standpoint, a mobile Soviet capability might be considered militarily undesirable, since it would tend to rule out any chance of protecting the homeland by striking hard and decisively at Soviet strategic forces.\n\nBut from the standpoint of longer-term strategic stability, it is clear that much can be said for mobile Soviet strategic foicu.l The Russians would feel a relative sense of sccurity'which might leave them less apt to undertake reckless action such as installing medium~\nrange missiles in Cuba to redress the strategic balance.\n\nThey might similarly be less inclined to compete with the United States in numbers of bombs or delivery vehicles, th'-..ngh' they cannot realistically be expected to accept the notion of permanent numerical inferiority.\n\nA significant benefit of a Soviet emphasis on mobility, compelled in aeabnant:l._a.l. part by US observation satellites, might be a net decrease in Soviet dependence on cther forms of secrecy as a military asset.\n\nOthep Papers of Study FAIR point out that anything which tends to diminish the Soviet emphasis On Sacrecy may ganerally be considered to be desirebdle.\n\nThat is, if the Soviets can make their strategic -forces secure through mobility instead of concealment, so much the better from a Western standpoint.\n\nA\n\n\n## Physical Vulnerabilitz Of Satellites\n\nFor the Furposes of this inquiry,\n4 crucial ouestion is whether the Soviets have *he capability physically to0 disable observation Satellites, and, if so, whether they would use it.\n\nThe discussion and comments in the United States following the Vostok IIT and Iv flights implied\n\nhat the Soviets might try to destroy op disable US observation satellites if they had the capability.\n\nThis is not self-evident.\n\nFirst of all, the Soviets would need to know at which satellites to shoot, They might be able to decide this largely on the basis of ug laynching data.\n\nAt the present time the This would seem to be where the recent Vostok\n{\nexper.ence would be most applicable;\ngiven Some very v the Soviets probably could ap But this imple thing to achieve, It was evidently intended that Vostok III should be in precis ely the right tining and position for the launching of Vostok IV, but such conditions for the launch of an inspection satellite would almost certainly not be met by non-Soviet satellites that the Soviets might want to inspect.\n\nThus, a capability for ragid launch, extensive maneuvering in space, and other technically difficult feats would be needed before the Soviets could count on inspecting unidentified satellites.\n\nFurthermore,'it is not at all clear how ciose the inspecting satellite might have to come to the unidentified satellite to examine it carefully\n.\n\n~nough really to determine its mission, as the observation satellite could be made with relatively little trouble to look like another kind of satellite.\n\nIf the Soviets knew exactly which satellite they wanted to destroy, their task might be comparstively easy, although still perhaps expensive.\n\nOnce they had picked cut the objectiunable satellite, they could compute its ephemeris and make plans for destroying it at a time and place most favorable to the intercepting weapon.\n\nIt might not be difficult for them to propel a nuclear weapon up to th.kaatellito alt;tudc at just the right time with a combarltivcly simple rocket.\n\nThe situatidn might alter, however, if decoy satellites were used by the United States.\n\nIt is theoretically possitle to distinguish decoys from actual observation satellites hy calculating the effects of air drag, could be dj Stinguished.\n\nthe task of the satellite destroyer more expensive, So much for Capability, physiculy to destroy or dis would stop once it started.\n\nIf each side decided to exercise its military option, rather indiscriminate destruction of satellites and space vehicles could result in fairly short uider, to the point where neither side would be able to carry on its longer-range space program.\n\nOne may judge that such a progran is very important to the Soviets in view of the efforts which they have put into it and the extent to which their prestige has been involved.\n\nThey would have relatively more to lose in seeing their space program defeated than would the United States, and this is a fact which they are not likely to overlook when they first consider whether or not to shoot at US observation satellites.\n\nIn summary, the main military considerations with regard to observation satcllites afe the following:\n(a)\ncthe intelligerice information which satellites can provide may well be of military value;\n(b) US acquisition of prccise targeting data for the Soviet Union may encourage the Soviets to emphasize mobility and hardening in their strategic forces, thereby reducing the threat to them of observation satellites as an aid to a US\npre-emptivo strike, and at the same t1me allowing the Soviets to feel relatively more secure and thus less apt to undertake certain kinds of reckless action;\n(c) this increased Soviet emphasis on mobility and hardening may be accompanied by a net fringed by observation satelli tes?\n\nSome of the answers may derive Erom dnalogies, Oothers from fhe development of Precedent , and\n\n## Space Photoqraphy\n\nThe first analogy which might be emphasized is that between human photography and instrumental photography from space.\n\nAfter all, the results obtained by both means can be very similar.\n\nThe fact that both the United States and the Soviet Union have orbited men who have taken pictures argues in favor of at::epta-nce of the legitimacy of the procedure, a status which may then be extended to the orbiting of photographic instruments.\n\nIt is not certain that the USSR has orbited optical satellites, but the film made of Major Titov's flight included some of the photographs which he took in the course of his seventeen orbits, and there may be similaz; releases based on subseguent flights.\n\nEven though the Soviets may insist that these pictures were \"peaceftl\" and innocuous, they will, regardless cf their intentions, have strengthened the legitimacy of photography from outer space.\n\n## Outer Space O.Nd The High Seas\n\nAnother possible analogy is that between outer space and the high seas.\n\nUS spokesmen at meetings of the Legal Suncomittce of the UN Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space', for instance, have compared the US satellites to Soviet trawlers hovering off US coasts with electronic equipment just beyond the three-mile territorial limit.\n\nWhile the United States certain.}y does not\n\"approve\"\nof this activity, it does not consider it illegal a-g does not try to terminate it.\n\nThe Soviets, however, have never publicly conceded that these vessels are, in fact, engaged in electronic reconnaissance or surveillance.\n\nThe Soviet position, as expressed in May 1962 at the Geneva meetings of the Legal Subcommitcee, appears to be that the orbiting of satellites opr other space vehicles is in itself legitimate;\nthe question of legality or propriety arises ocnly in connection function of the satellite.\n\nIn other words, while in the Soviet view the United States may orbit anything it chooses\n(with the Probable exception of weapons ), observation of territory belonging to a Sovereign nation is illegal and aggressive behavior.\n\nThus, in their draft from space to be \"incompatible with the cbjectives'of mankind in:\nthe conquest of outer space.\"\nOne of the difficulties with the high seas anal ogy is that of definintions.\n\nIt is universally accepted, for instance, that waters more than twelve miles off-shore are cutside of national Sovereignty (and some nations, including the United restrict territorial waters to six or even three miles).\n\nThe United States may, however, prefer not to define the lower limits of \"outer space,\" inasmuch as \"airspace\"\nis internationally\n\n## Am'\n\nagreed to be within the jurisdiction of the underlying state.l Another problem might result from attempts to apply the law of piracy to outer space,\n&5 the United States may wish to avoid the implication that an inspecticn satellite, designed to ascertain that observation or reconnaissance satellites are not carrying weapons of mass destruction, might be considered a \"pirate.\"\n\n## Satellites And U-2S\n\nSome of the suspicion of illegality surrounding the use of\n'\nobservation satellites clearly derives from public identification of satellites with U-2 reconnaissance aircraft.\n\nThis equation was buttressed by the early official assurances in 1960 that curtailment of the activities of the latter would not adversely affect the national security, inasmuch as satellites would perform the\n2\nIn strictly same function and provide the same informaticu.\n\nlegal terms, the equation is ill-founded.\n\nWhile as an aircrafc\n(that is, a non-orbiting vehicle) the U-2 went through airspace\n1. Vehicles at current orbiting altitudes are generally agreed to be in outer space, not :I.n airspace, but unless there is a4 relatively low ceiling on airspace some countries may not be able to gst 1n and out of space without violating anot nation's\n\" sove: eignty.\"\nSee Richard N.\n\nGardner, \"Cooperation in Outer Space,\" Foreign Affairs, Vol.\n\n41, No.\n\n2 (Janusry 1962), p.\n\n34S.\n\nand unmistakably came within the'jurisdiction of the sovereignty of the underlying state, this concept is not automatically applicable to outer space.\n\n'the UN General Assembly, in its Resolution\n1721 (Part A) of\n20 December 1961, commended to Statcs the principle that \"outer space and celestial bodies are free for exploration and use by all States in conformity with international law and are not subject to national appropriation.\"\nThus such use by the Unituod States for the orbiting of observation satellites is not, in the absence of more specific injunctions, necessarily illegal.\n\nStill, se_long as the military reconnaissance function of the observation satellites ic emphasized at the expense of non-military functions, the identification of U-2s with satellites is likely to continue, especially since the Soviets find this to their advantage.\n\n## Sovereignty, Secrecy, And Satellites\n\nEven if it is concluded that there are no existing legal barrfiers to observation from space, either by instruments or human beings, objections to the practice may still be raised.\n\nIt is not only the Soviets who claim that determination of howrmuch information about one's society will be furnished to other nations is an inherent attribute of sovereignty;\nmany US allies and neutral countries are equally jealous of their supposed prerogatives.\n\nBut certainly it is the Soviets who are most articulate about their concern, and who fe:l most threatened by US insistence on the right to orbit photographic satellites.\n\nSome US spokesmen, on the other hand, have criticized the quiet Union for maintaining maximum secrecy as the foundation of its entire society, ancl have warned tha: such secrecy is becoming obsolete in the face of confiemporary technological developments.\n\nOne of\n:he subsidiary purposes of the satellite program, in fact, may be to prove to the Soviets that their concepts of secracy are ocutmoded and impossible to perpetuate.\n\nThe above-cited General Assembly resolution may be interpreted as implying that the orbiting of observation satellites is not in and of itself :llleg'al.1\nTo expect the Russians to agree at the present time is clearly unrealistic.\n\nBut it is not necessary that they should agres now.\n\nSoviet society is changing rapidly, and what nolds true today may no longer be true tomorrow.\n\nAt the same time it must be recognized that the rest of the world is not standing still either, so that a significant internatidnal consensus on matters of law and political philosophy, while certainly a distant dream, may not be unrealizadle.\n\n.___-'_'-_____._____\nThe question of sovereignty remains an open one.\n\nThe Soviets m&y depend on Secrecy for their security, but the Uniced States seeiks curtain kinds of intelligence information for its security, and the two convictions are incompatible.\n\nThis is inevitable in\n4 world of disunity and disagreement.\n\n1In the absence of a worid government to resolve such questions and enfcrce its it is each nation! S task to implement its conviction to the best of its ability, in the light of the limitations imposed by the opposition of other nations.\n\nThus we may tentatively answer the questions raised at the beginning cf this section as follows:\n(a)\nthe free use of Outer Space, implicitly including the orbiting of observation satelappears to be accepted by the UN General Assembly as legitimace, although the Communist countiies do not agree;\n(b) the legitina ey of manned or weather satellites is more universally accepted than that of reconnaissance satellites;\n(c) even if there is a distinct: on between photography by instruments and photo-\n\" graphy by human beings, the Onited States may wish to de-emphasize it;\n(d) the line between \"airspace\" and \"outer space\" has not;\nyet been drawn, though the U-\n2 is clearly in the former (and therefore illegal when over countries objecting to it) and satellites are Clearly in the latter;\nthe maintenance of widespread secreny, but it may also be upheld to the extent that they assist in the self-cefense of the country doing the orbiting.\n\nIn general, tfie legal picture is clouded and obscure, which leaves open the possibility that ihe United States fiight be able to set unilateral precedents for the accepted international law of the future.\n\n## V. Political-Psychological Factors\n\nThe political and psychological factors involved in an obser=\nvation satellite program are of rather more immediate import than the legal issues, and are perhaps as significant as the military considerations.\n\nThey relate to the over-all image which the United States presents to the world, and wfiich the US Government presents to its citizens.\n\nThe problem faced by US policy-makers in this area is, essentially, one of ofitaining information in such a way as to provoke as little opposition as possible from other nations, especially the Soviet Union, while eliciting the widest possible national and international sfipport.\n\nThncochpt offlflpwovoggt;on\"\nis an eiusive one, With rer:rence to the USSR, it may fairly be said that almost anything which the US does affecti\n.g Soviet society is bound to be 'provocative\"\nin scme way.\n\nOf course, the Soviets may consider some actions more threatening than others, but it is often impossible to judge less unpalatable\n\"he Mmear.time, however, faced with Several comp]ex Questions, for instance, vill the the Stability of the Soviet at least until i* beromes evident in the structure of Soviet society itself.\n\nDe-emphasizing the military reconnaissance aspect of satellite observation in favor of its non-military potential might be reassuring not only to the Soviet Union, but also to other countries wlere concern has been cipressed about us belligerence.l\n\n## Us_Image Abroad\n\nThis brings us to consideration of the image which the United States may be presenting to the rest of the world.\n\nIt has made a public commitment (in the United Nations and elsewhere)\nO\nsupport the peaceful uses of outer space.\n\nThe general identification of \"peaceful\" with \"non-military\" inevitably brings the United States under suspicion of using space for belligerent purposes, since\n':s reconnaissance satellite program is the exc].u?\n\nsive responsibility of the armed serviczz Turning the program in toto over to a civilian agency might result :n a de-emphasis of the military aspects of satellite development.\n\nHowever, it\n-\n1.\n\nSee, for example, the results of polls in the United Kingdom\n- and France conducted by the United States Information Agency in May 1960, which were published in The New York Times on\n27 October 1960, p.\n\n28.\n\nForty-eight per cent of 1,150 British respondents, and forty-nine per cent of 1,000 French respondents, held tiat the US was not doing all it should to prevent a new world war (vs.\n\nthirty-three per cent and twenty-nine per cent, respectively, who held that it was).\n\nSixty-two per cent of the British and fifcy-nine per cent of the French believed, similarly, that the USSR was not doing all it should to prevent war (vs. thirteen per cent and eighteen per cent who believed that it was).\n\n29\n.\n\nwould have two obvious disadvantages:\nfirst, it would Suggest, erroneously, that the military was incapable of being useful in Peaceful activities, and second, it might simply transfer sus-\nPicions already aroused to other programs carried on by the gram into two parts, one to remain essentially military and classified and the .other to be civilian and open (see below, It is brobably unwise in any case, when dealing with public relations, to try to treat one aspect of US policy as entirely Separate from others.\n\n' De-emphasis of the uilitumy'uacs'ot\"satela lites, for example, problem is not really one of peaceful observation, but rather of the peaceful uses of the knowledge gained through observation, and this is somsthing which can nnly be demonstrated over a period of time, not broved by opvopaganda or pronouncements.\n\n## The Public Press\n\nThere is one aspect of US policy, however, which is a thing apart, and that is the press relations of the satellite program.\n\nI=s special nature derives from the change in policy in 1962\nwhich drastically 'redu_ced the information available to the public\n(=ece above, PP.\n\n2\n-\nJ).\n\nThus newsmen, in the absence of de=-\ntailed and specific information, tend to incorporate recent releases into what they learned in 1960 and 1961, when such in-\n\nformation was being disclosed.\n\nThe reiultcnt speculation is frequently of such a nature as to create more apprehension and\n'\nuncertainty among the various audiences and readerships than might be the case if more authoritative or official data ware distribi ted.\n\nThe most cbvious solution seems tc be to make such data available to the news media.\n\nThe spy-in-the-sky image of US\nobservation satellites could not be changed overnight, but it is certainly in order to begin thinking about the ways in which a gradual modification might come about.\n\nWe do not intend to Suggest that the satellite program should be declassified immediately, with all details disclosed to the public;\nit weuld he useful, however, as a first step, to replace some of the speculation by actual fact.l In any case, it may perhaps be assumed that the scope and extent of the US observation satellite program will eventually be known.\n\nThis could come about in any of several ways:\nthe USSR\nmight, for reasons of its own, decide to disakle or destroy an objectionable satellite;\nthe United States might wish to offer the Satellite System to help inspect an arms control agreement;\nthere might be disclosures to certain elements of the prese by individual government officials;\nor, perhaps most .realistically, in order fully to explo.= the peaceful potential of the satellite system the United States might in time find it advisable to reveal or demonstrate the value of the program.\n\nWhen this happens, the United States will somehow have to cope with the \"history\"\nof secrecy and even defensiveness which will have been crested.\n\nIn sum, the UnitedStates mast pay some attentiofi to the image which it presents to the rest of the world when determining a policy for its observation sitellite system.\n\nImpressions of undue belligerence should be countered by demonstrations of peaceful intent and utility.\n\nWhile it is not essential to deprive the military of parcici'patiun in or even directidn of work in peadeful\n(though not necessarily non-military) areas, it is important to de-emphasize the military aspects of the system as a whole.\n\nRelations with the press may be particularly difficult to handle, due to past changes in policy which have 1:ft reporters less informed today than they once were.\n\nIt is to be hoped that greater coope.ration between press and program dimct'ors may be achieved in the\n' future, especially in light of the 11k-iihood that the scope of the program will someday become known.\n\n## Vi. The Choices\n\nThe alternatives open to US decision-makers in terms of the emphasis of the satellite program are, broadly, two:\nthe United States may attempt to maintain secrecy insofar and as long as possible;\nor it may make a carefully planned and widely based effort to legitimize the principle of observation from outer space.\n\nThere are certain further choices regarding direction and control of the program.\n\nWe shall consider these possibilities in turn, in the light of the. vearious factors covered in the preceding sections.\n\n## Maintenance Of Secrecy\n\nTo the extent that the military and intelligence agencies have never been obliged to announce in detail what .they are doing, there may be sound precedent for maintaining secrecy with regard to the observation satellite program.\n\nThere are s of course, certain limitations on secrecy, especially in the United States, one being the impossibility of comealit;g the launchings altogether, and another, the obligation to reporf: launchings to the UN General Assembly (see above, pp.\n\n4\n-\n6)..\n\nHowever, as long as there is no official acknowledgement of the observation satellite program, there are arguments in favor of maintaining a certain amount cf discretion.\n\nFor one thing, official acknowledgement of the program might compel the Soviets to react to it in some way, perhaps by challenging its legality in the United Nations.\n\nThan the United States might find itself under pressure to reduce the program, as happened in tho case of the U-2, In addition, the sorting out of satellites by mission would certainly make the development of countermeasures easier.\n\nr-'ina.uy,' by maintaining secrecy, the United States also maintains the greatest possible emount of flexibility and, similarly, of imprecision, thereby making it difficult for the Soviet Union, or any other country, to know exactly what is going on.\n\n## =\n\nOther pressures in faver of a policy of secrecy include a reluctance to assist the Soviets in determining the relative value of information obtained by the United States from observation satellites compared to that obtained from other sourees.l In other words, whiie the Soviets probably know generally what the United States is doing in this area, it is unlikely that they know precisely what information comes from where.\n\nIt would seem advisable to keep them ignorant of this fact as long as possible, and certainly om way of doing this would be to treat even \"innocucus\"\nlavnchings the same way as actual launchings of reconnaissance satellites.\n\nAlso, US policy-makers would prefer te avoid embarrassing the Soviets unduly, should the ex':ent of US surveillance become known as happened with the U-2, A policy of secrecy minimizes the involvement of national prestige on either side.\n\nThe advantages of secrecy must be weighed against the drawbacks and disadvantages of such a policy.\n\nSome of these have been noted in previous sections.\n\nOne is the insistence of the press on handling the launching stories in terms of the record which was created during the relatively open period of 1960-1961.\n\nAnother s the possible damage to the image of the United States as\n& country publicly committed to the support of the \"peaceful uses\n1.\n\nA related pressure is the intelligence tradition which rules out identifying the origins of one's information, lest the\n\"sources\" be compromised.\n\n'\n' of outer space,\" as Se2recy inevitably raises suspicions about us space activities.\n\nAn additional public relations problem is SOViet:s themselves have already practiced the latter.\n\nAnother is the development of analogies between outer space and the high seas.\n\n3 third possibility, perhaps most promising, is a new emphasis on, and demonstration of s Some of the manifestly Peaceiul uses of observation satellites, expected to keep up with the unclassified literature in the field.\n\nAt the same time, the United States would wish not to confrort the Soviets with a embarrassing is:uc vhich they would fina difficult to overlook.\n\nThis is a further reason for emphasizing the peaceful benefits obtainable from observation satellites rather than their intelligence capability.\n\nThe issue of national prestige as a whols, however, may well be irrelevant.\n\nTo a sophisticated audience, the capabilities of observation satellites may be no more than a ainor technical innovation;\nto an unsophisticated audience, they may be so incomprehensible as to be unimpressive.\n\nIn terms of any great impact on public opinion, details of the space effort,v prior to the stag\nof interplanetary travel, may be ocut of date, as each successive space achievemsnt is less newsworthy than the last.\n\nFar more important than cailing attention to the ;trict technical capability ol taking pictures would be a new stress on ;hc arfius contro; and other peaceful lppiications of observation Qatcnitcs.\n\nIn addition, ths general image of the United States as a country practicing openness and honesty in its dealing; with the rest of the world would be fostered bv attempts to make the satellite program acceptable instead of continuing to conceal its scope as long as possible.\n\n## Directicn And Control  T Control\n\nWhile alternatives in the emphasis and presentation of the US satellite program provide the most basic choices for government policy-makers in this field, alternative methods of directing the program also merit Scme examination.\n\nWe have suggested above\n(see .\n\n30) the possibility of an initial and te.\n\nsporary division of the program into distinct civilian and milicary spheres, thereby permitting concomitant development of its non-military and military applications, There are also, however, problems of. national vs.\n\ninternational control.\n\nIt has been suggested, for example, that the US transfer an operational satellite system to the 'nited Nations, so that the international community itself might monitor the military threats Posed by any one country to another, while simultaneously developing the peaceful uses of the system.\n\n' In this way, the system itself, at least, need not be construed as a threat.\n\nBut the United Nations is only the sum of its parts, and sometimes it is sven less than that.\n\nIt is not organized at the present time to administer a system of such techriological and political complexity, nor is it reasonable to assume that it will be able to do so in the foreseeable future., The immediate economic and social problems with which the UN Secretariat is trying to deal already tax the financial and intellectual resources of the organization to the utmost.\n\nThus, while international control may be an ultimate goal, it is not a realistic alternative for the present.\n\nTie possibility way arise again._however.\n\nin conjunction with an arms contrel treety.\n\nwhere it would be necessary to equip the control organization with all available means for ascertaining that the 2qreements were being adhered to.\n\nObservation satellites could influence arms control efforts, both as a method for verifying compliance and as\n4 unilateral method for obtaining information to affect attitudes tcward arms control as such.1\nFov in-\nStance, it may well be that the technical potentialities of the Satellite system would significantly lessen the requirements for verification by other means, to the point ot permitting che United States to reach\n4 compromise with the Soviet Union on the degree of additional (ground) inspection which a treaty should specify The system might ventually also be helpfulin another way, namely, by convincing the Soviets thatr they need have no objection to an internaticnal inspection program because of the inroads on their nilitary secrecy which an observation satellite system would alreadv have nade.\n\n____.___._______________________._.__._________________\nl.\n\nSee the daccompanying baper,\n\"Obserwvation Satellites for Arms Control:\nConcepts and Applications. \"\n1In the context of a negotiated agreement, there may be scme inspection tasks which airplanes could carry out more cheaply or more effectively than satellices.\n\nirements.\n\nThe Unit ed States wishes to avoid being unduly Provocative to the Soviets--and at the same time Prove that secrecy in all fo?ms is becoming obsolete.\n\nIt would like to demonstrate the peaceful uses of observation satellites--without revealing militarily essential information.\n\nIt wants to set up a legitimate basis for satellite observation;-in the face of explicit and adamant Soviet opposition., It would like to reshape its press and public information program--without unnecessarily embarrassing the Soviets.\n\nIJt wishes to create and foster a consisgent image of itself as dcicatod to the peaceful uses of outer space--even though the military applications of observation satellites are much better known and understood.\n\nIn essence, the United States wants to continua to develop its observation satellite system--\nbut without incurring international disapproval.\n\nClearly, all these requirements cannot be reconciled.\n\nHow~\never, certain beginnings, certain compromises, certain initiatives can be undertaken even_ndw.\n\nIn the following section we make a number of suggestions regarding steps which might be contemplated in the immediate future.\n\n## Vii. Suggestions\n\nOn the basis of the foregoing discussion, we wish to indicate certain reasonable first steps in the implementation of a policy designed to develop the full potential for usefulness of the observation satellite system.\n\nRather than Attempt to outline a clea rly Great popular interest in these pictures may be expected.\n\nSuch interest srould be fostered by photo interprecation pointing out the most noteworthy features, along with emphasis on whatever scientific value they might have.\n\nWhile the United States would hope to create a maximum favorable impact with the photographs, it should avoid giving the impression that their release is the result of a solemn declassification decision or that there is risk of offending the Soviets or anyone else in publicizing them.\n\nIf the opportunity arises, the US might let it be known that it would appreciate seeing similar photographs of US territory made by the Sovier cosmonauts.\n\nAnother initial step, following the first in a matter of a few months, might be ar announcement that the United States is going to map Antarctica with sateliites.\n\nSc far a little over ten per cent of the six million square miles has been covered by a mapping program.\n\nCost estimates for completing the job, with airplanes and over a period of at least several years, are in the\n$40 to $50 million rarge, and these may run higher when all costs are included.\n\nIt seems very likely that the job could be done more eeonomically and more efficiently with two or three sateilites, using cameras and vehicles that are not even the best available in the present state of the ar-.\n\nmoreover, this would be a first step toward realizing some of the peaceful benefitsvfrom observation satellites, of which there will be more in the futfire.\n\nconvenienC'nor accurate fop Atlas, would be suj tabl Satelliteg, Tlie\n:\n0 anathes civilian lau ching from military\n\\\\\\-s ewee ---\\\n1o Lee vp SCcumpany\n3 g paper,\n\"Ohge Arms Control;\n=\nTvation S3co3\n\nWechniecal Capab ilitjes.\nfacidities.\n\nwWe would recommend the release of Antarctica maps, perhaps on two or tiree different scales, making them avaiiable thiough the normal channels for distribution of scientific and Fntarctica data.\n\nIt would be desirable to publicize the utility of the maps and the means whereby they were made, but it should be pcssible to avoid implying that a volicy change had thereby been implemented.\n\nIt is important to note here that releasing the Antarctica maps would reveal essentially nothing about US satellite reconnaissance capability.\n\nThey would repvesent something less than ths maximum results now echievable, and it is certain that the Soviets already know that the United States is capable of conducting such\n\n_\na program.\nFor Optimum effect,\nthe available information on the\nvehicles and cameras should be made as complete as possible. but\nif\nic\nis not possible to disclose all the design details because\nsome of them might relate exclusively to classified reconnaissance\nsatellites,\nthis information should be withheld as inconspicuously\nas possible.\nProbably there are some prncedsnts for such\na prn-\n_cedure\nin prnvious NASA space activity.\n\n## General Climate Of Opinion\n\n_While these first two steps are teing taken, efforts must also be made to create a favorable climate of opinion for observation satellite activity, n the course of consciously undertaking to legitimize Such activ ity, tha Unic able reactiong from the Suviets.\n\n71t clearly but ;;5.\n\n2nt of Soviet consent., The\n\nIn addition, the Unived Stites might the Soviets tc release more da ta the Communist bloc, In brief, US planners should expesct to respond promptly to Soviet challenges, but they should not allow themselves to provoke avoidable arguments.\n\nAfter the Antarctica maps have been released, the next task might be the mapping of some relatively u'nexplored parts of the world, perhaps alohg with some resource studias of chese areas.\n\nIt should not be difficult to do this work at the request of an African, Asian, or South American councry.\n\nAnother possibmty would be to chart the waters below the equator near Australia, where many of the reefs and islands are improperly located ard thus a hazard to sailors.\n\nn additional NASA satellite or even two might be required for these purposes, though the excess rilming capacity inherent in the Antarctica mapping satellites themselves should not bs overlooked.\n\nIt should generally be possible to avoid taking, or at least publishing, picturcs of areas where US efforts are not welcome, but care should probably be exercised to avcid establishing the principle of photographing only dhcn requested to do so by the nation or nations concerned.\n\nPerhaps the cccasional relsase of low-resolution photogoaphs of the Soviet Union or the Chinese mainlard would serve to inhibit such a contingercy; a picture by Major L. Gordon Cooper of a portion of China, covered by clouds, has already been published.l\n_'--________'\n\n1.\nLife Magazine,\n7 June 1963,\np.\n29.\n\n## Of Peacefyl Space Activi-- -Ye\n\nUp to this point, we have envisaged five or gix NASA sacellites and a time period of some two years.\n\nWe mey assume tha:\na classified reconnaissance Satellite program will have been going forward concurrently, an announcement that the United States b2\nin accord with the US over-all peaceful aspirations, the already demonstrated benefits of the NASA program, and the realization that technology is carrying mankind inevitably toward a more open and interdependent world.\n\nFrom this point on it should be possible to bring about a gradual merger of the continuing MASA program and the classified military program.\n\nSubsequent developments would depend mor: on concomitant legal, poltical, and military considerations than on unildteral decisions by us policy-makers., Tt may be that the United States could corcider at that time doing some work under UN auspices or making some observations explicitly for arms cortrol purposes, The classified satellites may, in any case, have been gathering information of value for arms control even before the transitiosnal pericd, In conclusion, there is no need at this time to make a crecy and Jegitimiza:ion, but neither ard exploiting the Peaceful applications of observation satellites.\n\nIt is to be hoped"
    },
    {
        "text": "## Homeland Threat Assessment October 2020\n\nWith honor and integrity, we will safeguard the American people, our homeland, and our values\n\n## Contents\n\n3\n6\nForeword\nStructure of the HTA\nThreats:\n    Cyber\n8\n    Foreign Influence Activity\n10\n    Economic Security\n14\n    Terrorism\n17\n    Transnational Criminal Organization\n21\n    Illegal Immigration\n23\n    Natural Disasters\n25\n\n## Foreword\n\nIn my role as Acting Secretary, I receive intelligence, operational, law enforcement, and other information on a daily basis. This Homeland Threat Assessment (HTA), the first of its kind for the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS), draws upon all sources of information and expertise available to the Department, including from intelligence, law enforcement, and our operational Components. The result is a \"Whole-of-DHS\" report on the threats to the Homeland. This HTA is as close as the American people will get to seeing and understanding the information that I see as Secretary and that our employees see in their national security missions. As you read through the HTA you should have faith in knowing that these threats were identified using the best intelligence, operational information, and employee knowledge available to the Department.\n\n## Identifying Threats Using A Whole-Of-Dhs Approach\n\nThe men and women serving in our operational Components are the experts in their national security and homeland security missions, making their insights critical in threat identification and prevention. Our operational Components provided information about the threats they see and combat in performance of their mission. DHS is the first and last line of defense against many threats facing our\n\"DHS has a vital mission: to secure the nation from the many threats we face. This requires the dedication of more than 240,000 employees in positions that range from aviation and border security to emergency response, from cybersecurity analyst to chemical facility inspector. Our duties are wide-ranging, and our goal is clear - keeping America safe.\"\ncountry. Our ability to mitigate these threats is predicated on our ability to understand them and to inform the American people. I hope all Americans take a moment to review this HTA and visit DHS.gov to learn how they can protect themselves from these threats.\n\n## Today's Threat Environment\n\nCombatting terrorism will always be a priority to the Department of Homeland Security. Foreign terrorist organizations (FTO) still have the intent to attack the Homeland within and from beyond our borders. In the 19 years since September 11th, 2001, the United States Government (USG), DHS, and our foreign partners have taken the fight directly to those responsible for the attacks on that day, and to other FTOs who seek to destroy our country based on an ill-informed and twisted ideology. We have enhanced our ability to identify and prevent individuals affiliated with these organizations from traveling or immigrating to the United States. We have enhanced security and processes at our airports, ports of entry, and beyond our borders. We have built the world's greatest counterterrorism ecosystem to keep Americans safe. More specifically, DHS has partnered with other USG agencies and foreign governments to raise the baseline for screening and vetting in the United States. In the last few years we have enhanced existing vetting programs, created the National Vetting Center (NVC), expanded biographic and biometric information sharing programs, and enacted national-level policies requiring foreign governments to share essential information for vetting purposes or face potential travel restrictions. Trade and economic security is Homeland Security. We are increasingly concerned about the threat posed by nation state actors in an emerging era of great power competition. DHS\nis specifically concerned with the direct and indirect threat posed to the Homeland by the People's Republic of China (PRC). The Chinese Communist Party (CCP)-led PRC is challenging America's place as the world's global and economic leader. Threats emanating from China include damaging the U.S. economy through intellectual property theft, production and distribution of counterfeit goods, and unfair trade practices. DHS has a mandate to mitigate these threats and we will do so with a clear-eyed view that China is a long-term strategic competitor to the U.S. Domestic violent extremism is a threat to the Homeland. As Americans, we all have the right to believe whatever we want, but we don't have a right to carry out acts of violence to further those beliefs. The Department works with other Government, non-Government, and private sector partners to prevent individuals from making this transition from protected speech to domestic terrorism reflected by violence. As Secretary, I am concerned about any form of violent extremism. That is why we design our programs to be threat agnostic - ensuring that we can combat a broad range of domestic threats. However, I am particularly concerned about white supremacist violent extremists who have been exceptionally lethal in their abhorrent, targeted attacks in recent years. I am proud of our work to prevent terrorizing tactics by domestic terrorists and violent extremists who seek to force ideological change in the United States through violence, death, and destruction.\n\n\" With honor and integrity, we will safeguard the American people, our Homeland, and our values.\"\nExploitation of Lawful and Protected Speech and Protests. During the course of developing the HTA we began to see a new, alarming trend of exploitation of lawful protests causing violence, death, and destruction in American communities. This anti-government, anti-authority and anarchist violent extremism was identified by DHS in September 2019 when we published our Strategic Framework for Countering Terrorism and Targeted Violence. As the date of publication of this HTA, we have seen over 100 days of violence and destruction in our cities. The co-opting of lawful protests led to destruction of government property and have turned deadly. Indeed, DHS law enforcement officers suffered over 300 separate injuries and were assaulted with sledgehammers, commercial grade fireworks, rocks, metal pipes, improvised explosive devices, and more. This violence, perpetrated by anarchist extremists and detailed in numerous public statements that remain available on the DHS website, significantly threatens the Homeland by undermining officer and public safety as well as our values and way of life. While the HTA touches on these issues, we are still in the nascent stages of understanding the threat this situation poses to Americans, the Homeland, and the American way of life. Cyber security threats from nation-states and non-state actors present challenging threats to our Homeland and critical infrastructure. DHS has a critical mission to protect America's infrastructure, which includes our cyberinfrastructure. We are concerned with the intents, capabilities, and actions of nation-states such as China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea. Nation-state targeting of our assets seeks to disrupt the infrastructure that keeps the American economy moving forward and poses a threat to national security. On top of the threats to critical infrastructure, cybercriminals also target our networks to steal information, hold organizations hostage, and harm American companies for their own gain.\n\ntransit, to U.S. border communities, and to our officers and agents who encounter migrants when they enter the United States. To mitigation this threat we instituted enhanced restrictions at our borders, limited travel to only essential travelers and implemented a Center for Disease Control (CDC) order that protects Americans from COVID-19. Natural occurrences continue to harm the life and property of Americans. In 2020 alone we have storm season that has many Americans in our c wildfire season that has Nation-states will continue to try to undermine American elections. Threats to our election have been another rapidly evolving issue. Nation-states like China, Russia, and Iran will try to use cyber capabilities or foreign influence to compromise or disrupt infrastructure related to the 2020 U.S. Presidential election, aggravate social and racial tensions, undermine trust in U.S. authorities, and criticize our elected officials. Perhaps most alarming is that our adversaries are seeking to sway the preferences and perceptions of U.S. voters using influence operations. Americans need to understand this threat and arm themselves with all information available to avoid falling prey to these tactics.\n\nseen an unprecedented taken the livelihoods of Gulf states and a histori\n\ncaused devastation on the West Coast. Americans in-between our coasts also face the threat of natural disasters from a variety of causes. On top of the threat to life and safety, these events have devastating impacts on local and national economies. The Department is at the forefront of providing information to help Americans prepare, and we stand ready to respond after these events occur.\n\nWhile Russia has been a persistent threat by attempting to harm our democratic and election systems, it is clear China and Iran also pose threats in this space. The IC's Election Threat Update from August 2020 and Microsoft's announcement of cyber-attacks from China, Russia, and Iran provide further evidence of this threat and underscore the importance in public and private partnerships to secure democratic processes. DHS's #Protect2020 website can help you understand the threat to our elections and increase your preparedness and awareness. Transnational Criminal Organizations (TCOs)\nconti lives.\n\nLikewise, a foreign-born virus reached our shores in 2020. COVID-19 is the most recent and deadly, in a list of infectious diseases that have threatened the lives of Americans. We have seen unprecedented impact to life, health, and public safety from COVID-19 and taken action to prevent our healthcare system from being overburdened from COVID-19 patients. DHS was at the forefront mitigating threat and we took decisive action to restrict air and sea travel from disease hot-spots, close our land borders to non-essential travel, provide lifesaving PPE to Americans, prevent fraudulent PPE from entering our supply chains, and identify fraudsters who are trying to exploit this situation for their own personal gain.\n\n## Conclusion\n\nnue to profit at the expense of American Mexican cartels and other TCOs will continue to smuggle hard narcotics like fentanyl, heroin, and methamphetamine into our communities, contributing to an alarming level of overdoses in the United States. No American community is immune from the impact of these drugs. Furthermore, cartels will continue to use dangerous human smuggling methods to facilitate migrants to our borders, putting these migrants and our officers and agents at significant risk given the current COVID-19 pandemic. The threat of illegal and mass migration to the United States. Traditional migration push factors like insecurity and economic conditions continue to push individuals north to the United States. While we are addressing illegal migration through a network of initiatives, we are concerned that during a pandemic this poses a more specific threat to the migrants, the communities they As you read the HTA you will become more acutely aware of the threats facing the American people, the Homeland, and the American way of life. You will also gain a clearer picture of the broad mission of the Department of Homeland Security. It is my privilege and honor to serve as the Acting Secretary of an organization whose employees willingly and bravely put themselves in harm's way every day to protect us all. The men and women of the Department live up to our motto: With honor and integrity, we will safeguard the American people, our Homeland, and our values.\n\n## Structure Of The Threat Assessment\n\nThe Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is the first and last line of defense against the many threats facing our country. Our ability to mitigate these threats is predicated on our ability to understand them and to inform the American people. The DHS Homeland Threat Assessment1\n(HTA) identifies the primary threats facing the United States of America at and inside our borders. This Assessment draws upon all sources of information and expertise available to the Department, including from intelligence, law enforcement, and our operational components.\nThe purpose of the HTA is to provide the American people with an overview of the information collected and analyzed by DHS employees around the world and provided to the Secretary of Homeland Security. The HTA is primarily informed by intelligence analysis prepared by the DHS Office of Intelligence and Analysis (I&A) and by the Component intelligence offices, which identified the leading security threats to the Homeland based on a review of all-source intelligence information and analysis. Given the array of potential issues, I&A's scoped its analysis to focus on key threats covered by the intelligence elements of the Department, which expert analysts considered most likely and with the potential to significantly affect U.S. security. The HTA was also informed by the expertise and insights of the Department's Operational Components, which assess and respond to threats on a daily basis, as well as the informed views of the DHS Office of Strategy, Policy, and Plans (PLCY), which leads threat identification and prevention activities.\n\nThis inaugural HTA presents a holistic look\nfrom across the Department and provides\nthe American people with the most\ncomplete, transparent, and candid look at\nthe threats facing our Homeland. It breaks\ndown the major threats to the Homeland in\nthe following sections:\n\n1. The Cyber Threat to the Homeland 2. Foreign Influence Activity in the\nHomeland\n3. Threats to U.S. Economic Security 4. The Terrorist Threat to the Homeland 5. Transnational Criminal Organization\nThreats to National Security\n6. Illegal Immigration to the United\nStates\n7. Natural Disasters\nWE STAND READY TO RISE AND FACE THE NEXT CHALLENGE THAT THREATENS OUR HOMELAND.\n\n## The Cyber Threat To The Homeland\n\nCyber threats to the Homeland from both nation-states and non-state actors will remain acute. U.S. critical infrastructure faces advanced threats of disruptive or destructive cyber-attacks. Federal, state, local, tribal and territorial governments, as well as the private sector, will experience an array of cyber-enabled threats designed to access sensitive information, steal money, and force ransom payments.\n\n## Nation State Threats\n\nRussiawhich possesses some of the most sophisticated cyber capabilities in the world\ncan disrupt or damage U.S. critical infrastructure networks via cyber-attacks. Russian state-affiliated actors will continue targeting U.S. industry and all levels of government with intrusive cyber espionage to access economic, policy, and national security information to further the Kremlin's strategic interests.\n\n-\nRussia probably can conduct cyber-attacks\nthat would result in at least localized effects over hours to days and probably is developing capabilities that would cause more debilitating effects.\n-\nWe expect Russian cyber actors to use a range of capabilities including social engineering, publicly known software and hardware vulnerabilities, poorly configured networks,\nand sophisticated \"zero-day\" attacks that exploit security weaknesses in software.\n-\nUnder Russian law, the Federal Security Service (FSB) can compel Russian firms doing business in the United Statesor Russians working with U.S. firmsto comply with FSB information sharing and operational mandates, presenting additional routes for cyber espionage.\nChina already poses a high cyber espionage threat to the Homeland and Beijing's cyber-attack capabilities will grow. Chinese cyber actors almost certainly will continue to engage in wide-ranging cyber espionage to steal intellectual property2 and personally identifiable information (PII) from U.S. businesses and government agencies to bolster their civil-military industrial development, gain an economic advantage, and support intelligence operations. China possesses an increasing ability to threaten and potentially disrupt U.S. critical infrastructure.\n\n-\nWe expect China's cyber operations against U.S. companies to focus on the critical manufacturing, defense industrial base, energy, healthcare, and transportation sectors.\n-\nBeijing has targeted information technology and communications firms whose products and services support government and private-sector networks worldwide, while concurrently advocating globally for Chinese information technology companies that could serve as espionage platforms.\n-\nUnder China's 2017 National Intelligence Law, Beijing can compel businesses based in China and Chinese citizens living abroad to provide intelligence to the Chinese government.\n-\nWe remain concerned about China's intent to\ncompromise U.S. critical infrastructure in order to cause disruption or destruction.\n-\nChina's efforts to dominate the 5G world pose new challenges to U.S. efforts to national security, privacy, resistance to malign influence, and human rights. The exponential increases in speed, connectivity, and productivity could render American systems particularly vulnerable to Chinese cyber threats.\nWhile Russia and China are the most capable nation-state cyber adversaries, Iranian and North Korean cyber actors also pose a threat to U.S. systems, networks, and information. Iran continues to present a cyber espionage threat and is developing access in the Homeland that could be repurposed for destructive cyber-attacks.  North Korean cyber capabilities, while sophisticated, probably will remain confined to criminal generation of revenue. If Pyongyang's intent changes, however, it probably could quickly build capabilities to conduct broader espionage activity or threaten infrastructure with disruptive cyber-attacks.\n\n## Cybercrime\n\nactivities, including efforts to target voter registration systems; to compromise election system supply chains; to exploit poor cybersecurity practices on protected election systems or networks; or to hack official election websites or social media accounts.\n\nCybercriminals increasingly will target U.S. critical infrastructure to generate profit, whether through ransomware, e-mail impersonation fraud, social engineering3, or malware. Underground marketplaces that trade in stolen information and cyber tools will continue to thrive and serve as a resource, even for sophisticated foreign adversaries.\n\n-\nUnidentified cyber actors have engaged in suspicious communications with the U.S. Census public-facing network over at least the last year, including conducting vulnerability scans and attempting unauthorized access. Cyber activity directed at the U.S. Census could include attempts to gain illicit access to census-gathered bulk data;\nto alter census registration data; to compromise the census infrastructure supply chain; or conducting denial-of-service attacks.\n-\nRansomware attackswhich have at least doubled since 2017often are directed against critical infrastructure entities at the state and local level by exploiting gaps in cybersecurit\n-\nVictims of cybercriminal activity in 2018 reported over $2.7 billion in lossesmore than twice the amount lost in 2017. This figure does not represent the full scope of loss because some victims do not report incidents.\n\n## Cyber Threat To The U.S. Democratic Processes Opportunity For Cyber Actors To Exploit Covid-19\n\nBoth cybercriminals and nation-state cyber actors\nmotivated by profit, espionage, or disruptionwill\nexploit the COVID-19 pandemic by targeting the U.S.\nhealthcare and public health sector; government\nresponse entities, such as the U.S. Department\nof Health and Human Services and the Federal\nEmergency Management Agency; and the broader\nemergency services sector.\n\nSome state or non-state actors likely will seek to use\ncyber means to compromise or disrupt infrastructure\nused to support the 2020 U.S. Presidential election\nand the 2020 U.S. Census. Given the national\nimportance of these events, any related cyber\nactivitiesor mere claims of compromisemight\nfuel influence operations aimed at depressing voter\nturnout or census participation, misinforming about\ndemocratic processes, or shaping perceptions about\nthe integrity or outcome of the election or census\n(see subsequent section regarding Foreign Influence\nin the Homeland).\n\n-\nCybercriminals most likely will deploy ransomware for financial gain, whereas nation-state cyber actors might seek to capture insights into U.S. response plans and scientific information related to testing, therapeutics, and vaccine development.\n-\nAdvanced persistent threat or other malicious cyber actors likely will target election-related infrastructure as the 2020 Presidential election approaches, focusing on voter PII, municipal or state networks, or state election officials directly. Operations could occur throughout the 2020 election cyclethrough pre-election activities, Election Day, and the post-election period.\n-\nWe expect that cybercriminals and nation-state cyber actors will target victims in the United States with COVID-19-themed spear-phishing e-mails, which we already have observed overseas. These e-mails appear to claim to be from official government sources, including the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention and the U.S. Department of State.\n-\nAdversaries' cyber capabilities vary greatly as does the cyber defensive posture of electoral boards to stymie such actors. Adversaries could attempt a range of election interference\n2On Thursday, September 17, 2020, FBI Director Wray described China's unmatched success in stealing American intellectual property as \"the greatest transfer of wealth in the history of the world.\" U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Homeland Security, Annual Hearing on Threats to the Homeland.\n\n## Foreign Influence Activity In The U.S.\n\nForeign influence activity will target U.S. foreign and domestic policy, international events such as COVID-19, and democratic processes and institutions, including the 2020 Presidential election. Russia is the likely primary covert influence actor and purveyor of disinformation and misinformation within the Homeland. We assess that Moscow's primary objective is to increase its global standing and influence by weakening Americadomestically and abroadthrough efforts to sow discord, distract, shape public sentiment, and undermine trust in Western democratic institutions and processes.\n\n## Amplifying U.S. Socio-Political Division\n\n-\nRussian influence actors will continue using overt and\ncovert methods to aggravate social and racial tensions, undermine trust in U.S. authorities, stoke political resentment, and criticize politicians who Moscow views as anti-Russia. Although some of this activity might\n4 Proxy Website: Foreign news outlets, think tanks, and investigative journalist websites on behalf of foreign governments or foreign government-linked businessmen and oligarchs in a non-overt or non-attributed way and that echo foreign government narratives, talking points, and disinformation. State media often cite these proxy websites and portray them as credible and independent sources of information.\n\nbe framed in the context of the U.S. electionseemingly in support of or opposition to political candidates we assess that Moscow's overarching objective is to weaken the United States through discord, division, and distraction in hopes that America becomes less able to challenge Russia's strategic objectives.\n\n-\nRussian influence actors will engage in media manipulationacross social media platforms, proxy\nwebsites4, and traditional media, to\ninclude state-controlled outletsto\nexacerbate U.S. social, political, racial,\nand cultural fault lines.5\n-\nRussian actors will attempt to undermine national unity and sow seeds of discord that exploit perceived grievances within minority communities, especially among African Americans. Russian influence actors often mimic target audiences and amplify both sides of divisive issues to maximize discord, tailoring messaging to specific communities to \"push and pull\" them in different ways.\n-\nThe Russian government promulgates misinformation, threats, and narratives intended to incite panic or animosity among social and political groups. For example, Russian actors amplified narratives such as U.S. law\n-\nRussian online influence actors spread misinformation and conspiracy theories about the origin of COVID-19, claiming it is a U.S.-engineered biological weapon that U.S. military officials spread in China.\nenforcement ignoring ICE detention requests and releasing an illegal immigrant accused of rape; assaults on supporters and opponents of the President; and portrayals of U.S. law enforcement as racially biased. Russian influence actors also have exploited national tragedies, such as the 2017 mass shooting in Las Vegas, and protest movementssometimes magnifying both a protest and a counter-protestsuch as the 2017 protest activity in Charlottesville.\n\n## Covid-19 Influence Narratives\n\nChinese operatives probably are waging disinformation campaigns using overt and covert tacticsincluding social media trolls to shift responsibility for the pandemic to other countries, including the United States. China might increase its influence activities in response to what it views as anti-China statements from the U.S. Government over China's role in the pandemic.\n\nRussian online influence actors are advancing misleading or (what they perceive as) inflammatory narratives about the COVID-19 pandemic probably to stoke fear, undermine the credibility of the U.S. government, and weaken global perceptions of America. Moscow probably will study the American public's reaction to its COVID-19 disinformation to improve future influence campaigns aimed at shaking public confidence in Washington, which it can unleash opportunistically during a crisis, hostilities, or a period of degraded relations.\n\n-\nSince August 2019, more than 10,000 suspected fake Twitter accounts have been involved in a coordinated influence campaign with suspected ties to the Chinese Government. Among these are hacked accounts from users around the world that post messaging and disinformation about the COVID-19 pandemic and other topics of interest to China.\n-\nRussian online influence actors have claimed that the U.S. President is incapable of managing the COVID-19 crisis and sought to exacerbate public concerns by amplifying content critical of the U.S. response to the public health crisis and the economic downturn. In contrast, the actors highlighted China's and Russia's alleged success against the COVID-19 outbreak and praised\n-\nChina's Foreign Ministry, state media, and official Twitter accounts promote overt narratives claiming the coronavirus may have originated in the United States, criticize the U.S. pandemic response, and publicize\n\n## Foreign Influence Definitions:\n\nForeign Influence. Any covert, fraudulent, deceptive, or unlawful activity of foreign governmentsor persons acting on their behalfundertaken with the purpose or effect of influencing, undermining confidence in, or adversely affecting U.S. democratic processes or institutions or otherwise affecting socio-political sentiment or public discourse to achieve malign objectives.\n\n-\nCovert Influence: Activities in which a foreign government hides its involvement, including the use of agents of influence, covert media relationships, cyber influence activities, front organizations, organized crime groups, or clandestine funds for political action.\n-\nOvert Influence: Activities that a foreign government conducts openly or has clear ties to, including the use of strategic communications, public diplomacy, financial support, and some forms of propaganda.\n-\nDisinformation: A foreign government's deliberate use of false or misleading information intentionally directed at another government's decisionmakers and decision-making processes to mislead the target, force it to waste resources, or influence a decision in favor of a foreign government's interests.\n-\nMisinformation: Foreign use of false or misleading information. Misinformation is broader than disinformation because it targets a wide audience rather than a specific group.\nPresident Putin's COVID-19 plan and Russia's ample supply of tests.\n\nChina's COVID-19-related medical assistance to U.S. cities and states. China has doubled the number of official government posts disseminating false narratives about COVID-19 and has carried out persistent and large-scale disinformation and influence operations that correlate with diplomatic messaging.\n\n-\nChina most likely will continue amplifying narratives supportive of its pandemic response while denigrating U.S. official criticism that Beijing views as tarnishing its global image.\nIranian online influence actors are employing inauthentic social media networks, proxy news websites, and state media outlets to amplify false narratives that seek to shift responsibility for the COVID-19 pandemic to the United States and other Western nations. Tehran probably will continue to malign the United States for enforcing economic sanctions, arguing these sanctions hinder Iran's ability to put forward an appropriate public health response to the pandemic.\n\n-\nIranian actors have spread COVID-19 disinformation and false narratives through videos, cartoons, and news stories from state media outlets on popular social media platforms to appeal to U.S. and Western audiences.\n-\nIranian operatives have covertly used proxy networks and sites to advance narratives suggesting that the United States created the virus as a bioweapon, that Western media is spreading lies about COVID-19 in Iran, and that the Iranian response to the pandemic was better\nthan that of the United States.\n\n## 2020 U.S. Presidential Election\n\nAhead of the 2020 U.S. elections, adversaries are using covert and overt influence measures to try to sway U.S. voters' preferences and perspectives about candidates, political parties, policies, and the electoral process itself. Influence actors will adjust their goals and tactics as the election nears. Russia uses online influence operations in its attempt to sway U.S. voter perceptions. As noted earlier, although some Russian influence activity appears to be in support of or in opposition to specific political candidates, Moscow's overarching objective is to undermine the U.S. electoral process and weaken the United States through discord, division, and distraction in hopes America becomes less able to challenge Russia's strategic objectives.\n\n-\nRussian online influence actors have attacked\nor praised multiple 2020 U.S. Presidential candidatesincluding candidates of both major political parties.  Russia uses divisive measures to disrupt the electoral process including denigrating former Vice President Biden and what it sees as an anti-Russia \"establishment\"as part of a broader effort to divide and destabilize America. Russian online influence actors' have opined on a wide swath of socio-political issues relevant to the 2020 elections.\n\n\n\nRussian online influence actors probably will engage in efforts to discourage voter turnout\nand to suppress votes in the 2020 U.S. election using methods they have deployed since at least 2016. Before the 2016 U.S. Presidential election, Russian trolls directed messages at specific audiences with false information about the time, manner, or place of voting to suppress votes. Russian influence actors also posed as U.S. persons and discouraged African\n\n## Evolving Influence Tradecraft And Targeting\n\nRussian influence actors are evolving\ntheir methods of interacting with\ntarget U.S. audiences and obfuscating\ndetection of their online influence\nactivity.\n\n-\nWe expect that influence actors will evolve their ability to create and operate fake social-media accounts, thereby obfuscating their online influence activity.\n-\nRussian influence actors likely will use U.S.-based servers and other computer infrastructureincluding virtual private networksto mask their location, obscure login activity, and prevent account banning.\n-\nRussian influence actors probably will leverage artificial intelligence to automate the creation and distribution of memes with socially divisive messages on social media. Previously, Russian actors mass produced politically themed picture memes called \"demotivators,\" some of which they produced under the guise of U.S. activist groups.\nAmericans, Native Americans, and other minority voters from participating in the 2016 election.\n\nAhead of the election, China likely will continue using overt and covert influence operations to denigrate the U.S. Presidential Administration and its policies and to shape the U.S. domestic information environment in favor of China. China will further use its traditional \"soft power\" influence toolkitovert economic measures and lobbyingto promote U.S. policies more aligned with China's interests. Iran will continue to promote messages supporting its foreign policy objectives and to use online influence operations to increase societal tensions in the United States. Tehran most likely considers the current U.S. Administration a threat to the regime's stability. Iran's critical messaging of the U.S. President almost certainly will continue throughout 2020. Russian influence actors see divisive issues regarding the 2020 Census, such as the consideration of adding a citizenship question, as an opportunity to target a fundamental democratic process. In addition to potential cyber operations, Russia might use social media messagingmuch like it does in the context of US electionsto attempt to discourage public participation in the census, to promote a loss of confidence in census results, or to undermine trust in public institutions.\n\n## Influencing State And Local Governments\n\nsister city, Wuhan, 450,000 surgical masks and 1,350 coverall protective suits. Pittsburgh also established a GoFundMe account that raised over $58,000 to support Wuhan response efforts by providing medical supplies.\n\nForeign governmentsprincipally Chinaseek to cultivate influence with state and local leaders directly and indirectly, often via economic carrots and sticks such as informal and legal or social agreements that seek to promote cultural and commercial ties. Chinese officials calculate that U.S. state- and local-level officials enjoy a degree of diplomatic independence from Washington and may leverage these relationships to advance policies that are in China's interest during times of strained relations.\n\n-\nIn Chicago, Chinese officials leveraged local and state official relationships to push pro-Chinese narratives. Also, a Chinese official emailed a Midwestern state legislator to ask that the legislative body of which he was a member pass a resolution recognizing that China has taken heroic steps to fight the virus.\n-\nChina views a state or locality's economic challengesincluding healthcare challenges due to COVID-19as a key opportunity to create a dependency, thereby gaining influence. Beijing uses Chinese think tanks to research which U.S. states and counties might be most receptive to China's overtures.\n-\nDuring the beginning of the COVID-19 outbreak, Beijing leveraged sister city relationships with U.S. localities to acquire public health resources. In February, Pittsburgh shipped its\n-\nThe Chinese government invites U.S. officials and business leaders on carefully choreographed trips to China, promising them lucrative investment projects and business deals. Although visits this year largely have been postponed due to COVID-19, the Chinese government probably will continue to cultivate state and local relationships virtually and by offering enticements, which might include bailing out U.S. companies, investing in real estate in economically hard-hit areas, and selling medical equipment and supplies at reduced cost.\n\n## Threats To U.S. Economic Security Covid-19 Effects On Economic Security And Health Security\n\nThe COVID-19 pandemic has destabilized U.S. supply chains and introduced opportunities for economic competitors to undermine the United States. This will lead to dramatic and sustained disruptions to the global economy and could challenge U.S. economic and supply chain security.\n\n-\nIn response to measures to control cross-border flows of people and goods, which have significantly disrupted international trade and supply chains, countries will invest in domestic industries and in countries they consider more reliable suppliers, considering the ability to control illicit activity and protect intellectual property rights. Varying social distancing and lockdown policies will continue to strain and disrupt goods supply chains at multiple levels.\n-\nAccess to personal protective equipment (PPE) and pharmaceuticals sourced from abroad or that depend on global supply chains will remain especially vulnerable to disruptions due to sustained demand, foreign government actions to secure these supplies for their countries' use, and the length of time required to reconstitute these production capabilities elsewhere.\n-\nCounterfeiters and other malicious actors have exploited the high demand for essential goods\nduring the outbreak by selling substandard or non-approved PPE, vitamins, medicines, and other goods to desperate customers, posing a threat to public health and undermining legitimate businesses. Many manufacturers and distributors have failed to verify that the goods they are selling meet performance specifications. China has been a particularly persistent source of such counterfeit goods.\n-\nTargeting illicit Chinese manufacturers who produced and disseminated fraudulent or prohibited COVID-19 PPE and medical supplies to the United States has resulted in the seizure of over 1,000,000 FDA-prohibited COVID-19 test kits and 750,000 counterfeit masks.\n-\nChina is collecting information on U.S. supply chain shortages and is using the COVID-19 crisis to build additional leverage with the United States, given that Beijing controls many critical\ncommodities. China could exploit future shortages of critical supplies by conditioning their provision on U.S. acquiescence in other matters important to Beijing.\n\nThe political nature of international critiques regarding COVID-19 responses may depress reporting in future public health crises. This highlights the importance of the Global Health Security Agenda and need for continued effort to drive increased participation.\n\n-\nSeveral countries employed denial and deception efforts to conceal COVID-19 statistics and/or limit COVID-19 testing to maintain a low case count. Countries that were transparent in reporting their COVID-19 case count have occasionally been the subject of criticism by adversarial countries. These influence operations may induce countries to limit transparency during future outbreaks, increasing the risk that outbreaks will turn into pandemics as they will not be addressed robustly while still locally or regionally contained.\n\n## Exploiting U.S. Academic Institutions And Research\n\nChina will continue seeking U.S. research and expertise vital to its economic and military advancement by using a wide range of government, non-government, and private actors and platforms. Chinawhich has mobilized vast resources to support its industrial development and defense goalswill continue exploiting U.S. academic institutions and the visa system to transfer valuable research and intellectual property (IP) that Beijing calculates will provide a military or economic advantage over the United States and other nations.  Beijing uses some visiting professors, scholars, and students in the United States as non-traditional collectors (NTCs)individuals who conduct their espionage-like activities by exploiting open systems rather than clandestinelyby virtue of their participation in targeted research and development activities. These NTCs most often include a subset of graduate- and post-graduatelevel researchers studying in certain science, technology, engineering, and mathematics (STEM) fields. Although some NTCs are unwitting, by U.S. industry, academia, and local governments of China's tactics for acquiring technology and IPwe expect NTCs will adjust their methods, including by taking different paths to travel to the United States or shifting their studies abroad while still aiming to collect sensitive U.S. information and intellectual property.\n\nothers are cognizant of their role and some have admitted to stealing research from U.S. institutions to advance Chinese research. These non-traditional collectors depart the United States and return to China, taking research and materials without the consent of the academic institutions, often deliberately hiding the material prior to their departure to prevent its detection.\n\n## Foreign Investment In The United States\n\n-\nIn January 2020, a Chinese post-graduate researcher in Boston was indicted for allegedly attempting to smuggle stolen vials of biological research; he stated that he planned to bring them to China to conduct research\nin his own laboratory and publish the results under his own name.\nAlthough Chinese foreign direct investment in the United States over the last two years has decreased from record highs, China will continue to pursue select investment in the United States to gain new technologies that it cannot produce domestically, to develop its own industrial base, and to secure access to critical supply chains.\n\n-\nSome Chinese firms will adapt to enhanced U.S. national security vetting of foreign direct investmentintroduced as part of the Foreign Investment Risk Review Modernization Act (FIRRMA)by using new types of investment structures and new legal methods. Foreign companies seeking to invest in U.S. businesses might bolster efforts to obfuscate their links to intelligence or security services, such as by using cutout organizations for acquisitions.\n\n## Threats To U.S. Supply Chain Integrity\n\n-\nIn June 2020, a Chinese student was arrested at Los Angeles International Airport for visa fraud, having failed to disclose on his visa application that he was an Officer in the People's Liberation Army (PLA). During an outbound interview with U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), he admitted to providing access to research from a California university to the PLA. He said that his supervisorthe director of his military university laboratory in Chinainstructed him to observe the university's layout and bring the information to replicate it in China.\nChina and Russia will continue to represent the top threats to U.S. supply chain security, given the sophisticated intelligence and cyber capabilities they can use to infiltrate trusted suppliers and vendors to target equipment and systems. Criminal actors also will engage in efforts to compromise supply chains, with such methods as inserting malicious code in a third party's software to conduct operations against firms that use the software. Criminal and state actors also attempt to compromise supply chains through protectionist measures and by exploiting rapid procurement procedures at the local, state, and federal level during disasters.\n\nChina's government-run talent recruitment programs facilitate licit and illicit transfer of U.S. technology, IP, and know-how to further China's Science and Technology development and military modernization. The programs recruit overseas academics, scientists, and other experts and reward them for stealing proprietary information and delivering it to the Chinese government to gain an advantage over the United States. Recipient contracts in many cases require them to keep the terms secret and transfer IP rights to the sponsoring Chinese institution. Some program participants are incentivized or obligated to establish \"shadow laboratories\" in China that mirror U.S. taxpayer-funded research to provide China with early insights into U.S. research before discoveries are shared globally. Several U.S. professors selected by these programs have been charged with crimes, including fraud and theft of trade secrets.\n\n-\nWe are especially concerned about adversaries' exploitation of information and communications technology (ICT) supply chains given that the goods that rely on these supply chains play a vital role in most aspects of life. Some actors might exploit ICT through \"white labeling\"rebranding equipment or altering equipment's visual appearance to obfuscate the original manufacturerto get compromised goods into supply chains.\nNow that the U.S. government is aware of these methods of exploiting academic institutions and research, Beijing's strategy will likely change. Considering the issuance of Presidential Proclamation 10043 banning the entry of certain students associated with China's military-civil fusion strategyas well as increased awareness\n\n-\nAs Chinese firms become more competitive globally and achieve market dominance in\nkey sectors, the United States will be less able to source and supply key goods and services that are not dependent on Chinese investment or suppliers.\n\n-\nThe United States and other nations competing for globally scarce resources during disasters, will struggle to keep up with economies that lower quality standards and requisition U.S. subsidiaries manufacturing facilities to hoard supplies. During the COVID-19 outbreak, Chinese state-owned enterprises were encouraged to convert manufacturing without having\nthe capacity or quality control to produce medical supplies and equipment. In addition to quality control issues, Chinese suppliers export products under one licensed company's name but source their products from second, third or fourth factories with little to no traceability down the chain of supply. In March, a Canadian manufacturer of face masks with factories in China, reported the Chinese government requisitioned all production and nothing was being exported.\n-\nChina began accumulating critical medical supplies rather than ship them to buyers in other countries - indicating apparent knowledge of the outbreak and efforts to hoard critical medical supplies.\n\n## Violations Of U.S. Trade Laws And Policies\n\nChina will remain the leading source of U.S.\n\ntrade policy violations. Actions by China-based criminal organizations will continue to present the principal challenge to U.S. enforcement of trade laws and policies in the year ahead, despite progress in U.S.-China negotiations aimed at addressing this issue.\n\n-\nChinese entities' infringement on the IP rights of U.S. entities costs the U.S. economy as much as $600 billion annually and adversely impacts U.S. industries and competitiveness.\n-\nIn Fiscal Year 2019, DHS seized more counterfeit goods originating from China than any other country. Counterfeit goods from China and Hong Kong pose the greatest challenge to IP enforcement and present health and safety risks to the public due to the sub-standard quality of most counterfeit products.\n\n## The Terrorist Threat To The Homeland\n\nIdeologically motivated lone offenders and small groups pose the most likely terrorist threat to the Homeland, with Domestic Violent Extremists presenting the most persistent and lethal threat. Foreign terrorist organizations will continue to call for Homeland attacks but probably will remain constrained in their ability to direct such plots over the next year. Iran will maintain terrorist capabilities, including through proxies such as Lebanese Hizballah, as an option to deter the United States from taking action Tehran considers regime-threatening.\n\n## Violent Extremism In The United States\n\nincite violence, intimidate targets, and promote their violent extremist ideologies.\n\n-\nSimple tacticssuch as vehicle ramming, small arms, edged weapons, arson, and rudimentary improvised explosive devices (IEDs)probably will be most common. However, lone offenders could employ more sophisticated means, to include advanced and/or high-consequence IEDs and using crude chemical, biological, and radiological materials.\nThe primary terrorist threat inside the United States will stem from lone offenders and small cells of individuals, including Domestic Violent Extremists6\n(DVEs) and foreign terrorist-inspired Homegrown Violent Extremists7 (HVEs). Some U.S.-based violent extremists have capitalized on increased social and political tensions in 2020, which will drive an elevated threat environment at least through early 2021. Violent extremists will continue to target individuals or institutions that represent symbols of their grievances, as well as grievances based on political affiliation or perceived policy positions.\n\n-\nWhile ISIS and other Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTOs) have called for attacks in the West using \"all available means,\" biologicalfocused attempts would likely involve crudely produced toxins and poisons. Similarly, during the COVID-19 outbreak, domestic extremists have called for the spread of the SARS-CoV-2\nvirus through unsophisticated means. While significant expertise and infrastructure limits the threat by low-level actors, even rudimentary actions can result in economically significant costs and incite fear without a corresponding risk to health.\nThe domestic situation surrounding the COVID-19 pandemic creates an environment that could accelerate some individuals' mobilization to targeted violence or radicalization to terrorism. Social distancing may lead to social isolation, which is associated with depression, increased anxiety, and social alienation. Similarly, work disruptions, including unexpected unemployment and layoffs, can also increase risk factors associated with radicalization to violence and willingness to engage in acts of targeted violence.\n\n-\nViolent extremist media almost certainly will spread violent extremist ideologies, especially via social media, that encourage violence and influence action within the United States.\nSome DVEs and other violent actors8 might target events related to the 2020 Presidential campaigns, the election itself, election results, or the post-election period. Such actors could mobilize quickly to threaten or engage in violence. Violence related to government efforts to mitigate the COVID-19 pandemic and amidst otherwise ongoing lawful protests has exacerbated the typical\n\n-\nViolent extremists will continue their efforts to exploit public fears associated with COVID-19 and social grievances driving lawful protests to\nelection-season threat environment.\n\n-\nSome DVEs have heightened their attention to election- or campaign-related activities, candidates' public statements, and policy issues connected to specific candidates, judging from domestic terrorism plots since 2018 targeting individuals based on their actual or perceived political affiliations.\n-\nOpen-air, publicly accessible parts of physical election infrastructure, such as campaignassociated mass gatherings, polling places, and voter registration events, would be the most likely flashpoints for potential violence.\nAmong DVEs, racially and ethnically motivated violent extremistsspecifically white supremacist extremists9 (WSEs)will remain the most persistent and lethal threat in the Homeland. Spikes in other DVE threats probably will depend on political or social issues that often mobilize other ideological actors to violence, such as immigration, environmental, and police-related policy issues.\n\n-\nWSEs have demonstrated longstanding intent to target racial and religious minorities, members of the LGBTQ+ community, politicians, and those they believe promote multi-culturalism and globalization at the expense of the WSE identity. Since 2018, they have conducted more lethal attacks in the United States than any other DVE movement.\n-\nSome WSEs have engaged in outreach and networking opportunities abroad with\nThis chart depicts DVE and homegrown violent extremists (HVEs) attacks in the US since 2018\nthat posed a threat to life, based on DHS data. 2019 was the most lethal year for domestic violent extremism in the United States since the Oklahoma City bombing in 1995.  We are still evaluating data for incidents occurring in 2020. VEs perpetrated 16 attacks, killing 48, whereas HVEs conducted\n5 attacks and killed 1 person. Among DVE actors, WSEs conducted half of all lethal attacks (8 of 16), resulting in the majority of deaths (39 of 48).  All the DVE attackers had a dominant violent extremist ideology, with many motivated by multiple violent extremist ideologies or violent extremist ideologies unconnected to global violent extremist groups.\n\nlike-minded individuals to expand their violent extremist networks. Such outreach might lead to a greater risk of mobilization to violence, including traveling to conflict zones.\n\n-\nOther racially or ethnically motivated violent extremists could seek to exploit concerns about social injustice issues to incite violence and exploit otherwise peaceful protests movements.\nAnother motivating force behind domestic terrorism that also poses a threat to the Homeland is anti-government/anti-authority violent extremism.\n\n-\nThese violent extremists, sometimes influenced by anarchist ideology, have been associated with multiple plots and attacks, which included a significant uptick in violence against law enforcement and government symbols in 2020.  This ideology is also exploited by hostile nation-states, which seek to promote it through disinformation campaigns and sow additional chaos and discord across American society.\n-\nAnti-government and/or anti-authority violent extremists are likely to be emboldened by a perceived success exploiting otherwise peaceful protest movements and concealing violent tactics. These violent extremists are increasingly\ntaking advantage of large protest crowds to conduct violence against government officials, facilities, and counter-protestors.\n\n-\nThe primary threat to the Homeland from FTOs probably will manifest as \"inspired\" attacks. FTOs seek to inspire violent extremism in the United States and continue to use social media and other online platforms to call for attacks against the United States. Despite territorial defeats in Iraq and Syria, ISIS continues to draw support from HVEs in the United States and the group's global calls for attacks have intensified since the death last year of senior leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi.\n-\nWe also remain particularly concerned about the impacts from COVID-19 where anti-government and anti-authority violent extremists could be motivated to conduct attacks in response to perceived infringement of liberties and government overreach as all levels of government seek to limit the spread of the coronavirus that has caused a worldwide pandemic.\n-\nTransportation infrastructureespecially the aviation sectoralmost certainly will\nremain a primary target for terrorists plotting overseas. While terrorists continue to pursue flight school training and the use of insiders, plotting against domestic aviation targets most likely will remain aspirational among FTOs and their supporters over the next year.\n-\nIdeologies driven by such DVE's often are\nreinforced by a variety of online content, including conspiracy theories and political commentary they view as controversial. Current events that DVEs perceive as infringing on their worldviews often contribute to periods of increased ideologically motivated violence, including recently during the COVID-19 pandemic and nationwide lawful protests.\n-\nTerrorists and other criminal actors might look to unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) to threaten critical infrastructure. In 2019, there were nearly 4,000 reports of unique incidents of UAS activity near U.S. critical infrastructure or public gatherings. Although we have no indication that any of these events were terrorism-related, it is possible that malicious or criminal actors will turn to UAS tactics.\n\n## Iran And Lebanese Hizballah\n\n-\nThe domestic threat environment is rapidly evolving. Operational reporting shows that DHS law enforcement officers suffered over 300 separate injuries while they were present during months of nightly unrest in Portland, Oregon. This is but one example among many across the country, including in Brooklyn, New York, and Kenosha, Wisconsin, where law enforcement officers have been injured or killed.  These increasingly pervasive incidents highlight the threat of anarchist violence that has accelerated in our cities in recent months.\n\n## Foreign Terrorist Threats\n\nIran will continue to develop and maintain terrorist capabilities as an option to deter the United States from taking what Tehran considers regimethreatening actions or to retaliate for such activity, real or perceived. The Government of Iran and its proxy, Lebanese Hizballah (LH), have demonstrated the intent to conduct an array of operations in the Homeland.  Iran or LH could advance an attack plotwith little to no warningin response to heightened tensions. The U.S. Government in recent years has arrested several individuals acting on behalf of the Government of Iran or LH who have conducted surveillance indicative of contingency planning for lethal attacks in the U.S.\n\n## Weapons Of Mass Destruction And Other Chemical, Biological, Radiological, And Nuclear Threats\n\nThe overall global WMD threat will continue Foreign terrorist organizations (FTOs), including al-Qa'ida and the Islamic State of Iraq and ash-Sham\n(ISIS), will maintain interest in attacking the Homeland but we expect the primary threat from these groups to remain overseas in the coming year due to sustained U.S. counterterrorism pressure. Nevertheless, these groups can adapt quickly and resurge, and terrorists overseas will continue to probe for vulnerabilities in U.S. immigration and border security programs. Collectively, vulnerabilities may create an illegal migration environment that FTOs could exploit to facilitate the movement of affiliated persons towards the United States.\nto rise in 2021. Spurred by continued capability expansion, modernization, low yield weapons development, eroding international norms, information proliferation, emerging drone concerns and increasing actor awareness; the risk of intentional chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear incidents in the homeland and abroad has likely increased.\n\n-\nBiological threats (deliberate, accidental, and naturally occurring) are more diverse and continue to expand with increased global interconnectivity and rapid advances in biotechnology, genomics, and other legitimate-use capabilities that could introduce\nrisks to global health and food security and the potential for adversaries to develop novel biological warfare agents. Notably, the biological agent attribution shortfalls coupled with the now known devastating impacts may lead to a resurgence of state and non-state biological weapon pursuits.\n-\nChemical threats are particularly notable as we continue in the most significant and sustained period of chemical weapons use in decades. The publicity of emerging chemical weapons compounds and increases in information availability is evolving the chemical threat landscape.  This global trend could manifest as an increased domestic threat.\n-\nRadiological attacks are less likely, guidelines for hazards and safe handling of radiation sources reduce the likelihood of radiological attacks; however, actors driven by extremist ideology could pose a threat if they have knowledge\nand access of locations to aid radioactive materials acquisition. The major licensed users of radioactive material in the United States are in the energy, healthcare, and construction sectors with larger activity sources protected by physical security measures. The amount of radioactive material in use is not expected to increase in the short term.\n-\nNuclear threats remain enduring and will remain largely unchanged. The number of nuclear weapons states will probably remain unchanged over the next year. Concerns remain related to lower yield weapons development and regional expansion of nuclear capabilities by several nuclear weapons states and the subsequent increasing risks of weapons loss or nuclear conflict that could have global impacts. Non-state actors continue to face\nsignificant barriers to acquiring special nuclear material for use in an improvised nuclear device, but vulnerabilities remain. Experts do, however, estimate the rate of nuclear security improvement around the globe has decreased since 2018. The COVID-19 pandemic has drawn government resources away from normal functions, similar to resource shifts observed globally in military and other defense sectors; nuclear security may also be vulnerable to resource shifts which could increase risks of theft or sabotage of nuclear facilities. Domestic and foreign-based non-state actors attempting to steal special nuclear material for use in a nuclear weapon will continue to pose a threat to the Homeland.\n\n## Tco Threats To U.S. Security\n\nTransnational Criminal Organizations (TCOs)especially those based in Mexicowill continue to undermine public health and safety in the Homeland and threaten U.S. national security interests.  They represent an acute and devastating threat to public health and safety in the Homeland and a significant threat to U.S. national security interests. Beyond their complicity in the 71,000 drug overdose deaths in the U.S. last year, TCOs destabilize partner nations, decrease citizen confidence in good governance, foment corruption, and destroy confidence in the international banking system. Countering these organizations' malign activities will remain an enduring challenge to US safety and security. TCOs will continue to take advantage of illegal migration flows to enter the United States and attempt to exploit legal immigration avenues. Criminal elements attempting to provide a level of legitimacy to their illicit immigration claims by intermingling with migrants travelling to the US Southwest border pose an intrinsic risk to the U.S. lawful immigration system.\n\n## Mexico-Based Cartels\n\nretail-level drug distribution and sales for Mexican TCOsvie for access to new users, the United States may face increased criminal violence in some parts of the country. Social distancing lockdown measures, however, probably will moderate any increase in the near term, as opportunistic crimes become less frequent.\n\nAmong TCOs, Mexico-based cartels pose the greatest threat to the Homeland because of their ability to control territoryincluding along the U.S. Southwest Borderand co-opt parts of government, particularly at a state and local level.\n\nAlthough COVID-19 has disrupted some cartel operations, their ability to move large quantities of illicit goods into and throughout the Homeland remains largely intact.\n\n## Illicit Drugs\n\n-\nOf the Mexico-based TCOs, the Sinaloa and Jalisco New Generation Cartel (CJNG) networks pose the greatest cross-border drug smuggling threat in the near-term; they dominate the lucrative trafficking of cocaine, heroin, fentanyl, and methamphetamine to the United States.\nThe COVID-19 pandemic has slowed the pace of drug trafficking into the United States; however, the threat of illicit drugsincluding the rates of overdoseswill persist as traffickers adapt and drug compositions become more potent.  TCOs continue to distribute synthetic narcotics such as fentanyl and methamphetamine.\n\n-\nMexican TCO fracturing, disruption of previous drug supply chains, and territorial disputes especially over important cross-border plazasalmost certainly will lead to increased violence in Mexico, along the U.S. Southwest Border, in the year ahead. Mexican border states experienced nearly 12,000 homicides in 2019, most of which involved TCOs.\n-\nAs U.S.-based gangssome of which provide\n-\nPotent opioid narcotics like fentanyl and heroin almost certainly will continue to cause alarming levels of overdose in the United States over the next year.  The use of stimulant drugs like methamphetamine and cocaine will continue, and distributors will explore new markets in the United States beyond major transportation hubs and regional cities.\n-\nTCOs engaged in the manufacturing of fentanyl and methamphetamine will likely experience mid-term disruption due to COVID-19 response measures that may hinder their receipt of chemicals from international suppliers. Production and transportation of heroin, cocaine, and marijuana also has been affected by travel restrictions and stay-at-home orders within the Western Hemisphere.\n\n## Human Smuggling\n\nMexico-based cartels play an influential role in human smuggling, often facilitating illicit migration over and near the border. Mexico-based drug cartels control large sections of territory just south of the United States southwest land border and have traditionally taxed human smugglers and traffickers to move migrants through their areas of operation. Since the COVID-19 pandemic began, these criminal groups have continued efforts to facilitate the movement of migrants throughout most of their routes.\n\n## Exploitation Of Others For Profit\n\nCriminal elements will continue to exploit others to facilitate their pursuit of illicit profits.\n\n-\nHuman traffickingboth sex trafficking and forced laborremains a significant issue. Top threats include sex trafficking and juvenile sex\ntrafficking, domestic labor trafficking and indentured servitude, and goods imported into the United States that were produced by forced labor.  These illicit activities often have a nexus to criminal organizations, such as those operating illicit massage businesses or engaged in exploitation of migrant and undocumented populations.\n\n-\nChild exploitation is also a significant issue. Top threats in this area include the proliferation of online Child Sexual Abuse Material, live streaming of child sexual exploitation, online enticement and extortion,\nand child sex trafficking.\n-\nCriminal networks engage in multiple types of illicit financial activities to maintain affirmative control of their proceeds, including bulk cash smuggling, trade-based money laundering (TBML), third party money laundering (3PML), virtual currency-based money laundering and fraud, and transnational financial fraud schemes. The top threats in the illicit finance area are Chinese TCOs, money laundering organizations specializing in supporting drug trafficking organizations, Colombian money brokers, West African TCOs, and cyber hacking groups.\n\n## Illegal Immigration To The United States\n\nThe duration and severity of the COVID-19 pandemic will shape migration to the U.S. Southwest Border into 2021, along with traditional push and pull factors stemming from weak economic and political conditions in the region. COVID-19's impact on Caribbean nations increases the chance of a mass migration event from Cuba or Haiti. Although the majority of migrants do not pose a national security or public safety threat, pathways used by migrants to travel to the United States have been exploited by threat actors. As a result, surges of migrants could undermine our ability to effectively secure the border without adversely impacting other parts of the immigration system.\n\n## Illegal Immigration Via Land\n\nThe duration and severity of the COVID-19 pandemic in the United States and within Central and South America and the Caribbean will shape illegal immigration to the U.S. Southwest Border, exacerbating the underlying economic and political conditions in the region. As COVID-19-related restrictions on mobility ease, we are seeing an increase in illegal immigration flows to pre-pandemic levels.\n\nremain key drivers of U.S.-bound migration from the Caribbean and Central and South America, especially as COVID-19-related citizen mobility restrictions ease in the region. Seasonal weather changes and perceptions of U.S. and Mexican immigration and enforcement policies and measures also will shape migration patterns as inter-governmental division and inconsistent messaging continue to impede Congressionally mandated immigration enforcement policies.\n\n## Human Trafficking\n\n-\nIllegal immigration flows within the Western Hemisphere have begun to increase after a short-term decline in response to the world-wide COVID-19 pandemic and countries instituting border transit restrictions. Over the\nmedium term, mass migration might occur if the economies of the Caribbean, Central and South American countries continue to decline and if the health and humanitarian response capabilities continue to deteriorate due to COVID-19. Mass migration especially might occur if these negative conditions are coupled with an economic resurgence in the United States.\nHuman traffickers continue to use force, fraud, and coercion against millions of victims worldwide, as many of them attempt to gain entry to the United States via the southwest land border. Many victims never seek assistance from law enforcement because of language barriers, fear of retaliation from their traffickers and/or fear of law enforcement. This allows traffickers to force victims into labor or commercial sexual exploitation. Traffickers continue to target people they believe to be susceptible for a wide variety of reasons including but not limited to psychological or emotional vulnerability, economic hardship, natural disasters, political instability or a lack of a social safety net.\n\n-\nCOVID-19-related international travel restrictions that many countries have instituted have curtailed some illegal immigration from outside the Western Hemisphere. When these measures are lifted, there will be sporadic illegal immigration into and through the region.\n-\nIncreased illegal immigration to the U.S. Southwest Border will require United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) to re-examine how resources are properly aligned at the Southwest Border, likely impacting the larger asylum system. Increasing numbers of\n-\nWeak job markets, high crime rates, and governmental or non-state repression will\napprehensions will lead to an increased number of fear claims, requiring USCIS to dedicate additional resources to protection screenings and away from addressing case backlogs such as the asylum case backlog.\n\n-\nSocial distancing requirements could continue to affect work taking place in detention facilities along the Southwest border. Budgetary impediments towards immigration enforcement and lack of bipartisan support of detention measures continue to undermine U.S. immigration enforcement policies. Such inconsistent practices continue to lead to\nthe release of dangerous criminal aliens and absconders who may then commit additional crimes when they might otherwise have been expeditiously detained and removed from the United States.\n-\nSince 2014, DHS has experienced repeated illegal immigration surges at the Southwest Border. DHS anticipates that the number of apprehensions at the border will significantly climb post-pandemic, with the potential for another surge as those who were previously prevented from seeking entry into the United States arrive at the border and as poor economic conditions around the world fuel migration. This high volume of illegal immigration, including unprecedented numbers of family units and unaccompanied alien children arrivals, stretch government resources, and create a humanitarian and border security crisis that cripples the immigration system.\n-\nRecord migration at the Southwest Border took up limited U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) detention resources, drove increases in the agency's average daily population (ADP), resulted in decreased interior arrests (including arrests of criminals), and forced ICE to balance its critical public safety mission in the interior with its support for DHS efforts to secure the border. As the pandemic subsides, ICE will conduct additional enforcement operations to uphold its public safety mission and address the growing fugitive backlog.\n-\nDHS projects that until fundamental changes are made to the immigration enforcement process, including legislation that addresses current legal loopholes that incentivize high levels of illegal immigration, the United States will periodically experience additional humanitarian and border security crises.\n\n## Illegal Immigration At Sea\n\nThe impact of COVID-19 very likely will affect maritime migration from both migrant origin and transit countries in the Caribbean through 2021. Weak socio-economic conditions in Cuba, political instability and food insecurity in Haiti, and the uncertainty of COVID-19 impacts in the region will increase the chances of a maritime mass migration event, although the overall risk remains low.\n\n-\nInterviews of interdicted migrants reveal that some still desire to come to the United States, regardless of the risk posed by COVID-19, rather than face the deteriorating economic conditions in their home\ncountries.\n-\nMeasures such as border closures, quarantines, and a reduction in legitimate vessel traffic can disrupt migrant flows; however, increased food insecurity and unemployment, reduced economic opportunities, a lack of medical infrastructure, and other second- and third-order effects in migrants' home countries serve as likely push factors resulting in increased maritime migration to the United States.\n-\nIn the event of increased maritime migration, the U.S. Coast Guard and USCIS will need to increase interdiction and screening resources in the region. This could result in the reallocation of limited resources, impacting the ability to conduct other operations.\n\n## Natural Disasters\n\nNatural disasterswhich refer to all types of severe weather, including floods, earthquakes, hurricanes, wildfires, and winter stormsremain an ongoing threat to the nation. These disasters pose a significant threat to human health and safety, property, critical infrastructure, and homeland security while subjecting the nation to frequent periods of insecurity, disruption, and economic loss. Over the last year, the United States has faced the COVID-19 crisis while simultaneously dealing with numerous natural disasters. These natural disasters require the Department to readjust its priority focus, as resources continue to be reallocated to focus on responding to multiple natural disasters, while continuing to handle its traditional roles and responsibilities.\n\n## Hurricanes\n\nthe same. Federal, state, local, tribal, and territorial officials, along with the private sector and non-governmental organizations, must continue to partner together to fulfill their respective missions and help disaster survivors.\n\n## Wildfires\n\nWildland fires pose a major threat to lives, property, and ecosystem integrity. Wildfires increase the likelihood of adverse impacts, including flooding, erosion, reduced water quality, loss of key wildlife habitat, and other ecological and economic impacts.\n\nHurricanes pose a persistent hazard to life and property.  DHS assesses that hurricanes will continue to pose a hazard for the United States and its territories in the coming months. While their individual impact varies based on the intensity and duration of the storms, hurricanes are one of nature's most destructive forces, which can cause enormous damage and may precipitate mudslides, flash floods, storm surges, and wind and fire damage.  Severe weather events associated with hurricanes can have widespread impacts across multiple states, take lives, damage or destroy property, and impact the nation's economic capability. They have the potential to overwhelm the emergency response and recovery capabilities of the affected state(s) and may require the sustained deployment of Federal assets.\n\n-\nThus far in 2020, there have been 94 large fires,\nwhich have burned approximately 5.37 million acres throughout the West.  September alone saw 87 large fires burning simultaneously uncontained from the West Coast to the Rocky Mountains, with over 25 Fire Management Assistance Grants approved. Wildfires not only pose a threat to key infrastructure, housing, and public safety but also contribute to poor air quality.\n-\nThe 2020 season has been the second most active Atlantic hurricane season on record, behind only the 2005 season.  This season was the first to see seven named tropical cyclones make landfall in the continental United States before September, which became the most active September on record with 10 tropical or subtropical storms.\n-\nEfforts to undertake better and more active land management will be needed at every level of government in order to reduce the annual threat of wildfires.  Such challenges cannot be addressed simply within the federal government, but must also involve state and private actors to better prepare to minimize the impacts of wildfires.\n-\nAs a result of the COVID-19 pandemic, the Nation continues to face unprecedented challenges as we respond to the compounding issues surrounding the 2020 hurricane season. Although the operating environment has changed the mission of helping people before, during, and after disasters remains\nWITH HONOR AND INTEGRITY, WE WILL SAFEGUARD THE AMERICAN PEOPLE, OUR HOMELAND, AND OUR VALUES"
    },
    {
        "text": "(U//FOUO) Domestic Extremism Lexicon IA-0233-09\nUNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY\n\n##\n\n\n(U//FOUO)  Domestic Extremism Lexicon\n26 March 2009\n(U)  Prepared by the Strategic Analysis Group and the Extremism and Radicalization Branch, Homeland Environment Threat Analysis Division. (U//FOUO)  Homeland Security Reference Aidsprepared by the DHS/Office of Intelligence and Analysis (I&A)provide baseline information on a variety of homeland security issues.  This product is one in a series of reference aids designed to provide operational and intelligence advice and assistance to other elements of DHS, as well as state, local, and regional fusions centers.  DHS/I&A intends this background information to assist federal, state, local, and tribal homeland security and law enforcement officials in conducting analytic activities.  This product provides definitions for key terms and phrases that often appear in DHS analysis that addresses the nature and scope of the threat that domestic, non-Islamic extremism poses to the United States.  Definitions were derived from a variety of open source materials and unclassified information, then further developed during facilitated workshops with DHS intelligence analysts knowledgeable about domestic, non-Islamic extremism in the United States.\n\n##\n\n(U)  Definitions (U)  aboveground\n(U//FOUO)  A term used to describe extremist groups or\nindividuals who operate overtly and portray themselves as law-abiding.\n(U)  alternative media\n(U//FOUO)  A term used to describe various information\nsources that provide a forum for interpretations of events and issues that differ radically from those presented in mass media products and outlets.\n(U)  anarchist extremism\n(U//FOUO)  A movement of groups or individuals who advocate a society devoid of government structure or ownership of individual property.  Many embrace some of the radical philosophical components of anticapitalist, antiglobalization, communist, socialist, and other movements. Anarchist extremists advocate changing government and society through revolutionary violence. (also: *revolutionary anarchists*)\n(U)  animal rights extremism\n(U//FOUO)  A movement of groups or individuals who ascribe equal value to all living organisms and seek to end the perceived abuse and suffering of animals.  They believe animals are sentient creatures that experience emotional, physical, and mental awareness and deserve many of the same rights as human beings; for example, the right to life and freedom to engage in normal, instinctive animal behavior. These groups have been known to advocate or engage in criminal activity and plot acts of violence and terrorism in an attempt to advance their extremist goals.  They have targeted industries, businesses, and government entities that they perceive abuse or exploit animals, including those that use\nanimals for testing, human services, food production, or\nconsumption. (also: *animal liberation*)\n(U)  antiabortion extremism\n(U//FOUO)  A movement of groups or individuals who are virulently antiabortion and advocate violence against providers of abortion-related services, their employees, and their facilities.  Some cite various racist and anti-Semitic beliefs to justify their criminal activities.\n(U)  anti-immigration extremism\n(U//FOUO)  A movement of groups or individuals who are vehemently opposed to illegal immigration, particularly along the U.S. southwest border with Mexico, and who have been known to advocate or engage in criminal activity and plot acts of violence and terrorism to advance their extremist goals. They are highly critical of the U.S. Government's response to illegal immigration and oppose government programs that are designed to extend \"rights\" to illegal aliens, such as issuing driver's licenses or national identification cards and providing in-state tuition, medical benefits, or public education.\n(U)  antitechnology extremism\n(U//FOUO)  A movement of groups or individuals opposed to technology.  These groups have been known to advocate or engage in criminal activity and plot acts of violence and terrorism in an attempt to advance their extremist goals. They have targeted college and university laboratories, scholars, biotechnology industries, U.S. corporations involved in the computer or airline industry, and others. (also: *Neo-Luddites*)\n(U)  Aryan prison gangs\n(U//FOUO)  Individuals who form organized groups while in prison and advocate white supremacist views. Group members may continue to operate under the auspices of the prison gang upon their release from correctional facilities.\n(U)  black bloc\n(U//FOUO)  An organized collection of violent anarchists and\nanarchist affinity groups that band together for illegal acts of civil disturbance and use tactics that destroy property or strain law enforcement resources.  Black blocs operate in autonomous cells that infiltrate nonviolent protests, often without the knowledge of the organizers of the event.\n(U)  black nationalism\n(U//FOUO)  A term used by black separatists to promote the\nunification and separate identity of persons of black or African American descent and who advocate the establishment of a separate nation within the United States.\n(U)  black power\n(U//FOUO)  A term used by black separatists to describe their\npride in and the perceived superiority of the black race.\n| (U)  black separatism                                          |\n|----------------------------------------------------------------|\n| African American descent who advocate the separation of the    |\n| races or the separation of specific geographic regions from    |\n| the rest of the United States; some advocate forming their     |\n| own political system within a separate nation.  Such groups or |\n| individuals also may embrace radical religious beliefs.        |\n| Members have been known to advocate or engage in criminal      |\n| activity and plot acts of violence directed toward local law   |\n| enforcement in an attempt to advance their extremist goals.    |\n| (U)  Christian Identity                                          | (U//FOUO)  A racist religious                            |\n|------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------|\n| philosophy that maintains                                        |                                                          |\n| non-Jewish whites are \"God's                                     |                                                          |\n| Chosen People\" and the true                                      |                                                          |\n| descendants of the                                               |                                                          |\n| Twelve Tribes of Israel.                                         |                                                          |\n| Groups or individuals can be                                     |                                                          |\n| followers of either the Covenant                                 |                                                          |\n| or Dual Seedline doctrine; all believe that Jews are conspiring  |                                                          |\n| with Satan to control world affairs and that the world is on the |                                                          |\n| verge of the Biblical apocalypse.  Dual Seedline adherents       |                                                          |\n| believe Jews are the literal offspring of Satan and that non-    |                                                          |\n| whites, who are often referred to as \"mud people,\" are not       |                                                          |\n| human beings.                                                    |                                                          |\n| (also:                                                           | Identity, CI, Anglo-Israel                               |\n| (U)  Cuban                                                       |                                                          |\n| independence                                                     |                                                          |\n| extremism                                                        |                                                          |\n| (U//FOUO)  A movement of groups or individuals who do            |                                                          |\n| not recognize the legitimacy of the Communist Cuban              |                                                          |\n| Government and who attempt to subvert it through acts of         |                                                          |\n| violence, mainly within the United States.                       |                                                          |\n| (also:                                                           | anti-Castro groups                                       |\n| (U)  decentralized                                               |                                                          |\n| terrorist movement                                               |                                                          |\n| (U//FOUO)  A movement of groups or individuals who               |                                                          |\n| pursue shared ideological goals through tactics of leaderless    |                                                          |\n| resistance independent of any larger terrorist organization.     |                                                          |\n| (U)  denial-of-service                                           |                                                          |\n| attack                                                           |                                                          |\n| (U//FOUO)  An attack that attempts to prevent or impair the      |                                                          |\n| intended functionality of computer networks, systems, or         |                                                          |\n| applications.  Depending on the type of system targeted, the     |                                                          |\n| attack can employ a variety of mechanisms and means.             |                                                          |\n| (also:                                                           | DoS attack                                               |\n| (U)  direct action                                               | (U//FOUO)  Lawful or unlawful acts of civil disobedience |\n| ranging from protests to property destruction or acts of         |                                                          |\n| violence.  This term is most often used by single-issue or       |                                                          |\n| anarchist extremists to describe their activities.               |                                                          |\n(U)  environmental extremism\n(U//FOUO)  A movement of groups or individuals who use violence to end what they perceive as the degradation of the natural environment by humans.  Members have advocated or engaged in criminal activity and plot acts of violence and terrorism in an attempt to advance their extremist goals. They target industries, businesses, and government entities that they allege are engaged in habitat destruction, citing urban sprawl and development, logging, construction sites and related equipment, and man-made sources of air, water, and land pollution. (also: *ecoterrorism*)\n(U)  ethnic-based extremism\n(U//FOUO)  A movement of groups or individuals who are drawn together and form extremist beliefs based on their ethnic or cultural background.  Members have advocated or engaged in criminal activity and have plotted acts of violence and terrorism in an attempt to advance their extremist goals.\n(U)  extremist group\n(U//FOUO)  An ideologically driven organization that\nadvocates or attempts to bring about political, religious, economic, or social change through the use of force, violence, or ideologically motivated criminal activity.\n(U)  green anarchism\n(U//FOUO)  A movement of groups or individuals who combine anarchist ideology with an environmental focus. They advocate a return to a preindustrial, agrarian society, often through acts of violence and terrorism.\n| (U)  hacktivism                                                 | (U//FOUO)  (A portmanteau of \"hacking\" and \"activism.\")     |\n|-----------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------|\n| The use of cyber technologies to achieve a political end, or    |                                                             |\n| technology-enabled political or social activism.                |                                                             |\n| Hacktivism might include website defacements,                   |                                                             |\n| denial-of-service attacks, hacking into the target's network to |                                                             |\n| introduce malicious software (malware), or information theft.   |                                                             |\n| (U)  hate groups                                                | (U//FOUO)  A term most often used to describe white         |\n| supremacist groups.  It is occasionally used to describe other  |                                                             |\n| racist extremist groups.                                        |                                                             |\n| (U)  Jewish extremism                                           | (U//FOUO)  A movement of groups or individuals of the       |\n| Jewish faith who are willing to use violence or commit other    |                                                             |\n| criminal acts to protect themselves against perceived affronts  |                                                             |\n| to their religious or ethnic identity.                          |                                                             |\n(U)  leaderless resistance\n(U//FOUO)  A strategy that stresses the importance of individuals and small cells acting independently and anonymously outside formalized organizational structures to enhance operational security and avoid detection.  It is used by many types of domestic extremists.\n(U)  leftwing extremism\n(U//FOUO)  A movement of groups or individuals that embraces anticapitalist, Communist, or Socialist doctrines and seeks to bring about change through violent revolution rather than through established political processes.  The term also refers to leftwing, single-issue extremist movements that\nare dedicated to causes such as environmentalism, opposition to war, and the rights of animals. (also: *far left, extreme left*)\n(U)  lone terrorist\n(U//FOUO)  An individual motivated by extremist ideology\nto commit acts of criminal violence independent of any larger terrorist organization. (also: *lone wolf*)\n(U)  Mexican separatism\n(U//FOUO)  A movement of groups or individuals of Mexican descent who advocate the secession of southwestern U.S. states (all or part of Arizona, California, New Mexico, and Texas) to join with Mexico through armed struggle. Members do not recognize the legitimacy of these U.S. states, including the U.S. Government's original acquisition of these territories.\n(U)  militia movement\n(U//FOUO)  A rightwing extremist movement composed of\ngroups or individuals who adhere to an antigovernment ideology often incorporating various conspiracy theories. Members oppose most federal and state laws, regulations, and authority (particularly firearms laws and regulations) and often conduct paramilitary training designed to resist perceived government interference in their activities or to overthrow the U.S. Government through the use of violence. (also: *citizens militia, unorganized militia*)\n(U)  neo-Nazis\n(U//FOUO)  Groups or individuals who adhere to and\npromote Adolph Hitler's beliefs and use Nazi symbols and\nideology.  Subjects subscribe to virulently racist as well as\nanti-Semitic beliefs, many based on national socialist ideals derived from Nazi Germany.  Neo-Nazis may attempt to downplay or deny the Jewish Holocaust. (also: *national socialists, Nazis*)\n| (U)  patriot movement                                        | (U//FOUO)  A term used by rightwing extremists to link their    |\n|--------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------|\n| beliefs to those commonly associated with the American       |                                                                 |\n| Revolution.  The patriot movement primarily comprises        |                                                                 |\n| violent antigovernment groups such as militias and sovereign |                                                                 |\n| citizens.                                                    |                                                                 |\n| (also:                                                       | Christian patriots, patriot group, Constitutionalists,          |\n| Constitutionist                                              | )                                                               |\n(U)  Phineas Priesthood\n(U//FOUO)  A Christian Identity doctrine derived from the Biblical story of Phinehas, which adherents interpret as justifying inter-racial killing.  Followers of this belief system also have advocated martyrdom and violence against homosexuals, mixed-race couples, and abortion providers.\n| (U)  primary targeting                                         | (U//FOUO)  Plans or attacks directed by extremists against    |\n|----------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------|\n| parties that are the focus of an organized campaign.           |                                                               |\n| (U)  Puerto Rican                                              |                                                               |\n| independence                                                   |                                                               |\n| extremists                                                     |                                                               |\n| (U//FOUO)  Groups or individuals who engage in criminal        |                                                               |\n| activity and advocate the use of violence to achieve           |                                                               |\n| Puerto Rican independence from the United States.              |                                                               |\n| (U)  racial Nordic                                             |                                                               |\n| mysticism                                                      |                                                               |\n| (U//FOUO)  An ideology adopted by many white supremacist       |                                                               |\n| prison gangs who embrace a Norse mythological religion,        |                                                               |\n| such as Odinism or Asatru.                                     |                                                               |\n| (also:                                                         | Odinism, Asatru                                               |\n| (U)  racialist                                                 | (U//FOUO)  A term used by white supremacists intended to      |\n| minimize their extreme views on racial issues.                 |                                                               |\n| (U)  racist skinheads                                          | (U//FOUO)  Groups or individuals who combine white            |\n| supremacist ideology with a skinhead ethos in which \"white     |                                                               |\n| power\" music plays a central role.  Dress may include a        |                                                               |\n| shaved head or very short hair, jeans, thin suspenders, combat |                                                               |\n| boots or Doc Martens, a bomber jacket (sometimes with racist   |                                                               |\n| symbols), and tattoos of Nazi-like emblems.  Some are          |                                                               |\n| abandoning these stereotypical identifiers.                    |                                                               |\n| (also:                                                         | skins                                                         |\n| (U)  radicalization                                            | (U//FOUO)  The process by which an individual adopts an       |\n| extremist belief system leading to his or her willingness to   |                                                               |\n| advocate or bring about political, religious, economic, or     |                                                               |\n| social change through the use of force, violence, or           |                                                               |\n| ideologically motivated criminal activity.                     |                                                               |\n(U)  rightwing extremism\n(U//FOUO)  A movement of rightwing groups or individuals who can be broadly divided into those who are primarily hate-oriented, and those who are mainly antigovernment and reject federal authority in favor of state or local authority. This term also may refer to rightwing extremist movements that are dedicated to a single issue, such as opposition to abortion or immigration. (also known as *far right, extreme right*)\n(U)  secondary targeting\n(U//FOUO)  Plans or attacks directed against parties (secondary targets) that provide direct financial, logistic, or physical support to the primary target of an organized campaign, with the goal of coercing those parties to end their engagement with a primary target.  Secondary targets can include customers of or suppliers to a primary target or employees of a primary target organization.\n(U)  single-issue extremist groups\n(U//FOUO)  Groups or individuals who focus on a single issue or causesuch as animal rights, environmental or anti-abortion extremismand often employ criminal acts. Group members may be associated with more than one issue. (also: *special interest extremists*)\n(U)  skinheads\n(U//FOUO)  A subculture composed primarily of\nworking-class, white youth who embrace shaved heads for males, substance abuse, and violence.  Skinheads can be categorized as racist, anti-racist or \"traditional,\" which emphasizes group unity based on fashion, music, and lifestyle rather than political ideology.  Dress often includes a shaved head or very short hair, jeans, thin suspenders, combat boots or Doc Martens, and a bomber jacket. (also: *skins*)\n(U)  sovereign citizen movement\n(U//FOUO)  A rightwing extremist movement composed of groups or individuals who reject the notion of U.S. citizenship.  They claim to follow only what they believe to be God's law or common law and the original 10 amendments (Bill of Rights) to the U.S. Constitution. They believe they are emancipated from all other responsibilities associated with being a U.S. citizen, such as paying taxes, possessing a driver's license and motor vehicle registration, or holding a social security number. They generally do not recognize federal or state government authority or laws.  Several sovereign citizen groups in the United States produce fraudulent documents for their members in lieu of legitimate government-issued forms of identification.  Members have been known to advocate or engage in criminal activity and plot acts of violence and terrorism in an attempt to advance their extremist goals. They often target government officials and law enforcement. (also: state citizens, freemen, preamble citizens, common law citizens)\n(U)  tax resistance movement\n(U//FOUO)  Groups or individuals who vehemently believe taxes violate their constitutional rights.  Among their beliefs are that wages are not income, that paying income taxes is voluntary, and that the 16th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, which allowed Congress to levy taxes on income, was not properly ratified.  Members have been known to advocate or engage in criminal activity and plot acts of violence and terrorism in an attempt to advance their extremist goals.  They often target government entities such as the Internal Revenue Service and the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives.\n(also: tax protest movement, tax freedom movement, antitax\nmovement)\n(U)  tertiary targeting\n(U//FOUO)  Plans or attacks against parties with indirect\nlinks to the primary target of an organized campaign. Tertiary targets can include employees, customers, investors, and other participants in a company (the secondary target) that does business with or provides support services to the primary target; or parties who provide direct financial, logistic, or physical support to the secondary target.\n(U)  underground\n(U//FOUO)  A term used to describe clandestine extremist\ngroups, individuals, or their activities.\n\n\n\n(U)  violent antiwar extremism\n(U//FOUO)  A movement of groups or individuals who advocate or engage in criminal activity and plot acts of violence and terrorism in an attempt to voice their opposition to U.S. involvement in war-related activities.  They often target the military, seats of government power, and defense industry personnel, facilities, and activities.\n(U)  violent religious sects\n(U//FOUO)  Religious extremist groups predisposed toward violence.  These groups often stockpile weapons, conduct paramilitary training, and share a paranoid interpretation of current world events, which they often associate with the end of the world.  They perceive outsiders as enemies or evil influences; display intense xenophobia and strong distrust of the government; and exercise extreme physical or psychological control over group members, sometimes isolating them from society or subjecting them to physical or sexual abuse and harsh initiation practices.\n(U)  white nationalism\n(U//FOUO)  A term used by white supremacists to emphasize\nwhat they perceive as the uniquely white (European) heritage of the United States.\n(U)  white power\n(U//FOUO)  A term used by white supremacists to describe\ntheir pride in and the perceived superiority of the white race.\n(U)  white separatism\n(U//FOUO)  A movement of groups or individuals who\nbelieve in the separation of races and reject interracial marriages.  Some advocate the secession of specific geographic regions from the rest of the United States. Members have been known to advocate or engage in criminal activity and plot acts of violence and terrorism in an attempt\nto advance their extremist goals.\n(U)  white supremacist movement\n(U//FOUO)  Groups or individuals who believe that whites\nCaucasiansare intellectually and morally superior to other\nraces and use their racist ideology to justify committing crimes, acts of violence, and terrorism to advance their cause. Some advocate racial separation/segregation.\nWhite supremacists generally fall into six categories:\nNeo-Nazi, Ku Klux KlanUSPER, Christian Identity, racist\nskinhead, Nordic mysticism, or Aryan prison gangs. White supremacists have been known to embrace more than one of these categories.\n\n\n\n##\n\n(U)  Reporting Notice: (U)  DHS encourages recipients of this document to report information concerning suspicious or criminal activity to DHS and the FBI.  The DHS National Operations Center (NOC) can be reached by telephone at\n202-282-9685 or by e-mail at NOC.Fusion@dhs.gov.  For information affecting the private sector and critical infrastructure, contact the National Infrastructure Coordinating Center (NICC), a sub-element of the NOC.  The NICC can be reached by telephone at 202-282-9201 or by e-mail at NICC@dhs.gov.  The FBI regional phone numbers can be found online at http://www.fbi.gov/contact/fo/fo.htm.  When available, each report submitted should include the date, time, location, type of activity, number of people and type of equipment used for the activity, the name of the submitting company or organization, and a designated point of contact. (U)  For comments or questions related to the content or dissemination of this document, please contact the DHS/I&A Production Branch at IA.PM@hq.dhs.gov, IA.PM@dhs.sgov.gov, or IA.PM@dhs.ic.gov. (U)  **Tracked by:** TERR-020100-01-05, TERR-020600-01-05, TERR-060100-01-05"
    },
    {
        "text": "# ~ Office Of Government Ethics\n\nfJ 1201 New York Avenue, NW., Suite 500\n\"'~ Washington, DC 20005-3917\n\n# -I>.,Y1\\Fen'T ~\n\nJuly 27,2010\nTracking No.: OGE FOIA FY 10/59 (admin. appeal of FY 10/52)\nThe Office of Government Ethics (OGE) has reviewed its initial determination in response to your July 9, 2010 administrative appeal under the Freedom of Information Act\n(FOIA).\n\nUpon review, OGE is providing an unredacted copy of the record you requested, specifically the Letter for Steven G. Bradbury, Acting Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, from Marilyn L. Glynn, General Counsel, OGE (February 9,2006).\n\nThe official responsible for this FOIA determination is the undersigned. This constitutes the final OGE action on your July 12,2010 FOIA request as administratively appealed.\n\nDonW.Fox General Counsel Enclosure\n\n# Unired Srates ~ Office Of Government Ethics\n\n1201 New York Avenue, NW, Suire 500\nWashington, DC 20005-3917\nFebruary 9, 2006\nSteven G. Bradbury Acting Assistant Attorney General Office of Legal Counsel Department of Justice Washington, DC 20530\nDear Mr. Bradbury:\nThis is in response to the request of your office for the views of the Office of Government Ethics (OGE) with respect to a recent letter from the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) seeking a legal opinion.\n\nThe CIA letter, dated February 2,\n2006, disagrees with an interpretation of 18 U.S.C.\n\n 207(c) that is reflected in OGE Informal Advisory Letter 03 x 9 as well as in oral advice that OGE provided to the CIA last year.\n\nSpecifically, OGE\nhas advised that\n18\nU.S.C.\n\n\n207(c)\napplies to representational contacts with employees of an individual's former agency, even if those employees are serving on a detail to another agency in which the individual did not serve.\n\nThe CIA argues that section 207(c)\napplie~ only to contacts with an individual's own former agency, which does not include contacts by a former CIA\nemployee with current CIA\nemployees who are serving on detail to another agency in the Intelligence Community.\n\nIn our view, this conclusion would be inconsistent with the plain meaning of the statute.\n\nIn the first place, section 207 (c) is not written in terms of a bar on contacts with the individual's former \"agency.\"\nRather, the statute covers contacts with\n\"any officer or employee\" of the individual's former agency, in connection with any matter in which the individual seeks official action by \"any officer or employee\" of the former agency.\n\nThe CIA does not dispute that its detailees remain CIA employees.\n\nTherefore, as long as a former senior CIA employee is contacting a current CIA\nemployee and is seeking official action from a current CIA\nemployee, it does not appear relevant, under the terms of the statute, whether the current CIA employee is serving on a detail to another agency.\n\nThis conclusion follows from the unambiguous language of section 207 (c) itself, even apart from the special provision on detailees found in 18 U.S.C.  207(g)\n1\nSection 207 (g)\nconfirms this conclusion.\n\nThis provision states that detailees from one agency to another agency are deemed employees of both for the duration of the detail.\n\nThus, applying the plain meaning of this provision, a contact with a current CIA employee on detail to another agency would be deemed a contact with an employee of both the CIA and the other agency at the same time.\n\nThe CIA argues that section 207(g) should be read as being applicable only for the purpose of determining what is a former senior employee's former agency.\n\nHowever, section 207(g) begins rr [f) or purposes of this section, rr i. e. , for purposes of section 207 generally, not just for one limited purpose.\n\nThe CIA also points to another provision, section 207 (i) (1), which defines\n\"officer or employee\"\nfor the specific purpose of specifying when the President, Vice President and Members of Congress may not be contacted, under various provisions of section 207; the CIA suggests that if Congress had intended to include detailees among those who could not be contacted in certain circumstances, Congress would have addressed the subject likewise in section 207 (i) .\n\nApart from the fact that section\n207 (i) (1)\naddresses a very spe~ific and unique issue that is irrelevant to the subject of detailees -- i.e., the coverage of conticts with elected officials who generalli are not treated as officers or employees under the conflict of interest laws, pursuant to 18 U.S.C.\n\n\n202 (c)\nit also is significant that the provision uses the phrase \"shall include,\" which usually i~\nnot a term of limitation. See Singer, Sutherland on Statutory Construction 231\n(2000).\n\nMoreover, Congress would have had no reason to include the detailee language in a provision, such as section 207(i) (1), that is limited to the meaning of officer or\n1 We note the CIA's secondary argument that its details are so unique that they do not really constitute details within the meaning of 18 U.S.C.\n\n\n207 (g).\n\nEven if this argument were correct (which is by no means apparent to OGE) , it would not change the fact that the CIA detailees remain CIA employees.\n\nThe plain meaning of section 207(c), therefore, still would prohibi t a former senior employee of the CIA from contacting these current CIA employees in connection with a matter in which the former employee seeks official action from a current CIF~\nemployee, without regard to the operation of section 207(g).\n\nbe of the sole purpose of specifying who may not it were Congress' intent to address the status all purposes under section 207.\n\nemployee for contacted, if detailees for The CIA also argues that its interpretation is supported by the legislative history and purposes of section 207.\n\nIn our view, however, the statutory language is plain and unambiguous, as described above.\n\nThere is, therefore, no need either to resort to the legislative history or to engage in the exercise of discerning which interpretation best serves the various purposes that have been ascribed to section 207\nby: various sources over the years.\n\nSee,~, United States v. Medico Indus., Inc., 784 F.2d 840, 844 (1986)\n(section 207 grew out of certain legislative concerns \"but is not limited to themn).\n\nNevertheless, we db believe that aGE's view is more consistent with the legislative history of the statute.\n\nPrior to 1989, the CIA's arguments would have had more force.\n\nThe statute then applied only to particular matters that were\n\"pendingn before the individual's former \"department or agencyn or in which the fo~mer \"department or agency\" at least had \"a direct and substantial interest.\"\nHowever, section 207 (c)\nwas amended by the Ethics Reform Act of 1989, largely in response to the Nofziger case, in which the defendant argued that he lacked knowledge that his former agency had a direct and substantial interest in a particular matter at the time when he contacted an employee of the agency.\n\nSee United States v. Nofziger, 878 F.2d\n442 (D.C. Cir. 1989).\n\nAs Senator Levin explained, U[wJe correct that misinterpretation in this bill by including a knowing standard only for the act of making the communication with the intent to influence and state that the offense is committed if the former employee seeks official action by an agency or department employee. n\n135\nCongressional Record S15954\n(November 17, 1989) (emphasis added).\n\nThe CIA's interpretation would come close to reinstating the requirement that the matter be pending before the individual's former agency (or at least be one in which the former agency has an interest) r rather than merely a matter in which the individual is seeking action from an employee of the former agency.\n\nWe also believe that aGE's interpretation serves the general legislative purpose, identified by the CIA, of preventing misuse of influence or the appearance thereof.\n\nOne certainly could envision circumstances in which a former senior CIA employee might have the opportunity to use his or her former position to influence a current CIA\nemployee on detail to another agency in the Intelligence Community.\n\nA former CIA\nofficial undoubtedly is more likely than a member of the general public to know current CIA employees on detail, or at least to have a common network of CIA associates. 2\nMoreover, one could anticipate situations in which a current CIA detailee would be inclined, consciously or unconsciously, to accord greater weight or attention to the views of someone whose credentials include recent service in a senior CIA position.\n\nThe CIA cites also the rule of lenity in support of a narrower reading of the statute.\n\nHowever, it does not appear to us that the rule of lenity is applicable here.\n\nAs described above, we believe OGE' s view is compelled by the unambiguous language of the statute, and is consistent with the history and purposes of the statute.\n\nConsequently, there is \"no 'grievous ambigui ty or uncertainty in the language and structure' of the statute\" sufficient to invoke the rule of lenity.\n\n16 Op. O.L.C.\n\n59,\n64\n(1992)\n(quoting Chapman v. United States, 500 U.S.\n\n453,\n463 (1991)).\n\nFinally, guidance on the CIA argues that this subject in the the lack of express OGE\npast supports the CIA's\n2\nCIA states that it is \"unlikely\" that former senior CIA\nemployees would know whether an employee at another agency happens to be a CIA detailee.\n\nWe are in no position to guess how likely it is that a former senior CIA employee would know whether a particular official at another agency in the Intelligence Community is a CIA detailee.\n\nWhen the CIA first consulted with OGE about this question, we were advised that CIA\ndetailees wore badges clearly identifying them as CIA employees, even\" while they were on detail; more recently, however, we were advised that the Intelligence Community is moving to a single badge system for employees of various agencies, so it will no longer be possible to distinguish CIA detailees by their badges.\n\nApart (rom any such factual circumstances I\nhowever, it is not clear that section 207 (c)\neven would apply to situations in which the\" former CIA senior employee does not know that the person he or she is contacting at another agency is actually a CIA\ndetailee.\n\nDespite the post-Nofziger amendments, section 207(c) still reads,\n\"any person who knowingly makes, with the intent to influence, any communication to\" or appearance before any officer or employee of the department or agency in which such person served\" (emphasis added).\n\ninterpretation.\n\nThe simple answer is that OGE did not find it necessary to address this subject in writing until we were presented with the question, posed by a private attorney, in\n03 x 9.\n\nUntil contacted by the CIA concerning this question in the Fall of 2005, we were not aware that any agency was advising former senior employees that they could contact agency employees on detail to another agency.\n\nIn conclusion, we commend the CIA\nfor promptly disseminating new guidance to its employees once the agency determined that prior guidance was inconsistent with 03 x 9.\n\nWe also appreciate the difficulties faced by the agency, especially given its extensive use of details.\n\nNevertheless, we are convinced that the plain meaning of section 207(c)\nand\n(g)\ncannot.support the CIA's preferred interpretation.\n\nIf you have any questions concerning this matter, feel free to contact me, at 202-482-9292, or Rick Thomas of -my staff, at\n202-482-9278.\n\nSincerely,\n~(--'l~\n~\nMarilyn L. Glynn General Counsel RThomas/RT (fw)\\\nCN 4-4\nAG 1-42\nAGt~-29\nReaa File Doug Chapman Patricia Franklin\n~arilyn Bennett"
    },
    {
        "text": "(U//FOUO) Rightwing Extremism:\nCurrent Economic and Political\nClimate Fueling Resurgence in\nRadicalization and Recruitment\n\nIA-0257-09\n\n(U//FOUO)  Rightwing Extremism: Current Economic and Political Climate Fueling Resurgence in Radicalization and Recruitment\n7 April 2009\n(U)  Prepared by the Extremism and Radicalization Branch, Homeland Environment Threat Analysis Division.  Coordinated with the FBI.\n\n\n(U)  Scope (U//FOUO)  This product is one of a series of intelligence assessments published by the Extremism and Radicalization Branch to facilitate a greater understanding of the phenomenon of violent radicalization in the United States.  The information is provided to federal, state, local, and tribal counterterrorism and law enforcement officials so they may effectively deter, prevent, preempt, or respond to terrorist attacks against the United States.  Federal efforts to influence domestic public opinion must be conducted in an overt and transparent manner, clearly identifying United States Government sponsorship.\n\nshould be released to the media, the general public, or over non-secure Internet servers.  Release of this information could adversely affect or jeopardize\n\n(U)  Key Findings (U//LES)  The DHS/Office of Intelligence and Analysis (I&A) has no specific\ninformation that domestic rightwing* terrorists are currently planning acts of violence,\nbut rightwing extremists may be gaining new recruits by playing on their fears about several emergent issues.  The economic downturn and the election of the first African American president present unique drivers for rightwing radicalization and recruitment.\n- (U//LES)  Threats from white supremacist and violent antigovernment groups\nduring 2009 have been largely rhetorical and have not indicated plans to carry out violent acts.  Nevertheless, the consequences of a prolonged economic\ndownturnincluding real estate foreclosures, unemployment, and an inability\nto obtain creditcould create a fertile recruiting environment for rightwing extremists and even result in confrontations between such groups and government authorities similar to those in the past.\n\n- (U//LES)  Rightwing extremists have capitalized on the election of the first\nAfrican American president, and are focusing their efforts to recruit new members, mobilize existing supporters, and broaden their scope and appeal through propaganda, but they have not yet turned to attack planning. (U//FOUO)  The current economic and political climate has some similarities to the\n1990s when rightwing extremism experienced a resurgence fueled largely by an economic recession, criticism about the outsourcing of jobs, and the perceived threat to U.S. power and sovereignty by other foreign powers.\n- (U//FOUO)  During the 1990s, these issues contributed to the growth in the\nnumber of domestic rightwing terrorist and extremist groups and an increase in violent acts targeting government facilities, law enforcement officers, banks, and infrastructure sectors.\n\n- (U//FOUO)  Growth of these groups subsided in reaction to increased\ngovernment scrutiny as a result of the 1995 Oklahoma City bombing and\ndisrupted plots, improvements in the economy, and the continued U.S. standing\nas the preeminent world power. (U//FOUO)  The possible passage of new restrictions on firearms and the return of military veterans facing significant challenges reintegrating into their communities could lead to the potential emergence of terrorist groups or lone wolf extremists capable of carrying out violent attacks.\n\n- (U//FOUO)  Proposed imposition of firearms restrictions and weapons bans\nlikely would attract new members into the ranks of rightwing extremist groups, as well as potentially spur some of them to begin planning and training for violence against the government.  The high volume of purchases and stockpiling of weapons and ammunition by rightwing extremists in anticipation of restrictions and bans in some parts of the country continue to be a primary\nconcern to law enforcement.\n\n- (U//FOUO)  Returning veterans possess combat skills and experience that are\nattractive to rightwing extremists.  DHS/I&A is concerned that rightwing\nextremists will attempt to recruit and radicalize returning veterans in order to boost their violent capabilities.\n(U)  Current Economic and Political Climate (U//FOUO)  DHS/I&A assesses that a number of economic and political factors are\ndriving a resurgence in rightwing extremist recruitment and radicalization activity. Despite similarities to the climate of the 1990s, the threat posed by lone wolves and small\nterrorist cells is more pronounced than in past years.  In addition, the historical election of an African American president and the prospect of policy changes are proving to be a driving force for rightwing extremist recruitment and radicalization.\n- (U)  A recent example of the potential violence associated with a rise in rightwing\nextremism may be found in the shooting deaths of three police officers in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, on 4 April 2009.  The alleged gunman's reaction reportedly was influenced by his racist ideology and belief in antigovernment\nconspiracy theories related to gun confiscations, citizen detention camps, and a Jewish-controlled \"one world government.\"\n\n(U)  Exploiting Economic Downturn (U//FOUO)  Rightwing extremist chatter on the Internet continues to focus on the economy, the perceived loss of U.S. jobs in the manufacturing and construction sectors, and home foreclosures.  Anti-Semitic extremists attribute these losses to a deliberate\nconspiracy conducted by a cabal of Jewish \"financial elites.\"  These \"accusatory\" tactics are employed to draw new recruits into rightwing extremist groups and further radicalize\nthose already subscribing to extremist beliefs.  DHS/I&A assesses this trend is likely to accelerate if the economy is perceived to worsen.\n(U)  Historical Presidential Election (U//LES)  Rightwing extremists are harnessing this historical election as a recruitment tool.  Many rightwing extremists are antagonistic toward the new presidential administration and its perceived stance on a range of issues, including immigration and citizenship, the expansion of social programs to minorities, and restrictions on firearms\n ownership and use.  Rightwing extremists are increasingly galvanized by these concerns and leverage them as drivers for recruitment.  From the 2008 election timeframe to the present, rightwing extremists have capitalized on related racial and political prejudices in expanded propaganda campaigns, thereby reaching out to a wider audience of potential sympathizers.\n\n\n- (U//LES)  Most statements by rightwing extremists have been rhetorical, expressing concerns about the election of the first African American president, but stopping short of calls for violent action.  In two instances in the run-up to the election, extremists appeared to be in the early planning stages of some threatening activity targeting the Democratic nominee, but law enforcement interceded.\n\n\n(U)  Revisiting the 1990s\n\n(U//FOUO)  Paralleling the current national climate, rightwing extremists during the 1990s exploited a variety of social issues and political themes to increase group visibility and recruit new members.  Prominent among these themes were the militia movement's opposition to gun control efforts, criticism of free trade agreements (particularly those with Mexico), and highlighting perceived government infringement on civil liberties as well as white supremacists' longstanding exploitation of social issues such as abortion, inter-racial crimes, and same-sex marriage.  During the 1990s, these issues contributed to the growth in the number of domestic rightwing terrorist and extremist groups and an increase in violent acts targeting government facilities, law enforcement officers, banks, and infrastructure sectors.\n\n(U)  Economic Hardship and Extremism\n\n(U//FOUO)  Historically, domestic rightwing extremists have feared, predicted, and anticipated a cataclysmic economic collapse in the United States.  Prominent antigovernment conspiracy theorists have incorporated aspects of an impending economic collapse to intensify fear and paranoia among like-minded individuals and to attract recruits during times of economic uncertainty.  Conspiracy theories involving declarations of martial law, impending civil strife or racial conflict, suspension of the U.S. Constitution, and the creation of citizen detention camps often incorporate aspects of a failed economy.  Antigovernment conspiracy theories and \"end times\" prophecies could motivate extremist individuals and groups to stockpile food, ammunition, and weapons. These teachings also have been linked with the radicalization of domestic extremist individuals and groups in the past, such as violent Christian Identity organizations and extremist members of the militia movement.\n\n\n(U//FOUO)  Perceptions on Poverty and Radicalization (U//FOUO)  Scholars and experts disagree over poverty's role in motivating violent radicalization or terrorist activity.  High unemployment, however, has the potential to lead to alienation, thus increasing an individual's susceptibility to extremist ideas.  According to a 2007 study from the German Institute for Economic Research, there appears to be a strong association between a parent's unemployment status and the formation of rightwing extremist beliefs in their childrenspecifically xenophobia and antidemocratic ideals.\n\n(U)  Illegal Immigration (U//FOUO)  Rightwing extremists were concerned during the 1990s with the perception\nthat illegal immigrants were taking away American jobs through their willingness to work at significantly lower wages.  They also opposed free trade agreements, arguing that these arrangements resulted in Americans losing jobs to countries such as Mexico. (U//FOUO)  Over the past five years, various rightwing extremists, including militias and white supremacists, have adopted the immigration issue as a call to action, rallying point,\nand recruiting tool.  Debates over appropriate immigration levels and enforcement policy\ngenerally fall within the realm of protected political speech under the First Amendment,\nbut in some cases, anti-immigration or strident pro-enforcement fervor has been directed\nagainst specific groups and has the potential to turn violent. (U//FOUO)  DHS/I&A assesses that rightwing extremist groups' frustration over a\nperceived lack of government action on illegal immigration has the potential to incite individuals or small groups toward violence.  If such violence were to occur, it likely would be isolated, small-scale, and directed at specific immigration-related targets.\n- (U//FOUO)  DHS/I&A notes that prominent civil rights organizations have\nobserved an increase in anti-Hispanic crimes over the past five years.\n\n- (U)  In April 2007, six militia members were arrested for various weapons and\nexplosives violations.  Open source reporting alleged that those arrested had discussed and conducted surveillance for a machinegun attack on Hispanics.\n\n- (U)  A militia member in Wyoming was arrested in February 2007 after\ncommunicating his plans to travel to the Mexican border to kill immigrants\ncrossing into the United States.\n\n(U)  Legislative and Judicial Drivers (U//FOUO)  Many rightwing extremist groups perceive recent gun control legislation as a\nthreat to their right to bear arms and in response have increased weapons and ammunition stockpiling, as well as renewed participation in paramilitary training exercises.  Such activity, combined with a heightened level of extremist paranoia, has the potential to facilitate criminal activity and violence.\n- (U//FOUO)  During the 1990s, rightwing extremist hostility toward government\nwas fueled by the implementation of restrictive gun lawssuch as the Brady Law that established a 5-day waiting period prior to purchasing a handgun and the\n1994 Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act that limited the sale of various types of assault riflesand federal law enforcement's handling of the confrontations at Waco, Texas and Ruby Ridge, Idaho.\n\n- (U//FOUO)  On the current front, legislation has been proposed this year requiring mandatory registration of all firearms in the United States.  Similar legislation was introduced in 2008 in several states proposing mandatory tagging and registration of ammunition.  It is unclear if either bill will be passed into law;\nnonetheless, a correlation may exist between the potential passage of gun control legislation and increased hoarding of ammunition, weapons stockpiling, and paramilitary training activities among rightwing extremists. (U//FOUO)  Open source reporting of wartime ammunition shortages has likely spurred rightwing extremistsas well as law-abiding Americansto make bulk purchases of ammunition.  These shortages have increased the cost of ammunition, further exacerbating rightwing extremist paranoia and leading to further stockpiling activity.\nBoth rightwing extremists and law-abiding citizens share a belief that rising crime rates attributed to a slumping economy make the purchase of legitimate firearms a wise move at this time. (U//FOUO)  Weapons rights and gun-control legislation are likely to be hotly contested subjects of political debate in light of the 2008 Supreme Court's decision in District of Columbia v. Heller in which the Court reaffirmed an individual's right to keep and bear arms under the Second Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, but left open to debate the precise contours of that right.  Because debates over constitutional rights are intense, and parties on all sides have deeply held, sincere, but vastly divergent beliefs, violent extremists may attempt to co-opt the debate and use the controversy as a radicalization tool.\n\n(U)  Perceived Threat from Rise of Other Countries (U//FOUO)  Rightwing extremist paranoia of foreign regimes could escalate or be magnified in the event of an economic crisis or military confrontation, harkening back to the \"New World Order\" conspiracy theories of the 1990s.  The dissolution of Communist countries in Eastern Europe and the end of the Soviet Union in the 1990s led some rightwing extremists to believe that a \"New World Order\" would bring about a world government that would usurp the sovereignty of the United States and its Constitution, thus infringing upon their liberty.  The dynamics in 2009 are somewhat similar, as other countries, including China, India, and Russia, as well as some smaller, oil-producing states, are experiencing a rise in economic power and influence.\n\n- (U//FOUO)  Fear of Communist regimes and related conspiracy theories characterizing the U.S. Government's role as either complicit in a foreign invasion or acquiescing as part of a \"One World Government\" plan inspired extremist members of the militia movement to target government and military facilities in past years.\n\n- (U//FOUO)  Law enforcement in 1996 arrested three rightwing militia members in Battle Creek, Michigan with pipe bombs, automatic weapons, and military\n\nordnance that they planned to use in attacks on nearby military and federal facilities and infrastructure targets.\n\n- (U//FOUO)  Rightwing extremist views bemoan the decline of U.S. stature and\nhave recently focused on themes such as the loss of U.S. manufacturing capability to China and India, Russia's control of energy resources and use of these to pressure other countries, and China's investment in U.S. real estate and corporations as a part of subversion strategy.\n\n(U)  Disgruntled Military Veterans (U//FOUO)  DHS/I&A assesses that rightwing extremists will attempt to recruit and radicalize returning veterans in order to exploit their skills and knowledge derived from military training and combat.  These skills and knowledge have the potential to boost the capabilities of extremistsincluding lone wolves or small terrorist cellsto carry out violence.  The willingness of a small percentage of military personnel to join extremist groups during the 1990s because they were disgruntled, disillusioned, or suffering from the psychological effects of war is being replicated today.\n- (U)  After Operation Desert Shield/Storm in 1990-1991, some returning military\nveteransincluding Timothy McVeighjoined or associated with rightwing\nextremist groups.\n\n-  (U)  A prominent civil rights organization reported in 2006 that \"large numbers\nof potentially violent neo-Nazis, skinheads, and other white supremacists are now\nlearning the art of warfare in the [U.S.] armed forces.\"\n\n- (U//LES)  The FBI noted in a 2008 report on the white supremacist movement\nthat some returning military veterans from the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have joined extremist groups.\n\n(U//FOUO)  Lone Wolves and Small Terrorist Cells (U//FOUO)  DHS/I&A assesses that lone wolves and small terrorist cells embracing violent rightwing extremist ideology are the most dangerous domestic terrorism threat in the United States.  Information\nfrom law enforcement and nongovernmental organizations indicates lone wolves and small terrorist cells have shown intentand, in some cases, the capabilityto commit violent acts.\n- (U//LES)  DHS/I&A has concluded that white supremacist lone wolves pose the most\nsignificant domestic terrorist threat because of their low profile and autonomyseparate from any formalized groupwhich hampers warning efforts.\n\n- (U//FOUO)  Similarly, recent state and municipal law enforcement reporting has warned of the\ndangers of rightwing extremists embracing the tactics of \"leaderless resistance\" and of lone\nwolves carrying out acts of violence.\n\n- (U//FOUO)  Arrests in the past several years of radical militia members in Alabama, Arkansas,\nand Pennsylvania on firearms, explosives, and other related violations indicates the emergence of small, well-armed extremist groups in some rural areas.\n(U)  Outlook (U//FOUO)  DHS/I&A assesses that the combination of environmental factors that echo the 1990s, including heightened interest in legislation for tighter firearms restrictions and returning military veterans, as well as several new trends, including an uncertain economy and a perceived rising influence of other countries, may be invigorating rightwing extremist activity, specifically the white supremacist and militia movements. To the extent that these factors persist, rightwing extremism is likely to grow in strength. (U//FOUO)  Unlike the earlier period, the advent of the Internet and other informationage technologies since the 1990s has given domestic extremists greater access to information related to bomb-making, weapons training, and tactics, as well as targeting of\nindividuals, organizations, and facilities, potentially making extremist individuals and\ngroups more dangerous and the consequences of their violence more severe.  New technologies also permit domestic extremists to send and receive encrypted communications and to network with other extremists throughout the country and abroad, making it much more difficult for law enforcement to deter, prevent, or preempt a violent extremist attack. (U//FOUO)  A number of law enforcement actions and external factors were effective in limiting the militia movement during the 1990s and could be utilized in today's climate.\n- (U//FOUO)  Following the 1995 bombing of the Alfred P. Murrah federal\nbuilding in Oklahoma City, the militia movement declined in total membership and in the number of organized groups because many members distanced\nthemselves from the movement as a result of the intense scrutiny militias received\nafter the bombing.\n\n-  (U//FOUO)  Militia membership continued to decline after the turn of the\nmillennium as a result of law enforcement disruptions of multiple terrorist plots linked to violent rightwing extremists, new legislation banning paramilitary training, and militia frustration that the \"revolution\" never materialized.\n\n- (U//FOUO)  Although the U.S. economy experienced a significant recovery and\nmany perceived a concomitant rise in U.S. standing in the world,  white\nsupremacist groups continued to experience slight growth. (U//FOUO)  DHS/I&A will be working with its state and local partners over the next\nseveral months to ascertain with greater regional specificity the rise in rightwing extremist activity in the United States, with a particular emphasis on the political,\neconomic, and social factors that drive rightwing extremist radicalization.\n(U)  Reporting Notice: (U)  DHS encourages recipients of this document to report information concerning suspicious or criminal activity to DHS and the FBI.  The DHS National Operations Center (NOC) can be reached by telephone at\n202-282-9685 or by e-mail at NOC.Fusion@dhs.gov.  For information affecting the private sector and critical infrastructure, contact the National Infrastructure Coordinating Center (NICC), a sub-element of the NOC.  The NICC can be reached by telephone at 202-282-9201 or by e-mail at NICC@dhs.gov.  The FBI regional phone numbers can be found online at http://www.fbi.gov/contact/fo/fo.htm.  When available, each report submitted should include the date, time, location, type of activity, number of people and type of equipment used for the activity, the name of the submitting company or organization, and a designated point of contact. (U)  For comments or questions related to the content or dissemination of this document, please contact the DHS/I&A Production Branch at IA.PM@hq.dhs.gov, IA.PM@dhs.sgov.gov, or IA.PM@dhs.ic.gov. (U)  **Tracked by:** CRIM-040300-01-05, CRIM-040400-01-05, TERR-010000-01-05"
    },
    {
        "text": "This report summarizes the research, application, and operation of the U.S. government's biometric systems since 2001.\n\nJonathon Phillips, DOC/NIST Scott Swann, FBI/CJIS Elham Tabassi, DOC/NIST Mary Theofanos, DOC/NIST Kimberly Weissman, DHS/US VISIT\nMike Garris, DOC/NIST Michael King, IC Michael Lilienthal, DoD/BTF\nRoss Michaels, DOC/NIST\nChris Miles, DHS/S&T Elaine Newton, DOC/NIST Fernando Podio, DOC/NIST\nAbout the National Science and Technology Council The National Science and Technology Council (NSTC) was established by Executive Order on November 23, 1993. This cabinet-level council is the principal means by which the President coordinates science, space, and technology policies across the Federal Government. NSTC acts as a virtual agency for science and technology to coordinate diverse paths of the Federal research and development enterprise.  An important objective of the NSTC is the establishment of clear national goals for Federal science and technology investments in areas ranging from information technologies and health research to improving transportation systems and strengthening fundamental research. The Council prepares research and development strategies that are coordinated across the Federal agencies to form a comprehensive investment package aimed at accomplishing multiple national goals. For additional information about the NSTC, please visit our website at http://www.ostp.gov/nstc/html/NSTC_Home.html. About the Office of Science and Technology Policy The Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP) was established by the National Science and Technology Policy, Organization and Priorities Act of 1976. OSTP's responsibilities include advising the President in policy formulation and budget development on all questions in which S&T are important elements; articulating the President's S&T policies and programs; and fostering strong partnerships among Federal, state and local governments, and the scientific communities in industry and academe. For additional information about OSTP, please visit our website at http://www.ostp.gov. About this Report This report, prepared by the NSTC Subcommittee on Biometrics and Identity Management, highlights key US Government initiatives in advancing the science of biometrics and its utilization in meeting pressing operational needs.  While federal efforts in biometric technologies predate 9/11/2001 by several decades, this report primarily focuses on the breath and impact of the significantly enhanced attention and progress made since that date. Acknowledgements The NSTC Subcommittee on Biometrics and Identity Management would like to thank our partners from the academic, industrial, and privacy communities for their guidance and assistance over the past seven years.  Our scientific and operational successes would not have been possible without this partnership. The Subcommittee offers special thanks to the following Subcommittee members for authoring portions of this paper: Duane Blackburn, EOP/OSTP Tom Coty, DHS/S&T John Cook, NCC Tom Dee, DoD/ATL Jeff Dunn, NSA Patrick Grother, DOC/NIST Mike Hogan, DOC/NIST\n\n\nFinally, the Subcommittee would like to thank Heather Rosenker and Megan Hirshey, US-VISIT contractors, for their editorial assistance, as well as the FBI CJIS Division for providing graphics, editing, publishing and printing services in support of this paper. Dear Colleagues: This report, prepared by the National Science and Technology Council (NSTC) Subcommittee on Biometrics and Identity Management, documents key US Government initiatives to advance the science of biometrics and assesses their value in meeting critical operational needs. While federal efforts in biometric technologies predate the terrorist attacks of September 2001 by several decades, this report focuses on progress made since then.\nWorking through the NSTC, and in cooperation with the academic and industrial research communities, agencies embarked on a multi-year initiative to advance the capabilities of biometric technologies. As capabilities advanced, agencies quickly incorporated them into their operational systems and then worked to develop government-wide policies on how to use biometrics to support missions against known and suspected terrorists, while simultaneously enhancing privacy protection for US Citizens and foreign visitors. By developing a common planning focus for departments and agencies we have advanced the technology and its operational implementation at a far greater pace than would have been possible otherwise. Today, federal agencies are using biometrics to enhance security and operational efficiency throughout the nation, at the borders and in the battlefields of Afghanistan and Iraq. Their continued efforts to meet the ongoing needs outlined in The National Biometrics Challenge will ensure even greater successes in the future.\n\n\n\nSincerely,\n\nJohn H. Marburger, III Director\n\n## Introduction\n\nOn September 11, 2001, 19 terrorists boarded aircraft in Boston, Mass., and Dulles, Va., and changed our world.  All had successfully passed through security screening prior to boarding the aircraft and, previously, had also successfully passed through immigration screening while entering the country.  A suspected 20th terrorist had been refused entry by a suspicious immigration inspector at Florida's Orlando International Airport the previous month.  Of the remaining 19 terrorists, 18 had been issued U.S. identification documents.  The global war on terror had reached American soil, and the terrorists had already realized how important identity was to be in this fight.\n\n\"Sources of identification are the last opportunity to ensure that people are who they say they are and to check whether they are terrorists.\" While these terrible events were unfolding, a group of approximately 30 individuals from government, industry, and academia were in a hotel conference room in Orlando, Fla., at a Biometric Interoperability, Performance and Assurance Working Group1 meeting.  Cell phones and beepers started going off, alerting the workshop attendees of the ongoing terrorist attacks. The thoughts of those present were initially the same as those of any other citizen:  \"What is going on? Do I know anyone that may be hurt?\" These individuals were participating in a pre-conference workshop of the Biometric Consortium, an interagency body to discuss and coordinate biometric activities within the federal government.\nThe conference that was to have started the next day would have been a small affair consisting of approximately three hundred technologists working on the bleeding edge of a nascent technology.  The agenda for that conference did not include any presentations on active or planned government biometric systems.  This small group knew that the world had instantly changed and that their tiny world of biometrics was about to experience significant change, as it would soon be called upon to help enhance security in many facets of government business.  The group did not yet grasp the extent of this calling, nor how unprepared the community was to meet it.\n\n\n\n## Initial Reactions\n\nBiometrics was still very much a nascent technology and had not had a chance to properly mature before being thrust into the national spotlight.  Cross-mission biometric standards were practically non-existent.  The science of biometric testing was very much in its infancy with only one open, statistically relevant, evaluation of commercial biometrics having been performed. Government, industry, and academia had little experience working collaboratively within each sector, much less across sectors.  The media had virtually no knowledge of biometric technologies and issues, and those with this knowledge had little experience working with the media.  The hole was filled by instant experts, which led to numerous inaccurate press articles. Numerous entities with little to no understanding of biometrics technologies, of how to introduce users to the technology, or of how to ensure privacy, nonetheless rushed to be the first to install them.  The results were predictable and established a feeling of distrust of the technology throughout the country that still exists to some degree today. The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) quickly established, with support and guidance from the Department of Defense, the Aviation Security Biometrics Working Group (ASBWG) to perform an initial analysis of the efficacy of integrating biometrics into airport security systems.\nThe rapid (less than two months) work of this *ad hoc* group not only provided a reality check for the FAA and a foundation for biometric decisions in the soon-to-be-created Transportation Security Administration (TSA), but also identified several difficult issues that would need dedicated attention by government agencies for some time to come.  Indeed, although aviation security was the primary focus for biometric applications in the immediate aftermath of 9/11, the possibilities for applying biometrics to homeland security and counterterrorism were quite broad. Federal agencies faced an unenviable task of having limited in-house biometrics expertise while simultaneously managing five critical activities:\n- Rapidly  integrating existing biometric capabilities into operational systems to meet critical short-term needs;\n- Advancing technology so that future systems better met long-term operational needs;\n- Advancing privacy theory and applying it to biometric activities; - Overcoming technical, policy, and interagency trust issues to transition from traditional, stove-piped operational systems to government-wide interoperability of systems to meet counter-terrorism needs;\n- Educating government officials and the citizenry about biometric technologies, their capabilities and limitations, and how they should be used.\n\n\nThis report examines how these five key activities have been addressed since 2001 across four operational areas:  immigration and border management, law enforcement, intelligence and counterterrorism, and access control and credentialing.  Although this report breaks out biometric activities by agency, this does not mean that each agency's biometric initiatives have been developed in a vacuum.  On the contrary, agencies have laudably avoided stovepipes in order both to drive innovation and to achieve interoperability.  A close reading of this report will reveal that cross-agency collaboration on biometric initiatives has been significant and directly contributed both to advancing biometric science and to enhancing federal operations.\n\n## General Timeline Of Federal Government Biometric Activities\n\nKey -\nPolicy, Legislation, and General Events\n-\nResearch, Development, Testing and Evaluation; Standards\n-\nOperations\n\n1967 - The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and NIST begin research on technologies\nfor the automated matching of fingerprints.\n1986 - ANSI/NBS-ICST 1-1986 \"American National Standard - for Information Systems -\nFingerprint Identification - Data Format for Information Interchange\" is adopted.\n1992 - The Biometric Consortium is established within the U.S. government. 1993 - The Department of Defense (DoD) initiates the FacE REcognition Technology\n(FERET) program.\n- Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) initiates INSPASS using hand\ngeometry at ports of entry to facilitate the inspection of business travelers to the US (using special kiosks and lanes that bypass the normal inspection lanes)\n1994 - FBI plans development of the Integrated Automated Fingerprint Identification\nSystem (IAFIS).\n- INS' IDENT system becomes operational.\n1995 - Iris prototype becomes available as a commercial product.\n- INS uses facial recognition and voice recognition to verify the identity of preenrolled persons in vehicles crossing the border at Otay Mesa, California using a special, dedicated lane.\n1996 - The Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 becomes\nlaw.\n- NIST begins hosting annual speaker recognition evaluations. - INS opens the first fully automated Port of Entry at Scobey, Montana relying upon\nvoice verification technology\n1997 - The Human Authentication Application Program Interface (API), the first\ncommercial, generic, biometric interoperability standard is published.\n1998 - The Department of State (DOS) begins collecting biometrics from Mexican nationals\napplying to enter the United States with a Border Crossing Card (BCC).\n1999 - FBI's IAFIS major components become operational.\n2000 - The first Face Recognition Vendor Test (FRVT 2000) is held.\n- DoD establishes its Biometrics Management Office (BMO) and Biometrics Fusion\nCenter (BFC).\n- The Visa Waiver Program Act of 2000 becomes law. - The Defense Advance Research Projects Agency (DARPA) begins the Human\nIdentification at a Distance (HumanID) Program.\n- The Biometric Application Programming Interface (BioAPI) specification is released.\n2001 - The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 occur.\n- FAA establishes Aviation Security Biometrics Working Group. - INCITS establishes M1 Technical Committee on Biometrics. - The USA PATRIOT Act becomes law.\n- The Center for Identification Technology Research (CITeR) begins operation as a\nNational Science Foundation Industry/University Cooperative Research Center.\n2002 - The Enhanced Border Security and Visa Entry Reform Act becomes law.\n- The ISO/IEC SC 37 standards subcommittee on biometrics is established. - The Maritime Transportation Security Act becomes law, establishing the\nTransportation Worker Identification Credential (TWIC).\n- FRVT 2002 is held. - The E-Government Act of 2002 becomes law.\n\n2003 - DOS begins collecting biometrics from visa applicants through the\nBioVisa program.\n- The National Science and Technology Council charters a Subcommittee on\nBiometrics to coordinate biometrics research and development (R&D), policy, outreach, and international collaboration across the federal government.\n- ICAO adopts blueprint to integrate biometrics into machine-readable travel\ndocuments.\n- The Department of Justice (DOJ), DOS and NIST submit joint Patriot Act report to\nCongress on \"Use of Technology Standards and Interoperable Databases with Machine-Readable, Tamper-Resistant Travel Documents\"\n- Testing for the Fingerprint Vendor Technology Evaluation (FpVTE 2003) begins. - NIST begins Proprietary Fingerprint Template (PFT) testing. - Homeland Security Presidential Directive (HSPD) 6 establishes the Terrorist\nScreening Center.\n2004 - HSPD-11 establishes a coordinated and comprehensive approach to terroristrelated screening.\n- HSPD-12 calls for standard, government-wide personal identification verification\n(PIV) credentials for all federal employees and contractors.\n- Face Recognition Grand Challenge begins. - International Meeting of Biometrics Experts held. - DHS' US-VISIT program begins collecting biometrics from international visitors at\nall international air, sea, and land border ports of entry.\n- AirNexus kickoff - facilitated travel program operated jointly with the Government\nof Canada using iris verification at kiosks for pre-enrolled travelers\n- Slap Fingerprint Segmentation Evaluation 2004 (SlapSeg04). - DoD's IAFIS-compatible database, Automated Biometric Identification System\n(ABIS), becomes operational.\n- The fingerprint Minutiae Interoperability Exchange 2004 (MINEX 04) tests begin.\n- The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act becomes law. - DHS and NIST initiate a program to develop human computer interaction (HCI)\nguidelines and standards for biometric systems.\n- The first statewide automated palm print databases in the United States are\ndeployed in California, Connecticut, and Rhode Island.\n- The first Common Biometric Exchange Formats Framework (CBEFF) ANSI standard\nis published.\n- NIST Fingerprint Image Quality assessment tool is released.\n2005 - NIST issues standards for federally mandated, government-wide PIV cards.\n- NIST hosts the 10-Print Capture Scanner & Software Requirements Workshop. - The Iris Challenge Evaluation 2005 (ICE 2005) Program is held. - The European Commission hosts a \"Workshop on Ethical and Social Implications\nof Biometric Identification Technology:  Toward an International Approach.\"\n2006 - DoD reorganizes the BMO and the BFC into the Biometrics Task Force (BTF).\n- FRVT 2006 is held. - First international *NIST Biometric Quality Workshop* is held. - Defense Science Board launches Task Force to study biometrics in the DoD. - DHS hosts the 10-Print Capture User Group Industry Day. - NIST holds the Latent Fingerprint Testing Workshop. - Agencies, working through the NSTC, begin the process of designing governmentwide biometric system interoperability.\n- The President approves the *National Implementation Plan for the War on Terror.* - www.biometrics.gov is launched. - *The National Biometrics Challenge* is issued. - ICE 2006 is held. - The United States hosts the \"International Conference on Biometrics and Ethics\"\n2007 - Agencies, working through the NSTC and National Counterterrorism Center, begin\ncollaboration to improve the coordination of biometric activities to support efforts against known and suspected terrorists.\n- TWIC Enrollment and Issuance begins. - Technology demonstrations for the Fast Capture Rolled-Equivalent Finger/Palm\nPrint Initiative begin.\n- NSTC expands the focus of its existing biometrics subcommittee, creating the\nNSTC Subcommittee on Biometrics and Identity Management.\n- NIST conducts Phase I of the Evaluation of Latent Fingerprint Technologies (ELFT). - ANSI/NIST-ITL 1-2007 - Data Format for the Interchange of Fingerprint, Facial, &\nOther Biometric Information - Part 1 is adopted.\n- NIST conducts MINEX II (Fingerprint Match on Card). - DHS *Privacy Technology Implementation Guide* is issued. - NSTC Policy for Enabling the Development, Adoption and Use of Biometric\nStandards is issued.\n- NIST releases public domain build instructions for the Multimodal Biometric\nApplication Resource Kit (MBARK).\n- DOS begins deploying 10-fingerprint collection at all visa-issuing posts. - US-VISIT begins deploying 10-fingerprint collection at all U.S. airports.\n2008 - The NSTC Task Force on Identity Management is chartered.\n- The Multiple Biometric Grand Challenge (MBGC) begins. - DHS begins accepting applications for the Global Entry expedited trusted traveler\nprogram.\n- FBI plans development of the Next Generation Identification System to incorporate\nmultimodal biometrics.\n- NSTC *Registry of USG Recommended Biometric Standards* is issued. - The President issues NSPD-59/HSPD-24:  Biometrics for Identification and\nScreening to Enhance National Security.\n- The International Workshop on Usability and Biometrics is held. - ANSI/NIST-ITL 2-2008 - XML Data Format for the Interchange of Fingerprint, Facial\n& Other Biometric Information - Part 2 is adopted.\n\n## Advancing The Science Of Biometrics\n\nTo ensure that U.S. biometrics-based systems would meet the government's long-term\noperational needs, the U.S. government recognized the need to improve its understanding of\nbiometrics and lead the effort to advance the technology's capabilities.  After 9/11, the\nfederal government initiated a series of activities focused on research, development, testing,\nand evaluation (RDT&E), as well as standards development.  These activities were\ncollaboratively planned, funded, and managed by multiple federal agencies, as coordinated through the NSTC Subcommittee on Biometrics and Identity Management.  Scientists at the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) often provided technical leadership\nand performed day to day management of the individual projects. These activities have enabled the U.S. government to establish new, and enhance existing,\nbiometrics-based systems that are both improving the security of the United States and maintaining personal privacy and civil liberties.  The following section of this report addresses the U.S. government's progress to date on RDT&E and development of biometric standards.\n\nRDT&E and Standards Timeline\n\n1993 - DoD initiates the FacE REcognition Technology (FERET) program.\n1996 - NIST begins hosting annual speaker recognition evaluations. 1997 - The Human Authentication API, the first commercial, generic biometric\ninteroperability standard, is published.\n2000 - The first Face Recognition Vendor Test (FRVT 2000) is held.\n- The Defense Advance Research Projects Agency (DARPA) begins the Human\nIdentification at a Distance (HumanID) Program.\n- The Biometric Application Programming Interface (BioAPI) specification is released.\n2001 - The Center for Identification Technology Research (CITeR) begins operation as a\nNational Science Foundation Industry/University Cooperative Research Center.\n- INCITS establishes M1 Technical Committee on Biometrics.\n2002 - The ISO/IEC SC 37 standards subcommittee on biometrics is established.\n- FRVT 2002 is held.\n2003 - The NSTC charters a Subcommittee on Biometrics to coordinate biometrics R&D,\npolicy, outreach, and international collaboration across the federal government.\n- Testing for the Fingerprint Vendor Technology Evaluation (FpVTE 2003) begins. - NIST begins Proprietary Fingerprint Template (PFT) testing.\n2004 - Face Recognition Grand Challenge begins.\n- Slap Fingerprint Segmentation Evaluation 2004 (SlapSeg04). - The fingerprint Minutiae Interoperability Exchange 2004 (MINEX 04) tests begin. - DHS and NIST initiate a program to develop human computer interaction (HCI)\nguidelines and standards for biometric systems.\n- The first Common Biometric Exchange Formats Framework (CBEFF) ANSI standard\nis published.\n\n- NIST Fingerprint Image Quality assessment tool is released.\n2005 - NIST issues standards for federally mandated, government-wide PIV cards.\n- NIST hosts the 10-Print Capture Scanner & Software Requirements Workshop. - The Iris Challenge Evaluation 2005 (ICE 2005) Program is held.\n2006 - FRVT 2006 is held.\n- The first international *NIST Biometric Quality Workshop* is held. - DHS hosts the 10-Print Capture User Group Industry Day. - NIST holds the Latent Fingerprint Testing Workshop. - *The National Biometrics Challenge* is issued. - ICE 2006 is held.\n2007 - Technology demonstrations for the Fast Capture Rolled-Equivalent Finger/Palm\nPrint Initiative begin.\n- NIST conducts Phase I of the Evaluation of Latent Fingerprint Technologies (ELFT). - ANSI/NIST-ITL 1-2007 - Data Format for the Interchange of Fingerprint, Facial, &\nOther Biometric Information - Part 1 is adopted.\n- NIST conducts MINEX II (Fingerprint Match on Card). - NSTC Policy for Enabling the Development, Adoption and Use of Biometric\nStandards is issued.\n- NIST releases public domain build instructions for the Multimodal Biometric\nApplication Resource Kit (MBARK).\n2008 - The Multiple Biometric Grand Challenge (MBGC) begins.\n- NSTC Registry of USG Recommended Biometric Standards is issued. - The International Workshop on Usability and Biometrics is held. - ANSI/NIST-ITL 2-2008 - XML Data Format for the Interchange of Fingerprint, Facial\n& Other Biometric Information - Part 2 is adopted.\n\n1. Research, Development, Test & Evaluation (RDT&E)\n\nAfter 9/11, the U.S. government has primarily focused its RDT&E efforts on four biometricsface, finger, iris, and multimodal.  Agencies throughout the U.S. government, working with partners from industry and academia, have contributed to these efforts.  All federal biometrics RDT&E is closely prioritized and coordinated through the NSTC Subcommittee on Biometrics and Identity Management and often involves joint sponsorship and project management from multiple agencies.  Prioritized RDT&E needs are described in *The National Biometrics Challenge*.  A brief summary of RDT&E efforts is provided in this section.  Additional detail about each effort is provided in Appendix A.\n\na. Face Recognition As face recognition technology became commercialized in the late 1990s, the government needed a way to measure the performance of these systems in a statistically relevant manner.  In 2000, the U.S. government began a series of evaluations for face recognition systems, known as the Face Recognition Vendor Tests (FRVT), which were continued after the attacks of 9/11.  There have been\n\nthree FRVT evaluations since 2000.  Each successive evaluation increased in size, difficulty, and complexity.  These evaluations not only provided snapshots in time of face recognition capabilities, but also drove continuing advancement of the technology world-wide.  The most recent FRVT results also showed that several automatic face recognition algorithms were comparable to or better than humans at recognizing faces taken under different lighting conditions.\n\n\n\nThe reduction in error rate for state-of-the-art face recognition algorithms as documented through the FERET, the FRVT 2002, and the FRVT 2006 evaluations. The Face Recognition Grand Challenge (FRGC) was initiated in 2004 to improve face recognition verification performance by an order of magnitude over the FRVT 2002 results.  Challenge problems were developed with a set of experiments designed to guide technology development to meet U.S. government operational requirements. The government also sponsored the Face Recognition Advanced Study Workshop in 2005.  The purpose of the workshop was twofold:  to discuss advancement hurdles, recent seminal works related to those hurdles, and ideas for future research topics; and to stimulate research and cross-institution collaboration among the most promising young scientists in the maturing field.  A total of 55 individuals participated in this invitation-only workshop, where participants were generally sequestered for two and a half days of intensive technical deliberations.\nThe workshop's format was similar to defending a PhD dissertation before the nation's recognized experts and produced highly interactive discussions.\n\n\nb. Fingerprint Identification and Verification Since 2001, the U.S. government has increased its efforts to advance and evaluate fingerprint recognition technology.  The government has conducted vendor technology evaluations, Proprietary Fingerprint Template (PFT) testing, slap fingerprint segmentation evaluations, fast fingerprint slap and rolled-equivalent capture, latent fingerprint testing, and fingerprint minutiae interoperability testing.\n\n\n\nThe U.S. government began the Fingerprint Technology Vendor Evaluation (FpTVE) in 2003.  It was the most comprehensive independent evaluation of fingerprint matching systems ever executed, particularly in terms of the number and variety of systems and fingerprints.  From this testing, the U.S. government learned that top-performing systems performed consistently well over a variety of image types and data sources, and they produced matching accuracy results that were substantially different from less robust systems. The testing also statistically confirmed the degree to which the use of additional fingers improve accuracy, as well as the degradation of accuracy caused by the collection of poor-quality fingerprints.  Additionally, this test showed that fingerprint scanners alone do not determine fingerprint image quality. Through Proprietary Fingerprint Template (PFT) testing, the U.S. government continues to test fingerprint-based biometric matching systems using vendorsupplied software development kits.  The PFTs measure the state-of-the-art in one-to-one matching for verification over a wide range of fingerprint image qualities.  This testing is important to ensure that the fingerprint matching algorithms being used in existing and planned government systems are state of\nthe art. To assess the accuracy of algorithms used to segment slap fingerprint images into individual fingerprints, the U.S. government has conducted Slap Fingerprint Segmentation Evaluations since 2004.  In the first Slap Fingerprint Segmentation test, SlapSeg 04, the U.S. government evaluated segmentation algorithms on a variety of operational-quality slap fingerprints based on their abilities to produce highly matchable images, identify finger positions, and detect segmentation failures.\n\n In particular, information obtained through SlapSeg 04 has played a critical role in the work of the Department of Justice (DOJ) and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to make their fingerprint databases, IAFIS and IDENT\nrespectively, interoperable.  The National Institute of Standards and Technology\n(NIST) plans a new series of segmentation evaluations called SlapSeg II that will provide the U.S. government with information about how the current state of the art in slap segmentation has advanced. The U.S. government has also worked to advance both rolled-equivalent and slap capture devices.  In 2004, the U.S. government began the Fast Capture Rolled-Equivalent Finger/Palm Print Initiative, a multi-year, applied research program.  The goal of this effort is to enable the ability to capture rolled-equivalent fingerprints in 15 seconds or less and both palms in 1 minute or less.  In 2005, agencies across the U.S. government identified joint needs for faster, smaller, slap capture 10-fingerprint scanners.  The agencies issued a Request for Information and held two industry days at which they set their operational requirements and then refined their operational requirements after industry's initial response with fingerprint scanners.  Today, the slap capture\n10-fingerprint scanners procured through this process are being used at U.S.\n\nvisa-issuing posts, ports of entry, and for civilian background checks.\n\n\n\nA U.S. Customs and Border Protection officer demonstrates how an international\nvisitor should place her fingers on the scanner during the entry process. The federal government is also conducting a series of tests to evaluate the state of the art in automated latent fingerprint matching, called Evaluation of Latent Fingerprint Technologies (ELFT).  ELFT is structured as a multi-year project.\nThe first part of this project consists of two phases running in a \"lights-out\" environment.  Phase I was completed in 2007 and represents a proof-of-concept test whose main purpose was to demonstrate integrity of the software, including the evaluation of the test-bed itself.  Phase II is currently under way and employs a larger database to quantify the achievable performance (\"hit rate\") for automated searches. Finally, the federal government established the Minutiae Interoperability Exchange (MINEX) program to determine the feasibility of using minutiae data\n(rather than image data) as the interchange medium for fingerprint information between different fingerprint matching systems.  This program is made up of three tests with a fourth test planned, and the results from these tests have been influential on various biometric-based identity management programs.  These tests have helped define the structure of an identity credential, established a test to which vendors can submit their products to ensure PIV compliance, and demonstrated the use of match-on-card verification algorithms as a means of privacy enhancement.\n\nc. Iris Recognition The U.S. government funded iris recognition research for several years prior to 9/11.  While iris recognition technology garnered acceptance as a highly accurate biometric, it required a high degree of cooperation from the user.  To improve the utility, performance, and ease-of-use of this technology, the U.S. government substantially increased its investment after 9/11.  Notable advancements that can be attributed to this investment and foresight include but are not limited to: increased standoff distances, increased system performance (while reducing size and cost), and the demonstration of prototypes capable of acquiring and matching the iris of subjects while moving through a portal.  In addition, the U.S. government has sponsored the development of multiple matching algorithms, including government-owned algorithms.\n\nOther areas of influence include the sponsorship of academic programs to create U.S. experts and spawn new technologies that encourage commercial competition and foster the rapid introduction of technological advancements.  In addition, the U.S. government has sponsored the development of multiple analysts' tools that augment automated iris match algorithms to address the needs of a broad array of government, industry, and academic partners.  These activities have significantly advanced the state of the art and enabled interoperable iris biometric technology.\n\nd. Multimodal Biometric Identification Prior to 9/11, the U.S. government had already begun efforts to develop automated, multimodal systems for identifying people at a distance for protection and early warnings against asymmetric threats.  One such effort was the Defense Advance Research Projects Agency's (DARPA) Human Identification at a Distance (HumanID)\nProgram, which began in September 2000.  The state-ofthe-art capability at that time on cooperative subjects, indoors, with controlled illumination was less than 10 feet.  Various types of biometric technology were explored, to include face recognition, iris recognition, Doppler radar, infrared imagery, pulse and heartbeat, and gait (recognizing someone by their walk).  By the end of the program in 2003, some technology had improved from being able to recognize people at less than 10 feet to being capable of recognizing people at up to 150 feet.  Overall, the HumanID program made significant gains in understanding the difficulties associated with biometric technology and provided the ground work for numerous future biometric research programs.\n\n\n\nToday, the U.S. government is managing the Multiple Biometric Grand Challenge\n(MBGC) to foster theory and systems that can smartly use multiple biometric technologies.  The MBGC's first set of results are planned for early 2009. Additionally, the U.S. government developed the Multimodal Biometric Application Resource Kit (MBARK).  MBARK is public domain source code that provides a consistent and usability-tested user interface, which means that operators can more quickly recover from both minor mistakes and major hardware failures.\n\ne. Biometric Quality Results from as early as FpVTE 2003 clearly demonstrate that one of the most significant factors affecting biometric accuracy is that of quality.  Test and evaluations demonstrate time and again that many algorithms perform well on high-quality biometric samples, but what separates the crowd is how algorithms perform on poor-quality samples.  An effective quality measure can have many uses, but circa 2003, no publicly open or standard quality metrics existed.  To address this gap, the federal government created a Biometrics Quality Program. If quality can be improved, either by sensor design, user interface design, or standards compliance, better performance can be realized.  For those aspects of quality that cannot be designed-in, an ability to analyze the quality of a live sample is needed.  This is useful primarily in initiating the reacquisition from a user, but also for the real-time selection of the best sample and the selective invocation of different processing methods.  That is why quality measurement algorithms are increasingly deployed in operational biometric systems.  With the increase in deployment of quality algorithms, the need to standardize an interoperable way to store and exchange biometric quality scores increases.\n\n Since 2004, the federal government has focused on standards, tools, guidance, and workshops.\n- Standards.  The federal government actively participates in SC 37 and M1\nquality standardization activities, including making significant contributions to the draft ISO/IEC 2974 standard.\n- Tools.   The federal government released the NIST Fingerprint Image\nQuality (NFIQ) algorithm in August of 2004.  NFIQ is a fingerprint\nquality measurement tool.  It is implemented as open-source software and\nis used today in U.S. government and commercial deployments.  Its key innovation is to produce a quality value from a fingerprint image that is directly predictive of expected matching performance, and it has been designed to be matcher independent.  There is now international consensus\nin industry, academia, and government that a statement of a biometric sample's quality should be related to its recognition performance.  Since its release, NFIQ has won national and international acceptance and has\nbecome a *de facto* standard.\n- Guidance.  NIST has published a technical contribution and guidance\ntoward quality summarization, examined methods of assessing how effective a quality algorithm is in predicting performance, and conducted studies on incorporating quality in multimodal biometric systems.\n- Workshops.  The federal government has hosted a series of international\nBiometric Quality Workshops in March 2006 and November 2007 to discuss capabilities vis-a-vis operational requirements and to identify research needs, testing requirements, and standardization gaps.  The workshops provided a forum for experts to share their research and discuss\nproblems and new developments.\nf. Biometrics Usability A more recent avenue of scientific research is the human computer interaction\n(HCI) of biometric systems.  The federal government recognized this need and initiated a program in 2004 to develop HCI guidelines and standards for biometric systems. The goal of the usability effort is the development and testing of a set of usability guidelines for biometric systems that enhance performance (throughput and quality), improve user satisfaction and acceptance, and provide consistency across biometric system user interfaces.  Achieving these goals requires an understanding of the users, user behavior, and the biometric systems.\n\nFingerprint scanner height and\nangle have a direct influence on image\ncapture, and thus, operational success.\nThe federal government analyzed this\nissue, and developed recommendations\nand adjustable mounting brackets to\nmaximize collection quality over a\ndiverse population. US-VISIT quickly\nimplemented the results of this\nresearch into their operational\ncollection sites.\n\n Six usability research studies have been conducted including the study of the\nimpact of the following.\n- user habituation or acclimatization - counter height and anthropometrics - instructional materials - adaptable devices for accessibility - international symbols - relationship of counter height and angle of fingerprint scanners\n- face overlays\n\nThese research studies have resulted in seven reports and two ISO standards submissions.  These documents provide guidelines for implementation and\ndeployment of biometric applications.  The International Workshop on Usability\nand Biometrics was held in June of 2008 to further promote biometric usability studies.  The test results have had a direct impact on existing and planned\nbiometric deployments within biometrics programs, such as US-VISIT.\n\n\nDuring the entry inspection process, international visitors have their fingers digitally\nscanned and a photograph taken. This process takes only seconds and is easy to do.\n\n\n2. Development of Biometric Standards In addition to studying various biometric technologies, the U.S. government has invested significant efforts into the development of biometric standards.  While some very successful biometric standards activities had existed well before 2001, 9/11 provided an impetus to greatly expand and accelerate comprehensive standards development, as envisioned government and private sector systems required a solid standards base.  The first step was to create formal working/technical groups in accredited standards development organizations to develop generic biometric standards that would support both identification and verification applications.  The U.S. government spearheaded this effort by formally proposing these groups at the national (INCITS - InterNational Committee for Information Technology Standards) and international (Joint Technical Committee 1 of ISO/IEC) levels in October 2001 and January 2002, respectively.  To further support these efforts, the U.S. government also assigned personnel and fiscal resources to lead these efforts.  Since that time, 22 national standards and 25 international standards have been developed and approved.  Several of these standards are now in their second versions.\n\nBy 2007, multiple competing versions of some standards existed2.  To help ensure interoperability of government systems, the NSTC Subcommittee on Biometrics and Identity Management led an interagency effort to develop the NSTC Policy for Enabling the Development, Adoption and Use of Biometric Standards (September 2007).  The goal of this policy is to establish a framework to reach interagency consensus on biometric standards adoption for the federal government and resulted in the release of the Registry of US Government Recommended Biometric Standards (June 2008).  Federal agency adoption of these recommended standards and associated conformity assessment programs will enable necessary next generation federal biometric systems, facilitate biometric system interoperability, and enhance the effectiveness of biometric products and processes.\n\n## Operational Activities\n\nThe use of biometrics by government agencies to enhance operational capabilities has exploded over the past seven years.  On 9/11, there were two major operational systems:  the FBI's Integrated Automatic Fingerprint Identification System (IAFIS) and the Immigration and Naturalization Service's Automated Biometric Identification System, called IDENT, accompanied by a few smaller-scale projects and pilot studies.  Today, biometric systems are being used by numerous programs to establish, authenticate and verify identity.  The sections below highlight some of the federal government's major operational efforts.  While these activities are categorized in this report by agency, most of these efforts required significant interagency collaboration in both their development and operations.\n\nBiometrics Operations Timeline\n\n1993 - Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) initiates INSPASS using hand geometry at ports of entry to facilitate the inspection of business travelers to the US (using special kiosks and lanes that bypass the normal inspection lanes)\n\n1994 - FBI plans development of the Integrated Automated Fingerprint Identification\nSystem (IAFIS).\n- INS' IDENT system becomes operational.\n1995 - INS uses facial recognition and voice recognition to verify the identity of preenrolled persons in vehicles crossing the border at Otay Mesa, California using a special, dedicated lane.\n1996 - INS opens the first fully automated Port of Entry at Scobey, Montana relying upon\nvoice verification technology\n1998 - DOS begins collecting biometrics from Mexican nationals applying to enter the\nUnited States with a Border Crossing Card (BCC).\n1999 - FBI's IAFIS major components become operational. 2000 - DoD establishes its Biometrics Management Office (BMO) and Biometrics Fusion\nCenter (BFC).\n2003 - DOS begins collecting biometrics from visa applicants through the BioVisa\nprogram.\n2004 - DHS's US-VISIT program begins collecting biometrics from international visitors at\nall international air, sea, and land border ports of entry.\n- AirNexus kickoff - facilitated travel program operated jointly with the Government\nof Canada using iris verification at kiosks for pre-enrolled travelers\n- DoD's IAFIS-compatible database, Automated Biometric Identification System\n(ABIS), becomes operational.\n- The first statewide automated palm print databases in the United States are\ndeployed in California, Connecticut, and Rhode Island.\n2006 - DoD reorganizes the BMO and the BFC into the Biometrics Task Force (BTF). 2007 - TWIC enrollment and issuance begins.\n- DOS begins deploying 10-fingerprint collection at all visa-issuing posts. - US-VISIT begins deploying 10-fingerprint collection at all U.S. airports.\n2008 - DHS begins accepting applications for the Global Entry expedited trusted traveler\nprogram.\n- FBI plans development of the Next Generation Identification System to incorporate\nmultimodal biometrics.\n\n1. Department of Defense (DoD) (Law Enforcement/Intelligence/Access Control)\n\nToday, the DoD recognizes and supports the critical role biometrics plays in national security.  Because biometrics makes a difference in the current fight against terrorism, protects the warfighter and the homeland through data sharing with other agencies, and is a tool to bring more effective and efficient business processes to the federal government, it will continue to play a key role in the future security and development of our country and our world.\n\na. History of DoD BiometricsFormalizing, Centralizing, Funding, Access Control The DoD began implementing biometric technologies in 2000 following a feasibility study commissioned in 1999 by the U.S. Congress.  This study demonstrated that biometric technologies were an emerging capability that would have a significant impact on the DoD and needed to be formalized, centralized, and funded.\n\nThe **Biometrics Management Office** (BMO) was established within the chain of command of the Army's Chief Information Officer (CIO/G-6).  The Secretary of the Army was named as Executive Agent (EA) for the DoD, making the BMO the focal point for biometrics for all of the military branches and DoD agencies.  The mission at that time focused on Information Assurance (IA), particularly network access.\n\n\nIn the fall of 2000, the **Biometrics Fusion Center (BFC)** opened in Clarksburg, W.Va.  Reporting to the BMO, the BFC was tasked with testing commercial biometric products for accuracy and compatibility with DoD information systems. Over the next three years, the BMO and BFC were heavily involved in running pilot projects to evaluate the practicality of using biometric technologies for managing both network and physical access.  Work began on designing the backbone architecture needed to pass biometric data securely and quickly between DoD installations and vessels.  Development of standards for biometric templates, files, software, and hardware began in earnest.  The BMO became a significant contributor in the development of DoD, federal, and international standards for biometrics.  At the same time, the BMO began to identify and develop formal policies regarding biometrics as the need arose across the military branches and DoD agencies\nb. DoD Biometrics Post 9/11Identifying Terrorists, Storing, Analyzing Biometric Data After the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the DoD developed a vision for using biometrics to lock down the identity of known or suspected terrorists.  This represented an expansion of the BMO and BFC mission beyond simply keeping American facilities and networks secure.  To accomplish this, the DoD saw the need for a biometric collection and storage system compatible with the FBI's IAFIS.  In 2004, the DoD Automated Biometric Identification System (ABIS) became operational.  This database gave the DoD a centralized storage point for biometric data collected by the military.  In 2006, the BMO and BFC were moved from reporting to the Army CIO to reporting to the Army Chief of Operations (G-\n3/5/7).  At that time, the BMO and BFC were reorganized into the Biometrics Task Force (BTF).\n\n\nAs the ABIS developed, biometric systems that had already been in use for smallscale verification applications were adapted so that the data captured by them would be compatible with ABIS.  Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom made it clear that warfighters needed more advanced tools for distinguishing known terrorists and insurgents from friendly populations and that biometric technologies could help fill that need.\n\n\nThe value of the ABIS and various biometric collection and verification platforms has been repeatedly demonstrated since 2004.  With data in the ABIS expanding to more than 1.5 million records by summer 2007, biometric matches gave the warfighter a tool to aid in distinguishing between friend and foe.  For example, some Iraqi personnel applying for selection to the Iraqi Police Academy were found to have biometric records as terrorists or insurgents.  Some detainees in theater were matched to felony records in the United States.\n\n## Operational Success:  Dod And Fbi Partnership\n\nJoint efforts between the DoD and the FBI to compare biometric\ndatasets showed a previously undiscovered trend:  numerous individuals that the DoD captures in war zones in Iraq and Afghanistan have prior criminal histories in the United States.  This discovery led to even greater collaboration between the two agencies in the war theaters.\n\n\"To date, (the Bureau) has developed more than 2,500 latent fingerprints from items such as cordless telephone circuit boards and remote devices -- even batteries and electrical tape. They have made 60 fingerprint identifications and more than 1,000 forensic matches between IEDs.\"\n--FBI Director Robert Mueller, March 28, 2007\n\nAs the collection, transmission, and storage systems have matured, the frequency of such matches has increased.  At the same time, the response time to answer \"Should I detain or not?\" has decreased, helping the warfighter to protect himself and other Coalition forces by quickly separating suspected enemies from the general population.\n\n\nAlthough the ABIS can quickly determine if there is a biometric match, it cannot determine the value of that match.  Is it a match between the fingerprints of a known terrorist and a police academy applicant or between a previously cleared U.S. facility employee and a police academy applicant?  The need for this \"so what\" information has led to new relationships between DoD law enforcement and the DoD intelligence community.  These groups can determine the value of a match and then help get that answer back to the warfighter who needs to know \"Should I detain or not?\"  Much of the work at the BTF focuses on facilitating the architecture, policy, and relationships that get this information quickly back to the warfighter.\n\n\nBiometric technologies other than fingerprint technologies are also in use throughout DoD.  Prototype iris matching has been performed, resulting in unexpected matches when there were no previous connections between the individual records using only fingerprint data.  When biometric fingerprint records were examined by certified fingerprint examiners, different reported identities were shown to be the same person.  This demonstrates the value not only of iris biometrics, but also that of modality fusion as well. Interagency matches of iris records between the FBI and DoD foreign detainee databases have also yielded results.  Agreements between the DOJ and DoD have made this type of data sharing possible.  The DoD is moving ahead with establishing not only common technical architectures with non-DoD federal agencies, but also the policies to allow sharing of biometric data while ensuring that legal and privacy rules are followed.\n\n The need for biometric technologies in DoD is clear.  As a result, the scope of their deployment will only increase.  Along with using biometrics for identifying the enemy, biometrics will soon be used for managing base, building, and network access in accordance with federal guidelines that ensure commonality across the government.  Identification of the enemy will also increasingly be a shared governmental function, requiring a common architecture and shared infrastructure across the government.  American citizens will not tolerate a situation in which DHS, after taking biometric data, would grant entry into the United States to a person that the DoD can identify as an enemy based on his or her biometric file.  A great amount of work is required to tie together biometric and biographic watch lists and the technical architecture to collect and match biometrics across federal agencies.  DoD, DHS, and DOJ are meeting these challenges.\n\n## C. Today's Dod Biometrics StructureOperating And Synchronizing Technologies And Capabilities Today, Dod Has An Integrated Structure To Program, Develop, And Synchronize Biometric Technologies And Capabilities And To Operate And Maintain Dod's Authoritative Biometric Database To Support The National Security Strategy.\n\nIn October 2006, DoD designated the Director, Defense Research and Engineering (DDR&E), under the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics (USD(AT&L)), as the Principle Staff Assistant for Defense Biometrics with overall responsibility for DoD biometric programs, initiatives, and technologies.  The Biometrics DoD Directive of February 2008 further refined these responsibilities and authorities, including appointing the DDR&E lead for interagency coordination, and outlined the policy roles and responsibilities for all DoD biometric stakeholders.  The BTF executes day-to-day biometric functions and leads coordination for strategic movement forward for all parts of the DoD.  The BTF is supported by multi-Service governance structures that capture Service and user requirements, provide coordination of science and technology efforts, and identify and resolve biometrics-related issues.\n\n## 2. Department Of Homeland Security\n\n\"On 9/11, America was attacked from within, by 19 men who entered our country, hid among us, and then killed thousands.  To stop this from happening again we've taken important steps to prevent dangerous people from entering America.\nWe made our borders more secure, and deployed new technologies for screening people entering America.\"\n\nRemarks by President Bush on the 5th anniversary of DHS.\n\n\n\nThe establishment of DHS, a direct response to the 9/11 attacks, was the most sweeping reorganization of the federal government since the start of the Cold Warmerging 22 different government organizations into a single department with a clear mission:  to protect America from future attacks.  DHS is charged with keeping terrorists and their weapons out of the United States while at the same time providing a welcoming environment for the roughly one million international travelers arriving at U.S. ports each day. A number of organizations within DHS have statutory and regulatory mandates to incorporate biometrics into identity documents for the purpose of freezing identity, searching watchlists, conducting criminal background checks, reducing fraud, improving border and transportation security, and granting benefits and credentialing. DHS directorates maintain their autonomy and responsibility for planning and managing their biometrics efforts; however, to ensure Department-wide coordination on biometric issues and standards, the DHS Biometrics Coordination Group (BCG) was established.\nThe BCG serves as a focal point for intra-departmental planning and coordination on biometrics RDT&E and deployment to operational end-users.  The BCG has been granted delegated authority by the DHS Chief Information Officer and the Under Secretary for Science and Technology to coordinate biometrics technology policy, standards and RDT&E requirements, and to establish a common view of DHS equities on biometrics technology issues before national and international groups.\n\n\n\n## A. Us-Visit (Immigration And Border Management/Law Enforcement/ Intelligence) Challenge\n\n\nThe United States has more than 300 official ports of entry where nearly a half billion crossings occur every year.  The Department of State (DOS) considers more than 9 million visa applications annually.  DHS processes nearly 50,000 requests for asylum annually and processes approximately 30,000 applications for immigration benefits every day.  The U.S. economy depends on the quick and efficient movement of people and goods across our borders.  Among the equally imperative needs for security, law enforcement, travel, immigration, and trade, the United States faces an exceptionally complex challenge that requires unprecedented levels of coordination, advanced technology, innovative thinking, investment, and collaboration.\n\n\nAs the 21st century approached, DHS needed a better system to collect, store, analyze, and share information about international visitors to assess risk and protect the United States from dangerous people.  The Department's initial focus included the development of a biometrics-based entry-exit system for international visitors.  This system would enhance the security of the United States and ensure the integrity of the immigration and border management system while facilitating legitimate travel and trade and protecting the privacy of visitors to the United States.\n\nSOLUTION\nDHS' US-VISIT Program provides biometric identification and analysis services to agencies throughout the immigration and border management, law enforcement, and intelligence communities to accurately identify people and assess whether or not they pose a risk to the United States.  Biometrics form the foundation of US-VISIT's services because they are unique, reliable, convenient, and virtually impossible to forge. The most visible US-VISIT service is the collection and analysis of biometrics digital fingerprints and a photographfrom international visitors at U.S. visa-issuing posts (collection of the biometrics is handled by the DOS BioVisa Program, and US- VISIT provides the analysis of the data against IDENT) and ports of entry.  This service provides US-VISIT customers with the information they need to make efficient and well informed decisions.  US-VISIT systems establish and verify international visitors' identities for U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) or DOS consular officers to help them make admission or visa-issuance decisions.  U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (CIS) uses US-VISIT services to help facilitate requests for immigration benefits.  U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE)\nofficers receive credible leads on immigration violators through US-VISIT. US-VISIT establishes and verifies the identities of illegal migrants apprehended by the U.S. Border Patrol along U.S. land borders and the U.S. Coast Guard at sea.\nUS-VISIT analyzes biometric information collected from locations where terrorists have been, like safe houses or training camps for DoD and the intelligence community, to help them identify terrorists and terror suspects.  US-VISIT's Biometric Support Center analyzes fingerprints for federal, state, and local agencies to solve crimes, identify John or Jane Does, and support terrorist investigations.\n\nPROGRAM OVERVIEW\nBetween 1996 and 2004, Congress passed a series of laws that would enhance the security of the United States and ensure the integrity of the immigration and border management system.  DHS established the US-VISIT program in 2003 as a means to better integrate existing information on international visitors and provide decision makers throughout immigration and border management, law enforcement, and intelligence agencies with the right information at the right time and in the right way. Through the collection, storage, analysis, and sharing of biometric-based information, US-VISIT is meeting congressional mandates and the four core goals set when the program began.  These goals are to enhance the security of the United States, facilitate legitimate travel and trade, ensure the integrity of the immigration system, and protect the privacy of visitors. US-VISIT's initial focus was clear and urgent:  deploy an electronic, automated, integrated entry and exit capability at U.S. airports and seaports by the congressionally mandated deadline of December 31, 2003.  In accordance with this congressionally mandated deadline, US-VISIT deployed the biometric screening capability to U.S. airports and seaports by December 31, 2003, and began collecting visitors' fingerprints and a digital photograph on January 5, 2004.3   At the same time, US-VISIT began testing biometric exit procedures at airports and seaports.  The following timeline demonstrates US-VISIT's incremental deployment of biometrics-based capabilities as of June 2008.\n\n## Operational Success Story __ Fraud Detection\n\nIn March of 2008, a man arrived at New York's JFK International Airport\nand presented a valid passport and an unexpired visa to the CBP\nofficer. The name on his travel documents did not raise any concerns. However, when his fingerprints were checked through US-VISIT, they did not match the fingerprints associated with the visa he presented. In fact, further investigation showed that he was trying to use the visa belonging to his twin brother, who had\nno history of criminal or immigration violations. By matching his biometrics, CBP\nofficers learned that this man had been apprehended for taking photos of a U.S.\n\nmilitary base, had overstayed the term of his admission on a previous visit to the United States, and had been asked to leave voluntarily following a previous deportation hearing. CBP officers prevented this immigration violator from using fraudulent travel documents to enter the United States and removed him\nfrom the country.\n\n2004:\nUS-VISIT deployed biometric entry procedures at all international air,\nsea, and land border ports of entry.\n\n\n3 US-VISIT began processing international visitors through the new biometric entry procedures on January 5, 2004, not December 31, 2003, in order to accommodate the high volume of travel through airports and seaports during the holidays.\n\n\nBioVisa program began.\n\n\nBiometric entry procedures expanded to include visitors traveling under the Visa Waiver Program (VWP).\n\n20042006:  US-VISIT tested biometric exit procedures at 14 major airports and\nseaports.\n\n\nUS-VISIT worked with countries participating in the VWP to meet the\ncongressionally mandated deadline requiring them to issue\ne-Passports.\n\n20052006:  US-VISIT tested radio frequency identification (RFID) technology at\nfive land border ports of entry.\n\n2006:\nUS-VISIT deployed e-Passport readers at the necessary airports to\nprocess visitors traveling under the VWP.\n\n\nUS-VISIT and the U.S. Coast Guard began testing the use of mobile\nbiometric technology to identify illegal migrants at sea.\n\n\nUS-VISIT, DOJ, and state and local law enforcement agencies began testing the first phase of an effort to make US-VISIT's IDENT and the FBI's IAFIS fingerprint databases interoperable.\n\n2007:\nUS-VISIT tested 10-fingerprint collection at U.S. airports.\n\n\nUS-VISIT's biometric technology enables officers to quickly and efficiently verify that international visitors are who they say they are and do not pose a threat to the United States.\n\n\n\n2008:\nUS-VISIT signed a Memorandum of Understanding with the United\nKingdom to collect and transmit biometric and biographic data from U.K. visa applicants at USCIS's Applications Support Centers on\nbehalf of the U.K. government.\n\n\nUS-VISIT published a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM) that\nwould establish biometric exit procedures at U.S. airports and seaports.\nUS-VISIT continues to build on these existing capabilities to continue supporting\nDHS' mission to protect the United States from dangerous people.  By the end of 2008, US-VISIT plans to have the 10-fingerprint collection capability at all U.S. ports of entry, begin the second phase of IDENT/IAFIS interoperability, and provide the DHS Secretary with a report on the challenges and opportunities for deploying biometric exit procedures at land border ports of entry.  Additionally, DHS plans to begin deploying biometric exit at U.S. airports in 2009.  US-VISIT will continue to work with other countries as they develop biometrics-based immigration and border management systems to learn from and share US-VISIT's best practices.\nPRIVACY POLICY\nDHS protects the biometric and biographic information provided by travelers and ensures that their privacy is protected in a manner consistent with all applicable privacy laws and regulations.  Personal information is kept secure and confidential, and appropriate security controls ensure that the data are not used or accessed improperly. US-VISIT publishes Privacy Impact Assessments (PIAs) to ensure that personally identifiable information (PII) is used appropriately, protected from misuse and improper disclosure, and destroyed when no longer needed.  PIAs are updated as needed to ensure they remain current with any changes to the programs and systems. US-VISIT's dedicated privacy officer is responsible for the program's compliance with privacy laws and procedures, as well as creating a culture within the program where privacy is inherently valued, treated as a fundamental right and obligation, and embedded into planning and development processes.  Information on the US-VISIT\nprivacy program is available at *www.dhs.gov/us-visit*. US-VISIT complies with all environmental laws and regulations.  Environmental Impact Assessments conducted prior to deployment of every phase of the program have found no adverse impacts.\n\nAUTHORIZING LEGISLATION AND FUNDING\nUS-VISIT received $330 million in FY04, $340 million in FY05, and $336 million in FY06, and Congress appropriated $362 million for FY07 and $475 million for FY08. The following laws are relevant to the mission and goals of US-VISIT.\n\n- The Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996\n(IIRIRA), Public Law 104-208\n\n\n\n- The Immigration and Naturalization Service Data Management Improvement Act\nof 2000 (DMIA), Public Law 106-215\n\n- The Visa Waiver Permanent Program Act of 2000 (VWPPA), Public Law\n106-396\n\n- The Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools\nRequired to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT) Act, Public Law 107-56\n\n- The Enhanced Border Security and Visa Entry Reform Act of 2002 (EBSVERA),\nPublic Law 107-173\n\n- The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (IRTPA), Public\nLaw 108-458, Section 7208\n\n## B. Transportation Worker Identification Credential (Twic) (Access Control)\n\nCHALLENGE\nSince 9/11, DHS has focused time and attention on enhancing the security of U.S.\n\nports, particularly because of the role the ports play in the U.S. economy.  Each day, $1.3 billion worth of goods move in and out of U.S. ports.  In addition, many major urban centers (more than half of the U.S. population) and significant critical infrastructure are in proximity to U.S. ports or are accessible by waterways.  As points of the entry and exit program, they are critical nodes that affect terrorist travel and transiting of material support or weapons.  The economic, physical, and psychological damage that would result from a significant terrorist attack targeting maritime commerce or exploiting America's vulnerability to sea strikes is difficult to estimate, but the stakes are high.  A significant breakdown in the maritime transport system would send shockwaves throughout the world economy. Maritime security requires a partnership between DHS and all other parties involved in the operation of U.S. ports, including transportation employees.  DHS needed to create a program ensuring those with unrestricted access to the nation's ports did not pose a threat to national security.\n\nSOLUTION\nTWIC is a vital security measure that will help ensure that properly vetted individuals are allowed access to the nation's transportation infrastructure, while denying this access to individuals who pose a threat, do not require unescorted access, or do not warrant access to secure areas of the nation's maritime transportation system.\n\nTWIC was established by Congress in 2002 through the Maritime Transportation Security Act (MTSA) and is administered by the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) and the U.S. Coast Guard.  The TWIC credentials are tamperresistant biometric cards that will be issued to workers who require unescorted access to secure areas of ports, vessels, outer continental shelf facilities, and all credentialed merchant mariners.  It is anticipated that more than one million workers (including longshoremen, truckers, port employees, and others) will be required to obtain a TWIC. The TWIC contains two biometric templates of a person's fingerprint.  These templates are stored on the card in a format that is enciphered using a card-specific TWIC privacy key.  To confirm a cardholder's identity and ensure it matches the stored biometrics, the data on the card are retrieved, deciphered, verified, and matched against a live finger. TWIC uses biometrics for two primary identification purposes:  background screening and verification.  Background screening occurs prior to the issuance of a TWIC and encompasses an FBI criminal history records check and a check of DHS'\nIDENT database.  Post-issuance, biometrics may be used at access control points to ensure that the biometrics of the individual attempting to use the TWIC match those stored within the credential.\n\nPROGRAM OVERVIEW\nThe TWIC final rule was issued in 2007 by TSA.  Enrollment and issuance began at the Port of Wilmington, Del., on October 16, 2007, and will continue through calendar year 2008 and part of 2009. The TWIC rule involves the following:\n\n-\nTSA will collect a worker's biographic and biometric information, including: 10 fingerprints, name, date of birth, address, phone number, photo, employer,\njob title, and, if the worker is not a U.S. citizen, other appropriate information\nto be able to authenticate the worker's immigration and work authorization\nstatus.\n-\nAll individuals that require unescorted access to secure areas of port facilities and vessels regulated under the Maritime Transportation Security Act are required to have a TWIC.  This includes longshoremen, port operator employees, truck drivers, and rail workers.  U.S. merchant mariners who hold an active Merchant Mariner's Document, Merchant Mariner's License, Certificate of Registry, Standards of Training, or a Certification and Watchkeeping Endorsement are also required to obtain a TWIC.\n-\nBackground checks are performed and include a review of criminal history records, terrorist watch lists, legal immigration status, and outstanding wants and warrants.\n-\nTWIC uses smart card technology and includes a worker's photo, name,\nbiometric information, and multiple fraud protection measures.  The card's\ntechnical specifications are consistent with most Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 201-1 requirements and will be interoperable with other federal credentials built to those standards.\n-\nThe program is expected to cover approximately 1.2 million workers and is funded through user fees.  The fee for TWIC will be $132.50, and it is valid for five years.  Workers with current and comparable background checks will\npay a reduced fee of $105.25.\n-\nPort facility and vessel owners and operators are required to implement TWIC\ninto their existing access control systems and operations, purchase and use\ncard readers, and update their approved security plans.\nThe TWIC program is progressing steadily and has opened more than 130 fixed enrollment centers and dozens of mobile sites nationwide.  To date, more than\n350,000 workers have enrolled.  Thousands more are processed each week. The U.S. Coast Guard issued the Merchant Mariner Credential (MMC) rule on the same day as the TWIC final rule.  The MMC regulation works in conjunction with TWIC to streamline the current credentialing process for merchant mariners, as all U.S. merchant mariners will be required to obtain a TWIC.  The TWIC will meet/support the identity verification requirements for MMC holders.  The TWIC will also support electronic verification of MMC attributes in the future.  The Coast Guard and TSA are streamlining the process for the two credentials to reduce costs, duplication of effort, and processing time for mariners.\n\nPRIVACY POLICY\nPrivacy and the security of personal information are critical to the TWIC program.\nInformation collected at the enrollment center or during the pre-enrollment process, including the signed privacy consent form and identity documents, is scanned into the TWIC system for secure storage.  Information is encrypted and stored at a secure government facility using methods that protect the information from unauthorized retrieval or use.\n\n\nTWIC has published a PIA to ensure that personal information is used appropriately, protected from misuse and improper disclosure, and destroyed when no longer needed.  The PIA can be found on the TSA website at www.tsa.gov.\n\nAUTHORIZING LEGISLATION\nThe following laws are relevant to the mission and goals of the TWIC.\n\n- The Maritime Transportation Security Act (MTSA), Public Law 107295\n\n- Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required\nto Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act (USA Patriot Act), Public Law 107-56\n\n- The Aviation Transportation Security Act (ATSA), Public Law 107-71\n\n## C. Global Entry (Immigration And Border Management)\n\nCHALLENGE\nWhile a rigorous inspection process does increase the safety of the nation, long lines can result in irritated travelers, missed connections, and negative impressions of the United States.  This can be especially cumbersome for frequent international travelers who pose no risk to the country.  How can we facilitate U.S. citizens who are not a threat?\n\nSOLUTION\nGlobal Entry is a pilot program managed by U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) that allows pre-approved, low-risk travelers expedited clearance upon arrival into the United States.  Currently, only U.S. citizens and lawful permanent residents are eligible to join.  Upon returning from international travel, Global Entry-enrolled travelers may bypass the regular passport control line and proceed directly to the Global Entry kiosk.  The Global Entry process will require participants to present their machine-readable U.S. passport or permanent residency card, submit their fingerprints for biometric verification, and make a customs declaration at the kiosk's touch screen.  The kiosk will compare the fingerprints presented to the fingerprints on file to confirm the traveler's identity. Upon successful completion of the Global Entry process at the kiosk, the traveler will be issued a transaction receipt and directed to baggage claim and the exit unless chosen for a selective or random secondary referral. On June 10, 2008, Global Entry operations began at John F. Kennedy International Airport, Washington Dulles International Airport, and George Bush Houston Intercontinental Airport.\n\nPRIVACY POLICY\nThe information collected through the online application is secured in the Global Online Enrollment System (GOES) as the system of record for CBP trusted traveler programs.  The personal information provided by applicants, including the fingerprint biometrics, may be shared on a need-to-know basis with other government and law enforcement agencies in accordance with applicable laws and regulations.  The personal information collected through GOES is maintained in a Privacy Act system of records that was last published in the Federal Register on April 21, 2006, (71 FR\n20708).  CBP has also published two PIAs that cover this pilot on the DHS Privacy Office website at http://www.dhs.gov/xinfoshare/publications/editorial_0511.shtm.\nIn addition, an update addressing online functionality of the enrollment process was posted to the DHS Privacy Office website on November 1, 2006.  The applicant's biometrics are stored in DHS' Automated Biometric Identification System (IDENT). The IDENT Privacy Act System of Records Notices (SORNs) was last published on June 5, 2007, (72 FR 31090).\n\nAUTHORIZING LEGISLATION The following laws are relevant to the mission and goals of Global Entry.\n\n- Consolidated Appropriations Act, Public Law 110-161\n- Paperwork Reduction Act, 44 U.S.C. 3501 *et seq*.\n- Federal Information Security Management Act, Public Law 107-347 - Service Data Management Improvement, Public Law 106-205\n\n\n3. Department of Justice (Law Enforcement and Intelligence)\nIn September 2001 the DOJ, through the FBI Criminal Justice Information Services (CJIS) Division, maintained the largest and most advanced biometric database in the world, containing fingerprint biometrics linked to criminal history records contributed by all 50 states and US territories.  CJIS provided biometric identification services and criminal history information services primarily to law enforcement, but also to civil customers for employment and licensing purposes. In the months following 9/11, Congress tasked the Attorney General with leading a number of interagency studies and making recommendations on the feasibility of expanding the use of biometric identification services for additional civil purposes such as visa screening.  Today, the DOJ, DOS, DHS, and DoD all have established biometrics programs to support identification and screening requirements.  The FBI CJIS Division is making a major investment in \"Next Generation Identification,\" to expand identification services and investigation services for law enforcement and counter terrorism purposes, and to keep pace with the growing demand for biometric services for civil purposes.\n\nCHALLENGE\nEvery day, local, state, tribal, and federal law enforcement agencies in the United States arrest more than 50,000 people.  There is a limited amount of time to identify and link them to any outstanding warrants or criminal history.  Additionally, well over 60,000 people a day apply for positions of trust, visas to visit the United States, for citizenship, etc.  In each case, a check has to be made to determine if there are any facts that would make them unsuitable.  The FBI meets these identification challenges through electronic processing of fingerprint-based background checks by its CJIS Division using the IAFIS. The events leading up to 9/11 showed that these databases and searches were neither comprehensive enough nor rapid enough to support all counterterrorism challenges.  Files have to be exchanged with DHS, DOS, and others to ensure that checks made by one department would not miss known or suspected terrorists (KSTs), persons with criminal backgrounds, etc.  Biometric-based information also needed to be better coordinated among DoD and the intelligence community in order to \"connect the dots.\" Other U.S. government agencies needed to access the rich database maintained by CJIS, but were impeded by several obstacles, including response time and the then minimum number of 10-fingerprint images needed for a background check.  In many instances where an on-the-fly background check was required (e.g., at a border crossing), CJIS' two-hour response time was not acceptable.  While CJIS was achieving substantially faster results than their advertised maximum turn-around time for criminal transactions, they were not in the one- to two-minute range required for transactions at border crossings or in the field where DoD warfighters encounter unknown but suspicious persons. Not every U.S. government agency had the equipment, facility, or need to capture all 10- fingerprint images for background checks.  The warfighter or border agent does not always have the time and equipment a booking officer in a police station might have. Thus, for many years, DoD and DHS (and its predecessors) captured transactions with just two fingerprints, and IAFIS could not process these transactions.  The mandatory format for collection and submittal to IAFIS was based on the inked fingerprint card format of all 10 fingers being rolled as well as the same fingers being collected as plain impressions (AKA \"sequence slaps\").  The following graphic shows the paper format. There is a corresponding electronic format developed in concert with NIST.  IAFIS now accepts and processes digitally-collected rolled and flat fingerprint submissions.\n\n\nThe CJIS Division's identification system, the program, IAFIS, is nearly 10 years old, and the algorithms are even older.  Newer algorithms would lead to better matching performance.  IAFIS is able to process only fingerprints, yet the government is moving toward a multi-biometric collection protocol that includes fingers, palms, faces, and irises.  The challenge therefore was two-fold:  to modify existing IAFIS processing to allow government partners to rapidly search millions of files with less than 10 rolled fingerprints and to move to a newer platform that will improve matcher accuracy and use other biometrics in addition to fingerprints.\n\nSOLUTION\nWith 9/11, the emphasis of the FBI's mission was refocused to make the national security mission as important as the criminal investigation mission.  CJIS' mandate expanded from the identification of criminals to include the identification of KSTs and other individuals whose primary goal was the destruction of the freedoms and privileges that are the backbone of America.  The mandate also included enhanced data sharing requirements as outlined in the USA PATRIOT Act.\n\n## Operational Success Story - Outstanding Warrant\n\nA man applied for asylum at a U.S. Asylum Office. When the man's fingerprints were run against US VISIT's database, which was linked to the IAFIS database, they revealed that this man had an extensive criminal record, including charges for rape, assault and an outstanding warrant in Maryland for kidnapping. Although he had used three aliases and a different date of birth to try and evade detection, his fingerprints confirmed he was the man wanted for kidnapping. As a result of US VISIT's positive identification of this person, the asylum office contacted Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), and ICE arrested the man. The use of biometrics became even more focused when HSPD-12 was issued on August 27, 2004.  As with many other programs, the issuance of a PIV would be dependent on an applicant passing a fingerprint-based background check on the CJIS records. The USA PATRIOT Act directed the Attorney General to commission a study on the feasibility of using biometric identifiers to identify people as they attempt to enter the United States, which would be connected to the FBI's database to flag suspected criminals.  Another study was commissioned to determine the feasibility of providing airlines with names of suspected terrorists before they boarded flights.  This created a requirement for greater data sharing between CJIS, DoD, DOS, and DHS. In response, CJIS and DHS are working together to make the IAFIS fingerprint database and the US-VISIT's IDENT database interoperable.  In 2007, the US-VISIT Program began to test 10-fingerprint collection using identification-slaps.  The IAFIS was modified to accept the submission of these identification-slap fingerprint images for applicant background checks.  These are easier and faster to collect than the traditional rolled impressions.  The number of these submittals has grown to approximately 48,000\nper day; 30,000 per day from DOS and 18,000 per day from DHS.  This number is expected to rise to almost 78,000 per day by the end of 2008.\n\nThe CJIS Division has developed a 22-pound *Quick Capture Platform* for contemporaneous biometric collection and search from the field by FBI Hostage Rescue Teams.  These platforms have collection devices for multiple modalities and satellite links for remote searches of the IAFIS.  Currently, 49 of these units are operationally deployed with approximately 20 of them deployed in Afghanistan alone.\n\nIn February 2008, the CJIS *Flyaway Team* deployed to Afghanistan for a 90-day mission to obtain data from the Afghan National Police and the Afghan National Army.  These biometrics will be the baseline for the Automated Fingerprint Identification System to be established for the government of Afghanistan through the DoD and the FBI.  CJIS staff have visited 29 countries this year through the Foreign Fingerprint Exchange Program.\n\nThe IAFIS now has unique databases for agency partners, which allows them to use the resources of the extensive CJIS Division databases.  For example, in 2004 the DoD ABIS became operational and is compatible with the IAFIS and co-housed with the IAFIS in Clarksburg, W.Va.  CJIS is supporting the global war on terrorism by working with DoD\nin searching latent fingerprints from improvised explosive devices (IEDs) to identify persons involved in anti-Coalition force activities.\n\n\nThe FBI maintains a website at http://www.fbibiospecs.org/fbibiometric/biospecs.html dedicated to providing the most up-to-date information regarding FBI biometric standards initiatives from the CJIS Division, Technology Evaluation Standards Test Unit.  Current offerings include the following.\n\n- Electronic Biometric Transmission Specification (EBTS)\n- The Registry of USG Recommended Biometric Standards\n- IAFIS Certified Products List PROGRAM OVERVIEW\nThe FBI became the national repository for fingerprints and related criminal history data in 1924 when 810,188 fingerprint records from the National Bureau of Criminal Identification and Leavenworth Penitentiary were consolidated to form the nucleus of the FBI's files.  Since then, the FBI's fingerprint files have grown to become the world's largest biometric repository with associated criminal history information.  Fingerprint identification services, which had steadily increased over the years, became even more important following 9/11. The FBI CJIS Division maintains both criminal and civil fingerprint records in separate databases.  Today, the master criminal fingerprint file contains the records of approximately 56.4 million individuals, while the civil file represents approximately 20 million fingerprint submissions.  The civil file predominantly contains fingerprints of past and present U.S. military personnel and present and former federal government employees. The paper-based process changed on July 28, 1999, with the CJIS Division implementation of the IAFIS.  The IAFIS provides an up-to-date, integrated system to respond to the needs of the local, state, tribal, federal, and international criminal justice and authorized non-criminal justice agencies.  It houses the largest collection of digital representations of fingerprint images and associated criminal history information in the world.  The current operation supports electronic submission of fingerprint identification data to IAFIS and an electronic response to the inquiring agency.  An electronic response is normally sent within two hours of a criminal identification request and within 24 hours of an electronic civil submission. Originally designed to process 62,500 fingerprint submissions daily, the IAFIS now averages approximately 90,000 fingerprint transactions per day.  A record was achieved on July 23, 2008, when 163,089 transactions requesting searches against the criminal repository were completed within a 24-hour period.  Each day, approximately 8,000- 10,000 new records are added to the criminal repository. Prior to 9/11, the FBI receipts averaged 15.4 million fingerprint submissions annually. Approximately 7.4 million, or 48%, were civil fingerprint submissions.  During FY07, the FBI received a total of 26.1 million fingerprint submissions.  Of this total, 56%, or approximately 14.5 million, were civil fingerprint submissions. The FBI continues to improve existing processing to provide the most reliable and accurate information possible on a system that is now nine years old.  To remain responsive to law enforcement and other customer needs, CJIS must embrace the advances in identification technology.  It is essential that enhancements be made to the FBI identification program.\n\n\nThe Next Generation Identification (NGI) Program Advances in technology and the changing business needs of IAFIS customers have highlighted the need for a next generation of identification services.  To further advance its biometric identification services, CJIS, along with guidance from its user community, has established the vision for the Next Generation Identification (NGI).  The NGI\nProgram will improve the current functionality of the IAFIS and provide new identification modalities to enhance the accuracy and quality of biometric records.  NGI will offer state-of-the-art, multimodal biometric identification services through numerous initiatives, including:\nAdvanced Fingerprint Identification Technology Advanced Fingerprint Identification Technology will provide faster, more efficient identification processing, increased search accuracy, and improved latent processing services.  As a new feature, the Repository for Individuals of Special Concern (RISC) will provide the capability to search two or ten fingerprints against fingerprints of wanted persons, KSTs, and sex offender registry subjects with a response returned in seconds.\nThis service will be expanded to allow for the same type of rapid search against other special populations such as persons of national security interest.\n\n\nEvaluating the Effectiveness of Multimodal Biometrics The NGI Program will advance the integration strategies and indexing of additional biometric data, providing a framework for a future multimodal identification system.\nCollection and use of additional biometrics must be cost-effective and demonstrably enhance the accuracy and quality of fingerprint records.  This will permit identifications based on not just fingerprints, but faces, irises, palm prints, and the fusion of these identification techniques. The Biometric Center of Excellence The FBI'S Science and Technology Branch has established a Biometric Center of Excellence (BCOE) within CJIS to support U.S. government-wide biometric and identity management activities.  The BCOE will facilitate research, development, and training activities that relate to biometric technologies.  Plans for the BCOE include the\n\nOperational Success Story  - IDENT/IAFIS Interoperability\nIn Boston, officers arrested a subject for breaking and entering. Through the\none-step biometric submission process that the pilot provides, officers in Boston\nand ICE's LESC were automatically notified of the subject's extensive history of\ncriminal and immigration violations.  Though the subject had used seven different\naliases\nand nine dates of birth over the years to evade detection, the subject's biometrics\nrevealed an extensive criminal record and two previous deportations. The subject\nis now detained.\n\nconstruction of the Biometric Technology Center in Clarksburg, W.Va.  The Center will house the FBI biometric operations and the DoD Biometric Task Force with the potential addition of new partner agencies.\n\nInterim Data sharing Model (iDSM)\nTo take advantage of the benefits of interoperability, CJIS partnered with several\nagencies to implement the iDSM.  The iDSM includes the sharing of the following datasets among appropriate agencies and departments.\n- IAFIS Wants and Warrant records (DOJ) - KST records (DOJ) - added 8/09/2007 - IDENT Expedited Removal records (DHS) - Category I Visa Critical Refusals records (DOS) Several local agencies as well as federal agencies are participating in a pilot program for iDSM searches.  These agencies include the following.\n\n- Boston Police Department online 09/03/2006 - Dallas County Sheriff's Office online 11/01/2006\n- Office of Personnel Management online 12/01/2006 - Harris County Sheriff's Office online 02/01/2007\n- DoD online 04/03/07 Immigration Violator File\nAs of April 2008, all incoming IAFIS submissions are being searched against the NCIC Immigration Violator File (IVF) records that have associated fingerprints.  The IVF contains name-based records of subjects that are a high enforcement priority for the DHS' Immigration and Customs Enforcement.\n\n\nPRIVACY POLICY\nThe FBI protects the privacy of individuals whose biometric templates are in IAFIS according to the Privacy Act of 1974, tempered by the need to share information between different government agencies as specified in the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act 2004.\n\nSUMMARY\nThe acceptance and success of biometrics have increased law enforcement enrollments and searches both nationally and internationally.  Responding to the challenges of terrorists and transnational criminals has expanded both domestic and international data sharing needs.  The FBI has responded to these needs with a refocusing of priorities, enhancements of business practices and the related technology, and more cooperative sharing measures.  As national boundaries blur, the political, technical, and legal frameworks become more challenging.  The CJIS Division continues to meet these challenges.  In the next few years, the NGI system will revolutionize the level and scope of services that CJIS provides.\n\n## 4. Department Of State (Immigration And Border Management And Intelligence) Similar To Previously Discussed Federal Departments, The Dos Also Had Small-Scale Biometrics Efforts Prior To 9/11, But Activities Have Greatly Increased Since That Time. Examples Of Operational Efforts Are Described Below.\n\na. Biometric Visa Program The Biometric Visa (BioVisa) Program was developed and implemented to enhance the security of the U.S. visa and thereby strengthen the border security of the United States.  The legislative bases for the BioVisa Program are section 403(c) of the USA PATRIOT Act, which mandated biometric screening for visa applicants, and section 303(a) of the Enhanced Border Security and Visa Entry Reform Act, which required the Secretary of State to use biometric identifiers for all visas issued to aliens.\n\nb. Border Crossing Card Program Since 1998, DOS has had experience using biometrics at consular posts in Mexico in the visa process through the Border Crossing Card (BCC) Program, which was mandated by the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act.  The BCC, issued only to Mexican nationals, serves as a visa.  Under the BCC\nProgram, two index fingerprints and a photo were captured of BCC applicants and cleared against the fingerprint watch list of DHS' IDENT, which contains the fingerprints of suspected terrorists, wanted persons, and immigration law violators.  IDENT also stores the fingerprints of BCC applicants.  The BCC Program served as the model for the BioVisa Program.\n\nc. BioVisa and US-VISIT as Partner Programs The BioVisa Program was established as a partner program with DHS' US-VISIT\nprogram.  In rolling out the BioVisa Program, DOS started deployment of equipment and capturing two index fingerprints of visa applicants in September 2003.  Thirteen months later, on October 7, 2004, all posts issuing nonimmigrant and immigrant visas were capturing fingerprints of applicants.  From the very beginning, the BioVisa Program has been responsible, through the results of the fingerprint checks against the IDENT watch list, for the refusal of visas to many thousands of ineligible applicants who would likely have succeeded in obtaining visas had it not been for the fingerprint checks.  For example, in the first six months of 2008, there were 12,932\nmatches of visa applicant fingerprints with fingerprints in IDENT, and in almost all of those cases the visas were refused.\n\n## Operational Success Story - Multiple Aliases\n\nIn 2007, an individual applied for a visa at a U.S. Embassy. When the person's fingerprints were checked against the US VISIT biometric database, it was revealed that the person had been denied a visa just one day earlier under a different name.\n\nTherefore, the person was denied the visa due to willful fraud and misrepresentation.\n\n\n\nd. Biometric Identity Verification at Ports of Entry Aside from the screening of visa applicants against the IDENT watch list, the BioVisa Program also enables CBP officers at ports of entry (POEs) to match the fingerprints of a person presenting a visa with the fingerprints in the IDENT database that were captured at the time of visa issuance.  This ensures that the person presenting the visa at the POE is the person to whom the visa was issued, thus preventing visa fraud.\nThis biometric identity verification at POEs guarantees the integrity of the U.S. visa because it has essentially eliminated the possibility of visa fraud through counterfeit or photo-substituted visas or through the use of valid visas by imposters.\n\ne. Issued Visa Records Viewed at Ports of Entry To ensure the security of valid visas issued prior to the beginning of the BioVisa Program, DOS and the US-VISIT Program implemented a separate procedure by which the visa data of all issued visas worldwide, which are replicated within 10 minutes to the Consular Consolidated Database at DOS and relayed directly to the DHS Treasury Enforcement Telecommunications System (TECS), are made available for display to CBP officers at primary inspection.  Under this procedure, when the passport or visa is scanned at primary inspection, the visa data, including the photo, are retrieved from TECS and displayed on the CBP officer's screen.  This procedure, in addition to the matching of the person's biometrics, prevents the counterfeiting or photo substitution of visas issued prior to the beginning of the BioVisa Program.\n\nf. DOS Facial Recognition System Screens Photos of Visa Applicants Under the BioVisa Program, diplomats, certain other government officials, children under age 14, and persons age 80 and over are exempt from fingerprints during the visa application process.  The photos of all applicants exempt from fingerprinting are cleared against a photo watch list of KSTs in the DOS Facial Recognition System.\nTo combat visa fraud, visa applicant photos are also checked through the Facial Recognition System against over 68 million photos in the Consular Consolidated Database.\n\ng. BioVisa Program Transition from Two to Ten Fingerprints To build on the success of the BioVisa and US-VISIT programs, federal agencies, working through the Homeland Security Council, decided in 2005 that there should be a transition from two to ten fingerprint collection.  Collection of 10 fingerprints enables the following:  1) 10 fingerprints provide additional biometric information that can improve the accuracy of the IDENT system; 2) 10 fingerprints provide additional matching opportunities with latent fingerprints collected from terrorist or other crime scenes; and 3) 10 fingerprints can be checked against the full IAFIS\ncriminal master file to prevent issuance of visas to persons with criminal records.\n\nh. Ten Prints Screened Against KST Latents in IDENT\nDuring 2007, Consular Affairs transitioned all visa-issuing posts from collection of two to ten fingerprints.  The 10 fingerprints sent to IDENT are checked against all available KST latent fingerprints, as well as latent prints from federal crime scenes. Moreover, latent fingerprints collected from IEDs in Iraq and Afghanistan are transferred to IDENT to be used in checks against visa applicant fingerprints.\n\ni. BioVisa 10 Prints Advance IDENT-IAFIS Interoperability\n\nIn January 2008, the 10 fingerprints collected from visa applicants began to be searched against the FBI's IAFIS criminal master file.  The process for this is that the\n10 fingerprints continue to be sent across the interface from Consular Affairs to IDENT, which searches them against IDENT but also relays them to IAFIS for a search.  The results of the IAFIS search are returned to Consular Affairs through the IDENT interface.  In this manner, an additional benefit in IDENT-IAFIS\ninteroperability has been achieved.\n\nj. 10 Print Screening Against IAFIS\nSince 2002, the FBI CJIS Division has provided Consular Affairs with names of wanted persons and persons with criminal history records for inclusion in the Consular Lookout and Support System (CLASS), which is the name-based lookout system against which the names of all visa applicants are screened prior to issuance of visas.  However, persons with criminal records could avoid detection by the CLASS screening by obtaining passports in different identities.  The BioVisa transition to 10 fingerprints and the screening of the 10 prints against IAFIS has prevented criminals from being able to conceal their criminal records when applying for visas.  In the first six months of 2008, the fingerprints of more than 4 million visa applicants were screened against IAFIS; 27,912 of those visa applicants had records of arrest and prosecution (RAP sheets).  Many of these RAP sheets involved crimes that rendered the visa applicants ineligible for a visa.\n\n## K. Biovisa Program Essential For Border Security By Preventing Ineligible Applicants From Obtaining Visas And By Enabling Biometric Identity Verification Of Persons Presenting Visas At Ports Of Entry, The Biometric Visa Program Has Proven To Be An Unqualified Success In Strengthening The Border Security Of The United States. 5. Personal Identity Verification Credential (Access Control)\n\nHomeland Security Presidential Directive 12 (HSPD-12), signed by the President in August 2004, established the requirements for a common identification standard and\n\ncredentials to be issued by federal agencies to federal employees and contractors to gain physical access to federal facilities and logical access to systems and networks.  The directive specified that the technical requirements for the secure credential meet four control objectives:\n- Is issued based on strong criteria for the verification of an individual's identity;\n- Is strongly resistant to identity fraud, tampering, counterfeiting, and terrorist exploitation;\n- Can be authenticated electronically; and - Is issued only by providers whose reliability has been established by an official accreditation process.\n\nNIST was directed by the HSPD-12 to create standards and requirements for the security and interoperability of the cards and processes required for the government-wide implementation of HSPD-12.  After significant consultation, both within the government and with the private sector, NIST issued Federal Information Processing Standard (FIPS)\n201, The Personal Identity Verification Standard, in February 2005.  NIST has issued additional technical specifications to ensure that the cards, data stored on the cards, and data interfaces are standardized across government implementations.  The General Services Administration (GSA) established the FIPS-201 Evaluation Program in May\n2006 to evaluate commercial products and services for conformance to the normative requirements of FIPS-201.\n\n\n\nFor the first time in history,\nthe President's annual budget\nrequest to Congress was\ntransmitted electronically on\nFebruary 4, 2008.  The\nExecutive Clerk used an\nHSPD-12 approved credential\nto digitally sign the electronic\ntransmittal of the budget to\nCongress, thus proving the\ndocument's authenticity.\n\n\nThe federal government has established 23 categories of products and services (e.g.,\nsmart cards, card readers, fingerprint scanners, face image capture equipment, card\nprinting equipment, etc.) that require evaluation and testing for conformance to FIPS-201\nrequirements.  Commercial industry has responded to the FIPS-201 requirements quickly\nand effectively.  There now are more than three-hundred compliant products approved for\ngovernment-wide use for the implementation of HSPD-12.  The FIPS-201 Approved\nProducts List is available at http://www.idmanagement.gov.\n\n\n## Advancing And Utilizing Privacy Theory\n\nTo some individuals, biometric information represents the most worrisome of all forms of personally identifiable information (PII).  The Subcommittee, as well as agencies with operational missions, takes this concern quite seriously and has worked to simultaneously advance privacy technology theory and to integrate these new concepts into operational system planning and oversight.  Subcommittee members met with the DHS Privacy Office soon after it was established to ask for assistance and guidance on how to better approach this problem.  The Privacy Office immediately recognized both that solving the biometrics privacy problem is critical, and that this solution could easily be adapted to less privacy-sensitive technologies.\nSince that time, privacy work on biometrics has advanced both through the Subcommittee and among agency privacy offices.  A highlight of activities is provided below.\n\n\n\"\"Privacy means more than \"private\" - it is not limited to keeping a secret.  Most conceptions of secrecy assert that once the secret is revealed it is available for any public use (the individual\n\"owner\" of the secret loses all claims of control over the information).  However, privacy claims can cover information and activities involving others (for example, bank accounts held by banks, medications known to doctors and pharmacists, etc.).  In the biometric context, privacy protection governs the use of personal information that is shared (not \"secret\").   In response, the biometrics community must work to implement policies and processes that effectively govern the appropriate use of data, individually and in its aggregate.  These policies and procedures should be clearly communicated to all affected constituencies.\"\"\n\nFrom The National Biometrics Challenge document of August 2006\n1. Building a Conceptual Foundation The first step toward advancing biometrics privacy was to establish a common reference.  Immediately after 9/11 and for some time thereafter, there existed a state of cross-talk between biometrics and privacy experts.  Biometrics experts, mostly scientists, attempted to study and explain privacy issues but were unsuccessful as they didn't truly grasp the legal and social ramifications.  Privacy experts, mostly lawyers, attempted to study and explain biometric issues but were unsuccessful as they didn't truly grasp the technology's capabilities and limitations.  Neither group of experts spoke in a manner that was understandable by the other. The subcommittee brought these two groups of experts together so that they could engage in a series of cross-training discussions, which led to an enhanced understanding of basic theories and science, thus enabling advanced application on operational systems.  To promote this understanding throughout and beyond the U.S.\n\ngovernment, the subcommittee later developed a public paper entitled Biometrics and Privacy:  Building a Conceptual Foundation, which was released in 2006.  The paper attempts to connect privacy and biometrics at a structural level so that both fields can be understood within a common framework.  The paper provides a general overview of both privacy and biometrics, and offers a perspective from which to view the convergence of both.  The goal is to provide a context in which details and future developments can be placed and better understood.\n\n2. Privacy Impact Assessments\n\nPrivacy Impact Assessments (PIAs) are a key aspect of the federal government's privacy compliance efforts.  Section 208 of the e-Government Act requires all federal agencies to conduct and complete PIAs for all new or substantially changed technologies that collect, maintain, or disseminate PII.  The PIA process forces system owners and developers to ensure that they have consciously incorporated privacy protections throughout the entire system development lifecycle.  A PIA provides an analysis of how PII is collected, stored, protected, shared, and managed. For example, the PIA process provided greater transparency into CBP's implementation of the air phase and the land/sea phase of the Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative (WHTI).  Privacy Officers coordinate the completion of PIAs for the Department and the components and must approve them prior to systems being implemented and/or adjusted. As privacy compliance has matured, so too has the content and procedures for conducting a PIA.  The lessons learned from previous reviews have translated into better content for each subsequent PIA process.\n\n\n3. Privacy Technology Implementation Guide\n\nTo better inform managers of technology projects on how to approach the PIA process, the DHS Privacy Office developed the Privacy Technology Implementation Guide (PTIG) in 2007.  The PTIG incorporates privacy protection considerations, organized according to privacy compliance requirements, and presents those considerations in the context in which technologists will encounter them:  in the management and development of operational systems. This guide does not dictate additional mandates for system development.  Instead, the PTIG offers a new method of raising awareness regarding what \"privacy protection\"\nmeans in the context of managing and developing operational systems and, through that awareness, initiating the process of privacy compliance earlier in the system development life cycle and more thoroughly across the overall process of deploying systems. The goal of this guide is to raise awareness of privacy issues for those working directly with technology and to present additional considerations that, if addressed directly and early in system development, can improve the effectiveness and efficiency of complying with privacy protection requirements.\n\n4. International Privacy Workshops Biometrics privacy issues also have an international context, as many end-users of federal biometric systems are foreign visitors.  This realization is complicated as privacy expectations and experiences vary considerably throughout the world. In December of 2005, the European Commission hosted a \"Workshop on Ethical and Social Implications of Biometric Identification Technology:  Toward an International Approach\" in Belgium.  Employees from OSTP and DHS' Privacy Office represented the U.S. government at this workshop.  The primary purpose of the workshop was to initiate a dialogue between U.S. and Europe on biometric data protection and to compare laws, regulations, and social conventions. The U.S. hosted a follow-on workshop in November 2006 called \"International Conference on Biometrics and Ethics.\"  This workshop brought together approximately 80 experts from several countries to engage in an open discussion of the application and ethics of biometrics.  Participants included representatives from academia, private industry, non-profit organizations, and government, hailing from Asia, Europe, the Middle East, and North America.  The workshop had four main panel discussions.\n\n- Privacy & Ethics under Normal & Extraordinary Circumstances - Ethics of Medical and Health Risks - Ethics of International Data Sharing - Government-Industry Collaboration\n\n## Communications\n\nFor the majority of the public, biometrics remains a technology they are more familiar with due to science fiction movies than practical experience.  This lack of familiarity impacts perceptions of both the technology and its application by government agencies.  Government communications activities have been aimed to not only enable the general public to better understand the technology and its applications, but also to educate the biometrics community on federal programs and plans so that they can better partner with the government to meet critical mission requirements.\n\n\n\"Promoting a scientifically educated and aware public is necessary if we are to make the appropriate decisions about the nation's R&D investments, guide the adoption and debate the societal implications of new science and technologies, and reap the maximum benefits from our investments.  The quality of these efforts underpins the entire US scientific enterprise.\"\n\n--Science for the 21st Century, July 2004\n\n1. Communications Group In 2006, the NSTC Subcommittee on Biometrics and Identity Management established an *ad hoc* interagency communications group to develop and coordinate an integrated outreach strategy for the government.  The group's primary objective was to ensure an accurate awareness and understanding of biometric technologies and federal programs by the public, press, and Congress.  Representative activities include:\n- consistent use of key biometric terms throughout the government; - coordination and messaging on outreach activities (such as conference presentations, press inquiries, etc.); and\n- enhanced public websites and liaison activities.\n\n\nSome specific activities are described in more depth below.\n\n\n2. Biometric Consortium Conference\n\nThe Biometric Consortium's charter was established and formally chartered in 1995\nby a committee working under authority of the Security Policy Board under Presidential Decision Directive/NSC-29.  The Security Policy Board was subsequently abolished with issuance of National Security Presidential Directive 1, signed in February 2001, and the Biometric Consortium activities were eventually integrated with the communications activities of the NSTC Subcommittee on Biometrics and Identity Management.  Today, the Biometric Consortium's primary function is to organize and host an annual conference, which serves as the federal government's major outreach effort each year.  During this conference, government agencies openly discuss past activities and future plans and exchange ideas and\n\nlessons learned with the industrial and academic communities, as well as with foreign partners.  Conference participation has skyrocketed since 2000 with three times as\nmany attendees.  The three-day conference now has three concurrent tracks, nearly 100 exhibitors, and approximately 2,000 participants from around the world, easily making it the world's premier biometrics-based conference.\n\n3. Foundation Documents\n\nIn 2006, the NSTC Subcommittee on Biometrics and Identity Management released a series of foundation documents to enable the public to obtain an accurate understanding of biometric technologies and issues.  Individual papers provided a top-level overview in an easy-to-understand manner while technology-specific papers\nprovided a further level of specificity. This set of documents also included a Biometrics Glossary, which represented government-wide consensus on terminology and definitions that agencies would use in their outreach material to make them more consistent across agencies and easier to\nunderstand. The full set of foundation documents is available at\nhttp://www.biometrics.gov/ReferenceRoom/Introduction.aspx.\n\n4. Websites\n\nThe NSTC Subcommittee on Biometrics and Identity Management hosts a triad of websites to help disseminate biometric information to the public.\n- Biometrics.gov is the central source of information on biometrics-related\nactivities of the federal government.  Visitors to this site will find general\ninformation about biometrics and interagency collaboration activities, as well as introductions to federal biometric programs.\n- The Biometrics Catalog is a user-updated repository of biometrics-related\npublic information.  The Biometrics Catalog is a searchable database of biometrics documents such as government reports, commercial products,\nevaluation reports, news articles, and a calendar of events.\n- The Biometric Consortium Website provides information about its annual\nconference and hosts a bulletin board for public discussion of biometric\ntechnologies and issues.\n\nThese websites, working together, were developed to encourage greater collaboration\nand sharing of information on biometric activities among government departments\nand agencies; commercial entities; state, regional, and international organizations;\nand the general public.\n5. International Meeting of Biometrics Experts\n\nNIST hosted the International Meeting of Biometrics Experts on March 23-25, 2004, in Gaithersburg, Md., to discuss international sharing of testing protocols and approaches in biometrics.  The implementation of efficient and effective biometric systems on an international scale can be greatly aided through international sharing of testing and evaluation methodologies and protocols, test results, and approaches that can be used by different nations to test their own systems.  The purpose of this unique meeting was to support technical information sharing on biometrics between the various national biometrics testing laboratories as well as other appropriate organizations in the hope of leading to coordination of testing and evaluation procedures for the biometric components of travel documents.  The impetus for this meeting came from a G-8 high-level working group on biometrics that focused on biometrics for travel documents.  This group recognized the need for additional research to improve the accuracy of biometric systems and for international experts to meet to exchange ideas on testing methodologies. The meeting was organized jointly by the Department of Commerce, DHS, DOS, DOJ, and the OSTP.  The meeting was attended by senior technical experts, including experts in biometric science and biometric systems testing and evaluation, border and immigration systems including database and information technology systems, and law enforcement, particularly international law enforcement.  Presenters and attendees represented G-8 and other nations including Australia, Canada, European Commission, France, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Ireland, Japan, Korea, Malaysia, Mexico, Netherlands, Norway, Russia, Singapore, South Africa, Switzerland, United Kingdom, and United States.  The high level of expertise representing the governments of so many countries made this meeting a uniquely important contribution to biometrics for border security and law enforcement.\n\n## Government-Wide Coordination, Strategies And Policies 1. Coordination\n\nExecutive Order 12881, signed by President Clinton on November 23, 1993,\nestablished the National Science and Technology Council (NSTC) and directed it to:\n- coordinate the science and technology (S&T) policy-making process; - ensure S&T policy decisions and programs are consistent with the President's\nstated goals;\n- help integrate the President's S&T policy agenda across the federal\ngovernment;\n- ensure S&T are considered in development and implementation of federal\npolicies and programs; and\n- further international cooperation in S&T. The NSTC established its Subcommittee on Biometrics and Identity Management in\n20024, and it has been coordinating biometrics S&T policy issues ever since.\nCoordination approaches and priorities have changed over the years, which is normal as technologies are advanced and issues evolve from pure science to the application of science to meet specific operational needs.\nPhase 1\n2002-2003\nGoals:\n- Share lessons learned\nfrom operational systems\n- Grow USG biometrics\nexpertise\n- Build relationships\n\n\nDeliverables\n- List of topics for potential\ncollaboration\n- Initiate joint RDT&E\nefforts\n\nPhase 2\n2003-2006\nGoals:\n- Advance technology,\nprivacy & communications\n- Grow USG biometrics\nexpertise\n- Build relationships\n\n\nDeliverables\n- Joint RDT&E successes - Foundational documents - Privacy paper & websites - The National Biometrics\nChallenge\n\nPhase 3\n2006-Present\nGoals:\n- USG-wide biometric\nsystem of systems\n- Community able to meet\nother government and private sector needs\n- Expansion to IdM\n\nDeliverables\n- Interoperable Systems - USG-wide plans for\nstandards, RDT&E, privacy & communications\n- Enhanced operational\ncapabilities\n\n\n\nInitial subcommittee activities focused on expanding knowledge of biometrics within the government, sharing operational lessons learned to assist in rapid deployment of biometric technologies, building interagency relationships, and identifying unmet operational needs.  One of the first activities was the Government Biometrics Workshop5 held in March of 2003 and hosted by DoD, DOJ, and Treasury.  The goal of the workshop was a first cut at identifying common operational needs in order to develop an interagency roadmap for future RDT&E. Having identified an initial roadmap, the Subcommittee quickly transitioned to a focus on rapid advancement of the technology, developing standards at the national and international level, advancing and performing evaluations, and promoting privacy protection.  Numerous projects from this phase are described throughout this paper. A summation of current RDT&E priorities can be found in The National Biometrics Challenge. By 2006, the technology had sufficiently advanced and interagency relationships had grown to the point that in-depth collaboration on future biometric systems and overall governance could begin.  The Subcommittee, while continuing its core S&T mission, also stepped out to begin interagency collaboration of this piece under an *ad hoc*\ninteragency Interoperability Working Group.  In June, 2006, the President approved the National Implementation Plan for the War on Terror (NIP) and in October 2006 the National Security Council tasked the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) to ensure that the diverse, varied, departmental efforts to employ biometric technology to meet counterterrorism objectives are harmonized, de-conflicted and efficiently implemented and focused on using biometrics to identify known and suspected terrorists (KSTs). Representatives of NCTC and OSTP met soon after the NIP was signed to determine how to best coordinate efforts.  A joint approach was agreed to, with NSTC continuing to have primary S&T responsibilities and the NCTC sponsoring an interagency coordination group (ICG) focusing on the operational planning and implementation roles.  When policy recommendations had been developed, they would be approved by the NSTC for S&T issues and by the National Security Council for operational issues6.  Several individuals worked on both the Subcommittee and the ICG, and the Interoperability Working Group reported to both because its tasking had equal parts technology and operational issues.  The Subcommittee and the ICG worked together, mutually driving each other to a successful conclusion.  In March 2008, the National Security Council (NSC) Deputies Committee approved a strategic framework that summarized a number of recommendations developed by the Subcommittee and the ICG and directed agencies to begin planning their implementation. In June 2008, President Bush signed NSPD-59/HSPD-24, \"Biometrics for Identification and Screening to Enhance National Security.\"  This directive builds upon the decisions in the strategic framework and initiates a process to expand operational coordination to national security concerns beyond KSTs. Taken together, these activities represent the full cycle of government technology: identifying operational needs, which drives technology advancement, which serves as a foundation for policy/strategy formulation and implementation. Looking even more broadly, biometrics is a subset of identity management, which is a topic that has emerged rapidly in recent years.  Biometrics, badges and tokens of all kinds, passwords and personal identification numbers (PINs), etc., are just some of the current physical components of identity management.  To all this must be added a wealth of law, regulation, policy, and awareness of and sensitivity to the attitudes and views of the organizations within which these systems are installed and operated. The Subcommittee chartered a subordinate NSTC Task Force on Identity Management in January 2008 to develop an initial roadmap for coordinated RDT&E\nactivities, much like biometrics coordination efforts began six years prior.\n\n\n2. Strategies Prior to the issuance of NSPD-59/HSPD-24, a number of national strategies also discussed the importance of biometric technologies to support operational requirements.  Some examples are listed below.\n\n\na. The National Strategy for Maritime Security, September 2005, Executive Office of the President\n\"In cooperation with the private sector, the United States will establish a system-wide common credential for use across all transportation modes by individuals requiring unescorted physical access to secure, restricted, and critical areas of the maritime domain.  The identification card for access will use biometrics to link the person to the credential definitively.\" \"The rapid and accurate identification of individuals for access to secure, restricted, and critical areas is a paramount protection measure that must be implemented by the private sector in cooperation with the federal government. Persons seeking to enter the United States will undergo identity checks and biometric screening at the border and in the coastal approaches to verify their lawful admission.\"\n\n\nb. National Infrastructure Protection Plan, January 2006, DHS\nAccess Control Systems (p. 34):  Cyber systems allowing only authorized personnel and visitors physical access to defined areas of a facility.  Access\ncontrol systems provide monitoring and control of personnel passing throughout a facility by various means, including electronic card readers, biometrics, and radio frequency identification.\n\nc. National Strategy for Information Sharing, October 2007, Executive Office\nof the President\nSharing Information with Foreign Partners (p. 25):  \"The counterterrorism mission requires sharing many types of terrorism-related information, for example, the exchange of biographic and biometric information related to known or suspected terrorists.\"\n\nd. National Strategy for Homeland Security, October 2007, Executive Office of the President, Homeland Security Council\n\"In the face of resourceful terrorists... we must continue to expand the US-\nVISIT program's biometric enrollment from two fingerprints to ten fingerprints, as well as leverage science and technology to enable more advanced multimodal biometric recognition capabilities in the future that use fingerprint, face, or iris data.\" \"Create 'smart borders' (p. 22).  We must prevent terrorists and the implements of terror from entering the United States.  At the same time, our economic security depends on the efficient flow of people, goods, and services.  We will build a \"smart border\" that achieves both of these critical goals.  It will feature strong, advanced risk-management systems, increased use of biometric identification information, and partnerships with the private sector to allow precleared goods and persons to cross borders without delay.\"\n\n## 3. Policies A. Budget Guidance Memorandum\n\nFY2009 Administration Research and Development Budget Priorities Memorandum, August 2007, Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP)\n\"Rapid, reliable and accurate biometric-based recognition of individuals is necessary for successful homeland security, counterterrorism, border control, law enforcement, e-commerce and e-government, and identity theft prevention...  As directed by the National Security Council's Deputies Committee, agencies are to place emphasis on the priorities outlined in The National Biometrics Challenge and the resulting agenda developed by the NSTC Subcommittee on Biometrics and Identity Management.\"\n\n## B. Presidential Directives\n\nHSPD-6:  Integration and Use of Screening Information, September 2003, Executive Office of the President.\n\nProvides for the establishment of the Terrorist Threat Integration Center, which became the NCTC.\n\n\nHSPD-11:  Comprehensive Terrorist-Related Screening Procedures, August 2004, Executive Office of the President.\n\nImplements a coordinated and comprehensive approach to terrorist-related screening that supports homeland security at home and abroad.  This directive builds upon HSPD-6. HSPD-12:  Policy for a Common Identification Standard for Federal Employees and Contractors, August 2004, Executive Office of the President.\n\nEstablishes a mandatory, government-wide standard for secure and reliable forms of identification issued by the federal government to its employees and contractors (including contractor employees). NSPD-59/HSPD-24:  Biometrics for Identification and Screening to Enhance National Security, June 2008, Executive Office of the President.\n\nEstablishes a framework to ensure federal departments and agencies use compatible methods and procedures in the collection, storage, use, analysis, and sharing of biometric and associated biographic and contextual information of individuals known or suspected to be a national security threat in a lawful and appropriate manner while respecting privacy and other legal rights under U.S. law.\n\n## Conclusion\n\n\nThe U.S. government studied and worked with biometrics long before 9/11, but the technology has experienced rapid growth and attention in the ensuing years by agencies and high-level coordination bodies.  Working closely with the private sector and international partners over the past seven years, federal agencies have advanced the scientific basis of the technology and its mutual co-existence with fundamental privacy principles, rapidly implemented operational systems to meet immediate needs, and laid the foundation for maximizing the appropriate use of biometrics in future identity management applications. The technological and operational growth of biometrics since 9/11, as well as its rise in stature within the current administration, has been unprecedented in the technology's history.  Continued attention over the ensuing years will reap even greater operational capability while continuing to ensure privacy protection.\n\n## Appendix A - Expanded Rdt&E Discussion\n\n\nBefore being thrust into wide-scale U.S. government operations, biometrics needed to develop a more stable scientific footing.  The U.S. government therefore implemented a series of research, development, test and evaluation (RDT&E) and standards development activities, several of which are discussed below.  These activities have significantly advanced the capabilities and our understanding of biometric technologies.  These advancements have enabled the establishment and enhancement of many government systems in use today, such as those that screen for KSTs, while simultaneously maintaining personal privacy and civil liberties.\n\na. HumanID\nDARPA's Human Identification at a Distance (HumanID) Program began in September 2000.  The goal at that time was to develop automated, multimodal, multibiometric surveillance systems for identifying humans at a distance for protection and for early warning against asymmetric threats.  The state-of-the-art capability at that time on cooperative subjects, indoors, with controlled illumination was less than 10 feet.  By the end of the program in 2003, some technology was capable of recognizing people at up to 150 feet.  However, there was much to be done to improve performance.\n\n\nThe HumanID program provided the scientific foundation for human identification at a distance across the board.  Various types of biometric technology were explored, to include face recognition, iris recognition, Doppler radar, infrared imagery, physiological methods such as pulse and heartbeat, and gait (recognizing someone by their walk).  The HumanID Gait Challenge was the first time the potential of gait as a biometric had been thoroughly investigated.  The HumanID program also developed the first prototype system for recognizing iris at a distance.\n\n\nOverall, the HumanID program made significant gains in understanding the difficulties associated with biometric technology and provided the groundwork for future biometric technology programs.\n\n## B. Face\n\ni. Face Recognition Vendor Tests The Face Recognition Vendor Tests (FRVTs)7 were a series of independently administered technology evaluations for face recognition systems.  As face recognition technology began to be commercialized in the late 1990s, the government needed a way to measure the performance accuracy of these systems.  The FRVT evaluation was created as a means\n\nof measuring the state-of-the-art performance capabilities and providing a methodology for evaluating this technology.  Since that time, there have been three FRVT evaluations.  Each successive evaluation increased in size, difficulty, and complexity.  All of these evaluations were jointly sponsored by multiple federal government agencies.\n\n\nAfter 9/11, the biometrics industry as a whole was thrust into the foreground of government and commercial operational requirements. Though face recognition technology had been in the commercial industry for a few years, 9/11 highlighted the importance of including biometrics in security applications.  This launched a new interest in fielding face recognition systems to solve operational security requirements.  There became an immediate need to expedite technology development and an urgency to assess the current state-ofthe-art capabilities of commercial biometric technology.  A new independent technology evaluation was required to determine if face recognition technology could answer this call.  The first evaluation for face recognition after 9/11 was the Face Recognition Vendor Test\n(FRVT) 2002. The FRVT 2002 was sponsored by six different U.S. government organizations, including DARPA, DOS, the National Institute of Justice (NIJ), NIST, FBI, and TSA. The primary objective of the FRVT 2002 was to assess the capability of mature automatic face recognition systems to meet real-world applications.  Achieving this objective required an evaluation that was much larger and broader in scale than the previous biometric evaluations.  The increase in scale included the number of individuals in the evaluation as well as the detail and depth of analysis performed.\nIt also required designing a new biometric evaluation protocol and establishing a new standard for evaluations. At the end of the FRVT 2002, face recognition performance for verification had improved significantly.  The verification error rate on full-frontal face images taken indoors with controlled illumination decreased from 79 percent (c. 1993) to 20 percent. The FRVT 2002 showed it was possible to conduct large-scale biometric technology evaluations with greater than 100,000 biometric samples.  Because the FRVT 2002 was so successful, large-scale evaluations are now routinely conducted in face, fingerprint, and iris recognition. The onset of the war in Iraq brought an even greater need for deployable face recognition systems.  It was the first time biometric technology was in such high demand for operational scenarios.  To meet this demand, more expedient technology development and evaluation methodology was required. The challenge problem and evaluation methodology for rapidly advancing the performance of biometric technology began with the Face Recognition Grand Challenge (FRGC) technology development program and the FRVT 2006 independent evaluation.\n\n\nii. Face Recognition Grand Challenge The Face Recognition Grand Challenge (FRGC)8 and FRVT 2006\nestablished a new paradigm in computer vision for rapidly improving a technology's performance.  The FRGC began in May 2004 and was the first technology development program of its kind for face recognition technology.  The main objective of the FRGC was to improve face recognition verification performance by an order of magnitude over the FRVT 2002 results.  The FRGC structure consisted of a set of challenge problems developed by the FRGC evaluation team, the test data, and the test software infrastructure.  Each challenge problem consisted of a set of experiments designed to guide technology development to meet U.S.\n\ngovernment operational requirements. To emulate operational data, much more test data were needed.  The FRGC collected one of the largest repositories for face recognition test data in the world.  The test data were collected in strict adherence with Institutional Review Boards and all subjects signed consent forms prior to data collection.  The test data consist of two-dimensional still images, both indoors and outdoors, and three-dimensional imagery.  These test data were distributed to participating face recognition researchers and developers through a series of workshops.  Participants were given the challenge problems, the infrastructure for conducting experiments, and the test data on which to develop their algorithms.  Participants were asked to submit their results to the FRGC program manager for compilation and to present their results at subsequent workshops.  Participants' self-reported results were used as the first-level performance gage to determine if the goal of an order of magnitude improvement was met.  The results showed that it had indeed achieved its goal.  However, independent verification of this achievement was required in order to make the claim.  The FRVT 2006 did just thatconfirmed the goal had been met.\n\n\nThe main objective of the FRVT 2006 was to assess the current state-ofthe-art performance of face recognition technology and determine if it met\n\n\nthe FRGC goal of improving the verification error rate by an order of magnitude over the FRVT 2002 results.\n\n\nThe FRVT 2006 documented significant progress since January 2005 in face recognition when faces were matched across different lighting conditions.  In the FRVT 2006, an evaluation on sequestered data, five submissions performed better than the best results in the January 2005\nFRGC results.  The observed increase occurred despite the FRGC being an open challenge problem with the identities of faces known to the FRGC\nparticipants and the FRVT 2006 being an evaluation on sequestered data.\n\n\nThe FRVT 2006 and FRGC programs were also the first to include human performance versus machine performance testing.  FRVT 2006 integrated human face recognition performance into an evaluation for the first time.\nThis inclusion allowed a direct comparison between humans and state-ofthe-art computer algorithms.  The study focused on recognition across changes in lighting.  The experiment matched faces taken under controlled illumination against faces taken under uncontrolled illumination.  The results show that, at low false alarm rates for humans, seven automatic face recognition algorithms were comparable to or better than humans at recognizing faces taken under different lighting conditions.  Furthermore, three of the seven algorithms were comparable to or better than humans for the full range of false alarm rates measured.\n\nAt the conclusion of the FRVT 2006, results confirmed that the goal had been met.  Face recognition verification performance for frontal face stills in controlled illumination had improved by an order of magnitude over FRVT 2002 results, from a 20 percent error rate to a less than 1 percent error rate [*Figure 2*].  In fact, face recognition performance had improved by two orders of magnitude since the beginning of the FERET program in 1993.  This rapid improvement can partly be attributed to the technology development and evaluation methodology established by NIST and its sponsors.\n\n\n\nThe FRVT 2006 and FRGC were jointly sponsored by six U.S. government agencies and organizations, to include the DHS' Science and Technology Department and TSA, the Director of National Intelligence's Information Technology Innovation Center, the FBI, the NIJ, and the Technical Support Working Group.  The test data collected by the FRGC program are still being requested and used worldwide to further develop face recognition technology algorithms and improve performance. While the FRVT 2006 and FRGC worked well to advance face recognition technology, they also highlighted areas requiring more research to meet new operational requirements.  These areas include imagery taken in uncontrolled conditions, such as hallways or outdoors, and video.  These areas of interest form the foundation for the follow-on program, the Multiple Biometric Grand Challenge, which is described below.\n\n## C. Finger\n\niii. FpVTE\nThe Fingerprint Vendor Technology Evaluation (FpVTE) 20039 was conducted\nto evaluate the accuracy of fingerprint matching, identification, and verification systems.  FpVTE was conducted by NIST on behalf of DOJ's Justice\nManagement Division (JMD).  FpVTE serves as part of the NIST statutory\nmandate under section 403(c) of the USA PATRIOT Act to certify biometric technologies that may be used in the US-VISIT Program.\n\nThe FpVTE evaluations were conducted to:\n- measure the accuracy of fingerprint matching, identification, and\nverification systems using operational fingerprint data;\n- identify the most accurate fingerprint matching systems; - determine the effect of a wide variety of variables on matcher\naccuracy; and\n- develop well vetted sets of operational data from a variety of sources\nfor use in future research. Planning for FpVTE started in May 2003, and analysis continued through April 2004.  Eighteen different companies participated, with 34 systems tested. Participants were required to assemble, configure, and run their own hardware and software at NIST's Gaithersburg, Md., facility.  The trials began in October 2003, with each participant running over a two- or three-week period depending\non which of the three specific tests they participated in and using a predetermined and staggered schedule.  Testing of all 18 different companies was completed in November 2003. At the time, FpVTE 2003 was the most comprehensive independent evaluation of\nfingerprint matching systems ever executed, particularly in terms of the number and variety of systems and fingerprints.  More than 48,000 sets of operationalquality fingerprints from more than 25,000 individuals were used in FpVTE. Conclusions from FpVTE include the following.\n- The top-performing systems performed consistently well over a variety\nof image types and data sources.\n- These systems produced matching accuracy results that were\nsubstantially different than the rest of the systems.\n- The variables that had the largest effect on system accuracy were the\nnumber of fingers used and fingerprint quality:\no Additional fingers greatly improve accuracy.\no Poor quality fingerprints greatly reduce accuracy.\n- Capture devices alone do not determine fingerprint quality.\n- Accuracy can vary dramatically based on the type of data.\niv. Proprietary Fingerprint Template (PFT) testing Since June of 2003, NIST has been conducting tests of fingerprint-based biometric matching systems using vendor-supplied software development kits (SDKs).  This testing program has been named Proprietary Fingerprint Template (PFT) testing10 because vendors submit matching algorithms that are permitted to use any potentially proprietary fingerprint features they determine useful.  (This is in contrast to the interoperable fingerprint template testing (MINEX) described later in this section.)  Fingerprint matching algorithms from vendors are being evaluated to insure that the accuracy of the matchers used in various existing and planned government systems (including FBI/IAFIS and DHS/US-VISIT) are comparable to the most accurate available COTS products.  PFT measures the state-of-the-art in one-to-one matching for verification over a wide range of fingerprint image qualities.\n\n\nIn PFT testing, an application written by NIST controls calls to two vendorsupplied SDK functions.  The first function (extraction) is used to create the fingerprint matcher templates, and the second function (matcher) compares two fingers at a time and returns a match score.  All testing is performed by NIST\npersonnel and run on NIST computer hardware.\n\n\nPerformance was originally reported on matching single index fingers.  NISTIR\n7221 \"Studies of One-to-One Fingerprint Matching with Vendor SDK\nMatchers\"11 reports results on earlier single-finger matching.  The evaluation of fingerprint SDK matchers was extended to evaluate the matching accuracy that can be achieved by combining scores for the right and left index fingers to support work at NIST on Personal Identity Verification (PIV)12 for HSPD1213.  NISTIR 7249\n\n\n\"Two Finger Matching with Vendor SDK Matcher\"14 reports results on twofinger matching.\n\n\nThe PFT testing program continues to this day.  Vendors are permitted and encouraged to submit their latest and greatest algorithms for evaluation.  In this way, the progression of the state of the art of fingerprint matchers can be tracked. To date, more than 15 organizations have participated in PFT and, in all, NIST has evaluated more than 30 different fingerprint matching algorithms. To summarize current PFT status,\n\n\n\n- The top seven matchers with lowest error rates are contributed by the three\ntop-performing vendors in FpVTE; (FNMR in this group ranges from 0.0003 to 0.0010 at a FMR of 0.0001).\n- There are two outliers of poor-performing systems;\n(FNMR of these two is greater than 0.0900 at an FMR of 0.0001).\n- Algorithms in between these two groups steadily decline in performance;\n(FNMR ranges from 0.0010 to 0.0245).\n\nThe wide range of error rates plotted in this figure demonstrates the need for public tests such as PFT.\nv. Slap fingerprint segmentation evaluation\nThe Slap Fingerprint Segmentation Evaluations at NIST assess the accuracy of algorithms used to segment slap fingerprint images into individual fingerprint images.\n\n- **Slap fingerprints** are taken by simultaneously pressing the four\nfingers of one hand onto a scanner or fingerprint card.  Slaps are also\nknown as four-finger simultaneous plain impressions.\n- **Slap segmentation** is the process by which a slap image (a four-finger\nsimultaneous plain impression) is divided into four images of the individual fingers.\n\nSlap fingerprints have the advantage of enabling much quicker capture of\nall 10 fingers than individually rolling each finger; however, slaps have the disadvantage of only being plain impressions, whereas rolled\nfingerprints collect more friction skin data (nail to nail).\n\nSlapSeg 0415 was conducted by NIST in 2004 on behalf of the DOJ/JMD,\nIDENT/IAFIS Integration Project.  Additional partners included the US-\nVISIT Program of DHS and the FBI.  At that time, the use of slap\nfingerprints for background checks was being considered in a variety of\nU.S. government fingerprint systems (including US-VISIT and IAFIS).\nAutomated segmentation of slap fingerprints was known to have an associated error rate, but no rigorous evaluation of current slap\nsegmentation algorithms had ever been conducted before SlapSeg 04. Knowing whether existing segmentation software was of sufficient\naccuracy for operational use was of practical interest and value to policymakers.\n\nSlapSeg 04 was conducted to determine the accuracy of existing slap segmentation algorithms on a variety of operational-quality slap fingerprints.  Segmentation algorithms were evaluated based on their abilities to:\n\n- produce highly matchable images; - identify finger positions; and - detect segmentation failures.\n\nThey were evaluated using a variety of data from different sources.  The fingerprints were acquired from inked paper cards (subsequently scanned)\nor by livescan devices.  The images had a wide range of operational and\nnon-operational quality.\n\nConclusions from SlapSeg 04 included the following.\n\n- The most accurate segmenters produced at least three highly\nmatchable fingers and correctly identified finger positions in from 93% to over 99% of the slap images, depending on the data source.\n- The data source had a much greater effect on success rate than\nwhether the images were collected using livescan devices or paper.\n- Most segmenters achieved comparable accuracies on the better\nquality data, but there were significant differences among segmenters when processing poor quality data.\n- Some segmenters are capable of identifying many, but not all, problem slaps; failure rates could be cut substantially by allowing some of the slaps to be recaptured or rejected.\n\n\nGiven the results of SlapSeg 04, federal agencies, including the FBI, DOS, and DHS, are now using slap fingerprints to support applications such as civilian background checks, U.S. visa issuance, and the US-VISIT Program.  NIST has recently announced a new series of slap segmentation evaluations called SlapSeg II16.  Unlike SlapSeg 04 (which relied on matchability as the criterion for successful segmentation), NIST intends for SlapSeg II to use a measure of success based the location and boundaries of the segmented fingerprints.  This will reduce the time and labor needed to administer these tests, facilitating larger-scaled studies and enabling participants to submit multiple algorithms over time.  This will serve to improve segmentation technology by fostering competition and innovation.\n\n\nThrough SlapSeg II, technology users will benefit from knowing how much the current state of the art in slap segmentation technology has advanced.  Vendors will also benefit as they will gain the knowledge of how their segmentation implementation performs on a large collection of operational-quality data.\n\n\nvi. Fast fingerprint slap capture In the fall of 2005, DHS, FBI, DOS, NIJ, DoD/BFC, and NIST jointly defined an urgent, near-term demand for faster, smaller, more mobile, 10- fingerprint slap capture devices to meet critical national security needs. These departments organized a unified 10-Print Capture User Group to develop common requirements and co-sponsor a \"Challenge to Industry\" as a first step toward meeting these common needs.\n\n\nThe User Group identified the need for a 10-print capture scanner device (the \"Scanner\") along with client- and server-based utility software (the \"Software\"), including slap quality, slap segmentation, sequence verification, fingerprint image quality, compression, and other utilities. The Scanner and Software had to be interoperable; that is, any approved Scanner must work with any approved Software and vice versa.\n\n\nThe essential operational requirements of the Scanner and Software (some of which were not met by the industry at that time) included:\n\n\n\n- meet the current space requirements (6\"x6\"x6\") constraints of the\ndeployment facilities;\n- be mobile so as to support multiple operational scenarios; - perform all the 10-print capture processing steps including individual\nfinger segmentation and image quality checks within five seconds per slap from the time the subject places his/her fingers on the Scanner to\nthe moment the capture Software has segmented, analyzed image quality, and delivered status to the operator;\n- be powered without an additional 120v power plug in order to meet\npower capacity and power cabling constraints of the current facilities;\n- comply with the current biometric industry standards; and - meet or exceed fingerprint quality requirements contained in the latest\nversion (7.1) of the FBI's Electronic Fingerprint Transmission Specification, Appendix F.\n\nThe size of the Scanner, power requirements, and speed of both the\nSoftware and Scanner were of critical importance due to their impact on\nfacilities and operations.\n\nIn October 2005, NIST hosted the 10-Print Capture Scanner & Software\nRequirements Workshop.17  At this workshop, the User Group announced\nits plan to conduct market research and presented industry with the challenge of developing a fingerprint scanner that met these requirements. A Request for Information (RFI) was issued, and a number of interested vendors submitted white papers in response telling the User Group how\nthey planned to meet these requirements by bringing technology to market within one year.  A selected set of vendors who responded to the RFI were\nthen invited to meet with the User Group one-on-one to gain further insight into the state of the market and how firms intended on meeting the requirements within the necessary time frame.\n\nAt the end of its market research, the User Group concluded that, while no\nvendor at that time had a complete solution available, industry would be\nable to meet the general objectives and meet the User Group's core requirements in the expected time frame of 12 months.\n\nJust over one year later, in November 2006, DHS hosted a 10-Print\nCapture User Group Industry Day.  At this event, it was publicly\nannounced that industry had stepped up to the challenge of the User Group's requirements, and industry was able to demonstrate functioning\n10-print capture scanners and software that had not existed one year\nearlier.\n\n\nToday, 10-print slap capture fingerprint devices are being used within DOS BioVISA, DHS US-VISIT, and FBI IAFIS civilian background checks.  The 10-Print Capture User Group's tremendous success serves as a model of how federal agencies can come together, form common procurement requirements, promote a unified market to industry, and have industry step up and deliver with great efficiency for the U.S. taxpayer.\n\nvii. Fast rolled-equivalent fingerprint capture The Fast Capture Rolled-Equivalent Finger/Palm Print Initiative began in January 2004 to improve and advance the current state of technology for the capturing of 10 rolled-equivalent fingerprints or fingerprints and palm prints.  The resulting technology will provide the ability to capture 10\nrolled-equivalent fingerprints in 15 seconds or less and both palms in 1\nminute or less.  Significantly greater convenience, speed, reliability, affordability, and accuracy for finger and palm capture will improve our nation's ability to meet the screening requirements for criminal, terrorist, border, transportation, and employment checks.\n\n\nThis initiative was a joint effort of the NIJ, FBI, Drug Enforcement Agency, and the JMD; and the DoD, DHS, and DOS.  The agencies worked cooperatively to define the requirements, author a solicitation, review the applications, and fund four resulting projects.  The NIJ took the lead on awarding and managing the projects.\n\n\nEach project approached capturing the prints in a different way:  a visual 3-dimensional model of the hands constructed from multiple camera images stitched together; analysis of structured-light interference patterns on the fingerprints; a 2-dimensional flexible polymer plastic foil sensor array; and a motion-controlled scanning three-camera assembly.  Initial demonstrations of the technologies occurred in May 2007 showing that capturing 10 rolled-equivalent fingerprints in 15 seconds was feasible, and second phase efforts were funded in FY08 to continue to engineer the solutions into prototype devices.  Concurrently, funding was provided to NIST to provide independent technology assessment of the prototypes and to develop evaluation criteria by which to certify their performance against national standards and data interchange formats.\n\n\nEarly concepts are already finding follow-on DHS support to evaluate contactless capture of fingerprints to support faster screening and reduce concerns of exposure to germs or contaminants on touch devices.\nviii. Latent fingerprint testing NIST is conducting a series of tests called Evaluation of Latent Fingerprint Technologies (ELFT)18 for evaluating the state of the art in automated latent fingerprint matching.  ELFT is being conducted for the DHS Science & Technology (S&T) Directorate and the FBI.  The scope and structure of these tests are based partly on lessons learned from the April 2006 NIST Latent Fingerprint Testing Workshop19, supplemented by technical interchanges with workshop participants and vendors.  The intent of the testing is to quantify the core algorithmic capability of contemporary matchers.\n\n\nWhile the immediate goal of ELFT is to assess automated technology, long-term goals go far beyond simply quantifying performance.  It is fully expected that understanding the performance envelope and limitations of contemporary matchers will lead to improvements in technology.  These in turn will lead to enhanced performance for searches of 10-prints and plain impressions against unsolved latent databases and watch lists.\nEqually important, technology improvements will provide law enforcement with the capability to search their unsolved latent fingerprints against 10-print files with greatly reduced effort.\n\n\nELFT is structured as a multi-year project.  The first part of this project consists of two phases run in a \"lights-out\" environment.  Phase I was completed in 2007 and represents a proof-of-concept test the main purpose of which was to demonstrate integrity of the software, including the evaluation test-bed itself.  During Phase I the participants' software demonstrated:\n\n- automated feature extraction from latent images; - ability to match these features against enrolled 10-print backgrounds; and\n- generation of candidate lists.\n\n\nEach participant in Phase I received a personalized performance report on their algorithms.  Only aggregate results were released to the public.  In summary, 10 participants contributed a total of 16 SDKs for evaluation.\nEach SDK was subjected to 100 latent searches against a background of 1,000 10-prints.  The performance across algorithms varied greatly, with best performers achieving a lights-out latent hit rate at rank-1 of better than 80%, while the poorest performers achieved a hit rate of less than\n\n30%.  This wide range of performance demonstrates the need for continued public testing and technology improvements.\n\n\nPhase II is currently under way and employs a larger database to quantify the achievable performance (\"hit rate\") for automated searches.  In Phase II, each SDK is being subjected to 1,000 latent searches against a background of 10,000 10-prints.  The performance of each SDK will be publicly disclosed in Phase II.\n\nix. Fingerprint minutiae interoperability testing\nThe Minutiae Interoperability Exchange (MINEX) family of tests is being conducted by NIST to support the use of fingerprint minutiae templates as\nthe *de facto* leading biometric data element for large-scale identity\nmanagement applications.  This is centered primarily on storage of minutiae records on identity credentials but extends to the transmission of compact fingerprint data over operational and bandwidth-limited networks.\n\nThe MINEX program was established to determine the feasibility of using minutiae data (rather than image data) as the interchange medium for fingerprint information between different fingerprint matching systems. The key focus is on standardized minutiae data to achieve effective and efficient interoperability.  The MINEX program is currently made up of\nthe three tests described below:  MINEX 0420, Ongoing MINEX21, and\nMINEX II22.  Further activities in this area, MINEX III, IV, etc., are now\nbeing planned to enhance conformity, accuracy, and interoperability of minutiae-based systems.  Federal partners who benefit from this program include DHS S&T, DHS US-VISIT, DOJ/JMD IDENT/IAFIS, and DOJ/FBI.  Globally, the MINEX program has been influential on various identity management programs, including those for border management.\n\nMINEX 04\nThe approval of the INCITS 378 fingerprint template standard creates the\npossibility of a fully interoperable multivendor marketplace for applications involving fast, economic, and accurate interchange of compact biometric templates.  MINEX 04 was conducted from August 2004 through March 2006\nto address the outstanding questions surrounding the new standard.\n\n20 Patrick Grother, Michael McCabe, Craig Watson, Mike Indovina, Wayne Salamon, Patricia Flanagan, Elham\n\n- Does the template give accuracy comparable with proprietary\n(image-based) implementations?\n- Can template data be generated and matched by different vendors\nwithout an increase in error rates? The MINEX 04 evaluation was designed to answer these questions and\ncompared proprietary templates against two variants of the INCITS 378\nformat - MIN:A, which codes minutiae (x, y, , type, quality) and MIN:B,\nwhich supplements it with ridge count, core, and delta information. Fourteen vendors participated.  All of them implemented the MIN:A template;\nsix elected to implement the MIN:B enhancement; and each was baselined\nagainst its corresponding proprietary template technology.  By using very\nlarge-scale trials and four archived operational datasets, conclusions from\nMINEX 04 included the following.\n- Proprietary templates are superior to MIN:A templates in terms of\nlower error rates.\n- The reduced accuracy obtained using standard templates compared\nto proprietary templates can be adequately compensated for by using two fingers for all authentication attempts.\n- Some template generators produce standard templates that are\nmatched more accurately than others; some matchers compare templates more accurately than others.  The leading vendors in generation are not always the leaders in matching, and vice-versa.\n- Certification of an interoperable group of products requires some\nprior specification of the required accuracy.  Large numbers of\nproducts will interoperate when the accuracy requirement is low. Fewer vendors are interoperable in high-performance interoperability scenarios. In terms of impact, the results of MINEX 04 were used in decisions for\nprojects such as PIV.  In response to MINEX 04, NIST released FIPS-20123 in\nFebruary 2005, which defines the structure of an identity credential.  It specified the inclusion of data from two fingerprints as a third authentication factor.  The format for this information was finalized in February 2006 when\nNIST Special Publication 800-76-124 specified essentially the MINEX MIN:A\ntemplate as a profile of the INCITS 378 standard.  The result of this is the\npresence of INCITS 378 templates in PIV cards to be carried by all employees and contractors of federal agencies.  Other programs such as TSA's\n\nTransportation Worker Identification Credential (TWIC) and Registered Traveler may adopt this specification, and together these biometric-enabled credentials will soon number in the millions.\n\nOngoing MINEX\nOngoing MINEX follows the approach of MINEX 04 and is a continuing\nevaluation of INCITS 378 fingerprint template interoperability.  The test program has two mandates:\n- to provide measurements of performance and interoperability of core\ntemplate encoding and matching capabilities to users, vendors, and\ninterested parties; and\n- to establish compliance for template encoders and matchers for the\nU.S. government's PIV program. The Ongoing MINEX program evaluates template encoding and matching\nsoftware submitted to NIST in the form of an SDK library.  This involves, at a minimum, the submission of an SDK that provides functionality to create MINEX-compliant templates based on individual fingerprint images.\nParticipants are encouraged to also provide a template-matching function. Participants in the Ongoing MINEX test may optionally submit their products to establish PIV compliance in accordance with section 7.4.1 of NIST Special Publication 800-76-1.  Upon completion of testing, if the submitted SDK meets the performance criteria defined by NIST (the interoperable group of algorithms must maintain FMR = 0.01 and FNMR  0.01), it shall be\nconsidered MINEX-compliant and listed on the NIST website25.  The effect is\nto establish a baseline for the core algorithmic capability of the providers' implementations.  To date, 21 feature extractors (template generators) and 19 matching algorithms have been tested to be compliant.  The program is being used to support credentialing efforts worldwide.\n\nMINEX II\nMINEX II was conducted between July 2007 and February 2008 to evaluate the accuracy, speed, and interoperability of Match-on-Card verification algorithms.  Match-on-Card is an example of a privacy-enhancing technology\nin that a cardholder's biometric data never leave the host card.  Instead, the\ntemplate-matching calculation is executed on ISO/IEC 7816 smartcards.  They\ncompare conformant reference and verification instances of the ISO/IEC\n19794-2 Compact Card fingerprint minutiae standard and render a verification decision.  MINEX II was designed to answer the longstanding question of whether such complex matching algorithms running on smartcards can\nachieve accuracy approaching that of server-based algorithms.  The MINEX II\ntest therefore represents an assessment of the core viability of the *de facto*\nleading compact biometric data element on personal identity credentials based on the industry standard smart card.  The results are relevant to users seeking to use minutiae templates as an additional factor for authentication. MINEX II did not evaluate interface standards, secure transmission protocols, or card or algorithm vulnerabilities.  In addition, it did not mimic a particular verification scenario, and it did not compare fingerprint sensors or system-oncard implementations.  MINEX II was conducted concurrently with a separate NIST activity, SBMOC26, which was designed to assess feasibility of conducting cryptographically secure, contactless biometric authentication in less than 2.5 seconds.  Participation in SBMOC was not required for participation in MINEX II. The significant results from MINEX II include the following.\n\n- The most accurate Match-on-Card implementation achieves the minimum error rate specifications of the U.S. government's PIV program.\n\n- For the one provider who has submitted both Match-on-Card and Match-off-Card minutiae-matching algorithms to NIST, the accuracy of the former approaches that of the latter.\n\n- The most accurate Match-on-Card implementation executes 50% of genuine ISO/IEC 7816 VERIFY commands in 0.54 seconds (i.e., median), and 99% within 0.86 seconds.  For the fastest implementation, these values are 0.18 and 0.48 seconds, respectively.\n\n- MINEX II attained unprecedented transparency in its execution; the evaluation plan was published during its development with industry, and version-controlled open-source software was released for both conformance and conversion of INCITS 378 and ISO/IEC 19794-2 Compact Card templates and for invocation of ISO/IEC 7816 Matchon-Card operations. In June 2008, the national bodies of ISO/IEC JTC 1 Subcommittee 37, Biometrics, voted to initiate standardization of a match-on-card test protocol as ISO/IEC 19795 Biometric Performance Testing and Reporting - Part 7: Testing of ISO/IEC 7816-based verification algorithms.  The U.S. national body has contributed the core of the MINEX II test plan, NISTIR 748527, toward a base working draft of the standard.\n\nd. Iris The U.S. government funded iris recognition research for several years prior to 9/11.\nWhile iris recognition technology garnered acceptance as a highly accurate biometric, it required a high degree of cooperation from the user.  To improve the utility, performance, and ease-of-use of this technology, the U.S. government increased its investment after 9/11.  Notable advancements that can be attributed to this investment and foresight include but are not limited to:  increased standoff distances and useable volume; increased system performance while reducing size and cost; and the demonstration of prototypes capable of acquiring and matching the iris of subjects while moving through a portal.  In addition, the U.S. government has sponsored the development of multiple match algorithms, including government-owned. Several elements of the U.S. government collaborated to sponsor the NIST Iris Challenge Evaluation, described in further detail below. Other areas of influence include the sponsorship of academic programs to create U.S.\n\nexperts and spawn new technologies that encourage commercial competition and foster the rapid introduction of technological advancements.  In addition, the U.S. government has sponsored the development of multiple analysts' tools that augment automated iris match algorithms to address the needs of a broad array of government, industry, and academic partners.  This influence has significantly advanced the state of the art and emphasizes interoperable iris biometric technology.\n\nICE\nThe technology development and evaluation methodology for face recognition worked very well on the FRVT 2006 and FRGC programs, improving face recognition performance by an order of magnitude over FRVT 2002 results.\nSome of the sponsors were also interested in doing the same type of technology development and evaluation for iris recognition.  The Iris Challenge Evaluation (ICE) Program began in 2005.  The ICE 2005 was the technology development phase of the ICE Program while the ICE 2006 was the evaluation phase.\n\n\nAs with the FRGC, the ICE 2005 consisted of a challenge problem, the test data, and the test software and infrastructure.  To use the existing infrastructure, the ICE 2005 and ICE 2006 ran concurrently with the FRVT 2006 and FRGC.  This was the first time, however, that iris recognition had been independently tested by one sensor on multiple algorithms.  Results from the ICE 2006 were published with the FRVT 2006 results, since they ran concurrently on the same test infrastructure, and provided a baseline for future evaluations.\n\n## E. Biometric Quality Performance Of Biometric Systems Depends On The Quality Of The Acquired Input Samples.  Accuracy Of Current Biometric Systems Is High When High-Quality Samples Are Being Compared.  Performance, However, Degrades Substantially As\n\nquality drops.  Although only a small fraction of input data are of poor quality, the bulk of recognition errors can be attributed to poor-quality samples.  Poor-quality samples decrease the likelihood of a correct verification and/or identification, while extremely poor quality samples might be impossible to verify and/or identify.  If quality can be improved, whether by sensor design, user interface design, or standards compliance, better performance can be realized.  For those aspects of quality that cannot be designed in, an ability to analyze the quality of a live sample is needed.  This is useful primarily in initiating the reacquisition from a user but also for the real-time selection of the best sample and the selective invocation of different processing methods.  That is why quality measurement algorithms are increasingly deployed in operational biometric systems.  With the increase in deployment of quality algorithms, the need to standardize an interoperable way to store and exchange biometric quality scores increases. Biometric quality analysis is a technical challenge because it is most helpful when the measures reflect the performance sensitivities of one or more target biometric matchers.  NIST addressed this problem in August 2004 when it issued the NIST Fingerprint Image Quality (NFIQ) algorithm.  NFIQ is a fingerprint quality measurement tool.  It is implemented as open-source software and is used today in U.S. government and commercial deployments.  Its key innovation is to produce a quality value from a fingerprint image that is directly predictive of expected matching performance and has been designed to be matcher-independent.  There is now international consensus in industry, academia, and government that a statement of a biometric sample's quality should be related to its recognition performance.  Since its release, NFIQ has won national and international acceptance and has become the *de facto* standard.  NFIQ is included in the Electronic Biometric Transmission Specification (EBTS), which is a required standard for doing business with the FBI's IAFIS. Since 2004, NIST has been considering how quality measures should be evaluated, developing quality measures for other biometrics, and considering the wider use of quality measures in biometric systems, including quality summarization and quality calibration.  In addition, NIST is active in SC 37 and M1 standardization activities on biometric quality and sample conformance. The NIST Biometric Quality Program focuses on standards, tools, guidance, and workshops.\n\nStandards In January 2006, the SC 37 Biometrics Subcommittee of JTC 1 initiated work on ISO/IEC 29794, a multipart standard establishing quality requirements for fingerprint (Part 4), face (Part 5), generic aspects (Part 1), and possibly other biometrics later.  Both DHS and FBI expressed a need for achieving interoperability of quality scores with other government agencies.  The NIST Biometric Quality Program has contributed to the generic ISO quality draft\n(ISO/IEC 29794-1) to require that quality values must be indicative of recognition performance; and NIST has made technical contributions on representation, storage, and exchange of quality scores.  The goal is an improved standard that reflects the operational needs of the U.S. government, particularly DHS US-\nVISIT, TSA Registered Traveler, PIV, and the recent rollout of the international e-Passport.\n\nTools As mentioned above, NIST has developed the free, open, and vendor-independent fingerprint image quality algorithm, NFIQ.  NFIQ formalizes the concept of biometric sample quality as a scalar quantity that is related monotonically to the performance of biometric matchers under the constraint that at least two samples with their own qualities are being compared.\n\nGuidance NIST has published a technical contribution and guidance toward quality summarization.  Quality summarization addresses the important issue of enterprise quality-assurance surveying by providing tools on how to combine quality scores of individual samples into one scalar representing quality of the whole database.  Such a function would support identification of, for example, defective sensors, underperforming sites, and seasonal or secular trends.  Slap quality addresses the problem of how to combine quality scores of each finger (i.e., right index, right middle,...) into one scalar representing quality of the slap fingerprints.  This is relevant to DHS' operational needs with regard to US-\nVISIT's 10-print matching system.\n\nIn the paper titled *Performance of Biometric Quality Measures*, published in the April 2007 issue of IEEE Pattern Analysis and Machine Intelligence, NIST examined methods of assessing how effective a quality algorithm is in predicting performance.  This activity supports future development of quality measurement algorithms since the ability to evaluate is necessary and vital during development. NIST also conducted studies on incorporating quality in multimodal biometric systems and presented *When to Fuse Two Biometrics* at the Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition conference in June 2006.\n\nWorkshops To discuss capabilities vis-a-vis operational requirements, and to identify research needs, testing requirements, and standardization gaps, NIST conducted a series of international Biometric Quality Workshops in March 2006 and November 2007. The workshops provided a forum for experts to share their research and discuss problems and new developments.  Each workshop attracted more than 160 attendees to listen to more than 40 presentations of the world's leading technologies.  The workshops are aimed at improving accuracy of biometric systems by incorporating quality assessment technologies into the sample acquisition process.  They aim to assess current quality measurement capabilities and to identify technologies, factors, operational paradigms, and standards that can measurably improve quality.\n\n\n\n## F. Multimodal\n\ni. MBGC\nOver the last decade, numerous government and industry organizations have or are moving toward deploying automated biometric technologies to provide increased security for their systems and facilities.  Results from the FRVT 2006 and FRGC documented two orders of magnitude improvement in the performance of face recognition under full-frontal, controlled conditions over the last 14 years.  For the first time, ICE 2006 provided an independent assessment of multiple iris recognition algorithms on the same data set.\nHowever, further advances in these technologies are needed to meet the full range of operational requirements.  Many of these requirements focus on biometric samples taken under less than ideal conditions, for example:\n\n-\nlow-quality still images;\n-\nhigh- and low-quality video imagery;\n-\nface and iris images taken under varying illumination conditions; and\n-\noff-angle or occluded images.\n\n\nBuilding on the challenge problem and evaluation paradigm of FRGC, FRVT 2006, ICE 2005, and ICE 2006, the Multiple Biometric Grand Challenge (MBGC) is designed to address these problem areas.  One of the highlights of the MBGC is the Portal Challenge problem.  The success of the iris at a distance project (HumanID) and the \"Iris on the Move\" System led to the design of the MBGC Portal Challenge problem.  The goal of the Portal Challenge problem is to develop algorithms that recognize people from near-infrared image sequences and high-definition video sequences.\nThe sequences will be acquired as people walk through a portal. The MBGC started with a kick-off workshop on April 18, 2008, and plans to have the first set of results by early 2009.  Plans are to follow the MBGC with an independent technology evaluation to verify MBGC results.\n\n## Ii. Mbark\n\nDespite existing efforts, building modern biometric applications (or *clients*)\nthat are flexible with respect to changes in sensors, workflow, configuration, and responsiveness remains both difficult and costly.  The Multimodal Biometric Application Resource Kit, or MBARK, reduces the complexity and costs of implementing such an application.  MBARK is public domain source code that may be leveraged to develop the next-generation of biometric and personal identity verification applications. Incorporating the MBARK libraries can yield a variety of enhancements critical for the success of any real-world system.  For example, MBARK provides a usability-tested and consistent user interface.  MBARK provides operators with the means to quickly recover from both minor mistakes and major hardware failures.  In addition, the use of XML facilitates true sensor interoperability via plug-ins and allows for changes in workflow on-the-fly. MBARK represents an immediate and field-tested response to The National Biometric Challenge of developing middleware techniques and standards that will permit \"plug-and-play\" capabilities for biometric sensors. The following are just some of the features of MBARK that make it robust and flexible with respect to changes in sensors, workflow, configuration, and responsiveness.\n\n- Provides a consistent user interface\nA user-centered and consistent user interface reduces errors and minimizes the need to retrain users as vendors develop new sensors and software. The benefits of usability-driven design are well understood.\n- Allows users to recover from mistakes\nSignificant costs may accompany any system that does not allow recovery from both common and uncommon mistakes.  With MBARK, an operator can not only easily recover from mistakes, but may also save a snapshot of a session (in the form of an XML file) and load it again at a later time.\n- Adjusts workflow automatically\nDefining a workflow that accommodates mistakes becomes more complex as \"edge cases\" are added.  For example, how should the system behave if a fingerprint sensor detects that a finger is missing but the operator has not\nindicated such?\n- Responds to user input\nUsers expect modern applications to be responsive to their input at all\ntimesduring initialization, startup, capture, task editing, and so on.  How does a user distinguish between a long-running operation and a system that is simply \"frozen\"?  MBARK uses a natively multi-threaded\narchitecture to allow as much \"background\" processing as possible.\n- Provides true sensor interoperability\nMBARK uses a plug-in style mechanism that allows true sensor interoperability based on a unified APIa common interface that has been\nused to successfully integrate real face cameras, fingerprint scanners, and iris sensors.  The MBARK architecture allows new sensors to be deployed\nwithout the need to even restart an MBARK application.\n- Provides flexible user configuration\nA highly configurable biometric client empowers users to define and experiment with various biometrics and workflows without depending on\nany particular vendor to implement such changes.  With XML files,\nMBARK allows users to define precise custom workflows specifically\ntailored to their needs.\n- Open and free\nMBARK source code is public domainthe benefits of free software are well-discussed elsewhere.  The GNU document Categories of Free and\nNon-Free Software contains more information about the differences\nbetween *open source* and *public domain software*.\nMore information about MBARK may be found at the project's website, http://mbark.nist.gov.\n\ng. CITeR\nThe Center for Identification Technology Research (CITeR) is a National Science Foundation (NSF) Industry/University Cooperative Research Center (I/UCRC).\nInitial discussions and planning for CITeR began in the late 1990s and was funded for its first five years of operation as an I/UCRC in December of 2001.  CITeR was renewed after external peer review for a second five years of operation in December\n2006. CITeR works with its affiliates to advance identification technology through cooperative definition and completion of highly leveraged research, education of the next generation of scientists and engineers, and effective knowledge transfer. The results of the center's highly leveraged research are formally disseminated to members at twice yearly meetings.  In addition to reports, papers, and site visits, access to the student researchers as potential future employees represents perhaps the most important long-term means of knowledge transfer.\n\nh. Biometrics Usability A more recent avenue of scientific research is the human computer interaction (HCI) of biometric systems.  HCI and usability guidelines were well established for desktop systems, applications, and web applications that allow developers to design systems according to HCI principles and established baselines.  However, no such HCI guidelines existed for biometric systems.  DHS recognized this need and initiated a program in 2004 with NIST to develop HCI guidelines and standards for biometric systems.\n\nThe goal of the usability effort is the development and testing of a set of usability guidelines for biometric systems that:\n- enhance performance (throughput and quality); - improve user satisfaction and acceptance; and - provide consistency across biometric system user interfaces.\nAchieving these goals requires an understanding of the users, user behavior, and the systems' usability. Six usability research studies have been conducted, including the study of the impact of:\n- user habituation or acclimatization; - counter height and anthropometrics;\n- instructional materials; - adaptable devices for accessibility; - international symbols; - relationship of counter height and angle of fingerprint scanners; and - face overlays. These research studies have resulted in seven reports and two ISO standards submissions.  These documents provide guidelines for implementation and\ndeployment of biometric applications.  The test results have had a direct impact on\nexisting and planned biometric deployments within US-VISIT.\ni. Standards While some very successful biometric standards activities existed well before 2001, such as the ANSI/NIST ITL-1-200x standards, the BioAPI specification (released March 2000) developed under the BioAPI Consortium with participation of government agency representatives, and the Common Biometric Exchange Formats Framework (CBEFF) specification developed by a group lead by NIST and NSA, 9/11 provided an impetus to greatly expand and accelerate comprehensive standards development as envisioned government and private sector systems required a solid standards base.  The first step was to create formal standards working technical groups in accredited, existing standards development organizations to develop generic biometric standards that would support both identification and verification applications. The U.S. government spearheaded this effort by formally proposing these groups at the national (INCITS - InterNational Committee for Information Technology Standards) and international Joint Technical Committee 1 of ISO/IEC\nlevels in October of 2001 and January of 2002, respectively.  To further support these efforts, the U.S. government also assigned personnel and fiscal resources to lead these efforts.  Since that time, 22 national standards and 25 international standards have been developed and approved.  Several of these standards are now in their second versions. Additional government-based standards activities include the following.\n\n- Common Biometric Exchange Formats Framework (CBEFF), NISTIR 6529-\nA, April 2004 (proposed as an American National Standard, approved in 2005\n\nas ANSI INCITS 398-2005.  Since then a revision of this standard was approved in 2008 as ANSI INCITS 398-2008.\n- Release of beta versions of BioAPI Conformance Test Suites (CTS),\nSeptember 2005 by NIST and DoD.\n- A Taxonomy of Definitions for Usability Studies in Biometrics, NISTIR\n7378, November 2006.\n- Approval of ANSI/NIST-ITL 1-2007, Data Format for the Interchange of\nFingerprint, Facial and Other Biometric Information - Part 1, April 2007.\n- Conformance Testing Architecture and Test Suite for data instantiations of\nCBEFF (ANSI INCITS 398-2008) developed by NIST and made available to the U.S. government - June 2008.\n- Initiation of the development by NIST of Conformance Test Suites for\nbiometric data interchange formats started June 2008.\n- Initiation of a second version of the ANSI/NIST-ITL standard for an XML\nformat.  ANSI/NIST-ITL 2-200X, Data Format for the Interchange of Fingerprint, Facial and Other Biometric Information - Part 2:  XML, which is\nundergoing  ballot and  public review in the summer of 2008.\n\nBy 2007, multiple competing versions of some standards existed28.  To help ensure\ninteroperability of government systems, the NSTC Subcommittee on Biometrics and\nIdentity Management led an interagency effort to develop the NSTC Policy for Enabling the Development, Adoption and Use of Biometric Standards (September\n2007).  The goal of this policy is to establish a framework to reach interagency\nconsensus on biometric standards adoption for the federal government and resulted in\nthe release of the *Registry of US Government Recommended Biometric Standards*\n(July 2008).  Federal agency adoption of these recommended standards and\nassociated conformity assessment programs will enable necessary next generation federal biometric systems, facilitate biometric system interoperability, and enhance\nthe effectiveness of biometrics products and processes.\n\n## Appendix B - About The Nstc Subcommittee On Biometrics And Identity Management\n\nThe NSTC is the principal means within the Executive Branch to coordinate S&T policy across the diverse entities that make up the federal research and development enterprise. Chaired by the President, the membership of the NSTC is made up of the Vice President, the Director of the OSTP, Cabinet Secretaries and agency heads with significant S&T responsibilities, and other White House officials.  The Subcommittee on Biometrics and Identity Management serves as part of the internal deliberative process of the NSTC. Reporting to and directed by the Committee on Technology, the Subcommittee's tasks are to:\n- For Biometrics:\no Provide technical leadership in the development and implementation of\ninteroperable federal biometric systems;\no Develop and implement multi-agency investment strategies that advance\nbiometric sciences to meet public and private needs;\no Develop and adopt biometric standards as specified in the NSTC Policy\nfor Enabling the Development, Adoption and Use of Biometric Standards;\no Develop consensus strategic outreach plans for biometrics, including\ncollaboration on www.biometrics.gov, the annual Biometric Consortium Conference and other events;\n- For Identity Management (of which biometrics is a subset):\no Identify cross-sector IdM issues and develop and implement plans to\naddress the federal government's priority S&T needs;\no Facilitate the inclusion of privacy-protecting principles in IdM system\ndesign;\no Promote a scientifically educated and aware public that properly\nunderstands IdM technologies, federal programs, and issues;\no Strengthen international and public sector partnerships to foster the\nadvancement of IdM technologies.\nCo-chairs\nRussell Neuman, OSTP (2002-2003) Gary Strong, DHS S&T (2003-2004) Kevin Hurst, OSTP (2003-2005) Duane Blackburn, FBI, OSTP (2004-Present) Brad Wing, DHS/US-VISIT (2006-2008) Chris Miles, DOJ/NIJ, DHS (2006-2007, 2008) James Dray, DOC/NIST (2007-Present) Executive Secretaries\nKaren Walker, DHS/S&T (2003-2005) Kim Shepard, DOJ/FBI/SETA (2005-2007) Michelle Johnson, DOJ/FBI/SETA (2007-Present)\nMichael Garris, DOC/NIST Alexandra Gianinno, EOP/OMB\nBill Gravell, DoD/Navy Myra Gray, DoD/BTF David Grazer, EOP/NSC Patrick Grother, DOC/NIST Joseph Guzman, DoD/BMO* Ed Harras, DOT/FAA Monte Hawkins, NCTC, EOP/HSC Martin Herman, DOC/NIST David Herrington, DoD/CTTSO Douglas Hill, State/CA Mike Hogan, Commerce/NIST* Robert Holman, DOJ/FBI Thomas Hopper, DOJ/FBI John Hotchner, State/CA Kevin Hurst, EOP/OSTP Larry Jellen, GPO* Usha Karne, SSA Kim Keefer, DHS/OCRCL Joe Kielman, DHS/S&T Michael King, ITIC, IARPA* Nuala Kelly, DHS/Privacy* Andy Kirby, ITIC* Eva Kleederman, ODNI Kathleen Kraninger, DHS/SCO Scott Lamoreux, DOJ/FBI Jim Lantzy, NCTC Neal Latta, DHS/US-VISIT, TSC Rick Larazrick, DOT/FAA, DHS/TSA* Michael Lilienthal, DoD/BTF Valerie Lively, DHS/S&T* Dave Lohman, DoD/BTF\nPhilip Loranger, DOT/OCIO\nJames Loudermilk, DOJ/FBI Jim Mahan, DOJ/FBI Joseph Maher, DHS/OCRCL Richard Martin, State/CA Michael McCabe, DOC/NIST Ed McCallum, DoD/CTTSO Thomas McKenna, DoD/ONR Ross Michaels, DOC/NIST* Chris Miles, DOJ/NIJ, DHS/S&T* Kenneth Mortensen, DHS/Privacy, DOJ/Privacy Frank Moss, State/CA\nSubcommittee Participants29\n\nDonald Anderson, EOP/NSC Josepth Arata, DoD\nDouglas Arnold, DoD Joanne Arzt, State John Atkins, State Carol Bales, EOP/OMB Bill Baron, DOT/RITA * Sankar Basu, NSF* Andy Black, DOJ/BOP Duane Blackburn, DoD, DOJ/FBI, EOP/OSTP * Janice Bland, DOJ/FBI Janet Boodro, DOJ/JMD John Boyd, DoD/Navy Sam Bradley, DOE Chris Brazier, State Fred Bunke, DHS Susan Burk, State Michael Butler, GSA Zaida Candelario, Treasury/IRS Sam Cava, DoD, DOJ/FBI* Michael Chang, NCTC Ed Chase, EOP/OMB Patricia Cogswell, DHS/SCO Greg Collett, DHS/CIS John Cook, State, NCC Maureen Cooney, DHS/Privacy Thomas Coty, DHS/S&T Bert Coursey, DOC/NIST Dan Cundiff, DoD/AT&L David Cuthbertson, DOJ/FBI Tim Daugherty, DHS/USSS Aaron Davenport, EOP/OVP Jeff David, DoD/CTTSO Tom Dee, DoD/AT&L *\nKimberly Del Greco, DOJ/FBI *\nSemahat Demir, NSF Stephen Dennis, DHS/S&T Trent DePersia, DOJ/NIJ, DHS/S&T MaryBeth Dormuth, DOT/FAA Jim Dray, DOC/NIST* Jeff Dunn, NSA* Stanley Erickson, DOJ/NIJ Travis Farris, State/CA Sarah Francia, State Art Friedman, DoD Cita Furlani, DOC/NIST\nJim Zok, DOT/MARAD*\n\nGreg Motta, DOJ/FBI Todd Mullenax, DOJ/FBI\nMichael Neifach, EOP/HSC Elaine Newton, DOC/NIST Kirstjen Nielsen, EOP/HSC Joyce Nyman, DHS/CG Omid Omidvar, DOC/NIST* Eric Panketh, EOP/OMB Jonathon Phillips, DoD/DARPA, DOC/NIST* Richard Phillips, Treasury/IRS Jennie Plante, DOJ/USA Carl Pocratsky, DOE Fernando Podio, DOC/NIST* Troy Potter, DHS/US-VISIT Niels Quist, DOJ/Privacy* Ben Riley, DoD/AT&L Bob Ross, DOT/OGC Peter Sand, DHS/Privacy* Jeff Sarnacki, EOP/HSC George Saymon, DHS/FBI Marie Sciarrone, EOP/HSC Susan Sexton, DOT/FAA Paul Shannon, EOP/HSC Kristen Sheldon, EOP/HSC Nicole Spaun, DOJ/FBI Richard Stewart, DOT/NHTSA Scott Swann, DOJ/FBI, CJIS Barbra Symonds, DOT/IRS Elham Tabossi, DOC/NIST David Temoshok, GSA Gerald Thames, NCTC* Mary Theofanos, DOC/NIST Jeanette Thornton, EOP/OMB Fred Vogel, State Richard Vorder Bruegge, DOJ/FBI\nKaren Walker, DHS/S&T Kimberly Weissman, DHS/US- VISIT* Kamela White, EOP/OMB Charlie Wilson, DOC/NIST Diane Wilson, DHS/TSA James Windle, EOP/OMB Brad Wing, DHS/US-VISIT, DOC/NIST* John Woodward, DoD/BMO* Steve Yonkers, DHS/US-VISIT"
    },
    {
        "text": "## National Security Space Strategy\n\nUNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY\n\n\n## (U) Preface\n\nDuring the past 50 years, U.S. leadership in space activities has benefited the global economy, enhanced our national security, strengthened international relationships, advanced scientific discovery, and improved our way of life. Space capabilities provide the United States and our allies unprecedented advantages in national decision-making, military operations, and homeland security.  Space systems provide national security decision-makers with unfettered global access and create a decision advantage by enabling a rapid and tailored response to global challenges. Moreover, space systems are vital to monitoring strategic and military developments as well as supporting treaty monitoring and arms control verification.  Space systems are also critical in our ability to respond to natural and man-made disasters and monitor longterm environmental trends.  Space systems allow people and governments around the world to see with clarity, communicate with certainty, navigate with accuracy, and operate with assurance. Maintaining the benefits afforded to the United States by space is central to our national security, but an evolving strategic environment increasingly challenges U.S. space advantages.  Space, a domain that no nation owns but on which all rely, is becoming increasingly congested, contested, and competitive.  These challenges, however, also present the United States with opportunities for leadership and partnership.  Just as the United States helped promote space security in the 20th century, we will build on this foundation to embrace the opportunities and address the challenges of this century. The National Security Space Strategy charts a path for the next decade to respond to the current and projected space strategic environment.  Leveraging emerging opportunities will strengthen the U.S. national security space posture while maintaining and enhancing the advantages the United States gains from space. Our strategy requires active U.S. leadership enabled by an approach that updates, balances, and integrates all of the tools of U.S. power.  The Department of Defense (DoD) and the Intelligence Community (IC), in coordination with other departments and agencies, will implement this strategy by using it to inform planning, programming, acquisition, operations, and analysis.\n\n## The Strategic Environment\n\n\"The now-ubiquitous and interconnected nature of space capabilities and the world's growing dependence on them mean that irresponsible acts in space can have damaging consequences for all of us.\"\n\n- 2010 National Space Policy\nSpace is vital to U.S. national security and our ability to understand emerging threats, project power globally, conduct operations, support diplomatic efforts, and enable global economic viability.  As more nations and non-state actors recognize these benefits and seek their own space or counterspace capabilities, we are faced with new opportunities and new challenges in the space domain.\n\nThe current and future strategic environment is driven by three trends - space is becoming increasingly congested, *contested,* and *competitive.* Space is increasingly *congested*.  Growing global space activity and testing of China's destructive anti-satellite (ASAT) system have increased congestion in important areas in space.  DoD tracks approximately 22,000 man-made objects in orbit, of which 1,100 are active satellites (see Figure 1).  There may be as many as hundreds of thousands of additional pieces of debris that are too small to track with current sensors.  Yet these smaller pieces of debris can damage satellites in orbit.\nToday's space environment contrasts with earlier days of the space age in which only a handful of nations needed to be concerned with congestion.  Now there are approximately 60 nations and government consortia that own and operate satellites, in addition to numerous commercial and academic satellite operators (see Figure 2).  This congestion -\nalong with the effects of operational use, structural failures, accidents involving space systems, and irresponsible testing or employment of debris-producing destructive ASATs\n- is complicating space operations for all those that seek to benefit from space. Increased congestion was highlighted by the 2009 collision between a Russian government Cosmos satellite and a U.S. commercial Iridium satellite.  The collision created approximately 1,500 new pieces of trackable space debris, adding to the more than 3,000 pieces of debris created by the 2007 Chinese ASAT test.  These two events greatly increased the cataloged population of orbital debris.\nAnother area of increasing congestion is the radiofrequency spectrum.  Demand for radiofrequency spectrum to support worldwide satellite services is expected to grow commensurate with the rapid expansion of satellite services and applications.  As many as 9,000 satellite communications transponders are expected to be in orbit by 2015.  As the demand for bandwidth increases and more transponders are placed in service, the greater the probability of radiofrequency interference and the strain on international processes to minimize that interference.\n\nSpace is increasingly *contested* in all orbits.  Today space systems and their supporting infrastructure face a range of man-made threats that may deny, degrade, deceive, disrupt, or destroy assets.  Potential adversaries are seeking to exploit perceived space vulnerabilities.  As more nations and non-state actors develop counterspace capabilities over the next decade, threats to U.S. space systems and challenges to the stability and security of the space environment will increase. Irresponsible acts against space systems could have implications beyond the space domain, disrupting worldwide services upon which the civil and commerical sectors depend. Space is increasingly *competitive*.  Although the United States still maintains an overall edge in space capabilities, the U.S. competitive advantage has decreased as market-entry barriers have lowered (see Figure 3).  The U.S. technological lead is eroding in several areas as expertise among other nations increases.  International advances in space technology and the associated increase in foreign availability of components have put increased importance on the U.S. export control review process to ensure the competitiveness of the U.S. space industrial base while also addressing national security needs. U.S. suppliers, especially those in the second and third tiers, are at risk due to inconsistent acquisition and production rates, long development cycles, consolidation of suppliers under first-tier prime contractors, and a more competitive foreign market.  A decrease in specialized suppliers further challenges U.S. abilities to maintain assured access to critical technologies, avoid critical dependencies, inspire innovation, and maintain leadership advantages.  All of these issues are compounded by challenges in recruiting, developing, and retaining a technical workforce.\n\n## Strategic Objectives\n\nIn executing the National Space Policy, our National Security Space Strategy seeks to maintain and enhance the national security benefits we derive from our activities and capabilities in space while addressing and shaping the strategic environment and strengthening the foundations of our enterprise.  The U.S. defense and intelligence communities will continue to rely on space systems for military operations, intelligence collection, and related activities; access to these capabilities must be assured.  We must address the growing challenges of the congested, contested, and competitive space environment while continuing our leadership in the space domain. Our strategy is derived from the principles and goals found in the National Space Policy and builds on the strategic approach laid out in the National Security Strategy.\nSpecifically, our national security space objectives are to:\n\n- Strengthen safety, stability, and security in space; - Maintain and enhance the strategic national security advantages afforded to the\nUnited States by space; and\n- Energize the space industrial base that supports U.S. national security.\nWe seek a safe space environment in which all can operate with minimal risk of accidents, breakups, and purposeful interference.  We seek a stable space environment in which nations exercise shared responsibility to act as stewards of the space domain and follow norms of behavior.  We seek a secure space environment in which responsible nations have access to space and the benefits of space operations without need to exercise their inherent right of self-defense. We seek to ensure national security access to space and use of space capabilities in peace, crisis, or conflict.  We seek to meet the needs of national leaders and intelligence and military personnel, irrespective of degradation of the space environment or attacks on specific systems or satellites.  Enhancing these benefits requires improving the foundational activities of our national security space enterprise - including our systems, our acquisition processes, our industrial base, our technology innovation, and our\nspace professionals. A resilient, flexible, and healthy space industrial base must underpin all of our space activities.  We seek to foster a space industrial base comprised of skilled professionals who deliver those innovative technologies and systems that enable our competitive advantage.  Our space system developers, operators, and analysts must deliver, field, and sustain national security space capabilities for the 21st century.\n\n\n## Strategic Approaches\n\n\"To promote security and stability in space, we will pursue activities\nconsistent with the inherent right of self-defense, deepen cooperation\nwith allies and friends, and work with all nations toward the\nresponsible and peaceful use of space.\"\n\n                      - 2010 National Security Strategy\n\nThe National Security Space Strategy draws upon all elements of national power and requires active U.S. leadership in space.  The United States will pursue a set of interrelated strategic approaches to meet our national security space objectives:\n\n- Promote responsible, peaceful, and safe use of space; - Provide improved U.S. space capabilities; - Partner with responsible nations, international organizations, and\ncommercial firms;\n- Prevent and deter aggression against space infrastructure that supports U.S.\nnational security; and\n- Prepare to defeat attacks and to operate in a degraded environment.\n\n## Promoting Responsible, Peaceful, And Safe Use Of Space\n\n\"All nations have the right to use and explore space, but with this\nright also comes responsibility.  The United States, therefore, calls\non all nations to work together to adopt approaches for responsible\nactivity in space to preserve this right for the benefit of future\ngenerations.\"\n                       -  2010 National Space Policy\n\nAs directed in the National Space Policy, the United States will promote the responsible,\npeaceful, and safe use of space as the foundational step to addressing the congested and\ncontested space domain and enabling other aspects of our approach.  We will encourage\nallies, partners, and others to do the same.  As more nations, international organizations,\nand commercial firms field or aspire to field space capabilities, it is increasingly\nimportant that they act responsibly, peacefully, and safely in space.  At the same time,\nthey must be reassured of U.S. intentions to act likewise.  We will encourage responsible\nbehavior in space and lead by the power of our example.  Moreover, U.S. diplomatic\nengagements will enhance our ability to cooperate with our allies and partners and seek\ncommon ground among all space-faring nations.\n\nThe United States will support development of data standards, best practices,\ntransparency and confidence-building measures, and norms of behavior for responsible\nspace operations.  We will consider proposals and concepts for arms control measures if\n\nthey are equitable, effectively verifiable, and enhance the national security of the United States and its allies.  We believe setting pragmatic guidelines for safe activity in space can help avoid collisions and other debris-producing events, reduce radiofrequency interference, and promote security and stability in the space domain - all of which are in the interests of all nations.\nShared awareness of spaceflight activity must improve in order to foster global spaceflight safety and help prevent mishaps, misperceptions, and mistrust.  The United States is the leader in space situational awareness (SSA) and can use its knowledge to foster cooperative SSA relationships, support safe space operations, and protect U.S. and allied space capabilities and operations.\nDoD will continue to improve the quantity and quality of the SSA information it obtains and expand provision of safety of flight services to U.S. Government agencies, other nations, and commercial firms.  DoD will encourage other space operators to share their spaceflight safety data.  DoD, in coordination with other government agencies, will seek to establish agreements with other nations and commercial firms to maintain and improve space object databases, pursue common international data standards and data integrity measures, and provide services and disseminate orbital tracking information, including predictions of space object conjunction, to enhance spaceflight safety for all parties.\n\n## Providing Improved U.S. Space Capabilities\n\n\"Being able to deliver capability cost-effectively when it is needed improves mission effectiveness, provides leadership with flexibility in making investments, and precludes gaps in necessary capabilities.\"\n- 2009 National Intelligence Strategy U.S. space capabilities will continue to be fundamental for national security.  DoD and the IC will identify, improve, and prioritize investments in those capabilities that garner the greatest advantages.  We will develop, acquire, field, operate, and sustain space capabilities to deliver timely and accurate space services to a variety of customers, from soldiers to national decision-makers.  We will enhance interoperability and compatibility of existing national security systems, across operational domains and mission areas, to maximize efficiency of our national security architecture; we will ensure these characteristics are built into future systems.  We will ensure that data collection and products are released at the lowest possible classification to maximize their usefulness to the user community. Ensuring U.S. capabilities are developed and fielded in a timely, reliable, and responsive manner is critical for national decision-makers to act on time-sensitive and accurate information, for military forces to plan and execute effective operations, and for the IC to enable all of the above with timely indications and warning.  Improving our acquisition processes, energizing the U.S. space industrial base, enhancing technological innovation, and deliberately developing space professionals are critical enablers to maintaining U.S. space leadership. In cooperation with our industrial base partners, DoD and the IC will revalidate current measures and implement new measures, where practicable, to stabilize program acquisition more effectively and improve our space acquisition processes.  We will reduce programmatic risk through improved management of requirements.  We will use proven best practices of systems engineering, mission assurance, contracting, technology maturation, cost estimating, and financial management to improve system acquisition, reduce the risk of mission failure, and increase successful launch and operation of our space systems. Mission permitting, we will synchronize the planning, programming, and execution of major acquisition programs with other DoD and IC processes to improve efficiencies and overall performance of our acquisition system and industrial base.  DoD and the IC will evaluate the requirements and analysis of alternatives processes to ensure a range of affordable solutions is considered and to identify requirements for possible adjustment. The requirements process must produce combinations of material and non-material solutions.  Realistic cost and schedule estimates must inform the President's annual budget request.  Human resources processes must provide the right personnel for successful execution.\nWe seek to foster a U.S. space industrial base that is robust, competitive, flexible, healthy, and delivers reliable space capabilities on time and on budget.  DoD and the IC, in concert with the civil space sector, will better manage investments across portfolios to ensure the industrial base can sustain those critical technologies and skills that produce the systems we require.  Additionally, we will continue to explore a mix of capabilities with shorter development cycles to minimize delays, cut cost growth, and enable more rapid technology maturation, innovation, and exploitation. A key aspect of energizing the U.S. space industrial base is to reform U.S. export controls to address technology security and global competitiveness.  Export controls have a farreaching impact on national security interests, as they help deter illicit efforts by others to obtain and use the materials, technology, and know-how that are vital to our national security.  Export controls, however, can also affect the health and welfare of the industrial base, in particular second-tier and third-tier suppliers.  Reforming export controls will facilitate U.S. firms' ability to compete to become providers-of-choice in the international marketplace for capabilities that are, or will soon become, widely available globally, while strengthening our ability to protect the most significant U.S. technology advantages.  In particular, as new opportunities arise for international collaboration, a revised export control system will better enable the domestic firms competing for these contracts.  Revised export control policies will address U.S. firms' ability to export space-related items generally available in the global marketplace, consistent with U.S. policy and international commitments. We will continue to pursue, adapt, and evolve the unique technologies, innovative exploitation techniques, and diverse applications that give the United States its strategic advantage in space.  The United States seeks to maintain and enhance access to those global and domestic technologies needed for national security space systems.  We will do so by expanding technology partnerships with the academic community, industry, U.S. and partner governments, mission customers, and other centers of technical excellence and innovation, consistent with U.S. policy, technology transfer objectives, and international commitments.  To advance the science and technology that enables U.S.\n\nspace capabilities, we will continue to assess global technology trends to find emerging technologies and potential breakthroughs.  We will explore new applications of current technologies and the development of unique, innovative technologies and capabilities. We will improve the transition of scientific research and technology development to the operational user and into major system acquisition.  To the extent practicable, we will also facilitate the incorporation of these capabilities and technologies into appropriate domestic space programs. People are our greatest asset.  To support the range of national security space activities, we will develop current and future national security space professionals - our \"space cadre\" - who can acquire capabilities, operate systems, analyze information, and succeed in a congested, contested, and competitive environment.  We will build a more diverse and balanced workforce among military, civilian, and contractor components.  These professionals must be educated, experienced, and trained in the best practices of their field - whether it is planning, programming, acquisition, manufacturing, operations, or analysis. We will continue to encourage students at all levels to pursue technical coursework as a foundation for space-related career fields.  Working with other departments and agencies, we will synchronize our science, technology, engineering, and mathematics (STEM) education initiatives with sound education investments to ensure an ample supply of space professionals with appropriate skills and capabilities.  We will encourage our space professionals to participate in STEM outreach and mentoring programs. We will continue to develop structured personnel development programs to expand, track, and sustain our space expertise, employing focused education and training as well as purposeful utilization of our people to offer a broad range of experiential opportunities. We will further professional development by growing, rewarding, and retaining scientific and technical expertise and professional leadership.  We will support an entrepreneurial ethos by encouraging initiative, innovation, collaboration, resourcefulness, and resilience.\nAs national security space priorities shift, we will continue to educate and train the workforce to align with new priorities.\n\n## Partnering With Responsible Nations, International Organizations, And Commercial Firms\n\n\"[E]xplore opportunities to leverage growing international and commercial expertise to enhance U.S. capabilities and reduce the vulnerability of space systems and their supporting ground infrastructure.\"\n- 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review The evolving strategic environment allows for additional opportunities to partner with responsible nations, international organizations, and commercial firms.  DoD and the IC will continue to partner with others to augment the U.S. national security space posture across many mission areas.  This includes looking for opportunities to leverage or work in conjunction with partnerships pursued by U.S. Government civil space agencies.  By sharing or exchanging capabilities, data, services, personnel, operations, and technology, we can ensure access to information and services from a more diverse set of systems - an advantage in a contested space environment.  We will promote appropriate cost-sharing and risk-sharing partnerships to develop and share capabilities.  Decisions on partnering will be consistent with U.S. policy and international commitments and consider cost, protection of sources and methods, and effects on the U.S. industrial base.\nPartnering with other nations also is essential to ensuring global access to the radiofrequency spectrum and related orbital assignments and promoting the responsible, peaceful, and safe use of outer space.  Nations gain international acceptance of their use of the radiofrequency spectrum and satellite orbits through the International Telecommunication Union (ITU).  Registering satellite networks with the ITU can help prevent and, if necessary, address radiofrequency interference.\n\nThe United States will lead in building coalitions of like-minded space-faring nations and, where appropriate, work with international institutions to do so.  With our allies, we will explore the development of combined space doctrine with principles, goals, and objectives that, in particular, endorse and enable the collaborative sharing of space capabilities in crisis and conflict.  We will seek to expand mutually beneficial agreements with key partners to utilize existing and planned capabilities that can augment U.S. national security space capabilities.  We will pursue increased interoperability, compatibility, and integration of partner nations into appropriate DoD and IC networks to support information sharing and collective endeavors, taking affordability and mutual benefit into account.  At the same time, U.S. military and intelligence personnel will ensure the appropriate review and release of classified information to enhance partner access to space information. We will actively promote the sale of U.S.-developed capabilities to partner nations and the integration of those capabilities into existing U.S. architectures and networks.\nPosturing our domestic industry to develop these systems will also enable the competitiveness of the U.S. industrial base. We will explore sharing space-derived information as \"global utilities\" with partnered nations.  As we do today with the positioning, navigation, and timing services of the Global Positioning System, we will provide services derived from selected space systems and enhance those services through partnerships.  We will continue to share SSA\ninformation to promote responsible and safe space operations.  We will also pursue enhanced sharing of other space services such as missile warning and maritime domain awareness.  We may seek to establish a collaborative missile warning network to detect attacks against our interests and those of our allies and partners. Strategic partnerships with commercial firms will continue to enable access to a more diverse, robust, and distributed set of space systems and provide easily releasable data.\nStrategic partnerships with commercial firms will be pursued in areas that both stabilize costs and improve the resilience of space architectures upon which we rely.  Innovative approaches will be explored for their utility in meeting government performance requirements in a cost-effective and timely manner.  We will rely on proven commercial capabilities to the maximum extent practicable, and we will modify commercial capabilities to meet government requirements when doing so is more cost-effective and timely for the government.  We will develop space systems only when there is no suitable, cost-effective commercial alternative or when national security needs dictate.\n\n## Preventing And Deterring Aggression Against Space Infrastructure That Supports U.S. National Security\n\n\"U.S. forces must be able to deter, defend against, and defeat aggression by potentially hostile nation-states.  This capability is fundamental to the nation's ability to protect its interests and to provide security in key regions.\"\n- 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review Given the degree to which the United States relies on space systems and supporting infrastructure for national security, we must use a multilayered approach to prevent and deter aggression.  We seek to enhance our national capability to dissuade and deter the development, testing, and employment of counterspace systems and prevent and deter aggression against space systems and supporting infrastructure that support U.S.\nnational security.\nMany elements of this strategy contribute to this approach.  We will: support diplomatic efforts to promote norms of responsible behavior in space; pursue international partnerships that encourge potential adversary restraint; improve our ability to attribute attacks; strengthen the resilience of our architectures to deny the benefits of an attack;\nand retain the right to respond, should deterrence fail. DoD and the IC will support the diplomatic and public diplomacy efforts of the Department of State to promote the responsible use of space and discourage activities that threaten the safety, stability, and security of the space domain.  We will also work with the Department of State and other appropriate U.S. Government agencies to strengthen alliances with other space-faring nations and pursue partnerships with commercial firms and international organizations. We will improve our intelligence posture - predictive awareness, characterization, warning, and attribution - to better monitor and attribute activities in the space domain. Thus, SSA and foundational intelligence will continue to be top priorities, as they underpin our ability to maintain awareness of natural disturbances and the capabilities, activities, and intentions of others.  We will also enable and develop intelligence professionals who can provide greater scope, depth, and quality of intelligence collection and analysis. We will seek to deny adversaries meaningful benefits of attack by improving costeffective protection and strengthening the resilience of our architectures.  Partnerships with other nations, commercial firms, and international organizations, as well as alternative U.S. Government approaches such as cross-domain solutions, hosted payloads, responsive options, and other innovative solutions, can deliver capability, should our space systems be attacked.  This also will enable our ability to operate in a degraded space environment. Finally, the United States will retain the right and capabilities to respond in self-defense, should deterrence fail.  We will use force in a manner that is consistent with longstanding principles of international law, treaties to which the United States is a party, and the inherent right of self defense.\n\n## Preparing To Defeat Attacks And Operate In A Degraded Environment\n\n\"Increase assurance and resilience of mission-essential functions\nenabled by commercial, civil, scientific, and national security\nspacecraft\n            and\n                  supporting\n                              infrastructure\n                                              against\n                                                       disruption,\ndegradation,\n              and\n                    destruction,\n                                  whether\n                                            from\n                                                   environmental,\nmechanical, electronic, or hostile causes.\"\n                   - 2010 National Space Policy\n\nWe believe it is in the interests of all space-faring nations to avoid hostilities in space.\nIn spite of this, some actors may still believe counterspace actions could provide\nmilitary advantage.  Our military and intelligence capabilities must be prepared to \"fight\nthrough\" a degraded environment and defeat attacks targeted at our space systems\nand supporting infrastructure.  We must deny and defeat an adversary's ability to achieve\nits objectives.\n\nAs we invest in next generation space capabilities and fill gaps in current capabilities, we\nwill include resilience as a key criterion in evaluating alternative architectures.\nResilience can be achieved in a variety of ways, to include cost-effective space system\nprotection, cross-domain solutions, hosting payloads on a mix of platforms in various\norbits, drawing on distributed international and commercial partner capabilities, and\ndeveloping and maturing responsive space capabilities.  We will develop the most\nfeasible, mission-effective, and fiscally sound mix of these alternatives.\n\nTo make the most effective use of space protection resources, we will identify and\nprioritize protection for vital space missions supporting national security requirements.\nWe will implement cost-effective protection commensurate with threat, system use, and\nimpact of loss - applied to each segment of our space systems and supporting\ninfrastructure.\n\nTo enhance resilience, we will continue to develop mission-effective alternatives,\nincluding land, sea, air, space, and cyber-based alternatives for critical capabilities\ncurrently delivered primarily through space-based platforms.  In addition, we will\nseek to establish relationships and agreements whereby we can access partner\ncapabilities if U.S. systems are degraded or unavailable. We will be prepared to\nuse these capabilities to ensure the timely continuity of services in a degraded\nspace environment.\n\nPreparing for attacks must extend to the people and processes relying on space information, operating our space systems, and analyzing space-derived information.  We will improve the ability of U.S. military and intelligence agencies to operate in a denied or degraded space environment through focused education, training, and exercises and through new doctrine and tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs).\n\n\n## Implementation\n\nConsistent with the guidance provided by the President in the National Space Policy, DoD and the IC will implement the National Security Space Strategy by using it to inform future planning, programming, acquisition, operations, and analysis guidance. DoD and the IC will work with other U.S. Government agencies and departments, as well as foreign governments and commercial partners, to update, balance, and integrate all of the tools of U.S. power.  We will evolve policies, strategies, and doctrine pertaining to national security space. Implementation plans will be developed based on feasibility and affordability assessments and cost, benefit, and risk analyses.  Further, the impact of plans on manning, operations, and programs will be understood prior to implementation.  As stated in the National Security Strategy, our ability to achieve long-term goals for space depends upon our fiscal responsibility and making tough choices, such as between capability and survivability.\n\n## Conclusion - A New Type Of Leadership\n\n\"Our national security strategy is, therefore, focused on renewing\nAmerican leadership so that we can more effectively advance our\ninterests in the 21st century.  We will do so by building on the sources\nof our strength at home, while shaping an international order that can\nmeet the challenges of our time.\"\n                    - 2010 National Security Strategy\n\nThe United States will retain leadership in space by strengthening our posture at home and collaborating with others worldwide.  Just as U.S. national security is built upon maintaining strategic advantages, it is also increasingly predicated on active U.S. leadership of alliance and coalition efforts in peacetime, crisis, and conflict.\nActive U.S. leadership in space requires a whole-of-government approach that integrates all elements of national power, from technological prowess and industrial capacity to alliance building and diplomatic engagement.  Leadership cannot be predicated on declaratory policy alone.  It must build upon a willingness to maintain strategic advantages while working with the international community to develop collective norms, share information, and collaborate on capabilities. U.S. leadership in space can help the United States and our partners address the challenges posed by a space domain that is increasingly congested, contested, and competitive.  Our strategy seeks to address this new environment through its set of interrelated approaches:\n\n- We seek to address *congestion* by establishing norms, enhancing space situational\nawareness, and fostering greater transparency and information sharing.  Our\nwords and deeds should reassure our allies and the world at large of our intent to act peacefully and responsibly in space and encourage others to do the same.\n- We seek to address the *contested* environment with a multilayered deterrence\napproach.  We will support establishing international norms and transparency and\nconfidence-building measures in space, primarily to promote spaceflight safety but also to dissuade and impose international costs on aggressive behavior.  We\nwill improve and protect vital U.S. space capabilities while using interoperability,\ncompatibility, and integration to create coalitions and alliances of responsible space-faring nations.  We will improve our capability to attribute attacks and seek\nto deny meaningful operational benefits from such attacks.  We will retain the\nright and capabilities to respond in self-defense, should deterrence fail.\n- We seek to address *competition* by enhancing our own capabilities, improving our\nacquisition processes, fostering a healthy U.S. industrial base, and strengthening collaboration and cooperation.\nOur objectives are to improve safety, stability, and security in space; to maintain and enhance the strategic national security advantages afforded to the United States by space; and to energize the space industrial base that supports U.S. national security.  Achieving these objectives will mean not only that our military and intelligence communities can continue to use space for national security purposes, but that a community of nations is working toward creating a sustainable and peaceful space environment to benefit the world for years to come."
    },
    {
        "text": "traditionally determined through the use of surveys which ask questions such as: \"Who among your co-workers do you typically go These techniques are described briefly below for reference.\n\nHierarchical\n~ Clustering is a technique that clusters\n(i.e., groups individuals or objects) in descending order\n-to for help or advice when you encounter a problem or have a question at work?\"\nor\n\"Check the names of all those who you talk of the strength of the connections in each cluster based on the measure applied to virtually every day about work-related matters\" (Krackhardt, 1996:165, 170).\n\nOnce all of these surveys are\n(Borgatti,\n1994:78).\n\nA number of other clustering approaches and distance measures exist.\n\nThe aim of cluster analysis procedures is to\n\"classify n objects or individuals, upon which\n\nmeasurements have been taken, into m clusters\"\n(Godehardt, 1990:29). Godehardt notes that there are four broad types of clustering procedures:\n(1) disjoint clustering where n objects are split into a m non-overlapping, collected, the relationships revealed are plotted on either directed or undirected graphs based on the type of study under consideration (Krackhardt, 1996:165).\n\nThe resulting graph allows one to make certain observations about the given social network.\n\nFor example, the number of edges\n(representing the relationship elicited in the survey tool) incident on a node (representing a person or group) indicates the relative importance of that node in the social network\n(Krackhardt,\n1996:166).\n\n This relative importance may be far different than that node's (person's) formal position in the given organization under consideration.\n\nIn disjoint clusters, (2) non-disjoint clustering where objects may belong to more than one cluster at the same time,\n(3) hierarchical clustering where objects and groups of objects are arranged in the form of a tree representing the hierarchy, or\n(4)\nquasihierarchical clustering where clusters at each level of the hierarchy may overlap\n(Godehardt, 1990:42-43).\n\nInferences based on Hierarchical Clustering must be based on the measure applied.\n\nFor example, if one used the measure of number of communications then fact, one cannot directly infer from a formal organizational chart the underlying social network (Krackhardt, 1996:171).\n\nNor can one \"infer from the network pictures how to solve their particular problems\n... [unless]\naccompanied by a local sense of the problems\" (Krackhardt, 1996:172).\n\nRelationships in a SNA network can be quantified in several ways, allowing further analysis. One measure of \"strength\"\nis counting the number of edges incident on the individuals involved. Depending on the survey tool used, other countings may also be possible;\nfor example, counting the number of times pairs of individuals communicate in a fixed time period.\n\nFor cases where these measures exist, they can the closest people are those who communicate most frequently and the resulting clusters are those containing people who communicate with each other frequently.\n\nThis type of analysis does not, however, clarify why these people communicate.\n\nFurther, Hierarchical Clustering is restricted to the context of the measure applied.\n\nMultidimensional Scaling (MDS)\nis another SNA technique commonly found in use by Social Scientists.\n\nMultidimensional Scaling \"provides a visual representation of be used to weight the edges in the SNA\ngraph.\n\nUsing a weighted SNA graph, there are existing techniques utilized by Sociologists to conduct further analysis.\n\nthe pattern of proximities (i.e., similarities or distances)\namong a set of objects\n[or people]\" (Borgatti, 1996:29). MDS requires however, results must be considered in light the same data matrix as Hierarchical Clustering and a stress function that measures\n\"the degree of correspondence between distances\n[or similarities]\"\n(Borgatti, 1996:32).\n\nBorgatti suggests the use of the metric Kruskal stress function, of these limitations.\n\nCorrespondence Analysis is a technique very similar to Multi-Dimensional Scaling for cases where data is non-metric\n(Anderson,\n1992:340).\n\nCorrespondence analysis, however, only preserves ordinal relationships at most and provides no order relationships when nominal\n(categorical)\ndata is used\n(Anderson,\n1992:340).\n\nCorrespondence Analysis, a qualitative technique similar to MDS, is of limited use which is defined as:\nStress\n=\n((ZZ;\naydy)/(Z%; dg)\"* where dy is the Enclidean distance between points i and j based on the coordinates assigned in the MDS algorithm\n(Borgatti, 1996:32).\n\nUsing the MDS\n approach, particularly when two-dimensional spaces in extending SNA techniques to analytical Operations Research methods.\n\nIt has all of are used, it is possible to plot the coordinates of people in the social network where those people who are closer to each other are, based on the theory of this technique, closer socially in the context of the measure applied.\n\nBorgatti notes that,\n\"the best possible configuration in two dimensions may be a very poor, highly distorted, representation of your data.\n\nIf so, this will the same mathematical problems of MDS\nand additional problems associated with the non-metric data.\n\nWhile SNA\nand related analysis techniques provide a foundation for developing an analytical model, these techniques have several weaknesses where improvement must be made in order to create a robust model.\n\nThe survey-based approach to collecting data is not practical in be reflected in a high stress value\" (Borgatti,\n1996:31). Any stress value greater than zero indicates that the representation of relationships is distorted.\n\nBorgatti suggests all situations.\n\nIn addition, the questions currently asked are fairly simple and are only taken in one context (problems at work, that even in the presence of stress, \"you can rely on the larger distances as being accurate\" (Borgatti, 1996:35).\n\nfor example).\n\nFurther, the survey questions may lead to a bounding of the number of connections (for example, if one is asked to check up to three names of co-workers with whom they associate).\n\nIn addition, such questions do not capture the relative weight Borgatti further. notes that, \"four or more dimensions render MDS\nvirtually useless as a method of making complex data more accessible to the human mind\" as there is no way to visually observe the results in a single. graph (Borgatti, 1996:31).\n\nHe also maintains that the axes and the orientation of of the relationship.\n\nAlthough SNA can be used to consider either individuals or groups, it is not presently intended to consider both individuals and groups in the same graph. Further, the analysis techniques the MDS plot are \"meaningless\"\nas there may be multiple orientations that have the same minimum stress and the axes are only proportional in nature (Borgatti,\n1996:35).\n\nfor SNA graphs described have the noted mathematical problems.\n\nThe problems inherent to analysis techniques such as MDS, the most robust of the methods discussed, stem in part from a lack of advantageous properties of the measures applied (they may be non-metric, In addition, since MDS is based on the same data matrix as Hierarchical Clustering, MDS has all the problems inherent to making inferences based on such data.\n\nThese problems do not make MDS\nunusable;\nfor example), the dimensionality of the space may be ill defined, and a lack of multi-context data may lead to higher stress as significant social connections may be neglected\n(Borgatti,\n1996:36).\n\nMapping social network analysis to a flow model representation resolves many of the problems found in existing SNA techniques.\n\n## Social Network Analysis Mapped To Flow Problems\n\ndifferent single-criteria measures, even within the same .context, that Ax) #-g(x);\nhowever, for any f(x)\nor g(x)\nan inverse function will exist for all ratio type measures used in this study.\n\nFor the purpose of the analysis presented in this study, only social closeness measures are considered and are assumed to have positive monotonicity, on a positivevalued scale where zero represents the absence of social closeness\n(or no relationship whatsoever).\n\nFor measures not defined on this scale, the stated conditions may be achieved through a simple mathematical transformation without loss of detail or generality.\n\nFor example, social distance (with negative monotonicity) may The fundamental concept of mapping social network analysis to a classic flow problem is that pairwise measures of social closeness represents the capacity of the potential influence\n* between individuals\n(Borgatti: 1999, 59).\n\nThis means that social closeness, distance, similarities, or differences can be represented as capacities on the influence between individuals.\n\nInfluence measured by social closeness, distance, similarities, or differences are, thus, the commodities flowing over the network where the magnitude of their flow be converted to social closeness\n(with positive monotonicity)\nby multiplying all values by\n-1.\n\nMeasures that take on negative values may be rescaled to a positive scale.\n\nFor example, one could simply add any number greater than the absolute value of the smallest valued measure to all measures.\n\nFor measures where zero does not represent the absence of social closeness, it is also possible to rescale is their relative influence. We define social closeness and similarities to be strictly positive monotonic\n(greater magnitude implies greater influence).\n\nLikewise social distance and differences are defined to be in a similar manner.\n\nSuch linear transformations are admissible for measures strictly negative monotonic\n (greater magnitude implies less influence).\n\nThese strictly monotonic functions are related as follows.\n\nIf x and y are both measures of social closeness, and if x <y, then f(x) < f(y) where the function f is the relative influence in a particular context.\n\nIf x and y are both measures of social distance, and if x <\ny, then g(x) > g(y) where the function g is the relative influence in a particular context. Within the same context, then, f(x) = -g(x)\n.\n\nIn other words, within the same context, g is the inverse function of f (Apostol, 1974:94).\n\nIf fix) #-g(x)\n, then that are at least ratio in nature (Knuze: 1971,\n67-68).\n\nA discussion of measures violating these assumptions may be found in Modeling and Analysis of Social Networks\n(Renfro, 2001).\n\nMaximum flow problems, with both single and multiple sources and sinks, are useful for the analysis of several issued related to the social networks.\n\nMaximum flow problems can address questions such as how much A\nsources influence B sinks, where sets A and B exist in the set of all nodes in the social network N (4, B\nN).\n\nThe case where A and B have cardinality of fix)\nand g(x)\ndo not measure the same influence (i.e., one or both of f(x) and g(x)\nare incomplete measures).\n\nIt is possible for\n1 is the situation where one person desires to influence only one other person in the network.\n\nThe case where A has cardinality of 1 and B = N - A indicates that one person,\n\nsj=-a(sa),a>0,i % j k=1, Vijkl\nn\n.\nFurther,\ns;\nneed\nnot equal sl\n.\nA in this case, attempts to influence an entire network, N - A. Cases where the cardinality\n\nSocial Closeness is therefore defined as a set\ndenoted S, where S contains V's;. S is, thus,\na subset of R.\nof A\nis greater than\n1\nrepresents a combination of people attempting to influence one or more individual in a network.\n\nWhen data is available, achieving specified threshold levels of influence, the effects of predispositions, misunderstanding the message, and other such problems of interested may also be modeled in the flow network representation (Renfro, 2001:86).\n\nWe define Social Closeness, in general, as a non-metric measure, as follows:\nThe underlying assumptions of a linear program are linearity, additivity, proportionality, divisibility, and certainty\n(Winston, 1994:53-54).\n\nAny mathematical program with a linear objective function, linear constraints, and Social Closeness measures may be represented as a linear program.\n\nSocial Closeness, in network modeling terms, is a capacity on potential Definition.\n\nSocial Closeness is defined by influence\n(Evans,\n1992:10).\n\nPotential sij  R* (where R\" is the set of positive real numbers)\nand is the maximum potential influence one person or group (i) has upon another person or group\n(j) in a set of N\npeople or groups in a given scenario. The set influence may, therefore, be modeled as a commodity (Evans, 1992:10).\n\nAs such, the flow of influence across a social network, as measured by Social Closeness, may be appropriately modeled as a traditional network flow problem.\n\nSince Social Closeness meets the necessary assumptions of N people or groups and their associated s;\nmeasures completely define a social network whens=a(su),a>0,i # jk#\nI, Vi j k of classic flow models, all such flow models are appropriate for analysis of social networks without exception.\n\nTable\n1\nlays the foundation for mapping social networks to classic flow models.\n\nle N\n(ie., Social Closeness is a ratio measure). When s; = 0 = O(sy) and s;; = 0\nVi, there exists no potential influence.\n\nSince s;; is directed and the network may be asymmetric, -s;; denotes the inverse of flow between i and j and has the property\n\n| Flow           | Model       | Properties    |\n|----------------|-------------|---------------|\n| Social         | Closeness   | Terms         |\n| People         | or          | groups        |\n| transshipment) |             |               |\n| Connectivity   | or          | affinity      |\n| Capacitated    | arcs        | (or           |\n| between        | nodes       |               |\n| Social         | Closeness   | Capacity      |\n| Influence      | Commodity   |               |\n| Potential      | Influence   | Quantity      |\n| People         | or          | groups        |\n| influence      | in          | the           |\n| Target         | people      | or            |\n| be             | influenced  |               |\n| People         | or          | groups        |\n| Transshipment  | node(s)     |               |\n| in             | influencing |               |\n\nThe flow model mapping has several\n\n## Single-Commodity Flow\n\nadvantageous theoretical properties:\n\n1.\nThe single-commodity flow representation of a social network is defined\n\n2.\nin this section.\n\nFirst, it is necessary to define a notional source node (denoted s)\nand a notional sink node (denoted ). Node s is then assigned incident notional directed arcs with infinite capacity (or at least large enough capacity so as not to artificially bound the solution) terminating in the actual source nodes under consideration in the problem.\n\nAn alternative representation is to capacitate the edges from node s based on the ability of the decision-maker to influence Flow models do not require metric measures (Renfro, 2001:95).\n\nFlow models are well defined and accepted.\n\nThe flow model representation is applicable to multiple problem classes.\n\nFormal sensitivity analysis may be conducted. Applicable problem classes may be extended through the use of Goal Programming and other techniques. Lack of fit may only result by improperly defining the network structure,\n-\nThe optimal solution includes both aggregate flow and path information.\n\nThis paper describes and demonstrates the single-commodity flow case.\n\nMulti-commodity flow model applications follow naturally from the single-commodity development.\n\nthe actual source nodes.\n\nThis alternative representation allows for course of action analysis as part of the flow problem rather than as post-processing analysis.\n\nThe actual source nodes are those individuals who will initiate the influence represented by the flow in the network.\n\nNode  will have notional directed arcs with infinite capacity from the actual sink nodes under consideration in the problem terminating in node\n.\n\nThese actual sink nodes are the individuals to be influenced.\n\nThe objective of this problem representation is to maximize the flow (i.e., To better understand the singlecommodity flow representation of a social network, an example based on influencing maximize the influence) from s to\n#.\n\nThe capacity from node i to node j in the network is dij where dy is the selected monotonically increasing social closeness measure between from node i to j. Note that the Iranian government is considered in detail.\n\ndi need not necessarily equal dj for all\n\n## Sample Case: Iranian Government\n\nThe purpose of this case study is to understand the relative influence of individuals in the Iranian government.\n\nSpecifically, this case demonstrates using cases.\n\nThe actual flow from node i to j is denoted x;; where x;; < d; since no gains are allowed in this formulation.\n\nIn addition, note that Y X = 3 x;; since no losses are allowed in this formulation.\n\nFor other scenarios, losses and gains may be used to represent predispositions, miscommunication, mistranslation, and other similar properties (Renfro 2001:86).\n\nThe related mathematical program the flow model representation to determine who among Iran's senior leaders has the greatest ability to influence the key Iranian government decision making bodies.\n\nSuch for this problem is (Evans, 1992:178):\nan individual might then be considered the Let x;; = the flow of influence over the edge from node i to j Maximize z (where z is the maximum flow)\nbest target for an influencing campaign focused at the overall decision-making process of the Iranian government.\n\nIn other words, the individual with the maximum influence is a pressure point.\n\nNote that the best operational approach to influencing the target pressure point, a specific individual Subject to:\n2iX-2=0\n2iXij-25%i=0V\ni z-2ixp=0\nOSXideij V iandj This formulation is demonstrated in the following example.\n\nSocial closeness measures may be countings of communications over one or means of communication\n(phone calls, for example, may or may not be directly applying resources to the target pressure point, depending on access and means available to the decision-maker desiring to influence the given social network.\n\nEspecially in non-cooperative cases, decision-makers outside the social network may need to work through co-opted intermediaries, for example.\n\nThe example used in this paper is a geo-political scenario based on Iran.\n\nSample case data comes from Foundation faxes, emails, meetings, and so on), elicited from people in the social network, or more complex psychological profile based measures.\n\nAggregations\n(summations, averages, and so on)\nof social closeness measures, when properly defined, are also for Democracy in Iran\n(FDI)\n(http://www.iran.org). FDI provides data for Iran in\n1997\nwith regard to President Khatami's Cabinet, the Council of Expediency and Discernment, the Council of Guardians, the Judiciary Branch, the Maijlis, and the Supreme National Security Council.\n\nsocial closeness measures.\n\nAnalysis results may be no more accurate than the input data.\n\nWhen uncertainty exists, traditional sensitivity analysis may be applied as a corrective measure if better data is not available or possible to collect.\n\nIn the graphical representation in Figure\n1, the membership in organizations other than senior leaders has been\n\n2.\nEdges are directed based on the rules\nthat:\n(1) people influence other people\nand\ngroups\ndown\ntheir\nchain-ofcommand and (2) groups influence other groups.\nThis weighting is done for example purposes only.\n\nActual operational weights and measures must be developed from the fusion of open source, expert opinion, and data collected by national technical means.\n\nThe data, while representative of the 1997\naggregated into\n.\n\ntheir respective organizations.\n\n= The number of people aggregated into an organizational node is denoted in parentheses below its name.\n\nMembership in an organization need not be mutually exclusive\n(for example, the Executive Branch has\n31\nmembers, this includes the 22 Cabinet members, the 8 Vice Presidents, and President Khatami).\n\nThe weighting of connections is depicted by the width of the edges in the graph.\n\nNotional weighting is provided for example purposes based on the following Social Closeness measure:\n\n1.\nSocial Closeness between members of a group they are primarily\na member of\nare\nthree\ntimes\nthat\nof\nonly\nadministrative connections.\nSecondary\ngroup membership is twice as important\nIranian government, should not be taken as authoritative as FDI is an Iranian opposition group which advocates the overthrow of the existing regime\n(i.e., the data was not provided by the Iranian government or approved for use by any domestic of foreign government agency).\n\nThe Iranian government social network is depicted in Figure 1.\n\nas\nadministrative\nconnections.\nTherefore, there\nis\na ratio of 1:2:3 for\nadministrative:secondary:primary\nconnections.\nConsider, for example, the problem of identifying who among Iran's senior non-metric, ratio. social closeness measure defined based on primary, secondary, and administrative organizational membership.\n\nleaders depicted\n(i.e., sources)\nin the network\n(Khatami, Rafsanjani, Nouri, Mohammad, Jannati, and Firouzabadi) has the greatest potential, represented in terms of maximum flow, to influence the key\n\n| Source      |   Maximum  |\n|-------------|------------|\n| Khatami     |        17  |\n| Rafsanjani  |         9  |\n| Nouri       |        15  |\n| Mohammad    |         9  |\n| Jannati     |         8  |\n| Firouzabadi |         3  |\n\nIranian government bodies\n(i.e., sinks)\ndepicted in the network (Executive Branch, Council of Expediency and Discernment, Majlis, Supreme National Security Council, Judiciary, and Council of Guardians).\n\nThis problem is a single-commodity maximum flow problem.\n\nThe results of this analysis are given The maximum flow solution is depicted graphically in Figure 2.\n\nin Table\n2.\n\nPresident Khatami has the maximum flow\n(indicating maximum potential influence) of 17 in terms of the The results of this sample problem all of the major governmental departments, and likely informally retains some or all those membership ties. Further, observe that Khatami served under Rafsanjani when he was President.\n\nIt is now possible to update are not unexpected.\n\nThe social closeness measure applied essentially represents strength in terms of the given organizational hierarchy.\n\nTherefore, the result that President Khatami would exercise the greatest influence in the formal hierarchy of the Iranian social network with this multiple context data and recalculate the maximum flow problem.\n\nFor illustrative purposes only, additional notional edges have been added to represent Rafsanjani's influence in the government of Iran is expected.\n\nAs noted, to fully wunderstand influence both formal and informal contexts must be considered.\n\nObserve, for example, the informal context with a weight of 2 on that Rafsanjani was once the President of the same scale used in the pervious analysis.\n\nIran, a member of or closely associated with These results indicate that Rafsanjani The results of the analysis for the Multi-\nContext problem are given in Table 3.\n\nactually has a greater potential to influence key Iranian government decision-making bodies than Khatami.\n\nThis result implies\n\nSource\nMaximum Flow\n\nthat targeting Rafsanjani would result in a greater potential to influence the decisions\n\n| Khatami    |   17  |\n|------------|-------|\n| Rafsanjani |   21  |\n\nof the Iranian government than targeting any other individual senior Iranian leader.\n\nThis maximum flow is depicted graphically in Figure 4.\n\n| Nouri       |   15  |\n|-------------|-------|\n| Mohammad    |    9  |\n| Jannati     |    8  |\n| Firouzabadi |    3  |\n\nmodeling approach to social network While additional data on all of the relevant contexts of influence applicable to the analysis.\n\nIranian government social network are needed for a formal analysis, this notional example demonstrates the value of the flow\n\n## Conclusions\n\nOperations Research may contribute to furthering the ability to describe and predict social network behavior.\n\nSocial network analysis is of broad interest to both private sector and government analysis.\n\n The methods developed in this research adds to The theoretical development of the flow model representation and sample case analysis reinforces the conclusion that mapping social network analysis to a flow model is an analytically correct and very useful methodology.\n\nConceptually, it is easy to conceive that this methodology may be extended to modeling gains and losses to represent predispositions and properties of the existing capability of social network analysis.\n\n:\nThis research began with, and is founded on, the complementary lineage of Psychological, Sociological, Anthropological, and other theories that form a starting point for understanding social networks.\n\nThe methodological focus of this research was placed on relevant areas the communication environment\n(loss of information, translation problems, misunderstandings, and so on).\n\nMaximum flow analysis provides solutions to many relevant problem classes of social network of Operations Research, including Graph Theory, Optimization, and Network Models, that may add insight to the analysis of social networks.\n\nThe methods described in this research, expand on these existing Operations Research methods by extending them to social network analysis applications.\n\nanalysis, as discussed and demonstrated.\n\nIn addition, minimum cost flow analysis may be applied for cases where resource constraints are applicable\n(for example, communication costs per minute or based on geographic distance).\n\n Multi-commodity flow may be used to represent different overlapping contexts with multiple means of influencing\n(i.e., commodities).\n\nGoal programming may be wused to model multiple possibly competing, objectives\n(Renfro, 2001:109).\n\nFirst, the methodology formally defines a class of non-metric measures termed Social Closeness.\n\n These measures were then mapped to a flow model representation of a social network.\n\nThe flow model representation provides a robust, transparent, analytically correct problem specification for the analysis of multiple social network problem classes.\n\nThis paper has introduced the concept of social network analysis, discussed the current capabilities of the Social Sciences for modeling social networks, and described areas where\n\n## Reference List\n\nAnderson, Rolph, et al. 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    },
    {
        "text": "(U//FOUO) Leftwing Extremists Likely to Increase Use of Cyber Attacks over the Coming Decade IA-0141-09\nUNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY\n\n\n(U//FOUO)  Leftwing Extremists Likely to Increase Use of Cyber Attacks over the Coming Decade\n26 January 2009\n(U)  Prepared by the Strategic Analysis Group, Homeland Environment and Threat Analysis Division.\n\n\n(U)  Scope (U//FOUO)  This product is one of a series of intelligence assessments published by the DHS/Office of Intelligence and Analysis (I&A) Strategic Analysis Group to facilitate a greater understanding of the emerging threats to the United States. The information is provided to federal, state, and local counterterrorism and law enforcement officials so they may effectively deter, prevent, preempt, or respond to terrorist attacks against the United States. (U//FOUO)  This assessment examines the potential threat to homeland security from cyber attacks conducted by leftwing extremists, a threat that DHS/I&A believes likely will grow over the next decade.  It focuses on the more prominent leftwing groups within the animal rights, environmental, and anarchist extremist movements that promote or have conducted criminal or terrorist activities (see Appendix).  This assessment is intended to alert DHS policymakers, state and local officials, and intelligence analysts monitoring the subject so they can better focus their collection requirements and analysis. (U//FOUO)  The key assumptions underpinning this report include:\n- (U//FOUO)  Cyber attack capabilities will continue to proliferate and be readily available.\n\n\n- (U//FOUO)  Some cyber attack capabilities will continue to outpace countermeasures.\n\n\n(U)  **LAW ENFORCEMENT INFORMATION NOTICE:** This product contains Law Enforcement Sensitive (LES) information.  No portion of the LES information should be released to the media, the general public, or over non-secure Internet servers.  Release of this information could adversely affect or jeopardize investigative activities.\n\nFOUO information and is not to be released to the public, the media, or other personnel who do not have a valid need-to-know without prior approval of an authorized DHS official.  State and local homeland security officials may share this document with authorized security personnel without further approval from DHS.\n\n- (U//FOUO)  Leftwing extremists will continue to focus on what they consider\neconomic targets.\n\n- (U//FOUO)  Economic enterprises and other organizations will become more\ndependent on advanced information technologies.\n\n(U)  Source Summary Statement\n\n(U//FOUO)  This assessment reflects primarily intelligence reporting from federal, state, and local agencies at the Unclassified//For Official Use Only level.  Key judgments are based largely on field agent reporting considered highly reliable and on law enforcement finished intelligence.  By design, the judgments use an estimative analytic approach.  DHS subject-matter experts in the areas of domestic leftwing extremism and cyber technologies provided support for threat and trend analysis.  In addition, DHS/I&A examined leftwing extremist media for evidence pointing to ideological shifts or changes in motivation and intent.  Government crime data specific to leftwing extremist cyber attacks are unavailable, but DHS/I&A assesses that open source and other data accurately frame leftwing extremist goals and motivations, although some of the sources may have provided information intended to deceive or mislead.  Other open source information included business journals and research institute reports.\n\n\n(U)  Key Findings (U//FOUO)  DHS/Office of Intelligence and Analysis (I&A) judges that a number of\nemerging trends point to leftwing extremists maturing and expanding their cyber attack\ncapabilities over the next decade with the aim of attacking targets in the United States.\n\n- (U//FOUO)  The potential for economic damage, the individually-initiated and\nanonymous nature of cyber attacks, and the perception that cyber attacks are nonviolent align well with the ideological beliefs, strategic objectives, and tactics of many leftwing extremists.\n\n- (U//FOUO)  The increasing reliance of commercial businesses and other\nenterprises on cyber technologies, including interconnected networks and remote access, creates new and expanding vulnerabilities that technically-savvy leftwing extremists will exploit.\n\n- (U//FOUO)  The proliferation of cyber technologies and expertise as well as the\npublic availability of online hacking tools and \"hackers-for-hire\" offer leftwing extremists incentives to adopt a cyber attack strategy.\n(U)  Appeal of Cyber Attacks (U//FOUO)  DHS/I&A assesses that cyber attacks are attractive options to leftwing extremists who view attacks on economic targets as aligning with their nonviolent,\n\"no-harm\" doctrine and tactic of \"direct action.\"\n- (U//FOUO)  Their no-harm doctrine includes claiming to ensure the safety of\nhumans, animals, and the environment even as they attack businesses and associated operations.\n\n- (U//FOUO)  Many leftwing extremists use the tactic of direct action to inflict\neconomic damage on businesses and other targets to force the targeted organization to abandon what the extremists deem objectionable.  Direct actions range from animal releases, property theft, vandalism, and cyber attacksall of which extremists regard as nonviolentto bombings and arson.\n\n- (U//FOUO)  The North American Earth Liberation Front Press Office, the media\narm of the Earth Liberation Front (ELF), published the following guidance for\nactivists: \"By inflicting as much economic damage as possible, the ELF can allow a given entity to decide if it is in their [sic] best economic interest to stop\ndestroying life for the sake of profit.\" (U//FOUO)  Lone wolves and small cells can conduct highly-effective cyber attacks consistent with the strategy of leaderless resistance that many leftwing extremists embrace.  DHS/I&A assesses that this facet of leftwing extremist operational strategy\n\nwill further encourage some extremists to improve their cyber attack capabilities and possibly encourage recruitment of individuals with sophisticated cyber skills into their trusted circles.  Furthermore, extremists can apply their cyber skills in support of a number of different leftwing movements, a capability that is consistent with the frequent shifting of individuals among movements.\n\n(U)  Leaderless Resistance\n\n(U//FOUO)  Leaderless resistance stresses the importance of individuals and small cells operating independently and anonymously outside of formalized organizational structures or leadership in order to increase operational security and avoid detection.  Postings on extremist websites and other online media forums offer guidance on objectives, tactics, and target selection.  Followers are encouraged to self-train, promote their own objectives, and conduct attacks on their own initiative.\n\n (U)  The most common leftwing extremist cyber attacks (particularly within the animal rights movement) in the past several years have included deletion of user accounts, flooding a company's server with e-mails, and other types of e-mail assaults intended to\nforce businesses to exhaust resources.\n- (U//FOUO)  On 13 July 2007, an animal rights extremist hacked into a\nU.S. company's computer system and deleted more than 300 associates' user accounts.  To restore the accounts, the perpetrator demanded that the company\nsell its shares in a corporation that conducts tests using animal subjects.\n\n- (U//FOUO)  In October 2005, animal rights extremists launched an e-mail attack\nagainst a Milwaukee, Wisconsin firm that held stock in an animal testing laboratory.  The firm subsequently sold its shares in the laboratory, with losses it estimated at approximately $1.4 million.\n\n- (U//FOUO)  In late April 2005, animal rights extremists overwhelmed a\nU.S. company's computer server with e-mail, which the company claims resulted in a loss of approximately $1.25 million.\n\n(U)  Attractive Strategy for the Future (U//FOUO)  DHS/I&A judges that the cyber attack option will become increasingly attractive to leftwing extremists as companies' reliance on cyber technologies grows.\nDHS/I&A also assesses that these extremists will improve their cyber attack capabilities\nby keeping pace with emerging technologies and overcoming countermeasures that develop over the period of this assessment.\n(U)  Increasing Reliance on Cyber Technologies (U//FOUO)  Businesses and other enterprises rely on interconnected computer networks\nfor operational continuity, storage of vital data, and communications, introducing\nvulnerabilities that leftwing extremists could exploit.  For example, the use of integrated systems and remote access creates opportunities for computer intrusion and data theft\nthrough poorly-monitored or unsecured connections.  In this target rich environment,\ncyber attacks likely will become an increasingly attractive option, particularly on businesses and industries that extremists consider high-priority targets.\n\n- (U)  The logging industry, a principal target for environmental extremists and an\nindustry not traditionally associated with cyber technologies, now relies on integrated systems to support forestry operations.\n\n- (U)  The farming industry also is experiencing a growth in the use of advanced\ntechnologies, such as Global Positioning Systems and remote sensing, to cut costs and manage crop production.  The agricultural industry often is a target of environmental extremists who oppose genetically-modified crop production.\n\n(U)  Proliferation of Cyber Attack Tools and Expertise (U//FOUO)  DHS/I&A believes that the availability of cyber technologies and expertise such as online hacking tools and hackers-for-hire provides leftwing extremists with resources to augment their own homegrown cyber attack capabilities.  Resources and capabilities for successful cyber attacks are becoming more accessible to the public as evidenced by online advertisements for hacking services and software.  A simple online search provides users with numerous links to discussion forums and websites that offer hacking tutorials and information regarding exploitable system vulnerabilities. In addition, illegal file-sharing sites allow pirated copies of hacking software to be freely\nexchanged.\n- (U//FOUO)  In October 2007, law enforcement authorities discovered a group\nadvertising hacking services to customers seeking passwords to the e-mail accounts of spouses, employees, and business competitors.\n\n- (U//FOUO)  A website identified early in 2008 originating in the United States\nprovided customers the ability to purchase and download hacking tools and malicious codes as well as video tutorials on how to use the software. (U//FOUO)  DHS/I&A believes that the emerging trend exhibited by some leftwing\nextremists of posting hacking-related materials on their websites signifies their intent\nto develop more robust cyber strategies over the coming decade.\n\n- (U)  *The Anarchist Cookbook*, continually updated and revised in online versions\nand accessible on numerous anarchist, animal rights, and environmental websites, contains several chapters focusing on hacking techniques and tutorials.\n\n\n| (U)                                           |\n|-----------------------------------------------|\n| \"hacking\" and \"activism,\" using cyber         |\n| technologies to achieve a political end.      |\n| Hacktivism includes website defacement,       |\n| denial-of-service attacks, hacking into the   |\n| target's network to introduce malicious       |\n| software, information theft, insider attacks, |\n| economic sabotage, and other malicious        |\n| Internet-based activities.                    |\n\n- (U)  Popular anarchist Internet\ngroups such as The HacktivistUSPER\nand Internet Liberation FrontUSPER\npromote hacking as a means of direct action and publish links to hacking resources on their websites.\n\n(U)  Potential Targets\n\n(U//FOUO)  Based on an analysis of previous limited attacks, both cyber and noncyber, and on the prospective growing advantages of cyber attacks in the future, DHS/I&A judges that potential targets likely will expand to include a broader set of organizations\nand critical infrastructure that extremists associate with harming animals and degrading the natural environment, as well as icons of capitalism and authority.\n\n- (U//FOUO)  In addition, DHS/I&A judges that leftwing extremists will build\nupon the perceived success of previous, noncyber attacks on secondary targets organizations with business links to a primary targetand increasingly will attack secondary and possibly tertiary targets.  One animal rights extremist website claims that attacks on secondary businesses have resulted in more than 200 companies severing ties with the primary target organization.  Secondary targets in previous, noncyber attacks have included financial partners and suppliers\nassociated with the principal target organization.\n\n(Provider of office supplies to HLS;\nattacked throughout April and May\n2008 by extremist animal rights groups.)\n\n(U//FOUO)  The international nature of many types of cyber attacks means that many more attackers will be available to attack a greater number of distant targets, including those in the United States.  A recent study of noncyber attacks demonstrates that a majority of leftwing extremists previously have focused their efforts locally and limited their targeting to within 30 miles of where they live; global connectivity, however, makes the distance between the cyber attacker and the target irrelevant.\n\n\n- (U)  One extremist animal rights group's monthly newsletter stated that\n\nin today's technological age, computer systems are the real front doors to companies.  So instead of chaining ourselves together in the physical doorways of businesses we can achieve the same effect from the comfort\n[sic] our armchairs.\n\n(U)  Potential Indicators (U//FOUO)  The following highlight a range of signposts that may expose leftwing extremists' intenteither domestically or abroadto develop more robust cyber attack strategies:\n- (U//FOUO)  Increasing number of statements by leftwing extremists advocating\nthe use of cyber attack techniques.\n\n- (U//FOUO)  Increasing number of communiques published on leftwing extremist\nwebsites claiming credit for cyber attacks.\n\n- (U//FOUO)  Suspicious cyber attack activity or increased frequency, creativity, or\nseverity against traditional primary, secondary, and tertiary targets of leftwing extremists.\n\n- (U//FOUO)  Evidence that leftwing extremist groups or activists are recruiting or\nattempting to acquire the services of individuals with cyber capabilities.\n\n(U)  Cyber Attack Terms (U)  Cyber attacks are malicious acts that degrade the availability, integrity, or security of data.  Cyber attack techniques are constantly evolving; some examples include the following:\n\n- (U)  Unauthorized intrusions into computer networks and systems. - (U)  Website defacement or subtle changes to web pages in order to disseminate false\ninformation.\n- (U)  Information theft, computer network exploitation, and extortion. - (U)  Denial-of-service attacks, typically by overwhelming the resources of the system.\n- (U)  The introduction of malicious software into a computer network.\n\n\n(U)  Reporting Notice: (U)  DHS encourages recipients of this document to report information concerning suspicious or criminal activity to DHS and the FBI.  The DHS National Operations Center (NOC) can be reached by telephone at 202-282-9685 or by e-mail at NOC.Fusion@dhs.gov.  For information affecting the private sector and critical infrastructure, contact the National Infrastructure Coordinating Center (NICC), a sub-element of the NOC.  The NICC can be reached by telephone at 202-282-9201 or by e-mail at NICC@dhs.gov.  The FBI regional phone numbers can be found online at http://www.fbi.gov/contact/fo/fo.htm.  When available, each report submitted should include the date, time, location, type of activity, number of people and type of equipment used for the activity, the name of the submitting company or organization, and a designated point of contact. (U)  For comments or questions related to the content or dissemination of this document please contact the DHS/I&A Production Branch at IA.PM@hq.dhs.gov, IA.PM@dhs.sgov.gov, or IA.PM@dhs.ic.gov.\n\n(U)  **Tracked by:** CRIM-040600-01-05, TERR-060100-01-05, TERR-060800-01-05\n\n## (U)  Appendix: Leftwing Extremists\n\n (U//FOUO)  DHS/Office of Intelligence and Analysis defines leftwing extremists as\ngroups or individuals who embrace radical elements of the anarchist, animal rights, or\nenvironmental movements and are often willing to violate the law to achieve their objectives.  Many leftwing extremist groups are not hierarchically ordered with defined members, leaders, or chain of command structures but operate as loosely-connected underground movements composed of \"lone wolves,\" small cells, and splinter groups.\n- (U//LES)  Animal rights and environmental *extremists* seek to end the perceived\nabuse and suffering of animals and the degradation of the natural environment perpetrated by humans.  They use non-violent and violent tactics that, at times, violate criminal law.  Many of these extremists claim they are conducting these\nactivities on behalf of two of the most active groups, the Animal Liberation Front and its sister organization, the Earth Liberation Front.  Other prominent groups\ninclude Stop Huntingdon Animal Cruelty; and chapters within the Animal\nDefense LeagueUSPER, and Earth First!USPER.\n\n- (U//FOUO)  *Anarchist extremists* generally embrace a number of radical\nphilosophical components of anticapitalist, antiglobalization, communist,\nsocialist, and other movements.  Anarchist groups seek abolition of social, political, and economic hierarchies, including Western-style governments and large business enterprises, and frequently advocate criminal actions of varying scale and scope to accomplish their goals.  Anarchist extremist groups include\nentities within CrimethincUSPER, the Ruckus SocietyUSPER ,and Recreate 68 USPER."
    },
    {
        "text": "# Foreign And Military Intelligence Book I\n\nFINAL REPORT\nOF THE\nSELECT COMMITTEE\nTO STFDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS\nWITH RESPECT TO\nINTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES\nUNITED STATES SENATE\nTOGETHER WITH\nADDITIONAL, SUPPLEMENTAL, AND SEPARATE\nVIEWS\nAPRIL 26 (legislative day, APRIL 14),1976\nU.S. GoVERNMENT PIUNTING OFFICE\nWASHINGTON : 1976\nWashington, D.C. 20402 - Price $5.35\ntions in DIA. There has been a similar potential pr<?blem in NSA, although it has provoked fa! less concern than DIA smce NSA must also serve national and tactIcal needs. In 1961 the JCS at!e?TIpted to gain control of that agency,49 and in recent years some <:rItI<:B at the other extreme have suggested taking NSA out of DOD, ~mce I! serves many non-military needs. The entIr~ pr?ble~ of dealing WIth. the mutual relations of national and tactIcal mtellIgence may ~ clarified as the DCI assumes the additional authority granted to hIm by the President's Executive Order of F.ebrua!y 1S! 1976.\n\n.\n\nWhile establishment of a Pentagon mtellIgence c~ar m.th~ form of the new Deputy Secretary may reduce fragt?enta~lOn ~Ithm t?-e d.epartment and improve the coherence of mI~tar:y mtellIgence, It WIll probably have a major im!>act on the coordmatmg r?le o~ the DCI.\n\nGiven that the overwhelmmg volume of total U.S. mtellIgence collection and production occurs within DOD, th~ .Deputy Secret~ry could become, in effect, a second DCI: The defimt~~n of the r~latIOn between these two officials will be the smgle mO!lt crI~lCal factor m toplevel organization for management of natIonal mtellIgence.\n\n4-. Requirement8 for Oongre88ional Oversight.\n\n.\n\nIf Congress- attempts to exe!cise mo~ comprehe.nsI.ve and detailed oversight of intelligence agenCIes, the bIggest Issue I!l lIkely to be what information the exec-ntive branch should make av~tllable. On defense intelligence there is likely to be less ofa problem If Congress conce~\ntrates on issues of intelligence process rather than substance. Ther~ IS, of course, a limit as to how far it is possible to eyaluate the former ~Ith\nout considering the latter. Therefore, norms wIl! have. to be. estabhsh~d about what kinds of material (for exalXlple1 fimsh~d mtell~g;ence) WIll be subject to scrutiny by Q0I?-gress on.a routme baSIS. PrOVIsIon should also be made to keep basIC mformatI<!n on budgets and reso.urce allocation in a clear and available form m the Pent~gon, obtamable bI\nthe oversight committee on demand. More conSIstent and th?roug documentation of the. chain of command could al8(') be requU\"(;d m internal correspondence (thus avo!~ing the:r;>roblem. of \"unattrl~ut\nwble\" records of controversial deCISIOns turnmg up m the files, I.e., unsigned directives or cables which cannot clearly be traced to an authoritative source).\n\n.\n\n.\n\nIf independent ongoing <!versight O! the substance of defense m~lligence is the goal, an ove:r~Ight corm~nttee sh(;mld have st;aff expertI~\nin several areas: (1) PolItIcal, to ~eIgh the rIsks. and gams of certam programs and targets; (2) ScientIfic a~d Techmcal, t<! ~valuate sensOrs; (3) Economic, to judge cost-effect~veness; (~) MIlItary, to consider non-national strategIc and tactIcal reqUIrements of DOD\nintelligence.\n\n## Xvi. Disclosure Of Budget Information On The Intelligence Community'\n\n~t.t~e present t~e the aggregate amount spent for the intelligen~\nactIVItIes of the Umted States Government is classified. The individual budgets for the C~ntral Intel~gen~e ~gency, the National Security Agency, and certam other umts wIthm the Department of Defense which gather national intelligence are likewise classified.\n\nThe budgets for these agencies-which spend billions of dollars annually-are kept not only from the American people but also from most Members of Congress. This secrecy prevents the public and most\n~em?ers of Congress from knowing how much is spent on national mtelligence and from determining whether that amount is consistent with other national needs and priorities. It prevents the public and most Members of Congress from knowing how much is spent by each of the national intelligence agencies and from determining whether that alloca~ion among agencies is appropriate. Because funds for these agenCIes are concealed in the budgets of o.ther agencies, the public and most Members of Congress cannot be certam that funds in the open appropriations are used for the purposes for which they were approprIated. No item in the overall federal budget is above suspicion as ~ hiding place for intelligence agency funds. 1 Finally and most serIOusly, the present system of secrecy is inconsistent with the constitutional provision. which states:\nNo Money shall be drawn from the Treasury but in Consequence of Appropriations made by Law; and a regular Statement and Account of the Receipts and Expenditures of all public Money shall be published from time to time.2\n1 During the recent debate in the House of Representatives on the publication of the CIA's budget Congressman Kooh described an encounter with DCI Helms in which Congressman Koch asked about -the size of the CIA budget and the num:\nber of CIA employees, questions that DCI Helms told Congressman K0Ch \"we don't ans~er.\" As Congressman Koch described it, he then asked Mr. Helms \"Are you tellmg me that I, a Member of Congress, do not have the right to know what the budget is, so that when I vote, I do not know what I am voting on?\" DCI Helms said, \"Ye!'l ... The item is placed in some other larger item, and you do not know.\" Congressman Koch then asked, \"Do you mean that it might be included under Social Security?\", to which DCI Helms replied, \"We have not used that one yet, but that is not a bad idea.\" Congo Rec. H9359, daily ed., 10/1/75, remarks of ReP., Kpcp. )\nand policy issu()s involved, see \"Tbe CIA's Secret Funding and the Constitution,\"\n84 Yale Law *Journal* 608 (1975), \"Fiscal Oversight of the Central Intelligence Agency: Can Accountability and Oonfidentiality Coexist?\" 7 New York University Jourritll,'-of International Law *and Politics* 493 (1974), and \"Cloak and Ledger:\nIs CIA Funding Constitutional?\" 2 Hastings Oonstitutional Law *Quarterly* 717\n(1975).\n\n## A. The Present Budgetary Process For Intelligence Community Agencies And Its Consequences\n\nAt present, the Director of Central ~ntel1igenc~ subl!1its ~o the President recommendations for a consolIdated natIOllal IntellIgence program budget. The consolidated national intelligEmce budget, as well as the budget requests from the various agencies within the intelligence community, are reviewed by the Office of Man~gement and BudO\"et (OMB) in the \"same detail that [OMB] reVIews the b\n.\n\nb h\n\"3 A f budget requests of any other executIve ranc agency.\n\ns ormer OMB Director Roy Ash described it:\nThe specific amounts of the CIA's approved appropriations request an~ the identification of th~ approl?riation estimates in the PreSIdent's annual Budget, wIthm whICh these amounts are included, are formally provided by the Director o~ O~B\nto the chairmen of the Senate and House ApprOprIatIOns Committees.4\n.\n\nIn the past, special subcommittees of the House and Sena~ Appropriations Committees have considered the .C~A budget. In closed session' the chairman of the House ApproprIatIOns CommIttee noted that hi~ subcommittee \"tried and tried and tried to hold the secrecy of these matters as closely as we could.:' 5\n-\nThese practices have ?een changIng .. T?e entIre House Defense Appropriation SubcommIttee now scrutImzes the CI1\\ b.udget. In September of 1975 the Chairman of the House ApproprIatlOn~ Committee invited all the Members of the House of Representat~ve~ to review the executive session hearings of the Defense ApprOprIatIOns Subcommittee on the CIA's budget, although Members had to agree not to remove any documents from the room\" not to take notes, and llot to reveal the classified information to 'unauthorized persons.\"\nWhile the Chairman invited this review by the Members, the full\n.. House Appropriations Committee voted not to receive figures on the CIA's budget from the Defense A~propriatio~s Subcommittee.\n\nNp,;ther the Sena,t.e AppronrIatIOns CommIttee as a whole nor the Senate as a whole is informed, even in se?ret s~sion, of. the budget:\nfigures for the CIA. NSA or certain other lJ!-te~hgenre um!s.\n\nOnce the subcommittees of the ApproprIatIons Co.mmIttee, agree upon bhe level of funding for the intelligence agenCIes,. these fUl!-ds are concealed in appropriation requests for other agenCIes on WhICh the full Appropriations Committees and Senate and House of Representatives vote.\n\n. .\n\n.\n\nAfter congressional approval of these appropna~lOns, the. chaIrmen of the Senate and House Appropriatio~s CommIttees notI,fy the Office of Management and Bud,q:et of the SIze and true locatIOn of intelligence agency funds. Funds for the CIA are then transferred\n3 Letter from Roy Ash to Senator Proxmire, 4/29/74, quoted in Congo R:Ci S9604, daily ed., *tI/4/74,* remarks of ~en, P~oxmire. It might b~ argued t :s the intelligence budgets should be reVIewed III even greater detaIl h~ ?M~ in neither the Congress as a whole nor the public can ~ntly. partIcIpa e tIle process of reviewing and debating the budget requests ill thIS area.\n\n- Ash letter, 4/29/74.\n\nU t\"l 1974\n5 Congo Rec. H9363, daily ed., 10/1/75, remarks of Rep. Mahon..\n\nn I\n, even the names of members of these special subcommittees were WIthheld from the public.\n\nto the CIA from these appropriations.s Former OMB Director Ash noted:\nrhe transfer of funds to CIA . . . is accomplished by the Issuance of Treasury documents routinely used for the transfer of funds from one government agency to another. The amount and timing of these transfers, ... are approved by OMB.7\n. This whole pr?cess tr~ats the CIA and other intelligence agencies ill a mann.er radIcally dIfferent from other highly sensitive agencies o~ t~e Umted States Government, such as the Atomic Energy CommISSIOn and the pepartment of Defense. While intelligence agency budgets ~ay reqUIre somewhat different handling, it is important that any speCIal approach reflect real needs justifying departure from the careful processes which Congress has developed over the years for maintaining its power over the purse.\n\n## B. The Constitutional Requirement\n\n. The present budgetary process apparently violates Article 1 SectIon9, Clause '7 of the Constitution, which reads:\n'\nNo Money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in Consequence of Appropriations, made by Law; and a regular Statemen~ and ACC01Int of the Receipts and Expenditures of all publIc Money shall be published from time to time.\n\nThis constitutional provision was intended to insure that Congress\n~ould control the governmental purse and that the public would be Informed of how Congress and the Executive spend public funds.s In keeping with this constitutional mandate, Congress enacted 31\nU.S.C. 66b (a), which provides that:\nthe Secretary of the Treasury shall prepare such reports for t~e inforylllation of the Presiodent, the Congress, 'and the publIc, as WIll present the results of the financial operrutions of the Government.\n\n6 This is done pursuant to 50 U.S.C. 403f which autIlorizes the CIA to transfer to. and receive from other government agencies funds as approved by the OMB.\n\nAsh letter, 4/29/74. Under established procedures, funds approved by OMB\nfor transfer to the CIA are limited to the amounts which tIle chairmen of the Senate and House Appropriations Committees specified to OMB.\n\n8 See D. Robertson, Debates ana Other Proceedings ot the Convention ot Virginia, 1788 .(Richmond, 1805), p. 326. The Chancellor of New York asked if the public were more anxious about any thing under heaven than the expenditUre of their moneY?\" 2 J. Elliot, Debates in the SeveraZ States' Conventions on the Adoption ot the Federal *Constitution,* (Philadelphia: 'J. B. Lippencott, 1836), p.347.\n\n.\n\nThe clause was implemented during the first Congress. The act creating the Treasury Department required the Treasurer to annually present each House of Congress with \"fair and accurate copies of all accounts\" and a \"true and perfect account of the state of the Treasury.\" Act of Sept. 2, 1789, Chapter 12, Section I, I Statute 65, This Act was replaced by 31 U.S.C. 1029, which provides, \"It shall be tIle duty of the Secretary of the Treasury annually to lay before Congress ... an accurate, combined statement of the receipts and expenditures during the last preceding fiscal year of all public monies.\" The receipts, wherever practicable, we!\"e to he divided hy ports, districts, and states, and the expenditures by each separate head of appropriation.\n\nFulfilling its charge, the Treasury DepaI4tment publishes a Oombi;wd Statement of Receipt8, Expenditure8, and Balance8 of *the* Dn~ted State8 G01Jernment, which is recognized as the offi:cial p~biication of the details ~f .receipt 'and outlay data:Wlth whIch all other.r~ports con~nmg similar dJai'ba must be m agreement. In addItIOn to servmg t~e needs of Congress, [the report i8 U8ed b?{] the general pubZw in its continuing review of the operatwnB of Government.\n\n[Emphasis added.] 9\nThe *Oombined Statement,* however, contains. no entry for the Ce~\ntral Intelligence .A:gency, the National Secunty Agency or c.ertam other intelligence units within the Department of Defense .. WhIle the figure for total funds received and ~xpended by the Umted ~tates Government isaccurake, some funds hsted 'as expended by partIcular agencies 'are, in fact, merely tmnsferred from them to the Central Intelligence Agency.\n\nWilliam Colby, former Director o~ th~ 9IA, has argued t~at ~he\n-\npresent practice is constitutional, mam~ammg that the ConstItutIon permits concealment of funds f~r agenCIes such as the C~A: Not only does this posi,tion ignore the plam text o~ th~ Clause, but I~ IS n~ supported by the deb~tes, ~ither at ~he ConstitutIOIl!al ConventIOn or m the ratifying conventIOns m the V'arlOUS States.\n\nMr. Colby'sargument relies .chiefly on t?-e fact. that when the State ment and Account Clause was mtroduced It prOVIded for annual publication of the account, but it was subsequently amended to allow congressional discretion over timing.10\nThe amendment was intended, however, not to perI~llt concealment of expenditures from the full Cong:ess and the AmerIcan I?eople,. but rather to insure that the informatIOn would be .made aV!J:Ilable In a fashion permitting its thorough comprehensIOn.\n\n1\n\n1 NeIther p~o\nponents nor opponents of the amendment argued agamst the assertion draft [of the Constitution]. The language ~rst sugg~ted by George Mi~n woul~\nhave required an annual account of publIc expendltures. J\"nmes Ma~lson, ho~\never argued for making a change to require reporting 'from time to time,' Ma~\nson ~:x;plained that the intenJt of his amendment was to 'l'~ve e~ough to the mscretion of the Legislature.' Patrick Henry opposed the MadIso~ 'language b~US~\nit made concealment possible. But w.hen the debate wa-s over, It was the MadISO\nview that prevailed.'~\n.\n\nMr. 00lby 'also argued that the provision allowing Congress lto.keep theIr p~\nceeding-asecret demonstrated the intent of the Fr3JIDers to prOVIde fo~ .concea ment. That provision, unlike the Statement and Account Clause explICItly provides for secrecy; moreover, the Statement and Account. Claus.e guarantees an accounting for aU puiblic money. For a fuller treatment of thIS arg-UInent, see\n\"The CIA's Secret Funding and the Constitution,:' Yale *L..J.* 608.(1975).\n\ne It could be argued that the constitutional reqUlrement.Ig not vlOlated ~s th Combined Statement provides an accurate total for recelpts and expendlturest Under this theory .all government funds could be appropriated to one governme~\nagency and secretly transferred to the other agen.cies: As long ~s the total afJrb -\npriated and expended were published, the constItutlOnal reqUIrement wou e fu~il~: Farrand, Records of the FetlerwZ *Oonvention* of 1787 New Haven: Yale UniYersity Press, 1966), pp. 618-19.\n\nthat the people had a \"right to know\" how their funds were being spent.u It should also be noted that the proponents of congressional discretion did not argue that secrecy was needed. Rather they contended that leaving the interval of publication to be fixed by Congress would result in fuller disclosure, since no agency would be forced to publish an incomplete report to meet an inflexible and unrealistic deadlineY\nA fixed schedule would result in statements that would be \"incomplete\" 14 or \"too general to be satisfactory.\" 15 The proponents of the amendment ridiculed the possibility that granting Congress discretion would mean that information would be concealed. forever; Congress would publish the reports at regular, frequent intervals.16\nIt has been implied that the constitutional requirement has been met, at least in the House of Representatives, in that all Members can examine the Defense Appropriations Subcommittee's executive session hearings on the CIA budget.n As one Member of the House noted:\nSecrecy in Government is distasteful to a free society, but preservation of our free society demands that we maintain a prudent cloak over vital intelligence operations, so long as the Representatives of the people have the right to examine what is covered-as they do in this situation.18\nKnowledge on the part of *all* of Congress, would satisfy part of the constitutional requirpment. As Justice Story noted. one of the purposes of the constitutional requirements is :\nto secure regularity, punctuality and fidelity in the disbursements of the public money ... it is highly proper, that Congress should possess the power to decide how and when any money should be applied for these purposes. If it were otherwise, the executive would 'possess an unbounded power over the public purse of the nation .... The power to control and direct the appropriations constitutes a most useful and salutary check upon profusion and extravagance, as well as upon corrupt influence and public speculation. . . . It is wise to interpose in a republic, every restraint, by which the public treasure, the common fund of all, should be applied with unshrinking honesty to such objects as legitimately belong to the common defense and the general welfare.19\nBut even if all of Congress had the information now held by the subcommittees of the Appropriations Committees, the Constitution would still be violated. The Constitntion requires that the *public* know how its funds are being spent. The Constitution requires that the statement and account be made public \"from time to time.\" 20 This re-\n.\n\n.\n\nd t make congressional responsibility \"more I'rement was Impose\n0\nd th t'\nqu\n\"21 b\n11 win the people to check Congress an\n. e execu lve perfect y a. o.\n\nf?;\nf' f.ormati.on on what \"money IS expended, through the pubhcatIOdnb.o mh t authority.\" 22 As Chancellor Livingfor what purposes, an Y w a st.on pointed out:\n.\n\ny will give up to your state legislature everythmg dear\n. and valuable' but you will give no power to Congress, ~ecause\n't rna be abused' you will give them no revenue, ecause\n~he Jblic treasur~s may be squandered. Bl.:!-t do you ~ot see her~ a ca ital check ~ Congress are to publ~sh, from tIme to f a~count of their receipts and expendItures. These may\n~:~~l~;ared together; and if the former, year after year, e~\nceed the latter, the co~ruPtiondwi11 be tetect~d, and the pe.op e may use the c.onstitutIonal mo eo re ress.\n\n.\n\n.\n\nThe debates and later commentary indicate that the cQnshtutIO~al\n.\n\nreqUlremen t was designed to all.ow citizens t.o chart the course .of PO~ICy\n., f t I\npenditures-t.o determme, thr.ough an exammatIOn 0 gh'ernmen. a ex t defense and t.o.o little for example, whether t.o.o muc m.oney IS spen:-\nh uld be allocated\n~~l :~~~~:~s~~:~i!~~i~~~d~h~~i~~h~:mh~~~n :.o~~t ~obyent~1:;:c~\ne.o Ie with C.ongress, to determl'Il.e w et er expen I ~.\n\nf\n~tiJe c~nf.orm to the intent .of the apprQpria~~n. Pubhca~lO~ fy f~f~~~\npriations and expenditures w.ould a~s.o 'provl d an .opp~~ un~ were for pe.ople to ascertain if both appr.oprratIOns an expen 1 ure c.onst~tuti.onal purposels.\n\n24 h h l;nf.ormation .on appr.opriations It IS h.owever unc ear ow muc\n'U\nbI\" h d N\nand expenditu~ is required by the. C.ons~ituti.on to ~e pu l!s:erlio~\n.one at the Constituti.onal ConventIOn dlsaftzood WIt:!: t~e hilling\"\n~:!;\\:f:~dp~~~Pdi:~f~u~~ ~~:~r~o;ri~~i~~ ;d:;p~nditu~~\nof n.onsensitive g.overnmen~al ag~ncles, there IS a hmIt t.o the amo\n.of detail which can be pubhshed.\n\n2511\nted. a stand-\nThe Su reme Court in United States v. Robel, sUf?;ges\n.\n\nd h hP might !be used to fix the constituti.onal reqUlrement partIcuar W' IC\n.\n\n.\n\nf th b dget w.ould damage n'alarly when claims that pubhcrutI.on .0\ne u\n'd t to'ts 'tizens ti.onal security are. raised ~ainst the ?,.ov;::en!: a:la~un~1 of reto publish from tIme to tlIDe a regu ar\n. me\n'\" 2 J. Story, Sec. 1348, pp. 222--223.\n\n.. Ibid.\n\n23 2 J. Elliot, p. 345.\n\n1\nntators on the Constitution wrote\n.. Rs David Ramsey, one of the ear Y comme r than those set forth If Congress applied any funds for purposes. othe Th Clause provides in the Constitution, they would have efxctheed~ ~~::{ ~~~~s'whOe pay, are to be information so that \"[t]he people 0\ne.\n\n~~\njudges how far their money is properly apPchedi'\non the subject of the Federal\n\"An address to the Freemen of South ll;ro l.na\n.\n\nSt t p. 374\nCom,titution;\" in Pamphlets on the ConstttutlOn of the Umted\n\"a es,\n(Pro 6~~~u~~ ~~\nS:a~\\~l~~~!~;~~~~:: ;?~~~~h S:o~~~J~ed,.isavailable under the F~edom of Information Act.\n\n25&389 U.S. 258 (1967).\n\nceipts and expenditures .of all public m.oney. The Court held that\n''when legitimate concerns are expressed in a statute which imposes a substantial burden on First Amendment activities, C.ongress must achieve its gQal by means which 'have the least drastic impact on the c.ontinued Vitality of First Amendment freedoms.\" 26\nUnder this test the c.onstitutionality of a level of discl.osure .of inf.ormation .on expenditures depends on whether there is another system of greater discl.osure which, without endangering nati.onal security, w.ould have a \"less drastic\" impact .on the public's right t.o know how its funds are being spent. It is clear, however, that the present secrecy surr.ounding the appropriations and expenditures for intelligence-particularly the inflation .of unspecified appropriatiQns ill which funds for intelligence are concealed-vitiates the constituti.onal guarantee.27 Under the present system neither the public nQr the C.ongress as a whole kn.ows h.ow much is beillg spent on natiQnal intelligence.or by each intelligence agency. In addition, both Congress as a whole and the public are \"deceived'\" as one Senat.or put it,28 about the\n\"true\" size .of other agency budgets. As certain unspecified general appr.opriati.ons c.ontain funds which are secretly transferred to the CIA, it is impossible for m.ost Members of Congress .or the public to kn.ow the exact am.ount .of money which actually is destined for any g.overnment agency.29 C.ongress is thus unable to set pri.orities through the allocation .of funds,30 or to determine if expenditures by the executive conform to congressional intent and are being spent wisely and well. Members .of the public cannot determine with any confidence whether they agree willi C.ongress' allocatiQn .of res.ources and cannot m.onit.or expenditures by the executive branch.\n\n26 389 U.S. 258, 268. While the public's right to information on governmental expenditures has not been accO'rded the \"preeminent\" status of the First Amendment, the test is an appropriate place to begin an analysis.\n\nlIT As Justice Black wrote, \"The guarding of military and diplomatic secrets at the expense of informed representative government provides no real security for our republic.\" New Yorlc Time8 00. v. Unite(l *States,* 403 U.S. 713 at 719 (1971). In th'e same case, Justice Stewart wrote, \"In the absence of the governmental checks and balances present in other areas of our national life, the only effective restraint upon executive policy and power in the area of national defense and international affairs may be in an enli~htened citizenry.\" *[(t.* at 728. Justice Stewart's remarks apply equally well to the exercises of power by the Congress.\n\n28 Congo Rec. S9602, daily ed., 6/4/74, remarks of Sen. Proxmire.\n\n29 Congo Rec., H9361, daily ed., 10/1/75, remarks of Rep. Evans. As Congressman Evans recently noted, the secrecy surrounding th'ese funds for the intelligence community is infectious: \"When we are tucking it away in another pocket in the budget, we are also making a secret of something else that should not be a secret.\"\n30 *See e.g.,* Congo Rec;, H9372, daily ed., 10/1/75, remarks of Rep. Leggett. Congressman Leggett noted, \"How can we 'oversee' in any fu-shion if we have no knowledge of the Agency's command on our resources? How can we set budgetaTy priorities in a meaningful fashion, if we have no basis for comparing intelligence with unemployment, health, or other competing program areas?\"\n\n## C - .Alternatives To Concealing Intelligence Budgets From Con- Gress And The Public\n\nWithin certain limits, Congress has the. power to det.ermine ho~\ninformation about the receipts and expendItures of publIc moneys IS\nmade available to the public.31\n-\nCongress could choos,,: to p~blish CIA or NSAbudg~t~ and expenditures, for example, m detail.equal to those of nonsel\"!-sItIve ~gen\ncies. This approach, however, mIght threaten ~he secunty of mtelligence operations or agents. Congress ha~ avaIlable ~noth~r. ~odel for budget disclosure to protect the securIty of certam actIvItIes.\n\nSince 1793, certain agencies, such as the AEC, the F~I, and the Department of State have been appropriated funds speCIfically for\n\"confidential purposes,\" which for seeuri~y reasons, are exempt from normal accounting procedures.32 In each mstance, ho~ever, C~mgress appropriates funds to the agen~y ?irectl~ a~d pU~~lCly spec~fies the small percentage of the approprIatIOn whIch. IS for confidentIal P:urposes\" and thus exempt from nor:qJ.al accountmg proce?-ures. Drawmg on this practice Congress obviously could publish detaIled budgets for the intelligence' agencies while providing a lump sum to each for \"confidential purposes.\"\nld bI\" h Congress could also devise other models. Congress cou pu IS\nonly the total appropriated to each int~lligence agency.ss As the Special Senate Committee To Study QuestIOns Relate4 to ~ecret and Confidential Documents 34 suggested in 1973, the publIcatIOn of such funds should provide members ~ith. the minimal information they should have about our mtellige~ce ope~a\ntions. Such information would also end, th~ pra?tIce of m-\nHating certain budget figures for use to hIde mtelhgence costs and would insure that all Members wopld know the true cost of each budget item they must vote upon.\n\nm. Oincinnati Soap 00. v. Unitea *State8,* 301 U.S. 308 (193&). In fixin~ the level of detail revealed, however, a congress~onal decis~on cannot overnde a constitutional requirement such as that of Article 1, SectIOn 9, Clause 7, particularly as one purpose of that requirement was to serve as a check on Co~gress.\n\nso The first such statute authorized special procedures for sums relatmg to foreign ''intercourse or treaty.\" By the Act of February 9, 1793, Congress provided: \"that in all cases, where any sum or sums of money h~ve \"issned, or shall hereafter isuP, from the treasury, for the purposes of mtercourEe or treaty, the President shall be, and he hereby is authorized to cause the, same to be duly settled annually with the accounting officers of the Treasury m the manner following, that is to say; by causing the same to be acc~)Unt.ei .for, specifically in 'all inStJances wherein the expenditures thereof may, m, hlS Judgment be made public; and by making a certificate or certificates, or causmg the Secr~~\ntary of State to make a certificate or certificates of the amount of such expendI- tures as he may think it advisable not to specify; and every su<;.h certificate shall be deemed a sufficient voucher for the sum or sums therem expre~sed to have been expended.\" [Act of Feb. 9, 1793, ch. 4, sec. 2, 1 Stat. 300, codified as 31 U.S.C. 107 (1970).J\nTJ:e Sp~cia~ Committee recommended that the Appropriations CommIttee ItemIze the Defense Department appropriations bill in order that the \"total sums proposed to be appropriated for intelligence activities by each of the following agencies: Central Intelligence Agency, Defense .Intelligence Agency, National Security Agency, National ReconnaIssance Office, and any separate intelligence units within the Army, Navy, and Air Force\" could be revealed.s5\nFinally, th~ Congress. could decide. that only the total budget figure for natIOnal mtellIgence be publIshed. This would be the aggregate of funds provided to CIA, NSA, DIA, and the national intelligence components in the Departments of Defense, State, and Jre3:sury. Alth<?ugh there ma:r be problems defining w~at constitutes natIOnal mtellIgence,\" the DIrector of Central IntellIgence already prepares a national intelligence budget. The Director could, with the appropriate congressional committees determine what agencies or departments would be included.36\nThe secrecy presently surrounding intelligence expenditures vitiates the constitutional guarantee. Even publishing one figure-the total appropriations and expenses for national intelligence-would have a salutory effect. It would eliminate the inflation of figures presently in the Budget and in the Combined Statement resulting from the concealment of. intelligence agency funds in other agency appropriations and ~xpendItures. Congress would be able to establish its priorities by placmg the amount appropriated for national intelligence activities against other claims on the public purse; the public could make its own independent judgment about priorities.aT\n~s Se~ator ~roxmir,,: noted, publication of the aggrega.te budget for natIonal mtellIgence mIght also have the effect of deterrmg potential adversaries by showing that the United States Government continues to spend sizeable amounts on intelligence.38 As former DCI and Secretary of Defense Schlesinger noted, publication of this figure might also\n85 The Committee specifically did not request that any line items be revealed, although they did recommend the publication of the total number of personnel employed by each agency.\n\n36 The Senate Select Committee has proposed an oversight committee which would have jurisdiction over authorization for national intelligence activities of the United States Government, S. 93--2893.\n\n.., Former Director Colby has argued that publication of the CIA budget would\nnot aid the public in any way. As he put it, \"Knowledge of the Agency budget would not enable the public to make a judgment on the appropriateness of the amount without the knowledge of the product and the ways it is obtained.\"\n(William Colby testimony, House Select Committee on Intelligence, 8/4/75, p. 123.)\n.\n\n36 Congo Rec. S9603, daily ed., 6/4/74, Remarks of Senator Proxmire. However, as Senator Pastore noted, if the public figure declined \"then the Russians and the Chinese Communists know that we are doing less, and that might let them become more audacious.\" *la,* at S9605.\n\ndecrease speculation about the budget and focus the debate on intelligence on more significant issues.39\nFinally, the disclosure of any figures on intelligence expenditures might well increase the effectiveness of oversight of the intelligence agencies by both individual members of Congress and by the appropriately charged congressional committees. Members of the House might be encouraged to inspect executive session hearings on intelligence agency budgets; 40 members of the oversight committees of both houses might be spurred to review the proposed budgets more closely, in anticipation of a possible debate on the figures. 41\n\n## D. The Effect Upon National Security Of Varying Levels Of Budget Disclosure\n\nEven given the constitutional requirement, any disclosure of budgetary information on agencies in the Intelligence Community has been strongly resisted. In responding to a proposal for the publication of the total sum budgeted for the. national intelligence community, Senator Stennis noted that:\n[I] f it becomes law and is carried out, [it] would, as its practical effect, virtually destroy 80 to 90 percent of the effectiveness of much of our most important work in the field of intelligence.42\nAnd Congressman Burlison told the House that if an amendment which provided for publication of the total figure budgeted for the CIA were adopted, \"i [t] will totally paralyze the intelligence community.\" 43\nAn examination of the effect on national security of publication of any data on the intelligence community budgets is difficult, in part beCause the examination itself must not be allowed to jeopardize the national security. Given the constitutional guarantee, however, the burden of proof must fall on those who would deny this information to\n.. During testimony before the Senate Select Committee, Mr. Schlesinger was asked whether there was a good reason for actually publishing a budget figure.\n\nHe replied: \"Only in that the public debate at the present time covers so wide a range that if you had an official number, the debate would tend to die down and focus on something more significant than whether we're spending $11 billion on intelligence.\" (James Schlesinger testimony, 2/2/76, p. 54.)\nMr. Schlesinger was later asked whether he thought there was any chance of convincing the American people or the enemy of the truthfulness of any figure that is published, to which Mr. Schlesinger replied: \"I do not believe that you could persuade the Soviets that that is a truthful figure, but I am not sure that that is our objective. Whether or not you could persuade the American public, I\nthink there is a large segment of the American public that would be persuaded. ... \" SchleSinger, 2/2/76, p. 56.)\nthe public. The possible effects on the national security of certain levels of budget dIsclosure are examined below.44\n\n## 1. The Effect On Nation?L Security Of Publication Of The National Intell1Gence Oomrnumty Budget Many I!1Diyiduals Familiar With The Intelligence Community Agree\n\n~h~t publIcatIOn of a gross figure for national intelli!!ence would not m Itse~f, dan:age the national security.\n\nI:>\n, DUrIng Ius confir!nation hearings as Director of Central Intelligence' James Schlesmger, former Secretary of Defense and past head\n~f tl~e OMB, told Senator Harry F. Byrd, Jr., in regard to the publIcatIon <?f the gross figure for national intelligence: \"I think that the securIty concerns are minimal. The component figures I would be more concer!1ed about but .for t~e gross national intellige~ce program figures, I thmk we could lIve WIth that on a security basis, yes.\" 45\n. Former DCI HelI?-s t?ld the Senate Select Committee that because It .was so larg~, publIcatIOn of a single figure for national intelligence mIght be \"satIsfactory.\" 46\nWhile it p.as b~en s~ggested that the publication of even a total for th~ natIOnal mtelhgence budget would aid our enemies,41 Mr.\n\n,~chlesl1lger to~d the Senate Select Committee that our enemies already know I~l the first place and it's broadly published. All that you would have IS a confirmed official figure for information. That is\n.44 There are. many pos~~ble variants of budget disclosure running from the full dIsclosure polIcy governIng such government agencies as the Department of Agric~lture, throug~ the bUdge~ d~sclosure utilized by the FBI and AEe which pro-\nVIdes for a specIfic appropnatIOn of funds for \"confidential\" purposes which are exempted from normal accounting reqUirements, to the possible disclosure of an aggregate figure for each national intelligence agency or for national intelligence as. a 'Y\"hole. The Committee has not attempted to analyze the constitutional implIcatIOns and effect on national security of each, but has focused on the disclosure\n?f th~ global sum for national intelligence and the aggregate budgets of each Intelhgence agency.\n\n: Q~oted in Congo Re~., S9603, daily ed., 6/4/74, remarks of Sen. Proxmire.\n\nRlchard Helms testImony, *1130/76,* pp. 36,37. Because the figure is so large the introd~;~ion of expensive. collection systems would not result in a \"conspic~\nuous b~mp In the budget WhlCh would alert hostile powers to new activities by the Umte~ St:;ttes. For 51 ful1er discussion of this argument and its relationship to the publIcatIon of the CIA's aggregate budget, see pp. 378-381.\n\nJohn Clarke, a former Comptroller of the CIA and an advisor to DCI Colby was -asked about the effects of publication of the total national intelligence budget and specifically whether publication of the figure would disclose the existence\n?of, Or the start of, a high-cost technical collection systf'm. Mr. Clarke responded I have not run the studies on this, but I would be very hard pressed to find' ~\nca.se that I could supPort. The budget figures don't reflect that. They are down.\n\nHIstorically, at. least .they have bE>~n down inside of a larger figure and it doesn't really pop out In a bIg way. And It can be explained away.\" (John Clarke testimony, 2/5/76, p. 47.)\n41 See e.g. p. 376 .\n\nmore or less in the public domain anyhow without public confirmation.\n\nwithout official confirmation.\" 48\n'\nMr. Schlesinger described for the Select Committee the impact of publishing the total national intelligence budget:\nI am not so concerned about that from the security aspect as some people are. I'm not sure I recommend it, but I'm not so concerned about it from the security aspect.\n\nIt could do some good in that there are some inflated notions around about how much the United States Government is actually spending on intelligence, and if you had an official statement, I think that would put the total amount of expenditures in better context for the public.4sa\n\n13. The Effect on National Seowity of Disclosure of the Total Appropriated to or Expended by Each National Intelligence Agency\nPublication of the total of the CIA's budget or of the other agencies'\nbudgets has also been opposed. In a Freedom of Information Act suit, DCI Colby argued against publication of the Agency's budget total, as follows:\nPublication of eieher the CIA budget or the expenditures made by CIA for any given year would show the amounts planned to be expended or in fact expended for objects of a confidential, extraordinary or emergency nature. This information would be of considerable value to a potentially hostile foreign government. For example, if the total expenditures made by the Agency for any particular year were publicized, these disclosures, when taken with other information publicly available ... would enable such governments to refine their estimates of the activities oia major component of the United States intelligence community, including specifically the personnel strength, technological capabilities, clandestine operational activities, and the extent of the United States Government intelligence analysis and dissemination machinery ....\n\nThe subsequent pUblicrution of simiLar daita for 'Other fiscal years . . . would enable a potentially hostile power to refine its estimat.es of trends in the United States Government intelligence efforts.\n\nHe continued:\nThe business of intelligence is to a large extent a painstaking collection of data and the formation of conclusions utilizing a multitude of bits and pieces of information. The revelation of one such piece, which might not appear to be of significance to anyone not familiar with the process of intelligence analy-\n<S Schlesinger. 2/2/76. p. 52. Mr. Schlesinger noted that. as the Intelligence Community has \"no constituenC'y,\" it b>ndR to be \"blam('d for one t.hing or another,\" and \"if you had an openly publish('d figure . . . there would be pressure within the Congress at budget mark-up time to take a 15 percent or 20 percent whack at it just for good measure and ... there is no way of having a public debate about the merits of intelligence.\" *lrI.* at 51-52. Mr. Schlesinger's argument implies that Congress as a whole should not be given information because it should not be allowed to exercise its control over the purse.\n\nsis (and which, therefore, might not arguably be said to be damaging to the national security) would, when combined with other similar data, make available ... information of great use and which would result in significant damage to the national security of the United States.\n\nHe provided the following example of the impact on the nation's security of publication of the CIA's budget:\nIf it were learned that CIA expenditures have increased significantly in anyone given year, but that there has beep.\n\nno increase in Agency personnel ( apparent from traffic, cars in the parking lots, etc.) it would be possible to make some reasonable estimates and conclusions to the effect that, for example, CIA had developed a costly intelligence collection system which is technological rather than manpower intensive; and that such system is operational. Knowledge readily availa;bleat the time about reconnaissance aircraft photography, and other technology, can result in a more accurate analysis ,about a new collection system which would enable a potentially hostile power to take steps to counter its effectiveness . . . the development of the U-2 aircraft as an effective collection device wou1d not have been possible if the CIA\nbudget had been a matter of public knowledge. Our budget u:creased significantl:y during the development phase of that alrcraft. Thrut fact, If publIc, would have aJttractedattention .... If itihad 'been supplemented by knowledge (Iavailable perhaps from technical magazines, industry rumor, or advanced espionage techniques) that funds were being committed to a major aircraft manuacturer and to a manufacturer of sophisticated mapping cameras, the correct conclusion would have been simple to draw. The U.S. manufacturers in question ... would have become high priority intemgence\n;targets .... And I'm sure that ,the Soviets would have taken steps earlier to ,acquire a capability to destroy very -highaltitude aircraft. They did indeed take these steps, with eventual success, but only sometime after the 'aircraft 'began operating over their territory-that is, once they had knowledge of a U.S. intelligence project.49\nA close examination of Mr. Colby's statement raises a number of questions as to the effecJt of publication of the CIA's aggregate budget.\n\nAlthough Mr. Colby notes that the CIA's total budget figure would allow governments to \"refine their estimates of the activities of a major component of the Un~ted States intelligence community,\" he provides no evidence of *h010* the publication of this one figure would increase the other government's knowledge of, for example, the clan-\nAction No. 75-0676, United States District Court for the District of Columbia, Pp. 3-5. Other knowledgeable figures have reached different conclusions about the effect. of publishing the CIA's budget. For example, Elliot Richardson, pre!'ently Secretary of (1ommerce and formerly Secr('tary of Defense, hqs stated that publication of the amount of the CIA's expenditures would not be damaging to the national security.\n\ndestine DperatiDnal activities *'Of* the CIA.50 There wDuld, *'Of* CDUrse~\nbe SDme \"refinement\" if it were knuwn that the CIA's budget was\n$X milliDns rather than $X + 1 milliDns. Such refinement goes 'On at all times, but the questiDn is whether such a gain by hostile powers is sufficient to justify 'Overriding the cDnstitutiQnal reQui~ement tha~ the American peQple be told hDW their funds are spent. Havmg an offiCIally acknDwledged budget tQtal does nut signal tD a hostile PQwer manpuwer levels in the Clandestine Service, let alQne the number *'Of* deep CDver agents. Having an 'Officially acknowledged aggregate figure does not reveal the CQst 'Of a reconnaissance vehicle, let alQne its technical capability.\n\n.\n\nMr. CDlby has maintained that 'One-time publicatiDn 'Of the total amQunt budgeted for the CIA would set a precedent and that infDnnutiQn revealed thrDugh successive publicatiDn WQuld prDvide hostile pDwers with insights intQ United States intelligence activities.\n\nOf particular importance is Mr. Colby's. claim that successive disclosures 'Of .the CIA's aggregate budget WQuld eliminate the effectiveness *'Of* ma;or technicrt.l cQllection systems like the U-2. A change in the CIA's tQtal budget frDm 'One year to the next may be due tQ a number\n'Of faotors: inflatiDn, cutbacks in -activities, 'a major reorganizlatiQn, or long term gains in efficiency, fQr example. Assuming that an increase in the CIA's budget alerted hoStile PQwers to some change in the Agency's activities, it would nQt in itself reveal what the new aotivity was-a new CQvert aetion proiect, mQre materi,al procurement, 'Or an increase in analytical capwbility through mechanizatiQn. For Mr.\n\nCQlby's argument tQ be valid nQt 'Only must the hostile power be able 'accuraJbe.ly tQ determine what the ,activity is--fDr instance, a new reconnaissance system-bnt that power WQuld have tD gain, cQvertly, an enQrmQUS amount 'Of tightly guarded inrormation, sw:~h as the techno-\nIQgical capabilities 'Of the vehicle and the surveillance systems which it cDntained.51 It WQuld seem that a hostile PQwer able to gain that informatiQn wouJd be ruble tQ discover t,he total 'Of the CIA's budget, a much mQre widely knQwn figure. The possibility that a hostile power mav pieree all the barriers designed to limit disseminatiQn\n'Of clQsely held infDrmatiQn cannQt be used tQ ;ustify denying the American peQple infQrmatiDn which the CDnstitutiDn guarantees them, and which is widely published, and which must be assumed tQ be within the grasp 'Of hostile PQwers.\n\nIt is far frQm clear, mDreQVer. that the develQpment and intrDductiQn *'Of* a majQr new system will be annQunced by a change in the Agency's total budget.\n\nThe CIA budget may be large enQugh not tQ change substantially when a new system CQmes 'On line. A preliminary analysis *'Of* past CIA\nbudgets has indicated that majQr new activities have nDt always resulted in \"bumps\" and that SDme \"bumps\" in the budget still are nDt\n50 Mr. Colby's statement ignores the fact that figures for the CIA budget are already widely publicized. although not officiallY confirmed. In this regard. it is interesting to note that the Central Intelligence Agency withdrew its objection to the far more detailed budget diselosure in The OIA and the Oult of IntelUgenoe by Victor Marchetti and John D. Marks.\n\n~r:r~~iie~ti~~~~~.52 Because *'Of* the impDrtance 'Of expensive techth\"\n.\n\nb - ms, hDwever, the Select CQmmittee believes that e CQnSpICUDUS ump\" argument deserves fulle st d b th f\n~::{!g::: ~h~~gigrtt~es,~ Pfirticulfarly in.light .of t.h~ re~ufts If t.h~ p~;bli~\nby the Committee. ga e gure 'Or natIOnal IntellIgence recQmmended Finally .. the. claims abDut damage tD the national securit resultin frDm pubhcatlOn of the ao-gregate figure for each . t lr y g must be viewed in the light *'Of* far mDre detailed ~~de c~~~:~i~ge~c~\n~Dsure *'Of* the budgets Q.f 'Other a.gencies vital tD the natiDnal sec~~it~\nfo nQ~mQus amounts *'Of* InfOrmatIOn have been prDvided tQ the publlc'\nAt~ri~taE~~r~DC~!~i:i~~ 'Of t~d pelPartmenft *'Of* Defense an~ th~\nand d db' e ISC Qsure '0 funds apprDprIated t'\njxpen e 1 these agencies did not and dDes not reveal vltal na ab:t ~hcrets.\n\ns SenatQr Symingt?n noted, \"There's nDthing secret G-5A \" But '''k costl *iIf* a f~chlear aIrcraft carrier 'Or the CDSt of the th'\nnDwe geD\ne CDSt does not eaual knQwledO\"e *'Of* hQW\nedf} W~~fDhs 'Operate Dr how .they ~Quld be utilized.\" Similariy,knDwl-\n1ge\n} ~ 'Overall ~Qst *'Of* IntellIgence does nDt in any way entail the rfune eats.e '0\nInlfDrmatlOn ~bout how the variDus -intelligence groups c lOn, 'Or p an tQ functIOn.\" 54\n\n## E. The Argument That Publicatiqn *'Of* Any Infdrmatidn Will Inevitably Result In Demands Fdr Further Infdrmatidn -\n\nlis~i:e 'Opponents *'Of* budget discl.osure., while admitting that pube g agg~egat~llfigures fDr the IntellIgence community Dr intelli ftc~~i~~g;rCIeSh fi nQt h~r~ na~iQnal security, have argued that pub:\nd t il A nl!C\ngures WIll mevItably lead tQ demands fDr ever mDre g:n~e; s IrectDr Colby tolc1 the HDUse Select CDmmittee 'On Intellie aI.s prQ ably wDuld grDW. What dDes it include 2 What d ryeDver b\n, 'Once the budget total is revealed, the demand fDr\n~Des It e~clude ~ Why did it gQ up ~ Why did 't d .\n\n2 I\nIt wDrth It? HQW dQes it wQrk? .\n\nI gQ 'Own. s\n52 One series of activities which did b'\nAgency's activities in Laos, which we~:u:I~:rlYu~P III ~e CIA's budge! was the U.S. but were kept secret from the Am'\nnlown\n0 powers hostile to the\n53 If encan peop e for many y a new systems would be revealed by \"b .\".\n\ne rs.\n\ntion other than denying all information on 3~s III td~e CIA's budget a solupeople might be found J\n.\n\nexpen ItlIres to the American figure could be based ~n :~~~l S~~l\\~~:~';en~a~ s~fge~t:1 that the published dollars which could be spent. while obli'\ny e rather than on the the years, actual outlays \"tend to gatlOns may fluctuate dramatically over\n(S~hJeSinger, *2/2176,* p. 55.)\n_\nmove smoothly over a period of years.\"\n117 Congo Rec., p. S42925 remarks of S\nS\n.\n\ngett o~ the House Armed Se~vices Committ:~' nJ:U:~~' ~s Congressman Leg-\nCommIttee Report of about 4000\nt\n.\n\ne ave a book here, the they talk about the money for th~~~ ~ ~h~ D~p~rtment of Defense in whieh works? The answer is: no.\n\n- -\nII ye\n0 we know how the SAM-D\n\"We have the details of the money for Th'l d\n..\n\nwe know what the money is actually used f\n?a~ an , and It IS spelled out. But do\n\"We can go through the FBI b or .\n\nO.\n\nThe answer is: no.\" (Cong. Rae udi{i37~o~ \\hat dtelll0lIs what they are doing?\n\nLeggett.)\n.\"\nal y e.,\n/1/75, remarks of Rep.\n\nThere would be revelations ... which would gradually reduce the unknown to a smaller and smaller part of the total, permitting foreign intelligence services tc? concentrate their efforts in the areas where we would least hke to attract\n. their attention.\n\n.\n\n.\n\nWe-and I specifically mean in this instance both Intelhgence professionals and Members of Congress-would h~ve an acute problem when the matter of our budget arose In the floor of the House or Senate. Those who knew the facts would have two unpleasant choi?es--to remain.silent in the face of all questions and allegatIOns, however maccurate, or to attempt to keep the debate on accurate grOlmds by at least hinting at the full story.\n\n.\n\nMv concern that one revelation will lead to another IS based on more than a \"feeling.\" The atomic weapons bu~get was considered very sensitive, and the Manhattan. ProJect was concealed completely during World War.II. WIth the est~b\nlishment of the AEC however, the deciSIOn was made to Include in the 194'7 budget a one-line.item for the weapons account. That limitation was short-hved. By 19'74, a 15-page breakout and discussion of the Atomic Weapons Program was being published. Were the intelligence budget ~o uIl:dergo a similar experience, major aspects of our mtelhgence strategy, capabilities and successes would be revealed.55\n.\n\np. ~!~ator McClellan described the consequences of publishing the total budget for national intelligence. \"That is when you intend to put the camel's nose under the tent. That is the beginning. That is the wedge. You say you do not want to know all the details and how the money is spent. But, if you get the overall figures of one billion dollars or half-a-billion dollars or five billion, or w.hatever, then how are you going to know, how can you evaluate, how can you Judge or. n:ake .an intelligl'nt judgment on whether that is too much or too little, .whether It IS bemg expended wisely or unwisely, except when you can get the detaIls? .\n\n.\n\n\"How? You cannot know. And, if you receive these figures and If you end thIS\nignorance as to the total amount, next you will want to end the. i~orance as to the different agenCies and how it is spent, an~ t~rough whom It IS spent. Next will want to end the ignorance of what It IS spent for. Nex~ you want to end the ignorance of how that intelligence is procurpd. There IS no end to it.\" (Cong Rec. S9609, daily ed., 6/4/74, remarks of Sen. McClellan:)\n.\n\nDuring the same debate Senator Humphrey noted that 'Yhlle .he d~d not oppose tbe purpose of the disclosure of the total budget for natl?nal mteillgence,\n\"the problem is it is sort of like loose string or a ball of twme, so. to speak, that starts to unravel.\" *(ld.* at S9606, remarks of Sen. Humphrey.) Dunng a more recent House debate on the publication of the CIA's budget, Congref'sman !Otlllg described such publicrttion as \"the first baby step.\" (Cong. Rec. H9376, dallyed.,\n10/1/75, remarks of Rep. Young.)\nAs James Schlesinger told the Splect Committee, \"But onpof the problems here is the camel's nose under the ed~e of the tent, and I think that th~t is the fundamental problem in the area. There are very few people who ca~ a~tlculately argue tbat the publication of those figures in and of themgelves, If It stopp.ed there would be harmful. The argument is that then the pressure would buIld up t~ do somethhi.g else, that once you have publish~d for example the .. , budget. that the pressures would build up to reveal tbe kmds of systems tIl.at are bemg bought for tbat money, and it is regarded as the first steD down a slIDperY\nslope for those who worry' about those kinds of things.\" (Schlesinger, 2/2/76, p.53.)\nTher~ are several problems with this argument. While there obviously WIll be pressure, the problem as Mr. Helms agreed \"is not insuperable.\" 56 For many years Congress has refused to reveal the figures tor t~e national i~telligence budget and the aggregate budgets of the Intelhgence. agenCIes. It seems ~likely that given this past history, Congre~ WIll suddenly reverse Itself and fail to protect information\n~hose dIsclosure w~uld harm the national security. Much more likely IS. that Congress WIll, as Senator Church proposed, \"establish very stringe~t rules when it came to handling the money figures.\" 57\nMore Importantly, as Congressman Koch noted:\nThe real fear on bOth sides of the aisle that some have expressed is.' '~Gee, if we do that, that is the first step.\"\nMaybe It IS, but, whatever the second step is, it is what this House wants it to be, and if this House decides that this is the last step, so be it. If the House decides that it wants to have more information it will have to have a vote on it.\n\nWhat is wrong with that? That is what is called the democratic system. We are sent here to be part of that system. 58\n. It is i~structiv~ to note in this context the amount of budgetary InfOrmatIOn prOVIded on the Atomic Energy Commission. That information has constantly ~ncreas~d: Y~t each step of the way, Congress has had the opportumty to lImIt dIsclosure and chose not to. This experience confirms congressional control over the process. More importantly the national security was not harmed by disclosure of a substantial amount of budgetary information about an -agency and a weapons program crucial to the defense of the United States.\n\nFinally, the argument is without limits. It could be used to justify mu?h great~r secrecy. It could be used to justify the withholding of allmformatlOn on the Defense Department because information which the Congress wis~es ~ protect .would _~ threatened by pressures caused by the pubhcatIOn of any rnformatIon on that Department.\n\n## F. The Argument That The United States Should Not Publish Information Of Its I:R.\"\"Telligence Budget Since No Other Govern- Ment In The World Does\n\n. I~ has. also been argued that the United States should not publish Its rntellIgence budget when no other government in the world does. 59\nYet as Congressman Moss noted:\nI point out to those Members who do not know the difference between this country and others, and the fact that we\n'become un.ique in disclosing this that, thank God, we do become umque. We have grO!W1l great and maintained our strength as an open society and we should continue to be an open society to the maximum consistent with our true security requirements.\n\nI t the Russians 0'1' the Chinese\n, I dO' *nDt* w;~~.: ~~~~~: !. the operatiDn Qf t~e variQus Dr even Qur rr.l ts under their QffiCIal secrets agencies Df theIr gye~en to realize the strength that we acts and ather 'areas. wan us d f ad electorate.so gain rDman alert electorate an m Qrm\n\n## G. Summary And Cdnclusidn\n\n-\n.\n\ntl vern the Central Intelli-\nThe budget procedures Whld: presen e~!~lli nee cDmmunity p'regence Agency and Dther agenCIes of t~l as the ~ublic from knD'Ylllg vent most Membe~s of Congress a~f ';;~~e a ncies or even hQW much hQW much m~)lley ~s spent by ant 1 In adltion mQst Members of is spent on mtelhgen~ as a ;\n0. e. d ,about the ~pprQpriations and Congress and the pl1bhc 'are ecelve\n.\n\nhose bud t'I\"OIl-Q are inflated d\nf -'-h gQvernment aO\"P.]lCles w b V\n\"':\nexpen Itures 0\nOt,; er\n.\n\n.\n\no~ mmunit The faIlure to proto conceal funds fQ!\" the mtelhgen~ 00\nth~ Congre6S prevents vide this illform~tlOn 'tdth.e PUb~I~ti~~ at;:d violates Article 1, Seceither from effectIvely or e;rmg pno t\n9 Clause 7 which proVIdes that:\n.\n\nIOn ,\n'\nb t CQnse No MDney shall be. d~awn frDm thL;:~~~d~ r~~u~~r State~\nquence Qf ApproprlatIQnS made .by d' E\nd;tures 'Of all ent and Account O'f the ReceIpts an.\n\nxpe~ 1\n\n~lblic MQney shall be published frQm tIme to' tIme.\nb!\"\nt\"\nQf the aO\"o'!'eo-ate figure fQr The CQmmittee finds that, p~ lCa I(n f the cQ:Stit:tiQnal requirenatiDnal intelligence would be~ to' :.a IS {securitv. While substantial ment .and WQul.d nDbt da~ge i t~ ~~l~i;~etween the cQnstitutiQnal requestIOns remam a Qut.\n\n~ re a 10.\n\nthe Committee recommends the quirement and the D!atlOnal secunty, fi The CDmmittee alsO' recannual publication Qf the aggreg3:~~eefs~~dy the effects of publis~ng Qmmends that ~ny succ~ssor cQmm h 'bI d ts of the intelligence agenCIes.\n\nmore detailed mformatIOn Qn 't e\n11 ge\n\n## Xvii. Testing And Use Of Chemical And Biologi- Cal Agents By The Intelligence Community\n\nUnder its mandate 1 the Select CQmmittee has studied the testing and use Qf chemical and biDIQgical agents by intelligence agencies. Detailed descriptiQns Qf the prQgrams cQnducted by intelligence agencies invO'lving chemical and biQlQgical agents will be included in a separately published appendix *to'* the .senate .select CQmmittee's repQrt. This sectiO'n *O'f* the repO'rt will discuss the ratiO'nale fQr the prO'grams, their mO'nitO'ring and cO'ntrQl, and what the CO'mmittee's investigatiQn has revealed abO'ut the relatiO'nships amO'ng the intelligence agencies and about their relations with other gO'vernment agencies and private institutions and individuals. 2\nFears that countries hostile *to'* the United States would use chemical and biological agents against Americans or America's allies led to the develDpment Df a defensive prDgram designed *to'* discDver techniques for American intelligence agencies *to'* detect 'and COlmteract chemical and biological agents. The defensive orientation soon became secondary as the possible use of these agents to obtain information from, or gain control over, enemy agents became apparent.\n\nResearch and developnient programs to find materials which could be used to alter human behavior were initiated in the late 1940s and early 1950s. These experimental programs originally included testing O'f drugs involving witting human subjects, and culminated in tests using unwitting, nQnvolunteer human subjects. These tests were designed to determine the potential effects of chemical or biO'logical agen,ts when used O'perationally against individuals unaware that they had received a drug.\n\nThe testing programs were considered highly sensitive by the intelligence agencies administering them. Few people, even within the agencies, knew of the programs and there is no evidence that either the executive branch 0'1' CQngress were ever informed of them. The highly compartmented nature of these programs may be explained in part by an O'bservatiQn made by the CIA InspectO'r General that, \"the knQwledge that the Agency is engaging in unethical and illicit activiate (Section 2(4) and (8;\n\"(c) The adequacy of executive branch and congressional oversight of intelligence activities (Section 2(7) and (11 ;\n\"(d) The adequacy of existing laws to safeguard the rights of American citizens (Section 2(13) ).\"\na The details of these programs may never 'be known. The programs were highly compartmented. Few records were kept. What little documentation existed for the CIA's principal program was destroyed early in 1973."
    },
    {
        "text": "## Project Accomplishment Summary\n\n\nSandia National Laboratories is a multi-program laboratory managed and operated by Sandia Corporation, a wholly owned subsidiary of Lockheed Martin Corporation, for the U.S. Department of Energy's National Nuclear Security Administration under contract DE-\nAC04-94AL85000.\n\n\nOperated for the U.S. Department of Energy by Sandia Corporation Albuquerque, New Mexico\n\n# Project  Accomplishments  Summary Cooperative Research And Development Agreement (#1714) Between **Sandia National Labs** And Northrop Grumman Systems Corporation\n\n\nNote:  This Project Accomplishments Summary will serve to meet the requirements for a final abstract and final report as specified in Article XI of the CRADA.\n\n\nTitle:  Unmanned Air Vehicle (UAV) Ultra-Persistence Research\n\nFinal Abstract: Sandia National Laboratories and Northrop Grumman Corporation Integrated Systems, Unmanned Systems (NGIS UMS) collaborated to further ultra-persistence technologies for unmanned air vehicles (UAVs). The greatest shortfalls in UAV capabilities have been repeatedly identified as 1) insufficient flight persistence or \"hang time,\" 2) marginal electrical power for running higher power avionics and payload systems, and 3) inadequate communications bandwidth and reach. NGIS UMS requested support from Sandia to develop an ultra-persistent propulsion and power system (UP3S) for potential incorporation into next generation UAV systems. The team members tried to determine which energy storage and power generation concepts could most effectively push UAV propulsion and electrical power capabilities to increase UAV sortie duration from days to months while increasing available electrical power at least two-fold. Primary research and development areas that were pursued included these goals: perform general system engineering and integration analyses; develop initial thermal and electrical power estimates; provide mass, volume, dimensional, and balance estimates; conduct preliminary safety assessments; assess logistics support requirements; perform, preliminary assessments of any security and safeguards; evaluate options for removal, replacement, and disposition of materials; generally advance the potential of the UP3S concept. The effort contrasted and compared eight heat sources technologies, three power conversion, two dual cycle propulsion system configurations, and a single electrical power generation scheme. Overall performance, specific power parameters, technical complexities, security, safety, and other operational features were successfully investigated. Large and medium sized UAV systems were envisioned and operational flight profiles were developed for each concept. Heat source creation and support challenges for domestic and expeditionary operations were considered. Fundamental cost driver analysis was also performed. System development plans were drafted in order to determine where the technological and programmatic critical paths lay. As a result of this effort, UAVs were to be able to provide far more surveillance time and intelligence information per mission while reducing the high cost of support activities. This technology was intended to create unmatched global capabilities to observe and preempt terrorist and weapon of mass destruction\n(WMD) activities. Various DOE laboratory and contractor personnel and facilities could have been used to perform detailed engineering, fabrication, assembly and test operations including follow-on operational support. Unfortunately, none of the results will be used in the near-term or mid-term future. NGIS UMS\nand SNL felt that the technical goals for the project were accomplished. NGIS UMS was quite pleased with the results of analysis and design although it was disappointing to all that the political realities would not allow use of the results. Technology and system designs evaluated under this CRADA had previously never been applied to unmanned air vehicles (UAVs). Based upon logistic support cost predictions, because the UAVs would not have had to refuel as often, forward basing support costs could have been reduced due to a decrease in the number and extent of support systems and personnel being required to operate UAVs in remote areas. Basic application of the advanced propulsion and power approach is well understood and industry now understands the technical, safety, and political issues surrounding implementation of these strategies.\n\nHowever, the overall economic impact was not investigated. The results will not be applied/implemented.\n\nNo near-term benefit to industry or the taxpayer will be encountered as a result of these studies.\n\n\nBackground: The state of the art in unmanned flight systems prior to this effort was to depend entirely on hydrocarbon or hydrogen fuels for propulsion and electrical power creation. This leads operational units to be reliant on costly and fragile long haul fuel supply chains in order to accomplish their missions. This CRADA effort was instituted to learn whether it was possible to break expensive traditional logistical support constructs and create a propulsion and power configuration that would drastically increase operational performance and remove the primary logistical load on operational units thereby allowing them to focus their critical resources on providing \"more tooth\" and \"less tail.\" NGIS UMS and Sandia teamed to tackle this challenge since NGIS UMS had the industrial leadership position in unmanned flight systems while Sandia had extensive knowledge in the realm of alternative power technologies.\n\nDescription: The purpose/objective of the project was to further ultra-persistence technologies for unmanned air vehicles (UAVs). The greatest shortfalls in UAV capabilities have been repeatedly identified as 1)\ninsufficient flight persistence or \"hang time,\" 2) marginal electrical power for running higher power avionics and payload systems, and 3) inadequate communications bandwidth and reach. This effort was broken into four task areas: Task 1 - UP3S Systems Engineering Analyses, Task 2 - UP3S Project Planning, Task 3 - Briefing Support, and Task 4 - Interim and Final Reports. Under task 1, Sandia conducted computer-based engineering and literature-based process analyses to meet the technical and programmatic requirements. Based on requirements and direction provided by NGIS\nUMS, Sandia performed focused studies to translate stated needs into conceptual designs and processes that could be transferred easily from Sandia to industry design and production personnel. Propulsion and power system topics included include fuel cycle analyses, scalability of systems, control systems, safety, security and safeguards analyses, electronic system survivability and hardness, decommissioning and disposal analyses, logistics support analyses including main operating base (MOB) issues, and life cycle cost analyses. Also, Sandia helped identify new processes, designs, hardware, software, safety, and reliability required for improved national UAV performance. Sandia assisted NGIS UMS to baseline at least one future UAV configuration with new energy and power systems to meet emerging U.S. military operational needs. Sandia conducted analyses at component and system-levels that emerged during the project. No physical asset testing or demonstrations was performed during this effort. Deliverables from Task 1 included the results of the analyses and studies, including presentation materials. Under task 2, Sandia and NGIS UMS developed technology development requirements, projected costs, schedule, manpower, facilities, equipment, associated resources, key experiments, demonstrations, tests, and decisions, operational system modifications versus new system acquisition. Deliverables from task 2\nincluded the results of the analyses and studies. Under task 3, Sandia helped the NGIS UMS UP3S team to develop and present briefing materials. Due to the nature of topical expertise required for the project and the dependence of NGIS UMS upon Sandia's subject matter experts (SMEs), Sandia supported NGIS UMS in providing \"tag team\" briefings to Northrop Grumman Corporation (NGC) upper management and non- NGC entities (e.g. industry partners, government). NGIS UMS staff presented the materials that NGIS\nUMS developed and in which they had expertise; Sandia did the same for its materials.  Finally, under task 4, Sandia provided progress reports to NGIS UMS at their request, using their format. Upon completion of the CRADA, Sandia provided a final out-brief to NGIS UMS. Accomplishments: The effort concentrated on propulsion and power technologies that went well beyond existing hydrocarbon technologies. It contrasted and compared eight heat sources technologies, three power conversion, two dual cycle propulsion system configurations, and a single electrical power generation scheme. Overall performance, specific power parameters, technical complexities, security, safety, and other operational features were successfully investigated. Large and medium sized UAV systems were envisioned and operational flight profiles were developed for each concept. Heat source creation and support challenges for domestic and expeditionary operations were considered. Fundamental cost driver analysis was also performed. System development plans were drafted in order to determine where the technological and programmatic critical paths lay. NGIS UMS and SNL felt that the technical goals for the project were accomplished. NGIS UMS was quite pleased with the results of analysis and design although it was disappointing to all that the political realities would not allow use of the results.\n\nBenefits to the Department of Energy: This project was intended to support specific strategic Defense Programs R&D goals, core competencies, and plans at the DOE facilities if the results were to be implemented. This project focused on supporting Sandia's Defense Systems and Assessments (DS&A) Strategic Management Unit (SMU) from the Integrated Military Systems (IMS) Center 5400 by promoting development of advanced propulsion and electric power generation for more electric unmanned aircraft (MEUA). Results were to be used in the next generation of unmanned air vehicles used for military and intelligence applications. Through these technologies, UAVs were to be able to provide far more surveillance time and intelligence information per mission while reducing the high cost of support activities. As investigation, development, and fielding of this new unmanned air vehicle (UAV) propulsion and power approach were to be achieved through the national labs, the United States would have created unmatched global capabilities to observe and preempt terrorist and weapon of mass destruction (WMD) activities. Various DOE laboratory and contractor personnel and facilities could have been used to perform detailed engineering, fabrication, assembly and test operations including follow-on operational support. None of the results are currently in use by DOE and it is doubtful that they will be used in the near-term or mid-term future. Currently, none of the results can be shared openly with the public due to national security constraints.\n\nEconomic Impact: Technology and system designs evaluated under this CRADA have previously never been applied to unmanned air vehicles (UAVs). Use of these technologies would have provided system performance unparalleled by other existing technologies. Northrop Grumman and the U.S. military would have received new propulsion and power options that are not currently available. Based upon logistic support cost predictions, because the UAVs would not have had to refuel as often, forward basing support costs could have been reduced due to a decrease in the number and extent of support systems and personnel being required to operate UAVs in remote areas. Basic application of the advanced propulsion and power approach is well understood; however, the overall economic impact was not investigated due to termination of the effort. The results will not be applied/implemented. However, industry now understands the technical, safety, and political issues surrounding implementation of these strategies. Industry now knows how significantly aerial operations can be improved by using these propulsion and power approaches even though current political conditions will not allow use of the results. No near-term benefit to industry or the t axpayer will be encountered as a result of these studies.\n\nProject Status: Completed\n\n\n## Additional Information\n\n\nLaboratory/Department of Energy Facility Point of Contact for Information on Project Steven B. Dron\nSandia National Laboratories PO Box 5800 MS 1158 Dept 5424, Bldg 971 Albuquerque, NM 87185 505.845.7126 (office) 505.284.1373 (FAX)\nCompany Size and Points of Contact Industrial partner: Northrop Grumman Integrated Systems / Unmanned Systems (NGIS/UMS) Rancho Bernardo, CA Technical POC: Stephen Johnson 17066 Goldentop Rd Rancho Bernardo, CA stephen.johnson@ngc.com 949-678-9534\nCRADA Intellectual Property None Technology Commercialization No commercialization Project Examples There are no tangible items related to the project that could be used in a show and tell situation (e.g. during Congressional testimony). There are no photographs that help explain what was accomplished under the CRADA.\n\n## Project Accomplishments Summary\n\nCooperative Research and Development Agreement (SCOS/01714)\nbetween Sandia National Laboratories and Northrop Grumman Systems Corporation This summary has been approved for public release by Sandia and Northrop Grumman Systems Corporation San~~Ji~i_~~ ~ab~~ories Principal Investigator Sandia National Laboratories WFO/CRADA Agreements Northrop Grumman Systems Corporation In order to expedite the process, if we do not receive your signed reply by 7 /z.t!/zOJ/\nwe will assume your concurrence for the release of this document to the public."
    },
    {
        "text": "## On Our Radar The New Race For Space\n\nBy Ryan Lewis and Todd Stavish President John F. Kennedy, speaking several months after John Glenn's historic flight aboard Friendship 7, famously proclaimed that, \"No nation which expects to be the leader of other nations can expect to stay behind in this race for space.\" The origins of the modern space industry are rooted in one of the most renowned global competitions: the race for space between the United States and the former Soviet Union. Fifty years later, a new space race is underway that is being driven not by nations, but by venture-backed startups.\n\nThroughout the 1960s and 1970s, space research and development was driven by government agencies seeking to expand their national security capabilities and prestige. In today's space race, this generation of venture-backed startups is challenging long-held industry conventions by leveraging the same techniques that drove innovation in the software market and applying them to space systems. As a result, space capabilities and services are rapidly becoming accessible for commercial and government consumers alike. The changes currently unfolding in the market are truly unprecedented. While the space industry had its share of new commercial entrants in previous decades, never before has the industry experienced aggressive startup activity across every market segment. From providing reliable and affordable access to space to developing new analytics for remote sensory data, startups are looking to disrupt current practices by leveraging affordable platforms that allow them to innovate quickly and inexpensively. This approach allows companies to rapidly evolve their products and services at previously unimaginable price points. The cost structure of these startups also allows them to pursue new types of business models. Unlike a majority of their predecessors, most new space startups are not looking to government agencies to serve as their sole or even primary customers. Instead, commercial industries serve as their main sources of revenue generation. While many of these consumers may be unfamiliar with space-based capabilities, the insights provided from space remote sensory data fit directly into existing big data, communications, or tracking and monitoring challenges. This comprehensive market change and rising commercial interest has not been lost on investors. For the first time, venture capital firms are playing an increasingly significant role in funding space startups. As more money enters the industry, more entrepreneurs are likely to join this new race. It is important to consider why this innovation in the market is happening now. Startups are taking advantage of fundamental changes occurring across a variety of market sectors, including launch vehicles, hardware and software, satellites, and analytics.\n\n## Decreased Cost To Access Space\n\nThe ability to reach outer space safely has always been one of the biggest challenges in the space industry. As recent events have shown, rocket launches are still risky enterprises. Despite the inherent challenges of rocket science, recent advances in expanding affordable For the first time, venture capital firms are playing an increasingly significant role in funding space startups. As more money enters the industry, more entrepreneurs are likely to join this new race.\n\nmethods, in which requirements and solutions evolve through collaboration between self-organizing, crossfunctional teams. This promotes adaptive planning, evolutionary development, early delivery, continuous improvement, and rapid and flexible response to change. The end result is that a single satellite design can evolve through ten generations in one or two years - taking advantage of hardware that did not exist at the inception of the design cycle.\n\naccess to space have made it possible for entrepreneurs and startups to put pathfinders and prototypes into orbit at a fraction of the cost. Demand for secondary rides has developed so rapidly that startups specializing in launch brokerage services have emerged to simplify the process for new companies. The U.S. government also helped ease access to space by supporting efforts like NASA's rideshare program, which provides secondary rides to university science projects.\n\n## Standardized Satellite Buses\n\nAlthough the secondary launch market helped catalyze growth among aspiring small satellite startups, it cannot address the ever-increasing demand for launch services. From launch dates to desired orbits and altitudes, startups are demanding increasingly complex services to meet their needs on an already overtaxed system. A series of startups have emerged to meet this demand for timely, reliable, and affordable access to space. These innovations will be important not only for aspiring companies dedicated to small satellite launch, but also the current heavy lift providers who are looking to diversify their product lines.\n\n## Commodity Hardware And Software\n\nExpanding on the original CubeSat standard developed at California Polytechnic State University and Stanford University, manufacturers have drastically simplified the process for researchers and companies alike to procure, test, and fly their own inexpensive satellites for a wide variety of missions and/or research projects. This flexibility has catalyzed numerous startup companies to develop tailored satellite services leveraging an inexpensive satellite bus. As the standard matures and companies support different elements of the supply chain, it will become easier for individuals and companies interested in CubeSats to experiment with their own satellites.\n\n## Common Analytic Engines And Services\n\nHistorically, the analysis of remote sensory data from space assets required a series of highly trained professionals to prepare, analyze, and disseminate the data to the appropriate stakeholders. While there will always be a need for highly trained professionals, the emergence of proprietary and open source analytics engines have enabled companies to sell affordable analytic products, not just raw data.\n\nThe second major change to the space industry is the adoption of commodity hardware coupled with the use of agile development methods. The advantage of using commodity hardware is most widely recognized in \"Moore's Law\" - the observation that, over the history of computing hardware, the number of transistors in a dense integrated circuit doubles approximately every two years. This doubling effect creates massive computing power over generations. The power of generational doubling is not isolated to computing, however. For example, space startups are utilizing the rapid pace of innovation currently experienced in solar power cells, battery systems, software-defined radios, and smartphone sensors.\n\nThe shift from raw data to insights will have a substantial impact on the market. Companies, both incumbents and startups, now have new product lines to sell customers. Furthermore, it has given rise to a new group of startups focusing exclusively on remote sensory analytics. Thus, a major barrier to entry for The exponential improvement of commodity hardware is further amplified by the use of agile development most commercial companies interested in space-based remote sensing data has been removed. Companies, no longer encumbered by analytic challenges associated with raw data exploitation, focus directly on business needs by purchasing tailored analytic products. In conclusion, the transformation occurring in the commercial space industry is undeniable, but change is not easy. In each market segment, consumers, both public and private alike, are slowly being forced to reconsider how they currently plan, buy, and use commercial space services and products. Similar to the software market, customers, including the Intelligence Community, will be increasingly challenged to decide between a series of companies, not simply one or two sole-source suppliers.\n\nRyan Lewis is a Director of Intelligence Community Support at In-Q-Tel. Prior to joining IQT, Lewis was an Account General Manager for Computer Science Corporation. In this role, he was responsible for the account's technical delivery, financial management, business development, and strategic planning. Lewis received a bachelor's degree from Truman State University and a master's degree from the University of Maryland, where he was named a Memorial Fellow.\n\n\nTodd Stavish is a Senior Member of the Technical Staff within IQT's Advanced Analytics practice. Stavish's company portfolio includes investments in big data, geospatial information systems, and space technologies. Prior to IQT, as a Chief Systems Engineer with InfiniteGraph, Stavish was responsible for customer acquisition. In this role, he acquired the company's first customer and won a key intelligence customer for media analytics. Stavish received\na bachelor's degree in Computational Physics from Saint Bonaventure University.\n\nRecognizing this shift in the space market, IQT is undertaking a strategic mission initiative focused on exploring the commercial space revolution. Going beyond IQT's core investment model, this initiative seeks to provide the IC with a mechanism to rapidly understand, architect, and demonstrate the art of the possible using new capabilities from the emerging commercial space industry. As space services become the realm of startups, not just governments, the IC and its partners must consider the implications of global commercial sales. While these market forces present both changes and challenges, it is truly an unprecedented time in the market. The new space race is on."
    },
    {
        "text": "Ann Caracristi Institute For Intelligence Research A WORLD EMERGING\nFROM PANDEMIC\nImplications for Intelligence and National Security Edited by Stacey E. Pollard and Lawrence A. Kuznar\n\n# A World Emerging From Pandemic Implications For Intelligence And National Security\n\nEdited by Stacey E. Pollard and Lawrence A. Kuznar The goal of the NI Press is to publish high quality, valuable, and timely books on topics of concern to the Intelligence Community and the U.S. Government. Books published by the NI Press undergo peer review by senior officials in the U.S. Government as well as outside experts. This publication has been approved for unrestricted distribution by the Office of the Director of National Intelligence. The views expressed in this publication are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, the Intelligence Community, or the U.S. Government. Authors of NI Press publications enjoy full academic freedom, provided they do not disclose classified information, jeopardize operations security, or misrepresent official U.S. policy. Such academic freedom empowers authors to offer new and sometimes controversial perspectives in the interest of furthering debate on key issues. This publication is subject to Title 17, United States Code, Sections 101 and 105. It is in the public domain and may not be copyrighted. How to order this book: Everyone may download a free electronic copy of this book from our website at http://www.NI-U.edu. U.S. Government employees may request a complimentary copy of this book by contacting us at: press@NI-U.edu. Editor, NI Press Spring 2022 National Intelligence University Bethesda, MD\nISBN: 978-1-932946-09-3 Library of Congress Control Number: 2022936046 Cover image from Shutterstock\n\n## Acknowledgments\n\nThis volume sprang from a partnership between NIU and the Joint Staff Strategic Multilayer Assessment (SMA) office. Authors explore the transformative influence of the COVID-19 pandemic on the intelligence enterprise, probing how that influence is shaping the present\nand will shape the future. Numerous people from both organizations worked to move the project from idea to reality. This book would not have been possible without the sponsorship of Manolis Priniotakis, NIU's vice president for research and infrastructure, and CAPT (Ret) Todd Veazie, USN, the director of SMA. We thank all authorswho freely gave of their time, talent, and expertise. Finally, we thank the people from both organizations who are not mentioned by name, but contributed to this effort in innumerable ways, from early brainstorming sessions to final editing and publication. Without their efforts, this book would not have been possible.\n\n## Contents\n\nForeword  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 9\nJosh Kerbel\nIntroduction: The COVID-19 Pandemic and Intelligence  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  17\nStacey E. Pollard and Lawrence A. Kuznar\nPART ONE: LOOKING IN  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  25\nCOVID and Intelligence: Corrections, Overcorrections,\nand the Status Quo Ante    .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  27\nManolis Priniotakis\nPART TWO: LOOKING OUT  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  61\nTechnology and Global Supply Chain Security   .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  63\nJason Schenker\nFigure 1. E-Commerce Retailers as Percent of Retail Sales Surged in Q2 2020  . . .  72 Figure 2. E-Commerce Retailers Showed Record Revenues in Q2 2020, Q1 2021  . . . . . . . .  73\n\n## Covid-19 And Inequality In Human Development    .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  81\n\nJon Hall, Carolina Rivera Vazquez, Heriberto Tapia, and Jacob Assa\nFigure 1. Human Development Index . . . . . . . .  85\nFigure 2. COVID-19's Unprecedented Shock to Human Development . . . . . . . .  87 Figure 3. Short-term Effective Out-of-School Rate for Primary Education (Q2 2020)  . . . . . . . .  90\nFigure 4. Countries Implementing Nonpharmaceutical Interventions (as of April 2020) . . . . . . . .  91 Figure 5. Cumulative COVID-19 Vaccination Doses Administered\nper 100 People . . . . . . . .  92\nFigure 6. Female Labor Force Participation Rates in Mexico, Chile, and Colombia  . . . . . . . .  97\nThe Long-term Effects of the COVID-19 Pandemic on Political Instability and Democracy    .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  113\nCristina Bodea and Christian Houle\nLatin America: Political Instability Gives Organized Crime\na Window To Expand Control    .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  129\nJimena Blanco\nFigure 1. Initial Pandemic Response Suppressed Protest Levels  . . . . . . . .  131 Figure 2. Lockdown and Quarantine Measures Initially Reduced Civil Unrest . . . . . . . .  132\nIslamic State Resurgence in the Era of COVID-19  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  141\nStacey Pollard, Henry Baraket, Girish Ganesan, and Natalie Kim\nFigure 1. Dramatic Rise in Attacks Claimed by ISIS in Iraq  . . . . . . . .  148 Figure 2. Dramatic Rise in Attacks Claimed by ISIS in Syria . . . . . . . .  150\nTransnational Crime During a Pandemic: How Criminals Are Capitalizing on the Chaos Caused by COVID-19  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  161\nLayla M. Hashemi, Sarah Meo, and Louise Shelley\n\n## A Postpandemic Outlook For Organized Criminal Activities: Agility Across The Physical, Social, And Cyber Spaces  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  189\n\nJim Jones and Anthony Stefanidis\nFigure 1. The Prepandemic Attack Surface . . . . . . . .  194 Figure 2. The Postpandemic Direct Attack Surface . . . . . . . .  195 Figure 3. The Postpandemic Indirect Attack Surface  . . . . . . . .  196 Figure 4. A Taxonomy of Illicit Activities . . . . . . . .  200\nCOVID-19 and the Information Ecosystem: Lessons from Russian Malign Influence Campaigns for the Post-COVID-19 World   .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  207\nKacper T. Gradon\nPART THREE: LOOKING FORWARD   .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  229\nBeware a Virus Bearing Gifts: Can a \"Great Leveler\" Be Our Elites' Best Friend?   .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  231\nMichael Vlahos\n\n## What Goes Around Comes Around? Historical Comparison Of Impacts, Responses, And Long-Term Effects Of The 1918 H1N1 Vs . 2020 Covid-19 Pandemics   .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  243\n\nLawrence A. Kuznar\nFigure 1. U.S. 1918 H1N1 Pandemic Proportion of Deaths by Age Category  . . . . . . . .  249\nFigure 2. U.S. COVID-19 Pandemic Proportion of Deaths by Age Category  . . . . . . . .  250\nCOVID Had No Secrets .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 271\nJosh Kerbel and Zachery Tyson Brown\nCONCLUSION   .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  285\n\n## Conclusion: A World System Changed By The Covid-19 Pandemic  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 287\n\nLawrence A. Kuznar and Stacey E. Pollard\nFigure 1. World System During COVID-19 Pandemic: Relationships Among Social, Political, Cohesion, and Economic Variables  . . . . . . . .  291 Figure 2. First- Through Third-Order Effects of the COVID-19 Pandemic: An Example   . . . . . . . .  292 Figure 3. Direct, First-Order Relationships During the COVID-19 Pandemic  . . . . . . . .  294\n\nFigure 4. First-, Second-, and Third-Order Impacts of the COVID-19 Pandemic on the World System   . . . . . . . .  296 Figure 5. Disinformation Impacts on the World System During\nthe COVID-19 Pandemic  . . . . . . . .  299 Figure 6. Corruption's Impact on Governance and Security During the COVID-19 Pandemic  . . . . . . . .  300\n\n## Foreword\n\nJosh Kerbel T\nhis volume explores how the COVID-19 pandemic may reshape the U.S. Intelligence Community (IC). Yet, it is not a volume about the COVID-19 pandemic. In the pages that follow, the COVID- 19 pandemic is a stand-in, a proxy, for a much larger challenge: complexity. Complexity, of course, predates COVID-19. It is something that has always been with us. However, if COVID-19 has taught us anything it ought to be that complexityin myriad formsis now the predominant security challenge confronting us.\n\n## Complexity: What Does It Really Mean?\n\nBefore assessing how much strategic complexity concerns the IC not to mention how much it shouldit is necessary to understand what it really means to say that the world is complex. For most national security practitioners (like most people in general) it seems to mean the obvious: that the world is a confusing, disordered, tangled, and convoluted place. And, indeed, all of those descriptions do apply to any genuinely complex system.\n\nAdapted in part from the *NIU Research Short*: \"Complexity, COVID, and the Failure of Strategic Incrementalism\"\nHowever, using complexity as a mere synonym for those terms is to miss the more importantsystemicmeaning of the term. Today's global system is so highly interconnected and interdependentorders of magnitude more so than the Cold War strategic environment that preceded itthat it is extraordinarily prone to a phenomenon known as \"emergence.\" Emergence is the organic (not centrally directed) generation and propagation of nonlinear (more than the sum of the parts) phenomena that are systemically disruptive and/or transformative. And it is the crux of complexity. It is precisely such emergent phenomena that are the truly vital issues when one describes the world as complex.\n\nSo, what are some examples of emergence in a global context?\n\nWell, they run the gamut of today's most pressing strategic challenges: climate change, globalization, urbanization, economic/financial contagion, sweeping political/social movements, critical network failure, extremism, cyber threats, mass migration, technology preference/standardization, infectious propagation of lies, and, of course, pandemics. All of them are, first and foremost, functions of today's extraordinary complexity.\n\nAnd what of China and the increasingly prevalent strategic notion of renewed great power competition? Well, the same holds. Quite simply, China is ever more enmeshed in today's global networks, and, thus, the key challenges it poses are more likely to be emergent rather than derived from some Cold War-like (i.e., linear, force-on-force) calculation of the country's brute military capability. This is already evident in China's obvious role in so many of the emergent global phenomena described abovemost notably at the moment, the COVID-19 pandemic.\n\n## Extraordinary Complexity\n\nThe nature of today's complexity is revolutionary, as the COVID-19 pandemic makes clear. Never in history has a pandemic been able to emerge and spread with the speed, global scope, and impact of COVID-19. Due largely to comprehensive modern transportation links and commerce patterns, few parts of the world and few people are not physically accessible within 20 hours.1 Most conspicuously, the post-Cold War world has not only seen the largest piece of previously disconnected territoryRussiaconnect and integrate, but it has also seen, in China, the largest previously disconnected population do the same.\n\nGiven this growth in interconnectivity and interdependence, it is no wonder that COVID-19 has been able to emerge and spread around the world in the exponential way it has. That emergent behaviorwhich would have been impossible during the Cold War because there just was not enough physical interconnectivity and interdependencemakes it hard to argue that the complexity of the post-Cold War era is not really different.\n\nBut even if one still somehow insists that the above does not represent anything fundamentally different, what about the virtual world's complexity? COVID-19's physical impact has been matched, and possibly exceeded, by its virtual reach. This is largely because it is only in the past 30 years that it has become possible for *anyone*\nnot just governments, corporations, and/or the supremely wealthy to broadcast effectively. Today, the World Wide Web (born only in\n19892) permits anyone's ideas, fears, hopes, information, liesyou name itto rapidly and widely propagate. Is it any wonder then that COVID-19 could be perceived in so many, often conflicting, ways in the public health sphere? Not to mention the pandemic's having such immediate and extraordinary impact in domains beyond public health?\n\nTo illustrate this latter point, consider how quickly the COVID-\n19 pandemic was able to bring the global economy to its knees. It took the Great Depression several years to reach its nadir. It took COVID-19 mere weeks to inflict similar economic carnage.3 And because global Internet penetration is only at around 53.6 percent, the ability for emergent phenomena to virtually appear, propagate, and disrupt is only going to grow.4 All told, virtual interconnectivity and interdependence, as exemplified by COVID-19's virtual transmission and amplification, give entirely new meaning and relevance to the expression \"to go viral.\"\n\n## The Cold War's Complicated Legacy: Ambivalence And Unpreparedness\n\nThe world on some level has always been complex. No one seriously disputes that fact. But neither is it disputable that the IC's formative experienceeven todayremains the Cold War. And the Cold War was not particularly complex; it was, in systems parlance, complicated.5 That is to say, it was essentially a two-body problem and, therefore, lacked the highly interconnected and interdependent conditions that spawn nonlinear (emergent) phenomena. All told, the Cold War's primacy in the eyes of the national security community eclipsed the complexity of the larger world. Even so, the complexity that did exist in the backgroundremember this was pre-World Wide Webwas simply lesser than that of today.\n\nThis enduring prevalence of the Cold War's complicated notions, and the ambivalence with regard to complexity that those notions have bequeathed, can be seen in how stunningly unprepared the broader national security community, including the IC, is for the complexity it now confronts. For evidence, one again need only look at COVID- 19. COVID-19 renders irrelevant most of the traditional security assumptionsmilitary, intelligence, diplomaticupon which the national security community stands. COVID-19 has no central head to be decapitated, shocked, or awed. It has no ships, tanks, planes, or satellites. It has no classified plans to be stolen. And it cannot be bargained with, threatened, or persuaded to stand down.\n\nAt the time of this writing, COVID-19 has killed more than 200\ntimes the number of Americans killed on 9/11 and more than 250\ntimes the number killed at Pearl Harbor.6 Moreover, many aspects of our society have been profoundlyand probably permanentlydisrupted. When it comes to national security in today's world, things truly are very different.\n\n## The World's Complexity Is Reshaping Itself, Not Receding\n\nGiven the above, it is no wonder that the national security community would look for reasons to question this reality. In its latest form, this doubt argues that increasing complexityas manifested in globalizationprobably has crested and that developments like onshoring (sometimes called reshoring), 3-D printing, the increasing availability of viable local energy sources (fracking, wind, etc.), resurgent nationalism, the United States-China trade war, etc. will now start unwinding the world's interconnectivity and interdependence.7 This line of argumentation has been misleadingly bolstered by COVID-19 and the associated restrictions or constraints on physical movement that the pandemic has, at least temporarily, imparted.\n\nIt is certainly true that globalization has been evolving for some time, and COVID-19 will surely influence that process in various ways. However, the old, physical measures of how much stuff is shipped around the world are no longer the best barometer of globalization.8\nToday, the global economy is increasingly digital (i.e., virtual), and consequently the traditional metrics of trade (value of shipped goods) no longer capture the, well, complexity of the modern supply chain.9\nFurthermore, for whatever crimp on physical interconnectivity and interdependence the COVID-19 pandemic may have helped impose, its effect has been the exact opposite in virtual/digital terms. The COVID-19 pandemic has seen virtual interconnectivity and interdependence spike as impeded physical links have been compensated for or overcome by virtual ones.10 People will eventually go back to the office and school, but teleworking, online education, and other growing virtual connections are unlikely to shrink to prepandemic levels.11\n\nSpeaking of telework, this experience has been particularly disorienting for the IC. Before the COVID-19 pandemic, anyone who had said the IC would soon face a situation where many officers need to work from homebecause the systems they require (web cams, microphones, video-chat, etc.) to do their jobs are not available in the officewould have been laughed out of the room. And yet, here we are.\nAll told, the world's interconnectivity and interdependence are not so much going to unwind as take on new forms and patterns especially virtual. And these new manifestations must become primary drivers for how the national security community conceives itself, its roles, and its responsibilities. Nation-states and traditional military threats still matter. However, short of outright war (and maybe even then), their power probably will be determined more by their ability to manipulate the world's interconnectivity and interdependencenetworks: political, economic, social, and militarythan by traditional military power.\n\n## Unprecedented Complexity Demands Unprecedented Changes\n\nAt the end of the day, the essential question that still needs to be asked is: *why does it matter* whether the IC and broader national security community truly believe in the fundamental nature of the change that today's complexityas embodied in the COVID-19 pandemic represents? Well, the answer is not that complex. It is actually quite simple: fundamental change demands fundamental changes.\n\nUnfortunately, to look at the national security community's changesboth proposed in assorted strategies and concrete in implementationis to see mostly incremental initiatives aimed at improving, enhancing, upgrading, and reinforcing. Often these incremental changes get characterized in \"powerful\" termsbetter!, stronger!, faster!, smarter!that are practically Orwellian in that they aim to \"give an appearance of solidity to pure wind.\"12 As good as they soundwho does not want to be better, stronger, faster, and smarter?what these characterizations too often really mean is that the national security community is just going to keep on doing more of what it has been doing. But, just doing more of the same in this vastly more complex strategic landscape is not going to cut it. What is needed is something truly different.\n\nIt is often said that the first step in any effort to change is to acknowledge you have a problem. Perhaps, if there is a positive to be found in the tragedy that is the COVID-19 pandemic, it will be the understandingfor realby the national security community, in general, and the IC, in particular, that the world's complexity represents a strategic challenge that is fundamentally different and new. Additionally, maybe it will recognize just how unprepared its incremental strategies have undeniably left it. This volume can assist in catalyzing just such understanding and recognition.\n\n\n\n1\nBryan Walsh, \"COVID-19: The History of Pandemics,\" *BBC Future*, March\n25, 2020, https://www.bbc.com/future/article/20200325-covid-19-the-historyof-pandemics\n2\n\"A Short History of the Web,\" CERN, https://home.cern/science/computing/ birth-web/short-history-web.\n3\nNouriel Roubini, \"The Coronavirus Has Delivered the Fastest, Deepest Economic Shock in History,\" *Guardian,* March 25, 2020, https://www.theguardian.\ncom/business/2020/mar/25/coronavirus-pandemic-has-delivered-the-fastestdeepest-economic-shock-in-history.\n4\n\"Percentage of Global Population Accessing the Internet from 2005 to 2019, by Market Maturity,\" Statista, November 2019, https://www.statista.com/statistics/\n209096/share-of-internet-users-in-the-total-world-population-since-2006/.\n5\nJohn M. Kamensky, Managing the Complicated vs. the Complex, Business of Government, http://www.businessofgovernment.org/sites/default/files/John Kamensky.pdf.\n6\n\"Coronavirus in the U.S.: Latest Map and Case Count,\" *New York Times*, accessed\nJuly 23, 2021, https://www.google.com/search?q=current+us+death+toll+covid.\n7\nSara Silverstein, \"Ian Bremmer Breaks Down Trump's Response to the Coronavirus Crisis,\" *Business Insider,* https://www.businessinsider.com/ian-bremmerbreaks-down-trump-response-coronavirus-crisis-china-gzero-2020-3.\n8\nShawn Donnan and Lauren Leatherby, \"Globalization Isn't Dying, It's Just\nEvolving,\" *Bloomberg,* July 23, 2019, https://www.bloomberg.com/graphics/\n2019-globalization/.\n9\nDonnan and Leatherby, \"Globalization Isn't Dying.\"\n10\nAdam Clark Estes, \"Why the Internet (Probably) Won't Break During the Coronavirus Pandemic,\" *Vox,* March 25, 2020, https://www.vox.com/recode/2020/\n3/25/21188391/internet-surge-traffic-coronavirus-pandemic.\n11\nDerek Thompson, \"The Workforce Is About To Change Dramatically: Three\nPredictions for What the Future Might Look Like,\" *The Atlantic,* August 6, 2020,\nhttps://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2020/08/just-small-shift-remotework-could-change-everything/614980/.\n12\nGeorge Orwell, *Politics and the English Language,* http://www.public-library.uk/\nebooks/72/30.pdf.\n\n## Introduction: The Covid-19 Pandemic And Intelligence\n\nStacey E. Pollard and Lawrence A. Kuznar O\nne year beyond the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic when lockdowns swept the world, cases of COVID-19 have exceeded\n185 million, more than 4 million people have died from the virus, and new variants present enduring challenges.1 Quality of life everywhere has dramatically declined. The world economy is rocked, travel and supply lines are disrupted, and U.S. adversaries are leveraging the crisis to their advantage. The pandemic has created many challenges, and perhaps a few opportunities, for the national security of select countries. In short, the pandemic has impactedand will undoubtedly continue to impactthe U.S. Intelligence Community (IC) in how intelligence is fostered and conducted, as well as how pandemicassociated conditions interact with national security problem sets. The authors of this volume present evidence-based, qualitative, quantitative, and mixed-methods analyses so their projections can be tested against future conditions. They explore the many ways the pandemic is influencing the IC and the world in order to anticipate and prepare for the future. To that end, this book is organized in three sections: Looking In, Looking Out, and Looking Forward.\n\nLooking In examines the impact of the pandemic on the IC itself.\n\nHow have the pandemic/pandemic-associated outcomes affected the intelligence and broader national security communities, and how can we expect these effects to influence future national security enterprise work? What national security vulnerabilities have been exposed by pandemic-associated challenges, and how can this exposure inform and improve anticipation and responsiveness?\nLooking Out explores how the pandemic has changed the global national security environment in which analysts work. This section examines the pandemic's impact on geopolitical forces and strategic competition, technology and especially supply chains, inequality, political unrest and instability, violent nonstate actors, and the information ecosystem.\n\nLooking Forward considers the future implications of the pandemic on the IC and the world in which it operates. This section begins with historical comparisons that provide baseline expectations of those effects. Then, the authors explore how they see the intelligence enterprise changing in relation to these effects and how lasting these changes might be.\n\nThe perspective we advance in this volume is informed by the recognition that the world in which the IC operates, as well as the community itself, is part of a complex system. The system's complexity comprises many elements: great powers, regional powers, developing nations, terrorist organizations, transnational criminal organizations, populations and ethnic groups, nongovernment organizations, intergovernmental organizations, civil society organizations, multinational corporations, small businesses, and so on. These many elements interact on many levels and often in nonlinear ways. Small events sometimes have disproportionate effects on a complex system, and the reverse is also true; sometimes the impacts of major events, such as the global COVID-19 pandemic, are dampened by negative feedback that tends to bring the system back to a steady state. The contributions in this volume explore what these complex effects might be, and we return to this framework in the conclusion to assess how the pandemic's immediate effects, as identified by the authors, may play out in the complex world in which the IC is asked to operate.\n\n## Looking In\n\nThis chapter examines the pandemic's influence on IC enterprise operations and analysis. Manolis Priniotakis considers how the pandemic and pandemic-associated outcomes are affecting the intelligence and broader national security communities, as well as how we can expect these outcomes to influence future national security enterprise work.\n\nHe argues that, even prior to the pandemic, the IC suffered from a myriad of weaknesses that went beyond basic organization or lines of reporting and broadened into fundamental questions about the validity of the work, the use of technology, and the overall posture of the IC across the full range of national security challenges facing the country. Priniotakis illustrates how the pandemic has exacerbated these problems and urges the nation's decisionmakers to seize postpandemic reflection and recovery opportunities to implement balanced, cleareyed reforms that best serve the IC and U.S. national security.\n\n## Looking Out\n\nThis section examines the impact of the pandemic on the world in which the IC operates.\n\nJason Schenker examines the effect the pandemic has had on global supply chains and economic activity. Notably, the pandemic threw into relief issues of food insecurity as even well-off consumers in developed countries faced empty shelves and short food supplies, reminding us all of the fragility of the systems supporting our most basic needs. While the pandemic has been devastating to many small businesses, it has been a boon to e-commerce. Corporations often strive to keep inventories and their associated costs low, which is efficient when supply chains are secure. However, the pandemic has challenged this business paradigm, especially in the case of medical supplies. The politically divisive response to economic disruption and lack of goods in the United States exposed a leverage point that adversaries could target in the future by combining a biological attack with social media disinformation, which has flourished during the pandemic. Schenker proposes a framework to identify and prioritize factors that impact national security in a crisis, such as the COVID-19 pandemic. This framework, with the acronym NOISE, focuses on necessities (food, water, power, shelter, safety), occupations, information, systems (financial, health, transportation, education), and external factors (international relations, military, supply chains, trade).\n\nJon Hall, Carolina Rivera Vazquez, Heriberto Tapia, and Jacob Assa examine the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on inequality through the lens of the UN Human Development Index (HDI), which evaluates the well-being and potential of a country's population in terms of per capita GDP, life expectancy, and education. The authors point out that the pandemic has been detrimental to all dimensions of human development. Their modified version of the HDI, accounting for the adverse effects of school closures on well-being, shows the HDI for 2020 plummeted. Because the adverse effects of school closures are disproportionately felt by people of lower income, the pandemic is likely to exacerbate already growing levels of inequality, and long-term unemployment among youth seeking to enter the labor market may intensify these scarring effects. Hall et al. anticipate growing levels of inequality between and within countries, as well as inequality in terms of ethnicity and genderall of which are expected to increase instability worldwide.\n\nCristina Bodea and Christian Houle focus on how major crises, such as the COVID-19 pandemic, exacerbate global inequality. Globally, low-wage occupations have been disproportionately affected because they cannot be performed from home. Because racial and ethnic minorities are disproportionately employed in low-wage sectors, racial and ethnic inequality are probably increasing. The authors point out that the combination of inequality and ethnicity often feeds social instability. In addition, authoritarian leaders have used the pandemic to increase and centralize their power. The mixture of increased instability and authoritarianism threatens democratic institutions worldwide. For this reason, Bodea and Houle suggest it is more important than ever for countries to address inequality.\n\nJimena Blanco focuses on inequality in Latin America. She notes that Latin America has limited capability to recover from the effects of the pandemic. Job loss and business closures have dramatically reduced government revenues by reducing tax receipts. The shrinking legitimate economy will push even more low-wage earners into the informal economy where they are exploited. Increased inequality will exacerbate discontent with governments and increase instability, and these trends will create an environment that is even more favorable for organized crime. This development, in turn, will weaken governments in the region and increase risks to U.S. national security through the illicit drug trade, which will further destabilize the region.\n\nStacey Pollard, Henry Baraket, Girish Ganesan, and Natalie Kim examine how violent extremist organizations are exploiting insecurity stemming from the COVID-19 pandemic in the Middle East to undermine U.S.-supported counterterrorism efforts in the region. Specifically, Pollard et al. focus on how ISIS is capitalizing on social unrest and a rapidly deteriorating security environmentexacerbated by the COVID-19 pandemicto reconstitute in permissive areas of Iraq and Syria. Their chapter analyzes ISIS's pandemic-era ground and information operations through the lens of its state- and nation-making efforts to help analysts and decisionmakers better understand the imminence and scope of the threat.\nLayla Hashemi, Sarah Meo, and Louise Shelley's chapter dovetails with Schenker's analysis of supply chains and Blanco's analysis of the rise of organized crime in Latin America. Hashemi et al. describe how the pandemic's adverse impact on supply chains has provided opportunities for organized crime to expand illicit trade. Furthermore, pandemic- related foreign aid and increased government inefficiency and corruption throughout the world have provided transnational criminal organizations with greater opportunities to expand their operations and siphon off legal funds. These developments have fueled increased human and drug trafficking, environmental and financial crimes, and trade in counterfeits, demonstrating how the COVID-19 crisis poses new and unprecedented threats to public health and human security.\n\nJim Jones and Anthony Stefanidis analyze how the global pandemic and pandemic responses are affecting the activities of criminal organizations in the physical, social, and cyber domains. Their chapter assesses how the pandemic has interacted with the strength and agility of global criminal organizations. The authors also examine how pandemic-adapted criminal activity and other factors create investigative opportunities including increased data and exposure through risky operations, both of which enable deeper understanding of underlying criminal organization structure and enhance our ability to disrupt and dismantle criminal organizations.\n\nKacper Gradon analyzes Russian information operations in Western democracies, focusing his research on Russia's disinformation campaign in Poland. He argues that the pandemic has provided Russia a perfect opportunity to exercise its well-honed use of disinformation and deception to weaken Western democracies. Furthermore, Gradon warns that Russia is using Eastern European countries as a test bed before launching new malign influence tactics and techniques worldwide. He draws attention to infodemics, the spread of disinformation about a pandemic in parallel to the spread of the disease agent. Russia has emerged as the primary purveyor of disinformation in the current infodemic, seeking to discredit Western powers and their responses to the pandemicall in an effort to weaken alliances within NATO and to sow political division within Western democracies. Gradon proposes countering Russia's efforts by establishing a transatlantic research center for intelligence sharing and media literacy training.\n\n## Looking Forward\n\nPerhaps ironically, this section begins by looking backward and examines how previous pandemics affected the security of nations in ways that can inform today's IC about challenges the community is facing.\n\nMichael Vlahos reflects on the profound impacts of plagues on ancient Roman and medieval societies, concluding that pandemics are not harbingers of change, but accelerators of changes already underway and weakeners of already eroding institutions. Most adversely affected by major pandemics have been the elites, whose centralized power proves ephemeral, leading to loss of unitary power and social fragmentation. The Roman Empire was already in decline from the top down when the Justinian Plagues (7th century) probably accelerated this decline; central Roman elites lost power to outside, \"barbarian\" groups who emulated Roman civilization and divided the empire among themselves. The Black Plague (14th century) accelerated transformations of European society from the bottom up; as Europe experienced prosperity and growth, the rising expectations of its peasant and mercantile classes created simmering resentment against the feudal system. The plague depopulated urban centers of power and created an intense demand for now-scarce peasant labor, leading to the feudal system's breakdown and rising power for the peasantry and merchants who laid the foundations for modern Europe.\n\nLawrence Kuznar compares the underlying conditions and consequences of the 1918 H1N1 flu (Spanish Flu) pandemic to those of the COVID-19 pandemic. The 1918 pandemic came on the heels of a devastating world war, followed by an economic boom as nations rebuiltfor which there is no parallel in the early 21st century. Significant demographic differences also exist: the 1918 pandemic disproportionately infected and killed people of prime working age, whereas the COVID-19 pandemic has primarily killed the elderly. Consequently, the 1918 pandemic reduced the global labor force, creating a favorable market for labor; however, the COVID-19 pandemic has created no similar boon for working-age people, exacerbating inequality as described by Hall et al., Bodea and Houle, and Blanco. One potentially disturbing long-term parallel may hold between the 1918 and COVID-19 pandemics: the disenfranchisement of specific sectors of society that eventually emerged as full-scale and violent challenges to the status quo. The effects of the 1918 pandemic hit German working-class veterans particularly hard; the COVID-19 pandemic has similarly disadvantaged conservative working-class people and, if the inevitable recovery passes them by, it may plant the seeds for greater challenges to national security in the future.\n\nFinally, Josh Kerbel and Zachery Tyson Brown take a hard look at the IC, arguing that the community still operates, intellectually, from within an increasingly obsolete, 20th century paradigm of what constitutes national security. This paradigm is predicated on the idea of information scarcity, and it views the world largely in terms of\n\"threats to\" instead of \"risks from\"for example, *from* the vulnerabilities built into our open system of government, or *from* the severe social, political, and economic knock-on effects of a brutal pandemic that has claimed half a million American lives. Although the authors conclude there are no simple solutions to this challenge, they discuss six broad areas of reform \"the Intelligence Community must consider if it hopes to survive and thrive through an era in which change is the only constant, and more surprise the only certainty.\"\n\n\n## Endnotes Part On E Looking In Covid And Intelligence: Corrections, Overcorrections, And The Status Quo Ante Manolis Priniotakis\n\nAs the U.S. national security community emerges from the trauma of the COVID-19 pandemic, it must resist the urge to simply return to old ways of doing business. No systematic effort, however, appears to be underway to reassess the IC's long-held priorities, policies, and procedures in light of the pandemic experience. A self-examination would allow the IC to adjust priorities to address issues not usually seen as core to U.S. national securitydemographics, economics, energy, environment, religion, and public health. It would also support the modernization of personnel practices to encourage more flexible work options that could promote a distributed, yet still secure, workforce and open the door to employees without full clearances. A blue-ribbon panel something that once seemed a certaintymay never convene, and the IC should conduct its own introspective review of its practices to remain competitive and prepare for the next crisis. Documenting the lessons and outcomes would enable the IC to emerge from the pandemic with a useful playbook for similar future scenarios.\n\n## Introduction\n\nStarting in January 2020, the United States experienced with the COVID-19 pandemic a traumatic episode that will have lasting effects on the popular consciousness and U.S. national securityor at least it should. For the U.S. Intelligence Community (IC) and the broader Federal government, the pandemic emptied offices, changed priorities, and even called into question the nature and definition of national security. The pandemicthe worst health crisis to hit the world in more than a century1, 2crippled the international movement of people, inhibited global trade, and raised serious questions about many governments' ability to deal with such a crisis.3, 4, 5 As of the fall of 2021, Western governments had enacted widespread vaccination programs, but developing countries were hit with the nasty brunt of the third and fourth waves of the virus, followed by additional waves washing over the unvaccinated in even those countries with high vaccination rates. More than a year into the COVID-19 global crisis, India set a record for most cases in a single country on a single day.6 Even with the speedy introduction of vaccines, the pandemic will remain a factor in international interactions by individuals, companies, and governments for years to come.\n\nThroughout 2020, public discussion of the pandemic's impact on national intelligence largely centered on the idea that the world had changed somehow, that the IC must adjust to a new reality, and that a commission would be created to understand how this specific event was missed.7 During that complicated year, IC agencies wrestled not only with altered ways of operating but also with how to address new thematic topics. Social distancing requirements, space constraints, school closures, and other dependent care responsibilities forced agencies to bend on personnel practices, and a public debate ensued about the utility of the IC analyzing such global phenomena as a worldwide pandemic. There was discussion of a \"New Normal.\" (Unfortunately, there has been little public disclosure of how individual agencies adjusted their activities to accommodate for social distancing and reduced capacity or even updated their areas of focus. This chapter relies on the author's knowledge of how IC agencies responded in general.)\nAs of May 2021, IC agencies are moving forward with a broad\n\"return\" to full operationsor at least they are trying to get back to \"normal.\" They are emerging from shift work or week on/week off schedules, with most employees who had worked from home since March 2020 returning to the office. The \"New Normal\" predicted to emerge is looking a lot like the \"Old Normal.\" A real danger exists if the \"New Normal\" ends up simply being a return to old ways of doing business or if the IC treats the past 18 months as an anomaly to be observed with interest but no serious attempt to understand its lessons. Some agencies are capturing \"lessons learned,\" but no systematic effort appears to be underway to understand the priorities, policies, and procedures challenged by the COVID-19 experience.\n\nEven with more than 600,000 deaths in the United States alone, billions in economic damage, loss of prestige, and mental and physical effects on individuals that are hard to define, let alone on which to place a valuethe virus could have been worse. It could have been more deadly, spread more easily in children, or ravaged the developing worldor at least hit it earlier. The virus could have been more resistant to vaccine development and, perhaps most concerning of all, it could have hit at time of war or been an intentional act by an adversarial state or nonstate actor that got lucky.\n\nHallway conversations about the impact of COVID-19 on intelligence have ranged from the need for extreme change to the sentiment that disease monitoring and prevention are not \"our job.\" The reality lies somewhere in between. If the IC can adapt and take the lessons of COVID-19 seriouslychanging its focus and how it operates while understanding the limits of intelligence's roleit may emerge from the pandemic with a useful playbook for similar future scenarios. Experts predict this pandemic is unlikely to be the last and the next could be more damaging.8, 9 How can the IC prepare for the \"big one\" if COVID-\n19 was not it? The answer lies in adjusting priorities to address topics often seen as not core to U.S. national security and to modernize personnel policies and practices to remain competitive and agile.\n\n## The Pandemic Arrives In The United States: A Quick Recap\n\nAt the time of this writing, it has been almost a year and a half since early public awareness of the pandemic. The interim has seen an assault on the Capitol and a high-profile and challenging withdrawal of U.S. forces from Afghanistan, in addition to ongoing contentious partisan political quarreling in the United States that has influenced and been influenced by perceptions of the ongoing pandemic.\n\nIt is easy to forget how uncertain life looked in March 2020. Offices emptied out, friends and strangers became health threats, and grocery stores transformed from simple sources of food to lifelines staffed by \"front-line workers.\" Within the U.S. Government, people who had spent their careers believing themselves to be essential discovered overnight that their work was expendableat least during a global pandemic.10\nAlthough the world was more than two months into the experience, it was not until mid-March that the ICas well as all Federal agenciesbegan to respond in earnest to what had already developed into as a clear a health threat to humanity as anything seen in a century. Questions about transmission abounded, and public and private institutions and companies responded with varying degrees of severity to protect the safety of their citizens and employees.\n\nIt is worth reviewing the sequence of relevant events.\n\n- Dec. 31, 2019: Chinese officials reported to the World Health\nOrganization (WHO) that they were treating dozens of pneumonia cases of unknown etiology.11\n- Jan. 7, 2020: Chinese researchers identified the cause as a new\ntype of virus.12\n\n## Covid And Intelligence\n\n- Jan. 11, 2020: China reported its first virus-related death.13 - Jan. 13, 2020: Thailand reported its first case, the second country to detect the virus's presence.14\n- Jan. 20, 2020: The WHO issued its first situation report on the\n\"Novel Coronavirus (2019-nCoV).\"15\n- Jan. 21, 2020: Health officials in Olympia, Washington, reported\nthe first known case in the United States.16\n- Jan. 28, 2020: U.S. President Trump received an intelligence\nbriefing on the virus, the contents of which are disputed but later portrayed by the White House as having been \"downplayed.\"17, 18\n- Jan. 30, 2020: The WHO declared a global health emergency.19\n- Jan. 31, 2020: The U.S. Government restricted travel from\nChina into the United States; U.S. citizens overseas began to\nreturn to avoid being caught overseas.20, 21\n- Feb. 14, 2020: France reported Europe's first death.22 - Feb. 19, 2020: Iran reported two cases, the first known emergence in the Middle East.23\n- Feb. 26, 2020: Brazil reported the first cases in Latin America.24 - Feb. 29, 2020: The first death in the United States occurred in\nSeattle.25\n- Mar. 15, 2020: The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) recommended reducing the size of gatherings. The Office of Personnel Management (OPM) changed the operating status for the Federal Government from \"Open\" to \"Open with maximum telework flexibility to all current telework eligible employees, pursuant to direction from agency heads.\"26\nWith that OPM order, the worldat least, the world of IC\nemployeeschanged. As agencies began looking for ways to reduce the office density to allow for social distancing, they had to determine which employees were \"mission essential\" and which could go home, possibly to telework. Local governments in the National Capital Region, as elsewhere, established a phased approach, with severe restrictions on the movement of individuals, adding pressure to the definition of \"essential.\"27, 28, 29 Federal employees required in the workplace received letters allowing them to pass through possible local law enforcement stops to get to the office.\n\nAll government agencies had longstanding continuity of operations plans in place to handle related situations but not for the scale or duration they now faced. However, IC agencies, with few employees deemed \"telework eligible\" based on mission requirements, began to release employees to stay home. Remote system access was available to somebut far from allemployees. As schools closed, dependent care became a serious concern, especially for families with small children. Employees faced the prospect of drawing down annual leave to adjust to the new situation but were not sure how long they could hold out. New definitions for \"high risk\" began circulating. The world had changed, and IC officers were having discussions about opensource information and use of home systems in ways that almost all would have once found unimaginable. And nobody knew how long any of these measures would last.\n\n## But Was It An Intelligence Failure?\n\nFor years, multiple directors of national intelligenceechoing health expertshad been warning, in public, of the possibility that a pandemic or epidemic could have tremendous impact on U.S. national security.30 But when one finally hit, the U.S. Administration appeared unprepared. Does this mean the failure to anticipate the COVID-19 pandemic was an intelligence failure? Given the complexity of the role of intelligence in anticipating and responding to such an event, it is not a simple question, but the answer is a qualified \"Yes.\"\nThe public discussion of the IC's role in predicting the onslaught of the virus began early in the pandemic and continues to the date of publication.31, 32 This necessary discussion may consume internal attention in the coming months and perhaps even years, but it is likely to be addressed in terms of warning intelligence, the role of nonstate actors and nontraditional threats, and the resources devoted to the range of topics that have traditionally been binned into \"global issues.\"\nEarly in the pandemic, *Foreign Policy* published an article by Micah Zenko, a professor of political science at Brandeis, with the provocative title: \"The Coronavirus Is the Worst Intelligence Failure in U.S. History.\" The headline, likely the work of editors rather than the author, did not actually match the thrust of the argument.33\nZenko did not make the case for an intelligence failure, as traditionally understood by the definition advanced by Abram Shulsky and Gary Schmitt in *Silent Warfare*: \"Any misunderstanding of a situation that leads a government or its military forces to take actions that are inappropriate and counterproductive to its own interests.\"34\nZenko, instead, described a policy failure, making the argument that decisionmakers did not sufficiently act on what they may have heard from the IC, as Zenko understood it from media reporting. He quoted Henry Kissinger's famous, although perhaps apocryphal, line in response to having received unwelcome intelligence: \"You warned me, but you didn't convince me.\"35\nGiven the impact of the virus on key facets of U.S. societyincluding mass casualties, economic devastation, and a crisis of confidence in U.S. institutionsit is hard to consider the IC's performance to be anything other than a failure, albeit one with an important caveat. That the IC warned President Trump is not in doubt.36 Yet at various levels, a systemic gap developed over years in collections mechanisms and analytic functions, as well as in the IC's ability to convince relevant policymakers they should act against their political inclinations to take undefined actions. That manifestation appears to have been clear early in the pandemic. The twist is that the failure to inform policy during the early stages of the pandemic was an intelligence failure in which the IC performed reasonably well, given the resources and attention paid to this kind of amorphous and global challenge. Shameful efforts to pin the blame on individual IC officers occurred early in the pandemic.37\n\nOne sense in which it was a failure was that the virus caused unanticipated and massive economic and political effects. The pandemic damaged U.S. prestige; put the Trump Administration in the position to not succeed in meeting the demands the virus put on the government; and highlighted the need for good information to support administrative competence. Under Shulsky and Schmitt's definition, it is reasonable to assess that the Administration took actions that were \"inappropriate and counterproductive to its own interests\" in ways that intelligence could have better informed its decisions. The IC must share some portion of the blame but need not shoulder all or even most of it. Neither does the intelligence fault lie exclusively with the Trump Administration. Instead, it lies with many administrations in many ways over decades. It is a failure with origins that predate the careers of today's officers, compounded over time by a misallocation of resources.\n\nBefore the pandemic, the IC was already facing a reckoning. As Amy Zegart and Michael Morell argued in *Foreign Policy* in 2019, technology advancesespecially in biotechnology, nanotechnology, quantum computing, and artificial intelligencewere narrowing the United States' advantage over its near peers, in addition to allowing lesser powers to make gains. The changing media landscape had facilitated the spread of disinformation faster than any U.S. ability to respond. Zegart and Morell called for an overhaul of the IC, \"a broad-based intelligence-community-wide effort with input from technology companies, civil society, and academia. A blue-ribbon commission, instituted and overseen by Congress, could drive this change.\" They also criticized an employment system designed for a different time, for when people spent their careers at one agency.38\nIn the wake of a disruption as severe as the pandemic, it is easy to say that the IC is \"doing it all wrong.\" Although it is an easy but unhelpful position, the accusation unfortunately has some truth. From assigning collections and analytic resources to recruiting and managing a 21st century workforce, it may very well be possible that we are \"doing it all wrong.\" The IC's track record, viewed objectively, is not great when it has really mattered: counterterrorism and counterproliferation. From 9/11 to challenges anticipating multiple nuclear developments reaching back to the early days of the Cold War, the record is spotty, at best. Anticipating a foreign-originated pandemic that reached our shores via routine international travel? The weaknesses built into the system left the IC with almost no chance.\n\n## The Rise Of \"Global Issues\"\n\nThe pandemic highlighted a longstanding problem for the modern IC. Founded at the onset of the Cold War and in many ways still organized to confront the Soviet Union, the IC has generally emphasized \"traditional\" national security challenges over other, perhaps esoteric, topics.39, 40 Support for the White House and Departments of State and Defense has played to the IC's strengths on military and diplomatic concerns, the areas easiest to justify for collections and analysis and the easiest on which to recruit staffespecially under well-intentioned mandates to adhere to veterans' preference in hiring. The pandemic sheds long-overdue sunlight onto \"global issues\"a set of topics often shunted aside or relegated to second-tier or thirdtier status by the traditional focus on diplomatic or military topics under Combat Support Agency requirements, compounded by cultural forces in agencies that trace origins to military organizations.41\nThe pandemic revealed weaknesses on one of these \"nontraditional\" topics. Global issues generally include demographics, economics, energy, environment, religion, and, of note, global public health. These are not areas traditionally associated with national security, but they unquestionably represent concerns that can very quickly consume U.S. attention and overwhelm its resources. These issues also impact the lives of people in foreign countries at an immediate level and dictate how those people interact with their governments. In addition, they are not new to the national security infrastructure; they just feel that way. Reaching back to the very earliest days of the\n\nmodern IC, understanding these topics has been core to policymakers' broader understanding of adversaries and allies. For example, CIA's economic analysis of the Soviet Union was the key proxy for understanding its military capabilities, and an understanding of the religious dynamics in Vietnam underpinned U.S. policy there.42, 43\nThe focus on combat support, WMD, and regional studies, especially focused on political issues, has not surprisingly crowded out resources for these other fields. The traditional topics play to recruitment tendencies and the organizing function of most intelligenceconsuming agencies, such as the National Security Council, Department of State, and Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy. Each of these elements possesses functional directorates or groups, but the prestige lies with the regional offices, which are staffed by officers who have studied or served in the countries they oversee.\n\nGlobal issues have been pushed to the corners of IC organizations, but a better grasp of these topics would offer policymakers a broader understanding of how the world works and how countries operate. Some large IC agencies' efforts during the past decade to reorganize into \"mission centers\" integrated intelligence disciplines but left them siloed by topic, which will undercut their capacity to harness computing power's ability to find connections across fields, regions, and topics. Global issues represent the fundamental relationships between governments and the governed worldwide. They address how capitals interact with their populations and how populations interact with the rest of the world. Just as our oceans no longer serve as protective barriers, the virus has demonstrated that no boundary can protect or insulate a country from the ravages of a pandemic that travels on the back of a globalized economy.44\nThe Annual Threat Assessment (ATA) statements from a succession of directors of national intelligence and other IC leaders reflect a growing recognition that national security threats go beyond the traditional military dangers of terrorist organizations and near-peer adversaries. These assessments enumerate such diverse concerns as cyber, disease, novel technology developments, and other assorted 21st century worries.45 For many years, the ATAs have pointed to the looming danger of an epidemic or even global pandemic, and observers have used those inclusions to argue that the IC did its job.46 The Trump Administration's return to great power competition carried with it an implicit need to focus on more traditional markers of foreign power, such as order-of-battle analysis, even if the Chinese threat looks vastly different than the Soviet danger during the Cold War era.47\nIn an op-ed in April 2020, longtime CIA senior official Michael Morell and former NSA lawyer Glenn Gerstell called for a broader definition of national security, arguing that \"the consequences of nonmilitary and political threatssuch as economic, health or climate disruptionsare significant and must be assigned a high priority.\" The pandemic emphasized the importance of these other aspects, especially nondefense applications of science and technology development.48 According to former intelligence officer Norman Roule,\n\"The COVID-19 and 2003 SARS outbreaks underscore the importance of knowing of outbreaks as soon as they occur as well as how leaders in those countries respond.\"49 There are several organizations within the U.S. Government, to include at the CDC and DoD, with responsibility for doing this detection work, but the IC and DoD intelligence components have a role as well.\n\nCOVID-19 has also revealed new avenues for investigation and analysis on new areas of geopolitical competition. In particular, the use of medical equipment and assistance to advance diplomatic objectives. Despite the limited introduction of vaccines in late 2020 and their spread in 2021, the virus will remain a part of the international landscape for the foreseeable future. Poorer countries still struggle to gain access to vaccines and to administer them on a broad basis, and questions remain about the durability of the first wave of inoculations. Vaccine-focused politics highlight new areas of competition, especially related to the global supply chain.50, 51, 52 For instance, Canada's Prime Minister Justin Trudeau has publicly lamented his country's vulnerability to global vaccine supply fluctuations because of an earlier decision to eliminate its domestic vaccine production capacity.53\nThe targeting of vaccine producers has been another new aspect of global competition under COVID conditions. Although many countries have long been willing to undertake economic espionage against the United States or other competitor states, the willingness to attempt cyber penetrations of these firms is a new phenomenon.54 Even the U.S. distribution of vaccines by the Biden Administration came with messaging, as it emphasized the role of COVAX, an international effort aimed at reaching poorer countries with vaccines, but also set aside a quarter of its donated vaccines to \"regional priorities and other recipients,\" according to the White House press release.55\nThe pandemic also revealed the fragility and resilience of economies. It highlighted and probably exacerbated the economic divides between wealthier and poorer countries and among populations within these countries. Food supply, medicine supply chain, and public policies in foreign countries have existed beyond the definition of U.S. national security, as it is generally understood. The political and economic impact of the crisis on poorer countries may be among the most prominent of the virus's lasting global effects. It took time, but reports of the virus hitting the developing world began as a trickle and turned into a flood. For as much success as China appeared to have in combatting the disease, Brazil, India, and many others have struggled.56, 57 It is easy to foresee the health care systems and general financial resources of many governments struggling to recover. Some were pushed to a breaking point even with numbers in the low hundreds of cases.58 The unfortunate reality is that it will take years for the poorest countries in the world to vaccinate their populations, and the process will be complicated by variants and decisions related to boosters for already-vaccinated individuals.\n\nThe medium- and long-term consequences will be severe. International financial institutions stepped in to support needy countries.59,\n60 Some governments have severely restricted civil liberties to try to contain transmission, and a subset of them may be tempted to retain those limits.61, 62, 63 If impacts are severe, death counts grow, government responses fail, and dependencies on foreign aid grows. Such trends would give the virus the potential to impact regional alignments and the political and economic trajectories of some vulnerable countries for years to come, exacerbating transnational economic disparities, even at the lower, pandemic-era levels in industrialized countries.\n\nThe political and economic impacts on these countries may be among the most prominent of the virus's lasting global effects, but there are opportunities to learn. This period has provided the data for a decade of comparative studies of how societies and governments respond to a crisis. An enterprising researcher could examine any country's response to the COVID-19 crisis to uncover useful information about government leadership performance; effectiveness of lockdowns, restrictions or other policies; economic decisionmaking; performance of emergency services; use of the security services; public and private healthcare responses; media coverage and government treatment of the media; popular reaction to and compliance with restrictions; relationships with neighbors and international organizations; changes in supply chains and illicit markets; and many other COVID-19 related effects. This approach would be useful for understanding the diversity of responses by country: size, region, wealth, political system, access to foreign markets, relative isolation, level of industrialization, ethnic homogeneity, infrastructure connectivity, island vs. landlocked vs. littoral, and military capacityamong other attributes. Resulting analyses could reveal useful insights into each country's strategic culture, ability to plan, and emergency response capabilities.\n\nCOVID-19 will have lasting impacts. States could still fail and adversaries strengthen, especially if countries at the forefront of vaccine development are unwilling to share their largesse or do not act on President Biden's May 2021 advocacy for patent relinquishment by pharmaceutical companies holding related intellectual property.64\nMost poor countries are going to continue to suffer from the virus until international organizations or wealthy donors provide them with the vaccines, professionals, and supply chains needed to inoculate their populations, through international efforts such as COVAX.65\nEven then, questions will linger about the length of coverage these initial variants provide and dangers related to viral mutations.66\nThe IC will need to reorient resources to understand all of these trends. IC managers may argue that global issues are not \"the IC's job\" and agencies should continue to focus on those areasmilitary and diplomatic issueswhere they possess a comparative advantage. That approach leaves global issues to Agriculture, Commerce, Energy, Health and Human Services, Treasury, and other subject-specific Cabinet agencies, to include those that do not possess intelligence elements. The Naval Postgraduate School's Erik Dahl argues that the IC should focus its efforts on approaches where the IC has a comparative advantage: namely, clandestine reporting.67 This argument suggests that value on these topics exists outside clandestine channels and runs counter to the developing view that the IC must pay more heed to open-source information.68 But is it the job of the modern U.S. Intelligence Community to cover these topics? Is it worth the time and effort to reorient collections and analysis resources away from traditional strengths to these \"global\" or \"emerging\" issues? Put another way: Are threats to international order a threat to U.S. national security? As an analogue, the longstanding debate over the use of intelligence resources to cover climate change spilled into the public in 2019, to include a high-profile resignation of a climate analyst at the Department of State's Bureau of Intelligence and Research.69 While multiple organizations across multiple non-intelligence agencies focus on nontraditional intelligence topics, the ability to fuse all sources of information to inform national security leaders sets the IC apart from its counterparts.\n\nThe IC's purpose is to help policymakers understand the world as it is, not as they would like to see it or even binned by regional divides, especially with the prospects of further pandemics a likelihood. To make this work, the IC will need to break down the attitudes that have relegated these \"global issues\" to second-class status and to properly cover themrather than downgrade their offices and minimize their budgets. Some elements, such as DoD's National Center for Medical Intelligence and the Biodefense Knowledge Center at the Department of Energy's Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, exist to tackle important aspects of global public health from a national security perspective, but these are modest and dispersed efforts. A serious attempt will challenge decades of practices and require hiring more hydrologists, epidemiologists, and others with technical backgrounds into both analytic and collections roles, as well as retaining them by empowering them to layer their expertise onto information that only the IC\npossesses. It may mean hiring individuals who only work with open sources and may not require the same level of security clearance as traditional IC officersand then figuring out how to work with them.\n\nOf course, such an approach does not mean an abandonment of support to military operations. Joshua Rovner has argued that the lesson of the pandemic should be the opposite of tackling more \"global issues\" and that the IC should instead retrench and recenter around secret information.70 The bulk of DoD IC resources will remain focused on these topics under any circumstance, and it should. A review of other priorities, as captured by the National Intelligence Priorities Framework (NIPF), however, is possible even though the NIPF has limited utility. A real response would lead to a broader overhaul of recruitment practices and the array of analytic resources.71\n\n## Workforce Policies\n\nBeyond substantive considerations, the other area where the pandemic experience will have an impact is workforce management.\n\nIn a sense, the U.S. population was lucky that the pandemic did not occur before Federal Communications Commission reforms, begun in 2009, encouraged the nationwide expansion of broadband.72\nAccess to high-speed and reliable Internet connections enabled many industries to continue to operate and school-age children to experience some sense of educational normalcy. Federal agencies had been pursuing expanded telework before this expansion, and the Telework Enhancement Act of 2010 pushed that approach further.73 For many Federal employees, telecommuting for some portion of their week has been common. Other trends in government also supported broader U.S. Government readiness, such as actions in the early 2010s to promote increased use of video teleconferences and virtual meetings after the public uproar over the excessive spending at a General Services Administration conference in Las Vegas in 2010.74\nThe IC had moved inconsistently on these policies for obvious security motivations but also for cultural reasons. The mantra attributed to former White House Chief of Staff Rahm Emmanuel of \"never letting a crisis go to waste\" argues for the IC to use the lessons of this experience to accelerate reforms needed to modernize the IC's operating methods and institutionalize some of the personnel flexibilities that will allow it to compete for and retain the staff necessary to carry out those changes.\n\nThe term \"Before Time\" has passed from science fiction into the pandemic-related lexicon.75 For the IC, the \"Before Time\" was one of minimal flexibility and inconsistent policies. At the outset, few IC entities had measures to manage people working in unusual circumstances. The decision on whether to bring people into workplaces affected every public and private institution in the world. Security requirements and the need to maintain continuity on several aspects of the work compounded the question for the IC. How many had working telework and related security policies in place? How many were up to the job of managing a workforce during a pandemic? On March 15, 2020, when it became clear that the pandemic would be more serious than first understood, government workers all over the country found themselves going from lobbying for telework to being mandated to work remotely, whichin most casesmeant: \"from home.\"76 IC officers pride themselves in being adaptive, and under these circumstances, they had to be. The pandemic forced a recognition that although IC work is different, it is not immune to external influences. As the pandemic played out during 2020, some IC leaders' internal statements demonstrated sensitivity to and awareness of the pressures on individuals and families. Others demonstrated less sensitivity. In addition, agencies were uneven in providing masks and other PPE and in their cleaning protocols. Some moved early to offer flexible leave options to support caregiving, while others granted extensive Weather and Safety Leave to help employees manage their suddenly complicated home lives. Some took advantage of the CARES Act, while others were slow to act.\n\nThere has also been an element of guilt and even martyrdom, leading to condescension, resentment, and shame. Some IC employees felt pressure in the office, and others experienced feelings of inadequacy and even guilt over not being present. Others appear to have lorded their office access over others deemed non-mission essential. While employees have faced being identified as nonessential before whenever the government has shut down over lapses of appropriations or political disagreements over the debt limit, most recently in 2018-19the pandemic brought this reality into starker relief. Some agencies' claimed abilities to maintain high levels of productivity have raised uncomfortable questions about their previous productivity if a global pandemic did not demonstrably undercut their performance.\n\nFor some Federal employees, the pandemic requirements comported with their regular practices or available options. For most IC officers and other national security professionals, however, it did not. In fact, the idea of working in nonsecure spaces is anathema to the intelligence ethos, even with the increase in open-source work during the past 20 years. Reasons for that attitude are rooted in managers'\nreluctance to lose sight of their employees and legitimate concerns about security. The outset of the pandemic prompted a diversity of responses to the need to reduce the number of people in offices to minimize transmission at a time when the mechanics of the virus were\n\nnot well understood. Agencies able to transition work to telework status did so, while others simply removed people from the office.\n\nTwo RAND reports produced for the National Geospatial-\nIntelligence Agency (NGA) in 2018 illuminated the challenges: \"Understanding Government Telework: An Examination of Research Literature and Practices from Government Agencies\" and \"Moving to the Unclassified: How the Intelligence Community Can Work from Unclassified Facilities.\"77, 78 These studies considered what work could occur remotely. As the preface to the second volume reads, RAND \"assisted the [NGA] in understanding how to operate in unclassified environments, including outside Sensitive Compartmented Information Facilities (SCIFs).\"79 The first volume, a survey of the literature on telework, offers insights on such topics as recruitment, performance, and costs/benefitsparticularly related to generational change. The report cites studies suggesting upward of 20-25 percent of workers, enabled by expanded broadband access and improvements in collaborative tools, already teleworked for some period (as of 2016) and \"80-90 percent want to telework 2-3 days per week to balance independent and collaborative work responsibilities.\"80 The costs and benefits discussions cover those for the employer and employee, as well as the environment. Most costs and benefitsespecially those related to commuting times and real estate savingsare hard to quantify in any case but even more so during a pandemic response.\n\nOf course, that is where the pandemic took the IC. RAND broke the challenges into six categories: policy, legal, technology, security, financial, and cultural, with specific analysis of emergency response and Continuity of Operations (COOP) activities. The papers provided insights and recommendations on how to prepare employees to shift their activities out of SCIFs. On emergency response, the operative commentary relative to the pandemic was:\n\n- \"[E]mployees [must] understand the job functions they are\nallowed to conduct remotely and have access to the data and\nsystems they need to conduct those functions, as well as to the collaboration tools to remain in communication with their own colleagues and with other offices.\"81\n\n- \"Agencies should ... adopt clear, detailed, and easily understood security classification guides; implement policies on how to digitally access and handle CUI [controlled unclassified information]; and implement policies about how to handle and secure hard copies of CUI.\"82\n- \"In preparing for a COOP event, how should agencies balance\nthe risk-mitigation benefits of dispersing employees across geographic locations and across the power grid and other critical infrastructure against the benefits created by the hardened systems that agencies may have available on-site?\"83\nThe pandemic of 2020 represented such an extreme crisis. Information garnered from informal discussions across the IC indicates some agencies adjusted better than others. Training was uneven across IC elements, as were human resources measures, with agencyspecific requirements probably accounting for the bulk of the differences. Some made unclassified systems available to employees; others did or could not, especially in the absence of widespread distribution of government-furnished equipment.\n\nThere may also be good news. The second RAND paper suggests: \"[I]f agencies create systems and processes for employees to work remotely and identify unclassified functions that could occur entirely off-site, they could increase the pool of talent available for recruitment by allowing employees to work in other parts of the country or by attracting employees who may meet skill and capability requirements but not necessarily meet security clearance requirements.\"84 Of course, some parts of the IC workforce cannot and will not ever transition from working in nonsecure spaces; others operate in the field. But some agencies may find the RAND assessment to be true.\n\nWhen this current crisis dissipates sufficiently to assess agencylevel performance, it will be worthwhile to conduct thorough studies on how each agency responded. Plenty of lessons will be learned across a range of U.S. Government activities, but, for the IC, this question will be among the most important. It is not yet clear what lasting impacts the pandemic will have on the nature of work in the contemporary U.S. economy, but learning those lessons is imperative, as all other employers seeking to hire knowledge- economy workers have taken note.85, 86 They are the IC's competition for future employees.\n\nThe pandemic opened new possibilities for improved work practices and highlighted procedural and security shortcomings. The key lessons include the need for more flexible and alternative work schedules and the possibility of increased unclassified work. Provided security can address systems accessibility, these steps could allow greater worker flexibility; allow for a distributed workforce; and help with recruitment by opening the door to more employees without full clearances. Such an evolution could decrease costs, reduce the number of employees who wash out during the clearance process, and create opportunities for recruiting workers with specific skill sets. Such measures could be the key to recruiting the technical workforce needed to cover current and emerging global issues.\n\nImplementing new approaches will not be easy, but it cannot happen slowly. The pool of people from which the IC will draw its workforce of the future was already transforming before the pandemic and has now probably become accustomed to a new employment paradigm. Some companies are saying they are never going back to the office in the same way as before, and smaller cities are offering cash and tax incentives to compete for individuals who can work remotely but may want a more relaxed or lower-cost standard of living.\n\nIC officers have gotten a taste of the possible during this period.\n\nWhile most employees longed to return to the office and some could do little or nothing outside of it, much of the IC continued to operate with some level of effectiveness under pandemic conditions. It is probable that employees will expect a different experience after this year of workplace flexibility. Having some agencies return to their previous approaches while others retain some pandemic-era practices is likely to spark an intra-IC competition for talent, with those agencies willing to adopt greater workplace flexibility poaching from those that do not. In addition, the IC should not underestimate the competition for talent with a private sector learning from the pandemic. Amazon's arrival in the National Capital Region will be worth watching.87 A portion of IC officers may expect, at a bare minimum, some semblance of the flexibility that their colleagues departing to the private sector possess. Savvy IC professionals could use that flexibility as leverage in hiring negotiations across agencies.\n\nSome IC agencies will attract people based on the allure of intelligence work alone. These individuals have a focus on national security and will be willing to take what conditions they can get. Inequities in salary and workplace flexibility that exist across the agencies demonstrate that some people are willing to overlook those considerations to enter the IC. That tendency may not persist, or at least not at previous levels. For the marginal employee interested in IC work but not necessarily committed to it, whose marketable skills attract higher salaries and more benefits, workplace flexibility could be more important than ever. Generational change and evolving attitudes about work may decrease the size of the pool of people focused on IC work in the years to come.\n\n## Overreactions And The Status Quo Ante\n\nSince its arrival, the pandemic has sparked discussion about a \"New Normal\" across all activities: schools, businesses, and government.88, 89 In theory, the \"New Normal\" described operating procedures that retained some of the adjustments of the pandemic workplace, paired with whatever possibilities vaccination introduced. While some desire to merely \"return to normal\"reality, at least for some time, will require keeping elements of the practices that emerged during the pandemic, to include consciousness of spacing and possibly even mask usage in parts of the country with high infection rates. Some companies see opportunity in reducing their real estate costs through a distributed workforce.90, 91 Others, however, are taking a harder linemost notably, Morgan Stanley, whose CEO has mandated that all employees return to the office by September and whose chief counsel said that firms that want the investment giant's business need to be operating from the office.92, 93\nWithin the IC, there appears to be a desire to return to how things were before the pandemic hit: to the status quo ante. The \"New Normal\" need not be the \"Old Normal\" with a little more flexibility and the ability to do required training remotely. OPM has articulated a need to \"promote a different vision of work in the federal government going forward.\"94 The new COVID-19 operating paradigm forced IC managers into the uncomfortable position of losing visibility into portions of their workforce. The private sector and other parts of the government came to terms with telework years ago, but this episode forced a remote approach on national security organizations to an extent never imagined or before experienced. The pandemic should spur a reassessment of subject-matter priorities and workforce practices.\n\nAt same time, the danger exists that the IC will engage in another longstanding tendency: over-correcting to respond to the latest threat. The U.S. Government has long taken drastic responses to real or perceived poor intelligence practices or performance, to include establishing the Director of Central Intelligence after Pearl Harbor; lowering risk appetite after the Church and Pike Committee hearings in the 1970s; focusing on terrorism post-9/11; standing up the Office of the Director of National Intelligence in response to 9/11 and the Iraq WMD misstep in 2003; and imposing restrictions after Edward Snowden's unauthorized disclosures. A drastic correction occurred after Gen. Norman Schwarzkopf's famous criticisms that intelligence had not provided sufficient support to the invasion of Iraq in 1991, which led to a focus across agencies on support to military operations. The DoD-based intelligence agencies, which make up the bulk of intelligence budgets, developed into \"combat support agencies,\" with a primary function to aid military operations. This focus transitioned with little difficulty to counterterrorism operations after 9/11, likely causing the IC to lose sight of other trends developing during these years.95\nThe IC was already hurtling toward a reckoning for the reasons described by Morell and Zegart.96 Those concerns went beyond basic organization or lines of reporting and into fundamental questions about the validity of the work, the use of technology, and the overall posture the Community had taken across the range of national security challenges facing the country. None of those questions have gone away. Instead, they have just become more acute and more difficult, especially given possible decreased post-COVID funding profiles.\n\nIt will be necessary to resist the temptation to return to status quo ante. The virus will have an impact on many activities including how office spaces are organized and organizations' ability to carry out their mission remotely. This important debate is underway and will continue, as it should. From a substantive or subject matter perspective, another debate will occur, largely focused on priorities. There was a disruption, and the question now is how severe. It will be tempting to treat it as a blip, but also to treat it as a complete break from the past. Neither approach will best serve IC professionals or the IC mission.\n\n## A Covid-19 Commission?\n\nFor its 2019 publication *Preface to Strategy*, Johns Hopkins University's Applied Physics Laboratory put together an august panel of former senior national security officials, spanning multiple organizations, administrations, and fields to examine the preconditions for a new national security strategy. Led by former Secretary of the Navy Richard Danzig, the report was not a national security strategy or even a roadmap for a strategy but instead an in-depth treatment of the underlying realities of U.S. national security conditions and perceptions. The \"prelude\" of the title spoke to a fundamental review of how national security thinkers and decisionmakers understand the strengths, weaknesses, and even basic conditions that underpin U.S. planning, the views adversaries hold of the United States, and even our biases. The report asked national security experts to do the uncomfortable work of looking inward before looking outward. The bottom-line assessment: the attributes we once thought protected us from dangerour economic might, scientific and technical supremacy, and geographic isolationare no longer the dependable buffers we once thought. The authors argued that the United States required a reset on how it looked at itself.97 That review is even more valid than ever, given the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic and the attack on the U.S. Capitol on January 6, 2021.\n\nSimilarly, the 2020 pandemic created a need for the IC to undertake a course of introspection on par with resets in the 1940s, 1970s, and 2000s. The self-examination would address the fundamentals of IC work, going beyond any in IC historyeven those that resulted from unauthorized disclosures, revelations of wrongdoing, or even high-profile intelligence failures that contributed to policy or military mistakes or disasters. The pandemic has raised basic questions about the broad mission of the IC down to every single member: Do we need this person to do their job, and, if so, when, and where?\n\nAlthough most IC agencies will do some level of \"lessons learned\" analysis, such a comprehensive review is likely to be difficult for the IC to do on its own, and a Congressional review could end up overly politicized, given the sharp divides in Congress and country over the pandemic. As argued by Zegart and Morell, the IC was due for a large-scale review even before the pandemic.98\n\n## Covid And Intelligence\n\nCOVID-19 may have just accelerated the IC substantive and workforce trends already underway.\n\nThe United States experienced multiple traumas in the 20 years before the COVID-19 pandemic: the 9/11 terrorist attacks and subsequent Afghanistan invasion; the 2003 Iraq invasion; the 2008 global financial crisis; and foreign interference in the 2016 U.S. Presidential election. Others, like the H1N1 flu in 2009, could enter that list, but these four had widespread national security implications and affected the average American, albeit in the case of Iraq, in a more diffuse way than the other three. The first even changed the way people traveled and, combined with the invasion of Iraq and the nuclear issues that served as predicates for it, led to an overhaul of the country's national security infrastructure. The 2016 Russian election interference is perhaps too recentand controversialto have truly been understood to be the \"Cyber 9/11\" or \"Cyber Pearl Harbor\" it was.\n\nDahl calls COVID-19 a warning failure, either through the failure to warn or for policymakers to heed the warning.99 He compared the pandemic to Japan's attack on Pearl Harbor. Roule took a different path, comparing the IC's path to responding to the virus to the actions taken in reaction to the terror attacks of September 11, 2001.100 Neither of these comparisons, however, is apt.\n\nEach involved systemic failure and an inability to piece together the necessary clues to warn military and policy leaders, but both fell squarely within the common understanding of the role and mission of intelligence: violent adversaries seeking to harm the United States. Both involved an elusive but defined enemy operating with a set of strategic goals, and both led to reorganizations of the U.S. intelligence effort to identify and share the markers that could have avoided the catastrophes.\n\nThe twin traumas of 9/11 and Iraq led to such a review, which suggested major changes, many of which were implementedbut not all. The global financial crisis, which had widespread and massive domestic and foreign impacts, resulted in a collective national\n\nsecurity shrug. No one questioned that Pearl Harbor or 9/11 fell squarely in the IC's job jar. But a global economic meltdown with its roots in the U.S. housing market? That was harder to understand as falling in the IC's purview. Unfortunately, it is possible that the pandemic will be seen the same way. The Biden administration's mandate that the IC review the intelligence on the origins of the pandemic offered a glimmer of hope, but its narrow focus will limit its impact.101\nIn 2020, it appeared that a national coronavirus review commission was inevitable, on par with the 9/11 and Iraq WMD commissions. The entire national security community and broader Federal government had failed to develop the information necessary to identify and proactively avert an impending disaster. Pandemic fatigue and the attack on the U.S. Capitol in January 2021 eroded any sense of urgency for a comprehensive COVID review. Aside from low-profile Congressional hearings into the virus and its handling by the Federal Government, a blue-ribbon panelsomething that once seemed a certaintymay never convene. In its absence, there would be utility in the IC conducting its own introspective review of policies, practices, and priorities to remain competitive and prepare for the next crisisand documenting the lessons and outcomes. There is an open question as to whether the IC has learned enough to be ready for the next pandemic. A mental playbook now exists, but it will only be useful if the next crisis hits while today's officers are on the job.\n\n\n\nManolis Priniotakis is Vice President for Research and Infrastructure at the National Intelligence University (NIU). Previously, he served with the U.S. Department of Energy's Office of Intelligence and Counterintelligence as chief of staff. His research has focused on economics intelligence and intelligence integration.\n\n1\nJ. Feehan, \"Is COVID-19 the Worst Pandemic?,\" *Maturitas,* February 6, 2021,\ndoi: 10.1016/j.maturitas.2021.02.001, https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/\nPMC7866842/.\n2\nMarie Rosenthal, \"Fauci: COVID-19 Worst Pandemic in 100 Years,\" Infectious Disease Special Edition, Octber 21, 2020, https://www.idse.net/Covid-19/\nArticle/10-20/Fauci--COVID-19-Worst-Pandemic-in-100-Years/60937.\n3\n\"The Coronavirus Effect on Global Economic Sentiment,\" McKinsey & Company, April 30, 2021, https://www.mckinsey.com/business-functions/strategy-andcorporate-finance/our-insights/the-coronavirus-effect-on-global-economicsentiment.\n4\nLora Jones et al., \"Coronavirus: How the Pandemic Has Changed the World\nEconomy,\" BBC.com, January 24, 2021, https://www.bbc.com/news/business- 51706225.\n5\n\"The COVID-19 Pandemic and Trade-Related Developments in LDCs,\" World Trade Organization, June 8, 2020, https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/covid 19_e/ldcs_report_e.pdf.\n6\nShashank Bengali, \"India Sets a Record for Daily Infections,\" *New York Times*,\nApril 22, 2021, https://www.nytimes.com/2021/04/22/world/india-coronavirusrecord.html.\n7\nErik Dahl, \"Was the Coronavirus Outbreak an Intelligence Failure?,\" Government Executive, June 16, 2020, https://www.govexec.com/defense/2020/06/\nwas-coronavirus-outbreak-intelligence-failure/166179/.\n8\nDavid Murdoch, \"The Next Once-a-Century Pandemic Is Coming Sooner Than\nYou ThinkBut COVID-19 Can Help Us Get Ready,\" *The Conversation*, June\n14, 2020, https://theconversation.com/the-next-once-a-century-pandemic-iscoming-sooner-than-you-think-but-covid-19-can-help-us-get-ready-139976.\n9\nGabriel Wainer et al., \"Coronavirus: How New Simulations Can Predict the\nSpread of Future Pandemics,\" *The Conversation,* March 26, 2020, https://news\nroom.carleton.ca/story/new-simulations-predict-future-pandemics/.\n10\nNicole Ogyrsko, \"Federal Agencies in DC Open but With 'Maximum Telework'\nFlexibilities, OMB Says,\" *Federal News Network*, March 15, 2020, https://federal\nnewsnetwork.com/workforce/2020/03/federal-agencies-in-dc-open-but-undermaximum-telework-flexibilities-omb-says/.\n11\n\"Pneumonia of Unknown CauseChina,\" World Health Organization, January 5, 2020, https://www.who.int/csr/don/05-january-2020-pneumonia-of-unkowncause-china/en/.\n12\nNatasha Khan, \"New Virus Discovered by Chinese Scientists Investigating Pneumonia Outbreak,\" *Wall Street Journal,* January 8, 2020, https://www.wsj.com/\narticles/new-virus-discovered-by-chinese-scientists-investigating- pneumoniaoutbreak-11578485668.\n13\nAmy Qin and Javier Hernandez, \"China Reports First Death From New Virus,\"\nNew York Times, http://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/10/world/asia/china-viruswuhan-death.html.\n14\n\"Novel CoronavirusThailand (ex China),\" World Health Organization, January 14, 2020, https://www.who.int/csr/don/14-january-2020-novel-coronavirusthailand-ex-china/en/.\n15\n\"Novel Coronavirus (2019-nCoV)Situation Report 1,\" World Health Organization, January 20, 2020, https://www.who.int/docs/default-source/coronavi ruse/situation-reports/20200121-sitrep-1-2019-ncov.pdf?sfvrsn=20a99c10_4.\n16\n\"First Travel-related Case of 2019 Novel Coronavirus Detected in United States,\" Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, January 21, 2020, https://www.cdc. gov/media/releases/2020/p0121-novel-coronavirus-travel-case.html.\n17\nAyesha Rascoe and Colin Dwyer, \"Trump Received Intelligence Briefings on Coronavirus Twice in January,\" NPR.org, May 2, 2020, https://www.npr.org/ sections/coronavirus-live-updates/2020/05/02/849619486/trump-receivedintelligence-briefings-on-coronavirus-twice-in-january.\n18 Bill Gertz, \"White House: Intelligence Agencies Missed Early Signs of Coronavirus Pandemic,\" *Washington Times*, June 9, 2020, https://www.washing\ntontimes.com/news/2020/jun/9/robert-obrien-us-intelligence-botched-earlydonald/.\n19\n\"Statement on the Second Meeting of the International Health Regulations (2005) Emergency Committee Regarding the Outbreak of Novel Coronavirus (2019- nCoV),\" World Health Organization, January 30, 2020, https://www.who.int/ news/item/30-01-2020-statement-on-the-second-meeting-of-the-internationalhealth-regulations-(2005)-emergency-committee-regarding-the-outbreak-ofnovel-coronavirus-(2019-ncov).\n20\nErica Werner et al., \"Trump Administration Announces Mandatory Quarantines in Response to Coronavirus,\" *Washington Post*, January 31, 2020, https://\nwww.washingtonpost.com/us-policy/2020/01/31/trump-weighs-tighter-chinatravel-restrictions-response-coronavirus/.\n21\nVivian Lin et al., \"'Scared and Panicked': Travelers Rush To Avoid Virus Quarantine,\" *New York Times*, February 2, 2020, https://www.nytimes.com/2020/02/02/\nus/coronavirus-airports.html.\n22\nElian Peltier, \"France Confirms First Death in Europe From Coronavirus,\" New York Times, February 15, 2020, https://www.nytimes.com/2020/02/15/world/\neurope/france-coronarivus-death.html.\n23\nLisa Schnirring, \"China's COVID-19 Death Toll Tops 2,000; Iran Reports First Cases,\" Center for Infectious Disease Research and Policy, University of Minnesota, February 19, 2020, https://www.cidrap.umn.edu/news-perspective/2020/ 02/chinas-covid-19-death-toll-tops-2000-iran-reports-first-cases.\n24\nLisandra Paraguassu and Carolina Mandl, \"Brazil Confirms First Coronavirus Case in Latin America,\" Reuters.com, February 26, 2020, https://www .reuters.com/article/us-china-health-brazil/brazil-confirms-first-coronaviruscase-in-latin-america-idUSKCN20K1EU.\n25\nNicole Acevdo and Minyvonne Burke, \"Washington State Man Becomes First U.S. Death from Coronavirus,\" NBCNews.com, February 29, 2020, https://\nwww.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/1st-coronavirus-death-u-s-officials-say-n1 145931.\n26\nOffice of Personnel Management Tweet, March 15, 2020, https://twitter.com/ USOPM/status/1239359767904235521.\n27 \"Mayor Bowser Issues Stay-at-Home Order,\" Executive Office of the Mayor,\nMarch 30, 2020, https://mayor.dc.gov/release/mayor-bowser-issues-stayhome-order.\n28\n\"Executive Order Number Fifty-Five (2020),\" Office of the Governor of the Commonwealth of Virginia, March 30, 2020, https://www.governor.virginia. gov/media/governorvirginiagov/executive-actions/EO-55-Temporary-Stay-at- Home-Order-Due-to-Novel-Coronavirus-(COVID-19).pdf.\n29 Kate Amara and Greg Ng, \"Maryland Governor Issues Stay-at-Home Order\nAmid Coronavirus Pandemic,\" WBALTV.com, March 31, 2020, https://www. wbaltv.com/article/coronavirus-pandemic-maryland-stay-home-directive/ 31977340.\n30\nJames Clapper, \"Statement for the Record, Worldwide Threat Assessment of the US Intelligence Community,\" 10, Senate Armed Services Committee, February 26, 2015, https://www.dni.gov/files/documents/ Unclassified_2015_ATA_\nSFR_-_SASC_FINAL.pdf.\n31\nNahal Toosi, \"Coronavirus Rattles America's National Security Priesthood,\"\nPolitico.com, March 28, 2020, https://www.politico.com/news/2020/03/28/\ncoronavirus-rattles-national-security-priesthood-152988.\n32\nDavid B. Rivkin and George S. Beebe, \"Before this Pandemic Ends, Intel Agencies Should Prepare for a World of Threats,\" TheHill.com, March 31, 2020,\nhttps://thehill.com/opinion/national-security/490160-before-this-pandemicends-intel-agencies-should-prepare-for-a-world-of-threats.\n33\nMicah Zenko, \"The Coronavirus Is the Worst Intelligence Failure in U.S. History,\" *Foreign Policy*, March 25, 2020, https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/03/25/\ncoronavirus-worst-intelligence-failure-us-history-covid-19/.\n34\nAbram Shulsky and Gary Schmitt, *Silent Warfare* (Washington, DC: Brassey's,\nInc.), 63.\n35\nZenko, \"The Coronavirus Is the Worst Intelligence Failure in U.S. History.\"\n36\nRascoe and Dwyer, \"Trump Received Intelligence Briefings on Coronavirus Twice in January.\"\n37\nGertz, \"White House: Intelligence Agencies Missed Early Signs of Coronavirus Pandemic.\"\n38\nAmy Zegart and Michael Morell, \"Spies, Lies, and Algorithms: Why U.S. Intelligence Agencies Must Adapt or Fail,\" *Foreign Affairs*, May/June 2019, https://\nwww.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2019-04-16/spies-lies-and-algorithms.\n39\nRuss Travers, \"The Coming Intelligence Failure,\" *Studies in Intelligence* 10, no. Y,\n36-43. https://www.cia.gov/static/b907a844d9a2a03760f35afca91b06c2/comingintelligence-failure.pdf.\n40\nJosh Kerbel, \"Coming to Terms with Anticipatory Intelligence,\" Warontherocks .com, August 13, 2019, https://warontherocks.com/2019/08/coming-to-termswith-anticipatory-intelligence/.\n41\nTim Weiner, *Legacy of Ashes* (New York: Anchor Books).\n42\nGerald K. Haines and Robert E. Leggett, Watching the Bear: Essays on CIA's Analysis of the Soviet Union (Langley, VA: Center for the Study of Intelligence,\n2003).\n43\n\"The Buddhists in South Vietnam,\" CIA, June 28, 1963, https://www.cia.gov/ readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP79-00927A004100030002-4.pdf.\n44\nJoel Achenbach et al., \"A Viral Tsunami: How the Underestimated Coronavirus\nTook Over the World,\" *Washington Post*, March 9, 2021, https://www.washington\npost.com/health/2021/03/09/coronavirus-spread-world/.\n45\n\"Annual Threat Assessment of the US Intelligence Community,\" Office of the Director of National Intelligence, April 9, 2021, https://www.dni.gov/files/\nODNI/documents/assessments/ATA-2021-Unclassified-Report.pdf.\n46\nNorman Roule, \"Our Response to 9/11 Gave Us Lessons for COVID-19,\" The CipherBrief.com, April 6, 2020, https://www.thecipherbrief.com/article/china/ our-response-to-9-11-gave-us-lessons-for-covid-19.\n47\n\"Description of the National Military Strategy 2018,\" Department of Defense, Directorate for Strategy, Plans, and Policy (J-5) The Joint Staff, 2018, https://\nwww.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Publications/ UNCLASS_2018_National_ Military_Strategy_Description.pdf.\n48\nGlenn S. Gerstell and Michael Morell, \"Four Ways U.S. Intelligence Efforts\nShould Change in the Wake of the Coronavirus Pandemic,\" *Washington Post*,\nMay 17, 2021, https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/ 2020/04/07/fourways-us-intelligence-efforts-should-change-wake-coronavirus-pandemic/.\n49\nRoule, \"Our Response to 9/11 Gave Us Lessons for COVID-19.\"\n50\nAndreas Fuchs et al., \"China Sent Masks, Gloves and Gowns to Many U.S.\nStates. Here's Who Benefited,\" *Washington Post*, January 29, 2021, https://www.\nwashingtonpost.com/politics/2021/01/29/china-sent-masks-gloves-gowns-manyus-states-heres-who-benefited/.\n51\nRachel Sadoff, \"COVID-19 and the Politicization of Personal Protective Equipment,\" *Harvard Political Review*, May 21, 2020, https://harvardpolitics.com/\npoliticization-ppe/.\n52\nSam Meredith, \"As Russia and China Seek To Boost Their Global Influence, Analysts Warn Vaccine Diplomacy Is Here To Stay,\" CNBC.com, February 17, 2021, https://www.cnbc.com/2021/02/17/covid-vaccine-diplomacy-russia-chinaseek-to-boost-global-influence.html.\n53\nPaula Newton, \"Shutout by Allies, Canada Will Produce its Own Vaccines by the End of 2021,\" CNN.com, February 3, 2021, https://www.cnn.com/2021/02/02/ americas/canada-coronavirus-vaccines/index.html.\n54\nGordon Corera, \"Hackers Targeted COVID-19 Vaccine Supply 'Cold Chain,'\" BBC. com, December 3, 2020. https://www.bbc.com/news/technology-55165552#:~:\ntext=Coronavirus%3A%20Hackers%20targeted%20%20Covid%20vaccine%20 supply%20'cold%20chain',-Gordon%20Corera&text=%20The%20intern ational%20%20vaccine%20supply%20chain,the%20right%20temperature%20 during%20transportation.\n55\n\"FACT SHEET: Biden-Harris Administration Announces Allocation Plan for 55 Million Doses To Be Shared Globally,\" The White House, June 21, 2021, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/06/21/ fact-sheet-biden-harris-administration-announces-allocation-plan-for-55- million-doses-to-be-shared-globally/.\n56\nTalha Burki, \"China's Successful Control of COVID-19,\" *The Lancet* 20, no. 11\n(November 1, 2020): 1240-41, , https://doi.org/10.1016/S1473-3099(20)30800-8.\n57\nLisa Schnirring, \"India, Brazil Grapple With Massive COVID-19 Surges,\" Center for Infectious Disease Research and Policy, University of Minnesota, April 15, 2021, https://www.cidrap.umn.edu/news-perspective/2021/04/indiabrazil-grapple-massive-covid-19-surges.\n58\n\"What Will Be the Impact of the Covid-19 Pandemic on Healthcare Systems?,\" Deloitte.com, https://www2.deloitte.com/fr/fr/pages/covid-insights/articles/ impact-covid19-healthcare-systems.html.\n59\n\"The World Bank Group's Response to the COVID-19 (coronavirus) Pandemic,\" The World Bank, https://www.worldbank.org/en/who-we-are/news/ coronavirus-covid19.\n60\n\"The IMF's Response to COVID-19,\" The International Monetary Fund, https:// www.imf.org/en/About/FAQ/imf-response-to-covid-19.\n61\n\"Hungary's Orban Seeks Continued Emergency Powers For COVID-19 Response,\" RFERL.org, February 15, 2021, https://www.rferl.org/a/hungaryorban-emergency-powers-coronavirus/31103780.html.\n62\nRon Synovitz, \"COVID-19 Crackdowns, Expanded Authoritarianism, and The Post-Pandemic World,\" RFERL.org. December 30, 2020, https://www.rferl.\norg/a/authoritarianism-crackdowns-covid-human-rights-coronavirus/31026 181.html.\n63\nThomas Carothers and David Wong, \"Authoritarian Weaknesses and the Pandemic,\" Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, August 11, 2020, https:// carnegieendowment.org/2020/08/11/authoritarian-weaknesses-and-pandemicpub-82452.\n64\nThomas Kaplan et al., \"Taking 'Extraordinary Measures,' Biden Backs Suspending Patents on Vaccines,\" *New York Times*, May 5, 2021, https://www.nytimes\n.com/2021/05/05/us/politics/biden-covid-vaccine-patents.html.\n65\n\"Covax: How Will Covid Vaccines Be Shared Around the World?,\" BBC.com, May 3, 2021, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-55795297.\n66\nNoah Higgins-Dunn, \"The U.K. Has Identified a New Covid-19 Strain that Spreads More Quickly. Here's What They Know,\" CNBC.com, December 19, 2020, https://www.cnbc.com/2020/12/19/the-uk-has-identified-a-new-covid- 19-strain-that-spreads-more-quickly-heres-what-they-know.html.\n67\nDahl, \"Was the Coronavirus Outbreak an Intelligence Failure?\"\n68\nDaniil Davydoff, \"The Cult of the Search in Open-source Intelligence,\" Security, November 24, 2020, https://www.securitymagazine.com/articles/94003-\nthe-cult-of-the-search-in-open-source-intelligence.\n69\nTimothy Puko and Warren P. Strobel, \"State Department Analyst Resigns After\nWhite House Blocked Climate Change Testimony,\" *Wall Street Journal*, July 10,\n2019, https://www.wsj.com/articles/state-department-analyst-resigns-after-whitehouse-blocks-climate-change-testimony-11562780573.\n70\nJoshua Rovner, \"Think Small: Why the Intelligence Community Should Do Less\nabout New Threats,\" *War on the Rocks*, June 16, 2021, https://warontherocks.\ncom/2021/06/think-small-why-the-intelligence-community-should-do-lessabout-new-threats/.\n71\n\"Intelligence Community Directive Number 204: Roles and Responsibilities for\nthe National Intelligence Priorities Framework,\" The Office of the Director of National Intelligence, September 13, 2007, https://www.dni.gov/files/documents/ ICD/ICD_204.pdf.\n72\n\"National Broadband Plan,\" Federal Communications Commission, March 17, 2010, https://www.fcc.gov/general/national-broadband-plan.\n73\n\"Telework Enhancement Act,\" Telework.gov, https://www.telework.gov/ guidance-legislation/telework-legislation/telework-enhancement-act/.\n74\nAlexander Abad-Santos, \"GSA Threw an $800,000 Party and All You Got Was\nthe Bill,\" *The Atlantic*, April 3, 2012, https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/\narchive/2012/04/gsa-threw-800000-party-and-all-you-got-was-bill/329797/.\n75\nBen Zimmer, \"'The Before Time:' A Sci-Fi Idea That Has Made Its Way to Real\nLife,\" *Wall Street Journal,* June 19, 2021.\n76\nOPM, Tweet.\n77\nCortney Weinbaum et al., \"Understanding Government Telework: An Examination of Research Literature and Practices from Government Agencies,\" 2018, https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR2023.html.\n78\nCortney Weinbaum et al., \"Moving to the Unclassified: How the Intelligence Community Can Work from Unclassified Facilities,\" April 23, 2018. https:// www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR2024.html.\n79\nWeinbaum, \"Moving to the Unclassified,\" iii.\n80\nWeinbaum, \"Understanding Government Telework,\" 8.\n81\nWeinbaum, \"Moving to the Unclassified,\" 3.\n82\nWeinbaum, \"Moving to the Unclassified,\" xi.\n83\nWeinbaum, \"Moving to the Unclassified,\" 48.\n84\nWeinbaum, \"Moving to the Unclassified,\" x.\n85\n\"THE YEAR THAT (SORT OF) WASN'T: Five Lessons Employers Learned During the COVID-19 Pandemic and What They Mean for the Future,\" JDSupra .com, March 16, 2021, https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/the-year-that-sort-ofwasn-t-five-7957856/.\n86\nKathy Gurchiek, \"Workplace Lessons Learned During the Pandemic,\" SHRM.\norg, March 29, 2021, https://www.shrm.org/hr-today/news/hr-news/pages/\nworkplace-lessons-learned-during-covid19.aspx.\n87\nFredrick Kunkle, \"Amazon Unveils Helix Building as Heart of Campus in Arlington,\" February 2, 2021, https://www.washingtonpost.com/dc-md-va/2021/02/ 02/amazon-arlingon-headquarters-helix/.\n88\n\"Life After the COVID-19 Vaccine: Envisioning the 'New Normal,'\" UChicago News, April 1, 2021, https://news.uchicago.edu/story/life-after-covid-19- vaccine-envisioning-new-normal.\n89\nJanna Anderson et al., \"Experts Say the 'New Normal' in 2025 Will Be Far More Tech-Driven, Presenting More Big Challenges,\" Pew Research Center, February 18, 2021. https://www.pewresearch.org/internet/2021/02/18/ experts-say-the-newnormal-in-2025-will-be-far-more-tech-driven-presenting-more-big-challenges/.\n90\nCharles S. Gascon and Jacob Haas, \"The Impact of COVID-19 on the Residential Real Estate Market,\" Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, October 6, 2020, https:// www.stlouisfed.org/publications/regional-economist/fourth-quarter-2020/ impact-covid-residential-real-estate-market.\n91\nBrodie Boland et al., \"Reimagining the Office and Work Life After COVID-19,\" McKinsey & Company, June 8, 2020, https://www.mckinsey.com/businessfunctions/organization/our-insights/reimagining-the-office-and-work-life-aftercovid-19#.\n92\nPaul R. La Monca, \"Morgan Stanley CEO to NY Workers: Be Back in the Office by September or Else,\" CNN.com, June 23, 2021, https://www.cnn.com/ 2021/06/16/investing/morgan-stanley-ceo-return-to-office/index.html.\n93\nBrian Baxter and Ruiqi Chen, \"Tech Legal Leaders Veer from Morgan Stanley Return-to-Work Order,\" *Bloomberg Law*, https://news.bloomberglaw.com/\nbusiness-and-practice/tech-legal-leaders-veer-from-morgan-stanley-returnto-work-order.\n94\nNatalie Alms, \"OPM Official: No Going Back to Pre-COVID Status Quo,\" FCW. com, March 24, 2021, https://fcw.com/articles/2021/03/24/opm-post-covidno-going-back.aspx.\n95\nDavid P. Oakley, Subordinating Intelligence: The DOD/CIA Post-Cold War Relationship (Frankfurt, KY: University Press of Kentucky, 2019).\n96\nZegart & Morell, \"Spies, Lies, and Algorithms.\"\n97\nRichard Danzig et al., A Preface to Strategy: The Foundations of American National Security, Johns Hopkins Applied Physics Laboratory. 2018. https://\nwww.jhuapl.edu/Content/documents/PrefaceToStrategy.pdf.\n98\nZegart and Morell, \"Spies, Lies, and Algorithms.\"\n99\nDahl, \"Was the Coronavirus Outbreak an Intelligence Failure?\"\n100 Roule, \"Our Response to 9/11 Gave Us Lessons for COVID-19.\" 101 Michael Shear et al., \"Biden Orders Intelligence Inquiry Into Origins of Virus,\"\nNew York Times, May 26, 2021, https://www.nytimes.com/2021/05/26/us/politics/\nbiden-coronavirus-origins.html.\n\n## Pa Rt Two Looking Out Technology And Global Supply Chain Security\n\nJason Schenker Prior to the COVID-19 pandemic, references to supply chain security most commonly evoked associations with national defense. During the darkest moments of the pandemic, however, Americans saw widespread images of sparse grocery store shelves, where paper products, fresh fruits and vegetables, meat, and other goods were in short supply. E-commerce technologies supported social and economic stability through the worst of the pandemic, but broader supply chain risks were exposed. In the post-pandemic period, supply chain is likely to remain a concern for consumers and policymakers, as well as military strategists. Reflecting the increasing technological complexities of supply chains in the decade ahead, the national security approach to protecting U.S. supply chainsespecially of critical goods like pharmaceuticals, high-technology goods, aircraft parts, rare earth minerals, and materielwill need to be multifaceted and embrace futures thinking. Identifying new ways to use technology to bridge economic and social stability gaps presents tremendous opportunities for the future of national security.\n\n## Open Secrets And Overlooked Risks\n\nMaintaining a secure supply chain has often been a deciding factor in maintaining operational advantage in conflict. Supply chain security is also critical for economic health and social stability, especially maintaining access to food. Prior to the COVID-19 pandemic, the importance of supply chain was something the civilian population blissfully ignored. The pandemic, however, opened the aperture in many ways, revealing open secrets and overlooked risks to our society, economy, and security. Supply chain vulnerability has continued to color the path forward as the period of mass vaccination began. For national security, the COVID-19 pandemic exposed the importance of being vigilant with our borders. And it highlighted the risks of overly lean supply chains, as well as the potential downside of being dependent on the global supply chain for critical goods like medical supplies, medical devices, basic necessities, and personal protective equipment (PPE), including gloves and masks.\n\n## Four Meals Away From Anarchy\n\nAlthough food insecurity and shortages are persistent concerns and risks for many countries around the world at any point in time, it is uncommon for this to be a concern in the most developed Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries like the United States. But the COVID-19 pandemic, shutdown, and recession changed that. Images of stores without paper products or with limited selections of food were reminiscent for many Americans who lived through parts of the Cold War of the widespread images seen during the death throes of the Soviet Union.\n\nDespite the relative abundance of agricultural production in the United States, which is one of the world's biggest net exporters of agricultural products, resilience issues and risks related to the food and agricultural supply chain have remained top of mind for many Americans. Media stories of meat shortages and other limited supplies were widespread during the spring 2020 surge of COVID-19. And while some might decry these as overblown, in truth, our entire economy and society were probably a lot closer to the edge than we would like to admit to ourselves. The British Security Service MI5 has long held the motto that society is \"four meals away from anarchy.\"1 During the COVID-19 pandemic and shutdown, it seemed at times that we were not too far off this mark. Additionally, now that these risks have been exposed, they could be exploited again in the future as global power competition and conflict threaten to become more contentious.\n\n## Supply Chain As A National Security Risk\n\nMaintaining a secure supply chain is inherently difficult when the goods come from a country that is far away. Generally low levels of inventory as well as long, lean supply chains revealed risks to national security in the United States in 2020. The corporate playbook for most companies has been to keep inventories and supply chains lean. That works well during times of supply chain stability, but lean inventories coupled with geographic distance became an issue for supply chain security during the COVID-19 pandemic. This was especially critical for medical devices and PPE.\n\nTrade risks were already a national security issue related to metals for materiel in the United States, which was the impetus behind the implementation of the U.S. Section 232 tariffs on aluminum and steel. Additionally, the Section 301 tariffs highlighted risks to U.S. national security from Chinese threats to U.S. intellectual property. Due to the COVID-19 crisis, PPE and medical devices may now very well end up on lists of essential goods as well. There may even be a bipartisan political push to secure supply chains for critical medical devices, PPE equipment, and pharmaceuticals to prevent the loss of American lives in the futureand to minimize the potential disruption or devastation of the American economy in the event of another pandemic. After all, one of the big reasons it was necessary to slow the spread of COVID-19 in the United States and \"flatten the curve\" was because there were not enough ventilators, gloves, masks, or other equipment to handle a pandemic. If we could ensure greater stability in the supply chain for PPE and medical devices, we may be better able to protect the economy and the American people in the future.\n\n## Psychological And Existential Risks\n\nThe COVID-19 outbreak revealed that the United States can be exploited in a pandemic-type event in myriad ways. Making the economy of the United States seem reminiscent of the Soviet Union's financial state during the last days of the Cold War is no small feat. It also exposed U.S. supply chain vulnerabilities and revealed that, if the United States had been solely targeted, it would have significantly threatened national security and the ability of the United States to project influence globally. In general, COVID-19 revealed that a  pandemic-level biological attack on the United States would be beyond economically devastating. Plus, the vulnerability of the American public to media and social media messaging and potential manipulation was also revealed. Devastatingly hot buttons of bias that parts of the public clung to included anchoring bias, confirmation bias, and false consensus biaseven when related to something fundamental, like wearing a mask. With poignant and punchy memes, parts of the civilian population were influenced into action or inactionin the face of the deadliest pandemic in a century. The social media activity and public response to COVID-19 highlight the at-risk status of the American public to future psychological operations (PSYOPS) in a post-truth world dominated by the mass adoption of subjectivist truth.\n\nA most worrisome scenario would be if adversaries of the United States were to intentionally pair a biological attack with widespread social media and traditional media disinformation. Such a plan would be designed to cause maximum disruption, political destabilization, and economic devastation, and it would likely be successful for at least a brief time. These kinds of risks may sound extreme. But the COVID-19 pandemic was an extreme situation, and, as a pandemic and public health crisis, it may not be singular in the decades ahead. Plus, the powers of the worldgreat and smallhave seen how a pandemic plays out. For those countries and entities that seek recognition, power, or chaos, COVID-19 offers a glimpse into the scale of instability that can be rapidly created in the world by a pandemic that could have been much worse.\n\n## Noise Framework\n\nFollowing the outbreak of COVID-19, The Futurist Institute was approached by the Strategic Foresight and Futures Branch of the U.S. Air Force Warfighting Integration Capability (AFWIC) to help frame the importance of the COVID-19 pandemic for national security.2\nOur response to that request was to create the NOISE framework, which examines some of the most important factors that contribute to national security and political stability. Our framework includes five critical factors:\n\nNecessitiesFood, Water, Power, Shelter, Safety OccupationsJobs, Vocations, Hobbies InformationAccess to Accurate, Complete Information SystemsFinancial, Health Care, Transportation, Education ExternalInternational Relations, Military, Supply Chain, Trade\n\nThe first items The Futurist Institute included are the necessities of food, water, power, shelter, and safety. After all, the most important driver of most governmental policy and social change is what economists often call *the economics of the stomach*. In short, if people lack access to food or other basic necessities, there are significant risks of political instability. This is why supply chain is so criticaland why it became such a critical topic in 2020. If necessity factors are stable, then a country or economy is likely to remain on an even keel. In the most recent experience of the COVID-19 pandemic, concerns about safety and food emerged. But man does not live by bread alone, and the other components of the NOISE framework are also necessary for stability in the face of significant risks and upheaval. Maintaining the U.S. supply chain and basic services as well as utilities (like power and water) was critical, as was sustaining safety and access to food.\nSecond are occupations. These made the list because of the notion that peopleat the population levelneed things to do. Can people be retired and do essentially nothing? Yes, of course. But as a nation, people need jobs, vocations, and hobbies. They just need to be doing something. The need for this stabilizing force is tied to the proverbial notion that \"idle hands are the devil's workshop.\" Occupational risks and instability became critical during the COVID-19 pandemic outbreak, as people were forced to shelter in place. Some people could still work, but others were concerned about their jobs. This is why the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security (CARES) Act in the United States, as well as other forms of fiscal stimulus at home and abroad, has been so important. After all, even if people could not work, they needed to know their chance of still having jobs would be high after the pandemic. Yet, even with fiscal and monetary policy stimulus, the U.S. labor market suffered significantly.\n\nTo put the job situation in perspective, in 1933the worst year of the Great Depression in the United Statesthere were around 12.8\nmillion unemployed people.3 In the 62 weeks from March 14, 2020, to May 15, 2021, there were almost 82.5 million initial filings for unemployment benefits in the United States.4 Although the ranks of jobless Americans in the worst weeks of 2020 were at record levels, the number of unemployed might have been much higher if it were not for the CARES Act and the Paycheck Protection Program (PPP). Furthermore, even though the worst of the pandemic's job losses and economic devastation were seen in the second quarter of 2020, high levels of joblessness were sustained throughout 2020 and well into 2021. Even for the week ending May 1, 2021, there were still almost 16 million Americans claiming unemployment benefits across all categories, including for Pandemic Unemployment Assistance (PUA) as well as Pandemic Emergency Unemployment Compensation (PEUC).5\nThe third element of stability The Futurist Institute identified is information. Real information, rather than opinion, is critical for maintaining order and keeping people calm and their interests aligned. The topic of information included sharing accurate and complete information. The risks here include misinformation, disinformation, opinion presented as fact, and subjectivist truth when the truth is, in fact, objective. This is part of the PSYOPS risk noted above.\n\nSystems are fourth on the list. National security depends on the proper functioning of several critical social and economic systems, including the financial system, the health care system, the transportation system, and the education system. All of these were disrupted or at risk of being disrupted during the most severe outbreaks of the COVID-19 pandemic.\n\nThe fifth and final element of national security stability The Futurist Institute identified is external. This factor includes international relations, the existence of and ability to deploy the military, the global supply chain, and trade. When most people consider national security risks, this is the category they think of first. There is a simple reason for that: they take the other four categories for granted. If COVID-19 showed us anything, it is that almost every aspect of society believed to be stable can be rapidly destabilized. Fortunately, some of these core elements, like international relations and the military, were relatively undisrupted by the COVID-19 pandemic. But global supply chains and trade were disturbed, which had second order impacts on systems, occupations, and necessities. Plus, supply chain disruptions also exposed information elements of the framework to misinformation and disinformation.\n\nWhen considering the NOISE framework, it is easy to see how the COVID-19 pandemic has actually threatened all of these different pillars of national security and political stability in one way or another and how supply chain disruptions and uncertainty fed that instability risk. The risks posed by COVID-19 justified, in large part, the unprecedented levels of fiscal and monetary policy stimulus enacted globally. Of course, there will also be a legacy of record high global government debt and ballooned central bank balance sheets as a result of those necessary actions. The long-term implications of those dynamics remain to be seen, but one thing is clear: the COVID-19 pandemic threatened to push U.S. national security, the global economy, supply chains, and society as we know it to the brink. This time, we held the line because of significant and swift action. Next time, we may not be as lucky. And we may not have the same ability to issue as much debt or enact as much monetary policy accommodation as we did in 2020. For these reasons, shoring up risks could prove criticalespecially because the next incidence of pandemic or plague might not be an accident.\n\n## Listening For Noise\n\nAs for the minimization of risk to national security, it will be critical to control for and support those elements in the NOISE framework that represent the fundamental building blocks of stability. That is where the risks are, and only if those levers of stability are firmly in place can the risks to national security and society be minimized. This is just as true now as it was in the first days of the COVID-19 pandemic. And it will remain true whenever the next public health crisis rears its ugly head.\n\n## Manufacturing And National Security\n\nIn addition to broad-based national security risks that the COVID- 19 pandemic revealed, The Futurist Institute also identified risks that have specific implications for national security industries. This includes the potential for disruptions to national security vendors, including the airplane manufacturers and airplane parts manufacturers that were economically devastated by challenging economic and business conditions engendered by a massive slowdown in air travel. Although this risk was a critical second-order impact of the COVID-19 pandemic, it is of primary importance for national security entities. Looking ahead, national security organizations will need to more aggressively monitor economic and business risks of critical vendors. This is just as true for large vendors as it is for startups that provide essential materiel to the defense industry. How the government addresses these risks in the future is up for debate, but one thing seems certain: Even if national security vendors are not too big to fail, they may be *too important* to fail.\n\n## Technology As A Critical Lever\n\nAt times in 2020, when the greatest number of Americans were forced to shelter in place or quarantine, the most visible part of the supply chaine-commerce retailhelped keep the economy functioning. The applications and offerings for retail goods, restaurant food, and grocery delivery, which had been expanding for years, found their moment in the sun and kept people supplied with necessitieseven if, at times, an almost overburdened system required scheduling food delivery several weeks in advance. In the face of COVID-19 challenges, the food and grocery parts of the e-commerce supply chain grew significantly. In fact, e-commerce as a sector expanded rapidly in 2020. In the second quarter of 2020, U.S. e-commerce retailers accounted for 15.7 percent of all retail sales. This was up from 11.4 percent in the first quarter of 2020 and up from the 10.7 percent average for all of 2019.6\nIn dollar terms, U.S. e-commerce retail revenue was $203.8 billion in the second quarter of 2020, up almost 32 percent from $154.6\nbillion in the first quarter.7 The host of convenience-oriented applications and services helped keep the economy, and society more broadly, from falling apart. It was lucky to have had so much technology as a lever at a time when reducing human contact was critical. There is no previous time in human history when this would have been possible to this degree. The technology available just one decade earlier would have left economies and societies much more exposed to COVID-19 transmission, economic uncertainty, and social disorder. Interestingly, e-commerce technologies that kept goods flowing to consumers during 2020 were not born in the pandemic. In fact, e-commerce retailers have been gaining market share of retail sales in the United States for more than two decades, as can be seen in Figure 1.\n\nseries/ECOMPCTSA.\n\nAlthough COVID-19 was not the origin of these technologies, it was an accelerant that ushered in a period of semi-forced digital transformation, making e-commerce less of a convenience and more of a necessity. As pandemic concerns and restrictions generally eased in the United States in the third quarter of 2020, the percent of e-commerce retail fell to 13.8 percent. It declined a bit further in the fourth quarter of 2020 to 13.6 percent. In dollar terms, however, U.S. e-commerce retailers pulled in $201.4 billion in retail sales in the third quarter, which was only down slightly from the $203.8 billion in the second quarterbut up immensely from the first quarter of\n2020.8 It was also significantly greater than in any quarter of 2019.\n\nPart of the reason the percentage declined, of course, was that non- ecommerce retail saw improvements in the third and fourth quarters of 2020. This is why you can see declines in U.S. e-commerce retail as a percent of all retail in the third and fourth quarters of 2020 in Figure 1, as well as the more modest declines in e-commerce retailer dollars for those same quarters in Figure 2.\n\nSource: U.S. Census Bureau, *E-Commerce Retail Sales [ECOMSA]*, retrieved from FRED, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, accessed on May 21, 2021, https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/ECOMSA.\n\nThese dynamics offer some insight into the near-term future of e-commerce. Many analysts and pundits have referred to 2020 as a new normal. That makes 2019 the *old normal*. But what will the future hold for the balance of 2021 and beyond? Many industries, including supply chain, will not go back to the old normal of 2019. In true Hegelian fashion, the *Weltgeist* is likely to propel us forward into a world that is a synthesis of both new and old. I expect we will follow a middle path forward to a *new, new normal*.\n\nFor supply chain, this means e-commerce percentages of total retail sales in coming quarters may be lower than those seen in the second quarter of 2020. But e-commerce percentages of total retail sales are still likely to exceed the e-commerce activity of 2019. Plus, U.S. e-commerce dollar levels are poised to remain strong and rise further to new highs. In fact, e-commerce spending in the first quarter of 2021 hit a new record level that eclipsed the previous peak in the second quarter of 2020.\n\nThese dynamics of the new, new normal are also likely to impact various industries and sectors that experienced significant changes in 2020, including remote work, online education, telehealth, real estate, and travel. Another lasting impact of the new, new normal is likely to be people's situational awareness of supply chain. It will hopefully be a very long time before people wait up in the middle of the night for the clock to strike midnight and food delivery slots to open up for a date three weeks in the future. But the memories of food insecurity during the COVID-19 pandemic are likely to cast a long shadow over consumer behaviors for many years. In fact, consumers may continue to remember the importance of supply chain and e-commerce technologies, even when these are no longer top-of-mind concerns in a post-pandemic world.\n\n## Disruptive Impacts On Supply Chains\n\nWhile e-commerce and technology are levers of opportunity for supply chain, enhanced security will also be increasingly critical in the next decadeespecially for supply chains. Security issues could pose a number of disruptive impacts. Supply chains are likely to be disrupted by transportation hijacking, hacking, and cyber ransom. Alternatively, on-site machinery, flying warehouse drones, or even entire fleets of autonomous trucks could be hacked and held for cyber ransom. And, of course, customer data could be stolen, and financial accounts could be hacked. In truth, there are myriad risks from different kinds of security threats. There are also growing counterfeiting risks.\n\nCybersecurity risks are likely to be detected, either by software or because of a ransomware demand. But the big security risk posed by counterfeiting technology is likely to remain intentionally difficult to identify. Plus, over the next decade, counterfeit goods are likely to become increasingly more difficult to detect. The most vulnerable goods to this kind of risk are military goods, dual-use technology goods, pharmaceuticals, and high-value consumer technology goods, putting national security risks in play as well as financial and business risks. Many technologies are likely to be deployed over the next 10 years to ensure the integrity of the supply chain, including blockchain as a more comprehensive and permanent record as well as other new kinds of physical marking and virtual technologies. Marking goods is a way to prevent counterfeiting and to protect intellectual property. Although likely to be used initially for goods of high technological, high intellectual property, or military value, marking goods will become increasingly important for many parts of the supply chain as the transition continues to an intellectual capital economy.\n\nThere are a number of value-adds from securely marking goods at the beginning of the supply chain and testing them throughout and at the end ofthe supply chain. These value-adds include ensuring the vendor of goods can be verified, the intermediary location of goods can be verified, and the end customers can verify that they have received genuine goods. Even simply deploying this technology may reduce counterfeiting and hijacking of goods shipmentsespecially if markings are a critical part of verifying the authenticity by end consumers. In practical terms, nanotechnology markings, which are invisible to the naked eye, could be placed on inverted delta parts for airplanes and verified by the customer. Blockchain technology could also be integrated with marking technology to verify the supply chain parties involved in every physical transaction of the goods throughout their chain of custody. As with other blockchain technology use cases, the integrated use of securely marking goods and blockchain will be most valuable for protecting individual consumers and for providing greater transparency for high-value supply chain goods.\n\nUnfortunately, marking goods and using blockchain will not mitigate or solve all supply chain risks. After all, drones could be increasingly used for hijacking with little risk to the individuals involved, and supply chain security technologies will not protect the intellectual capital value chain. Plus, there are still risks posed by the people in any system. No one technology is likely to be sufficient.\n\n## Better Mousetrap, Better Mouse\n\nEven though we may think that supply chains are secure or imagine new technologies like blockchain to be a panacea, there are still risks. Perhaps most importantly, from a cybersecurity standpoint, will be the impact of quantum computing as a means to crack encryptions and wreak havoc. If blockchain and current forms of cryptography are the better mousetrap, quantum computing threatens to be a better mouse. Nothing will be safe. Most disconcertingly, China has been taking a significant lead in quantum computing technology for years and made tremendous technological strides during 2020. It is a race we cannot afford to losebecause of risks posed not just to supply chains and the cybersecurity of corporations, but also to national security encryption.\n\n## Anticipating Future Threats\n\nThe risks to supply chain during 2020 were all too clearas were the benefits of e-commerce technologies that supported societal and economic stability. Looking to the decade ahead, the technologies that guide and threaten our supply chains will become increasingly complex. Opportunities and risks will be even greater with increased complexity. This means that the solution to securing U.S. supply chainsespecially of critical goods like pharmaceuticals, hightechnology goods, aircraft parts, rare earth minerals, and materiel will also need to be multifaceted and complex. There will not be one silver bullet solution that gets us toor at least temporarily keeps us living ina more secure world.\n\nNecessary and sufficient conditions for secure supply chains require a leveling up. Tracking numbers is not enough. Blockchain is not enough. Securely marking goods with nanotechnology is not enough. The future approach to supply chain security will require a broad array of technologies that incorporate and integrate higher volumes of data, real-time imagery, and documentation. This is especially true as the greatest risks to the supply chain remain people who could be compromised. Yes, blockchain can provide records that allow for potentially easier forensic accounting and examination. But all that really does is provide a list of the usual suspects to round up if something goes awry. Blockchain cannot prevent the supply chain from being compromised in real time. And I suspect that the main sources of compromise in the future will be the same as they have been in the past. These are best represented by the acronym MICE: money, ideology, compromise, or ego. Furthermore, blockchains could prove to be significantly less resilient in the face of Chinese quantum supremacy.\n\nIn the same way that passwords and logins for sensitive and financial accounts are moving to two-way authorization systems, there is likely to be a greater need for a multi-pronged approach to mitigate the risks across the supply chain. A digital record as well as visual imagery, coupled with invisible, inviolable markings, could help ensure authenticity of goods. In a post-COVID-19 world, this is critical enough for vaccines. But it will also be increasingly critical for technological goodsespecially if there is an eventual bifurcation of global supply chains as the great power competition between the United States and China heats up in the decade ahead and beyond.\n\nThe notion to consider here is that if man can make it, he can break it. This represents the two sides of each technology coin: the upside opportunity and the downside risk. An example of this idea is how industrial drones that may transport pipelines to remote oil pads can also be used to hijack shipments of exotic fruits, auto parts, or cobalt. This concept is the origin of my final recommendation regarding the future of supply chain. To deal with increasingly complex dynamics, the approach to future supply chain security, from a national security perspective, needs to be one that embraces futures thinking. It is important for national security professionals to approach the challenges of the future in a way that recognizes the trends of the past and the data of the present, as well as the myriad future outcomes that could be driven by emerging technologiesand by those that are yet to be discovered.\n\nThis analytic process involves examining trends and data, as well as identifying fundamental truths and recognizing that \"this time\" is never different. In the supply chain world, this means that long-term economic and societal stability will continue to hinge on access to food and goods as well as the associated public belief in the security and surety of those supply chains. Additionally, there is a need to recognize that we live in a Rousseauian world of limited resources. This means there will be incentives for disruption of a system that favors legacy participants. The United States faces tremendous challenges, butin a decadewe may find something surprising. We may find that China's supply chains are being disrupted even more than our own.\n\nThe best thing we can do now to prepare for the future is to understand the levers of risk and opportunity that will determine the future. COVID-19 is a salient example of how supply chain systems can be exposed and contribute to uncertainty. But COVID-19 has also revealed the opportunities of e-commerce, underscoring the value proposition and potential for technology to support economic operations and social order at a time of human distraction, disorder, and suffering. Finding more ways to use technology to bridge potential social and economic stability gaps represents a tremendous opportunity for national security, and I expect it will be increasingly important in the future.\n\nJason Schenker is chairman of The Futurist Institute and president of Prestige Economics. He has written over 30 books and created over 45 online courses on emerging technologies, finance, supply chain, leadership, and the economy. Bloomberg News has ranked Mr. Schenker the number-one forecaster in the world in 26 categories since 2011, including for his forecasts of the euro, Russian ruble, Chinese yuan, industrial metals prices, and oil prices. Mr. Schenker has earned three master's degrees and over a dozen academic certificates and professional designations.\n\n1\nWill Iredale and Jack Grimston, \"Britain 'Four Meals Away from Anarchy,'\" Sunday Times, October 10, 2004, https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/britain-fourmeals-away-from-anarchy-fc9kfgc0w92.\n2\nJason Schenker, \"The Future Nexus of Supply Chains and National Security,\"\nGlobal Futures Report: Alternative Futures of Geopolitical Competition in a Post- COVID-19 World, Air Force Warfighting Integration Capability (AFWIC), June\n2020, http://www.futuristinstitute.org/pentagon-report/.\n3\nU.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, \"Labor Force, Employment and Unemployment,\n1929-39: Estimating Methods,\" *Monthly Labor Review*, July 1948, https://www.bls.\ngov/opub/mlr/1948/article/pdf/labor-force-employment-and-unemployment- 1929-39-estimating-methods.pdf.\n4\nU.S. Employment and Training Administration, *Initial Claims [ICSA]*, retrieved\nfrom FRED, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, accessed on May 21, 2021, https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/ICSA.\n5\nU.S. Department of Labor, *Unemployment Insurance Weekly Claims*, May 20,\n2021, accessed on May 21, 2021, https://www.dol.gov/ui/data.pdf.\n6\nU.S. Census Bureau, E-Commerce Retail Sales as a Percent of Total Sales [ECOM- PCTSA], retrieved from FRED, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, accessed on\nMay 21, 2021, https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/ECOMPCTSA.\n7\nU.S. Census Bureau, *E-Commerce Retail Sales [ECOMSA]*, retrieved from\nFRED, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, accessed on May 21, 2021, https:// fred.stlouisfed.org/series/ECOMSA.\n8\nU.S. Census Bureau, E-Commerce Retail Sales [ECOMSA].\n\n## Covid-19 And Inequality In Human Development\n\nJon Hall, Carolina Rivera Vazquez,\nHeriberto Tapia, and Jacob Assa This chapter considers what COVID-19 might mean for global inequality. The pandemic's effects are exacting a toll on health, education, employment, and incomeas well as trust. COVID-19 is a wedge, pushing existing inequalities wider and creating new ones.\n\nConsidering global inequality raises the question \"inequality of what?\" Not surprisingly, in a chapter from the Human Development Report Office of the United Nations Development Program, we will consider inequalities in human development.\n\n## The Human Development Approach: What, Why, And How\n\nThe Human Development Approachnow more than 30 years old was born in part to challenge thinking that saw economic growth as synonymous with increases in well-being and progress.\n\nFor the latter half of the 20th century there was \"an implicit assumption that economic growth was synonymous with progress: an assumption that a growing gross domestic product (GDP) meant life must be getting better. But now the world recognizes that it isn't\n\nquite as simple as that.\"1 Yet GDP was never designed to be used as a proxy for wellbeing. Simon Kuznets, one of the fathers of the system of national accounts, showed remarkable prescience in 1934, writing to the U.S. Congress that \"the welfare of a nation can scarcely be inferred from a measurement of national income.\"2\nThe 2009 report by the French government's Commission on the Measurement of Economic Performance and Social Progress provides a detailed discussion on the limitations of GDP as a measure of wellbeing.3 For an eloquent summary, however, we know nothing better than Senator Robert Kennedy's 1968 address to the University of Kansas:\nToo much and too long, we seem to have surrendered community excellence and community values in the mere accumulation of material things. Our gross national product ... if we should judge America by thatcounts air pollution and cigarette advertising, and ambulances to clear our highways of carnage. It counts special locks for our doors and the jails for those who break them. It counts the destruction of our redwoods and the loss of our natural wonder in chaotic sprawl. It counts napalm and the cost of a nuclear warhead, and armored cars for police who fight riots in our streets. It counts Whitman's rifle and Speck's knife, and the television programs which glorify violence in order to sell toys to our children.\n\nYet the gross national product does not allow for the health of our children, the quality of their education, or the joy of their play. It does not include the beauty of our poetry or the strength of our marriages; the intelligence of our public debate or the integrity of our public officials. It measures neither our wit nor our courage; neither our wisdom nor our learning; neither our compassion nor our devotion to our country; it measures everything, in short, except that which makes life worthwhile. And it tells us everything about America except why we are proud that we are Americans.4\nThe human development approach, report, and index were introduced in part to respond concerns like those of Senator's Kennedy.\nAs Amartya Sen, one of the creators of the Human Development Approach, has said, \"Human development, as an approach, is concerned with what I take to be the basic development idea: namely, advancing the richness of human life, rather than the richness of the economy in which human beings live, which is only a part of it.\"5 (See box.)\n\n## What Is Human Development About?\n\nSource: UN Development Program (UNDP), \"About Human Development,\" Human Development Reports (\"About\" tab), accessed January 21, 2021, http://hdr.undp.org/en/humandev.\n\nThe first Human Development Report, published in 1990 by the\nUnited Nations Development Program, introduced a new approach\nfor advancing human well-being, which centers on:\n     People: Human development focuses on improving the lives\npeople lead rather than assuming that economic growth will lead,\nautomatically, to greater well-being for all. Income growth is seen as\na means to development, rather than an end in itself.\n     Opportunities: Human development is about giving people\nmore freedom to live lives they value. In effect this means devel-\noping people's abilities and giving them a chance to use them. For\nexample, educating a girl would build her skills, but it is of little use\nif she is denied access to jobs or does not have the right skills for\nthe local labor market. Three foundations for human development\nare to live a long, healthy, and creative life; to be knowledgeable;\nand to have access to resources needed for a decent standard of\nliving. Many other things are important, too, especially in helping\nto create the right conditions for human development. Once the\n\nbasics of human development are achieved, they open up opportu-\nnities for progress in other aspects of life.\n    Choice: Human development is, fundamentally, about more\nchoice. It is about providing people with opportunities, not insisting\nthat they make use of them. No one can guarantee human happi-\nness, and the choices people make are their own concern. The pro-\ncess of developmenthuman developmentshould at least create\nan environment for people, individually and collectively, to develop\nto their full potential and to have a reasonable chance of leading\nproductive and creative lives that they value.\n\nMeasurement is an important facet of quantifying and promoting human development thinking. *Human Development Reports*, since the first in 1990, has published the Human Development Index (HDI) that ranks all the world's countries by their level of human development (see Figure 1). Even so, the report authors have always recognized that the concept of human development is much broader than the HDI, making it impossible to come up with a comprehensive measure, or even a comprehensive set of indicators, because many dimensions of human development are non-quantifiable.\n\nThat said, the dimensions of human development include:\n\n- Education, Health, and Command over Resources: Particularly income and nutrition.\n- Participation and Freedom: Particularly empowerment, gender equality, and civil and political rights.\n- Human Security: In daily life against chronic threats, such as\nhunger, and abrupt disruptions including joblessness, famine,\nconflict, crime, etc.\n- Equity: In the distribution of all of the above. - Sustainability: For future generations in ecological, economic,\nand social terms.\n\n## Covid-19 And Inequality In Human Development\n\nAnd so, when considering the impact of COVID-19 on inequality, we will consider its impact on many facets of human development. All of these elements are important and, when taken together, paint a much more detailed picture of life than would be presented using a narrower focus on income inequality.\n\nDevelopment Reports (\"About\" tab), accessed January 21, 2021, http://hdr.undp.org/en/humandev.\n\n## Covid-19 And Its Impact On The Primary Pillars Of Human Development\n\nThe COVID-19 pandemic has hit all the key dimensions of human development. By late January 2021, it has caused within one year more than 2 million confirmed direct deaths, surpassing the annual deaths caused by malaria, HIV/AIDS, interpersonal violence, conflict, and international terrorism combined.6 In addition, the crisis is expected to have broad indirect health impacts, including the likely increase in child and maternal mortality across low- and middle-income countries.7\nThe United Nations (UN) has called the COVID-19 pandemic\n\"the greatest test that we have faced since the formation of the United Nations.\"8 This pandemic is, the UN argues, more than a health emergency: it is a systemic crisis that is affecting economies and societies in unprecedented ways.9\nShocks emanating from nature are part of human life. Most countries have made tremendous progress in dealing with relatively frequent shocks, thanks to continuous learning and preparedness through policies and social norms. However, the ability to respond to very rare or new shocks is much lower and more unequally distributed. The 2019 Human Development Report highlighted that among the new generation of capabilities needed for 21st century challenges is resilience to low-frequency, high-impact shocks.10 The COVID-19 pandemic is an example that shows, all too clearly, the effects of a large-scale shock emerging from ecological systems under pressure from humanity.11 COVID-19 has hit a world wealthier than ever but facing deep divides in human development that affect our vulnerability toand preparedness forsuch crises.\n\nIt is too early for a comprehensive assessment of the consequences of COVID-19 on human development (as we write in early 2021, daily deaths were higher than at any point during 2020). The likely impacts on people's capabilities can be simulated, however, using a version of the HDI that is more sensitive to the effects of COVID-19. This adjusted index retains the standard HDI dimensions but modifies the education indicators to reflect the effects of school closures and other COVID-related impacts on education.\n\nDuring 2020 the capabilities accounted for in the HDIhealth, education, and incomewere all severely affected:\n\n- Income: Global gross national product per capita is estimated\nto have fallen more than 5 percent in 2020.12\n- Education: Whether students are actively engaged in education\ndepends on physical and virtual access to learning. The disruption in education has been unprecedented. During 2020 schools\nclosed in most countries at some point, affecting more than 1.4 billion young peoplearound 86 percent of the world's student populationin April 2020 at the peak of school closures.13\nWhile some have had the opportunity to keep learning remotely, mainly thanks to Internet access, others have experienced an almost complete loss of formal learning throughout 2020.\n- Health: Two million direct deaths from COVID-19 and a\nstill-undetermined number of indirect deaths have affected\nlife expectancy at birth for 2020. Adjusted UN figures14 provide a conservative estimate of the potential effects of COVID-\n19 on health.15 Under this simulated and optimistic scenario,16\nglobal life expectancy at birth in 2020 is assumed be around its level in 2019.17\nTaken together, these factors yield a COVID-19-adjusted HDI\nthat projects a steep decline in human development worldwide in 2020, led by a massive setback in effective education. The index's decline (under conservative assumptions) is equivalent to erasing all progress in global human development over the past seven years, which is unprecedented (see Figure 2). If conditions in school access are restored, measured capabilities related to education will tend to bounce back, although with long-term costs in learning; the income dimension will follow the path of the post-crisis economic recovery.\n\nThis is a staggering outcome for school children, with long-term consequences for their potential development. The extent to which formal schooling is substituted with learning at homethrough parental involvement, own initiative, and Internet availabilityis a function of household means and support.18 As the 2019 Human Development Report has argued, parents' education shapes children's learning.19\nPublic education is meant to be an equalizerit can help break the intergenerational transmission of inequality. Quality education, regardless of parental education, is meant to provide equal opportunity for everyone. But, by disrupting schooling, the pandemic is taking that equalizer away from hundreds of millions of children, making it harder for them to break the intergenerational transfer of disadvantage.\n\nIn many countries, schools and universities have moved their courses and learning online. Yet access to technology is unequal20\nbecause, while there is convergence in access to basic technologies such as mobile phones, digital gaps between and within countries are widening in areas like access to computers, Internet, and broadband.\n\nThese are all examples of what the *Human Development Report* in\n2019 defined as \"enhanced capabilities\" (or the new necessities for life in the 21st century).21 The interaction of the pandemic with inequality in these enhanced capabilities means that many countries lack the option to move courses and schoolwork online (see box).\n\n## Out Of School During Covid-19\n\nWith widespread school closures during 2020, technology was used\nto continue the learning process. This positive development from the\ntechnological revolution has supported the resilience of education\nfor some in the face of shocks.\n    After accounting for those still learning from home, what was\nthe effective out-of-school rate during the peak of school closures\nin April 2020? Adjusting the percentage of primary school-age chil-\ndren facing school closures to account for those in households with\nInternet access sheds some light, yielding an optimistic estimate of\nthe out-of-school rate that assumes every child with Internet access\ncan continue learning. Assuming Internet access ensures continued\nlearning also provides an optimistic estimate of inequalities between\ncountries because it does not account for differences that will arise\naccording to how wealthy countries are, whether broadband is wide-\nspread, and so on.\n    The effective out-of-school rate jumped substantially every-\nwhere in 2020 (even under optimistic assumptions). For primary\neducation, the out-of-school rate was highest in low human devel-\nopment countries,22 rising to 86 percent of primary school-age\nchildren, an increase of 59 percentage points. This was followed by\nmedium human development countries (74 percent, an increase\nof 68 percentage pointsthe largest reversal) and high human\ndevelopment countries (47 percent, an increase of 41 percentage\npoints). Only in very high human development countries have most\nprimary school-age children been ablepotentially at leastto\ncontinue structured learning, with an effective out-of-school rate of\n20 percent (an increase of 19 percentage points).23\n\nOverall, this dramatic increase in out-of-school rates represents the largest reversal of this indicator in history, which is opening new gaps in human development. Being out of schooleven for a limited amount of timeis expected to inflict long-term scarring on learning, earning potential, and well-being.\n\nNotes: Data account for 86 percent of students in primary schoolage children worldwide.\n\nThe effective out-of-school rate has several caveats. First, a different indicator could be used to reflect access to online learning. Second, the rate does not account for other factors such as access to a device, least of all a personal device. Overall, this measure provides a rough estimate of the disruptive impacts of school closure.\n\nSource: Human Development Report Office calculations based on data, accessed on\nMay 6, 2020, from the International Telecommunications Union (https://www.itu.int/en/ ITU-D/Statistics/Pages/stat/default.aspx), the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization Institute for Statistics (https://en.unesco.org/covid19/education response), and the World Health Organization/ACAPS (https://www.acaps.org/covid-19- government-measures-dataset).\n\n## Covid-19 And Its Other Effects On Inequality\n\nThe COVID-19 crisis is a systemic human development crisis, and its effects go far beyond its impacts on health, education, and income. The pandemic's effects on inequality have been diverse, not least because some of the consequences of COVID-19 have had a greater impact on people who were already disadvantaged.\n\nInequality in the Response During the first months of the pandemic, without vaccine or therapeutics, most of the measures to slow the spread of COVID-19 were nonpharmaceutical interventions. The strategy of reducing contagion aimed not just to protect the most vulnerable populations, but also to avoid strain on health care systems. Even countries with plenty of hospital beds became overwhelmed during the pandemic's peaks,24\nso reducing virus transmission was important. In general, developed countries were faster to react (see Figure 4).\n\nMost countries around the globe have implemented nonpharmaceutical interventions to slow the spread of COVID-19. Measures that included both internal restrictions (domestic travel, checkpoints, curfews, and monitoring) and external restrictions (border closures, international flight suspensions, and visa restrictions or additional requirements on arrival) have been the most widespread, affecting more than 7 billion people in 183 countries by mid-April 2020. Measures related to movement and travel have affected tourism and other services, as well as global supply chains. By mid-April 2020, more than 1.4 billion children ages 517 in 147 countries (or 86 percent of children worldwide) were out of school.\n\nAnd now, in January 2021, discussion is quickly moving to the implications of unequal access to COVID-19 vaccine and how this might ratchet up those inequalities that have been exacerbated by COVID-19.\n\nIt is still too early to know whether and how this might change and what it might mean for inequality, but alarm bells are ringing.\n\nMore developed countries have secured access to most of the vaccine doses. The Duke Global Health Innovation Center estimated that, as of January 20, 2021, high-income nations had secured 4.2 billion doses. On the other hand, more populous, lower income countries had secured orders for only 680 million doses.25\nVaccination rates between countries also vary enormously.\n\nAlthough data should be interpreted with caution, in part because some vaccines require two doses and others one dose, the scale of difference in vaccinating one's population is stark. As of January 20, 2021, Israel had administered a total number of doses equal to almost one-third of its population, while Brazil's total was fewer than\n1/1000th of the Brazilian population (see Figure 5).26\nThe international community is already raising the alarm about the longer term effects of such high levels of inequality. In late January, the World Health Organization's Independent Panel for Pandemic Preparedness and Response noted that the response has deepened inequalities and that \"inequitable access to vaccines is amongst the most glaring examples of inequality exacerbated by the pandemic.\"27 The panel's co-chair, Ellen Johnson Sirleaf, said that \"the vaccine roll-out is currently favoring wealthy countries. A world where high-income countries receive universal coverage while low-income countries are expected to accept only twenty per cent in the foreseeable future is on the wrong footingboth for justice and for pandemic control. This failure must be remedied.\"28\nLabor and Poverty Impacts Social distancing and the pause in much nonessential business have disrupted work. The International Labor Organization estimates that in the second quarter of 2020, working hours fell by the equivalent of 495 million full-time workers.29 Employment was hit through two channels: a contraction in labor demand from reduced human activity and the financial effects of the global recession, and a short-term drop in labor supply from the suspension of nonessential business.30\nHow to respond remains a matter of debate. The usual macroeconomic tools of stimulating consumption and encouraging economic activity are difficult to apply when public health policies are also looking to slow the spread of COVID-19 by reducing human interaction and, as a result, economic activity.\n\nThese effects are intertwined with varying propagation patterns.\n\nVery high human development countries, for the most part, suffered the health shock first and responded with strong health systems and\n\nsupportive monetary and fiscal policies. By September 2020, $12 trillion had been devoted to finance emergency fiscal programs, most of themaround $10 trillion in the G20 economies.31\nBut, as the pandemic spread more widely, countries less able to cope with a health crisis were hit. And this hit happened during what had now become a global economic collapse with rising uncertainty, including in health security, food security, and job security.32\nThe number of people living in extreme poverty is estimated by the World Bank to have increased by 88-115 million in 2020.33 As a result of the pandemic, 1 billion people could be living in extreme poverty by 2030. The UN Food and Agriculture Organization estimates the number of undernourished people increased from 688 million in\n2019 to 780-829 million in 2020.34\nWithin countries, the pandemic is exposing the disadvantages already faced by low-income groupsand magnifying fissures. For instance, in the United States, employment for people earning less than $27,000 a year decreased by 35 percent in April 2020, but by only 13 percent for those earning over $60,000 a year.35 Employment had rebounded by fall 2020 for the latter group but not the former.36\nSocial distancing directives in the workplace also have dramatically unequal implications. People with higher incomes are more likely to be able to work from home, and so continue to both earn and stay healthy.37 People in low-income groups are more likely to be in \"essential\" occupationsthose that require workers to come to the workplace and risk exposure to infection.38 A study based on data from mobile devices in the United States shows that people in wealthier groups are staying home more than those in low-income groups. In those metro areas with the bigger disparities between rich and poor, people in high-income neighborhoods stopped moving right after official guidance. People in lower income neighborhoods reduced movement as well, but later and only partially.39\nAdditionally, economic crises threaten health and health system performance. Financial pressure hinders access to health services while the need for health services grows. Negative health effects disproportionately affect groups already vulnerable to shocks, such as the unemployed.40 Mental health problems have also increased.41\nPatterns of Morbidity by Ethnicity COVID-19 has been an x-ray exposing how inequalities exacerbate shocksand vice versa. Consider the two countries with the most confirmed COVID-19 deaths at the time of writing: the United States and Brazil. In the United States, black/African American people and Hispanic/Latino people are nearly three times as likely as white people to test positive for COVID-19 and five times as likely to be hospitalized.42 In Brazil, being of mixed ethnicity has been the second most important risk factorafter agefor death among hospitalized COVID-19 patients.43\nAcross Latin America, the pandemic has spread rapidly across rural indigenous communities, home to nearly 42 million people, 80\npercent of them in Bolivia, Guatemala, Mexico, and Peru.44, 45 In Peru,\n7580 percent of the population in villages within the indigenous communities of Caimito, Pucacuro, and Cantagallo have been infected.46 In Mexico, indigenous people who contract COVID-19 have a higher risk of pneumonia, hospitalization, and death than others.47\nGender Inequalities Across many social, economic, and political areas, women and girls are disproportionately affected by the crisis.48 Although the COVID-\n19 crisis affects everyone, women and girls face specific and often disproportionate risks due to deeply entrenched inequalities, social norms, and unequal power relations.\n\nWomen are also more often on the frontline of the COVID-19\nresponse, putting them at a higher risk of exposure to the virus. They make up 70 percent of the workers in the health and social services sector globally,49 and they constitute most health facility service staff.50 Across the very high, high, and medium human development country groups, women make up more than 85 percent of nursing personnel and almost half of doctors for all countries except those with low human development.51\nWomen's health is also being hurt by the reallocation of resources and priorities away from areas such as sexual and reproductive health services.52 This redirection could lead to an increase in maternal mortality and morbidity, adolescent pregnancies, and HIV and sexually transmitted diseases, as seen during previous health crises like the Ebola and Zika virus outbreaks.53 Simulations by the UN Population Fund show that, if COVID-19 lockdowns shut reproductive health services for six months in low- and middle-income countries, 47 million women are expected to lose regular access to modern contraceptives, leading to an expected additional 7 million unintended pregnancies.54\nThe pandemic's economic impacts have left no country or population unscathed, and women are, again, disproportionately affected.55 Women generally have less capacity than men to absorb economic shocks because they have lower earnings, savings, and job security. Women are also overrepresented in the informal sector: 740 million women worldwide, and over 70 percent of women in informal employment in developing economies.56 Due to the nature of this work, women are less likely to have paid sick leave, protection against dismissals, and other workers' rights if they are affected by the crisis.\n\nWidespread lockdowns around the world mean many women and girls are being asked to stay home and isolate in a space that is supposed to be safe but often is not, increasing the risk they will go hungry or suffer gender-based violence. Already toxic social norms, combined with increased economic and social stress from the pandemic, have driven an increase in gender-based violence, with many women in lockdown with their abusers.57 Meanwhile services to support survivors are disrupted or inaccessible.\n\nGlobally, women spend an average of 3.2 more hours a day on unpaid care and domestic work than men.58 With quarantine measures, the workload in caring for children, the sick, and the elderly, as well as household tasks, will likely increase. Furthermore, the gradual reopening will pose additional challenges for women as it could push them more permanently out of the labor force or into part-time jobs while increasing their responsibilities at home. This pressure intensifies for single mothers.59 This burden, combined with the lockdowns, has reduced the female labor force participation rate in Mexico, Chile, and Colombia by 10 percentage points, erasing decades of progress (see Figure 6).\n\nin Mexico, Chile, and Colombia.\n\nNote: Refers to the population ages 15 and older.\n\nEducation is crucial to allowing women to increase their ability to make decisions and act on them. School closures and lockdowns, however, mean that as many as 10 million girls at the secondary-school level could be out of school due to the crisis. 60 And remember that, for many girls in low-income countries, access to education was already a challenge before the outbreak.61\nLonger Term Impacts of COVID-19 on Inequality Looking even further beyond the crisis, it becomes more difficult to predict the impact of the pandemic on inequalities. But the forecast is not rosy.\n\nFirst, there might be scarring effects particularly among young people. Education shutdowns or long-term unemployment when first entering the labor market, for example, might hurt people for the rest of their lives.\n\nSecond, inequalities in some of the less tangible aspects of life, such as trust in institutions and in each other, have also widened between and within countries.62 A Pew Research poll from mid-2020 found that, while 72 percent of Danes felt their country was more united following the virus's spread, only 18 percent of Americans did.63\nThe loss of trust will be felt in many areas, from governance to mental health:\n\n- In the United States, the impact of the pandemic on people's\nemotionsincluding depressionappears to have been worse among those who have little trust in others.64\n- Inequalities in trust also impact our ability to manage shocks\nin the future: \"trust in government by citizens and businesses\nis essential for effective and efficient policy making both in\ngood times and bad.\"65\n- As the UNDP's *2020 Human Development Report* points out,\n\"social and planetary imbalances interact in a vicious cycle,\" each exacerbating the other. Climate change, among other\ndangerous planetary changes, will only make global inequality worse, and yet collective action on climate change becomes more difficult against a backdrop of social fragmentation.66\nEven before the COVID-19 pandemic struck, the 2019 Human Development Report had showcased remaining gaps in traditional areas of inequality along with widening gaps in new domains.67 For example, while life expectancy at birth has been slowly converging (meaning that inequality in this indicator has been declining) between countries, life expectancy at 70an enhanced capability has been diverging rapidly. Similarly, inter-country inequality in primary education has decreased, but inequality in tertiary education (also an enhanced capability) has increased.\nNotwithstanding the pandemic, climate change and technological transformation have exacerbated these growth trends in enhanced-capability inequality, as the most vulnerable populations are often the most severely impacted by shocks. Climate change, in particular, is slowing economic progress and sharpening inequalities, as explored in the *2020 Human Development Report*.68 For example, per capita income in most countries would have been higher if not for climate change, especially in low-income countries where income would have been nearly one-third higher.69 Indeed, income inequality among countries is estimated to be 25 percent higher due to climate change.70\nThe impact of planetary change also depends on specific context. Countries with higher social vulnerability (e.g., larger inequalities in human development, greater empowerment gaps for women, and a higher proportion of children projected by 2030) face greater ecological risks (e.g., resource scarcity and natural disasters). Intergenerational inequalities in the present are linked to inequality and environmental damage across generations, including through procedural (legal) and distributional (economic) inequalities.71\nMoreover, current inequalities in empowerment are a root cause of environmental threats to future generations. Horizontal inequalities can particularly exacerbate intergenerational inequalities and environmental degradation.\n\nSome of the public policy responses to the pandemic have aimed at a green recovery, but these have mostly been pursued by high- income countries.72 Furthermore, some low-carbon investments could further widen inequalities within countries. For example, high-speed trains can benefit urban rather than rural populations, while green credit facilities or R&D subsidies can favor the formal over the informal segments of an economy.73\n\n## Conclusion\n\nThe effects of COVID-19 are unprecedented in their impact on inequality. The effects are real and significant between countries, within countries, and across almost any aspect of human development you might consider: from the health of people to the health of our planet's climate; in education, employment, and income; and from our trust in each other to inequality between men and women.\n\nMoreover, in many cases, an individual's place in the pyramid of existing inequalities has played a role in determining the direct and indirect impacts of the pandemic. In the United States, for example, \"Black and Latino Americans have experienced a disproportionate burden of COVID-19 morbidity and mortality, reflecting persistent structural inequalities that increase risk of exposure to COVID-19 and mortality risk for those infected.\"74\nAnd so COVID-19 is a wedge pushing existing inequalities even wider and creating new ones. New types of inequality in \"enhanced\"\naspects of human development (e.g., access to broadband Internet) are proving particularly important in determining how people weather the COVID-19 storm.\n\nThis chapter has touched on just some of these areas to convey the sweeping scale of the challenge. Much of the data are preliminary, and it would be courageous to try to put more precision on what has happenedand will happento inequality in light of COVID-19.\n\nWe can be certain that inequality is set to worsen around the world because of COVID-19. And we can be sure that inequalityat all levels of geographywill have an important influence on national security. We saw the impact of growing inequality in 2019 with social unrest in several countries. But the future is not set in stone. As always, every country has a choice in determining where its people will head, as we try to \"build back better\" from the pandemic.\n\n\n\nJon Hall, a policy specialist in the Human Development Report Office of the UN Development Program (UNDP), has been thinking about how to quantifyand influencenational development since 2000. His 2002 work for the Australian Bureau of Statistics on Measuring Australia's Progress won a national award as the \"smartest\" social project of the year. Mr. Hall led a project at the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development promoting these ideas (2005-09), and since 2012 he has been working on strengthening national human development reporting. In 2013 he was one of ten \"global opinion leaders\" to meet with German Chancellor Angela Merkel. He holds a master's degree in applied statistics and econometrics and another in public service administration.\n\nCarolina Rivera Vazquez is an economist, currently working for the Human Development Report Office at UNDP. Her research focuses on gender inequalities and social justice. She previously worked as a public policy specialist for UNDP Mexico's Country Office, on the analysis and mapping of indicators and public policies on human development, poverty, and governance at the local level. Ms. Rivera\n\nVazquez has applied her skills in policy analysis, strategy design, and model development with the Organization of American States, the Central Bank of Mexico, and international development organizations including the Center for Effective Global Action and the Bixby Center for Global Reproductive Health. She holds a master's degree in public policy from the University of California, Berkeley.\n\nHeriberto Tapia is the research and strategic partnership advisor at the Human Development Report Office at UNDP, where he has been part of the research team since 2014. Previously, he served in the Executive Office of UNDP and in the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean. Dr. Tapia has been a lecturer in universities throughout the United States and Chile. He holds a Ph.D. in economics from Columbia University, as well as a master's degree in economics and a commercial engineering degree from the University of Chile.\n\nJacob Assa has worked at the United Nations for 22 years, most recently as an economist and co-author of the UNDP Human Development Reports, Inequality in Human Development (2019) and The Next Frontier: Human Development and the Anthropocene (2020). Dr. Assa has published on inequality and growth, financialization, peacebuilding and development, and the political economy of national accounting in journals including *Ecological Economics* and *New Political Economy*. He holds a Ph.D. in economics from the New School for Social Research and his doctoral dissertation, The Financialization of GDP: Implications for Economic Theory and Policy, has been published by Routledge.\n\n2\nSimon Kuznets, \"National Income, 1929-1932,\" National Bureau of Economic Research, Bulletin 49 (June 7, 1934), findings first provided in U.S. Senate\nDocument 124, 73rd Congress, 2nd Session, https://www.nber.org/system/files/ chapters/c2258/c2258.pdf.\n3\nJoseph Stiglitz, Amartya Sen, and Jean-Paul Fitoussi, Report by the Commission on the Measurement of Economic Performance and Social Progress, commissioned by the Government of France, 2010, https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/\ndocuments/8131721/8131772/Stiglitz-Sen-Fitoussi-Commission-report.pdf.\n4\nRobert F. Kennedy, \"Remarks at the University of Kansas, March 18, 1968,\" John F. Kennedy Presidential Library and Museum, transcribed from original recording in Lawrence, Kansas (March 18, 1968), https://www.jfklibrary.org/learn/ about-jfk/the-kennedy-family/robert-f-kennedy/robert-f-kennedy-speeches/ remarks-at-the-university-of-kansas-march-18-1968.\n5\n\"Amartya Sen: A More Human Theory of Development,\" Interview with Amartya Sen, Asia Society, December 6, 2004, https://asiasociety.org/amartya-senmore-human-theory-development.\n6\nGlobal Burden of Disease 2019, Institute for Health Metrics and Evaluation (IHME), University of Washington, October 2020 (published in *The Lancet*),\nhttp://www.healthdata.org/gbd/gbd-2019-resources.\n7\nTimothy Roberton et al., \"Early Estimates of the Indirect Effects of the COVID- 19 Pandemic on Maternal and Child Mortality in Low-Income and Middle-\nIncome Countries: A Modelling Study,\" *The Lancet Global Health* 8, no. 5\n(May 12, 2020): E901-E908, https://www.thelancet.com/pdfs/journals/langlo/ PIIS2214-109X(20)30229-1.pdf.\n8\n\"UN Launches COVID-19 Plan That Could 'Defeat the Virus and Build a Better World,'\" *UN News*, March 31, 2020, https://news.un.org/en/story/2020/\n03/1060702. The United Nations has called for the magnitude of the response to match the scale of the crisis, with a framework for immediate socioeconomic responses that presents a roadmap to suppress the various transmissions, control the pandemic, safeguard people's lives, and learn from the crisis to build back better.\n9\n\"UN launches COVID-19 plan,\" *UN News*.\n10\nUNDP, Human Development Report 2019Beyond Income, Beyond Averages, Beyond Today: Inequalities in Human Development in the 21st Century (New\nYork: UNDP, 2019), http://hdr.undp.org/sites/default/files/hdr2019.pdf.\n11\nE. S. Brondizio, J. Settele, S. Diaz, and H. T. Ngo, eds., Global Assessment Report on Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services (Bonn, Germany: Intergovernmental Science-Policy Platform on Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services (IPBES), 2019), https://ipbes.net/global-assessment. Even though the specific anthropogenic origin of the SARS-CoV-2 virus is under study, it represents a manifestation\nof a risk scientist have been warning of for years, a result of human pressure on the planet. Zoonotic diseases are substantial threats to human health, with vector-borne diseases accounting for approximately 17 percent of all infectious\ndiseases and causing an estimated 700,000 deaths a year globally.\n12 International Monetary Fund (IMF), \"Policies for the Recovery,\" Fiscal Monitor, October 14, 2020, https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/FM/\nIssues/2020/10/27/Fiscal-Monitor-October-2020-Policies-for-the- Recovery- 49642. Based on projections of gross domestic product per capita for 2020, prepared by the International Monetary Fund in October 2020 as part of the World Economic Outlook.\n13\nHuman Development Group calculations based on data by mid-April 2020 from \"COVID-19 Government Measures,\" Report #5, Assessment Capabilities Project (ACAPS), May 1, 2020, accessed May 6, 2020, https://www.acaps.org/sites/\nacaps/files/products/files/20200501_acaps_covid19_government_measures_ report_update.pdf; and WHO 2020 ACAPS (Assessment Capacities Project) and WHO (World Health Organization) 2020, May 6, 2020 (https://www.acaps.org/ covid-19-government-measures-dataset). In data recorded by the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), the number of countries affected is even larger, around 180, reflecting that more countries\nhave enacted local closures. UNESCO, COVID-19 Educational Disruption and Response, April 2020 (updated global map of school closures now available at UNESCO, *Education: From disruption to recovery*, https://en.unesco.org/covid19/\neducationresponse).\n14\nUN Department of Economic and Social Affairs (UNDESA), Population Division, *2019 Revision of World Population Prospects*, 2019, https://population.un.\norg/wpp/#:~:text=The%202019%20Revision%20of%20World%20Population% 20Prospects%20is,and%20Social%20Affairs%20of%20the%20United%20 Nations%20Secretariat.\n15\nRoberton et al., \"Early Estimates of the Indirect Effects of the COVID- 19 Pandemic on Maternal and Child Mortality.\" Based on Roberton et al.'s low-impact scenario, one of three they constructed for infant and maternal mortality linked to disrupted health services and increase in malnutrition\nin low- and middle-income countries. The low-impact scenario assumes\nsmall reductions in health services due to demand and supply factors (e.g., movement restrictions, fear of infection, economic pressure, reallocation of resources to the pandemic response) and a 10 percent increase in wasting prevalence. For global estimates of child mortality under different scenarios, see also Oliver Fiala, \"Using Data to Support the Most Vulnerable Children,\"\nSave the Children, April 12, 2020, https://www.savethechildren.net/blog/\nusing-data-support-most-vulnerable-children.\n16\nStudies on the effect of the COVID-19 pandemic over life expectancy are\nemerging, for example, Elizabeth Arias et al., \"Provisional Life Expectancy Estimates for January through June 2020,\" NVSS Vital Statistics Rapid Release, Report 10 (February 2021), https://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/vsrr/VSRR10- 508.pdf; Francesco Bianchi et al., \"The Long-term Impact of the COVID-19 Unemployment Shock on Life Expectancy and Mortality Rates,\" National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) Working Paper 28304, December 2020, https://www.nber.org/papers/w28304; Simone Ghislandi et al., \"News from the Front: Excess Mortality and Life Expectancy in Two Major Epicentres of the COVID-19 Pandemic in Italy,\" preprint posted posted May 13, 2020, https:// www.medrxiv.org/content/medrxiv/early/2020/05/13/2020.04.29.20084335.\nfull.pdf; Guillaume Marois et al., \"Assessing the Potential Impact of COVID-\n19 on Life Expectancy,\" *Plos One*, September 17, 2020, https://journals.plos.\norg/plosone/article?id=10.1371/journal.pone.0238678; and Sergi Trias-Llimos and Usama Bilal, \"Impact of the COVID-19 Pandemic on Life Expectancy in\nMadrid (Spain),\" *Journal of Public Health* 42, no. 3 (September 2020): 635-36,\nhttps://academic.oup.com/jpubhealth/article/42/3/635/5857763?login=true. Nevertheless, there is still no consensus on a robust global effect, and, in this context, the conservative choice of adjustment to life expectancy gives robustness to the main message of the sharp drop in human development.\n17\nUNDESA, *2019 Revision of World Population Prospects*. The authors' adjustment is rather conservative and based on available information as of mid-May 2020. The adjustment implicitly assumes the deployment of policies to minimize the disruption of COVID-19 on essential health services (see Roberton et al, \"Early Estimates of the Indirect Effects of the COVID-19 Pandemic\"). The authors' adjustment also does not consider other sources of excess mortality such as increased HIV, tuberculosis, or malaria (see Alexandra B. Hogan et al., \"The Potential Impact of the COVID-19 Epidemic on HIV, TB and Malaria in Low- and Middle-Income Countries,\" MRC Centre for Global Infectious Disease Analysis, Imperial College London, Report 19 (May 1, 2020), https://www.\nimperial.ac.uk/mrc-global-infectious-disease-analysis/covid-19/report-19-\nhiv-tb-malaria/). There might be, on the other hand, some reduction in mortality coming from other causes linked to lower economic activity in developed countries (see Joan Ballester et al., \"Effect of the Great Recession on Regional\nMortality Trends in Europe,\" *Nature Communications* 10, no. 679 (February 8,\n2019), https://www.nature.com/articles/s41467-019-08539-w/).\n18\nFamilies with means are conversant with a vast landscape of online learning resources, including Khan Academy, Coursera, massive open online courses, online visits to museums, and so on.\n19\nUNDP, *Human Development Report 2019*. In the United States, children of professional parents are exposed to more than three times as many words as children in households that receive welfare benefits.\n20\nUNDP, *Human Development Report 2019*.\n21\nUNDP, *Human Development Report 2019*.\n22\nThe 2014 Human Development Report introduced a system of fixed cutoff points for the four categories of human development achievements. The cutoff points (COP) are the HDI values calculated using the quartiles (q) from the distributions of the component indicators averaged over 200413: Very high human development 0.800 and above, High human development 0.7000.799,\nMedium human development 0.5500.699, and Low human development Below 0.550. To find more information please consult our Technical Notes (http://hdr.undp.org/en/content/hdr-technical-notes).\n23\nAuthors' calculations based on data, accessed on May 6, 2020, from the International Telecommunications Union (https://www.itu.int/en/ITU-D/Statistics/ Pages/stat/default.aspx), the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization Institute for Statistics (https://en.unesco.org/covid19/education response), and the World Health Organization/ACAPS (https://www.acaps.org/ covid-19-government-measures-dataset).\n24\nLars Jensen and George Gray Molina, \"COVID-19 and Health System Vulnerabilities in the Poorest Developing Countries,\" *UNDP Transitions Series*, June 2020,\nhttps://www.undp.org/content/undp/en/home/librarypage/transitions- series/ covid-19-and-health-system-vulnerabilities-in-the-poorest-develo.html.\n25\n\"Mapping COVID-19 Vaccine Pre-purchases Across the Globe,\" Duke Global Health Innovation Center, 2020 data, accessed on January 20, 2021, https:// launchandscalefaster.org/COVID-19.\n26\nCoronavirus (COVID-19) Vaccinations, Our World in Data, accessed January\n20, 2021, https://ourworldindata.org/covid-vaccinations.\n27\n\"Independent Panel for Pandemic Preparedness and Response Urges Countries\nto Take Proven Measures Now to Mitigate COVID-19 Pandemic,\" Independent Panel for Pandemic Preparedness and Response, News Release, January 18, 2021, https://mailchi.mp/ipppr/the-independent-panel-analysing-timelineof-pandemic-who-recommendations-9671838.\n28\n\"Independent Panel for Pandemic Preparedness and Response Urges Countries to Take Proven Measures.\"\n29\nInternational Labor Organization (ILO),  ILO Monitor: COVID-19 and the World of Work, sixth edition, September 23, 2020, https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/\npublic/---dgreports/---dcomm/documents/briefingnote/wcms_755910.pdf.\n30\nVeronica Guerrieri et al., \"Macroeconomic Implications of COVID-19: Can Negative Supply Shocks Cause Demand Shortages?,\" NBER Working Paper 26918, April 2020, https://www.nber.org/papers/w26918. See the analytical model analyzing the case of the interlinks between these shocksthe transmission from a short-term supply shock to a deeper demand shock.\n31\nIMF, \"Policies for the Recovery.\"\n32\nUN Sustainable Development Group (UNSDG), Shared Responsibility, Global Solidarity: Responding to the Socio-Economic Impacts of COVID-19, March\n2020, https://unsdg.un.org/resources/shared-responsibility-global-solidarityresponding-socio-economic-impacts-covid-19.\n33\nThe World Bank, \"COVID-19 To Add as Many as 150 Million Extreme Poor by 2021,\" Press Release, October 7, 2020, https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/ press-release/2020/10/07/covid-19-to-add-as-many-as-150-million-extremepoor-by-2021; Andy Sumner, Chris Hoy, and Eduardo Ortiz-Juarez, \"Estimates of the Impact of COVID-19 on Global Poverty,\" United Nations University World Institute for Development Economics Research (UNU-WIDER), WIDER Working Paper 2020/43 (April 2020), https://www.wider.unu.edu/sites/default/ files/Publications/Working-paper/PDF/wp2020-43.pdf: Under more pessimistic scenariosassuming that household income per capita could fall 5-20 percent extreme poverty could increase by 80-420 million.\n34\nFood and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), The State of Food Security and Nutrition in the World: Transforming Food Systems for Affordable Healthy Diets (Rome, Italy: FAO, 2020), http://www.fao.org/documents/\ncard/en/c/ca9692en.\n35\nOpportunity Insights, *Economic Tracker* (Economic Impacts of COVID-19\nAcross the United States), Harvard University, accessed on March 30, 2020, https://tracker.opportunityinsights.org.\n36\nOpportunity Insights, *Economic Tracker*.\n37\nJonathan I. Dingel and Brent Neiman, \"How Many Jobs Can be Done at Home?,\"\nNBER Working Paper 26948, April 2020,  https://www.nber.org/system/files/\nworking_papers/w26948/revisions/w26948.rev0.pdf. See the description of the\nbreakdown in the United States.\n38\nElizabeth Ananat and Anna Gassman-Pines, \"Snapshot of the COVID Crisis Impact on Working Families,\" The ECONOFACT Network, March 30, 2020, https://perma.cc/LX9Z-VB7J.\n39\nJennifer Valentino-DeVries, Denise Lu, and Gabriel J.X. Dance, \"Location Data\nSays It All: Staying at Home During Coronavirus Is a Luxury,\" *New York Times*,\nJune 11, 2020, https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2020/04/03/us/coronavirusstay-home-rich-poor.html.\n40\nSarah Thomson et al., Economic Crisis, Health Systems and Health in Europe: Impact and Implications for Policy (Copenhagen, Denmark: WHO, 2015), https://\nwww.euro.who.int/__data/assets/pdf_file/0008/257579/Economic-crisis-healthsystems-Europe-impact-implications-policy.pdf.\n41\nFor instance, there is evidence of higher suicide rates in developed countries. (see Shu-Sen Chang et al., \"Impact of 2008 Global Economic Crisis on Suicide:\nTime Trend Study in 54 Countries,\" *The British Medical Journal (BMJ)*, September 17, 2013, https://www.bmj.com/content/347/bmj.f5239; Aaron Reeves et al., \"Increase in State Suicide Rates in the USA During Economic Recession,\"\nThe Lancet 380, no. 9856 (November 24, 2012), https://www.thelancet.com/\njournals/lancet/article/PIIS0140-6736(12)61910-2/fulltext.\n42\nCenters for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) COVID-19 Response Team, \"Geographic Differences in COVID-19 Cases, Deaths, and Incidence\nUnited States, February 12April 7, 2020,\" Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report 69, no. 15 (April 17, 2020): 465-71, https://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/\nvolumes/69/wr/mm6915e4.htm#suggestedcitation; Samantha Artiga, Bradley Corallo, and Olivia Pham, \"Racial Disparities in COVID-19: Key Findings from Available Data and Analysis,\" Kaiser Family Foundation (KFF), August 17, 2020,\nhttps://www.kff.org/racial-equity-and-health-policy/issue-brief/racialdisparities-covid-19-key- findings-available-data-analysis/; Lily Rubin-Miller et al., \"COVID-19 Racial Disparities in Testing, Infection, Hospitalization, and Death: Analysis of Epic Patient Data,\" KFF, September 16, 2020, https://www. kff.org/ coronavirus-covid-19/issue-brief/covid-19-racial-disparities-testinginfection- hospitalization-death-analysis-epic-patient-data/.\n43\nPedro Baqui et al., \"Ethnic and Regional Variations in Hospital Mortality from\nCOVID-19 in Brazil: A Cross-Sectional Observational Study,\" The Lancet Global Health 8, no. 8 (August 1, 2020): E1018-E1026, https://www.thelancet.\ncom/journals/langlo/article/PIIS2214-109X(20)30285-0/fulltext.\n44\nMost of the countries in the region do not have official disaggregated data by\nethnicity, but some rough estimates are presented according to regions, states, or municipalities that have higher representation of indigenous peoples. (see Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) and Red de Investigaciones sobre Indigenas Urbanos (RISIU), \"Contribucion Continental al Informe del Relator Especial sobre los derechos de los pueblos indigenas\"\n[Continental Contribution to the Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples], Consejo Latinoamericano de Ciencias Sociales (CLACSO), 2020, https://www.clacso.org/contribucion-continental-al- informedel-relator-especial-sobre-los-derechos-de-los-pueblos-indigenas/.)\n45\nSebastian Iglesias-Osores and Johnny Leandro Saavedra-Camacho, \"COVID- 19 en comunidades indigenas del Peru: casos y accesibilidad a servicios de salud\" [COVID-19 in Indigenous Communities of Peru: Cases and Accessibility to Health Services], *An Fac med*. 81, no. 2 (May 2020): 250-51, https://\nwww.researchgate.net/publication/341611755_COVID-19_en_comunidades_ indigenas_selvaticas; Sergio Meneses-Navarro et al., \"The Challenges Facing Indigenous Communities in Latin America as They Confront the COVID-19\nPandemic,\" *International Journal for Equity in Health* 19, no. 63 (May 7, 2020),\nhttps://equityhealthj.biomedcentral.com/articles/10.1186/s12939-020-01178-4.\n46\nJess Cherofsky, \"Abandoned by Government, Peru's Indigenous Peoples Lead\nPowerful COVID-19 Response,\" *Cultural Survival*, September 3, 2020, https://\nwww.culturalsurvival.org/news/abandoned-government-perus-indigenouspeoples-lead-powerful-covid-19-response; Guillermo and Gina Somra, \"In This Indigenous Village, Two Nurses Care for Hundreds of COVID-19 Patients,\" CNN, Galdos June 23, 2020, https://www.cnn.com/2020/06/23/americas/ peru-coronavirus-caimito-nurse-intl/index.html; Emerson Mucushua and Elmer Huerta, \"Coronavirus: Unos 600 habitantes de Pucacuro en Loreto tienen sintomas de COVID-19, informo el Apu de la comunidad\" [Coronavirus: About 600 Inhabitants of Pucacuro in Loreto Have Symptoms of COVID-19, Community Apu Reported], RPP Podcast, May 25, 2020, https://rpp.pe/peru/ actualidad/coronavirus-unos-600-habitantes-de-pacacuro-en-loreto-tienensintomas-de-covid-19-informo-apu-de-la-comunidad-noticia-1268259.\n47\nLuis Ortiz-Hernandez and Miguel A. Perez-Sastre, \"Inequidades sociales en la progresion de la COVID-19 en poblacion mexica\" [Social Inequalities in the\nProgression of COVID-19 in the Mexican Population], Revista Panamericana de\nSalud Publica, September 25, 2020, https://iris.paho.org/handle/10665.2/52680.\n48\nUnited Nations, *Policy Brief: The Impact of COVID-19 on Women*, April 9, 2020,\naccessed on May 21, 2021, https://www.un.org/sites/un2.un.org/files/policy_brief_\non_covid_impact_on_women_9_april_2020.pdf; Carolina Rivera et al., \"Gender\nInequality and the Covid-19 Crisis: A Human Development Perspective,\" UNDP Human Development Working Paper, 2020, http://hdr.undp.org/en/content/ gender-inequality-and-covid-19-crisis-human-development-perspective.\n49\nMathieu Boniol et al., Gender Equity in the Health Workforce: Analysis of 104 Countries, WHO Health Workforce Working Paper 1, March 2019, https://apps.\nwho.int/iris/bitstream/handle/10665/311314/WHO-HIS-HWF-Gender-WP1- 2019.1-eng.pdf.\n50\nUN Secretariat, *The Impact of COVID-19 on Women*, UN Secretary-General Policy Brief (published by UN Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women (UN Women) and UN Secretariat), April 9, 2020, https://www.un women.org/-/media/headquarters/attachments/sections/library/publications/ 2020/policy-brief-the-impact-of-covid-19-on-women-en.pdf?la=en&vs=1406.\n51\nCarolina Rivera et al., \"Gender Inequality and the Covid-19 Crisis: A Human Development Perspective.\"\n52\nUN Population Fund (UNFPA), COVID-19: A Gender LensProtecting Sexual and Reproductive Health and Rights, and Promoting Gender Equality, Technical Brief, March 2020, https://www.unfpa.org/sites/default/files/resource-pdf/ COVID-19_A_Gender_Lens_Guidance_Note.pdf.\n53\nClare Wenham, Julia Smith, and Rosemary Morgan, \"COVID-19: The Gendered\nImpacts of the Outbreak,\" *The Lancet* 395, no. 10227 (March 14, 2020): 846-48,\nhttps://www.thelancet.com/journals/lancet/article/PIIS0140-6736(20)30526-2/ fulltext.\n54\nUNFPA, Impact of the COVID-19 Pandemic on Family Planning and Ending Gender-based Violence, Female Genital Mutilation and Child Marriage, Interim\nTechnical Note, April 2020, https://www.unfpa.org/sites/default/files/resourcepdf/COVID-19_impact_brief_for_UNFPA_24_April_2020_1.pdf.\n55\nUNDP, COVID-19 and Human Development: Assessing the Crisis, Envisioning\nthe Recovery, 2020 Human Development Perspectives (New York: UNDP, 2020),\nhttp://www.hdr.undp.org/sites/default/files/covid-19_and_human_develop ment_0.pdf.\n56\nUN Secretariat, *The Impact of COVID-19 on Women*; ILO, The COVID-19 response: Getting Gender equality Right for a Better Future for Women at Work, Policy Brief,\nMay 2020, https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---dgreports/---gender/ documents/publication/wcms_744374.pdf.\n57\nUNDP, *Gender-based Violence and COVID-19*, May 11, 2020, ttps://www.\nundp.org/content/undp/en/home/librarypage/womens-empowerment/genderbased-violence-and-covid-19.html.\n58\nILO, *Care Work and Care Jobs for the Future of Decent Work* (Geneva, Switzerland: ILO, 2018), https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---dgreports/--- dcomm/---publ/documents/publication/wcms_633135.pdf.\n59\nPatricia Cohen and Tiffany Hsu, \"Pandemic Could Scar a Generation of Working Mothers,\" *New York Times*, June 3, 2020, https://www.nytimes.com/2020/\n06/03/business/economy/coronavirus-working-women.html.\n60\nMalala Fund, Girls' Education and COVID-19: What Past Shocks Can Teach Us About Mitigating the Impact of Pandemics, April 6, 2020, https://malala.org/\nnewsroom/archive/malala-fund-releases-report-girls-education-covid-19.\n61\nRobert Jenkins and Rebecca Winthrop, \"5 Actions to Help Bring the Most Marginalized Girls Back to School after COVID-19,\" Brookings Institution, May 15, 2020, https://www.brookings.edu/blog/education-plus-development/ 2020/05/15/5- actions-to-help-bring-the-most-marginalized-girls-back-to-sch ool-after-covid-19/.\n62\nFor an interesting take on trust, see David Brooks, \"America Is Having a Moral\nConvulsion,\" *The Atlantic*, October 5, 2020, https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/\narchive/2020/10/collapsing-levels-trust-are-devastating-america/616581/.\n63\nKat Devlin and Aidan Connaughton, \"Most Approve of National Response to COVID-19 in 14 Advanced Economies,\" Pew Research Center, August 27, 2020,\nhttps://www.pewresearch.org/global/2020/08/27/most-approve-of-nationalresponse-to-covid-19-in-14-advanced-economies/.\n64\nLee Rainie and Andrew Perrin, \"The State of Americans' Trust in Each Other Amid the COVID-19 Pandemic,\" Pew Research Center, April 6, 2020, https:// www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2020/04/06/the-state-of-americans-trust-ineach-other-amid-the-covid-19-pandemic/.\n65\nOECD, \"Trust in Government, Policy Effectiveness and the Governance Agenda,\"\nin *Government at a Glance 2013* (Paris, France: OECD Publishing, 2013),\nhttps://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/docserver/gov_glance-2013-6-en.pdf?expires= 1611255840&id=id&accname=guest&checksum=35AB33F535615E06340F5 A5ADE3CE479.\n66\nUNDP, Human Development Report 2020The Next Frontier: Human Development and the Anthropocene (New York: UNDP, 2020), http://www.hdr.undp.\norg/sites/default/files/hdr2020.pdf.\n67\nUNDP, *Human Development Report 2019*.\n68\nUNDP, *Human Development Report 2020*.\n69\nNoah S. Diffenbaugh and Marshall Burke, \"Global Warming Has Increased\nGlobal Economic Inequality,\" Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America 116, no. 20 (May 14, 2019): 9808-13, https://www.\npnas.org/content/116/20/9808.\n70\nDiffenbaugh and Burke, \"Global Warming Has Increased Global Economic Inequality.\"\n71\nMelissa Leach et al., \"Equity and Sustainability in the Anthropocene: A\nSocialecological Systems Perspective on Their Intertwined Futures,\" Global Sustainability, vol. 1 (2018), https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/global-\nsustainability/article/equity-and-sustainability-in-the-anthropocene-a- socialeco logical-systems-perspective-on-their-intertwined-futures/F6DCBE05CA3F6 820A10C0DF193BB29E7.\n72\nIMF, \"Policy Responses to COVID-19,\" Policy Tracker, accessed on November 18, 2020, https://www.imf.org/en/Topics/imf-and-covid19/Policy-Responsesto-COVID-19.\n73\nUNDP, *Human Development Report 2020*: 215.\n74\nTheresa Andrasfay and Noreen Goldman, \"Reductions in 2020 US Life Expectancy Due to COVID-19 and the Disproportionate Impact on the Black and Latino\nPopulations,\" Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America 118, no. 5 (February 2, 2021), https://www.pnas.org/content/118/5/\ne2014746118.\n\n## The Long-Term Effects Of The Covid-19 Pandemic On Political Instability And Democracy\n\nCristina Bodea and Christian Houle The COVID-19 pandemic has already contributed to political unrest and the deterioration of democracy worldwide. In multiple countries, leaders immediately used the exigencies of a health emergency to centralize power and reduce democratic freedoms. We argue that, beyond this direct, and perhaps short-term effect, the pandemic is likely to have long-term indirect consequences arising from its effects on the economy. Studies show that economic crises often increase economic inequality. Ample evidence suggests this has been particularly true about this pandemic, notably because most low-wage occupations cannot be done from home. Moreover, racial and ethnic minorities have suffered greater harm, which has increased inequality between racial/ethnic groups. Research also has demonstrated that inequality, particularly when it overlaps with race/ethnicity, is a leading determinant of political instability and democratic deterioration. Thus, this pandemic is likely to increase instability and harm democracy worldwide, and the impact is likely to be long-lasting, because inequality is highly sticky within countries over timeonly changing in response to major events, such as wars.\n\nWe conclude by pointing to potential policies that could help preserve political stability and democracy; primarily that inequality should be squarely addressed as policymakers design their economic aid packages.\n\n## The Covid-19 Pandemic, Economic Inequality, And Democracy\n\nThe ongoing COVID-19 pandemic has already contributed to political unrest and the deterioration of democracy in multiple countries, including Bolivia, Brazil,1 Hungary, India, Israel, the Philippines, and Thailand.2 In these countries, leaders immediately used the exigencies of a health emergency to centralize power and reduce democratic freedoms. Even in the United States, the pandemic directly reduced the quality of democracy despite high voter turnout. The 2020 election cycle was characterized by closed polling stations,3 long lines, and delays in counting ballots,4 and many officials allowed accusations of election fraud to escalate. The immediate effects of the pandemic are concerning for the stability of democracy worldwide. Yet, arguably once the health crisis subsides with the help of vaccination, democraciesthose countries with multiple veto players and diverse civil societiesmay be able to take corrective actions that reverse the direct restrictive measures that tackled the pandemic.\n\nWe argue that, in the long term, the pandemic's consequences for democratic freedoms and political stability are likely to come from its impact on countries' economies. In particular, we assess that the global economic crisis is poised to generate additional income inequality and reduce social mobility, which in turn will potentially increase people's support for authoritarian values and reduce access to political representation. These are causal pathways that our research shows can lead to the breakdown of democracy. These effects should be equally if not more concerning because income and wealth inequities historically tend to be difficult to dislodge or need major events, like high mobilization wars or the Great Depression, to be tackled effectively.5\n\n## The Long-Term Effects Of The Covid-19 Pandemic\n\nThe pandemic has also given license to authoritarian countries to further restrict dissent, under the cover of enforcing social distancing rules needed to quell the virus. For example, China and Russia have doubled down on controlling their populations through the ever more intrusive use of artificial intelligence and social media.6 Iran and Pakistan have ceded more civilian control to their militaries,7 which they are using to control the pandemic. And other lower capacity authoritarian countries like Algeria and Uganda have violently repressed antigovernment protests and jailed or beaten opposition leaders.8\n\n## State Of Inequality Pre-Pandemic/Covid And Immediately Recognizable Unequal Outcomes\n\nAlready sharp economic inequities had been increasing in many countries even before the coronavirus pandemic hit.9  In the United States, class and racial divides were stark. In 2016, about 1 percent of income earners received 20 percent of U.S. pretax national income, while the bottom 50 percent of earners received only 12 percent.10\nMoreover, the median black household income was half that of the median white household,11 while the median white family's net worth was about 10 times that of black families.12 Similarly, inequality also had been high and rising in other large countrieslike Brazil, China, India, and Russiaand across smaller countries in Sub-Saharan Africa and Latin America.\n\nThe direct pandemic effectslockdowns, the shift to working from home, and illnessand the resulting pandemic-induced global economic crisis are likely to exacerbate the disparity in income between low- and high-wage earners.13 Low-wage earners deemed essential may have preserved their salaries, but most low-wage jobs deemed nonessentiallike in the hospitality industrycannot be done from home. Moreover, the pandemic added to the burden of home care, which falls disproportionally on women, eroding their ability to earn\n\nwages.14, 15, 16, 17, 18 Thus, the poor, the uneducated, women, andto the extent that poverty overlaps with racepeople of color will experience downward social mobility. Already news reports from the United States raise the alarm that the super-rich are benefiting from the pandemic itself and the economic policies put in place in response, while the combined health and economic shock of the pandemic is disproportionately affecting black households.19, 20, 21, 22, 23\nEmerging research on the COVID-19 economic shock shows an increase in economic disparities along class lines. Studies show that low-income individuals in Germany and the United Kingdom24, 25\nand lower wage workers in Spain26 experienced significantly larger income losses and that, across countries, government transfers mitigated this trend. The health-related lockdowns are also expected to increase income inequality along social and cultural lines.27, 28 On the whole, the World Bank estimates that because of the coronavirus 88\nmillion more people worldwide will live in extreme poverty in 2020.29\nAdditionally, research shows that at the onset of the pandemic, the incomes of the poor in many countries had not yet recovered from the most recent 2008 financial crisis.30\n\n## Economic Crisis And Inequality\n\nOur work using cross-country data analysis shows that concerns about the long-term inequality effects of the economic crisis provoked by the pandemic are warranted. Looking at 66 countries between 1960 and 2010, we show that economic crises are drivers of income inequality.31 We look at diverse forms of economic crises\nbanking, currency, debt, inflation, and stock marketto show that, with the exception of stock market slumps, all crises tend to increase inequality, measured with Gini coefficients.* The effects of economic crises play out in the long run, and, thus, the political consequences of a major financial crisis, like that of 2008 or the ongoing economic slump linked to the pandemic, have yet to be fully realized.\nThe mechanisms behind our findings have ample empirical support. Most directly, the unemployment spikes and lower economic growth that characterize economic crises more severely affect lowskill, low-income individuals.32, 33, 34 Such unemployment spells can be expected to further erode human capital and re-employment wagesespecially if prolonged. Indirectly, workers have less bargaining power in an economic crisis; even unionized labor may agree to wage restraints to restore firms' profitability and avoid massive layoffs resulting from bankruptcies.35, 36 In the aftermath of crises, different constituencies vie for and receive state support, and the policy responses to crises can increase inequality.37 Thus, large companies or banks are more likely to access government bailouts while individuals or small businesses, due to their large numbers and lack of organization, will miss out on government support. To the contrary, most individuals and small businesses will suffer if, and when, governments use austerity measures that reduce spending in response to resource constraints. Directly, one study shows that fiscal consolidation increases income inequality especially through its effect on employment and wages.38, 39\n\n## The Consequences Of Economic Inequality\n\nOur research on the political implications of economic inequality and a survey of related literature suggest two likely political consequences of the increase in economic inequality engendered by the COVID-19 pandemic. First, we can expect inequality to affect diverse forms of political unrest, ranging from riots and antigovernment demonstrations to full-blown civil wars. Second, we expect inequality to erode democracy worldwide and even perhaps threaten the survival of many democratic regimes.\n\nEconomic Inequality and Political Instability Most of the large body of literature on the effect of inequality on political unrest focuses on a country's overall inequality level, often called vertical inequality: that is, the inequality among the country's citizens, regardless of their cultural (ethnic or religious) group. This is often measured using Gini coefficients. Some also use capital shares as an indicator of inequality between the social classes. Capital shares measure the proportion of created wealth that accrues to the owner of capital, as opposed to the laborers. Most authors find that vertical inequality and interclass inequality fuel diverse forms of political unrest, such as antigovernment demonstrations, riots, and even small-scale popular rebellions.40, 41 Countries with lower levels of social mobility also are more likely to experience social unrest.42\nInequality and downward social mobility create grievances, which in turn encourage citizens to voice their discontentment.43, 44, 45, 46\nThe evidence on the effect of a country's overall inequality level and interclass inequality on large-scale levels of political unrest, most notably civil wars, is more ambiguous. Although some researchers find that vertical and interclass inequality fosters civil wars,47, 48 others find it has little effect.49, 50, 51, 52 Strong evidence suggests, however, that horizontal inequalitythe inequality between culturally defined groups such as ethnic or religious groupsdoes breed civil wars.53,\n54, 55 The rationale is that most civil wars are fought between culturally defined groups, such as ethnic or religious groups. Therefore, according to this literature, it is inequality between such groups that matters for civil wars, not the overall level of inequality or interclass inequality. While these authors focus on civil wars, we also find that horizontal inequality increases the probability that a country experiences a coup d'etat, particularly when inequality *within* culturally defined groups is low.56 When inequality between groups is high but inequality within a group is low, each group's members have very distinct preferences, which can motivate a group to mobilize and, for example, stage a coup.\n\nIn short, the previous literature suggests that the rise in inequality and reduction in social mobility caused by the coronavirus will, at a minimum, foster low-level civil unrest worldwide. Horizontal inequality has arguably already contributed to the protests associated with the Black Lives Matter movement. As explained above, the COVID-19 pandemic has had more impact on some groups than on others. In the United States, for example, racial minorities have experienced greater economic harm, which has increased racial inequality. If inequality between culturally defined groups increases in other countries, we could also witness an increase in the number of civil wars across the world.\n\nEconomic Inequality and Democratic Stability An established body of literature has investigated the effect of economic inequality and social mobility on democratic stability and survival. Most authors find inequality and low social mobility destabilize already established democracies.57, 58 Moreover, other authors find that inequality's effect is particularly strong when it follows ethnic lines.59 That is, democracies are particularly unstable when they combine high levels of between-ethnic group inequality with low levels of within-ethnic group inequality.\n\nA number of mechanisms drive the relationship between inequality and social mobility, on the one hand, and democratic stability, on the other. First, as explained above, inequality and downward social mobility foster political unrest. Political unrest often, in turn, leads to authoritarian responses by governments, as exemplified by the clearing of peaceful protesters in Lafayette Square in Washington, DC, on June 1, 2020.60 More broadly, political instability erodes the public trust necessary to maintain a viable democracy and creates opportunities for governments to adopt oppressive measures.\nSecond, inequality also fosters distributional conflicts, which, in turn, destabilize democracy.61, 62, 63 According to Meltzer and Richard's classical model,64 which they based on the median voter theorem,\ninequality increases taxation and redistribution in democracies. Inequality increases the gap between the preferences of the masses and the economic elites over economic policies. For example, at high levels of inequality, the masses may want to adopt poor-friendly policies, such as redistribution or public education/health care, while the economic elites may oppose such policies and the increased taxation they imply. Because the economic elite makes up only a minority of any country's population, democracy's majority rule suggests the masses will get to set their preferred tax rate and economic policies. Increased inequality, therefore, increases the incentive for the economic elite to overthrow democracy and impose their preferred policies. Distributional conflicts between social classes and culturally defined groups have played a central role in many democratic breakdowns, including the military coup in Chile in 1973.65\nThird, and perhaps most significant, research suggests people who live in high inequality countries or experience downward mobility are less likely to support democracy and are more like to espouse authoritarian values.66, 67, 68 For example, in analyzing survey data from Latin America and Sub-Saharan Africa, Houle and Miller found that individuals who have experienced downward mobility are less likely to exhibit strong attachments to democracy.69 Krieckhaus et al. arrive at similar conclusions when they investigate the attitudes of individuals who live in democracies with high levels of inequality.70\nPublic support for democracy is crucial to its establishment and consolidation, as recognized as far back as Alexis de Tocqueville (1835)71\nand John Stuart Mill (1861).72 According to Mattes and Bratton, \"[n]o matter how well or badly international aid donors and academic think tanks rate the extent of democracy in a country, this form of regime will only consolidate if ordinary people believe that democracy is being supplied.\"73 Popular support for democracy is particularly important in the current historical context. In recent years, multiple democracies, in countries such as Hungary, Turkey, and Venezuela, collapsed because leaders and parties voted into office through free and fair elections simply have refused to leave.74 Although democratic breakdowns traditionally have been caused by elites through coups d'etat, they are now increasingly driven by populist leaders and parties that adopt anti-elite rhetoric.75 These actors directly depend on the support of the masses both to gain office and to consolidate power, for example, through referenda. Thus, decreased support for democracy will encourage voters to choose candidates with weak democratic credentials, which could lead to the erosion or even breakdown of democracy.\n\nIn sum, the coronavirus induced rise in inequality is likely to harm democracy worldwide by breeding political instability, fostering distributional conflicts, and weakening support for democratic norms. The fact that the coronavirus has increased inequality between culturally defined groups suggests that its adverse effect on democracy may be particularly pronounced.\n\n## How Can We Turn The Tide?\n\nThe COVID-19 pandemic has already weakened democracy in Brazil, Ethiopia, Hungary, Russia, Tanzania, Uganda, and other countries. We argue that, even after the health situation has stabilized, the coronavirus is likely to exert long-term damage to democracy and political stability worldwide. This is because the COVID-19 pandemic will also have an indirect effect: the economic crisis it caused has led to an increase in inequality, which according to the literature is likely to increase political unrest and destabilize democracies, even in the long run. Inequality is notoriously sticky within countries over time.76 Once large-scale events like the coronavirus pandemic affect inequality, it tends to remain stable.77 Therefore, the coronavirus is likely to have lasting adverse effects on political unrest and democratic stability worldwide.\n\nThis suggests that inequality should be squarely addressed as policymakers design their economic aid packages. For example, European countries' efforts to mitigate the consequences of the crisis have succeed in reducing unemployment more than those of the United States.78\nIf democracy and political stability are to be preserved, it is paramount that additional resources are dedicated to improving opportunity for those at the bottom of the income distribution. This includes expanding access to education and increasing the progressivity of taxation.\n\n\n\nCristina Bodea is an associate professor of political science at Michigan State University and an editor of the *British Journal of Political Science*.\n\nChristian Houle is an associate professor in the department of political science at Michigan State University. He specializes in the study of regime change, economic inequality, and political conflict\n\n1\nSimon Romero, Leticia Casado and Manuela Andreoni, \"Threat of Military\nAction Rattles Brazil as Virus Deaths Surge,\" *New York Times*, June 10, 2020,\nhttps://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/10/world/americas/bolsonaro-coup-corona virus-brazil.html.\n2\nSelem Gebrekidan, \"For Autocrats, and Others, Coronavirus Is a Chance To\nGrab Even More Power,\" *New York Times*, March 30, 2020, https://www.nytimes\n.com/2020/03/30/world/europe/coronavirus-governments-power.html.\n3\n\"'It Was Very Chaotic': Long Lines, Voting Machine Issues Plague Georgia Primaries,\" National Public Radio, June 9, 2020, https://www.npr.org/2020/06/09/ 873054620/long-lines-voting-machine-issues-plague-georgia-primary.\n4\nZak Hudak, \"Pennsylvania's Mail-in Votes Still Weren't all Tallied After One Week\nOfficials Fear Elections 'Nightmare' in November,\" *CBS News*, June 30, 2020,\nhttps://www.cbsnews.com/news/pennsylvania-general-election-fears-primaryresults-delay-mail-in-votes/.\n5\nKenneth Scheve and David Stasavage, Taxing the Rich: A History of Fiscal Fairness in the United States and Europe (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press,\n2016).\n6\nFrances Brown, Saskia Brechenmacher, and Thomas Carothers, \"How Will the Coronavirus Reshape Democracy and Governance Globally?,\" Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, April 6, 2020, https://carnegieendowment .org/2020/04/06/how-will-coronavirus-reshape-democracy-and-governanceglobally-pub-81470.\n7\nBrown, Brechenmacher, and Carothers, \"How Will the Coronavirus Reshape Democracy?\"\n8\nAbdi Latif Dahir, \"Jailed, Exiled and Silenced: Smothering East Africa's Political Opposition,\" *New York Times*, November 27, 2020, https://www.nytimes\n.com/2020/11/27/world/africa/Africa-leaders-suppression.html.\n9\nFacundo Alvaredo et al., *World Inequality Report* (Boston: Harvard University\nPress, 2018).\n10\nAlvaredo et al., *World Inequality Report*.\n11\nMoritz Kuhn, Moritz Schularick, and Ulrike I. Steins, \"Income and Wealth\nInequality in America, 19492016,\" *Journal of Political Economy* 128, no. 9 (2020):\n3469-3519.\n12\nBradley Hardy and Trevon Logan, \"Racial Economic Inequality Amid the COVID-19 Crisis,\" Brookings Essay 2020-17, Brookings Institution, August 2020.\n13\nAbby Vesoulis, \"Coronavirus May Disproportionately Hurt the PoorAnd\nThat's Bad for Everyone,\" *Time*, March 11, 2020, https://time.com/5800930/\nhow-coronavirus-will-hurt-the-poor/.\n14\nIan Goldin and Robert Muggah, \"COVID-19 Is Increasing Multiple Kinds of Inequality. Here's What We Can Do About It,\" World Economic Forum, October 9, 2020, https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2020/10/covid-19-is-increasingmultiple-kinds-of-inequality-here-s-what-we-can-do-about-it/.\n15\nRobert Joyce and Xiaowei Xu, \"Sector Shutdowns During the Coronavirus Crisis: Which Workers Are Most Exposed?\" Institute for Fiscal Studies, April 6,\n2020, https://www.ifs.org.uk/publications/14791.\n16\nNicole Bateman and Martha Ross, \"Why Has COVID-19 Been Especially Harmful for Working Women?,\" Brookings Institution, October 2020, https:// www.brookings.edu/essay/why-has-covid-19-been-especially-harmful-forworking-women/ .\n17\nGoldin and Muggah, \"COVID-19 Is Increasing Multiple Kinds of Inequality.\"\n18\nAbi Adams-Prassl et al., \"Inequality in the Impact of the Coronavirus Shock:\nEvidence From Real Time Surveys,\" *Journal of Public Economics* 189 (2020).\n19\nCharlie Cooper, \"The Next Pandemic: Rising Inequality,\" *Politico*, April 28, 2020,\nhttps://www.politico.eu/article/the-next-pandemic-rising-inequality-corona virus-covid19-economic-turmoil-lockdowns/.\n20\nChuck Collins, \"Billionaires Are Getting Even Richer from the Pandemic. Enough is Enough,\" CNN, May 11, 2020, https://www.cnn.com/2020/04/28/ perspectives/inequality-coronavirus-billionaires/index.html.\n21\nJeff Stein and Peter Whoriskey, \"The US Plans to Lend $500 Billion to Large Companies. It Won't Require Them To Preserve Jobs or Limit Executive Pay,\"\nWashington Post, April 28, 2020, https://www.msn.com/en-us/money/markets/\nthe-us-plans-to-lend-500-billion-to-large-companies-it-won-t-require-themto-preserve-jobs-or-limit-executive-pay/ar-BB13khDm.\n22\nHardy and Logan, \"Racial Economic Inequality Amid the COVID-19 Crisis.\"\n23 Similar outcomes have been shown to exist in Brazil. Pedro Baqui et al., \"Ethnic and Regional Variations in Hospital Mortality From COVID-19 in Brazil: A Cross-sectional Observational Study,\" *Lancet Global Health* 8 (2020):\n1018-26.\n24\nSinem Hacioglu, Diego R. Kanzig, and Paolo Surico, \"The Distributional Impact of the Pandemic,\" Discussion Paper 15101, Center for Economic Policy Research, July 26, 2020.\n25\nHajo Holst, Agnes Fessler, and Steffen Niehoff, \"Covid-19, Social Class and Work Experience in Germany: Inequalities in Work-related Health and Economic Risks,\" *European Societies*, October 2020.\n26\nOriol Aspachs et al., \"Measuring Income Inequality and the Impact of the Welfare State during COVID-19: Evidence from Bank Data,\" VOXEU, September 22, 2020, https://voxeu.org/article/income-inequality-and-welfarestate-during-covid-19.\n27\nRichard Blundell et al., \"COVID19 and Inequalities,\" *Fiscal Studies* 41, no. 2\n(June 27, 2020): 291-319.\n28\nRachel Gisselquist and Anustup Kundu, \"Horizontal Inequality, COVID-19,\nand Lockdown Readiness. Evidence from India,\" World Institute for Development Economic Research, WIDER Working Paper 2020/156.\n29\nChristoph Lakner et al., \"Updated Estimates of the Impact of COVID-19 on Global Poverty: The Effect of New Data,\" World Bank Blog, October 7, 2020, https://blogs.worldbank.org/opendata/updated-estimates-impact-covid-19- global-poverty-effect-new-data?token=d3c7288f257b662e819adb237c06033e.\n\n## The Long-Term Effects Of The Covid-19 Pandemic\n\n30 Thomas Piketty and Emmanuel Saez, \"Top Incomes and the Great Recession:\nRecent Evolutions and Policy Implications,\" *IMF Economic Review* 61 (3):\n2013.\n31\nCristina Bodea, Christian Houle, and Hyunwoo Kim, \"Do Financial Crises Increase Income Inequality?,\" Conference Paper, European Political Science Association, June 20-22, 2019, Belfast, Ireland.\n32\nEmmanuele Baldacci, Luiz de Mello, and Gabriela Inchauste, \"Financial Crises, Poverty, and Income Distribution,\" International Monetary Fund, IMF Working Paper, 02/4, 2002.\n33 Michael Bordo and Christopher Meissner, \"Does Inequality Lead to a Financial Crisis?,\" *Journal of International Money and Finance* 31, no. 8 (2012):\n214761.\n34\nCarmen Reinhart and Kenneth Rogoff, This Time Is Different: Eight Centuries\nof Financial Folly (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2009).\n35\nIshac Diwan et al., \"Debt as Sweat: Labor, Financial Crises, and the Globalization of Capital,\" World Bank Working Paper, January 2001.\n36\nArjun Jayadev, \"Capital Account Openness and the Labor Share of Income,\"\nCambridge Journal of Economics 31, no. 3 (2007): 423-43.\n37 Atif Mian, Amir Sufi, and Francesco Trebbi, \"Resolving Debt Overhang: Political Constraints in the Aftermath of Financial Crises,\" American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics 6, no. 2 (2014): 1-28.\n38\nLawrence Ball et al., \"The Distributional Effects of Fiscal Consolidation,\" Working Papers, International Monetary Fund, January 13, 2013.\n39\nUsing a series of experiments, Evelyne Hubscher, Thomas Sattler, and Markus Wagner show that voters across Germany, Italy, Portugal, Spain, and the United Kingdom electorally punish the political parties that enact the spending cuts\nassociated with austerity measures. \"Voter Responses to Fiscal Austerity,\" British Journal of Political Science, forthcoming.\n40\nHenrikas Bartusevicius, \"The InequalityConflict Nexus Re-examined: Income,\nEducation, and Popular Rebellions,\" *Journal of Peace Research* 51, no. 1 (January\n2014): 35-50.\n41\nChristian Houle, \"Why Class Inequality Breeds Coups but not Civil Wars,\" Journal of Peace Research 53, no. 5 (September 2016): 680-95.\n42\nChristian Houle. \"Social Mobility and Political Instability,\" Journal of Conflict Resolution 63, no. 1 (2019): 85-111.\n43\nJames Davies, \"Toward a Theory of Revolution,\" *American Sociological Review*\n27, no. 1 (February 1962): 5-19.\n44\nTed Gurr, *Why Men Rebel* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1970).\n45\nManus Midlarsky, \"Rulers and the Ruled: Patterned Inequality and the Onset\nof Mass Political Violence,\" *American Political Science Review* 82, no. 2 (June\n1988): 491-509.\n46 Edward Muller, \"Income Inequality, Regime Repressiveness, and Political\nViolence,\" *American Sociological Review* 50, no. 1 (February 1985): 47-61.\n47\nJoerg Baten and Christina Mumme, \"Does Inequality Lead to Civil Wars? A\nGlobal Long-term Study Using Anthropometric Indicators (18161999),\" European Journal of Political Economy 32, C (2013): 56-79.\n48\nCarles Boix, \"Economic Roots of Civil Wars and Revolutions in the Contemporary World,\" *World Politics* 60, no. 3 (April 2008): 390-437.\n49\nPaul Collier and Anke Hoeffler, \"Greed and Grievance in Civil Wars,\" Oxford Economic Papers 56, no. 4 (2004): 563-95.\n50\nPaul Collier, Anke Hoeffler, and Dominic Rohner, \"Beyond Greed and Grievances: Feasibility and Civil War,\" *Oxford Economic Papers* 61, no. 1 (2009): 1-27.\n51\nJames Fearon and David Laitin, \"Ethnicity, Insurgency and Civil War,\" American Political Science Review 97, no. 1 (2003): 75-90.\n52\nHoule, \"Why Class Inequality Breeds Coups but not Civil Wars.\"\n53\nLars-Erik Cederman, Nils Weidmann, and Kristian Skrede Gleditsch, \"Horizontal Inequalities and Ethno-nationalist Civil War: A Global Comparison,\"\nAmerican Political Science Review 105, no. 3 (2011): 478-95.\n54\nJoshua Gubler and Joel Selway, \"Horizontal Inequality, Crosscutting Cleavages\nand Civil War,\" *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 56, no. 2 (2012): 206-32.\n55\nGudrun stby, \"Polarization, Horizontal Inequalities and Violent Civil Conflict,\" *Journal of Peace Research* 45, no. 2 (2008): 143-62.\n56\nChristian Houle and Cristina Bodea, \"Ethnic Inequality and Coups in Sub-\nSaharan Africa,\" *Journal of Peace Research* 54, no. 3 (2017): 382-96.\n57\nCarles Boix, *Democracy and Redistribution* (Cambridge: Cambridge University\nPress, 2003).\n58\nChristian Houle, \"Inequality and Democracy: Why Inequality Harms Consolidation but Does Not Affect Democratization,\" *World Politics* 61, no. 4 (2009): 589-622.\n59\nChristian Houle, \"Ethnic Inequality and the Dismantling of Democracy: A\nGlobal Analysis,\" *World Politics* 67, no. 3 (2015): 469-505.\n60\nMatt Flegenheimer, \"What Democracy Scholars Thought of Trump's Bible Photo\nOp,\" *New York Times*, June 2, 2020, https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/02/us/\npolitics/trump-holds-bible-photo.html.\n61\nDaren Acemoglu and James Robinson, Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy (New York: Cambridge University Press 2006).\n62\nBoix, *Democracy and Redistribution*.\n63\nHoule, \"Inequality and Democracy.\"\n64\nAllan Meltzer and Scott Richard, \"A Rational Theory of the Size of Government,\" *Journal of Political Economy* 89, no. 5 (1981): 914-27.\n65\nHoule, \"Why Class Inequality Breeds Coups but not Civil Wars.\"\n66\nR. Anderson, \"Support for Democracy in Cross-National Perspective,\" Research in Social Stratification and Mobility 30 (2012): 389-402.\n67\nT. L. Karl, \"Economic Inequality and Democratic Instability,\" Journal of Democracy 11 (2000): 149-56.\n68\nChristian Houle, \"Does Economic Inequality Breed Political Inequality?,\"\nDemocratization 25, no. 8 (2018): 1500-18.\n69\nChristian Houle and Michael Miller, \"Social Mobility and Democratic Attitudes: Evidence from Latin America and Sub-Saharan Africa,\" Comparative\nPolitical Studies 52, no. 11 (2019): 1610-47.\n70\nJ. Krieckhaus et al., \"Economic Inequality and Democratic Support,\" Journal of Politics 76 (2014): 139-51.\n71\nAlexis de Tocqueville, *Democracy in America* (New York. Library of America,\n[1835] 2004).\n72\nJohn Stuart Mill, *Considerations on Representative Government* (Prometheus\nBooks, [1861] 1991).\n73\nR. Mattes and M. Bratton, \"Learning About Democracy in Africa,\" American Journal of Political Science 51 (2007): 192-217.\n74\nSteven Levitsky and Daniel Ziblatt, *How Democracy Dies* (New York: Crown\nPublishing, 2018).\n75\nWilliam Galston, \"The Populist Challenge to Liberal Democracy,\" Journal of Democracy 29, no. 2 (2018): 5-19.\n76\nKlaus Deininger and Lyn Squire, \"A New Data Set Measuring Income Inequality,\" *World Bank Economic Review* 10, no. 3 (1996): 565-91.\n77\nScheve and Stasavage, *Taxing the Rich*.\n78\nAnke Hassel and Kathleen Thelen, \"Europe Has Kept Down Pandemic Unemploymentand the US Hasn't. Here's Why,\" *Washington Post*, April 24, 2020,\nhttps://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2020/04/24/europe-has-kept-downpandemic-unemployment-us-hasnt-heres-why.\n\n## Latin America: Political Instability Gives Organized Crime A Window To Expand Control Jimena Blanco\n\nThe COVID-19 pandemic has laid bare Latin America's structural deficiencies and exacerbated pre-existing economic and social inequalities, which threaten to increase security risks in a slow, post-pandemic recovery scenario. As governments struggle to address the rise in unemployment and informality, poverty and inequality will remain major drivers of social unrest and political discontent. In this context, traditional political structures will struggle to contain violence and criminality, with organized crime looking to exploit the situation to entrench its illegal economic activities among the most vulnerable segments of the population.\n\n## Covid-19 Enables A Vicious, Downward Cycle\n\nLatin America experienced the second biggest pandemic-induced economic contraction of any region in 2020, just behind the Euro-zone,1\nand the Verisk Maplecroft Recovery Capacity Indexwhich measures more than a dozen factors that determine a region's ability to recover from the crisis2puts Latin America below all but Africa in recovery capability. Falling tax receipts will cripple governments' ability to address spiraling demands from already impoverished workers, who are likely to be pushed into even lower-paid, unstable, and informal jobs.3 Structural hurdles will slow post-pandemic reconstruction, and the inability to deliver effective health, economic, and social responses to the pandemic is likely to push social discontent into civil unrest, which in turn will erode leaders' ability to stem regional violence and increasing criminality. This context can exacerbate a key threat to U.S. national security interests by strengthening criminal gangs. Before the pandemic, Latin America had ten cities with the world's highest murder rates, with much of the violence narcotics-related.4 Drug trafficking organizations (DTOs) and gangs5 will exploit the region's endemic institutional weaknesses to expand their activities. The pandemic has provided an opportunity to increase their social control within rural and vulnerable communities, pushing up security risks across large territories.\n\n## The Pressure Cooker Could Explode In 2021\n\nSeveral compounding structural factors will weigh heavily on Latin America's ability to recover from the COVID-19 crisis; the region's inherently high civil unrest risk is among the most significant. As the socioeconomic fallout from COVID-19 mounts, global protesters' ranks are likely to swell during the next two years, and unrest will sweep across developed, emerging, and frontier markets alike. According to data from Verisk Maplecroft's Civil Unrest Index projections, 75 countries are likely to experience an increase in protests by late 2022. Of these, 34predominantly in Europe and the Americasare likely to see a particularly significant deterioration, defined as a projected decrease of 0.5 or more on the Civil Unrest Index score.6\nThe surge in instability will take place against a backdrop of a painful post-pandemic economic recovery, which is likely to inflame existing public dissatisfaction with governments. Europe and the Americas dominate the list of 34 countries that are expected to see a significant increase in the risk of business disruption from protests in 2021. As the pandemic began to spread across the globe in March\n2020, most Latin American countries adopted lockdown or quarantine measures to contain the spread. The number of protests initially fell during this period. As Figure 1 shows, those that did occur were mainly motivated by the direct impact of COVID-19such as food insecurity, job losses, or frustration over lockdowns.\n\nHowever, the quarantines only put the lid back on the pressure cooker while turning up the heat under it. Once restrictions were lifted, protests quickly resumed as longstanding grievances resurfaced and, in some cases, were worsened by the pandemic. Simply put, anger over preexisting socioeconomic issues, rising unemployment, government missteps in coronavirus response, and other problems exploded once the initial shock of the pandemic subsided. In some cases, like Argentina, the protracted nature of lockdown measures was, in itself, a driver of mass mobilization.\n\nInitially, governments' emergency spending helped quell demonstrations, but those measures largely came to an end, or were reduced, in 2021. The belt-tightening is affecting food and fuel subsidiesa textbook catalyst of unrest. Argentina, projected to experience the eighth most significant rise in unrest risk by August 2022, is one of the countries most exposed to protests driven by government aid withdrawal. Meanwhile, in Brazil, growing political polarization and the massive economic and health toll of the COVID-19 pandemic are expected to deepen the risk of protests from both sides of the political divide. Figure 2 shows that the total number of demonstrations in Latin America climbed steadily in the third and fourth quarters of 2020. By year-end, the region was back to pre-pandemic levels of unrest. With most countries still applying some restrictive measures as they go through the second wave, the outbreak's complete economic shock is yet to be felt. The number of protests is likely to continue to rise during the coming months.\n\n## Unrest Erodes Political Stability Before Crucial Elections\n\nRising political instability will dominate Latin America in the early 2020s. In addition to increasing the potential for supply chain disruption, the region's civil unrest risk makes for a more volatile political landscape, undermining elected governments' stability across the region. The outbreak of COVID-19 did not start the fire. Still, it has undoubtedly aggravated the underlying socioeconomic tension that provoked mass street protests across the region in 2019, which in turn eroded political stabilitya trend that intensified in 2020.\n\nVerisk Maplecroft's Political Stability Index indicates that 77\npercent of the 26 countries in the Americas included in the dataset are likely to see an increase in political instability during the Index's two-year timeframe.7 The Index, which measures the stability of a country's executive authority to implement laws and policy priorities, considers the executive's risk of being challenged by other institutions or the public and the risk of disruption arising from the civil unrest. For example, in Mexico and Argentina, Presidents Andres Manuel Lopez Obrador and Alberto Fernandez saw their approval ratings nosedive between March and December 2020.8, 9 A key concern for future governability is whether this drop will translate into larger demonstrations and poor performances at the ballot box for their respective coalitions in the 2021 midterms.\n\nAt the executive level, the main threat to stability in 2021 will be along the Pacific coastline of South America. Protests were already ticking up well before the pandemic hit, indicating heavy public disillusionment with elected officials embroiled in serious corruption scandals. Chile, Ecuador, and Peru all experienced extended social unrest and political instability in 2019 and 2020, which threatened or succeeded in toppling the governments. Chile and Peru have seen the most unstable cabinets in a generation, and the ministerial revolving doors have all but eliminated the effective implementation of government policies. Governments from Santiago to Quito remain on the back foot as the pandemic has further eroded public support for high-profile presidents and emboldened legislatures and other institutions to challenge these executives. In Peru, the legislative branch forced a change in the executive in November 2020, which triggered mass mobilizations that caused another change in government.\n\nVerisk Maplecroft's Political Stability Index identifies the most significant risk of further deterioration in Peru, where the revolving political door has seen three presidents serving since the election in 2016.\n\nThat year, Peru experienced the most challenging election and transition since the country's return to democracy. The Index projects, with a 75.9 percent probability, that the country's stability score will worsen during the next two years. The collapse of traditional national parties under the weight of corruption scandals has created a fragmented political scene that resulted in a wide-open and unpredictable second round runoff between far-right and far-left candidates. Peru's glut of small populist regional parties have benefitted from the economic crisis and social discontent, with each gaining solid support. Although Peruvians traditionally place a very high value on macroeconomic stability at the ballot box, the 2021 presidential contest could propel an untested radical newcomerrather than the typical moderateover the line.\n\nIn Ecuador, the outcome has been only marginally better, and political stability will be on a knife-edge during the next two years. The presidential election pit the radical left against the traditional right, with the latter returned to office after 15 years in opposition. And although the more business friendly candidate, Guillermo Lasso, emerged victorious, the unicameral National Assembly will remain very polarized, threatening to derail policy implementation. The return of the government's traditional right means policy continuity with the pro-business reforms of the outgoing President, center-left Lenin Moreno. However, it also means a continuation of the current International Monetary Fund-supported austerity program and public sector reform agenda. In the context of a very depressed economy and a restive, potentially uncooperative National Assembly, this intensifies the risk of widespread popular discontent under a new government.\n\nLast, Chile is caught up in an electoral Iron Man race that will see voters heading to the ballot box no less than four times in 2021 to vote on constitutional reform and municipal and general elections. With Chile's Political Stability Index score having already deteriorated dramatically after the 2019 unrest, Verisk Maplecroft's current forecast sees a 47.9 percent risk of further deterioration in the next two years.10 It is not clear that the constitutional reform process, launched in response to the 2019 crisis, will fully resolve the demands of Chile's restive population. With this reform process running concurrently with the local and general election calendar, Chile is at elevated risk of further outbreaks of social unrest during 2021, which promises to be another politically heated year for the country. The country's political class has no 'Plan B' to address public demands. If the constitutional reform process fails to meet expectations, the two traditional political coalitions, which have alternated in power since the return to democracy in 1990, would be further discredited. In this scenario, an outsider candidate in 2021 could represent an attractive break with the status quo for many voters, potentially hindering Chile's ability to recover the policy stability that has characterised the country for decades.\n\n## Organized Crime Will Seek To Fill The Shoes Of Discredited Elites\n\nAs Latin American populations grow increasingly disillusioned with political leaders at both the local and national levels, political instability risks will rise, and the widespread backlash against government authorities will provide opportunities for criminal groups to infiltrate the political system and to control territory, production, and distribution networks. The pandemic had an unexpected impact on the profitability of DTO activity. The containment measures implemented across the region included border closures and enhanced screenings by transit and customs authorities, severely disrupting the licit supply chains that drug traffickers rely on to ship narcotics. The resulting decrease in drug supply caused street prices to rise, which, in turn, triggered a spike in violent competition within local consumer markets that fuelled preexisting turf wars.11 For example, despite a general fall in common criminality, homicides in Mexico remained stable in 2020 in part because of DTO competition in central and\n\nnorthwestern Mexico. Colombia experienced a significant increase in mass killings in September and October, especially in the south, where DTOs and other nonstate armed groups battle for control of the production and transshipment of cocaine.12\nThe changing drug trafficking patterns complicate law enforcement, suggesting the problem of more diversified methods will long outlast the pandemic. Disruption has forced DTOs to use more sophisticated transshipment methods, as the pandemic disruption coincided with a decrease in the supply of chemical precursors needed to produce synthetic drugs. DTOs have responded by expanding their presence in maritime routes, which enabled them to respond to increased demand from the United States and maintain profits.\n\nDTOs and smaller criminal organizations have capitalized on the pandemic to tighten territorial control and capture the state's role. The pandemic provided an opportunity to broaden a strategy already used in remote rural areas. Indeed, criminal groups violently enforced lockdown measures and provided relief to communities. In Mexico, for instance, the Jalisco Nueva Generacion Cartel, Los Viagras, the Gulf Cartel, and the Sinaloa Cartel delivered branded packages of food and personal protective equipment.13\n\n## Tackling Poverty And Inequality Key To Defusing Criminal Expansion\n\nThe COVID-19 crisis hit the Americas at a time when social tension was already building. The unrest that erupted in Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, the Dominican Republic, and Ecuador in 2019 and early 2020 remained at high levels in many countries during 2020. Peru joined the list of the jurisdictions where protests included fatalities and allegations of human rights violations by the security forces. Albeit less disruptive, demonstrations also remained at 2019 levels in Brazil and increased in Argentina and Mexico. The pandemic's impactand that of the response strategies that have accompanied ithave only made the social discontent underlying this unrest all the worse.\n\nThe Recovery Capacity Index shows that Latin America is the world's least economically dynamic region after Africa, constraining the region's ability to rebound. Most countries are highly dependent on primary commodity exports. Weaker global demand and the pandemic-related disruption to local and international supply chains have heavily damaged these exports, which have dropped sharply across the board.\n\nGiven all of this, the pandemic threatens to reverse a decade or more of gains against poverty. In most countries, unemployment has spiked, pushing more people into informal jobs and outside the social safety net. The International Labour Organization (ILO) estimates that the average unemployment rate in Latin America, which it put at 8.1 percent at the beginning of 2020, could increase by as much as five percentage points by year-end.14 This is a conservative estimate, considering that unemployment levels have already reached much higher rates in several countries. In Colombia, for instance, unemployment in May 2020 had reached 21.4 percent, more than double the 10.5 percent in May 2019. Although the rate had since come down to 14.7 percent in October 2020, that is still four percentage points above the 2019 rate.15 The second wave of COVID-19 is proving devastating for slowly recovering employment.\n\nAlthough exacerbated by COVID-19 and its inflicted economic malaise, protests continue to be primarily driven by domestic structural issues, such as socioeconomic inequality, the rising cost of living, and the rise in nativism and populism. Indeed, 2020 is unlikely to be an outlierbut rather a harbinger of things to come, not just within the next two years but also for much of the coming decade.\n\nIn the most vulnerable countries, the ranks of protesters marching against longstanding grievances are likely to continue to swell, with millions of newly unemployed, underpaid, and underfed citizens posing a risk to domestic stability, a scenario with few parallels in recent decades. Organized criminal groups in the region will seek to exploit this situation as an opportunity to increase their power by\n\nexpanding recruitment and seeking to co-opt the political system at the local level and influence national politics.\n\nThe pandemic has opened opportunities to deepen and expand illicit activities, which are likely to lead to stronger, localized criminal cells. This will sustain high levels of violence and increase common criminality, particularly in vulnerable communities. The pandemic's economic fallout is likely to bolster the role of organized crime as the employment needs of remote localities increase. The decline of living standards in rural areas will increase the availability of recruits for organized crime groups. The strong presence of criminal organizations will increase violence around common crimes.\n\nDuring the next two years, governments in Latin America will need to ensure continued support, through economic growth and formal employment, to vulnerable communities. Failure to do so will exacerbate popular discontent with political elites, undermining political stability and increasing the risk of 'outsider' candidates seizing power. Across the region, local gangs, drug trafficking, and organized crime groups would have the opportunity to grow stronger. The depressed economic and political landscape would open a two-track opportunity to increase operational capacity, territorial control, and formal institutions' capture. Law-abiding citizens taking to the streets to denounce political elites' failure to meet their needs may find the result is not what they bargained for.\n\n\n\nJimena Blanco leads Verisk Maplecroft's Americas research team and is its expert on Brazil and the Southern Cone. She provides advice to multinational companies and multilateral institutions on political risk in Latin America and has conducted Human Rights Impact Assessments for extractive companies. She participates in diplomatic, academic, and business forums, addressing regional and country-specific concerns and regularly contributes to major television, radio, and print outlets. Previously, Ms. Blanco edited several publications at Latin News and wrote extensively on Latin America, covering political, economic, and security issues. She contributed to the International Institute for Strategic Studies' special dossier, \"The Farc Files: Ecuador, Venezuela and the Secret Archive of 'Raul Reyes.\" She studied history and political science at  Randolph-Macon Woman's College and obtained a master's degree in Latin American Studies from the Institute for the Study of the Americas, University of London.\n\n1\n\"Latest World Economic Outlook Growth Projections,\" International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook, October 2020, accessed December 1, 2020, https://www.imf.org/-/media/Images/IMF/Publications/WEO/2020/October/ English/weo-map-oct-20-social-eng.ashx.\n2\nVerisk Maplecroft, Recovery Capacity Index, accessed December 1, 2020, https://www.maplecroft.com/.\n3\n\"Social Panorama of Latin America 2019,\" United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), December 2019, accessed December 1, 2020, https://www.cepal.org/en/publications/44989-\nsocial-panorama-latin-america-2019.\n4\nVerisk Maplecroft, Crime Index, accessed December 1, 2020, https://www. maplecroft.com/.\n5\nWorld Drug Report 2020, United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, accessed December 1, 2020, https://wdr.unodc.org/wdr2020/.\n6\nVerisk Maplecroft, Civil Unrest Index Projections, accessed December 22, 2020, https://www.maplecroft.com/.\n7\nVerisk Maplecroft, Political Stability Index Projections, accessed December 22, 2020, https://www.maplecroft.com/.\n8\nConsulta Mitofsky, \"#AMLOTrackingPoll Aprobacion de AMLO, 23 de noviembre,\" *El Economista*, accessed December 1, 2020, https://www.eleconomista.\ncom.mx/politica/AMLOTrackingPoll-Aprobacion-de-AMLO-23-de--noviem\nbre-20201123-0018.html.\n9\nManagement and Fit, Infobae, \"Mas del 50 percent de los argentinos desaprueban la gestion de Alberto Fernandez y crece la imagen positiva de Horacio Rodriguez Larreta,\" accessed December 3, 2020, https://www.infobae.com/\npolitica/2020/11/22/mas-del-50-de-los-argentinos-desaprueba-la-gestion-dealberto-fernandez-y-crece-la-imagen-positiva-de-horacio-rodriguez-larreta/.\n10\nVerisk Maplecroft, Political Stability Index Projections, accessed December 22, 2020, https://www.maplecroft.com/.\n11\n\"Covid-19 Causes Some Illegal Drug Prices To Surge, as Supplies Were Disrupted Worldwide,\" *UN News*, May 7, 2020, https://news.un.org/en/story/2020/\n05/1063512.\n12\n\"Colombia Sees Surge in Mass Killings in 2020: UN,\" *Al Jazeera*, October 2, 2020,\nhttps://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/10/2/colombia-sees-surge-in-masskillings-in-2020-un#:~:text=The%20United%20Nations%20reports%20a,\nAmerican%20country%20in%20recent%20months.&text=Colombia%20 has%20recorded%20at%20least,the%20United%20Nations%20has%20said.\n13\n\"Narcos Aprovechan coronavirus en Mexico para repartir despensas y pelear territorio,\" Infobae, April 20, 2020, https://www.infobae.com/america/mexico/ 2020/04/20/narcos-aprovechan-coronavirus-en-mexico-para-repartir-despensasy-pelear-territorio/.\n14\n\"Sharp Rise in Unemployment in Latin America and the Caribbean Leaves Millions Without Income,\" International Labor Organisation, International Labour Organization, July 1, 2020, https://www.ilo.org/caribbean/news room/WCMS_749692/lang--en/index.htm#:~:text=of%20COVID%2D19- ,ILO%3A%20Sharp%20rise%20in%20unemployment%20in%20Latin%20 America%20and%20the,record%20of%2041%20million%20people.\n15\n\"Mercado Laboral, Visor de datos,\" Colombia National Administrative Department of Statistics (DANE), accessed December 1, 2020, https://sitios.dane.gov. co/visor-geih/#/visor.\n\n## Islamic State Resurgence In The Era Of Covid-19\n\nStacey Pollard, Henry Baraket,\nGirish Ganesan, and Natalie Kim One year after U.S.-led coalition operations liberated ISIS-held territories in Iraq and Syria and killed ISIS-core leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, ISIS is resurging. Taking a page from its old playbook, the organization is capitalizing on social unrest and a rapidly deteriorating security environmentexacerbated by the COVID-19 pandemicto reconstitute in permissive areas of Iraq and Syria. This chapter examines ISIS's  pandemic-era ground and information operations through the lens of its state- and nation-making efforts to help analysts and decisionmakers better understand the imminence and scope of the threat. We find that ISIS is rapidly overcoming U.S.- supported counterterrorism gains and, without direct pressure to reverse these advances, ISIS is poised for recovery.\n\n## Background: Analytic Oversight And The 2014 Ascent Of Isis\n\nIn June 2014, U.S. and partner intelligence and national security strategists were taken by strategic surprise when ISIS exploited state and nation failures in Iraq and Syria to establish the so-called Islamic\n\nCaliphate. This area, which stretched for more than 280,000 square kilometers from Aleppo, Syria, to Diyala, Iraq, was home to more than 10 million people.1 Although the deterioration of the operational environments in Iraq and Syria had previously raised analytic concerns about the fragility of and failure to rebuild these countries, analysts missed the opportunities these conditions provided a violent extremist organization (VEO) with transnational state-making and nation-making ambitions.2 That is, in contrast to the ambitions of traditional insurgent groups, which aimed to simply disrupt or overthrow an established government and win over local populations through state- and nation-building, ISIS's intent was to attempt nation-state making by redrawing territorial boundaries and reinventing national identities.3\nThe swift ascent of ISIS during the summer of 2014 can be attributed to the organization's ability to accomplish what no other Sunni insurgent group hadthe establishment of an Islamic state rooted in a defensible territory that transcended internationally recognized state borders.4 Unlike the Taliban, which conquered and established a primitive military-religious emirate, or al-Qaida, which managed its global terror franchise network from safe havens in Sudan, Afghanistan, and Pakistan, ISIS built a transnational  proto-state that supplanted the region's state system and performed all of the roles of a nation-state despite lacking international recognition and access to legitimate economies.5 By exploiting conditions of state collapse in Iraq and Syria, ISIS created a new state and nation from the ashes of old ones.6 This unforeseen development made ISIS the most resilient and formidable insurgent force operating in Iraq and Syria and arguably within the largely Salafi-jihadi world.7\nLeading researchers' analysis of artifacts from the organization's\n2014-era state- and nation-making project reveals ISIS's comprehensive approach to becoming a full-fledged state. That state had a military apparatus conducting kinetic and nonkinetic operations and an institutionalizedalbeit ruthless and totalitariangovernment overseeing taxation, a petroleum based economy, a health care system, social services, and a rigid, ISIS ideology-indoctrinating education curriculum.8, 9, 10 In 2015, the U.S. Congressional Research Service reported that ISIS had a $2 billion budget which it used to pay for military operations, salaries, infrastructure repairs, and social services.11\n\n## Definitions:\n\nState failure occurs when a government fails to deliver political goods to citizens on a scale that undermines the legitimacy and existence of the state. These political goods include security, a legal system to adjudicate disputes, provision of economic and communication infrastructures, some form of social services, and opportunities to participate in the political process.12 Nation failure occurs when cultural projections of nationhood are no longer convincing and the population lacks consensus on cultural traditions, customs, symbols, rituals, and historical experiences, which allows competing, often mutually exclusive, nationalisms to emerge that seek to replace the former common identity.13\n\n## Isis's Model For Nation-State Making\n\nAccording to counterterrorism scholars, the ground and information operations ISIS undertook to create its nation-state entailed capturing and defending territory; extracting revenue to finance its institutions and war efforts; building systems of government to sustain these gains; and cultivating a shared sense of citizenship within this establishment.14, 15 The literature indicates the most crucial initial aspect of nation-state making is the task of capturing and defending territory and then exercising a monopoly of force in that area. ISIS's ability to monopolize force depends on four interrelated factors: the permissive regional environment; organizational prowess (gained as a result of military competition); strategic selection of targets (both territorial and political); and ideological uniformity and motivation.16\n\n## Horizon Scan: Isis's Prospects For Recapturing Territory And Reclaiming A National Identity\n\nIn 2019, the U.S. Operation INHERENT RESOLVE-led coalition significantly degraded ISIS's military capabilities and liberated former ISIS- held territories in Iraq and Syria, dismantling the physical caliphate, minimizing its ability to extract revenue, and eliminating its system of government. However, the transnational organization, although decentralized and globally dispersed, is loyal to new ISIS-core leader, Abu Ibrahim al-Hashimi al-Qurashi, and the caliphate's national identity remains intact. This study considers prospects for ISIS to reclaim territory in Iraq and Syria and restore its national identity within established borders. We weigh pandemic-era conditions in Iraq and Syria and current ISIS ground and information operations against the criteria necessary for ISIS to regain a monopoly of force to help analysts and decision makers better understand the imminence and scope of the threat. These criteria include a permissive regional environment; organizational prowess; strategic selection of targets; and ideological uniformity and motivationadding to the last the reassertion of shared citizenship.\n\n## Permissive Conditions: Insecurity Exacerbated By Pandemic In Iraq And Syria\n\nPandemic-accelerated U.S. and coalition drawdowns and diversions of forces are creating security vacuums in Iraq and Syria. Iraq's fractured security forces are overwhelmed by popular unrest, Iranian attacks against the United States and U.S. targets in Iraq, and clashes between  Iranian-backed militias and Iraqi forces. In Syria, the  Kurdish-dominated Syrian Defense Forces (SDF), backed by the U.S.-led coalition, are beset by Turkish incursions in the north and are battling regime-affiliated and violent extremist challengers Syria-wide. As a result, they are struggling in some areas to provide security to local populations belonging to other ethnic and sectarian groups that dispute the SDF's legitimacy.\n\nIraq: A Disintegrating Social Contract Iraq's early attempts to contain COVID-19 failed largely because Iraqi disillusionment with the government made it difficult to implement and enforce protocols.17 As a result, Iraq has had more than 500,000\ncases and 12,411 deaths, although these numbers and their context are difficult to confirm because the Iraqi government forbids medical personnel from publicly discussing the situation.18\nOctober 1, 2019, marked the start of a massive Iraqi resistance movement led predominantly by young Shia men demanding better employment opportunities, increased essential services, accountability for state security forces, and an end to political corruption influenced by foreign powers, especially Iran.19 The protesters have denounced the country's sectarian divides and enjoyed broad, pan-sectarian support across Iraq.20 Unarmed, they have waved Iraqi flags and called for a united and nonsectarian Iraq, in contrast to elements of the Iraqi security forces that exacerbate sectarian divides and fly the flags of poorly regulated, often Iranian-linked militia groups.21 Violent clashes between Iraqi security forces and protestors have prompted demonstrators to see the Iraqi forces as an extension of the corrupt government.22\nDeclining oil prices and pandemic-associated economic losses are crippling the economy, throwing millions of Iraqis into poverty. The World Bank estimates the incomes of 5.5 million more Iraqis now fall below the poverty line as both crises continue.23 The United Nations estimates roughly 300,000 people live in crowded camps without access to healthcarerisking a severe COVID-19 outbreak and humanitarian crisis.24 These abysmal conditions are intensifying distrust between the Iraqi people and Prime Minister Mustafa Al-Kadhimi's newly formed government, further eroding the country's already disintegrating social contract.\n\nSyria: Unprepared for COVID-19 Challenges The number of COVID-19 cases and deaths in Syria is unknown because the government requires all information to be channeled through the Ministry of Health, which the government tightly controls. However, on October 8, 2020, Syria Relief, the UK-based Syrian advocacy NGO, citing independently gathered data, declared COVID-19 an emergency in Syria. Syria Relief's Head of Advocacy, Charles Lawley, called on the international community to provide aid.\n\nThe destruction of hospitals and medical facilities during Syria's civil war has depleted the medical infrastructure and equipment needed to cope with the pandemic. Approximately 40 percent of Syria's healthcare facilities have been destroyed, and roughly two million displaced people live in overcrowded camps25 where self- isolation is nearly impossible and proper sanitation and hygiene are hard to maintain. The risk of an outbreak is high, and the camps lack the healthcare capacity to manage the virus and treat patients.26\nSyria is unprepared to cope with the challenges of the pandemic, and President Bashar al-Assad is not receiving his usual assistance from Iran, Russia, and China. The ten shipments of aid received collectively from China and Russia have provided Syria with only a fraction of what it needs.27 Instead, Syria has relied on aid from oil-rich nations such as Kuwait, which donated $4 million to UNICEF's COVID-19\nresponse in Syria in mid-November.28 Measures adopted in March to hinder the spread of the virus created economic turmoil and civil unrest. Food prices sky-rocketed, and people with the means began panic buying. The value of the Syrian pound dropped while the cost of living increased beyond 100 percent.29 At a time when the monthly median state salary in Syria equals only $97, masks cost nearly $4, hand sanitizer is almost $6, and oxygen cylinders can cost nearly $300.30 The economic crisis is creating animosity toward the government even in regime strongholds like Damascus, where rare civilian protests are taking place. Syrian people are also finding ways to get around Syria's restricted information environment by airing their grievances with the government's handling of the crisis on social media.\n\n## Comparing Permissive Conditions 2014 Era\n\nISIS evolved from its progenitor\norganization the Islamic State of\nIraq (ISI) by capitalizing on post-\nArab Spring regional destabiliza-\ntion, insecurity stemming from\nthe U.S. military withdrawal from\nIraq, and spillover effects of the\nSyrian civil war.\n\n- The sectarian conflict\nbetween Sunni and Shia groupings in Iraq allowed ISIS to offer an alternative to the increasingly Shia dominated government.\n- As the uprisings across the\nArab world erupted, ISIS infiltrated Syria, exploiting longstanding animosities between the Sunni majority and President Assad's repressive Shia-Alawite minority regime and offering stability relative to the\nchaos of the Civil War.\n\n## Covid-19\n\nThe spread of COVID-19 has\nallowed ISIS to exploit insecurity,\nweak governance, and social\nunrest in Iraq and Syria.\n\n- The Iraqi Security Force's\nviolent reaction to Iraqi protestors demonstrating against Iranian influence is aggravating sectarian tension.\n- Pandemic-associated\nsecurity vacuums and the fraying social fabric in both countries allow ISIS to move between western Iraq and central Syria and restore access to critical infrastructure and networks.\n- ISIS is increasing kinetic\nattacks and information operations to exacerbate ethno-sectarianism, discredit both governments, and hasten Iraqi and Syrian state and nation failure.\n\n## Isis Ground Operations To Reclaim Caliphate\n\nIn August, the United Nations estimated approximately 10,000 active ISIS militants were operating in Iraq and Syria, a level equivalent to\n2012 and roughly a third of their estimated 31,500 presence in 2014.31, 32\nAlthough ISIS has lost its monopoly of force in areas it once held, fighters are hunkered down and regrouping in Iraq's north-central region along a rugged, rural belt stretching across the provinces of Kirkuk, Salahudidin, and Diyalaincluding territories in dispute between Baghdad and the Kurdish Regional Government.33 The COVID-19- associated suspension of Iraqi and SDF patrols and intelligence collection in former ISIS hotspots in western Iraq and central Syria is allowing ISIS to reinfiltrate old stomping grounds where disaffection with government and U.S.-supported forces is growing.34\nSource: BBC Monitoring, based on data gathered from IS media outlets. Mina al-Lami, \"Jihadists See COVID-19 as an Opportunity,\" Global Network on Extremism & Technology, June 2020, https://gnet-research.org/2020/06/01/jihadists-see-covid-19-as-an-opportunity/.\n\nOver-burdened security forces in both countries and the November 2020 reopening of the Iraq-Syria border allow ISIS to move more freely and reengage in illicit cross-border activity, carry out more sophisticated attacks, conduct prison breaks, and negotiate the release of ISIS fighters and families from prisons.35 The increase in ISIS attacks in Iraq and Syria since the pandemic began demonstrates the organization's commitment to hastening instability to advance its objectives.36\nFigure 1 shows a dramatic spike in guerilla-style ISIS IED detonations from about 40 in January 2020 to more than 110 in April 2020 under ISIS's declared \"battle of attrition\" against Iraqi security forces.37 Among these were waves of seven IEDs detonated simultaneously on February 22 and March 12 near military and police installations, intensifying pressure on Iraqi security forces.38, 39\nDuring Ramadan, between late April and late May 2020, ISIS claimed responsibility for at least 269 attacks in Iraq, including shootings, raids, ambushes of security forces, roadside bombs, and killing of informants. In August 2020, ISIS fighters crossed into Syria and killed four members of the SDF.40\nFigure 2 shows that beginning in March 2020, ISIS attacks in Aleppo, Deir Ez Zor, Hama, Homs, and Raqqa have doubled or more since 2019.41 In early March, ISIS and pro-regime Syrian forces clashed over control of a road connecting Raqqa to Homs province. Homs has had the greatest number of ISIS attacks since the summer of 2020; just in November these attacked included the gruesome slaying of 10 shepherds and the burning of their camp, the capture of a large Syrian Arab Army outpost, and an attack on a joint Syrian-Russian station.42 Perhaps most significantly, overwhelmed SDF units in mid-November 2020 released ISIS leaders and families from Syria's overcrowded prisons, including former ISIS leader of public relations, Abd al-Hamid al-Dairi; 515 ISIS family members without tribal guarantees to prevent them from rejoining ISIS;\nand 23 former ISIS fighters under tribal guarantees.43 From early to mid-December 2020, ISIS assassinated a Syrian mayor, killed at least 29 pro-Syrian regime fighters, and injured 25 more across Deir ez-Zour, Hama, and Homs provinces, demonstrating resurgent organizational prowess and increasingly sophisticated attacks against opponent forces and territorial targets.\n\n## Isis Information Operations To Restore Isis National Identity\n\nThe onset of the COVID-19 pandemic has revived ISIS-core information operations as the organization attempts to capitalize on deteriorating conditions to advance its nation-rebuilding ambitions.\n\nISIS is using insurgent operators and various media platforms to amplify pandemic-exacerbated insecurity in Iraq and Syria; erode Iraqi's and Syrian's sense of citizenship; galvanize ideological uniformity and motivation among its ranks; and reclaim ISIS national identity. These operationsconsisting of word-of-mouth influence activities, propaganda material, social media campaigns, and ISIS publicationspromote and reinvigorate existing ISIS narratives, which are experiencing increased power and currency as a result of the pandemic's erosion of material, political, and ideological conditions in the region, while also renewing a commitment to action among its followers. ISIS online recruitment has also been reenergized, emphasizing an increased sense of urgency, and the group is well-funded, with reserves estimated at between $50 million and $300 million.44\n\n## Reinforcing And Advancing Ideological Narratives\n\nISIS's narration of the unfolding pandemic has been consistent with the group's broader ideological underpinnings. ISIS labeled the COVID-19 outbreak \"God's wrath\" as early as February 2020, when an editorial in Issue #220 of the Islamic State newspaper Al-Naba sought to provide a divine explanation for the virus.45, 46 Around that time, the publication also claimed that the virus originated from China's mistreatment of its Uyghur Muslim population and that Iran's outbreak was an exemplary punishment from God for Shia Muslim idolatry.47\nNotably, ISIS has developed its usual \"divine wrath\" narrative that claims its enemiesincluding the Iraqi and Syrian governments, the United States, and other Western countriesare vulnerable and weak.48 For instance, an editorial titled \"The Crusaders' Worst Nightmare\" in Issue #227 of *Al-Naba* describes Western countries as fearful ISIS's fighters will escalate their military operations against the West's apostate helpers in Muslim countries or repeat past terror attacks when these countries' security and medical institutions have reached the limits of their capacity in some areas.49, 50 The editorial describes the West as incapable of handling new burdens as it struggles to care for its populations and mitigate economic recession, claiming that during this time the \"Crusader\" powers cannot coordinate with their allies and fear that other enemiespresumably Russia and China\ncould realize gains at their collective expense.51, 52\n\n## Open Calls To Action\n\nDespite some operational challenges and mobility restrictions resulting from the pandemic, ISIS remains committed to tangible action, unlike other extremist groups who have focused on idealist messaging and gaining popular support.53 Although ISIS has advised travel cautions to avoid contracting the virus, various media outlets have used COVID-19 as a rallying cry, urging followers to attack security forces, work toward the release of detainees, and make financial contributions. For example, the \"Crusaders\" editorial implored ISIS supporters to liberate Muslim captives from prisons and camps and show no mercy to the \"infidels\" and \"apostates\" in their moment of crisis, but instead to attack and weaken them to render them less able to harm Muslims. The editorial also asks supporters to bear in mind that the calamity befalling the West and its allies will soon prevent them from resisting ISIS's resurgence. The editorial ends by reminding readers that the best way to avoid God's punishmentincluding coronavirusis through obedience to Him, and that the act of obedience most beloved to God is \"jihad\" and \"inflicting pain on His enemies.\"54, 55\nThese directives have exacerbated security threats, particularly in SDF-controlled camps and prisons where COVID-19 adds urgency to the situation. Detainees in camps housing thousands of ISIS families have turned to online messaging and social media platforms to share grievances and openly call for support, as was the case in al-Hawl camp, where social media campaigns were launched to raise money for the families of detainees.56 ISIS operators are also reaching into camps, prisons, and other deteriorating areas, taking advantage of instability caused by the pandemic to seek out vulnerable recruits and reindoctrinate former followers.57\n\n## Isis State- And Nation-Making In The Covid-19 Era\n\nAlthough still in the nascent stages of resurgence, ISIS appears to be poised for recovery given the release of ISIS leaders, fighters, and families from camps and prisons; the increasingly permissive conditions in Iraq and Syria; and the lack of direct pressure to stop the organization. All indications suggest analysts can expect progressively permissive conditions; increasingly sophisticated and targeted attacks; an expanding, ideologically unified militant force; and thus, a growing capacity to reclaim territory, populations, and resources. In the past, ISIS's success in nation-making was based on dogmatic compliance to its principles, adhering to the notions of religious imperative and divine inevitability.58 ISIS media's framing of COVID-19 as \"divine punishment\" builds on this established national identity, and the organization is likely to reap the ideological gains. By portraying enemy nations as weak and vulnerable, ISIS may be able to energize its followers, posing security threats now and in the future.59 Furthermore, the calls to action in SDF-\nrun camps serve to unite followers under a common cause, \"cultivating a shared sense of citizenship within this establishment.\"60\nIn addition to reclaiming its national identity, ISIS has the potential to bolster its real and perceived state-making capacity through numerous competitive advantages brought to light by the virus. Crucial to ISIS's ascent in the region were the state failures of Iraq and Syria, and ISIS media's portrayal of COVID-19 now exposes many of the same economic, social, and sectarian crises that originally led to the group's rise to power. The influx of media surrounding the situation of ISIS detainees also \"underscores the narrative that coalition forces are not focused on or able to take care of the people.\"61 Such narratives provide powerful mechanisms for furthering ISIS's political foothold in the region.\n\nAlthough ISIS's current approach to nation- and state-making is similar to its previous efforts, the effects of COVID-19 deepen the grievances on which the organization's influence depends.62 Experts also postulate that the deleterious psychological effects of the pandemic, such as increased isolation and feelings of uncertainty, may create circumstances especially amenable to ideological radicalizationpotentially enhancing ISIS's appeal and broadening the caliphate's citizenry.63\n\n\nDr. Stacey Pollard is the director of the Ann Caracristi Institute for Intelligence Research and Center for Designing Intelligence Research at National Intelligence University. She specializes in conflict and instability in the Middle East and North Africa and has extensive field research experience in Iraq and Syria.\n\nHenry Baraket is pursuing an M.S. in national security studies at New Jersey City University, with interests in research, political philosophy, and advancing liberty. He has lived in the Middle East, where he earned a B.A. in political science and international affairs. Girish Ganesan, a Rutgers University sophomore majoring in computer science and mathematics, is interested in applying quantitative and statistical techniques to natural and social sciences problems. Natalie Kim, a senior at Rutgers University majoring in electrical engineering and mathematics, is interested in applying quantitative and technological tools to problems in the social sciences.\n\n1\nCameron Glen et al., \"Timeline: The Rise, Spread, and Fall of the Islamic State,\" Wilson Center, October 28, 2019, https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/ timeline-rise-and-spread-the-islamic-state.\n2\nStacey E. Pollard, David Poplack, and Kevin Casey, \"Understanding the Islamic State's Competitive Advantages: Remaking State and Nationhood in the Middle East and North Africa,\" *Terrorism and Political Violence* (2015): 1045-1065,\nhttps://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/09546553.2015.1108310 ?journalCode=ftpv20.\n3\nPollard, Poplack, and Casey, \"Understanding the Islamic State's Competitive\nAdvantages.\"\n4\nPollard, Poplack, and Casey, \"Understanding the Islamic State's Competitive Advantages.\"\n5\nPollard, Poplack, and Casey, \"Understanding the Islamic State's Competitive Advantages.\"\n6\nPollard, Poplack, and Casey, \"Understanding the Islamic State's Competitive Advantages.\"\n7\nPollard, Poplack, and Casey, \"Understanding the Islamic State's Competitive Advantages.\"\n8\nAymenn Jawad al-Tamimi, \"Archive of Islamic State Administrative Documents,\"\nAymenn Jawad al-Tamimi (blog on pundicity.com), January 27, 2015, http://www. aymennjawad.org/2015/01/archive-of-islamic- state-administrative-documents.\n9\nCharles Lister, \"Profiling the Islamic State,\" Brookings Institution, November 2014.\n10\nResearchers such as Aymenn Jawad al-Tamimi, Shadi Hamid, Kenneth Pollack, Charles Lister, and Graeme Wood (among many others) have published prolifically on the Islamic State.\n11\nCarla E. Humud, Robert Pirog, and Liana Rosen, \"Islamic State Financing and U.S. Policy Approaches,\" Congressional Research Service, 2015.\n12\nR.I. Rotberg, \"Failed States, Collapsed States, Weak States: Causes and Indicators,\" in *State Failure and State Weakness in a Time of Terror*, ed. R. I. Rotberg\n(Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 2003).\n13\nArmin von Bogdandy et al., \"State-Building, Nation-Building, and Constitutional Politics in Post-Conflict Situations: Conceptual Clarifications and an\nAppraisal of Different Approaches,\" in Max Planck Yearbook of United Nations Law, Volume 9, ed. A. Bogdandy and R. Wolfrum (Leiden, the Netherlands:\nKoninklijke Brill NV, 2005), 579613.\n14\nPollard, Poplack, and Casey, \"Understanding the Islamic State's Competitive Advantages.\"\n15\nThis model combines Charles Tilly's early criteria for state making, in Charles\nTilly, \"War Making and State Making as Organized Crime,\" in Bringing the State Back In, ed. Peter Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer, and Theda Skocpol (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), with his later work on the role of\nnationalism in state making in, \"The State of Nationalism,\" *Critical Review* 10\n(1996): 299306.\n16\nPollard, Poplack, and Casey, \"Understanding the Islamic State's Competitive Advantages.\"\n17\nAbbas Abboud Salem, \"Iraq Faces Coronavirus with Empty Coffers and a\nCrumbling Health System,\" Washington Institute, August 13, 2020, https:// www.washingtoninstitute.org/fikraforum/view/iraq-coronavirus-corona-covidcovid19-health.\n18\n\"Iraq Has Confirmed Thousands More COVID-19 Cases than Reported, Medics Say,\" Reuters, April 2, 2020, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-health-corona virus-iraq/iraq-has-confirmed-thousands-more-covid-19-cases-than- reportedmedics-say-idUSKBN21K2GQ.\n19\nKatherine Lawlor and Ketti Davison, \"Iraq is Fragile, Not Hopeless: How Iraq's Fragility Undermines Regional Stability,\" Institute for the Study of War, December 2020, http://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/Iraq%20is%20\nFragile%2C%20Not%20Hopeless.pdf.\n20\nLawlor and Davison, \"Iraq is Fragile.\"\n21 Katherine Lawlor and Brandon Wallace, \"Anti-U.S. Protests in Baghdad:\nInterim Summary,\" Institute for the Study of War: Blogspot, January 24, 2020, iswresearch.blogspot.com/2020/01/anti-us-protests-inbaghdad-interim. html.\n22\nMina al-Lami, \"Jihadists See COVID-19 as an Opportunity,\" Global Network on Extremism & Technology, June 2020, https://gnet-research.org/2020/06/01/ jihadists-see-covid-19-as-an-opportunity/.\n23\nAshraf Al-Saeed and Nabeel Darweesh, \"COVID-19 and Low Oil Prices Push Millions of Iraqis into Poverty,\" World Bank, November 11, 2020, https://www. worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2020/11/11/new-world-bank-reportcalls-for-urgent-fiscal-stimulus-and-economic-reforms-to-help-the-poor-andthe-most-vulnerable-in-iraq.\n24\nAndres Gonzalez, \"Coronavirus Threatens Iraq with New Humanitarian Crisis,\" Oxfam International, 2020, https://www.oxfam.org/en/coronavirusthreatens-iraq-new-humanitarian-crisis.\n25\n\"Syria Relief Declare COVID-19 Emergency in SyriaSyrian Arab Republic,\" ReliefWeb, October 8, 2020, https://reliefweb.int/report/syrian-arab-republic/\nsyria-relief-declare-covid-19-emergency-syria.\n26\n\"COVID-19 in Northwest Syria: Taking Risks Simply to SurviveSyrian Arab Republic,\" ReliefWeb, November 10, 2020, https://reliefweb.int/report/ syrian-arab-republic/covid-19-northwest-syria-taking-risks-simply-survive.\n27\nSarah Dadouch, \"Coronavirus Is out of Control in Syria, No Matter What\nthe Government Says,\" *Washington Post*, September 25, 2020, https://www\n.washingtonpost.com/world/middle_east/syria-coronavirus-outbreak-doctors/ 2020/09/24/95d9323a-fcea-11ea-b0e4-350e4e60cc91_story.html.\n28\n\"Kuwait Fund Contributes US $4 Million Supporting UNICEF's COVID-19\nResponse in SyriaSyrian Arab Republic,\" ReliefWeb, November 15, 2020, https://reliefweb.int/report/syrian-arab-republic/kuwait-fund-contributesus4-million-supporting-unicef-s-covid-19.\n29\nMehmet Ozalp, \"In War-Torn Syria, the Coronavirus Pandemic Has Brought Its People to the Brink of Starvation,\" The Conversation, September 25, 2020, https://theconversation.com/in-war-torn-syria-the-coronavirus-pandemichas-brought-its-people-to-the-brink-of-starvation-144794.\n30\nDanny Makki, \"Syria Is Facing a COVID-19 Catastrophe,\" Middle East Institute, November 2020, https://www.mei.edu/publications/syria-facing-covid- 19-catastrophe.\n31\nEdith M. Lederer, \"Over 10,000 Islamic State Fighters Active in Iraq, Syria as Attacks 'Significantly' Increase: UN,\" Associated Press, August 25, 2020, https:// www.militarytimes.com/news/your-military/2020/08/25/over-10000-islamicstate-fighters-active-in-iraq-syria-as-attacks-significantly-increase-un/.\n32\nJim Sciutto, Jamie Crawford, and Chelsea J. Carter, \"ISIS Can 'Muster' Between 20,000 and 31,500 Fighters, CIA Says,\" CNN, September 12, 2014, https://www. cnn.com/2014/09/11/world/meast/isis-syria-iraq/index.html.\n33\nSam Heller, \"When Measuring ISIS's 'Resurgence,' Use the Right Standard,\" International Crisis Group, May 13, 2020, https://www.crisisgroup.org/ middleeast-north-africa/gulf-and-arabian-peninsula/iraq/when-measuring-isiss-resur gence-use-right-standard.\n34\nHeller, \"When Measuring ISIS's 'Resurgence.'\"\n35\nElizabeth Dent, \"US Policy and the Resurgence of ISIS in Iraq and Syria,\" Middle East Institute, October 2020. https://www.mei.edu/sites/default/files/2020- 10/US%20Policy%20and%20the%20Resurgence%20of%20ISIS%20in%20 Iraq%20and%20Syria%20%20.pdf.\n36\nDent, \"US Policy and the Resurgence of ISIS in Iraq and Syria.\"\n37\nal-Lami, \"Jihadists See COVID-19 as an Opportunity.\"\n38\nBrandon Wallace, \"Iraq Situation Report: February 20-25, 2020,\" Institute of the\nStudy of War, March 2, 2020.\n39\nKatherine Lawlor and Brandon Wallace, \"Iraq Situation Update: March 11-17, 2020,\" Institute for the Study of War, March 20, 2020, www.understandingwar. org/backgrounder/iraq-situation-update-march-11-17-2020.\n40\n\"Iraq: Extremism & Counter-Extremism,\" Counter-Extremism Project, December 1, 2020, https://www.counterextremism.com/countries/iraq.\n41\nGregory Waters, \"ISIS Redux: The Central Syria Insurgency in November 2020,\" December 1, 2020, https://www.counterextremism.com/blog/isis-reduxcentral-syria-insurgency-november-2020.\n42\nMichael Land and Nada Atieh, \"Syria Situation Report: March 4-17, 2020, Institute for the Study of War,\" March 20, 2020, http://www.understandingwar.org/ backgrounder/syria-situation-report-march-4-17-2020.\n43 Andrew Greco, \"Syria Situation Report: November 11-December 1, 2020,\"\nInstitute for the Study of War, December 3, 2020, http://www.understand ingwar.org/backgrounder/syria-situation-report-november-11-december-1- 2020.\n44\nSean W. O'Donnell, Stephen Akard, and Ann Calvaresi Barr, Operation Inherent Resolve (Washington: U.S. Federal Government, 2020), 18, https://media. defense.gov/2020/Aug/04/2002469838/-1/-1/1/LEAD%20INSPECTOR%20\nGENERAL%20FOR%20OPERATION%20INHERENT%20RESOLVE%20 APRIL%201,%202020%20-%20JUNE%2030,%202020.PDF.PDF.\n45\nMohamed Mokhtar Qandil, \"Terrorism and Coronavirus: Hyperbole, Idealism, and Ignorance,\" The Washington Institute, April 28, 2020, https://www. washingtoninstitute.org/fikraforum/view/Terrorism-Extremism-Coronavirus- ISIS-Al-Qaeda-Resurgence-COVID-19.\n46\nAl-Naba Newsletter #220, February 26, 2020, https://jihadology.net/2020/02/06/\nnew-issue-of-the-islamic-states-newsletter-al-naba-220/.\n47\nMohamed Mokhtar Qandil, \"Terrorism and Coronavirus.\"\n48\nTova C. Norlen, \"The Impact of COVID-19 on Salafi-Jihadi Terrorism,\" Connections 19, no. 2, The Security Impacts of the COVID-19 Pandemic (2020), 11-24,\nhttps://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/26937606.pdf?refreqid=excelsior%3Ad4b 2886ef0eedb2d9447af3ca01ba3c9.\n49\nAl-Naba Newsletter #227, March 26, 2020, https://jihadology.net/wp-content/\nuploads/_pda/2020/03/The-Islamic-State-al-Naba%CC%84%E2%80%99-News letter-227.pdf.\n50\n\"Contending with ISIS in the Time of Coronavirus,\" International Crisis Group, March 31, 2020, https://www.crisisgroup.org/global/contending-isistime-coronavirus.\n51\nAl-Naba Newsletter #227.\n52\n\"Contending with ISIS in the Time of Coronavirus,\" International Crisis Groups.\n53\nQandil, \"Terrorism and Coronavirus: Hyperbole, Idealism, and Ignorance.\"\n54\nAl-Naba Newsletter #227.\n55\n\"Contending with ISIS in the Time of Coronavirus,\" International Crisis Group.\n56\n\"Twenty-sixth report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team submitted pursuant to resolution 2368 (2017) concerning ISIL (Da'esh), Al- Qaida and associated individuals and entities,\" United Nations Security Council, July 23, 2020, https://undocs.org/S/2020/717.\n57\nIlan Berman, \"ISIS Is Using the COVID Distraction to Rearm and Regroup,\" USA Today, August 28, 2020, https://www.usatoday.com/story/ opinion/2020/08/28/\nisis-did-not-disappear-and-now-its-poised-rise-again-amidst-instabilitycolumn/5644397002/.\n58\nPollard, Poplack, and Casey, \"Understanding the Islamic State's Competitive Advantages.\"\n59\n\"The Impact of the COVID-19 Pandemic on Terrorism, Counter-terrorism and Countering Violent Extremism,\" United Nations Security Council Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate, June 2020, https://www.un.org/\nsc/ctc/wp-content/uploads/2020/06/CTED-Paper%E2%80%93-The-impactof-the-COVID-19-pandemic-on-counter-terrorism-and-countering-violentextremism.pdf.\n60\nPollard, Poplack, and Casey, \"Understanding the Islamic State's Competitive Advantages.\"\n61\nAudrey Alexander, \"The Security Threat COVID-19 Poses to the Northern Syria\nDetention Camps Holding Islamic State Members,\" CTC Sentinel, Special Issue: COVID-19 and Counterterrorism 13, no. 6, (June 2020), https://ctc.usma.edu/\nthe-security-threat-covid-19-poses-to-the-northern-syria-detention-campsholding-islamic-state-members/.\n62\n\"The Impact of the COVID-19 Pandemic on Terrorism.\"\n63\nGary Ackerman and Hayley Peterson, \"Terrorism and COVID-19: Actual and\nPotential Impacts,\" *Perspectives on Terrorism* 14, no. 3 (June 2020): 59-73.\n\n## Transnational Crime During A Pandemic: How Criminals Are Capitalizing On The Chaos Caused By Covid-19\n\nLayla M. Hashemi, Sarah Meo, and Louise Shelley The COVID-19 pandemic has dramatically escalated criminal activity from violent exploitation of youth to complex financial scams. Much of this activity is linked to the increasing dependency on online platforms, social media, and cellphones. This chapter examines the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on transnational crimes, including human and drug trafficking, environmental and financial crimes, and trade in counterfeits. It demonstrates how the COVID-19 crisis poses new and unprecedented threats to public health and human security. Creative criminals have capitalized on the chaos caused by COVID- 19 to expand their illicit activities. For example, drug traffickers are This research was supported by NSF grant # 1837881, EAGER: ISN: A New Multi- Approach to Understanding, Modeling, and Disrupting Drug and Counterfeit Illicit Supply Chain.\n\nemploying new techniques and initiating new trade routes and delivery strategies. Online exploitation has grown significantly during the pandemic as young people become victims of child sexual exploitation and senior citizens are targeted by financial scammers. Criminals exploit timber and other natural resources as these environmental products are inadequately protected during COVID-19. The drastic increase in the volume of the online activity surrounding the COVID-19 pandemic makes it difficult to combat these transnational crimes and requires new strategies and tactics.\n\n## Introduction\n\nThe COVID-19 pandemic has been much more than a health crisis. In addition to killing millions of the more than 180 million infected worldwide,1 it has caused significant economic and social harm and poses new and unprecedented threats to public health and human security. The global economy declined more than 4 percent in 2020,2\nand international trade by much more. As a result, in October 2020, the World Bank predicted \"that between 71 million and 100 million people will be pushed into extreme poverty this year, erasing almost all progress made in the last five years in the fight against extreme poverty.\"3 Women have suffered disproportionate harm from the pandemic, which has set back economic advances they had made in the United States and globally.4, 5 This impoverishment has increased human trafficking and sexual exploitation of women, particularly online. Social connections also have eroded as many, especially the elderly, have become isolated. The increased use of online services and communications has been pronounced globally. School closures, in particular, have resulted in youth spending more time online, making them more vulnerable to recruitment by criminals.\n\nThe challenges of online criminal activity, evident before the COVID-19 pandemic, have accelerated in 2020 and 2021. Criminals have capitalized on health vulnerabilities, isolation, and economic hardship to make significant profits during this challenging period. Massive amounts of fraudulent equipment and medical supplies such as counterfeit masks have entered supply chains, which has possibly compounded the death rate as individuals are not adequately protected by masks or are treated by personnel with inferior or substandard counterfeit respirators.6, 7 Isolation has increased vulnerability to frauds. Scams and the illegal recruitment of money mules and youth for child sexual exploitation online have grown during the pandemic.\n\nIn addition to pandemic's impacts on transnational crimes, including human and drug trafficking, this chapter will focus on environmental and financial crimes, as well as the trade in counterfeits.\n\nAt the March 2021 United Nations Congress on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice, speakers highlighted the need for continued international cooperation in combating cybercrime and environmental crime.8 Natural resources have been particularly hard hit as tourism has declined, reducing a major revenue source in Africa and complicating guardianship of forests from illicit timber cutters. Many regions have noted a growth in environmental crime and in trade in counterfeits, which based on customs seizures had already represented more than $500 billion annually in business before the pandemic. In 2016, trade in counterfeit and pirated goods was 3.3\npercent of world trade9 and represented the most significant illicit trade component.10\n\n## Growth Of Online Fraud (Covid-19 Payments)\n\nAs the pandemic has pushed large parts of society onto their phones, tablets, and laptops, online fraud has grown rapidly. In its COVID-19\nCybercrime Analysis Report, INTERPOL noted a sharp rise in online scams and cybercrimes, including phishing, disruptive technology, data harvesting, malware, malicious domains, and  pandemic-related misinformation schemes, all of which capitalize on the uncertainty of the pandemic.11 Many organizations hastily moved to a \"work from home\" system without the cybersecurity needed to protect their remote working environments, which provided ample opportunity for cybercriminals to obtain sensitive user data.12 Similarly, banking Internet technology systems were unequipped to handle the public's newfound dependency on remote banking. Money exchange apps allow for fraudulent transactions, the theft of personally identifiable information (PII) through cyberattacks, and human error.13\nPopulations with less technical experience and capabilities, including elderly and low- income individuals, are particularly susceptible to these cybercrimes.\n\nCybercriminals are using phishing emails and misinformation schemes to capitalize on the fear surrounding the pandemic.14 The FBI\nhas issued warnings against scam emails that claim to provide information on pandemic-related payments such as stimulus checks, airline carrier refunds, and charitable donations but are actually aimed at gaining responders' PII.15, 16 Cybercriminals operating both on the dark and open webs have also used fear of the virus and confusion surrounding vaccine distribution in phishing campaigns advertising for individuals to personally pay for vaccines or to pay to get on a waiting list for a vaccine. There were also unsubstantiated claims of FDA\napproved vaccines advertised online.17 Fake forms offering vaccines have been sent to large organizations and .edu email addresses to steal email credentials and intellectual property.18 Similarly, criminals are conducting fraudulent phone scams to gather PII from the growing pool of teleworkers and exploit an increasingly isolated population.19\nCybercriminals worldwide are also using malicious domains that masquerade as authoritative bodies, such as the World Health Organization (WHO) and the Centers for Disease Control (CDC), to fool users, often in conjunction with disruptive malware.20 INTERPOL\nreported a dramatic increase in the registration of malicious domains using keywords such as \"COVID\" and \"Corona,\" with a large portion of these newly registered domains claiming to provide COVID-19\nupdates and statistics.21 A corporate partner of INTERPOL \"detected a 569 percent growth in malicious registrations\" between February and March 2020.22 An article in the Journal of the American Medical Association called misinformation a \"serious threat to public health\"\nthat \"likely accelerated the spread of COVID-19,\" making these fraudulent domains even more distressing.23\nWidespread unemployment has provided cybercriminals a significant opportunity to target both individuals and government relief programs. Within the United States, the unprecedented influx of unemployment claims has opened the doors for illicit actors to defraud COVID-19 relief programs or gain fraudulent unemployment insurance.24 One Seattle software developer, for example, was charged with wire fraud after attempting to defraud COVID-19 relief programs of more than $550,000.25 Another scam involved buying and selling PII\non the dark web to submit fraudulent relief applications.26 By selling these \"fraud kits\" to Internet users with less experience stealing PII data, cybercriminals can further monetize the pandemic.27 In a recent article on dark web marketplaces, experts found that of 788 COVID-19-specific listings, 99 fell under the category of \"guides on scamming\" that offered \"manuals on how to earn money exploiting flaws in COVID-19 related government relief funds\" and manipulating online banking and delivery systems.28 These occurrences began in March 2020 and became more frequent after the introduction of the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security (CARES) Act and the extension of the Small Business Association loan program, until finally beginning to fall in September.29\nWith rising unemployment during COVID-19, criminals use work-from-home, employment, and romance scams to launder stolen funds. The use of money mulesindividuals who transfer illicit profits on a criminal's behalfhas increased during the pandemic.\n\nUsing money mules to move funds through bank transfers and cash transactions is intended to obfuscate the money trail and avoid detection by law enforcement investigations.30 In Northern Virginia, for example, criminals used school emails and the Nextdoor app to\n\ntarget several George Mason University students at the beginning of the pandemicoffering fake jobs paying hundreds of dollars per week for minimal remote \"work.\"31 From January 2020 to early August 2021, the U.S. Federal Trade Commission recorded almost 348,000 fraud reports worth more than $519 million in fraud loss.\n\nThe top categories were online shopping and vacation/travel,32 which illustrates transnational criminals' interest in capitalizing on the high levels of isolation caused by the pandemic.\n\nThe rise in unemployment also enables the spread of malware such as info-stealers and more sophisticated banking Trojan horses. According to the Organized Crime Corruption and Reporting Project (OCCRP), in conjunction with the cybersecurity firm Check Point, malware is being dispersed through employment-related documents such as curriculum vitae (CV) and medical leave forms. The number of malicious CV files doubled in just two months in 2020.33 According to INTERPOL data, a significant number of disruptive malware campaigns are now targeting larger institutions such as government agencies and the healthcare industry rather than individuals and smaller companies.34 In March 2020, the second largest hospital in the Czech Republic suffered a ransomware attack that blocked the sharing of medical information between departments until a \"ransom\" had been paid. Since then, many other hospitals have been targeted.35, 36 The same month, the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services website was the target of a denial-of-service attack and subsequently crashed.37\nAs recently as December 2020, the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN) issued a notice urging financial institutions to stay alert to potential fraud concerning the COVID-19 vaccine, indicating that vaccine research has been the target of certain known ransomware.38\n\n## Trends In The Drug Trade\n\nTrends in the drug trade have fluctuated in response to the COVID-19 outbreak and countries' subsequent containment measures. Country lockdowns and movement restrictions initially disrupted global drug supply chains, and widespread flight cancellations placed considerable stress on those working as drug mules.39 However, traffickers proved resilient and quickly adapted to the \"shock\" of the pandemic by shifting routes, production, and distribution and using the dark web for certain substances.40, 41, 42\nAcross various regions, border closures and restrictions on land, air, and maritime travel initially interrupted drug traffickers. Mexican production of fentanyl and methamphetamines was temporarily curtailed by a lack of necessary precursor chemicals from China.43\nEvidence suggests, however, that production was reinstated quickly;\nfentanyl seizures in Mexico increased 465 percent between January and mid-September of 2020 compared to the first three quarters of 2019. 44, * In northern Central America, the cancellation of commercial flights hindered the delivery of synthetic drugs and cocaine, typically transported in small quantities by drug mules.45 Countries in North Africa and the Middle East experienced a similar interference in the drug trade, reporting a reduction in seizures following the initial COVID-19 restrictions and instances of rising wholesale and retail prices.46 In Europe, social distancing measures sharply curtailed trade on the distribution level, while shortages and stockpiling of cannabis resin and herbal cannabis pushed retail prices higher.47\nSimilarly, the street price of marijuana increased 55 percent from March to May in New York City.48\nDrug cartels and organized crime groups, however, adapted quickly to the shifting conditions of the drug trade. The MS-13 and 18th Street gangs quickly began to emphasize the marijuana retail market and synthetic drugs being processed in northern Central America, capitalizing on drug production in Guatemala and Honduras.49 According to the OCCRP, the cocaine industry in Colombia also fared well during the lockdown, courtesy of large stockpiles of cocaine that had been warehoused before the pandemic.50 Reports also indicate a strong cocaine market in Honduras where authorities had confiscated more of the drug by late September 2020 than in all of 2019.51\nRestrictive measures related to COVID-19 have had a considerable impact on drug trafficking routes. In late May 2020, the OCCRP reported Colombian cocaine smugglers, who could no longer use preferred maritime methods like speedboats and fishing vessels because of COVID-19 restrictions, had developed approximately six new or revived land routes through Panama.52 Adaptation has also been noted in the transit countries of Honduras and Guatemala, where an increase in coca cultivation camps has been detected, suggesting that the countries may be developing as production locations.53 New strategies have also been adopted in North Africa, where reports suggest traffickers are relying more on maritime and overland routes that avoid control points.54\nReported innovations in drug distribution methods include the increased use of darknet markets for small quantities of cannabis.55\nThe European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction's analysis of online drug markets during an early phase of COVID-\n19 lockdowns shows a rise from January to March of 2020 in dark web activity and encrypted use of messenger services to sell cannabis products.56 Experts indicate that dark web markets for cocaine and cannabis are typically more significant at the distribution level than with wholesale production and supply.57 The OCCRP, however, has reported examples of \"coronasales\" where large quantities of drugs are sold to dealers at a discount via the dark web.58 For street-level distribution in Europe and North America, dealers facilitated their business mainly through WhatsApp, coordinating \"no contact drops\" and door-to-door deliveries, using or masquerading as essential workers.59, 60\n\n## Human Trafficking And Child Pornography\n\nThe spread of COVID-19 has exacerbated the underlying circumstances which contribute to human trafficking and has motivated an enormous increase in online child sexual abuse material (CSAM). Rising unemployment and global economic insecurity have increased the vulnerability of groups already disproportionately exploited in human traffickingincluding women, migrants, refugees, domestic workers, and children.61 This phenomenon occurs on a global scale, putting vulnerable populations at risk in the United States and less developed countries.\n\nLockdowns and pandemic containment measures have heightened the exposure to trafficking for women and girls in households with domestic violence and for domestic workers who may be trapped in quarantine with their abusers. The significant global increase in domestic abuse observed in relation to social distancingwhich UN Women, an organization dedicated to gender equality, describes as a \"shadow pandemic\"only intensifies the danger of intimate partner trafficking victims.62 Similarly, abuse victims may be exposed to exploitation while attempting to escape their situation, as domestic abuse is a commonly recognized push factor toward trafficking.63\nThe socio-economic footprint of COVID-19 and its restriction measures have isolated victims within patterns of abuse and separated survivors from vital rehabilitation aid. Many services typically offered by anti-trafficking NGOs, such as victim rescue missions, shelters, counseling, and legal assistance, have been cancelled or limited because of economic instability and COVID-19 restrictions.64\n\nSimilarly, the need for law enforcement and criminal justice agencies to prioritize pandemic restrictions has reduced antitrafficking operations and created delays in the court system for survivors awaiting justice.65\nMany survivors who have escaped their traffickers are at considerable risk of returning to the sex trafficking cycle because they lack income and support services.66 Polaris, an NGO dedicated to ending human trafficking, has also noted a growing trend toward sextortion. Landlords capitalize on their tenants' financial hardship by pressing for sexual acts in exchange for rent.67 While speaking at a July 2020\nforum on sextortion, organized in part by the Partnership for Transparency, Dr. Ortrun Merkle noted that sextortion is a global phenomenon and emphasized the increased vulnerability of migrant women with disabilities, traveling with small children, and in the LGBTQ\ncommunity.68 Transactional sex has been reported extensively, along with other potentially dangerous activities imposed on women and girls, such as becoming drug couriers.69\nWithin the sector of migrant smuggling, several reports suggest border closures and mobility restrictions have created a greater dependency on smugglers, who, in turn, have increased transportation fees.70 In a survey of migrants conducted by the Mixed Migration Centre in July 2020, most respondents said smugglers had begun using more dangerous routes after the spread of COVID-19.71 This response was widespread in Malaysia, Nigeria, and Tunisia, where more than 70 percent of respondents reported more dangerous routes were being used.72\nThe health crisis has further complicated the already perilous migrant route across the Mediterranean Sea. Several public and private search and rescue missions were suspended in 2020, and vessels carrying migrants were required to remain offshore while quarantiningelongating a dangerous and painful journey.73 Evidence provided by the UN Office of Drugs and Crime shows that smugglers are abandoning migrants in transit countries, compounding their exposure to violence, trafficking, and COVID-19.74 Additionally, health policies that require the forced return of migrant laborers can endanger children who may be separated from their parents or stranded if not given proper aid.75 By June 2020, 1,359 migrant childrenmany unaccompaniedhad been returned to Ethiopia from various countries in Africa and the Middle East, where mandatory quarantine required them to be held at the borders for 14 days with social workers and medical professionals.76\nMigrants working under government-regulated mass labor contracts that were terminated because of the pandemic found themselves stranded in their countries of former employment and left with no ability to return home.77 In the Gulf Cooperation Council states, hundreds of thousands of workers from Pakistan and India were left jobless after the pandemic outbreak, with only a minority succeeding in receiving government-sponsored flights to return to their home countries.78 According to an October 2020 press release, the International Organization for Migration estimated that, as of July 2020, at least 2.75 million migrants were stranded worldwide, with many left in inhumane conditions without basic hygiene or necessary distancing protection against the virus.79\nIncreased travel restrictions and lockdowns have intensified the demand for child pornography,80 and school closures and the shift to online learning have increased the opportunity for online child exploitation. Both domestically and internationally, social distancing and the conversion of schools and workplaces to virtual environments have drastically increased time spent online, leaving school-age children particularly vulnerable to recruitment, grooming, and sextortion from online predators.81 These children may be pressured to livestream sexual material by online predators or by family members attempting to offset financial difficulties caused by COVID-19.82 Professionals working in Northern Virginia communities tell of older men approaching young girls during the lockdown on popular social media apps such as Instagram, Lemon, Snapchat, Tinder, Twitter, and YOLO.83, 84\n\nChildren are further victimized by the drastic increase in the production and circulation of online CSAM observed throughout the pandemic. During the first nine months of 2020, the National Center for Missing and Exploited Children \"experienced a 98.66 percent increase in online enticement reports\" compared to the same period in 2019.85 A September 2020 INTERPOL report addressing the issue of CSAM as a global phenomenon indicated a substantial increase in CSAM being shared on peer-to-peer networks, social media platforms, and messaging applications, as well as continued discussion of CSAM on dark web fora.86 National and international agencies report uninvited participants sharing CSAM on videoconferencing platforms, such as Zoomsimultaneously victimizing the material's subject and potentially victimizing other participants on the call.87, 88\nIn a tragic extension of this explosion of online CSAM, in February 2021, two FBI agents were fatally shot during an investigation into a Florida-based suspect of violent crimes against children, the first agents to be shot and killed while on duty since 2008.89\n\n## Environmental Crime\n\nThe effects of the COVID-19 pandemic have undercut wildlife conservation efforts.90 Ecotourism, which provides significant funding for conservation activities, has declined massively.91 TRAFFIC, an NGO devoted to combating wildlife crime, reported in 2020 that damage to the economy and migration from urban to rural spaces are \"increasing pressure on already stressed wildlife areas.\"92 Widespread job loss and a lack of surveillance of restricted wildlife areas have boosted food and trade poaching.93\nThe situation is aggravated by governmental corruption related to the COVID-19 response contributing to environmental crimes, such as illegal logging, deforestation, and poaching.94 Despite restrictive lockdown measures, illegal logging and deforestation continue to flourish in parts of Africa and the Amazon rainforest. In Brazil, the Igarape Institute estimates that \"70 percent of timber products from the Amazon come from illegal operations.\"95, 96 The Environmental Investigation Agency has reported that 80 percent of lumber production in Peru is illegal or illicit.97, 98 Rather than being curtailed by three months of COVID-19 restrictions, Peruvian timber exports grew by 25 percent in July 2020.99\nPublic and private corruption facilitate the illicit timber trade, and both are bolstered by the pandemic's creation of insecure economic and regulatory environments.100 In Peru, privately produced fake harvest permitscalled forest inventorieshave long been corruptly approved by public officials.101, 102 Under the pretense of \"reactivating\" the economy, several regional authorities in Brazil, Peru, and elsewhere have pushed for relaxing timber trade regulations, opening the door to further deforestation and corruption.103 Similarly, in Mozambique, which has experienced significant deforestation and related labor abuses, donors' main concerns regarding COVID-19 related corruption have centered on public PPE procurement and donor assistance rather than preventing deforestation.104\nEvidence suggests poaching for subsistence purposesfor food and tradehas increased to offset economic distress caused by the pandemic.105 As detailed in a recent Targeting Natural Resource Corruption (TNRC) panel, roughly 90 percent of African tour operators have suffered a 75 percent decline in bookings.106 Rural residents who depend on tourism supply chains in many regions are being driven to poaching: the Uganda Wildlife Authority reported that poaching cases in Africa between February and June 2020 were double the number recorded in 2019.107 During India's lockdown period, the poaching of ungulates, which are typically hunted for their meat, also doubled, rising from 22 percent of total reported poaching cases pre-lockdown (February/March) to 44 percent during lockdown (March-May).108\nThe impact of COVID-19 on the future of the legal and illegal wildlife trade remains unclear. In certain regions, such as Central\n\nAfrica, illicit wildlife trafficking has continued with little resistance. Uganda, for example, continues to serve as both a source and transit country, facilitating trafficking between the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Kenya.109 Nevertheless, the pandemic has raised global concern about wildlife trade in general, as significant evidence points to the live animal markets (\"wet markets\") in Wuhan, China, as the original COVID-19 transmission source between animal and human.110, 111 Pandemic-induced fear and stigma surrounding wildlife food products did manifest in specific areas: in March 2020, a survey conducted in Hong Kong, Myanmar, Thailand, and Vietnam \"suggested that the vast majority of respondents\n(84 percent) would be unlikely or very unlikely to engage in future consumption of wildlife products.\"112 Experts contend, however, that not only will COVID-19 not bring about the end of the illegal wildlife trade, but the trade itself must be regulated to help prevent future pandemics.113, 114 Unfortunately, during COVID-19, those trying to safeguard natural resources are restricted because of lockdowns or targeted by illicit traders. This problem has been especially problematic for indigenous people who are on the frontline of protecting trees and wildlife.115 They have suffered disproportionately from COVD-19 while simultaneously being targeted by poachers and illegal loggers.116\n\n## Corruption, Counterfeits, And Threats To Public Health\n\nThe pandemic has created windows of opportunity for corrupt networks that facilitate money laundering, counterfeiting, and other transnational crimes. The shutdown and resulting economic stagnation led to the implementation of financial management systems, such as cash transfers, that involved several corruption risks especially in developing countries where levels of corruption are high.117 In contexts where the rule of law is weak and there is little transparency and accountability, corrupt government officials can misappropriate emergency aid funds.118 The urgency surrounding the pandemic has impeded proper oversight and due diligence regarding international financial flows.\nWe're not just fighting an epidemic; we're fighting an infodemic.\nFake news spreads faster and more easily than this virus,\nand is just as dangerous.\n\n- TEDROS ADHANOM GHEBREYESUS, WHO DIRECTOR-GENERAL,\nAT MUNICH SECURITY CONFERENCE 2020119\nAs noted by the World Health Organization (WHO) and other intergovernmental organizations, a massive \"infodemic\"or overabundance of informationhas accompanied the COVID-19 pandemic. Similar to the virus, medical misinformation and disinformation spread rapidly, threatening national health and security. This flood of information, both accurate and false, impedes individuals' ability to obtain trustworthy guidance critical to preventing the spread of the virus and protecting public health. In some cases, this public information mismanagement fomented distrust of governments and medical professionals and hindered efforts to stop the virus's spread. In other cases, medical misinformation and rumors of false cures proved deadly. For instance, in Iran, false claims that drinking methanol can cure the coronavirus led to more than 500 deaths; dozens went blind, and thousands were hospitalized. The Iranian government and traditional media outlets initially denied that COVID-19 was present to influence voter turnout during national elections in February 2020. Once public information was made available, much of it was unreliable.120\nMuch of the misinformation and disinformation surrounding COVID-19 involved promoting unverified treatments and cures for the virus. Former U.S. President Donald Trump's Twitter account was\n\nsuspended in mid-2020 after he shared a video of a doctor falsely claiming the antimalarial drug hydroxychloroquine could cure the coronavirus. According to an observational medical study, \"From March 1 to April 30, 2020, Donald J Trump made 11 tweets about unproven therapies and mentioned these therapies 65 times in White House briefings, especially touting hydroxychloroquine and chloroquine.\"121 Consumers' rush to purchase hydroxychloroquine led to the medication being unavailable for treating the diseases for which it has been approved, such as malaria and the autoimmune conditions lupus and rheumatoid arthritis.122 On June 15, the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) revoked the emergency use authorization for hydroxychloroquine and chloroquine in treating COVID-19, based on evidence that the medicines did not decrease the likelihood of death or speed recovery.123 This points to the urgent need for effective public education and media outreach to ensure individuals do not fall prey to medical misinformation that could exacerbate the virus's spread. To inform the public and prevent the purchasing of counterfeits of sought-after products such as respirators or face masks, the FDA, CDC, and others have conducted extensive media and educational outreach efforts and released guidelines raising awareness of the rapid increase in counterfeit PPE.\n\nShortages of PPE and medical supplies encouraged the counterfeiting of COVID-19 related products, including respirators (N95 masks), ventilators, and other medical supplies, such as gloves, gowns, and sanitizing products. Shortages of toilet paper, paper towels, and cleaning supplies led to price gouging. In response, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement's Homeland Security Investigations (HSI) launched Operation Stolen Promise in April 2020 to combat COVID-\n19 related fraud and other criminal activity.124 Under Operation Stolen Promise, HSI formed partnerships with government, law enforcement, and private companies to strengthen global supply chain security and protect the American public from victimization. In May, HIS reported that \"HSI and CBP have collaborated to seize 494 shipments of mislabeled, fraudulent, unauthorized, or prohibited COVID-19 test kits, treatment kits, homeopathic remedies, purported antiviral products and personal protective equipment (PPE).\"125\nIn addition to the proliferation of counterfeit goods, vendors used fraud, price gouging, and other crimes to exploit rising demand. In some cases, criminals defrauded consumers and companies through the nondelivery of products.126 In late March-early April 2020, a New Jersey car dealer tried to sell \"7 million of the 3M-branded masks to New York City's Office of Citywide Procurement for about 500 percent above the typical list price.\" He was also accused of offering to sell \"3 million Mexican-made N99 face masks to Florida's Division of Emergency Management for $5.46 million, a more than 500 percent markup.\"127 As a result, he was charged with wire fraud and two conspiracy charges, including Conspiracy to Violate the Defense Production Act.128\nTerrorists and other criminal organizations also took advantage of the ongoing supply shortages surrounding the pandemic. In the summer of 2020, the U.S. Department of Justice shut down an ISIS- affiliated scam involving the attempted sale of 100,000 fake N95 masks and counterfeit PPE through websites and social media accounts. According to the website Facemaskcenter.com, the masks were manufactured in Turkey but were certified by the U.S. FDA or other U.S. agencies. The website also claimed it had been operating since 1996 as \"the original online personal protective equipment supplier and was the first of its kind,\" even though it was only established in late February 2020.129\nCounterfeiting concerns surrounding COVID-19 are not limited to medical supplies. To be effective, COVID-19 vaccines must be distributed by approved and licensed manufacturers and properly administered by medical professionals. Concerns have arisen that illegitimate or counterfeit vaccines will be sold on the open and dark webs. Even though licensed vaccines are not being sold online, advertisements for COVID-19 vaccines have been found before they were publicly available on the dark web and encrypted messaging platforms such as Telegram for \"as much as US $150 per dose.\"130\nCounterfeit vaccines are offered on darknet markets alongside ads for weapons, narcotics, and other illicit goods, such as counterfeit currency, demonstrating the convergence of illicit trade in medical products and other forms of transnational crime. 131\n\n## Conclusion\n\nCriminals are often highly flexible and innovative. Although it is hard to identify beneficiaries of the COVID-19 pandemic, criminals and their corrupt associates have certainly been able to profit in this difficult time. This is particularly evident for those engaged in fraud and financial crime against the vulnerable, as well as for those who operated effectively online and through social media. The damage caused by criminal elements is not confined to the virtual world; it is occurring in the real world as well. Environmental destruction proliferates, individuals can still access narcotics, and the large-scale distribution of counterfeit PPE through existing supply chains is exacerbating the costs and morbidity of COVID-19.\n\nThe isolation required to prevent the spread of COVID-19 has inhibited the response to this growth in criminality. Moreover, the sheer volume of online trade in child sexual images and counterfeit medical products, as well as other forms of cybercrime, strains a law enforcement system more accustomed to on-the-ground investigations than the investigative techniques required to address this new criminality. The large-scale data analytics and artificial intelligence needed to address these phenomena are not adequately applied by law enforcement. Methods only now in development need to be applied with alacrity.\n\nThe growth of life-threatening criminality under COVID-19\nshows that traditional response methods are not adequate. To address this activity, we need a whole-of-society perspective that requires the cooperation of civil society, corporations, journalists, governments, and international bodies.132 Only by identifying rapidly changing criminality and encouraging collaboration between different sectors of society can we hope to stem the crime that devastates our health, social fiber, economic well-being, and the sustainability of our planet.\n\n\n\nDr. Layla M. Hashemi is a researcher and data analyst at the George Mason University (GMU) Terrorism, Transnational Crime and Corruption Center (TraCCC) focusing on international supply chains, cybercrime, and illicit trade. She currently is analyzing the supply chains of counterfeit PPE, fentanyl, and pharmaceuticals for the National Science Foundation project Disrupting Operations of Illicit Supply Networks (D-ISN). She earned her Ph.D. in public policy at GMU's Schar School and her master's in international relations and comparative politics at New York University with a concentration in Middle Eastern and Islamic studies.\n\nSarah Meo is pursuing a Ph.D. in public policy at GMU. She completed a Fulbright scholarship in Palermo, Sicily, working with the anti-mafia organization Fondazione Falcone. Her research focuses on transnational crime and corruption, mafia-type criminal organizations, and human trafficking in Europe. Currently she is working with Dr. Louise Shelley on an National Science Foundation-funded project analyzing human trafficking supply chains in the United States.\n\nDr. Louise Shelley is the Omer L. and Nancy Hirst Endowed Chair and a University Professor at GMU. Within the Schar School of Policy and Government, she founded and directs the TraCCC. She specializes in transnational crime, corruption, illicit financial flows, and money laundering. As an inaugural Andrew Carnegie Fellow, she wrote her most recent book, Dark Commerce: How a New Illicit Economy is Threatening our Future (Princeton University Press, 2018), on illicit trade.\n\n1\n\"Coronavirus World Map: Tracking the Global Outbreak,\" *New York Times*,\naccessed February 5, 2021, https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2020/world/\ncoronavirus-maps.html.\n2\n\"World Bank Expects Global Economy to Expand by 4 Percent in 2021,\" UN News, January 5, 2021, https://news.un.org/en/story/2021/01/1081392.\n3\nUnited Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, \"UN/DESA Policy Brief #86: The Long-Term Impact of COVID-19 on Poverty,\" October 15, 2020, https://www.un.org/development/desa/dpad/publication/un-desa-policybrief-86-the-long-term-impact-of-covid-19-on-poverty/.\n4\nPallavi Gogoi, \"Stuck-At-Home Moms: The Pandemic's Devastating Toll on Women,\" npr.org, October 28, 2020, https://www.npr.org/2020/10/28/928253674/\nstuck-at-home-moms-the-pandemics-devastating-toll-on-women.\n5\n\"COVID-19 and Its Economic Toll on Women: The Story behind the Numbers,\" UN Women, September 16, 2020, https://www.unwomen.org/en/news/ stories/2020/9/feature-covid-19-economic-impacts-on-women.\n6\nU.S. Customs and Border Protection, \"ICE, CBP Seize More Than 100,000 Counterfeit Surgical Masks Intended for Hospital Workers,\" December 9, 2020, https://www.ice.gov/news/releases/ice-cbp-seize-more-100000-counterfeitsurgical-masks-intended-hospital-workers.\n7\n\"3M PPE How To Identify Fraudulent Offers, Counterfeit Products and Price Gouging,\" 3M: PPE Safety, accessed February 2021, https://www.3m.com/3M/ en_US/worker-health-safety-us/covid19/covid-fraud/.\n8\nUnited Nations, General Assembly, Fourteenth United Nations Congress on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice (Draft Report), A/CONF.234/L.2/Add.5, (March 2021), https://undocs.org/A/CONF.234/L.2/ADD.5.\n9\nOECD and European Union Intellectual Property Office, Trends in Trade in Counterfeit and Pirated Goods (Paris: OECD Publishing, 2019), https://doi.org/\n10.1787/g2g9f533-en.\n10\nChanning May, \"Transnational Crime and the Developing World,\" Global Financial Integrity, March 2017, 166, https://www.gfintegrity.org/wp-content/ uploads/2017/03/Transnational_Crime-final.pdf.\n11\nINTERPOL, *COVID-19 Cybercrime Analysis Report*, INTERPOL General\nSecretariat, August 2020, 5, https://www.interpol.int/en/News-and-Events/ News/2020/INTERPOL-report-shows-alarming-rate-of-cyberattacks-during- COVID-19.\n12\nINTERPOL, *COVID-19 Cybercrime Analysis Report*, 4.\n13\nPrem Mahadevan, \"Cybercrime Threats during the Covid-19 Pandemic,\" Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime, April 2020, https:// globalinitiative.net/wp-content/uploads/2020/04/Cybercrime-Threats-duringthe-Covid-19-pandemic.pdf.\n14\nMahadevan, \"Cybercrime Threats during the Covid-19 Pandemic,\" 7.\n15 Federal Bureau of Investigation, \"FBI Sees Rise in Fraud Schemes Related to\nthe Coronavirus (COVID-19) Pandemic,\" FBI Alert I-032020-PSA, March 20, 2020, accessed January 20, 2021, https://www.ic3.gov/Media/Y2020/PSA 200320.\n16\nFederal Bureau of Investigation, \"FBI Warns of Potential Charity Fraud Associated with the COVID-19 Pandemic,\" Press Release, October 14, 2020, https://www.fbi.gov/news/pressrel/press-releases/fbi-warns-of-potentialcharity-fraud-associated-with-the-covid-19-pandemic.\n17\nFederal Bureau of Investigation, \"Federal Agencies Warn of Emerging Fraud Schemes Related to COVID-19 Vaccines,\" Press Release, December 21, 2020, https://www.fbi.gov/news/pressrel/press-releases/federal-agencies-warn-ofemerging-fraud-schemes-related-to-covid-19-vaccines.\n18\nLindsey O'Donnell, \"COVID-19 Vaccine Cyberattacks Steal Credentials, Spread Zebrocy Malware,\" Threat Post. December 9, 2020, https://threatpost. com/covid-19-vaccine-cyberattacks-credentials-zebrocy/162072/.\n19\nMahadevan, \"Cybercrime Threats during the Covid-19 Pandemic,\" 14.\n20\nMahadevan, \"Cybercrime Threats during the Covid-19 Pandemic,\" 7.\n21\nINTERPOL, *COVID-19 Cybercrime Analysis Report,* 10.\n22\nINTERPOL, *COVID-19 Cybercrime Analysis Report*, 11.\n23\nRaina M. Merchant, Eugenia C. South, and Nicole Lurie, \"Public Health Messaging in an Era of Social Media,\" Journal of the American Medical Association\n325, no. 3 (January 2021), doi:10.1001/jama.2020.24514.\n24\nFinancial Crimes Enforcement Center, \"FinCEN Advisory on Unemployment Insurance Fraud During the Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) Pandemic,\" October 13, 2020, https://www.fincen.gov/sites/default/files/shared/Advisory%20 Unemployment%20Insurance%20COVID%2019%20508%20Final.pdf.\n25\nDepartment of Justice, \"Seattle Software Developer Pleads Guilty to Wire Fraud\nfor COVID-Relief Fraud Scheme,\" October 22, 2020, https://www.justice.\ngov/opa/pr/seattle-software-developer-pleads-guilty-wire-fraud-covid-relieffraud-scheme.\n26\nDan Patterson, \"Exposing the Dark Web Coronavirus Scammers,\" TechRepublic, June 15, 2020, https://www.techrepublic.com/article/exposing-the-darkweb-coronavirus-scammers/.\n27\nPatterson, \"Exposing the Dark Web Coronavirus Scammers.\"\n28\nAlberto Bracci et al., \"Dark Web Marketplaces and COVID-19: Before the Vaccine,\" *EPJ Data Science* 10, no.6 (2021), https://doi.org/10.1140/epjds/s13688-\n021-00259-w.\n29\nBracci et al., \"Dark Web Marketplaces and COVID-19: Before the Vaccine.\"\n30\nScott Peddle, \"Money Mules Moving Illicit Proceeds from COVID-19-Related Crimes,\" CUInsight, December 9, 2020, https://www.cuinsight.com/moneymules-moving-illicit-proceeds-from-covid-19-related-crimes.html.\n31\nCINA, \"The Effects of the COVID-19 Response on Criminal Network Activity and Investigations,\" George Mason University, Criminal Investigations and Network Analysis Center, June 2020, https://cina.gmu.edu/wp-content/uploads/2020/06/ Covid-White-Paper_FINAL.pdf.\n32\nFederal Trade Commission, \"FTC COVID-19 and Stimulus Reports,\" Tableau Public, August 5, 2021. https://public.tableau.com/profile/federal.trade. commission#!/vizhome/COVID-19andStimulusReports/FraudLosses.\n33\nZdravko Ljubas, \"IT Specialists Warn of Malware Increase During COVID- 19,\" Organized Crime and Corruption Reporting Project (CCRP), June 10, 2020, https://www.occrp.org/en/daily/12509-it-specialists-warn-of-malwareincrease-during-covid-19.\n34\nINTERPOL, *COVID-19 Cybercrime Analysis Report*, 9-10.\n35\nMahadevan, \"Cybercrime Threats during the Covid-19 Pandemic,\" 1.\n36\nAlbin Sybera, \"The Human Factor: Experts Warn of Czech Hospitals' Cyber Vulnerability,\" Balkan Insight, December 9, 2020, https://balkaninsight.com/2020/ 12/09/the-human-factor-experts-warn-of-czech-hospitals-cyber-vulnerability/.\n37\nMahadevan, \"Cybercrime Threats during the Covid-19 Pandemic,\" 11.\n38\nFinancial Crimes Enforcement Center, \"FinCEN Asks Financial Institutions to Stay Alert to COVID-19 Vaccine-Related Scams and Cyberattacks,\" December 28, 2020, https://www.fincen.gov/sites/default/files/shared/COVID-19%20 Vaccine%20Notice%20508.pdf.\n39\nTuesday Reitano and Mark Shaw, Criminal Contagion: How Mafias, Gangsters and Scammers Profit From a Pandemic (London: C Hurst & Co).\n40\nInternational Crisis Group, \"Virus-Proof Violence: Crime and COVID-19 in\nMexico and the Northern Triangle,\" Latin America Report N. 83, 78, https://\nd2071andvip0wj.cloudfront.net/083-virus-proof-violence.pdf.\n41\nLucia Bird et al., \"Transformative Technologies: How Digital Is Changing the Landscape of Organized Crime,\" Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime, June 2020, 5, https://globalinitiative.net/wp-content/up loads/2020/06/Transformative-Technologies-WEB.pdf.\n42\nReitano and Shaw, *Criminal Contagion*, 71.\n43\nInternational Crisis Group, \"Virus-Proof Violence,\" 4-5.\n44\nReitano and Shaw, *Criminal Contagion*, 69.\n45\nInternational Crisis Group, \"Virus-Proof Violence,\" 4.\n46\nEuropean Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction, \"Impact of COVID- 19 on Drug Markets, Drug Use, Drug-Related Harms and Responses in South European Neighbourhood Policy Area,\" December 2020, 2, https://www.emcdda. europa.eu/system/files/publications/13481/EU4MD_Trendspotter_South_ ENP_FINAL_21122020.pdf.\n47\nEuropean Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction, \"EU Drug Markets: Impact of COVID 19,\" November 30, 2020, 7, https://data.europa.eu/doi/ 10.2810/19284.\n48\nParker Asmann, Chris Dalby, and Seth Robbins, \"Six Ways Coronavirus Is\nImpacting Organized Crime in the Americas,\" InSight Crime, May 4, 2020, https://www.insightcrime.org/news/analysis/coronavirus-organized-crimelatin-america/.\n49\nInternational Crisis Group, \"Virus-Proof Violence,\" 7.\n50\nCecilia Anesi et al., \"What Lockdown? World's Cocaine Traffickers Sniff at Movement Restrictions,\" Organized Crime and Corruption Reporting Project, May 20, 2020, https://www.occrp.org/en/coronavirus/what-lockdown-worldscocaine-traffickers-sniff-at-movement-restrictions.\n51\nInternational Crisis Group, \"Virus-Proof Violence,\" 7-8.\n52\nAnesi et al., \"What Lockdown?\"\n53\nInternational Crisis Group, \"Virus-Proof Violence,\" 8.\n54\nEuropean Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction, \"Impact of COVID-19 on Drug Markets,\" 8.\n55\nEuropean Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction, \"EU Drug Markets: Impact of COVID 19,\" 8.\n56\nEuropean Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction, \"COVID-19 and Drugs: Drug Supply via Darknet Markets,\" May 2020, 3, https://www. emcdda.europa.eu/system/files/publications/13042/EMCDDA-report_ COVID19-darknet-final.pdf.\n57\nLucia Bird, \"Smuggling in the Time of COVID-19: The Impact of the Pandemic on Human-Smuggling Dynamics and Migrant-Protection Risks,\" Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime, April 2020, 5, https:// globalinitiative.net/wp-content/uploads/2020/04/GIATOC-Policy-Brief-003- Smuggling-COVID-28Apr0930-proof-4.pdf.\n58\nAnesi et al., \"What Lockdown?\"\n59\nAnesi et al., \"What Lockdown?\"\n60\nReitano and Shaw, *Criminal Contagion*, 20, 79.\n61\nLivia Wagner and Thi Hoang, \"Aggravating Circumstances: How Coronavirus\nImpacts Human Trafficking,\" Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime, May 2020, 2, https://globalinitiative.net/wp-content/uploads/2020/06/ Aggravating-circumstances-How-coronavirus-impacts-human-trafficking- GITOC-1.pdf.\n62\n\"UN Women Raises Awareness of the Shadow Pandemic of Violence Against Women During COVID-19,\" UN Women, May 27, 2020, https://www.un women.org/en/news/stories/2020/5/press-release-the-shadow-pandemic-ofviolence-against-women-during-covid-19.\n63\n\"Guidance Addressing Emerging Human Trafficking Trends and Consequences of the COVID-19 Pandemic,\" Organization for Security and Cooperation in\nEurope, Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights, and UN Women, July 30, 2020. https://www.osce.org/files/f/documents/2/a/458434_1.pdf.\n64\nWagner and Hoang, \"Aggravating Circumstances,\" ii.\n65\nWagner and Hoang, \"Aggravating Circumstances,\" ii.\n66 Christina Bain and Louise Shelley, \"The Evolution of Human Trafficking During\nthe COVID-19 Pandemic,\" Council on Foreign Relations, August 13, 2020, https://www.cfr.org/blog/evolution-human-trafficking-during-covid-19- pandemic\n67\n\"Sex Trafficking Is Still Happeningand May Be More Violent Than Ever,\" Polaris, April 17, 2020, https://polarisproject.org/blog/2020/04/sex-traffickingis-still-happening-and-may-be-more-violent-than-ever/.\n68\nOrtrun Merkle et al., \"SEXTORTION: A Crucial Global Humanitarian- Corruption Challenge,\" Partnership for Transparency, July 1, 2020, https://www .ptfund.org/acf-sextortion/.\n69\nReitano and Shaw, *Criminal Contagion*, 60.\n70\n \"Impact of COVID-19 on Migrant Smuggling,\" Mixed Migration Centre, 1, https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/126_Covid_Snapshot_ Global_smuggling.pdf.\n71\n\"Impact of COVID-19 on Migrant Smuggling,\" 5.\n72\n\"Impact of COVID-19 on Migrant Smuggling,\" 1.\n73\nBird, \"Smuggling in the Time of COVID-19,\" 17-18.\n74\n\"Impact of the COVID Crisis on Migrant Smuggling,\" United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, September 10, 2020, www.unodc.org/unodc/en/front page/2020/September/impact-of-the-covid-crisis-on-the-crime-of-migrantsmuggling.html.\n75\nInternational Labour Organization and UNICEF, COVID-19 and Child Labour: A Time of Crises, A Time to Act, 13, https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/\npublic/---ed_norm/---ipec/documents/publication/wcms_747421.pdf.\n76\nInternational Labour Organization and UNICEF, *COVID-19 and Child Labour*, 13.\n77\nReitano and Shaw, *Criminal Contagion*, 57-58.\n78\nReitano and Shaw, *Criminal Contagion*, 58.\n79\n\"Immediate Action Required to Address Needs, Vulnerabilities of 2.75m Stranded Migrants,\" United Nations International Organization for Migration, October 9, 2020, https://www.iom.int/news/immediate-action-requiredaddress-needs-vulnerabilities-275m-stranded-migrants.\n80\nFinancial Action Task Force, \"COVID-19-related Money Laundering and Terrorist FinancingRisks and Policy Responses,\" (Paris: FAFT/OECD), 8, https:// www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/COVID-19-AML-CFT.pdf.\n81\nFederal Bureau of Investigation, \"School Closings Due to COVID-19 Present Potential for Increased Risk of Child Exploitation,\" Press Release, March 23, 2020, https://www.fbi.gov/news/pressrel/press-releases/school-closings-due-tocovid-19-present-potential-for-increased-risk-of-child-exploitation.\n82\nWagner and Hoang, \"Aggravating Circumstances,\" 6.\n83\nCINA, \"The Effects of the COVID-19 Response on Criminal Network Activity and Investigations,\" 5.\n84\nBain and Shelley, \"The Evolution of Human Trafficking.\"\n85\nBrenna O'Donnell, \"COVID-19 and Missing & Exploited Children,\" National Center for Missing and Exploited Children, October 20, 2020, https://www. missingkids.org/blog/2020/covid-19-and-missing-and-exploited-children.\n86\nINTERPOL, \"Threats and Trends: Child Sexual Exploitation and Abuse: COVID-19,\" 9-11, https://www.interpol.int/en/News-and-Events/News/2020/ INTERPOL-report-highlights-impact-of-COVID-19-on-child-sexual-abuse.\n87\nFederal Bureau of Investigation, \"FBI Warns of Child Sexual Abuse Material Being Displayed During Zoom Meetings,\" Press Release, May 20, 2020, https:// www.fbi.gov/news/pressrel/press-releases/fbi-warns-of-child-sexual-abusematerial-being-displayed-during-zoom-meetings.\n88\nINTERPOL, \"Threats and Trends,\" 12.\n89\nPatricia Mazzei et al., \"2 F.B.I. Agents Killed in Shooting in Florida,\" New York\nTimes, February 2, 2021, https://www.nytimes.com/2021/02/02/us/fbi-shootingsunrise-florida.html.\n90\nSaket Badola, \"Indian Wildlife Amidst the COVID-19 Pandemic: An Analysis of Poaching and Illegal Wildlife Trade,\" Traffic, 4, https://www.traffic.org/site/ assets/files/12885/wildlife-amidst-covid-19-india-web.pdf.\n91\nBadola, \"Indian Wildlife Amidst the COVID-19 Pandemic,\" 4.\n92\nBadola, \"Indian Wildlife Amidst the COVID-19 Pandemic,\" 4.\n93\nBadola, \"Indian Wildlife Amidst the COVID-19 Pandemic,\" 4.\n94\nDuan Biggs et al., \"The COVID-19 Pandemic, Corruption, and the Socio- Economic Impacts on Local Communities,\" Targeting Natural Resource Corruption (TNRC) (blog), December 14, 2020, https://www.worldwildlife.org/ pages/tnrc-blog-the-covid-19-pandemic-corruption-and-the-socio-economicimpacts-on-local-communities.\n95\nBrodie Ferguson, Julia Sekula, and Ilona Szabo, \"Technology Solutions for Supply Chain Traceability in the Brazilian Amazon: Opportunities for the Financial Sector,\" Igarape Institute, https://igarape.org.br/wp-content/up loads/2020/07/2020-07-29-AE-48_Amazonia-Technology-Solutions.pdf.\n96\n\"Understanding How Corruption Is Accelerating Illegal Logging and Deforestation during the COVID-19 Pandemic,\" Targeting Natural Resource Corruption (TNRC) (blog), September 2020, https://www.worldwildlife.org/pages/ tnrc-blog-understanding-how-corruption-is-accelerating-illegal-logging-anddeforestation-during-the-covid-19-pandemic.\n97\n\"Understanding How Corruption.\"\n98\nJulia Urrunaga et al., \"How Fraud and Corruption in Peru's Concession System Are Destroying the Future of Its Forests,\" Environmental Investigation Agency, https:// content.eia-global.org/assets/2012/04/The_Laundering_Machine_ENG.pdf.\n99\n\"Understanding How Corruption.\"\n100 \"Understanding How Corruption.\" 101 \"Understanding How Corruption.\" 102 Urrunaga et al., \"How Fraud and Corruption,\" 53. 103 \"Understanding How Corruption.\" 104 \"Understanding How Corruption.\" 105 Biggs et al., \"The COVID-19 Pandemic.\" 106 Biggs et al., \"The COVID-19 Pandemic.\" 107 Biggs et al., \"The COVID-19 Pandemic.\" 108 Badola, \"Indian Wildlife Amidst the COVID-19 Pandemic,\" 8. 109 Mohamed Daghar, \"Uganda's Illegal Wildlife Traders Undeterred by COVID-19\nRestrictions,\" Institute for Security Studies, January 25, 2021, https://issafrica.org/\niss-today/ugandas-illegal-wildlife-traders-undeterred-by-covid-19-restrictions.\n110 Reitano and Shaw, *Criminal Contagion*, 97.\n111 A. Alonso Aguirre et al., \"Illicit Wildlife Trade, Wet Markets, and COVID19:\nPreventing Future Pandemics,\" *World Medical & Health Policy* 12, no. 3 (September 2020): 256-65. https://doi.org/10.1002/wmh3.348.\n112 Reitano and Shaw, *Criminal Contagion*, 100. 113 Reitano and Shaw, *Criminal Contagion*, 112.\n114 Peter Lindsey et al., \"Conserving Africa's Wildlife and Wildlands through the\nCOVID-19 Crisis and Beyond,\" *Nature Ecology & Evolution* 4 (2020): 130010,\nhttps://doi.org/10.1038/s41559-020-1275-6.\n115 Ben Leather et al., \"Risks to Indigenous and Other Land and Environmental\nDefenders Heightened During COVID,\" International Land Coalition, August 7, 2020, https://www.landcoalition.org/en/newsroom/case-study-indigenouspeoples-and-land-and-environment-defenders-face-risks-due-covid-19/.\n116 \"COVID-19 and Indigenous Peoples: United Nations For Indigenous Peoples,\"\nUN/DESA, https://www.un.org/development/desa/indigenouspeoples/covid- 19.html/.\n117 Inge Amundsen, \"Covid-19, Cash Transfers, and Corruption,\" U4Brief, Chr.\nMichelsen Institute (CMI), 7, https://beta.u4.no/publications/covid-19-cashtransfers-and-corruption.pdf\n118 Financial Action Task Force, \"COVID-19-related Money Laundering,\" 9. 119 Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus, \"Munich Security Conference Speech,\" February 15, 2020, https://www.who.int/director-general/speeches/detail/munichsecurity-conference.\n120 Mohammad Delirrad and Ali Banagozar Mohammadi, \"New Methanol Poisoning Outbreaks in Iran Following COVID-19 Pandemic,\" *Alcohol and Alcoholism*\n55, no. 4 (July 2020): 34748, https://doi.org/10.1093/alcalc/agaa036.\n121 Kacper Niburski and Oskar Niburski, \"Impact of Trump's Promotion of\nUnproven COVID-19 Treatments on Social Media and Subsequent Internet\nTrends: Observational Study,\" *Journal of Medical Internet Research* 22, no. 11\n(2020), https://doi.org/10.2196/20044.\n122 Lianna Matt McLernon, \"COVID-Related Shortages of Malarial, Other Drugs\nSpotlighted,\" Center for Infectious Disease Research and Policy, November 11, 2020, https://www.cidrap.umn.edu/news-perspective/2020/11/covid-relatedshortages-malarial-other-drugs-spotlighted.\n123 \"Coronavirus (COVID-19) Update: FDA Revokes Emergency Use Authorization for Chloroquine and Hydroxychloroquine,\" Food and Drug Administration,\nOffice of the Commissioner, June 16, 2020, https://www.fda.gov/news-events/\npress-announcements/coronavirus-covid-19-update-fda-revokes-emergencyuse-authorization-chloroquine-and.\n124 \"ICE HSI Launches Operation Stolen Promise,\" U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, April 15, 2020, https://www.ice.gov/news/releases/ice-hsilaunches-operation-stolen-promise.\n125 \"Operation Stolen Promise: 4 Central Pillars,\" U.S. Immigration and Customs\nEnforcement, webpage, https://www.ice.gov/stolenpromise/pillars.\n126 Knight Holl et al., \"FinCEN Warns of Scams Relating to PPE and Other Medical Goods During COVID-19 Pandemic,\" *Lexology*, July 30, 2020, https://www.\nlexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=22f409d6-b2ff-4935-a2fe-f0c6fe855aa2.\n127 Jonathan Stempel, \"Used Car Dealer Charged with Price Gouging New York\nCity on 3M's N95 Masks,\" *Reuters*, May 26, 2020, https://www.reuters.com/\narticle/us-health-coronavirus-3m-charges-idUSKBN2322Q1.\n128 Department of Justice, \"United States of America vs Ronald Romano,\" https://\nwww.justice.gov/usao-sdny/press-release/file/1278731/download.\n129 David Choi, \"Fake Face Masks Were Being Sold on This Website with Links\nto ISIS,\" *Business Insider*, August 29, 2020, https://www.businessinsider.com/\nfake-face-mask-website-isis-2020-8.\n130 Tina Bellon, \"A COVID-19 Shot for $150? Online Scams Surge as Slow Vaccine\nRollout Frustrates,\" *Reuters*, January 5, 2021, https://www.reuters.com/article/\nhealth-coronavirus-vaccine-scams-idINKBN29A1BI.\n131 Bellon, \"A COVID-19 Shot for $150?\"\n132 Louise I. Shelley, *Dirty Entanglements; Corruption, Crime and Terrorism* (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 336-38.\n\n## A Postpandemic Outlook For Organized Criminal Activities: Agility Across The Physical, Social, And Cyber Spaces\n\nJim Jones and Anthony Stefanidis The global COVID-19 pandemic and response affected every aspect of our society, including the activities of criminal organizations. In this chapter, we discuss several examples of criminal organization agility during the pandemic, drawn from the physical, social, and cyber domains. We assess that criminal organizations are emerging from the pandemic stronger than before, the pandemic presents a unique opportunity to study criminal organization agility, and criminal organizations are more exposed after their pandemic-driven adjustments. We also assess that this adjusted criminal activity and other factors, including risky operations that expose discoverable data, create investigative opportunities that will enable a deeper understanding of criminal organization structure and will enhance our ability to disrupt and dismantle the organizations behind a broad range of illegal activity.\n\n## Covid-19 Disrupts Illicit Business\n\nThe effects of the COVID-19 pandemic on the global economy were substantial and broad reaching. Harvard economists David Cutler and Larry Summers estimated in 2020 that the combined financial cost of pandemic-related lost output, as well as current and longterm health expenses, amounted to $16 trillion in the United States alone,1 making this the biggest economic crisis since the Great Depression. With the illicit economy accounting for a not insignificant part of the global economyestimates put it at 5-10 percent of the global GDP2it was expected that this subset too would be affected by the pandemic.\nIn addition to upending everyday life worldwide, pandemicrelated disruptions affected numerous activities that are integral parts of the operations of transnational criminal organizations. For example. restrictions on travel, border closings, and worldwide lockdowns temporarily obstructed the global illicit drug supply chain.3\nAs a result, the movement of drugs into and throughout the United States was temporarily disrupted, lowering the availability and raising the price of illicit drugs like heroin and fentanyl during the first half of 2020.4\nBut the disruptive effects of COVID-19 on illicit activities were complex and multifaceted. Human smuggling cartel operations, for example, were impacted by the COVID-19-induced restrictions on nonessential travel across the United States-Mexico border. U.S. Customs and Border Patrol (CBP) data suggest a massive drop in apprehensions of families from the Northern Trianglecomprising Guatemala, Honduras, and El Salvadorthat attempted to cross the Southwest border into the United States in mid-2020 compared to a year earlier.5 At the same time, however, the economic crisis in the United States resulted in a significant drop in remittances sent by migrant workers to their families back home in Mexico. This put these families in financial hardship and drove higher migration patterns from Mexico to the United States, with the result of an actual increase in the number of Mexican families apprehended while crossing the border.6 So, while the pandemic created obstacles for some manifestations of organized criminal activities, it also created opportunities.\n\nIn this chapter, we focus on the agility demonstrated by criminal networks around the world during the COVID-19 crisis, as they diversified their operational portfolio to take advantage of the opportunities emerging during the pandemic. We do so by examining illicit activities that relate to the trade of substandard health supplies and certain cybercrime activities that capitalize on the Zoom-dominated workplace environment that characterized the initial 12-month pandemic period. These representative examples of the agility and resourcefulness displayed by these organizations support an argument that we should be viewing such organizations as functional networks in pursuit of opportunities, rather than rigid structures that are exclusively pursuing specific types of operations.\n\n## Illicit Activities Adapting To The Pandemic\n\nThe sensationalistic means and broad societal impact of illicit activities tend to dominate attention when we try to understand and respond to such activities. However, studying them under the light of economics principles provides additional insight on goals and methods, especially regarding organized illegal entities like cartels.7, 8\nIn that context, the disruptive effects of the pandemic tested the adaptability of illicit businesses. Businesses adapt for two reasons: to respond to changes in their business environment or to reshape existing environments9, 10 in an effort to identify and capitalize on emerging market opportunities.11 And illicit business pursued both.\n\nTaking Advantage of a New Business Environment The pandemic changed the business environment by making medical supplies a scarce and, therefore, highly profitable commodity. Events\n\nin the early stages of the pandemic were indicative of individual illicit entrepreneurship, rather than organized efforts.\n\nThe World Health Organization declared COVID-19 a pandemic on March 11, 2020, and the United States declared a national emergency under the Stafford and National Emergencies Acts on March 13, followed on March 23 by Executive Order 13910, to prevent hoarding of health and medical resources, and eventually by the establishment of a Department of Justice (DOJ) COVID-19\nHoarding and Price Gouging Task Force.12\nDespite these government efforts to anticipate such activities, medical supply scams were already underway. As early as April 1,\n2020, the DOJ and the Department of Health and Human Services seized hundreds of thousands of masks (N95 and surgical) and other medical equipment from a price gouger in Brooklyn who was selling this equipment to doctors and nurses at prices as much as\n700 percent above market price.13 Comparable activities were concurrently evolving in cyberspace. As early as March 22, the DOJ filed an action against a website that was engaging in wire fraud and stealing credit card information by promising to ship COVID-\n19 vaccines,14 a good eight months before the first announcement of such a vaccine was made. Numerous other scam websites started popping up offering nonexistent or counterfeit N95 masks, nonexistent COVID-19 tests, and other fraudulent COVID-19-related items.15 While early efforts focused on stealing credit card information, an actual global industry emerged to produce and disseminate counterfeit personal protective equipment (PPE). From Turkey to Romania, counterfeit PPE goods were seized at their point of production or intercepted by CBP agents as the items were shipped to the United States. The UN Office on Drugs and Crime summarized, in a 2020 report, the wide global footprint spread by the illicit production and distribution of substandard and falsified medical products, spanning all continents and thousands of websites.16\nReshaping Business Environments Concurrently with illicit activities taking advantage of emerging business opportunities, criminal organizations saw the pandemic as a unique opportunity to strengthen their position within local communities. In a unique take on brand management, the Sinaloa Cartel invited BBC journalists to a safehouse to record the cartel packing tuna, rice, and toilet paper for Mexico's poor.17 The packages, marked with the name of \"El Chapo\" Guzman, were distributed publicly, some directly by the cartel and others through \"El Chapo 701,\" the brand of Guzman's daughter Alejandrina. Although donating money to local communities was not unknown to the Sinaloa Cartel under El Chapo, even more brutal cartels, like the Cartel Jalisco Nueva Generacion, quite remarkably joined this practice.18 This narco-philanthropy serves a direct purpose: to offer these cartels community leverage, potentially strengthening their status as a local authority that rivals state authority.\n\n## Cybercrime's Evolution During Covid-19\n\nCybercriminal adaptation to the pandemic environment occurred in two distinct stages. First, email and web-based scams immediately pivoted to pandemic-related goods and services.19 As noted previously, nonexistent test kits, PPE, and vaccines were all used as the basis for financial fraud and ruses for data collection as soon as these items or anticipated developments received attention in the public space. Considering the minimal cost to adapt existing scams to these new areas, and the well-established cybercriminal tendency and ability to adopt the fear of the day,20 this is not surprising. The second adaptation stage included criminal activity that took some time to ramp up, either because of infrastructure or capability requirements, as in the case of counterfeit goods, or because the actions themselves took time, as in the case of computer system and network compromise. The subject of this section is this last activity: the circumstances, activities, and implications of cybercriminal system and network compromise during the pandemic.\n\nExploitation Targets Prior to the pandemic, enterprise networks were in something of a steady-state environment. Broadly speaking, these systems had reasonably robust technical countermeasures in place to secure their digital assets against external attackers and to secure communications between themselves and business partners, and less-secure home users were somewhat isolated from enterprise networks, as suggested in Figure 1. Attackers (red in Figures 1-3) faced solid defenses at the enterprise perimeter and gained nothing against the enterprise by attacking home users. This is not to say that these enterprise systems had zero risk or that they were not being actively and sometimes successfully attacked via phishing and other means. Rather, the enterprise ecosystem had reached a sort of equilibrium where most had reasonable protections in place and were generally not viewed as low-hanging fruit by the cyber attacker community.\n\nPerhaps only in retrospect can we make the statements above, as it is only by comparison to the current state of affairs that the prepandemic security posture of our enterprise systems looks good. The pandemic response drove a rushed, unplanned, and inconsistently executed move to provide enterprise-wide, remote access with tools\n\n## A Postpandemic Outlook For Organized Criminal Activities\n\nand technology that were not initially up to the task, performed by personnel often lacking the necessary skills and training to securely implement these inadequate tools and technology, and allowed a sense of urgency to bypass the best practices in risk assessment and risk management.21\nThis \"rush-to-remote\" increased the direct attack surface of nearly every system and network in the enterprise ecosystem. Even if implemented properly, instituting enterprise-wide remote access created multiple new attack vectors into a given network.22, 23 If any errors were made, then these errors compounded the number of additional vectors, increasing even further the enterprise's risk exposure. Once in a network, attackers had increased access to the enterprise's partners as well (see Figure 2).\n\nTo make matters worse, previously unconnected home users quickly became remote workers with privileged access to the enterprise network (see Figure 3). Where business partners had previously been screened to assess and ensure their cyber security posture often enforced contractuallyenterprises suddenly opened their entire networks to multiple endpoints with utterly unknown security postures and compromise states.24 The typical home network\n\nhas multiple unmanaged devices on a single unpartitioned internal network with minimal physical security, mixed personal and professional accounts and devices, no controls limiting the introduction and removal of portable digital devices, no personnel security, no formal patch management process, no active monitoring, and uncertain network perimeter security.\n\nIn the prepandemic cyber world, business partners were often walled off to a limited section of the enterprise network, and they and other remote users underwent additional monitoring to detect misuse or system compromise. Walling off was not possible when the entire workforce became remote: as a group, they required access to the entire enterprise. Establishing individual user system and network permissions is unwieldy even when given plenty of time, and time was not a luxury that enterprise IT teams and risk managers had at the start of the pandemic. Furthermore, the best practice of increased monitoring for remote userswhether business partners or workforcedoes not scale. In short, the increase in direct and indirect attack surfaces meant the prepandemic enterprise fortress became an open city with effectively no walls, moats, or gates.\n\nFrom an attacker's point of view, home users who were of limited value as targets before the pandemic abruptly became easy gateways to enterprise targets of considerable value. Attackers could monitor the network endpoints of traffic on a shared medium (e.g., neighborhood, public WiFi, etc.) and establish likely individual-employer relationships even without access to the encrypted network traffic contents. If an attacker wanted to be a bit more direct about a target, a moderate amount of effort using open sources could identify the home locations of at least some employees from almost any organization.\n\nPostpandemic Considerations Unfortunately, the risk posed by the rushed implementation of remote access is not limited to the pandemic timeframe. Considering the challenges faced by IT teams to implement remote access at the pandemic lockdown's outset, it is too much to hope that all steps taken were thoroughly documented so that they could be fully undone after the lockdown was lifted. These unintentional residual configurations, combined with the set of capabilities deliberately left in place,25 present an undesirable departure from the prepandemic security posture of enterprise networks and systems. For those organizations desiring to retain work-from-home capabilities for their employees and contractors, much work remains to secure these endpoints and the systems they access.\n\nAdditionally, networks and systems *were* compromised during the lockdown,26 and not all of these compromises are yet known or addressed. Over time, we expect to discover these compromises as they are leveraged by the attackers, or discovered by threat-hunting and remediation teams. As we learn more about recent and ongoing ransomware attacks, we may find that some of these attacks were facilitated by the circumstances of the lockdown and remote access. The Colonial Pipeline hack, for example, was reportedly initiated via a compromised VPN account.27 The password for this account was subsequently found connected to an unrelated breach on the Dark Web, raising the possibility that the same password may have been re-used on multiple systems and this was how the attackers compromised the account.28 Prepandemic, not as many users had VPN accounts, and these accounts were more tightly controlled and monitored; however, in the resource-challenged pandemic times, it appears that an account was not fully disabled and VPN access was not carefully monitored, enabling the successful attack.\n\nOther Considerations Fortunately, not all implications of the lockdown-driven, enterprise access changes are bad from a cybercrime investigation point of view. Cybercrime actors were more active during the pandemic lockdown, for example, performing reconnaissance activities against a greater number of targets. Expanding the target set increased not only the likelihood that cybercriminals might hit a honeypot, but the likelihood that investigators might discover this activity through routine detection, and in both cases gain a richer dataset for correlation and analysis. This richer dataset has increased our ability to discover and understand cybercriminal activities and infrastructure, both key aspects of preventing and mitigating attacks. Additionally, multiple non-cybercriminal organizations and others entered the cyberattack space with weak operational security and without the requisite skills, tools, and tactics. Returning to the Colonial Pipeline example, the attackers represented a loose coalition of at least two different cybercriminal groups, one writing the ransomware tool and another executing the attack. The ransom, paid in Bitcoin, was transferred through multiple Bitcoin wallets in the days after the attack, but a sizeable portion (about 85 percent) wound up in a wallet that the FBI was able to seize.29 While not exactly a rookie mistake, transferring significant funds through a public ledger cryptocurrency and to an insecure account reveals the inexperience of at least some of the attackers. Put simply, amateurs make mistakes, and sometimes these amateurs are connected to more sophisticated actors, making both of interest to analysts and investigators.\n\n## Outlook: Challenges And Opportunities\n\nOne way to describe the universe of illicit activities is through the taxonomy presented in Figure 4. The light-colored top boxes represent the aggregate of what we know about actors and operations, whereas the bottom darker boxes represent what is still unknown to us. One of the major challenges that criminal investigations face is that, while we have reasonable estimates for the size of the top boxes, our understanding of the size of the bottom two boxes is obviously miniscule. Furthermore, this taxonomy is characterized by the connections among its components. Some of these connections are known: we have an understanding of connections between known actors and operations (solid blue arrow). But some of the connections are only suspected: we suspect the connections between known actors and unknown actors and operations (blue-outlined arrow), but we do not know their full extent.\nThe pandemic affected the connections of this taxonomy in two ways. First, it broadened the previously unknown connections by adding novel links between known actors and unknown actors/ unknown operations (red-outlined arrow). At the same time, we gained additional clarity on these connections, as some of them were revealed through apprehensions (solid red arrow).\n\nSeen through an investigative lens, these developments have advanced our understanding by revealing new actors and operations, such as small-time opportunistic criminals engaged in price gouging or other illicit activities. Although these new insights are not expected to have lasting or substantial effects, the connections established during the pandemic between known actors and unknown actors/unknown operations can be viewed as both challenges and opportunities. Challenges because these previously known and unknown actors may be empowered, as may be the case when they enjoy heightened support by local communities, or they may form more complex networks, with more sophisticated operational modi operandi and capabilities that were up to now untapped. At the same time, as some of these organized criminal networks may have stepped beyond their traditional operation spaces, we may gain additional opportunities to study them and advance our understanding of their structure and membership.\n\nReturning to the question of criminal organization agility that we posed in this chapter's introduction, we find:\n\n- The cartels and other criminal organizations are strengthened\nand emboldened in the aftermath of the pandemic. Many staterun institutions were weakened during the pandemic, both in terms of actual weakness (e.g., budgets, staffing, infrastructure) and in terms of public trust. This damage will take\nyears to repair, and, in the interim, criminal organizations will\ncontinue to step in and exploit the current voids. Similarly, cybercriminals learned much during the pandemic and will use these new skills going forward; they also built a significant backlog of compromised systems for later exploitation.\n- The pandemic offered, and still does offer, a unique opportunity to study the agility of criminal organizations. First impressions suggest that these actors are remarkably resilient and\nadaptable. On the other hand, the new activities and associated indicators have not been invisible. Ongoing and future research and analysis promise a better understanding of how these adaptations occur, what data and indicators we might collect and develop, and how we might detect and disrupt such activities in their early stages.\n- Criminal organization structure is more exposed than it was\nprepandemic. As these organizations moved into new areas of\nactivity, sometimes unprepared and ill-equipped to do so, we have found abundant data to support analysis and discovery of criminal network activity and structure. Analysis of these new areas will lead to connections, discovery, and understanding of previously stealthy activities, facilitating disruption and dismantling of the underlying criminal organizations behind the activities rather than simply addressing criminal activities in a surface and piecemeal fashion.\n\nJim Jones has been a cyber security and digital forensics practitioner, researcher, and educator for over 25 years in industry, government, and academia. Currently the director and digital forensics lead for George Mason University's DHS Center of Excellence for Criminal Investigations and Network Analysis (CINA), Dr. Jones' research focuses on the extraction, analysis, and manipulation of full and partial digital artifacts to support criminal investigations and intelligence analysis. Research sponsors have included the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, the Intelligence Advanced Research Projects Activity\n(IARPA), and the National Science Foundation (NSF). He has a bachelor's degree in systems engineering, a master's in mathematical sciences, and a Ph.D. in computational sciences and informatics.\n\nAnthony Stefanidis is a Professor of Computer Science and a Special Advisor to the President for Research Partnerships at the College of William & Mary. He is also a member of the Academic Advisory Board of the CINA Center of Excellence. His areas of academic expertise include the geosocial analysis of social media and crowdsourced content, network analysis, and the analysis of digital imagery and video, and he has authored over 100 journal and conference publications on these topics. Research sponsors for his activities include DHS, IARPA, NSF, the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration. Dr. Stefanidis holds Ph.D. and master's degrees from The Ohio State University, and a Dipl. Eng, from the National Technical University of Athens, Greece.\n\n1\nDavid M. Cutler and Lawrence H. Summers, \"The COVID-19 Pandemic and the $16 Trillion Virus,\" JAMA 324, no. 15 (2020): 1495-96, https://jamanetwork. com/journals/jama/fullarticle/2771764.\n2\nWorld Economic Forum, \"State of the Illicit Economy,\" Briefing Papers (2015), http://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_State_of_the_Illicit_Economy_2015_2. pdf.\n3\nUnited Nations Office of Drugs and Crime (UNODC), \"COVID-19 and the Drug Supply Chain: From Production and Trafficking to Use,\" Research Brief (2020), https://www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-analysis/covid/Covid-19- and-drug-supply-chain-Mai2020.pdf.\n4\nU.S. Drug Enforcement Administration, \"2020 National Drug Threat Assessment,\" DEA-DCT-DIR-008-21, March 2, 2021, https://www.dea.gov/sites/ default/files/2021-02/DIR-008-21%202020%20National%20Drug%20Threat%\n20Assessment_WEB.pdf.\n5\nU.S. Customs and Border Protection, U.S. Border Patrol Southwest Border Apprehensions by Sector: Southwest Border Family Unit Encounters by Country,\naccessed on June 15, 2021, https://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/stats/southwestland-border-encounters/usbp-sw-border-apprehensions.\n6\nJohn Gramlich, \"Migrant Apprehensions at US-Mexico Border Are Surging\nAgain,\" Pew Research Center, March 15, 2021, https://pewrsr.ch/3fjlGDO.\n7\nAlexis Jacquemin and Margaret E. Slade, \"Cartels, Collusion, and Horizontal\nMerger,\" Chapter 7 of *Handbook of Industrial Organization*, Vol. 1 (Amsterdam:\nNorth Holland Publishing Co., 1989), 415-73.\n8\nJohn M. Connor and Robert H. Lande, \"Cartels as Rational Business Strategy:\nCrime Pays,\" *Cardozo Law Review*, 34 (November 2012): 427, file:///C:/Users/\nOwner/Downloads/SSRN-id1917657.pdf.\n9\nJohn Child, \"Strategic Choice in the Analysis of Action, Structure, Organizations and Environment: Retrospect and Prospect,\" *Organization Studies* 18, no.\n1 (January 1997): 43-76.\n10\nMatti Tuominen, Arto Rajala, and Kristian Moller, \"How Does Adaptability\nDrive Firm Innovativeness?,\" *Journal of Business Research* 57, no. 5 (May 2004):\n495-506.\n11 Balaji S. Chakravarthy, \"Adaptation: A Promising Metaphor for Strategic\nManagement,\" *The Academy of Management Review* 7, no. 1 (January 1982):\n35-44.\n12\nMarissa Rydzewski, \"Price Gouging During a Pandemic: The Federal Government's Response,\" *DttP: Documents to the People* 48, no. 4 (2020): 33-38, https://\njournals.ala.org/index.php/dttp/article/view/7480/10332.\n13\nAlexander Mallin, \"Medical Supplies Seized From Alleged Price Gouger to be Distributed to Hospitals,\" ABC News, April 2, 2020, https://abcnews.go.com/ Politics/medical-supplies-seized-alleged-price-gouger-distributed-hospitals/ story?id=69938363.\n14\nU.S. Department of Justice, \"Justice Department Files Its First Enforcement Action Against COVID-19 Fraud: Federal Court Issues Temporary Restraining Order Against Website Offering Fraudulent Coronavirus Vaccine,\" Press Release, March 22, 2020, https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-files-its-firstenforcement-action-against-covid-19-fraud.\n15\nMatt Binder, \"Coronavirus Sparks Black Market Filled with Fake and Stolen N95\nFace Masks,\" Mashable, April 10, 2020, https://mashable.com/article/coronavirusface-mask-scams/.\n16\nUNODC, \"COVID-19-related Trafficking of Medical Products as a Threat to Public Health,\" Research Brief (2020), https://www.unodc.org/documents/ data-and-analysis/covid/COVID-19_research_brief_trafficking_medical_pro ducts.pdf.\n17\n\"Coronavirus: How Mexican Cartels Are Taking Advantage of Pandemic,\" BBC News, July 10, 2020, https://www.bbc.com/news/av/world-latin-america- 53343599.\n18\nVanda Felbab-Brown, \"Mexican Cartels Are Providing COVID-19 Assistance. Why That's Not Surprising,\" The Brookings Institution, April 27, 2020, https:// www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2020/04/27/mexican-cartels-areproviding-covid-19-assistance-why-thats-not-surprising/.\n19\nINTERPOL, *Cybercrime: COVID-19 Impact*, General Secretariat Report, August\n2020, https://www.interpol.int/en/content/download/15526/file/COVID-19%20 Cybercrime%20Analysis%20Report-%20August%202020.pdf.\n20\nHarjinder Singh Lallie et al., \"Cyber Security in the Age of COVID-19: A Timeline\nand Analysis of Cyber-crime and Cyber-attacks during the Pandemic,\" Computers & Security 105 (June 2021), file:///C:/Users/Owner/Downloads/2006.11929.pdf.\n21\nCedric Nabe, \"Impact of COVID-19 on Cybersecurity,\" Deloitte, accessed on June 7,\n2021,\nhttps://www2.deloitte.com/ch/en/pages/risk/articles/impact-covidcybersecurity.html.\n22\nDanny Bradbury, \"Criminals Exploit Pandemic with Brute-Force RDP Attacks,\"\nInfoSecurity, June 29, 2020, https://www.infosecurity-magazine.com/news/\npandemic-bruteforce-rdp-attacks/.\n23\nKelly Sheridan, \"RDP Attacks Persist Near Record Levels in 2021,\" DARK- Reading, March 17, 2021, https://www.darkreading.com/threat-intelligence/ rdp-attacks-persist-near-record-levels-in-2021/d/d-id/1340444.\n24\nJim Boehm et al., \"Cybersecurity Tactics for the Coronavirus Pandemic,\" McKinsey & Company, March 2020, https://www.mckinsey.com/~/media/ McKinsey/Business%20Functions/Risk/Our%20Insights/Cybersecurity%20 tactics%20for%20the%20coronavirus%20pandemic/Cybersecurity-tactics-forthe-coronavirus-pandemic-vF.ashx.\n25\nPulseSecure, \"New Research Indicates 84% of Businesses Will Likely Increase Work-from-home Capacity Beyond Pandemic Despite Security Concerns,\" Intrado Global Newswire, May 27, 2020, https://www.globenewswire.com/ news-release/2020/05/27/2039222/0/en/New-Research-Indicates-84-of- Businesses-Will-Likely-Increase-Work-from-home-Capacity-Beyond-Pandemic-\nDespite-Security-Concerns.html.\n26\nArielle Waldman, \"10 of the Biggest Cyber Attacks of 2020,\" TechTarget, January 5, 2021, https://searchsecurity.techtarget.com/news/252494362/10-ofthe-biggest-cyber-attacks.\n27\nStephanie Kelly and Jessica Resnick-ault, \"One Password Allowed Hackers To\nDisrupt Colonial Pipeline, CEO Tells Senators,\" *Reuters,* June 8, 2021, https://\n\n## A Postpandemic Outlook For Organized Criminal Activities\n\nwww.reuters.com/business/colonial-pipeline-ceo-tells-senate-cyber-defenseswere-compromised-ahead-hack-2021-06-08/.\n28\nWilliam Turton and Kartikay Mehrotra, \"Hackers Breached Colonial Pipeline Using Compromised Password,\" *Bloomberg.* June 4, 2021, https://www\n.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-06-04/hackers-breached-colonial-pipelineusing-compromised-password.\n29\nDavid Uberti, \"How the FBI Got Colonial Pipeline's Ransom Money Back,\" Wall Street Journal, June 11, 2021, https://www.wsj.com/articles/how-the-fbi-gotcolonial-pipelines-ransom-money-back-11623403981#:~:text=on%20May%20 8%20paid%20roughly,Investigation%20followed%20the%20digital%20money. &text=On%20Monday%2C%20the%20Justice%20Department,million%20 of%20Colonial's%20initial%20ransom.\n\n## Covid-19 And The Information Ecosystem: Lessons From Russian Malign Influence Campaigns For The Post-Covid-19 World\n\nKacper T. Gradon Actors who utilize disinformation campaigns and fake news propagation to achieve their strategic political objectives have leveraged COVID-19 to distribute harmful narratives and messaging faster and wider than before the pandemic. The Russian Federation is notably exercising \"infodemics\" (information overflow) during the ongoing global health emergency, contributing to the Kremlin's asymmetric warfare strategy of weaponizing malign influence tactics to attack adversaries, particularly the United States and its European Union and NATO allies. Asymmetric warfare is part of a wider concept of total war (New Generation Warfare) endorsed by Russia's leadership. Neoimperial Russia utilizes information warfarebased on disinformation, propaganda, and deceptionin an effort to correct the imbalance between itself and the West by weakening government legitimacy and trust in democratic values in the eyes of target states' populations. Central and Eastern European countries have become Russia's test field for new propaganda methods used to incite internal tensions and unrest, so their experiences and field intelligence could be used as a forewarning for the United States and Western Europe, enabling the NATO partners to prepare for malign influence tactics, techniques, and procedures. Actionable recommendations to prevent, interdict, and mitigate Russian disinformation include establishing a transatlantic research center for intelligence sharing and media literacy training.\n\n## Intertwined Pandemics\n\nCOVID-19 disease caused by the SARS-CoV-2 coronavirus came to the world's attention in December 2019 when, after originating in the Chinese city of Wuhan, the malady quickly spread to other parts of the world.1 The scale and range of this health disaster reached proportions unparalleled in the 102 years since the 1918 Spanish Flu pandemic, not necessarily in terms of mortality rates, but definitely in the scale of triggering scientific, economic, and political responses at an unprecedented level. By the end of August 2021, the growing emergency had affected all continents, countries, and territories of the world, apart from a handful of isolated Pacific Island nations, and the virus had infected over 214 million people and claimed the lives of over 4.4 million.2 The mounting health crisis brought economic chaosdepressing financial, industrial, and entrepreneurial activity; raising unemployment rates;\nand destroying decades of developmental gains worldwide.3\nAs the world was being ravaged by the SARS-CoV-2 pandemic, another epidemic emerged as a hallmark of 2020: an astonishing data overflow, bringing to the global audience massive amounts of information referring both to COVID-19 itself and to the health, social, and economic problems the disease has exacerbated.4 The sheer volume of databoth accurate and incorrectthat was produced, consumed, and proliferated daily made finding reliable and trustworthy sources extremely difficult. The propagation of deceptive or misleading information is certainly not a new phenomenon. The U.S.\n\nDepartment of Homeland Security (DHS) has reported on hazards associated with the propagation of false and misleading information during earlier disasters and emergencies.5 Most recently, social media magnified disinformation during the Ebola epidemic in the Democratic Republic of Congo, stimulating fear and disorder.6 However, the increase in dissemination and reproduction of distorted and misinforming storylines has become much more prevalent during the ongoing health crisis than ever before.7\nThe SARS-CoV-2 pandemic and the increase in misinformation and disinformation narratives developed simultaneously and quickly became heavily intertwined.8 Crucially, the information and messaging overload began to capitalize on, and eventually to parasitize, the health emergency. Various actors and interest groupsoperating on the local, regional, national, and international levelsleveraged this messaging.9\nState actors, primarily Russia (on which this chapter is focused) and China, used their disinformation campaigns rooted in the pandemic crisis as tools of their geopolitical strategies.10 Nonstate actors around the worldincluding terrorist organizations, violent extremists, and organized criminal groupsexploited the COVID-19 pandemic to achieve their goals that include, quite similarly to state actors, undermining public trust in democratic governments and their agencies.11\n\n## Coming To Terms With Infodemics\n\nThe World Health Organization (WHO) observed the information overflow and associated potential problems in the early stages of the SARS-CoV-2 crisis. In March 2020, the WHO adopted the term \"infodemics\" to label the phenomenon. \"Infodemics\" was first used by foreign policy scholar David Rothkopf, who noticed during the 2003\nSARS epidemic that narratives and ideas about SARS spread through populations in a way strikingly similar to the disease itself.12 The WHO\nnow uses the term to describe and address the excessive amounts of information about a disease that can spread misinformation, disinformation, malinformation, and rumors during a health emergency and that can hamper an effective public health response by fostering confusion and distrust among people (see box).13\n\n## Defining The Terms Of Infodemics\n\nThe WHO Conference of Infodemiology in 2020 called for agreement on the terms of infodemics, which are frequently used as synonyms although they describe different problem sets. Scholars and experts specializing in this field shared the WHO's concern,14 and the following definitions are now generally accepted in infodemics management:15\n\n- Disinformation is false information that is deliberately created or disseminated with the express purpose to cause harm; the producers of disinformation typically have political, financial, psychological, or social motivations.\n- Misinformation is information that is false but not intended to\ncause harm; for example, individuals who do not know that a piece of information is false may spread it on social media in an attempt to be helpful.\n- Malinformation is genuine information that is shared to cause\nharm; this includes private or revealing information that is spread to harm individuals or their reputations.\n- Propaganda is true or false information spread to persuade\nan audience, but it often has a political connotation and is usually connected to information produced by governments.\nPublic health professionals and infodemiology experts are increasingly rejecting the popular catch phrase of \"fake news.\" This common term was coined to describe the use of disinformation and misinformation in news reporting and further to label manipulative online information,16 but it has now been deployed as a disinformation and misinformation tactic by political actors attempting to discredit news reporting and reported facts they dislike.17 Some authorities, such as the UK government, do not use the term, stressing that \"fake news\" is a poorly defined and misleading expression that conflates a variety of false information, from genuine error to foreign interference in democratic processes; instead, the United Kingdom endorses using the term \"disinformation.\"18\nBesides the general impact of infodemics on public health systems and on the response of national and supranational agencies and institutions responsible for disease prevention and control, disinformation and misinformation can have direct and profound influence on the behavior of individual persons. Dubious, suspicious, or conflicting information may lead to dangerous decisions related to individual health, which may diminish the society-wide success of countermeasures employed by governments.19\n\n## Russia Emerges As A Leading Purveyor Of Infodemics\n\nThe COVID-19 pandemic has created several opportunities for Russia to weaponize its malign influence tactics to attack the Kremlin's adversaries, especially the United States and its European Union (EU) and NATO allies. Anxieties arising from the SARS-CoV-2 crisis, combined with contemporary over-reliance on social media and electronic sources of information, have made people particularly vulnerable to disinformation, and Russia has recognized the benefits of leveraging conspiracy theories, malinformation, misinformation, and disinformation about COVID-19.20 Regardless of the suffering the pandemic has brought to Russia, the Kremlin hastily seized the opportunity in 2020 to utilize the worldwide health emergency for its strategic objectives abroad. The disinformation tactics employed by Russia during the COVID-19 crisis bring invaluable data that will support designing intelligence and counterintelligence strategies as the world emerges from the pandemic.\n\nEvil Empire Strikes Back The U.S. State Department's Global Engagement Center (GEC) has been tracking narratives promoted by Russian, Chinese, and Iranian-sponsored sites and different platforms related to COVID-19 since January 2020, leading U.S. Special Envoy and GEC coordinator Lea Gabrielle to criticize Russia for capitalizing on the chaos and uncertainty that health scares and pandemics engender by applying the known Russian tactic of perpetuating disinformation.21 According to the GEC's August 2020 special report, Russia's disinformation and propaganda ecosystem is the collection of official, proxy, and unattributed communication channels and platforms that Russia uses to create and amplify false narratives. The Kremlin bears direct responsibility for cultivating these tactics and platforms as part of its approach to using information as a weapon. It invests massively in its propaganda channels, its intelligence services, and its proxies to conduct malicious cyber activity to support disinformation efforts, and it leverages outlets that masquerade as news sites or research institutions to spread false and misleading narratives.22 Key entities involved in Russia's influence campaign related to COVID-19 include RIA Novosti, RT (formerly Russia Today), *Sputnik News*, the intelligence services, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the Ministry of Defense, as well as trolls, bots, and fake accounts.23\nThroughout the COVID-19 crisis, the key targets of the Kremlin's disinformation messaging have been the EU, NATO, the United States, Ukraine, the WHO, Bill Gates, and George Soros.24 As observed by the Polish Institute for International Affairs, the pandemic has become an opportunity for both Russia and China to conduct disinformation campaigns that include overt and covert propaganda directed at the EU, NATO, and the United States.25 Among the main aims of the pro-Kremlin disinformation campaigns around the COVID-19 pandemic are to discredit the EU and expose it as a failed project, and to strengthen the legitimacy of the authoritarian Russian state and enhance its position in the international arena.26\nPolluting discourse from multinational and nongovernmental organizations, think tanks, and individuals associated with these entities27\nis designed to instigate chaos. In its practice of this information, or asymmetric, warfare, Russia is applying technical advances to a longstanding strategic playbook (see box).\n\n## Infodemics And Russian Neoimperialism\n\nThe Russian Federation is the direct descendant of the Soviet\nUnion, and Russian political warfare practitioners have inherited the\nUSSR's political warfare theories and practices.28 As intelligence\nscholars have noted, Soviet KGB operations included subversion,\nmedia manipulation, propaganda, forgeries, political repression,\npolitical assassinations, agents of influence, the establishment of\nopposition parties and criminal organizations, antiwar movements\nand front organizations, and proxy paramilitary operations.29 These\nactivities bear a striking resemblance to the current practices of\nthe Russian Federation's Federal Security Service (FSB), including\nsuch \"soft power\" exercises as worldwide disinformation campaigns,\nforeign political meddling, and the establishment of networks of\ninfluence abroad.30\n\n    The foreign policy of the Russian Federation, particularly under\nVladimir Putin, is often referred to as imperial or neoimperial, using\nforce as a tool to spread influence and dominate other political\nactors.31 Russia's aggressiveness toward its immediate neighbors and\nareas considered to be within its zone of influencesuch as Ukraine,\nGeorgia, or the Baltic Statesstems, according to some scholars,\nfrom Western efforts to extend NATO affiliation to former members\nof the Soviet bloc in Eastern Europe and the Balkans.32 Putin's\nresponseterritorial expansion, aggressive nationalist ideology, and\nconfrontation with the West33is largely predefined by the state's\nimperial traditions, memories, and fears that the Kremlin may irre-\ntrievably lose control over lands that were once Russian, as assessed\nin European scholar Ostap Kushnir's thorough study of Russian neo-\nimperialism.34, 35 These strategies, based on spreading internal fears\n\nof external, encroaching threat, are a continuation of longstanding\npolicies of Soviet and Russian leaders to \"rally-round-the-flag\" in\norder to gain domestic popularity and support.36\n    Moscow's use of information warfarebased on disinformation,\npropaganda, and deception37to correct the imbalance between\nRussia and the West38 also serves the purpose of the Russian mili-\ntary's so-called Gerasimov's Doctrine.39, 40 Chief of the General Staff\nValery Gerasimov proposed in 2013 that asymmetric methods be\nused to weaken government legitimacy in the eyes of a target state's\npopulation.41, 42 These activities, short of kinetic warfare along a\nspectrum of conflict, pursue alternative battlefields, where U.S. and\nWestern dominance is less relevant; target the population; and attack\nthe decisionmaking process of the target state.43 Such an approach\nis part of the wider concept of total war (New Generation Warfare\nNGW), endorsed by Russia's leadership. NGW is a concept for fight-\ning total war in Europe, simultaneously across all frontspolitical,\neconomic, informational, and cyberthrough fear and intimidation,\nbut without launching a large-scale attack.44 Increasing fear and\nintimidation can also be fueled by Russia's military capabilities:\nits nuclear and conventional capabilities and its application of the\nanti-access and area denial (A2AD) approach in \"strategic outposts\"\nsuch as the Kola Peninsula, Kaliningrad Oblast, or Crimea.45\n\nNot So Quiet on the Eastern Front As part of Russia's active, worldwide propaganda operation, the Kremlin engages in a persistent campaign in the Central and Eastern European countries, seeking to recapture influence over territory considered by Russia to be its rightful buffer zone from NATO and the EU.46 This is especially true during the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic, as social unrest and fear are easily exploitable foundations for disinformation campaigns. The Kremlin disseminates its narratives to Russian speakers in Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Ukraine, and neighboring countries through a variety of means, including traditional and social media.47 Poland has become a \"petri dish\" for Russia and China to try out their disinformation tactics, including their trolls and bots, according to the U.S. Ambassador.48 The Polish Internal Security Agency warns that Russia has been using and will continue to use all available methods to influence the political situation in the region, including operations against democratic elections and processes, to achieve Russian geopolitical aims that include pushing U.S. influence out of Europe, undermining the integrity and efficiency of NATO, and weakening the coherence of the EUeffectively leading to the \"neutralization\" of Central and Eastern Europe.49\nCentral and Eastern Europe, therefore, have become Russia's test field for new propaganda methods before they are employed in Western Europe and the United States, and the regions of the Eastern Partnership (consisting of the EU countries and Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine), the Baltic States (Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania), and Visegrad Group countries (Poland, Czech Republic, Slovakia, and Hungary) are special targets for information warfare.50 According to Col. Zdzislaw Sliwa of the Baltic Defense College, Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia are on the cyber frontline of Russian propaganda targeting Russian-speaking minorities and disinformation tactics that he calls the \"dirty news laundering\"making these countries an invaluable source of experience and intelligence for the NATO alliance.51 As Central and Eastern European countries, especially those that were part of the former Warsaw Pact and Soviet Union, are often the first to be targeted by Russian active measures, their experiences and field intelligence could be used as a forewarning, enabling the NATO partners to prepare for malign influence tactics, techniques, and procedures being recalibrated for Russia's use against Western Europe and the United States.52\nSome Men Just Want to Watch the World Burn Some of the Russian Federation's disinformation activities focus on disadvantaged populations abroad in order to leverage frustration, according to a European Parliament study,53 that is fueled by economic crisis and resulting social inequalities.54 This economic crisis, amplified and exacerbated by the COVID-19 pandemic, is being exploited by Russian disinformation strategies to instigate riots and mass protests abroad.55 During the early months of the COVID-19 crisis, according to a Central and Eastern European think tank, the Russian agency RIA Novosti sought to instigate socioeconomic fear and unrest in the West by publishing disinformation narratives that claimed the EU and the United States were bracing themselves for hunger riots as an outcome of the SARS-CoV-2 pandemic.56 Russia backs and finances, directly or indirectly, various and sometimes competing protest groups in foreign countries, such as the Occupy movement.57 It also reportedly controlled social media activities that amplified the \"yellow vests\" movement in France, enabling the protests to become more threatening to the French government.58 Confirmed to have meddled in the 2016 U.S. presidential election, when Russian trolls posing as Americans made payments to genuine activists in the United States to fund protest movements on socially divisive issues,59 Russia has continued during the COVID-19\ncrisis to organize conflicting demonstrations. The St. Petersburg-based Internet Research Agency (IRA), which specializes in creating and disseminating false information on social media,60 uses ads designed to exacerbate racial tensions and related problems including police brutality, violence against police, white supremacy, and immigration61 to fan mutual suspicion on both sides of a conflict.62\nRussia is seemingly unable to have direct, concrete, and immediate influence on election results or the policies of individual governments or transnational organizations of the Western world. It does, however, employ political lobbying and corruption schemes. The most notable targets of such approaches are high-level European politicianse.g., German Chancellor Gerhard Schroder, Finnish Prime Minister Paavo Lipponen, and Chancellor of Austria Wolfgang Schusselwho have been offered top management positions in Kremlin-dependent companies, such as Gazprom, Rosneft, and Lukoil, after they retired from office.63 Apart from targeting the leadership of Western European nations, Russia finds it less expensive and more convenient to resort to raising chaos, unrest, and disorder, which are the key features of influence groups linked to it. The Kremlin's actions are not about supporting pro-Russian circles, but about a modernized version of the\n\"*Divide et Impera*\" (divide and rule) principle. According to Lt. Col.\n\nGeir Hagen Karlsen, director for Strategic Communication at the Norwegian Command and Staff College, influence activities directed at the populations of Europe aim to disrupt and create distrust, and the \"divide and rule\" approach means to create as many cleavages at as many levels as possible; Russia, as a large power, could then more easily deal with a multi-fragmented Europe. Karlsen highlights three levels of the \"divide and rule\" approach: first, at the European level, attacking NATO and the EU; second, at the interstate level, creating division and distrust between nations; and third, at the intrastate level, creating division internally among various groups in individual countries.64\nRussia will continue to use disinformation and malinformation during the COVID-19 crisis and its aftermath, as the world struggles to emerge from the pandemic. The Kremlin will run its information campaigns through a variety of venues including social media, state-controlled news, pseudo-science, and official statements to disseminate lies and distortions.65 Such actions will not disintegrate the United States or the EU and will not allow Russian-controlled puppets to hijack the governments: what matters is to amplify the chaos and to weaken the public trust in and the legitimacy of democratic systems, as the weaker the government's legitimacy, the weaker the state.66 The immediate effects of disinformation and misinformation on affected societies are increased feelings of fear, anxiety, uncertainty, and anger, leading to the disruption of social fabric and further exacerbation of ongoing chaos.67\n\n## Protecting The Home Front\n\nPreventing, interdicting, and mitigating disinformation is likely to be one of the top concerns of the United States and its Western allies as they face the challenge of asymmetric warfare employed by the Russian Federation and other hostile states, especially in the post- COVID-19 era. As indicated earlier, foreign meddling to sow discord, increase tensions, and exacerbate societal divisions within a population is one of the most serious risks to the social fabric. If the public loses trust in democratic values and the systems of government based on them, that would lead to chaos and anarchy and open the gates for fringe and radical political parties, violent extremism and terrorism, and finally social and economic unrest. Destroying or at least undermining democratic standards and suppressing civil societies are the ultimate goals of authoritarian rulers. Russia has been in the vanguard of a relentless campaign against liberal values and has moved persistently to export authoritarian ideas and techniques to other societies.68 Putin's strategy, as summarized by President Joseph Biden and the head of the Penn Biden Center for Diplomacy and Global Engagement Michael Carpenter, is to take the fight beyond Russia's borders to attack what it perceives as the greatest external threat to its survival: Western democracy. By attacking the West, the Kremlin shifts attention away from corruption and economic malaise at home, activates nationalist passions to stifle internal dissent, and keeps Western democracies on the defensive and preoccupied with internal divisions, allowing Moscow to consolidate its power at home and exert untrammeled influence over its \"near abroad.\"69\nSaving democratic values and protecting Western societies from conflict and discord amplified by disinformation calls for swiftly applied preventive measures. The fundamental approach to countering disinformation at the societal level is to invest in education, raising awareness of the threats induced by disinformation. Such awareness can be achieved by inspiring media literacy training, beginning at middle or junior high school level. It can also be reinforced by supporting and funding fact-checking initiatives.70 As noted earlier, in order to protect the home front, the same strategies should be applied in the countries that are on the forefront of Russian disinformation campaigns. Isolationism is not a solution, as allowing the Kremlin to undermine young democracies would eventually lead to the reversal of the post-Cold War order.\n\nAt the governmental level (both nationally and internationally among Western allies), it is also essential to appraise the opportunities for the use of artificial intelligence, data science, and machine learning to aid and assist responsible government agencies, health care providers, news media of all types, and civil society organizations to process and analyze information, in order to deliver reliable and actionable information to stakeholders and decisionmakers. Such an approach requires collaborative action on a global scale because crises such as the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic are borderless and cannot be tackled by individual nations, regardless of their wealth and power. The implementation and enforcement of integrated preventive procedures necessitate the internationalization of infodemic management.71\nFinally, from the perspective of the intelligence services of the United States and its Western partners, it is crucial to learn from the experiences of the nations being first affected by the Kremlin's information warfare. As highlighted earlier, these countries are the training grounds for the malign influence tactics and techniques that Russia later uses elsewhere, primarily in the Western world. Western intelligence services might consider the benefits of establishing a dedicated research center that would cooperate closely with affiliated academic and intelligence partners in the former Warsaw Pact countries, which are most severely affected by the Russian disinformation campaigns. As retired U.S. Department of Homeland Security official Wesley Moy and the author have proposed, this group would include the Czech Republic, Estonia, Georgia, and Poland. The practitioners and experts representing government agencies and intelligence services of all countries involved would partner with a transatlantic alliance of scholars specializing in the domain of Russian influence and disinformation activities. Such a research center would be unique in fostering the study of Russian disinformation in real time and in the authentic field of asymmetric warfare operations. The know-how gained could then be adjusted to the American setting and tested in wargaming exercises, allowing for the design of proactive, sound, and empirically-based policies for the prevention, mitigation, and interdiction of foreign malign operations in the United States.72\n\n\nKacper T. Gradon, Ph.D., is the Honorary Senior Research Fellow at University College London (UCL) and a visiting professor in UCL's Department of Security and Crime Science. He is also the Visiting Fulbright Professor at the University of Colorado BoulderPrevention Science Center and Associate Professor in the Department of Cybersecurity at Warsaw University of Technology. His research expertise includes multiple homicide and other criminal analysis and counterterrorism. Dr. Gradon has published on the application of open-source intelligence, as well as digital and Internet forensics and analysis, to forecasting and combating cyber-enabled crime and terrorism, including malign foreign influence and disinformation campaigns. He is a trained World Health Organization Infodemic Manager.\n\n1\nZhangkai J. Cheng and Jing Shan, \"2019 Novel Coronavirus: Where We Are and\nWhat We Know,\" *Infection* 48, no. 2 (April 2020): 155-63, doi:10.1007/s15010-\n020-01401-y, https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/32072569/.\n2\nCenter for Systems Science and Engineering, *COVID-19 Dashboard*, Johns\nHopkins University, https://coronavirus.jhu.edu/map.html.\n3\nUnited Nations, \"Describing COVID-19 Pandemic as Wake-Up Call, Dress Rehearsal for Future Challenges, Secretary-General Opens Annual General\nAssembly Debate with Vision for Solidarity,\" *Meetings Coverage and Press Releases*,\nSeptember 22, 2020, https://www.un.org/press/en/2020/ga12268.doc.htm.\n\n## Covid-19 And The Information Ecosystem\n\n4\nTaher S. Valika, Sarah E. Maurrasse, and Lara Reichert, \"A Second Pandemic?\nPerspective on Information Overload in the COVID-19 Era,\" OtolaryngologyHead and Neck Surgery 163, no. 5 (November 2020): 931-33, doi:10\n.1177/0194599820935850, https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/32513072/.\n5\nU.S. Department of Homeland Security, Countering False Information on Social Media in Disasters and Emergencies, Social Media Working Group for Emergency Services and Disaster Management Report, March 28, 2018, https:// www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/SMWG_Countering-False-Info- Social-Media-Disasters-Emergencies_Mar2018-508.pdf.\n6\nKathryn E. Bouskill and Elta Smith, \"Global Health and Security: Threats and\nOpportunities,\" *RAND Perspective, December 2019,* https://www.rand.org/\npubs/perspectives/PE332.html.\n7\nJennifer Rose, \"The Mortal Coil of Covid-19, Fake News, and Negative Epistemic Postdigital Inculcation,\" *Postdigital Science and Education* 2 (October\n2020): 812-29. https://doi.org/10.1007/s42438-020-00192-7.\n8\nFabio Tagliabue, Luca Galassi, and Pierpaolo Mariani, \"The 'Pandemic' of\nDisinformation in COVID-19,\" *SN Comprehensive Clinical Medicine*, August\n1, 2020, 1-3, doi:10.1007/s42399-020-00439-1, https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih. gov/32838179/.\n9\nWesley Moy and Kacper Gradon, \"COVID-19 Effects and Russian Disinformation Campaigns,\" *Homeland Security Affairs* 16, no. 8 (December 2020), https://\nwww.hsaj.org/articles/16533.\n10\nAustralian Strategic Policy Institute, Covid-19 Disinformation & Social Media Manipulation, October 27, 2020, https://www.aspi.org.au/report/covid-\n19-disinformation.\n11\nUnited Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute, Stop the Virus of Disinformation: The Risk of Malicious Use of Social Media During\nCOVID-19 and the Technology Options To Fight It, November 2020, http://www.\nunicri.it/sites/default/files/2020-11/SM%20misuse.pdf.\n12\nDavid J. Rothkopf, \"When the Buzz Bites Back,\" *Washington Post*, May 11, 2003,\nB01.\n13\nWorld Health Organization, *Coronavirus Disease 2019* (COVID-19): Situation Report45, March 5, 2020, https://www.who.int/docs/default-source/\ncoronaviruse/situation-reports/20200305-sitrep-45-covid-19.pdf.\n14\nLejla Turcilo and Mladen Obrenovic, \"Misinformation, Disinformation, Malinformation: Causes, Trends, and Their Influence on Democracy,\" Heinrich Boll Foundation Companion to Democracy #3, August 2020, https://hk.boell.org/\nsites/default/files/importedFiles/2020/11/04/200825_E-Paper3_ENG.pdf.\n15\nClaire Wardle and Hossein Derakhshan, \"Information Disorder: Towards an\nInterdisciplinary Framework for Research and Policy-Making,\" Council of Europe Report, September 27, 2017, https://rm.coe.int/information-disordertoward-an-interdisciplinary-framework-for-researc/168076277c.\n16\nAdam Kucharski, The Rules of Contagion: Why Things Spreadand Why They Stop (New York: Basic Books, 2020).\n17\nElinor Carmi et al., \"Data Citizenship: Rethinking Data Literacy in the Age of\nDisinformation, Misinformation, and Malinformation,\" *Internet Policy Review*\n9, no. 2 (May 28, 2020), DOI: 10.14763/2020.2.1481, https://policyreview.info/ pdf/policyreview-2020-2-1481.pdf.\n18\nUK House of Commons, Digital, Culture, Media and Sport Committee, Disinformation and 'fake news,' Final Report: Eighth Report of Session 201719,\nFebruary 14, 2019, https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201719/cmselect/\ncmcumeds/1791/1791.pdf.\n19\nMatteo Cinelli et al., \"The COVID-19 Social Media Infodemic,\" Nature Scientific Reports 10, no. 16598 (October 6, 2020), https://doi.org/10.1038/\ns41598-020-73510-5.\n20 Moy and Gradon, \"COVID-19 Effects and Russian Disinformation\nCampaigns.\"\n21\nU.S. Department of State, \"Briefing on Disinformation and Propaganda Related to COVID-19,\" Special Briefing by Lea Gabrielle, Special Envoy and Coordinator of the Global Engagement Center, March 27, 2020, https://www.state. gov/briefing-with-special-envoy-lea-gabrielle-global-engagement-center-ondisinformation-and-propaganda-related-to-covid-19/.\n22\nU.S. Department of State, GEC Special Report: August 2020. Pillars of Russia's Disinformation and Propaganda Ecosystem, August 2020, https://www.state.gov/\nwp-content/uploads/2020/08/Pillars-of-Russia%E2%80%99s-Disinformationand-Propaganda-Ecosystem_08-04-20.pdf.\n23\nPolish Government Information Services, \"Polska na celowniku dezinformacji\" [Poland in the crosshairs of disinformation], Report of the Minister-Coordinator for Special Services, Government of the Republic of Poland, 2020, https:// www.gov.pl/web/sluzby-specjalne/polska-na-celowniku-dezinformacji.\n24\nRay Serrato and Jake Wallis, \"Covid-19 and the Reach of pro-Kremlin Messaging,\" Australian Strategic Policy Institute Covid-19 Disinformation & Social Media Manipulation Reports, Issue 215, October 8, 2020, https://s3-ap-southeast-2.\namazonaws.com/ad-aspi/2020-10/Pro%20Kremlin%20messaging.pdf.\n25\nAgnieszka Legucka and Marcin Przychodniak, \"Dezinformacja Chin i Rosji podczas pandemii Covid-19\" [Disinformation by China and Russia during\nCovid-19 pandemic], *Polish Institute for International Affairs Bulletin,* No. 86,\nApril 21, 2020 https://pism.pl/publikacje/Dezinformacja_Chin_i_Rosji_w_ trakcie_pandemii_COVID19.\n26\nJulia Baer-Bader, \"EU Response to Disinformation from Russia on COVID-19: Three Lessons,\" German Council on Foreign RelationsDGAP Commentary, No. 18, June 3, 2020, https://dgap.org/en/research/publications/eu-responsedisinformation-russia-covid-19\n27\nTad A. Schnaufer, \"Redefining Hybrid Warfare: Russia's Nonlinear War against\nthe West,\" *Journal of Strategic Security* 10, no. 1 (2017): 1731, https://doi.org/\n10.5038/1944-0472.10.1.1538.\n28\nJeffrey V. Dickey et al., \"Russian Political Warfare: Origin, Evolution and Application\" (master's thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, June 2015), https://www. hsdl.org/?view&did=811550.\n29\nDickey et al., \"Russian Political Warfare.\"\n30\nOrysia Lutsevych, \"Agents of the Russian World: Proxy Groups in the Contested Neighbourhood,\" Chatham House: The Royal Institute of International Affairs Report, April 2016, https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/ publications/research/2016-04-14-agents-russian-world-lutsevych.pdf.\n31\nJurji Temirow, \"Neoimperializm, Rosja i zagrozenie pustki\" [Neo-imperialism, Russia and the threat of emptiness], *Obserwator Miedzynarodowy* (PL)\n5, August 2020, http://obserwatormiedzynarodowy.pl/2020/08/05/prof-jurijtemirow-neoimperializm-rosja-i-zagrozenie-pustki-analiza/.\n32\nAndrew Natsios, \"Introduction: Putin's New Russia: Fragile State or Revisionist Power?,\" *South Central Review* 35, no. 1 (Spring 2018): 1-21, DOI: 10.1353/\nscr.2018.0000, https://muse.jhu.edu/issue/38271.\n33\nNatsios, \"Introduction: Putin's New Russia.\"\n34\nOstap Kushnir, *Ukraine and Russian Neo-Imperialism: The Divergent Break*\n(Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2018).\n35\nMarcel Van Herpen, \"Confronting Russia's New Imperialism: The Different Fates of Ukraine, Belarus and the Baltic states,\" Barcelona Centre for International Affairs Monografias, November 2017, https://www.cidob.org/en/articulos/ monografias/war_in_peacetime_russia_s_strategy_on_nato_s_eastern_and_\nsouthern_flanks/confronting_russia_s_new_imperialism_the_different_fates_\nof_ukraine_belarus_and_the_baltic_states.\n36\nAnna Yudina, \"The Rally `round The Flag Effect In Russia: How An International Crisis Turns Regime Opponents Into Regime Supporters\" (unpublished\ndissertation, University of North Carolina, 2015), https://doi.org/10.17615/\nh5pg-4d29.\n37\nU.S. Army Special Operations Command, \"Little Green Men\": A Primer on Modern Russian Unconventional Warfare, Ukraine 20132014, 2016, https://\nwww.jhuapl.edu/Content/documents/ARIS_LittleGreenMen.pdf.\n38\nAlina Polyakova, \"Weapons of the Weak: Russia and AI-driven Asymmetric\nWarfare,\" Brookings Series: *A Blueprint for the Future of AI: 2018-2019*, November 15, 2018, https://www.brookings.edu/research/weapons-of-the-weakrussia-and-ai-driven-asymmetric-warfare/.\n39\nMoy and Gradon, \"COVID-19 Effects and Russian Disinformation Campaigns.\"\n40\nOfer Fridman, \"On the 'Gerasimov Doctrine': Why the West Fails to Beat Russia\nto the Punch,\" *PRISM* 8, no. 2 (2019): 100-12, https://ndupress.ndu.edu/Portals/\n68/Documents/prism/prism_8-2/PRISM_8-2_Fridman.pdf.\n41\nTad A. Schnaufer, \"Redefining Hybrid Warfare: Russia's Nonlinear War against\nthe West,\" *Journal of Strategic Security* 10, no. 1 (2017): 1731, https://scholar\ncommons.usf.edu/jss/vol10/iss1/3/.\n42\nCharles K. Bartles, \"Russia's Indirect and Asymmetric Methods as a Response to\nthe New Western Way of War,\" *Special Operations Journal* 2, no. 1 (June 1, 2016),\nDOI: 10.1080/23296151.2016.1134964, https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/ 10.1080/23296151.2016.1134964.\n43\nSchnaufer, \"Redefining Hybrid Warfare: Russia's Nonlinear War against the West.\"\n44\nMartin N. Murphy, \"Understanding Russia's Concept for Total War in Europe,\"\nThe Heritage Foundation Special Report No. 184, September 12, 2016, http://\nreport.heritage.org/sr184.\n45\nGuillaume Lasconjarias and Jeffrey A. Larsen, ed., NATO's Response to Hybrid Threats (Rome: NATO Defense College, 2015).\n46\nJohn Walcott and Warren Strobel, \"Russia Has 'Playbook' for Covert Influence\nin Eastern Europe: Study,\" *Reuters*, October 13, 2016, https://www.reuters.com/\narticle/us-russia-security-usa-idUSKCN12D13Q.\n47\nTodd C. Helmus et al., Russian Social Media Influence: Understanding Russian Propaganda in Eastern Europe (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2018),\nhttps://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR2237.html.\n48\nMatt Apuzzo, \"Pressured by China, E.U. Softens Report on Covid-19 Disinformation,\" *New York Times*, May 1, 2020, https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/24/\nworld/europe/disinformation-china-eu-coronavirus.html.\n49\nMichal Wojnowski, \"Presidential Elections as a State Destabilization Tool in the Theory and Practice of the Russian Info-psychological Operations in the 20th\nand 21st Century,\" *Internal Security Review,* 21/19, 2019, 311-33, http://www\n.abw.gov.pl/download/1/2892/MWojnowski-ENG.pdf.\n50\nOlga Chyzhova (Coordinator), Disinformation Resilience in Central and Eastern Europe, Ukrainian PrismThe Foreign Policy Council (Kyiv), 2018, http://\nprismua.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/06/DRI_CEE_2018.pdf.\n51\nZdzislaw Sliwa, \"Podcast: Cyberbezpieczenstwo, to tez walka z 'praniem brudnych informacji'\" [Podcast: cybersecurity is also combating 'dirty information laundering'], Nowa Europa Wschodnia (New Eastern Europe), December 19, 2020, https://new.org.pl/#944,podcast_s2e8_litwa_lotwa_estonia_i_ cyberbezpieczenstwo.\n52 Moy and Gradon, \"COVID-19 Effects and Russian Disinformation\nCampaigns.\"\n53\nPolicy Department for Citizens' Rights and Constitutional Affairs, Directorate\nGeneral for Internal Policies of the Union, Disinformation and Propaganda Impact on the Functioning of the Rule of Law in the EU and Its Member States\n(Commissioned by European Parliament), PE 608.864, February 2019, 30, https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2019/608864/IPOL\n_STU(2019)608864_EN.pdf.\n54\nBrooke Rogers, \"The Economic Downturn: A Boon for Home-grown Terrorists?,\" *NATO Review Magazine, July 27,* 2012. https://www.nato.int/docu/\nreview/articles/2012/07/27/the-economic-downturn-a-boon-for-home-grownterrorists/index.html.\n55\nJolanta Darczewska, \"Srodki aktywne jako rosyjska agresja hybrydowa w retrospekcji. Wybrane problem\" [Active measures as Russian hybrid warfare in\nretrospect. selected problems], *Przeglad Bezpieczenstwa Wewnetrznego ABW* (*Internal Security Review)*, 18/18, 2018, 45, file:///C:/Users/Owner/Downloads/\n2__PBW18_J__Darczewska.pdf.\n56\nMichal Szkaradek and Wojciech Przybylski, \"Hunger Riots in Europe? The Kremlin in Action: Russian Disinformation through the European Parliament,\nVisegrad Insight Report, May 12, 2020, https://visegradinsight.eu/hunger-riotsin-europe-the-kremlin-in-action/.\n57\nMicah White, \"Troll Lives Matter? Russian Infiltration of the Black Lives Matters Movement,\" in *Troll Factories: Russia's Web Brigades,* ed., A. Karpen (New\nYork, NY: Greenhaven Publishing, 2019).\n58\nMatthew Dalton, \"France Probes Any Moscow Role in Yellow-Vest Movement,\" *Wall Street Journal*, December 14, 2018, https://www.wsj.com/articles/\nfrance-probes-any-moscow-role-in-yellow-vest-movement-11544826863.\n59\nShaun Walker, \"Russian Troll Factory Paid US Activists To Help Fund Protests\nDuring Elections,\" *Guardian*, October 17, 2017, https://www.theguardian.com/\nworld/2017/oct/17/russian-troll-factory-activists-protests-us-election.\n60\nJosephine Lukito, \"Coordinating a Multi-Platform Disinformation Campaign: Internet Research Agency Activity on Three U.S. Social Media Platforms, 2015 to 2017,\" *Political Communication* 37, no. 2 (2020): 238-55, DOI:\n10.1080/10584609.2019.1661889, https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.10\n80/10584609.2019.1661889.\n61\nApril Glaser, \"Russian Trolls Were Obsessed With Black Lives Matter,\" *Slate*, May\n11, 2018, https://slate.com/technology/2018/05/russian-trolls-are- obsessedwith-black-lives-matter.html.\n62\nNick Penzenstadler, Brad Heath, and Jessica Guynn, \"We Read Every One of the\n3,517 Facebook Ads Bought by Russians. Here's What We Found,\" *USA Today,*\nMay 11, 2018. https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/2018/05/11/what-wefound-facebook-ads-russians-accused-election-meddling/602319002/.\n63\nGrzegorz Kuczynski, \"Follow the Petro-roubles: European Officials Go Into\nRussian Business,\" *Warsaw Institute News*, March 25, 2019, https://warsaw\ninstitute.org/follow-petro-roubles-european-officials-go-russian-business.\n64\nGeir Hagen Karlsen, \"Divide and Rule: Ten Lessons about Russian Political\nInfluence Activities in Europe,\" *Palgrave Communications* 5, no. 19 (February\n8, 2019), https://doi.org/10.1057/s41599-019-0227-8.\n65\nSergey Sukhankin, \"Covid-19 as a Tool of Information Confrontation: Russia's\nApproach,\" *School of Public Policy Publications* (University of Calgary) 13, no.\n3 (April 2020): 1-9, https://www.policyschool.ca/wp-content/uploads/2020/03/ COVID-19-Tool-of-Information-Sukhankin.pdf.\n66\nPiotr Panek, \"Amerykanin, Rusek i Covid\" [American, Russian and Covid],\nNiedowiary Blog Szalonych Naukowcow, December 17, 2020, https://naukowy.\nblog.polityka.pl/2020/12/17/amerykanin-rusek-i-covid/.\n67\nKacper Gradon, \"Crime in the Time of the Plague: Fake News Pandemic and the\nChallenges to Law-Enforcement and Intelligence Community,\" *Society Register*\n4, no. 2, (April 2020), DOI: 10.14746/sr.2020.4.2.10,  https://www.researchgate. net/publication/340489268_CRIME_IN_THE_TIME_OF_THE_PLAGUE_ FAKE_NEWS_PANDEMIC_AND_THE_CHALLENGES_TO_LAW- ENFORCEMENT_AND_INTELLIGENCE_COMMUNITY.\n68\nArch Puddington, \"Breaking Down Democracy. Goals, Strategies, and Methods\nof Modern Authoritarians,\" *Freedom House Special Report*, June 2017, https://\nfreedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/June2017_FH_Report_Breaking_Down_ Democracy.pdf.\n69\nJoseph R. Biden, Jr. and Michael Carpenter, \"How to Stand up to the Kremlin:\nDefending Democracy against Its Enemies,\" *Foreign Affairs* 97, no. 1 (January/\n\n## Covid-19 And The Information Ecosystem\n\nFebruary 2018), https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/russia-fsu/2017-12-05/ how-stand-kremlin\n70\nLorant Gyori, \"Countering Fake News. We Must Wake Up Before It Gets Too\nLate: A CASE STUDY from Hungary,\" *Visegrad Insight Report*, May 31, 2019,\nhttps://visegradinsight.eu/countering-fake-news/.\n71\nKacper Gradon et al., \"Countering Misinformation: A Multidisciplinary Approach,\" *Big Data & Society (Studying the COVID-19 Infodemic at Scale* Special\nIssue), May 5, 2021, https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/205395172 11013848.\n72\nMoy and Gradon, \"COVID-19 Effects and Russian Disinformation Campaigns.\"\n\n## Part Th R E E Looking Forward\n\n# Beware A Virus Bearing Gifts: Can A \"Great Leveler\" Be Our Elites' Best Friend?\n\n## Michael Vlahos\n\nThe great coronavirus pandemic is seen everywhere as world shaking and world changing. That it is. Yet it should be seen not as a grand historical force, but rather as a force enabler. COVID-19 does not leave earthshattering wreckage in its wake. Rather, it removes popular residual restraints so that ruling elites may wreckand thus reshapeour world as they will. Past great upheavals were authentic, multivalent events, where plague, climate change, migrations, and war transformed our human landscapeoften for the better. This handcrafted upheaval, in contrast, collars our deepest memories of old terrorsthrough the urgent press of continuous emergencyto lock in an elite-bespoke world order, forever. Hence, while antecedent world calamities had the power to bring elites and their oppression down, this elite-curated event has deployed calamity to ensure the elites' globe-girdling command of humanity.\n\nW\nhen COVID-19 began to spread, elite wisdom promptly declared the world transformed. As early as mid-March 2020, Politico Magazine published a wise man survey entitled, \"Coronavirus Will Change the World Permanently. Here's How.,\"1 in which dozens of \"smart, macro thinkers\" weighed in on the profound changes to come. Yet of the 34 predictions in the *Politico* piece, only two have stood the test of a single year.* The sampling size of this exercise helps us appreciate the poverty of elite analysis: the forecasts fail because they are entirely unconnected to history.\n\nHistory is quite clear about how pandemics effect \"Big Change.\"\n\n- A pandemic is not the bearer of change but rather its helpful\nmidwife.\n- A pandemic's arrival in a near-crisis world system will help\npush that system over the edge.\n- Pandemic intervention most strongly impacts weakened or\nbrittle elites.\nThese factors are history's yardsticks for pandemics and world change*not the plague's relative severity* in terms of human death tolls. Change flows from how the epidemic interacts with the dynamics of a society or larger system already under intense pressure. Let's take a look.\n\nAfter 10,000 centuries of evolution, the last remaining human species has developed a peak value proposition which, for the past 50 of those centuries, we have called \"civilization.\" This competitive advantage is a vision of human society as a matrix of cities linked to a spoke-and-hub network, which has been built out worldwide.\n\nThis human constellation concentrates people into dense communities, with each city connected to the entire mesh. These city networks Beware a Virus Bearing Gifts: Can a \"Great Leveler\" Be Our Elites' Best Friend?\n\nhave been the germinator and driver of human cultural evolution and a continuum of change.\n\nWe describe the history of civilization as relentlessly positive and draw our progress on an ever-ascendingeven soaringcurve. But civilization's bounty has its downsides, tooboth cultural and material. The cultural downside inheres in society's continual tendency to move toward segmented, stratified, and unequal development, which in practical terms operates as a limit on the success and relative life expectancy of governing regimes and their constitutional paradigms. Civilization's material downside concerns the collective physiology of cities' and networks' health. Since the beginning, dense human communities have created fertile petri dishes for culturing disease. Moreover, the networks connecting these communities have served as a primary and efficient pathway for disease spread. This proclivity toward pathogenesis and epidemy, in practical terms, has operated as a historically recurring limit to physical growth of the world-city matrix.\n\n## Pandemic's Destruction  .  .  .\n\nAt their most severe, pandemic episodes can intersect with a weakening of ruling paradigms to disrupt the integrity of the current global-city matrix and trigger an abrupt discontinuity in civilization itself. During civilization's 50 centuries, just two pandemic episodesthe Justinianic Plague (54149) and the Black Death (134653)were vast enough to disrupt the world-city matrix. In each episode, civilization survived, presenting an uneven topology of subsidence, but the world-city matrix broke into smaller, more self-referent networks.2\nThe first such dynamic pandemic, the Justinianic Plague saw the initial visitation of *Yersinia pestis*the same bacteria that caused the Black Death eight centuries later. It killed between 30 percent and 60 percent of the Greco-Roman population, and its impact was felt across the Greco-Roman world.3 The Roman (Byzantine) effort to reintegrate the Mediterranean world system came to a sudden end as the plague depressed intra-Mediterranean trade and the amount of currency in circulation. Rome's superpower authority and that of the Sassanians in neighboring Persia were gravely weakened.\n\nDuring the second and more familiar great pandemic, the Black Death, *Yersinia pestis* again killed as much as 60 percent of the population across Europe, Eurasia, and North Africa.4 The Mongol Khanate (12061368) and its \"world network\" across Eurasia collapsed, and the Byzantine Empire (3951453) was also dealt a death blow. War continued, but armies and navies shrank dramatically.\n\nEven with these huge death tolls, both events reveal an ability to maintain political and economic continuity. The life patterns of society were unbrokeneven in the face of 6 out of 10 mortality. What such notable world calamities tell us is that it takes an awful lot to disrupt human civilization's world matrix, and even when that matrix is disrupted, the effects are impermanent and evanescent. The larger significance of mini apocalypse is not in the direct damage and disruption of the plague episode in itself, but rather in the additive impetus of the plague dynamic on other human things. In other words, the power of pandemic lies in its capacity to push dynamic changes in civilization already underway or to unleash forces so pent up that only an exogenous force might intervene. The Chart shows plague's influence long after the pestilence has departed.\n\nThe statuses of the human communities of Late Antiquity and the High Middle Ages seem to be in total contrast. The Greco- Roman- Sassanian world was already coming apart in the 6th century; hence, the Justinianic Plague provided the fissiparous force to accelerate its breakup. In contrast, when the Black Death hit, 14th century human society was rich and living large. Yet the deeply intertwined world of the High Middle Ages also came apart, even though its marquee societies were rich and powerful.\n\nWhat the networked world societies of Late Antiquity and the High Middle Ages shared was an elite architecture of rule that was Beware a Virus Bearing Gifts: Can a \"Great Leveler\" Be Our Elites' Best Friend?\n\nhighly corrupt and under pressure from below. Yet what are \"elites,\" or the \"ruling class,\" or even \"aristocracy?\" Simply, elites are the secret of the success of the world of cities (i.e., civilization) and, just as surely, the core source of their failure. Millennia ago, elites grew into leadership among emerging, late-Neolithic (or Chalcolithic) communities, the proto-city-states of early civilization. Elites became a new, necessary, and yet ineradicable institution in the new human societygroomed to lead and yet insatiable of privilege. Their capacity to inspire or oppress would become the heart of civilizational success, and failure.\n\n## Pandemic's Vast And Long-Lasting Impact\n\nFor the Eurasian World of the 14th and 15th Centuries:\nFor the Greco-Roman- Sassanian World of the 6th and 7th Centuries:\n\nThe Mongol network's\ncollapse and the Ottoman\nEmpire's rise cut Europe off\nfrom Eurasia a second time.\n\nTrade declined. In the year 530,\nItaly imported 35 percent of\nits wine; by 560, that level had\nfallen to 10 percent.\n\nSocial mobility in the West\nsurged, and new aristocratic\nlineages emerged.\n\nCirculation of coins collapsed\nbetween 550 and 600, first in\nthe West, then in the East.\n\nSerfdom broke down; labor\nwas suddenly in high demand,\nand technology became a val-\nued good as labor costs rose.\n\nWaves of plague reduced\nEgypt's population from 30\nmillion in 540 to 10 million\nin 700.\n\nEngland's prepandemic pop-\nulation, estimated at 4 million\nin 1348, did not reach that\nlevel again until at least 1700.\n\nAfter 600, Sassanian, then\nArab and Slav, invaders overran\nthe Balkans and Levant.\n\nEurope broke out of isolation,\nbuilding out a global oceanic\nnetwork.\n\nThe world system remained\nsegmented into three separate\nculture areas for 500 years.\n\nHere is the oppression scorecard: In Late Antiquity, concentrations of wealth, counterpoised with the grinding misery of the people, became unsustainable.5 Elites had become stratified in both East and West. For example, in 450, three senators each had wealth equal to that of the imperial Roman state. In contrast, perhaps 20 percent of the population was enslaved, with many more millions in colony serfdom.6 Desperate, wholesale migrations from governed spaces had created autonomous, insurgent spaces the size of modern Belgium or even Hungary. Germanic invaders were often welcomed because they ended hated taxes.\n\nIn the High Middle Ages, population had maxed out and had been exploited to its productive limit. Feudal society was a tyranny. The supply of serfs exceeded demand, and a corrupt Church owned the majority of the region's assets.\n\n## .  .  . Leads To Transformation\n\nThe evidence leaves no doubt. The collapse of the Western Roman state between 450 and 550 and the near collapse, and then reconstitution, of a new Byzantine state (550700) brought great benefit and relief to the people of the Mediterranean world. The tripartite successor subsystemsLatin West, Greek East, and Arab Levantsaw declines in trade, urbanization, and literacy, although less so in the Levant. Butbottom linepeople were more free.7\nAs early modern Europe emerged from succeeding waves of Black Death, the people were freed from serfdom. They could command much higher wages, and free men could aspire to landed gentry status.8 Kings, who depended on such free men to flesh out their armies, found they could only make war if they had the money to hire professional soldier companies or raise volunteer \"free companies\" from yeomen with the promise of advancement to gentry status for their captains and lieutenants.9 Technology was now highly prized as a means to offset lost labor, and its advancesthe powered loom, the\n\n## Beware A Virus Bearing Gifts: Can A \"Great Leveler\" Be Our Elites' Best Friend?\n\npolder-draining windmill, the three-masted ship, working muskets, and the printing pressshocked the established power structure. In this new world, reformation of both Church and establishment was now \"just a shot away.\"10 In other words, the two great *Yersinia pestis*\npandemics broke up long-established social and political patterns in civilization, as well as rending wealth-building networks for trade and cultural mixing*and this was good*.\n\nWhy was it good? Those long-established social and political patterns wereto be politeperhaps too hard and too fixed. By 541 and by 1346, civilization had reached the point where regular people had zero chance of upward mobility and, thus, zero hope of social advancement and economic betterment. Moreover, the wealthbuilding networks of the system had become a wired racket for the elite. The anointed aristocratic caste (making up perhaps 1 percent of the population) and its accompanying privileged servant class (adding another 9 percent) got ever richer and richer, while an increasingly excluded and oppressed 90 percent of the population would forever have no voice, no outlet, and no hope.11, 12\nAbove all, remember that these *Yersinia pestis* events were existentialat least to those who lived through or died in them. Such is not the nature of today's COVID-19 pandemic. The current pandemic ranks ninth on Wikipedia's list of Major Epidemics and Pandemics by Death Tollwhich might be argued, is a perfectly modern exercise in misdirection, as it ignores the overall explosion of the world's population.13 This sleight of hand makes it possible to represent the coronavirus's death toll of 3.7 million (as of June 2021)14 as something as close to an existential event as great plagues of times past. COVID-19 and the tragic \"HIV/AIDS pandemic\"which ranks number 4, with a death toll of 35 millionset against a world population of 7.8 billion15 cannot be compared to the Black Death or the Justinianic Plague, where perhaps half of humanity perished. Have 4 billion people died of AIDS?\n\nIn practical terms, although existential pandemics threaten the very life of society, for elites the pandemics threaten what they value mosttheir accumulated wealth and right to rule. Stratified and unjust elite orders, no matter what their titular authority, are actually quite brittle. The Roman order of Late Antiquity and the \"Latin\"\nchurch order of the High Middle Ages initially survived as ruling institutions, yet in several generations they had either collapsed or radically reformed. Today's Western elites eerily mirror the 1+9 percent aristocratic and privileged servant demography of Late Antiquity and the Middle Ages described above, yet our grandee class may actually be wealthier and their regimes even more sclerotic than their ancient and medieval antecedents.16 They have done their best to turn COVID-19 into a wealth and regime building opportunity by comparing the coronavirus directly to the great plagues and giving it inconsistent significance. Placing the pandemic so high in the hierarchy of human calamity has served as an elite dispensation: A wide-open call to arms for Western aristocracies to consolidate and expand their hold on increasingly restive societies.\n\nThe long national shutdowns have wiped away constraints on the state, creating, in effect, a clean slate for new constitutional norms. Moreover, asserted as precedent with instant standing, these new norms will constitute a major expansion of state power. For example, drawn-out, draconian Blue state lockdowns have established a strong precedent for open-ended state emergency powers. Summarily invoked and enforced like martial law, rule-by-fiat now has the constitutional standing to drive future \"Green New Deal\" reordering and regulation of society.\n\nExpanded state ruling and its enforcement implicitly mean expanded privileges and protections for preferred groups. The time of lockdown has also amplified wealth concentration. High-skilled, high-paying virtual jobs ensure that elite income is untouched, while the great working class shift to tomorrow's labor marketthe \"gig economy\"is correspondingly accelerated.17 New analysis shows that, in terms of the 1 percent, wealth concentration in the United States is double that of the Roman Empire.18\n\n## Beware A Virus Bearing Gifts: Can A \"Great Leveler\" Be Our Elites' Best Friend?\n\nWhich brings us back full circle to the *Politico* piece. The 34 contributorswith one exceptionpresented COVID-19 as a route to a better world: an \"expert\"-ruled \"reformed society\" emphasizing \"virtual reality\" but also \"a healthier digital lifestyle,\" state \"family care,\" more science, less religion, \"big government\" inspiring a new citizen solidarity, leading to \"new trust in institutions, \"universal basic income\" but also, state \"restraints on mass consumption,\" and surely including a Green New Deal (curbing wanton desires like \"driving cars, eating meat, and burning electricity\").\n\nThe impressionistic vision from this wide-ranging, uncoordinated sampling is unusually consistent in presenting the elite worldview. It also generally harmonizes with the sweeping \"future of humanity\" assessments from the 2020 World Economic Forum in Davos.19 The grandly styled \"Great Reset\"20 has been relentlessly advertised, to the point where it is now a standard meme among rightwing insurgents. Yet among the American 1+9 percent, it is hailed., 21 Hence, in historical contrast to the great pandemics, COVID-19 has been adroitly appropriated by ruling classes to consolidate power but just as critically, to rework the constitutional terms of the relationship between state and elites and the people.\n\nYet there is a correlation between COVID-19 and its existential plague ancestors. Like in Late Antiquity and the High Middle Ages, the people are restive under elite \"management\" regimes. Moreover, COVID lockdowns have intensified gathering rebellion: See intense clashes with mounted police, for example, in New South Walesor massive street protests in France over vaccine passportsor the bitter recall campaign against California Governor Gavin Newsom because of his lockdown policies.\n\nSo what was at first a strategic opportunity for Western elites may, in the end, generate a more clamoring insurgency, building on frustration and collective anger already boiling among those left behind.\n\nThose for whom the rewards once dangled by an ever-richer world are now visibly, painfully, withdrawn, with no end in sight.\n\nRobert Frost wrote in 1915: \"Two roads diverged in a yellow wood\n...\" We Americans want to believe that \"The Road Not Taken\" is a \"paean to triumphant self-assertion ('I took the road less traveled by'),\" but, as David Orr makes clear \"the road he will later call less traveled is actually the road *equally traveled*. The two roads are interchangeable.\"22\nAmericans are constantly confronted with the existential prospect of choosing between two unalterably opposed pathswith equally all-or-nothing outcomesand yet, at Frost's fundamental level, there is no choice. Both paths lead to the same place. An elite class that once served this nation so well and for so long *is failing us*. Whatever happensrevolt, revolution, overthrow and eventual renewalthis is what lies ahead. This is our predestined future.\n\nThe plague did not cause this, nor did it bring us hereit simply made the revelation. Pandemic urgency and emergency ruthlessly stripped away the restless, seething heart that inevitably bursts with the recognition of a sacred vision betrayed; and assuredly, also, the unclothed, narcissistic ruling class that led us here.\n\n\n\nMichael Vlahos is a writer and author of the book Fighting Identity:\nSacred War and World Change. Over several decades, he has taught war and strategy at Johns Hopkins University, the Naval War College, and Centro de Estudios Superiores Navales (CDMX). He is a weekly contributor to *The John Batchelor Show*. Follow him on Twitter @\nMichalis_Vlahos, and on his blog, anewcivilwar.com Beware a Virus Bearing Gifts: Can a \"Great Leveler\" Be Our Elites' Best Friend?\n\n1\n\"Coronavirus Will Change the World Permanently. Here's How.,\" *Politico*, March\n19, 2020, https://www.politico.com/news/magazine/2020/03/19/coronaviruseffect-economy-life-society-analysis-covid-135579.\"\n2\nMichael Vlahos, TEDx talk, World Crisis? Again? What the Past Tells Us About Things To Come, TEDx talk, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MsNjl7n20WU.\n3\nWilliam Rosen, *Justinian's Flea: Plague, Empire, and the Birth of Europe* (New\nYork: Viking Press, 2007).\n4\nWilliam H. McNeill, *Plagues and Peoples* (New York: Anchor Books, 1976).\n5\nChris Wickham, Framing the Early Middle Ages: Europe and the Mediterranean, 400-800 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005). See Chapter 4: \"Aristocracies,\" 153-259.\n6\nHannah Basta, \"Slaves, Coloni, and Status Confusion in the Late Roman\nEmpire,\" *Journal of the National Collegiate Honors Council,* Online Archive,\n2017, 558.\n7\nPeter S. Wells, *Barbarians to Angels: The Dark Ages Reconsidered* (New York:\nW.W. Norton, 2008).\n8\nDavid Routt, \"The Economic Impact of the Black Death,\" Economic History Association, EH.net, https://eh.net/encyclopedia/the-economic-impact-of-theblack-death/.\n9\nAnne Curry, \"English Armies in the Fifteenth Century,\" in Anne Curry and\nMichael Hughes, *Arms, Armies and Fortifications in the Hundred Years War*\n(Woodbridge, UK: The Boydell Press, 1994).\n10\nSteven Ozment, The Age of Reform, 1250-1550: An Intellectual and Religious History of Late Medieval and Reformation Europe (New Haven: Yale University\nPress, 1980).\n11\nWickham, *Framing the Early Middle Ages*.\n12\nWells, *Barbarians to Angels*.\n13\n\"List of Epidemics,\" Wikipedia, last modified June 16, 2021, https://en.wiki\npedia.org/wiki/List_of_epidemics.\n14\n\"List of Epidemics,\" Wikipedia.\n15\n\"List of Epidemics,\" Wikipedia.\n16\nWalter Scheidel and Steven J. Friesen, \"The Size of the Economy and the Distribution of Income in the Roman Empire,\" *Journal of Roman Studies* 99 (November 2009): 61-91.\n17\nRani Molla and Emily Stewart, \"America's Deeply Unequal Economic Recovery, Explained in 7 Charts,\" Vox, February 5, 2021.\n18\nBranko Milanovic, Peter H. Lindert, and Jeffrey G. Williamson, \"Ancient Inequality,\" National Bureau of Economic Research, Working Paper 13550, October 2007, www.nber.org/system/files/working_papers/w13550/w13550,pdf.\n19\nKlaus Schwab, \"Now Is the Time for a 'Great Reset,'\" *World Economic Forum*,\nJune 3, 2020.\n20\n\"The Great Reset,\" *Time*, January 25, 2021, https://time.com/collection/greatreset/5933167/davos-agenda-solutions/.\n21\nJustin Haskins, \"Introducing the 'Great Reset,\" World Leaders' Radical Plan To\nTransform the Economy,\" *The Hill*, June, 25, 2020, https://thehill.com/opinion/\nenergy-environment/504499-introducing-the-great-reset-world-leaders-radicalplan-to.\n22\nDavid Orr, \"The Most Misread Poem in America,\" *The Paris Review,* September\n11, 2015.\n\n## What Goes Around Comes Around? Historical Comparison Of Impacts, Responses, And Long-Term Effects Of The 1918 H1N1 Vs . 2020 Covid-19 Pandemics\n\nLawrence A. Kuznar Comparison of the 2020 COVID-19 and 1918 H1N1 flu pandemics provides an opportunity for a disciplined examination of the conditions and the short- and long-term effects of a pandemic on the world and U.S. national security. Taking into account the different geopolitical, epidemiological, and social contexts of these two periods, this comparison leads to several projections. Because the underlying conditions for pandemic (e.g., population growth, urbanization, interconnected trade and travel) persist, future pandemics are inevitable; continued vigilance and preparation are necessary. China and Russia will try to leverage the pandemic against the United States, but the United States has an opportunity to assume a leadership role in combatting the pandemic. U.S. and global economic recovery is likely, although an increase in real wages and standard of livingtypical after a pandemicis not expected. Current inequalities are likely to increase due to differential unemployment between service industries and manufacturing, on the one hand, and higher-paid, white collar industries where people can continue to work from home. The politicization of the pandemic in some Western democracies is likely to be exacerbated by growing inequality along social divisions. Therefore, the COVID-19 pandemic presents the danger of political instability and weakening Western democracies in competition against their autocratic rivals.\n\nM\nany expert opinions have been offered regarding the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on the world and U.S. national security, but disciplined, data-based assessments are needed. Disciplined historical assessment moves beyond speculation and toward a sounder evaluation of the effects of the COVID-19 pandemic. No two historical periods are the same; however, by accounting for key factors in historical context, similar conditions and effects can be isolated from those that might be specific to a particular time and place.1, 2, 3 This chapter provides a systematic consideration of the pre-existing contexts, the active disease agents, government and population responses, and ultimate effects of the 1918 H1N1 and 2020 COVID-19 pandemics. The first step in understanding these pandemics is an examination of these separate factors (see Table). However, these factors interact in complex biological, demographic, social, economic, and geopolitical contexts,4 and the interactive effects will be considered in this comparative analysis.\n\n| Factor                  | 1918 H1N1                |\n|-------------------------|--------------------------|\n| The Preexisting Context |                          |\n| Global War Effort       | World War I - widespread |\n| devastation             |                          |\n| Global War on Terror -  |                          |\n| localized devastation   |                          |\n| Great Power             |                          |\n| Competition             |                          |\n| Yes                     | Yes                      |\n\n## What Goes Around Comes Around?\n\n| Factor                        |\n|-------------------------------|\n| The Preexisting Context       |\n| Global Political              |\n| Disruptions                   |\n| Communist revolution in       |\n| Russia                        |\n| Color revolutions, Arab       |\n| Spring, global jihad, politi- |\n| cal divisiveness              |\n| Economic                      |\n| Conditions                    |\n| War economy, post-war         |\n| boom                          |\n| Economic boom, pandemic       |\n| recession                     |\n\n## The Virus\n\n| Origin             | Kansas - pigs?    | China - bats? pangolins?    |\n|--------------------|-------------------|-----------------------------|\n| Possible lab leak? |                   |                             |\n| Contagiousness     | Highly contagious | Highly contagious           |\n\n## The Disease\n\n| Death Rate                   |\n|------------------------------|\n| United States, U.S. rate 0.7 |\n| percent                      |\n| 4.2M global, 611K United     |\n| States, U.S. rate 0.18 per-  |\n| cent, as of July 28, 2021    |\n| Demographic                  |\n| Impact                       |\n| Killed very young, prime     |\n| labor force, elderly         |\n| Killed elderly               |\n\n## The Economic Effects\n\n| GDP                       | Contraction of 6 percent   |\n|---------------------------|----------------------------|\n| Unemployment              | Little impact, may have    |\n| decreased                 |                            |\n| Major short-term increase |                            |\n| Inequality                | Mostly impacted poor,      |\n| minorities                |                            |\n| Mostly impacted poor,     |                            |\n| minorities                |                            |\n\n## The Response\n\nNational Government\nNone - response left to local municipalities; their responses mixed\nMixed - mixed messaging on nonpharmaceutical interventions (NPIs)\nLocal Government\nVaried - shutdown to nothing\nVaried levels of shutdown\nPopulation Compliance\nVaried - evidence suggests that compliance waned, contributing to new waves\nVaried - urban populations most responsive, rural populations rejected NPIs, eventually compliance waned\n| Factor                     | 1918 H1N1          | 2020 COVID-19   |\n|----------------------------|--------------------|-----------------|\n| The Social Effects         |                    |                 |\n| Politics                   | Fueled nationalism |                 |\n| eventually                 |                    |                 |\n| Highly politicized, fueled |                    |                 |\n| nationalism immediately    |                    |                 |\n| Urbanization               | No clear impact    | Minimal impact  |\n\n## The Preexisting Context\n\nGlobal War. The 1918 pandemic was profoundly facilitated by World War I. The disease most likely began at a U.S. army training camp in Kansas as U.S. troops began staging to enter WWI.5, 6 From there, massive global troop movements spread the virus. Malnourished, war-weary Europe was defenseless against infection since immune systems were challenged by the conditions of war.7 Since the war was global, the disease rapidly spread to the vulnerable, starving populations in India, Africa, and East Asia. In contrast to 1918, today's world is much healthier and, therefore, more resilient against pandemic.\n\nGlobal conflict, in recent times, has been primarily centered on non-state violent extremist organizations, and these small wars have spawned other regional conflictsespecially in Afghanistan, Syria, Somalia, and Nigeriathat great powers have leveraged against one another.8, 9, 10 Although some observers have warned that these vulnerable populations could be key nodes in the spread of the virus,11 measures taken in refugee camps have so far prevented massive outbreaks that spread to other populations;12 developed countries have been more impacted by the COVID-19 pandemic. Large troop movements have not accompanied these wars, especially since the drawdown of U.S. and NATO forces in Afghanistan and Iraq. However, the world is a much more accessible place today because of modern transportation, especially air transportation and globalized commerce.13 Modern transportation presents an analogue to the massive troop transports of WWI and will be more persistent. Recent studies of the spread of COVID-19\nhave identified travel as the primary factor in deaths, far above contributing factors such as comorbidity (e.g., diabetes, heart disease, obesity, high blood pressure, alcohol use), poverty, and lack of insurance.14, 15\nGreat Power Competition. WWI was the product of great power competition that spiraled out of control.16 Great power competition exists today, although the strategies employed by the United States, Russia, and China are aimed at avoiding open conflict rather than falling into it.17 18, 19 Today's great power competition is probably more relevant because it has hampered information exchange and cooperation among the powers to combat the pandemic worldwide. The hacking of Western pharmaceutical companies by Russian, Chinese, Iranian, and North Korean entities is evidence of the absence of this cooperation.20\nGlobal Political Disruptions. In both 1918 and 2020, there have been important political disruptions. Communist revolution erupted in Russia in 1917-18 and eventually spread worldwide. The Arab Spring and color revolutions, as well as global Jihadist movements and Hong Kong's democracy movement, have recently challenged existing orders. However, as noted above, these do not appear to have impacted the 2020 pandemic globally.\n\nEconomic Conditions. Despite the devastation of WWI, wartime economies generated wealth for many.21 Major wars are often followed by major economic booms because of the need to rebuild from the destruction.22, 23, 24 In 2020, the world was largely experiencing an economic recovery from the 2008 global recession.25 While the great recession represented a devastating loss of wealth, it did not create war-like devastation from which people needed to rebuild. The post-COVID era cannot, therefore, experience a post-war boom.\n\n## The Virus\n\nOrigin. The origins of both diseases are still uncertain. Points of origin for the 1918 H1N1 included had dense populations of people and pigs and who was the vector for whom remains uncertain.26, 27 The recency\n\nof COVID-19 makes pinpointing its origin especially challenging.28\nLeading theories point to resident bat populations and exotic pangolins that were traded in meat markets in Wuhan, China, although enough questions persist that the World Health Organization has requested information from the Chinese government and President Biden has asked the Intelligence Community to investigate.29, 30\nContagiousness. Both 1918 H1N1 and COVID-19 have had the same reproductive rate, or R0 (R-naught), which is the average number of people an infected person infects. If the R0 is less than one, the disease will eventually go extinct, but, if it is greater than one, the disease will spread. Both diseases appear to have R0s between 2 and\n3, which is very high (regular influenza has an R0 of 1.3) and leads to extremely rapid spread.31\n\n## The Disease\n\nMorbidity and Mortality. Morbidity refers to ill health effects. The first question in morbidity is, \"Of those infected, who gets sick?\" In 1918, the answer was variable. Some populations, such as African-\nAmericans, experienced very few illnesses after exposure.32, 33, 34 Other populations, including Italians and indigenous Inuit of Alaska, experienced extremely high illness rates.35, 36, 37, 38 The causes ranged from genetic immunity to pre-existing health conditions and population density. The leading factors in COVID-19 morbidity and mortality appear to be similarly variable: age (elderly), sex (males are more susceptible), and comorbidity (having pre-existing health conditions)\nmake one susceptible to the disease.39, 40, 41\nThe 1918 epidemic killed an estimated 50-100 million (2 percent)\nof the world's population at that time and at least 550,000 (approximately 0.5 percent) of the U.S. population.42, 43 At the date of this writing (July 28, 2021), COVID-19 has claimed 4.2 million lives worldwide and over 611,000 in the United States, or only 0.05 percent and 0.18 percent of the world and U.S. populations, respectively.\n\n## What Goes Around Comes Around?\n\nAlthough the mortality rate of 1918 H1N1 varied dramatically worldwide,44, 45, 46, 47, 48 the likelihood an infected person would die was 2.5\npercent, compared to 1 percent for COVID-19 and 0.1 percent for normal influenza.49, 50 Therefore, COVID-19 is likely to have a much lesser demographic impact on the world population than the 1918 H1N1 pandemic, but ten times the impact of normal influenza.\n\nDemographic Impact. Both pandemics have had unusual demographic impacts. Most epidemics attack those with the weakest immune systems, the very young and the very old, producing a U-shaped distribution of mortality by age. The 1918 pandemic was notable in that it not only attacked the very young and very old but curiously also killed those in the prime of their lives, the most economically productive people between 15 and 44.51, 52, 53, 54, 55 As depicted in Figure 1, the curve assumed a W-shape, with peaks for the very young and old, and a lower peak in the middle for those in their economic prime.56 In terms of economic impact, explored further below, the 1918 H1N1 pandemic decreased the labor force relative to industry needs and dependents.\n\nCOVID-19 also has a unique demographic profile, disproportionately killing the very elderly and having the least impact on the very young, producing an unusual J-shaped death curve, as depicted in Figure 2.57, 58 However, COVID-19 appears to be spread particularly by asymptomatic people; therefore, the young play a key role in transmitting the virus to the elderly, as supported by statistical analyses.59 By implication, COVID-19 has not altered the supply of productive labor, will not impact the demographic profile of the next generation (because it has not killed the young), and largely has eliminated the least economically productive. Unlike 1918, the labor force will emerge much the same as before the COVID-19 pandemic.\n\nportal, accessed August 12, 2021, https://data.cdc.gov/NCHS/Provisional-COVID-19-Deaths-by-Sex-\n\n## Economic Effects\n\nGDP. Both pandemics have had very similar short-term impacts on the global economy. Economists estimate that the global economy contracted 6 percent in 1918-19.60 Similarly, the World Bank estimates that COVID-19's impact on the world economy will be about 5.2 percent.61 As nearly every country experienced a loss of GDP in 2020, the U.S. GDP had dropped 6 percent as of that May.62 One nation appears to have benefitted; China claimed a 1-percent increase in GDP in 2020.63 Nonetheless, because the overall world economy was structurally strong before the pandemic, there should be a sound basis for economic recovery once the pandemic subsides.64, 65\nUnemployment. Both pandemics created unemployment as economies slowed down. In 1918, the losses were temporary, and jobs were rapidly regained as the pandemic subsided, creating a V-shaped recovery in which a steep decline was followed by a rapid recovery.66 Unemployment was further reduced because of post-war reconstruction.67 Furthermore, because the disease disproportionately attacked the prime labor force, reducing the supply of labor in relation to demand, real wages increased 68, 69, 70an effect reproduced in pandemics throughout history.71 The combination of a labor market favorable to workers and the post-war boom ushered in the\n\"Roaring 20s\"72, 73 age of prosperity.\n\nThe COVID-19 pandemic has created job loss worldwide, due to a combination of government shutdowns and fears that have held people back from purchasing select consumer goods and services.74, 75\nJob loss has reduced incomes and further weakened economies, leading to a vicious cycle of job loss.76 The United States witnessed the greatest increase in unemployment11 percent above its recent normcompared to other developed economies experiencing a\n1-percent increase on average.77 The U.S. Bureau of Labor statistics has designated the industries most hurt by the pandemicincluding restaurants and bars, travel and transportation, entertainment, personal services (dentists, daycare providers, barbers), retail sensitive to shutdown (department stores and car dealers), and manufacturing sensitive to shutdown (aircraft and car manufacturing)which constitute 20.4 percent of the labor force.78 What we cannot know now is how employment will be impacted through the rest of this pandemic and what its recovery will look like. Because there will be demand for the goods and services of impacted industries after the pandemic, they probably will recover.79 However, the closing of so many small businesses leaves in doubt how many will be replaced and could further endanger the return of some jobs. As of the writing of this chapter (July 28, 2021), the U.S. economy is rebounding, although workers have been reluctant to return to work, forcing employers to raise wages and increase benefits, reminiscent of the 1918 epidemic. However, Federal pandemic benefits are soon to end, potentially forcing workers back into the labor market. Whether increases in wages will persist remains to be seen.\n\nInequality. Addressing inequality from the 1918 pandemic is complicated. In the short run in the United States, manufacturing jobs were most jeopardized, as well as jobs that employed African Americans, and so inequality increased between poor and wealthy, and white and black.80 However, a major migration of African Americans to northern industrial cities occurred during WWI that opened opportunities and a standard of living not possible for them in the rural south. During the \"Roaring 20s,\" blacks experienced the\n\"Harlem Renaissance.\"81 Global post-war economic developments probably erased some temporary inequalities brought on by the pandemic,82, 83, 84, 85 but some pockets apparently did not recover and experienced a permanent loss of social status. For instance, the Treaty of Versailles imposed crushing demands on Germany that particularly impacted working-class German veterans, fueling the rise of the Nazi Party.86, 87 A related unforeseen impact of the pandemic was that U.S. President Woodrow Wilson contracted H1N1 and consequently missed the treaty negotiations, where he had intended to push for a less punitive settlement with the Germans that might have lessened the resentments of the German working class.\n\nBecause the 2020 COVID-19 pandemic has disproportionately impacted low-wage jobs held by people with little savings, combined with the uncertainty of a post-pandemic wage hike, an increase in\n\n## What Goes Around Comes Around?\n\ninequality should be expected. Although unemployment rose only 1 percent above normal in the developed countries hardest hit by the pandemic, reducing the likelihood that inequality will be widespread globally,88 the unemployment spike in the United States of 11\npercent leaves a much larger proportion of the population vulnerable to permanent wealth loss.\n\n## The Response\n\nGovernment Response. In 1918, national governments were limited in what they could do to respond to the pandemic,89 due in part to being at war and/or in a state of political turmoil. The U.S. Government response in 1918 was largely nonexistent, apparently because of a combination of cultural factors: Americans did not like to be told what to do, libertarian values (no government intervention in personal freedoms) prevailed, and once President Woodrow Wilson committed to the war effort, he was unwilling to pull back, even though the epidemic had begun.90\nThe involvement of national and state-level governments worldwide differs between 1918 and 2020. For many countries, the response to the COVID-19 pandemic has been a national concern and nationwide policies have been implemented.91, 92, 93 China, due to its authoritarian control and a generally compliant population, has been able to institute strict lockdowns in specific areas to localize and contain the disease's spread.94, 95 Consequently, China appears to have suffered the least impact from the virus despite having been the pandemic's point of origin. Democracies have had a more difficult time controlling the spread of the virus, although some countries, like Italy, imposed rather strict lockdowns. In contrast to most countries, Sweden consciously chose no lockdowns, hoping that the spread of the virus among the young would create herd immunity in the population, allowing the government to concentrate care on the most vulnerable. Sweden's strategy was not entirely effective; as of July 28, 2021, it had the 38th highest per capita death rate (142/100,000) of any country, although it was lower than the United States (ranked 22nd at 186/100,000), the United Kingdom (ranked 20th at 194/100,000), and first-ranked Peru\n(602/100,000).96\nThe U.S. Federal Government response to the COVID-19 pandemic has been mixed. The Trump administration vacillated between acknowledging the pandemic, while blaming adversary China, and downplaying the seriousness of the threat, while sending mixed messages regarding nonpharmaceutical interventions (NPIs).97 One Federal response that has been sustainedand may save the nation and world from the pandemicwas Operation Warp Speed, the unprecedented push to support pharmaceutical companies to produce a vaccine.\n\nLocal Response. In 1918, most of the responsibility for the pandemic response fell to local governments, mostly municipalities, in the United States. Their reactions varied from no action to strictly imposed lockdowns in major cities, such as San Francisco and New York.98, 99, 100 New York in particular took a proactive role. Bars and restaurants were closed, many businesses shut down, clinics were opened, and curfews were imposed. Famously, schools remained open because the living conditions of poorer children were cramped and unsanitary and school provided them with a clean environment where their health could be monitored. This saved children's lives and provided city officials with a means to monitor the pandemic's spread. In contrast, Philadelphia had lax restrictions, and the mayor insisted on holding a victory parade to welcome home troops, which created a superspreading event and led to many deaths; Philadelphia consequently had the highest death rate in the country.101, 102 Similarly mixed responses and results were seen around the world.103, 104\nLocal responses have also been important, but varied, in the 2020\nCOVID-19 pandemic. Perhaps the most obvious and widespread manifestation of local control in the United States is the decision of local school boards to keep schools open or close them.105 Local municipalities have also been free to institute their own restrictions, although there have been cases where local and state-level policies have conflicted. One case in point was the Georgia governor's lawsuit against the city of Atlanta over its mask mandate.106\nPopulation Compliance. Compliance with NPIs was mixed worldwide during the 1918 pandemic. This appears mainly due to a general reluctance to wear masks and take other precautions, as well as pandemic fatigue; people became less compliant as the pandemic dragged on and they tired of the restrictions.107, 108 In a few cases, organized resistance occurred; the Anti-Mask League of San Francisco was a formal organization that lobbied against restrictions.109\nSimilar fatigue is evident worldwide in the COVID-19 pandemic, spawning a new wave.110, 111, 112 A key difference in compliance in 2020, compared to 1918, was the explicit politicization of NPIs. Germany has seen organized protests and riots by mask opponents, although the politicization of NPIs has been most obvious in the United States. As President Trump at first rejected, and then later reluctantly advised, that the population wear masks,113 his supporters took this as a signal that mask-wearing was undesirable. Their reluctance to wear masks was compounded by the initially lesser impact of the pandemic but greater impact of job loss from shutdowns in rural areas.114 Unfortunately, the disease has spread in rural areas, which had been hard-hit in the pandemic's follow-on waves. The United States has experienced the most divisive impact of the pandemic, with people killing one another over mask disputes, violent protests and takeovers of state capitals, and organized militias plotting to kidnap and execute governors.115, 116\n\n## The Social Effects\n\nAccounting for the social effects of pandemic is trickier because they are not direct; they constitute second- and third-order effects that are more difficult to trace and to support. Nonetheless, pandemics impact the broader social fabricin some cases, for decades.\n\nPolitical Impacts. The 1918 pandemic was not explicitly politicized the way COVID-19 has been, but historians argue that it did have profound political impacts. Some historians assert that the\n1918 pandemic brought WWI to an end,117, 118 because the disease spread rapidly in the cramped conditions of the trenches and military camps, weakening armies to the point where continued combat was no longer reasonable. If true, this would constitute an immediate, first-order effect of the disease on global politics. Economists and historians have also pointed out that, especially in Germany, those who were most impacted by the pandemic were among those passed by in the post-war economic boom.119 One study points out a strong correlation between cities with economic losses that undercut social services and economic development and those with strong support for the Nazi party in the 1920s. The Great Depression exacerbated their grievances, leading to the meteoric rise of the Nazi party in 1930s German politics and its eventual takeover of Germany.120 Such a delayed effect is clearly mediated by many other variables and constitutes an indirect but profound impact on a nation's complex political system.\n\nIt is too early to know what the political impacts of COVID-19\nwill be. Some pundits argue that COVID-19 is likely to strengthen China's influence in the world at the expense of the United States. They assert that China's seemingly more effective mitigation of the pandemic, combined with a diplomatic charm offensive of providing aid to developing and even Western countries, will increase China's prestige and influence.121, 122 These efforts are marred, however, by blame for China's initially slow response, allowing the pandemic to erupt in the first place, and by faulty materiel aid.123\nRussia has also attempted its own diplomatic charm offensive by sending aid, which also was faulty, and by announcing the first vaccine, whose effectiveness is in doubt. China's and Russia's attempts to leverage the pandemic to compete with U.S. influence appear mixed at best.\n\nA more indirect impact on global politics that worries some policy makers is the appearance that more authoritarian governments were more effective at containing the virus, which might erode confidence in democratic systems more generally.124 Whether this will happen remains to be seen; given the levels of noncompliance with NPI controls in democratic countries, their populations may not be sold on a promise that an authoritarian and controlling government would be more competent and preferable.\n\nThe 2020 pandemic has impacted domestic politics, most notably in the United States. The pandemic hit during what was a contentious election year. Some analysts argue that COVID-19 decided the election, given President Trump's high disapproval ratings for his handling of the pandemic.125 The pandemic was indisputably a crucial issue that exacerbated political divisions; Democrats and Republicans were split on their views about the virus.126 Expanding this level of divisiveness is an explicit goal of both Russia and China;127, 128, 129 the virus has helped do their work for them.\n\nUrban-Rural Migration. The 1918 pandemic did not appear to cause any major migratory shifts, and the same appears to be true of 2020. Media have sounded an alarm over a mass exodus from urban centers to escape COVID-19 that threatens to hollow out cities;130, 131\nhowever, a comprehensive analysis of U.S. real estate sales has found no evidence of a general urban exodus.132 Virtually all city markets have remained stable. Only the particularly expensive urban centers of Manhattan and San Francisco have seen highly paid white-collar workers who can work remotely liquidate their urban real estate for more suburban locales.133\n\n## Implications\n\nBecause the pandemic is a complex phenomenon impacting complex systems, single points of comparison provide limited insight into the current COVID-19 pandemic. However, taking these points together and considering their interactive effects can lead to some cautious projections.\n\nThe global war on terror and its many manifestations have not created the widespread devastation and disruption that WWI did. Therefore, there is no reason to expect a postwar reconstructive boom to help the world bounce back from the COVID-19 recession. Because the world economy was experiencing strong growth before the pandemic and was structurally sound, however, the conditions for a rapid recovery exist.\n\nBoth 1918 and 2020 were periods of great power competition, and one would expect each power (i.e., the United States, China, Russia)\nto look for opportunities to leverage the pandemic to its advantage. China and Russia have tried to position themselves as humanitarian aid providers, but in reality, the aid they have provided is limited and has been faulty. The United States has not been seen as a leader in the fight against the pandemic, butwith the largest economy, most robust medical research infrastructure, and strongest potential international reach (diplomatically and logistically)should the U.S. Government choose, it could assume the role of leader in the fight against the pandemic. Therefore, the great powers may muddle along in their competition over this issue, or the United States could take a leadership role.\n\nOther forms of social disruption neither have been much impacted by nor have they impacted geopolitics. The only potentially disruptive change is the pandemic leading to further political divisions within major democratic powers, namely the United States and Germany, which would weaken these democracies at home and diminish their ability to counter challenges from China and Russia.\n\nIn 1918, the global movement of armies created the ideal vectors for disease spread. European populations were under nutritional and other stresses and had large armies packed in close, unsanitary conditions, creating fertile ground for pandemic once the disease reached them. In 2020, populations were arguably far healthier, but global trade and ease of travel presented risk conditions for the spread of disease. As travel restrictions relax, a key underlying facilitator of pandemic will return. Another key factor is continued population growth and expanding urbanism, which will put potential animal vectors in contact with dense human populations, allowing future pandemics to erupt.134, 135 If governments wish to maintain vigilance against these threats, they must sustain advance warning systems, which have already been developed and can be upgraded through artificial intelligence and machine learning.136\nWhile the 1918 pandemic disproportionately struck the most productive part of the labor force, the 2020 pandemic has decimated the least productive, the elderly. Therefore, no disruptions in current or future labor forces are expected with the COVID-19 pandemic, and there will be no change in the demand and supply of labor that could lead to wage and wealth increases for the working class, as has been typical for most pandemics. The continued balance between the supply and demand for labor may bode well for businesses and, if they experience a comeback, they could provide greater employment opportunities for laborers.\n\nThe expected post-pandemic recovery may exacerbate preexisting inequalities. Pandemic unemployment has disproportionately impacted low-wage service and manufacturing sectors of the economy. These jobs should come back, but the economic losses these laborers experienced will not be recovered without the typical wage hike that accompanies pandemic recoveries. Furthermore, people in white-collar industries have been much more likely to remain employed and consequently experience no loss in wealth. The net effect is likely to be a further shift in wealth to well-educated, upperclass sectors of society and greater inequality, which is associated with increased homicide,137, 138, 139 social unrest, and political instability.140,\n141, 142, 143 Unforeseen economic booms (e.g., a new Internet or technology bubble) could counteract this prognosis for greater instability, but such booms are still to be determined.\n\nIn conclusion, the post-COVID pandemic world is unlikely to be radically different from the pre-COVID world. Great power competition will continue, and the global economy should recover given its previous strong structural base. However, some changes are expected to persist and, given the complex nature of the systems they impact, have the potential to spiral out of control and cause major disturbances if not monitored and mitigated. The logistical conditions (e.g., population growth, urbanization, trade, and travel) for the eruption of pandemic remain. There will be another, and this future pandemic is likely to exacerbate existing urban/rural, education, and class divides; inequality is likely to increase, as will the grievances that inequality often generates. The politicization of the pandemic in Western democracies has already interacted with social divisions, potentially weakening democratic resistance against challenges from authoritarian states such as China and Russia. In this future scenario, the world may muddle along with its current competitions and conflicts or divisions in Western democracies could metastasize into weakness and internal divisions upon which competing world powers could seize.\n\n\n\nDr. Lawrence A. Kuznar is currently Chief Cultural Sciences Officer, National Security Innovations, Inc. and Emeritus Professor of Anthropology, Purdue University-Fort Wayne. He focuses on anthropological research relevant to U.S. national security. Dr. Kuznar's research includes applications of complexity theory, advanced statistical and geographical modeling of social instability, and discourse analysis of adversaries including state and non-state actors. He recently published a statistical model in *Humanities and Social Science Communications*\nthat highlights differences in how the COVID-19 pandemic was experienced in rural versus urban America.\n\n1\nChristopher H. Aachen and Duncan Snidal, \"Rational Deterrence Theory and\nComparative Case Studies,\" *World Politics* 41, no. 2 (January 1989), 143-69,\nhttps://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/world-politics/article/abs/rationaldeterrence-theory-and-comparative-case-studies/05B3C8641D5EF6F9A36067 EEA0210CCE.\n2\nVivaldo Gomes da Costa et al., \"Comparative Epidemiology between the 2009\nH1N1 Influenza and COVID-19 Pandemics,\" Journal of Infection and Public Health 13, no. 12 (December 2020), doi: 10.1016/j.jiph.2020.09.023, https://\nwww.sciencedirect.com/journal/journal-of-infection-and-public-health/vol/13/ issue/12.\n3\nAlexander L. George and Andrew Bennett, Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences (Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, 2005).\n4\nLawrence A. Kuznar, \"The COVID-19 Pandemic: Gray Rhinos, Complexity, Prediction, and National Security,\" in Contagion Effect: Radicalization, Unrest, and Competition in the COVID-19 Era, ed. Adib Farhadi (New York:  Springer-Verlag,\n2021), 167-84.\n5\nNicholas A. Christakis, Apollo's Arrow: The Profound and Enduring Impact of Coronavirus on the Way We Live (New York: Little, Brown Spark, 2020).\n6\nLaura Spinney, Pale Rider: The Spanish Flu of 1918 and How It Changed the World (London: Cape, 2017).\n7\nSpinney, *Pale Rider*.\n8\nU.S. Office of the Director of National Intelligence, Worldwide Threat Assessment of the US Intelligence Community (Washington, D.C.: Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, 2019).\n9\nRobert C. Jones, \"'Queen Me:' The Evolution of Populations in Great Power\nCompetition,\" in *The Age of Disruption: How Power Shifts Create More Conflict*,\ned. Gina Ligon, Robert Jones, and Mariah Yager (Arlington, Virginia: Strategic Multilayer Assessment (SMA) Periodic Publication, OSD/ASD (R&E)/RSD/ RRTO, 2019).\n10\nTom Wilhelm, \"A Russian Military Framework for Understanding Influence\nin the Competition Period,\" *Military Review* (July-Augiust 2020), https://www.\narmyupress.army.mil/Journals/Military-Review/English-Edition-Archives/ July-August-2020/Wilhelm-Russian-Framework/.\n11\nInternational Rescue Committee, \"COVID-19 Threatens Refugee Camps,\" 2020, accessed November 28, 2020, https://www.rescue.org/covid-19-threatens-refugeecamps.\n12\nLisa Schnirring, \"From Refugee Camps to Developed Nations, COVID-19 Keeps\nWorld on Edge,\" *CIDRAP News*, August 28, 2020, https://www.cidrap.umn.\nedu/news-perspective/2020/08/refugee-camps-developed-nations-covid-19-\nkeeps-world-edge.\n13\nEvan Henshaw-Plath, \"Network Technology and Networked Organizations,\"\nin *Reformatting Politics: Information technology and Global Civil Society*, ed.\nJon W. Anderson, Jodi Dean, and Geert Lovink, (London, Routledge, 2006), 129-40.\n14\nLawrence A. Kuznar, \"A Tale of Two Pandemics: Evolutionary Psychology, Urbanism, and the Biology of Disease Spread Deepen Sociopolitical Divides\nin the U.S.,\" *Humanities and Social Science Communications* 8, no. 42 (February 2021), https://www.nature.com/articles/s41599-021-00719-8.epdf?sharing _token=JTEg60nkc7t5GyAA14rDPlxOt48VBPO10Uv7D6sAgHt_EPO2-\nMO6ObGZnPZMxqFIASLpRxKioovo8KYsyQc8VG1rXpbVyLN6qqM8k vqbc-Mj4EcMO1jfbpaKi3xSXNY_XVr2Ke2_3pqBBBalRQYXlD4rntfsBcgv UFCX5RJS6pg%3D.\n15\nChristopher T. Leffler et al., \"Association of Country-wide Coronavirus Mortality with Demographics, Testing, Lockdowns, and Public Wearing of Masks,\" Virginia Commonwealth University, update July 2, 2020, https://www.medrxiv.org/ content/10.1101/2020.05.22.20109231v4.full.pdf.\n16\nT. Antal, P.L. Krapinsky, and S. Redner, \"Social Balance on Networks: The\nDynamics of Friendship and Enmity,\" *Physica D: Nonlinear Phenomena* 224, no.\n1-2 (December 2006), 13036, https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/ abs/pii/S0167278906003642.\n17\nGina Ligon and Robert Jones, eds., The Age of Disruption: How Power Shifts Create More Conflict (Arlington, Virginia: Strategic Multilayer Assessment (SMA)\nPeriodic Publication, OSD/ASD (R&E)/RSD/RRTO, 2019).\n18\nMichael Pillsbury, The Hundred-Year Marathon: China's Secret Strategy to\nReplace America as the Global Superpower (New York: Griffin, 2015).\n19\nAndrew Scobell et al., China's Grand Strategy: Trends, Trajectories, and Long- Term Competition, (Santa Monica, California: RAND Corporation, 2020).\n20\nSchnirring, \"From Refugee Camps to Developed Nations, COVID-19 Keeps\nWorld on Edge.\"\n21\nElizabeth Brainerd and Mark V. Siegler, \"The Economic Effects of the 1918 Influenza Epidemic,\" *CEPR Discussion Paper No. 3791,*Centre for Economic Policy\nResearch (UK), 2003, https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/The-Economic- Effects-of-the-1918-Influenza-Epidemic-Brainerd-Siegler/688f8d6ae48711ec8b 4213a607ff6f201ff3abbe.\n22\nBrian Beach, Karen Clay, and Martin H. Saavedra, \"The 1918 Influenza Pandemic and Its Lessons for COVID-19,\" NBER Working Paper Series Working Paper 27673, August 2020, https://www.nber.org/papers/w27673.\n23\nBrainerd and Siegler, \"The Economic Effects of the 1918 Influenza Epidemic.\"\n24\nChristakis, Apollo's Arrow.\n25\nWorld Bank, *Global Economic Prospects* (Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 2020).\n26\nChristakis, Apollo's Arrow.\n27\nJeffrey K. Taubenberger and David M. Morens, \"1918 Influenza: The Mother of\nAll Pandemics,\" *Emerging Infectious Diseases* 12, no. 1 (January 2006), 15-22,\nhttps://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/16494711/.\n28\nSmriti Mallapaty, \" Where Did COVID Come From? WHO Investigation\nBegins But Faces Challenges,\" *Nature* 587 (November 11, 2020), 341-42, https://\nwww.nature.com/articles/d41586-020-03165-9.\n29\nChristakis, Apollo's Arrow.\n30\nAmy Maxmen and Smriti Mallapaty, \"The COVID Lab-leak Hypothesis: What\nScientists Do and Don't Know,\" *Nature* 594 (2021), 313-15, https://doi.org/ 10.1038/d41586-021-01529-3.\n31\nEskild Peterson et al., \"Comparing SARS-CoV-2 with SARS-CoV and Influenza Pandemics,\" *The Lancet Infectious Diseases* 20, no. 9 (September 1, 2020),\ne238-e244, https://www.thelancet.com/journals/laninf/article/PIIS1473-3099 (20)30484-9/fulltext.\n32\nChristakis, Apollo's Arrow.\n33\nThomas Garrett, Economic Effects of the 1918 Influenza Pandemic: Implications for a Modern-day Pandemic, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, November 2007,\nhttps://www.stlouisfed.org/~/media/files/pdfs/community-development/ research-reports/pandemic_flu_report.pdf.\n34\nSpinney, *Pale Rider*.\n35\nBeach, Clay, and Saavedra, \"The 1918 Influenza Pandemic and Its Lessons for COVID-19.\"\n36\nChristakis, Apollo's Arrow.\n37\nGarrett, *Garrett*.\n38\nSpinney, *Pale Rider*.\n39\nChristopher F. Baum and Miguel Henry, \"Socioeconomic Factors Influencing\nthe Spatial Spread of COVID-19 in the United States,\" University of Chicago Center for Spatial Data Science, October 2020 (preprint), https://www.research\ngate.net/publication/344841216_Socioeconomic_Factors_influencing_the_ Spatial_Spread_of_COVID-19_in_the_United_States.\n40\nKuznar, \"A Tale of Two Pandemics.\"\n41\nLeffler et al., \"Association of Country-wide Coronavirus Mortality.\"\n42\nRobert J. Barro, Jose F. Ursua, and Joanna Weng, The Coronavirus and the Great\nInfluenza Pandemic: Lessons from the \"Spanish Flu\" for the Coronavirus's Potential Effects on Mortality and Economic Activity, National Bureau of Economic\nResearch, April 2020, https://www.nber.org/papers/w26866.\n43\nChristakis, Apollo's Arrow.\n44\nBarro, Ursua, and Weng, *The Coronavirus and the Great Influenza Pandemic*.\n45\nBeach, Clay, and Saavedra, \"The 1918 Influenza Pandemic and Its Lessons for COVID-19.\"\n46\nChristakis, Apollo's Arrow.\n47\nSpinney, *Pale Rider*.\n48\nTaubenberger and Morens, \"1918 Influenza: The Mother of All Pandemics.\"\n49\nPeterson et al., \"Comparing SARS-CoV-2 with SARS-CoV and Influenza\nPandemics.\"\n50\nTaubenberger and Morens, \"1918 Influenza: The Mother of All Pandemics.\"\n51\nBeach, Clay, and Saavedra. \"The 1918 Influenza Pandemic and Its Lessons for COVID-19.\"\n52\nBrainerd and Siegler, \"The Economic Effects of the 1918 Influenza Epidemic.\"\n53\nChristakis, Apollo's Arrow.\n54\nSpinney, *Pale Rider*.\n55\nTaubenberger and Morens, \"1918 Influenza: The Mother of All Pandemics.\"\n56\nJeffrey Luk, Peter Gross, and William W. Thompsen, \"Observations on Mortality during the 1918 Influenza Pandemic,\" Clinical Infectious Diseases 33 (2001), 1375-78,  https://academic.oup.com/cid/article/33/8/1375/347461.\n57\nCenters for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) data portal, accessed August 12, 2021, https://data.cdc.gov/NCHS/Provisional-COVID-19-Deaths-by-Sexand-Age/9bhg-hcku/data.\n58\nNovel Coronavirus Pneumonia Emergency Response Epidemiology Team, \"The Epidemiological Characteristics of an Outbreak of 2019 Novel Coronavirus Diseases (COVID-19)China, 2020,\" *China CDC Weekly* 2, no. 8 (2020),\n113-22, https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/32064853/.\n59\nKuznar, \"A Tale of Two Pandemics.\"\n60\nBarro, Ursua, and Weng. *The Coronavirus and the Great Influenza Pandemic*.\n61\nWorld Bank, *Global Economic Prospects*.\n62\nWorld Bank, *Global Economic Prospects*.\n63\nWorld Bank, *Global Economic Prospects*.\n64\nLawrence A. Kuznar, \"Power in the Post-Pandemic Economy,\" in Paradoxes of Power: A Collection of Essays about Failed Leadership and How to Fix It, ed.\nCarl W. Hunt and Joshua M. Hunt (Centennial, Colorado: Local Buzz Business Solutions, 2020): 72-83.\n65\nWorld Bank, *Global Economic Prospects*.\n66\nBeach, Clay, and Saavedra, \"The 1918 Influenza Pandemic and Its Lessons for COVID-19.\"\n67\nBrainerd and Siegler, \"The Economic Effects of the 1918 Influenza Epidemic.\"\n68\nBeach, Clay, and Saavedra, \"The 1918 Influenza Pandemic and Its Lessons for COVID-19.\"\n69\nBrainerd and Siegler, \"The Economic Effects of the 1918 Influenza Epidemic.\"\n70\nGarrett, *Economic Effects of the 1918 Influenza Pandemic*.\n71\nOscar Jorda, Sanjay R. Singh, and Alan M. Taylor, \"Longer-Run Economic\nConsequences of Pandemics,\" Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco Working Paper 2020-09, June 2020, doi:10.24148/wp2020-09, https://www.frbsf.org/\neconomic-research/publications/working-papers/2020/09/.\n72\nChristakis, Apollo's Arrow.\n73\nKuznar, \"Power in the Post-Pandemic Economy.\"\n74\nAlexander W. Bartik et al., \"The Impact of COVID-19 on Small Business Outcomes and Expectations,\" *Proceedings of the National Academies of Science* 117,\nno. 30 (July 28, 2020): 17656-66. doi: 10.1073/pnas.2006991117, https://www. pnas.org/content/117/30/17656.\n75\nRobert W. Fairlie, \"The Impact of COVID-19 on Small Business Owners: Evidence of Early-stage Losses from the April 2020 Current Population Survey,\"\nNBER Wortking Paper Series Working Paper 27309, August 2020, https://www.\nnber.org/papers/w27462.\n76\nKuznar, \"The COVID-19 Pandemic: Gray Rhinos, Complexity, Prediction, and National Security.\"\n77\nWorld Bank, *Global Economic Prospects*.\n78\nMatthew Dey and Mark A. Loewenstein, \"How Many Workers Are Employed in Sectors Directly Affected by COVID-19 Shutdowns, Where Do They Work,\nAnd How Much Do They Earn?\" *Monthly Labor Review*, U.S. Bureau of Labor\nStatistics, April 2020, doi: doi.org/10.21916/mlr.2020.6, https://www.bls.gov/ opub/mlr/2020/article/covid-19-shutdowns.htm.\n79\nChristakis, Apollo's Arrow.\n80 Brainerd and Siegler, \"The Economic Effects of the 1918 Influenza Epidemic.\" 81\nChristakis, Apollo's Arrow.\n82\nBeach, Clay, and Saavedra, \"The 1918 Influenza Pandemic and Its Lessons for COVID-19.\"\n83\nBrainerd and Siegler, \"The Economic Effects of the 1918 Influenza Epidemic.\"\n84\nGarrett, *Economic Effects of the 1918 Influenza Pandemic*.\n85\nKuznar, \"Power in the Post-Pandemic Economy.\"\n86\nKristian Bickle, \"Pandemics Change Cities: Municipal Spending and Voter\nExtremism in Germany, 1918-1933,\" Federal Reserve Bank of New York Staff Report\nNo. 921, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, June 2020, https://www.newyorkfed\n.org/research/staff_reports/sr921.\n87\nSpinney, *Pale Rider*.\n88\nWorld Bank, *Global Economic Prospects*.\n89\nBeach, Clay, and Saavedra. \"The 1918 Influenza Pandemic and Its Lessons for COVID-19.\"\n90\nDartunorro Clark, \"'A Breaking Point': Anti-lockdown Efforts during Spanish Flu\nOffer a Cautionary Tale for Coronavirus,\" *NBC News*, May 11, 2020, https://www\n.nbcnews.com/politics/politics-news/breaking-point-anti-lockdown-effortsduring-spanish-flu-offer-cautionary-n1202111.\n91\nChristakis, Apollo's Arrow.\n92\nSeth Flaxman et al., \"Estimating the Effects of Non-pharmaceutical Interventions on COVID-19 in Europe,\" *Nature* 584 (June 8, 2020), 257-62. doi: 10.1038/\ns41586-020-2405-7, https://www.nature.com/articles/s41586-020-2405-7.\n93\nLeffler et al., \"Association of country-wide coronavirus mortality.\"\n94\nHaroro Ingram, \"Pandemic Propaganda and the Global Democracy Crisis,\" War on the Rocks, May 18, 2020, https://warontherocks.com/2020/05/pandemicpropaganda-and-the-global-democracy-crisis/.\n95\nColin H. Kahl and Adriana Berengaut, \"Aftershocks: The Coronavirus Pandemic and the New World Disorder,\" *War on the Rocks*, April 10, 2020,\nhttps://warontherocks.com/2020/04/aftershocks-the-coronavirus-pandemicand-the-new-world-disorder/.\n96\nJohns Hopkins Coronavirus Resource Center, *Mortality Analysis*, accessed\nNovember 28, 2020, https://coronavirus.jhu.edu/data/mortality.\n97\nChristakis, Apollo's Arrow.\n98\nChristakis, Apollo's Arrow.\n99\nGarrett, *Economic Effects of the 1918 Influenza Pandemic*.\n100 Spinney, *Pale Rider*.\n101 Christakis, Apollo's Arrow.\n102 Spinney, *Pale Rider*.\n103 Marta Balinska and Caterina Rizzo, \"Behavioural Responses to Influenza Pandemics: What Do We Know?\" *PLOS Currents,* September 9, 2009, doi:10.1371/\ncurrents.RRN1037, https://europepmc.org/article/PMC/2762764.\n\n## What Goes Around Comes Around?\n\n104 Clay, Beach, and Saavedra, \"The 1918 Influenza Pandemic and Its Lessons for\nCOVID-19.\"\n105 Michael T. Hartney and Leslie K. Finger, \"Politics, Markets, and Pandemics:\nPublic Education's Response to COVID-19,\" EdWorking Paper No. 20-304\n(2020), https://edworkingpapers.com/sites/default/files/ai20-304.pdf.\n106 Brian P. Kemp, \"Brian P. Kemp Issues Statement on Lawsuit Against Bottoms,\" Atlanta City Council, August 13, 2020, https://gov.georgia.gov/pressreleases/2020-08-13/kemp-issues-statement-lawsuit-against-bottoms-atlantacity-council.\n107 Balinska and Rizzo, \"Behavioural Responses to Influenza Pandemics: What Do\nWe Know?\"\n108 Beach, Clay, and Saavedra, \"The 1918 Influenza Pandemic and Its Lessons for\nCOVID-19.\"\n109 Clark, \"'A Breaking Point'.\" 110 Leffler et al., \"Association of Country-Wide Coronavirus Mortality.\" 111 The Royal Society, \"Face Masks and Coverings for the General Public:\nBehavioural Knowledge, Effectiveness of Cloth Coverings and Public Messaging,\" The British Academy (UK), June 26, 2020, https://royalsociety.org/-/media/ policy/projects/set-c/set-c-facemasks.pdf.\n112 Benjamin van Rooj et al., \"Compliance with COVID-19 Mitigation Measures\nin the United States,\" Amsterdam Law School Legal Studies Research Paper No. 2020-21, September 3, 2020, https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_\nid=3582626.\n113 Christakis, Apollo's Arrow.\n114 Kuznar, \"A Tale of Two Pandemics.\"\n115 Julia Jones, \"Inside the Plot to Kidnap Gov. Whitmer,\" *CNN News* (2020), published electronically October 11, 2020, https://www.cnn.com/2020/10/11/us/ michigan-whitmer-plot/index.html.\n116 Kuznar, \"Power in the Post-Pandemic Economy.\"\n117 Spinney, *Pale Rider*.\n118 Taubenberger and Morens, \"1918 Influenza: The Mother of All Pandemics.\"\n119 Spinney, *Pale Rider*.\n120 Bickle, \"Pandemics Change Cities.\"\n121 Ingram, \"Pandemic Propaganda and the Global Democracy Crisis.\" 122 Kahl and Berengaut. \"Aftershocks.\" 123 Kahl and Berengaut. \"Aftershocks.\" 124 Ingram, \"Pandemic Propaganda and the Global Democracy Crisis.\"\n125 Aaron Bycoffe, Christopher Groskopf, and Dhrumil Mehta, \"How Americans\nView the Coronavirus Crisis And Trump's Response,\" *FiveThirtyEight,* November 25, 2020, https://projects.fivethirtyeight.com/coronavirus-polls/.\n126 Kuznar, \"A Tale of Two Pandemics.\" 127 Media Ajir and Bethany Vaillant, \"Russian Information Warfare: Implications\nfor Deterrence Theory,\" *Strategic Studies Quarterly* 12, no. 3, (Fall 2018): 70-89,\nhttps://www.jstor.org/stable/26481910?refreqid=excelsior%3Aacef920003f394 c3a7e75f6b31628f78&seq=1#metadata_info_tab_contents.\n128 U.S. Office of the Director of National Intelligence, \"Worldwide Threat Assessment of the US Intelligence Community.\"\n129 Kahl and Berengaut. \"Aftershocks.\" 130 Sarah Marsh, \"Escape to the Country: How Covid Is Driving an Exodus from\nBritain's Cities,\" *Guardian,* September 26, 2020, https://www.theguardian.com/\nworld/2020/sep/26/escape-country-covid-exodus-britain-cities-pandemicurban-green-space.\n131 Kevin Stankiewicz, '''Shark Tank' Investor Herjavec: We're about To See Biggest\nExodus from Cities in 50 Years,\" *CNBC News,* July 9, 2020, https://www.cnbc.\ncom/2020/07/09/shark-tank-investor-herjavec-were-about-to-see-biggestexodus-from-cities-in-50-years.html.\n132 Zillow Research, *Zillow 2020 Urban-Suburban Market Report*, August 12, 2020,\nhttps://www.zillow.com/research/2020-urb-suburb-market-report-27712/.\n133 Kuznar, \"The COVID-19 Pandemic: Gray Rhinos,  Complexity, Prediction, and\nNational Security.\"\n134 Christakis, Apollo's Arrow.\n135 Kuznar, \"The COVID-19 Pandemic: Gray Rhinos,  Complexity, Prediction, and\nNational Security.\"\n136 Philippe Barboza et al., \"Evaluation of Epidemic Intelligence Systems Integrated in the Early Alerting and Reporting Project for the Detection of A/H5N1\nInfluenza Events,\" *PLoS ONE* 8, no. 3 (March 2013), https://www.researchgate.\nnet/publication/235886353_Evaluation_of_Epidemic_Intelligence_Systems_ Integrated_in_the_Early_Alerting_and_Reporting_Project_for_the_Detection_ of_AH5N1_Influenza_Events.\n137 Martin Daly, *Killing the Competition: Economic Inequality and Homicide* (New\nYork,  Transaction Publishers, 2016).\n138 Lawrence A. Kuznar, \"Migration: The Relationship between Inequality, Risk\nSensitivity and Violence,\" in The Age of Disruption: How Power Shifts Create More Conflict, ed. Gina Ligon, Robert Jones and Mariah Yager (Arlington,\nVirginia: Strategic Multilayer Assessment (SMA) Periodic Publication, OSD/ ASD (R&E)/RSD/RRTO, 2019).\n139 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, Global Study on Homicide: Homicide, Development and the Sustainable Development Goals, United Nations\n(Austria), July 2019, https://www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-analysis/ gsh/Booklet_4.pdf.\n140 Christian Houle, \"Why Class Inequality Breeds Coups but not Civil Wars,\" Journal\nof Peace Research 53, no. 5 (July 27, 2016), 680-95, doi: 10.1177/0022343316652187,\nhttps://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/0022343316652187.\n141 Lawrence A. Kuznar, Eric C. Kuznar, and Weston Aviles, Statistical Modeling of\nRisk and Political Instability in the Influence Environment (Arlington, Virginia,\nStrategic Multilayer Assessment (SMA) Periodic Publication, OSD/ASD (R&E)/\nRSD/RRTO, 2019), https://nsiteam.com/statistical-modeling-of-risk-and-politicalinstability-in-the-influence-environment-an-nsi-aggrieved-populations-analysis/.\n142 Gudrun stby, \"Polarization, Horizontal Inequalities and Violent Civil Conflict,\"  *Journal of Peace Research* 45, no. 2 (March 1, 2008), 143-62, https://www.\nprio.org/Publications/Publication/?x=182..\n143 Peter Turchin, \"Dynamics of Political Instability in the United States, 1780\n2010,\" *Journal of Peace Research* 49, no. 4 (July 9, 2012): 577-91, http://petert\nurchin.com/PDF/Turchin_JPR2012.pdf.\n\n## Covid Had No Secrets\n\nJosh Kerbel and Zachery Tyson Brown\n\nThe world has been fundamentally transformed since 1947, the year\nthe modern Intelligence Community was founded. Why then has the\nIC stayed much the same across the intervening decades? As consti-\ntuted, the IC is optimized for an era of strategic competition that has\nlong since passed and is not coming back. The truth is that the com-\nmunity will need more than new technology and fresh talent to rebuild\nitself for 21st- century national security challenges. It will also need\nto reexamine the assumptions that underwrite the business of intel-\nligence itself and to be prepared for a structural overhaul that in our\njudgment is long overdue.\n\nT\nhe coronavirus pandemic should be a wake-up call for the IC. Not\nonly has it been the most significant crisis of the 21st century in\nterms of its staggering death toll, it has also wrought significant social,\npolitical, and economic consequences both here at home and around the\nworld.1 The collective sigh of relief as intelligence officers and the cus-\ntomers they support slowly get \"back to normal\" is almost audible. But\nthe IC should not celebrate. The pandemic is emblematic of the very type\nof challenge that the IC is certain to face more ofa type that the com-\nmunity is woefully ill-suited to address in both form and function.\n\nIntelligence has a history; it also has a future. Its history exhibits\nfaults of understanding, of organization, of administration and\nplanning. We can rest on our laurels and wait for future disasters\nto shock us into sporadic correction. Or we can study the lessons\nof experience and implement those lessons now.\n\n- GEORGE S. PETTEE, 19462\nThe coronavirus, you see, had no secrets that could be stolen. It sent no signals that could be intercepted. It provided none of the indicators intelligence officers traditionally look for that might have given warning of the pandemic's advent. Although it is true that the IC had long reported that the likelihood of a global outbreak was increasing, the IC remains unable to provide specific, \"actionable\" information about such outbreaks because they are, in a word, *emergent*.\n\n## What Do We Mean By That?\n\nThe generation of emergent phenomena, or emergence for short, is a process to which highly interconnected and interdependent systemslike today's strategic environmentare particularly prone. Emergence often seemingly comes out of nowhere and is difficult, if not impossible, to predict. That said, conditions for emergence have usually been building for some time, and, thus, it is often possible to anticipate it. Examples of emergence include the Arab Spring and the current spread of a novel respiratory infection that has sidelined much of the world for the past year.\n\nThe pandemic is not the last emergent crisis we will face in this turbulent era. It almost certainly is not even the last pandemicand the next one could be even more lethal.3 These sorts of issues will, we believe, define this new era of strategic competition, and the IC must adapt if it hopes to keep up.\n\n## Allow Us To Explain\n\nSince the IC's modern establishment nearly three-quarters of a century ago, generations of American intelligence officers have diligently provided the nation's political and military leaders with the secret information they needed to make better decisions. Today's officers, however, are increasingly challenged to do so within a competitive environment that is remarkably dissimilar to the one the IC was created to address.\n\nEstablished in 1947, the IC initially had two purposes. The first, and initially most salient, was the prevention of another surprise attack on the scale of Pearl Harbor.4 The second, which eclipsed all other concerns after 1949, was the need to observe and understand the Soviet Union, in sober recognition of the existential threat posed by atomic war. Secretary of State George C. Marshall said at the time that \"The whole world of the future hangs on a proper judgment.\"5\nBecause the Soviet Union was a closed system, the nascent IC had to pierce the veil of Stalin's Iron Curtain to catch a glimpse of what was going on behind it. Because the Soviet Union was rigidly hierarchical, the IC had to learn to understand its top-down decisionmaking processone different in many ways from the distributed centers of power that engaged in the consensus building that intelligence officers were familiar with at home.\n\nThe United States and its allies built a veritable armature of information acquisition during the decades of the Cold War: a technical collection architecture that eventually grew to cover the world with spy planes, satellites, and listening posts. The IC also built up a cadre of officers who spent their entire careers building deep expertise on every aspect of the Soviet adversary, from the makeup of Soviet tank divisions and the personality dossiers of its commanders to net annual potato harvests and myriad other specialties.6\nThis enormous investment of time and resources made a lot of sense within the context of the Cold War, where nations faced the constant threat of nuclear annihilation. Back then, useful information about the Soviet adversary was a scarce commodity, and the IC was quite often its only possible purveyor. Additionally, the pressing need to understand the inner workings of the vast and complicated command system that was the Soviet hierarchy meant dividing intelligence officers into reductive branches, and that made a lot of sense, too. Because these intelligence officers had often exclusive access to the fruits of the expensive collection machine, their views were always respected, if not always adopted.7\nThe IC helped shape and *was shaped by* the Cold War crucible.\n\nIts culture and forms were adapted to the purpose of stealing secrets from an obsessively secretive adversary and the compelling need to understand that adversary's decisionmaking processes. Over time, the forms themselves came to be held almost in reverence, as if they had intrinsic value and were not simply means to an end. The complicated structure of the Soviet problem set drove a particularly reductive and deductive approach to thinking, one that would dominate the IC's mental models long after the Soviet Union's demise.\n\nThe combination of information acquisition and reductive analytical thinking served the IC remarkably well during the Cold War, despite several noteworthy failures, lapses, and scandals. By the latter years of the conflict, the IC had developed extensive, expansive, and granular knowledge of the Soviet Union's military and economic capabilitiesa fact that, according to one former Director of Central Intelligence, did much to prevent the sort of miscalculation that might have destroyed the world.8\nThat said, it is important to neither dismiss nor downplay the very real intelligence failures that did occurthe most notable of which was perhaps anticipating the collapse of the Soviet Union itself.9 These failures were harbingers of the onset of a new era of persistent unpredictability for which the IC was ill-prepared.\n\nWhen Mikhail Gorbachev officially dissolved the Soviet Union on Christmas Day, 1991, a geopolitical glacier that had shaped the contours of the global order for the better part of a century suddenly melted away, unleashing a torrent of change in its wake. That flood quickly inundated the political landscape of the so-called \"post-Soviet space,\" washing away the old and leaving a morass of debris in its wake.\n\nEven in the still nominally communist People's Republic of China, Deng Xiaoping's more open economic reforms had taken root, swiftly overpowering a reactionary freeze in the wake of the 1989 Tiananmen massacre. China's rapid transformation earned it World Trade Organization membership in 2001 and fostered its deep integration into the world's economy. It has become a leading geopolitical actor and a true peer of the United States across the full spectrum of national power. By some measures, it has even surpassed the United States, for example as the world's leading economic power.10\nThese changes have not been limited to the former Soviet Union or its Chinese protege. Throughout the 1990s, once separate and distinct actors and elements across the globe began to connect with one another using new information and communications technologies, forming and reforming new networks of trade and influence almost overnight. The two-body problem of the Cold War period had suddenly transformed into a confusing and chaotic morass of overlapping issues, threats, and compounding risks.\nPut simply, the world the IC is tasked with helping our nation's leaders better understand no longer resembles the one for which it was created. *That* world was slower-paced, having operated at the speed of the carbon copy and ambassador's cable. It was less connected and more easily divided into issues and regions. Power in that world was more concentrated, most often in the hands of a relatively small number of societal elites who could be easily identified and targeted for intelligence collection. In that world, America squared off against the Soviet Union, a monolithic and hierarchical adversary. Our leaders' principal challenge was a decided lack of information about that complicated adversarya problem the IC was invented to solve.\n\nToday, in sharp contrast, the speed of relevance is often measured in hours, if not minutes. Instead of unitary sovereign states with clearly demarcated borders and easy distinctions between foreign and domestic power, our modern world is one of overlapping webs of influence that run over, under, and through states, institutions, political parties, and even individuals. Security issues that were once separate now regularly brush up against one another or even at times seem to converge. Because people, from Silicon Valley to Central Asia's Ferghana Valley, are more mobile and more connected than ever before, power is far more evenly distributed than in the past, and significant issues can arise from many more sources across a vast influence network. Instead of being confronted by a monolithic superpower like the Soviet Union, today the United States is challenged by a diverse array of greater and lesser threatssome conventional, others quite novel. This threat spectrum is compounded by a parallel matrix of systemic vulnerabilities, some of which we have let accrue to the point where they pose existential risks by themselves. Instead of thirsting for information, today's national security leaders are drowning in it.\n\n## Simply Put, Today's World Is More Complex\n\nComplexity is a loaded word, one whose power has been diluted from overuse. It is oftenincorrectlyused as a synonym for complicated.\n\nBoth derive from Latin but are subtly distinct. The Latin verb *plicare* means to fold. *Complicare* is to fold together. The Latin past participle plexus can mean to weave, braid, or entwine. Therefore, complication denotes layers, one atop another, while complexity implies merging individual strands into a single, braided, or woven whole.11 A given system's complexity is, in short, measured by the level of interconnectedness of the elements within that system.12 That connectivity, over time, can give rise to the emergence of new behavior: that is, novel phenomena that are more than simply the sum of their parts.13\nIn a simpler world, analysisthe reduction of systems into their constituent pieces to examine how they workcould be used to make reasonable predictions. The fatal flaw of analysis, however, is that it often ignores how the pieces, once deconstructed, fit back together within the larger whole. It also tends to ignore that those \"wholes\" are themselves parts of other, larger wholes out there in the real world. Thus, as the world has grown more complex through the advent of greater interconnectedness, once separate pieces have become more integrated, and once predictable outcomes have become less linear. In practical terms, this means the world that the IC was invented to understand has grown less amenable to the entire idea of collection, analysis, and predictionand ultimately, has become more dangerous.\n\nYet despite the fundamental changes in the external environment that the IC exists to comprehend, our internal organizational and intellectual frameworks have remained remarkably consistent. Yes, we have made plenty of individual, incremental reformscreating, merging, and splitting agencies, for instance, and dramatically improving our ability to gather secrets from all over the world through the growth of the enormous technical collection architecture described above. Yes, to be fair, intelligence officers have significantly improved the drafting and delivery of finished analysismost notably with reforms implemented as part of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, which established the Director of National Intelligence and codified standards for analytic writing.14\nBut for all these helpful improvements, the IC today still looksand thinksmuch as it did in 1970, if not 1950.\n\nIt is still organizationally optimized to deal with closed, hierarchical systems like the Soviet Union, when very few of the convoluted threats we face today resemble that of the communist behemoth. Beholden to an antiquated planning process that Robert McNamara bequeathed it in 1962,15 it struggles to respond quickly to rapidly changing user requirements. Intellectually, it still operates from within an increasingly obsolete 20th century paradigm of what constitutes national security.\n\nOne that is predicated on the idea of information scarcity and views the world largely in terms of *threats to* instead of *risks from*from, for example, the vulnerabilities built into our open system of government or from the severe social, political, and economic knock-on effects of a brutal pandemic that has claimed a half million American lives.\n\nNo simple solutions exist for the challenges outlined above. There are, however, a few broad areas of reform the IC must consider as part of any effort to set the conditions for the requisite changes demanded by an era in which change is the only constant, and more surprise the only certainty.\n\nFirst, IC leaders must recognize that the reductive analytic scaffolding we cling to is particularly unsuited to the sort of complex, systemic, and emergent challenges the United States is unfortunately certain to face in the 21st century. Instead of placing undue value on deep niche expertise that invariably creates information silos, the IC will need to develop a cadre with the creativity and synthetic thinking skills that facilitate much broader approaches to issues, emphasizing the anticipation of systemic possibilities.\n\nNext, IC leaders must recognize that, very often, little can be gleaned from classified collection techniques that is not already openly available. Since its outset, the IC has been seduced by the characteristically American conceit that it will one day be able to know all the world's secret information and accomplishing this would prevent surprises. But even if it were possible to collect every bit of information relevant to national security in the 21st century (it is not), it would not serve policymakers as well as some intelligence planners might think. Although we tend to find the things we look for, we are surprised when the things we are not looking for find us instead.\n\nHuman susceptibility to cognitive errors, such as availability bias and the observer expectancy effect, means that we arrange for classified collection against the problems we already know about and are convinced those problems exist even when we fail to find the needle in the haystack. We are then surprised by exogenous events that did not appear from where we were looking. In other words, the IC's expensive collection apparatus is often largely impotent against the emergent complex issues we have been describing and can, at times, even make our challenge more difficult.\n\nThankfully, the information revolution has spawned freely accessible sources of every sort imaginable in the public domainfrom hundreds of new publications in any language to crowd-sourced videos and photographs that provide access that intelligence collection managers could once only dream about. The real value of open-source information is not in the perspective of any of these individual sources, however, but in the aggregatenumerous sources all looking at the same issue or event. The IC would be worse than remiss, it would be negligent, if it did not seriously consider the value of triangulating this multitude of perspectives to make our own view of reality more accurate.\n\nThird, IC leaders must take a hard look at organizational transformation. Although the old saw tells us that culture eats strategy, structure *creates* culture. The IC will never be able to change its cognitive framework or break its addiction to classified collection along the lines described above if it does not also evolve organizationally. Presently, the IC remains a funhouse mirror reflection of the closed, hierarchical system it was designed to combatthe Soviet Union. That made sense for an era in which classified information was the price of admission and reductive analytic thinking prevailed. But in an open age of rapidly evolving networks, such structures are not neutral, they are actively harmful. Closed, hierarchical structures, with their sharply drawn boundaries and bins, compel the very analytic thinking that is simply no match for the rapidly morphing, complex networks with which they must contend. Until the IC becomes a truly open network that can think synthetically, it will struggle with the complexity of a century that really is just beginning.\n\nFourth, IC leaders must address an era of rapidly advancing technology. We are not technologists, so we will not pretend to have a comprehensive understanding of the digital tools that come online each month. But as analysts and leaders of analysts, we do know that if the IC hopes to succeed in the 21st century, it must be able to adopt these new tools quickly and combine existing tools in new ways to let analysts do new things. Too often, the community's leaders have thought only in terms of using new capabilities to do the same things it has always done, only a little bit faster and a little more efficiently.\n\nWe question the utility of such an incremental approach. A much larger discussion must be held about what the IC should do differentlyholistically and synthetically. Then, IC leaders must seek out technologies that will help to realize that vision. To be sure, doing the same old things better and faster has appeal, but it is important that the IC not let marginally improving the old things it is already good at impede creating something entirely new and fundamentally different.\n\nFifth, the IC needs to break free from some of its historical inhibitionslimitations that may have once made sense but no longer do in a world that bears little resemblance to the one for which the community was created. Two of these limitations stand out to us the IC's historical prohibition against examining the actions of the United States itself and the more unspoken, but nonetheless binding prohibition against becoming too close to the policymakers intelligence officers support.\n\nIn the first case, borders are increasingly irrelevant in the complex, integrated world we have been describing. Prohibiting analysts from examining the actions (or inactions) of one of that world's most significant actors results in analyses with little resemblance to what is a messy reality. In the second, this same reticence prevents intelligence officers from helping policymakers understand that they are themselves contributing to the creation of the world the IC is meant to help them navigate.\n\nLast, the IC should take a good hard look at its measures of success. Metrics are ultimately incentives. What we measure is usually constrained by what is measurable, such as the number of classified reports used in an analytic paper, for instance. What we measure also sends a message about what we value, both to our own people and to the consumers of intelligence we seek to help.\n\nConsequently, those metrics drive what the workforce works on, and when it comes to intelligence, that means production. And so, the community producesa lot. Indeed, an argument can be made that the IC produces so much for so many (and really for no one at the same time) that the net result is not clarity or understanding but obscuration and confusion, so much dust thrown in the eyes of the policymaking class.\n\nHere is a final point worth consideration. It is very easy for successful institutionsparticularly those with storied legacies like the IC's\nto believe that because they have been successful in the past, they will continue to be successful in the future. As long as they keep getting better at doing the things they have always done, this line of thinking goes, they will maintain and even expand their history of accomplishment. Blinded by their very success, they mistakenly conflate their way of doing things with the way of doing things. They inadvertently create the conditions for their decline as newer and nimbler competitors arise to meet the challenges of a world that is itself always changing.16\nWe hear echoes of this confident mantra almost everywhere as we move around the IC, particularly in discussions about hastening the adoption of artificial intelligence. All too often, these discussions focus on leveraging machine learning to make existing processes a little bit faster, a little bit smarter, a little bit more efficient.\n\nThe bad news is that getting even better at things the IC is already quite good at is not enough in a changed world. Today, past pedigree counts for little, and past accomplishment is no guarantor of future success. The good news is that the IC is well-positioned to begin doing new things that new technologies now permit, if only it can muster the collective will to do so. Intelligence officers are sharp, diligent, and famously dedicated to their mission. They have performed admirably all over the worldoften in austere conditions, and not infrequently under fire. Several of them have paid the ultimate price in defense of their country. But the community simply cannot afford to rest on its laurels, making incremental advances here and there. As former Principal Deputy Director of National Intelligence Sue Gordon once put it,\n\"We've never been as good as we are now, but we have to be better.\"17\n\n\nJosh Kerbel is a member of the research faculty at the National Intelligence University where he also serves as co-director of the Center for Anticipatory Intelligence and Adaptive Influence.\n\nZachery Tyson Brown is a former defense intelligence officer and independent researcher who writes about the changing strategic environment and the future of the art and profession of intelligence.\n\n1\nDavid M. Cutler and Lawrence H. Summers, \"The Covid-19 Pandemic and\nthe $16 Trillion Virus,\" *Journal of the American Medical Association* 324, no. 15\n(October 12, 2020): 1495-96, https://dx.doi.org/10.1001%2Fjama.2020.19759.\n2\nGeorge S. Pettee, *The Future of American Strategic Intelligence* (Washington,\nDC: Infantry Journal Press, 1946), 24.\n3\nMike May, \"Tomorrow's Biggest Microbial Threats,\" *Nature Medicine* 27 (2021):\n358-59, https://www.nature.com/articles/s41591-021-01264-2.\n4\n\"Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack,\" Notable Senate Investigations (Washington DC, U.S. Senate Historical Office), June 20, 1946,\nhttps://www.senate.gov/about/powers-procedures/investigations/pearl-harbor. htm.\n5\nGeorge C. Marshall, \"Marshall Plan Speech\" (speech, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA, June 5, 1947), http://marshallfoundation.org/marshall/themarshall-plan/marshall-plan-speech/.\n6\nFinal Report, Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities, Senate, Ninety Fourth Congress, Second Session, April 29,\n1976, (Washington: U.S. Government Publishing Office, 1976), 347-48, https:// www.intelligence.senate.gov/resources/intelligence-related-commissions.\n7\nCarmen A. Medina, \"What To Do When Traditional Models Fail,\" Studies in\nIntelligence 46, no. 3 (2002): 4.\n8\nRobert Michael Gates, From the Shadows: The Ultimate Insider's Story of Five Presidents and How They Won the Cold War (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2011), 562.\n9\nElaine Sciolino, \"Director Admits CIA Fell Short in Predicting Soviet Collapse,\"\nNew York Times, May 21, 1992, https://www.nytimes.com/1992/05/21/world/\ndirector-admits-cia-fell-short-in-predicting-the-soviet-collapse.html.\n10\nWorld Economic Outlook, October 2020: A Long and Difficult Ascent, International Monetary Fund, October 2020, https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/ WEO/Issues/2020/09/30/world-economic-outlook-october-2020.\n11\nMurray Gell-Mann, \"Complexity at Large: Let's Call it Plectics,\" Complexity\n1, no. 5 (May 1996): 3-5, http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/cplx.613 0010502/epdf.\n12\nValerie Strauss, \"The Difference Between Complex and Complicated and Why\nit Matters,\" *Washington Post*, August 8, 2014, https://www.washingtonpost.\ncom/news/answer-sheet/wp/2014/08/08/the-difference-between-complex-andcomplicated-and-why-it-matters-in-school-reform/?utm_term=.e11e43aa3b9e.\n13\nMelanie Mitchell, *Complexity: A Guided Tour* (New York: Oxford University\nPress, 2009).\n14\nIntelligence Community Directive 203: Analytic Standards, Office of the Director\nof National Intelligence, January 2, 2015, https://www.dni.gov/files/documents/ ICD/ICD%20203%20Analytic%20Standards.pdf.\n15\nMatthew Fay, \"Pentagon Planning and the Problem of Predictability,\" The Niskanen Center, May 27, 2015, https://www.niskanencenter.org/pentagonplanning-and-the-problem-of-predictability/.\n16\nJim Collins, \"Five Stages of Decline,\" in *How the Mighty Fall* (New York: HarperCollins, 2011), https://www.jimcollins.com/concepts/five-stages-of-decline. html#:~:text=We%20found%20that%20great%20companies,Capitulation%20 to%20Irrelevance%20or%20Death.\n17\nSue Gordon, \"DNI Coats and PDDNI Gordon Announce Transformation,\nPosturing the ODNI To Drive the IC Forward,\" Office of the Director of\nNational Intelligence, News Release No. 12-18, March 18, 2018, https://www .dni.gov/index.php/newsroom/press-releases/item/1855-dni-coats-andpddni-gordon-announce-transformation-posturing-the-odni-to-drive-theintelligence-community-forward.\n\n## Conclusion Conclusion: A World System Changed By The Covid-19 Pandemic\n\nLawrence A. Kuznar and Stacey E. Pollard Insights offered in this volume's chapters represent a complex system of relationships between the COVID-19 pandemic and factors influencing U.S. intelligence and national security. We use these insights to construct a network of influences from which we derive second- and third-order cascading effects. The results of our analysis corroborate the contributing authors' research findings and illuminate the interconnectedness and compounding nature of the relationships examined throughout the volume. The model indicates that several destabilizing social, economic, and political factors stemming directly from the pandemic have coalesced to exacerbate each other, deepen existing threats to human security, and yield new ones. This dynamic has been accelerated and intensified by floods of disinformation. Governance and securityindeed, the social contracthave been put to the test, making nations including the United States and U.S. partners more vulnerable to adversarial threats and creating permissive environments in which illicit economies and transnational criminal, as well as terrorist, organizations can thrive. Finally, the model indicates that, while pandemic-associated problems are fracturing domestic and international political cohesion, some pandemic- associated solutions are strengthening aspects of global economic cooperation and interdependence. This fragile and yet interdependent system represents the state of play as the world emerges from pandemic.\n\n## A Holistic View: Understanding The Changed World System\n\nThe authors of this volume provide illuminating perspectives on a broad range of influences the COVID-19 pandemic is having on variables critical to U.S. intelligence and national security. While clearly each of these analyses is valuable on its own, the variables they examine interact in complex ways. Therefore, this study seeks to maximize the full value of the authors' insights and expertise by examining them holistically from a complex system perspective.\n\n## Methodology\n\nOur analysis pools together key variables examined by each author, maps them to Fragile States Index (FSI) indicators,* where appropriate, and analyzes the variables' relationships to the pandemic and to each other, creating a holistic picture of the pandemic's short- and long-term impacts and implications for intelligence and national security. In our review of the contributed chapters, we identify 25 variables that the authors proposed as related to the COVID-19 pandemic and their relationships to FSI indicator categories (see Table).\n\n## (Fsi) Indicators\n\n| FSI Indicator               | FSI Variable Category      | Variable                 |\n|-----------------------------|----------------------------|--------------------------|\n| Social                      | Demographic                |                          |\n| Pressures                   |                            |                          |\n| Food and Water Scarcity     |                            |                          |\n| Life Expectancy             |                            |                          |\n| Hall et al., Hashemi et al. |                            |                          |\n| Hall et al.                 |                            |                          |\n| Displacement                | Blanco, Hashemi et al.,    |                          |\n| Pollard et al.              |                            |                          |\n| Refugees and                |                            |                          |\n| Internally                  |                            |                          |\n| Displaced People            |                            |                          |\n| Political                   | Public Services            | Essential Services       |\n| Education                   |                            |                          |\n| Supply Chains               |                            |                          |\n| Disinformation              |                            |                          |\n| Crime                       |                            |                          |\n| Tax Revenue                 |                            |                          |\n| State Legitimacy            | Governmental               |                          |\n| Effectiveness               |                            |                          |\n| Illicit Economy and         |                            |                          |\n| Transnational Crime         |                            |                          |\n| Organizations (TCOs)        |                            |                          |\n| Global Terrorism            |                            |                          |\n| Corruption                  |                            |                          |\n| Democratic Decline          |                            |                          |\n| Human Rights and            |                            |                          |\n| Rule of Law                 |                            |                          |\n| Unequal Protection/         |                            |                          |\n| Treatment                   |                            |                          |\n| Blanco, Bodea and Houle,    |                            |                          |\n| Hall et al., Kuznar,        |                            |                          |\n| Hashemi et al.              |                            |                          |\n| Cohesion                    | Fragmentation              |                          |\n| of Elites                   |                            |                          |\n| Fragmentation               | Vlahos                     |                          |\n| Group Grievance             | Racial and Ethnic Division |                          |\n| Powerlessness/Grievance     |                            |                          |\n| Security Apparatus          | Security and Citizenry     | Blanco, Kerbel and Tyson |\n| Brown, Kuznar, Hashemi      |                            |                          |\n| et al., Pollard et al.,     |                            |                          |\n| Priniotakis, Vlahos         |                            |                          |\nBlanco, Hall et al., Pollard\net al.\nHall et al. Schenker, Hashemi et al.,\nJones and Stefanidis\nKerbel and Tyson Brown,\nGradon, Pollard et al., Priniotakis, Schenker,\nJones and Stefanidis\nBlanco, Hashemi et al.,\nPollard et al., Jones and Stefanidis\nBlanco\nKerbel and Tyson Brown,\nKuznar, Hashemi et al., Pollard et al., Priniotakis, Vlahos\nBlanco, Hashemi et al.,\nJones and Stefanidis\nPollard et al. Blanco, Hashemi et al. Bodea and Houle, Kuznar\nBodea and Houle, Pollard\net al.\nBlanco, Kuznar, Vlahos\n\n| FSI Indicator                | FSI Variable Category    |\n|------------------------------|--------------------------|\n| Economic                     | Uneven Economic          |\n| Development                  |                          |\n| Economic Inequality          | Blanco, Bodea and Houle, |\n| Hall et al., Kuznar,         |                          |\n| Hashemi et al., Vlahos       |                          |\n| Poverty and Economic         |                          |\n| Decline                      |                          |\n| GDP                          |                          |\n| Economic Globalization       |                          |\n| Small Businesses             |                          |\n| E-commerce                   |                          |\n| Unemployment                 |                          |\n| Blanco, Hall et al., Pollard |                          |\n| et al.                       |                          |\n| Schenker                     |                          |\n| Schenker                     |                          |\n| Schenker                     |                          |\n| Blanco, Bodea and Houle,     |                          |\n| Hashemi et al., Schenker     |                          |\n\nSource: FSI Indicators and Variable Categories are from The Fund for Peace, *Fragile States Index*, https://fragilestatesindex.org/indicators/; the volume editors have derived the Variables from the chapters prepared by their co-authors.\n\nOur interpretation of the authors' statements regarding the causal relationship between the pandemic and these variables, as well as the variables' relationships to each other, enables us to produce a network of influences among all the variables. The network is represented by a matrix of direct (first-order) relationships between each of the variables, in which a negative relationship receives a -1, a positive relationship, 1, and no relationship, 0. The connections between variables were not weighted, even though some variables are likely to have a stronger impact than others. We extracted as much information as we felt we responsibly could from the authors' works and tried not to infer more than was reasonable. Also, the analysis is static in that it assumes that the first-order effects do not change with time. History shows us that this probably is not the case, as noted by Kuznar and Vlahos. As the pandemic subsides and economies recover, the second- order effects in these variables are likely to change. An analysis like this, therefore, is best suited for identifying unforeseen nth order effects in a system as it currently exists. Finally, the assumptions of our model should not be taken as authoritative or final. Further work with the experts who contributed to this volume and a fuller consideration of the relationships among these variables are necessary.\n\n## Conclusion: A World System Changed By The Covid-19 Pandemic\n\nNonetheless, our study provides preliminary results and serves as an example of how such a technique can provide intelligence analysts and national security end users with insights into the systemic effects of a pandemicor any shock on a complex systemand expectations that can be tested with further data collection. Bearing in mind the limitations, our findings appear to confirm some of the higher-order effects anticipated by the authors and other researchers assessing the pandemic's effects. The network we created for this chapter is best understood as a world system that has existed during the COVID-19 pandemic. A world without the pandemic, or under a different shock (e.g., global economic collapse), might look different.\n\nNote: This network of COVID-19's effects on each variable examined by the authors of\nthis book, as well as the variables' effects on each other, conveys the complexity of the pandemic's impact on the world system (as captured by the FSI of social, political, cohesion, and economic indicators).\n\nOnce the network is created (see Figure 1), the direct and indirect effects of one variable on the others can be traced. For instance, the model indicates that the COVID-19 pandemic has directly encouraged fragmentation among elites who are vying for political power, which in turn has generated a second-order effect (i.e., an effect two steps away from the initial variable) of diminishing governmental effectiveness. Because governmental effectiveness increases security, its diminishment has a third-order effect of decreasing security (see Figure 2). Another advantage of this network approach is that recursive effects of variables can be captured. For instance, the COVID-19 pandemic is not modeled as having an effect on itself. However, through the myriad 9,638 first, second, and third pathways that affect the COVID- 19 pandemic, 46 recursively impact the pandemic itself with a net positive effect, causing it to increase. As an example, a second-order pathway that increases disinformation leads in turn to rejection of non-pharmaceutical interventions (masks, hygiene, social distancing), which then leads to further pandemic spread.\n\nBecause many thousands of pathways can be traced throughout the model, understanding the indirect effects of the connections among the variables and identifying the drivers requires an analytical approach that measures the degree to which a particular variable is related to the others. One straightforward approach involves matrix multiplication. Second-order relationships are calculated by multiplying the matrix of first-order relationships by itself; third-order relationships are calculated by multiplying the matrix by itself three times.1, 2,  The full number of ways one variable can impact another is obtained by adding the products that result from multiplying these matrices. The ways to traverse a network increase rapidly as one considers higher and higher orders. For instance, there is only one direct connection between the COVID-19 pandemic and security and citizenry, but there are 717 third-order connections in the model. Still, it is unlikely that distant third-order effects are 717 times stronger than a first-order effect because an effect usually decays with distance in a network. Downscaling the effects of each higher-order relation accounts for the typical decay of influence. To account for the diminished effect of one variable on another with its distance in the network, we scaled each order by its largest number of connections between two variables (e.g., the 717 third-order connections between COVID-19 and security and citizenry were scaled down to -1.784).\n\n## A World Emerging From Pandemic Covid-19'S Impact On The World System\n\nOur examination of two uses of the FSI model yields the following measures of the pandemic's effects. First, we present what the model shows about the degree to which the pandemic impacts key variables. In the next section, we explore the impact of specific factors that the United States' adversaries are leveraging to gain enhanced influence from the pandemic.\n\n## First-Order Effects\n\nThe direct, first-order effects are those that immediately impact other variables in the system. The first-order effects of the COVID-19 pandemic implied by the model are depicted in Figure 3.\n\nAs discussed by Hall et al. and Hashemi et al., the pandemic has directly jeopardized survival, access to basic needs, and education. As Schenker shows, it has disrupted vital supply chains, rendered some segments of the workforce unemployed, and taken a toll on small businesses, which are less resilient than big businesses and corporations. According to Blanco, Kuznar, Kerbel and Tyson Brown, Hashemi et al., Pollard et al., Priniotakis, and Vlahos, challenges stemming from pandemics fragment nations' elites and erode the relationship between governments and their citizenry in regions examined by the authors. Simultaneously, as laid out comprehensively by Gradon and also touched on by Kerbel and Tyson Brown, Pollard et al., Priniotakis, Schenker, and Jones and Stefanidis, adversaries of the United States and its partners launched information operations campaigns aimed at undermining and discrediting the democratic governments' COVID-\n19 responses, causing disaffection and sowing chaos and doubt. These campaigns pumped disinformation and conspiracy theories about the pandemic into the information environment, which spread like a global wildfire amid the tinder of worldwide fear and confusion.\n\nExploring economic variables, Schenker illustrates how ecommerce has boomed as people in developed countries have transitioned to the virtual environment to do business, find entertainment, and shop to satisfy even basic needs. Kuznar demonstrates a feedback loop between the pandemic and economic globalization: travel associated with economic globalization was the primary driver of the pandemic's spread,3 while the pandemic intensified economic interdependence for scarce resources, stressing the international supply chains upon which economic globalization depends.\n\n## First- Through Third-Order Effects\n\nAs shown in Figure 4, the combined first- through third-order effects of the pandemic depict how its influence has percolated through the system. Blanco, Hall et al., Kuznar, Kerbel and Tyson Brown, Hashemi et al., Pollard et al., Priniotakis, and Vlahos show how pandemics can challenge and erode the quality of governance, particularly government effectiveness and the provision of essential services. Blanco,\n\nBodea and Houle, Hall et al., Kuznar, and Hashemi et al. illustrate how the cascading effects of the COVID-19 pandemic are serving to undermine the rule of law, especially equal protection of populations under law, and are fostering democratic decline by allowing corruption to grow. As characterized by Blanco, Bodea and Houle, Hall et al., Kuznar, Hashemi et al., Pollard et al., Jones and Stefanidis, and Vlahos, ripple effects of pandemics take a toll on GDP everywhere, FSI indicators). These combined effects have generated (as illustrated by blue bars) the greatest decline in the security of citizens around the globe (-4.1) and the greatest rise in citizenry powerlessness (+3.7).\n\nexacerbating structural inequalities, incentivizing crime, and deepening poverty and economic declineespecially among the world's most vulnerable populations. Their work demonstrates this is particularly true in countries that were already fragile or unstable before the pandemic began. Finally, as the various works of Blanco, Bodea and Houle, Hall et al., Kuznar, Hashemi et al., Pollard et al., Jones and Stefanidis, and Vlahos show, forced displacement and group grievancesstoked by inflamed racial and ethnic rivalries, as well as the growing powerlessness of underprotected groupscreate permissive environments in which illicit economies and transnational criminal, as well as terrorist, organizations can thrive. These combined effects have most undermined the security of citizens around the globe, as illustrated by the greatest decline (-4) in Figure 4.\n\nA variable's effect usually diminishes with distance in a network, and downscaling the effects of each higher-order relation can account for this typical decay of influence. In this bar chart, each order is scaled by its largest number of connections between two variables.\n\n## Influence Of Specific Variables On The World System\n\nThis section focuses on the potential influence of specific factors that adversaries of the United States and its partners might leverage and provides measures of the threat potential that these factors have on other variables in the world system. Our application of the FSI model demonstrates that every variable, even COVID-19, is influenced to some degree by other variables, although some are less impacted (e.g., COVID-19) and some are impacted by many others (e.g., food and water scarcity, essential services, economic inequality, governmental effectiveness).\n\nVariables introduced from outside the system (e.g., COVID-19) have few leverage points for control and are poor candidates for levers of control. Similarly, variables that are caused by a blend of other variables are difficult to leverage because orchestrating the confluence of many variables for a desired effect is tricky. Variables in the \"sweet spot\" for control should have a tractable set of impact variables that an actor can more easily manipulate to influence the system. This characteristic probably leads the adversaries of the United States and its partners to focus their influence operations primarily on two correlated variables with tractable sets of impacts: disinformation and corruption.4, 5\nDisinformation Kacper Gradon's chapter makes the case that Russia is a primary purveyor of disinformation in an \"infodemic\" characterized by spreading disinformation and trying to discredit Western powers and their responses to the pandemicall in an effort to weaken alliances within NATO and to sow political division within Western democracies. According to the model, the pandemic has triggered a spike in disinformation (see Figure 4), an observation shared by other analysts.6, 7\nThe enduring and strong first- through third-order effects of disinformation on the world system during the COVID-19 pandemic are shown in Figure 5.\n\nA variable's effect usually diminishes with distance in a network, and downscaling the effects of each higher-order relation can account for this typical decay of influence. In this bar chart, each order is scaled by its largest number of connections between two variables.\n\nThe variables most influenced by disinformation include governmental effectiveness and the illicit economy and TCOs. Governmental ineffectiveness and disruptions in the provision of essential services foster democratic decline. These factors also fuel crime, inequality, powerlessness, and displacement, eroding governmental capacity and creating insecurity. Moreover, disinformation has an inherently self-perpetuating effect, exhibiting classic positive feedback within the system. In other words, disinformation begets more disinformation in the system and, therefore, is a particularly pernicious and destabilizing weapon of war. This model illuminates how disinformation campaigns, especially from Russia and China, represent a critical threat to the United States.\n\n## Conclusion: A World System Changed By The Covid-19 Pandemic\n\nCorruption, Security, and COVID-19\nAs shown by the model and examined in each of the contributions to this volume, the pandemic's most damaging effects have been on security and the citizenry's well-being, with correspondingly intensified perceptions of powerlessness and racial and ethnic divisions. Examining these relationships more closely, the model indicates that corruption has the most salient adverse effect on security; therefore, the impacts of corruption throughout the world system are explored\n\nhere (see Figure 6). A number of studies beyond the scope of this volume show how adversaries of the United States, particularly Russia and China, exploit corruption to advance their national interests.8, 9\nNote: In this figure, the variable of corruption (red bar) has exacerbated the first- through thirdorder effects of the COVID-19 pandemic throughout the world system, generating (as illustrated by blue bars) the greatest decline in security (-7.4), as well as the governance variables of essential services (-5.7) and governmental effectiveness (-4.8), and the greatest rise in citizenry powerlessness (+6.4). A variable's effect usually diminishes with distance in a network, and downscaling the effects of each higher-order relation can account for this typical decay of influence. In this bar chart, each order is scaled by its largest number of connections between two variables.\n\nSimilar to disinformation, corruption has a negative influence on governanceincluding the provision of essential services and governmental effectivenessfostering democratic decline. When combined with corruption, as described in depth by Hashemi et al., these factors lead to unequal protection, increased crime, and a growth in the illicit economy and transnational criminal organizations. Corruption also has a strong influence on feelings of powerlessness, driving racial and ethnic divisions and, most of all, eroding a nation's ability to secure its citizenry. The highly disruptive influence of corruption on political stability in this model mirrors the results of recent empirical studies demonstrating a similarly strong and negative impact of corruption on political systems.10\n\n## Conclusions And Outlook\n\nThe model of the world system during the COVID-19 pandemic, developed and analyzed in this chapter, illuminates the dynamic and interactive multiplicity of temporary and enduring challenges that U.S. and U.S. partner intelligence and national security establishments have experienced by failing to adequately anticipate the COVID-19 pandemic and its associated outcomes. At the time of this writing, the pandemic is reproducing and perpetuating deadlier variants of the virusincluding the Delta variant, which is sweeping unprotected regions of the worldregions where domestic and international political and public health arenas are fraught with turmoil and infodemic-related distrust and where the vaccine is most needed to stop the spread. The COVID-19 pandemic has weakened governmental and civil institutions, as well as social cohesion, leaving governments less capable of countering obstacles such as economic decline and criminal activity and challenges from non-state violent actors and illegitimate political rivals.\n\nThe pandemic has exacerbated and exposed the vulnerabilities of relatively resilient, advanced industrialized, institutionalized democracies, such as the United States. In less stable regions and conflict zones of the developing worldsuch as the Middle East, Latin America, and the Caribbean, in particular, where human insecurity was already a problemthe delicate fiber of the state-society relationship is fraying, unraveling, and, in some cases, disintegrating. In Tunisiathe Arab Spring's only success storythe lethality of the Delta variant is overwhelming the health care system, heaping pressure on the country's nascent democracy, which has already resulted in fragmentation.11 In Lebanon, pandemic-related economic collapse threatens the survival of the Arabic-speaking Levant's last cosmopolitan hub as the region's only semidemocracy crumbles.12 In Iraq and Syria, amid the worst human displacement crisis in modern history, the pandemic has hastened and exacerbated state and security failure. As observed by Pollard et al., terrorist organizations, as well as other illegitimate and non-state groups, are filling these governance and security gaps, staking out territory and violently competing for a monopoly of force and influence over helpless populations.\n\nIn Latin America and the Caribbean, failure to mitigate pandemicassociated economic shocks is exacerbating popular discontent with political elites, undermining political stability, and increasing the risk of outsider or illegitimate actors seizing power. Local gangs, as well as drug trafficking and organized crime groups, are supplanting legitimate officials and elites, as noted by Blanco. This model of the breakdown of formal state institutions and disintegration of the social contract is most clearly playing out in Haiti where the pandemic has put that country's already weak political, economic, and social institutions to the test, grinding public services in many areas to a halt. Working-class neighborhoods have descended into zones of lawlessness as public institutions have been abandoned, and the lives of ordinary people have become subject to the will of well-armed gangs. The political crisis deepened in July 2021, when armed mercenaries assassinated Haitian president Jovenel Moise at his home in the night, leaving the government in disarray, with no parliament or president, a dispute over who is the prime minister, and a weak police force.13 Gangs now control more than half of the capital of Port- au-\nPrince. Kidnappings and political assassinations are rampant. Tens of thousands of people are fleeing their homes due to gang violence and arson amid skyrocketing inflation, blackouts, and food, water, and fuel shortages. COVID-19 is surging in Haiti, which has yet to begin a vaccination program, and there is no privacy or social distancing in shelters set up by domestic and international aid workers.14\nThese trends, in some cases intensified and made more calamitous by increasingly lethal variants of the COVID-19 virus, are emergent in regions unexplored in this volume, particularly vulnerable areas of Africa and Asia. At the same time, some pandemic- associated solutions are strengthening aspects of global economic cooperation and interdependence. As Schenker illustrates, the pandemic has forced long overdue technological transitions, including vastly improved and greatly interconnected global e-commerce, as well as virtual environments within which to do business, find entertainment, and shop to satisfy even basic needs. This fragile and yet interdependent system represents the state of play as the world emerges from pandemic.\n\n1\nStanley Wasserman and Katherine Faust, Social Network Analysis: Methods and Applications (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994).\n2\nFor an application to international affairs, see Allison Astorino-Courtois, \"The Cognitive Structure of Decision Making and the Course of Arab-Israeli Relations 1970-1978,\" *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 39, no. 3 (1995): 419-38.\n3\nLawrence A. Kuznar, \"A Tale of Two Pandemics: Evolutionary Psychology, Urbanism, and the Biology of Disease Spread Deepen Sociopolitical Divides\nin the U.S.,\" *Humanities and Social Science Communications* 8, no. 42 (February\n2021): 1-6, doi:10.1057/s41599-021-00719-8.\n4\nKacper T. Gradon et al., \"Countering Misinformation: A Multidisciplinary\nApproach,\" *Big Data & Society,* January-June, 2021, 1-14, doi:10.1177/205395\n17211013848.\n5\nNational Intelligence Council, *Global Trends 2040: A More Contested World*\n(Washington, DC: Office of the Director of National Intelligence, 2021), https:// www.dni.gov/files/ODNI/documents/assessments/GlobalTrends_2040.pdf.\n6\nJason Blazakis et al., Quantifying the Q Conspiracy: A Data-driven Approach\nto Understanding the Threat Posed by QAnon (London: Soufan Center, 2021),\nhttps://thesoufancenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/04/TSC-White-Paper_ QAnon_16April2021-final-1.pdf.\n7\nPeter W. Singer and Eric B. Johnson, \"The Need to Inoculate Military Servicemembers against Information Threats: The Case for Digital Literacy\nTraining for the Force,\" *War on the Rocks*, February 1, 2021, https://waronthe\nrocks.com/2021/02/we-need-to-inoculate-military-servicemembers-againstinformation-threats-the-case-for-digital-literacy-training/.\n8\nHeather A. Conley et al., The Kremlin Playbook: Understanding Russian Influence\nin Central and Eastern Europe (Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield, 2016).\n9\nHans Binnendijk and Sarah Kirchberger, The China Plan: A Transatlantic Blueprint for Strategic Competition (Washington, DC: Atlantic Council, 2021),\nhttps://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep30709.\n10\nLawrence A. Kuznar and Jeffery Day, Hunting Gray Rhinos and Black Swans: Statistical and Machine Learning Models of Political Stability and Terrorism\n(Arlington, Virginia: Strategic Multilayer Assessment (SMA) Periodic Publication, OSD/ASD (R&E)/RSD/RRTO, 2020), https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/citations/ AD1097405.\n11\nVivian Yee, \"Tunisia's Democracy Verges on Collapse as President Moves to\nTake Control,\" *New York Times*, July 27, 2021, https://www.nytimes.com/2021/\n07/26/world/middleeast/tunisia-government-dismissed-protests.html.\n12\nMona Yacoubian, \"As Lebanon Melts Down, Can it Avert Total Collapse?\" United States Institute for Peace, March 5, 2021, https://www.usip.org/pub lications/2021/03/lebanon-melts-down-can-it-avert-total-collapse.\n13\nDanica Coto and Evens Sanon, \"Gangs Add to Haiti's Post-Assassination Chaos,\"\nLos Angeles Times, July 12, 2021, https://www.latimes.com/world-nation/story/\n2021-07-12/haiti-gangs-complicate-recovery-effort-assassination.\n14\nCaitlin Hu, \"Fear Stalks Haitians as Their Murdered President Is Buried and\nGangs Terrorize the Capital,\" CNN World, July 23, 2021, https://www.cnn.\ncom/2021/07/23/americas/haiti-moise-kidnappings-refugees-insecurity-intlcmd/index.html.\n\n## How Has The Pandemic Transformed The Ic?\n\nCOVID has changedand will continue to changethe fragile yet interrelated world system that intelligence analysts study as they grapple with threats to U.S. national security. A truly complex phenomenon, the pandemic has challenged the workings of the U.S. Intelligence Community itself, as well as influencing the national security problem sets the IC confronts. Faced with this fundamentally altered world, the authors present evidencebased, qualitative, quantitative, and mixed-methods analyses on the impacts of COVID-19 on our national security. They anticipate and prepare for a future beyond the pandemic.\nDr. Stacey Pollard is the director of the Ann Caracristi Institute for Intelligence Research at National Intelligence University. She specializes in conflict and instability in the Middle East and North Africa and has extensive field research experience in Iraq and Syria. **Dr. Lawrence A. Kuznar** is chief cultural sciences officer at National Security Innovations, Inc. and emeritus professor of anthropology at Purdue University-Fort Wayne. His research includes applications of complexity theory."
    },
    {
        "text": "## \"All Necessary Means\" - Employing Cia Operatives In A Warfighting Role Alongside Special Operations Forces\n\nby COLONEL KATHRYN STONE\nUnited States Army Professor Anthony R. Williams Project Advisor The views expressed in this academic research paper are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the U.S. Government, the Department of Defense, or any of its agencies.\n\nU.S. Army War College CARLISLE BARRACKS, PENNSYLVANIA 17013\n\n## Report Documentation Page\n\nPublic reporting burder for this collection of information is estibated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing this collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burder to Department of Defense, Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports (0704-0188), 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to any penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number. PLEASE DO NOT RETURN YOUR FORM TO THE ABOVE ADDRESS.\n\n1. REPORT DATE (DD-MM-YYYY) 07-04-2003\n\n| 2. REPORT TYPE                                                                   |\n|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------|\n| xx-xx-2002 to xx-xx-2003                                                         |\n| 4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE                                                            |\n| \"All Means Necessary\" - Employing CIA Operatives in a Warfighting Role Alongside |\n| Special Operations Forces                                                        |\n| Unclassified                                                                     |\n| 6. AUTHOR(S)                                                                     |\n| Stone, Kathryn ; Author                                                          |\n| 7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME AND ADDRESS                                      |\n| U.S. Army War College                                                            |\n| Carlisle Barracks                                                                |\n| Carlisle, PA17013-5050                                                           |\n| 9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME AND ADDRESS                                 |\n| ,                                                                                |\n| 12. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT                                          |\n| APUBLIC RELEASE                                                                  |\n| ,                                                                                |\n| 13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES                                                          |\n| 14. ABSTRACT                                                                     |\n| See attached file.                                                               |\n| 15. SUBJECT TERMS                                                                |\n| 16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF:                                                  |\n| 17. LIMITATION                                                                   |\n| OF ABSTRACT                                                                      |\n| Same as Report                                                                   |\n| (SAR)                                                                            |\n| a. REPORT                                                                        |\n| Unclassified                                                                     |\n| b. ABSTRACT                                                                      |\n| Unclassified                                                                     |\n| c. THIS PAGE                                                                     |\n| Unclassified                                                                     |\n| 5a. CONTRACT NUMBER                                                              |\n| 5b. GRANT NUMBER                                                                 |\n| 5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER                                                       |\n| 5d. PROJECT NUMBER                                                               |\n| 5e. TASK NUMBER                                                                  |\n| 5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER                                                             |\n| 8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT                                                |\n| NUMBER                                                                           |\n| 10. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S ACRONYM(S)                                                 |\n| 11. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S REPORT                                                     |\n| NUMBER(S)                                                                        |\n| 19. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON                                                   |\n| Rife, Dave                                                                       |\n| RifeD@awc.carlisle.army.mil                                                      |\n| 18.                                                                              |\n| NUMBER                                                                           |\n| OF PAGES                                                                         |\n| 55                                                                               |\n| 19b. TELEPHONE NUMBER                                                            |\n| International Area Code                                                          |\n| Area Code Telephone Number                                                       |\n| DSN                                                                              |\n\nStandard Form 298 (Rev. 8-98)\nPrescribed by ANSI Std Z39.18\nABSTRACT\nAUTHOR:\nColonel Kathryn Stone\n\n## Title: \"All Necessary Means\" - Employing Cia Operatives In A Warfighting Role Alongside Special Operations Forces\n\nFORMAT:\nStrategy Research Project\nDATE:\n07 April 2003\n  PAGES: 55\nCLASSIFICATION:  Unclassified\nIn response to the terrorist attacks on the United States on 11 September 2001, the President -- as both Commander-in-Chief and as authorized by Congress in Joint Resolution 23 -- ordered our armed forces into combat in order to disrupt and defeat the global terror network.  The President concomitantly signed a Presidential Finding directing the Central Intelligence Agency\n(CIA) to use all necessary means to destroy Osama bin Laden and Al Qaeda.  As a consequence of these orders, CIA paramilitary operatives have been performing a warfighting role alongside Special Operations Forces (SOF) in the war against terrorism. This strategy research paper explores the respective roles and missions of the CIA and SOF, their legal authority to execute their assigned missions, the policy advantages and disadvantages of integrating their warfighting operations in combat, and the legal and operational ramifications of such integrated combat operations.  The paper concludes that integrated combat operations between the CIA and SOF are an appropriate template for warfare in certain situations, provided we develop and adhere to clear, well-understood criteria to manage this CIA-SOF warfighting relationship. The war against terrorism is a fight for the preservation of our national interests and values, our way of life, and the very future of our country.  We must employ every element of national power -- all necessary means -- in its prosecution.  While managing the CIA-SOF warfighting relationship will present significant challenges, those challenges can be minimized in a manner that both preserves the combatant commander's flexibility and capitalizes on each agency's strengths and capabilities.\n\n## Preface\n\nThis paper is dedicated to Judge Advocates everywhere who toil industriously but unremarked in loyal support and defense of our country and the rule of law.\n\n## \"All Necessary Means\" - Employing Cia Operatives In A Warfighting Role Alongside Special Operations Forces\n\nI wish to be useful, and every kind of service necessary to the public good becomes honorable by being necessary.\n\nNathan Hale This research paper looks at the separate roles, missions, and responsibilities of Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) paramilitary operatives and the Department of Defense (DOD) Special Operations Forces (SOF); the new and apparently *ad hoc* policy of integrating their operations together in combat; and the legal ramifications of such warfighting integration.  This paper will be based on open source materials and media accounts of the CIA's involvement in the war against terrorism.  This paper is intended as a general discussion vehicle for those legal issues associated with the employment of CIA paramilitary operatives in a warfighting role alongside SOF, and does not purport to speak with any operational authority regarding the conduct of CIA activities; nor does it discuss the wide range of traditional CIA activities that might be involved in the war against terrorism.\n\nOn September 11, 1999, a small number of operatives from the CIA were in Afghanistan.\n\nThey were there in a non-combat mode for the purpose of recruiting sources, supporting anti-\nTaliban warlords and their operations, liaising with members of the Northern Alliance,1 and generating intelligence on Osama bin Laden2 and his Al Qaeda3 terrorist organization. 4\nTwo years later, on September 11, 2001, the United States was attacked by terrorist hijackers who flew three airliners into both towers of the World Trade Center in New York City, and the Pentagon in Washington, D.C.  A fourth hijacked airliner, heading in the direction of Washington, D.C., crashed instead in a rural section of Pennsylvania.5  These terrorist acts6 killed over 3000 people and caused an estimated national economic loss of over $ 33 billion.7 The evidence soon concluded that these acts of terrorism -- which amounted to an act of war8 --\nwere committed by members of the terrorist organization known as Al Qaeda, and masterminded by Osama bin Laden.\n\nOn September 14, 2001, the United States Congress passed a joint resolution authorizing the President of the United States, George W. Bush, to \"use all necessary and appropriate force\" against those who were involved in the terrorist attacks that occurred against the U.S. on September 11, 2001. 9  Close in time, President Bush signed a Memorandum of Notification*\nordering the CIA to \"use all necessary means\" to destroy bin Laden and Al Qaeda.10\nConsequently, CIA paramilitary teams were on the ground in Afghanistan \"within days\" of the attacks on New York and the Pentagon, \"trained not just to observe conditions but if need be to change them,\" according to the CIA Deputy Director for Operations.11  President Bush's Finding ordering the CIA to \"use all necessary means\" to destroy bin Laden and Al Qaeda meant the inserted CIA officers were legally free to identify Taliban and Al Qaeda targets for the Northern Alliance to attack; to accompany Northern Alliance and U.S. SOF units (when they arrived) on their combat missions against the Taliban; and to call in U.S. airstrikes against the Taliban and Al Qaeda. 12\nOn September 24, 2001, a few days after the Presidential Finding, President Bush, acting pursuant to his Constitutional authority to conduct U.S. foreign relations and as Commander-in-\nChief and Chief Executive, ordered the deployment of various combat equipped and combat support forces to several foreign nations in the Central and Pacific command areas of operations in order to prevent and deter further acts of terrorism.13  Two weeks later, on October\n7, 2001, President Bush announced that he had ordered the U.S. military to begin strikes against Al Qaeda terrorist training camps and Taliban14 military installations in Afghanistan in order to disrupt the use of Afghanistan as a terrorist base of operations and to attack the military capability of the Taliban regime.15\nCIA paramilitary operatives entered Afghanistan on 26 September 200116 ahead of U.S.\n\nSpecial Operations Forces (SOF) in order to link up with Northern Alliance17 forces, secure helicopter landing zones for follow-on SOF, and guide SOF teams -- who arrived with their arsenal of laser target designators to enable U.S. aircraft to strike Taliban positions -- to the enemy.18  These CIA officers were inserted ahead of the SOF because of their ability to get on the ground quickly, their language skills and knowledge of the terrain, and their existing contacts with anti-Taliban groups.19  At the same time, U.S. military forces continued to flow quickly into Afghanistan, Uzbekistan, Pakistan, and the Arabian Sea, while the CIA continued to increase its activity in the region, adding logistics hubs, communication sites, and command and control centers and capabilities.  All of this CIA paramilitary activity -- identifying targets, accompanying the Northern Alliance and SOF into combat, calling in airstrikes -- amounts to a warfighting role in the war against terrorism that continues today.\n\n## Current United States Policy Objective (Ends)\n\nThe President's strategic objective is to win the global war on terrorism by employing all instruments of national power at his command, not just military power:  \"We will direct every resource at our command - every means of diplomacy, every tool of intelligence, every instrument of law enforcement, every financial influence and every necessary weapon of war -\nto the disruption and to the defeat of the global terror network.\"20  The important point about the President's objective (\"end\") is that the war on terrorism is global in nature and directs multiple elements of U.S. national power against all terrorists who threaten U.S. interests; the war is not just about the destruction or capture of Al Qaeda.21  This integration of all elements of national power is also one of the unifying themes of the 2002 National Military Strategy (pre-decisional draft) - to integrate military activities and operations with activities across the interagency spectrum.22\n\n## Ways\n\nAlthough CIA operatives have worked with U.S. military forces in the past,23 their current warfighting operations in Afghanistan constitute the Agency's \"most sweeping and lethal\" covert action since its statutory founding in 1947 and signal a major return to the Agency's paramilitary involvement in armed conflicts.24  This new policy, or course of action -- using CIA paramilitary operatives in a warfighting role alongside SOF (e.g., calling in airstrikes, accompanying SOF and Northern Alliance groups on combat missions, and other clandestine combat operations) -- epitomizes the President's determination to win the war on terrorism using all elements of national power, and constitutes \"unprecedented\" coordination between the CIA and SOF military units.25\nAccording to Bob Woodward of the Washington Post, administration officials have said that President Bush has \"pledged to dispatch military units to take advantage of the CIA's latest and best intelligence.\"26  For example, according to one reporter, Dana Priest, Washington Post Staff Writer, it took just 316 SOF soldiers* to oust the Taliban from power, with nearly every A-\nteam including one or two CIA operatives.27  Priest even describes a mission briefing given by a CIA operative to both CIA and SOF personnel.28  Other U.S. sources have said that SOF have been \"seconded\" to the CIA for paramilitary operations in Afghanistan.29  In his book, Bush at War, Bob Woodward quotes the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Richard B. Myers, as telling President Bush, \"We're ready to put Special Forces on the ground with CIA\nforces.\"30   Woodward also quotes \"Hank,\" the CIA's counterterrorism special operations chief, as saying in a message to CIA assets in the field that, among other things, \"we are fighting for the future of CIA/DOD integrated counterterrorism warfare around the globe . . . [w]hile we will make mistakes as we chart new territory and new methodology, our objectives are clear, and our concept of partnership is sound.\"31\nRegardless of who is seconded to whom, however, it is clear that the war in Afghanistan highlights not just the tight integration, but also the erosion of distinctions between SOF and the CIA in the war against terrorism.  Past administrations made more of an effort to differentiate between military combat activities and CIA missions.32  In the war on terrorism, however, the Bush Administration has gradually blurred these distinctive lines in response to an asymmetrical, non-State threat that requires greater coordination and cooperation among intelligence, military, and law enforcement officials.33\n\n## Resources/Means\n\nTo accomplish his strategic objective and resource this course of action, President Bush ordered the use of all necessary means.34  This order in turn generated an operationally-driven ad hoc relationship between CIA paramilitary operatives and SOF on the ground in Afghanistan that resulted in improved lethality and agility on the battlefield stemming from each group's distinct contribution to warfighting.  For example, Jim Pavitt, head of the CIA's clandestine service, acknowledged publicly in a speech that the CIA's covert operations inside Afghanistan immediately after September 11 paved the way for follow-on SOF and the resulting rout of the Taliban in the fall of 2001. 35  Clearly then, working together, the CIA's and SOF's respective capabilities complimented each other in a manner sufficient to ensure the defeat of the Taliban. According to one author, this new type of operation involving \"fastmoving CIA paramilitary teams\" and SOF may well \"serve as a model for future encounters against terrorism in other parts of the world . . . [t]he dramatic success of specialized use of reconnaissance weapons and a dynamic, small-unit combat strategy obviated\" the need to deploy large numbers of ground troops.36\nClearly, the full spectrum dominance bought with this CIA-SOF integration of warfighting capabilities has produced a new, successful battlefield synergy.  Improving the ways of warfighting by integrating all means has resulted in a synergy that has not only succeeded, but that has transformed the traditional view on the prosecution of armed conflict.\n\n## Risks\n\nThis multidimensional integration is not without significant legal and operational risks, however.   The CIA and SOF communities possess very distinct identities and mandates, with separate legal authorities, operating structures, and methods of organization.  Though this relationship between the DOD and CIA has been successful to date, and was praised by Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld (who was also Secretary of Defense in the mid-1970s)\nin February 2002 as \"good as I've ever seen it . . . They've got a darn good record . . . .,\"37 the relationship has not been without problems that deserve attention.  To understand the context of these problems and their associated issues, however, this paper must first review the statutory basis, and roles and missions, of the DOD, SOF and the CIA.\n\n## Dod And Cia Authorities And Missions\n\nSeparate groups of Constitutional authorities, statutory authorities and responsibilities, and executive orders separate the CIA and DOD/SOF, which in turn delineate separate divisions of responsibility for national security.\n\n## Department Of Defense Legal Authority\n\nConstitutional.  The legal authority for the existence of the armed forces is set forth in Articles I and II of the U.S. Constitution.  Specifically, Article I, Section 8, provides that the Congress shall have the power to raise and support Armies, to provide and maintain a Navy, and to make rules for the government and regulation of the same.  Article II, Section 2, provides that the President shall be Commander-in-Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States.38\nStatutory (U.S. Code).  While the U.S. Constitution provides the overarching genesis of authority for the armed forces, Title 10 of the United States Code fills in the blanks by codifying in more concrete terms the statutory authority, and broad missions and functions, of DOD.39\n\n## Roles And Missions\n\nDOD Writ Large.  Of more practical daily use is the delineation of DOD's mission statement in DOD Directive 5100.1, Functions of the Department of Defense and its Major Components.  Specifically, as prescribed by higher authority (*i.e.*, U.S. Code Title 10), the DOD \"shall maintain and employ Armed Forces to:  Support and defend the Constitution of the United States against all enemies, foreign and domestic; ensure, by timely and effective military action (emphasis added by author), the security of the United States, its possessions, and areas vital to its interests; and uphold and advance the national policies and interests of the United States.40\nSOF.  Wartime special operations conducted by U.S. armed forces are as old as the American Revolutionary War, in which General George Washington approved a plan for several of his soldiers to capture the traitor Benedict Arnold and return him to American control.41  In 1986, as part of the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act,42 Congress consolidated all SOF from all the services into one new command, the U.S. Special Operations Command.  This reorganization resulted in large part from the failed 1980 Desert One operation to rescue American hostages in Iran, which exposed shortfalls in the training and equipping of SOF and highlighted in tragic form the neglect that the covert side of warfare had suffered for far too long.43\nSOF forces conduct special operations missions and activities in war and peace, either independent from or integrated with conventional military operations.44  While special operations encompass the use of small units in direct or indirect military actions, they are usually focused on strategic and operational objectives, which are frequently shaped by political-military considerations, thereby requiring \"clandestine, covert, or low-visibility techniques and oversight at the national level.\"45  SOF units consist of combinations of specialized personnel, training, equipment, and tactics that exceed the routine capabilities of conventional military forces.46\nImportantly, unless otherwise directed by the President or Secretary of Defense, a special operations activity or mission is supposed to [\"shall\"] be conducted under the command of the unified combatant commander47 in whose geographic area the activity or mission is to be conducted.48  Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld's recent change establishing the U.S.\n\nSpecial Operations Command as both a *supported* and *supporting* command may require a change to Title 10 of the U.S. Code.\n\nThe current National Military Strategy of the United States provides that the Armed Forces\n\"are the Nation's instrument for ensuring our security,\" their primary purpose is to \"defeat\"\nthreats of violence against the U.S. should deterrence fail, and their foremost task is to \"fight and win our Nation's wars.\"49  The Pre-Decisional Draft of the 2002 National Military Strategy of the United States of America, dated 19 September 2002, continues the theme of the previous strategy by stating that our national military objectives remain, among other things, to \"defend the Nation\" and \"win the Nation's wars.\"50 However, the Constitution does not dictate how (ways)\nour country should be protected, or what our national security establishment should specifically look like.  This flexibility in national defense has produced various statutory and regulatory forms of national security organization, to include the National Security Act of 1947,51 which is codified in portions of Titles 10, 32 and 50 of the United States Code.\n\n## Central Intelligence Agency Legal Authority\n\nStatutory (U.S. Code).  The legal basis for the CIA is set forth in the National Security Act of 1947, which established the CIA and the DOD, among other agencies.52\nConstitutional.  Intelligence operations are as old as our Nation, as noted in the 64th Federalist, which \"commended\" the new U.S. Constitution, in granting power to the President to make treaties, for providing the means (resources) \"by which the President could 'manage the business of intelligence in such a manner as prudence may suggest.'\"53\n\n## Roles And Missions\n\nDefinition of Covert Action.  One of the CIA's several missions, among other duties and responsibilities related to intelligence functions, is to conduct special activities approved by the President.54  Special Activities were defined by President Reagan in Executive Order 12333, United States Intelligence Activities, dated December 4, 1981, and still in effect, as \"activities conducted in support of national foreign policy objectives abroad which are planned and executed so that the role of the United States Government is not apparent or acknowledged publicly.\"55  In fact, no agency except the CIA may conduct any special activity unless the President directs such, and the CIA itself must have a Presidential Finding in order to conduct special activities or covert action.56  The U.S. military may also conduct special activities during a time of war declared by Congress or during any period covered by a report from the President to the Congress under the War Powers Resolution.57\nAccording to one author, Executive Order 12333's reference to \"special activities\" is a euphemism for \"covert action.\"58  In fact, 10 years later, in the Intelligence Authorization Act of\n1991, Congress provided a detailed definition of covert action that closely resembles the definition of \"special activities\" in Executive Order 12333, specifically:  an \"activity or activities of the United States Government to influence political, economic, or military conditions abroad, where it is intended that the role of the United States Government will not be apparent or acknowledged publicly, but does not include . . . traditional . . . military activities or routine support to such activities.\"59  This language -- the definition of covert action in the 1991 Intelligence Authorization Act -- is mirrored in Title 50, U.S. Code, Section 413b(e)60and remains the controlling legal definition for covert action today, even though Executive Order 12333 -- and its definition of \"special activities\" -- remains effective as well.\n\nIn plain language, then, covert action is action designed to produce certain results in foreign countries without such action being clearly and openly identified with the United States. Accordingly, because it can be a convenient and stealthy tool for the execution of foreign policy, covert action has been the traditional tool of U.S. Presidents when confronted with problems that have not responded to other tools of statecraft pressure.61  Former Director of Central Intelligence Stansfield Turner explained it best when he stated, \"Covert action is not intelligence. Covert action is the conduct of foreign policy.  Its object is to affect the course of events, not to inform our policy makers about events.\"62  Further, the most extreme form of covert action --\nparamilitary operations -- can be described as secret wars, according to David Isenberg, a research associate at the Washington-based Cato Institute Project on Military Procurement.63\nLegal Authority for Covert Action.  Interestingly, the National Security Act of 1947 did not explicitly indicate that the CIA as an agency should or would engage in covert action, nor did it specify therein that covert action is one of the CIA's assigned missions.64  In fact, nowhere in the Act was covert action mentioned, although some have argued that the Act's legislative history indicates an intention for the CIA to collect intelligence by engaging in espionage (vice covert action) abroad.65\nAccordingly, the CIA's covert action mission, and underlying capability attendant thereto, have an ambiguous foundation.  Nevertheless, successive Presidential administrations have found statutory authority for the CIA to conduct covert action in an obscure phrase in the agency's basic charter, wherein the \"CIA is given the duty 'to perform such other functions and duties related to intelligence affecting the national security as the National Security Council may from time to time direct.'\"66  The U.S. Congress \"acquiesced\" in this interpretation;67 and early National Security Council directives during the Cold War instructed the CIA to conduct paramilitary operations as part of the U.S. effort to contain the former Soviet Union.68  During the\n1950's, \"more and more covert operations were assigned to the CIA because State and Defense did not want to do them in the open or because the simplest and fastest way to get something done was to assign the job to the secret arm.\"69\nInterestingly, the CIA's first general counsel, Lawrence R. Houston, who helped draft the Act establishing the CIA, has stated that the clause permitting the CIA to engage in \"such other functions\" referred only to intelligence collection and not to covert action, and that the CIA was stretching the law's original intent by using the \"such other functions\" clause to justify covert action.70  According to Houston, \"all during this drafting of the Act, all during the presentations to congressional committees, there was no mention of covert action. . . It was entirely intelligence .\n\n. . That was [to be] the sole product.\"71  After the Act was passed into law, however, and at the request of Truman administration officials, Houston wrote a legal opinion stating that the CIA could legally execute covert action if the President gave it a directive to do so and if Congress funded the action. 72\nThus began the dawn of CIA covert actions, and U.S. Presidents have \"systematically employed [the CIA] as a mechanism through which they can . . . carry out military actions\n(emphasis added) without the armed forces.\"73  The Intelligence Authorization Act of 1991, codified in Title 50, U.S. Code, Section 413 and discussed above, further solidified in statute the definition of, and authority to conduct, covert action.  One type of covert action that closely resembles military action is the CIA's paramilitary operations, or, according to one author,\n\"unconventional warfare:  to support or stimulate armed resistance elements in their homeland against the regime in power, or to employ irregular troops to invade a country and unseat its regime - or a combination of both.\"74  The President may not authorize the conduct of a covert action, however, unless he determines such an action is necessary to support identifiable foreign policy objectives of the United States and is important to the national security of the United States.  That determination must be set forth in a written finding.75  Further, each finding must specify each agency or other U.S. Government entity that is authorized to fund or otherwise participate in any significant way in such covert action,76 and no finding may authorize any action that would violate the Constitution or any statute of the United States.77\nCIA Support to Military Operations.  While America's history of covert action dates back to the colonial era, when Revolutionary officials conspired with certain Bermuda officials to\n\"obtain\" a store of gunpowder from the Royal Arsenal at Bermuda,78 the \"CIA's\" history of support to U.S. military operations is also not new, but began immediately upon the birth of the CIA's predecessor agency.\n\n\"CIA\" support to military operations originated during World War II, with the creation of the Office of Strategic Services (OSS), which built for its own use a covert paramilitary force.79  OSS\nofficers ran commando operations in Europe, acted as guides in the Allied landings in North Africa in 1942, conducted sabotage to support the Allied landings in Normandy in 1944, established effective intelligence sources and networks, provided technical and logistical support to resistance groups and fighters, and worked to coordinate paramilitary activities with conventional military operations.80  Of note is the fact that OSS agents also received instructions from military commanders, and \"reported on the results of sabotage missions and the effectiveness of Allied bombing.\"81   According to Charles D. Ameringer in his book, U.S. Foreign Intelligence - The Secret Side of American History, OSS field activities were under the control of the theater commanders.82\nCIA paramilitary operatives continued to operate with U.S. military forces in Korea, Vietnam, and the Gulf War, and in recent years the Agency has actually been tasked to provide direct support to military operations and deployments.83  With the exponential growth in U.S.\n\nmilitary peacekeeping deployments in the 1990s, there was a concomitant need by the Armed Forces for ever more tactical intelligence support, and President William Clinton supported that need by issuing a 1995 Presidential Order (Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) - 35) instructing the Intelligence Community to provide the military with the tactical intelligence it needed. 84  During a visit to CIA headquarters a few months after issuing PDD-35, President Clinton explained his directive and emphasized that the intelligence community's \"first priority was to support 'the intelligence needs of our military during an operation,' and that commanders in the field needed 'prompt, thorough intelligence to fully inform their decisions and maximize the security of our troops.'\"85\nAccording to CIA officials, however, this resulted in a \"diversion of shrinking national strategic (emphasis added) intelligence resources to growing, *tactical* (emphasis added)\nmissions.\"86  Despite other warnings from intelligence community officials that DOD budgetary cuts were forcing the armed forces to \"trim [their] tactical intelligence programs\" and thereby shift their work to the \"national\" intelligence services, Congress did not resist this \"shift of national means to tactical ends.\"87  Whether this is a smart move in the long run is not within the scope of this paper.  However, as will be discussed later in this paper, U.S. Central Command is successfully fighting the war against terrorism by using the CIA, a national strategic resource (means), in an operational/tactical-level warfight (ways) in order to achieve both the President's strategic objective (win the war on terrorism) and the operational-level objective (disrupt the use of Afghanistan as a safe haven for terrorists and destroy the military capability of the Taliban and Al Qaeda).\n\n## Covert Action Within Dod\n\nIntegrated CIA-SOF combat operations in support of Operation Enduring Freedom have transcended the typical forms of unconventional warfare performed by each agency and have even been described as a new template for warfare.  Despite the successful resurgence of CIA paramilitary covert action in the war against terrorism in Afghanistan, however, one CIA veteran has told Bob Woodward of the Washington Post that the CIA is \"not fully equipped or trained\" to perform the high-risk operations that President Bush directed in his Presidential Finding ordering the CIA to \"destroy bin Laden and Al Qaeda,\" since the Directorate of Operations, which runs covert actions, \"has been out of the business of funding and managing lethal covert action\" since the end of the Cold War.88  This opinion, although certainly not dispositive, is not new.  Back in 1987, Allan E. Goodman, relying on former CIA Director Stansfield Turner's contention that a majority of espionage professionals believe that covert activities detract from the CIA's primary mission to collect and analyze intelligence, proposed that covert action should be limited to paramilitary operations and given to the Department of Defense.89  Even earlier, in\n1975, Harry Rositzke championed the transfer of paramilitary covert action (a subset of covert action) to the Department of Defense based on his belief that the \"self-defeating amalgam of covert action and secret intelligence in one organization was key to the CIA's ineffectiveness.\"90\nIt would seem that the CIA has never seen a time in its history when someone has not been declaring the ineffectiveness of its covert actions, as many others over the years have also called for the transfer of paramilitary covert actions to the Department of Defense.\n\nRositzke's proposal to transfer the CIA's paramilitary operations to DOD makes somewhat more sense than Goodman's proposal to limit all covert action to paramilitary covert action and also transfer such to DOD.  By limiting covert action to only paramilitary action, Goodman's proposal would remove from the CIA's arsenal those non-paramilitary intelligence tools that are not appropriate for DOD or any other government agency to execute, such as influence operations, press placements, exfiltration operations, etc.  Limiting covert activities to paramilitary operations would also severely restrict the President's ability to conduct effective foreign policy.  In addition, the transfer of covert paramilitary operations to DOD would confront the military with an operational problem for which it has no prior history - i.e., the possibility that a military operation would have to be undertaken in the context of official deniability.  If the covert military operation was of vital interest to U.S. security but also extremely sensitive, the President would be vulnerable to the unfortunate possibility that one day he might have to choose between abandoning military personnel in the field in order to maintain plausible deniability, or acknowledging the covert activity, with all the second and third order affects attendant thereto.\n\nThis leads to another issue.  The use of formal military force to conduct a covert military operation amounts to an act of war in terms of international law.  If such an operation were undertaken and was somehow discovered and publicized, the President would not only lack plausible deniability, but unless he was prepared to punish severely the military personnel involved (which would be extremely difficult to do if he directed or \"permitted\" the operation), the Nation would face *de facto* and *de jure* a condition of war that had not been authorized by Congress.  By using the CIA, or some other non-military organization to undertake such missions, the President at least fuzzes the legal issue of an act of war.  While it is true that CIA covert actions can themselves amount to an act of war, the President can use the CIA to engage in an act of war without U.S. fingerprints.  This capability lies in the CIA's lap for a reason.\n\nThe following example is illustrative and assists our analysis here.  U.S. intelligence sources discover an Al Qaeda command and control headquarters in a friendly country, and the President decides it must be destroyed.  If responsibility for paramilitary covert action were to lie with the Department of Defense, then the President would direct the Secretary of Defense to conduct a deniable covert operation to destroy the terrorist headquarters.  Technically, the Department of Defense could execute the mission with minimal difficulty.  SOF possess the required skill-sets and would need only to render anonymous their fingerprints:  no uniforms or other identification tags associated with the U.S., and no weapons traceable back to the U.S. Operationally, however, several roadblocks present themselves.\n\nBy entering the friendly country with military forces in execution of a military mission, the U.S. has committed an act of war even though our interest lies not with them but in the terrorist headquarters.  [Note:  This is so regardless of whether the mission is executed by SOF in a covert mode or in a public mode, or whether it is executed by CIA paramilitary operatives, for that matter].  The Secretary of Defense's tasking to U.S. Special Operations Command to execute this covert action (\"act of war\"), however, works smoothly only if we can get SOF into and out of Pakistan without their being noticed.  In that case, we have a *de facto* war that is deniable.  If any of the SOF are captured or killed, however, we have a *de jure* act of war.  Most of the world has come to look at CIA *de facto* wars as a way of life because most powers benefit from their own CIA-equivalents operating in foreign countries, with nothing to be gained politically by claiming an act of war when another's covert action is discovered.  The world, however, is not likely to tolerate the U.S. throwing its regular military muscle around in a covert fashion.  The world will rightly ask:  Where does it stop?  If the U.S. employs SOF to conduct deniable covert action, then is the next step a clandestine tomahawk missile strike, or maybe even a missile strike whose origin is manipulated to conceal U.S. fingerprints?\n\nBy abdicating their open identification as U.S. military personnel, SOF would forfeit their Geneva Conventions status.  This is important not just because of their loss of entitlement to prisoner of war status should they be captured, but also because of their loss of lawful combatant immunity against charges of spying, or murder for anyone they killed in the operation.  SOF in this scenario could also be considered unlawful combatants.\n\nThere is another consequence if SOF forfeit their U.S. identity in a covert military operation.  If they are killed, the lack of evidence associating them with the U.S. would preserve the President's plausible deniability option, and the dead SOF personnel would not be affected because they are, after all, dead.  If SOF are captured, however, the issue is more difficult.  The President could continue to plausibly deny the operation in spite of claims by the captives that they are U.S. military personnel, although such claims would undoubtedly muddy the political waters, create a public relations challenge, and embarrass the President.  The more significant aspect to the President's decision to continue denying the operation would be that the SOF captives could expect to receive no protection or help from the U.S.  If the CIA were to conduct the operation, however, these issues disappear because CIA paramilitary operatives are trained -- from their first day in that specialty -- to accept as part of their mission the requirement to operate in the \"cold,\" without protection or help from their Government.\n\nIt is unlikely that the Secretary of Defense or anyone else could lawfully order SOF\npersonnel to conduct a covert action that would require them to forfeit their Geneva Convention status in order to retain deniability.  Clearly a commander could issue a lawful order to SOF to conduct a covert operation, but no one can order military personnel to forfeit their status as otherwise lawful combatants in the execution of that mission.  This is problematic.  Covert actions are not covert if they lose their anonymity and deniability.  SOF personnel, however, although permitted to reduce their operating profile like any good soldier, can be required only to maintain the secrecy of their mission, not to actively hide their military identity to their detriment. Accordingly, the Department of Defense would be seriously limited in its ability to execute successful covert military operations that are anonymous and deniable.  This dilemma could be solved if there is found within the SOF ranks a sufficient number willing to forfeit this status.  The method used to solicit such \"volunteers,\" however, is fraught with the dangers of undue influence, peer pressure, traditional military values, the U.S. public's long-standing expectations of how their SOF sons and daughters will be treated at the hands of the enemy, and, perhaps most important, informed consent.\n\nLastly, some form of legal instrument would likely be needed to empower and direct the Department of Defense to conduct the type and scope of covert actions heretofore conducted under the CIA's domain.  Regardless of the necessary legal mechanism, however, the issues discussed above highlight the complications associated with tasking the Department of Defense to conduct covert actions.  In the 2004 defense budget Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld provided the U.S. Special Operations Command with more budget authority and manpower to enable it to assume an expanded strategic military role.  Recent press reports have speculated that this new role will include covert actions similar to the CIA's.  If this is so, this change in roles and missions for SOF should be approached with great caution and informed analysis.\n\n## Legal Ramifications Of Integrated Cia-Sof Warfighting\n\nThere are a number of profound legal and operational issues associated with integrating CIA and SOF warfighting operations, and then managing that integrated relationship on the battlefield.  This remains so whether the operation is CIA-led, with SOF seconded to the Agency, or vice versa, with SOF in the lead and CIA seconded.  These issues are categorized in the following discussion under the general subheadings of Deniability, Lawful Action, Geneva Conventions, and Command and Control.  As these issues are discussed below, it is important to keep in mind that in integrated CIA-SOF warfighting, SOF are still conducting military operations.  The CIA paramilitary operatives are usually also performing military operations. Further, although the CIA paramilitary operatives maintain their covert cover, SOF hide only the mission and not their U.S. identity, although they have every right to reduce their profile through lawful means.  A collateral effect during integrated operations is that SOF often become the CIA paramilitaries' operational cover.\n\n## Deniability\n\nWhile some covert CIA operations receive extensive support from various military units and DOD agencies, in general the intent is for the CIA's covert operations -- because of their very purpose and nature -- to avoid overly close identification with the U.S. Government.91\nNevertheless, the more often we integrate CIA and SOF operations on the battlefield, the more we subject the covert action to an overly close identification with the U.S. Government, with resultant \"deniability\" problems.  In contrast, stand-alone SOF operations demonstrate a public commitment of U.S. military forces to protect our national interests, though the specifics may remain secret or receive little scrutiny.  Such secrecy, however, at times provides SOF the opportunity to operate closer to the edge of the law.92\n\"Paramilitary operations are the noisiest of all covert actions.\"93  Add to that noise the presence of U.S. military forces alongside CIA paramilitary operatives, and one runs the risk of making the covert action more visible to its enemies.  As the size of the operation increases, secrecy becomes more problematic, particularly if military or paramilitary forces are involved.\n\nForces mean people, and people talk.94  As the size of the operation increases, it also becomes more complicated, with the attendant possibility that something will go wrong.  For example, the end of the covert Iran-Contra operation began when a \"single American survived an airplane crash.\"95\n\n## Lawful Action\n\nAnother issue associated with integrated CIA-SOF warfighting operations is the lawfulness of each agency's methods of operations.  CIA covert paramilitary operations may be contrary to customary international law or the laws of the country in which the activity is taking place, whereas U.S. military forces routinely operate in the public domain in a legally based forum requiring them to follow international law, with all the attendant scrutiny and Mondaymorning second-guessing.  When the CIA and SOF operate together on the battlefield, the legal distinctions regarding operating authorities and procedures, and accountability, can become blurred.  While these blurred boundaries are of significant concern, they can be overcome through situational awareness and adherence to proper governing (legal) authorities.\n\nGiven that some rogue countries and non-State entities such as Al Qaeda and other terrorist groups have threatened the United States and its allies and friends with death and destruction, the U.S. must be prepared to take whatever action it deems necessary in order to protect our vital interests.96  Nevertheless, the employment of the CIA and DOD in protecting such interests must be consistent with national law.  Whereas U.S. military operations are more easily proven to be in compliance with both national and international law because they occur in the public domain, this is not the case with CIA covert operations.97  Covert actions do not imply that U.S. law is superior to that of another country's, or that of international law, but that, instead, there are overriding national interests (vital interests) that must be protected outside the framework of international law and regular diplomatic relations.98\nWhile there is a statutory requirement for CIA covert actions to comply with U.S. national law,99 there is no parallel statutory requirement for such actions to comply with international law.\n\nAccording to Ronald Kessler in Inside the CIA - Revealing the Secrets of the World's Most Powerful Spy Agency, it is the job of the Directorate of Operations (the CIA Directorate that undertakes covert action) to \"break the laws of other countries.\"100  Stansfield Turner, CIA\nDirector during the Carter Administration, stated in 1996, when comparing the CIA to the FBI, a law enforcement agency, that \"The FBI agent's first reaction when given a job is, 'How do I do this within the law?',\" whereas the CIA agent's first reaction when given a mission is, \"How do I\ndo this regardless of the law of the country in which I am operating?\"101  When William Webster became Director of the CIA after the Iran-Contra affair, however, he reemphasized the need to ensure CIA activities complied at a minimum with U.S. national law, if not international law.  One of his policy imperatives was to make sure that every proposal from the White House and National Security Council not only made sense, but also complied with established U.S. law and precedent.  He did this by testing every covert action proposal \"against a set of unvarying questions:  Does it fall within U.S. law?  What would happen if it became public?  Will the public understand it?  Finally, will it work?\"102\nThe DOD, on the other hand, is legally bound to execute its military operations in accordance not only with national law but also the international treaties governing the laws of armed conflict to which the U.S. is a signatory.  Further, U.S. government policy dictates that U.S. military forces must \"comply with the law of war during all armed conflicts, however such conflicts are characterized, and with the principles and spirit of the law of war during all other operations.\"103  This policy edict is important for two reasons:  First, the laws of war generally apply only to international armed conflicts between nation-states (and organized resistance movements under certain circumstances);104 second, the laws of war usually do not govern the conduct of military personnel against non-State actors in law enforcement operations.105  Thus, even though the U.S.-led war against terrorism is not an international armed conflict between nation-states, U.S. military forces must adhere to the international laws of war as codified in the various Geneva and Hague Conventions.\n\nThe CIA, however, is under no similar requirement regarding international law.  This provides the U.S. with tremendous flexibility when it implements foreign policy.  Because of the additional legal constraints imposed on the DOD, however, we must be careful to maintain a well-delineated separation between the CIA and DOD when they integrate their battlefield operations.\n\nAccountability and control of CIA paramilitary covert actions on the battlefield are just as vital as they are for SOF operations if all such activities are to remain legitimate instruments of U.S. foreign policy.  Accountability and control demonstrate that regardless of the mixture of CIA-SOF forces on the battlefield, their integrated operations are compatible with our democratic form of government because they are conducted with accountability and adherence to the law.106  For CIA covert activities to remain a viable option in furtherance of our national security, they must also have the support of the American people in overarching concept, if not the details.  In this regard, the CIA is ultimately accountable to the American people -- whether directly, or through the Congress.107\nThis accountability and control are assured because, as discussed previously, the U.S.\n\nCode mandates that covert actions not be contrary to the U.S. Constitution or our Nation's laws.108  This also means that CIA operatives remain subject to international norms, human rights laws, and war crimes prosecutions, should they get themselves into that situation.109  This accountability is further ensured in that, as noted earlier, CIA covert actions must be authorized by the President, and the Agency must report to the House and Senate Intelligence committees for accountability and oversight purposes.110\n\n## Geneva Conventions\n\nDuring the U.S. Civil War, the Lincoln Administration commissioned Francis Lieber, a professor at Columbia College, to draft a code of the laws of war, which became the basis of The Hague and Geneva Conventions, to which the United States is a signatory.111  In 1863 Mr.\n\nLieber advised President Lincoln and the Union Army that guerrillas, spies, and saboteurs could be summarily shot.112\nBecause CIA personnel operate without uniforms or identification as U.S. Government officers -- even though their arsenal includes airplanes, helicopters, and unmanned aerial Predators armed with Hellfire missiles, all typically thought of as military equipment -- they are not normally afforded the protections of the Geneva Conventions, whereas regular military forces are.  In a combat operation where CIA and SOF forces are tightly integrated, the result could be that, if captured, the SOF soldiers are afforded Geneva Convention protections while the CIA operatives are not; further, CIA operatives might even be considered by the enemy to be unlawful combatants.  Worse, the intermingling of CIA and SOF forces/operations could result in our enemy, unable to distinguish between the two groups, categorizing all captives as unlawful combatants.\n\nWhile this lack of lawful combatant status is a condition that CIA paramilitary operatives work under daily, such is not the case for U.S. military personnel.  Further, from a practical standpoint, should such a dilemma arise, would U.S. officials be willing to stand up and say, \"the SOF captives are prisoners of war entitled to Geneva Convention protections, but the CIA operatives you are holding captive are not\"?  Are U.S. officials equipped with such moral courage?  How would the American public react to such a statement, even if they knew the officials spoke the truth about the status of the CIA captives?  Additionally, how would we explain the presence of CIA operatives with military forces but, more importantly, if we decide to officially acknowledge their presence on the battlefield, how would we categorize their status: lawful combatants (even if they are not wearing uniforms or distinctive insignia)? Noncombatants?  Entitled to Geneva Conventions protections?  There may be no good answers to these questions when we must resort to protecting our national interests through CIA paramilitary operations.\n\nIn some conflicts, such as the current war against terrorism, the issue of whether Geneva Convention status applies to SOF but not to CIA operatives may be irrelevant in law, though not irrelevant in diplomatic relations and on the political stage.  As noted earlier, the laws of war generally apply only to international armed conflicts between nation-states (and organized resistance movements under certain circumstances).113  This means that the Geneva Conventions apply normally when *nations* fight.  So, if members of an integrated CIA-SOF team are captured by a *State* actor (e.g., a member of the Armed Forces of a hostile country) during an international armed conflict, the CIA operatives normally would not be entitled to prisoner of war/Geneva Conventions status, whereas the military team members would, so long as they do not meet one of the exceptions, such as acting as spies or saboteurs in hostile territory.  If that same CIA-SOF team is captured by a *non-State* actor, such as a terrorist group, the military members are technically not prisoners of war but are instead crime victims - hostages, in fact, subject to immediate release under Geneva Convention III.114  In such a case, the U.S. could legally demand that all of the captives, both CIA operatives and SOF, be immediately released.\n\nThe U.S. could also argue on the stage of world opinion that all captives -- whether CIA or SOF -- should be treated by their non-State captors in accordance with the Geneva Conventions as a matter of policy, just as the U.S. does even when a conflict does not rise to the level of an international armed conflict.  That argument is likely to fail, however, given the Bush Administration's decision to classify all Taliban and Al Qaeda fighters as unlawful combatants not entitled to prisoner of war status, although the Administration's policy is to treat them in a manner consistent with the principles of the Geneva Conventions.\n\n## Command And Control\n\nAs a consequence of the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of\n1986, 115 Unified Combatant Commanders116 are charged with overseeing all military operations in their regional areas of responsibility, whether conducted by conventional military forces or SOF.117  Title 10, U.S. Code, Section 162(a)(4) states with more specificity that, \"except as otherwise directed by the Secretary of Defense, all forces operating within the geographic area assigned to a unified combatant command shall be assigned to, and under the command of, the commander of that command.\"118  Further, a combatant commander is responsible to the President and to the Secretary of Defense for the performance of missions assigned to that command.119  To implement this authority in military regulations, DOD Directive 5100.1, Functions of the Department of Defense and Its Major Components, assigns the combatant commanders with the command function to employ forces within that combatant command as he considers necessary to carry out missions assigned to the command.120  Of additional note is the fact that commanders of commands and forces assigned to a combatant command are under the authority, direction, and control of, and are responsible to, the combatant commander on all matters for which the combatant commander has been assigned authority.121\nStated more succinctly, the combatant commander has the responsibility for missions in his geographical area of command, and commands all military forces assigned to his area of responsibility.  The combatant commander, however, has no specific statutory authority over other U.S.  Government personnel in his area of operations, such as CIA paramilitary operatives.  Accordingly, when CIA paramilitary operatives are integrated with SOF in a warfighting operation in a combatant commander's area of operations, the combatant commander has no authority over those CIA paramilitary operatives -- whose very presence in that integrated mix is in furtherance of a military mission -- unless the President has given him such authority.  This lack of authority over all participants in the combatant commander's military mission can potentially but not necessarily handicap the combatant commander's statutory responsibility to the President and Secretary of Defense to accomplish his assigned missions. Accordingly, this potential problem must be addressed up front in the planning stages of every military operation in which integrated CIA-SOF operations may be employed.\n\nOne way to resolve this potential problem would be to place CIA paramilitary assets directly under the authority and control of the regional combatant commanders.  One journalist, Nathan Hodge of Defense Week, has opined that in wartime the CIA Director is \"supposed to put all CIA assets within a given command region . . . under the operational control of the regional commander in chief\" because the CIA is mainly an intelligence gathering agency, with military operations not one of its core, or traditional competencies.122  Hodge reinforces his opinion on this matter with his assertion that when the CIA receives information of value to U.S. commanders, it should turn such information over to the \"professional\" [U.S. military]\nwarfighters.123  Hodge also asserts that even though officers from the CIA's predecessor agency, the Office of Strategic Services (OSS), worked under military commanders in World War II, the CIA in Afghanistan today is conducting its own campaign independent of U.S.\n\nCentral Command.  Hodge proposes that this is consistent with the CIA's pattern of \"resisting subordination to military command,\" and he cites as examples the CIA's covert paramilitary actions in Honduras, Nicaragua, and El Salvador during the 1980s, where the CIA completely bypassed the Combatant Commander of U.S. Southern Command.124  Hodge fails to note, however, that all such CIA operations are undertaken at the order of the President, the Commander-in-Chief.\n\nAnother opinion in a vein similar to that of Hodge's is that of Michael Vickers, a former Army Green Beret and CIA official and now the Director of Strategic Studies at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments.  According to a press report quoting Mr. Vickers, all of the CIA operatives in Afghanistan, including the operators of the Predator drones, are supposed to report to U.S. Central Command, but they also report to the CIA's Near-East Division, which is responsible for Afghanistan and Pakistan.125  However, Vickers notes that not all CIA\nparamilitary operatives have diligently consulted with, much less reported to, their military commanders, leading to some friction.126\nIn an article written before and independent of Hodge's, Douglas Waller, writing for Time magazine, made some additional observations.  According to Waller, after Vietnam and the scandals of the 1970s, the CIA practically disbanded its paramilitary force, and when they subsequently needed paramilitary experts for their own covert actions against the Soviets in Afghanistan or to train contra rebels in Nicaragua, the Agency \"borrowed\" Army Green Berets or Navy SEALs, or hired retired SOF on a contract basis.  Waller also noted that, in the past two years, CIA Director George Tenet has expanded the CIA's paramilitary force to the point where, according to one intelligence source cited by Waller, \"the CIA is practically creating its own army, navy and air force.\"127\nAnother way to resolve this potential problem (i.e., the combatant commander's lack of direct authority and control over CIA paramilitary operatives in his area of responsibility) is for the CIA paramilitary operatives to maintain their separate (CIA) line of authority but be required to coordinate and consult directly with the combatant commander when they will be part of an integrated CIA-SOF warfighting operation.  This option is more practical and realistic in a large scale military operation such as the global war on terrorism.  For example, it is working successfully in Afghanistan today, although on an *ad hoc* rather than a formalized (required coordination and consultation) basis.  In his book Bush at War, Bob Woodward describes how \"Hank,\" the CIA's counterterrorism special operations chief met with General Tommy Franks, commander of U.S. Central Command, and made it clear that the CIA paramilitary teams in Afghanistan would be \"working for Franks,\" somewhat contrary to recent practice, as \"partners\"\nwith the military.128  This option will not only help to reduce the potential problem discussed above, but will preserve the combatant commander's operational flexibility to capitalize on the strengths that each agency (CIA and DOD/SOF) brings to the battlefield by applying the force most advantageous to successful mission accomplishment.\n\nIn further support of this option, CIA operatives are reportedly working \"hand in glove\" with SOF and have provided a \"crucial eyes-on-the-ground capability,\" while still reporting through CIA operational channels.129  CIA paramilitary operatives are small in number, flexible, and generally freer from bureaucratic hierarchies than their SOF counterparts, who must usually jump through 18 food chains, 20 levels of paperwork and 22 hoops before they can take action.130  CIA operatives are able to use cash and other favors, such as supplying modern combat gear, to buy loyalty and information from tribal warlords in Afghanistan, whereas military forces do not possess such legal authorities.131  Another advantage to using CIA paramilitary operatives is that their ability to pinpoint the enemy is in many cases more humane than a fullscale military assault because the result will generally be fewer civilian casualties.132  In a war against terrorists, where the enemy does not wear uniforms and intermingles with the local populace, CIA paramilitary operatives are better able to distinguish the \"good guys from the bad guys\" and thus identify the right targets.133\nNevertheless, close cooperation and intermingling between the CIA and SOF is fraught with danger given their respective cultures, operational modes, sources of information, and oversight structures.134  For example, the CIA did not always obtain landing rights from neighboring countries before it moved its teams into Afghanistan, and it was free to ignore the traditional military requirement when going into combat to be backed up with an extraction plan and search-and-rescue teams.  If the CIA teams got into any trouble, they were on their own.135\nIntegrated CIA and SOF warfighting operations, accordingly, invite significant legal and operational issues associated with deniability, legality, Geneva Conventions status, and command and control.  These issues can be minimized or even overcome, however, if this integrated relationship is managed in a coordinated manner that best preserves the combatant commander's flexibility in battle by capitalizing on the strengths and capabilities that each agency brings to the fight.\n\n## Additional Issues Associated With Integrated Cia-Sof Warfighting.\n\nThree additional concerns associated with integrated CIA-SOF warfighting merit comment.\n\n## Capabilities-Shifting\n\nWe must be careful to capitalize on what the CIA brings to the fight, not give them a military mission to execute in DOD's stead.  While the CIA's covert paramilitary capability is a valuable and attractive means of operation compared to the usual \"noise\" of military combat operations, both agencies must be careful to ensure that their integrated operations do not negatively affect the positive capabilities of each.  For example, is CIA-SOF warfighting integration true capabilities-shifting, i.e., a reasonable means of \"outsourcing\" by the National Security Council in order to use the CIA as supplemental warfighters alongside SOF?  Or, is such integration merely burden-shifting from the DOD to the CIA based on the CIA's high-speed low-drag flexibility and reduced span of complexity?  If it is burden-shifting by the DOD, how would this affect DOD writ large as the various military departments transform themselves to deal more effectively and efficiently with future threats?  These policy implications suggest strongly that we must capitalize on each agency's strength and capabilities in combat, not cannibalize each other's missions or shift unwanted burdens.\n\n## Congressional Oversight\n\nIt is difficult for Congress to provide effective oversight of integrated CIA and SOF\noperations, as different sets of committees with disparate agendas and jurisdictions attend this issue.  The ways by which the U.S. Congress funds and oversees both the CIA and DOD may not be optimized to support their evolving and overlapping mission in the war against terrorism.136  Further, it is already difficult to provide effective and seamless oversight of intelligence activities and military operations abroad;137 to attempt to do so over shared missions imposes an even greater challenge.  For covert operations to remain a legitimate national tool, however, this very accountability and control are vital.  The fact that Congressional oversight will be more difficult does not militate against the viability of integrated CIA-SOF combat operations as a legitimate tool of U.S. foreign policy.\n\n## Targeting\n\nBoth SOF and CIA personnel on the ground in Afghanistan have provided \"real-time and near-real-time\" targeting data - using either laser designators or radios and laptops to call in global positioning system coordinates to U.S. aircraft flying over the battlefield.138  Yet there were difficulties in a few of the new targeting tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) that had to be hurriedly fielded between the CIA and DOD, and even though the targeting tactics, techniques, and procedures were improved on the battlefield as the war progressed, \"as many as a dozen opportunities to strike high-value but time-critical targets\" were lost in the first weeks of the war in Afghanistan.139  Some of these problems were due to interoperability issues between the CIA and DOD, while others were due to \"the length of the decision loop - the time required from when a sensor detects a target to when it can be identified and approved by a human operator.\"140  Nevertheless, when compared to each other, the CIA's targeting process is usually quicker, more fluid, and encompasses fewer decision-makers in its \"trigger-pulling chain of command\" than DOD's141  According to one anonymous senior defense official in November\n2002, today's military is still not designed to move with speed or agility, despite its success in Afghanistan.142\nTarget engagement in integrated CIA-SOF operations involves another major coordination concern, namely, the increased difficulties in preventing friendly fire incidents on battlefields where other government agencies are operating, like Afghanistan.  For example, during Operation Anaconda in Afghanistan in March 2002, CIA assets operating on the ground wanted large No Fire Areas over each of their positions, \"many of which covered key terrain of interest\"\nto the joint and coalition unconventional warfare and special reconnaissance teams.143  The use of large No Fire Areas would have denied these unconventional warfare and special reconnaissance teams the flexibility they needed to engage targets in those areas.  To address this problem, Coalition Joint Task Force - Mountain (CJTF-Mountain) employed Restricted Fire Areas instead.  Restricted Fire Areas enabled the approving ground tactical commander to engage targets he deemed necessary, while facilitating unconventional warfare and special reconnaissance team movement and allowing the commander to set the conditions for future engagements,144 and continuing to provide friendly fire protection for all concerned.  Keeping up to date with all of the CIA assets and non-government agency personnel on the ground and their changing locations was often a significant challenge, however.  Although CJTF-Mountain executed an incredibly effective and successful targeting plan while meeting the legitimate concerns of the CIA and non-government agencies, this issue is critical.  To prevent fratricide on a battlefield such as that confronted in Afghanistan, where there is no clear front or rear, all participants must work together before the fight to establish interoperable communications in targeting cells and intelligence fusion centers, as well as same-meaning terminology - with all forces clear on the operational terminology and the meaning of those terms.145\n\n## Recommendation\n\nIn order to win the war on terrorism decisively and with dispatch, the President should continue this new policy of employing CIA paramilitary operatives in a warfighting role alongside SOF in combat.  To better manage this new policy, however, the CIA and DOD should jointly develop clear, well-understood procedures that ensure close and effective coordination and that provide for the seamless sharing of battlefield information.\n\nInteragency coordination and cohesion of strategy are the vital links in this new template for warfare.146  To implement this new policy and ensure a seamless sharing of battlefield information and a consolidated unity of effort on the battlefield, the Joint Interagency Coordinating Group at each combatant command should develop or expand as appropriate the following:\nJoint Interagency Coordinating Groups.  These groups, headquartered at each unified combatant command, should be composed of liaison officers from any and all organizations that can potentially be helpful to the combatant commander.\n\nInteragency Coordination Annex (Annex V).147  An Annex V should be included in every combatant command contingency plan to ensure the integration of all pertinent instruments of national power into the combatant commander's deliberate planning process, and to articulate the combatant commander's criteria for entry and exit conditions for other U.S. Government agencies during an operation.  Annex V should also serve as the combatant commander's vehicle to identify major missions and tasks for interagency coordination; to identify interagency issues arising with each phase of military operations; to develop follow-on interagency politicalmilitary planning; and to request other relevant interagency activities.148\nNew Procedures to Govern Integrated Operations.  These procedures should address doctrine, training, policies, and coordination, to ensure their synchronization on the battlefield. Herein lies a thorny thicket of command and control issues, which should be resolved in a manner that provides the combatant commander with more sharply focused unity of command, and the requisite authority -- however defined and accomplished -- over CIA operatives during combat operations to accomplish his assigned tasks.  Unity of command necessarily requires clearly defined authorities, roles, and relationships.149  If CIA operatives are going to be involved in warfighting missions on the battlefield, then they should be responsible to the combatant commander in some organized and formal shape or form.\n\nLaws of War.  A working group should be established to formally develop procedures to protect SOF forces from inadvertently violating the Laws of War when they intermingle their operations with CIA operations.  This working group should also study and develop legal bases to protect CIA paramilitary operatives and associated SOF from allegations that they are unlawful combatants (this is an issue only for periods of legally recognized armed conflict).\n\nTraining Plan.  An interagency training plan should be developed to delineate and incorporate coordination measures.\n\nTraining Exercise.  An interagency training exercise should take place to validate the training plan and coordination measures.\n\nMemorandum of Understanding.  This memorandum of understanding should be between the CIA and DOD (and any other agency as deemed necessary) and should outline the authorities and responsibilities of both agencies when they operate together in combat in order to ensure unity of effort.\n\nAlthough there is no overarching interagency doctrine that specifies or even dictates the procedures and relationships governing all organizations involved in interagency operations, Joint Publication 3-08, Interagency Coordination During Joint Operations, and Presidential Decision Directive-56, Managing Complex Contingency Operations, provide useful general guidance and procedures for planning and managing complex operations.150\n\n## Conclusion\n\nChanged international realities require the U.S. to adapt its response to transnational threats by employing CIA paramilitary operatives in a warfighting role alongside SOF. According to former Senate Intelligence Committee Chairman Bob Graham, Democrat - Florida, \"The type of combat we're likely to be in from now on is not World War II, with mass tank attacks, but rather this type of small-unit operation where good intelligence, operational intelligence is the key to your success. . . . We've asked the question [about coordination] consistently . . . and we've gotten . . . increasingly positive statements about the close and effective relationship between intelligence and war fighters.\"151  This integration blurs organizational boundaries, however, and for policy reasons, legal protections, and operational effectiveness, we must develop new procedures to deal with these blurred boundaries.  Further, there is a concomitant need for both groups to maintain a well-delineated separation between themselves.  Without this separation, we risk losing the political and military value of covert operations, and invite the perception that we are attempting to avoid customary international law and the laws of war by disguising SOF operations as CIA operations or, more likely, vice versa.\n\nBecause America's political-military activities are increasingly colored by self-imposed legal constraints as well as the weight of world opinion, choosing between CIA covert action, military action, or a combination of the two, presents important and difficult challenges to America's senior policy-makers.  Competing interests must be weighed and balanced, and compromises will surely have to be made.152  In that the political object to be had by war will affect not only the level of effort to be made but also the conduct of the operations, it is also appropriate to quote Carl von Clausewitz, who rejected the idea that there is only one \"best path to victory, finding instead that 'many roads lead to success.'\"153\nWord Count = 10,740\n\n## Endnotes\n\n1 In October 1996, Uzbek and Tajik factions in the geographical northern third of Afghanistan formed the \"Northern Alliance\" to combat the Taliban.  Since then the Northern Alliance became known as the umbrella grouping of anti-Taliban forces in Afghanistan.  See\n\"Country Profile: Afghanistan,\" World News Digest, 29 August 2002; available from http://www.2facts.com/ancillaries/index/c00002.asp.html; Internet; accessed 29 August 2002. See also \"Afghanistan - Countrywatch;\" available from http://www.countrywatch.com/cw_topic.asp?vCOUNTRY=1&SECTION=SUB&TOPIC=POPCO& T.html; Internet; accessed 29 August 2002.\n\n2 Osama bin Laden is an Islamic fundamentalist believed by intelligence officials to be the leader of Al Qaeda, an international terrorist network.  See Endnote 6, *supra*.  Bin Laden was born in Saudi Arabia in 1957 to a Yemeni-born Saudi billionaire.  Osama bin Laden left Saudi Arabia in 1991 after aiding groups opposed to the reigning Fahd family, taking his $250 million inheritance with him.  Bin Laden's sworn hostility to the United States purportedly stems from Saudi Arabia's 1990 decision to permit the U.S. to station troops on Saudi soil after Iraq invaded Kuwait.  Bin Laden has issued *fatwahs* (religious rulings) encouraging Muslims to kill Americans.  See \"Facts on Osama bin Laden,\" World News Digest, 29 August 2002; available from http://www.2facts.com/ancillaries/index/b00222.asp.html; Internet; accessed 29 August 2002.\n\n3 Al Qaeda (Arabic for \"the base\") is an international terrorist network formed around 1987\nby Osama bin Laden and militants from the Egyptian Islamic Jihad as a base for their worldwide crusade.  See \"Facts on Osama bin Laden,\" World News Digest, 29 August 2002; available from http://www.2facts.com/ancillaries/index/b00222.asp.html; Internet; accessed 29 August 2002.  Al Qaeda \"terrorists practice a fringe form of Islamic extremism that has been rejected by Muslim scholars and the vast majority of Muslim clerics . . . The terrorists' directive commands them to kill Christians and Jews, to kill all Americans and make no distinctions among military and civilians, including women and children.\"  See \"World Trade Center and Pentagon Terrorist Attacks: Transcript of Bush's Speech to Congress,\" World News Digest, 27 September 2002; available from http://www.2facts.com/stories/index/2001227310.asp.html; Internet; accessed 29 August 2002.\n\n4 Bob Woodward, Bush at War (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2002), 40. *See also* Bob Drogin, \"U.S. Had Plan for Covert Afghan Options Before 9/11,\" Los Angeles Times, sec. A, p. 14 (1074 words) [database on-line]; available from Lexis-Nexis; accessed 29 August 2002.\n\n5 United Airlines Flight # 93 crashed near Shanksville, Pennsylvania when passengers fought back against four terrorists who had hijacked the airliner.  Passengers learned from cellular telephone calls with family members and friends on the ground that three other airliners had been hijacked minutes earlier and flown into the Twin Towers and the Pentagon.  Because the terrorists had turned Flight # 93 back east, away from its intended West Coast destination, passengers believed the hijackers were trying to fly the plane back to a target in the D.C. area when they fought back.  Several months later, U.S. officials said that captured senior Al Qaeda leader Abu Zubaydah had told them that Flight 93 was intended to hit the White House on 11 September 2001.  See \"White House Target of Flight 93, Officials Say,\" CNN.COM, 23 May 2002; available from http://www.cnn.com/2002/US/05/23/flight.93/index.html; Internet; accessed 17 March 2003.\n\n6 An \"act of terrorism\" means an activity that involves a violent act or an act dangerous to human life that is a violation of the criminal laws of the United States or of any State . . . and appears to be intended to intimidate or coerce a civilian population; to influence the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion; or to affect the conduct of a government by assassination or kidnapping. Title 18, U.S. Code, Section 3077, Definitions (Section 3077 is a part of Chapter 204, Rewards for Information Concerning Terrorist Acts and Espionage).  DOD Directive 2000.12, DOD Antiterrorism/Force Protection (ATFP) Program, 13 April 1999, defines \"terrorism\" as the \"calculated use of violence or threat of violence to inculcate fear; intended to coerce or to intimidate governments or societies in the pursuit of goals that are generally political, religious, or ideological.\"  Department of Defense, DOD Antiterrorism/Force Protection (ATFP) Program, Department of Defense Directive 2000.12 (Washington, D.C.:  U.S. Department of Defense, 1 April 1999).\n\n7 Amy Westfeldt, \"9/11 Cost for NYC Tops $33 Billion,\" The Patriot-News, 13 November\n2002, sec. A, p. 8.  The total worldwide economic loss impact has been estimated to top $600\nbillion, a \"strategically significant\" event according to remarks made by a speaker participating in the Commandant's Lecture Series at the Army War College in 2002.\n\n8 \"The deliberate and deadly attacks, which were carried out yesterday against our country, were more than acts of terror.  They were acts of war.\"  See \"Hijacked Jets Destroy World Trade Center, Hit Pentagon:  Text of President Bush's September 12 Statement,\" World News Digest, 13 September 2001; available from http://www.2facts.com/stories/index/2001226370.asp.html; Internet; accessed 29 August 2002.  *See also* United States Congress, Report on Actions Taken to Respond to the Threat of Terrorism Communication from the President of the United States Transmitting a Report, Consistent with the War Powers Resolution and Senate Joint Resolution 23, to Help Ensure that the Congress is Kept Fully Informed on Actions Taken to Respond to the Threat of Terrorism, 107th Cong., 1st sess., 25 September 2001.  This report became House Document 107-127.  *See also* United States Congress, Senate Joint Resolution\n23: Authorization for Use of United States Armed Forces, 107th Cong., 1st sess., 14 September\n2001.  This joint resolution became Public Law on September 20, 2001 (see P.L. 107-40).\n\n9 United States Congress, Senate Joint Resolution 23: Authorization for Use of United States Armed Forces, 107th Cong., 1st sess., 14 September 2002.  This joint resolution became Public Law on September 20, 2002 (see P.L. 107-40).\n\n10 Bob Woodward, \"Secret CIA Units Playing a Central Combat Role,\" The Washington Post, 18 November 2001, sec. A, p. 1 [database on-line]; available from ProQuest; accessed 29 August 2002.  *See also* Presidential Approval and Reporting of Covert Actions, U.S. Code, Title\n50, sec. 413b (2002).\n\n11 Jim Pavitt, Deputy Director for Operations, Central Intelligence Agency, Text of Address to Duke University Law School Conference (as delivered), 11 April 2002; available from http://www.cia.gov/cia/public_affairs/speeches/archives/2002/pavitt_04262002.html;  Internet; accessed 17 March 2003.  *See also* Maxim Kniazkov, \"CIA Creates Super Secret Hit Team to Target Terrorists Abroad,\" Agence France Presse, 4 June 2002, p. 1 (547 words) [database online]; available from Lexis-Nexis; accessed 29 August 2002.\n\n12 Ibid., 101, 134-135.\n\n13 United States Congress, Report on Actions Taken to Respond to the Threat of Terrorism Communication from the President of the United States Transmitting a Report, Consistent with the War Powers Resolution and Senate Joint Resolution 23, to Help Ensure that the Congress is Kept Fully Informed on Actions Taken to Respond to the Threat of Terrorism, 107th Cong., 1st sess., 25 September 2001.  This report became House Document 107-127.  See also Alexander Hamilton, \"Federalist No. 74:  The Command of the Military and Naval Forces, and the Pardoning Power of the Executive,\" Federalist Papers, from the New York Packet, 25 March 1788 (\"The President of the United States is to be commander-in-chief of the army and navy of the United States, and of the militia of the several States when called into the actual service of the United States.\").\n\n14 On September 27, 1996, members of the Islamic Taliban (Religious Students Movement), a Moslem fundamentalist group composed largely of former theology students, displaced the ruling members of the Afghan Government and declared themselves -- the Taliban -- the legitimate government of Afghanistan.  The Taliban were never recognized by the United Nations.  See \"CIA -- The World Factbook -- Afghanistan;\" available from http://www.cia.gov.cia/publications/factbook/geos/af.html; Internet; accessed 29 August 2002.\n\nSee also \"Afghanistan - Countrywatch;\" available from http://www.countrywatch.com/cw_topic.asp?vCOUNTRY=1&SECTION=SUB&TOPIC=POPCO& T.html; Internet; accessed 29 August 2002.\n\n15 \"Bush's Address Announcing Military Strikes Against Afghanistan:  Text,\" World News Digest, 11 October 2001; available from http://www.2facts.com/stories/index/2001228130.asp.html; Internet; accessed 29 August 2002.\n\n16 The CQ Researcher, Intelligence Reforms, Washington, D.C.: CQ Press, 25 January\n2002, vol. 12, no. 3.  *See also* Bob Woodward, Bush at War (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2002), 139.\n\n17 See Endnote 1, *supra*. 18 Bob Woodward, Bush at War (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2002), 101, 134, 141. See also Associated Press, \"CIA Plays High-Profile Military Role in Afghanistan with US-CIA- Shadow Army,\" Associated Press Worldstream, 20 May 2002, p.1 (379 words) [database online]; available from Lexis-Nexis; accessed 29 August 2002; and Evan Thomas and Colin Soloway, \"A Street Fight,\" Newsweek, 29 April 2002, sec. International, p. 30 (2596 words) [database on-line]; available from Lexis-Nexis; accessed 29 August 2002.  *See also* Bob Woodward, Bush at War (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2002), 193.\n\n19 Bob Woodward, Bush at War (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2002), 101, 134. 20 \"World Trade Center and Pentagon Terrorist Attacks: Transcript of Bush's Speech to Congress,\" World News Digest, 27 September 2002; available from http://www.2facts.com/stories/index/2001227310.asp.html; Internet; accessed 29 August 2002.\n\n21 Bob Woodward, Bush at War (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2002), 90. 22 Richard B. Myers, National Military Strategy of the United States of America (Pre-\nDecisional Draft) (Washington, D.C.:  The Pentagon, 19 September 2002).\n\n23 *See generally* Pat M. Holt, Secret Intelligence and Public Policy - A Dilemma of Democracy (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly Inc., 1995), 149-156.\n\n24 Bob Woodward, \"CIA Told to Do 'Whatever Necessary' to Kill Bin Laden,\" The Washington Post, 21 October 2001; available from http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wpdyn/A27452-2001Oct20; Internet; accessed 26 September 2002.  *See also* Associated Press, \"CIA Plays High-Profile Military Role in Afghanistan with US-CIA-Shadow Army,\" Associated Press Worldstream, 20 May 2002, p.1 (379 words) [database on-line]; available from Lexis- Nexis; accessed 29 August 2002.  *See also generally* Ronald Kessler, Inside the CIA - Revealing the Secrets of the World's Most Powerful Spy Agency (New York: Pocket Books, 1992); and Charles D.  Ameringer, U.S. Foreign Intelligence - The Secret Side of American History (Lexington, Massachusetts: Lexington Books, 1990).\n\n25 Bob Woodward, \"CIA Told to Do 'Whatever Necessary' to Kill Bin Laden,\" The Washington Post, 21 October 2001; available from http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wpdyn/A27452-2001Oct20; Internet; accessed 26 September 2002.  *See also* Bob Woodward, Bush at War (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2002), 166.\n\n26 Ibid. 27 Dana Priest, \"'Team 555' Shaped a New Way of War; Special Forces and Smart Bombs Turned Tide and Routed Taliban,\" The Washington Post - Final Edition, 3 April 2002, sec. A, p. 1 (4014 words) [database on-line]; available from Lexis-Nexis; accessed 29 August 2002.\n\n28 Ibid.  \"Phil [from the CIA's analytical branch] gave a briefing on the mission: The next day, the team [SOF Team 555] would join up with commanders allied with Massoud's successor, Gen. Mohammed Fahim, the Northern Alliance's defense minister. . . . First, they [Team 555] were to help U.S. warplanes destroy the Taliban front line around that airfield. Then, they were to search for and destroy Taliban and Al Qaeda targets in the 35-mile stretch south to Kabul. Finally, they were to help the alliance seize Kabul . . . When Phil introduced [the team members] to Bismullah Khan at their next safe house . . . he said, 'Here's the Special Forces team I've been promising you.'\"  *See also* Jonathan Weisman, \"CIA, Pentagon Feuding Complicates War Effort,\" USA Today, 17 June 2002, sec. A, p. 11 (1534 words) [database on-line]; available from Lexis-Nexis; accessed 29 August 2002.\n\n29 Bryan Bender, Kim Burger, and Andrew Koch, \"Afghanistan:  First Lessons,\" Jane's Special Reports, 14 December 2001; available from http://www.janes.com.html; Internet; accessed 12 September 2002.\n\n30 Bob Woodward, Bush at War (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2002), 166. 31 Ibid., 202. 32 Thom Shanker and James Risen, \"Rumsfeld Weighs New Covert Acts by Military Units,\"\nThe New York Times, Late Edition - Final, 12 August 2002, sec. A, p. 1 (1604 words) [database on-line]; available from Lexis-Nexis; accessed 29 August 2002.\n\n33 Ibid. 34 See Endnote 19, *supra*.\n\n35 Jim Pavitt, Deputy Director for Operations, Central Intelligence Agency, Text of Address to Duke University Law School Conference (as delivered), 11 April 2002; available from http://www.cia.gov/cia/public_affairs/speeches/archives/2002/pavitt_04262002.html;  Internet; accessed 17 March 2003.  *See also* Bob Drogin, \"U.S. Had Plan for Covert Afghan Options Before 9/11,\" Los Angeles Times, sec. A, p. 14 (1074 words) [database on-line]; available from Lexis-Nexis; accessed 29 August 2002.\n\n36 J. Daniel Moore, \"CIA Support to Operation Enduring Freedom,\" Military Intelligence Professional Bulletin, vol. 28, iss. 3 (Jul-Sep 2002): 46 [database on-line]; available from ProQuest; accessed 29 August 2002.\n\n37 Ron Kampeas, \"CIA's Paramilitary Scores Successes,\" Associated Press Online, 20 May\n2002, p. 1 (968 words) [database on-line]; available from Lexis-Nexis; accessed 29 August 2002.  *See also* Bryan Bender, Kim Burger, and Andrew Koch, \"Afghanistan:  First Lessons,\" Jane's Special Reports, 14 December 2001; available from http://www.janes.com.html; Internet;\naccessed 12 September 2002 (\"U.S. Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld has denied any coordination problems, saying the CIA forces on the ground 'are tucked in very tight with the U.S. military.'\")\n38 See Constitution of the United States, Article I, Section 8; and Article II, Section 2. 39 *See generally* Armed Forces, U.S. Code, Title 10 (2002). 40 Department of Defense, Functions of the Department of Defense and Its Major Components, Department of Defense Directive 5100.1 (Washington, D.C.:  U.S. Department of Defense, 1 August 2002), 4.\n\n41 The mission to capture Arnold was aborted when Arnold's change in travel plans made his capture impossible.  See \"Intelligence Operations (Wartime Special Operations),\" 2 October 2002; available from http://www.cia.gov/csi/books/warindep/intellopos.html; Internet; accessed 2 October 2002.  Other examples of special operations in the colonial era include Major Robert Rogers, who led the New England Companies of Rangers in the French and Indian War; Francis Marion (aka the \"Swamp Fox\"), a guerilla leader during the American Revolutionary War; and Sergeant Ezra Lee, who used an oak submersible to attack a British frigate in New York Harbor in August 1776.  See United States Special Operations Command, Special Operations in Peace and War, United States Special Operations Command Pub 1 (Washington, D.C.:  U.S. Special Operations Command, 25 January 1996), 2-2.\n\n42 Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986, Public Law 99-\n433, 99th U.S. Congress, October 1, 1986, codified at  U.S. Code, Title 10, Subtitle A, Part 1, Chapter 5.  With respect to Special Operations Forces in particular, see Unified Combatant Command for Special Operations Forces, U.S. Code, Title 50, section 167 (2002).\n\n43 Rowan Scarborough, \"Rumsfeld Gives 'Blank Sheet' to Update Special Operations,\" The Washington Times, 21 November 2002, p. 15.\n\n44 For a list of special operations activities, see Unified Combatant Command for Special Operations Forces, U.S. Code, Title 10, sec. 167(j) (2002).  *See also* United States Special Operations Command, Special Operations in Peace and War, United States Special Operations Command Pub 1 (Washington, D.C.:  U.S. Special Operations Command, 25 January 1996), 3- 2 - 3-6.\n\n45 United States Special Operations Command, Special Operations in Peace and War, United States Special Operations Command Pub 1 (Washington, D.C.:  U.S. Special Operations Command, 25 January 1996), 3-1.\n\n46 Ibid, 1-1. 47 The term \"unified combatant command\" means a military command which has broad, continuing missions and which is composed of forces from two or more military departments.\" Combatant Commands: Establishment, U.S. Code, Title 10, sec. 161(c)(1) (2002).\n\n48 Unified Combatant Command for Special Operations Forces, U.S. Code, Title 10, sec.\n\n167(d) (2002).\n\n49 John M. Shalikashvili, National Military Strategy of the United States of America\n(Washington, D.C.:  The Pentagon, September 1997), 5.\n\n50 Richard B. Myers, National Military Strategy of the United States of America (Pre-\nDecisional Draft) (Washington, D.C.:  The Pentagon, 19 September 2002), 14.\n\n51 National Security Act of 1947, Public Law 235, 61 Stat. 496, July 26, 1947, codified in various portions of Titles 10, 32, and 50 of the U.S. Code.\n\n52 Ibid. 53 Harry Rositzke, The CIA's Secret Operations (New York: Reader's Digest Press, 1977), xviii.  *See also* John Jay, \"Federalist No. 64:  The Powers of the Senate,\" Federalist Papers, from the New York Packet, 7 March 1788; and Article II, Section 2, Constitution of the United States, which provides the President with the power to make treaties, with the advice and consent of the Senate.\n\n54 All duties and responsibilities of the CIA shall be related to the intelligence functions set out in paragraph 1.8 of Executive Order 12333; and as authorized by the National Security Act of 1947, as amended; the CIA Act of 1949, as amended; and other appropriate directives or other applicable law.  See Executive Order 12333--United States Intelligence Activities, paragraph 1.8, 46 Federal Register 59941, 3 CFR, 1981 Comp., p. 200; also available from http://www.cia.gov/cia/information/eo12333.html; Internet; accessed 29 September 2002.  See also George J. Tenet, The Authorities and Responsibilities of the Director of Central Intelligence as Head of the U.S. Intelligence Community, Director of Central Intelligence Directive 1/1 (Washington, D.C.: Director of Central Intelligence, 19 November 1998), para's 7.a, 7.c.\n\n55 Ibid. 57 Ibid.\n\n58 Pat M. Holt, Secret Intelligence and Public Policy - A Dilemma of Democracy\n(Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly Inc., 1995), 136.\n\n59 Intelligence Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 1991, Statutes at Large 105, sec. 602, 443\n(1991) [Public Law 102-88, 14 August 1991]; *See also* War and National Defense, National Security:  Presidential Approval and Reporting of Covert Actions, U.S. Code, Title 50, section 413b(e) (2002); and Pat M. Holt, Secret Intelligence and Public Policy - A Dilemma of Democracy, (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly Inc., 1995), 136.\n\n60 War and National Defense, National Security:  Presidential Approval and Reporting of Covert Actions, U.S. Code, Title 50, section 413b(e) (2002).\n\n61 Charles D. Ameringer, U.S. Foreign Intelligence - The Secret Side of American History\n(Lexington, Massachusetts: Lexington Books, 1990), 392.\n\n62 Stansfield Turner, \"Intelligence and Secrecy in an Open Society,\" The Center Magazine XIX, no. 2 (March/April 1986): 4.\n\n63 Ibid. 64 John M. Oseth, Regulating U.S. Intelligence Operations (Lexington: The University Press of Kentucky, 1985), 36.  *See also generally* National Security Act of 1947.  Get cite.\n\n65 Ronald Kessler, Inside the CIA - Revealing the Secrets of the World's Most Powerful Spy Agency (New York: Pocket Books, 1992), 237.\n\n66  John M. Oseth, Regulating U.S. Intelligence Operations (Lexington: The University Press of Kentucky, 1985), 136.  *See also* Sec. 102(d)(5) (50 U.S.C. 403-3) of the National Security Act of 1947, as amended, at Public Law 235, 61 Stat. 496, July 26, 1947.\n\n67 John M. Oseth, Regulating U.S. Intelligence Operations (Lexington: The University Press of Kentucky, 1985), 136.\n\n68 Ibid, 36. 69 Harry Rositzke, The CIA's Secret Operations (New York: Reader's Digest Press, 1977),\n155.\n\n70 Ronald Kessler, Inside the CIA - Revealing the Secrets of the World's Most Powerful Spy Agency (New York: Pocket Books, 1992), 237-238.\n\n71 Ibid, 238. 72 Ibid. 73 Harry Rositzke, The CIA's Secret Operations (New York: Reader's Digest Press, 1977), xvi.\n\n74 Ibid, 152.\n\n75 War and National Defense, National Security:  Presidential Approval and Reporting of Covert Actions, U.S. Code, Title 50, section 413b(a) and (a)(1) (2002).  *See also* Intelligence Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 1991, Public Law 102-88 [H.R. 1455]; 14 August 1991; title VI, sec. 503.  *See also* footnote 9, *supra*.\n\n76 War and National Defense, National Security:  Presidential Approval and Reporting of Covert Actions, U.S. Code, Title 50, section 413b(a)(3) (2002).\n\n77 Ibid, 413b(a)(5).  *See also* Pat M. Holt, Secret Intelligence and Public Policy - A Dilemma of Democracy (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly Inc., 1995), 158.\n\n78 \"Intelligence Operations (Covert Action),\" 2 October 2002; available from http://www.cia.gov/csi/books/warindep/intellopos.html; Internet; accessed 2 October 2002.\n\n79 J. Daniel Moore, \"CIA Support to Operation Enduring Freedom,\" Military Intelligence Professional Bulletin, vol. 28, iss. 3 (Jul-Sep 2002): 46 [database on-line]; available from ProQuest; accessed 29 August 2002.\n\n80 Ibid.  *See also* Charles D. Ameringer, U.S. Foreign Intelligence - The Secret Side of American History (Lexington, Massachusetts: Lexington Books, 1990), 168.\n\n81 Charles D. Ameringer, U.S. Foreign Intelligence - The Secret Side of American History\n(Lexington, Massachusetts: Lexington Books, 1990), 168.\n\n82 Ibid. 83 Ibid. 84 Central Intelligence Agency, Center for the Study of Intelligence, Central Intelligence:\nOrigin and Evolution (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, September 2001), 13.\n\n85 Ibid. 86 Ibid. 87 Ibid, 14. 88 Bob Woodward, \"CIA Told to Do 'Whatever Necessary' to Kill Bin Laden,\" The Washington Post, 21 October 2001; available from http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wpdyn/A27452-2001Oct20; Internet; accessed 26 September 2002.  *See also* Evan Thomas and Colin Soloway, \"A Street Fight,\" Newsweek, 29 April 2002, sec. International, p. 30 (2596 words) [database on-line]; available from Lexis-Nexis; accessed 29 August 2002; and Bob Woodward, \"Secret CIA Units Playing a Central Combat Role,\" The Washington Post, 18 November 2001, sec. A, p. 1 [database on-line]; available from ProQuest; accessed 29 August 2002.\n\n89 Alan E. Goodman, \"Reforming U.S. Intelligence,\" Foreign Policy, no. 67 (Summer 1987):\n131, 133.  *See also* John C. Green, Secret Intelligence and Covert Action: Consensus in an Open Society, Strategy Research Project (Carlisle Barracks: U.S. Army War College, 19 March 1993), 29.\n\n90 Harry Rositzke, \"America's Secret Operations: A Perspective,\" Foreign Affairs 53, no. 2\n(January 1975): 344-345, 348.  *See also* John C. Green, Secret Intelligence and Covert Action: Consensus in an Open Society, Strategy Research Project (Carlisle Barracks: U.S. Army War College, 19 March 1993), 29.\n\n91 Congressional Research Service Report for Congress, Intelligence and Law Enforcement: Countering Transnational Threats to the U.S. (Washington, D.C.: The Library of Congress, January 16, 2001), p. CRS-26.\n\n92 The ideas for this sentence came from William M. Arkin, \"Warfare; Dressed -- and Equipped -- to Kill,\" Los Angeles Times, 4 August 2002, p. M1 [database on-line]; available from ProQuest; accessed 29 August 2002.\n\n93 Harry Rositzke, The CIA's Secret Operations (New York: Reader's Digest Press, 1977),\n166.\n\n94 Pat M. Holt, Secret Intelligence and Public Policy - A Dilemma of Democracy\n(Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly Inc., 1995), 159.\n\n95 Ibid.  This begs an obvious political question:  What happens if the operation fails, or is compromised?  It depends on the nature of the operation, of course.  For example, the U.S. might find itself in the position where it must abandon its operatives rather than admit U.S. complicity.  Or, the President might face a crisis, such as the failed Desert One mission in April of 1980, that contributes in part to the loss of his office in the next election.  This question, although meaningful, addresses an issue that is beyond the scope of this paper.\n\n96 Congressional Research Service Report for Congress, Intelligence and Law Enforcement: Countering Transnational Threats to the U.S. (Washington, D.C.: The Library of Congress, January 16, 2001), p. CRS-26 - 27.  *See also generally* The White House, National Security Strategy of the United States of America 10-12 (2002); available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nssall.html.\n\n97 By their very nature and purpose, CIA covert operations reflect an inability -- or perhaps an unwillingness -- to accept the constraints of acting openly within legal norms and, *ipso facto*, challenge the traditional U.S. values of openness and respect for the sovereignty of other nations.  See \"Special Ops; Exploring New Uses is Appropriate,\" Star Tribune (Minneapolis, MN), 19 August 2002, sec. A, p. 10 (432 words) [database on-line]; available from Lexis-Nexis; accessed 29 August 2002.  *See also* Congressional Research Service Report for Congress, Intelligence and Law Enforcement: Countering Transnational Threats to the U.S. (Washington, D.C.: The Library of Congress, January 16, 2001), p. CRS-27.\n\n98 Congressional Research Service Report for Congress, Intelligence and Law Enforcement: Countering Transnational Threats to the U.S. (Washington, D.C.: The Library of Congress, January 16, 2001), p. CRS-26.  However, the secrecy of such covert actions, as necessary as they are, and as well understood as that necessity is by other law-abiding nations, does deprive the U.S. of demonstrable evidence that all of our actions in protecting our vital interests are consistent with either national or international law\n100 Ronald Kessler, Inside the CIA - Revealing the Secrets of the World's Most Powerful Spy Agency (New York: Pocket Books, 1992), 3.\n\n101 Quoted in Benjamin Wittes, \"Blurring the Line Between Cops and Spies,\" Legal Times, 9\nSeptember 1996, p.20.  *See also* Congressional Research Service Report for Congress, Intelligence and Law Enforcement: Countering Transnational Threats to the U.S. (Washington, D.C.: The Library of Congress, January 16, 2001), p. CRS-9; and Unified Combatant Command for Special Operations Forces, U.S. Code, Title 10, sec. 167 (2002); and Department of Defense, Functions of the Department of Defense and its Major Components, Department of Defense Directive 5100.1 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Defense, 1 August 2002) 4, 10-11.\n\n102 Ronald Kessler, Inside the CIA - Revealing the Secrets of the World's Most Powerful Spy Agency (New York: Pocket Books, 1992), 188.\n\n103 Department of Defense, Law of War Program, Department of Defense Directive 5100.77\n(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Defense, 9 December 1998), para. 5.3.1.\n\n104 See Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded and Sick in Armed Conflict in the Field, 12 August 1949, art. 2, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 3118, 75 U.N.T.S. 31, 33; Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, 12 August 1949, art. 2, 6 U.S.T. 3217, 3220, 75 U.N.T.S. 85, 88; Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, 12 August 1949, art. 2, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 3318, 75 U.N.T.S. 135, 137 [Geneva Convention III]; Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, 12 August 1949, art. 2, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 3518, 75 U.N.T.S. 287, 289 [Geneva Convention IV].\n\n105 Brigadier General Charles J. Dunlap, Jr., USAF, \"International Law and Terrorism: Some\n'Qs and As' for Operators,\" The Army Lawyer, Department of the Army Pamphlet 27-50-357 (October/November 2002): 24.\n\n106 Charles D. Ameringer, U.S. Foreign Intelligence - The Secret Side of American History\n(Lexington, Massachusetts: Lexington Books, 1990), 392.\n\n107 John C. Green, Secret Intelligence and Covert Action: Consensus in an Open Society, Strategy Research Project (Carlisle Barracks: U.S. Army War College, 19 March 1993), 14. See also Robert M. Gates, \"CIA and Openness,\" Vital Speeches of the Day LVIII, no. 14 (1 May 1992): 430-431.\n\n108 War and National Defense, National Security:  Presidential Approval and Reporting of Covert Actions, U.S. Code, Title 50, section 413b(a)(5) (2002).\n\n109 Ron Kampeas, \"CIA's Paramilitary Scores Successes,\" Associated Press Online, 20 May\n2002, p. 1 (968 words) [database on-line]; available from Lexis-Nexis; accessed 29 August 2002.  *See also* War and National Defense, National Security:  Presidential Approval and Reporting of Covert Actions, U.S. Code, Title 50, section 413b(a)(5) (2002).\n\n110 War and National Defense, National Security, Accountability for Intelligence Activities, General Congressional Oversight Provisions, U.S. Code, Title 50, sec. 413(a) (2002).  See also Ron Kampeas, \"CIA's Paramilitary Scores Successes,\" Associated Press Online, 20 May 2002, p. 1 (968 words) [database on-line]; available from Lexis-Nexis; accessed 29 August 2002.\n\n111 Frank J. Williams, Chief Justice, Supreme Court of Rhode Island, \"Letter to the Editor:\nAbraham Lincoln and Al Qaeda,\" American Heritage, October 2002, 10-11.\n\n112 Ibid. 113 *See supra* note 105. 114 Brigadier General Charles J. Dunlap, Jr., USAF, \"International Law and Terrorism: Some\n'Qs and As' for Operators,\" The Army Lawyer, Department of the Army Pamphlet 27-50-357 (October/November 2002): 24-25, 29.  *See also generally supra* note 105.\n\n115 Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986, Public Law 99-\n433, 99th U.S. Congress, October 1, 1986, codified at  U.S. Code, Title 10, Subtitle A, Part 1, Chapter 5.\n\n116 Commanders of Combatant Commands: Assignment; Powers and Duties, U.S. Code, Title 10, sec. 164 (2002).\n\n117 Susan Schmidt and Thomas E. Ricks, \"Pentagon Plans Shift in War on Terror:  Special Operations Command's Role to Grow with Covert Approach,\" The Washington Post, 18 September 2002, p. 1 [database on-line]; available from https://www.us.army.mil/portal/jhtml/earlyBird/Sep2002/e20020918pentagon.htm; accessed 18 September 2002.\n\n118 Combatant Commands: Assigned Forces; Chain of Command, U.S. Code, Title 10, sec.\n\n162 (2002).\n\n119 Commanders of Combatant Commands: Assignment; Powers and Duties, U.S. Code, Title 10, sec. 164(b)(1) (2002).  The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 makes the following statement of policy:  \"In enacting this Act, it is the intent of Congress, consistent with the congressional declaration of policy in section 2 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401) - . . . (3) to place clear responsibility on the commanders of the unified and specified combatant commands for the accomplishment of missions assigned to those commands.\"  See Joint Chiefs of Staff, Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF), Joint Publication 0-2 (Washington, D.C.: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 10 July 2001), I-2.\n\n120 Department of Defense, Functions of the Department of Defense and Its Major Components, Department of Defense Directive 5100.1 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Defense, 1 August 2002), 11.\n\n123  Ibid.  Hodge's viewpoint is consistent with Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) - 35\nissued by President Clinton, which instructs the Intelligence Community to provide military commanders with the tactical intelligence they need in operations.  See Central Intelligence Agency, Center for the Study of Intelligence. Central Intelligence: Origin and Evolution\n(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, September 2001), 13.\n\n124 Nathan Hodge, \"CIA's Predator Behavior is Cause for Concern,\" Newsday, 6 June 2002, sec. Viewpoints, p. A49 (979 words) [database on-line]; available from Lexis-Nexis; accessed 29 August 2002.\n\n125 Jonathan Weisman, \"CIA, Pentagon Feuding Complicates War Effort,\" USA Today, 17\nJune 2002, sec. A, p. 11 (1534 words) [database on-line]; available from Lexis-Nexis; accessed 29 August 2002.\n\n126 Ibid.\n\n127 Douglas Waller, \"Inside the CIA's Covert Forces,\" Time, 10 December 2001, p. 56\n[database on-line]; available from ProQuest; accessed 29 August 2002.\n\n128 Bob Woodward, Bush at War (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2002), 193-194. 129 Bob Woodward, \"Secret CIA Units Playing a Central Combat Role,\" The Washington Post, 18 November 2001, sec. A, p. 1 [database on-line]; available from ProQuest; accessed 29 August 2002.\n\n130 The idea, and number figures, for this sentence and its point of view came from Thom Shanker and James Risen, \"Rumsfeld Weighs New Covert Acts by Military Units,\" The New York Times, Late Edition - Final, 12 August 2002, sec. A, p. 1 (1604 words) [database on-line]; available from Lexis-Nexis; accessed 29 August 2002.\n\n131 Ron Kampeas, \"CIA's Paramilitary Scores Successes,\" Associated Press Online, 20 May\n2002, p. 1 (968 words) [database on-line]; available from Lexis-Nexis; accessed 29 August 2002.  *See also* Thom Shanker and James Risen, \"Rumsfeld Weighs New Covert Acts by Military Units,\" The New York Times, Late Edition - Final, 12 August 2002, sec. A, p. 1 (1604 words) [database on-line]; available from Lexis-Nexis; accessed 29 August 2002.\n\n132 The CQ Researcher, Intelligence Reforms, Washington, D.C.: CQ Press, 25 January\n2002, vol. 12, no. 3.\n\n133 Ron Kampeas, \"CIA's Paramilitary Scores Successes,\" Associated Press Online, 20 May\n2002, p. 1 (968 words) [database on-line]; available from Lexis-Nexis; accessed 29 August 2002. Enforcement: Countering Transnational Threats to the U.S. (Washington, D.C.: The Library of\n135  Evan Thomas and Colin Soloway, \"A Street Fight,\" Newsweek, 29 April 2002, sec.\n\nInternational, p. 30 (2596 words) [database on-line]; available from Lexis-Nexis; accessed 29 August 2002.\n\n136 Congressional Research Service Report for Congress, Intelligence and Law Enforcement: Countering Transnational Threats to the U.S. (Washington, D.C.: The Library of Congress, January 16, 2001), p. CRS-4.\n\n137 Ibid. 138 Bryan Bender, Kim Burger, and Andrew Koch, \"Afghanistan:  First Lessons,\" Jane's Special Reports, 14 December 2001; available from http://www.janes.com.html; Internet; accessed 12 September 2002.\n\n139 Ibid. 140 Ibid. 141 Dana Priest, \"CIA Killed U.S. Citizen in Yemen Missile Strike,\" The Washington Post, 8\nNovember 2002, Sec. A, p. 1.\n\n142 Vince Crawley and Amy Svitak, \"Execution or Act of War: CIA Attack on Al-Qaida Leader Surprises Pentagon, Brings Up Ethical Concerns,\" Army Times, 18 November 2002, p. 10.\n\n143 Lieutenant Colonel Christopher F. Bentley, \"Afghanistan: Joint and Coalition Fire Support in Operation Anaconda,\" Field Artillery (September-October 2002): 10.\n\n144 Ibid. 145 These comments are based on the author's personal experience and discussions with Lieutenant Colonel Christopher F. Bentley in Uzbekistan and Afghanistan from December 2001 through June 2002.  Lieutenant Colonel Bentley served as the Division Fire Support Coordinator (DFSCOORD), and the author served as the Staff Judge Advocate, for Coalition Joint Task Force - Mountain/10th Mountain Division (Light Infantry).\n\n146 *See generally* Joint Chiefs of Staff, Interagency Coordination During Joint Operations, Joint Publication 3-08 (Washington, D.C.: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 9 October 1996).\n\n147 Ibid. 148 The ideas regarding Annex V are derived in part from Rick Westermeyer, \"Theater Interagency Operations,\" briefing slides with scripted commentary, Carlisle Barracks, U.S. Army War College, December 2002.  *See also generally* Joint Chiefs of Staff, Interagency Coordination During Joint Operations, Joint Publication 3-08 (Washington, D.C.: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 9 October 1996).\n\n149 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF), Joint Publication 0-2\n(Washington, D.C.: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 10 July 2001), xiii.\n\n150 See Joint Chiefs of Staff, Interagency Coordination During Joint Operations, Joint Publication 3-08 (Washington, D.C.: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 9 October 1996); and The White House, Presidential Decision Directive/National Security Council 56, Managing Complex See also Association of the United States Army, Handbook for Interagency Management of Complex Contingency Operations (Washington, D.C., 13 August 1998); available from http://www.ausa.org/RAMPnew/PCR-PDD56Handbook.doc.htm; accessed 5 March 2003.  This handbook is intended to institutionalize the mechanisms mandated by Presidential Decision Directive (PDD)-56.  The procedures therein were derived from lessons learned from past U.S.\n\nparticipation in complex contingency operations and subsequent improvements made in the interagency planning process. The handbook provides a guide for those in the interagency that are or will be involved in planning such operations.\n\n151 Chuck McCutcheon, \"Intelligence Authorization Calls for Greater Reliance on Spies and New Technology,\" Congressional Quarterly Weekly, 15 December 2001, p. 2993.\n\n152 Congressional Research Service Report for Congress, Intelligence and Law Enforcement: Countering Transnational Threats to the U.S. (Washington, D.C.: The Library of Congress, January 16, 2001), p. CRS-29.\n\n153 Suzanne C. Nielson, \"Political Control Over the Use of Force: A Clausewitzian Perspective,\" The Letort Papers, U.S. Army War College (May 2001): 17, quoting Carl von Clausewitz, On War, trans. and eds. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976), 94.  No serious research paper by a student at the U.S. Army War College can neglect to include a quote from Clausewitz.\n\n## Bibliography\n\n\"Afghanistan - Countrywatch.\" Available from http://www.countrywatch.com/cw_topic.asp?vCOUNTRY=1&SECTION=SUB&TOPIC=PO\nPCO&T.html. Internet.  Accessed 29 August 2002.\n\nAmeringer, Charles D. U.S. Foreign Intelligence - The Secret Side of American History.\nLexington, Massachusetts: Lexington Books, 1990.\nArkin, William M. \"Warfare; Dressed -- and Equipped -- to Kill.\" Los Angeles Times, 4 August\n2002, M1. Database on-line. Available from ProQuest. 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    },
    {
        "text": "Transnational Islamic Activism and Radicalization: Patterns, Trends, and Prognosticators\n\n\n1\n\nSANDIA REPORT SAND2009-0325\nUnlimited Release Printed June 2010\n\n\n\nTransnational Islamic Activism and Radicalization:  Patterns, Trends, and Prognosticators\n\n\nRichard Colbaugh, Dennis Engi, Randall A. Laviolette, and Judy E. Spomer\n\n\n\nPrepared by Sandia National Laboratories Albuquerque, New Mexico  87185 and Livermore, California  94550\n\n\nSandia is a multiprogram laboratory operated by Sandia Corporation, a Lockheed Martin Company, for the United States Department of Energy's National Nuclear Security Administration under Contract DE-AC04-94AL85000.\n\n\nApproved for public release; further dissemination unlimited.\n\n\n\n2\n\n\n\nIssued by Sandia National Laboratories, operated for the United States Department of Energy by Sandia Corporation.\n\nNOTICE:  This report was prepared as an account of work sponsored by an agency of the United States Government.  Neither the United States Government, nor any agency thereof, nor any of their employees, nor any of their contractors, subcontractors, or their employees, make any warranty, express or implied, or assume any legal liability or responsibility for the accuracy, completeness, or usefulness of any information, apparatus, product, or process disclosed, or represent that its use would not infringe privately owned rights. Reference herein to any specific commercial product, process, or service by trade name, trademark, manufacturer, or otherwise, does not necessarily constitute or imply its endorsement, recommendation, or favoring by the United States Government, any agency thereof, or any of their contractors or subcontractors.  The views and opinions expressed herein do not necessarily state or reflect those of the United States Government, any agency thereof, or any of their contractors.\n\nPrinted in the United States of America. This report has been reproduced directly from the best available copy.\n\nAvailable to DOE and DOE contractors from\n U.S. Department of Energy\n Office of Scientific and Technical Information\n P.O. Box 62\n Oak Ridge, TN  37831\n\n Telephone: (865) 576-8401\n Facsimile: (865) 576-5728\n E-Mail: reports@adonis.osti.gov\n Online ordering: http://www.osti.gov/bridge\n\nAvailable to the public from\n U.S. Department of Commerce\n National Technical Information Service\n 5285 Port Royal Rd.\n Springfield, VA  22161\n\n Telephone: (800) 553-6847\n Facsimile: (703) 605-6900\n E-Mail: orders@ntis.fedworld.gov\n Online order: http://www.ntis.gov/help/ordermethods.asp?loc=7-4-0#online\n\n\n\n3\n\nSAND2009-0325\nUnlimited Release Printed June 2010\n\n\nTransnational Islamic Activism and Radicalization:\nPatterns, Trends, and Prognostications\n\n\n\nRichard Colbaugh, Dennis Engi, Randall A. Laviolette, and Judy E. Spomer\n\n\nSandia National Laboratories\n\nP.O. Box 5800\nAlbuquerque, NM 87185\n\n\n\nAbstract\n\n\nThe research described in this report developed the theoretical and conceptual framework for understanding, recognizing, and anticipating the origins, dynamic mechanisms, perceptions, and social structures of Islamic social reform movements in the Muslim homeland and in diaspora communities. This research has revealed valuable insights into the dynamic mechanisms associated with reform movements and, as such, offers the potential to provide indications and warnings of impending violence.  This study produced the following significant findings:\n\n\n A framework for understanding Islamic radicalization in the context of Social\n\nMovement Theory was developed and implemented. This framework provides a causal structure for the interrelationships among the myriad features of a social movement.\n\n The degree to which movement-related activity shows early diffusion across multiple social contexts is a powerful distinguisher of successful and unsuccessful social movements. Indeed, this measurable appears to have significantly more predictive power than volume of such activity and also more power than various system intrinsics.\n\n Significant social movements can occur only if both\n the intra-context \"infectivity\" of the movement exceeds a certain threshold and\n the inter-context interactions associated with the movement occur with a frequency that is larger than another threshold.\n\n\nNote that this is reminiscent of, and significantly extends, well-known results for epidemic thresholds in disease propagation models.\n\n\n\n 4\n\n More in-depth content analysis of blogs through the lens of Argumentation Theory has the potential to reveal new insights into radicalization in the context of Social Movement Theory. This connection has the potential to be of value from two important perspectives;\n first, this connection has the potential to provide more in depth insights into the forces underlying the emergence of radical behavior.\n second, this connection may provide insights into how to use the blogosphere to influence the emergent dialog to effectively impact the resulting actions taken by the potential radicals.\n\n\nThe authors of this report recognize that Islamic communities are not the only source of radicalism; indeed many other groups, religious and otherwise, have used and continue to use, radicalism to achieve their ends. Further, the authors also recognize that not all Muslims use, or condone the use of, radical behavior. Indeed, only a very small segment of the Muslim communities throughout the world use and/or support such behavior. Nevertheless, the focus of this research is, indeed, on understanding, recognizing, and anticipating the origins, dynamic mechanisms, perceptions, and social structures of Islamic radicalism.\n\n\n\n 5\n\nTable of Contents\n\n\nIntroduction and Background ........ 8\n\nApproach ........ 9\n\nResults ........ 13\n\nFramework Development ........ 13\n\nPattern Discovery and Analysis ........ 16\nIntroduction ........ 16\nPublic Opinion Dynamics and Radicalization ........ 17\nWarning Analysis: Social Dynamics and Radicalization ........ 19\nSituational Awareness: Context and Framing ........ 30\n\nRecommendations for Next Phases of This Research ........ 33\n\nReferences ........ 36\n\nAppendix A:  The Danish Cartoons ........ 38\n\nAppendix B:  Scientific and Technical Intelligence Committee Workshop Papers ........ 39\n\nStrain Theories ........ 39\nMuslim Radicalization DynamicsSocial Science Methods and Models for Global Assessments ... 47\nExecutive Summary of Conference 1 ........ 49\nOverview of Social Movement-Related Methods and Measurements ........ 55\nDynamics of Political Activism and Radicalization Workshop ........ 62\n\nAppendix C: Influence Diagram Representation of Social Movement Theory ........ 72\n\nAppendix D:  Predictive Analysis Methodology ........ 75\n\nAppendix E:  The Hedstrom Model ........ 80\n\nAppendix F: Eight Seminal Blogs ........ 89\n\nAppendix G:  Relativistic Assessment of the Seminal Blogs ........117\n\nAppendix H:  Pattern Analysis for Predicting Ethnic Violence ........123\n\nAppendix I:  Automated Identification and Analysis of Framing Document for Global Climate Change ........133\n\nAppendix J.  Supplemental Framing Documents ........145\n\nAppendix K:  The Vital Issues Process ........147\n\n\n\n 6\n\nTable of Figures\n\n\nFigure 1. Integration of Source Materials. ........ 10\nFigure 2.  Components of the Radicalization Assessment. ........ 12\nFigure 3.  Dynamic Coupling of SMT Elements. ........ 13\nFigure 4.  Extended Form of the SMT Kernel (R-SMT Kernel) ........ 15\nFigure 5.  Palestinian Public Opinion Regarding Suicide Bombing Against Israel ........ 18\nFigure 6.  Multi-scale Model for Social Processes ........ 20\nFigure 7.  Sample Results for the Swedish Social Democratic Party Case Study ........ 24\nFigure 8.  Schematic Representation of Blog Graph Model. ........ 25\nFigure 9.  Sample Results for Islamic Mobilization Case Study. ........ 27\nFigure 10. Sites of Ethnic Violence ........ 31\nFigure C-1.  Resource Mobilization Influence Diagram. ........ 72\nFigure C-2.  Opportunities and Constraints Influence Diagram. ........ 73\nFigure C-3.  Framing Process Influence Diagram. ........ 74\nFigure C-4.  The Social Movement Theory Kernel Influence Diagram. ........ 74\nFigure E-1.  Vensim Representation of the Hedstrom Model ........ 83\nFigure E-2.  Graph for Believers ........ 84\nFigure E-3. Believer Test Graphs ........ 85\nFigure E-4.  Time and Numbers of Believers ........ 86\nFigure E-5.  Overview of Social Movement Theory and Applicability to Radicalization. ...... 88\nFigure G-1.  Relativistic Assessment of the Eight Seminal Blogs. ........117\nFigure G-2.  Summary Statistics for Eight Seminal DC1 Blogs. ........118\nFigure G-3.  The Epistemological Dimensions of Argumentation. ........119\nFigure G-4.  The basic structure of an argument. ........120\nFigure G-5.  Distribution of Argumentation Claims Contained in Seminal Blog 8. ........122\nFigure H-1. Condensed Population Distribution ........126\nFigure H-2. Prediction of Outbreaks of Ethnic Violence Using Ratios ........127\nFigure H-3. Comparison of Scores Between Randomized Populations ........127\nFigure H-4. Map of Social Exclusion in Guatemala. ........129\nFigure H-5. Demographic Map Resulting from Applying Segregation Model to Social\n\nExclusion Map of Figure H-4. ........130\nFigure H-6. Scores from blob detection with two different scaling lengths ........131\nFigure H-7. Reported Violence in Guatemalan Civil War from Gulden (2002). ........131\nFigure I-1.  Distribution of Non-Framing and Framing Documents. ........134\nFigure I-2.  Distribution of Non-Framing and Framing Tasks. ........135\nFigure I-3.  Proportion of Framing Documents in Clusters. ........138\nFigure I-4.  Proportion of Framing Documents by Task in Clusters. ........138\nFigure I-5.  Training Data Set. ........139\nFigure I-6.  Test Data Set. ........139\nFigure I-7.  Nonlinearity of SVD_2. ........140\n\n\n\nTables\n\nTable 1.  Potential Relationships among the Categories of Argumentation Claims ........ 29\nTable I-1.  Expectation Maximization Clusters ........136\nTable I-2.  Model 1 Parameter Estimates ........140\nTable I-3.  Model 1 Fitting Information ........141\nTable I-4.  Model 1 Classification Table ........141\nTable I-5.  Model 2 Parameter Estimates ........141\nTable I-6.  Likelihood Ratio Tests for Model 2 ........143\nTable I-7.  Model 2 Fitting Information ........143\nTable I-8.  Model 2 Classification Table ........143\n\n\n\n 7\n\nAcronyms\n\n\nDHS  Department of Homeland Security DVD  digital video disk HDS  hybrid dynamical system IA  Intelligent Agents ICM  a British market research company NIC  National Intelligence Council NSM  New Social Movement O&C  opportunities and constraints ODE  ordinary differential equations PBUH  Peace Be Upon Him PCE  Post/context entropy RM  Resource Mobilization SDE  stochastic differential equations SDP  Swedish Social Democratic Party S-HDS  stochastic hybrid dynamical system SMO  social movement organizations SMT  Social Movement Theory STIC  Scientific and Technical Intelligence Committee SVD  singular value decomposition TIARA    Transnational Islamic Activism and Radicalization VIP  Vital Issues Process\n\n\n\n 8\n\nIntroduction and Background\n\nThe research described in this report developed the theoretical and conceptual framework for understanding, recognizing, and anticipating the origins, dynamic mechanisms, perceptions, and social structures of Islamic social reform movements in the Muslim homeland and in diaspora communities. Diaspora here refers to Muslims living as a minority among people of the prevailing religion. This developed framework is based largely, but not exclusively, on Social Movement Theory. To determine the viability of this framework, relevant target case studies were used. This research focused on Muslim reaction to six recent incidents, each of which appeared at the outset to have the potential to trigger significant protest activities:\n\n publication of photographs and accounts of prisoner abuse at Abu Ghraib in Spring 2004;\n\n publication of cartoons depicting the prophet Mohammad in the Danish newspaper Jyllands-Posten1 in September 2005;\n\n distribution of the DVD I was blind but now I can see in Egypt in October 2005;\n the lecture given by Pope Benedict XVI in September 2006 in which he quoted controversial material concerning Islam;\n Salman Rushdie being knighted in June 2007;\n re-publication of the \"Danish cartoons\" in various newspapers in February 2008.\n\n\nThe research reported herein has revealed valuable insights into the dynamic mechanisms associated with reform movements and, as such, offers the potential to provide indications and warnings of impending violence.\n\nSocial reform has been and is a fundamental underpinning of civil society. Reforms have been instrumental in shaping societies throughout human existence. It is well known that social reform has come in many shapes and sizes throughout the ages. One such form is radicalization. In this report, radicalization is taken to mean fundamental, drastic, revolutionary changes in society, where violence is a key agent of change. The focus of this research is on understanding, recognizing, and anticipating the origins, dynamic mechanisms, perceptions, and social structures of Islamic radicalism. The authors of this report recognize that Islamic communities are not the only source of radicalism; indeed, many other groups (religious and otherwise) have used, and continue to use, radicalism to achieve their ends. Further, the authors also recognize that not all Muslims use, or condone the use of, radical behavior. Indeed, only a very small segment of the Muslim communities throughout the world use and/or support such behavior.\n\n\n1 The Jyllands-Posten Muhammad cartoons controversy began after twelve editorial cartoons, most of which depicted the Islamic prophet Muhammad, were published in the Danish newspaper Jyllands-Posten on 30 September 2005. Appendix A displays these cartoons.\n\n\n\n 9\n\nApproach\n\nTwo synergistic methodological approaches were used in this research to develop the theoretical and conceptual framework to understand, recognize, and anticipate the origins, dynamic mechanisms, perceptions, and social structures of Islamic radicalism. The first, hereinafter referred to as the macro model, captures the societal (causal)\ndynamics while the second, the meso model, focuses on group dynamics within the larger societal context. One important element of this research was to explore the viability of using Social Movement Theory2 (SMT) to explain the dynamics of Islamic radicalism. The macro model was constructed with a view toward representing SMT in a causal modeling context. The meso model focused on developing an understanding of indicators that radical behavior may be emerging.\n\nSMT was used to help develop the theoretical and conceptual framework used in this research. SMT is an interdisciplinary study within the social sciences that generally seeks to explain why social mobilization occurs and the forms under which it manifests, as well as potential social, cultural, and political consequences. SMT is offered, and in some cases required, as part of the university curricula in sociology, political science, and anthropology.\n\nVarious aspects of SMT have been published in numerous texts and in many articles appearing in scholarly journals. One text (Wiktorowicz 2004) in particular served as excellent source material for this research.  In this text, Wiktorowicz and the other contributors incorporate the study of Islamic activism into SMT. In the context of the Wiktorowicz text, Islamic activism is defined as the mobilization of contention to support Muslim causes. This does not necessarily equate to radicalization (qua violence) in the sense used in this report. Nevertheless, many of the insights provided in the Wiktorowicz text were valuable to this research. Material taken from this text provided intellectual capital to develop the SMT kernel3 that formed the basis in this research for modeling Social Movement Theory. Appendix C provides graphical representations of the three elements of the SMT kernel that were described by Wiktorowicz namely, Framing, Resource Mobilization (RM), and Opportunities and Constraints (O&C). The coupling of these three elements via their interrelationships constitutes the SMT kernel.  In computer science, the kernel is the inner or central part of a large program or of an operating system which is unchanged when run on different computers.  In abstract algebra, the kernel of a homomorphism measures the degree to which the homomorphism fails to be injective.  In general, the notion of a kernel has been used to characterize \"the choicest or most essential of most vital part of some idea or experience.\"\n\nAnother collection of unpublished papers was developed in support of a series of three workshops convened during 2007 on behalf of the Scientific and Technical Intelligence Committee (STIC) of the National Intelligence Council (NIC), the Intelligence\n\n\n2 See (Klandermans and Staggenborg 2002), (Della Porte and Diani 1999), or (McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald 1988) for an overview of SMT.\n3 See http://wordnet.princeton.edu/perl/webwn?s=kernel\n\n\n\n 10\n\nCommunity's center for mid-term and long-term strategic thinking.4 These workshops were directed toward exploring the \"Social Dynamics of Activism and Radicalization\" by bringing together academicians expert in SMT and government officials responsible for understanding and countering radicalization, especially that which underlies support for jihadist terrorism. The goal of the workshops was to evaluate current SMT, both theory and research, in relation to understanding trajectories of political activism, radicalization, and terrorism. Three significant concerns were addressed during the first workshop to realize the potential possibilities of using SMT as a framework for understanding activism and trajectories of political violence. The first was to examine SMT as a conceptual model including resource mobilization, frames, political opportunity, and their hypothesized relations, and to review the evidence supporting this model including the methods and measures with which these concepts are operationalized. The second was the relevance of SMT to Muslim cultures under diverse socio-political conditions. The third was the extent of SMT's explanatory and predictive power.\n\nFour unpublished papers (Earl 2006, Oliver 2006, Soule 2006, and McCauley 2006), written in support of the first STIC workshop, provided in draft form in Appendix B, formed the basis for expanding the SMT kernel that was developed using the Wiktorowicz text. These expansions were crucial in moving beyond Islamic activism and into the realm of radicalization qua violence in the SMT kernel. Figure 1 illustrates the integration of these materials to form the overall framework used in this research.\n\n\n\nSocial Movement Theory\n\n&\nIslamic Activism\n(Wiktorowicz)\n\nState Response\n(Oliver)\n\nMuslim Radicalization\n\nDynamics\n(Soule)\n\nMethods &\nMeasurement\n\n(Earl)\n\nOverall Framework\n\nSummary Observations\n(McCauley)\n\n\n\nSocial Movement Theory\n\n&\nIslamic Activism\n(Wiktorowicz)\n\nState Response\n(Oliver)\n\nMuslim Radicalization\n\nDynamics\n(Soule)\n\nMethods &\nMeasurement\n\n(Earl)\n\nOverall Framework\n\nSummary Observations\n(McCauley)\n\n\n\nFigure 1. Integration of Source Materials.\n\n\n\n4 See http://www.dni.gov/nic/NIC_about.html for an overview of NIC functions.\n\n\n\n 11\n\nTo convert the information in these scholarly papers into a form that can facilitate computer modeling and mathematical analysis, an influence diagram5 representing the R SMT kernel (the \"R\" was added to the SMT kernel to reflect the inclusion of Radicalization) was constructed that is helpful in bridging the macro scale modeling of the overall SMT perspective to the meso scale modeling used to discern patterns of emerging radical behavior. The R-SMT kernel formed the framework for bridging the meso and macro scale modeling perspectives in this research.\n\nThe theoretical framework described above can be operationalized to yield a methodology for understanding, recognizing, and anticipating Islamic activism and radicalization. A key element of the proposed analysis methodology is proper characterization of the interplay between the persuasiveness of an argument or intrinsic aspects of a social process and the social dynamics, which is its realization of the way the argument propagates through a segment of society. The notion of an argument was explored in depth in this research, particularly as an aid to content analysis. This characterization enables us to:\n\n\n1. Identify those measurable components and associated data patterns useful for situational awareness and warning analysis for radicalization phenomena and\n\n2. Develop data-driven algorithms to provide robust, scalable situational awareness and warning. Specific capabilities derived in this way include those for:\n early warning analysis of Islamic mobilization and radicalization,\n assessment of the potential for ethnic violence in a given region, and\n automatic identification and classification of documents instantiating the framing processes that are central to many social movements including radicalization.\n\n\nThe considerable potential for these capabilities to affect situational awareness and warning analysis of social movements in general, and Islamic radicalization in particular is illustrated through both theoretical and empirical case studies described in subsequent sections of this report.\n\nWhile radicalization phenomena have attracted the attention of researchers and analysts for decades, most work in this area has been of a qualitative, descriptive nature and, therefore, does not naturally support quantitative situational awareness and warning analysis. Recently, researchers have proposed that SMT may provide a useful framework within which to study Islamic activism and radicalization (Earl 2006, Oliver 2006, Soule\n2006, McCauley 2006, and Wiktorowicz 2004). The application of SMT to radicalization proposed by these authors, while still largely qualitative, represents an important contribution and provides the basis for constructing the R-SMT Kernel, our quantitative, dynamical extension of their basic formulation. The R-SMT Kernel is a key enabler in our proposed approach to quantitative radicalization situational awareness and warning analysis as shown in Figure 2.\n\n\n\n5 Influence diagrams also called relevance diagrams, are directed graphs representing decision problems. See [Howard and Matheson\n\n1984] for a review of the use of influence diagrams in decision analysis.\n\n\n\n 12\n\n\n\nFigure 2.  Components of the Radicalization Assessment.\n\nThe operational framework described above was used to analyze actual data sets and to develop a demonstration of the methodology. The case studies chosen for this research were:\n\n publication of photographs and accounts of prisoner abuse at Abu Ghraib in Spring 2004;\n\n publication of cartoons depicting the prophet Mohammad in the Danish newspaper Jyllands-Posten in September 2005;\n\n distribution of the DVD I was blind but now I can see in Egypt in October 2005;\n the lecture given by Pope Benedict XVI in September 2006 in which he quoted controversial material concerning Islam;\n Salman Rushdie being knighted in June 2007;\n re-publication of the \"Danish cartoons\" in various newspapers in February\n\n2008.\n\nThis collection of case studies provided an excellent test bed for the methodology being developed.  The next section of this report describes the results of this analysis.\n\n\nFraming Process spread of Western values and practices (AKA Cultural\n\nImperialism)\n\nunemployment economic development government debt public housing public social and welfare programs impression that the current regime is corrupt and is a puppet of\n\nWestern governments perception that Islam is the solution likelihood of a society that is governed by Islamic law desire to control the State\n\n+\n\n\"RESONANCE\"\n\ncultural consistency reputation of framing individual(s)\n\npersonal salience of frame consistency of frame empirical credibility of frame\n\n+\n+\n\n+\n\n+\n+\n\nease of identifying and publicizing social problem(s)\n\n+++\n\n+\n+\n\nDiagnose problem in need of redress\n\nOffer solutions\n(i.e., tactics and strategies)\nthat ameliorate injustice\n\nProvide rationale to motivate support and collective action\n\n+\n\nstate repression of the citizenry\n\n+\n\nState policies and practices\n\n+ +\n\n+\n\n+\n\n+\n\n+\n\n\n+\n\n\n\n+\n\n+\n\n+\n\n+\n\n+\n\ninformation that is of value in achieving reform perception of opportunities perception of threats tactical adjustment of doctrine to maximize the strategic success formal access to political institutions and decision making informal access to political institutions and decision makingrational decision making to maximize the use of openings and minimize the adversity\n\n+\n\n+\n\n+\n\n+\n\n+\n\n+\n\n+\n\n+\n\n+\n\nOpportunities and Constraints political, social, cultural,\n& economic problems\n\n+\n\n+\n\n+\n\n+\n\n+\n\nSMO strength\n\nSMO provision of social services that are not provided by the State\n\n+\n\npublic perception that the SMO provides more value than the State\n\n+\n\npublic perception that the SMO is of value to the people public perception that the State regime is of value to the people\n\nSMO membership\n+\n\n\n+\n\nState strength\n\n+\nISN activism\n\nISN membership\n\nISN strength.\n\n+\n\n\nSMO =\nSocial\n\nMovement Organization\n\nResource Mobilization\n\n\n+\n\n+\n\n+\n\nSMO activism\n+\n\nState provision of social services\n\n+\n\n+\n\ncontributions to SMO\n\n+\n\n+\n\n\n+\n\n+\n\n+\n\n+\n\n+\n\n+ - +\n\n--+\n\n\n<state repression of the citizenry>\n\n+\n\n+\n\n\n+\n\n+\n\nmaterial assets financial assets human assets moral alignment cultural alignment social-organizational infrastructure revolutionaries wanderers converts compliants human population\n+\n\n+\n+ + +\n\n+\n+\n\n+\n+\n\n+\n\n+\n\n+\n\n+\n\n+\n\nstrain theory\n+\n\nthreats\n+\n\n+\n\n\"openness\" of State to political processes\n\n+\n\nnon-violent dissent\n(ISN)\n\nviolent dissent (isn)\n\nnon-violent dissent\n(smo)\n\nviolent dissent\n(smo)\n\n+\n\n\n+\n\n\n+\n\n+\n\n\n+\n\nSMT kernel with Workshop Executive Summary/Soule dynamics & the Oliver State\n\nResponse diagnostics frames prognostic frames motivational frames\n\n+\n\n+\n\nTactics\n\nState repressive capacity\n\n+\n\n+\n\nalignment stability presence/absence of allies\n\n+\n+\n\n+\n\nlarge-scale repression repression of a small number of radicals\n\n\n\npopular support for radicalism\n\n\n+\n\n+\n\nunmet needs of radicals\n\n+\n\n+\n\n+\n\nState permitting of non-violent dissent\n\n+\n\n+\n\n+\n\n\nblockage of dissidents'\ncommunications channels\n\n\n+\n\n+\n\nState's responsiveness to non-violent dissident groups'\n\nneedsunmet needs of non-violent dissident groups\n\nState satisfying dissident groups\n\n\n+\n\n\n\n+\n\n+\n\nwith the Earl mesaures level of protest+\n+\n\n+\n\n+\n\n\"strain\" measures\n\n\"opportunities and constraints\" measures\n\n\"resource mobilization\"\nmeasures\n\n\"framing process\"\nmeasures\n\n+\n\n+\n\n+\n\n+\n\n+\n\n+\n\nquantitative coding of news stories on movement issues+\n\n<quantitative coding of news stories on movement issues>\n\n+\n\nsurveys of individuals statistical analyses quantitative historical analyses macro-level social indicators\n\n+\n\n+\n+\n\n+\n\nSMT kernel pattern analysis data radicalization assessment\n\nFraming Process spread of Western values and practices (AKA Cultural\n\nImperialism)\n\nunemployment economic development government debt public housing public social and welfare programs impression that the current regime is corrupt and is a puppet of\n\nWestern governments perception that Islam is the solution likelihood of a society that is governed by Islamic law desire to control the State\n\n+\n\n\"RESONANCE\"\n\ncultural consistency reputation of framing individual(s)\n\npersonal salience of frame consistency of frame empirical credibility of frame\n\n+\n+\n\n+\n\n+\n+\n\nease of identifying and publicizing social problem(s)\n\n+++\n\n+\n+\n\nDiagnose problem in need of redress\n\nOffer solutions\n(i.e., tactics and strategies)\nthat ameliorate injustice\n\nProvide rationale to motivate support and collective action\n\n+\n\nstate repression of the citizenry\n\n+\n\nState policies and practices\n\n+ +\n\n+\n\n+\n\n+\n\n+\n\n\n+\n\n\n\n+\n\n+\n\n+\n\n+\n\n+\n\ninformation that is of value in achieving reform perception of opportunities perception of threats tactical adjustment of doctrine to maximize the strategic success formal access to political institutions and decision making informal access to political institutions and decision makingrational decision making to maximize the use of openings and minimize the adversity\n\n+\n\n+\n\n+\n\n+\n\n+\n\n+\n\n+\n\n+\n\n+\n\nOpportunities and Constraints political, social, cultural,\n& economic problems\n\n+\n\n+\n\n+\n\n+\n\n+\n\nSMO strength\n\nSMO provision of social services that are not provided by the State\n\n+\n\npublic perception that the SMO provides more value than the State\n\n+\n\npublic perception that the SMO is of value to the people public perception that the State regime is of value to the people\n\nSMO membership\n+\n\n\n+\n\nState strength\n\n+\nISN activism\n\nISN membership\n\nISN strength.\n\n+\n\n\nSMO =\nSocial\n\nMovement Organization\n\nResource Mobilization\n\n\n+\n\n+\n\n+\n\nSMO activism\n+\n\nState provision of social services\n\n+\n\n+\n\ncontributions to SMO\n\n+\n\n+\n\n\n+\n\n+\n\n+\n\n+\n\n+\n\n+ - +\n\n--+\n\n\n<state repression of the citizenry>\n\n+\n\n+\n\n\n+\n\n+\n\nmaterial assets financial assets human assets moral alignment cultural alignment social-organizational infrastructure revolutionaries wanderers converts compliants human population\n+\n\n+\n+ + +\n\n+\n+\n\n+\n+\n\n+\n\n+\n\n+\n\n+\n\n+\n\nstrain theory\n+\n\nthreats\n+\n\n+\n\n\"openness\" of State to political processes\n\n+\n\nnon-violent dissent\n(ISN)\n\nviolent dissent (isn)\n\nnon-violent dissent\n(smo)\n\nviolent dissent\n(smo)\n\n+\n\n\n+\n\n\n+\n\n+\n\n\n+\n\nSMT kernel with Workshop Executive Summary/Soule dynamics & the Oliver State\n\nResponse diagnostics frames prognostic frames motivational frames\n\n+\n\n+\n\nTactics\n\nState repressive capacity\n\n+\n\n+\n\nalignment stability presence/absence of allies\n\n+\n+\n\n+\n\nlarge-scale repression repression of a small number of radicals\n\n\n\npopular support for radicalism\n\n\n+\n\n+\n\nunmet needs of radicals\n\n+\n\n+\n\n+\n\nState permitting of non-violent dissent\n\n+\n\n+\n\n+\n\n\nblockage of dissidents'\ncommunications channels\n\n\n+\n\n+\n\nState's responsiveness to non-violent dissident groups'\n\nneedsunmet needs of non-violent dissident groups\n\nState satisfying dissident groups\n\n\n+\n\n\n\n+\n\n+\n\nwith the Earl mesaures level of protest+\n+\n\n+\n\n+\n\n\"strain\" measures\n\n\"opportunities and constraints\" measures\n\n\"resource mobilization\"\nmeasures\n\n\"framing process\"\nmeasures\n\n+\n\n+\n\n+\n\n+\n\n+\n\n+\n\nquantitative coding of news stories on movement issues+\n\n<quantitative coding of news stories on movement issues>\n\n+\n\nsurveys of individuals statistical analyses quantitative historical analyses macro-level social indicators\n\n+\n\n+\n+\n\n+\n\nSMT kernel\n\nFraming Process spread of Western values and practices (AKA Cultural\n\nImperialism)\n\nunemployment economic development government debt public housing public social and welfare programs impression that the current regime is corrupt and is a puppet of\n\nWestern governments perception that Islam is the solution likelihood of a society that is governed by Islamic law desire to control the State\n\n+\n\n\"RESONANCE\"\n\ncultural consistency reputation of framing individual(s)\n\npersonal salience of frame consistency of frame empirical credibility of frame\n\n+\n+\n\n+\n\n+\n+\n\nease of identifying and publicizing social problem(s)\n\n+++\n\n+\n+\n\nDiagnose problem in need of redress\n\nOffer solutions\n(i.e., tactics and strategies)\nthat ameliorate injustice\n\nProvide rationale to motivate support and collective action\n\n+\n\nstate repression of the citizenry\n\n+\n\nState policies and practices\n\n+ +\n\n+\n\n+\n\n+\n\n+\n\n\n+\n\n\n\n+\n\n+\n\n+\n\n+\n\n+\n\ninformation that is of value in achieving reform perception of opportunities perception of threats tactical adjustment of doctrine to maximize the strategic success formal access to political institutions and decision making informal access to political institutions and decision makingrational decision making to maximize the use of openings and minimize the adversity\n\n+\n\n+\n\n+\n\n+\n\n+\n\n+\n\n+\n\n+\n\n+\n\nOpportunities and Constraints political, social, cultural,\n& economic problems\n\n+\n\n+\n\n+\n\n+\n\n+\n\nSMO strength\n\nSMO provision of social services that are not provided by the State\n\n+\n\npublic perception that the SMO provides more value than the State\n\n+\n\npublic perception that the SMO is of value to the people public perception that the State regime is of value to the people\n\nSMO membership\n+\n\n\n+\n\nState strength\n\n+\nISN activism\n\nISN membership\n\nISN strength.\n\n+\n\n\nSMO =\nSocial\n\nMovement Organization\n\nResource Mobilization\n\n\n+\n\n+\n\n+\n\nSMO activism\n+\n\nState provision of social services\n\n+\n\n+\n\ncontributions to SMO\n\n+\n\n+\n\n\n+\n\n+\n\n+\n\n+\n\n+\n\n+ - +\n\n--+\n\n\n<state repression of the citizenry>\n\n+\n\n+\n\n\n+\n\n+\n\nmaterial assets financial assets human assets moral alignment cultural alignment social-organizational infrastructure revolutionaries wanderers converts compliants human population\n+\n\n+\n+ + +\n\n+\n+\n\n+\n+\n\n+\n\n+\n\n+\n\n+\n\n+\n\nstrain theory\n+\n\nthreats\n+\n\n+\n\n\"openness\" of State to political processes\n\n+\n\nnon-violent dissent\n(ISN)\n\nviolent dissent (isn)\n\nnon-violent dissent\n(smo)\n\nviolent dissent\n(smo)\n\n+\n\n\n+\n\n\n+\n\n+\n\n\n+\n\nSMT kernel with Workshop Executive Summary/Soule dynamics & the Oliver State\n\nResponse diagnostics frames prognostic frames motivational frames\n\n+\n\n+\n\nTactics\n\nState repressive capacity\n\n+\n\n+\n\nalignment stability presence/absence of allies\n\n+\n+\n\n+\n\nlarge-scale repression repression of a small number of radicals\n\n\n\npopular support for radicalism\n\n\n+\n\n+\n\nunmet needs of radicals\n\n+\n\n+\n\n+\n\nState permitting of non-violent dissent\n\n+\n\n+\n\n+\n\n\nblockage of dissidents'\ncommunications channels\n\n\n+\n\n+\n\nState's responsiveness to non-violent dissident groups'\n\nneedsunmet needs of non-violent dissident groups\n\nState satisfying dissident groups\n\n\n+\n\n\n\n+\n\n+\n\nwith the Earl mesaures level of protest+\n+\n\n+\n\n+\n\n\"strain\" measures\n\n\"opportunities and constraints\" measures\n\n\"resource mobilization\"\nmeasures\n\n\"framing process\"\nmeasures\n\n+\n\n+\n\n+\n\n+\n\n+\n\n+\n\nquantitative coding of news stories on movement issues+\n\n<quantitative coding of news stories on movement issues>\n\n+\n\nsurveys of individuals statistical analyses quantitative historical analyses macro-level social indicators\n\n+\n\n+\n+\n\n+\n\nSMT kernel pattern analysispattern analysis datadatadata radicalization assessment\n\n\n\n 13\n\nResults\n\nAs shown previously in Figure 2, the proposed approach to operationalizing SMT for radicalization situational awareness and early warning analysis integrates two elements:\nan expressive, quantitative encoding (and extension) of SMT as it applies to radicalization, denoted the SMT kernel, and a collection of \"pattern analysis\" algorithms that combine this kernel with real world data to produce radicalization assessments. We now describe each of these elements; additional information on the elements is provided in the Appendices of this report.\n\nFramework Development\n\nThe nature of SMT used in this research involves its characterization in terms of three fundamental elements; (1) Resource Mobilization, (2) Opportunities and Constraints, and\n(3) the Framing Process. Further, it is assumed that these elements interact with one another to form the dynamics of SMT, as shown in Figure 3.\n\n\n\nFigure 3.  Dynamic Coupling of SMT Elements.\n\n\nThese elements are defined6 as follows:\n\n\nResource Mobilization. This school of social movement analysis, developed from the 1960s onward, has been, and remains, the dominant approach among sociologists, though it has increasingly been challenged in recent years. Resource Mobilization Theory stresses the ways in which movements are shaped by, and work within, limits set by the resources\n(especially economic, political, and communications resources) available\n\n\n6 These definitions were taken from http://www.wsu.edu/~amerstu/smc/glossary.html.\n\nResource Mobilization\n\nFraming Process\n\nOpportunities\n&\n\nConstraints\n\n\n\n 14\n\nto the group and the organizational skills of movement leaders in utilizing those resources. It is especially interested in direct, measurable impacts of movements on political issues and is less interested in the expressive, ideological, identity-shaping, and consciousness-raising dimensions of movements. More recently, the attention of scholars in this school has been turning slowly toward some of these more cultural questions.\n\nOpportunities & Constraints (or Political Processes). This form of social movement analysis stresses the ways in which the wider political system opens up and closes down opportunities for organizing resistance. An example of the opening up would be the positive Supreme Court decision against segregation in Brown v. Board of Education, while an example of closing down would be the infiltration and repression of Black, Red, and Brown Power groups in the late 1960s and early 1970s by the FBI and other state agencies. Political Process Modeling is closely connected to Resource Mobilization Theory but looks more broadly at the political context in which movements mobilize their resources.\n\nFraming Process. The concept of frames or framing is used in the contexts of some social movement analysis to mean patterns of perception and/or schemata of interpretation employed by social movement participants or social movement organizations viewed collectively. A frame might be imagined as a kind of template or filter that organizes how one processes new information encountered in the world. Frames organize that information based on previously held beliefs or previously shaped patterns of perception and interpretation.\n\n\nThe SMT kernel developed using the Wiktorowicz text as the primary source material is depicted in Appendix C. The three fundamental elements, Resource Mobilization, Political Processes, and the Framing Process, were modeled individually in Figures C-1, C-2, and C-3 respectively, by constructing influence diagrams to represent the salient sub-elements of each of these three primary elements, including their interrelations. Next, these three primary elements were coupled by developing the interrelations among these three elements as depicted in Figure C-4, in Appendix C. The coupled set of primary elements formed the SMT kernel.  In the spirit of the classical usage of the term kernel, the SMT kernel developed for this research is intended to provide a graph theoretic representation of the essential parts of the ideas embodied in SMT.\n\nThe next step in constructing the framework used in this research was to extend the SMT kernel to specifically include the findings from the STIC workshop. This extended form of the SMT kernel (referred to as \"the R-SMT kernel\") is intended to represent the distinguishing features, and their interactions, of radicalization. The R-SMT kernel is shown in Figure 4. It is noteworthy that although this extended form of the SMT Kernel has been discussed with academicians and other specialists from the intelligence\n\n\n\n 15\n\ncommunity7 who have expertise in SMT and in radicalism (they have been most helpful in providing critical feedback that was used in the evolution of this form), this does not constitute a validation8 of the R-SMT kernel. Nevertheless, this form provides a valuable means to help understand the dynamics of radicalization in the context of the underlying causal mechanisms associated with SMT.\n\n\n\nFigure 4.  Extended Form of the SMT Kernel (R-SMT Kernel)\n\n\n\n7 The extended form of the SMT kernel was discussed extensively in private communications with Gary Ackerman , Research\n\nDirector of the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism and Director of the Center for Terrorism and Intelligence Studies, University of Maryland; Dr. Jennifer Earl, Associate Professor, Department of Sociology, University of California, Santa Barbara; Emile Nakhleh (former Director of the CIA's Political Islam Strategic Analysis Programme); Dr. Kathryn Hochstetler, Professor, Department of Political Science, University of New Mexico; Dr. Pamela Oliver, Professor, Department of Sociology, University of Wisconsin; and Dr. Quintan Wiktorowicz (Senior Analyst, National Counter Terrorism Center). Each of these scholars provided insights that were invaluable in the evolution of this extended form of the SMT kernel.\n\n8The extended form of the SMT kernel has not been validated in that it has not been demonstrated to consistently and accurately represent the dynamics of radicalization in the context of Social Movement Theory.\n\nFraming Process spread of Western values and practices (AKA Cultural\n\nImperialism)\n\nunemployment economic development government debt public housing public social and welfare programs impression that the current regime is corrupt and is a puppet of\n\nWestern governments perception that Islam is the solution likelihood of a society that is governed by Islamic law desire to control the State\n\n+\n\n\"RESONANCE\"\n\ncultural consistency reputation of framing individual(s)\n\npersonal salience of frame consistency of frame empirical credibility of frame\n\n+\n+\n\n+\n\n+\n+\n\nease of identifying and publicizing social problem(s)\n\n+++\n\n+\n+\n\nDiagnose problem in need of redress\n\nOffer solutions\n(i.e., tactics and strategies)\nthat ameliorate injustice\n\nProvide rationale to motivate support and collective action\n\n+\n\nstate repression of the citizenry\n\n+\n\nState policies and practices\n\n+ +\n\n+\n\n+\n\n+\n\n+\n\n\n+\n\n\n\n+\n\n+\n\n+\n\n+\n\n+\n\ninformation that is of value in achieving reform perception of opportunities perception of threats tactical adjustment of doctrine to maximize the strategic success formal access to political institutions and decision making informal access to political institutions and decision makingrational decision making to maximize the use of openings and minimize the adversity\n\n+\n\n+\n\n+\n\n+\n\n+\n\n+\n\n+\n\n+\n\n+\n\nOpportunities and Constraints political, social, cultural,\n& economic problems\n\n+\n\n+\n\n+\n\n+\n\n+\n\nSMO strength\n\nSMO provision of social services that are not provided by the State\n\n+\n\npublic perception that the SMO provides more value than the State\n\n+\n\npublic perception that the SMO is of value to the people public perception that the State regime is of value to the people\n\nSMO membership\n+\n\n\n+\n\nState strength\n\n+\nISN activism\n\nISN membership\n\nISN strength.\n\n+\n\n\nSMO =\nSocial\n\nMovement Organization\n\nResource Mobilization\n\n\n+\n\n+\n\n+\n\nSMO activism\n+\n\nState provision of social services\n\n+\n\n+\n\ncontributions to SMO\n\n+\n\n+\n\n\n+\n\n+\n\n+\n\n+\n\n+\n\n+ - +\n\n--+\n\n\n<state repression of the citizenry>\n\n+\n\n+\n\n\n+\n\n+\n\nmaterial assets financial assets human assets moral alignment cultural alignment social-organizational infrastructure revolutionaries wanderers converts compliants human population\n+\n\n+\n+ + +\n\n+\n+\n\n+\n+\n\n+\n\n+\n\n+\n\n+\n\n+\n\nstrain theory\n+\n\nthreats\n+\n\n+\n\n\"openness\" of State to political processes\n\n+\n\nnon-violent dissent\n(ISN)\n\nviolent dissent (isn)\n\nnon-violent dissent\n(smo)\n\nviolent dissent\n(smo)\n\n+\n\n\n+\n\n\n+\n\n+\n\n\n+\n\nSMT kernel with Workshop Executive Summary/Soule dynamics & the Oliver State Response diagnostics frames prognostic frames motivational frames\n\n+\n\n+\n\nTactics\n\nState repressive capacity\n\n+\n\n+\n\nalignment stability presence/absence of allies\n\n+\n+\n\n+\n\nlarge-scale repression repression of a small number of radicals\n\n\n\npopular support for radicalism\n\n\n+\n\n+\n\nunmet needs of radicals\n\n+\n\n+\n\n+\n\nState permitting of non-violent dissent\n\n+\n\n+\n\n+\n\n\nblockage of dissidents'\ncommunications channels\n\n\n+\n\n+\n\nState's responsiveness to non-violent dissident groups'\n\nneedsunmet needs of non-violent dissident groups\n\nState satisfying dissident groups\n\n\n+\n\n\n\n+\n\n+\n\nwith the Earl mesaures level of protest+\n+\n\n+\n\n+\n\n\"strain\" measures\n\n\"opportunities and constraints\" measures\n\n\"resource mobilization\"\nmeasures\n\n\"framing process\"\nmeasures\n\n+\n\n+\n\n+\n\n+\n\n+\n\n+\n\nquantitative coding of news stories on movement issues+\n\n<quantitative coding of news stories on movement issues>\n\n+\n\nsurveys of individuals statistical analyses quantitative historical analyses macro-level social indicators\n\n+\n\n+\n+\n\n+\n\n\n\n 16\n\nPattern Discovery and Analysis\n\nIntroduction\n\nIn this section, we present a collection of pattern discovery and analysis algorithms that leverage the R-SMT kernel to enable real-world observables to be mapped to robust, timely situational awareness and warning analysis; the basic idea was depicted in Figure\n2. A central challenge in the pattern analysis process is discovering which aspects of a social system, if any, are sufficiently predictive of radicalization to be useful for situational awareness and warning analysis. While the R-SMT kernel identifies features and processes that can be relevant to radicalization, the representation is at a high level of abstraction and does not relate directly to real world data. One difficulty associated with establishing this relationship is the nature of social system data setsthey are usually too\n\"coarse-grained\" and incomplete to be of direct use in situational awareness and warning analysis. For instance, Gulden (2002) finds that certain spatial distributions of ethnic groups exhibit increased rates of ethnic violence. However, determining whether these distributions are present requires data of significantly higher spatial resolution than are usually available. Perhaps more importantly, even if data of adequate resolution and fidelity are available, it is typically unclear what particular features of the data have predictive power. Thus, for example, it is plausible that public opinion dynamics may be important for some radicalization phenomena and that these dynamics may be inferred from online, web-based sources such as blogs. But what aspects of these online interactions should be measured to characterize, and possibly even anticipate, the intensity and dynamics of public opinion concerning a given issue?\n\nWe address this challenge through the use of our recently developed approach to predictive analysis for social processes (Colbaugh and Glass 2007). Briefly, this approach begins by considering problem solvabilityis the phenomenon of interest predictable?\nAssessing predictability before attempting prediction is, of course, scientifically sensible. Moreover, because formal predictability analysis evaluates the possibility to make predictions using a specific set of observables, this analysis plays a key role in identifying those observables most useful for prediction. For instance, the work reported in Colbaugh and Glass (2007) shows that for many social processes the observables commonly used for prediction actually possess little or no predictive power; this is one reason standard prediction methods are frequently unsuccessful. Interestingly, this result often implies the existence of other system observables that do have predictive power and that can form the basis for successful prediction (Colbaugh and Glass 2007). Additional details regarding this approach to predictive analysis are given in Appendix D.\n\nThis part of the report makes four main contributions. First, we show how formal predictive analysis can be used to develop pattern analysis algorithms that relate the R SMT kernel to real world data, thereby operationalizing this theoretical framework. Second, we consider the question of whether public opinion dynamics are relevant to radicalization phenomena and provide evidence that the two are indeed related and that, in fact, public opinion can be predictive of radicalization. Next we present an algorithm for characterizing, and predicting, Islamic mobilization and public opinion dynamics and\n\n\n\n 17\n\nshow how this algorithm can be used to provide an automated early warning capability for \"cascading\" mobilization and protest events. Finally, we describe two algorithms for situational awareness analysis, one that detects regions with increased likelihood for ethnic violence and one that automatically identifies framing documents in large text corpora.\n\nWe close these introductory remarks with an illustrative example of the way the R-SMT kernel and pattern analysis methods can be combined to enable real world data to be mapped to radicalization assessments. Consider the role played by social dynamics in radicalization. Examination of the R-SMT kernel reveals that this role is crucial, for instance underlying much of resource mobilization and also impacting framing (e.g., in frame dissemination). Moreover, the R-SMT kernel suggests that these social dynamics should be of the \"positive externality\" variety, in which the adoption of an opinion or idea by an individual's neighbors increases the probability that the individual will also adopt the opinion. This in turn leads to the identification of particular social dynamics models (Hedstrom et al. 2000) to incorporate into the pattern analysis algorithms (see Appendix D).\n\nPublic Opinion Dynamics and Radicalization\n\n\nAn important ultimate objective of the work initiated in this project is the development of capabilities for understanding, recognizing, and anticipating Islamic radicalization, and we propose that the synthesis of SMT and pattern analysis depicted in Figure 2 provides the setting to achieve this goal.  The R-SMT kernel summarized above relates SMT to radicalization, thereby providing a quantitative framework within which to study situational awareness and warning analysis for radicalization. The focus of the pattern analysis results presented in subsequent sections is the public opinion and mobilization dynamics associated with radicalization. This focus is motivated in part by the fact that these phenomena are shown to be important for radicalization by the R-SMT kernel, and in part because of the availability of high resolution data for recent opinion dynamics /\nmobilization events and not for the underlying radicalization. This section, which addresses the connection between radicalization and public opinion dynamics from an empirical perspective, provides a \"bridge\" between the R-SMT framework and the pattern analysis results for social dynamics situational awareness and warning analysis.\n\nHere we consider the following question: Is public opinion dynamics in a particular society related to the radicalization of groups in that society? Examination of the R-SMT Kernel reveals that public opinion may influence the behavior of extremists through a variety of channels. For example, extremist elements in a society may depend upon that society for financial and other support, as a pool from which to recruit new members, and as an accommodating environment for development and dissemination of radical ideologies. However, the relationship between public opinion and violent behavior by extremists is complex and difficult to quantify from SMT considerations alone, so it is desirable to explore this issue empirically as well.\n\n\n\n 18\n\nWe investigate the relationship between public opinion dynamics and the extremist groups' use of violent tactics by studying this aspect of the Israel-Palestine conflict. The choice of analysis target is motivated in large part by the availability of fairly high resolution temporal data for both Palestinian public opinion regarding suicide bombing and suicide bombing activities by extremist groups. In particular, we obtained public opinion data from surveys conducted by the Jerusalem Media and Communication Center and suicide bombing event data from the MIPT (see http://www.mipt.org/) and START (see http://www.start.umd.edu/) terrorism databases.\n\n\nWe collected and analyzed data for 1) Palestinian public opinion regarding suicide bombing against Israel and 2) suicide bombing attacks against Israel by the Palestinian groups Fatah, Hamas, PFLP, and PIJ, for the period 1997 to 2006. This is the largest time period for which both public opinion and events data are available. These time series are plotted in Figure 5, and visual examination of this plot suggests the possibility that the dynamics of public opinion and suicide bombings are correlated. The blue line represents the percent in favor (public opinion) and the red line represents suicide bombing attacks against Israel by Palestinian groups (normalized). Analysis of the time series confirms this impression: public opinion regarding suicide bombing and suicide bombing events are strongly correlated, with public opinion leading bombing events by 12 months (R =\n0.8, P < 0.0001). Note that this result suggests the possibility that public opinion dynamics data could be predictive for extremist activity in certain situations.\n\n\nFigure 5.  Palestinian Public Opinion Regarding Suicide Bombing Against Israel\n\nThe empirical evidence obtained in this study and the theoretical insights captured by the R-SMT kernel support the notion that public opinion dynamics can be an important element in radicalization. Indeed, Oliver and Myers (2000) suggest that social\n\n\n\n 19\n\nmovements can be understood as interrelated sets of diffusion processes, many reflecting the propagation of ideas and opinions. Thus, in much of what follows, we concentrate on understanding social dynamics and diffusion phenomena and estimating these dynamics from real-world data. We investigate three related social dynamics problems. First we consider early warning analysis for social cascades, with a focus on Islamic mobilization/\nprotest events. Of particular interest is early warning via dynamical analysis of online Internet-based social behavior. Next we examine the possibility of estimating the context for social dynamicsin this case ethnic mix and its relation to ethnic violencefrom coarse-grained demographic data. Finally, we study the problem of automatically identifying framing documents in a large text resource such as the Web. Among other applications, we expect this capability to be useful for tracking and assessing the diffusion of frames and ideologies through a society. Recall that frame diffusion has been shown to be important for a variety of social movements (Oliver and Myers 2000).\n\nWarning Analysis: Social Dynamics and Radicalization\n\nIdentifying reliable, practically measurable early indicators of impending radicalization is of considerable interest to the national security community. Of course, anticipating the evolution of complex processes that possess a social component, such as radicalization, is quite difficult. In fact, recent experiments suggest that there are fundamental limits to the predictability of many social processes, at least if the predictions are to be formed using standard methods (Salganik et al. 2006, Colbaugh and Glass 2007). Moreover, this work indicates that much of the difficulty associated with social system prediction is a consequence of the subtle, intricate dynamics that underlie many social processes. For example, radicalization emerges from a complex interplay between intrinsic features of the situation, such as regime oppressiveness or perceived religious legitimacy, and the social network dynamics that define the way individual beliefs and preferences become collective actions. Successful early warning analysis for social movements such as radicalization would appear to demand that these complex dynamics be understood.\n\n\nWe have recently developed a scientifically rigorous, computationally tractable approach to predictive analysis for social processes that is well-suited to the task of obtaining this understanding (Colbaugh and Glass 2007]. A crucial step in the approach is to assess the predictability of the process of interest. Among other things, predictability assessment enables identification of those measurables that are most useful for prediction. We expect this function to be important, as there are myriad measurables associated with radicalization that may have predictive power.  Identifying those measurables is both challenging and critical for successful warning analysis. A brief summary of this predictive analysis methodology is given in Appendix D.\n\n\nWe now apply this predictive analysis methodology to the early warning analysis for social movements, including radicalization-related information propagation and mobilization. The study consists of three phases: 1) a theoretical investigation of social movement warning analysis using SMT models and formal predictability assessment, 2)\nan empirical study of social movement warning analysis involving \"data-rich\" social movement case studies such as the emergence and diffusion through Sweden of their\n\n\n\n 20\n\nSocial Democratic Party, and 3) a combined empirical/theoretical investigation of Islamic mobilization warning analysis involving both successful and unsuccessful mobilization events and using online social activity as the main data source.\n\n\nIt is widely recognized that collective dynamics are central to a variety of social movement processes such as recruitment, attracting support, development and dissemination of ideas, and expressive action. However, there has been little done to rigorously explore the implications of these dynamics for anticipating successful movements. A key step in understanding these dynamics and their impact on predictive analysis is the formulation of appropriate social dynamics models. Recent work has clearly demonstrated the importance of capturing social network effects when modeling social processes (Newman 2003). Unfortunately, detailed information concerning the relevant social networks is not typically available. Additionally, even when these data can be estimated, naive approaches to modeling the networks often lead to unnecessarily complicated models and subsequent analytic difficulties.\n\n\nThese facts motivate the development of a class of multi-scale models for social processes. The proposed multi-scale representation reflects the essential structures present in the social systems of interest through the use of three modeling scales:\n\n a micro-scale, for modeling the behavior of individuals;\n a meso-scale, which enables efficient yet accurate representation of the collective dynamics within social contexts (via \"fully mixed\" models for the interaction dynamics);\n\n a macro-scale, which characterizes the interaction between the social contexts.\n\n\nA schematic of the basic framework is given in Figure 6.\n\n\n\nFigure 6.  Multi-scale Model for Social Processes\n\n\nThe drawing at left illustrates the basic model structure, in which individuals represented by blue and red nodes interact within social contexts of ellipses encircling nodes via fully mixed dynamics and between contexts according to the network topology characterizing context relationships. The block diagram at right depicts a hybrid dynamical system encoding of the model.\n\n\n\nstochastic process continuous system inputs inputs discrete statecontinuous state stochastic process continuous system inputs inputs discrete statecontinuous state context switching context i context j type A type B context switching context i context j type A type B\n\n\n\n 21\n\nThis multi-scale approach alleviates the need for detailed social network data because interactions within social contexts are modeled as fully mixed. Moreover, by distinguishing between the way individuals interact within and across social contexts, we simultaneously capture the important social network structure and obtain analytically tractable mathematical formulations. Note that the characterization of intra-context and inter-context dynamics implicit in the proposed multi-scale framework is based on established social science understanding (Watts et al. 2002).\n\n\nWe develop and analyze multi-scale social dynamics models using the hybrid dynamical system (HDS) formalism (Bemporad et al. 2007, Colbaugh et al. 2007). Briefly, HDS's are feedback interconnections of continuous dynamics, such as the dynamics of individuals exchanging ideas within a social context, and discrete dynamics, capturing for instance the switching behavior encountered when an individual from one context moves to another and introduces an idea that is novel in the latter context (see Figure 6). An advantage of representing multi-scale social dynamics using an HDS framework is that the resulting models are amenable to quantitative analysis. For example, the approach to predictability assessment summarized in Appendix D can be implemented with HDS models, enabling rigorous analysis of these systems (Colbaugh and Glass 2007); see Appendix D for sample Matlab programs for performing this analysis.\n\n\nAs indicated above, we begin our study of the early warning problem with an investigation of general social movements. This broader setting is reasonably well characterized both theoretically and empirically and therefore provides the opportunity to identify candidate early indicators in a principled way. Candidate indicators, if any, can then be tested for relevance to Islamic mobilization and radicalization. Consider the problem of identifying those measurables that permit successful social movements attracting significant following to be distinguished from unsuccessful ones early in their lifecycle. This problem is naturally formulated within the proposed predictability assessment framework. Movement success is quantified by defining a subset Xs of the social system state space that corresponds to a level of movement membership consistent with movement goals, and we seek measurables that allow early identification of those movements that are likely to evolve to Xs (see Appendix D).\n\n\nIn the theoretical study of social movements, we first collect a family of models from the SMT literature and formulate these within our multi-scale, HDS framework. This approach yields models that appropriately represent social network effects while remaining broadly consistent with current SMT thinking. We adopt a stochastic hybrid system (S-HDS) representation for social movements (see Appendix D) and find that this formulation enables simultaneous analysis of an entire collection of relevant SMT models. More precisely, the model abstraction methodology presented in (Colbaugh et al.\n2007) is employed to derive a \"base model\" whose parameterization enables any model in the family of interest to be recovered through suitable specification of parameter values. We then work with the complete family of models all at once by conducting the analysis for the entire set of feasible parameter values.\n\n\n\n 22\n\nThe continuous system portion of the S-HDS model (see Figure 6) is a collection of stochastic differential equations (SDE), each of which captures a particular instantiation of the intra-context social dynamics. This collection is indexed by a discrete \"mode\" q Q that specifies which vector SDE is currently active. The mode q concisely quantifies the history of inter-context interactions, and specification of the appropriate active SDE is based on this history. Thus, for example, a particular sequence of inter-context communications concerning new information leads to a certain distribution of informed individuals across social contexts, and this distribution in turn impacts the subsequent intra-context dynamics. Mode q evolves according to a Markov chain with state set Q and continuous state dependent transition probabilities. This is the discrete system component of the S-HDS (see Figure 6).\n\nLet us describe one such S-HDS model in more specific terms. Consider for simplicity a social system composed of only two contexts, one which contains a small fraction of individuals who have adopted an opinion and one that has not been exposed to this new idea. We can model the diffusion of the opinion within the two contexts using one set of coupled differential equations for each context (e.g., the Hedstrom model analyzed in Appendix E); these two sets of differential equations form the continuous system within the S-HDS framework. The discrete system part of the S-HDS then captures the dynamics associated with an individual from the first context moving to the second and introducing the novel idea there. One way to model this context switching phenomenon is to use a Markov chain with continuous state-dependent transition probabilities. This dependency enables us to monitor only the movement of individuals who have adopted the novel opinion, as this is all that is needed to assess the possibility of the opinion\n\"escaping\" the first context (see Appendix D for additional details).\n\nPredictability assessment is performed for the collection of S-HDS social movement models within a stochastic setting. That is, we compute provably correct upper and lower bounds for the probability that any model in the collection will reach Xs from X0 (the set of admissible initial states.) Because this computation does not require forward simulation and can be conducted for sets of initial states and parameter values, we can efficiently explore the way various measurables affect these probability bounds. Those measurables for which the probability of reaching Xs exhibits sensitive dependence are designated to be potentially useful indicators of movement success.\n\nBriefly, this study produced two main results. First, the degree to which movement related activity shows early diffusion across multiple social contexts is a powerful distinguisher of successful and unsuccessful social movements. Indeed, this measurable appears to have significantly more predictive power than volume of such activity and also more power than various system intrinsics. Second, significant social movements can occur only if both 1) the intra-context \"infectivity\" of the movement exceeds a certain threshold, and 2) the inter-context interactions associated with the movement occur with a frequency that is larger than another threshold. Note that this is reminiscent of, and significantly extends, well-known results for epidemic thresholds in disease propagation models (see Appendix D for additional details).\n\n\n\n 23\n\nThe empirical investigation of early warning analysis for social movements involved several data-rich social movement case studies, including the emergence and growth of the Swedish Social Democratic Party (SDP). The case of the SDP is particularly relevant for our purposes, as the early activities of political \"agitators\" associated with the SDP led to the establishment of a well-defined and well-documented network linking previously disparate geographically and demographically based social contexts in Sweden (Hedstrom et al. 2000).9 We explore the role played by this inter-context network by analyzing archived data and published accounts describing the dynamics of the SDP. Our investigation uses standard time series analysis techniques similar to those employed in (Hedstrom et al. 2000) and reveals that an important predictor of SDP spatio-temporal dynamics is early diffusion of SDP-related activity across social contexts. In fact, this measurable has more predictive power than demographic and political features of the population.\n\nThe visualization at the top of Figure 7 depicts the temporal evolution of the concentration of SDP members in approximately 360 Swedish jurisdictional districts over the period 1885 to 1947. In this rendering of the data, the horizontal coordinate axis is district index, the vertical coordinate is time, and the colors indicate variation from minimum member concentration (dark blue) to maximum concentration (red). Visual inspection of the figure reveals the expected \"contagion\" effect in membership evolution, in which districts that are close geographically experience similar membership trajectories (geographically proximate districts have index values that are close). However, this visualization also shows that in the early years of the party, some geographically disparate districts initiated local party chapters almost simultaneously and then experienced similar growth patterns.\n\n\nThe cross-correlation results at the bottom of Figure 7 confirm this observation. The time series of membership concentration on the left and local party office founding on the right show both local geographic correlations, corresponding to contagion effects, and also non-local effects. Further analysis (not shown) indicates that these correlations are significantly larger than those observed in appropriately randomized data. More interestingly, we find that the non-local correlations can be explained by the inter-context network established by early party activists: those districts that exhibit similar early party initiation and growth are also those with direct (activist-induced) inter-context links. Thus inter-context dynamics appear to have played an important role in the emergence and growth of the SDP.\n\nThe theoretical and empirical results summarized above suggest social network dynamics are critical to social movement success. Moreover, the results show that the features of these dynamics that may be useful early indicators of movement success are practically measurable in many applications. For instance, diffusion across social contexts often can be inferred from analysis of public opinion and demographic data, as this measure requires only incomplete information regarding the relevant social networks. For instance, in a preliminary examination of Palestine public opinion data regarding suicide\n\n\n9 The Hedstrom model was explored in depth during this research to better understand the inherent dynamics of the underlying phenomenology of social movements. This exploration is reported in Appendix E.\n\n\n\n 24\n\nbombings, we find that social contexts inferred from age, education level, and geographic location data produce results that are consistent with those obtained in the theoretical and SDP studies.\n\n\n.\n\n\n\nFigure 7.  Sample Results for the Swedish Social Democratic Party Case Study\n\n\nWe investigated whether diffusion across social contexts is a useful early indicator for Islamic mobilization and protest events. More specifically, we explored the extent to which this measurable distinguishes successful and unsuccessful Islamic mobilization events early in the mobilization process. Recall that there is considerable theoretical and empirical evidence indicating that understanding such events, and the associated social dynamics and overall social environment, is central to understanding and anticipating Islamic radicalization\n\n\nThe study focuses on Muslim reaction to six recent incidents, each of which appeared at the outset to have the potential to trigger significant protest activities:\n\n publication of photographs and accounts of prisoner abuse at Abu Ghraib in Spring 2004;\n\n\n\n 25\n\n publication of cartoons depicting the prophet Mohammad in the Danish newspaper Jyllands-Posten in September 2005;\n\n distribution of the DVD I was blind but now I can see in Egypt in October 2005;\n the lecture given by Pope Benedict XVI in September 2006 in which he quoted controversial material concerning Islam;\n Salman Rushdie being knighted in June 2007;\n re-publication of the \"Danish cartoons\" in various newspapers in February 2008.\n\n\n\nRecall that the first of the Danish cartoons events ultimately led to substantial Muslim mobilization, including massive protests and considerable violence and that the Egypt DVD event also resulted in significant Muslim mobilization and violence. In contrast, Muslim outrage triggered by Abu Ghraib, the Pope lecture, the Rushdie knighting, and the second Danish cartoons event all subsided quickly with essentially no violence. Therefore, taken together, these six events provide a useful setting for testing whether the extent of early diffusion across social contexts can be used to distinguish nascent Islamic mobilization events that become large and self-sustaining, and also potentially violent, from those that quickly dissipate.\n\nA central element in the proposed approach to early warning analysis is the measurement, and appropriate processing, of social dynamics associated with the process of interest. Indeed, the preceding results suggest that in many cases, reliable warning analysis requires such data. In the present case study, we use online social activity as a proxy for\n\"real world\" diffusion of mobilization-relevant information. More specifically, we use blog-based communications and discussions as our primary data set. The \"blogosphere\"\nis modeled as a graph composed of two types of vertices, the blogs themselves and the concepts that appear in them. Two blogs are linked if a post in one hyperlinks to a post in the other, and a blog is linked to a concept if the blog contains a significant occurrence of that concept. Figure 8 shows a schematic representation of this sort of blog graph. Among other things, this blog graph model enables the identification of blog communitiesthat is, sets of blogs with intra-group edge densities that are significantly higher than expected\n[Newman 2003]. In what follows, these blog communities serve as one proxy for social contexts as shown in Figure 8.\n\n\n\nFigure 8.  Schematic Representation of Blog Graph Model.\n\nThe schematic on left depicts the basic graph structure, in which blogs (red vertices) can be connected to each other via hyperlinks (solid edges) and also connected to concepts\n\n\n\n 26\n\n(blue vertices) they contain. Blog graph on right corresponds to political blogs; note that in this graph, liberal (blue) and conservative (red) blogs form two distinct communities.\n\nWe propose the following procedure or steps for warning analysis using blog data given a potential \"triggering\" event of interest\n\n1. Use key words and concepts associated with the triggering event to collect relevant blog posts and build the associated blog graph.\n\n2. Identify the blog social contexts (e.g., graph community-based, language-based).\n3. Construct the post volume time series for each social context. Compute the post/\n\ncontext entropy time series associated with the post volume time series.\n4. Construct a synthetic ensemble of post/context entropy time series from (actual)\n\npost volume time series using a general S-HDS social diffusion model.\n5. Perform motif detection: compare the actual post / context entropy time series to the synthetic ensemble series to determine if the early diffusion of activity across contexts is \"excessive.\" Flag events with excessive early diffusion for further\n(e.g., manual) analysis.\n\n\nStep 1 is by now a standard operation in web mining applications, and various \"off the shelf\" tools exist that can perform this task. For instance, in this study we employ Google Blogs together with tools developed by the Artificial Intelligence Laboratory at the University of Arizona [AI Lab 2007].\n\n\nIn Step 2 we use two definitions for blog social context: graph-community based, in which the contexts are graph communities found through standard community extraction applied to the blog graph, and language-based, in which contexts are defined based on language of the posts. Google Blogs archives blog posts in 43 languages.\n\nIn Step 3, post volume for a given context i and sampling interval t is obtained by counting the number of relevant posts made in the blogs comprising context i during interval t, and the post volume time series are simply the concatenation of these counts. Post/context entropy (PCE) for a given sampling interval t is defined as follows:\n\nPCE(t) = i fi(t) log(fi(t)), where fi(t) is the fraction of total relevant posts during interval t which occur in context i;\nthe associated time series is again simply the sequence of these values.\n\n\nGiven the post volume time series obtained in Step 3, Step 4 involves the construction of an ensemble of PCE time series that would be expected under \"normal circumstances,\"\nthat is, if Muslim reaction to the triggering event diffused from a small \"seed set\" of initiators according to SMT social dynamics. For this study, we use the multi-scale S HDS modeling framework to generate the PCE time series ensembles. Finally, motif detection in Step 5 is carried out by searching for periods, if any, during which the actual PCE time series is excessive relative to the synthetic PCE ensemble (e.g., exceeds the mean of the ensemble by two standard deviations).\n\n\n\n 27\n\n\n\nFigure 9.  Sample Results for Islamic Mobilization Case Study.\n\nThe time series plots at the top correspond to the first Danish cartoon event (left) and the Pope event (right). In each plot, the red curve is blog volume and the blue curve is blog entropy; the Danish cartoon plot also shows two measures of violence (pale blue and purple lines). Note that while the data are scaled to allow multiple data sets to be graphed on each plot, the scale for entropy is consistent across plots to enable cross-event comparison. The table at the bottom summarizes the result of the motif analysis study. Note that only the first Danish cartoons event and Egypt DVD event exhibit time series motifs. We now apply the proposed approach to early warning analysis to the Islamic mobilization case study. If early diffusion of discussions across blog communities is an indicator that the associated Islamic mobilization event will be large, we would expect to observe such diffusion with the mobilization associated with the first Danish cartoons and Egypt DVD events and not with the other four events. Additionally, we would expect this early diffusion to be excessive, relative to the synthetic ensemble, for the first two events and not for the latter four. As can be seen in Figure 9, this is precisely what we find. In the case of the first Danish cartoons event, the entropy of diffusion of relevant discussions across blog communities (blue curve) experiences a dramatic increase a few weeks before the corresponding increase in the volume of blog discussions (red curve);\nthis latter increase, in turn, occurs before any violence. In contrast, in the case of the Pope event, the entropy of diffusion of discussions across blog communities is small relative to the cartoons event, and any increase in this measure lags discussion volume. Similar curves are obtained for the other four events. More importantly, the proposed motif detection process also yields the expected result: motifs are found only for the Danish cartoons and Egypt DVD events, and these motifs precede significant blog volume and\n\nTime series motif analysis\n\nEvent                            Motif\n\nDanish cartoons 1:      1/11/26/2006. Egypt DVD release:     10/210/9/2005. Abu Ghraib story:        none. Pope lecture:     none. Rushdie knighting:      none. Danish cartoons 2:  none\n\n\n\n 28\n\nreal world violence. Note that qualitatively similar results are obtained for both the graph community-based and language-based definitions of social context. This case study suggests that early diffusion of mobilization-related activity (here blog discussions)\nacross disparate social contexts (blog communities) may be a useful early indicator of successful mobilization events.\n\n\nThe Muslim response to the publication of cartoons by the Danish newspaper Jyllands Posten  was explored in more depth in this research through the lenses of Social Movement and Argumentation Theories. Appendix A contains the collection of these cartoons.\n\nIn the meso model a bag-of-words approach was used to provide this content analysis. To delve further into blog content, a collection of eight blogs was examined in more depth. The eight chosen (see Appendix F) were those that were assessed to be seminal in the sense that they stimulated a significant level of subsequent blogging activity. The purpose of this more in-depth analysis of the content of these blogs was to more carefully explore for relationships to SMT and specifically to seek information regarding motivation and intent of the bloggers.\n\nThe next level of detail in this content analysis was directed toward determination of relative emphasiswithin each blogon each of the three elements of SMT; namely, Framing, Opportunities & Constraints, and Resource Mobilization. The relativistic assessment, using pairwise comparisons of the use of the three SMT elements for each of the eight seminal blogs, revealed that the Framing Element of SMT is the dominant theme for most of the eight blogs. Appendix G contains the detailed results of this analysis. Further, the summary statistics for the relativistic composite of the eight seminal blogs provided the insights that:\n\n framing is clearly the most dominant of the three SMT dimensions,\n resource mobilization and opportunities/constraints are nearly equivalent, and\n the eight bloggers were most consistent in their use of resource mobilization and least consistent in their use of opportunities/constraints.\n\n\nThese summary statistics are intuitively consistent with the relationships between the underlying themes of the three fundamental elements of SMT and the motivation and intent of the bloggers. Because the Framing element is focused on:\n\n diagnosing the problem(s) and the need for redress;\n providing the rationale to motivate support and collective action, and\n offering solutions, strategies, and tactics that ameliorate the injustice;\n\nthe Framing element of SMT is the element of choice for those wishing to stimulate support for their cause. Further, because of the relative consistency of need for the mobilization of resources (RM) to support the cause and because of the emergence and disappearance of both opportunities and constraints (O&C), it is not surprising that there is less variability in the use of the RM than there is in O&C by the bloggers.\n\nThe final level of detail in content analysis for this research focused specifically on one of the eight seminal blogs. Appendix G provides a discussion of this analysis. This blog\n\n\n\n 29\n\nwas chosen because it was viewed as being especially relevant to the motivation and intent imperative in that it framed the cartoons as an affront to the Islamic religion\n(motivation) and argued for a reaction (intent) to stimulate amusement, shock, and fear among Muslims. This analysis was conducted using the well-developed discipline of argumentation. Argumentation10 is the study of reasons given by people to justify their acts or beliefs and to influence the thoughts or action of others.  Although argumentation theory is well developed, the authors are unaware of a direct application of this theory to the analysis of blogs\n\n\nElements of argument are:\n Claims are the statements that we want listeners to believe and on which we want them to act.\n Evidence11 represents the grounds for making the claim.\n The inference is the main proof line leading from evidence to claim.\n The warrant is the license to make the claim.\n\n\nFurther, the four basic forms of claims are:\n Claims of fact involve description.\n Claims of definition involve interpretation.\n Claims of value involve judgment.\n Claims of policy involve action.\n\n\n\nIn the case of blog Number 8, which can be found in Appendix F, the dominant claims are those of value (judgment) and of fact (description). This example is one that was assessed to be essentially a framing blog.\n\nIn drawing a qualitative connection between Argumentation and Social Movement Theories, a collection of relative relationships are listed in Table 1 below. These relationships are intuitive estimates and are not based on any rigorous analyses.\n\nTable 1.  Potential Relationships among the Categories of Argumentation Claims\n\n and the Fundamental Elements of Social Movement Theory.\n Framing Opp & Constraints Res Mobilization Description Moderate High Interpretation Moderate High Judgment High Action High  High\n\nNevertheless, they do provide one vantage point for understanding Islamic radicalization in the context of SMT through the lens of Argumentation Theory. This connection has the potential to be of value from two important aspects. First, this vantage point has the potential to provide more in-depth insights into the forces underlying the emergence of\n\n\n10 An excellent overview of Argumentation is provided in the text authored by David Zarefsky, Argumentation: The Study of Effective\n\nReasoning, 2nd edition, The Teaching Company, 2005.\n11 Both the evidence and the warrant must either be accepted by the audience or they must be established by a separate argument.\n\n\n\n 30\n\nradical behavior. Second, this vantage point may provide insights into how to use the blogosphere to influence the emergent dialog to effectively create an impact on the resulting actions take by the potential radicals.\n\nSituational Awareness: Context and Framing\n\nIn addition to developing methods for early warning analysis of Islamic mobilization and protest events, and showing that such capabilities are likely to be of importance for understanding and anticipating radicalization, we also derived two techniques for obtaining situational awareness of relevance to radicalization phenomena. These two capabilities leverage insights provided by the R-SMT kernel, particularly related to the framing and opportunities and constraints aspects of the kernel, and take the form of algorithms that map real world data to situational awareness as shown previously in Figure 2. The two algorithms are now briefly summarized. A detailed description of these capabilities and the results obtained when applying them to several case studies are given in Appendices I and J.\n\n\nTechnique One for obtaining situational awareness\n\nEthnic/cultural violence is an important element of global conflict in general and much radicalization phenomena in particular. The first of our two situational awareness algorithms detects regions of the world with increased likelihood for ethnic violence, and has the potential to contribute to the objectives of understanding and anticipating radicalization by enabling analysts to focus their attention on \"hot spots\" with elevated potential for conflict and violence. The analytic approach is based on recent results reported in Gulden (2002) and Lim et al. (2007), each of which shows quantitative correlations between outbreaks of regional violence and certain features of the spatial distribution of ethnic groups. These results form the foundations for our development of a\n\"filtering\" algorithm that maps coarse-grained data on the spatial distribution of ethnic populations to quantitative assessments of violence potential. More specifically, the algorithm operates on data defining the spatial distribution of ethnic groups in the region of interest, convolving this data with the \"Mexican hat\" approximation of the two dimensional Laplacian.  The resulting filter identifies regions in which the minority occupies a peninsular region surrounded by the majority, a distribution found to be correlated with ethnic violence. The algorithm is computationally robust and practically implementable because it requires only fairly low resolution data.\n\nThe algorithm was tested through case studies involving ethnic conflict in the former Yugoslavia during the 1990s and in Guatemala during the period 1977 to 1986. In each case, the \"hot spots\" nominated by the algorithm are in good agreement with the locations that experienced violent conflict as shown in Figure 10 by the blue dots, although violent events that occurred in Kosovo are missed. Additional discussion of the algorithm and its performance on former Yugoslavia and Guatemala data are provided in Appendix I.\n\n\nTechnique Two for obtaining situational awareness\n\n\n\n 31\n\nThe second situational awareness capability is a method for automatically identifying and characterizing framing documents in a large text resource. For more information see Appendix J: Automated Identification and Analysis of Framing Document for Global Climate Change.  Framing is a crucial element of social movements, including radicalization. For instance, the R-SMT kernel identifies and quantifies the important roles played by framing in social movements, and our preliminary findings in blog content analysis supports this characterization. However, for analysts to exploit the valuable information contained in framing documents, it is necessary to locate such documents in the vast text resource on the web, in classified and unclassified collections of reports, and in other repositories of potentially relevant documents. Manual monitoring of these data sets in the search for text that is indicative of the framing process is not feasible in the time frame necessary to detect a growing trend towards violent social action. Thus, it is necessary to develop techniques for automatically ingesting text documents and sifting out those texts that are part of the framing process.\n\n\n\nFigure 10. Sites of Ethnic Violence (blue dots) and Algorithm Nominated \"Hot Spots\" in the Former Yugoslavia.\n\n\n\nThis situational awareness methodology provides the capability to automatically distinguish framing from nonframing documents and further classify a framing document as performing one of the three framing tasks specified in the R-SMT kernel: diagnostic, prognostic, and motivation. The proposed analytic process combines Latent Semantic Analysis techniques and statistical modeling to produce text analysis algorithms that, once trained, can classify new documents with high accuracy. More specifically, the proposed analysis process consists of three main steps:\n\n Parse the documents and map them into a matrix representation in which matrix rows and columns correspond to corpus terms and documents, respectively, and the term weights (frequencies) populate the matrix cells.\n\n\n\n 32\n\n Approximate the corpus matrix constructed above with a low rank matrix obtained through Singular Value Decomposition and calculate a set of numerical values for each text document. These values are the \"features\" used by the document classification algorithm.\n\n Construct and train a logistic regression classification algorithm which identifies and characterizes framing documents based on the document features computed above.\n\nThe proposed methodology was tested on a collection of documents associated with the global warming debate. This choice of case study was motivated in part by the availability of open-source text documents, in electronic form, addressing the topic of global warming. Briefly, the classification algorithm performed very well in this case study. For instance, the algorithm correctly classified approximately 98 percent of the framing documents and 96 percent of the nonframing documents in the test data set. Additional discussion of the methodology and its performance in the global warming case study is given in Appendix J.\n\n\n\n 33\n\nRecommendations for Next Phases of This Research\n\n\nPhase I:  Develop and demonstrate a prototype\n\nThis task will focus on demonstrating the Transnational Islamic Activism and Radicalism\n(TIARA) methodology by using the Danish cartoons as a case study. An argument will be provided that draws clear parallels between that case study and other important, relevant cases. The complementary analytical modalities in this prototype will be the meso-scale, which focuses on the social dynamics of groups, and the macro-scale, which focuses on the system dynamics of the societies writ large.\n\nThe prototype will:\n\n Provide both a meso and macro-scale analysis of both Danish cartoon events, including analysis aimed at explaining why these two events evolved so differently.\n\n Develop and demonstrate analytic mathematical relationships between the meso and macro scale models. This will center on the framing perspective of SMT.\n\n Quantitatively explore the relationship between public/group opinion dynamics, such as those reflected in the Danish cartoon case study, and radicalization/\nterrorist activity. Evidence of such a relationship would provide support for the national security relevance of the Danish cartoon case study.\n\n\nPhase II:  Exploration and demonstration\n\nThe exploration will be directed toward the enhancement of TIARA's predictive capabilities by:\n\n Including message content analysis in the analysis of social dynamics,\n Extending the federated modeling tools to include the dynamics of Individuals as well as that of Groups and the collective Society; and\n Developing a more comprehensive characterization and exploitation of Social\n\nMovement Theory that includes the Framing Process and Opportunities &\nConstraints in addition to Resource Mobilization.\n\n\nThe demonstration will be centered on applying TIARA to an emergent threat of significant value to the Department of Homeland Security (DHS).  The demonstration will apply the full suite of TIARA's federated methodologies, the full spectrum of the SMT dimensions, and the enhanced message content analysis to the case studies that are chosen by the DHS stakeholder community.\n\n\nTask II.1  Develop and demonstrate enhanced message content analysis\n\nThe preliminary analysis conducted for the prototype used simple keyword-based analysis to identify appropriate blogs to analyze, and applied novel, sophisticated dynamical systems and graph theoretic analysis to extract useful \"warning\" information from the blog time series. We propose to enhance this capability by performing\n\n\n\n 34\n\nsubstantially deeper content analysis so as to retain computational tractability. We expect to realize these competing goals by leveraging both SMT and our previous results in blog time series analysis.\n\n\nTask II.2  Define the case studies on which to demonstrate TIARA\n\nThe Danish cartoon cases that were analyzed during Phase I demonstrated the value of TIARA information in the context of a well documented social phenomenon.  The next step is to demonstrate the TIARA methodology using a case study that is of strategic importance to the Department of Homeland Security (DHS).  In order to select the most appropriate case studies a rigorous stakeholder dialog, the Vital Issues Process (VIP), will be implemented.  This process is described in more depth in Appendix K. The dialog will have both qualitative as well as quantitative components.  The qualitative component is based on real time textual analysis which facilitates deconstruction of the relationships among the participating stakeholders and the identification and definition of objectives through consensus-building techniques.  The quantitative component generates a cardinal ranking (the first moment) that can be used in nonlinear optimization and quantification of the level of agreement among stakeholders (the second moment) that is intrinsically valuable for risk assessment.  This task will employ two VIP panel meetings:\n\n\n VIP1 to identity the criteria by which to choose the case studies and the relative importance to the DHS, and\n\n\n VIP2 to determine the candidate case studies and their relative value to the DHS.\n\n\nTask II.3  Extend the federated analytical tools to include micro-scale modeling\n\n\nThe two methodologies used to form the basis of TIARA during Phase I were Social Dynamics and System Dynamics. These two methodologies captured the Group and the Societal dynamics, respectively. The intent of this task is to explore the inclusion into TIARA of modeling the dynamics of the Individual. The methodology to be explored for modeling the Individual Dynamics is Intelligent Agents (IA). The product of this task will be a TIARA methodology that is a federated suite of tools to capture the intricate interplay among the three Social Dimensions: the Individual, the Group, and the Societal. Improvements in the predictive capabilities resulting from the enhanced fidelity of this federated suite of tools will be explored in this task. It is noteworthy that IAs can also be of use in gathering information. The use of IAs in on-line environments such as the blogosphere will also be explored.\n\n\nTask II.4  Develop and implement the analytic relationships for all three dimensions of Social Movement Theory; Resource Mobilization, Opportunities & Constraints, and Framing Processes\n\n\nPhase I of TIARA developed a preliminary characterization of Social Movement Theory using the three fundamental dimensions: Resource Mobilization, Opportunities &\n\n\n\n 35\n\nConstraints, and the Framing Process.  During Phase I the interplay between the Group Dynamics and the Societal Dynamics was modeled with a focus on Resource Mobilization. The intent of this task is to enhance the understanding and ideally, the predictive fidelity of TIARA by extending this modeling scope to include the other two fundamental dimensions of Opportunities and Constraints, and the Framing Process.\n\n\n\n36\n\nReferences\n\n[AI Lab 2007] http://ai.bpa.arizona.edu/start.html.\n\n[Bemporad et al. 2007] Bemporad, A., A. Bicchi, and G. Buttazzo, eds., Proc. 10th International Conference on Hybrid Systems: Computation and Control, Pisa, Italy, April\n2007.\n\n[Clarke et al. 1999] Clarke, E., O. Grumberg, and D. Peled, Model Checking, MIT Press, MA, 1999.\n\n[Colbaugh and Glass 2007] Colbaugh, R. and K. Glass, \"Predictability and prediction of social processes,\" Proc. 4th Lake Arrowhead Conference on Human Complex Systems, Lake Arrowhead, CA, April 2007.\n\n[Colbaugh et al. 2007] Colbaugh, R., K. Glass, and G. Willard, \"Scalable method for vulnerability analysis of complex networks,\" patent application submitted by the National Security Agency, May 2007.\n\n[Della Porta and Diani 1999] Della Porta, D., and Mario Diani, Social Movements : An Introduction, Oxford: Blackwell Publishers. 1999.\n\n[Earl 2006] Earl, Jennifer, Methods and Measurement in Social Movement Studies, DRAFT provided in support of the 1st STIC workshop, 2006.\n\n[Gulden 2002] Gulden, T., \"Spatial and temporal patterns in civil violence,\" Politics and the Life Sciences, Vol. 21, pp. 26-36, 2002.\n\n\n\n[Hedstrom et al. 2000] Hedstrom, P., R. Sandell, and C. Stern,  \"Mesolevel networks and the diffusion of social movements: The case of the Swedish Social Democratic Party,\"\nAmerican Journal of Sociology, Vol. 106, pp, 145-172, 2000.\n\n[Howard and Matheson 1984] Howard, R. A., and J. E. Matheson, Readings and Applications of Decision Analysis, Volumes I and II, Strategic Decisions Group, 1984.\n\n[Klandermans and Staggenborg 2002]  Klandermans, B., and S. Staggenborg (eds.), Methods of Social Movement Research, Social Movements, Protests, and Contention, Volume 16, University of Minnesota Press, 2002.\n\nM. Lim, R. Metzler, and Y. Bar-Yam. Global Pattern Formation and Ethnic/Cultural Violence. Science 317 (2007) 1540-1544.\n\n[McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald 1988] McAdam, Doug, John D. McCarthy and Mayer N. Zald, \"Social Movements.\" in Neil Smelser, ed, Handbook of Sociology, Sage Publications, 1988.\n\n\n\n 37\n\n[McCauley 2006] McCauley, Clark, Executive Summary of First Conference on Muslim Radicalization Dynamics  Social Science Methods and Models for Global Assessments, DRAFT provided in support of the 1st STIC workshop, 2006.\n\n[Newman 2003] Newman, M., \"The structure and function of complex networks,\" SIAM Review, Vol. 45, pp. 167-256, 2003.\n\n[Oliver 2006] Oliver, Pamela, An Evaluation of Social Movement Theory-based predictions, especially those concerning interaction of movement action and State response, DRAFT provided in support of the 1st STIC workshop, 2006.\n\n[Oliver and Myers 2000] Oliver, P. and D. Myers, \"Diffusion models of cycles of protest as a theory of social movements,\" Working Paper, 2000.\n\n[Parrilo 2000] Parrilo, P., Structured Semidefinite Programs and Semialgebraic Geometry Methods in Robustness and Optimization, PhD dissertation, California Institute of Technology, Pasadena, CA, 2000.\n\n[Salganik et al. 2006] Salganik, M., P. Dodds, and D. Watts, \"Experimental study of inequality and unpredictability in an artificial cultural market,\" Science, Vol. 311, pp.\n854-856, 2006.\n\n[Sontag 1998] Sontag, E., Mathematical Control Theory, Second Edition, Springer, NY,\n1998.\n\n[Soule 2006] Soule, Sarah, Overview of Social Movement Theories and Applicability to Radicalization, DRAFT provided in support of the 1st STIC workshop, 2006.\n\n[SOSTOOLS 2007] http://www.cds.caltech.edu/sostools/, 2007.\n\n [Watts et al. 2002] Watts, D., P. Dodds, and M. Newman, \"Identity and search in social networks,\" Science, Vol. 296, pp. 1302-1305, 2002.\n\n[Wictorowicz 2004] Wiktorowicz, Quintan, ed, Islamic Activism  A Social Movement Theory Approach, Indiana University Press, 2004.\n\n\n\n 38\n\nAppendix A:  The Danish Cartoons\n\n\n\n 39\n\nAppendix B:  Scientific and Technical Intelligence Committee Workshop Papers\n\n\nNote:  These papers are presented here in the original DRAFT format with no attempts to correct grammar or spelling.\n\n\nSarah A. Soule Cornell University, Department of Sociology\n\nJanuary 2, 2007\n\n\nThis essay offers brief descriptions of four (4) different social movement perspectives that have been used to explain social movement emergence and fluctuations. The essay also attempts to describe what each of these perspectives may say about why some social movement groups turn to radicalization and violence.\n\nStrain Theories\n\nStrain theories, popular through the 1950s and 1960s, argued that groups will mobilize when they face broad-scale social changes, including economic crisis, wars, the loss of supporting social institutions, or mass migrations (Gusfield 1963; Hofstadter 1955;\nKornhauser 1959).  The strain theories of the early 1960s focused primarily on the right- wing movements (e.g., Nazism, fascism, Stalinism, McCarthyism) active throughout the\n1940s, 1950s and early 1960s (Garner 1997), and included both macro- and individual level components.   At the macro-level, the theory argued that mobilization is influenced by broad social changes, including the restructuring of the economy (Bell 1963), changes in international relations (Parsons 1963), and immigration (Lipset 1963).  Those enjoying relatively powerful positions in society by virtue of their class, gender, ethnicity, and so on,  may have sufficient economic and organizational resources and political leverage to mobilize, but may only be inspired to do so only when faced with a loss of  this power. The individual-level (or social psychological) component of the theory suggested that socially isolated individuals are more likely to participate in movements, and that participation was a response to psychological distress (Kornhauser 1959; Turner and Killian 1986). While strain theory was popular through the mid-1960s, research on the left-oriented movements that emerged during the 1960's led to questions about its utility\n(Garner 1997).  Associated with the strain perspective, as it has evolved, are at least four rather different claims or themes: One is the mass society variant that accents the disintegration of social ties (Kornhauser 1959); a second is the absolute deprivation thesis that focuses on immiserating life conditions, such as extreme poverty (Van Dyke and Soule 2002); a third is the relative deprivation thesis, with its emphasis on the perceived discrepancy between expectation and attainment (Gurr 1969), and a fourth is the \"quotidian disruption\" thesis, which highlights the disruption of everyday subsistence and survival routines (Snow et al. 1998; Walsh 1981).\n\n\nApplied to Radicalization: Strain theories (especially the individual-oriented components)\nhave fallen from favor of scholars in this area. However, it might be worth examining the potential utility of strain models with respect to some social movements, in particular\n\n\n\n 40\n\nreactive social movements, or those which mobilization in response to the real or perceived loss of power or resources (Tilly 1978; Van Dyke and Soule 2002).  It is important to consider the effect of threat (both real and perceived) on mobilization and radicalization. Several scholars studying right right-wing extremism and racial violence have suggested that mobilization is a function of unstable macro-level phenomena such as unemployment and changes in the size of minority populations (Barret 1987; Beck\n2000; Koopmans 1996; McVeigh 1999).  Koopmans (1996), for example, demonstrates that an influx of refugees into Western European countries is associated with an increase in right-wing racist violence.  Kitschelt (1995) shows that right-wing political parties in Europe have also responded to increased immigration, and to changes in the economic structure.  And, Castells (1997) argues that processes of globalization and economic restructuring have influenced the rise of fundamentalist movements in all parts of the world. Thus, it might be useful to consider the ways in which threat can lead to mobilization and radicalization.\n\nResource Mobilization (RMT)\n\nThe central, orienting premise of the resource mobilization perspective is that the emergence and persistence of social movement activity is contingent on the availability of resources that can be channeled into movement mobilization and activity (Jenkins\n1983; McCarthy and Zald 1977; McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald 1988).  According to this perspective, the availability, aggregation, and deployment of resources are regarded as among the most critical determinants of the development and character of social movements. Although people, money, organizations, and legitimacy are typically mentioned as major resources, there continue to be efforts to clarify conceptually and operationally what constitutes an essential \"resource\" and to assess the relative importance of different resources (Cress and Snow 1996; Edwards and McCarthy 2004).\n\n\nApplied to Radicalization:  How the source of resources impacts the tactics chosen by a particular group is one of the issues that might be examined with respect to the role of resources in radicalization.  Juska and Edwards (2005), for example, discuss the contributions by the Animal Welfare Institute, an advocacy organization in the US, to a confrontational direct action campaign in Poland designed to block corporate-style farming in that country.  While this advocacy organization did not participate directly in the confrontational actions, they did provide a variety of different kinds of resources to a group that did use confrontational tactics. The flipside of this is when certain sources of resources lead to less radical and confrontational resources, as was the case in Jenkins and Eckert's (1986) study of foundation funding of movements, which lead to more moderate movement goals and tactics. Or, we can also think about how funding and other resources provided by religious organizations and or corporations (Edwards and McCarthy 2004) may impact tactical choice of groups.\n\n\nA second issue that we might consider is precisely the level of resources needed for various tactics. Some tactics require more or less of a given kind of resource. For example, some protest tactics cost more money than others to deploy (e.g., costs of travel, information dissemination, materials, etc). Or, certain tactics cost more in terms of\n\n\n\n 41\n\n\"people-resources\". For example, mass demonstrations require a critical mass of people, while the September 11th attacks required fewer people, however those people needed to possess a set of skills (e.g., piloting airliners).\n\n\nA final and related issue is that we might consider not just the number of people (as a resource) needed for certain activities, but the social bases of these people. People who are familiar with the workings of the institutional bases of the political system of a given country or state are one type of resource. Movements drawing on this type of people resource may favor more institutional and less confrontational tactics and goals. However, people who are outsiders to the political system may favor more radical and violent tactics, thus movements drawing on this type of people-resource may be more inclined toward radicalization.  Thus, considering the social bases of support for a particular movement ought to be critical.\n\n\nPolitical Opportunity Structure\n\nOverlapping with the resource mobilization perspective, with its emphasis on the resource context and related organizational factors, is the political process model, with its emphasis on the context or structure of political opportunities (McAdam 1982; Tarrow\n1994; Tilly 1978).  Although there is no single, consensual definition of political opportunity structure, Tarrow's working conceptualization will suffice: \"consistent... dimensions of the political environment that provide incentives for people to undertake collective action by affecting their expectations for success or failure\" (1994: 85). Underlying this conception are three interrelated observations: that political systems can vary considerably in terms of how receptive (open) or unreceptive (closed) they are to organized protest and challenge; that this variability is signaled by or read from the system's ongoing functioning; and that these signals to or readings by social and political actors either encourage or discourage their mobilization into social movements.  In his synthesis of a number of scholarly treatments of this issue, McAdam (1996: 26-29) has identified a \"highly consensual list of (four) dimensions of political opportunity:\" (1)\nsystem accessibility or the degree to which a political system is open or closed to challenge; (2) the relative stability of the pattern of political alignments within a system;\n(3) the presence or absence of influential allies; and (4) the repressive capacity of the state or relevant political entity.\n\n\nApplied to radicalization: One key issue that might be considered overlaps with the discussion (above, Strain section) on the mobilizing effect of \"threat.\"  In that section, threats came primarily from immigration, economic recession, and globalization. But, it is also worthy of note that early versions of political opportunity structure (Tilly 1978)\nargued that protest is stimulated not only by opportunity, but also by threat.  It could be that elite allies do not stimulate protest; instead, the lack of such allies could present a threat, which stimulates protest (Goldstone and Tilly 2001). McAdam (2004), in reflecting on two decades of empirical and theoretical work in this area, agrees that the importance of threat as a stimulant to protest has been eclipsed by opportunity. He notes that, \"...in polities where there is some expectation of state responsiveness and few formal barriers to mobilization, we should expect perceived threats to group interests to\n\n\n\n 42\n\nserve, along with expanded opportunities, as two distinct precipitants of collective action\n(2004: 205). Importantly, empirical work has shown this to be the case. For example, Van Dyke and Soule (2002) and Snow, Soule, and Cress (2005) have pointed out that the absence of political allies may imply a threatening political environment, which can stimulate protest and, in the case of Van Dyke and Soule (2002), stimulate extremist forms of protest. Snow, Soule, and Cress (2005) make the explicit link to tactical use, noting that it might be the case that more radical types of protest are necessary when groups do not have allies in power, since nearly by definition, more institutional channels are blocked in these cases.\n\n\nAnother point that should be thought about is how state repression (one dimension of the political opportunity structure) affects subsequent levels of mobilization and changes in tactical deployment.  Soule and Earl (unpublished paper) review the literature on the question of how repression impacts mobilization levels, as does Koopmans (1997). More germane to the task at hand, though, is how repression impacts radicalization of tactics. McAdam (1983) points to the way in which social movement organizations need to innovate in response to state repression; often tactical innovation can mean escalation and/or radicalization (see also Zwerman and Steinhoff (2005).  Others have talked about how repression can increase radicalization of ideology (Adamek and Lewis 1973; Opp and Roehl 1990).\n\nCollective Action Frames\n\nIt has often been noted that RMT, political opportunity structure, and Strain theories neglect the power of ideology and the related concept of collective action frames (Snow and Benford 1988; Benford and Snow 2000; Snow 2004). Collective action frames (or\n\"frames\" for short) are interpretive schemas that allow people to make sense of a situation or set of events. They allow people to identify a problem (diagnostic frames), place blame on some entity for the problem (prognostic frames), and provide a rationale for action (motivational frames).  Benford and Snow argue that \"frames are constructed as movement adherents negotiate a shared understanding of some problematic condition or situation they define as in need of change, make attributions regarding who or what is to blame, articulate an alternative set of arrangements, and urge others to act in concert to affect change\" (2000, 615).  As such, frames have been called \"punctuating\" devices\n(Snow 2004:384), since they help to clarify an event or set of events.\n\n\nOne of the key functions of frames is to mobilize people by helping to interpret strains and grievances. One of the reasons that strains (e.g., immigration, economic recession, etc) do not automatically generate mobilization is that they are subject to differential interpretation.  That is to say the meanings or implications of those conditions for some kind of action are contestable and thus open to discussion and debate. Such debate and discussion is how a coherent frame is arrived upon and how it comes to be used to bring previously un-mobilized individuals into a given movement.\n\n\nApplied to Radicalization:  The role of ideology is one of the most intriguing questions that we might ask when looking at the radicalization of political groups.  Diagnostic\n\n\n\n 43\n\nframes can be used very powerfully to recruit people to a given movement because they can help crystallize a set of ideas and experiences into a worldview that can lead to action. When this is accomplished, a prognostic frame can be offered as a way to solve the problem via certain forms of mobilization  sometimes the prognoses will be radicalization and violence. The framing process thus offers the link between objectively experienced grievances or strains and mobilization, which sometimes can be radical and violent.\n\n\nSnow (forthcoming) has analyzed three core framing tasks used by the modern Islamascist movement.  He argues that diagnostic frames (who is to blame?) are evident in much of the commentary by Islamic leaders in pamphlets and on websites. These sources, Snow argues, are devoted to making the causal link between the current suffering and injustice of Muslims to Western (and especially American) sources, such as moral laxity and political and economic presence throughout the globe.  Second, Snow argues that prognostic frames (what is to be done about this?) are evident in the statements of Osama bin Laden and his followers, who have called for jihad and for the killing of Americans and the plundering of their riches. Third, Snow shows that motivational frames (calls to action) are evident in a number of ways. For example, he points to the rhetoric used by this movement of \"religious duty and obligation\" to mobilize people. He also discusses the rewards of suicide bombers both on earth via the posting of their pictures and overall honoring of these individuals as \"martyrs,\" and after death by the promise of 72 virgins.\n\n\nAnother interesting question is how different actors frame radical behavior.  In a paper on the French riots of October 2005, Snow, Vliegenthart, and Corrigall-Brown (2006)\nexamine how various media and government actors framed these riots. While not so much about how frames can lead to radicalization, this work is quite an interesting analysis of news accounts of radical social movement activity.\n\n\nSummary\n\nIn summary, it is worth noting that the above theories in conjunction with one another point to a couple of places where we might begin our discussion.\n\n\n We ought not disregard the mobilizing effects of threat, particularly in conjunction with framing processes.  We should consider the effects of several different kinds of threat including economic restructuring, globalization, immigration, as well as absence of political allies and closure of political systems. And we should consider how careful framing of these grievances/strains or threats can lead to mobilization and radicalization.  (Note that this point combines elements of Strain, political opportunity structure, and Framing Theories.)\n\n We ought to examine carefully the types, sources and levels of resources, as well as the social bases of supporters of social movements. When thinking about the social bases of supporters, we should examine their positions relative to the institutional political systems (i.e., are they insiders or outsiders, and if they are outsiders, what does this mean about available tactics?).  Note that this point\n\n\n\n 44\n\ncombines insights from resource mobilization and political opportunity structure theories.\n\n\nAnd, it might be worth throwing out a few points for us to consider in our discussion.\n\n\n We might also spend some time talking about how diffusion processes and networks matter to recruitment into radical groups. In particular, we can talk about the different roles of direct (e.g., interpersonal relationships) and indirect/mediated connections (e.g., media, Internet).\n\n We might also talk about the role of leadership, both as a resource and also in the framing process.\n\n\n\nSources\n\nAdamek, Raymond, and Jerry M. Lewis. 1973. \"Social Control Violence and\n\nRadicalization: The Kent State Case.\" Social Forces 51:342-347. Barret, Stanley R.  1987.  Is God Racist?  The Right Wing in Canada.  Toronto:\n\nUniversity of Toronto Press. Benford, Robert D. and David A. Snow ( 2000)  \"Framing Processes and Social\n\nMovements: An Overview and Assessment.\" Annual Review of Sociology, 26,\n611-639.\n\nBeck, E.M.  2000.  \"Guess Who's Coming to Town: White Supremacy, Ethnic Competition and Social Change\"  Sociological Focus 33(2): 153-174.\n\nBell, Daniel.  1963.  \"The Dispossessed - 1962\" in Bell (ed.) The Radical Right, pp. 1-38. Garden City, NY: Doubleday and Co.\n\nCastells, Manuel.  1997.  The Power of 1dentity.  Oxford, UK: Blackwell Publishers. Cress, Daniel M. and David A. Snow. 1996.  \"Resources, Benefactors, and the Viability of Homeless Social Movement Organizations.\" American Sociological Review 61:\n1089-1109.\n\nEdwards, Robert and John McCarthy. 2004.  \"Resources and Social Movement Mobilization.\"\n\nPp. 116-152 in The Blackwell Companion to Social Movements, edited by David A. Snow, Sarah A. Soule, and Hanspeter Kriesi. London: Blackwell.\n\nEarl, Jennifer and Sarah A. Soule. 2006. \"The Effects of Protest Policing on Protest\" In preparation.\n\nGarner, Roberta.  1997.  \"Fifty Years of Social Movement Theory,\"  in Social Movement Theory and Research:  an annotated bibliographical guide.  Roberta Garner and John Tenuto (ed.) Pasadena, CA: Salem Press.\n\nGoldstone, Jack A. and Charles Tilly. 2001. \"Threat (and Opportunity): Popular Action and State Response in the Dynamics of Contentious Action\". Pp. 179-194 in Silence and Voice in Study of Contentious Politics, edited by Ronald R. Aminzade, Jack A. Goldstone, Doug McAdam, Elizabeth J. Perry, William H. Sewell, Jr., Sidney Tarrow, and Charles Tilly.Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press.\n\n\n\n 45\n\nGusfield, Joseph. R.  1963.  Symbolic Crusade:  Status Politics and the American Temperance Movement.  Urbana and Chicago, IL:  University of Illinois Press.\n\nGurr, Ted Robert. 1969. Why Men Rebel. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Hofstadter, Richard.  1955.  The Age of Reform.  New York:  Knopf. Jenkins, J.  Craig.  1983.  \"Resource Mobilization Theory and the Study of Social\n\nMovements,\" Annual Review of Sociology 9: 527-553. Jenkins, J. Craig and Craig M. Eckert. 1986. \"Channeling Black Insurgency: Elite\n\nPatronage and Professional Social Movement Organizations in the Development of the Black Movement.\" American Sociological Review 51:249-68.\n\nJuska, Arunas and Bob Edwards. 2005. \"Refusing the Trojan Pig: The American-Polish Coalition Against Corporate Prok Production in Eastern Europe.\" In Joe Bandy and Jackie Smith (editors) Coalitions Across Bourders:Negotiating Difference and Unity in Transnational Struggles Agianst Neoliberalism. MD: Rowman & Littlefield.\n\nKitschelt, Herbert.  1995.  The Radical Right in Western Europe: A Comparative Analysis.  Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press.\n\nKoopmans, Ruud.  1996.  \"Explaining the Rise of Racist and Extreme Right Violence in Western Europe: Grievances or Opportunities?\" European Journal of Political Research 30: 185-216.\n\nKoopmans, Ruud. 1997. \"The Dynamics of Repression and Mobilization: The German Extreme Right in the 1990s.\" Mobilization 2:149-165.\n\nKornhauser, William. 1959. The Politics of Mass Society. New York: The Free Press. Lipset, Seymour Martin.  1963.  \"The Sources of the 'Radical Right' - 1955,\" in Bell\n\n(ed.) The Radical Right, pp. 259-312.  Garden City, NY: Doubleday and Co. McAdam, Doug. 2004. \"Revisiting the U.S. Civil Rights Movement: Toward a More\n\nSynthetic Understanding of the Origins of Contention\".  Pp. 201-232 in Rethinking Social Movements, edited by Jeff Goodwin and James M. Jasper.  NY:\nRowman and Littlefield Publishers, Inc.\n\nMcAdam, Doug 1996. \"Political Opportunities: Conceptual Origins, Current Problems, and Future Directions.\"  Pp. 23-40 in Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements: Political Opportunities, Mobilizing Structures, and Cultural Framings, edited by Doug McAdam, John D. McCarthy, and Mayer N. Zald. New York: Cambridge University Press.\n\nMcAdam, Doug, John D. McCarthy, and Mayer N. Zald. 1988. \"Social Movements.\" Pp.\n695-738 in Handbook of Sociology, edited by Neil Smelser.  Newbury Park, CA:\nSage Publications.\n\nMcAdam, Doug.  1982.  Political Process and the Development of Black Insurgency,\n1930-1970.  Chicago: University of Chicago Press.\n\nMcAdam, Doug. 1983. \"Tactical Innovation and the Pace of Insurgency.\" American Sociological Review 48: 735-54.\n\nMcCarthy, John D. and Mayer N. Zald.  1977.  \"Resource Mobilization and Social Movements: A Partial Theory,\" American Journal of Sociology 82(6): 1212-1241.\n\nMcVeigh, Rory.  1999.  \"Structural Incentives for Conservative Mobilization:  Power Devaluation and the Rise of the Ku Klux Klan, 1915-1925,\" Social Forces 77(4):\n1461-1496.\n\nOpp, Karl-Deiter, and Wolfgang Roehl. 1990. \"Repression, Micromobilization, and Political Protest.\" Social Forces 69:521-547.\n\n\n\n 46\n\nParsons, Talcott.  1963.  \"Social Strains in America\" in Bell (ed.) The Radical Right, pp.\n175-199.  Garden City, NY: Doubleday and Co.\n\nSnow, David,  Rens Vliegenthart and Cahterine Corrigall-Brown (2006). \"Framing the French Riots: A Comparative Study of Frame Variation\" Unpublished paper.\n\nSnow, David (forthcoming). \"Ideology, Framing Processes, and Islamic Movements.\"\nJeff Goodwin, editor, Islam and Social Movements. Snow, David. 2004. \"Framing Processes, Ideology, and Discursive Fields.\" Pp.\n380-412 in The Blackwell Companion to Social Movements, edited by David A. Snow, Sarah A. Soule, and Hanspeter Kriesi. London: Blackwell.\n\nSnow, David and Robert Benford.1988 \"Ideology, Frame Resonance, and Participant Mobilization\" International Social Movement Research, Vol. 1:197-217.\n\nSnow, David A., Daniel M. Cress, Liam Downey, and Andrew W. Jones. 1998.\n\"Disrupting the 'Quotidian': Reconceptualizing the Relation between Breakdown and the Emergence of Collective Action.\"  Mobilization: An International Journal. 3:1 22.\n\nSnow, David, Sarah A. Soule, and Daniel Cress. 2005. \"Homeless Protest Across 17 U.S. Cities, 1980-1991: Assessment of the Explanatory Utility of Strain, Resource Mobilization, and Political Opportunity Theories.\" Social Forces 83(3):1183 1210.\n\nTarrow, Sidney. 1994. Power in Movement. Cambridge University Press. Tilly, Charles. 1978. From Mobilization to Revolution. .  Reading, MA: AddisonWesley Turner, Ralph H. and Lewis M. Killian.  1987.  Collective Behavior, 3rd edition.\n\nEnglewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall Inc. Van Dyke, Nella and Sarah A. Soule. 2002. \"Explaining Variation in Levels of Patriot and Militia Mobilization: Resources, Political Process, and Strain Explanations.\"\nSocial Problems 49(4):497-520.\n\nWalsh, Edward J.  1981.  \"Resource Mobilization and Citizen Protest in Communities Around Three Mile Island,\" Social Problems 29:1-2 1.\n\nZwerman, Gilda, and Patricia Steinhoff. 2005. \"When Activists Ask for Trouble: State Dissident Interactions and the New Left Cycle of Resistance in the United States and Japan.\" Pp. 85-107 in Repression and Mobilization, edited by Christian Davenport, Hank Johnston, and Carol Mueller. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.\n\n\n\n 47\n\nMuslim Radicalization DynamicsSocial Science Methods and Models for Global Assessments\n\nThis project is sponsored by the Scientific and Technical Intelligence Committee (Office of the Director of National Intelligence).  Project Introduction and Executive Summary of Conference 1 from Clark McCauley (cmccaule@psych.upenn.edu), drawing on the notes of all participants of 5-6 Jan conference.\n\nProject Introduction\n\nProject Tasks and Products\n\nAcademic experts and security analysts are invited to three conferences.  The first reviewed the current status of Social Movement Theory (SMT), including concepts, predictions, and evidence base.  The second conference will review applications of SMT to understanding the different histories of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, Sudan, and Jordan/Syria.  The third conference will review applications of SMT to Muslim diaspora communities in Europe and the U.S.  A core group of academics and analysts who attend all three conferences will convene after the third conference to work on a consensus report that will evaluate both promise and problems of SMT for understanding Islamic radicalization and mobilization for political violence.  An executive summary of each conference is developed from combined notes of conference participants.\n\nThe problem\n\nUnderstanding the degree of support for political violence among Muslim communities worldwide -- and support for local and US efforts to counter violent Islam -- is vital to inform U.S. diplomatic and security policies.  Understanding non-violent activism for Muslim causes is also important, because violent activists often begin as non-violent activists.  The relevant Muslim communities include not only the majorities in predominantly Muslim countries, but the Muslim diaspora communities in Europe, North America, Australia, and South Asia.  Sympathies for Muslim causes among majority citizens of non-Muslim countries can also be important for development of international cooperation against terrorism.   Thus understanding the base of sympathy and support for jihadist violence is the larger problem, in which is located current efforts to understand the mobilization to violence of small groups inspired by Al Qaeda but with little organizational connection with Al Qaeda leadershipthe \"franchise model\" of Islamic terrorism.\n\nRadicalization refers to changes in beliefs, feelings, and behavior toward increasing support for group conflictincreasing identification with and action for us versus them. Radicalization is thus more a process rather than a condition, and this process may be importantly different depending on the unit of analysis: individuals, groups, organizations, and mass publics.  Behavioral radicalization is increased personal sacrifice for the cause, but readiness for sacrifice need not mean violence.\n\n\n\n 48\n\nActivism refers to legal and non-violent political organization and action, and, as Ghandi famously demonstrated, this form of conflict can be as powerful as violence.   Activism no less than radicalization depends on development of beliefs, feelings, and behaviors that support intergroup conflictan increasing identification with and action for us versus them.   The difference between activism and radicalism is in tactics: nonviolent or violent.  Thus the problem is to understand behavioral radicalization that includes commitment to violence as a means to social change, and to understand this problem in the context of a much larger number of activists and sympathizers who agree with radical goals but not radical means.\n\nThis is a difficult problem.  Polls in six Muslim countries in 2005 asked whether\n\"..suicide bombing and other forms of violence against civilian targets are justified in order to defend Islam from its enemies.\"  Percentages of Muslim respondents saying\n\"often justified\" or \"sometimes justified\" ranged from 13-15% in Morocco, Turkey and Indonesia to 25% in Pakistan, 39% in Lebanon, and 57% in Jordan.   Obviously it can be only a tiny percentage of the millions approving suicide terrorism who actually attempt a suicide bombing.\n\nSimilarly an ICM poll of UK Muslims after the July 7, 2005 suicide bombings in the London Underground asked, \"Do you think any further attacks by British suicide bombers in the UK are justified or unjustified?\"  Five percent of respondents said\n\"justified.\"  There are approximately 1.6 million Muslims in the UK; thus approximately\n80,000 UK Muslims believed the London attacks were justified.  But only about 80 UK Muslims have been implicated in the July 7 bombings and other planned or attempted bombings.  The clear implication is that only one in a thousand is acting on his or her belief that suicide terrorism in the UK is justified.  How are the few mobilized from the many who share their beliefs?\n\nThe promise of Social Movement Theory\n\nSMT is a theoretical perspective developed by sociologists trying to understand how movements aiming for social change begin and end, and why some movements are more successful than others.  The promise of SMT for understanding radicalization is signaled by several characteristics of SMT research.  First, SMT is interdisciplinary at least in the sense of borrowing from research in economics, psychology, and political science. Second, SMT offers the possibility of integrating across levels of analysis, at least to the extent that SMT researchers have looked at individual, small group, organizational, and mass determinants of movement success and failure.  Third, and perhaps most important, SMT researchers take an explicitly dynamic perspective in which the choices and outcomes of a social movement are the result of actions over time.  In this perspective, social movements emerge, succeed, and fail in cycles of action and reaction with multiple players: movements, states, and counter-movements.\n\n\n\n 49\n\nExecutive Summary of Conference 1\n\nThe two-day conference was held at the Solomon Asch Center for the Study of Ethnopolitical Violence (Philadelphia, PA), January 5  6, 2007.\n\nThree papers were presented: \"Overview of Social Movement Theories and Applicability to Radicalization\" (Professor Sarah A. Soule, Department of Sociology, Cornell University), \"Methods and Measurement in Social Movement Studies\"\n(Professor Jennifer Earl, Director, Center for Information Technology and Society, University of California  Irvine), and an evaluation of SMT-based predictions, especially those concerning interaction of movement action and state response (Professor Pamela Oliver, University of Wisconsin, Madison).\n\nBrief history of Social Movement Theory (SMT) research\n\nResearch in the 1950s and early 1960s focused on the rise of totalitarian and authoritarian movements: Nazism, communism, fascism, McCarthyism.  The theoretical perspective was unflattering: macro-level strains such as war, depression, and immigration leave individuals feeling frustrated and out of control.  According to strain theory, individuals join right wing movements for an illusion of control over forces they do not understand.\n\nResearch in the late 1960s and early 1970s focused on left-leaning movements more congenial to SMT scholars.  Thus civil rights and anti-war movements were seen as rational responses to injusticerational both in resource mobilization and in responding to political opportunities.\n\nAttention in the 1980s turned toward 'new movements' such as those seeking women's liberation, gay and lesbian liberation, and disability rights.  These were 'new' in seeking changes in society and culture that go beyond economic or political advancement.  Such movements tend to have loose and informal organizational structureoften associated with participative and anti-hierarchical values.  SMT scholars examining these New Social Movements (NSMs) have emphasized the importance of ideas and action frames for mobilizing movement supporters.\n\nFinally, recent years have seen resurgent interest in perceived threat as a source of mobilization.  Examples include movements to save endangered species, environments, and cultures.  Consistent with this interest is psychological research indicating that losses and potential losses are more motivating than gains of the same size.  Threat can be considered a negative part of the structure of political opportunity, or a return to strain theory's emphasis on the dislocations brought by war, depression, and immigration.\n\nAlthough SMT aspires to understand social movements of every kind, in practice SMT has focused on movements aiming to change the state or state policy.  This focus is an advantage for understanding pathways to terrorism, insofar as terrorist violence is often aimed at changing state policies or even state leadership.\n\n\n\n 50\n\nUnpacking resources, opportunities, and frames\n\nAttention to resources begins with the observation that even a powerful and shared grievance does not produce collective action in the absence of resources for action, including material, human, social-organizational, moral, and cultural resources.  Thus intangibles such as perceived legitimacy of a cause, or perceived legitimacy of an organization as representing a cause, can be important resources.  Similarly, organizational structures need not be formal organizations with membership lists; grass roots settings of work and neighborhoodchurches, clubs, teamscan provide the informal friendship networks in which trust can support collective action.\n\nPolitical opportunity includes any aspect of the environment that can make protest easieror more difficult.  Opportunities may be structural and stable, or emergent and shifting.  States differ in political opportunity structures: open or closed to protest, with stable or unstable elites, with potential allies or opponents, and with more or less capacity to repress dissent.  Over time within a state, volatile political opportunities can favor or inhibit state challengers.  Movement actions and state responsesincluding repression- are principal sources of volatile opportunities.\n\nAction frames are shared meanings that join opportunities with organization and action. An effective action frame diagnoses what is wrong, who is responsible, and what to do about righting the wrong.  Bin Laden's diagnosis is that Muslims are humiliated, the West is responsible, and \"Islam is the answer.\"  Frames translate objective opportunities into perceived opportunities, personal grievance into group grievance, and individual helplessness into collective efficacy.  Frame analysis usually focuses on the impact of a frame on sympathizers and potential sympathizers, and on the competition of frames of movements and counter-movements (abortion vs choice).\n\nSMT ideas particularly relevant to radicalization\n\nFractionating repression.  State repression is an interesting example of a volatile political opportunity with complex implications.  Repression typically imposes costs on a challenge group, including loss of material, human, and social-organizational resources. However repression can also increase moral and cultural resources of a challenge group if the group is able to frame repression as illegitimate or excessive.  Thus the effects of repression are varied: protest reduction (Tiananmen Square), protest acceleration (Indian independence movement), and protest unchanged (Korean workers' protests, 1990 1991see Nan, Mobilization, 2006).\n\nAt the conference, Jennifer Earl argued that the concept of repression is misleadingly narrow.  Instead she suggests attention to protest control, which includes the full range of responses to movement protest activities.  Police responses can aim not only to inhibit protest but to channel it with measures as varied as tax law, surveillance, and parade permits.  Responses by non-state groups can likewise aim to inhibit or channel protest with means ranging from violence to elite patronage.\n\n\n\n 51\n\nIn a similar move for better specification of the meaning of \"repression,\" Donatella della Porta has offered a number of dimensions with which to characterize police response to protest.  These dimensions include reactive vs. preventive intervention, level of communication between police and protestors, level of force used, legality of police behavior, and number of groups and behaviors proscribed.\n\nIt seems likely that predictions about the effects of \"state repression\" can be improved by more precise specification of state and non-state responses to movement challenges. Similar improvements may come from comparing different kinds of resources (material vs. moral) or comparing different kinds of political opportunities (structural changes vs. volatile events)\n\nRadical Flank Effects.  What is the effect on moderates of a more radical element in the same movement?  There are two mechanisms.   First, the moderates gain advantage to the extent that opponents, including state policy makers, are more likely to deal with the moderates in order to undermine the radicals.  An example is the foundation support for moderate civil rights groups in the face of Black Panther threat.  Second, moderates are advantaged to the extent that those already sympathetic to the cause are likely to offer more support to the moderates in order to control the radicals.  An example is the additional support for Fatah after Hamas won elections.  Thus both ingroup and outgroup reactions to the radical flank will tend to give advantage to the moderates.\n\nResources and tactics.  It seems likely that there is a relation between resources and use of violent tactics.  A group with moderate mass support has something to lose if it turns to violence and its support base does not approve of violence.  In contrast a group with a tiny support base may see nothing to lose in turning to violence, and similarly a group with overwhelming support may see little to lose in turning to violence.  Thus the relation between level of support and likelihood of turning to violence may be curvilinear, an inverted U.\n\nSometimes it is not mass support but support of one or two key sources that is at issue.  In this case, the reaction of these few sources of support can be an important restraint on use of violence.  When foundations fund movements, for instance, they are likely to encourage moderate and non-violent tactics.  When states fund terrorist groups, the need for mass support can be diminished and the brake on violence diminished.\n\nNSMs.  New Social Movements, with their non-hierarchical organizations and participative values, seem particularly akin to Islamic radicalization among Euro Muslims.  Review of research on NSMs, especially research emphasizing identity politics and grass-roots organizing, may provide useful ideas for understanding trajectories that lead to franchise-style Islamic terrorism.  Unfortunately, as Obershall has noted\n(Sociological Theory, 2004), NSM researchers have focused on secular ideologies and have given little attention to religious movements.\n\n\n\n 52\n\nCurrent limitations of SMT\n\nEvidence base.  The evidence used by SMT researchers is most often newspaper reports, sometimes government and organizational records, perhaps least often interviews with movement actors and state actors.  Although interest in action frames suggests the potential of studying frame 'resonance' in survey research, such research has so far seen little attention by SMT scholars.  Research that uses triangulation of different kinds of evidence is also relatively uncommon.  Historically, case studies of a single movement are more common than research comparing movements.\n\nLeadership.  Leadership style, especially \"charismatic leadership,\" is often invoked to understand how different movements develop differently.   And movements can split over leadership conflicts that sometimes seem as much about personality as politics (e.g. Melkonian vs. Hagopian split in Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia). Leadership can be considered a resource and an input to framing strategy, but is not yet well integrated into SMT.\n\nFailed or disbanded groups.  As there is much more attention to how terrorism begins than to how terrorism ends, so there is much more SMT research on the origins of social movements, especially relatively successful movements, than on failed or dissolved movements.  Understanding the origins of successful movements requires more attention to less successful movements.\n\nOdious groups and movements.  As noted in the brief history, each decade of SMT research is likely to focus on the newest round of movements congenial to the values of SMT scholars.  The result is relatively less attention to less congenial groups, such as neo-nazi, white-survival, anti-abortion, and fundamentalist religious groups.  An SMT approach to Islamic radicalization is hardly five years old.\n\nNon-Western groups and movements.  Most SMT researchers are North American or European; attention to groups and movements in other parts of the world is relatively uncommon.  Language difficulty is one part of the barrier, but the absence of reliable records from news agencies or government are additional barriers to research in less developed parts of the world.\n\nMicro-mobilization.  Resources theory has focused on organizations that could mobilize resources--movements that could be counted as membership lists.  Less attention has been devoted to issues of micro-mobilization: how individuals are or are not moved to action.  Still, there is some interesting work at this level.  Linden & Klandermans\n(Mobilization, June 2006) interviewed 36 extreme-right activists in the Netherlands and noted four different pathways to radical commitment: revolutionaries (lifetime commitment to extreme-right politics), wanderers (history of trying one radical party after another), converts (life changing events opening susceptibility to extreme right appeals), and compliants (invited into radical group by friends or family despite weak interest in politics).  This result is consistent with the idea that there is no one path to radicalization that can be identified and interrupted.\n\n\n\n 53\n\nDiffusion and mobilization via networks.  There is considerable recent interest in networks, especially networks developed or maintained via the Internet.  Network definition requires specifying node-to-node links, including individual-to-individual, individual-to-movement, and movement-to-movement links.  It may be important to characterize links according to their significance: friendship, kinship, religious/ideological, business, or criminal.  When there are qualitative differences in significance of links, a network map may be difficult to interpret.  A cluster of links may not indicate a group boundary and the size of the cluster may not indicate anything about group dynamics.\n\nA related problem is that a retrospective network map will inevitably show pre-existing links among members of a violent group.  But a prospective network mapone that includes all an individual's contacts at some point in time before participation in violencewill likely include a great majority of innocent contacts who have nothing to do with violence.  Thus, without qualitative information about the nature of the links, the predictive power of network analysis may be limited.\n\nOn the other hand, group dynamics are likely to be particularly powerful in defining morality and action when links among group members combine many kinds of significance: personal, ideological, and economic ties combined.  This kind of group is sometimes referred to as encapsulated or barricaded: the social world of group members is contracted to a single high-cohesion group.  Underground terrorist groups are usually thus encapsulated, as are small army units in combat.  SMT recognizes the special power of such groups to promote radicalization and self-sacrifice.\n\nConclusion: Current value of SMT\n\nSMT is a collection of ideas about what is important in the birth and life of a group seeking social change.   Expansion and contraction of opportunities, frames that turn opportunities into action, and resources organized for actionthese are useful categories for organizing information about groups and movements.  These are categories of information to be gathered, filed, and tracked over time to evaluate the threat posed by groups and movements that challenge the state.\n\nThese categories may also be of use for assessing the impact of state action in response to protest and violence.  Is the political structure becoming more open or more closed to the movement's cause?  Is the latest political event reducing or increasing perceived threat to the cause the movement stands for?  Are the movement's frames resonating less or more with movement sympathizers and potential sympathizers?  Are the resources of the movement increasing or decreasing?  The answers to these questions will often need to be multiple and qualified rather than univocal, but the questions introduce at least a disciplined approach to evaluation of 'protest control.'\n\nSMT does not offer mechanical cause and effect predictions, but at least some of its concepts offer probabilistic predictions.  Perhaps more important, SMT encourages a view of the future as a fanning out of possible trajectories of the competition between\n\n\n\n 54\n\nstate and non-state challenger.  A particular action by state or challenger will decrease the likelihood of some trajectories and increase the likelihood of othersor perhaps make no difference.  The competition between state and challenger is complicated by reactions of other groups: changes in the sympathies of bystander states, and changes in the success of multiple challenge groups competing for the same base of support.\n\nThus SMT is useful in moving attention beyond the violent few to the dynamics of group competition from which radicals evolve and in which they must struggle for survival. SMT points to the importance of political context for understanding the life course of activist and radical groups and movements.  SMT encourages a view of counter-terrorism as an iterated game of action and reaction between state and terrorists, a many-sided game that includes at each step the reactions of other states and other challenge groups. Terrorism in the SMT perspective is politics by other means.\n\n\n\n 55\n\nOverview of Social Movement-Related Methods and Measurements Jennifer Earl Associate Professor of Sociology & Director, Center for Information Technology and Society, University of California, Santa Barbara Prepared for the Science and Technology for Intelligence Committee (STIC) of the National Intelligence Council January 2, 2007\n\nThis memo discusses selected trends in social movement research methods and measures over the past several decades and more recently. I also include short break out discussions on recent research on repression, research advances around social networks and cautions on appropriate uses of these methods, and Internet research.\n\nCommon Measures in Major Approaches within Social Movements\n\nWhen examining major theoretical paradigms in social movement research, most methods and measurement issues can be dissolved into attempts to measure the level of protest (or other form of collective action that is of interest) and causally relating that protest level to measures of factors thought to stimulate or dampen protest.\n\nMeasuring Protest Levels\n\nMeasuring the level of protest (or measuring other forms of collective action) has actually proven a much trickier measurement issue than one might imagine. Since no government agency, or private agency, is responsible for counting protests, and protests can happen without warning to authorities, there is no central databank from which draw measures of protests. Some kinds of protests and collective action are better tracked by government and private entities than others, particularly major explosive events such as revolutions, riots (civilian or prison), major labor strikes, etc. Even within each of these kinds of events there are questions about the completeness and accuracy of records of such events.\n\nProtest events have proven very hard to systematically track. Some scholars have worked with police departments to try to build records of protests in limited geographical areas\n(e.g., Madison, WI, led by Pam Oliver; Washington D.C., led by Clark McPhail and John McCarthy, various European localities, etc.). These approaches are limited among other reasons by the unwillingness of police to share their records, the bias that those records may hold given some police departments' negative views of protest, and the completeness of those records, given that not all protests are permitted and that police record keeping can be spotty for protests.\n\nA more popular, although sometimes criticized, approach to trying to build a record of protest events involves using newspaper reporting of protest events (for a review of this approach, see Earl et al. 2004). If participants of the workshop are interested in learning more about this approach, the three presenters represent two established collectors and users of such data (Soule and Earl) and a published critic of such data who has also collected newspaper data (Oliver). Whether discussing newspaper records of protest\n\n\n\n 56\n\nevents, or any other form of collecting data on protest, it is clear that getting complete, accurate, and verifiable data on all protest events that occur within a given geographic area in a given time period can be extremely difficult, and yet is an important research building block for social movement studies.\n\nIn addition to measuring protest levels, or levels of other forms of collective action (e.g., strikes, collective violence, riots), scholars examining major research paradigms must also try to measure the factors that they believe stimulate or dampen protest and other forms of collective action. The following brief review of measures across various major research approaches follows the order of Dr. Soule's memo.\n\nStrain Theories: Early social movement research often treated social movement activity and collective gatherings more generally with a very skeptical eye. Early explanations focused on psychological defects that were thought to either make individuals more susceptible to protest behavior or psychological transformations that were thought to take place when individuals collectively gathered and acted together (e.g., LeBon 1960\n[1895]). Measures, therefore, focused on personality dispositions, such as authoritarianism (Adorno et al. 1950) or alienation (Kornhauser 1959).\n\nIn the 1960s and 1970s, strain-based theories were reformatted around an entirely different set of assumptions, which embraces the rationality and even importance of protest to healthy civic and democratic societies (Buechler 2004 offers a good summary of strain theories and changes within this approach over time). As this theoretical shift occurred, measures also changed. Measures moved away from a focus on psychological dispositions and moved toward understanding how individuals might evaluate and react to inequality (e.g., Gurr's 1969 book focused on relative deprivation). While Gurr's work made an important shift toward looking at the social conditions that may lead individuals to desire change, his work was still couched within a fairly social-psychological framework; he argued that aggression and frustration built over time, eventually leading to collective outbursts.\n\nOther strain approaches broke more fully from these psychological and social psychological models, assuming that collective action was a rationale response to collective grievances. Studies that followed this more solid shift away from psychological determinants of protest focused on measuring various kinds of grievancesfrom suddenly imposed grievances (e.g., the Three Mile Island incident, Walsh and Warland\n1983) to quotidian disruptions (i.e., major changes to people's daily lived experience, Snow et al. 1998)and causally connecting those grievances to collective action. Ways of measuring grievances varied widely, ranging surveys of individuals (as in Walsh and Warland 1983, Useem 1980) to historical, qualitative research (e.g., Einwohner's 2003\nresearch on Jewish resistance while imprisoned in Nazi ghettos in WWII and Goldstone's\n1991 work on revolutions), to statistical analyses correlating the frequency of various kinds of events (protest, militia organizing) to macro-level social indicators (Van Dyke and Soule 2002).\n\nIt is worth remarking on the relative prevalence of this strand of theorizing in many\n\n\n\n 57\n\nmilitary, National Guard, and police documents that I have reviewed, particularly in terms of the tendency to embrace older, more psychological or social-psychological variants of strain theory. And yet, in my opinion, this theory does not reflect the state of the art in social movement research, particularly when focused on more psychological variants. New versions that focus on threat are quite promising, and are an important part of contemporary theorizing, but these versions are only distant relatives of the psychological approaches from decades ago.\n\nResource Mobilization (RM): Social movement scholars examining a RM approach tend to focus on the birth, growth, death, and size of social movement organizations (SMOs), as well as the flow of various kinds of resources to different SMOs. The goal here is to determine whether there are positive causal relationships between protest and the number, size, and/or resources of SMOs. Sometimes analyses focus on more specific aspects of protest, beyond simply protest frequency, such as protest size and radicalization of tactics or ideology. Specific measures often involve the founding date of SMOs, the number of SMOs in various social movement fields at a given time (sometimes broken down by type of SMO), membership size for SMOs, and financial resources of SMOs. Edwards and McCarthy (2004) have a nice review of RM and research on SMOs for interested participants.\n\nPolitical Opportunities (PO): In this approach, scholars are generally interested in how open or closed a polity/government is to protest. Scholars typically distinguish between two types of political opportunities: (1) stable political opportunity structures, which tend to be more glacially changing, structural elements of regimes, such as voting formats, the structure of the legislative process, the availability of direct democracy avenues such as initiative and referendum, etc.; and (2) more volatile political opportunities, which tend to change frequently and often tied to the political sensibilities of ruling elites, as well as factions and internal conflict that may exist within the elite.\n\nCommon measures of stable political opportunities tend to be categorical measures that group countries with common structural governmental designs, such as constitutional democracies versus monarchies versus military rulers. Such measures are most commonly used in cross-national research. Common measures of volatile political opportunities include periodization schemes in longitudinal research (where a host of factors are used to designate \"periods\" that are open or closed to various kinds of civic participation), or measures of political party strength (e.g., the percentage of a legislature held by a particular party, the party of the President, whether different branches of government are headed by the same or different parties, or the percentage of voters who voted for a specific party's candidate in the last election).\n\nAs one can see, these often tend to be very coarse measures of the political opportunities, although some researchers have attempted to refine their measures to focus on legislative trajectories and action (e.g., number of bills on a topic introduced in prior legislative sessions, number of Congressional hearings on a topic in prior legislative sessions), or presidential attitude (e.g., through examining the content of State of the Union addresses)\nand action (e.g., the timing of relevant executive orders).\n\n\n\n 58\n\n\nFraming: Most of the measurement involved in framing seeks to identify the presence and prevalence of various frames across a social movement field, and the diffusion of various frames into public dialogue. For instance, quantitative content coding of news stories on a movement issue may be used to identify how frequently frames supported by various sides in a conflict are being publicly aired. Various qualitative techniques have been used to understand the development and change in frames over time as well.\n\nI was asked to comment about trends in methods and measurement in social movement studies. While much could be said about this, I focus on three trends that I think are particularly important to this group.\n\nGeneral Trend 1: American-focused Research: While there is a great deal of interesting and important work that examines collective action in other countries and/or examines collective action from a cross-national perspective, it remains the case that a large amount of the empirical data that has been collected and analyzed on protest, or other forms of collective action (except for revolutions), has focused on the American case. The generalizability of many findings that are based upon American, or Western European, cases to different regions, political environments, and cultures has been a subject of debate. To the extent that research on foreign countries, or other regions of the world, may usefully inform US foreign policy, questions about the generalizability of research on American and European cases, and the slower rate of research on other countries, may be a concern to policy makers.\n\nGeneral Trend 2: Discord Over What is Included In the Study of Collective Action: There has been some debate over the confines of social movement studies and over how expansive of a vision of collective action can be usefully understood using social movement theories. For instance, are social movement scholars focused on contentious politics (McAdam et al. 2001), ideologically structured action (Zald 2000), or challenges to institutional authorities (Snow et al. 2004)? Are cultural movements readily understood using current theories in social movement research? Similarly, are religious movements best understood using theories from the sociology of religion or using theories derived from social movement studies? Can collective violence, riots, and other forms of more ephemeral collectives be properly understood using social movement studies? There has been marked discord over these types of questions and it may be useful to consider what types of experts might be consulted, in addition to social movement scholars, when discussing terrorism or religious extremism.\n\nGeneral Trend 3: Improving Measures: As research in social movement studies develops, scholars are refining and improving measures, particularly where measures involved in more meso-level questions are involved. For instance, research on repression is improving as scholars recognize critical theoretical differences between various types of repressive action (see Earl 2003 for a discussion on this point), making more refined hypotheses and analyses possible. Along side these developments, the nuance in specific measures has also been improving. For instance, along with Sarah Soule and John McCarthy, I introduced a new measure for studying police presence and action at protest\n\n\n\n 59\n\nevents that has helped to refine our understanding of what may lead to various police actions (Earl et al. 2003; Earl and Soule 2004; 2006), as well as the consequences of such action for protest frequency in the following weeks (Earl and Soule unpublished). The same could be said for other areas of social movement research, where complex concepts such as social movement leadership are being condensed into more empirically identifiable component parts (e.g., Earl forthcoming)\n\nThis memo concludes with three short break-out discussions from the email requesting memos.\n\nRepression Research: In addition to the brief remarks above on theoretical advances in the study of repression and methodological advances in quantitative studies of repression, there has also been very high quality qualitative research conducted on repression recently. Of particular note is Cunningham's (2004) study of several specific COINTELPRO programs carried out by the FBI in the 1950s through 1970s. In this work, Cunningham details how the program was structured, elaborates on factors that affected who the program targeted and how, and discusses the effect of this program. In addition, Cunningham argues that Hoover's ideological belief in the connection between Communism and some protest movements drove the FBI to ignore negative findings in investigations and interpret those negative findings instead as evidence that the conspiracy they were looking for must be much be deeper, and therefore require more investigative resources, versus interpreting those findings as evidence against a conspiracy. In part, this led to inefficient uses of FBI resources and manpower as the FBI was driven by its beliefs, instead of its investigatory findings. This work stands as a caution for any agency dedicated to efficiently using its resources for public safety and public good.\n\nResearch on Social Networks: Research on social networks in social movement studies has suggested the importance of network connections for becoming involved in protest and for sustaining commitment to protest. Much of this research examines person-to person ties. Some research has expanded to examine inter-organizational networks, coalitions, or other inter-organizational dynamics, often by building on the concept of duality (Brieger 1974). Duality acknowledges that groups are made up of people and that people's attitudes and behaviors can be shaped by the groups they belong to. Research measures designed to capture or build on duality are built around understanding these person-organization relationships (although one could use duality to understand other unit-group relationships). In other research areas, such measures are used to understand the relationships between businesses with overlapping board memberships, whereas in social movement studies they are often used to understand the development of organizations and coalitions when members are shared.\n\nOne caution should be considered in using social network analysis. Many people tend to think of social network analysis as if demonstrating a tie between units (e.g., a tie between two people) necessarily implies common behavior or attitudes. In fact, the importance of that tie for structuring beliefs and behaviors will vary markedly by the type of tie along with a host of other factors. In practice, this suggests that an analysis that\n\n\n\n 60\n\nattempts to identify likely extremists by common ties to known or suspected extremists will be not be very effectivecollecting and analyzing data on ties in large networks involves a great deal of noise, very little precision, high levels of inefficiency, and a large risk of mistaken inferences. As well, collecting data on large networks likely involves important trade-offs with civil liberties, which should be very seriously considered.\n\nResearch on Social Movements and the Internet: Measurement in this area is still evolving. One major methodological issue, which I have addressed in some of my own work (Earl 2006) involves how one identifies websites to study (Earl, 2006).  It would appear that some non-probabilistic sampling techniques may have led to wide concern about an abundance of extremism online. While there is undeniably extremist content online, subsequent research using alternative samplings strategies has not found such content to be as ubiquitous as many initially claimed and/or feared.\n\nReferences\n\nAdorno, T.W., Else Frenkel-Brunswik, Daniel J. Levison, and R. Nevitt Sanford. 1950.\n\n\"The Measurement of Implicit Antidemocratic Trends.\" Pp. 222-279 in The Authoritarian Personality.\n\nBreiger, Ronald. 1974. \"The Duality of Persons and Groups.\" Social Forces53:181 190.\n\nBuechler, Steven M. 2004. \"The Strange Career of Strain and Breakdown Theories of Collective Action.\" Pp. 47-66 in The Blackwell Companion to Social Movements, edited by David A. Snow, Sarah A. Soule, and Hanspeter Kriesi. Oxford:\nBlackwell Publishing.\n\nCunningham, David. 2004. There's Something Happening Here: The New Left, the Klan, and FBI Counterintelligence. Berkeley: University of California Press.\n\nEarl, Jennifer. 2003. \"Tanks, Tear Gas and Taxes: Toward a Theory of Movement Repression.\" Sociological Theory 21:44-68.\n\n. forthcoming. \"Leading Tasks in a Leaderless Movement.\" American Behavioral Scientist.\n\n. 2006. \"Pursuing Social Change Online: The Use of Four Protest Tactics on the Internet.\" Social Science Computer Review 24:362-377.\n\n. 2005. \"Who is leading? Who is Following? Strategic Voting as a Contrast Case in the Study of Leadership.\" in Unpublished manuscript.\n\nEarl, Jennifer, Andrew Martin, John D. McCarthy, and Sarah A. Soule. 2004.\n\"Newspapers and Protest Event Analysis.\" Annual Review of Sociology 30:65-80.\n\nEarl, Jennifer, and Sarah A. Soule. 2004. \"Political Opportunities and State Repression:\nThe Limits of Political Elite Influence.\"\n\n. 2006. \"Seeing Blue: A Police -Centered Explanation of Protest Policing.\"\nMobilization 11: 145-164.\n\nEarl, Jennifer, Sarah A. Soule, and John D. McCarthy. 2003. \"Protests Under Fire?\nExplaining Protest Policing.\" American Sociological Review 69:581-606.\n\nEdwards, Bob, and John D. McCarthy. 2004. \"Resources and Social Movement Mobilization.\" Pp. 116-152 in The Blackwell Companion to Social Movements, edited by David A. Snow, Sarah A. Soule, and Hanspeter Kriesi. Oxford:\n\n\n\n 61\n\nBlackwell Publishing. Einwohner, Rachel L. 2003. \"Opportunity, Honor, and Action in the Warsaw Ghetto\n\nUprising of 1943.\" American Journal of Sociology 109:650-675. Goldstone, Jack A. 1991. Revolution and Rebellion in the Early Modern World.\n\nBerkeley: University of California Press. Gurr, Ted Robert. 1969. Why Men Rebel. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Kornhauser, William. 1959. The Politics of Mass Society. New York: The Free Press. LeBon, G. 1960 [1895]. The Crowd: A Study of the Popular Mind. New York: Viking\n\nPress. McAdam, Doug, Sidney Tarrow, and Charles Tilly. 2001. Dynamics of Contention.\n\nCambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press. Oliver, Pamela E., and Daniel J. Myers. 1999. \"How Events Enter the Public Sphere:\n\nConflict, Location, and Sponsorship in Local Newspaper Coverage of Public Events.\" American Journal of Sociology 105:38-87.\n\nSnow, David A., Daniel M. Cress, Liam Downey, and Andrew W. Jones. 1998.\n\"Disrupting the 'Quotidian': Reconceptualizing the Relationship between Breakdown and the Emergence of Collective Action.\" Mobilization 3:1-22.\n\nSnow, David A., Sarah Soule, and Hanspeter Kriesi. 2004. \"Mapping the Terrain.\" Pp. 3 16 in Blackwell Companion on Social Movements, edited by David A. Snow, Sarah Soule, and Hanspeter Kriesi. Malden, MA: Blackwell.\n\nUseem, Bert. 1980. \"Solidarity Model, Breakdown Model, and the Boston Anti-Trust Movement.\" American Sociological Review 45:357-369.\n\nVan Dyke, Nella, and Sarah A. Soule. 2002. \"Structural Social Change and the Mobilizing Effect of Threat: Explaining Levels of Patriot and Militia Mobilizing in the United States.\" Social Problems 49:497-520.\n\nWalsh, Edward J., and Rex H. Warland. 1983. \"Social Movement Involvement in the Wake of a Nuclear Movement.\" American Sociological Review 48:764-780.\n\nZald, Mayer N. 2000. \"Ideologically Structured Action: An Enlarged Agenda for Social Movement Research.\" Mobilization 5:1-16.\n\n\n\n 62\n\nDynamics of Political Activism and Radicalization Workshop Pamela Oliver January 2, 2007\n\nAssignment: Overview of predictions from SMT theory and research for improving government response to movement challenges: challenge and response at levels ranging from protest and policing to terrorism and genocide, short-term vs long-term effectiveness of state responses at different levels; evidence base for whatever generalizations are emerging; evaluation of directions for improving these predictions\n(Oliver).\n\nMy work is not as far along as I would have hoped, for which I apologize.  This document is still largely in outline form.  (This makes it take up 10 pages, but the amount of content is closer to the assigned four pages.)  My emphasis is on the theoretical predicts of extant theory.  As I understand it, there is relatively little solid research in this area.\n\nThe main points:\n\n(1) There is a great deal of theory that provides an analytic lens for understanding how movements radicalize and become violent and that suggests possible points of intervention.  In general, satisfying people and permitting nonviolent dissent are expected to be more effective ways of preventing popular support for violence than repression of populations.  If violent actors are a small, relatively isolated group who lack support from a broader population, selective targeted repression can be effective.  Intelligence and network access that permit accurate differentiation between violent and non-violent actors are especially important, as coercive repression targeted on non-violent actors tends to increase popular dissatisfaction.  Repression targeted on blocking communication networks can be an effective way of suppressing collective action.  However, dissidents respond to extreme repression by hiding and becoming more difficult to find.\n\n(2) There is very little consistent data on the impact of state responses to movements. Most studies have focused on coercive repression or, less often, facilitation. Results between studies are inconsistent.  Most of the studies use news sources for measures of dissent or repression.  There is substantial reason to believe that the measured relation between dissent and repression is distorted in the news record.  Additionally, many studies fail to recognize the crucial difference between \"acts of repression\" and \"repression.\"  Specifically, to the extent that repression \"works\" to quell dissent, it does not actually have to be used, and there will be no \"acts of repression.\"  I am aware of no work that analyzes the impact of intelligence or the suppression of communication networks.\n\n(3) There is substantial theoretical reason to believe that responses to state interventions cannot be highly controlled or predicted, except in very narrow instances.  There are three main reasons for this.  First, both states and movements are complex multi-actor fields.  It is generally impossible to isolate an intervention from the actions of others that may change its impact.  Second, most potential interventions have contrary effects, and it is difficult to predict the net\n\n\n\n 63\n\neffect of these contrary forces.  Third, actions against particular dissidents impact the attitudes and actions of bystanders, and the nature of these impacts is highly contingent and depends upon the network relations between dissidents and bystanders as well as the discursive construction of events in news media and popular discussions.\n\n(4) In considering possible interventions, it is necessary to work with a theory of how the movement is organized and how radicalization occurs.  For this reason, I include a section on assumptions about Islamic movements and a section on religion and movements.\n\n\n1. Broad overview: states and movements are in a close coevolutionary relationship.\n\nThe \"political opportunity\" concept points to these issues but I believe there are more useful approaches to these general ideas.\n\n1.1. Political context or culture: Framework of desires/needs/goals & framework of acceptable forms of action are shaped by the broader social context. Political/social contexts differ both in what forms of action are meaningful/interpretable/acceptable and in what forms of action are disruptive. Popular protest is threatening when there is a large pool of aggrieved, discontented people who will be emboldened by the protest and whose satisfaction entails a major disruption in the privileges of existing power holders. Some systems can easily tolerate peaceful protest by some sectors, and systems vary in how much protest they can tolerate and by who before the existing order is threatened.  This is relevant to understanding why peaceful protest may be repressed and why some forms of violence have popular support.\n\n1.2. Grievances are related to unmet needs/desires.  When groups control the government or have their needs/desires met, they do not have any reason to protest/rebel.\n\n1.3. A general heuristic (old political opportunity theory, Eisenman]: an inverted U shaped relation between a group's power and its disruptiveness.  Very strong groups don't need to be disruptive; very weak groups are just oppressed and don't have the capacity to be disruptive.  Peak disruption occurs at moderate levels of power where a group does not enough power to get what it wants routinely, but enough to cause trouble & avoid genocide.\n\n1.4. A general idea from political science (especially Lichbach): states shape movements, avoid violence by responding with concessions or benefits to non violent expressions of dissent and responding to violence with repression.  This is grounded in rational action and learning theory.\n\n1.4.1. Summary of Moore: (1) Lichbach 1987: repression of nonviolent protest\n violent protest (2) Gupta et al: repression of protest in democracies protest, while impact of repression on protest in authoritarian states is inverted-U.  (3) Rasler: repression reduces protest in the short term but increases dissent and thus protest in the long term, + concessions provoke protest in a revolutionary context.  Data is NYT and regional news diaries. Sequences are constructed of state and movement action to determine whether there are consistent patterns. Only Lichbach is supported.  For Peru\n\n\n\n 64\n\nand Sri Lanka, crackdown on violence leads to less violence; in Sri Lanka but not Peru, repression of nonviolence leads to more violence.\n\n1.4.2. States can foment dissident violence by reducing the incentive to avoid violence if they either: (1) punish non-violent protest as aggressively as they punish violence; or (2) ignore non-violent protest but respond with concessions to violence.   Conversely, states reduce violence by responding positively to non-violent expressions of grievance and by satisfying the needs and desires of their citizens.\n\n1.4.3. States have historically fomented violence not only by their own violent acts against dissidents or minorities but by overtly or tacitly supporting violence by one group against another (i.e. majority against minority or dissidents).  Much of the world's terrorism and violence is linked to communal or ethnic conflict.\n\n1.4.4. Populations that have had violence used against them may cease overt dissent in the face of overwhelming force, but they rarely accord legitimacy to a regime that has used violence against them.  Thus, a population quelled by state violence is one ready to rebel if it can find a way.   Repressive regimes that loosen their repression often face revolutionary upheaval.\n\n1.5. States are not monolithic.  It is very common for the same movement to be facilitated by one part of the state while opposed or repressed by another. Similarly, movements are not monolithic.  It is very common for movements to have factions that advocate different goals and engage in different tactics.  Thus, the dynamics of state-movement interactions can get very complex.  In general, societies have different interest groups with different degrees of power in the state and different levels of movement mobilization within them.\n\n1.6. Private police forces and security companies are an important feature of current repression systems, as they have been in the past.  Domestic forces include the TSA and a wide variety of security firms that operate in schools, private businesses, and some residential areas, as well as the private firms that operate prisons.  International forces include a wide array of private military and police forces that operate under government contracts.\n\n1.7. State agents operate in this multi-actor field.  Thus, the outcomes of state actions cannot, in general, be as neatly predictable as would be expected from a two actor model.  Not only are the movements complex, but one set of state agents may be impacted by the actions of another set outside the first group's control.\n\n\n2. A discussion of possible state responses requires some specification of what the empirical phenomenon is.  I am not an expert in Islamic movements, but my thinking about relevant aspects of state response is shaped by what I believe about the empirical phenomenon, so I sketch that here.\n\n2.1. Regimes in many Muslim countries are corrupt and/or repressive and/or unstable.  European colonialism, US imperialism historically created or supported many of these regimes.  \"Islamic fundamentalism\" arose in this context.\n\n2.2. Popular peaceful movements against many of these states have been repressed.\n2.3. Muslim immigrants in Europe are generally segregated and disadvantaged.\n\n\n\n 65\n\n2.4. The creation of Israel as a Jewish state is widely viewed among Muslim as unjust, as an example of European/US imperialism.  Displaced Palestinians were/are a source of instability in many Middle Eastern countries.  Israel's occupation of the West Bank has been particularly oppressive and has fueled violent resistance to the occupation.  Muslims elsewhere identify with that struggle.\n\n2.4.1. Data point: Frank Hairgrove's survey of Indonesian Muslim fundamentalists finds that a much higher proportion approve of suicide bombers against Israel than approve of suicide bombers in Indonesia.\n\n2.5. There is widespread popular antipathy toward the US/Europe and secularists and/or Christians/Jews among Muslims around the world.  This is the broader\n\"sentiment pool\" from which the more violent movements draw.\n\n2.6. There are groups who have grievances against the government in most predominantly-Muslim nations, and that, in the current period, these grievances are increasingly interpreted as the state being un-Islamic.\n\n2.7. There has been a shift toward Islam rather than Communism as the organizing ideology for movements of lower class resistance, especially since 1989.  The mass killings of Communists in Indonesia in the 1960s and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan presumably also were factors.  It seems likely that US anti Communist efforts may also have directly or indirectly fostered Islamic organizing as an alternative to Communist organizing during the Cold War.\n\n2.8. There is a cadre of activists/leaders who are recruiting through religious channels.  A small number of people advocate and practice violent tactics while a larger pool of people have some sympathy with these actions, especially if they are directed at targets that are far away or stigmatized.\n\n2.9. Leaders of majority Muslim nations risk losing popular legitimacy if they are seen as following instructions of \"western\" leaders.\n\n2.10. Immigrant youths in Europe are one of the major sources of violent actors and ethnic/cultural conflicts in Europe are one of the underlying sources of grievance.\n\n\n3. Types of state responses. An analytic general way of thinking about this is as a continuum of repression & facilitation.  There are analytically two broad categories of repression/facilitation: a) state actions that reward or punish particular forms of movement action; b) state actions that block or promote the conditions that permit collective action.  The political science literature has focused primarily on state uses of rewards and punishments rather than impacts on conditions of action and, within this, primarily on coercive repression by states, coupled with some recognition of facilitation.\n\n3.1. How the state responds to a group's actions: is the action rewarded or punished?\n3.1.1. Punishment: death, injury, arrest and incarceration, monetary fines.  These affect future action through both incapacitation and deterrence.\n3.1.1.1.Incapacitation: death, injury or incarceration makes it impossible for that actor to engage in further actions.\n\n\n\n 66\n\n3.1.1.2.Deterrence: the punishment of one actor at time 1 makes other actors\n(or the same actor at later times) decide that the risk of punishment is too high.\n\n\nPunishment \"works\" in two ways.  In the language of crime control theory, those who are killed or incarcerated are directly \"incapacitated\" from further dissent or crime.  Killing someone permanently incapacitates them, while incarceration incapacitates only for the duration of the incarceration.  Otherwise, punishment \"works\" indirectly: the threat of punishment deters crime or dissent by changing people's calculations of the expected costs and benefits of actions.  A point often overlooked is the negative relation between the strength of a deterrent effect and the extent to which punishment actually has to be used.  If deterrence really works, there will be no dissent, and thus no punishment. Systems with high levels of deterrence should need only the occasional punishment to remind everyone that the system is still there.  Conversely, if we see a system with high levels of dissent and repression, we can be theoretically sure that deterrence is not strong in that system.  High levels of punishment ought to deter dissent and thus ought to bring dissent  and thus the punishment of dissent  back down to low levels.  If we see high levels of repression in a system, we should ask why deterrence is not working in that system.\n\n\n3.1.1.3.Punishment is two-sided because it tends to increase the dissatisfaction and sense of grievance in those punished.  This, although the punishment effect may reduce dissident action, the increased grievance effect may increase it.  Depending on the perceived legitimacy of the punishment and the relation between the person punished and others, punishment may also impact the satisfaction and sense of grievance among bystanders.  This paradox is central to much of the literature on the impact of repression.  This implies that it is important to understand the social relation between those punished and the larger population.\n\n\nThe key debate in political science has been around the idea that coercive repression always is a two-edged sword.  On the one hand, \"repression works\" to quote Tilly's apt phrase.  Coercion can suppress action.  On the other hand, repression can backfire.  The reliance on coercion almost uniformly leads the targets of coercion to reduce their support for the coercive agents and often fosters a desire for revenge.  Furthermore, the use of coercion can alienate bystanders who are not themselves coerced.  Of course, sometimes bystanders approve of the coercive repression of dissidents.  Thus, the net effect of coercion on regime legitimacy hinges on the bystanders: do they view the dissidents as alien or dangerous and approve of the coercion, or do they approve of the dissidents or disapprove or the level of coercion exerted by the state?  Coercive tactics which spill over  which punish bystanders who have not engaged in the dissenting behavior  almost inevitably have the negative effect of decreasing regime support among those punished.\n\nOn the other side, groups that engage in violence tend to be viewed as illegitimate by bystanders  especially if they (the bystanders) are impacted by the violence.  Violence\n\n\n 67\n\nusing groups tend to be supported only by those who believe the targets of violence are, themselves, evil or dangerous.  Most often those targets are stigmatized minorities. Sometimes they are states or majorities that are viewed as violent, oppressive, and dangerous.\n\n\n3.1.2. Rewards, yielding benefits in response to petition or challenge: grant concessions; promote a group's well-being and goal-attainment; avoid policies that outrage group sensibilities; accord the group legitimacy and provide mechanisms to include the ground in decision-making.  Positive responses to a group set in motion contradictory forces that tend to both increase and decrease dissent.\n\n3.1.2.1.Reinforcement.  A reinforcement effect leads rewarded behaviors to be repeated.  Thus, a positive response to a given form of action at time 1\nis likely to lead both that actor and others more likely to repeat that form of action in the future.  This will increase that form of protest.\n\n3.1.2.2.Satisfaction.  On the other hand, receiving desired benefits reduces dissatisfaction, and groups that are more satisfied should protest less.\n\n3.1.2.3.As the reinforcement effect and the satisfaction effect work in opposite directions, it is not clear what the net outcome will be on the level of protest.  There is, however, a longstanding recognition that revolt is especially likely in times of \"rising expectations.\"  However, as these are generally cases in which repressive regimes ease their repression, there are multiple forces in motion.  Thus, the outcome is uncertain.\n\n3.1.3. Apart from rewarding or punishing dissent, states have other reactions. One is to either ignore the challenge  the strongest stance  or to ridicule or trivialize it, the next strongest stance.  Ignoring a movement avoids setting off the contradictory forces of punishment and reward.  Ignored movements typically do not get publicity and are not able to attract new members.  This does, however, tend to encourage the aggrieved to escalate tactics.\n\n3.1.4. Cooptation.  If a movement is too strong to ignore, another deescalating response is cooptation: accept the vocabulary and issue, discursively repackage the issue to grant as little concession as possible.  This becomes a battle of discourse and perception.\n\n3.1.5. States also create rules and regulations that constrain forms of action: tax laws, permitting procedures.  These provide rewards such as inexpensive postage and traffic control for following the rules, and punishments such as arrest and fines for not following them.\n\n\n3.2. Actions that affect the group's ability to draw in others and/or to coordinate their actions.  This prevents action from occurring in the first place, essentially by blocking the diffusion of ideas. Note: these approaches entail violations of the civil liberties that most in North America and Europe consider to be essential elements of democracy.\n\n3.2.1. Promote or block communication: news coverage or censorship, permit or ban meetings and public speeches.  Disrupt communication: authoritarian states ban gatherings, censor news media, punish public statements of\n\n\n\n 68\n\ndissent.  This prevents people from knowing others' grievances, prevents them from coordinating large-scale actions.  Case studies from authoritarian states suggest that low-level private resistance was sometimes coordinated outside public view.\n\n3.2.2. Intelligence work that infiltrates organizations [permits selective arrest/incapacitation; agents provocateurs; saboteurs; disrupts personal relations of trust]  Intense surveillance that monitors the smallest displays of discontent: prevents diffusion to other groups.  This requires an extremely high ratio of police agents to citizens, but has historically \"worked\" at least temporarily to suppress political action.  This is what is popularly called a\n\"police state.\"  It requires a high level of state capacity.  There is evidence that the agents of surveillance have a substantial tendency to fabricate evidence or to promote the actions that are supposedly being restricted.  This is because career advancement or payment as an informer depends upon finding the crime one is assigned to find.\n\n3.2.3. On the positive side, facilitative actions: provide information, organizing assistance, access to communication media, etc. to help groups engage in actions around desired issues using desired forms.\n\n\nThere has been very little theoretical investigation of the matter of surveillance, intelligence-gathering, and restrictions on communication as repressive actions, even though these can actually be much more effective in preventing dissent and have potentially lower risk of alienating bystanders.  To understand the role of such forms of repression, it is necessary to analyze how collective action is mobilized and then examine how forms of repression intervene into this process.\n\n\n1) Consensus mobilization: persuading large numbers of people that the goals of the movement are appropriate.  In open societies, these acts of persuasion are in principle unhindered, although it is often made illegal to advocate the overthrow of the regime. Overt governmental news censorship, implicit market-based or politically-based self censorship by news and media organizations, restrictions on free speech and large assemblies are all repressive measures designed to reduce consensus mobilization.  There are also counter-mobilizations in which the \"other side\" engages in persuasive activities to stigmatize or de-legitimate the movement.  This is the \"war of ideas\" which is very important for affecting the broader sentiment pool of support.\n\n\n 2) Recruitment into collective groups or organizations.  This happens through channels of communication and influence and is grounded in the social structure of the group and its relation to the larger community in which it is embedded.  Social policies that increase the segregation or isolation of groups or conversely increase their integration can influence the nature of their ties to other groups.  The nature of social networks and the extent to which cliques are bridged are major factors shaping recruitment and mobilization.\n\n 3) Influence and decision processes within organizations.  If we are concerned with the choice between relatively peaceful and relatively violent forms of action, we\n\n\n\n 69\n\nneed to examine processes within groups.  There is a literature on radicalization processes, whereby people become more alienated over time from the larger society and more willing to engage in violence.  Some issues to consider:\n\n a. Total institutions: It has long been understood that ideational change happens fast when an organization becomes a total environment.  Generalizing, the more a person's social ties and experiences are all inside the group, the more that group can take over the person's understanding and the greater the possibility of extreme radicalization.\n b.  There is a tradeoff: radicalization happens more efficiently if ties to the outside are cut off, but recruitment is reduced if there are no such ties.\n c. This would seem to imply that successfully radicalizing groups have an outer shell that connects with the larger community and an inner shell that creates an isolated environment for radicalization.\n d.  Covert intelligence and surveillance is often oriented toward penetrating into such groups.  There is a lot of evidence that such agents often make things worse: in their zeal to prove their importance, the police agents have often been the ones who were most likely to propose violent actions and strongly sought the radicalization of others.  At a minimum, there is a high rate of falsely accusing groups of violence or radicalism.\n\n4. Networks.  In considering what the likely consequences of various forms of repression, it is essential to consider the relation between the activists and the larger pool of bystanders.\n\n4.1. If the violence-users are isolated and stigmatized, there will be strong support for repressing them and little negative consequence of repression.\n\n4.2. However, if the violence-users are part of a larger community that feels oppressed or embattled, the larger community may support the use of violence and will not support its repression.\n\n4.3. Punishing a larger supportive community for violence by some of its members almost never reduces the support for the violent members, but instead reduces the support for the regime.  If the victims of repression were actually opponents of violence or unconnected to the violence-users, regime supporters may be converted into regime opponents.\n\n4.4. In a divided or multi-cultural society, there can be strong support for repression from some factions and strong opposition in others.  These dynamics can fuel the fires of division and further escalate the potential for violence and radicalization.\n\n4.5. It is always important to consider the relation between the radicals and their larger community.\n\n\n\n5. Religion and the state.  This is not relevant to my assignment of state responses, but\n\nI bring this up because religion plays a role in the Islamic movements.  Although I know relatively little about these movements, a political science student in my recently-completed graduate seminar (Frank Hairgrove) is an expert on Islamic movements in Indonesia, and I draw on discussions with him.  He has been\n\n\n\n 70\n\nstudying Hizbut Tahrir, an avowedly non-violent group that advocates the Muslim state.  According to him, it is growing rapidly in many countries.\n\n5.1. All religions I know about have themes of justice and ideological challenge to unjust authority that provide potential underpinnings for challenging movements.  (All religions also have themes of obedience to moral authority that provide potential underpinnings for religious support for a regime.)\n\n5.2. The relation between religion and political movements varies.\n5.2.1. When state and religious authority coincide, religion becomes a tool of elite control and popular revolutionary movements are often anti-clerical.\n(Europe, Mexico).\n\n5.2.2. If religion is separate from the state, religion can be a base of opposition to an authoritarian state (many Latin American countries, Korea, Iran under the Shah).  Religious institutions have often sheltered dissidents: many dissidents joined churches in Latin America and Korea under authoritarian regimes.  Much African-American political action was organized through churches, especially after the anti-Communist campaigns of the McCarthy era.\n\n5.2.3. Cultural or ethnic conflict is often organized through religious institutions or using religious symbols\n\n5.3. Government regimes in many Muslim countries have promoted secularism as modernization.  Secularism is generally ideologically associated with European colonialism & US imperialism and/or wealthy educated elites.  Thus, Muslim religiosity became associated with resistance to outside colonial/imperialist forces or class inequalities.  This is a historical phenomenon, not an inherent characteristic of Islam.  However, Hairgrove insists that the Turkish abolition of the caliph has become an important international Muslim symbol for a movement that wants to dismantle secular states and create Muslim rule.\n\n5.4. The literature on religious organizations and conversion shows similar processes across religions.  People with a particular upbringing tend to have a taken-for granted worldview about morality and justice; challenges to this worldview tend to evoke moral outrage.  Recruitment into intense religious involvement\n(conversion) tends to draw from a pool of people who already have the basic religious orientation or who are from the broad cultural group for whom the orientation is meaningful.  Within the religious circle, the framework for conversion into a more intense and active religiosity occurs within small groups where people form intense personal relationships and all of life is interpreted through the ideological lens.\n\n5.5. This process of conversion is very similar to the network processes DellaPorta identified for Italian terrorists, although in this case the larger circle was political rather than religious.\n\n\n6. The problem of ethnic/political conflicts within a state.  Many of the world's deadliest conflicts involve competing groups within nations.  Violence is most commonly used by relatively strong groups against weaker groups.  States are rarely neutral in these conflicts.  If state force is used to protect the weaker groups, violence may be defused.  If states overtly or tacitly support attacks on minorities,\n\n\n\n 71\n\nviolence is rewarded and genocide is possible. State forces siding with one side in a conflict may become the target of attacks from the other side.  Legitimate states treat competing ethnic/political groups even-handedly and avoid taking sides in ethnic or cultural conflicts, constraining both sides to eschew violence.\n\n\n7. Media issues.\n\n\n7.1. Most empirical studies of dissent and repression rely on news accounts.  This is a serious problem, because the likelihood that there is news coverage of protest or repression varies across time and is affected by the same kinds of political factors that affect dissent and repression.  For example, it is possible that Moore's study of sequences is capturing the fact that after the news media covers government repression of violence, it is less prone to cover acts of violent dissent.  \"Selection bias\" studies indicate that news coverage of protests and violence is much more peaked than the underlying events themselves are.  That is, news coverage tends to come in short intense bursts of attention, while actual events have much longer build ups and declines.  Further, in many cases, news coverage of repression is lowest precisely when repression is highest, because the same political forces that produce the repression also discourage news coverage of it.\n\n7.2. Apart from these methodological issues, news coverage is theoretically important.  Terrorist violence is symbolic protest.  News about the event is crucial for its symbolic value to have maximum weight.  \"Routine\" peaceful protests tend to lose news value, and there is some tendency for protesters to increase the extremity of their protests in an attempt to recapture the news. Violent events are considered to be inherently more newsworthy than nonviolent events.  Protesters feel they have succeeded when they get international news coverage, and big news stories tend to attract recruits.  Repressive states can and do suppress news coverage of both protest and repression to reduce these dynamics.\n\n7.3. New modes of communication on the Internet have possibly shifted some of these dynamics.  I have not made a systematic study of these issues, and I believe others on the panel may be addressing this.\n\n\n\n 72\n\nAppendix C: Influence Diagram Representation of Social Movement Theory\n\n\n\nFigure C-1.  Resource Mobilization Influence Diagram.\n\n\n\nSMO strength\n\nSMO provision of social services that are not provided by the State\n\n+\n\npublic perception that the SMO provides more value than the State\n\n+\n\npublic perception that the SMO is of value to the people public perception that the State regime is of value to the people repression of public by the State\n\nSMO membership\n\n+\n\n\n+\n\n+\n\nState strength\n+\n\nISN activism\n\n+\n\n\nISN membership\n\n+\n\nISN strength.\n\n+\n\n\nSMO = Social Movement\n\nOrganization\n\nISN = Informal Social Network\n\nResource Mobilization\n\n\n+\n\n+\n\n+\n\nSMO activism\n+\n\n\nState provision of social services\n\n+\n\n+\n\ncontributions to SMO\n\n+\n\n+\n\n\n\n 73\n\n\n\nFigure C-2.  Opportunities and Constraints Influence Diagram. information that is of value in achieving reform perception of opportunities perception of threats tactical adjustment of doctrine to maximize the strategic success formal access to political institutions and decision making informal access to political institutions and decision making rational decision making to maximize the use of openings and minimize the adversity\n\n+\n\n+\n\n+\n\n+\n+\n\n+\n\n+\n\n+\n\n+\n\nOpportunities and Constraints political, social, cultural, & economic problems\n\n+\n\n+\n\nbring shadow from Framing process\n\n+\n\n+\n\n+\n\n\n\n 74\n\n\n\nFigure C-3.  Framing Process Influence Diagram.\n\n\n\nFigure C-4.  The Social Movement Theory Kernel Influence Diagram.\n\nFraming Process spread of Western values and practices (AKA Cultural Imperialism)\n\nunemployment economic development government debt public housing public social and welfare programs impression that the current regime is corrupt and is a puppet of Western governments perception that Islam is the solution likelihood of a society that is governed by\n\nIslamic law desire to control the State\n\n+\n\n\"RESONANCE\"\n\ncultural consistency reputation of framing individual(s)\n\npersonal salience of frame consistency of frame empirical credibility of frame\n\n+ +\n\n+\n\n+\n+\n\nease of identifying and publicizing social problem(s)\n\n+++\n\n+\n+\n\nDiagnose problem in need of redress\n\nOffer solutions (i.e., tactics and strategies) that ameliorate injustice\n\nProvide rationale to motivate support and collective action\n\n+\n\nstate repression of the citizenry\n\n+\n\ngovernment ineffectiveness and corruption\n\n+ +\n\n+\n\n+\n\n+\n\n+\n\n\n+\n\n\n\n+\n\n+\n\n+\n\n+\n\n+\n\nFraming Process spread of Western values and practices (AKA Cultural Imperialism)\n\nunemployment economic development government debt public housing public social and welfare programs impression that the current regime is corrupt and is a puppet of Western governments perception that Islam is the solution likelihood of a society that is governed by\n\nIslamic law desire to control the State\n\n+\n\n\"RESONANCE\"\n\ncultural consistency reputation of framing individual(s)\n\npersonal salience of frame consistency of frame empirical credibility of frame\n\n+\n+\n\n+\n\n+\n+\n\nease of identifying and publicizing social problem(s)\n\n+++\n\n+\n+\n\nDiagnose problem in need of redress\n\nOffer solutions (i.e., tactics and strategies) that ameliorate injustice\n\nProvide rationale to motivate support and collective action\n\n+\n\nstate repression of the citizenry\n\n+\n\nState policies and practices\n\n+ +\n\n+\n\n+\n\n+\n\n+\n\n\n+\n\n\n\n+\n\n+\n\n+\n\n+\n\n+\n\ninformation that is of value in achieving reform perception of opportunities perception of threats tactical adjustment of doctrine to maximize the strategic success formal access to political institutions and decision making informal access to political institutions and decision makingrational decision making to maximize the use of openings and minimize the adversity\n\n+\n\n+\n\n+\n\n+\n\n+\n\n+\n\n+\n\n+\n\n+\n\nOpportunities and Constraints political, social, cultural, & economic problems\n\n+\n\n+\n\n+\n\n+\n\n+\n\nSMO strength\n\nSMO provision of social services that are not provided by the State\n\n+\n\npublic perception that the SMO provides more value than the State\n\n+\n\npublic perception that the SMO is of value to the people public perception that the State regime is of value to the people\n\nSMO membership\n\n+\n\n\n+\n\nState strength\n+\nISN activism\n\n\nISN membership\n\nISN strength.\n\n+\n\n\nSMO =\nSocial\n\nMovement Organization\n\nISN = Informal Social Network\n\nResource Mobilization\n\n\n+\n\n+\n\n+\n\nSMO activism\n+\n\n\nState provision of social services\n\n+\n\n+\n\ncontributions to SMO\n\n+\n\n+\n\n\n+\n\n+\n\n+\n\n+\n\n+\n\n+ - +\n\n--+\n\n\n<state repression of the citizenry>\n\n+\n\n+\n\n\n+\n\n+\n\nSMT Kernel\n\n\n\n 75\n\nAppendix D:  Predictive Analysis Methodology\n\nBasic Approach\n\nWe formulate prediction problems as questions about the expected dynamics of a system of interest, with the system dynamics specified within a linear temporal logic (LTL)\nframework. In LTL, propositional formulas are obtained by combining \"atomic\"\npropositions using a grammar of Boolean and temporal operators (Clarke et al. 1999). Defining the atomic propositions to correspond to problem-relevant subsets of the system's state space enables expressive characterization of the dynamics. As a consequence, predictions about the evolution of the system can be naturally posed in terms of (the satisfaction of) LTL formulas. As an illustrative example, consider the problem of predicting ultimate market share in a cultural market (e.g., music or films) in which \"buzz\" about a product propagates through various social networks. If, in a market containing two products with indistinguishable \"intrinsic appeal\", it is possible for one of the products to achieve a dominant market share, we might view the market to be unpredictable. Conversely, a predictable market would be one in which market shares of indistinguishable products evolve similarly and market shares of superior products are typically larger than those of inferior ones. Prediction, of course, then involves estimating the ultimate market share of a product of interest, perhaps based on measures of appeal. It is easy to see that these intuitive ideas can be naturally and quantitatively expressed using LTL. For instance, market share dominance by product A is associated with a region of market share state space, and the condition that A eventually achieves such dominance and simultaneously possesses an appeal that is indistinguishable from product B is easily written as an LTL formula.\n\nPerhaps the simplest way to formulate prediction questions within an LTL framework is in terms of reachability. In this setting, the behavior about which predictions are to be made is used to define the system state space subsets of interest (SSI). Available measurables allow identification of indistinguishable starting sets (ISS), that is, those sets of initial conditions and system parameters which cannot be resolved with the available data. Predictability assessment then involves determining which SSI can be reached from ISS. If the system's reachability properties are incompatible with the prediction goals if, for instance, \"hit\" and \"flop\" are both reachable from a single ISS  then the given prediction question should be refined in some way. Possible refinements include relaxing the level of detail to be predicted (by redefining the SSI) or using additional measurables to resolve the ISS. If and when a predictable situation is obtained, the problem of forming robust, useful predictions can be addressed. This problem is also naturally studied within the reachability framework, as it involves determining the most likely evolution of the system and quantifying the uncertainty associated with this estimate.\n\nThe preceding discussion motivates the need to develop a rigorous, tractable methodology for assessing reachability of complex processes in the presence of uncertainty regarding the process parameters. Particularly desirable are methods that can be implemented both in stochastic settings, where probabilistic characterizations of the uncertainty are available, and nonstochastic situations, for instance where bounds on the\n\n\n\n 76\n\nuncertainty are known. Additionally, the practical utility of the approach is greatly enhanced if it is possible for reachability assessments to be carried out for entire sets of initial conditions and system parameter values.\n\n\n\nWe now briefly summarize an approach to reachability assessment which possesses these characteristics. Consider a system with state x  X, where X  n is the state space, and let X0  X, Xu  X, and D  p denote the sets of initial states, \"undesirable\" states, and admissible parameter values, respectively. Suppose we wish to show that no system trajectory starting from X0 can evolve to the set Xu for any admissible parameters. We adopt an analysis methodology which is analogous to the one underlying Lyapunov function-based stability analysis [Sontag 1998]: we seek a scalar function of the system state A(x) which permits reachability to be deduced without computing system trajectories. The basic idea is depicted in Figure D-1. If we can find a function A(x) with a \"level curve\" (say, the set of states for which A(x) = 0) that separates the green and red sets of states and on which the system flow points from red to green, then we can conclude that the red set (i.e., Xu) is not reachable from the green set (i.e., X0); moreover, we reach this conclusion without explicitly computing the set of states reachable from the green set.\n\nMore specifically, suppose we can find a function A(x) which is 1.) nonpositive on the set of initial states X0, 2.) strictly positive on the set of undesirable states Xu, and 3.)\nnonincreasing along all system trajectories (e.g., for all system parameters in D). In this case it is easy to see (and can be proved rigorously) that no trajectory from X0 can reach Xu [Colbaugh and Glass 2007].\n\nThe trick, of course, is to find such a function A(x) or prove that no such function exists. Recent work in semidefinite programming and semialgebraic geometry [Parrilo 2000]\n\nFigure D- 1.  Reachability Diagram.\n\n\n\n 77\n\nprovides a powerful framework within which to perform this analysis. Briefly, the inequality conditions to be satisfied by A(x) (e.g., A(x)  0  x  X0) are \"relaxed\" to sum of squares (SOS) conditions, so that the search for A(x) can be formulated as a convex (SOS) optimization problem. Software for solving SOS programs is available as a third-party Matlab toolbox [SOSTOOLS 2007], so that this analysis is convenient to implement. Moreover, the approach is tractable: the computational complexity of the associated SOS program grows polynomially in the dimension of the system's state space X and parameter space D.\n\n\nA.4.2: Sample Matlab Code\n\n% Social Cascades Via Context Switching\n\n% Multi-scale model implemented as an S-HDS with\n% [Hedstrom et al. 2000] continuous dynamics.\n\n% Uses SOSTOOLS version 2.01 and SeDuMi 1.05R5\n\n\nclear; echo on;\n\nsyms x1 x2 x3;\n\nnumber_contexts = 4.0;   % 1.0, 2.0, 4.0\nlittle_pop = number_contexts;\nbig_pop = 10.0;  % 2.0\n\nImax = 5.0;\n\nbeta = (1.0/number_contexts);  % 0.5 1.0\ndelta1 = 0.1;  % 0.1 0.025 0.55  empirical evidence suggests delta1=10*delta2\ndelta2 = (0.01/number_contexts);  % 0.002 0.005 0.01\n\nlambda = 0.001; % 0.001 0.004\n\nthresh = 0.05*lambda;\n\n\n% Initial probability distribution for the discrete state\n%p = 0.5;\np = 1.0;\n\n% Vector fields f1 = [-beta*x1*x2;\n      beta*x1*x2-delta1*x2-delta2*x2*(little_pop-x1-x2);\n      0.0];\n\nf2 = [0.0;\n      0.0;\n      x3*(big_pop-x3)];\n\n\n\n 78\n\n%f1 = [-2.0*beta*x1-beta*x1*x2+(beta*pop1-delta)*x1;\n%      delta*x1];\n\n%f2 = [-2.0*beta*x1-beta*x1*x2+(beta*pop2-delta)*x1;\n%      delta*x1];\n\ng = 0.0;\n\n% Degree of the barrier certificates deg = 6;  % 6  10\n\nprog = sosprogram([x1; x2; x3]);\n\n% Constructing B1, B2, B3 -- they must be >=0 on \\mathcal{X} (Equation\n(32))\n[prog,mu1] = sossosvar(prog,monomials([x1,x2,x3],0:deg/2-1));\n[prog,mu2] = sossosvar(prog,monomials([x1,x2,x3],0:deg/2-1));\n[prog,mu3] = sossosvar(prog,monomials([x1,x2,x3],0:deg/2-1));\n[prog,sos1] = sossosvar(prog,monomials([x1,x2,x3],0:deg/2));\nB1 = sos1+mu1*(x1+10.0)*(10.0-x1)+mu2*(x2+10.0)*(10.0-x2)...\n     +mu3*(x3+10.0)*(20.0-x3);\n\n[prog,mu1] = sossosvar(prog,monomials([x1,x2,x3],0:deg/2-1));\n[prog,mu2] = sossosvar(prog,monomials([x1,x2,x3],0:deg/2-1));\n[prog,mu3] = sossosvar(prog,monomials([x1,x2,x3],0:deg/2-1));\n[prog,sos1] = sossosvar(prog,monomials([x1,x2,x3],0:deg/2));\nB2 = sos1+mu1*(x1+10.0)*(10.0-x1)+mu2*(x2+10.0)*(10.0-x2)...\n     +mu3*(x3+10.0)*(20.0-x3);\n\n% Equation (31)\n[prog,mu1] = sossosvar(prog,monomials([x1,x2,x3],0:deg/2-1));\n[prog,mu2] = sossosvar(prog,monomials([x1,x2,x3],0:deg/2-1));\n[prog,mu3] = sossosvar(prog,monomials([x1,x2,x3],0:deg/2-1));\nexpr1 = B1-mu1*(x1+10.0)*(10.0-x1)-mu2*(x2+10.0)*(10.0-x2)...\n          -mu3*(x3-Imax)*(20.0-x3)-1;\nprog = sosineq(prog,expr1);\n\n[prog,mu1] = sossosvar(prog,monomials([x1,x2,x3],0:deg/2-1));\n[prog,mu2] = sossosvar(prog,monomials([x1,x2,x3],0:deg/2-1));\n[prog,mu3] = sossosvar(prog,monomials([x1,x2,x3],0:deg/2-1));\nexpr1 = B2-mu1*(x1+10.0)*(10.0-x1)-mu2*(x2+10.0)*(10.0-x2)...\n          -mu3*(x3-Imax)*(20.0-x3)-1;\nprog = sosineq(prog,expr1);\n\n% Equation (34)\n[prog,gamma] = sospolyvar(prog,1);\nexpr2 = subs(p*B1+(1-p)*B2,{x1,x2,x3},{(number_contexts-0.5),0.5,0.1});\nexpr2 = -expr2+gamma;\nprog = sosineq(prog,expr2);\n\n% Equation (33)\n%[prog,mu1] = sossosvar(prog,monomials([x1,x2],0:deg/2-1));\n%[prog,mu2] = sossosvar(prog,monomials([x1,x2],0:deg/2-1));\n%expr3 = -(diff(B1,x1)*f1(1)+diff(B1,x2)*f1(2) +\n0.5*g^2*diff(B1,x2,2)...\n\n\n\n 79\n\n%    + 0.5*B2-0.5*B1)-mu1*(4^2-x1^2)-mu2*(4-x2)*(x2+1.5);\n%prog = sosineq(prog,expr3);\n\n[prog,mu1] = sossosvar(prog,monomials([x1,x2,x3],0:deg/2-1));\n[prog,mu2] = sossosvar(prog,monomials([x1,x2,x3],0:deg/2-1));\n[prog,mu3] = sossosvar(prog,monomials([x1,x2,x3],0:deg/2-1));\nexpr3 = -(diff(B1,x1)*f1(1)+diff(B1,x2)*f1(2)+diff(B1,x3)*f1(3)...\n        +(lambda*x2-thresh)*B2...\n        -(lambda*x2-thresh)*B1)...\n        -mu1*(x1+10.0)*(10.0-x1)-mu2*(x2+10.0)*(10.0-x2)...\n        -mu3*(x3+10.0)*(20.0-x3);\nprog = sosineq(prog,expr3);\n\n[prog,mu1] = sossosvar(prog,monomials([x1,x2,x3],0:deg/2-1));\n[prog,mu2] = sossosvar(prog,monomials([x1,x2,x3],0:deg/2-1));\n[prog,mu3] = sossosvar(prog,monomials([x1,x2,x3],0:deg/2-1));\nexpr3 = -(diff(B2,x1)*f2(1)+diff(B2,x2)*f2(2)+diff(B2,x3)*f2(3))...\n        -mu1*(x1+10.0)*(10.0-x1)-mu2*(x2+10.0)*(10.0-x2)...\n        -mu3*(x3+10.0)*(20.0-x3);\nprog = sosineq(prog,expr3);\n\nprog = sossetobj(prog,gamma);\n\n% Impose a lower bound on gamma, for better termination prog = sosineq(prog,gamma-0.1);\n%prog = sosineq(prog,gamma-0.2);\n%prog = sosineq(prog,gamma-0.346);\n%prog = sosineq(prog,gamma-0.145);\n%prog = sosineq(prog,gamma-0.069);\n\nprog = sossolve(prog);\n\n% =============================================\n% Get solution GMA = sosgetsol(prog,gamma)\n\n\n\n 80\n\nAppendix E:  The Hedstrom Model\n\nPeter Hedstrom, Professor of Sociology and Fellow of Nuffield College, Oxford,12\ndeveloped a model13 of the behavior of people entering and leaving a social movement. In his research, Hedstrom focused on developing a generative model to explain what he refers to as macro-level dynamics.  Hedstrom's generative model is a system of ordinary differential equations (ODEs) that describes the time-varying relationships among the number of believers, potential believers, and ex-believers in a social movement.  In this sense, Hedstrom equates macro-level dynamics to the time-varying relationships among the number of people at various stages (such as the three classes defined above) of a social movement.\n\nThe following notation will be used to describe the three populations of interest in the Hedstrom model:\n\nB(t) is the number of people who can be accurately categorized as \"Believers\" at time\n\"t\";\nP(t) is the number of people who can be accurately categorized as \"Potential believers\" at time \"t\"; and E(t) is the number of people who can be accurately categorized as \"Ex-believers\" at time \"t\".\n\nUsing this notation, the Hedstrom model can be described as:\n\n\n\nThe rate constants  and  are fundamental to determining the dynamics of the three populations of interests.  Hedstrom defines each of these rate constants14 as follows:\n\n\n52\n\n431\n\n21\n\n\n\n12 Peter Hedstrom's primary work is in analytical sociology focused on mechanism-based, quantitative techniques.\n13 Hedstrom, Peter, \"Explaining the growth of social movements\", appearing in Understanding Choice, Explaining Behaviour  Essays in Honour of Ole-Jrgen Skog,  pp 111-126, Unipub forlag, Oslo Academic Press, 2006.\n14 In the full Hedstrom model there is another term included in the ODEs describing both dttdPanddttdE /)(/)( .  This term allows for the ex-believers to become potentially recruitable again.  The associated rate constant is the rate at which this occurs.  For the purposes of this research, this rate is taken to be zero because of the fundamental differences in timeframes for the conversion of ex-believers vs the other categories. That is, the rate for moving ex-believers back into the ranks of either believers or potential believers is assumed to be much less than the other rates represented in this model.  It is noteworthy that both the transient as well as the steady-state behavior of the model can be substantively different without this term.\n\n)()()(/)(\n\n)()()()()(/)(\n\n)()(/)(\n\n21\n\n21\n\ntBtBtEdttdE tBtBtEtPtBdttdB tPtBdttdP\n\n\n\n 81\n\nwhere;\n is the average density of network ties between believers and potential believers,\n  is the attack rate of the believers (i.e., the number of potential believers being recruited in relation to the number being contacted by a current believer),\n  is the average density of network ties between believers and ex believers,\n  is the attack rate of the ex-believers (i.e., the number of believers being induced to leave the movement in relation to the number being contacted by ex-believers), and\n   is the non-interaction-based rate at which members leave the movement.\n\n\nThe dimensions of these rate constants are important to note.  First, the dimension of the rate constantsand  is [(time units) x (number of people)]-1 for both and the dimension of  is (time units)-1.  Using months for time units, this translates into dimensions of\n(number of people)-1 for and  and (month)-1 for   and   .  Therefore, in determining these rate constants, it is necessary to estimate the average number of ties between believers and potential (ex-)believers per person for  (), the monthly fraction of potential believers who are being recruited (believers being induced to leave the movement) for (), and the monthly fraction of believers leaving the movement because of reasons other than being induced to do so by ex-believers for  .\n\nHedstrom used historical data from the Swedish temperance movement to estimate the rate constants     and  .  The optimal parameter estimates are reported in\n(Hedstrom, Peter, \"Explaining the growth of social movements\", appearing in Understanding Choice, Explaining Behaviour  Essays in Honour of Ole-Jrgen Skog, pp 111-126, Unipub forlag, Oslo Academic Press, 2006).  Using these estimates, Hedstrom achieved a fit (R2 = 0.46) that he judged to be \"reasonably good\".  He then approximated the values for each of the 's using these parameter estimates.  For example, he approximated the value of  to be ~ .03 per person; i.e., 3 out of every 100\npotential believers had ties to at least one person within the believer community.\n\nInterestingly, Hedstrom makes a strong case for coupling macro-level considerations with what he refers to as a generative model. The following excerpt from his paper\n\"Explaining the growth of social movements\" makes this case.\n\n\n\"During the last few years there has been an increasing recognition that much of what goes under the rubric of sociological theory has little to offer when it comes to explaining concrete social outcomes. The typical sociological \"theory\" of today is not a theory in the conventional sense of the term i.e., an explanatory tool. Rather, it is an abstract social typology that is meant to provide a \"perspective\" on society. For most explanatory purposes these typologies are of limited use however, because they normally lack a clear deductive structure that shows how the entities to be\n\n\n\n 82\n\nexplained follow from their alleged causes. Simply postulating that some social event or state X is a cause of Y without specifying the details through which X exerts its influence upon Y can never be an acceptable explanation; the mechanisms providing the detailed link between the cause and the effect must also be specified. The identification of explanatory mechanisms, in particular the reasons for why individuals do what they do, therefore constitutes a core activity in the construction of explanatory theories; without such micro-level mechanisms the explanations will be wanting. However, although the identification of the relevant micro-level mechanisms is necessary for the development of explanatory theory, it is not always sufficient. In order to explain macro level outcomes, an additional step typically is required: the mechanisms must be assembled into a generative model which allows us to derive the macrolevel outcomes they are likely to bring about.\"\n\n\nIn the spirit of coupling the macro-level with the meso-level (AKA Hedstrom's generative) model, a potentially fruitful area for research is in exploring for the mathematical relationships that can be used to quantitatively represent the relationships between the rate constants in the Hedstrom model and the elements that comprise the R SMT Kernel.  For example, Hedstrom defines   as  x ; i.e., the product of (the average density of network ties between believers and potential believers) with (the number of potential believers being recruited in relation to the number being contacted by a current believer).  As such he has related the macro-level model of population size to the micro-level features of recruitment effectiveness of individuals within the believer population.  There are clearly connections between the recruitment effectiveness and elements of the R-SMT Kernel.  For example, believers can use their \"Social Organizational Infrastructure\" to increase the density of network ties and the fraction of potential believers being recruited thereby increasing both  x  and, by extension, . Further, believers can create the perception of political opportunities, the perception of the value of believing, the consistency of the frame, and the reputation of the framing individual (who may, indeed, be one of the believers qua recruiters) to enhance the effectiveness of their recruiting.\n\nConsider the following elements of the R-SMT kernel:\n\n\n1. Opportunities & Constraints a. Perception of opportunities (v constraints)\n\n2. Resource Mobilization a. Social organizational infrastructure b. Perception of the value of believing\n\n3. Framing Process a. Consistency of frame i. Cultural consistency ii. Moral consistency b. Empirical credibility of frame c. Personal salience of frame\n\n\n\n 83\n\nd. Reputation of framing individual or organization\n\nA cursory analysis of the direction of influence of each of these eight elements on the Hedstrom rate constants is illustrated in table A.6.1.\n\nTable E. 1.  Potential Directional Relationships between the Hedstrom Rate Constants and Elements of SMT\n\n\n\n1.a +(-) -(+) -(+)\n\n2.a +  2.b +  3.a.i +  3.a.ii +  3.b +  3.c +  3.d +\n (Note: \"+\" indicates a direct relationship and \"-\" indicates an inverse relationship).\n\nThe rate constants that are intrinsic to the Hedstrom model are arguably related to a collection of the entities drawn from the R-SMT kernel.  A recommended area for research is in exploring for the mathematical relationships that can be used to quantitatively represent the relationships implied by the directions of influence indicated in Table A.6.1 above.\n\nOne standard methodological approach to analyzing systems such as the one suggested by Hedstrom is System Dynamics15. Figure E-1 is a representation of the Hedstrom Model using the convention of Stocks and Flows of System Dynamics.\n\n\nPotential Believers\n\nBelievers Ex-Believers conversion to believers conversion from believers beta delta 1 delta 2\n\ncreation of potential believers elimination of ex-believers\n\n\n\nFigure E-1.  Vensim Representation of the Hedstrom Model\n\n\n15 System dynamics is a methodology for studying and managing complex feedback systems, such as one finds in business and other social systems.\n\n\n\n 84\n\nThere are a number of software tools that have been developed to model and analyze such systems. One such tool is Vensim16. The following is an example application of the Vensim tool to the Hedstrom Model.\n\nInitial populations\n\nP(0) = 50 people, B(0) = 25 people, E(0) = 25 people\n\nRate constants\n\n = 0.0016 (month x people)-1\n\n= 0.0008 (month x people)-1\n = 0.04 (month)-1\n\nResults\n\n\n\nFigure E-2.  Graph for Believers\n\n\n\n16 Vensim,maintained and marketed by the Ventana Simulation Environment, is an integrated framework for conceptualizing, building, simulating, analyzing, optimizing and deploying models of complex dynamic systems (see http://www.vensim.com/ )\n\nGraph for Believers\n\n40\n\n30\n\n20\n\n10\n\n0\n\n0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100\nTime (Month)\n\nBelievers : Test 1 people\n\n\n\n 85\n\n\nFigure E-3. Believer Test Graphs\n\n\n\nAnother property of the Hedstrom model is the influence of the ratios of the rate constant in a normalized version of the differential equations.  To explore these influences, the Hedstrom model equations were each divided by the rate constant   .\n\nTest 1\n\nExBelievers\n60\n45\n30\n15\n0\n\nconversion from Believers\n2\n\n1.5\n1\n\n0.5\n0\n\n0 50 100\nTime (Month)\n\nelimination of ExBelievers\n\nTest 1: 1\n\nTest 1\n\nPotential Believers\n60\n50\n40\n30\n20\n\nconversion to Believers\n2\n\n1.5\n1\n\n0.5\n0\n\n0 50 100\nTime (Month)\n\ncreation of Potential Believers\n\nTest 1: 1\n\n\n\n 86\n\n\n\nAlso\n\n\n\nFigure E-4.  Time and Numbers of Believers\n\n\nPreliminary observations...\n\n(1)  the ratio of  to  influences the amount of time that believers remain believers, and\n(2)  the ratio of  to  influences the maximum number of people who are believers at any one time.\n\n\n 1 8 1024\n\nGraph for Believers\n\n 20 40 160\n\n1,000\n\n500\n\n0\n\n0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100\n\nTime (Month)\n\nGraph for Believers\n\n1,0\n\n46\n\n0\n\n0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10\n\nTime\n\n\n\n 87\n\n(1) can be interpreted as saying that as the entry recruiting rate becomes more effective than the exit recruiting rate the dwell time as a believer decreases.\n\n(2) can be interpreted as saying that as the nominal attrition becomes more effective than the exit recruiting rate the maximum number of people in the believer state increases.\n\n\nThese sensitivities were explored using the following ratio template...\n\n\n\nThe results are...\n\n\n\n2\n\n\n(50,100,200)\n\n\n4\n\n\n(50,100,200)\n\n\n8\n\n\n(50,100,200)\n\n\n1\n\n\n(25,50,100)\n\n\n2\n\n\n(25,50,100)\n\n\n4\n\n\n(25,50,100)\n\n\n0.5\n\n\n(12.5,25,50)\n\n\n1\n\n\n(12.5,25,50)\n\n\n2\n\n\n(12.5,25,50)\n\n\n\n 88\n\n\n\nFigure E-5.  Overview of Social Movement Theory and Applicability to\n\nRadicalization.\n\n\n\n 89\n\nAppendix F: Eight Seminal Blogs\n\n\nBlog 1:\n\n\n\n 90\n\n\n\nMuslim Boycott of Denmark http://canadiancoalition.com/forum/messages/12376.shtml told daily newspaper Information.\n\nTensions have run high between Muslims and official Denmark since the newspaper Jyllands-Posten published 12\ncartoons in September that depicted the prophet Mohammed. The newspaper said printing the cartoons was a way to ensure the freedom of speech in the face of intimidation from radical Islamists.\n\nTrade organisation Danish Industry said that so far. none of its members had reported feeling the effects of a boycott, however.\n\nWE NEED YOUR HELP!\nPlease take 2 minutes to join CCD or make a donation. Thank you for your generosity.\n\nFollow Ups:\n\n Re: Muslim Boyeott of Denmark - Hydar 19:33:47 2006/02/03 (12)\no Re: Muslim Boveott of Denmark - The Wiking /9:28:35 2006/02/12 (0)\no Re: Muslim Bovcott of Denmark. Churchill - The Wiking 79:17:55 2006/02/12 (0)\no Re: Muslim Boyecott of Denmark - The Wiking 78:55:59 2006/02/08 (2)\n= Re: Muslim Boyceott of Denmark - The Wiking 79:35:58 2006/02/09 (0)\n= Re: Muslim Boveott of Denmark - zakaria 76:02:50 2006/02/09 (0)\no Re: Muslim Bovcott of Denmark - Cheapshot911 27:06:37 2006/02/06 (0)\no Re: Muslim Boyceott of Denmark - The Wiking 19:17:24 2006/02/04 (5)\nm Re: Muslim Boyceott of Denmark - zakaria 16:31:19 2006/02/09 (4)\nm Re: Muslim Boyceott of Denmark - The Wiking 19:41:51 2006/02/09 (3)\n= Re: Muslim Boyceott of Denmark - mokhtar 07:35:13 2006/02/10 (2)\n Re: Muslim Boycott of Denmark - The Wiking 08:02:31 2006/02/10 (1)\n= Re: Muslim Boycott of Denmark+to ya dump - zak /7:55:39\n2006/02/12 (0)\ne Re: Muslim Boycott of Denmark - Hisham //7:55:00 2006/02/03 (0)\ne Re: Muslim Boyeott of Denmark - Ali 03:36:50 2006/02/02 (3)\no Re: Muslim Boycott of Denmark - Cheapshot911 2/7:14:01 2006/02/06 (0)\no Re: Muslim Bovcott of Denmark - Daddy /6:33:41 2006/02/02 (1)\n= Re: Muslim Boyceott of Denmark - zak 12:27:30 2006/02/12 (0)\ne Muslims have to continue boycotting Danish products - Abdullah 05:17:06 2006/01/31 (5)\no Re: Muslims have to continue boycotting Danish products - Cheapshot911 27:32:15 2006/02/06 (0)\no Re: Muslims have to continue boycotting Danish products - R.Nalland 07:45:51 2006/02/02 (0)\no Re: Muslims have to continue boycotting Danish products - The Wiking /8:37:57 2006/01/31 (2)\nm Re: Muslims have to continue boycotting Danish products - XLL 72:16:02 2006/02/12 (1)\n= Re: Muslims have to continue boycotting Danish products - The Wiking /8:44:59\n2006/02/12 (0)\ne CLINTON? - Lisbeth 16:38:07 2006/01/30 (0)\ne Re: Muslim Boycott of Denmark - FATIMA /4:07:59 2006/01/30 (4)\no Re: Muslim Boycott of Denmark - Cheapshot911 2/:41:09 2006/02/06 (0)\no Re: Muslim Bovycott of Denmark - Ibrahim 79:03:34 2006/01/30 (2)\n= Re: Muslim Boycott of Denmark - FarJunior 75:75:36 2006/01/31 (1)\nm Re: Muslim Boyceott of Denmark - zak 12:30:35 2006/02/12 (0)\ne CHRISTIAN EXTREMISM - Mohammed /7:50:35 2006/01/29 (1)\no Re: CHRISTIAN EXTREMISM - Cheapshot911 21:59:30 2006/02/06 (0)\ne Re: Muslim Boyeott of Denmark - Dr Ahmed 17:17:12 2006/01/29 (2)\no Re: Muslim Boycott of Denmark - saladin1970 /0:713:12 2006/01/30 (1)\n\n4/10/2008 10:53 AM\n\n90\n\n\n\n 91\n\n\nBlog 2:\n\n\n\n 92\n\nThe Anti-Daily Show: Europe pressured to censor anti-muslim Journalist... hitp:/neoconconfederation blogspot com 2006/0 1 /europe- pressured-to-c...\n\nChampion Football Co...\n\nThe Organization of the [slamic Conference (OIC), representing\n\n57 Muslim states and territories, issued a memorandum on\n\nJanuary 1 accusing the Danish government of \"indifference\" after\n\n1 Power Blogger\n\nPrime Minister Anders Fogh Rasmussen declined to intervense in the dispute.\n\nRasmussen called it a matter of freedom of speech, echoing the reasoning of the newspaper at the center of the row.\n\nJyllands-Posten had said it wanted to test the limits of free speech at a time it was under threat because of the influence of radical [slam.\n\nThe OIC dismissed the free speech argument, saying in its statement this week that the publication of the cartoons \"was meant to disturb and infuriate Muslims, and could not be considered as an innocent behavior falling within the scope of freedom of expression in which everyone believes.\"\n\nClaiming that the publication \"has offended hundreds of millions of Muslims around the world,\" the organization announced that the governments and cultural organizations in all OIC member states had been asked to boycott a forthcoming cultural project on the Middle East, partly funded by the Danish govemment.\n\nLast week, foreign ministers of the Arab League mandated the\n\n22-nation bloc's secretary-general, Amr Moussa, to take up the issue directly with the Danish government.\n\nIn a declaration, they voiced \"surprise and indignation over the\n\nDanish government s reaction, which was disappointing, despite the political, economic, and cultural bonds with the Muslim world.\"\n\nNot only did Rasmussen refuse to take up the matter with the newspaper, he also declined to meet with a delegation of ambassadors from 11 Muslim nations who wanted to discuss the\n\n\"tone\" of the debate over Islam in Denmark.\n\n2 0of3\n\n92\n\n4102008 11:01 AM\n\n\n\n 93\n\n\n\nThe Anti-Daily Show: Europe pressured to censor anti-muslim Journalist...\n\n\"As prime minister I have no tool whatsoever to take actions against the media, and I don't want that kind of tool,\" he said at the time.\n\nThe growing pressure - the U.N. and European Union have also waded in, while a group of former Danish ambassadors said the premier was wrong to refuse to meet with the Muslim envoys appears to have left the government cold.\n\n\"Now it is important to stand our ground and say that we have a separation of powers in Denmark and something called freedom of expression,\" the Copenhagen Post quoted the ruling party's foreign affairs spokesman Troels Lund as saying in response to the Arab League complaints.\n\nDenmark's Ritzau news agency noted that while other Muslim groups had previously criticized the government over the cartoon issue, \"the declaration from the Arabic League is seen as the most serious response so far.\"\n\nAn Egypt-based Muslim interfaith group is planning a conference for Danish journalists next March on what it calls \"the ignorant and inflammatory portrayal of Islam in the media.\"\n\nPOSTED BY CROWDER AT 11:41 AM\n\n1 COMMENTS:\n\nX John said...\n\nNorway started posting pics of the prophet and allah too now in magazines and point out that they can do it because their country is FREE (freedom of speech).\n\nScandinavian jackasses? :P\n\n11:41 AM\n\nPOST A COMMENT\n\n<< Home\n\n93\n\nhttp://neoconconfederation.blogspot.com/2006/01/europe-pressured-to-c...\n\n4/10/2008 11:01 AM\n\n\n\n 94\n\n\nBlog 3:\n\n\n\n 95\n\nDhimmi Watch: International Union of Muslim Scholars urges Norway.... http://www.jihadwatch.org/dhimmiwatch/archives/009863.php\n\n20f7\n\n\"in a press release, [UMS said it will call on Muslims to boycott all Norwegian and Danish products\"\n\nconsidering that Denmark's biggest export is bacon and pork, whoever IUMS are , shows that they are as stupid as their moronic fascist ideology.\n\nPosted by: archduke % at January 21, 2006 3:24 PM oT:\n\nBritish Dhimmi awards http://drinkingfromhome.blogspot.com/2005/12/british-dhimmi-awards-2005-update.html long list of British dhimmi's , with lots of links to dhimmi news items.\n\nPosted by: archduke \"% atJanuary 21, 2006 3:41 PM\n\n1 am offended that they are offended. Why is my apology?\n\nPosted by: epg G at January 21, 2006 4:00 PM cani call for a boycott of muslim countries, because their portrayal of atheists as being a lower form of pond life is offensive to me?\n(being an atheist myself)\n\nmight go and set up a \"international union of scholars that dont believe in imaginary things in the sky union\"\n\n(no offense intended to the non-Islam religious of you on this site...)\n\nPosted by: archduke % at January 21, 2006 4:14 PM archduke it isn't just muslims who think Atheists are pond scum. There's plenty of xians who feel the same way. I find it amusing and they find it maddening when I just laugh at them.\n\n1like Christians and have met many fine ones over the years. For them Jesus is their role model. We all know who the muslim's role model is which makes it only logical they'd have such a hateful out look on life.\n\nMuslims act like bullies and brats. They need to get over themselves and join the 21\ncentury.\n\nPosted by: fireangel @ at January 21, 2006 4:51 PM\n\nI hear the Danes have named their new Prince - \"Christian\".\n\n4/10/2008 10:41 AM\n\n95\n\n\n\n 96\n\nDhimmi Watch: International Union of Muslim Scholars urges Norway.... http://www.jihadwatch.org/dhimmiwatch/archives/009863.php\n\nSurely that is offensive to the Muslims? Then again they would take great delight in having a royal Dane named \"Christian\" as a Dhimmi.\n\nPosted by: 3rdtimelucky 4 at January 21, 2006 5:43 PM\n\nThe International Union of Muslim Scholars seems to be unable to issue any refutation of the cartoons' contents. Why not? With all that collective brain-power, with all that knowledge of the Koran, Hadiths, and Sira, they should be able to tell us what is wrong with the cartoons. I haven't thus far seen a refutation. As has been the pattern historically, Islam must resort to pressure tactics of various sorts, such as these threats. Mohammad was not able to refute the crities, so he had to turn to force to establish his method. This has almost always been the tradition in Islam.\n\nWhich cartoon was unfair? Mohammad never held a sword? He never had an angry expression on his face? Muslims have never overreacted to critics? What about the depiction with Mohammad with a bomb on his head?\n\nThe Bomb on Mohammad's head cartoon.\n\n1. Verse 8:60 says use whatever means necessary Lo defeat the enemy. That's open-ended as to what equipment is used in the jihad. Bombs are in that (practically unlimited) category.\n\n2. Putting the bomb on his head? The issue of whether suicide bombing is supported, in principle, in the Koran, is not resolved. However, in the context of jihad, believers are indeed expected to slay or be slain for Allah (9:111) and do whatever is needed to achieve the ultimate goal of Islam (9:33).\n\nSo-called moderate Muslims only hurt their case by (a) failing to refute these cartoons, and (b) backing appeals to force in attempting to silence critics.\n\nPosted by: Archimedes 4 at January 21, 2006 6:06 PM\n\nMore cartoons please!!!!\n\nPosted by: DavidE % at January 21, 2006 6:52 PM\n\nThe new prince is called Christian:\n\nhttp://www.jp.dk/english _news/artikel:aid=3509122/\n\nWe have had ten kings called Christian, all danish kings since 1513 have been called either Christian or Frederik. Some muslim in a program today suggested that the new king sould be callad Omar instead in order to show acceptance of the muslim minority. I sincerely hope he was joking...!\n\nPosted by: odin, king of gods 4 at January 21, 2006 7:06 PM\n\n30f7 4/10/2008 10:41 AM\n\n96\n\n\n\n 97\n\nDhimmi Watch: International Union of Muslim Scholars urges Norway.... http://www.jihadwatch.org/dhimmiwatch/archives/009863.php\n\n40of 7\n\nWhich cartoon was unfair? Mohammad never held a sword? - Archimedes Muhammed even had names for his swords.\n\nPosted by: Silvester @ at January 21, 2006 7:29 PM\n\nI remember reading somewhere - it might have been Tbn Warraq's 'Why Iam not a Muslim' - that the reason for the embargo against pictorial representations of Muhammed was purely for reasons of vanity, on his, Muhammed's, part. In his fifties when he became powerful, he felt he was past his prime in the looks department.\n\nPosted by: Silvester % at January 21, 2006 7:33 PM\n\nWhy don't they just command them to bow in submission and pay the jizya?\n\nPosted by: Bohemond_1069 & at January 21, 2006 8:03 PM\n\nCalling tariq ramadan, calling tariq ramadan . . . tar baby, you've been busy, you and the brothers.\n\nBut surely you can do better than jums? no fancy word play, but hey, something a little more poetic, don't you think?\n\nWas it a surprise lo see the Free, the Danes, the Northmen stand their ground.not bow down, not submit?\n\nPosted by: the poetess & atJanuary 21, 2006 9:01 PM\n\nAnyone who has seen the cartoons will agree they are despicable. There is nothing funny about the early barbarous period of Islam. We need more cartoons in Islamo realism, not Islamo- impressionism. Anyone who is angry enough to kill you over a cartoon should be incarcerated or institutionalized. Perhaps we need a Grand Theft Islam (Copyright- 2006 All Rights Reserved), to allow someone straight out of the madrass to vicariously achieve heaven. We can have him steal, rape and pillage infidels for jihadbucks and then seek Jihad where the program unites him with Allah and all his sex toys in paradise.\n\nPosted by: David England 4 at January 22, 2006 8:46 AM\n\nAaaaah, poor babies\n\n4/10/2008 10:41 AM\n\n97\n\n\n\n 98\n\nDhimmi Watch: International Union of Muslim Scholars urges Norway.... http://www.jihadwatch.org/dhimmiwatch/archives/009863.php\n\n50f7\n\nPosted by: marilyn \"2 atJanuary 22, 2006 9:13 AM test\n\nPosted by: sheik yer'mami 4 at January 22, 2006 2:02 PM\n\nAn explicit call to restrain free speech on behalf of a putative protected class.\n\nMORE KORANS MORE HADITHS MORE SIRATS MORE MOSLEMS MORE ISLAM MO'\n\nToo bad about all the already laid groundwork that makes selective restraint possible. Before. it was always to quiet down relatively harmless whiners and manipulators. You know, this group or that group.\n\nNot so with the Moslems. They be more serious people. They be scowling. They be laughing all the way to Global Sharia.\n\nPosted by: Alarmed Pig Farmer '@ at January 22, 2006 3:57 PM\n\n\"International Union Of Muslim Scholors International Union of Muslim Suicide Bombers International Union of Muslim Subway Bombers International union of Muslim Wife-Beaters International Union of Islamic Beheaders International Union of Taquiya training for Muslims. International Union for illegal immigration of Muslims International Union for gaining the world for Allah.\n\nPosted by: rafia % ar January 22, 2006 8:47 PM\n\nI trust that there has been a large scale Muslim evacuation from these countries ,how can they live in such intolerance? OH that's not the case more wish to move to the West.\n1 don not understand I don\"t go where I am not wanted why do Muslims? I wish to go to Suadi Arabia and read good poelry but I'm sure that would be band so do I go there no.\n\nPosted by: mark52 %4 at January 22, 2006 11:28 PM\n\nHonestly. Someone asked to stop cartoons. Silly request(by our standards) but does it really need amazing responses like this:\n\nInternational Union Of Muslim Scholors\n\nInternational Union of Muslim Suicide Bombers\n\nInternational Union of Muslim Subway Bombers\n\nInternational union of Muslim Wife-Beaters\n\n4/10/2008 10:41 AM\n\n98\n\n\n\n 99\n\nDhimmi Watch: International Union of Muslim Scholars urges Norway.... http://www.jihadwatch.org/dhimmiwatch/archives/009863.php\n\nInternational Union of Islamic Beheaders\n\nInternational Union of Taquiya training for Muslims.\n\nInternational Union for illegal immigration of Muslims\n\nInternational Union for gaining the world for Allah.\n\nAnd this is just plain wrong. I don't think death threats were made yet:\n\n\"Anyone who is angry enough to kill you over a cartoon should be incarcerated or institutionalized\"\n\nMore veiled racism from jtf. Here muslims are subtly to fachist Nazis(They don't like Jews. The comparisons fizzle out after that):\n\n(they have)..fascist ideology....These groups grow like weeds. ...fascist spirit cannot be contained. a community of destiny, **THE VOLK#*#*, the Ummah, and now a little thing known as the IUMS...\n\nExcellent article on the kind of people that abuse language with terms like\n\"Islamo-fachists\"\" and \"Ultra-liberal\". htlp://home.attnet/~hugh2you/examples.html\n\nPosted by: Kazuya % at January 23, 2006 4:09 PM\n\n\"And this is just plain wrong. I don't think death threats were made vet...\"\n\n-- posted by Kazuya\n\nYou have it backwards. It is you who is just plain wrong here. Wise up. Please check out the Copenhagen Post, from a DW archive posting. http://www.jihadwatch.org/dhimmiwatch /archives/2005/ 10/008528print.html\n\nPosted by: Stendec Q@ at January 23, 2006 4:29 PM\n\nSorry, that should be \"you are,\" of course.\n\nPosted by: Stendec @ at January 23, 2006 4:31 PM\n\n\"police arrested a 17-year-old, who admitted to phoning in the threat.\"\nSorry. Well the plural \"threats\" is wrong.\n\nPosted by: Kazuya 4 at January 23, 2006 4:46 PM\n\n60f 7 4/10/2008 10:41 AM\n\n99\n\n\n\n 100\n\n\n\nDhimmi Watch: International Union of Muslim Scholars urges Norway, ... hitp: ffwrww jihadwatch. org/dhimmiwatch/archives/009863.php\n\nTof7\n\nKazuya, Well, here are some more then:\nNorwegians on the receiving end of death threats:\n\nhttp:/ /www.cnsnews.com/news/ viewstory.asp? Page= %5 CCulture?s 5Carchive % 5C200601%5CCUL2006 0127\n\nPakistanis putting a bounty on the heads of each cartoonist:\n\nbttp:/ fwww.caglecartoons.com/preview Column. asp 2colummI D={C54 5481 E-ED8E-4D73-A087-26508 F34%7\n\nMore details on the bounty:\n\nhttp:/ /www.metimes.com/ articles/normal.php?StoryI D=20051205-072033-70 721\n\nSo, [slam and its followers say everyone on the planet, Muslim or not, has to follow their rules, or else. And the \"else\"\" is violent chastisement unto death. Nice.\n\nPosted by: Stendec % at January 23, 2006 5:21 PM\n\n20,555,485\n\n4/10/2008 10:41 AM\n\n100\n\n\n\n 101\n\n\nBlog 4:\n\n\n\n 102\n\nJustice for All: An open letter tothe people of Denmark - Let's Talk-Video\n\n20 Mar 08, 2029\nv'eb.v.fil.rl;\npenles Leadnl s |\ne ) el\n\n23Feb 8, 1220\nmoony. < bas i a el Wl S Al e 3\nUple U iy Uy 35\nAy e ay g Ungey o g e i p1\nit e dy M dy Oedesl ey e b e\n\n[Get a Cbox]refrest\n\n# s Paecn & Cparvwis\n\n20f12\n\n102\n\nhttpe/Gusticedevery 1 blogspot.com/2006/02/open-letter-to-people-of-de...\n\nI D M e o Wl D |, 013 M NS T b i e e T Mt ) abiad ) nih b 3\nThe reaon 1 am dosng what 1 am duing todey, 1 10 et you krow, Bt so maey of o Arierstarnd e value of Feedom of seech, Cur o dversity, and Ovibied debate _we luve safforwid comhanies of brutal de tatorshaps, Ben cormunes of westam colonsasm, St we sl ve the aftmemath of it A M Vsl s i Ul AT T W 3D 5t B30 e 3530 DS U i B AL el Al D i) DL iy | il J3D 3 DY Ul )\nBl DL ) SBUS. e P il of i theve e e ityg,  back of confidence o our own selves. B et ) D) PP 1) DD s R DD A s V3 NS b i o s S\n| A s Q! 2Dy D ST N S west, ner tey ont of Mun B simply dont urder vtand e largaage yous spm sk 1 msan B Language of Gees et ol s o and orvpide with 113 by produe iy and sale offects. We orfly Lk the language of detatr dap, closed mand rws s, ancd fear o (s B By il DD A s o' s e s it S i S Sy e Ain B3 0 s 8 S Al D A A s | i s ) s sy DR S 5 i Sy GG st B b\n1 have 10 sy, But the mockery some of your stists made of Mobhamed Iy not anly rde udous, bt stged igreorant s b et | et stared Bt de o s of ewe spwech, be it lhabde or not. st Ml il 20 o DS b Nrs D8y iy o B D & it ) it PR A e B it L P BUBLT 51 Dt i il Q> L) RS B QL Ig0 & v B St\n1hrow that even L Agures andd r adtions can be easlly wved sooerwd, i & pre So, 1 100 the oulture of democr acy and roe spoech that comes with & (B sttadments B3 et L B U it 3 Q! 2t ) Rl Bl B> & D 21y G el ! A3 M D30 O O e ) L il (ol S 2 i DD e On the offwe haeed, same of us meght Snd It 30 confining, Bat sch democracy might cormader criBo s of The [vaell id & oewd of b your laws 0, Rereps oy mined, hat Munlinn see that o very Iypootbical sod beugultde. BT M S T AR Bl s D3 e 1 s e e e 235\ne s 0303 Q) Blaad U3 U S5 Mol Al o Y e U i R S| S ot B Al DD bl 3T Proghe of Dermack. | must sakite you Sor w0 ey Hngs you have done in e et o)t OF your s tandds an st sues. Aoy wppao and iood Srm agatrat e aggestion sgaet 1rag by the vioan b of USA M. Diah the new dutol Ses wa h and sbwiiter 10 those who sought sulom in your Lok and treatnd Swen with euality..... yeos, you heve some who see pregudc e and IGNarant amangnt you, Bt what natan has rot?\nB e B el (it el oS BB DD N i i REIGE 3y NI Dl\n il B e il NS & O b Sl B o DI B DTt ) BB b g N G g NS Spr ans i' 93\nR R ]\n1 ot wardt yous to uancbers Lard, St weith my Bt Sl acrow o meda  have o an eddvedual, and with my cheap vidioo (ip 1 am s tresssing from my bog wetnite | ss Sying o sey Amdens tand _And don't get by the cathy On e contrary, bet 41\nnabons of B warld come 1 wnder vtand that we are sl in 2t toge ther, and that hatred crmates hatrod and terroriem, AR G A el A8 T Bk 2013 LBl aUs I Guianl Sk U 1ga BTN )\n. | i ol 3 i e T TP TP Dt P} i POIPE bt i O L DD i it S | D B S e 0 DD it P S Wi Oy MBI Ay ML ey\n\nThe ondy\n\nMany of my peogle dav't v\n\nThe furery Sing is thet even e religous goverrmment - Backed w oo _Aew e o i of e narmed ncident, 10 beauttily their wgly sctions sgent thew people ... They se g the emotanally charged orowds to stewr them, oz s help them stay o powes .. Peogie can ity Lol o it e it BB S Pl WD ) VBUE DB ) Dkl i) WBDS Y it U BB B Pl e N BD 57 ) i 3 e e s O ANt et i\n\nNS b By |l b DR et i g i PD N ) Al D G T 2Nt D e B S e i a3 At DD vt\n\nO ey yous need 8 know alout iropbet Mobasesed i that be iy net Mohunmed that the A8 magar e DaF trayed.....\n\n4/10/2008 11:17 AM\n\n\n\n 103\n\nJustice for All: An open letter tothe people of Denmark - Let's Talk-Video  http:/justicedevery | blogspot.com/2006/02/open-letter-to-people-of-de. .. www.ihath.com e & Moo T Orgeasing Beyorsd Noem ol Gl v o Qe >\nTt 1) Mot osaad s W oge Dertt M wy s FIEalad's & Bihen Forge\n\nHDwre\n\n3of12\n\ne wan o tnan, who Creatied the very Bes tlounbs Don of homan oghits s Arabia, wer e 10 oghis for sy Beng et\n\nB B A B DD Vi DB Dy B S i BBy B Y, i A 4y |\n\nWhen tabe L wanen wive treated as awl Cmrerm, andd there wers 1o code of #Becs a0 sy 3y\n\nB AL Y A UL L e e e 3 | M R Sl\n) ATl o S 1 DD Pl Bdih Yo Moharmmd wan Martin Luther kg of Amenca, Gandy of i, ened Mandels of 5\noe Ths b0 Mchummend Bt snarry of Un Defiewr LA It ot our Bt that pecpde had des oped Bes image of hem by thetr s Bgad scBons of berror and |\nmost of w e e Q) BTy  il il (R liansld) (b st e P il N )\n[SSC T JC ST VI W R P TR 18 gt et for yons 1 know, Bt sceme OF U, repect your demoo acy with il ik, becaune 10 Lar more Inlamic than ol Sctatond regemes in the *\n\nel RS D e ey e o D B e A s P S il DD UAP DD N QIS el S a TM Abe!\n\nA Yoo prbes 17 or I b E gyt Cals for boycott, wiile he is one of the most cor Torpt, who uned by relgous efluence srd sffuenc e 1 decowve milbors of Decame & tool for the dictaton g of Egypt _now I is Cryng wolves_ it becs pEr ity 10 g bate the crowd . Doewtt St remind you of the o of Aserica, who ' o edvance\n\nS e W) N P i CARBAD DN b it DD P it ST B ot 2l W Bt i |l N N o N B\n\nP O M ity il S Bl Wi 3\\ M . i Juis B 8 s\n\nB e e e Wi\n\nSutiamed was 2 poor mae, who stood S st Canes and put people's alfaes o teng elve L he was heve now with us, he mght have sad . = wiry are youi whide nation of pecgle by the words of 4 few? Mave not | Laght you fustice T Let demonired me do what they want Bt dor't be (ndas 1 miBom in retaason Bt | wans strgped Arsd wan whigged wath At whele bow\n\n1w ayers? Aeed have rot called ke e 0501 i WIS i 8| S JT D30 el i 3 NS Al Dy | D W,\n\nT s LR  PRPUPL ZNTEPASL TIPS  T i Y\n1m 30  A8 O QD e St ! s S 6 Bl DD D, it g\n1w st Spau) T tuas Q3 DUyl\n\nMaree you hargntten how | orgeve the eeiw e tion of Meca, when | was capabie the ity down to\n\nTl e 8 W | A W ol el s T S\n\nWAt 1 mecr e Bger Tand? My eusme or vy teachogn T My name will remaln Paarveri St you don't Burew B woery about, bt worry sbout the mrellions dradvantaged peogie who wnb o de overy e oo\n\nT Al s WD ! D 85 Pt it Y s B i |\nT i ) Bt e B B | i) 3 1l D i\n\nThat what Mohamed wosdd have told s e o, e taught on Sut knto wvwence of Iham, and Aaboe s GOOS name _ yes, (\n\nA ! B T 1 P ] e s W S N e AR N Ul et\n\nPocple of Devenark, some of you mght daag se with me an whao Mobuame Staly rengect that _bust bet un teing the salsject o e Labde i en hororalie marrwr el et un dl Tk Cotrenon serne s pon\n\nTl LBy i Ll 3,00\\ Y s Nsir S 0 Dt i  WD Dy s g BT Do s S Caae D S 3D e\n\nPoople of Derwmark . | respedt your democsacy, even 11t aBows hatebd peoy arsmonty, sexd | hodd Sune who created B crivn ot countadde, ared |l them dobiate an st any wheen, st sy U\n\nS P 3 A 0l B e a PN ) o e e ISl s B sy e D3y e g I A e 8 il B 33 N D s B W\n\n<\n1 know That you may have 3 QuesBon, when we s Muslims ry 10 agerosch you t o Lt who Mok el whiat hiy LELE T sk your self e question, and | am sure you have shed yourselves Bes gues aned that in: My, your ae tryeng 10 Sl us Siat your fath is ol about M ot i how 8 e st gecpde Vasnarwly, anel ut bhe gef out the |\n\n41072008 11:17 AM\n\n103\n\n\n\n 104\n\nJustice for All: An open letter to the people of Denmark - Let's Talk-Video  http://justicedevery1.blogspot.com/2006/02/open-letter-to-people-of-de... under brutal dictatorships and you have not done any thing , we your prophet's traditions , and we'll find in these two things commands from your prophet ordering you 1o speak truth to powe injustices and unfalmess in all kinds and shapes and forms . How c your religion, and what it teaches, while you have not done any t teach us the justice of Islam? But we live in justice..So why teachings and benelit your selvwes first from it, before you come to u wslslow waokuwolls Aol b Lo Vsl 14D pus ko o s Lokl\n: 929 I pfanal pulle plal., Al 9 Qs\n\nJSi bl Uslels &S pSole laass Ulg JAB e pSus Ul el us\n930 uwds 39 29 |l Ul W g pibs s, Ul B9k gog |\nA 08 v 5/ wsaku Ys fuaw sl wstlls wov wse |Ha)\nIsouig polinnl Lo lgnsli ulg ppalles Lol plol gl Joaw aSUl\n il @ wsaaen J oy s5ws o5t L I vl vas =\nWealeg ol allie Uil Igoasiwl.,. allas 08 yaum oo  pilul s e W iglsad Wil gt ul\n\nThis is a very legitimate question, I my self asked It so many consider my self as a fundamentalist who loves to go back to the |\nto seek truth and apply to my real life anc\n\nG Jsol 55281 Ul pdeaisS s G Al b Uil @\nol e lpis angol\n\n1 find this question a very legitimate question, why can't we as Mu our faith with every one else, while we are not even using it very fu our selves, why do we want every one to listen to us, while we arc else? Why did not we as Muslims rise in anger, when a fact!\nBuddha's statue whose considered a god and a holy figure foran billion people? You did not speak out, yet you are so enraged abou very legitimate question, and we can not amswer this question how..It is very hypocritical of us to speak about every thing else a bu s By o)) Moy Sl Gandannd| (e gledan V1300 L Sale JS Boiun 0l L 5lod  luus s padaw (ol 118 Jse! bl o il gaalunll o Angans Cald liie Wis Lommi al |3ta) 1ud a3  g o8 ot Luas Luly  pasas Juls was oo 483 Lwsin o9 gl s\n\n@S o U W aie b Ul e U WEs,\n\nV3l sl pals Ul avp Vs uw W JS pals s JS\n\nSee the problem Is not In Islam It self and not In Mubhammad's teac we always felt like victimized, and we have been victimized, and t to look into sues. It is very problematic. And It very crucial us Muslims, have to listen to others as we ask them to listen to us, we rules to our selves as we ask others t i) e sl auleg liasy Upsly sl\n\nJeall uas SASL! el il audasl iy se8Vl JSJ |\n\nlgw Wl Bloiw W peulles (ows Lot goiun ol o wsakuaad!\nppaual e lpadday Gpsil e\n\nYes, there are so many Injustices in this world, and there are wronged themselves and others..But If we would to rise up and ask respect us, we have to respect ourselves first and respect our U85, Leul 1l gl p5e Us ) Ul GSUg.., wsthuus s Usakuis lpnis sl Ll o Jaa Vs 1S e iy o Oliaisall Uls bl o\n\nSo If you Danish people asked us this question, it is a very legitim what 1 am so worried about today, That we have to first use the and apply to ourselves ,..we can not ask any one else to kno traditions and to honor the prophet of our faith if we are not oy teachings and fundamentals and apply it to our selves first, or wi sald before, If we ask of you to be just we have to be just ourselve export to you and every one else the teachings of our faith while our selves, and how can we ask of you or any one else for that faith, while we don't understand ourselves sometimes, and how to be sincere and hitforward, if we our selves are hypocrit S, 28 o3l usg b AD3 Gxes ol s allw V)l 64D Lson whi @llaml Usas lew Ul s el ods o lpadaw & atall ol i Loy Liys Al i 2y LaSea, Guadlis US Ylg... Yl unsis LSS s anga Vilo! Lows |\n\n13 pley o 14 UL apan sy B3l G Aolaww My Lol\n\nBut see, the problem also In those scholars and people who took |\non our behalf for a very long time. And told us what religion shoo how told us how to tnderstand it. There are o lot of those people wi\n\n4of 12 4/10/2008 11:17 AM\n\n104\n\n\n\n 105\n\n\n\nJustice for All: An open letter to the people of Denmark - Let's Talk-Video  http://justicedevery1.blogspot.com/2006/02/open-letter-to-people-of-de...\n\nLo Lofls g S wosh, o alull usiaade ol W Sudtvd plo, wsSliay a2 biszils gl Ao sisa\n\nIt is very important to us to understand that we are |\nelse about thelr flaws, we have to adm |t our own fl process; it is a first step in bridging the gap, or to exte vl gl 8algi gue Vel v Bis) ul v pellesl |\nil o pdladl & iop.. spxall &\n\nSo, Danish pacple, People of Denmark, | hope you u that we are living a very hypocritical life, and that v taught us, and we were so angered by the cartoon t that we are not using, although these teachings haw\n\nALY pulles g Al slor i Wil pgas o o ul Llacs eas> Lo ps )l olde ol U i U &\nS0 you might ask yourselves time and time again, be apply to yours elves first, and then we can tal\n\nBde pSus Al wsaduoll Gl Isado.. vl b S &\n\nAlthough, [ would ask of you to understand that |\ncreate a platform to spread hatred, this Is not only de adore and live, bu\n\n3! 8 Sl Lo ian (o) pacnan 5) Lo sunims posow\n148 Lo 19,0150 aSunl usasivs oSl s\n\nMy own independent free website, is not politically, r backed by .\n\nGcgoms F ouluw ol Wie 9l Logiavl 3l bwliw 1>l 31\n\nBecause, those who belleve in justice Wil oid o9 >l coub Si oo\n\nHave you watched the word of Amr Khaled? T hope with what he is doing, he dosn't want to insult muskem all the world that we are ANGRY, but we don't ha about our refigion, this is the most impo demonstrations are not BAD, but they are not sufficie Khaled's word, that | was really smart, that he said tt fast and briefly, you know why? cause we simply defend them and forget our problem, VIGLENCE IS8\nSMART, and know how to speak, we don't have to pic sorry, not strat to ferget what they should change in th s aroot thing, and FOOUS on our disiwdvantages, Plea right and we shoukd really take and we should teke lass |\n\nVel pllall 05 >, plac! alk Jaw, Jodldaa Pl V| 6800 Samadl wloide Jocls D\n\n5of 12 4/10/2008 11:17 AM\n\n105\n\n\n\n 106\n\n\nBlog 5:\n\n\n\n 107\n\nRandom Platitudes: The \"Cartoon Row\" dissected -- part 2 http://randomplatitudes.blogspot.com/2006/02/cartoon-row-dissected-par...\n\n4of 5\n\n(Continued in part 3)\n\nTechnorati tags: denmark, cartoon row, current affairs, history, islam, xenophobia\n\nPOSTED BY RP AT 2/18/2006 10:12:00 PM\n\n2 COMMENTS:\n\n2 said...\n\nRP wrote: \"It should be noted that Vilhelmsen was sentenced to 14 days in jail for this, recently -- since these remarks was a clear transgression of Danish law dealing with inciting criminal acts.\"\n\nOnce again, a very interesting post. Keep it up! :)\n\nNow, just out of curiosity, in the above passage, you state that Vilhelmsen received a punishment (as nominal as 14 days in jail is) for having incited people toward making criminal acts. My question is, what is the difference between this person's speech, which obviously crossed the line of Danish law, causing the accused to be punished, yet\n(presumably) caused no criminal acts to actually be committed, and the publication of the cartoons, which, IMO, also crossed the line of Danish law (although obviously not in the eyes of the Danish justice system), caused no punishment to the accused, but did incite numerous people worldwide to do criminal acts?\n\n| can't believe that the medium (radio vs. newspapers) would make a difference. Nor can | believe that inciting people outside of the country is \"OK\" while inciting people inside of Denmark is not. (For example, |\nstrongly suspect that if similar cartoons were published in Denmark that crossed Jewish sensitivities - say, the topic of the Holocaust - and that, while Danish Jews didn't do criminal acts, but (say) French Jews did, the publishers of these cartoons would be punished with jail time.\n\nSo what is the difference?\n\n20 FEBRUARY, 2006 03:00\n\nEIRP said...\n\nA small correction (made in the main text of the blogpost)... please read as: \"...since these remarks were a clear transgression of Danish law, specifically section 266b of the Danish penal code, dealing with racist utterances, etc.\"\n\nKaj Vilhelmsen was sentenced to 14 days of haefte (which term I'll explain in a moment) at the Municipal Court of Copenhagen, on February\n\n4/10/2008 12:09 PM\n\n107\n\n\n\n 108\n\n\n\nRandom Platitudes: The \"Cartoon Row\" dissected -- part 2 http://randomplatitudes.blogspot.com/2006/02/cartoon-row-dissected-par...\n\n50f5\n\n13 2006.\n\nThe Danish penal code allows for three levels of punishment for a breach of the law:\n\nAt the lowest level, there is the fine. If one cannot, or will not, pay a fine, one can serve time in jail instead.\n\nAt the next level, there is haefte, which is equivalent to jail, except that it doesn't leave a mark on your criminal record. This is often used for misdemeanors.\n\nThe final level is actual jail time, which does leave a blot on the criminal record of the punished person (although there is an obsolescence clause -- as time passes, some types of old crimes are erased, each type of crime having a separate obsolescence period).\n\nAll of these judgements can, of course, be made suspended, only to be invoked in the case of a future transgression.\n\nThe fact that Kaj Vilhelmsen's sentence was fairly lenient reflects two issues. First, there is an inherent conflict with free speech; second, and most importantly, Kaj Vilhelmsen is a crackpot and his audience is tiny. To punish him harshly would be to make a martyr of him. It would be counterproductive.\n\nIt should be noted that Radio Holger, his radio station, had its broadcast license suspended for three months. That was a much more useful outcome, in my opinion.\n20 FEBRUARY, 2006 12:30\nPOST A COMMENT LINKS TO THIS POST:\nDenmark: Historian's augury: R Plat blogs historical sleuthing of ... M.Cartoons : Another History\n\nDenmark's Diplomatic Breakdown\n\nCREATE A LINK\n\n<< Home\n\n4/10/2008 12:09 PM\n\n108\n\n\n\n 109\n\n\n\nBlog 6:\n\n\n\n 110\n\n\nBlog 7:\n\n\n\n 111\n\nRandom Jottings from (\".)::~~~ the Absolutely Hilarious, IFabulously W... http://azlanadnan.blogspot.com/2006/01/lets-boycott-danish-goods.htm 1\n\n20f12\n\n\"We must quietly point out here that the drawings illustrated an article on the self-censorship which rules large parts of the Western world,\" the paper said. \"Our right to say, write, photograph and draw what we want to within the framework of the law exists and must endure - unconditionally!\"\n\nThe ambassadors of 10 Muslim countries (including a number of Arab countries, Pakistan, Iran, Bosnia-Hercegovina and Indonesia)\nsent a joint letter of complaint to the Danish Prime Minister Anders Fogh Rasmussen, asking him to take a stance on the issue.\n\nRasmussen refused to intervene and responded by merely stating that Denmark had a free and independent press. He said he could not tell newspapers what to print - or what not to. In his New Year's speech, Mr Rasmussen fell just short of an apology speaking of responsibility in exercising freedoms of speech.\n\nUnsurprisingly, neither semi-apologies seem to have been accepted in a Muslim world which sees any depiction of the prophet as blasphemous.\n\nThere are now fears that the incident could affect Danish businesses. The Danish company Arla Foods, one of Europe's largest dairy producers, has placed advertisements in Middle Eastern newspapers to try to stop a boycott of Danish produce in Muslim countries.\n\nArla Foods said earlier in the week that its customers in Saudi Arabia appeared to have stopped selling its dairy produce and had begun a boycott of Danish goods. Finn Hansen, a divisional director with Arla, on Thursday said \"We fear that we will be hit by a wave of consumer anger.\" He added that there had been calls for boycotting Danish products in Friday prayers and on Saudi television and in newspapers.\n\n\"We are certainly afraid this will spread across Saudi Arabia and affect our business,\" he said.\n\nThere were street protests both in Denmark and in Muslim countries following the publication of the cartoons.\n\nThe Confederation of Danish Industries has now appealed to Jyllands-Posten to print an apology for having commissioned the drawings.\n\n4/10/2008 10:32 AM\n\n111\n\n\n\n 112\n\n\n\nRandom Jottings from (\"))~~~ the Absolutely Hilarious, Fabulously W... http:fazlanadnan blogspot.com/2006/01/1ets-boycott danish- goods html\n\nSaudi Arabia has recalled its ambassador to Denmark \"for consultations in light of the Danish government's lack of attention to insulting the Prophet Muhammad by its newspapers.\"\n\nCopyright 2003-2006 Azlan Adnan Legal Notice\n\n# posted by (\", )azlan::~~~@ 11:55\n\nRANDOM JOTTINGS HOME Comments: Post a Comment osta vomment Jol SI'OL'IpS B oin Now! 1 Power\n. Blogger\n\nFriends\n\nBuy this book at Lulu.com Menpwsion [ eLocsares\n\nLegal Notice\n\nUnique Visitors since March 13, 2004: (30282\n\nOverstock\n\nAzlan\n*'Adgan\n\n30f12 4/10/2008 1032 AM\n\n112\n\n\n\n 113\n\n\nBlog 8:\n\n\n\n 114\n\nEHSAN: Media War On Islam\n\n2of4\n\nportraying Prophet Muhammad (PBUH), ignoring the fact that visual depictions of prophets is prohibited in Islam.\n\nIn September, Danish daily newspaper lyllands-Posten invited cartoonists to submit drawings of the holy Mohammed, after an author complained that nobody dared illustrate his book on Mohammed.\n\nAbout 12 cartoons were published as \"a test of whether fear of Islamic retribution has begun to limit freedom of expression in\n\nDenmark.\"\n\nInstead of seeing the cartoon as controversy and racist, some media outlets defended the incident as an expression of\n\nFreedom of Speech.\n\nDanish Muslim organizations plan to take the daily Jyllands-Posten to the European Court of Human Rights for publishing drawings of Prophet Muhammad [PBUH).\n\nKasem Ahmad, leader of Danish Islamic religious body Islamsk Trossamfund, uniting different Muslim organizations, announced the decision following an announcement that a\n\nDanish local attorney general had rejected their case.\n\nIslamsk Trossamfund sued the Danish paper for the publication of drawings of the prophet Muhammad (PBUH) for blasphemy.\n\nBut the media war against the Muslims has taken a more grievous turn than some cartoons; this matter has become a test case for the continued viability of freedom of speech in\n\nWestern countries,\n\nThe Western media always portrays the Islamic religion as exotic imagery - a myth adapted from 1001 Nights; with huge harems, wild sex orgies, luxurious palaces, flying carpets, incredible wealth, fierce warriors, hordes of thieves, cruelty and religious fanaticism.\n\nThe biased approach of the Western media led people in European nations and the Americas believe that the armed groups we hear about, including Al Qaeda network, are the true representatives of the Islamic faith and the Muslims, or course here we're not speaking about the resistance groups in\n\n114\n\nhttp:/fehsanibnzaid blogspot.com/2006/01/media-war-on- slam html\n\nBelieve in Yourself is the\n15t Secret of Success\n\nTeen Ceria\n\nIslam Online Amal Malaysia Agenda Daily Aljazeera\n\nArab World News Terengganu Kite\n\nScreenshots\n\nParti Islam Semalaysia\n\nHarakah Daily\n\nBerita Harian Utusan Malaysia New Straits Times Reader Digest Cla\n\n4/10/2008 12:28 PM\n\n\n\n 115\n\nEHSAN: Media War On Islam\n\n3of4\n\nPalestine like Hamas and lslamic Jihad, we're speaking about militant and armed groups who perceive Islam the wrong way. All that with the aim of fueling negative feelings, hatred and fear against this religion.\n\nUnfortunately people, who depend mainly on Western media as their sole source of information, continue on blissfully ignorant of just how biased and unjust their free societies are.\n\nPOSTED BY EHSAN IBN ZAID AT 12:27 P# s\n\n7 COMMENTS:\n\nB lenmyfisher05063971 said. ..\n\nThis post has been removed by a blog administrator.\n\n9:39 PM\n\n3 Anorymous said. ..\n\nGood design!\n[url=http://ldgx<fnmu.com/pmlin/khgo.html]Wy homepage[ /url]\n| [url=http: //kpooxilm.com/nanc/rexr.html]Cool site[ /url]\n\n10:13 PM\n\n3 Anorymous said. .. Good design!\nMy homepage | Please visit\n\n10:13 PM\n\n2 Anonymous said. ..\n\nThank you!\nhttp://ldgxfnmu.com/pmin/khgo.html |\nhttp://aqkosqgie.com/cjil/ rrwd.html\n\n10013 PM\n\n= Anonymous said. ..\n\nBestregards from NY! Spierpijn vitamines Teen naked sex medical side effects of protonix Surgery venlafaxine bleed Articles for incorporate application forms How a spark starts from a lantern battery Download softwares earn money join free guide protonix use patient assistance program for protonix wholesale affiliate programs modafinil and chronic fatigue syndrome delta how to faucets\n\n12:33 PM\n\n115\n\nhttp:/fehsanibnzaid blogspot.com/2006/01 /media-war-on- slam html\n\nSaiful Islam alirajaie ct hurairah dinaluzrig fikry hairil irza hayyie hazwan ibnsabil kanot kembara hati pak di syikhah umamudin zaidah zaitun zarifi zikri\n\nSELAMAT HARI RAYA AIDILADHA\n\nAYUH SAWBUT TAHUN BARU CARA ISLAM,\n\nKESATUAN ISLAMW, - ET KA KETIKA BERLAKU PERSELISIHAN. ..\n\nASK Y OUR EFFORT YOURSELF\n\nSYAIR PEJUANG\n\nHIASAN ABADI\n\nJADIKAN MATLAMAT PEMIKIRAN DOMINAN KITA\n\nICARISMA\n\nRAMADHAN KARIM o A i1 L\n\n\"v Y |   ATV EUY vALS\n\nName: Ehsan Ibn Zaid\n\n4/10/2008 12:28 PM\n\n\n\n 116\n\n\n\nEHSAN: Media War On Islam\n\n4 of 4\n\n- Anorymous said. ..\n\nYou have an outstanding good and well structured site, |\n\nenj oyed browsing through it hair loss woman What is the use of video conferencing baldness hair loss remedies howtostophairloss.com withdrawal of bextra area rugs south carolina Cell cheap phone verizon wireless lonamin or phentermine Cheap calls mayotte hair loss permanent disease Teen pussy clip customized jeeps for sale jenna jameson nude pi No doc loan credit score Miss wheelchair kansas bontril+discount\n\n11:02 AM a8 Anonymous said. ..\n\nEnjoyed a lot!\n\n1146 PM\n\nPOST A COMMENT\n\n<< Home\n\n116\n\nhttp:/fehsanibnzaid blogspot. com/2006/01 /media-war-on- slam html\n\nAge: 23\n\nProfile: Engineer Hobby: Reading and Designing Yision: Iman dan Amal, Kasih Sayang dan Persaudaraan Motto: Simple and Smart E-mail: qaradhawi.yahoo.com\n\n1. .:Ehsan itu adalah apabila ia menunaikan tanggungjawabnya, akan lahir rasa gerun di hatinya kerana ia mendapati bahawa Allah SWT itu sentiasa melihat akan perbuatannya:.\n\n2. .:Pesan Sheikh Mustafa Masyhur: \"Tegakkan Islam Dalam Dirimu Nescaya la Akan Tertegak Di Daulahmu\":,\n\n3. .:Ehsan kata: Kita terasa terpaksa untuk terus sibuk walaupun kita tidak pasti tentang apa yang patut kita sibukkan. Kita sering menggandakan usaha kita, setelah tidak pasti tentang obj ektif kita. Kita cuba untuk mengisi kekosongan tujuan dengan aktiviti yang tidak bermakna. Wahai diri belajarlah:.\n\n4. .:lslam yang ditakrifkan oleh Allah itu, adalah sebaik-baik takrifan, Bukan seperti takrifan manusia yang pelbagai dan mengikut kefahaman yang tidak jelas:.\n\n5. .:Prophet Muhammad SAW said:\nThe Best Of Our Minds is to Plan for Things.\n\n4/10/2008 12:28 PM\n\n\n\n 117\n\nAppendix G:  Relativistic Assessment of the Seminal Blogs\n\n\nContent analysis of the blogs is an important feature of the analysis in that it may provide insights into the motivation and intent of the bloggers.  In the meso model a bag-of-words approach was used to provide this content analysis.  To delve further into blog content a collection of eight blogs were examined in more depth.  The eight chosen (see Appendix F) were those that were assessed to be seminal in the sense that they stimulated a significant level of subsequent blogging activity.  The purpose of this more in depth analysis of the content of these blogs was to more carefully explore for relationships to SMT and specifically to seek information regarding motivation and intent of the bloggers.\n\nThis phase of the content analysis was directed toward determination of relative emphasis\n within each blog  on each of the three elements of SMT; namely, Framing, Opportunities & Constraints, and Resource Mobilization.  The relativistic assessment\n(using pairwise comparisons) of the use of the three SMT elements per each of the eight seminal blogs is depicted in Figure A.7.1.  It is noteworthy that this assessment is\n\n\n\nFigure G-1.  Relativistic Assessment of the Eight Seminal Blogs.\n\n\n\n0%\n\n10%\n\n20%\n\n30%\n\n40%\n\n50%\n\n60%\n\n70%\n\n80%\n\n90%\n\n100%\n\n1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8\n\nBlog Number\n\nR el at iv e S\n\nM T\n\n D im en si o n\n\n S co re\n\nFraming\n\nOpp&Const\n\nResMob\n\n\n\n 118\n\ninherently replete with subjectivity on the part of the assessor.  Nevertheless, it does provide a qualitative measure of the relative emphasis within these seminal blogs on each of the three fundamental elements of SMT.  Inspection of this figure reveals that the Framing Element of SMT is the dominant theme for most (blog 5 is an exception) of the eight blogs.  Further, the summary statistics for the relativistic composite of the eight seminal blogs are depicted in Figure G-2, where it is clear that:\n\n framing is clearly the most dominant of the three SMT dimensions,\n resource mobilization and opportunities/constraints are nearly equivalent, and\n the eight bloggers were most consistent in their use of resource mobilization and least consistent in their use of opportunities/constraints.\n\n\n\nFigure G-2.  Summary Statistics for Eight Seminal DC1 Blogs.\n\n\nThese summary statistics are intuitively consistent with the relationships between the underlying themes of the three fundamental elements of SMT and the motivation and intent of the bloggers.  Because the Framing element is focused on:\n\n diagnosing the problem(s) and the need for redress;\n providing the rationale to motivate support and collective action, and\n offering solutions (i.e., strategies and tactics) that ameliorate the injustice;\n\n\n\n0.0\n\n1.0\n\n2.0\n\n3.0\n\n4.0\n\n5.0\n\n6.0\n\nResMob Opp&Const Framing\n\n\n\n 119\n\nthis element of SMT is the element of choice for those wishing to stimulate support for their cause.  Further, because of the relative consistency of need for the mobilization of resources (RM) to support the cause and because of the emergence and disappearance of both opportunities and constraints (O&C), it is not surprising that there is less variability in the use of the RM than there is in O&C by the bloggers.\n\nThe next level of detail in content analysis focused specifically on one of the seminal blogs; namely, seminal blog number 8.  This blog was chosen because it was viewed as being especially relevant to the motivation and intent imperative in that it framed the cartoons as an affront to the Islamic religion (motivation) and argued for a reaction\n(intent) to stimulate amusement, shock, and fear among Muslims.  This analysis was conducted using the well developed discipline of argumentation.  Argumentation can be thought of as lying at the nexus of the interrelated disciplines of rhetoric, logic, and the dialectic.  Figure G.3\n\n\n\nFigure G-3.  The Epistemological Dimensions of Argumentation.\n\n\nillustrates this notion.  Argumentation17 is the study of reasons given by people to justify their acts or beliefs and to influence the thoughts or action of others.  Argumentation has been defined as...\n\n...\"a verbal and social activity of reason aimed at increasing (or decreasing) the acceptability of a controversial standpoint for the listener or reader, by putting forward a\n\n\n17 An excellent overview of Argumentation is provided in the text authored by David Zarefsky, Argumentation: The Study of Effective\n\nReasoning, 2nd edition, The Teaching Company, 2005.\n\nRhetoric\n\nDialectic\n\nLogic A r g u m e n t a t i o n\n\n\n\n 120\n\nconstellation of propositions intended to justify (or refute) the standpoint before a rational judge.\" 18\n\nElements of argument are:\n\n\n Claims which are the statements that we want listeners to believe and on which we want them to act.\n\n Evidence19which represents the grounds for making the claim.\n The inference which is the main proof line leading from evidence to claim.\n The warrant which is the license to make the claim.\n\n\nThe framework that connects these elements is illustrated in Figure G.4.  The blogs\n\nClaim\n\nWarrant\n\nEvidence\n\nInference\n\nClaimClaim\n\nWarrantWarrant\n\nEvidenceEvidence\n\nInference\n\n\n\nFigure G-4.  The basic structure of an argument.\n\n\nstemming from the publication of the Danish Cartoons are not unlike most real-world arguments.  Characteristics of real-world arguments include:\n\n most arguments are embedded in complex structures;\n a claim in one part of an argument may evidence in another;\n subsidiary claims can be joined together to a main claim or resolution; and\n basic ways that arguments are joined to form more complex structures are multiple, coordinative, and subordinative. Further, the four basic forms of claims are:\n\n Claims of fact involve description.\n Claims of definition involve interpretation.\n Claims of value involve judgment.\n Claims of policy involve action.\n\n\nAlthough argumentation theory is well developed, the authors are unaware of a direct application of this theory to the analysis of blogs.\n\n\nThe categorization of claims for blog 8 is shown below.\n\n\n18 Van Eemeren, F. H., R. Grootendorst, and F. S. Henkemans, et.al. Fundamentals of Argumentation Theory, a Handbook of\n\nHistorical Backgrounds and Contemporary developments, zLawrence Erlbaum Associats, Mahweh, New Jersey, 1996.\n19 Both the evidence and the warrant must either be accepted by the audience or they must be established by a separate argument.\n\n\n\n 121\n\n Claims of Fact (description):\n Recently we read media reports, some praising, and others denouncing a\n\nDanish newspaper for publishing drawings portraying Prophet Muhammad (PBUH), ignoring the fact that visual depictions of prophets is prohibited in Islam.\n\n In September, Danish daily newspaper Jyllands-Posten invited cartoonists to submit drawings of the holy Mohammed, after an author complained that nobody dared illustrate his book on Mohammed.\n\n About 12 cartoons were published as a test of whether fear of Islamic retribution has begun to limit freedom of expression in Denmark.\n\n Danish Muslim organizations plan to take the daily Jyllands-Posten to the European Court of Human Rights for publishing drawings of Prophet Muhammad (PBUH).\n\n Kasem Ahmad, leader of Danish Islamic religious body Islamsk Trossamfund, uniting different Muslim organizations, announced the decision following an announcement that a Danish local attorney general had rejected their case.\n\n Islamsk Trossamfund sued the Danish paper for the publication of drawings of the prophet Muhammad (PBUH) for blasphemy.\n\n Claims of Definition (interpretation):\n Western minds consider the Islamic world an exotic enigma, part fairy tale, part attitudes formed in colonial times in which logical acts are construed with misunderstandings and misgivings.\n\n Instead of seeing the cartoon as controversy and racist, some media outlets defended the incident as an expression of Freedom of Speech.\n\n Claims of Value (judgment):\n The U.S. media has been fueling hatred against the Muslims and the\n\nIslamic religion, since the September 11 attacks, creating an atmosphere of fear particularly for Arabs living in the West.\n\n The 'negative' media coverage has been influencing the attitudes and perceptions in the West, making it even more hostile towards Muslims.\n\n And lately we started seeing disrespect for the Islamic culture and Prophets all under the guise of Freedom of Speech.\n\n But the media war against the Muslims has taken a more grievous turn than some cartoons; this matter has become a test case for the continued viability of freedom of speech in Western countries.\n\n The Western media always portrays the Islamic religion as exotic imagery\n- a myth adapted from 1001 Nights; with huge harems, wild sex orgies, luxurious palaces, flying carpets, incredible wealth, fierce warriors, hordes of thieves, cruelty and religious fanaticism.\n\n The biased approach of the Western media led people in European nations and the Americas believe that the armed groups we hear about, including Al Qaeda network, are the true representatives of the Islamic faith and the Muslims, or course here we're not speaking about the resistance groups in Palestine like Hamas and Islamic Jihad, we're speaking about militant and\n\n\n\n 122\n\narmed groups who perceive Islam the wrong way. All that with the aim of fueling negative feelings, hatred and fear against this religion.\n\n Unfortunately people, who depend mainly on Western media as their sole source of information, continue on blissfully ignorant of just how biased and unjust their free societies are.\n\n Claims of Policy (action):\n Every Muslim must understand what the typical Westerner thinks about him - his traditions, culture and religion- He'll be both amused and shocked and may be frightened.\n\nThe distribution of claims for blog 8 is shown in Figure G-5.  It is noteworthy that most of the claims fall either in the category of Judgment or Description.  This is to be expected because the blogger is describing the currently untenable situation based on his judgments.  There is less emphasis on interpretation because this leaves open the potential for debate.  Finally, there is only one claim that is clearly a call for action.  This action claim leaves the readers with the imperative to be amused, shocked, and frightened.  This imperative creates fertile ground for follow-on actions that may, very well, be of a radical nature.\n\n\n\nFigure G-5.  Distribution of Argumentation Claims Contained in Seminal Blog 8.\n\n\n\nDescription\n\n(6, 37.5%)\n\nInterpretation\n\n(3, 19%)\n\nJudgment\n\n(6, 37.5%)\n\nAction\n\n(1, 6%)\n\n\n\n 123\n\nAppendix H:  Pattern Analysis for Predicting Ethnic Violence\n\n\nIntroduction\n\nThe goal of this phase of the work was to evaluate the utility of the diverse methods employed in pattern analysis studies for future predictions of regional ethnic violence. In particular we examine recent pioneering work by Gulden20 and by Bar-Yam, et al.21, who each discovered quantitative correlations between outbreaks of regional (i.e., larger than cities, smaller than countries) ethnic violence and features of the spatial distribution of ethnic groups.  Their results are remarkable because they deliberately ignored the sociological facts of any particular ethnic group or conflict between groups, let alone the acts of individuals. Both efforts (employing different approaches) instead exploited only certain features of the spatial distribution of ethnic populations. The ability of such features to provide even a rough predictor would in turn provide a powerful tool to planners who need to anticipate outbreaks of regional ethnic violence, simply because the data requirements to inform such an approach would be drastically reduced compared to traditional approaches. Nevertheless questions remain about how such an approach could be reliably implemented; we address these in what follows.\n\nApproach\n\nFor each of the studies by Gulden and by Bar-Yam, we first outline their approach followed with our implementation.\n\nA. Scoring ratios of population of ethnic groups\n\nGulden (2002) observed from his study of the civil war in Guatemala that the most intense violence between (pairs of) antagonistic ethnic groups occurs when the ratio of population of the two groups in proximity to one another is between 1:4 and 1:5; where the ratio is either 1:1 or overwhelmingly in favor of one group (e.g., 1:10) there is relatively much less violence.  The data support both the correlation and the fact that it doesn't matter which group is the minority and which the majority. The part that is most open to the reader's interpretation is what Gulden might mean by proximity since this wasn't clearly defined. We chose to calculate the ratios of ethnic groups as follows: First, we digitized the demographic maps into a square lattice of cells, each of which contains a single number for the dominant ethnic type. Implicit in Gulden's observation is likely the notion that the two groups are also spatially organized or clustered rather than randomly dispersed within the region; a randomly dispersed population wouldn't be expected to produce violence. Without a provision for the spatial order of the population, counting only the population ratio in a window would merely\n\n\n20 T. R. Gulden. Spatial and Temporal Patterns in Civil Violence: Guatemala 1977-1986. Center on Social and Economic Dynamics,\n\nWorking Paper No. 26, February 2002.\n21 M. Lim, R. Metzler, and Y. Bar-Yam. Global Pattern Formation and Ethnic/Cultural Violence. Science 317 (2007) 1540-1544.\n As discussed in detail in the Approach, the application of either approach to predicting ethnic violence required some interpretation on our part; thus our conclusions won't exactly coincide with the views reported by either Gulden or Bar-Yam.\n\n\n\n 124\n\ntrace out the border between groups, a trivial and uninformative result. Consequently we should score both the number of each ethnic type in a window of potential conflict and whether they are in a connected in a cluster. Therefore in a square window of conflict, we first collect all of the connected clusters, according to ethnic type, i.e., all the elements in a cluster are neighbors of each other on the square lattice in our case and are of the same type. There may be several clusters of the same type. Immediately we test for diversity and dominance. If there is only one cluster, which fails the diversity test, or if there is no cluster whose population is at least half of the population in the window, which fails the dominance test, then we conclude immediately that this isn't a region of interest. Otherwise, we next ask if the distribution of clusters is or is not random given that one cluster is at least half of the population. These requirements guarantee that a dispersed population won't indicate ethnic violence with this analysis. If there is more order than a random distribution, then we proceed with the scoring c(x,y) of each cell (labeled by cell coordinates x, y ), i.e., c(x,y)\nN2\n\nN1  N2\n\nN1  Nkk 2\n\nn1\n\n\n\n0 otherwise\n\n\n\nEquation 1\n\nwhere N1 is the number of the most populous cluster, N2 is the number of the second most populous cluster, if the top two most populous clusters are of different types. Then\n0  c(x,y)  0.5 and the most significant scores would be those between 0.2 and 0.25\nusing Gulden's \"rule.\" There isn't any reason in advance to suspect that the results would be independent of the size of the window, so our results include different window sizes.\n\nB. Scoring peninsular regions containing ethnic groups\n\nBar-Yam et al. (2007) acknowledge Gulden but don't explicitly employ his recommendation concerning the ratios of different ethnic groups.  While they implicitly agree with Gulden's notion of the significance of ethnic imbalances, they explicitly look for imbalances in the spatial distribution of populations. In contrast to Gulden, who doesn't provide explicit guidance for selecting spatial features (only ratios), Bar-Yam seeks to identify those regions in which the minority occupies a peninsular region surrounded by the majority; there's no attempt to score such regions according to the ratios. One straightforward, popular, and venerable approach to identifying such peninsular regions (or \"blobs\") from image processing theory22,23 employs the convolution of the image with the (2-D) Laplacian; this method gives more weight to circular edges than straight edges. The usual way to approximate the Laplacian for digital images is the \"Mexican Hat\" L , which is in turn well approximated by second derivative of the standardized Gaussian24, i.e.,\n\n\n22 J. C. Russ. The Image Processing Handbook, Fifth Edition, CRC Press, Boca Raton FL (2006).\n23 Blob Detection. www.nationmaster.com/encyclopedia/Blob-detection\n24 Consequently in the literature this last step is sometimes called \"LoG\" for \"Laplace of Gaussian\" but it results simply by the sequence of approximations discussed in the text. Confusingly, sometimes Equation 2 is itself called the \"Mexican Hat.\"\n\n\n\n 125\n\nL(  x ,  y ) 1 |  x 2   y 2 | exp   x 2   y 2\n\nEquation 2\n\nwhere the coordinates are scaled so that  q 1. The score employed in [21] convolves L(  x ,  y )  with the contrast function g that, for each ethnic type of interest s, assigns +1 to the region(s) of that type s and -1 to all the other regions. For g  we employed g(x,y;s)\n1 s(x,y)  0, s(x,y)  s\n1 s(x,y)  0, s(x,y)  s\n\n0 s(x,y)  0\n\n\n\n,\n\nEquation 3\n\nwhere s(x,y) is the ethnic type (in the place of shade or color in image processing applications) of the cell at (x,y) and \"0\" means that the cell is empty25.  We put this in the calculation of this approach's score21\n\nc(x,y)  max s g(x',y ';s)  L((x  x') / l,(y  y ') / l)\nx',y'\n\n\n\n,\n\nEquation 4\n\nwhere l is a scaling factor. It will turn out that this scaling factor plays a crucial role but we defer that discussion to the sections that follow. In contrast to our discussion of Gulden's approach, these scores have only relative and no absolute meaning: the more circular the region, the higher the score, and the more likely the outbreak of violence compared with regions bounded by straight edges. There's no direct relation to a high score in this approach and the ratios recommended by Gulden. Nevertheless, in our implementation of Gulden's approach above, we can't account for the difference between the case of the boundary between two groups that is a straight line and the case of a boundary that envelops one of the groups. This difference will turn out to be crucial, as discussed below.\n\nResults\n\nWe applied Gulden's idea of critical ratios of ethnic groups to the demographic map of the former Yugoslavia, since Gulden had focused on the civil war in Guatemala and hadn't studied the civil war in Yugoslavia. We display that demographic map of former Yugoslavia in Figure H-1.\n\n\n25 Immediately [21] raises the concern that the boundary sites (those next to empty, i.e., s = 0 sites) might give rise to anomalies, so they propose to fill empty sites with the type under consideration. In effect they chose g(x,y;s)\n1 (s(x,y)  s or s(x,y)  0)\n\n1 (s(x,y)  0 and s(x,y)  s)\n\n\n\n  for the contrast function. This choice, while convenient in some respects, in principle changes the information content of the map in what seems to us an uncontrolled manner. It turned out that the difference between the two choices for g  was barely noticeable and unlikely to be statistically significant with real noisy data. We suggest that we ignore border sites altogether and adopt the more standard choice given in the text.\n\n\n\n 126\n\n\nFigure H-1. Condensed Population Distribution\n\n(blue-green), Reported Outbreaks of Ethnic Violence (orange) and Predicted Outbreaks (red).\n\n\nIn spite of our efforts to avoid merely tracing out the boundaries between the various ethnic groups, our results shown in Figure H-2 in applying Equation 1 are not much more interesting than that. This approach predicts too many locations for the outbreak of ethnic violence compared to the actual outbreaks.\n\nFigure H-3 displays our implementation of approach in Bar-Yam et.al (2007), using Equation 4. We essentially (although not exactly) reproduce their results shown by the red shading in Figure H-1. Our reproduction of their result is not completely trivial because we obtained it without applying a further segregation model to obtain populations on a small scale; instead we essentially reproduced their results while maintaining population demographics at the coarse scale of the region itself. In addition, as a way to form a null hypothesis, we tested their method against a randomized population in which the proportions of the ethnic groups were maintained but their spatial distribution was randomized; as expected, we predicted no outbreaks of ethnic violence in that case.\n\n\n\n 127\n\n\n\nFigure H-2. Prediction of Outbreaks of Ethnic Violence Using Ratios\n\n of Different Ethnic Groups with Two Different Window Sizes (left panel: 4% right panel: 8%).\n\nNote: The orientation is rotated 180 degrees (on the horizontal axis) with respect to Figure H-1.\n\n\n\nFigure H-3. Comparison of Scores Between Randomized Populations\n(left panel) and Actual Populations (right panel) Using Blob Detection.\n\n\nNote: The higher score corresponds to more violence and the orientation is the same as in Figure H-2 but inverted with respect to Figure H-1.\n\n\n\n 128\n\nFinally, we decided to apply Equation 4 to the demographic map of Guatemala. The latter was complicated by the lack of good census data. Therefore we approximated the population distribution from a map of \"social exclusion\" shown in Figure H-4. that seems to correspond to the division between Hispanic and indigenous26groups. In particular, we assumed for the sake of a test that \"most excluded\" corresponded to 80% indigenous population, \"less excluded\" corresponded to 50% indigenous, \"intermediate excluded\"\ncorresponded to 20% indigenous, and \"least excluded\" corresponded to 10% indigenous. We applied a segregation model (similar to the one employed by Bar-Yam) to mix the resulting populations in each state of Guatemala. Considering the unrealistic final mix of ethnic types by state obtained in this way shown in Figure H-5, it is remarkable that the application of Equation 4 can, with different choices for the scale parameter l , produce qualitatively reasonable predictions of ethnic violence as illustrated by comparing Figure H-6 and Figure H-7. Nevertheless, note that in Figure H-6, the results depend dramatically on the choice of the scale parameter l .\n\n\n\n26 C. Tomuschat, O. Lux de Coti, and A. B. Tojo. Guatemala: Memory of Silence. Report of the Commission for Historical\n\nClarification, Conclusions, and Recommendations. (nod date) http://shr.aaas.org/guatemala/ceh/report/english/toc.html\n\n\n\n 129\n\n\nFigure H-4. Map of Social Exclusion in Guatemala.\n\n\n\n 130\n\n\nFigure H-5. Demographic Map Resulting from Applying Segregation Model to\n\nSocial Exclusion Map of Figure H-4.\n\nNote: Orange indicates indigenous Maya, blue indicates Hispanic population.\n\n\n\n 131\n\n\nFigure H-6. Scores from blob detection with two different scaling lengths\n\n(left=10, right=30; on 600600 lattice of cells).\n\n\n\nFigure H-7. Reported Violence in Guatemalan Civil War from Gulden (2002).\n\n\n\n 132\n\nConclusions and Recommendations\n\nThe correlation of peninsular features of the spatial population distribution to outbreaks of regional ethnic violence, developed by Bar-Yam et al. (2007), performs well even on much coarser data than they employed in their study of the former Yugoslavia as well as on the data that we reconstructed from Guatemalan demographics. Our first attempt to directly link Gulden's hypothesis to spatial population distribution wasn't successful;\ninstead this procedure more or less reproduced the boundaries between ethnic groups thereby overestimating the number and size of regions where ethnic violence occurred. However, these studies showed that the choice of scale, which characterizes the size of the region of conflict, is crucial.\n\nBar-Yam et al. (2007) argued that they had always chosen the right, or the most likely scale parameter l  (see Equation 3 and Equation 4) for their final results. That is one approach to resolving the scale dependence in the absence of other data. Nevertheless, we recommend exploiting the scale dependence in order to connect these results to other social or geographical facts that might be available. For a crude example, if one knew that almost all of the conflicts in Guatemala would employ loosely organized units supplied only with small arms fighting only in towns or villages, one might know in advance to choose a small scale; if one knew that conflicts in the former Yugoslavia would employ organized infantry, artillery, and armored units fighting on widely varying terrain, one might know in advance to choose a larger scale. Furthermore, one could imagine developing dynamic models for the scale parameter itself in which the scale would be part of a feedback loop between the outbreak of violence and other measurable facts. At a minimum, it would be worthwhile to find a way to choose the scale so that the predicted region of ethnic violence matched Gulden's hypothesis about the ratios of ethnic groups.\n\nIt might also be worthwhile to study the 17-year civil war in Colombia. At least one writer alleges that in this case \"Social conflict is not ethnic, religious, nor regional, as often the case elsewhere...\"27, thus (if true) making the conflict in Colombia an interesting case study. As far as we know, no one has employed the kind of models and predictions discussed here to that conflict.\n\nFinally, it would be interesting both as a test and relevant to the rest of the work discussed in this Report to apply these techniques to the outbreak of riots in France in\n2005 and 2007. Although the immediate provocations were traffic accidents involving young Muslim men and police, a study of the ethnic populations (including spatial distributions) in France might reveal correlations to actual outbreaks.\n\n\n\n27 F. Murtagh. From data to the p-adic or ultrametric model. arXiv:0809.0492[stat.ML] (2008). http://arxiv.org/abs/0809.049\n\n\n\n 133\n\nAppendix I:  Automated Identification and Analysis of Framing Document for Global Climate Change\n\nIntroduction\n\nIn this portion of the research, we present a methodology to build a classification model that can distinguish framing from non-framing documents and further classify a framing document by one of three tasks as defined by the tenets of Social Movement Theory.  We propose that a combination of Latent Semantic Analysis techniques and statistical modeling algorithms can produce a model that will classify new text documents with high accuracy.\n\nWhile the internet presents a wealth of text to analyze, said wealth can be likened to a flood of information, of which only a small fraction is of interest.  Manual monitoring of web sites in the search for text that is indicative of the framing process, is not feasible in the time frame necessary to detect a growing trend towards violent social action.  Thus, we contend that a necessary component of our larger model is a means of automatically ingesting the flood of text documents from the internet and sifting out those texts that are part of the framing process.  The volume, frequency, timing, and tone of such documents can then be determined and employed in predictive models.\n\nAs stated previously, framing is the process by which social movement organizations organize or filter how one processes information.  The framing process can be broken into three key tasks (Snow & Benford 1988):\n\n1. Diagnostic, which defines the problem, often places blame, and may describe how innocent victims are affected,\n\n2. Prognostic, which itemizes solutions or steps to resolve the issue, and\n\n3. Motivational, which states an urgent need for action to address the problem, and invites others to join in ameliorative collective social action.\n\n\nAttributes that distinguish framing texts have been discussed extensively in Social Movement Theory literature.  A common suggestion is to develop a list of framing keywords based on the most frequently occurring terms that are found in a collection of framing documents (Triandafyllidou & Fotiou, 1998: 3.7; Semetko & Valkenburg, 2000). Computer-assisted qualitative data analysis software (CAQDAS) in conjunction with word maps is another method proposed for identification of framing text (Koenig 2005). Laborious processes have also been used to characterize framing texts, such as manual extraction of words and phrases which are then assigned codes for further analysis\n(Cooper 2002).\n\nOur approach combines Latent Semantic Analysis (LSA) techniques with statistical data mining algorithms to train a model that can accurately identify documents that perform framing functions.  Furthermore, we show that this methodology effectively distinguishes framing documents by type.\n\n\n\n 134\n\nLSA is a well established information retrieval methodology (Deerwester et al, 1990). Text documents are parsed and represented by a matrix with a row for each term in the corpus, a column for each document, and term weights populating the cells.  This matrix is quite sparse, with zero cell values for terms that do not appear in a particular document. Singular Value Decomposition (SVD) decomposes the matrix while retaining most of the information in the corpus, enabling the calculation of a set of numerical values for each text document.  These values are then incorporated into distance measures that flag documents that are closest (most similar) to a query text.  In our research, we employ these calculated values as input to classification modeling algorithms resulting in a deployable tool that can uncover framing activity.\n\nDocument Collection\n\nWe select global warming as the social issue for this study.  Global warming, sometimes referred to as climate change, is a hotly contested topic with factions arguing over:\n\n whether or not the earth is truly warming,\n the causes of warming,\n the timing and effects of warming, and\n viable solutions to this threat.\n\n\nConcerns over the presumed effects of global warming have spawned social movements that span cultural, religious, and geographical boundaries.\n\nPublicly available open source text documents in electronic form, all addressing the topic of global warming, were collected.  Our non-framing documents are scientific publications that are, or should be, objective, and non-framing in nature.  Abstracts from technical papers, conference presentations, and reviews, were assumed to be non-framing documents.  The internet is a rich source of texts that have been produced with the intent of influencing opinion on global warming or recruiting others to join the efforts of the movement. Framing text was gathered from web sites that support various social movements focused on the global warming issue.\n\nAll documents in the corpus were classified as framing or non-framing.  The framing documents were further classified as one of three core framing tasks: Diagnostic, Prognostic, or Motivational (Snow & Benford 1988).  Examples of the framing documents may be found in the Supplemental Framing Documents section.  The entire corpus comprises 6,531 text documents, of which just over 9% are framing in nature\n(Figure I-1).  By framing task, there are approximately 2% diagnostic, 3% prognostic, and 4% motivational documents in the corpus (Figure I-2).\n\n\n\nFigure I-1.  Distribution of Non-Framing and Framing Documents.\n\n\n\n 135\n\n\n\nFigure I-2.  Distribution of Non-Framing and Framing Tasks.\n\nText Preparation and Processing\n\nThe entire corpus of framing and non-framing documents was imported into SAS TextMiner.28  Terms and phrases were parsed from the texts.  Singular and plural nouns and all forms of verbs were stemmed into their respective canonical forms.  Terms were tagged with their parts of speech.  Only those parts of speech that are considered informative were retained:  Noun, Proper Noun, Verb, Adjective, Adverb, and Abbreviation.  A stop word list, containing 154 commonly, non-informative terms, was applied to remove those terms from the analysis.\n\nA term-document matrix, with rows representing terms and columns representing documents, is populated with the log-entropy weighted term frequency as follows:\n\n\n\nj i ij i ij ijij n g f g f fa\n2\n\n2\n\n2 log log\n\n11log\n\n\n where\n  fij  is the frequency of term i in document j\n  gi  is the number of times that term i appears in the entire corpus\n  n  is the number of documents in the corpus\n\nFor our corpus of 6,531 documents, we have over 23,000 terms, even after selecting only the most informative terms, applying a stop word list, and performing stemming.  In addition, this matrix is quite sparse; most cells contain zero.  This sparse, highly dimensional matrix cannot be processed efficiently or effectively.  Thus, singular value decomposition (SVD) is performed to transform the matrix into a lower dimensional, compact form while still retaining the information represented by the original matrix.\n\nSVD factors the term-document matrix so that the matrix equals UDVT.  The factor matrices U and V have orthonormal columns.  D is a diagonal matrix containing singular values.  We chose to calculate only the first 100 columns of the factor matrices giving a truncated decomposition of the term-document matrix.  The document columns of the\n\n\n28 SAS Text Miner software is a component of SAS Enterprise MinerTM, Version 5.3 of the SAS System for Windows.  Copyright\n2003 - 2005 SAS Institute Inc. SAS and all other SAS Institute Inc. product or service names are registered trademarks or trademarks of SAS Institute Inc., Cary, NC, USA.\n\n\n\n 136\n\nterm-document matrix are projected onto the first 100 columns of U.  This gives a 100 dimensional space with each dimension representing a concept in the corpus.  These 100\nSVD dimension values for each document become the input variables for our models.\n\nExploration of Corpus\n\nAn assessment of the feasibility of this effort requires examination of the collection of documents to seek indications that our document classes exhibit similarity characteristics. Expectation Maximization clustering of the documents was performed with the SVD dimension values as input variables resulting in 21 clusters as show in Table I-1 below.\n\n\nTable I-1.  Expectation Maximization Clusters\n\nName Descriptive Terms\n#\n\nDocs\n%\n\nDocs\n\nAtmospheric Obs &\nMeas cloud, sensor, observation, technique, instrument, aerosol, parameter, mission, satellite, earth, measure, provide, resolution, data, atmospheric, measurement, accuracy, present, surface, study\n\n280 4.3%\n\nAtmospheric Variation variability, record, variation, atmospheric, circulation, mechanism, temperature, atmosphere, solar, past, surface, activity, ocean, last, cycle, forcing, show, time, scale, warming\n\n294 4.5%\n\nClimate Models climate, estimate, result, water, data, assess, present, simulation, model, scenario, condition, impact, study, hydrological, use, change, method, base, future, scale\n\n538 8.2%\n\nDirect Action, Protest people, direct action, day, come, coal, workshop, station, action, want, join, group, protest, stop, camp, camp, direct, expansion, take, action, movement\n\n49 0.8%\n\nFaith-Based Response care, tradition, creation, man, god, live, faith, thing, responsibility, life, see, protect, call, earth, do, way, just, come, world, community 17 0.3%\n\nForests carbon, increase, forest, rate, effect, increase, management, concentration, response, growth, atmospheric, tree, soil, specie, ecosystem, plant, model, potential, area, high\n\n624 9.6%\n\nFossil Fuels fossil fuels, paper, renewable, emission, production, resource, gas, technology, power, plant, generation, efficiency, global, development, fossil, reduction, fuel, energy, warming, source\n\n465 7.1%\n\nFriends & Group Actions friend, join, do, send, know, school, way, help, action, make, write, group, just, take, start, see, idea, want, people, good 84 1.3%\n\nGHGs / Ozone gas, warming, use, process, atmosphere, emission, high, ozone, environmental, system, warming, carbon dioxide, method, product, potential, application, global, global warming, problem, low\n\n476 7.3%\n\nGlaciers snow, extent, sea, balance, glacier, surface, accumulation, summer, cover, ice, temperature, area, record, show, indicate, variability, region, year, period, trend\n\n247 3.8%\n\nGovt / Corp Response help, send, state, clean, government, renewable energy, take, stop, now, efficiency, invest, reduce, renewable, company, create, action, solution, energy, power, do\n\n107 1.6%\n\nGWCC & Human Populations human, world, food, health, people, country, population, problem, affect, do, cause, environmental, environment, increase, make, warming, global warming, more, part, other\n\n311 4.8%\n\n\n\n 137\n\nName Descriptive Terms\n#\n\nDocs\n%\n\nDocs\n\nGWCC Challenges challenge, impact, develop, environment, information, assessment, ecosystem, management, approach, resource, strategy, policy, climate change, research, paper, issue, system, address, environmental, problem\n\n570 8.7%\n\nHabitats &\nPopulations community, response, diversity, range, habitat, pattern, population, genetic, distribution, suggest, specie, plant, predict, climatic, environmental, rate, environment, analysis, condition, change\n\n332 5.1%\n\nHolocene Period indicate, holocene, core, right, period, evidence, lake, bp, climatic, b.v., last, record, sequence, glacial, all, occur, record, suggest, elsevier, basin\n\n323 4.9%\n\nInternational GWCC Action community, climate, leader, create, build, do, country, action, group, take, people, student, join, world, see, solution, government, action, international, way\n\n102 1.6%\n\nInternational Policy international, technology, gas, convention, paper, emission, sector, cost, climate, kyoto, framework, greenhouse, carbon, reduce, energy, reduction, policy, economic, change, ghg\n\n365 5.6%\n\nLifestyle Changes appliance, recycle, reduce, big, drive, do, save, carbon dioxide, pound, take, make, home, energy, bulb, car, replace, money, buy, help, use\n\n123 1.9%\n\nPrecipitation Variation year, variation, precipitation, region, increase, climatic, area, degree, temperature, show, period, trend, land, data, analysis, analyze, mean, annual, vegetation, result\n\n487 7.5%\n\nSea Level sea level, coast, risk, coastal, river, frequency, storm, rise, event, area, extreme, flood, recent, scenario, future, change, impact, large, paper, climate change\n\n273 4.2%\n\nWater Ecosystems specie, temperature, water, surface, ecosystem, fish, ocean, low, lake, river, effect, increase, population, increase, high, affect, change, large, suggest, region\n\n464 7.1%\n\n\n\nWhen we observe the proportion of framing and non-framing documents in each cluster in Figure I-3, the framing documents are primarily in six clusters.  The fact that the framing documents clustered together indicates there are detectable attributes that these documents have in common, as described by the SVD dimension values, that these documents do not have in common with the non-framing documents.\n\n\n\n 138\n\n\n\nFigure I-3.  Proportion of Framing Documents in Clusters.\n\n\nLikewise, the proportions of framing documents by task (Figure I-4) demonstrate a tendency for these documents to cluster together, although not as cleanly as framing vs. non-framing.  Note that some diagnostic documents, and to a lesser degree the prognostic\n& motivational documents, are found in clusters that which are primarily non-framing\n(e.g.GWCC & Human Populations).  This suggests that the diagnostic framing documents may be the most difficult to model since they have some commonality with non-framing documents.\n\n\n\nFigure I-4.  Proportion of Framing Documents by Task in Clusters.\n\n\n\n 139\n\nResults\n\nWe developed two classification models using Clementine29 software:  (1) a dichotomous logistic regression model to distinguish framing from non-framing documents, and (2) a polychotomous logistic regression model to further classify the framing documents by task. These models were trained on a randomly selected 4,358 documents and tested with the remaining 2,173 documents (Figures I-5 and I-6).  Random selection was within document class in order to maintain the class proportions.  The training documents were processed as described in Section 3 to obtain SVD dimension values for each document.\n\n\n\nFigure I-5.  Training Data Set.\n\n\n\nFigure I-6.  Test Data Set.\n\nModel 1:  Framing, Non-Framing Model\n\nLogistic regression makes an assumption of linearity for continuous variables.  This is no concern in the case of variables for which the proportion of the target variable steadily increases or decreases over the range of the predictor variable.  This is not the case for the SVD dimension variables in the training data set.  For example, Figure I-7 demonstrates the nonlinearity of SVD_2 in relation to the dependent variable.  Therefore, indicator variables were created for the independent variables.\n\n\n\n29 Clementine data mining software is a product of SPSS, Inc.\n\n\n\n 140\n\n\nFigure I-7.  Nonlinearity of SVD_2.\n\n\nParameter estimates for the fitted model are shown in Table I-2.  The p-value, P(|z| >\nWald30), for each variable is significant.  Zero is not contained in any of the 95%\nconfidence intervals for the odds ratios, e , for the predictor variables in consideration. So, with 95% confidence, we can state that the coefficients for each of these variables is not zero.  Thus, all independent variables are significant in this model.\n\n\nTable I-2.  Model 1 Parameter Estimates\n\n\n\nFraming_Flag =\nFraming (a)\n\n\nStd.\n\nError Wald df Sig. Exp()\n\n95.0% Confidence Interval for  Exp()\n\nLower Bound Upper Bound\n\nIntercept  22.698 2.624 74.840 1 .000\n\nSVD2_01=0  4.547 1.278 12.656 1 .000 94.390 7.706 1156.119\n\nSVD2_02=0  -2.317 .508 20.802 1 .000 9.86E-002 3.64E-002 .267\n\nSVD2_03=0  -4.928 .531 86.246 1 .000 7.24E-003 2.56E-003 2.05E-002\n\nSVD2_04=0  -7.175 .629 130.314 1 .000 7.66E-004 2.23E-004 2.62E-003\n\nSVD2_05=0  -9.332 1.106 71.165 1 .000 8.86E-005 1.01E-005 7.74E-004\n\nSVD5_01=0  -3.570 .578 38.120 1 .000 2.81E-002 9.06E-003 8.74E-002\n\nSVD6_02=0  1.227 .533 5.302 1 .021 3.410 1.200 9.688\n\nSVD9_01=0  -.885 .448 3.893 1 .048 .413 .171 .994\n\nSVD11_01=0  -4.531 .658 47.391 1 .000 1.08E-002 2.97E-003 3.91E-002\na. The reference category is: Non-Framing\n\n\n\nThe Likelihood Ratio Test in Table I-2 shows significant, p-value  0.000, model fit.\n\n\n\n30 Wald is calculated as the coefficient estimate divided by the standard error of the coefficient.\n\n\n\n 141\n\nTable I-3.  Model 1 Fitting Information\n\n\nModel\n\nModel Fitting Criteria Likelihood Ratio Tests\n\n-2 Log Likelihood  Chi-Square df Sig.\n\nIntercept Only 1821.333\n\nFinal  167.503 1653.829 9 .000\n\n\n\nWe now test Model 1 with the 2,173 test documents.  These documents are processed and SVD dimensions are produced for each document in accordance with the training model generated by TextMiner.  The test documents were scored with the dichotomous logistic regression model.  The resulting classification table is shown in Table I-3.\n\n\nTable I-4.  Model 1 Classification Table\n\n\n   Model Classification True Value Framing Non-Framing Total Framing 208 5 213\nNon-Framing 84 1,876 1,960\nTotal 292 1,881 2,173\n\n\nThe overall error rate is (84+5)/2173 = 0.0410.  The false negative rate is 5/1881 =\n0.0027 and the false positive rate is 84/292 = 0.2877.  The model correctly classified\n208/213 = 97.7% of the framing documents and 1876/1960 = 95.7% of the non-framing documents in the test data set.\n\nModel 2:  Diagnostic, Prognostic, Motivational, Non-Framing Model\n\nParameter estimates for the fitted model are shown in Table I-4.  Zero is not contained in any of the 95% confidence intervals for the odds ratios, e , for the predictor variables in consideration.  So, with 95% confidence, we can state that the coefficients for each of these variables is not zero.  In this model we have continuous predictor variables.  For continuous predictor variables, likelihood ratio tests are preferable, as compared to Wald, to test the significance of the variables (Hosmer & Lemeshow, 2000).  Table I-5 lists the likelihood ratio tests for each of the predictor variables, showing that all are significant. The likelihood ratio test for the model fit in Table I-6 shows significant, p-value  0.000, model fit.\n\n\nTable I-5.  Model 2 Parameter Estimates\n\n\nFraming Task\n(a)\n\n      Std. Error Wald df Sig. Exp()\n95.0% Confidence Interval for\n\nExp()\n\nLower Bound  Upper Bound\n\nMotivational\n\nIntercept -.134 1.193 .013 1 .911\n\nSVD_1  -13.708 3.461 15.690 1 .000 1.11E-006 1.26E-009 9.83E-004\n\nSVD_2  48.664 5.189 87.952 1 .000 1.3633E+21 5.2201E+16 3.5606E+25\n\nSVD_3  4.917 3.551 1.918 1 .166 136.607 .130 143805.166\n\nSVD_4  6.827 3.069 4.948 1 .026 922.504 2.252 377921.880\n\nSVD_5  1.861 2.467 .569 1 .451 6.432 5.11E-002 809.248\n\n\n\n 142\n\nFraming Task\n(a)\n\n      Std. Error Wald df Sig. Exp()\n95.0% Confidence Interval for\n\nExp()\n\nLower Bound  Upper Bound\n\nSVD_6  5.221 2.713 3.704 1 .054 185.103 .908 37722.019\n\nSVD_8  -8.310 3.206 6.718 1 .010 2.46E-004 4.59E-007 .132\n\nSVD_9  2.684 3.448 .606 1 .436 14.642 1.70E-002 12597.975\n\nSVD_10  3.119 4.227 .545 1 .461 22.628 5.71E-003 89633.289\n\nSVD_11  -3.895 3.776 1.064 1 .302 2.03E-002 1.24E-005 33.309\n\nSVD_12  -18.534 4.439 17.437 1 .000 8.93E-009 1.49E-012 5.36E-005\n\nSVD_22  -12.300 3.807 10.437 1 .001 4.55E-006 2.62E-009 7.93E-003\n\nSVD_23  6.603 2.837 5.419 1 .020 737.337 2.839 191488.042\n\nSVD_27  1.699 3.746 .206 1 .650 5.467 3.54E-003 8444.140\n\nPrognostic\n\nIntercept .612 1.101 .309 1 .578\n\nSVD_1  -10.077 3.005 11.245 1 .001 4.20E-005 1.16E-007 1.52E-002\n\nSVD_2  35.707 4.250 70.597 1 .000 3.2175E+15 7.7646E+11 1.3332E+19\n\nSVD_3  7.421 3.554 4.360 1 .037 1670.695 1.577 1769758.767\n\nSVD_4  2.737 2.979 .844 1 .358 15.439 4.50E-002 5300.717\n\nSVD_5  2.578 2.334 1.220 1 .269 13.173 .136 1277.994\n\nSVD_6  -2.505 2.634 .904 1 .342 8.17E-002 4.68E-004 14.275\n\nSVD_8  -6.080 2.996 4.119 1 .042 2.29E-003 6.45E-006 .812\n\nSVD_9  6.830 3.279 4.338 1 .037 924.789 1.496 571653.943\n\nSVD_10  -5.235 4.165 1.580 1 .209 5.33E-003 1.52E-006 18.687\n\nSVD_11  -7.304 3.406 4.599 1 .032 6.73E-004 8.49E-007 .533\n\nSVD_12  -12.614 4.086 9.532 1 .002 3.32E-006 1.11E-009 9.99E-003\n\nSVD_22  -8.269 3.304 6.265 1 .012 2.56E-004 3.95E-007 .166\n\nSVD_23  2.101 2.493 .710 1 .399 8.174 6.18E-002 1081.872\n\nSVD_27  -6.117 3.198 3.659 1 .056 2.21E-003 4.18E-006 1.163\n\nDiagnostic\n\nIntercept 1.463 1.032 2.011 1 .156\n\nSVD_1  -10.861 2.852 14.500 1 .000 1.92E-005 7.17E-008 5.14E-003\n\nSVD_2  34.675 4.072 72.512 1 .000 1.1458E+15 3.9174E+11 3.3513E+18\n\nSVD_3  .659 3.378 .038 1 .845 1.932 2.57E-003 1450.467\n\nSVD_4  6.109 2.570 5.653 1 .017 450.066 2.924 69265.663\n\nSVD_5  8.989 2.285 15.482 1 .000 8018.221 91.067 705987.581\n\nSVD_6  7.211 2.420 8.877 1 .003 1353.581 11.789 155412.335\n\nSVD_8  2.874 2.791 1.060 1 .303 17.705 7.45E-002 4206.758\n\nSVD_9  12.653 3.370 14.098 1 .000 312771.532 423.356 2.3107E+08\n\nSVD_10  -7.122 4.160 2.932 1 .087 8.07E-004 2.32E-007 2.802\n\nSVD_11  -8.542 3.207 7.095 1 .008 1.95E-004 3.63E-007 .105\n\nSVD_12  -9.481 4.019 5.565 1 .018 7.63E-005 2.90E-008 .201\n\nSVD_22  -7.489 3.158 5.626 1 .018 5.59E-004 1.15E-006 .272\n\nSVD_23  4.839 2.676 3.270 1 .071 126.403 .666 23983.466\n\nSVD_27  -7.967 3.061 6.775 1 .009 3.47E-004 8.60E-007 .140\n\na. The reference category is: Non-Framing\n\n\n\n 143\n\nTable I-6.  Likelihood Ratio Tests for Model 2\n\n\n\nEffect\n\nModel Fitting Criteria  Likelihood Ratio Tests\n\n-2 Log Likelihood of Reduced Model  Chi-Square  df  Sig.\n\nIntercept  470.816 4.054 3 .256\n\nSVD_1  487.989 21.227 3 .000\n\nSVD_2  1131.705 664.942 3 .000\n\nSVD_3  480.600 13.838 3 .003\n\nSVD_4  475.482 8.719 3 .033\n\nSVD_5  494.910 28.148 3 .000\n\nSVD_6  496.248 29.486 3 .000\n\nSVD_8  492.238 25.476 3 .000\n\nSVD_9  490.812 24.050 3 .000\n\nSVD_10  477.753 10.991 3 .012\n\nSVD_11  477.271 10.509 3 .015\n\nSVD_12  487.285 20.523 3 .000\n\nSVD_22  478.409 11.647 3 .009\n\nSVD_23  475.959 9.197 3 .027\n\nSVD_27  484.959 18.197 3 .000\n\nThe chi-square statistic is the difference in -2 log-likelihoods between the final model and a reduced model. The reduced model is formed by omitting an effect from the final model. The null hypothesis is that all parameters of that effect are 0.\n\n\nTable I-7.  Model 2 Fitting Information\n\n\n\nModel\n\nModel Fitting Criteria Likelihood Ratio Tests\n\n-2 Log Likelihood  Chi-Square df Sig.\n\nIntercept Only 2808.295\n\nFinal  466.762 2341.533 42 .000\n\n\n\nWe now test Model 2 with the 2,173 test documents.  As for Model 1, the test documents are processed and SVD dimensions are produced for each document in accordance with the training model generated by TextMiner.  The test documents were scored with the polychotomous logistic regression model.  The resulting classification table is shown below in Table I-7.\n\nTable I-8.  Model 2 Classification Table\n\n\n   Model Classification True Value Diagnostic Prognostic Motivational Non-Framing Total Diagnostic 21 3 4 4 32\nPrognostic 3 49 13 5 70\nMotivational 0 5 105 1 111\nNon-Framing 3 2 1 1,954 1,960\nTotal 27 59 123 1,964 2,173\n\n\n\n 144\n\nThe overall error rate is 44/2173 = 0.0203.  The false positive rate is 6/27 = 22.2% for Diagnostic, 10/59 = 17.0% for Prognostic, 18/123 = 14.6% for Motivational, and 10/1964\n= 0.5% for Non-Framing.\n\nThe model correctly classified 21/32 = 65.6% of the Diagnostic documents, 49/70 =\n70.0% of the Prognostic documents, 105/111 = 94.6% of the Motivational documents, and 1954/1960 = 99.7% of the Non-Framing documents in the test data set.\n\nConclusion and Future Work\n\nWe have shown that a model can be trained to distinguish framing and non-framing documents with high accuracy.  We have also shown that a more finely grained model can be developed to further distinguish framing documents by type.  The second model performs very well for Motivational and Non-Framing document types and less accurately for Diagnostic and Prognostic document types.  We believe the results for Diagnostic and Prognostic framing classification may be improved with more advanced modeling techniques such as ensemble modeling.\n\n\n\nReferences\n\nCooper, A. (2002) Media framing and social movement mobilization: German peace protest against INF missiles, the Gulf War, and NATO peace enforcement in Bosnia. European Journal of Political Research, 41:3780.\n\n\nDeerwester, S., S. Dumais, G. Furnas, T. Landauer, & R. Harshman. (1990) Indexing by latent semantic analysis. Journal of the American Society for Information Science, 41\n(6): 391407.\n\nHosmer, D., & Lemeshow, S. (2000) Applied Logistic Regression. Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & Sons.\n\n\nKoenig, T. (2005) Routinizing frame analysis, Proceedings of the ISA RC-33\n\nMethodology Conference. Leverkusen: Leske & Budrich.\n\nSemetko, H. & P. Valkenburg. (2000) Framing European politics: a content analysis of press and television news. Journal of Communication 50 (2): 93-109.\n\nSnow, D. & R. Benford. (1988) Ideology, frame resonance and participant mobilization.\n\nInternational Social Movement Research, 1:197-219.\n\nTriandafyllidou, A. & A. Fotiou. (1998) Sustainability and modernity in the European\n\nUnion: a frame theory approach to policy-making.  Retrieved August 28, 2008, from Sociological Research Online, vol. 3, no. 1, http://www.socresonline.org.uk/socresonline/3/1/2.html.\n\n\n\n 145\n\nAppendix J.  Supplemental Framing Documents\n\nExample Diagnostic Framing Document:\n\nIn April 2008 the government will decide whether Kingsnorth in Kent will have the first new coal-fired power station in the UK for decades. Of all fuels, coal is the most polluting - even worse than burning oil or gas.\n\nKingsnorth power station alone will release more CO2 each year than Ghana. It will not use carbon capture and storage technology, and so will contribute to climate change that is already hitting the world's poor first and hardest.\n\nFor the UK to be encouraging the development of new coal-fired power stations, instead of promoting the switch to a low carbon future, is madness in an era of impending climate crisis. http://www.wdm.org.uk/campaigns/climate/action/kingsnorth.htm  viewed 5/19/2008\n\nExample Prognostic Framing Document:\n\nGo Vegetarian One Day a Week To produce one pound of beef requires 2,500 gallons of waterthat's 40 times more water than is used to produce a pound of potatoes. Before buying beef, think about the immense cost of energy used to raise cattle and to transport meat to your supermarket shelf. Besides all this, cows consume enormous amounts of antibiotics and are a prodigious source of methane, which is the number-two greenhouse gas; livestock are responsible for almost 20 percent of the methane in the atmosphere.\n\n\nhttp://www.vanityfair.com/politics/features/2006/05/savetheplanet200605  viewed 7/28/2008\n\nExample Motivational Framing Document:\n\nget serious!\nNO DESALINATION PLANT -- PHASE OUT COAL NO NEW FREEWAY TUNNEL -- NO BAY DREDGING YES to renewable energy, public transport & urgent action to stop global warming\n\nWe are calling for Victorians to join the Climate Emergency Rally on July 5. We want to send a wake-up call to state and federal governments that they are heading in the wrong direction. New coal, new freeways and desalination plants increase our use of and reliance on fossil fuels dramatically at a time when we must be cutting our use even more dramatically. We are calling on governments to implement sustainable alternatives to these irresponsible and expensive projects.\n\nWe call on all community groups and individuals to join us to send this important message to the government. We are going to form a 140-metre-long human sign to spell the words \"Climate Emergency\".\n\n\n\n 146\n\n\nPlease organize your group to send endorsement, tell everyone you know, and come on the day wearing something red to symbolize emergency. http://climaterally.blogspot.com/  viewed 5/20/2008\n\n\n\n 147\n\nAppendix K:  The Vital Issues Process\n\n\nThe Vital Issues Process (VIP) is a strategic planning tool that identifies a portfolio of programmatic activities (such as an \"investment portfolio\") for an organization, aimed at satisfying its overall goals and objectives. The process requires a high level of stakeholder involvement, thus predisposing acceptance of the programmatic activities by those stakeholder communities.\n\nThe VIP is typically a multi-stage process, involving a series of daylong, intensive workshops, each of which builds on the results of the previous one. The first workshop focuses on definitions, identifying target goals and objectives, describing the type of issues or topical areas addressed by the sponsoring organization, and identifying criteria for issue or problem selection. The next workshop (or set of workshops) uses the selection criteria and the definition of the topical area or problem to identify and rank a set of vital issues. The following workshop (or set of workshops) selects one of those identified issues (probably, but not necessarily the highest ranked) and identifies and ranks associated programmatic activities. Subsequent workshops (or sets of workshops)\ncan focus on tasks associated with specific programmatic activities.\n\nGroup dynamics constrain the effective size of a panel to between 10 and 15 people. The panel of participants in each workshop will differ, as expertise will be relevant to the topic at hand. Institutional perspectives key to organizational success (e.g., the private sector, local/state/federal government, citizens' interest groups, and academe) should be identified a priori and represented on each panel. Individual panelists should be well respected and well recognized within their professional communities.\n\nThe VIP incorporates two primary facets:  a qualitative facet, which takes a synthesis orientation; and a quantitative facet, which is analytically oriented. The qualitative aspect involves dialogue among individuals or groups with some stake in the topical area of interest. Such dialogue usually focuses on problem or issue definition (which can include definition of an organization's goals and objectives) and criteria for measuring success through problem solution or goal achievement. Participation in the construction, or synthesis, of those definitions encourages participants to become invested in the process. The definitions constructed by these synthesis activities form the environment within which a set of alternatives (such as issues or programs) can be identified and ranked as to their relative importance. Next, quantitative methods are used to identify the portfolio that provides the greatest organizational good according to the set of criteria synthesized during the qualitative phase.\n\nThis dual approach can be applied in each phase of the VIP. The agenda leads off with a discussion of the topical area with which the workshop is charged, seeking to construct a definition that satisfies the group and which sets the context within which the specific issues, activities, or tasks are identified. A set of criteria for measuring success is also identified. Group discussion clarifies the identified issues and leads to consensus on their definition and scope.  The issues are then relatively ranked (i.e., the items in the set are ranked against each other, and not against any external, absolute standard) using pairwise\n\n\n\n 148\n\ncomparisons that compare each issue to all others in the set in turn against each of the identified selection criteria. This ranking is obtained by asking the panelists to assign specific values to each issue. This procedure allows panelists to make explicit the tradeoff process and the criteria by which they are making the tradeoffs. In addition to the relative importance of the vital issues, the quantitative phase also yields an assessment of the relative level of agreement among panelists.\n\nThe VIP has been successfully applied in over 90 applications with topical areas ranging from national security, economic competitiveness, environmental quality, energy security, to health care. The VIP is a facilitated, rapporteured process with one deliverable being a report and another being a model of the dialog. The report is more than a \"minutes\" of the meeting(s). The report actually \"tells a story\" with a rich description of the issues that are of vital importance in the context of the topical area of interest. The \"model\" provides a topological depiction of the major elements that emerged during the dialog and of their primary couplings. The story illustrated by the model provides a graphical representation that reveals valuable insights that typically go unrecognized. One of the more important aspects of this \"story\" is that its authors, the panelists, are representative of the primary stakeholders. A valuable characteristic of this process is that the panelists are recruited from the full spectrum of institutional perspectives representative of the stakeholder community. This serves to ensure that the\n\"story\" captures the salient aspects of the Vital Issues associated with the topical area under consideration and, perhaps even more importantly, that the stakeholders feel ownership of the results.\n\n\n\n 149\n\nDISTRIBUTION:\n\n 1 Joe Kielman\n U.S. Department of Homeland Security\n\nWashington, D.C. 20528\n\n1 David Boyd\n S&T C21\n U.S. Department of Homeland Security\n\nWashington, D.C. 20528\n\n1 Gary Ackerman\n University of Maryland\n\nAssistant Director for Research and Communication\n College Park, MD 20742\n\n1 Gary LaFree\n Director, National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism\n\n(START)\n University of Maryland\n College Park, MD 20742\n\n1 MS  0620 G. M. Terhune, 5630\n1        0899 J. Spomer, 9537\n1        1027 C. Johnson, 5635\n2        1027 R. Colbaugh, 5635 and Kristin Glass\n1        1138 P. Garcia, 6370\n1        1188 C. Duus, 1434\n1        1209 G. Laughlin, 5920\n5        1217 R. A. Contreras, 5925\n3        1217 D. Engi, 5925\n1        1217 N. Hayden, 5925\n1        1217 A. Nichols, 5925\n\n\n\n  1 MS0899 Technical Library, 9536 (electronic copy)"
    },
    {
        "text": "## Broadening The Open Source Landscape: Insights From The Open Source Hardware Association\n\nOpen source hardware is an alternative to the patent intellectual property (IP) structure. The communally written and accepted definition states, \"Open source hardware is hardware whose design is made publicly available so that anyone can study, modify, distribute, make, and sell the design or the hardware based on that design. The hardware's source, the design from which it is made, is available in the preferred format for making modifications to it.\n\nThe Open Source Hardware Association (OSHWA) is a pending 501(c)3 nonprofit founded to educate people about open source hardware, collect data from the community, and voice community standards. OSHWA aims to represent the open hardware movement globally.3\n\n## Innovating Based On Models\n\nIdeally, open source hardware uses readily-available components and materials, standard processes, open infrastructure, unrestricted content, and open source design tools to maximize the ability of individuals to make and use hardware. Open source hardware gives people the freedom to control their technology while sharing knowledge and encouraging commerce through the open exchange of designs.\"1\nTechnology has always been innovated based on other people's successes, from the discovery that Earth was round to the invention of the telephone, steam engine, or airplane. Although patent laws were originally designed to protect inventors' ideas and benefit the public good, today patents can sometimes constrain further innovation. Open source is founded upon the belief that the more designs and processes can be open and shared, the quicker that innovation can happen. Open source hardware generally benefits consumers because it enables them to test, alter, and iterate upon the product, thereby allowing for competition within the free market.\n\nMore organizations in industry, design, and technology are adopting the open hardware definition as part of their missions and values, broadening the landscape of source files available for use. Open source hardware has been applied to electronics, fashion, furniture, musical instruments, bio-engineering, and much more. Arduino, a microcontroller and IDE (Integrated Developer Environment) software platform developed for hobbyists to make electronic prototypes, has expanded the world of hardware development for electrical engineers, artists, hobbyists, and even youth.2 Open hardware projects cover a range including industrial machines (Open Source Ecology), 3D printers (RepRap), environmental disaster relief efforts (Protei, OpenRelief), space programs (DIY Space Exploration, Mach 30), and underwater robotics (OpenROV).\n\nThere are many examples of successful businesses openly sharing software, such as Mozilla and Linux, but the rise of the open hardware trend is just beginning. This growing trend is founded in the belief that sharing ideas, designs, and methodologies can bring technological innovation and manufacturing mainstream on local and global scales, making it easier to engineer new solutions to complex problems.\n\nOpen hardware projects that facilitate free sharing of documentation, source code, and CAD designs are an approach to proliferate innovation.\n\n## How To Create Open Source Hardware\n\nAs the previously shared open source hardware definition explains, one must document the complete and preferable versions of the files for a design, rather than an intermediate or obfuscated version. For mechanical components and physical designs, the preferable versions are the original CAD files, and for circuit boards, the original schematic and board layout files. The open hardware community has generated a list of best practices for documenting and sharing work related to a piece of hardware so that others can use and modify the work.4\nUnfortunately, a technology that attempts to be open will often incorporate original design files in proprietary formats from expensive software tools because an open source software equivalent does not exist. In this case, it's helpful and encouraged to offer versions of the design in alternative or intermediate formats that can be viewed and edited with common or free programs. Such formats include PDFs of circuit schematics, Gerbers for circuit board layouts, and IGES or STL files for mechanical objects. These allow people without access to expensive or proprietary software to make use of the design as best possible. However, releasing the *original* files as well defines the core of open source hardware best practice. Many individuals and companies that produce open source hardware publish design files on their websites when a product goes on sale (e.g., Arduino).5 Others store their files in online version control systems (e.g., GitHub or Google Code), so that they are public throughout the design and development process. Further, there are websites specifically designed for sharing hardware designs, like Thingiverse and Instructables.6,7 If the inventor adheres to the open source hardware definition, then he or she may use the open hardware logo to denote to the community that the project is open and the source files are publicly available.\n\n## Collaboration Is Vital In The Open Source Hardware Community\n\nThe open source hardware community is made up of a diverse set of people and backgrounds. Participants often categorize themselves as DIY-ers, engineers, makers, hackers, artists, and activists, and often a combination of these categories. Communities of these people participate in the DIY movement, the rise of makerspaces/hackerspaces (places where likeminded people collaborate and innovate in science, tech, and art), the maker movement, and the open source hardware movement. Similar to the sharing ethos that occurs in the maker and DIY cultures, the open source hardware movement began as a way for people to share information and documentation for fabricating hardware. Several companies and open source hardware projects have branched from other open projects as a result of the knowledge and skill sharing in collaborative work facilities.\n\nIn 2012, OSHWA conducted a survey to collect data about the open source hardware community. The survey had 2,000 participants, although this is not representative of the entire open source hardware community. The survey found that 44 percent of the participants were using open source hardware for their jobs/careers. Only 14 percent of participants reported that none of their income comes from building open source hardware, while 86 percent of participants make some or all of their income from open source hardware. Fifty-two percent reported living in the U.S., though this number could be high as the survey was in English, and U.S.-centric despite OSHWA's best efforts to reach out internationally.\n\n## Why Go Open?\n\nPatents were created to incentivize inventors and spur innovation in exchange for 20 years of exclusive rights. Patentees have to disclose to the public how their innovation was created. In today's patent system, 20 years may no longer be a realistic timeframe for the pace of technology innovation in the digital age. The barriers and frustrations that the patent system has created are steering inventors to adopt a new alternative to patents: open source hardware. It is vastly easier to innovate on a technology which is open with free, publicly available source files. Open source hardware creates products not driven by building monopolies, but driven by capitalistic pursuits and technological innovation in an open environment. This type of information sharing leads to powerful opportunities for companies and individuals to learn from each other. To further illustrate these ideals, Nathan Seidle, former OSHWA board member and open hardware business owner of SparkFun Electronics, was invited to testify also means the consumer is getting a better product. Inventors are creating the marketplace and alternate IP system that they want to be part of.\n\n## The Future Of Open Source Hardware\n\nto the House Subcommittee on Courts, Intellectual Property and the Internet.8 Seidle uses open source hardware rather than patents because his products are innovated within weeks, not years. His products\nalso get copied and reproduced by consumers and users. Patented works get copied, too, but Seidle reports that it is more lucrative to out-innovate a copied product than to litigate. Open source hardware companies value a large community using, sharing, and making derivative products, working towards a common goal of bettering the world of electronics and prototyping tools.\n\nOSHWA hosts an annual Open Hardware Summit, which continues to grow each year and attract attendees and sponsors from bigger and bigger businesses. Open source hardware tools, such as open source laser cutters (e.g., Lasersaur) and open source jigsaws are now making it to mainstream markets.9,10 Along with these new advancements and growth within the community, OSHWA recognizes that people want more options for their hardware, even in the open source niche. OSHWA is looking to develop a labeling system that would graphically represent which parts of a project were open source (e.g., the mechanicals, the electronics, the process, etc.), which parts can be easily fixed if broken, which parts can be recycled, and which parts have instructions for troubleshooting. As open hardware increases the options that inventors have when releasing their technologies, OSHWA hopes to grow the number of innovations using open source hardware and continue to relay the benefits of open source hardware to the general public.\nIndividuals and companies value open source hardware to make technologies more accessible and attainable by a broader audience. Additionally, open source hardware piggybacks off the DIY movement by valuing giving others design files to build things themselves and fix them when broken. People find it beneficial that open source hardware aligns with the DIY and maker ethics, valuing the ability to control, alter, and personalize the items which one owns. As products swing back to personalization from mass market goods, open source hardware makes personalization of goods possible. Not only does personalization benefit the consumer, but the fact that companies can build off of, curate, and improve other open source hardware products Alicia Gibb is the founding President and Executive Director of the Open Source Hardware Association (OSHWA).\n\nPrior to becoming an advocate for OSHWA, Gibb was a researcher and prototyper at Bug Labs, where she ran the academic research program and the test kitchen, an open R&D lab. She is a member of NYC Resistor, co-founder of the Open Hardware Summit, and a member of the advisory board for Linux Journal. Gibb holds a degree in Art Education, an M.S. in Art History, and an M.L.I.S. in Information Science from Pratt Institute.\n\n\nGabriella Levine is President of the Board of the Open Source Hardware Association, and a hardware designer interested in the relationship between technology and ecology. Levine's sculptural and robotic works include Protei Inc. (open source sailing drones), Sneel.cc (biomimetic swimming snake robots that sense environmental data), and OCP (Ocean Collaboration Platform developing marine technologies). She teaches at ITP (Interactive Telecommunications Program, NYU) and CIID (Copenhagen Institute of Interaction Design), and has presented globally at symposia and lectures including the Open Hardware Summit, Startup Festival, TEDxNavesink, and Unreasonable@State. Gabriella holds a Master's degree from ITP, Tisch School of the Arts, NYU.\n\n## R E F E R E N C E S"
    },
    {
        "text": "## Summary Department Of Defense Cyber Strategy\n\nThis page left intentionally blank\n\n## Introduction\n\nAmerican prosperity, liberty, and security depend upon open and reliable access to information.  The Internet empowers us and enriches our lives by providing ever-greater access to new knowledge, businesses, and services.  Computers and network technologies underpin U.S. military warfighting superiority by enabling the Joint Force to gain the information advantage, strike at long distance, and exercise global command and control. The arrival of the digital age has also created challenges for the Department of Defense (DoD) and the Nation.  The open, transnational, and decentralized nature of the Internet that we seek to protect creates significant vulnerabilities.  Competitors deterred from engaging the United States and our allies in an armed conflict are using cyberspace operations to steal our technology, disrupt our government and commerce, challenge our democratic processes, and threaten our critical infrastructure. We are engaged in a long-term strategic competition with China and Russia.  These States have expanded that competition to include persistent campaigns in and through cyberspace that pose longterm strategic risk to the Nation as well as to our allies and partners.  China is eroding U.S. military overmatch and the Nation's economic vitality by persistently exfiltrating sensitive information from U.S. public and private sector institutions.  Russia has used cyber-enabled information operations to influence our population and challenge our democratic processes. Other actors,  such as North Korea and Iran, have similarly employed malicious cyber activities to harm U.S. citizens and threaten U.S. interests.  Globally, the scope and pace of malicious cyber activity continue to rise.  The United States'\ngrowing dependence on the cyberspace domain for nearly every essential civilian and military function makes this an urgent and unacceptable risk to the Nation.\nThe Department must take action in cyberspace during day-to-day competition to preserve U.S. military advantages and to defend U.S. interests.  Our focus will be on the States that can pose strategic threats to U.S. prosperity and security, particularly China and Russia.  We will conduct cyberspace operations to collect intelligence and prepare military cyber capabilities to be used in the event of crisis or conflict.  We will defend forward to disrupt or halt malicious cyber activity at its source, including activity that falls below the level of armed conflict.  We will strengthen the security and resilience of networks and systems that contribute to current and future U.S. military advantages.  We will collaborate with our interagency, industry, and international partners to advance our mutual interests. During wartime, U.S. cyber forces will be prepared to operate alongside our air, land, sea, and space forces to target adversary weaknesses, offset adversary strengths, and amplify the effectiveness of other elements of the Joint Force.  Adversary militaries are increasingly reliant on the same type of computer and network technologies that have become central to Joint Force warfighting.  The Department will exploit this reliance to gain military advantage.  The Joint Force will employ offensive cyber capabilities and innovative concepts that allow for the use of cyberspace operations across the full spectrum of conflict. The *2018 Department of Defense Cyber Strategy* represents the Department's vision for addressing this threat and implementing the priorities of the *National Security Strategy* and *National Defense Strategy* for cyberspace.  It supersedes the *2015 DoD Cyber Strategy*. The United States cannot afford inaction: our values, economic competitiveness, and military edge are exposed to threats that grow more dangerous every day.  We must assertively defend our interests in cyberspace below the level of armed conflict and ensure the readiness of our cyberspace operators to support the Joint Force in crisis and conflict.  Our Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen, Marines, and civilian employees stand ready, and we will succeed.\n\n## Strategic Competition In Cyberspace\n\nThe United States' strategic competitors are conducting cyber-enabled campaigns to erode U.S.\n\nmilitary advantages, threaten our infrastructure, and reduce our economic prosperity.  The Department must respond to these activities by exposing, disrupting, and degrading cyber activity threatening U.S. interests, strengthening the cybersecurity and resilience of key potential targets, and working closely with other departments and agencies, as well as with our allies and partners.\n\nFirst, we must ensure the U.S. military's ability to fight and win wars in any domain, including cyberspace.  This is a foundational requirement for U.S. national security and a key to ensuring that we deter aggression, including cyber attacks that constitute a use of force, against the United States, our allies, and our partners.  The Department must defend its own networks, systems, and information from malicious cyber activity and be prepared to defend, when directed, those networks and systems operated by non-DoD Defense Critical Infrastructure (DCI)1 and Defense Industrial Base (DIB)2 entities.  We will defend forward to halt or degrade cyberspace operations targeting the Department, and we will collaborate to strengthen the cybersecurity and resilience of DoD, DCI, and DIB networks and systems. Second, the Department seeks to preempt, defeat, or deter malicious cyber activity targeting U.S. critical infrastructure that could cause a significant cyber incident regardless of whether that incident would impact DoD's warfighting readiness or capability.  Our primary role in this homeland defense mission is to defend forward by leveraging our focus outward to stop threats before they reach their targets.  The Department also provides public and private sector partners with indications and warning (I&W) of malicious cyber activity, in coordination with other Federal departments and agencies. Third, the Department will work with U.S. allies and partners to strengthen cyber capacity, expand combined cyberspace operations, and increase bi-directional information sharing in order to advance our mutual interests.\n\n##\n\nThe Department's cyberspace objectives are:\n\n1. Ensuring the Joint Force can achieve its missions in a contested cyberspace environment;\n2. Strengthening the Joint Force by conducting cyberspace operations that enhance U.S.\nmilitary advantages;\n3. Defending U.S. critical infrastructure from malicious cyber activity that alone, or as part\nof a campaign, could cause a significant cyber incident;31\n4. Securing DoD information and systems against malicious cyber activity, including DoD\ninformation on non-DoD-owned networks; and\n5. Expanding DoD cyber cooperation with interagency, industry, and international partners.\n\n\n## Defending Civilian Assets That Enable U.S. Military Advantage\n\nThe Department must be prepared to defend non-DoD-owned Defense Critical Infrastructure\n(DCI) and Defense Industrial Base (DIB) networks and systems.  Our chief goal in maintaining an ability to defend DCI is to ensure the infrastructure's continued functionality and ability to support DoD objectives in a contested cyber environment.  Our focus working with DIB entities is to protect sensitive DoD information whose loss, either individually or in aggregate, could result in an erosion of Joint Force military advantage.  As the Sector Specific Agency (SSA) for the DIB and a business partner with the DIB and DCI, the Department will: set and enforce standards for cybersecurity, resilience, and reporting; and be prepared, when requested and authorized, to provide direct assistance, including on non-DoD networks, prior to, during, and after an incident.\n\n\n\ngroup of related events that together are) likely to result in demonstrable harm to the national security interests, foreign relations, or economy of the United States or to the public confidence, civil liberties, or public health and safety of the American people (Presidential Policy Directive 41).\n\n## Strategic Approach\n\nOur strategic approach is based on mutually reinforcing lines of effort to build a more lethal force; compete and deter in cyberspace;  expand alliances and partnerships; reform the Department; and cultivate talent.\n\n##  Build A More Lethal Joint Force\n\nAccelerate cyber capability development:  The Department will accelerate the development of cyber capabilities for both warfighting and countering malicious cyber actors.  Our focus will be on fielding capabilities that are scalable, adaptable, and diverse to provide maximum flexibility to Joint Force commanders.  The Joint Force will be capable of employing cyberspace operations throughout the spectrum of conflict, from day-to-day operations to wartime, in order to advance U.S. interests.\nInnovate to foster agility:  The Department must innovate to keep pace with rapidly evolving threats and technologies in cyberspace.  We will accept and manage operational and programmatic risk in a deliberate manner that moves from a \"zero defect\" culture to one that fosters agility and innovation because success in this domain requires the Department to innovate faster than our strategic competitors.\n\nLeverage automation and data analysis to improve effectiveness:  The Department will use cyber enterprise solutions to operate at machine speed and large-scale data analytics to identify malicious cyber activity across different networks and systems.  The Department will leverage these advances to improve our own defensive posture and to ensure that our cyber capabilities will continue to be effective against competitors armed with cutting edge technology.\n\nEmploy commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) cyber capabilities:  The Department excels at creating cyber capabilities tailored for specific operational problems.  In addition to these capabilities, we will make greater use of COTS capabilities that can be optimized for DoD use.\n\n##  Compete And Deter In Cyberspace\n\nDeter malicious cyber activities:  The United States seeks to use all instruments of national power to deter adversaries from conducting malicious cyberspace activity that would threaten U.S. national interests, our allies, or our partners.  The Department will prioritize securing sensitive DoD information and deterring malicious cyber activities that constitute a use of force against the United States, our allies, or our partners.  Should deterrence fail, the Joint Force stands ready to employ the full range of military capabilities in response. Persistently contest malicious cyber activity in day-to-day competition:  The Department will counter cyber campaigns threatening U.S. military advantage by defending forward to intercept and halt cyber threats and by strengthening the cybersecurity of systems and networks that support DoD missions. This includes working with the private sector and our foreign allies and partners to contest cyber activity that could threaten Joint Force missions and to counter the exfiltration of sensitive DoD information. Increase the resilience of U.S. critical infrastructure:  The Department will work with its interagency and private sector partners to reduce the risk that malicious cyber activity targeting U.S. critical infrastructure could have catastrophic or cascading consequences.  We will streamline our publicprivate information-sharing mechanisms and strengthen the resilience and cybersecurity of critical infrastructure networks and systems.\n\n##  Strengthen Alliances And Attract New Partnerships\n\nBuild trusted private sector partnerships:  The private sector owns and operates the majority of U.S. infrastructure and is on the frontlines of nation-state competition in cyberspace.  In coordination with other Federal departments and agencies, the Department will build trusted relationships with private sector entities that are critical enablers of military operations and carry out deliberate planning and collaborative training that enables mutually supporting cybersecurity activities. Operationalize international partnerships:  Many of the United States' allies and partners possess advanced cyber capabilities that complement our own.  The Department will work to strengthen the capacity of these allies and partners and increase DoD's ability to leverage its partners' unique skills, resources, capabilities, and perspectives.  Information-sharing relationships with allies and partners will increase the effectiveness of combined cyberspace operations and enhance our collective cybersecurity posture.\nReinforce norms of responsible State behavior in cyberspace:  The Department will reinforce voluntary, non-binding norms of responsible State behavior in cyberspace during peacetime.  The United States has endorsed the work done by the UN Group of Governmental Experts on Developments in the Field of Information and Telecommunications in the Context of International Security (UNGGE) to develop a framework of responsible State behavior in cyberspace.  The principles developed by the UNGGE include prohibitions against damaging civilian critical infrastructure during peacetime and against allowing national territory to be used for intentionally wrongful cyber activity.  The Department will work alongside its interagency and international partners to promote international commitments regarding behavior in cyberspace as well as to develop and implement cyber confidence building measures (CBM).  When cyber activities threaten U.S. interests, we will contest them and we will be prepared to act, in conjunction with partners, to defend U.S. interests.\n\n##  Reform The Department\n\nIncorporate cyber awareness into DoD institutional culture:  The Department will adapt its institutional culture so individuals at every level are knowledgeable about the cyberspace domain and can incorporate that knowledge into their day-to-day activities.  Leaders and their staffs need to be \"cyber fluent\" so they can fully understand the cybersecurity implications of their decisions and are positioned to identify opportunities to leverage the cyberspace domain to gain strategic, operational, and tactical advantages. Increase cybersecurity accountability:  Reducing the Department's \"attack surface\" requires an increase in cybersecurity awareness and accountability across the Department.  We will hold DoD personnel and our private sector partners accountable for their cybersecurity practices and choices. Seek material solutions that are affordable, flexible, and robust:  The Department will reduce the time it takes to procure software and hardware in order to keep pace with the rapid advance of technology.\nWe will identify opportunities to procure scalable services, such as cloud storage and scalable computing power, to ensure that our systems keep pace with commercial information technology and can scale when necessary to match changing requirements.  We will also leverage COTS capabilities where feasible to reduce our reliance on expensive, custom-built software that is difficult to maintain or upgrade.\nExpand crowd-sourced vulnerability identification:  The Department will continue to identify crowdsourcing opportunities, such as hack-a-thons and bug-bounties, in order to identify and mitigate vulnerabilities more effectively and to foster innovation.\n\n##  Cultivate Talent\n\nSustain a ready cyber workforce:   The Department's workforce is a critical cyber asset.  We will invest in building future talent, identifying and recruiting sought-after talent, and retaining our current cyber workforce.  We will provide ample opportunitiesboth inside and outside the Departmentfor the professional development and career progression of cyber personnel.  We will create processes for maintaining visibility of the entire military and civilian cyber workforce and optimizing personnel rotations across military departments and commands, including maximizing the use of the Reserve Components.  The Department will also ensure that its cyber requirements are filled by the optimal mix of military service members, civilian employees, and contracted support to serve mission requirements.\nEnhance the Nation's cyber talent:  The Department plays an essential role in enhancing the Nation's pool of cyber talent in order to further the goal of increasing national resilience across the private and public sectors.  To that end, we will increase our efforts alongside other Federal departments and agencies to promote science, technology, engineering, mathematics, and foreign language (STEM-L)\ndisciplines at the primary and secondary education levels throughout the United States.  The Department will also partner with industry and academia to establish standards in training, education, and awareness that will facilitate the growth of cyber talent in the United States.\nEmbed software and hardware expertise as a core DoD competency:  To make it attractive to skilled candidates, the Department will establish a career track for computer science related specialties\n(including hardware engineers, software developers, and data analysts) that offers meaningful challenges, rotational billets at other Federal departments and agencies, specialized training opportunities tied to retention commitments, and the expansion of compensation incentives for the Cyber Excepted Service (CES). Establish a cyber top talent management program:  The Department will establish a cyber talent management program that provides its most skilled cyber personnel with focused resources and opportunities to develop key skills over the course of their careers.  The Department will use competitive processes, including individual and team competitions, to identify the most capable DoD military and civilian cyber specialists and then empower those personnel to solve the Department's toughest challenges.\n\n## Conclusion\n\nThe arrival of the cyber era has created new opportunities and challenges for the Department and the Nation.  Open and reliable access to information is a vital U.S. interest, and our allies and competitors alike should understand that we will assertively defend it.  The *2018 DoD Cyber Strategy* directs the Department to defend forward, shape the day-to-day competition, and prepare for war by building a more lethal force, expanding alliances and partnerships, reforming the Department, and cultivating talent, while actively competing against and deterring our competitors.  Taken together, these mutually reinforcing activities will enable the Department to compete, deter, and win in the cyberspace domain."
    },
    {
        "text": "## National Cybersecurity Strategy\n\n MARCH 2023 Digital technologies today touch nearly every aspect of American life.  The openness and connection enabled by access to the Internet are game-changers for communities everywhere, as we have all experienced throughout the COVID-19 pandemic.  That's why, thanks to the Bipartisan Infrastructure Law, my Administration is investing $65 billion to make sure every American has access to reliable, high-speed Internet.  And when we pick up our smart phones to keep in touch with loved ones, log on to social media to share our ideas with one another, or connect to the Internet to run a business or take care of any of our basic needs, we need to be able to trust that the underlying digital ecosystem is safe, reliable, and secure.  This National Cybersecurity Strategy details the comprehensive approach my Administration is taking to better secure cyberspace and ensure the United States is in the strongest possible position to realize all the benefits and potential of our digital future. Cybersecurity is essential to the basic functioning of our economy, the operation of our critical infrastructure, the strength of our democracy and democratic institutions, the privacy of our data and communications, and our national defense.  From the very beginning of my Administration, we have moved decisively to strengthen cybersecurity.  I appointed senior cybersecurity officials at the White House and issued an Executive Order on Improving the Nation's Cybersecurity.\nWorking in close cooperation with the private sector, my Administration has taken steps to protect the American people from hackers, hold bad actors and cybercriminals accountable, and defend against the increasingly malicious cyber campaigns targeting our security and privacy.\nAnd we've worked with our allies and partners around the world to improve our capacity to collectively defend against and respond to cyber threats from authoritarian states that go against our national interests. This strategy recognizes that robust collaboration, particularly between the public and private sectors, is essential to securing cyberspace.  It also takes on the systemic challenge that too much of the responsibility for cybersecurity has fallen on individual users and small organizations.  By working in partnership with industry; civil society; and State, local, Tribal, and territorial governments, we will rebalance the responsibility for cybersecurity to be more effective and more equitable.  We will realign incentives to favor long-term investments in security, resilience, and promising new technologies.  We will collaborate with our allies and partners to strengthen norms of responsible state behavior, hold countries accountable for irresponsible behavior in cyberspace, and disrupt the networks of criminals behind dangerous cyberattacks around the globe.  And we will work with the Congress to provide the resources and tools necessary to ensure effective cybersecurity practices are implemented across our most critical infrastructure. As I have often said, our world is at an inflection point.  That includes our digital world.  The steps we take and choices we make today will determine the direction of our world for decades to come.  This is particularly true as we develop and enforce rules and norms for conduct in cyberspace.  We must ensure the Internet remains open, free, global, interoperable, reliable, and secureanchored in universal values that respect human rights and fundamental freedoms. Digital connectivity should be a tool that uplifts and empowers people everywhere, not one used for repression and coercion.  As this strategy details, the United States is prepared to meet this challenge from a position of strength, leading in lockstep with our closest allies and working with partners everywhere who share our vision for a brighter digital future.\n\nJ\n\n## Introduction\n\nThe Internet has transformed our world.  In a single generation, it has revolutionized the way we innovate, communicate, and share information on a global scale, catalyzing unprecedented advancements in human prosperity, equality, and connectivity.  Upon this Internet backbone we have built a flourishing digital ecosystem, combining systems and technologies with our economies, our societies, and ourselves. In doing so, the digital ecosystem has come to reflect the values of its architects and its users. Technologies have promoted democracy, free speech, innovation, and equality.  But they also have been misused to enable transnational repression and digital authoritarianism; steal data and intellectual property; distribute disinformation; disrupt critical infrastructure; proliferate online harassment, exploitation, and abuse; enable criminals and foster violent extremism; and threaten peace and stability.  People and technology are increasingly linked, further enabling the very best, as well as the worst, of humanity. In this decisive decade, we have grand ambitions for the further values-driven development of our digital ecosystem.  We are building a smart grid, powered by distributed renewable electricity and balanced with intelligent systems, that promises a bright and resilient future of energy abundance. We envision a maturing \"Internet of Things\" (IoT), comprising everything from consumer goods to digitized industrial controls to constellations of satellites, that will increase efficiency and safety while providing game-changing insights into our environment and economy.  We are laying the foundations for real-time global collaboration leveraging vast amounts of data and computing power that will unlock scientific discoveries and other public goods of which we cannot yet conceive.\n\nAchieving this vision of a prosperous, connected future will depend upon the cybersecurity and resilience of its underlying technologies and systems.  We have learned hard lessons and made significant progress in the collaborative defense of our digital ecosystem.  Every day, cyber defenders foil state-backed attacks and prevent criminal plots around the world.  But the underlying structural dynamics of the digital ecosystem frustrate their efforts.  Its components remain prone to disruption, vulnerable to exploitation, and are often co-opted by malicious actors. We must make fundamental changes to the underlying dynamics of the digital ecosystem, shifting the advantage to its defenders and perpetually frustrating the forces that would threaten it.  Our goal is a defensible, resilient digital ecosystem where it is costlier to attack systems than defend them, where sensitive or private information is secure and protected, and where neither incidents nor errors cascade into catastrophic, systemic consequences.  In creating these conditions, we can and must seize the opportunity to instill our most cherished values, as embodied by the Declaration for the Future of the Internet (DFI) and by the Freedom Online Coalition. This strategy will position the United States and its allies and partners to build that digital ecosystem together, making it more easily and inherently defensible, resilient, and aligned with our values.  By the end of this decisive decade, we will achieve these outcomes so we can confidently take bold leaps into a digitally-enabled future that benefits us all.\n\n## The Strategic Environment\n\nThe United States has made significant progress toward achieving the President's affirmative vision for a digitally-enabled future, but emerging trends are creating both new opportunities for further advancement and new challenges to overcome.  Malicious actors threaten our progress toward a digital ecosystem that is inclusive, equitable, promotes prosperity, and aligns with our democratic values.\n\n## Emerging Trends\n\nThe world is entering a new phase of deepening digital dependencies.  Driven by emerging technologies and ever more complex and interdependent systems, dramatic shifts in the coming decade will unlock new possibilities for human flourishing and prosperity while also multiplying the systemic risks posed by insecure systems.\n\nSoftware and systems are growing more complex, providing value to companies and consumers but also increasing our collective insecurity.  Too often, we are layering new functionality and technology onto already intricate and brittle systems at the expense of security and resilience.  The widespread introduction of artificial intelligence systemswhich can act in ways unexpected to even their own creatorsis heightening the complexity and risk associated with many of our most important technological systems. The Internet continues to connect individuals, businesses, communities, and countries on shared platforms that enable scaled business solutions and international exchange.  But this accelerating global interconnectivity also introduces risks.  An attack on one organization, sector, or state can rapidly spill over to other sectors and regions, as happened during Russia's 2017 \"NotPetya\" cyberattack on Ukraine, which spread across Europe, Asia, and the Americas, causing billions of dollars in damage.  The potential cost of attacks like this will only grow as interdependencies increase. Digital technologies increasingly touch the most sensitive aspects of our lives, providing convenience, but also creating new, often unforeseen risks.  The COVID-19 pandemic has pushed us to live ever more deeply in a digital world.  As our lives become intertwined with video and audio streaming, wearable devices, and biometric technologies, the quantity and intimacy of personal data collection is growing exponentially.  Theft of that data is also growing rapidly, and opening up novel vectors for malicious actors to surveil, manipulate, and blackmail individuals. Next-generation interconnectivity is collapsing the boundary between the digital and physical worlds, and exposing some of our most essential systems to disruption.  Our factories, power grids, and water treatment facilities, among other essential infrastructure, are increasingly shedding old analog control systems and rapidly bringing online digital operational technology (OT).  Advanced wireless technologies, IoT, and space-based assetsincluding those enabling positioning, navigation, and timing for civilian and military uses, environmental and weather monitoring, and everyday Internet-based activities from banking to telemedicinewill accelerate this trend, moving many of\n\nour essential systems online and making cyberattacks inherently more destructive and impactful to our daily lives.\n\n## Malicious Actors\n\nMalicious cyber activity has evolved from nuisance defacement, to espionage and intellectual property theft, to damaging attacks against critical infrastructure, to ransomware attacks and cyberenabled influence campaigns designed to undermine public trust in the foundation of our democracy.  Once available only to a small number of well-resourced countries, offensive hacking tools and services, including foreign commercial spyware, are now widely accessible.  These tools and services empower countries that previously lacked the ability to harm U.S. interests in cyberspace and enable a growing threat from organized criminal syndicates. The governments of China, Russia, Iran, North Korea, and other autocratic states with revisionist intent are aggressively using advanced cyber capabilities to pursue objectives that run counter to our interests and broadly accepted international norms.  Their reckless disregard for the rule of law and human rights in cyberspace is threatening U.S. national security and economic prosperity. The People's Republic of China (PRC) now presents the broadest, most active, and most persistent threat to both government and private sector networks and is the only country with both the intent to reshape the international order and, increasingly, the economic, diplomatic, military, and technological power to do so.  Over the last ten years, it has expanded cyber operations beyond intellectual property theft to become our most advanced strategic competitor with the capacity to threaten U.S. interests and dominate emerging technologies critical to global development.  Having successfully harnessed the Internet as the backbone of its surveillance state and influence capabilities, the PRC is exporting its vision of digital authoritarianism, striving to shape the global Internet in its image and imperiling human rights beyond its borders. For more than two decades, the Russian government has used its cyber capabilities to destabilize its neighbors and interfere in the domestic politics of democracies around the world.  Russia remains a persistent cyber threat as it refines its cyber espionage, attack, influence, and disinformation capabilities to coerce sovereign countries, harbor transnational criminal actors, weaken U.S. alliances and partnerships, and subvert the rules-based international system.  Like its 2017 \"NotPetya\" attack, Russia's cyberattacks in support of its 2022 brutal and unprovoked invasion of Ukraine have resulted in irresponsible spillover impacts onto civilian critical infrastructure in other European countries. The governments of Iran and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) are similarly growing in their sophistication and willingness to conduct malicious activity in cyberspace.  Iran has used cyber capabilities to threaten U.S. allies in the Middle East and elsewhere, while the DPRK\nconducts cyber activities to generate revenue through criminal enterprises, such as through the theft of cryptocurrency, ransomware, and the deployment of surreptitious information technology (IT) workers for the purposes of fueling its nuclear ambitions.  Further maturation of these capabilities could have significant impacts on U.S., allied, and partner interests.\n\nThe cyber operations of criminal syndicates now represent a threat to the national security, public safety, and economic prosperity of the United States and its allies and partners.  Ransomware incidents have disrupted critical services and businesses across the country and around the world, from energy pipelines and food companies, to schools and hospitals.  Total economic losses from ransomware attacks continue to climb, reaching billions of U.S. dollars annually.  Criminal syndicates often operate out of states that do not cooperate with U.S. law enforcement and frequently encourage, harbor, or tolerate such activities.  These and other malicious cyber activities continue to threaten Americans across society, including disproportionately affecting those without the resources necessary to protect themselves, recover, or seek recourse.\n\n## Our Approach: A Path To Resilience In Cyberspace\n\nDeep and enduring collaboration between stakeholders across our digital ecosystem will be the foundation upon which we make it more inherently defensible, resilient, and aligned with U.S. values.  This strategy seeks to build and enhance collaboration around five pillars: (1) Defend Critical Infrastructure, (2) Disrupt and Dismantle Threat Actors, (3) Shape Market Forces to Drive Security and Resilience, (4) Invest in a Resilient Future, and (5) Forge International Partnerships to Pursue Shared Goals.  Each effort requires unprecedented levels of collaboration across its respective stakeholder communities, including the public sector, private industry, civil society, and international allies and partners.  The pillars organizing this strategy articulate a vision of shared purpose and priorities for these communities, highlight challenges they face in achieving this vision, and identify strategic objectives around which to organize their efforts. To realize the vision these pillars lay out, we will make **two fundamental shifts** in how the United States allocates roles, responsibilities, and resources in cyberspace.  In realizing these shifts, we aspire not just to improve our defenses, but to change those underlying dynamics that currently contravene our interests.\n\n## Rebalance The Responsibility To Defend Cyberspace\n\nThe most capable and best-positioned actors in cyberspace must be better stewards of the digital ecosystem.  Today, end users bear too great a burden for mitigating cyber risks.  Individuals, small businesses, state and local governments, and infrastructure operators have limited resources and competing priorities, yet these actors' choices can have a significant impact on our national cybersecurity.  A single person's momentary lapse in judgment, use of an outdated password, or errant click on a suspicious link should not have national security consequences.  Our collective cyber resilience cannot rely on the constant vigilance of our smallest organizations and individual citizens. Instead, across both the public and private sectors, we must ask more of the most capable and bestpositioned actors to make our digital ecosystem secure and resilient.  In a free and interconnected society, protecting data and assuring the reliability of critical systems must be the responsibility of the owners and operators of the systems that hold our data and make our society function, as well as\n\nof the technology providers that build and service these systems.  Government's role is to protect its own systems; to ensure private entities, particularly critical infrastructure, are protecting their systems; and to carry out core governmental functions such as engaging in diplomacy, collecting intelligence, imposing economic costs, enforcing the law, and, conducting disruptive actions to counter cyber threats.  Together, industry and government must drive effective and equitable collaboration to correct market failures, minimize the harms from cyber incidents to society's most vulnerable, and defend our shared digital ecosystem.\n\n## Realign Incentives To Favor Long-Term Investments\n\nOur economy and society must incentivize decision-making to make cyberspace more resilient and defensible over the long term.  Balancing short-term imperatives against a long-term vision will be no easy task.  We must defend the systems we have now, while investing in and building toward a future digital ecosystem that is more inherently defensible and resilient. This strategy outlines how the Federal Government will use all tools available to reshape incentives and achieve unity of effort in a collaborative, equitable, and mutually beneficial manner.  We must ensure that market forces and public programs alike reward security and resilience, build a robust and diverse cyber workforce, embrace security and resilience by design, strategically coordinate research and development investments in cybersecurity, and promote the collaborative stewardship of our digital ecosystem.  To achieve these goals, the Federal Government will focus on points of leverage, where minimally invasive actions will produce the greatest gains in defensibility and systemic resilience. The Federal Government is making generational investments in renewing our infrastructure, digitizing and decarbonizing our energy systems, securing our semiconductor supply chains, modernizing our cryptographic technologies, and rejuvenating our foreign and domestic policy priorities.  The United States has an opportunity to rebalance the incentives necessary to lay a stronger, more resilient foundation on which to build the future of our digital ecosystem.\n\n## Building On Existing Policy\n\nThis strategy, while laying out a new approach to our cybersecurity, builds on significant achievements already shaping our strategic environment and digital ecosystem.  In its first days, the Biden-Harris Administration assumed responsibility for managing the fallout from Russia's compromise of the SolarWinds Orion platform and the PRC's compromise of servers running Microsoft Exchange.  The President elevated White House leadership on cybersecurity, appointing experienced, senior leaders in new positions at the National Security Council (NSC) and the Office of National Cyber Director (ONCD), and moved quickly to fold lessons learned from these and other incidents into executive actions. These forward-leaning efforts have laid the foundation upon which this strategy is built.  It was developed alongside the National Security Strategy and National Defense Strategy by a broad\n\ninteragency team and through a months-long consultation process with the private sector and civil society.  It is informed by and implements the values of the DFI, the Freedom Online Coalition, and other long-standing efforts to realize a democratic vision for our digital ecosystem.  It carries forward the foundational direction of Executive Order (EO) 14028, \"Improving the Nation's Cybersecurity,\" National Security Memorandum (NSM) 5, \"Improving Cybersecurity for Critical Infrastructure Control Systems,\" NSM 8, \"Improving the Cybersecurity of National Security, Department of Defense (DoD), and Intelligence Community Systems,\" and other executive actions.\nIt integrates cybersecurity into the once-in-a-generation new investments made by the Bipartisan Infrastructure Law, the Inflation Reduction Act, the Creating Helpful Incentives to Produce Semiconductors (CHIPS) and Science Act, and EO 14017, \"America's Supply Chains.\" This strategy also builds on the work of prior administrations.  It replaces the 2018 National Cyber Strategy but continues momentum on many of its priorities, including the collaborative defense of the digital ecosystem.  The Administration remains committed to enhancing the security and resilience of U.S. space systems, including by implementing Space Policy Directive 5, \"Cybersecurity Principles for Space Systems.\" The Administration also continues to implement critical efforts to secure next-generation technologies, including through the National Artificial Intelligence Initiative and the National Strategy to Secure 5G, among other existing policies and initiatives. This strategy's goals for securing Federal systems and collaborating with the private sector build on EO 13800, \"Strengthening the Cybersecurity of Federal Networks and Critical Infrastructure,\" EO 13691, \"Promoting Private Sector Cybersecurity Information Sharing,\" and EO 13636, \"Improving Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity,\" and fit within the frameworks established by Presidential Policy Directive 21, \"Critical Infrastructure Security and Resilience,\" and Presidential Policy Directive 41, \"United States Cyber Incident Coordination.\"  It carries forward and evolves many of the strategic efforts originally initiated by the 2008 Comprehensive National Cybersecurity Initiative.\n\n## Pillar One | Defend Critical Infrastructure\n\nDefending the systems and assets that constitute our critical infrastructure is vital to our national security, public safety, and economic prosperity.  The American people must have confidence in the availability and resilience of this infrastructure and the essential services it provides.  We aim to operationalize an enduring and effective model of collaborative defense that equitably distributes risk and responsibility, and delivers a foundational level of security and resilience for our digital ecosystem. Collaboration to address advanced threats will only be effective if owners and operators of critical infrastructure have cybersecurity protections in place to make it harder for adversaries to disrupt them.  The Administration has established new cybersecurity requirements in certain critical sectors. In other sectors, new authorities will be required to set regulations that can drive better cybersecurity practices at scale.  This Administration has conducted sector-specific engagement with industry to construct consistent, predictable regulatory frameworks for cybersecurity that focus on achieving security outcomes and enabling continuity of operations and functions, while promoting collaboration and innovation. Private sector entities have made significant commitments to engage in collaborative defense efforts. The \"Shields Up\" campaign preceding Russia's 2022 brutal and unprovoked war on Ukraine, to proactively increase preparedness and promote effective measures to combat malicious activity, is an example of public-private collaboration that must be scaled and repeated. We must build new and innovative capabilities that allow owners and operators of critical infrastructure, Federal agencies, product vendors and service providers, and other stakeholders to effectively collaborate with each other at speed and scale.  Federal agencies that support critical infrastructure providers must enhance their own capabilities and their ability to collaborate with other Federal entities.  When incidents occur, Federal response efforts must be coordinated and tightly integrated with private sector and State, local, Tribal, and territorial (SLTT) partners. Finally, the Federal Government can better support the defense of critical infrastructure by making its own systems more defensible and resilient.  This Administration is committed to improving Federal cybersecurity through long-term efforts to implement a zero trust architecture strategy and modernize IT and OT infrastructure.  In doing so, Federal cybersecurity can be a model for critical infrastructure across the United States for how to successfully build and operate secure and resilient systems.\n\n## Strategic Objective 1.1: Establish Cybersecurity Requirements To Support National Security And Public Safety\n\nThe American people must have confidence in the critical services underpinning their lives and the nation's economy.  While voluntary approaches to critical infrastructure cybersecurity have produced meaningful improvements, the lack of mandatory requirements has resulted in inadequate and inconsistent outcomes.  Today's marketplace insufficiently rewardsand often disadvantagesthe owners and operators of critical infrastructure who invest in proactive measures to prevent or mitigate the effects of cyber incidents. Regulation can level the playing field, enabling healthy competition without sacrificing cybersecurity or operational resilience.  Our strategic environment requires modern and nimble regulatory frameworks for cybersecurity tailored for each sector's risk profile, harmonized to reduce duplication, complementary to public-private collaboration, and cognizant of the cost of implementation.  New and updated cybersecurity regulations must be calibrated to meet the needs of national security and public safety, in addition to the security and safety of individuals, regulated entities, and their employees, customers, operations, and data. The Administration has made progress in this area, establishing cybersecurity requirements in key sectors such as oil and natural gas pipelines, aviation, and rail, led by the Transportation Security Administration and water systems, led by the Environmental Protection Agency.  A collaborative process between industry and regulators will produce regulatory requirements that are operationally and commercially viable and will ensure the safe and resilient operation of critical infrastructure. The most effective and efficient regulatory frameworks will be those put in place well before a crisis, rather than through the imposition of emergency regulations after a crisis occurs.\n\n## Establish Cybersecurity Regulations To Secure Critical Infrastructure\n\nThe Federal Government will use existing authorities to set necessary cybersecurity requirements in critical sectors.  Where Federal departments and agencies have gaps in statutory authorities to implement minimum cybersecurity requirements or mitigate related market failures, the Administration will work with Congress to close them.  Where states or independent regulators have authorities that can be used to set cybersecurity requirements, the Administration will encourage them to use those authorities in a deliberate and coordinated manner. Regulations should be performance-based, leverage existing cybersecurity frameworks, voluntary consensus standards, and guidanceincluding the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA)'s Cybersecurity Performance Goals and the National Institute of Standards and Technology\n(NIST) Framework for Improving Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity and be agile enough to adapt as adversaries increase their capabilities and change their tactics.  In setting cybersecurity regulations for critical infrastructure, regulators are encouraged to drive the adoption of secure-by-\n\ndesign principles, prioritize the availability of essential services, and ensure that systems are designed to fail safely and recover quickly.  Regulations will define minimum expected cybersecurity practices or outcomes, but the Administration encourages and will support further efforts by entities to exceed these requirements. Further, these and other critical sectors rely upon the cybersecurity and resilience of their third-party service providers.  Cloud-based services enable better and more economical cybersecurity practices at scale, but they are also essential to operational resilience across many critical infrastructure sectors. The Administration will identify gaps in authorities to drive better cybersecurity practices in the cloud computing industry and for other essential third-party services, and work with industry, Congress, and regulators to close them.\n\n## Harmonize And Streamline New And Existing Regulation\n\nEffective regulations minimize the cost and burden of compliance, enabling organizations to invest resources in building resilience and defending their systems and assets.  By leveraging existing international standards in a manner consistent with current policy and law, regulatory agencies can minimize the burden of unique requirements and reduce the need for regulatory harmonization. Where Federal regulations are in conflict, duplicative, or overly burdensome, regulators must work together to minimize these harms.  When necessary, the United States will pursue cross-border regulatory harmonization to prevent cybersecurity requirements from impeding digital trade flows. Where feasible, regulators should work to harmonize not only regulations and rules, but also assessments and audits of regulated entities.  ONCD, in coordination with the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), will lead the Administration's efforts on cybersecurity regulatory harmonization. The Cyber Incident Reporting Council will coordinate, deconflict, and harmonize Federal incident reporting requirements.\n\n## Enable Regulated Entities To Afford Security\n\nDifferent critical infrastructure sectors have varying capacities to absorb the costs of cybersecurity, ranging from low-margin sectors that cannot easily increase investment without intervention, to those where the marginal costs of improving cybersecurity can be absorbed.  In some sectors, regulation may be necessary to create a level playing field so that companies are not trapped in a competition to underspend their peers on cybersecurity.  In other sectors, regulators are encouraged to ensure that necessary investments in cybersecurity are incentivized through the rate-making process, tax structures, or other mechanisms.  In setting new cybersecurity requirements, regulators are encouraged to consult with regulated entities to understand how those requirements will be resourced.  In seeking new regulatory authority, the Administration will work with Congress to develop regulatory frameworks that take into account the resources necessary to implement them.\n\n## Strategic Objective 1.2: Scale Public-Private Collaboration\n\nDefending critical infrastructure against adversarial activity and other threats requires a model of cyber defense that emulates the distributed structure of the Internet.  We will realize this distributed, networked model by developing and strengthening collaboration between defenders through structured roles and responsibilities and increased connectivity enabled by the automated exchange of data, information, and knowledge.  Combining organizational collaboration and technologyenabled connectivity will create a trust-based \"network of networks\" that builds situational awareness and drives collective and synchronized action among the cyber defenders that protect our critical infrastructure. CISA is the national coordinator for critical infrastructure security and resilience.  In this role, CISA\ncoordinates with Sector Risk Management Agencies (SRMAs) to enable the Federal Government to scale its coordination with critical infrastructure owners and operators across the United States.\nSRMAs have day-to-day responsibility and sector-specific expertise to improve security and resilience within their sectors.  In turn, SRMAs support individual owners and operators in their respective sectors who are responsible for protecting the systems and assets they operate. Information sharing and analysis organizations (ISAOs), sector-focused information sharing and analysis centers (ISACs), and similar organizations facilitate cyber defense operations across vast and complex sectors.\n\nThe Federal Government will continue to enhance coordination between CISA and other SRMAs, invest in the development of SRMA capabilities, and otherwise enable SRMAs to proactively respond to the needs of critical infrastructure owners and operators in their sectors.  The Federal Government will collaborate with industry to define sector-by-sector needs and assess gaps in current SRMA capabilities.  Investment by the Federal Government in building out the capabilities of SRMAs will enable security and resilience improvements across critical infrastructure.  SRMAs will coordinate with CISA to improve their ability to be proactive and responsive to the needs of their sectors.  SRMAs must also continue to support the maturation of third-party collaboration mechanisms.  Building on decades of experience collaborating with ISACs and ISAOs, the Federal Government will work with these and other groups to develop a shared vision of how this model should evolve.\n\nAccelerating operational collaboration will require the use of technology solutions to share information and coordinate defensive efforts.  We must complement human-to-human collaboration efforts with machine-to-machine data sharing and security orchestration.  Realizing this model will enable real-time, actionable, and multi-directional sharing to drive threat response at machine speed.  In partnership with the private sector, CISA and SRMAs will explore technical and organizational mechanisms to enhance and evolve machine-to-machine sharing of data.  The Federal Government will also deepen operational and strategic collaboration with software, hardware, and managed service providers with the capability to reshape the cyber landscape in favor of greater security and resilience.\n\n## Strategic Objective 1.3: Integrate Federal Cybersecurity Centers\n\nThe Federal Government must coordinate the authorities and capabilities of the departments and agencies that are collectively responsible for supporting the defense of critical infrastructure. Federal Cybersecurity Centers serve as collaborative nodes that fuse together whole-of-government capabilities across the homeland defense, law enforcement, intelligence, diplomatic, economic, and military missions.  Once fully integrated, they will drive intragovernmental coordination and enable the Federal Government to effectively and decisively support non-Federal partners.\n\nThe Administration has made progress toward this goal, establishing the Joint Cyber Defense Collaborative (JCDC) at CISA to integrate cyber defense planning and operations across the Federal Government and with the private sector and international partners; strengthening the capabilities of the National Cyber Investigative Joint Task Force (NCIJTF) to coordinate law enforcement and other disruption actions; and revitalizing the Cyber Threat Intelligence Integration Center's (CTIIC) role in coordinating intelligence collection, analysis, and partnerships. Operational collaboration models at SRMAs, such as the Department of Energy (DOE)'s Energy Threat Analysis Center (ETAC) pilot, DoD's Defense Industrial Base Collaborative Information Sharing Environment (DCISE), and the National Security Agency (NSA)'s Cybersecurity Collaboration Center provide opportunities to enable timely, actionable, and relevant information sharing directly with private sector partners in their respective sectors. Further efforts will be required to strengthen and integrate the Federal Government's operational capabilities and improve integration of the Federal Cybersecurity Centers.  ONCD will lead the Administration's efforts to enhance the integration of centers such as these, identify gaps in capabilities, and develop an implementation plan to enable collaboration at speed and scale.\n\n## Strategic Objective 1.4: Update Federal Incident Response Plans And Processes\n\nThe private sector is capable of mitigating most cyber incidents without direct Federal assistance. When Federal assistance is required, the Federal Government must present a unified, coordinated, whole-of-government response.  Organizations targeted by cyber threats must know which government agencies to contact for what purposes.  The Federal Government must provide clear guidance on how private sector partners can reach Federal agencies for support during cyber incidents and what forms of support the Federal Government may provide. Consistent with Presidential Policy Directive 41, \"United States Cyber Incident Coordination,\"\nwhich defines lead roles for the Department of Justice (DOJ), Department of Homeland Security (DHS), and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence in threat, asset, and intelligence\n\nresponse efforts, respectivelyCISA will lead a process to update the subordinate National Cyber Incident Response Plan (NCIRP) to strengthen processes, procedures, and systems to more fully realize the policy that \"a call to one is a call to all.\"  When any Federal agency receives a request for assistance, the agency will know what support the wider Federal Government can provide, how to contact the right Federal agencies that can provide such support, and have access to effective information sharing mechanisms.  Because most Federal responses take place through field offices, the NCIRP will bolster coordination at the local level, taking lessons from the successes of the Joint Terrorism Task Forces.\nWhen incidents do occur, the Cyber Incident Reporting for Critical Infrastructure Act of 2022 (CIRCIA) will enhance our awareness and ability to respond effectively.  CIRCIA will require covered entities in critical infrastructure sectors to report covered cyber incidents to CISA within hours.  These timely notifications and CISA's rapid sharing of relevant information with DOJ and other incident response stakeholders will strengthen our collective defense, improve efforts to identify the root causes of incidents, and inform decision-making within government on how to respond.  CISA will consult with SRMAs, DOJ, and other Federal agencies during the CIRCIA rulemaking and implementation process to integrate incident reporting systems and ensure real-time sharing and actioning of all relevant incident information. Following major incidents, we will ensure that the cybersecurity community benefits from lessons learned through the Cyber Safety Review Board (CSRB).  Established by EO 14028, \"Improving the Nation's Cybersecurity,\" the CSRB brings together public and private sector cybersecurity leaders to review major cyber incidents, conduct authoritative fact-finding, generate insights that will inform and guide industry remediations, and provide recommendations for improving the nation's cybersecurity posture going forward. The Administration will work with Congress to pass legislation to codify the CSRB within DHS and provide it the authorities it needs to carry out comprehensive reviews of significant incidents.\n\n## Strategic Objective 1.5: Modernize Federal Defenses\n\nThe Federal Government requires secure and resilient information, communications, and operational technology and services to perform its duties.  In its first months, this Administration set a new strategic direction for Federal cybersecurity, publishing EO 14028, \"Improving the Nation's Cybersecurity,\" which led to the release of NSM 8, \"Improving the Cybersecurity of National Security, the Defense Department, and Intelligence Community Systems,\" and the OMB Federal zero trust architecture strategy. Building on this momentum, the Administration will drive long-term efforts to defend the Federal enterprise and modernize Federal systems in accordance with zero trust principles that acknowledge threats must be countered both inside and outside traditional network boundaries.  By making its\n\nown networks more defensible and resilient, the Federal Government will be a model for private sector emulation.\n\n## Collectively Defend Federal Civilian Agencies\n\nFederal civilian executive branch (FCEB) agencies are responsible for managing and securing their own IT and OT systems.  With different agency structures, missions, capabilities, and resourcing, FCEB cybersecurity outcomes vary.  We must continue to build a model for Federal cybersecurity that balances the individual authorities and capabilities of agencies with the security benefits achieved through a collective approach to defense. We will continue to build Federal cohesion through focused action across the Federal Government. OMB, in coordination with CISA, will develop a plan of action to secure FCEB systems through collective operational defense, expanded availability of centralized shared services, and software supply chain risk mitigation.  These efforts will build on prior programs and prioritize actions that advance a whole-of-government approach to defending FCEB information systems.  The software supply chain risk mitigation objective, developed in coordination with NIST, will build on the implementation of EO 14028, \"Improving the Nation's Cybersecurity,\" including the Software Bills of Material (SBOM) efforts, NIST's Secure Software Development Framework, and related efforts to improve open-source software security.\n\n## Modernize Federal Systems\n\nThe Federal Government must replace or update IT and OT systems that are not defensible against sophisticated cyber threats.  The OMB zero trust architecture strategy directs FCEB agencies to implement multi-factor authentication, encrypt their data, gain visibility into their entire attack surface, manage authorization and access, and adopt cloud security tools.  These and other cybersecurity goals cannot be achieved unless Federal IT and OT systems are modernized so they are capable of leveraging critical security technologies.  OMB will lead development of a multi-year lifecycle plan to accelerate FCEB technology modernization, prioritizing Federal efforts on eliminating legacy systems which are costly to maintain and difficult to defend.  The plan will identify milestones to remove all legacy systems incapable of implementing our zero trust architecture strategy within a decade, or otherwise mitigate risks to those that cannot be replaced in that timeframe.  Replacing legacy systems with more secure technology, including through accelerating migration to cloud-based services, will elevate the cybersecurity posture across the Federal Government and, in turn, improve the security and resilience of the digital services it provides to the American people.\n\n## Defend National Security Systems\n\nNational security systems (NSS) store and process some of the Federal Government's most sensitive data and must be secured against a wide range of cyber and physical threats, including insider threats, cyber criminals, and the most sophisticated nation-state adversaries.  The Director of the NSA, as the National Manager for NSS, will coordinate with OMB to develop a plan for NSS at FCEB agencies that ensures implementation of the enhanced cybersecurity requirements of NSM-8.\n\n## Pillar Two | Disrupt And Dismantle Threat Actors\n\nThe United States will use all instruments of national power to disrupt and dismantle threat actors whose actions threaten our interests.  These efforts may integrate diplomatic, information, military (both kinetic and cyber), financial, intelligence, and law enforcement capabilities.  Our goal is to make malicious actors incapable of mounting sustained cyber-enabled campaigns that would threaten the national security or public safety of the United States.\n\nCoordinated efforts by Federal and non-Federal entities have proven effective in frustrating the malicious cyber activity of foreign government, criminal, and other threat actors. The Federal Government has increased its capacity to respond to cyber incidents; arrested and successfully prosecuted transnational cybercriminals and state-sponsored actors; imposed sanctions on malicious cyber actors, including bans on travel and denying access to money service providers; and deprived threat actors of access to digital infrastructure and victim networks.  The Federal Government has also targeted financial infrastructure used for illicit activity; established new diplomatic initiatives attributing disruptive, destructive, or otherwise destabilizing cyber activities to hold actors accountable for their malicious behavior; and recovered billions of dollars' worth of ill-gotten assets.\n\nWe will build upon these successes to enable more sustained and effective disruption of adversaries. Our efforts will require greater collaboration by public and private sector partners to improve intelligence sharing, execute disruption campaigns at scale, deny adversaries use of U.S.-based infrastructure, and thwart global ransomware campaigns.\n\n## Strategic Objective 2.1: Integrate Federal Disruption Activities\n\nDisruption campaigns must become so sustained and targeted that criminal cyber activity is rendered unprofitable and foreign government actors engaging in malicious cyber activity no longer see it as an effective means of achieving their goals.  DOJ and other Federal law enforcement agencies have pioneered the integrated deployment of domestic legal authorities with private industry and international allies and partners to disrupt online criminal infrastructure and resources, from taking down notorious botnets to seizing cryptocurrency gleaned from ransomware and fraud campaigns.\nInformation generated from these investigations enables other efforts, such as victim notification, issuance of cybersecurity advisories, private-sector actions, sanctions designations, diplomatic actions, and intelligence operations. The Department of Defense's strategic approach of defending forward has helped generate insights on threat actors, identify and expose malware, and disrupt malicious activity before it could affect its intended targets.  Informed by lessons learned and the rapidly-evolving threat environment, DoD will develop an updated departmental cyber strategy aligned with the National Security Strategy,\n\nNational Defense Strategy, and this National Cybersecurity Strategy.  DoD's new strategy will clarify how U.S. Cyber Command and other DoD components will integrate cyberspace operations into their efforts to defend against state and non-state actors capable of posing strategic-level threats to U.S. interests, while continuing to strengthen their integration and coordination of operations with civilian, law enforcement, and intelligence partners to disrupt malicious activity at scale. To increase the volume and speed of these integrated disruption campaigns, the Federal Government must further develop technological and organizational platforms that enable continuous, coordinated operations.  The NCIJTF, as a multi-agency focal point for coordinating whole-of-government disruption campaigns, will expand its capacity to coordinate takedown and disruption campaigns with greater speed, scale, and frequency.  Similarly, DoD and the Intelligence Community are committed to bringing to bear their full range of complementary authorities to disruption campaigns.\n\n## Strategic Objective 2.2: Enhance Public-Private Operational Collaboration To Disrupt Adversaries\n\nThe private sector has growing visibility into adversary activity.  This body of insight is often broader and more detailed than that of the Federal Government, due in part to the sheer scale of the private sector and its threat hunting operations, but also due to the rapid pace of innovation in tooling and capabilities.  Effective disruption of malicious cyber activity requires more routine collaboration between the private sector entities that have unique insights and capabilities and the Federal agencies that have the means and authorities to act.  The 2021 takedown of the Emotet botnet showed the potential of this collaborative approach, with Federal agencies, international allies and partners, and private industry cooperating to disrupt the botnet's operations.  Given the interest of the cybersecurity community and digital infrastructure owners and operators in continuing this approach, we must sustain and expand upon this model so that collaborative disruption operations can be carried out on a continuous basis.\n\nPrivate sector partners are encouraged to come together and organize their efforts through one or more nonprofit organizations that can serve as hubs for operational collaboration with the Federal Government, such as the National Cyber-Forensics and Training Alliance (NCFTA).  Threatspecific collaboration should take the form of nimble, temporary cells, comprised of a small number of trusted operators, hosted and supported by a relevant hub.  Using virtual collaboration platforms, members of the cell would share information bidirectionally and work rapidly to disrupt adversaries. The Federal Government will rapidly overcome barriers to supporting and leveraging this collaboration model, such as security requirements and records management policy.\n\n## Strategic Objective 2.3: Increase The Speed And Scale Of Intelligence Sharing And Victim Notification\n\nThe timely sharing of threat intelligence between Federal and non-Federal partners enhances collaborative efforts to disrupt and dismantle adversaries.  Open-source cybersecurity intelligence and private sector intelligence providers have greatly increased collective awareness of cyber threats, but national intelligence that only the government can collect remains invaluable.  For instance, the NSA Cybersecurity Collaboration Center's national intelligence-driven engagement with industry has been highly effective at disrupting adversary activity targeting the Defense Industrial Base.  Similarly, CISA enables persistent, multi-directional threat information sharing with the private sector through the JCDC and, in coordination with the FBI, uses that information to accelerate victim notification and to reduce the impact of identified intrusions.\n\nThe Federal Government will increase the speed and scale of cyber threat intelligence sharing to proactively warn cyber defenders and notify victims when the government has information that an organization is being actively targeted or may already be compromised.  SRMAs, in coordination with CISA, law enforcement agencies, and the CTIIC, will identify intelligence needs and priorities within their sector and develop processes to share warnings, technical indicators, threat context, and other relevant information with both government and non-government partners.  These processes must provide mechanisms for the private sector to provide timely feedback and their own threat intelligence to the Federal Government to improve targeting of cyber threats for disruption and further intelligence collection.  The Federal Government will also review declassification policies and processes to determine the conditions under which extending additional classified access and expanding clearances is necessary to provide actionable intelligence to owners and operators of critical infrastructure.\n\n## Strategic Objective 2.4: Prevent Abuse Of U.S.-Based Infrastructure\n\nMalicious cyber actors exploit U.S.-based cloud infrastructure, domain registrars, hosting and email providers, and other digital services to carry out criminal activity, malign influence operations, and espionage against individual victims, businesses, governments, and other organizations in the United States and abroad.  Often, these services are leased through foreign resellers who have multiple degrees of separation from their U.S.-based providers, hindering the ability of those providers to address abuse complaints or respond to legal process from U.S. authorities.  The Federal Government will work with cloud and other internet infrastructure providers to quickly identify malicious use of U.S.-based infrastructure, share reports of malicious use with the government, make it easier for victims to report abuse of these systems, and make it more difficult for malicious actors to gain access to these resources in the first place.\n\nAll service providers must make reasonable attempts to secure the use of their infrastructure against abuse or other criminal behavior.  The Administration will prioritize adoption and enforcement of a risk-based approach to cybersecurity across Infrastructure-as-a-Service providers that addresses known methods and indicators of malicious activity including through implementation of EO 13984, \"Taking Additional Steps to Address the National Emergency with Respect to Significant Malicious Cyber-Enabled Activities.\"  Implementation of this order will make it more difficult for adversaries to abuse U.S.-based infrastructure while safeguarding individual privacy.\n\n## Strategic Objective 2.5: Counter Cybercrime, Defeat Ransomware\n\nRansomware is a threat to national security, public safety, and economic prosperity.  Ransomware operators have disrupted hospitals, schools, pipeline operations, government services, and other critical infrastructure and essential services.  Operating from safe havens like Russia, Iran, and North Korea, ransomware actors exploit poor cybersecurity practices to take control of victim networks and rely on cryptocurrencies to receive extortion payments and launder their proceeds. Given ransomware's impact on key critical infrastructure services, the United States will employ all elements of national power to counter the threat along four lines of effort: (1) leveraging international cooperation to disrupt the ransomware ecosystem and isolate those countries that provide safe havens for criminals; (2) investigating ransomware crimes and using law enforcement and other authorities to disrupt ransomware infrastructure and actors; (3) bolstering critical infrastructure resilience to withstand ransomware attacks; and (4) addressing the abuse of virtual currency to launder ransom payments.\n\nAs ransomware is a borderless challenge requiring international cooperation, the White House has convened the Counter-Ransomware Initiative (CRI) with participation from more than thirty countries.  The CRI has conducted global exercises to build resilience and, as of January 2023, launched an international counter ransomware task force, led by Australia, to share information regarding the actors and infrastructure conducting ransomware attacks that will support and further accelerate CRI member countries' existing, often coordinated disruption efforts.  The CRI will also drive synchronization of policy and diplomatic efforts across its members. The Administration is committed to mounting disruption campaigns and other efforts that are so sustained, coordinated, and targeted that they render ransomware no longer profitable.  The Joint Ransomware Task Force (JRTF), co-chaired by CISA and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), will coordinate, deconflict, and synchronize existing interagency efforts to disrupt ransomware operations and provide support to private sector and SLTT efforts to increase their protections against ransomware. Our approach will also include targeting the illicit cryptocurrency exchanges on which ransomware operators rely and improving international implementation of standards for combatting virtual asset illicit finance.  The United States subjects financial institutions offering covered services in\n\ncryptocurrencies to Anti-Money Laundering and Countering the Financing of Terrorism\n(AML/CFT) controls, and the Department of the Treasury, the Secret Service, DOJ, the FBI, and private sector partners are collaborating to trace and interdict ransomware payments.  The CRI has gained the commitment of members to implement international AML/CFT standards, including know-your-customer (KYC) rules, to make it harder for ransomware actors to launder cryptocurrency proceeds from attacks.  Over the long term, the United States will support implementation of international AML/CFT standards globally to mitigate the use of cryptocurrencies for illicit activities that undermine our national interest as part of our efforts to implement EO 14067, \"Ensuring Responsible Development of Digital Assets.\" Ultimately, the most effective way to undermine the motivation of these criminal groups is to reduce the potential for profit.  For this reason, the Administration strongly discourages the payment of ransoms.  At the same time, victims of ransomware - whether or not they choose to pay a ransom -\nshould report the incident to law enforcement and other appropriate agencies.  These reports enhance the Federal Government's ability to provide victim support, to prevent further use of cryptocurrencies to evade AML/CFT controls, and to reduce the likelihood that future ransomware attacks will be successful.\n\n## Pillar Three | Shape Market Forces To Drive Security And Resilience\n\nTo build the secure and resilient future we want, we must shape market forces to place responsibility on those within our digital ecosystem that are best positioned to reduce risk.  We will shift the consequences of poor cybersecurity away from the most vulnerable, making our digital ecosystem more worthy of trust.  In this effort, we will not replace or diminish the role of the market, but channel market forces productively toward keeping our country resilient and secure.  Our goal is a modern digital economy that promotes practices that enhance the security and resilience of our digital ecosystem while preserving innovation and competition. Continued disruptions of critical infrastructure and thefts of personal data make clear that market forces alone have not been enough to drive broad adoption of best practices in cybersecurity and resilience.  In too many cases, organizations that choose not to invest in cybersecurity negatively and unfairly impact those that do, often disproportionately impacting small businesses and our most vulnerable communities.  While market forces remain the first, best route to agile and effective innovation, they have not adequately mobilized industry to prioritize our core economic and national security interests.\n\nTo address these challenges, the Administration will shape the long-term security and resilience of the digital ecosystem, against both today's threats and tomorrow's challenges.  We must hold the stewards of our data accountable for the protection of personal data; drive the development of more secure connected devices; and reshape laws that govern liability for data losses and harm caused by cybersecurity errors, software vulnerabilities, and other risks created by software and digital technologies.  We will use Federal purchasing power and grant-making to incentivize security.  And we will explore how the government can stabilize insurance markets against catastrophic risk to drive better cybersecurity practices and to provide market certainty when catastrophic events do occur.\n\n## Strategic Objective 3.1: Hold The Stewards Of Our Data Accountable\n\nSecuring personal data is a foundational aspect to protecting consumer privacy in a digital future. Data-driven technologies have transformed our economy and offer convenience for consumers.\nBut the dramatic proliferation of personal information expands the threat environment and increases the impact of data breaches on consumers.  When organizations that have data on individuals fail to act as responsible stewards for this data, they externalize the costs onto everyday Americans.  Often, the greatest harm falls upon the vulnerable populations for whom risks to their personal data can produce disproportionate harms.\n\nThe Administration supports legislative efforts to impose robust, clear limits on the ability to collect, use, transfer, and maintain personal data and provide strong protections for sensitive data like geolocation and health information.  This legislation should also set national requirements to secure personal data consistent with standards and guidelines developed by NIST.  By providing privacy requirements that evolve with threats, the United States can pave the way for a more secure future.\n\n## Strategic Objective 3.2: Drive The Development Of Secure Iot Devices\n\nInternet of Things (IoT) devices, including both consumer goods like fitness trackers and baby monitors, as well as industrial control systems and sensors, introduce new sources of connectivity in our homes and businesses.  However, many of the IoT devices deployed today are not sufficiently protected against cybersecurity threats.  Too often they have been deployed with inadequate default settings, can be difficult or impossible to patch or upgrade, or come equipped with advancedand sometimes unnecessarycapabilities that enable malicious cyber activities on critical physical and digital systems.  Recent IoT vulnerabilities have shown just how easily bad actors can exploit these devices to construct botnets and conduct surveillance. The Administration will continue to improve IoT cybersecurity through Federal research and development (R&D), procurement, and risk management efforts, as directed in the IoT Cybersecurity Improvement Act of 2020.  In addition, the Administration will continue to advance the development of IoT security labeling programs, as directed under EO 14028, \"Improving the Nation's Cybersecurity.\"  Through the expansion of IoT security labels, consumers will be able to compare the cybersecurity protections offered by different IoT products, thus creating a market incentive for greater security across the entire IoT ecosystem.\n\n## Strategic Objective 3.3: Shift Liability For Insecure Software Products And Services\n\nMarkets impose inadequate costs onand often rewardthose entities that introduce vulnerable products or services into our digital ecosystem.  Too many vendors ignore best practices for secure development, ship products with insecure default configurations or known vulnerabilities, and integrate third-party software of unvetted or unknown provenance.  Software makers are able to leverage their market position to fully disclaim liability by contract, further reducing their incentive to follow secure-by-design principles or perform pre-release testing.  Poor software security greatly increases systemic risk across the digital ecosystem and leave American citizens bearing the ultimate cost. We must begin to shift liability onto those entities that fail to take reasonable precautions to secure their software while recognizing that even the most advanced software security programs cannot\n\nprevent all vulnerabilities.  Companies that make software must have the freedom to innovate, but they must also be held liable when they fail to live up to the duty of care they owe consumers, businesses, or critical infrastructure providers.  Responsibility must be placed on the stakeholders most capable of taking action to prevent bad outcomes, not on the end-users that often bear the consequences of insecure software nor on the open-source developer of a component that is integrated into a commercial product.  Doing so will drive the market to produce safer products and services while preserving innovation and the ability of startups and other small- and medium-sized businesses to compete against market leaders. The Administration will work with Congress and the private sector to develop legislation establishing liability for software products and services.  Any such legislation should prevent manufacturers and software publishers with market power from fully disclaiming liability by contract, and establish higher standards of care for software in specific high-risk scenarios.  To begin to shape standards of care for secure software development, the Administration will drive the development of an adaptable safe harbor framework to shield from liability companies that securely develop and maintain their software products and services.  This safe harbor will draw from current best practices for secure software development, such as the NIST Secure Software Development Framework.  It also must evolve over time, incorporating new tools for secure software development, software transparency, and vulnerability discovery. To further incentivize the adoption of secure software development practices, the Administration will encourage coordinated vulnerability disclosure across all technology types and sectors; promote the further development of SBOMs; and develop a process for identifying and mitigating the risk presented by unsupported software that is widely used or supports critical infrastructure.  In partnership with the private sector and the open-source software community, the Federal Government will also continue to invest in the development of secure software, including memorysafe languages and software development techniques, frameworks, and testing tools.\n\n## Strategic Objective 3.4: Use Federal Grants And Other Incentives To Build In Security\n\nFederal grant programs offer strategic opportunities to make investments in critical infrastructure that are designed, developed, fielded, and maintained with cybersecurity and all-hazards resilience in mind.  Through programs funded by the Bipartisan Infrastructure Law, the Inflation Reduction Act, and the CHIPS and Science Act, the United States is making once-in-a-generation investments in our infrastructure and the digital ecosystem that supports it.  This Administration is committed to making investments in a manner that increases our collective systemic resilience. The Federal Government will collaborate with SLTT entities, the private sector, and other partners to balance cybersecurity requirements for applicants with technical assistance and other forms of support.  Together, we can drive investment in critical products and services that are secure- and resilient-by-design, and sustain and incentivize security and resilience throughout the lifecycle of\n\ncritical infrastructure.  The Federal Government will also prioritize funding for cybersecurity research, development, and demonstration (RD&D) programs aimed at strengthening critical infrastructure cybersecurity and resilience.  And, the Administration will work with Congress to develop other incentive mechanisms to drive better cybersecurity practices at scale.\n\n## Strategic Objective 3.5: Leverage Federal Procurement To Improve Accountability\n\nContracting requirements for vendors that sell to the Federal Government have been an effective tool for improving cybersecurity.  EO 14028, \"Improving the Nation's Cybersecurity,\" expands upon this approach, ensuring that contract requirements for cybersecurity are strengthened and standardized across Federal agencies.  Continuing to pilot new concepts for setting, enforcing, and testing cybersecurity requirements through procurement can lead to novel and scalable approaches.\n\nWhen companies make contractual commitments to follow cybersecurity best practices to the Federal Government, they must live up to them.  The Civil Cyber-Fraud Initiative (CCFI) uses DOJ authorities under the False Claims Act to pursue civil actions against government grantees and contractors who fail to meet cybersecurity obligations.  The CCFI will hold accountable entities or individuals that put U.S. information or systems at risk by knowingly providing deficient cybersecurity products or services, knowingly misrepresenting their cybersecurity practices or protocols, or knowingly violating obligations to monitor and report cyber incidents and breaches.\n\n## Strategic Objective 3.6: Explore A Federal Cyber Insurance Backstop\n\nWhen catastrophic incidents occur, it is a government responsibility to stabilize the economy and provide certainty in uncertain times.  In the event of a catastrophic cyber incident, the Federal Government could be called upon to stabilize the economy and aid recovery.  Structuring that response before a catastrophic event occursrather than rushing to develop an aid package after the factcould provide certainty to markets and make the nation more resilient.  The Administration will assess the need for and possible structures of a Federal insurance response to catastrophic cyber events that would support the existing cyber insurance market.  In developing this assessment, the Administration will seek input from, and consult with, Congress, state regulators, and industry stakeholders.\n\n## Pillar Four | Invest In A Resilient Future\n\nA resilient and flourishing digital future tomorrow begins with investments made today.  We can build a more secure, resilient, privacy-preserving, and equitable digital ecosystem through strategic investments and coordinated, collaborative action.  In doing so, the United States will maintain its leading role as the world's foremost innovator in secure and resilient next-generation technologies and infrastructure.\n\nFoundational elements of our digital ecosystem, like the Internet, are products of sustained and mutually-supporting investments by both public and private sector entities.  However, public and private investments in cybersecurity have long trailed the threats and challenges we face.  As we build a new generation of digital infrastructure, from next-generation telecommunications and IoT\nto distributed energy resources, and prepare for revolutionary changes in our technology landscape brought by artificial intelligence and quantum computing, the need to address this investment gap has grown more urgent.\n\nThe Federal Government must leverage strategic public investments in innovation, R&D, and education to drive outcomes that are economically sustainable and serve the national interest.  We will leverage the National Science Foundation's (NSF) Regional Innovation Engines program, longstanding Secure and Trustworthy Cyberspace program; new grant programs and funding opportunities established in the Bipartisan Infrastructure Law, Inflation Reduction Act, and CHIPS and Science Act; Manufacturing Institutes; and other elements of the Federal research and development enterprise.\n\nThese investments will assure continued U.S. leadership in technology and innovation as part of a modern industrial and innovation strategy.  Decades of adversaries and malicious actors weaponizing our technology and innovation against usto steal our intellectual property, interfere in or influence our electoral process, and undercut our national defenseshas demonstrated that leadership in innovation without security is not enough.  We will complement our efforts to outinnovate other countries with focused, coordinated action to optimize critical and emerging technologies for cybersecurity as they are developed and deployed.  We will ensure that resilience is not a discretionary element of new technical capabilities but a commercially viable element of the innovation and deployment process.\n\n## Strategic Objective 4.1: Secure The Technical Foundation Of The Internet\n\nThe Internet is critical to our future but retains the fundamental structure of its past.  Many of the technical foundations of the digital ecosystem are inherently vulnerable.  Every time we build something new on top of this foundation, we add new vulnerabilities and increase our collective risk\n\nexposure.  We must take steps to mitigate the most urgent of these pervasive concerns such as Border Gateway Protocol vulnerabilities, unencrypted Domain Name System requests, and the slow adoption of IPv6.  Such a \"clean-up\" effort to reduce systemic risk requires identification of the most pressing of these security challenges, further development of effective security measures, and close collaboration between public and private sectors to reduce our risk exposure without disrupting the platforms and services built atop this infrastructure.  The Federal Government will lead by ensuring that its networks have implemented these and other security measures while partnering with stakeholders to develop and drive adoption of solutions that will improve the security of the Internet ecosystem and support research to understand and address reasons for slow adoption. Preserving and extending the open, free, global, interoperable, reliable, and secure Internet requires sustained engagement in standards development processes to instill our values and ensure that technical standards produce technologies that are more secure and resilient.  As autocratic regimes seek to change the Internet and its multistakeholder foundation to enable government control, censorship, and surveillance, the United States and its foreign and private sector partners will implement a multi-pronged strategy to preserve technical excellence, protect our security, drive economic competitiveness, promote digital trade, and ensure that the \"rules of the road\" for technology standards favor principles of transparency, openness, consensus, relevance, and coherence.  By supporting non-governmental Standards Developing Organizations (SDOs), the United States will partner with industry leaders, international allies, academic institutions, professional societies, consumer groups, and nonprofits, to secure emerging technologies, enable interoperability, foster global market competition, and protect our national security and economic advantage.\n\n## Strategic Objective 4.2: Reinvigorate Federal Research And Development For Cybersecurity\n\nThrough Federal efforts to prioritize research and development in defensible and resilient architectures and reduce vulnerabilities in underlying technologies, we can ensure that the technologies of tomorrow are more secure than those of today. As part of the update to the Federal Cybersecurity Research and Development Strategic Plan, the Federal Government will identify, prioritize, and catalyze the research, development, and demonstration (RD&D) community to proactively prevent and mitigate cybersecurity risks in existing and next generation technologies.  Departments and agencies will direct RD&D projects to advance cybersecurity and resilience in areas such as artificial intelligence, operational technologies and industrial control systems, cloud infrastructure, telecommunications, encryption, system transparency, and data analytics used in critical infrastructure.  These efforts will be supported by the Federal RD&D enterprise, including the NSF, DOE National Laboratories, and other Federally funded research and development centers (FFRDCs), and through partnerships with academia, manufacturers, technology companies, and owners and operators.\n\nThese RD&D investments will focus on securing three families of technologies that will prove decisive for U.S. leadership in the coming decade: computing-related technologies, including microelectronics, quantum information systems, and artificial intelligence; biotechnologies and biomanufacturing; and clean energy technologies.  This effort will facilitate the proactive identification of potential vulnerabilities, as well as the research to mitigate them.  It will also support a larger modern industrial and innovation strategy to promote coordinated and strategic innovation and create markets for trustworthy products and services by comprehensively leveraging Federal investment vehicles, Federal purchasing power, and Federal regulations.\n\n## Strategic Objective 4.3: Prepare For Our Post-Quantum Future\n\nStrong encryption is foundational to cybersecurity and global commerce.  It is the primary way we protect our data online, validate end users, authenticate signatures, and certify the accuracy of information.  But quantum computing has the potential to break some of the most ubiquitous encryption standards deployed today.  We must prioritize and accelerate investments in widespread replacement of hardware, software, and services that can be easily compromised by quantum computers so that information is protected against future attacks.\n\nTo balance the promotion and advancement of quantum computing against threats posed to digital systems, NSM 10, \"Promoting United States Leadership in Quantum Computing While Mitigating Risks to Vulnerable Cryptographic Systems,\" establishes a process for the timely transition of the country's cryptographic systems to interoperable quantum-resistant cryptography.  The Federal Government will prioritize the transition of vulnerable public networks and systems to quantumresistant cryptography-based environments and develop complementary mitigation strategies to provide cryptographic agility in the face of unknown future risks.  The private sector should follow the government's model in preparing its own networks and systems for our post-quantum future.\n\n## Strategic Objective 4.4: Secure Our Clean Energy Future\n\nOur accelerating national transition to a clean energy future is bringing online a new generation of interconnected hardware and software systems that have the potential to strengthen the resiliency, safety, and efficiency of the U.S. electric grid.  These technologies, including distributed energy resources, \"smart\" energy generation and storage devices, advanced cloud-based grid management platforms, and transmission and distribution networks designed for high-capacity controllable loads are far more sophisticated, automated, and digitally interconnected than prior generations of grid systems.\n\nAs the United States makes a generational investment in new energy infrastructure, the Administration will seize this strategic opportunity to build in cybersecurity proactively through implementation of the Congressionally-directed National Cyber-Informed Engineering Strategy, rather than developing a patchwork of security controls after these connected devices are widely deployed.  The Administration is coordinating the work of stakeholders across the Federal Government, industry, and SLTT to deploy a secure, interoperable network of electric vehicle chargers, zero-emission fueling infrastructure, and zero-emission transit and school buses.  DOE, through efforts such as the Clean Energy Cybersecurity Accelerator (CECA) and the Bipartisan Infrastructure Law-directed Energy Cyber Sense program, and the National Labs are leading the government's effort to secure the clean energy grid of the future and generating security best practices that extend to other critical infrastructure sectors.  DOE will also continue to promote cybersecurity for electric distribution and distributed energy resources in partnership with industry, States, Federal regulators, Congress, and other agencies.\n\n## Strategic Objective 4.5: Support Development Of A Digital Identity Ecosystem\n\nEnhanced digital identity solutions and infrastructure can enable a more innovative, equitable, safe and efficient digital economy.  These solutions can support easier and more secure access to government benefits and services, trusted communication and social networks, and new possibilities for digital contracts and payment systems. Today, the lack of secure, privacy-preserving, consent-based digital identity solutions allows fraud to flourish, perpetuates exclusion and inequity, and adds inefficiency to our financial activities and daily life.  Identity theft is on the rise, with data breaches impacting nearly 300 million victims in 2021 and malicious actors fraudulently obtaining billions of dollars in COVID-19 pandemic relief funds intended for small businesses and individuals in need.  This malicious activity affects us all, creating significant losses for businesses and producing harmful impacts on public benefit programs and those Americans who use them.  Operating independently, neither the private nor public sectors have been able to solve this problem. The Federal Government will encourage and enable investments in strong, verifiable digital identity solutions that promote security, accessibility and interoperability, financial and social inclusion, consumer privacy, and economic growth.  Building on the NIST-led digital identity research program authorized in the CHIPS and Science Act, these efforts will include strengthening the security of digital credentials; providing attribute and credential validation services; conducting foundational research; updating standards, guidelines, and governance processes to support consistent use and interoperability; and develop digital identity platforms that promote transparency and measurement.  Acknowledging that States are piloting mobile drivers' licenses, we note and encourage a focus on privacy, security, civil liberties, equity, accessibility, and interoperability.\n\nIn developing these capabilities, our digital identity policies and technologies will protect and enhance individual privacy, civil rights, and civil liberties; guard against unintended consequences, bias, and potential abuse; enable vendor choice and voluntary use by individuals; increase security and interoperability; promote inclusivity and accessibility; and improve transparency and accountability in the use of technology and individuals' data.\n\n## Strategic Objective 4.6: Develop A National Strategy To Strengthen Our Cyber Workforce\n\nToday, there are hundreds of thousands of unfilled vacancies in cybersecurity positions nationwide, and this gap is growing.  Both private sector and public sector employers face challenges in recruiting, hiring, and retaining professionals to fill these vacancies, which negatively impacts our collective cybersecurity.  To address this challenge, ONCD will lead the development and oversee implementation of a National Cyber Workforce and Education Strategy. This strategy will take a comprehensive and coordinated approach to expanding the national cyber workforce, improving its diversity, and increasing access to cyber educational and training pathways. It will address the need for cybersecurity expertise across all sectors of the economy, with a special focus on critical infrastructure, and will enable the American workforce to continue to innovate in secure and resilient next-generation technologies.  The strategy will strengthen and diversify the Federal cyber workforce, addressing the unique challenges the public sector faces in recruiting, retaining, and developing the talent and capacity needed to protect Federal data and IT infrastructure.  And, the strategy will recognize that cyber workforce challenges are not unique to the United States, expanding upon and drawing inspiration from efforts underway in other countries.\n\nThe strategy will build on existing efforts to develop our national cybersecurity workforce including the National Initiative for Cybersecurity Education (NICE), the CyberCorps: Scholarship for Service program, the National Centers of Academic Excellence in Cybersecurity program, the Cybersecurity Education Training and Assistance Program, and the registered apprenticeships program.  The strategy will also leverage ongoing workforce development programs at NSF and other science agencies to augment Federal Government programs. It will tackle head on the lack of diversity in the cyber workforce.  Employers are hiring from too small a pool of talent and from professional networks that and are not able to draw from the full diversity of the country.  Women, people of color, first-generation professionals and immigrants, individuals with disabilities, and LGBTQI+ individuals are among the communities which are underrepresented in the field.  Addressing systemic inequities and overcoming barriers that inhibit diversity in the cyber workforce is both a moral necessity and a strategic imperative.\n\nTo recruit and train the next generation of cybersecurity professionals to secure our digital ecosystem will require Federal leadership and enduring partnership between public and private sectors.  Building and maintaining a strong cyber workforce cannot be achieved unless a cybersecurity career is within reach for any capable American who wishes to pursue it and every\n\norganization with an unfilled position plays a part in training the next generation of cybersecurity talent.\n\n## Pillar Five | Forge International Partnerships To Pursue Shared Goals\n\nThe United States seeks a world where responsible state behavior in cyberspace is expected and rewarded and where irresponsible behavior is isolating and costly.  To achieve this goal, we will continue to engage with countries working in opposition to our larger agenda on common problems while we build a broad coalition of nations working to maintain an open, free, global, interoperable, reliable, and secure Internet. For decades, we have worked through international institutions to define and advance responsible state behavior in cyberspace.  We have used multilateral processes such as the United Nations (UN) Group of Governmental Experts and Open-Ended Working Group to develop a framework that includes a set of peacetime norms and confidence-building measures, which all UN member states have affirmed in the UN General Assembly.  We have supported the expansion of the Budapest Convention on Cybercrime and other global efforts to make cyberspace more secure.  We will continue these efforts while recognizing the need to work with partners to thwart the dark vision for the future of the Internet that the PRC and other autocratic governments promote.  We will do so by demonstrating to economies and societies the value of openness and jointly imposing consequences for behavior that runs counter to agreed norms of state behavior. To counter common threats, preserve and reinforce global Internet freedom, protect against transnational digital repression, and build toward a shared digital ecosystem that is more inherently resilient and defensible, the United States will work to scale the emerging model of collaboration by national cybersecurity stakeholders to cooperate with the international community.  We will expand coalitions, collaboratively disrupt transnational criminals and other malicious cyber actors, build the capacity of our international allies and partners, reinforce the applicability of existing international law to state behavior in cyberspace, uphold globally accepted and voluntary norms of responsible state behavior in peacetime, and punish those that engage in disruptive, destructive, or destabilizing malicious cyber activity.\n\n## Strategic Objective 5.1: Build Coalitions To Counter Threats To Our Digital Ecosystem\n\nIn April 2022, the United States and 60 countries launched the Declaration for the Future of the Internet (DFI), bringing together a broad, diverse coalition of partnersthe largest of its kind around a common, democratic vision for an open, free, global, interoperable, reliable, and secure digital future.  Through the DFI, the Freedom Online Coalition, and other partnerships and mechanisms, the United States is rallying like-minded countries, the international business community, and other stakeholders to advance our vision for the future of the Internet that\n\npromotes secure and trusted data flows, respects privacy, promotes human rights, and enables progress on broader challenges. Through mechanisms like the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (\"the Quad\") between the United States, India, Japan, and Australia, the United States and its international allies and partners are advancing these shared goals for cyberspace.  These include improving information sharing between computer emergency response teams and the development of a digital ecosystem based on shared values.  The Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity (IPEF) and the Americas Partnership for Economic Prosperity (APEP) create opportunities for the United States and regional governments to collaborate in setting rules of the road for the digital economy, including facilitating the development of technical standards, mechanisms to enable cross-border data flows that protect privacy while avoiding strict data localization requirements, and actions to foster supply chain security and resilience.  Through the U.S.-EU Trade and Technology Council (TTC), we are coordinating across the Atlantic to combat shared threats and demonstrate how market approaches to digital trade, technology, and innovation can improve the lives of our citizens and be a force for greater prosperity.  The United States is also working closely with Australia and the United Kingdom through the trilateral security and technology pact (\"AUKUS\") to secure critical technologies, improve cyber coordination, and share advanced capabilities. Through these and other partnerships, the United States and international counterparts can advance common cybersecurity interests by sharing cyber threat information, exchanging model cybersecurity practices, comparing sector-specific expertise, driving secure-by-design principles, and coordinating policy and incident response activities.  Furthermore, multistakeholder partnerships and coalitions that also include private sector and civil society organizations, such as the Christchurch Call to Action to Eliminate Terrorist and Violent Extremist Content Online, the Freedom Online Coalition, and the Global Partnership for Action on Gender-Based Online Harassment and Abuse, are crucial to tackling systemic issues.  We will leverage these partnerships to enable effective operational collaboration to defend our shared digital ecosystem.  We will also support and help build, as needed, new and innovative partnershipsas in the case of the international Counter-Ransomware Initiativethat bring together unique collections of stakeholders to address new and emerging cybersecurity challenges.\n\nBecause most malicious cyber activity targeting the United States is carried out by actors based in foreign countries or using foreign computing infrastructure, we must strengthen the mechanisms we have to collaborate with our allies and partners so that no adversary can evade the rule of law.  The United States will work with its allies and partners to develop new collaborative law enforcement mechanisms for the digital age.  For example, the European Cybercrime Centre has played a vital role in modernizing legal frameworks, training law enforcement, improving attribution, collaborating with private sector partners, and responding to malicious cyber activities in Europe.  To extend this model, we will support efforts to build effective hubs with partners in other regions.\n\n## Strategic Objective 5.2: Strengthen International Partner Capacity\n\nAs we build a coalition to advance shared cybersecurity priorities and promote a common vision for the digital ecosystem, the United States will strengthen the capacity of like-minded states across the globe to support these goals.  We must enable our allies and partners to secure critical infrastructure networks, build effective incident detection and response capabilities, share cyber threat information, pursue diplomatic collaboration, build law enforcement capacity and effectiveness through operational collaboration, and support our shared interests in cyberspace by adhering to international law and reinforcing norms of responsible state behavior. To accomplish this goal, the United States will marshal expertise across agencies, the public and private sectors, and among advanced regional partners to pursue coordinated and effective international cyber capacity-building and operational collaboration efforts.  Within the law enforcement community, DOJ will continue to build a more robust cybercrime cooperation paradigm through bilateral and multilateral engagement and agreements, formal and informal cooperation, and providing international and regional leadership to strengthen cybercrime laws, policies, and operations.  DoD will continue to strengthen its military-to-military relationships to leverage allies' and partners' unique skills and perspectives while building their capacity to contribute to our collective cybersecurity posture.  The Department of State will continue to coordinate wholeof-government efforts to ensure Federal capacity building priorities are strategically aligned and further U.S., allied, and partner interests.\n\n## Strategic Objective 5.3: Expand U.S. Ability To Assist Allies And Partners\n\nAs recent cyberattacks against Costa Rica, Albania, and Montenegro have demonstrated, allies and partners who fall victim to a significant cyberattack may seek support from the United States and allied and partner nations to investigate, responding to, and recover from such incidents.  Providing this support will not only assist with partner recovery and response, but will also advance U.S. foreign policy and cybersecurity goals.  Close cooperation with an affected ally or partner demonstrates solidarity in the face of adversary activity and can accelerate efforts to expose counternormative state behavior and impose consequences. The Administration will establish policies for determining when it is in the national interest to provide such support, develop mechanisms for identifying and deploying department and agency resources in such efforts, and, where needed, rapidly seek to remove existing financial and procedural barriers to provide such operational support.  As one example, the United States is leading a North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) effort to build a virtual cyber incident\n\nsupport capability that enables Allies to more effectively and efficiently support each other in response to significant malicious cyber activities.\n\n## Strategic Objective 5.4: Build Coalitions To Reinforce Global Norms Of Responsible State Behavior\n\nEvery member of the United Nations has made a political commitment to endorse peacetime norms of responsible state behavior in cyberspace that includes refraining from cyber operations that would intentionally damage critical infrastructure contrary to their obligations under international law. While our adversaries know that such commitments are not self-enforcing, the growing influence of this framework has led states to call out those who act contrary to it.  Increasingly, a community of nations has collaborated to produce coordinated statements of attribution that carry the simultaneous diplomatic condemnation of many governments and strengthening the coalition committed to a stable cyberspace. The United States, as a core part of its renewed, active diplomacy, will hold irresponsible states accountable when they fail to uphold their commitments.  To effectively constrain our adversaries and counter malicious activities below the threshold of armed conflict, we will work with our allies and partners to pair statements of condemnation with the imposition of meaningful consequences. These efforts will require collaborative use of all tools of statecraft, including diplomatic isolation, economic costs, counter-cyber and law enforcement operations, or legal sanctions, among others.\n\n## Strategic Objective 5.5: Secure Global Supply Chains For Information, Communications, And Operational Technology Products And Services\n\nComplex and globally interconnected supply chains produce the information, communications, and operational technology products and services that power the U.S. economy.  From raw materials and basic components to finished products and servicesboth virtual and physicalwe depend upon a growing network of foreign suppliers.  This dependency on critical foreign products and services from untrusted suppliers introduces multiple sources of systemic risk to our digital ecosystem. Mitigating this risk will require long-term, strategic collaboration between public and private sectors at home and abroad to rebalance global supply chains and make them more transparent, secure, resilient, and trustworthy.\n\nCritical inputs, components, and systems must increasingly be developed at home or in close coordination with allies and partners who share our vision of an open, free, global, interoperable, reliable, and secure Internet.  Building on the National Strategy to Secure 5G, we are working with our partners to develop secure, reliable, and trustworthy supply chains for 5G and next-generation\n\nwireless networks including through Open Radio Access Networks (Open RAN) and collaborative initiatives to diversify suppliers.  Such efforts include DoD testing of Open RAN implementations across multiple bases, with multi-million dollar smart warehouse and logistics projects, and National Telecommunications and Information Administration's (NTIA) work to catalyze the development and adoption of open, interoperable, and standards-based networks through the Public Wireless Supply Chain Innovation Fund.  Extending this model to other critical technologies will require long-term, strategic collaboration between public and private sectors at home and abroad to rebalance global supply chains and make them more secure, resilient, and trustworthy.  The Bipartisan Infrastructure Law mandates \"Build America, Buy America\" for Federally-funded projects, including for digital infrastructure. Through EO 14017, \"America's Supply Chains,\" the CHIPS and Science Act, and the Inflation Reduction Act, the Federal Government has introduced new industrial and innovation strategy tools to help restore production of critical goods to the United States and its close partners while securing our information technology and advanced manufacturing supply chains. The United States will work with our allies and partners, including through regional partnerships like IPEF, the Quad Critical and Emerging Technology Working Group, and the TTC, to identify and implement best practices in cross-border supply chain risk management and work to shift supply chains to flow through partner countries and trusted vendors.  This effort will prioritize opportunities to provide higher levels of assurance that digital technologies will function as expected and to attract countries to support the shared vision of an open, free, global, interoperable, reliable, and secure Internet.  The Department of State will further accelerate these efforts through the new International Technology Security and Innovation Fund to support the creation of secure and diverse supply chains for semiconductors and telecommunications.  Finally, through implementation of EO 13873, \"Securing the Information and Communications Technology and Services Supply Chain,\" as well as EO 14034 \"Protecting Americans' Sensitive Data From Foreign Adversaries,\" we will work to prevent unacceptable and undue risks to our national security from information and communications technology and services subject to control or influence from adversarial governments.\n\n## Implementation\n\nRealizing the strategic objectives outlined in this strategy will require a strong focus on implementation.  Under the oversight of NSC staff and in coordination with OMB, ONCD will coordinate implementation of this strategy.  ONCD will work with interagency partners to develop and publish an implementation plan to set out the Federal lines of effort necessary to implement this strategy.  Where implementation of this strategy requires review of existing policy or the development of new policy, NSC staff will lead this effort through the process described in NSM-2,\n\"Renewing the National Security Council System.\"\n\n## Assessing Effectiveness\n\nIn implementing this strategy, the Federal Government will take a data-driven approach.  We will measure investments made, our progress toward implementation, and ultimate outcomes and effectiveness of these efforts.  ONCD, in coordination with NSC staff, OMB, and departments and agencies, will assess the effectiveness of this strategy and report annually to the President, the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, and Congress on the effectiveness of this strategy, associated policy, and follow-on actions in achieving its goals.\n\n## Incorporating Lessons Learned\n\nThe Federal Government will prioritize capturing lessons learned from cyber incidents and apply those lessons in the implementation of this strategy.  The CSRB completed its first review on the Log4j vulnerability in summer 2022, during which the CSRB compiled an authoritative account of what happened, from the discovery of the vulnerability to the progression of the largest-scale cyber incident response in history.  The CSRB also provided industry, Federal agencies, and the software development community with clear, actionable recommendations based on what the review discovered, so that the community can be better protected going forward. When the CSRB concludes its reviews, the Federal Government will address its recommendations by improving its own operations through executive action where possible, and will work with Congress to enhance authorities, as necessary.  Federal agencies also will promote and amplify CSRB recommendations that are directed to network defenders in the private sector.  Beyond the CSRB, a broader national effort to learn from cyber incidents is required.  Regulators are encouraged to build incident review processes into their regulatory frameworks.  CISA and law enforcement agencies are also encouraged to build processes to routinely extract lessons learned from their investigations and incident response activities.  Private companies are likewise encouraged to undertake these reviews and share findings from their efforts to inform implementation of this strategy.\n\n## Making The Investment\n\nMaintaining an open, free, global, interoperable, reliable, and secure Internet and building a more defensible and resilient digital ecosystem will require generational investments by the Federal Government, allies and partners, and by the private sector.  Many Federal actions contained in this strategy are intended to increase private sector investment in security, resilience, improved collaboration, and research and development.  For Federal agencies to support their private sector\n\npartners and increase their capacity to carry out essential Federal missions, targeted investment will be required.  To guide this investment, ONCD and OMB will jointly issue annual guidance on cybersecurity budget priorities to departments and agencies to further the Administration's strategic approach.  ONCD will work with OMB to ensure alignment of department and agency budget proposals to achieve the goals set out in this strategy.  The Administration will work with Congress to fund cybersecurity activities to keep pace with the speed of change inherent within the cyber ecosystem."
    },
    {
        "text": "Ministry of Youth........41 Ministry of Human Rights........42 Ministry of Planning........43 Ministry of Municipalities........44 Ministry of Electricity........45 Baghdad........47 Ministry of Finance........48\nConclusion #2. Lack of access to the ministries is the single biggest hurdle to\nprosecution of anticorruption cases........52 Conclusion #3. In addition to the lack of capacity within the anticorruption agencies politicization and fear of accountability are serious impediments to the enforcement of anticorruption laws........54 Sectarian Prosecutions........55 Conclusion #4. The Government of Iraq is making grudging progress in capability to investigate and prosecute corruption in Iraq bit not at a level that would support any reasonable time line........60 Recommendations........62 Annex A........63 Annex B........64 Executive Summary........2 The Institutions Iraq Relies Upon to Enforce Anticorruption Laws........4 Conclusion #1:  Currently, Iraq is not capable of even rudimentary enforcement of anticorruption laws....6 The Commission on Public Integrity..8\nThe Ministries........10 The Inspector General........10\nInvestigative Judges........11 Board of Supreme Audit........12 Ministry by Ministry Breakdown.....12 Ministry of the Interior........13 Ministry of Defense........15 Ministry of Trade........18 Ministry of Health........20 Ministry of Oil........22 Ministry of Education........24 Ministry of Water........26 Ministry of Labor & SA........28 Ministry of Transportation........29 Ministry pf Higher Ed........29 Ministry of Justice........32 Ministry of Migration........33 Counsel of Ministers........34 Ministry of Science........36 Ministry of Housing........37 Ministry of Foreign Affairs........38 Non government Organizations........39\n\n This report analyzes the ability of Iraq to enforce its anticorruption laws. It seeks to provide a snapshot of Iraq's institutions created to fight corruption, the ability of the United States Government to support capacity building, and catalogue those actions which would provide an indication of the Iraqi will to take on the often painful reality of prosecuting ones political supporters.\n\nIt must be acknowledged that the enforcement of anticorruption laws is only a part of the anticorruption effort. Also included as a vital part are civil society efforts, transparency efforts, accountability efforts, economic reform, and public education. These essential programs are not within the scope of this report.\n\nExecutive Summary\n\nCurrently, Iraq is not capable of even rudimentary enforcement of anticorruption laws.\n\nThe study team conducted a comprehensive study of the cases in Commission on Public Integrity (CPI) and a review of the performance of the anticorruption institutions.\nCPI is currently a passive rather than a true investigatory agency1. Though legally empowered to conduct investigations the combined security situation and the violent character of the criminal elements within the ministries make investigation of corruption too hazardous for all but a tactically robust police force with the support of he Iraqi government. Currently this support is lacking.\nWithin the ministries Inspectors General (IG) have repeatedly complained that fighting corruption is seen as an IG function alone and is not seen as a concern outside of that office. This lack of support has allowed corruption to be the norm in many ministries. Unarmed in the red zone subject to intimidation, reports submitted by the Inspectors General can not be trusted to truthfully reveal criminal activity against anyone protected by the violent or powerful.\n\nThe court system in Iraq remains weak, intimidated, subject to political pressure, and clogged with minor cases.\n\nReviews of the cases and interviews with CPI investigators and American advisors give a breakdown of the anticorruption efforts in the ministries that have provided 70% of the corruption complaints. The Ministry of Interior is seen by Iraqis as untouchable by the anticorruption enforcement infrastructure of Iraq. Corruption investigations in Ministry of Defense are judged to be ineffectual. With 196 complaints and only 8 being sent to court and only one person having been convicted in what is widely recognized as a troubled ministry, corruption investigations are clearly inadequate in the Ministry of Trade.  The Ministry of Health is a sore point; corruption is actually affecting its ability to deliver services and threatens the support of the government. The lack of investigative capacity and the presence of militia make it beyond the reach of anticorruption efforts. The high number of dismissals in cases involving alleged political motivations indicates manipulation of the investigations within Ministry of Oil. CPI and the IG are completely ill-equipped to handle oil theft cases. Anticorruption cases concerning the Ministry of Education have been particularly ineffective. As is shown by the small number of investigations in the Ministry of Water Resources it is effectively out of the anticorruption fight with little to no apparent effort in trying to combat fraud. The number of referrals for prosecution and failure of even rudimentary cooperation support the contention that the Ministry of Labor & Social Affairs is hostile to the prosecution of corruption cases. Militia support from Sadr has effectively made corruption in the Ministry of Transportation wholesale according to investigators and immune from prosecution. In the Ministry of Displacement & Migration there has been only one investigation initiated or complaint made about any person identified with the Shia. Anticorruption activity efforts are in practical measure devoid in the Ministry of Science and Technology. In general, the lack of cooperation within the Ministry of Housing &\nConstruction has left the anticorruption fight principally to CPI which is not capable of any sustainable campaign within that ministry. That there are so many complaints about NGOs that it leads to the conclusion that either NGOs are wrapped up in political intrigue or they are a significant contributor to the corruption problem. In the Ministry of Youth &\nSports no cases have made it to trial because the minister has granted Article 136B\nimmunity from trial on wholesale bases. The concentration on investigating people once they leave the ministry implies political protection for those currently within the Ministry of Electricity. Only one conviction has ever come from corruption cases in the entire city of Baghdad. In the Ministry of Finance the minister has developed a reputation for ruthlessness in applying the anticorruption laws to control his staff. CPI is powerless to prevent this type of abuse. Lack of access to the ministries is the single biggest hurdle to prosecution of anticorruption cases.\n\nThe inability of CPI investigators to travel safely to and from the ministries in the red zone has so hobbled the agency it is relegated to relying almost entirely on IGs to conduct investigations. Because the IGs are subject to the same threat, anticorruption investigations are subject to tampering or political manipulation. Several ministries are so controlled by criminal gangs or militias as to be impossible to operate within absent a tactical force protecting the investigator. Though severely undermanned, CPI could vastly improve its anticorruption cases if it were not so dependant on unreliable ministry support.\n\nCPI investigators have also suffered by recent attacks on their character. The withdrawal of apparent support by the top of the government has provided an intangible excuse to avoid compliance with the law by many in the Iraqi government.\n\nIn addition to the lack of capacity within the anticorruption agencies, politicization and fear of accountability are serious impediments to the enforcement of anticorruption laws.\n\nThe Prime Minister's Office has demonstrated an open hostility to the concept of an independent agency to investigate or prosecute corruption cases. The Iraqi Government also withholds support and resources from CPI. There have been a number of identified cases where government and political pressure has been applied to change the outcome of investigations and prosecutions in favor of members of the Shia Alliance.\nAdvisors have documented a pattern of pressure seemingly designed to hire personnel along political lines. There also has been a clear sectarian shift in those who have been appointed as IGs since the Shia Alliance has taken control of the government.\n\nAcross the board there is a fear by anticorruption agencies to any metrics that might indicate performance or the lack of it. There is a pattern of loose accountability and a lack of clear rules throughout the Iraqi Government. This lack of accountability and transparency has resulted in both promoting corruption and manipulation of the criminal justice system against otherwise innocent people.\n\n\nThe Government of Iraq is making grudging progress in capability to investigate and prosecute corruption in Iraq, but not at a level that would support any reasonable time line. The average CPI investigator has proven him/herself adept at comprehending the training; diligent in applying the techniques taught in a lawful way; and highly interested in expanding their professional abilities and contributions.  CPI's 120 investigators do not have the numbers or the capacity to confront the job it is asked to do and is not being funded to a substantial increase. CPI has no formal means to handle internal security or discipline. This lack of a CPI IG or internal affairs department has placed in jeopardy the agency's reputation. The Iraqi government is conducting a series of classes for the training of hundreds of inspectors general, but without an increase in numbers nor a means to conduct investigations absent intimidation their value may only be administrative in character. Without a commitment to withdraw partisan and sectarian politics from the selection of senior IG leadership, there is the likelihood that investigations will not have credibility. According to the figures supplied, BSA is not a major player in referring criminal investigations. The US Embassy has established the Office of Accountability and Transparency to provide direct support to the capacity building of CPI, the IGs and BSA. If adequately resourced this organization will provide the expertise needed to confront the stalled growth in capacity building. This agency can provide support where there is the political will which has waned over the last six months.\n\nINTRODUCTION\n\nCorruption has been described through number of sources as one of the major hurdles the Iraqi government must overcome if it is to survive as a stable and independent entity. Corruption is identified as a funding and logistical source for the insurgency and the mainstay of unsanctioned armed groups which make up the militias and conduct attacks both against the Coalition forces and populations other than their own ethnic or sectarian groups. The Prime Minister of Iraq has repeatedly described the fight corruption as the second war in Iraq. The popular press has openly reported corruption as endemic to Iraq and all indications point to corruption as undermining the support of the population for Iraq's government.\nWith the wide spread acknowledgement that corruption is a serious if not potential fatal threat to the government of Iraq this report is a comprehensive look at the state of Iraq's anticorruption enforcement institutions. A six month review this report catalogues the progress of decline of those institutions in their capability and performance. In the last six month analysis the statistics showed a remarkable increase in the newly immerging institutions. In the time between January to July of 2006 the number of cases processed equaled the total cases of the year before.\nThe cases filed in June 2006 showed what appeared to be a sectarian concerning senior leadership but only in those ministries that changed hands as a result of the new government formed in May 2006. Leadership in those ministries suddenly found themselves subject to unsympathetic scrutiny by the ministry. Only two of those cases, the former Minister of Electricity and two cases from the Ministry of Defense have gone to trial. Most have stalled at the investigative court or after investigation been dismissed.\n\nBy far most of the cases did not result in pretrial detention.\nThis report takes off from there tracking Iraqi performance and using the observations of US Personnel within CPI, interviews with Iraqi investigators, and a case review of the files. It should be noted that with 120 investigators and 20 US personnel providing training and mentoring this organization has proportionately closer supervision and scrutiny than any other institution in Iraq.\n\nMethodology for Six Month Review See Annex A\nThe Institutions Iraq Relies Upon To Enforce Anticorruption Laws\n\nIn order to understand the anticorruption system in Iraq it is essential to have a familiarity with the following agencies and/or judicial positions that conduct and prosecute investigations.\n\nA.  Board of Supreme Audit:    (BSA)\nThis agency routinely conducts financial audits of the various Iraqi Ministries.\nTheir published audits are provided to both the affected Ministry Inspector General office and to CPI. The relationship between BSA and the IG offices is outlined in CPA orders\n55, 57, and 77. Specifically, a referral for possible criminal investigation is made by the BSA to CPI should that possibility be encountered.  Under the Iraqi Constitution BSA is an independent commission.2\n\nB.  Inspectors General:     (IG)\n\n2 Article 103:\nFirst: The Central Bank of Iraq, the Board of Supreme Audit, the Communication and Media Commission, and the Endowment Commissions are financially and administratively independent institutions, and the work of each of these institutions shall be regulated by law.\n\nMost of the approximate 40 Iraq Ministries and other governmental entities has an IG Office. The authorization of the IG stems from CPA 57 which is still Iraqi law. The IG is responsible for conducting internal investigations within the Ministry.  In matters pertaining to ministry employee corruption, fraud, theft, embezzlement, etc, the IG is to refer the case, along with whatever it had collect up to that point, to CPI.  The IG's office is also the contact for and conduit to CPI for ministry documents and other assistance CPI may request.  When the IGs detect thefts of ministry property, funds, and products during its audits/inquiries and no employee involvement is evident the IG refers those matters to the police or other enforcement agencies.\n\nC.  Investigative Judges:    (IJ)\nFor purposes of this review, criminal cases are judicially resolved in the Central Criminal Court of Iraq (CCCI) established by CPA Order 13.  There are also criminal courts that cover the northern and southern sections of the country.  CCCI employ both Trial Judges, who hear cases (similar to Judges in the US), and Investigative Judges (IJ), who function more as investigators but with the added jurisdiction to order (demand subpoena) documents and compel testimony.  (Although unheard of in the US judicial system, IJ's operate in some European judicial systems and can be likened to a hybrid, Federal Agent - Assistant US Attorney).  All CPI investigations/allegations, no matter the merit, are presented to IJ's as required by law.  A panel of three IJs at CCCI receive matters brought by CPI.  It is the IJ's who determine; if a CPI case is advanced to a criminal proceeding before a Trial Judge; should be dismissed: returned to CPI for further investigative efforts; or retained by the IJ's who will personally direct additional investigation.\n\nD. The Commission on Public Integrity (CPI)\nEstablished by CPA Order 55 and reaffirmed as an independent commission under the oversight of the legislature in the Iraqi Constitution,3CPI is a multifunctional agency which is dedicated to enforcing anticorruption laws and transparency. CPI has the legal authorization to investigate accusations of corruption and take jurisdiction of cases from local courts and move them to the CCCI. Authorized to have investigators of the first class, the agency may assist investigative judges once the case is referred. They are still subject to the requirements of the Iraqi Criminal Procedure Code which grants primacy to the investigative court and rests prosecutorial discretion at that level. Except in cases involving violations of the Code of Conduct, CPI is not empowered to refer cases to the minister rather than the court. Nor does it have arrest powers, detention powers or\n\n3 Article 102:\nThe High Commission for Human Rights, the Independent Electoral Commission, and the Commission on Public Integrity are considered independent commissions subject to monitoring by the Council of Representatives, and their functions shall be regulated by law.\n\n\nthe power to carry firearms. To support its anticorruption responsibilities, CPI must maintain a hotline and protect the identification of callers, establish a code of conduct for all government employees, establish a pubic awareness program, and collect and enforce a government-wide financial discloser requirement. The commissioner in CPA 55 is given exclusive power to hire, fire and discipline its employees as well as appoint a deputy commissioner and director generals. Team finding : CPI is currently more of a passive rather than a true investigatory agency. Though legally empowered to conduct investigations the combined security situation and the violent character of the criminal elements within the ministries make investigation of corruption too hazardous unless performed by a tactically robust police force with the support of the Iraqi government. Currently this support is lacking.\n\nTeam finding : Within the ministries IGs have repeatedly complained that fighting corruption is seen as an IG function alone, and should not be a concern outside of that office. This lack of support has allowed corruption to be the norm in many ministries. Team finding : Unarmed in the red zone subject to intimidation, reports submitted by the Inspectors General can not be trusted to truthfully reveal criminal activity against anyone protected by the violent or powerful. Team finding : The court system in Iraq remains weak, intimidated, subject to political pressure, and clogged with minor cases. Team finding : The Ministry of Interior is seen by Iraqis as untouchable by the anticorruption enforcement infrastructure of Iraq. Team finding : Corruption investigations in MOD are judged to be ineffectual.\n\nTeam finding : With 196 complaints and only 8 being sent to court and only one person having been convicted in what is widely recognized as a troubled ministry, corruption investigations are clearly inadequate in the Ministry of Trade.\n\nTeam finding : In the Ministry of Health corruption is affecting its ability to deliver services and threatens the support of the government. The lack of investigative capacity and the presence of militia make it beyond the reach of anticorruption efforts. Team finding : The high number of dismissals involving alleged political motivations indicates manipulation of the investigations within MOO.   CPI and the IG are completely ill-equipped to handle oil theft cases. Team finding : Anticorruption cases concerning the MOEd has been particularly ineffective.\n\n\nTeam finding : As is shown by the small number of investigations the Ministry of\nWater Resources is effectively out of the anticorruption fight with little to no\napparent effort in trying to combat fraud.\n\nTeam finding : The Ministry of Labor & Social Affairs has been described as hostile\nto the prosecution on corruption cases. The number of referrals for prosecution and\nfailure of even rudimentary cooperation would seem to support that contention.\n\nTeam finding : The militia support from Sadr has effectively made corruption in the\nMinistry of Transportation wholesale, according to investigators, and immune from\nprosecution.\n\nTeam finding : In the Ministry of Displacement & Migration, only one investigation\nwas initiated or complaints were made about any person identified with the Shia.\n\nTeam finding : Anticorruption activity efforts are in practical measure devoid in the\nMinistry of Science and Technology.\n\nTeam finding : In general the lack of cooperation within the Ministry of Housing &\nConstruction has left the anticorruption fight principally to CPI, which is not\ncapable of any sustainable campaign within that ministry.\n\nTeam finding : That there are so many complaints about NGOs, where in many\nministries there are far fewer investigations, leads to the conclusion that either\nNGOs are wrapped up in political intrigue or they are a significant contributor to\nthe corruption problem.\n\nTeam finding : In Ministry of Youth & Sports no cases have made it to trial because\nthe minister has granted Article 136B immunity from trial on a wholesale bases.\n\nTeam finding : There is a practice within the Ministry of Electricity of investigating\npeople once they leave the ministry implying political protection for those currently\nwithin the ministry itself.\n\nTeam finding : Only one conviction has ever come from corruption cases in the\nentire city of Baghdad.\n\nTeam finding : In the ministry of Finance the Minister is the former Minister of\nInterior where he developed a reputation for ruthlessness in applying the\nanticorruption laws to control his staff. CPI is powerless to prevent this type of\nabuse.\n\nTeam finding: Neither this team nor any other entity it can find has a clear picture\nof or is following what is happening in corruption in any manner than antidotal\nstories.\n\n Conclusion #1:  Currently, Iraq is not capable of even rudimentary enforcement of anticorruption laws.\n\nThe Commission on Public Integrity\n\nCPI has a staff of 120 investigators to cover 34 ministries and a number of other entities, not to mention a rapidly rising number of local, regional, and provincial functional governments. The Iraqi investigators observed by US trainers are inundated simply with paperwork criminal investigations and polishing IG cases in preparation for sending them to court. The investigators in truth are closer to clerks processing paperwork rather than investigators solving crimes.\n\nINL has funded the training of a little over half of the investigators in basic investigation procedures. For the most part CPI is mostly processing IG investigations to the Investigative Judge. As with other cases investigations initiated from sources other than IGs are passive using only documents and witnesses provided by cooperative IGs and ministries. The fundamental truth of nearly all investigations is that if the witnesses are not willing to come into the IZ the case can not be prosecuted due to the security situation and the lack of tactical capability within CPI. There are a few notable exceptions caused by heroic initiative by individual investigators, which have drawn sharp reactions from high level Shia Alliance Party operatives or senior members of the government.\nProactive investigation in the form of undercover operations including \"sting operations\", physical/electronic surveillance, using cooperating defendants and witnesses are at present beyond CPI's capability.  The pattern of criminal activity associated with MOO would require comprehensive use of proactive investigative techniques to have a chance for success.  The pattern of criminality endemic at MOI is beyond CPI's capability and charter.  Other ministries can be effectively policed through contract fraud investigations if documents are forthcoming and the IG's are motivated to cooperate. The BSA has on a few occasions been a valuable resource to CPI, if whenever investigators left the office and developed contacts.\n\nThe investigators function well when acting in small groups with freedom to move as required. This is now impossible in the midst of a war zone where entire sections of the City are off limits even to army personnel.4\nCPI investigators have been accosted by armed gangs within ministry headquarters and denied access to officials and records there. 5\nCPI investigators are barred from carrying weapons unless they apply for and are approved for permits by the Ministry of Interior, utilizing the same procedures that civilians must follow.  They are not granted law enforcement status. 6\nThe Commissioner has determined that he needs at least 450 investigators.\n\nThreats to investigators from insurgents and militias including those supporting the current government are so common place as to be impossible to catalogue. Many investigators sleep at night in the office in the IZ. Threats against the family often cause investigators to ask for leave to move their families out of the country.  The hiring of\n\nadditional staff in light of the danger involved 7, or just maintaining the 120 investigators,\nis a challenge. The current administration has been unsympathetic to requests for additional funding and manpower needs. Few guards for the investigators to leave the IZ\nhave been authorized, and CPI has resorted to arming people hired for janitorial and maintenance duty. CPI has hired some contractors to provide protection for the investigators, which has caused a dilemma for INL funded-trainers in that to train and equip a contractor is to risk losing that investment at the end of the contract. In late October 2006 these \"maintenance workers\" were needed to rescue a lead investigator involved in an investigation of corruption in MOD when an Iraqi Army unit raided his home. When confronted by the CPI ad hoc quick reaction force, the army unit claimed it\nhad simply gotten the wrong address and withdrew.\nThe lack of support from the administration has had a clear negative affect on the\nmorale of the investigators themselves.\nIn light of these observations it is clear that CPI is currently an administrative\nrather than a true investigatory agency. Though legally empowered to conduct investigations the combined security situation and the violent character of the criminal elements within the ministries make investigation of corruption too hazardous, unless performed by a tactically robust police force with the support of the Iraqi government. Currently this support is lacking.\n\nTo underscore and expand upon the above the following points need highlighting:\nI.\nWhat CPI can do:\na)\nIt is the primary agency under law assigned criminal \"White Collar\" investigative jurisdiction.\nb)\nCollect all evidence, physical and testimonial, it can obtain voluntarily.\nc)\nInvestigate any and all matters brought to its attention.\nd)\nComply with directions and deliver orders, etc, from the IJs.\ne)\nDevelop sources of information within Ministries and elsewhere.\n\nII.\n What CPI can not do:\na)\nDecline to investigate fully any criminal referral or complaint.\nb)\nDemand or order the production of documents.\nc)\nRequire a person to provide testimony.\nd)\nMake arrests.\n\nIII.\n How CPI conducts an investigation:\na)\nUpon receipt of an allegation the matter is referred to the appropriate CPI \"team\" of investigators assigned to a particular Ministry.\nb)\nConduct logical investigation as decided by the investigator.  Options:\n1. Ask for Ministry IG assistance by providing the allegation. 2. Ask for Ministry IG assistance while withholding allegation,\n3. Present the matter directly to an IJ for review.\nc)\nCPI investigators typically conduct their investigations from within their offices by directing letters to IGs, individuals or organizations.\n\nd)\nDeliver IJ judicial orders if issued.\n\ne)\nDeliver arrest warrants to MOI for execution, if issued.\n\nThe Ministries\n\nThe ministries operate in such an opaque manner as to make enforcement nearly impossible. The regulatory promulgation process is inherently secret and fraught with conflicts of interest.  The minister through Article 136B of the Iraqi Criminal Procedure Code has the power to, in effect, make illegal actions retroactively legal. This has resulted in an atmosphere that leaves the impression that political alliances trump the law.\n\nA review of actual contracts entered into by Ministry officials show a universal lack of basic contractually sound procedures.  Many contracts are partially or fully paid prior to the delivery of goods.  Description specs on items ordered are dismal.  Delivery dates are ignored without penalty.  Suppliers default on contracts without facing criminal or civil penalties.8\nIndividual IGs within the ministries have repeatedly complained that within the ministries fighting corruption is seen as an IG function alone, and should not be a concern outside of that office. This lack of support has allowed corruption to be the norm in many ministries.\n\n\nThe Inspector General: Each of the dangers described for the CPI investigators is compounded for the IG\ninvestigators.  The general level of violence in Baghdad multiplies the intimidation factor in that murders are so common that tying them back to the work place would be difficult even for an accomplished police force. Knowing this, those confronted with criminal activity are fully aware of the near immunity available to violent criminals. So great is the danger in the ministries as to make nearly all of the IG actions suspect. Even when investigations are possible the IG investigator realizes that should the case go to court, upon completion of the investigation the file will go to the Minister for his decision as to whether or not to allow it to go to trial. Such means that the Minister will get the name of the investigator as well as those of the witnesses. An investigator must in each investigation make the judgment as to whether the suspect has the support of his Minister and trust that the Minister will safeguard all involved. Unarmed in the red zone subject to intimidation, reports submitted can not be trusted to truthfully reveal criminal activity against anyone protected by the violent or powerful.\nIt must be noted that the IGs have universally condemned Article 136B of the Iraqi Criminal Procedure Code as has CPI. When the Iraqi government considered the repeal of this law the JAG, MNSTC-I came forward to express the military's reservation and concern that the law might be appealed. The movement to repeal the law is currently stalled.\n\nThis has resulted in a number of failings in the IG system. CPI receives scant\nnotification from IG offices regarding possible criminal acts committed by employees,\nparticularly those holding the position of Director General and above.9CPI files are\nreplete with requests made to IGs for copies of documents and/or access to witnesses that\nare not complied with or even answered.  Certain ministries have refused lawful court\norders issued by IJs.10\n\nInvestigative Judges:\nAn interview conducted by the advisors of the Supreme Investigative Judge of CCCI has\nidentified a number of issues that he recommended to be addressed:\n1. Interference  -  A history of  political pressure being placed upon the judiciary\nfrom  both Iraq and American interests was conveyed.\n2. Security  -  The day before the advisors meeting with the IJ in November, another\nJudge was assassinated. Judges are regularly subject to intimidation throughout\nIraq.\n3. IG Concerns  -  The IJ expressed concerns regarding the position of Ministry IGs\nin the following terms:\na) IGs fail to refer criminal cases to CPI attention. b) IGs are politically appointed and lack independence. c) IGs should be subjected to greater scrutiny, as they may contribute to the\ncorruption encountered.\n4. CPI Concerns  -  The IJ recommended the following actions:\na) Increase the number of CPI investigators.\nb) Expand CPI offices into every province in Iraq. c) Construct modern forensic laboratories and place them under CPI control.\nd) Increase CPI investigator salaries. e) Address CPI investigators lack of basic security.\nf) Eliminate the political pressure that is brought upon CPI by Iraq\nGovernment officials.\nThe judges within CCCI are clearly over burdened. The lack of prosecutorial\ndiscretion below the court system has caused the courts to strain even under the poor\nperformance as outlined below. Most of the cases are not major and thus the system has\nbeen clogged in what should be handled by a less prestigious body.\nDespite widespread disinformation to the contrary, only the courts have the power\nto detain in corruption cases. CPI does not even make detention recommendations. There\nis confusion as to the role of RCC 38 of 1993 which the lead judge of the CCCI claims\nrequires detention in all cases involving corruption throughout the investigative stage.\nOther judges have stated that the law applies only to those cases involving the security of\nthe state. In fact, an analysis of those cases submitted to the court with the exception of\nOil cases, have by a wide margin not resulted in detention.\nJudicial power in Iraq is less than what most Americans are used to. Courts do not\nhave the power of equity to enforce court orders. Ministries regularly ignore court orders. Literally hundreds of arrest warrants remain outstanding, as do court orders to produce\nevidence, witnesses and documents, all of which remain outstanding and ignored by government officials. Legal counsel of many ministries refuses to come to court to explain their ministry's actions. Ministers regularly sit on requests to send cases to trial, thereby stalling the case.\n\nThe court system in Iraq remains weak, intimidated, subject to political pressure, and clogged with minor cases.\n\n\nBoard of Supreme Audit: BSA has been neglected in our support. A long standing agency, it has a good reputation but we know little of its performance. As the figures below indicate the reputation may be overrated. BSA audits have resulted in few investigations of corruption. It is a fair assumption that all of the safety concerns of the IGs would apply as well to auditors of the BSA.\n\n\nThe Anticorruption Advisor to the Prime Minister Dr Adel Muhsien Abdulla Al-Quza'alee has been appointed by the Prime Minister as the Anticorruption Advisor, in what could be called an anticorruption czar. This position is not statutorily empowered but was created on an ad hoc bases. Dr. Adel is also the IG of Health and the President of the IG association. As a trusted confident of the Prime Minister he makes recommendations as to the appointment of new IGs. He has repeatedly stated openly that independent agencies should be subject to control of the Prime Minister.\nDr. Adel has steadfastly refused to submit his financial disclosure form. Dr. Adel is also a well known political operative with the open agenda of keeping the relationship between the Dawa, Sadrist, and Fadillah political parties intact.\n\n\nLocal Anticorruption Efforts What may be most alarming is what the Coalition and Embassy does not know as ground truth at the local level. Neither this team nor any other entity it can find has a clear picture of or is following what is happening in corruption in any manner than antidotal stories. The Embassy is seeking to remedy this through the staffing of four regional IRMO employees for the newly created Office of Accountability and Transparency. These individuals will be able to contribute only if they can get out and observe what is in fact happening at a local level. In the past this has proven a challenge in an atmosphere where protection escorts are few and the need for them highly competitive. Also the staffing of these four positions has been from the Department of State has been less than urgent. Ministry by Ministry Breakdown Below is a breakdown by ministry of CPI cases from January 2005 to the present.\n\nAn analysis has shown that 70% of all investigations apply to the listed governmental entities. CPI's case tracking is rudimentary and the numbers have come from an audit hand done by CPI staff at the request of this team. Also some data is probably incomplete in that the former Deputy Commissioner, Mosa Farraj upon his dismissal for prosecutions along sectarian lines, left CPI with literally a car load of case files. An arrest warrant and court order for the return of the files is pending.\n\nFunctionally, CPI has not been a genuine participant in anticorruption prosecutions before January 2005. A ministry by ministry breakdown of statistics shows the following:\nMinistry of Interior Minister of Interior. Jawad  al Balani\n\n\nName of Ministry Inspector General:\nAqueel Omran Saeed Al- Tarihee\n\nDate of appointment as IG:\n12/28/2005\n\n\nPolitical/Ethnic/Militia affiliation of IG:\nShia'a / Al-Dawa Party\n\n\n\nIn interviews of investigators in CPI, the IG of MOI has a poor reputation with questions about his qualifications and honesty. He is viewed as uncooperative with investigators and obstructive.  A review of cases has shown a scarcity of contractual cases which is a mainstay in other ministries. Interviews early in 2006 with Miss Halla the DG in MOI finance indicated that vender contracts in MOI for feeding are particularly suspect. The lack of such cases by the IG is notable.\n\nCurrently 426 investigations are hung up awaiting response for documents belonging to MOI which routinely are ignored. Efforts in the past to obtain them from MOI by court order has regularly been ignored or when brought before the court declared as secret as a matter of national security. Judges regularly defer to such claims thereby scuttling the case making it unprosecutable.\nBecause CPI does not have arrest powers it relies upon MOI to serve arrest warrants. The numbers of unserved arrest warrants are in the hundreds. There are indications that in some cases police take bribes to not pick up defendants. There are repeated credible accounts of police not serving warrants without first checking with local militia for permission. Failure to arrest MOI employees when presented with a valid arrest warrant is the rule and not the exception. In the Ministry of Interior there have been a total of 636 investigations of corruption. The break down by source is as follows.\n\n| Cases            |   Subjects  |   Sunni  |   Shiia  |   Kurd  |   Other  |\n|------------------|-------------|----------|----------|---------|----------|\n|                  |             |          |          |         |          |\n| IG referral      |             |          |          |         |          |\n| 199              |        210  |      10  |     187  |      0  |      13  |\n| BSA referral     |             |          |          |         |          |\n| 1                |          1  |       0  |       1  |      0  |       0  |\n| Hotline referral |             |          |          |         |          |\n| 209              |        228  |      14  |     207  |      0  |       7  |\n\nOther\n227\n270\n23\n229\n0\n18\nTotals\n636\n709\n47\n624\n0\n38\n\nOf cases involving major figures within MOI (DG or above)\nCases\nSubjects\nSunni\nShiia\nKurd\nSec\n\n\nIG referral\n16\n21\n4\n16\n\n1\nBSA referral\n0\n0\n\n\n\nHotline referral\n18\n22\n2\n18\n\n2\nOther\n27\n31\n2\n28\n\n1\nTotals\n61\n74\n8\n62\n0\n4 Of those cases involving significant sums of money (Above $25,000)\nCases\nSubjects\nSunni\nShiia\nKurd\nSec\n\n\nIG referral\n94\n97\n4\n89\n\n4\nBSA referral\n1\n1\n\n1\n\n\nHotline referral\n111\n121\n8\n111\n\n2\nOther\n73\n78\n7\n69\n\n2\nTotals\n279\n297\n19\n270\n0\n8\n\n Of those cases involving small amounts or what would otherwise be considered administrative in nature:\n\n| Cases            |   Subjects  |   Sunni  |   Shiia  | Kurd    |   Sec  |\n|------------------|-------------|----------|----------|---------|--------|\n|                  |             |          |          |         |        |\n|                  |             |          |          |         |        |\n| IG referral      |             |          |          |         |        |\n| 63               |         92  |       2  |      82  |         |     8  |\n| BSA referral     |             |          |          |         |        |\n| 0                |          0  |       0  |       0  |         |     0  |\n| Hotline referral |             |          |          |         |        |\n| 80               |         85  |       4  |      78  |         |     3  |\n| Other            |             |          |          |         |        |\n| 127              |        161  |      14  |     132  |         |    15  |\n| Totals           |         270 |      338 |       20 | 292     |     0  |\n\n\nOf the 636 investigations processed by CPI thus far, 476 cases have been submitted to the investigative judge. Of the 199 cases received by from the IG 97 went to the IJ. Of the total cases investigated from all sources involving DG or above, there were\n57 cases having involved 63 defendants. (6 Sunni, 50 Shi'a, 3 Kurd, 4 others or undeterminable) Of those 63 defendants involved in high-level corruption, 23 were detained at some point in the process. There have been only 6 convictions involving in Sunni, 4 Shia, and 1 other defendant.\n\nSignificant problems remain in anticorruption enforcement concerning the Ministry of Interior. The complexity of combating corruption within MOI is compounded by the near independent character of provincial police making them nearly immune from oversight. There is a general impression in the public and within the anticorruption enforcement establishment that MOI is immune from prosecution of corruption charges unless the subject falls out of favor within MOI. This impression was reinforced through the blocking of the case on ghost employees and human rights violations by the former Minister and Prime Minister's Office against its current Deputy Minister of Administration.\nGroups within MOI function similarly to a Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organization (RICO) in the classic sense11.  MOI is a \"legal enterprise\" which has been co-opted by organized criminals who act through the \"legal enterprise\" to commit crimes such as kidnapping, extortion, bribery, etc.  Unlike CPI officers, MOI officers carry guns and are extremely dangerous.  A good example of the reality of the situation is the murder of Amer al-Hashima , the brother of the VP of Iraq, on 9 October 2006 which was carried out by Iraqi subjects who were allegedly armed and transported with US issued guns and vehicles.12 The subjects in approximately 8-10 SUV's were allowed to pass through a police/military checkpoint 20 meters from the victim's residence to commit the murder.  Approximately 15 neighbors of al-Hashima were kidnapped during the incident and are presumed to be dead.  CPI Advisors were contacted about a week after the incident by a CPI officer who led the Advisors to 2 eyewitnesses who survived the incident (turned over to the FBI MCTF) who had never been interviewed by the police. The CPI officer stated that MOI IP's or Nat'l Guard personnel could not be trusted with the identity of the witnesses and would likely be murdered if identified.\nThe Advisors cannot say definitively that the subjects were MOI but the facts and circumstances of this heinous crime surely lead to that conclusion.  In any event, the CPI officer knew that he/she would be assassinated if his/her cooperation in the murder/kidnapping case was known. Similar attacks implying police collusion or involvement are a weekly occurrence and widely accepted to be true.  Independent of this anecdotal evidence of MOI treachery, CPI investigators assigned to MOI investigations have unanimously expressed their fear of being assassinated should they aggressively pursue their duties at MOI. Thus when the head of MOI intelligence recently personally visited the Commissioner of CPI and the CCCI to end investigations of MOI contracts there was a clear sense of concern within the agency.\nOnly 9 CPI investigators are assigned to investigate MOI cases. Over the last six months only 15 cases were finished due to non-compliance on the part of MOI for requests. Investigators can't go to MOI because of security concerns. CPI investigators are too intimidated to conduct serious investigations. This has particularly been the case since the practical pardon given by the former Minister Jabr to Adnan al-Assadi. Contract fraud is seen as the greatest violation investigated. The MOI-IG does not typically respond to CPI request for documents or witnesses. The IG often ignores the IJ's request for documents/witnesses as well. When MOI does respond to the IJ it will usually say that it can't divulge documents and witnesses because their lives will be put in danger. CPI investigators have identified Adnan al-Assadi as one official responsible for thwarting CPI efforts.\nCPI must give IJ arrest warrants to MOI for execution.  Investigators have learned that MOI shows warrants to subjects, extorts payment and tells CPI that they couldn't locate subject. The latest rash of complaints involve weapons and police cars provided by US diverted and sold on black market.\n\nFor all the reasons above the Ministry of Interior is seen as untouchable by the anticorruption enforcement infrastructure of Iraq. It is the observation of the ICITAP mentors and trainers within CPI that its investigators are incapable of penetrating MOI which is seen as a criminal enterprise under the color of law. The IG in MOI has thus far been ineffectual in providing a significant impact to improve this perception.\n\n\nMinistry of Defense Minister Abdul Qadar Muhammed Jasim Name of Ministry Inspector General:\nFaez Mohamed Baqer Mahdi Share's Al-Islam Date of appointment as IG:\n12/11/2005\n\nPolitical/Ethnic/Militia affiliation of IG:\nShia'a\n\n\n\nIn interviews of investigators in CPI there is a consensus that the ministry doesn't cooperate in corruption cases often not notifying the witnesses or implementing the arrest orders against the suspects within the ministry. There is a lack of seriousness in the IG office when it comes to administrative investigations or evidence collection with most requests simply ignored. The ministry has adopted the practice of paying in advance for many of the contracts which results in a weak position for the ministry to enforce these contracts. In most contracts the investigators have reviewed13 the conditions favor the supplier not the ministry. The use of intermediaries rather than directly with suppliers have become commonplace giving the impression of sweetheart deals with particular contractors. MOD sometimes does not take a performance bond. When investigations are conducted many are impossible to pursue for lack of records showing the receipt of goods purchased or their disposition.\nThe ministry suffered a major blow with the apparent theft of at least $850 million dollars from the MOD procurement budget for which the minister at the time was directly blamed. This theft has resulted in the postponement of vital equipment needed to stand up the Iraqi army and has likely delayed the readiness of the Iraqi army to carryout missions currently conducted by US troops. In this regard there is likely a correlation between American casualties and the delay of Iraqi units capable of assuming their combat role. The ministry has demonstrated a shocking lack of concern in discovery of the offenders and their prosecution of the in the wake of that scandal.14 In investigations emerging out\n\nof this incident there has been a circling of the wagons within MOD with a general sense of denial that any problem existed outside of the minister's personal actions. In some cases American advisors working for US DOD have interceded to remove suspects from investigations or custody.\n\nWhat is most obvious is the lack of participation of the IG in conducting prosecutions of corruption in MOD. Only 12 cases have been referred for prosecution over two years in a ministry that has openly been singled out for wholesale theft. In the Ministry of Defense there have been a total of 453 investigations of corruption.\n\nThe break down by source is as follows.\n\n| Cases            | Subjects   | Sunni    | Shiia    | Kurd    | Sec    |\n|------------------|------------|----------|----------|---------|--------|\n|                  |            |          |          |         |        |\n|                  |            |          |          |         |        |\n|                  |            |          |          |         |        |\n| IG referral      |            |          |          |         |        |\n| 15               | 15         | 8        | 3        | 2       | 2      |\n| BSA referral     |            |          |          |         |        |\n| 91               | 95         | 26       | 45       | 8       | 16     |\n| Hotline referral |            |          |          |         |        |\n| 97               | 97         | 33       | 45       | 3       | 16     |\n| Other            |            |          |          |         |        |\n| 252              | 248        | 80       | 118      | 15      | 35     |\n| Totals           | 455        |          |          |         |        |\n| 455              | 147        | 211      | 28       | 69      |        |\n\n Of cases involving major figures within MOD (DG or above)\nIG referral\n4\n\nBSA referral\n2\nHotline referral\n15\nOther\n39\nTotals\n60\nCases\nSubjects\nSunni\nShiia\nKurd\nSec\n\n Of those cases involving significant sums of money (Above $25,000)\n\n\nIG referral\n4\n8\n3\n2\n1\n2\nBSA referral\n54\n58\n16\n30\n4\n8\nHotline referral\n47\n52\n18\n20\n2\n12\nOther\n79\n98\n30\n47\n8\n13\nTotals\n184\n216\n67\n99\n15\n35\nCases\nSubjects\nSunni\nShiia\nKurd\nSec Of those cases involving small amounts or what would otherwise be considered administrative in nature:\n\n\n\nIG referral\n4\n7\n5\n1\n1\n0\nBSA referral\n35\n37\n10\n15\n4\n8\nHotline referral\n35\n45\n15\n25\n1\n4\nOther\n134\n150\n50\n71\n7\n22\nTotals\n208\n239\n80\n112\n13\n34\n\n\nOf the 455 investigations processed by CPI thus far 313 cases have been sent to the investigative court. Of those 313 cases sent to the investigative judge only 3 of those came from the IG. Of those cases involving DG or above there were 54 cases involving 56 defendants, (20 Sunni, 26 Shia, 3 Kurd, 7 others or undeterminable). Only 13 MOD defendants have been detained at some point in the process (6 Sunni, 7 Shia). A total of\n15 cases have advanced to trial involving 18 defendants, 7 Sunni, 9 Shia, and 2 Kurd.\nOne individual was granted immunity by the minister via Article 136B of the Criminal Procedure Code. Nine defendants have fled the country. In one case a general was released from custody and told not to return to his command. Once he was released he returned and the two witnesses were later found murdered.\n\nOnly four investigators are assigned to investigate corruption in MOD. Those investigators see the greatest violations as contract fraud, diversion and theft (est. in hundreds of millions or greater). Some of the stolen money has been traced to militias. Corruption in MOD has in the past been traced to the top; the prior minister and CFO both were convicted or in fugitive status. So massive was the corruption that current investigations from contracts, etc, remain clogged with actions before May 2005.\n\nIn response to past abuses MOD has reacted by taking steps that makes procurement far more difficult and time consuming but likely does little to nothing to prevent contract fraud15. Contract approval takes literally dozens of signatures which obfuscates responsibility and makes prosecution difficult. The practice has done little to prevent bribes and kick backs for contracts.  Where a smaller pool of approvers under supervision or independent review to prevent fraud could efficiently process procurement, MOD has widened opportunity to delay or refuse on an arbitrary manner and thus for extortion.\nMOD receiving facilities do not have copies of contracts so don't know what was supposed to be delivered. There has been no follow through by MOD re civil or criminal charges if goods contracted for were not delivered or were not in compliance.\nThe IG's typical response to document/witness requests is that the documents were lost and they can't identify who was involved. MOD personnel accosted a CPI\nassistant director general for investigations at his family's apartment in the IZ at night and CPI PSDs had to be called but had no power to arrest.\nSignificant problems remain in anticorruption enforcement concerning the Ministry of Defense. MOD has been working to develop its own courts martial system but such has not come into effect. The criminal prosecution of MOD defendants is near nonexistent as compared to the perception of contract and procurement fraud as well as ghost employees. There is an impression in the public and within the anticorruption enforcement establishment that MOD is immune from prosecution of corruption charges unless the complaint comes from outside of the ministry. Even on those rare occasions when the court gets jurisdiction and a defendant, the sharp counter-reaction to control the investigation and the suspect leaves an impression that corruption cases will not be pursued in MOD. This impression is reinforced through the lack of action on the part of the IG of MOD.  It is the observation of the ICITAP mentors and trainers within CPI that its investigators are incapable of penetrating MOD and receives little to no cooperation from MOD-IG.\nFor all of the reasons noted above corruption investigations in MOD are judged to be ineffectual.\n\nMinistry of Trade Minister : Abd  al- Falah al Sudani\n\nName of Ministry Inspector General:\nAbdul Hadi Abdul Monem Hassan Al-Taee Date of appointment as IG:\nAug/10/2006\n\nPolitical/Ethnic/Militia affiliation of IG:\nShia'a/ Secular\n\n\nThe IG of Trade is well respected within the anticorruption community and generally cooperates with CPI when they ask for information on investigations. There are no reported incidents of intimidation of IGs or CPI investigators. The ministry is considered to be a permissive place in which to investigate which makes it unusual for Iraq.\nThat said the MOT has a bad reputation of corrupt activities as it applies to support for the food program. Because of the way Iraq handles its regulatory promulgation it is easy to hide much of the corrupt practices. The people who make the regulations are the same people who carry them out and the regulatory process is nontransparent.\nThe relationship between CPI and MOT is too cozy with a failure to aggressively prosecute cases. On one known occasion an investigator found evidence of the sale of food stuffs meant for oil for food distribution a likely violation of the law. Missing was 18 billion dinars ($12,860,000) worth of food with no indications of where the money went. Commissioner Rhadi approached the minister giving him 48 hours to come up with proof that the government was reimbursed. Receipts were provided showing that the money was returned to the government. (In fairness the same deal has been offered to other ministries most notably MOD). The case was not referred to court on the theory that the minister has the power to use his administrative authority as per Article 136B ICPC to avoid prosecution. In the Ministry of Trade there have been a total of 193 investigations of corruption. The break down by source is as follows.\n\nWorking Draft\n| Cases                                                              | Subjects    | Sunni    | Shiia    | Kurd    | Sec    |\n|--------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------|----------|----------|---------|--------|\n|                                                                    |             |          |          |         |        |\n| IG referral                                                        |             |          |          |         |        |\n| 14                                                                 |             |          |          |         |        |\n| 24                                                                 | 4           | 18       | 1        | 1       |        |\n| BSA referral                                                       |             |          |          |         |        |\n| 3                                                                  |             |          |          |         |        |\n| 3                                                                  | 1           | 2        | 0        | 0       |        |\n| Hotline referral                                                   |             |          |          |         |        |\n| 67                                                                 |             |          |          |         |        |\n| 80                                                                 | 12          | 61       | 4        | 3       |        |\n| Other                                                              |             |          |          |         |        |\n| 109                                                                |             |          |          |         |        |\n| 124                                                                | 15          | 96       | 5        | 8       |        |\n| Totals                                                             |             |          |          |         |        |\n| 193                                                                |             |          |          |         |        |\n| 231                                                                | 32          | 177      | 10       | 12      |        |\n|                                                                    |             |          |          |         |        |\n| Of cases involving major figures within MOT (DG or above)          |             |          |          |         |        |\n|                                                                    |             |          |          |         |        |\n| Cases                                                              | Subjects    | Sunni    | Shiia    | Kurd    | Sec    |\n|                                                                    |             |          |          |         |        |\n| 3                                                                  | 4           | 1        | 3        | 0       | 0      |\n| IG referral                                                        |             |          |          |         |        |\n| 0                                                                  | 0           | 0        | 0        | 0       | 0      |\n| BSA referral                                                       |             |          |          |         |        |\n| 6                                                                  | 8           | 2        | 5        | 0       | 1      |\n| Hotline referral                                                   |             |          |          |         |        |\n| 9                                                                  | 12          | 2        | 8        | 0       | 2      |\n| Other                                                              |             |          |          |         |        |\n| 18                                                                 | 24          | 5        | 16       | 0       | 3      |\n| Totals                                                             |             |          |          |         |        |\n|                                                                    |             |          |          |         |        |\n|                                                                    |             |          |          |         |        |\n| Of those cases involving significant sums of money (Above $25,000) |             |          |          |         |        |\n|                                                                    |             |          |          |         |        |\n| Cases                                                              | Subjects    | Sunni    | Shiia    | Kurd    | Sec    |\n|                                                                    |             |          |          |         |        |\n| 6                                                                  | 10          | 1        | 8        | 0       | 1      |\n| IG referral                                                        |             |          |          |         |        |\n| 0                                                                  | 0           | 0        | 0        | 0       | 0      |\n| BSA referral                                                       |             |          |          |         |        |\n| 18                                                                 | 22          | 2        | 18       | 0       | 2      |\n| Hotline referral                                                   |             |          |          |         |        |\n| 24                                                                 | 30          | 4        | 20       | 0       | 6      |\n| Other                                                              |             |          |          |         |        |\n| 48                                                                 | 62          | 7        | 46       | 0       | 9      |\n| Totals                                                             |             |          |          |         |        |\n|                                                                    |             |          |          |         |        |\n|                                                                    |             |          |          |         |        |\n| 21                                                                 |             |          |          |         |        |\n\nOf those cases involving small amounts or what would otherwise be considered administrative in nature:\n\n| Cases            |   Subjects  |   Sunni  |   Shiia  |   Kurd  | Sec    |\n|------------------|-------------|----------|----------|---------|--------|\n|                  |             |          |          |         |        |\n| 8                |         10  |       2  |       7  |      1  |        |\n| IG referral      |             |          |          |         |        |\n| 3                |          3  |       1  |       2  |      0  |        |\n| BSA referral     |             |          |          |         |        |\n| 43               |         50  |       8  |      38  |      4  |        |\n| Hotline referral |             |          |          |         |        |\n| 76               |         82  |       9  |      68  |      5  |        |\n| Other            |             |          |          |         |        |\n| 130              |        145  |      20  |     115  |     10  | 0      |\n| Totals           |             |          |          |         |        |\n\n\nOf the 193 investigations processed by CPI thus far thus far 100 cases have been sent to the investigative court. Of those court investigations involving DG and above, 8 cases have been sent to the investigative court involving 13 defendants. (3 Sunni, 9 Shi'a, and 1 is undeterminable) Of those 13 defendants, none were detained. Two were sent to trial and no one has been convicted. Fifteen have however fled the country.\n\nThe Ministry of Trade has a terrible reputation for corruption and both the IG and CPI have failed to aggressively correct that impression. The Senior Consultant of Trade has once described MOT as the most corrupt ministry. Much of the corruption involves what can be called criminal gangs within the ministry by function.16 Grain theft is handled by one gang for example, diversion of ministry transportation assets by another. There are no indications that these gangs are politically motivated.\nMuch of the corruption however comes from the people who handle contracts or testing of food stuffs. This is possible because of the regulations are created by the people responsible to carry them out. Regulations are passed making corruption likely and difficult to prove. There have been some inferences that the failure of the Ministry of Trade to properly carry out some of its functions is due to fear of CPI. A review of two years records show that no Ministry of Trade employee has ever been detained on corruption charges. With out of 196 complaints only 8 being sent to court and only one person having been convicted in what is widely recognized as a troubled ministry corruption investigations are ineffectual.\n\nMinistry of Health Minister Ali al-Shammari (Just Resigned New Ministry not Appointed)\n\nName of Ministry Inspector General:\nAdel Muhsien Abdulla Al-Quza'alee\n\n\n16 Observations sourced from INL funded trainers\n\n\nDate of appointment as IG:\n2004\nPolitical/Ethnic/Militia affiliation of IG:\nShia'a Collation/ Alda'wa party\n\n\nThe relationship between the IG and CPI is the lowest of all the IGs with the Commissioner accusing the IG of operating a pharmaceutical diversion scheme and Dr. Adel accusing Commissioner Rhadi of lawless behavior and is lobbying openly to have the commissioner removed with CPI under his person control. The reputation of MOH is poor and is openly under the control of the Medhi Army of Muktad al-Sadr.  Dr. Adel travels with a Medhi Army body guard detachment and sometimes volunteers his services by taking Sunni bodies from the morgue and delivering them to their families.\n\nIn the Ministry of Health there have been a total of 221 investigations of corruption. The break down by source is as follows.\n\n| Cases                                                     | Subjects    | Sunni    | Shiia    | Kurd    | Sec    |\n|-----------------------------------------------------------|-------------|----------|----------|---------|--------|\n|                                                           |             |          |          |         |        |\n| 52                                                        | 72          | 7        | 62       | 0       | 3      |\n| IG referral                                               |             |          |          |         |        |\n| 0                                                         | 0           | 0        | 0        | 0       | 0      |\n| BSA referral                                              |             |          |          |         |        |\n| 89                                                        | 113         | 14       | 95       | 0       | 4      |\n| Hotline referral                                          |             |          |          |         |        |\n| 80                                                        | 85          | 10       | 71       | 0       | 4      |\n| Other                                                     |             |          |          |         |        |\n| 221                                                       | 270         | 31       | 228      | 0       | 11     |\n| Totals                                                    |             |          |          |         |        |\n|                                                           |             |          |          |         |        |\n| Of cases involving major figures within MOH (DG or above) |             |          |          |         |        |\n| Cases                                                     | Subjects    | Sunni    | Shiia    | Kurd    | Sec    |\n|                                                           |             |          |          |         |        |\n| 2                                                         | 2           | 0        | 2        | 0       | 0      |\n| IG referral                                               |             |          |          |         |        |\n| 0                                                         | 0           | 0        | 0        | 0       | 0      |\n| BSA referral                                              |             |          |          |         |        |\n| 10                                                        | 11          | 2        | 8        | 0       | 1      |\n| Hotline referral                                          |             |          |          |         |        |\n| 4                                                         | 4           | 1        | 3        | 0       | 0      |\n| Other                                                     |             |          |          |         |        |\n| 16                                                        | 17          | 3        | 13       | 0       | 1      |\n| Totals                                                    |             |          |          |         |        |\n|                                                           |             |          |          |         |        |\n|                                                           |             |          |          |         |        |\n| 23                                                        |             |          |          |         |        |\n\nOf those cases involving significant sums of money (Above $25,000)\n\n| Cases                                                                        | Subjects    | Sunni    | Shiia    | Kurd    | Sec    |\n|------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------|----------|----------|---------|--------|\n|                                                                              |             |          |          |         |        |\n| 7                                                                            | 10          | 2        | 7        | 0       | 1      |\n| IG referral                                                                  |             |          |          |         |        |\n| 0                                                                            | 0           | 0        | 0        | 0       | 0      |\n| BSA referral                                                                 |             |          |          |         |        |\n| 37                                                                           | 50          | 7        | 42       | 0       | 1      |\n| Hotline referral                                                             |             |          |          |         |        |\n| 26                                                                           | 26          | 4        | 20       | 0       | 2      |\n| Other                                                                        |             |          |          |         |        |\n| 70                                                                           | 86          | 13       | 69       | 0       | 4      |\n| Totals                                                                       |             |          |          |         |        |\n|                                                                              |             |          |          |         |        |\n| Of those cases involving small amounts or what would otherwise be considered |             |          |          |         |        |\n| administrative in nature:                                                    |             |          |          |         |        |\n|                                                                              |             |          |          |         |        |\n| Cases                                                                        | Subjects    | Sunni    | Shiia    | Kurd    | Sec    |\n|                                                                              |             |          |          |         |        |\n| 48                                                                           | 60          | 5        | 53       | 0       | 2      |\n| IG referral                                                                  |             |          |          |         |        |\n| 0                                                                            | 0           | 0        | 0        | 0       | 0      |\n| BSA referral                                                                 |             |          |          |         |        |\n| 42                                                                           | 52          | 5        | 45       | 0       | 2      |\n| Hotline referral                                                             |             |          |          |         |        |\n| 50                                                                           | 55          | 5        | 48       | 0       | 2      |\n| Other                                                                        |             |          |          |         |        |\n| 140                                                                          | 167         | 15       | 146      | 0       | 6      |\n| Totals                                                                       |             |          |          |         |        |\n\n\nOf the 221 investigations processed by CPI, 101 were sent to the court for investigation. Nineteen of the 52 cases sent by the IG were sent to the IJ. At total of 4 of the 16 cases involving DGs or above (1 Sunni and 6 Shia defendants) have been sent to the court for investigation.\nThus far Only 6 Ministry of Health personnel (3 Sunni, 3 Shia) have been detained at some point in the pretrial process. Two people have been found guilty with the remainder either found innocent or are still pending trial. Three accused however were granted immunity by the minister via Article 136B of the Criminal Procedure Code. Fifteen have fled the country to avoid prosecution.\n\nIn interviews with the CPI investigators, they repeatedly said that the IG is not cooperative. CPI investigators say that the IG usually doesn't produce requested documents or witnesses for CPI. The IG normally won't respond to IJ request either.\n\nAccording to both ICITAP and Iraqi investigators, cases coming out of the IG's department are notoriously incomplete or frivolous. Many of the simple or weak allegations such as minor fraud or certificate cases could have been handled within the ministry. Investigations often come as general allegations without names of accused or witnesses. When cases are referred to the court the ministry is unresponsive to the court orders.\nReports from the Ministry of Health show what seem to be inappropriate actions by the IG with the IG taking a role in deciding who receives contracts. Discussions with employees within MOH bring multiple claims that the MOH IG office shakes down doctors, particularly involving private clinics and diverting pharmaceuticals. The allegations because of the lack of CPI investigative capacity and Medhi Army protection are impossible to verify or debunk.\nMOH has an atrocious reputation in the public and the Iraqi press regularly complains bitterly about the lack of pharmaceuticals which is blamed on corruption. There are repeated stories of patients having to purchase black market drugs that were originally destined for MOH. Complaints of preventable deaths due to lack of medicines are commonplace. Military sources have reported that the Medhi Army finances operations from diverted medicines.\nCPI has 4 investigators assigned to investigate corruption in Health. CPI is currently incapable of even basic efforts to stem this perception due to lack of access or to challenge the IG due to his powerful position within Prime Minister's Office. CPI can no longer go into the ministry because it is controlled by militia who have threatened CPI investigators. Contract fraud and employee theft of medicines, food, vehicles are viewed by investigators as the greatest problems.\nThere are also significant numbers of employees submitting fraudulent MD and nursing licenses. Most IG referrals are for minimal cases, such as a $7 theft of gas. Because CPI must investigate all reports it did so in the $7 gas theft and only after an extensive investigation the then the Minister used Article 136 B to excuse the thief. There are minimal referrals received from BSA. Cases not coming from the IG office are near impossible to investigate.\nRecent accounts have Medhi army members paying hospital employees to ID\nSunnis who they then removed and kill. Discussions with senior members of the The Ministry of Health is a sore point in corruption actually affecting its ability to deliver services so obviously as to threaten the support of the government. The lack of investigative capacity and the presence of militia make it beyond the reach of anticorruption efforts.\n\nMinistry of Oil Minister: Husyn al-Sharistani Currently there is no appointed IG. The former IG has been moved as secretary of the Council of Ministers\n\n\nName of Ministry Inspector General:\nAli Muhsen AlAlaq\n Recently resigned\n\nPolitical/Ethnic/Militia affiliation of IG:\nShia'a Collation/ Shia'a/ Aldawa Party\n\n\nIn conversations with the Senior Consultant of Oil an atmosphere of intimidation by the IG over the minister is described. The IG office concentrates on administrative technicalities at the expense of oil theft or procurement. In the IG's defense there are no IG investigators capable of confronting oil theft rings that have come to fore supported by violent groups. The Minister feels intimidated into signing nearly every case no matter how petty for criminal prosecution. Part of this unequal relationship may stem from the IG's relationship with the PMO. The cases sent to CPI have more than met the standard to pass along to court. CPI has been relegated in such cases as delivering the mail due to the intimidating atmosphere of the ministry, its proximity to the dangerous area of Sadr City and the Iraqi low standards requiring the presentation of cases to the IJ in the Criminal Procedure Code. In the Ministry of Oil there have been a total of 154 investigations of corruption. The break down by source is as follows.\n\n| Cases                                                     | Subjects    | Sunni    | Shiia    | Kurd    | Sec    |\n|-----------------------------------------------------------|-------------|----------|----------|---------|--------|\n|                                                           |             |          |          |         |        |\n| 38                                                        | 30          | 4        | 24       | 0       | 2      |\n| IG referral                                               |             |          |          |         |        |\n| 1                                                         | 3           | 0        | 3        | 0       | 0      |\n| BSA referral                                              |             |          |          |         |        |\n| 45                                                        | 48          | 4        | 36       | 2       | 6      |\n| Hotline referral                                          |             |          |          |         |        |\n| 70                                                        | 67          | 8        | 50       | 5       | 4      |\n| Other                                                     |             |          |          |         |        |\n| 154                                                       | 148         | 16       | 113      | 7       | 12     |\n| Totals                                                    |             |          |          |         |        |\n|                                                           |             |          |          |         |        |\n| Of cases involving major figures within MOO (DG or above) |             |          |          |         |        |\n|                                                           |             |          |          |         |        |\n| Cases                                                     | Subjects    | Sunni    | Shiia    | Kurd    | Sec    |\n|                                                           |             |          |          |         |        |\n| 1                                                         | 1           |          | 1        |         |        |\n| IG referral                                               |             |          |          |         |        |\n|                                                           | 0           |          |          |         |        |\n| BSA referral                                              |             |          |          |         |        |\n|                                                           |             |          |          |         |        |\n| 26                                                        |             |          |          |         |        |\n\n| 3                |   3  |      |   2  |      |   1  |\n|------------------|------|------|------|------|------|\n| Hotline referral |      |      |      |      |      |\n| 8                |   5  |   1  |   2  |   1  |   1  |\n| Other            |      |      |      |      |      |\n| 12               |   9  |   1  |   5  |   1  |   2  |\n| Totals           |      |      |      |      |      |\n\n Of those cases involving significant sums of money (Above $25,000)\n\n| Cases            |   Subjects  | Sunni    |   Shiia  | Kurd    | Sec    |\n|------------------|-------------|----------|----------|---------|--------|\n|                  |             |          |          |         |        |\n| 3                |          3  | 1        |       2  |         |        |\n| IG referral      |             |          |          |         |        |\n| 1                |          3  |          |       3  |         |        |\n| BSA referral     |             |          |          |         |        |\n| 8                |         10  | 1        |       7  |         | 2      |\n| Hotline referral |             |          |          |         |        |\n| 27               |         25  | 3        |      19  | 2       | 1      |\n| Other            |             |          |          |         |        |\n| 39               |         41  | 5        |      31  | 2       | 3      |\n| Totals           |             |          |          |         |        |\n\n Of those cases involving small amounts or what would otherwise be considered administrative in nature:\n\n| Cases            |   Subjects  | Sunni    | Shiia    | Kurd    | Sec    |\n|------------------|-------------|----------|----------|---------|--------|\n|                  |             |          |          |         |        |\n| 25               |         26  | 3        | 21       |         | 2      |\n| IG referral      |             |          |          |         |        |\n|                  |          0  |          |          |         |        |\n| BSA referral     |             |          |          |         |        |\n| 34               |         35  | 3        | 27       | 2       | 3      |\n| Hotline referral |             |          |          |         |        |\n| 35               |         37  | 4        | 29       | 2       | 2      |\n| Other            |             |          |          |         |        |\n| 94               |         98  | 10       | 77       | 4       | 7      |\n| Totals           |             |          |          |         |        |\n\n\nOf the 154 investigations processed by CPI thus far 101 cases have been sent to the investigative court. Nineteen of those cases involved DG or above, but only involving\n9 separate people, 8 Shia, one other. On the 38 cases provided by the Oil IG 14 made it to the investigative court. Of the 101 cases sent to the IJ, 22 defendants were detained at some point in the process (1 Sunni, 11 Shia, 7 Kurds, 3 others). This is the highest percentages of people detained of all the ministries in Iraq. There is no identifiable cause as to why Oil has such a high percentage of people detained other than most of those detained have come from the IG's office after a signature of the Minister. It must be noted that five have fled the country. Only two people have been found guilty with the remainder either found innocent or are still pending trial. Five however were granted immunity by the minister via Article 136B of the Criminal Procedure Code.\nOil has developed a reputation as being the largest source of corruption in Iraq with open sources claiming that a large percentage of insurgency is being funded from diverted oil and oil products. \"Oil theft\" and smuggling is alleged to be \"massive\". It is beyond the scope of CPI resources to estimate the gross amount of the theft.\nHaving said this, based upon the interviews of several CPI officers, the following MOO \"accountability issues\" exist.  CPI investigators have noted that the physical accounting for oil from production of crude, to the transportation, storage, shipment and/or export is materially understated.  The \"book\" records of oil production etc are often misstated.  This renders analysis of oil records to be materially misleading.  The situation facilitates organized theft.  Incomplete records, lack of paper trail, missing documents help in the proof of theft.  (The proof must come from protected witnesses, surveillance by adequately equipped/empowered officers, undercover sting operations, and/or seizures by honest police/customs officials.  All of which are in short supply or non existence in Iraq.)  There is no incentive to begin accurately accounting for oil production and oil movement to refineries, storage or export as long as organized criminals move this valuable commodity for the benefit of militias/insurgents, corrupt public officials and foreign buyers. 17 Unfortunately, protection rackets and other violent criminal enterprises supporting theft, smuggling and illegal distribution of Iraq's oil products make the correction of the situation difficult.  Security forces loyal to Iraq must be deployed to secure every link in the oil industry and to ensure an accurate accounting for oil.18\nIn cases especially in the south and north the ministry has failed to bring in witnesses and defendants to investigators.\nCPI, with mostly an administrative staff lacks the expertise or the manpower and simply accepts the cases provided to them by the Oil IG. CPI has only four investigators assigned to Oil cases. Over two years there have been only 154 cases.\n\nInvestigators indicate that contract fraud, document forgeries, product theft/diversion, poor product accounting is the greatest problem. CPI has limited ability to investigate the high impact crimes related to the oil industry.  The physical threats to CPI\ninvestigators who are investigating militia protected organized crime are an insurmountable obstacle at present. 19\nThe cases that have come from the IG have involved mostly small cases while large ones go uninvestigated. The IG has been incapable to of securing major cases of either oil theft or on procurement. In those cases that come from the IG, investigators have noticed a pattern of referring those persons without political support.\nThe IG has alleged poorly drafted contracts, lack performance standards. He points to no enforcement, civil or criminal by MOO for non-performance under contract.\n\nThe IG has objected that many contracts paid full or in-part up front and the minister has signed off such cases for prosecution as such being not lawful and not as per his instructions. The IG has been accused of taking on for himself as the final arbitrator as to what is or is not a proper contract award or financial procedure. Experts in the field from a number of sources have singled out the IG's office as having little to no experience in the petroleum field or its business practices and thus have hindered the contracting and procurement processes without curbing the fraud therein.\nMore recently the MOO Minister has directed the acting IG not to cooperate with CPI.  The acting IG is also has not responded to the IJ's orders.\n\nThe Oil Ministry has become the focus of military and press attention with regards to corruption. CPI is capable of operating in paper cases concerning oil but not oil theft which requires operations in the red zone with large numbers of investigators. Even in the paper cases an ability to verify the evidence is needed. The high number of dismissals in several cases where political rivalries were alleged indicates manipulation of the investigations within MOO.\n\nMinistry of Education Khudayyir al Khuza'i\n\nName of Ministry Inspector General:\nAli Abdulla Kadhem AlAmery Date of appointment as IG:\n11/16/2005\n\n\nPolitical/Ethnic/Militia affiliation of IG:\nShia'a Collation/ Shia'a\n\n\n\nAmong the investigators the IG has a reputation as being emotional and not\nfollowing the evidence. The IG office is desperately understaffed and untrained in\ninvestigative and auditing skills. This has tainted most of the investigations coming from\nthe IG office. The large spread out ministry overwhelms the IG staff making responses on administrative investigations laborious and slow. The IGs inability to go into many areas because of the security situation makes some areas beyond the reach of any anticorruption work. These facts make the IG office ineffective.\nIn the Ministry of Education there have been a total of 150 investigations of corruption. The break down by source is as follows.\n\n| Cases            | Subjects    | Sunni    | Shiia    | Kurd    | Sec    |\n|------------------|-------------|----------|----------|---------|--------|\n|                  |             |          |          |         |        |\n| 7                | 8           | 1        | 5        | 0       | 2      |\n| IG referral      |             |          |          |         |        |\n|                  |             |          |          |         |        |\n| BSA referral     |             |          |          |         |        |\n| 102              | 117         | 23       | 62       | 8       | 24     |\n| Hotline referral |             |          |          |         |        |\n| 41               | 47          | 14       | 22       | 2       | 9      |\n| Other            |             |          |          |         |        |\n| 150              | 172         | 38       | 89       | 10      | 35     |\n| Totals           |             |          |          |         |        |\n\n Of cases involving major figures within MOE (DG or above)\n\n| Cases            |   Subjects  | Sunni    | Shiia    | Kurd    | Sec    |\n|------------------|-------------|----------|----------|---------|--------|\n|                  |             |          |          |         |        |\n|                  |          0  |          |          |         |        |\n| IG referral      |             |          |          |         |        |\n|                  |          0  |          |          |         |        |\n| BSA referral     |             |          |          |         |        |\n| 6                |          7  | 2        | 4        | 1       |        |\n| Hotline referral |             |          |          |         |        |\n| 5                |          8  | 2        | 4        |         | 2      |\n| Other            |             |          |          |         |        |\n| 11               |         15  | 4        | 8        | 1       | 2      |\n| Totals           |             |          |          |         |        |\n\n Of those cases involving significant sums of money (Above $25,000)\n\n| Cases       |   Subjects  | Sunni    |   Shiia  | Kurd    |   Sec  |\n|-------------|-------------|----------|----------|---------|--------|\n|             |             |          |          |         |        |\n| 3           |          3  |          |       2  |         |     1  |\n| IG referral |             |          |          |         |        |\n\n\n\n|                                                                              | 0        |       |       |      |      |\n|------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------|-------|-------|------|------|\n| BSA referral                                                                 |          |       |       |      |      |\n| 23                                                                           | 28       | 6     | 13    | 3    | 6    |\n| Hotline referral                                                             |          |       |       |      |      |\n| 9                                                                            | 9        | 2     | 4     | 1    | 2    |\n| Other                                                                        |          |       |       |      |      |\n| 35                                                                           | 40       | 8     | 19    | 4    | 9    |\n| Totals                                                                       |          |       |       |      |      |\n|                                                                              |          |       |       |      |      |\n| Of those cases involving small amounts or what would otherwise be considered |          |       |       |      |      |\n| administrative in nature:                                                    |          |       |       |      |      |\n|                                                                              |          |       |       |      |      |\n| Cases                                                                        | Subjects | Sunni | Shiia | Kurd | Sec  |\n|                                                                              |          |       |       |      |      |\n| 3                                                                            | 5        | 1     | 3     |      | 1    |\n| IG referral                                                                  |          |       |       |      |      |\n|                                                                              | 0        |       |       |      |      |\n| BSA referral                                                                 |          |       |       |      |      |\n| 73                                                                           | 82       | 15    | 45    | 4    | 18   |\n| Hotline referral                                                             |          |       |       |      |      |\n| 27                                                                           | 30       | 10    | 14    | 1    | 5    |\n| Other                                                                        |          |       |       |      |      |\n| 103                                                                          | 117      | 26    | 62    | 5    | 24   |\n| Totals                                                                       |          |       |       |      |      |\n\n\nOf the 150 investigations processed by CPI thus far only 15 cases have been sent to the investigative court. Of cases involving DG or above 1 case was sent to court involving 2 defendants. On the 7 cases received from the IG, 2 made it to the investigative judge. There has been only 1 conviction of a single individual.\nCPI has only 3 investigators assigned to this ministry.  They also investigate the Ministry of Foreign Affairs but can't address Foreign Affairs because most activities occur overseas and CPI can't travel. CPI investigators do have access to MOEd HQ however, which allows them to concentrate on corruption cases in the central ministry of Education. Investigators report that contract fraud is the largest problem in Education.\nFor example, common cases are contracting for a school and paying the contract price but the school was never built.  Investigators have reported fraudulent payments to PSD teams. Fraudulent certificates used to obtain teaching jobs are common as are cases involving MOEd employees selling fraudulent documents.\n\nCPI investigators claim that the IG is non-cooperative for political reasons.\n\nAccording to CPI the IG only passes frivolous cases to CPI.  Criminal prosecutions have been repeatedly thwarted because when the IG learns of a CPI subject in MOEd, the\n\nemployee is penalized administratively which has the effect of nullifying the criminal case. When CPI is able to by-pass IG, the Minister will usually invoke Article 136 B.\n\nThe IG refuses to let staff assist CPI citing security concerns. BSA has not yet referred a case to CPI from MOEd.\n\nThus far, anticorruption cases concerning the MOEd has been particularly ineffective. Analysis and interviews with the investigators show a lack of capacity within the IG department and an inability of either CPI or the IG's office to operate in the field because of security concerns. Historically, corruption in Education centers on failure to teach classes but still collecting pay. It was traditional to have teachers share each others class room duties to moonlight on the side.\n\nMinistry of Water  Recourses\n\n'Abd al Latif Rashid\n\nName of Ministry Inspector General:\nAli Abdul-zWahed Ali AlAnsary Date of appointment as IG:\n3/30/2004\n\n\nPolitical/Ethnic/Militia affiliation of IG:\nShia'a Collation\n\n\n\nThe relationship between CPI and the IGs office is particularly bad with little cooperation at any level. Cases sent to the ministry take an excessive time for processing.\n\nCases sent to the minister for permission to prosecute languish making it difficult to refer to court.\n\nIn the Ministry of Water Resources there have been a total of 21 investigations of corruption. The break down by source is as follows.\n\n| Cases            | Subjects    | Sunni    | Shiia    | Kurd    | Sec    |\n|------------------|-------------|----------|----------|---------|--------|\n|                  |             |          |          |         |        |\n| 1                | 2           | 0        | 2        |         |        |\n| IG referral      |             |          |          |         |        |\n|                  |             |          |          |         |        |\n| BSA referral     |             |          |          |         |        |\n| 10               | 12          | 1        | 8        | 1       | 2      |\n| Hotline referral |             |          |          |         |        |\n| 10               | 12          | 3        | 8        |         | 1      |\n| Other            |             |          |          |         |        |\n| 21               | 26          | 4        | 18       | 1       | 3      |\n| Totals           |             |          |          |         |        |\n\n Of cases involving major figures within MOE (DG or above)\n\n\n| Cases                                                                        | Subjects    | Sunni    | Shiia    | Kurd    | Sec    |\n|------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------|----------|----------|---------|--------|\n|                                                                              |             |          |          |         |        |\n|                                                                              | 0           |          |          |         |        |\n| IG referral                                                                  |             |          |          |         |        |\n|                                                                              | 0           |          |          |         |        |\n| BSA referral                                                                 |             |          |          |         |        |\n| 2                                                                            | 2           |          | 2        |         |        |\n| Hotline referral                                                             |             |          |          |         |        |\n| 2                                                                            | 2           | 1        | 1        |         |        |\n| Other                                                                        |             |          |          |         |        |\n| 4                                                                            | 4           | 1        | 3        | 0       | 0      |\n| Totals                                                                       |             |          |          |         |        |\n|                                                                              |             |          |          |         |        |\n| Of those cases involving significant sums of money (Above $25,000)           |             |          |          |         |        |\n|                                                                              |             |          |          |         |        |\n| Cases                                                                        | Subjects    | Sunni    | Shiia    | Kurd    | Sec    |\n|                                                                              |             |          |          |         |        |\n|                                                                              | 0           |          |          |         |        |\n| IG referral                                                                  |             |          |          |         |        |\n|                                                                              | 0           |          |          |         |        |\n| BSA referral                                                                 |             |          |          |         |        |\n| 2                                                                            | 3           |          | 2        |         | 1      |\n| Hotline referral                                                             |             |          |          |         |        |\n| 1                                                                            | 1           |          | 1        |         |        |\n| Other                                                                        |             |          |          |         |        |\n| 3                                                                            | 4           | 0        | 3        | 0       | 1      |\n| Totals                                                                       |             |          |          |         |        |\n|                                                                              |             |          |          |         |        |\n| Of those cases involving small amounts or what would otherwise be considered |             |          |          |         |        |\n| administrative in nature:                                                    |             |          |          |         |        |\n|                                                                              |             |          |          |         |        |\n| Cases                                                                        | Subjects    | Sunni    | Shiia    | Kurd    | Sec    |\n|                                                                              |             |          |          |         |        |\n| 1                                                                            | 2           |          | 2        |         |        |\n| IG referral                                                                  |             |          |          |         |        |\n|                                                                              | 0           |          |          |         |        |\n| BSA referral                                                                 |             |          |          |         |        |\n| 6                                                                            | 7           | 1        | 4        | 1       | 1      |\n| Hotline referral                                                             |             |          |          |         |        |\n|                                                                              |             |          |          |         |        |\n| 33                                                                           |             |          |          |         |        |\n\n| 7      |   9  |   2  |   6  |      |   1  |\n|--------|------|------|------|------|------|\n| Other  |      |      |      |      |      |\n| 14     |  18  |   3  |  12  |   1  |   2  |\n| Totals |      |      |      |      |      |\n\n\nOf the 21 investigations processed by CPI thus far only 9 cases has been sent to the investigative court. One of those cases involving 2 defendants concerned a major figure in the ministry. Only one case sent by the IG have ever provided enough evidence to even make it to the investigative judge.\n\nAs is shown by the small number of investigations in the Ministry of Water Recourses is effectively out of the anticorruption fight with little to no apparent effort in trying to combat fraud.\n\nMinistry of Labor & Social Affairs Mahmud Mahammad Jawad al Radi\n\nName of Ministry Inspector General:\nWaleed Muthafer Mohammed Asoad (Acting)\nDate of appointment as IG:\nNot appointed yet\n\n\nPolitical/Ethnic/Militia affiliation of IG:\nShia'a Collation\n\n\n\nIn interviews with CPI investigators this IG office was described as being uncooperative in criminal cases. Investigators have described the IG office as in collusion with the accused. Administrative investigations requested by CPI or the courts have gone unanswered. Official requests are regularly delayed in response. Without exception the legal counsel of the ministry has not appeared in court to answer questions from the court.\nIn the Ministry of Labor & Social Affairs there have been a total of 77\ninvestigations of corruption. The break down by source is as follows.\n\n| Cases            |   Subjects  |   Sunni  |   Shiia  |   Kurd  |   Sec  |\n|------------------|-------------|----------|----------|---------|--------|\n|                  |             |          |          |         |        |\n| 7                |          5  |       1  |       2  |      1  |     1  |\n| IG referral      |             |          |          |         |        |\n| 12               |         15  |       3  |       6  |      1  |     5  |\n| BSA referral     |             |          |          |         |        |\n| 26               |         24  |       5  |      12  |      0  |     7  |\n| Hotline referral |             |          |          |         |        |\n| 33               |         29  |       5  |      13  |      3  |     8  |\n| Other            |             |          |          |         |        |\n\n| 78                                                                           | 73       | 14    | 33    | 5    | 21    |\n|------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------|-------|-------|------|-------|\n| Totals                                                                       |          |       |       |      |       |\n|                                                                              |          |       |       |      |       |\n| Of cases involving major figures within MOE (DG or above)                    |          |       |       |      |       |\n|                                                                              |          |       |       |      |       |\n| Cases                                                                        |          |       |       |      |       |\n|                                                                              |          |       |       |      |       |\n| IG referral                                                                  |          |       |       |      |       |\n| 1                                                                            |          |       |       |      |       |\n| BSA referral                                                                 |          |       |       |      |       |\n|                                                                              |          |       |       |      |       |\n| Hotline referral                                                             |          |       |       |      |       |\n| 7                                                                            |          |       |       |      |       |\n| Other                                                                        |          |       |       |      |       |\n| 8                                                                            |          |       |       |      |       |\n| Totals                                                                       | 16       |       |       |      |       |\n|                                                                              |          |       |       |      |       |\n| Of those cases involving significant sums of money (Above $25,000)           |          |       |       |      |       |\n|                                                                              |          |       |       |      |       |\n| Cases                                                                        | Subjects | Sunni | Shiia | Kurd | Sec   |\n|                                                                              |          |       |       |      |       |\n| 2                                                                            | 2        |       | 1     |      | 1     |\n| IG referral                                                                  |          |       |       |      |       |\n|                                                                              | 0        |       |       |      |       |\n| BSA referral                                                                 |          |       |       |      |       |\n| 19                                                                           | 24       | 5     | 12    |      | 7     |\n| Hotline referral                                                             |          |       |       |      |       |\n| 14                                                                           | 16       | 3     | 7     |      | 6     |\n| Other                                                                        |          |       |       |      |       |\n| 35                                                                           | 42       | 8     | 20    | 0    | 14    |\n| Totals                                                                       |          |       |       |      |       |\n|                                                                              |          |       |       |      |       |\n| Of those cases involving small amounts or what would otherwise be considered |          |       |       |      |       |\n| administrative in nature:                                                    |          |       |       |      |       |\n|                                                                              |          |       |       |      |       |\n| Cases                                                                        | Subjects | Sunni | Shiia | Kurd | Sec   |\n|                                                                              |          |       |       |      |       |\n| 3                                                                            | 3        | 1     | 1     | 1    |       |\n| IG referral                                                                  |          |       |       |      |       |\n| 12                                                                           | 15       | 3     | 6     | 1    | 5     |\n| BSA referral                                                                 |          |       |       |      |       |\n|                                                                              | 0        |       |       |      |       |\n| Hotline referral                                                             |          |       |       |      |       |\n\n| 11     |   13  |   2  |   6  |   3  |   2  |\n|--------|-------|------|------|------|------|\n| Other  |       |      |      |      |      |\n| 26     |   31  |   6  |  13  |   5  |   7  |\n| Totals |       |      |      |      |      |\n\n\nOf the 78 investigations processed by CPI, 23 had enough evidence to go to the investigative judge. Of cases involving major figures, 5 cases have been sent to the investigative court involving 6 defendants, 2 Sunni, 3 Shia, 1 other. None of the defendants sent to the IJ were put into pretrial detention. Five defendants fled the country. There have been no convictions.\nThe Ministry of Labor & Social Affairs has been described as hostile to the prosecution on corruption cases. The number of referrals for prosecution and failure of even rudimentary cooperation would seem to support that contention.\n\n\nMinistry of Transportation (Just Resigned, New Minister Not Appointed) Karim Mahdi Salih\n\nName of Ministry Inspector General:\nSadoon Haial Abood Hassan AlShara'a\nDate of appointment as IG:\n11/16/2005\nPolitical/Ethnic/Militia affiliation of IG:\nShia'a / Sader affiliate / Shia'a Collation\n\n\nThe relationship between CPI and MOT has been professional as far as the IG's office is concerned. The minister however has been less cooperative with the legal counsel unwilling to cooperate with the investigative courts.\nThe ministry is Sadrist controlled. For the most part there is little indication of targeting investigations against Sunnis although in minor cases there is a clear double standard. In a ministry where the Shia well out number Sunnis, the numbers of cases referred to CPI for criminal prosecution on issues that could have been handled internally are about equal in number leaving the impression that Shia employees are protected.  It is significant to note that outside complaints on all cases to CPI are about equal as well. This leads to two possible conclusions. Sunnis are more disposed to corruption or that the hotline and other sources are being manipulated from the outside to instigate investigations disproportional to their numbers.\n\nIn the Ministry of Transportation there have been a total of 166 investigations of corruption. The break down by source is as follows.\n\n| Cases       |   Subjects  |   Sunni  |   Shiia  |   Kurd  |   Sec  |\n|-------------|-------------|----------|----------|---------|--------|\n|             |             |          |          |         |        |\n| 37          |         29  |      12  |      13  |      0  |     4  |\n| IG referral |             |          |          |         |        |\n\n| 1                                                                  | 2        | 1     | 1     | 0    | 0    |\n|--------------------------------------------------------------------|----------|-------|-------|------|------|\n| BSA referral                                                       |          |       |       |      |      |\n| 55                                                                 | 70       | 30    | 31    | 0    | 9    |\n| Hotline referral                                                   |          |       |       |      |      |\n| 82                                                                 | 88       | 36    | 38    | 0    | 14   |\n| Other                                                              |          |       |       |      |      |\n| 175                                                                | 189      | 79    | 83    | 0    | 27   |\n| Totals                                                             |          |       |       |      |      |\n|                                                                    |          |       |       |      |      |\n| Of cases involving major figures within MOT (DG or above)          |          |       |       |      |      |\n|                                                                    |          |       |       |      |      |\n| Cases                                                              | Subjects | Sunni | Shiia | Kurd | Sec  |\n|                                                                    |          |       |       |      |      |\n| 1                                                                  | 1        | 0     | 1     | 0    | 0    |\n| IG referral                                                        |          |       |       |      |      |\n| 0                                                                  | 0        | 0     | 0     | 0    | 0    |\n| BSA referral                                                       |          |       |       |      |      |\n| 12                                                                 | 21       | 11    | 10    | 0    | 0    |\n| Hotline referral                                                   |          |       |       |      |      |\n| 8                                                                  | 10       | 3     | 4     | 0    | 3    |\n| Other                                                              |          |       |       |      |      |\n| 21                                                                 | 32       | 14    | 15    | 0    | 3    |\n| Totals                                                             |          |       |       |      |      |\n|                                                                    |          |       |       |      |      |\n| Of those cases involving significant sums of money (Above $25,000) |          |       |       |      |      |\n|                                                                    |          |       |       |      |      |\n| Cases                                                              | Subjects | Sunni | Shiia | Kurd | Sec  |\n|                                                                    |          |       |       |      |      |\n| 2                                                                  | 3        | 1     | 2     | 0    | 0    |\n| IG referral                                                        |          |       |       |      |      |\n| 0                                                                  | 0        | 0     | 0     | 0    | 0    |\n| BSA referral                                                       |          |       |       |      |      |\n| 18                                                                 | 21       | 9     | 11    | 0    | 1    |\n| Hotline referral                                                   |          |       |       |      |      |\n| 12                                                                 | 13       | 4     | 6     | 0    | 3    |\n| Other                                                              |          |       |       |      |      |\n| 32                                                                 | 37       | 14    | 19    | 0    | 4    |\n| Totals                                                             |          |       |       |      |      |\n|                                                                    |          |       |       |      |      |\n|                                                                    |          |       |       |      |      |\n| 37                                                                 |          |       |       |      |      |\n\nOf those cases involving small amounts or what would otherwise be considered administrative in nature:\n\n| Cases            |   Subjects  |   Sunni  |   Shiia  |   Kurd  |   Sec  |\n|------------------|-------------|----------|----------|---------|--------|\n|                  |             |          |          |         |        |\n| 25               |         25  |      11  |      10  |      0  |     4  |\n| IG referral      |             |          |          |         |        |\n| 1                |          2  |       1  |       1  |      0  |     0  |\n| BSA referral     |             |          |          |         |        |\n| 25               |         28  |      10  |      10  |      0  |     8  |\n| Hotline referral |             |          |          |         |        |\n| 62               |         65  |      29  |      28  |      0  |     8  |\n| Other            |             |          |          |         |        |\n| 113              |        120  |      51  |      49  |      0  |    20  |\n| Totals           |             |          |          |         |        |\n\n\nOf the 175 investigations processed by CPI, 113 were sent to the investigative court. Fourteen of the cases sent to the investigative court were DGs involving 19 defendants, 8 Sunni, 10 Shia, 1 other. Of those 19 defendants 3 were put into pretrial detention. Five defendants fled the country.  One has been granted immunity by the minister. There has been one conviction.\nMuch of the problem lies in that most of the corruption cases stem from Basrah which is an inpermissive environment. According to the Commissioner cases coming out of Basrah are impenetrable for either CPI or the IG due to what amount to crime gangs supported by local militia. Efforts to seek support in investigations in the Basrah area from the Prime Minister has literally resulted in silence in return.20 Investigators consider the ministry controlled by militias.\n\nCorruption has been identified at the very top with connecting a former minister with the purchase of two aircraft for 28 million dollars in which two crates of light air craft parts were delivered. Of particular concern is the lack of accountability for landing fees. It has been reported that landing fees are not properly accounted for show very little of the fees actually paid going into the treasury. A number of credible reports showing that the fleet of trucks are being leased to private concerns with no accounting for the fees. CPI investigators are effectively prevented from conducting investigations due to the presence of the Medhi Army. The militia support from Sadr has effectively made corruption in the Ministry of Transportation wholesale according to investigators and immune from prosecution.\n\nMinistry of Higher Education\n\nAbd Dhiyab al Ajili\n\nName of Ministry Inspector General:\nAbdul Majeed Abdul Hameed Issa\nAlRawee\nDate of appointment as IG:\n3/1/2004\nPolitical/Ethnic/Militia affiliation of IG:\nSunni\n\n\n\nThe inspector general has a reputation as being cooperative in corruption cases although the ministry is notorious for slow processing of administrative investigations. Most of these cases involve forged certificate (false college degrees) which are difficult to verify. Many spent time in Iran were there is a lucrative trade in false educational degrees. These degrees have a bearing on salaries and therefore constitute fraud.\n\nIn the Ministry of Higher Education there have been a total of 188 investigations of corruption. The break down by source is as follows.\n\n| Cases            |   Subjects  |   Sunni  |   Shiia  |   Kurd  |   Sec  |\n|------------------|-------------|----------|----------|---------|--------|\n|                  |             |          |          |         |        |\n| 42               |         40  |       8  |      25  |      0  |     7  |\n| IG referral      |             |          |          |         |        |\n| 1                |          2  |       0  |       0  |      0  |     2  |\n| BSA referral     |             |          |          |         |        |\n| 97               |         98  |      23  |      56  |      5  |    14  |\n| Hotline referral |             |          |          |         |        |\n| 48               |         56  |      23  |      28  |      3  |     2  |\n| Other            |             |          |          |         |        |\n| 188              |        196  |      54  |     109  |      8  |    25  |\n| Totals           |             |          |          |         |        |\n\n Of cases involving major figures within MOHE (DG or above)\n\n| Cases            |   Subjects  | Sunni    |   Shiia  | Kurd    | Sec    |\n|------------------|-------------|----------|----------|---------|--------|\n|                  |             |          |          |         |        |\n| 1                |          2  | 1        |       1  |         |        |\n| IG referral      |             |          |          |         |        |\n|                  |          0  |          |       0  |         |        |\n| BSA referral     |             |          |          |         |        |\n| 13               |         15  | 6        |       5  | 1       | 3      |\n| Hotline referral |             |          |          |         |        |\n| 8                |         10  | 5        |       4  |         | 1      |\n| Other            |             |          |          |         |        |\n\n| 22                                                                           | 27       | 12    | 10    | 1    | 4    |\n|------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------|-------|-------|------|------|\n| Totals                                                                       |          |       |       |      |      |\n|                                                                              |          |       |       |      |      |\n| Of those cases involving significant sums of money (Above $25,000)           |          |       |       |      |      |\n|                                                                              |          |       |       |      |      |\n| Cases                                                                        | Subjects | Sunni | Shiia | Kurd | Sec  |\n|                                                                              |          |       |       |      |      |\n| 5                                                                            | 6        | 2     | 3     |      | 1    |\n| IG referral                                                                  |          |       |       |      |      |\n| 1                                                                            | 2        |       |       |      | 2    |\n| BSA referral                                                                 |          |       |       |      |      |\n| 26                                                                           | 21       | 8     | 10    | 2    | 1    |\n| Hotline referral                                                             |          |       |       |      |      |\n| 14                                                                           | 16       | 8     | 6     | 2    |      |\n| Other                                                                        |          |       |       |      |      |\n| 46                                                                           | 45       | 18    | 19    | 4    | 4    |\n| Totals                                                                       |          |       |       |      |      |\n|                                                                              |          |       |       |      |      |\n| Of those cases involving small amounts or what would otherwise be considered |          |       |       |      |      |\n| administrative in nature:                                                    |          |       |       |      |      |\n|                                                                              |          |       |       |      |      |\n| Cases                                                                        | Subjects | Sunni | Shiia | Kurd | Sec  |\n|                                                                              |          |       |       |      |      |\n| 26                                                                           | 32       | 5     | 21    | 0    | 6    |\n| IG referral                                                                  |          |       |       |      |      |\n|                                                                              | 0        |       |       |      |      |\n| BSA referral                                                                 |          |       |       |      |      |\n| 58                                                                           | 62       | 9     | 41    | 2    | 10   |\n| Hotline referral                                                             |          |       |       |      |      |\n| 26                                                                           | 30       | 10    | 18    | 1    | 1    |\n| Other                                                                        |          |       |       |      |      |\n| 110                                                                          | 124      | 24    | 80    | 3    | 17   |\n| Totals                                                                       |          |       |       |      |      |\n\n\nOf the 188 investigations processed by CPI, 156 were sent to the investigative judge. High level persons in the ministries involve10 cases sent to the investigative court concerning10 defendants, 3 Sunni, 7 Shia, which is proportional to the population in the ministry. What is not proportional are complaints coming from either the IG or outside sources concerning major cases which show a bias against Sunni. This is so even though the IG is a Sunni.  Of those 10, all were convicted.  None were put into pretrial detention. Two defendants fled the country.\n\nOf the ministries this ministry is probably the best performing in fighting corruption. There has been a general failure in providing financial disclosure forms but such is the case across the board in Iraq's government. Moonlight is a problem in the universities at the expense of the class room. There are indications that Sunnis are targeted from the outside on anticorruption cases.\n\nMinistry of Justice Hashim al Shibli Name of Ministry Inspector General:\nAhmad Habieb AlAbbassy Date of appointment as IG:\n7/5/2005\n\n\nPolitical/Ethnic/Militia affiliation of IG:\nShia Collation\n\n\n\nThe IG has a good reputation among the CPI investigators office although the ministry itself does not. The departments outside of the IG's office are known for their delays or failures to respond either to CPI or the courts. The Minister often does not sign or otherwise delays on corruption issues. In the Ministry of Justice there have been a total of 108 investigations of corruption. The break down by source is as follows.\n\nCases\n\n9\nIG referral\n2\nBSA referral\n49\nHotline referral\n48\nOther\n108\nTotals\n\n Of cases involving major figures within MOJ (DG or above)\n\nCases\n\n\n\nIG referral\n\n\n\nBSA referral\n1\nHotline referral\n5\nOther\n2\nTotals\n8\n\n Of those cases involving significant sums of money (Above $25,000)\n\nCases\n\n\n\nIG referral\n2\nBSA referral\n1\nHotline referral\n8\nOther\n12\nTotals\n23\n\n Of those cases involving small amounts or what would otherwise be considered administrative in nature:\n\nCases\n\n\n\nIG referral\n7\nBSA referral\n\nHotline referral\n36\nOther\n34\nTotals\n77\n\n\nOf the 108 investigations processed by CPI, 66 have made it to the investigative judge. One case sent to the investigative court was a major figure in the ministry. Only one case went to trial but there has not yet been a conviction. No MOJ defendants have been detained on corruption charges but one has fled the country.\n\nMinistry of Displacement & Migration\n\n\nName of Ministry Inspector General:\nAmer Mohamed Ali AbuNabila\nDate of appointment as IG:\n3/2/2005\n\n\nPolitical/Ethnic/Militia affiliation of IG:\nSunni\n\n\n\nThe IG's office has a reputation for not being cooperative and doesn't send the original forged documents or delays the administrative investigations. Administrative investigations come incomplete and not including the needed data, lack of details and no accused named for follow up.\n\nIn the Ministry of Displacement & Migration there have been a total of 19 investigations of corruption. The break down by source is as follows.\n\n\nIG referral\n4 Cases\n5\nPersons\n\n\n4 1 Other\nBSA referral\n\n\n\n5\nKurds\nHotline referral\n6 Cases\n7\nPersons\n1 Sunni\n 1 Shia\n10\nOther\n9 Cases\n14\nPersons\n2 Sunni\n 2 Shia\nKurds\n2 Other\n\nOf cases involving major figures within MODM (DG or above)\nIG referral\n\n\nBSA referral\n\n\nHotline referral\n\n\nOther\n3 Cases\n3\nPersons\n1 Sunni\n\n2 Other\n\n Of those cases involving significant sums of money (Above $25,000)\n\nIG referral\n1 Cases\n1\nPersons\n\n1 Other\nBSA referral\n\n\nHotline referral\n2 Cases\n3\nPersons\n1 Sunni\n2 Other\nOther\n4 Cases\n3\nPersons\n1 Sunni\n2 Other\n\n Of those cases involving small amounts or what would otherwise be considered administrative in nature:\n\nIG referral\n3 Cases\n4\nPersons\n1 Sunni\n2 Kurd\n1 Other\nBSA referral\n\n\nHotline referral\n4 Cases\n6\nPersons\n2 Sunni\n3 Kurd\n1 Other\nOther\n2 Cases\n2\nPersons\n1 Sunni\n1 Kurd\n\n\n\nOf the 19 investigations processed by CPI, 16 went to the IJ.  Three cases involving three people were sent to the investigative court involving DGs or above. Only 2 cases coming from the IG ever got it to the court for investigation. No defendants have been detained on corruption charges. In the Ministry of Displacement & Migration is significant to note that there has been only one investigation initiated or complaints made about any person identified with the Shia. This oddity may well be because of the few corruption cases that stem from this ministry. It does however reflect on the high number of hotline and outside complaints made about other ministries and suggest that the hotline and the anonymous character of outside complaints, a requirement of law, may be being used in other ministries as well as this one to target ethnic groups or political rivals.\n\n\nCounsel of Ministers There is no IG office.\n\nTheir legal council never attends court at the summons of the judge. Nor does the COM comply with the arrest orders sent to them against their staff. In the COM there have been a total of 44 investigations of corruption. The break down by source is as follows.\n\nBSA referral\n1 Cases\n1\nPersons\n\n1 Shia\n\n\nHotline referral\n5 Cases\n4\nPersons\n\n2 Shia\n\n2 Other\n38\nOther\nCases\n30\nPersons\n3 Sunni\n22 Shia\n2 Kurd\n3 Other\n\n Of cases involving major figures within COM (DG or above)\n\nBSA referral\n1 Cases\n1\nPersons\n\n1 Shia\n\n\nHotline referral\n1 Cases\n1\nPersons\n\n1 Shia\n\n\n19\nOther\nCases\n15\nPersons\n2 Sunni\n9 Shia\n1 Kurd\n3 Other\n\n Of those cases involving significant sums of money (Above $25,000)\n\nHotline referral\n1 Cases\n1\nPersons\n\n1 Shia\n\n\nOther\n7 Cases\n9\nPersons\n2 Sunni\n5 Shia\n1 Kurd\n1 Other\n\n Of those cases involving small amounts or what would otherwise be considered administrative in nature:\n\nHotline referral\n3 Cases\n3\nPersons\n2 Shia\n1 Other\n\n12\nOther\nCases\n15\nPersons\n14 Shia\n1 Other\n\n\n\nOf the 44 investigations processed by CPI, 23 cases went to the investigative court . Of cases involving significant leadership, 12 charges involving 5 people were sent to the investigative court. Eight charges have been sent to the trail court involving thee defendants. One defendant was detained on corruption charges and one has fled the country.  There has yet to be a conviction.\n\nMinistry of Science and Technology Ra'id Fahmi Jahid\n\nName of Ministry Inspector General:\nDia Shait Mahmoud\nDate of appointment as IG:\n4/1/2004\n\nPolitical/Ethnic/Militia affiliation of IG:\nSunni\n\n\n\nThe IG is uncooperative and department is just for show according to CPI\ninvestigators. The legal counsel never comes to court. The ministry never enforces the requests for presentation to court. The 4 accused have never made it to court so ethnicities are not available. In the MOST there have been a total of 20 investigations of corruption. The break down by source is as follows.\n\nIG referral\n4 Cases\n\nBSA referral\n\nHotline referral\n8 Cases\nOther\n8 Cases\n\n No cases involving major figures within MOST have been investigated (DG or above) Of those cases involving significant sums of money (Above $25,000)\nIG referral\n2 Cases\n\nBSA referral\n\nHotline referral\n\nOther\n2 Cases\n\n Of those cases involving small amounts or what would otherwise be considered administrative in nature:\nIG referral\n2 Cases\n\nBSA referral\n\nHotline referral\n8 Cases\nOther\n6 Cases\n\n\n\nOf the 20 investigations processed by CPI, only three made it to the investigative court. Only one high ranking case involving two people was sent to the investigative court. Due to lack of appearance to court the case has not advanced to trial.\nAnticorruption activity efforts are in practical measure devoid in the Ministry of Science and Technology.\n\nMinistry of Housing & Construction Bayan Daza'l\n\nName of Ministry Inspector General:\nAmin AlHadi\nAbbas\nDate of appointment as IG:\n9/18/2006\n\nPolitical/Ethnic/Militia affiliation of IG:\nShia'a Collation\n\n\nThe legal counsel doesn't cooperate which make cases weak. Delays in the results of the administrative investigation have slowed anticorruption efforts to a crawl. In the MH&C there have been a total of 55 investigations of corruption. The break down by source is as follows.\n\n| Cases            |   Subjects  |   Sunni  |   Shiia  |   Kurd  |   Sec  |\n|------------------|-------------|----------|----------|---------|--------|\n|                  |             |          |          |         |        |\n| 14               |          0  |       0  |       0  |      0  |     0  |\n| IG referral      |             |          |          |         |        |\n| 0                |          0  |       0  |       0  |      0  |     0  |\n| BSA referral     |             |          |          |         |        |\n| 23               |         29  |       7  |      13  |      2  |     7  |\n| Hotline referral |             |          |          |         |        |\n| 19               |         24  |       7  |      11  |      0  |     6  |\n| Other            |             |          |          |         |        |\n| 56               |         53  |      14  |      24  |      2  |    13  |\n| Totals           |             |          |          |         |        |\n\n Of cases involving major figures within MH&C(DG or above)\n\n| Cases   | Subjects    | Sunni    | Shiia    | Kurd    | Sec    |\n|---------|-------------|----------|----------|---------|--------|\n\n\n\n|                                                                              | 0        |       |       |      |      |\n|------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------|-------|-------|------|------|\n| IG referral                                                                  |          |       |       |      |      |\n|                                                                              | 0        |       |       |      |      |\n| BSA referral                                                                 |          |       |       |      |      |\n| 6                                                                            | 6        | 2     | 3     | 1    |      |\n| Hotline referral                                                             |          |       |       |      |      |\n| 4                                                                            | 4        | 1     | 2     |      | 1    |\n| Other                                                                        |          |       |       |      |      |\n| 10                                                                           | 10       | 3     | 5     | 1    | 1    |\n| Totals                                                                       |          |       |       |      |      |\n|                                                                              |          |       |       |      |      |\n|                                                                              |          |       |       |      |      |\n| Of those cases involving significant sums of money (Above $25,000)           |          |       |       |      |      |\n|                                                                              |          |       |       |      |      |\n| Cases                                                                        | Subjects | Sunni | Shiia | Kurd | Sec  |\n|                                                                              |          |       |       |      |      |\n|                                                                              | 0        |       |       |      |      |\n| IG referral                                                                  |          |       |       |      |      |\n|                                                                              | 0        |       |       |      |      |\n| BSA referral                                                                 |          |       |       |      |      |\n| 12                                                                           | 15       | 3     | 7     |      | 5    |\n| Hotline referral                                                             |          |       |       |      |      |\n| 7                                                                            | 10       | 2     | 5     |      | 3    |\n| Other                                                                        |          |       |       |      |      |\n| 19                                                                           | 25       | 5     | 12    | 0    | 8    |\n| Totals                                                                       |          |       |       |      |      |\n|                                                                              |          |       |       |      |      |\n| Of those cases involving small amounts or what would otherwise be considered |          |       |       |      |      |\n| administrative in nature:                                                    |          |       |       |      |      |\n|                                                                              |          |       |       |      |      |\n| Cases                                                                        | Subjects | Sunni | Shiia | Kurd | Sec  |\n|                                                                              |          |       |       |      |      |\n|                                                                              | 0        |       |       |      |      |\n| IG referral                                                                  |          |       |       |      |      |\n|                                                                              | 0        |       |       |      |      |\n| BSA referral                                                                 |          |       |       |      |      |\n| 5                                                                            | 8        | 2     | 3     | 1    | 2    |\n| Hotline referral                                                             |          |       |       |      |      |\n\n| 8      |   10  |   4  |   4  |      |   2  |\n|--------|-------|------|------|------|------|\n| Other  |       |      |      |      |      |\n| 13     |   18  |   6  |   7  |   1  |   4  |\n| Totals |       |      |      |      |      |\n\n\nOf the 56 investigations processed by CPI 7, 52 were sent to the investigative court. Seven of these cases involved 8 people were sent to the investigative court, 3 Sunni, 4 Shia, 1 Kurd. One case involving 2 Shia has been sent to the trail court. As of yet there have been no convictions. One defendant (Shia) was detained on corruption charges and 4 have fled the country. But except for three cases which were dismissed by the judge they are all stalled in the investigative court. There has not been a single conviction on corruption from this ministry. In general the lack of cooperation within the Ministry of Housing & Construction has left the anticorruption fight principally to CPI\nwhich is not capable of any sustainable campaign within that ministry.\n\nMinistry of Foreign Affairs Hoshyar Zebari Name of Ministry Inspector General:\nSa'adi Ibraheem Al-Fadilee Date of appointment as IG:\nCPA days\n\n\n\nPolitical/Ethnic/Militia affiliation of IG:\nSunni/ Kurdish coalition\n\n\nThe IG has limited input and has been uncooperative, he lately promised to cooperate. The difficulty of getting information due to the fact that most MOFA agencies are outside of Iraq (Embassies, Consulates, etc) which require the creation of committees from the IG office to travel to conduct the administrative investigation that is assigned to them. In the MOFA there have been a total of 36 investigations of corruption. The break down by source is as follows.\n\n| Cases            |   Subjects  |   Sunni  |   Shiia  |   Kurd  |   Sec  |\n|------------------|-------------|----------|----------|---------|--------|\n|                  |             |          |          |         |        |\n| 0                |          0  |       0  |       0  |      0  |     0  |\n| IG referral      |             |          |          |         |        |\n| 1                |          1  |       0  |       1  |      0  |     0  |\n| BSA referral     |             |          |          |         |        |\n| 17               |         18  |       7  |       7  |      2  |     2  |\n| Hotline referral |             |          |          |         |        |\n| 18               |         16  |       5  |       7  |      1  |     3  |\n| Other            |             |          |          |         |        |\n\n| 36                                                                           | 35       | 12    | 15    | 3    | 5    |\n|------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------|-------|-------|------|------|\n| Totals                                                                       |          |       |       |      |      |\n|                                                                              |          |       |       |      |      |\n| Of cases involving major figures within MOFA (DG or above)                   |          |       |       |      |      |\n|                                                                              |          |       |       |      |      |\n| Cases                                                                        | Subjects | Sunni | Shiia | Kurd | Sec  |\n|                                                                              |          |       |       |      |      |\n|                                                                              | 0        |       |       |      |      |\n| IG referral                                                                  |          |       |       |      |      |\n|                                                                              | 0        |       |       |      |      |\n| BSA referral                                                                 |          |       |       |      |      |\n| 5                                                                            | 5        | 1     | 2     | 2    |      |\n| Hotline referral                                                             |          |       |       |      |      |\n| 8                                                                            | 6        | 2     | 2     | 1    | 1    |\n| Other                                                                        |          |       |       |      |      |\n| 13                                                                           | 11       | 3     | 4     | 3    | 1    |\n| Totals                                                                       |          |       |       |      |      |\n|                                                                              |          |       |       |      |      |\n| Of those cases involving significant sums of money (Above $25,000)           |          |       |       |      |      |\n|                                                                              |          |       |       |      |      |\n| Cases                                                                        | Subjects | Sunni | Shiia | Kurd | Sec  |\n|                                                                              |          |       |       |      |      |\n|                                                                              | 0        |       |       |      |      |\n| IG referral                                                                  |          |       |       |      |      |\n| 1                                                                            | 1        |       | 1     |      |      |\n| BSA referral                                                                 |          |       |       |      |      |\n| 3                                                                            | 3        | 2     | 1     |      |      |\n| Hotline referral                                                             |          |       |       |      |      |\n| 6                                                                            | 4        | 2     | 2     |      |      |\n| Other                                                                        |          |       |       |      |      |\n| 10                                                                           | 8        | 4     | 4     | 0    | 0    |\n| Totals                                                                       |          |       |       |      |      |\n|                                                                              |          |       |       |      |      |\n| Of those cases involving small amounts or what would otherwise be considered |          |       |       |      |      |\n| administrative in nature:                                                    |          |       |       |      |      |\n|                                                                              |          |       |       |      |      |\n| Cases                                                                        | Subjects | Sunni | Shiia | Kurd | Sec  |\n|                                                                              |          |       |       |      |      |\n|                                                                              | 0        |       |       |      |      |\n| IG referral                                                                  |          |       |       |      |      |\n|                                                                              |          |       |       |      |      |\n| 49                                                                           |          |       |       |      |      |\n|                  |   0  |      |      |      |      |\n|------------------|------|------|------|------|------|\n| BSA referral     |      |      |      |      |      |\n| 9                |  10  |   4  |   4  |      |   2  |\n| Hotline referral |      |      |      |      |      |\n| 4                |   6  |   1  |   3  |      |   2  |\n| Other            |      |      |      |      |      |\n| 13               |  16  |   5  |   7  | 0    |   4  |\n| Totals           |      |      |      |      |      |\n\n\nOf the 34 investigations processed by CPI, 13 cases were sent to the investigative judge. Five cases concerning DG or above involving 5 people were sent to the investigative court, 2 Sunni, 2 Shia, 1 Others. One defendant has fled the country and no one has ever been detained. Not a single cases has been referred from the IG.\n\n\nNon Governmental Organizations\n\nThere is no IG in that this is a collection of agencies and not a ministry. Various IGs have from all of the ministries have reported violations concerning their ministries. Not knowing the real addresses to most NGO has resulted in difficulty of notifying their staff of court orders.  Most of the income of these organization is foreign which make it difficult to account for what they spend and figuring out the illegal activities. Concerning NGOs there have been a total of 72 investigations of corruption. The break down by source is as follows.\n\nIG referrals\n8 Cases\n12\nPersons\n2 Sunni\n8 Shia\n2 Other\nBSA referral\n2 Cases\n5\nPersons\n1 Sunni\n3 Shia\n1 Other\n27\nHotline referral\nCases\n25\nPersons\n3 Sunni\n17 Shia\n5 Other\n35\nOther\nCases\n40\nPersons\n5 Sunni\n32 Shia\n3 Other Of cases involving major figures within NGOs\nIG referral\n\n\nBSA referral\n\n\nHotline referral\n3 Cases\n4\nPersons\n1 Sunni\n2 Shia\n1 Other\nOther\n7 Cases\n8\nPersons\n2 Sunni\n5 Shia\n1 Other\n\n\nOf those cases involving significant sums of money (Above $25,000)\n\nIG referral\n6 Cases\n7\nPersons\n\n5 Shia\n  2 Other\nBSA referral\n2 Cases\n3\nPersons\n\n2 Shia\n1 Kurd\n\nHotline referral\n3 Cases\n5\nPersons\n1 Sunni\n3 Shia\n  1 Other\nOther\n8 Cases\n10\nPersons\n2 Sunni\n6 Shia\n1 Kurd 1 Other\n\n Of those cases involving small amounts or what would otherwise be considered administrative in nature:\n\n\nIG referral\n2 Cases\n4\nPersons\n\n3 Shia\n  1 Other\nBSA referral\n\n\n\n21\n20\nHotline referral\nCases\nPersons\n3 Sunni\n14 Shia\n1 Kurd 2 Other\n28\n18\nOther\nCases\nPersons\n5 Sunni\n11 Shia\n  2 Other\n\n\nOf the 72 investigations processed by CPI, 38 have been sent to the IJ.  Eight cases involving 11 people were sent to the investigative court involving major figures, 2 Sunni, 7 Shia, 2 Others. None of the cases have yet to go to trial Three defendants have fled the country. That there are so many complaints about NGOs were in many ministries there are far fewer investigations leads to the conclusion that either NGOs are wrapped up in political intrigue or they are a significant contributor to the corruption problem.\n\nMinistry of Youth & Sports Jasim Muhammad Ja'far Name of Ministry Inspector General:\nHassan AbdulWahab Mousa AlSafi\n\nDate of appointment as IG:\n1/2/2006\nOrder No. Q/2/18431\nPolitical/Ethnic/Militia affiliation of IG:\nShia'a Collation\n\n\n\nThe IG is cooperative.  The Minister  (Jasim Mohammad Jaffer) does not cooperate with CPI and never gives his agreement on any suspect and uses article 136 B which results in closing of the case. In the MY&S there have been a total of 37 investigations of corruption. The break down by source is as follows.\n\n\n\nIG referral\n9 Cases\n7\nPersons\n2 Sunni\n4 Shia\n  1 Other\nBSA referral\n\n\n\nHotline referral\n8 Cases\n6\nPersons\n2 Sunni\n2 Shia\n1 Kurd 1 Other\n20\n17\nOther\nCases\nPersons\n3 Sunni\n10 Shia\n  4 Other\n\n Of cases involving major figures within MOJ (DG or above)\n\nIG referral\n2 Cases\n2\nPersons\n\n2 Shia\n\nBSA referral\n\n\nHotline referral\n\n\nOther\n8 Cases\n6\nPersons\n1 Sunni\n3 Shia\n2 Other\n\n Of those cases involving significant sums of money (Above $25,000)\n\nIG referral\n2 Cases\n2\nPersons\n\n2 Shia\n\nBSA referral\n\n\nHotline referral\n1 Cases\n1\nPersons\n\n\n1 Other\nOther\n3 Cases\n5\nPersons\n1 Sunni\n2 Shia\n2 Other\n\n Of those cases involving small amounts or what would otherwise be considered administrative in nature:\n\nIG referral\n5 Cases\n8\nPersons\n2 Sunni\n5 Shia\n1 Other\nBSA referral\n\n\nHotline referral\n7 Cases\n5\nPersons\n1 Sunni\n3 Shia\n1 Other\nOther\n9 Cases\n10\nPersons\n2 Sunni\n7 Shia\n1 Other\n\n\nOf the 37 investigations processed by CPI, 17 have gone to court. Three cases involving 7 people were sent to the investigative court, 1 Sunni, 5 Shia, 1 Other, on senior leadership. In Ministry of Youth & Sports no cases have made it to trial because the minister has granted Article 136B immunity from trial on a whole sale bases. ( 5\ncases involving 24 defendants, 4 Sunni, 18 Shia and 2 others) Three subjects have fled the country and remain at large despite an arrest warrant but still work at the ministry.\n\n## Ministry Of Human Rights Wijdan Mikha'Il\n\nName of Ministry Inspector General:\nMukhles AbdulRazaq Shaker Al- Hadithy\nDate of appointment as IG:\n2/25/2004\n\nPolitical/Ethnic/Militia affiliation of IG:\nSunni\n\n\n\nThe IG is uncooperative sending mostly minor cases. Delays in sending the administrative investigation are the usual slowing investigations. In the MHR there have been a total of 33 investigations of corruption. The break down by source is as follows.\n\nIG referral\n2 Cases\n3\nPersons\n2 Sunni\n1 Shia\n\n\nBSA referral\n\n\n\n18\n20\nHotline referral\nCases\nPersons\n9 Sunni\n8 Shia\n\n3\n13\n10\nOther\nCases\nPersons\n4 Sunni\n4 Shia\n2 Kurd Of cases involving major figures within MHR (DG or above)\nIG referral\n\n\nBSA referral\n\n\nHotline referral\n1 Cases\n1\nPersons\n\n1 Other\nOther\n2 Cases\n3\nPersons\n1 Sunni\n2 Other\n\n There are no investigations involving significant sums of money (Above $25,000) Of those cases involving small amounts or what would otherwise be considered administrative in nature:\n\nIG referral\n2 Cases\n2\nPersons\n1 Sunni\n1 Shia\n\n\nBSA referral\n\n\n\n10\n17\n21\nCases\nPersons\nHotline referral\nSunni\n8 Shia\n1 Kurd 2 Other\n11\n12\nOther\nCases\nPersons\n4 Sunni\n7 Shia\n  1 Other\n\n Of 33 investigations 17 went to the IJ.\n\nMinistry of Planning Development & Cooperation Ali Baban Name of Ministry Inspector General:\nHassan Aliwai AbdulHusien Al Qrghouly\n\n\nDate of appointment as IG:\n3/29/2004\nMinisterial Order No. 528 Letter 1080\n\nPolitical/Ethnic/Militia\naffiliation of IG:\nShia'a\n\n\n\n The IG is cooperative and assisted in closing some important cases. In the MPD&C there have been a total of 26 investigations of corruption. The break down by source is as follows.\n\n| Cases            |   Subjects  |   Sunni  |   Shiia  |   Kurd  |   Sec  |\n|------------------|-------------|----------|----------|---------|--------|\n|                  |             |          |          |         |        |\n| 3                |          0  |       0  |       0  |      0  |     0  |\n| IG referral      |             |          |          |         |        |\n| 0                |          0  |       0  |       0  |      0  |     0  |\n| BSA referral     |             |          |          |         |        |\n| 7                |          9  |       4  |       3  |      0  |     2  |\n| Hotline referral |             |          |          |         |        |\n| 16               |         17  |       8  |       5  |      2  |     2  |\n| Other            |             |          |          |         |        |\n| 26               |         26  |      12  |       8  |      2  |     4  |\n| Totals           |             |          |          |         |        |\n\n Of cases involving major figures within MPD&C (DG or above)\n\n| Cases            |   Subjects  | Sunni    | Shiia    | Kurd    | Sec    |\n|------------------|-------------|----------|----------|---------|--------|\n|                  |             |          |          |         |        |\n|                  |          0  |          |          |         |        |\n| IG referral      |             |          |          |         |        |\n|                  |          0  |          |          |         |        |\n| BSA referral     |             |          |          |         |        |\n| 3                |          4  | 2        | 2        |         |        |\n| Hotline referral |             |          |          |         |        |\n\n| 5                                                                                      | 9        | 4     | 3     |      | 2    |\n|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------|-------|-------|------|------|\n| Other                                                                                  |          |       |       |      |      |\n| 8                                                                                      | 13       | 6     | 5     | 0    | 2    |\n| Totals                                                                                 |          |       |       |      |      |\n|                                                                                        |          |       |       |      |      |\n| Of those cases involving significant sums of money (Above $25,000)                     |          |       |       |      |      |\n|                                                                                        |          |       |       |      |      |\n| Cases                                                                                  | Subjects | Sunni | Shiia | Kurd | Sec  |\n|                                                                                        |          |       |       |      |      |\n|                                                                                        | 0        |       |       |      |      |\n| IG referral                                                                            |          |       |       |      |      |\n|                                                                                        | 0        |       |       |      |      |\n| BSA referral                                                                           |          |       |       |      |      |\n| 1                                                                                      | 1        | 0     | 0     |      | 1    |\n| Hotline referral                                                                       |          |       |       |      |      |\n| 2                                                                                      | 3        | 2     | 0     | 1    | 0    |\n| Other                                                                                  |          |       |       |      |      |\n| 3                                                                                      | 4        | 2     | 0     | 1    | 1    |\n| Totals                                                                                 |          |       |       |      |      |\n|                                                                                        |          |       |       |      |      |\n| Of those cases involving small amounts or what would otherwise be considered           |          |       |       |      |      |\n| administrative in nature:                                                              |          |       |       |      |      |\n|                                                                                        |          |       |       |      |      |\n| Cases                                                                                  | Subjects | Sunni | Shiia | Kurd | Sec  |\n|                                                                                        |          |       |       |      |      |\n| 1                                                                                      | 0        |       |       |      |      |\n| IG referral                                                                            |          |       |       |      |      |\n|                                                                                        | 0        |       |       |      |      |\n| BSA referral                                                                           |          |       |       |      |      |\n| 3                                                                                      | 4        | 2     | 1     |      | 1    |\n| Hotline referral                                                                       |          |       |       |      |      |\n| 9                                                                                      | 5        | 2     | 2     | 1    |      |\n| Other                                                                                  |          |       |       |      |      |\n| 13                                                                                     | 9        | 4     | 3     | 1    | 1    |\n| Totals                                                                                 |          |       |       |      |      |\n|                                                                                        |          |       |       |      |      |\n| Of the 26 investigations processed by CPI, only 6 have gone to the IJ. Of senior       |          |       |       |      |      |\n| leadership 3 cases involving 6 people were sent to the investigative court, 2 Sunni, 3 |          |       |       |      |      |\n| Shia, 1 Other. No cases have made it to the IJ from the ministry IG but they have      |          |       |       |      |      |\n| effectively warded off some false complaints. They have also assisted in outside       |          |       |       |      |      |\n\ncomplaints. Two cases have been dismissed by the investigative judge involving 1 Shia and 1 other. One case was sent to trial involving 4 defendants, 1 Sunni, 2 Shia, 1 Other. All were convicted. No one was ever detained pretrial. One subject fled the country.\n\nMinistry of Municipalities and Works Riyad Ghurayyib\n\nName of Ministry Inspector General:\nEng. Salam AbdulSahib Houssien Mohammed Al-Safar\nDate of appointment as IG:\n2/1/2006\norder #1670\n\nPolitical/Ethnic/Militia affiliation of\nIG:\nShia'a Collation\n\n\n\nThe IG is considered half cooperative.  The administrative investigation is incomplete and not clear.  The legal representative is sometimes late in appearing. Delays in responding to the official letters are common place. In the MM&W there have been a total of 212 investigations of corruption. The break down by source is as follows.\n\n| Cases            |   Subjects  |   Sunni  |   Shiia  |   Kurd  |   Sec  |\n|------------------|-------------|----------|----------|---------|--------|\n|                  |             |          |          |         |        |\n| 66               |         51  |       9  |      28  |      4  |    10  |\n| IG referral      |             |          |          |         |        |\n| 1                |          1  |       0  |       1  |      0  |     0  |\n| BSA referral     |             |          |          |         |        |\n| 70               |         55  |       9  |      28  |      5  |    13  |\n| Hotline referral |             |          |          |         |        |\n| 75               |         66  |      12  |      35  |      5  |    14  |\n| Other            |             |          |          |         |        |\n| 212              |        173  |      30  |      92  |     14  |    37  |\n| Totals           |             |          |          |         |        |\n\n Of cases involving major figures within MM&W (DG or above)\n\n| Cases       |   Subjects  |   Sunni  |   Shiia  |   Kurd  |   Sec  |\n|-------------|-------------|----------|----------|---------|--------|\n|             |             |          |          |         |        |\n| 2           |          2  |       0  |       2  |      0  |     0  |\n| IG referral |             |          |          |         |        |\n\n| 0                                                                            | 0        | 0     | 0     | 0    | 0    |\n|------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------|-------|-------|------|------|\n| BSA referral                                                                 |          |       |       |      |      |\n| 5                                                                            | 6        | 1     | 3     | 0    | 2    |\n| Hotline referral                                                             |          |       |       |      |      |\n| 4                                                                            | 4        | 0     | 3     | 0    | 1    |\n| Other                                                                        |          |       |       |      |      |\n| 11                                                                           | 12       | 1     | 8     | 0    | 3    |\n| Totals                                                                       |          |       |       |      |      |\n|                                                                              |          |       |       |      |      |\n| Of those cases involving significant sums of money (Above $25,000)           |          |       |       |      |      |\n|                                                                              |          |       |       |      |      |\n| Cases                                                                        | Subjects | Sunni | Shiia | Kurd | Sec  |\n|                                                                              |          |       |       |      |      |\n| 18                                                                           | 15       | 3     | 8     | 2    | 2    |\n| IG referral                                                                  |          |       |       |      |      |\n| 1                                                                            | 1        | 0     | 1     | 0    | 0    |\n| BSA referral                                                                 |          |       |       |      |      |\n| 24                                                                           | 18       | 5     | 8     | 1    | 4    |\n| Hotline referral                                                             |          |       |       |      |      |\n| 22                                                                           | 20       | 3     | 11    | 2    | 4    |\n| Other                                                                        |          |       |       |      |      |\n| 65                                                                           | 54       | 11    | 28    | 5    | 10   |\n| Totals                                                                       |          |       |       |      |      |\n|                                                                              |          |       |       |      |      |\n| Of those cases involving small amounts or what would otherwise be considered |          |       |       |      |      |\n| administrative in nature:                                                    |          |       |       |      |      |\n|                                                                              |          |       |       |      |      |\n| Cases                                                                        | Subjects | Sunni | Shiia | Kurd | Sec  |\n|                                                                              |          |       |       |      |      |\n| 29                                                                           | 34       | 6     | 18    | 2    | 8    |\n| IG referral                                                                  |          |       |       |      |      |\n| 0                                                                            | 0        | 0     | 0     | 0    | 0    |\n| BSA referral                                                                 |          |       |       |      |      |\n| 41                                                                           | 31       | 3     | 17    | 4    | 7    |\n| Hotline referral                                                             |          |       |       |      |      |\n| 49                                                                           | 42       | 9     | 21    | 3    | 9    |\n| Other                                                                        |          |       |       |      |      |\n| 119                                                                          | 107      | 18    | 56    | 9    | 24   |\n| Totals                                                                       |          |       |       |      |      |\n\n\nOf the 212 investigations processed by CPI, 100 cases had enough evidence to present to the investigative judge. Sixteen of those cases involving 19 people were sent to the investigative court, 6 Sunni, 9 Shia, 4 others. Off the 66 IG referrals 26 went to the IJ. One case has resulted in a conviction involving a Shia defendant. No one was ever detained pretrial. Two subjects have fled the country.\n\nMinistry of Electricity Karim Wahid Name of Ministry Inspector General:\nSa'ady Mahdi Ali AlSuodani Appointed by:\nCPI Letter 34/62 dated 19/6/06\nPolitical/Ethnic/Militia affiliation of IG:\nShia'a Collation\n\n\nThe IG is cooperative and tries to facilitate the work of the CPI. Long delays from the minister in approving the transfer of accused to trial have slowed the process. The legal department in the ministry has shown a disappointing level of knowledge on anticorruption laws. Administrative investigations routinely come to CPI incomplete. In the MOE there have been a total of 175 investigations of corruption. The break down by source is as follows.\n\n18\nIG referral\nCases\n21\nPersons\n7 Sunni\n9 Shia\n1 Kurd\n4 Other\nBSA referral\n3 Cases\n3\nPersons\n1 Sunni\n2 Shia\n0\n0\n12\n58\nHotline referral\nSunni\n24 Shia\n0\n12\nOther\nCases\n48\nPersons\n10\n96\nOther\nSunni\n52 Shia\n2 Kurd\n11\nOther\nCases\n75\nPersons\n\n Of cases involving major figures within MOE (DG or above)\n\nIG referral\n8 Cases\n4\nPersons\n2 Sunni\n1 Shia\n1 Other\nBSA referral\n1\n0\n0\n\n\n20\nHotline referral\nCases\n13\nPersons\n7 Sunni\n5 Shia\n1 Other\n22\nOther\nCases\n0\n0 Sunni\n0\n\n\n Of those cases involving significant sums of money (Above $25,000)\n\nIG referral\n1 Cases\n2\nPersons\n1 Sunni\n1 Shia\n\n\n\nBSA referral\n 1 Case\n\n\n\nHotline referral\n5 Cases\n5\nPersons\n3 Sunni\n1 Shia\n1 Other\nOther\n3 Cases\n4\nPersons\n2 Sunni\n1 Shia\n1 Other\n\n Of those cases involving small amounts or what would otherwise be considered administrative in nature:\n\nIG referral\n9 Cases\n15\nPersons\n4 Sunni\n7 Shia\n1 Kurd\n3 Other\nBSA referral\n2 Cases\n3\nPersons\n1 Sunni\n2 Shia\n\n\n33\nHotline referral\nCases\n30\nPersons\n2 Sunni\n18 Shia\n\n10\nOther\n71\nOther\nCases\n71\nPersons\n8 Sunni\n51 Shia\n2 Kurd\n10\nOther\n\n\nOf the 175 investigations processed by CPI, 85 were sent to the judge for investigation. Of those involving DG or above, 34 cases involving 34 people were sent to the investigative court, 18 Sunni, 10 Shia, 6 Others. Of those 34 cases 5 were investigated and then dismissed by the investigative judge involving 7 people, 3 Sunni, 2 Shia, and 2 Others.  Only 7 of 18 referrals from the ministry IG made it to the IJ. Three cases were sent to trial involving people, 1 Sunnis, 1 Shia and one other. Another case resulted in a conviction which was overturned at appeal.  Only two were ever detained pretrial. Two subjects have fled the country.\nThe major case coming out of MOE concerned the first Minister Aiham al Aammarae from the Allawi administration. Al Sammarae was sent to the investigative court on 10 charges worked up by BSA. Seven of which were dismissed and he was released as to those cases. Three of which he remained detained and were bound over for trial. One case was tried and found guilty the other two were pending.\nOn the day he was found guilty he was spirited away by his American PSD and tried to get into the US Embassy. The US Ambassador ordered that he be returned to Iraqi custody.\n\nThe defendant appealed. With the appeal pending BSA came up with an eleventh case which was filed involving the following facts:\nAfter the removal of the Allawi government all ministers lost their legal right to obligate funds, a fact that drives us crazy every time they hold an election. On Feb 21 Al Sammarae entered into a contract with and American company, Vulcan to build a 74 million dollar power plant in Mosul and paid a 25 million dollar advance.  My translator read one document in the file that seemed to show that the company later acknowledged the illegality of the contract and returned the money although it was a translation from an original English document which made it unclear. The contract was, according to MoE generous to the contractor.\n\nThe defendant won his appeal and was scheduled for either release or proceeding with the unresolved case. On December 17, 2006 he disappeared from his cell. The police claimed that he was taken by 5 Americans. An investigation is pending as to how he in fact left custody.\n\nThere are only 3 investigators assigned to Electricity. CPI investigators can not go there because the area around the ministry HQ is controlled by the Medhi Army. The MOE Minister has stated he wants to cooperate with CPI but frequently uses the threat of Article 136 B to stop cases. Most of the IG referrals concern violations committed by past administrations leaving a suspicion that current employees are protected. Most BSA referrals concern violations committed by past administration as well. The concentration on investigating people once they leave the ministry implies political protection for those currently within the Ministry of Electricity.\n\nMinistry of Amanat (City Hall) Baghdad\n\nName of Ministry Inspector General:\nToma Jaber Louj AlAkydli Date of appointment as IG:\n6/2/2004\n\n\n\nPolitical/Ethnic/Militia affiliation of IG:\nShia'a Collation\n\n\n The IG is not cooperative. In the Baghdad there have been a total of 159 investigations of corruption. The break down by source is as follows.\n\n| Cases            |   Subjects  |   Sunni  |   Shiia  |   Kurd  |   Sec  |\n|------------------|-------------|----------|----------|---------|--------|\n|                  |             |          |          |         |        |\n| 40               |         47  |       2  |      40  |      0  |     5  |\n| IG referral      |             |          |          |         |        |\n| 0                |          0  |       0  |       0  |      0  |     0  |\n| BSA referral     |             |          |          |         |        |\n| 51               |         56  |       4  |      46  |      0  |     6  |\n| Hotline referral |             |          |          |         |        |\n| 68               |         70  |       9  |      55  |      0  |     6  |\n| Other            |             |          |          |         |        |\n| 159              |        173  |      15  |     141  |      0  |    17  |\n| Totals           |             |          |          |         |        |\n\n Of cases involving major figures within Baghdad (DG or above)\n\n| Cases       |   Subjects  | Sunni    | Shiia    | Kurd    | Sec    |\n|-------------|-------------|----------|----------|---------|--------|\n|             |             |          |          |         |        |\n| 0           |          0  |          |          |         |        |\n| IG referral |             |          |          |         |        |\n\n\n\n| 0                                                                            | 0        |       |       |      |      |\n|------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------|-------|-------|------|------|\n| BSA referral                                                                 |          |       |       |      |      |\n| 3                                                                            | 3        |       | 3     |      |      |\n| Hotline referral                                                             |          |       |       |      |      |\n| 6                                                                            | 7        | 2     | 3     |      | 2    |\n| Other                                                                        |          |       |       |      |      |\n| 9                                                                            | 10       | 2     | 6     | 0    | 2    |\n| Totals                                                                       |          |       |       |      |      |\n|                                                                              |          |       |       |      |      |\n| Of those cases involving significant sums of money (Above $25,000)           |          |       |       |      |      |\n|                                                                              |          |       |       |      |      |\n| Cases                                                                        | Subjects | Sunni | Shiia | Kurd | Sec  |\n|                                                                              |          |       |       |      |      |\n| 8                                                                            | 7        | 2     | 4     |      | 1    |\n| IG referral                                                                  |          |       |       |      |      |\n|                                                                              | 0        |       |       |      |      |\n| BSA referral                                                                 |          |       |       |      |      |\n| 12                                                                           | 15       | 3     | 9     |      | 3    |\n| Hotline referral                                                             |          |       |       |      |      |\n| 29                                                                           | 25       | 4     | 19    |      | 2    |\n| Other                                                                        |          |       |       |      |      |\n| 49                                                                           | 47       | 9     | 32    | 0    | 6    |\n| Totals                                                                       |          |       |       |      |      |\n|                                                                              |          |       |       |      |      |\n| Of those cases involving small amounts or what would otherwise be considered |          |       |       |      |      |\n| administrative in nature:                                                    |          |       |       |      |      |\n|                                                                              |          |       |       |      |      |\n| Cases                                                                        | Subjects | Sunni | Shiia | Kurd | Sec  |\n|                                                                              |          |       |       |      |      |\n| 28                                                                           | 40       |       | 36    |      | 4    |\n| IG referral                                                                  |          |       |       |      |      |\n|                                                                              | 0        |       |       |      |      |\n| BSA referral                                                                 |          |       |       |      |      |\n| 36                                                                           | 38       | 1     | 34    |      | 3    |\n| Hotline referral                                                             |          |       |       |      |      |\n| 33                                                                           | 38       | 3     | 33    |      | 2    |\n| Other                                                                        |          |       |       |      |      |\n| 97                                                                           | 116      | 4     | 103   | 0    | 9    |\n| Totals                                                                       |          |       |       |      |      |\n\n\nOf the 159 investigations processed by CPI, 83 went to court for investigation. Of those, 7 cases involving 7 people were sent to the investigative court, 2 Sunni, 4 Shia, 1\nOthers involved senior people. Of the 40 cases referred by the IG 27 were sent to court.\n\nNo cases have yet to go to trial. Only one was ever detained pretrial. One case involving one defendant led to a conviction. One subject has fled the country.\nAdministrative investigations are not clear and are not useful in prosecutions. The IG doesn't send the original documents to attach to each case as the material evidence delaying or curtaining prosecutions.\n\n\nMinistry of Finance21\n\nBayan Jabr Name of Ministry Inspector General:\nAkram KhuDhair was the IG, Baha Al-Deen Abdul-Razaq Al-Aieer is acting IG\n\nDate of appointment as IG:\nAkram was sent to retirement for old age and bad health\nAppointed by:\nThe new minister has nominated Mr. Dia for the post but there is no confirmation yet\nPolitical/Ethnic/Militia affiliation of IG:\nAkram was Shia'a Collation, Baha is Sunni\n\n\nThe former IG was not cooperative; the present acting one is too new to the job to evaluate. In the MOF there have been a total of 183 investigations of corruption. The break down by source is as follows.\n\n13\nIG referral\nCases\nBSA referral\n1 Cases\n90\nHotline referral\nCases\n79\nOther\nCases\n\n Of cases involving major figures within MOF (DG or above)\nIG referral\n\n\nBSA referral\n\n19\nHotline referral\nCases\n20\nOther\nCases\n\n Of those cases involving significant sums of money (Above $25,000)\nIG referral\n3 Cases\n\nBSA referral\n1 Cases\n14\nHotline referral\nCases\nOther\n\n\n Of those cases involving small amounts or what would otherwise be considered administrative in nature:\n\n\n10\nIG referral\nCases\nBSA referral\n\n57\nHotline referral\nCases\n59\nOther\nCases\n\n\nOf the 183 investigations processed by CPI, 144 had enough evidence to go to the investigative judge. Concerning DGs or above there were 17 cases involving 32 people sent to the investigative judge. Of those 17 cases 2 were investigated and then dismissed by the investigative judge. Only 3 of 13 cases from the IG went to court. Four cases have gone to the trial court with no convictions as of yet. Six have been detained pretrial. One case involving one defendant resulted in a conviction. Eight subjects have fled the country.\nCPI has 4 investigators assigned to MOF. Bribery and embezzlement are the most numerous bases for investigations. The IG not named yet, previous IG (former Judge) removed for age and ineffectiveness. The IG's office has only referred 13 out of 183\nactive investigations. CPI active cases include 10 within IG staff as the subject. In many cases CPI requests are met with the argument that IG's office has investigated the allegations and found that they lack merit so no documents or witnesses are provided to CPI. The IG appoints a committee to review the allegation (may include co-workers of subject) who report to the IG that case is baseless.\nThe administrative investigations are incomplete, not clear and doesn't name any one, specially people of high positions. There are numerous  reports that there are many cases of corruption in the IG's office languishing.\nThe court's requests for documents or witnesses infrequently responded to by IG.\n\nThis includes cases where the defendant is detained. In one case in particular the ministry sent the case to court resulted in the defendant being detained despite having cancer. Once the defendant was detained the ministry became unresponsive to requests from court delaying the progress of the case and prolonging the detention.22 The Minister is the\n\nformer Minister of Interior where he developed a reputation for ruthlessness in applying the anticorruption to control his staff. CPI is powerless to prevent this type of abuse.\n\n\nTeam Finding: The inability of CPI investigators to travel safely to and from the ministries in the red zone has so hobbled the agency as to relegate it to relying almost entirely on IGs to conduct investigations. In that the IGs are subject to the same threat anticorruption investigations are subject to tampering or political manipulation. Team Finding: Though severely under manned CPI could vastly improve the anticorruption cases if not so dependant on unreliable ministry support.\n\nTeam Finding: Several ministries are so controlled by criminal gangs or militias as to be impossible to operate without a tactical force protecting the investigator.\n\n\nConclusion #2. Lack of access to the ministries is the single biggest hurdle to prosecution of anticorruption cases.\n\nCPI's offices are located in the Green Zone and in the adjacent Amber Zone.  The investigators work at the 14th of July Office location or at the CCCI Courthouse.  Most CPI investigators have limited access badges to get in and out of the Green Zone.  A few have higher level (quicker) access but most have to spend time standing in line at checkpoints to gain entrance to the Green Zone.  This investment of time is significant over any given period and serves as a disincentive to field work for its 120 investigators.\n\nSince effective operations have commenced 12 CPI personnel have been killed in the line of duty with two of its members families have been kidnapped. The most recent of these murders was an investigator December 1,  2006 in Mosul. The situation became particularly bad in June 2006 when 4 of its investigators were killed in practical affect severely limiting investigations in the red zone.\n\nMinistry Offices are located in the Red Zone and some are in especially bad neighborhoods.  CPI investigators, mail couriers and inspectors i.e. CPI's \"front line\" in anti-corruption cases travel to these and other locations in the combat zone without police powers, tactical support or even protective equipment such as armored protective or firearms.  The standing and credibility of the CPI officer in the field is directly effected by the support, or lack there of, which is afforded the officer.  Access to the Ministries is not enhanced by the weakness of the CPI officer's position.   Investigator-Lawyers have responded to this reality by simply not going to the Ministries and sending requests for evidence in the mail.\n\nCPI operators i.e. investigators, couriers, inspectors must have credibility where they go to find leads or evidence, mostly at the ministries.  Besides the Government's moral backing, CPI operators need to be properly equipped and empowered to enter the Red Zone and move about freely in the offices of the ministries.\n\nProactive investigation in the form of undercover operations including \"sting operations\", physical/electronic surveillance, using cooperating defendants and witnesses are at present beyond CPI's capability.  The pattern of criminal activity associated with\nMOO would require comprehensive use of proactive investigative techniques to have a chance for success.  The pattern of criminality at MOI is beyond CPI's capability and charter.  Other Ministries can be effectively policed through contract fraud investigations if documents are forthcoming and the IG's are motivated to cooperate.  The BSA could also be developed as a valuable resource to CPI if investigators left the office and developed contacts.\n\nCPI investigators of MOH, MOD, MOO have all expressed fear of going to the ministries and/or attempting to conduct aggressive investigations.  CPI has no real access to these ministries and meets with various forms of resistance at each.  The Assistant DG who heads the MOD investigation team has been personally threatened and such threats have been reported previously.\n\nAccess to the ministries by CPI is basically through requests by mail or by IJ\norders (discussed elsewhere).  CPI officers have no standing or credibility to cover investigative leads at the ministries or to develop cooperating witnesses/informants at the ministries.  Instead, CPI must rely on the passive, often anonymous, receipt of information from \"good citizens\" at the ministries or criminal rivals.  Establishing reliability and credibility of the sources is limited by the same constraints of access.\n\nSince CPI has no real authority to demand or even cajole Ministry officials to provide books, records, documents and witnesses, CPI relies upon the IG's and the IJ's to provide such evidence.  Even where IG's cooperate, the pervasive atmosphere of corruption, criminal and sectarian violence, and political/tribal partisanship undermine true anti-corruption efforts.  IG's offer up minor cases against powerless subjects and CPI gets bogged down with the investigation of such cases.\n\nIn the case of MOD, CPI was able to investigate major cases only after the IJ's enabled CPI to gain access to major contracts.  According to ICITAP investigator's interviews with CPI investigators virtually every MOD contract reviewed by CPI became a \"prima facie\" case of corruption and fraud. CPI has pending investigations on the contracts and MOD has sent agents stop the investigations visiting both the Commissioner of CPI and the CCCI. The Iraqi investigations describe the agreements as \"sweetheart contract\" because the terms were so blatantly favorable to the suppliers.\n\nTeam finding : The Prime Minister's Office has demonstrated an open hostility to the concept of an independent agency to investigate or prosecute corruption cases as a matter of principle.\n\n\nTeam finding : The Iraqi Government has been withholding basic support and resources from CPI. Team finding : There has been a number of identified cases where government and political pressure has been applied to affect the outcome of investigations and prosecutions in favor of members of the Shia Alliance. Team finding : Advisors have documented a pattern of pressure seemingly designed to hire personnel along political lines.\n\nTeam finding : There has been with few exceptions a clear sectarian shift in those who have been appointed as IGs since the Shia Alliance has taken control of the government. Team finding : Across the board there is a fear by anticorruption agencies to any metrics that might indicate performance or the lack of it. Team finding : There is a pattern of lose accountability and a lack of clear rules throughout the Iraqi Government. Team finding : This lack of accountability and transparency has resulted in both promoting corruption and manipulation of the criminal justice system against otherwise innocent people.\n\n\nConclusion #3. In addition to the lack of capacity within the anticorruption agencies politicization and fear of accountability are serious impediments to the enforcement of anticorruption laws.\n\n\nThe Prime Minister's Office has demonstrated hostility to the concept of an independent agency to investigate or prosecute corruption cases as a matter of principle. On December 11, 2006, in an interview by the embassy Office of Accountability and Transparency chief of staff, James Mattil, the current advisor to Prime Minister, Dr. Adel, expressed openly the PMO's opposition to the concept of an independent agency stating that all such agencies must be under the control of the prime minister's office. He dismissed the legal requirements for such an agency in Iraq's constitution and law. Dr.\n\nAdel has expressed such views repeatedly. The Prime Minister has withheld the certification of CPI's Director General which according to Iraqi law should result in their dismissal by the close of the year 2006. This has had a profound affect on the morale of the agency.\nUpon the creation of CPI and the already established BSA the establishment of independent boards and commissions were an alien concept to Iraq. Not fully appreciated by CPA a number of ancillary statutes thought of as simply ministerial in character such as certifying to the Ministry of Finance Director Generals and above. The Prime Minister's Office is using this and other like statutes to attack the independence of CPI. In this particular case it is being used for force out the entire leadership of CPI to replace them with political appointees.23  There have been a plethora of other efforts to pressure CPI some serious and some bordering on the juvenile. 24\nThis pressure has gone past attacking personnel within the commission and has struck at the agency and its ability to conduct operations. CPI lacks the personnel and equipment to effectively conduct independent investigations and operate in the field. The Prime Minister's Office has been unsympathetic in requests for additional resources. In July of 2006 the Commissioner made a direct appeal for assistance in arresting members of the Fadillah and Sadrist parties of corruption charges concerning smuggling across the Iranian border and concerning the operation of the port.  These requests went unanswered other than increased pressure to hire people recommended by the Prime Minister's Office to supervise CPI functions.\n\nIn a letter to Commissioner Radhi from Prime Minister Nuri Kamal al-Maliki, dated Sept. 6, is close to an accusation that Radhi himself is guilty of corruption. The letter directed Commissioner Rhadi to account for what the prime minister asserts are hundreds of thousands of dollars of undocumented expenses by the commission. A number of the issues were detailed from a BSA audit and a number were outlined by the former Deputy Mosa Farraj. The Prime Minister's Office ordered that the Commissioner respond in writing to the Prime Minister's Office. The Commissioner refused to do so stating that according to the constitution he can only respond to the legislature citing Article 102.\n\nThere have been two BSA audits of CPI. The first was highly critical of CPI and its management.25 In the second BSA audit the reverse was found finding that all but minor problems had been fixed and could be described a glowing.\nThere have been a number of charges made by the head of the Anticorruption committee in Iraq is the legislature, Sheik al-Saadi. He hired as his legislature advisor Mosa Farraj after his dismissal. After a hearing by the legislature CPI was cleared of the charges made by al-Saadi and al-Saadi is currently pending his removal as the head of committee.\nA committee has been appointed involving Chief Judge Mehat and the Speaker of the Legislature to review the charges made by the Prime Minister.\n\nAmerican advisors have noted numerous efforts to interfere with investigations at by senior members of the Shia Alliance Party, government officials and American officials. This has included direct calls from the Shia Vice President Mehdi demanding not only a with draw of the case already sent to court but a demand that all cases filed be vetted through him. When the Commissioner refused a call on the case came several hours later from the President of the Iraqi Supreme Court. The Advisor of the Prime Minister's Office Dr. Adel has in the presence of American advisors pressed the Commissioner of CPI to withdraw cases referred to court as well. In each of the cases that regarding attempts at outside influence from the Iraqi government the defendant was a member of the Shia Alliance Party.\nThere has been repeated attempts to pressure hiring staff on a sectarian/political bases. Under the last administration the Commission was pressured to hire in a senior position a nominally qualified member of the Badr Corps. He was placed in a position not involved in investigations.\n\nThe most blatant political interference in personnel decisions has been in the case of Mosa Farraj. Pressed by Shia Alliance Party officials to hire this member of the Fadillah branch he set about on a campaign of sectarian prosecutions. Removed for that reason he was pressed upon by Dr Adel to rehire that person. Once rehired Farraj increased his activity not only prosecuting on a sectarian bases but delaying on cases involving the Shia Alliance. The issue came to a head when he allowed a Shia Alliance member to escape custody who then fled the country. He was dismissed a second time.\n\nUpon his dismissal he stole a large number of files from CPI. Three warrants were issued by the court for his arrest for allowing the suspect to escape, delaying on prosecution of cases, and stealing the case files.\nFarraj went on the TV news circuit claiming that the Commission was corrupt and a puppet of Americans. Dr Adel then pressed once again to have him rehired which the Commissioner refused. In late October 2006 the Prime Minister signed an order appointing Mosa Farraj as the Deputy Commissioner of CPI, a blatantly exceeding his authority.26 Mas Farraj has yet to report to work and the arrest warrants remain outstanding.\n\nRecently a controversy has arisen over the failure of the Iraqi government to execute its own budget failing to spend the funds allotted. This problem has been in place since the transfer of sovereignty but recently the excuse of fear of persecution on corruption charges by CPI has circulated. The breakout of the numbers of investigations and their sources as well as the numbers in detention and convictions does not support this contention. To think that four investigators (on average) responsible for each ministry, conducting investigations by means of written request for documents and interviews, with no arrest powers could cripple and cause ministries with tens of thousands of employees to cringe in terror is not credible.\nIt is impossible to gage the level of interference in Inspector Generals offices or the BSA for lack of eyes vision in what is going on in their respective departments. There is a clear indication that with the appointment of IGs the positions have been polarized.\nAs Appendix B shows there has been with few exceptions been a clear sectarian shift in those who have been appointed as IGs since the Shia Alliance has taken control of the government.\n\n\nSectarian Prosecution.\n\nAs a general rule across the board there is not a sectarian bent to the referrals from the IG's office to CPI.  In the cases reviewed in this study the break down goes as follows which does not vary greatly from referrals from the hot line or other sources.\nIraq, the size of California, has a population of 28,807,000. CIA country facts estimate the breakdown of Muslims in Iraq as: Shiia\n\n63% Sunni\n\n37% Arabs comprise 80%, Kurds 15%, and others 5%.\n\nOf those total cases that could be identified the breakdown with the remained being undeterminable the breakdown goes as follows.\n\n| Sunni                                      | Shiia    | Kurd    | Sec    |\n|--------------------------------------------|----------|---------|--------|\n|                                            |          |         |        |\n| Percentages of ethnicities for total cases |          |         |        |\n|                                            |          |         |        |\n| 13.12%                                     |          |         |        |\n|                                            |          |         |        |\n| Sunni                                      |          |         |        |\n|                                            |          |         |        |\n| 74.28%                                     |          |         |        |\n|                                            |          |         |        |\n| Shiia                                      |          |         |        |\n|                                            |          |         |        |\n| 2.04%                                      |          |         |        |\n|                                            |          |         |        |\n| Kurd                                       |          |         |        |\n|                                            |          |         |        |\n| 10.05%                                     |          |         |        |\n| Other                                      |          |         |        |\n|                                            |          |         |        |\n| IG referral                                |          |         |        |\n| 23.88%                                     |          |         |        |\n|                                            |          |         |        |\n| Sunni                                      |          |         |        |\n|                                            |          |         |        |\n| 48.51%                                     |          |         |        |\n|                                            |          |         |        |\n| Shiia                                      |          |         |        |\n|                                            |          |         |        |\n| 7.46%                                      |          |         |        |\n|                                            |          |         |        |\n| Kurd                                       |          |         |        |\n|                                            |          |         |        |\n| 17.16%                                     |          |         |        |\n| Other                                      |          |         |        |\n|                                            |          |         |        |\n| BSA referral                               |          |         |        |\n| 3.18%                                      |          |         |        |\n|                                            |          |         |        |\n| Kurd                                       |          |         |        |\n|                                            |          |         |        |\n| 11.81%                                     |          |         |        |\n| Other                                      |          |         |        |\n| 18.00%                                     |          |         |        |\n|                                            |          |         |        |\n| Sunni                                      |          |         |        |\n|                                            |          |         |        |\n| 62.54%                                     |          |         |        |\n|                                            |          |         |        |\n| Shiia                                      |          |         |        |\n|                                            |          |         |        |\n|                                            |          |         |        |\n| Hotline referral                           |          |         |        |\n| 3.51%                                      |          |         |        |\n|                                            |          |         |        |\n| Kurd                                       |          |         |        |\n|                                            |          |         |        |\n| 11.16%                                     |          |         |        |\n| Other                                      |          |         |        |\n| 20.19%                                     |          |         |        |\n|                                            |          |         |        |\n| Sunni                                      |          |         |        |\n|                                            |          |         |        |\n| 62.51%                                     |          |         |        |\n|                                            |          |         |        |\n| Shiia                                      |          |         |        |\n|                                            |          |         |        |\n|                                            | Other    |         |        |\n| 18.33%                                     |          |         |        |\n|                                            |          |         |        |\n| Sunni                                      |          |         |        |\n|                                            |          |         |        |\n| 63.92%                                     |          |         |        |\n|                                            |          |         |        |\n| Shiia                                      |          |         |        |\n|                                            |          |         |        |\n| 3.38%                                      |          |         |        |\n|                                            |          |         |        |\n| Kurd                                       |          |         |        |\n|                                            |          |         |        |\n| 11.43%                                     |          |         |        |\n|                                            |          |         |        |\n| Other                                      |          |         |        |\n|                                            |          |         |        |\n|                                            |          |         |        |\n| Totals                                     |          |         |        |\n\n Using the same measures the percentages of cases for subject(s) holding the position of Director General in ministry or above:\n\n20.00%\nSunni\n72.50%\nShiia\n2.50%\nKurd\n5.00%\nOther\n\nIG referral\n0.00%\nSunni\n33.33%\nShiia\n0.00%\nKurd\n0.00%\nOther\n\nBSA referral\n5.00%\nKurd\n9.29%\nOther\n28.57%\nSunni\n53.57%\nShiia\n\nHotline referral\n3.33%\nKurd\n16.67%\nOther\n22.00%\nSunni\n56.00%\nShiia\n\nOther\n17.64%\n53.85%\n2.71%\n7.74%\nOther\nSunni\nKurd\nShiia\n\nTotals\n\n Significant violations (involving sums greater than $25,000 or aggravating circumstance)\n\n\nIG referral\n11.49%\nSunni\n78.16%\nShiia\n2.30%\nKurd\n9.20%\nOther\nBSA referral\n22.54%\nSunni\n53.52%\nShiia\n7.04%\nKurd\n14.08%\nOther\nHotline referral\n19.11%\nSunni\n64.34%\nShiia\n2.33%\nKurd\n11.89%\nOther\nOther\n20.87%\nSunni\n60.68%\nShiia\n4.85%\nKurd\n11.89%\nOther\nTotals\n18.50%\nSunni\n64.17%\nShiia\n4.13%\nKurd\n11.77%\nOther Percentages of small violations (claims of education, etc)\n\n\nIG referral\n13.10%\nSunni\n72.46%\nShiia\n2.14%\nKurd\n10.96%\nOther\nBSA referral\n26.67%\nSunni\n43.33%\nShiia\n8.33%\nKurd\n21.67%\nOther\nHotline referral\n15.11%\nSunni\n62.99%\nShiia\n3.63%\nKurd\n12.24%\nOther\nOther\n19.57%\nSunni\n64.45%\nShiia\n2.92%\nKurd\n9.90%\nOther\nTotals\n18.61%\nSunni\n60.81%\nShiia\n4.26%\nKurd\n\n13.69%\nOther There are however, notable discrepancies as applied to particular ministries. See the ministry by ministry breakdown above.\n\nAcross the board there is a fear by anticorruption agencies to any metrics that might indicate performance or the lack of it. There is no effort by CPI, BSA or any of the IGs to track success within them much less tracking the success of cases passing from one agency to another. The statistic established for this report had to be created by actually counting individual files for example. The IGs can not provide reliable records seemingly for much the same reason.\nThere is a pattern of lose accountability and a lack of clear rules throughout the Iraqi Government. Rules of accounting and procurement vary from ministry to ministry and in some cases between departments within ministries. In large measure this is the result of the manner in which what we would call regulations are created. Regulatory powers are implied all the way down to Director Generals within ministries. Therefore the regulations are made by the people who then carry them out. There is little incentive for someone to make a rule or procedure that can latter be used to show a lack of performance. There is great incentive to establish rules that maximizes discretion. All of these rules are made in a completely untransparent manner.\nThis makes investigation and persecution for abuse of authority difficult in many cases. It also makes it easy for IGs to make cases that may eventually fail in court but that appear unflawed to CPI investigators. There are a number of cases that lead to court cases and in sometimes extended detention that latter turned on interpretation of vague or obscure rules. There have been a number of these cases that brought charges of political prosecution.  This lack of accountability and transparency has resulted in both promoting corruption and manipulation of the criminal justice system against otherwise innocent people.\nTeam finding : The average CPI investigator has proven himself adept at comprehending the training; diligent in applying the techniques taught in a lawful way; and highly interested in expanding their professional abilities and contributions.\n\nTeam finding : CPI's 120 investigators do not have the numbers or the capacity to confront the job it is asked to do.\n\n\nTeam finding : When working in tandem with other agencies with the muscle to confront armed groups CPI can conduct effective operations.\n\n\nTeam finding : CPI has no formal means to handle internal security or discipline. This lack of an IG or internal affairs department has placed in jeopardy the agency's reputation.\n\n\nTeam finding : The Iraqi government is conducting a series of classes for the training of hundreds of inspector generals but without an increase in numbers and a means to conduct investigations without intimidation their value my only be administrative in character.\n\n\nTeam finding : Without a commitment to withdraw partisan politics from the selection of senior IG leadership there is the likelihood that investigations will lack credibility.\n\n\nTeam finding : According to the figures supplied BSA's contribution does not show it to be a major player to criminal investigations.\n\nTeam finding : The US Embassy has established the Office of Accountability and Transparency to provide direct support to the capacity building of CPI, the IGs and BSA. Team finding : If adequately resourced and a demonstration of political will on the part of the Iraqi government IRMO OAT can provide the expertise needed to confront the stalled growth in capacity building. Conclusion #4. The Government of Iraq is making grudging progress in capability to investigate and prosecute corruption in Iraq bit not at a level that would support any reasonable time line.\n\n\nTo date the advisors have provided classroom and tactical training to investigators in the necessary topics and skills familiar to all law enforcement personnel everywhere. Additional practical exercises, mentoring and the provision of equipment have helped to advance a newly created agency with no previous experience or history into the modern age of law enforcement.  These efforts have produced many positive results.  The average CPI investigator has proven himself adept at comprehending the training; diligent in applying the techniques taught in a lawful way; and highly interested in expanding their professional abilities and contributions.\nThe Iraqi government has supported the growth of CPI until July of 2006 when its started to withdraw its political support. The 120 investigators do not have the numbers or the capacity to confront the job it is asked to do.\nThe general lack of physical security in Iraq, especially as encountered in the greater Baghdad metropolitan area, coupled with the blatant militia or organized crime control of certain ministries has slowed the development of CPI.\n\nUndercover operations including \"sting operations\", physical/electronic surveillance, using cooperating defendants and witnesses are beyond CPI's capability. The pattern of criminal activity associated with much of the oil, electricity, police, transportation, and food for oil cases require comprehensive use of proactive investigative techniques to have a chance for success.  The pattern of criminality at MOI and MOD is beyond CPI's capability and totally dependant upon their respective IGs.\nOther Ministries can be effectively policed through contract fraud investigations if documents are provided and the IG's are inclined to assist.  The BSA can also be developed as a valuable resource to CPI if investigators left the office and developed contacts.\n\nTwelve CPI personnel have been killed in the line of duty with two of its members families have been kidnapped. The situation became particularly bad in June\n2006 when 4 of its investigators were killed in practical affect severely limiting investigations in the red zone.27\nIn response the US government in December provided protective vests have been provided to all of the investigators. These vests are not capable of stopping more than handgun fire in an environment where assault weapons are common. Pistols funded by the US government are on order for the investigators. It must be noted that CPI investigators are not authorized in law to carry firearms. The Prime Minister's Office is opposed to the legislation proposed by CPI to do so. MOI can authorize the carrying of firearms through its weapons cards program but this program has been non-operational for more than a year and even when employed would require the investigators to provide their names and address. ICITAP has trained a small group called the SIU (Special Investigations Unit) to act as a personal security detachment when investigators have no alternative than to operate in the red zone. They are used mostly to serve warrants in the less violent areas. They often escort police officers to make arrests to ensure that the police don't simply say they cold not find the suspect or take a bribe. This unit is too small or ill-equipped to handle more than quick sallies from the IZ where it is unlikely to run into trouble.\nCPI has recently shown that when working in tandem with other agencies with the muscle to confront armed groups can have a real affect. On 18 December 2006 ICITAP trained CPI investigators in Basrah were called by British forces to accompany them on a tip that an incoming ship with Iranian registry might be smuggling in weapons through the seaport. The Customs agents working for MOI signed off on a shipment of children's cloths and toys. A search of the containers found the shipment to be late model cars being smuggled into the port. The British held the ship and four customs agents long enough for the CPI investigators to get an arrest and seizure warrants for the ship corrupt officials. The four customs agents remain in custody and a case is under way by the investigative judge28. A similar incident in November bagged another 4 MOI customs officials and ship. Actions such as these clearly demonstrate the CPI appears to have more capability than opportunity given the situation in Iraq. The training provided by ICITAP provided the needed basic skills to process a case to court. This capability is about to rise considerably as surveillance equipment and training are eminent for CPI as planned deliveries and training are accomplished by ICITAP trainers.\nSince its formation, CPI has been subjected to complaints, allegations, and other claims that maintain it operates as a rogue organization utilizing the law (correctly and/or incorrectly) to impede or otherwise inhibit the lawful functioning of the various Iraq ministries of state.\nA. Uses harassing techniques applying minor article violations to build cases against Ministry employees to further its professional reputation.\nB. Arrests and imprisons Ministry employees without proof that CPI promises to produce at a later time.\nC. Targets Ministry employees based upon religious, ethnic or tribal affiliation. D. Fabricates incriminating evidence against officials.\nAs each of these complaints have been made INL funded American police officers have investigated specifics. In the complaints that had the specifics they could find no evidence of CPI wrong doing. The advisors to CPI believe that most of these allegations are incorrect and are based upon misunderstandings and/or fraudulent stories told by ministry employees and perpetuated by others as factual when they are not.  In order to address these misconceptions the CPI advisors have produced this document that attempts to educate the reader in the mission, abilities, resources, operating partners and the environment in which CPI functions.\n\nThat is not to say that any of the above did not occur for in cases coming from the ministries themselves it is near impossible to verify the credibility of the evidence or the motives of the investigations. The American mentors have observed that the Iraqi system of justice as a whole is easy to manipulate at the ministerial level. This can be remedied once the case gets to court by the investigative judge but CPI lacks the capacity to more than verify the legal sufficiency that all of the elements of a crime have some evidence. Under Iraqi law once there is some evidence for each of the elements the case must be forwarded to an investigative judge who conducts the investigation. Concepts of prosecutorial discretion do not exist except at the ministerial level.\n\nThat does not mean that there has not been an occasion whereby wrong doing has not taken place in CPI. The former deputy commissioner, Mosah Farraj29 was discovered to be holding on to cases involving Shia while aggressively prosecuting Kurds.\nIn the latter part of November 2006 the head of the CPI Mosul office was reported through sources non-admissible in court to be accepting bribes from oil smugglers. He was summarily fired. There has been no legal action taken however.\n\nAmerican advisors have noted that CPI has no formal means to handle internal security or discipline. This lack of an IG or internal affairs department has placed in\n\nfor the affiliations with area militias the only ones left to protect them the CPI investigators were forced to abandon the evidence. When US Embassy staff in support of CPI sought military support from MNFI long enough to secure the smuggled vehicles for evidence and disposal the response was, \"It is unlikely we will want to divert troops from the fight.\"\njeopardy the agency's reputation. The INL funded mentors are devising a plan to correct that and the proposed management capacity building plan addresses this issue although the Commissioner has yet to authorize its implementation.\n\nThe ministry IGs are generally understaffed and so unprotected as to bring into question their ability to contribute to the anticorruption fight. The Iraqi government is conducting a series of classes for the training of hundreds of inspector generals but without an increase in numbers and a means to conduct investigations without intimidation their value may only be administrative and non-criminal in character.\nOf equal concern is the politicization of the IG system. Without a commitment to withdraw partisan politics from the selection of senior IG leadership there is the likelihood that investigations will lack credibility.\nBSA has received scant assistance from the US government since the transfer of sovereignty. Its reputation is the highest of the anticorruption players. But according to the figures supplied BSA's contribution does not show it to be a major player to criminal investigations.\nIn response to the problems listed the US Embassy has established the Office of Accountability and Transparency. This office shall provide direct support to the capacity building of CPI, the IGs and BSA. This organization should be able to confront most of the advice needed and give the embassy the capacity to direct assistance. Currently the resources available to apply are uncertain. It will be critical that when this group identifies those areas where only the US Government can remove barriers or where political assistance is required that the embassy to be nimble enough to act within a short period of time.\n\nThe one critical element however will be the Iraqi government's willingness to keep politics out of the anticorruption efforts. It is unlikely that anticorruption institutions tied to the political needs of the leadership will ignore the pressures of the head of government to maintain political support among those who would exact as their price the looting of the treasury. An empowered anticorruption institution inclined to political necessity then becomes an enabler punishing political enemies and granting criminal opportunity to political friends. Such a government under current conditions is likely to loose the support of its people and certain to repel any attempt to bring into the political process outside of the government. Just as worrying, the proceeds of allowed corruption will likely fund the violent groups that our troops are likely to face.\n\n\nRecommendations\n\n\nKey to any effort to enforce Iraqi's anticorruption laws is the absence of partisan politics in its prosecution. A clear expectation of this requirement has not been pressed as a matter of policy. Our passive observation to the centralizing of prosecutorial power in the political office of the Prime Minister's office has encouraged attacks on independence of its prosecutorial arm, CPI.\n\nThe US Embassy should articulate as a matter of policy that the fair and independent prosecutions should be a condition for continued assistance to the Iraqis in anticorruption enforcement.\n\n\nBoth the Embassy and MNFI should clearly state and or reinforce that Coalition personnel should not get involve it in lobbying efforts with any Iraqi official to drop and control the results of investigations or custody status concerning corruption cases without first clearing it with senior Embassy staff.\n\n\nBoth the Embassy and MNFI should clearly state and or reinforce that Coalition personnel should not get involve it in lobbying efforts involving Iraqi personnel decisions without first clearing it with senior Embassy staff.\n\n\nBoth the Embassy and MNFI should clearly state and or reinforce that Coalition personnel should not proffer and provide to any Iraqi official proposed legislation or plans on how to organize or operate the government without first clearing it with senior Embassy staff. Currently anticorruption enforcement forces are so vulnerable as to provide those involved in corruption immunity. The acceptance of militia, organized crime and/or common gang infiltration of Iraq Government Ministries must be confronted. Anticorruption forces should be supplied with the needed equipment, training and numbers to confront individuals protected by such violent groups.\n\nAs a temporary interim measure, in the areas where MNFI controls the battle space, for selected ministries that are critical for the Iraqi Government credibility military units under their control should provide force protection for CPI, BSA and the affected IGs to carry out anticorruption activities. As a temporary interim measure, in the areas where the Iraqi government controls the battle space, for selected ministries that are critical for the Iraqi Government credibility Iraqi military units should provide force protection for CPI, BSA and the affected IGs to carry out anticorruption activities.\n\nThe Embassy and MNFI should press the Iraqi Government to as an interim measure in cases not involved with MOI, national police units should provide force protection for CPI, BSA and the affected IGs to carry out anticorruption activities.\n\n\nThe Embassy should press the Iraqi Government to provide CPI, BSA, and IGs armored vehicles, vests, and firearms and PSDs for them and their families as a demonstration of its seriousness in support for anticorruption efforts. The Embassy should press the Iraqi Government to provide CPI the resources for a tactical capability to operate in the red zone.\n\nThe Embassy should press the Iraqi Government to enact legislation to allow CPI to carry firearms and the power to arrest. The  Embassy should press the Iraqi Government to enact legislation to allow IGs and BSA to carry firearms. The  Embassy should press the Iraqi Government to provide for each IG department, CPI, and BSA a special unit designed to mitigate threats to the families of investigators such as modifications of homes, safety studies, communications, and other such measures. The Embassy should insist that those ministries that are controlled by militias should be targeted by tactical units and other police assets to regain access and freedom of movement within. Where ties with armed groups can be established employees should be removed. A Liaison Officer from MNFI with access to those capable of ordering maneuver elements should be made available to the IRMO Office of Accountability and Transparency to process requests for assistance in a timely manner.\n\n\nA number of ministries have become so dangerous to enter that anticorruption efforts are impossible. Some of these ministries are critical to the success of the Iraqi Government.\n\nThe Embassy should press the Iraqi Government to focus its enforcement on the Ministries of Oil, Electricity, Transportation, and Health providing special protection for the investigators of the IGs, BSA, and CPI. In the case of the IGs, they should be provided new positions in other ministries after the close of the program. The Embassy should press the Iraqi Government to establish an IG swap program to move IG investigators from one ministry to another after sensitive investigations or a set period of time.\n\n\n\nEach of the current institutions is weak and incapable to attacking the issues of corruption in a practical manner. Cooperation between the institutions in large measure is no more than formal requests which are either complied with or ignored.\n\n\nThe Embassy should press the Iraqi Government to establish interagency task forces to fight corruption as it applies to certain ministries or types of corruption. These task forces would consist of CPI, IG, BSA with National, local or MOI Internal Affairs police. INL and other US funding agencies should revisit its material support the institutions with a bias in favor of tactical support to CPI, the IGs, and BSA front loading support that will allow these agencies to operate in a hostile environment.\n\nThe effort on the part of both the Iraqi Government and the US Embassy has been Baghdad-centric and Central Ministry-centric leaving the leadership divorced from ground truth of corruption in Iraq. Further it has ignored the coming title wave of newly empowered local governments whore capability to avoid or confront corruption is suspect.\n\nThe newly create positions of local Accountability and Transparency officers currently about to be staffed should be combined with the Rule of Law teams and both should be given the mandate to assess, strengthen, and monitor local corruption enforcement efforts. To do this the Embassy should press to have priority for protection escorts to provide the access to critical elements such as CPI, BSA, and IG offices as well as local governments and ministry branch officers. Force protection and transportation for an assessment of local offices of the IG, BSA, and CPI should be provided Office of Accountability and Transparency should be supported by MNFI.\n\nThe Courts are proving inadequate in investigating and prosecuting case due to outdated criminal procedure laws\n\nThe JACC should include a senior member of the HJC and the CCCI to provide insight not only on needed procedural reforms but a conduit for direct assistance and the building of an anticorruption capability within the court system beyond the CCCI.\n\n\nThe disregard of the law by senior Iraqi officials is undercutting the anticorruption effort.\n\nThe Embassy should press the Iraqi government to remove from office all Iraqi officials who refuse to fill out the financial disclosure requirements.\n\n\nThe Embassy should press the Iraqi government to remove from office all Iraqi that refuse to comply with CPA Order #57 which requires the reporting of those actions that are crimes under Iraqi Law.\n\nThe Embassy should press the Iraqi government to account for those ministers and legal offices that refuse to serve arrest warrants to their employees or respond to requests for information from the courts. There are some parts of the Iraqi law that are encouraging the abuse of the corruption laws.\n\nThe Embassy should press the Iraqi government to repeal Article 136 B of the Iraqi Criminal Procedure Code and RCC 38-1993.\n\n\nThere has bee considerable disinformation on the roles of the anticorruption institutions and their capabilities. For example, CPI investigates corruption cases and collects enough evidence to support each element of a charge and then must turn the case to the primary investigative body the courts. It has no discretion as to what cases it can or can not accept. From that point, any decision made in regard to such cases will be the court's call and CPI has no influence over the court system. However, many Iraqis and Americans, public and officials, believe that CPI is the one who makes the referral of the cases to the criminal court, arrest, prosecution, and whatever comes thereafter. For that, CPI gets blamed for whatever decision made by the court.\n\nThis report should be distributed beyond the anticorruption staff to others within the Embassy and MNF-I\nAnnex A Methodology\n\nCPI advisors directed a quantitative and qualitative analysis of CPI's case inventory for the period, January 2005 to the present.  CPI administrative personnel were tasked with collecting specific, sensitive and voluminous data, some of which were not routinely compiled by CPI.  An example of information sought for this review that is not routinely recorded by CPI regards the ethnicity of subjects.  Statistics captured identified subjects as Sunni, Shiia, Kurd or Secular.  This information was obtained by reference to the tribal names of subjects or by other indicators available to the researchers.  Another example is the political affiliation of Ministry, Inspectors General. Our review of CPI investigations determined that thirteen ministries (out of 40)\naccounted for 75% of all investigative activity; therefore, the advisors conducted extensive personal interviews of the CPI Investigator-Lawyers assigned to these specific ministries.  This provided insight and antidotal information regarding the actual conduct of investigations.  The advisors also interviewed a number of CPI management personnel to gain their perspective.  The Supreme Investigative Judge for CPI cases was interviewed as well. Unlike typical audits, the advisors neither had the capacity nor the ability to verify the statistical figures provided.  Certain documents offered for review were interpreted by our language assistants (LA) to verify the information being provided by CPI personnel. Example of the proffered documents would include numerous contracts entered into by various ministries. Part of the review involved a survey of the ICITAP trainers and mentors. These are former police officers with extensive investigative backgrounds. Many are from such agencies as the FBI, major metropolitan police forces, and State police agencies such as GBI. These are foot noted as observations sourced from INL funded trainers.\n\nList of the Inspector General in the ministries\nPolitical Affiliation details\n\n\nName of\nMinistry\nName of IG\nDate of\nappointment\nPolitical/Ethnic/Militia\naffiliation of IG:\n\n\nMinistry of Interior\nAqueel Omran Saeed Al-Tarihee\n12/28/2005\nShia'a / Al-Dawa Party\n12/11/2005\nShia'a\nMinistry of Defense\nFaez Mohamed\nBaqer Mahdi\nShare's Al-Islam\nMinistry of Trade\nAbdul Hadi Abdul Monem Hassan Al-Taee\nAug/10/2006\nShia'a/ Secular\nJul/5/2006\nShia'a Collation/ Alda'wa party\nMinistry of Health\nAdel Muhsien Abdulla Al- Quza'alee\nMinistry of Oil\nAli Muhsen AlAlaq\n0\nShia'a Collation/ Shia'a/ Aldawa Party\n11/16/05\nShia'a Collation/ Shia'a\nMinistry of Education\nAli Abdulla Kadhem AlAmery\nMinistry of Water Recourses\nAli Abdul-zWahed Ali AlAnsary\n3/30/2004\nShia'a Collation\nMinistry of Labor &\nSocial Affairs\nNot appointed\nyet\nShia'a Collation\nWaleed Muthafer\nMohammed Asoad (Acting)\nMinistry of Transportation\nSadoon Haial Abood Hassan AlShara'a\n11/16/2005\nShia'a / Sader affiliate / Shia'a Collation\n3/1/2004\nSunni\nMinistry of Higher Education\nAbdul Majeed Abdul Hameed Issa AlRawee\nMinistry of Justice\nAhmad Habieb AlAbbassy\n07/05/05\nShia Collation\nAmer Mohamed Ali AbuNabila\n03/02/05\nSunni\nMinistry of Displacement & Migration\n\nCounsel of Ministers\nNo assigned IG to the COM\n\n\nMinistry of Science and Technology\nDia Shait Mahmoud\n04/01/04\nSunni\nMinistry of Housing & Construction\nAmin AlHadi Abbas\n09/18/06\nShia'a Collation\nMinistry of Foreign Affairs\nSa'adi Ibraheem Al-Fadilee\nCPA days\nSunni/ Kurdish coalition\nNo IG since they are not a ministry\n\n\nNone Governmental Organizations\nMinistry of Youth & Sports\nHassan AbdulWahab Mousa AlSafi\nMinistry of Human\nRights\nMukhles\nAbdulRazaq Shaker Al-Hadithy\n2/25/2004\nSunni\nMinistry of Planning Development & Cooperation\nHassan Aliwai AbdulHusien AlQrghouly\nMinistry of Municipalities and Works\nEng. Salam AbdulSahib Houssien Mohammed Al- Safar\nMinistry of Electricity\nSa'ady Mahdi Ali AlSuodani\n8/10/6 by the order of the council of ministers No. 4649\nMinistry of Amanat (City Hall) Baghdad\nToma Jaber Louj AlAkydli\n6/2/2004\nShia'a Collation\n\nAkram was Shia'a Collation, Baha is Sunni\nMinistry of Finance\nAkram KhuDhair was the IG, Baha\nAl-Deen Abdul-\nRazaq Al-Aieer is acting IG\nMinistry of Industry & Minerals\nSalem Boles Ibraheeb\n8/10/6 by the order of the council of ministers No. 4649\nIraqi Intelligence\nHassan AlSaray\n0\nShia'a Collation\nMinistry of Communication\nAmeer Khuder Albisady\n0\nShia'a Collation\nMinistry of Agriculture\nAbdul-Razaq Maccy AlTabaq\nHe was sent to retirement lately and there is no replacement\n| 1/2/2006         | Shia'a Collation    |\n|------------------|---------------------|\n| 3/29/2004        | Shia'a              |\n| 2/1/2006         | Shia'a Collation    |\n| Shia'a Collation |                     |\n| Christian        |                     |\n| Shia'a Collation |                     |\n\nMinistry of Culture\nHana Yousef Shakoury\n2/14/2004\n0\nCentral Bank of Iraq\nAbbas Yahya AlHaiery\n8/2/2004\nShia'a Collation\n9/18/2006\nShia'a Collation\nMinistry of Environment\nJaseem Mohammed AbdAlSada AlAetouani\nMinistry of Mixed Sector\nIbraheem Tomer Antoan\n\n\n\nShia'a Collation\nthe Shia'a\nFoundation\nDawood AlRashidy   (Sa'ad\nAbdul Ameer\nHamoudy Acting- Moved to the VP office)\n2/10/2005\nSunni\nthe Sunni Foundation\nSa'ad Omar AbdulRahman AlKarbony"
    },
    {
        "text": "January 6, 2021\nUnited States Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Washington, DC 20510-6475\nRE: SSCI #2020-3029 Dear Acting Chairman Rubio and Vice Chairman Warner, U This letter responds to your letter to me of October 29, 2020, asking for an independent\n(\nreview of possible instances of politicization of intelligence. The letter transmits my findings , which are laid out more fully in the attached report. 1 am prepared to provide a classified briefing\n.\n\nto discuss the findings in more detail U The United States is in a hyperpartisan state, unlike any in recent memory. The country is\n(\ndivided along politica\\, ideological, and raciallines to the point where civil discourse has become difficu\\t if not impossible. The polarized atmosphere has threatened to undermine the foundations of our Republic, penetrating even into the Intelligence Community. Though, as intelligence professionals, we have the ethical responsibility to remain unbiased and objective in our work, we are human beings and can stil1 feel the pressures from society and our political leaders. Pressures from our political1eaders have sometimes placed demands on us that have translated into what might seem like bias or a loss of objectivity. In most cases, what we see is the entire system responding to and resisting pressures from outside, rather than attempts to\n.\n\npoliticize intelligence by our \\eaders or analysts In this environment, characterized by unintentionalloss of objectivity, there have been a few u\n(\nincidents where we documented where individuals, or groups of individuals, taking wil1ful actions that - whatever their motivations - had the effect of politicizing intelligence, hindering objective analysis, or injecting bias into the intelligence process. This report lays out the\n.\n\nevidence for these instances\n:\nU The bottom-line-up-front answers to your questions are\n(\n\nU **Have ODNI-published products adhered to Analytic Standards?** YES, within the scope\n(\n.\nof the tradecraft review explained below\nofficials politicized or attempted to politicize intelligence, exercised or\nU **Have ODN**\n(\nattempted to exercise undue influence on the analysis, production, or\npublished intelligence products related to -\ndissemination process of ODN\n.\nelection security? YES, in some cases as documented below\nU **Have definitions or analytic tradecraft been altered, misapplied, or applied**\n(\n.\ninconsistently on these products? YES, in some cases as documented below\nfollowed standard procedure for the drafting, editing, approval, and\nU **Has ODN**\n(\ndissemination of **analytic products related to election interference?** NO, not in\n.\nall cases, as documented below\n(U) By taking on board this report, the Intelligence Community recognizes where we have not met our responsibilities for objective intelligence. By taking up the recommendations detailed in Appendix I, the Intelligence Community shows that it is already taking steps to correct where we lost our focus on objectivity in the past and will work to ensure that it does not happen again.\n\nSincerely,\n< / /.\n\n                     / ~< '/t\n                   ~\n J:-u--p; / h\n                  /\n(\n\n                 //\n              ,\nDr. Barry'A.d'ulauf\n\n                                         ,\nIC Analytic Ombudsman\n\nOffice of the Director of National Intelligence\n\n## (U) Independent Ic Analytic Ombudsman's On Politicization Of Intelligence (U) Authorities\n\n(U) As the Intelligence Community (IC) Analytic Ombudsman, IRTPA Section 1020 grants me the authority to counseJ, conduct arbitration, offer recommendations, and, as appropriate, initiate inquiries into real or perceived problems of analytic tradecraft or politicization, biased reporting, or lack of objectivity in intelligence analysis. For definitions of these standards, see Annex 11. In his appointment letter to me, DNI Ratcliffe conveyed his personal commitment to the Ombudsman's obligation to provide an independent avenue for analysts to pursue unbiased analysis. Even the perception that intelligence is being politicized can undermine the trust that the American people have placed in the work of the Intelligence Community. Accordingly, what follows is my independent review and recommendations as the IC Analytic Ombudsman.\n\n## (U) Altered, Misapplied Or Inconsistent Analytic Tradecraft Or Definitions\n\n(U) My review, conducted in response to IC complaints regarding the election threat issue, surfaced a number of examples of altered tradecraft and misapplied or inconsistent definitions.\n\nDue to varying collection and insight into hostile state actors' leadership intentions and domestic election influence campaigns, the definitional use of the terms \"influence\" and \"interference\"\nand associated confidence levels are applied differently by the China and Russia analytic communities. A forma] definition document, Lexiconjor Russian lnjluence Ejforts (UIIFOUO), was published by the NIC in J une 2017, however there is no parallel document for China, and it seems that the Russia document is not widely known across IC agencies, at least not outside the election threat community. The terms were applied inconsistently across the analytic community.\n\nFailing to explain properly these definitions is inconsistent with Tradecraft Standards 1, 2, and 6.\n\n(U) Given analytic differences in the way Russia and China analysts examined their targets, China analysts appeared hesitant to assess Chinese actions as undue influence or interference.\n\nThese analysts appeared reluctant to have their analysis on China brought forward because they tended to disagree with the Administration's policies, saying in effect, I don't want our intelligence used to support those policies. This behavior would constitute a violation of Analytic Standard B: Independent ofPolitical Considerations (IRTPA Section 1019). On the other hand, Russia analysts assessed that there was clear and credible evidence of Russian election influence activities. They said IC management slowing down or not wanting to take their analysis to customers, claiming that it was not well received, frustrated them. Analysts saw this as suppression of intelligence, bordering on politicization of intelligence from above. At a minimum, it is a violation of the Analytic Standard for Timeliness. ODNI leaders were focusing on presenting intelligence as part of a story arc, highlighting significant trends in a way the customers could consume, rather than reporting each individual item. The incongruity between leaders' and analysts' perceptions might not have occurred if there had been more consistent and transparent communication about analytic differences.\n\nf) 1.1 c1 S l\n(U) ODNI officials engaging with policymakers said that these customers did notice the result, particularly differences in the volume, frequency, and confidence levels of the intelligence coming from the China and Russia analytic communities on activities that, from their perspective, were very similar in their potential effects. These differences were not intentional, but a result of different collection and analysis rhythms and interpretations by analysts that do not cross-pollinate between regional issues. Subtle differences in analytic concepts, and their inconsistent application did, therefore, make a difference in how customers consumed the intelligence. Some customers were able to perceive differences in tradecraft and definitions: they asked hard questions, leading to greater scrutiny within the IC as leaders suggested changes in an attempt to make the intelligence more consistent and, in some cases, more palatable to customers. IC leaders were not consistently transparent with the workforce about some of these probably justified changes.\n\n(U) According to interviews with NIC officials, policymakers were probably not aware of the behind-the-scenes machinations of the production and dissemination processes. These foundational analytic shortcomings contributed to instances of, and led to other instances of, at least the perceived politicization of intelligence, needlessly long review times, and differences between analytic conclusions in public statements on the one hand and established IC positions on the other. None of this happened in a vacuum, but the dispute appears to have largely begun with misapplied or inconsistent analytic definitions.\n\n(U) [Ombudslnan Comment: Classijied details on this issue can be provided at the request oj the committee. ]\n\n## Dissonance Between Public Statements And Ic Coordinated Assessments )(\n\nU) After conducting a thorough review 1 found several incidents where there were attempts to\n(\npoliticize intelligence. The most egregious example is the talking points provided alongside the written introductory statement delivered by, but not written by, National Counterintelligence and Security Center (NCSC) Director Bill Evanina on 10 March 2020. Evanina also issued a 24 July ODNI public statement on foreign election interference/infiuence, and a 7 August press release Analysts also referred to .\n\nfor both of which, the intelligence information came from the NIC\n[\nstatements by the DNI in an 8 October article published in The Hill. These statements left the impression that \"the IC thinks ... \" when, in fact what was stated was actually, according to analysts, a \"gross misrepresentation\" of established IC views. According to the Director of NCSC, when asked about the IC assessments shared in his March statement and August press release, he said that he assumed they represented coordinated IC views, because NIC and other ODNI officials gave them to him and portrayed them as such. They in fact did not represent fully\n.\n\ncoordinated IC views, as discussed below U) The March 10 Talking Points were drafted presumably by ODNI staff, however 1 was not\n(\nable to find one individual who admitted to writing them. Most officials say (in the passive voice) \"they were drawn from\" existing reporting, albeit selectively, and were \"shaped by other\n\". The main drafters were not ODNI officials and the Ambassador [meaning A1DNI Grenell analysts, which was probably a major contributing factor to the perceived difference between the a n\nl b l.1 d s rr r\n0\n,; 4 I 11 c. i V L i (\ntalking points and the established IC view. Analysts point out that there were substantive differences between the Talking Points and what the IC actually thought. Emails show that those who drew up the talking points did partially coordinate them and were informed of analysts'\nconcerns with them, but did not completely consider the concerns in the final version. There was widespread reluctance among intelligence professionals to deliver them. This reluctance on the part of seasoned IC officers should have been a red flag, but did not stop the statement from being issued.\n\n(U) [Ombudsman Comment: Classijied details on this issue can be provided at the request oj the committee. ]\n\n## U) Not Following Standard Procedure For Drafting, Editing, Approval, And Dissemination (\n\n-\nU Following the March Talking Points, 1 have identified a long story arc of - at the very least\n(\nperceived politicization of intelligence. Guidelines on special review procedures relating to election security products were promulgated by ODNI and CIA leadership, but according to interviews it appears not all analysts and managers were aware of them. Interviewees commented, if there are such guidelines they are not well promulgated. They may be known to other analysts. Three different NIC products demonstrate the overall pattern of perceived politicization stemming from the inconsistent application of definitions as outlined above. There was a neglect or refusal to re-coordinate changes, adopt alternative analyses, and include dissent language, as well as leadership's failure to communicate clearly and directly to analysts the\n.\n\nreasoning for those changes on a consistent basis U A NIC Memo (NICM) published in May 2020 suffered from a severe slowdown and major\n(\nchanges to coordinated assessments in the drafting, review, and approval process. CIA analysts noted that they and a wide range of IC analysts participated fully in the early analytic work leading up to this NICM, including in the analytic line review. They feel that the first drafts of the NICM followed the general agreement of the community. Then a revised draft came back from NIC review as substantially changed, leading with intelligence gaps that seemed to\n\"\nundermine the threat assessment. The draft led with intelligence gaps and \"buried the lead\n, regarding what the IC does know about election security threats. The then-NIC Chair immediately before becoming the Principal Executive, crafted this language. In a follow-up interview, the PE stated that he did this because it was good tradecraft to lay out the analytic\n.\n\nenvironment, including what is not known U Subsequently, the draft was held up by AlDNI Grenell for weeks before publication, and\n(\nunderwent what appears to be politically motivated editing. Analysts recounted that the NIC and DNI's changes were not fully re-coordinated with the community. The result was a final product whose delayed publication meant it diverged sharply from the up-to-date IC view communicated in other product lines. 1 have e-mail exchanges to document this delay, allusions to political repercussions, and frustration from intelligence professionals with the delay. These actions\n.\n\n7\nconstitute a violation of the Analytic Standard for Timeliness, and Tradecraft Standard U According to interviews, the established practice does not include the DNI actively\n(\nparticipating in the review chain for NIC Memos or Assessments. As a political appointee, there r1 1\nl.1 d s r J ! y l i c 0 r )!\n; 5 I A\nis a potential conflict of interest. As DNI Ratcliffe has stated, on the other hand, just because it is unusual to have DNI involvement in the review of these products does not mean it is necessarily wrong to do so. According to tradecraft standards, the DNI like any IC employee, has the right to an analytic conclusion, and provided it is supported by the intelligence. The DNI should also, when speaking publicly, adhere to good tradecraft and clearly delineate when they are sharing their own personal views versus when they are communicating a coordinated intelligence community assessment. To do otherwise would 'be a violation of Tradecraft Standard 3.\n\nU) [Ombudsman Comment: 1 have not interviewed AlDNI Grenell or his stajfwho have\n(\n.\ndeparted ODNI. They are no longer under my purview as Analytic Ombudsman U) In the August NICA, there were analytic lines from the Annual Threat Assessment (A TA -\n(\noriginally drafted in early 2020) which were technically accurate but not as cuaent as what the IC had published over the previous six months in other product lines. Instead of allowing the most current IC-coordinated NICA language to drive this alignment, previously IC-coordinated\n.\n\nAT A language was used without a re-coordination, at the instruction of the AJNIC Chair Analysts claim that NIC leadership consistently watered down conclusions during a drawn-out review process, boosting the threat from China and making the threat from Russia sound \"not too\n\"\n.\n\ncontroversial\n(U) NIC officials pointed to ODNI senior officials as intervening in the changes to conclusions, saying that they were overly sensitive to political customers who saw the dissonance between China and Russia reporting and the inconsistent application of definitions. DNI Ratcliffe just disagreed with the established analytic line on China, insisting 'we are missing China's influence in the US and that Chinese actions ARE intended to affect the election. DNI Ratcliffe wrote as much in his Wall Street Journal op-ed. Ultimately the DNI insisted in putting material on China in, and was aware analysts disagreed and probably still disagree. As a result, the final published NICA, analysts felt, was an outrageous misrepresentation of their analysis. DNI Ratcliffe states,\n\"1 know my conclusions are right, based on the intelligence that I see.\" As the DNI states, \"Many analysts think I am going off the script. They don't realize that I did it based on the intelligence.\"\n(U) Two NIOs wrote a NIC Alternative Analysis Memo (NIC AOA Memo) in October 2020, which expressed alternative views on potential Chinese election influence activities. These alternative views met with considerable organizational counter pressure, which we will address later in this report. ODNI has to ensure that alternative views are expressed, even when they differ from the majority. A healthy challenge culture in the IC can foster differences of analytic views and ensure that they are shared in intelligence products, consistent with IRTP A Section\n1017. In my discussions with him, DNI Ratcliffe agreed with the concerns expressed in the Alternative Analysis Memo, and was aware that most analysts did not hold that view. Not to include all intelligence would also be a violation of the IRTPA Analytic Standard D, to be\n\"Based on All Available Sources of Intelligence.\"\n(U) Ombudsmen from CIA, NSA, and ODNI report the widely shared perspective among IC\nanalysts that analysis on foreign election interference was delayed, distorted, or obstructed out of concern over policymaker reactions or for political reasons, which in their view constitutes\n\n                                       1 r\n                                      (\n                           L, d s rr'l\n                      I l\nc I Y t i c C /\" 6 I\n\npoliticization. These Ombudsmen agree, whether through application of highly stringent coordination and review practices or deliberate temporizing, there is a discernible pattern of delay on IC analytic production on election threat reporting. There is an inherent danger in even the perception that intelligence products were changed for political purposes. The perception of politicization undermined analysts' willingness to come forward with alternatives. This is a violation ofTradecraft Standard 4 and IRTPA Section 1017.\n\nU [  Ombudsman Comment: Classified details on this iSSLte can be provided at the request 01 the\n(\n]\n.\n\ncommittee\n\n## U) Undue Influence On Analysis, Production, And Dissemination (\n\n, in the August NICA\nU There were strong efforts to suppress analysis of alternatives (AOA\n(\nand associated IC products, which is a violation of Tradecraft Standard 4 and IRTPA Section\n1017. NIC officials reported that CIA officials rejected NIC coordination comments and tried to\n.\n\ndownplay analysis of alternatives in their own production during the drafting of the NICA\nAccording to NIOs and Directors, CIA management contacted the A1NIC Chair and NIOs to suppress the NIC from caveating analytic judgments that were downplayed due to concerns about policy. As a result, these NIC officials felt the only avenue to express alternative views was via the NIC AOA Memo they authored in October 2020. During the drafting of the NIC\nAOA Memo, CIA management again contacted the A1NIC Chair and other NIOs on joint duty assignment from CIA (who would eventually have to return to their home agency pressuring , them to withdraw their support of the NIC AOA Memo in an attempt to suppress it. This was seen by NIOs as politicization from below, just as the AlDNI's push to bring forward evidence of what the Chinese are or were doing without apparently being supported by intelligence\n.\n\navailable to all analysts \"must be politicization from above,\" according to an ODNI official Politicization may be in the eye of the beholder, but my objective and independent view is that\n.\n\nthere was politicization from above and below\n.\n\nU The NIOs and Directors faced opposition getting their views on election interference across\n(\nIt is difficult to have a healthy analytic conversation in a confrontational environment. ODNI and the IC agencies involved in analysis of election interference at first failed in allowing for a challenge culture where analysis of alternatives is required and dissents are encouraged as\n, healthy analytic tradecraft. Such actions amount to exercise, or at least the attempt to exercise undue influence on intelligence, which is a violation of Tradecraft Standard 4. ODNI and the NIC did, to their credit, ensure that the analysis of alternatives piece and other related\n.\n\nintelligence was published\n\n U [  Ombudsman Comment: Classified details on this issue can be provided at the request 01 the\n(\n         ]\n        .\ncommittee\n\n## U) Tradecraft Review (\n\nU Pursuant to your letter, 1 asked for products produced between January and October 2020 to\n(\nbe evaluated for compliance with Analytic Tradecraft Standards by the ODNI's Analytic in exactly the same manner as any other product would\nIntegrity and Standards Division (AIS\nbe evaluated pursuant to IRTPA Section 1019. We found no evidence of lack of objectivity or politicization of intelligence. Indications of politicization would come out in the inquiry focused on the editing, review, and coordination behind the scenes of the final products.\n\n## U **Historical Context**  (\n\nU Recent history gives an example of how politicization of intelligence can undermine the\n(\nintelligence analysis process. Politicization of election security intelligence this year echoes the events surrounding the writing of Secretary of State Colin Powell's UN Speech to make the case to go to war with Iraq in 2003. In this historic example, politicians and political appointees had also made up their mind about an issue and spent considerable time pressuring analysts and\n.\n\nmanagers to prove their thesis to the American public, with little regard for analytic tradecraft U The difference this time - with the accusations of politicization of intelligence in 2020 -- is\n(\nthat analysts remember what happened in 2003. Intelligence based on bias and subjected to undue influence led to a war. In this case, analysts have reacted strongly to what they see as history repeating itself. Analysts may have lost their own objectivity because they felt they had to fight to ensure the intelligence information they provided was not misconstrued, misused, or ignored. Analysts should not be put in this position. The DNI and other ODNI senior officials must stay above the fray and protect the integrity, timeliness and objectivity of intelligence by fostering a challenge culture in which differences of analytic opinion are shared without organizational suppression or fear of retribution. The IC must produce objective intelligence and communicate it clearly to customers; however customers might use or mis-use it for policy\n.\n\npurposes with which analysts or IC leaders may or may not agree\n\n## U **Conclusion**  (\n\nLooking back over the past year, it is evident that what began as mischaracterization of IC u\n(\nanalytic assessments by ODNI officials escalated into an ongoing widespread perception in the workforce about politicization and loss of analytic objectivity throughout the community on the topics of Russian and Chinese election influence and interference. Politicization need not be overt to be felt. This report documents the reality of both attempts to politicize and perception of\n.\n\npoliticization of intelligence u No ODNI official has stated that reviews or edits of election threat intelligence were phrased\n(\n, in a way that was explicitly political in nature. Rather, from the ODNI leadership perspective officials were seeking a way to deliver intelligence in a way that the Trump Administration would consume it. Top ODNI officials faced enormous pressure to balance between IC\nassessments and customers' demands. This pressure filtered back down the chain and analysts perceived their work as being politicized, in contravention to the Analytic Standards for Objectivity and avoiding political considerations, in order to make intelligence more palatable to senior customers. Their response to the perceived - and sometimes real- attempts at\n, politicization reflected a loss of analytic objectivity. When analysts face perceived politicization they have recourse to report their concerns to the Ombudsman just as they have the obligation to continue to produce timely, accurate, objective intelligence with no regard for political\n.\n\nconsiderations\n\n                                                           )\n                                                   r C\n                                 d s r L l r\n8 I /), ! I L ! y t i c 0\n\n(U) If our politicalleaders in the White House and Congress believe we are withholding intelligence because of organizational turf wars or political considerations, the legitimacy of the Intelligence Community' s work is lost. Intelligence officers, even those at the highest levels, cannot allow political considerations to influence analysis, and must stand as a bulwark against all political pressures, even if the cost is that senior customers do not like what the intelligence community assesses. As PE Neil Wiley has stated (and I paraphrase), intelligence is the only greatjunction oj state that does not come to top decision makers with an agenda, wanting something. The purpose oj il1telligence is to provide objective, Ltnbiased, and policy-neutral assessments. We are, perhaps, most important to decision makers when we bring to them the bad news, or what they don 't want to hear. This is an ethical c/1allenge to intelligence projessionals, and sometimes deman.ds moral courage to carry out. Other institutions are inherently poiitical and are much less likely to bring bad news. /jwe lose that objectivity, or even are perceived to have lost it, we have endangered the entire reasonjor us to exist.\n\n(U) Finally, IC officials, whether politically appointed or not, must not make statements that, implied or directly attributed, communicate the IC's analytic views when they are in fact not representative of the IC's analytic line of argument. There must be a clear distinction between the actual intelligence, the IC' s analytic assessments and judgments, and personal or political opinions. DNI Ratcliffe pointed out that \"objectivity needs to be on both sides of the debate.\n\nWhen senior leaders ask questions about analytic products that does not mean that is politicization.\" The IC needs to foster a stronger challenge culture to allow for alternative views and \"make the IC better at what it does.\"\n(U) This report has plesented the findings of my independent Ombudsman review, in response to your letter. I have appended a set of recommendations at Annex 1, based on those findings, pursuant to my authority under IRTPA Section 1020, which I have given to ODNI management to take for action. I have provided definitions in Annex II and a scope note in Annex 111.\n\n## Annexi (U) Recommendations\n\n(U) ODNI recognizes the analytic tradecraft deficiencies related to intelligence products on election interference. These recommendations have been accepted by the DNI, and ODNI is already taking steps and is prepared to take further steps to remedy the process, communication, and education failures that led to this ombudsman complaint.\n\n-\n(U) Reinforce through direct leadership communications from ODNI to the workforce as a\nwhole, and from agency heads to all IC agencie,s the importance of protecting analytic\nintegrity and a renewed commitment to analytic objectivity and avoiding politicization in\nboth policy and practice. Reinforce adherence to analytic tradecraft as spelled out in IRTPA\nSection 1019.\n-\n(U) This issue has created across the workforce, in several agencies, skepticism and rnistrust\namong analysts and line managers directed at agency and IC leaders. Take steps to rebuild\ntrust through more direct leadership communication and transparency. When departing from\nestablished practices, ensure consjstency in decision making that adheres to established\nanalytic tradecraft standards, best practices, and guidelines for production and dissemination\non this topic. Avoid verbal instructions, such as, \"ODNI says to do it this way.\" Adhere to\nclear and defensible written instructions, and provide timely, direct, and specific feedback.\nHelp the analytic workforce understand the balance between discretion required for this topic\nand the need to warn. Ensure that these guidelines and practices are written, widely\ndisseminated, and understood. Analysts may assume that changes must be politically\nmotivated. Better leadership communications will clarify when changes are being made NOT\nfor political or policy reasons.\n-\n(U) Foster a collaboration culture across the IC analytic community that expressly supports\nanalyses of alternatives and encourages dissent when appropriate as required in IRTPA,\nSection 1017. Publish a memo to IC and ODNI senior leaders, managers, and analysts\nreminding them that when fundamental disagreements to analytic judgments exist across\nagencies or analytic units, the solution is to write a product that clearly articulates those\ndisagreements, to include dissenting language and analysis of alternatives. Backchannel\nintimidation tactics between analysts, managers, and/or senior leadership to suppress\ndissenting views must be expressly forbidden.\n-\n(U) Use the Analytic Ombudsman to sponsor dialogues between analytic elements and\nleadership where needed to facilitate direct communication and transparency. The\nOmbudsman's statutory role in IRTPA Section 1020 is to help resolve differences before\nthey become problems.\n-\n(U) Mandate analyst exchanges between regional election security units within agencies\n(e.g., Russian election security analysts spend time working with China election security\nanalysts and vice versa) in order to facilitate the exchange of methodologies and analytic\npractice with the aim of providing more consistent analytic definitions across topics at the\nstrategic level. These analytic exchanges can clarify what has been seen as inconsistent\napplication of definitions and analytic models.\n-\n(U) Redouble analytic objectivity and tradecraft standards training efforts for three customer\ncategories: new analyst training, refresher training for managers and analysts, and executivelevel training. 1) Analysis **101** was once mandatory, but agencies resisted in favor of their\nown training. Clearly, the training going on now has been insufficient to inculcate good\ntradecraft -leading to this issue. This course already exists, and is overseen by the Analytic\nOmbudsman; 2) require an analytic standards and objectivity course prerequisite as part of\ncompleting the IC Advanced Analyst Program (ICAAP). Such a requirement will provide inservice training on analytic standards for senior analyst and managers of analysts, to better\nenable them to recognize and mitigate problems with objectivity and politicization. Courses\nalready exist, that j ust have to be recognized within and overseen by ICAAP; 3) Provide for\none expert on analytic tradecraft and objectivity to create and oversee an executive training\ncourse on analytic objectivity and tradecraft standards.\n-\n(U) Hold IC agencies to account for improving tradecraft issues found by ODNI' s\nassessments of analytic tladecraft conducted by AIS - and where possible by agencies own\ntradecraft evaluation effoltS. ODNI will work through the National Intelligence Analysis\nBoard (NIAB) to improve analytic tradecraft across the IC.\n\n## Annexii: U) Definitions: What We Mean When We Say (\n\nU Mandated by Section 1019 of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act\n(\nIRTPA the IC Analytic Standards guide analytic production, speak directly to the integrity of ,\n(\nthe analytic *process* that lies behind the disseminated analytic product, and to the *value* of that product to the consumer. Below are Intelligence Community Directive 203 definitions of these\n.\n\nterms; my comments add context for this case\n\nU Objective: Analysts must perform their functions with objectivity and with\n( a\nawareness of their own assumptions and reasoning. They must employ reasoning\ntechniques and practical mechanisms that reveal and mitigate bias. Analysts should be\nalert to influence by existing analytic positions or judgments and must consider\nalternative perspectives and contrary information. Analysis should not be unduly\nconstrained by previous judgments when new developments indicate a modification is\nnecessary. Ombudsman Comment: In this letter 1 rejer to this standard and violations\n.\nthereoj in terms oj analytic objectivity and bias\nU) Bias: According to the late Dick Heuer in Psychology of Intelligence\n(\n-\nAnalysis, bias in intelligence is a fundamentallimitation of human mental\nprocesses. These limitations cause people to employ various simplifying strategies\nand rules of thumb to ease the burden of mentally processing information to make\njudgments and decisions. In ordinary life, these simple rules of thumb are often\n,\nuseful in helping us deal with complexity and ambiguity. In intelligence analysis\nhowever, bias lead to predictably faulty analytic judgments and the inability to\n.\nprovide objective analysis to consumers of intelligence\nU) Independent of political consideration: Analytic assessments must not be distorted\n( b\n.\nby, nor shaped for, advocacy of a particular audience, agenda, or policy viewpoint\nAnalytic judgments must not be influenced by the force of preference for a particular\npolicy. Ombudsman Comment: In this letter 1 rejer to this standard and violations thereoj\n.\nin terms oj politicization and distortion\nU) Timely: Analysis must be disseminated in time for it to be actionable by customers .\n( c\nAnalytic elements have the responsibility to be continually aware of events of\nintelligence interest, of customer activities and schedules, and of intelligence\n.\nrequirements and priorities, in order to provide useful analysis at the right time\nOmbudsman Comment: In this letter 1 rejer to this standard and violations thereoj in\n.\nterms oj excessively delayed review times\nU Based on all available sources of intelligence information: Analysis should be\n( d\ninformed by all relevant information available. Analytic elements should identify and\naddress critical information gaps and work with collection activities and data providers to\ndevelop access and collection strategies. Ombudsman Comment: In this letter 1 rejer to\n.\nthis standard and violations thereoj in terms oj analytic tradecrajt\nU) Implements and Exhibits Analytic Tradecraft Standards: The nine standards as\n( e\n-\nfurther spelled out in ICD 203, are\n)\n,  J s r, i ( r\nl, L\nV l i ( C r\n! 11 .,' 1 , 12 I\n1. Properly Describes the Quality and Credibility of Underlying Sources, Data, and\nMethodologies\n2. Properly Expl'esses and Explains Uncertainties Associated With Major Analytic\nJudgments\n3. Propel'ly Distinguishes Between Underlying Intelligence Information and\nAnalysts' Assumptions and Judgments\n4. Incorporates Analysis of Alternatives\n5. Demonstrates Customer Relevance and Addresses Ilnplications\n6. Uses Clear and Logical Argumentation\n7. Explains Change to or Consistency of Analytic Judgments\n8. Makes Accurate Judgments and Assessments\n9. Incorporates Effective Visual Information Where Appropriate\n\n## Annexiii (U) Scope Note\n\n(U) 1 completed a comprehensive review and ascertained accusations and documentation of attempts to alter a range of analytic products for reasons that do not follow good tradecraft. Prior to receipt of the letter, 1 already had begun a review based on perceived problems with politicization and violations of analytic tradecraft that were brought to my attention by Ombudsmen in three IC agencies.\n\n(U) While Ombudsmen from other agencies do not report to me in my statutory role as ODNI\nOmbudsman, several of us met and conferred on these complaints and agree that aspects of these concerns fall within the IC definition of politicization. The concerns conveyed to us represent widely held views among IC officers engaged on the election threat issue and point to broadly perceived, and probably some actual instances of, politicized intelligence relating to foreign interference in US elections.\n\n(U) 1 conducted listening sessions with the analysts and managers from CIA, NSA, other agencies, NIC, PDB, and ODNI leadership to obtain information surrounding the complaints filed. Some interview subjects requested anonymity, which 1 granted, as a condition for their sharing documentation or comments. Others asked to be identified. 1 also conducted confidential interviews with a number of senior IC leaders connected with this issue. 1 have not interviewed individuals outside the IC."
    },
    {
        "text": "# A Sourcebook On The Tacksman I And Tacksman Ii Elint Bases In Iran Version Of 2022-01-16\n\nAdditional information would be welcome Please send it to thomsona@flash.net News code: 179 Date: 2011/07/05 Time: 18 : 15 CIA in Iran Eavesdropping and surveillance bases in Iran 1334-1357 AH , 1955-1978 AD [EXCERPT] The most important espionage bases of CIA in north of Iran were located in Safi Abad of Behshahr, Kabkan of Khorasan and Pars Abad of Moghan which was equipped with the most advanced spy equipments and information systems of that time.  Hashem Berenjian the lieutenant general, who was tried ( in a court ) after revolution, has said in regard of espionage bases of CIA in Safi Abad of Behshahr and other spy bases of CIA in northern parts of Iran as follows :\nSince getting the right intelligence database of Behshahr and Kabkan after a few years, in that year air force commander came to me and said, Shah (king) has handed his private garden in Safi Abad of Behshahr to the CIA. He called his head of personnel, informed him about this situation and said: as they do their job, air force introduces about 250 students to them yearly, and I will send my reliable officers to protect them in Behshahr. I have done my affairs by sending workers, personnel, services or protective issues during this period. However, they had done their own affairs related to their king and definitely they had got king's permission, because the land of the base (station ) was private property of king and did not have to do with air force and no officer had gone there against air counterintelligence . Whenever it was necessary, one civilian came and talked about the need of bases with me then I reflected it to authorities in different positions, then they left. These civilians were being changed every two or three years and I was just an intermediary between command of air force and these stations and I had no direct relation with Americans, besides there were no advisors next to me for consulting. Therefore, my relation with them was this, and no more. But what is certain is that Americans in Behshahr and Kabkan had such huge databases where could be seen from twelve miles. It is natural that these types of getting information were not related to inside , and every professional knew it.\n\nGrounds of the Safi Abad Palace Behshahr, Iran\n36.685 N, 53.528 E\n\n# Project: Melody ~1960\n\n* First noticed at Cape Canaveral\n- The signals from one of our ground\nradars bounced off a Thor missile on\na test launch\n- Was received by a second radar\nHmm...\n Bistatic intercept receiver\n------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------\n\nMelody\n        The 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) treaty between the United\nStates and the Soviet Union prohibited the development and testing of ABM\nsystems.\n       Soon after the treaty was ratified, the U.S. detected Soviet cheating via\n          a highly classified feature of Project Melody that intercepted Soviet\nmissile tracking radar signals [10]. During subsequent negotiations in Geneva,\nthen Secretary of State Henry Kissinger confronted his Soviet counterpart with\n\nthe dates and times that the Soviets had cheated on the treaty. The cheating\nstopped and the Soviets began a \"mole hunt\" for the spy who gave the infor-\nmation to the United States.\n                                        America got its way without compromising its\nMelody sensors.\n\n[10]\nE. Poteat, The use and abuse of intelligence: An intelligence provider's\nperspective, Diplomacy and Statecraft, vol. 11(2), pp. 1-16, 2000.\nEngineering in the CIA: ELINT, Stealth, and Beginnings of Information Warfare by S. Eugene Poteat, South Carolina Gamma '57 [EXCERPTS] The Oxcart mission planners were especially concerned about just how widespread the Soviet's earlywarning radar was and where itwas located. It seemed impossible, however, to determine the number, exact location, or any other technical information on those installations. I recalled a story from my Cape Canaveral days in the early 1950s, when the signal from a ground-based radar located nearly a thousand miles beyond our horizon was picked up at the Cape - the signal was reflected off a Thor missile during a test flight. The suggestion was then made that this same phenomenon (later called bistatic intercept) could be used to intercept Soviet high-powered radar located well over the horizon by pointing the ELINT antennas at the Soviet ballistic missiles during their flight testing, by using the missile's radio beacon for pointing, or simply programming the ELINT antennas to follow the missile's predicted trajectory. The idea to gain greater knowledge of Soviet air defense capabilities through bi-static interception was approved by CIA management, and project Melody was born. There were no computers in those days, so our feasibility studies and engineering calculations involved solving spherical trigonometry equations using slide rules, tables of logarithms, and hand-cranked calculators. Melody was installed at a CIA monitoring site on the shores of the Caspian Sea in northern Iran. Over the ensuing years, Melody produced bi-static intercepts of virtually all the ground-based Soviet missile tracking radar, including all their anti-ballistic missile tracking sites located at a test range nearly a thousand miles away. The fixed location of Melody and limited trajectories of the Soviet missiles being tracked, however, still did not provide the locations of all the air defense radar installations throughout the Soviet Union that were needed by the Oxcart mission planners. A new Soviet early-warning radar, called the Tall King, began to appear about this time, which if deployed widely, appeared to improve significantly the Soviets' air defenses. The new, very large, and obviously powerful Tall King radar quickly became the Oxcart's nemesis. Melody's success with the high-powered, missile-related radar led to the idea of using the moon as a distant bi-static reflector to intercept and locate the Tall King radar systems deployed in the Soviet Union. This article is based on an article by S.E. Poteat, 'Stealth, ELINT, 1960-75: Some Beginnings of Information Warfare, Studies in Intelligence, Vol. 42, No.1, 1998. The volume is SECRET. Ref. article has, however, been recently declassified.\n\nhttp://www.panoramio.com/photo/52206805\n\n## Safiabad Palace From The Rear\n\nComments (18) [Accessed 2011-09-18] [EDITED] Eric77584, on July 30, 2008, said: As a child in the 1970's I spent several years living at Safiabad Air Force Base. Most of the base in the satellite photos seems to be pretty much the same as I remember and seems to be maintained. Does anyone know what the base is used for today? ******** kim77573, on April 30, 2009, said: As a child, I also lived at Safiabad from '70-'72. We probably know each other. These photos really bring back memories. Would love to talk to anyone else who lived there. ******** stanky, on May 29, 2009, said: I lived there from 64-67. It was CIA. Iranian Air Force were trained there in electronics. After school we would sneak past the barbed wire and have adventures. ******** Eric77584, on September 24, 2009, said: Interesting conversation that has been started by this pictures. I haven't been back to this site since I posted the original comment. I was on base from '70-'72 as well. I was 8-10 years old at the time. I lived above the BOQ on the road that went to the T-site. House #9, I think. ******** IOR-, on October 18, 2009, said: Probably we lived in the next to last home just before the T-site. Those were two home units and the cadet instructor and his wife, a school teacher, lived in the unit just before T-site. We kept in contact for many years after leaving the place, through children etc. It sounds like you lived in one of the two houses above the first VOQ. ******** legreer102, on October 13, 2010, said: I was there from 76 till the people were evaced out in 79. I lived in the first single person house. Also was the Bendix people.\n\nhttp://www.panoramio.com/photo/7956911\nhttp://www.panoramio.com/photo/8686133\n10-70 Safiabad from Ridge [Presumably 10-70 means October, 1970]\nhttp://www.panoramio.com/photo/7956800\n\n## Safiabad Palace And Support Buildings\n\nhttp://www.panoramio.com/photo/8685664 http://www.panoramio.com/photo/8685664\nNote that the buildings are single-floor and behind a ridge that conceals them from the surrounding plain.\n\nhttp://my.opera.com/Iorwearth/albums/showpic.dml?album=470141&picture=6504991\nhttp://my.opera.com/Iorwearth/albums/showpic.dml?album=470141&picture=12503730\nhttp://www.panoramio.com/photo/7956783\n\nNear Kabkan/Kapkan, Iran\n37.295 N, 58.915 E\nGoogle Maps photo [Accessed 2019-07-20]\nhttps://www.nytimes.com/1979/03/03/archives/excia-aide-tells-of-life-at-iran-listening-postcatandmouse-game.html\n\n## ExCia. Aide Tells Of Life At Iran Listening Post By Hedrick Smith New York Times March 3, 1979\n\nWASHINGTON, March 2 - \"It was like an operation from the 21st century and it was so ironic,\" recalled Philip J. McCabe, a selfstyled former intelligence analyst who now runs a resort in Maine. \"Here we were out in the wilderness, living among nomads who were mostly living in the 18th and 19th century, and we had this supersophisticated electronic surveillance base.\" He was describing the incongruities of Kabkan, the remote American intelligence outpost overlooking the Soviet frontier, straining with its advanced Buck Rogers surveillance antennas for electronic signals from Soviet missile tests at Tyuratam, 650 miles to the northeast. Mr. McCabe, a 31yearold former Air Force sergeant, called The New York Times and offered information about his tour at Kabkan in 1973 and 1974. He drew a picture of a remote region, with roads cut sharply into the sides of mountains. The listening post was perched at 6,500 feet, overlooking what he called \"the open Russian frontier - I mean there were nomads who used to wander back and forth across the border with the seasons.\" \"This was a supersophisticated base,\" he said, \"but it was vulnerable because we were so close to the Russian border. In fact, we csed to be buzzed sometimes by Soviet aircraft. The Russians used to get permission from the Iranian Government to do flyovers when they had military maneuvers up there off the Indian Ocean. They would fly over our base by a few hundred feet and take photographs.\"\n\n## CatAndMouse Game\n\nIn a telephone interview, Mr. McCabe gave a picture of the catandmouse game being played by the Russians and Americans in the remote Iranian mountains. \"They were interested in our equipment, in our antennas, because we were always getting new experimental antennas and other equipment,\" he said. \"From the size and shape of our antennas they could figure out what we were looking for and what frequencies we were monitoring.\" Once the Russians worked out the American capabilities and intentions, he said, \"they would take various means to try to fool us, trick us, and try to stop us from acquiring information on their missile development.\" Mr. McCabe said he had been recruited by the Central Intelligence Agency its two bases in Iran because he had me a specialist on monitoring Soviet rocket experiments while serving as an Air Force sergeant at the American listening Post in Peshawar, Pakistan.\n\n## First Sent To Benshahr\n\nAfter joining the agency in 1971, Mr. McCabe said, he was sent to the C.I.A. facility at Behshahr, on the Caspian Sea, which he described as being within commuting distance of Teheran. He said it was a larger facility than Kabkan, where about 15 to 18 Americans, with Iranians as clerks, cooks, technicians and guards, manned an electronic outpost on a mountain perch. Another three or four would be resting in a valley base that had a swimming pool, tennis court and a private airstrip. \"We would go down there for a few days to relax,\" he recalled. \"Twice a week an American plane would come up from Teheran and bring us food and our supplies. Morale was good, the compensation was good. The plane would take our data. But when there was a special event, one of us would courier it. One of us would take the data immediately to the United States so it would be there within 29 hours.\" Although he was paid $27,000 a year plus an ample expense allowance whenever he traveled, Mr.McCabe said that he resigned from the C.I.A. in November, 1979, after three years in the two Iranian listening posts. lie returned to Maine to get a master's degree in business administration. Two years ago he bought his own resort, The Moorings, at Pine Point outside of Portland. \"I was shocked when I saw all the business about Kabkan on TV last night,\" he said. \"I was shocked to see it identified as a C.I.A. facility because it could be dangerous if any of those Americans was still there. You're sure they are all out?\" Mr. McCabe had been hesitant to speak until he was assured that the Government said all 22 technicians from the outpost had left Iran. https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1979/05/20/irans-airmen-keep-us-listening-postsintact-and-whirring/ Iran's Airmen Keep U.S. Listening Posts Intact and Whirring By William Branigin The Washington Post May 20, 1979 A secret American monitoring post abandoned Jan. 31 by Central Intelligence Agency technicians, is still in working order and is being kept that way by Iranian Air Force personnel who show signs of pro- American, anticommunist sentiments. The Iranian airmen are under orders to maintain the facility just the way the Americans left it until the two governments decide what to do with it. So far no decision appears imminent. Authorities say there have been no negotiations on either removing the post's sophisticated equipment or letting the Americans back in to resume running it. The latter prospect, they say, appears highly unlikely. No U.S. officials have been to the Behshahr station, which overlooks this town near Iran's Caspian Sea coast, or to a similar post on a remote mountaintop near Kabkan in north-eastern Iran since the posts were evacuated in the turmoil of the Iranian revolution. American technicians who were evacuated in late February from the Kabkan post after having been held captive by revolutionaries said the facility was vital for verification of Soviet compliance with the strategic arms limitations treaty. After the stations were abandoned, U.S. officials also expressed concern that sensitive equipment and materials might fall into the wrong hands and be passed on to the Soviets. A visit to the Behshar post Thursday by two American correspondents showed security to be rather weak. The post's 30-foot-high white radar dome and nearby radio monitoring and relay towers were found to be intact. Big air-conditioning units were still keeping the dome climate-controlled, and the steady whir of machinery indicated that the equipment behind the structure's locked doors was still functioning. \"We haven't done anything with these devices,\" said Sotvan Javaheri, a shy, 23 year-old second lieutenant who is in charge of the facility. \"Anytime you come here you will see that everything works, even the lights.\" The equipment runs on Behshahr electricity, but generators are designed to cut in automatically if the power fails. Javaheri said his men were keeping the generators topped with fuel oil. \"We don't have any orders from the U.S. government,\" Lt. Javaheri said. \"But the [Iranian] Air Force has told us to keep everything working until the Americans tell us what we should do with it.\" He said townspeople, long barred from the site when it was run by Americans under the government of the deposed shah, could come and see the dome on visiting days. \"But nobody can go inside it.\" Javaheri said he was the only one at the post who knows the combination for a lock consisting of five black buttons on the facility's steel double doors. Nor is anyone else allowed inside a windowless operations bunker built into the hilltop just below the white bubble, which sits on the grassy surface like a huge golf ball. The whirring and purring of electronic equipment inside the facility has raised speculation that it may be continuing to transmit data on Soviet missile tests and military communications back to the United States via satellite. A knowledgeable foreign source today dismissed this idea, however, saying technicians were needed to run the Behshahr post and similar facilities. Javaheri, who received some training in the United States, was reluctant to describe his ventures inside the dome. He explained in English that it was dark and he didn't see much. Then, in an aside to a companion, he said in Persian, \"I don't want to get in trouble with the CIA.\" Most of the visitors to the hilltop compound are mainly interested in seeing a 16th century palace on its grounds which commands an excellent view of the town below and the Caspian coast about nine miles to the north. The palace, once the summer residence of the Savafid dynasty monarch, Shah Abas, was formerly the headquarters of the monitoring post, which was established 20 years ago. A radar dome still sits in front of the palace, plainly visible from the highway linking Behshahr with other Caspian coastal towns. \"After the revolution people were curious to see the palace,\" Javaheri said. \"For them it is a historical place. Most people don't have the education for taking much interest in the dome. They just say, 'ooh, look at the big ball.\" Javaheri said he had received six months of training as a \"missile minder,\" or officer who commands a missile silo, at U.S. bases at Van Nuys, Calif., and San Antonio, Tex. \"I like American people,\" he said. \"No Russians have been here,\" Javaheri said. \"We wouldn't let them come in.\" Despite his assurances, it seemed debatable whether the guards would be able to tell the difference between Soviet agents and other visitors who wanted to tour the facility. In any case, according to an informed source, a spy could not hope to learn much from such a visit. The source tended to dismiss the value of any intelligence that could be gleaned even by entering the radar dome or its command bunker. All the top-secret cryptographic gear at the facility has been \"taken care of,\" he said. It was unclear, however, what, if any classified technical manuals or other documents remained at the site. According to a reporter who visited the Behshahr installation immediately revolution, the place bore the look of a \"latter-day Pompei.\" Clothes and personal effects were abandoned in the Americans' homes, indicating a hasty departure that might not have afforded enough time to destroy sensitive materials. Beside the radar dome were six metal barrels marked \"document destroyer drum type without igniters\" - all of them unused. Lt. Javaheri said he is careful about who comes into the compound. He said he keeps it under th control of the approximately 50 airmen under his command and only allows militiamen from the local revolutionary committee to man a checkpoint at the entrance to a nearby access road. He indicated that he distrusted the committee gunmen, hinting that he was unsure of their loyalties and that they could be Communists. Besides, he said, they were inexperienced in handling their weapons and not as reliable generally as his own men. People can come on Mondays but we don't let just anybody in because some Iranians are Communists and they shouldn't come here,\" Javaheri sai although it was unclear how visitors were screened for political persuasions. At night the dome is guarded by two airmen armed with Iranian-made G-3 automatic rifles. Armed airmen also guard the compound's main entrance gate, and a lone sentry is positioned halfway down the access road. His sentry box is linked to the base by telephone. The Lieutenant said he had taken it upon himself to have the personal belongings of the departed Americans packed in containers ready for shipment back to the United States whenever he gets the word to send them. Asked if he thought the Americans could return to the post, he said, \"I don't know. It's not in my hands.\" Given the present political climate in Iran and the anti-American sentiment of the followers of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, authorities say there is virtually no chance that such stations can be reopened under the Islamic republic. Most of the 32 brick bungalows that once belonged to the resident American personnel have been sealed, but station employes still trim the lawns every once in awhile. Except for the palace on a rise overlooking the entrance and the white radar dome visible behind a stand of trees a few hundred yards away, the post resembles an American suburb. American cars are very much in evidence and there are road signs in English. A reminder that this is an illusion comes at twilight with the wail of a muezzin, or Moslem prayer caller, rising up clearly from the town below. And meanwhile, the white dome, now illuminated around its base by floodlights, drones on - unattended.\n\n## Developments Post-1979\n\nSatellite photography available as of the date of this writing indicates that Iran has  maintained the TACKSMAN facilities and has been active at TACKSMAN I since at least 2006. A hilltop adjacent to the TACKSMAN II base underwent leveling in 2019 in a pattern suggesting it was being prepared for a large antenna or, possibly, an optical telescope.\n\nSummary: In the period subsequent to 2004, three 8-meter steerable dish antennas were installed at a site centered at 36.6841 N, 53.5277 E. Available imagery shows two 8-meter antennas at the site in 2004 - their date of installation is unknown. Subsequently, the  antennas were seen pointing at different azimuths ranging from east to southwest. Association with satellites in geosynchronous orbit seems likely, but confirmation awaits further analysis. The following images show the appearance of the antenna field over time and the changing pointing azimuths of the antennas. For reference the individual antennas are given the arbitrary designations NW, NE, C, SW and SE:\n\nSummary Table of Pointing Azimuths\nDate\nNW\nNE\nC\nSW\nSE\n2004-08-30\n198\n196\nAbsent\nAbsent(?)\nAbsent\n2006-09-28\nVertical?\n210\n180 (Horizontal?)\nAbsent(?)\nAbsent\n2013-10-16\n141\n147\n120\n277(?)\n137\n2015-05-29\n233\n201\n128\n223\n172\n2016-06-19\n222\n191\n158\n216\n156\n2018-09-12\n225\n205(?)\n180\n267\n158\n2019-03-09\n243\n219\n192\n263\n190\n2020-07-16\n233\n204\n163\n204\n210\n2021-07-20\n238\n205\n213\n204\n209\n\nNote: NW and NE are present in the earliest available satellite imagery of August 2004 but absent in ground-level photography of the early 1970s (see above).\n\n| Date       |   NW |   NE | C      | SW        | SE     |\n|------------|------|------|--------|-----------|--------|\n| 2004-08-30 |  198 |  196 | Absent | Absent(?) | Absent | | Date       |   NW |   NE |   C | SW     |   SE |\n|------------|------|------|-----|--------|------|\n| 2013-10-16 |  141 |  147 | 120 | 277(?) |  137 | | Date       |   NW |   NE |   C |   SW |   SE |\n|------------|------|------|-----|------|------|\n| 2015-05-29 |  233 |  201 | 128 |  223 |  172 | | Date       |   NW |   NE |   C |   SW |   SE |\n|------------|------|------|-----|------|------|\n| 2016-06-19 |  222 |  191 | 158 |  216 |  156 | | Date       |   NW | NE     |   C |   SW |   SE |\n|------------|------|--------|-----|------|------|\n| 2018-09-12 |  225 | 205(?) | 180 |  267 |  158 | | Date       |   NW |   NE |   C |   SW |   SE |\n|------------|------|------|-----|------|------|\n| 2019-03-09 |  243 |  219 | 192 |  263 |  190 | | Date       |   NW |   NE |   C |   SW |   SE |\n|------------|------|------|-----|------|------|\n| 2020-07-16 |  233 |  204 | 163 |  204 |  210 | | Date       |   NW |   NE |   C |   SW |   SE |\n|------------|------|------|-----|------|------|\n| 2021-07-20 |  238 |  205 | 213 |  204 |  209 |\n\nSite on 2021-09-09. No progress since 2019-08-20 is obvious.\n\n## Additional\n\nFrom the Shadows by Robert M Gates https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB506/docs/ciasignals_32.pdf"
    },
    {
        "text": "## Russian Private Military Companies\n\nAPRIL 2020\nTheir use and how to consider them in operations, competition, and conflict DISCLAIMER: The information contained herein is not current U.S. doctrine or policy and is not meant to supersede doctrine, commander's guidance or established unit standard operating procedures. Examine and use the information in light of your mission, the operational environment, the Law of Armed Conflict and other situational factors. This document does not constitute the provision of additional information or the approval of additional information upon request.\n\n## Distribution Statement A: Approved For Public Release; Distribution Unlimited. Contents\n\nFOREWORD ........ VII EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ........IX\nKey Findings  ........ ix Operational Challenges and Considerations Presented by Russian PMCs ........ x\nINTRODUCTION ........ 1\nDefinitional Note ........ 3 Data Limitations, Gaps, and Scoping ........ 4\nRUSSIAN PMCS: THEIR ORIGINS AND USE ........ 7\nBackground and Origins ........ 8 Uses ........12 Equipment, Training, and Personnel ........15 Coordination with the Russian Federation and Others........ 17 Legal Enablers and Parameters ........18\nANALYTICAL MODEL ........23\nThe Conflict Continuum and ROMO ........ 24 Four Thought Experiments ........ 25 Permissiveness/State Involvement Matrix ........ 26\nEXPERIMENT 1: SECURITY FORCE ASSISTANCE ........ 29\nStep One: Describe Type of Operation ........ 29 Step Two: Evaluate Using Matrix ........ 32 Step Three: Identify Insights ........ 35\nEXPERIMENT 2: NONCOMBATANT EVACUATION OPERATION ..... 37\nStep One: Describe Type of Operation ........ 37 Step Two: Evaluate Using Matrix ........40 Step Three: Identify Insights ........43\n\n## Figures\n\nFigure 1. The Conflict Continuum........ 25 Figure 2. Sample Permissiveness/State Involvement Matrix ........ 27 Figure 3. Abbreviated Example of Model ........ 28 Figure 4. Phasing an Operation Based on Predominantly Military  ....... Activities ........ 52 Figure 5. Notional Balance of Offense, Defense, and Stability Activities ........53\n\n## Tables\n\nTable 1. The Uses of Russian PMCs ........ 13 Table 2: SFA Goals ........ 30 Table 3: SFA Tasks  ........ 31 Table 4: SFA Permissiveness/State Involvement Matrix Analysis ... 32 Table 5: NEO Permissiveness/State Involvement Matrix Analysis ..40 Table 6: PKO Permissiveness/State Involvement Matrix Analysis ... 47 Table 7: Large-Scale Combat Operations Permissiveness/State Involvement Matrix Analysis........54\n\n## Foreword\n\nFellow Professionals, The Asymmetric Warfare Group (AWG) serves as the United States Army's global scouts. We leverage direct observations of the operational environment, emerging threat capabilities, and friendly gaps to advise the operational force. Our observations inform doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leader development, personnel, facilities, and policy solutions. Since our establishment in 2006, part of our mission has been anticipating asymmetric threats and \"seeing over the next hilltop.\" One of the threats we see on the horizon is that posed by Private Military Companies (PMCs). PMCs are proliferating worldwide and play an increasingly important role in competition and conflict. Specifically, PMCs based in the Russian Federation have been active in Europe, the Middle East, and Africa. They are of increasing concern to commanders worldwide, from the tactical to the strategic level. After observing the growth of PMC activity, AWG requested the Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory conduct an in-depth study into available open sources of information on PMCs, and analyze differences between PMCs and conventional armed forces. The resulting report complements AWG's work observing threats in the operational environment, and is also extremely valuable for others who may have to counter PMCs in the future. As this report demonstrates, PMCs pose unique dilemmas, but they also have unique vulnerabilities due to their informal nature and ambiguous status as illegal armed forces. We are publicly releasing this report, which is based largely on academic and press sources, so that it is widely available to the force, our Allies, and our global partners. We hope this product proves valuable to you and broadens understanding of this important topic. Think.  Adapt.  Anticipate.\n\nCol. Scott A. Shaw Commander, Asymmetric Warfare Group Fort Meade, MD\n\n## Executive Summary\n\nThe Asymmetric Warfare Group (AWG) sponsored the Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory (JHU/APL) to analyze the phenomenon of Russian private military companies (PMCs), the scenarios under which they would matter to U.S. Army maneuver commanders, and whether they constitute a unique threat to U.S. and partner forces. The primary audience for this analysis is U.S. Army maneuver commanders and their staffs, but the findings and insights should also be useful for anyone in the U.S. national security and defense communities concerned with asymmetric operations of the Russian Federation around the world. First, this analysis presents *key findings* from deep-dive research and analysis on Russian PMCs presented in the appendix. It addresses their uses, equipment, training, personnel, state involvement, legal issues, and other related topics. Second, these findings are used to inform an analytical model to explore the *operational challenges and considerations* Russian PMCs could present to U.S. Army maneuver commanders.\n\n## Key Findings\n\nBottom Line Up Front:  Russian PMCs are used as a force multiplier to achieve objectives for both government and Russia-aligned private interests while minimizing both political and military costs. While Moscow continues to see the use of Russian PMCs as beneficial, their use also presents several vulnerabilities that present both operational and strategic risks to Russian Federation objectives. Friendly Regime Support: Russian lawmakers view Russian PMCs as an instrument to prop up friendly regimes under threat of collapse or ouster. Russian PMCs operate:\n\n-\nAlongside and embedded with friendly state militaries.\n-\nWith non-state armed groups in offensive combat operations.\nOffensive Role: While also used for support tasks more typical of military and security contractors, Russian PMCs have had a pronounced role in offensive combat operations.\n\nShifting Control: The command and control (C2) of Russian PMCs is not consistent in all operational contexts.\n\n-\nSometimes Russian PMCs fall under the C2 of the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) or Russian intelligence agencies.\n-\nAt other times, PMCs fall under the C2 of partner governments or aligned private interests.\nInconsistent Capabilities: The quality of personnel and materiel enabling Russian PMCs is inconsistent.  Russian PMC capabilities in personnel, training, and equipment appear to be greater when a PMC is closely aligned with state support from the Russian MoD. Informal by Design: Despite legislative efforts to legalize PMCs, Russian law continues to formally outlaw their creation and bars individuals from joining them under anti-mercenary laws. However, Russian leaders use this legal prohibition to strictly control some PMCs (e.g., the selective arrest of PMCs who might present domestic security or political risks), not to prevent PMCs from operating. Vulnerabilities: The use of Russian PMCs presents new operational and strategic risks to Moscow. Morale in Russian PMC units in high-risk missions appears delicate. Although their use provides political protection from the optics of high Russian MoD casualties, both Russian PMC casualties and their return home create novel political and domestic security risks. Their use also complicates internal regime politics in Moscow, creating competition between the MoD and private equities that can jeopardize operations (see the appendix: Syria). Finally, the ambiguity of operational control and decision making over Russian PMCs opens Moscow up to the risk of being held responsible by the international community for actions taken by Russian PMCs under the command of other interests.\n\n## Operational Challenges And Considerations Presented By Russian Pmcs\n\nBottom Line Up Front:  Russian PMCs do not pose a unique tactical threatother state and non-state actors are similarly capable. However:\n\n-\nPMCs can operate across the conflict continuum and present the United States with dilemmas at all levels of war.\n-\nChallenges Russian PMCs could pose in noncombatant evacuation operations (NEOs) and peacekeeping operations (PKOs) deserve careful consideration.\nMost Dangerous Scenario:  The most dangerous scenario involving a Russian PMC is one where a U.S. Army brigade could encounter a state-supported, battalion tactical group (BTG)-like entity with advanced weapons, cutting-edge enabler technologies, and expertise:\n\n-\nWith a high level of Russian state support, a Russian PMC in Syria was able to function as a quasi-BTG; it conducted basic combined arms operations with infantry, armor, and artillery.\n-\nWith the aid of Russian support and forces, separatists in eastern Ukraine conducted combined arms operations and was highly proficient at enabling integration, particularly information operations (IO), electronic warfare (EW), and unmanned aerial systems (UAS).\nMost Likely Scenarios:  Russian state-supported PMC operations aimed at disrupting U.S. operations during crisis response or limited contingency operations. PMCs might execute the following:\n\n-\nOccupy potential evacuation sites or other key terrain during a NEO.\n-\nAlly with local actors in PKO to provide weapons and training to groups opposed to U.S. actions.\n-\nProvide other forms of support, including intelligence and maintaining influence in a given area.\nOther Potential Scenarios:  Less severe scenarios exist where Russian PMCs could seek to compete with and undermine U.S. influence with local authorities and civilians.\n\n## Introduction\n\nI believe that such companies are a way of implementing national interests without the direct involvement of the state...Yes, I think we could consider this option.1\n- President-elect Vladimir Putin, 2012\nNo private military companies exist in our country by law. Everyone is talking about some private military company, something called Wagner... [The President cannot] comment on what does not exist.2\n- Kremlin Spokesman Dmitry Peskov, 2018\nThe increasingly assertive posture of the Russian Federation between 2007 and 2019 in Eastern Europe and beyond presented U.S. service members and maneuver commanders with unfamiliar challenges. After decades of training, equipping, and deploying to fight terrorism, the U.S. National Defense Strategy now presents \"the reemergence of long-term, strategic competition... by revisionist powers\" as the leading challenge of the new strategic environment3 and such competition with China and Russia as \"the principal priorities of the Department.\"4 Russia's revisionist strategy not only \"aims to weaken U.S. influence in the world and divide us from our allies and partners,\"5 but also to erode and ultimately destroy the \"resilient, but weakening, post-WWII international order.\"6 In its place, Russia seeks to establish an international order in which it exercises \"veto authority over nations on its periphery\"7 across an exclusive sphere of influence, so that Moscow might reassert itself as a great power in the twenty-first century.8 One of the many instruments of power Russia leveraged to pursue this revisionist strategy has been increasing use of Russian private military companies (PMCs) in military operations and other areas of strategic competition and conflict. Since the invasion and prolonged conflict in Ukraine, and the Russian intervention on behalf of the Assad regime in Syria, the Russian PMC has been a fast growing subject of analysis and open-source reporting around Russian operations. There is significant study and a growing literature on questions around Russian PMCs: the motivations behind and nature of their use; their equipment, training, and personnel; their relationship and coordination with the Russian Federation or other adversaries; their vulnerabilities; their legal enablers or parameters; and whether or not their use affords Russia significant advantages. However, what remains unaddressed in the literature is how these issues impact the work of U.S. Army maneuver commanders and service members. The goal of this analysis is to equip U.S. Army maneuver commanders and other service members pre-deployment with two things: First, a grounded understanding of Russian PMCswhat they are, how they tend to operate, how Russia has employed themand second, clarity on how U.S. forces could encounter them across the continuum of conflict and range of military operations (ROMO). One of the many reasons why Russia utilizes such groups is to undermine the ability of its adversaries to make clear and quick decisions through deception. In an interview with *The Inquiry* on BBC, Dr. Kimberly Martenprofessor of Political Science at Columbia Universitysaid Russian PMCs are:\nan element in an information warfare campaign where... credible people can say 'oh, it's so confusing; it's just a cloud; we can't possibly make any determination about anything,' and so we all just give up and go home... Putin's goal is to try to confuse things and leave... his opponents, including the U.S. military, unsure about how to react to what's going on because it's just very unclear who is who.9\nClarity is important because U.S. Army maneuver commanders do not have the luxury of observing Russian PMCs from afar as a compelling subject of study. If such actors are present in their area of responsibility (AOR), they must be knowledgeable and ready to make quick and consequential decisions about how to proceed. While not prescriptive in terms of providing courses of action (COAs) for any given scenario, this analysis offers a grounded discussion of Russian PMCs in the context of U.S. doctrine and examines the operational implications Russian PMCs might present to a maneuver commander in their AOR. The analysis presented here answers two questions: 1. How does Russia leverage Russian PMCs and 2. Does their use pose a unique threat to U.S. forces? To answer these questions, this analysis first explores the capabilities and operational impacts of Russian PMCs in contemporary areas of operation (AOs) (see the appendix) through a deep dive into how they were used, their equipment, training, personnel, coordination with the Russian Federation and other actors, vulnerabilities, and any legal enablers or parameters. Second, utilizing data in notional experimentswhere Russian PMCs are encountered with varying degrees of both permissiveness of the environment and level of Russian state involvementthe analysis demonstrates how Russian PMCs could challenge the performance of U.S. Army brigade operations and whether any significant challenges emerge.\n\n## Definitional Note\n\nThe Russian Federation and its predecessors used a wide variety of privatized force to achieve national military or domestic security objectives, all of which inform the contemporary use of Russian PMCs. These include foreign mercenaries during the Tsarist era, Cossack associations, \"volunteers,\" and private security companies (PSCs),a both at home and abroad. While this analysis exclusively concerns \"Russian PMCs,\" it recognizes that there is significant overlap between Russian PMCs and other forms of private forces used by the Russian Federation and will discuss these other elements as necessary to inform the discussion and analysis of Russian PMCs. Defining Russian PMCs is an ongoing debate in the growing literature on these organizations. Russian law recognizes PSCs, which primarily perform domestic civilian security tasks, but not PMCs, which remain technically illegal in Russia. Although the law prohibiting Russian PMCs specifically concerns \"mercenary activities,\" simply referring to them as \"mercenaries\" is also less than ideal. International law provides a formal definition for mercenaries, and the role of nationalism in the motives of recruits and other factors around Russian PMCs complicates use of the label (see the section on Legal Enablers and Parameters). The debate is even further complicated by the already contested definitions of private military and security companies (PMSCs) writ large, and because Russian PMCs do not consistently fit within any of the existing categories, they operate in a markedly different manner than their Western counterparts.b Ase Gilje stensen and Tor Bukkvoll at the Norwegian Defence Research Establishment (FFI) argued in 2018 that there is more clarity to be found in categorizing services \"rather than the companies themselves.\"10 Notably, this approach appears to reflect how such companies are discussed in Rus-\n\nbriefly operated in Syria.\nb\nFor a thorough survey of the competing definitions from the wider literature on\nmercenaries and other forms of privatized force, and the complications in applying\nthem to Russian PMCs, see Kimberly Marten, \"Russia's use of semi-state security\nforces: the case of the Wagner Group,\" *Post-Soviet Affairs*, March 26, 2019, pp. 3-4.\nFor a survey on how Russian PMCs significantly differ from Western PMCs, see Ase\nGilje stensen and Tor Bukkvoll, Russian Use of Private Military and Security Companies - the implications for European and Norwegian Security, Norwegian Defence\nResearch Establishment, FFI-RAPPORT 18/01300, September 11, 2018, pp. 8-13.\nsian sources. According to Russian expert Sergey Sukhankin, the Russian literature (leaning on observations of the West) distinguishes between four types of companies, defining each according to the services they typically provide:\n\nMilitary provider companies... which offer their clients tactical support during military operations (including direct participation in hostilities); Military consulting companies... which consult clients on questions related to strategic planning and the reform of military forces, directly help with training of military personnel, as well as provide guidance on working with new types of weaponry; Military support companies... which provide auxiliary functions (including services in IT and military spheres); Private security companies [PSCs]... which deal with crisis management, risk assessment, security consulting, de-mining, or training of local law enforcement.11\nEven then, the reality of these groups complicates clean definitions. Several companies defined as PSCs under Russian law have participated in PMC work, and Russian PMCs are not precluded from providing services typically associated with PSCs. Armed groups also exist that straddle the definition between Russian PMCs and nationalist militias in their functions and activities. For this reason, to avoid exclusion of relevant data, any definition of Russian PMCs will have to account for their informal nature. For the purposes of this analysis, \"Russian PMCs\" refer to companies operated by or composed primarily of Russian persons, the bulk of whose activities on behalf of clients (the Russian Federation, other governments, or private clients) consist of tactical support during military operations (including combat), the direct training of military personnel, and other military support services.\n\n## Data Limitations, Gaps, And Scoping\n\nDue to the nature of Russian PMCs as informal, deniable, and covert, as well as the fog of war and incomplete open-source coverage of their operations, available information on such organizations and their operations is limited, imperfect, and at times unreliable. It is important to caveat that some sources cited or quoted in the research informing this analysis may confuse Russian PMCs with Russian PSCs or use the moniker \"Wagner\" (a specific organization) as shorthand for Russian PMCs more generally. While this is not an intelligence product, the research informing this analysis sought to ensure that information is presented transparently, completely, and with due consideration of uncertainty. This report has been reviewed by the TRADOC G2 and is consistent with the Army's Operational Environment assessments. The scope of this analysis is the use of Russian PMCs by the Russian Federation to accomplish their strategic and operational goals and the scenarios in which Russian PMCs would matter or constitute a threat to U.S. and partner forces.\n\n## Russian Pmcs: Their Origins And Use\n\nI have some experience with these groups and specifically the Wagner Group from my time in Syria... I think they concern me greatly... They're a quasi-military and as we saw play out in Crimea and Ukraine, little green men running around, not necessarily following rules of behavior we would expect from proper armies. So I have a pretty significant concern for the use of these kinds of forces and the way that the Russians are using them on the continent... this is something I'll certainly be looking into in greater detail... they train right alongside Russian armed forces... It'll be an endeavor to try to figure out exactly what they're doing with them... They are using them to guard the head of state. They are using them to train some of the local armed forces. Some of that could be benign, some of that is probably less than benign.12\n- Gen. Stephen J. Townsend Any analysis of how Russian PMCs should be considered across the continuum of conflict and the ROMO must be informed by a clear picture of the role they play in Russian military operations and foreign policy. This section will first provide a brief background on the history of Russia's market for force and its use to achieve military objectives, leading up to the advent of Russian PMCs. Second, it will summarize the operational, strategic, and political uses of Russian PMCs. Third, it will review the varying quality and means of how Russian PMCs are equipped, trained, and staffed. Fourth, it will review how Russian PMCs coordinated and worked alongside elements of the Russian Federation and other actors. Fifth, it will summarize legal enablers and parameters on the operation and use of Russian PMCs. Finally, these assessments will inform a brief discussion of exposed Russian vulnerabilities through using Russian PMCs. Informing these assessments is in-depth research on recent cases of Russian PMC deployments, which can be found in the appendix.\n\n## Background And Origins Private Security Companies\n\nRussian PMCs emerged from a private market for force that existed in Russia since the collapse of the Soviet Union. With the vast reduction in size of the post-Soviet Russian military after 1991, former soldiers found work with firms at home and abroad. PSCs were legitimized in 1992 to operate domestically when President Boris Yeltsin passed the Federal Law No 2487- I \"On Private Detective and Security Activity in the Federation of Russia\" and played an important role in protecting private businesses and individuals during the breakdown in the rule of law during the 1990s and early 2000s. As of this writing, PSCs, large and small, employ at least a million people in Russia.13 In spite of this legitimacy, the PSC market remained effectively ungoverned throughout the 1990s. As one analyst noted, \"The market [for force] has been shaped by the lack of domestic regulation or state control in...Russia... [and the] privatization of security and law enforcement in the region was driven mostly by ad hoc initiatives and short-term political and other considerations.\"14 The market for force in Russia was and remains characterized by its reliance on informal networks of military and intelligence contacts. While primarily focused at home, PSCs in different configurations acted as contractors abroad. Thousands of demobilized Soviet soldiers, primarily from newly independent Russian Federation and Ukraine, worked abroad as private contractors in Africa in the 1990s and 2000s, primarily in former Soviet client states, states under sanctions, and states with few relations with the West, including Angola, Chad, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Ethiopia, Eritrea, and Sudan.15\n\n## Cossacks\n\nAnother set of non-state groups Russia used in PMC-like functions are the Cossack community and volunteer forces. Cossack paramilitary formations played an important role in Russian imperial expansion and consolidation in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. However, the Bolsheviks repressed the Cossack community through the collapse of the Soviet Union. In 1994, Russian President Boris Yeltsin adopted the \"State Policy Concept regarding the Cossacks,\" re-establishing the legal rights of the Cossack community. Because Cossacks had been repressed for over sixty years, the re-emerged community was more heavily shaped and controlled by the state than its historic predecessors, known for their independence.16 President Putin introduced the law \"On the State Service of the Russian Cossacks\" in 2005. Since then, the primary role of Cossack formations has been the \"patriotic and Orthodox education of young people\" in Russia.17 However, their role as a domestic security auxiliary and paramilitary force also expanded. They engaged in everything from border security and firefighting to counterinsurgency operations in Chechnya. Excluding the conflict in eastern Ukraine, the Cossacks are primarily used outside of Russia for Russian soft-power influence, rather than in a PMC role, and almost exclusively in Slavic countries. Reorganized in 2014 to make them easier to control, the Cossacks participated in cultural and political events with Serbian nationalists in Republika Srpska, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Montenegro.18 Since the 2000s, the Cossacks also acted as auxiliaries for Russian military activity. The Cossacks participated in a 2004 special operation in the ethnically Georgian-settled Gali region of Abkhazia and then again in the Georgia-Russia war in 2008.19 During the conflict in eastern Ukraine, the volunteer forces of the Cossack National Guard of the Almighty Don Army, which formed specifically to support the Russian war against Ukraine in the Donbas, occupied several towns.20\n\n## Volunteers\n\nVolunteers are another type of non-state auxiliary force provider in Russia's near abroad, referring to the former Soviet states bordering the country. The early-1990s disintegration of the USSR led to numerous ethnic and civil conflicts in the newly independent republics. Various forces (and sometimes forces on both sides) received direct or indirect support from the Russian military. In Russia's near abroad, demobilized and still active duty Russian troops sometimes acted as mercenaries in emergent conflicts. For example, newly independent Armenia recruited recently demobilized Russian troops to drive tanks and engage in combat missions against Azerbaijan during the conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh.21 Genuine volunteers, some for ideological and nationalist reasons, also traveled to and participated in local conflicts, such as Transnistria (Moldova) and Abkhazia (Georgia) in 1992 and 1993. Along with individuals from other Orthodox countries, such as Greece, Ukraine, and Romania,22 hundreds of Russian volunteers participated in the conflict in Yugoslavia in support of the Serbian government of Slobodan Milosevic. Some arriving as early as September 1992, Russians were in at least five different units of foreign volunteers, such as the \"White Wolves.\"23 In 1999, Russian volunteers fought alongside the Milosevic government in Kosovo, participating in battles just weeks prior to the arrival of an official Russian military contingent for the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)-led Kosovo Force.24 The volunteer trend continued during the conflict in eastern Ukraine. At least 3,000 Russian volunteers fought alongside separatist forces, playing an important role in providing manpower during an early phase of the conflict against the Ukrainian military.25 While some see volunteers as a result of \"Russia's aim... to restore its influence throughout the region, on all sides, in every conflict,\"26 others noted it is difficult to discern \"who is participating in the conflict because of genuine zeal and who is there on secret orders.\"27 However, as noted by Mark Galeotti, \"These mercenaries, nationalists and adventurers are often of questionable military value but considerable enthusiasm, and also useful political-propaganda tools, demonstrating alleged popular support.\"28 Volunteers in Ukraine were not remunerated for their participation in the conflict, even if they were left with life-long grievous injuries. This is possibly for legal reasons, protecting them from Russia's strict law on mercenaries. As one scholar noted, \"If a person's intent [when participating in a foreign conflict] to receive remuneration is absent, such actions are not criminal\" under Russia's mercenary laws.29\n\n## Emergence Of Russian Pmcs\n\nAs Russian political stability improved, the private security sector became \"less freewheeling and more regulated\" throughout the 2000s and into the 2010s.30 During this time, PSCs were legalized for use abroad and utilized to protect Russian state-owned infrastructure, perform anti-piracy missions, perform demining missions, and provide security services in Iraq.31 As Russian companies styled themselves after American and other Western contractors, it became a larger topic of discussion in Russian military circles, wary of ceding control over the use of force. The majority of discussion around PMCs in Russian military analysis communities focused on three aspects: 1) the threat posed to Russia by American PMCs and their alleged involvement in \"color revolutions\" in Syria, Libya, and Russia's near abroad; 2) the money to be made if Russia was more competitive in the market; and 3) the use of PMCs as a means of furthering Russian national interests.\n\nIn 2012, a retired Russian military intelligence officer, Aleksandr Kanchukov, noted:\nThe main advantages of the PMCs appear to be their operational skill, responsibility, effectiveness, professionalism and undeniable financial advantage. PMCs are an alternative [for former soldiers] to the state and to crime; guarantees insurance in zones of instability; quick resolutions to problems; and effective administration of risks. It is far more profitable to sign a contract with a private company for a concrete task than to send the security company affiliated with a giant oil or gas company, or send troops and maintain a garrison. On the other hand, if the state does not want to be affiliated with their participation in any conflict or project, or they want to shift other dirty business in a war to others, then PMCs will be excellent performers for these purposes.32\nThese views were later reiterated at higher levels. In 2012, member of parliament (MP) Aleksei Mitrofanov asked President Putin if he would support the creation and legalization of such companies: \"Americans pay nearly 350 billion USD for these services. PMCs which protect foreign property and train foreign personnel, guard infrastructure, provide a huge quantity of services in Iraq and other countries. Doesn't it seem to you that we should also be represented in this business?\"33 Putin replied, saying \"I consider that [PMCs] certainly appear to be an instrument of realizations of national interests without direct participation of the state. We should think about and examine this topic.\"34 Russian PSCs profited greatly from security activities in Iraq, Afghanistan, Sri Lanka, and elsewhere. Nevertheless, despite Russian PMC proliferation, legalization efforts stalled despite numerous legislative attempts (see the section on Legal Enablers and Parameters).\n\n## Contemporary Russian Pmcs\n\nAs of the completion of this report, there are a number of well-established Russian PSCs and PMCs operating abroad. Some PSCs continue to fulfill normal functions such as demining, close protection, and anti-piracy services. When working abroad, the host country usually contracts with them directly to provide services.35 Conversely, Russian PMCs are playing a more direct goal in Russian geopolitical activity and the Russian state is the primary purchaser of their services.\n\nSince approximately 2013, Russian PMCs focused on furthering Russian national interests and carrying out high-risk missions that, if performed by regular troops, could be politically unpopular. These include groups like the Moran Security Group and Wagner. These groups are involved more directly in combat operations in coordination and often with the support of the Russian military. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) itself even operates a company now, known as Patriot, which is reportedly mostly involved in close personal protection of very important persons.36 According to a source in the Russian MoD speaking to the press, an unnamed Russian PMC protects the construction of a Russian military base in Burundi in coordination with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Federal Security Service (FSB).37 Despite the lack of domestic legalization, Russian PMCs will continue to be used as tools of Russian foreign policy. Russian PMCs will be operating in widely dispersed AOs where low-cost options are needed, and U.S. forces are likely to encounter them in contested environments.\n\nRussian PMCs are leveraged by the Russian Federation, its allies, and financial interests to perform a wide variety of functionsmost notably offensive combat missionsto achieve objectives as a force multiplier while minimizing both political and military costs. As observed in Syria, the political costs inherent in the deployment of regular volunteer troops to missions and wars abroad are comparatively avoided in the use of PMCs. Likewise, the use of Russian PMCs in the most dangerous roles and missions on the battlefield minimize official military casualty numbers.38 Allowing the Russian MoD to publish low official casualty counts and prevent headlines about service deaths appears to insulate the Kremlin politically,39 (e.g., popular Russian enthusiasm for official, \"boots on the ground\" support to the Assad regime in Syria was at only 19% as early as October 2015).40\n\n| Overall                                                             | : Achieve objectives for the Russian Federation, its allies,    |\n|---------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------|\n| and financial interests as a force multiplier while minimizing both |                                                                 |\n| political and military costs                                        |                                                                 |\n| Strategic:                                                          | In Combat:                                                      |\n| Includes uses typical of                                            |                                                                 |\n| PSCs                                                                |                                                                 |\n| - Political Insulation                                              | - Infantry (incl.                                               |\n| Mechanized)                                                         |                                                                 |\n| - Regime Stability/                                                 |                                                                 |\n| - Security Advisers                                                 |                                                                 |\n| Protection                                                          | - Forward Advisers                                              |\n| - Armed Security                                                    |                                                                 |\n| - Deterrence                                                        | - Sappers                                                       |\n| - Transport Convoys                                                 |                                                                 |\n| - Control Grey                                                      | - Coord. Fire and                                               |\n| Zones                                                               | Movement                                                        |\n| law enf.)                                                           |                                                                 |\n| - Zones of Artificial                                               | - Forward Air                                                   |\n| Stability                                                           | Controllers                                                     |\n| - Keep Russia                                                       | - Reconnaissance                                                |\n| in Force                                                            | Assassination*                                                  |\n| - Mine Clearance                                                    | -                                                               |\n| Involved in                                                         |                                                                 |\n| Conflict w/Low                                                      |                                                                 |\n| Commitment                                                          |                                                                 |\n| - Armored Troops                                                    | -                                                               |\n| - Deception                                                         |                                                                 |\n| - Artillery Units                                                   | -                                                               |\n| - Information                                                       | -                                                               |\n\n* Specific to Ukraine; more difficult to verify.\n\nStrategically, Russian PMCs have and can serve several purposes for the Russian Federation. They can be utilized as an instrument to stabilize friendly regimes seen as under threat of collapse or ouster. This purpose is apparent in their deployments (see the appendix: Syria, Sudan, and Venezuela), as well as in the public comments of Russian lawmakers.41 In 2014, Duma deputy Gennady Nosovko argued for legalizing Russian PMCs by referring to recent events in Ukraine, saying \"there would not have been this present situation in Ukraine if there in Russia had been relevant PMSCs for hire at the time of the crisis for the Yanukovych government.\"42 Deterrence of adversary intervention is another strategic use (see on the appendix: Venezuela). Russian PMCs can also be used as a means of deception, including as a potential cover for Russian special forces.43 Typically used in the earlier, non-kinetic stages of low-intensity conflict,44 Russian PMCs played early roles in protecting significant state-owned enterprises abroad (Gazprom, Rosatom, Rosneft, Russian Railways).45 Overall, while it did not pass, legislation proposed to legalize Russian PMCs (see the section on Legal Enablers and Parameters) contained a list of services the groups would have been authorized to provide under the law. According to Interfax, the list included:\nparticipation in peacekeeping operations, personnel training, military consulting, maintenance and service of military hardware and weaponry, the delivery of military equipment, demining, military construction, military translation, the protection of a foreign country's territory... the restoration of constitutional order on its territory... [and] security guard services of various types.46\nThe uses described in the proposed legislation reflect the conclusions of U.S. Department of State (DOS) senior Russian political analyst Nathaniel Reynolds, who argues that Moscow could use Russian PMCs like Wagner \"to launch a limited-objective incursion into a neighboring country, to train proxy forces to destabilize a pro-Western government, or to hide a secret Russian military presence.\"47 In combat situations, Russian PMCs are used for offensive operations. While uncommon for Western military contractors, most of the Russian military literature around Russian PMCs views their use in offensive military operations as a typical and assumed function.48 In both Ukraine and Syria, forward offensive use of Russian PMCs was in an embedded context with non-Russian forces (separatist militias, Syrian troops, Iran-backed militias), although this did not preclude an official Russian MoD presence or role with the unit. Knownthough not consistentRussian PMC roles in offensive combat operations include infantry, mechanized infantry, forward advisers, sappers,49 coordination of fire and movement, forward air controllers, reconnaissance in force, mine clearance, armored troops, and artillery units (see the appendix: Syria, Ukraine, and Libya). Russian PMCs playing any or all of these roles alongside Russia-allied forces can also serve a propaganda function to bolster the perceived strength and efficacy of forces friendly to Russia. Another information role of Russian PMCs is the potential obfuscation of Russian Federation efforts and forces behind what first appear to be private business interests and companies. Russian authors also noted how this obfuscation is seen as beneficial for both Russia and the United StatesRussia can deny actions, and the United States can choose to ignore and move on without losing face.50 Outside of combat operations, Russian PMC uses can include many services typically associated with PSCs, like security advisers, armed security for various infrastructure, construction security, transport convoys, training of military and law enforcement personnel, personal protection, anti-piracy ship protection, hostage rescue, and cargo retrieval. Russian PMCs also appear to be deployed in conjunction with international arms sales to train partner armed forces in the use of Russian-made equipment (see the appendix: Sudan and Central African Republic). There is also evidence to suggest that Russian PMCs are at times leveraged for use in subversive activities, including targeted assassinations (see the appendix: Ukraine), as well as \"sabotage, blackmail, subversive activities, terrorism, kidnapping\" and others.51 Finally, an unusual role played by some Russian PMCs or related groups has been their use in IO. This includes the promotion of Russian nationalism at home and in the \"near abroad\" through paramilitary youth camps and other activities. While typically carried out by front political organizations in partnership with local nationalist groups, a 2018 case in the Balkans highlighted the role of pseudo-Russian PMC organizations in the practice, which provoked bans on contact with such groups by the Latvian government.52 While the group in this case (E.N.O.T. Corp) appears to straddle the categories of political paramilitary group and Russian PMC,53 the participation of Russian PMCs in the promotion of nationalism through youth programs is not new. As far back as 2006, the early Russian PMC Anti-terror-Orel (founded in 2003) included \"military patriotic upbringing and training of the young people for the service in the armed forces\" in the list of services offered by the group.54 The Russian PMC role in IO also included personnel associated with Wagner leading tactical training courses for civilians in western Europe. Open-source reporting released by Ukrainian security services shows Wagner personnel providing such courses in Hungary, Italy, Germany, and Greece in 2018 through the Volk (Wolf) International Special Training Center. It is unclear if this work was conducted on a freelance basis or through coordination with Wagner or the Russian government.55\n\nRussian PMCs operating abroad have been inconsistently equipped. While some patterns are discernible, planners cannot consider Russian PMCs as a set unit of materiel and capability and should instead consider them on a case-by-case basis. When participating in Russian MoD-supported offensive operations in highly permissive environments, Russian PMCs were well equipped. However, the quality of equipment provided to Russian PMCs appears to be tied to the identity of the actor or actors that are their patrons at any given time (see the appendix: Syria). When the Slavonic Corps flew to Syria in 2013 to operate at the behest of local Syrian sponsors, their kit was outdated, dysfunctional, and ad hoc. In fall 2015, when the Russian Federation directly intervened in the Syrian Civil War to support the Assad regime, Russian PMC Wagner received both high qualities and quantities of light arms, ammunition, heavy weapons, and armor. Wagner operatives in Syria were also photographed in close proximity to Russian MoD helicopters and airplanes,56 though there is no indication that they were equipped with air capabilities. However, despite continued Russian MoD involvement in Syria, when Wagner sponsorship and C2 in the region appeared to shift from the Russian MoD to Syrian clientele, the quality equipment provided to the Russian PMC experienced a marked decline. In Nigeria, contractors from the former Soviet Union hired to perform offensive operations against Boko Haram were described by a diplomat observer as \"an incoherent mix of people, helicopters and random kit from all sorts of different sources.\"57 In CAR, there are indications that Russian PMCs in the country may have been armed using weapons donated by the Russian Federation to the government of CAR in cooperation with the United Nations (UN) Security Council (see the appendix: Central African Republic). Recruits into Russian PMCs tend to be male Russian citizens from across the country with a military or security background, but they also recruit from among fighters participating in ongoing conflicts in their \"near abroad\" (e.g., separatist militias in Donetsk, Ukraine).58 Accounts told by recruits to the press describe the use of both active reserve and former intelligence officers as recruiters. The Security Service of Ukraine (SBU) publicly reports that Wagner membership also includes people from Belarus, Moldova, Kazakhstan, Serbia, and elsewhere.59  Another Russian PMC called Redut-Antiterror allegedly specializes in recruiting former soldiers and ex-officers of both the GRU and the FSB special unit Vympel.60 At times, Russian PMCs impose high recruitment standardswhen preparing to deploy to Syria, Wagner required potential hires to have combat experience, pass physical fitness tests, demonstrate weapons handling skills, and pass other hurdles according to press reports. However, this is not universal. When recruitment efforts are expanded, at least some Russian PMCs (including Wagner) appear willing to widen their recruitment pool by lowering requirements, meaning the military experience of Russian PMC members is wide and inconsistent.61 Training of Russian PMC recruits before or during deployment does not appear to be consistent. Wagner appears to benefit from either support from or cooperation with the GRU, including the use of training grounds on or adjacent to the home base for the GRU's 10th Special Mission Brigade in Molkino, Russiapresumably an advantage over other Russian PMCs.62 One way this training was demonstrated was in the organization of Wagner during their operations in Syria, for the most part mirroring a battalion battlegroup.63 Wagner's command structure has been described by analysts and the Ukrainian SBU as a commander-in-chief and managing director at the top, followed by a mid-level command consisting of an administrative group, general staff, and control group. Coordination of military aspects of the group are allegedly managed by Wagner's Department of Military Preparation, which is then composed of several functional subunits (tank and vehicle crews, tactical training, firearm training, engineer training, artillery, and anti-air defense).64\n\n## Coordination With The Russian Federation And Others\n\nRussian PMCs appear to often operate in close coordination with elements of Russian intelligence and the military. In Syria, Wagner is described by sources speaking to the press as coordinated, tasked, and supervised by the FSB, GRU, and allegedly at times even officers from the General Staff's Chief Administration.65 Russian state-owned press outlets also reported that Wagner was under GRU supervision,66 and Wagner commanders who operated in Syria described their units in combat operations as accompanied by \"an officer of the Russian military command,\" who would coordinate air cover during the operation.67 However, operations in Syria in 2017 and 2018 suggest the Russian MoD may not have maintained C2 over Wagner forces in the country, but rather transitioned control to the Assad regime (see the appendix: Syria). Evidence tying Wagner to the Russian MoD and even GRU has also been presented in the form of openly published intelligence on the C2 relationship and support provided to the Russian PMC. These include a phone call between the head of Wagner and a GRU staff officer (see  the appendix: Ukraine), passports issued to Wagner personnel from what appears to be the desk used for GRU officers (see the appendix: Central African Republic), the use of allegedly GRU-exclusive materiel, transportation to AOs on Russian flagged naval cruisers, and the presentation of military honors to Wagner personnel (see the appendix: Syria). Russian expert Alexander Khramchikhin went so far as to describe Wagner as a \"pseudo-private\" military company that takes direction from the Russian army.68 Russian academic and military writing on the subject discuss Russian PMCs as entities essentially owned by, and used in service to, the Russian state and its interests.69 Russian PMCs also coordinated with a host of other actors in their operations abroad. When supporting a host government, Russian PMCs will typically have a close working relationship with the host nation's regular military. As observed in Syria, Wagner jointly participated in combat operations alongside state forces, or even within state units. According to public reporting, the relationship between the Assad government and Wagner included at times near exclusive funding of the PMC, as well as C2. Outside of active war zones, Russian PMCs will also participate in regular joint non-combat operations with friendly host forcesas observed in CARincluding training, patrols, checkpoints, transportation of materials, security, and stability deployments. Militias and other armed non-state groups also enjoyed close cooperation and coordinated operations with Russian PMCs, particularly in offensive operations in Ukraine and Syria. Wagner forces played an active offensive role in coordination with separatist militias against Ukrainian troops in the 2015 Battle of Debaltseve, resulting in a separatist victory (see the appendix: Ukraine). Likewise in Syria, Wagner participated in hostilities alongside numerous other groups, including (but not necessarily limited to) the Afghan Shia Liwa al-Fatimiyoun, Iraqi Shia militias, Lebanese Hezbollah, and Liwa al-Baqir (see the appendix: Syria). Beyond state cooperation, Russian PMCs also take on private contracts and investors in pursuit of economic interests, according to press reports. These include private firms with equity in the securing of oil facilities in Syria, gold and mining interests in CAR, and others. In several theaters, Russian PMCs reportedly take on a mix of state-sponsored and privately sponsored tasks. Finally, Russian analysts also speculated that Russian PMCs could enter partnerships with other PMCs abroad. Russian military analyst Vladimir Neyelov specifically mentions Specialised Tasks, Training, Equipment and Protection International (STTEP)a South African PMC as potential future partners for Russian PMCs.70\n\nUnlike Russian PSCs that are registered and regulated by the Russian Federation, Russian PMCs are formally outlawed under Article 359 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation as mercenary activities, carrying a prison sentence of 3 to 7 years.c 71 As of this writing, legislative efforts to legalize PMCs in Russia have all failed to pass. However, similar to earlier laws around Russian PSCs,72 debates around legalization in Russia concern internal political power struggles more than any operational restrictions. In fact, rather than restricting the use of Russian PMCs, the illicit status of such groups appears to serve as an enabler, allowing the state to maintain control over the creation and proliferation of Russian PMCs, as well as individual members after they return to Russia. The first effort to legalize Russian PMCs began in response to comments made by then president-elect Vladimir Putin and then Deputy Prime Minister Dmitry Rogozin in 2012, both appearing to support the proposition. In response to a question by a Duma deputy on whether PMCs might be utilized as instruments of influence abroad, Putin said \"I believe that such companies are a way of implementing national interests without the direct involvement of the state... Yes, I think we could consider this option.\"73 Likewise, Rogozin (who oversaw the Russian defense industry at the time) was quoted saying \"We will study the usefulness of creating such companies in Russia, and we'll make a step in that direction.\"74 Draft proposals failed to proceed past the defense committee in both November and December 2014. The committee described the measure as \"inarticulate,\" \"useless,\" and \"irrelevant,\" and both the MoD and FSB expressed concerns that such a measure could eventually see \"tens of thousands of uncontrollable Rambos turning their weapons against the government.\"75 On the other hand, Ivan Konovalov (director of a Russian think-tank and consultant to pro-legalization lawmakers) described the issue as \"a question of honor; Russians hate the concept of a mercenary because if you pick up a weapon you do it to defend the motherland,\" and that \"The idea of doing it for money lies counter to everything we're taught.\"76 Spurred by the release of a video online by ISIS of two members of a Russian PMC they captured in Syria, another legislative effort to legalize Russian PMCs and provide them greater protections was proposed in early 2018. The effort was introduced in January 2018 by two opposition MPs: Sergei Mironov and Mikhail Yemelyanov.77 Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov expressed support for the effort.78 Speaking of the incident, Lavrov appeared to bless legalization, saying \"a solid law base should be created to protect these people within a legal framework.\"79 The measure even appeared to gain support from leadership in Putin's own United Russia party, as well as several Senate committee heads, and was expected to pass by a source in the MoD who spoke to the Russian press at the time.80 The proposed legislation provided for Russian PMCs to be registered and licensed under the MoD restricted incumbent public servants from leading PMCs and laid out formal definitions and guidance for how their business would be conducted, including allowances for opening branches and subsidiaries abroad.81 Nevertheless, despite progressing past committee, the legalization effort failed when it was presented to the government for reviewthis time earning rejections from not just the MoD and FSB, but also the foreign, justice, and finance ministries, National Guard, Federal Protective Service, Foreign Intelligence, and Prosecutor General's Officesaying the provision was not supported and would violate the Russian Constitution.82 Senator Franz Klintsevich, Deputy Head of the Defense and Security Committee and proponent of legalizing Russian PMCs, described the impasse, saying \"we have been unable to pass the necessary laws because of a conflict between the Defense Ministry and the Federal Security Service over who would control such military groups. They have heavy serious weapons... so there is a security issue with their regulation.\"83 Close observers of Russian PMCs and both efforts to legalize them later noted that the status quo was actually more beneficial for both the government and groups like Wagner. A new law would likely see both the number and activities of Russian PMCs grow well outside the state's control, as well as limit their utility in subversive operations (see the section on Uses and the appendix: Ukraine).84 Additionally, as seen in the cases of the Slavonic Corps and E.N.O.T. Corp. (see the appendix: Syria), maintaining the illegality of Russian PMCs provides a means to control such groups and their members under the constant threat of arrest and imprisonment. Since the failed 2018 effort, Russian lawmakers referenced continued activity on the question, including third-party legislation drafting and policy roundtables but describe any formal discussions of PMC legalization too early.85 There has also been discussion of leveraging the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) as an alternative legal foundation for Russian PMCs.86 Despite these policy discussions happening in parallel, the Kremlin continued to deny the existence of Russian PMCs.87 Another recent domestic legal change related to PMCs occurred in September 2018, when President Putin signed an order on changes to the law on state secrets. The order classified information about individuals who cooperate with Russian foreign intelligence services, but are not members of those structures, as state secrets. One former security services member told the Russian newspaper Vedomosti that this move was most likely to protect Wagner or other PMCs who cooperate with Russian military intelligence because foreigners or other recruited agents are already covered under current state secrecy laws.88 This new law will likely reduce the amount of publicly available information on Russian PMCs after years of Russian investigative journalism, and at least one Russian researcher on PMCs, Vladimir Neelov, has been arrested under this new statute.89\n\n## International Law And Russian Pmcs\n\nInternational humanitarian law (IHL) covers private military companies and their employees and staffs; it is not a new or novel case to which the law has not been applied. However, how IHL will cover a particular PMC is context dependent. The status of PMCs under IHL will vary case by case, depending on their activities and level of incorporation into the parties of the conflict. The primary question is whether PMC staff are combatants or civilians. If the PMC staff are incorporated into the armed forces of one of the parties, then they are combatants. To be considered integrated in that way requires that they be commanded by a person responsible for subordinates, have a fixed distinctive emblem recognizable at a distance, carry arms openly, and conduct their operations in accordance with the laws and customs of war.90 If the PMC is accompanying the armed forces of a party and providing logistical and welfare support Article 4(4) of the Third Geneva Convention would provide that they should be prisoners of war if they are captured by the enemy. If the PMC staff are not part of one of the parties, then they remain civilians and cannot be targeted or engaged. This protection will be removed, however, if the PMC staff engage in the direct participation in hostilities.91 In that case, PMC staff are targetable during that participation, and if captured they can be tried for that participation.92 Examples of direct participation of hostilities that PMCs commonly perform include, guarding military bases from attacks, gathering tactical military intelligence, and operating weapons during combat.93 A common question regarding PMCs is whether they are simply mercenaries. International law has a specific and onerous definition of mercenaries in Article 47(2) of Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions. It contains six elements: (1) specially recruited locally or abroad to fight in an armed conflict; (2) takes part in the hostilities; (3) is motivated by the desire for private gain and its promised material compensation by or on behalf of a party to the conflict substantially in excess of that promised or paid to the armed forces of that party; (4) is neither a national of a party to the conflict nor a resident of territory controlled by a party to the conflict; (5) is not a member of the armed forces of a party to the conflict; and (6) has not been sent by a state which is not a party to the conflict on official duty as a member of its armed forces. All six elements of the definition must be satisfied to meet the definition. Accordingly, this provision only appears to apply in rare cases. Additional Protocol I Article 47(1) also provides that mercenaries do not receive combatant or prisoner of war status, and this has become a customary rule of international law, meaning it applies to everyone regardless of whether they signed Additional Protocol I. Mercenaries have a right to a fair trial if captured and are also targetable.94\n\n## Unclassified Asymmetric Warfare Group\n\nIn regard to international law, PMCs do not stress or challenge the rules of engagement, and military legal advisors will have the answers for service members about whether and when PMCs can be targeted or engaged.\n\n## Analytical Model\n\nThe previous section summarized the deep-dive research of Russian PMCs. This section introduces an analytical model in which to examine the relevance of Russian PMCs to U.S. Army maneuver commanders and staffs, mainly at the brigade level and below. Limitations: The model used here must contend with several principle limitations. First, there has been little interaction between Russian PMCs and the U.S. militarytoo little to establish broad historical trends. Second, the pronounced use of Russian PMCs is a recent development. These entities existed long enough to attract the attention of the U.S. defense establishment but are sufficiently new that some key questions remain unanswered. This relates directly to the third limitationdata. Available open-source information is scant, and much of it is of questionable veracity. Finally, Russian PMCs lack uniformity. There is variation in terms of missions/activities, organization, leadership, etc. Model: To provide a practical model for engagement, the authors created a three-step model to study PMC operations in various operational environments:\nStep One - Describe the Type of Operation: The model contains four thought experiments, each of which samples a type of operation from across the conflict continuum. Although the model does not examine every type of operation in which a U.S. brigade might encounter a Russian PMC, the sampling spans the entire spectrum from cooperation to competition to conflict and addresses each category within the ROMO. Step Two - Evaluate Using Matrix: Using the deep-dive research from the previous section and the appendix, as well as doctrinal publications, the model evaluates potential PMC operations to account for variations in (1) the permissiveness of the OE and (2) levels of Russian state support. Step Three - Identify Insights: Each experiment produces insights that, in aggregate, inform this study's conclusions. In addition, each experiment contains a most dangerous scenario, which is the product of two factors. The first is a PMC operating at peak performance based on known capabilities and limitations. The second is an OE most challenging to U.S. forces. Taken together, these two inputs comprise a most dangerous scenario.\n\nThe experiments, however, do not contain most likely scenarios. Due to the extreme variation in potential missions, locations, time, and other factors, there is no way to determine which would be most likely. For instance, the U.S. occasionally conducts Noncombatant Evacuation Operations (NEOs) to rescue Americans from crises in foreign countries. Such operations are irregular and usually arise with little warningeach NEO is very different depending on local factors. As such, there is no sound method to identify a most likely scenario. The same is true for the other three operation types used in these experiments. The remainder of this section explains this model's components in greater detail and concludes with an abbreviated example of how the model works.\n\n## The Conflict Continuum And Romo\n\nJoint Publication (JP) 3-0, \"Joint Operations,\" states that the U.S. military must be \"able to respond to a wide variety of challenges along a conflict continuum that spans from peace to war.\"95 Spanning this continuum is the ROMOa fundamental construct that helps relate military activities situationally and operations in scope and purpose.96 It consists of three categories:\n\n-\nMilitary engagement, security cooperation, and deterrence;\n-\nCrisis response and limited contingency operations; and\n-\nLarge-scale combat operations.97\nThe conflict continuum, depicted in Figure 1,98 illustrates the relationship between the continuum and ROMO. A great deal of military activity occurs for the purpose of bolstering allies (cooperation) and deterring potential adversaries (competition). Operation Atlantic Resolve, for example, is one such operation. U.S. forces deploy and train with NATO allies in seven Central and Eastern European nations. This mission is intended both to reassure U.S. allies and to deter Russian aggression.99 In the midrange of the continuum are crises and limited contingencies \"that require military operations in response to natural disasters, terrorists, subversives, or other contingencies and crises as directed by appropriate authority. The level of complexity, duration, and resources depends on the circumstances.100 Finally, there are large-scale combat operations. These are complex and typically consist of multiple campaigns, each of which a \"series of related major operations aimed at achieving strategic and objectives within a given time and space.\"101\n\n## Four Thought Experiments\n\nThe red arrows and numbering in Figure 1 identify the types of operations used as experiments in this model (explained in greater detail later). The first step of each experiment is a brief review of doctrine for the corresponding type of operation, focusing on common tasks and other criteria for each operation.\n\n1. *Security Force Assistance (SFA)*: SFA is a set of Department of\nDefense (DoD) security cooperation activities that contribute to unified action by the U.S. government to support the development of the capacity and capabilities of foreign security forces (FSF) and their supporting institutions, whether of a partner nation (PN) or an international organization (e.g., regional security organization), in support of U.S. objectives.102\n2. *Noncombatant Evacuation Operation (NEO)*: NEOs are operations\ndirected by the DOS or other appropriate authority, in conjunction with the DoD, whereby noncombatants are evacuated from locations within foreign countries to safe havens designated by the DOS when their lives are endangered by war, civil unrest, or natural disaster.103\n3. *Peacekeeping Operations (PKO)*: \"PKOs consist of military support to diplomatic, informational, and economic efforts to establish or maintain peace in areas of potential or actual conflict.\"104 JP 3-0 further elaborates that \"They are multi-agency and multi-national\noperations involving all instruments of national powerincluding international humanitarian and reconstruction efforts and military missionsto contain conflict, restore peace, and shape the environment to support reconciliation and rebuilding and facilitate the transition to legitimate governance. For the Armed Forces of the United States, [Peace Operations] encompass PKO, predominantly military [Peace Enforcement Operations], predominantly diplomatic [Peace Building] actions, [Peacemaking] processes, and conflict prevention.\"105\n\n4. *Large-Scale Combat Operations*: These are complex, joint operations typically consisting of multiple campaigns. This study makes use of the notional phasing concept, which allows commanders and staffs to \"visualize, plan, and execute the entire operation and define requirements in terms of forces, resources, time, space, and purpose.\"106 JP 3-0 continues, saying \"Actual phases of an operation will vary (e.g., compressed, expanded, or omitted entirely) according to the nature of the operation and the [Joint Force Commander's] decisions. Phases may be conducted or happen sequentially, but some activities from a phase may begin in a previous phase and continue into subsequent phases.\"107\n\n## Permissiveness/State Involvement Matrix\n\nThe second step of each experiment was to evaluate potential operations using a matrix specially designed for this model (see Figure 2). This matrix allows each experiment to account for two key variables:\n\n-\nPermissiveness of OE: A U.S. brigade might conduct these four types of operations in many OEs, ranging from hostile to permissive. Of note, permissiveness refers to the U.S. brigade, not that of the PMC or any other actor.\n-\nRussian State Involvement: The quality and resourcing of PMC operations varies depending mostly on degrees of Russian state support.\nThe y-axis measures permissiveness of the environment (i.e., how freely a U.S. brigade could operate in a given OE). For example, NATO allies would be very high on this scale because these countries have strong rule of law and cooperative security forces. Syria, on the other hand, would represent low permissiveness. The African nation, Mali, might represent some middle tier of permissiveness. Definitions of permissiveness are derived from JP 3-0 and are from the U.S. perspective:\n\n-\nPermissive environment: OE in which host-nation military and law enforcement agencies have control, as well as the intent and capability to assist U.S. operations that a unit intends to conduct.\n-\nUncertain environment: OE in which host government forces, whether opposed to or receptive to U.S. operations that a unit intends to conduct, do not have totally effective control of the territory and population in the intended operational area.\n-\nHostile environment: OE in which host government forces, whether opposed to or receptive to U.S. operations that a unit intends to conduct, do not have control of the territory and population in the intended operational area.108\nThe x-axis measures degrees of Russian state involvement in PMC operations. Definitions include:\n\n-\nLow: Little/no Russian state support for PMC operations. PMC members receive the same basic consular support Russia provides all citizens. Alternatively, the Russian government opposes PMC activity outright (i.e., participants face arrest upon return to the country).\n-\nMedium: PMC pursues goals generally consistent with those of the Russian regime. It receives intermittent support from the state but cannot rely solely on the state for sustainment.\n-\nHigh: PMC operates as a *de facto* Russian state element, regardless of official proclamations. It possibly co-locates with official forces and receives both sustainment and direction from the regime.\nThe second step of each experiment concluded with a completed matrix containing four permutations for each type of operation: low permissiveness/low state involvement (LP/LSI); high permissiveness/low state involvement (HP/LSI); low permissiveness/high state involvement (LP/HSI); and high permissiveness/high state involvement (HP/HSI). The last step of the experiment was to derive characterizations of PMC operations using the matrices and the deep-dive findings. These insights focus on matters relevant to a U.S. Army brigade but also include items pertinent to higher echelons. Figure 3 illustrates the model's process.\n\n## Experiment 1: Security Force Assistance Step One: Describe Type Of Operation\n\nMany day-to-day SFA activities occur at the lowest echelons in FSF garrisons and training areas around the globe. Nonetheless, SFA has implications at all levels of operations and support broader national goals that Russia would likely seek to contest, possibly with PMCs. According to joint doctrine:\n\n-\n\"Military engagement, security cooperation, and deterrence help assure operational access for crisis response and contingency operations despite changing US overseas defense posture and the growth of A2/AD capabilities around the globe. The more a [geographic combatant command, or] GCC can promote favorable access conditions in advance across the AOR and in potential OAs, the better.\"109\n-\n\"Security cooperation is a key element of global and theater shaping activities and critical aspect of communication synchronization. GCCs shape their AORs through security cooperation and stability activities by continually employing military forces to complement and support other instruments of national power that typically provide development assistance or humanitarian assistance to PNs...Ideally, security cooperation activities mitigate the causes of a potential crisis before a situation deteriorates and requires US military intervention. Security assistance and security force assistance (SFA) normally provide some of the means for security cooperation activities.\"110\n-\n\"SFA is DOD's contribution to unified action by the USG to support the development of the capacity and capability of foreign security forces (FSF) and their supporting institutions, to achieve objectives shared by the USG. SFA is conducted with and through FSF.\"111\nSecurity cooperation, including SFA, can occur elsewhere across the conflict continuum.112 For example, \"advising in a hostile environment and other activities geared toward assisting a partner nation engaged in conflictare performed...using resources and authorities specially provided to DOD for employment in support of combat operations.\"113 However, this experiment intends to measure the left side of the conflict continuumcooperation and competition. As such, it focuses on SFA that does not take place during limited contingencies, crises responses, or major operations. Field Manual (FM) 3-22 specifies goals and tasks for SFA, listed in Table 2 and Table 3.\n\nU.S. forces strive to develop foreign security forces that are\nCompetent\nAcross all levels from ministerial to the individual soldier or police officer. Across all warfighting functions.\nCapable and\nsustainable\nAppropriately sized and effective enough to accomplish missions. Sustainable over time. Resourced within partner-nation capabilities.\nCommitted\nTo security of all the people and survival of the state. To preservation of the liberties and human rights of the citizens. To peaceful transition of power\nConfident\nIn themselves to secure the country Trusted by the citizens, that their security force will provide security and be professional. Trusted by the partner-nation government, which is confident it has the correct security force. Trusted by the international community, which believes the nation's security force is a force for good.\nGeneral developmental tasks are organize, train, equip, rebuild and build,\nadvise and assist, and assess (known as OTERA-A)\nOrganize\nAll activities taken to create, improve, and integrate doctrinal principles, organizational structures, capability constructs, and personnel management. This may include doctrine development, unit and organization design, command and staff processes, and recruiting and manning.\nTrain\nAll activities taken to create, improve, and integrate training, leader development, and education at the individual, leader, collective, and staff levels. This may include the development and execution of programs of instruction, training events, and leader development activities.\nEquip\nAll activities to create, improve, and integrate materiel and equipment, procurement, fielding, accountability, and maintenance through life cycle management. This may include new equipment fielding, operational readiness processes, repair, and recapitalization.\nRebuild\nAll activities to create, improve, and integrate facilities. This may include physical infrastructures such as bases and stations, lines of communication, ranges and training complexes, and administrative structures.\nAdvise\nAll activities to provide subject matter expertise, mentorship, guidance, advice, and counsel to FSF while carrying out the missions assigned to the unit or organization. Advising occurs under combat or administrative conditions, at tactical through strategic levels, and in support of individuals or groups.\nAssess\nAll activities for determining progress toward accomplishing a task, creating an effect, or achieving an objective using measures of effectiveness and measures of performance to evaluate foreign security force capability. Once an objective is achieved, the focus should shift to sustaining it.\n\n## Step Two: Evaluate Using Matrix\n\nTable 4 uses the deep-dive research from the first section of this report to describe potential PMC operations in four SFA-related scenarios.\n\nhave control as well as the intent and capability to using PMCs have control as well as the intent and capability to of law and host nation security services prevent PMC operations outright or restrict them to roles nonintrusive to NEO (demining, private security, etc.)\n\n- Host country military and law enforcement agencies lack\ncontrol of all territory\n- Host country military and law enforcement possibly\nengaged in suppression of opposition groups\n- Host country engages in SFA with other nations, perhaps\nU.S. competitors and adversaries\n- Elements of host country security establishment may not\nsupport cooperation with United States\n- Host country government factional (e.g., MoD supports\nUnited States but Ministry of Interior supports Russia)\n- Russia takes no substantive actions to influence SFA\nusing PMCs\n- Non-state supported PMC operations possible across\nrange of PMC capabilities (support, training, logistics, combat, etc.)\n\ncompany, but possibly low due to lack of state support\n\n- Host country military and law enforcement agencies lack\ncontrol of all territory\n- Host country military and law enforcement possibly\nengaged in suppression of opposition groups\n- Host country engages in SFA with other nations, perhaps\n\nU.S. competitors and adversaries\n\n- Elements of host country security establishment may not\n\nsupport cooperation with United States\n\n- Host country government factional (e.g., MoD supports\n\nUnited States but Ministry of Interior supports Russia)\n\n- Russia wishes to disrupt/influence Western-led SFA\nusing PMCs to limit official involvement, risk to state forces, etc.\n- PMCs contract with host nation forces and/or local actors\nacross the range of PMC capabilities (support, training, logistics, combat, etc.)\n- Russia uses PMCs to influence local actors, stoke\ntensions, impede SFA, possibly provide weapons/ training to local actors; stage false flag attacks on SFA force and other local actors\n\n- Quality of PMC personnel/equipment high due to strong\nstate support\n\n- PMCs collect intelligence on U.S. forces for Russia - Russia provides advanced capabilities not yet observed\nin its history of support for PMCs (advanced MANPADS, ATGMs, EW/cyber, UAS, etc.)\n\n## Step Three: Identify Insights\n\nPermissiveness: High permissiveness favors the United States in SFA. Low permissiveness offers PMCs the most opportunity in SFA:\n\n-\nPMC occupation of key terrain is a considerable threat to SFA. For example, PMC personnel could occupy training areas and block lines of communications, precluding or disrupting trainequip-advise activities.\nRussian State Involvement: High state involvement presents the most dangerous course of action when paired with low permissiveness in SFA. When paired with high permissiveness, however, state involvement is negated.\n\n-\nSuccessful PMC relationships with partner nation forces or figures could undermine U.S. influence. Similarly, PMC-caused disruptions to U.S. SFA operations could undermine U.S. influence.\nConflict Continuum/ROMO/Operation Type: PMCs are capable in the cooperation/competition portion of the continuum, including during security cooperation. This capability requires low permissiveness and is dependent on high state involvement or, less likely, a non-state supported PMC demonstrating heretofore unseen levels of performance and resource.\n\n-\nIn such operations, the United States is largely dependent on partner nations for sustainment, force protection, intelligence, and other fundamental needs. The ability of the partner nation to provide for such needs, as well as the partner's threat perceptionespecially concerning Russiavaries greatly. As such, deployed forces may have insufficient means to detect, defend, and deter threats such as intelligence collection, IO, and EW.\n\n## Rules Of Engagement\n\nROE may be such that commanders should be prepared to protect personnel (military and evacuees) from a variety of threats without the authority to conduct offensive military operations or preempt hostile actions by proactive military measures. ROE should provide maximum flexibility so as not to unduly restrain the use of force. The JFC is provided tailored ROE from the GCC to ensure the successful accomplishment of the mission. ROE must ensure that the military commander has the authority to protect civilians while demonstrating restraint and, when appropriate, using force proportional to the threat. The JFC should establish ROE well ahead of any NEO in order to work through the process of obtaining supplemental measures to the standing ROE. The JFC never abrogates the right of self-defense. (1) Dissemination and use of clearly defined ROE are critical. Although the objectives (diplomatic and military) are not to destroy enemy forces and armed conflict should be avoided whenever possible, an appropriate and proportional use of force may become necessary. ROE must be as precise as practical while never denying the use of appropriate self-defense measures. (2) The JFC will discuss the ROE with the COM as early and as frequently as required. Modifications to the ROE will be made and approved by the appropriate authorities via the supported GCC.\n\n## Experiment 2: Noncombatant Evacuation Operation Step One: Describe Type Of Operation\n\nThis experiment is one of two that examines crisis response and limited contingency operations. Such missions are \"typically focused in scope and scale and conducted to achieve a very specific strategic or operational-level objective in an OA.\"116 Crisis response and limited contingency operations often require close, ongoing coordination with non-military entities, governmental and otherwise. Two characteristics require special attention. First, understanding the U.S. or coalition's strategic objective helps avoid actions that may have adverse diplomatic or political effects. It is not uncommon in some operations, such as peacekeeping, for junior leaders to make decisions that have significant strategic implications. Second, commanders should remain aware of changes not only in the operational situation but also in strategic objectives that may warrant a change in military operations.117 These are often economy of force operations. The complexity of the strategic environment is such that U.S. forces must be prepared to execute multiple simultaneous operations. As such, any single operation might fall to \"small elements like [special operation forces (SOF)] in coordination with allied nations or PNs. Initially, SOF may take the lead of these operations as an economy of force measure to enable major operations and campaigns with conventional focus to progress more effectively.\"118 This experiment focuses specifically on noncombatant evacuation operations. JP 3-68, \"Noncombatant Evacuation Operations,\" describes such operations thusly:\nAn operation whereby noncombatant evacuees are evacuated from a threatened area abroad, which includes areas facing actual or potential danger from natural or manmade disaster, civil unrest, imminent or actual terrorist activities, hostilities, and similar circumstances, that is carried out with the assistance of the Department of Defense. NEOs are conducted by the [DoD] to assist in evacuating US citizens and nationals, [DoD] civilian personnel, and designated persons (host nation... and third country nationals...) whose lives are in danger from locations in a foreign nation to an appropriate safe haven, when directed by the [DOS].119\nUnlike most other military operations, NEOs have a unique C2 structure in which neither the geographic combatant commander or the subordinate joint force commander (JFC) is the senior U.S. government authority. Instead, this responsibility belongs to the Chief of Mission (COM):\nThe personal representative of the president to the government of the foreign country or to the IGO to which he or she is accredited and, as such, recommends and implements national policy regarding the foreign country or IGO and oversees the activities of USG employees in the mission. If assigned, the U.S. ambassador will always be the COM.120\nThe decision to order a NEO rests with the COM. The timing of such an order may not be based on the tactical situation or other considerations paramount to a military commander. Instead, the order \"may be delayed until the last possible moment to avoid actions that may be viewed as a tacit admission of diplomatic and/or political failure or lack of [U.S. Government] confidence in the [Host Nation] government.\"121 The primary guiding document for any individual NEO is an emergency action plan (EAP), which has a section on military evacuation. The appropriate geographic combatant commander reviews and comments on this section. EAP contents include:\n\n-\nPossible courses of action for different threat environments\n-\nLocation of evacuation sites (landing zones, ports, beaches)\n-\nAnticipated number of evacuees (total number by area) categorized by medical status:\n\nPersons not requiring medical assistance\n\nPersons requiring medical assistance prior to evacuation\n\nPersons requiring medical assistance prior to and during evacuation\n-\nPersons requiring emergency medical evacuation\n-\nLocation of assembly areas and major supply routes\n-\nLocation of command posts\n-\nKey personnel (name, location, and desired means of contacting them)\n-\nDescription of the embassy communications system, transportation fleet, and warden system\n-\nQuantity of class I (subsistence) supplies on hand at the embassy\n-\nQuantity of class III (fuel)\n-\nAvailability of class VIII (medical supplies)\n-\nStandard map products of the local area, with annotations identifying critical landmarks122\nAnother important consideration for this experiment is DOS readiness, especially given the unique C2 relationship of NEOs and the fact that contingency forces would have little or no on-the-ground experience prior to an emergency. A 2017 report from the Government Accountability Office (GAO) found \"gaps in its crisis and evacuation preparedness for overseas posts.\"123 Such gaps included failure to complete annual EAP updates on time; incomplete EAPs; a view that EAPs are \"lengthy and cumbersome documents that are not readily usable in emergency situations;\" failure to complete required EAP drills, including at \"posts rated high or critical in political violence or terrorism;\" and the complete failure to \"transmit an after-action report listing lessons learned to State headquarters following evacuations.\"124 GAO concluded, \"the gaps in State's crisis and evacuation preparedness increase the risk that post staff are not sufficiently prepared to handle crisis and emergency situations.\"125\n\n## Step Two: Evaluate Using Matrix\n\nTable 5 uses the deep-dive research from the first section of this report to describe potential PMC operations in four NEO-related scenarios.\n\nhave control as well as the intent and capability to assist operations that a unit intends to conduct126 operation would require little or no assembly of combat forces in country127 assembled at designated assembly areas, evacuation points, and sites128 concurrence and possible support129 involving emergency medical treatment, transportation, administrative processing, and coordination with DOS and other agencies involved in the evacuation130 using PMCs\n\n- Host country military and law enforcement agencies\nhave control as well as the intent and capability to assist operations that a unit intends to conduct131\n- No resistance to evacuation operations is expected;\noperation would require little or no assembly of combat forces in country132\n- Evacuees may or may not have been processed and\n\nassembled at designated assembly areas, evacuation points, and sites133\n\n- JTF can expect host nation concurrence and\n\npossible support134\n\n- JTF's primary concerns may be logistic functions\ninvolving emergency medical treatment, transportation, administrative processing, and coordination with DOS and other agencies involved in the evacuation135\n\n- Russia wishes to influence NEO, but strong rule of\nlaw and host nation security services (1) prevent PMC operations outright or (2) restrict them to roles nonintrusive to NEO (demining, private security, etc.)\n\n- Noncombatant evacuees and civilians may be evacuated\nunder conditions ranging from civil disorder, to terrorist action, to full-scale combat136\n- JTF must be prepared for a wide range of\ncontingencies137\n- JFC may elect to deploy a sizable security element with\nthe evacuation force or position a large reaction force, either with the evacuation force or at an intermediate staging base138\n- In addition to normal functions associated with\nnoncombatant evacuations (embarkation, transportation, medical, and services), the JTF may be required to conduct a forcible entry operation, establish defensive perimeters, escort convoys, participate in public relations operations, and perform the screening of evacuees normally accomplished by DOS officials139\n- Russia takes no substantive actions to influence NEO\nusing PMCs company, but possibly low due to lack of state support\n\n- Noncombatant evacuees and civilians may be evacuated\nunder conditions ranging from civil disorder, to terrorist action, to full-scale combat140\n- JTF must be prepared for a wide range of\ncontingencies141\n- JFC may elect to deploy a sizable security element with\nthe evacuation force or position a large reaction force, either with the evacuation force or at an intermediate staging base142\n- In addition to normal functions associated with\nnoncombatant evacuations (embarkation, transportation, medical, and services), the JTF may be required to conduct a forcible entry operation, establish defensive perimeters, escort convoys, participate in public relations operations, and perform the screening of evacuees normally accomplished by DOS officials143\n- Russia wishes to disrupt/influence NEO using PMCs to\nlimit official involvement, risk to state forces, etc.\n- Russia supports deployment of PMC with high quality\npersonnel, equipment, and training; possibly allows PMC to use state infrastructure\n- Russia uses PMCs to influence local actors, stoke\ntensions, impede evacuation, possibly provide weapons/ training to local actors; stage false flag attacks on NEO force and other local actors\n- PMCs occupy key terrain (e.g., evacuation sites) prior\nto arrival of U.S. forces; United States unable to seize terrain necessary for evacuation; ROE prevent engaging PMC\n- PMCs collect intelligence on U.S. forces for Russia - Russia provides advanced capabilities not yet observed\nin its history of support for PMCs (advanced MANPADS, ATGMs, EW/cyber, UAS, etc.)\n\n## Step Three: Identify Insights\n\nPermissiveness: High permissiveness favors the United States in NEOs. Low permissiveness offers PMCs the most opportunity in NEOs.\n\n-\nPMC occupation of key terrain is a considerable threat to NEOs. Evacuation sites are critical for gathering, processing, and\ntransporting detainees. Potential evacuation sites are identifiable by key characteristics. For instance, PMCs could occupy stadiums and other areas suitable for crowds and landing aircraft. PMCs need not fire on U.S. forces. Depending on the ROE, U.S. forces might not be able to forcibly remove the PMC.\n\nRussian State Involvement: High state involvement presents the most dangerous course of action when paired with low permissiveness in NEOs. When paired with high permissiveness, however, state involvement is negated.\n\n-\nWith a high level of state support, a Russian PMC in Syria was able to function as a BTG. That is, the PMC conducted basic combined arms operations with infantry, armor, and artillery. However, details in open-source reporting are insufficient to determine how well the PMC integrated different combat arms. This is the most dangerous scenario based on current informationa U.S. Army brigade might encounter state-supported, BTG-like entity.\n-\nRussian-backed separatists in eastern Ukraine conduct combined arms operations and are highly proficient, by any standard, at enabling integration, particularly IO, EW, and UAS. Though open-source reporting has not found the same capabilities present among PMCs, Russia could supply such capabilities should it choose to do so. Similarly, Russia could provide advanced MANPADS, ATGMs, and other weapons systems. This is the most dangerous scenario based on a plausible change in the scope of state supporta U.S. Army brigade might encounter a state-supported, BTG-like entity with advanced weapons and cutting-edge enabler technologies and expertise.\nConflict Continuum/ROMO/Operation Type: PMCs are capable in the cooperation/competition portion of the continuum, including during brief operations like NEOs. This capability requires low permissiveness and is dependent on high state involvement or, less likely, a non-state supported PMC demonstrating heretofore unseen levels of performance and resource.\n\n## Experiment 3: Peace Operations Step One: Describe Type Of Operation\n\nThis experiment is the second that examines crisis response and limited contingency operations. Peace operations fall into this category within the ROMO. Peacetime operations include five types of operations. This experiment focuses on one: PKO.\n\nPKO take place following diplomatic negotiation and agreement among the parties to a dispute, the sponsoring organization, and potential force contributing nations. Before PKO begin, a credible truce or cease fire is in effect, and the parties to the dispute must consent to the operation. A main function of the PKO force is to establish a presence that inhibits hostile actions by the disputing parties and bolsters confidence in the peace process. Agreements often specify which nations' forces are acceptable, as well as the size and type of forces each will contribute.144\nPKOs have three fundamental characteristics:\n\n-\nConsent. PKOs require an invitation, or at a minimum, consent of all the major parties to the conflict.\n-\nRestraint and Minimum Force. In PKOs, minimum force imposed by the peacetime operations force along with its inherent right to self-defense, govern the non-threatening nature of the actions taken.\n-\nImpartiality, Credibility, and Legitimacy. A peacetime operations force conducting PKOs does not act in support of a government or any party to a dispute; it is entirely impartial. Demonstrated impartiality is essential to establish and maintain the legitimacy of the PKO. 145\nJP 3-07.3, \"Peace Operations,\" lists the following as PKO ground force support capabilities:\n\n-\nObserving, monitory, and reporting\n-\nMaintaining public order and protecting civilians and public officials\n-\nSupport to elections\n-\nDelivery and protection of humanitarian assistance efforts\n-\nManning of checkpoints and patrolling\n-\nForce protection\n-\nHealth service support\n-\nLimited construction of critical infrastructure\n-\nSupervising truces and cease fires\n-\nIntelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance\n-\nCrowd control\n-\nNegotiation and mediation\n-\nInterposition between parties to the conflict\n-\nDemobilization and disarmament\n-\nPersonnel recovery\n-\nInspection of facilities\n-\nTraining 146\n\n## Step Two: Evaluate Using Matrix\n\nTable 6 uses the deep-dive research from the first section of this report to describe potential PMC operations in four PKO-related scenarios.\n\n- No substantial anti-U.S. or anti-Western sentiment - Demobilization of armed groups ongoing\nprograms ongoing\n- Russia wishes to disrupt/influence Western-led PKO, but\npolitical and local actor support for PKO mandate/force is strong, resulting in no opportunity for PMC operations its associated conflict using PMCs\n- Political representatives of warring parties agree to PKO - Some local actors do not support PKO mandate/force - Potential hostility to U.S./foreign presence - Demobilization of armed groups not progressing - Violent territorial disputes and ceasefire\ndisruptions persist\n- Intermittent heavy weapons use occurs; small arms/\nmunitions plentiful and non-attributable\n- Russia wishes to disrupt/influence Western-led PKO\nusing PMCs to limit official involvement, risk to state forces, etc.\n- PMCs contract with local actors, ostensibly to provide\nsecurity (area, personal, and/or convoy), mine clearance, etc.\n- Russia uses PMCs to influence local actors, stoke\ntensions, impede full implementation of mandate, possibly provide weapons/training to local actors; stage false flag attacks on PKO force and other local actors\n- Quality of PMC personnel/equipment high due to strong - PMCs collect intelligence on U.S. forces for Russia - Russia provides advanced capabilities not yet observed\nin its history of support for PMCs (advanced MANPADS, ATGMs, EW/cyber, UAS, etc.)\n\n## Step Three: Identify Insights\n\nPermissiveness: High permissiveness favors the United States in PKOs. Low permissiveness offers PMCs the most opportunity in PKOs.\n\n-\nPMC occupation of key terrain is a considerable threat to PKOs, particularly if the PMC is fulfilling a contractual obligation to provide security (area, personal, or convoy).\nRussian State Involvement: High state involvement presents the most dangerous course of action when paired with low permissiveness in PKOs. When paired with high permissiveness, however, state involvement is negated.\n\n-\nWith a high level of state support, a Russian PMC in Syria was able to function as a BTG. That is, the PMC conducted basic combined arms operations with infantry, armor, and artillery. However, details in open-source reporting are insufficient to determine how well the PMC integrated different combat arms. This is the most dangerous scenario based on current informationa U.S. Army brigade might encounter state-supported, BTG-like entity.\n-\nRussian-backed separatists in eastern Ukraine conduct combined arms operations and are highly proficient, by any standard, at enabling integration, particularly IO, EW, and UAS. Though open-source reporting has not found the same capabilities present among PMCs, Russia could supply such capabilities should it choose to do so. Similarly, Russia could provide advanced MANPADS, ATGMs, and other weapons systems. This is the most dangerous scenario based on a plausible change in the scope of state supporta U.S. brigade might encounter a state-supported, BTG-like entity with advanced weapons and cutting-edge enabler technologies and expertise.\nConflict Continuum/ROMO/Operation Type: PMCs are capable in the cooperation/competition portion of the continuum, including during extended operations like PKOs. This capability requires low permissiveness and is dependent on high state involvement or, less likely, a non-state supported PMC demonstrating heretofore unseen high levels of performance and resource.\n\n-\nRussia has a history of perpetuating so-called frozen conflicts (e.g., Nagorno-Karabakh in Azerbaijan, Transnistria in Moldova, South Ossetia and Abkhazia in the Republic of Georgia, and the Donbas region of eastern Ukraine.) Such behavior enables Russia to maintain influence and presence, as well as use the conflict as a bargaining chip in other matters. PMCs would be well suited to promote Russian interests in such situations.\n\n## Experiment 4: Large-Scale Combat Operations Step One: Describe Type Of Operation\n\nLarge-scale combat operations typically occur in two forms:\n\n-\nMajor action: a \"series of tactical actions (battles, engagements, strikes) conducted by combat forces of a single or several Services, coordinated in time and place, to achieve strategic or operational objectives in an OA.\" 147\n-\nCampaign: \"a series of related major operations aimed at achieving strategic and operational objectives within a given time and space.\"148\nThe Army supports large-scale combat operations through the application of land power, specifically \"maneuver, fires, special operations, cyberspace operations, EW, space operations, sustainment, and area security.\" As such, an operation could require a brigade to execute a wide range of taskstoo many to address coherently here. Instead, this experiment uses the notional phasing concept as a model (see Figure 4149).d Each phase is briefly explained:\nPhase 0 Shape: \"In general, shaping activities help set conditions for successful theater operations. Shaping activities include long-term persistent and preventive military engagement, security cooperation, and deterrence actions to assure friends, build partner capacity and capability, and promote regional stability. They help identify, deter, counter, and/or mitigate competitor and adversary actions that challenge country and regional stability.\"150 Phase 1 Deter: \"Once a crisis is defined, these actions may include mobilization, tailoring of forces, and other predeployment activities; initial deployment into a theater; employment of intelligence collection assets; and development of mission-tailored C2, intelligence, force protection, and logistic requirements to support the JFC's CONOPS.\" 151 Phase 2 Seize Initiative: \"In combat, this involves both defensive and offensive operations at the earliest possible time, forcing the enemy to culminate offensively and setting the conditions for decisive operations.\" 152 Phase 3 Dominate: \"These actions focus on breaking the enemy's will to resist or, in noncombat situations, to control the OE. Successful domination depends on overmatching enemy capabilities at critical times and places. Joint force options include attacking weaknesses at the leading edge of the enemy's defensive perimeter to roll enemy forces back and striking in depth to threaten the integrity of the enemy's A2/AD, offensive weapons and force projection capabilities, and defensive systems.\" 153 Phase 4 Stabilize: \"These actions and activities are typically characterized by a shift in focus from sustained combat operations to stability activities. These operations help reestablish a safe and secure environment and provide essential government services, emergency infrastructure reconstruction, and humanitarian relief.\" 154 Phase 5 Enable Civil Authority: \"The purpose is to help the civil authority regain its ability to govern and administer the services and other needs of the population. The military end state is typically reached during this phase, signaling the end of the joint operation.\" 155\nEach phase consists of a balance of offense, defense, and stability activities. Figure 5156 depicts this notional balance in each phase. FM 3-0, \"Operations,\" describes responsibilities at the brigade level and below as \"performing offensive and defensive tasks and necessary tactical enabling tasks. During large-scale combat operations they perform only those minimal essential stability tasks necessary to comply with the laws of land warfare.\"157\n\n## Step Two: Evaluate Using Matrix\n\nTable 7 uses the deep-dive research from the first section of this report to describe potential PMC operations in four large-scale combat operations-related scenarios.\n\nenvironments not permissive to U.S. forces.\n\nenvironments not permissive to U.S. forces.\n\nadversary in operation be divided among various groups, and/or have no discernible authority and non-state actors States, might operate in the area or be allied with operations using PMCs\n- Host nation possibly opposes U.S. operation or is U.S.\nadversary in operation\n- Territory can fall under control of host nation entirely,\nbe divided among various groups, and/or have no discernible authority\n- Threats to U.S. forces can be manifold, including state\nand non-state actors\n- United States might operate as part of a coalition or\nact alone\n- Other nations, possibly not allied with the United\nStates, might operate in the area or be allied with U.S. adversary\n- Russia wishes to disrupt/influence U.S. operation using\nPMCs to limit official involvement, risk to state forces, etc. Alternatively, Russian state forces are committed to the conflict and PMCs fight alongside them\n- Russia supports deployment of PMC with high quality\npersonnel, equipment, and training; possibly allows PMC to use state infrastructure\n- During earlier/latter phases, Russia uses PMCs to\ninfluence local actors, stoke tensions, possibly provide weapons/training to local actors; stage false flag attacks on U.S. force and other local actors\n- PMCs collect intelligence on U.S. forces for Russia - Russia provides advanced capabilities not yet observed\nin its history of support for PMCs (advanced MANPADS, ATGMs, EW/cyber, UAS, etc.)\n\n## Step Three: Identify Insights\n\nPermissiveness: Such operations necessarily occur in environments hostile to U.S. forces. Russian State Involvement: High state involvement presents the most dangerous course of action:\n\n-\nWith a high level of state support, a Russian PMC in Syria was able to function as a BTG. That is, the PMC conducted basic combined arms operations with infantry, armor, and artillery.\nHowever, details in open-source reporting are insufficient to determine how well the PMC integrated different combat arms. This is the most dangerous scenario based on current informationa U.S. Army brigade might encounter state-supported, BTG-like entity.\n\n-\nRussian-backed separatists in eastern Ukraine conduct combined arms operations and are highly proficient, by any standard, at enabling integration, particularly IO, EW, and UAS. Though open-source reporting has not found the same capabilities present among PMCs, Russia could supply such capabilities should it choose to do so. Similarly, Russia could provide advanced MANPADS, ATGMs, and other weapons systems. This is the most dangerous scenario based on a plausible change in the scope of state supporta U.S. Army brigade might encounter a state-supported, BTG-like entity with advanced weapons and cutting-edge enabler technologies and expertise.\nConflict Continuum/ROMO/Operation Type: PMCs are capable in the conflict portion of the continuum, including during large-scale combat operations. However, a U.S. Army brigade would have relative advantages across all warfighting functions. As such, PMCs likely would have negligible impact during the middle phases (2-3). PMCs could play an impactful role in earlier phases (0-1), as well as latter phase (4-5).\n\n## Conclusions\n\nRussian PMCs are used as a force multiplier to achieve objectives for both government and Russia-aligned private interests while minimizing both political and military costs. While Moscow continues to see the use of Russian PMCs as beneficial, their use also presents several vulnerabilities that yield both operational and strategic risks to Russian Federation objectives. While they can operate across the conflict continuum and present the United States with dilemmas at all levels of war, Russian PMCs do not pose a unique tactical threat.\n\n## The Vulnerabilities Of Russian Pmcs\n\nThe swift proliferation and wide use of Russian PMCs abroad also revealed many of the vulnerabilities that such groups have, as well as the risks taken on by the Russian Federation when it chooses to use such groups to achieve political and military objectives abroad. Russian PMCs appear to present both typical and unique vulnerabilities that U.S. commanders and agencies should consider and constitute a promising field for future analyses. Morale/Desertion: The pronounced use of Russian PMCs in particularly high-risk combat creates the risk of extremely low morale and even desertion of the assigned mission. Wagner commanders who operated in Syria described their high-casualty operations as a \"meat grinder\" and even speculated that the Russian Federation was purposefully disposing of them.158 However, the risk of desertion is partially mitigated by the ability to selectively prosecute individuals in Russian PMCs for illegal mercenary activity, as happened to two leaders of the Slavonic Corps (see the appendix: Syria). Not Self-Equipped: When without MoD support, PMCs only appear to be equipped with what their host or sponsor can provide in country. Given that Russian PMC client states appear to include many that often have scant military resources, or even fall under sanctions or embargos (see the appendix: Syria, Central African Republic, and Sudan), a lack of direct Russian state support can lead to a significant drop in quality materiel, training, and efficacy. Political Pressure at Home: The lack of support or benefits for members of Russian PMCs who return home, even wounded, carries the potential to create domestic political complications. In the Russian press, one Wagner fighter injured in Syria described how he could not claim any more help or rehabilitation support from the government, fearing he might be jailed for mercenary activities if he pushed the issue. Russian veterans' groups also brought such complaints to the global stage by petitioning the International Criminal Court (ICC) to investigate Russia's use of PMCs, calling for protections and benefits.159 Another political pressure group is the Union of the Committees of Soldiers' Mothers of Russia, which was among the earliest groups to openly report the deaths of contract soldiers in Ukraine, raise awareness around the death toll of both private and regular forces abroad, and protest the lack of benefits available to members of Russian PMCs upon their return home.160 Domestic Security: The risks associated with war-hardened, potentially hyper-nationalist, and radicalized Russian PMCs returning home is an issue of which Russian authorities are already aware. When rejecting the prospect of domestically legalizing PMCs, the Russian MoD and FSB pointed to concerns of \"Rambos,\" an assessment informed by the chaotic history of Russian PSCs of the post-Soviet 1990s.161 These fears were put into action in November 2018, when Russian law enforcement and the FSB moved to arrest several members of the pseudo-PMC E.N.O.T. Corp.paramilitary nationalists who allegedly supported Russian interests in Syria and Ukraine.162 The ubiquitous nature of such concerns led Wagner commanders and Russian analysts to speculate that the use of Russian PMCs in high-risk offensive operations is intended to dispose of individuals who would otherwise return home to become domestic security risks.163 Interagency Politics: The dramatic decline in materiel and training available to Wagner in Syria suggests that the efficacy and performance of Russian PMCs are susceptible to disagreements with the Russian MoD (see the appendix: Syria). Because Russian PMCs appear dependent on state support, the impact of such interruptions or transitions from a well-equipped sponsor to a poor one can be significant. Unforeseen Costs: Both observers and Russian decision makers noted the risks associated with Russian PMCs taking on independent contracts, specifically in regard to the potential deviation of those private interests away from the national interest.164 However, a potential vulnerability in the status quowhere the relationship between Russian PMCs and the Russian Federation remains blurredis that Russia could incur diplomatic penalties and other political repercussions based on actions taken by Russian PMCs on their own behalf or that of a third party. U.S. Air Superiority: As demonstrated in the February 2018 U.S. action against Wagner personnel in Syria (see the appendix: Syria), Russian PMCs are vulnerable when not provided with support against U.S. air capabilities. Mixed Strategic Messaging and Unintended Escalation: In a situation where Russian PMCs are involved, but the level of Russian state involvement or commitment is opaque, misinterpretation by other actors can lead to unintended escalation and interstate conflict.165 The presence of Russian PMCs performing private contracts could be misinterpreted as aggressive, state-sponsored action. Likewise, the perception of Russian PMCs as serving other clients could lead national actors to underestimate Russia's national interests on the ground and unintentionally enter hostilities against what are effectively Russian forces. Finally, as noted by observers after the February 2018 U.S. action against Wagner personnel in Syria (see the appendix: Syria), Russian inaction can result in domestic political pressure not to appear weak,166 likewise presenting escalation risks.\n\n## The Relevance Of Russian Pmcs To U.S. Forces And Missions\n\nRussian PMCs do not pose a unique tactical threatother actors, state and non-state, are similarly capable. This is not to say Russian PMCs are unproblematic for U.S. forces. PMCs can operate across the conflict continuum and present the U.S. Army with dilemmas at all levels of war. Most Dangerous Scenarios: With a high level of state support, a Russian PMC in Syria was able to functionmore or lessas a BTG. That is, the PMC conducted basic combined arms operations with infantry, armor, and artillery. However, details in open-source reporting are insufficient to determine how well the PMC integrated different combat arms. This is the most dangerous scenario based on current informationa U.S. Army brigade might encounter state-supported, BTG-like entity. Russian-backed separatists in eastern Ukraine conduct combined arms operations and are highly proficient, by any standard, at enabling integration, particularly IO, EW, and UAS. Though open-source reporting has not found the same capabilities present among PMCs, Russia could supply such capabilities should it choose to do so. Similarly, Russia could provide advanced MANPADS, ATGMs, and other weapons systems. This is the most dangerous scenario based on a plausible change in the scope of state supporta U.S. Army brigade might encounter a state-supported, BTG-like entity with advanced weapons and cutting-edge enabler technologies and expertise. Either scenario would be highly problematic were the United States to encounter it during crisis response or limited contingency operations, such as NEOs and PKOs. The U.S. element might lack the sort of joint force necessary to defeat such a threat. An encounter of this sort during large-scale combat operations likely would favor the United States, though the more advanced threat described in the second scenario could prove highly problematic. Most Likely Scenarios: These scenarios involve smaller-scale PMC operations with more modest goals than the outright defeat of a U.S. formation. These scenarios take place during crisis response and limited contingency operations in operational environments the United States would deem hostile or uncertain. Success would likely require a high level of Russian state support, given the history of poor performance among PMCs without state support. Examples include:\n\n-\nOccupation of key terrain: PMCs need not attack U.S. formations to disrupt U.S. operations. During a NEO, PMCs could identify and occupy potential evacuation sites, such as stadiums, schools, and airports. This could complicate, and possibly curtail, U.S. efforts to gather, process, and transport evacuees out of the affected area. This would be especially problematic in an area with limited infrastructure suitable to support evacuation. Restrictive ROEs and political considerations might preclude the forcible removal of the PMC. In such a scenario, a PMC could be extraordinarily effective without firing a single shot.\n-\nFoment unrest: During a PKO, PMCs could ally with local actors to provide weapons, training, and other forms of support, including intelligence information on peace negotiations. This is particularly true in locations where Russia holds some cultural affinity with locals. Russia has long perpetuated so-called frozen conflicts to maintain presence and influence in a given area. PMCs are well suited for this purpose.\nOther Potential Scenarios: Lastly, there are less severe scenarios in which PMCs seek to compete with or undermine U.S. influence (during security cooperation, for example.) PMCs face limited opportunities in OEs deemed permissive for U.S. operations, regardless of the degree of Russian state support. Host nation governments welcome U.S. support. However, PMCs have much greater opportunity in OEs the United States considers hostile or uncertain.\n\n## Appendix: Contemporary Cases Of Russian Pmc Use\n\nMercenary captains are either excellent men of arms or not: if they are, you cannot trust them because they always aspire to their own greatness, either by oppressing you, who are their patron, or by oppressing others contrary to your intention; but if the captain is not virtuous, he ruins you in the ordinary way.167\nNiccolo Machiavelli, The Prince Russian PMCs are known, alleged, and suspected of being present and operating in numerous countries across eastern and central Europe, the Middle East, Africa, and elsewhere. This appendix details available information concerning Russian PMC activities in known or suspected AOs to inform the analysis contained in the body of this report. Syria, Ukraine, the CAR, and Sudan are discussed in depth, detailing the uses and other attributes of Russian PMCs in each AO. Other AOs discussed at length are Yemen, Libya, Nigeria, and Venezuela. Other countries where Russian PMCs are alleged to have operated are also mentioned and briefly discussed. While the number of actors and competing interests in the Syrian Civil War only grew since it began in 2011, the primary goals of the Russian Federation remained fairly consistent. First, maintain and defend the regime of Bashar al-Assad from removal and against both terrorist (e.g., Islamic State, or IS) and opposition forces. Second, Russia argued that fighting jihadist forces abroad in Syria serves a domestic security concernRussian estimates in 2014 and 2015 indicated that between 1,500 and 2,500 Russian citizens from the Caucasus and elsewhere were fighting for IS in Syria and Iraq, as well as 7,000 nationals from other countries in the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS).168 \"There is a threat of their return to us,\" President Putin said in a September 28, 2015 interview, \"So instead of waiting for their return, we are better off helping Assad fight them on Syrian territory.\"169 Third, intervention allowed for the solidification of military basing for power projection in the region, including the 2017 expansion of the naval facility in Tartus,170 the operation of Khmeimim Air Base in Latakia, as well as use of Shayrat Air Base in Homs. However, despite these guiding interests, Russian intervention in Syria and the Middle East appears to be improvised and responsive to shifting international and domestic factors.171\n\n## Early Pmc Involvement - Moran's Slavonic Corps\n\nInvolvement by Russian PMCs in Syria predated the formal involvement of the Russian Federation in 2015. The ill-fated deployment of the Slavonic Corps to Syria in 2013 is often cited as among the earliest examples of Russia's contemporary use of PMCs.172 Press reports of the group's involvement in Syria emerged when jihadists claimed to have killed Russians near Homs, publishing photographs of documents identifying the Russian and tying the Slavonic Corps (established in Hong Kong, but run out of St. Petersburg) to the Moran Security Group (a Russian PSC that provides teams for cargo retrieval, hostage rescue,173 convoy security, anti-piracy ship security, transportation of equipment, and other services174). While the Slavonic Corps fighter ISIS claimed to kill was alive and home in Russia, he confirmed to independent Russian journalists with *Fontanka* that the documents were genuine. The fighter claimed that the Slavonic Corps did not take part in any fighting, saying their job was to provide \"defense of economic facilities of the Syrian Republic... to free the sub-divisions of the Syrian army from these duties, so that they could take part in the battle against the bandits.\"175\n\nDetailed interviews with other members of the Slavonic Corps painted a different picture of the group's role. Recruits were flown to Lebanon and traveled by land to Syria under the impression that they would be serving a passive and legal security function, contracted by the Syrian government to protect \"energy facilities,\" and that the Russian Federation and FSB \"were on board and involved in the project.\"176 Instead, upon arriving in Damascus, Slavonic Corps recruits discovered they were working for different, unnamed Syrian nationals, and that they had to reach, seize, and hold an oil industry site more than 500 km away in Deir ez-Zor, where they would encounter resistance and even incur casualties.177\n\nThe Slavonic Corps has been described in press reports as poorly equipped and led.178 Members described the force as numbering 267 in total. One former member claimed it was divided into two companiesthe \"Cossack,\" and \"Slavic,\" (but it is unclear if these names reflected the make-up of the companies). Some of the former members interviewed had military backgrounds and were initially recruited for anti-piracy missions based on their military experience. Additionally, with universal conscription, most able-bodied Russian men have some basic military and small arms training. Slavonic Corps bosses allegedly claimed they expected the force to grow to as many as 2,000 men. There is no indication that Slavonic Corps members received any training prior to their deployment, and they were only equipped upon arrival in Syria via land crossings from Lebanon. Beyond small arms, they were provided with a variety of heavy weapons and equipment of fledgling quality: 1939-model anti-aircraft guns, mortars from 1943, four T-72 tanks (later taken by Syrians and replaced with T-62s that were in poor condition and abandoned), BMP infantry vehicles, and JMC jeeps and Hyundai buses with homemade armoring.179\n\nMembers from St. Petersburgformer soldiers, riot police, and interior officerswere allegedly recruited by the head of the Moran Security Group and FSB reserve lieutenant colonel Vyacheslav Kalashnikov, after which another recruiter facilitated their paperwork for Syria and ordered passports. One fighter identified this process directly with the FSB when describing his desire to speak anonymously (\"the FSB took our signatures.\").180 There is suspicion that the FSB was involved in the creation of the Slavonic Corps,181 but both the FSB and Moran Security Group denied knowledge or affiliation with the group.182 One anonymous press source noted that the ambiguity about state involvement with the Slavonic Corps was likely intentional: \"It's often hard to tell with military contractors where private interests end and government ones begin... That's kind of the point.\"183 Denis Korotkova Russian journalist covering Russian PMCsargued that Slavonic Corps \"could not exist without serious support from high-ranking government officials,\" a perspective affirmed by RSB Group leader Oleg Krinitsyn.184 The only coordination with actors other than Russia suggested by the testimony of Slavonic Corps members involves Syrian loyalist and potentially government elements. The Slavonic Corps was co-stationed with Syrian military recruits in Latakia. Unnamed Syrians exerted control over how the Corps was equipped (see below). The last combat operation of the Slavonic Corps occurred when they were allegedly sent to assist a loyalist Syrian militia in the neighboring village of Sukhnah, during which they received fire support from a Syrian government self-propelled gun and aircraft. The two Slavonic Corps units fled after the opposing militant forces began to surround them, leading to a shouting match between their leadership and Syrian \"employer\" afterwardthe Corps soon after disarmed and left Syria.185\n\nUpon the arrival of their chartered planes to Moscow in October, the members of the Slavonic Corps returning from Syria were detained by officers of the FSB. Digital media, passports, non-disclosure forms, and tickets were confiscated. While most Slavonic Corps members were released, their manager Vadim Gusev (deputy director of Moran) and Evgeny Sidorov (human resources) were arrested and charged by the FSB for carrying out mercenary activities.186 It is not clear why they were arrested upon return. However, despite this failure, it did not end the PMC careers of all involved. According to press reports, one of the commanders of the Slavonic Corps was Dmitry Utkin187a lieutenant colonel in the GRU (2nd Independent Brigade, 700th Independent Spetsnaz Detachment) until he became a reservist in 2013 to work with Moranwho would go on to found Wagner (a.k.a. ChVK Wagner,e Vagner).188 A separate group of Russians continued working in Syria guarding key locations, albeit signed to a different company (Zeitpplus Consultancy Services, Ltd of Cyprus), but their contracts suggested avoiding participation in warfare unless they obtain Syrian citizenshipwhich would avoid violating Russian laws against mercenary activity.189\n\n## Overt Intervention In Syria\n\nThe advent of the Russian Federation's formal military involvement in September 2015 initiated significant growth in the offensive use of Russian PMCs in Syria and shined a brighter light on the operations of Wagner, which served a role in Ukraine up until that point that was harder for observers to distinguish from other actors in the conflict. Russian PMCs were active in Syria well before Russia's formal interventionWagner since fall 2014 or earlier,190 and the Slavonic Corps in 2013. However, the formal use of force brought an influx of Russian PMC personnel and initiated a period punctuated by several battles where Russian PMCs played a significant roleprimarily Wagner, at times going by the name \"OSM\" according to some press reports.191 Cossack units also allegedly operated in Syria,192 though individual Cossack fighters were identified as participating within Russian PMCs in the region.193 While press reporting seems to indicate only Wagner participated in combat operations,194 other Russian PMCs are suspected by observers to have participated in the Syrian Civil War.195 It is possible that some open-source reporting on the participation of other Russian PMCs misidentified them as Wagner (see Introduction, Data Limitations and Gaps). Press reports on whether or not the Russian PSC RSB Group provided any PMC services in Syria are inconsistent, but they most likely did not.196 Erroneous press reports claimed that a Russian PMC called Turanan alleged \"Muslims battalion\" composed of fighters from Central Asia and the North Caucasusfought alongside Wagner in Syria,197 but subsequent investigative journalistic reports revealed the group to be a fabrication.198 Open-source reporting and data provide significant detail on the participation of Russian PMCs in at least four major engagements in Syria: 1. The liberation of Palmyra from ISIS forces by Russian, Syrian, and other pro-Assad forces over March 13-27, 2016; 2. The second liberation of Palmyra in spring 2017, after the city was recaptured by ISIS in December 2016;199 3. The fall 2017 offensive to capture the oil-rich province of Deir el-Zour ahead of and alongside Syrian counterparts and with Russian MoD support;200 and 4. The February 2018 Battle of Khasham in Deir el-Zour, where a mix of Syrian, pro-Assad, and Russian PMC forces advanced on a U.S. and coalition held position, only to be defeated with the support of overwhelming U.S. air and artillery strikes.\n\nRussian PMCs in Syria played prominent roles in offensive operations. Speaking to the press, Wagner members claimed to perform the most perilous and arduous tasks on the front lines,201 \"often moving out in the first wave of an attack and storming population centers and enemy positions.\"202 One member referred to Wagner's role in a battle as \"cannon fodder.\"203 Russia likely leverages Russian PMCs extensively to fill high-risk roles as an element of Russia's consistent policy to minimize, downplay, and underreport the deaths of official Russian soldiers in Syria204a policy motivated by political sensitivity at home.205 Roles and functions performed by Wagner in combat operations included forward advisers, coordination of fire and movement, forward air controllers,206 and shock troops,207 or elite infantry.208 Russian PMCs also allegedly served as trainers for Syrian and loyalist forces209 and even augmented Syrian units established and trained by Russian commanders (e.g., Syria's 5th Volunteer Assault Corps).210 They would also take on protection functions around Syrian infrastructure (hydrocarbon extraction, transmission)though they were allegedly tasked with liberating such sites as well.211 Russian PMCs also appear to be leveraged for propaganda purposes as a means to bolster local partners. Speaking to Republic. ru about the March 2016 recapture of Palmyra, a \"contractor complained... that in the end, official propaganda attributed all of the PMC's achievements to the Syrian military.\"212 This is reinforced by the fact that in 2018referencing the Battle of Khashamformer Donetsk separatist commander Igor Girkin (or \"Strelkov\") cited a source close to the group when he described Wagner forces during the engagement as \"posing as Syrians.\"213 As of late March 2019, there appeared to be a newer Russian PMC operating in Syria with pro-government forces called Vegacy Strategic Services LTD (a.k.a. Vegacy, Vega). Vegacy has had a pronounced public profile in Syria, performing more traditional military contracting work (training, facility security) and does not appear to perform frontline combat operations. Some open-source analysis describes Vegacy personnel as composed of both Russians and Ukrainians. The Ukrainian SBU denies this, however, and alleges that those personnel identified as Ukrainians left in 2014 to cooperate with Russian security services and that Vegacy is a front for Wagner.214 However, other observers of Russian PMCs have noted the pronounced coverage Vegacy has received from pro-Kremlin press and suggest that the group is little more than an information operation to discredit Western coverage of Wagner and other Russian PMCs.215 As of summer 2019, at least one Russian PMC, known as Schit (Shield), was identified providing protection services for an oil field north of Palmyra owned by the Russian company Stroitransgaz. This came to light in July 2019 when three Russians were reported killed in Arabic language media but not reported by the Russian military at Hmemima. Schit reportedly operates under the support of 45th Guards Brigade of the Russian Airborne based out of Kubinka. The leadership of Schit reportedly is made up of former Airborne veterans. The Russian newspaper, *Novaya Gazeta*, reported one leader may be 45th Brigade veteran, Evgenii Sidorov, who was arrested in 2014 for his activities with Moran Security Group in Syria (described earlier). Schit reportedly provides security for five sites in Syria, and has 25-30 people at each site for rotations of 3 months, paying around 120,000 rubles a month.216 At least two of the Schit PMC fighters killed in July 219 previously fought in the separatist Luhansk People's Republic in 2014-2015, but in separate militia battalions (one in Amur and the other in Vityaz). One had also previously been a member of Wagner, starting in September 2015 and switching to Schit in fall 2018. The families of two of the dead received death certificates signed by Russian military doctors based in Syria. Unlike Wagner, Schit was not able to obtain tanks, artillery, or self-propelled rocket systems. In fall 2018, Schit was recruiting for 82mm Vasilek mortar operators, but it is unclear if they successfully found candidates.217\n\nIn the 2015-2016 timeframe, Wagner appeared well trained and well equipped, according to open-source reporting. Selection and training for Wagner employees before travel to Syria occurred at (or adjacent to) a Russian military base in Molkino, Krasnodarhome of the GRU 10th Special Purpose Brigade.218 Press reports indicate Wagner fighters would receive up to 2 months of comprehensive training before deploying.219 When in Syria at that time, Wagner received effectively unlimited amounts of training ammunition and were issued an assortment of heavy weapons: T-72 tanks,f 220 BM-21 Grad launchers, and 122 mm D-30 howitzers.221 Wagner personnel were photographed next to Russian MoD helicopters and airplanes, and allegedly equipped with purportedly GRU-exclusive kit.g 222 Early numbers from Russian officials close to the MoD numbered the group at about 1,000 by December 2015.223 However, in mid-2017 and with the benefit of hindsight, Wagner members described the organization in Syria 2015-2016 as numbering from 1,500 to 2,000 at any given time (over 2,300 total), and composed of \"four reconnaissance and assault companies, a group command, a tank company, a combined artillery group, reconnaissance and support units.\"224 Three Wagner commanders interviewed by the press also estimated their numbers in Syria as somewhere around 2,000 as of 2018.225 The number of Russian civilians flying to Syria grew exponentially during Russia's intervention, also corresponding with the patterns of Russian PMC involvement in the conflict.h 226 Open-source estimates of overall Wagner numbers in Syria range widelylikely due to their ability to quickly recruit and field personnel, and their episodic employment for specific offensivesbut consistently grew over time,i 227 mirroring accounts that the group  was aggressively recruiting.228 Accounting for rotation of forces, the total number of Russian fighters engaged in Syria under Wagner likely amounted to between 3,600 and 6,000 (with between 1,000 and 2,500 active at any given time).229 Whatever the real number, it is important to note that the proportion of Wagner fighters operating in Syria at any given time to regular Russian troops and airmen on the ground at the height of the official intervention (4,000) is considerably highbetween one-fourth and almost two-thirds.230\n\nh\n The number of Russian citizens flying to Syria in 2013 and 2014 reflected a baseline\nof about 1,800 each year. This rate remained steady until it multiplied by five in the second half of 2015, and doubled again to stabilize at a new high-water mark: almost 22,000 departures in 2016, over 25,000 in 2017, and remaining steady with 17,000 departures in the first half of 2018. (Maria Tsetkova, 2018)\ni\n A MoD officer and source close to Wagner estimated the size of the group leading\nup to the liberation of Palmyra (March 2016) as \"about 2,500 personnel, including as many as 1,600 permanently deployed in the zone of combat.\" (Ilya Rozhdestvensky, 2018) Researchers with the *Conflict Intelligence Team* (CIT) estimated a total of\n3,000 Wagner employees rotated to Syria between 2015 and 2017. (Owen Matthews,\n2018) Documentation obtained by *Republic.ru* from a subdivision of the group\nallegedly listing the dog tag numbers of some Wagner employees (issued in ascending order, beginning at 0001) seemed to confirm that as of February 2018, Wagner\nemployed at least 3,602 men. (Ilya Rozhdestvensky, 2018) In 2018, an investigative journalist in Russia estimated the total number of Wagner fighters having rotated through Syria at 6,000, with about 1,500 active at any given timean estimate that an open source report on Russian PMCs out of the Norwegian Defence Research Establishment (FFI) assessed \"does not seem unreasonable.\" (Ase Gilje stensen and Tor Bukkvoll, 2018)\nHowever, soon after the successful liberation of Palmyra in March 2016 and a brief decline in operations through the latter half of 2016, the quality of recruits, equipment, training, and support all declined. Upon return to theater in January 2017 and since then, Russian PMCs in Syria \"were no longer provided air or artillery support, supplies declined [and] they began to be equipped with obsolete weapons instead of modern ones.\"231 Other opensource reports232 and press interviews with members of Wagner confirm this decline, as well as the loss of consistent training. There was now an \"inadequate amount of time devoted to preparation for missions in Syria,\"233 and with the decline in quantity of munitions provided to the group, \"regular shooting practice was abandoned.\"234 A Wagner commander described this time, saying \"They took away the tanks and the weapons... They took back everything they had given earlier. Now the Vagner forces fight with Syrian weapons.\"235 In the early 2017 effort to retake Palmyra, Wagner personnel were allegedly equipped with outmoded and far inferior equipment than the last engagement: lower quality small arms, machine guns, and limited ammunition;j several SVD rifles and at most two AGS-17s were provided, but arrived late; T-62 tanks (four or five); and M-30 howitzers from 1938 (about 12).236 There are press reports that suggest this decline in quality and loss of significant Russian MoD support was the political fallout of a mid-2016 argument between Wagner financier Yevgeny Prigozhin and Minister of Defense Sergei Shoigu (see Coordination with Russia and Others below).237 Another potential cause might be the shift of the financial burden for sustaining Wagner from Russia to sponsors in Syria (the Syrian authorities, other private interests, or both238), leading to pay discrepancies,k 239 delayed or unreliable funding, lower quality recruits, less time for training, and poor equipment.240 The lower quality of recruits was accompanied by broader sourcing internationally.241\n\nWagner and other Russian PMCs in Syria consistently coordinated with other actors aligned with the Assad regime. While Russian Federation and\n\nfour magazines and 120 cartridges were used as ammunition. Armament consisted of AK-47 automatic weapons of North Korean production, received from the Syrian\nside and several Kalashnikov machine guns PC and PKK. The second company received company machine guns of the 1946 model RP-46. In the Soviet Army, these weapons in the army were replaced by the PC and the PKK back in the 60s of the last century.\" (*Fontanka*, 2017)\nk\n Information on the salaries of Russian PMC employees in Syria is generally inconsistent and contradictory.\nRussian MoD support and coordination appeared significant for a time, the nature and extent of coordination with Russian PMCs operating in Syria later became blurred, potentially suggesting a shift in C2 away from the Russian MoD to the Assad regime. This obscuring or potential change in the relationship between Wagner and the MoD seems to have taken place between the March 2016 recapture of Palmyra and January 2017when Wagner employees returned to Syria to find a decline in support and materiel (see Equipment, Training, and Personnel above). Russian PMCs in Syria were allegedly coordinated, tasked, and supervised by the FSB, GRU,242 and in some cases the General Staff's Chief Administration243 in the 2016 timeframe, according to press reports citing sources with knowledge of their operations. A state-owned Russian news outlet reported that, according to individuals in the FSB and MoD, \"the Wagner group is supervised by the GRU.\"244 Wagner commanders interviewed by the press in 2018 described the PMC as operating under Syrian command, but nevertheless closely coordinating with the Russian MoD. One commander described how this worked in battle, saying:\nEvery company has a connection to [Vagner] headquarters and there is an officer of the Russian military command there... He coordinates the air cover where an operation is under way. In general, the coordination is very precise. Sometimes it is a thing of beauty to see how perfectly the aviation and artillery support works out.245\nWagner took part in the March 2016 battle at Palmyra alongside Russian Special Operations Forces and the Syrian Army, with the support of an aggressive air campaign246opening with 41 sorties against 146 targets over 24 hours.247 Participating Russian MoD forces included infantry, TOS-1 and BM-30 'Smerch' heavy multiple rocket launchers, and Mi-24 'Hind' helicopter gunships. Other Assad-aligned forces that participated in the battle include the Afghan Shia Liwa al-Fatimiyoun, Iraqi Shia militias, and Lebanese Hezbollah.248 Although ISIS would later recapture the city in December 2016,249 necessitating a second offensive early the next year (again with Russian PMC participation),250 the recapture of Palmyra was a significant victory for Russia at the timean event celebrated with an official state concert in an ancient amphitheater in the city, complete with a celebrity conductor and televised address by President Vladimir Putin (see the figure on the opposite page).251 Although Wagner's role in the battle was obscured in official propaganda,252 members of the PMC received official military honors for their role that year.253 The close operational relationship between Wagner and the MoD changed in January 2017, when support from the MOD all but disappeared. According to Russian journalists interviewing direct sources, Wagner was left without air or artillery support, evacuation of the wounded, or supplies from the MoD.254 These developments coincided with a shift in Wagner's mission set and clientele. Russian firm Euro Polis (or Evro Polis; allegedly owned by Wagner financier Yevgeny Prigozhin as a front for Wagner), with the help of Russian Energy Minister Aleksandr Novak, signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with Syria's state-owned General Petroleum Corp., agreeing to take back Islamic State-controlled oil and gas installations and guard them in exchange for a quarter of their output.255 According to Novak, the MOU was signed in December 2016,256 and an unauthenticated draft of the contract was published by the *Associated Press* in December 2017.257 In this vein, Russian officials were quoted in 2018 by Russian press saying that Wagner was operating for several unnamed \"private investors,\" and that the PMC was funded by the Assad regime since 2017.258 No definitive explanation for the breakdown of MoD support for Wagner has been made public, but informed speculations have included a personal fallout between Prigozhin and Sergei Shoigu,259 Russian PMCs attracting too much public attention, lack of MoD confidence in the quality of Wagner's services,260 an institutional MoD resentment for Wagner's role in the Syrian conflict outside their C2, or efforts by military commanders to force Prigozhin to give them a cut of his earnings.261 Regardless of the cause, while this shift in relationship away from the Russian MoD is reflected in a wide range of sources concerning the decline in funding, materiel, and support for Wagner in Syria, the loss of MoD coordination and support does not appear to have been complete or permanent. According to the Institute for the Study of War (ISW), out of eight areas in eastern Syria where \"Russian Proxies\" were presentas of March 8, 2019they were co-located with \"Russian Forces\" in five (incl. Arima, Mayadeen, and Palmyra).262 The Russian military base in Molkino where Wagner was trained underwent significant expansions and improvements between 2013 and 2017, suggesting a significant investment and coordination of state resources.263 According to open source reporting, as of February 2018, Molkino remained a focal point for the assembly and training for Wagner, but resources available to them have declined.264 The partial shift in coordination is also apparent in the transportation of Russian PMC recruits into theater. A former Russian sailor detained and questioned by the Security Service of Ukraine (SBU) testified that, during his service on the Russian cruiser Varyag in 2015 until 2017, he witnessed the vessel carry Wagner contractors, heavy weapons, and ammunition to port in Tartus, Syria. This is denied by the Russian MoD,265 but an earlier press report cited a Wagner commander who described a similar scene unloading crates of munitions at the port of Tartus.266 Nevertheless, by January 2017 and into 2018, Wagner employees were travelling to Syria by chartered flights out of Rostov to Latakia and Damascus on A320s operated by Syrian airline Cham Wings. However, one member of Wagner speaking to Reuters noted that they would also occasionally travel on Russian military aircraft when the contractors do not all fit in the chartered jets.267 Wagner participation in the September-November 2017 battle for Deir ez- Zorframed as a strategic, nearly final victory over ISIS, but also against Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) in the area268is the clearest evidence that the loss of MoD support in early 2017 did not mean a complete end of PMC-MoD cooperation in Syria. However, this does not necessarily mean that the Russian MoD had C2 over Wagner in the course of operations; it is possible that this cooperation only occurred in the context of the Russian MoD supporting the ground offensive of Syrian forces, which operated with support from Wagner. Other than the Syrian army, ground forces also included Hezbollah and other aligned Shia militias. The support provided by the Russian MoD was primarily through strategic bombing (over 150 attack sorties per day according to Russian press reports269) and cruise missile attacks against ISIS targets.270 Another form of support was Russian sappers brought into Syria via An-124 transport jets to install a 210 meter floating bridge (PP-2005) across the Euphrates River. This support also presumably involved Russian ground forces, as two commanders were among the casualties.l 271 Up to 100 Wagner fighters died in the operations, and when extended lines of communication through the desert were harassed by ISIS, two Russians were captured and executed.272 One press report quoted sources with direct knowledge of the battle who described the effectiveness of the Russians on the ground as \"not that impressive... not many professionals in the team and too much blood.\"273 However, the most apparently significant and dramatic breakdown in Wagner-MoD coordination occurred in February, 2018, when pro-Assad forces supported by Wagner fighters were soundly defeated by U.S. air power. At a press briefing soon after the engagement, Pentagon Chief Spokesperson Dana W. White described the event:\nSyrian pro-regime forces moved in a battalion-sized unit formation, supported by artillery, tanks, multiple-launch rocket systems and mortars. After 20 to 30 artillery and tank rounds landed within 500 meters of the SDF headquarters location, Syrian Democratic Forces, supported by the coalition, targeted the aggressors with a combination of air and artillery strikes. Coalition advisors were with the SDF, and this action was taken in self-defense. Pro-regime vehicles and personnel, who were turned around and headed back west, were not targeted. The coalition observed a slow buildup of pro-regime forces over the past week. Coalition officials alerted Russian officials of the SDF presence via the deconfliction line in advance of the attack. The deconfliction line -- the deconfliction process served its purpose. Coalition officials were in regular communication with Russian counterparts before, during and after the attack. Russian officials assured coalition officials they would not engage coalition forces in the vicinity. One SDF soldier was wounded, and there were no coalition casualties. Our forces have the inherent right to self-defense.274\nLater press accounts revealed more details about the engagement. While holding the Conoco plant with SDF and Kurdish forces in support of a separate offensive against ISIS in the region, the U.S. team of about 30 soldiers watched the forces assemble along the Euphrates Riverand monitored transmissions showed some of them were speaking Russian. The position was first bombarded with howitzer artillery fire before the assembled forces advanced with supporting mortar fire. The attacking forces300-500 with 27 vehicles (incl. both T-55 and T-72 main battle tanks, as well as APCs) included Wagner (\"5th and 2nd sections\"275), Syrian government soldiers, and militias (allegedly Lebanese Hezbollah276 and detachments from both Liwa al-Baqir and Afghan Fatemeyoun277). After calls by U.S. defense officials to Russian counterparts failed to stop the attack, a U.S. reaction team, Marine artillery, and air strikes defeated the attacking force in about four hours.278 However, this account is contradicted by one press report that alleges Russian PMC forces were stationed in the area, but not part of either formation advancing on the coalition-held position.279 Official accounts by the Russian and Syrian governments also deviate significantly from that in official DoD statements and U.S.-sourced press reports. U.S. accounts to the press insist that they were in contact with Russia through deconfliction lines during, before, and after the attack.280 Moscow, however, claims the U.S. only communicated with them after the coalition strikes, despite also maintaining that the pro-Assad forces involved had not coordinated with the Russian command.281 Nevertheless, Russia's ambassador to the UN made public that the incident would be brought up during closed door consultations at the UN Security Council.282 Then-U.S. Secretary of Defense James Mattis described the battle as \"a perplexing situation,\" that he had \"no idea why they would attack,\" and that \"you can't expect somebody to deconflict something they can't control.\"283 A Russian press report on the battle bluntly stated \"They do not report to the Defense Ministry. Therefore, the Defense Ministry bears no responsibility for them.\"284 This alleged lack of C2 over Wagner and associated pro-Assad forces calls back the question of the shift in Wagner's relationship away from the Russian MoD to local Syrian authorities through the Energy Ministry-negotiated contract with Euro Polis (see above). Wagner members interviewed by the press expressed suspicions that the MoD had promised air support, but then abandoned the Russian PMC in order to embarrass Prigozhin.285 However, other press reports alleged the MoD provided for the evacuation of injured Wagner fighters to military hospitals in Russia (contrary to earlier accounts to the press that this support was lost to Wagner in early 2017).286 Casualty estimates ranged from the Russian MoD official statement of 25 wounded pro-Syrian volunteers287 (allegedly only 5 Russian citizens dead), to over 300 dead or wounded.288 A Kremlin spokesperson denied any knowledge of \"other Russians [outside the Russian armed forces] who might be in Syria,\"289 and anonymous members of the Russian MoD confirmed to journalists the operation was not approved by the Russian command in Syria, instead characterizing the assault as a local fight over oil.290 However, there is reason to doubt the claims that the Russian Federation did not approve the attack or could not have acted to stop it. Press reports suggest that Yevgeny Prigozhin was in touch with the Kremlin and Syrian officials both shortly before and after the attack, allegedly communicating to senior members of the Assad government that he received approval for the operation from an unnamed Russian minister.291 Prigozhin also allegedly had to assure aides at the Kremlin that such a mistake would never happen again.292 According to one open source assessment, \"Russia both supported the attack and simultaneously gave the impression of genuine efforts to prevent the attack in order to confuse senior U.S. decision makers.\"293 After the battle, a Russian press report described the decision on Wagner's continued presence in the region as forthcoming, but quoted a source close to MoD as saying \"there is no question of disbanding the PMC.\"294 As time has passed, the conflict ebbed, and numerous press reported made Wagner widely known, the Russian government has been more open about PMCs in Syria. In June 2019, during his annual question and answer call in show, President Putin finally admitted the presence of PMCs in Syria but denied they had any connection to the Russian government. In response to a question about the deaths of PMCs, he said, \"There seems to be private companies, specifically private security companies, under the auspices of which the [killed Russians] are acting [in Syria]. This is not the Russian state and they are not participants in hostilities, unfortunately or fortunately.\" He went on further to describe how they were risking their lives and contributing to the fight against terrorism as part of their duties in solving \"national economic problems\" associated with \"oil production and the development of fields.\" However, he underlined, \"This is not the Russian state, nor the Russian Army, so we are not commenting any further.\" This description keeps them well outside Russian laws on mercenary activity. This followed the themes of a December 2018 press conference where Putin was asked about the legality of Wagner and stated, \"regarding their activities abroad, if , I repeat again, they do not violate Russian law, they have the right to work and push their business interests anywhere in the world.\"295\n\nThe friendliness of the Assad regime in Syria and their need for military assistance provides the Russian Federation with a highly permissive environment for the use of Russian PMCs in the country. In late 2013, Ukraine was expected to sign an association agreement with the European Union (EU). However, this would have precluded the country from membership in the Russia-led Eurasian Economic Union (EEU), so Moscow imposed escalating economic reprisals and threats on Kyiv, to the point that Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych announced a surprise reversal. The announcement sparked the Euromaidan movementa long series of pro-Western, anti-Russian protests and clashes from late 2013 to early 2014 in Kyiv and across western Ukrainewhich, despite efforts by Moscow, removed Yanukovych from office. Russia responded with military operations to invade and annex the Crimean Peninsula and support separatist forces in eastern Ukraine.\n\n## Alleged Use On The Crimean Peninsula\n\nIn late February 2014, Russian special forces personnel in unmarked uniforms appeared in Crimea and took control of certain government, airport, and other facilities. Euphemistically referred to as \"polite people\" or \"little green men,\" these officially unattributed forces operated alongside other military formations to immobilize Ukrainian forces and eventually take full control of the peninsula.296 Several open source reports allege that Russian PMCs participated in the operations leading to the annexation of Crimea (specifically an early iteration of Wagner that was at the time an informal grouping of Slavonic Corps remnants with locals and others).297 Nevertheless, the extent or veracity of a Russian PMC role in the invasion of Crimea is not confirmed, and there appears to be no direct evidence available to verify these claims.298 Russian Cossack units, however, played an overt role in the occupation as fighting forces, guards at checkpoints, and street enforcement to suppress protests.299\n\n## Eastern Ukraine (Donbas)\n\nSoon after Russia had annexed the Crimean Peninsula, pro-Russian separatist demonstrations in the Donbas region of southeast Ukraine escalated to a military conflict waged by two separatist bodies, one for each oblast in Donbas: the Donetsk People's Republic (DPR) and Luhansk People's Republic (LPR). The forces supporting the DPR and LPR are a mix of their own militias, Russian Cossacks, Serbian volunteers, Chechens, the Russian MoD, and Russian PMCs.300 Wagner fought in Ukraine,301 and was specifically sanctioned by the United States for their role in the conflict,302 but there are also unconfirmed open source reports that even more Russian PMCs participated in the conflict.303 However, the operational role of Russian PMCs was not overly prominent. At least one other study on the war in Ukraine assessed the role of Russian PMCs to be limited, to the point that the authors omitted them from their analysis.304 While Wagner did participate in the conflict in Donbas, it appears that it did so in an early stage in the PMC's development. In interviews with journalists, Wagner commanders described 2014 saying the separatists were \"fighting around Slovyansk and a lot of people wanted to go and help.\"305 This soon coalesced into groups of fightersroughly 250 per groupcrossing the border from Russia into Ukraine in June 2014. A Wagner commander described the group at the time as less formalized, saying \"They were basically company-sized tactical groups... There were no private military contractors then, but people were paid on time.\"306 Wagner left Ukraine in late 2015 before being sent into Syria.307\n\nRussian PMCs played an actively offensive role in the conflict, participating in offensives against Ukrainian government forces, including a strategic victory in the Battle of Debaltseve in January and February 2015.308 Alongside separatist militias, Wagner directed artillery barrages and infantry maneuvers that forced Ukrainian forces to fall back. According to the Ukrainian SBU, Wagner also conducted anti-air strikes, including the shooting down of an Il-76 aircraft at Luhansk International Airport that killed 40 Ukrainian paratroopers.309 Sources speaking to the press also described Wagner as \"protecting factories and pro-Russian rebel leaders.\"310 As they would later be used in Syria, Wagner in Ukraine participated in high-risk operations advancing in the first waves of attacks and storming enemy positions and population centersall of which brought the group high casualties.311 Overall, Wagner in Ukraine was described as ruthless, effective,312 and exhibiting a high level of competency that allowed them to perform missions requiring significant military proficiency.313 Unique to the conflict in Donbas is the use of Russian PMCs against proxies who moved too far outside Moscow's control. Open source reports indicate that such actions included the assassinations and apprehension of separatist warlords, disarming of separatist units, and enforcement against Russian Cossacks who became independent-minded after efforts to connect occupied Crimea with the Donbas region (making 'Novorossiya' or 'New Russia') stalled.314\n\nRussian proxy forces in Donbas (presumably including the Russian PMCs) were significantly dependent on the Russian Armed Forces for support. After Wagner's known participation in the conflict, in February 2017 the former defense minister of the DNR Igor Girkin spoke of separatist forces as being more \"mercenary than militia,\" and that they would implode within 48 hours of losing Russian support.315 Significant open source reporting exists on the weapons and other materiel used by separatist forces in Donbas, but whether or not there is a clear distinction between equipment used by Russian PMCs and that used by other proxies is not clear. Early analysis of separatist arms and equipment published during Wagner's presence in Donbas concluded that, while the illicit provision of weapons by external parties was very likely (including armor, heavy weapons systems, guided light weapons, light weapons, and small arms), the most significant source of materiel for separatist forces were domestic.316 However, more recent open source reporting provides some level of granularity on vehicles and armor. Footage purported to depict Wagner participating in the early 2015 Battle of Debaltseve shows the PMC operating several armored and military vehicles during the operation, including: Ural trucks (6), tanks (5, at least 2 of which were T-72s), MT-LB vehicles (2 with anti-air guns), UAZ pickup trucks (2), a KamAZ truck, a BMP-1 infantry fighting vehicle (IFV), and BPM-97 Vystral mine-resistant, ambush protected (MRAP) vehicles. Other local separatist proxies in Donbas also received BPM-97 Vystral MRAPs, reinforcing the difficulty in differentiating between equipment used by Russian PMCs in Ukraine and equipment used by Russian proxies generally.317 Materiel support from Russia into Donbas entered Ukraine through the southwestern Russian Oblast of Rostov (also an allegedly significant logistical node for Russian PMCs entering Syria; see above).318 The composition of separatist units used by the LPR and DPR to fight against the Ukrainian government in Donbas have included Russian PMCs (Wagner), Russian intelligence and military personnel, local recruits, Russian political groups (nationalists, communists, Cossacks, and others), defectors from Ukrainian forces, as well as other civilian and criminal organizations (sports hooligans, biker gangs).319 Early recruitment for Russian PMC participation in Donbas were ex-Russian servicemen sourced primarily from the North Caucasus, according to press reports.320 While open-source data on the pay received by recruits vary widely, it was less than what similar recruits would later be able to receive in Syria.321 Beyond Russian PMCs, other groups used to recruit proxies and volunteers for the fight in Donbas included nationalist and other extreme political groups, as well as public and Internet recruiting campaigns.322 Since their time in Donbas, Wagner recruited from separatist militias and volunteers in eastern Ukraine to fight elsewhere, according to the account of a Donetsk fighter recruited to fight in Syria.323\n\nThe Russian PMC presence in the varied composition of separatist units (see above), alongside coordinated operations against Ukrainian forces, indicate a significant level of cooperation with other proxies in the region. Beyond coordination with elements of the Russian Federation, a source in separatist circles claimed that Wagner in Donbas was \"integrated into the GRU, but also open for private customers on the side.\"324 Open source analysis performed and published by Bellingcat on the role of the Russian Federation in Donbassupported by public interviews given by separatist leaders, intelligence published by the Ukrainian SBU, and other open-source datahas produced the clearest public demonstration of Russian GRU command and control over Russian PMC forces operating abroad. GRU staff officer Col. Oleg Ivannikov (aliases Andrey Ivanovich and Orion) was deployed to Ukraine in 2014 and early 2015, allegedly handling the LPR political leadership, advising on security matters, supervising the procurement and transfer of arms across the Russian border into Ukraine, as well as coordinating and supervising the military operations of both separatist and Wagner forces. Referring to him by his alias, a former separatist commander identified Ivannikov as directly supervising Wagner commander Dmitry Utkin, providing funding, protection, and instructions to the PMC.325 Additionally, the audio of a phone call intercepted and published by the Ukrainian SBUallegedly between Col. Ivannikov and Utkinsuggests that the Wagner leader reported to, and took orders from, Col. Ivannikov.326\n\nAlthough they were operating in country against the Ukrainian government, the effective control of the LPR and DPR over Luhansk and Donetsk meant eastern Ukraine amounted to a permissive environment for Russian PMCs. The location of these oblasts along the Russian border also facilitated ease of access to the operational environment. However, there is at least one press report that indicates there were some legal obstacles to some Russian PMCs operating in Ukraine. Both Moran Security and RSB Group allegedly refrained from participating in the conflict for legal reasons and to protect preexisting foreign contracts.327 Whether or not the legal reasons include Moran's involvement with the ill-fated Slavonic Corps in Syria is not clear. Dissatisfied with the support his government received from France, Central African Republic (CAR) President Faustin-Archange Touadera in 2017 met with Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov in Sochi and appealed for assistance in rebuilding the CAR army and loosening the UN arms embargo that had been in effect since 2013. According to a Kremlin press release, Russia would, in exchange, explore \"the possibilities of the mutually beneficial development of Central African natural resources.\"328 A Western diplomat would later describe the situation in CAR, saying \"The Russians are smart... With France's withdrawal in recent years, Russia saw their chance to make some money and took it. And CAR's placement in the heart of Africa makes the country a gate to the north, south, east and west on the rest of the continent.\"329 Open source reporting that Russian PMCs would begin working in the CAR emerged in January 2018a month after Moscow had successfully secured an arms embargo exemption from the UN Security Council to send shipments of Russian-made weapons (see below). Russia also sought approval to train CAR troops in their use. Early assessments attributed the move to economic ventures and a means to build political good will with the CAR in the UN.330 Such favor is part of a broader effort by Russia. After being sanctioned by the West for their actions in Ukraine, the Russian Federation signed at least 19 military cooperation deals with countries in Africathe largest voting bloc in the UN General Assembly with 54 members, who rotate through three seats on the Security Council.331 Later that year, rumors that many of the Russians present there were military contractors linked to Wagner became ubiquitous among diplomats and other international officials working in CAR.332 CAR also became consistently mentioned by Russian veterans groups as an area where Russian PMCs operate,333 and subsequent Russian requests to the UN for more arms embargo exemptions were blocked.334\n\nThe uses of Russian PMCs in CAR are various. A CAR presidential spokesman declined to comment to journalists about what activities Russians present in the country were engaged in.335 Most apparent is their use as \"civilian instructors\"336 to train CAR government forces in combat operations and the use of Russian-made weapons (see above).337 Press reports indicate that at least some of the contractors arrived by plane with the arms themselves.338 The Russian instructors appear to take an active role alongside CAR forces filling a security function. As documented in the final report of the UN panel of experts on developments in CAR for the UN Security Council, the CAR minister of defense was cited as saying that Russian instructors are deployed alongside CAR forces \"to ensure that weapons are handled properly and that the skills acquired during the training are applied correctly once deployed.\"339 Russian instructors also participated in transporting construction materials from the Sudan into the territory of CAR, convoys within CAR, and provided security to hospitals and hospital personnel.340 Russian instructors have also provided training for CAR law enforcement officers and gendarmes.341 Russian PMCs in CAR are also serving as military advisers,342 and associated figures are providing senior national security advice to the Touadera government. Russians have also been seen and photographed providing personal security for CAR President Touaderafirst civilian instructors, followed by Russians wearing patches indicating they work for Sewa Security Services. According to a media report, Sewa is a part of a subsidiary of what appears to be a CAR company, Lobaye Invest (described later).343 The UN panel of experts cites representatives of the Russian Embassy as indicating the presence of Russian instructors with the Presidential Guard \"was part of a training exercise,\" but in April 2018 they were replaced by six Russian nationals hired by Sewaarmed with exempted weapons by CAR Ministry of Defence request, according to the Russian Embassy.344 The Russian PSC Moran Security (involved in the creation of the Russian PMC Slavonic Corps) mentions operations in CAR on their company website.345 Another use of Russian PMCs present in CAR is the provision of security services for mining projects (diamonds, precious minerals),346 including in rebel-held areas.347 It was the presence of such forces outside government controlled territories that three independent Russian journalists were investigating when they were infamously murdered in July 2018 (Russia aggressively denies involvement).348 The company Lobaye Investa subsidiary of larger Russian business interests founded by Yevgeny Prigozhin (Wagner financier and close associate of President Putin)received renewable 3-year exploration rights in six areas of Yawa, Boda Prefecture in southwestern CAR for gold and diamonds (June 2018).349 However, control of mineral deposits in CAR is contested by armed groups across the country, likely making reliable access to such sites contingent upon an end to the civil war (see below). Regional observers have described Russia's use of PMCs in CAR to the press as a cost-saving means to pursue both security and economic objectives, but that without the necessary peace to ensure consistent access to precious minerals, there might not be a return on the investment.350\n\nBeyond the facilitation of civilian instructors in CAR by the Russian Federation, several other factors suggest close coordination between Russian PMC forces in the country and the Russian government. First, Valery Zakharovformer member of Russian intelligence, and associate alleged Wagner financier Yevgeny Prigozhin according to press reports351serves as a security adviser to CAR President Touadera and also lives at the headquarters of Lobaye Invest.352 The Russian MoD has also described plans to embed a five-person team with their counterparts in CAR.353 However, Zakharov's role among Touadera's other advisers is vague and detached, according to press reports citing security sources in the country.354 The arms donation and presence of Russian PMCs appear to have been an avenue for the Russian Federation to expand economic and diplomatic activities in CAR,355 where Zakharov has played a visible and active role. While avoiding details, Zakharov has spoken enthusiastically about possibilities for natural resource extraction in CAR. When asked where he sees CAR in 30 years, he replied: \"The goal is to create something like the United Arab Emirates here. There are many resources. If they are exploited to the benefit of this country, it will change everything.\"356 Diplomatically, Russia and Zakharovalong with Sudan and with CAR endorsementhave facilitated meetings between several armed groups in the region to discuss disarmament and natural resource revenue distribution.357 Both meetings occurred in Khartoum (July and August, 2018), resulting in the signing of a general declaration of understanding with the possibility of more meetings.358 The meetings were also cited by the UN panel of experts as involving the violation of travel bans against individuals involved in the negotiations,359 and sparked concerns that Russia was attempting to establish a parallel and competing venue for peace negotiations in CAR.360 Russia has also spearheaded a sizeable cultural diplomacy campaign in the countryincluding a beauty contest, radio station, and youth soccer tournament. Funding for many of these efforts came, not from the Russian Foreign Ministry, but from Lobaye Invest (see above). Most notably, the Lobaye-funded beauty contest was attended by both Zakharov and Russian Ambassador to CAR Sergei Lobanovbut it was Zakharov who took precedence at the event, handing the prize to the winner, causing observers to wonder whether the Russian Embassy or private Russian interests were in the lead.361 In January 2019, Ambassador Lobanov was dismissed by presidential decree and replaced by Vladimir Titorenko, who previously served as ambassador to Iraq, Algeria, and Qatar.362 Evidence alleging direct Russian Federation support and coordination with Russian PMCs in CAR (as well as Sudan and other African and Middle East destinations) was published by the Ukrainian Security Agency (SBU) and investigated by open source analysts at *Bellingcat*. The SBU claimed to intercept passenger manifests for planes chartered by the Russian MoD in late 2018, which they allege show that Wagner employees on those flights were issued passports in sequential sets by a single passport desk located in Moscowallegedly the same desk that issued passports with cover identities to GRU officers.m \"[I]f proven true,\" observed the Bellingcat Investigation Team, \"they would implicate the Russian government in not simply tolerating Wagner's overseas military operations... but in being actively involved in the facilitation.\"363 Leveraging leaked travel records to analyze and validate the data published by the SBU, *Bellingcat* was able to conclude that the persons listed were associated with the Russian PMC Wagner, and that some of their passports were issued by Unit 770001whether that alone proved a direct GRU association, rather than the Russian MoD generally, was less clear. \"However,\" they concluded, \"the rest of the available evidence... strongly supports the hypothesis that PMC Wagner is indeed a proxy and serves at the command of the Ministry of Defense, and in particular the GRU.\"364 As regards with coordination with actors other than the Russian Federation, as was already noted, Russian PMCs in CAR have allegedly worked with mining company Lobaye Invest to guard diamond and gold sites in the country (see above). At least one analyst out of Russia has also alleged that Russian PMCs in CAR and elsewhere have secured \"standalone contracts.\"365 Russian PMCs have also been witnessed by UN observers in close coordination with host nation forces in numerous operations.n Such operations include joint patrols, jointly manned checkpoints, transportation of construction materials from the Sudan into the territory of CAR, convoys within CAR, provision of security to hospitals and hospital personnel, and deployments to numerous regions of CAR to assert State authority and establish a garrison-based army across the country.o According to the UN panel of experts, the Committee \"stressed the importance of coordination... regarding the training of the Central African Republic security forces,\" in response to which Russian Federation \"confirmed that the activities of the... instructors would focus solely on assistance to the security forces of the Central African Republic in the context of security sector reform\"366\n\nEvidence indicates that at least some Russian PMCs operating in CAR are equipped with the embargo-exempted arms and munitions donated to CAR by the Russian Federation.p 367 The UN panel of experts noted that, according to the Russian Embassy, Russians with Sewa Security Services operating with the CAR Presidential Guard were armed with exempted weapons by CAR Ministry of Defence request.368 On top of this, the documentation of serial numbers from donated weapons was flawed. Detailed inspection of the weapons was delayed until after a majority of the weapons had already been distributed to CAR forces, so many weapons could only be confirmed through weapons distribution lists. Several weapons listed in the documentation provided to the UN Sanctions Committee could not be located at all, and several inspected weapons bore serial numbers not on the original list.369 These could be honest errors, but could also suggest deliberate obfus-\n\nRussian PMCs were not alleged to have been active in any combat operations in CAR as of this writing.\np  The shipments were enough to equip two battalionsa total of 1,300 men. The\nshipments included 900 pistols (Makarov), 5,200 assault rifles (AKM), 140 sniper rifles, 840 Kalashnikov machine guns, 270 rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs), and 20 anti-aircraft guns. (AFP, 2017; MEMRI, 2018)\ncation in order to arm Russian PMCs with weapons shipped into the country with UN Security Council blessing. Russian PMC personnel are providing training to CAR forces, so Russian participation in training can likely be assumed. However, this does not mean that Russian PMC employees surreptitiously present in CAR for non-training purposes are receiving sufficient training. The Russian Federation and Valery Zakharov have publicly commented on and provided the UN with official numbers of Russian personnel and instructors in CAR (at times describing them as \"reservists\" from the Russian Ministry of Defense370), but independent estimates vary widely and press reports cite Western diplomats as suspecting the numbers are higher than officially acknowledged. The openly acknowledged and official numbers consist of an initial deployment of 175 instructors (170 civilian and 5 military), followed by a second of 60 more.371 Estimates quoted by Zakharov to the press have been between 250372 and 255, but press reports indicate that these numbers do not include an undisclosed increase in military instructors.373 A Cossack source associated with Russian PMCs estimated in late 2018 that there could be 1,000 such personnel in CAR.374\n\nThe UN mission in CAR and UN Security Council process appears to have provided significant means to legitimize and facilitate Russian Federation activities in the country with and through Russian PMCs. As was the case in Syria, the invitation and friendly reception of the host country provides a highly permissive environment for the use of Russian PMCs for the pursuit of Russian government and private sector interests. In January 2019, the CAR Ministry of Defence expressed openness to the establishment of a permanent Russian military base in CAR.375 According to press reports, Russian trainers are currently based out of the Palais de Berengo, former home of Emperor Jean-Bedel Bokassa, approximately 80 km from Bangui.376 A country persistently ravaged by civil wars and ethnic violence, Sudan under President Omar al-Bashirthe first sitting head of state ever indicted by the ICCenjoyed close relations with Russia for some time before the arrival of Russian PMCs. While sanctioned by Western powers, Bashir's government secured an approximately $1 billion deal in 2017 to purchase 4th generation Russian SU-24 fighter jets (plus equipment upgrades and training), as well as guarantees to buy 1 million metric tons of Russian grain in 2018.377 In November 2017, President Bashirin defiance of an ICC travel bantraveled to Sochi for a meeting with President Vladimir Putin. During the meeting, President Bashir expressed his government's \"need of protection from the aggressive acts of the United States,\" going on to say \"We are currently launching a programme to modernise our armed forces and we agreed with the defence minister that Russia will contribute to this.\"378 Bashir also invited Russia to build a naval base on the Red Sea.379 Bashir had a July 2018 meeting with Putin in Moscow that expressed shared commitment to military development, and a tentative military agreement with Russia was drafted in January 2019.380 During the writing of this report, President Bashir was removed and arrested in a coup d'etat, and a military council took control of Sudan.381 Russian lawmakers criticized the coup, drawing comparisons with Ukraine, Syria, and Venezuela. Chairman of the Duma's International Affairs Committee Leonid Slutsky insisted that the Russian partnership with Sudan would continue: \"No matter how the new government is configured, there is no doubt that they will seek cooperation with Russia in the near future.\"382 Analysts have pointed to the removal of Bashir as highlighting weaknesses in Russia's efforts in Africa,383 and as undermining their claims to provide security for friendly national leaders from overthrow.384\n\nRussian PMCs (allegedly Wagner) were used to train Sudanese military personnel, and allegedly special operations forces of Sudan's National Intelligence and Security Service (NISS).385 What were said to be Russian PMC personnel were also observed in the streets near NISS operations suppressing anti-Bashir protests in Khartoum in late December 2018, but accounts that they played an active role in the suppression of protesters are conflicted386 and denied by the Kremlin.387 Russian PMCs have also allegedly acted as military advisers in Sudan.388 Armed Russian personnel guard mining sites (gold, uranium, and diamond389) for Russian companies with extraction rights in Sudan.390 Finally, some witness accounts indicate that Russians helped with military construction activities (specifically a sandy area for the reception of helicopters in South Darfur391). Russians with military experience acting as trainers has a long history in Sudan, as evidenced by the 2008 death of a Russian MIG-29 pilot in Darfur.392 Russian-speaking individuals were first reported to be performing training tasks in Sudan by open source analysts in December 2017,393 while other press reports estimated the arrival of Russian PMCs in early January 2018.394 President Bashir later confirmed the presence of \"Russian specialists... preparing Sudanese military personnel\" during a meeting with Putin on July 14, 2018.395 Finally, in response to allegations that Russian PMC personnel were involved in the suppression of protests, a Kremlin spokesperson confirmed their presence, but denied they participated in any suppression of protests, and claimed they had no relationship with the Russian government.396\n\nThere is little information on how Russian PMCs in Sudan were equipped. One of several Russian guards outside a mining site was described as \"a sniper\" by a protester,397 and Russian-speaking personnel in Khartoum were photographed in an apparently up-armored Ural-4320 utility truck.398 Estimates of the number of Russian PMC personnel in Sudan in 2018 have ranged between \"about 150 operatives\"399 to \"about 500\" witnessed alongside Sudanese forces in South Darfur.400 The Ukrainian SBU allegedly exposed the identities of 149 Russian PMC (specifically Wagner) personnel operating in Sudan, alleging they \"directly partook in suppressing democratic protests.\"401 SBU Chief of Staff Ihor Huskov also publicly claimed that his agency detected that Wagner was recruiting fighters sent to Sudan from occupied Crimea.402 Observers have also speculated that the Russians training soldiers in Sudan may not be Russian PMCs, but either GRU personnel or dual-hatted depending on the circumstance or operation.403\n\nWhile confirming the presence of \"private security companies\" in Sudan to dispute claims that Russians participated in the suppression of protests, a Kremlin spokesperson said \"Their task... is limited to training staff for the military and law enforcement agencies of the Republic of Sudan,\" but also insisted that they \"have nothing to do with Russian state bodies.\"404 Nevertheless, Russian PMCs in Sudan appear to have closely coordinated relationships with then-Sudanese authorities, Russian mining companies in the country, and the Russian Federation. Open source reports on the December 2017 meeting with Presidents Bashir and Putin suggest the facilitation of a deal where a company owned by Yevgeny Prigozhin (M Invest LLC) was given gold mining concessions and the same company allegedly arranged for the deployment of Russian PMC personnel. Vladimir Neyelov described this and other similar deals as leveraging Russian PMCs in:\n\npolitical agreements about ensuring the security and physical protection of the central government and state authorities, training by the Russian experts of the African military personnel (a kind of personnel reserve), and all this in exchange for exclusive rights in concessions and extraction of mineral resources, as well as other preferences for the work of Russian business.405\nThe Ukrainian SBU alleges that, although Wagner personnel were flown to Sudan on Tu-154Ms with tickets bought by M Invest, the flights themselves were conducted by the 223rd Flight Squad of the Russian MoD.406 Documentation and passport details published by the SBU also claim to show that the passports issued to Wagner personnel flying to Sudan were facilitated by the GRU, or at the very least the Russian MoD (see the appendix: Central African Republic).407 Coordination with Sudanese armed forces and law enforcement included training408, military construction409, and allegedly response to protestsin either a passive or active rolein Khartoum410 as well as at mining sites operated by Russian companies (a protester at the scene described \"The Russian guards... [as] supported by Sudanese police\").411\n\nThe friendliness of the Bashir regime in Sudan and their need for security and economic assistance provided the Russian Federation with a highly permissive environment for the use of Russian PMCs in the country. However, the overthrow of Bashir in a coup d'etat on April 11, 2019 make the future of Russian PMC operations in Sudan uncertain as of this writing. Information concerning the alleged involvement of Russian PMCs in the Libyan Civil War is limited, but the geopolitical contexts and indicators are similar to other cases where Russian PMCs intervened, and observers have noted it as a country of particular interest.412 Libya's place in Russia's efforts to contain extremism abroad is similar to Sudan and Syria,413 and Libyan National Army (LNA) Field Marshal Khalif Haftar attended a November 2018 meeting in Moscow with Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu and Wagner financier Yevgeny Prigozhin. Prigozhin's presence at the meeting was only revealed due to a video released by the LNA.414 Despite this meeting and allegations of military assistance to Haftar, Moscow maintained relations with the widely recognized \"government of national accord\" in Tripoli.415 Russian PMCs and PSCs have attested to limited roles in Libya prior to 2018. The RSB-Group PSC has engaged in \"mine clearance in Libya\" according to their website,416 and the founder of MAR attested in 2015 that his PMC \"has been engaged in the evacuation of wounded personnel from Libya.\"417 However, observers and analysts have noted that Wagner \"appears to have fought at the request of the Russian government\" in Libya,418 even \"possibly\" regular Army special forces as of the latter half of 2018 in support of Haftar.419 Libya was cited as an area of Russian PMC operations by Russian veterans' organizations, both speaking to journalists420 and in an appeal to the ICC to investigate Russia's use of PMCs.421 Libya is also one of several countries where Russian PMCs have allegedly taken on contracts to protect \"hydrocarbon extraction sites and transmission infrastructure.\"422 In October 2018, British intelligence sources were cited in the press as saying Russian PMCs (specifically Wagner) were operating in Libya to support Haftar, that \"dozens\" of GRU and Spetznaz personnel were active in eastern Libya at bases in Benghazi and Tobruk as trainers and liaisons, and even that Russian Kalibr anti-ship missiles and S-300 air defense systems were believed to be in Libya.423 The press report was directly denied by the Russian government. While particulars of that report were not publicly corroborated (i.e., bases, missiles, and air defense), a second press report alleges that sources close to the Russian MoD confirmed the presence of Russian troops and special forces in eastern Libya, and that a local Libyan government source confirmed \"recent military activity\" by Russia in the region.424 In March 2019, a British newspaper cited sources in the British government as saying that there were 300 Wagner personnel in Benghazi, and that they had supplied the Libyan National Army with tanks, artillery, ammunition, and drones. 425 A separate source close to the Libyan Russian Oil & Gas Joint Company is quoted as saying \"lots of Wagner fighters went,\" that Wagner contractors are \"almost interchangeable with the GRU,\" and that they were present in Libya in order \"to secure the deep-water ports of Tobruk and Derna for the Russian fleet\" and potentially \"control the flow of oil to southern Europe.\"426 In early 2019, a former Russian diplomat called the idea that Moscow was sending Russian PMCs to Libya \"impossible\" and \"disinformation,\" saying that \"there are no secrets in Libya\" and if Russian PMCs were actually there \"we would already know.\"427 If Russian PMCs are operating in Libya, they have likely been able to do so because Libya is a largely ungoverned space, and due to the blessing of friendly forces controlling territory. Nigeria fits a profile relative to Russia similar to other countries where Russian PMCs have been dispatched as an apparent instrument of Russian foreign policy. It is one of several African countries where Russia has significant oil and gas interests,428 and with which Russia has signed both military-to-military agreements and energy contracts.429 Nevertheless, the presence of contractors from the former Soviet Union in the country has, as of this writing, remained more characteristic of typical markets for private force on the African continent. The Russian PSC Moran (who also performed PMC work in Syria through the Slavonic Corps; see Syria) has publicly attested to performing past missions in Nigeria.430 Most conspicuously was the October 2012 arrest of nine Moran maritime personnel in the port of Lagos on illegal weapons charges (the men were in possession of 14 AK-47 rifles w/3,643 rounds of ammunition and 22 Benelli MR1 rifles w/4,955 rounds of ammunition). The men were released in February 2013 and charges were dropped in an agreement reached by Russia's Ministry of Foreign Affairs, but the case appears consistent with the role of Russian PSCs performing anti-piracy activities on behalf of Russian state-owned oil transportation interests.431 A now-defunct Russian PSC called RusCorp Group offering security services also maintained an office in Nigeria (as well as Iraq, the United States, the UK, and elsewhere) as of 2010.432 The most significant involvement of private military forces in Nigeria occurred in early 2015 when Nigerian President Goodluck Jonathan hired contractors to perform offensive operations supporting counterinsurgency efforts against Boko Haram (coinciding with the lead up to an election), which may have included Russian PMCs. Between March and May 2015, men purportedly from Ukraine, Russia, and Israel were sighted working as military trainers in Nigeria. The South African firm STTEP was among the companies contracted for the effort. One diplomat in the capital referred to STTEP, saying the South Africans were backed by \"an incoherent mix of people, helicopters and random kit from all sorts of different sources,\" including the former Soviet Union, numbering in the \"low hundreds\" and paid approximately $400 per day in cash.433 While the potential role of Russian PMCs in this effort is not clear, Russian analysts have noted STTEP's effective performance fighting Boko Haram in Nigeria, and identified them as potential partners in the region.434 Open source analysis and Russian press reports have alleged that members of a Russian PMC were deployed to Yemen in September, 2018.435 The country was also cited as an area of Russian PMC operations by Russian veterans' organizations, both when speaking to journalists436 and in an appeal to the ICC to investigate Russia's use of PMCs.437 Kirill Semenova Russian government-affiliated expert on the Middle Eastsaid it's possible, but that he doubts Russian PMCs are operating in Yemen, as it is allegedly not a strategic interest of the Kremlin. Instead such involvement would be \"an example of securing some business interests such as infrastructural projects on Socotra Island, humanitarian missions related to food deliveries, or some oil-related initiatives.\"438 Data on how Russian PMCs are allegedly being used in Yemen is scarce. Non-Russian PMCs were already a large part of the civil war in Yemen well before 2018, including the participation of contractors from Australia, the United Kingdom (UK), and Colombia.439 However, what sets Russian PMC involvement apart from other military contractors in the country is that Houthi leader and President of the Supreme Political Council of Yemen Mahdi al-Mashatappealed to Putin for aid in July 2018, saying he should \"use Russia's influence and political weight to stop the civil war in Yemen,\" a request that the Russian Federation did not officially agree to fulfill.440 It is possible that the provision of a Russian PMC as support to the embattled regime is a means to provide unofficialif not wholly deniablemilitary aid. As opposition to the Chavista regime of President Nicolas Maduro escalated in late January 2019, a press report alleged that hundreds of Russian PMC personnel were sent to Venezuela in order \"to protect Maduro from any attempt by opposition sympathizers in his own security forces to detain him\" during the crisis, according to a source speaking to the press.441 Alleging association with Wagner, the report described the arrival of Russian PMC personnel to Venezuela in two wavesfirst before the election in May 2018, and then in late January days before the beginning of opposition protests, totaling up to 400 personnel. The report alleges that the Russian PMCs were flown to Venezuela via third countries; including two chartered flights to Cuba, followed by commercial flights from Cuba to Venezuela. The press outlet claims to have independently corroborated the story using public flight data, which indicate Russian government-owned aircraft performed flights matching those described in the reporting.q 442 There are few details about the Russian PMCs themselves (equipment, C2, etc.). However, it appears their presence in Venezuela was part of an overall deterrence and security assistance mission supporting the Maduro regime, as March 2019 saw the notably overt arrival of official Russian military planesr to Caracasafter a stop in Syriacarrying military personnel and equipment. Official Russian and diplomatic sources claimed these men and materiel were pursuant to longstanding military and technical cooperation agreements.443 Press reports in April 2019 indicated that the Russian Federation attempted to fly the same two aircraft from Syria to Venezuela a second time.444 As of this writing, the Maduro regime remained in power despite prolonged instability and recognition from several regional and Western countries of Juan Guaido as the interim president of Venezuela. There are several other countries where Russian PMCs are purported to be present and operating in some capacity. However, information concerning their uses, objectives, and other details is scarce. Additionally, differentiating whether such companies are operating as PSCs in the open market for force, or if they are fulfilling any Russian Federation foreign policy or security objectives, is unclear. PMCs have been active in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), according to open source reporting. The death of a Georgian contractor in the January 2017 DRC Air Force helicopter crash revealed that foreign pilots are active in the country as trainers, in this case in the use of a Russian-made Mi-24 combat helicopter. While private Russian and Ukrainian pilots have had an outsized role in the DRC since the early 1990s, the presence of military contractors in the DRC appears to have escalated in 2014potentially motivated by mining interests and the ineffectiveness of the DRC Army (FARDC)and some information suggests that they may play an active role in FARDC military operations.445 One Russian analyst alleges that several Russian PMCs worked in Sierra-Leone, Angola (among the countries visited by Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov446), and Kenya on \"standalone contracts.\"447 Moran Security (see the appendix: Syria) also claims to have performed missions in Kenya.448 According to Russian veterans' groups who sought to petition the ICC over Russia's use of PMCs, countries where Russian PMCs have operated (other than those already described above) include Gabon and South Sudan, as well as other unnamed countries.449 Evgeny Shabaev (committee chairman of the Russian Officer Congress, a veterans' group) in July 2018 cited Brunei as a country where Russian PMCs operate, also noting \"major talks about entering several African countries.\"450 Additional countries noted by analyst Sergey Sukhankin as \"operational theaters (proven and alleged)\" include South Sudan, Serbia, Bosnia, Montenegro, Tajikistan, Nagorno-Karabakh, Burundi, Somalia, Mozambique, Gabon, Shri Lanka, Cambodia, Afghanistan, countries of the former Yugoslavia, Iraq, Georgia (Abkhazia and South Ossetia), and Moldova (Transnistria).451\n\n## Bibliography\n\n\"'500 Russian troops on CAR-Darfur border'.\" *Radio Dabanga*, July 31,\n2018. https://www.dabangasudan.org/en/all-news/article/500-russiantroops-on-car-darfur-border.\n\nAbdelaziz, Khalid. \"Sudan's Bashir ousted by military; protesters demand\ncivilian government.\" *Reuters*, April 11, 2019. https://www.reuters.com/ article/us-sudan-politics/sudans-bashir-forced-to-step-down-sources-sayidUSKCN1RN0AY.\n\"About 1,500 Russian soldiers killed in Donbas since spring 2014: Russian\nNGO.\" *UNIAN*, April 28, 2017. https://www.unian.info/war/1899099- about-1500-russian-soldiers-killed-in-donbas-since-spring-2014-russianngo.html.\nAdministration of the Non-governmental Educational Establishment -\nthe Center \"Anti-terror.\" \"Letter of explanation.\" Antiterror-Orel, April 27, 2006, archived February 1, 2009. https://web.archive.org/ web/20090201085915/http:/www.antiterror-orel.ru/eng/index.php.\nAFP. \"Nigeria drops charges against Russians in arms case.\" Modern\nGhana, October 8, 2013. https://www.modernghana.com/sports/461731/ nigeria-drops-charges-against-russians-in-arms-case.html.\nAFP. \"Sudan's President Bashir asks Putin for 'protection' from 'aggressive' US.\" *France 24*, November 23, 2017. https://www.france24.com/ en/20171123-sudan-president-bashir-asks-putin-protection-aggressiveus.\nAFP. \"UN gives green light on Russia arms to C Africa.\" *News24*, December 16, 2017. 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Meduza, August 30, 2017. https://meduza.io/en/ feature/2017/08/30/people-think-it-doesn-t-affect-them-but-it-affectseveryone.\nKorotkov, Denis. \" ,\" Novaya Gazeta, July 28, 2019, retrieved\nfrom: https://www.novayagazeta.ru/articles/2019/07/28/81406-bez-schita\nKozak, Chris. \"ISIS Recaptures Palmyra in Major Blow to Pro-Regime\nForces.\" Institute for the Study of War, December 13, 2016. http:// www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/isis-recaptures-palmyra-major-blow-pro-regime-forces.\nKozak, Chris. \"Russian-Syrian-Iranian Coalition Seizes ISIS-Held Palmyra.\" Institute for the Study of War, March 27, 2016. http://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-syrian-iranian-coalition-seizes-isis-held-palmyra.\n\"Kremlin: no private military companies exist in Russia.\" *TASS*, December\n21, 2018. http://tass.com/defense/1037365.\nKrutikov, Evgeny. \"\n  .\" *Vzglyad,* October 10, 2017. https://vz.ru/ world/2017/10/10/890267.html.\nKurmanaev, Anatoly. \"2 Russian Military Planes Land in Venezuela,\nExacerbating Political Tension.\" *The New York Times*, March 25, 2019. https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/25/world/americas/russian-planes-caracas.html.\nKurtov, Mark. \"   .\" *Svoboda.org.* August\n22, 2017. https://www.svoboda.org/a/28690861.html.\nLapayev, Yuriy. \"Private and armed: Why the Kremlin needs private military companies.\" *The Ukrainian Week*, September 30, 2017. https:// ukrainianweek.com/World/200087.\nLeviev, Ruslan. \"Families of Russian mercenaries killed in Syria left in the\ndark about their loved ones' fate.\" *Conflict Intelligence Team*, December 18, 2017. https://citeam.org/families-of-russian-mercenaries-killed-insyria-left-in-the-dark-about-their-loved-ones-fate/?lang=en.\nLeviev, Ruslan. \"From Russia with Wagner: are Russian mercenaries suppressing the Sudan protests?\" *Conflict Intelligence Team*, January 11, 2019. https://citeam.org/are-ru-mercenaries-suppressing-the-sudan-protests/?lang=en.\nLeviev, Ruslan. \"Vega: a new PMC in Syria with ties to Russia and\nUkraine.\" *Conflict Intelligence Team*, March 28, 2019. https://citeam. org/russian-ukrainian-pmc-vega-in-syria/?lang=en.\nLinder, Andrew. \"Russian Private Military Companies in Syria and Beyond.\" Center for Strategic & International Affairs. 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Archived January 27, 2019 at https://web. archive.org/web/20190127014623/http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/american-fury-the-truth-about-the-russian-deaths-in-syria-a-1196074.html.\nReuters. \"Russia to Send More Military Trainers, Equipment to Central\nAfrican Republic.\" *Eyewitness News*, October 19, 2018. https://ewn.co. za/2018/10/19/russia-to-send-more-military-trainers-equipment-to-central-african-republic.\nReuters Staff. \"No information about reports of Russian mercenaries\nkilled in Syria: Kremlin.\" *Reuters*, February 13, 2018. https://www. reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-syria-russia-kremlin/no-information-about-reports-of-russian-mercenaries-killed-in-syria-kremlin-idUSKBN1FX12W.\nReynolds, Nathaniel. \"Putin's Not-So-Secret Mercenaries: Patronage, Geopolitics, and the Wagner Group.\" Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, July 8, 2019. https://carnegieendowment.org/files/GlobalRussia_NateReynolds_Vagner.pdf.\nRFE/RL. \"Putin Replaces Envoy To Central African Republic, Where\nRussian Reporters Died.\" *RFE/RL*, January 15, 2019. https://www. rferl.org/a/putin-replaces-russian-ambassador-to-central-african-republic/29711908.html.\nRFE/RL's Russian Service. \"Russian Veterans Appeal To ICC Over Moscow's Alleged Use Of Mercenaries.\" *RFE/RL*, November 19, 2018, https://www.rferl.org/a/russian-veterans-appeal-to-icc-over-moscow-salleged-use-of-mercenaries/29609013.html.\n\"The ride of the mercenaries: How 'Wagner' came to Syria.\" The Economist, November 2, 2017.\nRoche, Cody and Vincent Beshara. \"Assad Regime Militias and Shi'ite\nJihadis in the Syrian Civil War.\" *Bellingcat*, November 30, 2016. https://www.bellingcat.com/news/mena/2016/11/30/assad-regime-militias-and-shiite-jihadis-in-the-syrian-civil-war/.\nRomanovskii, Kirill, Denis Tarasov, and Vladimir Malyanov.\"\n .\" *Fontanka.ru.* 2018. https://www.fontanka.ru/longreads/ central_africa_investigation/.\nRoss, Aaron. \"How Russia moved into Central Africa.\" *Reuters*, October\n17, 2018. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-africa-russia-insight/ how-russia-moved-into-central-africa-idUSKCN1MR0KA.\nRozhdestvensky, Ilya, Anton Baev, and Mikhail Rubin. \"       .\" RBC. ru. March 23, 2016. https://www.rbc.ru/politics/23/03/2016/56f- 007d59a794704531f9229.\nRozhdestvensky, Ilya. \"There's No Question of Disbanding: How the Wagner Group Functions and How Much It Costs.\" The Current Digest of the Russian Press 70, no. 8-9 (2018): 9-10.\nRujevic, Nemanja. \"Serbian mercenaries fighting in eastern Ukraine.\" DW.\nAugust 14, 2014. https://p.dw.com/p/1Cv1b.\nRussia Monitor. \"Russian Mercenaries in Syria.\" Warsaw Institute, April 22,\n2017. https://warsawinstitute.org/russian-mercenaries-in-syria/.\n\"Russia arrests another treason suspect, this time an expert on private mil-\n\nitary companies.\" *Meduza*, November 02, 2018. https://meduza.io/en/ news/2018/11/02/russia-arrests-another-treason-suspect-this-time-an-expert-on-private-military-companies.\n\"Russian Condottieri\" [complete text]. The Current Digest of the Russian\nPress 64, no. 39 (September 24, 2012): 13-14.\n\"Russian Lawmakers Criticize Sudan Coup as 'Unconstitutional'.\"\nThe Moscow Times, April 11, 2019. https://www.themoscowtimes. com/2019/04/11/russian-lawmakers-criticize-sudan-coup-as-unconstitutional-a65190.\n\"Russian Mercenaries Help Rebel Libyan Army to Seize Oilfields.\"\nThe Daily Telegraph, March 4, 2019. https://search.proquest.com/ docview/2187614930?accountid=11752.\nSafronov, Ivan and Aleksandra Dzhordzhevich. \"     .\" Kommersant. October 11, 2017. https://www. kommersant.ru/doc/3435128.\nSagdiev, Rinat, Maria Tsetkova, and Olena Vasina. \"How a secret Russian\nairlift helps Syria's Assad.\" *Reuters*, April 8, 2018. https://www.reuters. com/investigates/special-report/russia-flights/.\nSautreuil, Pierre. \"Believe It or Not, Russia Dislikes Relying on Military\nContractors.\" *War is Boring*, March 8, 2016. https://medium.com/war-isboring/believe-it-or-not-russia-dislikes-relying-on-military-contractors- 8bad373f4793.\nSazhneva, Ekaterina.\"\n :   . *Moskovsky Komsomolets.* October 10, 2017. https://www.mk.ru/print/article/1763391/.\nSchmitt, Eric. \"Russia's Military Mission Creep Advances to a New Front:\nAfrica.\" *The New York Times*, March 31, 2019. https://www.nytimes. com/2019/03/31/world/africa/russia-military-africa.html.\nSekkarie, Sana. \"Syria Situation Report: September 14 - 27, 2017.\" Institute\nfor the Study of War and Syria: Direct, September 2017. http://www. understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/Syria%20SITREP%2014%20 -%2027%20SEP.pdf.\nShabayev, Yevgeny. 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May 12, 2014. http://time.com/95898/wolves-hundredukraine-russia-cossack/.\nSolopov, Maksim, Maksim Iusin and Marriana Belenkaia.\"\n . *Kommersant.* February 14, 2018. https://www. kommersant.ru/doc/3548170e.\nSparks, John. \"Revealed: Russia's 'Secret Syria Mercenaries'.\" Sky News,\nAugust 10, 2016. https://news.sky.com/story/revealed-russias-secret-syria-mercenaries-10529248.\nSpencer, Richard. \"Where are the Syrians in Assad's Syrian Arab\nArmy?\" *The Telegraph*, April 9, 2016. https://www.telegraph.co.uk/ news/2016/04/09/where-are-the-syrians-in-assads-syrian-arab-army/.\nSputnik. \"Russia May Consider Establishing Private Military Companies.\"\nRIA Novosti, April 13, 2012, archived on September 17, 2017. https:// web.archive.org/web/20170917033701/https://sputniknews.com/analysis/20120413172789099/.\nST. \"Russian military firm working with Sudan security service: sources.\"\nSudan Tribune, January 8, 2019. http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.\nphp?article66883.\nStein, Chris. \"Nigeria's President: Boko Haram Trained with Islamic State.\"\nVoice of America, March 11, 2015. https://www.voanews.com/a/nigerias-president-says-boko-haram-trained-with-islamic-state/2676217. html.\nStratfor. \"Russia Revisits an Old Cold War Battleground.\" *Assessments*,\nJanuary 15, 2018, https://worldview.stratfor.com/article/russia-revisits-old-cold-war-battleground.\nSuchkov, Maxim. \"Analysis: Reports on Russian troops in Libya spark controversy.\" *Al-Monitor*, October 12, 2018. https://www.al-monitor.com/ pulse/originals/2018/10/russia-libya-troops-hifter.html.\nSuchkov, Maxim. \"How Russia and the U.S. have Reached the Brink in\nSyria\" [condensed text]. The Current Digest *of the Russian Press* 70, no. 7, 2018: 5-6.\nSukhankin, Sergey. \"Behind the Scenes of Russia's Military Detachment to\nVenezuela.\" *Eurasia Daily Monitor* 16, issue 46 (April 2, 2019). https:// jamestown.org/program/behind-the-scenes-of-russias-military-detachment-to-venezuela/.\nSukhankin, Sergey. 'Continuing War by Other Means': The Case of Wagner,\nRussia's Premier Private Military Company in the Middle East. Washington, DC: The Jamestown Foundation, July 13, 2018. https://jamestown.org/program/continuing-war-by-other-means-the-case-of-wagnerrussias-premier-private-military-company-in-the-middle-east.\nSukhankin, Sergey. \"Revolt of the 'Disgruntled': Russian Mercenaries Seek\nJustice in International Courts.\" *Eurasia Daily Monitor* 15, issue 168 (November 29, 2018). https://jamestown.org/program/revolt-of-the-disgruntled-russian-mercenaries-seek-justice-in-international-courts/.\nSukhankin, Sergey. \"Russian PMCs, War Veterans Running 'Patriotic'\nYouth Camps in the Balkans (Part One).\" *Eurasia Daily Monitor* 15, issue 151 (October 24, 2018). https://jamestown.org/program/russianpmcs-war-veterans-running-patriotic-youth-camps-in-the-balkans-partone/.\nSukhankin, Sergey. \"Russian PMCs, War Veterans Running 'Patriotic'\nYouth Camps in the Balkans (Part Two).\" *Eurasia Daily Monitor* 15, issue 155 (October 31, 2018). https://jamestown.org/program/russianpmcs-war-veterans-running-patriotic-youth-camps-in-the-balkans-parttwo/.\nSukhankin, Sergey. \"Russian PMCs in Yemen: Kremlin-Style 'Security\nExport' in Action?\" *Eurasia Daily Monitor* 15, issue 144 (October 12, 2018). https://jamestown.org/program/russian-pmcs-in-yemen-kremlinstyle-security-export-in-action/.\nSukhankin, Sergey. \"Russian Special Operations Forces: Image Versus Substance.\" *Eurasia Daily Monitor* 16, issue 43 (March 27, 2019). https:// jamestown.org/program/russian-special-operations-forces-image-versus-substance/.\nSukhankin, Sergey. \"Vega Strategic Services: Russian PMCs as Part of\nInformation Warfare?\" *Eurasia Daily Monitor* 16, issue 51 (April 10, 2019). https://jamestown.org/program/vega-strategic-services-russian-pmcs-as-part-of-information-warfare/.\nSukhankin, Sergey. \"War, Business and Ideology: How Russian Private\nMilitary Contractors Pursue Moscow's Interests.\" In series War by Other Means: Russia's Use of Private Military Contractors at Home and Abroad. Washington, DC: The Jamestown Foundation, March 20, 2019. https://jamestown.org/program/war-business-and-ideology-how-russian-private-military-contractors-pursue-moscows-interests/.\nSuomenaro, Matti and the ISW Syria Team. \"U.S. Strategy in Syria is\nFailing.\" Institute for the Study of War, February 10, 2018. http://iswresearch.blogspot.com/2018/02/us-strategy-in-syria-is-failing.html.\n  .\" *TASS.* January 30, 2019. https://tass.\n\nTrevithick, Joseph. \"Russian Transport Aircraft Deliver Men And Materiel\nTo Venezuela Direct From Syria.\" *The Drive*, March 25, 2019. https:// www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/27143/russian-transport-aircraft-deliver-men-and-materiel-to-venezuela-direct-from-syria.\nTrump, Donald J. National Security Strategy of the United States of America. Washington, DC: The White House, December 2017.\nTsvetkova, Maria. \"Exclusive: Russian private security firm says it had\narmed men in east Libya.\" *Reuters*, March 10, 2017. https://www. reuters.com/article/us-russia-libya-contractors/exclusive-russian-privatesecurity-firm-says-it-had-armed-men-in-east-libya-idUSKBN16H2DM.\nTsvetkova, Maria. \"Russian contractors are training the army in Sudan, says\nMoscow.\" Edited by Andrew Osborn. *Reuters*, January 23, 2019. https:// www.reuters.com/article/us-russia-sudan-contractors/russian-contractors-are-training-the-army-in-sudan-says-moscow-idUSKCN1PH23T.\nTsvetkova, Maria. \"Russian toll in Syria battle was 300 killed and wounded:\nsources.\" *Reuters*, February 15, 2018. https://www.reuters.com/article/ us-mideast-crisis-syria-russia-casualtie/russian-toll-in-syria-battle-was- 300-killed-and-wounded-sources-idUSKCN1FZ2DZ.\nTsvetkova, Maria. \"Russian trips to Syria hit peak after Putin ordered partial\npull-out.\" *Reuters*, September 28, 2018. https://www.reuters.com/article/ us-mideast-crisis-syria-russia/russian-trips-to-syria-hit-peak-after-putinordered-partial-pull-out-idUSKCN1M81ZJ.\nTsvetkova, Maria. \"Russia underplayed losses in recapture of Syria's\nPalmyra.\" *Reuters*, March 22, 2017. https://af.reuters.com/article/world- News/idAFKBN16T0S2.\nTsvetkova, Maria and Anton Zverev. \"Exclusive: Kremlin-linked contractors help guard Venezuela's Maduro - sources.\" *Reuters*, January 25, 2019. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-venezuela-politics-russia-exclusive/exclusive-kremlin-linked-contractors-help-guard-venezuelas-maduro-sources-idUSKCN1PJ22M.\n   -       .      ,\nUkrainian Security Service. \":\n\n    . ,   ' -   -  -       .         . *Ukrainian Security Service website.* March 28, 2019. https:// ssu.gov.ua/ua/news/1/category/2/view/5908#.GomCNrty.dpbs.\nU.S. Senate Committee on Armed Services. \"Hearing to Consider the\nNominations of: General Tod D. Wolters, USAF for Reappointment to the Grade of General and to be Commander, United States European Command and Supreme Allied Commander Europe; and General Stephen J. Townsend, USA for Reappointment to the Grade of General and to be Commander, United States Africa Command\" (Stenographic Transcript). April 2, 2019. https://www.armed-services.senate.gov/imo/ media/doc/19-31_04-02-19.pdf.\nU.S. Department of Defense. *Joint Operations*. Joint Publication 3-0.\nJanuary 17, 2017. Incorporating Change 1, October 22, 2018. https:// www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/pubs/jp3_0ch1.pdf?ver=2018-11-27-160457-910.\nU.S. Department of the Treasury. \"Russia/Ukraine-related Designations and\nIdentifications.\" June 20, 2017. https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/OFAC-Enforcement/Pages/20170620.aspx.\nValdai Club.   - 2018. 2018. http://ru.valdaiclub.\ncom/a/reports/ugrozy-2018-prognoz-vneshney-politiki/.\nValetskii, Oleg.  :\n *19931999*. Moscow: Grifon, 2010. https://www.rulit.me/ books/volki-belye-serbskij-dnevnik-russkogo-dobrovolca-1993-1999- read-164484-1.html.\nVarin, Caroline. \"Turning the tides of war: The impact of private military\nand security companies on Nigeria's counterinsurgency against Boko Haram.\" *African Security Review* 27, no. 2 (2018): 144-157.\nVasilyeva, Nataliya. \"Thousands of Russian private contractors fighting\nin Syria.\" *Associated Press*, December 12, 2017. https://www.apnews. com/7f9e63cb14a54dfa9148b6430d89e873.\nVaux, Pierre. \"Fontanka Investigates Russian Mercenaries Dying For Putin\nIn Syria And Ukraine.\" *The Interpreter*, March 29, 2016. http://www. interpretermag.com/fontanka-investigates-russian-mercenaries-dying-for-putin-in-syria-and-ukraine/.\nVedomosti. \":   -    .\"\nVedomosti. November 20, 2018. https://www.vedomosti.ru/politics/ news/2018/11/20/786929-zhalobi-boitsov-chvk-v-gaagu.\nVukicevic, Jasna and Robert Coalson. \"Russia's Friends Form New 'Cossack Army' in Balkans.\" *RFE/RL,* October 18, 2016. https://www.rferl. org/a/balkans-russias-friends-form-new-cossack-army/28061110.html.\nYakoreva, Anastasiya and Svetlana Reiter. \"\n    .\" The Bell. March 02, 2018. https://thebell.io/restorator-putina-perestal-byt-lyubimym-podryadchikom-minoborony/.\n\"Wagner PMC part of Russian military intel, IDs of \"mercenaries\" confirm\n- Ukraine security chief.\" *UNIAN*, January 28, 2019. https://www.unian. info/world/10424754-wagner-pmc-part-of-russian-military-intel-ids-ofmercenaries-confirm-ukraine-security-chief.html.\nWesterlund, Fredrik and Johan Norberg. \"Military Means for Non-Military\nMeasures: The Russian Approach to the Use of Armed Force as Seen in Ukraine.\" *Journal of Slavic Military Studies* 29, no. 4 (2016): 576-601.\nWhite, Dana W. \"Department of Defense Press Briefing by Pentagon Chief\nSpokesperson Dana W. White in the Pentagon Briefing Room\" [Transcript]. Department of Defense, February 8, 2018. https://dod.defense. gov/News/Transcripts/Transcript-View/Article/1436566/department-ofdefense-press-briefing-by-pentagon-chief-spokesperson-dana-w-whit/.\nZaharova, Signe. \"Russian Federation: Regulatory Tools,\" in Multilevel\nRegulation of Military and Security Contractors: The Interplay between International, European and Domestic Norms, edited by Christine Bakker and Mirko Sossai, 461-485. Portland, OR: Hart Publishing, 2012.\nZelensky, Mikhail. \"A U.S. airstrike on Assad's supporters in Syria killed an\nunknown number of Russian 'volunteers.' Who were they?\" Translated by Peter Marshall. *Meduza*, February 13, 2018. https://meduza.io/en/ feature/2018/02/13/a-u-s-airstrike-on-assad-s-supporters-in-syria-killedan-unknown-number-of-russian-volunteers-who-were-they.\nZnak. \":          .\" (Dozhd: In Syria, a competitor to Wagner appears named 'Patriot') Znak.com, July 05, 2018. https://www.znak.com/2018- 07-05/dozhd_u_chvk_vagner_v_sirii_poyavilsya_konkurent_pod_nazvaniem_patriot.\n\n## Unclassified\n\nZoria, Yuri. \"New footage shows Russian PMC Wagner involved in crucial\n2015 Debaltseve battle in Ukraine.\" *Euromaidan Press*, June 22, 2018. http://euromaidanpress.com/2018/06/22/new-footage-shows-russianpmc-wagner-involved-in-crucial-2015-debaltseve-battle-in-ukraine/.\n\n## Notes\n\n1. \"Russia May Consider Establishing Private Military Companies,\" *Sputnik International*, April\n13, 2012, archived on September 17, 2017, https://web.archive.org/web/20170917033701/https:// sputniknews.com/analysis/20120413172789099/.\n2. \"Kremlin: No Private Military Companies Exist in Russia,\" *TASS*, December 21, 2018, http://\ntass.com/defense/1037365.\n3. James Mattis, Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy of The United States of\nAmerica: Sharpening the American Military's Competitive Edge, U.S. Department of\nDefense, 2018, 2.\n4. Ibid., 4.\n5. Donald J. Trump, *National Security Strategy of the United States of America*, The White\nHouse, December 2017, 25.\n6. Mattis, *Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy of The United States of America,* 2.\n7. Ibid. 8. JHU/APL, \"Ambiguous Threats and External Influences in the Baltic States - Phase 2:\nAssessing the Threat,\" JHU/APL Technical Report NSAD-R-15-036, November 2015, 9-15; Nataliya Bugayova, \"How We Got Here With Russia: The Kremlin's Worldview,\" Institute for the Study of War and the Critical Threats Project, March 2019, 24-25, http://www. understandingwar.org/report/how-we-got-here-russia-kremlins-worldview.\n9. Kimberly Marten, \"What is the Wagner Group?\" interviewed by Kavita Puri, *The Inquiry*,\nBBC, March 22, 2019, https://www.bbc.co.uk/sounds/play/w3cswqvs.\n10. Ase Gilje stensen and Tor Bukkvoll, Russian Use of Private Military and Security\nCompanies: The Implications for European and Norwegian Security, Norwegian Defence\nResearch Establishment, FFI-RAPPORT 18/01300, September 11, 2018, 10.\n11. Sergey Sukhankin, \"War, Business and Ideology: How Russian Private Military Contractors\nPursue Moscow's Interests,\" in War by Other Means: Russia's Use of Private Military Contractors at Home and Abroad (Washington, DC: The Jamestown Foundation, 2019),\nhttps://jamestown.org/program/war-business-and-ideology-how-russian-private-militarycontractors-pursue-moscows-interests/.\n12. U.S. Senate Committee on Armed Services, \"Hearing to Consider the Nominations of:\nGeneral Tod D. Wolters, USAF for Reappointment to the Grade of General and to be Commander, United States European Command and Supreme Allied Commander Europe; and General Stephen J. Townsend, USA for Reappointment to the Grade of General and to be Commander, United States Africa Command,\" (Stenographic Transcript), April 2, 2019, 30-31, https://www.armed-services.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/19-31_04-02-19.pdf.\n13. Cindy Hurst, \"The Militarization of Gazprom,\" *Military Review* (September-October 2010),\n61, https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a529212.pdf.\n14. Olivia Allison, \"Informal but Diverse: The Market for Exported Force from Russia and\nUkraine,\" in *The Markets for Force: Privatization of Security Across the World Regions*, eds. Molly Dunigan and Ulrich Petersohn (Pennsylvania: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2015),\n88.\n15. Ibid., 94.\n\n16. International Crisis Group, \"Patriotic Mobilisation in Russia,\" *Europe Report* 251 (July 4,\n2018), 17, https://d2071andvip0wj.cloudfront.net/251-patriotic-mobilisation-in-russia.pdf.\n17. Jolanta Darczewska, \"Putin's Cossacks: Just Folklore - or Business and Politics?,\" OSW Point\nof View 68 (December 2017), 21, http://aei.pitt.edu/92792/.\n18. Jasna Vukicevic and Robert Coalson, \"Russia's Friends Form New 'Cossack Army' in\nBalkans,\" *RFE/RL*, October 18, 2016, https://www.rferl.org/a/balkans-russias-friends-formnew-cossack-army/28061110.html.\n19. Tomas Baranec, \"Russian Cossacks in Service of the Kremlin: Recent Developments and\nLessons from Ukraine,\" *Russian Analytical Digest* 153, July 25, 2014, 11, http://www.css.ethz.\nch/content/dam/ethz/special-interest/gess/cis/center-for-securities-studies/pdfs/AD-153-9-12. pdf.\n20. Darczewska, \"Putin's Cossacks: Just Folklore,\" 21. 21. General Assembly, \"Use of Mercenaries as a Means of Violating Human Rights and Impeding\nthe Exercise of the Right of Peoples to Self-Determination,\" United Nations, A/49/362, September 6, 1994, http://psm.du.edu/media/documents/international_regulation/united_ nations/human_rights_council_and_ga/special_rapporteur/special_rapporteur_a-49-362.pdf.\n22. Dzenana Halimov, \"Uloga pravoslavnih dobrovoljaca u ratu u BiH,\" Radio Slobodna\nEvropa, March 8, 2014, https://www.slobodnaevropa.org/a/ruski-i-grcki-dobrovoljci-u-ratu-ubih/25290398.html.\n23. Oleg Valetskii,  :     *19931999*\n(Moscow: Grifon, 2010), https://www.rulit.me/books/volki-belye-serbskij-dnevnik-russkogodobrovolca-1993-1999-read-164484-1.html.\n24. Maggie O'Kane and Martin Kettle, \"Russians Accused of Kosovo Atrocities,\" Guardian,\nJune 22, 1999, https://www.theguardian.com/world/1999/jun/23/balkans6.\n25. Roger McDermott, \"Brother's Disunited: Russia's Use of Military Power in Ukraine,\" Foreign\nMilitary Studies Office, 2015, 24, https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/m/fmsomonographs/197162.\n26. Alexandros Petersen, \"The 1992-93 Georgia-Abkhazia War: A Forgotten Conflict,\"\nCaucasian Review of International Affairs 2, no. 4, Autumn 2008, http://georgica.tsu.edu.ge/\nfiles/05-Security/Petersen-2008.pdf.\n27. Mark Galeotti, *Political Warfare: Moving Beyond the Hybrid* (New York: Routledge, 2019),\n81.\n28. Ibid.\n29. Signe Zaharova, \"Russian Federation: Regulatory Tools,\" in Multilevel Regulation of Military\nand Security Contractors: The Interplay Between International, European and Domestic\nNorms, eds. Christine Bakker and Mirko Sossai (Portland, OR: Hart Publishing, 2012), 475.\n30. Mark Galeotti, *Russian Security and Paramilitary Forces Since 1991* (Oxford: Osprey\nPublishing, 2013), 54.\n31. Signe Zaharova, \"Russian Federation: Regulatory Tools,\" 473; Igor' Popov, \"\n  ,      ,\" Forbes, April 2, 2013, https://www.forbes.ru/sobytiya/biznes/236622-na-chem-i-skolko-zarabatyvalirusskie-moryaki-obvinennye-v-nigerii-v-kontraba.\n32. Sergei Kanchukov, \"   ,\"  ,\nAugust 30, 2012, https://army-news.ru/2012/08/chastnye-voennye-kompanii-rossii/&xid=17259\n,15700023,15700186,15700190,15700248,15700253&usg=ALkJrhiOq18AE1G1nNMlCCe2adT HYKSQVQ.\n33. Andrei Polunin, \" :      ,\" Svobodnaya\nPressa, April 12, 2012, https://svpressa.ru/politic/article/54437/.\n34. \"Russia May Consider Establishing Private Military Companies.\" 35. Maria Tsvetkova, \"Exclusive: Russian Private Security Firm Says It Had Armed Men in\nEast Libya,\" *Reuters*, March 10, 2017, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-russia-libyacontractors/exclusive-russian-private-security-firm-says-it-had-armed-men-in-east-libyaidUSKBN16H2DM; Lukas Andriukaitis, \"#PutinAtWar: More Mercenaries Menace\nMesopotamia,\" Digital Forensic Research Laboratory, *Medium*, March 25, 2019, https://\nmedium.com/dfrlab/putinatwar-more-mercenaries-menace-mesopotamia-6b97877e7927.\n36. \"Dozhd: In Syria, a Competitor to Wagner Appears Named 'Patriot',\" *Znak.com*, July  5,\n2018, https://www.znak.com/2018-07-05/dozhd_u_chvk_vagner_v_sirii_poyavilsya_ konkurent_pod_nazvaniem_patriot.\n37. Ibid. 38. Aleksandr Gostev and Robert Coalson, \"Russia's Paramilitary Mercenaries Emerge From\nThe Shadows,\" *RFE/RL*, December 16, 2016, https://www.rferl.org/a/russia-paramilitarymercenaries-emerge-from-the-shadows-syria-ukraine/28180321.html.\n39. Neil Hauer, \"Russia's Favorite Mercenaries: Wagner, the Elusive Private Military Company,\nhas Made Its Way to Africawith Plenty of Willing Young Russian Volunteers,\" *Atlantic*,\nAugust 27, 2018, https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2018/08/russianmercenaries-wagner-africa/568435/; Ruslan Leviev, \"Families of Russian Mercenaries\nKilled in Syria Left in the Dark about Their Loved Ones' Fate,\" *Conflict Intelligence Team*,\nDecember 18, 2017, https://citeam.org/families-of-russian-mercenaries-killed-in-syria-left-inthe-dark-about-their-loved-ones-fate/?lang=en; Oliver Carroll, \"Kremlin Distances Itself from\nCaptured 'Russian Soldiers' Shown in ISIS Propaganda Video,\" *Independent*, October 4, 2017,\nhttps://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/isis-russia-video-soldiers-syria-kremlinmercenaries-roman-zabolotny-grigory-tsurkanu-a7983316.html; stensen and Bukkvoll,\nRussian Use of Private Military and Security Companies: The Implications for European\nand Norwegian Security, 32.\n40. stensen and Bukkvoll, Russian Use of Private Military and Security Companies: The\nImplications for European and Norwegian Security, 37.\n41. Ibid., 39. 42. Ibid., 30. 43. Ibid., 37-38; Paul Goble, \"Kremlin Talks about 'Mercenaries' to Keep Russians from Focusing\non Syrian Losses and Others from Focusing on Real Role of Russian Army, Pastukhov\nSays,\" *Window on Eurasia* (blog), February 28, 2018, http://windowoneurasia2.blogspot.\ncom/2018/02/kremlin-talks-about-mercenaries-to-keep.html.\n44. Janis Berzins, \"Not 'Hybrid' but New Generation Warfare\" in Russia's Military Strategy\nand Doctrine, eds. Glen E. Howard and Matthew Czekaj (Washington, DC: The Jamestown\nFoundation, 2019), 170.\n45. Anna Maria Dyner, \"The Role of Private Military Contractors in Russian Foreign Policy,\"\nPolish Institute of International Affairs Bulletin 64, no. 1135, May 4, 2018, 2.\n46. Interfax, \"Defense Ministry Would License Private Military Companies, Heads Can't be Civil\nServants - Bill,\" *Russia & CIS Military Newswire*, January 23, 2018, http://search.ebscohost.\ncom/login.aspx?direct=true&db=tsh&AN=127495796&site=ehost-live&scope=site.\n47. Nathaniel Reynolds, \"Putin's Not-So-Secret Mercenaries: Patronage, Geopolitics, and\nthe Wagner Group,\" Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, July 8, 2019, 11, https:// carnegieendowment.org/files/GlobalRussia_NateReynolds_Vagner.pdf.\n48. Sukhankin, \"War, Business and Ideology: How Russian Private Military Contractors Pursue\nMoscow's Interests,\" note 21.\n49. Dyner, \"The Role of Private Military Contractors in Russian Foreign Policy,\" 2. 50. Goble, \"Kremlin Talks about 'Mercenaries' to Keep Russians from Focusing on Syrian Losses\nand Others from Focusing on Real Role of Russian Army, Pastukhov Says.\"\n51. Berzins, \"Not 'Hybrid' but New Generation Warfare,\" 170. 52. Sergey Sukhankin, \"Russian PMCs, War Veterans Running 'Patriotic' Youth Camps in the\nBalkans (Part One),\" *Eurasia Daily Monitor* 15, no. 151, October 24, 2018, https://jamestown.\norg/program/russian-pmcs-war-veterans-running-patriotic-youth-camps-in-the-balkans-partone/; Sergey Sukhankin, \"Russian PMCs, War Veterans Running 'Patriotic' Youth Camps\nin the Balkans (Part Two),\" *Eurasia Daily Monitor* 15, no. 155, October 31, 2018, https://\njamestown.org/program/russian-pmcs-war-veterans-running-patriotic-youth-camps-in-thebalkans-part-two/.\n53. Paul Goble, \"Russian Nationalist Group, Acting as a Private Military Company, Worries\nKremlin,\" *Eurasia Daily Monitor* 15, no. 164, November 15, 2018, https://jamestown.org/\nprogram/russian-nationalist-group-acting-as-a-private-military-company-worries-kremlin/.\n54. Administration of the Nongovernmental Educational Establishment - the Center \"Anti-terror,\"\n\"Letter of explanation,\" Antiterror-Orel, April 27, 2006, archived February 1, 2009, https://web. archive.org/web/20090201085915/http:/www.antiterror-orel.ru/eng/index.php.\n55. , \"  ,\" March 28, 2019, https://\nmyrotvorets.center/criminal/dzhinikashvili-dmitrij-vladimirovich/.\n56. Gostev and Coalson, \"Russia's Paramilitary Mercenaries Emerge From The Shadows.\" 57. Ed Cropley and David Lewis, \"Nigeria Drafts in Foreign Mercenaries to Take on Boko\nHaram,\" *Reuters*, March 12, 2015, accessed February 26, 2019, https://af.reuters.com/article/\nnigeriaNews/idAFL5N0WB3BR20150312.\n58. Owen Matthews, \"Putin's (Secret) Army: Why the Kremlin is Using Mercenaries to Fight\nIts Foreign Wars,\" *Newsweek Global*, January 26, 2018, 33; Reynolds, \"Putin's Not-So-Secret\nMercenaries,\" 7.\n59. Sergey Sukhankin, \"Vega Strategic Services: Russian PMCs as Part of Information Warfare?,\"\nEurasia Daily Monitor 16, no. 51, April 10, 2019, https://jamestown.org/program/vegastrategic-services-russian-pmcs-as-part-of-information-warfare/.\n60. Dyner, \"The Role of Private Military Contractors in Russian Foreign Policy,\" 2. 61. Ilya Rozhdestvensky, \"There's No Question of Disbanding: How the Wagner Group Functions\nand How Much It Costs,\" [complete text] *Current Digest of the Russian Press* 70, no. 8-9 (2018): 9-10, originally published in *Republic.ru*, February 21, 2018, https://republic.ru/po\nsts/89612?code=5b7fab5a66290d84fef399d24d5f7fc8; Reynolds, \"Putin's Not-So-Secret Mercenaries,\" 11.\n62. Sergey Sukhankin, \"Continuing War by Other Means\": The Case of Wagner, Russia's\nPremier Private Military Company in the Middle East (Washington, DC: The Jamestown\nFoundation, 2018), https://jamestown.org/program/continuing-war-by-other-means-the-case-ofwagner-russias-premier-private-military-company-in-the-middle-east.\n63. stensen and Bukkvoll, Russian Use of Private Military and Security Companies: The\nImplications for European and Norwegian Security, 26.\n64. Sukhankin, \"C*ontinuing War by Other Means\"*.\n65. Ibid; Rozhdestvensky, \"There's No Question of Disbanding,\" 9-10.\n66. \"Russia's Wagner Group Fighters Sighted in Syria,\" *RBC Magazine*, August 31, 2016,\narchived October 19, 2017, https://web.archive.org/web/20171019114422/https://www.rbth.com/ economics/defence/2016/08/31/russias-wagner-group-fighters-sighted-in-syria_625551.\n67. Sergei Khazov-Cassia and Robert Coalson, \"Russian Mercenaries: Vagner Commanders\nDescribe Life Inside The 'Meat Grinder',\" *RFE/RL*, March 14, 2018, https://www.rferl.org/a/\nrussian-mercenaries-vagner-commanders-syria/29100402.html.\n68. \"The Ride of the Mercenaries: How 'Wagner' Came to Syria,\" *Economist*, November 2, 2017,\nhttps://www.economist.com/europe/2017/11/02/how-wagner-came-to-syria.\n69. Sukhankin, \"War, Business and Ideology: How Russian Private Military Contractors Pursue\nMoscow's Interests.\"\n70. Vladimir Neyelov, \"Who are the Competitors of the 'Russian PMCs' on the African Market\nof Military Services,\" trans. by MEMRI in \"Russia In The World - Russian Private Military\nCompanies In The African Market Of Military Services,\" *Special Dispatch* No. 7614, August\n9, 2018, https://www.memri.org/reports/russia-world-%E2%80%93-russian-private-militarycompanies-african-market-military-services.\n71. Zaharova, \"Russian Federation: Regulatory Tools,\" 475-476. 72. Hurst, \"The Militarization of Gazprom,\" 62. 73. \"Russia May Consider Establishing Private Military Companies.\"\n74. \"Russian Condottieri,\" [complete text] *Current Digest of the Russian Press* 64, no. 39,\nSeptember 24, 2012, 13-14.\n75. Pierre Sautreuil, \"Believe It or Not, Russia Dislikes Relying on Military Contractors,\" War\nis Boring, March 8, 2016, https://medium.com/war-is-boring/believe-it-or-not-russia-dislikesrelying-on-military-contractors-8bad373f4793.\n76. Thomas Grove, \"Up to Nine Russian Contractors Die in Syria, Experts Say; Incident Shows\nHow the Country is Using Private Groups to Avoid Deploying Uniform Troops, They Say,\"\nWall Street Journal (Online), December 18, 2015, https://search.proquest.com/docview/175007\n1944?accountid=11752.\n77. Interfax, \"The Government of the Russian Federation Did Not Support the Bill on Private\nMilitary Companies,\" March 27, 2018, https://www.interfax.ru/russia/605539.\n78. Press Center for State Duma Committee on the Legal Support for Development of the\nOrganizations of the Military Industrial Complex, \"\n     ,\" *State Duma*, January 18, 2018, http://\nopk.km.duma.gov.ru/Press-Centr/Novost/item/15431851.\n79. Anton Mardasov, \"Kremlin Pressed to Legalize Private Military Companies,\" *Al-Monitor*,\nJuly 11, 2018, www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2018/07/russia-pmc-syria-putin.html; Interfax, \"A Just Russia Sees No Conflict Between Bill on Private Military Companies,\nMercenarism Counts in Russian Criminal Code,\" *Russia & CIS Military Newswire*, January 17,\n2018, http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=tsh&AN=127354951&site=eho st-live&scope=site.\n80. Rozhdestvensky, \"There's No Question of Disbanding,\" 9-10; Interfax, \"A Just Russia Sees\nNo Conflict Between Bill on Private Military Companies, Mercenarism Counts in Russian Criminal Code;\" Interfax, \"Private Military Companies Can Guard Russian Diplomatic\nSites if Legal Base Created - Slutsky,\" *Russia & CIS Military Newswire*, January 18, 2018,\nhttp://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=tsh&AN=127397404&site=eho\nst-live&scope=site; Paul Goble, \"Russian Private Military Companies Rapidly Growing\nSector, Participants and Experts Say,\" *Window on Eurasia* (blog), February 24, 2018, http://\nwindowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2018/02/russian-private-military-companies.html.\n81. Interfax, \"Defense Ministry Would License Private Military Companies, Heads Can't be Civil\nServants - Bill.\"\n82. Mardasov, \"Kremlin Pressed to Legalize Private Military Companies;\" Interfax, \"Russian\nGovernment Rejects Just Russia's PMC Bill,\" *Russia & CIS Military Newswire*, March 27,\n2018.\n83. Matthews, \"Putin's (Secret) Army,\" 34. 84. Sautreuil, \"Believe It or Not, Russia Dislikes Relying on Military Contractors;\" Dyner, \"The\nRole of Private Military Contractors in Russian Foreign Policy,\" 2; Paul Goble, \"Russian Private Military Companies a More Toxic Form of Latin American Death Squads, Pastukhov\nSays,\" *Window on Eurasia* (blog), August 8, 2018, http://windowoneurasia2.blogspot.\ncom/2018/08/russias-private-military-companies-more.html.\n85. Interfax, \"Too Early to Discuss Regulation of Private Military Companies' Activities -\nShamanov (Part 2),\" *Russia & CIS Military Newswire*, November 6, 2018, http://search.\nebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=tsh&AN=132857703&site=ehost-live&scope=site.\n86. Mardasov, \"Kremlin Pressed to Legalize Private Military Companies.\" 87. \"Kremlin: No Private Military Companies Exist in Russia,\" 88. Aleksei Nikol'skii and Svetlana Bocharova, \"     ,\" *Vedomosti*, September 4, 2018, https://www.vedomosti.ru/politics/\narticles/2018/09/04/779931-prezident.\n89. \"Russia Arrests Another Treason Suspect, This Time an Expert on Private Military\nCompanies,\" *Meduza*, November 2, 2018, https://meduza.io/en/news/2018/11/02/russia-arrestsanother-treason-suspect-this-time-an-expert-on-private-military-companies.\n90. Third Geneva Convention, Art. 4A(2). 91. ICRC, \"International Humanitarian Law and Private Military/Security Companies,\" December\n10, 2013, https://www.icrc.org/en/document/ihl-and-private-military-security-companies-faq.\n92. Ibid. 93. Ibid. 94. ICRC Customary IHL Database, \"Rule 108. Mercenaries,\" https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/\ncustomary-ihl/eng/docs/v1_rul_rule108#Fn_2751A96E_00021.\n95. Joint Chiefs of Staff, \"Joint Operations,\" Joint Publication (JP) 3-0, October 2018, V-1. 96. Ibid., xvii. 97. Ibid., xvii. 98. Ibid., VI-2. 99. U.S. Army Asymmetric Warfare Group, \"Operation Atlantic Resolve Handbook,\" November\n2018.\n100. Joint Chiefs of Staff \"Joint Operations,\" JP 3-0, xxi. 101. Ibid., xxii. 102. Joint Chiefs of Staff, \"Security Cooperation,\" JP 3-20, May 2017, vii. 103. Joint Chiefs of Staff \"Joint Operations,\" JP 3-0, VII-2. 104. Joint Chiefs of Staff, \"Peace Operations,\" JP 3-07.3, August 2012, xi. 105. Joint Chiefs of Staff \"Joint Operations,\" JP 3-0, VII-2-VII-3. 106. Ibid., xviii. 107. Ibid., xviii. 108. Ibid. 109. Ibid., VI-1. 110. Ibid., VI-3. 111. Ibid., VI-9. 112. Joint Chiefs of Staff, \"Security Cooperation,\" JP 3-20. 113. U.S. Army, \"Army Support to Security Operations,\" Field Manual (FM) 3-22, January 2013,\nI-10.\n114. Ibid., 4-1. 115. Ibid., 4-4. 116. Joint Chiefs of Staff \"Joint Operations,\" JP 3-0, VII-1.\n117. Ibid., VII-2. 118. Ibid. 119. Joint Chiefs of Staff, \"Noncombatant Evacuation Operations,\" JP 3-68, ix. 120. Ibid., II-3.\n\n121. Ibid., I-3. 122. Ibid., IV-2. 123. U.S. Government Accountability Office, \"Embassy Evacuations: State Department Should\nTake Steps to Improve Emergency Preparedness,\" GAO-17-714, July 2017.\n124. Ibid. 125. Ibid. 126. Joint Chiefs of Staff, \"Noncombatant Evacuation Operations,\" JP 3-68, IV-14 - IV-15. 127. Ibid. 128. Ibid. 129. Ibid. 130. Ibid. 131. Ibid., IV-15. 132. Ibid. 133. Ibid. 134. Ibid. 135. Ibid. 136. Ibid. 137. Ibid. 138. Ibid. 139. Ibid. 140. Ibid. 141. Ibid. 142. Ibid. 143. Ibid. 144. Joint Chiefs of Staff, \"Peace Operations,\" JP 3-07.3, vii. 145.  Ibid. 146. Ibid., II-3. 147. Joint Chiefs of Staff \"Joint Operations,\" JP 3-0, V-5. 148. Ibid. 149. Joint Chiefs of Staff \"Joint Operations,\" JP 3-0, V-13. 150. Ibid., V-9. 151. Ibid. 152. Ibid., V-10. 153. Ibid. 154. Ibid. 155. Ibid. 156. Ibid., V-16.\n\n157. U.S. Army, \"Operations,\" FM 3-0, October 2017, 5-4. 158. Khazov-Cassia and Coalson, \"Russian Mercenaries.\" 159. Sergey Sukhankin, \"Revolt of the 'Disgruntled': Russian Mercenaries Seek Justice in\nInternational Courts,\" *Eurasia Daily Monitor* 15, no. 168, November 29, 2018, https://\njamestown.org/program/revolt-of-the-disgruntled-russian-mercenaries-seek-justice-ininternational-courts/.\n160. Bulat Mukhamedzhanov, \"Hazing, Suicides and Unreported Deaths in the Russian Army,\"\nIntersection: Russia/Europe/World, November 2, 2017, http://intersectionproject.eu/article/\nsecurity/hazing-suicides-and-unreported-deaths-russian-army; Elena Barysheva and Markian\nOstapchuk, \"The Search for Dead Russian Mercenaries in Syria,\" DW, February 21, 2018,\nhttps://p.dw.com/p/2t6fB; Paul Goble, \"Donbas Mercenaries Bringing the War Home to Russia\nwith Them,\" *Euromaidan Press*, September 2, 2015, http://euromaidanpress.com/2015/09/02/\ndonbas-mercenaries-bringing-the-war-home-to-russia-with-them/; Yuriy Lapayev, \"Private and\nArmed: Why the Kremlin Needs Private Military Companies,\" *Ukrainian Week*, September\n20, 2017, https://ukrainianweek.com/World/200087; \"About 1,500 Russian Soldiers Killed in\nDonbas Since Spring 2014: Russian NGO,\" *UNIAN*, April 28, 2017, https://www.unian.info/\nwar/1899099-about-1500-russian-soldiers-killed-in-donbas-since-spring-2014-russian-ngo. html.\n161. Sautreuil, \"Believe It or Not, Russia Dislikes Relying on Military Contractors.\" 162. Goble, \"Russian Nationalist Group, Acting as a Private Military Company, Worries\nKremlin.\"\n163. Khazov-Cassia and Coalson, \"Russian Mercenaries;\" Vladimir Pastukhov, \"The Execution\nof the Wagner Group: A Confluence of Circumstances or a War Crime?\" Current Digest of the Russian Press 70, no. 8-9 (2018): 7-8.\n164. stensen and Bukkvoll, Russian Use of Private Military and Security Companies: The\nImplications for European and Norwegian Security, 34.\n165. Reynolds, \"Putin's Not-So-Secret Mercenaries,\" 12. 166. Paul Goble, \"Putin Didn't Expect US Attack on His Mercenaries in Syria and Now Faces a\nChallenge from the Right, Oreshkin Says,\" *Window on Eurasia* (blog), February 13, 2018,\nhttp://windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2018/02/putin-didnt-expect-us-attack-on-his.html.\n167. Niccolo Machiavelli, *The Prince*, trans. by Harvey C. Mansfield, Second Edition (Chicago\nand London: University of Chicago Press, 1998), 49.\n168. Sounak Mukhopadhyay, \"Security Service at Moscow Airport Detains Siberian Man\nSuspected to Join ISIS in Syria,\" *International Business Times*, September 24, 2015, https://\nwww.ibtimes.com/security-service-moscow-airport-detains-siberian-man-suspected-joinisis-syria-2111685; \"Around 2,500 Russian Citizens Fighting Alongside Islamic StateCivic\nChamber,\" *TASS*, September 17, 2015, archived November 10, 2016, https://web.archive.org/\nweb/20161110081428/tass.com/world/821862.\n169. Vladimir Putin, interview by Charlie Rose, *CBS News*, September 27, 2015, https://www.\ncbsnews.com/news/vladimir-putin-russian-president-60-minutes-charlie-rose/.\n170. \"New Russia-Syria Accord Allows Up to 11 Warships in Tartus Port Simultaneously,\" DW,\nJanuary 20, 2017, https://p.dw.com/p/2W8nI.\n171. Aron Lund, \"Russia in the Middle East,\" The Swedish Institute of International Affairs,\nFebruary 2019, 45, https://www.ui.se/globalassets/ui.se-eng/publications/ui-publications/2019/ ui-paper-no.-2-2019.pdf.\n172. James Bingham, \"Private Companies Engage in Russia's Non-Linear Warfare,\" Jane's\nMilitary and Security Assessments Intelligence Center, 2018, 7, https://www.janes.com/images/ assets/018/78018/Private_companies_engage_in_Russias_non-linear_warfare.pdf.\n173. Sautreuil, \"Believe It or Not, Russia Dislikes Relying on Military Contractors.\" 174. Halit Gulsen, \"The Role of Private Military Companies in Russia's Intervention in Syria,\"\nORSAM Review of Regional Affairs 64, July 2017, 11-12.\n175. \"St. Petersburg Sends Contractors to Syria,\" *Interpreter*, November 15, 2013, http://www.\ninterpretermag.com/st-petersburg-sends-contractors-to-syria/.\n176. \"The Last Battle of the 'Slavonic Corps',\" *Interpreter*, November 16, 2013, http://www.\ninterpretermag.com/the-last-battle-of-the-slavonic-corps/.\n177. Ibid. 178. Matthews, \"Putin's (Secret) Army,\" 31. 179. \"The Last Battle of the 'Slavonic Corps'.\" 180. Ibid. 181. Bingham, \"Private Companies Engage in Russia's Non-Linear Warfare,\" 8. 182. \"The Last Battle of the 'Slavonic Corps'.\" 183. Matthews, \"Putin's (Secret) Army,\" 31. 184. Sautreuil, \"Believe It or Not, Russia Dislikes Relying on Military Contractors.\" 185. \"The Last Battle of the 'Slavonic Corps'.\" 186. Ibid.\n\n187. Matthews, \"Putin's (Secret) Army,\" 31; Sautreuil, \"Believe It or Not, Russia Dislikes Relying\non Military Contractors.\"\n188. Pierre Vaux, \"Fontanka Investigates Russian Mercenaries Dying for Putin in Syria and\nUkraine,\" *Interpreter*, March 29, 2016, http://www.interpretermag.com/fontanka-investigatesrussian-mercenaries-dying-for-putin-in-syria-and-ukraine/; Gostev and Coalson, \"Russia's Paramilitary Mercenaries Emerge From The Shadows.\"\n189. Kimberly Marten, \"Russia's Use of Semi-State Security Forces: The Case of the\nWagner Group,\" *Post-Soviet Affairs* 35, no. 3 (2019): 11-12, https://doi.org/10.1080/106058\n6X.2019.1591142.\n190. stensen and Bukkvoll, Russian Use of Private Military and Security Companies: The\nImplications for European and Norwegian Security, 25.\n191. Grove, \"Up to Nine Russian Contractors Die in Syria, Experts Say.\" 192. Dyner, \"The Role of Private Military Contractors in Russian Foreign Policy,\" 2; Sukhankin,\n\"War, Business and Ideology: How Russian Private Military Contractors Pursue Moscow's Interests.\"\n193. Associated Press, \"The Latest: Russian Captive in Syria Identified as Cossack,\" Fox\nNews, October 4, 2017, https://www.foxnews.com/world/the-latest-russian-captive-in-syriaidentified-as-cossack; Mikhail Zelensky, \"A U.S. Airstrike on Assad's Supporters in Syria\nKilled an Unknown Number of Russian 'Volunteers.' Who were They?\" *Meduza*, trans. by\nPeter Marshall, February 13, 2018, https://meduza.io/en/feature/2018/02/13/a-u-s-airstrike-onassad-s-supporters-in-syria-killed-an-unknown-number-of-russian-volunteers-who-were-they; Yevgeny Shabayev, \"Cossack Fighter Laments Russian 'Utilization' of Mercenaries in Syria,\"\nRFE/RL, February 22, 2018, retrieved from https://www.rferl.org/a/syria-russian-mercenariescossack-shabayev--interview/29056934.html.\n194. Khazov-Cassia and Coalson, \"Russian Mercenaries.\" 195. Cody Roche and Vincent Beshara, \"Assad Regime Militias and Shi'ite Jihadis in the Syrian\nCivil War,\" *Bellingcat*, November 30, 2016, https://www.bellingcat.com/news/mena/2016/11/30/\nassad-regime-militias-and-shiite-jihadis-in-the-syrian-civil-war/.\n196. Sautreuil, \"Believe It or Not, Russia Dislikes Relying on Military Contractors;\" Sukhankin,\n\"War, Business and Ideology: How Russian Private Military Contractors Pursue Moscow's Interests;\" Gulsen, \"The Role of Private Military Companies in Russia's Intervention in Syria,\" 10-11.\n197. stensen and Bukkvoll, Russian Use of Private Military and Security Companies: The\nImplications for European and Norwegian Security, 27-28.\n198. Marten, \"Russia's Use of Semi-State Security Forces,\" 9.\n199. stensen and Bukkvoll, Russian Use of Private Military and Security Companies: The\nImplications for European and Norwegian Security, 25; Chris Kozak, \"ISIS Recaptures\nPalmyra in Major Blow to Pro-Regime Forces,\" Institute for the Study of War, December 13, 2016, http://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/isis-recaptures-palmyra-major-blowpro-regime-forces; figure from Russian Ministry of Defense, \"International Mine Action Center in Syria,\" Photograph, Mil.ru, Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International, April 7, 2016, https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:International_Mine_Action_Center_in_Syria_ (2016-04-07)_05.jpg.\n200. Pavel Felgenhauer, \"The Russian Strategic Offensive in the Middle East\" in Russia's Military\nStrategy and Doctrine, eds. Glen E. Howard and Matthew Czekaj (Washington, DC: The\nJamestown Foundation, 2019), 23.\n201. Sukhankin, \"Revolt of the 'Disgruntled'.\" 202. Gostev and Coalson, \"Russia's Paramilitary Mercenaries Emerge From The Shadows.\"\n203. John Sparks, \"Revealed: Russia's 'Secret Syria Mercenaries',\" *Sky News*, August 10, 2016,\nhttps://news.sky.com/story/revealed-russias-secret-syria-mercenaries-10529248.\n204. Maria Tsvetkova, \"Russia Underplayed Losses in Recapture of Syria's Palmyra,\" *Reuters*,\nMarch 22, 2017, https://af.reuters.com/article/worldNews/idAFKBN16T0S2.\n205. Grove, \"Up to Nine Russian Contractors Die in Syria, Experts Say;\" Dyner, \"The Role\nof Private Military Contractors in Russian Foreign Policy,\" 2; Hauer, \"Russia's Favorite Mercenaries;\" Leviev, \"Families of Russian Mercenaries Killed in Syria Left in the Dark about Their Loved Ones' Fate;\" Carroll, \"Kremlin Distances Itself from Captured 'Russian Soldiers' Shown in ISIS Propaganda Video;\" Rinat Sagdiev, Maria Tsetkova, and Olena Vasina, \"How a\nSecret Russian Airlift Helps Syria's Assad,\" *Reuters*, April 8, 2018, https://www.reuters.com/\ninvestigates/special-report/russia-flights/.\n206. Matthews, \"Putin's (Secret) Army,\" 33-34. 207. \"The Ride of the Mercenaries.\" 208. Marten, \"Russia's Use of Semi-State Security Forces,\" 13.\n209. Matthews, \"Putin's (Secret) Army,\" 33-34; stensen and Bukkvoll, Russian Use of Private\nMilitary and Security Companies: The Implications for European and Norwegian Security,\n25.\n210. Michael Kofman and Matthew Rojansky, \"What Kind of Victory for Russia in Syria?\"\nMilitary Review (March-April 2018): 20.\n211. Dyner, \"The Role of Private Military Contractors in Russian Foreign Policy,\" 2; *Fontanka*,\n\"What Losses PMC Wagner Suffered in Syria,\" August 22, 2017, trans. by RusLetter, archived March 27, 2019, https://web.archive.org/web/20190327090453/http://rusletter.com/articles/ what_losses_pmc_wagner_suffered_in_syria; Grove, \"Up to Nine Russian Contractors Die in\nSyria, Experts Say;\" Sukhankin, \"C*ontinuing War by Other Means\"*; Marten, \"Russia's Use of\nSemi-State Security Forces,\" 14-16, 18.\n212. Rozhdestvensky, \"There's No Question of Disbanding,\" 9-10.\n213. Aleksandr Golts, \"All-Out War,\" [condensed text] *The Current Digest of the Russian Press*\n70, no. 7, 2018: 3-4, originally published in *New Times*, February 12, 2018.\n214. Andriukaitis, \"#PutinAtWar;\" Ruslan Leviev, \"Vega: A New PMC in Syria with Ties to\nRussia and Ukraine,\" *Conflict Intelligence Team*, March 28, 2019, https://citeam.org/russianukrainian-pmc-vega-in-syria/?lang=en.\n215. Sukhankin, \"Vega Strategic Services.\"\n216. Denis Korotkov, \" , *Novaya Gazeta*, July 28, 2019, https://www.novayagazeta.ru/\narticles/2019/07/28/81406-bez-schita.\n217. Ibid.\n218. Bingham, \"Private Companies Engage in Russia's Non-Linear Warfare,\" 8-9; *Fontanka*,\n\"What Losses PMC Wagner Suffered in Syria;\" Matthews, \"Putin's (Secret) Army,\" 33;\nSukhankin, \"C*ontinuing War by Other Means\"*.\n219. Sukhankin, \"C*ontinuing War by Other Means\"*.\n220. Grove, \"Up to Nine Russian Contractors Die in Syria, Experts Say;\" Khazov-Cassia\nand Coalson, \"Russian Mercenaries;\" Michael Kofman, \"U.S. Strikes and Russian PMC\nCasualties in SyriaFact vs Fiction,\" *Russia Military Analysis* (blog), February 14, 2018,\nhttps://russianmilitaryanalysis.wordpress.com/2018/02/14/u-s-strikes-and-russian-pmccasualties-in-syria-fact-vs-fiction/; Oriana Pawlyk, \"US MQ-9 Reaper Drone Takes Out Russian T-72 Tank in Syria,\" *Military.com*, February 13, 2018, https://www.military.com/dailynews/2018/02/13/us-mq-9-reaper-takes-out-russian-t-72-tank-syria.html; *Fontanka*, \"What\nLosses PMC Wagner Suffered in Syria.\"\n221. *Fontanka*, \"What Losses PMC Wagner Suffered in Syria.\"\n222. Gostev and Coalson, \"Russia's Paramilitary Mercenaries Emerge From The Shadows.\" 223. Grove, \"Up to Nine Russian Contractors Die in Syria, Experts Say.\"\n224. *Fontanka*, \"What Losses PMC Wagner Suffered in Syria.\"\n225. Khazov-Cassia and Coalson, \"Russian Mercenaries;\" Reynolds, \"Putin's Not-So-Secret\nMercenaries,\" 6.\n226. Maria Tsvetkova, \"Russian Trips to Syria Hit Peak after Putin Ordered Partial Pull-out,\"\nReuters, September 28, 2018, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-syria-russia/\nrussian-trips-to-syria-hit-peak-after-putin-ordered-partial-pull-out-idUSKCN1M81ZJ.\n227. Matthews, \"Putin's (Secret) Army,\" 33; Rozhdestvensky, \"There's No Question of\nDisbanding,\" 9-10; stensen and Bukkvoll, Russian Use of Private Military and Security Companies: The Implications for European and Norwegian Security, 26-27.\n228. Sukhankin, \"C*ontinuing War by Other Means\"*; Goble, \"Russian Private Military\nCompanies Rapidly Growing Sector.\"\n229. Rozhdestvensky, \"There's No Question of Disbanding,\" 9-10; stensen and Bukkvoll,\nRussian Use of Private Military and Security Companies: The Implications for European\nand Norwegian Security, 26-27.\n230. Matthews, \"Putin's (Secret) Army,\" 33. 231. Rozhdestvensky, \"There's No Question of Disbanding,\" 9-10.\n232. Khazov-Cassia and Coalson, \"Russian Mercenaries;\" Sukhankin, \"Continuing War by\nOther Means\"; Pavel Felgenhauer, \"Russian Mercenaries Fight and Die in Botched Operation in Syria,\" *Eurasia Daily Monitor* 14, no. 128, October 12, 2017.\n233. Sukhankin, \"Revolt of the 'Disgruntled'.\"\n234. Sukhankin, \"C*ontinuing War by Other Means\"*.\n235. Khazov-Cassia and Coalson, \"Russian Mercenaries.\"\n236. *Fontanka*, \"What Losses PMC Wagner Suffered in Syria.\"\n\n237. Khazov-Cassia and Coalson, \"Russian Mercenaries;\" Hauer, \"Russia's Favorite Mercenaries.\" 238. Rozhdestvensky, \"There's No Question of Disbanding,\" 9-10.\n239. Matthews, \"Putin's (Secret) Army,\" 33; Sukhankin, \"C*ontinuing War by Other Means\"*;\nRozhdestvensky, \"There's No Question of Disbanding,\" 9-10.\n240. Sukhankin, \"C*ontinuing War by Other Means\"*.\n241. Mardasov, \"Kremlin Pressed to Legalize Private Military Companies;\" Richard Spencer,\n\"Where are the Syrians in Assad's Syrian Arab Army?\" *Telegraph*, April 9, 2016, https://www.\ntelegraph.co.uk/news/2016/04/09/where-are-the-syrians-in-assads-syrian-arab-army/.\n242. Sukhankin, \"C*ontinuing War by Other Means\"*; Rozhdestvensky, \"There's No Question of\nDisbanding,\" 9-10.\n243. Rozhdestvensky, \"There's No Question of Disbanding,\" 9-10. 244. \"Russia's Wagner Group Fighters Sighted in Syria.\" 245. Khazov-Cassia and Coalson, \"Russian Mercenaries.\" 246. Matthews, \"Putin's (Secret) Army,\" 33; Rozhdestvensky, \"There's No Question of\nDisbanding,\" 9-10.\n247. Chris Kozak, \"Russian-Syrian-Iranian Coalition Seizes ISIS-Held Palmyra,\" Institute for the\nStudy of War, March 27, 2016, http://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-syrianiranian-coalition-seizes-isis-held-palmyra; Dominic Evans, \"Syrian Army, with Russian Air\nSupport, Advances Inside Palmyra,\" *Reuters*, March 25, 2016, https://www.reuters.com/article/\nus-mideast-crisis-syria-idUSKCN0WR0RA.\n248. Kozak, \"Russian-Syrian-Iranian Coalition Seizes ISIS-Held Palmyra.\" 249. Kozak, \"ISIS Recaptures Palmyra in Major Blow to Pro-Regime Forces.\" 250. Tsvetkova, \"Russia Underplayed Losses in Recapture of Syria's Palmyra;\" stensen and\nBukkvoll, Russian Use of Private Military and Security Companies: The Implications for European and Norwegian Security, 25.\n251. Matthews, \"Putin's (Secret) Army,\" 33; figure on next page from Russian Ministry of\nDefense, \"Official Russian State Concert Celebrating Victory in Palmyra,\" Photograph, Mil.ru, Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International, May 5, 2016, https://commons.wikimedia.org/ wiki/File:%D0%A0%D0%B0%D0%B1%D0%BE%D1%82%D0%B0_%D0%B7%D0%B0%D 1%80%D1%83%D0%B1%D0%B5%D0%B6%D0%BD%D1%8B%D1%85_%D0%A1%D0%9C %D0%98_%D0%B2_%D0%B3%D0%BE%D1%80%D0%BE%D0%B4%D0%B5_%D0%9F% D0%B0%D0%BB%D1%8C%D0%BC%D0%B8%D1%80%D0%B5_%D0%B2%D0%BE_%D0 %B2%D1%80%D0%B5%D0%BC%D1%8F_%D0%BA%D0%BE%D0%BD%D1%86%D0%B5 %D1%80%D1%82%D0%B0_%C2%AB%D0%A1_%D0%BC%D0%BE%D0%BB%D0%B8% D1%82%D0%B2%D0%BE%D0%B9_%D0%BE_%D0%9F%D0%B0%D0%BB%D1%8C%D0 %BC%D0%B8%D1%80%D0%B5%C2%BB_(4).jpg.\n252. Rozhdestvensky, \"There's No Question of Disbanding,\" 9-10. 253. Gostev and Coalson, \"Russia's Paramilitary Mercenaries Emerge From The Shadows.\" 254. Rozhdestvensky, \"There's No Question of Disbanding,\" 9-10; Marten, \"Russia's Use of Semi-\nState Security Forces,\" 16; Denis Korotkov, interview in Russian by Evgeny Berg, translation by Kevin Rothrock, \"'People think it doesn't affect them. But it affects everyone.' Meduza\ninterviews the reporter who blew the lid on Russian mercenaries fighting in Syria,\" *Meduza*,\nAugust 30, 2017, https://meduza.io/en/feature/2017/08/30/people-think-it-doesn-t-affect-thembut-it-affects-everyone.\n255. \"The Ride of the Mercenaries;\" Nataliya Vasilyeva, \"Thousands of Russian Private\nContractors Fighting in Syria,\" *Associated Press*, December 12, 2017, https://www.apnews.\ncom/7f9e63cb14a54dfa9148b6430d89e873; Matthews, \"Putin's (Secret) Army,\" 31;  Marten, \"Russia's Use of Semi-State Security Forces,\" 14-16; Felgenhauer, \"Russian Mercenaries Fight and Die in Botched Operation in Syria;\" Rozhdestvensky, \"There's No Question of Disbanding,\" 9-10.\n256. Marten, \"Russia's Use of Semi-State Security Forces,\" 14. 257. Vasilyeva, \"Thousands of Russian Private Contractors Fighting in Syria.\" 258. Rozhdestvensky, \"There's No Question of Disbanding,\" 9-10; Khazov-Cassia and Coalson,\n\"Russian Mercenaries.\"\n259. Hauer, \"Russia's Favorite Mercenaries;\" Khazov-Cassia and Coalson, \"Russian Mercenaries.\"\n260. Rozhdestvensky, \"There's No Question of Disbanding,\" 9-10. 261. Marten, \"Russia's Use of Semi-State Security Forces,\" 16. 262. ISW Research Team, \"Disposition of Adversary and Friendly Forces in Eastern Syria,\"\nInstitute for the Study of War, March 9, 2019, http://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/ disposition-adversary-and-friendly-forces-eastern-syria.\n263. Bingham, \"Private Companies Engage in Russia's Non-Linear Warfare,\" 8-9. 264. Rozhdestvensky, \"There's No Question of Disbanding,\" 9-10. 265. Interfax, \"Russian Defense Ministry Denies Kyiv's Allegation Varyag Cruiser was Used to\nTransport Mercenaries to Syria (Part 2),\" *Russia & CIS Military Newswire*, April 18, 2018,\nhttp://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=tsh&AN=129120090&site=ehostlive&scope=site.\n266. Khazov-Cassia and Coalson, \"Russian Mercenaries.\"\n267. Sagdiev, et al., \"How a Secret Russian Airlift Helps Syria's Assad;\" Sukhankin, \"Continuing\nWar by Other Means\".\n268. Sana Sekkarie, \"Syria Situation Report: September 14 - 27, 2017,\" Institute for the Study of\nWar and Syria: Direct, September 2017, http://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/ Syria%20SITREP%2014%20-%2027%20SEP.pdf.\n269. Felgenhauer, \"Russian Mercenaries Fight and Die in Botched Operation in Syria.\" 270. Laila Bassam and Angus McDowall, \"Syrian Army, Allies, Take Last IS Stronghold in Syria:\nCommander,\" *Reuters*, November 8, 2017, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisisislamic-state/syrian-army-encircles-last-is-stronghold-in-syria-al-manar-idUSKBN1D81NM.\n271. Felgenhauer, \"The Russian Strategic Offensive in the Middle East,\" 23. 272. Felgenhauer, \"Russian Mercenaries Fight and Die in Botched Operation in Syria.\" 273. Matthews, \"Putin's (Secret) Army,\" 33-34. 274. Dana W. White, \"Department of Defense Press Briefing by Pentagon Chief Spokesperson\nDana W. White in the Pentagon Briefing Room,\" Transcript, Department of Defense, February 8, 2018, https://dod.defense.gov/News/Transcripts/Transcript-View/Article/1436566/ department-of-defense-press-briefing-by-pentagon-chief-spokesperson-dana-w-whit/.\n275. Shabayev, \"Cossack Fighter Laments Russian 'Utilization' of Mercenaries in Syria.\" 276. Bradley Hanlon, \"Weak U.S. Response to Russian Proxies Undermines Deterrence in Middle\nEast and Eastern Europe,\" Institute for the Study of War, February 16, 2018, http://iswresearch. blogspot.com/2018/02/weak-us-response-to-russian-proxies.html.\n277. Vladimir Frolov, \"The Same Plus Israel: A New Round of Escalation in Syria,\" [complete\ntext] *Current Digest of the Russian Press* 70, no. 7 (2018): 4-5, originally published in Republic.ru, February 13, 2018, https://republic.ru/posts/89484.\n278. Thomas Gibbons-Neff, \"How a 4-Hour Battle Between Russian Mercenaries and U.S.\nCommandos Unfolded in Syria,\" *New York Times*, May 24, 2018, https://www.nytimes.\ncom/2018/05/24/world/middleeast/american-commandos-russian-mercenaries-syria.html;\nSarah El Deeb, \"Syria Says Rare US Strike an Effort 'to Support Terrorism',\" *Associated Press*,\nFebruary 8, 2018, https://www.apnews.com/b5c465ccfa8f4b94b078d9cfaba1a0b4; CBS and Associated Press, \"Forces Hit by U.S. in Syria Included Russian Mercenaries, Official Says,\"\nCBS News, February 8, 2018, https://www.cbsnews.com/news/forces-hit-by-u-s-in-syriaincluded-russian-mercenaries-official-says/.\n279. Christoph Reuter, \"The Truth About the Russian Deaths in Syria,\" *Der Spiegel*, March\n2, 2018, archived January 27, 2019, https://web.archive.org/web/20190127014623/http:// www.spiegel.de/international/world/american-fury-the-truth-about-the-russian-deaths-insyria-a-1196074.html.\n280. Gibbons-Neff, \"How a 4-Hour Battle Between Russian Mercenaries and U.S. Commandos\nUnfolded in Syria;\" El Deeb, \"Syria Says Rare US Strike an Effort 'to Support Terrorism';\" CBS/Associated Press, \"Forces Hit by U.S. in Syria Included Russian Mercenaries.\"\n281. Maksim Suchkov, \"How Russia and the U.S. have Reached the Brink in Syria,\" [condensed\ntext] *Current Digest of the Russian Press* 70, no. 7 (2018): 5-6, originally published in RBC Daily, February 14, 2018: 5.\n282. El Deeb, \"Syria Says Rare US Strike an Effort 'to Support Terrorism'.\" 283. CBS/Associated Press, \"Forces Hit by U.S. in Syria Included Russian Mercenaries.\" 284. Vera Bergengruen, Borzou Daragahi, and Munzer al-Awad, \"Here's What We Know About\nThe US Airstrikes That Killed Russian Fighters In Syria,\" *Buzzfeed News*, February 13, 2018,\nupdated February 14, 2018, https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/verabergengruen/hereswhat-we-know-about-the-us-airstrikes-that-killed.\n285. Reynolds, \"Putin's Not-So-Secret Mercenaries,\" 7.\n286. Shabayev, \"Cossack Fighter Laments Russian 'Utilization' of Mercenaries in Syria;\"\nRozhdestvensky, \"There's No Question of Disbanding,\" 9-10; Frolov, \"The Same Plus Israel,\" 4-5.\n287. El Deeb, \"Syria Says Rare US Strike an Effort 'to Support Terrorism'.\" 288. Maria Tsvetkova, \"Russian Toll in Syria Battle was 300 Killed and Wounded: Sources,\"\nReuters, February 15, 2018, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-syria-russiacasualtie/russian-toll-in-syria-battle-was-300-killed-and-wounded-sources-idUSKCN1FZ2DZ.\n289. Reuters Staff, \"No Information about Reports of Russian Mercenaries Killed in Syria:\nKremlin,\" *Reuters*, February 13, 2018, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-syriarussia-kremlin/no-information-about-reports-of-russian-mercenaries-killed-in-syria-kremlinidUSKBN1FX12W.\n290. stensen and Bukkvoll, Russian Use of Private Military and Security Companies: The\nImplications for European and Norwegian Security, 34.\n291. Ellen Nakashima, Karen DeYoung, and Liz Sly, \"Putin Ally Said to Be in Touch with\nKremlin, Assad Before His Mercenaries Attacked U.S. Troops,\" *Washington Post*, February\n22, 2018, archived on February 23, 2018, https://web.archive.org/web/20180223185656/https:// www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/putin-ally-said-to-be-in-touch-withkremlin-assad-before-his-mercenaries-attacked-us-troops/2018/02/22/f4ef050c-1781-11e8- 8b08-027a6ccb38eb_story.html?utm_term=.3286c63955b6; Andrew Linder, \"Russian Private\nMilitary Companies in Syria and Beyond,\" *New Perspectives in Foreign Policy* 16 (Fall 2018):\n17.\n292. Reynolds, \"Putin's Not-So-Secret Mercenaries,\" 6. 293. Matti Suomenaro, \"U.S. Strategy in Syria is Failing,\" Institute for the Study of War, February\n10, 2018, http://iswresearch.blogspot.com/2018/02/us-strategy-in-syria-is-failing.html.\n294. Rozhdestvensky, \"There's No Question of Disbanding,\" 9-10.\n\n295. Interfax, \"       ,\" Mail.\nru, June 20, 2019, https://news.mail.ru/politics/37705595/\n296. Sergey Sukhankin, \"Russian Special Operations Forces: Image Versus Substance,\" Eurasia\nDaily Monitor 16, no. 43, March 27, 2019, https://jamestown.org/program/russian-specialoperations-forces-image-versus-substance/; JHU/APL, \"Little Green Men\": A Primer on Modern Russian Unconventional Warfare, Ukraine 2013-2014 (Fort Bragg, NC: USASOC),\n55-58, https://www.soc.mil/ARIS/books/pdf/14-02984_LittleGreenMen-UNCLASS-hi-res.pdf; JHU/APL, \"Ambiguous Threats and External Influences in the Baltic States and Poland - Phase 1: Understanding the Threat,\" JHU/APL Technical Report NSAD-R-14-110, October 2014, 10-20, 50-62.\n297. Marten, \"Russia's Use of Semi-State Security Forces,\" 2, 12; Bingham, \"Private Companies\nEngage in Russia's Non-Linear Warfare,\" 1; Sukhankin, \"C*ontinuing War by Other Means\"*; Matthews, \"Putin's (Secret) Army,\" 28; stensen and Bukkvoll, Russian Use of Private Military and Security Companies: The Implications for European and Norwegian Security,\n23, 25, 33; Yurii Butusov, \"Mystery of Wagner's Identity Unfolded: He is Russian Officer and Head of Large Private Military Company in Russia, Who Eliminated Mozgovoy, Dremov, and\nOther Terrorist Leaders, and Now is Fighting in Syria,\" *Censor.net*, March 31, 2016, https://\ncensor.net.ua/en/resonance/381743/mystery_of_wagners_identity_unfolded_he_is_russian_ officer_and_head_of_large_private_military_company.\n298. Bingham, \"Private Companies Engage in Russia's Non-Linear Warfare,\" 7; stensen and\nBukkvoll, Russian Use of Private Military and Security Companies: The Implications for European and Norwegian Security, 33.\n299. Dyner, \"The Role of Private Military Contractors in Russian Foreign Policy,\" 2; stensen\nand Bukkvoll, Russian Use of Private Military and Security Companies: The Implications for European and Norwegian Security, 18-19; JHU/APL, \"Ambiguous Threats and External Influences in the Baltic States and Poland - Phase 1,\" 16, 52-53, 60; *CCTV America*, \"Cossacks\nin Crimea,\" March 11, 2014, on CGTN America (YouTube), https://youtu.be/CCThuygFs5A.\n300. Simon Shuster, \"Meet the Cossack 'Wolves' Doing Russia's Dirty Work in Ukraine,\" *Time*,\nMay 12, 2014, http://time.com/95898/wolves-hundred-ukraine-russia-cossack/; Nemanja\nRujevic, \"Serbian Mercenaries Fighting in Eastern Ukraine,\" DW, August 14, 2014, https://p.\ndw.com/p/1Cv1b; Allison Quinn, \"Suspicions Abound as Chechen Fighters Make Mysterious\nExit from Donbas Battlefield,\" *Kyiv Post*, May 8, 2015, archived May 9, 2015, https://web.\narchive.org/web/20150509155417/http://www.kyivpost.com/content/kyiv-post-plus/suspicionsabound-as-chechen-fighters-make-mysterious-exit-from-donbas-battlefield-388012.html.\n301. Maria Tsvetkova and Anton Zverev, \"Exclusive: Kremlin-Linked Contractors Help Guard\nVenezuela's Maduro - Sources,\" *Reuters*, January 25, 2019, https://www.reuters.com/article/\nus-venezuela-politics-russia-exclusive/exclusive-kremlin-linked-contractors-help-guardvenezuelas-maduro-sources-idUSKCN1PJ22M.\n302. U.S. Department of the Treasury, \"Russia/Ukraine-Related Designations and\nIdentifications,\" June 20, 2017, https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/OFAC- Enforcement/Pages/20170620.aspx.\n303. stensen and Bukkvoll, Russian Use of Private Military and Security Companies: The\nImplications for European and Norwegian Security, 33.\n304. Fredrik Westerlund and Johan Norberg, \"Military Means for Non-Military Measures: The\nRussian Approach to the Use of Armed Force as Seen in Ukraine,\" Journal of Slavic Military Studies 29, no. 4 (2016): 580-581.\n305. Khazov-Cassia and Coalson, \"Russian Mercenaries.\" 306. Ibid. 307. Russia Monitor, \"Russian Mercenaries in Syria,\" Warsaw Institute, April 22, 2017, https://\nwarsawinstitute.org/russian-mercenaries-in-syria/.\n308. Yuri Zoria, \"New Footage Shows Russian PMC Wagner Involved in Crucial 2015 Debaltseve\nBattle in Ukraine,\" *Euromaidan Press*, June 22, 2018, http://euromaidanpress.com/2018/06/22/\nnew-footage-shows-russian-pmc-wagner-involved-in-crucial-2015-debaltseve-battle-inukraine/.\n309. Matthews, \"Putin's (Secret) Army,\" 31, 33; Interfax - Ukraine, \"Hrytsak: SBU Uncovers\nInvolvement of Russian 'Wagner PMC' in Destroying Il-76 in Donbas, Debaltseve Events,\"\nKyiv Post, October 7, 2017, https://www.kyivpost.com/ukraine-politics/hrytsak-sbu-uncoversinvolvement-russian-wagner-pmc-destroying-il-76-donbas-debaltseve-events.html.\n310. Grove, \"Up to Nine Russian Contractors Die in Syria, Experts Say.\" 311. Gostev and Coalson, \"Russia's Paramilitary Mercenaries Emerge From The Shadows.\" 312. Matthews, \"Putin's (Secret) Army,\" 31, 33.\n313. Sukhankin, \"C*ontinuing War by Other Means\"*.\n314. Sautreuil, \"Believe It or Not, Russia Dislikes Relying on Military Contractors;\" Sukhankin,\n\"C*ontinuing War by Other Means\"*; Marten, \"Russia's Use of Semi-State Security Forces,\" 12.\n315. Franklin Holcomb, \"The Kremlin's Irregular Army: Ukrainian Separatist Order of Battle,\"\nRussia and Ukraine Security Report 3, Institute for the Study of War, September 2017, 11,\nhttp://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/ISW%20Separatist%20ORBAT%20 Holcomb%202017_Final.pdf.\n316. Jonathan Ferguson and N.R. Jenzen-Jones, \"Raising Red Flags: An Examination of Arms\nand Munitions in the Ongoing Conflict in Ukraine,\" Armament Research Services (ARES), Research Report No. 3, November 2014, 18, 87, https://www.academia.edu/37600810/Raising_ Red_Flags_An_examination_of_arms_and_munitions_in_the_ongoing_conflict_in_Ukraine.\n317. Zoria, \"New Footage Shows Russian PMC Wagner Involved in Crucial 2015 Debaltseve\nBattle in Ukraine.\"\n318. Sukhankin, \"C*ontinuing War by Other Means\"*. 319. Holcomb, \"The Kremlin's Irregular Army,\" 10; stensen and Bukkvoll, Russian Use of\nPrivate Military and Security Companies: The Implications for European and Norwegian\nSecurity, 19.\n320. Matthews, \"Putin's (Secret) Army,\" 28. 321. Felgenhauer, \"Russian Mercenaries Fight and Die in Botched Operation in Syria;\"\nSukhankin, \"C*ontinuing War by Other Means\"*.\n322. Holcomb, \"The Kremlin's Irregular Army,\" 7. 323. Matthews, \"Putin's (Secret) Army,\" 33.\n324. stensen and Bukkvoll, Russian Use of Private Military and Security Companies: The\nImplications for European and Norwegian Security, 34.\n325. Bellingcat Investigation Team, \"MH17 - Russian GRU Commander 'Orion' Identified\nas Oleg Ivannikov,\" *Bellingcat*, May 25, 2018, https://www.bellingcat.com/news/uk-andeurope/2018/05/25/mh17-russian-gru-commander-orion-identified-oleg-ivannikov/.\n326. Bellingcat Investigation Team, \"Wagner Mercenaries with GRU-Issued Passports: Validating\nSBU's Allegation,\" *Bellingcat*, January 30, 2019, https://www.bellingcat.com/news/uk-andeurope/2019/01/30/wagner-mercenaries-with-gru-issued-passports-validating-sbus-allegation/.\n327. Sautreuil, \"Believe It or Not, Russia Dislikes Relying on Military Contractors.\" 328. Florian Elabdi, \"Putin's Man in the Central African Republic: Is Valery Zakharov at the\nHeart of Russian Skulduggery?\" *Daily Beast*, December 17, 2018, https://www.thedailybeast.\ncom/putins-man-in-the-central-african-republic-is-valery-zakharov-at-the-heart-of-russianskulduggery; International Crisis Group, \"Avoiding the Worst in Central African Republic,\"\nAfrica Report 253, September 28, 2017, https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/central-africa/\ncentral-african-republic/253-avoiding-worst-central-african-republic.\n329. Elabdi, \"Putin's Man in the Central African Republic.\"\n330. Stratfor, \"Russia Revisits an Old Cold War Battleground,\" *Assessments*, January 15, 2018,\nhttps://worldview.stratfor.com/article/russia-revisits-old-cold-war-battleground; AFP, \"UN\nGives Green Light on Russia Arms to C Africa,\" *News24*, December 16, 2017, archived\nDecember 17, 2017, https://web.archive.org/web/20171216225049/https://www.news24.com/ Africa/News/un-gives-green-light-on-russia-arms-to-c-africa-20171216; MEMRI, \"Russia in\nthe World - Russia on the African Continent Part I,\" *Special Dispatch* No. 7298, January 25,\n2018, https://www.memri.org/reports/russia-world-%E2%80%93-russia-african-continentpart-i.\n331. Aaron Ross, \"How Russia Moved into Central Africa,\" *Reuters*, October 17, 2018, https://\nwww.reuters.com/article/us-africa-russia-insight/how-russia-moved-into-central-africaidUSKCN1MR0KA.\n332. Patricia Huon and Simon Ostrovsky, \"Russia, The New Power in Central Africa,\" *Coda*,\nDecember 19, 2018, https://codastory.com/ disinformation/russia-new-power-central-africa/.\n333. Mardasov, \"Kremlin Pressed to Legalize Private Military Companies;\" RFE/RL's Russian\nService, \"Russian Veterans Appeal to ICC over Moscow's Alleged Use of Mercenaries,\" RFE/ RL, November 19, 2018, https://www.rferl.org/a/russian-veterans-appeal-to-icc-over-moscow-salleged-use-of-mercenaries/29609013.html.\n334. Ross, \"How Russia Moved into Central Africa.\" 335. Ibid. 336. Huon and Ostrovsky, \"Russia, The New Power in Central Africa.\"\n337. Nicolas Haque, \"Russia in Africa: Inside a Military Training Centre in CAR,\" Al Jazeera\nNews, April 14, 2019, https://www.aljazeera.com/programmes/talktojazeera/inthefield/2019/04/\nrussia-africa-military-training-centre-car-190411152658162.html.\n338. Ross, \"How Russia Moved into Central Africa.\" 339. Romain Esmenjaud, Melanie De Groof, Paul-Simon Handy, Ilyas Oussedik, and Enrica\nPicco, \"Final Report of the Panel of Experts on the Central African Republic Extended Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 2399 (2018),\" UN Security Council, S/2018/1119, December 14, 2018, 39-40, para. 176, https://undocs.org/S/2018/1119.\n340. Ibid., 39-40, para. 176. 341. Ibid., 40, para. 178.\n342. stensen and Bukkvoll, Russian Use of Private Military and Security Companies: The\nImplications for European and Norwegian Security, 3.\n343. Tim Lister, Sebastian Shukla, and Clarissa War, \"Putin's Private Army,\" CNN, August 7,\n2019, https://www.cnn.com/interactive/2019/08/africa/putins-private-army-car-intl/.\n344. Esmenjaud, et al., \"Final Report of the Panel of Experts on the Central African Republic\nExtended Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 2399 (2018),\" 39, para. 175; Huon and Ostrovsky, \"Russia, The New Power in Central Africa.\"\n345. stensen and Bukkvoll, Russian Use of Private Military and Security Companies: The\nImplications for European and Norwegian Security, 23; figure to the right from Confidential\nSource, \"Photograph of Sewa Security personnel reinforcing the President's security,\" photograph of Russian PMC personnel in CAR published in UN panel of experts report (public domain), in Esmenjaud, et al., \"Final Report of the Panel of Experts on the Central African Republic Extended Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 2399 (2018),\" 162, Annex 9.3.\n346. Ross, \"How Russia Moved into Central Africa.\" 347. Hauer, \"Russia's Favorite Mercenaries;\" Alec Luhn, \"Russian Journalists Killed in Central\nAfrican Republic While Investigating Mercenaries of 'Putin's Chef',\" *Telegraph*, August 1,\n2018, https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2018/07/31/russian-journalists-killed-central-africanrepublic/.\n348. Sasha Ingber, \"3 Russian Journalists Killed While Probing Reports of Mercenaries\nin Africa,\" NPR, August 2, 2018, https://www.npr.org/2018/08/02/635046238/3-russianjournalists-killed-while-probing-reports-of-mercenaries-in-africa; Interfax, \"Reports Connecting Journalist Deaths in CAR to Private Military Companies 'Drivel' - Foreign\nMinistry,\" *Russia & CIS Military Newswire*, August 1, 2018, http://search.ebscohost.com/login.\naspx?direct=true&db=tsh&AN=131008019&site=ehost-live&scope=site; Huon and Ostrovsky, \"Russia, The New Power in Central Africa.\"\n349. Lister, Shukla, and War, \"Putin's Private Army.\" 350. Huon and Ostrovsky, \"Russia, The New Power in Central Africa.\"\n351. Ibid.\n352. Lister, Shukla, and Ward, \"Putin's Private Army.\" 353. Ross, \"How Russia Moved into Central Africa.\" 354. Ibid. 355. Ibid. 356. Elabdi, \"Putin's Man in the Central African Republic.\" 357. Ross, \"How Russia Moved into Central Africa.\" 358. Esmenjaud, et al., \"Final Report of the Panel of Experts on the Central African Republic\nExtended Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 2399 (2018),\" 7-8, para. 15-19.\n359. Ibid., 44, para. 199. 360. Ibid., 8, para. 17. 361. Huon and Ostrovsky, \"Russia, The New Power in Central Africa.\"\n362. \"Putin Replaces Envoy to Central African Republic, Where Russian Reporters Died,\" RFE/\nRL, January 15, 2019, https://www.rferl.org/a/putin-replaces-russian-ambassador-to-centralafrican-republic/29711908.html.\n363. Bellingcat Investigation Team, \"Wagner Mercenaries with GRU-Issued Passports;\"\nBellingcat Investigation Team, \"Skripal Suspects Confirmed as GRU Operatives: Prior\nEuropean Operations Disclosed,\" *Bellingcat*, September 20, 2018, https://www.bellingcat.com/\nnews/uk-and-europe/2018/09/20/skripal-suspects-confirmed-gru-operatives-prior-europeanoperations-disclosed/.\n364. Bellingcat Investigation Team, \"Wagner Mercenaries with GRU-Issued Passports.\" 365. Neyelov, \"Who are the Competitors of the 'Russian PMCs' on the African Market of Military\nServices.\"\n366. Esmenjaud, et al., \"Final Report of the Panel of Experts on the Central African Republic\nExtended Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 2399 (2018),\" 39-41, para. 176, 179.\n367. AFP, \"UN Gives Green Light on Russia Arms to C Africa;\" MEMRI, \"Russia in the World.\" 368. Esmenjaud, et al., \"Final Report of the Panel of Experts on the Central African Republic\nExtended Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 2399 (2018),\" 39, para. 175.\n369. Ibid., 43, para. 192. 370. Haque, \"Russia in Africa.\" 371. Reuters, \"Russia to Send More Military Trainers, Equipment to Central African Republic,\"\nEyewitness News, October 19, 2018, https://ewn.co.za/2018/10/19/russia-to-send-more-militarytrainers-equipment-to-central-african-republic.\n372. Huon and Ostrovsky, \"Russia, The New Power in Central Africa.\" 373. Elabdi, \"Putin's Man in the Central African Republic.\" 374. Ross, \"How Russia Moved into Central Africa.\"\n375. \"Central African Republic Open to Russian Military Base,\" *Moscow Times*, January 10,\n2019, https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2019/01/10/central-african-republic-open-to-russianmilitary-base-a64091.\n376. Lister, Shukla, and War, \"Putin's Private Army.\" 377. Stratfor, \"Russia Revisits an Old Cold War Battleground.\"\n378. AFP, \"Sudan's President Bashir Asks Putin for 'Protection' from 'Aggressive' US,\" France\n24, November 23, 2017, https://www.france24.com/en/20171123-sudan-president-bashir-asksputin-protection-aggressive-us.\n379. Stratfor, \"Russia Revisits an Old Cold War Battleground.\"\n380. \"Russian Military Firm Working with Sudan Security Service: Sources,\" *Sudan Tribune*,\nJanuary 8, 2019, http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article66883; Andrew McGregor,\n\"Russian Mercenaries and the Survival of the Sudanese Regime,\" *Eurasia Daily Monitor* 16,\nno. 15, February 6, 2019, https://jamestown.org/program/russian-mercenaries-and-the-survivalof-the-sudanese-regime/.\n381. Khalid Abdelaziz, \"Sudan's Bashir Ousted by Military; Protesters Demand Civilian\nGovernment,\" *Reuters*, April 11, 2019, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-sudan-politics/\nsudans-bashir-forced-to-step-down-sources-say-idUSKCN1RN0AY.\n382. \"Russian Lawmakers Criticize Sudan Coup as 'Unconstitutional',\" *Moscow Times*, April 11,\n2019, https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2019/04/11/russian-lawmakers-criticize-sudan-coupas-unconstitutional-a65190.\n383. Paul Goble, \"Sudan Coup Highlights Weaknesses of Putin's Plan to Create 'African Empire'\nfor Russia,\" *Eurasia Daily Monitor* 16, no. 54, April 16, 2019, https://jamestown.org/program/\nsudan-coup-highlights-weaknesses-of-putins-plan-to-create-african-empire-for-russia/.\n384. Neyelov, \"Who are the Competitors of the 'Russian PMCs' on the African Market of Military\nServices.\"\n385. Ruslan Leviev, \"From Russia with Wagner: Are Russian Mercenaries Suppressing the Sudan\nProtests?\" *Conflict Intelligence Team*, January 11, 2019, https://citeam.org/are-ru-mercenariessuppressing-the-sudan-protests/?lang=en; McGregor, \"Russian Mercenaries and the Survival of the Sudanese Regime;\" \"Russian Military Firm Working with Sudan Security Service:\nSources;\" Jane Flanagan, \"Russian Mercenaries Help Put Down Sudan Protests: Sudan,\" *Times*,\nJanuary 10, 2019, https://search.proquest.com/docview/2165597449/fulltext/297E509B051417D PQ/2?accountid=11752.\n386. Leviev, \"From Russia with Wagner;\" \"Russian Military Firm Working with Sudan Security\nService: Sources;\" Flanagan, \"Russian Mercenaries Help Put Down Sudan Protests.\"\n387. Maria Tsvetkova, \"Russian Contractors are Training the Army in Sudan, Says Moscow,\"\ned. Andrew Osborn, *Reuters*, January 23, 2019, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-russiasudan-contractors/russian-contractors-are-training-the-army-in-sudan-says-moscowidUSKCN1PH23T.\n388. stensen and Bukkvoll, Russian Use of Private Military and Security Companies: The\nImplications for European and Norwegian Security, 3.\n389. Daniel Brown, \"3 Countries Where Russia's Shadowy Wagner Group Mercenaries are\nKnown to Operate,\" *Business Insider*, April 27, 2018, https://www.businessinsider.com/russiawagner-group-mercenaries-where-operate-2018-4#2-sudan-2.\n390. Mohammed Amin, \"Blood and Gold: Now Sudan's Land Wars Have Spread to Mining,\"\nMiddle East Eye, April 21, 2018, https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/blood-and-gold-nowsudans-land-wars-have-spread-mining.\n391. \"500 Russian Troops on CAR-Darfur Border,\" *Radio Dabanga*, July 31, 2018, https://www.\ndabangasudan.org/en/all-news/article/500-russian-troops-on-car-darfur-border.\n392. stensen and Bukkvoll, Russian Use of Private Military and Security Companies: The\nImplications for European and Norwegian Security, 15.\n393. Ibid., 23; Leviev, \"From Russia with Wagner.\" 394. Brown, \"3 Countries Where Russia's Shadowy Wagner Group Mercenaries are Known to\nOperate.\"\n395. Leviev, \"From Russia with Wagner.\"\n396. Tsvetkova, \"Russian Contractors are Training the Army in Sudan.\" 397. Amin, \"Blood and Gold.\"\n398. Leviev, \"From Russia with Wagner;\" \"Russian Military Firm Working with Sudan Security\nService: Sources;\" Flanagan, \"Russian Mercenaries Help Put Down Sudan Protests.\"\n399. stensen and Bukkvoll, Russian Use of Private Military and Security Companies: The\nImplications for European and Norwegian Security, 33.\n400. \"500 Russian Troops on CAR-Darfur Border.\" 401. \"Wagner PMC Part of Russian Military Intel, IDs of 'Mercenaries' Confirm - Ukraine\nSecurity Chief,\" *UNIAN*, January 28, 2019, https://www.unian.info/world/10424754-wagnerpmc-part-of-russian-military-intel-ids-of-mercenaries-confirm-ukraine-security-chief.html.\n402. \"Mercenaries Recruited to Russia's Wagner PMC in Occupied Crimea - SBU,\" *UNIAN*,\nFebruary 21, 2019, https://www.unian.info/war/10454832-mercenaries-recruited-to-russia-swagner-pmc-in-occupied-crimea-sbu.html.\n403. stensen and Bukkvoll, Russian Use of Private Military and Security Companies: The\nImplications for European and Norwegian Security, 37-38.\n404. Tsvetkova, \"Russian Contractors are Training the Army in Sudan.\"\n405. Neyelov, \"Who are the Competitors of the 'Russian PMCs' on the African Market of Military\nServices.\"\n406. stensen and Bukkvoll, Russian Use of Private Military and Security Companies: The\nImplications for European and Norwegian Security, 26; McGregor, \"Russian Mercenaries\nand the Survival of the Sudanese Regime;\" \"Wagner PMC Part of Russian Military Intel.\"\n407. Bellingcat Investigation Team, \"Wagner Mercenaries with GRU-Issued Passports.\"\n408. Tsvetkova, \"Russian Contractors are Training the Army in Sudan.\"\n409. \"500 Russian Troops on CAR-Darfur Border.\" 410. Leviev, \"From Russia with Wagner;\" \"Russian Military Firm Working with Sudan Security\nService: Sources;\" Flanagan, \"Russian Mercenaries Help Put Down Sudan Protests.\"\n411. Amin, \"Blood and Gold.\"\n412. Reynolds, \"Putin's Not-So-Secret Mercenaries,\" 12. 413. Stratfor, \"Russia Revisits an Old Cold War Battleground.\" 414. Paul Goble, \"Moscow Laying Groundwork for Deeper Military Involvement in Libya,\"\nEurasia Daily Monitor 15, no. 162, November 13, 2018, https://jamestown.org/program/\nmoscow-laying-groundwork-for-deeper-military-involvement-in-libya/.\n415. Ibid.\n416. stensen and Bukkvoll, Russian Use of Private Military and Security Companies: The\nImplications for European and Norwegian Security, 23.\n417. Ibid., 24. 418. Ibid., 25. 419. Goble, \"Moscow Laying Groundwork for Deeper Military Involvement in Libya.\" 420. Mardasov, \"Kremlin Pressed to Legalize Private Military Companies.\" 421. RFE/RL's Russian Service, \"Russian Veterans Appeal to ICC over Moscow's Alleged Use of\nMercenaries;\" Sukhankin, \"Revolt of the 'Disgruntled'.\"\n422. Dyner, \"The Role of Private Military Contractors in Russian Foreign Policy,\" 2. 423. Tom Newton Dunn, \"Putin Troops in Libya: Russia Sends Troops and Missiles into Libya\nin Bid to Enforce Stranglehold on the West,\" Sun, October 8, 2018, updated October 9, 2018,\nhttps://www.thesun.co.uk/news/7448072/russia-missiles-libya-warlord/.\n424. Maxim A. Suchkov, \"Analysis: Reports on Russian Troops in Libya Spark Controversy,\" Al-\nMonitor, October 12, 2018, https://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2018/10/russia-libyatroops-hifter.html.\n425. \"Russian Mercenaries Help Rebel Libyan Army to Seize Oilfields,\" *Daily Telegraph*, March\n4, 2019, https://search.proquest.com/docview/2187614930?accountid=11752.\n426. Ibid.\n427. Emily Sherwin, \"Could Libya be Russia's New Syria?\" DW, April 10, 2019, https://www.\ndw.com/en/could-libya-be-russias-new-syria/a-48277255.\n428. Eric Schmitt, \"Russia's Military Mission Creep Advances to a New Front: Africa,\" New York\nTimes, March 31, 2019, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/31/world/africa/russia-militaryafrica.html.\n429. Theodore Karasik, \"Russia's Financial Tactics in the Middle East\" in Russia in the Middle\nEast, eds. Theodore Karasik and Stephen Blank (Washington, DC: The Jamestown Foundation,\nDecember 2018), 258; Theodore Karasik and Gorgio Cafiero, \"Why Does Vladimir Putin Care\nabout Sudan?\" *New Atlanticist*, November 27, 2017, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/\nnew-atlanticist/why-does-vladimir-putin-care-about-sudan; Paul Burkhardt, \"Russia Signs\nAgreement with Nigeria for Nuclear Power Plant,\" *Bloomberg Wire Service*, October 31, 2017,\nhttps://search.proquest.com/docview/2009882702?accountid=11752.\n430. stensen and Bukkvoll, Russian Use of Private Military and Security Companies: The\nImplications for European and Norwegian Security, 23.\n431. Marten, \"Russia's Use of Semi-State Security Forces,\" 10; AFP, \"Nigeria Drops Charges\nagainst Russians in Arms Case,\" *Modern Ghana*, October 8, 2013, https://www.modernghana.\ncom/sports/461731/nigeria-drops-charges-against-russians-in-arms-case.html.\n432. stensen and Bukkvoll, Russian Use of Private Military and Security Companies: The\nImplications for European and Norwegian Security, 21.\n433. Caroline Varin, \"Turning the Tides of War: The Impact of Private Military and Security\nCompanies on Nigeria's Counterinsurgency against Boko Haram,\" *African Security Review*\n27, no. 2 (2018): 150; Cropley and Lewis, \"Nigeria Drafts in Foreign Mercenaries to Take on Boko Haram;\" Chris Stein, \"Nigeria's President: Boko Haram Trained with Islamic State,\"\nVoice of America, March 11, 2015, https://www.voanews.com/a/nigerias-president-says-bokoharam-trained-with-islamic-state/2676217.html; John Campbell, \"Mercenaries in Nigeria,\"\nCouncil on Foreign Relations (blog), March 12, 2015, https://www.cfr.org/blog/mercenariesnigeria; Bingham, \"Private Companies Engage in Russia's Non-Linear Warfare,\" 11.\n434. Neyelov, \"Who are the Competitors of the 'Russian PMCs' on the African Market of Military\nServices.\"\n435. Sergey Sukhankin, \"Russian PMCs in Yemen: Kremlin-Style 'Security Export' in Action?,\"\nEurasia Daily Monitor 15, no. 144, October 12, 2018, https://jamestown.org/program/russianpmcs-in-yemen-kremlin-style-security-export-in-action/; Marten, \"Russia's Use of Semi-State Security Forces,\" 2-3.\n436. Mardasov, \"Kremlin Pressed to Legalize Private Military Companies.\" 437. RFE/RL's Russian Service, \"Russian Veterans Appeal to ICC over Moscow's Alleged Use of\nMercenaries;\" Sukhankin, \"Revolt of the 'Disgruntled'.\"\n438. Sukhankin, \"Russian PMCs in Yemen;\" Sukhankin, \"C*ontinuing War by Other Means\"*;\nStephen Blank, \"From Sochi to the Sahel: Russia's Expanding Footprint,\" Eurasia Daily Monitor 14, no. 154, November 29, 2017, https://jamestown.org/program/sochi-sahel-russiasexpanding-footprint/.\n439. Bingham, \"Private Companies Engage in Russia's Non-Linear Warfare,\" 11; Emily B. Hager\nand Mark Mazzetti, \"Emirates Secretly Sends Colombian Mercenaries to Yemen Fight,\" New York Times, November 25, 2015, https://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/26/world/middleeast/\nemirates-secretly-sends-colombian-mercenaries-to-fight-in-yemen.html.\n440. Sukhankin, \"Russian PMCs in Yemen.\" 441. Tsvetkova and Zverev, \"Exclusive: Kremlin-Linked Contractors Help Guard Venezuela's\nMaduro - Sources.\"\n442. Ibid. 443. Joseph Trevithick, \"Russian Transport Aircraft Deliver Men and Materiel to Venezuela\nDirect from Syria,\" *Drive*, March 25, 2019, https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/27143/\nrussian-transport-aircraft-deliver-men-and-materiel-to-venezuela-direct-from-syria; Anatoly Kurmanaev, \"2 Russian Military Planes Land in Venezuela, Exacerbating Political Tension,\"\nNew York Times, March 25, 2019, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/25/world/americas/\nrussian-planes-caracas.html; Giancarlo Fiorella, \"Russians in Venezuela: What We Know\nSo Far,\" *Bellingcat*, April 4, 2019, https://www.bellingcat.com/news/americas/2019/04/04/\nrussians-in-venezuela-what-we-know-so-far/; Sergey Sukhankin, \"Behind the Scenes of\nRussia's Military Detachment to Venezuela,\" *Eurasia Daily Monitor* 16, no. 46, April 2,\n2019, https://jamestown.org/program/behind-the-scenes-of-russias-military-detachment-tovenezuela/.\n444. Alberto Nardelli, \"Russia is Trying to Fly Military Planes into Venezuela via Syria Again,\"\nBuzzfeed News, April 15, 2019, https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/albertonardelli/russiavenezuela-planes-malta-syria.\n445. Alberto Fittarelli, \"The Strange Tale of the Georgians in Congo,\" *Bellingcat*, June 26, 2017,\nhttps://www.bellingcat.com/news/africa/2017/06/26/strange-tale-georgians-congo/.\n446. Paul Goble, \"Moscow Quickly Expanding Ties to Africa,\" *Eurasia Daily Monitor* 15, no. 92,\nJune 14, 2018, https://jamestown.org/program/moscow-quickly-expanding-ties-to-africa/.\n447. Neyelov, \"Who are the Competitors of the 'Russian PMCs' on the African Market of Military\nServices.\"\n448. stensen and Bukkvoll, Russian Use of Private Military and Security Companies: The\nImplications for European and Norwegian Security, 23.\n449. RFE/RL's Russian Service, \"Russian Veterans Appeal to ICC over Moscow's Alleged Use of\nMercenaries;\" Sukhankin, \"Revolt of the 'Disgruntled';\" Paul Goble, \"Kremlin Rapidly Losing\nControl of 'Private Military Company' Story,\" *Windows on Eurasia* (blog), November 20,\n2018, http://windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2018/11/kremlin-rapidly-losing-control-of.html.\n450. Mardasov, \"Kremlin Pressed to Legalize Private Military Companies.\" 451. Sukhankin, \"War, Business and Ideology: How Russian Private Military Contractors Pursue\nMoscow's Interests.\"\nAsymmetric Warfare Group 2270 Rock Avenue Fort Meade, MD 20755\nwww.awg.army.mil THINK. ADAPT. ANTICIPATE."
    },
    {
        "text": "# Early Warning Analysis For Social Diffusion Events\n\nRichard Colbaugh1 and Kristin Glass2\n\n1 Analytics and Cryptography Department, Sandia National Laboratories, Albuquerque, USA\n2Cyber Research and Education Department, Sandia National Laboratories, Albuquerque, USA\n\nRC: colbaugh@comcast.net KG: kglass609@comcast.net\n (corresponding author)\n\nAbstract  -- There is considerable interest in developing predictive capabilities for social diffusion processes, for instance to permit early identification of emerging contentious situations, rapid detection of disease outbreaks, or accurate forecasting of the ultimate reach of potentially \"viral\" ideas or behaviors. This paper proposes a new approach to this predictive analytics problem, in which analysis of meso-scale network dynamics is leveraged to generate useful predictions for complex social phenomena. We begin by deriving a stochastic hybrid dynamical systems (S-HDS) model for diffusion processes taking place over social networks with realistic topologies; this modeling approach is inspired by recent work in biology demonstrating that S-HDS offer a useful mathematical formalism with which to represent complex, multi-scale biological network dynamics. We then perform formal stochastic reachability analysis with this S-HDS model and conclude that the outcomes of social diffusion processes may depend crucially upon the way the early dynamics of the process interacts with the underlying network's community structure and *core-periphery structure*. This theoretical finding  provides the foundations for developing a machine learning algorithm that enables accurate early warning analysis for social diffusion events. The utility of the warning algorithm, and the power of network-based predictive metrics, are demonstrated through an empirical investigation of the propagation of political \"memes\" over social media networks. Additionally, we illustrate the potential of the approach for security informatics applications through case studies involving early warning analysis of large-scale protests events and politically-motivated cyber attacks.\nKeywords: social dynamics, predictive analysis, early warning, protest and mobilization, cyber security, security informatics.\n\n## 1. Introduction\n\nUnderstanding the way information, behaviors, innovations, and diseases propagate over social networks is of great importance in a wide variety of domains [e.g., 1-4], including national security [e.g., 5-13]. Of particular interest are predictive capabilities for social diffusion, for instance to enable early warning concerning the emergence of a violent conflict or outbreak of an epidemic. As a consequence, vast resources are devoted to the task of predicting the outcomes of diffusion processes, but the quality of such predictions is often poor. It is tempting to conclude that the problem is one of insufficient information. Clearly diffusion phenomena which \"go viral\" are qualitatively different from those that don't or they wouldn't be so dominant, the conventional wisdom goes, so in order to make good predictions we must collect enough data to allow these crucial differences to be identified.\nRecent research calls into question this intuitively plausible premise and, indeed, indicates that intuition can be an unreliable guide to constructing successful prediction methods. For example, studies of the predictability of popular culture indicate that the *intrinsic* attributes commonly believed to be important when assessing the likelihood of adoption of cultural products, such as the quality of the product itself, do not possess much predictive power [14-16]. This research offers evidence that, when individuals are influenced by the actions of others, it may not be possible to obtain reliable predictions using methods which focus on intrinsics alone; instead, it may be necessary to incorporate aspects of *social influence* into the prediction process. Very recently a handful of investigations have shown the value of considering even simple and indirect measures of social influence, such as early social media \"buzz\", when forming predictions. This work has produced useful prediction algorithms for an array of social phenomena, including markets [16-21], political and social movements [17,22], mobilization and protest behavior\n[23,24], epidemics [17,25], social media dynamics [26,27], and the evolution of cyber threats [28].\nRecognizing the importance of accounting for social influence, this paper proposes a predictive methodology which explicitly considers the way individuals influence one another through their social networks. It is expected that prediction algorithms which are based, in part, on network dynamics metrics will outperform existing methods and be applicable to a wider range of diffusion systems. We begin by developing a stochastic hybrid dynamical systems (S-HDS) model for diffusion processes taking place over social networks with realistic topologies. This modeling approach is inspired by recent work in biology demonstrating that S-HDS offer a useful mathematical formalism with which to represent multi-scale biological network dynamics [29-33]. An S-HDS is a feedback interconnection of a discrete-state stochastic process, such as a Markov chain, with a family of continuous-state stochastic dynamical systems [34].\n\nCombining discrete and continuous dynamics in this way provides a rigorous, expressive, and computationally-tractable framework for modeling the dynamics of the complex, highly-evolved networks that are ubiquitous in biological systems [35], and we show in this paper that the S-HDS framework is also wellsuited to the task of modeling the network dynamics which underlie social diffusion.\nWith the S-HDS model in hand, we then perform formal stochastic reachability analysis and conclude that the outcomes of social diffusion processes may depend crucially upon the way the early dynamics of the process propagates with respect to the underlying network's 1.) *community structure*, that is, densely connected groupings of individuals which have only relatively few links to other groups [36], and 2.) *core-periphery structure*, reflecting the presence of a small group of \"core\" individuals that are densely connected to each other and are also close to the remainder of the network [36]. This theoretical finding leads to the identification of novel metrics for the community and core-periphery dynamics which should be useful early indicators of which diffusion events will propagate widely, ultimately affecting a substantial portion of the population of interest, and which will not. Prediction is accomplished with a machine learning algorithm [37] which is based, in part, on these network dynamics metrics.\nThe paper makes three main contributions. First, we present a new S-HDS-based framework for modeling social diffusion on networks of real-world scale and complexity, enabling these dynamics to be appropriately represented as multi-scale phenomena. Second, we formulate predictive analysis problems as questions concerning the reachability of diffusion events, and present a novel \"altitude function\" method for assessing reachability *without simulating system trajectories*. The altitude function technique is both mathematically rigorous and computationally tractable, thereby permitting the derivation of provably-correct assessments for complex, large-scale systems. Third, the S-HDS model and altitude function analytics are used to characterize the importance of *meso-scale* network features, specifically network community and core-periphery structures, for understanding diffusion processes and predicting their fates.\n\nThis characterization, in turn, forms the foundation for developing a new machine learning-based classification algorithm which employs these network dynamics features for accurate early warning analysis.\n\nAdditionally, we evaluate the efficacy of this early warning algorithm through three empirical case studies investigating: 1.) the propagation of political \"memes\" [38] over social media networks, 2.) warning analysis for large-scale mobilization and protest events, and 3.) early warning for politically-motivated cyber attacks. These empirical studies illustrate the effectiveness of the proposed early warning methodology and demonstrate the significant predictive power of meso-scale network metrics for social diffusion processes. Moreover, the results indicate that the proposed algorithm provides a readily-implementable Web-based tool for early warning analysis for important classes of security-relevant diffusion events.\n\n## 2. Early Warning Methodology\n\nThis section begins by defining the class of early warning problems of interest, then presents a brief, intuitive summary of the proposed social diffusion modeling and predictive analysis procedure, and finally describes the early warning indicators identified through this analytic procedure and the warning algorithm that is derived based on these results. A detailed mathematical presentation of the modeling and analysis methods is provided in Appendices One and Two. 2.1 Problem Formulation\nThe objective of this paper is to develop a scientifically-rigorous, practically-implementable methodology for performing early warning analysis for social diffusion events. Roughly speaking, we suppose that some \"triggering event\" has taken place or contentious issue is emerging, and we wish to determine, as early as possible, whether this event or issue will ultimately generate a large, self-sustaining reaction, involving the diffusion of discussions and actions through a substantial segment of a population, or will instead quickly dissipate. An illustrative example of the basic idea is provided by the contrasting reactions to 1.) the publication in September 2005 of cartoons depicting Mohammad in the Danish newspaper Jyllands-Posten, and 2.) the lecture given by Pope Benedict XVI in September 2006 quoting controversial material concerning Islam. While each event appeared at the outset to have the potential to trigger significant protests, the \"Danish cartoons\" incident ultimately led to substantial Muslim mobilization, including massive protests and considerable violence, while outrage triggered by the pope lecture quickly subsided with essentially no violence. It would obviously be very useful to have the capability to distinguish these two types of reaction as early in the event lifecycle as possible.\nIn order to state the early warning problem more precisely, we make a few assumptions:\n\n-\nWe suppose that the triggering event or emerging situation is given. Note that this is often the case in national security settings, and that additionally there exist techniques for *discovering* such events or issues in an automated or semi-automated manner [e.g., 24,27].\n-\nIt is assumed that data are available which provide a view of the early reaction of a relevant population to the trigger or issue of interest. These data can be only indirectly related to the event; for example, in this paper the primary data source is social media discussions (e.g., blog posts) while the\nevents of interest are \"real-world\" activities such as protests.\n-\nIt is expected that the \"customer\" for the analysis provides at least qualitative definitions of the population of interest and the scale of reaction for which a warning is desired. Thus, for instance, in the\nexample above, it might be of interest to anticipate Muslim reaction to the triggering incident, and to obtain a warning alert if the reaction is likely to eventually include self-sustaining, violent protests.\nWe formulate the early warning problem as a classification task. More specifically, given a triggering incident, one or more information sources which reflect (perhaps indirectly) the reaction to this trigger by a population of interest (e.g., social media discussions, intelligence reporting), and a definition for what constitutes an \"alarming\" reaction, the goal is to design a classifier which accurately predicts, as early as possible, whether or not reaction to the event will ultimately become alarming. Note that a more mathematically precise statement of this warning problem is given in Appendix Two. Observe that this type of warning analysis is both important in applications and \"easier\" to accomplish than more standard prediction or forecasting goals. Consider, as a familiar non-security example, the case of movie success. It is shown in [14-16] that it is likely to be impossible to predict movie revenues, even very roughly, based on the intrinsic information available concerning the movie ex ante (e.g., personnel, genre, critic reviews).\n\nHowever, we have demonstrated that it is possible to identify early indicators of movie success, such as temporal patterns in pre-release \"buzz\", and to use these indicators to accurately predict ultimate box office revenues [39]. Recent research indicates that this result holds more generally, so that it may be more scientifically-sensible in many domains to pursue early warning rather than ex ante prediction goals [14-\n28]. 2.2 S-HDS Social Diffusion Model\nIn social diffusion, individuals are affected by what others do. This is easy to visualize in the case of disease transmission, with infections being passed from person to person. Information, innovations, behaviors, and so on can also propagate through a population, as individuals become aware of a new piece of information or an activity and are persuaded of its relevance and utility through their social and information networks. The dynamics of social diffusion can therefore depend upon the topological features of the pertinent networks, such as the presence of highly connected blogs in a social media network (see, e.g., [4]). Indeed, social scientists have developed extensive theories explaining the role of social networks in the dynamics of social diffusion and mobilization (see the books [2-4] and the references therein, and also Appendix One, for discussions of this work). This dependence suggests that, in order to understand the predictability of social diffusion phenomena and in particular to identify features which possess predictive power, it is necessary to conduct the analysis using social and information network models with realistic topologies.\nThe social diffusion models examined in this study possess networks with three topological properties that are ubiquitous in real-world social and information networks and which have the potential to impact diffusion dynamics [36]:\n\n-\ntransitivity - the property that the network neighbors of a given individual have a heightened probability of being connected to one another;\n-\ncommunity structure - the presence of densely connected groupings of individuals which have only\nrelatively few links to other groups;\n-\ncore-periphery structure - the presence of a small group of \"core\" individuals which are densely connected to each other and are also close to the other individuals in the network.\nAdditionally, we permit our network models to possess *right-skewed degree distributions,* in which most individuals have only a few network neighbors while a few individuals have a great many neighbors, as such networks are common in online settings. The manner in which the communities and the core-periphery are arranged will be said to define the network's *meso-scale* structure. For convenience of exposition, the subsets of individuals specified by a partitioning of the network into communities and into a core and periphery will sometimes be referred to as the *partition elements*, and the collection of these\n(community and core-periphery) subsets will be called the *network partition*.\nIn order to deal effectively with networks possessing realistic topologies, and in particular to represent and analyze the way social dynamics is affected by the meso-scale structure, we model social diffusion in a manner which explicitly separates the individual, or \"micro\", dynamics from the collective dynamics. More specifically, we adopt a multi-scale modeling framework consisting of three network scales:\n\n\n-\na *micro-scale*, for modeling the behavior of individuals;\n-\na *meso-scale*, which represents the interaction dynamics of individuals within the same network partition element (community or core/periphery);\n-\na *macro-scale*, which characterizes the interaction between partition elements.\nThe micro-scale quantifies the way individuals combine their own inherent preferences or attributes with the influences of others to arrive at their chosen courses of action. It is shown in Appendix One that separating the micro-scale dynamics from the meso- and macro-scale activity permits the dependence of this decision-making process on the social network to be characterized in a surprisingly straightforward way. The meso- and macro-scale components of the proposed modeling framework together quantify the way the decision-making processes of individuals interact to produce collective behavior at the population level. The role of the meso-scale model is to quantify and illuminate the manner in which behaviors within each network partition element (communities, core or periphery), while the macro-scale model captures the interactions *between* these elements. The primary assumptions are that interactions between individuals belonging to the same network partition element can be modeled more simply than those between individuals from distinct partition elements, and that the latter interactions are constrained by the \"metanetwork\" which defines the dependencies between the partition elements.\nThis perspective offers a number of advantages. For example, at the micro-scale it is possible to unify behaviors which appear different phenomenologically but actually possess equivalent dynamics. We show in Appendix One that the social dynamics associated with classical \"utility-maximizing\" behavior and those arising from individuals attempting to infer information by observing the actions of others can be represented with the *same* micro-scale model. Additionally, separating the individual and collective dynamics supports efficient and flexible model building and simplifies the process of estimating model components from empirical data [39]. Dividing the collective dynamics into meso- and macro-scales also provides a mathematically-tractable, sociologically-sensible means of representing complex social network dynamics. For instance, because network communities are topological structures corresponding to localized social settings in the real world, determined by workplace, family, physical neighborhood, and so on, it is natural both mathematically and sociologically to model the interactions of individuals *within* communities as qualitatively different (e.g., more frequent and homogeneous) than those *between* communities.\nDeveloping a mathematically-rigorous, expressive, scalable, and computationally-tractable framework within which multi-scale social network diffusion models can be constructed is, of course, a challenging undertaking. Recent work in systems biology has demonstrated that stochastic hybrid dynamical systems (S-HDS) provide a useful mathematical formalism with which to represent biological network dynamics that possess multiple temporal and spatial scales [29-33]. An S-HDS is a feedback interconnection of a discrete-state stochastic process, such as a Markov chain, with a family of continuous-state stochastic dynamical systems [34]. Thus the discrete system dynamics depends on the continuous system state, perhaps because different regions of the continuous state space are associated with different matrices of Markov state transition probabilities, and the particular continuous system which is \"active\" at a given time depends on the discrete system state. Combining discrete and continuous dynamics in this way provides an effective framework for modeling the dynamics of the complex, highly-evolved networks that are ubiquitous in biological systems [35]. For example, the rigorous yet tractable integration of switching behavior with continuous dynamics enabled by the S-HDS model allows accurate and efficient representation of biological phenomena evolving over disparate temporal scales [29-31] and spatial scales [32,33].\nInspired by this work, in this paper we apply the S-HDS framework to social diffusion dynamics evolving over multiple *network* scales. Appendix One provides a detailed discussion of the proposed S-\nHDS social diffusion model and demonstrates the effectiveness with which this formalism captures multiscale network dynamics. As an intuitive illustration of the way S-HDS enable complex network phenomena to be efficiently represented, consider the task of modeling diffusion on a network that possesses community structure. As shown in Figure 1, this diffusion consists of two components: 1.) intracommunity dynamics, involving frequent interactions between individuals within the same community and the resulting gradual change in the concentrations of \"infected\" (red) individuals, and 2.) intercommunity dynamics, in which the \"infection\" jumps from one community to another, for instance because an infected individual \"visits\" a new community. S-HDS models offer a natural framework for representing these dynamics, with the S-HDS continuous system modeling the intra-community dynamics\n(e.g., via stochastic differential equations), the discrete system capturing the inter-community dynamics\n(e.g., using a Markov chain), and the interplay between these dynamics being represented by the S-HDS\nfeedback structure. A detailed description of the manner in which S-HDS models can be used to capture social diffusion on networks with realistic topologies is given in Appendix One.\ni i j j inputs inputs k k inputs inputs\n\n\n\n2.3 Predictability Assessment One hallmark of social diffusion processes is their ostensible unpredictability: phenomena from hits and flops in cultural markets to financial system bubbles and crashes to political upheavals appear resistant to predictive analysis (although there is no shortage of ex post explanations for their occurrence!). It is not difficult to gain an intuitive understanding of the basis for this unpredictability. Individual preferences and susceptibilities are mapped to collective outcomes through an intricate, dynamical process in which people react individually to an environment consisting largely of others who are reacting likewise. Because of this feedback dynamics, the collective outcome can be quite different from one implied by a simple aggregation of individual preferences; standard prediction methods, which typically are based on such aggregation ideas, do not capture these dynamics and therefore are often unsuccessful.\nThis section provides a brief, intuitive introduction to a systematic approach to assessing the predictability of social diffusion processes and identifying process observables which have exploitable predictive power (see Appendix Two, and also [17,39], for the mathematical details). Consider a simple model for product adoption, in which individuals combine their own preferences and opinions regarding the available options with their observations of the actions of others to arrive at their decisions about which product to adopt. As discussed above, it can be quite difficult to determine which characteristics of the process by which adoption decisions propagate, if any, are predictive of things like the speed or ultimate reach of the propagation [15-17]. In Appendix Two we propose a mathematically rigorous approach to predictability assessment which, among other things, permits identification of features of social dynamics which should have predictive power. We now summarize this assessment methodology.\nThe basic idea behind the proposed approach to predictability analysis is simple and natural: we assess predictability by answering questions about the reachability of diffusion events. To obtain a mathematical formulation of this strategy, the behavior about which predictions are to be made is used to define the system *state space subsets of interest* (SSI), while the particular set of candidate measurables under consideration allows identification of the *candidate starting set* (CSS), that is, the set of states and system parameter values which represent initializations that are consistent with, and equivalent under, the presumed observational capability. As a simple example, consider an online market with two products, A and B, and suppose the system state variables consist of the current market share for A, ms(A), and the rate of change of this market share, r(A) (ms(B) and r(B) are not independent state variables because ms(A) +\nms(B) = 1 and r(A) + r(B) = 0); let the parameters be the advertising budgets for the products, bud(A) and bud(B). The producer of item A might find it useful to define the SSI to reflect market share dominance by A, that is, the subset of the two-dimensional state space where ms(A) exceeds a specified threshold (and r(A) can take any value). If only market share and advertising budgets can be measured then the CSS is the one-dimensional subset of state-parameter space consisting of the initial magnitudes for ms(A), bud(A), and bud(B), with r(A) unspecified (the one-dimensional \"uncertainty\" in the CSS reflects the fact that r(A) is not measurable).\nRoughly speaking, the proposed approach to predictability assessment involves determining how probable it is to reach the SSI from a CSS and deciding if these reachability properties are compatible with the prediction goals. If a system's reachability characteristics are incompatible with the given prediction question - if, say, \"hit\" and \"flop\" states in the online market example are both fairly likely to be reached from the CSS - then the situation is deemed unpredictable. This setup permits the identification of candidate predictive measurables: these are the measurable states and/or parameters for which predictability is most sensitive (see Appendix Two). Continuing with the online market example, if trajectories with positive early market share rates r(A) are much more likely to yield market share dominance for A\nthan are trajectories with negative early r(A), then the situation is unpredictable (because the outcome depends sensitively on r(A) and this quantity is not measured). Moreover, this analysis suggests that market share rate is likely to possess predictive power, so it may be possible to increase predictability by adding the capacity to measure this quantity.\nA key element of this approach to predictability assessment is the proposed method of estimating the probability of reaching the SSI from a CSS. Note that in a typical assessment such estimates must be computed for several CSS in order to adequately explore the space of candidate predictive features, so that it is crucial to perform these estimates efficiently. In Appendix Two we develop an \"altitude function\" approach to this reachability problem, in which we seek a scalar function of the system state that permits conclusions to be made regarding reachability *without computing system trajectories*. We refer to these as altitude functions to provide an intuitive sense of their analytic role: if some measure of \"altitude\" is low on the CSS and high on an SSI, and if the expected rate of change of altitude along system trajectories is nonincreasing, then it is unlikely for trajectories to reach this SSI from the CSS. Moreover, the difference in altitudes between the CSS and SSI gives a measure of the probability of reaching the latter from the former. Because the reach probability is computed for *sets* of states without simulating system trajectories, the altitude function method offers an extremely efficient way to explore the space of candidate predictive features.\nWe have applied the predictability assessment methodology summarized above to the social diffusion prediction problem, and we now summarize the main conclusions of this study; a more complete discussion of this investigation is given in Appendix Two. The analysis uses the mathematically rigorous predictability assessment procedure summarized above, in combination with empirically-grounded S- HDS models for social dynamics, to characterize the predictability of social diffusion on networks with realistic degree distributions, transitivity, community structure, and core-periphery structure. The main finding of the study, from the perspective of the present paper, is that the predictability of these diffusion models depends crucially upon social and information network topology, and in particular on the community and core-periphery structures of these networks.\n\nIn order to describe these theoretical results more quantitatively and leverage them for prediction, it is necessary to specify mathematical definitions for network communities and core-periphery structure.\n\nThere exist several qualitative and quantitative definitions for the concept of community structure in networks. Here we adopt the *modularity-based* definition proposed in [40], whereby a good partitioning of a network's vertices into communities is one for which the number of edges between putative communities is smaller than would be expected in a random partitioning. To be concrete, a modularity-based partitioning of a network into two communities maximizes the modularity Q, defined as\n\nQ = sT B s / 4m,\nwhere m is the total number of edges in the network, the partition is specified with the elements of vector s by setting si = 1 if vertex i belongs to community 1 and si = 1 if it belongs to community 2, and the matrix B has elements Bij = Aij  kikj / 2m, with Aij and ki denoting the network adjacency matrix and degree of vertex i, respectively. Partitions of the network into more than two communities can be constructed recursively [40]. Note that modularity-based community partitions can be efficiently computed for large social networks, and can be constructed even with incomplete network topology data [39].\nWith this definition in hand, we are in a position to present the first candidate predictive feature nominated by the theoretical predictability assessment: the presence of early diffusion activity in numerous distinct network communities should be a reliable predictor that the ultimate reach of the diffusion will be large (see Appendix Two). In what follows, propagation dynamics which possess this characteristic will be said to exhibit *significant early dispersion across network communities.* Note that this measure should be more predictive than the early volume of diffusion activity (the latter has recently become a fairly standard measure [e.g., 19,20]). A cartoon illustrating the basic idea behind this result is given in Figure 2.\n\n Analogously to the situation with network communities, there exists a wide range of qualitative and\nquantitative descriptions of the core-periphery structure found in real-world networks. Here we adopt the characterization of network core-periphery which results from *k-shell decomposition*, a well-established technique in graph theory that is summarized in, for instance, [41]. To partition a network into its k-shells,\none first removes all vertices with degree one, repeating this step if necessary until all remaining vertices have degree two or higher; the removed vertices constitute the 1-shell. Continuing in the same way, all\nvertices with degree two (or less) are recursively removed, creating the 2-shell. This process is repeated\nuntil all vertices have been assigned to a k-shell. The shell with the highest index, the kmax-shell, is\ndeemed to be the core of the network.\nGiven this definition, we are in a position to report the second candidate predictive feature nominated by our theoretical predictability assessment: early diffusion activity within the network kmax-shell should be a reliable predictor that the ultimate reach of the diffusion will be significant (see Appendix Two). In particular, this measure should be more predictive than the early volume of diffusion activity. An intuitive illustration of this result is depicted in Figure 3.\n\n\n2.4 Early Warning Method\nWe are now in a position to present an early warning method which is capable of accurately predicting, very early in the lifecycle of a diffusion process of interest, whether or not the process will propagate widely. We adopt a machine learning-based classification approach to this problem: given a triggering incident, one or more information sources which reflect the reaction to this trigger by a population of interest, and a definition for what constitutes an \"alarming\" reaction, the goal is to learn classifier that accurately predicts, as early as possible, whether or not reaction to the event will ultimately become alarming. The classifier used in the empirical studies described in this paper is the Avatar ensembles of decision trees (A-EDT) algorithm [42]. Other classification algorithm were also explored to allow the robustness of the proposed early warning approach to be evaluated, and these alternative methods produced qualitatively similar results [39]. Prediction accuracy in all tests is estimated using standard N-fold crossvalidation, in which the set of diffusion events of interest is randomly partitioned into N subsets of equal size, and the A-EDT algorithm is successively \"trained\" on N1 of the subsets and \"tested\" on the heldout subset in such a way that each of the N subsets is used as the test set exactly once.\nA key aspect of the proposed approach to early warning analysis is determining which characteristics of the social diffusion event of interest, if any, possess exploitable predictive power. We consider three classes of features:\n\n-\nintrinsics-based features - measures of the inherent properties and attributes of the \"object\" being\ndiffused;\n-\nsimple dynamics-based features - metrics which capturing simple properties of the diffusion dynamics, such as the early extent of the diffusion and the rate at which the diffusion is propagating;\n-\nnetwork dynamics-based features - measures that characterize the way the early diffusion is progressing relative to topological properties of the underlying social and information networks (e.g., community structure).\nConsider, as an illustrative example, the diffusion of \"memes\", that is, short textual phrases which propagate relatively unchanged online (e.g., 'lipstick on a pig'). Suppose it is of interest to predict which memes will \"go viral\", appearing in thousands of blog posts, and which will not. In this case, intrinsicbased features could include language measures, such as the sentiment or emotion expressed in the text surrounding the memes in blog posts or news articles. Simple dynamics-based features for memes might measure the cumulative number of posts or articles mentioning the meme of interest at some early time\nand the rate at which this volume is increasing. Network dynamics-based features might count the cumulative number of network communities in a blog graph GB that contain at least one post which mentions the meme by time  and the number of blogs in the kmax-shell of GB that, by time , contain at least one post mentioning the meme. Alternatively, in the case of an epidemic, the intrinsic-based features could include the infectivity of the pathogen, simple dynamics-based features might capture the number of individuals infected by the disease in the early stages of the outbreak, and network dynamics-based features could include metrics that characterize the way the epidemic is progressing over the communities of relevant social and transportation networks.\nThe proposed approach to early warning analysis is to collect features from these classes for the event of interest, input the feature values to the (trained) A-EDT classifier, and then run the classifier to generate the warning prediction (i.e., a forecast that the event is expected to become 'alarming' or remain\n'not alarming'). In the algorithm presented below this procedure in specified in general terms; more specific instantiations of the procedure are presented in the discussions of the three case studies in Section 3.\n\nIn what follows it is assumed that the primary source of information concerning the event of interest is social media, as that is emerging as a very useful data source for predictive analysis [e.g., 17-24,26,27].\n\nHowever, the analytic process is quite similar when other data sources (e.g., intelligence reporting) are employed [24].\nThus we have the following early warning algorithm:\nAlgorithm EW Given: a triggering incident, a definition for what constitutes an 'alarming' reaction, and a set of social media sites (e.g., blogs) B which are relevant to early warning task.\nInitialization: train the A-EDT classifier on a set of events which are qualitatively similar to the triggering event of interest and are labeled as 'alarming' or 'not alarming' according to the definition given above\n(see the case study discussions for additional details on this training process).\n\nProcedure:\n1. Assemble a lexicon of keywords L that pertain to the triggering event under study.\n2. Conduct a sequence of blog graph crawls and construct a time series of blog graphs GB(t). For the\nlexicon L and each time period t, label each blog in GB(t) as 'active' if it contains a post mentioning\nany of the keywords in L and 'inactive' otherwise.\n3. Form the union GB = tGB(t), partition GB into network communities and into k-shells, and map the\npartition element structure of GB back to each of the graphs GB(t).\n4. Compute the values of appropriate measures for the intrinsics, simple dynamics, and network dynamics features for each of the graphs GB(t).\n5. Apply the A-EDT classifier to the available time series of features, that is, the features obtained from\nthe sequence of blog graphs {GB(t0), ..., GB(tp)}, where t0 and tp are the triggering event time and present time, respectively. Issue an early warning alert if the classifier output is 'alarming'.\nWe now offer additional details concerning this procedure; more application-specific discussions of\nthe methodology are provided in the case studies in Section 3. Identifying appropriate keywords in Step 1\ncan be accomplished with the help of subject matter experts and also through various automated means\n(e.g., via meme analysis [38,27]). Step 2 is by now standard, and various tools exist which can perform these tasks [e.g., 43]. In Step 3, blog network communities are identified with a modularity-based community extraction algorithm applied to the blog graph [40], while the decomposition of the graph into its k-shells is achieved through standard methods [41]. The particular choices of metrics for the intrinsics, simple dynamics, and network dynamics features computed in Step 4 tend to be problem specific, and typical examples are given in the case studies below. It is worth noting, however, that we have found it useful in a range of applications to quantify the dispersion of activity over the communities of GB(t) using a blog entropy measure BE:\n\nBE(t) = i fi(t) log(fi(t)),\nwhere fi(t) is the fraction of total posts containing one or more keywords and made during interval t which occur in community i. Finally, in Step 5 the feature values obtained in Step 4 serve as inputs to the A-\nEDT classifier and the output is used to decide whether an alert should be issued.\n\n## 3. Case Studies\n\nThis section applies Algorithm EW to three early warning case studies involving social phenomena that have proved to be both practically important and challenging to analyze: 1.) diffusion of information through social media, 2.) mobilization/protest events response to \"triggering\" incidents, and 3.) planning/coordination/execution of politically-motivated cyber attacks.\n3.1 Case Study One: Meme Diffusion\nThe goal of this case study is to apply Algorithm EW to the task of predicting whether or not a given \"meme\", that is, a short textual phrase which propagates relatively unchanged online, will \"go viral\". Our main source of data on meme dynamics is the publicly available datasets archived at http://memetracker.org [44] by the authors of [38]. Briefly, the archive [44] contains time series data characterizing the diffusion of ~70 000 memes through social media and other online sites during the five month period between 1 August and 31 December 2008. We are interested in using Algorithm EW to distinguish successful and unsuccessful memes early in their lifecycle. More precisely, the task of interest is to classify memes into two groups - those which will ultimately be successful (acquire more than S posts) and those that will be unsuccessful (attract fewer than U posts) - very early in the meme lifecycle.\nTo support an empirical evaluation of the utility of Algorithm EW for this problems, we downloaded from [44] the time series data for slightly more than 70 000 memes. These data contain, for each meme M, a sequence of pairs (t1, URL1)M, (t2, URL2)M, ..., (tT, URLT)M, where tk is the time of appearance of the kth blog post or news article that contains at least one mention of meme M, URLk is the URL of the blog or news site on which that post/article was published, and T is the total number of posts that mention meme M. From this set of time series we randomly selected 100 \"successful\" meme trajectories, defined as those corresponding to memes which attracted at least 1000 posts during their lifetimes, and 100 \"unsuccessful\" meme trajectories, defined as those whose memes acquired no more than 100 total posts. It is worth noting that, in assembling the data in [44], all memes which received fewer than 15 total posts were deleted, and that ~50% of the remaining memes have <50 posts; thus the large majority of memes are unsuccessful by our definition (as well as according to the criteria of most applications [38,27]).\nTwo other forms of data were collected for this study: 1.) a large Web graph which includes websites\n(URLs) that appear in the meme time series, and 2.) samples of the text surrounding the memes in the posts which contain them. More specifically, we sampled the URLs appearing in the time series for our set of 200 successful and unsuccessful memes and performed a Web crawl that employed these URLs as\n\"seeds\". This procedure generated a Web graph, denoted GB, that consists of approximately 550 000 vertices/websites and 1.4 million edges/hyperlinks, and includes essentially all of the websites which appear in the meme time series. To obtain samples of text surrounding memes in posts, we randomly selected ten posts for each meme and then extracted from each post the paragraph which contains the first mention of the meme.\n\nRecall that Algorithm EW employs three types of features: intrinsics-based, simple dynamics-based, and network dynamics-based. We now describe the instantiation of each of these feature classes for the meme problem. Consider first the intrinsics-based features, which for the meme application become language-based measures. Each \"document\" of text surrounding a meme in its (sample) posts is represented by a simple \"bag of words\" feature vector xR|V|, where the entries of x are the frequencies with which the words in the vocabulary set V appear in the document. A very simple way to quantify the sentiment or emotion of a document is through the use of appropriate lexicons. Let sR|V| denote a lexicon vector, in which each entry of s is a numerical \"score\" quantifying the sentiment/emotion intensity of the corresponding word in the vocabulary V. The aggregate sentiment/emotion score of document x can be computed as\n\nscore(x) = sTx / sT1,\nwhere 1 is a vector of ones. Thus score(.) estimates the sentiment or emotion of a document as a weighted average of the sentiment or emotion scores for the words comprising the document. (Note that if no sentiment or emotion information is available for a particular word in V then the corresponding entry of s is set to zero.)\nTo characterize the emotion content of a document we use the Affective Norms for English Words\n(ANEW) lexicon, which consists of 1034 words that were assigned numerical scores with respect to three emotional \"axes\" - happiness, arousal, and dominance - by human subjects [45]. Previous work had identified this set of words to bear meaningful emotional content [45]. Positive or negative sentiment is quantified by employing the \"IBM lexicon\", a collection of 2968 words that were assigned {positive, negative} sentiment labels by human subjects [46]. This simple approach generates four language features for each meme: the happiness, arousal, dominance, and positive/negative sentiment of the text surrounding that meme in the (sample) posts containing it. As a preliminary test, we computed the mean emotion and sentiment of content surrounding the 100 successful and 100 unsuccessful memes in our dataset. On average the text surrounding successful memes is happier, more active, more dominant, and more positive than that surrounding unsuccessful memes, and this difference is statistically significant (p<0.0001). Thus it is at least plausible that these four language features may possess some predictive power regarding meme success.\n\nConsider next two simple dynamics-based features, defined to capture the basic characteristics of the\nearly evolution of meme post volume:\n-\n#posts() - the cumulative number of posts mentioning the given meme by time  (where  is small\nrelative to the typical lifespan of memes);\n-\npost rate() - a simple estimate of the rate of accumulation of such posts at time .\nHere we adopt a simple finite difference definition for post rate given by post rate() = (#posts()\n#posts(/2)) / (/2); of course, more robust rate estimates could be used.\n\nThe simple dynamics-based measures of early meme diffusion defined above, while potentially useful, do not characterize the manner in which a meme propagates over the underlying social or information networks. Recall that the predictability assessment summarized in Section 2.3 suggests that both early\ndispersion of diffusion activity across network communities and early diffusion activity within the network core ought to be predictive of meme success. The insights offered by this theoretical analysis motivate the definition of two network dynamics-based features for meme prediction:\n-\ncommunity dispersion() - the cumulative number of network communities in the blog graph GB that,\nby time , contain at least one post which mentions the meme;\n-\n#k-core blogs() - the cumulative number of blogs in the kmax-shell of blog graph GB that, by time ,\ncontain at least one post which mentions the meme.\nThese quantities can be efficiently computed using fast algorithms for partitioning a graph into its communities and for identifying a graph's kmax-shell [39]. Thus these features are readily computable even for very large graphs.\nWe now summarize the results of this case study. First, using only the four language features with the A-EDT classifier to predict which memes will be successful yields a prediction accuracy of 66.5%\n(ten-fold cross-validation). Since simply guessing \"successful\" for all memes gives an accuracy of 50%, it can be seen that these simple language intrinsics are not very predictive. For completeness it is mentioned that the ANEW score for \"arousal\" and the IBM measure of sentiment are the most predictive of these four features. In contrast, the features characterizing the early network dynamics of memes possess significant predictive power, and in fact are useful even if only very limited early time series is available for use in prediction. More quantitatively, applying Algorithm EW with the four meme dynamics features produces the following results (ten-fold cross-validation):\n-\n = 12hr, accuracy = 84%, most predictive features: 1.) community dispersion, 2.) #k-core blogs, 3.)\n#posts;\n\n-\n = 24hr, accuracy = 92%, most predictive features: 1.) community dispersion, 2.) post rate, 3.)\n#posts;\n-\n = 48hr, accuracy = 94%, most predictive features: 1.) community dispersion, 2.) post rate, 3.)\n#posts.\nThese results show that useful predictions can be obtained *within the first twelve hours* after a meme is detected (this corresponds to 0.5% of the average meme lifespan), and that accurate prediction is possible after about a day or two. Note also that, as has been found with other social dynamics phenomena [e.g.,\n16-18], dynamics features appear to be more predictive than \"intrinsics\", at least for the features employed here.\nIt is worth mentioning that the fact that a particular meme goes viral does not imply that it will influence behavior in the real world. The next two case studies focus on the important issue of behavioral consequences of information diffusion.\n3.2 Case Study Two: Mobilization and Protest\nThere is considerable interest to develop methods for distinguishing successful mobilization and protest events, that is, mobilizations that become large and self-sustaining, from unsuccessful ones early in their lifecycle. It is natural to pose this question as an early warning problem and to approach it using Algorithm EW. In order to examine the efficacy of this approach, we collected together fourteen recent events, each of which appeared at the outset to have the potential to trigger significant protests. This set of events contains seven triggering incidents which ultimately led to substantial mobilization, including massive protests and significant violence, and seven triggers with reactions that subsided quickly with essentially no violence. Taken together, these events provide a useful setting for testing the applicability of Algorithm EW to mobilization/protest phenomena.\nThe events employed in this study are listed below.\nTriggers leading to significant mobilization/protest:\n\n-\nQuran desecration, May 2005;\n-\nfirst Danish cartoons, September 2005 to March 2006;\n-\nEgypt DVD release, October 2005;\n-\nFrance riots, October and November 2005;\n-\nanti-Ahmadiyya protests, June and July 2008;\n-\nU.S Republican National Convention, September 2008;\n-\nIsrael/Gaza event, December 2008 to January 2009.\nTriggers not leading to significant mobilization/protest:\n\n-\nAbu Ghraib news release, April and May 2004;\n-\nPope lecture, September 2006;\n-\nSalman Rushdie knighting, June 2007;\n-\nsecond Danish cartoons, February 2008;\n-\nU.S. Democratic National Convention, August 2008,\n-\nBali bombers execution, November 2008;\n-\nJakarta bombings/NM Top blog post, July 2009.\nThis list is intended merely to identify the fourteen events under study; additional information concerning each incident is given in [39] and the references therein.\nAs a preliminary examination of the possibility to obtain useful early warning indicators from analysis of social media discussions of these events, we performed Steps 1-4 of Algorithm EW and then plotted the time series for two quantities: 1.) the volume of blog posts mentioning keywords relevant to the events (these keywords were obtained through a simple news search [39]), and 2.) the blog entropy measure BE(t) = i fi(t) log(fi(t)) associated with the way online mentions of the keywords diffused over the blog graph. Illustrative time series plots are shown in Figure 4. Observe that in the case of the first Danish cartoons event (plot at right) the BE of relevant discussions (blue curve) experiences a dramatic increase a few weeks before the corresponding increase in volume of blog discussions (red curve); this latter increase, in turn, takes place before any violence. In contrast, in the case of the pope event (plot at left), BE\nof blog discussions is small relative to the cartoons event, and any increase in this measure lags discussion volume. Similar time series plots are obtained for the other twelve events, suggesting that network dynamics-based features, such as dispersion of discussions across blog network communities, may be a useful early indicator for large mobilization events.\nTo examine this possibility more carefully, we applied Algorithm EW to the task of distinguishing triggers which led to large protests from those that did not. For simplicity, in this case study we did not use any intrinsics-based features (e.g., language metrics) in the A-EDT classifier, and instead relied upon the four dynamics-based features defined in Case Study One. In the case of the seven triggering events which led to protest behavior, the blog data made available to Algorithm EW was limited to posts made during the eight week period which ended two weeks before the protests began. For the seven triggers which did not lead to protests, the blog data included all posts collected during the eight week period immediately following the triggering event.\nblog activity blog activity date date Because the set of events in this case study included only fourteen incidents, we applied Algorithm EW with two-fold cross-validation. More specifically, the set of incidents was randomly partitioned into two equal subsets, the algorithm was trained on one subset of seven incidents and tested on the other subset, and then the roles of the two data sets were switched. In this evaluation Algorithm EW achieved perfect accuracy, correctly distinguishing the 'protest' and 'non-protest' triggers. An examination of the predictive power of the four features used as inputs to the A-EDT classifier reveals that, as suggested by Figure 4, the community dispersion feature was the most predictive measure.\n\n3.2 Case Study Three: Cyber Attack Early Warning\nThis case study explores the ability of Algorithm EW to provide reliable early warning for politicallymotivated distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks. Toward this end, we first identified a set of Internet \"disturbances\" that included examples from three distinct classes of events:\n1. successful politically-motivated DDoS attacks - these are the events for which Algorithm EW is intended to give warning with sufficient lead time to allow mitigating actions to be taken;\n2. natural events which disrupt Internet service - these are disturbances, such as earthquakes and electric\npower outages, that impact the Internet but for which it is known that no early warning signal exists in social media;\n3. quiet periods - these are periods during which there is social media \"chatter\" concerning impending\nDDoS attacks but ultimately no (successful) attacks occurred.\nIncluding in the case study events selected from these three classes is intended to afford a fairly comprehensive test of Algorithm EW. For instance, these classes correspond to 1.) the domain of interest (DDoS attacks), 2.) a set of disruptions which impact the Internet but have no social media warning signal, and\n3.) a set of \"non-events\" which do not impact the Internet but do possess putative social media warning\nsignals (online discussion of DDoS attacks).\nWe selected twenty events from these three classes:\n\nPolitically-motivated DDoS attacks:\n\n-\nEstonia event in April 2007;\n-\nCNN/China incident in April 2008;\n-\nIsrael/Palestine conflict event in January 2009;\n-\nDDoS associated with Iranian elections in June 2009;\n-\nWikiLeaks event in November 2010;\n-\nAnonymous v. PayPal, etc. attack in December 2010;\n-\nAnonymous v. HBGary attack in February 2011.\nNatural disturbances:\n\n-\nEuropean power outage in November 2006;\n-\nTaiwan earthquake in December 2006;\n-\nHurricane Ike in September 2008;\n-\nMediterranean cable cut in January 2009;\n-\nTaiwan earthquake in March 2010;\n-\nJapan earthquake in March 2011.\nQuiet periods:\nSeven periods, from March 2005 through March 2011, during which there were discussions in social media of DDoS attacks on various U.S. government agencies but no (successful) attacks occurred.\nFor brevity a detailed discussion of these twenty events is not given here; the interested reader is referred to [39] and the references therein for additional information on these disruptions.\nWe collected two forms of data for each of the twenty events: *cyber data* and *social data*. The cyber data consist of time series of routing updates which were issued by Internet routers during a one month period surrounding each event. More precisely, these data are the Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) routing updates exchanged between gateway hosts in the Autonomous System network of the Internet. The data was downloaded from the publicly-accessible RIPE collection site [47] using the process described in\n[48] (see [48] for additional details and background information on BGP routing dynamics). The temporal evolution of the volume of BGP routing updates (e.g., withdrawal messages) gives a coarse-grained measure of the timing and magnitude of large Internet disruptions and thus offers a simple and objective way to characterize the impact of each of the events in our collection. The social data consist of time series of social media mentions of cyber attack-related keywords and memes detected during a one month period surrounding each of the twenty events. These data were collected using the procedure specified in Algorithm EW.\nAs in the preceding case study, we performed a preliminary examination of the possibility to obtain useful early warning indicators from analysis of social media discussions by completing Steps 1-4 of Algorithm EW and plotting the time series for two quantities: 1.) the volume of blog posts mentioning keywords relevant to the events (these keywords were obtained through a simple news search [39]), and 2.)\nthe blog entropy measure BE(t) = i fi(t) log(fi(t)) associated with the way online mentions of the keywords diffused over the blog graph. Illustrative time series plots corresponding to two events in the case study, the WikiLeaks DDoS attack in November 2010 and Japan earthquake in March 2011, are shown in Figure 5. Observe that the time series of BGP routing updates are similar for the two events, with each experiencing a large \"spike\" at the time of the event. The time series of blog post volume are also similar across the two events, with each showing modest volume prior to the event and displaying a large spike in activity at event time. However, the time series for blog entropy are quite distinct for the two events. Specifically, in the case of the WikiLeaks DDoS the blog entropy (blue curve in Figure 5) experiences a dramatic increase several days before the event, while in the case of the Japan earthquake blog entropy is small for the entire collection period. Similar social media behavior is observed for all events in the case study, suggesting that network dynamics-based features, such as dispersion of discussions across blog network communities, may be a useful early indicator for large mobilization events.\n\n To examine this possibility more carefully, we applied Algorithm EW to the task of distinguishing\nthe seven DDoS attacks from the thirteen other events in the set. For simplicity, in this case study we did not use any intrinsics-based features (e.g., language metrics) in the A-EDT classifier, and instead relied upon the four dynamics-based features defined in Case Study One. Because the set of events in this case\nstudy included only twenty incidents, we applied Algorithm EW with two-fold cross-validation, exactly as described in Case Study Two. In the case of DDoS events, the blog data made available to Algorithm EW was limited to posts made during the five week period which ended one week before the attack. For the six natural disturbances, the blog data included all posts collected during the six week period immediately prior to the event, while in the case of the seven non-events, the blog data included the posts collected during a six week interval which spanned discussions of DDoS attacks on U.S. government agencies.\nIn this evaluation, Algorithm EW achieved *perfect* accuracy, correctly distinguishing the 'attack' and\n'non-attack' events. If the test is made more difficult, so that the blog data made available to Algorithm EW for attack events is limited to a four week period that ends two weeks before the attack, the proposed approach still achieves 95% accuracy, An examination of the predictive power of the four features used as inputs to the A-EDT classifier reveals that, as suggested by Figure 5, the community dispersion feature was the most predictive measure. It is worth emphasizing that, in this case study, accurately distinguishing 'attack' from 'non-attack' events is equivalent to providing practically-useful early warning for attack events, because the data which serves as input to Algorithm EW reflects online discussions that took place *prior to* the events under investigation.\n\n## 4. Conclusions\n\nThis paper presents a new approach to early warning analysis for social diffusion events. We begin by introducing a biologically-inspired S-HDS model for social dynamics on multi-scale networks, and then perform stochastic reachability analysis with this model to show that the outcomes of social diffusion processes may depend crucially upon the way the early dynamics of the process interacts with the underlying network's meso-scale topological structures. This theoretical finding provides the foundations for developing a machine learning algorithm that enables accurate early warning analysis for diffusion events. The utility of the warning algorithm, and the power of network-based predictive metrics, are demonstrated through empirical case studies involving meme propagation, large-scale protests events, and politically-motivated cyber attacks.\n\n## 5. Acknowledgements\n\nThis research was supported by the U.S. Department of Defense, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, The Boeing Company, and the Laboratory Directed Research and Development program at Sandia National Laboratories. Fruitful discussions regarding aspects of this work with Curtis Johnson of Sandia National Laboratories, Paul Ormerod of Volterra Partners, and Anne Kao of Boeing are gratefully acknowledged.\n\n## 6. References\n\n[1] Anderson, R. and R. May, *Infectious Diseases of Humans*, Oxford University Press, 1992. [2] Rogers, E., *Diffusion of Innovations*, Fifth Ed., Free Press, NY, 2003. [3] Della Porta, D. and M. Diani, *Social Movement*, Second Ed., Blackwell, Oxford, UK, 2006. [4] Easley, D. and J. 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Processes in which observing a certain behavior increases an individual's probability of adopting that behavior are often referred to as *positive externality processes* (PEP), and we use that term here. PEP have been widely studied in the social and behavioral sciences and, more recently, by the informatics and physical sciences communities [e.g., 4]. In particular, social scientists have constructed theories which qualitatively and quantitatively explain these processes and their dependence on social networks [e.g., 2-4, 6, 18, 36, 49-52]. One result of this research is a recognition that the process by which preferences and opinions of individuals become the collective outcome for a group can be complex and subtle, and thus challenging to model and predict. People arrive at their decisions by reacting individually to an environment consisting largely of others who are reacting likewise, and one consequence of this feedback dynamics is that the collective outcome can be quite different from one implied by a simple aggregation of individual preferences.\n\nWe model PEP in a manner which explicitly separates the individual, or \"micro\", dynamics from the\ncollective dynamics. More specifically, we adopt a modeling framework consisting of three modeling scales:\n-\na *micro-scale*, for modeling the behavior of individuals;\n-\na *meso-scale*, which represents the interaction dynamics of individuals within the same network partition element (community or core/periphery);\n-\na *macro-scale*, which characterizes the interaction between partition elements.\nWe now derive a few properties of the multi-scale model. The micro-scale quantifies the way individuals combine their own inherent preferences regarding the available options with their observations of the behaviors of others to arrive at their chosen courses of action. Interestingly, the dependence of this decisionmaking process on the social network admits a straightforward characterization. Consider the common and important binary choice setting, in which N agents choose from a set O = {0,1} of options based in part on the choices made by others. Let oi  {0,1} denote the selection of agent i and o = [o1 ... oN]T  ON\nrepresent the vector of choices made by the group. It is reasonable to suppose that agent i chooses between the options probabilistically according to some map POi: Ai  ON  [0,1], where POi is the probability that agent i chooses option 1, Ai measures i's inherent preference for option 1, and POi is nondecreasing in Ai. In positive externality situations POi should also be \"nondecreasing in o\" in some sense, and we now make this notion precise. (For notational simplicity in what follows we suppress the dependence of POi on Ai.)\nBecause it is defined in such general terms it may appear that the map POi could be a very complicated function of the choices of the other agents. In fact, Theorem 1 indicates that this map must be tractable.\nTheorem 1: Given any POi there exists a vector wi = [wi1 ... wiN]T  RN, with wij  0 and j wij = bi, and a scalar function ri: [0, bi]  [0,1] such that POi(o) = ri(oTwi).\nProof: It is enough to prove that the wij can be chosen so oTwi: ON  [0, bi] is injective, since then ri can be constructed to recover any POi. One such choice for wi is wi = [20 21 ... 2N1]T, as then oTwi provides a unique (binary number) representation for each o.\nWe call ri the *agent decision function* and si = oTwi agent i's *social signal*, and interpret the wij as defining a weighted social network for the group of N agents. Observe that Theorem 1 quantifies the way social influence is transmitted to an agent by her neighbors and highlights the importance of this signal in the decision-making process. The result also allows a simple characterization of positive externality agent behavior: for such behavior, ri is nondecreasing in si.\nThe micro-scale model structure allows PEP behaviors which appear to be distinct to be represented within a unified setting. For example, the basic model readily accommodates two of the most common sources of PEP: 1.) *utility-oriented externalities*, in which the utility or value of an option is a direct function of the number of others choosing it, and 2.) *information externalities*, which arise from inferences made by an individual about decision-relevant information possessed by others.\nExample A1.1: utility-oriented externalities. Suppose each agent i has a utility function ui: O  [0, bi]\n R+ which depends explicitly on i's social signal si. The standard, albeit dated, example here is the fax machine, with the utility of owning a fax machine increasing with the number of others who own one.\n\nThe key quantity considered by agent i when selecting between options 0 and 1 is the utility difference between the options, ui(si) = ui(1,si)  ui(0,si). In positive externality situations ui is increasing in si, and there exists a *threshold* social signal value s*, possibly with s* < 0 or s* > bi, such that a utility maximizing agent will choose option 0 if si < s* and option 1 if si  s*.\nExample A1.2: information externalities. Suppose the utility to agent i of each option is independent of the number of other agents choosing that option but there exists uncertainty regarding this utility. To be concrete, assume that agent i's utility depends on the \"state of world\" w  {w0, w1}, so that ui = ui(oi,w), and there exists uncertainty regarding w. In this case, agent i may observe others' decisions in order to infer w and then choose the option which maximizes his utility for this world state (as when a tourist chooses a crowded restaurant over an empty one in an unfamiliar city). Consider, for instance, the decision of whether to adopt an innovation of uncertain quality, and let the world state w1 signify that innovation quality is such that adopting maximizes utility. In this situation it is reasonable for agent i to maximize *expected* utility and choose the option (adopt or not) oi* = argmaxoO wW P(w | si) ui(oi,w). If agent i uses Bayesian inference to estimate P(w1 | si) then we have a positive externality decision process and there exists a threshold value s* for the social signal such that agent i will choose option 0 if si < s* and option 1 if si  s* [17].\nIt can be seen that in these examples, different positive externality \"drivers\" lead to equivalent (threshold)\nmicro-scale models.\nTaken together, the meso- and macro-scale components of the proposed modeling framework quantify the way agent decision functions interact to produce collective behavior at the population level. For convenience of exposition, in this Appendix we focus on network communities as the meso-scale structure of interest; however, all of the modeling results derived here also hold for the case of core-periphery structure . The role of the meso-scale model is to quantify and illuminate the manner in which agent decision functions interact *within* social network communities, while the macro-scale model characterizes the interactions of agents *between* communities. The primary assumption is that interactions between individuals within social network communities can be modeled as \"fully-mixed\" - all pairwise interactions between individuals within a network community are equally likely - while interactions between communities are constrained by the network defining the relationships between the communities. We argue below that this assumption is reasonable and useful.\nOne advantage of identifying a scale at which agent interaction is (approximately) homogeneous is that this enables the leveraging of an extensive literature on collective dynamics. To be concrete, we derive two examples. Consider first the social movement model proposed in [49,50]. In this model, each individual can be in one of three states: member (of the movement), potential member, and ex-member.\n\nIndividuals interact in a fully-mixed way, with each interaction between a potential member and a member resulting in the potential member becoming a member with probability , and each interaction between a member and an ex-member resulting in the member becoming an ex-member with probability 1;\nmembers also \"spontaneously\" become ex-members with probability 2. The connection between this representation and standard epidemiological models [1] is clear.\nUnder the assumption of fully-mixed interactions at the meso-scale, standard manipulations yield the following representation for the social dynamics within network communities:\n                                          dP/dt  =  PM(PM)1/21(t),\nH:                                            dM/dt  =  PM+(PM)1/21(t)1ME(1ME)1/22(t) 2M(2M)1/23(t),\n                                          dE/dt  =  1ME+(1ME)1/22(t)+2M+(2M)1/23(t), where P, M, and E denote the fractions of potential members, members, and ex-members in the community population, , 1, and 2 are nonnegative constants related to the probabilities , 1, and 2 defined above, and the i(t) are appropriate random processes [e.g., 17]. The deterministic version of this basic model (i.e., with 1(t)=2(t)=3(t)0) is discussed by Hedstrom and coauthors in [49,50], and therefore we denote the model H. The deterministic version is shown in [49] to provide a useful description for the local growth of a real world social movement.\nThe second example incorporates the fact that innovations often have both enthusiasts and skeptics, each of whom may actively attempt to recruit the uncommitted. The model H can be modified to account for this competition in recruitment:\n                                                       dP/dt = 1PM1  2PM2,\nB:                                                       dM1/dt = 1PM1  1M1,\n                                                     dM2/dt = 2PM2  2M2,\n                                                       dE/dt = 1M1 + 2M2, where P and E denote the fractions of potential members and ex-members, as before, M1 and M2 are members of the competing groups or movements, and 1, 2, 1, and 1 are nonnegative constants. A\nmodel of this basic form is proposed in Bettencourt and coworkers in [51] and thus we label it B. The model can be fitted, with good agreement, to empirical data for the diffusion of Feynman diagrams (an innovation in physics) in the post World War II era [51]. Developing a stochastic version of B, analogous to the representation H, is straightforward [39].\nThe meso-scale model describes the way individual agent decision functions interact to produce collective behavior within social network communities. Individuals also interact with people from other communities, of course, and receive information from channels that transmit to many communities simultaneously (e.g., mass media). These inter-community interactions and \"global\" social signals are quantified at the macro-scale level of the multi-scale modeling framework. The basic idea is simple and natural:\nwe model interdependence between social network communities with a graph Gsc = {Vsc, Esc}, where Vsc and Esc are the vertex and edge sets, respectively, |Vsc| = K, each vertex v  Vsc is a community, and each directed edge e = (v,v)  Esc represents a potential inter-community interaction. More specifically, an edge (v,v) indicates that an agent in community v can receive decision-relevant information from one in community v. The way agents act upon this information is specified by their decision functions ri. The broadcast of global social signals to individuals is modeled as a community-dependent input uv to each individual in community v. Thus Gsc and the uv define the macro-scale model structure.\nA key task in deriving a macro-scale model is specifying the topology of Gsc, as this graph encodes the social network structure for the phenomenon of interest. The most direct approach to constructing Gsc is to infer communities directly from social network data, by partitioning the network so as to maximizing the graph modularity Qm. The main challenge with this method for building social community graphs is obtaining the requisite social network data. While this task is certainly nontrivial, availability of such data has increased dramatically over the past decade. For instance, social relationships and interactions increasingly leave \"fingerprints\" in electronic databases (e.g., communication via email and cell phones, financial transactions), making convenient the acquisition, manipulation, storage, and analysis of these records [e.g., 4].\nAlternatively, demographics data can sometimes be used to define both the communities themselves\n(e.g., families, physical neighborhoods) and their proximity. The basic idea is familiar: individuals belong to social groups, which in turn belong to \"groups of groups\", and so on, giving rise to a hierarchical organization of communities. For instance, in academics, research groups often belong to academic departments, which are organized into colleges, which in turn form universities, and so on. The proximity of two communities is specified by their relationship within the hierarchy, and this distance defines the likelihood that individuals from the two communities will interact. The probability of inter-community interaction, in turn, can be used to define the network community graph Gsc [39].\nA1.2 S-HDS Model Formulation\nWe now show that the stochastic hybrid dynamical system formalism provides a rigorous, tractable, and expressive framework within which to represent multi-scale social dynamics models. Consider the following Definition A1.1: A *stochastic hybrid dynamical system* (S-HDS) is a feedback interconnection of a continuous-time, continuous state-dependent Markov chain {Q, (x)} and a collection of stochastic differential equations indexed by the Markov chain state q:\n                                                                  {Q, (x)},\nS-HDS:                                                  dx = fq(x,p)dt + Gq(x,p)dw, where qQ is the discrete state, xXRn is the continuous state, pRp is a vector of system parameters,\n{fq} and {Gq} are sets of vector and matrix fields characterizing the continuous system dynamics, w is an m-valued Weiner process, and (x) is the matrix of (x-dependent) Markov chain transition rates; the entries of (x) satisfy qq(x)  0 if q = q and q qq(x) = 0 q, and are related to the standard Markov state transition probabilities as follows [e.g., 34]:\n\n$${\\rm P}\\{{\\rm q}({\\rm t}+\\Delta)={\\rm q}^{\\prime}|\\,{\\rm q}({\\rm t})={\\rm q}\\}= \\left\\{\\begin{array}{ll}\\lambda_{\\rm qq^{\\prime}}({\\rm x}({\\rm t}))\\Delta+{\\rm o }(\\Delta)&\\quad\\mbox{if ${\\rm q}\\neq{\\rm q}^{\\prime}$}\\\\ 1+\\lambda_{\\rm qq}\\left({\\rm x}({\\rm t})\\right)\\Delta+{\\rm o}(\\Delta)&\\quad \\mbox{if ${\\rm q}={\\rm q}^{\\prime}$}.\\end{array}\\right.$$\nA general discussion of S-HDS theory and applications is beyond the scope of this paper and may be found in, for instance, [34] and the references therein.\n\nWe now develop an S-HDS representation for multi-scale social diffusion processes. It is assumed\nthat:\n-\nthe social system consists of N individuals distributed over K network communities;\n-\nindividuals can influence each other via positive externalities;\n-\nintra-community interactions are fully-mixed;\n-\ninter-community interactions involve the (possibly temporary) migration of individuals from one\ncommunity to another.\nThe phenomenon of interest is the diffusion of innovations, in which an innovation of some kind (e.g., a new technology or idea) is introduced into a social system, and individuals may learn about the innovation from others and decide to adopt it [e.g., 2]. By definition an innovation is \"new\", and therefore it is supposed that initially only a few of the network communities have been exposed to it. An important task in applications is to be able to characterize the likelihood that the innovation will spread to a significant fraction of the population [17].\nWe model social diffusion as follows:\nDefinition A1.2: The *multi-scale S-HDS diffusion model* is a tuple\n\n$\\Sigma_{\\rm S\\_HDS,\\ diff}=\\{{\\rm G_{sc}},{\\rm Q\\times X},\\{{\\rm f_{q}(x),G_{q}(x),H_{q}(x)}\\}_{q \\in Q},{\\rm Par,\\ W,\\ U,\\{{\\rm Q,\\Lambda(x)}\\}}\\}$\nwhere\n-\nGsc = {Vsc, Esc} is the social network community graph;\n-\nQX is the system state set, with Q and X  Rn denoting the (finite) discrete and (bounded) continuous state sets, respectively;\n-\n{fq(x),Gq(x),Hq(x)}qQ, Par, W, U is the S-HDS continuous system, a family of stochastic differential\nequations which characterizes the intra-community dynamics via vector field/ matrix families\n{fq},{Gq},{Hq}, system parameter vector pParRp, and system inputs wWRm, uURr;\n-\n{Q, (x)} is the S-HDS discrete system, a continuous-time Markov chain which defines intercommunity interactions via state set Q and transition rate matrix (x).\nThe social community graph Gsc defines the feasible community-community innovation diffusion pathways: if (v,v)  Esc then it is not possible for the innovation to spread directly from community v to community v. The discrete state set Q = {0,1}K specifies which communities contain at least one adopter of the innovation by labeling such communities with a '1' (and a '0' otherwise). Thus, for example, state q = [1  0  0  ... ]T indicates that community 1 has at least one adopter, community 2 and 3 do not, and so on. The continuous state space X has coordinates xij  [0,1], where xij is the ith state variable for the continuous system dynamics evolving in community j. For consistency we use the first coordinate for each community, x1j, to refer to the fraction of adopters for that community. The continuous system dynamics is defined by a family of q-indexed stochastic differential equations {cs, q}qQ, with\ncs, q:                                           dx = fq(x,p)dt + Gq(x,p)dw + Hq(x,p)du, where wW is a standard Weiner process and uU is the exogenous input. Ordinarily w is interpreted as a stochastic \"disturbance\", while u is employed to represent influences from \"global\" sources such as mass media. These dynamics quantify intra-community diffusion of the innovation of interest, for instance through models of the form H. The Markov chain matrix (x) specifies the transition rates for discrete state transitions q  q and depends on both Gsc and x (e.g., the rate at which community v will\n\"infect\" other communities depends upon the fraction of adopters in v). It is worth noting that the model\nS-HDS, diff naturally accommodates both probabilistic (via w and the Markov chain dynamics) and setbounded (through parameter set Par) uncertainty descriptions, as this expressiveness is desirable in applications. A1.3 A Simple Example\nWe now demonstrate the implementation of the proposed multi-scale S-HDS diffusion modeling framework, and illustrate its efficacy, through a simple example; a more complex example, with more interesting analytic goals, is investigated in Appendix Two below. Consider a social network consisting of two communities and a social movement process playing out on this network. We construct the social network using the method given in [52]. Briefly, a collection of N vertices is divided into two communities of equal size, denoted L and R (for 'left' and 'right', see Figure 6). For all vertex pairs, if both vertices belong to the same community then an edge is placed between them with probability pi, and if the vertices belong to different communities then they are connected with probability pe < pi. Increasing the ratio pi /\npe makes the resulting network more \"community-like\" by increasing the relative intra-community edge density. Figure 6 shows two small example networks built in this way, with the network on the left corresponding to a larger pi / pe ratio.\nThe social movement dynamics evolving on this network is a \"network version\" of the model proposed in [49]. Thus each individual can be in one of three states - member, potential member, and exmember - and individuals can change states in one of three ways: 1.) members persuade potential members to whom they are linked to become members with probability , 2.) ex-members likewise influence neighboring members to become ex-members with probability 1, and 3.) members can spontaneously become ex-members with probability 2. For convenience of reference this \"agent-based\" system representation is denoted ABM.\n\nIt is straightforward to derive an S-HDS version of the social movement model ABM. Consider the diffusion model S-HDS, diff = {Gsc, QX, {fq(x), Gq(x), Hq(x)}qQ, Par, W, U, {Q, (x)}} specified in Definition A1.2. Note first that in this case the social network community graph Gsc is very simple, consisting of two vertices corresponding to communities L and R and an undirected edge connecting them. The continuous system state is x = [PL  ML  PR  MR]TX, where the subscripts indicate communities (note that the concentrations of ex-members, EL and ER, are not independent states because the total concentration sums to one on each community). We approximate the agent-based social movement dynamics *within* each network community with the fully-mixed model H, that is, with a set of stochastic differential equations governing the evolution of the concentrations of members M and potential members P.\nIt can be seen that H together with the preceding discussion defines the model components X,\n{fq(x),Gq(x),Hq(x)}qQ, Par, W, U that make up the continuous system portion of S-HDS, diff. Thus all that remains is to specify the discrete system {Q, (x)}. The discrete state set Q = {00, 10, 01, 11} indicates which communities contain at least one movement member, so that for instance state q = 10 indicates that community L has at least one member and community R has no members. The Markov chain matrix (x)\nspecifies the transition rates for discrete state transitions q  q. These rates depend on the continuous system state x because the likelihood that one community will \"infect\" the other depends upon the current concentrations of members, potential members, and ex-members in that community. We examine the utility of the S-HDS social diffusion model constructed above by using this model to estimate the probability that a small set of \"seed\" members introduced into community L will lead to the movement growing and eventually propagating to community R. Because the model S-HDS, diff is derived from ABM, ABM is taken to be ground truth and S-HDS, diff is deemed a useful approximation if the cascade probability estimates obtained using the S-HDS representation are in good agreement with those computed based on ABM. The following parameter values are chosen for ABM: N = 2000,  = 0.5, 1 =\n0.01, 2 = 0.1 (the results reported are not sensitive to variation in these values). We build 50 random re-\n\nalizations of the social network for each of 15 pi / pe ratios. The values for pi / pe are selected to generate a collection of 15 network sets whose topologies interpolate smoothly between networks with essentially disconnected communities (large pi / pe) and networks whose two communities are tightly coupled (small pi / pe). A \"global\" cascade is said to occur if an initial seed set of five movement members in community R, chosen at random, results in the diffusion of the movement to community L. The probability of global cascade at a given pi / pe ratio is computed by running 20 simulations on each of the 50 social network realizations associated with that pi / pe, and counting up those for which the innovation propagates to community L. The results of this simulation study are presented in the plot at the bottom of Figure 6, with the blue curve showing the probability estimates as a function of pi / pe ratio and the error bars corresponding to  2 standard errors.\nWe now investigate the efficacy of the S-HDS social diffusion model by using this model to estimate the probability of global cascade. The social diffusion model S-HDS, diff is instantiated to be equivalent to the agent-based representation ABM described above. Note that, in particular, there are no free parameters available to permit the response of S-HDS, diff to be \"tuned\" to match ABM. For instance, the ABM parameters , 1, 2 uniquely define S-HDS, diff parameters , 1, 2, and specifying values for the pi / pe ratios gives corresponding values for the S-HDS transition matrices (x) (to within a single \"offset\" parameter, see [39]). A Matlab program implementing the resulting model S-HDS, diff is given in [39].\nIn order to compute the probability of global cascade using the S-HDS model S-HDS, diff, we employ the \"altitude function\" method described in Appendix Two below. This method calculates provablycorrect upper bounds on the probability of the social movement propagating to community L. The results of this analysis are given at the plot of the bottom of Figure 6 (red curve). Observe that the global cascade probability estimates obtained using the two models ABM and S-HDS, diff are in close agreement. As it is challenging to model \"discontinuous\" phenomena such as diffusion across social network communities, this agreement represents important evidence that the S-HDS provides a useful characterization of social diffusion on networks.\nWhile the models ABM and S-HDS, diff generate similar results in this example, the S-HDS representation is much more efficient computationally. For instance, estimating the desired global cascade probabilities using the S-HDS model requires less than one percent of the computer time needed to obtain these estimates with the equivalent agent-based model. Moreover, this difference on efficiency increases with network size, which is important because realistic social networks have hundreds or thousands of communities rather than just two. This computational tractability hints at a more general, and more significant, mathematical tractability enjoyed by the S-HDS framework, a property we now leverage to develop a rigorous predictive analysis methodology for social diffusion events.\n\n\n\n## A2. Appendix Two: Predictive Analysis\n\nIn this Appendix we formulate the predictive analysis problem in terms of reachability assessment, show that these reachability questions can be addressed through an \"altitude function\" analysis without computing system trajectories, and apply this theoretical framework to demonstrate that predictability of a broad class of social diffusion models depends crucially upon the meso-scale topological structures of the underlying networks. For convenience of exposition, in this Appendix we focus on network communities as a representative meso-scale structure; however, all results derived here are also applicable to the more general case in which the \"network partition\" (see Section 2.2) includes both community and coreperiphery structures.\nA2.1 Predictive Analysis as Reachability Assessment\nWe propose that accurate prediction requires careful consideration of the interplay between the intrinsics of a process and the social dynamics which are its realization. We therefore adopt an inherently dynamical approach to predictive analysis: given a social process, a set of measurables, and the behavior of interest, we formulate prediction problems as questions about the reachability properties of the system. Toward that end, the behavior about which predictions are to be made is used to define the system state space subsets of interest (SSI), while the particular set of candidate measurables under consideration allows identification of the *candidate starting set* (CSS), that is, the set of states and system parameter values which represent initializations that are equivalent under the assumed observational capability. This setup permits predictability assessment, and the related task of identifying useful measurables, to be performed in a systematic manner. Roughly speaking, the proposed approach to predictability assessment involves determining how probable it is to reach the SSI from a CSS and deciding if these reachability properties are compatible with the prediction goals. If a system's reachability characteristics are incompatible with the given prediction question - if, say, \"hit\" and \"flop\" in a cultural market are both likely to be reached from the CSS - then the prediction objectives should be refined in some way. Possible refinements include relaxing the level of detail to be predicted or introducing additional measurables.\nWe now make these notions more precise. Consider the multi-scale S-HDS social diffusion model\nS-HDS, diff specified in Definition A1.2. Let P0 be a subset of the parameter set Par and X0, Xs1, Xs2 be subsets of the (bounded) continuous system state space X. Suppose X0  P0 and {Xs1, Xs2} are the CSS and SSI, respectively, corresponding to the prediction question. Let a specification  > 0 be given for the minimum acceptable level of variation in system behavior relative to {Xs1, Xs2}. Consider the following\nDefinition A2.1: A situation is *eventual state (ES) predictable* if |1  2| > , where 1 and 2 are the probabilities of S-HDS, diff reaching Xs1 and Xs2, respectively, and is *ES unpredictable* otherwise.\nNote that in ES predictability problems it is expected that the two sets {Xs1, Xs2} represent qualitatively different system behaviors (e.g., hit and flop in a cultural market), so that if the probabilities of reaching each from X0  P0 are similar then system behavior is unpredictable in a sense that is meaningful for many applications. Other useful forms of predictability are defined and investigated in [39].\nThe notion of predictability forms the basis for our definition of useful measurables:\nDefinition A2.2: Let the components of the vectors (x0, p0)  X0  P0 which comprise the CSS be denoted x0 = [x01 ... x0n]T and p0 = [p01 ... p0p]T. The *measurables with most predictive power* are those state variables x0j and/or parameters p0k for which predictability is most sensitive.\nIntuitively, those measurables for which predictability is most sensitive are likely to be the ones that can most dramatically affect the predictability of a given problem. Note that we do not specify a particular measure of sensitivity to be used when identifying measurables with maximum predictive power, as such considerations are ordinarily application-dependent (see [39] for some useful specifications). Definitions A2.1 and A2.2 focus on the role played by *initial* states in the predictability of social processes. In some cases it is useful to expand this formulation to allow consideration of states other than initial states. For instance, we show in [18] that very early time series are often predictive for PEP, suggesting that it can be valuable to consider initial state *trajectory segments*, rather than just initial states, when assessing predictability. This extension can be naturally accomplished by redefining the CSS, for instance by augmenting the state space X with an explicit time coordinate [18].\nWe now turn our attention to the \"early warning\" problem.\nDefinition A2.3: Let the event of interest be specified in terms of S-HDS, diff reaching or escaping some SSI Xs, and suppose a warning signal is to be issued only if the probability of event occurrence exceeds some specified threshold . *Reach warning analysis* involves identifying a state set Xw, where Xs  Xw necessarily, with the property that if the system trajectory enters Xw then the probability that S-HDS, diff will eventually reach Xs is at least . Analogously, *escape warning analysis* involves identifying a state set Xw, where X \\ Xw  Xs necessarily, with the property that if the system trajectory enters Xw then the probability that S-HDS, diff will eventually escape from Xs is at least .\nA2.2 Stochastic Reachability Assessment\nThe previous section formulates predictive analysis problems as reachability questions. Here we show that these reachability questions can be addressed through an \"altitude function\" analysis, in which we seek a scalar function of the system state that permits conclusions to be made regarding reachability without computing system trajectories. We refer to these as altitude functions to provide an intuitive sense of their analytic role: if some measure of \"altitude\" is low on the CSS and high on an SSI, and if the expected rate of change of altitude along system trajectories is nonincreasing, then it is unlikely for trajectories to reach this SSI from the CSS.\nConsider the S-HDS social diffusion model S-HDS, diff evolving on a bounded state space Q  X. We quantify the uncertainty associated with S-HDS, diff by specifying bounds on the possible values for some system parameters and perturbations and giving probabilistic descriptions for other uncertain system elements and disturbances. Given this representation, it is natural to seek a probabilistic assessment of system reachability.\nWe begin with an investigation of probabilistic reachability on *infinite* time horizons. The following\n\"supermartingale lemma\" is proved in [53] and is instrumental in our development:\nLemma SM: Consider a stochastic process s with bounded state space X, and let x(t) denote the\n\"stopped\" process associated with s (i.e., x(t) is the trajectory of s which starts at x0 and is stopped if it encounters the boundary of X). If A(x(t)) is a nonnegative supermartingale then for any x0 and  > 0\n\nP{sup A(x(t))   | x(0) = x0}  A(x0) / .\nDenote by X0  X and Xs  X the initial state set and SSI, respectively, for the continuous system component of S-HDS, diff, and assume that X and the parameter set Par  Rp are both bounded. Thus, for instance, the SSI is a subset of the continuous system state space X alone; this is typically the case in applications and is easily extended if necessary. We are now in a position to state our first stochastic reachability result:\nTheorem 2:  is an upper bound on the probability of trajectories of S-HDS, diff reaching Xs from X0, while remaining in Q  X, if there is a family of differentiable functions {Aq(x)}qQ such that\n-\nAq(x)   xX0, qQ;\n\n\n-\nAq(x)  1 xXs, qQ;\n-\nAq(x)  0 xX, qQ;\n-\n(Aq/x) (fq + Hq u) + (1/2) tr [Gq\nT (2Aq/x2) Gq] + qQ qq Aq  0 xX, qQ, uU, pPar.\nProof: Note first that BAq(x) = (Aq/x) (fq + Hq u) + (1/2) tr [Gq T (2Aq/x2) Gq] + qQ qq Aq is the infinitesimal generator for S-HDS, diff, and therefore quantifies the evolution of the expectation of Aq(x)\n[53,34]. As a consequence, the third and fourth conditions of the theorem imply that A(q(t),x(t)) is a nonnegative supermartingale [53]. Thus, from Lemma SM, we can conclude that P{x(t)Xs for some t}\nP{sup A(q(t),x(t))  1 | x(0)=x0}  A(q,x0)   x0X0, qQ, uU, pPar.\n\nThe preceding result characterizes reachability of S-HDS on infinite time horizons. In some situations, including important applications involving social systems, it is of interest to study system behavior on *finite* time horizons. The following result is useful for such analysis:\nTheorem 3:  is an upper bound on the probability of trajectories of S-HDS, diff reaching Xs from X0 during time interval [0,T], while remaining in Q  X, if there exists a family of differentiable functions\n{Aq(x,t)}qQ such that\n-\nAq(x,t)   (x,t)X00, qQ;\n\n-\nAq(x,t)  1 (x,t)Xs[0,T], qQ;\n-\nAq(x,t)  0 (x,t)XR+, qQ;\n-\nBAq(x,t)  0 (x,t)XR+, qQ, uU, pPar.\nProof: The proof follows immediately from that of Theorem 2 once it is observed that P{x(t)Xs for some t[0,T]} = P{(x(t),t)Xs[0,T]}.\nThe idea for the proof of Theorem 3 was suggested in [54].\nHaving formulated predictability assessment for social processes in terms of system reachability and presented a new theoretical methodology for assessing reachability, we are now in a position to give our approach to deciding predictability. Observe first that Theorems 2 and 3 are of direct practical interest only if it is possible to efficiently compute a tight probability bound  and associated altitude function A(x) which satisfy the theorem conditions. Toward that end, observe that the theorems specify *convex*\nconditions to be satisfied by altitude functions: if A1 and A2 satisfy the theorem conditions then any convex combination of A1 and A2 will also satisfy the conditions. Thus the search for altitude functions can be formulated as a convex programming problem [55]. Moreover, if the system of interest admits a polynomial description (e.g., the system vector and matrix fields are polynomials) and we search to polynomial altitude functions, then the search can be carried out using sum-of-squares (SOS) optimization [56].\nSOS optimization is a convex relaxation framework based on SOS decomposition of the relevant polynomials and semidefinite programming. SOS relaxation involves replacing the nonnegative and nonpositive conditions to be satisfied by the altitude functions with SOS conditions. For example, the conditions for Aq(x) given in Theorem 2 can be relaxed as follows:\n                               A(x)   xX0                     A(x)  0\nT(x) g0(x) is SOS\n                              A(x)  1 xXs                   A(x)  1  s T(x) gs(x) is SOS\n                                    A(x)  0 xX              A(x)  X1\nT(x) gX1(x) is SOS\nBA(x)  0 xX, pPar            BA(x)X2\nT(x) gX2(x)P\nT(p) gP(p) is SOS\nwhere the entries of the vector functions 0, s, X1, X2, P are SOS, the vector functions g0, gs, gX1, gX2, gP satisfy g()  0 (entry-wise) whenever xX or pPar, respectively, and we assume |Q| = 1 for notational convenience. The conditions on Aq(x,t) specified in Theorem 3 can be relaxed in exactly the same manner. The relaxed SOS conditions are clearly sufficient and in practice are typically not overlyconservative [56,39].\nOnce the set of conditions to be satisfied by A(x) are relaxed in this way, SOS programming can be used to compute min, the minimum value for the probability bound , and A(x), the associated altitude function which certifies the correctness of this bound. Software for solving SOS programs is available as the third-party Matlab toolbox SOSTOOLS [56], and example SOS programs are given in [39]. Importantly, the approach is tractable: for fixed polynomial degrees, the computational complexity of the associated SOS program grows polynomially in the dimension of the continuous state space, the cardinality of the discrete state set, and the dimension of the parameter space.\nFor completeness, we outline an algorithm for computing the pair (min, A(x)):\n\n## Algorithm A2.1: Altitude Functions Via Sos Programming (Outline)\n\n1. Parameterize A as A(x) = k ck ak(x), where {a1, ..., aB} are monomials up to a desired degree bound\nand {c1, ..., cB} are to-be-determined coefficients.\n2. Relax all A(x) criteria in the relevant theorem to SOS conditions.\n3. Formulate an SOS program with decision variables , {c1, ..., cB}, where the desired bound on altitude function polynomial degree is reflected in the specification of the set {c1, ..., cB}. Compute the\nminimum probability bound min and values for the coefficients {c1, ..., cB} that define A(x) using\nSOSTOOLS.\nIt is emphasized that, although the computation of (min, A(x)) is performed numerically, the resulting function A(x) is guaranteed to satisfy the conditions of the relevant theorem and therefore represents a proof of the correctness of the probability upper bound min. Note also that the probability estimate is obtained without computing system trajectories, and is valid for entire sets of initial states X0, parameter values Par, and exogenous inputs U.\nHaving given a method for efficiently computing pairs (min, A(x)), and thereby characterizing reachability, we are now in a position to sketch an algorithm for assessing ES predictability:\n\n## Algorithm A2.2: Es Predictability (Outline)\n\nGiven: social diffusion process of interest is S-HDS, diff, CSS = X0  P0, SSI = {Xs1, Xs2}, and minimum\nacceptable level of variation = .\nProcedure:\n1. compute (upper bound for) probability 1 of S-HDS, diff reaching Xs1 from X0  P0;\n2. compute (upper bound for) probability 2 of S-HDS, diff reaching Xs2 from X0  P0;\n3. if |1  2| >  then problem is ES predictable, else problem is ES unpredictable.\nNote: 1, 2 can be computed using Theorem 2 (infinite time horizon) or Theorem 3 (finite time horizon)\ntogether with Algorithm3.1 and SOSTOOLS [56].\nA2.3 Application to Social Diffusion\nThe theoretical framework developed in the preceding sections is now used, in combination with empirically-grounded models for social diffusion [e.g., 17,49-51], to demonstrate that predictability of this class of diffusion models depends crucially upon network community structure. We investigate the following predictability question: Is the diffusion of social movements and mobilizations ES predictable and, if so, which measurable quantities have predictive power?\nWe adopt a specific version of the S-HDS social diffusion model proposed in Definition 2.2:\n\n\nS-HDS, diff = {Gsc, QX, {fq(x),Gq(x)}qQ, Par, W, {Q, (x)}}\nwhere\n-\nthe social network community graph Gsc consists of K communities (so |Vsc| = K), connected together\nwith an Erdos-Renyi random graph topology, with community size drawn from a power law distribution [36];\n-\neach continuous system cs, q: dx = fq(x,p)dt + Gq(x,p)dw, qQ, is given by the meso-scale social\nmovement model H or B with appropriate parameter vector p and system \"noise\" w;\n-\nthe discrete system {Q, (x)} is a Markov chain that defines inter-community interactions in the\nmanner described in Definition A1.2.\nA Matlab instantiation of this S-HDS diffusion model is given in [39] and is available upon request.\nThe behavior of the model can be shown to be consistent with empirical observations of several historical\nsocial movements (e.g., various movements in Sweden) [39].\nIn order to assess ES predictability, SSI = {Xs1, Xs2} is defined so that Xs1, Xs2 are state sets corresponding to *global* (affecting a significant fraction of the population) and *local* (remaining confined to a small fraction of the population) movement events, respectively. We then employ Algorithm A2.2 iteratively to search for a definition for CSS = X0  P0 which ensures that the probabilities of reaching Xs1 and Xs2 from X0  P0 are sufficiently different to yield an ES predictable situation. We use two models of the form S-HDS, diff for this analysis, corresponding to the two definitions for the continuous system H and B.\n\nEach model is composed of K = 10 communities connected together with an Erdos-Renyi random graph topology. (Using different realizations of the Erdos-Renyi random graph does not affect the conclusions reported below.)\nES predictability analysis yields two main results. First, both the intra-community and intercommunity dynamics exhibit *threshold* behavior: small changes in either the intra-community \"infectivity\" or inter-community interaction rate around their threshold values lead to large variations in the probability that the movement will propagate \"globally\". More quantitatively, for the diffusion model S-HDS, diff with continuous system dynamics H, threshold behavior is obtained when varying 1.) the generalized reproduction number R =  / 2 and 2.) the rate  at which inter-community interactions between individuals take place. Thus in order for a social movement to propagate to a significant fraction of the population, the threshold conditions R1 and 0 must be satisfied simultaneously. An analogous conclusion holds when H is replaced with the diffusion model B in the S-HDS representation. This finding is reminiscent of and extends well-known results for epidemic thresholds in disease propagation models [1].\nThis threshold behavior is illustrated in the plot at the top right of Figure 7, which shows the way probability of global propagation increases with inter-community interaction rate when the intracommunity diffusion is sufficiently infective (i.e.,  R1). The probabilities which make up this plot represents provably-correct (upper bound) estimates computed using Theorem 2 and Algorithm A2.1. A similar threshold response is observed when varying intra-community infectivity R, provided the intercommunity interaction rate satisfies 0. Importantly, the inter-community interaction threshold 0 is seen to be quite small, indicating that even a few links between network communities enables rapid diffusion of the movement to otherwise disparate regions of the social network. This result suggests that a useful predictor of movement activity in a given community is the level of movement activity among that community's neighbors in Gsc.\n\nR0 R0\n0 0 The second main ES predictability result characterizes the way probability of global propagation varies with the number of network communities across which a *fixed* set of \"seed\" movement members is distributed. To quantify this dependence, the social movement model S-HDS, diff is initialized so that a small fraction of individuals in the population are movement members and the remainder of the population consists solely of potential members. We then vary the way this initial seed set of movement members is distributed across the K network communities, at one extreme assigning all seeds to the same community and at the other spreading the seeds uniformly over all K communities. For each distribution of seed movement members, the probability of global movement propagation is computed using Theorem\n2 and Algorithm A2.1. Other than initialization strategy, the model is specified exactly as in the preceding analysis.\nThe results of this portion of the ES predictability assessment are summarized in the two plots at the bottom of Figure 7. It is seen that for both choices of meso-scale social movement dynamics, H and B, the probability of global movement propagation increases approximately linearly with the number of network communities across which the fixed set of seed members is distributed (here the number of initial members is set to one percent of the total population)."
    },
    {
        "text": "Per your request, a long, but still only very partial list, of declassified facts. I added a new item #9 to highlight two important declassifications related to upstream collection:\n\n(1) The CIA and FBI's role in many aspects of the 702 program. Declassified facts include:\n-The fact that CIA and FB I\" nominated\" targets to Section 702 has been previously hinted at in prior\nGovernment declassifications. The Board's report clarified that there is a formal nomination process\nwhereby CIA and FBI personnel propose targets to NSA for Section 702 collection. Such nominations\nare subject to the NSA's targeting procedures. (Pg. 42)\n-The Board's report further reports that it is the CIA and FBI, not necessarily the NSA, that review the\ncollection from these nominations to ensure that individuals have been properly targeted (Pg. 44) and\nare charged with reporting instances where a US person or person in the US has been targeted to\nensure that the tasked selectors are immediately detasked (Pg. 69).\n(2) Directly related to the CIA's role in the program, with the exception of what was released in the letter to\nSenator Wyden just prior to the release of the Board's report, the report includes pretty much everything that\nis publicly known about the CIA minimization procedures (which have yet to be declassified; such\ndeclassification was one of the Board's recommendations). Declassified facts include:\n-That the CIA's retention standard in the CIA minimization procedures \"is comparable to the standard\nfound in the NSA's minimization procedures.\" (pg. 63). And, more specifically:\n-That the CIA has a default 5 year age-off period for unreviewed data or data not found to\nmeet the retention standard. (Pg. 60).\n-That the CIA's standard for retaining United States person information is that t~e information\nis necessary or may reasonably become necessary to understand foreign intelligence\ninformation. (Pg. 63)\n-That the CIA retains communications found to meet this standard in access-controlled\nrepositories that are limited to CIA personnel, but not limited to CIA personnel who have been\ntrained in CIA's minimization procedures. (Pg. 63)\n-That CIA may also retain data in order to report it federal law enforcement agencies as\nevidence of a crime, even if that information has no foreign intelligence information. (Pg. 63)\n-That despite the similarities to the NSA's minimization procedures, CIA's minimization procedures\ncontain no requirement \"that a communication containing no U.S. person information upon\nrecognition that the communication contains n~ foreign intelligence information.\" (Pg. 62)\n-A number of facts regarding how CIA queries the data. The number of content and metadata queries\nconducted by CIA was first released in the Government's response to the Wyden letter (both Senator\nWyden and the PCLOB had requested this information be declassified). The Board's report included\nfurther details, including:\n-The standard content queries have to meet, i.e., that they must be \"reasonably designed to\nfind and extract foreign intelligence information.\" (Pg. 57)\n-And CIA employees are required to write contemporaneous justifications of their queries using United States person identifiers {but are not required to seek pre-approval for conducting such queries). {Pg. 58)\n-The fact that there is no comparable standard applied to metadata queries other than that they \"may not be conducted for an unauthorized purpose {such as trying to find information about a love interest).\" (Pg. 58)\n-That the CIA does not track how many metadata queries using U.S. person identifiers it conducts. (Pg. 58)\n-That CIA's minimization procedures also permit it to disseminate any United States person information that CIA concludes is necessary to understand foreign intelligence information, some United States person information that CIA believes may become necessary to understand foreign intelligence information, as well as evidence of a crime. (pgs. 65-66).\n\n(3) Similarly, with the exception of what was released in the letter to Senator Wyden just prior to the release of the Board's report, the report includes pretty much everything that is publicly known about the FBI\nminimization procedures (which have yet to be declassified; such declassification was one of the Board's recommendations). Declassified facts include:\n-That the FBI's retention standard permits FBI to retain communications \"indefinitely if the communications either contain no U.S. person information or if the communications contain information that 'reasonably appears to be foreign intelligence information. [is] necessary to understand foreign intelligence information or assess its importances, or\n[is] evidence of a crime.\"' (Pg. 63)\nThat the FBI has a default 5 year age-off period for unreviewed data, but unlike NSA and CIA, FBI's retention period for data that has been reviewed but has not been found to meet the retention standard for a longer retention period. (Pg. 60).\n\nThat the FBI is also \"required to retain reviewed information that reasonably appears to be exculpatory or that reasonably appears to be discoverable in a criminal proceeding.\" (Pgs.\n\n63-64)\nThat like the CIA's procedures, the FBI's minimization procedures also contain no requirement (apart from the overall age-off requirements) to delete upon recognition communications that contain no United States person information. (Pg. 62).\n\n-Additional facts beyond the number of such queries regarding FBI's querying of Section 702 data, including precisely why the uncounted number of queries using United States person identifiers is likely to be \"substantial\" because of the prevalence of such queries when new assessment or investigations are opened (Pgs. 59-60).\n\n-The standards for FBI's dissemination of United States person information acquired via Section 702\n(which are comparable to the now declassified QA standards), and the fact that FBI's procedures permit the dissemination of minimized information to foreign governments. (Pg. 66)\n\n(4) Various aspects of the NSA targeting procedures- including:\n-The due diligence requirements for determining the non-USP status (pg. 29) and non-US location (pg.\n\n30) of Section 702 targets. Some advocates had previously believed that such due diligence was not required under the NSA targeting procedures.\n\n-Though there were some hints in previously declassified documents, the Board highlighted and fleshed out the diminished requirement (as opposed to what is required for location) for NSA to document the basis for its determination a targeting will result in the acquisition of foreign intelligence information (Pgs. 45-46).\n\n-The post-tasking requirements imposed to ensure that collection remains lawful, including:\n\n-The CIA and FBI's role in post-tasking review of their nominations (pg. 48). -That NSA has developed automated systems to remind analysts to review collection from\nInternet traffic, but not yet telephony traffic, to ensure that targets remain properly targeted\n(Pg. 48).\n-The NSA's annual requirement to re-verify that foreign intelligence information is expected to\nbe acquired from each selector. (Pg. 48)\n-The fact that failures to engage in the post-tasking checks of Section 702 targets in the manner\nrepresented to the Court (representations which exceed what is actually stated in the targeting\nprocedures themselves) have been reported to the FISA court and Congress as compliance\nincidents. (Pg. 48)\n(5) Whether the targeting procedures actually are effective or not. Specifically:\n--The fact that targeting results in a United States person or person in the US being targeted 0.4% of the time. (Pgs. 44-45)\n-Also that the compliance incident rate for the application of FBI targeting procedures has been\n0.04%. (Pg. 71-72)\n(6) The percentage of NSA reporting based on 702 information (-- 25% and climbing) (Pg. 108}.\n\n(7) The number of times in which an NSA intelligence report based in whole or in part on Section 702\nincluded a \"masked\" reference to the identity of a U.S. person, and in which the NSA\nsubsequently \"unmasked\" the U.S. person identity at the request of agencies that received the report. This happened approximately 10,000 times in 2013 (Pg. 132}.\n\n(8) Descriptions of the types of compliance incidents that have occurred, with some specific examples of more substantial compliance incidents beyond MCTs (examples-- issues with purges, changes in communication technology, and problems with post-tasking checks) (Pgs. 77-79). The discussion on compliance also includes the fact that to date there have been two incidents of reverse targeting (Pg. 79).\n\n(9) Additional information regarding upstream collection, to include:\n\n-the fact electronic communications are first filtered to eliminate potential domestic transactions, and are then\nsubsequently screen\ncaptured transactions containing a selector (Pg. 36).\n-The FISC's legal justification for finding \"about\" collection justifiable under the statute (Pg. 37-38).\nMost importantly, the Board pulled together many facts that had been previously unclassified in a variety of different documents by the Government and explained how the Section 702 program actually worked --\ninstead of disparate facts declassified over the last year, this is a comprehensive overview of the program and its efficacy."
    },
    {
        "text": "## On Our Radar Building Intelligence - The First Things That Matter In The Internet Of Things\n\nBy James H. Smith The Internet of Things and, in particular, the availability of home automation, is beginning to affect each of us. In addition to managing high energy consumption for heating and cooling, access control, security, and life safety in both commercial and residential applications, connected widgets are having a dramatic impact on our lives, starting with our local indoor environments (homes, schools, offices, factories, etc.). Smart devices include baby monitors for infants, latchkey monitors for children, and systems that help the disabled and elderly continue to live in their own homes, with higher quality of life and less need for assistance from caregivers.\n\nHome automation has been developing since 1885, when Albert Butz patented the furnace regulator and alarm - which became the company Honeywell. These systems evolved slowly over the next century but predominately remained as single purpose, stand-alone, dedicated control and reporting systems that were hardwired between fixed monitoring and control locations. As the Internet (and the concept of generalized connectivity) entered the picture in the 1980s and 90s, followed by the widespread adoption of mobility (i.e., smartphones, PDAs, tablets, laptops) in the 2000s, home automation systems began to slowly adopt IP-based communications, while also introducing the mobile handset as a tool for monitoring and controlling these systems. Today we are witnessing the interconnection and coordination of these systems. The use of IP-based communications within each of these (previously) dedicated systems means that the coordination of systems is only a few lines of code and a quick modification to a firewall away from integrating information and control across these individual domains into a cohesive system. My experience with smart buildings includes a beach house originally built in 1873 that now is bursting at the seams with IP-based networks such as GigE, Wi-Fi, Bluetooth, Z-Wave, and General Packet Radio Service (GPRS), the data service on GMS phones. For the first 137 years of its existence, the most sophisticated control system this house contained was a modern derivative of the furnace regulator developed by Butz - a two to four wire control system that closed an electrical circuit when the temperature dropped below a set level at a central monitoring point (called the thermostat) and closed a switch that activated the furnace. Access to the home was managed with the old style skeleton key in a mortised lock until it was replaced by a deadbolt in the 1970s. Remote manages the rules that interconnect these systems and provides remote monitoring and access from web browsers and mobile devices.\n\naccess control and monitoring were accomplished by neighbors or in-person visits from rental agencies and home watch companies well into the 2000s.\n\nAlthough most people only interface with a remotely managed system like this for a week's vacation, these systems are becoming ubiquitous and will have dramatic effects on all of us as we and our loved ones age.\n\nIn the current decade, rapid changes have occurred.\n\nA residential home monitoring and control system from 2GIG provides HVAC control, access control, fire and burglar monitoring, and lighting control. It also monitors for unexpected events such as outof-range temperatures (indicating the furnace is malfunctioning) and flooding (indicating a pipe has burst). The classic wired central station monitoring has been replaced by a cellular GPRS data connection that is accessible by the user not only at a dedicated control panel within the house but also from any web browser or smartphone. Calls from the central station have been replaced by SMS messages. In order to monitor these previously disparate systems, the control panel has interfaces not only for the conventional \"wired\" sensors but also for Z-Wave locks, lights, and thermostats; for ISM-band wireless security (doors and windows, motion, glass break, flood, etc.) sensors; and for cellular data (GPRS).\n\nMembers of the Intelligence Community (IC), need to ask themselves how to prepare both defensively and offensively for the coming adoption of Building Intelligence. Classic \"INT\"s such as MASINT or SIGINT overlap the area of Building Intelligence. However, a new term such as BuildINT or IoTINT (for Internet of Things) would be more appropriate. Significant intelligence on patterns of life can be derived from access to the information flowing among these systems. Even if the information is protected by encryption, the timing, volume, and header information of these packets can be used to provide meaningful insights on patterns of life. Moreover, these systems are migrating towards cloud management, where the data is no longer confined to the premise, and the potential economical and societal benefits of centralized management need to be tempered by the security implications of the Cloud. Perhaps some of these systems are already helping to manage your household or care for loved ones, giving you the opportunity to contemplate the future implications of this technology. My next venture into automated systems will start with a trip to the Apple Store for their new line of IP-connected light bulbs that change color based on the colors in photographs on your iPhone. I have no idea (today) of what real value a light bulb with an IP address has (except the cool factor), but perhaps you can start to imagine the intelligence applications of mauve vs. amber lighting changes. That's up to the reader. For now, I'm going to stare at the ocean feed at my desk and ignore the IP packets around me.\nVisits by home watch companies have been replaced by a 2GIG system, monitoring various sensors within the house and an outdoor IP-based camera (which does double duty monitoring for storm damage and providing a view of the ocean to my desktop in Virginia). The rental agent distributing a physical key to the occupants has been replaced by a Z-Wave door lock and an access code. Instructions to turn the heat down and the A/C off when the occupants leave have been replaced by a set of Z-Wave thermostats interconnected with the alarm system so that temperatures adjust automatically depending upon the occupancy of the house. Simple coordination functions such as disabling the circulation fans within the HVAC system if a fire is detected within the house are also implemented. All of these control systems can operate independently (including battery backup) on the premises but they also report to a cloud-managed service over a GPRS cellular modem. The cloud service James H. Smith serves as Technology Vice President on IQT's Technical Staff in the Physical and Biological Technologies practice. He has previously held VP Engineering and Director of Technology roles with Fortune 500 companies such as L-3 Communications, Honeywell, and AlliedSignal. He co-founded Transparent Networks, Inc., a Silicon Valley-based developer of switches for all optical networks. Early in his career, Smith developed a number of MEMS-based technologies and components at Sandia National Laboratories. He earned a Ph.D. in Engineering from Penn State, has an MBA, and is a registered Professional Engineer. He is a senior member of the IEEE and a member of the American Society of Mechanical Engineers."
    },
    {
        "text": "## Preface\n\n(U)\nTitle III of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act Amendments Act of 2008 required the Inspectors General (IGs) of the elements of the Intelligence Community that participated in the President's Surveillance Program (PSP) to conduct a comprehensive review of the program.\n\nThe IGs of the Department of Justice, the Department of Defense, the Central Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency, and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence participated in the review required under the Act.\n\nThe Act required the IGs to submit a comprehensive report on the review to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, and the House Committee on the Judiciary.\n\n(U)\nIn response to Title III requirements, we have prepared this unclassified report on the PSP, which summarizes the collective results of our reviews.\n\nBecause many aspects of the PSP remain classified, and in order to provide the Congressional committees the complete results of our reviews, we also prepared, and have bound separately, a classified report on the PSP.\n\nThe individual reports detailing the results of each IG's review are annexes to the classified report .\n\nGlenn A. Fine Gordon S. Heddell Inspector General Acting Inspector General Department of Justice Department of Defense Patricia A. LeWiS\nActing Inspector General Inspector General Central Intelligence Agency National Security Agency ROkh:.~ ~\nInspector General Office of the Director of National Intelligence\n\n## Unclassified Report On The President's Surveillance Program\n\nI.\nINTRODUCTION........ 1\nA.\nScope of Report........ 2\nB.\nMethodology of this Review ........ 3\nII.\nINCEPTION OF THE PRESIDENT'S SURVEILLANCE PROGRAM\n(PSP) ........ 4\nA.\nExpansion of NSA's Collection Activities ........ 4\nB.\nPresidential Authorization of the PSP ........ 5\nC.\nThreat Assessment Memoranda Supporting Authorization of\nthe PSP........ 7\nD.\nDepartment of Justice Office of Legal Counsel's Early Memoranda Supporting the Legality of the PSP ........ 10\nIII.\nIMPLEMENTATION OF THE PRESIDENT'S SURVEILLANCE\nPROGRAM ........ 14\nA.\nNSA Intelligence Activities under the PSP ........ 14\nB.\nAccess to the PSP ........ 16\n1.\nExecutive Branch Personnel ........ 16\n2.\nCongressional Briefings ........ 16\n3.\nForeign Intelligence Surveillance Court Briefings ........ 17\n4.\nFBI Participation in the PSP ........ 17\n5.\nCIA Participation in the PSP ........ 17\n6.\nODNI Participation in the PSP ........ 18\nC.\nImpact of PSP-Derived Information on the FISA Process ........ 18\nD.\nDiscovery Issues ........ 18\nIV.\nLEGAL REASSESSMENT OF THE PRESIDENT'S SURVEILLANCE\nPROGRAM ........ 19\nA.\nJustice Department Attorneys Become Concerned About the\nLegality of Some Activities under the PSP ........ 19\nB.\nOLC Begins Developing a New Legal Analysis for the PSP ....... 20\nC.\nDOJ Officials Convey Concerns to the White House ........ 20\nD.\nConflict Between DOJ and the White House ........ 21\nE.\nWhite House Counsel Certifies Presidential Authorization Without Department of Justice Concurrence........ 26\nF.\nDepartment of Justice and FBI Officials Consider Resigning .. 27\nG.\nWhite House Agrees to Modify the PSP ........ 29\nH.\nDepartment of Justice OIG Conclusions........ 30\nV.\nTRANSITION OF CERTAIN PROGRAM ACTIVITIES TO FOREIGN\nINTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE COURT ORDERS........ 30\n\nVI.\nIMPACT OF THE PRESIDENT'S SURVEILLANCE PROGRAM ON\nINTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY COUNTERTERRORISM EFFORTS ..... 31\n\n|                   | A.                      | NSA's      | Assessment    | of           | the    | PSP    |     |   31   |\n|-------------------|-------------------------|------------|---------------|--------------|--------|--------|-----|--------|\n| B.                | DOJ                     | OIG's      | Assessment    | of           | the    | PSP    |     |   32   |\n| C.                | CIA                     | OIG's      | Assessment    | of           | the    | PSP    |     |   33   |\n| D.                | ODNI's                  | Assessment | of            | the          | PSP    |        | 35  |        |\n| E.                |                         |            |               |              |        |        |     |        |\n| Intelligence      | Community               | Activities | Supported     |              |        |        |     |        |\n| by                |                         |            |               |              |        |        |     |        |\n| the               | PSP                     |            | 36            |              |        |        |     |        |\n| VII.              | PUBLIC STATEMENTS ABOUT | THE        | PRESIDENT'S   | SURVEILLANCE |        |        |     |        |\n| PROGRAM           |                         |            |               |              |        |        |     |        |\n|                   | 36                      |            |               |              |        |        |     |        |\n| VIII.  CONCLUSION |                         | 37         |               |              |        |        |     |        |\n\n## Unclassified Report On The President's Surveillance Program I. Introduction\n\nIn the weeks following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the President authorized the National Security Agency (NSA) to conduct a classified program to detect and prevent further attacks in the United States. As part of the NSA's classified program, several different intelligence activities were authorized in Presidential Authorizations, and the details of these activities changed over time. The program was reauthorized by the President approximately every 45 days, with certain modifications.\n\nCollectively, the activities carried out under these Authorizations are referred to as the \"President's Surveillance Program\" or \"PSP.\"l One of the activities authorized as part of the PSP was the interception of the content of communications into and out of the United States where there was a reasonable basis to conclude that one party to the communication was a member of al-Qa'ida or related terrorist organizations.\n\nThis aspect of the PSP was publicly acknowledged and described by the President, the Attorney General, and other Administration officials beginning in December 2005 following a series of articles published in The New York Times. The Attorney General subsequently publicly acknowledged the fact that other intelligence activities were also authorized under the same Presidential Authorization, but the details of those activities remain classified.\n\nThe President and other Administration officials labeled the publicly disclosed interception of the content of certain international communications by the NSA as the \"Terrorist Surveillance Program.\"\nSeveral different agencies had roles in the PSP. At the request of the White House, the NSA was involved in providing the technical expertise necessary to create the program. The NSA also was responsible for conducting the actual collection of information under the PSP and the intelligence activity involvipg communications that was authorized by the President during the period beginning on September 11,2001, and ending on January 17,2007, including the program referred to by the President in a radio address on December 17, 2005 (commonly known as the Terrorist Surveillance Program).\n\ndisseminating intelligence reports to other agencies such as the Federal Bureau ofInvestigation (FBI), the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) for analysis and possible investigation.2 In addition, the NSA Office of General Counsel and Office of the Inspector General were responsible for reviewing and monitoring the NSA's PSP\noperation. With the exception of the NSA, the Department of Defense (DoD)\nhad limited involvement in the PSP.\n\nComponents of the Department of Justice (DOJ) other than the FBI\nalso were involved in the program. Most significantly, DOJ's Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) provided advice to the White House and the Attorney General on the overall legality of the PSP. In addition, DOJ's Office of Intelligence Policy and Review (now called the Office of Intelligence in DOJ's National Security Division) worked with the FBI and the NSA to address the impact PSP-derived information had on proceedings under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA). DOJ's National Security Division also handled potential discovery issues that may have involved PSP-related information in international terrorism prosecutions.\n\nThe CIA, in addition to receiving intelligence reports as PSP\nconsumers, requested information from the program and utilized this information in its analyses. The CIA also initially prepared threat assessment memoranda that were used to support the periodic Presidential Authorizations.\n\nBeginning in 2005, the newly-created ODNI assumed responsibility for preparing these threat assessment memoranda. In addition, NCTC analysts received program information for possible use in analytical products prepared for the President, senior policymakers, and other Intelligence Community (IC) analysts and officers.\n\n## A. Scope Of Report\n\nTitle III of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978\nAmendments Act of 2008 (FISA Amendments Act) - signed into law on July 10,2008 - required the Inspectors General of Intelligence Community agencies that participated in the PSP to conduct a comprehensive review of the program. The review required to be conducted under the Act was to examine:\n\n(A)\nall of the facts necessary to describe the\nestablishment, implementation, product, and use of\nthe product of the Program;\n(B)\naccess to legal reviews of the Program and access to\ninformation about the Program;\n(C)\ncommunications with, and participation of,\nindividuals and entities in the private sector related\nto the Program;\n(D)\ninteraction with the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance\nCourt and transition to court orders related to the\nProgram; and\n(E)\nany other matters identified by any such Inspector\nGeneral that would enable that Inspector General to\ncomplete a review of the Program, with respect to\nsuch Department or element.\nThe Inspectors General (IGs) of the DoD, DOJ, CIA, NSA, and ODNI\ncollectively the \"PSP IG Group\" - conducted the review required under the Act. This unclassified report summarizes the portions of the collective results of the IG reviews that can be released in unclassified form. A\nseparate classified report summarizes the classified results of the individual IG reviews. In addition, the individual IG reports that document the results of each of the participating IGs' reviews and investigations, which provide additional classified details concerning the PSP and each agency's role in the PSP, are included as attachments to the classified report.\n\nTitle **III** of the FISA Amendments Act required that the report of any investigation of matters relating to the PSP conducted by the DOJ Office of Professional Responsibility (OPR) be provided to the DOJ Inspector General, and that the findings and conclusions of such investigation be included in the DOJ OIG review. OPR has initiated a review of whether any standards of professional conduct were violated in the preparation of the first series of legal memoranda supporting the PSP. OPR has not completed its review.\n\n## B. Methodology Of This Review\n\nThe PSP IG Group collectively interviewed approximately 200\ngovernment and private sector personnel as part of this review. Most of the interviews were conducted separately by the individual OIGs as part of their agency-specific reviews, although some interviews were conducted jointly.\n\nAmong the interviewees were former and current senior government officials, including Director of National Intelligence (DNI) John D.\n\nNegroponte, NSA Director Keith Alexander, and DNI Michael McConnell, NSA and CIA Director and Principal Deputy DNI (PDDNI) Michael V.\n\nHayden, White House Counsel and Attorney General Alberto Gonzales, FBI Director Robert Mueller, and Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld.\n\nCertain senior officials either declined or did not respond to our requests to be interviewed for this review, including Counsel to the Vice President David Addington, White House Chief of Staff Andrew Card, Attorney General John Ashcroft, DOJ Office of Legal Counsel Deputy Assistant Attorney General John Yoo, and former Director of Central Intelligence George Tenet.\n\nThe OIGs also interviewed many agency managers and personnel, including attorneys, NSA operational personnel, FBI special agents and analysts, and CIA officials and analysts who were responsible for the day-to-day operation of the PSP, including the legal issues associated with the program.\n\nIn addition to these interviews, the PSP IG Group reviewed thousands of documents and electronic records, including the Presidential Authorizations and Threat Assessments supporting reauthorization of the program, OLC legal memoranda, contemporaneous notes and e-mails of various senior officials describing significant events during the program, Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC) pleadings and orders, and documents that were used to disseminate PSP-derived leads to FBI field offices and CIA stations for investigation and for other purposes related to the PSP. Finally, there were previous NSA OIG reports and supporting documentation to use as additional sources.\n\n## Ii. Inception Of The President's Surveillance Program (Psp) A. Expansion Of Nsa's Collection Activities\n\nPrior to September 11,2001, the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 and Executive Order 12333 were generally viewed as the principal governing authorities for conducting electronic surveillance for national security purposes. 3 The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, 50 U.S.C.\n\n 1801, et *seq.,* was enacted in 1978 to \"provide legislative authorization and regulation for all electronic surveillance conducted within the United States for foreign intelligence purposes.\" S. Rep. No. 95-701, at 9 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3973,3977. Executive Order 12333 placed Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA), 50 U.S.C.  1801, et *seq.* also was amended by the FISA Amendments Act of 2008. Unless otherwise indicated, this report refers to FISA\nas it existed prior to 2008.\n\nrestrictions on intelligence collection activities engaged in by Executive Branch agencies, including the NSA, while also seeking to foster \"full and free exchange of information\" among these agencies. In 2000 the NSA\nreported to Congress that\n(U) The applicable legal standards for the collection, retention, or dissemination of information concerning u.s. persons reflect a careful balancing between the needs of the government for such intelligence and the protection of the rights of u.s.\n\npersons, consistent with the reasonableness standard of the Fourth Amendment, as determined by factual circumstances.\n\n(U) In the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) and Executive Order (E.O.) 12333, Congress and the Executive have codified this balancing. (Citations omitted.)4\nAs explained below, the PSP expanded the NSA's authority by allowing it to conduct electronic surveillance within the United States without an order from the FISC when certain factual conditions and legal standards were met.\n\n## B. Presidential Authorization Of The Psp\n\nIn the days immediately after September 11, 2001, the NSA used its existing authorities to gather intelligence information in response to the terrorist attacks. When Director of Central Intelligence Tenet, on behalf of the White House, asked NSA Director Hayden whether the NSA could do more against terrorism, Hayden replied that nothing more could be done within existing authorities. When asked what he might do with more authority, Hayden said he put together information on what was operationally useful and technologically feasible. This information formed the basis of the PSP.\n\nShortly thereafter, the President authorized the NSA to undertake a number of new, highly classified intelligence activities. 5 All of these activities were authorized in a single Presidential Authorization that was periodically reauthorized.\n\nThe specific intelligence activities that were permitted by the Presidential Authorizations remain highly classified, except that beginning in December 2005 the President and other Administration officials acknowledged that these activities included the interception without a court order of certain international communications where there is \"a reasonable basis to conclude that one party to the communication is a member of al-Qa'ida, affiliated with al-Qa'ida, or a member of an organization affiliated with al-Qa'ida.\"6 The President and other Administration officials referred to this publicly disclosed activity as the \"Terrorist Surveillance Program,\" a convention we follow in this unclassified report. We refer to other intelligence activities authorized under the Presidential Authorizations as the \"Other Intelligence Activities.\" The specific details of the Other Intelligence Activities remain highly classified, although the Attorney General publicly acknowledged the existence of such activities in August\n2007.7 Together, the Terrorist Surveillance Program and the Other Intelligence Activities comprise the PSP.\n\nThe Presidential Authorizations were issued at intervals of approximately every 45 days. As described in the next section, with each reauthorization the CIA and later the NCTC prepared an assessment of current potential terrorist threats and a summary of intelligence gathered through the PSP and other means during the previous authorization period.\n\nThe Department of Justice's Office of Legal Counsel reviewed this information to assess whether there was \"a sufficient factual basis demonstrating a threat of terrorist attacks in the United States for it to continue to be reasonable under the standards of the Fourth Amendment for the President to [continue] to authorize the warrantless searches involved\" in the program. The Office of Legal Counsel then advised the Attorney General whether the constitutional standard of reasonableness had been met and whether the Presidential Authorization could be certified \"as to form and legality.\" Each of the Presidential Authorizations included a finding to the effect that an extraordinary emergency continued to exist, and that the circumstances \"constitute an urgent and compelling governmental interest\" justifying the activities being authorized without a court order.\n\nEach Presidential Authorization also included a requirement to maintain the secrecy of the activities carried out under the program. The President also noted his intention to inform appropriate members of the Senate and the House of Representatives of the program \"as soon as I judge that it can be done consistently with national defense needs.\" As discussed in Section III.B.2. below, beginning on October 25,2001, White House officials and Hayden provided briefings on the PSP to members of Congress and their staffs.\n\nAlthough there was no legal requirement that the Authorizations be certified by the Attorney General or other Department of Justice official, current and former DOJ officials told us that this certification added value by giving the program a sense of legitimacy. Former Attorney General Gonzales stated that the NSA was being asked to do something it had not done before, and it was important to assure the NSA that the Attorney General had approved the legality of the program. He also stated that it was important that the cooperating private sector personnel know that the Attorney General had approved the program. In addition, Gonzales said that for \"purely political considerations\" the Attorney General's approval of the program would have value \"prospectively\" in the event of congressional or inspector general reviews of the program.\n\n## C. Threat Assessment Memoranda Supporting Authorization Of The Psp\n\nThe CIA initially prepared the threat assessment memoranda that were used to support the Presidential Authorization and periodic reauthorizations of the PSP. The memoranda documented intelligence assessments of the terrorist threats to the United States and to U.S.\n\ninterests abroad from al-Qa'ida and affiliated terrorist organizations. These assessments were prepared approximately every 45 days to correspond with the President's Authorizations of the PSP.\n\nThe Director of Central Intelligence's (DCI) Chief of Staff was the initial focal point for preparing the threat assessment memoranda. According to the former DCI Chief of Staff, he directed CIA terrorism analysts to prepare objective appraisals of the current terrorist threat, focusing primarily on threats to the U.S. homeland, and to document those appraisals in a memorandum. Initially, the analysts who prepared the threat assessments were not read into the PSP and did not know how the threat assessments would be used. CIA's terrorism analysts drew upon all sources of intelligence in preparing these threat assessments.\n\nAfter the terrorism analysts completed their portion of the memoranda, the DCI Chief of Staff added a paragraph at the end of the memoranda stating that the individuals and organizations involved in global terrorism (and discussed in the memoranda) possessed the capability and intention to' undertake further terrorist attacks within the United States.\n\nThe DCI Chief of Staff recalled that the paragraph was provided to him initially by a senior White House official. The paragraph included the DCI's recommendation to the President that he authorize the NSA to conduct surveillance activities under the PSP. CIA Office of General Counsel (OGC)\nattorneys reviewed the draft threat assessment memoranda to determine whether they contained sufficient threat information and a compelling case for reauthorization of the PSP. If either was lacking, an OGC attorney would request that the analysts provide additional threat information or make revisions to the draft memoranda.\n\nThe threat assessment memoranda were then signed by the DCI.\n\nGeorge Tenet signed most of the threat memoranda prepared during his tenure as DCI. On the few occasions when he was unavailable, the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, John E. McLaughlin, signed the memoranda on behalf of Tenet. McLaughlin also signed the memoranda in the capacity of Acting DCI in August and September 2004.\n\nIn November 2004, Porter J. Goss became DCI and assumed responsibility for signing the memoranda. There were no occasions when the DCI or Acting DCI withheld their signatures from the threat assessment memoranda. The memoranda were co-signed by the Secretary of Defense, reviewed by the Attorney General, and delivered to the White House to be attached to the PSP Presidential Authorizations signed by the President.\n\nResponsibility for drafting the threat assessment memoranda was transferred from the CIA to the newly established Terrorist Threat Integration Center (TIIC) in May 2003. This responsibility subsequently was retained by TIIC's successor organization, the NCTC. The DCI\ncontinued to sign the threat assessment memoranda through April 2005.\n\nThe ODNI was established in April 2005, and the NCTC became a subcomponent of the ODNI. Once Ambassador Negroponte was confirmed as the DNI, senior IC officials believed that DNI Negroponte, as the President's new senior intelligence advisor, should make the IC's recommendation to the President regarding the need to renew the PSP.\n\nThe preparation and approval of the threat assessments became the ODNI's primary role in the PSP. Beginning in April 2005, and continuing at specific intervals until the program's termination in early 2007, ODNI\npersonnel prepared and approved threat assessments in support of the periodic renewal of the PSP.\n\nThe ODNI OIG found that the ODNI threat assessments were drafted by experienced NCTC personnel who prepared the documents in a memorandum style following an established DOJ format used in earlier PSP\nrenewals. Throughout the ODNI preparation and approval process, the threat assessments were also subject to varying degrees of review and comment by DOJ and ODNI attorneys. Each threat assessment was designed to set forth the DNI's view regarding the current threat of an al-Qa'ida attack against the United States and to provide the DNI's recommendation whether to renew the PSP. NCTC personnel involved in preparing the threat assessments told the ODNI OIG that the danger of a terrorist attack described in the threat assessments was sobering and\n\"scary,\" resulting in the threat assessments becoming known by ODNI and IC personnel involved in the PSP as the \"scary memos.\" During interviews, ODNI personnel said they were aware the threat assessments were relied upon by DOJ and White House personnel as the basis for continuing the PSP, and understood that if a threat assessment identified a threat against the United States the PSP was likely to be renewed. NCTC analysts also reported that on a less frequent basis they prepared a related document that set forth a list of al-Qa'ida affiliated groups that they understood were targets of the PSP. The ODNI OIG found that the threat asses~ments and the less frequent list of al- Qa'ida-affiliated groups underwent the same ODNI approval process.\n\nThe ODNI OIG also determined that the ODNI threat assessments were prepared using evaluated intelligence information chosen from a wide variety of IC sources. ODNI personnel told the ODNI OIG that during the period when the ODNI prepared the threat assessments, the IC had access to fully evaluated intelligence that readily supported the ODNI assessments that al-Qa'ida terrorists remained a significant threat to the United States.\n\nThe ODNI OIG found that once the ODNI threat assessments were approved within NCTC and by the NCTC Director, the documents were forwarded through an established approval chain to senior ODNI personnel who independently satisfied themselves that the documents were accurate, properly prepared, and in the appropriate format.\n\nOnce the draft threat assessments were sUbjected to this systematic and multi-layered management and legal review, the documents were provided to the DNI or his Principal Deputy (PDDNI) for consideration and, if appropriate, approval. Overall, the ODNI OIG found that the ODNI process used to prepare and obtain approval of the threat assessments was straightforward, reasonable, and consistent with the preparation of other documents requiring DNI or PDDNI approval.\n\nNCTC analysts involved in preparing the threat assessments told the ODNI OIG that only a portion of the PSP information was ever used in the ODNI threat assessments because other intelligence sources were available that provided more timely or detailed information about the al-Qa'ida threat to the United States. During interviews, the NCTC analysts noted that PSP\ninformation was only one of several valuable sources of intelligence information available to them. The NCTC analysts also told ODNI OIG staff that during the period when the NCTC prepared the threat memoranda, the intelligence demonstrating the al-Qa'ida threat to the United States was overwhelming and readily available to the IC.\n\n## D. Department Of Justice Office Of Legal Counsel's Early Memoranda Supporting The Legality Of The Psp\n\nFrom the outset of the program, access to the PSP for non-operational personnel was tightly restricted. Former White House Counsel and Attorney General Alberto Gonzales told the DOJ OIG that it was the President's decision to keep the program a \"close hold.\" Gonzales stated that the President made the decision on all requests to \"read in\" any non-operational persons, including DOJ officials.8\nDOJ Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) Deputy Assistant Attorney General John Yoo was responsible for drafting the first series of legal memoranda supporting the program.9 Yoo was the only OLC official \"read into\" the PSP\nfrom the program's inception in October 2001 until Yoo left DOJ in May 2003.10 The only other non-FBI DOJ officials read into the program during this period were Attorney General Ashcroft and Counsel for Intelligence Policy James Baker.\n\nJay Bybee was OLC Assistant Attorney General from November 2001\nthrough March 2003, and Yoo's supervisor. Bybee told the DOJ OIG that in early July 2001, before he was confirmed, he learned that Yoo was already under consideration for one of OLC Deputy Assistant Attorney General slots.\n\nBybee said he was \"enthusiastic\" about Yoo and later agreed to Yoo's request to be assigned to the \"national security portfolio\" because Y00 had more national security experience than any of the other OLC deputies.\n\nHowever, Bybee stated he was never read into the PSP and could shed no further light on how Yoo came to draft the OLC opinions on the program.\n\nHe said that Yoo had responsibility for supervising the drafting of opinions related to other national security issues when the September 11 attacks\n8 Gonzales testified before the Senate Judiciary Committee on July 18,2006, that\n\"[a]s with all decisions that are non-operational in terms of who has access to the program, the President of the United States makes the decisions, because this is such an important program[.]\"\nare reviewed by the Office of Legal Counsel as to form and legality, as are other matters that require the President's formal approval.\n\n10 The process of being \"read into\" a compartmented program generally entails being approved for access to particularly sensitive and restricted information about a classified program, receiving a briefing about the program, and formally acknowledging the briefing, usually by signing a nondisclosure agreement describing restrictions on the handling and use of information concerning the program.\n\noccurred. l1 Bybee described Yoo as \"articulate and brilliant,\" and said he had a \"golden resume\" and was \"very well connected\" with officials in the White House. Bybee said that from these connections, in addition to Yoo's scholarship in the area of executive authority during wartime, it was not surprising that Yoo \"became the White House's guy\" on national security matters.\n\nIn September and early October 2001, Yoo prepared several preliminary opinions relating to hypothetical random domestic electronic surveillance activities, but the first OLC opinion explicitly addressing the legality of the PSP was not drafted until after the program had been formally authorized by President Bush in October 2001. Attorney General Ashcroft approved the first Presidential Authorization for the PSP as to \"form and legality\" on the same day that he was read into the program.\n\nThe first OLC opinion directly supporting the legality of the PSP was dated November 2, 2001, and was drafted by Yoo. As discussed in Section IV of this report, deficiencies in Yoo's memorandum identified by his successors in the Office of Legal Counsel and the Office of the Deputy Attorney General later became critical to DOJ's decision to reassess the legality of the program in 2003.\n\nYoo's November 2,2001 memorandum focused almost exclusively on the activity that the President later publicly confirmed as the Terrorist Surveillance Program. Y00 acknowledged that FISA \"purports to be the exclusive statutory means for conducting electronic surveillance for foreign intelligence,\" but opined that \"[s]uch a reading of FISA would be an unconstitutional infringement on the President's Article II authorities.\" Yoo characterized FISA as merely providing a \"safe harbor for electronic surveillance,\" adding that it \"cannot restrict the President's ability to engage in warrantless searches that protect the national security.\" According to Yoo, the ultimate test of whether the government may engage in warrantless electronic surveillance activities is whether such conduct is consistent with the Fourth Amendment, not whether it meets the standards of FISA. Yoo wrote that \"unless Congress made a clear statement in FISA that it sought to restrict presidential authority to conduct warrantless searches in the Other Means,\" Yoo wrote that \"[a]s a deputy to the assistant attorney general in charge of the office, I was a Bush Administration appointee who shared its general constitutional philosophy.... I had been hired specifically to supervise OLC's work on [foreign affairs and national security].\" \"War by Other Means,\" by John Yoo, at 19-20.\n\nnational security area - which it has not - then the statute must be construed to avoid such a reading.\"12\nYoo's analysis of this point would later raise serious concerns for other officials in OLC and the Office of the Deputy Attorney General (ODAG)\nin late 2003 and early 2004. Among other concerns, Y00 did not address the section of FISA that creates an explicit exemption from the requirement to obtain a judicial warrant for 15 days following a congressional declaration of war. See 50 U.S.C.  1811. Yoo's successors in OLC criticized this omission in Yoo's memorandum because they believed that by including this provision in FISA Congress arguably had demonstrated an explicit intention to restrict the government's authority to conduct electronic surveillance during wartime.\n\nYoo's memorandum also analyzed Fourth Amendment issues raised by the Presidential Authorizations. Yoo dismissed Fourth Amendment concerns regarding the PSP to the extent that the Authorizations applied to non-U.S. persons outside the United States. Regarding those aspects of the program that involved interception of the international communications of U.S. persons in the United States, Yoo asserted that Fourth Amendment jurisprudence allowed for searches of persons crossing the border and that interceptions of communications into or out of the United States fell within the \"border crossing exception.\" Yoo further opined that electronic surveillance in \"direct support of military operations\" did not trigger constitutional rights against illegal searches and seizures, in part because the Fourth Amendment is primarily aimed at curbing law enforcement abuses.\n\nYoo also wrote that the activity described in the Presidential Authorizations was \"reasonable\" under the Fourth Amendment and therefore did not require a warrant. In support of this position, Yoo cited asserted that Congress had not included a clear statement in FISA that it sought to restrict presidential authority to conduct warrantless surveillance activities in the national security area and that the FISA statute therefore does not apply to the President's exercise of his Commander-in-Chief authority. In Bradbury's unclassified January 15,2009, memorandum (included among those released in March 2009), Bradbury stated that this proposition \"is problematic and questionable, given FISA's express references to the President's authority\" and is \"not supported by convincing reasoning.\"\nSupreme Court opinions upholding warrantless searches in a variety of contexts, such as drug testing of employees and sobriety checkpoints to detect drunk drivers, and in other circumstances \"when special needs, beyond the normal need for law enforcement, make the warrant and probable-cause requirement impracticable.\" Veronia School Dist. 47J v.\n\nActon, 515 u.S. 464, 652 (1995)(as quoted in November 2,2001\nMemorandum at 19). Yoo wrote that in these situations the government's interest was found to have outweighed the individual's privacy interest, and that in this regard \"no governmental interest is more compelling than the security of the Nation.\" Haig v. *Agee,* 435 U.S. 280, 307 (1981). According to Yoo, the activity authorized by the Presidential Authorizations advanced this governmental security interest.\n\nYoo's legal memoranda omitted any discussion of Youngstown Sheet &\nTube Co. v. *Sawyer,* 343 U.S. 579 (1952), a leading case on the distribution of government powers between the Executive and Legislative Branches.\n\nJustice Jackson's analysis of President Truman's Article II\nCommander-in-Chief authority during wartime in the *Youngstown* case was an important factor in OLC's subsequent reevaluation of Yoo's opinions on the legality of the PSP.\n\nY00 also discussed in his memoranda the legal rationale for Other Intelligence Activities authorized as part of the PSP. To the extent that particular statutes might appear to preclude these activities, Yoo concluded that \"we do not believe that Congress may restrict the President's inherent constitutional powers, which allow him to gather intelligence necessary to defend the nation from direct attack.\"\nHowever, as detailed in Chapter Three of the DOJ OIG report, Yoo's discussion of some of the Other Intelligence Activities did not accurately describe the scope of these activities. Yoo's factual discussion of these activities was later identified by his successors in the Office of Legal Counsel and ODAG in late 2003 as insufficient and presenting a serious impediment to recertification of the program as to form and legality.\n\nThe President continued to reauthorize the PSP periodically during late 2001 and 2002, with some modifications of the scope of the intelligence activities being authorized. In October 2002, at Attorney General Ashcroft's request, Yoo drafted another opinion concerning the PSP. This memorandum, dated October 11, 2002, reiterated the same basic analysis contained in Yoo's November 2, 2001, memorandum in support of the legality of the PSP.\n\nAs the only OLC official read into the PSP through early 2003, Yoo consulted directly with White House officials about the PSP during this period. Because the DOJ OIG was unable to interview Yoo, it could not determine the exact nature and extent of these consultations. The DOJ OIG\nwas also unable to determine whether Attorney General Ashcroft was fully aware of the advice Y00 was providing directly to the White House about the PSP.\n\nFormer Attorney General Gonzales and former OLC Assistant Attorney\nGeneral Bybee both told the DOJ OIG that they did not know how Yoo became responsible for analyzing the legality of the PSP. Bybee told us that he was \"surprised\" and \"a little disappointed\" to learn through media accounts that Yoo had worked on the PSP without Bybee's knowledge.\n\nBybee said that it would not be unusual for a Deputy Assistant Attorney General such as Yoo to have direct contact with the White House for the purpose of rendering legal advice, but that the OLC Assistant Attorney General must be aware of all opinions that issue from OLC. Other senior DOJ officials also criticized the assignment of a single OLC attorney to draft the legal rationale for the program. These officials noted that OLC\ntraditionally adheres to a rigorous peer review process for all legal memoranda it issues. They also cited the importance of having the OLC\nAssistant Attorney General, a Senate-confirmed official accountable for the work of that office, be aware of all OLC legal memoranda.\n\nGonzales told the DOJ OIG that the Yoo opinions represented the legal opinion of DOJ, and that it was Ashcroft's decision as to how to satisfy his obligations as Attorney General. Gonzales told the DOJ OIG that Ashcroft complained to the White House that it was \"inconvenient\" not to have the Deputy Attorney General or Ashcroft's Chief of Staff read into the PSP, but Gonzales also stated that he never got the sense from Ashcroft that this affected the quality of the legal advice about the program that DOJ\nprovided to the White House. As noted, Ashcroft declined the DOJ OIG's request for an interview. The DOJ OIG therefore was unable to determine from Ashcroft whether he sought additional DOJ read-ins to assist in the legal analysis of the program, how hard he may have pressed for these additional read-ins, or whether he believed he was receiving adequate legal advice about the program from Yoo alone during this early phase of the PSP.\n\n## Iii. Implementation Of The President's Surveillance Program A. Nsa Intelligence Activities Under The Psp\n\nAccording to the NSA OIG report, the first Presidential Authorization was the product of discussions between former NSA Director Hayden and White House officials. Hayden also consulted with NSA senior technical experts and experienced attorneys from the NSA's Office of General Counsel.\n\nWhile he consulted with NSA personnel in identifying critical intelligence gaps, only Hayden knew about and participated in the development of the Presidential Authorization by serving as a technical advisor. After the Authorization was signed, NSA attorneys supported the lawfulness of the resulting program. Hayden stated that DOJ did not participate in his early meetings about the NSA's collection activities. As noted, the Attorney General was read into the program on the same day he signed the first Authorization as to form and legality.\n\nWhen the NSA received the first Presidential Authorization, Hayden noted that he was assured by the signature of the Attorney General that the program was iawful and had been reviewed by the White House and DOJ.\n\nAfter Hayden received the first Authorization, he assembled 80 to 90\npeople in a conference room and explained what the President had authorized. Hayden said: \"We're going to do exactly what he said and not one photon or electron more.\" The NSA's purpose in implementing the PSP\nwas to collect foreign intelligence. According to Hayden, the activities were targeted and focused with the purpose of \"hot pursuit\" of communications entering or leaving the United States involving individuals believed to be associated with al-Qa'ida, not to intercept conversations between people in the United States. The intercepted communications had to be reasonably believed to be al-Qa'ida communications, one end of which was in the United States.\n\nAccording to the NSA OIG, the PSP had standards for targeting al-Qa'ida. There were several layers of review, starting with an NSA\nmanagement review, and the NSA OIG conducted a review of target folders to ensure compliance with program standards and additional management controls.13 A sample of target folders was tested to determine whether targeting decisions were adequately supported. Any ambiguities were discussed with analysts and adequately resolved.\n\nThe NSA OIG reported that the NSA's conduct of the PSP was reviewed and monitored by the NSA Office of General Counsel and the NSA\nOIG. According to the NSA OIG, NSA employees involved in the program received tailored training and their work was overseen to ensure that all activities were consistent with the letter and intent of the Authorization and with the protection of civil liberties. The NSA OIG report concluded that it found no evidence of intentional misuse of the PSP.\n\ncompliant with applicable laws and regulations.\n\nHayden stated that although he understood that the PSP activities were more aggressive than those available traditionally under FISA, he believed that the PSP was less intrusive because the period of time in which collection was conducted was, in most cases, far less than was authorized in a typical FISC order. Additionally, the sole purpose of the overall PSP was to detect and prevent terrorism against the United States. According to Hayden, the program was designed to provide the NSA with the operational agility to cover terrorism-related targets.\n\n## B. Access To The Psp 1. Executive Branch Personnel\n\nKnowledge of the PSP was strictly controlled and limited at the express direction of the White House. Further information about the number of Executive Branch employees who were read into the program is provided in the classified report.\n\nAs discussed below and in more detail in the DOJ OIG report, the DOJ OIG found that overly restrictive limitations on the number of DOJ\npersonnel read into the program created several problems. Among other things, these limitations prevented DOJ from adequately reviewing the PSP's legality during the earliest phase of the program's operation. The subsequent identification of what DOJ officials perceived to be serious factual and legal flaws in Yoo's early legal analysis ofthe PSP also precipitated a major dispute between DOJ and the White House over reauthorization of the program that nearly led to the resignations of several senior DOJ and FBI officials in March 2004. In addition, the ODNI OIG\nfound that the opportunity for ODNI oversight components to participate in oversight of the PSP was limited by ODNI oversight personnel not being granted timely access to the PSP.\n\n## 2. Congressional Briefings\n\nOn October 25,2001, White House officials and Hayden conducted a briefing on the PSP for the Chairman and Ranking Member of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, Nancy P. Pelosi and Porter J.\n\nGoss; and the Chairman and Vice Chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, D. Robert Graham and Richard J. Shelby. According to the NSA, between October 25,2001, and January 17,2007, Hayden and current NSA Director Keith Alexander, sometimes supported by other NSA\npersonnel, conducted approximately 49 briefings to members of Congress and their staff, 17 of which took place before the December 2005 media reports regarding what was called the \"Terrorist Surveillance Program.\"\nHayden told us that during the many PSP briefings to members of Congress no one ever suggested that NSA should stop the program.\n\n## 3. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court Briefings\n\nFrom January 2002 to January 2006, only FISC Presiding Judge Royce Lamberth, followed by Presiding Judge Colleen Kollar-Kotelly, were read into the PSP. The classified report and the full DOJ OIG report describe the circumstances under which the Presiding Judge was notified of the existence of the PSP and read into the program, and the measures subsequently taken to address the effect of the PSP on the government's relationship with the FISC.\n\n## 4. Fbi Participation In The Psp\n\nThe DOJ OIG report also describes the FBI's participation in the PSP, particularly as a recipient of intelligence collected under the program. The DOJ OIG addresses the challenges the FBI faced in disseminating this information to FBI field offices for investigation without revealing the source of the information, as well as the efforts the FBI made to improve cooperation with the NSA to enhance the usefulness of PSP-derived information to FBI agents. Further details about these topics are classified and therefore cannot be discussed here. The DOJ OIG generally found that the FBI implemented reasonable procedures for expeditiously disseminating PSP-derived information to FBI field offices for investigation while protecting the sources and methods by which the information was obtained. However, the DOJ OIG also found that the highly compartmented nature of the PSP\ncreated obstacles for the FBI's process for handling program-derived information and understandably frustrated FBI agents responsible for investigating the information.\n\n## 5. Cia Participation In The Psp\n\nThe CIA OIG report describes the CIA's participation in the PSP. CIA\nofficials, as PSP consumers, requested information from the program and utilized this information in their analyses. The CIA OIG found that CIA\nofficials appeared to have had an adequate understanding of the justification needed to request PSP-derived information, and that CIA\nrequests were adequately justified.\n\nSenior CIA officials, including former Directors of Central Intelligence\n(DCI) Hayden and Goss, and former Acting Director McLaughlin, stated that the PSP addressed a gap in intelligence collection. Following the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, there was concern that additional acts of terrorism would be perpetrated by terrorist cells already inside the United States. Senior IC officials believed that providing IC analysts access to increased signals intelligence could lead to the discovery of terrorists in the U.S. and planned terrorist attacks. However, collection of such communications required authorization under FISA, and there was widespread belief among senior IC and CIA officials that the process for obtaining FISA authorization was too cumbersome and time consuming to address the current threat. CIA officials stated that FISA required extensive paperwork and high-level reviews and approvals by the DCI and the Attorney General and the FISC did not always approve FISA applications in a timely manner. Hayden and other senior IC officials also told the CIA OIG\nthat, at the time that the PSP operated, Congress had not updated FISA\nsince its 1978 enactment to reflect changes in communication technologies.\n\n## 6. Odni Participation In The Psp\n\nPSP-derived information was closely held within the ODNI and was made available to a limited number of NCTC analysts for review or, if appropriate, use in preparing NCTC analytical products. Generally, the NCTC analysts approved for PSP access received PSP-derived information in the form of NSA intelligence products. NCTC analysts told the ODNI OIG that they generally obtained access to the PSP-derived information from a secure IC database or directly from an NSA representative. NCTC analysts told the ODNI OIG that the PSP-derived information was subject to stringent security protections. The NCTC analysts said that they received training regarding the proper handling of IC signals intelligence, and they reported that they handled all such information, including PSP-derived information, consistent with standard rules and procedures.\n\n## C. Impact Of Psp-Derived Information On The Fisa Process\n\nChapters Three and Six of the DOJ OIG report describe how DOJ and the FISC addressed the impact PSP-derived information had on the FISA\nprocess. The DOJ OIG concluded that it was foreseeable that such information might impact the process and that the initial delay in reading anyone from DOJ's Office of Intelligence Policy and Review (OIPR) or the FISC into the PSP unnecessarily jeopardized DOJ's relationship with the Court. In addition, overly restrictive limitations on the number of OIPR\nattorneys and FISC judges who were read into the program created significant and avoidable problems of workload imbalance in the functioning both of OIPR and the FISC. The DOJ OIG concluded that once the PSP began to affect the functioning of the FISA process, the number of OIPR staff and FISC judges read into the PSP to manage the program's impact should have increased.\n\n## D. Discovery Issues\n\nThe DOJ OIG reviewed DOJ's handling of PSP information with respect to its discovery obligations in international terrorism prosecutions.\n\nDOJ was aware as early as 2002 that information collected under the PSP\ncould have implications for DOJ's litigation responsibilities under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure Rule 16 and Brady v. *MC1'rylahci,37:3* 0:8.83\n(1963).\n\nAnalysis of this discovery issue was first assigned f() oib DeputY\nAssistant Attorney General Yoo in 2003: However, no DOJ attorneys with terrorism prosecution responsibilities were read into the PSP until mid-2004, and as a result DOJ continued to lack the advice of attorneys who were best equipped to identify and examine the discovery issues in connection with the PSP.\n\nSince then, DOJ has taken steps to address discovery issues with respect to the PSP, which is discussed in the DOJ OIG classified report.\n\nBased upon its review of DOJ's handling of these issues, the DOJ OIG\nrecommends that DOJ assess its discovery obligations regarding PSP-derived information, if any, in international terrorism prosecutions.\n\nThe DOJ OIG also recommends that DOJ carefully consider whether it must re-examine past cases to see whether potentially discoverable but undisclosed Rule 16 or *Brady* material was collected under the PSP, and take appropriate steps to ensure that it has complied with its discovery obligations in such cases. In addition, the DOJ OIG recommends that DOJ\nimplement a procedure to identify PSP-derived information, if any, that may be associated with international terrorism cases currently pending or likely to be brought in the future and evaluate whether such information should be disclosed in light of the government's discovery obligations under Rule 16\nand Brady.\n\n## Iv. Legal Reassessment Of The President's Surveillance Program\n\nChapter Four of the DOJ OIG's report describes the period in late\n2003 and early 2004 when DOJ determined that aspects of the PSP were not supported by law and advised the President that the program should be modified.\n\n## A. Justice Department Attorneys Become Concerned About The Legality Of Some Activities Under The Psp\n\nAs noted above, John Yoo was the sole OLC attorney who advised Attorney General Ashcroft and White House officials on the PSP from the program's inception in October 2001 through Yoo's resignation from DOJ in May 2003. Upon Yoo's departure, another DOJ official, Patrick Philbin, was selected by the White House to be read into the PSP to assume Yoo's role as advisor to the Attorney General concerning the program. In addition, Jack Goldsmith replaced Jay Bybee as the Assistant Attorney General for OLC on October 6,2003. Even though Bybee had never been read into the PSP, Philbin persuaded Counsel to the Vice President David Addington to read in Goldsmith, Bybee's replacement.\n\nAfter being read into the PSP, Goldsmith and Philbin became concerned about the factual and legal basis for Yoo's legal memoranda supporting the program. For example, FISA prohibits persons from intentionally engaging in electronic surveillance \"under color of law except as authorized by statute[.]\" 50 U.S.C.  1809(a). Yoo's analysis concluded that this provision did not implicate the legality of the PSP because FISA did not expressly apply to wartime operations. However, Yoo's memoranda omitted any reference to the FISA provision allowing the interception of electronic communications without a warrant for a period of 15 days following a congressional declaration of war. See 50 U.S.C.  181l.\n\nGoldsmith and Philbin were concerned that this provision contradicted Yoo's assertion that Congress did not intend FISA to apply to wartime operations.\n\nThey also were troubled by other aspects ofYoo's legal analysis and by the lack of an adequate factual description in his memoranda of how the PSP\noperated.\n\n## B. Olc Begins Developing A New Legal Analysis For The Psp\n\nGoldsmith and Philbin began developing an analysis to more fully address the FISA statute with respect to the PSP. This new analysis relied on the legal argument that the Congressional Authorization for Use of Military Force Joint Resolution (AUMF), enacted shortly after the attacks of September 11,2001, effectively exempted some of the activities under the PSP from FISA. However, Goldsmith and Philbin became concerned that this revised analysis would not be sufficient to support the legality of certain aspects of the Other Intelligence Activities that the President had authorized under the PSP.\n\nBeginning in August 2003, Philbin and later Goldsmith brought their concerns about the OLC legal opinions to Attorney General Ashcroft. With Ashcroft's approval, Philbin began preparing a new OLC memorandum assessing the legality of the PSP. During this period in late 2003, Goldsmith and Philbin advised Ashcroft to continue to certify as to form and legality the Presidential Authorizations for the PSP pending completion of the new legal analysis.\n\n## C. Doj Officials Convey Concerns To The White House\n\nIn December 2003, Goldsmith and Philbin met with Counsel to the Vice President Addington and White House Counsel Gonzales at the White House to express their growing concerns about the legal underpinnings of the program. Goldsmith said he told them that OLC was not sure the program could survive in its current form. According to Goldsmith's contemporaneous notes of these events, these discussions did not contemplate an interruption of the program, although the White House officials represented that they would \"agree to pull the plug\" if the problems with the program were found to be sufficiently serious.\n\nIn late January 2004, at Goldsmith's request, the White House agreed to allow Deputy Attorney General James Comey to be read into the PSP\nfollowing Comey's confirmation as the Deputy Attorney General in December\n2003. After being briefed, Comey agreed that the concerns about Yoo's legal analysis were well-founded. 14 Comey told the DOJ OIG that of particular concern to him and Goldsmith was the notion that Yoo's legal analysis entailed ignoring an act of Congress, and doing so without full congressional notification.\n\n## D. Conflict Between Doj And The White House\n\nComey told the DOJ OIG that he met with Attorney General Ashcroft on March 4, 2004, to discuss the PSP and that Ashcroft agreed with Comey and the other DOJ officials' assessment of the potential legal problems with the PSP. Later that day, Ashcroft was struck with severe gallstone pancreatitis and was admitted to the George Washington University Hospital in Washington, D.C.IS\nOn March 5, 2004, Goldsmith advised Comey by memorandum that under the circumstances of Ashcroft's medical condition and hospitalization, a \"clear basis\" existed for Comey to determine that \"this is a case of 'absence or disability' of the Attorney General\" within the meaning of\n28 U.S.C.  508(a). The \"cc\" line of Goldsmith's memorandum to Comey indicated that a copy of the memorandum was also sent to White House Counsel Gonzales.\n\nLater on March 5, Gonzales called Goldsmith to request a letter from OLC stating that Yoo's prior OLC opinions \"covered the program,\" meaning the PSP. Philbin told the DOJ OIG that Gonzales was not requesting a new opinion that the program itself was legal, but only that the prior opinions had concluded that it was. As a result of Gonzales's request, Goldsmith, Philbin, and Comey re-examined Yoo's memoranda with a view toward determining whether they adequately described the actual intelligence activities of the NSA under the Authorizations. Goldsmith, Philbin, and\n14 Corney also discussed DOJ's concerns about the legality of the program with FBI\nDirector Mueller on March 1,2004. Mueller told the DOJ OIG that this was the first time he had been made aware of DOJ's concerns.\n\n15 Ashcroft's doctors did not clear Ashcroft to resume his duties as Attorney General until March 31, 2004.\n\nCorney concluded that Yoo's memoranda did not accurately describe some of the Other Intelligence Activities that were being conducted under the Presidential Authorizations implementing the PSP, and that the memoranda therefore did not provide a basis for finding that these activities were legal.\n\n~\nOn Saturday, March 6, Goldsmith and Philbin, with Corney's concurrence, met with Addington and Gonzales at the White House to convey their conclusions that certain activities in the PSP should cease.\n\nAccording to Goldsmith's notes, Addington and Gonzales \"reacted calmly and said they would get back with us.\"\nOn Sunday, March 7,2004, Goldsmith and Philbin met again with Addington and Gonzales at the White House. According to Goldsmith, the White House officials informed Goldsmith and Philbin that they disagreed with their interpretation of Yoo's memoranda and on the need to change any of the NSA's intelligence activities under the PSP.\n\nOn March 9 Gonzales called Goldsmith to the White House in an effort to persuade him that his criticisms of Yoo's memoranda were incorrect and that Yoo's analysis provided sufficient legal support for the program.\n\nAfter Goldsmith disagreed, Gonzales next argued for a \"30-day bridge\" to get past the expiration of the current Presidential Authorization on March 11,\n2004. Gonzales reasoned that Ashcroft, who was still hospitalized, was not in any condition to sign a renewal of the Authorization, and that a \"30-day bridge\" would move the situation to a point where Ashcroft would be well enough to approve the program. Goldsmith told Gonzales he could not agree to recommend an extension because aspects of the program lacked legal support.\n\nAt noon that day, another meeting was held in the White House office of Andrew Card, the President's Chief of Staff. According to Director Mueller's notes, Mueller, Card, Vice President Cheney, CIA Deputy Director McLaughlin, Hayden, Gonzales, and other unspecified officials were present.\n\nCorney, Goldsmith, and Philbin were not invited to this meeting. After a presentation on the value of the PSP by NSA and CIA officials, it was then explained to the group that Corney \"has problems\" with some activities authorized under the program. Mueller's notes state that Vice President Cheney suggested that \"the President may have to reauthorize without [the]\nblessing of DOJ,\" to which Mueller responded, \"I could have a problem with that,\" and that the FBI would \"have to review legality of continued participation in the program.\"\nAnother meeting at the White House was held on March 9, this time with Corney, Goldsmith, and Philbin present. Gonzales told the DOJ OIG\nthat the meeting was held to make sure that Corney understood what was at stake with the PSP and to demonstrate the program's value. Corney said Vice President Cheney stressed that the PSP was \"critically important\" and warned that Corney would risk \"thousands\" of lives if Corney did not agree to recertify the program. Corney said he stated at the meeting that he, as Acting Attorney General, could not support reauthorizing certain intelligence activities unless they were modified. According to Corney, the White House officials said they could not agree to that modification.\n\nGoldsmith, Philbin, and Corney met in the early afternoon of March 10, 2004, to discuss the meeting at the White House the day before and how DOJ should proceed. Goldsmith and Philbin confirmed their position to Corney that some of the Other Intelligence Activities under the PSP could not be legally supported and would have to be changed or shut down.\n\nGonzales told the DOJ OIG that after President Bush was advised of the results of the March 9, 2004, meeting, the President instructed Vice President Cheney on the morning of Wednesday, March 10, to call a meeting with congressional leaders to advise them of the impasse with DOJ. On the afternoon of March 10, at approximately 4:00 or 5:00 p.m., Gonzales and other White House and intelligence agency officials, including Vice President Cheney, Card, Hayden, McLaughlin, and Tenet, convened an \"emergency meeting\" with congressional leaders in the White House Situation Room.\n\nThe congressional leaders in attendance were Senate Majority and Minority Leaders William H. \"Bill\" Frist and Thomas A. Daschle; Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Chairman Pat Roberts and Vice Chairman Jay Rockefeller; Speaker of the House Dennis Hastert and House Minority Leader Nancy Pelosi; and House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence Chair Porter Goss and Ranking Member Jane Harman. This congressional group was known informally as the \"Gang of Eight.\" No officials from DOJ were asked to attend the meeting.\n\nAccording to Gonzales's notes of the meeting, individual congressional leaders expressed thoughts and concerns related to the program. However, Gonzales told the DOJ OIG that the consensus of the congressional leaders was that the program should continue. 16\n\"Gang of Eight\" briefing as he did in his handwritten notes of the briefing, stating, \"The consensus in the room from the congressional leadership is that we should continue the activities, at least for now.\" However, after Gonzales testified Representative Pelosi, Senator Rockefeller, and Senator Daschle issued statements sharply disputing Gonzales's characterization of their statements at the March 10, 2004, meeting, stating that there was no consensus at the meeting that the program should proceed. Pelosi's office also issued a statement that she \"made clear my disagreement with what the White House was asking\"\nconcerning the program. The DOJ OIG did not attempt to interview the congressional\n(Cont'd.)\nGonzales told the DOJ OIG that following the meeting with the congressional leaders on March 10, President Bush instructed him and Card to go to the George Washington University Hospital to speak to Ashcroft, who was in the intensive care unit recovering from surgery.\n\nAccording to notes from Ashcroft's FBI security detail, at 6:20 p.m.\n\nthat evening Card called the hospital and spoke with an agent in Ashcroft's security detail, advising him that President Bush would be calling shortly to speak with Ashcroft. Ashcroft's wife told the agent that Ashcroft would not accept the call. Ten minutes later, the agent called Ashcroft's Chief of Staff David Ayres at DOJ to request that Ayres speak with Card about the President's intention to call Ashcroft. The agent conveyed to Ayres Mrs.\n\nAshcroft's desire that no calls be made to Ashcroft for another day or two.\n\nHowever, at 6:45 p.m., Card and the President called the hospital and, according to the agent's notes, \"insisted on speaking [with Attorney General Ashcroft].\" According to the agent's notes, Mrs. Ashcroft took the call from Card and the President and was informed that Gonzales and Card were coming to the hospital to see Ashcroft regarding a matter involving national security.\n\nAt approximately 7:00 p.m., after learning that Gonzales and Card were on their way to the hospital, Ayres relayed this information to Corney.\n\nAccording to Corney's May 2007 testimony before the Senate Judiciary Committee, Corney called his Chief of Staff and directed him to \"get as many of my people as possible to the hospital immediately.\" Corney next called FBI Director Mueller and told him that Gonzales and Card were on their way to the hospital to see Ashcroft, and that Ashcroft was in no condition to receive guests, much less make a decision about whether to recertify the PSP. According to Mueller's notes, Corney asked Mueller to come to the hospital to \"witness [the] condition of AG.\" Mueller told Corney he would go to the hospital right away.\n\nPhilbin said he was leaving work that evening when he received a call from Corney, who told Philbin that he needed to get to the hospital right away because Gonzales and Card were on their way there \"to get Ashcroft to sign something.\" Corney also directed Philbin to call Goldsmith and tell him what was happening.\n\nCorney arrived at the hospital between 7: 10 and 7:30 p.m. In his congressional testimony, Corney said he ran up the stairs with his security detail to Ashcroft's floor, and he entered Ashcroft's room, which he described as darkened, and found Ashcroft lying in bed and his wife leaders and obtain their recollections as to what was said at this meeting because this was beyond the scope of its review.\n\nstanding by his side. Corney said he began speaking to Ashcroft, and that it was not clear that Ashcroft could focus and that he \"seemed pretty bad off[.]\"\nGoldsmith and Philbin arrived at the hospital within a few minutes of each other. Corney, Goldsmith, and Philbin met briefly in an FBI \"command post\" that had been set up in a room adjacent to Ashcroft's room. Moments later, the command post was notified that Card and Gonzales had arrived at the hospital and were on their way upstairs to see Ashcroft. Corney, Goldsmith, and Philbin entered Ashcroft's room and, according to Goldsmith's notes, Corney and the others advised Ashcroft \"not to sign anything.\"\nGonzales and Card entered Ashcroft's hospital room at 7:35 p.m., according to the FBI agent's notes. The two stood across from Mrs. Ashcroft at the head of the bed, with Corney, Goldsmith, and Philbin behind them.\n\nGonzales told the DOJ OIG that he carried with him in a manila envelope the March 11, 2004, Presidential Authorization for Ashcroft to sign.\n\nAccording to Philbin, Gonzales first asked Ashcroft how he was feeling and Ashcroft replied, \"Not well.\" Gonzales then said words to the effect, \"You know, there's a reauthorization that has to be renewed ....\" Gonzales told us that he may also have told Ashcroft that White House officials had met with congressional leaders \"to pursue a legislative fix.\"\nCorney testified to the Senate Judiciary Committee that at this point Ashcroft told Gonzales and Card \"in very strong terms\" about his legal concerns with the PSP, which Corney testified Ashcroft drew from his meeting with Corney about the program a week earlier. Corney testified that Ashcroft next stated:\n\"But that doesn't matter, because I'm not the Attorney General.\n\nThere is the Attorney General,\" and he pointed to me - I was just to his left. The two men [Gonzales and Card] did not acknowledge me; they turned and walked from the room.\n\nRecords kept by the Attorney General's security detail indicate that Gonzales and Card left Ashcroft's room at 7:40 p.m. Moments after Gonzales and Card departed, Mueller arrived at the hospital. At approximately 8:00 p.m., Mueller went into Ashcroft's room for 5 to 10\nminutes. Mueller wrote in his notes: \"AG in chair; is feeble, barely articulate, clearly stressed.\"\nBefore leaving the hospital, Corney received a call from White House Chief of Staff Card. Corney testified that Card was very upset and demanded that Corney come to the White House immediately. Corney told Card that he would meet with him, but not without a witness, and that he intended that witness to be DOJ Solicitor General Ted Olson. Corney and Olson subsequently went to the White House at about 11:00 p.m. that evening and met with Gonzales and Card. Gonzales told the DOJ OIG that little more was achieved at this meeting other than a general acknowledgement that a \"situation\" continued to exist because of the disagreement between DOJ and the White House regarding legal authorization for the program.\n\n## E. White House Counsel Certifies Presidential Authorization Without Department Of Justice Concurrence\n\nOn the morning of March 11,2004, with the Presidential Authorization set to expire, President Bush signed a new Authorization for the PSP. In a departure from the past practice of having the Attorney General certify the Authorization as to form and legality, the March 11\nAuthorization was certified by White House Counsel Gonzales. The March 11 Authorization also differed markedly from prior Authorizations in three other respects. It explicitly asserted that the President's exercise of his Article II Commander-in-Chief authority displaced any contrary provisions of law, including FISA. It clarified the description of certain Other Intelligence Activities being conducted under the PSP to address questions regarding whether such activities had actually been authorized explicitly in prior Authorizations. It also stated that in approving the prior Presidential Authorizations as to form and legality, the Attorney General previously had authorized the same activities now being approved under the March 11 Authorization. I7\nWhite House Chief of Staff Card informed Corney by telephone on the morning of March 11,2004, that the President had signed the new Authorization that morning. At approximately noon, ,Gonzales called Goldsmith to inform him that the President, in issuing the Authorization, had made an interpretation of law concerning his authorities and that DOJ\nshould not act in contradiction of the President's determinations.\n\nAlso at noon on March 11, Director Mueller met with Card at the White House. According to Mueller's notes, Card told Mueller that if no\n\"legislative fix\" could be found by May 6, 2004, when the March 11\nAuthorization was set to expire, the program would be discontinued.\n\nActivities were not accurately described in the prior Authorizations that he realized that he had been certifying the Authorizations prior to March 2004 based on a misimpression of those activities.\n\nMueller wrote that he told Card that the failure to have DOJ representation at the congressional briefing and the attempt to have Ashcroft certify the Authorization without going through Corney \"gave the strong perception that the [White House] was trying to do an end run around the Acting [Attorney General] whom they knew to have serious concerns as to the legality of portions of the program.\" Card responded that he and Gonzales were unaware at the time of the hospital visit that Corney was the Acting Attorney General, and that they had only been following the directions of the President.\n\n## F. Department Of Justice And Fbi Officials Consider Resigning\n\nSeveral senior DOJ and FBI officials considered resigning after the Presidential Authorization was signed without DOJ's concurrence. Corney told the DOJ OIG that he drafted a letter of resignation because he believed it was impossible for him to remain with DOJ if the President would do something DOJ said was not legally supportable. Corney also testified that Ashcroft's Chief of Staff David Ayres believed Ashcroft also was likely to resign and thus Ayres urged Corney to wait until Ashcroft was well enough to resign with him.Is Goldsmith told the DOJ OIG he drafted a resignation letter at around the same time as Corney. According to his contemporaneous notes, Goldsmith cited the \"shoddiness\" of the prior OLC legal review, the\n\"over-secrecy\" of the PSP, and the \"shameful\" incident at the hospital as among his grievances.\n\nAt approximately 1:30 a.m. on March 12, 2004, FBI Director Mueller drafted by hand a letter stating, in part: \"[A]fter reviewing the plain language of the FISA statute, and the order issued yesterday by the President ... and in the absence of further clarification of the legality of the program from the Attorney General, I am forced to withdraw the FBI from participation in the program. Further, should the President order the continuation of the FBI's participation in the program, and in the absence of further legal advice from the AG, I would be constrained to resign as Director of the FBI.\" Mueller told the DOJ OIG that he planned on having the letter typed and then tendering it, but that based on subsequent events his resignation was not necessary.\n\nLevin, James Baker, David Ayres, and Deputy Chief of Staff to the Attorney General David Israelite, were also prepared to resign. Corney wrote that he believed that \"a large portion\"\nof his staff also would have resigned if he had.\n\nOn the morning of March 12,2004, Corney and Mueller attended the regular daily threat briefing with the President in the Oval Office. Corney said that following the briefing President Bush called him into the President's private study for an \"unscheduled meeting.\" Corney told the President of DOJ's legal concerns regarding the PSP. According to Corney, the President's response indicated that he had not been fully informed of these concerns. Corney told the President that the President's staff had been advised of these issues \"for weeks.\" According to Corney, the President said that he just needed until May 6 (the date of the next Authorization), and that if he could not get Congress to fix FISA by then he would shut down the program. The President emphasized the importance of the program and that it \"saves lives.\"\nThe President next met with Mueller. According to Mueller's notes, Mueller told the President of his concerns regarding the FBI's continued participation in the program without an opinion from the Attorney General as to its legality, and that he was considering resigning if the FBI were directed to continue to participate without the concurrence of the Attorney General. Mueller wrote that he explained to the President that he had an\n\"independent obligation to the FBI and to DOJ to assure the legality of actions we undertook, and that a presidential order alone could not do that.\" According to Mueller's notes, the President then directed Mueller to.\n\nmeet with Corney and other PSP principals to address the legal concerns so that the FBI could continue participating in the program \"as appropriate under the law.\"\nOn the morning of March 12,2004, Corney decided not to direct the FBI to cease cooperating with the NSA in conjunction with the program.\n\nCorney's decision is documented in a one-page memorandum from Goldsmith to Corney in which Goldsmith explained that the President, as Commander in Chief and Chief Executive with the constitutional duty to\n\"take care that the laws are faithfully executed,\" made a determination that the PSP, as practiced, was lawful. Goldsmith concluded that this determination was binding on the entire Executive Branch, including Corney in his exercise of the powers of the Attorney General.\n\nOn March 12,2004 an interagency working group led by OLC was convened to continue reanalyzing the legality of the PSP. In the days that followed, Goldsmith continued to express doubt that a viable legal rationale could be found for some of the Other Intelligence Activities being conducted under the PSP.\n\nOn March 16,2004 Corney drafted a memorandum to White House Counsel Gonzales setting out his advice to the President. According to the memorandum, Corney advised that DOJ remained unable to find a legal basis to support certain Other Intelligence Activities that had been authorized as part of the program and that such activities should be discontinued immediately. Comey cautioned that he believed some ongoing activities under the program raised \"serious issues\" about congressional notification, \"particularly where the legal basis for the program is the President's decision to assert his authority to override an otherwise applicable Act of Congress.\"\nGonzales replied by letter on the evening of March 16. The letter stated, in part:\nYour memorandum appears to have been based on a misunderstanding of the President's expectations regarding the conduct of the Department of Justice. While the President was, and remains, interested in any thoughts the Department of Justice may have on alternative ways to achieve effectively the goals of the activities authorized by the Presidential Authorization of March 11,2004, the President has addressed definitively for the Executive Branch in the Presidential Authorization the interpretation of the law.\n\n## G. White House Agrees To Modify The Psp\n\nNotwithstanding Gonzales's letter, on March 17, 2004 the President decided to modify certain PSP intelligence-gathering activities and to discontinue certain Other Intelligence Activities that DOJ believed were legally unsupported. The President's directive was expressed in two modifications to the March 11, 2004 Presidential Authorization.\n\nOn May 6,2004 Goldsmith and Philbin completed an OLC legal memorandum assessing the legality of the PSP as it was operating at that time. The lOB-page memorandum traced the history of the program and analyzed the legality of all of the intelligence activities conducted under the program in light of applicable statutes, Executive Orders, cases, and constitutional provisions. Much of the legal reasoning in the May 6, 2004\nOLC memorandum was publicly released by DOJ in a \"White Paper\" issued after one aspect of the program was revealed in The New York Times and publicly confirmed by the President in December 2005 as the Terrorist Surveillance Program. The OLC memorandum stated that the Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF) passed by Congress shortly after the attacks of September 11, 2001 gave the President authority to use both domestically and abroad \"all necessary and appropriate force,\" including signals intelligence capabilities, to prevent future acts of international terrorism against the United States. According to the memorandum, the AUMF was properly read as an express authorization to conduct targeted electronic surveillance against al-Qa'ida and its affiliates, the entities responsible for attacking the United States, thereby supporting the President's directives to conduct these activities under the PSP.\n\n## H. Department Of Justice Oig Conclusions\n\nThe DOJ OIG concluded that it was extraordinary and inappropriate that a single DOJ attorney, John Yoo, was relied upon to conduct the initial legal assessment of the PSP, and that the lack of oversight and review of Yoo's work, as customarily is the practice of OLC, contributed to a legal analysis of the PSP that at a minimum was factually flawed. Deficiencies in the legal memoranda became apparent once additional DOJ attorneys were read into the program in 2003 and when those attorneys sought a greater understanding of the PSP's operation. The DOJ OIG concluded that the White House's strict controls over DOJ access to the PSP undermined DOJ's ability to perform its critical legal function during the PSP's early phase of operation.\n\nThe DOJ OIG also concluded that the circumstances plainly called for additional DOJ resources to be applied to the legal review of the program and that it was the Attorney General's responsibility to be aware of this need and to take steps to address it. Ashcroft's request during this period that his chief of staff David Ayres and Deputy Attorney General Larry Thompson be read into the program was not approved. However, the DOJ OIG could not determine whether Attorney General Ashcroft aggressively sought additional read-ins to assist with DOJ's legal review of the program during this period because Ashcroft did not agree to be interviewed.\n\n## V. Transition Of Certain Program Activities To Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court Orders\n\nCertain activities that were originally authorized as part of the PSP\nhave subsequently been authorized under orders issued by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC). The activities transitioned in this manner included the interception of certain international communications that the President publicly described as the \"Terrorist Surveillance Program.\"\nAs a result of this transition, the President decided not to reauthorize these activities and the final Presidential Authorization expired on February\n1, 2007. The White House stated that work on the transition of authority over a two-year period addressed Administration concerns about preserving the speed and agility that the Terrorist Surveillance Program provided.\n\nThe transition of certain PSP-authorized activities to FISC orders is described in detail in Section 5 of the classified report and Chapter Five of the DOJ OIG Report. Further details regarding this transition are classified and therefore cannot be addressed in this unclassified report.\n\nIn August 2007, the Protect America Act was enacted, amending FISA\nto address the government's ability to conduct electronic surveillance in the United States of persons reasonably believed to be located outside the United States. This legislation expired in early 2008, and in July 2008 the FISA Amendments Act of 2008 was enacted. This latter law authorized the government to intercept inside the United States any communications of non-U.S. persons reasonably believed to be located outside the United States, provided a significant purpose of the acquisition pertains to foreign intelligence. This legislation gave the government even broader authority to intercept international communications than did the provisions of the Presidential Authorizations governing the activities that the President acknowledged in December 2005 as the Terrorist Surveillance Program.\n\nThe DOJ OIG review concluded that several considerations favored initiating the process of transitioning the PSP to FISA authority earlier than had been done, especially as the program became less a temporary response to the September 11 terrorist attacks and more a permanent surveillance tool. These considerations included the PSP's effect on privacy interests of U.S. persons, the instability of the legal reasoning on which the program rested for several years, and the substantial restrictions placed on FBI\nagents' access to and use of program-derived information due to the highly classified status of the PSP.\n\n## Vi. Impact Of The President's Surveillance Program On Intelligence Community Counterterrorism Efforts A. Nsa's Assessment Of The Psp\n\nThe NSA OIG reported that Hayden, referring to portions of the PSP in\n2005, said there had probably been no communications more important to NSA efforts to defend the nation than those involving al-Qa'ida. NSA\ncollected communications when one end was inside the United States and one end was associated with al-Qa'ida or terrorist groups associated with al Qa'ida in order to detect and prevent attacks inside the United States.\n\nHayden stated that \"the program in this regard has been successful.\" During the May 2006 Senate hearing on his nomination to be CIA Director, Hayden said that, had the PSP been in place before the September 2001\nattacks, hijackers Khalid Almihdhar and Nawaf Alhazmi almost certainly would have been identified and located.\n\nIn May 2009, Hayden told NSA OIG that the value of the Program was in knowing that NSA signals intelligence activities under the PSP covered an important \"quadrant\" of terrorist communications. NSA's Deputy Director echoed Hayden's comment when he said that the value of the PSP was in the confidence it provided that someone was looking at the seam between the foreign and domestic intelligence domains.\n\n## B. Doj Oig's Assessment Of The Psp\n\nIn 2004 and 2006, the FBI's Office of General Counsel (OGC)\nattempted to assess the value of PSP information on FBI counterterrorism efforts. Neither of these efforts represented a comprehensive assessment of the PSP's value. The FBI conducted a more comprehensive survey of the impact of PSP-derived information, also in 2006. The results of these surveys are summarized in the DOJ OIG Report. Based in part on the results of one study, FBI management, including Director Mueller and Deputy Director John Pistole, concluded that the PSP was \"of value.\"\nThe DOJ OIG sought as part of its review to assess the role of PSP-derived information and its value to the FBI's overall counterterrorism efforts. Director Mueller told the DOJ OIG that he believes the PSP was useful. Mueller said that the FBI must follow every lead it receives in order to prevent future terrorist attacks and that to the extent such information can be gathered and used legally it must be exploited. Mueller also stated that he \"would not dismiss the potency of a program based on the percentage of hits.\"\nThe DOJ OIG interviewed FBI officials, agents, and analysts responsible for handling PSP information about their experiences with the program. These assessments, more fully described in Chapter Six of the DOJ OIG's report, generally were supportive of the program as \"one tool of many\" in the FBI's anti-terrorism efforts that \"could help move cases forward.\" Even though most PSP leads were determined not to have any connection to terrorism, many of the FBI witnesses believed the mere possibility of the leads producing useful information made investigating the leads worthwhile.\n\nHowever, the DOJ OIG also found that the exceptionally compartmented nature of the program created some frustration for FBI\npersonnel. Some agents and analysts criticized the PSP-derived information they received for providing insufficient details, and the agents who managed counterterrorism programs at the FBI field offices the DOJ OIG visited said the FBI's process for disseminating PSP-derived information failed to adequately prioritize the information for investigation.\n\nThe DOJ OIG also examined several cases that have frequently been cited as examples of the PSP's contribution to the IC's counterterrorism efforts. These assessments, more fully described in Chapter Six of the DOJ\nOIG's report, generally were supportive of the program as \"one tool of many\"\nin the FBI's anti-terrorism efforts.\n\nIn sum, the DOJ OIG found it difficult to assess or quantify the overall effectiveness of the PSP program as it relates to the FBI's counterterrorism activities. However, based on the interviews conducted and documents reviewed, the DOJ OIG concluded that although PSP-derived information had value in some counterterrorism investigations, it generally played a limited role in the FBI's overall counterterrorism efforts.\n\nThe reasons for this conclusion are classified and are described in the classified report and Chapter Six of the DOJ OIG report.\n\nAs noted above, certain activities that were originally authorized as part of the PSP have subsequently been authorized under orders issued by the FISC. The DOJ OIG believes that DOJ and other IC agencies should continue to assess the value of information derived from such activities to the government's counterterrorism efforts.\n\n## C. Cia Oig's Assessment Of The Psp\n\nThe CIA OIG reviewed the impact of the PSP on the CIA's counterterrorism efforts.\n\nThe CIA OIG reported that senior administration officials considered the PSP to be a valuable counterterrorism tool. In his December 2005 press conference, President Bush also said that there was an on-going debate in Washington, D.C. that criticized his, and previous, administrations for not\n\"connecting the dots\" prior to the attacks of September 11, 2001. He went on to say that the USA PATRIOT Act and the NSA program (the PSP) are helping to connect the dots as best as his administration possibly can.\n\nDuring a December 2005 press briefing, Hayden said that information had been obtained through this program that would not otherwise have been available. Senior CIA officials also told the CIA OIG that they had received PSP reporting with information that was previously unavailable. One senior official told the CIA OIG that the program eliminated some of the impediments that the CIA had encountered in accessing and analyzing communications between foreign and domestic locations. Another said that the PSP was a key resource, and without it there would have been a missing piece of the picture.\n\nThe CIA OIG determined that the CIA did not implement procedures to assess the usefulness of the product of the PSP and did not routinely document whether particular PSP reporting had contributed to successful counterterrorism operations. CIA officials, including Hayden, told the CIA\nOIG that PSP reporting was used in conjunction with reporting from other intelligence sources; consequently, it is difficult to attribute the success of particular counterterrorism case exclusively to the PSP. In a May 2006\nbriefing to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, a senior CIA official said that PSP reporting was rarely the sole basis for an intelligence success, but that it frequently played a supporting role. He went on to state that the program was an additional resource to enhance the CIA's understanding of terrorist networks and to help identify potential threats to the U.S.\n\nhomeland. Other officials told the CIA OIG that the PSP was one of many tools available to them, and that the tools were often used in combination.\n\nNSA disseminated PSP-derived information in its normal reporting channels when it could be done without revealing the source of the information. As such, CIA officers, even those read into the program, would have been unaware of the full extent of PSP reporting. In the course of this review, the CIA OIG learned of numerous PSP reports that provided leads.\n\nHowever, because there is no means to comprehensively track how PSP\ninformation was incorporated into CIA analysis, officials were able to provide only limited information on how program reporting contributed to successful operations, and the CIA OIG was unable to independently draw any conclusion on the overall effectiveness of the program to the CIA.\n\nThe CIA OIG determined that several factors hindered the CIA in making full use of the product of the PSP. Many CIA officials stated that too few CIA personnel at the working level were read into the PSP. At the program's inception, a disproportionate number' of the CIA personnel who were read into the PSP were senior CIA managers. According to one CIA\nmanager, the tight control over access to the PSP prevented some officers who could have made effective use of the program reporting from being read in. Another official stated that the disparity between the number of senior CIA managers read into PSP and the number of working-level CIA personnel resulted in too few CIA personnel to fully utilize PSP information for targeting and analysis.\n\nOfficials also told the CIA OIG that working-level CIA analysts and targeting officers who were read into the PSP had too many competing priorities, and too many other information sources and analytic tools available to them, to fully utilize PSP reporting. Officials also stated that much of the PSP reporting was vague or without context, which led analysts and targeting officers to rely more heavily on other information sources and analytic tools, which were more easily accessed and timely than the PSP.\n\nCIA officers also told the CIA OIG that the PSP would have been more fully utilized if analysts and targeting officers had obtained a better understanding of the program's capabilities. There was no formal training on the use of the PSP beyond the initial read-in to the program. Many CIA\nofficers stated that the instruction provided in the read-in briefing was not sufficient and that they were surprised and frustrated by the lack of additional guidance. Some officers told the CIA OIG that there was insufficient legal guidance on the use of PSP-derived information.\n\nThe CIA OIG concluded that the factors that hindered the CIA in making full use of the PSP might have been mitigated if the CIA had designated an individual at an appropriate level of managerial authority who possessed knowledge of both the PSP and CIA counterterrorism activities to be responsible and accountable for overseeing CIA involvement in the program.\n\n## D. Odni's Assessment Of The Psp\n\nHayden told the PSP IG Group that during his tenure as Director of the NSA, he sought to disseminate PSP information within the IC while also protecting the PSP as the source of the information. Hayden said this policy likely resulted in IC analysts not having a full appreciation of the PSP's value because they likely did not realize that some NSA reporting was derived from the PSP. NCTC analysts confirmed that they often did not know if the NSA intelligence available to them was derived from the PSP.\n\nThe NCTC analysts said they understood that NSA marked PSP information in a manner that protected the source of the information.\n\nOn those occasions when the NCTC analysts knew that a particular NSA intelligence product was derived from the PSP, the analysts said they reviewed the PSP information in the same manner as other NSA intelligence products and, if appropriate, incorporated the PSP information into analytical products being prepared for the DNI and other senior intelligence officials. NCTC analysts with access to PSP information told the ODNI OIG\nthat they had broad access to a wide variety of high-quality and fully evaluated terrorism related intelligence, including some of the most sensitive and valuable terrorism intelligence available to the IC. In this context, NCTC analysts characterized the PSP information as being a useful tool, but noted that the information was only one of several valuable sources of information available to them. During ODNI OIG interviews, some NCTC\nanalysts and ODNI personnel described the PSP information as \"one tool in the tool box\" or used equivalent descriptions to explain their view that the PSP information was not of greater value than other sources of intelligence.\n\nThe NCTC analysts noted that the NSA policy protecting the source of the PSP information would have resulted in them not fully understanding the value of the PSP information.\n\nHayden said the PSP information allowed IC leaders to make valuable judgments regarding the allocation of national security resources. Hayden described the PSP as an \"early warning system\" for terrorist threats.\n\nHayden told the ODNI OIG that the PSP was extremely valuable in protecting the United States from an al-Qa'ida terrorist attack. He cited several examples of where he said the PSP information was used to disrupt al-Qa'ida operatives or assist in terrorism investigations.\n\n## E. Intelligence Community Activities Supported By The Psp\n\nMost IC officials interviewed by the PSP IG Group had difficulty citing specific instances where PSP reporting had directly contributed to counterterrorism successes. Although it was difficult for a variety of reasons already discussed to independently identify instances where PSP reporting contributed to successful counterterrorism efforts, there are several cases identified by IC officials and in IC documentation where PSP\nreporting may have contributed to a counterterrorism success. These cases cannot be discussed in this unclassified report, but are described in the classified report and accompanying individual OIG reports.\n\n## Vii.  Public Statements About The President's Surveillance Program\n\nAs noted above, aspects of the PSP were first disclosed publicly in a series of articles in The New York Times in December 2005. Subsequently, Attorney General Gonzales was questioned about NSA surveillance activities in two public hearings before the Senate Judiciary Committee in February 2006 and July 2007. As part of its review, the DOJ OIG examined whether Attorney General Gonzales made false, inaccurate, or misleading statements to Congress related to the PSP in those hearings.\n\nThrough media accounts and former Deputy Attorney General Corney's Senate Judiciary Committee testimony in May 2007, it was publicly revealed that DOJ and the White House had a major disagreement related to the PSP in March 2004. As discussed in Section IV of this unclassified report, this dispute - which resulted in the visit to Attorney General Ashcroft's hospital room by Gonzales and Card and brought several senior DOJ and FBI officials to the brink of resignation - concerned certain of the Other Intelligence Activities that were different from the communication interception activities that the President later publicly acknowledged as the Terrorist Surveillance Program, but that had been implemented through the same Presidential Authorizations.\n\nIn testimony before the Senate Judiciary Committee, Gonzales stated that the dispute at issue between DOJ and the White House did not relate to the Terrorist Surveillance Program that the President had confirmed, but rather pertained to other intelligence activities. The DOJ OIG concluded that this testimony created the misimpression that the dispute concerned activities entirely unrelated to the Terrorist Surveillance Program, which was not accurate. As previously noted, both activities had been authorized by the President in a single Presidential Authorization.\n\nIn addition, the DOJ OIG concluded that Gonzales's testimony that DOJ attorneys did not have \"reservations\" or \"concerns\" about the program the \"President has confirmed\" (the Terrorist Surveillance Program) was incomplete and confusing. As detailed in Chapter Four of the DOJ OIG\nreport, there also was a dispute about this portion of the program.\n\nAlthough this dispute was not the subject of the hospital room confrontation or the threatened resignations, DOJ's concerns over this issue were communicated to the White House in several meetings over a period of months prior to and including March 2004 before the issue was resolved.\n\nThe DOJ OIG recognized that Attorney General Gonzales was in the difficult position of testifying before the Senate Judiciary Committee about a highly classified program in an open forum. However, the DOJ OIG\nconcluded that Gonzales, as a participant in the March 2004 dispute between the White House and DOJ and, more importantly, as the nation's chief law enforcement officer, had a duty to balance his obligation not to disclose classified information with the need not to be misleading in his testimony about the events that nearly led to resignations of several senior officials at DOJ and the FBI. The DOJ OIG concluded that Gonzales did not intend to mislead Congress, but it found that his testimony was confusing, inaccurate, and had the effect of misleading those who were not knowledgeable about the program.\n\n## Viii. Conclusion\n\nPursuant to the FISA Amendments Act of 2008, the Inspectors General of the DOJ, DoD, ODNI, NSA, and CIA conducted reviews of the PSP. In this report, the classified report, and the accompanying individual reports of the participating IGs, we describe how, following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the President directed that the NSA's signals intelligence collection capabilities be used to detect and prevent acts of terrorism within the United States.\n\nPursuant to this authority the NSA conducted new intelligence activities, including the collection of the content of communications into and out of the United States, where one party to the communication was reasonably believed to be a member of al-Qa'ida or its affiliates. The NSA\nanalyzed this information for dissemination as leads to the IC, principally to the CIA and the FBI. As described in the IG reports, the scope of this collection authority changed over the course of the PSP.\n\nThe IG reports describe the role of each of the participating agencies in the PSP, including the NSA's management and oversight of the collection and analysis process, the CIA's and FBI's use of the PSP-derived intelligence in their counterterrorism efforts, the ODNI's involvement in the program by providing periodic threat assessments and using the program intelligence to produce analytical products, and DOJ's role in analyzing and certifying the legality of the PSP. With the exception of the NSA, the DoD had limited involvement in the PSP.\n\nThe IG reports also describe the conflicting views surrounding the legality of aspects of the PSP during 2004, the confrontation between officials from DOJ and the White House about the legal basis for parts of the program, as well as the resolution of that conflict. The ensuing transition of the PSP from presidential authority to statutory authority under FISA is also described in the IG reports.\n\nThe IGs also examined the impact of PSP information on counterterrorism efforts. Many senior IC officials believe that the PSP filled a gap in intelligence collection thought to exist under the FISA statute shortly after the al-Qa'ida terrorist attacks against the United States.\n\nOthers within the IC, including FBI agents, CIA analysts and officers, and other officials had difficulty evaluating the precise contribution of the PSP to counterterrorism efforts because it was most often viewed as one source among many available analytic and intelligence-gathering tools in these efforts. The IG reports describe several examples of how PSP-derived information factored into specific investigations and operations.\n\nFinally, the collection activities pursued under the PSP, and under FISA following the PSP's transition to that authority, involved unprecedented collection activities. We believe the retention and use by IC\norganizations of information collected under the PSP and FISA should be carefully monitored.\n\n## Unclassified\n\nPREPARED BY THE\nOFFICES OF INSPECTORS Gj':NERAL\nOF THE\nDEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE\nDEPARTMENT OFJUSTICE\nCENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AG:ENl NATIONAL SECURITY\nOFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF\n(U) UNCLASSIFIED\nPRESIDENT'S \"'TT1.V\"'TI\nREPORT No."
    },
    {
        "text": "## %Ecrer ;I R Y P Tog Rap H I K\n\nL e h y l)\n1.1\nC\n11\nd e r G e h e i m s c h rei b e k u n s t\n(Chiffrir- nun nechiffrirkur1st)\nin'\nS~/:~ 'a t s-\nL1 n '1\nP r i vat g esc b 2\n~ teD.\n\n'Von\n\n## .I~>.::J 0.H.. Ludw. Kliib Ar.\n\n:Mi t **'Vi** fT Tab ell F:Xl un1 S E;C hs Kupf erta! cln.\n\n'];:i b .;\nn g t: n -\nIr:; o.er\n~T .G.\n\nCott~lsc::.r::n 3uchhandlun.g\n1 8 () 9 .\n\n~ Aus:' Klii-aer, Kryptographik. Tiibingen 1809.\n\nU be r a i c h t\n.\n\nErster Teil .\n\nChi f f r i e r K u n st.\n\nErates Buch.\n\nAllgemeine Theorie -\n\n 1.Begriff und Arten der Kryptographik:. 2. Ihre Verwandtschat't\nmit der Brachygraphik, Stenographik, Tacbygraphik, Okygraphik.\n3. Mit der Pasigraphik, Hieroglyphik und Telegraphik, auch\nFingersprache un~ Schiffsignalkunde. 4. Chiffrier- und Dechiffrierkunst. 5. Schltissel. 6. Nutzen und Frequenz der Geheimsclrrift\n7.8. MiJ3brauch. 9. gfordernisse einer guten Geheimschrift.\n10. l)Einfachheit. 11. 2)Geringe Mtihe. 12.13.3)Zuverli;issigkeit.\n14.15.16. 4)Sicherheit des Geheimnisses. 17.18. post-undo Briefgeheimni13. 19. Geheime Expedition des Premierministers, Grafen\nvon BrUhl. 20. Angestellte und Angehorige dieser Expedition.\n21. Operationen. 22. Und endliches Sohicksal derselben. 23. Talion Friedrichs II. 24. Anerkennung der Unver1etz1ichkeit der\nBriefe. 25. Vervvahrungsm\"itte1 gegen BrieferbrectmDg, I) ohne\n\"Ver1etzung nes Papiers uni des Siegels. 26. 2) Mit Ver1etzung\ndes Pap~ers der Briefdecke. 27. 6)Mit Vernichtung des Couverts.\n28. 4)Mit Ver1etzung des Ob1atensiege1s. 29. 5) Mit Ver1etzung\ndes Lacksiege1s.\nZlIeites Buch.\n\nS P\n~ z i\n~ lIe The 0 r i e -\nOster Abschnitt.\n\n,\"\nZifferschrift oder Zahlenchiffre.\n\n30. Begriff. 31. Chiffriertabe11en. 32 Verschiedene Aeten derselben. 33. Einrichtung der Ohiffiertabel1en.34. Gedruckte Tabe1-\nlen. 35. Speziel1e Rege1n. 36. Nomenc1ator. 37. Blinde Zah1en\n(non-va1eurs). 38. K1arschrift(en c1\"air). 39. Zeichen (les 'i'lidersinnS. 40. Changir-Zeichen. 41. Annu1lier-Zeichen. 42. Abwechslung\n43.\n\nin der Sprache ./Abktirzung d er franzo sischen Sprache. 44. Ebraisc h e Manier. 45. Beispiel einer Chiffriertabelle. 46.~nd einer TIechiffriertabelle. 47. Praktisches Beispiel. 48. Andere, einfache Art der Ziffernschrift. 49. Dritte Methode. 50. Vierte Methode.\n\n51. FUnfte Methode.\n\n## Zw Ei T Er Abscllni Tt . Buchstabenschrift.\n\n1.Cap. Einleitung.\n52.53. Verscbiedenhei t der Methoden in der Bu.chsta-benscnrift uberbaupt.\n\n2.Cap. Wortchiffre.\n54. Methode. Tabelle. 55. Blinde WKrter. 56. Vermisch~ng mit Ziffer.tJ. u.lHl Kalrschrift. 57. Mehrheit der echten u.nd u.nechten W~rter. 58. Mehrheit der Ohiffrier- und Uechiffriertabellen.\n\n59. Probe ciner Chiffriertabe11e. 60. Dechiffriertabelle. 61 -\n. Beispiel einer chiffrierten 1)epesche. 62. Dechiffrieru.ng. 63.\nGedru.cktes W~rterbuch oder aegister, stati der Ohiffrier- u.ni\nUechiffriertabel1en.64. Gebrau.oh ies W~rterbu.chs 01el' Registers.\n65. Beispiel nach dieser Methode. 66. Deklinierte und conju.-\ngiert e Vi~rt er. 67. Sch1uB. 68. Trt t heir::1s MethoEie. 69. Heirle1s\nMethode. 70. Fortsetzu.ng. Tri theims geheiJ!1e r'~ethode. 71. An(1.ere\nvon Tri theim bekannt genBchte r1ethod_e.\n3.Kap. Kartenchiffre.\n72. 7.ubereitu.ng des Kartenspie1s. 73. Beschreibung des aandes,\n\nund Dechiffrieru.ng der Geheimschrift. 74. Eine andere 1'[ethodeT\n4.Kap. Lacedamonische Geheimschrift. 75. Verfahrungsart.\n5.Kap. Vermehrungschiffre.\n76. Erste Methode. 77. Beispiel. 78. Zweite, iritte und vierte Methode. 79. und 80. Tritheims erste und zweite Methode. 81.\n\nMehrere andere Methoden. 82.83.und 84. Bacos Methode.\n\n6.Kap. Reversionschiffre.\n85. Verfahrungsweise. 86. Beispiel.\n\n7. Kap.\n\n7.Kap. Siloenchiffre.\n87. Methlbde.\n\n8.Kap. Einfacher Buchstabenchiffre.\n88.89. Methode der einfachen Versetzung der Buchstaben. 90. Bessere Methode. 91. Dritte un~ vierte Methode. 92.96.94. und 95.\n\nFtinfte bis achte Methode.\n\n9.Kap. Multiplikationschiffre.\n96. GroBes Ansehen dieses Chiffre. 97. Beurteilu.ng. 98. Dnd, Alter desselben. 99. Benennung. 100. Beschaffenlleit der Chiffrier- und TIechiffriertafel. 101. Gebrauchmethode. Wahlwort.\n\n102.103. Operation d.es Chlffrierens, 104. Und Dechiffrierens.\n\n105. Contrahierte Chiffriertabelle. 106. Spazialtabe11e. 107.\n\nbis 111. Nebenvorteile. 112. Verwandte Chif:t'rierarten.\n\n10.Kap. Quadratlinienchiffre.\n113. Verfahr~lgsart. 114. Beispiel.\n\n11.Kap. Winkelchiffre.\n115. Verfahrungsweise. 116. B~ispiel.\n\n12.Kap. Transposition- oder Versetzungschiffre.\n117. Grundlage dieser Methode. 118. 119. Schltissel. 120. -122.\n\nChiffrieroperation. 126~ Dechiffrieroperation. 124.125. GroSe Sicherheit dieser Methode. Zah1 der Versetzungsarten. 126.127.\n\nAndere lTersetzungsmethoden.\n\n13Ksp. Netz- oder Gitterschrift.\n128. Begriff und Wert der Gitterschrift. 129. Verfahrungsweise im Allgemeinen. 130. Brsts Methode. 131. Zweite l1ethode. 132.\n\nBeispiel. 133. Regeln Zllr Verfertigung der Gitter. 13'4. his 13~;.\n\nAnzah1 der Gitter. (2n)'2 Zellen. 140.141. Anzahl der Gitter\n(2n -!- I)? Zellen. 142. bis 144. Verschiedene Arten, den Inhalt einer Schrift duroh einerlei Hetz auf geheime Weise auszudrticken\n14Kap. Verssc,hrift.\n\n145 bis 147. Methode.\n\nDritter\n\n## Dritter Abschnitt. Zeichenschrift.\n\n1.Kap~ Einleitung. Insbesondere Hand- Qder Fingerschrift und Geberdensprache.\n149. Begriff~ 149. Stenographie, Pas1graphie, Ze1ohenspraohe, Telegraphie, Sch1ffs1ghalkQnde, kryptograph1sehe Katoptr1k.\n\n150. Insbesondere Hand- odeT F1ngersehrift und Ge'oerdenspraohe.\n\n151 bis 154. Ftint Proben derselben.\n\n2. Kap. l?uilktierehiffre. 155. Gesehiehte. Erste Methode. Kirellers\nabaous numeralis. 156. Htilfsmittel. 157. Chiffrieroperation.\n158~ Deehiffrieroperation. 159. SehluS. 160. Zweite Methode.\n161~ Dritte Methode. 164. Seehsts Methode. (Fadenohiffre.)\n3. Kap. Lini enehiffre.\nm1,i\n165.166. nrei Arten des Linienohiffre. 167. Ahnlichkeit/der\nStenographie.\n4. Kap.Winkel- und Quadratehiffre.\n168~ Sehlussel. 169. Verfahrungsweise.\n5. Kap~ Notensehr1ft oder Musikehiffre und Cirkularsche1benscl1rift.\n170. Meehanisene Vorrichtung. 171.Verfahrungsweise bei dern\nChiffrieren. 172. Deehiffrieren. 173. VorsiehtsrnaEregeln.\n174. 175. Gebraueh der Buehstaben statt der Musiknoten oder\nZirkularseheibensehrift. 176. And ere Art g eheimer Not enschrif\":.;.\n\n## Vierter Absehnitt. Figuren- Und Farberiehiffre.\n\n1. Kap. Einlei tung.\n187. Begr1ff.Nutzen.\n2. Kap. Rieroglyphensehrift.\n178 bis 180. Agyptisehe Hierog1yphensehrift. 181. Blumenehiffre der Morgenlander.\n\n3. Quadrat- und Liniensehrift.\n182 - .Besehreibung 1i es er I;~et.tlOde .183. Vorteile uno. Vorsic.htsma.sregeln.\n\n4.Rap.\n\n4.Kap. Zirkel- und gerade Linienschrift.\n184 . Beschrei.bung dieser Methode.\n\n5.Kap.Zirkel- und krumme 1inienschrift.\n185 . Beschreibung dieser Methode.\n6.Kap. Geheime Polizeischrift.\n186. Geheime Polizeischrift. Allf Sicherhei ts- una. 'lhpfeh1ungskart en. 187. Insbesondere des Grafen von Vergennes. Geschichte.\n\n188. Erste Methode. Allgemeine Tabe11e. 189 bis 194. Spezialtabellen. Ers te bis sechst e.\n\n195. 196. Zwei Beispi el e nach obie en Tabel1en. 197 bis 199. Zweite Methode. Chiffriertabel1en. 200.\n\nQrdnung der Zeichen und Zahlen. 201. bis 203. Drei Beispiele.\n\n## Ftinfter Abschnitt.\n\nAbbreviatursc.hrift oder Brachigraphie, Pasigraphie, Ste-\n\n## Nographie, Okygraphie.\n\n20~. Begriff. 205. Pasigraphie und Stenographie. 206.207.208.\n\nOkygraphie. 209~ Brachygraphie in dem emgeren Sinn. 210. Allgemeine Rege1n. 211. Besondere Hoegeln. Uberhaupt. 212. I)Auslassung der Vokale und Doppellauter. 213.II) Abktirzung einsilbiger, zwei- und mehrsilbiger Worter, welche oft vorkommen. 214.\n\nIII) AbkU.rzullg der Vor-\nLIDd Endsllllben. 215. IV) Ahdere A'bbreviaturen.\n\n## Sechster Abschnitt.\n\nVermischte Ge.b.eimschrift.\n\n1.Kap. Einlei tung.\n216. Begriff. Verschiedenheit der Methoden.\n\n2.Kap. Buchschrift.\n217. SChltissel. 218. Wahl des Bl1chs. 219. Brste Methode. 220.\nBeispiel. 221.222. Zweite Methode. Schltisse1. 223. Chiffrieroperation. 225. 1inpfehlung hser Methode. 226. Beispiel eines\nSchlussels. 227. Geheimschrift nach diesem Schlusse1. 228. Dritte Methode. 229. Beispiel.\n3. Kap.\n\n3.Kap. Astronomischer Chiffre.\n230. Einfacher Astro.llomischer Chiffre. 231. Vermischter astronom1scher Chiffre.\n\n4.Kap. Mnemonischer Chiffre.\n232. Dobels Methode. 233. Mundliche mnemonische \"Depesche.\n\n5.Kap. Verschiedene andere Arten der vermischten Geheimschrift.\n234. Zwei Art en der vermischt en Geheimschrift aus dem nel1.llten\nJahrhunclert. 235.\nS:teben andere Arten der vermischxten Geheimschrift. 266. Noch drei Arten.\n6. Kap. Geheime Schreib- und Copiermaschine D.nd li thographische\nCopierm.ethode.\n237. Hllbins geheime Maschinensc brift. 238. Ungers Mllsikmaschine.\n\n239. 240. Copiermaschinen. 241. Manier, ohne l\\~aschine zu kopiereno 242. Lithographische Kopiernethode. 243. 1\\.bnliche Erfindung en.\n\n## Siebenter Abschnitt. Unsichtbare Ocl.Er Sogenannte Sympathetisohe Geheimsclj.Rift.\n\n1.Kap. Einleitung.\n244. Begriff. 245.246. Erfordernis und allgemeine Vorsicht.\n\n2.Kap. Geheimschrift, welche durch aufgestreutes Pulver sichtbar\nwird.\n247. Verfahrungsweise.\n\n3 .. Kap. Geheimschrift, welohe durch Johab en oder Rei ben 1 eS bar wj.rd,\n248. Verfahrungsweise.\n4.Kap. Geheimschrift, welohe siohtbar wird, wenn man s~e der freien Luft aussctzt.\n249. 1)rei Methoden.\n\n5.Kap. lIeheimschrift, welche hervorkommt, wenn man sie erwar)::,mt\noder erhitzt.\n250bis 259. Elf verschiedene Arten geheimer Tintex.\n6.Kap. G'ehei.mschaift, welche hervorkommt, werm man sie aufellchtet.\n254. Sechs verschiedene Arten.\n7.Kap. Geheimschrift, welche lesbar wird, Wenn man.sie in eine\nFItissigkeit taucht.\n255.256. Sechs verschiedene Methoden.\n8.Kap. Tinte, welche lesbar wird, wenn 1':28.n eie T)aJl1pfen aussetzt.\n257.258. Zwei Arten dieser Tinte.\nAchter Abschnitt.\n\nGeheime Mitt eilung g eheimer Dep eschen.\n\n259 bis 263. Verechiedene Methoden.\n\n---------------\n.\"'~\nZw ei t er T eil -\nDec h iff r i e r k u n st.\n\nBinl ei tung.\n\n 264. Begriff. 265. Rechter Gebrauch und :Mi~brauch. 266.267.\nSchwierigkeiten. 268. Allgemeine uIld besondere Theorie der Entzifferungskunst.\n\n## Eaes Buch.\n\nAll g e ill e i neT h e 0 r i e.\n\n269. Wert der Regeln\n'l~-:(I BRispiele. 270. Eigenschaften eines\n1)echiffreurs. 271. Spracheigenschaften. 272. Allgemeine Vorteile und Bemerkungen. 273. Beispiel.\n\n## Zwei T Es Buch.\n\nS p e z i ell e The 0 r i e.\n\n1. *Kap.* Deutsche Sprache.\n274. Grunds aa. t z e - 275. 276. Zwei Beispiele.\n\n2. Kap~ Franzosische Sprache.\n277. Grundsatze.278. Beispiel.\n3. Kap. Englische Sprache.\n279. Regeln.\n4. Kap. Itali enisch e Sprache.\n280. Grundsatze.\n5.Kap. Spaniscbe S:prache.\n281. Grunrisatze.\n6.Kap. Holl11ndische Sprache.\n282. Rege1n.\n7.Kap. Lateinische Sprache.\n283. Rege1n.\n8. Kap. Entzifferung einiger Fig ur enchiff r e -\n284. Methode.\n9.Kap. Entdeckung geheimer ~inte.\n285. Verfahru.ngsart.\n=====~=============~=====\nLiteratur der Kryptographik.\n\nYier Tabe11,en I.md sechS Kupfertafe1n.\n\n-.-.-.-.-.-\nAus:Kltiber, Kryptographik; Ttibingen 1809.\n\nAlphabetisches Verzeichnis der Schriften von der Chiffrier- und Dechiffrierkunst.\n\nAnmerkung: die Schriften von der Brachygraphik, Stenographik, Tachygraphik, Pasigraphik, Hierog~yphik, Telegraphik und 8chiffsignalkunde, sind ~nter diesen Worten beisamrnen angezeigt.\n\nEbenso die Schriften von d.er Geschichte der Kr,ptographik.\n\nAnweisung, s.Dechiffrieren.\n\nAugast, Herzog von Braunschweig, s. Selenus.\n\nBaco, Franc. de Verulumio (st.1626), de dignitate et augmentis sCientiarum, lib. VI.cap.I.; in s. Operib. omnibus (Francof.1665.fol.)pag. 147-151.\n\n(Beguelin) Memoire sur la decouverte des 10ix d'un chiffre de feu M. Ie professeur Herrmann, propose comme absolwment ind~chiffrable par M.Beguelin; in den Memoires de l'Academie royale des sciences et des belles-lettres de Berlin, Tome XIV (Berlin *1765.4')i* page 369 -389. Mit zwei Kupfertafeln.\n\nBiclfeld, J.B. de, institutions po1itiques, Tome II.p.19l.sqq.\n\n(h la Haye 1760.4.)\nBost, s. Trithemius.\n\nBr8chygraphie. F.A.H12chs Literatur der Diplomatik, .B1.lCh II.\n\n/S.4.\n(.Erl.1792.8.), 3.268 ff.- Nouveau traite de diplomatique\nT.III.p.499 - 622. - J.L.Waltheri lexicon diplomaticum.\nGoett.1747. ib. 1751. Ulm.1756. fol. - InSbesondere gehoren die Scbriften von Sigeln und tyronianischen Noten\nhierher, bei Huch a.a.B. -\nJo. Geirardi Sig1arium Roma-\n\nnum sive explicatio notarum ac litterarum etc. Lond. 1793.\ngr. 4. - D.J. de Lennep diss. de M. Tullio Tirone. Amstelode 1804.\nBraunschweig Herzog August von, s. Selenus.\nBreithaupt, Chr. , disquisitio historica, critics, curiosa de\nvariis modis occulte scribendi, tam apud veteres, quam\napud recentiores, usitatis. Helmst. 1727. 8. Steht auch in\ndessen Ars decifratoria (Helmst. 1737.) p. 1 - 80.\nEjusdem ars decifratoria, sive scientia occultas scriptures\nsolvendi et legendi. Helmst. l737.~2 und 160 S.8.\nBrieferbrechung, s. Wie sichert man u.s.w.\nCaramuel, s. Trithemius\nColorni, Abr. scotographia italica. In Fraga l593.4.obl. forma.\nConradi, naVe Arn., cryptographia denudata siv ars deciferandi,\nquae occlllte scripta sunt in Cd.uocunQ.ue linguarum genere,\npraecipue in germanica, batava, latina, anglica gallic8,\nitalica, graeca. Lugd. Batav. 1739. 73.S. in gr. 8.\nContr'espion, le, s. Dlandel.\n(Cpspi) L'interpretation des chiffl~es ou reigle (sic) pour bien\nent endre et expliquer facilement tout es sortes des ohiffr8E\nsimples, Tire de l'Italien du Sr. Ant. COS~i, Secretaire dQ Grand-Duc de Toscana. Augmente et accommode particulierem.ent a l'Qsage des 1angues fran90ise et espagnole, pa.r F.J.F.N.P.M. ~ Paris 1641. 90S. in 8.\n\n(Neoh einigen hatte der Verf. Philid~or geheiBen.\n\nAllein wahrscheinlich war es der Mrhnorit Pater Joh.\n\nFranz Niceron zu Paris, welcher 1646 starb. AQf dieser passen die Anfangsbuchstaben, Qud er solI ein EtlCh unter dem Titel: l'interpretation des chiffres, gescnrieben haben. Jochers gel. Lexie.\n\nCrellii, Lud.Chr., eliss. de scytala Laconiea. Lips. 1697.4.\n\n(Dechiffrieren) Anweisung zum Dechiffrieren, ode~ die Kunst, verborgene Schriften aufzulosen. Helmst. 1755.8.\n\nDechiffrieren, s. Buch Cospi, Kortum, Lindner, Grischow, Funk, Gravesend, WalliS, Vieta, Hiller, Conradi, Sohaup+atz , Mysterienbuch.\n\nS.5.\nDinte, s.Tinte.\n/(Dlandol) Le contr'espion 00.. les clefs de toutes les correspondances secrettes. a Paris 17~4. 66 s. in 8. In der Vorrede\nnennt der Verf. sieh D~andol.\nElements, s. Lindner.\n(Fingerspreehe) Kurze Abhandlung vonder Handspraehe, insoweit\nderen Merkmale bei den alten Schriftstellern sich auBern.\nCassel 1750. 104 S. 8. - Versuch uber die 1m frankischen\nKreise bekannte sogenannte Fingersprache,nebst einer 1110..-\nminierten Kupfertafel. Blirnberg 1796. XIV\n[,,1. 40 S. in 8.-\nVon der Wiener Fingersprache, s. l)eutsche Zeitung, 1795,\nNum. 37, und in dem angef. Yersuch usw. S. 3 ff. o..nd fJ.6?-\n40; desgl. ein ciganer, in Kupfer gestocnener halber Foliobog~n mit 26 Feldern, worin das Wiener Handalphabet der\nTaubstummen abgebildet ist.- Von der zu Zurich Ubl:ichen\nFingersprache, s. den llelvetischen Kalender von 1'180, S.lU8\nff.- C.H. Wolke's AnVleisung, wie Kinder und. Stu..\"TJIle . ., zum\nVerstehen unc1. f:ipreohen, zum Les en und Sohreiben ... Zll. bringen sind. Leipzig 1804. XIV u. 496 S. gr. 8. Porta de occultis leterarum notis, p. 43 - 49. Hanedi Steganologia, 3.4 ff\nForeilius, Henr., disd. de modis occulte scribendi et prBecipue\nde Soy tala Laconica. Holm. 1697. 8.\nFriderici, Jo. Balth., Cryptographis, oder geheime, schrift-,\n6.6.\n\n| munr'l.-              |  und            | '!lirkliche    | Correspondenz,    | welche       | lehrmaihg    |\n|-----------------------|-----------------|----------------|-------------------|--------------|--------------|\n| V'JT-                 |                 |                |                   |              |              |\n| stellet,              | eine            | hochschatzbare | Kunst,            | verborgene   | 3chriften    |\n| maehen                | und             | aufzulosen,    | in                | sich         | begreifend   |\n| verwunderungswurcliga | Ar.ten,         | wie            | man               | durch        | Versetzung   |\n| Buchstal)             | en,             | item           | durch             | all          | crhand       |\n| Punkte,               | mathematische   | un(\"l          |                   |              |              |\n| B.ndere               |                 |                |                   |              |              |\n| .B'iguren, Nah- und   | :Jtickwerk,     |                |                   |              |              |\n| Krauter-o..nc1        | B1umenbusche,   | Schildereien,  | Spielkarten,      | .FabIlsn,    |              |\n| Feller                | und             | Fackeln,       | Glocken           |              |              |\n| uno                   |                 |                |                   |              |              |\n| andere                | Stimmarten,     | selbst         |                   |              |              |\n| erdichtete            | Sprachen,       | verblttmte     | Discoures,        | Augenwinken, | un-          |\n| verdachtige           | Briefe,         | die            | etwas             | auderes      | ausdrucklich |\n| lich                  | melden;         | auch           | sonsten           | durch        | gewisse      |\n| und                   | viel            | andere         | Dinge             | mehr,        | nahe         |\n| ~ag                   |                 |                |                   |              |              |\n| und                   | in              |                |                   |              |              |\n| der                   | Nacht,/seine    | Meinung        | gewissen          | Personen     | genz         |\n| Vveise                | kann            |                |                   |              |              |\n| ZQ                    |                 |                |                   |              |              |\n| verstehen             | geben.          | Ramb.          | 1684.             | 4.           |              |\n| (Fritandus)           | Das             | (wohl          | zubereitete)      | DinteufaB    | von          |\n| 2                     | Bogen           | in             | 12.               | 1750.8.      |              |\n| Funks,                | Christl.Bened., | naturliche     | Magie.            | Berl.        | u.           |\n| gr.                   | 8.              | (Enthalt       | auch              | eine         | kurze        |\n| kctnst.)              |                 |                |                   |              |              |\n| Gabriel,              | s.              | Trithemius.    |                   |              |              |\n| Geheimscllreiberei,   | s.              | Lemang.        |                   |              |              |\n| Geheime               |                 |                |                   |              |              |\n\nGeheime Polizeisohrift, s. Polizeischrift.\n\nGeschichte der Kryptographik. Davon handeln:\nein Aufsatz in der Histoire de l'academie royale des sciences et belles-lettrel de Berlin, annee 1745, p. 105. (81n Auszug aus einer Histoi re abregee de la cryptographie, Vlelche Stubenrauch der Berliner Akademie tiberreicht hatte.) -\nChr. Breithaupt, ars decifractori~ (Helmst. 1737. 8.) *p.l* - 80. - H.W. Lawtitz, Handbuch fur BUcherfreunde u.nd Bibliothekare Th. I, Bd. 1,\n(Halle 1788.8), S. 80 ff. Erster Nachttag (1791), S.45.\n\nZweiter Nachtrag. Brste Abteilung (17~4), S.52 ff. - J.G.\n\nv. Aretins Beitrage zur Geschichte und Lmteratur, St.rY\n(Oktober 1803.8.), S. 78 f.- Mysterienbuch alter und neuer Zeit (Leipz. 1797.8.),S.61f.\n\nGlauberg, s. Trithemius.\n\n, s'Gl~avesand introductio in philosophiam (Lugd.Bat. edit. 2. 1737, cap. 35. handelt von der Dechiffrierkunst. Rin Auszag in del Encyclopedie, par Diderot et d'Alembert, v. dechiffrer;\nQuch in der Encyclopedie methodique, Economie politique et diplomatique, T.I.p.36.sqq.\n\nGrischow, Aug., introductio in philologiam generalem. Jen.1705.\n\n8. \\.IIandelt cap. 4. yon der Kunst geschwind und verborgen zu achreihen und das Verborgene zu entratseln.)\nHandalphabet oder Handspraohe, s. Fingersprache.\n\n(IIanedi)Steganologia et Steganographia nova. Geheime, magische\n\nS.7.\nnatUrliche Red- und Schreibekunst,durch Resene Gibronte\nRuncleus Hanitdi. NUrnb. (ohne JahreSZa~~;99 S. ohuE: das\nRegister und die Vorrede. 8. Verfasser . an. 8chwenter, Prof. der Mathematik zu Altorf, st. 16' 6. (s.auch Sunde.)\nHeidel, s. T~hemius.\nHerrmann, s. Beguelin.\nHieroglyphik. Verzuglioh die Agypt er, die al ten Sines en und l\\Taxikaner bedienten sich derselben. Horus s. Hurapo110 de\nhieroglyphicis Aegyptiorum libri duo .. Bonon. 1517. 4. Basil.\n1518. Aug. Vind. 1605. 4. rec. Ul traj. 1721. -\ni~thanas.\nKircheri oedipl.l.s aegyptiacllS, s. theatrum hieroglyphicllD1.\nRom. 1654. - J.G. Wachteri natllrae et scripturae conoordia\n(Lips. 1752.4.) p.l - 47.\n- Will. Warhurton the divine\nlegation of Moses, p. 66. sqq. - A.Y. Gogl.l.et de l'origine\ndes loix, des arts et des sCiences, Vol. 1. liv.2.ch.6. -\n1e comte de Cayllls recueil d'antiql.l.it~s, T.I.p.1-76. -\nNelles Lehrgeb~ude der Diplomatik, Th. II, 8. 5ff. 12ff.\n304 - 312. - J.C. Gattereri elem. artis diplomaticae universalis, Vol. I. .72. -\nEncyclopedie, v. hieroglyphes. -\nJ.W. 1awtitz Handb. Th. LBd. 1.8.63 i'f. u. Nachtrag r,p.\n42 f. - J *.E.* Fabri Handb. der histor. Hall~twissenSohaften\nund deren HUlfsdoctrinen (Brl. 1808.8.), ~.127.\nHilleriJ\nLudw.\nHein~.'.J myst~ri~ arti~ steganmrap~icae noviss~um, modum Omnes eplstolas aIlaque scrIpta incognita\ncharacteribus furtivi.s exanta, in omnibus linguls, pT2G-\nser.tiIp.'latina, gerP1anica, gallica, italic-a, expedite 801-\nven.d.i pendens. Hlmae 1682. 8.\n'\nHindenburg~, a.F., Archiv 'l.e1' reinen Lmrl angewand1;en Mathematik,\nHeft ~Ir und V. (Hanrlelt von der krypt~graphischen Netzuni G-i tt erschr:i.ft. )\nHoohheimers, C.A.l!'., 1)intenbuch, oder Anweisung alle sohwarze,\nbLJ.nte un(l sJ7111.p8thetisohes T)inten zu verfertigen. ZVI(:11\";e\nverbesserte ~\"llfl. Leipz. 1804. 117 S. in 8.\nHottinga, DOr.lj_n. de, rcl:T[;raphie, Oll methode universelle ole 1'2-\nori ture caohe e at oabbalistiqlle. Groning.\n(o~ler vj. l'lebr\nEmden) 1602. 4. AVeo figllres.\n\n,.,\nHubin, ... 0_eOOuverte interessant e i bureau ohirographiQue.\n3.8.\n\n1788. (Gotting. gel. Anzbisen, 1788. St. 84. )\n/Kiroheri, Atanas., axtifioium oryptographioUID, seu abaous numeralis; in Casp. Sohotti thaumaturgo physioo s. Magia\nu.niversali, P.IV.lib. i.Syntagm. IV. p. 38. (Kiroher,\nJesuit, Prof. d.er _Mathern. zu Wtirzburg, il.vignon und doom,\nst. 1680.)\nICortum, C.A., (Med. Doot.) Anfangsgrtinoe fler Entziffernngsktlnst\ndeutscher Zifferschriften. Duisburg 1782. 144S.8.\nKunst der Geheimschreiberei, s.Lemang.\n1)ie Kunst, geheiroe Sohriften zu entziffern, fU.r .B'eldherren,\nGesandtschaftssekretare, Beamten bei geheimen Kabinetten,\nArohivare, Polizeibeamten, Postoffizianten, Diplomatiker\nu.. a.m. 180... 8.\nKryptograpnie; in der Georgia(einer zu Bamberg erschienenen\nZei tschrift), B:L I I, Nun:. 70. (Auch b esonders ab~ edruokt\nung efahr 1806.)\n(Lemang)Uie Kunst d.er Geheimsohreiberei, oder \"Jeutliche Anweisung, Zll einer gehS'imen Correspondenz von G.L .. (Lemang).\nLei~z. 1797. 40.s. in 4. s. auch Steganographie.\n(Linnner / El ementa artis deoifratoria (a uot. ~)8m .L:illlner . )~(ebiom.\n\n1770.\nMyst erienbuch alter LUl(l. neuer Zci t, oder Anlc;i tung geheime\nSchriften lesen Zil konnen,\nir~[;:c:~'\")h,?'J_ (Jhiffren Blli:\"mlejsen.\nNebst einc)'l'! Ant1.8Ilse, 1ie BltLTrJenchiffren der Horgenlanierinnen .ZI..:t verst ehen UGd naohzuahmen. 1eipz. 1797.115. J. 8.\nNeipperg, Gref Leap. v., Beschrcibung ejnsr Masohine,\nb8na~nt:\nJedermanns geheimer Copist, mittelst welcher man sein eig~\nner Copist wird, ocl. er Y'or1!..:troh n~Eln );]i t\n\\'l enig or Mii11e seine\nBriefe nnn. Aufsatze auf ei_tlmal doppelt, IHld naoh 13elieben\ndrei- und mehrfach, als so viele Ursohriften, mit bester\nVerWahrtlng des Gebeimnisses u:cd groLe\"'\"\n;:::~j_tgewinn auf\n3.~.\nein~al zu Papier bringen kann. Wien 1764. ~it Kupfern.\nDer deutschen Beschreibung ist eine franzosische Obsrset zung geg enub er gedruckt, unt er dem '1:i t 81: Analyse et\ndescription d'une nouvelle machihe nomrnee le copiste\nsecret, inv-entee a Naples l'an 1762, par 15i/comte de\nNeipperg. Vienne 1764. 11 Bogen Text in 4. S~chs Kupfsrtaf eln in }I' 01.\nNeyron, Jose:ph Pie!re, prinoipes du droit des gens (Bronswio\n\n1783.8.)1'. 160.sQq.\n\n|                    |              |               |                    | Nioeron,      | s.             | Cospi.       |\n|--------------------|--------------|---------------|--------------------|---------------|----------------|--------------|\n| Opus               | novUID,      | praefeotis    | arcium,            | imperatoribus | ex             | ero          |\n| rCUUill            | ,            |               |                    |               |                |              |\n| explo-             |              |               |                    |               |                |              |\n| ratoribus,         | patriae      | defensoribus, | peregrinis,        | meroatoribus, |                |              |\n| militibus,         | architeotis, | ac            | omnis              | industriae    | et             | littera-     |\n| tetrae             | stLlniosi8,  | prinoipibus   | maxime             | ul            | tissimllf.'l   | pru          |\n| lingua             | latina,      | graece,       | italica,           | et            | quavis         | alia         |\n| miter              |              |               |                    |               |                |              |\n| describentHm~)     |              |               |                    |               |                |              |\n| interpretandisque. | CCtIn        | gratia        | et                 |               |                |              |\n| privilegio.        | (In          | lateinischer  |                    |               |                |              |\n| llL:'l_            |              |               |                    |               |                |              |\n| i                  | talieni3cher | :-Jprache.    |                    |               |                |              |\n| Ar:t               | Sohlusse     | steht:        | impressuI'D        | Romae         | anno           | MDXXVI.) 14 |\n| ter                | in           | gr.B.         | (Auf               | dem           | zweiten        | 31atte       |\n| Rrfinder           | ai           | es            | er                 | Regulae       | ocoul          | t e          |\n| vester,            | civis        | Florentinus;  | der                | in            | Jochers        | gel.         |\n| Binig              | e            | Holzschni     | tt                 |               |                |              |\n| f:;;               |              |               |                    |               |                |              |\n| sind               | b            | eig           | efugt.             | )             |                |              |\n| Ozauam,            | <Tacques,    | rEScrea       | tions              | ma            | thema          | tiques       |\n| Enthal             | t            | versa         |                    |               |                |              |\n| hj                 |              |               |                    |               |                |              |\n| wI                 | en           | e             | st                 | enographi     | sohe           | Methocl      |\n| starb              | zu           | raris         | 1717.              |               |                |              |\n| P                  |              | ,             | C.W.,              | s.            | Steganographia | reoens       |\n| Panoirolli,        | Gllidonis,   | rerUTll       | me'7.lorabilim)'), | 'Sive         | deperdi        | ta           |\n| t'um               |              |               |                    |               |                |              |\n| o o                | rom          | entarius      | etc.               | 1660.4.       | Hand_el        |              |\n| t                  |              |               |                    |               |                |              |\n| 3.                 | 262          | sqq.          | d.e                | Zi}?          | 8ri3           |              |\n| seu                | furtivis     | litterarum    | notis.             |               |                |              |\n\nPasigraphie. Fur 1ie Pasigraphie arbeiteten: ~oh. Jac. Bacher,\nGe. Dahlgare~s, Athanas. Kircher, Joach. Frisich, Job.\nnave Solbrig, Andr. MUller; vorzUglich Bber Leibni'tz(in\nder Diss. de arte combinatoria, in der historia et commendatione ling~ae cbaracteristioae universalis, in 8einen\nvon Raspe e~irten Oeuvres posthumes, p. 533, ~nd in seinen\nvon Ulricb ins De~tsche Ub ers e-'Gzt en pbilosophisc~: en 'iVerken,Halle 1778, Bd. II.S.646-653; auoh in seinem neuen\nVersuch tiber den mensohlichen Verstand, 8.363.); Jobn Wilkins (essays towards a real charaoter and a philosopbical\nlanguage, Lon(t. 1668.). C.B.Wolke (in einer oesondern,~767\nzu 'Dessa&. ersohienenen Sohrift.);Georg Kalmar,\na~s Ungarn,\n(in einer zu Berlin und Leipzig 1772 yuf 58~.in 4. ersobie-\nS.lO.\n;nenem. Schrift, dann in 8 einen Prec etti (lj_ G-rammatica per\nla lingua filosofica 0 sia universale, propria per ogni\ngenere di vita. In ~toma1773.122 S. u. XXIV S. Vorrede,\nnebst 6 Kupferlt . in gr.8.; Co~rt de Gebelin (grammaire\nuniverselle at vomparative. Peris 1774.4. 1st a~ch ein\nTe~l von desselbeu Monde primitif.); J.de Memie~ (oder J!'lamieu.:x?)\n~n0. *:l.A.* Sioard (franzosiaoh, ~nd ins Deutsohe UlllJ;\nsetzt unter dem Titel: Pasigraphie, oder Grundlegung der K~nst du.rob zwolf Zeichen so ~u so hrei b eU,\"Ji-'l.f;) all e *118* tionen es verstehen konnen. ;Schleswig 1798. gr. 4. MemieLl.\n\narbeitete tiber 30 Jahre d.aran, unrl 8icB.ro. braOtlte seine Arbeit in ein ~)ysterrl.); der sohvvedische i!Iajor von Morath\n(Vers~c.h sine Pasigrapbie orier e.llgemeinen SchreibspracllE.\n\nStralsdlnd 18Cl.8.) und Joh. Zach. Natter (in s.!ibhanr!.l.\n\neiner gam~ neuen Pasigraphie oder Kl1nst zu schreihen Llnd zu drucken, daU es von allen Nationen in allen Sprachen ebenso leicl1t gelesen werden karw, als'l,ie Oharakter 1,2,..)\nin b'orm siner Sprachlercre orier G:cammstik. Gorlitz 18li~).5.)-\nJ.S.Vaters VTsuch einer allgemeinen Sprachlehre. Halle\n1801. Eoend. Lehrbll.oh der allg emeinen Sprache. Hall e 18('5.\n\nSylvester a e Sacy' s Grtmo.satz e der allgemeinsn Sprachlehreo Aus riern Franzosischen von J .8. Vat er. Halle 1804. ilbrege du traite d~ la langue exacte, adaptee a l'imprimerie et ~ la stenographie de Taylor, orne de gravures aur cuivre\n,Par M.de Montigny. Paris 1805.4. Schmid (ProfTEsor zu Dillingen) von den bisherigen Vers~c.hen, eine allgemeine :,i~kxi Schriftspraohe einzuftihren. Dillingen 18()7. 5~ ::3.8. Ebendesselben vollstiindiges wissenso.baftliohes Ged.ankenverzeichnis zrun Beh~f einer allg emeinen Schriftspracbe. l)illingen 1807.19 und 115 S. 8.\n\n(Auch lateinisch). Ebend.\n\nwissenschaftliohes GeClan.lcenverz eiohnis in einem .l~usz~ge.\n\nDillingen 1807.30 8. 8, (A~ch lateinisch.) Ebendess. GrLU:lQ\nsatze fUr eine allgemeine ~3prachlehre. Dillineen 18c;7. IV\nund 239 3.8. -\nVergl. J.A. Pabrici~s AbriB einer allgemei-\n\n8.11.\n\nnen Historie der Gelehrsamkeit, Th. I, S.192,ff. Meiners\nAbh. in dem gotting. histor. Magazin, 231.I1I, 178E,/';.483ff\nW.'2.Krugs systemat. Enoyclopadie d. Wissenso11. Th.I (1796),\n~ 37. J.C.v.Aretins neuer litera.r. Anzeiger, 1808,\nI'1u.~.1.\nSaul Ascher, sur Glschiohte der Pasigraphie, in dam Berlinischen Arohiv riel' Zeit, 1796, Jlllius,\nl~u.m.II.G.L<l. i}rott'-\nfendi comm. de pasigraphia Goett. 1799. 4. Pasigraphie, oder tiber oie neu.es\";.; Erfindung einer allgemcinen Lohriftsprache fUr alle VoH::er, Qui von Wolkens, LeibnitzE;'ns, Wilkins und Kalrnars pasigraphisohen Ideen, von J.S.Vater.\n\nNebst einer K~pfertafel. Weissenfels Llnd Leipzig 1799.\n\n270 S. in 8. Programme de la pangraphie, partei fonlamentale de la caraoteristiCJ.~e syntactiClue, systeme de nota--\ntion uni.verselle; par BUrmann. Mannheim 1807. 28 S.8.\n\nPhilido..J: __\nPhilidor, s. Cospi.\n\n,\n\nPolizeischrift, geheime, des Grafen von Vergennes. (Ohne Uruokort. Eisenach.) 1793.46 S. in kl.8. Mit Kpfn.\nPorta, J.Bapt., Neapolitani, de oocu1tms literarwm notis, seu\nart is animi sensa ovculte a1iis significandi, aut ab a1iis\nsignifica ta expiscandi enod,ana,iqlle Li bri IV. Ivlontis'beligardi 1593. 275 S. ohne die Vorrede und Register. Hebst\neinem Anhang: animatversiones ad 1ibros Portae -\n-\nobiter\ninter per1egendum annotatae. 24 S. 8. -\nEditio 2. priore\ncastigatior. Argent. 1603.8. 8. Ejusdem, de furtivis\nlitteraruID notis, vu1go de Zifris, libri Quique. N'eapo1i\n1563. 4. ibid. 1602. Fol. Lond. 1591.4.\nEjusdem magia naturalis. Hanov. 164<1. (In dem lib. XVI. p. 505-\n529, wird von der Geheimschrift gehandelt. Der Verf. starb\nzu Neape1 1615.)\nPrasse, Maur. de, progr. de reticu1is cryptographicis. Lips.\n1799.14 s. 4.\nRamsay, Car. Albr.) Tacheographia oder GescbwindschreibEkunst.\nNebst einem Anhang von der Cryptographia oder Geheimschreibekunst. Aus (leM Englischen ins Deutsche lib ersetzt. (Sine\nI. et 8. Sieoente Allf1age.) 52 S. in 8. (Ob dieser Anhang\nauch bei fo1genden Ausgaben befind1ich sei, ist mir llnbekannt:\nC.A.~smsey ~acheographia. Jenae 1681. 1684. 8. Paris\nS.12.\n1683. 12. Deutsch, unter dem~itel: C.A. R8msay Tacheographie. Leipz. 1743. 8. Mit Fig. Allch eine franzosische\nUbersetzllng erschien zu Paris 1683.12. mit Kllpf. Ebend.\n1692.12. mit Kupf . )\nSchaup1atz, neu eroffneter, geheimer phi1osophischer Wissenschaften, d.arinnen sowoh1 zu der Chiromantia, 1\\\" etaposcopia,\nPhysiognoP1ia, Opha1moscopia, der Punktierkunst, Onamantia, NatiVitatkunst, Cabala, Cryptographia llnd Dechiffrirkunst gehorige illileitung gegeben ----wird. Mit Kpfn. Regensb. 1770. 1 *&lph.* 3 Bogen. 8. (Naah Jan. Here. de tJunde\nllnd Schott.)\nSchiffsigna1kllnde. Verg1. J.il.Rodings a11gem. Worterbuch der\nMarine in allen ellropaischen Seespraohenj in Lic. P.a. Nemnichs Catholicon' o,1.er encyc10padischem Worterbnche aller\nellropT Sprachen, I.L1ef., 2. Abtei1. Hamh.1793. 4.\nSchott, Casp. schola steganographica in classes octo distributao Norimb.1665.1666.1680.4. CUfl fig. aen.(Der Verf. war\nJesui t u. Prof. der lilathematik zu Wlirzb. st. 1666.)\nEj usdem thaumaturgus phjsicllS seu magia llni versa1is (HErbip .1659.\n4.) Part. IV.1ib. I. syntagm. 4.p. ;38. Erwahnt er:.c.r~ cr,:!:>.\nVIr. einer cryptographiee' ~toptricae. S. auch ~~ohauplat z,\nneu eroffneter.\nSchwenter, s. Sunde und Hanedi.\nSe1enus, s. Trithemills.\nSigismundlls, s. Trithemius.\nSilvester, s. Opus novum ete.\nSolbrig, Dav., ratio scribendi per zifras. Soltqu. 1726.8.\nEbendesse1 ben allgem ctne Schrift, oder Art durch Ziffern zu\nschreiben. Coburg 1736.8.\nSpate, der, s.Stie1er.\nSteganographia recens detecta: oder ganz nen entdecktes Kunst-'\nstuck, so geheim zu schreiben, da,S es kein 'DechiffrE;ur\nauflosen kann; von von P .... TJlm, 1764.6 Bogen in D. Auch\nmit der Jahrzahl 1767. 94 S. in 8. (Hinter der Vorrede\nllnt erschrei bt sic h \"ler Verfass er: C. Vi - P. )\nSteganographie oder die Geheimschreibekunst. Kein Kommentar\n\nS.13.\n\nsondern ein Gegenstlick zur G .. L .. schen Kunst der Geheim-\n.schreiberei. Hurnh. 1799. 8 1/2 Bogen 8.\n/ Stenographik. Nach den stenographischen VersLlchen der Griechen\n--ill11L\nund R6mer, insbesondere Tyros, verbessert~ Taylor, Professor zu Oxford, die Stenographie. An Essay intended to establish a S;andard for an Lln,iversel System of' Stenograppy etc. By Sam. Taylor. Lond. 1786. gr. 8. Er erfand allgemeine Hegeln, besonders fUr die Zusammensetzung, und simp1ificierte a11es mehr. Er ar'beitete zunachst fUr die englische Sprache. Sein System ward nachher angewandt auf die'franz6sische Sprache von Hn. Theoi. Peter Bertin, dessen h'erk(Systeme universe1 et comp1et de Stenographie, ou maniere abgregee d'ecrire applicable a tous les idiomes)\nzu Paris 1792, lmd in (ler vi ert en Al1flage in ien XII.J.\n\naer Repub1ik. (1904) auf 132 S. in gr. 8. erschien; auf die lateinische Sprache, yon Hrn. 1)anzer; auf die deutsche Sprache, von den Herren 1',~osengei1, Horstig und Uanzer;mit noch mehr GlUck a'ber Yon Hrn Penzenkufer einem jungen, inde13 verstorbenen Ntirnbe.::::ger Gelehrten (1797 u. 1798), u.nd am meisten von llrn.Stoll, der in der Gegend yon Heilbroun lebt. nie Werke der beiden letzten sind noch ungedruckt. -\nSam. Taylor systerr,a generale Stenographiae\n\nad 1ingua1'1 latinam accomodatum a J.O.Danzer. Pestini 179 .\ngr.8. Frieir. Mosengei1s Stenographie. Mit 7 Kupfertafcln.\nEisenach 1796.47 S. in 8. ZV1eite Auf1. 1799.8. C.G.Horstigs er1eiohterte Stenographie. Mit 3 Kupfertafeln. Leipz-\n1797.66 G. in 4. Zweite Auflage 1798. 4. Kur~~e Anleitung\nzur deutschen Stenographie\noder Kurzschreibekunst. Mit\n2 Kupfertafe1n. Ntirnb. 1798.8. (1st die unverhnderte horstigi3che J'~E:thode). Sam. Taylor's al1gemeines .')ystern der\nStenographie. Aus der englisohen und franzosisohen, auf\ndie deutschefiprache angewendetE von J.C.DanzE::r. 'Nien 1801.\ngr.8. - Abrege du traite de 1a langue exaote, adaptee ~\nl'imprireerie et ~ 1a st~nographie de Taylor, orn~ de\ngravures S';,T ouivre. Par M. de Nontigny. Parjs 1805.4.\nStieler, CaspT von, (oder des Spaten) deutsoh~ Sccretariats-\n\nS.14.\nkunst (Ntirnb. 1678.4.) Th.I.S.5?7-555 .\n/ Stubenrauch ~ist6ire. abr~ge e c1 e 1a cryp~ographi e; ein Al?_S zug\ndaraus ln der Hlstolre de L'Aoadernle roya1e 1es SCleness\net be11f:::s- lett'res ae Berlin, annee 1745, (Tome I.der\nMemoires 1e l'Aoademie) p. 105 sqq.\n\nSunde, Jani Herc. de, Steganelogia et Stenographia nova, geheiT\nme, magische, natUrliohe Red- unO. So hra bkunst. NLtrnberg\n(ohne Zah1).8. (Verf. war ;)an. Sohwenter, Prof. der rLathema,tik zu j~ltord, st. 1636.S. auch Hanedi. 3. auch Johauplatz, neu eroffneter.\nTachygraphik, F.R.Huchs Literatur der 1)iplomatik, Buch II,B.\n271 f. Thorn. She1tons'taohygraphy. Lond. 1653 und 1666.8.\nJ .A. St ephani diss. de taohygraphia. Regiom 1717.\n~far.:.\nWeston's stenography oompleatedi or the art of Short-Hand.\nLond. 1727.4. Coulon de Thevenot art d'eorire auusi vite\nque l'on parle. Prospeotus PariS 1787. Fbenaesse1ben Almanac taohygraphiql1e. })aris 1788. Le TaohygraphE, par'\n],~ademois elle Cou10n~hevenot. Paris 1806 (nIle Samrr,lung\nstenographierter Gediohte). Auoh Theod. Pet .Bertin hat:; zu\nPariS dip tabeln von La Fontaine stenographisch in Kupfer\nst eoh en lass en, in fUnf 1Ji eferlIng en.\n17~l6. u .ff .8.\nTe1egraphik. H8nedi Steganologia et steganographia nova, 3.36-\n117. - Porta rie oooultis literarum notis, p. 39 - 4J T\nJ .L. B6ckmanns Versl.lch tiber Telegraphik und. ~degraphen.\n\nCE'.rlsr. 1794.8. -Beschrei bung u.nd Abbi1dl1ng des Tel t;graphen, yon einem Augenzeugen. Leipz. 1794. 8. -\nE.L.~os\nselts Tasohenbuoh fur die neueste Geschiohte. Dritter Jahrgang, 1 7 96, 8.207 - 217. J.A.B.BergstraBer tiber s~in am 21. nez. 1784 angeklindigtes Problem einer Korrespondent in ab- und unabsehbren Weiten der KriegsYorfa1le ocler\n, oder Synthematographik. Drei 'reile. J./lit lZupfern. ilanau\n1785.8. - tiber Telegraphie und Einrichtung einer telegraghischen Korrespondenz zwischen Hamburg und Cuxhafen, nebs t einer Vorl eSLlng dariib er, vom T)ornherrn ,,8'. J - U .l\\iley ar .\n\nHarnb. 1799.8. -\nC.H.Wolkes AnweisLlng, wie Kin':l.er llnd\n\nS.15.\n\nStm:lIl1e -\n!0Ur2 Verstehen un''] Jprechen, zIJ.m Lesen LHlrJ/]ohreiben -\nzu bringen sini. 1eipz. 1804. XIV und 496 3. gr.4.\n\n(Handelt Num XIII. von ~er Fernsprache oddr Fernsprechkunst. :1ie 13esohreihllng Cl.er daZll eriorCl.erlichen 1'!aschine wird dllrch ein Paar FiR'D.ren anschalllich limd durch die 'J.,;-\nschichte der 'felegraphischen Versuche in Petersbllrg ('.3.\n\n458) anzieheu1. ger:18,cbt)- Pyrotelegraph des jet:dgen russischen Collegienassessors Pansner.\n\n(Tinte) Geheimnisse, aIle Arten von Tinten ~u machen. j<'tinfto verbesserte Aufl. Leipz. 1806. 64S.in 8. \\Tergl. FritandUB und Hochheimer.\n\nTrithemii. Jo., Polygraphiae librj. VI. 1500 . .B'rancof. 1550. 4.\n\nColon.1564. 8. Argent.1616.612.S.8. Solon. 1671.8. Ai Maximilianur2 Gaesarem, cum clave seu enucleatorio, in quibus plures scribendi modos operit. 1518. fol. - Accessere Tri~heroii apologia praeposita stJ~ographiae et expositio Adolphi a Glauberg, tllrn ad Polygraphiam, tllm ad Polygraphiam, tllm ad Steganographiam pertinens. Coloniae\n1564. ibid.1571.8. Praeter clavem et observationes Adolphi a Glallbarg, accessit noviter Trithemii libellus de septem secundeis, sell intelligentiis orbem post Deum movent1bus, cum aliquot epistolis. Argent.\n\n161~)v.8. l!'ranoo1'.\n\n1606.4. Argent. 1613. 8. Francof. 1650.8.\n\nIn der strasburger Auegabe (161~) wird 8.76 ff. uui J.\n\n551 ff. von :~.er JehEoimschrift gehanclelt. Bine franzilisische Ubersetzllng dieses Werkes erschi~n llnt~r folg{mdem 'J:i tel;\nLa polygraphie et universel1e ~criture cabbulistiqll6\nde Jean Tritheme, divisee en cinq livres. ~rcduit dll latin pf.~::: ';!.abriel de Cologne . .t'aris 1561. ibid. 1621.\n\n1625.4.\n\n.\n\nStegahographia, hoc est, ars per ocollltam scriptllraM\nanimi slli voluntu t em abo enti bus ap En:i end.i c erta. t.llthore\n- J. r.Lrithemio, .h.bbate Spanheimens1. Pranc.1606.4. T)arms1;\n1606.4. Prallcof. 1608.4. Darmst. 1621. 158 J. in 4.\n\nUolon. 1635.4.\n\n| Clavis           | st                 | enographia       | e            |\n|------------------|--------------------|------------------|--------------|\n| IT               |                    |                  |              |\n| oanuis           | Tri                | themii           |              |\n| abb~~.tis        |                    |                  |              |\n| 3pan-            |                    |                  |              |\n| heimensis.       | Venundatur         | ape              | Jo.          |\n| }'rancofurtensem | 1621.              | 64               |              |\n| S.               |                    |                  |              |\n| in               | 4.                 |                  |              |\n| r./~lavi~.       | genera~is          | ,tripl~x         |              |\n| in,libros        |                    |                  |              |\n| stenograp~i~Os.  | ~J                 |                  |              |\n| -                |                    |                  |              |\n| S.16.            |                    |                  |              |\n| .Lr~ther:t~l     | abbat~s            | Spanhe~mensls.   |              |\n| I)a:rmst.        | 1621.,             |                  |              |\n| 0.               |                    |                  |              |\n| In               |                    |                  |              |\n| 4.               |                    |                  |              |\n| digismllndi,     | abbatis            | monasterii       | Seon.        |\n| Trithemiu.e      | sui                | ipsius           | vindex.      |\n| i)               |                    |                  |              |\n| Johanll          | v.                 | Hey'ienberg      | allS         |\n| von              | 1483-US06          |                  |              |\n| l~bt             |                    |                  |              |\n| des              | Benedictinerk10st  | ers              | zu           |\n| und              | von                | 1506-1516        | Abt          |\n| ~Tacob           |                    |                  |              |\n| zu               | 'vViirzbllrg;      |                  |              |\n| gab.             |                    |                  |              |\n| ~462,st.1516.    |                    |                  |              |\n| Von              | seiner             | Steganographie,  |              |\n| ~.               |                    |                  |              |\n| Uffen-           |                    |                  |              |\n| bachs            |                    |                  |              |\n| co~~ercium       |                    |                  |              |\n| 1itterar.        | P.V.p.215.221.226. |                  |              |\n| Zu               | der                | 'rri             |              |\n| theimi~chell     |                    |                  |              |\n| dt               |                    |                  |              |\n| J~ographie       |                    |                  |              |\n| gehoren          | no()h              | fol-             |              |\n| genCle           | 8chriften:         |                  |              |\n| Se1eni,          | Ij'llstavi,        | (i.e.Allgll;3ti, | 1)ucis       |\n| cryptomenytices  | et                 | cryptographiae   | libri        |\n| et               | planissima         | St               | eganographia |\n| J'.              |                    |                  |              |\n| Tri              | t                  | hemii            | enodat:Lo    |\n| traditur,        | inspersis          | iP.oique         | auctoris     |\n| cont             | e\"np.udis         | inventis.        | Luneb.       |\n| xx)              |                    |                  |              |\n\n,xx) Herzog August von Braunschweig- Liineburg, ,)tifter del'\nWolfenbUttelschen Bibliothek, geb. 1579, gest. 1666.\nsteganographiae, nec non clavicul~e Jalo~onis Ger~ani,\nJ .Trithemii, qLJ.ae hucusqy,e a nemine intellectae, a multis fuerunt condemnatae et Necromantiae nota inustue,\n'genuina, facilis, dilucidag.ue aeclal'atio. Auctore J.\nOaramuele. Oolon. 1664.4. (Caramuel, ein Cistercieuser,\ngeb. zu lVIarlrid 1606, ward Abt zu Prae; und 'dien, nachher\nBisohof zu Vigevano, st. 1682. M&n rechnete dieses Huch\nunter aie verbotenen BUcher.)\n,\n1ri themii, *J.,* stenographia.quae hucusque a nemine\nintellecta, sed passim ut suppositia, perniciosa, magioa\net nec1'omant:b3., rejecta, elusa, damnata et sententiam\ninquisitionis passa; nunc tandem vindicata, reseratu\net illustrata. Ubi post vindicias Trithemii clarissirr:e\nvindicantur conjurationes spiritu~~ **---.** Delnde solvuntur et exhi'bE.ntur artificia nova ste.c;anograph:ba Trithemio in li ttel'is ad A.rnoldum Bost1u.r.J. (ein Carmeli ter 1'1[\\5rlch\ngest. 1499.) et Polygraphia praemissa, ill hunG ~iem 8\nnemine capta etc. Autore Wolf[Clngo h'rnesto Heidel, Hcguntia e 1676.4. Norimb. 1721.364 8. in 4. Aucl1 unt er\nfolgendem Ti tel:\nHeidel, 'Nolf'g. Ern., st enographia e 'rri t llef1ianae \\[::\"n-\n~iuatio et illustratio. Ncrimh.1721.4.\nlUken, Melcmas, Allstriaci, St eganometrographia s1 ve El,rtifici urn\n\nS.17.\n\nnovum et ina ud,i'tLlm ,\n(lUO quilibet, etiam letinae linguae\net po eS E;Od ignavus 801il2s<lue materna e lingua e b enc:fj.oio\ninstructus, epistolam latino aut gerrnanico et ~ui~ern e~~gia\ncarT'1ine scribere potest -\n-\n, cur)' Geomantia metriea. Utrumque artificium spatio horae dimid1ae ad~iBci potest. irencof. et Lips. 1751. 328 S.2.. Aueh teutsch, unter dern Titel:\n:3t eganographi e, oci.er gehE;1r~, e :3ohrei belaulst in vers en usw.\nDIm 1759.8.\nUnger, .. Toh. l!'ried., Entwurf einer l~;lasehine, wodureh Alles, 'Ne:lS\nauf dern Klavier ~espielt wird, sieh von seIber In Noten\nsetzt. Braunschw. 1774.8. (Nouveaux l'.1emoil'E:S Je l'Acu'i(~si6\nDoyole ~e :)\"l'C'0E'\n1'771 p\n~ -!,C~\n'I\n... \\,.\nCl\n',l,\n1. JUO .... ,\n'\n\nUv<\" ... /\nVerg en.nes, s. l'<jlj, ~:: ciscLt :U:'j,\n~; dlE:!.))1 e.\n\nVigenere, Blaise, iJe, traiet des chi1'fre8 *Ov,* ;\";t;Ocetus Ennit:,'E:;s\nd'escrire. a Paris 1587. o':!:6Blatter in 4. ('ler '(crf. war\n~~nigl. Yabinettssekretar zu raris, Gt. 1596.)\nVieta, Franc.) (ein 5sschiekter ~;lathematiker, t\"iJl.tre :les(equ'i,:;tes\nzu Pc'lris, st. 1600), dessen Johriften se,h1' selten sind,\nsolI j.n der l)eobl:t':fr.ierku{wt seln: ~:eiibt gewesen sein.\nWalliS, Jo. opera miscellDnea. Oxoniae 1699. fol. In eins[' Traotatle ,,:ombinationibus, 8.1te:rn8tionibus et p8ytibus 8.1iquotis, vlelot1E::' zuerst in engli8~her, lwch.hel.' in l::!.teillLH;tLC.;.l'\n;jpn~ ehe erscbi en, entzif:f ert I\".'allis Gelleir\"sclu'if t 6L'~, ;Ie eli\nohn e\nr1. i e 'FOlJ i 1l!\"1:~ e i.)ya 0 u l-: t E *l\\,IE.* t11 c,\"l (~ a n~~ Llr \\\n~ n.\nWi e sichert man SiCIl yor ;:31'i efar brecl1ung Ll.ll't del' en Verfi:ilsc.hung?\nIn ''Irei verschiedenen Abl'wnrUungen.\nl~ebst 3it:c\"';blub.c1\n~khri:ftcnuille'~'i;en fUr Lieli1,::::r)6r. Lubeck u. Leipzig 1797.\n340 S. in gr. D. *(In* dem Anhange SiIlrl TjcLerbulgerJ von Jhit':::--\nroseLrift en) -\nWieglebs, j.e., natUrliche I!;agie, Bd. II. CBerl. 1786.8.) J.G??!' Wildvogel, Chr., diss. de scripturis terrilibus. ~rancof. 1719.4.\nZuS0..tZE;\n\n## /Zusatze\n\nzu del:' Literatur der Kryptographik.\n\n8.3.\n\nBrachygraphie. Konr. MalU,f::rts Miscellaneen, meist d.iplomatischen Inhal ts (Nli,rnb. 1795.S.) I\n::3. 34 - 46.\n\nS.5.\n\nFingersprache. Deda, Veneraoilis (st. 765), tr. rie loquela p~r ge.s t u1!lQ;igitorumj in n.esSen Bperibus, CGlon. 1138S. VITI To--\nm-l rc a.s\"p S .., I, ot t\n'~c kL' 'la\n<:.'~\" e' no crra\"J 'll- C a ((\"\"\n.,\n-.1. ')\n'\\\ni - ..\" ,-\nT' ere\n-\n,.I... '.\n\nv\n'\"\".\n\nU /o..L.\n\nQ\n~\nv\n.\n\n....) U\nc:'.t r I~) - v.\n\nt:..J. /.\n\nt.\n\n~:l LL -\nl.\n\n-\na Sunie, steganologia (s.S.14). T.P. Bertin syst~me universelet complet de la stenographie (Paris an XII.S.), p. 10)l~qq. Von der Zeichenspxache der NeapolitanErinnen, inl)\";~'~ehfues Gemalde von rqeapel una 8einen Umgebu.n2-;en, Th.I.{Ziixich lS0S.S.) S.llS.\n\nS.6.\n\nGeschiohte der Kryptographik. i),G, 11orhofii polyhistor(Lu.bec.\n\n,\n1747.), T.I~p. 7a3. sqq.\n\nOkygraphi. Okygraphie au l'aTi de i'iller, par ecrit, tOI) .. 8 les sons de parole avec autant de facilite, de'promptitLJ.de et de clarte que la bOLlche 1 es exprime. Nouvelle methode adafltee ~ la langue fran9Bi8e et applicable ~ tous les idibmes.\n\nPresentant des moyens aussi vastes, Bu.ssi surs qu.e nouveaux (l' entre tenir uue correspondence secrete dont le8\nsignes seront absolu.Llent inr'tecl1iffrables. l)ar B.'\\18nC, SOL1S-Ct.-ef au. bureau. de l' ins~;rLlot:....on pu.bliq Ub rJ e 1a prsfectllre i.e la Seine.\n\nJE:cor~A.e erlitioIl, a J.:'Dl'iS lEuU. IXYIII.\n\nu. 67 S. in gr. S. ~it 15 Kupfertnfeln.\n\n## S .~!\n\nPasigraphie.\nl01~~_c\"!.r. ,i..'nC-D.\nki.(;~~r)81\"r:t:;:t,L:ilt:l' J.8::>:~g:;~oLJLLb l1':'/,\n:r''le0f.~r!;-l.pllik. hi'no. JJCf'. 96 S.S. Ab21 Blirjas l)asj.J.alie,\no1er ku.rzrr TT'!'l1:~iB\nEin~r allgemeinen 'Jpracl *t:_* .Berl. lSC+' J _\nNotizen libel' Pasigraphie; in ~er Oberdeu.tsonen allgem. Lit.\n'\"\n. 1 '\nS +.. 1\n.\"\n\"\n[1\"\n' +\n6\n'\nC\" 1\nI Q\n()\nZ . 1\n12\n\"el;.,\n~uc\\:~,..). xc.];.,\nU,.\n')v.\nI\n). (j\n-\n-\nu. <7,\n8l e\nvon u.nten, statt ~ahlgareus 1. Da~lgarnus.\nS.12.\nSchiffsignalkunde. Acta Eruditorum a. 1710, p. 143, wo einc\nkleine xu.ssische, 1706 ZQ Moskau gedru.ckte Schrift angezeigt ist. M~moires sur les signaux de jou.r, approuves\npar le Ministre 1e la maritie; par J.F. Paul, enseigne 1e\nvaisa eaLl.\n179~'.\nS .1..5 -\nSt enographik. Thom.\", WalliS the schoolmast er in the art of st en9graphy. Lond. 1647.\n8.14.\nTacbygraphik. La Tachygraphie, par M.La Valade. PariS 1777. ~e\npari'ait Alphabet du cur~ 1e daint Lau.rent.17S7.\nS .14,.\nTelegraphik. Wolfg. Ern. Heidel, in Trithemii stenographia (Nom\nrimb. 1721.4.), p. 347-361. Casp. Schott de cryptographia\noatoptrica, in dessen Magia cryptogr~icaJ c. VII.; in\ndessen Magia universali. Herbip. 1649.4. ,Heidel l.c.p.\n353. )\n8.15.\nTinte. Geheimnisse allex Arten Tinten zu. machen u.nd mit Gold,\nSilber, Metall au.s del' Feder zu schreiben. Leipzig 180L.\nS.16.\n\nZ.5, von u.nten, statt praemissa 1. pxomissa.\n\n# I\n\n/\n/\n\".\n\nKryptographik; Tiibingen 1809.\n\nAus //K1iiber Einer der liiok1iohsten, doeh gewiI3 auch oer 381-\ntensten,JNH1e ist es, wen..1'J. ein Mi.6griff 1es Chiffreurs Orl.:;r Dechiffrettrs von so angeneLImen Fo1gen ist, wie der, we:lcller in der g~heimen Korrespondenz fiber die Negociation der preu:ssiscllen Konigswtirde vorkam. Jener Mfl3griff ist, in\n\nS,ei.te 23\nmehrfaoner Beziehung, auch fiir die Theorie der Kryptographik\n/\n.\nso l:~ter'eesant, da.8 1 eine genaue Angabe desselben, 11aeh :'18n\nin nero .Berliner Archive befind1ichen, aus zwan~ig gebuno. en em\nBanclen bestehendelU KronActen hier nicht am unrechten Ort e\nstehen ~ird.\nKurfurst F r i e d ric h\nIII, von Brandenburg\nfal3te den Entsc~11u.a, di e Konigswiirde anzunehmen, uno. das\nsouveraine Herzogtum PrctJ.[;len in ein Erbkonigreich umzuvlan(1eln<\nDamale herrscht enoch in Europa di e .t,n einung, daB, in ciLt'Til\n'.\n\nsolchenFal1e,.vorher die Anerkennung von Seiten des teu.tschen odeI' romiscb-kaiser1ieten Hofes,.wo nieht zu der\nReehtma.6igkei t der Standes erhohung unbedingt notw er'r1ig,\ndoeh so nutzlieh uod der Kanvenienz gema.B se1, dae Duchdcr\n\nmacht1gste Souverain sioh dariiber ohne Nachteil nicht 11111-\nwegsetzen konne. me demnach Kllrfiirst Friedrioh III. ~3icL\nzu Konigsberg (1701) die Konigs~rone aufsetzte, lieS Gr\nzu Vlien um' Anerkennung der preussischen Konigswlirde cegocii.-\nSette 24 reno ID;isse Negociation fand, ei~e ganze Reihe von Jahren,\n,\nbedeutende Sehwierigke1ten. Der preu.Sisehe Geeandte iIl .\\'!ien,\nvon 'B art hoI d i, erhielt von sanem Hofe einen\n.' \\\nChiffre, worin jeder Buchstabe des A1phabetes duro!l. aine\nZah1 yorgeste1l t war. Au3erdem waren, in ein'31!1 sogen8. nt.;.u\nNomenclator, etwa 20 bis 30 Namen von Personen, ader HiIl,lcrn,\njeder such duroh eine Zah1 bezeichnet. :r.~n kannte d.arnals\nnoch nic'ht iie gro.seren, ausfiiilr1ic.hen Tabell en, j etzt bei\n,f~s;tallen diplomatischen SGndungen gebrauchlich , wel-\n\nche die' Dechiffrierl1.ng einer Depe:che ftir ein., Pri tt en\n\"\nI\n,\n\nW'G':a:Lchtimmerganz unmoglioh machen, -dooh sehr er-\n$~~\"e:~en'~,>~uch war in den damaligen, Depeschen weit\n* I'\n;rn~.l::u:~':-ie:.--ni~~air ge~ohrieben, als j stat Zl1 gsschehen\n~;it:~g't.\n\n, (\n,i6I.n d'em, ge aQch t en Nomencl~tordes berliner\n(.:','\"\n~,\n',\"\\.\n\n\"~~~~~~e~:~]~~~~an;:ZUletzt auch ,e:in *',/96111* t, Pater\n\"\"1:\",>\",,,\n,\n' '\n.\n\n'\n\",'\n,'llQ'a;f,,'h;~t~t'>~.iJieragenen Zahl bezeic~et; er war be1\n~\"':'~~;\"(.~'\"~~'';;;)~~:''' ..\n\n-~\"~:\".'~/~\\\"'-\" '.'\n' \",'\n'\n. ,.'\n\"'.'\n,,'~~~1i1'~~miallA~ka'Eerl'1chen Gesandt en von \"F r e j: tag\n\n; '; -\n                        '.\n                                            i\" -,\n                                                                    '\n                                                                                          '\n                                                                                                ,~', . , ,Ii'\n                                                                                                                                                                            , .\n                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            -\n                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       \"\n\n\"\",~tt ~~~lin:,~~sandtscbaftsprediger gewesen und zugleich\n\n,\n                                                   ,\n                                                                                                 ,\n\n'ii:'l,'l>,Qll t1S~hen Angelegenhei ten fleiiiig gebrauoht w()rden; in Clem Nomenclator bedeutete die Zahl 24 den\n'tiur' ,f :Li r s ten, 110 den\n                               K a i s e r , 116 den\n\nPater W 0 1 f\n               -\n,',\n    \" '.\n\nNun berichtete von Bartholdi von iVien nach\n\nBerlin~ daa Sicherste warde sein, daE der Kurftirst\n\n'Seit:e '25!, /iarU:P,er ei,l'f eigenhl!n.diges Sohreiben am. den Kaiser er-\n':;I;.~S,~,~;'.D1e~ea'stt:l.nd nngefiihr so in der Depesche:\n..\n\n,',\n{\"~DaS 24 eigenht1.ndig. sn 110 wegen dieSer Sache\n,\n'\"\n',\"\n.ao.h:reiben wolle.\"\n.~\\(Nj)r N~ll in der Zahl war zufal11g oben links dar\n,~a,l).g des:Striqha etwas lang gersten, wie es bei ge-\n,\n,\n\";<\n.\n\n\"'1,.\n\n\n.. ..,~:;hwi,lldem:~iohreiben leioht geschieht. Der Dechiffreur\n,,I'\n\" .., l;$S alsodi'e 0 fUreine 6 und d eohiffri ert e:\nttds's der K u r fur s t eigenhlindig an den Pater' W 01 f schrei ben wolle.\"\n, 'I\nP~ter'Wolf war in der ganzen Negociation\n\"nQohni0i),tvorgekommen. Man kannte ihn aber in Berlin\n~+'s,~inen' Schlsukopf, weloher schon sonst in polit1schen\n~ngeleg ~b.~i ten war g'ebraucht worden. Ex war uberdem\n\n. e:in'gebDrener Untertan des KLirftirsten, aus Westphalen.\nD'er Kc.rfu.rst schreibt also eigenhandig an den\nPat er Wolf Wo,lf; ersuchte i1m, des KaiS ers Rinwill igung Ilnd Anerkennu.n,g zu bewerkstelligen.Der Jesui t fa~ sich dadurch Elehrgescb,meichel t, s ein Orden noch viel mehr. Von d em Auge!a:bliokan, wo der Pater' dieSe\"l!.ngelegenheit in seine\n,:'\nHlW.d~, be:k:,~; erhielt ,sie am kaisetliohen Hofe eine ganz a;lldere W~d,ung. Alle'vorherigen Schwierigkei ten verschwanden,andd:i,e Sacha kam in wenig Mdnaten zu Standee '\n'\\ ;Pater Wolf wechselte mit dam Kurftl.rsten mehrere\n,<eige.tfhahd~ge Eriefe. Auffallend'ist darJ die dem J esui ten\n,\n,\n\\\n:\ngewtlh!nli~h., \"anhUndelnde Schmeichelei , mit Pedant erie ver-\nmischt.\"g~;:fa.Bte **z.\"** B. der Pater in sEtinelll letzten Briefen\"wor:i;n.~er immer die Hoffnung eines baldigen erwiin8chten\n'Au.~ga~s:\\~ter N'egooiation vermehrt,' dtie' Ti tulatqr so:\nDurchlauchtiger Kurftirst, gnadiger Herr, beinahe Konig !\n\n\\ '\n4US; Kl.ifber: ltryptograp.h.i.k, Tiibingen 180~.\n\n 18.\n\n32\n. , For t s fJ t z u' n g (~~.li4~\n\"/:,\"'/'\" .\n\n~ *.hv.\\\"* ~,. .. .,~ /\"'8 'l,.!,4~..fA,..,.\\ ).\n\n(I\n\"'\n\"\"Die Geschioh te .ifatei.n,eRah~ von Beispielen aufb~wa.hrtJ'wo man sich dieses Kunstgriff'es x} bediente; unter\n$ndern'~s England ~ter der I{t()'~gin Elisapeth, aus Polen unter Aagust **III.** J caus Frankreion linter der 3 letzten kC5nigli:Qrfie'n Reg.ierungen und w~hrend d.sl:' Revolution, besonderS lril!te;r d er A:j.leinherrsohaftd.e's bl.utdWrstigen Robespierre, . Vi e1 er andern Beispiele d,et .. neuern und allerneuest er Zeit hl..er./nicht zu erwahnen. In dem Jahre 1806 erhielt de'r ko;n.1g\"'.L:1oheGesandt e .. Z.1l  mit der Pos t Depesohen seine's Hofes, w elOhe mit de,m Siegel des koniglichen KabinettsMinisteriums verschlossen, und in ein zweites Kouvert eingesc4lossen waren, welches mit dem ~ost\nsiegel des konigliohen GrenzPostamtes zugemacht war. Dicse Depeschen' waren von einer fremden Hand ingeheim' ero1'fnet worden. Denn bei ihrer Ankunft f~nd der Gesandte, daB das IbJWi KQuvert mit dem konigliohen M.inisteriaISiegel, das\n\n1n;g.'ere. hingegen mit riem Postsiegel versi egel t war. Es war siOb.tld:.ch, d9:13 bei der Wiederversiegelung eine Verwecl1selung dar naohgemachten Petschaf~e vorgefallen war. - In\neiner gr?'sen Residenz mllBten die'Bri.efe immer Abends der\nPost ti.oerliefert werden, weil das Fe+leist?n angeblich\nil:1'derN:aoht abgehe; es ging aber erst am l.\"olgenden Abend\n,ao . So gewannman Zeit, die. Briete zq,durchsuchen.\n.\nFehlt es doch nicht anBei~elen, wo die Urheb er\noder Tailnehmel;' Solcher Ungebiil+rkeine Scheu trugen, frei\n. zugestel1en, . daS sie g,.ieoffEmtl:iche Treue brachen, daf,;j\ns:J;E'i, das Geheimnis der'\" Bri e1'e, d.1e Ul;l.ter der Ga~antie deS\n'St~atasder Post anve.rtraut ,waren, in dem Namen eben dieses\nSt.1\\tes verlet~ten und so demVolkerrechte, dem allgemeinen\n-\n.:aednte der Staaten, dem Sitteng~setz offenbar Hohn spracnen.\n'B.iali. solonen Maohthabern ist Tugend gezwung~n vorsiqhtig\n'.2at s~i~,' wahrend ,das Verbreche.tt, in ihrer Hand, durch die\n; Gff!1Bheit, der Ungestraftheit U1l:verscn~twird, ja durch\nSc:h.am. uno. V e1\"borgenhei t 'sicn: zti: ~rIti,edrigen wahnt.\nDer ehemalige kursa:c.h.S1s~he G-esandte zu ...\nklagte einst; wa.b.rend der Prem1erministerscnB.l.\"t deS bekannt ell\n\" Gra;fenvon Briihl bei,'einem Minister dieses Rofell: Iter habe\nDepeschen von a,ei nen; Hofe erhal ten, die mit einem nachgemach-\n,tell Si.E?gel bedruokt seien; es habe .ein gewisaes, an dem\nechtenSieg.el befinq.liches Kenn.zeichen nicht. II lilts 1st wahr,\nerwidert~ der :Minister, Sie hab 9.11. in Dresden bess ere Pet,-\nsohai\"tstecher als wir hier **.'1-** Der fran2iosische Gesandte\nin London beschwerte sich bei dem Herzogs von Nawc8Btle,\ndai ar Depeschen von s einem Hofe mi t del.\" Post erhal ten\nhabe, die mit dell groBbritannisohen Siegel zugemacht gewesen seien. \"Durch einen].[iSgriff in der Kanzlei\"! -autwort et e del.\" Herzog Hi.chelnd.\neJ.\nAuch die neuesti Zeit liefert auBer dem in oem grGJ\nPublik;um.'noch nicht ganz enthiillten, mit einem Raub verschiede1J.E1r Privat:papiere yerbun.de.n~n ~astatter Gesandten-\n35\nmord( *281'* A.pr .1799), merkwurciige. 13e~sp~ele, wo t:eils Postt.el1eis~ von unbekannten Persoll-en gewa,lisam entwendet,\nwenigstens durohsnoht und spoliert oder Kouriere ihrer\npe~esohEm beraubt, wohl personlioh mi:.Bhandel t\" ja sogar:\nJrmp1\"det worden sind. Ruft dannpei solchen greuelvollen\n. MaJ3nehzr.nlngen; sofern sie naoh eQhtsul tanischen Launen be-\n,.stiriuntwu.rden, niemand Agathonsgoldene Lehre dem Gewal ti-\n\"\"!'}\n.\ngen __\nnamlioli Verletzu.ng des Briefgeheimnisses.\n';ig~~r'in~~'a Herz ~d; in den Sinn? Leider be~'tatigen\n: j~e :B~~.,iele d~e Wahrne.hmu.ng~ daJa man bel.' dern Bes:lt~;zed:~~, lloohsten Ausbildtlng .des empirisohen Verst.~l+deS~ehr Ul'lsitt1ioh handeln k~nne, weil dieae bl:~:B; zi\\z'al':ewandtlei tund Klughei t, nioh t zu Si ttliobkeit f~,:t.\n\n\n19.\n\n;~e,l<i$$l'~I:~(~edi tion des Premierminist era , Grafen\n, , \" ,,'\n\",',>; , von Briih1\n\",;i),V:}.oht leicht wird man, bis atlf deli Anfang\n\" ,',,;' ,\"'alii ,:fll...,a(:Ssiso11en Revollltion, ein Beispiel einer\n.,. l::f.\"ttr <1\\ \"':Sogenannte Postgcheimnia so xecht organi-\n',t'ta\"t :;find en, wi e di ej enige war, d cren\n'~i~':ReiertlIlg August III - .J Konigs von Pol en\n'i',:<,~~IIt:}.tr\"'rste:b. zu Saohsen, der fast unumsctirankt ilierkt'sI,()~,~e Premierminist er, G~af von ::BrUbJ., in War-\n>S'9U.I.:\\il;t+~,Dresdensich bed:iente.\n\n,:\n\". \",; *\"::])e1'* k1:tZsachsische Hofrat' von Sie:Q!tann, v/E;lcher\n,:in);d~'J~'AAre 1780, 75 Jahre al t, starb, ward von ili~, .Pl\\\"~~:erm.inister ala Chef dieser geheimsten\n\n;9-P:~tat:;L,~~e:p. gebrallcht. *Von* dem IVIiE.ister spaterhin\nz~~ok!g\\\ntzt .. und depotisi ert, .entwarf Siepmann,\n\"d'e,J:)i;;:\", andern'8uch eine Zei tlangals kurs.a.chsi-\n:\"~:t)4$tr\\~:~~,;dent~ndem preu.(3isch en Hofe a.ccredi ert.\n,>:::Wfil;li~;:tl:+;\\:Sf3;Lnem Al t'er einen. .A.ufsatz tiber d:Le Geschicil-\n\" ,:t~,:~lH~'iinci'i'poli tischen Wirksamkei t an d em Hofe des\n,/.,:X:6~;lggj;Q~ Po1enund Kurftirsten von Saoheen; ein\nilie:t;~({ilbes Akt ensttiok zu del' GescJ:ucht e des ehe-\n,maiJ,::;i;genl1H:;spotismus. J,ene geheime Expd.i tio.Q., j Ene\n;;':;W:;feer.!lIie such nennt- seltsame Bescnaftigllng\nti.ps, ,S'iepmarirS eigener ErzahluLg zUfo1ge, in den]\nJ,a.bre17:36 an und ward nur allein dD.rch ihn cine\n\" .ganze 'Rei1;l.e von Jahren (bis 1750) abV:'Gchse1n1 fortges~tzt), ,b1nnetJ. welcllor Z ei t vi el e taus end ~Sri EO:f E:\n. :u.nd' geS8:.ndtschaftliche Dep esohen ministeriel1 TlQ-\n,~PUlie~t, das heilt eroffnet, gelesen) abg,,=scb:rie-\n'bEillt deCti1ffriert,/unrl. d8J.1..D, ,58shhickt v.lieder zugc-\n'lf1$oht, an,ihre Adressen bef{:i,rdert wurden. Das geh~:irn8\nArchiv Z!il. Dresden'muB noch eine sehr betrachtlio,he\nM:enge'dei\"damals auf solche Art zusar::mengebracht,su\nPa:pier e.tt.llfbewahr en ~\n\n20\"\n1~est:el1ie' una Angehorige iiieser geheimen ~pedi-ti(ln -\n\"ii, <,\n,,:{~n hin1angliohes Personal war Z1.1 dies er\n::,i,ehe;i:rheri~'t.ats-operation angenommen t wovon j ener,\n,\"1iUn:re:eiJ.:::~eJ:trmats ,d en .Rid, 1.erTlette ,und Verschwi eige~~!ei't:j.~~\\&egn mu.Ste. Konig Augp;s.t. III. interessi er-\n. <~i.e::SiehiJ;~rsonlich fur *iie* Sache .. ':Er se1bst llatte\n.. ~ie<~~~~dung. ~11er aUf. derPoi~tJibge.he~cl~n UJ1~\ne:t:~~tl~~~en :Br~efe an d~e geheJ.~,eExped~t~on IDlt iem.rtenpostmei st er verebI' ed:e1t:_\\ Ibm ward von den\n,*t91lti .\",Restil t~ 1ten di es er gelie:lmsn NachforSoh0:n-\n:J{en:VQJ:{,~~it Zll Zeit Bericht erstattet .. Der Premier-\n,~iili:si;er.:f:~afBr:Uhl} der allverm/:?gende, zu Allem tahigle ~~L~'war ac,cll tiier dirigierender Minist er.\n\n,\n~.\n\nIhm uJ$~~;,;posttaglie.4 detaillierter Bericht von dem Tn-\n. d:~1i;:,eq:.\"oft'neten .Briefe und Depeschen, so' wei t solcher\n'i{~teressant s Gin konnte, erstatt.et\\ferden. Un,ters.4:'~{,geheimen Expedition wa.xen; .. zaerst der obenge-\n'It' te R_:trat von S1epmann, spaterhin der geheime Kriegs-\n,\",ra,t~1U . .mots, zuletzt rier geheime'i'riegsrat von Goltze.\n\n!\n\nrb,ie bei del' geheimen Expedf. tion angestellten Sg,b-\n\",!I'i!lrr\\e1$.,:iiv8,ren~ Del' Oberacu'li tour Jonisch, als Dolmetsehcr\n.. 4N~'r' d \"'e .t'n\nolnl.' soher\n('< rae\"' c>\n\"'e \"'bh ..... l. e'b en\"\"'\"\nB'~l' r~f e\n-::j1\n\"'l~l' ,-, ,\"'\n',~~\",.'t.F, .\n\n.......\n\n'\"-+~,,\n,p\n1..'1'\n~ . .J.J. ......\n\nb\n0\nJ..\n\n~. \"\".f........\n\n..r t ........ J..\" . .10<\n.\\!er'BarO~ von Sehe:l, Offi~i er bei d em Kadettencorp2, cin\n<s~a'~,hi9lt~~r Zeichner, ,ler ane bewundeTnswUrdige G~be uno\n'leriJigke-jiii.f;, besa.6,.nicht nUT dj.6 Gesichtsbilfung aller derer,\n'.:!~fi..e,er l({a'Wite, aueh d.er Abwesendell,mit Kreide oder ReiB-\n'Plai' .inM~niatur\" **aaoh** in Karikatux, treffend darzuGtel1'sn,\n\n':.$o.n~ern,.~oh aIle Hanclschriften zum Erstaunen ahnlioh\n'. \"naoh;zu~~~n.Er ward deswegen ztim Hauptman.n ernannt, Lli.L(l\n.erh.~el\nt~:;(tehal tsvermehru.ng . Seine Manollvr as in d. er gei~eimel'l\n,ltxpeditiQli warenlauter Meist.erstuok:e. Als er in dem Jahre\n1746 s101:.' entfernte, oder entfernt ward 1 k9nnte man vilJl e\n]3ri~:fe:n:ioht mehr effnen. Seit seiner Entfernung sah man\nibn we4er.je wieder,nooh harte man etwas von ibm. Br.\\-v!:]}:\ngleiohsam. versohwund en;\nII ein Umstand\" - sagt Siepmann-\"wo-\n. von siela. noeh vieles sar:.en lieEe tl - Ein KuB d.er untcrirrlisohen. J:u.ngfer gegeben, 'War in e;ewissen PE;rioden nioYlts\n.Unerhortes!\n~u den Subalternen gehorte aueh ein'~)~:in\nVirt,nosein d.emPetschaf'tsteohm, wie Scheel in ,18m :.ieLrel-\n.ben;; Di~ser ~Tu.de wu,Ste alle Sit::gel in clem hochf:1t81J Gradr.;\n.;3er .. 'TTol'11-~\"\"'.....,e-t-.~'t' in ~':pC!Sl.rl.0\" n'-...Io.zus+eol]c'n\nT,TI'+-\nr'c \".(e1 *r.;* ('i\",.'.tl\nu.\n'If.\n'\\,~~..t..U.,;..I.\n:.uJ,..Lc.t.\n\"',:..::..I..~\n~ a.A.J.\n'V\n.l._~\n\n'..-.\n\\,1\n,1.\nI. (.) ..... 'v.J\nJ\n.... ~ .. <.\n40\n:Pflichsteoh;~n muSte er sien bestan'dig besohafti[;en, / nClch-\nC!en:t;ieri'p: Pflicb.t g enornrr:en worden war. Er verfe.rtigt c 80-\nWC>hl,: 1n)?plen ala ,auoh in Dresden dcrgleiohen Petso.bafte\n1.ng:.rbBer,':Menge. -J.i e viell eioh t i'n dem geheime.n Kabinett\n ~1.il~!l7e$~noch vorhand~n sind, namentlieh die koni131ioll\n ~r~,tl;B;1Sp.hf:tl Kabine:ttssiegel und die Poststempel von Berlin\nlrUii;:;~ots~ft!1 - ..,.. Endlioh wara noeh der Eotkl einsohmidt in das\nICOln~n.ottge30gen .. Dieser mu.13te. Nachsehlu.ssel zu der SCllatulff!.~r:f~:p~igen, worin a. erpr eu.siachemGesandt e von Klinggr~if\ntifmB e ~and:t e o.haf t 1 ioh en C mffr e au.fbewahr t e -\n'.\n'. 'Nattixlioh war eS, sioh aueh d.er Postoffiziantcn\nzu versie.h.ern. Auoh si e wurden mit dem f'tirchterliohst en\n .B1d$' 'defVersohwiegenhei t belegt. Der Konig s elbst . ha tt c\n :ri:ttd.em G.enE)ralkronpostmeist er in Polen von Holzbri:qk\n',:(::t~;ZuS'endung aller auf der Post abgehenden l..lDrt einlaufeIl'-\n:'i1'sn'~r:ref~ verabredet .Der ~ronpo8tsekretar Kanls;;\nwnrr'l\ndfishal.b' ve.rpfliehtet. Eben so der Postmeister zu Lg,blin\n~\n,W.~.$~ep:ma~ einige Zeitlang mit der. geheimen Expetl.ition in\na,ern Poatha.us e wohnt e.\n.\ni\nDer Ol)erpostme'ister Hermann Zll Dresden unCI\n(~er\n.l?pstn:-eist~r zu Grossen.hyn, . einer Station auf der SerliiH:T\n.'. Rout~, ne.r Meilen von Dresden, wurden in Absieht auf ;jcLe\nJ)epesche:n gebraucht, die von Berlin an den preuEisohcll (~c\nsandten in Dresden, oder von (\"li eS em an s einen HofE\nm:Lt\nderiPostges endet wLlTden; z. B ./aer Postraeister zu GroGG i.::il--\n:hayn maSt. die daselbst eintJ:ef.fenden Berliner Postpakc.:tf:J\njeaesmal ~o:fort offnen, lUll. 'lie darin befindlichen .3ri o:fc\n~r 'nen pl;'eu.sisohen 1,~inister in Dresden sohleunigst dLlroh\neine Sta:f:fette a.n den Oberpostmeister Hermann in 1)rcsdel1\nl1bermachen.. Dieser sendete sie !9.11genblicklich in die gehei-\n. me hp~dition, wo sic eroffnet, gelesen, abt;esoi1rieLJen ode:(\n.$'Xce:p-piert',\nsodanr~ an das Dresdener Oberpostamt zur 1\\.bl;i.et-erulllg :~n die Behorde so baldzurUckgeliefert wurden,\n~a.ss:i e,mi't den iibrigen B~rliner Briefen desselben Post-\n.tt:ags:zugleioh ausgegeben werdenkonnten\" Oft mu'sten ai c\nPakete\nFekete, Zl.1 deren Expedierung die Zeit zu klyZ war, 'oi8 end\nden f'olgenden Posttag liegw bleiben. In sl'f.Lollem FaIle\n. wurden.die T)ata 0.er 3riefe verandert uDdin Qen Antwortcn\ndes preuBischen Minj.st ers ebenso, d~mdt al1cs zutraf, v c:i 1\nman\n~1Uf' beiden Sciten hierin s8hr allfmerksam war. T)srlu.rch\nward (lie. ohned em s ehr miihsam e Arb ei t nOGhbeSohw er1ic.hE:r\ngemacht.\nAuBerdem nebm man auch Bestechung\nUIl0. VerfUhrjJJ1L\ngesandtsoht'tlicher Personen und Domestiken zu HUlfe. So\nwurden4er Sekretar **J...er,** der Schreiber Roth~ uno ein Koch,\nalle in:l>iensten des preuBisehen Residenten Hofmann zu\nDresden;duroh Jahrgeha1te **u.d.** gewonnen, um rUe Berichte,\n.' :Briefe tthd andere Nachriehten ihres Herrn zr;;. verraten.\n\nSeite 42\nSp!aterh,i:l'JL zog man alleh \"len Kaml\"'1erd.iener des pEu/Llisehen Gesantiten VOll Klinggraf dUTCh den gedaehten Rothe in sein\nIntereSSe. Derselbe verschaffte aus d.er Schatu11e Seines\nHer,rn, wozu er einen Nachschltisse verfert1gen 11e13 7\nrJ en\n\n. Bej!\\ilinei\" Chiffre.~ Er erhiel t fUr dies en 1i e\"besdi ens t 300\n.])uJdate:n qna das Verspreehen, versorgt zu werden. Eben dies ,'r\niKammerdiener yersehafft~ am End.e, wahrend sein Herr nach\nLeipzig vereistw.ar, der geheim~n ExpecU tion 80gar die\nDtlrehsicht unO. Extrah1erung de+ wichtigst w Brief'sohaften\n~llS dem pr euBisch en Gesand tschaf'tserehive, wobei yi ele\nint.eressunte Entdeekungen gemaeht wurden. Gleichnaohh(;r\ne.nt.fernte er sieh heimlich, nseh Pole'n 7 wo er llni;cr f;::jncm\nanacren\" naehher bestandig beibeha1tenen Namen den irlln\n~~<.;\nstirnr:ten Dienst anti-at. Der Gesandte ward argwohniGch, ao(:r\nalle seine Remtihllusen, den verr'3.aehtjeen Kammer t1ien!;r,:;;elb8t\ngegen sine a~eb:ptene Bclohnung von lO()G Dukaten, aUSZll'-\nkundsehaft en, V!Rren verge 1)ens.\n\n21.\n\n## Operatiorh:N Rl Er Gehcimen .F.X:Pgc1I Tie'N.\n\nAuf diese Weise Wllrrlen Yiele tausend Briefe Url!1\nDepesehen erof'fne~, ge1esen, exzerpiert uew., de1' prcuSische Chiffre entwendet und rrasArehiv der Berliner GC8an~\nsohaft durehsucht. V pr+;Y'O\\A t e AuS 8r1) ngen in frcundsclwft1i-\n, chen Briefen, vorzu.glich vornehn: er I'olen, in rler/dama1igen\n'kri tisehen Lag e Pol ens , wurden verrat en und MiSbrallch Qnrn:i. t getrieben. Doeh ward aueh gleich a~angs auf diescm '.'lege einEi poln:j.sehe Versehworung wider den Konig entdeokt i moll wollte an einem gewissen Tage walrrend dcr offeutlichen G.ottesverehrung den Konig in s einem KircbeIlsi tze du.rch ci. nell Pistolenschui t<:Sten.\n\n'Siepmann . gesteht, daB dieses Geschaft mit groL:ler Millie ulld, Sorge verburuien ge\\~esen sei; daB cr nft ite CLm;',c Nacht und einen Teil des Tages dabei gesses :::ei; rjn.cmnn, so groIaauch die Anzahlder einlaufenden BriE;;fe gewes un :]cj >\ndoell keinen verschopj; habe, sclbst nicht die Briefe der G;5I3tend as Hof eS uuf!. seiner wtirdigst en Minist er; daB dj ljenigen, womit manbei Abgang der Post nicht fer:tig w'_T:Lu konnen, dUToh aine Staffette nachgesendet Vlordell seion; ')SlL\nman bci dn~n~ die man bis a~ den n~chsten Pasttag h008\nliegcll lassen, oft die Data verandert babe -\n.Anfc';:;gs be\"l.:L,;nte sioh von S:i.tpmann eilH.r ri\",tbod t::,\n:mit~;E'ls ei:,:,\"r rasse dit:: B1'icfe oline; mi.n1.l..:'1;(; *..,r..;* .L.:t~,Ll-'c.;\ni~.\n\nob,(; Abnebmu.l1C\n~t;3 I,Dcks i:l \\:3-':.~:t' kU.rzer Zd.t ZL1\nofl'l~cn.\n\n;~\"\"\nward aber. bei 0.er vLc:'cLlrten I:crH~e der 3risf8 no7;V/C;,(lj,,,\n.......\n\n.\n\n\"\" ......\n\ndie MUSFl e, \\Vomi.t\n:'!j c A til 1'Ueke von etlichen30 8i e[':I.::1 n '10!'\nVor tlchn:J\"~::L\nVO;r'll.hmsten aeS Reichs verfertig~, waren, zum fet'l1ern Gebrauene, wozu sieh posttti.glichG-t::legen.hai~ fand',\n.\n\nverhartet liegen /zu lassen. Dessenungeae.h*t wurden diejedesmal ,mit det' Massezu Irl.a:chenden llnd vie1\nZeit wegn,.ehmenden Abnrticke der Ubrigen Bri.cfe, die Zuriick$e.p.fl ang 1ers elben am die be'stiromt eltun1e vereitelt haben. Allein hier leam mit llJinemmale der obenerwitbnte. jiinisehe Petsehaftstecher dutch sein'e groEe Industrie zu. Httlfe. Als vollends aue h noell die Gewandheit des.' Barons Scheel in Na..chahmung fremder Hand.scl:riften in Requisition gesetzt ward; so ging in dieser g.eheimell Staatsfabrik nun alles leichter ur.d geschwin-\n,der yon$ta.tt;en. Nunkonl.lte man die Briefdecken oner KO'\\2verteohne Bea.enken zerreiEen und sie sogldoh dUTch nen.e ersetzen. Doch machte bei den preuEischen Depesc.b.en d.ie Verkleisterunp' noch iI'1T11er viel zu schaffen, we.::tl as schwer hielt (jerel.eichen Briefen i.hre gehorige<l!Iorm wieder Z'.J geb en. '!)arin mochte wohl 8'ucb die Veranlassung liegen,. daB sieh mit einemma1e wider Vermuten fand, daB \"lie :?ri cf,e deS KODigs von J-'rc;uEen\n. undo seinies 11inisters m:i..t Chi:f:f'ren gE;schrieben waren.\n\nMan S ohrie b S18 zvvar a b, kOllnt e 9i e a b er 8hcr nioh t\n, entzi:ffelTn, als bis man, wie obenerwahrJt, den Chiffre Sus des Gesandten SchstullB mittels eines ~ach8ctltis\n, ~e+s un.d deS Kammerdj.eners 8Iltw81leJ.et hatte.\n\nSeite 45\nI\n\n22.\n\nhdliches Schicksal. der geheimen Exper'l.i tion.\n\n:\n\"Doah eine UnvorS:i.chtigkei t deS Premiermi-\n~i~tBrs ~ereitelte'bald ferner den Gebrauchdiescs\n'Cl:if~freS', und -1 en davon a'bhangenden gliicklichen Fortg$.~int!ressanter diploma.tischer Entdeckungen. ;:Un\n\".oh1:e:frieq:*tes Scbxeiben d'es Konigs von PreuB~n ent-\nhi$:!.t llb,er gewiss,e Staatsau,,:3elegenhei ten eine s f\".hr\n, .Y'!i~:tiig ... ~ .. ,AnI~erkung ur..d. Instrtlktioll, wov~n die Ab-\n,~Htsohon frlih 'acht Ubr in desPrerni erminist ers\n\n| '.               | Hl.tl:c1enwar.    | Dfeserbeging         | die         | Unvorsiohtigkei    | t            |\n|------------------|-------------------|----------------------|-------------|--------------------|--------------|\n| J.               |                   |                      |             |                    |              |\n| kVIi             |                   |                      |             |                    |              |\n| -t~tag          |                   |                      |             |                    |              |\n| ,bei             |                   |                      |             |                    |              |\n| Hofe             |                   |                      |             |                    |              |\n| geg              |                   |                      |             |                    |              |\n| en               | den               | franzostschenGesandt | en          | in                 |              |\n| (jag             |                   |                      |             |                    |              |\n| cn-              |                   |                      |             |                    |              |\n| 'wart            |                   |                      |             |                    |              |\n| despreu-'3ischen |                   |                      |             |                    |              |\n| cine             |                   |                      |             |                    |              |\n| }iu.f;)erung     | zu                | tun,                 | welche      |                    |              |\n| d.q.:t'chaus    | Kenntnis,         | von                  |             |                    |              |\n| d                |                   |                      |             |                    |              |\n| em               |                   |                      |             |                    |              |\n| Inhalte          |                   |                      |             |                    |              |\n| j                |                   |                      |             |                    |              |\n| eme's            |                   |                      |             |                    |              |\n| chi;f.\":fri     |                   |                      |             |                    |              |\n| crt              |                   |                      |             |                    |              |\n| en               |                   |                      |             |                    |              |\n| Sc~eibeiLs       |                   |                      |             |                    |              |\n| voraussetzte.    | Der               | prcu.2iscl1e         | Gesandte    |                    |              |\n| s.cnopfte       | hi.';:!raus       | Argwohn.             | ir          | erklarttJ,         | bei          |\n| .Rt1ckkrmft    |                   |                      |             |                    |              |\n| vom              |                   |                      |             |                    |              |\n| Hofe,            | seinem            | Kam\"'erdiener        | (demsclben, |                    |              |\n| dar              |                   |                      |             |                    |              |\n| den              |                   |                      |             |                    |              |\n| Chiffre.         | demPremi          | el'r:'linister       | heimlich    | mi                 | tge-         |\n| tEiilt           | hatte):           | er                   |             |                    |              |\n| mUsSe            |                   |                      |             |                    |              |\n| fast             |                   |                      |             |                    |              |\n| ElUf             |                   |                      |             |                    |              |\n| den              |                   |                      |             |                    |              |\n| Gedanken         | gcr8.ten,         |                      |             |                    |              |\n| von              | VerrllterIl       | oplgeben             |             |                    |              |\n| Zll              |                   |                      |             |                    |              |\n| sein;            | 1em:'!            | GrnfBrtihl           |             |                    |              |\n| habe             |                   |                      |             |                    |              |\n| so               | eb                |                      |             |                    |              |\n| en               | in                | s                    | eir..er     |                    |              |\n| Gag              |                   |                      |             |                    |              |\n| enwart           | etwas             | geau13ert)           | riss        | nt2r               |              |\n| Gott             | una               | seinam               | Konige,     | ihm                | aber         |\n| Morgen           | bekannt           | sei,                 | usw -       |                    |              |\n| .                | Der               |                      |             |                    |              |\n| Kammerdiener     | Buchta            | dem                  | Gesandten   | allen              |              |\n| 'VerdslOhtzu     | beneilmen,        | beGorgte             | aber        | doch               | unan8enehme  |\n| Sei              |                   |                      |             |                    |              |\n| tti              |                   |                      |             |                    |              |\n| 46               |                   |                      |             |                    |              |\n| Folgen.Br        | entdeckte         | diesen               | Vorgang     | dom,               | gleioh:f&lls |\n| in.              |                   |                      |             |                    |              |\n| d                |                   |                      |             |                    |              |\n| em               |                   |                      |             |                    |              |\n| geh              | cimen             | Einver/standnis      | steilend    | en                 | 30hr         |\n| cd.              | bel'              |                      |             |                    |              |\n| Rpt:he           | linti'            | dieser               | berichtete  | saleh-en           | noch         |\n| Abenddem         | Premi             | erminist             | er.         | 7)er               | Mihist       |\n| an'eh            |                   |                      |             |                    |              |\n| -'mit:grBQBem    | Mil3vergniigen    | aus                  | dem         | Berichte,          | wclchen      |\n\n(ler Gesanat e Illi t nachst er Post n.ach2 '3rlin ohiffriert $''Q-gehen lieS, daP. dieser die Sac.h~ 88inem Hofe\n'.voTtXu.g:iind .Irgwohn blicken lie.8 ... Aber nooh graB 8.1'\nwar seii:t.:MiSvergnUgen, ale er sah, daE die Antwort\ndesK5n+.gs von Preu13en den ge!iu.8eT~en Argwohn sEines\nMinisters\nl\\Unisters' noa'n wei t starker ausdrUckt Qud daB, zu lL,ehrerer Sichsrneit ,n~~l:](3te:ns \"l,m:-ch oi,nen F eldj ager ihm 'ein neier Chiffre zukommen solle.Dieses gesohah. 'ger GE;sandte, lieE nun den l1.cuerJ\nChiffre\"cturch den Leg&tionssekYE:tar \"Iron Hecht 8,l:tfbe:wahrEJn: cine VorSic~t, ~e1che alle IT-offnung bcnahn1, 'sichje desselben \\viedT\nZQ, beni~~ht~gen~ De-c Kam~eT,1j euer berr;erkt e jet ':t cl eutlidl d,(::.n'lrc;-\nwohn se~p:es H~:rrlll, r'!er Uberr'!ern 811f seine ~'ritte una\n~Ghrit~,c Acht, gebe:t:;l 11e13: lX, brac,b::'llso ~Cll Fmbang mit.~em GekrGtar HotiH:\nab uudentfe:r;,:p;te sich heim1ich auf die obenange{lebere ~~rt.\n\n, Die;:'geheime .Expedition fuhr noab ein6''''ZE::jtlEtng Trlit thr Brotfp:(l,l1g und.:'Jl-bsct'lr 8i bl1ng der ankommenden una. abgE:.i.lu:lden T)t,;:-\npescli!ip.:f0r'tt'~ber gro~tentei15 cnne Nutz{;1n, weil man d~J:'I Uhiffrc\n'<nicht h.~t,te\\~1Uid. tj,ux.ohnechifi'ri erkuust, $l1c11 ni 011 t ent1eokt ~.\n\nilld.::t:q:q:':'~~iUi1ll:>a:ieErof,fnung, 181' 3riefeeip. Ende. Um. '1ieselt)e' Zei1;\n\n,Se,ite 47,\n\"\"~;:r::~q:t1;1l~trda1J,1C'h clU~ ~ie Oben aug ez eigte rats el/ha~t e .:Lj,rt der iJCi\n'de:r:;~gei!l:e#!melJ::B;xped~ t~ on 'an::S est ell t . gewesene So br (0'1- bkunstl er ,\n'Ja~0:r;l,),a:daaeel~'\n-\n\n~\n       \"\n                  .,,,\n                                 . <\",: '\n                                                         . '. ,,' ;' .-'> ,\n                                                                                                 ',I. \"\n\n,:.\n\n,\n\n#  23. Talion Friedrichs Ii.\n\n'-\nI\n:.,:\nDeP,'l Sc !1l:arfblickFri edrichs d ESS, Einl3l,gen kOllL,t e das\n;1hm:#e~pie1~e.Manovernicht entgel1en, wenn schon er das ]i'B}:'tUll1\n:~{~.ju;17istischer Gewi'shei t zllerhe'b en' nioht\"V'ermochte. ViE:.' 11 cictlt\n\"daJ3' ~;er ::groSeKonig 'hauptsach1ich dlll'Ch den,i11m g espi e1 t en\n~)tr de rl liuf,d:en G-edl!lnkeutS e17i et, eine Widervergel tung dQrsel b (~r;,'~rt\n,{rt!Eleop'~tr~ruse), gegen 18[1 konig1ieh':\"'polni$chen ur:d ku.rfiirstli'ch-S$tqitLSi~.p1:1~n 'liofallszuUbe,n .. \"Denn bald nachher, im Jahre l-752,.e:fr~'olgt'~;von Berlin 8l?S '1:ie bekannte. und fo1genrciche :.:rka:uf't;n:g ::ae8.:~sach8ischen ,ge11eynen Kabinettskanzlisten Nren~:el.\n\nDi;ser-ltefer:te :ron -1752 bis zlfJ..TJ1.Aus,bruche des ~ie~e.tJjah~i,~(:3,c\n'Kr~egs a.,em preuhschen GesHndten zu 1)resden fas+. ~n Jcdcr \\u,',cilc Absol1.r,iften von wichtigEln Urkunfl en und Papieren,aas d erl\n~3dl e::h:l':rJ\nKabinet,~:~arch:i:v zu Dresr3,en,. auch kbschriften. von ,i)ep6Scl'E:::n,\n(1:; ',C\nvon W;j;.,enundl\"et ersbur,g bei \"em i)resdener Hof einsitl::::;en - :)o'lu ;~cb watdlJl:riedrioh II. von1en gehrimsten Absic,hten jcner *W5fe,* in-\n\\Seite' 48 ,sono.i;r'b:eit von 1SP.l. geheimen AnE\"riffS,p1an der I1(Sfe von '.',':;8U\nl.Lj~\n.. Pete:t.ebu:;rg gegen Hm, glaubwur1ig Qnt erricll tet ..\n\n7'1\n\\ \"\n\n# \"  126.\n\n## Andere Versetzqugsmethoden.\n\nEs gibt noch verschi,edne andere Versetzungsme-\n\n. ,\n. thaden, d eren auch J eder s el bst nac h B eli eb en neue erdenken\n.kann. Zi.13 , 1m maicegeo mesper et rnaavi xe ouq rpimum ide, d.h.\n\n\"miamio El', ego semper te amavi, ex quo'die etc. Oder Mortu.-\nriap.t l?a~tes nadioulus mu.s, d.h. parturiunt montes, riascetu.r\n\nI,\n\"rid,ic tilUS' muse Tritbeim, in seiner poiygraphia (Norimb. 1721.\n\nI\nsagt: \"c u.m nemilus, raphocam, lapulc e, d es-\n\".gj;~~~li'$:hsuD ,race, in leopi,/in necoflas, in ceooa1i, rRtG.ra\"\n.. ', ,\".\n} .. is'~ill,ia\"\nd~h.' alLtmine, aamphora, cepulla, cera, pileo, flas ....\n'do:i!t~, oaliee terra, lapilLlis .\n. ,\",\n'f \"\nAuch teilt man die Klarsehrift der geheimen\n,\n,\nDel>:t3schen in ~lassen, j ede voneiner h.estimlnten Anza.h.l Bu.chs:tab~n~ Dann schrei bt man von j eder Abt silung oaer Kla.ss e di e\ne:r~ten13Cl.C.hstaben, hi erauf p.ie zw ei ten, sodann die dri tten,\n\":'~'e:t:i1er qie vierten usw. in einzelrie Worte zu.sammen.Bei dem\nD%Cl.hiffrie,ren Ijjst man von j edem Worte der geheimen Depesche\n:ZI,H~:rS t den ers ten, dann den zwei ten, W \"\"i t erd en dri t t en u.sw.\n\",:Buchs tabe.n.\nBeispiel. Die gei1eime Depesche latite in Klarschrift\n\n, .\n't\"'\"\nso,~I'IQmnes oonsiliarii su.nt contra te; res. est perdita.\"Diese\n.\"\n.\n(.')\n\"\n, -\n,. .\nibn Abteil,.nngen oder Klassen von 7 Buchstaben geschrieben, w:Lrd\n, -J.\ntolgeud:e:.:Worte geben: Omnesco nsil-iar, 1isllnt'c ontrate resestp\n,\n'1'\" '.\n,\n-\n\":,~rd:i;lit~;lj),:i,:.es e nach obigem Sohltiss el- in Geheimscbrift tib'ers etzt,\n,,1:i',:'k:tptfO:J;,:g~mde geheime Depeschen: . Oniore mSiner nistsd elu.rei\n:ii;~~~~:~~ta ora ep .\n\n\"\n\".\n,'fe  , \\,,'\n. Diesegel:J.eimen Buchs,taben kann man tiberdem in einen verdaehtl-osen Brief aa.f sebr mannigfache Weise verstec}cen z.B. daB in dies em, Bri'efe, vonlem Ende nach\n:cd,e~'t,!L~arig hin, der Anfangsbuchst?'bztierst immer des/vi.ert en,\n,~a:im iriu:iie.r d,es dri tt en, hi eraui' immer ,des ',zweit en, endlich gelte. Bei dem Dec:hiffrieren teilt man den Brief zuvl:5rderst vonhint~n naoh -ror,ndurch Per-\n, \"',~\nhe in Quaternionen, ,in 'Ahteilungen von vier Vierzehntes Kapitel.\n\nV e r s s c h r i f t.\n\n 145.\n\nMethode.\n\n~an hat eine geheime Versschrift (Steganometragraphie), welche zu liIittelilungw'eniger Worte hinreichend ist llnd dem Geheimnis volle Sicherhei t gewiihrt, solange der Schltiss e1\ngeh~im bleibt.\n\nMan bringt die geheime Depesche in einen moglliohst\n. kurzen Satz und sohreibt unter j eden ,Bllchstaben eine Ziffer in\n\n\"\narithmetiscbex Ordnung; z.B.\n\nObi i  t  Car 0  1  u  s  E:  e r  i  5,  6  7  8  9  ':~1 ':2  3  4  10 11 12 13 14 15 16  t  A  u  g  u  u  s  I  m  22 23 24 I 25 26  s  21  17. 18.' 19 .20  p  e  r  a  t  0  r .  27';'28 29 30 31 32 33 -\n\n146.\n\nFortsetzWlg.\n\nIn Bereitsohaft maS man ha1ten eine be1iebige An-\n. , zahl( doeh nicht zu wenig) Tab-ell-en, etwa/44 fUr Briefe und ebensQviele fUr Antwortschrei ben. Jede Tabelle hat eine Nummer in alphabetischer Ordnung. Auf jeder Tabelle stehen vorn, abw!rts, alle Buohstaben des Alphabets von .A. bis Z. Neben jedem Bu'chstaben steht ein Stuck eines Hexameters oder Pentameters bis Z'U der Oasur, ein Hemimetrum.\n\nA11-e diese fragmente der\n...\n\nHexameter und Pentameter mussen allf der ersten und zWeiten,\n:c1a:nllsufq.er dri tt en und viert,en, ferner allf der fUnft en und s,eohs:ien usw. Tabelle genau auf einander passen, sodaE bei I\nder. Zusammensetzung der Fragment'zwei zusammeIlgshoriger Tabell.en jedesmal ein Sinn herauskommt; z .B.\n\nTab. 1.\n\nJab.2.\n\n:A,\nNe In(:')ra 'te teneat\nchartaeperfringere gemmam\nB\nBe ga;nctareprecor\n,\nB\nsua. vincula demere chartae\nH, \" Ne Q~digneris,\nperegrinam, evolvere ohartam\nI\n,T,ab. 3~\nTab.4.\n'I\n'<B:.,;:'a.t~lid. dileot:Ls\ncrede, venire plagis\nTab. 5.\nTab.S.\n\n## S:. 228.\n\nB\ndepinget epistola casus\n'-I \\\nQ\n.\" Noli ,11ibi dazrmjferos\n,\n-'\\'\"\nTab.8.\nTab.7.\nI\nLa~tQi'tias mentis\nI\ndemat Ilt illa.\n\n##  147.\n\nWill ion nun obige Dep'esche in Geheimschrift ttber-\n:~:r~~,enJs,'o sllche ich in del' erst en Tabelle dasj enige Fragment eitJ.\\:iS!le~amet ers (Hemimetrtun), welches neben dem Buchstaben JiI:st';ehtj.ebenso in del' zweiten Tabella elas, welches heb,en dem\n'$~clhstaben E ;ferner in der dri tt en Tabelle dasj enige , welches I\n\",'\n;\n..\n\n.neb~:p- denlBllchstaben R,in der viert'eD. dasij' welches neben dem I$1:l:.eht'uSw. Diese Fragmente sohreibe ion zusammen, so e,rscheint\n'~4:e\"~ehe:im Depesche in fol,genderGestalt ..\n\nNe dedig.B.eris, peregril1a1Jl evolvere chartam, A tibi dilectis, crede venire plag~s.\n\nNon tibi damniferos, depinget epistola casus Laetitias mentis, demat u.t ilIa.\n\nDel' Empf~ger nimmt hei dem Dechiffrieren dieseI-\nben 'Tabellen zur Hand. Er sllcht in del' ersten Tabelle, das Hemimetxrun: 1'6' dedigneris, in der zweiteIi das Bemimetrum: peregr:jlnam evol.:V:eree'.hartam; und so fahrt er in ,arithmetischer Ordnu.ng\n\nI,,';,\n                        ,,'d.':er. ~iab\"ei':1:en fort'.' De findet ,er ':ln', der ersten Tabell\"e dem\n                         .\" .\n                        ,\\',:\n\nersten\n\n::;,:~~ts,~~llt;\\~en:1~,'trum ,den Bllchstaben H~in der' zw e~(eil vor den).\n\n;':;'zw,e&;t~~\\deIl:fjJlO.hstaben **:I,** in der dri 1itan vor dwn dri tten R,\n\"\nin:d:e:fvd;er1:~ vor dem vierten I\nU8W~, SO findet er die geheiin:en.Jorte '; Heri obiit uew.\n\n !usKltib er: Kryptographik; Tubingen 1809. St .Bl. Nr. V8872.\n\nj Bei nem Nac'hgraben zwischen Belleville und lifontmartre, nahe bei Paris, fand man in dem Jahre 1779 einen Stein mit folgenden Oharakteren:\nS\nA\nN\nE\n.S\n'Die Pariser Akademie ler Inschriften Lllld sohonen Wissenscheften war lang vergebens beschilftigt mit der l Auslegung disser Inschrift. Der gelehrte Verfasser des Monde primitif (Oourt neGebelin), der so vi eles, was ander en unl csbar vvar, E:ntziffert zu haoen glalJ.bt8, gestand, a~af' iJm1 0.i888 Inse;1Jrift ein R~tsel sei. Siehe da, nur Ider Pedell von Montmartre war imstande, 1as Problem zu losan. Er las schleobtweg: 10i le chemin des anes. Der St.ein .p.atte den GypSelU\"l,iie mit ihren Eseln naC4 den Steingruben gingen, ,Gip.S zu holen, . als Wegwei-\n,ser gedient."
    },
    {
        "text": "# Limits On Freedom Of Expression\n\nArgentina - Brazil - Canada - China - France Germany - Israel - Japan - Netherlands New Zealand - Sweden - Ukraine United Kingdom June 2019\n\n        This report is provided for reference purposes only.\nIt does not constitute legal advice and does not represent the official\nopinion of the United States Government. The information provided\n       reflects research undertaken as of the date of writing.\n                      It has not been updated.\n\nContents\nComparative Summary ........ 1 Argentina ........ 7 Brazil ........ 9 Canada ........ 12 China ........ 20 France ........ 24 Germany ........ 32 Israel ........ 39 Japan ........ 49 Netherlands ........ 52 New Zealand ........ 58 Sweden ........ 69 Ukraine ........ 78 United Kingdom ........ 86\n\n## Comparative Summary\n\nRuth Levush Senior Foreign Law Specialist This report examines the scope of protection extended to freedom of speech in thirteen selected countries. In particular, the report focuses on the limits of protection that may apply to the right to interrupt or affect in any other way public speech. The report also addresses the availability of mechanisms to control foreign broadcasters working on behalf of foreign governments. The report consists of individual surveys for the following countries: Argentina, Brazil, Canada, China, Israel, Japan, Germany, France, New Zealand, Sweden, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, and Ukraine. The surveys were prepared by foreign law specialists and analysts at the Global Legal Research Directorate of the Law Library of Congress. Countries surveyed were selected from various continents based on relevance as well as on available staff's expertise. The terms \"freedom of speech\" and \"freedom of expression\" as used in this report are interchangeable. Quotations in this summary were taken from the relevant country surveys.\n\nI. Limits on Public Speech All countries surveyed appear to expressly recognize the right to freedom of speech as a constitutional or fundamental right. Freedom of speech, however, is not absolute; all of the countries apply limitations to it at varied levels. A. Geopolitical Content Restrictions Broad restrictions on speech were found in **China** and **Ukraine**. Although the **Chinese** Constitution declares that citizens enjoy freedom of speech and freedom of the press, these freedoms are tightly restricted by specific laws and regulations. For example, China's Cybersecurity Law prohibits the use of the internet to \"endanger the sovereignty, overturn the socialist system, incite separatism, break national unity, advocate terrorism or extremism, advocate ethnic hatred and ethnic discrimination, . . . [and] create or disseminate false information to disrupt the economic or social order.\" Similar prohibited expressions apply under China's Regulation on the Administration of Publishing, including a prohibition on the destruction of \"public order or . . . public stability.\" Other restrictions apply under China's Regulation on Radio and Television Administration, which prohibits endangerment of \"state . . . honour and interests; . . . [as well as the instigation of] nationality separation or . . . [disruption of] nationality solidarity.\" Restrictions on speech in **Ukraine** may be viewed in the context of the Euromaidan Revolution in 2014 and conflict with the **Russian Federation**. In addition to censorship, **Ukrainian** law contains restrictions in the form of language quotas for broadcasting, print, and publishing media in languages other than Ukrainian. Accordingly, only 10% of the total screenings of films in Ukraine can be in a language other than Ukrainian, and at least 50% of books published and distributed in Ukraine must be in Ukrainian. Ukrainian legislation further authorizes the banning of \"films containing the propaganda of an 'aggressor state,' including positive images of the workers of the aggressor state, Soviet state security bodies, and films justifying violation of the territorial integrity of Ukraine.\" The ban applies to films produced by individuals and entities of the aggressor state, and to movies with the above mentioned content produced after August 1, 1991, regardless of country of origin.\nThe ban also applies to movies and films produced after January 1, 2014, by individuals or legal entities of the 'aggressor state' \"in the absence of propaganda\". Restrictions also apply to the import and distribution of print media from the territory of the aggressor state.\" B. Specific Prohibitions on Disruption of Public Speech and Deliberations Some surveyed countries were found to have specific rules prohibiting disruption of public speech and deliberations. For example, the **Brazilian** Internal Rules of the National Congress as well as the Internal Rules of the Chamber of Deputies and Federal Senate do not allow the interruption of parliamentarian speech. During the joint sessions of the Congress, the galleries are made available to the public. No manifestation of support or disapproval to what happens in the plenary or the practice of acts that can disturb the work is allowed. Similarly, all persons are allowed to attend the public sessions in the Federal Senate from a reserved seat provided that they are silent and give no sign of applause or disapproval of what happens there. Japan specifically recognizes an offense of disruption of public speech for public election campaigns, an offense punishable by imprisonment or a fine. Sweden prohibits noise disruptions of public gatherings such as religious services, marriages, funerals, court proceedings, state or municipal meetings, or public deliberations. For example, disruption caused by hecklers at the Swedish Parliament is punishable with a fine or imprisonment. Swedish law further prohibits disorderly conduct that is aimed at aggravating people. Heckling a political group, according to the Swedish country survey, is likely to fall within the constraints of this offense even if it does not specifically meet the requirements to be deemed disruption of public deliberations and gatherings. Unreasonable disruption in a public place of \"any meeting, congregation, or audience\" is specifically prohibited under **New Zealand** law. In addition to a general prohibition on acting in a disorderly manner at a public meeting in order to \"prevent . . . the transaction of the business for which the meeting was called together,\" the United Kingdom has specific provisions prohibiting incitement to disrupt meetings that are part of an electoral campaign during a campaign period. C. Indirect Limitations on Public Speech Limitations on the right of expression exist in all the surveyed countries and are recognized under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the European Convention on Human Rights. Such limitations are designed to secure a variety of objectives that may include the protection of national security, territorial integrity, public safety, health, morals, the integrity of public service, a person's dignity and good name, religious feelings, etc. Protection of these and additional objectives are provided under the countries' constitutional provisions as well as under statutory and case law, as relevant. Limitations on speech that might be relevant in the context of interruption of public speech such as heckling include prohibitions on disturbance of public order or safety, defamation, hate speech, insult and violation of human dignity in a number of the countries surveyed. A\nprohibition on disrespecting the **French** national anthem or the French flag has been highlighted as a recognized limitation on speech under French law. Germany, **Israel**, and the **Netherlands** specifically recognize limits on speech that constitutes a denial or praise for atrocities committed during the Holocaust, with **German** law prohibiting disturbance of \"the public peace in a manner that violates the dignity of the victims [of the Nazi regime] by approving of, glorifying, or justifying the National Socialist rule of arbitrary force.\"\nIn **France** the denial or minimization of recognized crimes against humanity, in particular the Holocaust, are considered prohibited hate speech. Other types of restrictions that may affect public speech apply to limits \"based on political, religious, cultural or other beliefs in **Sweden**, incitement to religious hatred and discrimination in the **Netherlands,** and insults to religious feelings in **Israel**. The implementation of limits on speech in many countries is interpreted in a restrictive way, however, especially with regard to public speech. Recognizing the importance of free expression in democratic societies, the **European Court of Human Rights** has declared that freedom of speech \"is applicable not only to 'information' or 'ideas' that are favorably received or regarded as inoffensive or as a matter of indifference, but also to those that offend, shock or disturb the State or any sector of the population.\" The courts in Canada, France, **Germany**, and **Israel** have similarly extended the scope of free speech protection to harsh and exaggerated statements, as well as to political expressions that may not please the government. Protection of speech, however, does not apply in the same way to the deliberate assertion of untrue facts. D. Balancing the Right to Free Speech against Other Protected Rights Recognizing the importance of protecting freedom of speech, the European Convention on Human Rights provides that any limitation of freedom of expression must be prescribed by law, \"necessary in a democratic society,\" and aimed at certain enumerated objectives, one of which could be the prevention of disorder or crime. A determination as to whether a restriction on freedom of expression is necessary \"requires the existence of a pressing social need, and . . . the restrictions should be no more than is proportionate.\" Feelings or even outrage, in the absence of intimidation, however, was held by the European Court of Human Rights as insufficient for limiting freedom of expression: \"To hold otherwise would mean that freedom of speech and opinion is subjected to the heckler's veto.\"\nA similar approach is expressed by the **International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights**, which recognizes that freedom of expression may only be restricted as provided by law and to the extent necessary: \"(a) For respect of the rights or reputations of others; (b) For the protection of national security or of public order... or of public health or morals.\" The need to interpret limitations on freedom of expression restrictively has been recognized by the **Argentinian** Supreme Court. A narrow interpretation of the scope of limitations on speech was similarly applied by the **New Zealand** Supreme Court. One of the justices defined prohibited\n\"offensive behavior\" within the meaning of that country's law as behavior \"capable of wounding feelings or arousing real anger, resentment, disgust or outrage, objectively assessed, provided that it is to an extent which impacts on public order and is more than those subjected to it should have to tolerate.\" In determining whether the limitation on freedom of expression is justified, a balancing of the conflicting interests must be undertaken, the Court held. Attempting to find a balance between freedom of speech and the prohibitions against defamation and insult, **French** law determines that publication of a true statement that concerns a person's private life may nonetheless be defamatory for the purpose of criminal liability. An expansive protection of publication of even false information has been recognized by the Israeli Supreme Court based on a \"defense of responsible journalism.\" This defense applies in defamation suits where the publication was made in good faith, even if the information it contained ultimately turned out to be false. The defense is restricted to cases where there was an obligation to publish; no malicious intent; the publication complied with standards of responsible, cautious, and fair journalism; and the publisher took steps to prevent unnecessary harm to the object of the publication. French law similarly exempts good-faith reporting of parliamentary or judicial proceedings from prosecution for defamation. The French Cour de cassation has declared that criticism of the manner in which institutions function is a valid exercise of freedom of expression. Nevertheless, the country survey for France notes that defamation prosecutions do occur in France and are often difficult to defend against.\n\nInterpreting the wide scope of protection that should apply to political expression in **Israel**, that country's Supreme Court has narrowly interpreted the elements of the offense of insult to a public servant under Israel's criminal law. The Court held that the prohibition would apply only in rare cases where the expression \"harm[s] the core of human dignity and involve[s] a substantive and severe violation of the value-moral nucleus from which the public servant draws the source of his/her power and authority. \"The prohibition was similarly held to be applicable only where it is almost certain that the anticipated harm will harm the public employee as an individual as well as the public service system and the public's trust in it.\n\n\nII. Mechanism to Control Foreign Broadcasters Working on Behalf of Foreign Governments The issuance of foreign correspondent's certificates to foreign journalists is common among the countries surveyed. A number of countries similarly require licensing for radio and television broadcasting operations. Licensing in some countries surveyed requires legal residence or registration, or a commitment to adhere to broadcasting standards. A. Rules Specific to Broadcasters Controlled by Foreign States Under **French** legislation adopted in December 2018 the French regulatory agency for radio and television broadcasting may, after a first warning, withdraw the broadcasting authorization of an operator controlled by or under the influence of a foreign state if that state broadcasts content that harms a fundamental national interest of France. The law explicitly states that the propagation of false information to interfere with the proper functioning of institutions should be considered harmful to a fundamental national interest. Explicit blockage of access to Russian media and social networks, as well as search engines and electronic mail services and domains, was implemented in 2017 in **Ukraine** based on a presidential order. The same order also blocked individual journalists or broadcasters (foreign and domestic) who were deemed to be a threat to national security. B. Broadcasting Pluralism Standards The **French** regulatory agency for radio and television applies criteria for granting broadcasting permits that include, in addition to technical considerations, the promotion of \"the public interest and the respect of pluralism.\" Although the agency does not practice censorship prior to broadcasting, it may apply sanctions after broadcasting if a program violates French law. Foreign broadcasters operating in the **United Kingdom** and broadcasting to UK audiences must similarly be licensed by the UK's communication regulator, Ofcom. In order to obtain a license, the broadcaster must agree to the license conditions and to comply with the Broadcasting Code.\n\nAmong broadcasting standards to which licensees must commit in the UK is the requirement that, in dealing with matters of major political and industrial controversy and matters relating to current public policy, an appropriately wide range of significant views (respect for pluralism)\nmust be included and given due weight in each program. Failing to abide by the license's conditions or the Code and laws may result in Ofcom issuing its findings publicly, imposing a financial penalty, or suspending or revoking the broadcaster's license in the UK. A violation of the requirement of respect for pluralism resulted in the closing of an Iranianfunded television channel held by Ofcom to have failed to air alternative viewpoints on controversial issues in one case. The broadcasting of a news item with a two-minute video filmed by a terrorist prior to him conducting a terrorist attack resulted in a fine for the broadcast channel, which originated in Afghanistan but broadcast in the UK. According to Ofcom, \"the programme contained hate speech and was likely to encourage or to incite the commission of crime or to lead to disorder . . . with no surrounding content that sought to challenge, rebut or otherwise contextualise . . . highly extreme views.\"\nThe investigation of a TV channel that is financed by the Russian Federation and determined by Ofcom to have been controlled by the Russian government is ongoing in connection with an influx of programs broadcast on the channel after the poisoning of two Russian nationals in the UK. C. Requirements Regarding Broadcasters' National Identity or Financial Backing Foreign media organizations operating in **China** must seek approval from China's Ministry of Foreign Affairs and submit required documents in order to establish offices in China and send resident journalists to the country. The **Netherlands** limits the participation of foreign broadcasters by applying quotas for European and Dutch-Frisian programming of public and private broadcasters, thereby excluding or limiting the participation of foreign, non-EU broadcasters. Residence or seat requirements in Germany, in another EU Member State, or another Member State of the European Economic Area (EEA) apply to private broadcasters in **Germany**. A license will not be granted to legal persons under public law or to entities that are government funded. This prohibition also applies to foreign public or state institutions. The German Commission on Licensing and Supervision reportedly revoked the radio license of a broadcasting company because it allegedly uses too much content that is financed by the Russian government, thereby making it a de facto state organization. Under **Israel**i law, television and radio broadcasters are required to have a license. License applicants must, among other requirements, be a corporation registered in Israel. The Law requires that a certain percentage of the means of control to direct the corporation's operation be held by Israeli citizens and residents of Israel, or by registered corporations in Israel. Applicants may be disqualified based on a determination that granting them a license is contrary to the public interest or constitutes a risk to state security. Broadcasters must disclose any foreign contributions received from \"foreign political entities\" as defined by law. It should be noted that some surveyed countries have expressed concerns for foreign broadcasting activities. With regard to Russian Television (RT), the **Canadian** Radio-television and Telecommunications Commission (CRTC) recently commented that at this time \"it is not reviewing the presence on Canadian TVs of RT.\"  **Sweden** has similarly recognized that foreign media has the potential to become a threat to its national security.\n\nArgentina Graciela Rodriguez-Ferrand Senior Foreign Law Specialist SUMMARY\nFreedom of expression is protected in Argentina's National Constitution. Its exercise is restricted by certain actions that the Penal Code considers crimes, such as crimes against the public order or crimes against honor.  No specific limits on speech aimed at undermining another speaker's freedom of expression were found.\n\nI.  Constitutional Protection In Argentina the right to freedom of expression is protected at the constitutional level by proclaiming that all the inhabitants of the nation are entitled to a number of rights, in accordance with the laws that regulate their exercise, including the right to express their ideas in the press with no pre-publication censorship.1  The Constitution further provides that Congress may not enact laws restricting freedom of the press or establishing federal jurisdiction over the press.2\n\nII.  Criminal Sanctions on Violations of Freedom of Expression\n\nThe Penal Code describes a number of crimes related to freedom of expression.3 The chapter on crimes against the public order provides for the crime of public intimidation, penalizing with two to six years of imprisonment anyone who, in order to spread general fear or cause a riot or disorder, makes any sign, sounds an alarm, threatens to commit any crime of common danger, or uses any other physical means that would normally produce any such result.4  This penalty is increased to imprisonment for three to ten years if explosives or chemical substances were used in the perpetration of the crime.5 Anyone who publicly incites collective violence against groups of persons or institutions is sanctioned with imprisonment for three to six years for the incitement alone.6\n\n\nIn addition the Penal Code contains an entire chapter on the protection of the right to honor.7 It sanctions with a fine of 3,000 to 30,000 pesos (about US$67 to $670) anyone who slanders or falsely accuses another of a crime.8  Anyone who intentionally dishonors or discredits another is subject to a fine of 1,500 to 20,000 pesos (about US$34 to $454).  However, the sanction does not apply to expressions concerning matters of public interest or those that are not assertive.9\n\nIII.  Limitations of Freedom of Expression\n\nThe constitutional right to freedom of expression is not an absolute right and, according to Supreme Court decisions, may be limited if the limitation (1) is established by law, (2) has a legal purpose, and (3) meets the needs of a democratic society and is proportionate to that need.10 In addition the Supreme Court has unequivocally established that limitations on freedom of expression must always be interpreted restrictively.11 No specific limits on speech aimed at undermining another speaker's freedom of expression were found.12\n\nbut apparently not arrested. *Silbaron e Increparon a Avelluto en el Acto Inaugural de la Feria del Libro*, TN NOTICIAS\n(Apr. 24, 2019), https://tn.com.ar/sociedad/silbidos-e-incidentes-durante-el-discurso-de-pablo-avelluto-en-lainauguracion-de-la-feria-del-libro_957726, *archived at* https://perma.cc/V43L-B3KX.\n\nBrazil Eduardo Soares Senior Foreign Law Specialist\n\nSUMMARY\nFreedom of speech is protected under the Constitution.  The Internal Rules of the\nNational Congress as well as the Internal Rules of the Chamber of Deputies and Federal Senate do not allow the interruption of parliamentary speech.  In addition to freedom\nof speech generally, the Constitution also specifically provides for freedom of the press. I. Scope of Protection of Freedom of Speech According to article 5 of the Brazilian Constitution, everyone is equal before the law, with no distinction whatsoever, guaranteeing to Brazilians and foreigners residing in the country the inviolability of the rights to life, liberty, equality, security, and property, on the following terms: II - no one shall be compelled to do or refrain from doing something except by force of law;\n\nIV - manifestation of thought is free, but anonymity is forbidden; V - the right of reply is assured, in proportion to the offense, as well as compensation for pecuniary or moral damages[2]or damages to reputation; IX - expression of intellectual, artistic, scientific, and communication activity is free, independent of any censorship or license; X - personal intimacy, private life, honor and reputation are inviolable, guaranteeing the right to compensation for pecuniary or moral damages resulting from the violation thereof; XIII - exercise of any job, trade or profession is free, observing the professional qualifications that the law establishes;\n\nXIV - access to information is assured to everyone, protecting the confidentiality of sources when necessary for professional activity.1\n\nArticle 220 further determines that the expression of thoughts, creation, speech, and information, through whatever form, process or vehicle, must not be subject to any restrictions, observing the provisions of the Constitution.2\n\n\nII. Right to Interrupt Public Speech (e.g., by hecklers) No information on a general right of hecklers as a form of free speech was located.  Specific rules against the interruption of parliamentary speech in the National Congress are discussed below. A. Common Rules of the National Congress The Common Rules of the National Congress (Regimento Comun do Congresso Nacional) determine that  on the floor, only legislators, officials in service to the plenary, and, in their respective benches,  representatives of the press accredited by the legislature will be admitted.3 During the joint sessions of the Congress, the galleries will be made available to the public.  No manifestation of support or disapproval of what happens in the plenary or actions that can disturb the work is allowed.4 B. Internal Rules of the Federal Senate In public sessions, in addition to the senators, only alternate senators, federal deputies, former senators, including alternate senators who have exercised their mandate, and ministers of state when they appear for the purposes set forth in the Internal Rules of the Federal Senate, and Senate officials who are on duty will be admitted to the plenary.5  During public sessions, the bench designated for the press cannot hold people other than press professionals.6 All persons are allowed to attend the public sessions, in the galleries, provided they are unarmed and keep silent, without giving any sign of applause or disapproval of what happens there.7 C. Internal Rules of the Chamber of Deputies Article 73 of the Internal Rules of the Chamber of Deputies determines, among other things, that for the maintenance of order, respect, and austerity of the sessions, the following rules must be observed:\n\nII - conversation that disturbs the reading of documents, calls for voting, communications from the bureau, speeches and debates will not be allowed; VI - no Deputy will be allowed to speak without asking the floor and without the President granting it, and only after this concession will the reporter begin the taking of the speech;\n\n3 REGIMENTO COMUM DO CONGRESSO NACIONAL, 3rd ed. (2017), art. 26, https://www2.camara.leg.br/\nVII - if a Deputy intends to speak or remain in the  podium against the internal rules, the President will warn him or her; if, despite this warning, the Member persists in speaking, the President must end his or her speech; IX - if a Deputy disturbs the order or the procedural progress of the session, the President may censure him or her orally or, according to the gravity, promote the application of the sanctions provided for in the Internal Rules; XIII - the speaker may not be interrupted, except with his or her special permission, and in the case of a relevant communication that the President has to make; 8\n\nA Deputy may only speak in accordance with the express terms of article 74 of the Internal Rules.9 On the floor, during the sessions, only deputies and senators, former parliamentarians, staff of the Chamber and accredited journalists will be admitted.10  The public will be allowed access to the surrounding galleries to attend the sessions, without communicating with the plenary.11 Print, radio, and television outlets may obtain accreditation of their correspondents, including foreign correspondents, for the exercise of reportage concerning the Chamber of Deputies and its members.12  Only journalists and accredited press professionals will have access to the private premises of the Chamber of Deputies, other than the exceptions provided in the regulation.13 III. Availability of Mechanism to Control Foreign Broadcasters Working on Behalf of Foreign Governments\n\nArticle 220 ( 1) of the Constitution determines that no law shall contain any provision that may constitute an impediment to full freedom of the press, in any medium of social communication, observing the provisions of art. 5 ( IV, V, X, XIII, and XIV).14  Brazilian courts have upheld freedom of the press as an essential tool for the effective functioning of democracy.15  No legislation or case law was found specifically addressing foreign broadcasters.\n\n\nCanada Tariq Ahmad Foreign Law Specialist SUMMARY\nSection 2(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms establishes the right to freedom of expression, and the Supreme Court of Canada has interpreted this right in a very broad fashion. However, section 1 of the Charter establishes that reasonable limits can be placed on the right if those limits are prescribed by law and can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society.\n\nTelevision broadcasting in Canada is governed by the Broadcasting Act and regulations made under the Act by the Canadian Radio-television and Telecommunications Commission. Federal regulations prohibit television broadcasters from \"broadcasting false or misleading news and abusive comments that are likely to expose persons to hatred based on listed grounds.\" Subject to a public hearing under section 18 of the Act, the Commission has the power to suspend or revoke the license of a licensed broadcaster for contravention of or failure to comply with any condition of the license or mandatory orders, or any regulation made under the Act. I.  Constitutional Protection of Free Speech Section 2 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms,1 which is part of Canada's Constitution, stipulates that everyone is entitled to certain fundamental freedoms, including\n\"freedom of thought, belief, opinion and expression,\" which encompasses \"freedom of the press and other media of communication.\"2 The purpose of the section has been outlined on a number of occasions by the Supreme Court of Canada:\nThe protection of freedom of expression is premised upon fundamental principles and values that promote the search for and attainment of truth, participation in social and political decision-making and the opportunity for individual self-fulfillment through expression (Irwin Toy Ltd. v. Quebec (Attorney General), [1989] 1 S.C.R. 927 at 976; Ford v. Quebec, [1988] 2 S.C.R. 712 at 765-766). The Supreme Court of Canada has maintained that the connection between freedom of expression and the political process is \"perhaps the linchpin\" of section 2(b) protection (R. v. Keegstra, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 697; Thomson Newspapers Co. v. Canada (A.G.), [1998] 1 S.C.R. 877; Harper v. Canada (Attorney General), [2004] 1 S.C.R. 827). Free expression is valued above all as being instrumental to democratic governance. The two other rationales for protecting freedom of expression - encouraging the search for truth through the open exchange of ideas, and fostering individual self-actualization, thus directly engaging individual human dignity - are also key values that animate section 2(b) analysis.3 The Supreme Court has adopted the following three-part test for analyzing freedom of expression cases under section 2(b) of the Charter:\n1) Does the activity in question have expressive content, thereby bringing it within section\n2(b) protection?; 2) Does the method or location of this expression remove that protection?; and 3) If the expression is protected by section 2(b), does the government action in question infringe that protection, either in purpose or effect? (Canadian Broadcasting Corp. v.\n\nCanada (Attorney General), 2011 SCC 2 (\"Canadian Broadcasting Corp.\"); Montreal (City)\nv. 2952-1366 Quebec Inc., [2005] 3 S.C.R. 141; Irwin Toy Ltd., supra.)4\n\nII.  Scope of Protection\n\nThe Supreme Court has interpreted freedom of expression \"in a very broad fashion.\"5 According to Constitutional Law Professors Kent Roach and David Schneiderman, \"[t]he Supreme Court's purposive approach and \"large and liberal\" orientation to Charter guarantees ensured that all manner of expressive activities qualified for constitutional protection.\"6 Therefore Canadian courts often found \"a *prima facie* breach easily\" due to its broad interpretative approach to section 2(b).7 According to the Department of Justice's Charterpedia, \"[e]xpression protected by section\n2(b) has been defined as \"any activity or communication that conveys or attempts to convey meaning.\"8 A.  Content Neutrality According to the Charterpedia, \"[t]he courts have applied the principle of content neutrality in defining the scope of section 2(b), such that the content of expression, no matter how offensive, unpopular or disturbing, cannot deprive it of section 2(b) protection.\"9 The Charter also protects the \"expression of both truths and falsehoods.\"10 In *R v. Zundel* (1992),11 Canada's Supreme Court held that section 181 of Canada's Criminal Code, which prohibits the spreading of false news, is unconstitutional as it violates section 2(b) (freedom of expression) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.12 B.  Expression in the Form of Violence Expression that takes the form of violence does not qualify for section 2(b) protection.13 The Supreme Court has held that \"whether or not physical violence is expressive, it will not be protected by section 2(b).\"14 Though the Court did protect threats of violence as protected speech in a subsequent decision it found that such threats also falls outside the scope of section 2(b) protection.15\n\nC.  Location Location can also play a part in the determination of whether protection is removed from an expression as the right does not extend on all places. For example, private property \"will fall outside the protected sphere of section 2(b) absent state-imposed limits on expression, since state action is necessary to implicate the Charter\":16\n\nThe application of section 2(b) is not automatic by the mere fact of government ownership of the place in question. There must be a further enquiry to determine if this is the *type* of public property which attracts section 2(b) protection In *Montreal (City)*, the majority of the Supreme Court set out the current test for the application of section 2(b) to public property]). The onus of satisfying this test rests on the claimant(paragraph 73). The basic question with respect to expression on government-owned property is whether the place is a public place where one would expect constitutional protection for free expression on the basis that expression in that place does not conflict with the purposes which section 2(b) is intended to serve, namely (1) democratic discourse, (2) truth finding and (3) selffulfillment. To answer this question, the following factors should be considered:\n\ni.The historical or actual function of the place; and\nii.Whether other aspects of the place suggest that expression within it would undermine\nthe values underlying free expression. (*Montreal (City)*, paragraphs 73, 74).\n\nThe Supreme Court has highlighted that the ultimate question is the second factor. In *Canadian Broadcasting Corp, supra*, the court added that analysis of the second factor should focus on the essential expressive activity as opposed to the \"excesses\" that would be incidental to this activity. In that particular case, the essential expressive activity, a journalist's ability to gather news at a courthouse to inform the public about court proceedings, was held to engage section 2(b), despite the incidental excesses of this expression (\". . . crowds, pushing and shoving, and pursuing possible subjects in order to interview, film or photograph them . . . \"). Other relevant questions that that may guide the analysis of whether expression in a particular location is protected under 2(b) are: whether the space is one in which free expression has traditionally occurred; whether the space is in fact essentially private, despite being government-owned, or public; whether the function of the space is compatible with open public expression, or whether the activity is one that requires privacy and limited access; whether an open right to intrude and present one's message by word or action would be consistent with what is done in the space, or whether it would hamper the activity. There is some flexibility in the analysis and allowing public expression in a particular government-property location does not commit the government to such use indefinitely.17 D. Limitations on Free Speech and Hate Speech Laws\n\nFundamental rights, including freedom of expression, are subject to section 1, which allows \"reasonable\" limits to be placed on those rights:18 \"[t]he Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms guarantees the rights and freedoms set out in it subject only to such reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society.\"19 This means that \"once an infringement of a Charter right has been established, the courts must decide whether the violation by the government or other institution to which the Charter applies can be considered justified.\"20 As part of the section 1 analysis, courts must determine whether the limit on the right is\n\"prescribed by law,\" \"reasonable,\" and \"demonstrably justified\" (applying the test the Supreme Court established in R. v. Oakes21), and the law must have a pressing and substantial objective.22\nSection 1 considerations have been described as follows:\n\nThe broad scope of section 2(b) means that in most cases the constitutionality of the legislation or the government action will depend on the section 1 analysis. Generally speaking, because of the importance of the right to free expression, \"any attempt to restrict the right must be subjected to the most careful scrutiny\". However, the \"degree of constitutional protection may vary depending on the nature of the expression at issue . . . the low value of the expression may be more easily outweighed by the government objective\". For example, limits are easier to justify where the expressive activity only tenuously furthers section 2(b) values, such as in the case of hate speech, pornography or marketing of a harmful product. Limits on political speech will generally be the most difficult to justify. Restrictions will also be more difficult to justify where they capture expression that furthers artistic, scientific, educational or other useful social purposes (Butler, supra). Whether the limit minimally impairs the right to freedom of expression is often the deciding factor in section 2(b) cases. A total prohibition on a form of expression will be more difficult to justify than a partial prohibition. A restriction on expression backed by a civil penalty rather than a criminal sanction such as imprisonment will be considered a less impairing alternative. Where the limit on freedom of expression is minimal, the court may, in certain circumstances like elections advertising, accept section 1 justifications for this limit based on logic and reason without supporting social science evidence.23\n\nCanada's Criminal Code24 specifies three distinct hatred-related offenses: section 318 (advocating genocide), section 319(1) (publicly inciting hatred likely to lead to a breach of the peace), and section 319(2) (willfully promoting hatred).  In the landmark decision *R v. Keegstra*,25 the Supreme Court decided that section 319(1) was a breach of section 2(b) but held in a section 1 analysis that the infringement was justified as \"a reasonable limit prescribed by law in a free and democratic society\" and furthered \"an immensely important objective and directed at expression distant from the core of free expression values.\"26\n\nIn addition, provincial human rights laws \"further keep a tight grip on hate speech activity through its broad targeting of fundamentally discriminatory behaviors.\"27\n\nIII.  Interrupting Public Speech Heckling that involves actual threats or hate speech might violate Canada's Criminal Code, including the Code's hate-crime provisions. If the speech is in a public space and the heckling involves \"screaming, shouting, swearing, singing or using insulting or obscene language\" it might constitute a violation of section 175(1) (\"Causing disturbance\") Municipal bylaws or city regulations may also come into play depending on the situation.28 Whether heckling would be protected under section 2(b) would depend on the factual circumstances under the section 2(b) and 1 analyses above. The Supreme Court of Canada is currently considering a case on appeal from the Court of Appeal for Ontario29 that will partly look at the discretionary common law police power to arrest to prevent a breach of peace during a political demonstration where an individual was preventatively arrested even though the individual was not committing or even suspected of committing a crime. The Court is expected to look at whether such arrest would breach section 2(b) of the Charter.30\n\nIV.  Restriction on Foreign Government Broadcasters\nTelevision broadcasting in Canada is governed by the Broadcasting Act31 (S.C. 1991, c. 11) and regulations made under the Act by the Canadian Radio-television and Telecommunications Commission (CRTC). Federal regulations prohibit television broadcasters from \"broadcasting false or misleading news and abusive comments that are likely to expose persons to hatred based on listed grounds.\"32\n\nFederal broadcasting regulations that deal with false or misleading news include\n\n\nsection 8(1)(d) of the *Broadcasting Distribution Regulations*; [and]\n\nsection 5(1)(d) of the *Television Broadcasting Regulations, 1987*[.] Subject to a public hearing under section 18 of the Act, the Commission has the power to suspend or revoke the license33 of a broadcaster where the licensee has contravened or failed to comply with any condition of the license or mandatory orders, or any regulation made under the Act.\n\n\n\n29 Fleming v. Ontario, 2018 ONCA 160, http://www.ontariocourts.ca/decisions/2018/2018ONCA0160.pdf, archived at https://perma.cc/5FXT-BVLE.\nAccording to a report by Politifact,\n\n[a]ny network that wants to broadcast in Canada must get approved by the Canadian Radio-television and Telecommunications Commission. And Canadians who take issue with the truthfulness of their programming can file complaints to the commission. If a network amasses enough complaints and is found to have knowingly and deliberately broadcasted false news, its license can be limited or revoked. But that has never happened before, commission spokesperson Eric Rancourt said \"Based on the history of these kind of complaints, it would have be very, very egregious for the commission (to revoke or deny a license). That's all speculative, since it hasn't happened before,\" Rancourt said. The commission has only taken serious action a couple of times in its history, and not against Fox News, but Al Jazeera, according to commission regulator Sheehan Carter. The commission approved the Arabic-language news channel in 2004, with the condition that distributors must edit out abusive content. The condition doesn't apply to Al Jazeera English.34 According to news reports CRTC says \"it is not reviewing the presence on Canadian TVs of RT,\"\na channel that has been \"labelled a propaganda tool of the Russian government by US intelligence agencies and accused of spreading disinformation by French president Emmanuel Macron.\"35\nEric Rancourt, a spokesperson for the CRTC, reportedly said RT \"is not currently under review, nor has it ever been under review.\" Asked whether its use as a propaganda tool as outlined in the US intelligence report would contravene the conditions for its distribution in Canada, he said the CRTC \"cannot speculate on what might happen in the future,\" noting that the agency makes decisions \"based on the public record.\"36 More recently, partly in an effort to counter foreign influence in Canada's federal general elections, the government passed the Elections Modernization Act,37 which amended the Canada Elections Act38 to include a prohibition on the use of broadcasting stations outside Canada to influence elections:\n\n\n\n## Broadcasting Outside Canada Prohibition - Use Of Broadcasting Station Outside Canada\n\n330 (1) No person shall, with intent to influence persons to vote or refrain from voting, or to vote or refrain from voting for a particular candidate or registered party, at an election, use a broadcasting station outside Canada, or aid, abet, counsel or procure the use of a broadcasting station outside Canada, during an election period, for the broadcasting of any matter having reference to an election.\n\n## Exception\n\n(1.1) Subsection (1) does not apply in respect of any matter that is broadcast if the broadcasting signals originated in Canada.\n\n## Prohibition - Broadcasting Outside Canada\n\n(2) During an election period, no person shall broadcast, outside Canada, election advertising with respect to an election.39\n\nLaney Zhang Foreign Law Specialist SUMMARY\nAlthough the Chinese Constitution declares that citizens enjoy freedom of speech and freedom of the press, these freedoms are tightly restricted by specific laws and regulations. Typically, the laws and regulations governing cyberspace, the press, and the media contain a list of prohibited content, which includes but is not limited to matters concerning national security, terrorism, ethnic hatred, violence, and obscenity.\n\nForeign media organizations and their journalists must be approved by and register with the Chinese foreign affairs authority and obtain relevant certificates. Compared with journalists working for China's state-controlled media, foreign journalists appear to have less opportunities to be called on and raise questions at press conferences of the National People's Congress meetings.\n\nI.  Introduction The Constitution of the People's Republic of China (PRC or China) declares that citizens enjoy freedom of speech and freedom of the press. In practice, however, these freedoms are not institutionally protected. Public speeches of wide impact on forbidden subjects could result in punishment, including criminal sentences.1 According to the Freedom House's 2019 *Freedom in the World* report, China has become \"home to one of the world's most restrictive media environments and its most sophisticated system of censorship, particularly online.\" The Freedom House report observes that the government's ability to monitor online and offline communications \"has increased dramatically in recent years.\"2\n\nII.  Limits on Freedom of Speech A.  Constitution Article 35 of the PRC Constitution provides that \"[c]itizens of the People's Republic of China enjoy freedom of speech, of the press, of assembly, of association, of procession and of demonstration.\"3 Meanwhile, article 51 states that citizens, \"in exercising their freedoms and rights, may not infringe upon the interests of the State, of society or of the collective, or upon the lawful freedoms and rights of other citizens.\"4 B.  Laws Freedom of speech and freedom of the press are tightly restricted by specific laws and regulations.5 Typically, laws and regulations governing cyberspace, the press, and the media contain a list of prohibited content and penalties for violations. Such prohibited content includes but is not limited to matters concerning national security, terrorism, ethnic hatred, violence, and obscenity. 1.  Cybersecurity Law The PRC Cybersecurity Law, which took effect on June 1, 2017, provides that the state protects the rights of citizens, legal persons, and other organizations to use networks \"in accordance with the law,\" and prescribes a series of prohibited activities when using networks.6 Paragraph 2 of article 12 of the Law states as follows:\nAny person and organization using networks shall abide by the Constitution and laws, observe public order, and respect social morality; they must not endanger cybersecurity, and must not use the Internet to engage in activities endangering national security, national honor, and national interests; they must not incite subversion of national sovereignty, overturn the socialist system, incite separatism, break national unity, advocate terrorism or extremism, advocate ethnic hatred and ethnic discrimination, disseminate violent, obscene, or sexual information, create or disseminate false information to disrupt the economic or social order, or information that infringes on the reputation, privacy, intellectual property or other lawful rights and interests of others, and other such acts.7 Article 70 of the Law further provides that the publication or transmission of any information specified under paragraph 2 of article 12 of this Law or other laws or administrative regulations is subject to penalties prescribed by relevant laws and regulations.8\n2.  Regulation on the Administration of Publishing Publishing activities in China are governed by the Regulation on the Administration of Publishing, which was first promulgated by the State Council in 2001 and most recently amended in 2016.9 According to article 25 of the Regulation, no publication may contain content on any of the following matters:\n(1) Those opposing the basic principles established in the Constitution;\n\n(2) Those endangering the unification, sovereignty and territorial integrity of the State; (3) Those which divulge secrets of the State, endanger national security or damage the\nhonor or benefits of the State; (4) Those which incite the national hatred or discrimination, undermine the solidarity of the nations, or infringe upon national customs and habits; (5) Those which propagate evil cults or superstition; (6) Those which disturb the public order or destroy the public stability; (7) Those which propagate obscenity, gambling, violence or instigate crimes;\n(8) Those which insult or slander others, or infringe upon the lawful rights or interests of others; (9) Those which endanger public ethics or the fine national cultural traditions;\n(10) Other contents prohibited by laws, administrative regulations or provisions of the State.10 Persons publishing or importing publications containing such content may be criminally prosecuted or subject to administrative penalties, according to article 62 of the Regulation.11 3.  Regulation on Radio and Television Administration Similarly, the Regulation on Radio and Television Administration, which was first promulgated by the State Council in 1997 and has not been majorly revised since then, prohibits radio and television stations from producing or broadcasting programs containing the following content:\n\n(1) that which endangers the unity, sovereignty and territorial integrity of the country;\n\n(2) that which endangers state security, honour and interests; (3) that which instigates nationality separation or disrupts nationality solidarity; (4) that which divulges state secrets;\n(5) that which slanders or insults others; (6) that which propagates obscenity, superstition or plays up violence; and\n(7) other contents prohibited under provisions of laws and regulations.12\n\nThose who produce, broadcast, or provide to overseas users programs containing such content may be criminally prosecuted or subject to administrative penalties, according to article 49 of the Regulation.13\n\nIII. Mechanism to Control Foreign Broadcasters Working on Behalf of Foreign Governments The reporting activities of foreign media organizations and foreign journalists in China are governed by the Regulation on Reporting Activities of Permanent Offices of Foreign Media Organizations and Foreign Journalists, which was issued by the State Council in 2008.14 Under the Regulation, foreign media organizations must seek approval from China's Ministry of Foreign Affairs and submit required documents in order to establish offices in China and send resident journalists.15 After being approved, such foreign media offices and resident journalists must register with the Chinese foreign affairs authority and obtain relevant certificates. 16  The Regulation does not appear to differentiate broadcasters working on behalf of foreign governments from other foreign media and journalists. Foreign journalists also need \"foreign journalist cards\" in order to report China's \"Two Sessions\"the meetings of the National People's Congress and the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference. 17  Compared with journalists working for China's state-controlled media, foreign journalists appear to have less opportunities to be called on at the press conferences of the Two Sessions.18\n\n## France\n\nNicolas Boring Foreign Law Specialist SUMMARY\nFreedom of speech is considered an \"essential freedom\" in France.  It is protected by the 1789 Declaration of Human and Civic Rights, which is incorporated by reference into the French Constitution.  It is also protected by the European Convention on Human Rights, to which France is a party.  Yet, while French law considers free speech to be an essential component of a democratic society, it is not seen as absolute.  French legislators, and French courts, seek to balance freedom of speech with other imperatives, such as other freedoms and rights, and public order.  Thus, freedom of expression may be limited for the sake of protecting privacy, protecting the presumption of innocence, and preventing defamation and insults.  Freedom of expression may also be limited for the sake of protecting public order.  It is therefore illegal to incite others to commit a crime, even when no crime ends up being actually committed.  French law also prohibits hate speech, and speech denying or justifying the Holocaust and other crimes against humanity.  Additionally, French law prohibits defamation against government institutions and office-holders, as well as disrespecting the national anthem and flag in the context of public events organized or regulated by public authorities.\n\nTelevision and radio broadcasting used to be state monopolies, but were liberalized in the 1980s.  Freedom of broadcasting is the main legal principle for television and radio.\nNevertheless, broadcasters must abide by laws that protect and promote human dignity, freedom, the property of others, pluralism of views and opinions, children and adolescents, public order, and national defense. Furthermore, broadcasters that rely on radio waves must be authorized by the Conseil superieur de l'audiovisuel (CSA)\n(Superior Council on Audiovisual) to use specific bandwidths.  The CSA attributes bandwidths on the basis of technical criteria and also with the goal of promoting the public interest and pluralism.  Additionally, the CSA monitors broadcasts to ensure respect for French laws.  The CSA does not censure broadcasts beforehand, but may sanction broadcasters engaging in illegal speech after the fact.  First offenses lead to an order to cease and desist, but subsequent offenses may lead to fines and even the suspension or withdrawal of broadcasting authorizations.  Recent legislation also allows the CSA to withdraw the broadcasting authorization of an operator controlled by a foreign state if it broadcasts content that harms a fundamental national interest of France.  This legislation specifically mentions the dissemination of false information to interfere with the proper functioning of institutions as an example of a broadcast harmful to a fundamental national interest.\n\n\n\nI.  Freedom of Speech A.  An Essential Freedom Freedom of expression is considered an \"essential freedom\" in France.1  It is protected by the French Constitution, which incorporates the Declaration of Human and Civic Rights of 1789.2\nArticles 10 and 11 of the Declaration protect freedoms of opinion and expression, describing the\n\"free communication of ideas and of opinions\" as \"one of the most precious rights of man.\"3\nSimilarly, the European Convention on Human Rights, by which France is bound, provides that \"[e]veryone has the right to freedom of expression,\" including \"freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas without interference by public authority and regardless of frontiers.\"4 Consequently, courts have repeatedly recognized freedom of speech as a foundational right.  The Constitutional Council, which judges the constitutionality of French legislation, considers that \"the freedom of expression and of communication is that much more precious because its exercise is a condition of democracy and among the guarantees that other rights and freedoms will be respected.\"5  Consequently, the right to free speech should apply broadly.  The European Court of Human Rights declared that freedom of speech \"is applicable not only to 'information' or\n'ideas' that are favourably received or regarded as inoffensive or as a matter of indifference, but also to those that offend, shock or disturb the State or any sector of the population.\"6 B.  Freedom of Speech Is Not Absolute Despite its foundational importance, freedom of speech was never intended to be absolute.  In contrast to the First Amendment of the United States Constitution, the 1789 Declaration of Human and Civic Rights provided limits to freedom of expression in its very definition.  Article 10 declares that \"[n]o one may be disturbed on account of his opinions, even religious ones, as long france.gouv.fr/affichTexte.do?cidTexte=LEGITEXT000006071194, *archived at* https://perma.cc/95S6-F4KX, English translation *available at*  https://www.conseil-constitutionnel.fr/en/constitution-of-4-october-1958, archived at https://perma.cc/MPL8-K9PA. 1789], art. 11, https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/Droit-francais/Constitution/Declaration-des-Droits-de-l- Homme-et-du-Citoyen-de-1789, *archived at* https://perma.cc/G3K5-CBGQ, English translation *available at* https://www.conseil-constitutionnel.fr/sites/default/files/as/root/bank_mm/anglais/cst2.pdf, *archived at* https://perma.cc/K6FB-WUUQ. Convention_ENG.pdf, *archived at* https://perma.cc/BFR2-WU6M.\nas the manifestation of such opinions does not interfere with the established Law and Order.\"7\nArticle 11 provides that \"[a]ny citizen may therefore speak, write and publish freely, except what is tantamount to the abuse of this liberty in the cases determined by Law.\"8  Similarly, the European Convention on Human Rights declares that\n[t]he exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and responsibilities, may be subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society, in the interests of national security, territorial integrity or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, for the protection of the reputation or rights of others, for preventing the disclosure of information received in confidence, or for maintaining the authority and impartiality of the judiciary.9 Thus, French law seeks to balance freedom of speech with other imperatives, as shown by extensive jurisprudence on this topic.  The Cour de cassation, France's highest court for civil and criminal matters, established the general principle that \"restrictions to freedom of expression should be interpreted narrowly.\"10   They must also be proportional to the expected harm, as shown by a 1933 decision by the Council of State, which is the highest French jurisdiction for matters of administrative law.  In that case, the mayor of the City of Nevers prohibited the plaintiff from holding a public meeting, in response to protests from teachers' unions (the plaintiff had a history of mocking teachers in his speeches).11  The Council of State struck down the mayor's order prohibiting the meeting on the grounds that it was disproportional to the risk of public disorder that the meeting presented.12  While this decision was, strictly speaking, a freedom of assembly case, its principle of proportionality applies to freedom of expression as well.  For example, it was cited in a 2014 decision in which the Council of State upheld the prohibition of a public performance by controversial comedian Dieudonne M'bala M'bala, because it was justified by the high risk that he would disturb public order by engaging in illegal hate speech.13\n\n\n\n## 7 Declaration Des Droits De L'Homme Et Du Citoyen De 1789  Art. 10.\n\nTexte=CETATEXT000028460200, *archived at* https://perma.cc/G7JK-L55C.\n\nThe balance that French courts seek between freedom of expression and other imperatives is very fact-dependent.  Nonetheless, it appears that proper limits on speech can be separated into two broad categories:  limits related to the rights of others, and limits related to public order.14 II.  Limits Related to the Rights of Others The 1789 Declaration of Human and Civic Rights defines freedom in general as \"being able to do anything that does not harm others.\"15  Consistent with that definition, freedom of speech in France is limited by the right to privacy, the presumption of innocence, the right to \"human dignity,\" and by rules prohibiting defamation and insult.16\n\nThe right to privacy is protected by the Penal Code,17 the Civil Code,18 and the European Convention on Human Rights.19  Additionally, the Civil Code aims to protect the presumption of innocence of criminal defendants by prohibiting the media from presenting a person who has not yet been convicted of a crime as being guilty of that crime.20 Furthermore, the Law of 29 July 1881 on Freedom of the Press, which is still in force (although it has been amended numerous times since its original adoption), prohibits defamation and insults, both written and verbal.  The Law of 29 July 1881 defines \"defamation\" as \"any allegation or imputation of a fact which harms the honor or consideration of the person or group to which the fact is imputed.\"21  The same provision defines \"insult\" as \"any offensive expression, term of contempt, or invective which does not contain the imputation of any fact.\"22  The legislators have tried to find a balance between freedom of speech and the prohibitions against defamation and insult.  Thus, speech may not be considered defamation if it can be shown to have been expressed in good faith, or if it is truealthough the \"exception of truth\" is itself limited by the right to do;jsessionid=C50ABCA9B7BF412A2B73E353FBED9BE2.tplgfr23s_3?idSectionTA=LEGISCTA000006165309&ci dTexte=LEGITEXT000006070719&dateTexte=20190607, *archived at* https://perma.cc/Q597-7BYC. C50ABCA9B7BF412A2B73E353FBED9BE2.tplgfr23s_3?idSectionTA=LEGISCTA000006117610&cidTexte=LEGI TEXT000006070721&dateTexte=20190607, *archived at* https://perma.cc/G9KA-Q99G.\nprivacy, meaning that a true statement may still be considered defaming if it concerns a person's private life.23 III.  Limits Related to Public Order A.  Prohibitions on Inciting Criminal Acts Speech may be limited to protect the community in general.  Thus, speech that incites the commission of a criminal offense can be prosecuted as complicity in that offense.24  Incitation of homicide, physical or sexual assault, theft, extortion, destruction of property, and other intentional degradations that put others in danger is punishable by up to five years in prison and a fine of 45,000 (approximately US$50,500) even if the crime in question was never actually committed.25  The same punishment applies to inciting criminal offenses against a fundamental national interest, and defending or justifying slavery, war crimes, or crimes against humanity.26\nInciting or justifying acts of terrorism is punishable by up to five years in prison and a fine of\n75,000 (approximately US$84,160).27  These sanctions are increased to seven years in prison and a fine of 100,000 (approximately US$112,200) if the incitation or justification was done via a public online service.28 B.  Prohibitions on Hate Speech and Denial of Crimes against Humanity Similarly, French law prohibits \"hate speech,\" defined as \"inciting discrimination, hatred or violence against a person or group of persons because of their origins or because they belong or do not belong to a certain ethnicity, nation, race or religion,\" as well as \"inciting hatred or violence against a person or group of persons because of their sex, sexual orientation, gender identity, or disability.\"29    Hate speech is punishable by up to a year in prison and a fine of 45,000, as is the denial or minimization of recognized crimes against humanity, in particular the Holocaust.30  In the case of these prohibitions against hate speech and denial of crimes against humanity, freedom of speech is limited for the sake of protecting human dignity.31\n\n\n23 Wachsmann, *supra* note 14, at 498-49.\n\nC.  Limits on Speech against Institutions and Officeholders Speech may also be limited to protect, to a certain extent, the country's institutions.  The Law of\n29 July 1881 provides that \"defamation . . . against the courts, the tribunals, the army, navy or air force, the state bodies and public administrations, shall be punished by a fine of 45,000 Euros).\"32\nThe same sanction applies to defamation against government officials in their official capacity, from the President and members of Parliament all the way to local officials.33  Jurors and witnesses at trials are also protected by the same provision.34  The Law of 29 July 1881 explicitly exempts good-faith reporting of parliamentary or judicial proceedings from prosecution for defamation.35  Furthermore, the Cour de cassation has declared that criticism of the manner in which institutions function is a valid exercise of freedom of expression.36  Nevertheless, defamation prosecutions do occur, and are often difficult to defend against.37 Another limit to free speech that is worth noting is that disrespecting the French national anthem or the French flag, in the context of an event organized or regulated by public authorities (such as a commemorative ceremony or certain sports events), is punishable by a fine of up to 7,500\n(approximately US$8,400).38  The same act is punishable by a fine of 7,500 and up to six months in jail if it is committed by a group of people.39 IV.  Regulation of Radio and Television Broadcasting A.  General Overview Radio and television broadcasting were a state monopoly from 1945 to 1981.40  Private radio stations were allowed in 1981, and a 1982 law established the principle of broadcasting freedom for radio and television.41  This 1982 law was repealed in 1986 to be replaced by the Law of 30\nSeptember 1986 Regarding Freedom of Communication, often referred to as the *Loi Leotard* (after\n36 Cour de cassation, Crim. Mar. 23, 1978, No. 77-90339, https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichJuriJudi. do?idTexte=JURITEXT000007060809, *archived at* https://perma.cc/ZF2K-FRDG. 37 Wachsmann, *supra* note 14, at 497-501. 38 C. PENAL art. 433-5-1, https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichCode.do;jsessionid=4757158D1318F5 52A0FDF5F30DFC62D6.tplgfr38s_2?idSectionTA=LEGISCTA000006165369&cidTexte=LEGITEXT000006070719 &dateTexte=20190618, *archived at* https://perma.cc/U386-WVT2. 39 Id. 40 Wachsmann, *supra* note 14, at 492-93. https://perma.cc/9BBV-DD9E.\nthe name of the law's main sponsor, Minister of Culture and Communication Francois Leotard).42\nThe Loi Leotard, which was amended several times but remains one of the principal texts governing broadcasting in France, retained the general principal of freedom of audiovisual broadcasting.43  In its current wording, the Loi Leotard governs \"communication to the public via electronic means,\" which it defines as \"broadcasts, transmission or reception of signs, signals, written words, images, or sounds, by electromagnetic means,\" that do not have the nature of private correspondence.44  Freedom of broadcasting\n\nmay not be limited except to the extent necessary . . . to protect human dignity, freedom, the property of others, and the pluralistic character of the expression of trends of thought and opinions, . . . the protection of children and adolescents, the preservation of public order, the necessities of national defense, public service requirements, technical constraints inherent to the means of communication, as well as the necessity for audiovisual services to develop audiovisual production.45 B.  Enforcement The main regulatory agency for radio and television broadcasting is the Conseil superieur de l'audiovisuel (CSA) (Superior Council on Audiovisual), an independent agency that was created in a 1989 amendment to the Loi Leotard.46 One of the CSA's missions is to manage the attribution of radio frequencies.47  The criteria by which the CSA accepts or denies the applications of private broadcasters include, in addition to technical considerations, the promotion of \"the public interest and the respect of pluralism.\"48\nBroadcasters who do not rely on radio waves, such as cable television, are not subject to authorization.49  However, the CSA is also tasked with monitoring broadcasters to ensure that they respect French law.50  The CSA does not practice censorship prior to broadcasting, but may\n\n42 Loi n 86-1067 du 30 septembre 1986 relative a la liberte de communication (Loi Leotard) [Law No. 86-1067 of apply sanctions after broadcasting if a program violates French law.51  Applicable sanctions range from an order to cease and desist, to a fine of up to 3% of the broadcaster's revenue over the previous year, or 5% of the broadcaster's revenue in the case of recidivism.52  The CSA may also suspend or withdraw an authorization to broadcast.53  Additionally, the CSA may require operators to broadcast a communique, under terms and conditions dictated by the CSA itself, as part of a sanction for illegal speech.54 C.  Rule Specific to Broadcasters Controlled by Foreign States In addition to the enforcement authority mentioned above, an amendment to the Loi Leotard adopted in December 2018 specifically addresses the case of media controlled by foreign states. Article 42-6 provides that the CSA may, after a first warning, withdraw the broadcasting authorization of an operator controlled by or under the influence of a foreign state, if it broadcasts content that harms a fundamental national interest of France.55  This provision explicitly states that the propagation of false information to interfere with the proper functioning of institutions should be considered as harmful to a fundamental national interest.56  This provision also states that the CSA may, in deciding to withdraw an authorization, consider content that the broadcaster, or its subsidiary or parent organization, published on other communication services, but the CSA may not base its decision entirely on that.57\n\n## Germany\n\nJenny Gesley Foreign Law Specialist\n\nSUMMARY\nThe German Constitution guarantees freedom of expression, freedom of the press, and\nfreedom to receive information, among other enumerated communication rights, to every person. Disseminating untrue facts or \"abusive criticism,\" defined as statements that are not primarily made to debate a topic, but to defame a person, fall outside the\nscope of protection.\nThe communication rights may only be limited by general laws. In the context of\nheckling, such general laws could be criminal law provisions protecting personal honor\nor civil law norms on undisturbed enjoyment of premises, or other basic rights. However, these limitations have to be examined in light of the constitutional\nsignificance of the basic right they are restricting, meaning the limitations must\nthemselves be restricted. I. Overview of Freedom of Speech and Freedom of the Press\nArticle 5 of the German Basic Law, the country's constitution, guarantees freedom of speech and\nfreedom of the press, among other enumerated communication rights.1 The communication\nrights are not restricted to Germans; they are applicable to \"every person.\" In addition to all\nnatural persons, domestic legal persons may invoke it.2 This also applies to foreign legal persons\ndomiciled in the European Union (EU) due to the bans on discrimination under Union law.3 Article 5 states that\n(1) Every person shall have the right freely to express and disseminate his opinions in speech, writing and pictures . . . . Freedom of the press . . . shall be guaranteed. There shall\nbe no censorship.\n(2) These rights shall find their limits in the provisions of general laws, in provisions for the protection of young persons, and in the right to personal honour.\n\ninternet.de/englisch_gg/englisch_gg.pdf, *archived at* https://perma.cc/R94W-YBZ3.\nUnlike the US Constitution, which codifies a prohibition for Congress to make laws abridging free speech, the rights codified in the German Basic Law additionally have a \"radiating effect\" on private law, meaning that private parties are indirectly bound by them.4\n\nII. Scope of Protection A. Freedom of Speech The Federal Constitutional Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht, BVerfG) in its landmark Luth decision stated that freedom of opinion, as the most immediate expression of the human personality living in society, is one of the noblest of human rights (*un des droits les plus precieux de l'homme*\naccording to article 11 of the Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen of 1789). It is absolutely essential to a liberal-democratic constitutional order, because it alone makes possible the constant intellectual exchange and the contest among opinions that form the lifeblood of such an order; indeed, it is 'the matrix, the indispensable condition of nearly every other form of freedom' (Cardozo).5\n\nFreedom of speech covers value judgments and statements of facts, if those statements of facts form the basis for an opinion. The term \"opinion\" is understood broadly. Expressions of a viewpoint, the taking of a position, or the holding of an opinion within the framework of intellectual dispute fall within its scope. If the statement \"contributes to the intellectual battle of opinions on an issue of public concern,\" there is a presumption in favor of its admissibility. Untrue facts fall outside the scope of freedom of expression. The Federal Constitutional Court held that this basic right [freedom of opinion] guarantees to all persons the right to freedom of expression without expressly distinguishing between a value judgement and a statement of facts. Everyone is at liberty to speak his or her mind freely whether or not he or she is able to furnish verifiable reasons for his or her judgement. (42 BVerfGE 163, 170 et seq.); at the same time, the purpose of free speech is to form opinions, persuade, and exert an intellectual influence over other persons. This is why value judgements, always meant to convince others, are protected by article 5, para. 1, sentence 1 of the Basic Law. The basic right is primarily designed to protect the speaker's personal opinion. (7 BVerfGE 198, 210). It is irrelevant whether an opinion is valuable or worthless, correct or false, or justified emotionally or rationally. (33 BVerfGE 1, 14 et seq.). If the opinion in question contributes to the intellectual battle of opinions on an issue of public concern, there is a presumption in favor of the admissibility of that free speech. (7 BVerfGE 198, 212). Even harsh and exaggerated statements, in particular in the political battle of opinion, generally fall within the scope of Article 5, paragraph 1, first sentence of the Basic Law (54 BVerfGE 129, 139); the question can only be whether and to what extent the provisions of the general laws and the right to personal honor (article 5, para. 2 Basic Law) may draw limits here.\n\nThis does not apply in the same way to assertions of facts. False information is not an object worthy of protection from the viewpoint of freedom of opinion (54 BVerfGE 208, 219). The deliberate assertion of untrue facts is not protected by article 5, paragraph 1 of the Basic Law; the same applies to wrong quotations (BVerfG, loc.cit.). . . .  The communication of a fact is protected by freedom of opinion because and insofar as it forms the basis for an opinion. . . . From all this, the term \"opinion\" in article 5, paragraph 1, first sentence of the Basic Law must in principle be understood broadly: where an utterance is characterized as an expression of a viewpoint, the taking of a position, or the holding of an opinion within the framework of intellectual dispute, it falls within the scope protected by the fundamental right.6 Asking questions is also protected by freedom of speech, because questions play \"an important role in the process of opinion formation.\"7 They are treated like value judgments.8 Rhetorical questions, on the other hand, are not actually questions as they do not require an answer. The Federal Constitutional Court therefore treats them like value judgments or assertions of facts, depending on the content.9 However, the overall context always has to be taken into account, so that something that at first sight looks like a question, actually qualifies as a false assertion of a fact.10 Not protected by freedom of opinion is \"abusive criticism\" (*Schmahkritik*). The Federal Constitutional Court defines abusive criticism as statements that are \"no longer primarily aimed at addressing a debate in a matter-of-fact way, but at the defamation of a person. In addition to polemical and exaggerated criticism, it must include a degradation of the person.\"11 Such abusive criticism is not included in the scope of protection.\n\n\nB. Freedom of the Press Freedom of the press is not just a subcategory of freedom of expression; it is an independent and separate freedom under article 5 of the Basic Law. In addition to expressing and disseminating an opinion using the press, the basic right guarantees the \"institutional independence of the press that extends from the acquisition of information to the dissemination of news and opinion; [...]\n\n6 BVerfG, 61 BVerfGE 1, paras. 13-16, http://www.servat.unibe.ch/dfr/bv061001.html, archived at https://perma.cc/7B2V-44EQ, unofficial English translation available at https://law.utexas.edu/ transnational/foreign-law-translations/german/case.php?id=639, *archived at* https://perma.cc/JU43-L7BC. 7 BVerfG, 85 BVerfGE 23, para. 43, https://www.jurion.de/urteile/bverfg/1991-10-09/1-bvr-221_90/, archived at https://perma.cc/ARE9-5EDD, unofficial English translation available at https://law.utexas.edu/ transnational/foreign-law-translations/german/case.php?id=624, *archived at* https://perma.cc/8NBG-CTXW. 8 Id. at 44. https://perma.cc/H9AU-SXVK, unofficial English translation available at https://law.utexas. edu/transnational/foreign-law-translations/german/case.php?id=629, *archived at* https://perma.cc/GVJ4- 43LX.\nthis includes the right of persons working for the press to express their opinion as freely and unrestricted as every other citizen.\"12\n\nIII. Limits on Freedom of Speech and Freedom of the Press\n\nFreedom of speech and freedom of the press are limited by general laws, provisions for the protection of young persons, and the right to personal honor.13 The last two categories are generally seen as included in the category \"general laws.\"14 The Federal Constitutional Court defines \"general laws\" as laws that \"do not prohibit or target the expression of an opinion as such\", but rather \"aim to protect a legal interest per se without regard to a specific opinion.\"15\nExamples of general laws that might be relevant in the context of heckling are, among others, the Criminal Code, in particular the provisions on insult or on the dissemination of ideas that violate human dignity,16 police law, and civil law provisions. However, these general laws have to be examined in light of the constitutional significance of the basic right they are restricting, meaning the limitations must themselves be interpreted restrictively in order to preserve the substance of the basic right (balancing of interests).17 With regard to heckling and confronting speakers, the Federal Constitutional Court has held that, for example, the right of the owner to undisturbed enjoyment of the premises that derives from section 903, sentence one and section 1004 of the German Civil Code is a general law that may limit the communication rights codified in article 5, paragraph 1 of the Basic Law.18 Restrictions to prevent disturbances are not generally excluded. However, the state, unlike private citizens, may not use such a right to enforce its own interests and may only use it to prevent expressions of opinion if this serves the public interest.19 The Court stated that http://www.bverfg.de/e/rs20091104_1bvr215008.html, *archived at* https://perma.cc/TXA9-4V97, English translation (extract only) available at http://www.bverfg.de/e/rs20091104_1bvr215008en.html, archived at https://perma.cc/K5TL-D3DN. 15 BVerfG, *supra* note 4, para. 36. 16 STRAFGESETZBUCH [STGB] [CRIMINAL CODE], Nov. 13, 1998, BGBL. I at 3322, as amended,  185 et seq.,  130, http://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/stgb/StGB.pdf, *archived at* https://perma.cc/PA8M-E2ZU, unofficial English translation available at http://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/englisch_stgb/englisch_stgb.pdf (English version updated through Oct. 10, 2013), archived at https://perma.cc/RQ57-7ALQ. 17 BVerfG, *supra* note 4, para. 34. 18 Burgerliches Gesetzbuch [BGB] [Civil Code], Jan.2, 2002, BGBL. I at 42, 2909; corrected in BGBL. 2003 I at 738, as amended,  903, sentence 1,  1004, http://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/bgb/BGB.pdf, *archived at*\nhttps://perma.cc/BRN4-P7U4 unofficial English translation available at http://www.gesetze-iminternet.de/englisch_bgb/englisch_bgb.pdf, (English version updated through Oct. 1, 2013*), archived at* https://perma.cc/77EX-38MM.\nTherefore, in particular the wish to create a \"feel-good atmosphere\" in a sphere which is strictly reserved for consumer purposes and which remains free from political discussions and social conflicts cannot be used as the basis for prohibiting the distribution of leaflets. The state may not restrict fundamental rights in order to ensure that the carefree mood of citizens is not disturbed by the misery of the world (see BVerfGE 102, 347 <364>). Consequently, the fact that third parties are annoyed by being confronted with topics which they find unpleasant is irrelevant. What is particularly out of the question are bans which serve the purpose of preventing certain expressions of opinion for the sole reason that the defendant does not share them, disapproves of their content or regards them as discrediting the business of an enterprise because of the critical statements it contains.\n\n\nOn the other hand, the defendant is not prevented from using its right as the owner of premises to undisturbed possession to restrict the distribution of leaflets and other forms of expression of opinion to the extent necessary to guarantee the safety and functioning of airport operations. . . . [T]his is . . . an important common interest which can justify encroachment on fundamental rights. The restrictions on freedom of expression must be suitable, necessary and appropriate for achieving the purpose. This excludes in any event the possibility of a general ban. . . . On the other hand, restrictions which relate to certain types of expressions of opinion or places or times for expressions of opinion in order to prevent disturbances are not excluded in principle.20 As an exception to the rule that communications rights may only be restricted by general laws, the Federal Constitutional Court allows a restriction of freedom of speech by section 130, paragraph 4 of the Criminal Code, which criminalizes \"disturb[ing] the public peace in a manner that violates the dignity of the victims [of the Nazi regime] by approving of, glorifying, or justifying the National Socialist rule of arbitrary force.\"21 Even though the provision targets specific statements in relation to National Socialism and is not a general law, the Federal Constitutional Court held that the restriction is justified by \"the injustice and the horror which National Socialist rule inflicted on Europe and large parts of the world, defying general categories, and of the establishment of the Federal Republic of Germany which was understood as an antithesis of this . . .\".22 However, such an exception \"does not justify a general ban on the dissemination of right-wing radical or indeed National Socialist ideas.\"23\nIn addition to general laws, freedom of speech and freedom of the press can also be limited by other basic rights inherent in the German Basic Law. However, expressions of an opinion cannot be prohibited simply because they violate the constitutional order.24 The constitutional restrictions inherent in the Basic Law must be defined by the legislature. The public order reservation of section 15 of the Act on Assemblies as defined by the courts, for example, is insufficient to limit freedom of speech.25\n\nIV. Availability of Mechanism to Control Foreign Broadcasters Working on Behalf of Foreign Governments Article 5 of the Basic Law also protects the right of every person to receive information from generally accessible sources.26 The right to receive information has to be seen in light of the experiences of the National Socialist Regime where access to information was restricted, the state controlled opinions, and state prohibitions on the reception of foreign radio broadcasts and literature and art were in place.27 All types of sources are included in the right as long as they are generally accessible. The Federal Constitutional Court defines \"generally accessible sources\" as such that \"are suitable and intended to inform the general public, understood as an indeterminate group of persons.\"28 This includes mass communication, in particular radio and TV broadcasts. It is irrelevant whether the source is located in Germany or abroad.29 The Basic Law does not differentiate between national and foreign sources.30 In particular, foreign nationals who permanently reside in Germany have a right to receive information from sources from their home country to keep abreast of current events and to maintain a cultural and linguistic connection.31 The right to receive information includes the decision from which type of generally accessible source a person would like to get information.32 The Federal Constitutional Court has stated that\n[a]rticle 5 paragraph 1, sentence one of the Basic Law GG protects not only the active process of procuring information but also the simple receipt of information. The Basic Law seeks to guarantee that the individual is informed as comprehensively as possible. An individual can also be 'informed' from sources that come to his or her attention without the participation of the recipient. Only the possession of information enables an\n\nVersammlungsgesetz [VersG] [Act on Assemblies], Nov. 15, 1978, BGBL. I at 1789, as amended,  15, http://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/versammlg/VersammlG.pdf, *archived at* https://perma.cc/Q2P3-U2V6.\n26 Basic Law, art. 5, para. 1, sentence 1. 27 BVerfG, 27 BVerfGE 71, para. 35, https://openjur.de/u/193099.html, *archived at* https://perma.cc/YUV3- VBXN, unofficial English translation available at https://law.utexas.edu/transnational/foreign-lawtranslations/german/case.php?id=649, *archived at* https://perma.cc/9NTV-5W3P. 28 BVerfG, Feb. 9, 1994, docket no. 1 BvR 1687/92, ECLI:DE:BVerfG:1994:rs19940209.1bvr168792, para. 13, http://www.bverfg.de/e/rs19940209_1bvr168792.html, *archived at* https://perma.cc/85PQ-LY2T, providing further references.\n\nindependent selection. Being able to select between sources is the fundamental definitional element of every piece of information. If freedom of information did not guarantee that sources of information reach the individual, then he or she would be prevented from selecting among them through active participation. 'To inform himself' therefore also means the purely intellectual process of taking information in.33 In addition, as already mentioned, the right to free speech applies to every person, meaning that persons working for foreign broadcasters located in Germany can invoke it.34\n\nHowever, all communications rights, including the right to receive information, are limited by general laws as outlined above.35 If information from generally accessible sources from foreign broadcasters violates criminal law norms for example, it can be restricted.\n\nAnother limitation can be found in the Interstate Treaty on Broadcasting.36 It provides that private broadcasters in Germany need a license to operate.37 No license is needed for internet radio.38 A\nlicense will only be granted if several enumerated requirements are fulfilled, among them, residence or seat in Germany, another EU Member State, or another Member State of the European Economic Area (EEA). Foreign broadcasters must therefore establish a seat in Germany, the EU, or the EEA. A license will not be granted to legal persons under public law or institutions that are government funded. This prohibition also applies to foreign public or state institutions.39 It was reported that the German Commission on Licensing and Supervision revoked the radio license of Megaradio SNA because it allegedly uses too much content that is financed by the Russian government, thereby making it a de facto state organization.40 The broadcaster has lodged a complaint with the Administrative Court of Kassel.41\nGesetze_Staatsvertraege/Rundfunkstaatsvertrag_RStV.pdf, *archived at* https://perma.cc/L42Q-KDMU, English translation available at https://www.die-medienanstalten.de/fileadmin/user_upload/ Rechtsgrundlagen/Gesetze_Staatsvertraege/RStV_22_english_version_clean.pdf, archived at https://perma.cc/WP62-5KGS.\n\n## Israel\n\nRuth Levush Senior Foreign Law Specialist\n\nSUMMARY\nIsraeli law recognizes protection of freedom of speech as a constitutional principle.\nProtection extends to all forms and content of expression including freedom of the press\nand freedom to make a political speech. Freedom of speech, however, is not absolute and may be restricted under limited circumstances where there is \"near certainty\" that an expression would cause \"real harm\" to public safety.\nThe right to freedom of speech may also be limited in circumstances where it conflicts\nwith the right to human dignity protected under a basic law. Speech may also be\nrestricted based on statutory law containing prohibitions on incitement for racism; terrorism and violence; denial of the Holocaust and praise for atrocities committed by\nthe Nazis; as well as insult to a public servant and defamation; among others.\nIn balancing freedom of speech against other principles recognized under the legal\nsystem, the courts have applied relevant balancing formulas. Recognizing the significance of protecting speech, the Supreme Court applied a narrow interpretation to restrictions that may limit it. The Supreme Court has further determined that freedom of political expression should enjoy a particularly broad protection as compared with other types of expression. Such protection, however, does not extend to false factual expressions made maliciously against a public figure, as they do not\nconstitute protected expressions of opinion or criticism.\nTo extend broad protection to speech, the Court has also applied a narrow\ninterpretation to the elements of the offense of insult to a public servant. The offense, the Court held, exists only in rare cases where the expression \"harm[s] the core of human dignity and involve[s] a substantive and severe violation of the value-moral nucleus from which the public servant draws the source of his/her power and authority.\" Moreover, the prohibition will only apply where it is almost certain that the anticipated harm will harm the public employee as an individual as well as the public service system and the public trust in it.\nRecognizing a \"defense of responsible journalism\" against defamation suits, the Court\nextended the defense to circumstances where the publication was made in good faith, even if the information it contained ultimately turned out false. This defense will apply when there was an obligation to publish, no malicious intent, and when the publication complied with standards of responsible, cautious and fair journalism, and the publisher\ntook steps to prevent unnecessary harm to the object of the publication.\nThere appears to be no control of content disseminated by foreign broadcasters,\nincluding television, radio and social media, working on behalf of foreign governments. Television and radio broadcasting companies, however, are required to be registered in\nIsrael. Broadcasters that receive funding directly or indirectly from foreign\ngovernments are subject to disclosure requirements.\n\nI.  Introduction This report addresses limits to freedom of speech that may apply under Israeli law in situations where the speech is perceived to purposely undermine the right of a public servant or a politician for free speech. This includes circumstances where individuals, the press, including a blogger or group of individual bloggers, \"harass\" a speaker or \"misinform\" the public on issues of public interest. The report further discusses the availability of a mechanism to control foreign broadcasters working on behalf of foreign governments, to enable dissemination of misinformation thereby impacting public opinion in Israel. The terms \"freedom of speech\" and \"freedom of expression\" in this report are interchangeable.\n\nII.  Scope of Protection of Freedom of Speech and the Right to Interrupt Public Speech\n\nA. Normative Status of Protection of Freedom of Speech Freedom of expression had been recognized by Israel's Supreme Court as a basic constitutional right since the early days of the State. Judicial recognition of the constitutional protection of speech in Israel derived from the Declaration of Independence that provides for the democratic character of the state.1 Although freedom of speech has not been expressly guaranteed under a basic law, it has been opined that its normative status has been elevated following the adoption of Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty in 1992, as \"freedom of speech is an essential component of human's dignity and liberty.\"2 B. General Scope of Protection Israeli courts have recognized the principle of freedom of speech as applying to all forms of expression as well as types of content. It therefore applies to freedom of the press and freedom to make a political speech.3 The courts determined that freedom of speech includes the right to receive information and to react to it; the right to speak and to listen as well as to demonstrate. Freedom of expression, it was held, is not only the freedom to express accepted opinions, it is also the freedom to express divergent opinions that are disliked by the majority; the freedom to praise but also to criticize the government.4\n\nAlthough freedom of expression extends to a wide range of contents and formats, Israeli courts have recognized that an expression may be restricted under circumstances where there is \"near certainty\" that it would cause \"real harm\" to public safety.5 C. Balancing Freedom of Expression with Other Competing Principles Israeli law recognizes additional protections that may conflict with the right to free speech. Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty, e.g., expressly prohibits harm to human dignity.6 The Basic Law provides that\n[t]here shall be no violation of rights under this Basic Law except by a law befitting the values of the State of Israel, enacted for a proper purpose, and to an extent no greater than is required. . . .7 A number of laws include provisions that authorize restrictions on freedom of speech by criminalizing, among others, speech that constitutes incitement for racism, terrorism and violence; outrage to religious feelings; publication of false news causing fear and alarm; as well as expression of denial of the holocaust and praise for atrocities committed by the Nazis.8 When evaluating the right to freedom of expression against competing interests reflected under legislation authorizing limitations on such freedom, Israeli courts have applied various balancing formulas, including by limiting the scope of freedom of expression \"by time, space, frequency, etc., to achieve proper balancing, without having one of the [protected] interests completely withdrawn.\"9 Israel's Supreme Court has balanced competing interests in a number of cases including when freedom of expression conflicted with public safety, judicial ethics, public morality, and a person's right to a good name.10 D. Implementation of Statutory Limits on Freedom of Speech Relating to Public Servants, Journalists and Political Speech\n\nSpeech by a public servant or by a political figure may be limited under legislation prohibiting inflicting an insult to a public servant and under defamation law. The extent to which freedom of speech will be restricted in relevant cases has been defined by Israeli courts. The following is a discussion of the application of balancing formulas that apply when the legislative objective in prohibiting insult and defamation under the laws conflicts with the constitutional principle of freedom of speech.\n\n1.  Insult to Public Servant and Freedom of Speech In accordance with the Penal Law, 5737-1977,\n[a] person who by gestures, words or acts insults a public servant or a Judge or officer of a religious court or a member of a commission of inquiry under the Commissions of Inquiry Law, 5729-1968, whilst engaged in the discharge of his duties or in connection with the same is liable to imprisonment for six months.11 a.  Balancing of Freedom of Speech and Proper Functioning of Government A 2011 decision of the Supreme Court in the Ungarfeld case by an extended bench of nine justices analyzed the scope of the offense in view of its impact on the principle of freedom of expression.12\nThe petitioner in the case was convicted of the offense of insult to public servant (insult offense)\nfor hanging a poster across from the police station, stating that a named police officer should be fired \"because [he had] cooperated with criminals against those who complained against them,\n[and that] the police did not need 'rotten apples'.\"13 Rejecting the request for an additional hearing in the case, Justice Ayala Procaccia for the majority recognized the significance of freedom of expression in a democratic regime. The criminal prohibition on insulting a public servant, however, was intended to protect the proper functioning of public service in the state as an important foundation of a democratic government.\nAccording to Procaccia, a proper balance should be identified to achieve the objective of the criminal offense while inflicting a minimal negative impact on the constitutional right to freedom of expression. This requires a narrow interpretation of the insult offense, she opined. To constitute an \"insult\" in the meaning of the offense, the expression must pass a high bar composed of a \"qualitative test\" as well as a \"probability test.\" According to the former, the expression must\n\"harm the core of human dignity and involve a substantive and severe violation of the valuemoral nucleus from which the public servant draws the source of his/her power and authority.\"14 Commenting on the probability test, Procaccia stated,\n\"[i]nsulting\" within the normative meaning of the prohibition will therefore be devoted to irregular and extreme cases in which it is almost certain that the anticipated harm derived from it will not only harm the public employee as an individual, but also cause serious and severe harm to the fulfillment of his public function, thereby harming the public service system and the public trust in it.15 The Court rejected the request for an additional hearing and confirmed the petitioner's conviction in the offense of insulting a public servant.16 b.  Political Expression Further narrowing down the tests established in the Ungarfeld decision, the Supreme Court reached a different conclusion in a 2017 decision accepting an appeal of a conviction for the insult offense. The petitioner in that case was an editor of an internet site who had published an article criticizing the job performance of a former military rabbi, in view of the military's alleged handling of issues including joint military service of women and men and violation of the Sabbath and the Jewish dietary laws in military bases.17 Restating the high bar set under the Ungarfeld decision, Justice Miriam Naor, writing the majority opinion, held that implementation of the insult offense must be restricted only to cases where the insult may result in a serious and severe injury to a public servant's dignity. In cases involving a\n\"political expression,\" she opined, the bar will be even higher.18 Accordingly,\n\n[p]olitical expression is a means of realizing the individual's liberty and virtues, and incorporates a significant social value. It allows, perhaps more than any other expression, to fulfill the democratic component of freedom of expression. Political expression is a necessary condition for the exchange of ideas, the flow of information and the existence of a free discourse without which it is not possible to formulate a position on issues that are on the public agenda and to take part in the democratic process. Without political expression it will not be possible to have an effective oversight over the government . . . Because of all these political expression may not please the government, and therefore it needs a special protection against harassment on its [government] part . . . . Moreover, the political expression is important not only as a right of an independent value, but also as a means of securing additional basic rights. Against this background, a series of judgments determined that freedom of political expression should enjoy a particularly broad protection as compared with other types of expressions.19 The decision whether a particular statement constitutes \"a political expression\" should be made according to the relevant circumstances and context. The distinction between a political expression and a commercial one, according to Naor, depends primarily on the content of the expression, but also on the identity of its maker, and objectives.20 The more the expression deals with a public matter, such as a political or social issue, or with a public figure, the higher the tendency to classify it as a political expression. The Court has previously held in other cases that criticism of public officials, for example, criticism of the police commissioner due to the conduct of the police, will be considered a political expression.21 Naor determined that,\n[s]ince political expression stands at the top of the pyramid of expressions and fulfills the objectives of freedom of expression to the highest degree, it should be provided with the maximum possible protection . . . Accordingly, I believe that expressions should almost always be protected from the application of the insult offense . . . This means that in the vast majority of cases, if not in all of them, protection of political expression will be preferred over the protected value at the basis of the insult offense. At the same time, and for the sake of caution, I am prepared to leave a very narrow opening for the application of the offense in the rarest of cases, in which there is a disproportional and exceptional harm to the dignity of the public servant and at the moral nucleus from which  . . . [the public servant] draws his/her power and authority . . . .22\n\nAddressing the \"probability test\" established in the Ungarfeld decision, Naor made some additional determinations. In her view the higher the position of the public servant the higher the level of tolerance expected from him/her for offensive expressions.23 Other considerations for recognizing liability for the insult offense include the extent of public exposure enjoyed by the offensive publication.24 2.  Defamation Law and the \"Defense of Responsible Journalism\" Freedom of expression may be restricted when a publication constitutes defamation. A\ndefamatory publication is one that may\n(1) Humiliate a person or make that person a target of hatred, contempt or ridicule; (2) Degrade a person for acts, behavior or traits attributed to that person; (3) Harms a person's position, whether public office or other position, business, occupation, or profession; [or] (4) Degrade a person because of race, origin, religion, place of residence, age, sex, sexual orientation or disability, including permanent or temporary physical or mental impairment.25\nUnder section 15 of the Defamation Law, 5725-1965 (Defamation Law) it would be a good defense from criminal prosecution or a civil suit if the defendant or respondent made the publication in good faith circumstances including that\n\n(1) . . . what was published was true and that the publication was of public interest . . . ; [or when] (2) [t]he relationship between him/her and the person to whom the advertisement is directed has placed upon him/her a legal, moral or social duty to make such publication.26 a. Defense of Responsible Journalism A 2014 decision by nine justices of the Supreme Court centered on the application defenses under the Defamation Law to a journalist for a report regarding the responsibility of a commander of a unit that manned an Israel Defense Force post for the death of a girl from shooting. The petitioner sued the journalist and the broadcaster for defamation after he had been exonerated. The petition centers on the determination that the report dealt with an issue of significant public interest, and that the conditions of good faith were fulfilled, including meeting the criteria of responsible and cautious journalism.27 The main decision was given by Court President Asher Grunis. Rejecting the petition, Grunis determined that the publication was defamatory and did not reflect truth based on the evidence presented. Based on section 15(2) of the Law, however, Grunis recognized a defense of \"protection of responsible journalism.\" This protection will only apply to publications made in good faith, based on an obligation to publish, without malicious intent, and in accordance with the standard of responsible, cautious and fair journalism. In order to meet this standard, Grunis determined, the publisher will be required to take steps to prevent unnecessary harm to the publication object.28 The defense of protection of responsible journalism, according to Grunis, is not limited to professional journalists. He notes as follows:\nFrom a practical point of view, it is difficult to define the term \"journalist\" in a sweeping and exhaustive manner, especially in the present era, in which the characteristics and the spheres of activity of journalism have expanded beyond the traditional media. As stated, it is doubtful whether it is desirable to do so in the context before us.29\n\n\n\nb. Journalism Silencing Law Defense A 2018 decision by the Tel Aviv District Court rejected a lower court decision in a defamation suit filed by Prime Minister Netanyahu and his wife against the appellant, a journalist and novelist, in connection with publication of two posts on his Facebook page. In the first post the appellant described as \"an event that happened\" an event where the prime minister's convoy which included \"four black vehicles and more and more security guards and vehicles\" stopped and the Prime Minister supposedly exited shouting because of his wife's demands. The second post contained a demeaning caricature of the Prime Minister in the middle of the road.30 Rejecting the appeal District Court Judge Avigail Cohen held that Israeli law did not recognize the term \"silencing suit.\" Previous attempts to pass legislation in this regard, she noted, have failed (one bill's explanatory notes stated that it was inspired by the US ANTI SLAPP [Strategic Lawsuit against Public Participation] legislation adopted in 25 states). The circumstances of the case, however, she noted, would not qualify for a silencing suit defense, even if such a defense were recognized. This is because it centered on a publication that purported to be factual, not an expression of criticism or an opinion. Under the Defamation Law, proving that a publication was true or that it was made in good faith may serve as a defense against liability. In this case, however, the truthfulness of the publication had not been proved. As the content that was the subject of the suit was factual rather than an expression of opinion or criticism, the judge determined, the appellant could not enjoy a defense of good faith.31\nThe Court held as follows:\nIn the notice of appeal, the Appellant stated that he wishes to end the tenure of the Plaintiff as Prime Minister of Israel and that this wish cannot be an \"intent to harm\" . . .. Except that for the purpose of awarding compensation . . . , we are definitely dealing with a wish that shows that there is a desire to harm the plaintiff - in his public office . . . It is a democratic country and one can criticize a prime minister. It is also possible to want to change the government and the court does not serve as a thoughts police. However, when we deal with defamation, we examine for the purpose of determining compensation whether the publication was intended to harm the subject of the publication, and indeed, on the basis of the language of the publication and the testimonies of the parties, the factual conclusion that there is intent to harm is the correct conclusion.32\n\n\nIII. Availability of Mechanism to Control Foreign Broadcasters Working on Behalf of Foreign Governments Israeli law requires television and radio broadcasting companies to be registered in Israel and subjects their operations to licensing requirements. Israeli television and radio broadcasters working on behalf of or who receive funding from foreign governments are subject to disclosure requirements. There appear to be no restrictions on content disseminated by social media such as Yahoo, Facebook, Twitter, etc. A. Registration Requirements for Television and Radio Broadcasting Corporations In accordance with the Law for the Second Authority for TV and Radio (Authority), 5790-1990, broadcasters are required to obtain a license.33 The Authority is a corporate body that is subject to audit by the State Comptroller.34  A license will be granted in a public tender published by the Authority.35 Applicants must, among other requirements, be a corporation registered in Israel.\n\nThe Law requires that the ability to direct the corporation's operation and at least twenty-six percent of all the means of its control should be with Israeli citizens and residents of Israel or by registered corporations in Israel.36 The Authority may disqualify an applicant if, in its opinion, granting the applicant a license may be contrary to the public interest or constitute a risk to state security. An applicant may also be disqualified if, in the Authority's opinion, the applicant is a party or a representative of a party or of another body that may use the broadcasts to promote the special objectives of such a party or body.37 B. Duty to Disclose Support by a Foreign Political Entity\n\nUnder the Duty of Disclosure [for a Body] Supported by a Foreign Political Entity 5771-2011 Law\n(Disclosure Law), foreign political entities (FPEs) are subject to disclosure requirements. FPEs consist of the Palestinian Authority and foreign countries and organizations.38\n\nThe Disclosure requirements also apply to a corporation established by an FPEs law or one in which an FPE has more than half of a certain type of control in the corporation or which was\n\n33 Second Authority for TV and Radio, 5790-1990, SH 5770 No. 1304 p. 59, as amended.\n\nappointed by the FPE to act on its behalf. A foreign corporation whose financial report for the last fiscal year indicates it was funded mainly by bodies specified above is also subject to disclosure requirements.39 Any media company receiving funding directly from FPEs, or indirectly from *amutot* (nonprofit organizations) paid by FPEs, will be subject to quarterly financial reporting requirements as to the identity of donors, the amount and objectives of the donations, and the conditions for their receipt.40 The information submitted to the registrar of amutot will be published on the website of the Ministry of Justice and by the funded body if it has a website, and in any other way selected by the Registrar. Additionally, an *amuta* that received a donation from a foreign entity for the purpose of funding a special advertising campaign must publish, as part of its campaign, the fact that it has received the donation.41 Violation of the disclosure requirements provided under the Disclosure Law carry a fine of ILS\n29,200 (about US$8,067).42\nJapan Sayuri Umeda Senior Foreign Law Specialist SUMMARY\nThe Constitution of Japan guarantees freedom of expression and the Supreme Court has stated that freedom of expression is particularly important in a democratic nation such as Japan.  However, this freedom may be restricted for the sake of public welfare to a reasonable and unavoidably necessary extent.\n\nThe issue of interrupting general public speech has not yet been discussed in Japan, but disrupting campaign speeches is a criminal offense. There is no mechanism to specifically control broadcasters working on behalf of foreign governments. All broadcasters are required by the Broadcasting Act to be politically fair and not distort the facts. I.  Protection of Freedom of Speech The Constitution of Japan guarantees freedom of assembly and association as well as freedom of speech, the press, and all other forms of expression.1  Freedom of expression relating to public matters is regarded \"as a particularly important constitutional right in a democratic nation\"\nbecause it is critical to form a majority opinion of the constituents.2  However, the Constitution also states that people \"shall refrain from any abuse of these freedoms and rights and shall always be responsible for utilizing them for the public welfare.\"3 While constitutionally protected, the Supreme Court has repeatedly stated that freedom of expression has limits and may be restricted.  For example, the Court explained in dicta as follows:\n\n[F]reedom of expression under Article 21, paragraph (1) of the Constitution is not guaranteed without restriction but it may be restricted for the sake of public welfare to a reasonable and unavoidably necessary extent. Whether or not a restriction on a particular type of freedom is acceptable within such extent should be determined by comparing various factors including the degree of necessity to restrict the freedom, the content and nature of the freedom to be restricted, and the manner and level of the specific restriction imposed on the freedom.4\nThere are criminal provisions that punish acts of expression that harm another, such as defamation, insult, and intimidation. 5  In addition, if an expression constitutes a tort, civil remedies are available.6 Other than interruptions of political campaign speeches, the interruption of public speech has not become an issue in Japan.  The interruption of political campaign speeches is prohibited by the Public Office Election Act and is punishable by imprisonment for not more than four years or a fine of not more than one million yen (approximately US$9,000).7  In 1948, the Supreme Court stated that, even if the campaign speech continued after the disruption, the person who disrupted the speech by heckling and arguing with and hitting a campaign staffer could be punished.8  The Court also stated that actions to make it impossible or difficult for other members of the audience to hear a speech could constitute actionable disruption of a campaign speech.9 When Prime Minister Shinzo Abe's campaign speech on behalf of a candidate in the Tokyo metropolitan government election was greatly interrupted by a group of people in July 2017, the problem of interruption of campaign speeches by heckling gained people's attention.10  At the following election campaign for the House of Representatives in October 2018, some attendees of a campaign speech voluntarily started to scold hecklers.11  Some observers claim that hecklers infringe other attendees' right to know.12 II.  Foreign Broadcasters Control There is no mechanism to specifically control foreign broadcasters working on behalf of foreign governments.  However, when any broadcaster edits a domestic or domestic and international broadcast program, it must comply with the following:\ndetail2?id=55281, *archived at* https://perma.cc/89CE-5LAA. 9 Id. 10 *Abe 'Immature' to Raise Voice against Protesting Voters in Akihabara: Expert*, MAINICHI NEWSPAPER (July 4, 2017), https://mainichi.jp/english/articles/20170704/p2a/00m/0na/016000c, *archived at* https://perma.cc/9F8L-\nREW6.\n11 []  [[Observing Abe Administration] Street Speeches and Hecklings], SANKEI (Oct.\n\n31, 2017), https://www.sankei.com/premium/photos/171031/prm1710310006-p2.html, *archived at*\nhttps://perma.cc/T8X6-MZ5S.\n12 ?  [Heckling & Demonstration at Campaign Speech, Not Okay?\n\nHow Media Reported Primem Minister's Speech], ASAHI SHIMBUN (Oct. 18, 2017), https://www.asahi.com/\narticles/DA3S13185064.html, *archived at* https://perma.cc/U59E-F8UN.\n\n\nThe program must not negatively influence public safety or good morals;\n\nThe program must be politically fair;\n\nReporting must not distort the facts; and\n\nThe program must clarify the points at issue from as many angles as possible where\nthere are conflicting opinions concerning an issue.13 Under the Radio Act, when a broadcaster who is a licensee of a radio station has violated the Radio Act or the Broadcast Act, the Minister of Internal Affairs and Communications may order\nsuspension of operations of the radio station for a specified period not exceeding three months\nor impose a limitation on the permitted operating hours, frequencies, or antenna power for a\nspecified period.14\n\n## Netherlands\n\nJenny Gesley Foreign Law Specialist\n\nSUMMARY\nFreedom of expression in the Netherlands is protected by article 7 of the Dutch\nConstitution and article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). The\nscope of protection generally covers every type of expression from any individual, group, or type of media, notwithstanding its content, with the exception of expressions that negate the fundamental values of the ECHR or hate speech. Limitations of freedom of expression in the ECHR must be prescribed by law, be necessary in a democratic society, and be for one of the enumerated legitimate aims. Freedom of expression in the Dutch Constitution can only be limited by a formal law or regulation. In the context of\nheckling, relevant limitations in the Dutch Criminal Code are defamation, slander, and insult; lese-majeste; and the prohibition against incitement to religious hatred and discrimination (\"hate speech\").\nThe Dutch Media Act 2008 contains quotas for European and Dutch-Frisian\nprogramming of public and private broadcasters, thereby excluding or limiting the\nparticipation of foreign, non-European Union broadcasters. Under the ECHR, states are\nfree to regulate broadcasting with a licensing system, but they may not impose any\nrestriction on the means of reception.\n\n\nI.  Overview of Freedom of Expression Freedom of expression in the Netherlands is protected by article 7 of the Dutch Constitution\n(*Grondwet*) and article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR).1 The\nNetherlands follows the doctrine of monism, meaning that rights contained in international\ntreaties like the ECHR are automatically incorporated into national law without the need for a\ndomestic implementing law and can be invoked by everyone.2 All the case law of the European\nCourt of Human Rights (ECtHR) on a certain article of the ECHR must be taken into account by\nthe Dutch judges when they apply the respective ECHR provision (incorporation theory), not\n\n\nonly from cases that involved the Netherlands.3 It should also be noted that international law\nnorms that are binding on everyone prevail over constitutional provisions and statutes.4 Freedom\nof expression is among those rights.5 Lastly, the legislature interprets the Constitution as the\ncourts are prohibited from reviewing the constitutionality of acts of Parliament and treaties.6\nSome authors have pointed out that, due to that system, referring to the fundamental rights codified in the Dutch Constitution has become obsolete, and that it makes more sense to refer to\nthe rights codified in the ECHR.7 Article 7 of the Dutch Constitution states that\n\n1. No one shall require prior permission to publish thoughts or opinions through the press, without prejudice to the responsibility of every person under the law. 2. Rules concerning radio and television shall be laid down by Act of Parliament. There\nshall be no prior supervision of the content of a radio or television broadcast. 3. No one shall be required to submit thoughts or opinions for prior approval in order to disseminate them by means other than those mentioned in the preceding paragraphs,\nwithout prejudice to the responsibility of every person under the law. The holding of performances open to persons younger than sixteen years of age may be regulated by Act\nof Parliament in order to protect good morals.\n4. The preceding paragraphs do not apply to commercial advertising. Article 10 of the ECHR reads\n1. Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall include freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas without interference by public\nauthority and regardless of frontiers. This Article shall not prevent States from requiring\nthe licensing of broadcasting, television or cinema enterprises. 2. The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and responsibilities, may be subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society, in the interests of national security, territorial integrity or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, for the protection of the reputation or rights of others, for preventing the\ndisclosure of information received in confidence, or for maintaining the authority and impartiality of the judiciary.\n\n\nII. Scope of Protection A.  ECHR\nFreedom of expression protects natural and legal persons.8 It encompasses the freedom to hold opinions, the freedom to receive information and ideas, and the freedom to impart information and ideas. In general, every type of expression from any individual, group, or type of media is included in the scope of protection, notwithstanding its content. The ECtHR has stated that the protection of article 10 is \"applicable not only to 'information' or 'ideas' that are favourably received or regarded as inoffensive or as a matter of indifference, but also to those that offend, shock or disturb the State or any sector of the population. Such are the demands of that pluralism, tolerance and broadmindedness without which there is no 'democratic society'.\"9 However, if an expression negates the fundamental values of the ECHR, such as a denial of the Holocaust or hate speech, it is excluded from the scope of protection.10 B.  Dutch Constitution The Dutch Constitution divides freedom of expression into several categories: freedom of the press, freedom of the media, and freedom of expression by other means. Freedom of expression by other means includes, among others, speeches, theater, music, film, video, CD and CD-ROM, and expressions or communication via the internet.11 Dutch courts in their description of the scope of freedom of expression oftentimes use language similar or identical to the language used by the ECtHR. In a recent widely-reported case against the politician Geert Wilders for statements on race that were found to be hate speech, the Hague Court of First Instance in its preliminary remarks stated that \"freedom of expression is one of the foundations of our democratic society . . . [which] is characterized by pluralism, tolerance and open-mindedness and therefore requires that there is room for the dissemination of information, ideas and views that shock, hurt or disturb the State or a large part of the population. However, restrictions may be imposed on the exercise of this freedom, including to protect the rights and freedoms of others.\"12 It further held that \"even a democratically elected representative such as the defendant is not above the law . . . [a]nd for him too, freedom of expression is limited. When\n\n. . . he makes statements that go beyond that boundary, in the sense that his behavior constitutes a criminal offense . . . These are statements that have not been protected by freedom of expression from the outset.\"13 Like the ECtHR, the Dutch courts generally exclude hate speech from the scope of protection of freedom of expression. The decision in the Wilders case has been appealed by the defendant.14 A ruling is expected in October 2019.15\n\nIII.  Limits on Freedom of Expression A.  Dutch Constitution The Dutch Constitution does not contain a general limitations clause; instead, every right sets out whether and how it can be limited, either by an act of parliament or pursuant to an act of parliament (delegated authority) and occasionally just for specific purposes, such as public safety or protection of morals. Freedom of expression in the Dutch Constitution can only be limited by an act of parliament (\"without prejudice to the responsibility of every person under the law\"). The Dutch Constitution varies the level of protection and possibilities to limit the different components of freedom of expression. Whereas the prohibition of censure for freedom of the press is absolute (paragraph 1), performances open to persons younger than sixteen years of age that fall under freedom of expression by other means can be regulated by act of Parliament in order to protect good morals (paragraph 3). The Dutch Criminal Code contains several provisions that limit freedom of expression and are relevant in the context of heckling, among them defamation, slander, and insult;16 lese-majeste;17 and the prohibition against incitement to religious hatred and discrimination (\"hate speech\").18\n\n\n13 Id.\n\n15 Id.\n\nB.  ECHR Article 10 of the ECHR provides that any limitation of freedom of expression must be prescribed by law. Furthermore, the interference must be \"necessary in a democratic society\" and be aimed at certain enumerated objectives.19\" The legitimate aims are \"interests of national security, territorial integrity or public safety, the prevention of disorder or crime, the protection of health or morals, the protection of the reputation or rights of others, the prevention of the disclosure of information received in confidence, or the maintenance of the authority and impartiality of the judiciary.\" The term \"law,\" however, is much broader than in the Dutch Constitution and must not be a formal act of parliament; instead, it can refer to any rule of law that is accessible and foreseeable.20 Relevant in the context of heckling is the prevention of disorder or crime. The ECtHR has held, however, that \"ill feelings or even outrage, in the absence of intimidation, cannot represent a pressing social need [for limiting freedom of expression] . . . To hold otherwise would mean that freedom of speech and opinion is subjected to the heckler's veto.\"21\n\nIV.  Availability of Mechanism to Control Foreign Broadcasters Working on Behalf of Foreign Governments As mentioned, article 7, paragraph 2 of the Dutch Constitution provides that there is no prior censure of broadcasting and that the freedom of broadcasting may only be limited by an act of parliament. In 2008, the Dutch parliament passed the Media Act 2008 (Mediawet 2008), which sets out rules for public and commercial broadcasters, short-term broadcasters, and commercial on-demand media service providers.22 The Media Act 2008 replaced the outdated Media Act from\n1987.23 The Dutch Media Authority (*Commissariaat voor de Media*) supervises the media service providers; for example, it grants broadcasting licenses, monitors compliance with the rules of the Media Act 2008, and imposes penalties for non-compliance.24 However, the Media Act also states that the government does not interfere with the form and content of the programming of the public and private broadcasters.25 There are, however, rules in the Media Act 2008 that limit the participation of foreign broadcasters to a certain extent. The Media Act 2008 contains quotas for European and Dutch-Frisian\n\nprogramming of public and private broadcasters, thereby excluding foreign, non-European Union (EU) broadcasters. Fifty percent of the programming of public media corporations must consist of European works as defined in the EU Audiovisual Media Services Directive.26 Another\n50% must consist of Dutch-Frisian programming.27 For private broadcasters, there is also a requirement that 50% of the programming consist of European works; however, the Dutch Media Authority can lower that percentage to 10% in special cases.28 With regard to Dutch-Frisian programming, the Media Act 2008 requires a 40% quota, but the Dutch Media Authority may partially or fully exempt a private broadcaster from that requirement in special cases.29  Special cases may include broadcasters that are focused on a specific group of people, for example foreigners.30 Under the ECHR, as mentioned above, freedom of expression also covers the freedom to receive information.  States are free to regulate broadcasting with a licensing system, but they may only exercise that power for technical purposes.31 The ECtHR has held that \"any restriction imposed on the means [of reception] necessarily interferes with the right to receive and impart information.\"32\n\n# New Zealand Kelly Buchanan Foreign Law Specialist\n\nSUMMARY\nThe right to freedom of expression, as enshrined in the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act\n1990, may be subject to reasonable limits, prescribed by law, that can be \"demonstrably justified in a free and just society.\" The courts do not have the ability to strike down legislative provisions that unduly limit the right to freedom of expression. Limitations on the right can be found in several statutes, with some of the provisions potentially relevant to situations involving \"heckling\" or to the broadcasting of foreign\npropaganda. These include certain offenses against public order in the Summary Offences Act 1981; provisions related to racist \"hate speech\" in the Human Rights Act 1993; standards and complaint processes established under the Broadcasting Act 1989; prohibitions on possessing or dealing with \"objectionable\" publications under the Films, Videos and Publications Classification Act 2003; and the availability of\nprocedures to address harmful information posted online under the Harmful Digital Communications Act 2015. In addition, media entities and advertising are subject to complaint processes in accordance with established systems of self-regulation.\nThe issue of legal restrictions on \"hate speech\" has emerged in public debate related to\nvarious events over the past two years. The government is currently undertaking a review of existing provisions, including those in the Human Rights Act and the\nHarmful Digital Communications Act.\nI.  Right to Freedom of Expression under the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 The New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 (NZBORA) is one of several statutes that form part of New Zealand's constitution; the country does not have a single, codified constitutional\ndocument.1 It applies to any acts done by the legislative, executive, or judicial branches of the\nNew Zealand government, or \"by any person or body in the performance of any public function,\npower, or duty\" conferred or imposed on it by law.2 Section 14 provides protection for \"freedom\nof expression,\" stating that \"[e]veryone has the right to freedom of expression, including the\nfreedom to seek, receive, and impart information and opinions of any kind.\"3 The rights contained in the NZBORA may be subject to \"justified limitations.\" The relevant provision states that \"the rights and freedoms contained in this Bill of Rights may be subject only\nto such reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified in a free and\ndemocratic society.\"4 The legislation does not allow the courts to strike down or otherwise decide not to apply a provision of another law by reason only of its inconsistency with any provision in the NZBORA.5 However, the courts must, whenever possible, interpret any law in a manner that is consistent with the rights and freedoms contained in the NZBORA.6 When new legislation is introduced in the Parliament, the Attorney-General must \"bring to the attention of the House of Representatives any provision in the Bill that appears to be inconsistent with any of the rights and freedoms\" contained in the NZBORA.7\n\nII.  Legislative Limitations on the Right to Freedom of Expression In addition to the civil defamation law8 and various criminal law provisions (e.g., provisions on threats and intimate visual recordings in the Crimes Act 19619), the following legislative provisions contain limits on the right to freedom of expression in New Zealand, including potentially where \"heckling\" or broadcasting of foreign propaganda rise to the level of breaching the relevant provisions.\n\n\n\nA.  Summary Offences Act 1981 The Summary Offences Act 1981 contains several offenses under the heading \"offences against public order,\" including the following:\n3  Disorderly behaviour Every person is liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 3 months or a fine not exceeding $2,000 who, in or within view of any public place, behaves, or incites or encourages any person to behave, in a riotous, offensive, threatening, insulting, or disorderly manner that is likely in the circumstances to cause violence against persons or property to start or continue. 4  Offensive behaviour or language (1)\nEvery person is liable to a fine not exceeding $1,000 who,\n(a)\nIn or within view of any public place, behaves in an offensive or disorderly manner; or\n(b) In any public place, addresses any words to any person intending to threaten, alarm, insult, or offend that person; or\n(c)\nIn or within hearing of a public place,\n\n4 *Id.* s 5.\n\n(i)\nUses any threatening or insulting words and is reckless whether any person is alarmed or insulted by those words; or\n(ii) Addresses any indecent or obscene words to any person. (2)\nEvery person is liable to a fine not exceeding $500 who, in or within hearing of any public place, uses any indecent or obscene words. (3)\nIn determining for the purposes of a prosecution under this section whether any\nwords were indecent or obscene, the Court shall have regard to all the circumstances pertaining at the material time, including whether the defendant had reasonable grounds for believing that the person to whom the words were addressed, or any person by whom they might be overheard, would not be offended. (4)\nIt is a defence in a prosecution under subsection (2) of this section if the defendant proves that he had reasonable grounds for believing that his words would not be overheard. (5)\nNothing in this section shall apply with respect to any publication within the meaning\nof the Films, Videos, and Publications Classification Act 1993, whether the publication\nis objectionable within the meaning of that Act or not.10 Other offenses in this part of the Act include \"disorderly behaviour on private premises\" and\n\"disorderly assembly.\"11 A further offense, under the category of \"offences resembling nuisance,\"\nprovides that \"[e]very person is liable to a fine not exceeding $200 who, in any public place,\nunreasonably disrupts any meeting, congregation, or audience.\"12 In a 2011 decision, the Supreme Court of New Zealand overturned a woman's conviction under\nsection 4(1)(a) of the Summary Offences Act 1981 that had arisen from her burning a New Zealand\nflag at a protest during an annual ceremony to commemorate servicemen and servicewomen.13\nA summary of the decision released by the Court states that\n[t]he Court has held, unanimously, that offensive behaviour within the meaning of s 4(1)(a) must be behaviour which gives rise to a disturbance of public order. Although agreed that disturbance of public order is a necessary element of offensive behaviour under s 4(1)(a),\nthe Judges differed as to the meaning of \"offensive\" behaviour. The majority (with the\nChief Justice dissenting and Justice Anderson not entirely concurring on this point) considered that offensive behaviour must be capable of wounding feelings or arousing real\nanger, resentment, disgust or outrage, objectively assessed, provided that it is to an extent\nwhich impacts on public order and is more than those subjected to it should have to tolerate.14 In his judgment, Tipping J. held that\n[f]or me the word \"offensive\", in context, means that to contravene s 4(1)(a) a person must behave in a manner that causes offence to those affected to such an extent, or in such a manner, as disturbs public order. It cannot, however, be right that the unreasonable reactions of those who are affected by the behaviour can be invoked as indicative of a threat to public order. Hence those affected by the behaviour must be prepared to tolerate some degree of offence on account of the rights and freedoms being exercised by those responsible for the behaviour. It is only when the behaviour of those charged under s\n4(1)(a) causes greater offence than those affected can be expected to tolerate that an offence under s 4(1)(a) will have been committed. And it is always necessary for the prosecution to demonstrate a sufficient disturbance of public order. In this context public order is sufficiently disturbed if the behaviour in question causes offence of such a kind or to such an extent that those affected are substantially inhibited in carrying out the purpose of their presence at the place where the impugned behaviour is taking place. Only if the effect of the behaviour reaches that level of interference with the activity in which those affected are engaged is it appropriate for the law to hold that their rights and interests should prevail over the right to freedom of expression of those whose behaviour is in contention. That is the appropriate touchstone.15 McGrath J. also considered that the rights of those affected should be taken into account, holding that\n[i]t must be borne in mind that under s 5 of the Bill of Rights Act, all rights and freedoms may be made subject to such reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be justified in a free and democratic society. In order to be such a limit on freedom of expression, proscribed offensive behaviour must be confined to sufficiently serious and reprehensible interferences with rights of others. Such conduct is objectively intolerable. The court's analysis must assess the impact of the exercise of the right in the circumstances, as well as the importance of other interests affected. Consideration must also be given to whether there are other methods of addressing the conflict with free speech rights than the offence provision in question or its ordinary meaning. To this end, a balancing of the conflicting interests must be undertaken by the court as a basis for reaching a reasoned conclusion on whether the summary offence of offensive behaviour is a justified limitation on freedom of speech.16\n\n\nB.  Human Rights Act 1993 Section 61 of the Human Rights Act 1993 makes it unlawful for any person\n(a) to publish or distribute written matter which is threatening, abusive, or insulting, or\nto broadcast by means of radio or television or other electronic communication words\nwhich are threatening, abusive, or insulting; or\n(b) to use in any public place as defined in section 2(1) of the Summary Offences Act 1981,\nor within the hearing of persons in any such public place, or at any meeting to which the public are invited or have access, words which are threatening, abusive, or insulting; or\n(c) to use in any place words which are threatening, abusive, or insulting if the person\nusing the words knew or ought to have known that the words were reasonably likely\nto be published in a newspaper, magazine, or periodical or broadcast by means of\nradio or television,\nbeing matter or words likely to excite hostility against or bring into contempt any group of persons in or who may be coming to New Zealand on the ground of the colour, race, or\nethnic or national origins of that group of persons.17 Racial and sexual harassment are also unlawful under the Act, including when the use of relevant language or other behavior takes place in the context of a person's \"participation in fora for the\nexchange of ideas and information.\"18 The Act establishes dispute resolution procedures through which persons can make complaints\nabout breaches of the above provisions and other provisions in part 2 of the Act, and also provides\nfor civil proceedings arising from such complaints.19 In addition, the Act contains an offense of inciting racial disharmony, providing as follows:\nEvery person commits an offence and is liable on conviction to imprisonment for a term\nnot exceeding 3 months or to a fine not exceeding $7,000 who, with intent to excite hostility or ill-will against, or bring into contempt or ridicule, any group of persons in New Zealand on the ground of the colour, race, or ethnic or national origins of that group of persons,\n(a) publishes or distributes written matter which is threatening, abusive, or insulting, or\nbroadcasts by means of radio or television words which are threatening, abusive, or insulting; or\n(b) uses in any public place (as defined in section 2(1) of the Summary Offences Act 1981),\nor within the hearing of persons in any such public place, or at any meeting to which the public are invited or have access, words which are threatening, abusive, or insulting,\nbeing matter or words likely to excite hostility or ill-will against, or bring into contempt or ridicule, any such group of persons in New Zealand on the ground of the colour, race, or ethnic or national origins of that group of persons.20 It is also an offense under the Act to refuse to allow any other person access to or use of any place or vehicle which members of the public are entitled or allowed to enter or use, where that refusal is a breach of any of the provisions related to unlawful discrimination under part 2 of the Act.21 Section 61 of the Act was considered by the High Court for the first time in February 2018 in the context of an appeal from a determination of the Human Rights Review Tribunal dismissing a complaint about two cartoons published in newspapers that featured negative depictions of Maori and Pasifika people. The High Court dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the Tribunal that section 61 \"established a high threshold and was targeted to racist speech at the serious end of the spectrum.\"22 It found that, while the parties agreed that the cartoons met the first part of the test in section 61 (in that they were \"insulting\"), they did not meet the second limb of the test (being likely to \"excite hostility\" against or \"bring into contempt\" a group of people based on their race or ethnicity).23 C.  Broadcasting Act 1989 The Broadcasting Act 1989 establishes the responsibility of every New Zealand television and radio broadcaster for \"maintaining in its programmes and their presentation, standards that are consistent with\" the following:\n(a) the observance of good taste and decency; and (b) the maintenance of law and order; and (c) the privacy of the individual; and (d) the principle that when controversial issues of public importance are discussed, reasonable efforts are made, or reasonable opportunities are given, to present significant points of view either in the same programme or in other programmes within the period of current interest; and\n(e) any approved code of broadcasting practice applying to the programmes.24\n\nThe Act sets out principles and processes applicable to complaints about programs25 and establishes the Broadcasting Standards Authority, an independent Crown entity with\n\n\nresponsibility for receiving and determining complaints \"from persons who are dissatisfied with the outcomes of complaints made to broadcasters,\" among other functions.26 Its other functions\ninclude encouraging the development by broadcasters of, or issuing its own, codes of broadcasting practice relating to\n(i)\nthe protection of children:\n(ii) the portrayal of violence: (iii) fair and accurate programmes and procedures for correcting factual errors and\nredressing unfairness:\n(iv) safeguards against the portrayal of persons in programmes in a manner that\nencourages denigration of, or discrimination against, sections of the community on account of sex, race, age, disability, or occupational status or as a consequence of\nlegitimate expression of religious, cultural, or political beliefs:\n(v) restrictions on the promotion of alcohol: (vi) presentation of appropriate warnings in respect of programmes, including\nprogrammes that have been classified as suitable only for particular audiences:\n(vii) the privacy of the individual:27 The Broadcasting Standards Authority has issued codes of practice related to radio, free-to-air\ntelevision, and pay television, as well as a code on election programs.28 With respect to foreign\nchannels, the Authority notes that\npay television broadcasters may offer channels over which they have no (or little) editorial control (for example, foreign pass-through channels). This limited control of the broadcaster will be an important consideration when assessing whether a programme has breached standards. However, it is expected that generally a pay television broadcaster will be mindful of the standards and exercise appropriate discretion and judgement when\ndetermining which channels should be allowed to pass through its platform.29 D.  Films, Videos and Publications Classification Act 1993 New Zealand's censorship legislation, the Films, Videos and Publications Classification Act 1993,\nenables the Chief Censor and Deputy Chief Censor to classify a publication as unrestricted,\nrestricted, or objectionable.30 It is an offense under the Act to make, copy, import, supply or\n(last visited May 16, 2019), *archived at* https://perma.cc/K8D9-XVZ9. 29 BROADCASTING STANDARDS AUTHORITY, BROADCASTING STANDARDS IN NEW ZEALAND: CODEBOOK FOR RADIO, FREE-TO-AIR TELEVISION & PAY TELEVISION 8 (Apr. 2016), https://bsa.govt.nz/assets/Broadcasting- Standards/Broadcasting-Standards-Codebook/15bed03633/160304_12_BSA_CODE_OF _CONDUCT_BOOK_FINAL.pdf, *archived at* https://perma.cc/92WZ-EJYR. 30 Films, Videos and Publication Act 1993 s 23, http://www.legislation.govt.nz/act/public/1993/0094/latest/ whole.html, *archived at* https://perma.cc/9E6T-7K6Q. \"Publication\" is defined in section 2 of the Act as meaning\n\n(a) any film, book, sound recording, picture, newspaper, photograph, photographic negative,\nphotographic plate, or photographic slide:\ndistribute, or display or exhibit an objectionable publication.31 It is also an offense to possess such a publication.32 A publication is \"objectionable\" if it \"describes, depicts, expresses, or otherwise deals with matters such as sex, horror, crime, cruelty, or violence in such a manner that the availability of the publication is likely to be injurious to the public good.\"33 Recent examples of publications deemed objectionable under the Act are the video footage and \"manifesto\" produced by the man accused of attacking two mosques in Christchurch on March\n15, 2019.34 E.  Harmful Digital Communications Act 2015 The purpose of the Harmful Digital Communications Act 2015 is to\n\n(a) deter, prevent, and mitigate harm caused to individuals by digital communications;\nand\n(b) provide victims of harmful digital communications with a quick and efficient means of redress.35 The Act sets out a list of ten \"communication principles\" that must be taken into account by the agency designated to receive complaints under the Act and by the courts.36 These entities must also act consistently with the rights and freedoms contained in the NZBORA.37 In addition to complaint procedures, the Act establishes an ability for an affected individual or other relevant people to bring civil proceedings in relation to alleged harm resulting from a digital communication, and sets out the procedures applicable in such proceedings.38 It also creates an offense of causing harm by posting a digital communication. The relevant provision states that\n\n\n\n(b) any print or writing: (c) a paper or other thing that has printed or impressed upon it, or otherwise shown upon it, 1 or more (or a combination of 1 or more) images, representations, signs, statements, or words: (d) a thing (including, but not limited to, a disc, or an electronic or computer file) on which is\nrecorded or stored information that, by the use of a computer or other electronic device, is\ncapable of being reproduced or shown as 1 or more (or a combination of 1 or more) images,\nrepresentations, signs, statements, or words\n(1)  [a] person commits an offence if\n(a)  the person posts a digital communication with the intention that it cause harm to\na victim; and\n(b)  posting the communication would cause harm to an ordinary reasonable person\nin the position of the victim; and\n(c)  posting the communication causes harm to the victim. (2)  In determining whether a post would cause harm, the court may take into account any\nfactors it considers relevant, including (a)  the extremity of the language used: (b)  the age and characteristics of the victim: (c)  whether the digital communication was anonymous: (d)  whether the digital communication was repeated: (e)  the extent of circulation of the digital communication: (f)  whether the digital communication is true or false: (g)  the context in which the digital communication appeared. (3)  A person who commits an offence against this section is liable on conviction to,\n(a)  in the case of a natural person, imprisonment for a term not exceeding 2 years or\na fine not exceeding $50,000:\n(b)  in the case of a body corporate, a fine not exceeding $200,000. (4)  In this section, **victim** means the individual who is the target of a posted digital\ncommunication.39\n\nIII.  Industry Self-Regulation A.  New Zealand Media Council The New Zealand Media Council (formerly the New Zealand Press Council) is a self-regulatory, industry-funded body that provides an independent forum for resolving complaints related to\n\"published material in newspapers, magazines and their websites, including audio and video\nstreams, as well as to digital sites with news content, or blogs characterised by their new\ncommentary.\"40 It has published a list of principles that complainants may use as the basis for\ntheir complaints, and lists the organizations and publications that have agreed to abide by these\nprinciples. These include organizations that provide video-on-demand services and broadcasters\nthat provide online news content.41\n\nB.  Advertising Standards Authority The Advertising Standards Authority has established advertising codes42 and complaint processes regarding the content and placement of advertisements.43 It works within the legal framework provided by various laws that restrict advertising in New Zealand, which provide \"a legal backstop to deal with more serious advertising breaches.\"44 The three main objectives of the Authority are as follows:\n1. To seek to maintain at all times and in all media a proper and generally acceptable standard of advertising and to ensure that advertising is not misleading or deceptive, either by statement or by implication.\n\n2. To establish and promote an effective system of voluntary self-regulation in respect to advertising standards.\n\n3. To establish and fund an Advertising Standards Complaints Board.45\n\nIV.  Debate Regarding Regulation of \"Hate Speech\" There is currently debate in New Zealand regarding the regulation of \"hate speech\" and the implications for freedom of expression.46 This follows various events, including two \"alt-right\"\nfigures from Canada being denied access to council-owned speaking venues in Auckland in\n2018,47 ongoing discussions about freedom of speech at universities,48 as well as discussions\n\n2019), https://www.noted.co.nz/currently/politics/religion-the-flashpoint-in-free-speech-debate/, archived at https://perma.cc/9BCY-QU5S; Moana Jackson, Moana Jackson: No One's Exercise of Free Speech Should Make Another Feel Less Free, E-TANGATA (May 6, 2018), https://e-tangata.co.nz/comment-and-analysis/moanajackson-no-ones-exercise-of-free-speech-should-make-another-feel-less-free/, *archived at* https://perma.cc/KE89-JLMT. right-speakers.html, *archived at* https://perma.cc/W6CG-2AE2; Auckland Council Faces Legal Action: Free Speech Campaign Raises $50k After Ban of Far-Right Speakers, NZ HERALD (July 10, 2018), https://www.nzherald.co.nz /nz/news/article.cfm?c_id=1&objectid=12086540, *archived at* https://perma.cc/L5ZL-WXMJ.\nrelating to white supremacy and Islamophobia following the Christchurch mosque attacks,49 and homophobia in relation to comments made by a prominent sports player.50 The Minister of Justice, Andrew Little, stated in March 2019 that the government would fast-track a review of existing legislative provisions related to hate speech, particularly those in the Human Rights Act and the Harmful Digital Communications Act, as well as sections of the Crimes Act.51\nHe also did not rule out the establishment of \"hate crime\" as a separate offense.52 There is currently no specific \"hate crime\" offense in New Zealand, but the Sentencing Act 2002 includes hostility towards groups of people \"who have an enduring common characteristic\" as an aggravating factor to be taken into account when sentencing offenders.53\n\n## Sweden\n\nElin Hofverberg Foreign Law Specialist\n\nSUMMARY\nSweden protects free speech in its Constitution. However, freedom of the press and\nfreedom of expression may be limited by law. For example, Sweden criminalizes a number of behaviors aimed at groups and individuals, including hate speech (racial agitation), enticement, and defamation.\nDisruption of certain public gatherings, such as public deliberations in the Swedish\nParliament and religious ceremonies, is also criminalized. In addition, disorderly\nconduct aimed at aggravating others is criminalized.\nPublic speech (such as at town halls and demonstrations) may be limited by law.\nDemonstrations require a prior permit. Police may break up public speeches or other\ngroupings of people if there is a risk to human life or of a disruption to traffic or the\nimmediate surroundings.\nAll Swedish broadcasters must apply for a permit to broadcast in Sweden. Broadcaster\nlicenses may be revoked and broadcasters may be fined for violating regulations\napplicable to them. While foreign media may operate in Sweden, Sweden does not oversee foreign broadcasters that broadcast from abroad to a Swedish audience. For instance, several channels are offered to Swedish viewers from the United Kingdom.\nForeign journalists may receive accreditation from individual institutions and events\nand may have the same accreditations revoked for misuse.\nI. Scope of Protection of Freedom of Speech and the Right to Interrupt Public Speech A. Constitutional Protection of Free Speech\n\nSweden protects freedom of speech in its Constitution (Instrument of Government).1 Freedom of\nspeech is further protected and regulated in two separate constitutional actsthe Freedom of the\nPress Act and the Fundamental Law on Freedom of Expression.2 In addition, freedom of speech\nom-beslutad-ny-regeringsform_sfs-1974-152, *archived at* https://perma.cc/2L66-LWKR. 1949-105, *archived at* https://perma.cc/63C5-89AU; YTTRANDEFRIHETSGRUNDLAGEN [YGL] [FUNDAMENTAL LAW https://perma.cc/GB6Q-DLKC.\n\nis protected in the European Convention on Human Rights.3 Sweden introduced its first freedom of the press legislation in 1766.4 The document was adopted by Royal acclamation, and removed the need for publishers to attain preapproval from the King prior to publication.5 A special Fundamental Law on Freedom of Expression covering non-print media was adopted in 1991.6 While Swedish law generally protects freedom of expression, there are limits that may be imposed.  For example, the Freedom of the Press Act allows the legislature to regulate press freedom, such as by adopting laws that limit the use of advertisements and criminalize child pornography.7 B. Civil Ordinance Rules and Use of Freedom of Speech at Public Gatherings\n\nPeace and order in public places is regulated in the Swedish Civil Ordinance Act.8 The Civil Ordinance Act applies to public gatherings and seeks to guarantee the safety and security of those present.9 Public gatherings may not be held in Sweden without a prior permit.10  In addition, certain gatherings may be prohibited, either based the gathering's geographical location or content.11 Public gatherings may be dissolved if they are disruptive.12 Previous disruptions at similar events may also be a reason to deny the issuance of a permit for a public event.13\n\n1. Application and Permit Requirement\n\nPublic gatherings may not be held in Sweden without a prior permit.14 Applications must be made to the Swedish police.15 The Police may request that the applicant provide additional information with regard to the event before issuing a permit.16\n\n2. Police Rights to Break Up Public Speech Events\n\nThe police may dissolve gatherings held without a permit17 or that are disruptive.18 The fact that a specific gathering was previously disruptive may be a reason to refuse a permit for a public event.19 In addition, a public gathering to perform an artistic production or a public event may be dissolved \"if the gathering [in itself, or by] the use of sound or in any other way entails considerable disruption of the public order in its immediate surroundings. This does not, however, apply when the gathering is conducted in accordance with an issued permit.\"20 Public gatherings may only be dissolved if a less invasive measure is found ineffective.21 C. Criminalized Speech\n\n1. *Disruption of Public Deliberation or Public Gatherings*\n\nNoise disruption (such as heckling) at a \"religious service, marital ceremony, funeral, court proceeding, or other state or municipal meeting, or public deliberation\" is a separate crime in Sweden.22 An example of a disruption of a public deliberation includes hecklers at the Swedish Parliament. Such disruptions are punishable with a fine (*boter*) or up to six months of imprisonment.23\n\n2. Disorderly Conduct\n\nIn addition, disorderly conduct (*forargelsevackande beteende*) intended to aggravate (*forarga*) people is also criminalized, and punishable with monetary fines.24 The disorderly conduct provision explicitly includes noise disruptions.25 To be punishable the person must \"make noise in a public place or behave in public in a way that is intended to arouse public anger.\"26\n\nDisorderly conduct may include expressive conduct like waving a flag with offensive symbols.27\nThe crime has a long history and was included in the Criminal Code as early as 1734.28 As recently as the early 1900s it was also used to sentence persons who voiced opinions that were controversial.29 This changed when an explicit prohibition on punishing opinions in the 1940s was included in the legislative history to the amendment of the Penal Code, where the legislators explained that it was the *behavior* not the *content* of what was said that should be punished.30\nExamples of behavior that has led to convictions include a person who sang and played music in his private home with the windows open in order to disrupt a political meeting that was being held outside his property.31 Thus, heckling a political group is likely to fall within the constraints of disorderly conduct even if it does not specifically meet the requirements to be deemed disruption of public deliberations and gatherings mentioned above.\n\n3. Racial Agitation Sweden has criminalized \"hate speech\" when it amounts to \"racial agitation\" (*hets mot folkgrupp*), defined as \"a statement or other message that is spread and disseminated that threatens, or expresses condescension against, an ethnic group or another group of persons based on race, skin color, national or ethnic origin, faith, sexual orientation, gender, or gender identity or expression.\"32 The provision only protects the enumerated groups of people, and publication of untrue statements in itself is not considered hate speech. It was first introduced in a government bill in 1944 as a response to racial agitation against Jews.33 25 Id.\n\n4. Enticement Sweden criminalizes enticement (*Uppvigling*), defined as \"orally in front of a public gathering, [or by other means in writing], [trying] to entice others to commit a criminal act, betray a citizenship duty, or disobey a government agency.\"34\n\n5.  Offenses against Individuals In addition to the specific crimes mentioned above, which target behavior against groups of people, crimes directed at individuals, such as threats (hot),35 defamation (*fortal*),36 and insults\n(*forolampning*)37 are also criminalized.\n\nThe truthfulness or accuracy of an insulting or defamatory statement is generally not a legitimate defense against prosecution for such crimes under Swedish law.38 Thus, if a truthful statement\n(e.g., person A has been convicted of rape) is spread with the intent of causing that person harm, or harming his or her standing in society, it is still defamation.39 However, statements made by the press without the intent to cause another person harm may be excused because they are true if the publication (for instance, of the person's name) was necessary.40 These crimes are punishable with a fine or imprisonment of up to six months for insults, and two years for defamatory statements.41 These crimes can also be committed against a deceased person, provided that it is hurtful to his or her family, or because of the short period of the time that has elapsed since the person's death.42\n\nII. Control of Foreign Broadcasters Working on Behalf of Foreign Governments A. Regulation of Broadcasts from and to Sweden\n\n1. Swedish Broadcasters Swedish TV and radio broadcasters are subject to different rules compared to the printed press (including information published on the internet). Whereas the printed press is governed by the Freedom of the Press Act, broadcasters are covered by the Fundamental Law on Freedom of Expression.43 According to the Fundamental Law every Swedish citizen has the right to broadcast 34 16 kap. 5  BrB. 35 7 kap. 2  TF; 4 kap. 5  BrB. 36 7 kap. 3  TF; 5 kap. 1  BrB. 37 7 kap. 4  TF; 5 kap. 3  BrB. 38 5 kap 1.  BrB. 39 5 kap. 3  BrB.\nand that right may only be limited as further provided for in the Law.44 The Constitution further provides that such limits may not go beyond what is necessary in a democratic society, and \"may never exceed what is necessary in relation to the purpose\" nor \"extend so far that it constitutes a threat to the free formation of opinion (*asiktsbildningen*),\" nor may it be \"based on political, religious, cultural or other beliefs.\"45 Radio and TV broadcasts are further regulated in the Radio and TV Act.46 All broadcasters in Sweden must be registered47 and those who do not register are subject to a fine.48 The Swedish Government must approve any sound recording (radio) that wants to be sent abroad.49 Compliance with the Radio and TV Act is overseen by the Swedish Press and Broadcasting Authority (Myndigheten for Press, TV, och Radio, MPTR).50 The MPTR does not regulate broadcasts made from abroad. The current allocation of permits to broadcast in Sweden using the Swedish ground network will expire on March 31, 2020; new application procedures are expected to be announced in the fall of 2019.51\n\n2. EU Broadcasters\n\nIn accordance with the EU Audiovisual Media Services Directive,52 broadcasters located in another EU Member State may broadcast programs to Swedish viewers.53 Broadcasts made from another EU Member State are not covered by the Swedish regulations on broadcasting, but the 44 1 kap. 1  YGL. 45 2 kap. 21  RF. 48 Id. 17 kap. 3 .\n49 Id. 11 kap. 1 .\n\n50 Id. 16 kap. 3 . 51 MYNDIGHETEN FOR PRESS RADIO OCH TV (MPRT), MEDIEUTVECKLING MEDIEPOLITIK [MEDIA DEVELOPMETNS MEDIA POLITICS] (2019), https://www.mprt.se/Documents/Publikationer/Medieutveckling/ Mediepolitik/Mediepoltik%202019.pdf, *archived at* https://perma.cc/DJM4-H678. 52 Directive 2010/13/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 10 March 2010 on the Coordination of Certain Provisions Laid Down by Law, Regulation or Administrative Action in Member States Concerning the Provision of Audiovisual Media Services (Audiovisual Media Services [AMS] Directive), 2010 O.J. (L 95) 1, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32010L0013&from=EN, *archived at*\nhttps://perma.cc/S97F-TT9X.  Sweden is currently reviewing implementation of the amendments to the Audiovisual Media Services Directive.  Kommittedirektiv [Committee Directive] 2018:55, Genomforande av andringar i AV-direktivet och oversyn av radio- och tv-lagen i vissa andra delar [Implementation of the Amendments to the AMS Directive and Review of the Radio-and TV Act in Certain Other Respects], https://www.riksdagen.se/sv/dokument-lagar/dokument/kommittedirektiv/genomforande-av-andringar-iav-direktivet-och_H6B155, *archived at* https://perma.cc/7GQY-M3Z6.\nlaws of the country in which the broadcast originated.54 There are in total six channels in Sweden that are broadcast from abroad (all from the UK), and any complaints against these channels should therefore be lodged with the UK authority Ofcom (Office of Communication).55 In addition to EU broadcasts mentioned above, other international broadcasts may be viewed in Sweden using satellite services.56 The content of these shows is likewise not regulated by the Swedish authorities.57 Within the EU framework Sweden has been pushing for a change in the regulation that would give it the right to regulate and oversee programs that are sent from another EU country but are meant for a Swedish audience (for example, when broadcast in the Swedish language).58 However, under current legislation, programs that are filmed in Sweden and then sent to another EU country for broadcast from that EU country are not considered broadcast from Sweden.59 Thus, the determinative factor is not the location where a program is filmed, but \"where the regulation of the broadcast\" is conducted.60 For programs broadcast from abroad, the regulation of the broadcast occurs where the editorial decisions regarding the programs are made, as well as where the broadcaster is headquartered.61\n\n3. European Content Quotas The Swedish Radio and TV Act requires at least 50% of the content broadcast in Sweden to be produced in Europe.62 In addition, at least 10% of the content should be self-produced by the broadcaster in Europe.63 Moreover, a significant part of the programs broadcast should be produced in the Swedish language.64 \"Significant part\" is not defined. yttrandefrihetens omrade [Some Amendments to the Press Freedoms and Fundamental Freedoms opf Expression], https://www.regeringen.se/49bb7d/contentassets/9be090884fa4439f87ef5ea956452b5e/nagraandringar-pa-tryck--och-yttrandefrihetens-omrade-prop.-20131447, *archived at* https://perma.cc/S89Q-F55V.\n\nFor more information on regulation of UK broadcasters see the UK survey contained in this report.\n56 MPRT, *supra* note 56. 57 Id. 58 SOU 2006:92 Ett nytt grundlagsskydd for tryck- och yttrandefriheten? [A New Constitutional Protection for Press Freedoms and the Freedom of Expression?] at 82, https://www.regeringen.se/49bb90/contentassets/\ne577d9a2fca749df9f03deda75b5b0f2/ett-nytt-grundlagsskydd-for-tryck--och-yttrandefriheten-del-1-av-2-sou- 200696, *archived at* https://perma.cc/L72M-CPAG. 59 NJA 2002 s. 314, https://lagen.nu/dom/nja/2002s314, *archived at* https://perma.cc/X2GK-D4AJ. 60 Id. 61 Id.\n\n4. List of Foreign Journalists Operating in Sweden\n\nSweden keeps a list of foreign journalists and broadcasters that work in Sweden.65 To be listed a journalist must provide contact information and work samples to his or her publisher.66\n\n5. Issuance of Press Credentials in Sweden\n\nIndividual events or public institutions may have special rules for media accreditation. For example the Stockholsmassa (Sweden's largest exhibition center) requires that foreign journalists must have international press credentials, present a current letter or certificate from their employer or principal, and provide three articles or posts on the relevant topic from the prior year to be granted press access to their event.67 Also, the Swedish Parliament requires press credentials to be applied for directly with the Parliament.68 Only persons who are devoting at least 50% of their full-time employment to journalism may be issued credentials.69 Press credentials may be revoked if they were obtained using false or misleading information, the journalistic assignment has ended, the journalist has not complied with Swedish rules and regulations, or other extraordinary circumstances warrant revocation.70\n\n6. Fines against Broadcasters Broadcasters who violate the Radio and TV Act may be criminally fined (*boter*), imprisoned, or receive monetary sanctions (*sarskila avgifter*).71 Fines and prison sentences may be imposed for either broadcasting without a permit or not meeting the registration requirement.72 Monetary sanctions are issued for other violations of the Radio and TV Actfor instance, violating the rules on advertisements for public media or on broadcasting sponsored content outside of advertisements for private broadcasters.73 In addition, programs that are broadcast via satellite in Sweden may be sanctioned in certain cases, including when they contain sponsored,\n\narchived at https://perma.cc/LJ6J-YKT5. 66 Id. at 2. 67 *Press Service*, STOCKHOLMSMASSAN, https://www.stockholmsmassan.se/press/press-services? sc_lang=en#press-accreditation (last visited June 10, 2019)*, archived at* https://perma.cc/RW3R-SYRJ. 68 *Accreditation*, SVERIGES RIKSDAG (May 29, 2019), https://www.riksdagen.se/en/media/accreditation/, archived at https://perma.cc/AJR6-FK5M.\n\npornographic, or violent content.74 In these cases it is the satellite entrepreneur or its principal that is sanctioned.75 All fines and sanctions are paid to the Swedish state.76\n\n7. Revocation of Broadcasting Permits The MPRT or the Swedish courts may revoke permits for gross violations of the Radio and TV\nAct.77 The Swedish Parliamentary Ombudsman (Justitieombudsmannen, JO) may request revocation of a broadcaster's permit by lodging a complaint in Swedish court for violations with regard to the content of the broadcast programfor instance, in cases of violations of the prohibition and limitation on pornography and violence applicable to all broadcasters, or for bias or undemocratic content broadcast by public media.78 The MPRT determines revocations based on all other violations.79 B. Threat from Foreign Media Sweden recognizes that foreign media has the potential to become a threat to its national security.80 For example, Sweden's Defense Policy Strategy notes with concern that Sweden, as well as its neighbor countries, are already subject to information campaigns from individuals and foreign sources, with the goal of influencing its security policy.81\n\n## Ukraine\n\nAstghik Grigoryan Legal Research Analyst\n\nSUMMARY\nArticle 34 of the Constitution of Ukraine guarantees freedom of speech and expression.\nThe main international instruments to which Ukraine is signatory guaranteeing freedom of speech and expression are the European Convention on Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. Limitations of freedom of speech and expression are found in the Constitution, Civil Code, Criminal Code, and\nthe Law on Recognizing Ukrainian as a State Language.\n\n\nThe Euromaidan Revolution in 2014 and conflict with the Russian Federation impacted\nUkraine's legal and regulatory framework for freedom of speech and freedom of expression. The Russian Federation and Ukraine have been engaged in information warfare. In order to protect its information security, Ukraine adopted several laws aimed at countering foreign interference in broadcasting and securing the information sovereignty of Ukraine. The Ministry of Information Policy (created in 2014) is the main\ngovernment body responsible for policymaking and implementation in the field of information sovereignty. I. Overview The Euromaidan Revolution in 2014 and subsequent conflict with the Russian Federation over its annexation of Crimea and support of the separatists in the Eastern regions of Ukraine impacted Ukraine's legal and regulatory framework for freedom of speech and freedom of expression. Hybrid information warfare between the two countries resulted in Ukraine's adoption of legislation aimed at protecting Ukraine's information security and guarding its information\ndissemination space from the outside influences.1\n\nThese laws, which are discussed in more detail below, are as follows:\n\n\nLaw of Ukraine on Amending Certain Laws of Ukraine Concerning Restricted Access of Anti-\nUkrainian Content to the Ukrainian Market for Foreign Printed Products.2\n\nLaw of Ukraine on Amending Some Laws of Ukraine on the Protection of the Information\nTelevision and Radio Broadcasting of Ukraine.3\n\nLaw of Ukraine on Amending Article 15-1 of the Law of Ukraine \"On Cinematography.\"4 Enforcement of these laws faced criticism, as they are viewed by nongovernmental organizations as imposing restrictions on freedom of expression and speech.5 Ukraine ranks 102nd in the 2019 World Press Freedom Index, generated by Reporters Without Borders.6 According to human rights organizations, 235 cases of violations of freedom of speech were reported in nonoccupied territories of Ukraine in 2018.7 The majority of these cases (175)\nwere physical attacks against journalists, which remains the main challenge in the area of freedom of speech.8 Censorship and self-censorship pose another major constraint on freedom of speech and press. The Law on Transparency of Ownership of Mass Media, adopted in 2015, mandates disclosure of information about end-beneficiary owners (controllers), and in their absence - about all owners and participants of the broadcasting organization or service provider.\"9 Enforcement of this law remains weak, as documented by observers.10 According to a 2018 State Department report,\n\"privately owned media, the most successful of which is owned by wealthy and influential oligarchs, often presents readers and viewers with a 'biased pluralism, 'representing the views of their owners, favorable coverage of their allies, and criticism of political and business rivals.\"11 A\n\nhttps://perma.cc/L6ML-8F9K.\n8 Id.\n\npractice of producing favorable and (or) one-sided news coverage for monetary reward is widespread in Ukraine. 12 Ukraine's legislation does not contain specific anti-heckling provisions.\n\nII. Legislative Framework The Constitution of Ukraine contains guarantees for free speech and freedom of expression.13  As stated in Article 3 of the Constitution, \"human rights and freedoms, and guarantees shall determine the essence and course of activities of the State.\"14 Article 34 of the Constitution provides that\n[e]veryone shall be guaranteed the right to freedom of thought and speech, and to free expression of his views and beliefs. Everyone shall have the right to freely collect, store, use, and disseminate information by oral, written, or other means at his discretion.15 Article 300 of the Civil Code provides for the right to \"freely collect, store, use and disseminate information.\" According to same article, a physical person, who distributes information is responsible for the verification of authenticity (except in the cases when the information is obtained from the official sources).16 Ukraine is a signatory to the European Convention on Human Rights. Article 10 of the Convention guarantees freedom of expression.17 Additionally, Ukraine ratified the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which guarantees freedom of speech and expression.18\n\n\nIII. Limits on Freedom of Speech and Freedom of the Press The Constitution prescribes the following instances where the right of freedom of expression and speech can be limited:\n\nin the interest of national security, territorial integrity, or public order,\n\nfor the purposes of preventing disturbances or crimes,\n\nfor protecting the health of the population,\n\nfor protecting the reputation or rights of other persons,\n\nfor preventing the publication of information received confidentially, or\n\nfor supporting the authority and impartiality of justice.19 The Civil Code of Ukraine contains provisions providing for a ban on publishing or broadcasting information that violates personal non-property rights. 20 In 2019, Ukraine passed a law on strengthening the role of the Ukrainian language as the state language, which contains language quotas for broadcast, print, and publishing media.21\nAccording to the Language Law, only 10% of total film screenings can be in a language other than Ukrainian.22 Additionally, the Language Law requires that at least 50% of books published and distributed in Ukraine should be in Ukrainian.23 According to assessments, the linguistic quota system presents a considerable challenge for freedom of expression and speech for the segment of the population that does not speak Ukrainian and for media outlets that publish or broadcast in languages other than Ukrainian.24 Several provisions of the Criminal Code punish incitement of hate speech.25 Thus, Article 161 of the Criminal Code states that\n[i]ntentional acts aimed at incitement to national, racial or religious hatred or to humiliate national honor and dignity or the image of feelings of citizens in connection with their religious beliefs, as well as the direct or indirect restriction of rights or the establishment of direct or indirect privileges for citizens on the grounds of race, color, political, religious and other beliefs, sex, disability, ethnic or social origin, property status, place of residence, language or other characteristics - shall be punishable by a fine of two hundred to five hundred times the tax-free minimum incomes, or restraint of liberty for a term up to five\n\n\nyears, with the deprivation of the right to occupy certain positions or engage in certain activities for a term up to three years or without such.26 Article 300 of the Criminal Code provides for punishment for importing into, manufacturing, and distributing in Ukraine works (including film and video products) promoting a \"cult of violence and cruelty, racial, national or religious intolerance and discrimination.\"27 Article 300 stipulates fees and deprivation of liberty as a punishment for these offenses. 28\n\nIV.\n\nLaws Restricting Foreign Broadcasters Working on Behalf of Foreign Governments\n\nUkraine adopted several laws in the information management sphere in order to counter foreign influence and propaganda. These laws are discussed below. A. The Law of Ukraine Amends Ukrainian Law on the Protection of Information in Ukrainian Television and Radio Broadcasting\n\nThe Law established that an executive body can refuse issuance of a state certificate for distribution and showing of materials if the materials (statements, actions, etc.)\npromote war, violence, cruelty, fascism and neo-fascism, aimed at the elimination of Ukraine's independence, incitement to interethnic, racial, religious hatred, humiliation of the nation, disrespect for national and religious shrines, humiliation of the individual, propagandizing ignorance, disrespect for parents, as well as drug addiction, substance abuse, alcoholism and other harmful habits; films of a pornographic nature, confirmed by the conclusion of the expert commission on distribution and demonstration of films.29 The Law prohibits copying and showing films containing the propaganda of an \"aggressor state,\" including positive images of the workers of an aggressor state, Soviet state security bodies, films justifying violation of the territorial integrity of Ukraine. The ban also includes films produced by individuals and entities of an aggressor state.30 The ban applies to any films with the abovedescribed content produced after August 1, 1991, regardless of country of origin. The ban on movies produced by individuals or legal entities of the aggressor state in the absence of propaganda applies to movies and films produced after January 1, 2014. 31\nB. The Law of Ukraine Amends Certain Laws Concerning Restricted Access of Anti-\nUkrainian Content to the Ukrainian Market for Foreign Printed Products In 2016, Verkhovna Rada adopted a law aimed at limiting access to the Ukrainian market of foreign printed products with certain content. The definition of the restricted content provided for in the Law was similar to that of the Law on Protecting Information in Television and Radio Broadcasting of Ukraine.32 According to the Law, importing of the print media products to the Ukrainian market from the territory of an aggressor state is subject to obtaining a permit, with the exception of up to 10 copies of products imported by individuals in their personal luggage.33  The Law provides for the expert assessment and analysis of the printed products subject to the importation ban.34  In order to obtain a permit, a distributor of printed and publishing goods should submit an exhaustive list of documents (including linguistic evaluation of the products) to the central executive body. Based on the recommendations of an expert, the central executive body can choose to issue, refuse, or renew a permit.35 The central executive body also has a right to revoke a permit.\n\nRevocation of a permit can be appealed in court.36 The state executive body responsible for implementing the policy in the information sphere maintains on its website a registry of the publishing and printing products from the territory of an aggressor state or \"occupied territories\" of  Ukraine that were granted a permit. 37 Distributing printed products and publishing products in Ukraine without a permit are subject to a fine between ten to fifty times the minimum monthly wage, with ensuing removal from circulation of said products. 38 According to an Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe report, during the period from January 1, 2017, to February 14, 2018, the State Committee banned 30 books published in the Russian Federation.39\n\n\n\n## C. Law Of Ukraine On Amending Article 15-1 Of The Law Of Ukraine On Cinematography The Law Established Content-Specific Restrictions For Distributing And Showing Films  That Contain Promotion Or Propaganda Of The Aggressor State, Regardless Of The Country Of Origin, That Were Produced After August 1, 1999; And\n\n\nthat were produced by individuals and legal entities of an aggressor state that do not contain the promotion or propaganda of the aggressor state and its legal entities and were produced or released after January 1, 2014.40\n\nAccording to monitoring reports, around five hundred films were banned from 2015 to 2018.41\n\nD. Government Policies In 2014, Verkhovna Rada approved composition of the new Government of Ukraine, which also included the Ministry of Information Policy.42  The Government of Ukraine subsequently issued a Regulation on the Ministry of Information Policy.43 According to the regulation, the Ministry of Information Policy is a central executive body authorized to \"ensure Ukraine's informational sovereignty, in particular regarding the dissemination of publicly important information in Ukraine and beyond, as well as ensuring the functioning of state information resources.\"44 The Ministry of Information Security was also tasked with carrying out the implementation of mass media reforms concerning the dissemination of publicly important information.45\nEnforcement of the legislation in the information management sphere is also in the purview of the Ministry of Information Security. According to a 2018 progress report issued by the Ministry of Information Policy, the Ministry was engaged in the following areas of information policy:\n\nDeveloping the information space of Ukraine, which includes deregulation, demonopolization and de-oligarchization of the regulatory framework.\n\n\nEstablishing the system of state strategic communications, which includes reforms of government and strategic communications, as well as providing communication support for\nthe carrying out of the reforms.\n\nInformation reintegration of the temporarily occupied territory of Crimea and uncontrolled territories of Luhansk and Donetsk regions.46 In 2017, the President of Ukraine signed an order imposing sanctions on legal and physical persons, which included blocking access to Russian media and social networks, as well as search engines and electronic mail services and domains.47 The same order also blocked individual journalists or broadcasters (foreign and domestic) who were deemed to be a threat to national security.48 Among the affected social networks were VKontakte and Odnoklassniki, internet search engine Yandex and email service provider Mail.ru.49 According to estimates, banned social medial networks (Odnoklassniki and VKontakte) have twenty-five million subscribers in Ukraine.50 Nongovernmental organizations see these sanctions as restrictive of the freedom of press and speech.51\n\n## United Kingdom\n\nClare Feikert-Ahalt Senior Foreign Law Specialist\n\nSUMMARY\nThe UK provides for freedom of expression as a qualified right that may be restricted\nin certain circumstances as prescribed by law.  For any law restricting an individual's freedom of expression, various criteria must be met.  The UK has laws in place that operate to prevent people from heckling speakers, but these are not frequently implemented.  The main laws that appear to be used against hecklers are those aimed to preserve public order.\nForeign broadcasters operating in the UK and broadcasting to UK audiences must be\nlicensed by the UK's communication regulator, Ofcom.  In order to obtain a license, the\nbroadcaster must agree to license conditions and to comply with the Broadcasting Code.\nIf a broadcaster fails to abide by these conditions or the Code and laws, Ofcom may take action, including issuing its findings publicly, imposing a financial penalty, or suspending or revoking the broadcaster's license in the UK.\nI.  Introduction\nA number of laws protect freedom of expression across the UK.  While freedom of expression is\nprotected, it is a qualified right, meaning that there are certain circumstances in which it may be\noverridden, provided a defined set of criteria are met. The UK has a number of criminal laws that can be used to stop individuals from heckling speakers\nif the behavior is disruptive, but these do not provide an absolute prohibition on heckling and operate in balance with the need to ensure people have the right to express themselves. Broadcasters that provide services across the UK, including foreign broadcasters, must be\nlicensed by Ofcom, the UK's regulator for broadcast media.  There are a number of criteria that\nmust be met by the broadcaster prior to Ofcom issuing a license and, once a license is issued, the\nbroadcaster must continue to abide by the conditions of that license.  If the broadcaster fails to\nmeet these criteria, Ofcom has a number of steps that it may take, including revoking the license and thus the ability of the broadcaster to operate across the UK. II.  Heckling\n\nA.  Freedom of Expression The European Convention on Human Rights was incorporated into the national law of the United\nKingdom by the Human Rights Act 1998.1  Article 10 of the European Convention on Human\nRights provides for freedom of expression and grants individuals the right to hold opinions, and to receive and share ideas, without state interference.  It specifically includes politics and matters of public interest:\nEveryone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall include freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas without interference by public authority and regardless of frontiers. This Article shall not prevent States from requiring the licensing of broadcasting, television or cinema enterprises.2 Freedom of expression is a qualified right, which means that it may be restricted in certain circumstances provided it is prescribed by law and necessary in a democratic society to protect a legitimate aim.  Article 10(2) specifies as follows:\n\nThe exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and responsibilities, may be subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society, in the interests of national security, territorial integrity or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, for the protection of the reputation or rights of others, for preventing the disclosure of information received in confidence, and for maintaining the authority and impartiality of the judiciary.3 The European Court of Human Rights has determined that whether the restriction on freedom of expression is necessary \"requires the existence of a pressing social need, and that the restrictions should be no more than is proportionate.\"4 B.  Criminal Legislation\n\nA number of criminal laws may be used to prevent hecklers if the behavior is disruptive and meets additional criteria.  The Public Meeting Act 19085 provides that it is an offense to act in a disorderly manner at a public meeting if the purpose of the disorderly behavior is \"preventing the transaction of the business for which the meeting was called together.\"6  The Act does not define \"meeting\" or \"public meeting,\" and much of the case law is focused on whether or not the meeting is lawful.7  The offense is punishable by up to six months of imprisonment and/or an unlimited fine.   In cases where the meeting is part of an electoral campaign during the campaign period, it is unlawful under the Representation of People Act 1983 for a person to act, or incite others to act, in a disorderly manner to prevent the purpose of the meeting from occurring.8\n\"Lawful meeting\" in this instance is \"a political meeting held in any constituency between the date of the issue of the writ for the return of a Member of Parliament for the constituency and the date at which a return to the writ is made, or a meeting held with reference to a [specified period for a] local government election.\"9  This offense is punishable with an unlimited fine. Section 5 of the Public Order Act 1986 provides it is a criminal offense to \"use[] threatening or abusive words or behaviour, or disorderly behaviour . . . within the hearing . . . of a person likely to be caused harassment, alarm or distress thereby.\"10  This offense is punishable by a fine of up to 1,000 (approximately US$1,300).  Any of the following three circumstances may constitute a defense to this crime, however:\n\nThe accused did not have any reason to believe there was any person within hearing distance that would likely be caused harassment, alarm, or distress;\n\n\nThe accused was inside a home and did not believe anyone outside that home could hear; or\n\nThe conduct was reasonable.11 The law previously included using insulting words as part of the offense but after a campaign to repeal this law12 and a government review, the word \"insulting\" was removed from the offense in 2013.13  During the review, campaigners argued that the section inhibited the public from speaking openly, and that \"[i]n a free and democratic society, insults should not be a criminal offence.\"14 The common law offense of breach of the peace may also apply in circumstances where hecklers cause harm, or are likely to cause harm, to a person or the person's property in his or her presence, or where the behavior causes the person to be \"in fear of being harmed through an assault, affray, riot, unlawful assembly or other disturbance.\"15  This offense has been used against hecklers\nfor example, an individual received a deferred sentence for breaching the peace by heckling at a memorial service.16\n\n\n9 Id.  97(2); BLACKSTONE'S CRIMINAL PRACTICE, *supra* note 6,  B11.128.\n\nAdditional laws that could feasibly be used against hecklers who are particularly disruptive include the Protection from Harassment Act 1997.17  This Act was enacted to protect individuals from harassment from stalkers, but it has been argued that it might in some cases be \"applied against demonstrators whose acts cause harassment to particular individuals.\"18  Section 1 of the Act prohibits individuals from acting in a manner that amounts to harassment of another person, where the perpetrator knows, or ought to know, that the action amounts to harassment.  This offense is punishable with up to six months of imprisonment.19 An individual was ejected from a conference held by government ministers due to heckling and then prevented from re-entering, reportedly pursuant to powers under section 44 of the Terrorism Act,20 which at the time provided the police with the ability to stop and search individuals in certain scenarios.  This incident later resulted in an apology from the political party, which noted the way the individual had been treated was \"inappropriate.\"21\n\nIII.  Foreign Broadcasters Working on Behalf of Foreign Governments Foreign broadcasters working on behalf of foreign governments may be covered under EU and UK legislation if they are uploading content to a satellite in the UK, or are broadcasting content in the UK from other EU Member States.  The EU Audiovisual Media Services Directive provides that broadcasters located in other EU states may broadcast into the UK and are covered under the laws of the country the broadcast originates from, or the state where the content is uploaded to the satellite.22\n\n\nukpga_20000011_en.pdf, *archived at* https://perma.cc/8VE6-W2QR. liar-is-held-under-terrorist-law.html, *archived at* https://perma.cc/MZV2-WBSN.\nThe Communications Act 200323 and Broadcasting Acts of 199024 and 199625 provide the legislative framework within which broadcasters operating in the UK must operate.26  Ofcom was established under the Communications Act 2003 and has a number of roles, including enforcing content standards across television and radio broadcasters and the UK's media and telecommunications companies.27  When carrying out its statutory functions, Ofcom has a duty to ensure that television and radio services have\n. . . standards that provide adequate protection to members of the public from the inclusion of offensive and harmful material in such services [and that] provide adequate protection to members of the public and all other persons from both: (i)\nunfair treatment in programmes included in such services; and\n(ii) unwarranted infringements of privacy resulting from activities carried on for the purposes of such services.28 In order to provide television, radio, or on-demand video services in the UK, broadcasters must obtain a license from Ofcom under the Broadcasting Act 1990 and Broadcasting Act 1996.  In order to grant a license, Ofcom examines the application to determine whether the applicant and the proposed programming are \"fit and proper.\"29 If it considers that these criteria are met it may grant the license for a set duration, which may be renewed.30  State-controlled broadcasters that are licensed by Ofcom are required along with other broadcasters to comply with the Broadcasting Code.31  When granting licenses to state-controlled broadcasters, Ofcom has stated the consideration of whether such a broadcaster is fit and proper involves different considerations:\n17. . . . States have a unique range of activities, both domestically and internationally, that are undertaken within a legal and conventional framework that is intrinsically different from that which applies to individual and corporate licensees. 18. States whose services Ofcom has licensed vary greatly in the extent to which they accept and conduct themselves according to UK and generally accepted international values.\n\n\nhttps://perma.cc/5NAX-VJH7.\n\n24 Broadcasting Act 1990, c. 42 https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1990/42/data.pdf, *archived at* https://perma.cc/M4B2-RXVP. 25 Broadcasting Act 1996, c. 55 http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1996/55/data.pdf, *archived at* https://perma.cc/R9VN-8ER2.\nStates sometimes commit, or will have committed, acts which are contrary to these values. In our judgment, it would be inappropriate for Ofcom always to place decisive weight on such matters in determining whether state-funded broadcasters were fit and proper to hold broadcast licences, independently of their broadcasting record. If we did, many statefunded broadcasters (mostly those from states which may not share UK values) would be potentially not fit and proper. This would be a poorer outcome for UK audiences in light of our duties on plurality, diversity and freedom of expression.32 Section 3(4)(g) of the Communications Act 2003 requires Ofcom to protect audiences against harmful and offensive material \"in the manner that best guarantees an appropriate level of freedom of expression.\"33  Working together, the Communications Act 2003 and the Broadcasting Act 1996 place a duty on Ofcom to establish the standards for broadcasts, and compliance with these standards is part of the license conditions imposed on broadcasters.34\n\nThe Broadcasting Code contains various rules, including those\n\nprotecting children under the age of eighteen years of age;35\n\n\nprohibiting the broadcast of materials likely to incite crime or disorder;36\n\nensuring that news reports are provided with due accuracy and due impartiality,37 with the\nBroadcasting Code notably specifying that, \"[i]n dealing with matters of major political and\nindustrial controversy and major matters relating to current public policy an appropriately wide\nrange of significant views must be included and given due weight in each programme or in clearly\nlinked and timely programmes. Views and facts must not be misrepresented\";38\n\navoiding unfair or unjust treatment of individuals or organizations within programming;39\nand\n\nensuring broadcasters maintain editorial independence and control over programing, that there is a clear distinction between content and advertising, and that unsuitable sponsorship\nis not permitted.40 There have been instances where the government used licensing conditions to prohibit the voices\nof specific members of a political group from being broadcast across the UK during \"the\n33 Communications Act 2003, c. 21  3(4)(g).\nTroubles\" in Northern Ireland.  The aim of this was to deny terrorists \"the oxygen of publicity\"41\nand it was deemed in the public interest to issue such a ban.  On October 19, 1988, the then Home Secretary, Douglas Hurd, issued a notice42 under clause 13(4) of the BBC Licence and Agreement to the BBC and under section 29(3) of the Broadcasting Act 1981 to the Independent Broadcasting Authority prohibiting the broadcast of direct statements by representatives or supporters of eleven Irish political and military organizations.43  The statements made by these individuals could still be broadcast, just not the individuals' voices. If a broadcaster breaches the Code, Ofcom publishes its findings explaining why the broadcaster breached the Code and may direct that the program not be repeated or order the broadcaster to air a correction or statement of its findings.44  If a broadcaster breaches the Code in a serious, deliberate, or repeated manner, Ofcom may impose statutory sanctions against the broadcaster, including fines of up to 250,000 (approximately US$318,000) or 5% of the broadcaster's revenue, and it may shorten, suspend, or revoke the broadcaster's license.45  Examples of Ofcom findings over television shows that it has deemed to breach the Broadcasting Code, and investigations, include the following:\n\nFox News Broadcasts, which were found during the 2016 US presidential elections to be\n\"largely pro-Trump and did not sufficiently reflect alternative viewpoints,\"46 and thus violated the Code for not being impartial.47  Fox News ceased broadcasting in the UK prior to this decision being published, stating its decision was due to low audience figures making the show commercially unviable.48\n\n\nTV Novostiwhich is financed by the Russian Federation and was determined by Ofcom to\nbe thus controlled by the Russian governmentwas investigated by Ofcom after the\npoisoning by a nerve agent of two Russian nationals in England saw an influx of programs broadcast on the channel that potentially violated the due impartiality requirement of the\nlicense.  As a result, in April 2018, Ofcom opened several investigations into whether news\nprograms violated the terms of the license, and these remain ongoing.49\n\n\nPress TV, an Iranian-funded television channel, broadcast shows featuring a British politician.\nOfcom determined the shows violated the broadcasting code by failing to air alternative\nviewpoints on controversial issues. The content of the show was comprised mainly of pro-\nPalestinian viewpoints, with very limited input from individuals with pro-Israeli viewpoints.\nIn this case, Ofcom noted that, \"where a matter of major political controversy is being discussed, as here, the broadcaster must ensure that an appropriately wide range of\nsignificant views must be included and given due weight in each programme or in clearly\nlinked and timely programmes.\"50  It determined that Press TV did not control its editorial\ncontent and Ofcom used its powers to close the channel.\n\nAriana International, a channel originating in Afghanistan but broadcasting in the UK that broadcast a news item with a two-minute video filmed by a terrorist prior to him conducting\na terrorist attack.  Ofcom determined \"the programme contained hate speech and was likely\nto encourage or to incite the commission of crime or to lead to disorder . . . with no\nsurrounding content that sought to challenge, rebut or otherwise contextualise Muhammad\nRiyad's highly extreme views.\"51  It imposed a penalty of 200,000 (approximately\nUS$250,000) on the channel.\n\nNews channels BBC World News and CNN International aired programs funded by foreign governments, charities, and other bodies without informing viewers the shows were sponsored content.  BBC World News stated it obtained some of these programs for low fees and Ofcom stated that complex funding arrangements posed an \"inherent risk to independence and editorial integrity,\"52 but determined that the broadcasters had not compromised editorial independence.\n\n\n\nOfcom has the ability to issue an order to proscribe a foreign satellite service53 if it deems the service to be of an \"unacceptable quality\"54 and it is in the public interest to proscribe the service.55\nThe offensive subject matter must be \"repeatedly contained in programmes included in the service\" and must offend \"good taste or decency or [be] likely to encourage or incite to crime or to lead to disorder or to be offensive to public feeling.\"56\n\n50 *Galloway TV Shows 'Broke Rules'*, BBC NEWS (Aug. 3, 2009), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/\npolitics/8182361.stm, *archived at* https://perma.cc/8UPU-GEUG.\n51 Ofcom Broadcast and on Demand Bulletin, No. 333, at 6-7 (July 17, 2017), https://www.ofcom.org.uk/__ data/assets/pdf_file/0021/104637/Issue-333-of-Ofcoms-Broadcast-and-On-Demand-Bulletin.pdf, *archived at* https://perma.cc/4NBE-Y73V. 52 *News Channels Broke Sponsorship Rules, Ofcom Says*, BBC NEWS (Aug. 18, 2015), https://www.bbc.com/ news/entertainment-arts-33971919, *archived at* https://perma.cc/3XW5-6RAM. 53 \" 'Foreign satellite service' means (a) a service which is provided by a person who is not for the purposes of [the Audiovisual Media Services Directive] under the jurisdiction of the United Kingdom and which consists wholly or mainly in the transmission by satellite of television programmes which are capable of being received in the United Kingdom, or (b) a service which consists wholly or mainly in the transmission by satellite from a place outside the United Kingdom of sound programmes which are capable of being received in the United Kingdom.\"  Broadcasting Act 1990, c. 42  177(6) (as amended).\nOnce a service has been proscribed, it is an offense for a person to engage in conduct in support of the foreign satellite service.57  Such actions include supplying program material to be included in the service, or arranging or inviting others to do so.  Such offenses are punishable with up to two years of imprisonment."
    },
    {
        "text": "## (U/ / Fouo) Fi.Nal Report Of The Rendi.Ti.On , Detenti.On , And Inter Rogation Network Agency Accountabi.Li.Ty Board / I: (U) Scope Of Revi.Ew\n\n(U//FOUO) The CIA Office of the Inspector General (OIG)\non 30 January 2014 opened an investigation into potential unauthorized access to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI) shared drive portion of the Rendition, Detention, and Interrogation Network (RDINet) based ~n information derived from a special review conducted on 29 January 2014.\n\nThe OIG on 3 February 2014 reported to the Department of Justice (DOJ) the matter of potential CIA officer violations of 18 U.S.C.  1030 (Computer Fraud and Abuse Act)\nand 2511 (Wiretap Act).\n\nThe DOJ on 8 July 2014 informed the OIG\nthat the DOJ had no prosecutorial interest in the case and the OIG delivered its completed report to the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency (D/CIA) on 18 July 2014.\n\n(C//NF) The OIG Report concluded that Office of General Counsel\n(OGC) officers L_~~--~~~--~, improperly accessed the SSCI Majority Staff shared\n'--;-d-r -,-i_v_e_ o_n__J RDINet.\n\nThe OIG found the three IT officers also demonstrated a lack of candor during their first interviews with the OIG because they did not disclose actions they took on behalf of the two OGC officers.\n\n(U//FOUO) The OIG investigated a crimes report filed by the Agency with the DOJ that reported that SSCI staff members may have improperly accessed Agency information on the RDINet.\n\nThe OIG found that the factual basis for this referral was unfounded and the author of the letter had been pr~vided inaccurate information on which the letter was based.\n\n(U//FOUO) The OIG also found that subsequent to a directive by the 0/CIA to halt the Agency review of SSCI staff access to the RDINet, Security conducted a limited investigation of SSCI activities on the RDINet that included a keyword search of all, and review o f some, e-mails of SSCI\nMajority stqff members on that network.\n\n(U//FOUO) The D/CIA on 6 August 2014 convened an Agency Accountability Board (the Board) in response to the OIG\nfindings.\n\nThe Board was commissioned to investigate the conduct of the five individuals referenced in the IG report and -provide recommendations regarding both their individual accountability and any systemic CIA issues the Board might find.\n\n(A summary of the Board membership is found in Tab A.)\n(U//AIUO) The Board held its first meeting on 21 August 2014 and completed its deliberations on 24 November 2014.\n\nThe . Board first sought to establish relevant facts concerning the incidents cited in the OIG report per Accountability Board guidance found in Agency Regulation 4-7.\n\nAs a result, Board members reviewed the OIG report, OIG's Memoranda of Investigative Activity that summarize OIG interviews, written responses to the OIG report from the five named individuals, and other documents provided by individuals or used by the OIG to make its determinations.\n\nThe Board also interviewed the five named individuals the 0/CIA, the Executive Director,!\n\n~~--~~~~~~------------~~~~----~~~~~ the Office of Security (OS), I\nlthe Counterintelliqence Center\n(CIC), \\\n\\oiG's L--------------------------~\ninvestigative staff, the OIG attorney, and OIG officers who conducted the investigation.\n\n(U//FOUO) This report represents the Board's summary, analysis, and recommendations based on relevant informat ion that came before the Board and is not intended to be a definitive history of the RDI Network.\n\nThe Board was directed to limit its investigation only to the conduct of Agency officers, not investigate the conduct of SSCI staff members.\n\n## A. (U) The Rdi Network\n\n(U//FOUO) The creation of the RDINet was ground-breaking in that it provided SSCI staff members with full, un-redacted access to millions of the Agency's most sensitive operational materials.\n\nThe Agency had to build an information system that enabled the review and release of these documents, provide a secure means to transfer the documents to SSCI staff members, and create .\n\nelectronic partitions to offer some protection of SSCI work product.\n\n(U//FOUO) Most officers interviewed by the Board noted the unprecedented nature of RDINet with two branches of Government using a shared computer network s ystem to distribute vast amounts of sensitive operational information.\n\nRegrettably, none of the documents reviewed by the Board contained guidance on procedures to be used i n the event of a suspected security incident.\n\n## (U//Fouo) Cia Had Operational Responsibili Ty For Rdinet\n\n(U//FOUO) The Board received a copy of the 8 February 2011\ndocument DRG-RDI/SSCIRG Handbook for File *Reviews* that contains a summary of the RDINet program history.\n\nAccording to the Handbook, the SSCI on 26 March 2009 advised then- CIA Director Panetta that the Committee would conduct a thorough review of how the CIA created, operated , and maintained its detention and interrogation program.\n\nDirector Panetta on 1 May 2009 issued a preservation order directing CIA personnel to save documents, information, records, and other materials related to CIA's detention and interrogation program.\n\nThe authorized date range for any data under review to be possibly responsive was set as\n11 September 2001 to 22 January 2009.\n\n(U//FOUO) CIA established RDINet at its Building facility in June 2009 to allow the Agency to review and release responsive RDI material to SSCI Staff members.\n\nAt no time was any equipment associated with RDINet located on Senate property, nor was the equipment itself property of the Senate.\n\nThe Agency used electronic protocols to provide SSCI staff members with access to specific documents located in a database and separate electronic shared drives were established for SSCI Majority and Minority staffs.\n\nSSCI staff could only access RDINet by being physically present in the \\\n!building.\n\nNo remote access from SSCI offices was possible .\n\n## (U//Fouo) Cia Operated And Maintained Rdinet\n\n(0//FOUO) RDINet was operated by the CIA, maintained by CIA\nstaff and contractor IT officers , and CIA staff officers oversaw the implementation of the system _whe n t hey led what was designated as the Director's Review Group, the Office of Detainee Affairs, or the RDI Review Team.\n\n(Oi/FOUO) In addition to t he *Handbook* , the Board received Version 2.8 of the RDINet Sys tem Security Plan dated\n29 August 2013 and a copy of a 15 June 2011 Stat~ment of Work that covers activities of contractors who perform development work on Counter Terrorism Cent er document management systems that include RDINet.\n\n(0//FOUO) Combined with the uns igned Memorandum of Understanding\n(MOO)\n(discussed under the No Written Agr eement Governed CIA\nAccess to the SSCI Side of *RDINet* section below), these four documents capture how the Agency managed the operation of RDINet.\n\nAccording to an over v i ew in the St a t ement of Work, the Agency designated the highly customized system as Spartan Gate 1\nand retained standard security p r actices, created inter-office document management workflow, permitted redaction referral and rev~ew processes, and used standard information dissemination practices.\n\n## (U//Fouo) Cia Was Responsible For The Security Of Rdinet\n\n(U//FOUO) RDINet contained mi l l i ons of documents, where were provided without redaction.\n\nThere fore, RDINet contains highly classified and compartmented information about intelligence sources and methods; pseudonyms a nd true names of Agency personnel, assets, liaison officers , and detainees; details about liaison relationships ; and , the locations of black sites .\n\nThe Agency was responsible for securing this highly sensitive material from unauthorized disclosure .\n\nSection 102A(i) of the National Security Act requires'the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) to protect intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure .\n\n50 U. S . C.  3024(i) (1) .\n\nTo accomplish this imperative, the DNI requires \" heads of the IC\nelements [to) protect national intelligence, intelligence sources, methods and activities from unauthorized disclosure.\"\nIntelligence Community Directive 7 00 (E) ( 2) (a) .\n\nExecutive Order\n12333 contains the same imperative to \"protect intelligence, intelligence sources, methods, and activities from unauthorized disclosure.\"\nEO 12333  1.6(d).\n\n(0//FOOO) Section 1.5 of the RDINet System Security Plan highlights that the protection level and levels-of-concern for RDINet follow guidance in the 5 June 1999 Director of Central Intelligence Directive (DCID) 6/3 Protecting Sensitive Compartmented Information within Information Systems.\n\nThe policy section of DCID 6/3 contains the following:\nIntelligence information shall be appropriately safeguarded at all times, including when used in information systems.\n\nThe information systems shall be protected.\n\nSafeguards shall be applied such that (1) individuals are held accountable for their actions; (2) information is accessed only by authorized individuals* and processes; (3)\ninformation is used only for its authorized purpose ( s); ( 4) information retains jt~ content integrity; (5) information is available to satisfy mi s sion requirements; and (6)\ninformation is appropriately marked and labeled.\n\n* Authorized individuals are those with the appropriate clearance, formal access approvals, .and need-to-know.\n\n(U//FOUO) DCID 6/3 goes on to de f ine a security incident as \"an act or circumstance in which there is a deviation from the requirements of the governing security regulations.\n\nCompromise, inadvertent disclosure, need-to- know violation, and administrative deviation are examples of security incidents.\"\n(0//FOUO) Section 7.1 on System Administration in the RDINet System Security Plan requires the system administrator to explain how user notifications will be accomplished on the network.\n\nThe following text listed in the Plan explains how this requirement is satisfied :\n. (0//FOOO) All users of the RDINet will be informed by the application that they consent t o monitoring and recording, and that unauthorized use is prohibited and subject to criminal and civil penalties .\n\nThe login splash screen for all users fulfills this requirement.\n\n(U//FOUO} The OIG, the ere, and various interviewees noted that all sser users on RDINet clicked the OK\nbutton for the login warning banner that read :\nThis is a U.S. Government system and shall be used for authorized purposes only.\n\nAll infor.mation on this system is the property of the U. S . Government and may not be accessed without prior authorization.\n\nYour use of this system may be monitored and you have no expectation of privacy. (emphasis added)\nViol~tion of system security regulations and guidance may result in discipline by the Agency, and violators may be criminally prosecuted.\n\n## (U//Fouo) Rdinet Was Subject To Comprehensive , Continuous Monitoring For Security Purposes\n\n(S//NP) The entirety of RDI Net , including the sser ~ide, was subject to the same;\n!monitoring by the ere s I\nI as any ot her Agency information system.\n\nThe monitoring is routinely conducted as a security and counterintelligence measure. 3\n\n## B. (U) Arrangements For Use Of The System (U) Protection Of Ssci Work Product\n\n(U//FOUO} Documents reviewed by the Accountability Board highlight that sser work product was to be protected within RDINet.\n\nThe Board did not receive, nor understand there to have been, a signed agreement between the sser and Agency on the definition of work product.\n\nThe OIG report included an undated document on the Standard Operating Procedures for sser Revi ew\n2 (U//FOUO) OIG Report , ! 17.\n\n3 (U) Ibi d.\n\nthat contains what the Board considers to have been one understanding of SSCI work product :\n(U//FOOO) Any documents generated on the network drive (a walled-off network share-drive ) , as well as any other notes, documents , draft and final recommendations, reports, or other materials generated by the Committee staff or Members, are the property of the Committee and will be kept at the Reading Room solely for the safekeeping and ease of reference.\n\nThese documents remain congressional records in their entirety and disposition and control over these\nrecords, even after completion of the Committee's review, lies exclusively with the Committee.\n\n## (U//Fouo) No Written Agreement Governed Cia Access To The Ssci Si De Of Rdinet\n\n(U//FOUO) The OIG used correspondence between the SSCI and the Agency to establish what the OIG termed a \"common understanding\"\non the implementation of RDINet .\n\nThe Board agree s that one can discern a general working agreement on the day-to-day operations of RDINet, but there was no final, clear agreement on access limits to the SSCI portion of the network.\n\nOn the evidence reviewed by the Board it appears that recognizing the difficulties of reaching a full final agreement, the Senate and the Agency proceeded instead to leave the resolution of issues that arose to ad hoc administrative processes.\n\n(U//FOOO) The 2 June 2009 letter from the SSCI Chair and Vice Chair requests the Agency to \"provide a stand-alone computer _\nsystem in the Reading Room with a network drive for Committee staff and members.\n\nThis network drive will be segregated from CIA net works to allow access only to Committee staff and Members .\n\nThe only CIA employees or contractors with access to this computer system will be CIA information technology personnel who will not be permitted to copy or otherwise share informatio,n from the system with other personnel, except as otherwise authorized by the Committee.\"\n(U//FOUO) Director Panetta responded to the SSCI letter on 4\nJune 2009 with a clarification that \"the stand-alone network must be accessed by the CIA staff assigned to this effort to perform a variety of tasks, including, for examp~e, loading and organizing the raw responsive data requested by the Committee and review or redaction of material sought to be removed from the Reading Room.\"\nThe Direct6r's letter further outlines that\n\"any remaining security or logistical concerns or other issues can be resolved through our respective staffs.\"\n(U//POUO) A letter from Director Panetta to the SSCI Chair on 12 June 2009 notes \"an agreem~nt was reached between CIA and SSCI staff personnel regarding operating procedures for the SSCI\nreview of material related to the CIA's detention and interrogation programs.\"\nThe Board could find no further information that would clarify the substance behind this statement and the OIG could not locate a final signed agreement.\n\n(U//FOUO) The OIG report included a 28 May 2009 unsigned MOU on SSCI's review of CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program.\n\nThe SSCI had inform~d the Agency that it would issue a subpoeha to gai~ access to unredacted documents containing true names, cryptonyms, pseudonyms, liaison provided intelligence, information from other US government organizations, and the identity of \"black sites.\"\nThe Agency decided to avoid protracted litigatio~ and agreed to provide the above-referenced information with a series of conditions that included:\n\n-\nResponsive information will be available at a secure Agency Reading Room facility which 'will permit SSCI personnel with\nelectronic search, filing, and print capability.\n-\nAll notes, documents, draft and final recommendations,\nreports, and other materials generated by SSCI must be\nprepared and stored in the Reading Room on the CIA approved\nstand-alone computer system provided.\nA specially designed\nshare-drive will be provided on the Agency's stand-alone\nnetwork.\nAs SSCI requires, the share-drive can be\nsegregated with only SSCI access and walled-off CIA IT\nadministrators, except as otherwise authorized by SSCI.\n- All SSCI personnel will be required to receive and\nacknowledge receipt of a CIA security briefing prior to\nbeginning the review and will be required to review and\nsign a standard Sensitive Compartmented Information (SCI)\nnon-disclosure agreement relating to classified information obligations .\n\n## (U/ /Fouo) The Parties Dealt With Cia Access To Cia Documents Transferred To The Ssci Side Of Rdinet On An Ad Hoc Basis . Somet~Es They Agreed . Sometimes They Did Not .\n\n(U//FOUO) In the absence of a written understanding, ad hoc procedures were created as questions on issues arose.\n\nIndeed, the January 2014 RDINet incide nt was not the first time the Agency searched the SSCI side of RDINe t to determine if certain CIA-created documents not yet approved for transfer were inappropriately present on the SSCI side of the network.\n\nSuch administrative searches we re commonpla ce. 4' 5 - 6 For example, on 10 and 11 January 2011, a SSCI sta ffer asked a CIA officer to search the SSCI side of the database fo r documents the staffer thought were missing. 7 Another CIA officer responded by e-mail on\n21 January 2011 that the cables the SSCI sta f fer requested were now accessible to SSCI Staff. 8 While a search could reveal that the requested documents had not been produced for transfer to\n4 (U//FOUO) CIA I\nIAAB Submission, p.3\n(\"There was nothing unusual about a request to determ~ne the presence of files for which the SSCI staff lacked authorized access on the drives used by the SSCI Majo~\ni Minority Staffs.\n\nThe efforts I undertook at the direction of were entirely consistent with my responsibilities for RDINet secur~ty.\n\n5 (U//FOUO)\noccasions over our p us years, CIA IT officers had accessed RDI Net as they did here, for the purpose of determining whether particular documents were resident on the system.\n\nThey often did so at the urging of the Committee staffers themselves, using administrative procedures that were the same or similar to those used in this case. . . \")\n6 (U//E'OUO)\nAAB submission, p. 5\n(\"Throughout the rev~ew, pract~cal necessity of carrying out the document production non-IT professional CIA\nstaff routinely access CIA-generated documents on the CIA system for the purpose of administering the document production.\")\n7 (U//E'OUO)\nAAB submission , tab 6. (E-mail dated 10 January 2011\n(06:08 PM) from L---~-d~ated 11 January 2011 (06:12).\n\n8 (U//fOUO) Ibid. (E- mail dated 21 January 2011 ( 12:13 PM).\n\nthe SSCI staff, it also could reveal that the documents were in fact already on the SSCI side of RDINet. 9\n(U//FOOO) Another example is the May 2010 transactions in which the Agency unilaterally removed 926 documents from the SSCI side of RDINet. 1 CIA removed the documents because they had been erroneously comingled before being screened for privilege concerns. 11\n(U//FOOO) A SSCI staffer objected to the removal of the documents, making three assert ions about documents on RDINet:\n\n1.\nDocuments made available to SSCI on RDINet have been\nturned over to the Committee, even if made available\nerroneously ;\n2.\nCIA should not unilaterally access documents on the\nSSCI side of RDINet; and\n3 .\nCIA should not unilaterally remove or alter documents\non the SSCI side of RDINet. 12\n(U//FOOO) The Agency declined to summarily return these documents to the SSCI side of RDINet, and instead, the White House reviewed them for Executive Privilege. 13 When that review was complete, the Agency returned the majority of the documents\n9 (U//FOUO) Ibid. (E-mail dated 23 March 2011 from CIA officer to SSCI\nstaffer (\"I checked the SSCI side of Spartan Gate and i t appears that [the document you requested] is already in the system.\")).\n\n10 (U//POUO) OIG Report Exhibit D,\n~ 2 .\n\n11 (U) Ibid.\n\n12 (U) 12 May 2011 (01: 31 PM) e-mail from the SSCI staffer to CIA\nattorneys.\n\n13 (U//FOUO) 13 May 2010 (05:36 PM) e-mail from a CIA attorney to and a CIA attorney, and the CIA General Counsel (\"The WH is not\n'--r--.--.-----,----.J.\n\n~nclined at this point to ask CIA to categorically replace all the documents that were pulled, in large part because the mistake was clerical in nature\n... CIA will continue its ongoing efforts to identify all documents that were pulled from the reading room and to produce all such documents to the WHC for review asap.\").\n\nto the SSCI side of RDINet, but withheld those subject to the Privilege. 14 This incident reflects an Agency and White House view, known to the SSCI, that the SSCI side of RDINet was noninviolable.\n\nThe CIA officials believed that it was permissible for the Agency to search the SSCI side of the database to determine whether particular Agency documents were present there. 15\nemphasized at the time that such searches would be \"limited to checking to see whether a document is or is not already in the reading room.\" 16 However, at that time, Senator Feinstein expressed to the White House her strong view that removal of documents was inappropriate, and the White House acknowledged her concerns and agreed that the documents should not have been removed without notice to the Senate and no such removals should occur in the future.\n\n(U//FOUO) General Conclusion: SSCI staffers were , or should have\nbeen aware of, CIA' s \\\n                               \\monitoring of RDINet for security\npurposes .\n            In fact, CIA had previously accessed\ncollected from the SSCI side of RDINet when secuL-r~i~t~y~~c~o~n~c~e~r~n~s-~\narose.\n\n(a)\n      (U//FOUO) The Board determined that while an informal\nunderstanding existed that SSCI work product should be\nprotected, no common understanding existed about the roles and\nresponsibilities in the case of a suspected security incident.\n\n(b)\n      (U//FOUO) The joint desire to begin the review _ and avoid\nprotracied negotiations on a final agreement led the parties to\n\n             14 (U/ /F'OUO) Memo, \"Administrative Document Production Error,\"\n1 June 2010.\n\n15 (U//FOUO) 7 June 2010 (10:53 AM) e - mail from a CIA attorney to\n       (\"Occasionally in the course of the White House's review of EP\n\nL-d~o~c~u~m~e~n~t~s~,~ they will come across a document they believe may already be in\n the reading room (as part of a different batch) and have asked us to check,\n so they don't assert EP over a document that has already been produced.\n Prior to last month's events, the SOP was to check the reading room's\n holdings (electronically -\n                             not physically) and let the WH know.\n                                                                    We would\n like to continue to honor WH requests to check the reading room's holding\n when they ask about a specific document .\n                                            Are you ok with our continuing to\n do so?\n         We currently have several requests outstanding . \").\n\n          16 (U//POUO) 8 June 2010 (01:51 PM). e-mail from a CIA attorney to the RDI\nFront Office, another CIA offi cer, an1\n                                                                                  I\n\nproceed without a definitive, fully executed agreement, they elected instead to handle issues as they arose.\n\n(c) ~The Board concluded SSCI staffers were, or should have been, aware of the monitoring by D\nbecause of pastCJ discoveries of SSCI staffers' misconduct on RDINet:\nIn January\n2010, the same individual also reported having a camera in the secure facil it y to the facility's gate guard but did not provide the camera for review.\n\nThe individual was identified as L-----------------~\non RDINet in November and December 2010.\n\n~.,------,..-,---____J\nThe matter was referred to the CIA Counterintelligence Center's Counterespionage Group (CEG) and the employee was removed from the SSCI team. 17\n~In May 2010, a SSCI staff member requested from the Agency the ability to print a sensitive document from RDINet.\n\nThe SSCI staff member attempted to bypass the print restriction by[\n[reviewed the incident and recommended removing the\n.__p_o_s ___,s i b i 1 it y of S SCI staff e r .. s ___\nu_t_i_l_l_ z_ 1_ _n-\"g..LJ __________ ___jJ'-b __\nu_t ____ ---, because the capability was J\nlit coulLd ___ n_o_t ___ b_e ___ r _e_m_o_v_e_d ___ o_r ____________ __, L-~--~--~--~---------'\ndisabled.\n\nThe RDI team discussed this issue with SSCI\nstaff and reminded them of the need for security of sensitive documents. 18\n\n## Ii. (U) Events Of Days In Question, January 2014\n\n(U//POUO) Agency personnel searched the SSCI - side of RDINet or reviewed SSCI-related over several days in January 2014.\n\nThe Board grouped these activities into three separate \"looks.\"\n(Ui/POUO) I\nI told the IGD ordered what L-------------------~\nthe Board calls the first and second looks becausec==Jbelieved there was a security breach on RDINet . c==Jsuspected that privileged Weekly Case Reports (WCRs) could be on the SSCI's side of RDINet and had been accessed by SSCI staff. 19 D\nformed this belief because of a November 2013 Senate request for a copy of the \"Panetta Review\"; because .a draft SSCI report contained language remarkably similar t o portions of the \"Panetta Review\";\nand because of a statement by a SSCI s taffer that the staffer had \"seen the real response.\" 20\n\n## (U) The First Look\n\n(U//FOUO) On or about 9 January , instructed\n'\nL_ ______ to search RDINet to determine whether particular\n_j Agency-created documents not yet cleared for transfer were resident on the SSCI accessible portion of the database. 21\nSpecifically, wanted to know whether the privileged c__ ____\n_, anddeliberative draft CIA summary documents known variously as the \"Panetta Review,\" \"Special Review Team Documents (SRT),\" or WCRs\" were inappropriately on the SSCI side of the database . 22\nRDI personnel conducted this look on or about\n9 and 10 January 2014.\n\nhas maintained that the Agency's obligations under the National Securit y Act created a\n19 (U//f0UO) OIG notes of 27 March 2014 ,_1 _ _ _ _\n--'IInterview,\n'J[ 7 and 15.\n\n20 (U) Ibid . 'li'll 7- 10, 13.\n\n21 (U//FOUO) OIG notes of 27 March 2014 1,_ ____ -'linterview, 1 15 .\n\n22 (U) Ibid. 'J[ 8.\n\nlegal duty to search the SSC I side of RDINet for the presence of Agency documents to which SSCI staff should not have access. 23\n(U//FOUO) The RDINet IT employee,\n~------~~~--~----------------~\nrecalls being instructed by on 9 January 2014 to\n\n~=-=-=::-::r:-:-=~-=s=-e=-a~r--::c-ch--:e--:s=--o~\nf --;:;R:-;:D;-:;I;:-;;N-;-e\n-:-t;---;.f:--o-r~t:-;h\n--:e--p-r------'\ne sen c e o f f i 1 e s . w i t h \"W C R\"\nor \"SRT\" in their titles. 24\n~irst, searched the database containing documents to which the Agency had granted SSCI\naccess 25 and no file with WCR or SRT in its name was present on that portion of RDINe.t. 26 Next, c====J.conducted a Google search of RDINet, which by vir~~~-~~~ administrator access, searched the entirety of the network. 7\nThat search disclosed as expected that WCR and SRT files resided on the CIA side of the network, but also that they were present on the SSCI Majority Staff user drive . 28\nFinally ,1\n!conducted a root search with the search terms WCR and SRT, which revealed that files with those names were located on one SSCI Majority Staff user drive, and the SSCI Majority shared drive. 29\n(U//FOUO) When questioned by the IG, recalled\n\ninstructing\non 1 0 Jan u a rLy-'t....,o-'e_m_o\n                    -,--n-s't_r_a--:t\n                           :--e-'h_o_w---:s~s\"c=r-s-;:t--:a--:fr-f\n                                           -,=---w-:o-u--:;l--:d\n                                                  :-;----ch\n                                                    ;:-:-a-::-v-::e---=l;-o~o ked at\n\nthe WCR documents on the SSCI side of the network . 30 I\n                                                                      I\n\nrecalled asking [\n                         [to help c===J take screenshots of the\nMajority share drive folder and subfolder in which the WCR\ndocuments resided, and to demonstrate how SSCI staff could use\nthe Google appliance to locate the documents. 31 J\n                                                          Jsaid c==J\n\n23 (UI/FOUO) I\n                                 IAAB Submission, p . 6 .\n\n~==:::::::;---'\n\n2 ~ (U//FOUO) [\n                                          [ AAB Submission , p. 2.\n\n25 (U) Ibid.\n\n26 (U) Ibid.\n\n27 (U) Ibid.\n\n28 (U) Ibid.\n\n29 (U) Ibid.\n\n30 (U//FOUO) OIG Notes of 22 Apri l 2014 1L ___\n                                                                                                            _jJoiG interview, 'll 22.\n\ndid not recall whether this required!\n\nIto adjust c===J\nnetwork permissions. 32\nL-------~\n(U//FOUO) There is no evidence that any SSCI work product-e -\nmails, drafts, or other confidential or deliberative material of any type-were accessed at that time.\n\n(C//NF) There is disagreement about the timing of the activity recalls as occurring on 9 January, and who participated L------'\nin the activity.\n\nThe OIG concluded that L----~~----~\nlassisted l ion the 9th, 33 but time and\n~__a_t~t-e_n_d,_a_n_c_e __\nr_e_c_o_r_d--=-s- s-:-'how I\nI on 1 eave that da y 34 and\n1------,__ ____ __jl recalled assisting I\nI on the 9th. 35\n!recalls the RDINet searches being conducted between L-6_ a_n_d_ 8_ J-anuary, not 9 and 10. 36 II\nrecalled that iL -----'\nhad determined that SSCI staff had access to the WCR documents on 7 or 8 January. 37\nThe OIG Report also says !\n\n!opened \"a few\" of the files on the 9th, 38 but that finding is not corroborated by the OIG interview notes or the various AAB\nsubmissions. I\nI surmises that the OIG confused the activities of the 9th with activities of the 10th. 39\n31 (U) Ibid.\n\n32 (U) Ibid.\n\n':!! 23.\n\n33 (U) OIG Report':!! 24.\n\n34 (C//~lF) L_I ____ -'1 AAB Submission, p. 9 and Exhibit 3.\n\n35 (U//FOUO) I\nIAAB Submission, p. 2.\n\n36 (C//NF) I\nI AAB Submission, p . 6\n37 (U// FOUO/ OIG Notes of 27 March 2014 JL----~~ OIG Interview,\n':!! 14.\n\n38 (U) OIG Report ':!! 24.\n\n39 (U//FOUO) L~----'~ AAB Submission, p. 2.\n\n## (U) The Second Look\n\n(U//FOUO) The second look commenced on or about 10 January, when attempted to learn whethe r SSCI Staffers had actually\n'-----------'\naccessed or printed the WCR documents. 40\nIf the documents had not been accessed or copied, the potential security concerns and need to approach SSCI would . be more limited.\n\nstated in c===J rG interview that reported the results of the first look to the and the@\non the 9th, 41 and that \"between\n(the\n~----~----~--~==~\nt__ ____\n__j , they decided to approach the next step as determining whether the files had been accessed by SSCI.n 42\n~ecollecti~n of this meeting is consistent with the L. -----'~4)\nI\nI did this by asking!.-\n-----------~~~t_o __ t_a_s_k __ __, which I\n(S//NF)\nere I\nI believed to bei I\n~~--------------------! 4\n(U//FOUO) rn c===Jstatement, says that the!\n\n!visited\n'--------' on 9 January after briefing the D/CIA about the results of \"the first look,n and conveyed an explicit instruction to that O\ndetermine whether SSCI staff had accessed or printed the documents. 45 Specifically, recalled being told by the I\n!that the D/CIA \"wantedt,--,t\n,..,.o~b.--\ne ------'\n'completely sure' that the documents were, in fact, what they appeared to be\n. and also wanted t o know if they had been printed, as he was concerned the documents could have been\n40 (U) Ibid. 'l[ 20.\n\n~(U) Ibid. 'l[ 15. ~(U) Ibid. 'l[ 17.\n\n43 (U//FOOO) AAB 14 October 2014 j jrnterview (When I heard about this, I thought the f acts were not correctly developed.\n\nI wanted to know of the WCRs were just sitting there , or had they been used, or were taken.\n\nIf they were accessed, how often and by whom?)\n44 (U//FOOO) OIG notes of 27 March 2014 1\nL ____ _,I interview, 'l[ 17.\n\n45\n( U//FOUO) Ll _ _ _ _  _jl AAB Submission, p . 10.\n\nthe CIA faci1ity.\" 46\nalso wrote the 0/CIA himself reiterated these to D\non three occasions between secretly removed from inl\n!statement that explicit instructions\n10 and 13 January. 47\n(U//FOUO) A misunderstanding between the 0/CIA and L---.,------'\narose because the former did not appreciate what forensic techniques were necessary to answer his questions and the latter did not understand the 0/CIA's expectations that no intrusive methods be employed.\n\n~On\n10 January 2014 , sought to determine whether SSCI users accessed the WCR documents by tasking'l--'lto who acce~sed documents contained in folder of ROI Net fo\n'-r--~----~--~\"'1'/\"2~0~0~\n9 ~\nt -\no--------~\nL--.,1=-2*=----*1 =3 -=-1---,/-=2-=0\"\"\"\"1-=3=-.-'\" 4 8\nI n a f o 11 ow- on t a s king , L--:----=----'1 for the same documents .\n\nto deLt_e_r _m-=i_n_e--w-=-h_e_t---:h:--e-r_ s_t_a---=f---:f-:-e-r- s-----'\nwould have had the opportunity to take the documents for the Hill in hard copy.\" 49\n(S//NF) In addition to describing the information sought, the c=J tasking expressly limited wherec=J was to look.\n\nI first e - mail to D\ncarried the following caveat:\nL---------'\nWe ask that you provide us ONLY the ll-:---,--~\ndocuments in this folder and its component sub-\n47 (U//FOUO) Ibid. pp. 10-11 (\"First in his office on the night of January 10; second during a call placed to me at home on the afternoon of January 11; and third, in a passing conversation i n the doorway of his office on January 13.\n\nIn the January 11 call, the D/CIA particularly emphasized his desire to confront SSCI leadership immediately with information concerning the matter.\n\nAs a predicate to doin~ so , however, he felt the need to have a clear understanding of how the documents came to be accessible by SSCI\nStaff . \")\n46~(RS~,~,,~,~~lF~)LI ~-~-\n~AAB Submission, tab 1, 10 January 2014 (09 :18AM) email fr om !\n\nI toCJ staff .\n\n49 (U//FOUO)\n10 January 2014 (07 : 25 PM) e-mail from !'-___ _.I to ere !\n\nL ---'\nadvisors .\n\nfolders.\n\nPlease DO **NOT** undertake this tasking if it would require that you search and/or provide us relating to other contents of the RDI Net Y: drive, as this drive is a SSCI staff drive on the RDI Net system. 50\n(3//NF') After D\nfollow-on tasking, I\nI repeated this caveat in an e - mail to crc l ion 13 January 2014, 51\n\"To follow up on our conversation this morning, please be sure that crcl\n!understands that t he scope of the documents under review has not/not changed.\n\n!shoul d be told expressly to look ONLY at the rovenance of the documents in the\n( U//FOUO) I\nI reiterated the caveat:\n\"I can't stress how important this is .\n\nWe need to confine this review as narrowly as possible, and make sure everyone understands this is not a fishing expedition into SSCI files (emphasis added) . \" 52\n(U//FOOO) When the Executive Director convened a meeting with senior Agency leadership on the morning of 14 January, each person present was either aware of the first and second looks and approved of the action Ll\n_ __,---/had taken to date, or posed no objection. 53 - 54 - 55 - 56 the CIC I\n. also was present at the\n50 (8//NF) I\n~AAB Submission , tab 1, 10 January 2014 (09:18 Al.'1) email from LI ------~l to l__j staff (emphasis in original).\n\n51 (S//NF) [\nI AAB Submission, tab 3, 13 January 2014 (09: 18 AM) email from [\n[to crc t===J\n52\n~~;t~t[==~==] AAB Submission , tab 3, 13 January 2014 (04:57 PM) email L_ ______ ~ to crcc===J\n.\n\n53 (U//FOUO) OIG notes of 9 April 2014 . EXDIR interview, 'li 10 (meeting attendees surprised by the D/CIA's decision not to learn how the documents got on the SSCI side and felt that Agency personnel had not exceeded their authority or acted inappropriately regarding the review of RDI events.)\n54 (U//FOUO) OIG notes of 15 April 2014 the l\n!interview, 'li 16 (\"he knew!\n\nI was havingD\nIT guys look at it. .\n\n[and] I\nI\nactions dld not strike him as problematic or in any way untoward\").\n\n55 (U//FOUO) OIG notes of 2 April 2014 the [\n[interview, :1 18 ( \"SSCI\nhad documents on their side that were not passed through the firewall.\n\nAccording to the!\n\nI all of the information was provided by and meeting and recalled that the '\n~~~~--~--~~~--~~-~\nrepeatedly emphasized that the ' 0/CIA wants to GO' on this issue. \" 57\n\n## (U ) The Third Look\n\n(0//FOUO) The third ~ook, while benign in intent, was characterized by miscommunications, is the source of greatest controversy, and raised the most questions about the scope of the Agency's security review.\n\n~and the Office of Security's Cyber Blue Team (CBT)\nconducted this third look. c==J ~nalyzed act ivity on the SSCI\nfolder containing the WCRs to determine if any documents were printed from that folder and how the WCR's got onto the SSCI\nside of RDINet . 58 The CBT review was conducted to determine how SSCI could have gained access to the WCRs, how a SSCI user could discover the WCRs, and how the Agency knew that SSCI acquired access to the WCRs. 59\nThe Board tri ed to piece together the communications used to start, stop, modify, and continue t hese activities.\n\n~\nIn his OIG 'interview, a c==Jcontractor employee explained that he was tasked \"sometime in January 2014\" with\n\nL_ _____ _j on RDINet, and specifically, the \"CIA side.\" 60 He was\nT6el\n~tated that they knew the files were there t~rough whatever computer action had taken place.\n\nHe stated that he did not understand fully how they found them.\")\n56 (0//FOUO)\nAAB Submission , p. 8 . (Also present at the EXDIR\nmeeting the morning of 14 January were the [\nI Acting General Counsel , Director of the Office of Public Affalrs , Dlrector of the Office of Congressional Affairs, the Counterintelligence Center (CIC), I\nc=JciC, to EXDIR. 1\nNo one raised an objection to ri=-.;_!'--'-------\nactions.\n\n57 (S//NP) Time line provided byQic during AAB Interview .\n\n58 ( S//NF) OIG notes of 11 March 2014c:::::J contractor interview, 'll 2.\n\n59 (0//POUO) piG notes of 20 March 2014 CBT I\n~ nterview, 'll 4.\n\n'-------'\n60 (S//~lf) OIG Notes of 12 March 2014 separate O\ncontractor, 'l[ 3.\n\ninvestigating the possibility that the documents were provided to the sscr staff by a leaker though \"HUMINT. \" 61 The D\ncontractor did not have access to the RDINet hard drives, network share drives, or actual RDINet files. 62 Rather, he looked\n\" t th t h d\n1\nb\n11\nt d b D\nt a I\na a prevlous y een co ec e~\nas par of 'normal CIA\nlon CIA networks.' \" 63 The contractor explained that , for RDINet, I\nof\n164 He found no evidence a HUMINT leak, and theorlzed that a mlsconflguratlon of the google appliance may have given SSCI staff access to the document. 65 However, a stand down order from the Director, discussed below, arrived before he could test that theory. 66\n(U// POUO) When the 0/CIA was briefed the evening of\n14 January 2014 about the foregoing, he ordered the stand down. 67\nHe then proposed a joint CIA-SSCI review of the matter, 68 which the SSCI shortly thereafter declined to participate in. 69\nAt no time did the D/CIA order any further forensic work to be undertaken. 70\n(S//NF) Upon returning from that evening's meeting with the\n0/CIA, I\nicrc instructed!\n\nI \"to 'stand down immediately'\non any tasking on this issue.\" 71 Those woiking the issue had\n61 ( u) Ibid .\n\n62 ( u) Ibid .\n\n63 ( u) Ibid.\n\n64 ( u) Ibid. I\n1 7.\n\n65 ( u) Ibid., 1 8.\n\n.)\n66 ( u) Ibid.\n\n67 (Ui/FOUO) OIG Notes of 21 April 2014 D/CIA OIG Interview, 1 6.\n\n68 (U//FOUO) Ibid., 1 8.\n\n69 (U) Ibid., 'li 10.\n\n70 (U) Ibid. I\ndeparted for the day, and eventually, c=)crc\n,---~~~---L----i--------, home and instructed to call ere at home L__,----r-----------------~\nwith the order to instruct contractor analysts to stand down immediately. 72\n(U//FOUO) After the D/CIA briefing, the!\n\n!contacted the the Office of Securityc===bs) at home about the\n'---p-r_o_p_o_s_e-----:-d--j_o_.i n t review [\n[. 7 3 The'[ -------, askedc=Jos if the OS could lead an investigation of an IT\nissue. 74 [\nl calledc=JPs 15 minutes later and said the issue would be discussed at work on 15 January . 75 The SSCI\nSecurity then called and explained the work would be part of a joint SSCI-CIA review. 76\n(S//NF) O crc' s stand-down order apparently was not delivered in a timely fashion.\n\nAccording to one contractor employee, he was ordered on -15 and 16 January by the I\nIto look into I\nIt hat w aL_s __ a_v_a_l_. l_a __ b_l_e __ f_o_r ___ R_D_I_N_e_t_j . 77\nThere were three tasks: 1) analyze activity on the specified folder; 2) determine L_ ____ _JI and, 3 ) de t e rLm\n---=-i _n_e--:t--,h_e ___ p_r_o_v_e_n_a __ n_c_e __ o_f::---:-t :-h-e--d:-o-c_u __\nm_e_n-:-t-s- . TI< __ _J\n(3//NP) On 15 January, several Agency officers. met to scope the OS review and effect the turnover fromD\nto OS . 79Q\ns understood the guidance from the 14 January D/CIA meeting was\n72 (U) Ibid.\n\n73 (U//FOUO) OIG Notes of 3 April 2014~0IG Interview, ~ 30.\n\n74 (U//FOUO) AAB Notes of 8 September 2014D\nS Interview, p. 1.\n\n75 (U) Ibid.\n\n76 (U) Ibi d.\n\n7 7 (S//NF) OIG ~otes of 11 March 2014 D\ncontractor ~mp1oyee Interview,\n'![ 2 .\n\n7 8 (U ) Ibid .\n\n79 (S//~lF) Ibid .\n\nIn attendance wereO\nos, O cic, O cicf,_ _____\n__J\nosD\nOfficer, and OGC attorneys [\nI and CI ~l-. __\n___J\nthat ere Would stop its work and that OS would look at l'----\"\"\"\"'\nto determine if a violation occurred. 80\n'-:(-::::S'/'/c:-:N:-::F:-:-)--::A:-:t\"\"\"\"' a meeting also on the 15th I\nI the eyber Blue Team (eBT) received a tasking froml I\nI\nand [Y S . 81 The or a l Lt_a_s_k;--;-i _n_g_ w_a_s---:f:!-o- l=-=-1-o_w_e_d-:---. :-b_y_ a_n __\ne_,-\nmail confirmation. 82 The eBT was ordered to review the L__ ____\n___)\ndata to determine how sser could have gained access to the restricted documents. 83\n(S//NF) AC] contractor employee was assigned to help the Office of Security's Cyber Blue Team (CBT) conduct its review. 84\nHe stated that the CBT's tasks were to verify that unauthorized documents were in a specific location, and if so determine how they got there. 85 According to the employee, the combined team concluded that someone directly navigate to the file path containing the unauthorized documents and copied them to another SSCI accessible location . 86\nHowever, he was unsure of how that individual discovered the folder path that led him or her to the documents. 87\n{S//NF) When interviewed by the OIG , I\nlsaid the first tasking frome=Jos called for a full forensic review of the sser systems. 88 However, before eBT accessed any part of the SSCI side of RDINet, c=Jos countermanded that order and limited eBT's\n80 ( 0/ / FOUO) AAB Notes of Interview witho os p. 2.\n\n81 (U//FOUO) OIG notes of 20 March 20141\ni cyber Blue Team Interview,\n'l[ 4.\n\n82 (U) Ibid.\n\n83 (U ) Ibid.\n\n84 (S//Nf) OIG Notes of 11 March 2014 Interview ofD\ncontractor employee, 'li 3.\n\n85 (U ) Ibid.\n\n86 (U ) Ibid. 87 (U) Ibid.\n\n88 (U//FOUO) OIG Notes of 13 March 2014 Interview of l\n! 2.\n\nreview to the l\n89\nL__ ____________\n_JI monitoring of RDINet.\n\n(U//FOUO~ When interviewed by t he OI G, a CBT analyst said their review identified by name the SSCI user responsible for originally accessing the unauthor i zed documents. 90 The SSCI\nemployee acces s ed at leas t 166 files .\n\nThe review also discovered that beginning on November 9, 2010 the restricted documents were later disseminated among four other SSCI staffers and printed. 91\nThe names of the SSCI staffers were removed from the final CBT report and replaced wi th IDENs. 92\n(U//FOUO} Although OIG int erview notes mention the CBT's conclusions, they do not descri be the facts on which the CBT\nbased its conclusions.\n\nThe OIG Report's Executive Summary says the CBT report contains s ome \"forensically reconstructed\" SSCI\nstaffer e-mails. 93 And the body of the OIG Report describes those e-mails as \"communication between ' Congressional users' that directed them to review specific documents . \" 94 As previously indicated, SSCI communications inappropriately reviewed by Agency staff were limited in number (five) and did not involve discussions of substantive matters i n content .\n\nThe CBT report lists five e - mails made by one staffer :\n90 (U//FOUO) OIG Notes of 13 March 2014 CBT analyst Interview,\n~ 3.\n\n91 (U) Ibid.\n\n92 {U//FOUO) OIG Notes of '--~----'1 Interview, 'li 2.\n\n93 (U) IG Report, Executive Summary, p. iii.\n\n94 (U) IG Report, p. 44.\n\n(//NF) The OIG found that O\nos ordered the CBT review un~\nown authority as a normal OS function and did not believe l__j .\n\nneeded to seek higher approval . 95 c=Jos believed c===J actions were consistent with the D/CIA's stand down order because!\n\nJthought it applied to the joint CIA- SSCI investigat i on , not to an internal review of already had compiled. 96\n(U//FOUO) This third look resulted in inappropriate access to SSCI work product .\n\nWhile the access was limited-a total of five e-mails, none of any consequence or involving discussions of substantive matters-it was inconsistent with the D/CIA standdown order and with the work product limitations emphasized by\n'------_J and I\nI in_ their taskings.\n\n## Iii. (U) The Oig Findings : Questions And Issues Of Fact A . (U) Undisputed Facts\n\n(U//FOUO) The Agency and SSCI did not enter into a signed, final agreement to govern the management of security in this unusual ci r cumstance, but agreed to resolve ~ssues informally, case by case.\n\nNo record exists to establish that the SSCI staff security briefings agreed to in principle were provided.\n\n(U//f'OUO} The Agency monitored and collected all computer activity on RDINet as part of its standard information system\n95 (0) IG Report, p. 43.\n\n96 (0 ) Ibi d.\n\nsecurity process.\n\nThe included all activity on L---------------~\nthe SSCI portion of the ne t work.\n\n(U//POUO) On the basis of this monitoring, and as known by SSCI\nstaff, previous instances of improper conduct on the RDINet had been identified and responsive security measures taken.\n\nOn certain occasions, SSCI staff requested CIA technology staff assistance in locating documents by accessing SSCI space on the system.\n\n(U//FOUO)\nin discussions with L-~--~----------~\n~------------~~~\nmade the decision to find out if SSCI staff had access to WCR or SRT documents that were deemed privileged, and not part of the SSCI review, and were created after the information cut-off date of 22 January 2009.\n\n(U//FOUO)\ndirected RDINet IT officers to help c===J\ndetermine the location of the WCRs and SRTs on RDINet and t he documents were discovered on the SSCI portion of the shared drive.\n\n(S//NF) Cic0\nwas brought in to examine its to determine if SSCI staff accessed and used the WCRs and SRTs.\n\n(S//NF) The Office of Security's Cyber Blue Team analyzed!\n\nl and the Team's final report included a limL_i _t _e_d __ ~\nLn __\nu_m'b_e_r __ o\n--,=\nf----,s'\"\"\"s,...,c\"\"'I.,.-~s t a f f e -rna i 1 s .\n\n## B. (U) Facts And Issues In Dispute 1. (U) Legal Authorities And Authorization\n\n(U//FOUO) The IG concluded that communications in 2009 between SSCI and the Agency created a common understanding that CIA\naccess to the SSCI portion of RDINet would be restricted to IT\nstaff for administrative purposes unless authorized by the SSCI.\n\nIn this context, the IG found actions directed or performed by and the IT staff to be improper and/or unauthorized.\n\n(U//POUO) IG investigators highlighted to the Board that the five officers were not part of an investigative body (CIC, OS,\n\n## Top Secret ._I ------'T~Ofor~\n\nor OIG) and had no investigative authority.\n\nTwo IG officers had extensive IT experience and further noted to the Board that actions taken by the IT o fficers were unusual and beyond what is expected for an IT officer .\n\n(U//POUO) The five officers countered the IG's findings by highlighting how searches for doGuments on RDINet had become a common practice over the years with IT staff regularly called upon to help determine the location of documents across RDINet.\n\nThey also emphasized that the Agency always maintained responsibility for RDINet security, and the SSCI was aware of this fact from previous incidents and express notification before access to the system. ' with respect to who should have initiated an investigation, determined c==J had the authority and responsibility to ensure the security of RDfNet and c===J actions were in line with responsibilities.\n\nrn O\nwritten response to the IG report, notes that the System Security Plan to address unau access.\n\n(U//POUO) The Board notes that proactively and consistently communicated that the Agency take very limited actions so it would not intrude upon SSCI work product.\n\n## 2. (U) Accountability And Reporting To Leadership\n\n(U//POUO) There is some confusion as to who in Senior Leadership authorized what action and when they issued these directives.\n\nThe OIG told the Board that l I conveyed the D/CIA's interest in the matter before j j had received feedback from the D/CIA, but other information before the Board makes it appear there was regular dialogue with leadership as events unfolded.\n\nAlerts to the D/CIA can take different paths and it appears that the Actinq General Counsel the l I and thel lwere informed of the discoveries after the L_ __________________\nfirst look.\n\nOf note, it was difficult for the Board to develop a precise timeline because events happened in parallel and some of the communications were face-to-face or via phone calls.\n\n## 3. (U) Re Cusal Question\n\n(U//FOUO) The IG report notes that the Acting General Counsel by\n7 February 2014 had previously recused himself from RDI-related matters and was therefore unaware of programmatic details. The IG asserts that the recusal meant did not have a\n'--------------~\nsupervisor during the events in question.\n\n1U//FOUO) When interviewed by the Board on 8 September 2014, the Acting General Counsel explained that he recused himself after th~ 11 March 2014 SSCI Chair speech on the Senate floor and was not recused when he signed out the crimes report on 7 February 2014.\n\nHe explained his active participation throughout the events in question and that he had a discussion with about the potential security incident where he outlined the key issues as:\n\n-\nRDINet is an Agency system .\n-\nSSCI staff members were briefed on the audit capability\n(the Board could not confirm SSCI staffers were briefed on\nthis audit capability).\n-\nIT staff had authorized access.\n-\nThere was a past practice of removing items from the SSCI\nside of RDINet.\n-\nThat it is within Agency responsibilities to determine if\nsomeone took something .\n\n## Iv. (U) Board Concl Usions A. (U) Standa Rd For Reviewing Conduct\n\n(U//FOUO) The Board determined there wijs no agreement between SSCI and the Agency on what steps would be taken in the event of a suspected security incident.\n\nIn the absence of an agreement, the Agency followed its standard security practices with the understanding that the separations of powers concerns were very sensitive, and of keen importance to Agency leadership, and that SSCI work product should, therefore, be protected.\n\n(U//FOUO) In the absence of a formal agreement, the Board the\n\"reasonable person\" standard when evaluating the actions of the five individuals. The Board notes that this is the standard that the OIG told the Board was used in evaluating the conduct in question.\n\n(U//POUO) The Board did not attempt to define what path, decisions, or courses of action would represent the most reasonable responses among various reasonable alternatives, but instead evaluated if the conduct of these officers could be determined to have been unreasonable .\n\n(U//POUO) Under the \"reasonable personn standard, it is possible that different conclusions can be reached by different people from the same set of facts.\n\nThis is particularly so in a fundamentally complex case such as this, involving an unprecedented shared system holding millions of highly sensitive materials which was operated by the Agency and the Senate without a clear, settled agreement on the management of securi~y.\n\n(U//POUO) The fact that the potential security breach involved a co-equal branch of the United States Government added substantially to the complexity and sensitivity of the situation.\n\nGreat certitude was understandably desired before raising it with the Senate and pursuing formal allegations of wrongdoing.\n\n## B. (U) Legal Authorities **And** Author~Zat Ion (U) Appl Ication Of Criminal Law  1030\n\n(U//POUO) The IG referred this matter to the Department of Justice for potential violations of the Wiretap Act and the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act. 97 The OIG Report provided no rationale for either referral .\n\nIn Board interviews, the investigative staff asserted that L---~~~~------~~------~\nviolated the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act because they accessed the SSCI side of RDINet in violation of an unwritten \"Common Understandingn between CIA and the SSCI.\n\n(U/ /FOUO ) The facts and circumstances of this cas~ ~o not support the use of either statute to establish \"unauthorized accessn by these Agency personnel.\n\nThe Wiretap Act criminalizes\n97 (U}IG ~eport, ! 1.\n\nunder certain circumstances the intentional interception, disclosure, or use of the electronic communications of others.\n\n18 U.S.C.  2511.\n\nThe Act excludes from its coverage the i nterception of electronic communications if a party consents to the i nterception.\n\nId.  2511 ( 2) (c) .\n\nEach time a SSCI staffer logged onto RDINet, he or she was presented with the warning that his or her actions were subject to monitoring, and asked to consent to the monitoring as a condition of accessing the system.\n\nThus, SSCI Staffers consented to Agency access of the SSCI side of RDINet for some purposes, not to include the examination of SSCI work product.\n\nThe Act also excludes from its coverage the interception of communications \"under color of law to intercept the . . . communications of a computer trespasser.\" Id.  25ll(i).\n\nWhen Agency personnel accessed information from the SSCI Side of RDINet, they were investigating suspected access to highly classified information from the CIA side of RDINet, which the Agency has a legal duty to protect from unauthorized disclosure.\n\nAccordingly, the Wiretap Act does not support a finding of Agency personnel misconduct in the relation to the events of January 2014.\n\n(U//POUO) There also is no basis for such a finding in the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act referral.\n\nAn individual violates that Act when he \"intentionally accesses a computer without authorization or exceeds authorized access, and thereby obtains\n. Information from any de~artment or agency of the United States.\"\n18 U.S . C.  1030(a) (2) (B) .\n\nThe Board could not find evi dence of a \"Common Understanding\" that would have prevented from looking on the SSCI side of RDINet for the L__ ____\n__J\npresence of CIA documents-highly classified and sensitive documents SSCI was not entitled to access.\n\nTo the contrary, CIA\nrout i nely and without controversy searched the SSCI side of RDINet fo~ CIA documents and it did so on certain occasions at sscr staff request .\n\n(S//~lF) As for the more detailed examination conducted by O\na t direction , reasonably believed~\nL_a_c_t_i,--n_g __\nu_n_d::-e_lr the authority of the D/CIA when 0 task~\nto discover whether sscr staff had accessed and printed the documents~\n(0//FOUO} Because there is no basis for a finding against Iunder these statutes, neither can they establish\n'-m~\ni_s_c_o_n_d_u_c~t who simply carried out c===J\ninstructions.\n\n## C. (U//Pouo) The **Reasonableness** Of '---------' And J Actions '-------~\n\n(0//POUO} As previously noted, by early January 2014\nhad reason to believe that CIA documents had been acc~e_s_s_\ne~d--~\nwithout authorization by SSCI staff.\n\nThe origins and extent of the probable security breach were unknown tol I\n(0//FOUO) This presented D\nwith a dilenuna. O\nneeded to ensure that a CIA system containing substantial sensitive material was secure. O\nalso needed to safeguard the prerogatives of the Senate, particularly the protection of work product.\n\n(0//FOUO) Several courses of actions were possible, but none were without risk.\n\nIn fact, no good options may have existed and any may have led to the subsequent controversy .\n\n(0//FOUO) I\njchose to first verify that a security breach in fact existed before informingc===J superiors.\n\nThis seems reasonable given the embarrassment to the Agency and harm to the Agency-SSCI relationship that would have resulted from a false allegation.\n\n'-----.,------' at all times attempted to limit the scope of the verification process.\n\nOn the day the document was discovered on the SSCI side of the RDINet, relayed this information to Agency leadership.\n\nThere is no evidence thatc==J authorized the review of SSCI work product.\n\n(8//NF) .The IG contends that l lshould not have undertaken steps to verify!\n\n!concerns and instead should have gone to the Office of Security.\n\nThis would have spared adverse OIG findings , but in all likelihood could have\n'--1-e-d--t-o-t-h~e same controversy or worse. I\n(U//POUO) l\n!subsequent efforts to determine whether the documents had been copied or accessed also seem reasonable.\n\nFirst, c==Junderstood the D/CIA to have requested thatc==J do so\n(even though the D/CIA did not fully appreciate the technical methods this effort would necessitate).\n\nSecond, this was no normal potential security problem; it involved the United States Senate.\n\nAccordingly, it seems reasonable for to have explored all alterna~ives and possible solutions before the problem was confirmed and the 0/CIA would have raised it with Senate leaders.\n\n(Ui/FOOO} The Board evaluated j\n! actions in light of directivesc==J received from!\n\nI to determine the presence of documents on the SSCI side of RDINet.\n\nThe Board considered\n~-~! actions to use IT permissions to search for the documents as arguably unorthodox, but they seemed to be within reason given the imperative relayed to c===J by\n~--------'\n(S//NF) In written statement to the Board, D\nhighlighted the Agency on 8 January 2014 responded to the 26\nNovember 2013 SSCI request for copies of the \"Panetta Review and associated materials\" after the White House Counsel's office reviewed them on 7 January 2014 and confirmed they were subject to privilege.\n\nThis sets the framework for c===J initial speculative discussions with ~\n] that SSCI staffers likely had acce ss to the documents. l\n~ad a lingering concern with the Google search tool configuration because SSCI staffers in April 2013 obtained a copy of a privileged spreadsheet containing a list of Agency videos and the staffers agreed with the Agency to destroy the document. 98\n(S//NF) Regarding the use of SSCI-like access, !\n\n!wrote to the Board that \"we sought to test whether the previously known Google misconfiguration still existed and allowed an IT\nprofessional with IT permissions of a SSCI user to access particular nonresponsive, privileged **CIA** documents, which existed on RDINet with restrictions intended to limit access only to CIA users.\" (emphasis in the original) Search terms were\n98 (U//rouoJ'--I ___ _JFs submission, pages 9-10.\n\nchosen to return only CIA work product and c===Jfirst assumption was SSCI staff could have accessed the documents in a CIA-only location. O\nwas surprised to see th.e documents \"saved into a space intended for SSCI work product.u 99\n(U//POUO) J\nJ briefed D\nactions to Agency leaders at the previously mentioned 14 January 2014 morning meeting and none of the officers present objected to the wayc==Jidentified the documents.\n\nUpon the 0/CIA's later stand down directive, ~J --------, wrote to the IT staff to see if access to the documents could be restricted but directed that no further steps be taken. 100\n(U//FOUO) Summary:\nIt is entirely possible that reasonable people would make different decisions under this complex, unique set of circumstances.\n\nWe conclude, however, that and\n~----~~ did not act unreasonably and in fact tried to carefully balance both need for RDINet security with the desire to protect SSCI work product while ascertaining the facts necessary for their superiors' review .\n\n## D. (U) Candor (It Staff )\n\n(U//FOUO) The IG findings of lack of candor against the IT\nemployees did not assert untruthfulness.\n\nInstead the IG\ncontends that their responses were initially incomplete and that reasonable persons would have highlighted their actions taken at the direction of the OGC officers.\n\n(U //FOUO) This contention is unsupported for numerous reasons.\n\nFirst, no transcript, recording, or other comprehensive record of the interviews exists, so it is impossible to reconstruct the questions asked of the IT employees and their purportedly evasive answers. 101\nSecond, the purported problematic responses\n101 (C// NF) The Board notes that in the IG's Memorandum of Investigative Activity (MOIA) that summarizes their only interview with on 4\nFebruary 2014, paragraph 8 quotes I\nI\non D participation in a meeting withc===J approximately three weeks prior to the interview.\n\nThe Board assumed this meeting was related to the events in question and '--------'\nmight have intended to have referred to them.\n\ncame at the end of very brief interviews which focused mostly on unrelated technical matters, so there is a reasonable basis for the IT employees' belief that they were being responsive.\n\nThird~ the IG staff characterized the questions they asked as intentionally general and designed to elicit as broad a response as possible, not specific and detailed responses.\n\nFourth, when the Board interviewed the IT employees, each credibly denied any attem~t to evade questioning.\n\nFifth,\n'-----------~ and J\nJwere open about the searches they had ordered, so it would have been purposeless for the IT employees to conceal their actions .\n\n(U//FOUO) The Board evaluated the OIG's questions used during their first interviews of the three IT officers and the Board as unable to discern questions that would have ledJ\nJand L---------~~ to explain their recent work under the direction of\n(U//FOUO) IG investigators stressed to the Board that!\n\nand l\n!provided relevant details when they were'-----------'\n\"confronted with the evidence . \"\nHowever, there is no evidence mentioned in the corresponding MOIAs, and the OIG did not document the exact content of the questions asked during the second interview.\n\nWhen pressed, one investigator could not recall what was shown during the interview.\n\n(U//FOUO) Under these circumstances, where the alleged transgression is a lack of completeness not lying, more is needed to conclude that the individuals involved were unreasonable in their initial responses.\n\nThe Board concludeq that the allegations of lack of candor were unsupported by the evidence.\n\n## E. {U) Crimes Report Questions: Clarification In The Course Of The I G Interviews\n\n(U//FOUO) The IG asserted that provided i~accurate information that was subsequently included in the\n7 February 2014 letter to DOJ.\n\nThe OIG in interviews with the Board stated the OIG did not intend to suggest that L_ ________ ___j acted improperly in providing this information.\n\nThe Board determined that this assertion is at any rate erroneous.\n\nThe Cyber Blue Team provided the factual basis for the referral, wholly apart from any contribution by\n\n## F . (U) In Extraordinary Circumstances, Difficulties With All Choices Available\n\n(U//FOUO) The Board noted the difficulty of identifying the most appropriate, reasonable proper course of action for this security incident because nearly every such course is open to objection or question:\n\n-\n(U//FOUO) The Agency agreed to hold work product as offlimits, yet was required to maintain the security of its\nnetwork by installing\nmonitoring systems that\nsaved nearly all computer events on t he SSCI portion of\nRDINet.\n-\n(U//FOUO) The common agreement called for a walled-off and\nstand-alone network but this was not implemented so\ndocuments could be easily shared with SSCI staff.\nInstead,\naccess protocols were used to approve or deny access to each document in a common database and Agency IT staff had\nfull view of the entire network.\n. ~~~~~~~----~~~~--~~\ndetected unauthorized activities on the SSCI portion of\nRDINet and these events documented that SSCI understoo the\nextent of monitoring applied to the network.\nHowever, the\nOIG never located SSCI staff signed non-disclosure\nagreements that would verify their knowledge and acceptance\nof the security agreement.\n-\n(U//FOUO) The Board was not presented with an instruction\nor guidance that described what would constitute the\ntransfer of ownership for an Agency document.\nThe Agency\nretrieved documents given to SSCI in error and SSCI staff\ncomplained this violated the (unsigned) agreement.\nHowever, the Agency declined to return the documents en\nmasse and reviewed them for privilege, while at the same\ntime the White House agree.d in communications with Senator\nFeinstein that these were matters that required careful,\nsensitive treatment.\n\n## V. (U) Recommendations A. (U) Recommendations Addressing Specific Issues And Alle Ga Tions In This Matter\n\n(C//NF) After examining the facts, the Board recommends no disciplinary actions are warranted for\n~~~------~~--~~------------------~~ TLh __ e __ B_o_a_r_d ___ f_o_u_n_d ___\nt_h_e~\nactions and decisions of these officers to be reasonable in light of their responsibilities to manage an unprecedented computer system.\n\nThe ambiguity surrounding the agreement between the SSCI and the Agency could have created alternative Agency responses and solutions to this potential security incident, but each could also have raised questions such as those giving rise to the OIG investigation and this Board review.\n\nThe violation of SSCI work product that occurred resulted from communication failures, was not ordered by the individuals under review, and happe ned in spite of their protective efforts .\n\n(U//~OUO)\nThe Board has one recommendation that could improve how the Agency handles future pot e ntial security issues with Congress, and a separate recommendation for the Inspector General's consideration.\n\n(U//FOUO) Rec onunendation 1:\nIn any future questions of this\n\nkind i nvolvi ng Congress , advice from the Office o f Congressi onal\nAff a i r s should be sought . Another assessment mi gh t not alter the\ncours e chosen but could lead to a more comprehensive e va l uation\nof t he matt e r and greater assurance that protecti ve measures are\ni n f a c t impl emented in a manner less likely to generate c onfli ct\nbetwe e n t he branches .\n\n(U/ / FOUO) -Rec onunendation 2:\n                                            While the Board d i sagrees with the\nconcl usi ons i n the matter under review, we do not questi on that\nthe OI G performs a valuable public servi ce or t hat it did not\nstrive to address appropriately the issues in t h i s matter .\n                                                                                           I t\nwould bett e r serve its investigative purposes , and aided this\nboard in its review , if OIG kept ~ore complete records of\ninter v i ews .\n\n## B. (U) Systemic Recommendations\n\n(U//FOUO) The Board found four s~stemic problems that surfaced in this matter and from which specific recommendations are offered.\n\n## (U//Pouo) Systemic Factor 1: No. Signed Agreement And A Lack Of Transparency Between The Ssci And Cia Regarding Rdinet\n\n((U//FOUO)) As noted, the Board disagrees with the OIG that one could conclude there was a \"common understanding\" between the SSC I and CIA that would have governed the act ions taken to determine the existence of a security incident.\n\nThe core agreement was centered on the establishment of SSCI shared drives that would be walled- off but also accessible to CIA IT\nstaff for the purpose of IT network administration.\n\n-\nThere was no documentation that establ i shed agreed-upon\njoint (SSCI and CIA) responsibilities and procedures to be\nused in the event o f a\nsusp~cted security incident.\n-\nSeveral officers and the OIG highlighted that SSCI members\nclicked on the standard Agency warning banner when they\nlogged onto RDINet and this warning included the text, \"use\nof this system. may be mortitored and you have no expectation of privacy.\"\nHowever, SSCI staff members may not have been\naw~re that standard monitoring capabilities included\n-\nSSCI work product was often cited as protected but these\nproducts were not clearly defined or agreed to by both parties.\n(U//FOUO) Recommendation 3 :\nFor network connectivity involving\n\ntwo branches of goverpment and/or multiple lines of authori.ty ,\nthat the D/CIA direct the program's start-up and subsequent\nperformance reviews include specific discussion and signed\ndocumentation by each stakeholder to include terms of\nreferences , network ownership ., network monitoring roles and\nresponsibilities , incident repor~ing, and accountability.\n                                                                      The\n\nagreement shall be briefed to any officer invol ved with the\neffort and separate copies shall be kept in OIG , OS, and CIC.\n\n## (U//Fouo) Systemic Factor 2: Failure To Document And Update The Rdinet Agreement In Light Of Experience\n\n(U//FOUO) The IG's investigat ion highl i ghted three incidents that could have served as watershed events to refine security restrictions for access to RDINet and f urther show how the Agency will rely on its monitoring capabilities to investigate breaches of security.\n\nThe Board could not locate an updated agreement with the exception of a summary that directed Agency officers to consult with SSCI s t aff members before removing documents from the Reading Room .\n\nAs previously mentioned:\n\n- ~In\nDecembe r 2009\nmonitoring\ndetected a SSCI Staff Member\nFurther analysis of\nmonitoring data revealed t he same Staff Member\n'---c,----::-::-::-~\non the network in November and December 2009\n(though the OIG reported lists 2010) and the Member was\nremoved from the team .\n-\n(U//FOUO) In May 2010 the RDI team removed documents from\nthe virtual reading room after they we re unintentionally\ncomingled with document s intended for t he SSCI.\n- ~\nCICc===J in May 2010 detected a Staff Member\nattempting to bypass a p rint restriction by l\n[\n[ The RDI team reminded the SSCI sL__t _a_f_f __\no~f the\nneed for security of sensitive documents.\n\n(U//FOUO) Recommendation 4: For network connectivity involving\ntwo branches of government and/or multiple lines of authority,\nthat the D/CIA direct a quarterly review for issues that may\nwarrant clarification , policymaker awareness,. notification, or\nfurther policy guidance .\n\n(U) Systemic Factor 3: Authorities and Operations under One Hat\n\ncreated a situation where\n                              fundamentally\n\nL_~--~~r---~1 to investigate the potential security incident. '-:;:----c;---;-:---:--;-'\nSplitting these responsibilities would create shared responsibility and opportunities for discussion of alternatives and checks on matters of judgment.\n\n(U//POUO) Recommendation 5: If at all possible , the Agency\nshould avoid assigning operational control and l\n                                                            !oversight\nto one officer.\n\n(U//FOUO) Systemic Factor 4 : The Installation of a Computer\nSearch Tool with Access Control Deficiencies\n\n(8//NF) The Agency install~d a Googl~ search capability at the\nrequest of SSCI staff members but the capability had\nvulnerabilities that provided SSCI staff with access to CIA\nprotected documents.\n                          The search tool was installed as early as\n\n2010 but was not fixed until April 2013.\n\n(U//POUO) Recommendation 6:\n                                 For network connectivity involving\ntwo branches of government and/or multiple agencies , that the\nOffice of Security address network security issues in a timely\nfashion and hold quarterly reviews for issues that may warrant\nclarification , notification, or further policy guidance ."
    },
    {
        "text": "## Updated Assessment On Covid-19 Origins Key Takeaways\n\nScope Note: This assessment responds to the President's request that the Intelligence Community (IC) update its previous judgments on the origins of COVID-19.  It also identifies areas for possible additional research.  Annexes include a lexicon, additional details on methodology, and comments from outside experts.  This assessment is based on information through August 2021.\n\nThe IC assesses that SARS-CoV-2, the virus that causes COVID-19, probably emerged and infected humans through an initial small-scale exposure that occurred no later than November 2019 with the first known cluster of COVID-19 cases arising in Wuhan, China in December 2019.  In addition, the IC was able to reach broad agreement on several other key issues.  We judge the virus was not developed as a biological weapon.  Most agencies also assess with low confidence that SARS-CoV-2 probably was not genetically engineered; however, two agencies believe there was not sufficient evidence to make an assessment either way.  Finally, the IC assesses China's officials did not have foreknowledge of the virus before the initial outbreak of COVID-19 emerged. After examining all available intelligence reporting and other information, though, the IC remains divided on the most likely origin of COVID-19.  All agencies assess that two hypotheses are plausible: natural exposure to an infected animal and a laboratory-associated incident.\n\n Four IC elements and the National Intelligence Council assess with low confidence that the initial SARS-CoV-2\ninfection was most likely caused by natural exposure to an animal infected with it or a close progenitor virusa virus that probably would be more than 99 percent similar to SARS-CoV-2.  These analysts give weight to China's officials' lack of foreknowledge, the numerous vectors for natural exposure, and other factors.\n One IC element assesses with moderate confidence that the first human infection with SARS-CoV-2 most\nlikely was the result of a laboratory-associated incident, probably involving experimentation, animal handling, or sampling by the Wuhan Institute of Virology.  These analysts give weight to the inherently risky nature of work on coronaviruses.\n Analysts at three IC elements remain unable to coalesce around either explanation without additional\ninformation, with some analysts favoring natural origin, others a laboratory origin, and some seeing the hypotheses as equally likely.\n Variations in analytic views largely stem from differences in how agencies weigh intelligence reporting and\nscientific publications and intelligence and scientific gaps.\nThe IC judges they will be unable to provide a more definitive explanation for the origin of COVID-19 unless new information allows them to determine the specific pathway for initial natural contact with an animal or to determine that a laboratory in Wuhan was handling SARS-CoV-2 or a close progenitor virus before COVID-19 emerged.\n\n The ICand the global scientific communitylacks clinical samples or a complete understanding of\nepidemiological data from the earliest COVID-19 cases.  If we obtain information on the earliest cases that identified a location of interest or occupational exposure, it may alter our evaluation of hypotheses.\n\nChina's cooperation most likely would be needed to reach a conclusive assessment of the origins of COVID-19. Beijing, however, continues to hinder the global investigation, resist sharing information, and blame other countries, including the United States.  These actions reflect, in part, China's government's own uncertainty about where an investigation could lead as well as its frustration the international community is using the issue to exert political pressure on China.\n\n\n\n## Ic Assessments Of Covid-19 Origins\n\nin December 2019\n* Virus not developed as a biological weapon\n* Virus not genetically engineered\n* Beijing's lack of cooperation on origins not diagnostic\nof either hypothesis\n* Numerous information gaps, particularly related to technical data\n\n## Introduction\n\nThe IC has prepared several assessments examining the origins of COVID-19.  Analysts have focused on whether SARS-CoV-2, the causative virus of COVID-19, was genetically engineeredparticularly as a biological weaponwas transmitted to humans naturally or transmitted due to a laboratory-associated incident, perhaps during sampling or experimentation.  China's reaction to and handling of the pandemic have given analysts insights into these issues, but Beijing's actions have also impeded the global scientific community and our ability to confidently determine how the virus first infected humans.\n\n## Sars-Cov-2 Probably Not A Biological Weapon\n\nThe IC assesses China did not develop SARS-CoV-2 as a biological weapon.\n\n We remain skeptical of allegations that SARS-CoV-2\nwas a biological weapon because they are supported by scientifically invalid claims, their proponents do not have direct access to the Wuhan Institute of Virology (WIV), or their proponents are suspected of\nspreading disinformation.  [*See appendix B.*]\n\n## Most Analysts Assess Sars-Cov-2 Not Genetically Engineered\n\nMost IC analysts assess with low confidence that SARS- CoV-2 was not genetically engineered.  Their assessment is based on technical analysis of SARS-CoV-2 and the IC's growing understanding of traits and the potential for recombination in other coronaviruses.  Two agencies believe there is not sufficient evidence to make an assessment either way.\n\n As of August 2021, we still have not observed\ngenetic signatures in SARS-CoV-2 that would be diagnostic of genetic engineering, according to the IC's understanding of the virus.  Similarly, we have not identified any existing coronavirus strains that\ncould have plausibly served as a backbone if SARS-CoV-2 had been genetically engineered.\n\n Our growing understanding of the similarities of\nSARS-CoV-2 to other coronaviruses in nature and the ability of betacoronavirusesthe genus to which SARS-CoV-2 belongsto naturally recombine suggests SARS-CoV-2 was not genetically engineered.  For instance, academic literature has noted that in some instances betacoronaviruses have recombined with other viruses in nature and that furin cleavage sites (FCS)a region in the spike protein that enhances infectionhave been identified in naturally occurring coronaviruses in the same genetic location as the FCS in SARS-CoV-2. This suggests that SARS-CoV-2 or a progenitor virus could have acquired its FCS through natural recombination with another virus.\nIC analysts do not have higher confidence that SARS-\nCoV-2 was not genetically engineered because some genetic engineering techniques can make modifications difficult to identify and we have gaps in our knowledge of naturally occurring coronaviruses.\n\n Some genetic engineering techniques may make\ngenetically modified viruses indistinguishable from natural viruses, according to academic journal articles.  For instance, a 2017 dissertation by a WIV student showed that reverse genetic cloning techniqueswhich are standard techniques used in\nadvanced molecular laboratoriesleft no trace of genetic modification of SARS-like coronaviruses.\n It will be difficult to increase our confidence that\nthe distinguishing features in SARS-CoV-2 emerged naturally without a better understanding of the diversity of coronaviruses in nature and how often recombination occurs during co-infection of multiple coronaviruses within a particular host. For example, academic literature has indicated that a FCS had previously been inserted into SARS-CoV-1, the causative agent of SARS, complicating differentiation of how such a feature may have appeared.\n\n##\n\n The WIV previously created chimeras, or\ncombinations, of SARS-like coronaviruses, but this information does not provide insight into whether SARS-CoV-2 was genetically engineered by the WIV.\nsome features of SARS-CoV-2, according to publicly available information.  However, it probably would take years of laboratory adaptation using the appropriate cell types and a virus that is more closely related to SARS- CoV-2 than ones currently known to generate the number of mutations separating SARS-CoV-2 from any known coronavirus strains, judging from scientific journal articles.  Such processes would require differentiation and maintenance of primary cells and the development of appropriate animal models.\n\nNo IC analysts assess that SARS-CoV-2 was the result of laboratory adaptation, although some analysts do not have enough information to make this determination. Repeated passage of a closely related virus through animals or cell culturewhich we consider laboratory adaptation and not genetic engineeringcould result in\n\n## China's Lack Of Foreknowledge Of Sars-Cov-2\n\nThe IC assesses China's officials probably did not have foreknowledge that SARS-CoV-2 existed before WIV researchers isolated it after public recognition of the virus in the general population.  Accordingly, if the pandemic originated from a laboratory-associated incident, they probably were unaware in the initial months that such an incident had occurred.\n\n Early in the pandemic, the WIV identified that a\nnew virus was responsible for the outbreak in Wuhan.  It is therefore assessed that WIV researchers pivoted to COVID-19-related work to address the outbreak and characterize the virus. These activities suggest that WIV personnel were unaware of the existence of SARS-CoV-2 until the outbreak was underway.\n\n## Two Plausible Hypotheses Of Pandemic Origin\n\nIC analysts assess that a natural origin and a laboratoryassociated incident are both plausible hypotheses for how SARS-CoV-2 first infected humans.  Analysts, however, disagree on which is more likely, or whether an assessment can be made at all, given the lack of diagnosticity of the available information.  Most agencies are unable to make higher than low confidence assessments for these reasons, and confidence levels are tempered by plausible arguments for the opposing hypothesis.  For these hypotheses, IC analysts consider an exposure that occurs during animal sampling activity that supports biological research to be a laboratoryassociated incident and not natural contact.  What follows is a look at the cases that can be made for these competing hypotheses.\n\n## The Case For The Natural Origin Hypothesis\n\nSome IC analysts assess with low confidence that the first human COVID-19 infection most likely was caused by natural exposure to an animal that carried SARS- CoV-2 or a close progenitor virusa virus that would likely be more than 99 percent similar to SARS-CoV-2.\nFour IC elements, the National Intelligence Council, and some analysts at elements that are unable to coalesce around either explanation are among this group.  Analysts at these agencies give weight to China's officials' lack of foreknowledge and highlight the precedent of past novel infectious disease outbreaks having zoonotic origins, the wide diversity of animals that are susceptible to SARS-CoV-2 infection, and the range of scenariosto include animal trafficking, farming, sale, and rescuein China that enable zoonotic transmission.  Although no confirmed animal source of SARS-CoV-2 has been identified, to include a reservoir or intermediate species, analysts that assess the pandemic was due to natural causes note that in many previous zoonotic outbreaks, the identification of animal sources has taken years, and in some cases, animal sources have not been identified.\n\n These analysts assess that WIV's activities in early\n2020 related to SARS-CoV-2 are a strong indicator that the WIV lacked foreknowledge of the virus.\n They also see the potential that a laboratory worker\ninadvertently was infected while collecting unknown animal specimens to be less likely than an infection occurring through numerous hunters, farmers, merchants, and others who have frequent, natural contact with animals.\n Given China's poor public health infrastructure\nand the potential for asymptomatic infection,\nsome analysts that lean towards a natural origin argue that China's infectious disease surveillance system would not have been able to detect the SARS-CoV-2 exposure as quickly as a suspected exposure in a laboratory setting.\n\n## History Of Zoonotic Pathogen Emergence, Conditions In China Ripe For Zoonotic Spillover\n\nAnalysts that find the natural zoonotic spillover hypothesis the most likely explanation for the pandemic also note the wide diversity of animals that are susceptible to SARS-CoV-2 infection, range of scenariosto include animal trafficking, farming, sale, and rescuein China that would enable zoonotic transmission, and precedent of novel human infectious disease outbreaks originating from zoonotic transmission.  Previous human coronavirus outbreaks, to include SARS-CoV-1 and Middle East Respiratory Syndrome coronavirus (MERS-CoV), occurred naturally and were linked to animal reservoirs with zoonotic transmission to humans, according to scientific literature.\n\n Extensive wildlife and livestock farming, wildlife\ntrafficking, and live animal markets in China and historically lax government regulationand even promotionof these activities increase the probability that initial transmission occurred along one of these routes.\n Academic literature has revealed Wuhan markets\nsold live mammals and dozens of speciesincluding raccoon dogs, masked palm civets, and a variety of other mammals, birds, and reptilesoften in poor conditions where viruses can jump among species, facilitating recombination events and the acquisition of novel mutations.  SARS-CoV-2 can infect a range of mammals, including cats, dogs, pangolins, minks, raccoon dogs, and a variety of wild and domestic animals, according to academic literature.\n Wider Hubei Province has extensive farming and\nbreeding of animals that are susceptible to SARS-CoV-2, including minks and raccoon dogs.\nThese analysts note that there is a precedent for viral vectors to travel long distances in China and cause infection elsewhere because of transportation and trade nodes, thereby widening and complicating the search for the specific zoonotic spillover incident.  For instance, the bat coronavirus that is currently the closest known relative to the original SARS-CoV-1 was identified in Yunnan Province, even though the first SARS outbreak detected in humans occurred in Guangdong Province, hundreds of kilometers away.\n\n## The Case For The Laboratory-Associated Incident Hypothesis\n\nOne IC element assesses with moderate confidence that COVID-19 most likely resulted from a laboratoryassociated incident involving WIV or other researcherseither through exposure to the virus during experiments or through sampling.  Some analysts at elements that are unable to coalesce around either explanation also assess a laboratory origin with low confidence.  These analysts place emphasis on academic articles authored by WIV employees indicating that WIV scientists conducted research on other coronaviruses under what these analysts consider to be inadequate biosafety conditions that could have led to opportunities for a laboratory-associated incident.  These analysts also take into account SARS-CoV-2's genetic epidemiology and that the initial recorded COVID-19 clusters occurred only in Wuhanand that WIV researchers who conducted sampling activity throughout China provided a node for the virus to enter the city.\n\n## Wiv Research Includes Work With Animals That Carry Relatives Of Sars-Cov-2\n\nThe analysts that find the laboratory-associated origin theory most likely assess that WIV researchers' inherently risky work with coronaviruses provided numerous opportunities for them to unwittingly become infected with SARS-CoV-2.  Although the IC has no indications\n\n## Wiv Illnesses In Fall 2019 Not Diagnostic\n\nThe IC assesses that information indicating that several WIV researchers reported symptoms consistent with COVID-19 in autumn 2019 is not diagnostic of the pandemic's origins.  Even if confirmed, hospital admission alone would not be diagnostic of COVID-19 infection.\n\nthat WIV research involved SARS-CoV-2 or a close progenitor virus, these analysts  note that it is plausible that researchers may have unwittingly exposed themselves to the virus without sequencing it during experiments or sampling activities, possibly resulting in asymptomatic or mild infection.  Academic literature indicates that WIV researchers conducted research with bat coronaviruses or collected samples from species that are known to carry close relatives of SARS-CoV-2.\n\n Based on currently available information, the closest\nknown relatives to SARS-CoV-2 in bats have been identified in Yunnan Province, and researchers bringing samples to laboratories provide a plausible link between these habitats and the city.\n These analysts also note that China's investigations\ninto the pandemic's origin might not uncover evidence of a laboratory-associated incident if it involved only a small number of researchers who did not acknowledge or have knowledge of a potential infection.\n\n## Biosafety Conditions For Specific Work Could Have Led To An Incident\n\nThe analysts that assess COVID-19 most likely originated from a laboratory-associated incident also place emphasis on information suggesting researchers in China used biosafety practices that increased the risk of exposure to viruses.  Academic publications suggest that WIV researchers did not use adequate biosafety precautions at least some of the time, increasing the risk of a laboratory-associated incident.\n\n## The Role Of The Huanan Seafood Wholesale Market\n\nSome scientists and China's public health officials have shifted their view on the role of the Huanan Seafood Wholesale Market in the pandemic since early 2020.  Some now view the market as a potential site of community spread rather than where the initial human infection may have occurred.\n\n On January 1, 2020, China's security\nauthorities shut down the market after several workers fell ill in late December 2019.  China focused early source tracing on the market and Hubei Province; association with the market was included as part of the early case definition.\n\n In January 2020, a scientific article that\ndescribed clinical features of initial COVID-19 infections in China found that some COVID-19 patients did not have any known association with the market. Furthermore, there continues to be conflicting data with some academic articles and preprints noting that phylogenetic analysis of the available data on the earliest cases suggests that the progenitor virus may not have originated from the market.\n\n## China's Transparency Key To Determining Covid-19 Origin\n\nThe IC judges that closing persistent information gaps on the origins of COVID-19 is very likely to require greater transparency and collaboration from Beijing.  The scientific community lacks technical data on a reservoir species, possible intermediate species, and closer relatives to SARS-CoV-2.\n\nData and Samples From Initial Cases: The global scientific community does not know exactly where, when, or how the first human infection with SARS-CoV-2 occurred.  It lacks a complete picture of the initial cases in Wuhanor potentially elsewhere in Chinathat would allow it to better understand potential sources of infection or conduct phylogenetic analysis that would help validate both hypotheses.\n\nInformation That Would Confirm Natural Outbreak:\nSearching for a natural reservoir or potential intermediate host requires collecting, isolating, and sequencing viruses from samples taken from potential host species and environments to search for viruses related to SARS-CoV-2, endeavors that require international collaboration, resources, and time.\n\n Information that the earliest confirmed COVID-19\ncases were in individuals or families who spent time in rural regions or who were involved in animal trade or environments that facilitate close human-to-animal interactions could indicate that the virus was circulating within an animal reservoir and a zoonotic spillover event caused the first COVID-19 case in humans.\n However, some transmission pathways are\nfleeting, meaning an animal acquires a virus and evidence of infection vanishes, particularly if the animals are reared and harvested for agricultural or commercial purposes.\nInformation That Would Confirm Laboratory-\nAssociated Incident: China's coronavirus research or related information from origins investigations by Beijing or international organizations could provide clear indications of a laboratory-associated incident or at least yield some new insights.\n\n\n\n## Wiv's Publicly Available Coronavirus Research\n\nIC analysts are examining published research from China for any indicators that would inform our understanding of COVID-19's origins.  The WIV and other research groups in China published coronavirus articles in 2020 and 2021, including the discovery of the closest known relative of SARS-CoV-2, but at least some relevant data on coronaviruses of interest has either been unavailable or has not been published. Although the WIV described the sampling trip to the mineshaft in Mojiang in Yunnan Province where it collected RaTG13 in 2016, it did not explicitly state that RaTG13 was collected from that mine until 2020.  Similarly, the WIV collected eight other coronaviruses from the same mine in 2015 that it did not fully disclose until 2021.  In some of these instances, however, the WIV has described unpublished work in webinars and interviews prior to publishing.\n\n## China Likely To Impede Investigation\n\nThe IC judges they will be unable to provide a more definitive explanation for the origin of COVID-19 unless new information allows them to determine the specific pathway for initial natural contact with an animal or to determine that a laboratory in Wuhan was handling SARS-CoV-2 or a close progenitor virus before COVID-19 emerged.\n\n For instance, Beijing limited the World Health\nOrganization (WHO) investigation team's access to sites.\n In late July, China denounced a WHO plan for\nfuture investigations into COVID-19 origins, claiming that the proposal for future investigations was politicized.  China's officials publicly rebuked the WHO's plans for a future study of labs in China,\nsaying Beijing would not allow the WHO to engage in the \"conspiracy theory.\"\nChina is also pushing its narrative that the virus originated outside China.\n\n Public statements from China's Government have\ncontinued to claim the virus originated from imported frozen food, an extremely unlikely theory.\n China's Government continues to spread allegations\nthat the United States created or intentionally spread SARS-CoV-2 to divert attention away from Beijing.\n\n## Annex A: Definitions\n\nAntibody: A protein produced during an immune response to a part of an infectious agent called an antigen.\n\nBackbone: A genetic sequence used as a chassis upon which to build synthetic constructs, such as those used for cloning, protein expression, and production.\n\nBiological weapon: A weapon that uses bacteria, viruses, toxins, fungi, and biochemical/biomolecule agents that can cause death or injury to humans, plants, or animals or destroy materials.\n\nBiosafety: The application of knowledge, techniques, and equipment to prevent personal, laboratory, and environmental exposure to potentially infectious agents or biohazards.  Four **Biosafety levels (BSL)** define the containment conditions under which biological agents can be safely manipulated.  These standards range from moderate safety requirements for low-risk agents (BSL-1), to the most stringent controls for high-risk agents (BSL-4).  China's standards range from P14.\n\nBiosecurity: The protection, control of, and accountability for biological agents, toxins, and biological materials and information to prevent unauthorized possession, loss, theft, misuse, diversion, and accidental or intentional release.\n\nCoronavirus: A common type of virus that can infect humans and/or animals.  The human illness caused by most coronaviruses usually last a short time and presents symptoms consistent with the \"common cold,\" such as a runny nose, sore throat, cough, and a fever.\n\nCOVID-19: An infectious disease caused by the SARS-CoV-2 virus, which is a betacoronavirus. Diagnostic information: Information that allows IC\nanalysts to distinguish between hypothesesin this case, the laboratory origin and natural origin theories.\n\nDNA (deoxyribonucleic acid): A molecule that carries an organism's genetic blueprint for growth, development, function, and reproduction.\n\nEpidemiology: The study of the distribution and determinants of health-related events in specified populations, and the application of this study to prevent and control health problems.\n\nFurin cleavage site (FCS): A region in the spike protein of SARS-CoV-2 that enhances infection.\n\nGain-of-function: The IC considers this as a research method that involves manipulating an organism's genetic material to impart new biological functions that could enhance virulence or transmissibility (e.g., genetically modifying a virus to expand its host range, transmissibility, or severity of illness).  The IC assesses that genetic engineering, genetic modification, and laboratory-adaptation can all be used for gain-of-function experiments, but are not inherently so.  We address both genetic engineering and laboratory-adaptation in the body of this assessment; the IC is unaware of an agreed, international definition.\n\nGenetically engineered or genetically modified viruses are intentionally altered, created, or edited using biotechnologies, such as Clustered Regularly Interspaced Short Palindromic Repeat (CRISPR), DNA recombination, or reverse genetics.  These viruses have intentional, targeted edits to the genome designed to achieve specific results, but unintentional genomic changes may also occur.\n\nGenome: The genetic material of an organism.  It consists of DNA (and sometimes RNA for viruses). Genome sequencing: The process of determining the DNA or RNA sequence of an organism's genome, or its \"genetic code.\"  An organism's genetic code is the order in which the four nucleotide basesadenine, cytosine, guanine, and thymineare arranged to direct the sequence of the 20 different amino acids in the proteins that determine inherited traits.\n\nIntermediate species/host: An organism that can be infected with a pathogen from a resevoir species and passes the pathogen to another host species; infection is not sustained in this population.\n\nLaboratory-adapted viruses have undergone natural, random mutations through human-enabled processes in a laboratorysuch as repeated passage through animals or cellsthat put pressure on the virus to more rapidly evolve.  Specific changes to the viral genome are not necessarily anticipated in these processes, though the virus can be expected to gain certain characteristics, like the ability to infect a new species.  This is a common technique used in public health research of viruses.  We consider directed evolution to be under laboratory adaptation.\n\nLaboratory-associated incidents include incidents that happen in biological research facilities or during research-related sampling activities.\n\nMolecular biology: Study of the molecular basis of activities in and between cells.  This includes techniques to amplify or join genetic sequences.\n\nNaturally occurring viruses have not been altered in a laboratory.  Viruses commonly undergo random mutations as part of the evolutionary process and can continue to change over time; mutations may enable a virus to adapt to its environment, such as evading host immune responses and promoting viral replication.\n\nOutbreak: A sudden increase in occurrences of a disease in a particular time and place.  Outbreaks include epidemics, which is a term that is reserved for infectious diseases that occur in a confined geographical area.\nPandemics are near-global disease outbreaks. Pangolin: An African and Asian mammal that has a body covered in overlapping scales.  Pangolins are a natural reservoir of coronaviruses and researchers are investigating their potential role as an intermediate host for SARS-CoV-2.\n\nPathogen: A bacterium, virus, or other microorganism that can cause disease.\n\nPhylogenetics: The study of the evolutionary relationships among groups of organisms.\n\nProgenitor virus: A virus that is closely related enoughprobably more than 99 percentto SARS-CoV-2 to have been its direct ancestor or plausible immediate origin of the outbreak.  The closest known relative to SARS-CoV-2 is only around 96 percent similar; to put this into context, humans and chimps are around 99 percent similar, demonstrating the signficant differences even at this similarity.\n\nRaTG13: A coronavirus with the closest known whole genome to SARS-CoV-2, although it is widely believed to not be a direct ancestor of SARS-CoV-2.\n\nResevoir species/host: An organism that harbors a pathogen, which is endemic within the population.\n\nRNA (ribonucleic acid): A molecule essential for gene coding, decoding, regulation, and expression.  Certain viruses use RNA as a genetic blueprint.\n\nTransmissibility: The measure of new infections initiated by an existing infection.\n\nVirus: A replicating piece of genetic materialDNA or RNAand associated proteins that use the cellular machinery of a living cell to reproduce.\n\nWet market: A market where fresh food and live and dead animals, including wildlife, are sold.\n\nZoonosis: An infection or a disease that is transmissible from animals to humans under natural conditions.  A\nzoonotic pathogen may be viral, bacterial, or parasitic, and can sometimes be transmitted through insects, such as mosquitoes.\n\nZoonotic spillover: An initial infection or disease that is caused by contact between an animal and human under natural conditions.\n\n## Annex B: Ic Examination Of Open-Source Theories\n\nIC analysts have examined a number of open-source articles from a variety of sources that have raised theories about SARS-CoV-2 and COVID-19's origin. The IC assesses that these theories generally do not provide diagnostic information on COVID-19 origins, and in some cases, are not supported by the information available to us.  However, several have drawn on insightful methods or identified potential leads.\n\n## Theory Of Abnormal Activity At The Wiv In Fall 2019\n\nThe IC assesses that an assessment about abnormal activity at the WIV in fall 2019 lacks support and does not offer diagnostic insight.  The Multi-Agency Collaboration Environment (MACE) published a report assessing that the pandemic began in October 2019 because of a release at the WIV.\n\n Although the methodology is insightful, the IC\nhas concerns with the small data set and analytic rigor used to derive the group's findings, and our review of information directly contradicts some of its findings.\n\n## Theory That Sars-Cov-2 Was A Biological Weapon\n\nThe IC assesses that public claims from a Hong Kong virologist that Beijing created SARS-CoV-2 as a biological weapon are inconsistent with available technical information on coronaviruses.  We assess that the articles contain several technical inaccuracies and omit key data points.\n\n Since September 2020, a virologist who worked in\na WHO-affiliated laboratory in Hong Kong has publicly stated that Beijing created SARS-CoV-2 from bat coronaviruses and that China's researchers intentionally released it.  The scientific community did not peer review these articles and some publicly rejected the articles' claims as scientifically unsound.\n\n## Theory That Sars-Cov-2 Was Genetically Engineered\n\nThe IC assesses that public claims that some distinguishing features in SARS-CoV-2 are the result of genetic engineering are not diagnostic of genetic engineering.  The IC has been evaluating how SARS-CoV-2 could have developed these features and notes that the furin cleavage site (FCS)a region in the spike protein that enables infection and has been the topic of open-source debatecan also be consistent with a natural origin of the virus. We do not fully understand the diversity of natural coronaviruses or how often they recombine, suggesting that there are plausible natural means by which these features in SARS-CoV-2 could have emerged beyond what we currently understand.\n\n For example, the author of an article in April notes\nthe SARS-CoV-2's FCS is unique among known betacoronaviruses.  The author argues that such features are rare and so well-adapted for human infection that they are more likely emerged from laboratory work than from natural selection.\n Although an IC review of scientific literature has\nindicated that no known betacoronaviruses in the same subgenus have this FCS in the same region of\nthe spike protein as SARS-CoV-2, similar FCSs are present in the same region of the spike protein as other naturally occurring coronaviruses, according to scientific articles.\nWe also do not find credible a now-withdrawn preprint article from two Indian educational institutes posted in January 2020 that asserted SARS-CoV-2 was genetically engineered using sequences from the human immunodeficiency virus.  We assess it is unlikely that scientists would have chosen to intentionally engineer the specific sequences that were the focus of the scientific article.\n\n## Theory That Sars-Cov-2 Originated Outside China\n\nWe are aware of scientific studies claiming to have found SARS-CoV-2 viral fragments or antibodies in samples taken before November 2019 outside China. However, technical flaws in some of these studies, uncertainties in the methodologies, and in some cases, the lack of a credible review process make us skeptical of their utility in determining the pandemic's origin.\n\n We assess that the first cluster of confirmed\nCOVID-19 cases arose in Wuhan, China, in late 2019, but we lack insightand may never have iton where the first SARS-CoV-2 infection occurred.  Although all of the earliest confirmed cases of COVID-19 were documented in China's Hubei Province, where Wuhan is located, according to Western and China's press reports, it is plausible that a traveler came in contact with the virus elsewhere and then went to Wuhan.\n We continue to monitor scientific publications and\ndiscuss these issues with experts.  Even if the virus is found to have existed outside China before the Wuhan outbreak, credible evidence of human infection would also be necessary to determine if the first COVID-19 outbreak began there.\n\n\n## Annex C: Ic Approach To 90-Day Study\n\nThe NIC collaborated closely with the National Counterproliferation Center (NCPC), the National Intelligence Management Council (NIMC), IC agencies, and other USG entities and departments on this assessment.  The IC kicked off the 90-day study by outlining the core intelligence questions that would be addressed over lines of effortcollection and analysis. These questions included:\n\n Did the outbreak begin through contact with\ninfected domestic or wild animals or was it the result of a laboratory-associated incident?\n Was the virus genetically engineered?  Is SARS-CoV-2 a biological weapon?\nCollection: At the kick-off meeting for the 90-day study, the IC discussed core intelligence gaps to drive collection moving forward.\n\nAnalysis: The NIC had two separate structured analytic exercises to discuss both the underlying reporting and to strengthen argumentation moving into the drafting phase.  Analysts at individual agencies also pursued various structured analytic techniques to build their own assessments.\n\n During a two-day-long in-person IC-wide Analysis\nof Competing Hypothesis (ACH) analytic exercise\nin June, analysts determined whether existing reporting was consistent or inconsistent with information in individual reports.  This exercise allowed analysts to determine that most reporting was consistent with both hypotheses and the reporting that was inconsistent was deemed to be not credible.\n Before the start of drafting, the NIC hosted an IC-\nwide **Team A/Team B** analytic exercise to explore\nhow the IC could strengthen either hypothesis through a debate style format.  Agencies pulled from these conversationsalong with the work conducted during and before the studyto solidify their consensus positions.\n\n## Annex D: Outside Review\n\nThe NIC conducted four rounds of outside review of the draft assessment.  These sessions provided valuable feedback that we incorporated into the assessment.  The NIC made some organizational changes in response to comments; comments included:\n\n Emphasize points of agreement.  Provide additional definitions in the lexicon and\nensure technical or intelligence jargon is explicitly explained.\n\n## Annex E: Questions\n\nAnswers to the following questions would help us better evaluate hypotheses related to the origins of COVID-19:\nWhat additional informationto include timing, location, relevant animal exposures, occupational information, and clinical samplesis there on the earliest cases of COVID-19? How were early cases investigated?  What questions or tools were utilized for tracing contacts and contacts of those contacts? What direct or indirect indicators of COVID-19 clusters is China aware of from early in the outbreak?  This may include things like hospital occupancy rates or efforts to triage medical care outside of hospital facilities. What insight can China provide on the search for the reservoir and potential intermediate species of the COVID-19 virus? What insight can China provide on the search for the identification of a progenitor virus?  Have any leading candidates or regions for spillover been identified? What information, data, and/or samples does China have on wildlife or other animals present in the following markets in Wuhan:\n\n Huanan Seafood Wholesale Market\n Qiyimen Live Animal Market  Baishazhou Market\n Dijiao Outdoor Pet Market\nWhat information, data, and/or samples does China have on wildlife present in the other markets, wildlife rescue centers, and/or farms in Wuhan, across Hubei, in neighboring provinces, or in locations where live animals in Hubei Province are sourced from?"
    },
    {
        "text": "# Review Of Psychological Operations Lessons Learned From Recent Operational Experience Review Of Psychological Operations Lessons Learned From Recent Operational Experience\n\nby Christopher J. Lamb with a contribution from Paris Genalis National Defense University Press Washington, D.C. September 2005\nOpinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied within are solely those of the contributors and do not necessarily represent the views of the Defense Department or any other agency of the Federal Government. Cleared for public release; distribution unlimited.\n\nPortions of this work may be quoted or reprinted without permission, provided that a standard source credit line is included. NDU Press would appreciate a courtesy copy of reprints or reviews. First printing, September 2005\n\n## Illustrations Figures\n\nFigure 21. Product Development Process ........ 33 Figure 31. PSYOP Support, Operation *Iraqi Freedom*........ 49 Figure 51. Fault Lines and Options........ 99 Figure 52. PSYOP Tactical Force Structure........ 101 Figure 61. PSYOP Systems Taxonomy ........ 121 Figure 62. SOCOM Equipment Disposition........ 122\n\n## Tables\n\nTable 31. Doctrine for Joint Psychological Operations ........ 52 Table 51. Designated Approval Levels for PSYOP\nMission Categories........ 90\nTable 61. Comparison of DOD, SOCOM, and PSYOP\n        FY05 Funding........ 127\nTable 62. Actuals and POM 06 PSYOP Funding........ 128\n\n## Foreword\n\nThis work is dedicated to LTC Charles Buehring, SPC Adam Kinser, SPC Joseph A. Jeffries, SPC Jonathan J. Santos, and SGT Michael G. Owen, and their families. These psychological operations soldiers lost their lives in Iraq and Afghanistan while practicing their chosen profession, which so often saves the lives of U.S. military personnel as well as other combatants and noncombatants. Our hope is that this report will honor their sacrifice by providing insights on means to sharpen psychological operations capabilities.\n\nDr. Chris Lamb, a senior fellow in the Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS),1 led the research team, which was comprised of Dr. Paris Genalis, the National Defense University Chair for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics; Joel Wiegert, INSS research assistant; and Jason Barden, Ellen Chou-Gu, Ellen Corbin, and Francisco Escalante, research assistants from Booz Allen Hamilton. Dr. Genalis was responsible for the chapter on \"Equipment and Technology.\" Dr. Lamb was responsible for the other chapters.  The research assistants collected and analyzed data and drafted major sections of the report, including those on PSYOP equipment, PSYOP experience in recent operations, and historic PSYOP lessons learned from stability operations. The findings in this study are based on a range of primary and secondary sources that are identified in the bibliography and footnotes.  Without imputing responsibility for any of the report's conclusions, the research team would especially like to thank COL Jack Summe and the members of the 4th Psychological Operations Group who so ably and professionally responded to requests for assistance.  In addition (and again without suggesting that they ascribe to any conclusions), we would like to thank some members of the psychological operations community (active duty, reserve, and retired) who made extra efforts to assist with the research: SFC James Adam, SGT Brandon Ames, LTC Carl Ayers, SFC Jeff Bierman, LTC Curt Boyd, COL James Brenner, COL Al Bynum, SFC Robert Carroll, LTC Mike Ceroli, COL Steve Herczeg (ret.), SPC David Horning, Mr. Robert Jenks, COL Stephen Keeling, Lt Col David Lamp, SSG Michael Lindsay, COL Tony Normand (ret.), Major Allen McCormick, SGT(P) Lance Putnam, LTC Fredric W. Rohm, Jr., MSG Ken Sablan, LTC Marcel A. Schneider, COL Bob Schoenhaus, 1SG Scott Henry, SFC Christopher Sims, COL James Treadwell, LTC Kenneth Turner, and SSG Christopher Vasatka. We greatly appreciate the assistance rendered and insights provided by these dedicated servicemen. Thanks to their contributions, the accuracy and value of the report are much greater than they otherwise would have been.\n\n## Precis\n\nExtant lessons learned and guidance are correct but inadequate. Currently, psychological operations (PSYOP) are able to produce modest effects, particularly at the tactical level, with minimum resources.  The Joint Staff, Joint Forces Command, and the 4th Psychological Operations Group (POG) produced joint lessons learned about PSYOP from recent operations that identify factors constraining its ability to produce greater effects.  These lessons learned are accurate and consistent with the four lessons repeatedly revealed in postoperational assessments of PSYOPnamely, that PSYOP performance suffers from:\n\n- a lack of national-level themes to guide message formulation - slow product approval process that renders some products irrelevant - questionable product quality with uncertain effects - an overall lack of resources, including insufficient force structure.\nHowever, these official lessons learned are not sufficiently comprehensive or detailed to form the basis for remedial action to improve PSYOP performance.  The Information Operations (IO) Roadmap, published in late 2003, made a series of recommendations to improve PSYOP and its ability to produce effects.  However, the conclusion of this report is that the IO Roadmap recommendations also are helpful but insufficient to make a substantial difference in the ability of PSYOP to produce greater effects for commanders. There are shortfalls in both capabilities and resources. PSYOP is currently overextended and conducts neither theater nor tactical operations at peak effectiveness.  Theater PSYOP does not have sufficient target audience analysis and feedback sources.  Forces cannot really do theater broadcasts to general audiences, but substantial resources are poured into a marginal capability for that mission (no around-the-clock radio/television content and limited dissemination capability).  PSYOP has a more comprehensive ability to conduct tactical missions but cannot meet the demands of maneuver commanders for timely, tailored products.  Tactical PSYOP forces have insufficient intelligence, production, and dissemination capability to support fastmoving maneuver commanders well.  The lack of cooperation between theater and tactical PSYOP forces further reduces the effectiveness of the overall campaign. Finally, in both theater and tactical areas, the community is falling behind the technological trends.  A promising advanced concept technology demonstration (ACTD) could correct this deficiency, but ACTDs typically do not transition to major acquisition programs. Given that PSYOP investment is already significantly underresourced, expecting the ACTD to produce major operational capability when it comes to fruition at the end of the decade looks like a poor bet. Therefore, absent a major infusion of resources, PSYOP will continue to compensate poorly by buying off-the-shelf solutions to its materiel needs. The imbalance between theater and tactical PSYOP exacerbates resource shortfalls.  Currently, PSYOP expends considerable effort in areas where it lacks a comparative advantage.  To illustrate this point, the report makes a distinction between PSYOP requests to narrow target audiences for specific behaviors (largely but not exclusively conducted by tactical forces) and PSYOP messages to broad audiences that attempt to change attitudes or beliefs as a prelude to behavioral changes (largely but not exclusively the focus of theater-level PSYOP forces). PSYOP has a comparative advantage at the tactical level against specific target audiences when it leverages the ability of the U.S. military to compel compliance with behaviors that appear in the narrow self-interest of the target audience (such as surrender, safety instructions, and so forth).  Yet the bulk of limited PSYOP resources go into theater-level efforts to shape attitudes and beliefs about broad issues, an area in which PSYOP can make a valued contribution but often operates at a comparative disadvantage because target audiences do not consider the American military a credible source and because PSYOP receives such limited national-level support for this endeavor. In short, and contrary to the opinion of many PSYOP professionals and to other recommendations made on PSYOP reform, this report emphasizes that PSYOP can not compensate for an admittedly weak U.S. public diplomacy effort by absorbing more of that mission; it simply is not competitive in that arena, and the politics of strategic communications in the United States will not permit it in any case. The rewards and challenges of fixing theater and tactical PSYOP are different.  If the status quo (modest effects for minimum cost) is not satisfactory, PSYOP capabilities and the quality of PSYOP products can be improved relatively easily.  PSYOP currently does not follow relevant industry best practices for high-quality plans and products, mostly for lack of resources.  Doing so would improve the likelihood of producing greater effects in support of military operations. Any attempt to upgrade either theater- or tactical-level PYSOP must begin with some fundamental improvements, such as more resources and greater attention to target audience analysis and linguistic support.  However, there are major differences in the challenges and rewards of improving theater and tactical PSYOP. Significant resources (approximately $100 million annually) and uncertain national-level support would be needed to substantially improve theater PSYOP for general audiences, including a national commitment to organizing for successful strategic communications, a reformed approval process, and contractor support for commercial quality programming.\n\n- By comparison, improving tactical PSYOP would be less difficult, requiring doctrinal\nchanges and more modest resources to correct shortfalls in intelligence, communications,\nand production and dissemination capabilities.\n- U.S. forces in both major combat operations and stability operations would benefit from\nimproved PSYOP, but it is more critical to overall success in stability operations. This heightened success, in addition to reduced casualties and more efficient performance in major combat operations, would constitute the biggest returns on new investments in improved PSYOP performance.\nGiven all these considerations, and absent a national-level commitment to provide for the several key prerequisites for success in theater PSYOP, this report concludes that the commander, Special Operations Command (SOCOM), should focus on what is most easily improved, controlled, and measured: tactical PSYOP. The most important actions that could be taken in this regard would concern:\n\n- vision, doctrine, and concept of operations.  Update Joint and service doctrine, and the\nSOCOM PSYOP Vision and Concept of Operations, to be consistent with the findings in this report and guidance in the *IO Roadmap*, particularly with respect to the relationship between PSYOP and public diplomacy and public affairs.\n- intelligence and target audience analysis. Take steps to improve intelligence support to\nPSYOP, including redesigning the Strategic Studies Detachment to better support tactical target analysis, with the assumption that national-level institutions will conduct strategic\nstudies and share them with the 4th POG.  An examination of how the broader\nIntelligence Community and the Strategic Studies Detachment capture, assess, and segment target audiences in advance could be useful as well.\n- tactical product development support. Direct a plan to integrate personnel assigned to the\nJoint PSYOP Support Element (JPSE) and the Media Operations Center with a mission of immediate (less than 24 hours), tailored product support to tactical PSYOP forces in the field and institutional memory of products and effects.\n- theater to tactical communications. Direct a broad architectural look at PSYOP\ncommunications with a mandate to recommend short-term means of improving communications between the Joint Psychological Operations Task Force (JPOTF) and tactical PSYOP, ensure that all PSYOP communications network nodes have connectivity appropriate to the mission, and guarantee interoperability of equipment at all echelons through vigorous configuration management.\nBecause of the value of PSYOP for success in stability operations, the report recommends a national-level commitment to substantially improve theater PSYOP for general audiences by better organizing for strategic communications, reforming the approval process, and contracting for commercial-quality, general audience programming.  If this national-level support were available, SOCOM should:\n\n- produce a detailed reform plan consistent with the recommendations in this study, laying\nout a specific action plan to improve the quality of PSYOP products with estimated costs\n(assuming a tripling of PSYOP resources on an annual basis).\n- detail PSYOP planners to support an Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) Field\nAgency for Support to Public Diplomacy, the purpose of which would be to create commercial-quality, policy-consistent radio/television and print content for general foreign audiences that could be disseminated by PSYOP forces in support of military operations.\n- support national-level efforts to develop means to temporarily suppress adversary\ncommunications, in addition to the presumptive national-level reform efforts mentioned above.\nJust as SOCOM ought not to undertake reform of theater PSYOP for general audiences without national support, national leadership ought not to allocate substantial new resources for any PSYOP reform (theater or tactical) without a specific SOCOM plan for doing so. Improving the ability of PSYOP forces to produce desired effects is as much a matter of non-materiel reforms as of additional resources.  Currently, the PSYOP mission is defined vaguely, and PSYOP resources are not focused where they have the greatest comparative advantages.  PSYOP leadership resists integration with IO even though such integration would disproportionately benefit PSYOP.  A concrete plan that identifies and proposes affordable solutions to the greatest impediments to quality PSYOP programs and products is lacking.  Absent a specific and abiding commitment to eliminate such shortcomings, additional investment in PSYOP is not likely to produce commensurate improvements in effects.  Hence, the report recommends that SOCOM be tasked to produce an implementation plan to carry out the report's reform agenda for PSYOP doctrine, recruitment, training, force structure, and acquisition (summarized in the executive summary to the report).  Additional resources should be provided contingent upon the quality of the plan.\n\n## Study Charter\n\nThe Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy in the Office of the Secretary of Defense commissioned this report on the recommendation of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense-level Information Operations Steering Committee.  The Committee decided in its March 9, 2004, meeting that a review of PSYOP lessons learned from Operation *Iraqi Freedom* (OIF)\nwas in order.2\n\n- Objective. The purpose of the study was to obtain an independent look at the\nperformance of psychological operations forces in Operation *Iraqi Freedom* and to determine whether improvements were possible.  Specifically, results from the research were to be compared with recommendations for reform of psychological operations from the *Information Operations Roadmap*.  In particular, the research was to assess whether and how new technology might affect PSYOP performance.\n- Scope and Timeline. The study began on April 16, 2004.  Initially, it was limited to a\nreview of PSYOP lessons learned in OIF, but the mandate was expanded to include Operation *Enduring Freedom* (OEF) on the grounds that it was a significantly different operation that might yield important insights on PSYOP performance.  On June 22, 2004, an interim progress report was made to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense-level Information Operations Steering Committee.  During that briefing, the scope of the report was expanded to include lessons learned from stability operations, including OIF Stability Operations (commonly known as OIF 2).  In addition, the project timeline was extended from 90 to 180 days.  The output from the research effort was to be a final briefing and a report.\n\n## Study Methodology\n\nThe methodology adopted for this study was straightforward and largely spelled out in the terms of reference provided for the study effort (see appendix A).  First, official lessons learned for OIF were obtained and reviewed, and those specific to PSYOP were identified.  Then, after reviewing other informal lessons learned3 and identifying issues that seemed to merit further exploration, a set of additional hypotheses about PSYOP performance was circulated to informed parties for comment.  These hypotheses included research and technology issues as well as several specific to PSYOP performance in stability operations.  The research team used all relevant evidence available to resolve these issues, including primary documents and interviews with participants in recent operations.  A series of conclusions were developed based on the key issues identified and then compared to the *IO Roadmap* recommendations to identify discrepancies.  Further, as invited in the terms of reference, a series of recommendations were made to correct shortcomings.\n\n## Sources\n\nTo conduct this research, a large body of primary and secondary source material was obtained. The study team conducted a background survey of secondary sources, including historical literature reviews and doctrine, to help develop an understanding of PSYOP employment standards and issues over the past few decades.  Since the overarching objective of the study required an accurate assessment of PSYOP performance for which existing measures of merit are considered inadequate, the team explored industry standards that could be used to gauge the quality of the PSYOP process and products.  To assess lessons about PSYOP performance, the team reviewed all official lessons learned, including service as well as joint lessons, and informal lessons captured in briefings and after-action reports, either on information operations generally or on PSYOP specifically. In addition, the study team mined briefings, informal assessments of performance by PSYOP personnel, daily situation reports, and products to gather evidence that would either substantiate or challenge emerging consensus on lessons learned.  More specifically, these materials included briefings from SOCOM, U.S. Army Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Command\n(ACOPOC), and the 4th POG; the interview database at Joint Forces Command; research on Iraqi perspectives about PSYOP effects; PSYOP situation reports for OIF and OEF; and data on PSYOP equipment and budgets provided by SOCOM.  Most helpful were the results from online surveys and interviews (by phone or in person) with PSYOP specialists and subject matter experts directly in response to the postulated hypotheses. All interviews conducted were for nonattribution unless specified otherwise by the interviewee. The research team met with commanders of active duty PSYOP units, members of the nascent JPSE, former PSYOP commanders of the 4th POG, commanders of Joint PSYOP Task Forces\n(JPOTFs) in recent operations, members of the Joint Forces lessons learned team, members of the Joint Advanced Warfighting Program at the Institute for Defense Analyses, experts at the Central Intelligence Agency, and PSYOP experts in the Pentagon.  The research team also exchanged insights with allied PSYOP practitioners and traveled to Fort Bragg, North Carolina, and the Special Operations Command to discuss data and findings with PSYOP professionals. The report was circulated in draft for comment from PSYOP professionals before being produced in this final version.\n\n## Executive Summary\n\nThe Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy in the Office of the Secretary of Defense commissioned this report.  He did so at the recommendation of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense-level Information Operations Steering Committee.  The Committee decided in its March 9, 2004, meeting that a review of psychological operations (PSYOP) lessons learned from Operation *Iraqi Freedom* (OIF) was in order. The intent of the study was to obtain an independent look at the performance of psychological operations forces in Operation *Iraqi Freedom* and to determine whether improvements were possible.  Specifically, results from the research were to be compared with recommendations for reform of psychological operations from the *IO Roadmap*.   In particular, the research was directed to assess whether and how new technology might affect PSYOP performance. The study began on April 16, 2004.  Initially, the study was limited to a review of PSYOP lessons learned in OIF, but the mandate was expanded to Operation *Enduring Freedom* (OEF) on the grounds that it was a significantly different operation that might yield important insights on PSYOP performance.  On June 22, 2004, an interim progress report was made to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense-level Information Operations Steering Committee.  During that briefing, the scope of the report was expanded to include lessons learned from stability operations, including OIF Stability Operations as well as stability operations over the last 10 to 20 years. For decades, post-operations assessments of PSYOP have identified the same set of lessons learned:\n\n- a lack of national-level themes - a slow or unresponsive product approval process - questionable product quality - an overall lack of resources, including insufficient force structure.\nSome of these shortcomings have not been addressed because they are politically difficult to correct.  Others remain unresolved because there is uncertainty about the precise nature of the problem, or a lack of confidence in the ability of prescribed solutions to generate improved PSYOP effects that would be roughly estimated as cost-effective.  The insights gleaned from recent lessons learned efforts, as well as the results of this study, should provide enough insight on the precise origin of factors limiting PSYOP performance to allay some of these concerns.\n\n## Categories And Terminology\n\nEstablishing some categories and clarifying some terminology facilitate the presentation of findings. Missions and objectives. The terms missions, *objectives*, and *tasks* are often confused or used interchangeably.  In this report, the study team asserts that psychological operations is a mission distinct from public affairs and support to public diplomacy. A second assertion is that a variety of objectives assigned to PSYOP over the past decades can be condensed into a set of four overarching PSYOP objectives that apply to both major combat operations and stability operations:\n\n- isolate the adversary from domestic and international support - reduce the effectiveness of the adversary's forces - deter escalation by adversary leadership - minimize collateral damage and interference with U.S. operations.\nGeneral and specific audiences.  The distinction is often made between general and specific audiences in the report, but rather than a dichotomy, the distinction represents a range of target audiences.  The broadest audience is the entire theater of operations, and the most fundamental partition of that general audience into more specific ones is between combatants and noncombatants.  The most specific audience is the individual decisionmaker. Direct and indirect behavior modification.  To obtain any of the four goals identified above, PSYOP must modify behavior, inducing someone to either take action or refrain from it. However, PSYOP may request specific behaviors directly, or it may attempt to obtain the desired behaviors indirectly.  If indirectly, then PSYOP attempts to change knowledge, beliefs, or attitudes by informing, instructing, or interpreting information for the target audience as a prelude or contribution to behavioral changes.  The assumption is that behavior that correlates with American interests is more likely to be induced if it is based on a favorable set of beliefs or attitudes resident within the target audience. Levels of PSYOP.  This report discusses three levels of PSYOP, only two of which actually exist (theater and tactical) and which are repeatedly differentiated.\n\n- Strategic PSYOP and \"support to public diplomacy.\"  This level of PSYOP refers not to\nthe significance of any given PSYOP activity, but rather to its geographic scope. Strategic PSYOP would be transregional, if not global.  However, the IO Roadmap asserts that the U.S. military does not practice strategic PSYOP, and this report concurs\nwith that finding.  Any information provided by military sources to such a wide-ranging\naudience would constitute \"support to public diplomacy\" or to \"public affairs,\" if the audience included the U.S. public.\n- Theater/operational PSYOP. Theater-level PSYOP refers to forces and activities under\nthe direct control of the theater commander. Theater PSYOP often is directed toward general audiences and typically tries to modify general attitude sets as a prelude to behavior changes rather than requesting behavior changes directly.  The dominant approach for theater or operational PSYOP will involve rational argumentation designed to achieve longer lasting effects.  However, by engaging the target audiences' thought processes to a greater extent, the PSYOP effort will inspire stronger counterarguments. PSYOP can increase the audience's ability to receive the message by adapting it to the receiver's understanding and experience and by eliminating or reducing distractions. Delivery vehicles for messages at this end of the continuum include the Internet, television, radio, newspapers, and journals.\n- Tactical PSYOP. Tactical PSYOP refers to forces and activities under the direct control\nof individual maneuver force commanders.  Typically, tactical PSYOP is directed against specific target audiences and often asks for specific behaviors. Messages used in tactical psychological operations must be concise and to the point, often attempting to persuade an audience for short-term behavior modification in a brief statement on a leaflet or other paper product.  Because the PSYOP professional wants the target audience to act rather than to think about the message being conveyed, there may be relatively more emphasis on emotion than reason.  Many tactical products also derive a comparative advantage by leveraging the coercive power of the U.S. military and its reputation.  Delivery vehicles well suited for tactical PSYOP include face-to-face interaction, loudspeakers, posters and handbills, leaflets, and emails.  These products must attract attention and make the principal point quickly.\nLinks between level, audience, and method.  There is no necessary linkage between the level of PSYOP and its audience (general or specific) or its method of seeking behavior modification (directly or indirectly).  For example, theater PSYOP forces might have access to a mechanism that would target a specific decisionmaker (for example, a computer network operations tool), and it could use messages that either directly or indirectly try to modify behavior.  Alternatively, a small tactical PSYOP team could develop and run a Web site for general audiences in Iraq that attempts to change behavior indirectly.  However, the observable tendency is for neither of these examples to happen, and understanding why is important for a full appreciation of the results of this study.\n\n- Theater PSYOP/general audience/indirect behavior modification linkage:  Generally\nspeaking, in recent operations, theater PSYOP forces under the control of the JPOTF prepared theater products (primarily radio, but also printed products) for general audiences that tended to support public diplomacy (conveying the legitimacy of U.S. policy and objectives to the general population). The JPOTF also prepared tactical operations that requested specific behaviors (for example, desertion and surrender of enemy forces), but these generally were the focus of tactical PSYOP once the fastmoving operations began.  Therefore, in this report the tendency of theater PSYOP to\nfocus on general audiences and indirect behavior modification is remarked upon, even\nwhile it is understood that the connection is a current, but not a necessary, characteristic.\n- Tactical PSYOP/specific audience/direct behavior modification linkage:  Currently,\ntactical PSYOP forces tend to represent the needs of tactical maneuver units that, especially in combat operations, are only interested in direct and rapid behavior modification for the specific target audiences directly in their path of advance.  Even in stability operations, tactical forces focus on the target audience in their area of operation and most often require specific behaviorsthe quicker the better.  Moreover, tactical PSYOP forces do not normally control means of addressing general audiences.  Finally, their distance from policymakers militates against indirect behavior modification, since such messages often have political content that requires approval.  Therefore, in this report, the tendency of tactical PSYOP to focus on specific audiences and direct behavior modification is remarked upon.  Again, it is understood that the connection is a current characteristic rather than a necessary attribute of tactical PSYOP.\n\n## Official Lessons Learned\n\nThe only officially sanctioned (approved by a commander for dissemination) joint lessons learned on PSYOP were those completed by the Joint Staff, the Joint Forces Command\n(JFCOM), and the 4th PSYOP Operations Group (Airborne).  With minor exceptions reviewed in the body of the report, the official lessons learned were substantiated by the sources reviewed in this study. The lessons officially sanctioned by these three sources are outlined here. The Joint Staff lessons learned reported the need to:\n\n- fix interagency coordination to harmonize all national \"perceptual assets\" - coordinate operational-level IO (and thus PSYOP) with national efforts - consolidate IO policy oversight in OSD to facilitate such coordination (this lesson is\nimplied but not actually asserted directly in the Joint Staff's lessons)\n- have Public Affairs counter adversary disinformation around the clock in overseas\nas well as domestic audiences.\nThe Joint Forces Command lessons learned pointed out that:\n\n- theater-level PSYOP must be integrated with national efforts (similar to the point made\nby the Joint Staff  but with slightly more emphasis on the role of the Combatant Commander in accomplishing this objective)\n- PSYOP must build a competitive, responsive live theaterradiotelevision capability.\nMore specifically, the JFCOM lessons learned noted that PSYOP execution was marked by friction, assessment difficulties, and, at times, a lack of sophistication in spite of its contribution to strategic and operational objectives.\n- the Under Secretary of Defense (Policy) [USD(P)] should publish guidance that\neffectively incorporates interagency coordination and national-level guidance for PSYOP themes\n- the Joint PSYOP Support Element, a PSYOP unit supported by commercial sector\ncontractors as recommended in the *IO Roadmap*, should be activated more quickly to improve integration with national themes and messages\n- the quality and quantity of PSYOP broadcasting capabilities and platforms should be\nimproved, from the strategic to the tactical level.\nThe 4th Psychological Operations Group lessons learned indicated that:\n\n- personnel increases are needed and should be addressed in the current Force Design\nUpdate process\n- training is needed for PSYOP personnel for Internet/Web site development - equipment needs should be aligned with increases in force structure and addressed in the\nForce Design Update process\n- contracting funds are needed for satellite connections, PSYOP support elements (PSEs)\nassigned to embassies, linguists, and the use of products subject to copyright protection.\nHistoric lessons.  The lessons learned from the Joint Staff, JFCOM, and the 4th POG are consistent with previous PSYOP lessons learned from operations over the past two decades. Historically, PSYOP lessons learned have lamented the:\n\n- lack of national guidance on themes - flawed approval processes that render PSYOP products less timely and less effective - lack of sufficiently high-quality PSYOP products - limited resources to address all PSYOP requirements.\nOther lessons learned.  From the review of the official lessons learned and informal discussions with PSYOP participants in OEF, OIF, and OIF 2, ten critical issues emerged for further investigation.  They are grouped into the major categories of resources, improved decisionmaking, and PSYOP reform.\n\n## Resources\n\nGeneral underresourcing.  A frequent observation from previous reports, lessons learned, and after-action reports is that PSYOP forces simply do not have enough resources to do all of their assigned missions.  The issue of contention is whether PSYOP is so systematically underfunded that it cannot fulfill its increasingly important mission objectives or, if so, whether gross underfunding forces PSYOP to cut corners that have negative effects on mission execution. In short, the issue is whether decisionmakers should consider a wholesale increase in resources for PSYOP as opposed to just examining individual, specific shortfalls that are particularly egregious. Arguments reviewed suggest that PSYOP cannot currently meet the requirements of the defense strategy.  It cannot fulfill its missions across multiple contingencies, and it is falling behind general technology trends.  During OEF, OIF, and OIF2, for example, PSYOP was not able to broadcast or produce live television feeds in-theater.  The conclusion of this report is that while better PSYOP planning and resource management may be necessary and desirable, PSYOP simply cannot meet mission requirements and substantially improve its ability to produce effects without a substantial increase in resources. Critical specific shortfalls. PSYOP labored under a variety of specific resource shortfalls while conducting operations in Afghanistan and Iraq.  Shortfalls included a lack of connectivity between tactical PSYOP units supporting theater maneuver commanders and the JPOTF; an inability to rapidly produce and disseminate radio and television content; a number of tactical PSYOP limitations involving force protection and tactical equipment; the inability to benefit from seizure of adversary communications facilities; and a lack of fungible resources for translation, tactical dissemination, target audience analysis, and other tasks.  In addition, PSYOP equipment experienced operational problems in the desert terrains of Iraq and Afghanistan due to extreme heat and sand penetration and the aggressive operating schedule. The optimal solution to addressing PSYOP resource shortfalls is to pursue a cost-benefit analysis that would evaluate the range of PSYOP equipment and capabilities against their associated costs.  This would serve as a quantifying element in determining actual costs (to include potential risks for non- or under-investments) as well as providing a sound basis for the distribution and placement of PSYOP inventory.  However, PSYOP study resources are exceedingly limited for these kinds of acquisition analyses.  The alternative recommended in this report is an internal implementation plan from SOCOM that addresses the shortfalls. Quality of PSYOP products. A recurrent complaint throughout the period covered by this study concerns the quality of psychological operations products.  The quality of the overall PSYOP campaign, standard PSYOP processes, and individual products does not meet industry standards and could be improved with internal efficiencies and through steps that would require additional resources.  The report indicates specific areas for improvement, the most important of which are the need for high-quality translation and better target audience analysis.  Concerning target audience analysis, PSYOP generally does not have the resources to do extensive product testing, focus groups, and market surveys; nor does it have freedom of movement in nonpermissive or semipermissive environments.  However, it could compensate for these limitations by better accessing open sources, by using its Strategic Studies Detachment differently, and by more systematically using red-teaming efforts to improve product quality and assist with damage limitation when a product generates unintended effects.  Timing of product dissemination, quality product control sheets, and more easily useable product templates for field use could improve PSYOP product quality as well.\n\n## Improved Decisionmaking\n\nNational themes. The absence of national-level guidance on themes reduces the effectiveness of PSYOP plans, and the lack of coordinated national information activities also can undermine the overall effectiveness of an information campaign.  National guidance on information themes and the desired end state, which was provided in OEF but not in OIF or OIF 2, improves the likelihood of a robust and effective PSYOP campaign.  Without such guidance, PSYOP products conveyed to general audiences at the theater level are likely to be a less specific formulation of broad U.S. public policy positions.  PSYOP efforts may still counter adversary disinformation and provide information generally favorable of U.S. policies and operations, but they are less likely to provide strong argumentation in defense of U.S. policies for fear of getting ahead of them.  The ability of Pentagon authorities to affect the coordination of a national strategic communications is uncertain, but doing so would clearly increase the likelihood of PSYOP generating desired effects Approval process. A dilatory PSYOP product approval process is detrimental to the execution of an effective PSYOP campaign.  Before operations begin, a delayed process inhibits PSYOP planning and rehearsal time, while slow approval during an actual campaign can render some military and political products useless, since they may be overcome by events. Unless the approval process is reformed, both at the theater and tactical level, PSYOP effectiveness will be seriously compromised. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations/Low Intensity Conflict [ASD(SO/LIC)] should be tasked to author a DOD Directive and the Joint Staff to draft a Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction (CJCSI) that would codify the following approach to PSYOP product approval, the details of which are in the body of this report.\n\n- First, the concept for risk management would accept the possibility of an occasional poor\nproduct and would identify means of mitigating the consequences.\n- Second, a general scheme for preapproval of tactical products would be adopted that\nincludes a discrete set of product categories with designated approval levels.\n- Third, the Under Secretary of Defense (Policy) would delegate the approval process to\nsomeone with day-to-day access to contingency policy who can review products for approval on a by-exception basis.  The JPOTF would forward products to the Pentagon with more detailed product control sheets that would be logged in with an \"expiration\" time, after which their approval is assumed.  The Policy official charged with approval would check only for policy consistency, not quality.  If the Pentagon does not generate national-level themes and messages or participate in a process that allows expeditious interagency review on a recurring basis, then all product approval would be delegated to\nthe combatant commander on the assumption that Policy guidance was stable and broad\nenough that the oversight provided in the original review and approval of the combatant commander's plan would be sufficient.\nThe same general process should apply for tactical products.  However, the JPOTF would check for consistency with policy and planning as well as for minimum quality standards, since the JPOTF presumably would have more resources available for that purpose than would individual PSYOP company commanders. Leadership priority.  Below the level of combatant commander, flag officer attitudes about the ability of PSYOP to create effects remain mixed.  It is not surprising that in combat, many commanders will place greater confidence in kinetic weapons with which they are more familiar and which have more easily demonstrated effects.  For many, substituting kinetic options with PSYOP products amounts to targeting on faith, since their actual effects are so difficult to observe and quantify. The impact of PSYOP activities will always be more obscure than that of kinetic weapons, but much more could be done to systematically assess PSYOP effects through dedicated intelligence support and interrogation of target audiences.\n\n## Psyop Reform\n\nMission confusion. Many informal and formal lessons learned offered about PSYOP raise the question of whether it is properly focused on its priority mission.  In general, PSYOP missions have been alleged to be construed too broadly with negative effects. PSYOP needs to be coordinated with public diplomacy and public affairs efforts to avoid conflicting and/or dissipated effects.  PSYOP doctrine and mission statements that could easily be confused with mandates to conduct public diplomacy and public affairs are not helpful.  The broader Special Operations community clearly defines its primary missions and distinguishes between primary and collateral missions.  PSYOP would be well advised to do the same. PSYOP integration with IO. As part of its recommendation set, the Information Operations Roadmap suggested that PSYOP become integrated with broader IO efforts.  At issue is whether this integration actually benefits or weakens PSYOP and its effects.  Specifically, a major problem documented in OEF, OIF, and OIF 2 lessons learned is that IO planners did not adequately understand PSYOP and thus failed to appreciate its capabilities sufficiently or employ them appropriately and effectively. Based on the evidence collected, PSYOP integration with IO apparently produced historically unprecedented levels of cooperation between PSYOP, electronic warfare (EW), and computer network operations (CNO). There was also evidence of normal PSYOP cooperation with other IO core capabilities as well.  It cannot be said that this integration was to great effect, but it does bode well for the future vision of information operations as a core military capability.  It is also true that many IO officers were not well trained or well informed, but these shortcomings caused relatively few and minor problems for PSYOP.  Moreover, it is reasonable to expect that PSYOP integration into IO will improve when the *IO Roadmap* recommendations are fully implemented. Quantity of PSYOP planners. A widely recognized problem in OIF was the insufficient number of PSYOP planners available to support component commanders.  It was asserted that the lack of PSYOP planners contributed to poor planning and execution of PSYOP missions.  Specifically, the Combined Forces Air Component Commander (CFACC) and the Combined Forces Maritime Component Commander had insufficient PSYOP planning support within their respective commands.  PSYOP integration in mission planning was hampered by this shortfall. Service component commanders believed that the lack of PSYOP planners had a significant and negative impact on their operations.  PSYOP must be prepared to meet this demand in the future. The creation of a Standing Joint Force Headquarters and standard operating procedures for integrating information operations in all combat operations would go a long way toward rendering this issue moot by providing for the integration of PSYOP and IO with all other operations as a normal joint staffing process.  Until then, the other services must either offer up personnel for training in joint PSYOP, or PSYOP must provide for them by forward deploying more of its own personnel to support operations within the theater. Theater-tactical gap.  A gap exists between the missions and capabilities of theater-level and tactical-level PSYOP forces that undermines the effectiveness of the overall PSYOP effort. Tactical PSYOP forces, located predominantly in the reserves, are not as well equipped or trained as the Active Component, which is organized mainly to support theater-level PSYOP. Tactical PSYOP, once on the move, cannot communicate readily with the JPOTF, which is overseeing the theater-level effort, and they have scant resources to actually produce and disseminate products.  Because of the communications gap, the JPOTF is not well informed by the tactical forces on the effects their products have on target audiences.  This gulf that exists between the mission focus, capabilities, and, ultimately, cooperative intent of theater and tactical PSYOP degrades the overall effectiveness of the effort. It is important to close this gap to improve PSYOP effectiveness for the combatant commander. Tactical PSYOP in support of major combat operations is more cost effective and easier to fix but is less critical for the success of overall combat operations.   In contrast, theater PSYOP to general audiences is harder and more expensive to fix but is more critical for the success of stability operations.  Given the other reforms necessary to make PSYOP effective at the theater level for general audiences, senior leaders might want to consider focusing PSYOP on the tactical PSYOP mission, executed by either forces controlled by the JPOTF or tactical maneuver units.  Doing so would help reduce the variance in theater-tactical missions and lay the groundwork for greater cooperation between the JPOTF and tactical forces.  If senior leaders consider the theater PSYOP mission targeting general audiences worth the required expenditure of political and fiscal capital, it still might be advisable to have the content produced by another entity to allow the JPOTF to better balance its responsibilities for theater and tactical PSYOP support and oversight.\n\n## Stability Operations\n\nAll PSYOP lessons learned for past stability operations may be summarized in nine functional areas.\n\n- Coalition cooperation and interagency coordination (critical to success):  Information\nmust be shared between agencies and with coalition partners to ensure that PSYOP is part\nof a well-orchestrated information effort that generates consistent messages across multiple media outlets.\n- Understanding PSYOP (needs improvement):  Appreciation for the importance of\nPSYOP varies among individual U.S. commanders, with some using PSYOP well, and others, hardly at all.\n- Planning (early and continuous is best):  PSYOP must be involved early in the planning\nstage of operations in order to maximize its effects.\n- Operations (integrated efforts magnify effects):  PSYOP effects can be greatly enhanced\nwhen they are carefully integrated with conventional forces application.  Similarly, the effects of conventional forces are enhanced when supported by PSYOP.\n- Products (timeliness and quality need improvement): Securing product approval in a\ntimely manner is an ever-present problem.  Prepared and preapproved products offer a ready solution, since many themes and messages are consistent across the range of military operations and can easily be anticipated.\n- Training (needed to improve PSYOP capabilities): An insufficient number of well-trained\nPSYOP specialists is commonly identified as a weakness in stability operations.\n- Force structure (insufficient Active Component forces): The high operations tempo of the\nActive Component PSYOP forces over the past two decades has led to frequent observations that their numbers are insufficient to meet the demands of operational requirements.\n- PSYOP equipment (insufficient quantity and quality): PSYOP units are chronically short\nof the quantity and quality of equipment needed to accomplish their tasks efficiently and effectively.\n- Other resource issues: PSYOP lacks both strategic and tactical organic mobility. Forces\nfrequently arrive late to theater because they are accorded a low priority for movement. In addition, PSYOP has insufficient fungible resources to purchase short-notice support elements, particularly in the area of translator support.\nIn general, these nine sets of PSYOP lessons learned from stability operations apply equally well to major combat operations.  However, digging deeper into the specifics, the report identifies three PSYOP lessons learned for stability operations that deserve to be highlighted as distinct (either in application or criticality) from PSYOP lessons for major combat operations:\n\n- The center of gravity in stability operations is popular support, so PSYOP must focus on\nthe general population as well as enemy combatants and leaders.\n- Early and continuous theater-level PSYOP integration with other agencies to ensure\nconsistent themes and messages is essential.\n- Face-to-face PSYOP with the host population is critical, and PSYOP forces must use\nconventional forces to support this objective.\nIn addition to these three lessons, an overarching observation is that the entire role of PSYOP is more critical for success in stability operations than in major combat operations where the struggle will largely be determined by a clash of arms rather than changes in popular support for contending agendas. Acquisition and technology.  PSYOP investment is significantly underresourced. Moreover, PSYOP has no in-house analytical capability and only minimal resources to identify new technological directions to enhance its capabilities. PSYOP compensates in part for these shortcomings by rapidly acquiring any new commercial off-the-shelf equipment that supports its current mode of operation. Absent a major infusion of resources, PSYOP will continue to fall behind technological trends. However, the SOCOM investment process reflects all the directives and regulations of the Department of Defense.  It emphasizes jointness, capabilities-based thinking, high leveraging of others' programs with emphasis on industry, short acquisition cycles, and high warfighter involvement.  The mechanics of the process are logical and provide ample opportunity for leadership involvement.  Therefore, the resulting investment program reflects the priorities of SOCOM, both in total investment funds distribution and in near-total reliance on technology advances pursued largely by others.  Finally, the Advanced Concept Technology Demonstration (ACTD) sponsored by SOCOM is moving slowly and perhaps could benefit from some expansion, but it appears to cover all the most glaring shortfalls identified in this study and by the Defense Science Board. If the Department feels justified in expanding PSYOP resources, it does not need to reform SOCOM processes so much as it needs to communicate that intent clearly to command leadership.  PSYOP requirements repeatedly fail to make the cut with SOCOM's leadership.  If DOD wants a higher priority attached to PSYOP, it must provide the additional funding to SOCOM or provide direct guidance on the subject.  If additional resources are made available, a better resource distribution will be needed to reflect longer time horizons and steady program execution.  Improvements over the present situation would be easily achievableincluding more support for analyses to better understand how technology can support requirements, more work in research and development (R&D) to develop requisite technology or better adapt commercially available technology, and steady funding for acquisition supporting efficient buy profiles. IO Roadmap *recommendations*.  In general, the results of this research are consistent with the findings of the *Information Operations Roadmap*.  For example, this report reinforces Roadmap recommendations on training, career force, analytic support, standardized IO planning tools, and a virtual Major Force Program for all IO components.  In other respects, however, this report concludes that the *IO Roadmap* did not go far enough in its recommendations.  In particular, this report:\n\n- urges an acceleration of the PSYOP Global Reach ACTD effort, which is addressing\ndenied-area dissemination concerns as one of its primary pursuits.  In addition, this report\nsupports the continued emphasis of the ACTD on tactical PSYOP dissemination as well as the expansion of the Psychological Operations Broadcast System (POBS) to provide for a second theater capability.\n- notes that the recommendation on the JPSE in the *IO Roadmap* is not aggressive enough\nto make a difference at the theater level for general audiences, and that the *Roadmap* does not fully address the need to provide more responsive, tailored product support to tactical PSYOP units.\n- argues that the *Roadmap*'s recommendation for approval reform is also insufficient,\nespecially at the tactical level, to ensure timely delivery of products for the best effect. Approval authority reform should be extended to the JPOTF and division levels and should be more specific on product categories.\n- concludes that the *IO Roadmap* did not pay enough attention to the need to provide\ntactical-, as opposed to theater- or national-level, intelligence support to PSYOP.\n- indicates that the *IO Roadmap* is not aggressive enough on reform of PSYOP doctrine,\nrecruitment, training, force structure, and acquisition.  Where the *Roadmap* generally pushed resources at PSYOP to bridge the most glaring capability gaps, the PSYOP lessons learned review provides more detailed insight into needs and longer-term solutions.\n\n## Overarching Conclusions\n\nThe review of PSYOP lessons learned from OEF, OIF, OIF 2, and stability operations from the past two decades yields six major conclusions that provide context for recommendations. Current PSYOP missions are overextended.  The rising demand for PSYOP, coupled with inadequate resourcing, has resulted in an overextension of PSYOP missions.  PSYOP is incapable of mounting a competitive theater-wide effort targeted at general audiences or of meeting the current demand from commanders for timely, tailored tactical PSYOP products and dissemination. Improving tactical and theater PSYOP will have different costs and benefits.  The analysis of PSYOP performance in major combat operations versus stability operations suggests that tactical-level PSYOP in major combat operations is the most cost effective and generates the greatest return for the least amount of investment.  Similarly, tactical-level PSYOP in stability operations is also cost effective but is more difficult to execute because it requires substantial changes in operating concepts and doctrine.  In contrast, theater-level PSYOP in both major combat operations and stability operations demands even greater resources and generates less visible effects.  A well-coordinated national information strategy is needed in order for theaterlevel PSYOP to facilitate a noticeable impact.  In short, improvements in theater-level PSYOP are both more costly and more difficult to accomplish.\n\nPSYOP is critical to the success of stability operations.  PSYOP forces are increasingly employed to support stability operations because of their ability to isolate the adversary from domestic and international support.  PSYOP is more critical to success in stability operations than in major combat operations.  Success in stability operations requires changes to tacticallevel joint doctrine that would enable PSYOP to leverage infantry during their face-to-face interactions with the general populace.  It would also require a robust ability to engage the general target audience in the face of competing information sources, which requires around-theclock broadcasting and sophisticated print materials.  PSYOP cannot currently produce this content and has difficulty disseminating it.  Improving PSYOP for stability operations is an arduous and expensive undertaking that would significantly improve the likelihood of success in such operations. PSYOP is a major force multiplier in major combat operations.  Assessments of its effects in recent and previous operations indicate that PSYOP in major combat operations serves as an important force multiplier by helping to reduce the effectiveness of adversarial forces and deterring escalation by adversarial leadership.  PSYOP reform and improvements in tacticallevel major combat operations can be accomplished at relatively low cost by providing better intelligence support and communication equipment that would reduce the theater-tactical divide and improve the quality of products.  Resources permitting, PSYOP at the theater level for major combat operations could be improved by investing in the capability to provide and disseminate products that support public diplomacy. Theater-level PSYOP for general audiences could be left to the realm of public diplomacy, where integration of national themes and messages can best be achieved.  Doing so would not have a direct or deleterious impact on combat operations. Improvements in PSYOP decisionmaking are essential.  National themes and coordinated information activities would improve PSYOP, but the most important decisionmaking reform is an improved product approval process.  This process essentially breaks down in two areas: between the JPOTF and the Pentagon, and between the JPOTF and tactical forces.  Poor communication between the JPOTF and OSD Policy contributed to significant delays in the approval of theater-level PSYOP products during the initial phase of OEF.  Similarly, tacticallevel products encountered delays in obtaining JPOTF approval prior to development and distribution.  Unless the approval process is reformed at both the theater and tactical levels, PSYOP effectiveness may be seriously compromised. A three-pronged approach must be adopted to improve decisionmaking in PSYOP.\n\n- First, the risk of an occasional poor product must be accepted and mitigated with a rapid\neffects assessment and product revision process that limits the damage by quickly revising and reissuing it as an improved product.  This approach should be codified in both policy and doctrine and resourced accordingly.\n- Second, a process for preapproval of tactical programs and products should be adopted. - Third, the USD(P) should delegate the approval process to someone with day-to-day\naccess to contingency policy who can review products expeditiously.\nIn the case of both tactical product approval by the JPOTF and of JPOTF products by the Pentagon, products should be forwarded with product control sheets that log an expiration time, after which their approval is assumed and handled accordingly.  The sole responsibility of the approval authority should be to check for consistency with policy and the combatant commander's plan.  Quality control would be the sole responsibility of the JPOTF and, for tactical products, the JPOTF with assumed confidence in the tactical forces' knowledge of the specific target audience.  For this approach to be effective, the JPOTF would need direct liaison authority with the Policy official designated with product approvals in order to resolve outstanding issues expeditiously, and tactical PSYOP forces will need around-the-clock connectivity with the JPOTF.\nGiven the range and complexity of the many recommendations made in this report, it would be unwise simply to allocate more resources for PSYOP forces.  Without a genuine and abiding commitment to eliminating the shortcomings that constrain PSYOP effectiveness, there is much less reason to expect a significant improvement in its ability to produce effects for the combatant commander.  Decisionmakers should solicit a detailed reform plan from the PSYOP community and leadership that provides specific details and timelines for reform consistent with the recommendations made here.  If the proposed reforms are approved, then senior decisionmakers should provide the appropriate level of resources needed to realize the reform plan.\n\n## Specific Recommendations\n\nThis report provides an independent assessment of the lessons learned from OEF, OIF, OIF 2, and the stability operations of the past several decades that contribute to the body of understanding concerning PSYOP.  No doubt there are multiple ways of addressing the issues raised herein, many of which depend on the level of political and fiscal capital available.  For this reason, the study team has crafted a set of recommendations that would offer decisionmakers a menu of options that, taken collectively, would substantially increase the quality of PSYOP performance.\n\n- Create an OSD-led field agency for support to public diplomacy with a large contractor\nbase in the Washington, DC, area, run by Policy personnel and with content oversight from Policy regional deputy assistant secretaries, depending on the contingency in question.  The organization's mandate would be to obtain or create commercial-quality, policy-consistent radio/television and print content for general foreign audiences that supports public diplomacy with priority attention to support of U.S. military operations, and to help assess the effects of this material.  It would have a fly-away capability to assist political authorities managing stability operations in the field.  This content would be disseminated through PSYOP forces.\n- Recommend to the National Security Advisor that the President establish an authoritative\nmechanism for determining longer-term national themes and for interagency coordination on target audience analyses.\n- Reform the PSYOP approval process.  Consistent with recommendations in this report,\nhave the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations/Low-Intensity Conflict [ASD(SO/LIC)] draft a DOD Directive, and the Joint Staff develop a supporting CJCSI, to establish the new procedures.\n- Formulate a well-articulated PSYOP operating concept and a vision for how that concept\nwill evolve as part of the Department's push toward transformation.  Such a  concept would clear up any confusion over the PSYOP mission and how it related to public diplomacy and public affairs and would clarify the relative importance of PSYOP at the theater and tactical levels and in support of major combat operations and stability operations.  Additionally, the concept would make it easier for PSYOP to harness technology effectively.  PSYOP should develop a supporting concept that would help to inform planning, doctrine, and acquisition.  Consistent with the findings in this report and DOD guidance, the PSYOP concept should have the following attributes:\no focused on support to the combatant commander o fully exploiting cooperation with public diplomacy and public affairs o fully exploiting cooperation with other IO core capabilities o full-spectrum PSYOP o multi-mission capable o cross-cultural o theater-tactical balance o diversified delivery o fully integrated o expeditionary o rapid, responsive end-to-end planning and product cycles.\n- Direct the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) to modify Joint PSYOP doctrine\nto reflect the more specific depiction of the PSYOP mission first enumerated in the IO Roadmap and reinforced in this report.  Ensure that all relevant instructions and directives are consistent with it.  Specifically enumerate the tasks PSYOP performs as opposed to those conducted by public diplomacy and public affairs.  Include the permissibility and the desirability of PSYOP cooperating with public diplomacy and public affairs within these guidelines, to include exchanging information on target audience analysis, raw media materials such as video clips, and facilities.\n- Direct Policy to work for legislative changes that would exempt PSYOP product\ndevelopment from copyright laws.  This would expedite product development and provide a broader array of potential themes, images, logos, and icons for use in PSYOP leaflets and handbills.\n- Direct SOCOM to quickly produce a detailed PSYOP reform plan consistent with the\nrecommendations in this study, laying out a specific action plan to improve the quality of PSYOP products with estimated costs (assuming a tripling of PSYOP resources on an annual basis) that gives priority attention to:\no integration with IO and representation on combatant commander staffs.  PSYOP\npersonnel should have a prominent place in IO command slots and planning staffs since they are more numerous than the other IO core capability specialists, benefit disproportionately from integration with other IO core competencies, and are accustomed to command of personnel experts in both the hard and soft IO disciplines (human and electronic or automated decisionmaking) and to their integration in planning.  PSYOP personnel prefer isolation from IO, largely in the mistaken hope that they will be accorded direct access to commanders.  PSYOP needs leadership willing to embrace IO, oversee a general reform of PSYOP, and, on occasion, deploy to command a JPOTF to ensure PSYOP is well represented at the combatant commander staff level.  Serious consideration should be given to creating a flag officer for PSYOP to support the commander, ACAPOC, for these purposes.\no a plan to integrate the JPSE into the Media Operations Center with a mission of\nimmediate (less than 24 hours), tailored product support to tactical PSYOP forces in the field and institutional memory of products and effects\no a new recruitment process to draw in more functional experts in persuasive\ncommunications, similar to the direct accession program for Special Forces\no a revised set of tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) that provides more\nuser-friendly templates for field use, and a revised training program (reserve and\nactive) that includes greater familiarization with cross-cultural communication techniques and overall multimedia campaign planning with the TTP templates that are easily exportable to the field.  The plan must include the possibility of expansion to take in officers from other services.\n\no options for force structure redesign that would make PSYOP units more modular\nwhile providing more tactical PSYOP capability consistent with the Army evolution to transformed, approximately brigade-sized, units\no an option for redesigning the Strategic Studies Detachment to better support\ntactical target analysis, with the assumption that national-level institutions will\nconduct strategic studies and share them with the 4th POG\no procedures for increasing the number of PSYOP planners available for\ncontingencies and facilitating training of other service PSYOP planners in the context of the IO career force\no specific revisions to all SOCOM mission statements for PSYOP and to Army\nPSYOP doctrine to ensure their consistency with revised Joint PSYOP Doctrine (see above) and the *IO Roadmap*, and to PSYOP tactics, techniques, and procedures to provide field-friendly templates for tactical product development\no means to contract for world-class translation and linguistic services, at home and\nabroad\no a plan for online data management of all PSYOP personnel biographies that will\npermit the commander, 4th POG, to immediately determine sociological profiles\nand skill sets resident in all active and reserve PSYOP forces at either Fort Bragg or the Army's Human Resources Command\no production of budget estimates for meeting the specific recommendations in this\nreport, and in particular those required for exploiting the PSYOP ACTD for\nproduct dissemination in denied areas, expanding the Wind Supported Aerial Delivery System (WSADS) program so that every tactical company has three at its disposal, and producing a communications architecture study with options to fix the theater-tactical communications problem.\n- Direct a team of national laboratories, led by Lincoln Laboratories and supported by\nservice laboratories, to initiate an urgent examination of the technical challenges involved in the interdiction of an adversary's national communications infrastructure.\n- Direct the military services to develop concepts and requirements for new platforms that\nevaluate the feasibility of including PSYOP broadcast and leaflet delivery requirements.\n\n## Main Report\n\nTo assess the validity of lessons learned concerning PSYOP performance in recent operations, some basic questions must be asked and answered upfront.  First, what is PSYOP's mission; what are PSYOP forces supposed to be prepared to do?  Were they asked to doing anything different in recent conflicts?  What effects were PSYOP forces expected to produce, and could those effects be measured?  What standards should PSYOP meet in executing its missions? Finally, how did PSYOP actually perform in recent operations?  What effects did it produce, and is there room for improvement?  The first few sections of this report address these issues in order to establish a foundation for discussing specific lessons learned from recent operational experience.\n\n## 1. Definition And Mission\n\nHistorically, the Pentagon has defined *psychological operations* quite broadly:\nPlanned operations to convey selected information and indicators to foreign audiences to influence their emotions, motives, objective reasoning, and ultimately the behavior of foreign governments, organizations, groups, and individuals.4\nThis definition specifies that the audience is foreign but does not distinguish between friend or foe, individuals or governments.  Moreover, the goal is wide-ranging, from behavior modification to \"influence.\"  Slightly more specifically, the U.S. Army Special Operations Command's Web site states that PSYOP's mission is to \"disseminate truthful information to foreign audiences in support of U.S. goals and objectives.\"5  Similarly, the U.S. Army Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Command defines the ultimate objective of U.S. military psychological operations as the ability \"to convince enemy, neutral, and friendly nations and forces to take action favorable to the United States and its allies.\"6  In order to accomplish this goal, ACAPOC pursues the PSYOP missions set forth in Joint Doctrine.  Joint Publication 353\noutlines the missions of PSYOP units as:7\n\n- advising the supported commander through the targeting process regarding targeting\nrestrictions, psychological actions, and psychological enabling actions to be executed by the military force\n- influencing foreign populations by expressing information through selected conduits to\ninfluence attitudes and behavior and to obtain compliance or non-interference with friendly military operations\n- providing public information to foreign populations to support humanitarian activities,\nease suffering, and restore or maintain civil order\n- serving as the supported commander's voice to foreign populations by conveying the\nJoint Force Commander's intent\n- countering adversary propaganda, misinformation, disinformation, and opposing\ninformation to correctly portray friendly intent and actions, while denying others the ability to polarize public opinion and affect the political will of the United States and its multinational partners within an operational area.\nAgain, these missions are quite broad and are essentially the same ones enumerated in Army doctrine.8  Under these general mandates, the Army's 4th POG provides a more specific set of sub-missions or tasks:9\n\n- rapidly deploy assigned forces to support Army conventional or Special Operations\nforces and U.S. Marine Corps maneuver forces\n- develop PSYOP campaign plans and integrate them with operational-level plans or\ntheater peacetime PSYOP programs.  These could include non-PSYOP military information support missions such as humanitarian assistance, refugee control operations, or noncombatant evacuation operations (NEO).\n- conceive, develop, and produce PSYOP media products, to include: aerially delivered\nleaflets, posters, handbills, audio-visual products, video tapes, AM/FM radio broadcasts, and tactical loudspeaker broadcasts (via manpack, vehicle, boat, or helicopter)\n- conduct operational-level PSYOP campaigns: establish a Joint PSYOP headquarters,\ndirect and employ the full range of multiservice PSYOP assets, and conduct liaison with service components (for example, U. S. Air Force for leaflet drops) and host nation or coalition cells to effect dissemination of the products\n- conduct tactical-level PSYOP in concert with ground operations - provide PSYOP linguists with cultural expertise to assist commanders in planning and\nexecuting PSYOP missions\n- prepare basic and special PSYOP intelligence assessments and studies for CJCS, unified\ncommanders, and other Government agencies, as directed by SOCOM.\nA more constraining definition of the PSYOP mission is provided in the *IO Roadmap*.  This specifies that the PSYOP objective is \"aggressive behavior modification of adversaries at the operational and tactical level of war,\" in \"support of military endeavors in non-permissive and semi-permissive environments.\"  As a collateral mission, the *IO Roadmap* assigns PSYOP responsibility for supporting public diplomacy as part of the approved security cooperation guidelines.10\n\n## 2. Standards Of Performance\n\nSenior decisionmakers need to better understand the contribution that PSYOP makes to military operations in order to decide whether to spend marginal defense dollars on PSYOP or some other type of military capability.  They need to know whether PSYOP produces effects, to what extent, and how best to improve those effects.  In short, defense decisionmakers need measures of effectiveness.  Although quantitative measures of effectiveness for PSYOP are difficult to obtain and not fully reliable, it is possible to make qualitative assessments of PSYOP effects, and it is possible to hold PSYOP accountable for standards of performance that are more rather than less likely to produce desired effects.  The purpose of this section is to explain how. Causation not the standard.  Establishing a direct causal relationship between PSYOP messages and their intended behavioral effects is often difficult and subjective.  The assumption in this study is that it is impossible to prove causation when assessing the effect of PSYOP on target audiences.  In Operation *Iraqi Freedom*, more than 40 million leaflets were dropped before the commencement of fighting.  The leaflets urged Iraqi citizens to ignore the directives of Saddam Hussein's Baath Party leadership and encouraged Iraqi soldiers to voluntarily surrender.  The subsequent behavior of Iraqis suggests that many may have complied with the PSYOP requests, but their compliance might not have been caused by the PSYOP efforts.  It is possible they ultimately acted irrespective of PSYOP.  For example, many might have surrendered in the face of overwhelming U.S. military superiority even without a PSYOP campaign.  Extensive postconflict surveys could provide a better indication of what motivated Iraqis to desert their posts, but surveys could not prove causation. Direct behavioral correlation the standard for audience and behavior-specific PSYOP.  While causation cannot be proved, it is possible to substantiate a correlation between PSYOP efforts and PSYOP effects, both directly and indirectly.  Direct substantiation of PSYOP effects is best seen when PSYOP requests specific behaviors that then materialize in close proximity (time and distance) to the operations (usually at the tactical level).  For example, in recent fighting in OIF, Iraqi insurgents hid among women and children while engaging in combat operations with coalition forces.  In order to cull out the insurgents, the U.S. military broadcast loudspeaker messages denouncing the insurgents as cowards.  Often the insurgents responded by emerging to fight more directly.  It is possible that they felt trapped and were moving to extricate themselves or for some other reason.  However, the extremely close proximity between the loudspeaker broadcasts and the dramatic change in the target audience behavior suggests a strong correlation between the two.  Interviewing captured insurgents might further substantiate this correlation. Psychological operations conducted on Faylaka Island in the first Persian Gulf War provide another example of a close correlation between a conveyed PSYOP message and the recipient's observed behavior.  In this example, a tactical PSYOP team operating from a helicopter broadcast instructions for surrendering to an Iraqi unit on the island.  The next day, the Iraqi unit complied with the broadcast instructions, and the U.S. Marines were able to take control of the island without firing a shot.  The short time period between the execution of the PSYOP message (helicopter broadcasts) and the resulting behavior (surrender of the Iraqi unit) demonstrates a strong relationship between the two, albeit less direct and immediate than the preceding example of the insurgents. Less direct and immediate correlation between tactical PSYOP efforts and target audience behavior may still be substantiated after the fact, especially by means of polling and interviews. For example, in the Korean War, approximately one-third of the total prisoner of war (POW) population polled by the United Nations (UN) forces claimed to have surrendered at least in part because of the propaganda leaflets.11  The contributions of PSYOP in the first Persian Gulf War have also been corroborated through POW interviews.  Ninety-eight percent of the 87,000 POWs captured either possessed or had seen PSYOP leaflets that provided them with instructions on how to approach U.S. troops to surrender.  Fifty-eight percent of the prisoners interviewed claimed to have heard coalition radio broadcasts, and 46 percent believed that the coalition broadcasts were truthful despite coming from their enemy.12  Again, some portion of the surrenders might have occurred even without PSYOP encouragement; but certainly, there would appear to be a correlation between PSYOP, which offered the enemy a way to escape the onslaught of U.S. military power, and their compliance with those instructions. Indirect substantiation of audience and behavior-specific PSYOP effects. Less direct substantiation of PSYOP effects can come in the form of expert opinion, based on a thorough knowledge of an operation and its many variables.  General Charles Wilhelm, commander of the Marine division during Operation *Restore Hope* in Somalia, believed \"PSYOP loudspeaker teams were a combat reducer. . . . They reduced the incidents of combat, and saved the lives of my Marines and the lives of the Somalis as well.\"13  Less direct substantiation also comes in the form of expert opinion verified by the *absence* of PSYOP.  When the 200-plus PSYOP personnel supporting the Marines in Somalia were replaced with a UN force of less than 10 public affairs personnel, some experts predicted that General Mohamed Farah Aideed would quickly prevail in the \"information war,\" and they felt vindicated by ensuing events. Indirect attitudinal correlation the standard for general audience and non-behavior-specific PSYOP.  Frequently, PSYOP attempts to shift attitudes in a target audience as a prelude or contribution to behavioral changes.  The simple logic is that behavior that correlates with American interests is more likely if it is based on a favorable set of beliefs or attitudes resident within the target audience.  Instead of directly requesting behavior, PSYOP disseminates messages designed to change attitudes in a manner favorable to U.S. interests, with the presumption that favorable attitudes will contribute to positive behavior. Attempts to change attitudes or reinforce existing positive attitudes are made by PSYOP at the tactical level with small and specific audiences, and at the theater level with broad and amorphous general audiences.  Polling, interviews, focus groups, general intelligence assessments, and other techniques may provide indications of whether there is any demonstrable correlation between the PSYOP efforts and shifts in attitudes favorable to the United States. With smaller, more specific audiences, the assessment of effects is easier.  At the theater level with general populations, the presence of many additional independent variables that could potentially influence the target audience makes it much more difficult and resource-intensive to establish a correlation between PSYOP efforts and shifts in attitude within the target audience. The assumption here is that an indirect substantiation of PSYOP effects based on expert opinion with access to multiple information sources is the best assessment possible for PSYOP directed at general audiences that attempts to influence general attitudes rather than requesting specific behavior (which normally describes theater-level PSYOP). In summary, the assumption in this study is that the best evidence of tactical PSYOP performance against a specific audience is direct observable evidence of compliance with the requested behavior in close proximity to PSYOP efforts.  The best evidence of PSYOP performance against a general audience that does not request specific behaviors, but rather attempts to change attitudes and beliefs, is indirect evidence of changes in attitudes (or stable attitudes when other indicators are turning negative) through surveys, polls, and anecdotal but expert opinions on population moods.  This is particularly true for theater-level PSYOP that targets very broad and diverse population groups. As with many areas of military endeavor, it is not possible to establish quantitative standards of effectiveness for PSYOP that can be reliably measured.  However, it is possible to establish qualitative performance standards for PSYOP effects that can then be assessed with the use of direct observation, polling, surveys, interviews, and other methods.  Both the standards and the means of assessing PSYOP performance against them should be derived from a review of other persuasive communications disciplines insofar as they are reasonably transferable to PSYOP given its objectives, means available, and operating environment.  These issues are addressed in the following section of the report.\n\n## Comparison With Industry Standards For Persuasive Communication\n\nTo determine extant best practices in the persuasive communications field that are relevant to PSYOP, the study team requested specialists at Booz Allen Hamilton to review such practices and summarize them for assessment of their relevance to PSYOP.  The results of that effort can be discussed in two parts.\n\n- The analytical framework for communications strategy, decisionmaking, execution, and\nevaluation is well established and might be referred to as the \"science\" of persuasive communication since these processes are generally agreed upon, easily observable, and produce results that can more or less be measured.  It will be discussed below under the rubric of \"campaign processes.\"\n- The use of images, messages, and sensory stimuli to motivate target audiences is still\nvery much a creative process, the results of which are less certain but that can be evaluated qualitatively if not quantitatively.  The creative process of product development\nmight be referred to as the \"art\" of persuasive communications.  It will be discussed\nbelow as \"product development guidelines.\"\nEight best commercial and social marketing practices were identified and then examined for relevance to PSYOP. Have a strategic communications planning process. Accepting a message is a process. Individuals move through the stages of the process: awareness, understanding, adoption, and internalization.  A strong communications program builds awareness, shapes attitudes, and ultimately serves as a catalyst for action.  Strategic communications planning requires strong integration and cohesion between resources, processes, product execution, and measurement effectiveness.  It is a performance-driven approach to communications management that relies on strategy, accountability, and continuous improvement in support of tangible, measurable goals and outcomes.\n\n- Potential relevance to PSYOP:\no PSYOP has fewer opportunities to measure its impact, but it must maintain a\nconstant process of qualitative assessment backed by quantitative measures wherever possible.\no Specific products and assessments of their effects must be linked to an\noverarching strategy (that is, theater and tactical PSYOP must be in constant communication, with theater PSYOP updating tactical PSYOP on evolving objectives and feedback from other locales, and tactical PSYOP feeding tactical assessments of product effectiveness back to theater PSYOP planners).\nSegment and then re-segment your audience.  Marketers often limit the success of their programs by targeting too broad an audience.  Effective marketing begins with a strong understanding of which audiences the program is intended to effect and which is most likely to help the organization achieve its specific goals.  Good marketers identify their audiences, then resegment, evaluating priority audiences versus related stakeholders before targeting their audience with products.  Good market segments are accessible, winnable, homogeneous within the segment, heterogeneous across segments, and have the characteristics conducive to being \"profitable.\"\n\n- Potential relevance to PSYOP:\no Since PSYOP must be prepared to go on short notice, it often does not have the\nluxury of a lengthy target audience analysis.  Therefore, to be successful, it must be able to rapidly assess target audiences and quickly segment them.  An overview of the target audience may be possible from analytic skills either resident in the Intelligence Community broadly or within the Strategic Studies Detachment, but the local knowledge that will permit refined target audience segmentation probably must be provided through other means.  Rapid predeployment access of open sources through conferences and other mechanisms\nmight help, but PSYOP will need to perform ongoing assessments in theater,\nusing allies or contracting resources.\no PSYOP also may not have the luxury of \"writing off\" market segments that are\nnot \"profitable,\" but it can certainly concentrate on those that are most winnable. Knowing the sub-segments of target audiences will make both theater and tactical PSYOP efforts more effective.  The need to segment and re-segment an audience to be effective underscores the point that theater-level efforts aimed at general audiences alone, while important in their own right, are not sufficient.\nBecome a customer-centric marketing organization. Best practices in marketing are centered on the \"customer\" that the programs are trying to reach.  Marketers must have a strong understanding of their customers' behavior, motivations, perceptions, and preferences before marketing to them.  This requires not only thoughtfully and deliberately analyzing norms, culture, and demographics, but also listening to customers to discover needs, values, and motivations over time.  Being customer-centric requires a shift in mindsetspeaking to benefits and values, not specifications and the product the marketer wants to sell.\n\n- Potential relevance to PSYOP:\no To formulate an effective overall campaign, PSYOP personnel must have a deep\nunderstanding of the target audiences at all levels, including their culture and subcultures, and be able to communicate to the audience in terms of its perceived needs as well as PSYOP's desired effects.  In this respect, culture is more important than geography, which raises a question as to whether organizing PSYOP around geographic distinctions makes sense.  It also reinforces the need for rapid and ongoing development of target audience analysis in the context of well-articulated campaign objectives.\nBecome results-oriented; pre-test concepts and measure results. All goals should be expressed in quantifiable, measurable terms. Research that reveals the return on investment and success of marketing efforts is necessary.  Fact-based research not only affects and informs decisionmaking but also creates efficiency through shared best practices.  Marketers must position work in terms of baseline results to help predict success of future efforts.  The challenge is to shift from \"We communicated/sent X kind of messages\" to \"We achieved these results.\"\n\n- Potential relevance to PSYOP:\no The challenges of PSYOP measures of effectiveness are well understood, but\nPSYOP can and must conduct ongoing qualitative assessments of its effects. Currently, PSYOP does not have the resources to do much in this regard.  The absence of such resources would be an argument in favor of focusing on tactical PSYOP (or more specifically, audience- and behavior-specific PSYOP, the effects of which are easier to assess).\no The need to assess and record effects and change over time from baseline results,\nboth at the tactical and theater level, speaks to the need for PSYOP to maintain\ninstitutional knowledge of its efforts.  If the turnover in military personal prohibits the development of such knowledge, the tasks should be given to civilian staff or contracted out.\nBalance long-term brand image with short-term promotions. Beyond building brand recognition and equity to spur commercial success, addressing long-term brand management is critical.  Over time, the identification of characteristics with a particular brand greatly affects the success of products in the field.  A brand can be an asset or a liability, depending on the target market. However, even in cases where a target audience is resistant to a brand's message, use of relationship-building promotional activities in addition to transactional promotions is the practice of good marketers and integrated marketing programs.\n\n- Potential relevance to PSYOP:\no PSYOP is both assisted and limited by the fact that it is an organ of the U.S.\nGovernment and of the U.S. military in particular. This relationship enhances the credibility of PSYOP, but it will greatly diminish that credibility for some target audiences.  In such cases, PSYOP can still be effective if judiciously allied with relationship-building promotional activitiesfor example, assisting individual soldiers to better communicate with local populace or advertising the good work of civil affairs units.\nBecome a local player. Companies must determine the right balance of standardization and customization in their products and marketing mix.  Strong companies consciously evaluate the tradeoffs and efficiencies to be gained from localizing their media and messages while keeping the corporate brand and key corporate messages consistent and integrated.  Good marketers develop an appropriate level of adaptation based on in-depth audience, finances, and cultural analysis.  They determine what barriers and tradeoffs exist and what level of customization is appropriate from market to market in order to create the highest returns on investments.\n\n- Potential relevance to PSYOP:\no This best practice reiterates the importance of target audience knowledge and\nlinking specific PSYOP efforts to an overarching plan.  It also again highlights the importance of a balance between theater PSYOP (which tends to target general audiences with non-behavior-specific products) and tactical PSYOP (which tends to target much more local and specific audiences with specific behavior requests).\nCreate and engage in communities. Companies aim to fill the need individuals have for acceptance, belonging, and connectedness that often is at the psychological core of their consumers.  Commercial marketing attempts to create communities of needs in consumers through product identification, and social marketers use a sense of community to create identification with the shared needs of a group.\n\n- Potential relevance to PSYOP:\no PSYOP often makes straightforward appeals to individual self-interest: selfpreservation or self-improvement through rewards of various kinds.  This best practice suggests that PSYOP also should target even more fundamental emotional needs of individuals.  PSYOP should promote group identities that would be appealing to the target audience but that would undermine affiliation with, or stand as an alternative to, target audience identification with U.S. enemies.\nUse alternative channels and evaluate when to bypass traditional ones. Alternatives to traditional marketing vehicles include a range of word-of-mouth marketing techniques, often referred to in the private sector as \"buzz marketing,\" \"street marketing,\" or \"diffusion marketing.\"  Social marketing also exploits a range of new and creative advocacy channels, each attempting to reach the consumer while bypassing traditional media channels.  These includes emerging electronic media such as Weblogs and chat rooms, as well as the use of a range of third-party \"influencers\" and \"evangelists\" to persuade through increased credibility.\n\n- Potential relevance to PSYOP:\no PSYOP forces that establish a good contact net within local communities could\nexploit these alternative advocacy channels.  For example, informal, face-to-face communications with trusted and credible local sources could be used to help\nsquelch or start rumors14 favorable to U.S. objectives.  To be most effective,\nPSYOP would have to coordinate such efforts with a wider set of distribution channels available to information operations.  In particular, where alternative channels require nonattribution of the message to PSYOP sources, they likely would be better and more appropriately exploited by other U.S. Government agencies.\nPSYOP science: persuasive communication campaign processes.  Most of the best practices enumerated above could be captured in a PSYOP campaign process that continuously defines, analyzes, measures, and improves product quality.\n\nA communications strategy that is reflective of best practices i s supported by a A communications strategy that is reflective of best practices i s supported by a process that continuously defines, analyzes, measures and improv es product quality. process that continuously defines, analyzes, measures and improv es product quality.\n\nDefine and Segment Target Identify Audience Product Development Process Measures of Craft\nSuccess Audience Define Continuous Feedback Style and Select Media Define Timing\n\n- Informs decision-making - Reduces future risk - Increases product quality - Improves program results - Informs decision-making - Reduces future risk - Increases product quality - Improves program results\n(U) Source: Booz, Allen & Hamilton, \"Discussion Document: The Science and Art of Persuasive Communica tions,\" September 2, 2004. (U) Source: Booz, Allen & Hamilton, \"Discussion Document: The Science and Art of Persuasive Communica tions,\" September 2, 2004.\n\nThe processes outlined in Joint and Army PSYOP doctrine, and more specifically in Army PSYOP TTPs, generally reflect this industry cycle.  Joint doctrine describes PSYOP plan development as consisting of four steps: research and analysis, development, production requirements, and dissemination. Army doctrine highlights four phases of PSYOP planning: planning, target audience analysis, product development and dissemination, and test and evaluation. Army TTPs emphasize intelligence preparation, planning, target audience analysis, product development, and evaluation of product effectiveness.15  Doctrine and TTPs could place more emphasis on the requirement to assess results that can then be used to inform the next cycle, but the process steps are essentially similar.  Both doctrine and industry processes emphasize well-defined objectives, careful research and feedback, clear products, and attention to timing and repetition in product dissemination. More specific guidelines for a successful persuasive communication campaign are less agreed upon than the overarching process itself.  There are numerous communication strategies and tactics, 16 and their merits may depend on the culture of the target audience.  Below is an illustrative set consistent with, but more detailed than, the best practices identified above.17\n\n- Knowledge of Target Audience\no Identify the segments of the audience that are easiest to persuade and focus efforts\non them.\no Identify the fears, resentments, and desires of the target audience and build the\nthemes to take advantage of them.\no Identify the media to which the target group is most receptive and employ them. o Aim persuasive messages directly at opinion leaders; they are more effective in\nsecuring changes among followers than are the mass media.\n- Message Formation (some subtlety can improve effectiveness)\no Use cultural symbols that elicit intense emotional reactions in the audience and\nmotivations that are important within the target society (achievement, power, affiliation, intimacy, unity) to express the desired message.\no A message that seems close to the audience's core beliefs is more likely to be\nadopted than one that does not.\no In constructing the message, use pre-existing attitudes to establish agreement with\nwhat is being said (resonance), and then provide the concept you wish to be accepted.\no Laying out the evidence in a way that makes it natural for the audience to draw\nthe desired conclusion on their own is more persuasive than providing them with that conclusion explicitly.\no If the target audience can comply with a small request, it is more likely to comply\nwith larger ones latereven ones they previously would not have complied withsince a cooperative mode will have been established.\no Present the message as a \"right\" or a \"choice\" so the audience feels it is retaining\nfreedom or control.\n- Use of Emotion (a powerful tool, but one difficult to master)\no Use imagery (television or other images) to make emotional appeals and print\nmedia when appealing to logic and reason.\no Using slight levels of fear in messages is persuasive for most people, especially if\nthe message also provides a way to alleviate that fear (by taking some actions).\no Humor can increase message retention but does not usually increase persuasion,\nand it is one of the most difficult concepts to translate from one language to another.\n- Source of Message (source credibility matters)\no Use authority figures for the target culture and use them authentically to convey\nthe message.\no Positions that appear contrary to the source's self-interest are more persuasive. o Use individuals who are considered attractive to the target culture, and who do not\nseem to be motivated by self-interest, to convey the message.\no An attractive source is more credible and more persuasive than an unattractive\nsource.\no Dogmatic and authoritarian groups are most likely to respond to authority figures.\n- Message Environment (volume, in comparison with competition, is important)\no Create an environment in which adopting the desired attitude or belief is\nconsidered socially desirable.\no Expose the audience in advance to your opponent's counterarguments\n(inoculation) and show the audience how to refute them so they are more inclined to resist the opponent's arguments.\n The ability of inoculated people to resist attitude change is greater than for\nnon-inoculated people, even when they are exposed to counterarguments they have never heard before.\n Conversely, target audiences that are acclimated to countervailing\nmessages will be harder to affect and will demonstrate a higher level of cognitive dissonance, even to truthful messages.\no The more the audience learns and remembers about a message, the more likely it\nis to be persuaded by it.\no Controlling the majority of communication avenues better allows a communicator\nto affect behaviors with misrepresentations and at odds with the target audience's\nself-interests.18\nThe point to take from these illustrative examples of communication principles is that an effective PSYOP campaign requires sophistication.  That is not to say that each product must be elaborate, but rather that the overall campaign requires functional knowledge in some key areas: better means to access target audiences, deliberate nuance in themes and messages, careful but systematic use of emotion, attention to means to improve credibility, and volume of output in comparison with the competition. Comparing industry best practices with PSYOP tactics, techniques, and procedures.  A review of Army TTPs for PSYOP demonstrates that the PSYOP community, or at least the writers of TTPs, understands many of industry's best practices.19  However, the Booz Allen Hamilton review recommended a few areas for improvement:\n\n- The TTPs do not discuss the strategic marketing planning process but focus instead on\nindividual products.\n- Tools and techniques for measurement of product effectiveness are extensive and\nthorough but do not provide effective \"how-to\" steps or a template to facilitate the\nprocess.\n- Audience segmentation is discussed extensively, but the target audience analysis\nworksheet is insufficient to gauge audience characteristics, values, and motivations.\n- The TTPs do not provide tools to integrate messaging across communications activities\nand products.\n- The TTPs could be made more user-friendly for personnel operating in a fast-moving\nfield environment.\nTo help correct some of these shortcomings (particularly the first and last ones), Booz Allen Hamilton suggested a set of criteria for systematic evaluation of PSYOP process and individual products quality.  Each factor would be evaluated on a scale of 1 to 5:\n1 = criteria not considered 2 = criteria not met 3 = criteria believed to have been met 4 = criteria met with reasonable level of certainty 5 = criteria met and validated through testing.\n\nThe criteria for the overall plan and process were the following questions:\n\n- Is there a comprehensive plan that details objective, strategy, target audience, media\nchannel, resources, and tactical rollout plan in support of this communications product?\n- Does the plan clearly identify realistic, achievable, audience-focused, and concrete\nobjectives of your communications product? Does it:\no inform (raise awareness of an issue) o instruct (tell the audience how to do something) o interpret (help the audience develop its own perception of value or use) o persuade (prompt desired behavior or induce specific actions)?\n- Is there a greater campaign strategy that integrates products? - Is this communication the most cost-effective means of reaching the target audience\nwhen compared to other media? Has this comparison been done?\n- Is this communication product or plan consistent with other communications that also\nsupport this key message? Has there been cross-functional collaboration with other key players?\n- Does this communications product support the organization's brand values? - Did you have a strong understanding of the target audience's attitudes, perceptions,\nmotivations, and preferences to develop an appropriate baseline for product development?\n- Did you identify the segments of the audience that are easiest to persuade and focus\nproduct efforts on them?\n- Did you clearly identify preferences, opinions, and specific barriers to message\nacceptance and behavior change?\n- Did you determine whether logical or emotional appeals would be more effective in\npersuading members of the target culture?\n- Was the media selected aimed at the specific audience that you are trying to reach? - Were alternative outlets (such as town hall meetings, electronic vehicles, presentation at\nappropriate local function) considered?\n- Did you build relationships with local influencers to support the credibility of this\nproduct and increase its effectiveness with the target audience?\nPSYOP art: product development guidelines.  By comparison with best practices for process, best practices for individual products are more a matter of art than science.  There are general rules depending on the type of media in question, but the ultimate success of a product is in large part due to creative talent and intuition based on knowledge of a target audience.  Moreover, the specialists at Booz Allen Hamilton found that the PSYOP TTP manual generally did a good job of providing guidelines for individual products.  However, to summarize and simplify the TTPs to facilitate product evaluation in the field, a subjective set of criteria, organized by message, persuasiveness, and effectiveness, was recommended. The critical success factors for each category follow.\n\n- Product message:\no Is the message clear?  Does it involve the reader directly? o Does the communication include a specific call to action if appropriate?  Is the\naudience given a choice to make?\no When concepts are relevant, have you found a simple, straightforward means of\npresenting the information?\no Is the copy written to support key mission objectives?  Is the messaging consistent\nwith other communications?\no Is the message targeted at getting the attention of the specific audience?  Is it what\nyou want to say, or is it what they want to hear?\no Do the key messages focus on the audience needs and values?  Did you consciously\nevaluate both a positive approach that speaks to audience benefits as well as a negative approach that speaks to audience consequences?\no Is the tone targeted to the audience and the objective of the piece?  Have you had the\npiece proofed for local language use and style?  Have you removed all unessential technical terms?\no Does this product include captive statements to give readers a sense of urgency? o Does the product have the right amount of information to motivate the\nbehavior/change the perception?  Can it be reduced in size for impact?  Are sentences tight and brief?\no Have you personalized tone where appropriate to speak directly to the target\naudience?\n- Product persuasiveness:\no Did you decide how to apply and combine the six basic principles of persuasiveness\nto communicate with your audience?\n Liking: people like those who are similar to them and who like them.  To\ninfluence people, uncover real similarities and offer genuine praise.\n Reciprocity: people repay in kind.  Give what you want to receive.  Social proof: people follow the lead of similar others.  Use peer power\nwhenever and wherever available to influence horizontally, not vertically.\n Consistency: people align with their clear commitments.  Make others'\ncommitments active, public, and voluntary.\n Authority: people defer to experts who provide shortcuts to decisions\nrequiring specialized information. Do not assume your expertise is selfevident.\n Scarcity: people value more what they can have less of. Highlight unique\nbenefits and exclusive information to persuade.\n- Product effectiveness:\no Did you develop two or three key messages and test them prior to copywriting? o Was the proposed creative concept/visual/messaging tested prior to execution? o Was the design of the product visually appealing to the target audience? o Was the product delivered at the right time to the target audience? o Did you determine optimum timing for message delivery and identify obstacles? o Does the plan for this product include a direct or indirect mechanism to evaluate its\nsuccess?\no Was qualitative or quantitative research conducted to demonstrate the product's\nability to achieve the desired objective?\no Was the product effective?  Did it meet its established objective? o Did you weigh the cost against the value of the measurement tools you used for preor post-testing?\no Were the results of the campaign captured and communicated to serve as a tool for\nfuture PSYOP missions?\no Product gross rating points  (reach times frequency)\n Reach: will the communication reach the target audience with a high level of\ncertainty?\n Frequency: will the product be disseminated/distributed repeatedly?  If not, will\nthe messages be reinforced through another channel in an integrated fashion?\nThe criteria and rating scheme proposed by Booz Allen Hamilton for both process and products are suggested as a means of correcting the difficulties of using the elaborate TTPs in the field. They could serve as a simplified field-level tool to evaluate PSYOP efforts.  They would help focus field personnel on integrating the concepts of effective marketing strategy with the tactical considerations of effective product design in a format that is easy to use, and could serve as both a pre-production/planning tool and a post-production evaluation. The short list provided by Booz Allen Hamilton elevates and integrates some of the most important criteria for success.  Whether PSYOP forces adopt these criteria, some modified version of them, or altogether different ones based on expert functional knowledge and advice, is less important than making evaluation of process, product, quality, and effectiveness a routine in the PSYOP force.  Because quality is subjective and effects are difficult to measure, PSYOP success often is expressed in meaningless terms of simple output (number of leaflets, broadcasts, and so forth).  The pertinent observation is that systematic evaluation of both process and product quality and effectiveness must become part of the ethos of PSYOP.\n\n## Applicability To Psyop: Four Caveats\n\nWhile noting some room for improvement, especially with respect to process, the review here does not indicate that there are any insurmountable hurdles in PSYOP doctrine to adopting best practices.  On the contrary, the TTP manual generally supports best practices.  Therefore, leaving aside the question of whether current resources would permit the employment of best practices, there is no reason not to evaluate PSYOP effects by their own TTPs.  However, it is necessary to assess how PSYOP differs from either commercial or social marketing20 before simply accepting commercial best practices as the norm for PSYOP.  The study team found that in several respects, best practices for persuasive communication need caveats or modification when applied to PSYOP. Access to target audience.  PSYOP faces some serious constraints in pursuing communication campaign principles and processes.  Most significantly, and depending on the circumstances, PSYOP may have more difficulty in accessing a target audience.  PSYOP also is likely to have more trouble establishing credibility with the audience and pushing a substantial volume of product to the target audience than normally would be the case for other forms of persuasive communications.  To compensate for these constraints, it is incumbent upon PSYOP to make extraordinary efforts to build a knowledge base or have easy access to a knowledge base of target audiences in the event of a contingency.\n\n- Caveat One: PSYOP access to one target audience for assessment and feedback is more\nconstrained than in other persuasive communications disciplines, and it must compensate with extraordinary efforts to understand the target audience.\nTruth and credibility. It is generally agreed that the credibility of a source is greater when the source is perceived as truthful, and the inclination to believe the source is telling the truth is greater when the target audience considers the source credible.  Yet some PSYOP professionals take this correlation too far and assert that only the truth persuades, and PSYOP only promulgates the truth.21  Anyone who attempts to persuade others generally asserts that they speak the truth; but truth and credibility are not coincidental, and PSYOP professionals must be cognizant of this fact.  A source can be seen as fudging or spinning the facts in a self-serving manner and still be seen as quite credible, especially when the message resonates emotionally with the target audience.  Moreover, as noted above, it is generally accepted that if a communicator can control the majority of communication avenues, he can affect behaviors with misrepresentations, even ones that are at odds with the target audience's own self-interests. Insofar as the threat of military force or the actual use of force is often involved when PSYOP is employed, the presumption is that there is a clash of interests that potentially puts the U.S. military at odds with certain target audiences.  As a result, PSYOP often will start from a position of relatively low credibility with a target audience.  However, PSYOP can compensate and build credibility with adroit appeals to emotions or self-interests or by underscoring the truth of certain assertions through a demonstration of their validity.  In short, the use of truth may be a policy issue for PSYOP, but it is not an inviolable rule for effectiveness.\n\n- Caveat Two:  PSYOP must use truth but not only the simple truth, as is sometimes\nasserted by PSYOP professionals; it must use the full range of persuasive communication techniques to compensate for its credibility deficit (including threats and appeals to emotion).\nBalancing *appeals to reason and emotion.* The old marketing adage that reason persuades, but emotion motivateswith the corollary that appeals to reason are more likely to produce longer lasting effects while appeals to emotion are more likely to produce shorter but more immediate effectsis a critical consideration for PSYOP.  PSYOP, because of its military context, is primarily interested in tactical effects.  If an appeal to emotion, as opposed to reason, will produce the desired effect, this is an acceptable PSYOP tactic, especially in a combat environment.  The message \"come out and fight like a man,\" with its raw appeal to emotion, has little to do with truth but may be very effective in some circumstances.  As a tactic, the public will accept such appeals to emotion when employed in a conflict zone against an adversary that is harming U.S. interests and personnel. The observation that one must manipulate emotion effectively would not surprise marketing specialists, but it would be considered more suspect in U.S. Government persuasive communication disciplines such as public diplomacy and public affairs that deal with the domestic public and friendly or neutral foreign audiences.  They would insist that with such audiences, truth and appeals to reason are both more effective and more legitimate.  The assertion here is that such is not necessarily the case for PSYOP, which helps to partly explain the unease that exists and unsettles cooperation between these government information activity sets.  If short-term appeals to emotion by PSYOP are perceived especially to undermine longerterm appeals to reason, then PSYOP tactics may appear to counter longer-term U.S. Government objectivesa conflict of interest that must be reconciled.  Even if there does not appear to be a conflict between short- and long-term objectives, the difficulty for PSYOP is that effective use of emotion requires a deep knowledge of the target audience (the problem raised in caveat one).\n\n- Caveat Three: PSYOP's use of emotion is acceptable when deconflicted with other\nlonger-term information objectives (often pursued in parallel with public diplomacy and public affairs), but it can only be as effective as PSYOP's knowledge of the target audience.\nPersuasion and coercion.  Appeals of any kind backed by coercion can produce immediate effects, assuming there is freedom to comply with the source's requests.  In this regard some persuasive communication transcends culture by the most basic appeals to self-interest, including survival and well-being. While PSYOP advertises the rewards of cooperation with American forces and objectives, it also has an advantage over other disciplines of persuasive communication in that it supports military operations that may use the ultimate coercive: force. The threat of lethal force, or even the perception of controlling events through the threat of such force, can be a significant inducement to behavior modification, one that helps compensate for lesser knowledge of a target audience. PSYOP does not differ absolutely from other persuasive communication disciplines in this regard.22  Even an extreme example of coercionsuch as a gun to the headinvolves some persuasion.  The threatened partner must be persuaded that the gun is real, that it is loaded, and that it will be fired for lack of compliance.23  Similarly, even the most overt act of persuasion often appeals to a fear in the target audiencefor example, implying that friends will like you less if your teeth are not whiter.  Some argue that even positive inducements (such as large bounties for information on terrorists) are a form of coercion.  Not everyone would agree that coercion necessarily implies force; it could also be linked to rewards, incentives, inducements, flattery, ingratiation, or bribery, and PSYOP professionals are well advised to advertise these inducements as well.  In short, persuasion and coercion should be viewed as opposite anchors of an influence continuum, one that PSYOP must fully exploit. In exploiting coercion, PSYOP must pay attention to timing the message delivery for the moment when the target audience is most susceptible.  Timing is important in most persuasive communication efforts, both because a target audience may be more susceptible to a message at certain times, and because a dilatory response can allow disinformation or counterarguments to gain momentum.  However, timing is particularly important for PSYOP appeals to the enemy to desert, surrender, or otherwise betray sworn duty and/or feared authorities, as the perceived window of opportunity for compliance may be brief.\n\n- Caveat Four: PSYOP has a ready resort to the coercive power of the world's most\npowerful military and must exploit it when appropriate; indeed, it constitutes PSYOP's comparative advantage vis-a-vis other persuasive communication disciplines.  However, successful exploitation of coercion requires exquisite timing.\nModifications to normal standards. These four caveats suggest that industry standards are generally applicable to PSYOP but require some modifications.  In pursuing its mission, PSYOP has advantages and disadvantages in comparison with other persuasive communication disciplines that must be taken into account.\n\n- Intelligence support: PSYOP often will have limited direct access to target audiences\nbefore the initiation of operations, for which it must compensate by aggressively exploiting all-source intelligence prior to and during deployment and rapidly assessing effects and adjusting tactics accordingly once direct access is available.\n- Measuring effects: PSYOP effects will be difficult to measure quantitatively, but every\nattempt should be made to do so. PSYOP will have to accept qualitative assessments when quantitative data is not possible to obtain.\n- Credibility: PSYOP is often inherently a less credible source than most other persuasive\ncommunication sources, as it is seen as a tool of combat forces that also employ military deception and lethal means to obtain desired results.  To compensate, PSYOP must use the full range of persuasive communication techniques, including threats and appeals to emotion.\n- Emotion: PSYOP must appeal to emotion as well as reason to compensate for its initial\nand sometimes continuing credibility deficit and to meet its need to produce short-term effects, but it must do so carefully:\no Intimate knowledge of its target audiences is necessary for effective employment. o PSYOP use of emotion must not conflict with public affairs and public diplomacy\nobjectives. Both public diplomacy and public affairs rely more heavily on reason than emotion, and public affairs is concerned more with domestic than foreign audiences, which makes coordinating \"emotion-centric\" products with them a challenge.\n- Coercion: PSYOP has a comparative advantage in that it can leverage the coercive\nimpact of military force in conflict and the possibility of major rewards from reconstruction assistance and other inducements, but it must time the appeals carefully so that there is an opportunity for compliance.\n\n## Observations On Reasonable Goals For Psyop Efforts\n\nPersuasive communication process standards are generally well understood, whereas the quality of individual products is still largely a function of creativity and deep knowledge of target audiences.  Moreover, the process standards are mostly codified in PSYOP doctrine and TTPs, so there is no reason not to hold PSYOP forces accountable to those standards.  Assuming sufficient resources are available, one would expect PSYOP campaigns to emphasize careful planning, deep knowledge of target audience, clear messages with a logic train to intended effects, careful timing for greatest effect, repetition, assessment, and modification based on feedback. A well-executed PSYOP program, especially one that leverages the military's ability to coerce, reasonably can be expected to produce immediate efforts at the tactical level. Using PSYOP to target broad audiences without leveraging coercion, without well-orchestrated and complementary public diplomacy and public affairs campaigns, and in competition with numerous sources that are more credible to the target audiences, is not as likely to produce immediate effects.  And any effects that are produced will not be readily evident.  The exceptions would be cases where more credible competitors to PSYOP could be shut down or out, and perhaps cases where the target audiences' self-interests were manifest (for example, health and safety messages). Beyond these areas where PSYOP generally has a competitive advantage, the foregoing review of industry standards suggests that there are some reasonable expectations that can be applied to every PSYOP plan and set of products.\n\n- Integrated and sophisticated campaign. To produce a quality plan and products, PSYOP\nobjectives must be consistent with other U.S. Government information efforts, clearly linked to the overall military campaign objectives, and updated as the political and military campaign evolves.  They also must use a balanced range of techniques that are tailored as feedback becomes available.  More specifically, the campaign should:\no link all products and assessments of their effects to an overarching strategy o balance theater PSYOP, which tends to target general audiences with non-behaviorspecific products, and tactical PSYOP, with its tendency to target much more local and specific audiences with precise behavior requests\no be carefully coordinated with public diplomacy and public affairs efforts, at least\nwhen PSYOP is asked to target broad audiences to produce more favorable attitudes about U.S. policy or operations\no ensure that theater and tactical PSYOP are in constant communication, sharing\nupdated objectives and assessments of effects\no use a wide range of techniques, but balance appeals to self-interest, which are\nespecially effective when backed with credible threats, with appeals to the fundamental emotional needs of target audiences by promoting group identities that undermine affiliation with U.S. enemies (consistent with policy and public diplomacy and public affairs efforts)\no engage in relationship-building promotional activities where target audiences are\nparticularly resistant to PSYOP messages\no establish good contact nets within local communities to exploit alternative advocacy\nchannels, and maximize their efforts to do so by coordinating with broader U.S.\nGovernment information operations efforts.24\n- Quality process. A timely, repetitive planning process includes intelligence gathering,\ntarget audience analysis, product development, media selection, media production, dissemination, and assessment of results to inform the next cycle of product development. The logical connection between objectives, products, and intended effects should be clear and open to modification as feedback from product effects is made available. More specifically, PSYOP should:\no have access to deep functional expertise of both the persuasive communications\ndiscipline in general and PSYOP process and products in particular\no maintain long-term historical knowledge of its efforts and effects with civilian staff or\ncontractors to inform its practices\no pay careful attention to timing.  Anything that prevents timely delivery of products to\nthe target audience when it is most susceptible to the message will undermine the use of coercion, especially in those cases where compliance is requested on a specific timeline.\no have ready access to templates that summarize knowledge of effective techniques for\nfrequently encountered missions in easily comprehensible and user-friendly formats. For example, to create tactical products that induce surrender of specific enemy leaders and units, one might posit that the key elements in order of importance are a credible appeal to self-interest (coordinated with demonstrated lethal military effects), exquisite timing (when the enemy is most susceptible), and target audience savvy to ensure that the appeal is a winning one.  Such templates for mission success could then be tailored to a specific target audience and operational circumstances.\n- Target audience analysis.  PSYOP is often handicapped by having only indirect advanced\naccess to a target audience.  Analysis of this audience is a critical part of the persuasive communications process in general.  PSYOP must compensate for lower credibility, in part, by a stronger appeal to emotion, which requires subtle knowledge of a target audience. This analysis is an especially critical requirement for PSYOP.  Extra effort must be made to deepen knowledge of the target audience once it is known and to provide feedback on products once they are disseminated.  More specifically, PSYOP should be prepared and enabled to:\no access deep understanding of the target audiences' culture and subcultures o rapidly assess and segment target audiences, at the theater and tactical levels, with the\nassistance of allies or contracting resources\no identify and concentrate on target audiences that are assessed as \"winnable\"\no conduct ongoing qualitative assessments of effects, backed by quantitative measures\nwherever possible, giving priority to audience- and behavior-specific PSYOP, which is more easily measured.  (Effects of PSYOP products at the tactical level when specific behavior is requested can be assessed more directly than changes in target audience attitude and whether they lead to changes in behavior, but both should be done frequently nevertheless.)\n- Quality products and inputs. PSYOP products should reflect the general TTP guidelines.\nHowever, the quality of specific products ultimately can be estimated only by their effects on foreign audiences, not by how elaborate they seem or whether they appeal to U.S. leaders.  If the desired effects are not being achieved, it is reasonable to look at the creative input (in terms of training and experience) available to PSYOP, since successful product development is still largely a creative process.\n\n## 3. Actual Psyop Performance In Recent Operations Operation Enduring Freedom\n\nSince Operation *Enduring Freedom* required large-scale combat operations to topple a regime, but also included many small unit operations designed to combat terrorists, it has characteristics that reflect both major combat operations and stability operations.  However, the focus here is on the role of PSYOP in support of major combat operations.  Observations on PSYOP performance in OEF that are specific to stability operations do not differ from the conclusions in the section on stability operations in this report. Pre-conflict PSYOP and organization. PSYOP involvement in OEF began immediately following the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001.  The next day, Tactical PSYOP Detachment (TPD) 940 began target audience analysis of Afghanistan, including the Afghan populace, the Taliban, and al Qaeda.25  On September 22, 2001, U.S. Central Command\n(CENTCOM) requested that SOCOM activate a JPOTF in order to prepare PSYOP operations in support of the broader military campaign.  The JPOTF was activated on October 4, 2001, at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, and placed under the operational control of CENTCOM.  Its primary objective was to support CENTCOM as it carried out its missions of short-term strike operations, long-term counterterrorism operations, and engagement activities.  By October 10, 2001, the JPOTF totaled 95 personnel, 74 of whom were located at JPOTF Main at Fort Bragg. Following the establishment of the JPOTF, guidance and tasking were issued to PSYOP forces via the *USCENTCOM Campaign Plan: Enduring Freedom*.  This document established planning directions for conducting PSYOP in the CENTCOM area of responsibility (AOR).26 Specifically, the campaign plan defined PSYOP target audiences, objectives, and themes.27\nPrimary PSYOP objectives were to:\n\n- shift the debate from Islam to terrorism and to counter adversarial propaganda - discourage interference with humanitarian affairs activities - support objectives against state and non-state supporters and sponsors of terrorism - disrupt support for and relationships of terrorist organizations.\nA more detailed enumeration of PSYOP objectives for OEF is available in the classified annex to this report.  At an unclassified level, they can be summarized as being quite consistent with the desire to isolate the adversary (both the Taliban and al Qaeda) from domestic and international support, and conversely, to increase the perceived legitimacy of U.S. operations.  They also sought to reduce the effectiveness of Taliban and al Qaeda forces by undermining their morale and willingness to perform their missions. Pre-hostility PSYOP actions. Activity focused on the development of leaflets and radio scripts, which occurred at JPOTF Main in preparation for transport to the theater of operations.  EC130 Commando Solo aircraft began to transmit radio broadcasts to Afghanistan, the first mission being executed on October 5, 2001, 2 days before the start of major combat operations. PSYOP during combat operations. OEF major combat operations began on October 7, 2001. During this first stage of the CENTCOM plan, PSYOP forces carried out various missions to help prepare the ground for more substantial air-ground combat operations, including information support, humanitarian assistance, and intelligence collection.  In the early stages of the operation, PSYOP was focused on product development and distribution to the theater by air. The radio scripts developed at JPOTF Main were given to Commando Solo crews for broadcast over Afghanistan, and the leaflets were shipped to PSYOP support elements (PSEs) in Diego Garcia to be assembled into leaflet bombs and disseminated via B52s.  The first leaflets were dropped into Afghanistan on October 14, 2001, almost a week after combat operations began. PSYOP units working in the field also distributed small transistor radios so Afghans could hear PSYOP broadcasts.  Under the Taliban, possession of a radio was a crime, and thus few were available.  More than 7,500 small battery-powered transistor radios were distributed by airdrop and by tactical PSYOP teams operating with Special Forces detachments.28\nPSYOP messages initially encouraged the Taliban to cease support of al Qaeda and to return to their homes.  They demonstrated some sophistication in trying to portray al Qaeda as foreign interlopers who manipulated the Taliban and tried to drive a wedge between the two parties. But, following national policy, attempts to win over the Taliban were soon dropped, and they were placed in the crosshairs along with the terrorists. The PSYOP messages emphasized the power and determination of the United States to punish and eliminate the terrorists. The PSYOP products increasingly appealed to the Afghan people to support neither al Qaeda nor the Taliban, but rather to join in a common cause with the coalition against those parties. The PSYOP products overtly portrayed the Taliban as lackeys of foreigners (that is, Arabs) who had brought misery to Afghanistan and asserted that the coalition forces were there to help the Afghan people throw off the yoke of oppression. PSYOP put much effort into explaining why the United States and its coalition partners were in Afghanistan. Messages emphasized that the coalition was not there to provoke a conflict with Islam or to occupy Afghanistan, but rather to render it safe from terrorism and then depart. Reflecting the emphasis on securing some degree of popular forbearance if not overt support for U.S. operations, PSYOP produced far more political than military messages. It even produced more public information, public service, and safety/sanitation products than overt military messages.  Presumably to build good will with the Afghan populace, PSYOP produced a disproportionate amount of messages advertising mine avoidance but also many public service messages that advertised the advantages of accepting vaccines for children and the importance of using potable water.  Most of these products were generic and could have been used anywhere, but some demonstrated sensitivity to Afghan culturefor example, messages that offered congratulations on an Islamic holiday or advertised that American food donations complied with Islamic dietary restrictions.  The military messages PSYOP did produce emphasized U.S. power (airpower in particular) and the inevitable death of America's terrorist enemies.  Reflecting the assumption that terrorists could not be persuaded to abandon their cause (but perhaps also mirroring the national mood), the PSYOP messages did not request surrender but sought to demoralize enemy combatants by communicating our intent and ability to destroy them. In November 2001, combat operations began to include a more substantial U.S. ground presence with PSYOP support.  PSYOP units directly supported Special Operations forces with loudspeaker operations and the distribution of handbills that conveyed anti-Taliban messages during the capture of Bagram.29  Soon after, Kabul fell to coalition forces after the Taliban dispersed.  Special Operations forces then turned most of their attention to the hunt for Osama bin Ladin and his al Qaeda operatives.  PSYOP supported these operations with products advertising the reward program for information on terrorists.  In addition, through their continued face-to-face interaction with Afghan villagers, members of PSYOP teams became a valuable source of human intelligence (HUMINT).  They were able to identify influential tribal and village leaders and solicit their support. In the months after the fall of Kabul, PSYOP units on the ground adapted to carry out missions and tasks to support post-combat operations. PSYOP contributed to humanitarian aid efforts by handing out supplies to local Afghan schools and distributing blankets and medicine to hospitals. PSYOP messages also noted that without stability, delivering aid would be more difficult. In addition, PSYOP produced a bevy of political messages advertising the need for one Afghanistan and eventually portrayed President Hamid Karzai as someone who would bring prosperity to the population rather than the desolation endemic throughout the rule of the Taliban.  PSYOP also provided support to the U.S. Embassy in Kabul through a military information support team, which deployed to the Embassy on June 19, 2002.  The team coordinated with Embassy officials and provided support to forces operating in the region.\n\n## Operation Iraqi Freedom\n\nPSYOP objectives for OIF are available in the classified annex to the report.  However, the 10 classified objectives may be easily surmised from the products that were initially prepared for operations and that are discussed below.  As in OEF, the objectives generally sought to isolate the Iraqi regime from domestic support and to reduce the effectiveness of Iraqi forces by undermining their morale and willingness to perform their missions. Pre-conflict planning and organization. OIF combat operations took place from March 21, 2003, to May 1, 2003.  In the planning phase, PSYOP forces benefited from extensive experience conducting operations against Iraq in support of Operations Southern Watch, *Northern Watch*, and *Desert Fox*.  In addition, much of the PSYOP support, command, and production capability was already in place as a result of Operation *Enduring Freedom*, and key personalities involved in PSYOP planning, production, and product approval were well acquainted. Since September 14, 2001, a PSE had been located at CENTCOM headquarters in Tampa, Florida. This PSE consisted initially of the JPOTF commander and four staff.  On November 15, 2002, CENTCOM ordered the JPOTF commander to commence pre-hostility PSYOP against Iraq.  However, it was not until January 2003 that the JPOTF commander and deputy commander moved to Kuwait to better support preparations for OIF.  When CENTCOM headquarters relocated to Qatar in February 2003, the JPOTF commander and three staff members relocated as well to provide direct PSYOP support.  The total PSYOP planning phase for OIF was extensive, lasting 9 to 12 months before the start of major combat operations, and the total number of PSYOP personnel committed to the JPOTF in support of OIF fluctuated between 600 and 700 personnel.  However, only a handful of these were forward-deployed with the JPOTF commander. Pre-hostility PSYOP actions. The pre-hostility phase of OIF began in December 2002 and concluded when coalition forces entered Iraq on March 21, 2003.  During this time, PSYOP\nforces were tasked with several missions, including:\n\n- establishing an audience for radio broadcasts in Iraq - undermining the confidence of the Iraqi military and Iraqi security forces in Saddam\nHussein's regime\n- degrading Saddam Hussein's confidence in his ability to control Iraq - deterring the use of WMD.\nPSYOP executed these tasks through two primary vehicles, radio broadcasts and leaflet dissemination. Broadcasts into Iraq originated from several sources.  From Kuwait, PSYOP teams transmitted radio programs via the Special Operations Media System-B (SOMSB).  In addition, there were aerial broadcasts from Qatar-based EC130E Commando Solo, and maritime broadcasts from aircraft carriers in the Arabian Gulf.  PSYOP messages also specifically attempted to dissuade Iraqis from repairing fiber optic cables that were being bombed to degrade Iraqi communications and warned Iraqi air defense from targeting or shooting at U.S. planes.  The radio messages emphasized the legitimacy of UN votes to sanction compliance with resolutions and the American military buildup to enforce compliance if necessary. In conjunction with PSYOP broadcasts, leaflet drops were employed to influence the Iraqi target audience.  During the pre-hostility phase, PSYOP leaflets were dropped in abundance.  By the start of formal combat operations, the number of dropped leaflets totaled more than 20 million. The themes and messages that the PSYOP leaflets conveyed included:\n\n- capitulation - WMD use deterrence - preservation of Iraqi oil fields - radio frequencies for coalition broadcasts.\nLeaflet drops and radio broadcasts continued throughout the months before the start of combat operations.  The pre-hostilities messages emphasized the futile, dangerous, and counterproductive nature of mining waterways, sabotaging oil installations, blowing up dams, or using weapons of mass destruction. PSYOP during combat operations.  On March 21, 2003, coalition forces entered Iraq.  In contrast to OEF, most leaflets were directed at military units, which reflects a primary concern with the organized force available to Saddam Hussein's military as opposed to the threat from irregular forces.  Leaflets were used to convince Iraqi forces to surrender, desert, or \"capitulate.\"  About half of the leaflets prepared for this purpose were generic and about half were tailored for specific Iraqi units (for example, identifying any Iraqi units that failed to comply with coalition instructions and consequently were totally destroyed, and calling on the targeted Iraqi unit to avoid the same fate).  Most of the leaflets just encouraged the Iraqi soldier to go home where he was needed and not sacrifice his life for a bad regime.  The messages were implicitly sympathetic to the common Iraqi soldier's fate and communicated a coalition preference for not having to kill him.  While the majority of messages were directed at military audiences, there were also leaflets that asked Iraqi civilians to avoid combat areas and to listen to the coalition radio broadcasts, which emphasized the incompetence, corruption, and illegitimacy of Saddam and his henchmen. Commando Solo and SOMSB broadcasts continued to transmit information radio to both general Iraqi audiences and military units throughout combat operations.  PSYOP radio messages were also delivered to military audiences with the assistance of electronic warfare capabilities.  In general, Saddam Hussein's incompetence was emphasized for military audiences and his illegitimacy was underscored for the broader public.  As usual, the radio broadcasts had more political themes and messages than military messages since they were directed at the general public. Tactical PSYOP teams (TPTs) were attached to ground forces to provide PSYOP support directly to maneuver units and special operations detachments.  In the southern region, PSYOP\nteams were deployed with the Army's 3d Infantry Division, the 1st Marine Division, and the 10th Special Forces Group.  In western Iraq, TPTs assigned to support the 5th Special Forces Group provided assistance in securing the town of Ar Rutbah, while PSYOP units in the north were attached to the Joint Special Operations Task ForceNorth. These TPTs played an important support role to infantry and special operations units, particularly through their loudspeaker operations.  PSYOP teams supporting ground forces often communicated surrender appeals to enemy units via loudspeakers.  They also conveyed messages of noninterference to civilians in order to avoid noncombatant casualties.  One example of the value of loudspeaker operations occurred on March 25 at an Nasiriyah.  TPT\n1141 was supporting Task Force Tarawa assigned to the 1st Marine Expeditionary Force (I\nMEF).  Tarawa was fighting paramilitary forces that threatened to bog down the Marines' advance.  Iraqi paramilitary forces hiding in a hospital were sniping and firing mortars and machine guns at Marines crossing the bridge over the Euphrates.  TPT 1141 broadcast a surrender appeal and a statement about the inevitability of their defeat, and \"told [them that] we would drop bombs and artillery on the hospital if they did not surrender.\"  Approximately 10 minutes into the broadcast, Iraqi personnel emerged from the hospital and complied with TPT 1141's instructions.  TPT 1141 also supported Task Force Tarawa by ensuring safe passage of civilians and by obtaining valuable intelligence from civilian sources in the process.30\nDuring the month of April, coalition ground forces approached Baghdad.  PSYOP was tasked with a variety of objectives both before and after coalition forces had secured the city.  PSYOP's primary missions were to:\n\n- assist in locating enemy forces and weapons - gain widespread support for coalition forces - inform Iraqi civilians that coalition forces would not do them harm - distribute radios to the civilian population so that they could listen to coalition radio\nbroadcasts.\nTo accomplish these tasks, PSYOP forces dropped additional leaflets, continued coalition radio broadcasts, and engaged in intrusions of Iraqi communication nodes. In summary, OIF products, especially leaflets, were direct, simple, and to the point.  In contrast with OEF, they did not focus on the purpose of military operations or other political messages. Radio broadcasts were the exception in this regard.  They argued for the legitimacy of coalition operations but emphasized their legal justificationtoward which Iraqi audiences suffering under UN sanctions for many years may not have been sympathetic.  Also somewhat in contrast with OEF, the vast majority of OIF products were not culturally specific products.  They incorporated some pictures specific to the Iraqi setting but generally they could have been used anywhere for similar purposes.  This is especially true of the public service messages on mine awareness, the importance of sanitation, and the need to support the new government once combat operations ended.\n\n## Stability Operations: The 1990S And Operation Iraqi Freedom 2\n\nPSYOP objectives. The scope of this report was expanded to include a look at PSYOP performance in a range of stability operations.  The study team assessed both Joint and Army doctrine to determine whether PSYOP, in general, is expected to accomplish different objectives in stability operations than in major combat operations.  If so, the requirements for success might be different.  In turn, both PSYOP lessons learned for stability operations and the corresponding recommendations for remedial action might also be different. Joint doctrine distinguishes between \"broad\" PSYOP objectives for stability operations and major combat operations.  Army doctrine, on the other hand, states, \"There is no difference between PSYOP for stability and support operations and PSYOP for war except themes and messages.\"  Thus, while Joint doctrine highlights some differences in PSYOP objectives for major combat operations and stability operations, Army doctrine seems to downplay differences. The contradiction is more apparent than real.  Unlike Joint doctrine, Army doctrine does not offer broad PSYOP objectives for stability operations in general.  However, it does provide some examples of specific PSYOP objectives by type of stability operation.31  The PSYOP objectives in Joint doctrine are so broad that they could easily accommodate the specific PSYOP objectives offered up in Army doctrine. Since Joint doctrine explicitly distinguishes between PSYOP objectives in the two types of operations, an attempt was made to extract their essential differences.  After reviewing the objectives assigned to PSYOP in diverse historical contingencies, the team observed that all of the PSYOP objectives enumerated in joint doctrine for both stability operations and major combat operations easily fit into four broad mission objectives for PSYOP (see table 31).\n\nSuperimposed Categories (with examples of subcategories)\nMilitary Operations Other Than War (MOOTW) (without the use or threat of force)\nIsolating an adversary from domestic and international support\n-\nModify behavior of selected target audiences\ntoward U.S. and multinational capabilities\n-\nConfer legitimacy on U.S. policy and objectives and diminish adversary's legitimacy\n-\nSupport peacetime elements of U.S. national policy objectives, national security strategy, and national military strategy\n-\nSeparate combatants from popular support (critical in stability operations)\n-\nSupport geographic combatant commander's regional security strategy objectives\n-\nSupport objectives of the country team\n-\nEncourage populace not to interfere with U.S. operations and not to offer logistic and intelligence support to combatants (stability operations)\n-\nCounter enemy propaganda\nReducing effectiveness of adversary's forces\n-\nDemoralize enemy combatants\n-\nDegrade adversary's combat ability\n-\nEncourage surrender (war)\n-\nPromote ability of host\nnation to defend itself against internal and external insurgencies and terrorism by fostering reliable military forces and encouraging empathy between host nation armed forces and civilian populace\n-\nEncourage participation in amnesty programs (stability operations)\n| War                        |\n|----------------------------|\n| use or threat of           |\n| force)                     |\n| -                          |\n|                            |\n| Explain U.S. policies,     |\n| aims, and objectives       |\n| -                          |\n|                            |\n| Mobilize popular support   |\n| for U.S. and               |\n| multinational military     |\n| operations                 |\n| -                          |\n|                            |\n| Arouse foreign public      |\n| opinion or political       |\n| pressures for, or against, |\n| a military operation       |\n| -                          |\n|                            |\n| Counter hostile foreign    |\n| psychological operations   |\n| efforts                    |\n| -                          |\n|                            |\n| Gain and sustain popular   |\n| belief in and support for  |\n| U.S. and multinational     |\n| political systems          |\n| (including ideology and    |\n| infrastructure) and        |\n| political, social, and     |\n| economic programs          |\n| -                          |\n|                            |\n| Attack legitimacy and      |\n| credibility of adversary   |\n| political systems          |\n| -                          |\n|                            |\n| Publicize beneficial       |\n| reforms and programs to    |\n| be implemented after       |\n| defeat of adversary        |\n| -                          |\n|                            |\n| Shift loyalty of adversary |\n| forces and their           |\n| supporters to friendly     |\n| powers                     |\n| -                          |\n|                            |\n| Influence development      |\n| of adversary strategy and  |\n| tactics                    |\n| -                          |\n|                            |\n| Amplify economic and       |\n| other nonviolent forms of  |\n| sanctions against an       |\n| adversary                  |\n| -                          |\n|                            |\n| Undermine confidence in    |\n| adversary leadership       |\n| -                          |\n|                            |\n| Lower morale and           |\n| combat efficiency of       |\n| adversary soldiers         |\n| -                          |\n|                            |\n| Increase psychological     |\n| impact of U.S. and         |\n| multinational combat       |\n| power                      |\n| -                          |\n|                            |\n| Support military           |\n| deception and operations   |\n| security                   |\n\n## Deterring Escalation By Adversarial Leadership\n\n-\nDeter atrocities (stability operations)\n-\nDeter geographic expansion\n-\nDeter adversary powers or groups from initiating actions detrimental to the interests of United States, its allies, or conduct of friendly military operations\n-\nDeter WMD use (war)\n\n## Minimizing Collateral Damage And Interference With U.S. Operations\n\nSafety instructions to populace:\n\n-\nPromote cessation of hostilities to reduce casualties on both sides, reduce collateral damage, and enhance transition to post-hostilities.\n-\nAvoiding dangerous\noperations\n-\nCrowd control\n-\nApproaching checkpoints\n-\nRefugee assistance\nThe four overarching PSYOP missions that cover both major combat operations and stability operations may be summarized as:\n\n- isolating an adversary from domestic and international support - reducing the effectiveness of an adversary's forces - deterring escalation by adversarial leadership - minimizing collateral damage.\nWe believe that this short list of broad PSYOP objectives is simpler and more direct and better communicates desired effects than either the general objectives identified in Joint PSYOP doctrine or the PSYOP objectives across the range of military operations (also provided in Joint PSYOP doctrine),32  which use more nebulous verbs such as \"support, explain, promote, influence, and publicize.\"  The more specific exemplary list of sub-objectives or tasks for each of these four missions in table 31 illustrates that some sub-objectives will be more likely and important in stability operations than in major combat operations.33  Even though Army doctrine seems to play down differences between PSYOP objectives in stability operations and major combat operations, its examples of more specific, exemplary PSYOP objectives also emphasize that the specific target audience behavior desired in stability operations often differs from that sought in major combat operations. For example, under the broad category of \"deterring enemy leadership from escalation,\" deterring WMD use is a more common PSYOP mission in major combat operations than in stability operations, whereas deterring atrocities by undisciplined forces is a more common objective in stability operations.  Similarly, under the broad category of reducing the effectiveness of adversary forces, advertising the virtue of an amnesty offer is a more likely PSYOP mission in a stability operation, and explaining surrender procedures is a more likely PSYOP mission in major combat operations. Another difference between PSYOP objectives in stability operations and major combat operations is their criticality, which is not reflected in either Joint or Army doctrine but is mentioned in a recent CJCS instruction.34  Experts in stability operations argue that the center of gravity in stability operations is political relationships rather than terrain and armed forces. Therefore, influencing popular political and social perspectives, commitments, and behavior is an indispensable prerequisite for success in stability operations, and PSYOP missions are usually critical in that regard.35   Taking an example from table 31, we can acknowledge that the broad objective of \"isolating an adversary from domestic and international support\" is important in any contest between combatants.  However, successfully separating combatants from popular support, and especially from logistic and intelligence support from the population, will make a direct and critical impact in stability operations.  In contrast, convincing enemy combatants that their fellow citizens do not support them will have at best an indirect effect in deciding the outcome of major combat operations (and perhaps only a small effect when fighting authoritarian regimes). These differences between PSYOP submissions and the relative importance of their contribution to the overall military effort can drive major differences in tactics, techniques, and procedures. For example, since the focus in stability operations is on the mission of divorcing irregular forces from popular support, PSYOP must do more to reach the general populace, whereas it can afford to concentrate more on combatants in major combat operations.  This often means that PSYOP forces must do more to control the information available to the local populace.  When, in some cases, it will not be possible to restrict popular access to information or control its content, it will be especially important that U.S. forces make a positive impression on the local populace to belie the adversary's disinformation.  PSYOP can work with regular infantry forces to improve their ability to communicate messages to a local population more effectively than many other media products and sources.36  Allied PSYOP experts noted that in some cases, U.S. PSYOP forces were slow to transition from the TTP appropriate for major combat operations to those appropriate for stability operations.37  This is not surprising, since service and Joint doctrine and associated tactics, techniques, and procedures do not clearly identify the difference between major combat operations and stability operations and PSYOP objectives in each.\n\nIn summary, at the broader operational level, the four major categories of PSYOP missions are not noticeably different for stability and major combat operations.  However, at the tactical level, there are indeed differences in specific PSYOP missions.  Moreover, the contribution of PSYOP is more critical to the success of stability operations than it is to the success of major combat operations.  The question of whether these different PSYOP missions can be executed with capabilities required for major combat operations, or whether they generate different requirements for PSYOP capabilities and resources, will be addressed later in the report. Operation Iraqi Freedom 2. With this background on PSYOP in stability operations, the study team examined PSYOP performance in Iraq after major combat operations ended and stability operations began to determine whether PSYOP forces were assigned new missions and whether they were similar or different from those identified from historical experience.  For purposes of this study, OIF combat operations concluded on May 1, 2003.  May 1 also marks the beginning of the next phase of Iraqi operations known as OIF Stability Operations, or OIF 2. PSYOP efforts in OIF, which at the time were credited with the desertion of Iraqi soldiers, the deterrence of WMD use, and the prevention of the destruction of Iraqi oil fields, changed in focus in OIF 2.  Soon after major combat operations ended, it became apparent that U.S. forces not only would have to facilitate civil order, they also would have to defeat resistance from insurgents opposed to the new Iraqi government. PSYOP guidance on objectives. As it became evident that U.S. forces were engaged in a different and increasingly difficult stability operation, PSYOP forces were assigned new missions.  On July 17, 2003, the Combined Joint Task Force Seven (CJTF7) and the JPOTF received additional guidance on the mission in the form of an amendment to the existing operations plan.\n\nThe task force was to: 38\nConduct PSYOP in Iraq to provide a secure and stable environment and facilitate development of a functioning civil administration, which adheres to the rule of law, promotes regional stability, and eliminates threats from terrorism and WMD. On order, transition responsibility to the Coalition Provisional Authority enabling the Coalition Forces Command forces to withdraw.\n\nThe guidance further identified six major PSYOP objectives to accomplish the newly articulated mission, with numerous supporting objectives.39  The objectives were directed to ensure that:\n\n- Iraqis involved in the production, storage, transportation, and employment of WMD\nwould not support the use or trafficking of WMD\n- Iraqis would cooperate with coalition and civil military operations, Coalition Provisional\nAuthority, and the Iraq Survey Group\n- the regional and international communities would cooperate with coalition forces - Iraqis would support both interim and future Iraqi governments - Iraqis would not interfere with coalition military operations - terrorists would cease activities in Iraq.\nNotably, these objectives all fit into the first category from table 31: isolating an adversary from domestic and international support.  This reflects and supports the conclusion above that this PSYOP mission is vital to success in stability operations. PSYOP guidance on themes.  During OIF 2, PSYOP themes adapted to support the missions that were carried out in Iraq's post-conflict environment.  PSYOP messages emphasized the need to maintain order and to obey new laws set forth following the fall of the former regime.  Messages also communicated the need to be aware of mines and unexploded ordnance, both to safeguard innocent civilians and to help eliminate them as threats to coalition forces. A second set of themes common in OIF 2 PSYOP messages centered on information intelligence.  Specifically, the message was to influence the civilian populace to come forward and provide coalition forces with information and intelligence regarding WMD locations and whereabouts of insurgents, key members of Saddam's Baath Party, and paramilitary forces. These themes guided PSYOP missions throughout the stability support phase of OIF 2. PSYOP activities in support of OIF 2. PSYOP teams communicated their themes and messages through two principal means of communication: face-to-face interactions and loudspeaker operations.  PSYOP teams used face-to-face exchanges for disseminating handbills, leaflets, and posters.  This method also was the sole means for distributing newspapers that had been printed by PSYOP print companies and radios that conveyed coalition messages. Loudspeaker operations were the second means of conveyance. Curfews were imposed in some Iraqi cities shortly after the conclusion of major combat operations. Loudspeaker teams disseminated announcements regarding the curfew throughout Iraqi neighborhoods. The teams also accompanied Army infantry units in support of search operations. Through an interpreter, PSYOP teams read messages to individuals who occupied buildings being searched. These teams explained the purpose of the search operation, the intention of the search teams, and what was to be expected of the occupants once they vacated the buildings. PSYOP challenges in OIF 2. The new guidance and themes provided to PSYOP reflect a realization that effectively accomplishing the assigned objectives would require use of resources well beyond those normally available to PSYOP forces.  The guidance seems to acknowledge the difficulty of conducting a sophisticated PSYOP campaign in an environment in which multiple competing sources of information are available to target audiences.  During combat, the focus is usually on enemy forces that have limited sources of information.  In stability operations, the target audiences are among the general population, where the competition for public influence can be ferocious.  To effectively compete in such an environment requires multiple media, quality products, and significant production capacity.  Where existing media already have wellentrenched audiences, working through indigenous media to amplify the PSYOP message may be required.  In this regard, the PSYOP experience in OIF 2 was consistent with key lessons learned in Bosnia by the 4th POG.\n\nWhere infrastructure is less developed and thus offers fewer sources of competition, PSYOP may be able to compete directly with indigenous sources, as appeared to be the case in Somalia and, to some extent, in Afghanistan.  Radio and print media competition in Somalia was vibrant and a critical factor in the struggle for popular understanding and support as usual, but the relatively small numbers of radio stations and media sources and the importance attached to the American presence permitted PSYOP to compete directly and successfully.  In the immediate aftermath of OIF, the Iraqi people had relatively few media choices.  However, this quickly changed, greatly compounding the complexity of the PSYOP mission. Even when domination of or effective competition with the majority of information sources available to a target audience in a stability operation is not possible, the behavior of U.S. forces in general can send powerful messages to the local population.  To the extent PSYOP is used to coach other U.S. forces on messages, it can help raise popular opinion about the U.S. presence and purposes in a stability operation.  This lesson from past stability operations is being relearned by some U.S. commanders in OIF 2, as the following excerpt from an internal Army report on the operation indicates:\nCurrent Iraqi sentiment has evolved from personal relationships between coalition soldiers and Iraqi citizens.  Because these relationships differ from location to location and person to person, it is hard to correlate events and actions with relationship successes or failures.  An armor[ed] task force commander in Baghdad described his methodology as that of plotting and measuring everything: \"After a positive or negative event, he would have his staff evaluate all actions they had conducted before, during, and after the event.  This would allow him to correlate activities with outcomes and develop TTP [tactics, techniques, and procedures] for future success.\"  While not all actions provided equal measures or correlating events, this methodological approach helped establish a base line of comparative success for his task force.  It allowed him to utilize the Army approach of BDA [battle damage assessment] in regard to stabilization and support operations.  This task force was very in tune with the local Iraqi populace in their area of operation.  A bond was built and cultivated over many months resulting in a trust between the military and civilian population.  As a result of this established relationship, a new anxiety has developed due to the impending transfer of authority.  The local leaders inquired about the replacement force and their capability to \"be as good\" as the current command.40\nThis anecdote about the armored task force commander's attention to Iraqi attitudes demonstrates that ground force commanders in stability operations can support the critical and ongoing target audience analysis that PSYOP should conduct.  Unfortunately, as the Army report notes, this commander's experience was not the norm:\nSome U.S. units understand and use the concepts of setting objectives, developing themes, and setting measures of effectiveness.  Others do not understand the process and therefore are just conducting operations without any measure of success or failure.  Some commanders use tactical psychological operations teams as a reactive measure when negative second or third order effects occur.  Most IO\n[information operations] battle drills are reactionary in nature.41\n\n## Assessment Of Effects\n\nBased on an assessment of PSYOP efforts conducted during OEF, OIF, and OIF 2, specific PSYOP effects were difficult to ascertain.  In general, it is easier to assess effects where specific behavior is requested.  Efforts to change general target audience attitudes through radio broadcasts and other products were not much remarked upon by enemy sources, and allied efforts to assess these effects through surveys are not sufficient to provide reliable indications.42   A thorough assessment requires both manpower and funding to pay for interpreters to conduct systematic surveys so that effects can be more reliably measured.  At present, PSYOP has neither the manpower nor the funds to conduct such research.43\nTherefore, attempts to assess general effects are mostly the result of informal focus groups, anecdotal evidence, and other media input. The best and most expensive alternative, as a Coalition Provision Authority public affairs official responsible for information activities in OIF 2 noted, is polling.  In operations such as OIF 2, the environment may be stable enough to permit outsourcing of polling, but the costs are considerable.  PSYOP forces lack the training to do polling systematically and professionally themselves, as well as the money to pay others to do so.  That said, a careful examination of the available evidence from prisoner interviews and other intelligence sources permits some comment on correlations between PSYOP activities and target audience behaviors and attitudes. Strong correlation.  In several instances, a strong correlation between PSYOP objectives and activities on the one hand, and observable enemy behavior on the other, was apparent.  Typically this occurred when tactical PSYOP products asked for a specific behavior, which was then observed, and for which no other explanations seem as plausible. These cases include:\n\n- Surrenders:  During OEF, PSYOP leaflets and broadcasts directed at enemy forces in\nKonduz appeared to result in the surrender of 1,000 Taliban fighters.  Unlike surrender and desertion of enemy forces in OIF, the Taliban forces were not facing a sizable U.S. ground force, and therefore the correlation between the value of the PSYOP effort per se and enemy behavior seems stronger.  In other words, one might argue that large-scale enemy desertion or dereliction of duty by Iraqi soldiers was more a function of their immediate experience with and perception of overwhelming U.S. military force than it\nwas a function of PSYOP effectively communicating the futility of their resistance.44\nEven so, there were cases in OIF where tactical PSYOP teams appeared to have successfully induced armed Iraqis to surrender, and in those cases a strong correlation between the surrender and the PSYOP effort is evident.\n- Weapons buy-back: After major combat operations concluded in Iraq, PSYOP forces\nadvertised a program encouraging Iraqis to turn in their weapons for rewards.  This effort appeared to directly result in the collection of a substantial number of man-portable air\ndefense systems and other arms.\nLoose correlation.  It is also plausible to attribute other effects to PSYOP efforts, albeit with a lesser degree of confidence because other independent variables could explain the adversary behavior in whole or in part.  Typically this occurred when tactical PSYOP products asked for a specific behavior, which was then observed, and for which there are no other explanations that seem as strong.\n\n- Other surrender, capitulation, and desertion cases: Numerous Iraqi troops deserted and, in\nsome cases, surrendered their equipment directly in accordance with PSYOP instructions in OIF.  The extent to which this was a function of PSYOP efforts is less clear, however, because it was done in the face of a fearsome and well-demonstrated U.S. combat power. In other words, it is conceivable that the desertions or surrenders might have taken place\nwith lesser (or even without any) supporting PSYOP efforts.45\n- Mining: During OIF, PSYOP leaflets conveyed messages to prevent mining of Iraqi\nwaterways.  After the fact, it became apparent that the enemy had mines but only deployed them in a few cases.  There is no other explanation as likely as the combination of PSYOP and demonstrated U.S. military might.\n- Civilian noninterference: By broadcasting messages of noninterference to civilians,\ncoalition forces were able to minimize collateral damage during combat operations in both OEF and OIF.  The motivations for the compliance were probably varied, but it seemed to be directly correlated with PSYOP activities.\nUnsubstantiated correlation. General Tommy Franks notes that one of his major concerns in planning and executing OIF was to prevent the Iraqis from using WMD preemptively on U.S. forces staging in theater.  He assigned PSYOP forces the task of convincing Iraqis not to do so and also not to sabotage oil wells, which would have precipitated both an economic and ecological disaster.46  PSYOP worked hard at both of these objectives, and the fact that Iraqis did neither of these things was initially taken as evidence that the PSYOP campaign was effective in this regard.  However, subsequent prisoner interviews suggest that alternative explanations are at least as valid as potential explanations for Iraqi behavior.47\nSecondary and serendipitous effects. In addition to primary effects that correlated strongly or loosely with PSYOP actions, PSYOP activities were responsible for some secondary and even serendipitous effects.  For example, General Franks records a second reason for his decision to approve the aforementioned leaflets. He hoped that some Iraqis would directly comply with their messages, but he also believed they would remind Iraqi soldiers that their air defenses were useless and that U.S. forces could bomb them with iron as easily as with paper. Interviews with Iraqi prisoners of war suggest many were, indeed, more impressed by General Franks' secondary motivation for dropping the leaflets than by their primary message. They believed that their cover, concealment, and deception activities were working until the leaflets essentially notified them that U.S. forces were well aware of their precise locations.\n\nThus, PSYOP was able to leverage the hugely coercive value of U.S. military power through the implied message that a kinetic strike could be delivered just as easily as a leaflet bomb. Similarly, but with no evidence of malice aforethought, U.S. leaflets on Taliban forces in the Tora Bora region of Afghanistan convinced them not to lay down arms, but rather to flee to what they assumed was a more secure position in a mountain tunnel and cave network.  Unhappily for them, this simply presented a more concentrated target for U.S. airpower. Other PSYOP value. Although PSYOP forces are most often graded on their effects, they do make other contributions in support of combat and stability operations.  During OEF, OIF, and OIF 2, PSYOP repeatedly was credited with providing valuable intelligence to coalition forces. In the process of conducting extensive face-to-face communications and assessing effects, PSYOP tactical forces obtained a great deal of rich and current information on local sentiments and the activities of irregular enemy forces.  For example, in Afghanistan, TPTs were able to identify and approach tribal or influential leaders in villages throughout the region, who then provided specific information of intelligence value.\n\n## 4. Psyop Lessons Learned: Operations\n\nThe purpose of this section is to identify officially sanctioned PSYOP lessons learned and to determine whether modifications to these lessons learned (or altogether different and/or additional lessons) merited investigation.  Essentially, the only officially sanctioned48 joint lessons learned were those completed by the Joint Staff (primarily national or *strategic*-level lessons on information operations, but relevant to psychological operations), the Joint Forces Command (self-described as focused on the *operational* level of war), and the 4th Psychological Operations Group (most of which focused on *tactical* issues.)  From these three documents, lessons were captured at all levels of war and provide a solid illustration of the critical issues in psychological operations. To determine whether alternative lessons are sufficiently plausible to warrant further investigation, interviews with informed PSYOP leaders and a thorough review of numerous after-action reports and informal lessons learned produced by participants in the operations, but not formally approved by a commander, were conducted.49  This process yielded a comprehensive list of lessons learned that was then pared down and organized around 10 macrolevel issues:\n\n- the extent to which national-level authorities integrated the information element of\nnational security policy, providing guidance on themes and messages for PSYOP\n- the extent to which authorities in the Pentagon and CENTCOM accorded high priority to\nPSYOP\n- the extent to which PSYOP leaders and soldiers clearly understood their mission - whether PSYOP integration with IO was a positive or negative development - whether there was a dearth of PSYOP personnel to fulfill planning requirements - why and where the approval process failed to provide rapid approval of PSYOP products - whether a cooperation and communications gap between theater- and tactical-level\nPSYOP forces and efforts reduced possible effectiveness\n- whether the quality of PSYOP products could have been higher and created greater\neffects\n- whether historic underfunding of PSYOP forces reduced effectiveness in recent\noperations\n- whether and how specific resources shortfalls and equipment performance issues reduced\nthe effectiveness of PSYOP forces in recent operations.\nThese 10 macro issues and summary observations from various lessons learned efforts were then shared with members of the PSYOP community for comment, the results of which are reflected in the conclusions about the issues in this section.\n\n## Operations Enduring Freedom/*Iraqi Freedom*: Summary Of Official Lessons Learned\n\nThe Joint Staff lessons learned50 concerning broader information operations are equally relevant to PSYOP lessons learned.  Essentially, the Joint Staff made two broad observations that, if acted upon, would permit more effective PSYOP campaigns.  First, it noted that better integration of all aspects of national information efforts would facilitate PSYOP by providing timely, authoritative guidance on themes and messages.  This would ensure that PSYOP efforts were consistent with larger, national themes and messages about U.S. national security and defense policies.  Second, it pointed out that a more robust public affairs effort in the Pentagon that allowed rapid, effective official responses to enemy disinformation on a global basis would make PSYOP resources more readily available to concentrate on producing desired effects instead of responding to enemy efforts to do the same.  More specifically, the Joint Staff effort:\n\n- recommended fixing interagency coordination to harmonize all national \"perceptual\nassets\"\n- recommended coordinating operational-level IO (and thus PSYOP) with national efforts - implies, but does not actually state, that consolidating IO policy oversight in OSD would\nfacilitate such coordination\n- argues that public affairs must counter adversary disinformation around the clock in\noverseas as well as domestic audiences.\nThe United States Joint Forces Command lessons learned51 focused on the operational level of war.  Although JFCOM also concentrated on lessons learned from information operations, the document nevertheless included specific recommendations on PSYOP.  Specifically, two major observations were made:\n\n- Theater-level PSYOP must be integrated with national efforts (similar to the point made\nin the Joint Staff lessons learned, but with a slightly greater emphasis on the role of the Combatant Commander in accomplishing this objective).\n- PSYOP must build a competitive, responsive live theater-radio-television capability.\nMore specifically, the JFCOM lessons learned noted that PSYOP execution was marked by friction, assessment difficulties, and, at times, a lack of sophistication in spite of its contribution to strategic and operational objectives.\nIn addition, JFCOM provided the following PSYOP-relevant recommendations.\n\n- The Under Secretary of Defense (Policy) should publish guidance that effectively\nprovides interagency coordination and national-level guidance for PSYOP themes.\n- The Joint PSYOP Support Element, a PSYOP cell supported by commercial sector\ncontractors as recommended in the *IO Roadmap*, should be accelerated to improve integration with national themes and messages.\n- The quality and quantity of PSYOP broadcasting capabilities and platforms should be\nimproved from the strategic to the tactical level.\nThe 4th POG lessons learned52 focused on tactical-level issues.  One exception was the response to the maneuver commanders' criticism that they were not well supported by PSYOP units.  The\n4th POG characterized this concern as a misperception and recommended an improved understanding of PSYOP capabilities.  To the extent that PSYOP support to maneuver commanders was less than it should have been, the 4th POG considered it largely due to delays caused by the USD(P) in PSYOP product approvals.  Most of the 4th POG lessons learned addressed inadequate resources, both in overall force structure and personnel, and in specific equipment and Operations and Maintenance (O&M) funding categories.  They include:\n\n- Personnel/force structure: Generally, the 4th POG notes that more trained PSYOP\npersonnel are needed and that the issue should be included in their current Force Design Update process.\no More specifically, the unit supports an increase in active regional companies and in\nactive and reserve tactical companies.\no It recognizes the need to reverse projected recruiting shortfalls for PSYOP personnel\nand force structure to support the Army's transformation to units of action and employment.\no It notes the need for more PSYOP personnel to be placed in higher command staff\nelements for improving appreciation and attention to PSYOP-specific equipment requirements.\n- Training is needed for PSYOP personnel for Internet/Web site development. - Equipment needs should be aligned with increases in force structure and addressed in the\nForce Design Update process.  More specifically, the 4th POG agrees that it needs:\no long-range television-radio broadcasting systems for denied airspace o organic communication support at the company level to distribute information to and\nfrom the JPOTF\no communication links and print capability for product development detachments o a reserve of loudspeakers to replace damaged ones o satellite communication capability for electronic news gathering kits o ruggedized laptops with communications capabilities o up-armored high mobility multipurpose wheeled vehicles (HMMWVs), body armor,\nM4s, and M9 pistols for force protection.\n- Contracting funds are needed for:\no satellite connections to facilitate reachback capabilities o PSEs assigned at short notice to Embassies o linguists to translate products and to produce and conduct surveys on PSYOP effects o copyrighted products that are otherwise not available for use.\nThe lessons learned from the Joint Staff, JFCOM, and 4th POG are consistent with those found in previous PSYOP lessons learned, which often lament the absence of national guidance on themes, the flawed approval process that renders PSYOP products less timely and effective, the lack of sufficiently high-quality PSYOP products, and the limited resources to address all PSYOP requirements.  They also offer new insights and deeper, more detailed lessons. However, in the process of consolidating diverse issues and reaching a consensus, they necessarily obscure some contentious issues that are worth investigation. Issues of contention. The lessons learned from the Joint Staff, JFCOM, and 4th POG do not reveal all the contentious issues associated with PSYOP performance.  Informal lessons learned documents and interviews indicate a wider and deeper set of issues for exploration.  As noted above, we bundled these issues of contention in the list of 10 macro issues, the first 8 of which are operational or non-materiel issues.\n\nOf the eight operational PSYOP issue areas investigated, the two least controversial are the need for national-level authorities to integrate the information element of national security policy and the guidance on themes and messages for PSYOP.  The question is why a concept that all support in theory is seldom exercised in practice.  The extent to which authorities in the Pentagon and at CENTCOM accord high priority to PSYOP is more controversial and depends greatly upon the operation and the leadership element in question.  The same might be said of the approval process.  While the confusion surrounding the approval of products at the beginning of OEF left many of the participants embittered about Pentagoncombatant commander cooperation in this area, a cursory review suggests that the problems with the approval process were more widespread, possibly affecting the entire chain of command down to the tactical level. An additional issue to consider is the level of clarity and understanding in PSYOP missions, particularly in the area of strategic PSYOP. This is a point of strong contention within the Pentagon and among civilian and uniformed PSYOP leaders.  The *IO Roadmap* conclusion that PSYOP forces do not practice any form of \"strategic PSYOP\" and that the expression should be expunged from the Pentagon's lexicon remains a point of irritation for many in PSYOP circles. In a separate but related issue, the question of whether PSYOP integration with IO was a positive or negative development is also controversial within and outside of the PSYOP community. Many observers favored dividing information operations into a \"soft\" set of capabilities that focuses on human decisionmaking (for example, PSYOP and military deception) and a \"hard\" set that concentrates on automated or materiel systems (for example, electronic warfare and computer network operations).  The *Information Operations Roadmap* conclusion that PSYOP and the other four core capabilities of IO (electronic warfare, operations security, computer network operations, and military deception) are closely interrelated, largely because they all must increasingly exploit the electromagnetic spectrum to be effective, is still not widely accepted.  In recent military operations, this disagreement manifested itself in irritation among PSYOP personnel who were suddenly assigned to IO staff officers who had little background in or knowledge of PSYOP. The assertion that there were insufficient PSYOP planners is noncontroversial in the sense that it indicates an appreciation for PSYOP and a desire for its expertise in the joint planning process. The controversy stems from the issue of whether the personnel available to the PSYOP community were properly utilized to support joint planning.  The perception that a cooperation and communications gap existed between theater- and tactical-level PSYOP forces is a point of contention within the PSYOP community.  It reflects, in part, differences of opinion between active and reserve PSYOP officers and between the enlisted and officer ranks with respect to which PSYOP activities will generate the greatest effects.  The reserve PSYOP forces own the majority of the tactical PSYOP capability, and the Active Component is organized mostly to support theater planning and dissemination of PSYOP products.  Not surprisingly, the inclinations of the reserve and active personnel generally reflect their orientation toward the tactical and theater missions, respectively. PSYOP materiel resource issues are not controversial per se.  Most would acknowledge that additional resources would benefit PSYOP.  Resource issues become controversial when assertions are made that additional investments in PSYOP would be cost-effective; that is, that they would produce proportionately advantageous effects compared to the cost of the investments.  Cost benefit analysis is always difficult when the output is battlefield effects, but this challenge is particularly pronounced in gauging PSYOP effects (as explained in section 2 of this report).  Since it is difficult to ascertain and quantify PSYOP effects, it is equally difficult to address the observation that PSYOP products were unsophisticated or of low quality.  To address this controversial issue, measures of merit for quality in PSYOP products were developed in conjunction with this report.53\n\n## Stability Operations: Historic Lessons Learned\n\nDuring the interim review of this project in June 2004, Pentagon leadership directed that a more general overview of PSYOP performance and lessons learned in stability operations be included in the scope of the research.  Therefore, in addition to PSYOP in support of OEF and OIF combat operations, this section of the report also addresses PSYOP in stability operations over the past few decades. PSYOP forces are employed more frequently in support of stability operations than in major combat operations because stability operations are more common.  For this reason, PSYOP lessons learned from stability operations are more readily available than those gathered from major combat.  It is important to understand whether PSYOP lessons learned are specific to either type of operation so that the lessons are not misapplied, and to facilitate informed decisions about correcting any shortfalls revealed in the lessons learned analysis. Decisionmakers may opt to accept the risk of not fully correcting a shortfall if the costs are too great.  For this reason, understanding whether the shortfall applies only to major combat operations or stability operations, or both, may be an important factor in such decisions. The ready availability of PSYOP lessons learned from stability operations and the limited time for this research effort precluded a reexamination of primary sources on PSYOP lessons learned in stability operations.  For this study, a comprehensive review of secondary sources was conducted, consisting mainly of official and unofficial PSYOP\nlessons learned for stability operations over the past 20 years.54  The operations examined in this review included *Urgent Fury* (Grenada, 1983); *Just Cause* (Panama, 1989); Provide Comfort (Iraq/Turkey, 19911994); *Restore Hope* (Somalia, 19921993); Uphold/Restore Democracy (Haiti, 19931994); *Joint Guard* (Bosnia-Herzegovina, 19951998); *Assured Response* (Liberia, 1996); and *Noble Anvil* and Allied Force (Kosovo, 1999). Based on the list of all PSYOP lessons learned for these operations, nine functional areas emerged.  A complete review of the specific lessons learned for each category is available in the classified annex to the report.  A brief summary of each of the nine functional areas provides elucidation.55\n\n- *Coalition cooperation and interagency coordination (critical to success)*: Time and\nagain, reviews of PSYOP performance in stability operations underscore the need to share information between agencies and with coalition partners to ensure that PSYOP is part of a well-orchestrated information effort that generates consistent messages across multiple media outlets.\n- *Understanding of PSYOP (limited and irregular, depending on commander)*:\nAppreciation for the importance of PSYOP varies among individual U.S. commanders, with some using PSYOP well, and others, not at all.  In some instances, other Governmental agencies will not properly understand or utilize PSYOP.  Either the ability of PSYOP to produce positive effects is not fully understood or appreciated or the fear that PSYOP will hurt U.S. information efforts precludes certain agencies from employing PSYOP missions.  Lack of proper appreciation for PSYOP's role in supporting contingency operations has been a common complaint in operations from Grenada to Kosovo.\n- *Planning (early and continuous is best)*: Every lesson learned highlighted the importance\nof involving PSYOP early in the planning stage of operations in order to maximize its effects.  PSYOP is frequently late-to-need and is forced into a catch-up mode when authorities finally realize its importance to the overall military mission.  Similarly,\nbecause political and diplomatic circumstances can change quickly during a contingency operation, PSYOP planning must continue throughout all stages.  This truism is frequently recognized with respect to public affairs, but less often in the case of PSYOP.\n\n- *Operations (integrated efforts magnify effects)*: PSYOP effects can be greatly enhanced\nwhen they are carefully integrated with conventional forces.  Benefits are amplified when PSYOP forces use their knowledge of local mores and attitudes to prepare regular forces for the cultural context of their operations, and when those forces behave so as to\nreinforce PSYOP messages and themes.56  This is particularly true in prolonged stability\noperations where PSYOP is given sufficient time to generate observable effects.\no A related observation is that PSYOP is not well supported by conventional sources of\nintelligence.  In contrast, in the course of conducting their missions, PSYOP forces are able to gather a wealth of intelligence that is highly useful to conventional forces.\n- *Products (timeliness and quality need improvement)*: Securing product approvals in a\ntimely manner is an ever-present liability.  Prepared and preapproved products offer an easy solution to this problem, since many themes and messages are consistent across the range of military operations and can easily be anticipated.  The products can then be\ntailored to meet the immediate needs of forces on the ground.57  In addition, a higher\nvolume of superior quality products from radio and television is needed to fill airtime, especially in more sophisticated media markets where target audiences have multiple\nchoices for news sources and prefer these media venues.58\no Another unanimous lesson learned is that the quality of products could be improved if\nbetter intelligence support was available.  Most military intelligence is focused on the enemy order of battle and intentions, and the other intelligence organizations tend to focus on the political machinations of elite decisionmakers.  PSYOP needs an indepth understanding of its target audiences on a continuing basis, since it rarely receives help from the Intelligence Community in this regard.  In fact, the repeated observation is that PSYOP is a better source of intelligence than a valued consumer of\nintelligence.  While PSYOP forces can develop some knowledge of the target\naudiences through their own exertions once deployed, this does not help them prepare products in advance of deployment.\n- *Training (needed to improve PSYOP capabilities)*: Insufficient numbers of well-trained\nPSYOP specialists are a common weakness in many stability operations.  The main\ndeficiencies have been the lack of PSYOP campaign planning;59 insufficient levels of trained senior PSYOP Reserve Component officers;60 lack of knowledge concerning\ncombined operation functions;61 and the need for training PSYOP soldiers in marketing and advertising.62\n- *Force structure (insufficient Active Component forces)*: The high operations tempo of the\nActive Component PSYOP forces over the past two decades has led to frequent observations that there are insufficient numbers of Active Component PSYOP forces to meet the demands of operational requirements.\n- *PSYOP equipment (insufficient quantity and quality)*: Units are chronically short of the\nquantity and quality of equipment needed to effectively accomplish their tasks.\n- *Other resource issues*: PSYOP lacks both strategic and tactical organic mobility. Forces\nfrequently arrive late to theater because they are accorded a low priority for movement. In addition, PSYOP has insufficient fungible resources to purchase short-notice support elements, particularly in the area of translator support.\nAll nine of the general PSYOP lessons learned from stability operations apply equally well to major combat operations and indeed are reflected in lessons learned from Operation Desert Storm63 and from more recent major combat operations.  Similar to the analysis of doctrine, however, a more detailed review of these issue areas illuminates key differences between PSYOP lessons in stability operations and major combat operations. For example, integrating PSYOP with other military operations magnifies its effect by lending credibility to PSYOP messages.  This is true in both stability operations and major combat operations, but since the operational objectives are different, the way in which conventional forces magnify PSYOP effects is different in each type of operation. In major combat operations, conventional forces lend credibility to PSYOP messages that proclaim a stark choice between surrender and death by demonstrating their ability to destroy adversary forces as advertised.  This type of integration of PSYOP and conventional force operations is largely a tactical enterprise directed at specific enemy units.  Theater-level PSYOP supporting major combat operations generally cannot produce effects fast enough to affect combat operations.  They are aimed at the general population, and popular perceptions of U.S. forces are not directly relevant to the conduct of major combat operations against large, organized enemy forces. In contrast, conventional forces magnify PSYOP effects in stability operations by acting in a manner that curries favor with the local population and demonstrates that those resisting U.S. forces will be selectively punished with every attempt to minimize collateral damage, for which there will be compensation when it does occur.  Unlike major combat operations, the synchronization of PSYOP and conventional forces in stability operations applies at both the tactical and theater levels.  Tactically, face-to-face PSYOP takes on greater importance in stability operations, where soldiers leave an emotional impact through their interactions with the population.  Hence, lessons learned emphasize the importance of every soldier knowing PSYOP themes and messages on a current basis in stability operations.  A good example is Haiti, where lessons learned documented the impact of simple greetings and gestures by American forces, which went a long way toward transforming Haitians' views of American forces and their mission.64  At the theater level, PSYOP (radio, TV, and other media that broadly communicate with the general populace) is important as well to advertise the legitimacy of U.S. objectives. Other differences arise with respect to the criticality of a lesson learned.  PSYOP coordination with other agencies is important during major combat operations but is essential to the success of stability operations; hence emphasis is placed on close coordination with in-country teams.  The same is true of attempts to confer legitimacy on U.S. objectives.  As an example, great emphasis is placed on taking the information offensive early in stability operations and doing so with full coordination across all government agencies (including PSYOP and its themes and messages). Both the differences in the nature of tactical integration of PSYOP and conventional forces and the criticality of particular PSYOP lessons learned stem from the essential difference between stability operations and major combat operations.  At the strategic level, the country always wants to confer legitimacy on its use of military force and build that legitimacy over timeeven in the adversary's population.  At the operational and tactical level, however, the importance of doing so and the means of doing so are vastly different.  In major combat operations, the adversary's forces consider U.S. objectives illegitimate because they are fighting to prevent their imposition, and the public is largely neutral or indifferent.  In stability operations, the public directly enables and supplies the combatants depending on its perception of the legitimacy of U.S. forces and objectives.  It is difficult to obtain success in any stability operation without securing popular support or without at least neutralizing active support to insurgents and terrorists from the populace.  For this reason, the PSYOP mission of conferring legitimacy on U.S. forces and objectives is a critical one in stability operations and an ever-present focus of U.S. tactics. In summary, the PSYOP lessons learned for stability operations that deserve to be highlighted as distinct either in application or criticality from PSYOP lessons for major combat operations include the following:\n\n- The center of gravity in stability operations is popular support, so PSYOP must focus on\nthe general population as well as on enemy combatants and leaders.\n- Early and continuous theater-level PSYOP integration with other agencies to ensure\nconsistent themes and messages is essential.\n- Face-to-face PSYOP with the host population is critical, and PSYOP forces must use\nconventional forces to support this objective.\nAn overarching observation is that the entire role of PSYOP is more critical for success in stability operations than in major combat operations where the struggle will largely be determined by a clash of arms rather than changes in popular support for contending agendas. The significance of this observation will be taken up in the conclusion of the report.\n\n## 5. Findings On Critical Issues\n\nThis section of the report examines the set of 10 hypotheses that emerged from a review of formal and informal lessons learned from OEF, OIF, and, to a lesser extent, from OIF 2.  As noted in the preceding section, the official lessons learned did not cover all the contentious issues associated with PSYOP performance.  The following 10 key issues were extracted from informal lessons learned documents and interviews.\n\n## National Integration Of Themes And Messages\n\nIssue. The Joint Staff information operations lessons learned on OIF include the observation that the United States Government is not sufficiently organized to coordinate the full spectrum of national \"perceptual assets\" and activities.  Little debate exists on this point.  There is, however, broad opinion regarding the extent of the problem caused by the lack of organization, particularly with respect to PSYOP.  Most hold that the absence of national-level guidance on themes reduces the effectiveness of PSYOP plans.  A related point is that the lack of coordinated activities can undermine the overall effectiveness of an information campaign.  Others assert that national themes are nice to have but are not essential for PSYOP. Evidence. The office of the USD(P) coordinated and obtained interagency approval for strategic information campaign objectives and themes for OEF. The Joint Staff transmitted these themes to CENTCOM on October 7, 2001, the day OEF operations began, and approximately a month after the attacks of September 11.65 Shortly thereafter, the Department of State produced a revised list of themes that were less pointed than those developed by DOD. The differences of opinion were not resolved. Thus, other than periodic public affairs guidance on issues of the day, no other national guidance on a strategic information campaign was released from the Office of the Secretary of Defense to help guide the development of PSYOP themes and objectives. The national OEF themes enabled CENTCOM to prepare for its PSYOP campaign for Afghanistan and elsewhere.66  The content of the OEF PSYOP plan, its objectives, and its themes reflect, and are consistent with, national themes.  In this regard, they contain guidance on political and religious positions, as well as military objectives, such as the need to undermine enemy combatant morale.  Absent national-level guidance for OIF and OIF 2, CENTCOM\ncontinued to produce PSYOP plans that were approved by authorities in the Pentagon.67  The plan prepared for OIF focused largely on objectives that would facilitate combat operations.  The amendment to the OIF plans that accounted for post-conflict stability operations stressed political themes, especially those that would help secure popular support for coalition efforts. By way of comparison, the most specific themes in any of the three plans are found in the OEF plan, and they reflect national themes provided to CENTCOM.  For example, the OEF plan ventures to comment on religion and terrorism and on the moral and political justification for the war on terrorism.  In contrast, the PSYOP themes outlined in the plans of OIF and OIF 2 were generally, but not dramatically, less specific.  PSYOP professionals who responded to inquiries on this subject were unanimous in their observation that national-level guidance on themes is helpful from their point of view.  However, some expressed an appreciation for why it is difficult to obtain such guidance and noted that a PSYOP plan may be developed without it.  In this regard they held varying opinions on how critical such guidance was to the development of a PSYOP plan in support of an operation.  In short, there appears to be some correlation between the presence of national guidance on themes and more specific PSYOP campaign themes, which better support a more aggressive PSYOP campaign.  However, the absence of such national-level guidance did not prevent CENTCOM planners from developing PSYOP themes for all of their operations. Discussion. Not surprisingly, PSYOP professionals appreciate national-level guidance on information themes.  It provides important context for developing their more specific objectives. At a minimum, it saves planners the trouble of trying to divine policy objectives from the public statements of senior officials.  At best, it allows PSYOP professionals to produce plans and respond rapidly to evolving events with a high level of confidence that they were acting consistently with national objectives.68  Consistency is desirable, since the most effective persuasive communications campaigns repeat a small number of themes constantly, albeit in different ways.69\nIt also is not surprising that PSYOP themes in OEF, which benefited from national information themes, were somewhat more specific than in OIF and OIF 2.  The tendency of planners working without explicit guidance is to err on the side of more general formulations of information themes to ensure that they do not exceed established policy.  This is especially true since senior officials sometimes differ in how they explain policy objectives publicly.  And PSYOP planners must reconcile the differences as they see fit.  From the planners' point of view, broad formulations of information themes probably carry less risk of backfiring.  However, they may suffer from a corresponding diminution in effectiveness if the themes are so general or ambiguous that they do not help target audiences better appreciate U.S. policy and operations. Developments at the beginning of OEF may demonstrate both the importance and the limitations of national-level guidance.  Initial PSYOP operations in Afghanistan were handicapped by a lack of coordination between the policy and PSYOP communities and by the exclusion of the IO policy community from the Afghan war plan.  The planning for this operation was done quickly and in narrowly confined circles.  The Secretary of Defense was under the impression that PSYOP products would accompany the first publicly announced combat operations in Afghanistan.  However, lower ranking policy officials overseeing the information campaign were not aware of the date of the operations and the products under development by PSYOP forces. When it became clear that the Secretary was incorrect in announcing the dissemination of PSYOP leaflets the first time that he explained OEF operations to the public, the highest levels of the Pentagon were suddenly interested in seeing PSYOP products as quickly as possible.  The initial PSYOP product was deemed inconsistent with policy objectives and was disapproved, and all subsequent PSYOP products were subjected to particularly intense scrutiny by senior officials in the Pentagon.  The leaflet, similar to ones used in the first Gulf War, pictured B52 bombers dropping bombs on a green valley.  Policy officials were concerned that it would erroneously communicate U.S. objectives as revenge against the Afghan people for September 11. The national-level guidance that was approved and disseminated the day that operations began made clear that the U.S. response in Afghanistan would protect, not target, innocent people and that there was no cause that would justify purposeful targeting of the civilian population.  These themes make the B52 bomber leaflet appear particularly inappropriate in hindsight.  One can only speculate as to whether those charged with developing PSYOP products would have created something different had such guidance been available.  Interviews conducted in support of this study reveal that PSYOP officers who developed the products felt it communicated seriousness of purpose and national commitment.  Moreover, they intended it for limited distribution in support of one tactical operation, something policy officials did not understand.  The tension surrounding the review process contributed to a significant delay in getting subsequent approved PSYOP products into the field.  The incident demonstrates both the importance of guidance and the reality that opinions can differ as to which products are consistent with such guidance. Additionally, it demonstrates the importance of rapid communication between policy officials and PSYOP planners, a point that will be examined in discussions on the approval process. The incident also raises an important distinction concerning the relative importance of national themes for theater, as opposed to tactical, PSYOP, at least in major combat operations.  Pentagon decisionmakers assumed the B52 bomber leaflet would receive broad dissemination, whereas PSYOP leaders later indicated it was designed for a tactical application.  A recent Army report on OIF reached this conclusion:\nThe one clear point in IO doctrine, at least as it applies to psychological operations, is that top-down development of themes and messages often inhibits opportunity for tactical success.  In OIF, as in the Balkans, centralized themes and messages sometimes proved irrelevant to local populations and situations, and centralized control of active IO was not responsive to rapidly changing situations. For example, Tactical PSYOP Teams (TPTs) were provided capitulation leaflets for the first 48 hours of the conflict.  After that, the centralized message approval process proved unable to provide leaflet texts appropriate to the situation V Corps confronted.  TPTs were reduced to using their loudspeaker capability.  The Army and the joint team should revisit PSYOP doctrine and organization to find ways to provide commanders PSYOP support that is as agile as their combat units.70\nThe excerpt was taken from a report by the Center for Army Lessons Learned investigating information operations during the combat phase of OIF.  That same Army institution later concluded in a report reviewing stability operations in OIF 2 that PSYOP measures of effectiveness and criteria for success needed to be aligned to strategic and operational goals and that soldiers' interaction with the populace (including PSYOP) can have tactical, operational, and sometimes strategic implications.71  These apparently contradictory conclusions about the importance of national themes to PSYOP efforts may be explained by the important differences between major combat operations and stability operations. Many tactical PSYOP products in support of major combat operations are straightforward appeals for surrender, safety, compliance with procedures, and the like.  They do not contain much, if any, political content.  Subjecting these products to a national approval process often takes so long that they lose their value.  In contrast, since the focus in stability operations is on the objective of severing enemy combatants' support from the local population, PSYOP tactical messages have a significant amount of political content designed to reinforce the legitimacy of U.S. policy, actions, and forces, and those of local allies.  Such products need a timely, but nonetheless thorough, review from policy experts.  As recent experience in OIF 2 demonstrates, it is important to keep everyone \"on message,\"72 all the way down the chain of command.  In short, national themes are always helpful to PYSOP at the theater level and at the tactical level in stability operations.  However, while welcome, they are much less important to tactical PSYOP in support of major combat operations. Another incident that raises the importance of coordinated information activities was the decision to try to bomb the Iraqi minister of information (Mohammed Saeed al Sahaf, otherwise known as \"Baghdad Bob\") off the air.  One goal of the OIF PSYOP plan was to avoid destruction of PSYOP-relevant facilities.  This goal had to be balanced against the value of preventing the regime from communicating with its supporters (inside and outside of Iraq) during the war. Initially, concerns about collateral damage apparently kept the Ministry of Information off the targeting list.  However, as the minister of information's disinformation campaigns became more problematic, pressure grew to destroy his broadcast facilities.  The audience he was able to reach was largely foreign because few Iraqis had access to satellite television.73  Some experts in the information operations community assert that they knew the minister had mobile broadcasting options and had successfully used them after the ministry was bombed.  Moreover, this information was made known to senior officials in Washington, but their preoccupation with getting al Sahaf off the air prevailed, and the decision to bomb was ultimately made.  The bombs failed to prevent the minister from broadcasting, but they did succeed in denying communication assets that PSYOP could have used in OIF 2.74\nConclusion.  National guidance on information themes improves the likelihood of an aggressive PSYOP campaign.  Without such guidance, PSYOP products conveyed to general audiences at the theater level are likely to be a less specific formulation of broad U.S. public policy positions. Theater-level PSYOP products may still counter adversary disinformation and provide news generally supportive of U.S. policies and operations, but they are less likely to provide aggressive argumentation in defense of U.S. policies for fear of getting ahead of policy. At the tactical level of major combat operations, the lack of national guidance on themes is less significant.  Many tactical PSYOP products are designed to elicit specific behaviors (noninterference, surrender, safety compliance) that have little political content.  As such, they would benefit less from national-level guidance on themes.  Two caveats need to be addressed, however.  First, as the B52 leaflet example illustrates, what may be intended as a tactical product can be perceived as having broader unintended political effects.  Second, in stability operations, even tactical products that aggressively solicit popular support require political reasoning and appeal.  Therefore, the general conclusion holds true for tactical PSYOP products as well, with the exception that national themes are much less important to tactical PSYOP in support of major combat operations. Coordinated national guidance on information themes does not necessarily lead to themes that powerfully justify U.S. policies and operations.  It is possible that such an interagency process would resolve inevitable differences over information themes by promulgating the least objectionable themes rather than riskier, but potentially more powerful and effective, themes. Therefore, it is possible that even with national-level guidance, PSYOP planners might only obtain the most general direction on information themes.  A process for performing target audience analysis, \"market testing\" themes, and obtaining rapid feedback on information effects throughout the interagency would likely mitigate this problem. In summary, producing and routinely updating national-level guidance on themes would facilitate an aggressive, effective PSYOP campaign.  The British have a system for coordinating their information themes at the national level, and they are widely perceived to benefit as a result.  Their task is made easier by their relatively small bureaucracy and forces.75  A U.S.\n\nnational-level effort to coordinate themes would require a robust interagency coordination process, preferably with analytic support to help resolve issues of contention.  The absence of national-level guidance does not preclude the possibility of an effective PSYOP campaign at the tactical level, especially in major combat operations, but it greatly diminishes the likelihood of an effective campaign at the theater level.  In short, the lack of such guidance would be an argument in favor of concentrating PSYOP resources on producing specific behavioral effects at the tactical level where PSYOP has a comparative advantage.  Trying to indirectly affect adversary or popular behavior through attitude adjustments when PSYOP is limited to parroting broad public diplomacy themes is probably not a wise investment, particularly given the scarce resources available to PSYOP. Coordinating information activities. This study cannot conclude with confidence whether a more integrated approach to managing national perceptual assets might have improved decisionmaking on whether to knock Baghdad Bob off the air.  Based on evidence collected for this study, this decision was made with all of the relevant facts available.  In retrospect, it appears that a decision might have been made without benefit of all of the facts involved, since little formal documentation exists regarding this decision.  The real issue to note, however, is whether an interagency body dedicated to weighing the advantages and disadvantages of courses of action on information activities might have produced a better outcome.  This study concludes that it might have helped and that it could not have hurt. Therefore, the broader point about the value of better coordinating information activities seems like a logical conclusion, particularly with respect to theater-level information activities aimed at broad audiences that have access to multiple information sources.  In such instances, uncoordinated activities run a higher risk of working at cross-purposes and producing conflicting messages.\n\n## Leadership Priority Accorded To Psyop\n\nIssue. The Joint Forces Command lessons learned on OIF note that top-level advocacy for integration contributed to the success of information operations.  At issue is whether this advocacy translated into support for PSYOP, whether the support led to an improved PSYOP effort, and whether that support was uniform or intermittent, depending on personalities and circumstances. Evidence. Both senior civilian and military DOD leaders are increasingly vocal in their support for information operations and its component parts, including PSYOP.  The Secretary of Defense's personal interest in information operations is well known and documented in major Department of Defense strategy and guidance documents, beginning with the 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review and including the *Information Operations Roadmap*, signed out in 2003.  Daily briefing books for both the Chairman and the Secretary on PSYOP activities were prepared during OIF, including examples of the products, radio wheels, scripts, and schedules.  General Franks also indicated his interest and support for PSYOP in his account of OIF.76  Other than the opening weeks of OEF during which confusion and a lethargic approval process delayed the delivery of PSYOP products to the field, interviews with senior PSYOP officers indicate that General Franks and other senior CENTCOM leaders supported IO in general, and PSYOP specifically, as key components of their OEF and OIF plans. At the component commander level, however, a more complex picture emerges.  The Air Force lessons learned indicate that some component commanders \"inadvertently\" assigned low priority to PSYOP missions.  Other lessons learned also indicate77 that once PSYOP approval was delegated to the land forces component commander in OIF, a delay occurred while a good working relationship between that commander and the JPOTF was established.  Some PSYOP officers who worked directly with component commanders describe Special Operations Command Central, Air Force Command Central, and Navy Command Central as most supportive of PSYOP, while Army Command Central (ARCENT) and Marine Corps Command Central (MARCENT) were less supportive, both in OEF and OIF.  There is some irony in this observation, because the maneuver commanders working for ARCENT and MARCENT were the most vocal in their after-action reviews about the value of tactical PSYOP and the need to improve it.  In other words, these component commanders may have been out of touch with their subordinate commander's appreciation of and need for PSYOP. According to PSYOP officers involved with the JPOTF, neither V Corps nor I MEF ever complained about a shortage of PSYOP support during OIF planning.  At that time, PSYOP was not necessarily a high priority during planning and deployment.  But after operations commenced, the division commanders operating under V Corps and I MEF needed direct and immediate PSYOP support for their fast-moving forces, and they complained that they were inadequately supported by PSYOP tactical efforts.  The JPOTF, both before and during operations, seemed to many observers to be more focused on theater-wide activities.  This suited the perspective and needs of the other component commanders, who generally wanted theaterwide effects from PSYOP.  In short, and not surprisingly, the Marines and Army appreciated tactical PSYOP more than the Air Force and Navy, which tended to look for PSYOP support at the theater level. These differing attitudes about the value of theater versus tactical PSYOP may also help explain, at least in part, the apparent divergence in appreciation for PSYOP among different service component commanders.  The Navy and Air Force, which tend to look at PSYOP from a theater perspective, worked better with the JPOTF, which had the same outlook.  However, the Army and Marines, who appreciate tactical PSYOP more, were perceived by the JPOTF as less cooperative. Below the component commander level, appreciation for PSYOP was, again, mixed at best.\n\nSome wing, corps, and division commanders apparently had reservations about the relevance78 or ability of PSYOP products to create effects.79  Many senior officers have more confidence in their ability to produce effects with kinetic weapons than with PSYOP products.  As a result, PSYOP has trouble getting priority attention for air assets to deliver its products to theater and tactical targets.80  Similarly, depending on the commander in question, PSYOP officers occasionally had difficulty getting senior officer priority attention for approval of PSYOP products.  As a result, products and their delivery were sometimes delayed, greatly reducing their effectiveness.  In contrast, public affairs officers reportedly enjoyed better access to commanders.81\nConcerning OIF 2, the results again were mixed.  Initially, PSYOP leaders were under the impression that the duties would quickly transition to the Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA), the Pentagon organization assigned responsibility for planning and executing relief and humanitarian assistance operations following the combat phase of OIF.  By June, when it became evident that ORHA would not be overseeing information activities and that there would be organized resistance to the Coalition Provisional Authority in Iraq, PSYOP forces realized they would need to mount a substantial PSYOP effort in support of OIF 2.  By most accounts, the civilian leadership in the Coalition Provisional Authority was not attuned to the importance of PSYOP and essentially concentrated on keeping ahead of the public affairs agenda to the best of its ability.  However, some division commanders fighting the insurgency and terrorists show marked appreciation for PSYOP, devoting substantial fiscal resources, time, and attention to PSYOP commanders and activities. Discussion. PSYOP professionals over the years have often felt underappreciated and underutilized.  The lack of proper appreciation for PSYOP is a common complaint in PSYOP lessons learned from contingency operations during the 1980s and 1990s.  Nevertheless, senior civilian and military leader appreciation for PSYOP is generally acknowledged to have grown after the demonstrable effects attributed to it in the first Gulf War and later in Somalia. Presumably, Secretary Donald Rumsfeld's personal interest in PSYOP products from the earliest days of OEF and reportedly through OIF could only have further stimulated senior leader interest in PSYOP. The extent to which senior military officer appreciation for PSYOP received a boost in 2000 from the Secretary's more general interest in information operations is less clear.  It cannot simply be assumed from the publication of the *IO Roadmap* that senior military leader attitudes toward PSYOP in OEF and OIF were directly influenced by the new Bush administration's promotion of information operations as a critical and increasingly important component of modern war.  It must be remembered that the *Information Operations Roadmap* was not completed until late 2003.  During its development, there was much debate on whether PSYOP was a core capability of information operations.  Some asserted that information operations should be limited to exploiting cyberspace and the electromagnetic spectrum, the features of information operations stressed in the 2001 *Quadrennial Defense Review*.  Hence, it was not until after OEF and OIF ended that DOD settled on an agreed definition of information operations that included PSYOP. That said, it was clear well before the start of OIF that PSYOP was likely to be included in the definition of information operations and was certainly made to respond to those responsible for information operations in CENTCOM headquarters.  In this regard, the Secretary's personal support for information operations and the changes made in Secretary-level DOD guidance documents to reflect that support at least ensured that CENTCOM would organize for information operations in its planning and execution of contingency operations. Conclusion. The good news for PSYOP professionals is that their discipline has never before enjoyed such support and interest among high-ranking civilian and military leaders, in large part because of the rising interest in information operations. Secretary Rumsfeld's intense interest in information operations certainly gave PSYOP a higher profile in recent operations.  The current Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff was also a major supporter of information operations and intervened to help win approval of the *Information Operations Roadmap* from service leaders. Thus, PSYOP appears to be benefiting from senior leader support to the extent that its integration into information operations is beneficial.  Whether the attention from newly assigned IO leaders in the chain of command was always welcome by PSYOP professionals, the Pentagon's emphasis on information operations ensured that PSYOP activities would at least receive highlevel attention and the benefits of better coordination with other information operation core capabilities.  PSYOP integration with other IO disciplines was a net plus. This is not to argue that PSYOP received all the necessary resources, materiel and otherwise, that it needs to be most effective.  Below the level of combatant commander, flag officer attitudes about the ability of PSYOP to create effects remain mixed.  It is not surprising that in combat, many commanders will place greater confidence in kinetic weapons with which they are more familiar and that have more easily demonstrated effects.  For many, replacing kinetic options with PSYOP products amounts to targeting on faith, since their actual effects are so difficult to observe and quantify. The problem of limited support for PSYOP from combat commanders is not unique to the U.S. military.  Inquiries to U.S. allies indicate that they also believe that their combat commanders do not fully appreciate the importance of PSYOP or how best to utilize its capabilities.  In response, they intend to undertake a series of presentations to relevant commands to explain what PSYOP and information operations are and what they are not.  They also are revising their training and education requirements for commanders and staff officers and are producing a PSYOP video to be shown regularly to all troops for general awareness and prior to deployment. Some such measures are under way for U.S. forces as well, which would seem advisable.  Yet as one PSYOP officer observed, it is still the case that the first exposure many officers (at least in the Army) have to PSYOP is at one of the combat training centers, where PSYOP performance is typically lackluster.  This anecdote helps underscore the point that education and training alone will not make PSYOP believers out of commanders who must appropriate scarce resources to greatest effect on the battlefield.  It is incumbent upon PSYOP leaders to improve their ability to create and demonstrate effects. The means of improving the quality of PSYOP plans and products are examined in a subsequent section of this report.  As for measuring effects, the impact of PSYOP activities will always be more obscure than that of kinetic weapons, but much more could be done to systematically assess PSYOP effects through dedicated intelligence support and interrogation of target audiences.  Only then is PSYOP likely to receive more support from commanders.\n\n## Psyop Mission Definition\n\nIssue. Among the many informal and formal lessons learned about PSYOP, the question is sometimes raised of whether PSYOP is properly focused on its priority mission.  In general, PSYOP missions are alleged to have been construed too broadly with negative effects.  This allegation occurs at several levels.  At the national level, PSYOP authorities in the Pentagon are accused of trying to conduct strategic PSYOPthat is, PSYOP directed across wide swaths of the world's population base in a manner that inevitably results in PSYOP messages being received by the American public as well or being perceived as undermining the credibility of other U.S. persuasive communication tools such as public affairs and public diplomacy. In addition, some PSYOP personnel involved in JPOTF operations complained that a relatively ineffective theater public affairs effort resulted in time and attention being pulled away from offensive PSYOP to conduct \"defensive\" counter-propaganda missions.  The JFCOM recommendation to invigorate theater public affairs capability seems to support this concern. One level of command down, maneuver commanders in OIF complained that the JPOTF focused too much attention on theater missions (including support to public diplomacy) at the expense of supporting their tactical needs.  Finally, some tactical PSYOP forces observed that the commanders of the units they supported wasted their skills on commander information activities or what really amounted to public affairs activities.  All these complaints raise questions about the proper boundary between PSYOP, public affairs, and public diplomacy. Evidence. Historically, PSYOP has been defined broadly by command sources and doctrine and remains so now (see section 1 of this report).  In fact, it is defined so broadly that it could not be distinguished from public diplomacy and perhaps not from public affairs. The following set of excerpts from joint doctrine illustrates that PSYOP is not clearly distinguished from public affairs or public diplomacy:82\n\n- advise the supported commander through the targeting process regarding targeting\nrestrictions, psychological actions, and psychological enabling actions to be executed by the military force\n- *influence foreign populations* by expressing information through selected conduits to\ninfluence attitudes and behavior and to obtain compliance or noninterference with friendly military operations\n- *provide public information to foreign populations* to support humanitarian activities, ease\nsuffering, and restore or maintain civil order\n- *serve as the supported commander's voice to foreign populations* by conveying the joint\nforce commander's intent\n- counter adversary propaganda, misinformation, disinformation, and opposing information\nto correctly portray friendly intent and actions, while denying others the ability to polarize public opinion and affect the political will of the United States and its multinational partners within an operational area.\nAs the italicized passages indicate, the doctrine does little to clearly demarcate PSYOP from public affairs and public diplomacy.  With the exception of the emphasis on foreign audiences and advice on psychological operations, the description of PSYOP in joint doctrine could apply equally well to public diplomacy and, in some cases, to public affairs.  Moreover, if the SOCOM vision statement is any indication, PSYOP has set upon a course to further broaden its scope and confuse its boundaries with public diplomacy and public information.  The SOCOM vision for Joint Psychological Operations Force 2020 articulates a goal for PSYOP that includes \"conducting effective global influence operations . . . at all levels of operations, tactical to strategic,\" apparently irrespective of audience and circumstances.83\nMany PSYOP professionals and Pentagon officials responsible for oversight of PSYOP still support the concept of strategic PSYOP, by which they mean that products should be broadly disseminated across theaters in support of diverse national objectives and directed at friendly, neutral, and hostile target audiences.  SOCOM's vision statement for PSYOP also supports the concept of strategic PSYOP.  Informally, many senior officials responsible for policy and public affairs reject such a broad definition.  The *IO Roadmap* signed by the Secretary explicitly rejects such a broad scope for PSYOP and instead constrains objectives, audiences, and operational application as follows:\n\n- Objective: aggressive behavior modification (as opposed to mere influence) - Audience: adversaries (implicitly combatants, regular and irregular, and those who\nprovide them with intelligence, logistics, and other assets in the operational milieu identified below)\n- Operational level and milieu: the operational and tactical level of war in support of\nmilitary endeavors in nonpermissive and semipermissive environments (operating environments where American military personnel are at risk from hostile fire in varying degrees, which would include major combat operations and all but the most benign stability operations).\nAs a collateral mission, the *IO Roadmap* assigns PSYOP responsibility for supporting public diplomacy as part of the approved security cooperation guidelines.84  The impact of the IO\nRoadmap redefinition of PSYOP boundaries is twofold.  First, it helps deconflict PSYOP with other government information activities such as public affairs and public diplomacy, since it is limited to support to military endeavors in conflict zones (nonpermissive and semipermissive environments).  Second, it sets a high standard of \"aggressive behavior modification,\" not the more nebulous objective of \"influence.\" Responses to the survey conducted for this study suggest that PSYOP leadership and soldiers have mixed opinions about the importance of mission distinctions.  Most respondents indicated that they understood the differences between PSYOP, public diplomacy, and public affairs but expressed varied opinions about the importance of the distinctions.  Further, JPOTF personnel tended to dismiss the concerns of tactical commanders about their overemphasis on theater PSYOP (much of which constitutes support to public diplomacy).  The JPOTF personnel claimed that they also conducted tactical PSYOP with theater production and dissemination assets. Maneuver commanders felt, however, that the JPOTF tactical products were not tailored and delivered on the timelines needed in the fast-paced OIF operations. One possible explanation for the detrimental effects of the focus on theater-level PSYOP is that PSYOP leader interest in addressing broader audiences at that level undermines attention to the more stringent standards that might be reasonable at the tactical level.  Public affairs and public diplomacy provide only a small portion of the information available to foreign audiences, making their effects especially difficult to assess.  Public affairs and public diplomacy professionals can refer to polling for a general indication of how they are doing, but the correlation between their efforts and favorable attitudes toward U.S. policies and actions is, at best, obscure.  There is insufficient evidence to assert whether PSYOP tactical products are less than state-of-the-art because of limited resources, entrenched attitudes about the higher importance of theater PSYOP, or other factors. Many PSYOP professionals interviewed for this study had a relatively sanguine attitude about the lack of timely, tailored, tactical, iterative products based on a rapid assessment, feedback, and modification process.  Others, especially in the reserves, thought this was a major problem and said it was a byproduct of insufficient resources.  In any case, as indicated in the following discussions on the theater-tactical gap within PSYOP forces and on resource shortfalls, PSYOP does not have the capacity to support tactical forces in the manner they expect and require. At the tactical level, PSYOP practitioners had some concerns that they were asked to conduct public affairs to the detriment of their PSYOP duties.  However, most respondents to the study survey commented that the public affairs and command information functions they performed did not detract from their overall mission.  They seemed willing and able to get the commander's word out however he wanted.  In fact, some cited the advantage of taking on commander information tasks because doing so increases PSYOP's face-to-face interactions with the populace, which is advantageous for building knowledge of the target audiences. Discussion. Clearly, the PSYOP community and much of its leadership are wedded to a broad definition of goals and mission that is at odds with current policy.  At issue is whether PSYOP is best executed under such a broad mandate or whether a more constrained and focused definition of the mission (as dictated in the *IO Roadmap* or some other way) would improve PSYOP performance. Those who support the broader, looser definition of PSYOP argue that it is no longer possible to make distinctions between PSYOP, public diplomacy, and public affairs.  In the new global information environment, all information is qualitatively the same and must be orchestrated in one giant effort that will \"meld the activities of military PSYOP (international military information), public diplomacy, and public affairs.\"85 All informational communication disciplines share some common attributes, particularly the objective of influencing target audiences in a manner favorable to the communicator's interests.  And it is becoming increasingly easy for individuals to access multiple sources of communication regardless of location through the Internet, satellite television, and cellular communications devices.  These facts do not argue, however, for the necessity of eliminating distinctions between communication sources and methods.  As a matter of policy and perhaps law, there are distinctions in the United States between communication disciplines.  To date, the U.S. Government has insisted that these differences be respected, which explains why there is not one large government organization handling all types of information dissemination to both domestic and foreign audiences.  Such an organization would be political and legally unacceptable on many grounds.86\nIt seems reasonable that PSYOP professionals should accept the distinctions among public affairs, public diplomacy, and PSYOP, and some do.87  Many definitions of public affairs and public diplomacy exist, but just two will help demonstrate where they diverge as activity sets. Public affairs practiced in support of the Department of Defense are said to expedite the flow of accurate and timely information about the activities of U.S. joint forces to the public and internal audiences.88  This definition suggests a more passive, \"on-demand\" posture for public affairs, carried out mostly in dialogue with audiences (generally recognized as mostly domestic) to ensure they have the facts about U.S. military operations.  Public diplomacy \"seeks to promote the national interest of the United States through understanding, informing, and influencing foreign audiences.\"89 *Understanding* refers to visitor programs and other plans designed to acquaint foreigners with U.S. society, and *influencing* means providing a defense and promotion of U.S. policies and actions. Where do these definitions of public affairs and public diplomacy leave PSYOP?  In other words, why does the U.S. military have people in the profession of arms dedicated to persuasive communication?  The answer could be because public affairs and public diplomacy must occasionally be exercised in hostile environments where only armed forces dare operate.  But then they would still be public affairs and public diplomacyonly practiced by PSYOP forces as collateral missions necessitated by operational considerations.  The best argument for why the U.S. military has uniformed personnel practicing persuasive communications is that it directly benefits the larger military enterprise, which is inextricably focused on the employment of organized and lethal force.  In this context, the *Information Operations Roadmap*'s objective, audience, and operational scope seem appropriate for PSYOP: aggressive behavior modification of individuals and groups directly opposing U.S. military forces and their designated missions in conflict environments. However, one plausible argument in favor of a broad depiction of the PSYOP mission is that a commander would have much more flexibility in how PSYOP is employed.  There are two objections to this assertion.  First, it is not clear that a more restricted definition of PSYOP would prevent combatant commanders from doing anything that they needed to do in order to accomplish their missions.  The tasks required under the broader definition of PSYOP are able to be fulfilled either as PSYOP per se or as part of their collateral duty of support to public diplomacy.90\nSecond, it can be argued that the broad definition actually inhibits the flexibility of a commander by imposing more onerous coordination requirements upon him.  Confusing PSYOP boundaries alienates and reduces cooperation with other information arms of the U.S. Government, namely public affairs and public diplomacy officials.  Those responsible for these activities believe that the close association of PSYOP with military deception and lethal force would undermine its credibility with domestic and foreign audiences if PSYOP boundaries could not be distinguished from their spheres of activities. Precisely these concerns led to the demise of the Office of Strategic Information, which was established early in OEF to conduct some badly needed strategic planning and analysis of the Pentagon's contribution to the overall U.S. information campaign in support of the war on terror.  The Secretary dissolved the office reluctantly after a public brouhaha over its purported mission.  In short, confusing PSYOP with public diplomacy and public affairs encourages those responsible for these activities to avoid cooperation with PSYOP and, whenever possible, to impose stringent coordination requirements on PSYOP activities, which they fear will exceed proper bounds and negatively impact their missions. Conclusion. PSYOP needs to be coordinated with public diplomacy and public affairs efforts to avoid conflicting and dissipated effects. Ideally, it should be able to cooperate with these other persuasive communication disciplinesfor example, by sharing combat camera footage.  This level of cooperation is unlikely, however, as long as the practitioners of public diplomacy and public affairs feel obliged to distance themselves from PSYOP leaders who do not understand or cannot abide by more restrictive PSYOP boundaries.  PSYOP's broad and amorphous mission definitions help alienate practitioners of public diplomacy and public affairs, thereby making cooperation and even coordination more difficult.  This is much more the case at the national and theater levels.  But as the combat camera example illustrates, it affects cooperation at the tactical level as well. An overly broad and vague definition of the PSYOP mission may have other negative consequences.  It inclines both PSYOP professionals and senior leaders to expect levels of activity that PSYOP simply cannot generate with its current resource base.  Thus, PSYOP is criticized when it cannot competein short orderwith established government and private sector news outlets that operate around the clock with the benefit of established audiences (for example, Baghdad Bob and al Jazeera).  In trying to meet the demand for support to public diplomacy, in particular, PSYOP expends resources in an area in which it has difficulty producing and measuring effects.  In doing so, attention is drawn away from the tactical mission it can perform to higher standards.  Finally, as discussed in the evidence, some PSYOP officers appear willing to accept lower standards for tactical PSYOP operations because they are focused on theater-level PSYOP in support of public diplomacy. In summary, PSYOP vision, doctrine, and mission statements that could easily be confused with mandates to conduct public diplomacy and public affairs are not helpful.  The broader Special Operations community clearly defines its primary missions and distinguishes between primary and collateral missions.  The study concludes that PSYOP would be well advised to do the same. First, doing so would allow PSYOP to cooperate better with other U.S. Government informational communication efforts, and second, it might contribute to more attention and higher standards for the tactical missions in which PSYOP has a comparative advantage (especially prudent, given PSYOP's meager resources).  Unless PSYOP benefits from a major expansion of resources, collateral missions ought to remain decidedly less important than the primary mission of changing adversary behavior to immediately benefit U.S. forces in the field.\n\n## Psyop Integration With Information Operations\n\nIssue. Joint doctrine and the *Information Operations Roadmap* direct that PSYOP be integrated with broader IO efforts.91  At issue is whether this integration actually benefits or weakens PSYOP and its effects.  Specifically, a major problem documented in OEF, OIF, and OIF 2 lessons learned is that IO planners did not sufficiently appreciate PSYOP capabilities or employ them appropriately and effectively because they did not adequately understand PSYOP. Secondary evidence of this problem cited the lack of guidance material to formally integrate IO. It was asserted that joint tactics, techniques, and procedures for information operations do not exist and that this contributed to the problem of PSYOP integration. Evidence. Some evidence indicates that integration with IO benefited PSYOP. Specifically, PSYOP profited from close collaboration with EW,92 military deception (MILDEC),93 and CNO.\n\nIn some cases, PSYOP professionals did a great deal of staff work to elicit the desired level of cooperation, but ultimately that cooperation was obtained.  Perhaps the cooperation between PSYOP and EW was most telling.  PSYOP broadcast over Iraqi radio nets with the assistance of EW assets apparently was highly demoralizing to the enemy. Unclassified accounts of PSYOP cooperation with MILDEC and CNO are mentioned in the public domain but are not discussed in this review.  However, it can be said that cooperation with computer network operations generally produced less satisfying results than cooperation with EW and MILDEC. In his autobiography, General Tommy Franks provided an example of PSYOP support for military deception during Operation *Desert Storm*:\nEvery night, psychological operations units drove trucks fitted with gigantic loudspeakers slowly back and forth along the border, playing recordings of clanking tanks and Bradleys.  And this ruse complemented another of our PSYOP efforts, which broadcast bogus radio transmissions mimicking several heavy divisions moving forward to their final pre-attack tactical assembly areas.94\nOverall, since PSYOP seemed to produce uneven levels of effects, 95 it is not possible to attribute any great success to its integration with IO.  On the other hand, there certainly is more evidence of the benefits of integration as opposed to the costs. Many PSYOP officers were irritated by suddenly having to work closely with and through newly designated IO officers.  In one case, an IO officer reportedly distributed a product without PSYOP expert input and outside the bounds of the normal PSYOP product approval process, with disastrous effects.96  However, the incident seems to be the exception that proves the rule:\nexceptional in that the IO officer was able to produce a PSYOP product without getting PSYOP input or going through the product approval process, but common in that the officer apparently was poorly informed on PSYOP principles and practices.  The many complaints from PSYOP generally reflected frustration with having to educate untrained IO officers (for example, on the capabilities and limitations of PSYOP ).97  Despite the irritation of working with poorly informed superiors, there is little evidence that doing so actually undermined PSYOP performance. Nor does that irritation seem to outweigh the benefits of working closely with the other IO core capabilities. Discussion. Work on the *Information Operations Roadmap* began in January 2003, a few months before the start of Operation *Iraqi Freedom*, and was completed in October 2003.  Even though OIF major combat operations were concluded before the *Roadmap* was finished, the Joint Staff, services, and CENTCOM knew early on that the document would require the integration of the five core IO areas.  They also knew that the Secretary of Defense strongly supported information operations.  Thus, it is fair to assume that information operations and, by extension, PSYOP, received more attention than previously would have been the case.  In this regard, the work on the *Roadmap* may have contributed to a higher level of integration between PSYOP and other IO core capabilities. However, it is also evident that the *Roadmap* recommendations on a career force of planners and specialists, and commensurate training and education initiatives, had not yet taken effect. Unsurprisingly, then, officers in charge of IO were not well informed on PSYOP or how to integrate the core IO capabilities. Allied PSYOP experts commenting on their own performance made observations similar to the conclusions reached in this report.  They noted that integration of PSYOP with IO helped PSYOP perform better by making it a more direct part of operational planning and attention but that IO officers needed to better understand PSYOP and on occasion retarded the ability of PSYOP to perform well.98\nConclusion. Based on the evidence collected, PSYOP integration with IO produced historically unprecedented levels of cooperation between PSYOP, EW, and CNO.  PSYOP also contributed to military deception to a lesser degree. Overall this integration was not to great effect, but it does bode well for the future if one believes in the vision of information operations as a core military capability.  There is no evidence that the integration hurt PSYOP performance other than wasting some staff time, which admittedly was a precious commodity. The *IO Roadmap* recommends the establishment of a career force, designated billets, and joint doctrine, education, and training to support the integration of IO components.  In the absence of these supporting elements, it is not surprising that PSYOP officers and soldiers were dismayed by the lack of respect and understandingreal or perceivedon the part of IO. PSYOP integration into IO can be expected to improve when the *Roadmap* recommendations are fully implemented and IO leaders are better educated and trained on IO, including PSYOP. Army assessments of performance in OIF and OIF 2 recommend that the service take IO as a wholeincluding PSYOPmore seriously.99  PSYOP professionals should also take IO\nseriously; they have little to lose and much to gain by doing so.  For years PSYOP lessons learned (and PSYOP leaders) noted that senior commander understanding was limited and that PSYOP often was excluded from planning until it was too late to make a major impact.  PSYOP integration within IO does not mean that PSYOP professionals will be more isolated from senior commanders.  On the contrary, inclusion in IO, which is gaining prominence in planning and operations (and by extension, in Army and Joint doctrine, education, and training),100 will permit PSYOP to overcome a historic tendency to undervalue its contributions.  Instead of insisting that PSYOP must operate independently in support of the combatant commander, PSYOP leaders should seize the opportunity to make it more effective by first integrating their efforts with the larger IO community and then using a dominant position to help ensure that information operations are well represented in all planning and operations conducted by combatant commanders. PSYOP personnel should have a prominent place in IO command slots and planning staffs for three reasons.  First, they are more numerous and more senior in rank than personnel in many of the other IO core capabilities.  Second, arguably with the exception of military deception, the PSYOP discipline benefits most from integration with other IO core competencies since PSYOP increasingly needs EW and CNO to disseminate products.  PSYOP already needs the other core elements of IO to reach target audiences, and that will be increasingly true as more people get their information from networks and electronic media. Loudspeakers and leaflets will always have their place, but PSYOP will not be effective in the future unless it can utilize assets that permit U.S. forces to dominate the electromagnetic spectrum, which will only be possible through robust IO capabilities.  Third, and unlike some other IO core capabilities, PSYOP officers are accustomed to command of personnel expert in both the hard and soft IO disciplines (human and electronic or automated decisionmaking) and to their integration in planning.  Thus, PSYOP officers appreciate how important it is to integrated technical and human decisionmaking competencies in order to create effects, which is true of IO as a whole. Yet PSYOP personnel generally prefer isolation from IO, largely in the unlikely hope that commanders will someday accord them a status similar to that held by public affairs. The increasing emphasis on standing joint headquarters and effects-based planning is more likely to force PSYOP to integrate into IO and IO into operations planning.  Attention to IO overall will depend on demonstrated ability to affect adversary human and automated decisionmaking processes.  PSYOP could use a prominent position within IO to ensure access to commanders, who in turn would be likely to pay attention to PSYOP when its effects are magnified by cooperation with other elements of IO.  However, if the response of PSYOP leaders to this report is any indication, finding personnel in the field who agree with this vision will be difficult. An impediment that tends to subordinate PSYOP to other concerns and obscure its importance within IO is its rank structure.  This is especially true since the Army still defines IO too broadly (and inconsistently with the *IO Roadmap*), including civil affairs and other disciplines as part of IO.  In comparison with intelligence, foreign area experts, public affairs, civil affairs, or other military occupational specialties, PSYOP officers are usually junior to their counterparts at every level of command.101 Refusing to participate in IO will only aggravate the problem.  It would be better for PSYOP personnel to report to trained IO commanders, many of whom would be PSYOP specialists or have background in PSYOP, than to report to officers from other military disciplines with no training in IO and with a narrower focus such as civil affairs or intelligence.\n\n## Quantity Of Psyop Planners\n\nIssue. A widely recognized problem in OIF was the insufficient number of PSYOP planners available to support component commanders. The lack of PSYOP planners was alleged to have contributed to poor planning and execution of PSYOP missions. Evidence. Specifically, the Combined Forces Air Component Commander (CFACC) and the Combined Forces Maritime Component Commander had insufficient PSYOP planning support within their respective commands. In the case of the CFACC, the absence of a PSYOP planner with the requisite wind model to assist targeting analysis for leaflet drops reportedly was a particular problem. Personnel eventually were found and the shortfalls were addressed, but not before component commanders felt their mission planning and execution had suffered. Only two to four planners were required in each component commander's headquarters. Given the small number of slots that had to be filled and the hundreds of PSYOP personnel ostensibly under the command of the JPOTF (albeit spread among Fort Bragg, Tampa, and forward operating locations), it is surprising that the requests were not filled sooner. Interviews with PSYOP officers revealed different possible explanations, all of which may have an element of validity.  Some felt that Fort Bragg, where the largest number of PSYOP staff officers were working on a broad range of global operations, was not sufficiently attuned to the demands of Iraq and had other contingency requirements to meet in Afghanistan, the Philippines, and other locations.  Others assert that PSYOP commanders, all Army officers, were less concerned with the needs of other services.  After all, some argued, none of the other services provide any trained PSYOP personnel of their own.102  Some believe that the JPOTF, intent on theater-level operations, was content to work as directly as possible with the combatant commander's operations staff and later with the coalition forces land component commander (CFLCC), once PSYOP product approval was delegated to him. Most believe, however, that there were simply too few PSYOP planners available, and especially too few with experience serving at component command headquarters. Discussion. None of the proffered explanations are necessarily contradictory, and all may have contributed to decisions on how PSYOP planners were allocated.  Given the generally acknowledged limitations on PSYOP force structure and numbers and the multiple demands placed upon the JPOTF, simply concluding that there were not enough bodies to go around would be easy. Although that would certainly seem true at one level, there is sufficient evidence to suggest that the delayed allocation of planners was also a simple matter of priorities.  There were only a handful of component commander planning jobs for which to account.  All or most of the positions were eventually filled, and, unlike the rushed planning for OEF, there had been substantial lead-time in planning for OIF.  The fact that PSYOP planning initially was delayed suggests that greater priority had been placed on theater-level than tactical-level missions in meeting component commander requirements.  This assessment is consistent with Fort Bragg's emphasis on product development and dissemination to theater via improved communication links, rather than forward-deploying actual planners in theater. Reportedly the JPOTF commander had only a handful of planning staff forward with him in theater, so meeting the component commander needs would have required deploying personnel from Fort Bragg. Conclusion. The good news for PSYOP personnel is that other service component commanders hold them in high esteem and complained forthrightly about not having sufficient numbers of planners. The fact that commanders believed this shortage had a significant negative impact on their operations means that the PSYOP contribution to the total mission is gaining greater recognition and appreciation and that PSYOP must be prepared to meet this demand in the future.  The creation of a Standing Joint Force Headquarters and standard operating procedures for integrating information operations in all combat operations would go a long way toward rendering this issue moot.  In such circumstances, PSYOP presumably would be integrated through a joint IO operations cell rather than through individual component commanders.  Until then, either the other services must offer up personnel for training in joint PSYOP or PSYOP must provide for them by forward-deploying more personnel from Fort Bragg to the theater.\n\n## Approval Process\n\nIssue. A dilatory PSYOP product approval process is detrimental to the execution of an effective campaign. A delayed process inhibits PSYOP planning and rehearsal time before operations begin, while slow approval during an actual campaign can render some military and political products useless, since they may be late to need or overcome by events (especially at the tactical level). Evidence. During OEF, OIF, and OIF 2, the product approval process was a continual issue of contention at multiple levels of command.  At the front end of OEF, poor communications between OSD Policy and the JPOTF led to several PSYOP products, particularly leaflets, being disapproved, and other products being delayed.  The JPOTF commander was surprised that his products would require Policy approval, and Policy was surprised that it could not get an early look at the products and their rationale.  Because senior officials were disappointed in the initial products, they insisted on reviewing all PSYOP themes and products before finally delegating authority to CENTCOM in November 2001.103\nFrom that point on, the combatant commander could approve his products as he saw fit, referring only those with substantial political content to OSD Policy for preview and approval.  This shifted the initiative to the combatant commander, who personally granted ready access to the JPOTF commander to facilitate faster product review and approval.  Later, for OIF, the combatant commander delegated approval authority to the CFLCC.  Initially, this decision had the result of slowing product approval again.  Then, after a period during which personal relationships and access between the JPOTF and the CFLCC were ironed out, the pace of the approval process accelerated.  However, it never was fast enough for the tactical commanders, who complained that getting products approved still took too long.  They wanted product approval delegated to the division level, the lowest level consistent with the Chairman's instruction on the subject.104\nNo one was pleased with the approval process.  Numerous interviews at all levels of command underscore the difficulty in obtaining timely approval of products.  Some of the evident frustrations concerning tardy product approval stem from the natural desire on the part of those responsible for product development to have nearly instantaneous approval of their creative efforts.  However, interviews revealed specific cases where a significant delay in  approval rendered the product useless.  Reportedly, many tactical PSYOP units simply decided to \"seek forgiveness rather than permission\" for products they were confident would not run any significant risk of blowback.  In some cases, commanders who valued PSYOP simply relabeled it \"command information\" in order to circumvent the approval process.105  Close allies working with U.S. PSYOP forces in the field also concluded in lessons learned that the U.S. approval process needed to be substantially improved. Joint doctrine notes the importance of rapid approval and recently was modified to provide guidance on the PSYOP approval process, including approval of objectives and themes as well as products.  Joint doctrine states that the Office of the Secretary of Defense must approve PSYOP objectives and themes but that normally the Secretary of Defense will delegate product approval to the supported combatant commander.  It adds the caveat that \"in some cases, PSYOP products may be politically sensitive and may require separate approval for dissemination.\" The combatant commander may delegate product approval authority to the Commander, Joint Task Force, but service or functional component commanders will not have product approval authority.106\nDiscussion. Product approval is a longstanding issue with PSYOP that has surfaced repeatedly in lessons learned from contingency operations since the 1980s. The trend over time has been to require ever-higher levels of approval.  Problems in Vietnam reportedly led to the decision to require PSYOP products being approved at no lower than the division level.107  The requirement for Pentagon approval of PSYOP programs came about in the 1980s as the result of  \"peacetime PSYOP\" programs when it was necessary to ensure that PSYOP was consistent with policy and other public diplomacy efforts.108  But more recently, increasing calls have been made to delegate PSYOP approval to the lowest levels possible, a point made in several of the informal lessons learned sources reviewed for this study. Approval of PSYOP products can be held up at almost any point in the chain of command. However, there are two junctures in recent operations at which most difficulties seem to reside: between Pentagon and the JPOTF, which represented the combatant commander and had immediate access to products, and between the JPOTF (representing the combatant commander's theater perspective) and tactical maneuver commanders who could define their immediate tactical PSYOP needs. The Pentagon and the JPOTF. All concerned agree that PSYOP products with political content (those that represent U.S. positions on either foreign or international political issues) ought to be consistent with U.S. policy.  The question is, who makes that determination?  If U.S. policy is static, and the combatant commander has a firm understanding of it regarding the use of military forces, why not delegate all PSYOP product approval to the combatant commander and allow him to decide which ones require a judgment call by officials in the Pentagon?  This approach makes sense if several conditions apply.  First, the policy ought to be stable, if not static, as might be true in short-duration major combat operations.  In such cases, one might argue that the major policy positions have been worked out well in advance of the conflict and are readily understood by the combatant commander and his staff.  In such circumstances, the value of keeping busy Pentagon officials out of the approval process might be judged to outweigh the risks involved in miscommunicating U.S. policy.  The risk would be especially tolerable if the preferred approach is to keep the theater PSYOP products supporting U.S. policy at a relatively high level of abstraction (that is, devoid of nuance or many supporting arguments). Some would argue that the lack of sophistication in PSYOP products overseen by military commanders instead of Policy officials would undermine their effectiveness.  Another view would be that it depends on the conflict and how controversial U.S. policy is.  Clearly, the theater-level PSYOP products in OEF benefited from national-level policy oversight, and they had more nuance; however, the goals of OEF were more complicated than those of OIF. A third position would be that justifying war is always a complex enterprise, and that in a global communications environment, a more sophisticated understanding and defense of U.S. decisions to use force will always pay dividends. For those who want theater PSYOP products to be as timely, detailed, and consistent with U.S. policy as possible, the preferred solution is not to cut Policy officials out of the approval process, but rather to elevate the profile of PSYOP and military information more generally in the Pentagon and make sure the approval process is executed with alacrity.  This approach has the advantage of ensuring that justifications for U.S. policies and actions are completely current and well coordinated with other information efforts of the U.S. Governmentespecially valuable in situations where policy can change rapidly or where the proper expression of policy positions requires an up-to-date understanding of the risks that the Government is willing to accept.  For example, in the case of OEF, the original PSYOP products were disapproved because they seemed to emphasize that U.S. bombings were punitive and directed against Afghans in general rather than al Qaeda in particular.  Moreover, the products had to evolve as U.S. policy swung in favor of eliminating the Taliban regime once it became apparent they would not cooperate in the fight against al Qaeda. The JPOTF and maneuver commanders. Just as there is general agreement that PSYOP products should be consistent with U.S. policy, there is also a consensus that products with low political or noncontroversial content should be delegated.  The questions are, what products fit that description, and how far down the command chain should they be delegated?  Recently, agreement has been reached on a list of preapproved programs with low or no political content that seem to be staples in the PSYOP repertoire: safety and public service messages, for example. Wherever possible, expanding this list of programs or, in some cases, specific products is advisable. The question of how far down the chain the approval process should be delegated is more problematic.  Some former JPOTF personnel interviewed raised serious objections to delegation to division commanders.  They argued that consistency in products needed to be assured across the theater.109  For example, if procedures for approaching a checkpoint are conducted differently by each division in OIF, Iraqis traveling across divisional boundaries might apply the wrong set of rules and inadvertently cause an incident.  On the other hand, maneuver commanders and some PSYOP personnel who supported them directly in recent operations argue that some PSYOP products must be tailored to the division commander's immediate needs.110  For example, in OIF 2, if insurgents were operating out of cemeteries, a local commander would need a message challenging that practice.  Alternatively, local commanders trying to control border infiltration would need messages tailored to that problem.  In short, good arguments can and are made for both consistency and diversity of products, depending on circumstances. Conclusion. The two basic approval issues are quality and policy consistency.  High-quality products that could produce desired effects must nonetheless be consistent with policy, and products that are consistent with policy need to be reviewed by expert opinion to increase the likelihood that they will produce desired effects. Unless the approval process is reformed at both the theater and tactical levels, PSYOP effectiveness will be seriously compromised. First, the risk of an occasional poor product must be accepted and mitigated with a rapid effects assessment and product revision process that limits the damage by quickly modifying and reissuing a better product. Also, the norm concerning decisions about quality should be to leave them to those most expert in the subject. Commanders and Pentagon officials should review products to determine whether they are consistent with policy and the general campaign plan, not to rule on whether the quality of the product is high enough.  At the same time, PSYOP personnel should be ready to explain in detail to commanders and policy officials precisely why they believe their product will achieve the desired effect.  This approach should be codified in policy and doctrine and resourced accordingly. Second, a general scheme for preapproval of tactical products should be adopted.  Building on recent experience and the success of recent efforts111 to preapprove products for some small contingency operations such as noncombatant evacuation, humanitarian, counterdrug, and maritime interdiction operations, a more discrete set of product categories with designated approval levels should be developed.  Table 51 gives one example of how this might be done. Third, at the theater level, the preferred solution is to make the Policy approval process more responsive.  The Under Secretary of Defense (Policy) should delegate the approval process to someone with day-to-day access to contingency policy who can review products in an expeditious manner.  PSYOP products that are not preapproved for delegation or that the JPOTF believes need review should be forwarded directly to the Pentagon with product control sheets, logged in with an expiration time after which their approval is assumed, and handled accordingly.  The sole responsibility of the Policy official charged with approval should be to check for policy consistency, not quality, which would be the duty of the combatant commander. For this approach to work, the JPOTF would require direct liaison authority with the Policy official responsible for product approvals to resolve outstanding issues quickly. This preferred solution presumes that the Pentagon can generate national-level themes and messages, as well as develop a process that allows for expeditious, interagency review of themes and messages on a recurring basis.  In the case of the war on terror, the national themes and messages need to differentiate between those broad themes that apply on a global basis and those that are region- or country-specific.  If, for political reasons, it is not possible to produce and regularly review national themes, then the value added by the Pentagon would not be high enough to justify its participation in product review.  The Policy guidance would be relatively static and at a high level of abstraction, and no better than whatever was approved originally in the combatant commander's plan.  Instead, the combatant commander should have the JPOTF (or whatever staff element he puts in charge of PSYOP) review and approve theater-level products intended for general audiences simply on the basis of guidelines approved in the contingency plan and updated periodically as necessary. As for tactical products, the same general process should apply.  PSYOP products that are not preapproved for dissemination by tactical commanders or that the PSYOP company commander believes need JPOTF review should be forwarded directly to the JPOTF with product control sheets and logged in with an expiration time after which their approval is assumed by the local commander.  In the case of tactical products, however, the JPOTF responsibility should be to check for policy consistency as well as minimum quality standards, since he presumably will have more resources for that purpose than individual PSYOP company commanders.  Obviously, the JPOTF should be attentive to tactical PSYOP insights on what is effective and share these insights across the theater.\n\nPSYOP Mission Categories\n(with subcategory examples)\nMajor Combat Operations\nStability Operations\nJPOTF with Pentagon approval\nJPOTF with Pentagon approval\nIsolating adversary from domestic and international support\n- Confer legitimacy on U.S. policy,\nobjectives, and actions\n- Diminish the adversary's legitimacy - Separate combatants from popular\nsupport\n- Encourage populace not to offer logistic\nand intelligence support to combatants (stability operations)\n- Support local and national authorities\n(stability operations); for example, recruiting posters for security forces\n- Public health and safety messages for\ngoodwill\n- Counter enemy propaganda\nDivision-level commanders with\nJPOTF with Pentagon approval\nReducing effectiveness of adversary forces\n- Demoralize enemy combatants - Degrade adversary's combat ability\nJPOTF approval\n-   Sow discord and distrust among enemy\n- Rewards programs - Encourage desertion and surrender\n(combat operations)\n- Encourage desertion, cooperation, and\nparticipation in amnesty programs (stability operations)\n- \"Wanted\" posters\n| JPOTF with Pentagon approval            | JPOTF with Pentagon approval   |\n|-----------------------------------------|--------------------------------|\n| Deterring escalation by                 |                                |\n| adversary's leadership                  |                                |\n| -                                       |                                |\n|                                         |                                |\n| Deter atrocities (stability operations) |                                |\n| -                                       |                                |\n|                                         |                                |\n| Deter geographic expansion              |                                |\n| -                                       |                                |\n|                                         |                                |\n| Deter WMD use  (combat operations)      |                                |\n| Division-level commanders with          | Division-level commanders with |\n\n## Minimizing Collateral Damage And Interference With U.S. Operations - Dissemination Of Safety Messages To\n\n| JPOTF approval                      |\n|-------------------------------------|\n| populace                            |\n| -                                   |\n|                                     |\n| How to avoid danger in proximity to |\n| operations                          |\n| -                                   |\n|                                     |\n| How to approach checkpoints         |\n| -                                   |\n|                                     |\n| How to obtain refugee assistance    |\n| -                                   |\n|                                     |\n| Mine and unexploded ordnance        |\n| awareness                           |\n| -                                   |\n|                                     |\n| Public health and sanitation        |\n\n## Theater- And Tactical-Level Psyop Forces Divide\n\nIssue. A gap exists between the missions and capabilities of theater-level and tactical-level PSYOP forces that undermines the effectiveness of the overall effort.  Tactical PSYOP forces, located predominantly in the reserves, are not as well equipped or trained as the Active Component, which is organized primarily to support theater-level PSYOP.  Tactical PSYOP, once on the move, cannot communicate readily with the JPOTF, which is overseeing the theaterlevel effort, and they have scant resources to actually produce and disseminate products to meet local requirements.  The JPOTF can deliver tactical products on behalf of tactical commanders, on a prioritized basis, but the commanders complain that products frequently are not timely enough or tailored to their needs.  Because of the communications gap, the JPOTF is not well informed by the tactical forces on the effects their products have on target audiences.  The gap between the mission focus, capabilities, and, ultimately, cooperative intent of theater and tactical PSYOP degrades the overall performance. Evidence. The JPOTF ostensibly is responsible for all PSYOP efforts, but its focus is on the theater PSYOP campaign.  It prepares theater products for general audiences (mainly radio messages, but also printed products) and tactical products that are produced and delivered to specific target audience segments by theater-level resources (primarily, but not exclusively, printed materials delivered by air).  The products for general audiences tend to be support to public diplomacy (that is, conveying the legitimacy of U.S. policy and objectives to the general population) and preplanned tactical operations that have longer planning timelines (for example, desertion and surrender of enemy forces). In contrast, the mission of tactical PSYOP forces, especially in major combat operations, concentrates more on the provision of time-sensitive, tailored messages of persuasion and support to emerging tactical operations.  The tactical forces work directly in support of individual tactical commanders, who often desire products that are tailored to their specific exigencies delivered on a very rapid timeline.  There are exceptions.  For example, tactical PSYOP forces can deliver products for general audiences that do not ask for specific behaviors, but rather attempt to change general attitudes or beliefs.  An example would be showing videos village by village that make a broad case in support of U.S. policy or handing out printed tracts that do the same.  This is more often the case in stability operations.  The norm, however, is for tactical PSYOP forces to use loudspeakers and limited quantities of printed materials to request specific behavior from target audiences to help the tactical commander produce the effects needed accomplish his mission more efficiently.  Tactical PSYOP products typically require more precise intelligence about enemy commanders and the morale of local adversaries. The theater and tactical PSYOP missions should be mutually reinforcing.  However, the fact that the theater forces control the majority of PSYOP product development and dissemination capabilities, are geographically removed from the tactical fight, and are responsible for theaterwide missions (which some PSYOP officers believe are inherently more important) has contributed to lack of attention to tactical PSYOP priorities.112   As a result, some maneuver commanders in recent operations complained that the JPOTF was too focused on theater PSYOP and not sufficiently supportive of their tactical requirements. Capabilities. The tactical force can produce simple messages for dissemination by loudspeaker, assuming the availability of linguists.  They can also produce limited quantities of printed material that can be delivered to the target audience by air assets that they do not control, or by personnel in the case of stability operations.  All other radio, television, and printed production and dissemination capability is controlled by the JPOTF at the theater level or is resident at Fort Bragg, far removed from the front lines.  The problem is particularly acute in fast-paced combat operations such as OIF, where embedded tactical reserve PSYOP battalions were ill prepared and equipped to meet the demands of the operation.  The same is true of the rapid, short-term combat phases of stability contingency operations such as Panama and Kosovo, where securing adversary compliance was a fast-paced affair. In Operation *Desert Storm*, however, where the lead time prior to ground operations was longer and PSYOP planning and product dissemination were conducted at a less hectic pace, the problem was less acute.  The same is true of many stability operations, where the situation evolves more slowly.  Yet even in slower-paced stability operations where timeliness is less of an issue, maneuver commanders have still complained about lack of products tailored to their needs.113  The PSYOP forces supporting tactical units have difficulty obtaining JPOTF-approved products that they could modify within approved limits.  Even when they succeed in doing so, they currently have no organic means of distribution other than hand delivery of such products (although they can appeal to the tactical units they support for helicopters or C130s to accomplish leaflet dissemination).  When one considers that PSYOP effects are more readily observed at the tactical level and that the comparative advantage of uniformed persuasive communicators is the leverage they get from the highly effective and coercive U.S. combat arms, the gap between the theater and tactical capabilities is particularly glaring. Cooperation.  The differing mission focus, reinforced by the discrepancies in capabilities, is further highlighted by geographic distance, disparate training regimes, and some natural tension between active and reserve forces.  The result is a commensurate decline in ability and willingness to cooperate.  For many of the tactical reserve units, the JPOTF did not provide any value added for their efforts.  The JPOTF was not able to maintain a secret Internet protocol routing network (SIPRNET) connection for tactical forces to transmit with approved products that could be modified and for relaying news of PSYOP efforts and effects elsewhere in the theater.  (As mentioned already, the JPOTF is a higher authority that controlled product approval and dissemination assets, which required periodic situation reports.)  Nor was it able to provide much assistance to the tactical units once operations were under way.  From the JPOTF point of view, the overall structure and intent of the campaign was largely a theater effort.  Since tactical PSYOP units have few assets with which to measure product effects and no communication devices to rapidly transmit images or files, they were not particularly important to watch closely, other than to report to higher authorities the disposition of forces on a daily basis.  Tactical-level PSYOP units receive high marks for their contribution to tactical intelligence.  They use their interaction with the local populace to facilitate collection of critical information that is especially valued during stability operations.  However, this information is fed directly to tactical commanders rather than through the JPOTF. Discussion. The gap that separates theater and tactical PSYOP forces, coupled with PSYOP- specific factors that contribute to this problem, hinders overall PSYOP effectiveness.  Maneuver commanders do not feel well supported with timely and tailored products that evolve based on discernible effects, and the JPOTF cannot take advantage of feedback that should be available from tactical PSYOP forces more directly in contact with target audiences.  The significance of the theater-tactical gap depends somewhat upon the type of military operation under way.  For example, with respect to timeliness, combat operations generally may require more timesensitive support.  However, in all operations, including stability operations, it is advantageous to move quickly when countering disinformation from the adversary, and it is always important to tailor products rapidly based on tactical needs and feedback about product effects.  In this regard, it would be correct to say that the theater-tactical gap remains significant regardless of the type of operation.114\nIn addition to mission and capability differences, several factors that deepen the theater-tactical gap also need to be underscored.  PSYOP force structure is one such factor.  Active duty forces are primarily assigned to theater-level operations and serve as the first tier of in-theater PSYOP specialists.  Four of the six active duty battalions are oriented to specific regions and designed to focus on product development.  Depending on where the contingency occurs, the relevant active duty battalion is tapped and supported by active duty dissemination and tactical battalions, both of which are chronically in short supply.  The reserve units are called upon to round out support to tactical-level operations and to reinforce the small amount of active duty tactical and dissemination capabilities.  Education, training, and force alignment of the Active Components are all oriented toward theater-level missions, while reserve forces are limited in the amount of training that they receive (typically, one week per month) and are thus directed toward tactical PSYOP missions, which require less training and preparation than functional and regional expertise.  Reserve PSYOP forces are more likely to experience equipment shortages and receive inadequate training, which further exacerbates the tension between those working theater and tactical PSYOP missions. Some of the imbalance in theater and tactical capability reflects force structure adjustments made in the late 1980s and early 1990s.  The PSYOP force structure of the Vietnam era was based on multipurpose battalions designed to operate at province level in a mature theater.  Each battalion had its own product development cell, tactical cell, intelligence and interrogation cells, and support capabilities such as motor pools and cooks.  Following the war, PSYOP units maintained the old organizational structure.  The Active Component 4th POG was given worldwide responsibilities, while the three Reserve Component groups were given regional orientations.\n\nThe reserve groups were assigned much later deployment dates than the 4th POG  and reported up through the reserve structure.  Their internal organization and roles were not deemed appropriate to meet the emerging threats of the 1990s or to execute sensitive peacetime missions.  This caused great concern among multiple agencies in Washington and was confusing to the theater commanders, as there were two different PSYOP commanders under two different commands operating in each theater. This roles and missions issue was solved when all PSYOP forces were placed under SOCOM.  During the process, one reserve group was deleted from the force structure for readiness and mission reasons, and the other two were placed under the 4th POG for peacetime operational control, which included coordinating authority.115\nIn the late 1980s and early 1990s, just as PSYOP was being integrated into SOCOM and lessons from the first Gulf War were being absorbed, PSYOP force structure was revised.  At that time, lessons learned indicated that excess forces were assigned to the theater level and dissemination missions but that there was a dramatic shortage of tactical forces, especially if there were multiple contingencies or requirements for troop rotations over long periods of time.  Tactical operations are people-intensive, whereas planning and product development functions are not.\n\nAs a result, the tactical cells in the 4th POG were combined to form one tactical PSYOP battalion in order to have an on-call force capable of early deployment and initial support of key units. Regionally oriented cells in theater-specific battalions accomplished theater planning and product development. Finally, the regionally oriented battalions were placed under a single group commander.  Dissemination functions (print, radio, television) were consolidated into a single battalion in the 4th POG, which maintained a close relationship with its sister Reserve Component battalion.  The reserve forces were converted to tactical units except for the dissemination battalion and an enemy prisoner of war battalion.  In addition to the force structure changes, a single product development center was established at Fort Bragg, and product development capabilities for the field were reduced on theory that the products could be electronically disseminated from this center to forward locations.\n\nThe goal of these changes was to improve the training and readiness of the active group.  The 4th POG commander could task-organize his forces depending on the contingency and combatant commander needs, and each battalion commander was able to focus on a narrowly defined set of skills instead of having to try to master divergent skill sets of small, habitually undermanned cells.  The reserves could focus on tactical skills, which are easier to master in the short amount of training time available to them than are product development and regional orientation skills.\n\nAccording to a former 4th POG commander who help institute force structure changes in the early 1990s, they improved efficiency in part by leveraging reachback capability and improving the readiness of limited force structure:\nThe concept developed in the late '80s /early '90s was for the 4th Group to provide theater-level planning, execute operational programs, meet theater joint coordination requirements, and develop and execute dissemination operations. There was a very limited capability to provide the initial tactical loudspeaker assets.  All but the loudspeaker functions could be accomplished by three or four cells in each area, and force structure was sufficient to do this. This concept would permit rotations of highly trained cells capable of executing theater-level missions.  The early and sustaining follow-on tactical level forces would come from the reserve component in battalion level and lower size units. . . . It was also part of the concept that dissemination and production requirements would be met primarily by contracting in theater or in CONUS [continental United States], thus reducing the number of deployed personnel requirements.  In addition, technology would be exploited to leverage creative programs and products that could be developed anywhere in the world.116\nThe force structure reforms of the 1990s were focused on theater operations and had the advantage of allowing the PSYOP commander to task-organize, which is routinely done. PSYOP personnel are often pulled from wherever they are and sent to support various missions regardless of regional orientation.  Similarly, a large amount of product development or dissemination capability to fit the contingency at hand can be dispatched as needed.117  The changes also ensured more tactical capability in the reserves.  However, active duty tactical PSYOP is still in short supply and remains less capable than it needs to be of supporting maneuver forces.  Some minor adjustments to permit more leaflet printing capability by tactical units were made after maneuver commanders in Bosnia complained about the lack of tactical capability, but the major adjustments of the late 1980s and 1990s remain in place.  As a result of the *Information Operations Roadmap* effort, SOCOM added an active PSYOP company in fiscal year (FY) 2004 and plans to add one active and four reserve regional PSYOP companies in FY05.118  These additions will not correct the shortfalls in tactical PSYOP, but they will increase manpower available for theater-level product development. Some argue that total PSYOP forces have an abundance of tactical capability, enough to support seven Army corps equivalents (at the ratio of one PSYOP tactical battalion per corps equivalent).119  However, six of the seven tactical battalions are in the reserves and cannot be called up repeatedly for extended deployments without affecting retention.  Moreover, as demand for PSYOP rises in the war on terrorism, the standing assumption that a tactical PSYOP company can support a division and a battalion can support a corps may need to be reconsidered. This could be particularly true as the Army transitions to a transformed force structure that is based on roughly brigade-sized units.  Finally, those who argue that there is more than enough tactical PSYOP are only looking at overall force structure, not demand for capability and actual PSYOP tactical capabilities.  There may be enough tactical PSYOP companies if the reserves are available for repeated and extended deployments, but demand for their services is growing, and their capability is meager. The scarcity of tactical PSYOP capability is reflected in part by recent decisions by the Marines to build their own resources.  After operations in Iraq demonstrated the need for more tactical PSYOP capability, the Marines requested additional support from the Army, which had to deny the request because the PSYOP force was overextended.  Therefore, to compensate for this limited tactical capability, the Marines took a series of initiatives designed to provide organic PSYOP capability for their forward-deployed forces.  In addition to officer training, the following steps have been taken recently or are under way:120\n\n- The Marine Corps established the 9955 PSYOP Officer Additional Military Occupational\nSpecialty to identify and track PSYOP-trained personnel.  Marine PSYOP officers will be sent to the U.S. Army PSYOP Officer Course at Fort Bragg.  U.S. Army PSYOP doctrinal publications have been dual-designated as USMC publications to ensure that Marines operate under existing TTPs in the joint arena.\n- Billets and force structure have been allocated to create a TPD of three TPTs at both I\nand II MEFs to provide sequential TPTs to deploy with the three Marine Expeditionary Units (MEUs) on each coast.  III MEF will get a single TPT to support its single MEU.\n- A memorandum of understanding between the USMC and SOCOM is being developed to\nfacilitate an ongoing relationship for training and operational support as TPTs are trained and deployed.\n- 24 MEU purchased a tactical loudspeaker system (SoundCommander 1000) for its\ncurrent deployment to Iraq.\n- 26 MEU purchased four SoundCommanders and designated tactical broadcast teams to\ndeploy each system.  These four teams were to be trained in November 2004 at Fort Bragg by U.S. Army PSYOP personnel to become proficient in basic PSYOP broadcast procedures and coordination of reachback support.\nIf the product development center at Fort Bragg could be made responsive to tactical forces and quickly turn products for them that could then be disseminated rapidly, the lack of tailored, timely products for maneuver commanders would be solved in part.  However, the product development center has proven less than responsive to requests from the field, and the tactical PSYOP forces have no organic means of disseminating products.  What is sometimes referred to as the *CNN central* concept, wherein Fort Bragg is the hub that feeds the tactical PSYOP units on the fly, remains an unfulfilled promise. Inadequate means of communication between the JPOTF and tactical PSYOP forces contribute substantially to the inability to exercise a Fort Bragg-central concept and to the theater-tactical gap more generally.  An absence of organic communication equipment within tactical PSYOP teams hampers their ability to share real-time information with theater-level assets.  The result is that they are largely cut off from the JPOTF when moving with tactical units.  Once the tactical maneuver unit stops and sets up communications, it can attempt to connect with the JPOTF. Transferring large files is difficult, however, and major products (especially video) must be hand-carried to the JPOTF.  The lack of rapid, high-bandwidth communications makes it difficult for tactical and theater PSYOP forces to cooperate, thereby degrading the situational awareness of each.  This issue can lead to uncoordinated or duplicated efforts and reduces the overall effectiveness of PSYOP campaigns.121\nConclusion. The gap between theater- and tactical-level PSYOP must be closed to improve its effectiveness for the combatant commander.  Many of the nonmateriel recommendations in this report, such as reforming the product approval process and minimizing the confusion over PSYOP mission boundaries, could help narrow the chasm.  In other cases, additional resources will be required, particularly in the area of mobile, tactical high-bandwidth communications. Organic communications equipment for tactical PSYOP that would enable reachback to the theater level would allow theater PSYOP efforts to benefit from tactical feedback on effects and would permit tactical forces to leverage theater-level situational awareness and products and secure rapid product approval.  Perhaps as important, tactical PSYOP must have its own deployable product development and dissemination capabilities if it is to keep pace with fastmoving maneuver forces. The question arises whether theater-level PSYOP to general audiences (often executed through resource-intensive radio, television, and newspapers) is as cost-effective as tactical PSYOP conducted primarily through sound systems and small, simple paper products. The theater general audience missions are conducted for supporting public diplomacy and minimizing collateral damage, along with encouraging noninterference with U.S. operations, which are among the generic PSYOP objectives for both major combat operations and stability operations:\n\n- isolating an adversary from domestic and international support - reducing the effectiveness of an adversary's forces - deterring escalation by adversarial leadership - minimizing collateral damage and encouraging noninterference with U.S. operations.\nThe first objective is much more critical to the success of stability operations where irregular forces depend upon support from the population.  This objective is executed at both the theater and tactical levels.  In fact, direct PSYOP appeals to target audiences at the tactical level are a critical contribution to success in stability operations, which is why excessive focus on the theater level hurts PSYOP performance in both major combat and stability operations.122\nHowever, theater-level PSYOP in support of stability operations is also necessary to reach the civilian population, and it is most resource-intensive at the theater level, where PSYOP must compete with better-established information enterprises via newspapers, radio, and television.123\nUnless PSYOP is operating in the immediate aftermath of a major combat operation when major media outlets are temporarily out of commission, or the political will exists to curb competition from competing information sources, PSYOP may have difficulty competing and being effective at the theater level when engaging broad audiences.  \"Fixing\" theater PSYOP products for general audiences will be expensive, but it is critical for success in stability operations. By contrast, tactical PSYOP products can make direct and powerful contributions to the second and third objectives, which pay much higher dividends in major combat operations where adversary forces have more combat power and escalation options.  These objectives are best pursued at the tactical level where PSYOP can attempt to affect the enemy decisionmaker directly as opposed to eroding his support base.124\nTactical PSYOP in support of major combat operations is more cost-effective and easier to fix but less critical for the success of the overall combat operation.  In contrast, theater PSYOP to general audiences is harder and more expensive to fix but more critical for the success of stability operations.  Given the other reforms necessary to make PSYOP effective at the theater level, senior leaders might want to consider focusing PSYOP on the tactical mission whether executed by forces controlled by the JPOTF or by tactical maneuver units.  Doing so would help reduce the variance in theater-tactical missions and lay the groundwork for greater cooperation between the JPOTF and tactical forces.  If senior leaders consider the theater PSYOP mission that targets a broader and more general audience worth the required expenditure of political and fiscal capital, it still may be advisable to have the theater product and content development capabilities moved to another entity so that the JPOTF could concentrate on supporting the tactical mission. The need to provide robust tactical capability should also influence the current force redesign effort.  PSYOP reorganization in the late 1980s allowed better task organization by contingency or training event, but it diminished tactical capability once engaged. Force structure redesign needs to safeguard the advantages of flexibility in a more modular design while increasing the strength of tactical PSYOP where the greatest effects can be achieved at the least cost.  PSYOP force redesign also needs to account for the transformation of Army units that PSYOP tactical forces will support.  Previously, a tactical PSYOP company (TPC), made up of 6070 personnel, was tasked to provide PSYOP support to a division-strength combat force. According to some accounts, U.S. Army transformation is leading to ground forces based on units of approximately brigade size but nonetheless covering areas of operation previously requiring division-size forces.  These new Army units will have a more robust information operations capability that includes PSYOP.  A TPC that supports a transformed brigade-size unit would need more robust capabilities than currently reside in a TPC, including:\n\n- organic communications with the JPOTF while moving - organic intelligence support, to include HUMINT collection and intelligence\nanalysis\n- contract linguist support - organic tactical dissemination capabilities.\n\n| Major Combat Operations           |   Stability Operations |\n|-----------------------------------|------------------------|\n|                                   |                      4 |\n| 3                                 |                        |\n| Theater                           |                        |\n| PSYOP                             |                        |\n| Less critical                     |                        |\n| Harder to fix                     |                        |\n| Resource-intensive                |                        |\n| Effects more obscure              |                        |\n| More critical                     |                        |\n| Harder to fix                     |                        |\n| Resource-intensive                |                        |\n| Effects more obscure              |                        |\n| 1                                 |                      2 |\n| Tactical                          |                        |\n| PSYOP                             |                        |\n| More critical                     |                        |\n| Fixing requires                   |                        |\n| adjustments to concept            |                        |\n| and doctrine as well as resources |                        |\n| Less critical                     |                        |\n| Easier to fix                     |                        |\n| PSYOP comparative                 |                        |\n| advantage (leveraging             |                        |\n| coercion)                         |                        |\n\nBeefing up TPCs with these capabilities would solve several problems.  The PSYOP teams attached to future Army units must have organic communications common to those units, including the Force XXI Battle Command, Brigade and Below program, tactical FM radios to work with the unit's IO cell, and the Army's Maneuver Control System Light to enable battalionlevel PSYOP to communicate with higher headquarters.  Tactical PSYOP companies will not be under the operational control of the JPOTF, but they still must be able to communicate with the JPOTF for products to be quickly transferred, modified, and approved.  Such additional communications would also allow both the TPC and the JPOTF to have better situation awareness.  The JPOTF will maintain a clear tactical picture of the battlefield as events unfold and will benefit from insights on product effects obtained at the tactical level.  The TPC will be well informed of successes and failures elsewhere and can remain current on themes and messages as plans change. Readily available, direct intelligence support to TPC operations will improve target audience analysis and product assessment.  Whether in the form of intelligence cells attached to the TPCs or through intelligence liaison officers who respond to their requests for intelligence, TPCs need dedicated intelligence support.  Both a HUMINT officer to exploit human sources and an intelligence analyst to liaison with diverse intelligence sources and build a composite picture of local enemy leaders, enemy morale, and public attitudes in his area of operations are critical to good, timely target audience analysis. TPCs should be funded so that they can contract for local linguists.  Proficient linguists are an absolute necessity for the proper translation of radio broadcast scripts and leaflet messages, for conducting loudspeaker operations in support of infantry units, and for distributing surveys to target audiences to assess PSYOP product effectiveness.  In the words of one PSYOP professional, \"Without linguist support, either assigned or available on requestPSYOP cannot function.\"125\nFinally, TPCs must be equipped with limited organic production (for example, Risographs) and dissemination capability.  Tactical PSYOP teams often will not have the luxury of contracting out printing jobs, and the ability to print small materials greatly facilitates timely delivery of messages.  As for dissemination, the need to coordinate efforts with print production teams, broadcast teams (both SOMSB and Commando Solo aircraft), and leaflet bomb deliveries from aircraft operating within their AOR to disseminate products increases the time required to deliver a PSYOP product to a target and thereby reduces its effectiveness.  TPCs needs some form of organic, rapid local product delivery other than hand distributionfor example, the Wind Supported Aerial Delivery System.  In addition, tactical PSYOP needs the ability to broadcast video directly to audiences, either to increase effects or to directly reach illiterates who otherwise would have to rely on third-party interpretations of printed materials.126\nPSYOP should be willing to restructure to provide more of this kind of capability to future ground forces.  The Army intends to reorganize its fighting force into a structure consisting of 48 brigades.  If PSYOP planned on providing one TPC per brigade, it would require 48 TPCs in the active and reserve PSYOP battalions.  If each TPC is assigned 6070 personnel, PSYOP would need between 2,880 and 3,360 personnel. Currently, active and reserve PSYOP personnel total 3,935, so the reorganization is within the realm of the possible. However, it might have to come at the expense of some theater product development capability, which is where most of the active duty force resides.  This may be acceptable for two reasons. First, organizing most of PSYOP active duty structure around regions may be inefficient.  A general regional orientation may be less relevant than a general cultural or functional orientation for two reasons.  PSYOP force structure is so limited that personnel often are asked to perform in contingencies outside of their region.  In addition, the level of knowledge of target audiences provided by regional orientation is insufficient to produce high-quality products.  It provides a small running start at target audience analysis, but rapid in-depth study of local culture from open and classified sources prior to deployment (as is the habit of the Marines) is needed in any case.  Once on the scene, this must be augmented with detailed, persistent, and ongoing target audience analysis and assessment at both the theater and tactical level.  Second, other recommendations in this report would help compensate for this diminution of regional expertisefor example, the redesign of the SDD, and the amalgamation of the JPSE in Tampa, Florida, with the Media Production Center (MPC) at Fort Bragg.\n\n## Psyop Tactical Force Structure\n\nPSYOP Tactical Force Structure Tactical PSYOP\nBattalion HHC\nTactical PSYOP\nTactical PSYOP\nTactical PSYOP\nHQ Company Company Company Company Product Development Detachment Tactical PSYOP\nTactical PSYOP\nTactical PSYOP\nDetachment Detachment Detachment Tactical PSYOP\nTactical PSYOP\nTactical PSYOP\nTeam Team Team\n\n## Quality Of Psyop Products\n\nIssue. A recurrent complaint throughout the operations reviewed by this study concerns the quality of psychological operations products.  Specifically, according to both the JFCOM and 4th POG lessons learned, CENTCOM leaders were unhappy with the quality, timeliness, and sophistication of PSYOP products.127  In discussions on this issue in interviews, emails, and the informal survey distributed for this study, many PSYOP professionals responded to these complaints about quality by noting that what matters is what the target audience thinks and whether the product works.  They often use the analogy that \"the bait smells good to the fish and not necessarily to the fisherman,\" implying that PSYOP products may still be effective even if senior officers do not find them appealing for one reason or another.  The question at hand is whether PSYOP products are not appreciated by those without the requisite training to evaluate them, or whether there is a need for improvement. Evidence and discussion. Assuming that the most important determinant of quality is effects, PSYOP products present a mixed picture for two reasons.  First, as noted earlier, the correlation between PSYOP efforts and adversary behavior is spotty, ranging from a strong correlation to none at all.  We conclude that PSYOP demonstrated some ability to generate effects, especially at the tactical level, where the audience is limited, a specific behavior is requested, and coercion or appeals to emotion are heavily leveraged.  Loudspeaker operations and surrender leaflets show a closer correlation between product and effect, for example, than did leaflets warning against the use of WMD or destruction of oil wells.  As is usually the case, convincing evidence of PSYOP effects could not be found at the theater level, where the audience is more general and amorphous and the message less distinct.  One might argue that the muted reaction of the Afghan population to the coalition presence suggested an effective PSYOP campaign, but this conclusion would be speculative. Second, PSYOP effects are inherently difficult to measure.  Therefore, other criteria that can reasonably be considered indicators of quality must be examined, such as product sophistication (including timing, credibility, and cultural sensitivity) and quality of inputs (including education and training of personnel, intelligence, and analytic support).  These criteria can be considered as they apply to the overall PSYOP campaign and process and with respect to the quality of specific, individual products. Campaign quality. Effects can be assessed, and any good PSYOP campaign will go to extraordinary lengths to do so.  Enemy prisoner of war interviews and PSYOP face-to-face contacts provide information.  Physical evidence of effectiveness is also possible, such as leaflets found near abandoned equipment, evidence of attempts to follow PSYOP instructions, or immediate reaction to loudspeaker operations.  Generally, however, PSYOP does not have resources like those in the commercial sector to conduct extensive product testing, focus groups, and market surveys; nor does it have freedom of movement in nonpermissive or semipermissive environments.  Operational circumstances often will permit such product testing and feedback, however, and conducting it is simply a question of resources, training, and initiative. An example of how such market surveying can be used to good advantage was provided during OIF 2.  A division in southern Iraq was commended for using an operational analysis cell to develop and analyze measures of effectiveness covering the full spectrum of operations but emphasizing information activities.  The unit used weekly surveys to query population samples throughout the area of operations and to analyze the trends over time.  This continuous Iraqi attitude survey was conducted by an independent civilian scientific research organization.  This model had two advantages: the research organization provides trained, dedicated personnel to perform the task, and since they are not in the unit's chain of command, the organization can be an honest broker.128\nThe general lack of feedback on the effectiveness of past campaigns and products, combined with limited resources, undermines the quality of the overall PSYOP effort, as do other process shortcomings.  For example, the most straightforward complaint received about the larger PSYOP campaign was that the tactical units never really understood the campaign planthat is, the information that breaks down objectives into supporting objectives with different target audiences, appropriate themes and messages, and the necessary development and timing of products.  According to one PSYOP officer:\nEvery operation must be nested to support a higher intent.  When you have no higher intent, you are left on your own to do what seems best for your area.  This probably causes a lot of unnecessary redundancy in products and I cannot imagine how a POTF [psychological operations task force] can ensure it is meeting the commander's intent or progressing to the desired end state when there is no coherent idea what the different sectors are trying to accomplish.  There is no single Web site you can go to and find all the products for the region.  Ideally, these would be linked to the various programs and series if there were any.129\nComplaints such as this come from senior PSYOP officers, including battalion commanders, and are not just a prejudice resident in tactical PSYOP detachments.  Evidence of the weak planning is found in the lack of specificity in the product control sheets that chart the logic from product dissemination to anticipated effect.  In order to create an effective campaign, each product should be compared to the overall campaign objectives to determine whether the product supports the objective, has properly conveyed the core message, and is likely to result in the desired outcome. This should be an ongoing process, with revisions to both the campaigns and products as information and intelligence dictate. The PSYOP product control sheet should serve the purpose of linking products to overarching objectives, but the study's review of numerous samples indicates that it typically does not.  The sheets are not structured to ensure anticipated effects are clearly described and linked to knowledge of the target audience and the specific product attributes.  A review of products in the specified operations showed generally loose correlations between combatant commanders' and PSYOP objectives, and between PSYOP objectives and the specific product attributes.  They do not generally indicate the best means of dissemination to reach the target audience, nor do they address the issue of timing the message delivery.  In a 1999 article, Major Stephen C. Larsen suggested using product worksheets based on graphic design principles and specific to media dissemination means.  He noted, \"Without specificity, the doctrinal [Product/Action Worksheet]\nleaves too much for interpretation and does not support specific product development.\"130\nAnother key element of the campaign, intelligence support, is lacking, especially to the degree necessary to fully inform target audience analysis.  One respondent to this study's survey complained about the lack of cultural awareness in the field and the need to have intelligence support forward.  The 4th POG's Strategic Studies Detachment provides a high volume of general utility reports that help orient PSYOP personnel to the general cultural milieu in which they will be operating and that are generally useful for broad audience products.  However, as a result, the Strategic Studies Detachment is not able to devote as much time to specific target group analysis in support of tactical products, including product testing.131  When its personnel have deployed to support operations, their expertise has been found to be invaluable.132\nIn general, the historic pattern of PSYOP's relationship with intelligencethat PSYOP provides more intelligence than it receiveswas replicated in recent operations.  Tactical units were able to collect critical intelligence to pass on to their commanders, which was considered quite valuable.  In the past, this information often failed to make it to higher headquarters.133  This seemed likely to be the case in recent operations as well, given the communication gaps between tactical and theater PSYOP forces.  However, interviews with PSYOP personnel and a recent Army report indicated that PSYOP tactical intelligence was received and highly valued all the way up the chain of command and even in the Pentagon.134\nMore detrimental, though, has been the limited amount of intelligence support received by PSYOP units.  This is most likely a consequence of the fact that there is no dedicated PSYOP intelligence section in theater to support the PSYOP mission, which seriously impairs its ability to function most effectively.  Again, this lesson reflects past experience as well.135  The rationale behind having dedicated intelligence support in theater is that the PSYOP mission needs and intelligence requirements are not well understood by intelligence units, which means that PSYOP is given a low priority.  For example, PSYOP forces received little intelligence about specific enemy commanders, their predilections, and their decisionmaking environment, and no dedicated intelligence on the effects of products.  PSYOP battalions have intelligence officers, but they may not deploy if their battalions are simultaneously supporting multiple units deployed to different regions on different missions.136\nAnother characteristic of a good PSYOP campaign is effective timing, especially for tactical products or counter-disinformation products for general audiences.  Messages that either solicit capitulation from enemy commanders or warn them against escalation must be carefully timed to hit the target when it is most vulnerable to such appeals.  This requires a good understanding of the extant morale of adversary forces and the means to deliver PSYOP products at precisely the right moment.  In OIF, capitulation messages were poorly timed, having been delivered too late to be effective in some instances and too early in others.137  Evidence indicates that the factors that led to a failure in timing were the approval process and the limited means of product delivery. The priority of kinetic over nonkinetic bombs and the lack of organic delivery means limited the commander's ability to get the message out when it was most needed.\n\nFinally, PSYOP often lacks an organized red-teaming effort to improve product quality138 and assist with damage limitation when effects go awry.  PSYOP products can produce untoward effects among the target audiences but also may produce unintended blowback from domestic or international audiences.  Operation *Urgent Fury* in Grenada provides a classic example of a product that was effective in a local target audience but had unintended blowback elsewhere.  In this operation, a photograph of a black New Jewel leader seated naked on a chair with only a towel draped across his lap and a white PSYOP soldier standing over him was disseminated as a poster across Grenada to demonstrate to the populace that they should no longer fear their former leaders.  Although the photograph generated little negative reaction from the Grenada populace, a subsequent feature of the photo in the *Washington Post* resulted in accusations of racism perpetrated by the U.S. military. In general, PSYOP products tend toward the safe side to avoid potential blowback in the international media.  As noted above, the Pentagon and PSYOP leadership should recognize that some element of political risk is always associated with PSYOP products.  After taking reasonable steps to ensure consistency with national themes, the best PSYOP can do is be prepared to react quickly to failed messages and products.  Systematic red-teaming of products, with the requisite cultural and linguistic expertise, can improve products on the front end by eliminating obvious errors.  On the back end, red-teaming improves the overall quality of the effort by better preparing the PSYOP team to react quickly to unfortunate effects or enemy countermessages. Product quality.  The overall process can be assessed for the presence of all requisite steps generally required for product success, but the question of individual product quality remains. The examination of all PSYOP products in OEF and OIF, and some of those used in OIF 2, indicates that the majority of them are exceedingly straightforward and demonstrate little guile or cultural specificity.  While some may attempt to manipulate emotions with appeals to \"think of your family,\" most make a simple, direct appeal to self-interest: surrender or die.  Many PSYOP products are, in effect, public service messageshow to make potable water, avoid mines, ensure sanitation, obtain vaccines, and so forth. Many PSYOP products lacked target audience specificity and could be used anywhere with minor modifications.  In OIF, for example, only about half of the surrender products were targeted to specific units, and the majority of products were not culturally specific.  Printed products made little effort to persuade Iraqi soldiers or civilians that the U.S. mission and presence were legitimate.  Radio scripts conveyed messages justifying U.S. military presence but may not have used arguments that would most impress the Iraqi population, which had been suffering under UN sanctions.  The messages generally argued that the United States had a legal right to enforce the sanctions or informed the population that Saddam Hussein was a dictator and bad leader. How did PSYOP's simple and straightforward products actually work?  Anecdotal evidence, combined with a review of OEF, OIF and OIF 2 products, reveals both successful and failed products and illustrates the importance of following PSYOP procedures and industry best practices.  Successful products can be defined as those with messages that correlated with subsequent adversary behavior (reviewed in section 3 in this report).  We learn more about quality issues by examining products that obviously failed to achieve their intended effects. Examples of miscues in OEF products show low quality of translation and lack of message verification.  The initial PSYOP capitulation messages were widely cited as a product that failed to adequately assess its target audience.  Some argue that the capitulation concept was forced on PSYOP planners by Pentagon authorities who wanted to avoid the legal obligations involved with prisoners of war.  Others note that regardless of origin, the leaflets tried to communicate instructions that were nearly impossible to comply with (although there is some photographic evidence that a small number of Iraqi units did form up in squares, adopting the non-hostile posture requested of them).  The upshot, however, is that in many cases, \"The target audience did not easily understand [capitulation] messages that were delivered,\"139 a failure that must be attributed to an inadequate understanding of the target audience. Some product problems can be linked to uncertainty over U.S. policy and unanticipated political ramifications from messages that are not precisely crafted.  An example of questionable message development in some leaflets was the linking of humanitarian assistance to information on terrorists and insurgents.  This would be a legitimate message for some, especially if it portrayed the difficulty of providing aid as an unintentional byproduct of a poor security environment rather than a punitive tactic.  In any case, the message in question inadvertently linked information about insurgents directly to the receipt of aid from nongovernmental organizations, which elicited a negative response from aid donors, the press, and allied observers.140\nOther product failures were due to inadequate translation.  A handbill designed to close down illegal checkpoints ended up closing all checkpoints because of a translation error.  In OIF 2, one example of product failure was a poorand uncheckedArabic translation of a handbill that had intended to warn the populace to stay clear of the area where a U.S. unit was registering mortars.  Instead, the handbill told the audience that the troops were shooting mortars because they could and that the people should stay in their homes.141  The level of Arabic language used in OIF translations was criticized as \"juvenile and patronizing to the local population.\"142  These examples are from recent operations, but there is evidence that poor translation is an enduring problem for PSYOP.143\nThe problem of inadequate linguists is a resource issue, not a personnel management issue.  In other words, PSYOP forces must be able to contract for fluent native speakers; they cannot compensate by improving their own limited linguistic skills.  A 1996 RAND research project highlighted the difficulty of providing qualified linguists from organic sources.  In 1995, PSYOP and Civil Affairs could meet less than 10 percent of their requirements for qualified linguists. However, the problem was due not to recruiting or retention but rather to inappropriate use of those linguists in the force (with less than half serving in positions requiring foreign language proficiency, and less than 10 percent occupying positions requiring their specific language) and to dramatic shifts in requirements:\nShifting requirements appear to cause the shortages and poor utilization. Substantial changes in language requirements, both in number and in mix, were a major factor in the discrepancy between requirements and capability.  The number of linguist requirements for civil affairs units grew from 457 in fiscal year 1993 to 1,347 in fiscal year 1995.  The mix was also turbulent. For example, the requirements for Arabic speakers in psychological operations units went from zero in fiscal year 1993 to 157 in fiscal year 1995, while those for Russian speakers fell from 225 to 61 during the same period.  Changes of this magnitude are difficult for any unit to accommodate and virtually impossible for reserve component units.144\nThe RAND report was concerned with language skills resident within the PSYOP force, since personnel need minimum levels of foreign language proficiency to work effectively in a crosscultural milieu and with the native populace.  But the report, now almost 10 years old, also highlights some enduring facts about the PSYOP enterprise: namely, that it is hard to predict requirements in advance and hard to align language-qualified personnel with appropriate assignments within the PSYOP force.  These limitations remain in effect and underscore the need for flexible contract support.145\nIn addition to fundamental translation problems, a general comment across Afghanistan and Iraq was that PSYOP products used an abundance of photos and clip art, which suited Western culture more than the local culture.  Using such prepared graphics often is easier than developing a good illustrated product that will be easily discernible to the local population.  Some allied observers, in particular, noted that PSYOP lacks the flexibility to produce simple illustrations and drawings, relying too heavily on computer graphics and clip art.146\nCopyright restrictions are another factor severely limiting the quality (and quantity) of PSYOP products.  Were PSYOP forces free to use copyrighted products such as wire service photos, political cartoons, news stories, and commercial radio and television broadcasts without the usual legal and financial restrictions, their burden in creating timely products of high quality would be eased.  With PSYOP properly delimited to support for military operations in conflict environments, it should be possible to obtain voluntary or legal relief from copyright laws. Overall quality factors. Another means of assessing quality is to look at the inputs, particularly the training and functional expertise of PSYOP forces.  Assuming all other factors are equal, high-quality inputs should lead to higher quality output.  In the case of PSYOP products, the quality input is the creativity and skill of the individual PSYOP product developer.  PSYOP soldiers, whether active or reserve, do not typically join the PSYOP career track with a background in communications or graphic design.  The average age of a PSYOP enlisted solider is about 30 years old, and more than 90 percent are limited to a high school education.147  They generally have about 10 years of training in infantry or some other combat-related field before they enter the PSYOP field and are given a short introductory course in PSYOP. PSYOP training covers a lot in a short period.  PSYOPS Officer Basic Course is 9 weeks long and teaches basic soldiering skills, including tactics, maintenance, and operational aspects of processes, systems, and equipment used in a PSYOPS platoon.  Advanced Individual Training is 9 to 24 weeks long.  It includes loudspeaker training, a short tactical field training exercise, land navigation, and a few days of target audience analysis as well as other subjects.  Perhaps the most glaring deficiencies in the training regimen are functional expertise in general and target audience analysis in particular.  Teaching persuasive communication skills principles and techniques for developing and assessing product effectiveness simply requires more time.  In fact, many would argue that dedicated civilian support is required for this reason.148\nThe Army's cooperative master's degree program with Troy State University was a positive source of functional expertise in the PSYOP training regimen, but it is no longer available. The study was unable to determine what percentage of PSYOP officers had actually earned advanced degrees in either persuasive communication or international relations, but it was noted that many chose not to continue in the PSYOP career field in spite of the investment in their formal training.  Also, the members of the Strategic Studies Detachment lack functional communications expertise to complement their knowledge in regional and cultural areas, so they do not provide PSYOP with an authoritative source of functional expertise.  Finally, based on surveys administered for this study, it appears that only a small number of PSYOP reserve forces have civilian jobs in the communications industry.  To compensate, PSYOP soldiers seek out hands-on training, which in the past has included printing at the Document Automation and Production Service, broadcasting training at the Armed Forces Radio and Television Service, 2- week courses at  Industrial Light and Magic in Hollywood, and internships at CNN and National Public Radio. One important qualitative indicator of PSYOP campaign and product quality is the personal assessment of PSYOP officers themselves.  While noting that PSYOP can contribute a lot for the relatively low cost of these forces, PSYOP soldiers noted candidly in interviews that there is room for improvement in quality.  This sentiment is not a recent development. Citing after-action reviews from Bosnia, a PSYOP officer writes, \"PSYOP messages were bland, ineffective, and not properly targeted to the local population.\"149  Those with private sector marketing skills and those leaving after many years of service are the most critical of current capabilities and practices.  These individuals also cite the need for additional resources that would enrich individual products and contribute to an improved campaign process overall. Conclusions. PSYOP produces some effects for a small resource investment.  Even so, there is unquestionably room for improvement in the quality of the overall PSYOP campaign, standard PSYOP processes, and individual products.  To summarize the priority areas for improvement, we refer to the conclusions in section 2 of this report on industry standards for best practices.\n\n- Integrated and sophisticated campaign. Generally, PSYOP campaign planning:\no only vaguely links products and assessments of their effects to an overarching\nstrategy\no poorly balances theater and tactical PSYOP and does not provide for constant\ncommunication between the two to allow sharing of updated objectives and assessments of effects\no cannot fully benefit from coordination with public diplomacy and public affairs\nefforts, both because it alienates these disciplines by insisting on references to strategic PSYOP and because there is no coordination vehicle for national strategic communications\no does encourage *relationship-building* promotional activities where target audiences\nare particularly resistant to PSYOP messages, both through face-to-face PSYOP and in support of civil affairs (where local commanders are receptive to such initiatives)\no generally receives high marks for tactical PSYOP efforts to establish contacts within\nlocal communities, although these efforts are more for the purpose of obtaining intelligence than exploiting alternative advocacy channels.\n- Quality process: PSYOP processes emphasize a timely, repetitive planning process that\nincludes intelligence gathering, target audience analysis, product development, media selection, media production, dissemination, and assessment of results to inform the next\ncycle of product development. However, PSYOP does not have the resources and talent to execute these processes robustly. More specifically, PSYOP processes:\n\no do not emphasize the logical connection between objectives, products, and intended\neffects, both because the product control sheets lack specificity and because they lack the resources to assess product effects\no do not have access to deep functional expertise in persuasive communications o do not maintain long-term historical knowledge of PSYOP efforts and effects with\ncivilian staff or contractors to inform its practices\no do not emphasize the importance of careful attention to timing of product delivery\n(even though PSYOP cannot control timing in many cases anyway)\no do not have access to simple, field-ready templates that summarize knowledge of\neffective techniques in a comprehensible, user-friendly format\no do not undertake extraordinary efforts to compensate for lack of predeployment\naccess to target audiences and do not have the resources to develop deep understanding of the target audiences' culture and subcultures after deployment\no do not conduct ongoing qualitative assessments of effects, backed by quantitative\nmeasures wherever possible.\n- Quality products and inputs: PSYOP TTPs provide good general guidelines in their\nmanual to ensure product quality. However, a key component of qualityhighly trained, seasoned, and expert personnelis not available to PSYOP forces.\nThe quality of the overall campaign would improve greatly if PSYOP could benefit from national themes and rapid approval processes. Barring these difficult-to-achieve goals, the most immediate means of improving product quality are better tactical target audience analysis (and supporting intelligence) and access to high-quality translation capabilities. Beyond these pressing needs, the quickest way to improve PSYOP quality would be to address the following factors:\n\n- tactical dissemination capability to improve timeliness (and audience reach and impact) - need for graphic artists - responsive tactical production capability - communications linking tactical and theater PSYOP forces - quality of theater-level, general audience radio and TV products - training in PSYOP campaign process.\nThese improvements can be facilitated at less cost to the PSYOP community in several ways. For example, allied PYSOP experts commenting on U.S. performance observed that what appeared to be poor target audience analysis by PSYOP forces was, in some cases, a function of having to please general officers who imposed their own notions of quality on a product without the benefit on understanding the local audience.150 Fixing the approval process as recommended elsewhere in this report would minimize this problem. Also, the Strategic Studies Detachment might provide stronger tactical support to PSYOP soldiers without additional resources and with some retooling or reorientation. Currently it is focused on broad area studies and analyses instead of tactical support, where PSYOP needs the most help.151 In addition, better prioritization and utilization of current resources could contribute. Finally, legislative action allowing for the specific and narrow use of copyrighted material during combat and perhaps during stabilization operations should be explored. All these measures notwithstanding, the improvements identified above will require more resources. In general, PSYOP doctrine and tactics, techniques, and procedures, including the articulated sixpart process (intelligence gathering, target audience analysis, product development, media selection, media production, and dissemination)152 suggest that the community understands the necessary ingredients of a high-quality effort. As noted above, the process could be further improved with greater attention to red-teaming, timing of product dissemination, quality product control sheets, better target audience analysis, and easily useable product templates for field use. Putting more functional expertise at the disposal of PSYOP forces would help as well. But whether it is a question of recruitment, training, or additional funding for field analyses and translation services, PSYOP simply lacks the resources to make a significant improvement in quality. This is not to say that if PSYOP leadership is given additional resources, it would necessarily know how to best prioritize for their program needs or to invest them in improvements with the best rate of return.\n\n## Specific Resourcing Shortfalls And Equipment Performance Issues\n\nIssue. Numerous lessons learned, especially from the 4th Psychological Operations Group, pointed out that PSYOP suffered from specific resourcing shortfalls that had a direct and deleterious impact on its ability to complete its assigned missions. At issue is how seriously these shortfalls affected performance. Evidence.  The perennial question is not whether networking and interoperability were realized and proved useful, but whether there was enough networking and whether it connected all the nodes of communications (or at least the right nodes at the right times). Technology allowed the JPOTF to operate in Fort Bragg, Tampa, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Iraq, Diego Garcia, Afghanistan, and the Horn of Africa. The JPOTF had many assets at its disposal:  satellite connectivity via PSYOP Product Distribution System (PDS) and Joint In-Theater Injection SystemReceive Only (JITIRO) associated with SOMSB and Commando Solo aircraft, secure phones, and SIPRNET. These elements could receive audio only, audio/visual, and print products electronically via satellite from Fort Bragg, where they were produced. The 4th POG's formal lesson learned report states:  \"No longer does a JPOTF have to deploy in total. This ultimately conserves the resources and personnel. The PSYOP 'reachback' doctrine has been fully realized.\" On the other hand, the case can easily be made that this conclusion is overstated. Army Special Operations Forces lessons learned indicated that the Fort Bragg-to-JPOTF connections lacked dedicated, large-bandwidth, secure satellite access that in turn constrained the JPOTF ability to transmit timely, high-quality audio-visual products. (This problem was exacerbated by the lack of consistent funding for satellite contracts to facilitate reachback, but the problem was resolved late in the process.) In addition, the informal comments of the SOCOM conference documents indicate that collocation with CENTCOM Headquarters and Operations Directorate was essential to the JPOTF in order to have access to the communications backbone linking the theater command to CONUS. This conclusion suggests that organic PSYOP reachback capability was not sufficient and that the JPOTF relied on CENTCOM's communications structure. Other shortcomings hampered reachback as well:\n\n- 4th POG lacked a dedicated Joint Warfighting Intelligence Communications System video\nteleconferencing suite, which prevented the unit and the JPOTF from communicating with other government organizations quickly and securely\n- SOMSB software was not fully interoperable; during reachback, data and video could\nnot be transferred electronically between the Product Distribution Facility and the Mobile\nTelevision Broadcast System.153\nMoreover, the optimistic conclusion about reachback capability between Fort Bragg and the JPOTF does not extend to the connectivity between the JPOTF and tactical units, either directly or through the company commander. The 4th POG lessons learned indicate that connectivity was not easily available, and the results of this research found the gap between theater and tactical PSYOP forces to be a major problem. Interoperability is a key part of networking and can only be achieved by paying close attention to system architecture and configuration management as technology and attrition make acquisition of new systems necessary or desirable. Again, it is difficult to measure how much of it is present and how much of it is necessary. From the discussion above, it is evident that many systems were indeed interoperable and information did flow between Fort Bragg and JPOTF systems but that shortcomings were identified nonetheless. Shortfall in ability to disseminate radio and television in denied areas. PSYOP has a limited ability to target large areas with radio or TV broadcasts. These mass media capabilities were especially necessary during stability operations154 and will be required should it be determined that PSYOP will provide theater-wide dissemination support to public diplomacy. This experience reconfirms lessons learned from previous contingencies and discussed in some detail in a 2000 Defense Science Board (DSB) report.155\nThe Commando Solo aircraft currently is the only stand-off, high-altitude means available to PSYOP forces to disseminate information to large denied areas. Two orbits were established during OIF, one in the northern area and one in the southern part of the country, both far enough from harm's way to keep the aircraft out of reach of potential enemy attack. At their operational altitude of 18,000 feet and assuming clear channels, these aircraft can transmit radio and TV signals approximately 170 miles, which does not reach the objective areas near Baghdad. Straightforward physics dictate the range, given the power installed and the antenna configuration and assuming clear channels. The enhanced altitude capability of the Commando Solo EC130J (now funded) is increasing transmitter range. While this is an improvement over 130E capability, it is a small step, since the increase in altitude is only 7,000 feet (less than 50 percent) and the range increase is governed by a square root function (that is, a 14 percent increase in range). The PSYOP Global Reach ACTD is addressing area dissemination concerns as a primary pursuit. It is investigating various unmanned vehicles that may meet the requirement. Initial broadcast payload and unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) integration is being conducted on the WSADS UAV. This system can carry up to 575 pounds (or increase its range by reducing payload weight) into denied areas. Tactical PSYOP shortfalls. A review of several unofficial and official PSYOP mission execution lessons learned studies from OEF and OIF questioned the adequacy of PSYOP tactical equipment. In particular, the following needs were identified:\n\n- electronic news gathering kits (secure) - up-armored HMMWVs - forward product development equipment - M4 assault rifles and M9 pistols - pool of family of loudspeakers (FOLs) - ruggedized laptops.\nNo military unit is ever equipped to the point that additional or better gear is not desired, but the question here is one of adequacy of equipment to meet mission needs. Notably, all items identified above are associated with the tactical arm of PSYOP, the part that interacts with the enemy in the most direct way and in the most forward battle lines. These shortfalls exacerbate and probably also reflect the theater-tactical gap discussed elsewhere in this report. Discussion. PSYOP would benefit from a national capability to seize control of an adversary communication infrastructure without much, or possibly any, physical destruction.  PSYOP forces could then use these production and dissemination capabilities in the aftermath of the major combat operations or for supporting stability operations. Factors involved in developing such a capability are discussed in the classified annex to this report. Clearly, this is another area where PSYOP can benefit from a close association with electronic warfare and computer network operations. The ideal situation would be for these capabilities to work together to provide early electromagnetic spectrum dominance in a manner analogous to the proven strategy of rapidly defeating enemy air defenses.\n\no While not a PSYOP mission per se, the objective of seizing an adversary's\ncommunications networks is a desirable capability that affects calculations of PSYOP resources and generally suggests a growing demand for PSYOP services. PSYOP forces would need to be capable of manning these assets and would have to participate in planning that identified which facilities would be most useful.\n- Shortfalls in fungible resources for quality processes and products:  As noted in the\nsection of the report on quality (page 101), the quickest way to improve PSYOP quality is to provide more funding for the following:\no native-language translators\no tactical dissemination capability to improve timeliness, audience reach, and impact\n(in particular, the WSADS for all PSYOP companies and a successor to the AN/MSQ-85B for video dissemination)\no target audience analysis on the fly, including intelligence support156\no graphic artists o responsive production capability (more forward printing capability with PSYOP\ncompanies or sufficient responsiveness from the Media Operations Center at Fort Bragg, which would require around-the-clock battle staffing, expanded staff, and adequate reachback communications)\no training in campaign processes.\nNone of these shortfalls individually is crippling, with the possible exception of the inadequate linguistic support and target audience analysis, which together appear responsible for more PSYOP misfires than any other factors. However, taken together, they seriously degrade the quality of the overall PSYOP effort as well as individual products. Conclusions and recommendations. Several conclusions may be drawn from this review of specific shortfalls. Some of the most egregious theater shortfalls are being addressed by SOCOM's ACTD, which is a major boost in both funding and technological content. The leavebehind residuals will provide capability not now available, tools for further experimentation, and a possible avenue to an acquisition program. However, the ACTD will not deliver capability in the short term, nor will it address all the specific shortfalls. In addition, since the SOCOM requirements generation process and the analyses of concepts and system alternatives pit PSYOP systems against higher SOCOM and service priorities, it is unlikely that it will deliver adequate capability to PSYOP forces absent intervention by OSD.  Shortfalls that are not covered by the ACTD should be addressed under separate initiatives such as the following.\n\n- Shortfalls in tactical forces equipment and fungible resources for quality processes and\nproducts:  Elsewhere, this report reviewed the significance of a theater-tactical gap in PSYOP missions and capabilities and the means to improve the quality of PSYOP\nproducts. Conclusions from those reviews substantiate the need for additional resources in both areas.  However, absent a detailed action plan for comprehensive reform of PSYOP from SOCOM, additional investments in this area may not be warranted.  The likelihood that PSYOP can generate substantially improved battlefield effects without such a plan is small.  The single exception to this general observation would be funding for linguists, which could reasonably be expected to make an immediate and positive impact on the overall quality of products.\n\n- Expanding joint dissemination capabilities:  As the military services develop concepts\nand requirements for new platforms, PSYOP broadcast and leaflet delivery requirements should be considered as a potential capability for each platform.  While it is unlikely (and probably undesirable) that all will address this need, it should be possible to ensure that a few of the platforms have some of the requisite capability.\n- Reachback, interoperability, and theater-tactical communications links:  Interoperability\nis a key part of networking and can only be achieved fully by paying close attention to system architecture and configuration management as technology and attrition make acquisition of new systems necessary or desirable.  From the discussion above, it is evident that many systems were indeed interoperable and information did flow between Fort Bragg and JPOTF systems but that communication with forward forces was broken. In particular, the inability of the maneuver commanders to communicate directly with the JPOTF contributed to the slowdown of PSYOP product approval and production. Consequently, SOCOM should take a broad architectural look at the PSYOP assets and assure that their connectivity and interoperability reflect the mission assigned to PSYOP, all nodes of the network have connectivity appropriate to the mission, and vigorous configuration management ensures interoperability among issues of equipment at all echelons.\n- Temporary suppression of adversary communications: A team of national laboratories,\nled by Lincoln Laboratories and supported by service laboratories, should initiate an urgent examination of the technical challenges involved in this mission area. This effort should address what types of media need to be countered; identify alternative system vulnerabilities that might be exploited by differing techniques; identify potentially viable countermeasure techniques; summarize existing U.S. countermeasure capabilities for addressing each medium; and inform leadership on uncertainties or risks. The team should be guided in its efforts by the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics [USD(AT&L)]-chartered electronic warfare Integrated Product Team and should report out in 120 days to the electronic warfare Executive Steering Group.  Upon receipt of the analysis, USD(AT&L) should identify a lead service to complete an analysis of alternatives of promising technical capabilities or systems within 120 days.  Identified alternatives should be considered for implementation by a focus area Defense Acquisition Board no later than October FY05.\n\n## General Underresourcing Of Psyop And Its Impact\n\nIssue. A common observation about PSYOP is that it does not have enough resources to do its assigned missions.  Specific resource shortfalls were examined in the preceding section.  The issue here is whether PSYOP is so systematically underfunded that it either cannot fulfill its mission or is forced to cut corners in ways that have multiple and cross-cutting negative effects on mission execution.  In short, the question is whether decisionmakers should consider a wholesale increase in resources for PSYOP or just examine individual, specific shortfalls that are particularly egregious. Evidence. PSYOP is a minuscule part of the special operations major force program element managed by SOCOM and a fraction of the total DOD obligation authority.  SOCOM's total obligation authority is about $6.5 billion (not including contributions from the services), which is about 1.5 percent of the total DOD budget.  The SOCOM investment budget (about $2 billion) represents roughly the same percentage (1.5 percent) of the Department's overall investment.  In turn, PSYOP acquisition funding is 1 percent of SOCOM's investment account.  These figures are useful as background, but they hardly address the issue of whether PSYOP has sufficient resources to do its mission. PSYOP's small share of the SOCOM budget might simply reflect the fact that other types of special operations are much more resource-intensive.  Since PSYOP is such an anomalous capability, however, it cannot be compared directly with the Special Forces mission, nor can its funding be measured against other special operations forces budgets. A more appropriate comparison for general funding levels would be with the Armed Forces Information Service (AFIS), which oversees the Armed Forces Radio and Television Service (AFRTS).  Both PSYOP and AFIS rely on diverse communication technology to relay their messages to directed audiences.  PSYOP targets foreign audiences, whereas AFRTS broadcasts to U.S. military personnel stationed overseas.  AFIS is currently budgeted to spend roughly two and a half times as much per annum as PSYOP (approximately $125 million compared with $50 million).  AFIS spends an estimated $23 million each year on global satellite connectivity.  In comparison, PSYOP spends only $2 million on satellite connections, primarily to the JPOTF.157\nGiven that AFIS can leverage a well-established civilian infrastructure (overwhelmingly through contracting), whereas PSYOP must be prepared to move on short order, produce materials in foreign languages and cultures, and disseminate in austere environments and denied areas, the variance in Department funding is particularly notable.  Not surprisingly, the difference in funding seems to produce differing capabilities.  For example, AFRTS was able to broadcast to and from Baghdad, while PSYOP was limited in that regard.  AFRTS has no trouble broadcasting around the clock. Capability to execute the defense strategy.  However, the broader issue of whether PSYOP is resourced to meet standard Department mission definitions can be addressed.  The current DOD defense strategy requires the military to be able to swiftly defeat two regional adversaries in overlapping timeframes, as well as support ongoing stability operations, deter WMD use, and defend the homeland.  Although not always officially designated as such, PSYOP was generally considered a high-demand, low-density asset for most of the 1990s.  Indeed, the recent Army decision to expand its force structure acknowledges the historic stress on PSYOP.  Since the new defense strategy requires PSYOP to support even more concurrent missions, a prima facie argument may be made that it is underresourced in terms of force structure.  This argument could also be extended to equipping the PSYOP force.  Instead of the two Psychological Operations Broadcast Systems (POBS) needed to support operations in two different theaters, PSYOP to date only has been able to budget for one. However, the SOCOM 2006 Program Objective Memorandum (POM) reportedly will add a second POBS.  In effect, this is an admission that PSYOP is not capable of supporting two overlapping conflicts.  Instead, as happened when OEF and OIF overlapped, PSYOP must largely withdraw at least its major equipment items from one theater in order to engage in another. Capability to execute doctrinal PSYOP missions.  General Pentagon contingency planning factors and joint doctrine158 require PSYOP to be able to produce and distribute the full range of products in denied space, in a timely manner, in two overlapping conflicts.  PSYOP cannot execute within these doctrinal parameters. PSYOP also comes up short with respect to the need to produce and deliver timely products to broad and specific audiences in denied space.  Lessons learned from multiple sources plainly indicate that PSYOP is not able to generate the radio and especially not the television content for round-the-clock operations, nor would it be capable of disseminating such content if it were able to produce it.  The Media Operations Center at Fort Bragg lacked the proper equipment and personnel to broadcast from CONUS.  By way of contrast, coalition forces were able to produce quality broadcasts from in-theater, and the AFIS and AFRTS were able to reach military forces stationed overseas.  Finally, as the previous discussion of lessons learned indicates, PSYOP cannot disseminate tactical products in a timely fashion, especially not in support of fast-moving ground operations. Dissemination of products in denied areas.  PSYOP has limited ability to target large areas with radio or TV broadcasts.159 Commando Solo aircraft are the currently available PSYOP capability for standoff, high-altitude dissemination to large denied areas. The two operational SOMSBs possess a broadcast range of 400 kilometers (km) AM, 64 km FM, and 1,600 km short wave. They would not be able to effectively transmit messages over 1,090,542 square km of the operational terrain in Iraq and Afghanistan (applying the two-conflict metric to recent contingencies). JFCOM and CENTCOM reports also noted that the JPOTF has limited capability to produce TV programming.  No live broadcasting in Arabic meant delays in time-sensitive messages.  There appeared to have been some expectation that the Joint Staff or other organizations of the U.S. Government would provide 6 hours of world news television programming per day, although this was not provided.  By comparison, the United Kingdom provided world news programming within 2 weeks of request submission through its liaison office.  The British Broadcasting Company and Sky News produced a 1-hour program in Arabic, costing the United Kingdom $15,000 per day. A thoughtful and candid reply on this subject from one PSYOP officer is worth quoting at length, since it amply demonstrates the type of resources required to produce around-the-clock radio and television broadcasting and reaches appropriate conclusions about their absence and how to rectify the shortfall:\nIt takes an immense amount of resources to produce TV programming, both in people, time, and creativity. . . . any local [TV] channel normally has a few hundred people running their studio. A good example is WRAL, a CBS affiliate out of Raleigh, North Carolina.  They have 38 on-air and 206 behind-the-scenes personnel.  It takes all of these people to produce the live news, weather, and sports for the station which . . . produces 4.5 hours of live news per day and 3 hours of community service programming per week.  Additionally, the station produces commercials for clients, their own promotional videos, and public service announcements.  By comparison, the entire third PSYOP Battalion B Co[mpany] (the Company that does the TV and radio production) only has 70- something soldiers.  And all of these soldiers are not dedicated to producing TV. . . . If we expect PSYOP task forces to produce 24-hour coverage, we need to have the commensurate resources dedicated to that.  I am not convinced DOD has that commitment. On the creativity portion of the producing TV challenge: our soldiers are very well trained in the actual operation of the TV production equipment.  We have state-of-the-art equipment equal to what they have in Hollywood as far as nonlinear editing, etc.  Our cameras are a little behind but suitable for the mission. The greatest challenge is creativity.  The film industry pays huge salaries to get that creativity.  While we in the military can train the soldiers on how to operate the equipment, I have not broken the code on ensuring we have enough people that really have experience in developing films and producing state of the art programming.  Contracting this portion of the mission may be the solution. . . . These employees of commercial stations are trained professionals with on the average of 1014 years of experience in local broadcasting.  The youngest employees are usually college educated and start at the most basic level of television to gain experience.  The difference in the level of training of PSYOP soldiers and of civilians is not in training on equipment but the experience gained by producing TV every day for a number of years. . . . SOCOM has invested in world-class equipment and the skills of the soldiers need to keep pace with the advances in technology that have taken place.  Serious consideration should be given to commercializing . . . production requirements.  Through contracting, producers, directors, and other technicians can be hired on an as-needed basis to produce world-class products in support of the war on terrorism.160\nCapability to keep pace with emerging information sources.  Another indication of whether PSYOP is adequately resourced on a macro level is whether it is modernizing to keep up with adversary and general technology trends.  In May 2000, the Defense Science Board issued an excellent report161 that indicates PSYOP is not staying abreast of emerging technologies increasingly available to target audiences.  The DSB task force reviewed the various technological trends for mass media dissemination and then specifically addressed the dissemination of radio and TV from aircraft.  According to the task force, technology is moving toward systems and means of dissemination that are not favorable to the PSYOP equipment inventory in general and Commando Solo in particular.  (See section 6 on technology and equipment for additional details.) Catastrophic failures or systematic unsatisfactory performance.  The failure of PSYOP forces or equipment to perform well across the board could be taken as evidence of systemic underresourcing.  This was not the case in terms of quality of product or effects generated. However, the study also reviewed whether equipment failed at an alarming rate.  Equipment failed in OEF and OIF due to the climate and operating environment in both Afghanistan and Iraq (see appendices C and D).  A significant amount of the current inventories of tactical PSYOP equipment is purchased as commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) and is not ruggedized to meet the requirements of combat and extreme weather conditions.  Some specific examples include compact disc players and power generators that were rendered useless with the penetration of dust and sand.  Damaged equipment could not readily be replaced due to lack of funding.  For example, the modular print systems (MPS) located in-theater broke down repeatedly due to sand clogging the hoses inside the gas generator.162\nIn some cases, insufficient training in the use of PSYOP equipment apparently compounded equipment problems.  Although PSYOP specialists are required to complete a 16-week course, the training focus is more on PSYOP education, skills, and procedures than on equipment maintenance and operation.  The only pieces of equipment that soldiers are trained on initially are loudspeaker systems and leaflet bombs.163  Maintenance and usage training for PSYOP\nequipment is taught at most for 2 weeks.  After that training, soldiers do not see or review that piece of equipment until they reach theater.  There is no complete review to test soldiers'\ncomprehension on all PSYOP equipment. 164  Because of insufficient time to train and familiarize themselves with equipment, operators sometimes misused the limited quantity of PSYOP resources that were available, thereby adding to the failure rate of PSYOP equipment.  The problem is further exacerbated by training of reserve forces on outdated or cannibalized equipment and by the short mobilization time for reserve forces.165\nThe reported performance profile of individual equipment systems indicates that the equipment was used more intensively than envisioned and in an environment that exceeded the design specifications.  This raises the question of whether reliance on COTS equipment is appropriate in all cases of PSYOP equipment acquisition.  COTS is a quick solution and a very effective way to keep introducing new technology at the rate delivered by industry.  However, comparing the total life cycle cost of a series of COTS systems to meet a mission to the cost of a (presumably) smaller number of custom-made, more serviceable equipment could be revealing.  One would then also have to balance the cost of configuration management required for logistics and for ensuring interoperability against the benefit of new technology introduction.  PSYOP typically lacks the necessary funding to conduct these types of studies.  In fact, interviews and funding figures indicate that PSYOP's research, development, test, and evaluation (RDT&E) funding is so small and irregular that COTS equipment is used to compensate. Discussion. Some SOCOM leaders and past leaders of the PSYOP community caution against a blanket observation that PSYOP is systemically underresourced.  They argue that PSYOP receives adequate resources and that the community often fails to put those resources to good use.166  They observe that in the early 1990s, PSYOP budgets were elevated and all O&M\nrequirements were met.  The study team was unable to verify this because it could not obtain copies of past PSYOP budgets.  However, two observations seem pertinent. First, the additional resources allegedly provided to PSYOP in the early 1990s may well have produced commensurate improvements in performance.  This might explain why appreciation for the effects PSYOP could produce grew over the same period.  It also is possible that the spate of stability operations that the United States conducted in the 1990s simply underscored the importance of PSYOP for success in those operations.  And of course, both might be true: PSYOP was improved and performed better in stability operations where its contributions were considered critical to success. Second, it may be generally true that PSYOP resource planning could be improved. Some authoritative observers with intimate experience in PSYOP planning claim that this is the case.167\nThe situation could be remedied by having a detailed, concrete plan with funding estimates before allocating significant additional resources to PSYOP, something that this report recommends. The evidence and arguments made here suggest the need for a major increase if PSYOP is expected to meet the general planning factors outlined by the defense strategy. Marginal improvements in resource management, however necessary they may be, will not solve the problem. Another indication that current capability is insufficient to meet demand is the decision by other services to build their own organic PSYOP capability.  The services normally do not volunteer to meet requirements that a lead service already provides.  However, since Army capability has proven insufficient to meet demand, the Marines168 are investigating means to increase their organic capability to execute PSYOP.  After recent operations in Iraq demonstrated the need for more tactical PSYOP capability, the Marines requested additional support from the Army, which could not be provided because the force was overextended.  Consequently, the Marines decided to build some tactical PSYOP force structure.  The Navy allowed its ships to support PSYOP in recent operations but does not yet appear inclined to institutionalize those capabilities or procedures.169  Navy ships were able to broadcast short wave radio messages into southern Iraq from the Persian Gulf, and the USS *Constellation* provided leaflet production with its on-board, high-speed, multicolor printer and dissemination via F/A18s using the newly certified Product Development Unit 5 leaflet bombs.  The Air Force, like the Navy, is looking at PSYOP capability in a broader vein and proposing using the full range of air and space capabilities as psychological instruments of influence.170\nConclusion. PSYOP personnel interviewed typically insisted that PSYOP completed all assigned missions in recent operations but that it could benefit from significant resource increases.  The two assertions are not consistent.  Either PSYOP can complete all existing missions at current resource levels, or it cannot and some risk is accepted as an alternative to full mission capability. We conclude that the latter is true. PSYOP forces have made extraordinary efforts to produce effects for combatant commanders, but over the course of the 1990s, their reputation for producing effects, and consequently the demand for their services, has grown.  As was the case throughout the 1990s, PSYOP cannot currently meet the requirements of the defense strategy. It cannot fulfill its missions as laid out in doctrine, and it is falling behind competitors and general technology trends.  Its general funding level does not compare favorably with that of AFIS, suggesting that DOD places more importance on keeping its own forces well informed of world events and domestic debate than on generating information effects in adversary decisionmakers, combatants, and supporting populations. To compensate, PSYOP has spread its capabilities thinly.  Forces cannot really make theater broadcasts to general audiences, but a substantial amount of resources are poured into a marginal capability for that mission (no around-the-clock radio/TV content and limited dissemination capability).  Personnel have a more comprehensive ability to conduct tactical PSYOP missions but cannot meet the demands of maneuver commanders for timely, tailored products.  In both theater and tactical PSYOP areas, the community is falling behind the technological trends.  The conclusion of this report is that while better PSYOP planning and resource management may be necessary and certainly would be desirable, there is simply no way to meet mission requirements and substantially improve the quality of PSYOP products and the ability to produce effects without a substantial increase in resources.  A tripling of the PSYOP budget would put it on par with AFIS, which seems like a reasonable starting point assuming the PSYOP community can produce a detailed reform and implementation plan to correct identified shortfalls.\n\n## 6. Technology And Equipment\n\nPart of the mandate for this report was to assess whether PSYOP sufficiently exploits technology to accomplish its mission, and whether more could be done in this regard.  To make this determination, this section of the report provides an overview of current PYSOP equipment and capabilities; reviews SOCOM processes for establishing requirements and developing PSYOP programs; reviews extant opportunities to exploit technology, particularly the ACTD and Defense Science Board recommendations in this area; and draws appropriate conclusions.\n\n## Current Psyop Equipment\n\nFigure 61 is a depiction of the taxonomy of the various pieces of equipment, and figure 62 is a graphic of their disposition in CONUS or in theater.  Appendix B provides a more detailed description of the equipment with some specifications for each and, in some cases, a picture. Equipment stationed in CONUS.  The Media Operations Center at Fort Bragg supplies the JPOTF with a higher quality and larger quantity of PSYOP products than what can be produced with deployable PSYOP assets.  For example, the deployable print production center in theater consists of a Risograph printer, which is a two-tone printer capable of printing 93,000 copies a day. In contrast, the MPC's four Heidelberg print press machines can print 1,188,000 copies an hour.  The center has the capability of producing audio, video, and print products for broadcast and dissemination in combatant regions.  The products are provided through satellite communications (up-linking) or by shipment to theater.\n\n## Current Psyop Acquisition Programs\n\nTheater-level equipment.  In-theater equipment used during OEF, OIF, and OIF 2 included:\n\n- Modular Print Systems (MPSs), which contain heavy print press machines (HPPMs) - Deployable Print Production Centers (DPPCs), which contain Risographs - JITI systems - EC130E Commando Solo aircraft - Special Operations Media System Bravo (SOMSB) audio and video system - AN/MSQ85B, a mobile audio/visual system.\nThe Modular Print System is a compartmentalized, mobile print plant for in-theater production. It is generally deployed in a truck and trailer combination and uses HPPMs to print multicolor products.  Some HPPMs are used on board Navy ships as well. A DPPC is similar to but smaller than an MPS. It is deployed on HMMWVs and uses Risograph systems that produce two-color print products.  Both MPSs and DPPCs have to carry a gas generator to power the equipment. JITI systems located at Fort Bragg and in theater have two-way and one-way communication capability with Commando Solo aircraft and SOMSB systems in the field. PSYOP forces sent audio and video products to and from the theater with the system. A recent addition to the inventory, the Production Distribution System (PDS), uses recently developed improved video compression techniques to transmit information between systems in theater and in CONUS while using significantly less bandwidth. The SOMSB consists of four HMMWVs outfitted with radio and video broadcast equipment. In this configuration, the vehicles serve as broadcasting studios that can produce audio and video for or of events in theater through the use of its Deployable Audio Production System (DAPS). The Commando Solo EC130E aircraft flies orbits suitable for broadcasting audio and video PSYOP products.  Like the SOMSB, the Commando Solo uses the DAPS to create and broadcast content. For large audience broadcasts, an AN/MSQ85B Mobile Audio-Visual Information Collection and Dissemination system is used. It is a mobile audio and video recorder and transmitter designed to gather intelligence and broadcast audiovisual products.  The system, which is also outfitted with a family of loudspeakers, is antiquated and arguably no longer fit for use.171\nTactical unit equipment.  Tactical PSYOP forces have a set of vehicle-mounted loudspeakers from the family of loudspeakers systems that are designed to broadcast messages.  This speaker system is also mounted on manpacks so that individual soldiers can play prerecorded PSYOP messages wherever they go.  The majority of their recordings are on mini disc players that are connected to the loudspeakers.  Tactical PSYOP groups also carry news gathering kits that consist of a digital camera and camcorder to gather information. In the future, tactical units should have more routine access to leaflet delivery systems that are able to fly over target areas and drop leaflets.  These deployment systems can be bombs or remotely controlled UAVs.  Currently, not enough prototypes exist to be routinely supplied to tactical PSYOP units.  Similarly, the units need video dissemination capabilities to present audiovisual messages directly to local audiences.172\n\n## Observations About Current Equipment\n\nThe overarching observation from this review is that PSYOP is not effectively keeping pace with a rapidly evolving communications industry.  With the exception of the PDS and the WSADS, PSYOP is using increasingly dated technology.  The May 2000 DSB report173 on PSYOP\nunderscores this observation.  The DSB task force reviewed the various technological trends for mass media dissemination and then specifically addressed the dissemination of radio and TV from aircraft.  According to the task force, technology is moving toward systems and means of dissemination that are not favorable to the PSYOP equipment inventory in general and Commando Solo in particular.  The DSB report includes a table (reproduced in appendix F) of the various distribution methods made available by the new technologies and the possible associated content, but the following trends are especially noteworthy:\n\n- Cable transmission is quickly becoming the preferred mode for (terrestrial) television in\nmost developing countries.  High-definition television seems to be the next improvement for the medium.  Currently, it is transmitted in both analog and digital protocols.  The task force believes that transition to the digital format is inevitable.  Both cable and digital transmission are incompatible with Commando Solo equipment.\n- Radio is also quickly converting to digital transmission mode, making it incompatible\nwith Commando Solo as well.\n- Space-based television and radio are becoming popular in the developing world, and their\ntransmission method is also creating problems for PSYOP equipment.  It is mostly digital, quite directional (which would require very special positioning of Commando Solo or other equipment), and uses frequencies not used by existing PSYOP equipment.\n- Telephony is also expanding rapidly and is becoming adept at incorporating multimedia\ncapabilities in its cellular structure.  This may be an area that can be exploited with new\nequipment.174\n\n## Socom Processes\n\nThe ability of PYSOP to exploit technology is in part a function of the requirements, acquisition, and program management processes in effect at SOCOM.  These processes are described below with a view toward illuminating their impact on PSYOP programs. The requirements process.  SOCOM follows DOD guidelines (CJCSI 3710, DOD 5000, and the new Planning, Programming, and Budgeting Execution System).  However, they have adapted the directives and regulations to reflect the fact that their budget is quite small compared to budgets of the military departments (MILDEPs). Requirements are reviewed and validated annually, and an investment plan is prepared.  As CJCSI 3710 requires, a capabilities-based approach, the Capabilities Integration and Development System (CIDS), is implemented: first developing a force that meets all requirements at low risk, then applying fiscal constraints and prioritizing, recognizing assumed risk.  Modeling software is used to assist in the preparation of plans, with careful review of the assumptions and results by the staff.  Finally, a review by the board of directors, the most senior military and civilian leaders, occurs after the conclusion of the four major steps of the process.  Thus, the warfighters are key participants in the formulation, review, and approval of the annual plan that results in the POM and budget.  In summary, the requirements process follows the DOD sequence of validation with final approval for specific efforts by the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC)-equivalent, which results in a balanced portfolio across the command. Analyses to support CIDS and acquisition.  The analysis of requirements and the execution of analysis of alternatives (AOAs) are supported by a very small budget$1.6 million for FY04 (for some specific programs, MILDEPs may support the AOAs).  This permits only one or two major analyses and a few AOAs a year for the entire SOCOM;  even with that limited number, the cost per AOA is very small compared to ones funded by the MILDEPs.  (While making comparisons with the MILDEPs is difficult due to the annual variability of the need for AOAs, it is safe to say that the SOCOM budget is disproportionately low.)  The analyses are usually carried out by external entities (some by federally funded research and development centers). The limited budget translates to less than one study per year for PSYOP: for example, in FY01, a Long Range Broadcast System Feasibility Analysis, and in FY02, a functional analysis of IO requirements for the entire SOCOM (with ramifications for PSYOP).  Therefore, given little external analytical support, assessing requirements and reviewing options must be done by SOCOM's own PSYOP staff.  These circumstances force the staff to fend for themselves by gaining some knowledge of the options available through technology and acquisition alternatives.  SOCOM staff must serve as technology expertsnot the normal requirement for the average enlisted soldier or officer.  Not surprisingly, the tendency is to buy what is available rather than to pursue technology development for specific purposes. Research, development, and acquisition.  Because of its small size, the processes and procedures used at SOCOM heavily influence PSYOP investment.  SOCOM acquisition principles are to:\n\n- deliver equipment to user expeditiously - exploit proven techniques and methods - keep warfighters involved - take risk and manage it.\nThe resulting acquisition strategies for SOCOM investments are the following concepts:\n\n- 80 percent solutions to support short timeline - use COTS and nondevelopmental items - spiral development - evolutionary acquisition - competitive prototyping - innovative contracting - partnering with MILDEPS, other government agencies, and domestic and foreign\nindustry.\nThe emphasis on speed of acquisition and deployment of equipment is striking.  The acceptance of 80 percent solutionsacross the boardwith the promise of a better product later (or a new 80 percent solution) makes it possible to field a well-equipped force with today's technology that keeps pace with developments.  Unless special programs provide advanced capabilities that may be needed but are not provided by industry, lack of technological sophistication in specific areas of interest to SOCOM, and PSYOP in particular, may result and be a detriment to mission performance. Research, development, and acquisition of SOCOM systems is managed by the Special Operations Acquisition and Logistics (SOAL) office, one of the organizations supporting the acquisition executive (others support R&D).  SOCOM distributes its approximately $2 billion in program management and milestone decision authority (MDA) as follows:\n\n- 52 percent managed by SOCOM, with MDA at SOCOM - 22 percent managed by MILDEP, with MDA at SOCOM - 26 percent managed by MILDEP, with MDA at MILDEP.\nNote that about 50 percent of the program management is carried out by entities outside SOCOM, and about 25 percent of acquisition decisions are made by the service acquisition executives.  This is huge leveraging and exemplifies jointness and reliance on the DOD team. It also creates a need for vigilance by SOCOM, as the fate of their programs is in the hands of others. Research and development.  Since the publication of the *IO Roadmap*, PSYOP is receiving more attention within SOCOM, so there may be increasing work in supporting technologies. However, PSYOP has never had a major technology push project.  SOCOM has neither the dedicated laboratory structure nor the large cadre of scientists, engineers, and program mangers to execute its technology development and system acquisition responsibilities.  It relies heavily on support from the services, defense agencies, national laboratories, and industry.  Thus, many SOCOM programs and projects need to survive competition within the domains of other servicespecific priorities, usually related to major service acquisition plans. Technology awareness, monitoring, and exploitation are as highly leveraged as acquisition.  The directorate of advanced technology, which is supported by an overarching technology integrated product team, largely performs these functions.  The primary sensors for identifying needed technology are the warfighters themselves and liaison arrangements with others (military departments, DOD and other agencies, and industry).  Staff is encouraged to participate in conferences and expositions to see what industry has to offer and to interact with industry representatives to impart desired characteristics for the next products industry may want to develop.  SOCOM has an active program of allowing and, in fact, inviting industries to demonstrate their products.  An action officer is designated as the technology industry liaison officer.  He is the point of contact for industry when it has a product to offer for consideration. Liaison with each of the services provides opportunities to exploit DOD-generated technology. For example:\n\n- The Navy sponsors internally 10 to 15 programs annually, currently valued at $2.8\nmillion, that may have an impact on SOCOM.\n- For interaction with the Army, SOCOM prepares a list of project proposals in an annual\ninput to the Army's science and technology (S&T) master plan.  The proposals then compete with other Army projects.  This process is being institutionalized to strengthen the relationship.\n- The Air Force also maintains a liaison through the Air Force Research Laboratory. - The Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) provides access to a 5- to\n10-year outlook but also helps with 6- to 24-month applications.  In return, SOCOM provides challenges and feedback on how products of past cooperation worked in the field.  Liaison is accomplished by an on-site, full-time staff member at the senior executive service level who attends all requirements meetings and provides interface with DARPA program managers as necessary.  Prototypes obtained from DARPA programs, including the language translator, water purification pens, UAVs, and ground robotics, are currently in operators' hands.\n- Liaison is also close with the OSD-run DOD/Department of Energy munitions\ntechnology development program.\nThe annual R&D program for the entire SOCOM is documented in a book describing the organization and listing the various projects.175  The number of projects is rather large, indicating high leveraging with the services and other organizations; small size of projects; or possibly both.  Few of these programs are related to PSYOP. Investment in acquisition and technology. Table 61 summarizes the comparison of DOD, SOCOM, and PSYOP funding for investment and R&D. Note the disproportionately low PSYOP funding levels.\n\n|       | TOA          | Investment         | R&D                |\n|-------|--------------|--------------------|--------------------|\n| DOD   | $402 billion | $144 billion (36%) | $69 billion (17%)  |\n| SOCOM | $6.5 billion | $2.1 billion (31%) | $500 million (15%) |\n| PSYOP | $172 million | $29 million (17%)  | $3 million (2%)    |\n\nAcquisition investment.  PSYOP acquisition is a small part of SOCOM investment ($18 million versus $2 billion per year, or approximately 1 percent).  Most programs are in acquisition category III and therefore are managed by the SOAL with the Program Executive Office as the milestone decision authority. The same organization is managing the Global Reach ACTD. Reflecting the general philosophy of SOCOM, PSYOP acquisition strategy has been simply to buy equipment off the shelf with minimal, if any, modification.  As much as possible, staff works with industry to entice it to incorporate features needed or desirable for PSYOP use.  As always, one can question the effectiveness of this approach, given the small percentage of volume or sales that such a small group represents. The total PSYOP investment budget in FY05 is about $29 million, broken down as follows:\n\n| RDTE                   | $0.36 million   |\n|------------------------|-----------------|\n| RDTE (ACTD)            | $2.94 million   |\n| Procurement            | $18.39 million  |\n| Operations and Support | $7.45 million   |\nFY 05-11\nCategory\nProgram\n2000\n2001\n2002\n2003\n2004 2005 2006 2007 2008\n2009 2010 2011\nTOTAL\n\nPOBS\n9.24\n7.40 4.53\n17.35\n19.95\n13.79\n21.30\n34.35\n49.18\n37.02 32.78 31.58\n219.99\n\nTOTAL\n10.96\n8.30 4.84\n24.65\n79.93\n18.39\n42.83\n64.41\n62.43\n37.31 32.78 31.58\n289.73\n\nPOBS\n0.31\n0.42 0.00\n0.24 2.16 0.36 1.46 7.33 1.35\n2.37 0.66 0.67\n14.19\n\nTOTAL\n1.13\n1.47 0.00\n0.99 2.16 0.36 4.96 7.33 1.35\n2.37 0.66 0.67\n17.69\nACTD\n2.94 5.86 5.85 5.85\n4.88 0.00 0.00\n25.38\n\nCSOLO\n0.76\n0.00 0.22\n6.76\n47.18\n0.00\n15.87\n28.01\n11.83\n0.29 0.00 0.00\n56.00\n\nCSOLO\n0.00\n0.00 0.00\n0.00 0.00 0.00 3.50 0.00 0.00\n0.00 0.00 0.00 3.50\n\nDPPC\n0.00\n0.00 0.00\n0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00\n0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00\n\nFOL\n0.00\n0.00 0.00\n0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00\n0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00\n\nLDS\n0.82\n1.05 0.00\n0.75 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00\n0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00\n\nDPPC\n0.00\n0.00 0.00\n0.00 0.00 0.00 2.05 2.06 1.43\n0.00 0.00 0.00 5.54\n\nFOL\n0.96\n0.90 0.10\n0.00 2.87 0.98 0.00 0.00 0.00\n0.00 0.00 0.00 0.98\n\nLDS\n0.00\n0.00 0.00\n0.54 9.94 3.62 3.61 0.00 0.00\n0.00 0.00 0.00 7.23\nRDTE $\nPROC $\n\nTOTAL\n6.51\n6.20 7.89\n18.24\n14.99\n7.45\n15.58\n20.57\n21.57\n21.17 29.37 34.64\n150.34\nw/ACTD\n\n18.60\n15.98\n12.74\n43.88\n97.08\n29.13\n69.22\n98.16\n91.20\n65.74 62.81 66.89\n483.14\nw/o ACTD\n\n18.60\n15.98\n12.74\n43.88\n97.08\n26.19\n63.37\n92.31\n85.35\n60.85 62.81 66.89\n457.76\n\n2POG\n21.83\n22.17\n23.69\n24.75\n25.66 26.45 27.26\n171.81\n\n4POG\n77.35\n86.22\n89.48\n91.84\n94.40 97.61\n100.93\n637.83\n\n7POG\n22.41\n22.68\n24.29\n25.39\n26.33 27.12 27.95\n176.18\n\nTOTAL\n121.60\n131.07 137.46\n141.97\n146.39 151.18 156.14\n985.81\n\nPOBS\n4.82\n4.72 5.87\n14.46\n9.66 4.28 8.95\n12.60\n13.47\n12.93 20.77 25.69 98.69\n\nFOL\n1.06\n0.97 0.94\n1.41 3.31 1.69 1.65 1.63 1.65\n1.67 1.74 1.81\n11.83\n\nLDS\n0.24\n0.14 0.48\n0.39 0.54 0.47 3.11 4.00 4.06\n3.73 3.89 4.05\n23.29\n\n2POG\n4.46 2.72 2.78 2.89\n2.97 3.07 3.19\n22.07\n\n4POG\n10.89\n11.49\n9.65\n10.11\n10.37 10.74 11.16 74.40\n\nCSOLO\n0.00\n0.00 0.16\n0.32 0.98 0.50 1.29 1.30 1.31\n1.36 1.42 1.48 8.66\n\nDPPC\n0.39\n0.37 0.46\n1.66 0.50 0.51 0.59 1.05 1.08\n1.49 1.55 1.61 7.86\n129\nO&S $\nMIL PAY\nO&M $\nTot Investment\nTot Investment\nTOA W/ACTD\n171.83\n218.52 252.14\n250.41\n229.82 232.31 242.08\n1,597.11\nACTD\n168.89\n212.66 246.29\n244.56\n224.93 232.31 242.08\n1,571.73\nTOA(W/ACTD)\n10.70%\n19.60% 25.54%\n24.93%\n16.24% 14.11% 13.04%\n18.14%\nACTD)\n16.95%\n31.68% 38.93%\n36.42%\n28.60% 27.04% 27.63%\n30.25%\nPROC\n40.49%\n36.37% 31.94%\n34.54%\n56.75% 89.61%\n109.69%\n51.89%\n\nTOTAL\n21.10\n18.23\n16.52\n17.24\n17.69 18.33 19.05\n128.16\n\nW/ACTD\n1.92%\n4.95%\n5.23%\n2.88%\n3.15% 0.28% 0.28% 2.70%\n\nW/O ACTD\n0.21%\n2.33%\n2.97%\n0.55%\n1.05% 0.28% 0.28% 1.13%\n\n7POG\n5.75 4.02 4.09 4.25\n4.36 4.52 4.70\n31.69\nTOA\nTOA (BOTH W/\nINVEST % OF\nRDT&E % OF\nPROC % OF\nO&S % OF\nTOA W/O\n\nPSYOP inventory in FY05 is comprised of two parts:\n\n- about $735 million, supported by Major Force Program4 (that is, by the services) - about $123 million, supported by Major Force Program11 (that is, by SOCOM).\nGiven that the value of the total inventory of PSYOP equipment is about $123 million, excluding the EC130E aircraft and other major equipment supplied by the services, SOCOM appears to be recapitalizing PSYOP equipment every 5 to 10 years.  This is quite a rapid replacement when compared to major equipment in the MILDEPS, and it reflects the philosophy of buying COTS equipment for rapid deployment, use in harsh environments, and quick replacement. (See appendix C for the inventory and appendix D for the recapitalization plan.) Program Decision Memorandum II in FY02 provided $250 million to PSYOP.  By direction, the funds were distributed over 11 different accounts and over several years.  In short, the funds were used to fix the potholes rather than to start a new highway system. In contrast, the ACTD represents a significant percentage of RDT&E funding and, in fact, the overall investment budget.  It will provide significant capability but only in limited quantity. The disadvantage of largely bypassing the formal acquisition process is that there often is not a transition mechanism to permit continued procurement of additional equipment pioneered by the ACTD.  When the ACTD is completed, the long-term flow of funds to R&D will be much reduced. If one excludes ACTD funds from consideration (to more properly reflect long-term steady-state funding trends), RDT&E funding in FY05 is 0.20 percent of the total obligation authority (TOA).  This amount is shockingly low compared to MILDEP levels that typically hover around 15 percent.  (The DOD total in FY05 is 17 percent.)  As a further point of comparison, a few years ago, DOD considered setting a goal of  3 percent of TOA for S&T, which is the less expensive part of RDT&E (includes only 6.1, 6.2, and 6.3 funds).  The entire PSYOP RDT&E does not reach that level, let alone whatever the PSYOP S&T funding percentage might be. If the ACTD is included in the TOA, then RDT&E is 1.92 percent of TOA, which is not much better.  Even that slight improvement is a temporary infusion of R&D funding, and it includes some indirect acquisition funding since some of the equipment bought for the ACTD will become operational gearmuch the same way as other equipment is bought for SOCOM.  The technology infusion and the equipment bought to demonstrate it address requirements in areas that are technologically weak.  Thus, this R&D infusion should raise PSYOP capabilities as it also raises the quantity of equipment available to PSYOP forces. Prior to POM submission, the RDT&E plan budget included an increase in FY06 and FY07 with additional funds for POBS ($3 million each for Internet broadcast and telephone broadcast). That was eliminated by the formal POM submission, reducing the budget to its usual low level. Investment funding, in the usual definition, includes RDT&E and procurement accounts. PSYOP data provided was able to differentiate the operations and support (O&S) funds that directly support acquisition programs from the rest of the O&M account.  In order to give the PSYOP process every benefit of the doubt, in the following discussion we include the O&S funds as part of the total PSYOP investmentnot the usual practice. The total procurement budget and total investment budget oscillate a lot through the years.  This is normally indicative of inefficient support for research, development, and acquisition. Typically, it also signals that the program is funded with whatever remains after other programs of higher priority have been funded. Procurement funding, as a percent of TOA, for the entire DOD (in FY05) is about 18.5 percent. For SOCOM, it is 24 percent.  But for PSYOP, it is 10.7 percent, again showing a significant underemphasis (see appendix E for funding shortfalls in FY05).  As usual, the plan is to increase the percentage in the out years; in fact, in FY07 and FY08, it goes as far as about 25 percent.  Of course, the typical pattern is for funding to be reduced in the next year, as happened this year for POM FY06, and the program reverts to funding closer to historical trends.  Similarly, investment as a percent of TOA, even including O&S costs, is 17 percent for PSYOP, compared to 36 percent for DOD and 32 percent for SOCOM. Funding for equipment readiness (shown on the O&S line) is also unusual.  Normal acquisition programs require funding for O&S that is between 90 and 120 percent of the procurement cost. PSYOP O&S funding varied from a low of 31 percent to a high of 110 percent.  Most years the value is very low (in the 30s).  This again may reflect the philosophy of acquisition of COTS equipment, which is considered much more disposable than major items in the MILDEPS. Some of this episodic funding for investment can be explained by the very uneven acquisition of equipment.  Note the many line items that are not funded at all through the Fiscal Year Defense Program (except for continuing O&S).  This kind of programming reflects the priorities of the program within SOCOM, but also the fact that the PSYOP community has not made a case for more and better programmatic thrusts to fulfill a vision and a set of requirements.\n\n## Current Opportunities To Exploit Technology\n\nTwo noteworthy efforts to identify and exploit technology for PSYOP are the Defense Science Board report of May 2000, \"The Creation and Dissemination of All Forms of Information in Support of a Psychological Operations in Time of Military Conflict,\" and the PSYOP Advanced Concept Technology Demonstration sponsored by SOCOM and advocated by the Information Operations Roadmap.  This research reviewed both of these efforts in detail (see appendix F for an overview). The Defense Science Board recommendations on technology exploitation are being incorporated into the ACTD, which will not be completed until 2009. However, its charter appears to cover all the major shortfalls identified in this study and the DSB report, including the need for more responsible tactical PSYOP dissemination capabilities.  Informally, however, the emphasis of the ACTD appears to be on long-range dissemination in denied areas more than on new ways to quickly disseminate leaflets and videos over shorter ranges.  One area not addressed by the ACTD is the inadequate communication links between theater and tactical PSYOP forces.  It is not clear that this problem requires an advanced technology solution but, given the significance of the issue, SOCOM should review whether it should be covered by the ACTD. The ultimate question, as with all ACTDs, is whether the advanced technology prototypes it develops will be funded and integrated into the force. In addition to these efforts, SOCOM is developing a PSYOP technology roadmap and a Joint PSYOP Master Plan.  These efforts will benefit from a Joint PSYOP Initial Capabilities Document, which is on hold pending JROC approval.  This document will provide overarching requirements for PSYOP and a mechanism for asserting the commander of SOCOM's expanded authority under the Unified Command Plan to \"integrate and coordinate DOD PSYOP.\"  This expanded authority solidifies SOCOM's leadership and responsibility for enhancing interoperability and joint warfighting of PSYOP and comes at a time when the other services are showing increasing interest in developing some organic PSYOP capability for their forces. Beyond the modest improvements that come from numerous incremental upgrades from COTS purchases and the more substantial advances that are anticipated from the ACTD, some current PSYOP program improvements seem quite noteworthy in light of other findings in this report.\n\n- The Product Distribution System uses recently developed video compression techniques\nto transmit information between systems in theater and in CONUS using significantly less bandwidth. It does so without relying exclusively on military satellites (MILSATs), a major advantage in PSYOP product distribution. Since video transmission among systems is very resource-intensive (at 68 megs/second), the JPOTF and higher command elements often reserve the use of bandwidth (and MILSATs) for purposes other than PSYOP. The PDS will give PSYOP some organic ability to get battlefield video back to product development centers that can then quickly turn it into PSYOP products. The current inability to move video taken by tactical units was identified elsewhere in this report as one of the communication shortfalls that tends to inhibit cooperation between theater and tactical PSYOP.\n- The leaflet delivery system, using a WSADS, will enable delivery of payloads to multiple\nareas flying as high as 18,000 feet for distances up to 800 miles and at speeds up to 35 miles per hour (clearly, trades between these parameters will be made depending on the mission). If procured in quantity for tactical PSYOP units, this capability would contribute directly to reducing the shortfall in timely tactical dissemination of leaflets, which maneuver commanders identify as a problem.\n- Commando Solo transition to the C130J aircraft (with Congressional support) offers the\noption to upgrade and modularize the existing payload. The new aircraft's higher altitude does little for broadcast range, but its modular payload could support a capability to control a UAV that then could better penetrate denied airspace without endangering personnel. The value of controlling such UAVs from the air rather than the ground needs to be evaluated. However, the increased capability to target audiences in a more\nresponsive and persistent manner would help correct shortfalls identified elsewhere in this reportnamely, insufficient theater dissemination capacity and insufficiently timed tactical dissemination.\n\n- Reduced weight speakers, while technologically mundane, are an important improvement\nin PSYOP capability. Ground force maneuver commanders value immediately responsive PSYOP capabilities, a need best met by tactical PSYOP teams. Loudspeakers will remain the primary and most responsive dissemination tool for tactical teams until PSYOP is enabled by computer network attack or other innovative means of rapid dissemination. Thus, any improvements to loudspeaker capability are noteworthy.\n\n## Technology Conclusions\n\nSeveral observations emanate from this review of technology exploitation by SOCOM.\n\n- First, PSYOP is significantly underresourced in its acquisition account. It has no in-house\nanalytical capacity and only minimal resources to identify new technological directions to enhance its capability.  PSYOP compensates by rapidly acquiring any new commercial off-the-shelf equipment that supports the current mode of operation.\n- Second, the entire SOCOM investment process reflects all DOD directives and\nregulations.  It exhibits many of the desiderata of jointness, capabilities-based thinking, high leveraging of others' programs with emphasis on industry, short acquisition cycles, and high warfighter involvement.  The mechanics of the process are logical and provide many opportunities for leadership involvement.  Therefore, the resulting investment program reflects the priorities of SOCOM, both in total investment funds distribution and in near-total reliance on technology advances pursued largely by others.\n- Third, the ACTD sponsored by SOCOM is moving slowly and perhaps could benefit\nfrom some expansion, especially in the area of tactical product dissemination and perhaps with respect to communications.  That said, the ACTD appears to cover all the most glaring shortfalls identified in this study and by the Defense Science Board.\nIf the Department feels justified in expanding PSYOP resources, it does not need to reform SOCOM processes so much as it needs to communicate that intent clearly to SOCOM leadership, among whom funding for PSYOP requirements repeatedly fails to make the cut.  If DOD wants a higher priority attached to PSYOP, it must provide the additional funding to SOCOM or provide direct guidance on the subject.  If additional resources are made available to the command, a better resource distribution will be needed to reflect longer time horizons and steady program execution.  Improvements over the present situation would be easily achievableincluding more support for analyses to better understand how technology can support requirements, more work in R&D to develop requisite technology to better adapt commercially available technology, and steady funding for acquisition supporting efficient buy profiles.\n\n## 7. Comparison Of Findings With Information Operations Roadmap\n\nThis section of the report compares the research on lessons learned with the recommendations made in the *IO Roadmap*, as required in this study's mandate.  In general, the comparison reveals that the results of this research are broadly consistent with the findings in that document. However, in several cases, they modify and go well beyond the *Roadmap*'s 10 recommendations, reviewed below, that apply directly or inclusively to PSYOP. National themes.  The report agrees with the *IO Roadmap* recommendation that OSD oversight should include the requirement to ensure that PSYOP messages are congruent with national themes and messages.  The finding in this report is that national themes help PSYOP planning and product development, especially for theater-level products with the objective of defending U.S. policy, which are directed at general audiences.  Without national themes, theater PSYOP products will be more general, less forceful, and probably less effective.  National themes are not an essential prerequisite for most tactical PSYOP products. Delimiting PSYOP's mission.  This report supports the need to clarify the missions and tasks assigned to PSYOP, public diplomacy, and public affairs, respectively.  Limiting PSYOP to support for military endeavors in nonpermissive or semipermissive environments and for public diplomacy as part of approved security cooperation guidelines will provide much-needed focus. A reasonably expected result should be sharper standards for PSYOP efforts, less interference, and more cooperation between public affairs and public diplomacy.  The review also supports the *IO Roadmap* assertion that OSD Public Affairs should be more proactive and should include a broader set of select foreign media and audiences.  Doing so would reduce the need for PSYOP to provide public affairs assistance to commanders. Joint PSYOP support element.  The findings in this report support the original intent behind the creation of the JPSE: the need for policy-consistent, commercial-quality products in support of PSYOP campaigns.  Given the evolution of the JPSE and the decision to locate it outside the Washington, DC, area, where it could most effectively provide these capabilities, this report advises a modification to the *IO Roadmap* recommendation.  The JPSE should be redesignated to product support for tactical PSYOP products and integrated with the Media Operations Center, either at Fort Bragg or in Tampa, whichever site provides the best advantages.  Another entity, operating as a field agency under the direction of USD (Policy), should be established in the Washington, DC, area, with the sole purpose of supporting public diplomacy (not tactical PSYOP products, which would be the responsibility of the JPSE).  These public diplomacy products could support theater PSYOP efforts and would be disseminated by PSYOP forces. Product approval. The review supports the *IO Roadmap*'s call for delegation of product approval authority for all PSYOP products that do not have \"substantial political or strategic content or implication\" to the combatant commander; for designation of dedicated USD(P) staff and clear procedures to approve products without costly delays; and for the delegation of approval authority for additional products and modifications of preapproved products once an operation is under way.  However, the report goes further than the *IO Roadmap* and makes specific recommendations on a framework and procedures for delegation of product approval authority. It recommends shortening the chain of approval, fixing responsibility, and publishing the established guidelines.  The recommended concept of operation for PSYOP is to accept the additional risk inherent in faster product approval and to mitigate it with more rapid product assessment, revision, and redissemination capabilities. Force structure expansion. The report agrees with the *IO Roadmap* that the PSYOP force structure needs to be expanded.  However, the report concludes that active duty tactical forces, not regionally oriented product development battalions, should be given priority in the expansion. Modernize PSYOP force capabilities. The report agrees with the *IO Roadmap* that PSYOP force capabilities should be modernized but recommends some minor additions to its three recommendations:\n\n- PSYOP ACTD to address dissemination of PSYOP products into denied areas. This\nreport urges an acceleration of the PSYOP Global Reach ACTD effort, which is addressing area dissemination concerns as one of its primary pursuits.  Currently, it is not scheduled to reach completion until the end of the decade.  The ACTD is researching various unmanned vehicles, including the WSADS UAV.  This system can carry up to 575 pounds (or increase its range by reducing payload weight) into denied areas, both for theater and tactical PSYOP forces.\n- PSYOP recapitalization to modernize traditional delivery systems. Tactical dissemination\nsystems such as leaflets and loudspeaker broadcasts are highly responsive to maneuver commanders, and this report supports the continued emphasis of the ACTD on tactical PSYOP dissemination.  The ground-launched WSADS will provide an effective solution to leaflet distribution for tactical commanders.  In addition, the ACTD is investigating scatterable media payloads for UAVs as potential solutions for maneuver commanders. These capabilities are especially useful as a means for tactical PSYOP to be more responsive to maneuver commanders.\n- PSYOP Broadcast System.  The POBS program is funded and is actively procuring\nequipment and systems against validated requirements.  This report recommends that the POBS program address the immediate problem of closing the theater-tactical communication gap, perhaps in concert with the ACTD.  In addition, given the pace of operations in the war on terrorism and the need to be ready to respond to other regional contingencies, POBS should be expanded to provide for a second theater capability (which reportedly is the case in SOCOM's 2006 POM submission).\nIO career force.  The PSYOP lessons learned review is in agreement with the *Roadmap* on the need for a well-trained and educated IO career force.  PSYOP benefited from integration with information operations but squandered valuable staff time working with newly appointed IO officers who had little knowledge of PSYOP and its capabilities.  A well-trained IO career force would minimize this inconvenience and increase the benefits of PSYOP integration into IO and of IO into the overall war plan. Standardized IO planning capability.  The *IO Roadmap* recommends adopting a standardized IO planning capability at the joint level.  This report supports that recommendation for the same reason it supports the IO career force recommendations; it would facilitate integration of PSYOP across services and into IO, which recent operations suggest benefits PSYOP, not to mention the combatant commander's ability to degrade an adversary's decisionmaking process while preserving his own.176\nAnalytic support.  This report supports the *IO Roadmap*'s call for stronger analytic support, including human factors analysis provided by the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA).  However, the *IO Roadmap* appears to assume that DIA could provide all human factors analysis needed by PSYOP, which is not true.  PSYOP currently suffers from insufficient tactical target audience intelligence to properly tailor products for commanders.  The 4th Psychological Operations Group's Strategic Studies Detachment provides better support for theater-level products.  The report recommends that detachment be oriented toward tactical product production and that DIA provide the more general theater-level support.177 Transparent budgeting. During this 6-month research effort, it was impossible to obtain an accurate accounting of PSYOP expenditures over the past decade.  For this reason, the report supports the *IO Roadmap*'s call for improved transparency in IO budgeting and accounting. In summary, the PSYOP lessons learned review reinforces the conclusions of the *IO Roadmap*, including recommendations on training, career force, analytic support, standardized IO planning tools, and a virtual Major Force Program for all IO components.  This review suggests, however, that the *Roadmap* did not go far enough in its recommendations.  The recommendation on the JPSE in the *IO Roadmap* is not aggressive enough to make a difference at the theater level for general audiences, and it does not fully account for the need to provide more responsive, tailored product support to tactical PSYOP units.  The *Roadmap*'s recommendation for approval reform is also insufficient, especially at the tactical level, to ensure timely delivery of products for the best effect.  Approval authority reform should be extended to the JPOTF and division levels and should be more specific on product categories.  In addition, the document did not pay enough attention to the need to provide tactical, as opposed to theater or national-level, intelligence support to PSYOP.  This study found that the *IO Roadmap* is not aggressive enough on reform of PSYOP doctrine, recruitment, training, force structure, and acquisition.  Where the Roadmap generally pushed resources at PSYOP to bridge the most glaring capability gaps, the PSYOP lessons learned review provides more detailed insight into needs and longer-term solutions.\n\n## 8. Conclusions\n\nThe review of PSYOP lessons learned from OEF, OIF, OIF 2, and stability operations from the past two decades yields six major conclusions that merit further attention. Current PSYOP missions are overextended.  The rising demand for PSYOP, coupled with inadequate resourcing, has resulted in an overextension of PSYOP missions.  PSYOP as it is currently configured and resourced is incapable of mounting a competitive theater-wide effort targeted at general audiences or of meeting the demand from commanders for timely, tailored tactical PSYOP products and dissemination. The consequences of the suboptimal capabilities at the theater and tactical levels are different depending on whether PSYOP is participating in major combat operations or stability operations. In both types of operations, PSYOP pursues the same basic mission objectives:\n\n- isolating the adversary from domestic and international support - reducing the effectiveness of adversary forces - deterring escalation by adversary leadership - minimizing collateral damage and interference with U.S. operations.\nThe first objective is the most important for the success of stability operations, whereas the second and third are more important contributors to success in major combat operations.  Since the resources (both political and fiscal) required to improve PSYOP performance in stability operations, as opposed to major combat operations, are significantly different, senior decisionmakers may feel obliged to consider them separately. There are different costs and benefits in improving tactical and theater PSYOP.  Tactical-level PSYOP in major combat operations is the most cost-effective and generates the greatest return for the least amount of investment.  Similarly, tactical-level PSYOP in stability operations is also cost-effective but more difficult to execute because it requires substantial changes in operating concepts and doctrine.  In contrast, theater-level PSYOP in both major combat and stability operations demands greater resources and generates fewer visible effects.  Theater-level PSYOP tends to focus on national-level themes and messages directed toward broad, diverse audiences and is more resource-intensive than tactical-level PSYOP.  It also is difficult to gauge the success of PSYOP campaigns at the theater level since correlation between the conveyed message and its intended effects is less discernable.  A well-coordinated national information strategy is needed for theater-level PSYOP to generate a noticeable impact.  For these reasons, improvements in theater-level PSYOP are both more costly and difficult to accomplish.  Pentagon decisionmakers need to first determine whether overarching priorities justify the additional costs associated with reform of theater PSYOP and then pursue a commensurate investment strategy and reform plan. The question of whether Washington, DC, can generate national themes and help theater and tactical PSYOP stay on message with appropriate political content and product reviews is no small matter.  It simply may not be possible to achieve.  Many long-time Washington observers insist there is really no such thing as policy and that national leadership in a democracy is always in a reactive mode, managing public affairs responses to emerging events but incapable of producing longer-term vision for strategic communications.  A senior administration official in another setting recently confessed that this is essentially the view of the current White House office of strategic communications.  Even if this is true at the national level, it might still be possible to pursue a communications strategy at the theater level.  However, there is evidence to indicate it is a problem at that level as well.  As one PSYOP source working in the Coalition Provisional Authority headquarters in Baghdad remarked, \"The strategic communications office is focused only a week out because that is where 'the front office' wants them focused.\" Those concerned with public diplomacy and PSYOP often lament the lack of an organized, longer-term information strategy, but the reactive approach that relies essentially on public affairs alone is not indefensible.  One might argue that if the battle over immediate public interpretation of events is lost, longer-range strategic communications are ultimately worthless. Another view would be that truth will out over the long term and that there is no point in trying to guide or shape it; or that foreign perceptions of U.S. policy and actions are ultimately a function of the policy and actions rather than efforts to dress them up to be more appealing.  It is not the purpose of this research to argue this issue.  Rather, the point being made here is that if national-level authorities do not deem it necessary, possible, or worthwhile to provide strategic direction for an information campaign, then the United States will not have a robust public diplomacy effort or effect.  By extension, there is far less reason to build an expensive theater PSYOP capability to reach broad audiences in support of public diplomacy.  In short, and contrary to the opinion of many in PSYOP as well as the recommendations in some other reports on PSYOP reform, this report emphasizes that PSYOP cannot compensate for an admittedly weak U.S. public diplomacy effort by absorbing more of that mission; it simply is not competitive in that arena, and the politics of strategic communications in the United States will not permit it in any case. PSYOP is critical to the success of stability operations.  PSYOP forces are increasingly employed to support stability operations because of their ability to isolate the adversary from domestic and international support.  They do so in part by currying favor with the local population and neutralizing active support to insurgents and terrorists from the general populace through both theater and tactical PSYOP but especially through face-to-face interactions.  As examined in the section on official lessons learned, three key lessons are unique to stability operations:\n\n- The center of gravity in stability operations is popular support, so PSYOP must focus on\nthe foreign populace, as well as enemy combatants and leaders.\n- Early and continuous theater-level PSYOP integration with other agencies to assure\nconsistent themes and messages is essential.\n- Face-to-face PSYOP with the host population is critical, and PSYOP forces must use\nconventional forces to support this objective.\nPSYOP is more critical to success in stability operations than in major combat operations. PSYOP success in stability operations requires changes to tactical-level joint doctrine (for example, Joint Concept of Operation for Stability Operations) that would enable PSYOP to leverage the larger Army and Marine infantry pool during their face-to-face interactions with the general populace.  It would also require a robust ability to engage the general target audience in the face of competing information sources, which requires around-the-clock broadcasting and sophisticated print materials.  PSYOP cannot currently produce this content and has difficulty disseminating it.  In short, significantly improving PSYOP for stability operations will be an arduous and expensive undertaking. Alternatively, if decisionmakers cannot justify the increased costs of significantly improving theater PSYOP capabilities, they can still take less onerous steps to improve PSYOP performance in stability operations.  They can:\n\n- mandate the revision of joint operating concepts to reflect the importance of infantry\ncooperation with PSYOP forces\n- leverage an improved public diplomacy effort that conveys coherent national objectives\nand messages, thereby reinforcing persuasive communication toward foreign audiences. This would, in effect, de-obligate PSYOP from theater-level missions and promote its concentration on tactical-level missions.\n- authorize eliminating potential competition from adversarial broadcasts.  If PSYOP is\nsupported with policies and capabilities that allow temporary disruption of adversary communication channels, it can compete more effectively.\nPSYOP is a major force multiplier in major combat operations.  PSYOP helps to reduce the effectiveness of adversary forces and deters escalation by adversary leadership, as illustrated in recent operations.  Similar to PSYOP in stability operations, PSYOP effects in major combat operations are most discernable at the tactical level of engagement.  PSYOP reform and improvements in tactical-level operations can be accomplished at relatively low cost by bolstering communication equipment that would better link theater and tactical forces, improving the quality of tactical products, providing better intelligence support, targeting audience analysis capabilities, and providing linguistic support.  Justifying the war to general audiences could be left to the realm of public diplomacy, where integration of national themes and messages can best be achieved. Improvements in PSYOP decisionmaking are essential.  However senior decisionmakers decide on the relative merits of investing in theater and tactical PSYOP, some non-material fixes are required to improve it.  National themes and coordinated information activities would improve PSYOP, but the most important decisionmaking reform is an improved product approval process. The PSYOP approval process essentially breaks down in two areas: between the JPOTF and the Pentagon, and between the JPOTF and tactical forces.  Poor communication between the JPOTF and OSD Policy contributed to significant delays in the approval of theater-level PSYOP products during the initial phase of OEF.  Similarly, tactical-level products encountered delays in obtaining JPOTF approval prior to development and distribution.  Unless the approval process is reformed at both the theater and tactical levels, PSYOP effectiveness may be seriously compromised. A three-pronged approach must be adopted to improve decisionmaking in PSYOP:\n\n- First, the risk of an occasional poor product must be accepted and mitigated with a rapid\neffects assessment and product revision process that limits the damage by quickly\nrevising and reissuing an improved product.  This approach should be codified in both policy and doctrine and resourced accordingly.\n\n- Second, a process for preapproval of tactical programs and products should be adopted.\nBuilding on recent experience, and the success of recent efforts to pre-approve programs for some small contingency operations such as noncombatant evacuation, humanitarian, counterdrug, and maritime interdiction operations, a more discrete set of program and product categories with designated approval levels should be developed.  Tactical products should be forwarded with product control sheets that log an expiration time, after which their approval is assumed and handled accordingly.  The responsibility of the JPOTF should be to check for consistency with policy and the combatant commander's plan.  The JPOTF would also review products for quality control but with assumed confidence in the tactical forces' knowledge of the specific target audience.  For this approach to be effective, tactical PSYOP forces will need around-the-clock communication connectivity with the JPOTF.\n- Third, the preferred solution at the theater level is to make the Policy approval process\nmore responsive.  The USD(P) should delegate the approval process to someone with day-to-day access to contingency policy who can review products expeditiously.  As in the case of tactical PSYOP products, products that are not part of programs that have been preapproved for delegation or that the JPOTF deems as requiring review should be forwarded directly from the JPOTF to the Pentagon with product control sheets that log an expiration time, after which their approval is assumed and handled accordingly.  The sole responsibility of the Policy official charged with approval should be to check for policy consistency, not quality; that would be the sole responsibility of the combatant commander.  For this approach to be effective, the JPOTF would need direct liaison authority with the Policy official designated with product approvals in order to resolve outstanding issues expeditiously.\nResources should be linked with reforms. Finally, large and identifiable resource shortfalls notwithstanding, senior leaders should not simply allocate more resources to PSYOP.  Improving the ability of PSYOP forces to produce desired effects is as much a matter of nonmateriel reforms as it is a matter of additional resources.  Currently, the PSYOP mission is defined vaguely, and PSYOP resources are not focused where they have the greatest comparative advantages.  PSYOP leadership resists integration with IO even though such integration disproportionately benefits PSYOP.  A concrete plan that identifies and proposes affordable solutions to the greatest impediments to quality PSYOP programs and products is lacking. Absent a specific and abiding commitment to eliminate such shortcomings, additional investments in PSYOP are not likely to produce commensurate improvements in effects. Decisionmakers should solicit a reform plan from the PSYOP community and leadership that provides specific details and timelines for reform consistent with the recommendations in this report (the detailed set of recommendations outlined below offers a framework for the reform plan).  Additional resources should be provided contingent upon the quality of the plan.\n\n## 9. Recommendations\n\nThis report has provided an independent assessment of the lessons learned from OEF, OIF, OIF 2, and the stability operations of the past several decades, which have contributed to the body of understanding concerning PSYOP.  The study team acknowledges that there may be multiple ways of addressing the issues raised below, depending on the level of political and fiscal capital available.  For this reason, a set of recommendations has been crafted that would provide decisionmakers with a menu of options that, taken collectively, would substantially increase the quality of PSYOP performance. OSD *field agency for support to public diplomacy*. Create an OSD-led field agency for support to public diplomacy (for example, the Public Diplomacy Support Agency [PDSA]) with a large contractor base in Washington, DC.  The agency should be headed by ASD(SO/LIC) with content policy oversight administered by the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs and assisted by regional Deputy Assistant Secretaries of Defense (DASDs), as needed, depending on the contingency in question.  The Public Diplomacy Support Agency's mandate should be to create commercial-quality, policy-consistent, radio/television and print content for general foreign audiences that supports public diplomacy, with priority given to support of U.S. military operations, and to help assess the effects of U.S. public diplomacy campaigns.  The PDSA should have a \"fly-away\" capability to assist political authorities managing stability operations in the field (for example, the local ambassador or the ground component commander.)  Additionally, content would be disseminated through PSYOP forces to ensure that national-level themes and messages are properly conveyed in tactical-level products. Eventually, this organization might be transferred to U.S. Strategic Command (STRATCOM) as part of its Unified Command Plan responsibilities for information operations. Coordination of national themes. Recommend the U.S. National Security Advisor establish an authoritative mechanism for determining longer-term national themes for information campaigns that would inform the content of the new PDSA.  Developed themes and background research on potential target audiences should also be coordinated across all U.S. Government agencies to ensure consistency and continuity. Approval process. Reform the PSYOP approval process by tasking ASD(SO/LIC) to author a DOD Directive and the Joint Staff to draft a CJCSI that would codify the following approach (the details of which are available in the body of this report).  First, the concept for risk management would accept the possibility of an occasional poor product and would identify means of mitigating the consequences.  Second, a general scheme for preapproval of tactical products would be adopted that includes a discrete set of product categories with designated approval levels.  Third, the Under Secretary of Defense (Policy) would delegate the approval process to someone with day-to-day access to contingency policy who can review products for approval on a by-exception basis.  PSYOP products forwarded from the JPOTF to the Pentagon with more detailed product control sheets would be logged in with an expiration time, after which their approval is assumed.  The sole responsibility of the Policy official charged with approval should be to check for policy consistency, not quality, which would be the sole responsibility of the combatant commander.  For this approach to work the JPOTF needs direct liaison authority with the Policy official responsible for product approvals.  If the Pentagon is unable to generate national-level themes and messages or participate in a process that allows expeditious, interagency review of themes and messages on a recurring basis, then all product approval should be delegated to the combatant commander.  The assumption is that absent such themes and process, Policy guidance would be stable and broad enough that the Policy oversight provided in the original review and approval of the combatant commander's plan would be sufficient.  The same general process should apply for tactical products.  Those products not preapproved for dissemination by tactical commanders should be forwarded to the JPOTF with product control sheets, and again logged in with an expiration time, after which their approval is assumed by the local commander.  However, the JPOTF would check for consistency with policy and planning as well as for minimum quality standards since the JPOTF will presumably have more resources available for that purpose than individual PSYOP company commanders. Doctrine reform. Direct the CJCS to have the Office of Joint Civil-Military Operations include a more specific definition of PSYOP mission, as outlined in the *IO Roadmap*, in the revised joint PSYOP doctrine.  All relevant instructions and directives should be consistent with the new doctrine.  Specifically, we recommend enumerating the set of tasks that PSYOP performs, as opposed to those typically conducted by public diplomacy and public affairs.  This will facilitate distinction between the mission areas of public diplomacy, public affairs, and PSYOP to eliminate potential duplication of efforts and mission confusion.  Additionally, the revised doctrine should include the permissibility and the desirability of PSYOP cooperation with public diplomacy and public affairs to include exchanging information on target audience analysis, raw media materials such as video clips, and facilities, among others.  The doctrine should address PYSOP operations at both the theater and tactical level.178\nPSYOP vision and concept of operations.  The results of this research support the observation that PSYOP would benefit from a revised and more detailed vision and operating concept than those produced in 2002.179  Reportedly, SOCOM is currently revising the Joint PSYOP Vision Document and Joint PSYOP Operational Concept.  The revised concept should explain how near-term reforms will permit PSYOP to operate, and the revised vision should articulate a future concept toward which SOCOM will build in accordance with the Department's push towards transformation.180  A detailed operating concept would clear up any confusion over the PSYOP\nmission and how it related to public diplomacy and public affairs and how it can most effectively support them.  It would also clarify the relative importance of PSYOP at the theater and tactical levels and in support of major combat operations and stability operations, and the differing requirements for success at each level and in each type of operation.  Additionally, as many observers noted in interviews and discussions, it would be easier for PSYOP to harness technology if its concept of operation and a future vision for how that concept will evolve were clearer and more detailed.181\nA well-defined and more detailed PSYOP operating concept and vision of PSYOP transformation would also be consistent with current Pentagon guidance on transformation and capabilities-based planning.  The Pentagon evolution toward such planning requires that the development of military capabilities be linked to joint operating concepts and supporting concepts (or joint integrating concepts, as they are currently designated).  The Transformation Planning Guidance also requires the development of these joint operating concepts and supporting concepts.  Consistent with these trends and guidance, the Information Operations Roadmap gives STRATCOM responsibility for an integrated IO concept that supports broader joint operating concepts. The operating concept for PSYOP should support the information operations concept developed by STRATCOM.  It would help to inform PSYOP planning, doctrine, and acquisition. Consistent with the findings in this report and DOD guidance, SOCOM should ensure that the revised concept encompasses the following concepts.\n\n- Focused on support to the combatant commander:  Consistent with the information\noperations concept, the PSYOP concept should emphasize providing three functions for the warfighter: deterring, discouraging, dissuading, and directing an adversary; protecting and misdirecting the adversary's plans; and controlling adversarial communications and networks while protecting our own.  Properly construed and integrated with other IO core capabilities, PSYOP can make a contribution to all three of these goals.\n- Fully exploiting cooperation with public diplomacy and public affairs:  Consistent with\nthe information operations concept, the PSYOP concept should delimit PSYOP by mission, tasks, audience, and operating milieu.  Properly conceived and delimited, PSYOP is not a threat to the credibility of these other U.S. Government information activities.  When relegated to its proper task set, PSYOP should be able to use public diplomacy materials for dissemination and to share analysis and raw materials (like video and photos) with public diplomacy and public affairs.\n- Fully exploiting cooperation with other IO core capabilities:  As the Defense Science\nBoard noted, people increasingly are getting their information from a diverse set of technologies that exploit the electromagnetic spectrum.  PSYOP must increasingly use computer network operations and electronic warfare to access its target audiences. Moreover, PSYOP can be far more effective if these other IO core capabilities are used to help temporarily eliminate adversary sources of information that compete with PSYOP for audience share and credibility.\n- Full spectrum:  PSYOP should seek to accomplish the four primary objectives identified\nin this report as historic priorities.  In doing so, PSYOP will be able to render effects on every relevant target audience: the enemy commanders, the enemy soldiers, and the populations that support irregular forces.\n- Multi-mission-capable: To reach full-spectrum capability, PSYOP must identify both the\nPSYOP sub-missions that vary according to the difference between major combat operations and stability operations (and other relevant major joint concepts validated by the Pentagon), and the standards for success in each (the relative importance of such factors as timing, cultural sensitivity, linkage with coercion, volume, and so on).\n- Cross-cultural: Each mission and sub-mission should be characterized in advance for\nmodification required by major cultural differences.  In fact, organizing around different cultures rather than strictly by region may be a more effective way to bolster crosscultural communications expertise.\n- Theater-tactical balance: Currently, there is some concern that PSYOP is overly focused\non the need to reach general populations.  However, a close examination of the four major PSYOP objectives indicates that they break down into a set of difficult tactical tasks.  The exception would be the theater PSYOP mission of isolating the adversary from popular support that is generally executed in support to public diplomacy.   This is an important, but not dominant, concern of PSYOP, and it cannot be executed successfully absent close cooperation with public diplomacy.\n- Diversified delivery:  While target audiences increasingly have access to sophisticated\ntechnology as their information sources, there still remain many target audiences that can best be reached by simpler forms of media, including small printed materials.  PSYOP must be adept in relaying messages to radio nets, computer networks, and cellular phones, while maintaining the capability of delivering leaflets if that is the best means of reaching the target audience.\n- Fully integrated:  PSYOP theater- and tactical-level efforts must be fully integrated and\nwork toward common campaign objectives that are consistent with national guidance and information themes.  This requires an integrated planning capability and a robust communications architecture that allows reachback from tactical to theater and to CONUS-based PSYOP forces to achieve a shared awareness of evolving planning objectives and PSYOP themes and messages.\n- Expeditionary:  PSYOP must be fully deployable, able to rapidly advance to the theater\nand penetrate denied areas to reach critical target audiences.  It must strike a balance between reaching back to fixed installations for product development and having the agility to move the products rapidly forward to theater and on through tactical dissemination channels.  The PSYOP concept must also account for the fact that it will be necessary to move quickly to locations where it does not have an existing audience share. It must be able to quickly reach the audience, establish credibility (often with the assistance of coercion) and assess effects, and, where necessary, work with other military instruments to reduce sources of information competition.\n- Rapid, responsive end-to-end planning and product cycles:  The PSYOP concept must\nfully reflect the importance of the six steps laid out in doctrine, from intelligence support for target audience analysis through delivery of products and their assessment for rapid revision and re-dissemination.  Weakness in any step of the process will reduce the overall ability of the PSYOP effort to produce desired effects.  Among other things, this means that PSYOP must have an established set of intelligence requirements that map audience information habits around the world.  More specifically, PSYOP must identify key decisionmakers of interest and their decisionmaking processes so that it can perform well against those targets in the event of a contingency.  PSYOP also must have a planned means of systematically assessing the effects of its products in support of its four major missionsfor example, by observing adversary behavior with overhead systems, diverse polling and surveys, monitoring Internet habits, or interrogating prisoners.\n\no The entire planning and product development (and modification) cycle must be rapid\nin keeping with PSYOP's expeditionary nature and in response to the sudden\nemergence of specific contingency requirements.  It must be responsive because the enemy will certainly counter PSYOP efforts, and all the more so as they are perceived to be effective.182\n\n- Copyright exemption:  Exempt PSYOP products from copyright laws.  This would\nexpedite product development and provide a broader array of potential themes, images, logos, and icons for use in leaflets and handbills.\n- PSYOP reform:  Test the willingness of the PSYOP community to enact reforms in\nexchange for additional resources.  SOCOM should be directed to quickly produce a detailed reform plan that is consistent with recommendations proposed in this study. It would lay out a specific action plan to improve the quality of PSYOP products with estimated costs (assuming a tripling of PSYOP resources on an annual basis) that prioritizes the following concepts:\no Rank reform, integration with IO, and representation on commander staffs.  PSYOP\npersonnel should have a prominent place in IO command slots and planning staffs. However, PSYOP personnel generally prefer isolation from IO despite the fact that their discipline increasingly needs the other IO core capabilities.  PSYOP needs leadership willing to embrace IO, oversee a general reform of PSYOP, and, on occasion, deploy to command a JPOTF to ensure PSYOP is well represented at the combatant commander staff level.  Serious consideration should be given to creating a flag officer for PSYOP to support the commander, U.S. Army Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Command, for these purposes.  If PSYOP standards for officer training rise, consideration should be given to adjusting rank structure to better\nreflect that deeper subject matter expertise (similar to that of Civil Affairs).183\no A tactical JPSE. A plan is needed to integrate the JPSE into the Media Operations\nCenter at Fort Bragg with a mission of immediate (less than 24 hours), tailored product support to tactical PSYOP forces in the field.  Currently, the Media Operations Center is undermanned and underequipped to rapidly address PSYOP product requests from the field. Integrating the JPSE and the Media Operations Center would facilitate better response times and leverage limited resources that are currently available only within each organization.  This integrated organization should also be required to maintain institutional knowledge of lessons learned and\nproducts and their effects.184\no Direct accession. The recruitment and retention process should be revised to draw and\nretain more functional experts with experience in the field of persuasive communications and product design, a process similar to the direct accession program for Special Forces.  This would better align personnel skill sets with specific mission requirements, such as product and message development or graphic design, which would contribute considerably to the quality of PSYOP products.\no Revised TTPs and training. Tactics, techniques, and procedures should be reworked\nto provide more user-friendly templates for field use.  In addition, a revised training\nprogram for both active duty and reserve personnel should include greater familiarization with cross-cultural communication techniques, overall multimedia campaign planning, and practical exercises with the TTP templates that are easily deployable to the field.  The plan must also include the possibility of expansion to take in personnel from the other services, since at least the Marines and perhaps the Air Force appear ready to develop organic PSYOP planning and tactical capabilities. This effort should contribute to improvements in the quality of products.\n\no Force structure redesign. Options need to be developed that would make PSYOP\nunits more modular while providing more tactical capability.\no SSD redesign. The Strategic Studies Detachment should be reconfigured to better\nsupport tactical target analysis (deployable to theater during actual combat or stability operations), with the assumption that national-level institutions would conduct\nstrategic studies and share with the 4th POG.\no Increased planning expertise. The number of PSYOP planners available for\ncontingencies should be increased, and the training of other service planners in the context of the IO career force should be facilitated.  This is especially important since both the Marine Corps and the Air Force have expressed plans to develop their own PSYOP units, and joint training would increase the number of available planners and improve interservice coordination significantly.\no Revised guidance. Specific revisions to all SOCOM and Army PSYOP doctrine\nmission statements should reflect the changes incorporated in the revised Joint PSYOP Doctrine and the *IO Roadmap*.  Revisions to the TTP should include fieldfriendly templates for tactical product development.\no Contract linguist services. Means should be available to contract for world-class\ntranslation and linguistic services, both domestically and internationally.  This may include training, recruiting, and contracting initiatives.\no Online personnel data management. A program that would include and track\nsociological profiles and professional skill sets for all active and reserve PSYOP forces would enable commanders to identify suitable PSYOP personnel to complete required missions.  The database should reside at either Fort Bragg or the Army's Human Resources Command to facilitate quick access.\no Long-term budget planning for expanded capabilities. Budget estimates for meeting\nthe specific recommendations in this report should be produced.  In particular, a budget plan should be prepared for exploiting the PSYOP ACTD for product dissemination in denied areas, expansion of the WSADS program so that every tactical company has three at its disposal, and a communications architecture study with options to fix the theater-tactical communications problem.  Reportedly, the second POBs set is in SOCOM's FY06 POM, which will help PSYOP meet requirements for more than one contingency.\n- Temporary suppression of adversary communications: Direct a team of national\nlaboratories, led by Lincoln Labs and supported by service laboratories, to initiate an urgent examination of the technical challenges involved in interdicting an adversary's national communications infrastructure.\n-\nExpanding joint dissemination capabilities:  Direct the military services to develop concepts and requirements for new platforms that evaluate the feasibility of including PSYOP broadcast and leaflet delivery requirements.\n\n## Glossary\n\n| ACTD                              | Advanced Concept Technology Demonstration         |\n|-----------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------|\n| AFIS                              | Armed Forces Information Service                  |\n| AFRTS                             | Armed Forces Radio and Television Service         |\n| AOA                               | Analysis of Alternatives                          |\n| AOR                               | Area of Responsibility                            |\n| ARCENT                            | Army Command Central                              |\n| ASD(SO/LIC)                       | Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special        |\n| Operations/Low Intensity Conflict |                                                   |\n| CENTCOM                           | United States Central Command                     |\n| CFACC                             | Combined Forces Air Component Commander           |\n| CFLCC                             | Coalition Forces Land Component Commander         |\n| CJCS                              | Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff             |\n| CJCSI                             | Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction |\n| CNO                               | Computer Network Operations                       |\n| CONUS                             | Continental United States                         |\n| DAPS                              | Deployable Audio Production Service               |\n| ENG                               | Electronic News Gathering (Kits)                  |\n| EW                                | Electronic Warfare                                |\n| HMMWV                             | High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle        |\n| HUMINT                            | Human Intelligence                                |\n| IO                                | Information Operations                            |\n| JFCOM                             | United States Joint Forces Command                |\n| JPOTF                             | Joint PSYOP Task Force                            |\n| JPSE                              | Joint PSYOP Support Element                       |\n| MARCENT                           | Marine Corps Command Central                      |\n| MILDEC                            | Military Deception                                |\n| MILDEP                            | Military Department                               |\n| MPC                               | Media Production Center                           |\n| OEF                               | Operation                                         |\n| OIF                               | Operation                                         |\n| OIF 2                             | Operation                                         |\n| phase)                            |                                                   |\n| O&M                       | Operations and Maintenance                  |\n|---------------------------|---------------------------------------------|\n| ORHA                      | Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian   |\n| Assistance                |                                             |\n| O&S                       | Operations and Support                      |\n| OSD                       | Office of the Secretary of Defense          |\n| PA                        | Public Affairs                              |\n| PD                        | Public Diplomacy                            |\n| PDS                       | Product Distribution System                 |\n| POBS                      | Psychological Operations Broadcast System   |\n| POG                       | Psychological Operations Group              |\n| POW                       | Prisoners of War                            |\n| PSE                       | PSYOP Support Elements                      |\n| PSYOP                     | Psychological Operations                    |\n| PWB                       | Psychological Warfare Branch                |\n| SIPRNET                   | Secret Internet Protocol Router Network     |\n| SOCOM                     | United States Special Operations Command    |\n| SOMSB                    | Special Operations Media SystemB           |\n| STRATCOM                  | United States Strategic Command             |\n| TPD                       | Tactical PSYOP Detachment                   |\n| TPT                       | Tactical PSYOP Team                         |\n| TTP                       | Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures         |\n| UN                        | United Nations                              |\n| USA                       | United States Army                          |\n| USAF                      | United States Air Force                     |\n| USD(AT&L)                 | Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, |\n| Technology, and Logistics |                                             |\n| USD(P)                    | Under Secretary of Defense for Policy       |\n| USMC                      | United States Marine Corps                  |\n| WMD                       | Weapons of Mass Destruction                 |\n| WSADS                     | Wind Supported Aerial Delivery System       |\n\n## Appendix A: Study Terms Of Reference Appendix B: Psyop Equipment Inventory Conus Media Production Center (Mpc) Quantity: 1 Unit\n\n- Resides with the 4th Psychological Operations\nGroup (POG) at Fort Bragg, NC\n- Reachback capability for PSYOP forces in\ntheaters throughout the world\n- Upgrades:  modernize video and audio studios to commercial newsroom quality; automate\ndata archive system; modernize and standardize deployable production and electronic news gathering capability\n- Audio and video production - Commercial-quality graphic and print media - Print and digital imaging studio - Parallel structure capabilities allow simultaneous support for multiple missions and\nprovide redundancy of capability to minimize mission delay or abort due to equipment failure\n- Dual PSYOP Product Distribution System dedicated for POBS MPC allows for dual\nmajor theater of war support\n- Consist of four functional sections with multiple subsections: video section (production\nand edit); audio section (fixed and deployable); digital imagery section (graphic and imaging); and archive support section\n- Video section allows acquisition, manipulation, and transfer of video material, and\nstorage/archiving of video, audio, and digital imagery\no Supports National Television Standard Code, Permissive Action Link, and SECAM o Two video studios with control rooms o Four electronic news gathering (ENG) kits o Two fixed video editing suites o Duplication and format conversion o TV standards conversion o Cataloging and archiving o Two deployable video editing systems\n- Audio section allows acquisition, manipulation, transfer, and duplication/format\nconversion of audio material\no Primary audio standard is CD quality o Two audio studios with control rooms o Four deployable ENG kits o Two deployable audio nonlinear editing systems\n- Digital imagery section allows acquisition, development, and printing of still imagery and\ndevelopment of still and animated graphics\no Two multimedia graphics workstations o Four crystal controlled diode digital still camera kits o Two digital workstations for processing, manipulation, and printing of photographs o One workstation for developing digital 3D animation products\n\n## Theater Media Production Center (Tmpc) Air-Transportable Tractor-Trailer\n\n- Transportable, modular system capable of producing, editing, and distributing broadcastquality audio, video graphics, and other multimedia products\n- Can function as a theater hub for PSYOP media production with the embedded assets to\ndistribute these media products to other POBS subsystems\n- Video and audio subsystems are each\ncontained in an air-transportable tractor-trailer with a 5-ton Family of Medium Tactical Vehicle tractor as its means of conveyance\n- Multimedia/graphics and maintenance subsystem are each contained in Packhorse trailers\nconveyed by HMMWVs\n- Each system has its own generator and environmental control units so it can operate as\nstand-alone unit\n- Video: contains the production, editing, and duplication equipment necessary to produce\nand distribute broadcast-quality PSYOP video products. It also will be outfitted with ENG kits and electronic field production equipment to allow incorporation of local, in-theater footage to enhance the effect of the video products.\n- Audio (radio and loudspeaker): contains the production, editing, and duplication\nequipment necessary to produce and distribute high-quality PSYOP audio products\n- Multimedia/Graphics: contains the graphics workstations, photographic equipment,\nscanners, and printers needed to produce high-quality PSYOP multimedia products\n- Test/Repair: contains the equipment necessary to conduct preventive maintenance and\nrepairs on the equipment contained in the other TMPC subsystem\n\n## Heavy Print Plant\n\nQuantity: 4 units\n\n- A group of printers that can mass-produce print\nmedia such as magazines, leaflets, and newspapers for reachback support for forces in theater\n- Four heavy print press machines reside in the print\nplant at the 4th POG\n- Heavy print press machines that can be used for PSYOP products also are on Navy ships - Three heavy print plants are located around the country, although they are not all exactly\nalike. The Reserve units still have wet presses.:\no 3rd PSYOP Battalion, Fort Bragg, NC (Active Army) o 17th PSYOP Battalion, Joliet, IL (Reserve Component) o 306th PSYOP Company, 17th PSYOP Battalion, Los Alamitos, CA (Reserve\nComponent)\n- The facility's darkroom, layout, and plate-making section supports four large Heidelberg\npresses.\n- The binding section is equipped with a paper folder, collator, paper drill, stitches, and\ncutters used to produce booklets, brochures, and PSYOP studies.\n- Each press can produce up to 8,333 single-color (or up to four-color, single- or doublesided) leaflets per hour.\n\n## Theater Modular Print System (Mps)\n\nQuantity: 7 units\n\n- Deployable light printing facility designed to\nproduce mid- to high-quality multicolor products\n- Consists of 2 light medium tactical vehicles (2.5-\nton equivalent) and 2 medium tactical vehicles (5-ton equivalent) with 3 dolly sets (7.5 ton)\n- Requires 22 soldiers to operate - Broken down into 3 components:\no Module A prepares duplicating capability o Module B has two shelters designed to take two colors in the 20 X 14 Heidelberg\nGTO2P process\no Module C is finishing shelter, providing paper cutting\n- Can print high-quality pictures in two colors - Can print up to 550,000 single-color leaflets in 24 hours\n\n## Deployable Print Production Center (Dppc)\n\nQuantity: 5 units\n\n- HMMWV-mounted transportable print system - System includes dual 200MHz pentium processors,\nwith 128MB of RAM, scanner, and 600 dpi color laser printer\n- GMS-1497 communication shelter\no Commercial off-the-shelf components o Mounted on an expanded capacity vehicle HMMWV\n- Trailer System\no One 20KW turbo generator o One 3-ton ECU o One DHS model 2 Deployable Rapid Assembly Shelter (DRASH) tent o Associated peripherals\n- HP Color Laserjet 5M Printer\no Laser-quality proofs (600/2,400 dpi)\n- RISO GR3750 Duplicator\no High-speed production (93,000 single-color leaflets in 24 hours)\n- Triumph 3915 Paper Cutter\no Electric paper cutter (11\"x 17\" paper)\n- AN/VRC90 F VHF Transceiver\no SINCGAR tactical radio\n- AGFA ARCUS II Scanner\no 600x1200 dpi optical\n- PSYOP Product Development Workstations\no Dual pentium 200MHz processor o 19\" rack mounted, 20\" monitor o 128MB RAM, 512 KB cache o 32-bit fast/wide SCSI III control o Adaptec ultra-wide SCSI o Integrated 64-bit graphics accelerator o 300W power supply o CD ROM, sound card, uninterruptible power supply (UPS) o Windows NT V4.0 operating system o Keyboard/touchpad pointing device o Two removable Seagate 4.3GB SCSI III HDDs o Iomega Jaz 2GB/Iomega ZIP 250MB o Internal 56K data/fax/voice modem\n- Includes a paper cutter\n\n## Risograph\n\n- Digital duplicator that combines the basic output speed of a small press (120 copies per\nminute) with the simplicity and features of a copier\n- Can produce up to 93,000 single-color leaflets in 24 hours - Can be run by one operator\n\n## Ec130 Commando Solo\n\nQuantity: 6 units\n\n- Airborne electronic broadcasting system composed of 6 EC130s operating under the\n193d Special Operations Wing, Pennsylvania\nAir National Guard, Harrisburg, PA\n- Three Commando Solo aircraft will be\nconfigured with enhanced special mission equipment (SME) cross-decked from EC130E donor aircraft (AM, FM, SW, and TV broadcast capability)\n- Three Modular Commando Solo EC130J\naircraft will be configured to carry roll-on/roll-off SME modules (AM, FM, and SW broadcast capability)\n- Modular acquisition strategy allows for expansion into future PSYOP capabilities (such as\nUAVs) and emerging broadcast technologies\n- Broadcasts radio and TV frequencies in all formats and color - Broadcasts PSYOP messages on standard AM, FM, HF, HF TV and military\ncommunications bands\n- Flies as command, control, and communication countermeasures - Can broadcast programming over all of its systems simultaneously, allowing multiple\nprograms over several frequencies to be sent to the target audience\n\n## An/Msq-85B Mobile Audiovisual Information Collection And Dissemination System\n\nQuantity: 2 units\n\n- Mobile video unit contains TV monitors/receivers, videocassette recorders, video\ncamera/projector, 35mm camera, projector/film processor, AM/FM/SW receivers, and a loudspeaker\n- Operated by TPD personnel from a tactical PSYOP company\n- Receive radio and TV signals - Recording, editing, and production capability - Still photographic reproduction - Still picture and video projection for face-to-face communication with sound\n\n## Special Operations Media System Bravo (SomsB)\n\nQuantity: 6 units\n\n- PSYOP system housed in HMMWVs\nconsisting of two mobile radio broadcast systems (MRBS) and a mobile television broadcast system (MTBS)\n- MTBS is capable of producing highquality audio and products for PSYOP requirements and then transmitting those products on commercial television channels using PAL, SECAM, or NTSC station\n- Each SOMSB carries a mission trailer containing a 33kW commercial generator, an\nECU, and a DRASH tent system\n- MTBS and MRBS can be deployed separately\n- Capable of producing high-quality audio products for PSYOP requirements and then\ndisseminating those products on commercial AM, FM, and SW frequencies\n- One FM transmitter\no One kW, 88108 MHz range\n- One SW transmitter\no One kW, frequency agile, military system o Operates in the 330 MHz range\n- Production/Editing Equipment\no Samplitude 2496 audio non-linear editor with CD writer o One audio mixer o One standard audio cassette deck o Three digital mini-disc decks o One digital audio tape (dual deck) player/ recorder\n- Two wideband receivers\no Capable of receiving AM, FM, SW, and TV audio\n- MTBS\no One VHF television transmitter o 1kW, frequency agile, commercial system o Operates on commercial television channels 213 o Operates in PAL, SECAM, or NTSC formats o Production/editing equipment o One AVID Xpress Elite video non-linear editor o One audio mixer o One multi-standard VHS video tape deck o One standard Beta video tape deck o Three Beta SX decks o One DVCAM tape deck o TV demodulator capable of receiving TV, VHF, and VHF video/audio signals in\nNTDSC, PAL, or SECAM formats\n- Both MRBS and MTBS contain\no HF transceiver (used for command and control) o 125W military system (Improved Special Operations Forces High Frequency\nManpack Radio System)\no Operates in the 230MHz range o VHF transceiver (used for command and control) o Operates in the 3088 MHz range\n\n## Product Distribution System\n\n- Sends audio and video products\nin and out of the JPOTF\n- Electronically transmits and\nreceives PSYOP product files and related information\n- Transmits and receives real-time/non-real-time PSYOP products (broadcast-quality digital\nvideo, CD-quality digital audio, print-quality graphics) to/from a forward-deployed PSYOP task force for the purpose of editing, approval, and dissemination\n- Two-man lift transit cases - National Security Agency (NSA)approved encryption - MPEG2 4:2:2 or 4:2:0 sampling - Variety of I/O ports for interfacing to various I/O devices - Digital interface with SOMSB non-linear editor - Single channel per carrier (SCPC) or multi-channel per carrier (MCPC)\n\n## Operations\n\no\nMulticast high-bandwidth IP data\no\nSIPRNET/NIPRNET connectivity\n\n## Satellite Earth Terminal Design\n\no\nDMCS Satellite Communications Earth Terminal\no\n450W TWTA\no\nLaptop PC for control\no\nDMD15 satellite modem\no\nUp to 9.3 Mbps\no\nBPSK, QPSK, OQPSK, and 8PSK Modulation Schemes\no\nVeritibi and Reed Solomon concatenated FEC\no\nDM240/DD240 DVB satellite modulator/demodulator\no\nDVB compliant waveforms\no\nHigh data rate operations\n\n## Encryption Devices\n\no KIV19 NSA-approved encryption device o Up to 13 Mbps throughput\n\n## Audio/Video Design\n\no Production digital video server (PC-based) o 3.5\" floppy and 24X CD-ROM drive o Shock isolated transit case monitoring, 2-man lift digital mass storage o 432 GB useable storage minimum o 52+  hours of video storage o 2.0 KVA power conditioner/UPS\n\n## Mass Storage Display\n\no BETA SX VTR player/recorder o Mini-disc player/recorder o MPEG-2 encoder/decoder o SCPC or MCPC operations\n\n## Power Generation And Distribution\n\no Multiple 6KW stand-alone GENSETS o Compatible with SOMSB GENSETS trailer o Compatible with 3-phase 208 VAC shore power o Power distribution unit for power distribution/conditioning o UPS for video server/RAID\n\n## Digital Video Distribution System (Dvds)\n\nQuantity: 3 units\n\n- Creates and distributes copies of broadcast video - Housed in the Media Production Center at Fort Bragg\n- Can record and broadcast video through the use of a satellite link or Commando Solo - Can be placed in a SOMSB - DVDS 1 is fully operational and located at the OIF/ISO JPOTF\n\n## Joint In-Theater Injection (Jiti) System\n\nQuantity: 6 units\n\n- Global Broadcast System (GBS) in two\npieces:  a satellite and a trailer van containing power supply and connectivity\n- GBS network is designed to send\nbroadcast audio and video directly to the warfighters\nCapabilities\n- Capable of a total broadcast of 48 Mbps with near-real-time dissemination from multiple\nsources\n- Consists of 2 subsystems: the Receive Transmit (RT) and the Receive Only (RO) - Transportable by a single C130 - Self-sustaining power via integrated commercial generator (also allows for numerous\nshore power standards)\n- Fault-tolerant transmission systems integrated into mission shelters - Ability to accept numerous external audio, video, and data sources - System designed as open architecture platform based on commercial technologies - The RO is a lightweight flyaway system designed to receive audio, video, and data to\ninclude combinations of clear and encrypted broadcasts. It is a mission-scalable system allowing for flexibility in special circumstances to accommodate video and audio-only missions.\n\n## Improved Special Operations Communications Assemblage\n\nQuantity: 6 Units\n\n- Global radio communication device\nCapabilities\n- Provides voice, cipher, and encryption\n\n## Audio/Video Production Equipment\n\nQuantity: 3 units\n\n- Audio and video relay\nCapabilities\n\n- Can transmit to the EC130 Commando Solo or to the JPOTF from Fort Bragg\n\n## Deployable Audio Production System (Daps)\n\nQuantity: 4 units\n\n- Audio production system that can be moved around in the theater\nCapabilities\n\n- Mini-disc recorder and player - Sound editing equipment - CD player\n\n## Leaflet Delivery Systems\n\n- Provides accurate dissemination of large quantities of leaflets in denied areas from shortand long-range off-sites\n- Currently there are 2 short-range variants:\no Precision guided canister bomb (PGCB) o Wind supported aerial delivery system (WSADS)\n\n## M129E1 Leaflet Precision Guided Canister Bomb\n\n- Munitions-based delivery system with standoff distance of up to 40 nautical miles\nCapabilities\n\n- Can be deployed from a fixed wing aircraft and is used to disseminate PSYOP products - Can hold up to 30,000 machine- and hand-rolled leaflets - 3 to 4 soldiers needed to assist in loading leaflets - Can be mounted on F16, B52, and FA18\n\n## Wind Supported Aerial Delivery System (Wsads)\n\n- Powered parafoil UAV platform integrated with an airborne guidance unit and a payload\ndispensing system that can drop leaflets or other materials\n- Capable of both ground launch and air launch - Autonomous landings in a wide variety of unprepared\nterrains\n- 600 pounds total fuel and cargo - Maximum airspeed of 50 km/hr - Can fly more than 19 hours carrying 75100 pound of cargo - Autonomous payload deployment directly from cargo bay\n\n## Tactical Systems Family Of Loudspeakers (Fol)\n\n- Group of modular amplifiers/speakers forming loudspeakers - Provides spot and large-area broadcast capability - Enables communications with large audiences or harassment and\ndeception of enemies or target areas, either close in or at significant distances from operator\n- Portable, self-contained, high-performance loudspeaker systems capable of disseminating\nhigh-fidelity live and recorded messages from the mobile PSE in varied geographical areas and climatic conditions worldwide\n- Capable of broadcasting live or prerecorded messages from a cassette player, MP3 player,\nmini-disc, internal digital voice recorder, or wireless microphone providing flexibility to the end user\n- Ruggedized to withstand adverse environmental conditions - Meets MIL-STD 461 EMI requirements\n- Broadcast range of up to 23 miles - Provides capability to transmit audio (up to 144dB) - Operation temperature 13 F to +131F - Altitude function up to 15,000 ft - Relative humidity up to 100% - Amplifier distortion less than 0.5%\n\n## Manpack (Tpt-Tpd)\n\n- 2 battery-operated loudspeakers weighing 27 pounds that can easily be carried in soldier's\nmodified rucksack\n- Designed to make PSYOP messages mobile with\nPSYOP forces\n- Broadcast range of 7001,000M - Power output of 132dB@1m - Power source 3 BS 5590 or BA 590 batteries - Battery endurance of 8+ hours - Frequency response of 580 to 6000Hz - Ground reliability of 4,900 hours mean time between failure (MTBF)\n\n## Vehicle (Tactical Psyop Team [Tpt]/Tactical Psyop Detachment [Tpd])\n\n- FOL attached to M1025 or M1114 HMMWV; maritime\nversion is mounted on the Special Operations Mark V patrol craft, perfect for detaining or instructing suspicious watercraft\n- Shock mounted speakers - Six-speaker configuration for ground and water vehicles - Each system can be rotated 360 to reach target audience\n- Mobile PSYOP messages - Broadcast range of 1,0001,800M - Weighs 146 pounds - Power output of 137dB@1m - Power source of 24 to 32 VDC - Frequency response from 400 to 6,000 Hz - Ground frequency response of 2,200 hours MTBF - Naval frequency response of 1,500 hours MTBF\n\n## Aerial Loudspeaker System Description\n\n- FOL mounted on Blackhawk helicopter - One of the highest-powered FOLs\n- Weighs 290 pounds - Power output of 144dB @1m - Power source of 24 to 32 VDC - Frequency response between 5806,000Hz - Rotary frequency response 1,000 hours MTBF\n\n## Electronic News Gathering Kit\n\n- 1X Beta SX, SP, HI8, or DV camcorder - Associated equipment - 1 night vision lens - 1 light kit\no Collect digital video footage in all conditions for incorporation into PSYOP spots or\nnews features\n\nNon-SOCOM\nCost\n(MFP4)\nEC130J\n3 3 3\n$132,000\n$396,000\n$0\n$396,000\nEC130J Modular (no TV)\n3 3 2\n$117,000\n$234,000\n$60,000\n$174,000\nEC130E\n2 2 2\n$74,000\n$148,000\n$0\n$148,000\nSOMSB High Mobility Multi-\nWheeled Vehicle (HMMWV)\n48 24 24\n$35\n$840\n$0\n$840\nEC-130J Modular SME\n2 2 0\n$30,000\n$0 $0 $0\nMedia Production Center\n1 1 0\n$11,376\n$0 $0 $0\nTheater Media Production Center\n2 1 0\n$8,918\n$0 $0 $0\nFlyaway Broadcast Systems\n12\n4 0\n$3,572\n$0 $0 $0\nSpecial Operations Media System B\n(SOMSB)\n12\n6 6\n$6,090\n$36,540\n$36,540\n$0\nProduction Distribution System\n(PDS) R/T\n18 10\n5\n$1,385 $6,925 $6,925\n$0\nPDS R/O\n38 17\n0\n$1,002\n$0 $0 $0\nLong Range Broadcast System\nUnmanned Aerial Vehicle Payload\n21\n7 0\n$6,000\n$0 $0 $0\nSOCOM Cost\n(MFP11)\nFielded Inventory\nCost ($K)\nUnit Cost\n($K)\nQuantity\nto Date\nFunded\nThrough\n2005\nAppendix C: PSYOP On-Hand Inventory\nNumber\nAuthorized\nsItem Name\n\n*Helicopters used for FOL operations frequently are used for other operations and are not counted as PSYOP inventory. In cases where the PSYOP equipment carrier is not used for other purposes (C130, SOMSB, DPPC, FOL HMMWV), the carrier cost is included as part of the PSYOP inventory.\n\nTOTAL\n$857,813\n$122,598 $735,215\nVehicle FOL HMMWV\n352 352\n90\n$180\n$16,200\n$0\n$16,200\nDPPC HMMWV\n20\n5 5\n$35\n$175\n$0\n$175\nDeployable Print Production System\n(DPPC)\n20\n5 5\n$675\n$3,375 $3,375\n$0\nWind Supported Aerial Delivery\nSystem\n74 40\n2\n$350 $700 $700\n$0\nFamily of Loudspeakers (FOL)*\n0\n$0 $0 $0\nManpacks\n424 424 424 $11\n$4,664 $4,664\n$0\nVehicle/watercraft\n352 352 352 $26\n$9,152 $9,152\n$0\nAircraft\n22 22\n9\n$138\n$1,242 $1,242\n$0\n\n## Appendix D: Hardware Performance In Recent Operations And  Recapitalization Plan\n\nThis appendix reviews the performance of PSYOP equipment (including some items that were not designed for extensive use and harsh weather conditions) during OEF, OIF, and OIF2. It also provides information on SOCOM's current plans to recapitalize equipment based on the figures and data collected from OIF and OEF and makes some summary observations.\n\n## Specific Equipment Performance\n\nSOCOM reports that the equipment performed well considering that it was subjected to harsh environments of heat, dust, sand, shock, and vibration.  Some items were operated more hours than had been planned for, resulting in deterioration beyond reparability. Commando Solo Aircraft. Commando Solo supported both operations with numerous sorties. The aircraft logged 3,974 flight hours in OEF and 1,278 in OIF.  No missions were lost due to maintenance, reflecting good reliability.  Maintenance hours were about 9.5 per flight hour, which is normal. The EC130E airframe that flew during OEF and OIF is almost 30 years old and requires extensive maintenance.  The Commando Solo special mission equipment that flew during both operations represented 1970s technology.  The excellent reliability rates experienced during both operations were due to very senior and talented O&M Air National Guard personnel. EC130E altitude limitations forced Commando Solo to fly within the threat environments of antiaircraft and man-portable infrared surface-to-air missiles.  Its simultaneous (multifrequency) radio broadcast capability provided broad-spectrum coverage that increased its effectiveness.  However, its omnidirectional antennas precluded targeting of broadcasts into specific enemy areas.  During broadcast, the antennas saturate the aircraft's front-end electronics, resulting in limited situational awareness information that increased risks to aircraft survivability. PSYOP Broadcasting Systems. SOCOM reports that SOMSB and PDS operated around the clock for more than 2 years in harsh environments, resulting in increased maintenance. Civilian maintenance technician work hours increased from 40 to 112 per week, and an average of 3 full-time civilian maintenance technicians (a maximum of 6) were deployed to the war zone.  Iridium satellite phones provided a 24-hour-a-day communication link between maintenance technicians in the United States and overseas. Considering the operational environment, the equipment failure numbers are acceptable. SOMSB failures characterization:\n\n| Year                               | Number   |\n|------------------------------------|----------|\n| 2002                               | 183      |\n| 2003                               | 247      |\n| 2004                               | 61       |\n| Mean time between failures (MTBF): | 20 days  |\n| Mean time to repair (MTTR):        | 2 hours  |\n\nTwo of five SOMSB systems deployed in OEF were declared beyond economic repair upon their return to CONUS. Product Distribution System (PDS) failures characterization:\n\n| Year              | Number              |\n|-------------------|---------------------|\n| 2002              | 28                  |\n| 2003              | 70                  |\n| 2004              | 32                  |\n| MTBF:             | PDS (1,2,3)14 days |\n| PDS (4,5)35 days |                     |\n| MTTR:             | PDS (1,2,3)4 hours |\n| PDS (4,5)3 hours |                     |\n\nSystems 4 and 5 incorporated base band enhancements based on lessons learned. Deployable Print Production Center (DPPC) failures characterization:\n\n| Year   | Number      |\n|--------|-------------|\n| FY02   | 47          |\n| FY03   | 30          |\n| FY04   | 6 (to date) |\n| MTBF:  | 11 days     |\n| MTTR:  | 6 hours     |\n\nFamily of Loudspeakers. All FOL variants experienced heavy use in support of operations. Reports indicate that more desirable characteristics for FOL would be:\n\n\nsmaller size and lighter weight manpack loudspeakers\n\nmultidirectional broadcast capability\n\nextended range and increased power output for increased standoff distance\n\nmore durable loudspeaker systems to withstand military operations in urban terrain and desert environments.\nAncillary Equipment. Printers, laptops, and all other COTS electronic equipment had a common performance characteristic: they all suffered from the heat and the dusty, sandy environment.  Some equipment, such as the Product Work Station (light) Lunchbox System, was also exposed to vibration because of installation in HMMWVs and broke down within 2 weeks of deployment.  Failures due to such environmental factors can be fatal, resulting in the need for replacement rather than repair.\n\n## Recapitalization Plans Based On Oef And Oif Data\n\nBroadcast Systems. Two Psychological Operations Broadcast Systems (POBS), six SOMSB and PDSs, and one DPPC are currently fielded.  SOMSB has a life expectancy of 10 years. The first set of SOMSB systems will reach life expectancy in FY07.  A capital equipment replacement plan (CERP) has been developed and will be addressed in the FY08 POM.  The plan would procure two replacement SOMSB systems in FY09 and two in FY10.  Four SOMSB were refurbished in FY04.  Two systems were considered beyond economic repair after their return from OEF and will be replaced in FY05.  Consequently, their replacements will not need to be recapitalized until FY15. Distribution Systems. Five PDSs are currently fielded.  They will receive a complete overhaul and upgrade in FY05; hence, they will not require replacement until the FY09 timeframe.  A recapitalization plan has been developed that assumes commencement in FY09. Print Systems. Five DPPC systems are fielded; their life expectancy is 10 years.  DPPC has recently undergone a complete refurbishment and upgrade.  This system will not require replacements until the FY14 timeframe.  A CERP plan will be addressed in the FY10 POM. Commando Solo. There are no current plans to recapitalize Commando Solo, since the EC130J is considered a bridge mission until the full capabilities of the long-range broadcast mission are realized. Family of Loudspeakers. PSYOP strategy is to replace existing FOLs, which are late 1980s technology, with new technology when approved and funded in future POM cycles. Leaflet Delivery System. The wind-supported aerial delivery system has a predicted use expectancy of 7 years.  The first system was scheduled to be fielded in October 2004. Recapitalization has not yet been considered. The traditional leaflet bomb, MK129, is no longer suitable for operational use due to its age, lack of compatibility with current aircraft, and potential collateral damage to populations.  The PDU5B was heavily used at the onset of operations in OEF/OIF.\n\n## Summary\n\nThe reported performance indicates that the equipment was used intensively and in an environment that exceeded the design specifications.  This raises the question of whether reliance on COTS equipment is appropriate in all cases of PSYOP equipment acquisition.  It is a quick solution and an effective way to keep introducing new technology at the rate delivered by industry.  It would be interesting to compare the total life cycle cost of a series of COTS systems to meet a mission to the cost of a smaller number of \"ruggedized\" and more serviceable equipment.  The cost of configuration management required for logistics and for ensuring interoperability would have to be balanced against the benefit of new technology introduction.  As noted in the body of the report, however, there is a severe lack of funds for such acquisition studies for PSYOP equipment.\n\n## Appendix E: Psyop Basis Of Issue Plan And Unit Procurement Costs Rollup\n\n| System name         |   Authorized |   Funded |\n|---------------------|--------------|----------|\n| through             |              |          |\n| PB 05               |              |          |\n| EC130J             |              |          |\n| Commando Solo       |            3 |        3 |\n| 3                   |            3 |        2 |\n| EC130J Modular     |              |          |\n| Commando Solo       |              |          |\n| (No TV)             |              |          |\n| 2                   |            2 |        0 |\n| EC130J             |              |          |\n| Modular             |              |          |\n| Commando Solo       |              |          |\n| SME                 |              |          |\n| Media Operations    |              |          |\n| Center              |            1 |        1 |\n| Theater Media       |              |          |\n| Operations Center   |            2 |        1 |\n| Flyaway Broadcast   |              |          |\n| Systems             |           12 |        4 |\n| 12                  |            6 |        6 |\n| Special Operational |              |          |\n| Media System        |              |          |\n| Bravo               |              |          |\n| Print Distribution  |              |          |\n| System R/T          |           18 |       10 |\n| Print Distribution  |              |          |\n| System R/O          |           38 |       17 |\n| 21                  |            7 |        0 |\n| Long Range          |              |          |\n| Broadcast System    |              |          |\n| UAV-Payload         |              |          |\n| Deployable Print    |              |          |\n| Production System   |           20 |        5 |\n| 74                  |           40 |        2 |\n| Aerial Delivery     |              |          |\n| System              |              |          |\n| Family of           |              |          |\n| Loudspeakers        |              |          |\n| Manpacks            |          424 |      424 |\n| Vehicle/ Watercraft |          352 |      352 |\n| Aircraft            |           22 |       22 |\n\nShaded areas indicate funding shortfalls\n\nQuantity to Date\nUnit Cost ($K)\n\n## Appendix F: Review Of The Defense Science Board Report, The Advanced Concept Technology Demonstration, And Information Operations Roadmap Recommendations\n\nThe terms of reference for this report (see appendix A) required a review of opportunities to exploit advanced technology for PSYOP.  Accordingly, special consideration was given to the Defense Science Board (DSB) and the Advanced Concept Technology Demonstration (ACTD) reports, both of which took a detailed look at means to absorb new technology into the PSYOP program.  This appendix provides a brief summary of the DSB report and current ACTD activities and compares current SOCOM PSYOP technology development efforts with recommendations from the *IO Roadmap*.\n\n## The Dsb Report\n\nIn May 2000, the Defense Science Board issued a report prepared by its task force entitled \"The Creation and Dissemination of All Forms of Information in Support of Psychological Operations (PSYOP) in Time of Military Conflict.\"  We reviewed the report in the context of lessons learned from OEF and OIF.  While the scope of the DSB report is broader than the focus of this report, we believe the DSB findings related to technology are still valid.  In fact, recent evidence from events during OEF and OIF help validate the findings of the task force and give added force to its recommendations.  The reader is referred to the original report for details; only the more significant points are highlighted in this appendix. The task force was originally created to review the alleged limitations of the Commando Solo aircraft in disseminating TV and radio broadcasts in the Balkans.  The scope of the study was expanded to cover all radio and TV uses as an information instrument and the adequacy of U.S. Armed Forces to make use of such a tool during conflicts.\n\n## The Present State Of Technology Adoption In U.S. Psyop\n\nThe DSB task force reported that it had received many briefings that emphasized the increasing importance of PSYOP in the success of any action the U.S. Government undertakes overseas, whether diplomatic or military.  The task force also pointed out that, unlike our strong lead in military equipment, foreign competitors in PSYOP are on par with or arguably more sophisticated than the United States.  While the United States has, and maintains, a lead in world commercial media technology and development, foreign rivals are often more flexible and less restricted by outdated equipment and policy.185\n\n## Technological Environment For Peacekeeping Psyop Operations\n\nThe report explains that during peacekeeping operations, PSYOP forces would often have to compete against sophisticated, robust, indigenous media and with numerous hostile or neutral international media. It states that in this environment, military PSYOP would not have the ability to control the adversary's information outlets through destruction or jamming.186\n\n## Technology In Theater Psyop\n\nThe panel found that \"U.S. PSYOP forces cannot readily disseminate materials over the Internet or via commercial broadcast satellites.\"  Competitors are better funded and freer of restrictive policies.  Personnel are generally unsophisticated in this area, not trained in civilian marketing, polling, and media production skills.187\nThe report called Commando Solo's ability to broadcast from only 18,000 feet and its use of SME with decades-old technology vulnerable to jamming inadequate.  It also concluded that reliance on extensive reachback (supporting forward troops by dissemination of products developed in Fort Bragg) requires an enormous bandwidth through secure channels, which has often been very difficult to institute and support.188\n\n## Technology In Tactical Psyop\n\nThe panel identified loudspeaker operations, handbills, local radio broadcasts, and television programming as typical tactical PSYOP operations.  It further pointed out that the tactical segments of the PSYOP force are the most heavily tasked, and yet their tools could be overwhelmed by the power of electronic media that is now proliferating. The task force also expressed concern about the survivability of tactical PSYOP groups in a modern battlefield when deployed in a lightly armored HMMWV equipped with loudspeakers capable of only short range.  The panel recommended remote accomplishment of the mission via a heavily armored manned vehicle or unmanned vehicles capabilities we do not currently have.189\n\n## The Future Vision For Technology For Operational Psyop\n\nThe panel envisioned a future PSYOP force using a variety of manned and unmanned vehicles, some based in space, some commercial, and some owned by DOD or other agencies. Tactical units will be able to use these capabilities as well as perform newsgathering duties for transmission to Fort Bragg for further processing.  The panel concluded that the rather small Army PSYOP forces have a \"Cold War-oriented structure, often antiquated equipment, and limited financial support [and] yet, PSYOP is inundated with requests for support from the geographic combatant commanders to get information to foreign target audiencesaudiences that are being served by an ever expanding array of information dissemination options.\"190  It further stated that \"Until a 'road map' for the future of PSYOP is drafted and implemented, it is difficult to see how PSYOP can remain relevant and develop the capabilities to best serve the geographic combatant commanders. As the first step to remedy the deficiencies within military PSYOP, the DSB recommended that the Department of Defense draft a military PSYOP Vision as well as an accompanying future PSYOP Operational Concept.\"191  SOCOM\nhas done so, as indicated in the body of this report.\n\n## Measures Of Effectiveness For Psyop Technology\n\nThe panel recommended using the following measures of effectiveness.192\n\n- Receivability: How well did the physical message propagate to the intended\narea? Could it be jammed?\n- Receipt: How often did members of the target audience tune in to the\nmessage? Did they have the right receivers? Could they read? Did they read and speak the language, dialect, and argot in which the message was framed?\n- Receptivity: How favorably did the target audience respond to the\nmessage? Did they change their behavior in a favorable direction? Did it matter?\n\n## The Specifics\n\nThe task force reviewed technological trends for mass media dissemination and then specifically addressed the dissemination of radio and TV from aircraft.  The task force believes technology is moving toward systems and means of dissemination unfavorable to current PSYOP equipment:\n\n\nCable transmission is quickly becoming the preferred mode for (terrestrial) TV in most developing countries.  Further, high-definition TV seems to be the next improvement for the medium.  Transmission is now available in both analog and digital protocols, but the task force believes that transition to digital format is inevitable.  Both cable and digital transmission are incompatible with current Commando Solo equipment.\n\nRadio is quickly converting to digital transmission mode, making it incompatible with Commando Solo as well.\n\nSpace-based TV and radio are becoming popular in the developing world, and their transmission method is creating problems for PSYOP equipment.  It is mostly digital, quite directional (which would require very special positioning of Commando Solo or other equipment), and uses frequencies not used by existing PSYOP equipment.\n\nTelephony is also expanding rapidly and becoming very adept at incorporating multimedia capabilities in its cellular structure.  This may be an area that can be exploited with new equipment.\n\nThe Internet is a major new information transition method, and the task force makes a point of the need to exploit it with new systems and approaches.\nTo summarize the breadth of possibilities, the report includes a table of various distribution methods made available by the new technologies and the possible associated content:193\nThe report also briefly addressed the underlying physics of transmission of radio and TV signals from aircraft.  It points out that the distance a signal can reach is controlled by the height of the antenna, the effective power (power and antenna gain), the frequency, and the receiver's own noise characteristics.  The discussion focuses on the fact that the range is proportional to the square root of antenna heightand therefore a 100 percent increment in height implies only a 40 percent increase in range.  Given the power available in Commando Solo and the increase in altitude possible by upgrading from the C130E to the C130J aircraft, the task force recommended against the expenditure of funds for this transition. (Nonetheless, Congress funded it, and the C130J is now in the inventory.)\n\n## Recommendations\n\nFinally, three of the task force's recommendations deal specifically with technologies. They are reproduced verbatim as follows:\n\n## A. Recommendation 6\n\nThe Task Force recommends that the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) work with the Department of State to fund, position, exercise, and maintain suitable distribution channels and brand identities, insofar as these can be reasonably anticipated for future PSYOP requirements. Policies with respect to the use of new and emerging transnational media need to be developed or refined. Liberal reliance on recognized professionals and the generous use of highly qualified commercial entities are highly recommended. Buying good content on which the messages will \"ride\" is a necessary and desirable expenditure. The Task Force estimates this investment to be approximately $10 million per year.194\n\n## B. Recommendation 7\n\nThe Task Force recommends that DOD acquire the technical capability to understand emerging media dissemination techniques and technologies. Furthermore, DOD should provide the resources to acquire (rent or purchase) emerging media content and dissemination channels from commercial organizations. Here, DOD may be able to acquire good channels very cheaply by means of being an \"anchor tenant.\" The Task Force estimates this investment to be approximately $10 million per year.195\n\n## C. Recommendation 8\n\n\nThe Task Force recommends that DOD maintain the current EC130E Commando\nSolo fleet with existing Special Mission Equipment (SME). The estimated cost of $250 million to cross-deck the SME to a EC130J platform is not justified by the marginal increase in performance offered by this option. In addition, future worldwide media dissemination trends will limit the effectiveness of radio and TV broadcasts. The Task Force recommends that USSOCOM investigate the creation of small and easily reconfigurable information-dissemination packages that would be compatible with multiple platforms, including UAVs and leased aircraft, for a variety of missions. The Task Force estimates the initial investment for design and\ndevelopment of these packages to be $10 to $20 million per year.196\n\n## Summary Of The Dsb Report\n\nThe task force identified several dissemination technologies and trends in their growth.  To a large degree, current PSYOP capability is not well positioned to exploit these trends.  The task force recommended against expenditures for Commando Solo upgrades and instead proposed expenditure on small, modular information disseminations packages.  It also made recommendations regarding the access and exploitation of commercial channels, using strong U.S. marketing skills.\n\n## The Advanced Concept Technology Demonstration:  Psyop Global Reach\n\nThis section of the appendix reproduces the rationale for the ACTD and summarizes its essential characteristics.  The premise of the ACTD is that joint PSYOP forces lack sufficient capabilities to access audiences in denied areas.  Current capabilities consist of leaflets and handbills (legacy technology, high risk in denied areas), AM and FM radio (extremely limited range), and Commando Solo (slow response, resource-intensive, limited range, vulnerable). Additionally, joint PSYOP forces lack critical analytical tools to plan, develop, coordinate, execute, and evaluate (by specific measures of effectiveness) PSYOP missions across the entire spectrum of conflict. Started in FY04, the ACTD is to identify, assess, and field a limited number of equipment demonstrating technological solutions for warfighter needs.  It will improve joint PSYOP capabilities to disseminate information across extended ranges into denied areas and improve planning and analytic capability.197 Measures of success for long-range dissemination include:198\n\n\ndistance\n\nability to penetrate denied areas\n\nability to operate/disseminate continuously in denied areas\n\ndispersion area of a message in urban and rural areas.\nMeasures for planning and assessment tools are:199\n\n\nrapid identification of the proper target audience and cultural message\n\nmeasurement of message dispersion via various media\n\nmeasurement of message reception by the target audience\n\nmeasurement of the effectiveness and speed of planning approval, production, and dissemination\n\nability to leverage other sectors of knowledge and expertise (Hollywood, Madison Avenue, academia, industry).\nSeveral future technologies have been mentioned as potential candidates, such as holographic image projection, laser light messages, automated PSYOP decisionmaking tools and software, advanced sound projection, and language translation and replication.  While these future technologies will be monitored, the ACTD will assess and evolve nearer-term technologies, characterized by a technology readiness level of 5.200  These include:\n\n\nsatellite broadcast and receivers\n\ndirect TV\n\ntext messaging to cellular phones\n\nInternet broadcast\n\nadvanced delivery methods (Helios solar wing aircraft and high-altitude aircraft system)\n\nair-deliverable scatterable media (pre-programmed loudspeakers and re-transmitters)\n\nPSYOP planning software.\nTechnologies being reviewed by the ACTD will replace aging technology and will be incorporated into existing SOCOM acquisition programs.  Residuals of the various demonstrations will be supported by regular SOCOM contracts.\n\n## Funding And Schedule\n\nFunding for these technologies under the ACTD will focus on long-range dissemination of PSYOP in denied areas and planning and assessment collaborative planning tools.  The concept of operations of the technologies to achieve these will include employment from CONUS as well as in-theater.  Development of refined joint tactics and procedures will be an integral part of the ACTD. A phased spiral development approach will be used to demonstrate the technologies and, through the residuals of the ACTD, improve warfighter capabilities.  Several exercises have been identified as possible testing events. Phase 1 (second quarter FY06) will be a combination of off-the-shelf commercial packages that are tailored to the job at hand.  It will focus on getting the message to target audiences in permissive and nonpermissive environment through demonstration of a network of UAVs or airships and other platforms with PSYOP broadcast/repeater payloads and current system (Commando Solo, SOMSB, Theater Media Production Center, satellite systems) to provide full-spectrum PSYOP capability (digital, audio, visual, and printed).201\nPhase 2 (first quarter FY07) will explore available and adaptable technologies to enhance PSYOP capabilities to provide data mining to analyze target audience; tailor and choose mission-enabling PSYOP themes and messages; review results; provide information management tools; and enhance PSYOP capabilities and decisionmaking.202\nPhase 3 (third quarter FY09) will integrate and demonstrate a smoothly functioning system of PSYOP systems/technologies through all phases of PSYOP from analysis of audience to development of message, distribution, and dissemination and analysis of results.203\n\n| SOURCE   | FY04   | FY05   | FY06   | FY07   | FY08   | FY09   | TOTAL   |\n|----------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|---------|\n| SOCOM    | 3.0M   | 3.0M   | 6.0M   | 6.0M   | 6.0M   | 5.0M   | 29.0M   |\n| 8.2M     | 17.2M  | 11.5M  | 4.9M   | 3.6M   | 3.1M   | 48.5M  | SOCOM   |\n| *In-Kind |        |        |        |        |        |        |         |\n| TOTAL    | 11.2M  | 20.2M  | 17.5M  | 10.9M  | 9.6M   | 8.1M   | 77.5M   |\n| ACTD/OSD | 2.9M   | 6.65M  | 3.95M  | 2.0M   | 15.5M  |        |         |\n| (20%)    |        |        |        |        |        |        |         |\n\n* Represents funding associated with technology prototypes and hardware/software from SOCOM acquisition programs that will be used in ACTD demonstrations and assessments\n\n## Risk Assessment\n\nHighlights of the ACTD's risk assessment follow:\n\n\n\"Funding risk is low to medium.  USSOCOM funding ($29M) is based on a program\ndecision memorandum (PDM) specifically detailed for a PSYOP ACTD.\"205\n\nFunding from OSD must support the schedule as well.  \"Should these funds not be forthcoming, the demonstrations of the ACTD will be forced into a lengthy schedule to comply with the funding profile dictated by the PDM as well as the decreasing the\nresiduals and technologies to be demonstrated.\"206\n\n\"Risk associated with availability of unmanned platforms for use in the ACTD is low to medium for various tactical UAVs, medium to high for other UAVs, HAA, and\nother platforms such as the Helios solar wing.\"207\n\n\"Schedule risk is low to medium, depending on availability of unmanned platforms to demonstrate PSYOP payloads and networking concepts, and on the OSD funding as\nmentioned above.\"208\n\n## Residuals\n\nA key part of any ACTD is that it develops for use, demonstrates, and leaves behind a number of operational units of equipment.  This provides some usable capability immediately and gives the operating forces some items to experiment with, thus providing a robust avenue for feedback.  It also provides for the beginning of a transition from R&D to acquisition in support of the validated requirement on the basis of which the ACTD was established.\n\nFor this ACTD, residuals include:209\n\n| Satellite broadcast/radios       | 500 units   |          FY04   |\n|----------------------------------|-------------|-----------------|\n| Satellite service (radio)        | 60 days     | FY05            |\n| Satellite service (TV)           | 60 days     | FY04            |\n| UAV payload (FM/TV/AM)           | 2 units     | FY05            |\n| UAV rebroadcast (satellite)      | 2 units     | FY05            |\n| Scatterable media (transmitters) | 500 units   | FY06            |\n| (loudspeakers)                   | 500 units   |                 |\n| PSYOP Planning Software          | 1unit       | FY06            |\n\n(Includes Internet/text messaging integration)\n\n## Notable Opportunities And Programmed Improvements\n\nThe constant flow of commercial off-the-shelf and non-developmental items technology is improving current capability of PSYOP forces.  Beyond this welcome, modest, and routine upgrade, some programs are more noteworthy in that they provide a more significant increase in capability.  Given the problems identified as particularly onerous shortfalls in this study, we believe that the following developments provide the more significant advances in capability:\n\n\nProduct Distribution System: Video transmission among systems is very resourceintensive at 6-8 megs/second.  Accordingly, the JPOTF and higher command often reserve the use of bandwidth (and MILSAT) for uses other than PSYOP.  The PDS, using improved video compression techniques recently developed, will be able to transmit information between systems in theater and systems in CONUS (using significantly less bandwidth) instead of relying on MILSAT exclusively, and thus enhance communications and product distribution.\n\nThe Leaflet Delivery System: Using a wind supported aerial delivery system (a parafoil and guided UAV combination) will provide the ability to deliver payloads to multiple areas flying as high as 18,000 feet, for distances up to 800 miles, at speeds up to 35 miles per hour (trades between these parameters will be made depending on the mission).\n\nCommando Solo: Transition to the C130J aircraft (by Congressional support) provides the option to upgrade and modularize the existing payload.  Of more significance, the new aircraft, given additional funding, can be able to control a UAV that can then penetrate disputed area without endangering personnel.\n\nFamily of Loudspeakers: While technologically more mundane, reduced weight speakers will increase the usability of FOL systems.\n\n## Summary Of The Actd Report\n\nThis ACTD is providing needed capability extension to PSYOP systems.  The need to reach deeper into contested territory was demonstrated in both OEF and OIF, and this R&D and acquisition effort will help meet that need.  The ACTD also addresses the need to improve communications between tactical units and provide reachback to CONUS.  In addition, a tool for more effective campaign planning is also being developed and will be tested under this ACTD.\n\n## Comparison Of Socom Program And Actd With Information Operations Roadmap\n\nThe *IO Roadmap* issued by the Secretary of Defense on October 30, 2003, identified several PSYOP shortfalls.  Here is how the SOCOM program for PSYOP and the ACTD currently address those shortfalls.\n\n## Shortfall 1: Rapid Generation And Dissemination Of Quality Products Against Diverse Audiences\n\n- The POBS program is funded and is actively procuring equipment and systems against\nvalidated requirements.\n- With a view to FY08 funding, a formal requirement for PSYOP print systems is being\nreviewed by the user community for submission to SOCOM.  Until that time, the PSYOP acquisition program is seeking via the SOCOM unfunded requirement process.\n- Wideband satellite capability on the Commando Solo EC130J will allow receipt of\nPSYOP products and updates of products while the aircraft is en route to or executing its mission. Wideband satellite compatibility for Commando Solo will be fully funded with $6 million in procurement funds in FY0607.\n\n## Shortfall 2: Dissemination Of Products Into Denied Areas\n\n- Enhanced altitude capability of the Commando Solo EC130J is increasing transmitter\nrange.  While this is an improvement over C130E capability, it is a small step, since the increase in altitude is only 7,000 feet (less than 50 percent), and the range increase is governed by a square root function (that is, a 14 percent increase in range.)\n- The PSYOP Global Reach ACTD is addressing area dissemination concerns as one of its\nprimary pursuits.  It is investigating various unmanned vehicles that may meet the requirement.  Initial broadcast payload and UAV integration are being conducted on the WSADS UAV.  This system can carry up to 575 pounds (or increase its range by reducing payload weight) to deliver products into denied areas to a diverse audience.\n\n## .\n\nShortfall 3: Timely, long-range dissemination with a variety of delivery systems\n- A long-range broadcast system analysis of alternative study is currently under way.  This\nstudy will provide alternatives to providing long-range broadcast dissemination.\n\nNotes\n1 Dr. Chris Lamb is a Senior Military Fellow in the Institute for National Strategic Studies at the National Defense University.  The views expressed in this report are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the policy or positions of the National Defense University, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government.\n\n2 See appendix A for the tasking letter and terms of reference for the study.\n\n3 A wide variety of insights about PSYOP performance in recent operations that might constitute \"informal lessons learned\" were made available to the study team, some from organizations and individuals in the PSYOP and Special Operations community, but also from the services and other institutions charged with capturing lessons on recent operational experience.  See the bibliography for specific sources.\n\n4 Department of Defense, Joint Publication 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms (Washington, DC: Joint Staff, March 23, 1994.)\n5 Headquarters, United States Army Special Operations Command, Special Operations Forces Information, Primer. Available at http://www.soc.mil/sofinfo/primer.shtml.\n\n6  United States Army Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Command (ACAPOC), \"Psychological Operations Fact Sheet.\" Available at <http://www.soc.mil/usacapoc/capoc_default.htm>.\n\n7  Department of Defense, Joint Publication 3-53, *Doctrine for Joint Psychological Operations* (Washington, DC: Joint Staff, September 5, 2003), I-5 (hereafter cited as JP 3-53).\n\n8 United States Army, Field Manual 3-05.30, *Psychological Operations* (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, June 2000), 12, 13 (hereafter cited as FM-3-05.30).\n\n9  4th Psychological Operations Group, Mission Statement. Available at\n<http://www.poas.socom.smil.mil/misc/mission.html>.\n\n10 Department of Defense, *Information Operations Roadmap*, October 30, 2003 (hereafter cited as IO\nRoadmap). SECRET.\n\n11  Department of Defense, \"Psychological Warfare Fact Sheet.\" Available at\n<http://korea50.army.mil/index.html>.\n\n12  Dorothy E. Denning, *Information Warfare and Security* (Reading, MA: Addison Wesley, 1999), 7.\n\n13 LTC Frank G. Hoffman, USMC (ret.), \"One Decade LaterDebacle in Somalia,\" U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings 130, no. 1 (January 2004).\n\n14 See Stephanie R. Kelley, CPT, USAF, \"Rumors in Iraq: A Guide to Winning Hearts and Minds,\" master's thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, September 2004.  Kelley identifies how rumors in Iraq function and what we can learn from them.  With attention to differing American and Arab cultural communication styles, she recommends tailored rumor remedies (classified as proactive, reactive, and damage control), including observations on how the coalition information campaign could tailor messages to address significant Iraqi concerns and fears.\n\n15 JP 3-53, 1314; FM 3-05.30, A-1; United States Army, Field Manual 3-05.301, Psychological Operations Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, December 2003 [hereafter cited as FM 3-05.301]).\n\n16 Dr. Kelton Rhoads provides an interesting overview of sources and varying taxonomies of persuasive communication tactics at <www.workingpsychology.com>.  Dr. Rhoads teaches at the Annenberg School for Communication and in the Psychology Department at the University of Southern California.  See also the lists of techniques in FM 3-05.301, 5-11, 5-12, 11-2211-26.\n\n17 Source documents for the following sections include Charles Swett, \"Principles of Effective Information Campaigns,\" prepared for the Department of Defense in 1995; COL Benjamin F. Findley, Jr., USAFR, \"Blending Military and Civilian PSYOP Paradigms,\" in *Psychological Operations: Principles and Case Studies*, ed. COL Frank L. Goldstein, USAF (Maxwell AFB: Air University Press, 1996), 5165; Robert H. Gass and John S. Seiter, *Persuasion, Social Influence, and Compliance Gaining,* 2d ed. (Boston: Pearson Education, 2003); Erwin P. Bettinghaus and Michael J. Cody, *Persuasive Communication,* 5th ed. (New York: Wadsworth, 1994); and Garth S. Jowett and Victoria O'Donnell, *Propaganda and Persuasion,* 2d ed. (Newbury Park, CA: Sage Publications, 1992).\n\n18 This point raises delicate policy issues about restrictions on information sources when it is within the power of the United States to do so. The conclusion of the report argues that one way to improve the competitiveness of PSYOP is to temporarily disrupt adversary communication channels.\n\n19 FM 3-05.301. Chapter 5 on target audience analysis and Chapter 11 on propaganda analysis and counterpropaganda demonstrate significant functional expertise.\n\n20 There is disagreement as to whether PSYOP more closely resembles commercial marketing or social marketing.  It might be observed that audience- and behavior-specific PSYOP has much in common with commercial marketing and its bottom line: buying behavior.  In contrast, general audience- and non-behaviorspecific PSYOP has more in common with social marketing, which attempts to change attitudes or beliefs as an inducement to behavioral change.  In any case, it is not necessary to elaborate on these distinctions here, since despite differences in market environment and definitions of \"customers\" and \"competition,\" commercial marketing and social marketing rely on the shared principles and best practices enumerated above.\n\n21 United States Army Special Operations Command Web site. One PSYOP professional asserts that\n\"PSYOP alone accomplishes little. PSYOP is dependent upon the credibility and truthfulness of the message.\" MAJ Stephen C. Larsen, USA, \"Conducting Psychological Operations in Sophisticated Media Environments\" (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Army Command and General Staff College, 1999), 25.\n\n22 The study team agrees with Gass and Seiter (2830) that there is not a distinct difference between persuasion and coercion, but rather a continuum of variation between the two.\n\n23 Gass and Seiter, 2930.\n\n24 Referred to in PSYOP TTPs as \"psychological agents of action.\"  See FM 3-05.301, 625.\n\n25 Charles H. Briscoe, Richard L. Kiper, James A. Schroeder, and Kalev I. Sepp, Weapon of Choice: ARSOF\nin Afghanistan  (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press), 113.\n\n26 For more details, see United States Central Command, \"Campaign Plan: *Enduring Freedom*,\" annex C, tab D.\n\n27United States Central Command, \"Campaign Plan for *Enduring Freedom*: Information Operations,\"\nappendix 3 to annex C (Operations), C-3-8.\n\n28 Herbert A. Friedman, \"Psychological Operations in Afghanistan,\" in *Perspectives* 14, no. 4 (2002).  Also available at  <http://www.psywarrior.com/Herbafghan.html>.\n\n29 Briscoe and Kiper, 102. 30 Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL), \"On Point: The United States Army in *Iraqi Freedom*\" (Fort Leavenworth, August 11, 2004), chapter 4 (hereafter cited as \"On Point\"). Also available at <http://onpoint.leavenworth.army.mil/>.\n\n31 Joint PSYOP objectives are taken from JP 3-53, chapter 4, 2, and chapter 6, 2.  For Army doctrine, see FM\n3-05, A1A5.\n\n32 JP 3-53, chapter 4, 2. The most notable similarity between the list used in this research and the five joint PSYOP general objectives is the emphasis on reducing the capability of opposing forces.  However, joint PSYOP doctrine states that PSYOP should reduce the \"efficiency,\" and we thought \"effectiveness\" was more to the point. The five general objectives for PSYOP in joint doctrine are:\n\n-\nsupport and enhance foreign humanitarian assistance, foreign internal defense, and/or foreign national assistance military operations\n-\nreduce the efficiency of opposing forces\n-\nobtain the cooperation of allies and neutrals in any psychological operations effort\n-\nfurther U.S. and/or multinational effort by modifying, changing or reinforcing attitudes and behavior of selected foreign [audiences]\n-\nfacilitate reorganization and control of occupied or liberated areas in conjunction with civil-military operations.\n33 Army PSYOP doctrine also does a good job of providing illustrative lists of sub-objectives or tasks, albeit organized under discussion of \"functions\" and as examples in \"planning.\"  See FM3-05, chapter 4, and chapter 7, 711. to success,\" and that in declared war, \"PSYOP is a proven force multiplier that enhances the effectiveness of cited as CJCSI 3110.05C).\n\n35 Venerable sources on stability operations agree on this point, as do more recent reviews of requirements for success in stability operations.  There is less agreement on the tactics used to influence popular will.  For example, C.E. Callwell, a veteran of British colonial wars, argues in Small Wars: Their Principles and Practice (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1996) that while regrettable, it was occasionally necessary to tolerate greater amounts of punitive strikes against economic targets and associated collateral damage.  In contrast, the Marine Corps *Small Wars Manual* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1940) argues for much more restraint and minimizing collateral damage.  The approach of the Marines seems more appropriate for American social and cultural norms.  For an argument that PSYOP in particular is critically important in stability operations, see Chris Lamb, \"Information Age Technology and Operations Other Than War,\" in War in the Information Age (Cambridge, MA: Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, 1997).\n\n36 A recent Army lessons learned effort underscores the point that the behavior of the ground forces in general sends powerful messages and provides an example of how PSYOP helped communicate U.S. intent when entering mosques in OIF 2 in search of imams preaching violence.  Center for Army Lessons Learned, \"Operation *Iraqi Freedom* (OIF) CAAT II Initial Impressions Report (IIR),\" report no. 04-13 (May 2004), 16, 2526 (hereafter cited as OIF IIR).\n\n37 \"Allied Views on PSYOP Operational Lessons Learned,\" commentary from allied information operations experts in response to inquiry on U.S. PSYOP performance in OEF and OIF, August 27, 2004 (hereafter cited as Allied Views on PSYOP):  \"On occasions U.S. PSYOPS appeared to be too focused on 'warfighting' issues rather than wider issues and could therefore be too direct and aggression to the detriment of the overall long-term mission objectives.\"\n38 Cable from USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB to RUFDAVC/CDRVCORPS HEIDELBERG\nGE//J3/IO//RUESOC/COMJPOTF CC FT BRAGG NC; Subject: CFC FRAGO 09-304 to OPORD 09\n39 A more detailed review and actual excerpts from the objectives are available in the classified annex to this report.\n\n40 See CALL, OIF IIR, 4. 41 Ibid., iii, 5. 42 The Defense Intelligence Agency's Human Factors Analysis Center produced some survey reports on Iraqi attitudes during OIF, but in our estimation the information is too scant to support generalized conclusions.\n\n43 As one PSYOP commander noted, asking for money for a survey in a military headquarters is at best considered unusual.  As a public affairs official responsible for information activities noted, PSYOP forces lack the training to do polling systematically and professionally so that effects can be more reliably measured. Therefore, even if the environment is stable enough to permit outsourcing, the costs are considerable.\n\n44 CALL, \"On Point.\" The report observes that: \"the majority of Iraqi soldiers just melted away, offering relatively light, if any, resistance. Yet, it was unclear whether this was a deliberate tactic to preserve the force, the result of the extended PSYOP campaign, the result of the ongoing attacks on their command and control systems, the result of their fear of coalition combat power, or simply as close as the soldiers could come to a formal capitulation given the tight control imposed by the layers of security services.\"\n45 See the previous note.  It should be added, as the Army report notes (chapter 7, \"Implications\"), that Iraqi security forces took U.S. PSYOP efforts quite seriously.  They not only worked hard to collect leaflets as quickly as they fell, they exacted steep penalties for those caught with the leaflets.  The report concluded that:\nPsychological Operations (PSYOP) achieved important success but experienced some disappointments as well. PSYOP units can point with satisfaction to success in minimizing damage to the oil fields and keeping civilians off roads.  However, they do so with risk since there is very little evidence available yet to support that contention. It is entirely possible that the Iraqis chose not to fire their oil wells for their own reasons. Moreover, the PSYOP effort enjoyed far less success in encouraging Iraqi units to surrender. Clearly the regime respected the effort since Iraqi security forces worked hard to collect leaflets as quickly as they fell. Nonetheless, it is clear that on the whole, PSYOP produced much less than expected and perhaps less than claimed.\n\nofficial lessons learned that discussed psychological operations.  However, representatives from all the services provided the study effort with input on lessons learned.\n\n49 See the bibliography for informal sources of lessons learned. 50 Joint Staff Operation Iraqi Freedom Lessons Learned.  (SECRET/NOFORN) 51 United States Joint Forces Command, \"Joint Lessons Learned: Operation *Iraqi Freedom* Major Combat Operations Briefing,\" March 1, 2004.\n\n52 4th Psychological Operation Group (ABN), \"Lessons Learned OIF and OEF Briefing,\" March 12, 2004. 53 See section on \"Observations on Reasonable Goals for PSYOP Effects\" in this study for details.\n\n54 The bibliography to this report cites all the lesson learned studies.\n\n55 The classified annex to the report enumerates the specific lessons learned, classified and unclassified. 56 PSYOP lessons learned from Somalia (4th POG) ;Joint Psychological Operations Task Force Haiti,\n\"PSYOP Lessons Learned Operation *Uphold Democracy*,\" October 16, 1994 (hereafter cited as JPOTF Haiti).\n\n57 Center for Army Lessons Learned, \"Operation *Just Cause:* Lessons Learned, Volume II: Operations,\"\nOctober 1990; Liberia; and Somalia (4th POG).\n\n58 Lessons learned from Kosovo.\n\n59 For example, lessons learned from Somalia; see Company B, 9th Psychological Operations Battalion,\n\"Lessons Learned for Tactical Psychological Operations in Somalia (After-Action Review),\" March 10, 1994.\n\n60 For example, lessons learned from Bosnia; see 4th Psychological Operations Group, \"USASOC Bosnia-\nHerzegovina After-Action Report,\" April 22, 1998.\n\n61 Ibid. 62 Ibid.\n\n63 PSYOP lessons learned from the first Persian Gulf War included\n\n-\nthe approval process was not responsive and needs to be improved\n-\nPSYOP needs to be employed earlier in a conflict to improve deterrence and decrease the adversary's will to resist\n-\nPSYOP needs more qualified linguists\n-\nmore active duty PSYOP forces are needed in order to be able to cover more than one contingency.\nThe report to Congress on the first Gulf War can be found at <http://www.ndu.edu/library/epubs/cpgw.pdf>; PSYOP lessons learned are on page 623.\n\n64 JPOTF Haiti. 65 Joint Staff Message, dated 072138Z OCT 01, Subject: Approved Strategic Information Campaign Objectives and Themes for Operation Enduring Freedom, (S/REL USA/GCTF).\n\n66 Commander in Chief, United States Central Command (USCINCCENT), \"Campaign Plan For Enduring Freedom: Psychological Operations,\" November 19, 2001, tab D, appendix 3, annex C.\n\n67 USCINCCENT OPLAN 1003VChange One, Psychological Operations, 24 January 2003;\nUSCENTCOM Message, dated 171441Z July 03, Subject: CFC FRAGO 09-304 to OPORD 09, OIF, Tab D to Appendix 3 to Annex C.\n\n68 Presumably, the lack of national guidance on themes might also make commanders more risk adverse in approving PSYOP products that might have some blowback potential.  This in turn might delay approvals and disrupt the timing that is an important element in a quality PSYOP effort.  This observation is conjecture; it did not emerge from the data we were able to collect.\n\n69 It seems safe to assert that inconsistent themes and messages are much less likely to produce desired effects.  Theoretically, it might be argued that inconsistent themes could still be applied for desired effect if they could be isolated within target audiences, but this possibility is increasingly remote in a world of global communications. Operations.\" Report no. 04-13. Fort Leavenworth, KS, May 2004; 7, 16 (hereafter cited as IIR: OIF Information\n72 Ibid, 28ff.\n\nThe brigades are not staffed with IO personnel, and have limited IO assets, with the core capability of PSYOP (five TPTs) and related elements of CA and PA. They are also not authorized a PAO, but most commanders have designated one.  IO in the division is mainly decentralized. The guidance they receive from division is the weekly talking points.  This has been a common thread with all the BCTs.  They use these as general guidance in developing their own talking points specific to their AOR, as well as their engagement plan.  The talking points are used at all levels of command, from brigade to company, in their engagements with tribal and local leaders and Imams.  The CA teams use them as well.  Again, the most effective means of getting the message out seems to be with face-to-face and word of mouth.\n\n73 See the classified JULLS report for the statistics on Iraqi access to television and radio.  JULLS Number\n42937-11189 (02568).\n\n74 CALL, \"On Point.\" The report notes how the destroyed radio stations affected V Corps efforts to restore order:\nV Corps moved rapidly to restore internal security. Looters, opportunists, and regime die-hards all threatened to gain control of the cities in the power vacuum left in the aftermath of the Ba'ath regime's collapse.  To counter this, V Corps seized the radio station at Abu Ghurayb to provide a means to disseminate messages to the people of Baghdad.  Unfortunately, the station was too damaged to broadcast, so PSYOP teams resorted to mobile transmitting equipment instead.\n\n75 Allied Views on PSYOP. 76 Franks, 377.  General Franks' emerging concept for OIF included five fronts, one of which was reserved for psychological operations.\n\n77 Our interviews also underscored the difficulties associated with reestablishing trust and a good working relationship with the land forces component commander.\n\n78 One Army assessment made this point in particular with respect to stability operations in OIF 2, noting that \"U.S. commanders grapple with the concept of information operations across the range of military operations. While some affirm that this [i.e. OIF 2] is an IO fight and that it should be the priority for Coalition efforts, others believe that IO is not an option, but that offensive operations should be the main effort of this stability operations phase. See CALL, OIF IIR, 5.\n\n79 Disparaging comments about PSYOP activities are not hard to uncover.  One Air Force flag officer reportedly referred to M129 leaflet bombs as \"litter bombs,\" but this comment should not be taken as a statement on the Air Force's interest in PSYOP.  Similar expressions of skepticism can be found among other service general officers.\n\n80 Deployment of some PSYOP units to theater in OIF was delayed.  As a result, they were not able to integrate well with some ARCENT and MARCENT maneuver units.  Reportedly, the decision to assign a late, or lower priority, deployment sequence for these PSYOP forces was made by a relatively junior officer in Army's Forces Command headquarters. CENTCOM leaders corrected the problem once they understood what had happened, but the delay, coupled with the decision to launch the war before all forces were in position, meant the some ground units initially had to operate with limited or no PSYOP support.  This fact contributes to, but does not fully explain, the dissatisfaction of Army and Marine commanders with PSYOP support.  See issue seven on the theater-tactical gap in PSYOP capabilities in this section of the report.\n\n81 It is not clear from interviews whether this is a function of the importance attributed to public affairs by commanders or their skepticism about the importance of PSYOP.  Some sources suggest it is because it is easier to get approval for public affairs products than for PSYOP products.\n\n82 JP 3-53, I-5. 83 United States Special Operations Command (SOCOM), \"Joint Psychological Vision, July 2002,\"\nHeadquarters, United States Special Operations Command, Intelligence and Information Operations Center, Information Operations Directorate (July 19, 2002), 1 (hereafter cited as SOCOM Joint Psychological Vision).\n\n84 *IO Roadmap*. 85 SOCOM Joint Psychological Vision, 2. 86 It is interesting to note that the United States ended up with three different information efforts in World War II because of debate over the appropriate roles and themes for each organization.  Notably, the U.S. Army, not trusting the civilian-controlled Office of Strategic Services with sensitive invasion plans, created its own psychological warfare organization, the Psychological Warfare Service, to support tactical- and operational-level military operations.  Timothy J. Doorey, CDR, USN, \"Role of Public Diplomacy and Psychological Operations in Winning the War against Islamist Terrorism,\" research project, Naval War College, Newport, RI (June 5, 2002), 48.\n\n87 It is surprising that some PSYOP officers casually brush over these distinctions since the PSYOP\ncommunity so frequently receives direct evidence of just how sensitive government-managed information is in American social and political culture.  For example, in 2000, the Cable News Network (CNN) and National Public Radio (NPR) terminated an intern program in which members of the 4th POG were involved because\n\"media analysts\" expressed concern that rather than learning technical skills, the young soldiers might inappropriately control and spin the content of these news programs. This example, as well as the demise of the Pentagon's Office of Strategic Influence discussed in this report, underscores the sensitivity of governmentmanaged information to the American public.  See Jon Elliston, \"Target Audience: Fort Bragg's Propaganda Troops at Work on the Home Front,\" *The Independent Weekly* (Durham, NC), July 5, 2000.\n\n88 Joint Publication 3-61, *Doctrine for Public Affairs in Joint Operations* (Washington, DC: Joint Staff, May\n14, 1997), v (hereafter cited as JP 3-61).\n\n89 This definition is taken from the Planning Group for Integration of the United States Information Agency into the Department of State (June 20, 1997), available at <http://www.publicdiplomacy.org>.  The Planning Group distinguished public affairs from public diplomacy as follows: \"Public Affairs is the provision of information to the public, press, and other institutions concerning the goals, policies, and activities of the U.S. Government.  Public affairs seek to foster understanding of these goals through dialogue with individual citizens and other groups and institutions, and domestic and international media. However, the thrust of public affairs is to inform the domestic audience.\"\n90 Advocates of \"strategic\" PSYOP are not able to identify PSYOP tasks that can only be performed under the rubric of \"strategic\" PSYOP.  Two frequently cited examples are \"wanted\" posters and Web sites.  Yet there is no reason that these functions cannot be performed by PSYOP forces in support of military missions.  In allied and neutral areas where military forces are not engaged, wanted poster dissemination can be carried out appropriately by diplomatic personnel working with host nation officials or by public affairs officers.  Web sites are trickier since anyone can visit them.  While this is clearly an area requiring policy review, an acknowledged PSYOP Web site that clearly is aimed at a target audience in a semi-permissive or non-permissive environment where there are ongoing military operations (such as Iraq) would seem to meet the criteria of the IO Roadmap delimitation of PSYOP.\n\n91 JP 3-53, I-11: \"As one of the core capabilities of IO, PSYOP must be integrated with the other IO\ncapabilities providing mutual benefits for both.\"\n92 USCENTCOM Operation Iraqi Freedom Lessons Learned, 16 June 2003, 6. SECRET/REL USA GBR\nAUS.\n\n93 Ibid., 7. 94 Franks, 157.\n\n95 See section C on assessment of effects, based in part on conversation with PSYOP participants in Operation *Iraqi Freedom* at the TOP SECRET level.\n\n96 Reportedly, an IO officer at the division level decided it would be a good idea to poke fun at Saddam by creating posters of him as Elvis Presley, Madonna, and Homer Simpson.  He was able to put the product on the street without submitting it to a product approval process and without input from PSYOP personnel. The posters enraged Iraqis and led to conflict that resulted in casualties for U.S. forces.  PSYOP survey responses from currently serving PSYOP officers and enlisted soldiers commenting on the 10 critical hypotheses identified in the body of this report (hereafter cited as PSYOP Survey Responses).\n\n97 4th Psychological Operations Group, \"OIF PSYOP Lessons Learned draft,\" accessed at\n<http://recluse.centcom.smil.mil/crisis/catdesks/info_ops/other/Subpages/J3- PI%20PSYOP/PSYOP%20LL%20unfiltered%20(4%20POG).doc>.\n\n98 Allied Views on PSYOP: \"PSYOPS integration into Info Ops has helped PSYOPS within the [allied country] by bringing it into core planning, the targeting process and operational business.  On some occasions, a lack of knowledge/understanding by Info Ops staff officers was found to make the job of PSYOPS more difficult.\"\n99CALL, \"IIR: OIF Information Operations,\" 11:\nIO doctrine is still in its infancy, with tremendous potential as a combat multiplier. To bring about change within the Army as a whole, IO must be incorporated into all phases of the OES. It must receive equal attention and detail in the POI as the battlefield operating systems.  IO functional area training must include more training and education in the synchronization of IO elements.  IO training for officers needs to encompass more than integrating IO into the MDMP [military decisionmaking process].  If they are to integrate, synchronize, and coordinate all the IO elements in combat operations, then these officers need to have full understanding of the scope, capabilities, and limitations of those assets. Unit level exerciseswarfighters, mission rehearsal exercises, and combat training center operationsneed to have all elements of IO incorporated into the scenario.  Commanders need to exercise their staffs in an environment which produces second and third order effects based on kinetic operations.\n\n100 PSYOP previously was not part of the Officer and NCO Education System, and was not included in Field Manual 100-5, *Operations* (now FM 3-0).  However, that is changing, and in part because of greater attention to information operations in general.\n\n101 Typically, a JPOTF will be commanded by an O5 or an O6, who must then compete for attention on a combatant commander's staff dominated by flag officers.  At lower levels, PSYOP is again typically outranked. See, for example, CALL, \"IIR: OIF Information Operations,\" 2, 25.  At brigade level, fire support officers (FSOs), civil affairs, or public affairs are often in charge of IO:\nThere is no doctrinal method for the format or conduct of the IOWG [information operations working group]; it is unique to each unit's area of operations (AO).  At the brigade and below level, for example, the PA officer and CA planners/executers have a much bigger role in the conduct of IO, often in its execution.  The IO cell has no dedicated IO officer, so the command typically designates an officer to fill that function. At one brigade, the FSO filled the function of the IO officer.\n\nThe problem exists at the division level as well:\nBefore deploying to Iraq, the commanding general of one U.S. division sent a request to the Department of the Army (DA) G3 requesting additional IO support for the division.  This request was denied by Central Command.  As a result, this division did not have the resources to conduct IO properly.  The IOCOORD [information operations coordinator] does not believe the mission was properly resourced or supported by DA or IO proponency.  The IOCOORD firmly believes that they need an FA-30 trained officer at the brigade level and not someone who has the job as an additional duty. Another staff officer is going to focus on his primary role and think about IO secondarily.  The S2s and fire support officers (FSOs) have done a very good job in Iraq as the IO officers in their brigades. The FSOs were underemployed in some areas and have done well with targeting. However, they do not understand the interrelationships of all the components of IO. IO is much more than targeting.\n\n102 This is changing.  The Marine Corps recently established the 9955 PSYOP Officer Additional Military Occupational Specialty to identify and track PSYOP-trained personnel.  Marine PSYOP officers will be sent to the U.S. Army PSYOP Officer Course at Fort Bragg, NC. See J. R. Wassink, COL, USMC, HQMC, PP&O/PLI Information Paper, Subject: USMC Psychological Operations, September 27, 2004.\n\n103 Even so, senior leaders in the Pentagon remained interested in PSYOP products.  For example, reportedly during OIF, \"the Joint Staff prepared daily briefing books for the Chairman and the Secretary on PSYOP activities.  These books included examples of the products, radio wheels, scripts, and schedules.  MAJ Ben Robertson was TDY to the Joint Staff from CENTCOM to work that issue.\" PSYOP Survey Response. Operations,\" 1-81-10.\n\n107 Interview with retired PSYOP O6, currently serving in the Pentagon. The instruction codifying this guidance is CJCSI 3110.01.\n\n108 Tony Normand, former 4th POG commander and senior executive at United States Army Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Command, email to author, October 10, 2004.  Mr. Normand pointed out the connection to the peacetime PSYOP program but did not approve of the Pentagon oversight.\n\n109 Somewhat ironically, they dispute the value of oversight from the Pentagon to ensure policy consistency but insist on oversight of tactical commander products to ensure consistency with combatant commander objectives.\n\n110 This debate takes place in stability operations as well as major combat operations such as OIF.  See Larry Wentz, ed., *Lessons from Bosnia: The IFOR Experience* (Washington, DC: Institute for National Security Studies, 1997), available at <http://www.fas.org/irp/ops/smo/docs/ifor/index.html>.  See in particular chapter VIII, \"Tactical PSYOP Support to Task Force Eagle,\" 189224.  The authors note that Because Task Force Eagle could not always obtain the type of PSYOP support it desired, COMEAGLE [Commander, Task Force Eagle] turned to other organizations to convey information to the local population. . . . This type of independent, U.S.-only information campaign did not sit well with some in the CJIICTF [Combined Joint IFOR Information Campaign Task Force] who were concerned about the consistency of the IFOR [Implementation Force] message.  Indeed, some might argue that the CJIICTF correctly emphasized tight control over the development, approval, and dissemination of products because the mission itself was so political that any mistake at the tactical level would have enormous implications at the strategic level.\n\n111 CJCSI 3110.05C. 112 This tension between the JPOTF and tactical PSYOP units was also evident in Bosnia.  See Wentz, in particular chapter VIII, \"Tactical PSYOP Support to Task Force Eagle,\" 189224.  The authors note that\n\"Information regarding the nature of the PSYOP mission did not flow uninhibited from either the 2d POG to the deploying units or from the incoming CJIICTF to the troops once they were deployed.  This was due to physical and interpersonal communications problems at all levels of the PSYOP task force.\"\n113 Ibid. \"Several U.S. commanders, including GEN Crouch (COMSFOR [Commander, Stabilization Force]), MG Nash (COMEAGLE, 1st Armored Division), and MG Meigs (COMEAGLE, 1st Infantry Division), clearly expressed their dissatisfaction with the degree and nature of PSYOP support in their AORs.\"  The issue was very much one of support to the theater as opposed to tactical commanders and their specific needs.\n\n114 In some cases, timeliness may be a problem in stability operations for lack of dissemination assets.  One respondent wrote that it would take 4 weeks to go from request for product to delivery of a leaflet bomb during OIF stability operations.  However, this would seem to be a function of priorities rather than inherently slow approval and production processes.\n\n115 Normand, email to author, October 10, 2004. Normand is the primary source for these insights on the rationale behind changes to PSYOP force structure in the 1980s and 1990s.\n\n116 Ibid. Normand also notes that this approach \"reduces the number of personnel required if employed smartly.  A study showed that one new support person is required for every six additions to the force structure.\"\n117 More geographically diverse product development capability was provided in summer 1997 when manning spaces were subtracted from each existing regional battalion to build a task organized regional battalion dedicated to United States Pacific Command.  This task organization reduced the number of authorized personnel allotted to each PSYOP regional battalion from 151 to 126. Jack C. Guy, LTC, USA, and Steven Collins, LTC, USA, \"Current Challenges and Future Roles for US Army Reserve PSYOP Forces,\" *Special Warfare* (Summer 2000). Also available at <http://www.psywarrior.com/ReserveRole.html>. <http://www.house.gov/hasc/openingstatementsandpressreleases/108thcongress/03-04-01billingslea.html>. Science Board Task Force) makes this point, as do Guy and Collins.\n\n120 Wassink.\n\n121 This proved true in Bosnia as well.  See Wentz, chapter VIII,  189224.  The authors note,\n\"Communications difficulties exacerbated real and perceived problems between the various PSYOP elements and constrained mission capability and performance. PSYOP units must have state-of-the-art communication for voice and data transmission to include satellite communications, LAN, and telephone connections.\"\n122CALL, \"IIR: OIF Information Operations,\" 10:\nDoctrinal IO focuses on the operational level, that is, the combatant commander, land component commander (LCC), and corps levels. Resources follow doctrine, and the operational levels are where the scarce IO resources have been applied. In IOE [Iraqi operational environment], however, the focus of stability operations IO is appropriately placed on the civilian populace, tribal leaders, mullahs, and other unconventional warfare leadership. It is precisely at these critical nodes that their sources are either nonexistent or extremely scarcethe very levels at which they are needed the most. This doctrinal disparity precludes consistent, programmatic application of IO throughout the various organizational levels of IO planning and execution.\n\n123 Ibid., 2223.  Commenting on OIF 2, the report notes that units lacked the ability to print newspapers or broadcast radio or TV:\nWhen the brigades began conducting CMO [civil-military operations] in conjunction with peace enforcement operations, there were virtually no newspapers or radio stations operating within their AORs. . . . the only means of delivering PSYOP and command messages is through face-to-face meetings, PSYOP leaflets, and minimal newspaper coverage.  The television capability in these areas is from al Jazeera and al Arabia.  These stations provide only negative content with regards to U.S. presence in Iraq.  This is the best medium for distributing messages in the area, just as it is in the United States, but is only available in limited areas.  During the previous regime, satellite TV was prohibited amongst the local populace.  Now that they are liberated, nearly every household has a TV and satellite dish.  This provides the Former Regime Loyalists (FRLs) with a great method for delivering negative information messages to the public.  The best deception is reinforcement of an already preconceived perception. An overwhelming number of Iraqis/Arabs believe that the U.S. is there to steal oil and Iraq's resources and has no intention of leaving.  Since this is the mindset of the average Arab, this is what the media presents in TV coverage. The media selectively pursues only stories that support this angle.  You will not find local media portraying stories of Coalition forces rebuilding schools, hospitals, or other infrastructure improvements. These stories do not reinforce the understood perception.  Without the capability to present information in this medium, it is very difficult to counter their campaign messages.  Units have had to aggressively pursue the use of leaflets to counter FRLs information.  However, this cannot match the distribution of TV.\n\n124 Allied Views on PSYOP, August 27, 2004. Allied lessons learned also underscore the value of tactical PSYOP.  Commentary from allied information operations experts note that \"We did not have [TPTs] prior to Iraq and therefore senior commanders seeing them in action convinced our leadership that they were required. This means personnel, vehicles, and PSYOPS kit.  In particular, vehicle mounted loudspeaker systems were seen as invaluable.  Previously [we] only had dismounted sets.\" <http://dodccrp.org/events/2004/CCRTS_San_Diego/CD/papers/253.pdf >.  Tulak makes a most persuasive case for the need for a follow-on to the now-antiquated AN/MSQ-85B system for use in austere environments where television broadcasting cannot reach the target audience.\n\n4th Psychological Operations Group (ABN), \"Lessons Learned OIF & OEF,\" May 12, 2004, 2.\n\n128CALL, \"IIR: OIF Information Operations,\" 14.\n\n129 PSYOP Survey Response, August 15, 2004. 130 Larsen, 87. 131 Robert D. Jenks, Deputy Commander for Research, Analysis, and Civilian Affairs, 4th Psychological Operations Group (ABN), email to author.  Dr. Jenks notes that the 4th PSYOP Group is responsible for all Department of Defense (DOD) production of certain categories of intelligence under the DOD Intelligence Production Program.  Thus, anything that is coded in those categories is automatically sent to his Strategic Studies Detachment.  He estimates that more than 90 percent of the longer studies his team undertakes (production requirements) come from sources other than PYSOP units, mainly from regional combatant commands to support planning and operational requirements.  Deployed units (PSYOP and others, such as special organizations and units that stay away from the usual channels) request the remaining 510 percent.  In contrast, Dr. Jenks estimates that more than 70 percent of requests for specific information that is tactically relevant come from deployed units, both PSYOP units and others.\n\n132 Charles P. Borchini, LTC, USA, \"Psychological Operations Support for Operation *Restore Hope*, 9\nDecember 19924 May 1993,\" Personnel experience monograph, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA, 15.  LTC Borchini notes that the Strategic Studies Detachment personnel \"proved to be the backbone of our operation; not only did they edit virtually every article for the newspaper and radio, but they wrote many of the articles themselves.\"\n133 Detachment 920, 9th Psychological Operations Battalion, \"Preliminary After-Action Report, Operation Continue Hope, 9 October12 December 1993.\"\n134 According to one source, the Office of the Secretary of Defense became interested in intelligence produced by PSYOP forces during OIF 2 and requested regular updates.  In addition, CALL, \"OIF IIR,\" 15, notes with respect to OIF 2:\nIt is typical for many different staff sections (S2, IO, S3, etc.) to request the tactical PSYOP team (TPT) to collect information in different areas.  Some of these requests were specific questions and some were ongoing collectables.  The TPT detachment commander, working with the staff representatives, would develop his own priority intelligence requirements (PIRs) that would cover the spectrum of the information required by the different staff elements.  One example of this PIR occurred after the lead Iraqi Shia cleric, Sistani, issued a press statement calling for immediate elections. They developed and answered these PIRs and passed the information up through the daily PSYOP situation report (SITREP).  This information was valuable not only to the higher HQ, but also to national strategists.\n\n135 For example, during Operation *Urgent Fury*, the 1st Psychological Operations Battalion did not receive any PSYOP-relevant information.\n\n136 Larsen, 17.\n\n137 JFCOM, \"Joint Lessons Learned: OIF,\" chapter 7, \"Enemy Capitulation Concept.\"\n138 The benefits of red-teaming can range from mundane procedures to profound insights on local culture.\n\nAn example of the mundane is the need to have local authoritative sources conduct a final quality check before dissemination.  An illustration from OIF 2 makes the point: \"During a recent sweep through villages north of the nearby Euphrates River, the Marines distributed handbills that were supposed to tout the coalition's good intentions and to invite tipsters to anonymously call a hotline to report anti-coalition plotters.  But before printing them, the Marines enlarged the font size of the flowing Arabic script, inadvertently separating all of the letters. Recipients looked at the handbill in confusion and politely tried to hand it back.\"  Michael M. Phillips, \"Iraq's War of Words: The Handbill Battle for Hearts and Minds,\" *The Wall Street Journal*, June 7, 2004, 1.\n\n139CALL, \"On Point,\" chapter 3.  According to the report: \"The leaflet effort to induce capitulation was a high priority prior to breaching the berm. But, due to the speed of the subsequent ground advance, the program did not have adequate time in which to work. In many cases, efforts to deliver capitulation instructions to units failed outright, or the target audience did not easily understand messages that were delivered.\"\n140 PSYOP Survey Response from PSYOP enlisted soldier, September 13, 2004; Allied Views on PSYOP, 142 Coalition PSYOP officer, September 2, 2004.\n\n143 Lessons learned from numerous stability operations indicate as much; see sections C3 and D3 of this report.  One example from Somalia is a leaflet intended to convey the message of humanitarian relief to the Somali people.  The leaflet had been drafted to say, \"The forces of the world (United Nations) are here to assist in the international relief effort for the Somali people.  We are prepared to use force to protect the relief operation and our soldiers.  We will not allow interference with food distribution or with our activities.  We are here to help you.\"  Instead, several early versions of the printed leaflets contained misspelled words, words that did not exist in the Somali language, and perhaps the most critical mistake: use of the word for \"slave\" instead of \"world\" in the opening words of the leaflet.  See Herbert A. Friedman, \"United States PSYOP in Somalia,\" available at <http://www.psywarrior.com>.\n\n144 Ronald E. Sortor, \"Reserve Component Linguists in Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations,\" RAND,\n1996. A summary of this report is available at <http://www.rand.org/ard/summaries/linguists.html>.  The full report is also hyperlinked at the site: \"Reserve Component Linguists in Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations,\" DB-186-A.\n\n145 A recent report for the Under Secretary of Defense (Personnel and Readiness) also concludes that greater use of contract linguists will be necessary to meet demand for such services in future contingencies.  See Science Applications International Corporation, \"The Cutting Edge: Transforming Language Capability in Operational Units: Defense Language Transformation Task 5,\" September 2003.  One conclusion from the report was that the Defense Department should \"direct the rationalization and expansion of current linguist contract programs to enable greater breadth and depth of linguist support to meet language and regional expertise capability needs identified through the JCIDS [Joint Capability Integration and Development System] process.\"\n146 Allied Views on PSYOP, September 6, 2004: \"It was suggested that some U.S. PSYOPS lacked the flexibility to produce more simplistic illustrations/drawings (if this was what was required) and relied too heavily on computer graphics.\"\n147 Sociological Profile of Enlisted Active Duty PSYOP Soldiers, Career Management Field 37 Career Advisor/Assignment Manager of the U.S. Army Human Resources Command, June 30, 2004.\n\n148 Kelly Broome, Dan Gallagher, and Mark Schlottach, \"Information Operations Measures of Effectiveness Monitoring and Assessment,\" ManTech Security & Mission Assurance, August 13, 2004.  To request copies, contact Ed Glabus at: ed.glabus@mantech.com\n149 Larsen, 13, citing after-action report of MAJ Glenn James, chief of PSYOP Doctrine Branch at the U.S.\n\nArmy John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School, Fort Bragg, NC, 1998.\n\n150Allied Views on PSYOP, August 27, 2004:\nInterference by Senior Commanders/Washington.  It has been suggested that product development was made more difficult by those in the chain of command considering products from their \"western\" point of view or with the U.S. home audience in mind.  This is not helpful, as the product must be designed to resonate with target audience in terms of sophistication and messageand is not necessarily what we would react to. This is an education process, where commanders should ask for an \"effect\" and leave it to expert PSYOP personnel on how best to achieve that \"effect.\"\n151 This point was recently made well by an internal Army study on OIF 2, which noted:\nThe divisions are inadequately staffed to conduct the appropriate link and pattern analysis to benefit commanders at the tactical level who are conducting IO, and there is limited capability to maintain a central database for capturing all information pertaining to all leaders within the division's AOR.  As a result, battalion and brigade commanders are learning the AOR by simple trial and error. To be successful at the operational and tactical levels, human factors analysis level of information must be available to division, brigade, and battalion commanders and staffs.  Currently, all human factors analysis is conducted by the Defense Intelligence Agency on strategic or national-level personalities.\n\nIt recommended adding \"appropriate personnel and equipment to unit organizations/MTOEs in order to accomplish the IO mission, to include the link and pattern analysis process.\"  See CALL, \"IIR: OIF Information Operations,\" 15.\n\n152 Department of the Army, Field Manual 33-1-1, Psychological Operations Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures.\n\n153 4th POG OEF/OIF After-Action Report comments, available at\n<http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/2003/3id-aar-jul03.pdf>.\n\n154 JFCOM, \"101st Assault Division After-Action Report.\" 155 Defense Science Board Task Force. 156 See note 152.\n\n157 4th Psychological Operations Group.\n\n158 Joint Publication 3-13.1, *Doctrine for Command and Control Warfare (C*2W) (Washington, DC: Joint Staff, February 7, 1996), is 8 years old but reflects a general planning parameter that is still extant.\n\n159 JFCOM, \"101st Assault Division After-Action Report.\" 160 Response to survey questions, active duty PSYOP officer, August 17, 2004. 161 Defense Science Board Task Force.\n\n162 Telephone interview with source at 4th POG, September 14, 2004.\n\n163 United States Army, Soldier's Manual and Trainer's Guide, MOS 37F, Psychological Operations Specialist, Skill Levels 1 Through 4 (STP 33-37F14-SM-TG), April 2004, 25 (hereafter cited as Soldier's Manual).\n\n164 Telephone conversation with PSYOP Staff Sergeant, September 8, 2004.\n\n165 For example, one PSYOP soldier recounted in an interview that the reported failure of a short-wave radio on board a SOMSB was in fact due to user error.  The operator was unaware that geographical conditions affect radio transmission; he was simply using it in a bad location. Telephone interview with PSYOP soldier, July 7, 2004.\n\n166 Normand, personal interview with and email to author, October 1, 2004.  Normand provides examples of poor planning, including a large amount of resources wasted on development of loudspeaker capabilities that could be better provided for with commercial sources.\n\n167  Normand argues that: there must be some controlling mechanism with a long-term focus outside the 4th Group to manage the traditional procurement-type programs. The \"off the shelf\" leasing and purchase of rapidly evolving products should be significantly increased and controlled by the 4th Group.  By doing this, you reduce the losses generated by mismanagement and rapidly changing priorities which negatively impact traditional procurement programs, and provide a rapid capability to keep up with technology at the group level, unencumbered by a habitually slow bureaucracy.  Since most technological change today occurs as rapidly as a two-year command tour, each new commander can effectively refresh the technology without jeopardizing the large, slowly evolving programs existent in traditional procurement management cycles.\n\nA former PSYOP O6 with many years of oversight experience in the Pentagon agreed that PSYOP planning needed to be improved.  He also noted, however, that PSYOP budgets tended to be cut at SOCOM because it is difficult for PSYOP to demonstrate that it can produce effects.  Unless PSYOP can better demonstrate the effects it creates and SOCOM values those effects, the long-range acquisition oversight advocated by Mr. Normand still may not lead to increased PSYOP capability. Normand, email to author, October 10, 2004.\n\n168 Wassink's information paper provides an overview on Marine Corps PSYOP initiatives.  Currently the Marines only intend to establish a tactical PSYOP capability sufficient to support forward-deployed Marine Expeditionary Units.\n\n169 Initial Navy lessons learned observed that \"OIF is watershed event to change view that NAVY is not critical part of Joint PSYOP campaign,\" and noted that the Navy provided radio broadcasts, leaflets, support to Coalition Joint Forces Maritime Component Commander objectives.  The lessons learned effort recommended that the Navy develop PSYOP capabilities.  However, subsequent discussions with Navy staff concluded that the Navy lessons learned material was too tactical and that \"conceptually, the Navy staff would not emphasize [tactical] PSYOP as a naval mission, we would look to the joint community as a natural and more efficient provider.\"  Email communication with Navy staff point of contact, August 3, 2004.\n\n170 Air Force interest in greater PSYOP capability was related in conversations with COL William Astley\n(Chief, Psychological Operations Division) and LTC Carl Stanford (Chief, PSYOP IO Analysis), both from the Directorate of Operations, Headquarters, Air Intelligence Agency, and clarified in subsequent email exchanges.\n\n171 See Tulak.\n\n172 Ibid. Tulak is quite convincing on this score. 173 Defense Science Board Task Force. 174 The Defense Science Board also noted that the Internet is a major new information transition method and makes a point of the need to exploit it with new systems and approaches.  We conclude that the Internet would be an appropriate PSYOP vehicle, but only in specific circumstances.  See note 90 of the report.\n\n175U.S. Special Operations Command, \"Special Operations Technology Execution Plan, Annual Report,\"\n2004.\n\n176 Incidentally, this recommendation was reinforced in a recent Army study that concluded the service should: \"Develop and resource the force with Joint and Army IO automation tools that provide commanders and staff a common IO operational picture and uniform IO planning tool.\"  CALL, \"IIR: OIF Information Operations,\" 24.\n\n177 Jenks, email to author.  Dr. Jenks explains that his analysts currently are stretched thin providing support for more than just PSYOP forces.\n\n178 There is some concern that Army IO doctrine is focused too much on the strategic level, and PYSOP\ndoctrine should not replicate this error. CALL, \"OIF IIR,\" 10:\nMost of the current doctrine in FM 3-l3 includes only broad philosophy on IO full-spectrum operations at the strategic level.  Changes to the POI [program of instruction] should include a better understanding of the implementation of the core, supporting and related roles of IO, such as TPTs, CA teams, PA, EW, and military deception (MD).  There should also be sufficient practical exercises in the art of non-lethal targeting and setting measures of effectiveness (MOE).\n\n179 Both SOCOM's vision and concept identify the wrong scope for PSYOP since they reflect guidance from the 2004 Defense Planning Guidance, which predated the *IO Roadmap*.  They have many laudable qualities; for example, emphasizing full-spectrum operations using comprehensive reachback and detailed intelligence and human factors analysis to support target audience analysis.  However, they generally are not detailed enough to chart a way ahead for PSYOP.  In some cases, they seem to obscure the full range of tactical missions for PSYOP.  For example, the concept emphasizes the importance of PSYOP in reducing casualties, whereas in some cases PSYOP may be used to increase enemy casualties (for example, by encouraging the public to reveal the enemy's whereabouts or by goading the enemy to reveal himself).  The real goal is to reduce the effectiveness of the enemy and thereby improve the effectiveness of U.S. forces.\n\n180 The Department's Transformation Planning Guidance notes that, among other things, pursuing transformation means \"the Department must align itself with the on-going information revolution, not just by exploiting information technology, but by developing information-enabled organizational relationships and operating concepts.\"  This is certainly true for information operations in general and would hold true for PSYOP more specifically. Department of Defense, *Transformation Planning Guidance* (April 2003), 35.\n\n181 A similar observation was made in the Defense Science Board study.\n\n182 For example, in OEF, the Taliban spread reports that U.S. meals airdropped to Afghans did not meet the dietary requirements of observing Muslims.  In OIF, Iraqi leaders worked hard to counter PSYOP leaflets by claiming that they were contaminated with chemical or biological poisons.  To reinforce this impression, they wore protective suits as they disposed of the leaflets.  See Melissa Dittman, \"Operation Hearts and Minds,\" Monitor on Psychology 34, no. 6 (June 2003); available at <http://www.apa.org/monitor/jun03/operation.html >. The enemy can also try to counter PSYOP more directly. During the Kosovo contingency operations, Serb agents reportedly contacted Serbo-Croatian translators working with the U.S. Army at Fort Bragg and threatened harm to them and their families if they continued to support U.S. information efforts. PSYOP personnel at Fort Bragg, conversation with author.\n\n183 An argument has been made that PSYOP (along with Civil Affairs) should be made a branch.  This report is agnostic on the subject, seeing both pros and cons.  See Francis P. Landy and Rene B. Porras, \"The Utility of Making Functional Area 39 a  Branch,\" master's thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, December 1999.\n\n184 It has been suggested that automated decisionmaking aids can facilitate the PSYOP impact analysis process and help preserve institutional knowledge.  See Brian A. Haugh, \"PSYOP Impact Analysis White Paper,\" Institute for Defense Analyses, August 2000.\n\n185 Defense Science Board Task Force, 7.\n\n186 Ibid., 8. 187 Ibid., 13. 188 Ibid. 189 Ibid., 13, 14. 190 Ibid., 17. 191 Ibid., 18.\n\n192 Ibid., 28.\n\n193 Ibid., 44. 194 Ibid., 53. 195 Ibid., 53. 196 Ibid. 197 PSYOP Global Reach Advanced Concept Technology Demonstration, Fiscal Year 2004 Proposal to the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense Advanced Systems and Concepts, January 28, 2003, 2.\n\n198 Ibid., 23.\n\n201Ibid., 3. 200 Ibid.\n\n201 Ibid., 4.\n\n202 Ibid., 5. 203 Ibid.\n\n204 Ibid., 6.\n\n205 Ibid. 206 Ibid. 207 Ibid. 208 Ibid. 209 Ibid., 7.\n\n## Bibliography After-Action Reports\n\n3d Infantry Division (Mechanized).\"Operation *Iraqi Freedom* After-Action Report (FOUO).\"\nAvailable at <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/2003/3id-aarjul03.pdf>.\n4th Psychological Operations Group. \"Internal BiH After-Action Review Results.\" May 15,\n1998.\n. \"Operation *Enduring Freedom* and *Iraqi Freedom* Consolidated Psychological\nOperations Lessons Learned.\" September 24, 2003.\n. \"USASOC Bosnia-Herzegovina AAR.\" April 22, 1998.\n9th Psychological Operations Battalion. \"After-Action ReportOperation *Continued Hope*,\nSomalia.\" January 3, 1994.\n10th Mountain Division (Light Infantry).  \"U.S. Army Forces, Somalia: 10th Mountain\nDivision (LI), After-Action Report Summary.\" June 2, 1993.\n10th Special Forces Group, Headquarters. \"Operation *Support Hope* After-Action Report.\"\nAugust 5, 1994.\n305th Psychological Operations Company.  \"Mobilization and Combat Operations during\nOperation Iraqi *Freedom*, 3 January 2003 through 29 May 2003.\" June 17, 2003.\n. \"Mobilization and Combat Operations during Operation *Iraqi Freedom*, 3 January\n2003 through 29 May 2003, After-Action Report.\" June 17, 2003.\n312th Psychological Operations Company.  \"Mobilization and Combat Operations during\nOperation *Iraqi Freedom*, 16 February 2003 through 1 October 2003, After-Action Report.\" August 29, 2003.\n362d Psychological Operations Company. \"Psychological Operations in support of 4th Infantry\nDivision.\" After -ction report comments in \"Task Force Iron Horse, Point Paper: Operation *Iraqi Freedom*.\"\nC Company, 9th Psychological Operations Battalion. \"Operation *Assured Response* (Liberia\nNEO) After-Action Report.\" May 3, 1996.\n. \"After-Action Report for PSYOP Assessment Mission to Operation Assured\nResponse (Liberia NEO).\" June 25, 1996.\nCenter for Strategic Leadership. \"Somalia After-Action Review.\" Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S.\nArmy War College, September 16, 1994.\nDetachment 920, 9th Psychological Operations Battalion. \"Preliminary After-Action Report,\nOperation *Continue Hope*, 9 October12 December 1993.\" Date unknown.\nGabriel, Joseph, MAJ, USA, Tactical Psychological Operations Detachment 1560. \"AAR\nComments for Operation *Iraqi Freedom*.\" January 30, 2004.\nG1. \"Operation *Iraqi Freedom*: Lessons Learned.\" Date unknown.\nJoint Forces Command.  \"101st Assault Division After-Action Report.\" Date unknown.\nPsychological Operations Support Element Operation *Southern Watch*. \"Annual After-Action\nReport for PSYOP Support Element in Support of Operation *Southern Watch*.\" December 17, 2002.\n\n## Articles\n\nBorchini, Charles P., LTC, USA.  \"Psychological Operations Support for Operation Restore\nHope, 9 December 19924 May 1993.\" Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, June 1, 1994.\nBowdish, Randall G., CDR, USN.  \"Information Age Psychological Operations.\" Military\nReview, December 1998February 1999, 2836.\n\"Compass Call was Key to Special Operations in Iraq, Afghanistan.\" Insidedefense.com, April\n2, 2004.\nDittman, Melissa. \"Operation Hearts and Minds.\"  *Monitor on Psychology* 34, no. 6, June\n2003.\nDoorey, Timothy J., CDR, USN.  \"Role of Public Diplomacy and Psychological Operations in\nWinning the War against Islamist Terrorism.\"  Advanced research project, Naval War College, Newport, RI. June 5, 2002.\n\"Draft JFCOM OIF Assessment Outlines Logistics Failures, Success.\" Insidedefense.com,\nMarch 25, 2004. Available at <http://www.insidedefense.com/secure/defense_docnum.asp?f=defense_2002.ask&do cnum=PENTAGON-20-13-3>.\nElliston, Jon.  \"Target Audience: Fort Bragg's Propaganda Troops at Work on the Home\nFront.\" *The Independent Weekly* (Durham, NC), July 5, 2000.\nFindley, Benjamin F. Jr., COL, USAFR. \"Blending Military and Civilian PSYOP Paradigms.\"\nIn *Psychological Operations: Principles and Case Studies*, ed. Frank L. Goldstein, COL, USAF. Maxwell AFB, AL: Air University Press, 1996.\nFriedman, Herbert A. \"Psychological Operations in Afghanistan.\" *Perspectives* 14, no. 4,\n2002.\nGuy, Jack C., LTC, USA, and Steven Collins, LTC, USA.  \"Current Challenges and Future\nRoles for U.S. Army Reserve PSYOP Forces.\" *Special Warfare*, Summer 2000.\nHoffman, Frank G., LTC, USMC (ret).  \"One Decade LaterDebacle in Somalia.\" U.S.\nNaval Institute *Proceedings* 130, no. 1, January 2004, 66.\nKelley, Stephanie R., CPT, USAF. \"Rumors in Iraq: A Guide to Winning Hearts and Minds.\"\nMaster's thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, September 2004.\nJoint Psychological Operations Task Force Haiti.  \"PSYOP Support to Operation Uphold\nDemocracy: A Psychological Victory.\" Fort Bragg, NC: XVIII Airborne Corps, 1996, 78.\nLamb, Chris. \"Information Age Technology and Operations Other Than War.\" In War in the\nInformation Age: New Challenges for U.S. Security Policy, ed. Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr., and Richard H. Shultz, Jr. Cambridge, MA: Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, 1997.\nLandy, Francis P., and Rene B. Porras.  \"The Utility of Making Functional Area 39 a Branch.\"\nMaster's thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, December 1999.\nLarsen, Stephen C., MAJ, USA.  \"Conducting Psychological Operations in Sophisticated\nMedia Environments.\"  Fort Leavenworth, KS: Army Command and General Staff College, 1999.\n\"OIF Review Trumpets CENTCOM's Functional Joint Force Commands.\"\nInsidedefense.com, March 25, 2004. Available at http://www.insidedefense.com/secure/defense_docnum.asp?f=defense_2002.ask&docn um=PENTAGON-20-13-7.\n\"Operation Enduring FreedomAfghanistan.\" Globalsecurity.org, April 29, 2004.\n\nPhillips, Michael M.  \"Iraq's War Of Words: The Handbill Battle For Hearts And Minds.\" The\nWall Street Journal, June 7, 2004.\nSortor, Ronald E. \"Reserve Component Linguists in Civil Affairs and Psychological\nOperations.\" Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1996.  Summary available at http://www.rand.org/ard/summaries/linguists.html.  DB-186-A.\nSumme, Jack N., LTC, USA.  \"Information Warfare, Psychological Operations, and a Policy\nfor the Future.\" Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, March 27, 1999.\nTulak, Arthur.  \"Improving Tactical PSYOP Video Dissemination in Media-Austere\nOperating Environments,\" Research report, Air War College, Maxwell AFB, AL, March 25, 2004.  A longer version of the report is available at http://dodccrp.org/events/2004/CCRTS_San_Diego/CD/papers/253.pdf.\nWhitley, Gary L.  \"PSYOP Operations in the 21st Century,\" Strategy research project, U.S.\nArmy War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA, April 10, 2000.\n\n## Books\n\nBettinghaus, Erwin P., and Michael J. Cody.  *Persuasive Communication.* 5th ed. New York:\nWadsworth, 1994.\nBriscoe, Charles H., Richard L. Kiper, James A. Schroeder, and Kalev I. Sepp.  Weapon of\nChoice: ARSOF in Afghanistan.  Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2004.\nCallwell, C.E.  *Small Wars: Their Principles and Practice.* 3d ed.  Lincoln: University of\nNebraska Press, 1996.\nDenning, Dorothy E.  *Information Warfare and Security*. Reading, MA: Addison Wesley,\n1999.\nFranks, Tommy, GEN, USA (ret.).  *American Soldier*.  New York: HarperCollins, 2004. Gass, Robert H., and John S. Seiter.  *Persuasion, Social Influence, and Compliance Gaining.*\n2d ed. Boston: Pearson Education, 2003.\nJowett, Garth S., and Victoria O'Donnell. *Propaganda and Persuasion*. 2d ed. Newbury Park,\nCA: Sage Publications, 1992.\nSchultz, Richard H., Jr. In the Aftermath of War: U.S. Support for Reconstruction and Nation-\nBuilding in Panama following Just Cause.  Maxwell AFB, AL: Air University Press, August 1993.\nU.S. Marine Corps. *Marine Corps Small War Manual*. Washington, DC: Government Printing\nOffice, 1940.\nWentz, Larry, ed.  *Lessons from Bosnia: The IFOR Experience.*  Department of Defense\nCommand and Control Research Program. Washington, DC: Institute for National Security Studies, 1997. Available at\nhttp://www.fas.org/irp/ops/smo/docs/ifor/index.html>.\n\n## Briefings\n\n4th Psychological Operations Group (ABN). \"Lessons Learned OIF and OEF Briefing.\" March\n12, 2004.\n.  \"Organization and Capabilities (FOUO).\" Date unknown. .  \"Psychological Operations Lessons Learned/*IO Roadmap* Visit.\" May 11, 2004. Booz Allen Hamilton.  \"Discussion Document: The Science and Art of Persuasive\nCommunications.\" McLean, VA, September 2, 2004.\nCommander, United States Sixth Fleet. \"Navy Lessons Learned Program.\" October 2122,\n2003.\nDefense Intelligence Agency Human Factors Analysis Center.  \"Intelligence Assessment of\nthe Effectiveness of Psychological Operations in Iraq, 1 Oct 200320 Feb 2004.\" Date unknown.\nEnduring Freedom Combat Assessment Team. \"Information Management Issues Emerging\nfrom USMC Experience in Operation *Iraqi Freedom*.\" October 28, 2003.\nSwart, Bill, and Greg Gibbons. \"Operation *Iraqi Freedom*: Information Operations Lessons\nLearned.\" Joint Information Operations Center. Date unknown.\nUnited States Joint Forces Command. \"Joint Lessons Learned: Operation Iraqi Freedom\nMajor Combat Operations Briefing.\" March 1, 2004.\nUnited States Special Operations Command.  Advanced Concept Technology Demonstration.\nJanuary 28, 2003.\n. \"ARSOFARFOR Conference.\" Date unknown. . PSYOP Briefing for Dr. Paris Genalis. July 9, 2004.\n\n## Cables\n\nJoint Staff Message, dated 072138Z OCT 01, Subject: Approved Strategic Information\nCampaign Objectives and Themes for Operation Enduring Freedom, (S/REL USA/GCTF).\n\n## Uscentcom Macdill Afb To Rufdavc/Cdrvcorps Heidelberg\n\nGE//J3/IO//RUESOC/COMJPOTF CC FT BRAGG NC; Subject: CFC FRAGO 09- 304 to OPORD 09.\n\nUSCINCCENT OPLAN 1003V - Change One, Psychological Operations, 24 January 2003;\nUSCENTCOM Message, dated 171441Z July 03, Subject: CFC FRAGO 09-304 to OPORD 09, OIF.\n\n## Department Of Defense Reports And Internal Documents\n\nBroome, Kelly, Dan Gallagher, and Mark Schlottach. \"Information Operations Measures of\nEffectiveness Monitoring and Assessment.\"  ManTech Security & Mission Assurance, August 13, 2004.\nChairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction. \"Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan FY 2002.\"\nInstruction 3110.01.\n. \"Joint Psychological Operations Supplement to the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan\nFY 2002.\" Instruction 3110.05C,  July 18, 2003.\nDefense Science Board Task Force. The Creation and Dissemination of All Forms of\nInformation in Support of Psychological Operations (PSYOP) in Time of Military Conflict. Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics. May 2000.\nDepartment of Defense. *Information Operations Roadmap.* Washington, DC: Department of\nDefense, October 2003. SECRET\n. Joint Publication 1-02. Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated\nTerms. Washington, DC: Joint Staff, March 23, 1994.\n. Joint Publication 3-13.1. Doctrine for Command and Control Warfare (C2W).\nWashington, DC: Joint Staff, February 7, 1996.\n. Joint Publication 3-53*. Doctrine for Joint Psychological Operations.* Washington,\nDC: Joint Staff, September 5, 2003.\n. Joint Publication 3-61*. Doctrine for Public Affairs in Joint Operations*. Washington,\nDC: Joint Staff, May 14, 1997.\n. *Transformation Planning Guidance.* April 2003. Haugh, Brian A.  \"PSYOP Impact Analysis White Paper.\"  Institute for Defense Analyses,\nAugust 2000.\nJoint Psychological Operations Task Force Haiti.  \"PSYOP Support to Operation Uphold\nDemocracy: A Psychological Victory.\" May 4, 1995.\n\nReport of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Managed Information Dissemination.\nOffice of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics. October 2001.\nScience Applications International Corporation.  \"The Cutting Edge: Transforming Language\nCapability in Operational Units: Defense Language Transformation Task 5.\" September 2003.\nSwett, Charles.  \"Principles of Effective Information Campaigns.\"  Prepared for the\nDepartment of Defense as part of a study on the Revolution in Military Affairs and Low-Intensity Conflict, 1995.\nUnited States Army. Field Manual 3-05.30 (FM-33-1). *Psychological Operations*. Department\nof the Army, June 2000.\n. Field Manual 3-05.301 (FM 33-1-1).  Psychological Operations Tactics, Techniques,\nand Procedures.  Department of the Army, December 2003.\n. Soldier's Manual and Trainer's Guide, MOS 37F, Psychological Operations\nSpecialist, Skill Levels 1 through 4 (STP 33-37F14-SM-TG).  Department of the Army, April 2004.\nUnited States Special Operations Command.  \"Joint Psychological Operations Operational\nConcept, July 2002.\"  Headquarters, United States Special Operations Command, Intelligence and Information Operations Center, Information Operations Directorate. July 19, 2002.\n.  \"Joint Psychological Vision, July 2002.\" Headquarters, United States Special\nOperations Command, Intelligence and Information Operations Center, Information Operations Directorate. July 19, 2002.\n. \"USSOCOM Psychological Operations Study Final Report.\" September 1, 2002.\nSECRET\n. \"Psychological Operations during Operations *Just Cause* and *Promote Liberty*.\"\nMarch 1994.\n. \"Special Operations Technology Execution Plan, Annual Report, 2004. Unified Task Force Somalia.  \"Psychological Operations in Support of Operation Restore\nHope.\" May 4, 1993.\n\n## Interviews And Surveys\n\n\"Allied views on PSYOP operational lessons learned.\" Commentary from allied information\noperations experts in response to inquiry on U.S. PSYOP performance in OEF and OIF. August 27, 2004.  Delivered by email on September 1, 2004.\nSociological Profile of Enlisted Active Duty PSYOP Soldiers. Career Management Field 37\nCareer Advisor/Assignment Manager of the U.S. Army Human Resources Command. June 30, 2004.\nTelephone interviews with numerous active, reserve, or former members of PSYOP units.\nMany of those who did not prefer to remain anonymous are mentioned by name in the foreword to the report.  Interviews took place from March 2004 through October 2004 and often were followed up by email for clarification of specific points.\nTelephone interview with Tony Normand, former 4th Psychological Operations Group\nCommander, United States Army Special Operations Command Chief of Staff and vice-United States Army Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Command.  Mr. Normand clarified points in written products submitted by emails in September and October, 2004.\nPentagon conversation with PSYOP participants in Operation Iraqi Freedom at the TOP\nSECRET level.   This meeting was called to clarify issues surrounding the use of PSYOP disseminated through classified means.\nPSYOP survey responses from currently serving PSYOP officers and enlisted soldiers\ncommenting on the 10 critical hypotheses identified in the body of the report. Received via email, July through September 2004.\nRobert D. Jenks, Deputy Commander for Research, Analysis, and Civilian Affairs, 4th\nPsychological Operations Group (ABN).  Reponses via email to questions about Strategic Studies Detachment workload.\n\n## Lessons Learned Reports\n\n4th Psychological Operations Group.  \"Operation *Enduring Freedom* and Iraqi Freedom\nConsolidated Psychological Operations Lessons Learned.\" September 24, 2003.\n4th Psychological Operations Group (ABN). \"Lessons Learned OIF & OEF.\" May 12, 2004.\n. \"OIF PSYOP Lessons Learned draft.\" Date unknown. . \"PSYOP Lessons Learned in Somalia.\" 19 Apr 1994.  SECRET\n\n## Ccj3-Pi Information Paper. \"Operation Iraqi Freedom Aar (Psyop).\" 21 April 2003. Secret\n\nCenter for Army Lessons Learned.  \"Initial Impressions Report: Operation Iraqi Freedom\nInformation Operations, Civil Military Operations, Engineer, Combat Service Support: Stability Operations - Support Operations.\" Report no. 04-13. Fort Leavenworth, KS, May 2004.\n. \"On Point: The United States Army in *Iraqi Freedom*.\" Fort Leavenworth, KS,\nAugust 11, 2004.\n. \"Operation *Iraqi Freedom* (OIF) CAAT II Initial Impressions Report (IIR).\" Report\nno. 04-13. May 2004.\n. \"Operation *Just Cause*: Lessons Learned, Volume II: Operations.\"  October 1990. . \"Operation *Uphold Democracy:* Initial Impressions: Haiti D-20 to D+150, Volume\nII.\"  April 1995.\n. \"The United States Army in *Iraqi Freedom*.\" Fort Leavenworth, KS, August 11,\n2004.\nCompany B, 9th Psychological Operations Battalion. \"Lessons Learned for Tactical\nPsychological Operations in Somalia (After-Action Review).\" March 10, 1994.\nDepartment of Evaluations and Standardization.  \"Operation *Provide Comfort* Lessons\nLearned Observations.\" John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School. Date unknown.\nJoint Staff.  \"Operation Iraqi Freedom Lessons Learned.\"  Unknown date.\nSECRET/NOFORN\nJoint Psychological Operations Task Force.  \"*Noble Anvil* and *Allied Force* After-Action\nReview/Lessons Learned.\" May 22, 2000.\nJoint Psychological Operations Task Force Haiti.  \"PSYOP Lessons Learned Operation\nUphold Democracy.\" October 16, 1994.\nJoint Universal Lessons Learned System. Report no. 42937-11189 (02568). Date unknown. United States Central Command.  \"Operation Iraqi Freedom Lessons Learned.\" 16 June 2003.\nSECRET/REL USA GBR AUS\nUnited States Joint Forces Command.  \"Joint Lessons Learned: Operation Iraqi Freedom\nMajor Combat Operations (FOUO).\" March 1, 2004.\n\n## Miscellaneous\n\nBillingslea, Marshall, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Special\nOperations/Low-Intensity Conflict).  Statement before the Subcommittee on Terrorism, Unconventional Threats, and Capabilities. House Armed Services Committee, United States House of Representatives Concerning Special Operations Forces Acquisition, April 1, 2003. Available at http://www.house.gov/hasc/openingstatementsandpressreleases/108thcongress/03-04- 01billingslea.html\nJoint Psychological Operations Task Force. Situation reports. October 12, 2001November 2,\n2003.\nPSYOP products from recent operations.  All PSYOP products used in OEF and OIF 1 & 2,\nexcept for the radio programs from OIF 2, were reviewed along with product control sheets when they were available.\nShachnow, Sidney. Letter with attachments to Senator Edward Kennedy, May 31, 1985. United States Central Command. \"Campaign Plan: *Enduring Freedom*.\"\n\n. \"Campaign Plan for *Enduring Freedom*: Information Operations.\" . \"Campaign Plan for *Enduring Freedom*: Psychological Operations.\" November 19,\n2001.\nWassink, J. R., COL, USMC.  HQMC PP&O/PLI; information paper on United States Marine\nCorps Psychological Operations, September 27, 2004.\n\n## Web Sites\n\n4th Psychological Operations Group Web site. Available at\n<http://www.poas.socom.smil.mil/misc/mission.html.>\nDepartment of Defense. Final Report to Congress, Conduct of the Persian Gulf War Report.\nAvailable at <http://www.ndu.edu/library/epubs/cpgw.pdf>.  PSYOP lessons learned are on page 623.\n. \"Psychological Warfare Fact Sheet.\" Web site for 50th anniversary of the Korean War\nCommemoration.  Available at <http://korea50.army.mil/index.html>.\nHeadquarters, United States Army Special Operations Command. Special Operations Forces\nInformation, Primer.  Available at <http://www.soc.mil/sofinfo/primer.shtml.>\nHome of the Psywarrior.  Available at <http://www.psywarrior.com>.  Unofficial but quite informative Web site for learning about the history of PSYOP.\n\nPlanning Group for Integration of the United States Information Agency into the Department\nof State (June 20, 1997). Available at <http://www.publicdiplomacy.org>.\nRhoads, Kelton. Working Psychology Website: An Introduction to Social Influence. Available\nat <www.workingpsychology.com>.\nUnited States Army Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Command Homepage.\nAvailable at <http://www.soc.mil/usacapoc/capoc_default.htm>.  Site includes the \"Psychological Operations Fact Sheet.\""
    },
    {
        "text": "## Foreign Intelligence Gathering Laws\n\nBelgium - France - Germany - Portugal - Romania Netherlands - Sweden - United Kingdom European Union June 2016\nThis report is provided for reference purposes only.\n\nIt does not constitute legal advice and does not represent the official opinion of the United States Government. The information provided reflects research undertaken as of the date of writing.\nIt has not been updated.\n\nContents\nComparative Summary ........1 Belgium ........3 France ........8 Germany ........15 Portugal ........25\nRomania ........29 Netherlands ........36 Sweden ........42 United Kingdom........47 European Union ........65\n\n## Comparative Summary\n\nPeter Roudik Director of Legal Research This report, prepared by foreign law specialists and analysts of the Law Library of Congress, offers a review of laws regulating the collection of intelligence in the European Union (EU) and selected EU Member States, namely Belgium, France, Germany, Netherlands, Portugal, Romania, Sweden, and the United Kingdom, and updates a report on the same topic issued by the Law Library of Congress in 2014.  The previous survey of French legislation was substantially amended because of France's new Law on Intelligence, which was passed in 2015. The most recent decisions of the European courts concerning mass surveillance and the validity of data retention activities undertaken by the European countries' governments are reviewed in the EU survey, and measures aimed at the protection of personal data prescribed by a recently concluded USEU agreement are analyzed.  The individual country surveys also describe legislative proposals currently under consideration in the respective parliaments.  These include the Investigatory Powers Bill in the United Kingdom, the Cybersecurity Law of Romania, and proposals to enhance the privacy of citizens' communications in the Netherlands. Because issues of national security are under the jurisdiction of individual EU Member States and are regulated by domestic legislation, individual country surveys provide examples of how the European nations control activities of their intelligence agencies and what restrictions are imposed on information collection.  All EU Member States follow EU legislation on personal data protection, which is a part of the common European Union responsibility.  The report concludes with a comprehensive overview of applicable EU legislation. The surveys demonstrate efforts undertaken by individual countries to maintain a balance between law enforcement and national security needs on the one hand and rights to privacy and personal data protection on the other.  There is no single, comprehensive legal regime that applies to matters of surveillance, interception of communications, and privacy protection in the countries surveyed.  In all of the countries included in the report, intelligence functions are divided among general intelligence and security services, military and financial intelligence, and the police.  While in some countries (Belgium, Netherlands, Portugal, and the United Kingdom) intelligence agencies work according to principles established by a comprehensive statute, in others (Germany, Romania, and Sweden) individual laws address specific issues for particular intelligence agencies, and separate legislative or regulatory acts authorize certain government institutions to conduct specific intelligence gathering activities.  The report on France demonstrates the country's ongoing transition to regulating the work of intelligence-collection agencies through a major law, as opposed to the prior approach of regulating such work through various executive decisions. While the legislative bodies of the surveyed countries conduct general oversight of their respective intelligence agencies, parliamentary involvement varies greatly.  Judicial oversight is generally limited to the consideration and issuance of warrants for surveillance.  Special government bodies for reviewing the legality of interception surveillance and privacy issues have also been created.  These special bodies focus on how information is stored, shared among security agencies within the country and abroad, destroyed, and made available to interested individuals.  Limitations on intelligence collection are established by national constitutions, criminal procedure laws, and special legislation, and are aimed at the general defense of rights and freedoms.  They include restrictions in terms of the scope, duration, and subject matter of surveillance activities.  The use of special powers, including communications surveillance, requires express permission from the Minister of Interior (Netherlands), issuance of a judicial order (Romania), or an approval warrant authorized by the Secretary of State (United Kingdom). All national laws of the surveyed countries provide for some checks to preserve individuals' personal data and the privacy of electronic and telecommunications, and transpose European Union directives into domestic law.  At the same time, these measures are not always effective with regard to privacy protection.\n\n\n## Belgium\n\n# Nicolas Boring Foreign Law Specialist\n\n\nSUMMARY The Law of 30 November 1998 Organizing the Intelligence and Security Services, as most\nrecently amended in April 2016, establishes the general legislative framework within\nwhich Belgium's intelligence agencies operate.\n\nThe Law of 30 November 1998 divides intelligence-gathering methods into three categories: \"ordinary methods,\" \"specific methods\" and \"exceptional methods.\"  Ordinary methods tend to have the least impact on citizens' privacy and may generally be used\nwithout authorization.  If ordinary methods are insufficient, intelligence services may employ specific methods, which involve more extensive encroachments into privacy.\nFinally, exceptional methods, which are the most intrusive, may only be used to counter a\ngrave threat.  Attorneys, medical doctors, and journalists benefit from additional legal\nprotections against the use of specific methods and exceptional methods. The interception of communications falls into the category of exceptional methods.  Such\nmeasures must be proportional to the seriousness of the threat and must be authorized by a special oversight commission.  Service providers and network operators are required to cooperate with the intelligence agencies for the interception of communications.  While the refusal to cooperate is punishable by fine, those who cooperate actively with the operation are offered monetary compensation.  It appears that the service providers and network\noperators may not use or make available any form of encryption that they are not able to decrypt themselves. Oversight of intelligence gathering is principally provided by an independent\nadministrative commission.  In addition to this administrative commission, the Belgian Parliament also oversees intelligence agencies through its Standing Intelligence Agencies Review Committee, which monitors and evaluates the legality of the methods used as well\nas their effectiveness.\n\nI.  Introduction Belgium has two main intelligence services:  the Surete de l'Etat (State Security) and the Service general du renseignement et de la securite (SGRS, General Intelligence and Security Service).1\nThe Surete de l'Etat is a civilian intelligence and security service that falls under the authority of the Minister of Justice, although it sometimes also works for the Minister of the Interior.2  By\n\ncontrast, the SGRS focuses on military intelligence, and falls under the authority of the Minister of Defense.3 In addition, an interagency body was created in 2006 to assess the threat posed by terrorists and extremists against Belgium.4  This body, called the Organe de coordination pour l'analyse de la menace (OCAM, Coordination Unit for Threat Assessment), is placed under the joint authority of the Minister of the Interior and the Minister of Justice, and relies on information provided to it by the Surete de l'Etat, the SGRS, local and federal police, customs and tax authorities, the federal service for foreign affairs, and other Belgian government agencies.5  The OCAM then provides its analysis back to the agencies responsible for national security, so that they may act on the information as appropriate.6\n\nII.  Legislative Framework\n\nThe legislative framework within which Belgian intelligence agencies operate is principally provided by the Law of 30 November 1998 Organizing the Intelligence and Security Services\n(Loi du 30 novembre 1998 organique des services de renseignement et de securite).7  This Law has been amended several times since its initial adoption in 1998, with the most recent amendment occurring in April 2016.8  It applies to both agencies, and requires them to \"respect and contribute to the protection of individual rights and freedoms, as well as to society's democratic development.\"9  Toward that purpose, this Law provides a basic legal framework for intelligence-gathering activities. The Law of 30 November 1998 divides intelligence-gathering methods into three categories:\nordinary, specific, and exceptional.10  \"Ordinary methods\" appear to be those that have the least impact on the privacy of Belgian citizens and residents, such as consulting publicly-available information, accessing and observing public spaces, obtaining information from human sources, or asking an electronic communications service provider about the identity of one of its\n\n3 Id.\n\nAssessment?], COMITE PERMANENT DE CONTROLE DES SERVICES DE RENSEIGNEMENTS ET DE SECURITE [BELGIAN\nSTANDING INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES REVIEW COMMITTEE] (last visited June 9, 2016), http://www.comiteri.be/ index.php/fr/34-pages-fr/298-qu-est-ce-que-l-organe-de-coordination-pour-l-analyse-de-la-menace, *archived at* https://perma.cc/5PQ7-4B8N.\n\n5 Id. 6 Id. 7 Loi organique du 30 novembre 1998 des services de renseignement et de securite [Organizational Law of 30\nNovember, 1998, Organizing the Intelligence and Security Services], http://www.ejustice.just.fgov.be/cgi_loi/\nchange_lg.pl?language=fr&la=F&table_name=loi&cn=1998113032, *archived at* https://perma.cc/4C9Z-L9V7.\n\n8 Loi du 21 avril 2016 portant des dispositions diverses Interieur. - Police integree [Law of 21 April 2016\nEstablishing Miscellaneous Interior Provisions. - Integrated Police] arts. 1723, http://www.ejustice.just.fgov.\n\nbe/cgi_loi/change_lg.pl?language=fr&la=F&table_name=loi&cn=2016042106, *archived at* https://perma.cc/U4UK- A58L. .\n\nsubscribers.11  These methods may generally be used by the agents of the intelligence agencies as a routine matter, without specific authorization.  \"Specific methods\" involve more extensive encroachment into privacy, such as observing public spaces with the help of technical devices (which probably refers to microphones and recording devices), surveilling private spaces, identifying the sender and/or recipient of a postal letter or package, or asking an electronic communications service provider about the payment methods and timing of one of its subscribers.12  These intelligence-gathering methods may only be used if they are proportional to the potential threat being investigated and if ordinary methods are insufficient to obtain the information needed.13  Furthermore, specific methods may only be employed with the written authorization of the intelligence agency's leader and after notifying a special oversight commission.14  Finally, \"exceptional methods\" are those that are the most intrusive on privacy, such as accessing computer systems; collecting information on bank accounts and bank transactions; or intercepting, listening to, and/or recording private communications.15  Deceitful practices such as having agents use fake identities are also considered exceptional methods.16\nExceptional methods must be used in a way that is proportional to the seriousness of the threat, and may only be used to counter a grave threat.17  Furthermore, an exceptional method may only be used if ordinary and specific methods are insufficient, and after obtaining prior approval from the special oversight commission.18 Special protections exist for attorneys, doctors, and journalists.  If a specific or exceptional method is deployed against a member of these professions, the president of the target's professional organization (the Bar for attorneys, the National Council of the Medical College for doctors, or the Professional Journalists' Association for journalists) must be informed. 19\nFurthermore, an exceptional method may only be deployed against a member of these professions if there is serious evidence that he/she has actively and personally participated in the grave threat being investigated.20\n\n14 Id. 15 Id. art. 18/2. 16 Id. 17 Id. art. 18/9. 18 Id. 19 Id. art. 18/2. 20 Id. art. 19/9.\n\n## Iii.  Interception Of Communications\n\nArticle 18/17 of the Law of 30 November 1998 provides that intelligence services may \"listen to, gain knowledge of, and record communications\" in order to fulfill their missions. 21  Since secretly accessing, listening to, or recording private communications fall into the exceptional method category described above, an intelligence service must obtain prior authorization from the special oversight commission before employing these measures.22  When an intelligence service has obtained the required authorization to conduct this kind of surveillance on an electronic communications network, it can serve a written demand to the network operator or the service provider, upon which the network operator or service provider is required to give technical assistance to the intelligence service. 23  Any person who refuses to give technical assistance pursuant to a properly-authorized demand is punishable by a fine of between 26 and\n10,000 (about US$30 to US$11,364).24  On the other hand, companies and individuals who cooperate in giving technical assistance are paid for their services on the basis of governmentestablished rates.25\nThe principal statute governing electronic communications in Belgium requires that network operators as well as end users be capable of allowing the authorities to \"listen to, gain knowledge of, and record\" communications. 26   A Royal Order from 2010 includes electronic communications service providers alongside network operators as being required to have the technical ability to provide clear and readable (decoded, decompressed, and decrypted) copies of communications requested by Belgian intelligence services.27  It appears, in other words, that service providers and network operators may not use or make available any form of encryption that they would be unable to decrypt themselves.\n\n## Iv.  Oversight\n\nThe Law of 30 November 1998 created an administrative commission to oversee the activities of the Surete de l'Etat and the SGRS. 28  As discussed in Part II above, this administrative commission must be notified every time an intelligence service employs a specific method, and its prior approval is necessary for an intelligence service to use an exceptional method.  The\n21 Id. art. 18/17. 22 Id. art. 43/1.\n\ncommission is independent, and is composed of three members and three alternates.29  Two of the three members, and two of the alternates, must be judges.30  The commission members are appointed for a period of five years, renewable twice.31\n\nIn addition to the administrative commission, oversight over both intelligence agencies is exercised by the Belgian Parliament through the Comite permanent de controle des services de renseignements et de securite (Standing Intelligence Agencies Review Committee), also known as the Comite permanent R (R Standing Committee).32  This Committee monitors and assesses the legality of the means employed by the Belgian intelligence agencies.33  Additionally, this Committee evaluates the effectiveness of Belgian intelligence as well as the level of coordination between the intelligence agencies.34  The R Standing Committee publishes yearly reports on its activity (though the latest available one, as of the writing of this report, is for 2014).35  It also publishes some of its investigative reports36 and a few of its advisory opinions.37\n\n29 Id. 30 Id. 31 Id.\n\nindex.php/fr/publications/rapports-dactivites-3 (last visited June 10, 2016), *archived at* https://perma.cc/TSD6- MSYE, English version at http://www.comiteri.be/index.php/en/publications/activity-reports, *archived at* https://perma.cc/SKF8-C9B2.\n\n36 Rapports d'enquetes [*Investigation Reports*], COMITE PERMANENT DE CONTROLE DES SERVICES DE\nRENSEIGNEMENTS ET DE SECURITE [BELGIAN STANDING INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES REVIEW COMMITTEE], http://www.comiteri.be/index.php/fr/publications/rapports-denquetes-3 (last visited June 10, 2016), *archived at*\nhttps://perma.cc/HYY3-A64U, English version *at* http://www.comiteri.be/index.php/en/publications/investigationreports, *archived at* https://perma.cc/88K2-58XA.\n\n37 Avis [*Advice*], COMITE PERMANENT DE CONTROLE DES SERVICES DE RENSEIGNEMENTS ET DE SECURITE [BELGIAN\nSTANDING INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES REVIEW COMMITTEE], http://www.comiteri.be/index.php/fr/publications/avis (last visited June 10, 2016), *archived at* https://perma.cc/LE62-6VDS, English version at http://www.comiteri.be/ index.php/en/publications/advice, *archived at* https://perma.cc/2NF6-8XRY.\n\n## France\n\n# Nicolas Boring\n\nForeign Law Specialist SUMMARY While a number of intelligence agencies operate in France, large-scale communications interception is carried out primarily by the Directorate General on Exterior Security under the Ministry of Defense, and the metadata collected is shared within the French intelligence network.  All of the existing intelligence agencies were originally created by executive action.  The adoption of the Law on Intelligence, promulgated in July 2015, establishes a coherent and comprehensive legislative framework to regulate the activities of the intelligence agencies.\n\nThe interception of communications is principally governed by the Code of Domestic Security, as amended by recent laws such as the Law on Intelligence and the Law on International Electronic Communications Measures.  The legislation recognizes privacy guarantees but also provides for the interception of communications in circumstances where national security and other safety-related concerns are at issue.  The Prime Minister may authorize interception when proposed by specified ministers.  Such authorizations are time limited.  The information collected must be destroyed when no longer needed for a recognized purpose.  Intelligence agencies may also obtain certain technical information directly from telephone and Internet service providers.  Oversight of interception surveillance is provided by the National Commission for the Control of Intelligence Techniques, but this Commission's recommendations do not appear to be binding.\n\nParliamentary requests for classified information are routinely rejected and the French Parliament has no inherent right to hear or question members of the intelligence services.\n\nI.  Introduction The legislative framework for French intelligence services has changed drastically in the last year.  Up until July 2015, France was one of the only Western democracies without a comprehensive and coherent legal framework to govern the activities of its intelligence services.1\nAddressing this issue, the French government adopted the Law on Intelligence on July 24, 2015.2\nThe provisions of this Law were incorporated into the existing codes of French law, mainly the Code de la securite interieur (Code of Domestic Security). France has six intelligence agencies.  Three fall under the authority of the Ministry of Defense: the Direction generale de la securite exterieure (DGSE, Directorate General on Exterior Security),\n\nthe Direction du renseignement militaire (DRM, Directorate on Military Intelligence), and the Direction de la protection et de la securite de la defense (DPSD, Directorate on Defense Protection and Security).  Two agencies fall under the authority of the Ministry of Finance: the Cellule de traitement du renseignement et action contre les circuits financiers clandestins\n(TRACFIN, Service Against the Laundering of Capital and the Financing of Terrorism) and the Direction nationale du renseignement et des enquetes douanieres (DNRED, National Directorate on Customs Intelligence and Investigations).  Finally, the Ministry of the Interior has an intelligence service as well, the Direction centrale du renseignement interieur (DCRI, Central Directorate on Domestic Intelligence).3\n\nIt appears that large-scale communications interception is done mainly by the DGSE, which systematically collects all telephone and electronic communications metadata in France, according to news reports.4  The DGSE appears to share the collected metadata with the other French intelligence agencies.5\n\nII.  Legislative Framework The six main intelligence agencies mentioned above were all created by decisions of the executive branch rather than by legislation.  The DGSE, DPSD, DRM, DCRI, and TRACFIN\nwere all created by decrees, and the DNRED was created by an *arrete* (executive decision).6\nOnly in 2011 did the French Parliament provide some legislative basis for the creation of these agencies, by adopting a law stating that \"specialized intelligence services . . . are appointed by executive decision of the Prime Minister.\"7 Prior to the adoption of the Law on Intelligence, French intelligence agencies operated within an ill-defined legal framework.  A 2013 parliamentary report had noted that many of France's intelligence agencies operated in a very blurry \"paralegal\" or \"extralegal\" environment, despite\n3 COMMISSION DES LOIS CONSTITUTIONNELLES, DE LA LEGISLATION ET DE L'ADMINISTRATION GENERALE DE LA\nNo. 1022, at 1011 (May 14, 2013).\n\n4 Jacques Follorou & Franck Johannes, Revelations sur le Big Brother francais [Revelations on the French Big Brother], LE MONDE (July 4, 2013), http://www.lemonde.fr/societe/article/2013/07/04/revelations-sur-le-bigbrother-francais_3441973_3224.html, *archived at* https://perma.cc/YJ7J-XGLU.\n\n5 Id. 6 COMMISSION DES LOIS CONSTITUTIONNELLES, DE LA LEGISLATION ET DE L'ADMINISTRATION GENERALE DE LA 7 Loi No. 2011-267 du 14 mars 2011 d'orientation et de programmation pour la performance de la securite interieure\n[Law No. 2011-267 of March 14, 2011, of Orientation and Programming for the Performance of Domestic Security]\nart. 27, http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichTexte.do?cidTexte=JORFTEXT000023707312& categorieLien=id, archived at https://perma.cc/Q3TX-PAX9 .  This provision was incorporated into the French Code de la defense (Defense Code) as article L2371-1, http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichCode.do;jsessionid=6D0EC48E601 3B6B33D2E5AD1A7AC622E.tpdjo10v_3?idSectionTA=LEGISCTA000023710864&cidTexte=LEGITEXT000006 071307&dateTexte=20141204, *archived at* https://perma.cc/CN49-HXEQ.\nsome efforts by the legislative branch to provide a better framework.8  The regulation of French intelligence agencies rested on many decrees, executive decisions, circulars, and instructions that are classified.9  These regulations (decrees, executive decisions, etc.) do not have the same legal authority as duly enacted legislation. The Law on Intelligence aims to establish a unified legal framework for the activities of intelligence services. 10  Although the adoption of the Law was probably accelerated by the intensity of the threat of terrorism and, in particular, the January 2015 attacks in France, the government emphasized that it was the result of thorough reflection and not enacted under the pressure of any specific urgent situation.11 The Law on Intelligence has two main objectives.  First, the Law aims to strengthen the means of action of intelligence agencies by authorizing intelligence services to use newly developed techniques as well as techniques that were previously reserved for the police, such as location tracking, interception of communications, and covert sound recording (\"bugging\").12  Second, the Law aims to guarantee the protection of civil liberties and the right to privacy.  By establishing a precise legal framework that authorizes intelligence agencies to use the necessary techniques for intelligence gathering, the Law ensures a balance between the reinforced security of citizens and the protection of their individual freedoms.13 The Law on Intelligence authorizes intelligence agencies to exercise their powers exclusively in those cases that the law deems as necessary for reasons of public interest, within the limits prescribed by law, and with respect for the principle of proportionality.14  Furthermore, the Law defines the missions that the intelligence agencies may pursue and states the exclusive purposes\n\nACCELEREE, SUR LE PROJET DE LOI (NO. 2669) RELATIF AU RENSEIGNEMENT [REPORT PREPARED ON BEHALF OF THE\nCOMMISSION ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAWS, ON LEGISLATION AND ON THE GENERAL ADMINISTRATION OF THE REPUBLIC, AFTER ACTIVATION OF THE ACCELERATED PROCEDURE, ON BILL (NO. 2669) REGARDING INTELLIGENCE], ASSEMBLEE NATIONALE 14 (Apr. 2, 2015), http://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/14/rapports/r2697.asp#P31784757, archived at https://perma.cc/B4VF-YN3L.\n\n11 Press Release, *supra* note 1, at 8.\n\n0610, *archived at* https://perma.cc/3DGZ-PL8M.\n\nfor which the intelligence services may justify the use of their powers.15  The Law also specifies the conditions under which each intelligence-gathering technique may be used.16\n\nIII.  Interception of Communications Before the adoption of the Law on Intelligence, the interception of communications was already governed by certain provisions of the Code of Domestic Security.  However, the Law on Intelligence substantially broadens the legal framework surrounding the interception of communications and the collection of metadata.17  Furthermore, another law was adopted in November 2015 to govern the interception of electronic correspondence emitted or received abroad. 18   Like the provisions of the Law on Intelligence, the provisions of this law on interception were also incorporated into the Code of Domestic Security.\n\nThe right to privacy, particularly the secrecy of correspondence, is in principle guaranteed by the Code.19  Privacy may only be violated by the government when it is necessary and in the public interest, as defined by law. 20  Consequently, intelligence agencies may only exercise their powers to\n\n- protect national independence, the integrity of the territory, and provide for the national defense;\n\n- defend major interests in foreign policy and the execution of France's commitments to\nEurope and internationally;\n- prevent all forms of foreign interference;\n- defend the major economic, industrial, and scientific interests of France; - prevent terrorism;\n- prevent attacks on the republican form of institutions;\nLA SECURITE INTERIEURE arts. L811-3, & L821-1 to L821-8, https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichCode.do?id SectionTA=LEGISCTA000030935046&cidTexte=LEGITEXT000025503132&dateTexte=20160610, *archived at* https://perma.cc/F9F9-MT6M.\n\nMeasures (1)], https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/eli/loi/2015/11/30/DEFX1521757L/jo/texte, archived at https://perma.cc/968G-CG4V.\n\n- prevent actions for the maintenance or reorganization of banned groups, such as armed\nmilitias, terrorist organizations, or hate groups;\n- prevent collective violence that greatly disrupts public peace; - prevent crime and organized crime; and\n- prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.21 It appears that the term \"electronic communications\" includes communications by telephone, fax, and email.22  The authorization to intercept electronic communications may be given only by written order of the Prime Minister; by direct collaborators entitled to national defense secrets who are specifically chosen by the Prime Minister, upon the written and reasoned proposal of either the Minister of Defense, Minister of the Interior, or Minister in Charge of Customs; or by direct collaborators specifically chosen by these ministers.23  This authorization is valid for a maximum of four months, but may be renewed by the same procedure under which it was initially granted.24  Only information relevant to one of the purposes provided by the Code and enumerated above may be transcribed from the intercepted communications, and any recording must be destroyed after thirty days.25  Transcriptions must be destroyed as soon as they are no longer necessary for the purposes enumerated above.26  Furthermore, the Prime Minister sets, by decree, the maximum number of communications interceptions that may be simultaneously conducted at any given time.27  This number was set at 2,700 in 2015.28 The Law also extends the possible target of an interception to include people close to the individuals for whom an authorization was given, if there are serious reasons to believe that they can supply information.29  Intelligence agencies may also obtain directly from telephone and Internet service providers the type of technical information that may be found on a telecommunications bill: the service subscriber's identity, the location of the subscriber's LEGISCTA000030935046&cidTexte=LEGITEXT000025503132&dateTexte=20160610, *archived at* https://perma.cc/DTH8-39UG.\n\n24 Id. art. L821-4. 25 Id. arts. L822-2 & L822-3, https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichCode.do?idSectionTA=LEGISCTA\n000030935064&cidTexte=LEGITEXT000025503132&dateTexte=20160610, *archived at* https://perma.cc/E5XC- XHHU. 9B8697A.tpdila23v_2?idSectionTA=LEGISCTA000030935846&cidTexte=LEGITEXT000025503132&dateTexte =20160611, *archived at* https://perma.cc/A839-EYBD.\n\nterminal equipment, the calls made and/or received, and the date and duration of these communications.30\n\nInterception of communications emitted or received outside of France may be authorized for the purpose enumerated in article L811-3 of the Code of Domestic Security. 31   However, intelligence agencies may not use such a measure as a means to monitor individuals, unless such individuals are communicating from outside of France and pose a threat to the fundamental interests of the nation, or unless an authorization for the interception of their communications within France was already in place.32  The Prime Minister is to designate, in a reasoned decision, the networks of electronic communications for which the interception of electronic correspondence and data emitted or received outside of France may be authorized.33 Other means of covertly gathering intelligence, such as placing microphones (\"bugs\") in a private location or vehicle, secretly taking pictures or video footage, or capturing computer data, may also be authorized under similar conditions, and following similar procedures, as for the interception of communications.34  The restrictions imposed by the Code of Domestic Security tend to be somewhat more restrictive for these methods, however.  For example, the authorization to place a recording device in a private location is valid for two months instead of four,35 and the authorization to covertly access data on a computer system is valid only for a period of thirty days.36\n\nIV.  Oversight The main body responsible for the oversight of interception surveillance is the Commission nationale de controle des techniques de renseignement (CNCTR), National Commission for the Control of Intelligence Techniques).37  The CNCTR was instituted by the Law on Intelligence, replacing what used to be the Commission nationale pour les interceptions de securite (CNCIS, National Commission for Security Interceptions).38  Requests for authorizations to intercept a eTexte=20160611, *archived at* https://perma.cc/8NEJ-VFE9.\n\n31 Id. art. L854-1, https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichCodeArticle.do;jsessionid=1C72447446E6D4F80\n0C3DBF629B8697A.tpdila23v_2?idArticle=LEGIARTI000031552057&cidTexte=LEGITEXT000025503132&dat eTexte=20160611, *archived at* https://perma.cc/4J6Z-BTEX.\n\n32 Id.\n\n33 Id. art. L854-2, https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichCodeArticle.do;jsessionid=1C72447446E6D4F80\n0C3DBF629B8697A.tpdila23v_2?idArticle=LEGIARTI000031550317&cidTexte=LEGITEXT000025503132&dat eTexte=20160611, *archived a*t https://perma.cc/58TT-D8VL.\n\n34 Id. arts. L853-1 to L853-3, https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichCode.do?idSectionTA=LEGISCTA0000309\n35962&cidTexte=LEGITEXT000025503132&dateTexte=20160611, *archived at* https://perma.cc/DS34-NXPR.\n\nperson's communications must be sent to the CNCTR, which is to provide its opinion to the Prime Minister.39  In the case of absolute urgency, and only for reasons concerning national independence, the integrity of the territory and national defense, and the prevention of terrorism or attacks on the republican form of institutions, review by the CNCTR can be omitted, although the CNCTR must still be informed as quickly as possible.40  The CNCTR's decisions are not legally binding, but if the Prime Minister authorizes an interception of communications contrary to a CNCTR decision, he/she must provide an explanation as to why the CNCTR's advice was not followed.41  Furthermore, if an intelligence-gathering operation involves breaking into a private residence (for example, to place or retrieve a secret recording device), authorization may not be given without first consulting with the CNCTR. 42  If the Prime Minister decides to authorize the operation after a negative opinion on the part of the CNCTR, the latter may immediately appeal to the Conseil d'Etat (Council of State, the highest administrative court).43\n\nThe CNCTR is composed of nine members, including two senators and two members of the National Assembly.44  Beyond these four seats on the CNCTR, parliamentary oversight over intelligence activities appears to be quite weak.  Indeed, requests for classified documents from parliamentary committees tend to be rejected, and members of the French Parliament have no general right to hear or question members of the intelligence services.45\n\n## Germany\n\n# Jenny Gesley Foreign Law Specialist\n\n\nSUMMARY Germany maintains a strict separation between intelligence and law enforcement/police agencies.  Intelligence agencies are therefore prohibited from using police powers to gather information.  There are three intelligence agencies at the federal level, two of which focus on domestic intelligence, whereas the third one, the Federal Intelligence Service, focuses on foreign intelligence.  Intelligence gathering in Germany is regulated by the acts establishing the three federal intelligence agencies and the Act to Restrict the Privacy of Correspondence, Mail, and Telecommunications.  The expanded powers of the law enforcement and police agencies to maintain national security are contained in the Act on the Federal Criminal Police Office, the Act on the Federal Police, the Act on the Customs Investigation Bureau and the Customs Investigation Offices, and the Code of Criminal Procedure.  The intelligence and law enforcement agencies may access, intercept, and request stored communications data, subject to limits specified in applicable laws.  The intelligence agencies are subject to extensive administrative as well as parliamentary oversight, which includes several specialized parliamentary control panels but also general parliamentary oversight.\n\nI. Introduction In Germany, the task of maintaining national security is divided between the intelligence and the law enforcement and police agencies.  Because Germany is a federation, there are federal as well as state agencies.  In addition, there is a strict separation between intelligence and police agencies, although their areas of responsibility might overlap nonetheless. The strict separation was established after the Second World War in order to prevent an accumulation of police and intelligence powers in an agency like the Nazi's Secret State Police (Gestapo).  The Allied Occupation Forces made the separation a precondition of approval of the German Basic Law,1 the country's constitution, which provides for the establishment of police and law enforcement agencies as well as an intelligence agency.2  The law therefore states that the intelligence agencies are not authorized to use force or other types of police powers to gather information.3 The three existing federal intelligence agencies are the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution (Bundesamt fur Verfassungsschutz, BfV), the Military Counter-Intelligence Service\n(Militarischer Abschirmdienst, MAD), and the Federal Intelligence Service\n(Bundesnachrichtendienst, BND).  The BfV and the MAD gather domestic intelligence, whereas the BND focuses on foreign intelligence. In addition, following the September 11 terrorist attacks and the subsequent terrorist attacks in Madrid and London, federal law enforcement/police agencies were also given preventive powers to protect against \"homegrown terrorists,\" including, among other things, the authority to intercept communications.  Agencies granted such powers include the Federal Criminal Police Office,4 the Federal Police,5 and the Customs Investigation Bureau and Customs Investigation Offices.6 On April 20, 2016, however, the German Federal Constitutional Court ruled that the Act on the Federal Criminal Police Office was partially unconstitutional, because various provisions that deal with the investigative powers of the Federal Criminal Police Office for fighting international terrorism were not proportional.  The Court criticized the legal requirements for carrying out covert surveillance measures as too broad and unspecific and held that the norms allowing the transfer of data to third-party authorities and to authorities in third countries lacked sufficient\n\nhttp://perma.cc/C858-Y6VY; Gesetz uber den militarischen Abschirmdienst (MAD-Gesetz - MADG) [Act on the Military Counter-Intelligence Service], Dec. 20, 1990, BGBL. I at 2954, 2977, as amended,  1, para.  4,  4, para. 2, http://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/bundesrecht/madg/gesamt.pdf, *archived at* http://perma.cc/99CA-LB6W; Gesetz uber den Bundesnachrichtendienst (BND-Gesetz - BNDG) [Act on the Federal Intelligence Service], Dec. 20, 1990, BGBL. I at 2954, 2979, as amended, 1, para. 1, sentence 2,  2, para. 3, sentence 1, http://www.gesetze-iminternet.de/bundesrecht/bndg/gesamt.pdf, *archived at* http://perma.cc/7DTM-H656.  Unofficial English translations of all three acts are available at http://www.ennir.be/sites/default/files/pictures/GermanLawsgoverningParliamentary ControlofIntelligenceActivities.pdf, *archived at* http://perma.cc/9VKD-LDJH.\n4 Gesetz uber das Bundeskriminalamt und die Zusammenarbeit des Bundes und der Lander in kriminalpolizeilichen Angelegenheiten (Artikel 1 des Gesetzes uber das Bundeskriminalamt und die Zusammenarbeit des Bundes und der Lander in kriminalpolizeilichen Angelegenheiten) (Bundeskriminalamtgesetz - BKAG) [Act on the Federal Criminal Police Office], July 7, 1997, BGBL. I at 1650, as amended,  7, paras. 3, 4;  20b, paras. 3, 4;  20l;  20m;  20m;\n 22, http://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/bundesrecht/bkag_1997/gesamt.pdf, *archived at* http://perma.cc/XJ9R-\n4HUX.\n5 Gesetz uber die Bundespolizei (Bundespolizeigesetz - BPolG) [Act on the Federal Police], Oct. 19, 1994, BGBL. I\nat 2978, 2979, as amended, http://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/bundesrecht/bpolbg/gesamt.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/LEU5-HE59.\n6 Gesetz uber das Zollkriminalamt und die Zollfahndungsamter (Zollfahndungsdienstgesetz - ZFdG) [Act on the Customs Investigation Bureau and the Customs Investigation Offices] Aug. 16, 2002, BGBL. I at 3202, as amended,\n 7, paras. 5-9;  15, paras. 26;  23a23g, http://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/bundesrecht/zfdg/gesamt.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/T7J8-T9TV.\nlegal restrictions.  The provisions that were declared unconstitutional will mainly remain in force, subject to restrictions, up to and including June 30, 2018.7 In June 2016, in reaction to terrorist attacks in Paris and Istanbul, the Federal Government published a draft act which would amend several laws in order to improve information sharing between national and foreign agencies fighting international terrorism.  Among other things, the act would establish a common database for the BfV and foreign intelligence agencies and expand the powers of the BND and of the Federal Police.8\n\nII. Intelligences Agencies\n\nA. Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution (BfV)\n\nThe BfV is an executive agency that falls under the authority of the Federal Ministry of the Interior.9  Its purpose is to protect the free democratic order and the existence and the security of the Federation and the German states.10  The law provides that the BfV is required to cooperate with its counterparts at the state level to ensure the protection of the constitution.11 The agency focuses its work on fighting and collecting information on politically motivated crimes (left- and right-wing extremism); Islamist terrorism and other extremist efforts of foreigners posing a threat to national security; espionage, including cyber espionage and industrial espionage; and the Scientology Organization.12 According to section 3 of the Act on the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution, the agencies for the protection of the constitution are tasked with the collection and analysis of information, intelligence, and documents relating to individuals or subject matter, concerning\n\n\nInformationsaustausch bei der Bekampfung des internationalen Terrorismus [Draft Act of the Federal Government, https://www.bmi.bund.de/SharedDocs/Downloads/DE/Gesetzestexte/entw-infoaustauschterrorbek.pdf;jsessionid=8F0CDB27679238C6F4A52F3143693585.2_cid287?__blob=publicationFile, archived at\n\n- efforts\no directed against the free democratic order; or\no threatening the existence or the security of the federation or one of its states; or\no aimed at unlawfully hampering constitutional bodies of the federation or one of its\nstates or their members in the performance of their duties; or\no jeopardizing external relations of Germany through the use of violence or preparation\nthereof; or\no directed against the idea of international understanding (art. 9, para. 2 of the German\nBasic Law), in particular against the peaceful coexistence of nations (art. 26, para. 1 of the German Basic Law); or concerning\n- activities threatening national security or intelligence activities carried out on behalf of a\nforeign power (counterintelligence).\n In addition, the agencies for the protection of the constitution participate in security vetting procedures for persons working in sensitive areas.13 When the requirements of section 3 of the Act on the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution are fulfilled, the agency may use confidential informants, surveillance, telecommunications surveillance, image and sound recordings, false documents, and false vehicle license plates in order to gather intelligence.14  It may also request information from postal or telecommunication services, financial institutions, airlines, and Internet service providers.15\n\nB. Military Counter-Intelligence Service (MAD) The MAD forms part of the Federal Ministry of Defense.  Its purpose and tasks are similar to the BfV, but with the difference that it focuses on efforts and activities that target personnel, departments, or facilities of the Federal Ministry of Defense and are carried out by individuals who are members of, or are employed by the ministry of defense and its agencies.16  Section 3 of the Military Counter-Intelligence Service Act provides that the BfV and the MAD are required to cooperate closely and to provide mutual support and assistance. Even though the MAD generally focuses on gathering domestic intelligence, as an exception, it is also authorized to collect and analyze information during the course of special foreign assignments of the German Federal Armed Forces or during the course of humanitarian missions.17  Other foreign intelligence gathering is prohibited.18\n\nC. Federal Intelligence Service (BND) The BND reports directly to the federal chancellery and is generally the only intelligence agency authorized to gather foreign intelligence.19  For this purpose, it collects and analyzes information that is of importance for German foreign and security policy.20  It is also authorized to request information from postal or telecommunication services, financial institutions, airlines, and Internet service providers, as well as information required for the performance of its functions, including personal data, from every authority, and to inspect official registers.21 The intelligence objectives of the BND are defined by the mission statement of the federal government.  The mission statement currently focuses on proliferation, international terrorism, failing states, and conflicts over natural resources.  Regions that it currently prioritizes are the Near and Middle East, North Africa, and West and Central Asia.22\n\nIII. Legislative Framework The work of the intelligence agencies is undertaken in accordance with the legislative framework of the Act on the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution, the Act on the Military Counter-Intelligence Service, the Act on the Federal Intelligence Service, and the Act to Restrict the Privacy of Correspondence, Mail, and Telecommunications (Article 10 Act).23 For law enforcement and police agencies, authorizations are contained in the Act on the Federal Criminal Police Office, the Act on the Federal Police, the Act on the Customs Investigation Bureau and the Customs Investigation Offices, and the Code of Criminal Procedure.24\nAuftragsprofil_der_Bundesregierung/Auftragsprofil_node.html (last visited June 3, 2016), *archived at* http://perma.cc/72PM-73VV.\n23 Gesetz zur Beschrankung des Brief-, Post- und Fernmeldegeheimnisses [Artikel 10-Gesetz] [G 10] [Act to Restrict the Privacy of Correspondence, Mail, and Telecommunications] [Article 10 Act], June 26, 2001, BGBL. I at\n1254, 2298, as amended, http://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/bundesrecht/g10_2001/gesamt.pdf, *archived at*\nhttp://perma.cc/6YVZ-UCCU, unofficial English translation *available at* http://www.ennir.be/sites/default/files/ pictures/GermanLawsgoverningParliamentaryControlofIntelligenceActivities.pdf, *archived at* http://perma.cc/9VKD-LDJH.\n24 STRAFPROZESSORDNUNG [STPO] [CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE], Apr. 7, 1987, BGBL. I at 1074, 1319, as amended,  100a-100j, http://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/bundesrecht/stpo/gesamt.pdf, *archived at*\nhttp://perma.cc/ZA7K-47GY, unofficial English translation at http://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/englisch_\n\nIV. Interception and Transmission of Communications\n\nArticle 10 of the German Basic Law provides that the privacy of correspondence, mail, and telecommunications is inviolable.  Restrictions may only be imposed pursuant to law.  If the restriction serves to protect the free, democratic order or the existence or security of the German federation or of a German state, the law may provide that the affected person will not be informed of the measure. The abovementioned German intelligence and law enforcement agencies have been authorized to access, intercept, and request stored communications data.  This authority and its limits are delineated in article 10 of the Basic Law as noted above, in the specific acts establishing the agencies, in the Article 10 Act, and in the Telecommunications Act.25\n\nThe German Federal Constitutional Court has held that the transmission of subscriber data by telecommunications providers to a requesting agency is only permissible if there is a legal norm authorizing the agency to request the data and an additional legal norm obligating the telecommunications provider to transfer the data (\"double door model\").26  If the agency is authorized by law to request communications data, the Telecommunications Act requires telecommunications providers to immediately comply with such a request.\n\"Telecommunications providers\" are defined as anyone who exclusively or occasionally provides telecommunications services or who contributes to the provision of such services.27 Anyone who operates a telecommunications network that provides publicly available telecommunications services to more than ten thousand participants is obligated to install a surveillance system that complies with the technical requirements set out in the Telecommunications Surveillance Directive and the technical guideline adopted by the German Federal Network Agency.28  Telecommunications providers must ensure that they are at all times\n\n\nstpo/german_code_of_criminal_procedure.pdf, *archived at* http://perma.cc/8PSW-G87S. (English translation only current up to 2014).\n\n25 Telekommunikationsgesetz [TKG] [Telecommunications Act], June 22, 2004, BGBL. I at 1190, as amended,\n 110115, http://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/bundesrecht/tkg_2004/gesamt.pdf, *archived at*\nhttp://perma.cc/WP2Y-XH69.\n\n26 BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHT [BVERFG] [FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL COURT], 100 ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES\nBUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTS [BVERFGE] [DECISIONS OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL COURT] 313, 366 et seq., http://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/ SharedDocs/Entscheidungen/EN/1999/07/rs19990714_1bvr\n222694en.html, *archived at* http://perma.cc/QBZ9-3B9A.\n\n27 Telecommunications Act,  3, no. 6. 28 Telekommunikations-Uberwachungsverordnung [TKUV] [Telecommunications Surveillance Directive], Nov. 3,\n2005, BGBL. I at 3136, as amended,  3, 5, para. 1, http://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/bundesrecht/tk_v_2005/\ngesamt.pdf, *archived at* http://perma.cc/4MFL-9LW8; Technical Guideline for the Implementation of Legal Measures for the Surveillance of Telecommunications and the Disclosure of Information, Oct. 15, 2015, http://www.bundesnetzagentur.de/SharedDocs/Downloads/DE/Sachgebiete/Telekommunikation/Unternehmen_Insti tutionen/Anbieterpflichten/OeffentlicheSicherheit/TechnUmsetzung110/Downloads/TRTK%C3%9CV%20englisch e%20Version.pdf?__blob=publicationFile&v=7, *archived at* http://perma.cc/F382-S4TE.\n\ncapable of being informed by telephone of incoming requests and their urgency, and that they are able to accept and process such requests during regular business hours.29\n\nV. Oversight The intelligence agencies are subject to administrative as well as parliamentary oversight.  There are several specialized parliamentary control panels that were set up to scrutinize the work of the intelligence agencies, but they are also subject to the general framework of parliamentary oversight.\n\n\nA. Parliamentary Oversight\n\n1. Parliamentary Control Panel (PKGr)\n\nArticle 45d of the German Basic Law provides that the German Parliament must appoint a panel to scrutinize the federal intelligence activities.  Based on this constitutional provision, the Parliament enacted the Act on the Parliamentary Control of the Intelligence Activities of the Federation, which established the Parliamentary Control Panel (PKGr).30  The PKGr oversees the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution, the Military Counter-Intelligence Service, and the Federal Intelligence Service. The members of the PKGr are appointed by the Parliament from among their members; the Parliament also decides the number of members, the composition, and the PKGr's working methods.31  The Parliamentary Control Panel currently has nine members.32  The deliberations of the PKGr are conducted in secret.33 The federal government is required to disclose comprehensive information on the general activities of the federal intelligence services and of activities of particular importance to the Panel, as well as on other procedures if requested by the PKGr.34  Furthermore, the PKGr may require the federal government and the federal intelligence agencies to release files and other documents in official safekeeping and to transmit data stored in data files.  It may also obtain access to all official premises and interview members of the intelligence services and the federal\n\ngovernment.  The courts and public authorities are required to provide legal and administrative assistance.35\n\nIn addition, the Act on the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution,36 the Act on the Military Counter-Intelligence Service,37 and the Article 10 Act38 also contain special notification requirements. The PKGr reports to the German Parliament on its oversight activities halfway through and at the end of each electoral term.39  The reports are publicly available in the Parliamentary Material Information System (DIP).40\n\n2. Article 10 Commission\n\nRestrictions on the privacy of mail and telecommunications undertaken by the federal intelligence agencies pursuant to article 10 of the German Basic Law are monitored by the Article 10 Commission.41  The Article 10 Commission is appointed by the Parliamentary Control Panel and is composed of four members.  The chairperson must be qualified to hold judicial office.  In addition, there are four alternate members who may take part in the meetings with the right to speak and to ask questions.42 The G10 Commission decides ex officio or on the basis of complaints whether restrictions on the privacy of mail and telecommunications are permissible and necessary.  The oversight extends to the entire scope of collecting, processing, and using the personal data obtained pursuant to the Article 10 Act by the federal intelligence agencies.43 Before a restriction on the privacy of mail and telecommunications can be enforced, the federal ministry in charge has the obligation to report every month to the Article 10 Commission and to request approval.  In cases of imminent danger, a restriction may be enforced without prior approval.  Approval must be obtained without undue delay.44\n\n3. Confidential Committee of the Budget Committee The operating budgets of the federal intelligence agencies are not submitted to the general budget committee, but approved by a special committee called the Confidential Committee of the Budget Committee, which works under conditions of secrecy.45  The members are elected by the German Parliament according to the process used for the election of the members of the PKGr. The Federal Budget Code provides that the Confidential Committee of the Budget Committee has the same control rights as the PKGr laid down in sections 5, 6, 7, 8, 12, and 13 of the Parliamentary Control Panel Act.46  These rights include access to files and data stored in data files, access to all official premises, and the right to interview members of the intelligence services and the federal government. The PKGr and the Confidential Committee are obligated to consult with and advise each other in order to avoid oversight gaps.47\n\n4. General Parliamentary Oversight In addition, the work of the federal intelligence agencies is subject to general parliamentary oversight.48  This includes responding to requests from committees of inquiry49 and other specialized committees, answering questions in general debates and in debates on matters of topical interest,50 and answering formalized requests (interpellations) from minority groupings and individual members of Parliament.51  The Federal Constitutional Court has held that communications concerning contacts with foreign intelligence services cannot be withheld from a committee of inquiry by generally invoking the interests of the state; instead, specific reasons must be given.52\n\nB. Administrative Oversight\n\n1. Administrative and Technical Supervision by Competent Federal Ministry The Federal Chancellery as well as the Federal Ministry of the Interior and the Federal Ministry of Defense are authorized to request statements and issue instructions for the respective intelligence agency under their supervision.\n\n\n\n2. Federal Commissioner for Data Protection and Freedom of Information The Federal Commissioner for Data Protection and Freedom of Information monitors compliance of the federal intelligent agencies with data protection laws, in particular the Federal Data Protection Act,53 but also with the special data provisions contained in the acts establishing the federal intelligence agencies.54  The Commissioner has no powers with regard to data collected through mail and telecommunications surveillance.  In these cases, responsibility lies solely with the Article 10 Commission. The Commissioner is appointed by the German Parliament on a proposal from the federal government for a five-year term.55  He or she is independent in the discharge of his or her duties and subject only to the law.56\n\n3. Federal Court of Audit The Federal Court of Audit determines if public finances have been properly spent and efficiently administered.  A body called the \"College of Three\" composed of the president or vice president of the Court of Audit, the head of the unit, and the responsible audit director is in charge of the audit of the federal intelligence agencies' budgets.57  The College of Three informs the Confidential Committee of the Budget Committee, the PKGr, the federal ministry supervising the intelligence agency, and the Federal Ministry of Finance about the results of the audit of the annual account and the budgetary and economic management of the respective federal intelligence agency.58\n\nPortugal Eduardo Soares Senior Foreign Law Specialist SUMMARY Constitutional principles guarantee the protection of personal data in Portugal, including its collection and use, and the privacy of a person's home and communications.  An information system composed of intelligence services and supervisory bodies is in charge of producing intelligence for the purpose of defending national interests.  European Union Directives have been transposed into the country's domestic legal system to regulate the protection of personal data and privacy in the telecommunications and electronic communications sectors.\n\n\n\nI.  Constitutional Principles The protection of personal data used in connection with information technology is a fundamental right guaranteed by the Portuguese Constitution of 1976.1  The law must establish effective guarantees against the acquisition and abusive use, or use that is contrary to human dignity, of information concerning individuals and families.2  The home and the privacy of correspondence and other private means of communication are inviolable.3  Any interference by public authorities with correspondence, telecommunications, or other means of communication is prohibited, except in cases provided by law on matters of criminal procedure.4\n\nII.  Information System of the Portuguese Republic In Portugal, intelligence activities are coordinated by the Information System of the Portuguese Republic (Sistema de Informacoes da Republica Portuguesa, SIRP).  Law No. 30 of September 5,\n1984, establishes the general basis of SIRP.5  The purposes of SIRP are reflected exclusively in the powers and prerogatives of the information services provided for in Law No. 30.6  These information services are responsible for ensuring, in compliance with the Constitution and the law, the production of information necessary for the preservation of internal and external security, as well as the independence and national interests, unity, and integrity of the state.7\n\nAmong the bodies created to achieve the purposes of Law No. 30 are the Strategic Information Service of Defense (Servico de Informacoes Estrategicas de Defesa, SIED)8 and the Security Information Service (Servico de Informacoes de Seguranca, SIS).9  SIED is in charge of producing information that may assist in safeguarding national independence, national interests, and the external security of the country,10 while SIS is in charge of producing information to assist in safeguarding internal security and the prevention of sabotage; terrorism; espionage; and the performance of acts that, by their nature, may alter or destroy the state as constitutionally established.11 Law No. 30 determines that activities that involve researching, processing, and disseminating information that poses a threat or violates the rights, freedoms, and guarantees embedded in the Constitution and the law cannot be carried out.12  Accordingly, the information services are subject to all the restrictions established by law in defense of rights and freedoms.13  Each information service may develop research activities and process information related only to its specific mission, without prejudice to the obligation to mutually communicate data and information that may be relevant to the achievement of SIRP's purposes.14 Civil or military employees or agents of the information services provided for in Law No. 30 are not authorized to exercise powers, perform actions, or carry out activities under the specific jurisdiction of the courts and bodies with police functions.15  The information services may have data centers consistent with the nature of the service, which must process and save on magnetic files the data and information collected in the course of their business.16  Each data center works autonomously and is not permitted to be connected with other data centers.17\n\nIII.  European Union Directives and Domestic Laws In 1995, the European Union issued Directive 95/46/EC on the Protection of Individuals with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on the Free Movement of Such Data.18  During\n\n8 Id. art. 7(e). 9 Id. art. 7(f).\n\nPortugal's Constitutional Review of 1997, article 35 of the Constitution was amended to enable an adequate transposition of Directive No. 95/46/EC into Portugal's Constitutional Charter.19\nSubsequently, Law No. 67 of October 26, 1998, which transposed Directive No. 95/46/EC into Portugal's domestic legislation, was enacted as the new law on the protection of personal data.20 Law No. 41 of August 18, 2004, transposed Directive 2002/58/EC on Privacy and Electronic Communications into Portugal's domestic legislation.21  Law No. 41 applies to the processing of personal data in the context of networks and electronic communication services available to the public, specifying and supplementing the provisions of Law No. 67/98.22 The processing of personal data referring to philosophical or political beliefs, political party or union membership, religious faith, private life, and racial or ethnic origin, as well as the processing of data concerning a person's health or sex life, including genetic data, is prohibited under article 7(1) of Law No. 67/98.23  However, article 7(2) of Law 67/98 determines that the processing of the data mentioned in article 7(1) is allowed if permission is provided by law or authorized, in specific situations, by the National Commission of Data Protection (Comissao Nacional de Proteccao de Dados, CNPD).24  Article 5(1) of Law No. 67/98 lists the requirements for the collection and treatment of personal data.25 On July 17, 2008, Law No. 32 was issued to regulate the storage and transmission of traffic and location data relative to natural persons and legal entities, as well as the related data necessary to identify the subscriber or registered user, for purposes of the investigation, detection, and prosecution of serious crimes by the competent authorities.26  Law No. 32 transposed Directive\n\nhttps://perma.cc/GG7B-VDK9 (click \"See the Screenshot View\").  For a discussion of this and other EU\nlegislation, see EU survey.\n\n19 QUARTA REVISAO CONSTITUCIONAL, Lei Constitucional No. 1/97, de 20 de Setembro, art. 18, http://www.pgd lisboa.pt/pgdl/leis/lei_mostra_articulado.php?nid=11&tabela=leis&ficha=1&pagina=1, *archived at* https://perma.cc/ UT7S-YX96.\n20 Lei No. 67/98, de 26 de Outubro, Lei da Proteccao de Dados Pessoais [Personal Data Protection Law], http://www.pgdlisboa.pt/pgdl/leis/lei_mostra_articulado.php?nid=156&tabela=leis&ficha=1&pagina=1, *archived at*\nhttps://perma.cc/4Y92-FX9K.\n\n21 Lei No. 41/2004, de 18 de Agosto, http://www.pgdlisboa.pt/pgdl/leis/lei_mostra_articulado.php?nid=707&tabela\n=leis&ficha=1&pagina=1, *archived at* https://perma.cc/Q28H-4DF4; Directive 2002/58/EC, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 July 2002 Concerning the Processing of Personal Data and the Protection of Privacy in the Electronic Communications Sector (Directive on Privacy and Electronic Communications), 2002 O.J.\n\n(L 201) 37, http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:32002L0058:en:HTML, *archived at*\nhttps://perma.cc/BRG6-HTXK (click \"See the Screenshot View\").\n\npower to supervise and monitor compliance with the laws and regulations in the area of personal data protection, with strict respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, and the guarantees provided by the Constitution and the law.\n\n2006/24/EC into Portugal's domestic legal system.27  According to Law No. 32, the retention of data revealing the content of communications is prohibited, without prejudice to the provisions of Law No. 41/2004 and criminal procedure law on the interception and recording of communications.28 The storage and transmission of data must be made exclusively in connection with the investigation, detection, and prosecution of serious crimes by the competent authorities.29  The transmission of data to the competent authorities may be authorized only by a written order issued by a judge, in accordance with article 9 of Law No. 32/2008.30  The files for the retention of data under Law No. 32/2008 must be separated from any other files used for other purposes.31\nThe data subject cannot oppose the storage and transmission of data.32\n\n\n## Romania Nerses Isajanyan Foreign Law Consultant Summary Intelligence Gathering In Romania Is Divided Among Several Government Agencies As Provided In National Security Legislation.  Constitutional Principles Guarantee The Protection Of Privacy And Personal Data.  Surveillance And Intelligence Gathering Is Conducted In Accordance With National Criminal Procedural Legislation.  Control Over Intelligence Activities By Government Agencies Is Exerted Legislatively By The Parliament And Through The Judicial Review Of Warrants For Data Collection Issued By Prosecutorial Offices.  The Latter Form Of Control, However, Appears To Be Inefficient Due To Judicial Weakness. I.  Introduction The Romanian Intelligence Community Consists Of The Following Services And Ministerial Substructures Charged With Intelligence Collection: - Domestic Intelligence Service (Serviciul Roman De Informatii, Sri)\n\n- Foreign Intelligence Service (Serviciul de Informatii Externe, SIE) - Guard and Protection Service (Serviciul de Protectie si Paza, SPP, in charge of protecting\nRomanian and foreign VIPs)\n- Defense Ministry's Directorate of Defense Intelligence - Interior Ministry's General Directorate of Intelligence and Internal Protection (police)\n- Justice Ministry's special units1\nEach agency works in a specific field within the scope of its jurisdiction as assigned by the Law on National Security of Romania.2  The SIE was created under a specific law that defined its duties and created a multilayered oversight structure aimed at immunizing the Service from political manipulations along party lines.3  The Service operates independently of the government and is not subordinate to the incumbent executive.4  The Law states that the means\n\nof intelligence gathering must not violate citizens' basic rights and freedoms, private life, or honor and reputation, nor can it impose on them any illegal restraints.5 To ensure the unified coordination of all activities pertaining to defense and state security, including intelligence operations, the National Defense Supreme Council, an autonomous administrative body managed by the Office of the President of Romania, was created by law in\n1990.6  Additionally, the Council coordinates and monitors activities of the SRI, SEI, and SPP.7 On February 16, 2016, the Constitutional Court of Romania issued an important decision that affected the structure and competences of intelligence agencies.8  Interpreting a provision of the Criminal Procedure Code on technical surveillance, the Court concluded that intelligence collected through wiretapping and other technical means is inadmissible as evidence if it was not obtained by the police or a criminal investigation body.9  This decision directly affected the SRI\nbecause it was not considered a criminal investigative body.  The director of the SRI even stated that the decision impacted national security and that the SRI's technical surveillance department had become useless.10  The decision could impact thousands of ongoing corruption and organized crime investigations and cases already pending in court.11 Before the Court's ruling, the SRI had conducted technical surveillance at the request of the prosecutor's office and other agencies in cases involving not only national security but also corruption, tax evasion, and other crimes.12  The SRI was also the only agency with sufficient technical capacity to conduct such surveillance.  According to a European news source, \"the system contains very few checks and balances.  Nobody really knows if the [SRI] is controlling in any way the flow of information, deciding what to give away and what to hold back.\"13\n\nNational Defense, MO, July 10, 2002, https://www.sie.ro/legislatie_Legea_nr.415-2002.html (in Romanian), archived at https://perma.cc/GH7B-D2D4.\n\n7 THOMAS BRUNEAU & STEVEN BORAZ, REFORMING INTELLIGENCE: OBSTACLES TO DEMOCRATIC CONTROL AND\nEFFECTIVENESS 255 (U. Tex. Press 2009).\n\n8 Decision of the Constitutional Court No. 51 of Feb. 16, 2016, English translation *available* at https://www.ccr.ro/\nfiles/products/Decizie_51_2016_ENG.pdf, *archived at* https://perma.cc/59W8-ZG8S.\n\n9 Irina Popescu, *Romanian Intelligence Service Wiretapping Is Unconstitutional, Court Rules*, ROMANIA-\nINSIDER.COM (Feb. 18, 2016), http://www.romania-insider.com/romanian-intelligence-service-wiretapping-isunconstitutional-court-rules, *archived at* https://perma.cc/9BRL-KA42.\n\n10 *Romania's Govt. Grants Investigation Powers to the Biggest Secret Service, Sets Rules for Wiretaps*, ROMANIA-\nINSIDER.COM (Mar. 13, 2016), http://www.romania-insider.com/romanias-government-grants-more-powers-to-thebiggest-secret-service-sets-rules-for-wiretaps/166785, *archived at* https://perma.cc/V7ZX-NA8L.\n\n11 *Wiretaps Deemed Unconstitutional in 11 Corruption Cases in Romania*, ROMANIA-INSIDER.COM (Mar. 11, 2016), http://www.romania-insider.com/wiretaps-deemed-unconstitutional-in-11-corruption-cases-in-romania/166698, archived at https://perma.cc/PWV4-9C79.\n\nFollowing the decision of the Constitutional Court, President Iohannis stated that an emergency ordinance would be adopted by the government as a temporary solution to the problem.14  The ordinance, adopted on March 11, 2016,15 granted criminal investigative powers to the SRI in cases involving terrorism and crimes against national security.  Previously, the SRI could only notify the prosecutors of such crimes and assist with the investigation. In addition, the emergency ordinance gave wiretapping powers to the National Anticorruption Directorate (Directia Nationala Anticoruptie, DNA) at the State Prosecutor's Office within the High Court, and the Directorate for Investigating Organized Crime and Terrorism at the National Police (Directia de Investigare a Infractiunilor de Criminalitate Organizata si Terorism, DIICOT).  Before the Constitutional Court's decision these bodies mostly used SRI personnel and equipment for technical surveillance.  Now they can still use the SRI's equipment but not its personnel.16  Reportedly DNA's technical center would increase its staff by 130 officers while the Prosecutor's Office and the DIICOT would employ three hundred officers.17 Making the SRI a criminal investigation body was criticized by legal professionals and civil society, as it legalizes the involvement of a secret intelligence agency in the judicial process, undermining the SRI's independence,18 and \"brings back terrifying memories of Ceausescu's Securitate.\"19\n\nII.  Legislative Oversight The SIE and the SRI are subject to parliamentary control through special parliamentary committees individually dedicated to each agency.20  These committees consist of nine members each, seven representing the lower chamber of the Parliament and two representing the Senate.21\n15 Emergency Ordinance No. 6 of March 11, 2016, MO, Mar. 14, 2016, *available at* http://lege5.ro/Gratuit/\ngeydcmrwgi2q/ordonanta-de-urgenta-nr-6-2016-privind-unele-masuri-pentru-punerea-in-executare-a-mandatelorde-supraveghere-tehnica-dispuse-in-procesul-penal (in Romanian), *archived at* https://perma.cc/4H2E-Y3TY.\n\n(Mar. 15, 2016), http://www.antena3.ro/en/romania/how-many-interception-centers-are-in-romania-who-are-theinstitutions-taping-our-calls-346350.html, *archived at* https://perma.cc/2U4X-4FVE.\n\n18 *Is Europe Under Siege? MEDEL Declaration*, MEDEL (Mar. 12, 2016), http://www.medelnet.eu/index.php?\n\noption=com_content&view=article&id=240:is-europe-under-siege-medel-declaration&catid=45:an-independentjudiciary&Itemid=61, *archived at* https://perma.cc/4TG2-ACK3.\n\n19 Bogdan Manolea, ApTI, *Intelligence Organisations Get More Surveillance Powers in Romania*, EDRI\n(Apr. 6, 2016), https://edri.org/intelligence-organisations-get-more-surveillance-powers-in-romania, archived at https://perma.cc/DVE9-SHHZ.\n\n20 COUNCIL OF EUROPE, *supra* note 4, at 201.\n\nEach party represented in Parliament has members on these committees.22  Both committees overseeing the SRI and SIE are empowered to verify constitutional and legal compliance of the Services' activities and investigate allegations of illegal intelligence collection.23\n\nThe committees are allowed to request information possessed by the SRI and SIE.  Both Services are required to respond to such requests within a reasonable period of time, unless doing so jeopardizes ongoing operations, the identities of agents, or intelligence sources and methods.24\nThe committees are authorized to investigate the directors of the agencies and their staff members and have the right to conduct unannounced visits to the Services, which must grant the committees full access to personnel, data, and facilities.25  Reportedly the committees have uncovered corruption and links to organized crime within the agencies, and violations of civil rights and liberties committed by intelligence services personnel.26  On the basis of media accusations, parliamentary committees initiated a series of SRI and SIE investigations and inquiries, which resulted in the removal of personnel.27  For example, in May 2016 the committee controlling the activities of the SRI initiated an inquiry into the investigation of a local pharmaceutical company, Hexi Pharma, which sold diluted disinfectants to local hospitals. The committee will try to determine if the SRI was involved in the criminal investigation against Hexi Pharma and if the case was classified as a national security case.28\n\nIII.  Judicial Control over Surveillance Procedures Judicial oversight is generally limited to the consideration and issuance of warrants for surveillance that restrict an individual's civil rights and liberties.29  The National Security Law authorized the SRI and SIE to undertake intelligence surveillance and established preemptive control by judicial authorities.30  Article 13 of the Law states that requests for warrants must be approved by the Prosecutor General's office and must contain details regarding the following:\n\n- Nature of the threat to national security\n\n- Specific activities for which the warrant is being issued (e.g., surveillance, wiretapping,\nsearch, seizure)\n- Names of persons whose communications are to be intercepted, or of those who hold the\ninformation, documents, or objects that must be obtained\n- Location where the warranted activities will be carried out, if and when it is possible to\nprovide this information\n- Duration for which the requested warrant is valid (up to six months initially)\n- Office charged with the execution of the warrant31 Warrants are valid for six months, although they can be extended an indefinite number of times for three-month periods when cause is shown.32  In 2005 warrant approval was reassigned from prosecutors to judges, although prosecutors are still permitted to approve short-term (twentyfour- to forty-eight-hour) warrants during weekends when judges are off duty.33\n\nThe weakness and vulnerability to political influence of the legal and justice system is still a significant obstacle to effective democratic oversight.34  Government statistics revealed that\n14,267 wiretapping warrants were requested between 1989 and 2002 by the intelligence agencies, and the Prosecutor General did not deny a single one.35  Of the warrants issued, only about 2% led to an indictment, while the intelligence services claimed the remaining 98% were\n\"used for prevention of a crime.\"36 The National Security Law states that \"any citizen who considers himself injured in an unjustified manner through the activities that constitute the object of the warrant . . . may lodge a complaint with the public prosecutor specially appointed, hierarchically superior to the public prosecutor who has issued the warrant.\"37  The Law provides that citizens who believe that their rights or liberties have been violated by the government in the course of its information gathering have the right to \"inform any of the standing comittees [sic] for the defence and ensuring of the public order, of the two chambers of the Parliament.\"38 The emergency ordinance of March 11, 2016, granted criminal investigation powers to the SRI\nin certain cases involving national security and simultaneously introduced judicial control, which is to be carried out by the chairman of the High Court of Cassation and Justice or a judge appointed for this purpose in accordance with the rules on the operation of the Supreme Court.39\n\nIn 2014 the SRI proposed a new bill that would allow several agencies to gain access to data stored by Internet and phone service providers, without permission from a judge, only on the basis of a \"motivated request.\"40  The SRI claimed that the law was necessary because of the increasing number of cyber threats.41  The draft was based on the European Union's (EU's) thenupcoming Network and Information Security Directive, which requires Member States to appoint central authorities in charge of coordinating the response to cyber threats and incidents.42 However, the final version of the Bill as it was passed by the Romanian legislature in December 2014 ignored the EU recommendation that the authority responsible for cybersecurity be a civilian agency not linked to law enforcement or intelligence.43  The act was declared unconstitutional in its entirety by the Constitutional Court on January 21, 2015,44 on various grounds, including those pertaining to the unjustified infringement of the right of individuals to privacy and personal data protection.\n\n\nThe new bill on Romania's cybersecurity was made available for public debate in January\n2016,45 and President Iohannis expected that it would be adopted by the Parliament in June 2016, together with an improved counterterrorism law and a law on prepaid cards.46  The latter law was prepared at the initiative of the SRI, which complained that it could not keep track of the users of prepaid cards, which were allegedly used in preparing terrorist attacks in the EU.47\n\nRegarding terrorism prevention, as of December 2015, the Bucharest Court of Appeal had ordered, on the SRI's recommendation, the removal from the national territory of nine foreigners suspected of terrorist actions, while another 246 persons had been stopped at the border for the PCWORLD (Dec. 24, 2014), http://www.pcworld.com/article/2863632/romanian-version-of-eu-cybersecuritydirective-allows-warrantless-access-to-data.html, *archived at* https://perma.cc/PMV8-CB5H.\n\n43 Id. 44 Decision of the Constitutional Court No. 17 of Jan. 21, 2015, English translation *available* at https://www.ccr.ro/\nfiles/products/Decizie_17_2015_EN_final.pdf, *archived at* https://perma.cc/3HWW-GLLB.\n\n45 Adina Panaitescu, Communications Minister Bostan: I Hope Cybersecurity Law Gets Final Approval from Justice Ministry, AGERPRES (May 25, 2016), http://www.agerpres.ro/english/2016/05/25/communications-minister-bostan\n-i-hope-cybersecurity-law-gets-final-approval-from-justice-ministry-13-02-26, *archived at* https://perma.cc/6J8D- RJEN.\n\n46 Irina Popescu, *Romanian President: Three Laws on National Security to Be Sent to the Parliament by End-May*, ROMANIA-INSIDER.COM (Apr. 13, 2016), http://www.romania-insider.com/romanian-president-three-laws-onnational-security-to-be-sent-to-the-parliament-by-end-may/168740, *archived at* https://perma.cc/Z5TN-GTAT.\n\nROMANIA-INSIDER.COM (Mar. 28, 2016), http://www.romania-insider.com/romanias-it-infrastucture-is-used-forsame reasons.48  According to the director of the agency, the SRI was also monitoring nine thousand other people who do not have access to the national territory.49\n\n## Netherlands\n\nWendy Zeldin Senior Legal Research Analyst\n\n\nSUMMARY Foreign intelligence gathering in the Netherlands is regulated chiefly by the Intelligence\nand Security Services Act 2002.  The Act governs both the General Intelligence and\nSecurity Service and the Military Intelligence and Security Service, and requires that these\nServices obtain ministerial permission to exercise most of their powers, such as the power\nto institute surveillance and wiretaps and use intelligence agents.  The Act has come under\nscrutiny in recent years, however, and there are plans to overhaul it, with expectations that\ndraft legislation may be presented to the Dutch Parliament by the summer of 2016.\n\n\nI.  Introduction The General Intelligence and Security Service of the Netherlands (Algemene de inlichtingen- en veiligheidsdienst, AIVD), under the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Relations with the Realm, is responsible for investigating individuals and organizations, carrying out security screenings, furthering vital sectors' security, gathering international intelligence, and compiling risk and threat analyses.1  According to its website, the AIVD seeks to identify risks and threats to Dutch national security by \"conducting in-depth investigations to gather intelligence material,\" which it then \"enriches\" and shares with various other agencies, in particular the police Regional Intelligence Divisions (RIDs). 2   The AIVD can ask RID personnel to gather intelligence material; it also \"works intensively with local governments\" to help counter Islamic radicalism.3\nAs the AIVD emphasizes on its website, it \"is not a police service,\" and while it \"has the access to information, the powers and the expertise\" to investigate the roots of national security risks and threats, it does not investigate criminal acts but rather \"identifies threats and advises others, including policymakers and public officials at both the national and local levels, as to how they might act upon the information received.\"4 In addition to the police regional intelligence units, there is a Central Intelligence Division that is part of the Central Unit of the National Police.5  The Central Intelligence Division handles\n\"coordination of law enforcement information in the Netherlands and its exchange at [the]\ninternational level\" and oversees INTERPOL in The Hague.6\n\nOther intelligence services are the Military Intelligence and Security Service (Militarie Inlichtengen- en Veiligheidsdients, MIVD),7 the Fiscal Intelligence and Investigation Service-\nFinancial Control Service, 8 the National Signals Intelligence Organization, 9 the Inspectorate SZW,10 and the National Coordinator for Security and Counterterrorism (for analysis of threats and coordination of counterterrorism activities).11 In mid-2014, the Joint Sigint Cyber Unit (JSCU) began operations as a joint effort launched by the AIVD and MIVD.12  Under the covenant reached between the two services, the National Sigint Organization, together with other specialized sections of the two services, were merged into the new cooperative arrangement.13\n\nterroristen vanuit de polder, DE VOLKSKRANT (June 23, 2012), http://www.volkskrant.nl/binnenland/jagen-opterroristen-vanuit-de-polder~a3275554, *archived at* https://perma.cc/P5L9-N69E.\n\n10 The Inspectorate SZW, instituted on January 1, 2012, combines \"the organisations and activities of the former Labour Inspectorate, the Work and Income Inspectorate and the Social and Intelligence Investigation Service of the Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment.\"  *Special Investigation Departments*, RESEARCH AND DOCUMENTATION\nCENTER, MINISTRY OF SECURITY AND JUSTICE, https://english.wodc.nl/publicaties/bronnengids/politie_opsporing/ bijzondere_opsporingsdiensten/ (last visited June 13, 2016), *archived at* https://perma.cc/DU3Z-75FW.\n\n11 Nationaal Coordinator Terrorismebestrijding en Veiligheid (NCTV); *see* NATIONAL COORDINATOR FOR SECURITY\nAND COUNTERTERRORISM, ANNUAL PLAN NCTV 2014, at 35 (Jan. 27, 2014) https://english.nctv.nl/Images/nctvjaarplan2014-27012014-engels-def-internet_tcm92-536300.pdf?cp=92&cs=65023, *archived at* https://perma.cc/ 9FJE-26A7; ANNUAL PLAN NCTV 2015 (Jan. 20, 2015), https://english.nctv.nl/Images/nctv-jaarplan-2015-en-finalweb-lores-los_tcm92-579341.pdf?cp=92&cs=65023, *archived at* https://perma.cc/VHL5-LU57.\n12 *Joint Sigint Cyber Unit, AIVD-MIVD partnership in de praktijk*, NATIONALE VEILIGHEID EN CRISISBEHEERSING\n(Feb. 2015), https://cyberwar.nl/d/20150226_JSCU-AIVD-MIVD-samenwerking-in-de-praktijk_magazinenationale-veiligheid-en-crisisbeheersing-2015-nr-1.pdf, *archived at* https://perma.cc/VU7N-ZEHJ.  The article has been translated in a personal blog: Matthijs R. Koot, Dutch Joint Sigint Cyber Unit (JSCU), AIVD-MIVD\nPartnership in Practice, MATTHIJS R. KOOT'S NOTEBOOK (Feb. 26, 2015), https://blog.cyberwar.nl/2015/02/jointsigint-cyber-unit-aivd-mivd-partnership-in-practice, *archived at* https://perma.cc/LS8D-S7TY.  For the agreement on the JSCU's establishment, see Kamerbrief over Convenant Joint Sigint Cyber Unit [Parliamentary Paper on the Joint Sigint Cyber Unit Covenant], De Minister van Binnenlandse Zaken en Koninkrijksrelaties en de Minister van Defensie, July 3, 2014, https://www.rijksoverheid.nl/binaries/rijksoverheid/documenten/kamerstukken/2014/07/03/\nkamerbrief-over-convenant-joint-sigint-cyber-unit-jscu/kamerbrief-over-convenant-joint-sigint-cyber-unit-jscu.pdf, archived at https://perma.cc/G7B2-MELG.\n13 Didier Bigo et al., ANNEX 1 - The EU Member States Practices in the Context of the Revelations of NSA Large Scale Operations: 5. The Netherlands, in EU PARLIAMENT, DIRECTORATE-GENERAL FOR INTERNAL POLICIES, NATIONAL PROGRAMMES FOR MASS SURVEILLANCE OF PERSONAL DATA IN EU MEMBER STATES AND THEIR COMPATIBILITY WITH EU LAW 7374 (2013), http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/etudes/join/2013/ 493032/IPOL-LIBE_ET(2013)493032_EN.pdf, *archived at* https://perma.cc/D8TJ-4WRK.  According to this report, \"the JSCU is expected to centralize all Signals and Cyber surveillance in the Netherlands and will have a staff of\n350. . . . The signals location in Burum and the analysis location in Eibergen, currently operated by the NSO, will stay active.\"  Id. at 13.  *See also* Kamerbrief over Convenant Joint Sigint Cyber Unit, *supra* note 12, at 1\n(announcement preceding the text of the Covenant).\n\nThe AIVD shares intelligence analyses with the secret EU Intelligence Analysis Centre\n(INTCEN), and INTCEN shares its analyses with the AIVD.14\n\nII.  Legislative Framework The Intelligence and Security Services Act 2002 governs the activities and powers of the AIVD\nand also the MIVD.15  The Act includes provisions on transparency and accountability, measures that \"are a direct product of the European Convention on Human Rights.\"16 The AIVD has the authority, among other powers, to observe and follow people, use intelligence agents, and monitor and tap telecommunications.  It may use \"special powers\" (also referred to as \"special intelligence resources\") only if \"strictly necessary\" to carry out the duties entrusted to it by law.17  The special powers include surveillance,18 using intelligence agents,19conducting searches,20 opening mail \"and other consignments\" without sender or addressee consent,21 and monitoring and tapping telecommunications.22  Special powers cannot be used, however, for security screenings or \"safeguarding vital sectors,\" nor may any act \"likely to seriously infringe personal privacy . . . be taken without the express prior permission of the Minister of the Act of 7 February 2002, Providing for Rules Relating to the Intelligence and Security Services and Amendment of Several Acts (Intelligence and Security Services Act 2002), as amended by the Act of 2 November 2006 (Bulletin of Acts, Orders and Decrees 2006, 574), AIVD, https://english.aivd.nl/binaries/aivd-en/documents/publications/2002/\n03/26/bulletin-of-acts-orders-and-decrees-of-the-kingdom-of-the-netherlands/wiv2002en.pdf, *archived at* https://perma.cc/NH52-WZL3.  For the Dutch text of the Act, see Wet op de inlichtingen- en veiligheidsdiensten 2002 (Feb. 7, 2002, mostly in force on May 29, 2002, as last amended effective Jan. 1, 2013), http://wetten.over heid.nl/ BWBR0013409/geldigheidsdatum_14-09-2014, *archived at* https://perma.cc/Z6XW-D6NZ.\n17 *Powers,* AIVD, https://english.aivd.nl/about-aivd/contents/the-intelligence-and-security-services-act-2002/powers\n(last visited June 13, 2016), *archived at* https://perma.cc/Y2TP-PEW8. 04/23/annual-report-2013/annual-report-aivd-2013.pdf, *archived at* https://perma.cc/Q4KP-JTWC.   *See also* GENERAL INTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY SERVICE,  ANNUAL REPORT 2015: A RANGE OF THREATS TO THE NETHERLANDS, https://english.aivd.nl/binaries/aivd-en/documents/annual-report/2016/05/26/annual-report-2015- aivd/annual-report-2015-aivd.pdf, *archived at* https://perma.cc/9FGR-2D7E; REVIEW COMMITTEE ON THE INTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY SERVICES, ANNUAL REPORT 2015, http://english.ctivd.nl/binaries/ctivd-eng/ documents/annual-reports/2016/06/07/annual-report-2015/ctivd-annual-report-2015.pdf, *archived at* https://perma. cc/M3V3-C7D7.\nInterior.\"23  The exercise of a special power is generally allowed only if the relevant minister, or the relevant head of a service on the minister's behalf, has given permission for it.24 One of the tasks of the AIVD is to conduct investigations regarding other countries on subjects designated by the Prime Minister, in accordance with the relevant ministers.25  The AIVD is authorized to conduct investigations that involve other countries \"regarding matters with military relevance that have been designated by the Prime Minister, Minister of General Affairs in accordance with the relevant Ministers.\"26  The AIVD and the MIVD may process the personal data of persons when this is necessary in the context of investigations concerning other countries;27 tap, receive, record, and monitor conversations, telecommunications, or data transfer by means of an automated network with ministerial permission (with certain exceptions);28 and receive and record non-cable-bound telecommunications originating from or intended for other countries.29  Both Services are authorized to notify \"the appropriate intelligence and security services of other countries, and the appropriate international security, signals intelligence and intelligence bodies\" regarding information processed by or on behalf of the Service.30\n\nBoth the AIVD and MIVD must submit an annual report before May 1 every year. 31  The Intelligence and Security Services Act 2002 also requires the AIVD to \"notify anyone against whom it has used powers which infringe their constitutional right to privacy at home (Article 12)\nor secrecy of communications (Article 13).\"32  The AIVD must review whether such notification is possible five years after the use of the power in question has terminated, but it will not notify the persons in question if doing so would harm relations with other countries or reveal the sources or methods of the AIVD.33\n\nIII.  Oversight An independent regulatory commission, comprised of three members appointed by the Crown at the Parliament's recommendation, carries out retrospective monitoring of the AIVD in compliance with the Intelligence and Security Services Act 2002 and also the Security Screening Act.34  \"Subject to a legal obligation to confidentiality,\" the commission \"is entitled to inspect any information it wishes.\"35  The commission also publishes an annual report.36\n\nIV.  New Developments The Dutch government believes that technological developments have overtaken the 2002 Act, and that for the intelligence services to be able to continue to carry out their tasks as well as possible, adjustments in the law are necessary.37  The desired adjustments would mainly involve the collection of data from telephone, email, and Internet, be it over ether or via cable, to be done only if there is reason to do so, with an independent review beforehand and supervision afterwards.38  Additional requirements would be imposed to make sure that the privacy of Dutch citizens remains protected as much as possible.39\n\nA draft law to address the above concerns is currently under review by the Council of State (an advisory body one of whose major tasks is to advise the government and Parliament on legislation and governance).40  The current Act has 106 articles; the proposed revision has 151.41\nAn explanatory memorandum on the draft law contains appendices that (1) correlate the current Act's provisions and those of the proposed revision; (2) give the detailed structure of the draft law (chapter, section, and paragraph titles); and (3) provide in chart form and overview of the special powers and safeguards found in the draft law.42  The chart has six categories: the special power concerned; the authority granting permission for it; the duration of the power; the veiligheidsdiensten/inhoud/wet-op-de-inlichtingen-en-veiligheidsdiensten-wiv (last visited June 10, 2016), archived at https://perma.cc/WY9S-UVKK.\n\n38 Id.\n\n39 Id. 40 Wet op de inlichtingen- en veiligheidsdiensten 20.., INTERNETCONSULTATIE [INTERNET CONSULTATION], https://www.internetconsultatie.nl/wiv (consultation period July 2Sept. 1, 2015), *archived at* https://perma.cc/ VXD4-3SYD; *The Council of State*, RAAD VAN STATE, https://www.raadvanstate.nl/the-council-of-state.html (last visited June 13, 2016), *archived at* https://perma.cc/5BYY-PLML.\n41 Concept-wetsvoorstel Wet op de inlichtingen- en veiligheidsdiensten 20XX: wettekst (consultatieversie juni\n2015):  Regels met betrekking tot de inlichtingen- en veiligheidsdiensten alsmede wijziging van enkele wetten (Wet op de inlichtingen- en veiligheidsdiensten 20 [Draft Bill Law on Intelligence and Security 20xx; legislative text (consultation version June 2015): Rules Concerning the Intelligence and Security and Amending Certain Laws (Law on the Intelligence and Security 20..) (of June 2015)], *available at* Internetconsultatie, https://www.internet consultatie.nl/wiv/document/1715, *archived at* https://perma.cc/FY8W-FGTJ.\napplicable test (in all cases, necessity, proportionality, and subsidiarity); the data retention/destruction period; and whether the law provides for role separation/job separation/compartmentalization with respect to the special power.  In the case of the power of surveillance and monitoring, for example, the power-granting authority is in general the Minister of Security and Justice or the chief of the service, and the duration is a maximum of three months, with a possible three-month extension; the chart indicates the data retention period and the role separation categories do not apply to this power.43  One of two footnotes attached to the special power category states that to the extent that the exercise of the power takes place against a journalist with the purpose of finding out the journalist's source, the permission of the court in The Hague is required.44 The draft legislation is expected to be presented to the Dutch Parliament in the summer of 2016.45\n\n## Sweden\n\nElin Hofverberg Foreign Law Research Consultant\n\n\n## Summary Signal Surveillance Is Regulated By Swedish Law.  Only The National Defense Radio Establishment May Carry Out Surveillance And Only On Cross-Border Communications. Information May Be Requested By The Government, The Military, And The Police.  Sweden's Surveillance Legislation Has Received Widespread Criticism, Including From The European Parliament, On The Grounds That It Fails To Adequately Protect Privacy And May Violate The European Convention On Human Rights.  Specific Privacy Protection Regulations That Pertain To Surveillance Information Are In Place. I.  Legislative Framework\n\nCollection of intelligence data by signal surveillance is carried out by Forsvarets Radioanstalt\n(FRA) (the National Defense Radio Establishment)1 and is governed by the Act on Signal Surveillance for Defense Intelligence Activities, commonly referred to as the FRA legislation.2\nSurveillance is also limited by the more general Act on Defense Intelligence Activity.3\n\nA. Requirements\n\nCollection of intelligence data by signal surveillance can be requested only by the government, government offices, the Swedish Armed Forces, the Swedish Security Service (Police), and the National Operative Department of the Police.4  Such collection requires prior authorization from the Defense Intelligence Court5 and can only be carried out to determine\n\n\n1. external military threats against the country,\n2. conditions for Swedish involvement in peace promotion and humanitarian\ninternational missions or threats against the security of Swedish interests during such missions,\n3. strategic relationships regarding international terrorism and other significant\ntransborder crimes that can threaten important national interests,\n4. the development and spread of weapons of mass destruction, military material and\nproducts covered in the law (SFS 2000:1064) on control of products with dual uses\nand technical assistance,\n5. serious external threats against the society's infrastructure,\n6. conflicts abroad with consequences to international security, 7. foreign intelligence activity against Swedish interests, or 8. the conduct or intentions of foreign government powers that are of considerable\nimportance to Swedish foreign, security or defense policy.6 If necessary for security defense intelligence operations, signals in electronic form may also be collected to 1. follow changes in the signal environment abroad, technical developments and signal\nprotection and\n2. continuously develop the technology and methods needed to carry out its activity in\naccordance with this law (2009:967).7\n The court may grant an application for surveillance only if it conforms to the purposes of the surveillance legislation and the Act on Defense Intelligence Activity, the intelligence need cannot be met in a less invasive manner, and the value of the surveillance clearly outweighs the violations against integrity (human rights).8  In addition, the application cannot be limited to one specific, physical individual.9  The Swedish Defense may cooperate with foreign governments in the collection of the abovementioned information.10\n\nB.  Limitations The Act on Signal Surveillance limits the scope, duration, and subjects of signal surveillance.\nThe main limitation is that signal surveillance may cover only cross-border communications.11\nThus, communications that take place solely within the borders of Sweden cannot be legally collected through signal surveillance.  However, these limits do not apply to \"senders and receivers on foreign state ships, foreign state aircrafts or military vehicles.\"12  Domestic surveillance is instead covered by the Swedish law implementing the European Union Data Retention Directive.13  Moreover, surveillance cannot be targeted against one specific individual alone,14 and may be approved only for a period of six months at a time.15\nOnce collected, stored information must be destroyed by the FRA under certain circumstances\nfor example, if information on an individual lacks importance to the investigation16 or the\n\"information was communicated during religious confession or private care of the soul, unless there are exceptional reasons to collect the information.\"17\n\nII.  Privacy\n\nSpecific privacy legislation deals with the treatment of personal data collected by the FRA.18\nIndividuals have the right to inquire whether they are included in the material collected by the FRA.19  Requests for such information may be made once a year and must be answered within four months.20  Information may be withheld if secrecy requires it.21 Stored data can be shared only with foreign or multinational entities if the information is not protected by secrecy and sharing it is required for the FRA to fulfill its international commitments.22  However, the government has the right to issue regulations that allow secret information to be transferred if considered necessary for the operations of the FRA.23  The FRA\nmust employ security measures to safeguard personal information.24 Only decisions on correction requests and communications of information to third parties may be appealed.25  Under certain circumstances, such as when information collection constitutes a\n\n14 4  3 para. ACT ON SIGNAL SURVEILLANCE. 15 Id. 5a  5 item. 16 Id. 7 .\n\n17 Id.\n\n18 LAG OM BEHANDLING AV PERSONUPPGIFTER I FORSVARSMAKTENS FORSVARSUNDERRATTELSEVERKSAMHET OCH\nMILITARA SAKERHETSTJANST (SFS 2007:258) [ACT ON THE TREATMENT OF PERSONAL INFORMATION FOR THE\nINTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES OF THE SWEDISH DEFENSE AND MILITARY SECURITY SERVICE], https://www.notisum.se/ rnp/sls/lag/20070258.htm, *archived at* https://perma.cc/DVL6-Q5XR; LAG OM BEHANDLING AV PERSONUPPGIFTER I FORSVARETS RADIOANSTALTS FORSVARSUNDERRATTELSE- OCH UTVECKLINGSVERKSAMHET [ACT ON THE TREATMENT OF PERSONAL INFORMATION IN THE FRA'S INTELLIGENCE AND DEVELOPMENT ACTIVITIES] (SFS\n2007:259), https://www.notisum.se/rnp/sls/lag/20070259.htm, *archived at* https://perma.cc/TR4J-AKWK.\n\nviolation of personal integrity, the state can be held liable for damages to an individual whose information was illegally obtained.26 Sweden has been criticized by the European Parliament for its legislation on signal surveillance, especially as it pertains to privacy protections and its oversight, on the ground that it may violate the European Convention on Human Rights.27\n\nIII.  Oversight Authorities Sweden has two different oversight authorities for signal intelligence gathering.  The oversight authority that oversees the FRA's compliance with the Signal Surveillance Act is Statens inspektion for forsvarsunderrattelseverksamheten (Siun),28 whereas the Swedish Data Inspection Board is responsible for the oversight of privacy issues, specifically how information is stored and shared between agencies.29  In this capacity the Data Inspection Board has the right to access personal information that has been stored, obtain information about the storage and protection of the collection, and access facilities containing the information.30  The Board is also responsible for trying to ensure the correction of possible violations.31  The oversight authority may initiate court proceedings before the district administrative court to have illegally collected information erased.32  However, the information may not be erased if erasing it is deemed unreasonable.33 All government activity is also overseen by the Riksrevisionen (Swedish National Audit Office).34  In 2015 the Riksrevisionen published a report on FRA surveillance,35 and has issued a\n26 2 ch. 5 .\n1014703_/moraes_1014703_en.pdf, *archived at* https://perma.cc/EME7-EW2A.\n28 2  Forordning med instruktion for Statens inspektion for forsvarsunderrattelseverksamheten [Regulation with Instructions for State Inspection of the Defense Intelligence Activity] (SFS 2009:969), http://www.riksdagen.se/sv/\nDokument-Lagar/Lagar/Svenskforfattningssamling/Forordning-2009969-med-inst_sfs-2009-969, *archived at* https://perma.cc/83WS-VBPG.\n29 Forordning med instruktion for Datainspektionen [Regulation with Instructions for the Data Inspection Board]\n(SFS 2007:975), http://www.riksdagen.se/sv/Dokument-Lagar/Lagar/Svenskforfattningssamling/Forordning-\n2007975-med-inst_sfs-2007-975, *archived at* https://perma.cc/A5JE-BBJ6.\n\n## 30 5 Ch. 2  Act On The Treatment Of Personal Information In The Fra's Intelligence And Development Activities.\n\nnumber of recommendations on how FRA surveillance is handed, specifically focusing on the need for Siun to improve its practices for documenting and justifying its activities.36\n\n\n## United Kingdom\n\nClare Feikert-Ahalt Senior Foreign Law Specialist\n\n\nSUMMARY Foreign intelligence gathering in the United Kingdom is regulated by the Intelligence\nServices Act, the Human Rights Act, and the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act. These Acts provide for a system of warrants to be obtained to conduct surveillance and intercept communications, provided the surveillance is necessary to complete the statutory\nfunctions of the relevant agency.  Issuing warrants in the UK remains an executive, rather than judicial, act.  UK intelligence agencies are subject to parliamentary oversight.\nThe UK is currently in the process of introducing an Investigatory Powers Bill.  This bill,\nnow before the House of Lords, would substantially repeal and re-enact the majority of the\nlegal framework governing the interception of communications.  The aim of the bill is to provide a clearer framework of powers and oversight.  The bill would also require judicial approval of warrants issued by the Secretary of State and provide for the enhanced ability to intercept Internet communications records, which contain more information than communications data.  It would also allow for the interception and retention of data in bulk.  As with all previous bills that address the interception of communications, there has been significant criticism that the provisions are still not clear enough and are too wideranging.  The government claims that the bill would essentially re-enact existing\nlegislation and that the limited expansion of powers is necessary to fill gaps in the ability of law enforcement and the intelligence services to keep the country safe.\n\nI.  Introduction The UK has three intelligence and security agencies, which are commonly referred to collectively as the Agencies or the Intelligence Services.  These Agencies consist of the Secret Intelligence Service (SIS), also known as MI6 (\"MI\" standing for Military Intelligence), the UK's overseas intelligence agency; the Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ), the UK's signals intelligence gathering agency; and the Security Service, also known as MI5, the UK's domestic intelligence agency.  The Security Service has statutory responsibility to protect the national security of the UK from international threats, including those from terrorism.  It is supported in this role by the SIS and GCHQ, who provide intelligence gathered from overseas.1 While these are the primary agencies in charge of collecting, gathering, and analyzing intelligence information, they are not the only parts of the intelligence machinery in the UK.\nAdditional intelligence is compiled by the Cabinet Office, Defence Intelligence (part of the Ministry of Defence), and the Joint Terrorism Analysis Centre (JTAC).2  The National Crime Agency addresses organized crime and economic crime that occurs within the UK's borders.3\nAll of these agencies must act within the bounds of the law and their operations \"must relate to national security, the prevention or detection of serious crime, or the UK's economic wellbeing.\"4\n\nII.  Legislative Framework The work of the SIS and GCHQ is undertaken in accordance with the legislative framework of the Human Rights Act, 5  the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act (RIPA), 6  and the Intelligence Services Act 1994 (the ISA), 7 which placed the SIS and GCHQ on a statutory footing and under the responsibility of the Foreign Secretary. The ISA defines the function of the SIS as follows:\n\n\n(a) to obtain and provide information relating to the actions or intentions of persons\noutside the British Islands; and\n(b) to perform other tasks relating to the actions or intentions of such persons.8\n The GCHQ's role is defined as follows:\n\n\n(a) to monitor or interfere with electromagnetic, acoustic and other emissions and any\nequipment producing such emissions and to obtain and provide information derived from or related to such emissions or equipment and from encrypted material; and\n(b) to provide advice and assistance about(i) languages, including terminology used\nfor technical matters, and (ii) cryptography and other matters relating to the protection of information and other material, to the armed forces of the Crown, to Her Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom or to a Northern Ireland Department or to any other organisation which is determined for the purposes of this\nsection in such manner as may be specified by the Prime Minister.9\n These functions may only be exercised in the interests of national security with regard to the defense and foreign policies of the UK, in the interests of the economic well-being of the UK, and in support of the prevention or detection of serious crime.10\n\nThe ISA provides for a system of warrants that authorize entry on and interference with property or with wireless telegraphy upon application from any of the three Intelligence Services.11  Due to the important role the Intelligence Services play in safeguarding the UK's national security, the ISA's requirements for an authorization are much broader than those for the Acts that cover domestic surveillance.\n\nEach warrant must be approved by the Secretary of State.12  The Secretary of State must believe that the conduct is proportionate and necessary to assist the Security Service, SIS, or GCHQ in conducting any of their functions under their respective Acts and that the information sought cannot be obtained by other means.13  Warrants provided to the SIS and GCHQ for the purposes of preventing or detecting crime may not relate to the British Islands.  The Intelligence Services Act was amended by the Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005, which provides the Intelligence Services authority to obtain a warrant to conduct activities in the UK as well as overseas.  The Security Service also can obtain a warrant to interfere with property or wireless telegraphy if it is acting on behalf of the SIS or GCHQ and the action proposed is to be \"undertaken otherwise than in support of the prevention of detection of serious crime.\"14\n\nIII.  Interception of Communications\n\nThe use of covert surveillance, use of covert human intelligence sources,15 and interception of both communications and communications data in England and Wales is allowed, provided the relevant laws regulating this procedure are adhered to.16 There is no single legislative regime that applies to the interception of communications; instead the laws and procedures vary according to the body that is seeking the interception.  The main piece of legislation in this area is the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 (RIPA).17\nsystem/uploads/attachment_data/file/324152/Intelligence_Services_Commissioner_Accessible__2_.pdf, archived at https://perma.cc/4S6M-LBNW.    **\n13 Intelligence Services Act 1994, c. 13,  5, http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1994/13, archived at https://perma.cc/G7VW-XVYZ.\n\n14 Id.  5(4), (5). 15 Directed surveillance may be authorized by a designated person within each of the intelligence services provided that it is necessary to fulfill the agency's statutory functions, is undertaken for the purpose of a specific investigation, is proportionate, and cannot be achieved through other means.  Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000, c. 23,  28.\n\n16 The Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act provides that unlawfully intercepting communications is an offense punishable by up to two years' imprisonment and/or a fine.  Id.  1.\n17 Id.\nRIPA serves to augment the ISA, providing for distinct authorization processes for warrants that apply to the interception of communications18 and the interception of communications data.19 Before the Secretary of State can authorize a warrant to intercept communications, he must believe that the conduct requested by the warrant cannot be obtained by other means, is proportionate and necessary in what it is seeking to achieve, and has as its purpose one of the following: protecting the interests of national security, preventing or detecting serious crime,20\nsafeguarding the economic well-being of the UK from the acts or intentions of individuals outside the British Isles, or giving effect to an international mutual assistance agreement whose purpose is equivalent to that of preventing or detecting serious crime.21  Before signing the warrant, the Secretary of State must also consider whether the warrant is operationally required and if its issuance is proportionate and necessary.22\n\nRIPA provides for the lawful acquisition and disclosure of communications data in specified circumstances.  Communications data does not include the content of a communication but the information that relates to the use of a communications service; thus the requirements to obtain an authorization are less stringent and the list of individuals who can request an authorization is less restrictive.   An authorization to obtain communications data can only be obtained if necessary in the interests of national security or the economic well-being of the UK; for the purposes of preventing or detecting crime or preventing disorder; in the interests of public safety;\nfor assessing or collecting a tax, duty, levy or other imposition; or for protecting public health or, in an emergency, preventing death, injury, or damage to an individual's physical or mental health, or mitigating such damage.23 The range of officials who can authorize the interception of communications data is much broader than in other areas of surveillance, and such authorization can be granted by a senior official in the relevant public authority.24\n\n\n\n## Iv.  Oversight\n\nThe Intelligence Agencies are also subject to parliamentary oversight by the Intelligence and Security Committee, which operates within the \"ring of secrecy\" to examine the expenditure, administration, and policy of all the Intelligence Agencies.25  RIPA further requires that the Prime Minister appoint an Intelligence Services Commissioner to review how the Secretary of State issues warrants for both surveillance and interference with property by the Intelligence Services, as well as how the Secretary of State exercises and performs the powers and duties granted by RIPA in relation to the Intelligence Services, although the power to review warrants by this Commissioner is retrospective.26\n\nV.  Investigatory Powers Bill 2015-16\nThe government stated in 201527 that it would introduce a new Investigatory Powers Bill to regulate the interception of communications data.28  The bill was published in draft form in November 2015, 29 with the government emphasizing that it did not create a series of new powers, but merely served to repeal and re-enact in a clearer manner existing powers already provided for in legislation.  The draft bill was reviewed by three parliamentary committees,30 which criticized the existing framework of investigatory powers, 31 noting that the existing HCWS27, http://www.parliament.uk/business/publications/written-questions-answers-statements/writtenstatement/Commons/2015-06-11/HCWS27, *archived at* https://perma.cc/U5CS-QZTJ.\n29 DRAFT INVESTIGATORY POWERS BILL, Cm. 9152, 2015-16, https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/\nuploads/attachment_data/file/473770/Draft_Investigatory_Powers_Bill.pdf, *archived at* https://perma.cc/8YV2- RSYW.\n30 David Anderson, QC, *A Question of Trust*, June 2015, https://terrorismlegislationreviewer.\n\nindependent.gov.uk/wp-content/uploads/2015/06/IPR-Report-Web-Accessible1.pdf, *archived at* https://perma.cc/SEQ5-7TSW.  This report recommended that the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act be replaced with new legislation that bulk collection of intercepted materials should be permitted under strict safeguards; the Home Secretary's role in authorizing the interception of communications should be restricted and replaced with judicial oversight; the definition of communications data should be updated; and a new position, the independent surveillance and intelligence commissioner, should be created and should replace the three current commissioners.  INTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY COMMITTEE OF PARLIAMENT, REPORT ON THE DRAFT\nINVESTIGATORY POWERS BILL, HC 795, 2015-16, http://isc.independent.gov.uk/files/20160209_ISC_Rpt_ IPBill(web).pdf, *archived at* https://perma.cc/CSK2-AS7M.  This report criticized the current legal framework as being developed in a piecemeal way and that it was unnecessarily complicated, resulting in a lack of transparency.\nRUSI, *A Democratic Licence to Operate: Report of the Independent Surveillance Review*, July 2015, https://rusi.org/\npublication/whitehall-reports/democratic-licence-operate-report-independent-surveillance-review, archived at https://perma.cc/BC47-ZAZG.  This report claimed that the existing law was too complex and there were inadequacies in oversight.\nlegislation had developed in a patchwork fashion and was in need of reform.32  The disclosures of Edward Snowden also highlighted the need for a new, clearer legislative framework to govern the interceptions of communications.  Snowden's disclosures caused significant concern among UK citizens that the government was collecting data about them *en masse*, and led technology companies to improve privacy protections and strengthen the encryption they offer their customers, the results of which have been to place many communications outside the reach of the intelligence agencies and courts.33\n\nThe bill was introduced in the House of Commons on March 1, 2016.34  The bill has passed through the House of Commons and is currently awaiting its second reading in the House of Lords.35  Prime Minister David Cameron has stated there is a pressing need for the bill to be enacted before the sunset provision of the Data Retention and Investigatory Powers Act 2014\ntakes effect on December 31, 2016,36 which would leave law enforcement and the intelligence services without lawful authority to intercept certain communications absent passage of a replacement measure.  The bill aims to modernize the laws on communications data37 and bring together all investigatory powers available to law enforcement and the intelligence services.\n\nA.  Provisions in the Bill The Investigatory Powers Bill is substantive, containing 243 sections and ten schedules in 268 pages.  If enacted, it will repeal and replace almost the entire system that regulates the AND SECURITY COMMITTEE OF PARLIAMENT, *supra* note 30; HOUSE OF COMMONS SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY COMMISSION, INVESTIGATORY POWERS BILL: TECHNOLOGY ISSUES, THIRD REPORT OF SESSION 2015-2016, HC 573,\n2015-16, http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201516/cmselect/cmsctech/573/573.pdf, *archived at*\nhttps://perma.cc/5PYM-FQF2.  The government responded to these reports in the following report: INVESTIGATORY POWERS BILL: GOVERNMENT RESPONSE TO PRE-LEGISLATIVE SCRUTINY, Cm 9219, 2015-16, https:/ /www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/504174/54575_Cm_9219_WEB.PDF, archived at https://perma.cc/N35G-DZXG.\n32 *Investigatory Powers Bill*, HOUSE OF COMMONS LIBRARY, Mar. 11, 2016, http://researchbriefings.parliament.\n\nuk/ResearchBriefing/Summary/CBP-7518, *archived at* https://perma.cc/96TD-5QPH.\n33 INTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY COMMITTEE OF PARLIAMENT, PRIVACY AND SECURITY: A MODERN AND\nTRANSPARENT LEGAL FRAMEWORK, 201415, HC 1075,  4, http://isc.independent.gov.uk/files/20150312_ISC_\nP+S+Rpt(web).pdf, *archived at* https://perma.cc/GNT4-G4XS.\n34 *Investigatory Powers Bill 2015-16 to 2016-17*, PARLIAMENT.UK, http://services.parliament.uk/bills/2015-\n16/investigatorypowers.html, *archived at* https://perma.cc/SXB3-L3ED.  The provisions of the Bill as introduced to the House of Commons are available at: *Investigatory Powers Bill (HC Bill 2)*, PARLIAMENT.UK, http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/bills/cbill/2016-2017/0002/17002.pdf, *archived at* https://perma.cc/L5FA-\n2NSJ.  The current version of the bill is available at: Investigatory Powers Bill 2015-16, HL Bill 40, http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/bills/lbill/2016-2017/0040/17040.pdf, *archived at* https://perma.cc/8ZVS- V8CE.  As the bill is controversial, there are many amendments, and the clauses and numbering are frequently changed.\ninterception of communications. 38   The main parts of the bill address the interception of communications, the retention and acquisition of communications data, equipment interference, the retention and examination of bulk personal datasets, and the decryption of communications. These are areas where the government claims the gap in capabilities is putting lives at risk, and addressing these areas would enable law enforcement to effectively target terrorist communications.39  The bill provides for these powers to be used on both a targeted basis and, in certain instances, for the collection, retention, and examination of bulk datasets. 40   The government claims that the only new capability provided for in the bill is the ability to require the retention of Internet connection records, which the Home Secretary has compared to itemized phone bills as it shows the websites that an individual has visited.41\n\n1.  Interception of Communications\n\nChapter 1 of the bill provides the process for the lawful interception of communications.  There are three different types of interception and examination warrants that would be authorized under this part of the bill:\n- Targeted interception warrants.  This authorizes the interception of communications and the\n\nacquisition of associated communications data that relates to a particular organization,\nperson, premises, or group of connected to subjects that are part of a single investigation.42\n- Targeted examination warrants.  This authorizes the examination of intercepted materials\nobtained by a bulk interception warrant.\n- Mutual Assistance warrants.  This allows requests for assistance with overseas interception.43 Interference with communications in certain instances and locations is lawful without a warrant and the bill clarifies these circumstances.  These instances include when there is consent to the interception; if the interception occurs in a prison, psychiatric hospital, or immigration detention facility; or if the interception is for regulatory enforcement or business purposes.44\n\n2.  Warrant Authorization for the Interception of Communications\n\nThe process to obtain warrants varies according to the type of information for which interception is sought.  Given that intercepting communications covers the content of those communication, the criteria and authorities permitted to intercept communications is more stringent than that required to intercept communications data.\n\nUnder the bill, the heads of the intelligence services, National Crime Agency, the Police, HM Revenue and Customs, and Chief of Defence Intelligence, and a competent authority from another jurisdiction as part of a mutual assistance agreement, would be known as \"intercepting authorities\" who may apply for a warrant to intercept communications.  The Secretary of State would be able to issue a warrant to intercept communications if he or she believes it is necessary on the grounds of national security, for the prevention or detection of serious crime, to safeguard the economic well-being of the UK, to preserve national security, or to give effect to an international mutual assistance agreement.  The warrant must be proportionate to the goal that it seeks to achieve.45 In a substantial change from the current system used to authorize warrants, the decision of the Secretary of State would then need to be approved by a Judicial Commissioner.  When reviewing the decision, the Judicial Commissioner would be required to consider whether the Secretary of State met the test of necessity and proportionality when granting the warrant, using the same criteria as a court would during judicial review,46 meaning that the lawfulness of the decision would be determined according to the process the Secretary of State used to make it.47  Provided the decision process was reasonable and rational, or in cases where human rights and EU law were involved, the decision was also proportionate to the objective it sought to achieve, the warrant would stand.48  The Judicial Commissioner could refuse to approve the warrant if he or she feels that the tests have not been met, and must set out the grounds for the decision in writing.  The agency that requested the warrant could then attempt to address the concerns and resubmit the request.  If the Judicial Commissioner refused to approve the warrant again, the application could be sent to the Information Commissioner for reconsideration.  There would be no further course for appeal if the Information Commissioner refused to approve the warrant.49\nIn urgent cases, approval of the Judicial Commissioner would not be necessary, but would need to be obtained within three days.  If the Judicial Commissioner did not approve the warrant, it would cease to have any effect and the Judicial Commissioner would have discretion to determine what happened to any intelligence or material gathered during the period the warrant was lawfully in effect. Critics have expressed concern that the judicial oversight provided is too narrow as it looks only at whether the process and reasonableness of the home secretary's decision rather than the merit and substance of the warrant.50\n\n\n3.  Warrant Authorization for the Interception of Communications Data The number of authorities that may request a warrant for the interception of communications data is wider and includes the intelligence services, law enforcement agencies, government departments, regulatory bodies, and the National Health Service.  A designated person from these agencies may grant a warrant if they are satisfied that it is necessary and proportionate, and related to one of the ten following grounds:\n- In the interests of national security\n\n- To prevent or detect crime, or prevent disorder - In the interests of the economic well-being of the UK if these are also relevant to the national\nsecurity of the UK\n- In the interests of public safety\n- To protect public health - To assess or collect any tax, duty, levy, or charge payable to a government department\n- To prevent death, injury, or damage to a person's mental or physical health, or mitigate any\ninjury or damage\n- To assist into any investigation into the miscarriage of justice\n- To assist in the identification of any person who has died or who is unable to identify\nthemselves due to a physical or mental condition\n- To exercise functions relating to the regulation of financial services and markets or\nfinancial stability51\n Except in urgent cases, prior to granting the authorization, the designated senior officer would have to consult with \"an officer in a relevant public authority trained to facilitate lawful acquisition of communications data and effective cooperation between public authorities and CSPs.\"52\n\n4.  Interception of Internet Connection Records The interception of Internet connection records is provided for in clause 59, which states that these records may only be obtained to identify the sender of an online communication, the communication service a person has used, where the person has accessed illegal content, which Internet service is being used, and when and how it is being used.53  Any authorization obtained of communications data that may be obtained and the purposes that they may be obtained.\n\nunder this provision is valid for one month, although it may be renewed or cancelled.54  The bill creates a duty on communications service providers to comply, as far as reasonably practicable, with any request for communications data.55  Information that may be obtained under this section includes communications data for the purposes of identifying a journalist's source of information.  The approval of the Judicial Commissioner is required in cases where a public authority wishes to obtain this information.56 In cases where a complex request for data is made, clauses 6365 would provide the Secretary of State with the ability to establish a \"request filter\" system, where any material that is not directly relevant to an investigation would be filtered and deleted before the data is supplied.  This filter would be overseen by the Investigatory Powers Commissioner, who would be required to submit an annual report on the operation of this system.57\n\nThese provisions are among the most controversial of the bill.  Internet connection records were initially described by the Home Secretary as being the equivalent of an itemized phone bill.58\nThe definition of \"Internet connection records\" has been criticized as being vague.59  Individuals in the technology sector have expressed concern that the term does not exist within the industry and the information required to be collected is not within a recognized data type.60  The lack of clarity regarding the meaning of Internet connection records has also led many within the technology sector to express concern that the cost of compliance with the bill, and the impact on businesses and consumers, cannot be accurately assessed.61\n\n5.  Interception of Communications of Members of Parliament There has been a convention, known as the Wilson Doctrine, that communications of Members of Parliament should not be intercepted by the Intelligence Services or police.62  A recent case determined that this doctrine did not have any legal effect, however.63  The bill places the ability of law enforcement to conduct equipment interference and intercept the communications of Members of Parliament on a statutory basis.  Prior to approving any warrant to undertake these activities, the Secretary of State must consult with the Prime Minister.64\n\n6.  Retention and Use of Intercepted Material Clause 83 provides the Secretary of State with the ability to issue a retention notice to communications service providers that would require them to retain communications data for up to twelve months.65  The Secretary of State may issue one of these notices if he or she considers that one of the grounds for issuing an authorization to intercept communications data is met and that the retention is necessary and proportionate.  The retention notice can apply to more than one operator and all data or to a specified type of data for up to twelve months.  Prior to issuing a retention notice, the Secretary of State must take into account a number of factors, including the benefits of any information obtained from the notice; the potential number of users that the notice relates to; the technical feasibility of complying with the notice; and the effect on the communications service provider.  Prior to giving the notice, the Secretary of State should take reasonable steps to consult with any communications service provider to whom the notice relates.66 There is a review process for data retention notices by the Secretary of State.  In certain circumstances, the specifics of which will be provided for at a later date in regulations, the operator that receives a retention notice may refer the notice back for review by the Secretary of State, who must undertake the review in consultation with the Technical Advisory Board and the Investigatory Powers Commissioner.  Until the review is complete, there is no obligation to comply with the requirements in the notice.67  During the review, the technical requirements and financial consequences of compliance with the notice will be considered, as well as whether the notice is proportionate.  The Secretary of State may then affirm, vary, or revoke the retention notice.  The Communication Service Provider must have steps in place to ensure that data retained in compliance with the notice is securely stored, protected against unlawful disclosure, and destroyed when it is no longer authorized.68\n\n7.  Equipment Interference Equipment interference (also known as computer network exploitation) involves accessing individuals' devices and computers to obtain data, which includes geolocation, text messages, and emails, and also allows law enforcement agencies to access encrypted communications.69\nThe bill provides for the process to authorize equipment interference to obtain communications or private information that would otherwise be an offence under the Computer Misuse Act\n1990. 70  The bill provides for targeted equipment interference, which would authorize the interference with equipment to obtain communications, private information or equipment data, and allow the recipient to get, monitor, examine, and disclose any material obtained as a result of the warrant.  Targeted examination authorizes the person to examine material obtained under a bulk equipment interference warrant.  As with warrants to intercept communications, warrants for equipment interference may apply to a specific person, group of people, organization, multiple organizations, or a specific location or locations where the equipment is located.71  The warrant may also be targeted at equipment where there is a link between different people, locations, or organizations if it is necessary for the purposes of a single investigation. The Secretary of State may issue a warrant to authorize equipment interference upon application by the heads of the intelligence services where it is necessary on the grounds of national security, the prevention or detection of serious crime, or the interests of the economic well-being of the UK, and proportionate to the objective that it is seeking to achieve.72 Law enforcement may also obtain a warrant for equipment interference if it is necessary and proportionate for the purposes of preventing and detecting serious crime, or other purposes if necessary to prevent death or serious harm to a person's physical or mental health. 73  The warrant must be personally signed by the Secretary of State and approved by a judicial commissioner applying the principles of judicial review.74 Warrants issued under these provisions continue in force for up to six months, but may be renewed, modified or canceled.75 Items covered by legal privilege may be the subject of a targeted equipment interference or examination warrant and in these cases, the warrant would need to specify that it is the intention to obtain this information, and exceptional and compelling circumstances must exist to justify the warrant.76 As with warrants to intercept communications, communications service providers have a duty to assist with the implementation of any equipment interference warrant77 and must take all steps necessary to give effect to the warrant.  The bill contains provisions that aim to not unreasonably burden providers when complying with its provisions.  Communications service providers are not required to take any steps that are not reasonably practicable for them to take;78 however; the\n\nSecretary of State may enforce on any person in the UK the duty to comply with a warrant.  This may be done through civil proceedings for an injunction or specific performance of a statutory duty under section 45 of the Court of Session Act 1988, or through proceedings to obtain \"any other appropriate relief.\"79 Safeguards must be in place to protect any data acquired by the warrant, and equivalent safeguards to those that exist in the UK must be in place before any material is shared with an agency located overseas. 80  The offense of unauthorized disclosure applies to the details or existence of a warrant, and to any material obtained under it.81 There have been numerous objections to the proposed equipment interference provisions in the bill, with critics claiming that the bill does not acknowledge the \"dangers inherent with equipment interference.\"82\n\n8.  Warrants for Bulk Data\n\nThe bill provides for a number of warrants that would authorize the acquisition of data in the form of bulk interception warrants, bulk communications warrants, bulk equipment interference warrants, and bulk personal dataset warrants.83 Bulk communication warrants would enable the collection of bulk communications of individuals outside the British Islands, which includes the UK, Guernsey, Jersey, and the Isle of Man, followed by the selection of specific communications to be reviewed.  Warrants would only be issued where the main purpose it to obtain overseas communications or other data on specific grounds, one of which must be national security.  The heads of the intelligence services, or someone acting on their behalf, would be responsible for applying for a warrant, which must be personally signed by the Secretary of State and approved by a Judicial Commissioner. The provisions that apply to bulk interception warrants also apply to bulk acquisition warrants. The main difference is that these warrants would be available for domestic communications, and communications service providers could be required to disclose specific communications data, or they may be required to obtain and then disclose data if they do not have it.  A targeted examination warrant is required to examine material of any person within the British Islands.84 Bulk equipment interference warrants would allow the collection of data relating to a number of devices and enable the intelligence services to collect data from a number of devices without\n\ntargeting specific people, equipment, or activities.  These warrants aim to obtain overseas-related communications, private information, or equipment data.  As with bulk interception, a targeted examination warrant is required to examine material of any person within the British Islands.85\n\nWarrants may also be obtained for bulk personal datasets.  This would enable the intelligence services to apply for two types of warrants to intercept datasets in bulk.  A class warrant would enable the intelligence services to retain and examine bulk datasets about a large class of people that must be described in the warrant, and the majority of people within this class are not of interest to the agenciesfor example, a list of people who are in possession of a passport.86  The intelligence services would only be able to retain or examine a bulk personal dataset with a warrant under these provisions if the material does not fall under another warrant provided for in the bill.\n\nA \"specific warrant\" is also provided for in the bill, which would allow the intelligence services to retain and examine bulk personal data that is described in the warrant.87  These warrants would be necessary if the dataset does not fall in a class of information that could be covered by a class warrant, the dataset contains novel or new information, or in cases where the \"dataset may raise issues of sensitivity such that it would be appropriate for the Secretary of State to issue a specific warrant.\"88  In cases of both types of warrants, no data that is held in the bulk dataset may be examined unless it is necessary for the operational purposes specified in the warrant.89\nOnly trained staff may access the datasets, and any search \"must be justified on the basis of necessity and proportionality and for one of the authorised operational purposes.\"90 The Secretary of State must authorize warrants for bulk personal datasets and specific warrants and believe that it is necessary on the grounds of national security, serious crime, or economic well-being of the UK where relevant to national security.  The warrant must be proportionate to the objective that it seeks to achieve and satisfactory arrangements must be in place to handle data.  The warrant must then be approved by a Judicial Commissioner.91 Warrants continue in force for up to six months, and may be renewed, modified or cancelled.  In cases where the warrant expires or is cancelled, in order to retain and examine the dataset a new warrant must be applied for within three months.92  UK datasets from the UK must be examined within three months, and datasets originating from overseas must be examined with six months.93\nProvisions that allow for bulk interception and interference have been among the most controversial in the bill, with many critics asserting that it provides intelligence agencies with the ability to undertake mass surveillance. 94  Critics argue that the routine collection of bulk information gives rise to privacy concerns and that gathering data should be as targeted as possible.95\n\n9.  Encryption The Secretary of State may issue a national security notice to communication service providers that would require them to take steps that are necessary and proportionate in the interest of national security.  These notices could require conduct, such as the \"provision of services or facilities to assist an intelligence service to carry out its functions more effectively.\"96 The Secretary of State, after consulting with the technical advisory board and any affected communication service provider, would be able to use regulations to impose obligations on communication service providers in the form of technical capability notices to help facilitate assistance in response to warrants under the bill.  These obligations could include removing electronic protection to any communications or data.97  The communications service provider can only be required to remove encryption that it has applied, or that it has had a third party apply on its behalf.98  Prior to issuing a notice that imposes obligations to remove electronic protection, the Secretary of State must take into account the technical feasibility and cost of compliance.99  The communications service provider may refer the notice back to the Secretary of State for review, and during this period there is no obligation to comply with the requirements of the notice.  During review, the Secretary of State must consult the Technical Advisory Board and Investigatory Powers Commissioner and, after consultation, he or she may then vary, revoke or confirm the notice.100 The Investigatory Powers Bill would replace existing provisions, currently contained in the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act; however, UK technology groups have expressed concerns that clause is unclear as to whether it extends to end-to-end encryption, where the keys are generated for two unique users.  TechUK notes that if the provisions of the bill apply to endto-end encryption it will limit companies' ability to use security to safeguard customers privacy and security, and would result in UK companies having to weaken the security of products in\n\norder to comply with the legislation. 101   Major technology companies, including Apple, Facebook, Google, Microsoft, Twitter, Yahoo, and Mozilla, have expressed concern that the provisions in the bill would require them to insert \"backdoors\" into their software to facilitate government access. 102   Concern has also been raised that systems that utilize end-to-end encryption, which service providers currently do not have the capability to decrypt, could be banned in the UK.103\n\n10.  Offenses In addition to providing for an authorization mechanism for the lawful interception of communications, the bill also provides for the offenses of unlawfully intercepting or obtaining communications.104  There are monetary penalties for certain unlawful interceptions.105  The Bill provides restrictions on authorizing interceptions from overseas authorities as well as under mutual assistance agreements. The bill imposes a duty, with limited exemptions, not to disclose the existence or details of any warrant or intercepted materials obtained under a warrant.  It is an offense to do so.106  This offense is designed to \"prevent the 'tipping-off' of suspects or subjects of interest that their data has been sought, thus informing them that they are under suspicion.\"107\n\n11.  Extraterritorial Application Provisions relating to the interception of communications data would have extraterritorial application, meaning that communications service providers based overseas that handle communications data of citizens of the UK would be covered by the provisions of the Act.108\n\n12.  Miscellaneous Provisions\n\nIn an amendment, the Government Communication Headquarters and Secret Intelligence Service would be allowed to engage in property interference where the property is located in the UK, removing a current restriction that only allows them to undertake activities involving overseas property.109\n\n\n13.  Oversight If enacted, the bill would establish an Investigatory Powers Commissioner and Judicial Commissioners to oversee the implementation of legislation.  The three Commissioners that currently oversee the use of investigatory powers would be replaced for the first time by an element of judicial oversight.  The Judicial Commissioners would be appointed by the Prime Minister after consultation with senior members of the judiciary and must have held high judicial office.110 In cases where a public authority commits a serious error and fails to comply with a requirement over which the Investigatory Powers Commissioner has oversight, the Commissioner may inform the individual of the error and his or her right to bring a case to the Investigatory Powers Tribunal.111\n\nB.  Reaction to the Bill The only committee that has reviewed the draft bill with full security clearance was the Intelligence and Security Committee, which expressed concern that the bill did not cover all the intrusive capabilities of the intelligence services, leaving some of the powers governed by other legislation, and that privacy protections provided in the bill were inconsistent. 112   The government reportedly responded to these criticisms only by amending the heading of Part I of the bill from \"general protections\" to \"privacy.\"113  This response was strongly criticized in both the press and by human rights groups.  *The Independent* noted that Parliament's Intelligence and Security Committee - the only security-checked committee with access to the most sensitive workings of our intelligence agencies -told [government minister] May to place privacy at the heart of the Bill. Her Home Office officials simply added the word \"privacy\" to a chapter heading. To treat Parliament with such contempt is beneath one of the great offices of state.114 The Times expressed concern that police powers were being coupled with those of the Intelligence Services in the bill, opining that the police, unlike the Intelligence Services, had a long history of exploiting powers that were designed to combat crime for other purposes:115\n\nBritain's security services are known to use their powers discerningly. The same cannot be said about Britain's police. The House of Commons should be wary of gifting them new powers requiring little oversight from anybody other than senior police officers. The\n\n\nhome secretary, meanwhile, should not have jeopardised the vital preservation of national security by packaging it alongside new domestic powers that are almost certain to be abused.116\n\n\nThe Guardian has expressed concern that digital surveillance powers are being expanded to an uncomfortable level and that the government has made only minimal concessions after the review of the draft bill.  It also expressed concern about the burden on communications providers to now automatically keep a year of Internet connection records,117 and about offenses whose creation was originally justified to tackle terrorism and serious crime being used for other purposes, such as immigration and nationality offenses.118 The most heated issues raised by the bill are those of balancing the privacy of individuals and security, concerns of abuse of these inherently intrusive powers, and how much the public should be made aware of the exercise of these powers.119  Other concerns involve the technology sector, whose cooperation is essential to the successful operation of the Act.  The UK's technology industry has raised concerns that the proposed measures may not be feasible to implement, and will have a significant financial impact upon industry and result in a loss of competitiveness in the UK's technology sector. 120  Concerns have also been raised about the cost and security implications of the collection and retention of such large volumes of sensitive data and that the provisions that regulate and govern it are not sufficiently clear, as well as the question of who will bear the costs of the implementation.121  Given the financial burden on communications service providers that compliance with the provisions in the bill may cause, clause 222 provides that the government would contribute towards any costs incurred when complying with the bill.122\n\n## European Union\n\nTheresa Papademetriou Senior Foreign Law Specialist\n\n\nSUMMARY Electronic intelligence falls within the domain of the Member States of the European\nUnion (EU), who have sole responsibility for safeguarding their internal security.\nElectronic surveillance conducted by national law enforcement authorities is inherently linked to the right to privacy and personal data protection.  Such rights are enshrined in European Union treaties and secondary legislation as well as in Conventions adopted by the Council of Europe and in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,\nwhich binds EU Members.  The Charter of Fundamental Rights and the European\nConvention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms guarantee the\nrights to privacy and personal data protection to everyone within the jurisdiction of the EU\nMember States.  Legal issues arising from electronic surveillance that may infringe on the\nhuman rights of individuals are not subject to review by the Court of Justice of the EU. Aggrieved individuals, upon exhausting legal remedies at the national level, may bring\ntheir cases to the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg for a final review.\n\n\nFollowing the Snowden revelations in the United States and press reports of mass\nelectronic surveillance conducted by law enforcement authorities of several EU Members,\nthe European Parliament adopted a resolution on the US NSA Surveillance Programme,\nSurveillance Bodies in Various (EU) Members States and Their Impact on EU Citizens'\nFundamental Rights.  Moreover, the United Nations General Assembly, in a resolution\nadopted in 2013, urged UN Members to review their legislation on secret surveillance.\n\n\nIn February 2016, the EU and the United States signed an umbrella agreement on the\nprotection of personal data and privacy for law enforcement purposes.\n\nI.  Introduction Under European Union (EU) treaties, foreign electronic surveillance conducted by national law enforcement authorities of the twenty-eight EU Member States falls within the domain of the EU Members.  The Treaty on European Union provides that \"national security remains the sole responsibility of each Member State,\"1 and, hence, the EU arguably lacks competence to legislate in this area.  Moreover, based on the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU, the Court of Justice of the EU does not have jurisdiction over cases that involve surveillance conducted by national authorities in order to safeguard the internal security of the EU Members.2\nIn conducting electronic surveillance, either foreign or domestic, EU Members are required to maintain a balance between the needs of law enforcement authorities and respect for the fundamental rights to privacy, personal data protection, and private and family life, as such rights are guaranteed in domestic legislation, EU law, and international agreements, including the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms\n(ECHRFF) and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,3 by which EU\nMembers are bound.  Under settled case law of the European Court of Human Rights, national enforcement authorities are required, when conducting electronic surveillance, to justify such activity against the privacy of individuals on the basis of a law that sets forth clearly defined grounds, including national security and public safety, and adheres to the principles of necessity and proportionality. A number of EU Member States have been identified as engaging in large-scale surveillance.  In the aftermath of the Snowden revelations in the United States, it was reported that a number of EU Members, including France,4 Germany,5 Sweden,6 and the United Kingdom,7 were allegedly involved in mass surveillance operations in cooperation with the United States.  The allegations spurred a debate at the EU level with the European Parliament playing a leading role among the EU institutions by instructing the Civil Liberties Committee to conduct an inquiry.  The inquiry led to the adoption of the Resolution on the US NSA Surveillance Programme, Surveillance Bodies in Various EU Members States and Their Impact on EU Citizens' Fundamental Rights and on Transatlantic Cooperation in Justice and Home Affairs.8\n\nII.  Electronic Surveillance: Competence Issues\n\nCompetence in the area of surveillance between the EU and its Member States is delineated in a number of articles found in the Treaty on European Union (TEU) and the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU (TFEU).  Article 4, paragraph 2 of the TEU states that the Union \"shall archived at https://perma.cc/9LKM-LWTU.\n\n4 Angelique Chrisafis, France 'Runs Vast Electronic Spying Operation Using NSA-style Methods': Intelligence Agency Has Spied on French Public's Phone Calls, Emails and Internet Activity, Says Le Monde Newspaper, THE\nGUARDIAN (July 4, 2013), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jul/04/france-electronic-spying-operation-nsa, archived at https://perma.cc/99Q4-9EUJ.\n\n5 *The German Prism: Berlin Wants to Spy Too*, SPIEGEL ONLINE INTERNATIONAL (June 17, 2013), http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/berlin-profits-from-us-spying-program-and-is-planning-its-own-a- 906129.html, *archived* at https://perma.cc/76UD-VVJT.\n6 Jordan Shilton, *Swedish Intelligence Service Spying on Russia for US National Security Agency*, WORLD\nSOCIALISTS WEB SITE (Dec. 30, 2013), https://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2013/12/30/swed-d30.html, *archived at* https://perma.cc/8DBJ-FJKA.\n\n7 *NSA Leaks: UK and US Spying Targets Revealed*, BBC News (Dec. 20, 2013), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-\n25468263, *archived at* https://perma.cc/MFL9-Y9SJ.\n\n8 European Parliament Resolution 2013/2188 (INI) of 12 March 2014 on the US NSA Surveillance Programme, Surveillance Bodies in Various EU Members States and Their Impact on EU Citizens' Fundamental Rights and on respect [the Member States'] essential State functions, including ensuring the territorial integrity of the State, maintaining law and order and safeguarding national security.  In particular, national security remains the sole responsibility of each Member State.\"9  In a similar vein, article 72 of the TFEU stipulates that title V of the Treaty pertaining to the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice, \"shall not affect the exercise of the responsibilities incumbent upon Member States with regard to the maintenance of law and order and the safeguarding of internal security.\"10\nMoreover, article 73 of the TFEU allows the Member States to \"organise between themselves and under their responsibility such forms of cooperation and coordination as they deem appropriate between the [competent national agencies] responsible for safeguarding national security.\"11\n\nWhereas electronic surveillance is a state function, as the European Parliament has noted,12 the EU also possesses some competence concerning the internal security of the EU on the grounds of article 67, paragraph 3 of the TFEU.  The article states that the EU \"shall endeavor to ensure a high level of security, through measures to prevent and combat crime.\"13  The EU has exercised such competence by legislating and concluding international agreements, such as the Terrorist Financing Tracking Programme (TFTP) and Passenger Name Record (PNR) Agreement with the United States,14 designed to fight terrorism and other forms of serious crime, and by establishing agencies, such as EUROPOL15 and the Office of the EU Counter-terrorism Co-ordinator, tasked with combating terrorism and organized crime.16  The Parliament takes the position that the EU\nenjoys competence in the field of security because of the overlap of the notions of \"national security,\" \"internal security,\" \"internal security of the EU,\" and \"international security.\"17 A corollary of the EU's lack of competence in the area of surveillance is its lack of authority to legislate on secret surveillance in order to limit it and/or impose stricter safeguards.  In the event that the Commission, using its right of initiative, introduced legislation on the subject, it would not be enforceable given the lack of jurisdiction of the European Court of Justice on security matters.\n\n\n\nIII.  Privacy and Personal Data Protection Issues\n\nElectronic surveillance inevitably involves the collection and storage of personal data, access by law enforcement authorities to such data, and the possible infringement of the rights to privacy and the protection of personal data. Under EU law, the right to privacy and the right to protection of personal data are two distinct fundamental human rights.18  These rights are also guaranteed in the legal systems of the EU\nMember States and in international agreements to which the EU parties are signatories, including the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHRFF). The Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (CFR), which acquired binding status on December 1, 2009, recognizes the right to privacy in article 7 and the right to the protection of one's personal data in article 8.19  Furthermore, article 8 reaffirms the principle that personal data must be processed fairly and for specific purposes, based on the consent of the individual concerned or some other legitimate purposes laid down by law.  It also recognizes the right of individuals to access the data collected and the right to have it rectified, in case of inaccuracy or incompleteness.  Compliance with such rules is entrusted to the control of an independent authority established by the EU Member States.20  The right to personal data may be restricted by law in order to strike a balance with the freedoms and rights of others and public safety and security, subject to the principle of proportionality, which is established in the EU and in the legal systems of the Member States.21 The TFEU recognizes the right of every individual to his/her personal datathat is, individuals own their data.22  It also introduced a new and specific legal basis for the adoption of rules on data protection and granted authority to the EU legislative bodies (Parliament and Council) to adopt rules concerning the processing of personal data in the field of judicial cooperation in\n\ncriminal matters, and police cooperation in the cross-border and domestic processing of personal data.23\n\nThe right to respect for private and family life, home, and correspondence is established in article\n8 of the ECHRFF, to which all EU Members are also participating states as members of the Council of Europe.24  The ECHRFF recognizes, however, that there are circumstances in a democratic society where it may be necessary for the state to interfere with this right, but only in accordance with the law and for certain clearly defined grounds, such as national security, public safety, economic well-being, the prevention of crimes, and the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.25  When such interference by public authorities acting in their official capacities does occur, article 13 of the ECHRFF requires a means of redress for the affected individual.26\n\nA.  Directive 95/46/EC on Personal Data Protection Directive 95/46/EC on the Protection of Individuals with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on the Free Movement of Such Data is the basic framework legislation in the EU on personal data protection.27  The Directive provides strong protections applicable to the processing of personal data of persons living within the jurisdiction of the EU Member States. Pursuant to Directive No. 95/46/EC on personal data protection,  the ownership of personal data belongs to individuals who have legal rights over the collection and processing of personal data. One of the key requirements for the processing of personal data is that the data subject must unambiguously give his/her consent, after being informed that his/her data will be processed. Pursuant to the Directive, the data subject has the right of access, as provided for in article 12, which means that the data subject is entitled to information regarding any processing of his/her data, the purposes of processing, the categories of the data, and the recipients of the data.28  The basic principles governing the processing of one's personal data are the following:\n- Finality: Data must be collected for an explicit, specific, and legitimate purpose.\n\n- Transparency: Individuals must be informed of the data collected and the purpose\nof collection.\n- Legitimacy: Processing must be occur for a legitimate reason pursuant to article 7 of\nthe Directive.\n\n- Proportionality: The personal data collected must be adequate, relevant, and not excessive in\nrelation to the purpose of collection.\n- Accuracy and Retention of the Data: Individuals' records must be accurate and up to date.\nFalse or inaccurate data must be corrected.\n Directive 95/46/EC will be repealed on May 25, 2018, and replaced by Regulation (EU)\n2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the Protection of Natural Persons with regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on the Free Movement of Such Data, and Repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation).29\nRegulation 2016/679 will be applicable as of May 25, 2018.30 In addition to the above Regulation, the EU adopted Directive (EU) 2016/680 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the Protection of Natural Persons with regard to the Processing of Personal Data by Competent Authorities for the Purposes of the Prevention, Investigation, Detection or Prosecution of Criminal Offences or the Execution of Criminal Penalties, and on the Free Movement of Such Data, and Repealing Council Framework Decision\n2008/977/JHA.31  Member States have an implementation deadline of May 6, 2018, to comply with this Directive.32 Intelligence activities conducted by national law enforcement authorities that involve national security issues or issues concerning the common foreign and security policy of the EU fall outside the scope of Regulation 2016/679 and Directive 2016/680.33 B.  Confidentiality of Communications\n\nConfidentiality of communications is a principle enshrined in the legal systems of the EU Member States.  At the EU level, confidentiality of communications is stipulated in Directive 2002/58/EC Concerning the Processing of Personal Data and the Protection of Privacy in the Electronic Communications Sector (Directive on Privacy and Electronic Communications).34  In\n\nRepealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation) art. 94, 2016 O.J. (L 119) 1, http://eurlex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/ALL/?uri=CELEX%3A32016R0679, *archived* at https://perma.cc/3DBH-PKN4.\n\n30 Id. art. 99.\n\n31 Directive (EU) 2016/680 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the Protection of Natural Persons with regard to the Processing of Personal Data by Competent Authorities for the Purposes of the Prevention, Investigation, Detection or Prosecution of Criminal Offences or the Execution of Criminal Penalties, and on the Free Movement of Such Data, and Repealing Council Framework Decision 2008/977/JHA, 2016 O.J. (L 119)\n89, http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/ALL/?uri=CELEX%3A32016R0679, *archived* at https://perma.cc/BH32-VK2P.\n\n32 Id. art. 63.\n\n33 Id. Preamble (16). 34 Directive 2002/58/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 July 2002 Concerning the Processing of Personal Data and the Protection of Privacy in the Electronic Communications Sector (Directive on Privacy and Electronic Communications) art. 5, 2002 O.J. (L 201) 37, http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=\nCELEX:32002L0058:en:HTML, *archived* at https://perma.cc/AFB3-JCPU.\n\nparticular, article 5 of the Directive requires that EU Members \"prohibit listening, tapping, storage or other kinds of interception or surveillance of communications and the related traffic data by persons other than the users, without the consent of the users concerned, except when legally authorized to do so in accordance with article 15(1).\"35\n\nC.  Exemptions Interception or surveillance is permitted on the grounds of national security; defense and public security; and the prevention, investigation, detection, and prosecution of criminal offenses or of unauthorized use of an electronic communications system, as referred to in article 13(1) of Directive 95/46/EC.36 EU Members are also allowed to adopt legislation on data retention for a limited period and based on the same grounds provided above.37\n\nD.  Data Retention Prior to its invalidation in April 2014, Directive No. 2006/24/EC (the Data Retention Directive),38 required the providers of publicly available electronic communications services or public communications networks to retain traffic and location data belonging to individuals or legal entities.  Such data included the calling telephone number and name and address of the subscriber or registered user, user IDs (a unique identifier assigned to each person who signs with an electronic communications service), Internet protocol addresses, the numbers dialed, and call forwarding or call transfer records.  The retention period was to last for a minimum period of six months and up to two years, and the sole purpose of processing and storing the data was to prevent, investigate, detect, and prosecute serious crimes, such as organized crime and terrorism.\nThe content of the communications of individuals was not retained. On April 8, 2014, the Grand Chamber of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU)\nissued a judgment declaring the Directive invalid.39  The Directive was challenged on the grounds of infringement of the right to private life, and the right to the protection of personal data of individuals, as guaranteed in articles 7 and 8, respectively, of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union.\n\n35 Id. art. 5(1).\n\nIn examining the issue of interference with the rights to privacy and the protection of personal data, the CJEU made the following observations:\n- The obligation imposed on providers of electronic communications services or public\ncommunications networks \"constitutes in itself an interference with the rights guaranteed by article 7 of the Charter,\"\n- Access of the national authorities to data \"constitutes a further interference with that\nfundamental right,\" and\n- The interferences described above also violate the right to protection of personal data.40 The CJEU reasoned that the Directive did not establish clear and precise rules that regulate the\n\"extent of interference with the fundamental rights of Art. 7 and 8 of the Charter.\"41  Therefore, it concluded that the Directive \"entails a wide-ranging and particularly serious interference with those fundamental rights in the legal order of the EU, without such an interference being precisely circumscribed by provisions to ensure that it is actually limited to what is strictly necessary.\"42 The CJEU also held that the security and protection of personal data cannot be fully guaranteed in the absence of review of compliance by an independent authority of the rules on data protection, as required by article 8 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights.43 In September 2015, the Commission announced that, following the CJEU's decision, it has no plans to introduce new legislation on data retention at the EU level.  Therefore, EU Members are free to adopt national rules on this issue.44\n\nE.  EUUS Agreement On June 2, 2016, the European Union and the United States signed the Agreement on the Protection of Personal Data Information Relating to the Prevention, Investigation, Detection and, Prosecution of Criminal Offenses.45  The Agreement covers all personal data, such as names, addresses, and criminal records that will be exchanged between the EU and the US for the purposes of the prevention, detection, investigation, and prosecution of criminal offenses, including terrorism.46  In addition, the Agreement will provide safeguards and guarantees the lawfulness of data transfers, and will improve and facilitate EUUS law enforcement cooperation.  The Agreement will enter into force one month after both parties exchange notifications that their domestic ratification procedures have taken place.47  At the EU level, the European Parliament must give its consent to conclude the Agreement.\n\nIV.  Case Law\n\nA.  Jurisdiction Legal challenges to intelligence operations on the grounds of infringing the rights of the individual (such as the right to privacy freedom of expression, and a remedy) or because the intelligence operations are not conducted in accordance with the applicable law and are in violation of the standards of necessity and proportionality are not subject to review by the Court of Justice of the EU, as explicitly stated in article 276 of the TFEU:\n\n\nin exercising its powers regarding the provisions of Chapters 4 and 5 of Title V of Part Three relating to the area of freedom, security and justice, the Court of Justice of the European Union shall have no jurisdiction to review the validity or proportionality of operations carried out by the police or other law enforcement services of a Member State or the exercise of the responsibilities incumbent upon Member States with regard to the\nmaintenance of law and order and the safeguarding of internal security.48\n\nSuch challenges can be brought before the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR), however. In general, the ECHR has found that the \"mere existence of legislation allowing secret surveillance constitutes an interference with private life such that the necessity and legality requirements of article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights must be met.\"49  The ECHR has also found that emails, telephone communications, faxes, and Internet usage fall within the ambit of article 8 of the Convention.50 As far as the legality requirement, the ECHR has a strict requirement that surveillance activities must be based on a law and not conducted as matter of policy.51\n\n\nB.  Case of Szabo and Vissy v. Hungary In January 2016, the ECHR issued a critical judgment on mass surveillance issues in the case of Szabo and Vissy v. Hungary.52  Two applicants challenged 2011 legislation that permitted broad surveillance activities of the Hungarian Anti-Terrorism Task Force, on the grounds that it violated the applicants rights to privacy, home, and correspondence.  The ECHR ruled against Hungary because the contested legislation violated the rights of the applicants, due to sweeping secret surveillance, the lack of notification of surveillance measures, and other effective safeguards.53  As far as *ex ante* (prior) authorization, the ECHR held that it is not mandatory, as long as there is *ex post* judicial control.  However, the ECHR ruled that Hungary failed to meet this requirement as well.54 The ECHR has developed a number of minimum standards to which the national laws of the Member States of the Council of Europe must adhere, in order to avoid abuses of power and future litigation by affected or concerned individuals. 55 These standards include: (a) a description of the nature of the offenses that may give rise to an interception order; (b) identification of the categories of people who are likely to have their telephones tapped; (c) a limit on the duration of telephone tapping; (d) the procedure to be followed for examining, using, and storing the data obtained; (e) the precautions to be taken when communicating the data to other parties; and (f) the circumstances in which recordings may or must be erased or the tapes destroyed.56 A decision to authorize surveillance activity must be given by an independent body prior to initiation of such activities; it is not necessary that the body that gives authorization is judicial as long as it enjoys independence from the executive.57  The ECHR has accepted the practice of governments to waive authorization in emergency situations in order to expedite an operation, or where, due to the circumstances, authorization is not possible.58 As the ECHR has emphasized, especially in cases where prior authorization is not possible, the ex post review of government surveillance, either judicial or otherwise, is absolutely essential.59\nThat oversight, which must be performed by an independent external body, is also recommended by the UN Rapporteur on Human Rights.  In its 2010 Report on Compilation of Good Practices on Legal and Institutional Frameworks and Measures that Ensure Respect for Human Rights by Intelligence Agencies While Countering Terrorism, Including on Their Oversight, the UN\nRapporteur suggested that oversight be exercised by at least one institution fully independent of both the intelligence services and the political executive.60 Finally, an individual must be provided with an effective remedy through an existing complaint mechanism where one may raise allegations of violations of privacy rights.61\n\nV.  Large-scale Surveillance and Compatibility with Human Rights As stated above, at the EU level, large-scale surveillance conducted by government agencies of the EU Member States has raised concerns as to the compatibility of such activities with human rights standards.\n\nThe Parliament's Resolution on the US NSA Surveillance Programme, Surveillance Bodies in Various EU Members States and Their Impact on EU Citizens' Fundamental Rights, mentioned above,62 is a political statement lacking binding force.  It urged EU Members to discontinue the mass collection of data and to ensure that national laws and policies on electronic surveillance are in line with EU and Council of Europe standards.  It also proposed to establish at the EU level a high-level group to monitor progress.  In April 2014, the Parliament also requested the EU Agency for Fundamental Rights (FRA) to conduct research on the impact of large-scale surveillance on fundamental rights and to review whether individuals whose data are collected by intelligence agencies have adequate remedies against such practices.  The FRA's final report will be published in 2017.63 Similarly, the United Nations General Assembly adopted a resolution on December 18, 2013, urging UN Members to respect the right of privacy in digital communications and to review their legislation and practices on secret surveillance.64 A 2013 study conducted by the Directorate General for Internal Policies of the European Parliament, entitled National Programs of Mass Surveillance of Personal Data in EU Member States and Their Compatibility with EU Law, examines mass surveillance practices in four EU\ncountries: France, Germany, Sweden, Netherlands, and the United Kingdom.65  The study\n\nindicates that cooperation with foreign intelligence services appears to be a common practice. The study cites the so-called \"Five Eyes\" network, which comprises the US, UK, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand, that originated from a 1946 multilateral agreement for cooperation in signals intelligence, and which has extended over time in terms of activities (Echelon, and now Fornsat).66  The US also engages in cooperative relationships with \"second-tier\" and \"thirdtier\" partners such as France and Germany.67 The report indicates that some legal regimes operate on the basis of orders issued by special courts (for instance, in Sweden), while others were based on warrants issued by the government\n(the UK and Netherlands) or through an authorization role accorded to specially appointed oversight bodies (Germany, France, and Netherlands).68 With regard to oversight, the report found that in several Member States oversight bodies encounter a number of constraints that limit their ability to scrutinize the intelligence agencies'\nsurveillance practices.  In Sweden, the two main oversight institutionsthe intelligence court and the Statens inspektion for forsvarsunderrattelseverksamheten (Siun, State Inspection for Defense Intelligence Activity)are deemed to be insufficiently independent.  France's main oversight body, the Commission nationale pour les interceptions de securite (CNCIS, National Commission for Security Interceptions), was found to be substantially constrained in its reach, because it has limited administrative capacity.  The report also identified gaps in the UK's intelligence oversight regime, as evidenced by the statement released in July 2014 by the Intelligence Security Committee on the Government Communications Headquarters' (GCHQ's)\nalleged interception of communications under the PRISM program.69 The report also found that the surveillance programs operated by the Member States endanger the EU principle of \"sincere cooperation,\" enshrined in article 4.3 of the Treaty on the European Union, because they compromise compliance with existing EU-level mutual assistance and cooperation legal regimes and lawful searches between EU Member States and with the US, and also compromise the internal security of the EU."
    },
    {
        "text": "~ov 2 5 2015\nSteven Aftergood Federation of American Scientists\n1725 DeSales Street NW, Suite 600\nWashington, DC 20036\nReference: ODNI Case DF-2015-00312 Dear Mr. Aftergood:\nThis responds to your FOIA request dated 4 September 2015 (Enclosure 1) to the Office of the Director ofNational Intelligence (ODNI). You requested a copy ofE/S 00564, Guiding Principles for Implementing and Operating in a Common Intelligence Community Information Technology Enterprise, signed 19 September 2013.\n\nYour request has been processed in accordance with the Freedom of Information Act\n(FOIA) 5 U.S.C.  552, as amended. In response to your request, we have located the document you asked for. Upon thorough review, the ODNI has determined that this document may be released in its entirety (Enclosure 2).\n\nIf you have any questions, feel free to email our Requester Service Center at DNl-FOlA(a)dni.gov or call us at (703) 874-8500.\n\nSincerely,\n. //flo /{~s'-~\n, tf Lfer Hudson\n~\nDuector, InformatiOn Management Dtv1s1on Enclosures\n\n## Memorandum For: Distribution Subject: (U) Guiding Principles For Implementing And Operating In A Common Intelligence Community Information Technology Enterprise A. (U) Introduction\n\n1. (U) To improve the ability to securely and efficiently discover, access, and share information, the Intelligence Community (IC) will store, process, and retain intelligence and intelligence-related information collected and obtained; conduct analysis; and disseminate product on the common information technology environment, Intelligence Community Infonnation Technology Enterprise (IC ITE).\n\n2. (U) Implementation of IC ITE is a complex and iterative process of consolidating Community capabilities and resources. The following principles form the policy framework for operation and maintenance of IC ITE and the activities within the environment when fully operational and therefore will guide the implementation process and related activities.\n\n3. (U) Initial stages of implementation will focus on the establishment of IC ITE as infrastructure that provides end-to-end means for storing, processing, retaining, analyzing, and disseminating intelligence and intelligence-related information under current IC policies and practices. After initial deployment of the operational baseline, there will be a focus on advancing intelligence integration through more effective information sharing and safeguarding, thereby enabling deeper analytic collaboration across alllC Elements.\n\n4. (U) IC ITE is being established as a TS/SCI environment, but shall interconnect with and support other domains through the use of cross-domain interfaces.\n\n5. (U) Implementation of the common environment and the activities conducted therein shall maintain the protection of civil liberties and privacy while enabling intelligence integration and responsible information sharing and safeguarding. Implementation shall also be consistent with Federal statutes, Executive Orders, Presidential Directives, Attorney General-approved guidelines, IC policy, and IC element policies that do not otherwise conflict with these requirements (hereinafter, applicable legal and policy requirements).\n\n6. (U) IC elements shall abide by each principle provided below with exemptions being granted by the Director of National Intelligence or Principal Deputy Director of National Intelligence on a case-by-case basis. Implementation shall be consistent with IC policy, including lCD 50 I, Discovery and Dissemination or Retrieval of Information within the Intelligence Community, regarding data access and management and ICD 503, IC Information Technology Systems Security Risk Management, Certification and *Accreditation,* with respect to risk management.\n\nSUBJECT: (U) Guiding Principles for Implementing and Operating in a Common Intelligence Community Information Technology Enterprise\n\n## B. (U//Fouo) Architecture\n\n1. (U/IFOUO) IC ITE architecture utilizes a service model for the provision of IT. IC\nITE architecture will provide commonly designed and coherently engineered enterprise-level IT\ncomponents and infrastructure based upon the following operating principles:\na. The default approach for development, acquisition, and implementation of IT tools, products, and services shall be to build and operate in common.\n\nb. Core IT services will be provided by Service Providers, designated by the DNI in consultation with affected IC element heads. Implementation will be achieved through formal designation and completion of a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) outlining tem1s of performance.\n\nc. Information sharing and safeguarding within IC ITE shall be supported by a common framework for identity management, attribute-based access control, user activity auditing and monitoring, and data tagging.\n\nd. Secure communities of interest and secure collaborative environments established prior to the effective date of these Principles shall be transferred into and supported by IC ITE, to the greatest extent possible and in accordance with A.6 above.\n\ne. Implementation of IC ITE will be achieved through the development and deployment of the following services (hereinafter, IC ITE Services):\n\n(1) a common desktop environment;\n(2) a joint cloud environment;\n(3) an applications mall;\n( 4) enterprise management capability;\n(5) identification, authentication, and authorization capabilities;\n(6) network requirements and engineering services, and\n(7) a security coordination service.\n2. (U) Configuration management ofiC ITE shall be conducted through a process for identifying and prioritizing changes to the baseline, configuration item identification, change control, and configuration audits. The IC ITE enterprise management service provider, in coordination with the IC CIO, shall establish and maintain a process for the implementation of changes to IC ITE. Changes made to the enterprise shall follow standard methods, processes, and procedures as directed by the IC CIO in order to facilitate efficient and prompt resolution.\n\n3. (U//FOUO) Any necessary separation of data within IC ITE shall be achieved through a logical construct instead of by physical separation to the greatest extent possible and in accordance with applicable legal and policy requirements and Section A.6 above.\n\nSUBJECT: (U) Guiding Principles for Implementing and Operating in a Common Intelligence Community Information Technology Enterprise C. (U/IFOUO) Access, Use, and Discovery- Information acquired, collected, or produced by lC elements shall be available for access for all IC missions and functions, subject to applicable legal and policy requirements. Determinations about access to and use of such information within IC ITE shall continue to be based upon content and mission need.\n\nJ - Access - Access to data within IC ITE shaH be determined by information protection profiles, user clearance, and need to know criteria established by originators of intelligence infom1ation in accordance with IC policy.\n\na. Access to data within IC ITE shall comply with applicable legal and policy requirements governing this data.\n\nb. Access controls shall be enforced by the system processes in accordance with established rules.\n\nc. Access logs will be maintained and audited in accordance with established rules.\n\nd. IC ITE will support the requirements for access by foreign nationals (to include Second Party nationals accessing non-partnership systems) to systems processing intelligence information consistent with DCID 6/3, Appendix E, Access by Foreign Nationals To Systems Processing Intelligence lnfonnation.\n\n2. Use- Use of intelligence information within IC ITE shall be pursuant to an authorized recipient's mission need in accordance with applicable legal and policy requirements governing the recipient's own missions and functions.\n\n## 3. Discovery\n\na. Consistent with ICD 50 I, unless a discovery exemption has been obtained, originating IC clements shall authorize and provide for automated discovery and retrieval of intelligence and intelligence-related information in IC ITE by authorized personnel meeting access criteria in a manner that complies with applicable legal and policy requirements.\n\nb. IC elements that acquire or hold information provided by consent or by atTangement or agreement with federal departments or agencies, foreign nations, organizations, corporations, state, local, or tribal entities, or individuals outside the IC shall seek consent to make the information discoverable and retrievable in IC ITE. IC elements party to such agreements shall coordinate with the ODNI to seek to negotiate future agreements that provide for storage, processing, and retention within IC ITE.\n\nD. (U) Information Management - The creation, handling, use, protection, and disposition of intelligence information in IC ITE shall comply with applicable legal and policy requirements.\n\n1. Classification and Declassification- Consistent with EO 13526, Classified National Security lnfomzation, IC elements retain their Original Classification Authority within IC ITE.\n\nIC ITE does not alter classification, declassification, sanitization or downgrade authorities or responsibilities under applicable legal and policy requirements.\n\nSUBJECT: (U) Guiding Principles for Implementing and Operating in a Common Intelligence Community Information Technology Enterprise\n2. Records Management - Originating Elements retain their records management responsibilities within IC ITE with respect to the information they originate (e.g., Federal Records Act, Freedom of Information Act, Privacy Act, and record retention schedules). To enable originators to fulfill these records management responsibilities, IC ITE Service Providers shall provide the means to audit, track, manage, and if necessary, purge information as required by applicable legal and policy requirements.\n\n3. Joint Products- Records management responsibilities for joint products shall be documented by the authoring IC elements.\n\n4. Data Governance - Consistent with guidance issued by the IC CIO, data within IC ITE\nshall be tagged and marked with sufficient fidelity so that it may be stored, processed, retained, handled, and disseminated in full compliance with applicable legal and policy requirements, including Federal statutes, regulations, Executive Orders, Presidential Directives, court orders, Attorney General-approved guidelines and other authorities regarding retention and dissemination, including retention and dissemination of U.S. Person information.\n\n## E. (U//Fouo) Systems Security\n\n1. The IC CIO is the assessing and authorizing official for IC ITE Services and components and provides the framework for security control assessments and authorization decisions for IC ITE, in consultation with Service Providers and affected IC elements.\n\n2. IC elements developing applications connecting to and using IC ITE services shall be responsible for the assessment and authorization of such applications, consistent with the risk mitigation framework provided in lCD 503.\n\n3. IC ITE will be supported by a common security risk management framework in which baseline security controls and security requirements are integrated into system requirements.\n\n## F. (U/Ifouo) Personnel Security\n\n1. IC elements shall ensure that their IC ITE users have the accurate attributes for accessing data placed in IC ITE.\n\n2. Privileged Users within IC ITE who perform system administration functions may be subject to additional scrutiny in the performance of this role, in accordance with IC policy.\n\n3. IC ITE shall provide mechanisms for appropriate separation of duties among those Privileged Users with the highest accesses, so that accesses and privileges are distributed across the user population and no such individuals are able to perform all privileged actions for sensitive systems or applications.\n\n4. Personnel security processes and identity management tools will provide means for access by foreign partner detailees to the IC, consistent with DCID 6/3, Appendix E.\n\nSUBJECT: (U) Guiding Principles for Implementing and Operating in a Common Intelligence Community Infom1ation Technology Enterprise\n\n## G. (U/I:Fouo) Information Security\n\n1. IC ITE will be supported by an integrated and layered security architecture that meets the requirements for providing end-to-end technical and procedural security; an integrated security model for authorized access to IC ITE information resources; capabilities to collect, share, and analyze audit data; and end-to-end encryption capabilities available to further protect the sensitive data.\n\n2. Intelligence infonnation shall be protected in IC ITE through application of original classitication and control decisions; use of derivative classitication and control markings;\ntechnical specifications on machine-readable classification and control markings; national, IC, and individual IC element policies; and adherence to standardized counterintelligence and security practices. Information in IC ITE may be tagged with attributes not covered under the Intelligence Community Authorized Classification and Control Markings Register and Manual, such as need to know categories, communities of interest. dissemination, and usage control policy variables.\n\nH. (U/I:FOUO) Counterintelligence- IC lTE shall include comprehensive implementation of the National Insider Threat Policy, including an enterprise audit program. IC ITE Service Providers shall provide user audit and monitoring data to the gaining or employing agencies of IC ITE users and to the IC incident response and security coordination center.\n\nI. (U/IFOUO) Acquisition and Procurement -The DNI provides the strategic framework for procurement and acquisitions in support of IC ITE by:\n\n1. Providing direction and oversight of all IC ITE procurement;\n2. Ensuring that execution of budgets for enterprise information technology and\nenterprise-related research and development is consistent with the IC ITE strategy and these\nPrinciples;\n3. Addressing and mitigating supply chain threats; and\n4. Conducting oversight of acquisitions related to IC ITE Services through the DNI\nAcquisition Review Board chaired by the IC CIO.\nJ. (U) IC ITE Services- IC elements designated by the DNI as Service Providers will develop, maintain. and provide IC ITE Services of common concern.\n\n1. The DNI will provide oversight and strategic guidance with respect to IC ITE Services.\n2. The nature and scope of IC ITE Services will be defined at the time of designation.\n\nThe roles and responsibilities will be captured in a DNI designation memorandum and MOU\nconsistent with DNI guidance on the establishment of services of common concern.\n\n3. As IC ITE operational capabilities are implemented, the cost for IC ITE Services may in some instances be centrally funded. Consumers of Services that are not centrally funded will compensate Service Providers or their contractors for the use of those Services as appropriate.\n\nSUBJECT: (U) Guiding Principles for Implementing and Operating in a Common Intelligence Community Information Technology Enterprise\n4. Funding decisions for IC ITE will be made by the DNI as part of the budget and planning process, in coordination with IC element heads.\n\n## K. (U) Legal Responsibilities And Compliance Requirements\n\n1. Each IC element participating in IC ITE retains its existing legal, regulatory, policy, and statutory responsibilities for the information that it provides to, and accesses through, IC\nITE.\n\n2. IC ITE shall enable Service Provider, Service Consumer, Originating Element, and Data Custodian compliance with their respective obligations under law and policy.\n\n3. Each IC element remains responsible for ensuring that the provision of information to IC ITE is in accordance with applicable legal and policy requirements and other authorities applicable to the information, including those authorities regarding the retention, use, and dissemination of U.S. Person information.\n\n4. Use of IC ITE Services represents user consent to monitoring, access, use, and disclosure of their electronic communications. Each participating agency shall ensure user consent to monitoring, access, use, and disclosure of electronic communications or data residing in IC ITE.\n\nL. (U) Roles and Responsibilities- Within IC ITE, there are four roles: Service Provider, Service Consumer, Originating Element, and Data Custodian.\n\n1. Service Provider- An IC element designated by the DNI, in consultation with the IC\nelement head, to develop and maintain an IC ITE Service of common concern. Service Providers are responsible for facilitating IC elements' fulfillment of their respective information management responsibilities. A Service Provider uses only those authorities necessary to fulfill the responsibilities to manage the Service. These authorities are distinct from those of an IC\nelement acting as an originator of intelligence information or as a consumer of the Service.\n\nWhen other IC elements provide intelligence information to a Service Provider so that it may be made available by or through IC ITE, the Service Provider is responsible for implementing the agreed upon policies for processing and protecting that information. (The Service Provider may provide Privileged Users access to an originating element's infom1ation, unless otherwise protected (e.g., encrypted) for administrative and technical support purposes.) However, a Service Provider does not collect, retain, purge, destroy or disseminate information solely by the virtue of hosting, or providing system support to information on IC ITE that originated with another IC element. Further, Service Providers may not purge or destroy information without prior coordination with the appropriate Originating Element.\n\n2. Service Consumer - An organization whose affiliates and systems use the Service in accordance with its own authorities. In doing so, a Service Consumer uses the Service and any intelligence information that may be provided therein in accordance with law, regulation, and\n\n## Unclassified//For Official Use Only\n\nSUBJECT: (U) Guiding Principles for Implementing and Operating in a Common Intelligence Community Information Technology Enterprise policy governing the processing and protecting of such information in the conduct of its own missions and functions, as well as potential usage restrictions by Originating Elements.\n\n3. Originating Elements- A department, agency or component thereof that creates or collects information during the course of its business and is legally responsible for it (e.g., records management, classification, and lead for Freedom of Information Act and Privacy Act responsibilities).\n\na. Originating Elements make classification, access, and dissemination control determinations, and tag data for ingest into IC ITE. IC ITE will accommodate these decisions in a manner consistent with the standardized identity management, attribute-based access controls, and data tagging methodologies.\n\nb. Originating elements perform records management activities with respect to the information they provide to IC ITE.\n\nc. Originating Elements may delegate some of the activities listed above to an IC\nelement to handle information on its behalf (see Data Custodian).\n\n4. Data Custodian - An organization that is responsible for executing data-related tasks on behalf of an Originating Element. These tasks may include collecting, tagging, and processing data. An Originating Element may authorize Data Custodians to grant individual users access to additional infonnation beyond that of general systems, application and file pennissions to perform such functions.\n\nM. (U) Policy **Review-** IC elements shall review their policies to ensure consistency with the Guiding Principles contained in this memorandum. These Principles provide the basis for the Community's implementation ofiC ITE and will be incorporated into an IC policy issuance to govern IC activities within IC ITE after initial deployment of the operational baseline.\n\n## Unclassified//Por Official Use:L Only\n\nSUBJECT: (U) Guiding Principles for Implementing and Operating in a Common Intelligence Community Information Technology Enterprise\n\n## Distribution:\n\nDirector, Central Intelligence Agency Director, Defense Intelligence Agency Director, National Security Agency Director, National Reconnaissance Office Director, National Geospatial-lntelligence Agency Deputy Chief of Staff, G-2, U.S. Army Director of Naval Intelligence, U.S. Navy Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance, A2, U.S. Air Force Director of Intelligence, U.S. Marine Corps Executive Assistant Director, National Security Branch, Federal Bureau of Investigation Assistant Commandant for Intelligence and Criminal Investigations, CG-2, U.S. Coa.\"it Guard Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence, Department of Defense Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State Assistant Secretary, Office of Intelligence and Analysis, Department of the Treasury Chief, Intelligence Division, Drug Enforcement Administration Under Secretary, Intelligence and Analysis, Department of Homeland Security Director, Office of Intelligence and Counterintelligence, Department of Energy Joint Staff Director for Intelligence, *12,* Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff"
    },
    {
        "text": "by Jerrold M. Post The Counterproliferation Papers Future Warfare Series No. 39\nUSAF Counterproliferation Center Air University Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama\n\nJerrold M. Post March 2007\nThe Counterproliferation Papers Series was established by the USAF\nCounterproliferation Center to provide information and analysis to assist the understanding of the U.S. national security policy-makers and USAF officers to help them better prepare to counter the threat from weapons of mass destruction.  Copies of No. 39 and previous papers in this series are available from the USAF Counterproliferation Center, 325 Chennault Circle, Maxwell AFB AL 36112-6427.  The fax number is (334) 953- 7530; phone (334) 953-7538.\n\nCounterproliferation Paper No. 39\nUSAF Counterproliferation Center Air University Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama 36112-6427\n\nThe Internet address for the USAF Counterproliferation Center is:\nhttp://cpc.au.af.mil/\n\n\n## Disclaimer\n\nThe views expressed in this publication are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the U.S. Government, Department of Defense, or the USAF Counterproliferation Center.\n\n## The Author\n\nDr. Jerrold M. Post is a physician serving as Professor of Psychiatry, Political Psychology and International Affairs, and Director of the Political Psychology Program at The George Washington University.  Dr. Post has devoted his entire career to the field of political psychology, coming to George Washington after a 21-year career with the U.S. Government where he founded and directed the Center for the Analysis of Personality and Political Behavior.  At George Washington, he co-founded and directs the George Washington University Institute for Crisis and Disaster Management.  Dr. Post received his B.A. magna cum laude from Yale College.  After receiving his M.D. from Yale, where he was elected to Alpha Omega Alpha, honor medical society, he received post-graduate training in psychiatry at Harvard Medical School and the National Institute of Mental Health, and in international studies from Johns Hopkins.  A\npracticing psychiatrist, he is a Life Fellow of the American Psychiatric Association, a member of the American Academy of Psychiatry and the Law, and the American College of Psychiatrists.  Dr. Post has testified before Congress on numerous occasions and is a frequent commentator on national and international radio and television.  His books include When Illness Strikes the Leader: The Dilemma of the Captive King; Political Paranoia: The Psychopolitics of Hatred; Know Thy Enemy: Profiles of Adversary Leaders and Their Strategic Cultures; The Psychological Assessment of Political Leaders, with Profiles of Saddam Hussein and Bill Clinton; and Leaders and Their Followers in a Dangerous World:  The Psychology of Political Behavior.\n\n## Executive Summary\n\nHugo Chavez, the charismatic and controversial President of Venezuela, reached the ultimate seat of political power with his election as head of state in 1998.  Carefully cultivating the image of an impoverished Venezuelan youth reaching the highest political office in Venezuela, Chavez has a devoted and loyal following among Venezuela's lower class.\nHaving survived several political crises, Chavez is a masterful political gamesman who zealously guards his power while maintaining a staunchly anti-American and anti-elite stance.  This requires a delicate balancing act, as he gains strength from his oppositional stance to the Venezuelan elite and the West, especially the United States, whose financial resources are crucial to Venezuela's economic survival.\n\nHis outrageous and confrontational rhetoric, which increases during times of internal instability, has consistently worked to unite his followers in support of his leadership; he portrays himself as a modern day Simon Bolivar.  It is this unquestioning support by Venezuela's lower class that has enabled him to survive the slow destruction of Venezuela's economy, internal discord, and ultimately a coup attempt in 2002.\n\nHis internationally recognized victory in the August 2004 referendum has surely emboldened him.  For this consummate narcissist, this victory would have been expected to have swollen his already swollen ego.  The precipitous announcement on October 11, 2004, that royalties paid by foreign oil companies would be increased from 1 to 16.6 percent, represented \"the second and true phase of the nationalization of the country's oil\" and that \"we are no longer going to give our oil away,\" reflects the defiant populist bravura of Chavez.  As his hold on power becomes more absolute, so does his vision of himself as the savior of Venezuela.  Hugo Chavez is likely to do whatever it takes to retain his hold on power in order to secure his place in history.\n\nEncouraged by the validation of his victory at the polls, Chavez has increasingly allied himself with, and publicly supported, major adversaries of the United States, including Iran, Syria, and North Korea, as well as Hamas.  His self concept is not limited by the water's edge, but he seems to see himself as a leading international defender of the poor and the weak against the powerful.  This is the theme he exploited so effectively in winning the presidency of Venezuela.  His support for terrorism has not been so widespread as that for rogue state leaders, with major support to his social-revolutionary comrades operating in neighboring Colombia.\nThere are unconfirmed reports of early support for Al Qaeda, and such support could increase if he moves out in an increasingly messianic omnipotent direction.\n\nChavez has revised Venezuela's military doctrine, declaring the United States to be Venezuela's prime enemy and that Venezuela would resort to the \"war of the fleas\" (terrorism and insurgency) against the United States, which helps explain his recent purchase of 100,000 AK- 103s from Russia.  There are suggestions as well that he would pursue developing a nuclear capability, as Venezuela's sovereign right.\n\nHis over-the-top performance at the United Nations General Assembly contributed significantly to the defeat of Venezuela's campaign to become Latin America's representative to the Security Council, an example of Chavez's tendency to get carried away when he is in the world's spotlight, emphasizing that his judgment can falter at these times.\nHis recent 63 percent victory in the 2006 presidential elections, in which election laws were clearly violated, can be expected to produce a wave of hubristic defiance.  He is already acting as if he has supplanted Fidel Castro, his mentor and role model, as leader of the third world, behavior which will only intensify when Castro does finally pass from the scene. Chavez will probably attempt to stage a constitutional coup, rewriting the constitution to extend his stay in office, and would not leave office voluntarily if that fails.\n\nOn the occasion of his inauguration, declaring \"Socialism or death!\"\nwhich was Castro's defiant vow on the collapse of the Soviet Union, he stated his intention to establish Venezuela as a \"socialist republic.\"  He announced plans to nationalize electric utilities, Venezuela's major telephone company CANT, and four highly profitable foreign oil developments.  Despite the resulting financial turmoil, and a corrupt\n\ninefficient managerial class, there is every reason to believe he will, in an accelerated fashion, follow the path of his model Fidel Castro as he seeks to consolidate his self-appointed role as Castro's successor.\n\n\nJerrold M. Post2\n\n## Introduction\n\n\"If you try to assess me by traditional canons of analysis, you'll never emerge from confusion.\"\nHugo Chavez statement to Larry Rohter of the New York Times, April 10, 1999.\n\nHugo Chavez, the charismatic and controversial President of Venezuela, reached the ultimate seat of political power with his election as head of state in 1998.  Like his hero Simon Bolivar, Chavez is a mestizo (mix of European, African, and indigenous blood) and spent his very early years in poverty.  He has zealously clung to and cultivated the image of a lower-class child rising to the height of political power.  This image has contributed to Chavez's extraordinary popularity among Venezuela's lower class.  His MVR-200 political party receives its primary support from the lower class and alliances with other leftist parties.  Since taking office in 1999, Venezuela has experienced intense political and economic chaos with estimates of his internal support ranging from 25 to 50 percent of the population.\n\nChavez's devout following of \"Chavistas\" often invoke \"El fenomeno Chavez\" (the Chavez phenomenon) in describing Chavez the man as well as his rise to power.  It is this cult of personality which Chavez has so skillfully developed and maintained throughout his professional life that has greatly contributed to his continued power despite opposition from the\n\n2 . . . \"El Fenomeno Chavez\"\nupper class, the oil industry, media, labor unions, and elements of the military.  Despite a fifty year tradition of democracy in Venezuela and his own election by the people in 1998, Chavez appears to view himself more as a revolutionary figure vested with certain responsibilities toward the lower class.  He identifies himself with heroic Latin American figures such as Che Guevara and Fidel Castro and, in particular, seems to view himself as a modern day Simon Bolivar.\n\n## Childhood And Education3\n\nThe son of two school teachers and the second of six sons, Hugo Chavez's carefully maintained image of a background of extreme poverty is more myth than reality.  His family moved to Barinas (the state capital) while he was still a child and their economic situation improved.  But as a mestizo, he would have absorbed the psychology of the underclass, the resentment of the subaltern of the elite structure.\n\nHis family originally came from the town of Sabaneta which Chavez described as a town \"with only three dirt roads by the edge of a river,\"\nwhere \"people lived in dilapidated houses with dirt floors.\"4  When the young Chavez finished the sixth grade, his family moved to the state capital of Barinas, where his family remains today, so that the Chavez children could further their education.\n\nWhile certainly not members of Venezuela's upper class, the Chavez family was able to provide adequately for the children, and to ensure they received a solid education.  According to a variety of sources, young Chavez was exposed to a wide range of activities at which he excelled.  In addition to being a strong student, he was an outgoing and social child who was considered to be a talented musician, painter, and baseball player.\nHe apparently enjoyed learning and spent a good deal of time reading, including encyclopedias, which his mother kept at the family home.\n\nChavez grew up in a politically active family of devout Catholics during the apex of the socialist-communist movement in Latin American - the time of Che Guevera and Fidel Castro.  Growing up in a politically charged family during a time of social activism greatly influenced young Chavez and contributed to his unique blend of nationalism and radical socialism.  In interviews Chavez recalls an early interest in Simon Bolivar, the charismatic founding father of Venezuela, and politics - inspired, he claims, by his older brother Adan who was a devout Marxist.\n\nAfter rejecting the idea of attending the University of Los Andes, where his brother went, Chavez pursued his education at the Venezuelan Military Academy (VMA).  A highly competitive and well respected institution, VMA offered Chavez the opportunity to play on one of the best baseball teams in the country.  Having dreamed of a career in Major League Baseball, Chavez often claims this was a major consideration in his decision to attend the Venezuelan Military Academy.  It is unclear why Chavez stopped playing baseball, but dropping out of baseball allowed him to concentrate almost exclusively on his military studies and intellectual development.  His new focus became politics.\n\n## Military Career Conceals Political Ambitions\n\nWhile he was successful in his military studies, it was the intrigue of politics that inspired passion in the young Chavez.  Chavez had to hide his interest and extracurricular studies in Marxism, as in 1970s Venezuela, military officers interested in socialism were considered a threat to state security.  Chavez's older brother, Adan, an avowed Marxist who eventually became a University professor, mentored and encouraged his younger brother to pursue his unique vision of blending the revolutionary ideology of Simon Bolivar with modern-day socialism.  It was during this time that Chavez developed his idea of \"revolutionary takeover [based on]\nan alliance between civilian activists and military officers.\"5\nFollowing his graduation from Venezuelan Military Academy in\n1975, Chavez was deployed to jungle areas with the military to eliminate the remaining leftist insurgents.  Chavez has routinely commented about how these experiences profoundly influenced him, forcing him to fight against his fellow leftist sympathizers, questioning \"What am I doing here?  On one side peasants in military uniforms torture peasant guerrillas, and on the other, peasant guerrillas kill peasants dressed in green...\"6\nThis was, as Chavez himself states, his first existential crisis.7\nDespite his inner turmoil, Chavez chose to remain in the military.  It was during this time that he founded MBR-200 (Bolivarian Revolutionary Movement), a secret organization of officers with similar political\n\n4 . . . \"El Fenomeno Chavez\"\nleanings.  The organization was officially established in 1983, the two hundred year anniversary of the birth of Simon Bolivar.  For nearly ten years of his military career, 1980-1989, Chavez taught military history, leadership, and ethics to VMA cadets.8  Although he started studying for his Masters in Political Science at Simon Bolivar University, he never completed his studies.  He attained the rank of Lieutenant Colonel, but the failed coup attempt in February of 1992 effectively ended his military career.\n\n## The Path To Political Leadership\n\nThe growing popular dissatisfaction with the Perez administration, exemplified by the 1989 food riots resulting in the deaths of hundreds of civilians, mobilized Chavez's MBR-200 party, and three years later on February 4, 1992, Chavez led a failed coup attempt against the Venezuelan government.  The coup attempt resulted in the deaths of 18 persons and left 60 injured before Chavez gave himself up.  Despite the fact that the details of the coup attempt remain unclear to this day, and that it failed, the role of Chavez in the event has become part of Venezuelan lore.  The event has been recast as a case of Chavez leading his followers against a \"false democracy\" marked by corruption and resentment among Venezuela's impoverished majority.  It was this event that catapulted the young, previously unknown, soldier to the attention and admiration of many of the Venezuelan people.\n\nAlthough he had been sentenced to thirty years in prison for his role in the attempted coup, Chavez was pardoned and left prison after serving only two years and immediately began his political career.  Showing remarkable resiliency, just three years after his release, in April 1997, Hugo Chavez announced his candidacy for President.  His fiery antiestablishment rhetoric became the basis of his charismatic appeal and energized the Venezuelan population resulting in Election Day turnouts far surpassing any previous election.  A gifted orator, Chavez united the nation's political left wing and gave his followers a voice for their rage against a perceived corrupt and elitist system.  With a commanding 56\npercent of the vote, Hugo Chavez was elected President in December 1998 with a campaign platform that centered on giving prominence to the needs of impoverished and disenfranchised elements of Venezuelan society.  The same year that Hugo Chavez was elected President of Venezuela, his father was elected governor of the Barinas state.\n\n## Chavez As President\n\nSince becoming president, through 2001, Chavez has visited his heroic model and revolutionary soul-mate Fidel Castro six times, the latest being a visit to an ailing Castro in a Havana hospital.  In the summer of 2000, as the only South American member and as the sitting president of OPEC,9 Chavez visited many of the OPEC producing countries.  In open defiance of the United States, on August 11, 2000, Chavez traveled to Baghdad and visited with then Iraqi President, Saddam Hussein.  He was the first head of state to visit Iraq since the 1991 Gulf War.\n\nA year later, in August of 2001, Cuban leader Fidel Castro visited Chavez in Venezuela.  He was received with full military honors and was awarded the Order of Angostura, Venezuela's highest civil award, which commemorates the independence struggle of the South American liberator, Simon Bolivar.  Chavez, a strong supporter of Castro, greeted the aging Cuban dictator saying, \"We welcome the brother, the friend, the revolutionary soldier who has been an example of dignity for this entire continent, for the heavens and the sea.\"10  He went on to \"welcome this\n75-year-old youngster, the same Fidel as ever.\"  That Fidel occupies a special place in Chavez's political psychology seems clear, suggesting he hopes to acquire his mantle of leadership, emulating Castro's leadership style, i.e., winning popular support from the Venezuelan lower classes by confronting the \"Norte Americanos\" who are blamed for Venezuelan economic and social difficulties, just has Castro has so successfully portrayed the United States over the years.\n\nIt is still an open question whether Chavez is drawn to Castro's revolutionary ideology and person simply as a means of mobilizing domestic Venezuelan support for himself and his party, or whether he seriously aspires to spread revolution to other areas of Latin America such as his heroes Fidel Castro and Che Guevara attempted.  He has been openly supportive of leftist candidates through South America, including Evo Morales, the newly elected President of Bolivia11 and the leftist\n\n6 . . . \"El Fenomeno Chavez\"\ncandidate for President of Mexico, Lopez Obrador.  It is interesting to note that his other hero, Simon Bolivar, between 1810 and 1824 took up the sword to free Venezuela, Bolivia, Panama, Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru from Spanish control.  Bolivar, his hero, then became dictator over these areas.  If he follows the Bolivar, Castro, Guevara models in international affairs he will be prone to support violence as a means to a revolutionary end.  The jury is still out as to whether he will confine his activities to building domestic support by criticizing the United States and its Western Allies or whether he will cross the line and promote terror and revolutionary practice in the hemisphere outside his borders.\n\nIn April 2002, Hugo Chavez faced the biggest crisis of his political life.  Amidst falling popularity among most sectors of his constituency, along with his alienation of the business sector elites and labor leaders, strikes and protests erupted around the country.  In retaliation for the violent outbursts against his government, Chavez ordered his troops to break up the demonstrations, using force if necessary.\n\nThe bloodshed triggered a rebellion by the military and anti-Chavez demonstrators, culminating in a coup on April 12, 2002, which resulted in Chavez being captured and arrested in his own presidential palace.  The interim government led by Pedro Carmona, head of the business leader's association, claimed Chavez resigned.  The coup was short-lived as Chavez supporters and loyalist troops rose up in protest against the capture of their leader.  Lasting less than 48 hours, the coup was defeated and Chavez, who in fact had never resigned, was reinstated.  Reflecting an ironic sense of symmetry and justice, Chavez, who likes to see himself as a fair and just leader, sentenced Carmona to two years in prison, the same amount of time he himself spent in prison following the attempted coup of 1992 almost exactly ten years earlier.\n\nChavez seemed to have gained momentum following the resolution of the coup.  The base of his constituencythe poor and the lower class were energized around him and have insulated him from several attempts to bring him down since the 2002 coup (in 2003 more protests and strikes surfaced).  In December 2002, in response to a popular uprising, four oil executives were fired by Chavez's government.  Describing the men as\n\"rebels\" and \"subversives wearing ties,\" Chavez used this move to control the protests and demonstrations.\n\nIn July 2004, Chavez led a call for a united South American economic bloc before economic relations outside of the region were developed.  His speech criticized the Free Trade agreement that other South American countries (Colombia, Ecuador, Peru) have with the United States.  This confrontational and anti-American stance is in keeping with his modus operandi of intensifying his anti-American rhetoric as domestic instability increased.\n\nChavez's rule has led to a polarization of the country - those who see him as a spokesman for the poor, and those who regard him as a populist demagogue.  He has continued to emphasize his beliefs that it is the people who must decide his future, although there was little doubt that he will ensure his own political survival, for in his mind Venezuela requires his leadership.\n\nAfter two petitions, Chavez finally faced a national referendum vote on August 15, 2004.  The high oil prices had permitted Chavez to embark on a $17 billion social spending program.  He campaigned that a \"yes\" vote in the referendum to recall would be a vote for American imperialism.  Venezuela voted by a large margin58 to 42 percentto retain Chavez as president, a pivotal event and a powerful vindication for the pugnacious populist who had survived four strikes and a coup.  Adding to his euphoric response was the affirmation of international observers including the Organization of American States and Jimmy Carter (and the Carter Center) that the election was fair, despite opposition claims that \"they have perpetrated a gigantic fraud against the will of the people.\"\nThis was balm to Chavez' threatened ego.  And his response gave his victory a sacred significance: \"The Venezuelan people have spoken, and the people's voice is the voice of God.\"  He pledged that his government would continue with the so-called Bolivarian revolution.12\n\n## Wielding The Oil Weapon\n\nOn October 11, 2004, in a surprise announcement with no warning, Chavez declared that Venezuela was increasing the royalties paid by foreign oil companies from the earlier 1 percent, implemented in order to attract foreign investors, to 16.6 percent.  He called this \"an act of justice\n\n8 . . . \"El Fenomeno Chavez\"\nand sovereignty\" which \"marked the second and true phase of the nationalization of the country's oil.\"13\nThe importance of Venezuela's oil in the political arena was given added weight during a four-day visit to China in late December 2004. During that visit, Chavez announced that Venezuela's oil and natural gas fields would be open to China.  Under the terms of the agreement, Chinese companies would gain development rights to fifteen oil fields in eastern Venezuela and would be allowed to build oil refineries there.\n\nFurther casting doubt on whether Venezuela would continue as a reliable source of oil for the United States, in early February 2006, Chavez signaled that his government was looking to sell as many as eight refineries in its American oil-refining operations.  The refineries are owned by CITGO, the Houston-based subsidiary of Venezuela's state owned oil company, Petroleos de Venezuela.\n\nEver seeking opportunities to provoke the giant United States, Chavez agreed to provide eight million gallons of discounted heating oil to low income residents of the South Bronx from CITGO.  The agreement was negotiated with U.S. Representative Jose Serano, an outspoken Congressional supporter of both Fidel Castro and Chavez.\n\nHurricane Katrina gave Chavez another opportunity to mock the United States.  On September 5, 2005, after Hurricane Katrina hit the United States, the Chavez administration offered aid to its \"North American brothers.\"  In a rather brilliant public relations stroke, Chavez offered tons of food, water, and a million barrels of extra petroleum to the United States.  He has also proposed to sell, at a significant discount, as many as 66,000 barrels of heating fuel to poor communities that were hit by the hurricane, and offered mobile hospital units, medical specialists, and power generators.  (Castro made a similar \"generous\" offer.) As Chavez undoubtedly knew he would, President Bush declined this aid.\n\nOn November 23, 2005, Venezuelan officials struck a deal with Massachusetts officials to provide cheap heating oil to low-income homes, sold at 40 percent below market price from CITGO petroleum.  This was another slap at President Bush as the post-hurricane Katrina oil market significantly increased heating oil prices.\n\nVenezuela took control of two oil fields, one from France's Total SA, the other from Italy's Eni SpA, on April 3, 2006, after the companies refused to sign an agreement to turn the site over to a state-controlled joint venture, Petroleos de Venezuela SA (PDVSA).  Exxon Mobil Corporation decided to sell their stakes among the 32 Venezuelan oil properties rather than go along with the new terms.\n\nIn early April 2006, Chavez, who hosted the OPEC meeting on June\n1, 2006, in Caracas, indicated his intent to set the price of heavy crude oil at (U.S.) $50 a barrel.  Doing so would redefine reserve oil supplies and give him the highest percentage of oil reserves, more so than anyone in the Middle East.  The U.S. Department of Energy estimates that the Venezuelan government controls 1.3 trillion barrels of oil - more than the entire declared oil reserves of the rest of the planet.  Previously, heavy crude oil set at (U.S.) $20 a barrel was too expensive to process and was not counted in the reserves.\n\n## Chavez The Populist\n\nReminiscent of the land appropriation program of President Mugabe of Mozambique, in January 2005, Chavez promised to end what his government calls \"latifundios,\" estates of at least 5,000 hectares (approximately 12,500 acres) that remain idle, as part of a fast-moving land reform program.  Chavez, playing to his peasant support, has trained his sights on 6.6 million acres of private holdings, leading to widespread concern by major farmers, worried that the government will seize their property.\n\n## Chavez And The Media\n\nEver sensitive to criticism, Chavez has sought to muzzle the critics.\nIn December 2004, Chavez signed a law that permitted the government to censor news reports.  The vaguely worded law stipulated that the news media could not disseminate reports that endanger national security or incite disruption of public order, and outlined 78 possible infractions.  In passing this law, Chavez made the following observations:\n\"Let's say this, first of all we have to say something that John Paul II said.  There is no freedom without limits.  All\n10 . . . \"El Fenomeno Chavez\"\nfreedom should be regulated in a way.  You are free to go around Paris, but you need a document, right, or an identity card, otherwise you could go to prison.  You could have a car which is your own car but that doesn't mean you have to violate all traffic lights and the traffic code.  Your freedom is limited.  You can be the owner of a gun, you bought it, it is yours, but you cannot shoot people around, all right? So all freedom has limits, some constraints, it has to be regulated.  It is the same with freedom of speech, the use of the media especially should be regulated.  What we have done in Venezuela very recently is a law of social responsibility of radio and television.  For instance a TV channel can not incite hatred, cannot incite a coup, that is a crime, and it happened in Venezuela when during the coup in April 2002 all the private TV channels were supporting the coup, and calling the people to take to the streets to go against the palace and to give orders to the leaders and they weren't allowing the public to express themselves.  They published a great lie, that I had renounced my post as President, and that was false.  We are passing this law to save the freedom of speech of everyone.\"\nHaving muted the opposition, Chavez then sought a channel for his own views.  In what embassy officials have dubbed \"the Al Jazeera of Latin America,\" Chavez initiated Televisora del Sur (Television Station of the South), a pan-Latin American television network based in Caracas, Venezuela.  Intended to be a counter-weight to privately-owned networks such as CNN en Espanol, the network has taken on the slogan, \"News from the South.\"  It is funded with U.S. $10 million provided by the countries that jointly own the network and will collaborate on technology and news content: Venezuela, 51 percent, (the controlling share), Argentina, 20 percent, Cuba, 19 percent and Uruguay, 10 percent.  The newly elected populist president of Bolivia, Evo Morales, has agreed to buy a 5 percent stake.  The news channel has 160 employees and correspondents throughout Latin America, based in Argentina, Brazil, Bolivia, Colombia, Cuba, Haiti, Mexico, and Uruguay as well as in the United States.  There is a distinctly anti-imperialist coloration to the news programs.\n\n## Hugo Chavez The Man\n\nChavez is described as warm and genuine with a friendly, engaging demeanor.  His main vice appears to be espresso coffee - drinking up to 26\ncups a day and sleeping only two to three hours a night.  (This excessive amount of caffeine consumption could be expected to contribute to irritability, feeling \"wired,\" and over-rapid decision-making.)  He has no known medical problems other than reports of frequent and profuse nosebleeds as a cadet.  He is a highly intelligent man, who despite his inflammatory rhetoric is, for the most part, in good touch with political reality.\n\nWhile Chavez apparently has many friends and has a busy social life, he has had difficulty in sustaining happy marriages or developing relationships with his children.  In his mid-twenties Chavez married a not particularly attractive young woman from his hometown and had three children with her, two daughters and a son.  Nancy, Chavez's first wife, was from a poor family and was racially-mixed, dark and native in appearance, like Chavez himself.  Little else is known about her or their relationship.  They subsequently divorced in the late 1980s after 18 years of marriage.  During nine of those years, he also pursued an affair with a young historian, Herma Marksman.  Chavez sent his two daughters with Nancy to school in Cuba.\n\nMaria Isabel, Chavez's second wife, is a stark contrast to Nancy.  She is an attractive, fair-skinned blonde from an upper-class family of privilege.  Chavez met her during his 1997 Presidential Campaign.  They were married after she found out she was pregnant.  This marriage has produced another daughter.  Chavez and his second wife are now separated and he is reputed to have little contact with any of his four children or his single grandchild.\n\n## Flamboyant Political Style\n\nChavez is known for his outrageous and often unprovoked tirades against his opponents.  His bellicose and often inappropriate public commentary suggests not a lack of regard for public opinion beyond his\n12 . . . \"El Fenomeno Chavez\"\nimmediate supporters, but rather that he enjoys the attention such antics produce.  His staunchly anti-American, anti-old establishment and antielite stance empowers his lower-class followers who identify with him, demonstrating in their eyes his ability to stand up to the resented elements of society, which they blame for their feelings of powerlessness.\n\n## Narcissistic Personality\n\nChavez is an authoritarian narcissistic leader who has dreams of glory, and can be overly sensitive to criticism.  The arrogant certainty conveyed in his public pronouncements is very appealing to his followers. But under this grandiose facade, as is typical with narcissistic personalities, is extreme insecurity.  When under stress, his defiance becomes more pronounced, as does his tendency to blame others for his own shortcomings.\n\nChavez has cultivated a larger-than-life self-image, approaching messianic proportions, yet is not out of touch with political reality. However, at times he seems to become captive of his own inflammatory rhetoric.  He certainly has a sense of entitlement about his position.\n\nChavez has skillfully used religious rhetoric in this devoutly Catholic state.  While he appears to believe he has a \"mission\" as the leader of Venezuela, it is more in the image of Simon Bolivar than Jesus Christ.\nBut, since the election, Chavez has become increasingly seized with his messianic role, and likens himself to Christ.  In an interview with Ted Koppel, (September 16, 2005) Chavez remarked:\n\"I've been in revolt for years against ignominy, against injustice, against inequality, against immorality, against the exploitation of human beings.  One of the greatest rebels, who I really admire: Christ.  He was a rebel.  He ended up being crucified.  He was a great rebel.  He rebelled against the established power that subjugated.  That is what rebellion is; it's rebellion out of love for human beings.  In truth, that is the cause, the cause of love: love for every human being, for every woman, for every child, for every man, for every brother.\"\n\n## Paranoid Personality Features\n\nChavez is a man who has built his career, and in many ways his life, on plots and subplots of political intrigue.  At times he seemed surprisingly unconcerned with conspiracy theories and earlier had refused many of the standard security protocols of state leaders - he freely mingled with people during his political rallies and refused to wear a bulletproof vest.  As a man of the people, he did not seem to be consumed by paranoid fantasies himself, but rather appeared to use the conspiracy theories of his followers as a tool in his leadership and manipulation, rather than being dominated by paranoid fears.\n\nBut more recently he has been consumed with paranoid fears, suggesting his underlying insecurity.  A member of the Colombian security service who was a member of the presidential detail on a state visit described the lengths to which Chavez went to protect himself as being unusual to the extreme, surrounding himself with a virtual phalanx of security guards, personally checking out every detail of his protection. On several occasions he has threatened retaliation for plots.  In the September 2005 interview with Ted Koppel, Chavez stated with certainty that he had proof that the United States had plans to invade Venezuela.\n\nIn mid-August 2005, Venezuela prepared to deport 16 of 133\nColombians arrested outside Caracas who, Chavez charged, were paramilitary soldiers sent to assassinate him, charges ridiculed by Colombian diplomats.  Several days later, on the 700 Club broadcast of August 22, 2005, the Pat Robertson call for Chavez' assassination did nothing to dampen his fears.\n\n\"There was a popular coup that overthrew him [Chavez].\nAnd what did the United States State Department do about it?  Virtually nothing.  And as a result, within about 48\nhours that coup was broken; Chavez was back in power, but we had a chance to move in.  He has destroyed the Venezuelan economy, and he's going to make that a launching pad for communist infiltration and Muslim extremism all over the continent. You know, I don't know about this doctrine of assassination, but if he thinks we're trying to assassinate him, I think that\n14 . . . \"El Fenomeno Chavez\"\nwe really ought to go ahead and do it.  It's a whole lot cheaper than starting a war.  And I don't think any oil shipments will stop.  But this man is a terrific danger ... This is in our sphere of influence, so we can't let this happen.  We have the Monroe Doctrine, we have other doctrines that we have announced.  And without question, this is a dangerous enemy to our south, controlling a huge pool of oil, that could hurt us very badly.  We have the ability to take him out, and I think the time has come that we exercise that ability.  We don't need another $200\nbillion war to get rid of one, you know, strong-arm dictator.\nIt's a whole lot easier to have some of the covert operatives do the job and then get it over with.\"\nThese remarks, of course, produced a firestorm, with denials of any intent to assassinate from prominent Senators and indeed from President Bush himself.\n\nFour days after these remarks, his paranoid fears heightened, Chavez suspended permits for foreign missionaries.  And in October, he ordered a Christian missionary group working with indigenous peoples to leave the country after accusing its members of \"imperialist infiltration\" and spying.\n\nOn February 2, 2006, Chavez announced that his government had ordered the expulsion of the American naval attache, John Correa, at the U.S. Embassy in Caracas for spying.  This was immediately followed on February 3, 2006, by remarks by Vice President Cheney, comparing Chavez to Hitler, that were not designed to ease Chavez' paranoid fears.\n\n\"I mean, we've got Chavez in Venezuela with a lot of oil money.  He's a person who was elected legally - just as Adolf Hitler was elected legally - and then consolidated power and now is, of course, working closely with Fidel Castro and Mr. Morales and others.\"\nIn retaliation for the expulsion of John Correa, the United States declared persona non grata and ejected Jenny Figueredo Frias, identified as chief of staff to the Venezuelan ambassador.  Upon returning to Venezuela, Frias received a hero's welcome.\n\nDefending against the Hitler metaphor, on February 4, 2006, Hugo Chavez told a rally of supporters on Saturday that U.S. President George W. Bush was worse than Hitler and vowed to buy more arms to defend his nation as diplomatic relations deteriorated after a week of tit-for-tat diplomatic expulsions.\n\nChavez warned he could shut Venezuelan oil refineries in the United States and sell oil for the U.S. market elsewhere if Washington cuts off ties, although U.S. officials had made no suggestion they plan to break relations.\n\nAll of this populist defiance played well to the followers of Chavez, who admired his courage in standing up to the giant United States.\n\n## Politically Adroit\n\nHugo Chavez is a skilled political manipulator, who is adroitly Machiavellian.  His continual emphasis of his mission of championing of Bolivarian ideals, his oft stated pride in his being a *mestizo*, and his continuing emphasis on his own roots in poverty is employed to maintain his hold on power.\n\nTo keep his followers engaged, he must continue the outrageous and inflammatory attacks on the United States, the Venezuelan elite and other perceived enemies.  It would appear that while he does, in fact, believe in the essence of these world views, he also knows that they provide a platform for maintaining his popularity in Venezuela.\n\n## Episodic Flawed Decision-Making\n\nThere are two circumstances when Chavez's messianic personality adversely affects his decision-making, with a potential for flawed judgment - when he has just achieved a major success and when he perceives himself as failing.  When Chavez is succeeding, he can become heady with success, feeling he is invulnerable.  That the major increase from 1 to 16.6 percent in oil royalties followed his electoral success suggests that it may well have flowed from his being heady with success.\n\nWhen Chavez is failing, meeting setbacks, facing points of crisis -\nwhen his leadership is imperiled because of economic decline and loss of popular support - then his rhetoric and actions become bolder and more\n16 . . . \"El Fenomeno Chavez\"\nconfrontational.  Consistently, as instability in Venezuela rises, so too does his anti-American, anti-elite rhetoric and actions.\n\nIn many ways, Chavez will respond to internal crisis by creating a crisis with the elites or the international community.  This, in turn, then draws his supporters together, strengthening his internal base.  Chavez sees himself as the very embodiment of Venezuela, so had the ineffective government led to a legitimate major defeat at the polls, this would have been psychologically intolerable for Chavez, who would have either declared martial law or arranged to reverse the electoral defeat.\n\n## Hugo Chavez And Post-August Election Venezuela - Heady With Success\n\nRather than allowing the August 2004 referendum to slow down or undermine his popularity, it seemed to embolden Chavez and solidify his base.  Always appealing to the poor and impoverished of Venezuela, Chavez portrayed his margin of 58 percent to the opposition's 42 percent of the electoral vote as a victory for the people despite American interference.  With the Carter Center mission, led by former U.S. President Jimmy Carter, and the Organization of American States certifying the results shortly after voting, Chavez's victory was internationally recognized.  Although the opposition continued to cry foul, the United States quickly followed the international observers' recommendations and recognized the results, firmly establishing Chavez's control.\n\nThe opposition based its claims of fraud on three specific points:  (1)\nan exit poll supervised by an American polling company showed the opposition winning by 18 percent; (2) a pattern of polling stations where electronic voting machines returned identical results; and (3) in some districts there were fewer \"yes\" votes to recall Chavez than had been on a petition the previous year.  Carter Center observers have addressed each of these points.  First they call into question the accuracy of exit polls based on framing of questions, voters chosen to participate and ultimately the honesty of answers given to pollsters.  There was extensive testing of the voting machines prior to the elections and Carter Center observers participated in post-election vote counting and believed in the accuracy of the count.  They address the final point by saying that when it came time to vote, despite what people had indicated on a petition a year prior, they could have changed their minds on voting day.  Ultimately though, the recognition of the referendum results by the international observers undermined the opposition more effectively than Chavez himself could have done.\n\nChavez moved quickly to take advantage of the momentum from the August referendum.  He has announced a \"new stage\" of his Bolivarian revolution.  The government is expanding the \"electoral patrols\" -\nneighborhood groups that had mobilized the pro-Chavez vote and there is increasing legislation to further limit civil rights throughout Venezuela.\nFreedom of speech and press are being severely restricted.  Chavez has increased nationalization of industry with the establishment of a national airline, TV station and telecommunications industry.  Chavez was on a roll.\n\nHe put the large infusion of funds from oil revenues to work to solidify his political base.  The foundation of Chavez's support, the poor and disenfranchised, see results.  There has been a massive increase in public spending.  New medical clinics are being set up throughout the country.  There are reports of upwards of 11,000 neighborhood clinics being established with assistance of Cuban doctors and medical equipment.  There has been a \"redistribution\" of roughly 2.3 million hectares to 117,000 families throughout Venezuela.  Secondary education is now available for more children than ever before.  In addition to the three new university campuses functioning in 2003, there are reports of six more to be completed by 2006, through an increase of the education budget by almost 5 percent of the GDP from the previous government.\n\nWith no real foundation for a viable economic model in Venezuela, the question becomes how are these reforms being financed?  And, how long can it last?  Hugo Chavez knows that his base constituency is the poor who are benefiting from these new programs.\n\nVenezuela's state oil company, Petroles de Venzuela (PDVSA), saw massive changes as a result of a power struggle in 2003 resulting in Chavez taking control of the company and purging its senior management. Reports vary, but, in general, it seems that PDVSA's production has decreased in the past year and private operators now account for about\n1 million barrels/day of the company's output - a figure many expect to increase.\n\n18 . . . \"El Fenomeno Chavez\"\nWith PDVSA unable to maintain the necessary production to finance Chavez's plans, he is clearly in need of external multinational investment.\nThe December 2004 agreement with China, which itself is increasingly avid for petroleum supplies, is in the service of that goal, and such ventures are expected to increase.\n\n## Aspires To Be Leading Latin American Social Revolutionary, At Hazard To More Broad Support Of Terrorism\n\nChavez's populist \"in your face\" anti-American stance has been rewarded by his victory at the polls.  There is every reason to believe this stance will not only continue but will be intensified.  Will he provide support to terrorist groups as a consequence of this leftist social revolutionary stance?  To answer this question requires an examination of his core political personality.  His style is one of open, overt defiance against the demonized enemy, the United States.  This is what wins him points both domestically and internationally.  His mentor and model is Fidel Castro, and he has watched carefully and admired the manner in which Castro has politically exploited his anti-Western defiance, including support to African separatist movements.  His first two trips after his election were to meet with his mentor Castro, whose mantle of leadership as Latin American leftist leader he hopes one day to acquire, and to Saddam Hussein.  The latter visit was designed to tweak the United States; it was a \"thumb in the eye\" of the United States, an act of public defiance, designed to appeal to his supporters.\n\nThere are widespread reports he has supported the Colombian social revolutionary insurgency directly supporting the FARC in battles against the Colombian military, and there are scattered reports of both material and financial support to other insurgency/terrorist groups operating in the region.  In particular, Venezuela is reported to have allowed both the FARC and the ELN to operate safe havens on Venezuelan territory.\n\nIn the summer of 2000, Olga Martin, prominent FARC leader, spoke on the floor of Venezuela's National Assembly and praised Chavez as a hero of the rebel movement and thanked the Venezuelan government for its \"support.\"  Within weeks, the Colombian government reported confiscating more than 400 rifles and machine guns bearing the insignia of the Venezuelan armed forces.\n\nIn February 2001, Jose Maria Ballestas, a leader of ELN, the other main Colombian social-revolutionary terrorist organization, was captured in Venezuela by Interpol.  Although he was wanted for a 1999 airline hijacking, he was immediately released from custody by order of the Chavez government, which denied he'd been arrested.  This led to a major diplomatic crisis with Colombia, which released a video of his capture to put to a lie the Venezuelan claim that he had not been arrested.\n\nTo repair relations with Colombia, Chavez made a state visit in May\n2001, but had the effrontery to have as his chief body guard Diego Serna, a FARC member.  Later that fall, Venezuela's intelligence chief Jesus Urdaneta denounced Chavez for supporting the FARC, publicizing documents showing that the Chavez government offered fuel, money, and other support to the terrorists, including signed letters from a Chavez aide to provide support to the FARC.  The signatory was later to become Chavez' minister of justice.  A group of female journalists released video shortly thereafter showing meetings between Venezuelan military leaders and FARC guerilla commanders.  The Colombian Air Force also captured a Venezuelan plane loaded with ammunition intended for FARC terrorists.\n\nParticularly powerful confirmation of the Venezuelan-FARC\nconnection was provided when a high ranking FARC commander, Ricardo Granada, known as FARC's \"foreign secretary,\" was arrested on the Colombian border in December 2005.  In Caracas, Granada had enjoyed Venezuelan citizenship and had participated in a \"networking conference\"\nin which Chavez, Daniel Ortega of Nicaragua, and other socialist revolutionary leaders participated.  Colombia has become increasingly frustrated with the apparent impunity of Venezuela when it has been harboring terrorist leaders.  The arrest in Columbia in January 2005 and subsequent extradition to the United States of Simon Triubada, the nom de guerre of Ricardo Palmero, a high-ranking FARC terrorist, was a major blow to the FARC.  Palmero is currently awaiting trial in the United States.  During the trial, the details of Venezuela's support for the FARC\ncan be expected to become a major part of the prosecution case.14\nGiven reports that Venezuela has recently consummated an arms deal with Russia to provide 100,000 AK-103s, this raises questions whether this is for his military only or if some or a majority of these weapons have\n20 . . . \"El Fenomeno Chavez\"\nFARC and other insurgency/terrorist organizations as their ultimate recipient.15  The degree of support by the Chavez government is extremely strong and long standing. Indeed, Colombia's efforts to counter this powerful insurgency will not succeed as long as Venezuela continues to play such a central role in providing sanctuary, weapons, and financial support to the FARC insurgents.\n\nThere has also been at least one report of Chavez providing support to the Taliban.  A Venezuelan military defector, Major Juan Diaz Castillo, formerly the pilot for Chavez, reported that Chavez transferred $1 million to the Taliban through Venezuelan ambassador to India, Walte Marquez, in New Delhi, designating $900,000 to Al Qaeda for its relocation efforts, and $100,000 to the then-Afghan government for food and clothing. Major Castillo was one of a group of disaffected Venezuelan military officers opposed to the extremities of the undemocratic actions Chavez was taking to hold on to power.  Diaz has stated, \"I must warn America about Chavez.  He is a danger, not only to his own people but to the whole region.\"  Referring to the aid to Al Qaeda, Diaz indicated, \"It was a way of telling Osama bin Laden that he had a friend in Hugo Chavez.\"\nAfter the 9/11 attack, Chavez expressed admiration for the attacks in private, according to General Pedro Pereira, then the highest ranking general in the Venezuelan air force.  \"With 9/11, bin Laden showed the whole world that he was a force to be reckoned with.  This impressed Hugo to no end,\" the general recalled.  On the day after the attack, Chavez supporters held a celebration in which they burned the American flag in the main square of Caracas.  Diaz has indicated that after 2001, Chavez \"wanted direct contact to all the major terror groups in the world.\"  Diaz and his colleagues have established a website, MilitaresDemacraticos.com, on which this report was disseminated.  This report was widely disseminated on Venezuelan media, but, unlike the widely sourced reports of Venezuelan support to the FARC, there have been no independent confirmations of this report.16\n\"Hamas leaders will be received by Mr. Chavez with great pleasure,\"\nChavez indicated publicly on February 16, 2006.  This followed Putin's decision to undermine United States attempts to isolate the new Hamas government.  Asked whether they would receive a Hamas delegation, Vice President Jose Vicente responded, \"If they come, it will be a pleasure. They have a majority with the Palestinian people, they just won an election.\"  Chavez confirmed that it was ready to study Hamas appeals to the international community.  The decision was seen as part of Chavez' policy aimed to strengthen ties with Arab nations as part of efforts by the world's No. 5 oil exporter to break its traditional political and economic reliance on the United States.17\nSince assuming the presidency, Chavez has embarked on an interesting travel schedule, to say the least.  In addition to the early trips to Cuba and Iraq, he has also traveled to Iran, Syria, North Korea, Zimbabwe, Belarus, China, and Libyawith the exception of China, a veritable who's who of rogue leaders international.\n\nIn a reflexive manner, Chavez has strongly publicly supported Iran's right to develop a nuclear capability; Venezuela, along with Syria and Cuba, were the only countries to oppose the resolution to refer Iran to the United Nation Security Council at the February 2006 meeting of the International Atomic Energy Agency in Vienna.  After meeting with former Iranian president Khatami in Caracas, Chavez stated, \"Iran has every right, like many other countries have done, to develop its atomic energy and continue its research in this field.\"  (And if this is true for Iran, it is assuredly true for Venezuela.)  Indeed, Iran has become increasingly important to Venezuela in its efforts to oppose American influence in the developing world.  This strengthening of ties, including a number of recent joint commercial ventures, has led Iran to become Venezuela's closest ally outside of Latin America.  In Iran, where he appeared jointly with President Ahmadinejad in a late July visit on the occasion of which he was awarded the golden High Medallion of the Islamic Republic, Chavez made a number of statements strongly supporting Iran's right to a nuclear program.\n\nChavez was outspoken in his criticism of Israeli actions in Lebanon, which he characterized \"being carried out in the style of Hitler, in a fascist manner.\"  According to Alberto Garrido, a historian who is writing a book on Venezuela's ties to Muslim countries, \"Geopolitically, the most important front for Chavez in the world at the moment is Iran.  Chavez, together with his closest advisors, has defined the strategic alliance with Iran as a means with which to counter American power.\"18\nKhatami, speaking before the Venezuelan congress, referred to \"the injustice of the great powers that try to control the world\" and went on to deprecate the United States and its efforts that interfere \"in other states\n22 . . . \"El Fenomeno Chavez\"\nunder the pretext of fighting terrorism and try to force all of humanity to follow their monopoly of power.\"  Receiving Gholam-Ali-haddad Adel, speaker of the Iranian parliament, on a mission to discuss cooperation between Iran and Venezuela, the president of Venezuela's national Assembly, Nicolas Maduro stated, \"From our souls, we feel that our two nations are brothers, and that together with other peoples, we are carrying the flag of dignity and sovereignty, just as the North American empire (the United States) is beginning to decay.\"19\nThe major psychological reward for Chavez derives from being seen as the pugnacious openly defiant champion of the little man in the manner of his identified hero Simon Bolivar or Juan Peron.  His moves concerning rewriting petroleum contracts will be strengthened by the recent victory by his comrade in populist arms, Evo Morales, who has just nationalized Bolivian natural gas.  The oil club is a heavy cudgel and Chavez may be tempted by his recent successes to move towards full nationalization of Venezuela's oil industry.  That he requires the support of Western oil companies for the optimal exploitation of his oil resources should inhibit such a move.  But it did not for Qadhafi after the successful coup in Libya with the subsequent nationalization of Occidental Petroleum's holdings in Libya, and if Chavez were to go on one of his grandiose rolls, such a move is not out of the question.  He also provided verbal support to the populist leftist candidate for president of Mexico, former Mexico City mayor Lopez Obrador, who lost a very close 2006 election.\n\nNor would it be surprising to see him open diplomatic relationships with the Hamas-led government of the Palestinian Authority.  After all, Hamas, as Chavez now points out with pseudo-ingenuous glee, was elected legitimately, was it not?  If he did so, Hamas might gain a foothold in Venezuela where its embassy and consulate might be useful to potential trouble-makers from the Jihadist camp.  The main goals of such a move would be in the service of defying the United States, similar to the purposes of his early trip to visit with Saddam Hussein and his later expressions of solidarity and extensive trade agreements with Iran.  This could also serve to consolidate his support at home and Venezuela's solidarity with Arab oil-producing nations.  His decision to visit North Korea in late July 2006, which was subsequently cancelled, is another example of his consistently warm embrace of the major adversaries of the United States.\n\nDespite his rubbing shoulders with leaders of states hostile to the United States, the question of whether Chavez would give wide-spread support for international terrorism is another matter.  This has yet to be proven.  That he has provided strong support for the FARC and ELN in Colombia is assuredly the case.  But this may be a special case; note that Colombia has the closest ties to the United States of any state in the region, making Colombia even more of a target of Chavez.  Colombia shares a common border with Venezuela, and these are insurgencies directed against Colombia, with a social-revolutionary ideology quite compatible with that of Chavez.\n\nBut what of Al Qaeda and the global Salafi jihad?  Would he get involved in aiding such movements?  Here the evidence is mixed and not so compelling.  While Chavez can become heady with success and openly defiant in terms of his relations with such rogue states as North Korea and Iran, open support for Al Qaeda is another matter, and the often eccentric Chavez is not without prudence.  He assuredly knows that for incontrovertible evidence to be provided that he is actively supporting the major identified opponent of the United States in the war on terror would have dire consequences.  Would he covertly support them?  While it is true that major support of an Islamic extremist group, even if anti-\nAmerican, would not play well in the predominately Christian (Catholic)\nVenezuela20 and, given the clarity of the Bush doctrine concerning those who support terrorism, prudence would dictate a cautious path, Chavez has been on a defiant role.  Chavez has manifested flaws in his judgment in the past, and when carried away with success, can feel invulnerable and messianic, and therefore he could well move in this direction.  When he experiences support from Latin American allies for his anti-U.S. stance, this heightens the hazard for more extreme acts on his part.  This suggests the importance of presenting him with very clear unambiguous U.S. diplomatic communications to warn him of the consequences of such actions if U.S. leaders get any warnings and indications that Chavez is moving in this direction.  When he experiences support from Latin American allies for his anti-U.S. stance, this heightens the hazard for more extreme acts on his part.\n\n24 . . . \"El Fenomeno Chavez\"\n\n## New Military Doctrine\n\nDespite the long standing tradition of a requirement for retirement at age 55, President Chavez recently called back into military service 78 year old General Alberto Muller Rojas, who was one of Chavez's professors in the military academy.  He asked General Rohas to reformulate Venezuela's military doctrine.  (One is reminded of Osama bin Laden asking obedient clerics to provide fatwahs justifying Al Qaeda's extreme actions.)  In this new doctrine, which was released in the fall of 2005, there are three major points:21\n\n1. The United States is the main enemy of Venezuela.\n2. In the asymmetric conflict, it would be a \"war of the\nfleas,\" i.e., an insurgency, low intensity conflict.\nIt is unthinkable that an international political actor such as the North American state is today could be terrified by the conventional troops of an average power.  But it is possible to frighten it with irregular or non-conventional forces that have the same effect that fleas have on the human organism.  Many theorists refer to such a military action as the \"war of fleas.\"  This \"war of fleas\" is referred to as such because of the irritation that is caused but also because of the infection they transmit.  The irregular on nonconventional action causes this \"itching\", [which amounts]\nnot only to the effective damage of the capital and resources of the opponent, but also [to the introduction of] viruses that act on the nervous system, [or in this case] the centers of political decision [making] which eventually have the potential to annul the will of those who direct the actins of the attacker.  For that reason, militarily, before a threat of that nature, the best strategy is not to bite with a little pressure or the bite of a small dog.  The best practice is to nip with the venom of an insect.\n\nThis doctrinal statement places Venezuela's stated goal of producing more AK 103-style rifles, the weapon of choice for insurgencies and terrorists, in an interesting light, suggesting that Chavez has reworked the country's defense doctrine to prepare for an \"asymmetric war\" like the one being fought in Iraq. Chavez has stated their intention to open a factory in 2009 to begin producing the weapons, and has already purchased 100,000 weapons to restock his military, which has about 75,000 soldiers. How many are intended to supply FARC, which he has supported in the past? How many represent his fears of a U.S. invasion and the need to arm an insurgency against the feared invasion?\n\n3. A nuclear capability to serve as deterrent to the feared\nUnited States attack is suggested if not explicitly stated. Chavez has strongly supported the rights of Iran as a sovereign nation to have a nuclear capability, and has explicitly given voice to Venezuela's similar right. And he has addressed the asymmetry of the super powers and their stabilizing the international system by \"the balance of terror.\"\nThe state of the world that we are leaving in a political sense and consequently in a military sense is the world of bipolarity dominated by the preeminence of the weapons of mass destruction, with special consideration of those that were used in the handling of nuclear technology...the capabilities of such production of such military talents...were concentrated in two centers of power, the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R.....[these so-called \"superpowers\"] stabilized the international system by means of the \"balance of terror.\" ...There was a form of conduct that tended to impose in the hemisphere a \"pax Americana\" in the style of the \"pax Romana\" imposed by the Roman Empire of antiquity in the region of the Mediterranean River Basin. [The American interference] corresponded to interventions that caused an imbalance to impose submissive governments in the interests of Washington. ...our military institution has been able throughout the twentieth century to maintain the peace between the classes\n26 . . . \"El Fenomeno Chavez\"\nand estates that form our political community.  For that reason the military power that one should evaluate is the one that corresponds to the one that would possibly be used within the framework of a direct strategic threat by the real antagonist, the United States. Certainly nuclear power's use [amounts to] general suicide for humanity, because the escalation that would be originated by a decision of this nature would be produce the total destruction of the biosphere ...\nWar is for something more: the power and that on which power depends and with which power coincides, political freedom...War is not a simple confrontation of physical forces. It is mainly a confrontation of wills, which basically places it in the psychological terrain.\n\nThe concept that American power rests on nuclear power, and the apparent fear that the United States would threaten Venezuela with its nuclear capability coupled with the assertion that, like Iran, Venezuela has the right of a sovereign nation to develop a nuclear capability and the paranoid propensities of Chavez does suggest the possibility that Venezuela could conclude that Venezuela must develop a nuclear weapons capability to deter the perceived threat from the United States.\n\n## Basking Audaciously In The International Limelight\n\nChavez could not resist the opportunity to strut upon the world stage in addressing the general assembly of the United Nations.  Addressing the world body at its annual September meeting, Chavez, referring to President George W. Bush who had addressed the U.N. general assembly the day before, stated, \"The devil came here yesterday.\"  And, crossing himself ostentatiously, he indicated, \"And it smells of sulfur still today.\"\nHe went on to accuse Bush of having spoken \"as if he owned the world\" and said a psychiatrist should be called to analyze the statement.  He held up Noam Chomsky's book, Hegemony or Survival: The Imperialist Strategy of the United States, as recommended reading, quoting, \"The hegemonic pretensions of the American empire are placing at risk the very survival of the human species.\"  He also stated that the United States was \"the first enemy\" of its people, an apparent reference to the revised political/military doctrine summarized above.\n\nAt a news conference in Harlem the next day, he showed the book again, and indicated he that he had to wash the book \"with holy water because I put it in the same place that the devil put his papers.\"  In this press conference, the statements were if anything even more provocative than those at the United Nations.  In addition to repeating comments about the devil and the smell of sulfur, he described President Bush as \"an alcoholic, a sick man who suffers form feelings of inadequacy, but a very dangerous man because he has so much power.\"\nThese comments echoed ones he had made in March 2006 on his daily call in show, Hello, President.\n\n\"You are a coward because you did not go to Iraq to lead your armed forces.  It is very easy to command them from afar.  If it occurs to you one day to invade Venezuela, I will be here waiting for you on the savannah, Mr. Danger.  Mr.\n\nDanger you are a donkey ... You are killing children who are not to blame for your illnesses, for your complexes, kid.\"\nThe terminal illness of his mentor and role model Fidel Castro has stimulated Chavez, who is already behaving as if he has succeeded Castro in his role as leader of the Latin American left and as anti U.S. nonaligned movement leader.  His behavior will intensify when Castro finally passes from the scene.\n\nIt is interesting that Chavez states that \"a psychiatrist should analyze the statement,\" referring to Bush's speech before the general assembly, and then proceeds in the press conference to characterize President Bush as \"a sick man, who suffers from feelings of inadequacy, but a very dangerous man because he has so much power.\"  The author of this study is a psychiatrist, who has analyzed the statements of Chavez.  If one substitutes \"oil\" for \"power\" in his characterization of President Bush, it would be a characterization of Chavez, who may be projecting his own fears and anxieties on President Bush, and then defending himself against the assumed retaliatory aggression.  Chavez's paranoid reactions do flourish at times.  After his anti-Bush statements at the U.N. and in the\n28 . . . \"El Fenomeno Chavez\"\npress conference in Harlem, the next day, Chavez stated that \"many concerned friends have called me (saying) that because I said 'devil' over there (at the United Nations) they have sentenced me to die.  They will not kill me.\"\nIn the press conference, which was the day after President Ahmadinejad, in his address to the general assembly, had defiantly expressed Iran's intention to continue to pursue nuclear technology, Chavez, one of only three general assembly members (with Cuban and Syria) that broke from the wide consensus and supported Iran's sovereign right to pursue a nuclear programs in defiance of the counterproliferation treaty, provocatively took up the nuclear cudgel as well.  While disavowing intent to pursue a nuclear weapons program, Chavez stated that Venezuela would like to pursue the civilian use of nuclear energy as well.  As with his support of Iran, this was couched as the sovereign right of his nation.  Clearly enjoying the moment, he ended the news conference by saying, \"I have a meeting with the axis of evil somewhere around here, so I have to go.\"\nWhile Ahmadinejad did to be sure assert his continued resolve to pursue a nuclear program, he restrained his more provocative comments, not, for example giving voice to his often asserted statements concerning the \"illegitimate nation of Israel\" that \"should be wiped from the face of the earth.\"  In contrast, Chavez was seen as over the top, clearly stimulated by the international spotlight, and not being able to restrain his more outrageous excesses, and, while it played well to some members of the audience, it assuredly damaged his international stature, and significantly contributed to the failure of Chavez' active lobbying campaign for Venezuela to be the Latin American representative to the U.N. Security Council.  Chavez became despondent and depressed after his U.N. loss, failing to show up at the Ibero-American Summit in Montevideo, glumly explaining, \"my colleagues do not like me and they say I am bad news.\" This, however, was a short-lived setback.\n\nIn the fall 2006 presidential campaign for a second six-year term, Chavez scarcely mentioned his opponent, Manuel Rosales.  Rather, the former baseball player made anti-U.S. populism central to his campaign stating, \"We are confronting the devil - and we will hit a home run off the devil.\"  He managed the 2006 presidential election campaign in such a way to ensure that he would hit that home run and would secure an even larger margin of victory than that of President 'Lula' da Silva of Brazil.\n\nThe European Union Election Observation Mission (EU EOM)\narrived in Venezuela in November 2006 to observe the election proceedings and received \"numerous complaints regarding pressure exerted on public officials to vote for President Hugo Chavez, or to participate in his election campaign activities.\"22  The general complaints were exemplified by a speech by Rafael Ramirez, the president of Venezuela's state-owned oil company PDVSA (and concurrently Minister of Energy and Petroleum!), to his top management stating, \"Here we are supporting [President] Chavez, who is our leader, who is the maximum leader of this revolution and we will do all that we have to do to support our President and those who do not feel comfortable with this orientation need to cede their position to a Bolivarian.\"23  Indeed, reportedly several officials who objected to this clear violation of the law were discharged.\n\nAccording to the EU EOM report, there was \"widespread institutional propaganda in favor of the President, and Candidate, Hugo Chavez,\" despite the requirement in the election laws that \"The media, both public and private, shall offer comprehensive and well balanced news coverage.\"  EU EOM found a six fold disparity between coverage for Hugo Chavez, with 86 percent of the time devoted to candidates being for Chavez and that was uniformly positive, and only 14 percent for Rosales, and that was uniformly negative, scarcely \"comprehensive and well balanced.\"  On the other hand, two privately owned television stations reflected the opposite bias.\n\nAccording to former member of the senior management within Venezuela's state-owned oil company PDVSA, the registered voters increased from 11 million in the 1994 election to 16 million in the 2006 election.  Most of the new voters had illegally emigrated from Colombia, Panama, Ecuador, and the Dominican Republic, and their status had then been legalized by Chavez.\n\nOn December 3, 2006, Chavez received nearly 63 percent of the final vote (7.2 million votes out of about 12 million cast), exceeding \"Lula's\" total. \"It's another defeat for the devil who tries to dominate the world. Down with imperialism!  We need a new world!\"  This victory can be expected to be viewed by him as confirmation of his stature as worthy successor to Bolivar and Castro.\n\n## Outlook\n\nChavez continues to deride the international community, and to blame the state of poverty in his country on foreign investors.  And yet he desperately needs them to invest in the Venezuelan oil industry.  In the early 1990s, when Venezuela began privatization of its oil industry, numerous foreign investors were exempted from a national oil tax. Chavez has moved to enforce the \"national oil exploitation tax\" against all multinationals.  This 16.6 percent tax, an increase from 1 percent, went into effect in early October 2004 and affected all multinational corporations operating in Venezuela.  It is estimated that this tax would generate roughly $1.27 billion dollars annually for the Venezuelan government.  While in the short-term most companies have agreed to pay this tax, it could affect the willingness of international companies to invest in Venezuelan oil development and ultimately the ability of Venezuela to produce enough oil to pay for Chavez's domestic agenda.\n\nChavez continues to invoke the image of Simon Bolivar, the great revolutionary.  He remains close to Fidel Castro and has the support of much of the Arab world.  He has been increasingly strong in support of Iran, which in turn has proven to be an important ally of Venezuela outside of Latin America. Chavez apparently has defined the strategic alliance with Iran as a means with which to counter American power.\n\n## President For Life?\n\nHis hold on power in Venezuela appears to be strengthening, as the opposition is weakened by Chavez's public welfare programs that benefit the poor as well as by intensified legislation limiting internal dissent.  As his hold on power becomes more absolute, so will his vision of himself as the savior of Venezuela.  Seeing himself as the very embodiment of Venezuela, despite having said he would only serve two six-year terms, Chavez is likely to seek to extend his time in power, indeed could well move to become president for life, not unique in the Latin context.  There are already suggestions that he will attempt to modify the Venezuelan constitution, in what would be in effect a constitutional coup, to permit his staying in office beyond the current two term limit. Should that fail, he may well decide that his country needs him.  In those circumstances, it is unlikely that he would leave office peacefully.\n\nAs the internal economy falters due to mismanagement and corruption, Chavez will increasingly turn to the oil multinationals as a source of income.  The October 2004 oil exploitation tax is likely only the beginning.  It is unlikely he will move in the near term to entirely nationalize the oil industry.  However, if he is unable to finance the reforms he is pushing or faces any internal threat to his power, his first turn likely will be toward extracting more profits from the multinationals.\nVenezuela seized oil fields from France's Total SA and Italy's Eni SpA on April 3, 2006, after the companies refused to sign an agreement to turn the sites over to a state-controlled joint venture.  This is but a first example of what can be expected to become increasing control of the oil industry by the authoritarian Chavez, all in the name of service to the poor and exploited Venezuelan people.\n\nThere may be significant short-term benefit to multinationals if they invest in the Venezuelan oil industry.  The long-term risks, though, will remain uncertain, and further increases in taxes cannot be ruled out.  Other significant issues that will likely impact multinational investment decisions include the extent of any cross-border conflict with Colombia as the FARC and other groups expand their territory, and the degree to which any increased internal repression leads to violence in Venezuela and any disruption to oil production.\n\nReminiscent of the younger Qadhafi, Chavez sees himself as a leader of international importance, appealing to the poor and underprivileged against the powerful nations, just as he appealed within Venezuela to the poor against the economic elite.  He particularly relishes taking on the United States, which contributed to his motivations to find common cause with Iran, North Korea, Cuba, and China.  When he develops a euphoric head of steam, this can lead to miscalculation, and his support of terrorism, limited for the most part to Colombian insurgencies and rhetorical support to the new Hamas-led government, could become less discriminating.  Accordingly, it is strongly recommended that attention be continuously focused on Chavez and Venezuela as a possible source of terrorist organization support.  Additionally, the United States Government would be well advised to make very clear to the Chavez\n32 . . . \"El Fenomeno Chavez\"\ngovernment that serious consequences would follow the discovery of any link between Al Qaeda and Venezuela.\n\nBut, for now, his major goal appears not to be to support covert terrorism, but rather to be seen as the open overt champion of the poor and underprivileged in Latin America and internationally, aspiring to inherit Castro's mantle as third world leader.  His 63 percent victory in the 2006\nelection could be expected to produce a hubristic confrontational excess, and when Castro finally does pass from the scene, Chavez can be expected all the more vigorously to pursue his self anointed role as Castro's successor.\n\n## \"Socialism Or Death!\"\n\nIndeed, it was not long in coming.  In January 2007, Chavez announced plans to consolidate Venezuela as \"a socialist republic.\"  He announced plans to nationalize Venezuela's largest telecommunications company, CA Nacional Telefonos de Venezuela (CANT), the electrical utilities, and four highly profitable oil projects, run by foreign companies, Chevron, ConocoPhillips, and Exxon Mobil.  CANT, the only Venezuela company on the New York Stock exchange, with major foreign investors, including the New York-based Verizon corporation, precipitously dropped\n14 percent after the announcement by Chavez.  Having called Jesus Christ \"the greatest socialist in history,\" Chavez declared on the occasion of being sworn in for his second six year term, \"Fatherland.  Socialism or deathI swear it.\"\nThis slogan was invoked by Fidel Castro in the winter of 1989.24  As economic and political pressures mounted and the Soviet Union and one Eastern European country after another yielded to the pressures to liberalize, Gorbachev urged Castro to open up the Cuban system and refrain from foreign revolutionary involvement.  Instead Castro, declaring that \"socialism is facing the worst crisis in its seventy-year history,\" vowed \"socialism or death!\"  He then declared \"a special period in a time of peace,\" resembling a war time mobilization.  There were harsh shortages of basic foodstuffs and gasoline, severe rationing of food and petroleum, 200 thousand bicycles were ordered from China, and model agricultural communes were established in the country side.\n\n\"Whether there is war or a special period in our country's history, this is the most important time in our country's history, and one of the most important in the worldeven though a giant counterrevolutionary wave is taking over the world, we will struggle, resist and set an examplewe will live for the revolution or we will die defending the revolution.\"\nFBIS, July 1990\nDespite the manor financial instability this produced in the market, there is every reason to believe that this will be but the opening volley in his committed march to creating a socialist state.  He has already indicated his intention to nationalize the central bank.  As Castro's physical condition declines, his self-anointed successor seems increasingly to be emulating his mentor and attempting to establish his role not only as leader of the Latin American left but also a major international force resisting U.S. hegemony.\n\nIn the service of consolidating his rule, he will shortly be announcing a new Bolivarian mission for the Venezuelan armed forces, the public version of the revised military doctrine he has already developed.  The license for Radio Caracas TV has not been renewed, a further move towards government censorship.  Preliminary moves are afoot to unify the multiparty political alliance and create single Socialist Party of Venezuela. All of these moves are consistent with the pattern set by Castro in Cuba.\n\n## Notes\n\n\n1. The author wishes to acknowledge the assistance of Laurita Denny in preparing this assessment.\n\n2. Jerrold Post is Professor of Psychiatry, Political Psychology and International Affairs and Director of the Political Psychology Program, the George Washington University. Tel. (301) 229-5536; e-mail jmpost@pol-psych.com.\n\n3. There is limited information available on the early life of Hugo Chavez.  This section is a reflection of the information available to researchers at this time.\n\n4. Agustin Blanco Munoz, *Habla el Comandate,* (Caracas, Venezuela: Central University, 1998), 34.\n\n5. John Lee Anderson, \"The Revolutionary:  The president of Venezuela has a vision, and Washington has a headache,\" *The New Yorker*, 6 September 2001.\n\n6. Gabriel Garcia Marques, \"The two faces of Hugo Chavez,\" (M. Fried, Trans)\nNACLA Report on the Americas:  Report on Venezuela, Vol. XXXIII, No 6, May/June\n2000.\n\n7. Ibid. 8. Also, serving as an instructor at VMA provided Chavez a stage from which to recruit officers and develop a following of proteges that he later exploited.\n\n9. Major oil companies in Venezuela:\n\n1. Petroleos de Venezuela (PdVSA) - government-owned; generates 1/3 of\nnational GDP; monopolized the natural gas production in Venezuela.  Dec 2, 2002, PdVSA participated in a nationwide strike to call for a referendum on\nPresident Chavez.  Over 18,000 PdVSA workers, who were involved in the anti-governments strikes, were \"dismissed\" by Chavez, severely affecting Venezuela's oil production and almost leading to a full shutdown of PdVSA's oil operations.  Because Chavez follows strictly the OPEC guidelines, PdVSA has had to reduce production sites and therefore total capacity.\n2. Corporacion Venezolan de Petroleo (CVP) - subsidiary that is taking over\n33 PdVSA contracts - will manage the agreements.\n3. New investments - Petrobras Energia and Anadarko Petroleum Corporation\nhave rights to open new drilling sites and use existing wells over the next 20 years.\n\n36 . . . \"El Fenomeno Chavez\"\n\n4. Private Investments - Major Foreign Oil Company Involvement where\ncompanies operate sites for a fee: BP, Chevron/Texaco, CNPC (China),\nConocoPhillips, ExxonMobil, Repsol-YPF, Shell, Statoil, Total Fina Elf, and Petro-Canada.\n5. Chevron - Chavez gives Chevron new license for off-shore gas exploration.\nThe multinational firm \"plans to invest $107 million this year and create 723 jobs,\" according to Chavez, who noted that the gas that Chevron/Texaco produces will \"be used to supply both domestic and foreign markets.\" Source:  http://www.eia.doe.gov/ emeu/cabs/venez.html.\n\n10. \"Castro visits Venezuelan ally,\" *BBC News Online*, 12 August 2001, On-line, Internet, 6 March 2007, available from http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/americas/ 1486212.stm.\n\n11. Juan Evo Morales Ayma, a dedicated socialist, who sees the U.S.-driven Free Trade Area of the Americas as colonialism, is reputed to be Bolivia's first indigenous head of state since the Spanish conquest of that state over 450 years ago.  He is a former coca leaf grower who heads the cocalero movement of such growers opposed to coca eradication efforts of the United States.\n\n12. Juan Forero, \"Venezuela Votes by Large Margin to Retain Chavez,\" New York Times, 17 August 2004, A1, 6.\n\n13. Iain Bruce, \"Venezuela raises oil drilling tax,\" *BBC News Online*, 11 October\n2004, On-line, Internet, 6 March 2007, available from http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/- /2/hi/hi/americas/373224.stm.\n\n14. Thor Halvorssen, \"The Arrest of FARC Terrorist Ricardo Granda Sheds New Light on Hugo Chavez's Ongoing Support of Terrorism,\" *Guerrilla Nation*, 26 January\n2005, On-line, Internet, 7 March 2007, available from http://www.weeklystandard.com/ Content/Public/Articles/000/000/005/177yckaw.asp.\n\n15. Christopher Brown, \"The Growing Iran-Chavez Alliance,\" Front Page Magazine, 12 April 2005, On-line, Internet, 7 March 2007, available from http://www.worldthreats.com/latin_america/Iran-Chavez%20Alliance.htm.\n\n16. Art Moore, \"Defector: Chavez Gave $1 Million to al-Qaida,\" *World Net Daily*,\n7\nJanuary\n2003, On-line, Internet,\n7\nMarch\n2007, available from http://www.worldnetdaily.com/news/article.asp?ARTICLE_ID=30350.\n\n17. \"Venezuela Welcomes Hamas and Counts Iran as 'Great Ally',\" *Pravda*, 16\nFebruary\n2006, On-line, Internet,\n7\nMarch\n2007, available from http://english.pravda.ru/world/americas/76016-Venezuela-0.\n\n\n\n18. Simon Romero, \"Venezuela, Tired of U.S. Influence, Strengthens Its Relationships in the Middle East,\" *New York Times*, 21 August 2006, A7.\n\n19. \"Chavez: Iran Has Right to Atomic Energy,\" *Aljazeera*, 12 March 2005, Online, Internet, 8 March 2007, available from http://www.aljazeera.com/me.asp?service.\n\n20. The exception might be in the predominantly Muslim population of Margarita Island, owned by Venezuela and located just off-shore in the Caribbean.\n\n21. Pensamiento Militar Venezolano, 2005, On-line, Internet, 8 March 2007, available from http://militarvenezuela2005.blogspot.com/.\n\n22. European Union Election Observations Mission Presidential Election Venezuela\n2006, Caracas, 5 December 2006, 3, On-line, Internet, 8 March 2007, available from http://www.eueomvenezuela.org/pdf/EUEOM_Venezuela_Presidential_Election_2006_P reliminary_Statement.pdf.\n\n23. Gregory Wilpert, \"Venezuelan Opposition Accuses Oil Company President of Illegal Campaigning,\" *Venezuelanalysis.com*, 3 November 2006, On-line, Internet, 8\nMarch 2007, available from http://www.venezuelanalysis.com/news.php/news.php? newsno=2127.\n\n24. This discussion is drawn from Jerrold Post, \"Fidel Castro: Aging Revolutionary Leader in an Aging Revolution,\" *Leaders and their Follower in a Dangerous World*, (Ithica: Cornell Univ. Press, 2004), 204.\n\n\n\n38 . . . \"El Fenomeno Chavez\""
    },
    {
        "text": "Christine Large Trust Director, The Mansion Bletchley Park MK3 6EB\nUK\nTel: Bletchley +44 1908 647269 London +44 207 737 7220 Mobile +44 7971 193546\nE-mail: christine@christinelarge.com Christine Large, who has been Director at Bletchley Park since 1998, describes how human ingenuity and in particular, the Poles' early contribution, led to breaking a seemingly insoluble problem - the Enigma machine. She will speak with reference to Dillwyn Knox's seminal meeting with Marian Rejewski and the collaboration between men and machines that flowed thereafter. Some human factors that can lead to vital 'breaks' are highlighted. Bletchley Park's current role in Anglo-Polish diplomatic relations, including a joint public information campaign instigated as a result of the film, 'Enigma', is explained.\n\n## Introduction And How Humans Create Secret Messages\n\nThe odds of winning the jackpot in the UK's national lottery are calculated to be fourteen million to one. The odds against cracking the Enigma code make that look like a safe bet. In simple terms, the dice are loaded one hundred and fifty million million million against. For the purist, Enigma is not a code, for a code works by replacing a whole word or phrase with letters, numbers or symbols whereas a cipher substitutes individual letters in a word. The approach to solving them can be very different, but the terms are often used interchangeably and making the messages themselves secret goes back as far as language existed. Mesopotamian peoples in around 3300 BC developed a universal picture code - pictograms - to describe the world around them, as had the cave painters before them who left messages in paintings and simple symbols. Central American Mayans in 300 BC combined whole ideas and sounds into what we call 'glyphs', representing numbers with dots and bars. Their meaning was undiscovered till 1980. The Aztecs who ruled what has become Mexico from the 1200's also used complex pictures and symbols to record time's passage. Experts have still not discerned the meaning of one, four thousand year old, sophisticated Indian script. Hieroglyphs were an Egyptian system in use between 3100 BC and 600 AD, but it was not till centuries later that the ancient language revealed its secrets. At the very end of the eighteenth century, the Rosetta stone was discovered in the Nile delta. Weighing three quarters of a tonne, the black slab was chiselled with text in hieroglyphs, demotics, the business language of Ancient Egypt's scribes and in Greek - which was to provide the crucial 'crib' or way in to the message. Champollion, a Frenchman who had been a child prodigy,\nhad prepared himself for the attempt by learning twelve ancient languages. Eventually, by studying sets of inscriptions in different languages, he found one common letter, deduced that vowels had been omitted and found that the hieroglyphs, representing sometimes whole words, sometimes letters, started to make sense to him. His mental abilities foreshadowed those of Dillwyn Knox, a prominent Enigma codebreaker.\n\nAnother innovative method of secret communications, according to Herodotus, a chronicler of 5th century BC, had been to shave a messenger's head, write the message on the head and dispatch the messenger once the hair had grown back. This is a branch of secret communications called steganography, which translates as 'covered writing.' Alongside steganography, a form of message protection called cryptography (from the Greek for 'hidden') evolved, whose intention was to conceal the meaning of the message, not just the message itself. One of the world's greatest generals, Caesar, was using ciphers regularly in the first century BC, as revealed in his chronicles of the Gallic Wars. The occasional method of delivery, such as attaching the message to a spear, might be unconventional, but he was a classic cryptographer, substituting letters in a text according to a system that allowed the recipient to decipher the message without the enemy being able to read it. Julius Caesar invented his own cipher, substituting one letter for another - a technique that Enigma was to take to unprecedented lengths many centuries later. There are many reasons why the need for secrecy has caused message senders to conceal their intent and message recipients or interceptors to wish to reveal what is concealed. Kings, queens, the military, security forces, politicians and businesses had discovered the advantages of systematically keeping messages and information secret but without doubt, the prime motivation for doing so was the presence or threat of an enemy. In the sixteenth century, a legendary spymaster and a father of modern cryptography served Her Majesty Queen Elizabeth I. Sir Francis Walsingham was in the first rank of Elizabeth's ministers. He was ferociously bright and ruthless, which he needed to be in order to protect the queen's security. Arguably the forerunner of MI6, the UK's overseas intelligence agency, Walsingham had established a network of foreign agents to send him information from enemy territories abroad, where anti-royalist conspiracies often originated. He operated from over thirty locations in continental Europe, as well as Constantinople, Algiers and Tripoli. Occasionally, steganography and cryptography combined, as when German agents in World War II scrambled messages, condensed them to the size of a dot and hid the information in regular text. Recently, details have come to light about terrorist groups that have been using the internet, an 'open' medium, to conceal secret coded information in familiar places such as digital paintings. The enemies may have mutated and changed their ground, but the need to preserve and uncover secrets is very much alive in our society today, whether for military reasons, or in daily situations that affect us all, like ensuring the integrity of financial transactions. Keeping information secret by concealing it has existed just about as long as humans have, with endlessly ingenious devices to achieve the desired effect. I am going to select one particularly well-known device and briefly illustrate how 'breaking' it led to a revolution in secret messaging and in collaboration between men and machines. I will also allude to the feelings and behaviour of some of the key people involved and to human consequences that can flow from decisions about code making and breaking and indeed, how it is portrayed.\n\n## Enigma And Its Defences\n\nIt was in the financial sector that Enigma started its life, far from the battlefields of Western Europe that would be Enigma's eventual arena. Arthur Scherbius, an electrical engineer, was trying to sell his wares. He had designed Enigma for the banks, for which transaction security and retaining the lead in security issues are abiding issues and business drivers. In April 1918, Scherbius wrote to the Imperial German navy saying he had applied for a patent for a cipher machine. Scherbius claimed he had invented a wholly new system of cryptography, embodied in his electrical Enigma machine. The machine was based on rotors, wired codewheels made of nonconducting material. Evenly spaced around the circumference of the disk on both sides were electrical contacts, usually 26, usually made of brass. The contacts on one side were connected to those on the other side by wires through the body of the rotor in a random arrangement. Each contact represented a letter, so the rotor was a 'coded' alphabet. To encipher a letter the operator pressed the appropriate key on the typewriter-like keyboard, so completing an electrical circuit into the rotor at the corresponding input contact. The circuit continued through other rotors to a different output and on to a light bulb, which showed the letter as the enciphered version. Electrical encipherment was not in itself revolutionary. Scherbius's innovation lay in the machine's wiring and the ability of its wheels to rotate. Imagine a type of infinite electronic pinball, where the ball is a current whizzing unpredictably along tracks and it eventually pops up in a random pocket. The genius of the rotors was that when a rotor reached a certain position, the rotor on its left would be turned, individually or in groups, effectively altering the routes through which the electrical impulses would pass from the key before arriving at a bulb and dramatically increasing the encipherment options. Therefore, the machine's most important characteristic was that, if the operator pressed the same key on the keyboard over and over again, a random series of letters lit up on the glass panel. The original letter was randomly scrambled through the internal wiring, making it almost impossible to predict what the enciphered letter would be, or to work backwards from an enciphered message to the original text. After one analysis of Enigma's defences, a German cryptographer wrote, \"...due to the special procedures performed by the Enigma machine, the solvability is so far removed from practical possibility that the cipher system of the machine, when the distribution of keys is correctly handled, must be regarded as virtually incapable of solution.\" The incredible number of ways to set the keys and the machines convinced the Germans who used it in the Second World War that Enigma was invincible. Germany in World War I saw no reason to believe that its codes had been jeopardized, lacking sufficient, as they saw it, anecdotal information or compelling facts. The effect of admitting that the enemy might have broken German codes would have been to compound the military's sense of inertia and unwillingness to face reality, for it would have required battle plans to be changed and a complete overhaul of codes, planning, administration, security and personnel. It was not a prospect that the Germans seriously contemplated and it was an arrogant mistake that would be repeated in World War II.\n\n## German Secret Messaging Procedures\n\nA message would often start its journey from land and might begin with a senior command officer or close subordinate writing it out. The watch officer took the message to a command transmissions officer, whose job was to stamp it with the time and pass it on to a radioman, who began the enciphering process. Radiomen were responsible for enciphering, transmitting, receiving and deciphering radio messages and they commonly had access to a bank of several Enigma machines.\n\nThe radioman took the message and pressed it out key by key on the keyboard. A colleague wrote down the enciphered letter that appeared as a different, illuminated letter behind the keyboard. The message was written down in four letter groups, with two, four letter 'indicator groups' at the beginning that were copied at the end. The message was annotated with a date time number, a number stating how many four letter groups the message contained (not counting the indicator groups repeated at the end) and it was given a serial number. An error in the enciphered text would have produced a nonsensical or misleading result when it was deciphered. Another radioman therefore did a dummy run of the procedure that the receiving radioman on a U-boat would follow. If the message did not decipher correctly, it was corrected. The radioman's next task was to choose the radio network on which to transmit and the frequency that he used within the network, depending on the time of day. There were networks based on geography, on legend and on history. The names were often chosen to inspire a feeling of prowess and good fortune, for example, invoking by implication the powers of 'Diana', Greek goddess of hunting. The radioman turned his radio to the frequency and tapped out the enciphered message in Morse code, a series of aural dots and dashes. These signals were relayed by wire or pumped through the airwaves by relay stations and could be repeated several times. Automation, of course, is supposed to improve capability and in the case of Enigma, optimise security. The machine was designed to do as much as possible from an efficiency point of view, leaving theoretically no need to exercise human judgment, especially when it came to randomising letter selection. The machine was 'in charge' as much as possible. But think about the operating and operator conditions.\n\n## Enigma Operating Conditions 'In The Field'\n\nFrom the comparative comfort of command control, the message sped to a player on the chessboard of war, perhaps a U-boat in the North Atlantic. U-boats could receive messages up to forty feet down and the receiving radioman would be stationed in his cramped office, in the bowels of the ship cocooned by the inky deep. Medium height, mentally tough and physically wiry, he had volunteered for submarine service, liking the independence and the responsibility. Hunched at the desk, able to touch all four walls from his seated position, he would be temporarily oblivious to the sounds and scents that infiltrated every aspect of life on board. Fetid, stale air clung to every surface if the ship had been submerged for some time as it moved towards a target, skirting enemy occupied sea and avoiding surveillance. The unsleeping engines resonated in the background, a low vibration that set teeth on edge, drilling through the Atlantic's salted dark underbelly.\n\nYesterday's dinner wafted from the galley, mixing indiscriminately with human sweat, condensation and machine oil odours in the submarine community. Mr. Radioman blocked it all out, clutching earphones to his head, closing his eyes and concentrating on extracting the Morse signal from a mass of white noise hissing through the air. The ship juddered and his books crashed to the damp metal floor. He was hot, exhausted, hadn't eaten because he had been expecting the transmission, always on vigil. Serial numbers told him if he had missed any messages. Negligence was punished, but sometimes a message could not be received because the U-boat was too deeply submerged. The radioman had committed the enciphered message to paper. His Enigma machine had been set up mirroring the procedure at command control, according to the instructions of the day. He set about deciphering it, translating a letter of Morse to the typewriter - it required some pressure to depress the stiff keys - and backwards the signal span through the rotors and plugboard, finding the right exit at the illuminated panel and ending that stage of transit in the original 'plaintext', the unenciphered message that originated at its German author's hand. A convoy contact report; top priority.\nHe pushed himself up from his hard stool, closed the wooden lid of the Enigma machine, switched off the reading light suspended on a cord over the tiny desk, eased stiffly out of the narrow door, which he locked and hurried to his captain with the deciphered message. It might have been a routine weather report, another short transmission, headquarters could have been establishing a key, or a rendezvous with a submarine carrying fuel for the boat, the message might not have been for his particular boat, but this time... they would be seeing action. What aspects of the human factor might manifest themselves here? A radioman in a submarine or, perhaps, under fire or the threat of it, would be prone to forget rules and procedures, would suffer from time pressure, might lapse into inattention through fatigue or stress, or have a breakdown of skill; factors that the codebreakers and allies of Bletchley would, in due course, rejoice in exploiting.\n\n## The Polish Situation\n\nPerhaps more than anything, codebreakers dread silence, the absence of comprehensible communications when they cannot tell if reinforcements lie a hundred miles away, or they are a step from the deepest abyss. Often, that silence is broken by intuition and luck as much as by intellectual prowess. One nation that could not afford an intelligence blackout was Poland, for Germany was a river's width away, poised aggressively on the border. With self-interested foresight, the Poles founded a cipher bureau in 1918 and started to monitor Germany's activity through its coded messages, which they were able to read from the outset until 1926. In that year, the Poles noticed a change in German cryptograms that they deduced to be attributable to the introduction of machines. There was a curious incident in Warsaw's customs office around the end of 1927 when a package labelled 'radio equipment' turned up due to what the sender's German representative described as a 'shipping mistake'. The German insisted that the package be returned without being opened, but not before the cipher bureau had identified it as a potentially interesting cipher machine - not a transmitter/receiver. Among Enigma inventor Scherbius's first customers must have been the eager Pole who purchased a commercial Enigma for the Polish cipher bureau, maybe not realizing that it could not decipher military messages. The analysis of mechanized codes after World War I could not depend on word and code based linguistic techniques. New thinking was required to deal with the ciphers being generated by Germany's secret servant. The first machine enciphered military messages were intercepted in July 1928. German-speaking mathematics students were sought to solve the machine and one of their number was Marian Rejewski, a promising young man aged twenty-three. Rejewski had attended a cryptology course run by the cipher bureau at Poznan University. He was deputed to work alone on breaking the Enigma cipher. He devised a set of equations to try to understand the significance of the six letters, the 'key' that appeared at the outset of an enciphered message, but it was a struggle to make the mathematics sufficiently simple to solve. For good measure, not wishing to overlook any clues to the fiendishly difficult puzzle before them, the Poles also called in a clairvoyant. Rejewski was to discover that Enigma's Achilles heel was its opening three-letter message key, which was enciphered twice. Rejewski designed a grille to test which rotor was in use and what its starting position was, moving on to discover where the alphabet rings had been set on the rotors. The plugboard settings were largely irrelevant and the Poles' attack on Enigma started to yield results. Some messages could be read on the same day and the Polish unit was geared up to deal with the increase in volume. Enigma replicas were used to read messages and recover keys. As the German rearmament programme gathered pace, so did the message volume and rhythm of rotor changes.\n\n## Machines Increase Processing Capacity\n\nMachines were invented to provide additional capacity. The cyclometer, an electromechanical device linking Enigma rotors was useful in recovering rotor orders and settings. An ice cream sundae called 'bomba' 'baptized' the 'bomby', a parallel processing machine inspired one day over dessert. Rejewski's process harnessed six Enigmas to try multiple rotor orders. A correct bomby 'stop' produced text. In December 1938, a new silence descended. Enigma messages became indecipherable because the Germans introduced a choice of five rotors, not the original three. Two of the rotors' wiring was unknown, but at this stage the Germans did not change their method of enciphering the message key and the ingenious Poles again reconstructed the rotor wiring using their tried and tested methods. Plugboard connections escalated to ten in January 1939. The Poles would have needed ten times their processing capacity to crunch the number of permutations. Tension between Poland and Germany stretched their relations to snapping point and once the French had agreed to attack Germany promptly should Poland be invaded, the Poles unilaterally resolved to share their Enigma revelations.\n\n## A Seminal Meeting\n\nThe Pyry forest (something of a misnomer as, whilst it has trees, it is heavily populated with buildings) was the venue for an historic meeting hosted by the Poles for the French and British in July 1939. Bletchley Park director Commander Alastair Denniston, Dillwyn Knox and Commander Humphrey Sandwith travelled the ten kilometres from Warsaw to Pyry with the Polish cryptographers. Imagine the astonishment when the Poles revealed their Enigma replicas and showed their allies the six bomby. It was like being given the key to a treasure chest. The Poles were unstinting with their knowledge and handed over, in the days after preliminary discussions, heaps of decrypts, Zygalski sheets, the principles of their bomby and, to top it all, one Enigma replica each for the British and French. Although, as Rejewski recognized, Dilly was close to breaking German Enigma when they first met, the order in which the typewriter keys and lamps were wired to the entry plate had proved intractable. The Germans were not using a QWERTZU diagonal and Dilly had assumed that the letter order would be random to compound the difficulty. He was wrong; it couldn't have been simpler and he was rendered speechless to discover that the running order was ABCDE. The Poles had made a model with an ABCDE keyboard for their own use. A letter of Dilly's unearthed by historian Dr. Ralph Erskine confesses that a certain Mrs. BB at GC&CS had been ignored when she made the very same suggestion. Marian Rejewski spoke, in 1978, of the immediate rapport between him and Dilly, \"Knox grasped everything very quickly, almost as quick as lightning. It was evident that the British had been working on Enigma so they didn't require explanations.\" The Poles then, through Rejewski, carried the honours for first reconstructing Enigma's wiring and working out a method for finding its message keys. The Polish contribution in making these inroads was not to\nbe officially recognized until sixty years after the event, in an anniversary celebration at Bletchley Park on\n25th July 1999.\n\n## A Codebreaker In Exile\n\nThe Polish 'Biuro Szyfrow' (Ciphering Bureau) had been operating for several years, showing, according to Rejewski, \"...results which other nations such as England or France could only dream about.\" Each month, the bureau had passed on thousands of broken messages from German military, air, navy or SS sources. With the outbreak of war, or even a few months before, the period of excellence declined and three principal Polish mathematician-codebreakers, Rejewski, Zygalski and Rozycki were deprived of the opportunity to exercise their full abilities. The reasons for this, which I will cover, were political and security issues but the human factors in codebreaking had a strong bearing too. Thanks to Eugenia Maresch, archivist at the Polish Institute and Sikorski Museum in Great Britain, I am able to share extracts from Rejewski's papers that disclose his state of mind. 'Kilka uwag na temat trudnosci w jakich znajuje sie chwili obecnej Dzia szyfrow niemieck' A few comments on the present difficulties which the Polish section of German ciphers is encountering: \"During the French campaign the Polish analysts were assigned to the 'Bureau de Chiffres'. Instead of concentrating on research, they were dealing with ordinary traffic, a task which could have been done by the general office staff...After the fall of France [June 1940], the cryptological work was performed under conspiracy...\" The background is that the British government was reluctant to co-operate with the Bureau because of the ambiguous Vichy government. A memo, classified at the time, asks, \"We must ask them [the Bureau]: - Who are their masters (i.e.) If they are officially paid by a Government which may join the Nazis at any time, it is too risky for us.\" Too close a collaboration could have resulted in losing the entire Ultra operation and possibly, WWII. When France was overrun, the 'Biuro Szyfrow' had to be liquidated and all materials, instructions and a replica of an Enigma machine were hidden in a secure place. Some Polish cryptanalysts were arrested and went to German prison camps. Rejewski and Zygalski managed to reach England. They resumed work at the Polish Research Centre in Stanmore and Boxmoor - not at Bletchley Park. The British recognised, in a secret memorandum that, \"...without this liaison with the Poles, arranged by the French, we might not have been able to break [Enigma] in 1939 and thereafter establish daily contact.\"\nOn January 9th, 1940, the then Director of Bletchley Park, Commander Denniston, wrote to his head of service saying, in respect of the three Polish cryptanalysts, \"If we are faced with a change [in Enigma] on the outbreak of war (and we begin to suspect it), the experience of these men may shorten our task by months. We possess certain mechanical devices, which cannot be transferred to France. These young men possess ten years' experience and a short visit from them might prove of very great value.\" Rejewski, writing in 1944, was of course unaware of the British arguments and he found his isolation from top-level cryptanalysis, deeply painful. \"It would be fitting to remind the English that they owe a debt of gratitude to the Polish Cyphering Bureau...it is worth emphasising ...what precisely the Polish cryptanalysts expect from their English colleagues. First, they should be asked to return the Enigma machine which was given to them...Subsequently one should enforce an agreement so that they would share their experience on German ciphers...Lastly, one should try to persuade them to pass on the intercepted traffic material. This would be helpful as the Polish possibilities are very limited.\" Rejewski was grateful for the, \"exceptional hospitality on French soil\" and referred to, \"a personal bond of friendship\" but he recognised that, \"while the French co-operation would produce results at a later stage, the Anglo-Polish joint effort would show results almost instantly.\"\n\n## Preparations For British Breaks Into Enigma\n\nSo just how were the British obtaining some of their results? Common misconceptions are that the Bletchley operation was either a handful of chaps in a wooden hut, or that machines, especially Colossus, the world's first semi-programmable digital computer, produced the answer. The answer was neither and both. Bletchley did build up very rapidly indeed from the small beginnings initiated through 'Captain Ridley's Shooting Party'. Wooden huts proliferated in November 1938 to house the now highly productive Enigma decrypt teams. The first Bombe was in operation in August 1940, supporting Enigma breaks. Colossus 1 was a much later development. Working from December 1943, it was followed by ten others that were used to obtain the key to a sophisticated cipher used personally by Hitler and his High Command. The codebreakers, around 400, were at the core of a staff 12,000 strong on the Park. By 1944, Bletchley had an almost worldwide intelligence network. Decrypt stations in Malta, Cairo, Nairobi, Mombasa, Colombo and Brisbane were revealing enemy secrets, passing them on to operational theatre commanders and then sending them back to Bletchley Park for an overview of the war. Raw material came from thousands of wireless intercept officers in outstations - the Y Service and communications, especially Abwehr traffic, intercepted by the Radio Security Service. It was a huge, secret operation. I'd like to take you back to the German radioman whom I described earlier, as he holds the clues to other human factors in codebreaking.\n\n## Enigma's Challenges\n\nWhat made Enigma so difficult to break? The machines mustered a number of variable elements. In a typical, three rotor Enigma, the plugboard was at a right angle to the user, visible at the front of the machine when the wooden flap covering it was pulled down. It had the appearance of a flat metal plate, into which rivets had been punched. There were three, double-banked rows. By each plug hole was a letter, in the QWERTZU keyboard order, or a number. The twenty-six holes were designed to receive up to thirteen small, cylindrical metal plugs or 'jacks' sheathed in Bakelite type material. From each plug protruded a short, double-wired cable. When a cable was inserted, it could make a connection between any pair of letters. Each cable therefore used two holes to make the connection between letters. To calculate the plugboard permutations depended on how many cables were used, which group of holes was selected and the interconnections between these sockets. Dr. A. Ray Miller has calculated the number of theoretically possible Enigma permutations by examining the maximum possible combinations for each component of a three rotor Enigma and combining the values. He said, \"To see just how large that number is, consider that...there are only about 1080 atoms in the entire observable universe.\" The total of possible three rotor Enigma combinations is approximately 3 X 10114. It is a number that has no meaning in daily existence. Bletchley Park codebreaker and Dillwyn Knox protege Mavis Lever (now Batey) modestly avowed, \"When we were breaking Enigma under Dilly's guidance,\nthank goodness no-one explained exactly what we were doing. Had they done so, I don't know how we would have managed it.\"\nFortunately, the Enigma machine's practical operation and development increased the chance of penetrating these astronomic potential configurations from the frankly, impossible to the merely miraculous.\n\n## Human Factors Lead To Breaks\n\nHuman error and Enigma radiomen's characteristics and quirks prompted some great codebreaking successes. David Kahn reported an instance in 1932 when an operator who was supposed to delete codewords that were unenciphered, crossed out the enciphered ones instead and transmitted the message in plain text. Aghast, he reported his mistake, only to have it foolishly compounded by an order to retransmit the message with the correct, enciphered words. Anyone listening had the complete Enigma version, translated in 'clear'. Following this incident, the navy fortified and sharpened up its training, as well as changing keys. Choosing keys that were easy to remember was a tendency first spotted by Rejewski. Girlfriends' names, personal initials and imprecations topped the user poll. Mavis Lever claims only half in jest to have been a world expert on wartime dirty four-letter German words! These foibles in Enigma message settings were named 'cillies'. Less frequently, the Germans 'blew' what were called 'kisses', by repeating parts of Enigma messages in a vulnerable cipher. Mavis Lever said, \"As soon as I picked up one long message I could see that it had no L in it; as traffic was so infrequent operators were told to send out the occasional dummy message and this one had just put his finger on the last key of the keyboard, probably relaxing with a fag in his mouth.\" The sloppy operator had used L to encipher the whole message, giving the cryptanalyst the new wiring for the Enigma rotor.\n\n## Herivelismus\n\nAnother great coup became known as the 'Herivel tip', although John Herivel refers to it as 'Herivelismus.' Gordon Welchman had been Herivel's supervisor at Cambridge and it was his former supervisor who invited him to Bletchley in 1940, \"to do some very important work.\" Herivel said, \"One thing I was very clear about in the beginning was, that it was much more likely to happen if the German operators were working under great stress. They were more likely to make mistakes if they were frightened, in a great hurry or very tired.\" Herivelismus was inspired by an intuitive leap that put John Herivel in the shoes of the German operator. Herivel visualized the German sitting there, with the wheels and the book of keys. After he found the right wheels for the day, loaded them on the sprung spindle, fitted them into the machine and clicked the rotors round to the day's setting, his next task was to choose an indicator. What if the operator were afraid, in a hurry or distracted? Might he just bang down the hood, see the letters showing under the window in the top and use those? How did he actually deal with the ring settings? Rather than having set them, as he should have, at the outset, perhaps the anxious or lazy operator would set them after he placed the wheels in the machine. In that case, the indicator letters he chose as his message setting for the day would surely be close to the ring setting. It was an inspired guess whose net effect was to narrow down the 17,576 possible ring settings to maybe as few as twenty. Herivel remembers very clearly that his 'Tip' worked properly for the first time on May 1st\n1940. Welchman's thanks to Herivel was to ensure that Winston Churchill subsequently singled John out. In 2001, at Bletchley Park, Herivel reflected on his discovery, \"...and when I thought about that more I realized the really vital move, was for me to want to find some new way of breaking Enigma. It was very strange as\nI'd only been there for three weeks and only just got to know under the instruction of Turing and Kendrick how the machine and the system worked.\"\nIntercepting and analyzing the traffic, the formidable permutations, the cryptographic security, the stringent procedures; for all these reasons, some variations of Enigma were strongly resistant to being broken. Yet while human resourcefulness could create awesome complexity and brilliant cryptanalytic inroads, it was the human factor that rendered Enigma most vulnerable. A formidable machine, both designed and undermined by humans.\n\n## Automating Codebreaking And Working With Machines\n\nBletchley moved the design of bombes into a new league, in particular with Welchman's innovative diagonal board. The IEEE, an American organisation of electrical and electronic engineers, is shortly to unveil a plaque at Bletchley, commemorating it as the site of the world's first electronic codebreaking. However, it was the Americans who developed a machine designed to deal with four rotor Enigma and capable of being massproduced. The American testing machines were bigger than their British cousins, weighing about two-and-a-half tons and they ran much faster. The Bombe Room at Bletchley had been known as the 'Hell Hole'. In Dayton, large air conditioners were installed every ten feet and the American bombes ran twenty-four hours, seven days a week. 'Grey elephants', as they were called, lined the rooms, lumbering six feet high, three feet deep and ten feet wide. The operators were given charts that explained how to set the rotors and switches on the machines, thirty-six of each. The bombes' accuracy relied on the efficient women hand-picked to run them. \"We worked in ungodly hot buildings with those machines,\" said Beatrice Dunphy. \"Salt dispensers were near the water fountains. And the noise was terrific...\" By mid-1943, the American and British cryptanalysts had become so proficient at finding cribs, due to their familiarity with German naval signals, that naval Enigma was almost an open book. The availability of bombes at last matched the abundant cribs. As cipher machine complexity escalated (high-level machines were anyhow used by the German commanders), the British responded by inventing the first computer. Colossus was based on valves rather than relays, designed by Post Office engineer Tommy Flowers responding to the principles of Turing's universal machine. Colossus, like the bombes, was a tremendous advance but both machines were, in a sense, mere number crunchers supporting human judgment and intuition in the codebreaking process. The bombes required relays of humans to set, run and maintain them and Colossus, once it started, needed to be kept running - they were the first of their kind. I suggest that the scale of Bletchley and the Allies' phenomenal achievement, commonly considered to have shortened WW2 by two years, was surely only possible because men and machines were working in harmony, playing to their respective strengths.\n\n## A Communications Revolution\n\nAt first glance, realizing the odds against reducing possible combinations of Enigma keys to discernible messages should have stopped any attempt to do so in its tracks. From discussions I have had with former codebreakers, the 'attack' on the problem starts with total intellectual immersion in it, the 'left brain,' assembling disparate information. Then the mind starts to relax and lateral 'right brain' thinking kicks in, which is when solutions start to appear. At first, the problem can seem repellent, like an impenetrable crossword clue, but as the next clue emerges, it becomes obvious what the previous piece is.\nCodebreakers are looking for pattern recognition, something that the human brain is incredibly good at and computers are not. Bedazzling short cuts are ways of destroying randomness by seeing patterns - linguistic, numerical, pictorial, spatial and combinations. Being methodical is the worst possible approach. Compare the 'brute force' original bombe design, crunching through sequences to help determine whether cribs could be used to decipher Enigma messages. Welchman's insightful diagonal board made the bombes more efficient at a stroke by chopping down the number of combinations to be tested. Take Turing's approach to codebreaking, which he likened to finding a needle in a haystack. Method would suggest that the haystack should be divided into equal segments and searched. Turing would have thrown away each piece of straw until he found the needle. \"Which way round does a clock go?\" asked Dilly Knox. Clockwise - the methodical answer - is wrong, if you are the clock. Cipher machines and the technology required to break them were at the heart of a communications revolution engendered by the Second World War. Warring countries competed for technological supremacy, pitting their finest scientific and engineering resources against each other. The results were to have an impact far beyond the immediate arena and nowhere more so than in the field of secret communications, where the latest information on advanced planes, submarines, weaponry and defences was for the taking.\n\n## Bletchley And Enigma Become Legend\n\nMichael Apted's film of the Enigma novel, released in the UK last year, ended with panache. The problem was that unlike the novel, it didn't quite make sense. Tom Jericho, the reclusive codebreaking hero in Robert Harris's novel enters the film having been recalled to Bletchley Park after suffering a nervous breakdown. We learn that the cause is not, as did happen in the real wartime Bletchley, the intense intellectual pressure of generating solutions to almost impossible problems. Jericho collapsed from unrequited love for Claire Romilly, a bright and mysterious femme fatale who, to paraphrase her room mate Hester, Romillies her way through the Park's susceptible males at a prodigious rate. Claire disappears from Bletchley at the same time as Bletchley's ability to read key German U-boat codes is lost and there are suspicions of skulduggery. Jericho uses his return to the Park as a cover for the quest to protect Claire. By the end of the film, the miraculously restored and physically slight Jericho makes an astounding trip to Scotland, travelling without official sanction or apparent petrol coupons, whose piece de resistance is a daring chase across a channel where an absconding Pole is set to reveal Bletchley's secrets to the German enemy. \"The Polish Ambassador is on the phone for you,\" said my PA. The ambassador was exceedingly exercised by the treatment of Poland and the Polish contribution to breaking Enigma in the forthcoming film. There were no Poles working at Bletchley Park, as Rejewski poignantly stated and the poles were understandably upset that a Pole had been portrayed as the traitor willing to give away Enigma secrets, especially when so much of the rest of the story seemed to be true.\n\n## Enigma Diplomacy\n\nTo mark the 60th Anniversary of that historic rendezvous, and to give thanks for the Polish contribution to the cracking of Enigma, Bletchley Park had hosted a Polish Festival in July 1999. This has become an extremely popular annual event, with large numbers of Anglo-Polish and British people from all over the country coming to Bletchley to join in the celebrations. A few days prior to the 2000 Festival, a special ceremony took place at the Palace on the Water in Warsaw. The families of the three outstanding Polish cryptanalysts were presented with the Great Cross of the Order of Polonia Restituta (Poland's Rebirth) by Polish Prime Minister Jerzy Buzek in recognition of an achievement that many consider to be Poland's single greatest contribution to the Allied victory in WWII.\n\nIn September 2000, it was Britain's turn to present an Enigma machine to Poland. On an official visit to the country, HRH The Duke of York presented a machine to Mr Buzek as a \"symbol of Britain's gratefulness and thanks\".\n\nAs Enigma - the film - was launched, Bletchley Park engaged in a round of diplomacy involving public lectures, speeches, meetings and publications. At our joint conference in September just past, with Christ Church, Oxford, Professor MRD Foot gave a paper on the Polish contribution to breaking Enigma.\n\nThe 2001 Polish Festival saw the unveiling of a commemorative monument at the Park, inaugurated by Bletchley Park's chief patron, the Duke of Kent.\n\n## The Codebreakers' Human And Technological Legacy\n\nIn transformational times it is easy to neglect the aspects of our past that must be preserved to carry us into the future. NSA Director General Hayden said at a meeting in 2002, \"It is very difficult for us to talk about the today equivalent of what is going on at Bletchley Park, but by talking about Bletchley Park we build up the kind of confidence and put the human face on the agency that we need in the national debate about us and our tradecraft...We need to be reminded what represents the best of us and to emphasize those things that do not much change.\"\nUS Deputy Secretary of Defense Dr. Paul Wolfowitz said, in testimony September 19 2002 to the Senate and House Committees on Intelligence, quoted Thomas Scelling, \"Surprise, when it happens to a government, is likely to be a complicated, diffuse bureaucratic thing\n[*how different to Bletchley Park*]...It includes gaps in intelligence [*Ultra's role*], but also intelligence, that, like a string of pearls too precious to wear, is too sensitive to give to those who need it [*think of Rejewski*]...\nIt includes the unalert watchman, but also the one who knows he'll be chewed out by his superior if he gets higher authority out of bed [*remember the Enigma operators*]\"\nDr. Wolfowitz spoke of Bletchley, saying, \"During World War II, the United States and Britain assembled their best minds to crack the German code.\n\nThese codebreakers, assembled at a place in England called Bletchley Park, defied the odds, accomplishing their vital mission faster than anyone expected. In doing so, they hastened the demise of Nazi Germany and the end of the war. As we seek to defeat terrorists and their supporters, our intelligence culture must renew the sense of urgency in collecting and mining and analyzing intelligence that inspired the codebreakers of Bletchley Park.\"\nBletchley Park has a mission today, too, to build on the work of the wartime pioneers through a strategic plan that we have made good progress in implementing. Yet its future is not secure and Churchill's famous exhortation, when faced with a plea from Turing, Milner-Barrie, Alexander and Welchman, comes to mind, \"Make sure they have all they need in extreme priority.\""
    },
    {
        "text": "## (U) **Table Of Contents**\n\n(U) **EXECUTIVE SUMMARY** ........ 2 (U) **IC ASSESSMENTS ON COVID-19 ORIGINS** ........ 3\n(U) WIV ACTIVITIES PERFORMED WITH OR ON BEHALF OF THE PEOPLE'S\nLIBERATION ARMY........ 3\n(U) CORONAVIRUS RESEARCH AND RELATED ACTIVITIES PERFORMED AT\nTHE WIV ........ 4\n(U) WIV Coronavirus Research and Holdings ........ 4\n(U) WIV Genetic Engineering Capabilities ........ 4 (U) Biosafety Concerns at the WIV ........ 5\n(U) **WIV RESEARCHERS WHO FELL ILL IN FALL 2019** ........ 6 (U) **APPENDIX A: DEFINITIONS** ........ 7\n\n## (U) Executive Summary\n\n(U) This report responds to the COVID-19 Origin Act of 2023, which called for the U.S.\n\nIntelligence Community (IC) to declassify information relating to potential links between the Wuhan Institute of Virology (WIV) and the origin of the COVID-19 pandemic.  This report outlines the IC's understanding of the WIV, its capabilities, and the actions of its personnel leading up to and in the early days of the COVID-19 pandemic.  This report does not address the merits of the two most likely pandemic origins hypotheses, nor does it explore other biological facilities in Wuhan other than the WIV.  A classified annex to this report includes information that was necessary to exclude from the unclassified portion of this report in order to protect sources and methods, but the information contained in the annex is consistent with the unclassified assessments contained in this report.\n(U) This report was drafted by the National Intelligence Officer for Weapons of Mass Destruction and Proliferation and coordinated with the IC.\n\n## (U) Ic Assessments On Covid-19 Origins\n\n\n(U) In March, the IC updated its analysis on core intelligence questions related to COVID-19 origins, to include whether the first human infection with SARS-CoV-2the virus that causes COVID-19was the result of natural exposure to an infected animal or a laboratoryassociated incident.  Variations in IC analytic views on the origins of the COVID-19 pandemic largely stem from differences in how agencies weigh intelligence reporting and scientific publications and intelligence and scientific gaps.  All agencies continue to assess that both a natural and laboratory-associated origin remain plausible hypotheses to explain the first human infection.\n\n\n-\n The National Intelligence Council and four other IC\nagencies assess that the initial human infection with SARS-CoV-2 most likely was\ncaused by natural exposure to an infected animal that carried SARS-CoV-2 or a close\nprogenitor, a virus that probably would be more than 99 percent similar to SARS- CoV-2.\n\n-\n The Department of Energy and the Federal Bureau of\nInvestigation assess that a laboratory-associated incident was the most likely cause of\nthe first human infection with SARS-CoV-2, although for different reasons.\n\n-\n The Central Intelligence Agency and another agency remain unable to\ndetermine the precise origin of the COVID-19 pandemic, as both hypotheses rely on significant assumptions or face challenges with conflicting reporting.\n\n-\n Almost all IC agencies assess that SARS-CoV-2 was not genetically\nengineered.  Most agencies assess that SARS-CoV-2 was not laboratory-adapted;\nsome are unable to make a determination.  All IC agencies assess that SARS-CoV-2 was not developed as a biological weapon.\n\n## (U) Wiv Activities Performed With Or On Behalf Of The People's Liberation Army\n\n\n The WIV is a civilian research institute founded in the 1950s by the Chinese Academy of Sciences (CAS).  Although the WIV is independent of the People's Liberation Army (PLA), the IC assesses that WIV personnel have worked with scientists associated with the PLA on public health-related research and collaborated on biosafety and biosecurity projects.  Information available to the IC indicates that some of the research conducted by the PLA and WIV included work with several viruses, including coronaviruses, but no known viruses that could plausibly be a progenitor of SARS-CoV-2.  For example, PLA researchers have used WIV laboratories for virology and vaccine-related work.\n\n\n-\n Between 2017 and 2019, the WIV funded and some of its personnel\nconducted research projects to enhance China's knowledge of pathogens and early disease warning capabilities for defensive and biosecurity needs of the military.\n\n- (U\n Prior to collaborating on a vaccine for SARS-CoV-2, the WIV\ncollaborated with the PLA on other vaccine and therapeutics relevant to coronaviruses.  The IC assesses that this work was intended for public health needs\n\nand that the coronaviruses known to be used were too distantly related to have led to the creation of SARS-CoV-2.\n\n## (U) Coronavirus Research And Related Activities Performed At The Wiv\n\n\n Prior to the pandemic, we assess WIV scientists conducted extensive research on coronaviruses, which included animal sampling and genetic analysis.  We continue to have no indication that the WIV's pre-pandemic research holdings included SARS- CoV-2 or a close progenitor, nor any direct evidence that a specific research-related incident occurred involving WIV personnel before the pandemic that could have caused the COVID pandemic.\n\n(U) WIV Coronavirus Research and Holdings\n\n The WIV probably maintains one of the world's largest repositories of bat samples, which has enabled its coronavirus research and related public health support.  Information available to the IC indicates that the WIV first possessed SARS-CoV-2 in late December 2019, when WIV researchers isolated and identified the virus from samples from patients diagnosed with pneumonia of unknown causes.\n\n\n-\n In 2013, the WIV collected animal samples from which they identified\nthe bat coronavirus RaTG13, which is 96.2 percent similar to the COVID-19 virus. By 2018, the WIV had sequenced almost all of RaTG13, which is the second closest known whole genome match to SARS-CoV-2, after BANAL-52, which is 96.8 percent similar.  Neither of these viruses is close enough to SARS-CoV-2 to be a direct progenitor.\n\n-\n Since 2019, some WIV researchers analyzed pangolin\nsamples to better understand disease outbreaks in these animals.\n\n-\n By the end of 2019, the WIV maintained distinct teams focused on\nMERS and SARS-related coronaviruses.  Both teams separately used transgenic mouse models to better understand how the viruses infect humans as well as related vaccine and therapeutics research.  The WIV then shifted to support broader publichealth efforts related to the COVID-19 pandemic in early 2020.\n\n## (U) Wiv Genetic Engineering Capabilities\n\n\n We assess that some scientists at the WIV have genetically engineered coronaviruses using common laboratory practices.  The IC has no information, however, indicating that any WIV genetic engineering work has involved SARS-CoV-2, a close progenitor, or a backbone virus that is closely-related enough to have been the source of the pandemic.\n\n\n-\n Scientists at the WIV have created chimeras, or combinations, of\nSARS-like coronaviruses through genetic engineering, attempted to clone other unrelated infectious viruses, and used reverse genetic cloning techniques on SARS- like coronaviruses.\n\n-\n Some of the WIV's genetic engineering projects on coronaviruses\ninvolved techniques that could make it difficult to detect intentional changes.  A 2017 dissertation by a WIV student showed that reverse genetic cloning techniqueswhich are standard techniques used in advanced molecular laboratoriesleft no traces of genetic modification of SARS-like coronaviruses.\n\n## (U) Biosafety Concerns At The Wiv\n\n\n Some WIV researchers probably did not use adequate biosafety precautions at least some of the time prior to the pandemic in handling SARS-like coronaviruses, increasing the risk of accidental exposure to viruses.  Before the pandemic, the WIV had been working to improve at least some biosafety conditions and training.  We do not know of a specific biosafety incident at the WIV that spurred the pandemic and the WIV's biosafety training appears routine, rather than an emergency response by China's leadership.\n\n\n- (U\n Nearly a year after the accreditation of the WIV's BSL-4 laboratory in\n2017, China's decisions of which pathogens required higher biocontainment protocols remained opaque, while the facility had a shortage of appropriately trained personnel.\n\n-\n In mid-2019, WIV officials were evaluating and implementing biosafety\nimprovements, training, and procurements in the context of a growing body of broader biosecurity PRC legislation.  In November 2019, the WIV, in cooperation with other CAS entities, hosted a biosafety training course for WIV and non-WIV personnel that included speakers from the China Centers for Disease Control and Prevention.  Given the timing of the event, this training appears routine, rather than a response to a specific incident.\n\n-\n As of January 2019, WIV researchers performed SARS-\nlike coronavirus experiments in BSL-2 laboratories, despite acknowledgements going back to 2017 of these virus' ability to directly infect humans through their spike protein and early 2019 warnings of the danger of this practice.  Separately, the WIV's plan to conduct analysis of potential epidemic viruses from pangolin samples in fall 2019, suggests the researchers sought to isolate live viruses.\n\n-\n An inspection of the WIV's high-containment laboratories in\n2020only months after the beginning of the COVID-19 outbreak's emergence identified a need to update aging equipment, a need for additional disinfectant equipment, and improvements to ventilation systems.  As this inspection occurred in\nthe midst of the WIV's crisis response to the COVID-19 outbreak, these findings are not necessarily indicative of WIV's biosafety status prior to the outbreak.\n\n## (U) **Wiv Researchers Who Fell Ill In Fall 2019**\n\n\n Several WIV researchers were ill in Fall 2019 with symptoms;\nsome of their symptoms were consistent with but not diagnostic of COVID-19.  The IC continues to assess that this information neither supports nor refutes either hypothesis of the pandemic's origins because the researchers' symptoms could have been caused by a number of diseases and some of the symptoms were not consistent with COVID-19.  Consistent with standard practices, those researchers likely completed annual health exams as part of their duties in a highcontainment biosafety laboratory.  The IC assesses that the WIV maintains blood samples and health records of all of their laboratory personnelwhich are standard procedures in highcontainment laboratories.\n\n\n-\n We have no indications that any of these researchers were\nhospitalized because of the symptoms consistent with COVID-19.  One researcher may have been hospitalized in this timeframe for treatment of a non-respiratory medical condition.\n\n-\n China's National Security Commission investigated the WIV in early\n2020 and took blood samples from WIV researchers.  According to the World Health Organization's March 2021 public report, WIV officials including Shi Zhengliwho leads the WIV laboratory group that conducts coronavirus researchstated lab employee samples all tested negative for SARS-CoV-2 antibodies.\n\n While several WIV researchers fell mildly ill in Fall 2019, they experienced a range of symptoms consistent with colds or allergies with accompanying symptoms typically not associated with COVID-19, and some of them were confirmed to have been sick with other illnesses unrelated to COVID-19.  While some of these researchers had historically conducted research into animal respiratory viruses, we are unable to confirm if any of them handled live viruses in the work they performed prior to falling ill.\n\n\n## (U) **Appendix A: Definitions**\n\n(U) **Antibody:** A protein produced during an immune response to a part of an infectious agent called an antigen. (U) **Backbone:** A genetic sequence used as a chassis upon which to build synthetic constructs, such as those used for cloning, protein expression, and production. (U) **Biosafety:** The application of knowledge, techniques, and equipment to prevent personal, laboratory, and environmental exposure to potentially infectious agents or biohazards.  Four Biosafety levels (BSL) define the containment conditions under which biological agents can be safely manipulated.  These standards range from moderate safety requirements for low-risk agents (BSL-1), to the most stringent controls for high-risk agents (BSL-4).  China's standards range from P14. (U) **Biosecurity:** The protection, control of, and accountability for biological agents, toxins, and biological materials and information to prevent unauthorized possession, loss, theft, misuse, diversion, and accidental or intentional release. (U) **Coronavirus:** A family of common viruses that can infect humans and/or animals.  The human illness caused by most coronaviruses usually lasts a short time and presents symptoms consistent with the \"common cold,\" such as a runny nose, sore throat, cough, and fever. (U) **COVID-19:** An infectious disease caused by the **SARS-CoV-2** virus, which is a betacoronavirus. (U) **Diagnostic Information:** Information that allows IC analysts to distinguish between hypothesesin this case, the laboratory origin and natural origin theories. (U) **DNA (deoxyribonucleic acid):** A molecule that carries an organism's genetic blueprint for growth, development, function, and reproduction. (U) **Gain-of-function:** The IC considers this as a research method that involves manipulating an organism's genetic material to impart new biological functions that could enhance virulence or transmissibility (e.g., genetically modifying a virus to expand its host range, transmissibility, or severity of illness).  The IC assesses that genetic engineering, genetic modification, and laboratory-adaptation can all be used for gain-of-function experiments, but are not inherently so. (U) **Genetically engineered or genetically modified viruses** are intentionally altered, created, or edited using biotechnologies, such as Clustered Regularly Interspaced Short Palindromic Repeat (CRISPR), DNA recombination, or reverse genetics.  These viruses have intentional, targeted edits to the genome designed to achieve specific results, but unintentional genomic changes may also occur. (U) **Genome:** The genetic material of an organism.  It consists of DNA (and sometimes RNA for viruses).\n\n\n(U) **Genome sequencing:** The process of determining the DNA or RNA sequence of an organism's genome, or its \"genetic code.\"  An organism's genetic code is the order in which the four nucleotide basesadenine, cytosine, guanine, and thymineare arranged to direct the sequence of the 20 different amino acids in the proteins that determine inherited traits. (U) **Intermediate species/host:** An organism that can be infected with a pathogen from a reservoir species and passes the pathogen to another host species; infection is not sustained in this population. (U) **Laboratory-adapted viruses** have undergone natural, random mutations through humanenabled processes in a laboratorysuch as repeated passage through animals or cellsthat put pressure on the virus to more rapidly evolve.  Specific changes to the viral genome are not necessarily anticipated in these processes, though the virus can be expected to gain certain characteristics, such as the ability to infect a new species.  This is a common technique used in public health research of viruses.  We consider directed evolution to be under laboratory adaptation. (U) **Laboratory-associated incidents** include incidents that happen in biological research facilities or during research-related sampling activities. (U) **Naturally occurring viruses** have not been altered in a laboratory.  Viruses commonly undergo random mutations as part of the evolutionary process and can continue to change over time; mutations may enable a virus to adapt to its environment, such as evading host immune responses and promoting viral replication. (U) **Outbreak:** A sudden increase in occurrences of a disease in a particular time and place. Outbreaks include **epidemics**, which is a term that is reserved for infectious diseases that occur in a confined geographical area.  **Pandemics** are near-global disease outbreaks. (U) **Pangolin:** An African and Asian mammal that has a body covered in overlapping scales. Pangolins are a natural reservoir of coronaviruses and researchers are investigating their potential role as an intermediate host for the COVID-19 virus. (U) **Pathogen:** A bacterium, virus, or other microorganism that can cause disease. (U) **Progenitor Virus:** A virus that is closely related enoughmore than 99 percentto SARS-\nCoV-2 to have been its direct ancestor or plausible immediate origin of the outbreak.  The closest known relative to SARS-CoV-2 is only about 96 percent similar; to put this into context, humans and chimps are about 99 percent similar, demonstrating the significant differences even at this similarity. (U) **Reverse genetics**: A process for determining the natural function of genes by introducing mutations and studying the effect of those mutations. (U) **RNA (ribonucleic acid):** A molecule essential for gene coding, decoding, regulation, and expression.  The genome of certain viruses, including coronaviruses, is made of RNA rather than DNA. (U) **Virus:** A replicating piece of genetic materialDNA or RNAand associated proteins that use the cellular machinery of a living cell to reproduce. (U) **Zoonosis:** An infection or a disease that is transmissible from animals to humans under natural conditions.  A **zoonotic pathogen** may be viral, bacterial, or parasitic, and can sometimes be transmitted through insects, such as mosquitoes. (U) **Zoonotic spillover:** An initial infection or disease that is caused by contact between an animal and human under natural conditions."
    },
    {
        "text": "# Naval Postgraduate School Monterey, California Thesis Developing A Reliable Methodology For Assessing The Computer Network Operations\n\nTHREAT OF IRAN\n\nby\n\nJason P. Patterson Matthew N. Smith\n\nSeptember 2005\n Thesis Advisor:\nDorothy Denning Second Reader:\nJames Ehlert Approved for release; distribution is unlimited\n\nTHIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK\n\n## Report Documentation Page\n\nPublic reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instruction, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project (0704-0188) Washington DC 20503.\n\n## 4. Title And Subtitle:  Developing A Reliable Methodology For Assessing The Computer Network Operations Threat Of Iran 11. Supplementary Notes  The Views Expressed In This Thesis Are Those Of The Author And Do Not Reflect The Official Policy Or Position Of The Department Of Defense Or The U.S. Government.\n\n13. ABSTRACT (maximum 200 words)\nThis thesis is part of a project at the Naval Postgraduate School to assess the Computer Network Operations (CNO)\nthreat of foreign countries.  CNO consists of Computer Network Attack (CNA), Computer Network Exploitation (CNE), and Computer Network Defense (CND).  Threats to the nation's critical infrastructures come from an adversary using CNA and CNE to degrade, deny or destroy access to the information systems they depend upon.  Defensive capabilities are also addressed since exploitation, attack, and defense are inherently related.  The result of a successful cyber-attack upon these critical infrastructures has the potential to cripple a country's communications and other vital services, economic well-being, and defensive capabilities.\nThe goal of this thesis is to develop a methodology for assessing the CNO threat of Iran.  The methodology is based on open sources that can supplement classified information acquired by the intelligence community.\n\n14. SUBJECT TERMS  Computer Network Operations, CNO, Computer Network Attacks, CNA,\nComputer Network Exploitation, CNE, Computer Network Defense, CND, Iran\n15. NUMBER OF\nPAGES\n85\n16. PRICE CODE\n17. SECURITY\nCLASSIFICATION OF\nREPORT\nUnclassified\n18. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE\nUnclassified\n19. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF ABSTRACT\nUnclassified\n20. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT\n\nUL\nNSN 7540-01-280-5500\nStandard Form 298 (Rev. 2-89)\n\nPrescribed by ANSI Std. 239-18\n\n\n\nTHIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK\nApproved for release; distribution is unlimited DEVELOPING A RELIABLE METHODOLOGY FOR ASSESSING THE\nCOMPUTER NETWORK OPERATIONS THREAT OF IRAN\n\nJason P. Patterson Lieutenant, United States Navy B.S., University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 1999\n\nMatthew N. Smith Lieutenant, United States Navy\nB.S., United States Naval Academy, 1997\n\n\nSubmitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of MASTER OF SCIENCE IN INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY MANAGEMENT\nfrom the NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL\nSeptember 2005\nAuthors:\n\nJason P. Patterson\n\n\nMatthew N. Smith Approved by:\nDr. Dorothy Denning Thesis Advisor James F. Ehlert Second Reader Dr. Dan Boger Chairman, Department of Information Sciences\n\n## This Page Intentionally Left Blank Abstract\n\nThis thesis is part of a project at the Naval Postgraduate School to assess the Computer Network Operations (CNO) threat of foreign countries.  CNO consists of Computer Network Attack (CNA), Computer Network Exploitation (CNE), and Computer Network Defense (CND).  Threats to the nation's critical infrastructures come from an adversary using CNA and CNE to degrade, deny or destroy access to the information systems they depend upon.  Defensive capabilities are also addressed since exploitation, attack, and defense are inherently related.  The result of a successful cyberattack upon these critical infrastructures has the potential to cripple a country's communications and other vital services, economic well-being, and defensive capabilities.\nThe goal of this thesis is to develop a methodology for assessing the CNO threat of Iran.  The methodology is based on open sources that can supplement classified information acquired by the intelligence community.\n\n\n## This Page Intentionally Left Blank\n\nLIST OF FIGURES\n\nFigure 1.\nTAE Fiber-Optic Line [ORN 99]........9\nFigure 2.\nIran's inter-city ISDN lines as of 1997.  This network has since been\nexpanded to include other cities such asYazd, Zahedan, Arak, and Rasht\n[ORN 99] ........12\nFigure 3.\nTechnology Cooperation Office Archived Website [TCO 04]........34\nFigure 4.\nPardis Technology Park Headquarters Complex  [PTP 02]........35\nFigure 5.\nIran Hacking Sabotage Team Website  [IHS 05]........45\nFigure 6.\nNaval Station Guantanamo's Defaced Webpage [Zone 05]........46\nFigure 7.\nAshiyane Digital Security Team Website  [Ashiyane 05]........47\nFigure 8.\nNational Aeronautics and Space Administration Website Hack  by\nAshiyane DST [Zone 05]........48\nFigure 9.\nAn \"advertising\" attack upon www.svidal.com  by Ashiyane DST  [Zone\n05] ........48\nFigure 10.\nIran Babol-Hackers Security Team Website  [IBHST 05] ........50\nFigure 11.\nMessage being bounced through several nodes on the Tor  network.\n[Dingledine/Mathewson/Syverson 04] ........52\n\n## This Page Intentionally Left Blank\n\nLIST OF TABLES\n\nTable 1.\n\nNumber of Main Telephone Lines and Cellular Subscribers per 100\nPopulation [UNSD 04]........8\n\n\n\nTHIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK\n\n## List Of Acronyms And Abbreviations\n\n| ACM         | Association of Computing Machinery                       |\n|-------------|----------------------------------------------------------|\n| AICTC       | Advanced Information and Communication Technology Center |\n| ATM         | Asynchronous Transfer Mode                               |\n| AUT         | Amirkabir University of Technology                       |\n| B.A.        | Bachelor's of Arts                                       |\n| B.S.        | Bachelor's of Science                                    |\n| BHST        | Iran Babol-Hackers Security Team                         |\n| CAINE       | Conference                                               |\n| Engineering |                                                          |\n| CMM         | Capability Maturity Model for Software                   |\n| CNA         | Computer Network Attack                                  |\n| CND         | Computer Network Defense                                 |\n| CNE         | Computer Network Exploitation                            |\n| CNO         | Computer Network Operations                              |\n| DCI         | Data Communications Company of Iran                      |\n| DDoS        | Distributed Denial of Service                            |\n| DST         | Ashiyane Digital Security Team                           |\n| GEO         | Geostationary Earth Orbit                                |\n| GSTP        | Guilan Science and Technology Park                       |\n| IAEA        | International Atomic Energy Agency                       |\n| IASP        | International Association of Science Parks               |\n| ICEE        | International Conference on Electrical Engineering       |\n| ICPC        | ACM International Collegiate Programming Contest         |\n| ICT         |                                                          |\n| ICTI        | Information Communication Technology Institute           |\n| IHS         |                                                          |\n| IN          |                                                          |\n| IP          |                                                          |\n| IRICA       | Iranian Customs Administration                           |\n| ISP         |                                                          |\n\nITRC\nIranian Telecommunication Research Center\nITU\n\nInternational Telecommunications Union\nIUT\n\nIsfahan University of Technology\nJ. UCS\nJournal of Universal Computer Science\nM.A.\nMasters of Arts\nM.S.\nMasters of Science\nMPO\nManagement and Planning Organization\nNASA\nNational Aeronautics and Space Administration\nPDN\nPublic Data Network\nPTP\nPardis Technology Park\nPTSN\nPublic Switched Telephone Network\nQoS\nQuality of Service\nSCADA\nSupervisory Control and Data Acquisition\nSDH\nSynchronous Digital Hierarchy\nSIGSAC\nSpecial Interest Group on Security, Audit, and Control\nSUT\nSharif University of Technology\nTAE\nTrans-Asia Europe Project\nTCO\nTechnology Cooperation Office\nTERNENA\nTrans-European Research and Education Networking Association\nTWA\nTransWorld Airline\nUSG\nUnited States Government\nVPN\nVirtual Private Network\nWMDs\nWeapons of Mass Destruction\nACKNOWLEDGMENTS\nWe would like to thank Dr. Dorothy Denning and Mr. James Ehlert for their expertise and insight during this study.  It has been a very challenging and rewarding experience for both of us. We are very grateful for their assistance and patience.\nFrom Jason: To my wife, Cassie and son, Cooper.  Thank you for your love and support throughout this experience.  Your sacrifice is recognized and greatly appreciated. I love you both.\n\nFrom Matthew: Thank you to my family for their love and understanding.\n\n## This Page Intentionally Left Blank I. Introduction A. Problem Statement\n\nWith the conclusion of the Cold War, the United States has become a supreme power that exerts political and military influence over world affairs.  Rogue nations do not have the means or the capabilities to confront this hegemonic power with conventional warfare methods.  Instead they look to develop asymmetric capabilities to combat an overwhelming adversary.  Opposing nations could benefit greatly by developing a cyber attack capability that could potentially deal a crippling blow to critical infrastructures of the United States.  Although the US is considered to be on the forefront of Computer Network Defense (CND) technology, the worldwide availability of the Internet and the constant stream of newly discovered vulnerabilities in software make it a potentially easy target for exploitation and attack.\nAttacks on the critical infrastructures are becoming more prevalent as access to the Internet is expanded.  It is in a foreign country's best interest to develop a capability to degrade, deny, or destroy an adversary's access to information.  According to Richard Clark, a former United States Government (USG) counter terrorism and cyber security advisor, rogue countries such as Iraq and North Korea have spent hundreds of millions of dollars to develop an atomic bomb.  He postulates that engaging in a cyber war would cost less and doesn't require the support of a nation state.  [Vamosi 02]  However, in spite of this prediction and others like it, very little is known with respect to the Computer Network Attack (CNA) and Computer Network Exploitation (CNE) capabilities and intentions of foreign states.  It is unclear whether hacking activity is state sponsored or the actions of unorganized, mischievous hackers, or perhaps even a combination of both.  Clearly, a better understanding of the CNA/E activities of a given nation state would assist in our development of a robust and proactive CND capability.\n\n## B. Objectives\n\nThis thesis is part of a project at the Naval Postgraduate School to assess the CNA/E threat of foreign countries.  The definition of Computer Network Operations\n(CNO) consists of CNA, CNE, and CND.  The threat to critical infrastructures comes from CNA/E.  Since CND capabilities are inherently related to exploitation and attack, the thesis also addresses defensive capabilities.  The goal is to develop a methodology and apply it to selective countries.  The methodology is based on open sources that can supplement classified information acquired by the intelligence community  An analysis of North Korea has already been completed.  [Brown 04]  This thesis is intended to develop the methodology for an analysis of Iran's CNA/E capability.\nThe methodology used for this thesis consisted of analyzing four areas of activity relating to a country's CNA/E capabilities and intentions.  Each of these is discussed in a separate chapter.  The first chapter addresses the Iranian information technology infrastructure.  The chapter describes its capabilities and limitations.  The chapter also discusses laws and regulations associated with Internet use, including computer crime laws, and Iran's current diplomatic and ideological relationships with the United States and other countries.  The second chapter is an analysis of academic activity and public community.  It examines the involvement of Iranian academia with respect to education and research relating to CNA/E.  The third chapter is an examination of the government activity in the development of a CNA/E capability.  It shows the Iranian government's interest in expanding the IT infrastructure and its role in elevating Iran's IT reputation in the worldwide scientific community.  The fourth chapter examines the CNA/E activity within Iran.  It discusses the various motivations of hackers, provides some examples of hacking groups within Iran, and explains the difficulty in identifying these Iranian hackers.\nThis research consisted of open source unclassified intelligence collection and analysis.  Much of the research was conducted using Internet sources, including websites, discussion groups, and web logs.  This methodology will be presented in a manner that can then be applied in the analysis of another country of interest.\n\n## Ii. Background A. Introduction\n\nThis chapter provides the background information to help frame the scope of this research.  It will examine Iran's foreign policy, information technology infrastructure, and existing legal framework.  In addition, it attempts to provide insight into Iran's motive and technological capability to conduct computer network operations and attack against potential adversaries.\n\n## B. Foreign Relations\n\nIn order to develop an understanding of Iran's motivation for developing a cyberattack capability, a closer look at Iran's foreign policy is required.  After World War II, Iranian leaders had aligned themselves with the Western World.  This was due to the ideological commonalities they shared and the perceived aggression from the former Soviet Union.  This relationship with the western world dramatically changed when the Shah of Iran was overthrown in 1979.  After the victory of the Islamic Revolution and the hostage crisis in 1979-1980, foreign relations with the western world have been on a downward spiral.  The leaders of the revolution were skeptical of the United State's heavy involvement in the region and denounced the United States as the \"Great Satan.\" By the early 80's, most of the political elite inside Iran had accepted this point of view. [LOC 04]  Since then, Iran has had a history of challenging the western world and calling for the complete removal of all western interests from the Gulf region.  Recent news headlines have highlighted the impending danger of Iran's nuclear program.  These reports cite intelligence sources from western countries that claim the existence of secret nuclear weapons material production and testing facilities.  Iran claims that these sites do not exist and such ambitions are strictly peaceful to ensure adequate power generation requirements for their developing country.  Western policy makers contend that their motives go beyond power production.  The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)\nand the European Union have been in negotiation with Iran to prevent them from acquiring nuclear weapons.  Such negotiations have not been fruitful and have contained terse rhetoric from both sides.\nMore specifically, the United States has labeled Iran as world's most active state sponsor of terrorism. President Bush has labeled Iran, along with countries such as Iraq and North Korea, as being a member of the \"Axis of Evil.\"  [Bush 04]  This labeling by the US government brings with it implications of sanctions to include:\n\n1.\nA ban on arms-related exports and sales\n2.\nControls over exports of dual-use items, requiring a 30-day Congressional\nnotification for goods or services that could significantly enhance the\ncountry's military capability or ability to support terrorism\n3.\nProhibitions on economic assistance\n4.\nImpositions of miscellaneous financial and other restrictions to include:\n-\nRequiring the US to oppose any loans by the World Bank and\nother world financial institutions\n-\nAllowing families of terrorist attacks to file lawsuits against\nIranian diplomats in US Courts.\n-\nDenying tax credits for income earned in Iran\n-\nAuthority to prohibit financial transactions with Iran without a\nDepartment of Treasury license.\n-\nProhibition of Department of Defense (DoD) contracts over\n$100,000 with Iran.\nThe import and export of technology items are considered dual-use and are therefore prohibited under these sanctions.  [USDOS 03]  Iran has consistently pursued relationships with other state sponsors of terror and terrorist organizations. In February\n2005, Iran and Syria announced that they would form a united front against pressure from the United States and the western world.  Syria was the only Arab country that continued warm relations with Iran during the 1980-1988 Iran-Iraq War and has been a strategic ally for years. [AP 05]  Iran's connections to former Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein and terrorist organizations has been documented by an Iranian defector and former director of intelligence for the Iranian Revolutionary Guard.  Hamid Reza Zakiri described his personal knowledge of Iranian cooperation with other state sponsors of terror and terrorist organizations.  For instance, Zakiri tells of the cooperation between North Korea and Iran.  He has personally attended military courses such as psychological warfare, counter espionage, and physical security pertaining to nuclear installations for 40 day periods in North Korea.  He goes on to describe Iran's connection with Al-Qa'ida, Hezbollah, and other terrorist organizations.  He provides details of Iranian Revolution Guard involvement with terrorist organizations in the 1983 bombing in Beirut and the 1985 hijacking of the TWA airplane resulting in the death of numerous US servicemen.  And while Iran did not play an active role in the attacks on September 11, 2001, Zakiri states that the Revolutionary Guard received correspondence requesting assistance from Ayman Al-Zawhairi.  He stated that while they were ordered not to assist, they were to maintain relations with Al-Qa'ida for future operations.  Furthermore, Iran has assisted with the harboring of many Al-Qa'ida terrorists following OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM and IRAQI FREEDOM to include the transportation of Osama bin Laden's wife and son to Yemen.  Zakiri also speculated that Bin Laden himself may have escaped with the assistance of the Revolutionary Guard.  He details relationships with bogus companies headed up by Qusay Hussein since the 1990's to assist with the smuggling of oil.  [MEMRI 03]  Smugglers of oil from Iraq generally had unrestricted access to Iranian territorial waters.  Iran's territorial waters became known as a \"superhighway\" of smuggled oil due to a smuggler's ability to traverse and exit the entire Persian Gulf inside Iranian territorial waters.  These strategic connections with other state sponsors of terror and terrorist organizations detail a foreign policy that is very hostile to the United States and the western world.\nIran has also established military development relationships with other nonwestern military powers throughout the world.  These countries include Russia, North Korea, and China.   In mid-2000, Iran announced a \"25-year military development program\" with Russia, for which very little of the details of the agreement are known.\n[Billo/Chang 03]  To counter the American influence on behalf of Iraq in the Iran-Iraq War, the former Soviet Union saw an opportunity to increase its influence by selling military equipment.  After the 1991 Gulf War, Russia had lost Iraq as one of its primary customers of military equipment. Russia was compelled to further strengthen financial ties with Iran to compensate for the closure of its market and to reestablish influence within the region.  The United States had repeatedly tried to convince Russia to cut off military support for Iran with very little success.  While the United States has sometimes sanctioned the individual entities that deal with Iran, it has never sanctioned the Russian government.  [Katzman 03]  Iran and China also have a history of military dealings since the early-80's. To Iran, China is just another source of military equipment that is willing to sell technology needed to counter the perceived US aggression.  China does not agree ideologically or politically with Iran, but views the relationship as an opportunity to divert the US military from the China-Taiwan stand-off.  Besides obvious revenues from the sale of its military technology, China also has to ensure an adequate supply of oil in a tight market for a growing economy.  [Katzman 03]  As was the case with Russia, the relationship between Iran and China is mutually beneficial.\nThe Iranian relationship with North Korea is much more forward than that with Russia and China.  Traditionally, North Korea has always aligned itself with countries such as Iran, Syria, and Libya that share its opposition to the policies of the United States. This relationship has been furthered strengthened by the United States' characterization of North Korea and Iran as \"rogue states\" and institution of trade sanctions against them. [Katzman 03]  Although countries such as Iran, Russia, China, and North Korea may not agree ideologically or politically, mutual interests have brought these countries together to compete better in a world currently dominated by the west.\n\nSince the fall of the Shah in 1979, Iran's foreign policy has been extremely critical of the influence of the western world.  Iran has shown that it will use any means necessary, including acquiring weapons of mass destruction, to strengthen its position in the world.  The western world's heavy reliance on information technology makes cyberattack by countries such as Iran a likely possibility.\n\n## C. Information Technology Infrastructure\n\nAs with most developing nations, information technology is just starting to make an impact upon the education, economy, and social values within Iran.  With the cessation of hostilities in the Iran-Iraq war in August 1988, the Iranian government set out to develop a plan to restore the Iranian economy.  Included within this plan were requirements for the spread of Information and Communications Technology (ICT).\nCalled the First Five Year Plan, it was adopted by the Parliament in early 1990 and has experienced three iterations since then.  The current plan is called the Fourth Five Year Plan and contains the goals for 2005-2010.  [OXR 04]  The development of information technology in Iran was met with initial resistance, but was followed by a much more rapid growth of adaptation, use and privatization.  [Rouhani 00]\nThe following sections examine different sectors of the information infrastructure.\n\n\n## 1. Telecommunications\n\n  Iranian telecommunications are currently inadequate, but are being modernized and expanded to not only increase the volume and efficiency of urban services, but also to increase reach to rural areas throughout Iran.  The number of main telephone lines has risen dramatically with only 830,000 installed main lines in 1978 [ITU 05] compared to\n14.5 million installed lines in 2003.  According to the International Telecommunication Union there were 27.06 subscribers per 100 inhabitants of Iran.  [CIA 05]  While this is still a low penetration factor compared to the developed world, the overall increase has been dramatic.  As with most developing nations, demand for cellular phones within Iran has taken off.  In 2003, the mobile handset market grew by almost 26% within the African and Middle East region.  [AMET 04]  This rapid expansion is due to the low cost required to expand cellular phone infrastructure compared to traditional telephone lines. As depicted below, Iran has one of the fastest growing telecommunications expansion rate in the Middle East.\n\n\n\n1990\n2003\nPercent Increase\nIran\n4.04\n27.06\n669.8%\nUAE\n24.25\n101.68\n419.3%\nOman\n6.13\n31.67\n516.63%\nIndia\n.6\n7.10\n1183.3%\nUS\n56.85\n116.96\n205.7%\nSaudi Arabia\n7.78\n47.65\n612.5%\nChina\n.59\n42.38\n7183.1%\n\nIn addition to the rapid increase in telephone and cellular phone access within the country, access to the world telecommunication network has also greatly increased by a combination of satellite and fiber optic connectivity.  One such fiber optic line is the Trans-Asia-Europe (TAE) Project.  Agreed upon in 1993, it is the world's largest overland fiber-optic system.  By following the ancient silk trading route, it provides a link that stretches from China to Europe.  The fiber has the capability of up to 622 MBps. Participants in the TAE Project include China, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Turkey, Belarus, Poland, Hungary, Austria, Germany, Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Pakistan, and Afghanistan.  The Iranian portion of the fiber-optic line is 721 km and connects Turkmenistan to Turkey. (see Figure 1. below)  Another fiber optic line that links Iran to the global communication system is a submarine line that links Iran's southern coast with Fujirah in the United Arab Emirates.  It is a 172 km, un-repeatered line that provides a direct connection supporting a bandwidth of up to 140 Mb/s.  These fiber optic lines assist with providing Iran the much needed bandwidth of a developing nation.  [ORN 99]\n\n\nThe final link of Iran's telecommunication system to the world is through satellite technology.  Prior to recent developments, Iran's satellite communication ability was limited to using Inmarsat land earth stations connected to commercially operated satellites over the Indian Ocean that routed calls to terrestrial phone lines.  Since the\n1970's, Iran has considered creating a government-owned GEO (Geostationary Earth Orbit) communications network.  Through initial planning agreements in 1993, France, Italy, Russia and China, are said to be assisting with the development of the Zohreh\n(Venus) systems of satellites. This system of 2 satellites will expand Iran's telecommunication capability, provide military and data communications, and improve Iran's broadcasting capability.  The ground infrastructure needed for this system will include five land stations, 135 primary and secondary stations, 27 zonal stations, 31\ncommunity stations, and 1,374 rural stations.  [ORN 99]  In January 2005, a contract was signed in Tehren for the delivery and launch of the Zohreh satellites by a Russian subcontractor called The Academician Reshetnev Applied Mechanics Research and Production Association.  It is reported that it will take 30-36 months from initial building operations to final acceptance.  [SAT 05]  Iran's interest in space is still in the early development phase and aerospace companies throughout the world are willing to provide the expertise to expand Iran's capabilities.\n\n## 2. Internet Infrastructure\n\nLike the rest of the world, internet usage in Iran has exploded.  Iran's first use of the internet was spearheaded by the Institute for Studies in Theoretical Physics and Mathematics (IPM) during the early 1990's.  The IPM established a link through the BITNET network through Iran's membership in the Trans-European Research and Education Networking Association (TERENA).  The link later developed into a fullfledged internet connection with acceptance of Iran as a Class C node.  Initially the primary users were academic and research institutions, but domestic Internet connections have grown rapidly.  At times, growth of the Internet has placed Iran among the top countries for the rate of growth for internet access.  [Arabshani 97]\nThe first Internet Service Provider (ISP) in Iran was the Data Communication Company of Iran (DCI).  As of 2000, this government-owned company was the largest ISP in Iran.  There are well over 30 ISP's that provide internet service.  Some of the more popular services are Neda Rayneh, IRNET, Virayeshgar Corporation, Apedana, and Pars Suppala.  [Rouhani 00]  According to the ITU, internet users per 10,000 inhabitants rose from 155.57 in 2001 to 723.66 in 2003.  The number of internet hosts has also risen dramatically.  In 2001, there were .38 hosts per 10,000 inhabitants.  This rose to .76 hosts per 10,000 inhabitants in 2003.  [ITU 05]  Recently the French company Alcatel won a contract to provide the first DSL network in Iran.  Alcatel will provide and support access to 100,000 DSL lines over the next three years.  [AMET 04-1]  Prior to this, access to end users throughout the country was strictly via a Public Switched Telephone Network (PSTN) or the Public Data Network (PDN).  The PSTN provides 56kbps dial-up access to people willing to pay for service.  Access to the PDN is mostly limited to academic, government and some private entities.  Originally, this link used multiple 64kps ISDN lines (see below), but was upgraded with a combination of fiber optic backbones and T1 lines.  [ORN 99]  As of 1999, only 170 locations throughout Iran had access to this technology, but that number has grown dramatically since then.  With the announcement in early 2004 that Alcaltel was going to provide the first DSL networking Iran, access to high-speed internet and information technology promises to improve.\nUse of the internet has also spilled into the political arena of Iran.  While still a very censored medium within the country, the Internet provides more freedom for people to speak out when compared to the state-controlled print, television, and radio media.\nOfficials running for elections have begun to see the power that access to the internet can provide for a campaign.  During the May 1997 presidential campaign, the two presidential candidates, President Khatami\n(http://www.khatami.com)\nand the conservative candidate Ali Akbar Nategh Nouri (http://nategh.co.ir), used the World Wide Web to disseminate their messages.  In addition to this, the results of the election were posted \"live\" on the website of the Iranian government at www.netiran.com.\n[Rouhani 2000, 27]  The Internet has also become the voice of many people on the political spectrum.  The use of web logs has exploded in the country.  These \"blogs,\"\nwhich blur the line between reporting news and expressing political views, have become the voice of reformists unsatisfied with the current government.  The government has actively attempted to censor the expression of these web journalists.  The use of the Internet for Iranian politics will be examined further in the next chapter.\n\nInternet usage in Iran has become very controversial.  The debates are similar to those within most countries throughout the world about the social impact of the internet. The conservatives are concerned with the negative social impacts that the internet brings to an Islamic society.  They believe that the influence of westerns ideals, drugs and sex will become the demise of the Islamic state.  Furthermore, they believe that the internet will foster immorality and the \"Americanization\" of the Iranian youth.  While many conservatives realize that the internet is necessary to continue technological development within Iran, their argument is that internet regulation is necessary to protect the Islamic society. The more liberal factions within the country believe that such restrictions will obstruct the learning development of people and that the individual or their family should limit access to improper information.  They stress the importance of the internet for its economic advantages, expeditious transactions and democratic access that it offers. [Ebrahimian 03]  These issues are not unusual and are being faced by countries all over the world.  However, they become much more dangerous in a theocracy such as Iran in which censorship becomes a very likely possibility.\n\n## 3. Hardware Industry\n\nWhen compared to Iran's successful industrial sectors such as oil and natural gas, development of Iran's technological manufacturing capability has not been as successful.\nIran's automobile and military production capability has attracted some foreign investment, but Iran's attempt to create a high technology electronics industry has been unsuccessful.  Imported hardware is in limited supply due to import and export trade regulations and taxation.  Domestic industries in need of IT products find that there is a shortage of national producers of computer and communication hardware.  On a policy level, a prevailing barrier to technological advancement is the menial effort to attract private sector involvement.  This is due in part to the state's mismanagement of legal and regulatory procedures.  The state controls all national business activities under a confusing regulatory framework.  During the 2000 presidential elections, Tehran police closed all the cyber-cafes with broadband access due to political reformists gaining popularity from their effective use of the internet.   The government cited the lack of necessary permits as the reason why the cafes were shut down even though there were not any laws requiring permits.   Actions like these create an atmosphere of uncertainty for willing investors. There are increasing efforts for privatization of state run sectors of the economy.  In October 2004, the Management and Planning Organization (MPO) had drawn up a 20-year strategy for economic, social, and cultural development which can only be accomplished by privatization.  The Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khameni has ordered this plan to take effect commencing 2005.  [Ebrahimian 03]  It is believed that privatization of industries will reduce both the amount of government censorship and regulation and is the only way to spur economic and commercial development.\nIran's restrictive trade policies also make foreign investment very difficult.\nTaxation on imports are often levied in an inconsistent and undefined manner.  For instance, Iran imposes heavy import duties on computer peripheral products such as printers and displays.  Businesses that can afford to purchase approved point of sale systems cannot afford to purchase the printers or displays that are needed for them. Increases in productivity that are gained from the point of sale system are lost in the inability to print a receipt.  [Ebrahimian 03]\nIran's contradictory legislative actions have also deterred foreign investment.  For instance, Iran agreed to a contract in early 2004 with the Turkish cell phone company Turkcell to be the first foreign nation to provide nation-wide cellular phone service.\n\nSeveral months later, the Iranian legislative body voted to sharply cut the company's share in the multi-billion dollar deal.  The original deal consisted of an alliance of four companies; 51% of the shares were to go to Turkcell, 20% to two Iranian communications companies, and 9% to Nokia.  Instead, the Parliament voted to increase the Iranian portion of the deal to 51% and the remainder to go to Turkcell and Nokia. This has caused Turkcell to reconsider and possibly withdraw from the deal.  This type of contradictory behavior creates a uncertain business environment and makes future foreign investment in any industry much more difficult.\n\n## 4. Software Industry\n\nSince the late 90's and early 00's there has been a demand from Western firms to seek countries with highly trained software engineers to outsource the development of coding and thus become more competitive in the market.  Developers have found that outsourcing can be much more cost efficient than very expensive domestic employees. Countries from all over the world are competing for this outsourcing and Iran is no exception.  The Iranian software industry suffers many problems that hamper its development as a competitor on the world market.  It is estimated that there are 20,000 working in the software industry with about 200 companies involved in software development.  The required technology level of hardware in Iran is generally lacking. Application development in some cases is still based in MS-DOS.  There is widespread lack of software management expertise.  Even with high technical skills, large-scale projects often fail due to poor management.  There are no copyright protections of foreign-produced software in Iran, so pirating is widespread.  Many software companies cannot afford or are unwilling to buy software tools for development and will in turn use pirated version of these tools.  Developers are unable to receive technical support from the manufacturers for these pirated tools, so they rarely understand the full capabilities of the packages.  While there is an eagerness to explore the software export market, there is a lack of expertise to develop the necessary relationships needed for foreign investment.\nThe US trade embargo has also hampered the software export market.  In addition, there is an inability to develop a desirable portfolio of services to export to overseas companies.  Development of products for exports requires a thorough understanding of the needs of the world market.  Iran has not been able to capitalize on the same industry that other countries such as India have due to the general consensus that \"lower-level\"\nservice does not fit in the with \"Iranian national character.\"  Instead, Iranians preferred to focus on \"high-level\" application work.  Over the years, India has gradually been able to break into developing more complex applications by creating a reputation on the world market as being proficient in software development.  Another lost opportunity for Iran is the lack of collaboration between software companies and universities.  Even with 70% of software companies centered around Tehran, there is very little coordination amongst them.  Coordination promises to improve with the construction of Technology Park in Tehren that will attempt to bring researchers and technology businesses together. Currently, there are no Iranian companies with standard certifications such as ISO9000 or Capability Maturity Model for software (CMM).  Experiences in India have shown that these standards reassure foreign companies wishing to pursue outsourcing. [Nicholson/Sahay 03]\nLike the hardware industry, the software industry suffers greatly from a lack of a clear policy from the government.  There have been several plans and statements describing the importance of establishing a strong software industrial base, but the general consensus from those in the industry is that these are rarely followed through. The desire to become more competitive on a global scale is there, but there are technical, social, and political barriers to overcome.  These barriers, at least in the near term, prevent Iran from establishing a strong foothold in the world software market.\n\n\n\n## D. Legal Framework\n\nThere are very limited and inconsistent laws in Iran governing the protection and use of Information and Communication Technology (ICT).  The first law for the legal protection of software products was enacted in the year 2000.  This law, called \"Support for Computer Software Developers,\" gave legal protection of software copyrights to domestically produced software.  Software applications that are produced and properly registered with the Supreme High Council of Informatics are legally protected from pirating.  Even with this law, software pirating is still widespread since it is rarely enforced.  While this law establishes legal protection for domestic software, there is no protection for imported software.  In 2003, a bylaw was passed defining the procedure for the execution of ICT expansion.  The specifics of the bylaw include an implementation of e-government initiative and expansion of ICT in education.  [Sanaray 05]  While these initiatives are a good start, there are still some issues that need to be addressed.  There is no definition of cyber-crime and therefore no laws to prevent it.  In addition to this, copyright laws need to be enforced and protections expanded to include foreign intellectual property.  The Iranian government has promised to improve legislation to provide a more secure investing environment for foreign interests.  Without clear definition of cyber-crime laws, Iran's internet community runs rampant in lawlessness and ensures that hackers will go unpunished for their actions.\n\n\n## E. Conclusion\n\nThis chapter discussed the background necessary for the basis of this thesis.  It examined Iran's foreign policy, information technology infrastructure, and legal framework.  The political alignments, basic technological capabilities, and legal consequences provide insight into the ability and motivations for state-sponsored hackers to conduct cyber-attack against the United States.\n\n## Iii. Academic Activity And Public Community A. Introduction\n\nThis chapter describes Iranian academic and public community involvement with respect to Computer Network Attack and Exploitation capabilities.  It will discuss the Information Technology related educational opportunities available to Iranians as well as any activity in the public community that may be related to developing a cyber-attack capability.\n\n\n## B. Iranian Academic Opportunities\n\nIn order to assess Iran's cyber attack capabilities, a thorough examination of its academic institutions must be conducted.  Iran has an extensive academic research system spread throughout the country.  Like other developed nations, students have the opportunity to get undergraduate and graduate educations in major fields ranging from philosophical areas such as Islamic studies to sciences such a mathematics, engineering, and physics.  In particular, access to information technology related educations is widely available to those students that qualify for entry based on national exams.  The analysis provided is limited to the major institutions that had public information available.\n\n## 1. Sharif University Of Technology\n\nLocated in Teheran, Sharif University of Technology is one of the largest engineering schools in Iran. It was established in 1966 under the name of Aryarmehr University of Technology. When it was first founded there were 54 faculty members and a total of 412 students. In 1980, the university was renamed Sharif University of Technology. SUT now has a total of 300 full-time faculty members, approximately 430 part-time faculty members and a population of about 8,000 students. Undergraduate and graduate degrees are offered in computer engineering and software engineering.\n\nWithin SUT is the Advanced Information and Communication Technology Center\n(AICTC).  This center conducts research in various aspects of Information and Communication Technology.  Its faculty educational backgrounds range from computer science, information technology, engineering, and mathematics from both western universities and Iranian universities.  Several faculty members had degrees from U.S. universities such as University of Illinois and Pennsylvania State University.  Some of the research that the center conducts includes video communication in wireless networks such as scalable video coding, error concealment and post-processing techniques, rate control, wireless media streaming, transporting video over 3G wireless networks, and mechanisms to improve multimedia applications throughput over wireless links.  The center is also heavily involved in the development of Farsi Linux, a government directed OS initiative to lessen the dependence of western based software makers.  [SHARIF 05]\nWhile some of the professor's biographies included interests in computer security, there were a couple of faculty members that stood out.  Professor Shahram Bakhtiari shows an extensive interest in computer security topics.  He received his M.S. and Ph.D from Wollongong University in Australia.  He has published extensively in journals and conference proceedings such as the Journal of Universal Computer Science (J.UCS) and ACM Special Interest Group on Security, Audit, and Control (SIGSAC) Review.  Some interesting topics of his publications are \"Keyed Hash Functions,\" \"Practical and Secure Message Authentication,\" and \"On the Weaknesses of Gong's Collisionful Hash Function.\"  Some of the courses he teaches are called Systems and Networks Security, Advanced Topics in Programming, Data Structures and Design of Algorithms, and several programming courses in different languages. A course syllabus of the Systems and Networks Security course was also posted on his site.   The course description is quoted below:\nIn this course we study the applications of cryptography in systems/networks security and show how systems may encounter unauthorized access by intruders. Due to the extensive use of computer networks and the Internet, there exist a range of methods that intruders might use to access the information and files stored on a particular host. Students who take this course become familiar with methods of attack and the ways to protect systems and networks.\n\nHe also posted links to the presentations that he uses for this class.  One such presentation was titled \"Hacking Techniques.\"  However, the links were broken, so the presentation could not to be viewed.  [Bakhtiari 01]  Also found through a simple google search of\n\"sharif university security\" was the resume for Sauleh S. Etemady.  He recently completed his M.S. in Electrical and Computer Engineering from Michigan State University.  His undergraduate work was performed at SUT.  While a student at SUT he taught courses such as Network Security, Securing and Optimizing Linux, and TCP/IP\nAdministration for the AICTC.  His publications include \"Proposal for Information Security Center,\" \"Mail Security Solutions,\" and \"Security Aspects of Operating Systems.\"  While he is no longer affiliated with SUT, his computer security background was established during his time at Sharif as a student.  [Etemadi 05]  Another interesting personal web page found from SUT was that of Hashem Habibi who is currently a student studying for his Masters degree in Software Engineering.  His personal page consists of links to pages of fellow classmates, photo galleries, and links to various web logs and hacking sites.   His page also mentions a Network Security Center at SUT with pictures of some of the members of the center, however, a website for the Network Security Center was not found.  Another biography found was that of a PhD candidate named Mohammad Abdollahi Azgomi.  He has numerous papers published and has taught several courses on computer security topics.  Some of his more notable publications include \"Design and Implementation of a Firewall in Computer Networks,\" \"Security Enhancement for Network Services,\" and \"Modeling and Analysis of Reactive Systems.\"  According to his resume, he has consulted for the government on network security matters in the Iran Expediency Council Secretariat, State Organization for Registration of Deeds and Properties of Iran, Iranian Customs Administration (IRICA). He has taught several programming and simulation courses at Sharif and other Iranian universities.  [Azgomi 05]\nSharif University of Technology has been engaged in extensive computer security research and education.  Several faculty members and students have focused on computer security topics.  There are also courses in computer security.  While the principles of computer security are being taught to students, there was no evidence that the school was using this education to promote hacking in any way.\n\n## 2. University Of Tehran\n\nThe main part of the University is located at the center of Tehran. Some of the faculties and research centers are also located in Karaj, Qom, Pakdasht, Sari and Kheyrood Kenar. The University has 1500 faculty members. At present, this University admits students to 111 B.A./B.S. degree programs, 177 M.A./M.S. degree programs and 156 Ph.D. degree programs. The educational capacity of this university is about 32\nthousand students.  According to the university's website, 340 foreign students also study at the University.\nLike other universities, the information technology related faculty has wide ranging educational background in fields such as computer science, computer engineering, and mathematics.  Degrees offered include software engineering and computer engineering.  The university's advertised research projects include mostly electrical and computer engineering topics.  One particular project listed was called \"Iran National Grid Blackout, Power System Protection Point of View.\"  There was not any additional information to ascertain if this research was pertaining to defense of Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems.  The University does conduct some defense related research as a master's thesis was found that focused on improving missile accuracy.  The school's website had very little information regarding the specifics of the degree programs or individual course information.  [University of Teheran 05]\n\n## 3. Amirkabir University Of Technology\n\nAlso located in Tehran, the Amirkabir University of Technology was established in 1958.  The university's website boasts close ties with the Ministry of Science, Research and Technology.  There are currently 6400 students enrolled in 132 disciplines. It has 14 engineering groups, 7 research centers, and an ACM chapter.  It offers undergraduate and graduate degrees in Information Technology and Computer Science. Although this school has a relatively low enrollment compared to other Iranian institutions, its research seems to be more focused on computer security topics.  Within\n\nthe Computer Engineering and Information Technology department is the Data Security Research Laboratory.  The website's description of the laboratory's mission is quoted below:\nThe role of this laboratory is to help promoting research and innovations on computer, information and communications security, and help training engineers and scientists in related areas, while there will be special attentions on design and analysis of cryptographic algorithms, design and analysis of secure protocols with public use, developing hardware and software for secure data communications, processing and computations, and also for secure speech and image communications and processing, and design and implementation of secure computer systems, e.g. secure o.s.\n\nHowever, all aspects of cryptology and computer and communication security are interested research objectives of the Lab.\n\nThere is evidence that this security center actively attempts to identify vulnerabilities in software systems.  A posting was found on the New Order security site (neworder.box.sk)\nfrom April 2003 from Haamed Gheibi and Salman Niksefat of the Data Security Research Laboratory housed at Amirkabir University of Technology. They claimed in the post to find a Microsoft Windows SMB flaw.  [NEW 03]  Unsuccessful attempts to gain the attention of Microsoft through emails and phone calls warranted them posting this information on the Bugtraq mailing list.  Replies to the Bugtraq posting claimed that this exploit has been used before and that this vulnerability can be corrected by changing the LMCompatabilitylevel to a higher level as directed in the Windows 2000 Hardening Guide.  [Bugtraq 03]  Their attempt to contact Microsoft prior to publishing the flaw suggests that he was not maliciously subverting the software, instead attempting to get the vulnerability fixed.  Gheibi also represented Amirkabir in the 2003 ACM International Computer Programming Contest held in Tehren, which is explained in greater detail in a following section.  [ACMICPC 03]\nAs with other universities, the faculty educational and research vary within the fields of information technology and computer sciences.  One particular faculty member that stood out was Professor Mehran Soleiman Fallah.  His interests and educational background are exclusively in the computer security field.  His PhD dissertation was an analysis of denial of service attacks and a determination of the weaknesses of the protocol upon which the attacks were carried out.  Other faculty members also listed computer security as an interest, but Fallah was the only one who exclusively researched in this field.\n\n## 4. Isafahan University Of Technology\n\nLocated in the city of Isafahan, this university has about 7000 undergraduate and nearly 2000 graduate students studying Agriculture, Engineering, Basic Sciences and Natural Resources. Within IUT is the Information and Communication Technology Institute (ICTI).  Research areas within the ICTI include distributed system development, management information systems, and computer networks.  No specific information was found regarding specific degrees, research or classes in computer or network security related fields.  [IUT 05]\nIn September 2005, the university will host the 3rd Annual Iranian Society of Cryptology Conference.  Notable conference topic areas include cryptographic algorithms, digital signatures and hashing algorithms, PKI, network security, firewall and access control, stenography, electronic security laws and legal issues, and intrusion detection systems.  Committee members for the conference include numerous professors from IUT as well as from other Iranian universities.  The conference offered an open invitation to anyone wishing to attend.  There does not appear to be any published limitations on conference attendants.  [ISCC 05]\n\n## 5. University Of Isfahan\n\nLocated in the city for which it is named, the University of Isfahan has a student population of 14,000.  It has 450 faculty members and a wide variety of academic majors. It offers curriculums in information technology, computer science, and computer engineering.  As with the other universities, faculty member have varying educational backgrounds.  Research interests listed by faculty biographies cover traditional research areas expected from any major university.  Three professors focused on computer security research.  The biography of Professor Behrouz Tork Ladani lists formal specification and verification, cryptographic protocols, information system security analysis and design, information security standards and applications, network security, and Virtual Private Networks (VPNs).  He has several papers written in the same subject areas for various security conferences that were held both inside and outside Iran.\nAnother faculty member, Professor Ahmad Baraani-Dastjerdi, is also heavily interested in research areas such as security in object-orientated databases, cryptography, security in computing, and computer science.   He also has many papers written that support his research in those areas.  A third faculty member, Professor Shahram Bakhtiari has research interests of network security, VPNs, and cryptologic protocols.  He also teaches artificial intelligence, formal methods, and cryptology and distributed security system classes.  He has published numerous security related articles for various journals and conferences.  [Bakhtiari 01]\nGraduate and undergraduate degrees offered include Computer Engineering, Software Engineering, and Information Technology Engineering.  More specific information regarding research areas or class descriptions required intranet access.\n\nThere are many other universities within Iran.  The institutions listed above had the most substantial information technology, computer science, or software curricula of those websites examined.  However, access to information varied.  Some institutions required privileged access to view information pertaining to research programs, while others had inoperable websites.  In general, Iranian academic institutions exhibit ongoing research interest and education in computer security related topics.  The institutions'\nfaculty had a wide range of educational backgrounds to include western universities.  The information available shows Iran's academic community does not exhibit any activity outside the norm of typical academic institutions.  No evidence was found from academic institutions of open government sponsorship to develop an Iranian cyber-attack capability.\n\n## C. Information Technology Associations And Publications\n\nCommensurate with the national goal of becoming a leader in information technology in the Middle East, there is a substantial network of information technology associations and publications.  Participants in these publications and associations come from the academic and business communities of Iran.  Web sites and print publications promoting scientific exchange are abundant throughout the country.\nThere are a number of computer-related associations in Iran.  Participation in these societies consists of professionals and researchers from all over the world.  Some of these are chapters of world-wide associations while some are strictly focused on Iranian Information Technology.  For instance, the Association of Computer Machinery has a professional chapter located in Tehran and student chapters at Sharif University of Technology, Amirkabir University of Technology and University of Qazvin.  These chapters hold workshops, social gatherings, and discussions regarding the advancement of computing.  Members from these chapters actively contribute to ACM publications.\n\nACM chapters within the country also compete in the yearly ACM-International Collegiate Programming Contest (ICPC).  The 29th Annual World Finals were held in Shanghai, China in April 2005.  International teams including some from China, Russia, and Korea competed. Also attending were top US Universities such as Duke, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, and University of Illinois.  Iran sent teams from Sharif University of Technology and Amirkabir University of Technology.   AUT and SUT tied for 17th place, ahead of all US university teams.  [ACMICPC 05]  There have also been a lot of Iranian schools represented in previous regionals.  Sharif University of Technology is hosting the Asia regional contest for the next ACM-ICPC competition in November 2005.\n\nThere are also societies within Iran that focus exclusively on national information technology issues.  A comprehensive list of these societies can be found at the Pars Times\n(www.parstimes.com).  Numerous scientific associations and institutions are listed in a wide range of fields.  Some of these relating to ICT include the Iran Informatics Companies Association, Information Technology Council, Iranian Organization of Scientific and Technical Research, and the Iran and Information Society.  The Academic Center of Educational, Culture, and Research hosts a website that catalogs papers submitted to various academic journals from Iranian researchers.\n(http://www.sid.ir/En/Index.asp)  It contains 16740 documents in many fields including Information Technology.\n\nThere are also several IT-related online news magazine publications.  These publications include PC World Iran (http://www.pcworldiran.com/) and the ITNA\n(http://itna.ir/).  These publications are geared to researchers, professionals, and consumers with an interest in the field.  These sites are similar to those such as CNET.com or PC Magazine found in the US.  In addition to magazine publications, most major newspapers have science and technology sections that discuss news and advancement within the industry.\nThe information technology publishing within Iran is quite extensive.  There is an obvious interest within the country to disseminate and exchange information related to IT.  Iranian scientists and professionals actively participate in both Iranian and worldwide associations.   Their participation is measured by active contributions in peerreviewed academic journals, newspapers, and computer related magazines.\n\n\n## D. Iranian Public Internet Community\n\nAs access to technology increases, so does participation on the Internet within Iran.  The Iranian theocracy is trying desperately to balance the need for more information exchange while maintaining control of a growing opposition. Groups opposing the Iranian government are using the Internet as a medium of communication.\nA rapidly growing virtual community of people who are openly exchanging ideas has become a tool for the political opposition.  Contrary to government attempts to shut them down, reformists continue to use web logs to voice their opinions.  In addition to Iranian politics, the Internet has become the gathering place for those with an interest in network security.  These include both blackhat and whitehat groups.  Whitehat hackers identify security weaknesses in a computer system or network, but instead of taking advantage of it, expose the weakness in a way that will allow the system's owner to correct it.  On the other hand, blackhat hackers identify weaknesses and vulnerabilities in the same manner, but instead exploit the weakness for a variety of reasons.  This section will examine political websites, web logs and white hat activity.  Blackhat activity within Iran will be examined in greater detailer in subsequent chapters.\n\n## 1. The Internet And Politics\n\nOver the last 10 years, an increasingly powerful reform movement has taken root in Iran.  Experts have begun to question whether the Internet has been critical for this development.  As previously discussed, websites promoting political opinions have become commonplace.  The government has tried to block access to these sites, but as Dr. Payman Arabashi, an expert on Iranian telecommunications stated in an interview,\n\"web page content monitoring is not easily regulated.  Although all ISPs in Iran do provide web hosting for their users, many users choose to use free web hosting services abroad...So as long as you can get on the Net, you can pretty much do whatever you want, including setting up web pages outside of Iran, or surfing to any sites that may be 'blocked' using a variety of proxy and/or annonymizing services [such as safeweb.com].\" [Mazaar 02]\nNumerous Iranian political websites have been published on the Internet.  Some of the more significant of these are Presideent Khatami at http://www.president.ir/; the reformist parliament at www.majlis.irl; a website from the 2001 presidential election http://www.entekhab80.20m.com/; outspoken critic of the current regime and Shi'ia cleric Ayatollah Hussein Ali Montazeri at http://www.montazeri.com; and the Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khameini at http://www.wilayah.ir/.  The importance of this new medium is beginning to be recognized as more candidates seek the support of the youth of Iran.  Dr. Assad Homayoun, the President of Azedagan, an Iranian exile organization, argues that \"Mao Tse-Tung used to say that real powers come from the barrel of a gun, but today real power comes from the Internet.\"  His opinion is slightly exaggerated, but the Internet can be partly responsible for democratic progress within Iran.  Nasser Hadian-Jazy, a political science professor from the University of Tehren agrees that, \"like it or not, the satellite and the Internet are changing Iran and the conservatives have no idea how to deal with it.\" [Mazaar 02]\nThe use of web logs, commonly known as blogs, has grown considerably in Iran.\nA blog can take on many different implementations such as journalism, political campaigns, media programs, and even corporations.  The most influential blogs inside Iran are those that are centered on politics.  Blogs tend to overcome the tight control that a conservative theocracy such as Iran has over the media.  The author and readers can exchange information or discuss stories that quite possibly would have never made it to the Iranian conventional media.  Many have said that these blogs have become the voice of the opposition to the current regime and have advanced the cause of democracy in Iran.  There are an estimated 65,000 blogs written in Farsi. Farsi is the fourth most widely used language on web logs.  [WIKI 05]  A comprehensive listing of blogs written by Iranians can be found at http://blogsbyiranians.com.   The government has responded to the dissent among bloggers by arresting dozens of these web journalists.  Some of those detained, such as Arash Sigarchi and Mojtaba Saminejad, are reportedly being held in solitary confinement and are being tortured.  The government has not explicitly stated that their opposition is the reason for imprisonment, but both detainees have actively used their blogs to criticize the government.  Reporters Without Borders, human rights groups, and other bloggers are attempting to gain the release of all Iranian bloggers and cyberdissidents. [Boyd 05]\n\n## 2. White Hat Network Security Groups\n\nAlong with widespread usage of the Internet for political purposes, there is a growing interest in network security.  Rapid expansion of computer technology in Iran has resulted in a lack of training or attention towards network security.  While Iranian academic institutions have begun to teach these fundamentals, many computer systems within Iran are targets of opportunity due to a lack of adequate protection.  Widespread successful attacks on websites hosted in Iran highlight the inadequate security awareness.\nIn response to this threat, there are numerous white-hat websites that have been published.  Some examples of these are Hat Squad Security Team (http://www.hatsquad.com), Iran Security (http://weblog.iransecurity.com), IR Computer Emergency Response Team (www.ircert.com), Iran Virus Database (http://www.irvirus.com/), and Crouz Security Team (http://www.crouz.com/).  These sites, written in Farsi, appear to discuss vulnerabilities.  They are similar to English-language white-hat sites that purport to expose software vulnerabilities and prompt software manufacturers to patch them.  The goal of these web communities is to ensure software makers create more secure software.\n\nIn addition to white-hat websites, an Iranian group is also listed on the Defcon website as one of its membership groups.  Defcon holds an annual computer security conference in Las Vegas and is considered the largest underground hacking convention in the world.  Defcon groups were established to share security information among its members and to provide some cohesion within the hacker community.  The Tehran based group was formed in February 2004 by a hacker named Tenebrious.  Very little is known of this group's activities, but participation in the Defcon organization shows a willingness to share information among its members.  [DEFCON 05]\n\n## E. Conclusion\n\nThe study and use of information technology has become widespread throughout Iran.  Iranian learning institutions are actively teaching the fundamentals of Information Technology through undergraduate and graduate degrees.  Research at these institutions is commensurate of what is to be expected from academic institutions throughout the world.  The public community in Iran also actively participates through Information Technology.  The Internet has become a virtual community used not only for the advancement of science, but also for political activism, conventional Iranian media, and webbloggers struggling to derive the truth from a Islamic theocracy that tightly controls the media.\n\n## Iv. Government Activity A. Introduction\n\nThis chapter will examine Iranian government activity pertaining to CNA/E.  It will detail government entities involved in the research and development of IT, the use of IT in its military doctrine, and the likelihood of Iran conducting cyberwarrior training.\n\n\n\n## B. Government Entities Involved In Iranian It Development\n\nThroughout the last decade, Iran has expressed a strong interest in developing its information communications and technology infrastructure.  It has made considerable progress in expanding access to information technology.  The Second-Five Year Plan emphasized a policy in which the government would advance technology research to solve developmental problems.  According to the plan, this policy was to be realized by:\n\n-\nDeveloping a research system conducive to further enhancement, better\narrangement, and coordination of research activities and their evaluation\n-\nSetting research priorities\n-\nStrengthening relations between the country's research centers and their\ninternational counterparts\n-\nReinforcing an organic relationship between research application and education.\n[Shokoohi 96]  Furthermore, President Khatami expressed his views on the government's role in scientific research in a speech at the 11th Khwarazmi Science Festival:\nIf we are determined to make progress, our political system, government and state must earnestly engage in scientific inquiry and research so that our future course will be based on firm foundations. What is of great importance to us is turning research and investigation into a culture and everyday practice so that it can permeate all walks of life and all aspects of our society, and consequently, the notion can take root that life without inquiry and research is a life without glory and honor. The ground root and underlying foundation of our actions in the realms of science, technology, social sciences and civil service should be formed by research and investigation. To instill such a social attitude demands national determination, and the government alone will not be able to accomplish such a great task. We are all aware that the pivot of all research and investigation is man, that is, the thinking man. Therefore, real progress and true development is tantamount to the development of the human element. Out of the four elements which together form what we know as technology, three of them, that is, information and knowledge, skilled manpower, and management concern human beings, and only one, namely technical tools and equipment, are supposed to be non-human, although they, too, are actually the objective form and the crystallization of human thought. This goes to show that technology, which seems to be the most materialistic aspect of human society, is, in fact, the most human of all. [Khatami 05]\nGiven the policies set forth by the Second Five Year Plan and the opinion of the Iranian President, the government plays an active role in the development of information technology.\nThere are several government research institutions that conduct scientific research. Together with research from the academic institutions previously described, these institutions promote the rapid development and deployment of technology in Iran.\nThe primary research institutions pursuing information technology topics are the Iran Telecommunications Research Center, Guilan Science and Technology Park, and the Pardis Technology Park.\n\n## 1. Iran Telecommunications Research Center\n\nEstablished in 1970, the Iran Telecommunications Research Center (ITRC) is the research arm of the Ministry of Information and Communications Technology.  It has evolved as a key consultative body, liaising with and influencing the Ministry's decisionmaking concerning emerging technologies and international interactions.  The center boasts about 600 active researchers from academia and industry throughout the country and has an estimated 21,000 sq. meters of modern laboratories.  The ITRC is a member of the European Technical Standards Institute, participating in the development of new standards development and customization studies.  According to their website, the center also embraces collaboration in the development of new technologies with peers from all over the world.  Its stated goals are listed below:\n\n\n-\nLaunching research studies and disseminating results and experiences nationwide.\n-\nProvision of consultancy services\n-\nDirecting and managing national standards and regulations of ICT\nIn its role as a consultant, the center advises government policy makers in the ICT \"blueprint\" for Iran.  The center also confers with other international entities to improve the Iranian ICT infrastructure. Its research groups are divided into 4 different departments. The Information Technology department consists of multimedia, IT application, and IT strategy and infrastructure research groups.  The Strategic Management department consists of ICT economic and developmental planning, ICT\nsecurity management, strategic and regulatory issues, and integrated telecommunications network management groups.  The Networking department studies data networks, wireless technology, and switching system groups.  Finally, the transmission department focuses on antennas and radio systems, satellite communications, and optical communications groups.  The Third-Five Year Plan established a framework for the ITRC to study topics such as a data telecommunication management networks with an emphasis on design of network telecommunication management network, network evaluation and quality of service (QOS)' intelligent networks (IN) and related services' network security' asynchronous transfer mode (ATM) and synchronous digital hierarchy (SDH).\n\nWithin the ITRC are additional study groups that are aligned with the International Telecommunications Union (ITU-T) study groups that focus standards development and research in the form of study questions.  According to the ITRC\nwebsite, they are active in 12 groups and have generated numerous scientific and technical papers.   Of particular interest was the ITRC participation in Study Group 17, Security, Languages, and Telecommunication Software.  The ITRC website states that Study Group 17 has prepared 30 papers, conducted 5 workshops, and provided consultancy for executive departments since 2001.  [ITRC 05]\nIn addition to conducting research, the ITRC hosts international conferences to further promote the scientific achievement of Iran.  An International Symposium of Telecommunications was being organized for September 2005.  The purpose of the symposium is to highlight the most recent developments in communications and information technologies to include new concepts, theories, technological advancements, services, and network infrastructure improvements.  [ITRC 05]  An internet search for the ITRC yielded the resume of a Professor Shahram Bakhtiari of Sharif University of Technology.  His resume includes an extensive background in network security, cryptanalysis, and object orientated design.  He has run information security workshops for several conferences to include the Iranian Conference on Electrical Engineering (ICEE '99) hosted at the ITRC.  [Bakhtiari 01]  Another internet search result for the ITRC yielded a program for the 17th International Conference for Computer Applications in Industry and Engineering held in Orlando, Florida in 2004.  One of the presentations, given by three scientists from the ITRC, was entitled \"A Systematic Approach to Network Security Assessment\" by Mehdi Rasti, Davood Sarramy, and Mahmood Khaleghi.  [CAINE 04]  A search for Mehdi Rasti yielded another publication titled \"Neural Network Based Dynamic Anomaly Detection in Computer Networks: A Novel Training Paradigm Using Abnormal Behavior\" from CAINE 03 held in Las Vegas, NV.\n[Varjani 04]  Participation in International conferences demonstrates the ITRC's interest in contribution to the advancement of computer security topics.\nAs the principle research center for the Ministry of Information and Communication Technology, the ITRC is considered to be one of the principle elements of governmental participation of technology.  There was limited information pertaining to specific research projects, but given that network security is a topic of study, there may be substantial research in that area.\n\n## 2. Guilan Science And Technology Park\n\nFormerly known as the Iranian Research Organization of Science and Technology, the Guilan Science and Technology Park (GSTP) was established in 1989 as a research center and reorganized in 2002 as a technology park.  According to its website, some of the park's goals are to develop research activities in the private sector and to assist small companies to find markets for their innovations and products by promoting cooperation with the more established high-tech industry.  It is a member of the International Association of Science Parks (IASP) and works in close cooperation with the Steinbeis Foundation in Germany.  The GSTP focuses on the agro-food, biotechnology, chemistry, electronics, ICT, and tourism industries in Iran.  The technology companies that have established themselves in the park include the North Sabat Computer Cooperation Company, Guilan Communication and Technology Development Company, Green Pooya Net Company, Morvarid Information Technology and Software Company, and the Guilan Computer Science Cooperation Company. Within the park is an ICT Incubation center that provides additional assistance to technology companies aiming to reduce the inherent risk of technology development. [GSTP 05]  While this park has been a success, its principle focus is to promote small technological business development.  Its remote location relative to the thriving technology and research environment centered on Tehran presents an obstacle in becoming a premier research park in the Middle East.  [Khatami 05]\n\n## 3. Technology Cooperation Office\n\nThe Technology Cooperation Office (TCO) was founded in 1984 as the Office of Scientific and Industrial Studies to provide consultation to the President of Iran.  It was renamed to the TCO to promote the international cooperation in the field of advanced technologies.  The TCO supports Iranian organizations in the following ways:\n\n-\nTechnology development planning\n-\nOrganizing design offices and R&D centers\n-\nCoordinating joint research projects\n-\nOrganizing specialized training courses, seminars and exhibitions\n-\nTechnology procurement and localization\n-\nEstablishing relations between Iranian institutions and foreign industrial and scientific research centers for technology cooperation\nThe TCO is active in several fields including Biotechnology, Aerospace, Information Technology, Software, New Materials, Industrial Processes, Energy, Civil Engineering, Infrastructures, Power Engineering, Studies on Technology Development and Technology Management.  Attempts to view the website directly were unsuccessful due to the website being taken offline.  An archive of the TCO website is provided in Figure 3.\n\n\n\n## 4. Paradis Technology Park\n\nWhile still being developed, the Pardis Technology Park (PTP) was established to foster better cooperation between large-scale public and private research.  Hoping to capitalize on the success of Silicon Valley in the United States, the park has declared itself to be the future Silicon Valley of Iran.  PTP is under the direct management of a Board of Directors representing the TCO and Sharif University of Technology.  The involvement of the TCO shows a high level of governmental support and control. [UNIDO 05]  Its close proximity to the rapidly expanding high-tech industry in Tehran and several academic institutions such as Sharif University of Technology and the University of Tehran make it a very promising venture.  With a focus on ICT, the park claims the support from a myriad of local and international scientific organizations.  The government hopes that the PTP will provide a better opportunity for foreign investment of Iranian ICT.  The park is considered to be the heart of Iran's strategic technology development.  With an area of over 60 acres available, the park promises to provide leading edge IT infrastructure and communal facilities.  Its focus areas will be advanced engineering, biotechnology, chemistry, electronics, ICT, and nano-technology.  At least\n45 companies have thus far agreed to purchase land in the park.  A picture of the proposed headquarters building and park plans are included in Figure 4.   By leveraging public, academic, and private research into a single geographic area, Iran hopes to establish this area as the premium center for technology research in the Middle East.\n\nOutside of traditional academic research being conducted by public universities, these research centers are the bulk of the Iranian effort for ICT development.  The technology research centers described were established to better coordinate technology research and transfer.  Given the relatively tight economic controls placed on businesses in Iran, the coordination of competing research efforts by the government is essential to further technological innovation.  There was very limited information pertaining to specific research projects these institutions were undertaking, but there was substantial evidence of a proactive Iranian government approach with regards to ICT development support.\n\n## C. Military Doctrine\n\nIran's military doctrine is based on its regional political aspirations, external threat perceptions, and the desire to preserve the Islamic state.  Iran's strategy is to become the most dominant power in the Middle East.  Recent campaigns by the United States in Iraq and Afghanistan have prompted Iran to reevaluate its strategic doctrine. The perception of being surrounded by the United States or its allies is shaping the country to pursue more asymmetric capabilities to counter a much larger and more powerful force.  Iran believes that further development of WMDs and medium to long range missile systems are essential to ensure regional security.  Due to increased international scrutiny, Iran does not openly admit to the development of WMDs; recent press reports on Iran's nuclear capabilities indicate otherwise.  Regardless of the state of its nuclear capabilities, Iran claims to have other means to handle foreign threats.  In early August 2004, Iranian Deputy Defense Minister Mohammad Shafii-Rudsari declared that Iran \"has a diverse defense strategy to meet threats from foreign powers such as America and our defense capacity and power are entirely adequate for regional...threats.\" Iran highlighted its asymmetric military doctrine in the Ashura-5 military exercise during September 2004.  In this exercise, the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps conducted coordinated air and ground attacks, strategic missiles, and other weapons and methods. Iran also tested its defensive tactics, psychological warfare, and logistical capabilities. [Janes 05]\nThere was no evidence found to indicate Iran has an ability to conduct CNA/E\nagainst its enemies, although Iran has historically supported the development of asymmetric capabilities such as WMDs to include nuclear and chemical weapons, ballistic missile technology, and the sponsorship of terrorism.  [Rubin 02]  Given the United States and the western world's reliance on information technology, a cyber-attack capability would give Iran an opportunity to degrade or disrupt adversary information dominance strategy.\n\n## D. Training Cyber-Warriors\n\nEvaluating Iran's participation in CNA/E activities has proven to be a very difficult task.  Outside of the security courses being taught to university students, there was no direct evidence of state-sponsored training.  Iran's cooperation with North Korea is well known by the US government to include military technology transfer and training.\nThere have been recent reports regarding cooperation in the development of the Iranian Shahab-3 and the North Korean Nodong missile systems.  [Shannon 05]  In addition, according to an interview of Hamid Reza Zakiri, a senior Revolutionary Guard official who defected, Iran has sent military and intelligence officers to North Korea for training in psychological warfare and counter-espionage.  Although unconfirmed by the United States government, North Korea is reportedly operating a hacking school that produces up to 100 cyber-warriors a year.  [McWilliams 03]  The close cooperation between North Korea and Iran makes the possibility of cross-training of personnel in CNA/E capabilities likely.\n\n## E. Conclusion\n\nThis chapter summarized the participation of the Iranian government in the development of information technology.  Iran's efforts to be on the leading of research in the Middle East are evident in the government sponsorship and coordination of research by public, private, and academic entities.  In addition, this chapter discussed Iran's military doctrine of developing asymmetric capabilities to counter larger and more capable foreign powers.  Also examined were Iran's close military training ties with North Korea and possible cross-training of cyberwarfare personnel.  Given Iran's steady advancement of technological capabilities, it is reasonable to assume that the government intends to leverage this capability for offensive and defensive actions.\n\n## This Page Intentionally Left Blank V. Computer Network Attack/Exploitation Activity A. Introduction\n\nThis chapter examines the CNA/E activities of Iran.  There have been many suspicions and generalizations of suspected CNA/E activities being carried out by Iranian Internet users.  This chapter provides insight into whether these suspicions are correct by discussing various known hacking groups, some possible motivations for hacking, and difficulties in identifying Iranian hackers.\n\n## B. Computer Network Attack\n\nCNA is defined as operations to disrupt, deny, degrade, or destroy information resident in computers and computer networks, or the computers and networks themselves. CNA relies on interpreted signals in a data stream to execute an attack.  An example of CNA is sending a digital signal stream through a network to a central processing unit that instructs the controller to interrupt the power supply.  CNA is often confused with electronic warfare which targets the electromagnetic spectrum rather than computer networks.  [Wilson 04]\n\n## C. Computer Network Exploitation\n\nCNE involves the use of espionage of computer systems with tools that penetrate systems to return information enabling an adversary to gain an advantage.  Prior to conducting CNA, an adversary might conduct a covert and thorough analysis using CNE to determine vulnerabilities.  In addition, in order to develop an effective Computer Network Defense (CND), CNE may be conducted on adversary information systems to accurately diagnose their capabilities.  Therefore, reconnaissance, probing, and scanning of networks associated with CNE can readily be used in the conduct of CNA and CND.\n[Wilson 04]\n\n## D. Motivations For Hacking Within Iran\n\nIn order to analyze the hacking activities of Iran, an analysis of the motivations of this type of activity must be conducted first.  Researchers that have interviewed individuals in the hacking community have yielded a number of common themes to explain the motivations behind these people.  These motivators were a compulsion to hack, curiosity, control and attraction to power, peer recognition, and belonging to a group.  [Van Beveren 01]  In addition, monetary gain is increasingly becoming more influential for hackers.  In Iran, some hackers have been found with political or religious motivations.\n\n## 1. Traditional Hacking Motivations\n\nThere are common motivations that have motivated hackers world-wide.  These include money, power, curiosity, and a sense of belonging.  It is very likely that these motivations have some influence on the hacking community in Iran.  Historically, hackers have defaced web pages or launched worm and virus attacks to gain notoriety among their peers.  Hacking groups' discussion pages and blogs are littered with discussions of accomplishments and vulnerabilities.  One such observation came from an Iranian individual named \"Spiderhacker.\"  In his blog, he talks about hacking into many websites due to a lack of security.  Although he claims that he does not like to boast of his accomplishments, he believes that he is enhancing Iran's reputation in the worldwide community of hackers.  [Spider 04]  Another hacking motivator is the sense of belonging that is created among hacker \"teammates.\"  Various Iranian hacking teams were found. Most of their sites were actively recruiting new members with any level of kind hacking or programming proficiency.  Some examples of Iranian groups found include Iran Hacker Association, Iran Hacking Sabotage Team, Iran Babol-Hackers Security Team, Ashiyane Digital Security Team and Persian Crackers.  There are many more groups that have formed ad hoc hacking and computer security communities bound together by the Internet that are too numerous to list.  The Iran Hacker Association claimed to have scheduled meetings with some of its members in which they promised to post the minutes from this meeting.  The website also claimed \"Spiderhacker\" was the head of the association.  [IHA 03]\nAnother motivator that has increasingly becoming more influential for hackers is monetary gain.  According to FBI spokesman Paul Bresson, there \"has been a rise in the cases where the motivation appears not just to be for the purposes of bragging in chat rooms, but to actually profit financially.\"  He goes on to say that there is an increasing growing underground for selling credit card numbers, software vulnerabilities, or renting out \"botnets.\"  Botnets, also known as Zombie networks, are used to extort companies who are threatened with a Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attack.  [Ever 05]\nIranian hacking teams such as the IHS Team and the Ashiyane Digital Security Team have hacked sites throughout the country in the hopes of selling security training and services.  Both teams are well known for their hacking exploits on an internet database of attacks, Zone-H.org.  Their activities on the Internet are directly related to services they are selling.  These hacking groups exhibit some of the same motivations of hackers worldwide.  The quest for recognition, a sense of belonging, power, curiosity, and monetary gain drive individuals into the hacking world.  The lack of education and awareness of network security makes the Iranian portion of the Internet a target rich environment for skilled and unskilled hackers alike.\n\n## 2. Politically Motivated Hacking\n\nIran is considered to be an oppressive theocracy that has little tolerance for dissent or disagreement from the civilian populace.  Stories such as the government practice of web-content censorship and the detainment of webloggers that espouse anti-government rhetoric validate this belief.  This environment coupled with widespread vulnerabilities on the Internet in Iran makes politically motivated hacking, or hacktivism, very likely. One of the most well-known hactivists is Oxblood Ruffin the publisher of www.hacktivismo.com.  In an interview with Shift.com, he discusses software he has developed such as an anonymous tunneling protocol program and a program to embed messages inside of gif images to bypass censorship filters.    He reports that there has been considerable activity using these programs from Iran.  [Moyes 02]  This technology has been used by hackers and bloggers alike to subvert government filtering.  Although there was no evidence of this type of software being developed by Iranian programmers, there have been other potential politically motivated hacks.  The weblog by the reformist Iranian former Vice President Abtahi's weblog was hacked numerous times in response to his postings regarding the government torture of other webloggers.  Word of this cyber attack has spread throughout the Internet on other blogger's sites.  One such post on the blog of \"Persian Students in the UK\" attributed the following quote to Abtahi in which he hints that there is a greater conspiracy of hacking against him:\nAgain for a few days I was unable to publish anything. The reason is probably obvious, after writing the post about the arrested bloggers. If I get into trouble again, I will write about it comprehensively.\"\nPersian Students in the UK theorize that these hackers are funded by conservative elements within the country.  (Parthisan 05)  Other political sites have also been hacked.\nA more recent example of possible hacktivism is the distributed denial of service (DDoS) attack of an ex-Presidential candidate Ali Larijani.  The campaign committee for Larijani claimed that the opposition had hacked his sight due to his political views.  News of this activity has also made itself into several Iranian blogs such as regimechangeiran.blogspot.com and nowrooz.blogspot.com.  Evidence that politically motivated hacking is occurring within Iran is fairly substantial.  The attacks on the websites of Larijani and Abtahi indicate that elements within the country are attempting to silence the opposition.  Many bloggers have theorized that the government has been conducting these attacks.  Bloggers such as Hoder have gone as far as to label the hard line governments as \"IT-ollahs.\"  [Derakhshan 05]  There was no evidence validating these claims, but this opinion is widespread throughout the blogging community.\n\n## 3. Religious Motivations\n\nAs with the rest of the Islamic World, Islam has significant influence upon the lives of the Iranian people.  Fatwas issued by religious scholars have significant influence upon those who follow Islam  The World Wide Web is also used to disseminate information by scholars regarding Islamic law with some of them offering online fatwas for those with specific questions.  These fatwas can be found on websites such as www.islamtoday.com and www.islamonline.net, and www.ask-imam.com.  One particular fatwa issued by Dr. Sano Koutoub Moustapha, a Professor of Jurisprudence and Its Principles at the International Islamic University of Malaysia, issued a fatwa giving permission to hack into computers.  The question posed to him was:\nRespected scholar, I'd like to know the Islamic ruling on hacking web sites that serve the American and Israeli interests on the Internet?\n\nDr. Moustapha's response gives permission to hack into sites as defined below:\nYour question seems to be too general. However, Islam does stand for better cooperation and communications with nations who are not destroying and fighting us.  This is clearly stated in Almighty Allah's saying: \"Allah forbiddeth you not those who warred not against you on account of religion and drove you not out from your homes, that ye should show them kindness and deal justly with them. Lo ! Allah loveth the just dealers. Allah forbiddeth you only those who warred against you on account of religion and have driven you out from your homes and helped to drive you out, that ye make friends of them. Whosoever maketh friends of them (All) such are wrong doers.\" (Al-Mumtahanah: 8-9).  This means that one should differentiate between those enemies who are killing our innocent and helpless Muslims around the world and those enemies who help or assist them in doing so. In addition to that, one has to do his best to tackle and hack those sites which are meant to murder and kill Muslims. Furthermore, Muslims should be able to discover the plans and strategies of our enemies in order for them to come up with strategies that will protect us against the attacks of the enemies. In this regard, I shall say there is no harm or prohibition to hack any site meant to destroy Muslims or occupy our lands. It is a legitimate right to defend ourselves by using all possible means and tools including hacking and destroying those evil sites.  [Moustapha 04]\nThe fatwa above speaks with generalizations and does not say who the target of the attack should be.  Given the United States military operations ongoing throughout the world, it could be assumed that he was referring to the United States and its allies.  Although considered a powerful statement in Islamic law, a fatwa is only binding for the follower of the person who issues it.  Many people in the Islamic world believe that there is a lack of structured leadership in Islam and there are far too many people who can issue fatwas.\nNonetheless, statements like the one from Dr. Moustapha indicate that traditional Islamic jihad motivations could be used as a justification for cyber attack.\n\n\n## 4. Hacking As An Instrument Of Foreign Policy\n\nThere are several tools available to a nation state to execute its foreign policy, some examples of these include diplomacy, economic pressure, and military force.\nGiven the overwhelming dominance of the United States and its allies in world affairs, Iran's national military strategy to counter this perceived threat is to develop asymmetric warfare capabilities.  One such capability is cyber warfare.  No direct evidence of Iranian sponsorship of CNA was found, but it is possible that the capability is being considered or even currently being developed.\n\n\n## E. Iranian Hacking Groups\n\nThere is quite a substantial hacking community within Iran.  The skills of these hackers range from unskilled amateurs that can use software tools that are developed to exploit already known vulnerabilities to skilled hackers that find new vulnerabilities and exploitations.  Due to government filtering, all the sites found during the research were hosted in countries outside Iran.  A substantial number of websites posted vulnerabilities, exploits and downloadable software tools in Iran.  Several of them stood out due to increased level of sophistication and number of attacks credited to them.  These website were the Iran Hacking Sabotage Team, Aysahne Digital Security Team, and Iran Babol- Hacking Team.\n\n## 1. Iran Hackers Sabotage Team\n\nThe Iran Hackers Sabotage (IHS) Team is one of the most active hacking groups in Iran.  It is listed with Zone-H.org as one of the world's top attackers.  According to Zone-H, IHS has conducted 3551 attacks of which 481 were single IP attacks and 3069 were mass defacements.  The target of attacks that IHS have attacked include commercial, local and federal government, and academics domains within the United States.  IHS has also conducted attacks on foreign domains throughout the world.  [Zone 05]  According to their website, they were established in early 2004 to put Iran on the map with regards to hacking ability.  After being able to successfully penetrate servers throughout the world, they decided to offer vulnerability assessment services and secure web hosting.  The team consists of three hackers named NT, C0d3r, and LorD. According to the biographies on the website, NT and C0d3r are university students at an unnamed university.  LorD claims that he is a security researcher and a programmer.  All three express an interest in networking and exploitation coding.  Several original exploitation programs were available for download.  Each download was uncompiled code written for Visual C++ and contained comments providing the history of the bug/exploit.  All of the exploitations available on the IHS website were based on bugs found by other people or organizations.  Typically each exploitation code was generated by IHS within a few days of public release of the vulnerability on various security sites. Some examples of exploitations found include a local root exploit for IBM AIX, 3Com 3cdameon BOF exploit, Internet Download Manager remote stack overflow exploit, and PMsoftware Web Server version 1.0 remote stack server overflow exploit.  The exploitation code also contained the name Kaveh Razavi as the name for C0d3r.  [IHS 05]  A picture of the IHS website is shown below.\n\n\n\nAccording to Zone-H, IHS is responsible for the July 25th, 2005 attack on the U.S. Naval Station Guantanamo's public website (http://nsgtmo.jax.spawar.navy.mil).  A\nsaved copy of the attack is depicted below.  According to the text in the attack, the IHS\nexpressed disagreement with US foreign policy.  As of August 10th, 2005, the Naval Station's website was still not available.  Other attacks by IHS upon U.S. government sites include the Armed Forces Institute of Pathology and various local county websites.\n\n## 2. Ashiyane Digital Security Team\n\nAnother of the more well known Iranian hacking teams is the Ashiyane Digital Security Team.  According to Zone-H, the Ashiyane DST is accredited with 3,007 attacks of which 396 were single IP attacks and 2611 were mass defacements.  [Zone 05]  Their website is included below.  A simple Google search of the team name yields numerous web sites that have been hacked by the Ashiyane DST.  Like the IHS, this team's principle motivation is to sell its security consultation, web hosting, and network consulting services.  There was also some evidence of this team having using political motivations to hack.  A defacement of a National Aeronautics and Space Administration\n(NASA) website below also questioned the United States' Middle East foreign policy. Other attacks by Ashiyane were simply used to put their name with links to their website on the world-wide web.  An example of one of Ashiyane DST's advertising attacks is shown in Figure 9.\n\nAccording to their website, the Ashiyane DST appears to be fairly well organized.\nThey have several teams including management, training, defacement, and software programming teams.  There were biographies listed for 15 members of the team.  The team leader is Behrooz Kamalyan who goes by the nickname Behrooz_Ice.  The team member's ages ranged from 16 to 28.  The member of this group had a wide variety of computer related skills.  Most of the team members boast experience in the major operating systems such as Windows, UNIX, Cisco IOS, and LINUX.  Many of them had programming experience in languages such as C, C++, VC++, Delphi, and Perl.  All of them claimed some sort of hacking capabilities to include firewall penetration, social engineering, php database hacking, operating system penetration, shareware cracking, and decoding program executables.  Several of these members conducted classroom training for a fee on topics such as basic, advanced, and professional levels of hacking, hacking tools, and a list of other programming languages, operating systems, and professional certifications.  These classes were taught in an audio/visual classroom at a vocational school in Tehran.  The cost of hacking training varied by the level of instruction; the basic course cost approximately $200.00 for 40 hours of instruction while the professional level course cost approximately $355.00 for the same amount of instruction time.  The Ashiyane DST appears to a very active and a well structured organization for hacking in Iran.  Its members have a vast amount of technical knowledge and experience that could be used to develop a government sponsored CNA/E capability.\n\n## 3. Iran Babol-Hackers Security Team\n\nVery little is known of the Iran Babol-Hackers Security Team (BHST).  Zone-H\nattributes 297 attacks with 278 as single IP attacks and 20 as mass defacements.  A\nGoogle search of Iran Babol-Hackers Security Team yields many websites that have been defaced by them.  Their website was very well designed but contained very little information about the team.  A picture of the site is included below.  While no biographies were posted, the team members appear to be Ezrael, The Undertaker, Black- Ice, FaOp, and PoPo.  Most of the site was still under construction, but a statement on the site claims that it will post training videos and computer security related topics in the future.  While very little information could be determined from their website, the BHST\nhas shown that it has the necessary skills to conduct attacks on the internet. Activity by hacking groups such as the Iran Hackers Security Team, Ashiyane Digital Security Team, and the Iran Babol-Hacker Security Team indicate a substantial hacking community within Iran.  There was evidence of many more hacking group's webpages or web logs.  The groups listed above were the most active and well-known groups found.  This malicious hacking activity indicates that an organic CNA/E capability exists.  Although there was no evidence that the activity by these groups were supported by the Iranian government, a potential exists for Iran to hire the individuals involved to join a government CNA/E group.\n\n## F. Difficulties Of Identifying Iranian Hackers\n\nIt can be difficult to identify hackers and the origins of attacks on the Internet.\nThere are several reasons why this is so, including:\n\n\n## 1. Internet Protocol (Ip) Spoofing\n\nIP Spoofing is an attempt to gain access using a different IP address.  The hacker uses a variety of techniques to find an IP address from an external computer that is allowed access to the target network or computer, or to access an IP address from the addresses that the computers on a targeted network use. The illicitly obtained IP address is then used to modify the packet headers that the hacker sends, thereby tricking the target network or computer into allowing the hacker access to the target host.  Sophisticated hackers undoubtedly use this technique to gain access to a protected network.  Iranians could use this method to disguise their true address making it nearly impossible to trace the origin of the attack.\n\n## 2. Communication Bouncing\n\nCommunication bouncing involves bouncing communications through a distributed network to disguise the true origin.  Hackers can do this in a couple of different ways.  The first method involves a hacker gaining access to a server or series of servers and then using them as the source of an attack.  A second and far easier method is to use an online service such as the Tor network (www.tor.eff.org).  It uses a set of relay servers to keep communications private and to prevent internet traffic from being analyzed.  A diagram is included below to illustrate how a message is sent over the Tor network.  The communications between the nodes can also be encrypted to prevent any packet sniffing.  Iranian hackers could use this technology to not only bypass government filters, but also hack into computer networks.\n\n## 3. Manipulation Of Event Logs\n\nMost systems utilize system logs that record notable system events.  While these logs are considered an essential security practice, hackers have found ways to bypass or change them to disguise their attacks.  Some of these techniques are well-known throughout the Internet.  It is likely that Iranian hackers use these techniques to avoid identification.\n\n## 4. Lack Of Accurate Cyber Attack Reporting\n\nAccording to a speech by FBI Director Robert Mueller, most businesses do not report cyber attacks.  Reports of identity theft in the media have become quite common causing damage to a company's public image.  This has caused a reluctance to report attacks to the authorities.  A survey by the Computer Security Institute revealed that fewer than 20% of companies have reported computer intrusions for 2004.  In his speech, Director Mueller stated that the FBI \"cannot investigate if we are not aware of the problem.''  This is a substantial problem that affects the accurate diagnosis of hacking activity.  It is likely that successful attacks by Iranian hackers have gone unreported.\n[Sherman 05]\n\n## G. Conclusion\n\nThis chapter discussed the activities, motivations, and difficulties encountered through open source research of Iran's CNA/E activities.  Iranian hackers have established a loosely formed virtual community of web logs and security websites discussing network vulnerabilities and exploitations.  The task of identifying hackers, their motivations, and sponsorship however, can be difficult.  While Iran has a fairly substantial hacking community, it appears to lack formal structure or state sponsorship.\n\n\n                                THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK\n\n\n\n## Vi. Conclusions And Recommendations A. Conclusion 1. Academic And Research Activity Shows An Extensive Interest In Cno Activity\n\nIranian academic and research institutions are on par with comparable institutions throughout the world.  Many of the scientists and academic researchers that specialize in computer security have been educated in both Iranian and western academic institutions. Iranian academic and research institutions actively contribute by participating in international conferences and academic publications.  There is adequate access to information resources via the internet available to scientists.  The interaction with the international computer security community ensures adequate knowledge transfer.\nThere is substantial government interest in embracing the study of information technology.  Several Iranian public academic institutions are pursuing research in computer security related topics.  Faculty members from many academic institutions have had experience in or are actively pursuing topics that are relevant to CNO.  Overall goals for information technology research have been promulgated by guidance in the evolving Five Year Plans.  The Iranian government has maintained oversight of research efforts through the Technology Cooperation Office and the Ministry of Information and Communication Technology.  The establishment of the Iranian Telecommunications Research Center, Guilan Science Technology Park, and the Paradis Technology Park are used to facilitate research.  A firm foundation has been established for Iran to become one of the most technologically advanced nations in the Middle East.\n\n## 2. Malicious Hacking Is Widespread Throughout Iran\n\nMalicious hacking within Iran is widespread.  There were dozens of websites, blogs, and discussion groups that promulgate information pertaining to vulnerabilities exploitations, and software tools.  There was substantial evidence of hacking techniques such as domain hijacking, web page defacements, and software vulnerability exploitation. The activity found appeared to be mostly juvenile hacking that was unstructured and unorganized.  The motivations for this activity can be attributed to general hacking motives such as power, money, politics, recognition, etc.  There have been some claims that the government has used CNA to disrupt the efforts of political candidates and dissidents, but this study found no evidence found of government support or organization of this type of activity.\n\n## 3. Open Source Information Regarding Government-Sponsored Cno Is Not Widely Available\n\nThroughout the research, there was an abundance of information regarding cyber attack activity originating from Iran.  Most of this information is based on generalizations and suppositions made from Iran's potential capability to conduct cyber attacks. Difficulties arise when trying to establish a direct link between the government and malicious hacking.  Nation states typically try to keep their CNA/E capabilities from being released to the public as disclosure of this information would endanger the effectiveness of such operations.  Information regarding the United States' CNO activities is kept at a classified level, and it is reasonable to assume that Iran's CNO capabilities are treated similarly.  Open source information regarding the Iranian government's CNO activity is merely speculative and based on its potential for attack.\nThere was an abundance of evidence to indicate that this speculation is worthwhile in determining an adequate analysis for CND of critical infrastructures.  Although no direct evidence was found linking the Iranian government to a cyber attack capability, the information technology infrastructure, educational system, and government research activity indicates that such activity is possible if explored by the government.  Iran's education and research system actively participates in the world-wide community with regards to computer security.  Computer security specialists within Iran would be able to support or conduct cyber attacks for the government.\n\n## B. Recommendations For Future Work 1. The Assessment Of A Cna/E Capability By Terrorist Groups\n\nTerrorist groups such as Al-Qaeda and Hezbollah use the internet as a tool for public relations and recruiting.  Messages from terrorist leaders are often published to the web prior to the mainstream media receiving hardcopies.  Given a terrorist's modus operandi of seeking out asymmetric capabilities against a more powerful enemy, these groups may be seeking to develop a CNA/E capability.  An analysis of selected terrorist groups' CNA/E capabilities and limitations may provide insightful information to determine this possibility.\n\n\nTHIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK\n\n\n\n## List Of References\n\n[ACMICPC 03]  Association of Computing Machinery and International Collegiate Programming Contest, The 27th Annual ACM-International Collegiate Programming Contest Asia Finals 2003, http://icpc.baylor.edu/icpc/regionals/RosterPublicFull.asp?ContestID=655, 2005\nLast accessed on September 5. 2005.\n\n[ACMICPC 05]  Association of Computing Machinery and International Collegiate Programming Contest, The 29th Annual ACM-International Collegiate Programming Contest World Finals 2005, http://icpc.baylor.edu/past/icpc2005/finals/Standings.html, April 2005. Last accessed on August 26, 2005.\n\n[AMET 04]  Africa & Middle East Telecom,  \"Mobile Handset Market in MEA Grows by 26 Percent,\" September 2004.\n\n[AMET 04-1]  \"Alcatel Wins Private Sector ADSL Contract in Iran,\" Africa & Middle East Telecom, February, 2004.\n\n[AP 05]  Associated Press, \"AP News: Iran, Syria to Form United Front,\"\nhttp://apnews.myway.com/article/20050217/D889VGEO0.html, February 16, 2005.\n\nLast Accessed on January 10, 2005.\n\n[Arabshani 97]  Arabshani, Payman, \"The Internet in Iran: A Survey,\"\nhttp://www.iranian.com/WebGuide/InternetIran/InternetIran.html, June 9, 1997.\n\nLast Accessed on August 28, 2005.\n[Ashiyane 05]  Ashiyane Digital Security Team, Ashiyane Digital Security Team Website, http://www.ashiyane.com/, August, 2004.\n\nLast accessed on August 26, 2005.\n\n[Azgomi 05]  Azgomi, Mohammad Abdollahi, Mohammad Abdollahi Azgomi's Homepage, http://mehr.sharif.ir/~azgomi/, 2005.\n\nLast Accessed on August 26, 2005.\n\n[Bakhtiari 01]  Bakhtiari, Shahram, Shahram Bakhtiari Personal Website, http://sharif.ac.ir/~shahram/, July 20 2001.\n\nLast accessed on August 26, 2005.\n\n[Billo/Chang 05]  Billo, Charles G., Chang, Welton, \"Cyber Warfare: An Analysis of the Means and Motivations of Selected Nation States,\"\nhttp://www.ists.dartmouth.edu/directors-office/cyberwarfare.pdf, November 2004.\n\nLast Accessed on August 26, 2005.\n\n[Boyd 05]  Boyd, Clark,  \"The Price Paid for Blogging Iran,\"\nhttp://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/technology/4283231.stm, February 21, 2005.\n\nLast accessed on August 26, 2005.\n\n[Brown 04]  Brown, Christopher, \"Developing a Reliable Methodology for Assessing the Computer Network Operations (CNO) Threat of North Korea,\" 2004.\n\n[Bugtraq 03]  Bugtraq Mailing List, http://www.securityfocus.com/archive/1/319424, April 22, 2003. Last Accessed on August 26, 2005.\n\n[Bush 02]  Bush, George W., 2002 State of the Union Address, http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/01/20020129-11.html, January 29, 2002.\n\nLast Accessed on August 26th, 2005.\n\n[CIA 05]  Central Intelligence Agency, \"CIA World Factbook: Iran,\"\nhttp://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/print/ir.html, 2005.\n\nLast Accessed on August 28th, 2005.\n\n[DEFCON 05]  DEF CON, \"Defcon Groups Index Page,\"\nhttp://www.defcon.org/html/defcon-groups/dc-groups-index.html, September 7, 2005.\n\nLast Accessed on September 8, 2005.\n\n[Derakhshan 05]  Derakhshan, Hossein, \"Editor: Myself,\"\nhttp://www.hoder.com/weblog/, August 21 2005.\n\nLast Accessed on August 29, 2005.\n\n[Dingledine/Mathewson/Syverson 04]  Dingledine, Roger, Nick Mathewson, and Paul Syverson, \"Tor: The Second-Generation Onion Router,\" 2004.\n[Ebrahimian 05]  Ebrahimian, Laleh D. \"Socio-Economic Development in Iran through Information and Communications Technology,\" The Middle East Journal, Winter 2003.\n\n[Etemadi 05]  Etemadi, Sauleh, Personal Resume, http://www.egr.msu.edu/~etemadys/Resume.pdf, 2005\nLast Access on August 26, 2005.\n[Ever 05]  Ever, Joris. \"Hacking for Dollars,\" News.com, Jul 6, 2005. [GSTP 05]  Guilan Science and Technology Park. Guilan Science and Technology Park Website, http://www.gstp.ir, 2005.\n\nLast Accessed on August 26, 2005.\n\n[ISCA 04]  International Society for Computers and Their Applications, \"17th International Conference on Computer Applications in Industry and Engineering\n(CAINE-2004),\" http://www.isca-hq.org/CAINE-04-FINAL-PROGRAM.pdf, 2004.\n\nLast Accessed on August 15, 2005.\n\n[IBHST 05]  Iran Babol-Hacker Security Team, Iran Babol-Hacker Security Team Website, http://www.babol-hackers.com.\n\nLast Accessed on August 15, 2005.\n\n[IHA 03]  Iran Hack Association, Iran Hack Association Website, http://hackanjoman.persianblog.com/, 2003.\n\nLast Accessed on August 15, 2005.\n[IHST 05]  Iran Hacking Sabotage Team, Iran Hacking Sabotage Team Website, http://www.ihsteam.com/, August 8 2005. Last Accessed on August 26, 2005.\n\n[ISCC 05]  \"3rd Iranian Society of Cryptology Conference,  http://www.iscc2005.org/, August 2005. Last Accessed on August 26, 2005.\n\n[ITRC 05]  Iran Telecommunications Research Center, Iran Telecommunications Research Center Website, http://www.itrc.ac.ir/, 2005.\n\nLast Accessed on August 26, 2005.\n\n[ITU 05]  International Telecommunications Union: World Telecommunication Database, \"Information Technology,\" 2005.\n\n[IUT 05]  Isfahan University of Technology, Isfahan University of Technology Website, http://www.iut.ac.ir/, 2005.\n\nLast Accessed on August 26, 2005.\n[Janes 05]  Jane's Information Group, \"Jane's Sentinel Security Assessment - Gulf States:\nArmed Forces, Iran,\" http://www.janes.com, 2005.\n\nLast Accessed on August 26, 2005.\n[Katzman 03]  Katzman, Kenneth, \"Iran: Arms and Weapons of Mass Destruction Suppliers,\" Congressional Research Center, http://www.usembassy.it/pdf/other/RL30551.pdf, 2003.\n\nLast Accessed on August 26, 2005.\n\n\n[Khatami 05]  Khatami, Mohammad, \"Views of the President,\"\nhttp://www.president.ir/eng/outlooks/sicence.htm, 2005.\n\nLast Accessed on June 16, 2005.\n[LOC 04]  US Library of Congress, \"A Country Study: Iran,\"\nhttp://lcweb2.loc.gov/frd/cs/irtoc.html, Oct 1, 2004.\n\nLast Accessed on August 28, 2005.\n[Mazaar 02]  Mazaar, Michael, ed. Information Technology and World Politics. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002.\n\n[McWilliams 03]  McWilliams, Brian. \"North Korea's School for Hackers,\" http://wiredvig.wired.com/news/politics/0,1283,59043-2,00.html?tw=wn_story_page_next1, June 2 2003.\n\nLast Accessed on June10, 2005.\n\n[MEMRI 03]  The Middle East Media Research Institute, \"Top Iranian Defector on Iran's Collaboration with Iraq, North Korea, Al-Qaida, and Hizbullah,\"\nhttp://memri.org/bin/articles.cgi?Page=countries&Area=iran&ID=SP47303, 2003.\n\nLast Accessed on August 26, 2005.\n\n[Moustapha 04]  Moustapha, Sano Koutoub, \"Live Fatwa,\"\nhttp://www.islamonline.net/livefatwa/english/Browse.asp?hGuestID=LayrZP, February 23, 2004.\n\nLast Accessed on August 26th, 2005.\n\n[Moyes 02]  Moyes, Mark, \"Hacking For Democracy,\"\nhttp://www.shift.com/print/web/396/1.html, August 22 2002.\n\nLast Accessed on December 15th, 2004.\n[NEW 03]  New Order, \"Exploit code for Microsoft SMB authentication flaw,\"\nhttp://neworder.box.sk/explread.php?newsid=7782, April 24, 2003.\n\nLast Accessed on August 26, 2005.\n\n[Nicholson/Sahay 03]  Nicholson, Brian, Sahay, Sundeep. \"Building Iran's Software Industry: An Assessment of Plans and Prospects using the Software Export Success Model,\" http:/idpm.man.ac.uk/wp/di/index.htm, 2003.\n\nLast Accessed on January 25, 2005.\n\n[ORN 99]  Open Research Network, \"Iran's Telecom and Internet Sector: A\nComprehensive Survey,\" http://science-arts.org/internet/node1, 1999.\n\nLast Accessed on August 26, 2005.\n[OXR 04]  OxResearch, \"IRAN: Five-Year Plan Embroiled in Politics,\" 2004.\n\n[PTP 02]  Paradis Technology Park. Paradis Technology Park Website, http://www.hitechpark.com/Paradis/English/English.htm, 2002.\n\nLast Accessed on August 26, 2005.\n[Parthisan 05]  Parthisan, \"Abtahi's blog was hacked for revealing torture details,\"\nhttp://www.persianstudents.org/archives/001269.html, January 2 2005. Last Accessed on August 26, 2005.\n[Rouhani 00]  Rouhani, Farhang, \"The Spatial Politics of Leisure: Internet Use and Access in Tehran, Iran.,\"\nhttp://www.georgetown.edu/research/arabtech/wp/papers/frouhani.htm, April 16, 2000.\n\nLast Accessed on August 26, 2005.\n\n[Rubin 02]  Rubin, Michael.  \"The Tehran Temptation,\" Commentary, January 2002.\n\n[Sanaray 05]  Sanaray Corporation. \"ICT Laws and Regulations.,\"\nhttp://www.sanaray.com/english/Site.aspx?ParTree=AH&LnkIdn=791, 2005.\n\nLast Accessed on August 28, 2005.\n[SAT 05]  \"Russia to Deliver A Satellite to Iran.,\" Satellite Today, 4.25, 2005.\n\n[Shannon 05]  Shannon, Elaine. \"An Ominous Pairing,\" Time, February 28th, 2005.\n[Sharif 05]  Sharif University of Technology, Advanced Information and Communication Technology Center Website, http://www.aictc.com/index.htm, 2005.\n\nLast Accessed on August 26th, 2005.\n\n[Sherman 05]  Sherman, Mark. \"FBI: Businesses (Still) Reluctant to Report Cyber Attacks,\" Information Week, Aug 11 2005.\n\n[Shokoohi 96]  Shokoohi, Akbar. \"Public Administration Reform for Economic Transformation in Iran: The Legal Framework,\" Asian Review of Public Adminstration,\n8.2 (1996): 33.\n[**Spider 04**]  Spiderhacker, Spiderhacker Website, http://spiderhacker.persianblog.com,\n2004.\n\nLast Accessed on August 26th, 2005.\n[TCO 04]  Iranian Technology Cooperation Office, \"Technology Cooperation Office,\"\nhttp://web.archive.org/web/20041130031440/http://www.tco.ac.ir/, 2004.\nLast Accessed on August 26th, 2005.\n[UNIDO 05]  United Nation Industrial Development Organization, \"Technology Parks -\nIran,\" http://www.unido.org/en/doc/34918#io, 2005.\n\nLast Accessed on August 26th, 2005.\n[UNSD 05]  United Nations Statistics Division, \"Millenium Indicator: Telephone Lines and Cellular Subscribers Per 100 Populuation 2004,\" http://unstats.un.org, March 31,\n2005. Last Accessed on August 28, 2005\n[USDOS 03]  United States Department of State, \"Patterns of Global Terrorism 2003,\"\nhttp://www.state.gov/documents/organization/31912.pdf, 2003.\n\nLast Accessed on August 28th, 2005.\n\n[UT 05]  University of Tehran, University of Tehran Website, http://www.ut.ac.ir/, 2005.\n\nLast Accessed on August 26th, 2005.\n[Vamosi 02]  Vamosi, Robert, \"Is the US headed for a cyberwar? Actually, yes.\"\nCnet.com, http://reviews.cnet.com/4520-3513_7-5021272.html, September 25 2002.\n\nLast Accessed on August 26th, 2005.\n\n[Van Beveren 01]  Van Beveren, John, \"A Conceptual Model of Hacker Development and Motivations,\" Journal of E-Business 1.2 (2001).\n\n[Varjani 04]  Varjani, Ali Yazdian. Ali Yazdian Varjani Homepage, http://www.modares.ac.ir/eng/Yazdian/publication.htm, 2004.\n\nLast Accessed on August 26th, 2005.\n\n[Wilson 04]  Wilson, Clay. Information Warfare and Cyberwar: Capabilities and Related Policy Issues, Vol. RL3`787, CRS Report for Congress, 2004.\n[WIKI 05]  \"Iranian blogs,\" http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Iranian_Blogs, May 21, 2005.\n\nLast Accessed on August 26, 2005.\n[Zone 05]  Zone-H. \"Digital Attacks Archive.,\" www.zone-h.org/defacements, 2005.\n\nLast Accessed on August 26th, 2005.\n\n\n\n## Initial Distribution List\n\n1.\nDefense Technical Information Center Ft. Belvoir, Virginia\n2.\nDudley Knox Library Naval Postgraduate School Monterey, California\n3.\nDorothy Denning Naval Postgraduate School\nMonterey, California\n4.\nJames Ehlert Naval Postgraduate School Monterey, California\n\n5.\nDan Boger Naval Postgraduate School Monterey, California 6.\nDartmouth College\nInstitute for Security Technology Studies Hanover, New Hampshire\n7.\nPaul Powell National Security Agency Ft. George G. Meade, Maryland\n8.\nAndrew Macpherson\nUniversity of New Hampshire Durham, New Hampshire\n9.\nClay Wilson\nLibrary of Congress Washington, District of Colombia"
    },
    {
        "text": "# Naval Postgraduate School Monterey, California\n\n## Thesis Stimulating Innovation In Naval Special Warfare By Utilizing Small Working Groups\n\nby Thomas A. Rainville March 2001\nDavid Tucker Susan Hocevar Thesis Advisor:\nSecond Reader:\nApproved for public release; distribution is unlimited.\n\n20010328 050\nPublic reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instruction, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite\n1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project\n(0704-0188) Washington DC 20503\n\n4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE:\nStimulating Innovation in Naval Special Warfare by Utilizing Small Working\n Groups\n6. AUTHOR(S)   Rainville, Thomas A.\n\n## 11. Supplementary **Notes** The Views Expressed In This Thesis Are Those Of The Author And Do Not Reflect The Official Policy Or Position Of The Department Of Defense Or The U.S. Government. 12A. Distribution / Availability Statement Approved For Public Release; Distribution Is Unlimited. 13. Abstract (Maximum 200 Words)\n\nNaval Special Warfare has produced successful innovation by using small working groups. Naval Special Warfare deems an innovation successful if it results in a more efficient, less risky, more cost effective method to conduct special operations.\n\nThe Quantum Leap program is an example of successful innovation in Naval Special Warfare produced by a small working group. How have these small groups been able to produce successful innovations? Michael McCaskey's Theory offers an explanation of how small working groups innovate. His theory is a generally accepted theory on how to produce innovation in the business world by using small working groups. McCaskey identified three variables needed to produce innovation: 1) the small working group must have the support and protection of the leadership, 2) have access to resources, and 3) have autonomy from established structure within an organization. After interviews with senior Naval Special Warfare officers, two additional variables were deemed important. Ownership and the license to fail were added to McCaskey's three variables.\n\nThis thesis will test which variables were or were not present during three Naval Special Warfare case studies where small working groups attempted to produce innovation. Two of the case studies successfully produced innovation, but the final case study failed to produce an innovation. This thesis will evaluate the five variables in each case study and attempt to explain why the innovation was a success or a failure.\n\n## 14. Subject Terms 15. Innovation, Small Working Groups, Quantum Leap, Mkv Soc, Vision 2000 17. Security Classification Of Report 18. Security Classification Of This Page\n\nUnclassified\nUnclassified\n\nStandard Form 298 (Rev. 2-89)\nPrescribed by ANSI Std. 239-18\n\n## 12B. Distribution Code 15. Number Of Pages      9 2 16. Price Code 20. Limitation Of Abstract 19. Security Classification Of Abstract\n\nUnclassified\n\n## This Page Intentionally Left Blank\n\nApproved for public release; distribution is unlimited.\n\n## Stimulating Innovation In Naval Special Warfare By Utilizing Small Working Groups\n\nThomas A. Rainville, Lieutenant Commander, United States Navy B.A., Norwich University, 1990\nSubmitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of\n\n## Master Qe Science In Defense Analysis From The Naval Postgraduate School March 2001\n\nAuthor: \\'j *LrHfo* Q -   KL-S^_\nThomas A. Rainville Approved by: '72&&7fijlkesi David Tucker, Thesis Advisor yJ&=A\nusan Hoceyar, Second Reader fij\n/ Gordon McCormick, Chairman Special Operations Academic Group\n\n## This Page Intentionally Left Blank Abstract\n\nNaval Special Warfare has produced successful innovation by using small working groups.\n\nNaval Special Warfare deems an innovation successful if it results in a more efficient, less risky, more cost effective method to conduct special operations. The Quantum Leap program is an example of successful innovation in Naval Special Warfare produced by a small working group.\n\nHow have these small groups been able to produce successful innovations? Michael McCaskey's Theory offers an explanation of how small working groups innovate. His theory is a generally accepted theory on how to produce innovation in the business world by using small working groups. McCaskey identified three variables needed to produce innovation: 1) the small working group must have the support and protection of the leadership, 2) have access to resources, and 3) have autonomy from established structure within an organization. After interviews with senior Naval Special Warfare officers, two additional variables were deemed important. Ownership and the license to fail were added to McCaskey's three variables.\n\nThis thesis will test which variables were or were not present during three Naval Special Warfare case studies where small working groups attempted to produce innovation. Two of the case studies successfully produced innovation, but the final case study failed to produce an innovation. This thesis will evaluate the five variables in each case study and attempt to explain why the innovation was a success or a failure.\n\n## This^Page Intentionally Left Blank Table Of Contents\n\nI. INTRODUCTION 1\nA. BACKGROUND 1\nB. DEFINING INNOVATION AND SMALL WORKING GROUPS 3\nC. DEFINING SUCCESS AND FAILURE AT INNOVATION 4\nD. SCOPE 6\nII. FIVE KEY VARIABLES FOR SMALL WORKING GROUPS 9\nA. INTRODUCTION 9\nB. VARIABLES 11\nC. METHODOLOGY 22\nIII. QUANTUM LEAP CASE STUDY 27\nA. BACKGROUND 27\nB. VARIABLES 31\nC. SUMMARY 37\nIV. MKV SOC CASE STUDY 41\nA. BACKGROUND 41\nB. VARIABLES 44\nC. SUMMARY 50\nV. VISION 2000 CASE STUDY 53\nA. BACKGROUND 53\nB. VARIABLES 58\nC. SUMMARY    64\nVI. CONCLUSION 67\nA. FINDINGS 67\nB. RECOMMENDATIONS 70\nLIST OF REFERENCES 73 INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST 75\n\n## This Page Intentionally Left Blank List Of Tables\n\nTable 1. Quantum Leap Varibles 39\nTable 2. Quantum Leap/MKV SOC Variables 51\nTable 3. Quantum Leap/MKV SOC/Vision 2000 Variables 64\n\n## This Page Intentionally Left Blank Acknowledgments\n\nThe author wishes to thank Professors David Tucker and Susan Hocevar for their efforts, guidance and patience throughout this work.\n\n## This Page Intentionally Left Blank I.    Introduction\n\nA rapidly changing world deals ruthlessly with organizations that do not change-and USSOCOM is no exception.  Guided by a comprehensive, enduring vision and supporting goals, we must constantly reshape ourselves to remain relevant and useful members of the joint team.  USSOCOM must embrace and institutionalize the process of change  (General Peter J. Schoomaker, Special Operations Forces: The Way Ahead, p. 6).\n\n## A. Background\n\nNaval Special Warfare Command (NSWC) is a component command of the United States Special Operations Command\n(SOCOM).  NSWC is a bureaucracy within the larger United States military bureaucracy.  Stephen Peter Rosen, summarizing a commonly held view writes, \"Almost everything we know in theory about large bureaucracies suggests not only that they are hard to change, but that they are designed not to change.  Military bureaucracies, moreover, are especially resistant to change.\" (Rosen, 1991, p. 2)\nSOCOM has given its component commanders clear direction to innovate to remain relevant in the 21st Century.  Given that NSWC is a military bureaucracy, innovation is a very difficult task and extremely challenging to implement.\n\nJames Q. Wilson, author of *Bureaucracy,*   states,\n\"We ought not be surprised that organizations resist innovation.  They are supposed to resist it.  The reason an organization is created is in large part to replace the uncertain expectations and haphazard activities of voluntary endeavors with the stability and routine of organized relationships.\n\nThe standard operating procedure (SOP) is not the enemy of organizations, it is the essence of organization.  Stability and routine are especially important in government agencies where demands for equity are easily enforced.\" (Wilson,\n1989, p. 221)\nGiven the constraints of inflexibility and resistance to innovation, how do organizations within military bureaucracies innovate, remain relevant and successfully complete future missions?\n\nNaval Special Warfare (NSW) believes that small working groups are an effective tool to overcome bureaucracies' resistance to innovation.  The senior SEAL\nofficers, interviewed by the author, were members of small working groups attempting to stimulate innovation.  They believe small working groups break down barriers and roadblocks to innovation created by military bureaucracies.\n\nNSW has successfully utilized small working groups to stimulate innovation.  This thesis will ask the following questions: What makes small working groups effective at stimulating innovation?  Why do they work?\n\n## B. Defining Innovation And Small Working Groups\n\nInnovation within the military can take many forms -\ndoctrinal, strategic, tactical, technological, and material.  The definition of innovation for the purposes of this thesis is the introduction of something new or different that improves the operational capabilities of SEAL platoons or Special Boat detachments to conduct successful Naval Special Warfare missions.\n\nSmall working groups, as defined by this thesis, are a small group of people (normally less than ten) who come together to stimulate innovation within a larger, bureaucratic organization.  The small working group may be a permanent group or it may disband after meeting its objectives.\n\nWhy would a military bureaucracy need to utilize small working groups to stimulate innovation?  Lipman-Blumen and Leavitt, co-authors of Hot *Groups,*   believe that successful, long-lived organizations are fast becoming very rare.  They state, \"To cope with environmental turbulence, organizations are trying to become much more nimble, innovative and continuously self-modifying.  They are also much more willing to combine, subdivide, form alliances, absorb pieces of one another and spin off pieces of themselves.  [Small working groups,] temporary and deft, are a perfect fit for such volatile conditions.\" (Lipman-\nBlumen and Leavitt, 1999, p. 74)  In today's fast-paced environments, small working groups help organizations cut through red tape and excessive barriers to produce innovation.\n\n## C. Defining Success And Failure At Innovation\n\nPreviously in this chapter, innovation was defined as the introduction of something new or different that improves the operational capabilities of SEAL platoons and Special Boat detachments to conduct successful Naval Special Warfare missions.  This definition will be utilized throughout this thesis as the basic definition of a successful innovation.  A successful innovation must improve operational capabilities, and be recognized, accepted, implemented, and utilized by the Naval Special Warfare Community.  Identifying an innovation that improves operational capabilities is only the first step toward a successful innovation.  The most difficult step is getting the innovation recognized, accepted, implemented and utilized within the NSW Community.  \"In the organizational world... the right answer is not likely to be the whole answer.  The rest has to do with getting other parts of the organization and the world to believe, accept and use your group's earth-shaking breakthrough.  Failing that, your great output could - as so many have - quickly sink into the sea of the forgotten and forgone.\" (Lipman-Blumen and Leavitt, 1999, pp. 105-106)  Lipman-Blumen and Leavitt have identified the importance of properly implementing an innovation.\n\nAn innovation that fails can be defined as a good idea that would have improved the operational capabilities of Naval Special Warfare, but it was not implemented.  An example of this emerged during one of the case studies presented in this thesis (Vision 2000), where NSW senior leadership supported the innovation, received good reviews, but was not implemented.  This failure may happen at any step of the process of innovation such as during the concept phase, development, testing and evaluation phase or during the implementation phase.  A great innovative idea that would improve operational capabilities can easy fail during the implementation phase.  The NSW Community may not recognize the innovation; the innovation may be recognized, but not be utilized by the NSW Community because, for example, it is too costly to implement.  If the NSW does not recognize the importance of the innovation, then it is doomed to fail.\n\n## D.  Scope\n\nThis thesis will examine three cases where NSW\nutilized small working groups to produce innovation.  The NSW community\" has approximately 2,500 military personnel.\n\nIt is a relatively small organization when compared to other communities within the military or large corporations, but it is a military bureaucracy.  This thesis will provide specific details on how a bureaucratic organization can utilize small working groups to produce innovations.  I have identified five variables that will be tested in this thesis to identify their relevance to producing innovation by small working groups.  Three variables, support and guidance of the leadership, resources and funding, and autonomy, have been taken from Framework for Analyzing Work *Groups,*   by Michael B. McCaskey\n(1979).  The McCaskey article provides relevant definitions and examples of three common variables that will be tested and examined during this thesis.  It provides a study on how small working groups produce innovation within a larger bureaucracy.  This case study is used in the business world, but is relevant for Naval Special Warfare because the case study suggests how bureaucracies can utilize small working groups to stimulate innovation.\n\nStephen P. Rosen and James Q. Wilson support the McCaskey variables.  For example, Rosen writes, \"The study of peacetime military innovation showed that when military leaders could attract young officers with great potential for promotion to a new way of war, and then were able to protect and promote them, they were able to produce new, usable military capabilities.\"  (Rosen, 1991, p. 252)\nRosen emphasizes the importance of senior leadership's guidance and support when attempting to produce innovation. James Q. Wilson writes, \"Innovationrequires an exercise of judgment, personal skill....\" (Wilson, 1989, p.232)  Wilson also believes that leaders must possess the adequate skills and vision to stimulate innovation.\n\nI conducted interviews with senior SEAL officers who also support McCaskey's variables.  Two additional variables, ownership and license to fail, were suggested by these senior NSW officers, who had experience with small, innovative working groups in NSW, as being important for producing innovation.  The five variables will be explained in detail in Chapter two.\n\nThe thesis will examine three cases of innovation using small working groups; two cases produced innovation and one case failed to produce innovation.  This thesis will look for the presence or absence of the five variables in the case studies to determine which are relevant for innovation.\n\nChapter two will define the five variables and how they will be measured.  Chapters three, four and five present the Naval Special Warfare case studies.   Chapter six reports my findings and recommendations.\n\n## Ii.   Five Key Variables For Small Working Groups A.  Introduction\n\nMichael B. McCaskey (1979) wrote, \"Framework for Analyzing Work Groups\" as a case study to be used for classroom discussion at the Harvard Business School.  The three variables from the McCaskey article are support and guidance of the leadership, resources and funding, and autonomy.  His case study of the Merit Corporation has excellent examples of the positive effects when the variables are present within a parent organization as a small working group is attempting to stimulate innovation.\n\nThe study also shows the negative effects on innovation when the variables disappear as the small working group is trying to stimulate innovation.  These three variables were presented to several senior SEAL officers for validation and feedback.  They all agreed that the McCaskey variables are relevant when attempting to stimulate innovation.  A\nsenior NSW officer who produced innovations with small working groups believes that two additional variables must be considered: ownership and the license to fail.\n\nThe Merit Corporation is a fictitious corporation based on an American corporation.  \"The Merit Corporation was a medium-sized firm that manufactured and sold children's furniture nationally.  From its inception the company had been family owned and operated, and John Kirschner was now the President of Merit.\"(McCaskey, 1979, p.2)  Merit held a dominant market share in the children's furniture market, but the field was becoming increasingly competitive.  Kirschner, who was approaching retirement age, was concerned with Merit's problem with developing new products.  Kirschner decided to create a small working group to help develop new products and stimulate innovation within the Merit Corporation.  The small working group consisted of seven members with one team leader.\n\nUnder Kirschner, the small working group enjoyed the support and guidance of the leadership, access to resources and funding, and autonomy.  The group had three offices colocated on the fourth floor of an office building away from all the other Merit offices located on the second floor.\n\nWithin six months the small working group had developed a variety of innovative and unique product ideas.  After one year, the group developed a new product that within six months captured a 20% share of an extremely competitive market.  The product was widely acclaimed for its low manufacturing cost, durability and consumer appeal.\n\nAfter Kirschner retired, Joe Donaldson was brought in as the new Merit President.  Donaldson immediately began to question the small working group, as no new products were imminent.  He moved the group down to the main offices and assigned the members of the group different offices not colocated with each other as they had been on the fourth floor.  The group was encouraged to work routine hours and dress in traditional business attire.  These changes began to create adverse tensions and the group lost its creative edge and ceased to produce new product innovations.  The small working group was eventually disbanded and its personnel reassigned to different divisions.  Some voluntarily left the company.\n\nUnder Kirschner, the small working group at Merit produced new product innovations and was ultimately a success; whereas, under Donaldson, the group was stifled, disbanded and ended in failure.  McCaskey points out several variables that are necessary for innovation to occur and gives examples of positive outcomes when the variables are present within a large organization.\n\n## B.  Variables\n\nFive variables have been identified that should be present in order for small working groups to stimulate innovation within a larger, bureaucratic organization.\n\nThree variables are taken from McCaskey's article.  These variables are support and guidance from the leadership, resources and funding, and autonomy.  The two additional variables, ownership and the license to fail were provided by a senior NSW officer who produced innovations with small working groups.  All five variables will be tested in three Naval Special Warfare case studies to determine if they were present when innovation was successful or when it failed.\n\n## 1.  Support And Guidance Of The Leadership\n\nSupport and guidance of the leadership can be defined as the senior leadership, often the actual commander of a particular unit, endorsing and supervising the small working group in its efforts to stimulate innovation and advocating its work.  \"Teams [small working groups] need the visible support of top management... So in the most successful organizations, [The leadership] meets regularly with the teams to see how they are coming, show their interest, and to learn from the teams.\" (Glenn, 1991, p.\n\n20)  The leadership needs to be actively involved and interested in the small working group's activities.  They must ensure the group receives the appropriate level of priority within the larger organization so the group may overcome barriers and roadblocks that may impede progress and innovation.\n\nAdmiral William Moffett, who was responsible for the development of carrier aviation as separate striking force acting independently from battleships prior to World War II, provides an example of the importance of leadership.\n\n\"He did this... by intervening in the promotion process to ensure that a lot of aviators rose in rank.\" (Wilson, 1989, p. 22 6)  Admiral Moffett kept the carrier aviation innovation alive by protecting aviators and getting them promoted which helped to ensure the innovation would be fully implemented.  The aviation community had the support and guidance of the leadership.\n\nThe small working group in McCaskey's case study was given a high priority by the company president.  \"Kirschner personally recruited and selected the eight members of the group into the organization, thus making it clear to the rest of the organization that this is a special project, high on his list of priorities.\" (McCaskey, 1979, p. 5) The support and guidance provided by Kirschner is exactly what a small working group needs to flourish and become productive.  He made it perfectly clear to the rest of the organization that the small working group would receive his support and guidance to help produce new product innovations.  Kirschner provided a high level of support and guidance to the small working group.\n\nThis study will look for indicators that support and guidance of the leadership was provided to the small, innovative working groups and will attempt to establish whether or not each group received the support and guidance of the leadership it required to accomplish its task.\n\nSeveral questions must be answered to determine if the small working group enjoyed the support and guidance of the leadership.  Did the leadership select the personnel to make up the small working group?  In McCaskey's case study, Kirschner, the company president, personally selected members for the small working group.  What was the chain of command?  Was the small working group under the direct supervision of the top leader, or did it report to a lower ranking leader?  The small working group at the Merit Corporation reported directly to the company president and did not report to anyone else at the company.  Did the group have a direct line of communication with the top leadership?  In the Merit case, the group enjoyed a direct line of communication with the company president with no interference from the rest of the organization.  Another important test of whether the group had the support and guidance of the leadership was whether the leadership provides a vision with an end state along with clearly defined tasks and goals?  In the Merit Corporation, Kirschner clearly explained that he wanted improved product development and that the small working group was created to stimulate new product innovations.\n\nThe small working group needs the support and guidance of the leadership, but it also needs resources and funding.\n\nThe resources and funding variable can be defined as the small working group having access to the resources\n(personnel and time) and funding necessary to accomplish its mission, task or goal.  Admiral Moffett used his personnel and their time to acquire the funding to get contracts for high-speed carriers approved and kept the innovative carrier strike force alive and well.  Without these resources, the carrier aviation innovation may have failed.\n\nThe small working group at Merit was given a budget sufficient to design and build prototypes of innovative children's furniture.  Without the proper resources and funding made available from the larger organization, the group could not have properly functioned and would certainly not have accomplished its objectives.  Stephen Rosen does not believe that funding is important when trying to produce innovation.  He believes that talented military personnel and time are important.  He states that,\n\"Rather than money, talented military personnel, time and information have been the key resources for innovation.\"\n(Rosen, 1991, p. 252)  The senior NSW leadership disagrees with Rosen.  They believe that funding is very important when attempting to stimulate innovation.\n\nThe resources and funding available to the small working group must be evaluated to determine if the group was provided sufficient resources to successfully complete its tasks.  Several questions must be answered to determine if the small working group was provided the resources and funding by the larger organization.  Was the small working group staffed with enough personnel?  Did they possess the required skills to complete the necessary tasks?  The small working group at Merit was adequately staffed with eight full time employees whose only job was to produce innovative new products.  They were not assigned to any other divisions or given collateral duties.  Was the small working group given the time required to complete its tasks?  The group was given the proper amount of time to focus on new product development at Merit.  The group produced its first innovative product months before scheduled.  Was the group given the amount of funding to successfully complete its tasks?  Kirschner provided the group with a budget and used it for designing and building new innovative products.\n\nAutonomy can be defined as the small working group being an independent and self-directing group within the larger organization.  In 1933, the newly created Fleet Marine Force (FMF) of the Marine Corps had organizational autonomy as its members were left alone to write training manuals, conduct exercises, design equipment and establish doctrine for amphibious warfare.  The officers of the FMF\nwere given autonomy by the leadership to develop innovative tactics on amphibious warfare.  An autonomous group is one that is given very few organizational procedures to follow and very little formal structure that would constrain the group's behavior and innovative processes.  As an example of this, McCaskey noted, \"Because he wants to foster innovation, Kirschner has taken special pains to shield the\n[small working] group from most of the structure and procedures that apply to the rest of the organization.\"\n(McCaskey, 1979, p. 5) Kirschner only required a progress report every other week and a monthly financial report from the group.  This is a fine example of the corporate president giving the maximum autonomy to his small working group in order for the group to work towards its maximum potential.\n\nSeveral questions must be answered to indicate whether the small working group was given the proper amount of autonomy to complete its tasks.  Was the group subject to the same procedures that governed the rest of the organization? Who did the group work for and report to?\n\nHow often did the group have to report its progress?  What were the group members doing on a day-to-day basis and did it matter to the leadership of the organization?  What normal rules and regulations was the group exempted from?\n\nWhat were some of the critical decisions of the leadership to show that the group had autonomy?  In the Merit Corporation, the small working group was exempted from many of the procedures and guidelines that the rest of the organization had to follow.  The group worked for the company president and only had to report to him every other week.\n\nThe final two variables, ownership and the license to fail, were deemed important by senior NSW leadership.\n\nThere are three types of ownership.  The leadership, small working groups and the NSW community can take ownership of an innovation.  Although the leadership and the small working group at the Merit Corporation took ownership of the innovative project, the organization did not.  The small working group took autonomy to an extreme of isolation, which contributed to the failure of ongoing innovation when a new leader (Donaldson) replaced Kirschner.  In order to properly implement an innovation, the small working group must ensure that the leadership has ownership of the new innovation.  The leadership can be said to take ownership of an innovation when it understands the innovation, recognizes its value, and assists its implementation.  An indicator that the NSW leadership has taken ownership of an innovation is when the importance of the innovation is recognized and the leadership takes active steps to carry out the innovation.  Another indicator of an organization taking ownership of an innovation is when great efforts are taken to write manuals, conduct exercises and establish doctrine to validate an innovation.\n\nAn example of this is the establishment of the Fleet Marine Force (FMF) in the Marine Corps in 1933.  The establishment of the FMF may have been the most important advance in the history of the Marine Corps.\n\n\"The practical result was for the first time, a permanent organization for the study and practice of amphibious warfare was created...  [General John] Russell, [Commandant of the Marine Corps] directed that the Marine Corps Schools devote themselves exclusively to preparing a manual to train officers in the new methods of amphibious assault.\" (Rosen, 1991, p. 83)\nThe Marine Corps had taken ownership of the Fleet Marine Force innovation.\n\n\"[The small working group] must form the alliances, build the relationships and make the connections that will cause your groups output to be implemented.\" (Lipman-Blumen and Leavitt, 1999, pp. 105-106)  Lipman-- Blumen and Leavitt state that the organization must have xbuy-in' to the innovation produced by the small working group.  The group must brief the rest of the organization and show how the innovation will enhance the organization's ability to function more efficiently.  All of the key personnel briefed needed to have ownership of the project for it to be implemented and utilized.\n\nIn order for an innovation to be implemented, the organization must recognize the importance of the innovation and take ownership of it.  Several questions must be answered to prove that the small working group was successful at ensuring the whole organization would take ownership of their innovation.  Once briefed, did the key leaders in the community understand the innovation, recognize its value, and help push it through the implementation process?  Were training manuals written, exercises conducted and doctrine established to validate the innovation?  The organization needs to recognize the importance of the innovation and take ownership of it.\n\nA second issue that was mentioned by senior NSW\nleadership was the \"license to fail\".  The small working group must be issued a \"license to fail\" by the larger organi zat ion.\n\n\"[The leadership] must convince their\n[subordinates] that if they join the innovative efforts of a (usually) short-term executive, their careers will not be blighted if the innovation fails or the executive departs before it is implemented.  Admiral Moffett did this in the Navy; so did Commandant Russell in the Marine Corps...\"  (Wilson, 198 9, p. 231)\nLicense to fail exists when failing to meet an innovation goal does not have an adverse affect on the individual's military promotion.  The leadership recognizes that in order to produce successful innovation, the group must be given a great amount of the latitude to stumble, fall down, fail and pick itself back up and move forward again.  The group's operations and path to stimulating innovation will not be flawless, but a series of mistakes, roadblocks, and possible failures.  The license to fail gives the group permission to experiment and think far beyond organizational norms.  Under this charter, the small working group will not be afraid to try radical ideas and innovations to solve its problems and meet its objectives.\n\nSeveral questions must be answered to prove that the small working group was given the license to fail by the leadership.  Was any member of the group in fear of being passed over for a military promotion if the group failed to produce an innovation?  Due to a failure, was the group in jeopardy of being dissolved?  Could the group fail without fear of retribution from the leadership or the rest of the organization?  What was the leadership's response/actions when failure occurred?\n\n## C.  Methodology\n\nI interviewed Captain William McRaven and Frank Clarke, who were members of the Quantum Leap small working group, at NSWG-1 in Coronado, CA.  I interviewed CAPT\nMcRaven for one hour and Frank Clarke for three hours.  I\nconducted a one and a half hour telephone conversation with Dale Freeman, who was a member of the MKV SOC small working group, at USSOCOM located in Tampa, FL. I interviewed CAPT\nPete Toennies (ret), who was the group leader of the Vision\n2 00 0 small working group, for two hours in San Diego, CA.\n\nPrior to the interviews, I created a standard list of questions to ask all of the members of the small working groups.  The following is a list of the questions asked:\n\n## 1.  Support And Guidance Of The Leadership\n\n1. Did the leadership select the personnel to make up the\nsmall working group?\n2. What was the chain of command? 3. Was the small working group under the direct\nsupervision of the top leader, or did they report to a lower ranking leader?\n4. Did the group have a direct line of communication with\nthe top leadership?\n5. Did the leadership provide vision along with clearly\ndefined tasks and goals?\n1. Was the small working group staffed with the number of\npersonnel with the required skills to complete the\nassigned tasks?\n2. Was the small working group given the time required to\ncomplete their tasks?\n3. Was the group given the amount of funding to\nsuccessfully complete their tasks?\n1.  Was the group subject to the same procedures that\ngoverned the rest of the organization?  Who does the\ngroup work for and report to?  How often did the group have to report its progress?\n\nWhat are the group members doing on a day-to-day basis and does it matter to the leadership of the organization?\n\nWhat normal rules and regulations was the group exempted from?\n\nWhat were some of the critical decisions of the leader to show that the group had autonomy?  Specific examples.\n\n1. Once briefed, did the key leaders in the community\naccept the innovation and help push it through the\nimplementation process?\n1. Was any member of the group in fear of losing their job\nif the group failed to produce an innovation?\n2. Due to a failure, was the group in jeopardy of being\ndissolved?\n3. Was the group given the latitude to fail without fear\nof retribution from the leadership or rest of the organization?\n4. What was the leadership's response/actions when failure\noccurred?\nThe people interviewed were asked the same exact questions to keep the case studies standard and consistent.  They also provided written materials to provide additional reference material.  Their answers along with the written material were analyzed and the case studies were created.\n\nThe five variables (Support and guidance of the leadership, resources and funding, autonomy, ownership and license to fail) have been presented and defined.  Chapters three, four and five are NSW case studies.  Each case studyis analyzed for evidence of the variables and to identify what their presence or absence suggests about small working groups stimulating innovation.\n\n## This Page Intentionally Left Blank Iii.  Quantum Leap Case Study A.  Background\n\nNaval Special Warfare Group ONE (NSWG-1) is located at NAB Coronado in San Diego, CA and is commanded by a SEAL\nCaptain (0-6)..  NSWG-1 is the next higher authority for all West Coast SEAL Teams, SEAL Delivery Vehicle Team ONE in Hawaii and two overseas SEAL Units in Guam and Bahrain.\n\nThe purpose of NSWG-1 is to, \"Ensure NSWG-1 relevance in the 21st Century by maintaining a world class capability that is unorthodox in approach, dependable in execution and positively affects the Theater Commander's objective.\"\n(McRaven, NSWG-1, p. 8)  NSWG-1's vision is to provide the force of choice to clarify and simplify the battlefield, provide unorthodox solutions to complex military problems by leveraging advanced technology and to be recognized worldwide as dependable, highly disciplined and of uncompromising integrity.\n\nIn July 1996 a small working group with three key personnel was informally established to develop the Quantum Leap concept to use Indirect Warfare as an innovative approach to accomplishing NSW tasks.  The key personnel were the group's leader, a SEAL Commander, then Chief Staff Officer, the second in command at NSWG-1.  A Federal Civil Servant at NSWG-1 was the technical expert and provided .\n\ncontinuity for the project.  A Navy Lieutenant, who worked very closely with the civil servant, was the third member of the group.\n\nThe Quantum Leap project began because new technology was forcing SEALs to change the way they conducted operations, threatening to make them irrelevant.  The accuracy of precision-guided munitions made the standard SEAL platoon Direct Action mission appear too risky to the Theater Commander.  Unmanned Ariel Vehicles (UAV) have the potential to both conduct reconnaissance missions against an enemy without risking human life and provide real-time intelligence to the military commander who needs it.  UAVs can now conduct reconnaissance missions deep into enemy territory, where prior to UAV development, military personnel would have had to infiltrate enemy controlled territory to conduct risky reconnaissance missions.  Night Vision Devices and thermal imagers are making it more difficult for personnel to infiltrate across the beach.  It was obvious to the leadership at NSWG-1 that Naval Special Warfare operators needed to change the way they conducted operations in order to remain relevant in the 21st Century.\n\nProject Quantum Leap was the first step in ensuring that Naval Special Warfare forces remain relevant and dependable in the future.\n\nThe major concept of the Quantum Leap project was the focus on Indirect Action.  The difference between Direct Action and Indirect Action missions is that during a traditional SEAL Direct Action mission SEALs would use surprise and superior firepower to destroy a heavilydefended target; whereas during an Indirect Action mission, SEALs accomplish the same task by destroying critical unprotected nodes.   In doing so, the risk associated with the mission is reduced, but the effect on the enemy remains the same.\n\nAs an example, NSWG-1 has successfully completed xmock' attacks against real critical nodes located in the San Diego area.  The objective of the mission was to delay a naval vessel from getting underway for seventy-two hours.\n\nA traditional SEAL Direct Action mission would have been a combat swimmer attack against the naval vessel placing limpet mines on the hull of the ship.  This type of attack is very risky to the SEAL operator because it places him in a very vulnerable position while he executes the mission.\n\nInstead of attacking a naval warship in San Diego Harbor, Quantum Leap operators destroyed a critical fuel pumping station that supplies all fuel to the San Diego area.  By destroying a secluded and unprotected pumping station, fuel was denied to NAS Miramar, San Diego Naval Station and the Point Loraa Submarine Base, thus delaying the target vessel from getting underway for at least seventy-two hours.  By completing this type of operation, the threat and risk to the operator was diminished while the effect on the enemy was the same.\n\nQuantum Leap leveraged advanced technology to improve operational capabilities.  During a fleet exercise conducted in 1997, Quantum Leap used secure real-time chat between five different Task Unit Commanders all located on different fleet ships and submarines taking part in the exercise.  The NSW Task Group Commander, located on the command ship, was in constant communications with his Task Unit Commanders.  The COTS communications led to improved information flow, operational updates and intelligence reporting.  Improved technology allowed the development of tracking boxes that could be carried by individual SEALs and tracked by fleet systems.  This would provide the operational commander instant verification of the location of the SEALs conducting the mission and provide situational awareness for the duration of the operation.\n\n## B. Variables\n\nHaving explained Quantum Leap, we can now determine how many of the variables we have identified\" were or were not present during the Quantum Leap Project.\n\n## 1.  Support And Guidance Of The Leadership\n\nThe Quantum Leap small working group enjoyed the support and guidance of the leadership at NSWG-1.  The Commander, NSWG-1, personally selected the members of the original working group.  The three key group members were augmented with permanent and temporary personnel, as the group's leader deemed necessary to complete its goals. These personnel were drawn from NSWG-1 and its tenant commands and possessed the required expertise and skills to complete the Quantum Leap objectives.  As an example, the best-qualified enlisted SEAL operators were recruited to conduct \"mock\" attacks on real targets to display the effectiveness of the Quantum Leap efforts.  The small working group reported directly to the Commander, NSWG-1\nand did not report to another individual within the NSWG-1\norganization.  The small working group enjoyed a direct line of communication with the NSWG-1 Commander.  The Commander would intervene when the group required additional help to solve major problems or issues.  He intervened to help the small working group find adequate office space at NSWG-1.  The group's leader had unlimited access to the Commander, who was personally committed to the success of the project.  The Commander provided the vision and he clearly defined the tasks and goals for the group.  The Commander understood how important the project was to the future relevancy and success of the NSW\ncommunity.  He wanted the Quantum Leap small working group to produce innovative concepts, test and evaluate the concepts with practical exercises and report the successes, failures and recommendations.  With this information from the group, the Commander moved the project forward.  The Commander provided the vision and gave the group leader the responsibility with the authority to make changes and complete the objectives of the project. (Clarke, NSWG-1, 2 9\nJun 2 000)\n\nThe small working group was given the resources and funding it required to complete its assigned tasks.  The group was provided $150,000.00 of discretionary funds for the first year of operation.  Although $150,000 may not seem like a large amount of money, the people I interviewed agreed it was enough to get the program off and running. A\nmajority of the money was spent on purchasing new equipment for the project.  Additional computer terminals, a complex tracking system, and tracking boxes were purchased.\n\n(Clarke, NSWG-1, 29 Jun 2 000)  The group was given the time required to complete its tasks without pressure to speed up the schedule.  It must be mentioned that during a change in leadership, the Quantum Leap Project temporarily lost funding, resources and direction under a new Commander.\n\nThe project almost died.  The new Commander had to be convinced of the worthiness of the project before committing additional funding and resources to it.  The group leader convinced the new Commander of the value and importance of the project and he became a great supporter and patron of the project for the rest of his time in command.  (McRaven, NSWG-1, 30 Jun 2 000)\n\nThe Quantum Leap small working group was given autonomy from the larger organization to meet its objectives.  The Commander stated, \"If you need help, let me know.\" (Clarke, NSWG-1, 29 Jun 2000) Otherwise, the Commander provided the endstate and instructed the group to get there.  The Commander informed the group that they were free from the normal rules of NSWG-1 and allowed to use all available NSWG-1 staff to achieve the desired endstate.\n\nThe Chief Staff Officer, as group leader, understood how to keep the project moving and ensured that the group was never micromanaged.  The group was free to task organize as it saw fit without outside interference from the rest of the organization.  The group set its own agenda and plan of action and milestones free from organizational pressure.\n\nThe organization was actively involved and helped the group when they needed outside assistance.  NSWG-1 assisted in getting additional SEAL operators involved with the Quantum Leap project.  The leadership cared about the progress that the small working group was making and ordered the rest of the organization to provide help whenever requested.  The group purchased equipment and supplies whenever it was required.  During the initial phase of the project, the group was able to quickly purchase equipment, without the usual red tape, in order to get the project moving.\n\n(Clarke, NSWG-1, 29 June 2000)\n\nIn order for the innovations produced by Quantum Leap's small working group to be implemented, the NSW\nleadership and community had to take ownership of the project.  In order for the NSW leadership and community to take ownership of an innovation they must understand it, identify its value, and assist during the implementation process.  The Commander, NSWG-1, who first started the project, had ownership of the project as it began under his guidance and direction.  An indication that the NSW\nleadership had taken ownership of the Quantum Leap project was that exercises were conducted with the primary task of validating the Quantum Leap innovation.\n\nAn extremely difficult problem for military organizations trying to produce innovation is keeping the project alive and well during the frequent changes in leadership.  The Quantum Leap project nearly died when the next Commander was not involved with the project and did not understand it or recognize its value for several months.  Had the group leader failed to convince the new commander of the merit of the project, it might have ceased to exist and would have failed to produce innovation.  The new Commander eventually understood the Quantum Leap Project, recognized its value, and assisted in the implementation.  He took ownership of the project.  Once the Commander took ownership of the project, it was instantly revitalized by a new influx of resources and funding.  The Commander took ownership and placed it higher on his list of priorities.  The NSW leadership took ownership of the project and provided talented and highly qualified personnel to take an active part in the Quantum Leap program.  This ensured that the leadership had ownership of the project and that the project had qualified personnel to successfully complete its tasks. (McRaven, NSWG-1, 30 June 2000)\nThe Commander, NSWG-1, during a discussion about the importance of ownership needed from the NSW leadership for an innovation to take hold, stated, \"The first thing we did was get the Commanding Officers and Command Master Chiefs onboard.  Then we briefed the staff here [NSWG-1] and then\n1 briefed the Admiral [CNSWC].\" (McRaven, NSWG-1, June 30,\n2 000) All of the key personnel briefed needed to have ownership of the project for it to be implemented and utilized. Having the support of the admiral provides ownership at the highest level that will positively influence the entire NSW community and help stimulate successful innovation.\n\nThe small working group was given a license to fail by the Commander of NSWG-1.  The Commander understood that in order to produce innovation, the road would be full of stumbling, mistakes and failures.  The guidance provided by the leadership was to learn by making mistakes.  He believed that the small working group should make educated decisions to push innovation forward.  It would be impossible to push innovation forward without making mistakes along the way. (Clarke, NSWG-1, 29 June 2000) During interviews with two members of the small working group, they said that, no member of the group was in fear of losing a promotion if the group failed to produce an innovation.  The group could fail without fear of retribution from the leadership or the rest of the organization.  The Commander made it perfectly clear to the group leader that failure and mistakes would happen and that the group should learn from them.  It was also made clear to the NSWG-1 staff to give additional assistance to the project when it hit a barrier or roadblock. (McRaven, NSWG-1, 30 June 2000)\n\n## C.  Summary\n\nProject Quantum Leap successfully produced innovation by improving the operational capabilities of SEAL platoons to conduct NSW missions.  The Indirect Warfare innovation exposes SEALs to less risk while improving the chances of successfully completing the mission.  The five keyvariables were all present while the Quantum Leap small working group worked to produce innovation at NSWG-1.\n\nWhen the ownership variable was missing during the first several months after a leadership change, the project languished, lost direction and almost ended.  When the ownership variable was not present, it triggered negative reactions in the support and guidance of the leadership and the resources/funding variables.  This indicates how important it is for the Commander to take ownership of the project.   If he does not take ownership, the project is in serious jeopardy.  It is also important for the NSW\ncommunity to have some ownership to facilitate support through leadership transitions.  This case study suggests that when one variable disappears, it can have a cascading effect on other variables and almost stop the project in its tracks.\n\nQuantum Leap is a success in itself by surviving three changes of command at NSWG-1 and producing innovation.  Many small working group projects die in the military when the leadership changes and the following Commander does not take ownership of the project.  The new Commander may not identify the value of the project and choose not to support it.  When this occurs, it is only a matter of time before the project will fail.  It is crucial that the group leader has a strong character, be influential and respected by the NSW community, if the project is to survive the constant change of commands in the military.  The group leader must immediately show the value of his project to the new Commander so he will take ownership, lend support, guidance and resources to the proj ect.  The Quantum Leap case study shows that the critical point of the project occurred immediately following a change of command.\n\nAnother related event that proves that Quantum Leap was successful at producing innovations is that new, innovative projects such as Project 21 and the Mission Support Center (MSC) have evolved producing new innovations from the original Quantum Leap Project.  The innovations produced and lessons learned from Quantum Leap have been incorporated into the concept, design and functions of the MSC.  The MSC is a building with all the necessary equipment and networking applications to support overseas operations from its location at NSWG-1 in San Diego.  The mission statement for the MSC is, \"Collect, organize and disseminate mission essential information into a form specifically tailored to the Mission Commander's need in order to focus a larger percentage of the operator's limited time on the execution phase of planning, gear preparation and rehearsals, thereby enhancing the probability of mission success.\"  (McRaven, NSWG-1, 2000)\nThe MSC project cornerstones - distributive planning, network analysis, fusion, situational awareness, force reaction and enablers - are all concepts originally developed by Quantum Leap.  The MSC is now completed and has successfully conducted its first overseas exercise.\n\n| Resources   |     |\n|-------------|-----|\n| Autonomy    |     |\n| Ownership   |     |\n| License     |     |\n| Fail        |     |\n| Support     |     |\n| Guidance    |     |\n| Leadership  |     |\n| LDS         |     |\n| SWG         |     |\n| Quantum     |     |\n| Leap        |     |\n| X           |     |\n| X           |     |\n| X           |     |\n\n## Iv.  Mkv Soc Case Study A.  Background\n\nDuring the Persian Gulf War in 1990-1991, NSW used patrol craft designed in the 1960s that were well beyond their usable service life.  The craft had documented design flaws that jeopardized personnel safety and mission effectiveness.  The Gulf War proved that NSW needed a new and improved medium range craft to meet its current and future mission requirements.  A small working group was formed at USSOCOM to develop a new patrol craft to replace the aging Patrol-Lights, Sea foxes and Patrol Boat-\nRiverines in the NSW inventory.  The goal of the small working group was to provide the best possible craft to the NSW community, meeting its requirements in the shortest time, and staying within budget limitations.  The Mark Five Special Operations Craft (MKV SOC) project would soon produce a new, innovative patrol craft whose design and performance would be second to none.  The small working group developed the MKV concept into a unique design, oversaw system integrations and construction, and evaluated the product during operational testing.\n\nThe primary mission of the MKV SOC was to provide medium range insertion and extraction support for Special Operations Forces (SOF) personnel in a low to medium threat coastal environment.  The secondary mission of the MKV SOC\nwas coastal patrol and interdiction.  The operating system of a MKV SOC Detachment was designed as a C-5 deployable, road transportable combatant craft comprised of two craft, with two transporters and tractor-trailers.  A deployable support package that was made up of containerized support components and vehicles would accompany each detachment.\n\nEach detachment would have a Maintenance Support Team (MST) that would consist of two officers and sixteen enlisted whose job was to keep the MKV detachment operational and prepared to conduct NSW missions.\n\nInitially, the acquisition of the MKV SOC was going to be managed by the Commander, Naval Sea System Command\n(NAVSEA).  After determining that it would take NAVSEA\nseven years until the first craft would be operational, USSOCOM petitioned and won the right to execute the program in-house.  A SEAL Captain was chosen to be the first program manager of the MKV SOC project.  He was also the group leader for the MKV SOC small working group.  The Group Leader reported to the USSOCOM Program Executive Officer for Maritime and Rotary Wing Platforms (PEO M&R).\n\nThe PEO M&R reported to the Special Operations Acquisition Executive (SOAE), a civilian SES who had milestone decision authority for the MKV SOC program.  This meant, the SOAE's decisions were final and only the Commander-in-Chief, Special Operations Command (CINCSOC) had the authority to overturn the SOAE's decisions.  The group leader had a deputy and several support staff in the small working group such as a financial adviser and a contracting officer.  The MKV SOC small working group, which had overall responsibility for the project, had less than ten full time members.  He had various technical support teams made up primarily of contractors who were in charge of specific functions on the MKV SOC project such as weapons and engineering.. He also had Special Boat combat crewmen from both Special Boat Unit Twelve (SBU-12) located in San Diego, CA and SBU-2 0 located in Little Creek, VA who would make recommendations on improving the MKV SOC during the developmental and operational testing phases.\n\nThe MKV SOC project produced a craft that met or exceeded the operational requirements of a medium range patrol craft.  The small working group also produced significant innovations such as compressing the acquisition timeline.\n\n\"The truly impressive result of this streamlining strategy was that, in the case of the MKV SOC acquisition, from February 1992, the date the program was officially chartered, to delivery of the first two production MKV SOC\nsystems took only 4 0 months, almost four years ahead of the initial program execution estimates.\" (USCINCSOC, 1998, p. 3)\n\n## B.  Variables 1.  Support And Guidance Of The Leadership\n\nThe MKV SOC small working group enjoyed the support and guidance of the leadership. .As USSOCOM took the project from NAVSEA and it was USSOCOM's first in-house acquisition of a major platform, CINCSOC had to ensure that the project was a success.  He understood the importance and future implications that the project would have for the USSOCOM acquisition process.  The MKV SOC group leader reported directly to the PEO M&R.  The PEO M&R kept the unnecessary bureaucratic activities away from the MKV SOC\nsmall working group and took care of the daily administrative duties.  (Freeman, USSOCOM, 26 Oct 2000)\nThe PEO M&R had great confidence in the group leader to keep the MKV SOC project moving in the right direction.\n\nThe group leader benefited from a short, two-layer chain of command.  The Acquisition Executive was extremely helpful and supportive of the project and was empowered with the ultimate authority concerning the MKV SOC project.  It was extremely rare that the group leader would ever need to go above the Acquisition Executive for help on the project.\n\nThe group leader not only had  support and guidance from USSOCOM, but he also enjoyed  support and guidance from COMNAVSPECWARCOM.  \"The group leader traveled to the West Coast [to brief the SEAL admiral] every two months.\"\n(Freeman, USSOCOM, 26 Oct 2000)  The group leader kept the SEAL admiral appraised of the progress of the MKV SOC\nprogram and was provided help from NAVSPECWARCOM whenever he needed it.\n\nThe group leader volunteered and was personally recruited by USSOCOM and the NSW leadership to head the MKV SOC project.  The group leader was a highly respected member of the NSW community and possessed a great deal of knowledge and expertise on NSW small boat operations.\n\nUSSOCOM and NAVSPECWARCOM leadership provided the group leader with a clearly defined goal of developing a patrol craft, which met the NSW requirements in the shortest time, and within budget limitations. (USSOCOM, MKVSOC Standard Information Document, p. 2)\n\nThe MKV SOC project was staffed with the right personnel, who possessed the required skills to meet the goal of the project.  In addition to the key personnel of the small working group, the group enjoyed support from eighteen contractors as well as support, from the technical support team, operator support from the Fleet Introduction Team, USSOCOM staff directorate support, and other agencies and commands.  Although the actual MKV SOC working group was small, it had access to any expertise it required to complete the project successfully.\n\nThe group was given the time needed and was allowed to focus on completing its tasks.  The group used an innovative streamlined acquisition process to shorten the length of time needed to complete the project.  All developmental and production testing was completed ahead of schedule and all production milestones were on time or ahead of schedule.\n\nThe group was given the appropriate amount of funding to complete its tasks.  Funding was transferred to the companies, who were competing for the MKV SOC contract, on time and without problems. (Freeman, USSOCOM, 26 OCT 2000)\nThe funding for the program was made available from Research, Development, Test and Evaluation (RDT&E) funds for the first two years of the project.  The following years the funds came directly from the command's Program Objectives Memorandum (POM) and were funded directly from the USSOCOM budget.  (The POM is the routine process by which a project is funded in the Department of Defense.)\nThe small working group was given the funding it needed, but the group leader challenged the status quo and found ways to save money.  For example, the original cost estimate for the developmental testing of the MKV SOC was five million dollars.  The group leader challenged that dollar figure, conducted the tests in Key West, Florida and Eglin AFB, Florida and it cost only five hundred thousand dollars to test the craft, saving $4.5 million.\n\nThe MKV SOC small working group was given autonomy from USSOCOM to focus completely on its goal of developing a medium range patrol craft.  The group leader was allowed to separate the group from the daily routine at USSOCOM.\n\nThe group leader moved the group into an old barracks; away from the USSOCOM headquarters to better help the group focus on its mission.  The group enjoyed a workspace of its own, and worked virtually uninterrupted.  The group leader only reported to his boss when he needed help with problems.  The group leader was never micromanaged by USSOCOM.  The group was allowed to change the acquisition cycle and streamline the process.  The group leader was also able to receive approval and funding for a complete logistics package that included trucks, trailers and spare parts, so the first operational MKV SOC detachment and all future detachments would have the complete package required for an operational deployment.  The group leader was given the autonomy by the Acquisition Executive to make this happen. (Freeman, USSOCOM, 2 6 October 2000)\n\nThe NSW leadership understood the MKV SOC project, recognized its value and assisted its implementation.  They took ownership of the MKV SOC project from the beginning.\n\nIt was recognized throughout the NSW community that a medium range patrol craft was badly needed.  The group leader worked very hard to keep NAVSPECWARCOM informed so they felt as if they were part of the project.  The Fleet Introduction Team (FIT), which consisted of SBU operators whose job it was to ensure the craft had a smooth transition from SOCOM to the Special Boat Units, took ownership of the project immediately.  The SBU operators looked at the MKV SOC as their craft and made recommendations on how to improve craft performance and capabilities.  The FIT team concept allowed the first MKV\nSOC system packages to be delivered with trained crews, complete deployment and spare parts packages and in a fully operational ready status.\n\nMembers of the NSW community were integrated into specification reviews, design reviews, construction monitoring, developmental and operational testing, progress reviews, integrated logistics support development, configuration control and system delivery process and planning.  The small working group made it a point to deal with NSW operators who could positively influence the final product and had a vested interest in the success of the program.  Including the operators in this way, who were the end users of the craft, from the start of the project ensured that the NSW community took ownership of the project. (Freeman, USSOCOM, 2 6 OCTOBER 2 000)  This would help the MKV SOCs during the implementation process and ensured the entire NSW community accepted them.  A final indicator that the NSW leadership took ownership of the MKV\nSOC project was that training manual were written, exercises conducted and doctrine established to validate the MKV SOC program.\n\nThe MKV SOC small working group had a license to fail from USSOCOM.  During a telephone conversation with a MKV\nSOC small working group member, he said that no member of the group was in fear of losing a promotion if the group failed to produce the MKV SOC platform that would meet the operational requirements.  No failures or setbacks caused the group to be in jeopardy of being dissolved.  The group could fail without fear of retaliation from the USSOCOM\nleadership or the rest of the organization.  The group was very confident and understood it had the potential to produce a great, innovative system that would benefit the NSW community and enhance its operational capabilities.\n\nFailure was not on the minds of the group members.  The most critical event of the MKV SOC project was loading the MKV SOC on a C-5 and then air deploying the system.\n\n(Freeman, 2 6 OCTOBER 2 000)  In order for the project to be successful and meet the Operational Requirements Document of COMNAVSPECWARCOM, the MKV SOCs had to fit inside a C-5\naircraft.  Had this failed, this would have been a setback for the program.  The group was confident and they had no fear of failure or its repercussions.\n\n## C.  Summary\n\nThe MKV SOC project was a success by every measure.\n\nAll five key variables were present: support and guidance of the leadership, resources and funding, autonomy, ownership, and the license to fail, while the small working group labored to develop a unique, innovative insertion and extraction platform.  The project received a very high level of priority from the top leadership at USSOCOM and NAVSPECWARCOM.  Due to the project being taken from NAVSEA's control, and being the first in-house acquisition project at USSOCOM the success of the project was a major priority of the leadership at USSOCOM.  They realized that the success of the MKV project would have future ramifications on the prestige of USSOCOM and its acquisition process.  USSOCOM understood that NSW needed a medium range patrol craft.  Lack of one was a serious shortfall that adversely affected operational readiness.\n\nUSSOCOM took the project from NAVSEA because it believed that it could produce a patrol craft in less than the seven years required by NAVSEA.  NSW understood it badly needed a new patrol craft to insert and extract SEALs from a target on a craft that provided a reliable, safe, operator friendly and relatively comfortable platform.\n\nNSW operators were involved with the project from the beginning of the acquisition process.  The Fleet Introduction Team was made up of SBU operators.  They made continuous recommendations for improvements and identified problems during the entire project.  The SBU operators involved in the MKV SOC project returned to the Special Boat Units excited about the capabilities of the MKV SOCs.\n\nMany of the most qualified SBU operators wanted to be involved with the MKV SOC project.  The license to fail variable was the weakest of the five variables.  After interviewing a MKV SOC small working group member, I\nbelieve it was present, but it was never positively tested. The group was so confident during the project that failure never entered their minds.  There was not an event that was a critical failure that seriously threatened the project.\n\nThe MKV SOC small working group not only produced an innovative new craft for the NSW inventory, but it produced innovative processes such as acquisition streamlining, and end user participation.  The MKV SOC project was a successful innovation in all aspects.\n\n| Resources   |     | Autonomy   |     | Ownership   |     |\n|-------------|-----|------------|-----|-------------|-----|\n| License     |     | to         |     |             |     |\n| Fail        |     |            |     |             |     |\n| Support     |     | &          |     |             |     |\n| Guidance    |     | of         |     |             |     |\n| Leadership  |     |            |     |             |     |\n| LDS         |     | NSW        |     |             |     |\n| SWG         |     |            |     |             |     |\n| Quantum     |     |            |     |             |     |\n| Leap        |     |            |     |             |     |\n| X           |     | X          |     | X           |     |\n| X           |     |            |     |             |     |\n| MK          |     | V          |     |             |     |\n| SOC         |     |            |     |             |     |\n| X           |     | X          |     | X           |     |\n| X           |     | X          |     |             |     |\n| X           |     |            |     |             |     |\n\n## V.   Vision 2000 Case Study A. Background\n\nDuring the early 1990s, the East Coast SEAL Teams encountered difficulties finding qualified SEAL 0-4s to accept command of a Naval Special Warfare (NSW) Task Unit\n(one SEAL platoon, one Special Boat detachment) attached to the Mediterranean Amphibious Ready Group (MARG).  Qualified SEAL officers steered clear of the MARG Task Unit Commander assignment, as there was little career incentive in accepting a difficult job and deploying for six months.\n\nThe Task Unit Commander directly supported the Commander, Amphibious Task Force, a Navy Captain who commanded the three ship MARG.  Also, on board was a Marine Expeditionary Unit that consisted of approximately two thousand marines commanded by the Commander, Landing Force, who was a Marine Colonel.\n\nDeployments with the MARG were perceived as extremely frustrating and often boring.   It was extremely difficult to train while onboard Navy ships and this had an adverse effect on SEAL operational skills.  Arguably, the NSW\nforces assigned to the MARG were the best-trained and equipped forces present, but the NSW Task Unit was losing most battles in the political arena with the fleet navy and the marines.  NSW operators were excluded from operations where they felt their involvement would greatly enhance mission success.  Lack of training and being excluded from real world operations was extremely frustrating to the SEALs attached to the MARG.\n\nAnother problem that the East Coast SEAL Teams faced was a very high percentage of time each person stationed at a SEAL Team was deployed away from his family (i.e., perstempo).  The perstempo was 55%.  This meant that the average SEAL operator was deployed approximately 200 days out of every year.  This extremely high perstempo adversely affected professional development, schooling, and morale.\n\nThere was no time in the SEAL operator's schedule for advanced training and schooling.\n\nOther problems noted were the lack of NSW officers forward deployed, and the lack of command unity while forward deployed.  The full potential of NSW was not realized while on deployment.  The deployed NSW assets could not conduct interoperability and sustainment training with other deployed NSW assets.  The deployed NSW forces were \"stove-piped\" organizations, which meant they could only utilize their limited on-hand or organic assets instead of utilizing the full network of NSW assets in theater to enhance flexibility.  NSW units supported the Commander, Special Operations Command, Europe (COMSOCEUR)\nand the Commander, Sixth Fleet (COMSIXTHFLT).  Two SEAL\nplatoons and two Rigid Hull Inflatable Boat (RIB)\ndetachments directly supported COMSOCEUR.  NSW had three separate NSW Task Units supporting Sixth Fleet which were deployed on the Aircraft Carrier, MARG and a submarine.\n\nUnder this force structure, individual NSW units remained stove-piped, which meant the units could not combine assets and operate together to enhance mission capabilities and flexibility.  Another problem identified by the leadership at NSWG-2 was the limited shore duty billets for enlisted NSW operators. (Toennies, NSWG-2, p. 2)\nThese problems led the Commander, Naval Special Warfare Group TWO (NSWG-2), located in Little Creek, VA to form an Executive Steering Committee in the fall of 1994.\n\nThe commander appointed himself as the group leader of the Executive Steering Committee.  This small working group consisted of a SEAL commander, Chief Staff Officer of NSWG-\n2 and the commanding officers of: the three SEAL Teams, the SEAL Delivery Vehicle Team, and the three overseas NSW\nunits.  The small working group consisted of nine members formed to develop a strategic plan for NSWG-2.\n\nThe Executive Steering Committee developed a bold, innovative plan for NSW named \"Vision 2000\".  The primary goal of Vision 2000 was to, \"Provide the most capable warfighting organization possible to each combatant commander.\"  (Toennies, NSWG-2, p. 1)  Vision 2000's goal was to provide joint and fleet commanders from each region of the world the most flexible force package of NSW assets. In order to achieve the primary goal of Vision 2000, supporting goals and principles were developed.  The Executive Steering Committee wanted to improve the following areas:  1) unity of command at SEAL Teams and overseas NSW units; 2) SEAL commanders' focus on warfighting; 3) optimization of force structure; 4) efficiency of training; 5) combat service support and maintenance; and 6) integration of NSW forces. (Toennies, NSWG-2, p. 1)\nThe Executive Steering Committee developed the Vision\n2 000 concept to help NSW improve the structure of its organization to meet the challenges of the future.  The cornerstone of the Vision 2000 concept created a Naval Special Warfare Task Group (NSWTG) with a SEAL 0-6 in charge to provide a single SEAL officer who would be in charge of all NSW forces in Europe.  The NSWTG Commander would be an operational commander whose focus was on warfighting and he provided both COMSOCEUR and COMSIXTHFLT, a single NSW commander to call when NSW forces were required for real world operations.  The NSWTG Commander would have the authority to pull together NSW forces from around the European Theater to enhance the combat effectiveness of the NSW forces.\n\nThis authority to command and control all NSW forces in Europe would solve the problem of the deployed NSW\nforces being inflexible, stove-piped organizations.  Having an 0-6 forward would increase the flexibility of the NSW\nforce package and allow the best mix of NSW forces to deploy in support of contingencies and real world operations.  The NSWTG Commander, as a 0-6 operational commander, would be invited to participate during high level contingency planning conducted by COMSOCEUR or COMSIXTHFLT.\n\nAnother concept of Vision 2000 was to reorganize NSWG-\n2.  Streamlining the current force structure and creating an additional SEAL Team was proposed in order to support the Vision 2000 plan of command deployments where each command would deploy forward as a NSW Task Unit.  Having an additional SEAL Team would solve perstempo problems, the unity of command issues, and increase time for professional development and specialty schools.  A new SEAL training command would be created to streamline how the SEAL Teams trained.  At the same time, this command would provide more shore duty billets for enlisted SEAL operators.\n\nTwo operational deployment cycles were conducted with a SEAL 0-6 as the NSWTG Commander.  The deployments were highly successful.  The NSWTG planned and executed special operations in support of COMSIXTHFLT, conducted interoperability with COMSOCEUR, and exercised operational control of patrol coastals during the deployment.  The NSWTG acted as the executive agent for NSW training and readiness and was the COMSIXTHFLT agent for NSW/SOF related issues.  COMSIXTHFLT approved and endorsed the NSWTG in every aspect and liked the flexibility and enhanced operational capabilities provided by the NSWTG.\n\nThe Vision 2000 innovation would have improved the operational capabilities of SEAL platoons and Special Boat detachments to conduct successful NSW missions.  The Vision\n2000 innovation failed and was not implemented by NSW.\n\n## B.  Variables 1.  Support And Guidance Of The Leadership\n\nThe Executive Steering Committee had the support and guidance of the leadership.  The committee was a unique small working group due to the fact that the Commander, NSWG-2, was also the committee leader.  The commander personally selected the members who would make up the small working group.  The committee leader provided the vision required for strategic planning.  The immediate superior of the committee leader (Commander, NSWG-2) was the Commander Naval Special Warfare Command (COMNAVSPECWARCOM), who was the senior SEAL officer.  Due to his position and rank, the committee leader had a direct line of communication with his superior.  The SEAL admiral was concerned with the costs of Vision 2000.  He set the boundaries for the program.  Vision 2 000 could not require more funding or personnel, must be approved by the theater commanders, preserve the SEAL Team name and could be applied to both coasts.  Both COMSOCEUR and COMSIXTHFLT approved the NSWTG\ndeployment, as did COMNAVSPECWARCOM.  (Toennies, NSWG-2, 03\nNovember 2000)  The cornerstone of the Vision 2000 concept of having a SEAL 0-6 in command of the NSWTG in Europe was approved by all the required commanders and moved forward.\n\nThe Executive Steering Committee had access to resources and funding required to meet its goals.  Even though Vision 2 000 would not receive additional funding, the Commander, NSWG-2 had the authority to use the NSWG-2\nbudget as he saw fit.  He shifted funds to the Vision 2000\nproject ensuring it would not run out of resources.  The committee was staffed with the personnel who had the required skills to complete the assigned tasks.  The committee leader made it clear that the Vision 2000 project was a priority at NSWG-2 and that any member of the committee that required assistance would receive it immediately.\n\nThe committee was broken down into chairmen for particular functional areas such as facilities and training requirements.  A member of the committee was allowed special access to personnel at NSWG-2 that possessed the required knowledge and expertise.  For example, the facilities chairman was given special access, without being burdened by normal protocol, to the NSWG-2 Civil Engineer for detailed questions such as, \"How much square footage is required for an office space for two people?\"  Various members of the NSWG-2 staff assisted in answering detailed questions, which helped the committee members meet their goals.\n\nThe committee was also given the time required to complete its tasks.  The goal chairmen met monthly, stayed current on relevant issues so the project would not stall and reported back to the entire committee.  The committee members were extremely busy commanding officers, and still found time to commit to the Vision 2000 project.  Due to the fact that the committee members were very busy, the time schedule was realistic and allowed members the time to be commanding officers as well as productive committee members.  (Toennies, NSWG-2, 03 Nov 2000)  During an interview with the group leader, he said funding was made available when committee members required it to meet their objectives.  If a committee member needed to travel to help the project move forward, funding was always provided.\n\nThe committee was given autonomy from the rest of the NSWG-2 organization.  The committee members were highly respected commanding officers so they had autonomy that lower ranking, less experienced committee members would not have had.  The committee leader was the Commander, NSWG-2.\n\nBy having the NSWG-2 Commander as the committee leader, Vision 2000 enjoyed autonomy that many small working groups would never have. (Toennies, NSWG-2, 03 November 2000)\nThe committee leader provided vision to the group and allowed the goal chairmen the latitude and autonomy to work on their goals without interference from him or the rest of the NSWG-2 organization.  During an interview with the group leader, he said whenever a chairman had a problem, they could go straight to thecommittee leader for resolution or assistance and they were not required to get approval from lower ranking officers at NSWG-2.  By having the commander as the committee leader, it kept the chain of command flat and kept the rest of the organization from interfering with the committee's progress.\n\nThe small working group's leader had final authority on all decisions during the Vision 2000 project.  It proved to be very beneficial to the committee's progress.  The chairmen would meet monthly and the committee as a whole would meet once per quarter.  Only meeting once per quarter to review progress indicates that the committee enjoyed a great deal of autonomy in completing its tasks.  Chairmen were free to meet with whomever they needed to exchange ideas, brainstorm or share recommendations. (Toennies, NSWG-2, 03 November 2 000)\n\nInitially, key leaders in the NSW community took ownership of the Vision 2000 project and helped during the initial implementation process.  Two concept deployments were made and proved that the Vision 2000 concept was sound providing the most capable NSW organization possible to each combatant commander.  The deployments proved that having a SEAL 0-6 in command at the NSWTG in the European Theater worked.  It was so successful that the Commander, Sixth Fleet demanded that the deployments continue.\n\n(Toennies, NSWG-2, 03 November 2 0 00)\nJust as the Vision 2000 concept was validated, the entire leadership at NSWG-2 and the members of the Executive Steering Committee changed in the summer of 1996.\n\nAlso, there was a change of command at NAVSPECWARCOM.\n\nThese changes in leadership brought in new leaders who did not understand the Vision 2 000 project, who were not involved, and did not take ownership of the project.  The new Commander of NAVSPECEWARCOM was briefed on the project and was a supporter of the project, but it failed to become a major priority or focus. (Toennies, NSWG-2, 03 November 2000)\nThere was a change of command at NSWG-2 and the new commander had heard of the project and did not approve of it.  The new commander was briefed on the Vision 2000\nproject.  The new commander asked, \"How are we going to continue to do this?\" (Toennies, NSWG-2, 03 Nov 2000)  He was concerned that NSWG-2 was wasting valuable time and scarce resources on the Vision 2000 project.  The new leadership was not involved in the project, did not understand it, never took ownership of it and the project languished, lost steam and died.\n\nThe Executive Steering Committee was given the license to fail by the Commander, NSWG-2.  During the interview with the group leader of Vision 2000, he said that, no member of the group risked not being promoted if the committee failed to produce an innovation.  The members were not in fear of receiving a bad fitness report if the committee failed in its efforts.  The committee was never in jeopardy of being dissolved due to a failure.  The committee was given the latitude to fail without fear of retribution from the rest of the organization.  By having the Commander, NSWG-2 as the committee leader, the committee enjoyed great latitude to explore and think innovatively to benefit the NSW community.  The committee leader possessed the final authority and did not have to explain failures to anyone else in the community.\n\n(Toennies, NSWG-2, 03 November 2000)\n\n## C.  Summary\n\nThe Vision 2000 case is a study of when NSW failed to innovate.  Initially, the leadership took ownership of the Vision 2000 project.  The project stalled and eventually died due to new leadership taking command and not taking ownership of the project.  The new leaders did not understand the project, were not involved with it and did not buy into the project.  Due to changes of command that removed all the key leaders that had ownership of the project and replaced them with leaders who did not take ownership of the project, the project failed.  Vision 2000 did not fail because of faulty of misguided ideas and concepts; it failed because the ownership variable disappeared during leadership changes.\n\n|            |    | Resources   |     | Autonomy   |     |\n|------------|----|-------------|-----|------------|-----|\n| Ownership  |    | License     |     | to         |     |\n| Fail       |    |             |     |            |     |\n| Support    |    | &           |     |            |     |\n| Guidance   |    | of          |     |            |     |\n| Leadership |    |             |     |            |     |\n| LDS        |    | NSW         |     | SWG        |     |\n| Quantum    |    |             |     |            |     |\n| Leap       |    |             |     |            |     |\n| X          |    |             |     |            |     |\n| X          |    |             |     |            |     |\n| X          |    |             |     |            |     |\n| X          |    | X           |     |            |     |\n| X          |    |             |     |            |     |\n| X          |    |             |     |            |     |\n| MK         |    | V           |     |            |     |\n| SOC        |    |             |     |            |     |\n| X          |    |             |     |            |     |\n| X          |    |             |     |            |     |\n| X          |    |             |     |            |     |\n| X          |    | X           |     | X          |     |\n| X          |    |             |     |            |     |\n| Vision     |    |             |     |            |     |\n| 2000       |    |             |     |            |     |\n| X          |    |             |     |            |     |\n| X          |    | X           |     |            |     |\n| X          |    |             |     |            |     |\n| X          |    |             |     |            |     |\n\n## This Page Intentionally Left Blank Vi.  Conclusion A.  Findings\n\nThis thesis found that the five key variables identified by McCaskey and NSW leadership were present when small working groups succeeded in stimulating innovation within a larger organization.  The case studies confirm the importance of having the support and guidance of the leadership, access to resources and funding, and autonomy, if the small working group is to produce innovation.  The small working group must also have the license to fail in order to push the envelope and think innovatively without fear of failure.\n\nThe license to fail variable was the most difficult to prove during the case studies.  Often the group believed that they possessed the license to fail, but it did not test the leadership of the organization.  In order to positively test for its presence, the case studies needed to provide major failures or setbacks.  This did not happen during the three Naval Special Warfare (NSW) case studies. The Vision 2 000 case study failed to produce an innovation, but the project did not have any major failures or setbacks until it was ended.\n\nThe three case studies suggest that the ownership variable is the most important variable and must be present for an innovative project or concept to be implemented.\n\nThe small working groups all took ownership of their innovative projects from the beginning.  A new leader is not guaranteed to take ownership of an innovative project initiated prior to his arrival.  If the NSW community does not take ownership of the project, implementation will become a major problem.  If the ownership variable disappears, then it is only a matter of time until other variables disappear and the innovative project comes to an abrupt end.\n\nThe case studies display that implementing an innovation is the most difficult phase during the innovation process.  Innovative projects may cover a four to five year period from beginning to end; some projects continue for ten years or more.  The three NSW case studies covered approximately 5 years or slightly longer.\n\nA critical point was identified during the evaluation of the data collected on the case studies.  This critical point was the period of time immediately following a change of command or change in leadership.  In the Quantum Leap case study this critical point surfaced when a new commander took over Naval Special Warfare Group ONE (NSWG-\n1) , he did not understand the project, was not involved with it and did not take ownership of the project and it almost died.  In the Vision 2000 case study following a change of command at NSWG-2 and most members of the Executive Steering Committee, the new leaders did not take ownership of the project and the project died.\n\nWhen new commanders fail to take ownership of an innovative project, other key variables such as support and guidance of the leadership and access to resources and funding will eventually disappear.  When these variables disappear, the project will languish and eventually end.\n\nApproximately every two years in the military, a command's leadership will be replaced at a change of command ceremony.  This two-year cycle of command leadership will not change.  The changes in leadership within the military are a constant.  With that in mind, to keep innovation moving leaders must address the critical point following a change of command and identify procedures to keep an innovation alive and well following a change in leadership.\n\n## B.  Recommendations\n\nThe leadership of a command should recognize the value of all five variables when a small working group is trying to produce an innovation.  It is the responsibility of the leadership to ensure that the variables are present within the parent organization while the small working group is attempting to innovate.\n\nThe commander of the parent organization and the small working group leader must work together to ensure that the new commander will take ownership of the innovative project.  The commander and/or the group leader should brief the new commander once he has been identified to take command prior to his actual arrival.  In order for the new commander to take ownership of the project, he must thoroughly understand the project, its purpose, and the value of the project.  The new commander should understand the beneficial effects the project will have on the NSW\ncommunity.  It would be beneficial to the project to involve the new commander actively on the project.  He should receive updates on progress, milestones achieved, successes and failures and should be encouraged to make recommendations concerning the project.  The commander and the group leader should push to get the new commander to approve, support and commit to the success of the project.\n\nThe group leader needs to be confident and continue to sell the new commander on the merits of the project after he takes command.\n\nIt is the responsibility of the commander and group leader to ensure that the entire NSW community takes ownership of an innovative project.  They should brief individual NSW commands as often as possible:  It is much easier for the NSW community to take ownership of a project when a majority of the community has been briefed on the project and they have had a forum to ask questions and make recommendations.  With this broader support, the challenge of leadership transition may be reduced.  The commander and group leader need to get as many NSW personnel involved with and actively supporting the project as feasible.  They need to have \"buy-in\" from the 0-4/0-5 level.  It is necessary to brief all stakeholders who will be affected by the project.  This will limit misinformation and will limit the affect that detractors of the project will have on the community.  If the commander and group leader accomplish most of the above recommendations, it will not guarantee that an innovation will be implemented and successful, but it will greatly enhance the chances that the innovation will survive and be successful in the end.\n\n## This Page Intentionally Left Blank List Of References\n\nInterview between F. Clarke, GS-13, Naval Special Warfare\nGroup ONE, Coronado, CA, and the author, 29 June 2000.\nTelephone conversation between Dale Freeman, contractor,\nUnited States Special Operations Command and the\nauthor, 2 6 October 2000.\nGlenn, T., \"The Formula for Success in TQM,\" The\nBureaucrat,   pp. 17-2 0, Spring 1991.\nLipman-Blumen, J. and Leavitt, H., Hot  *Groups,*   New York:\nOxford University Press, 1999.\nMcCaskey, M. , Framework for Analyzing- Work *Groups,*   Harvard\nBusiness School, 480-009, 1979.\nInterview between W. McRaven, CAPT, USN, Naval Special\nWarfare Group ONE, Coronado, CA, and the author, 30\nJune 2 000.\nNaval Special Warfare Group ONE presentation, Project 21:\nNaval  Special   Warfare in  the 21st  *Century,*   McRaven, W. ,\nCoronado, CA, pp. 8, 12, 33.\nNaval Special Warfare Group TWO presentation, Naval  Special\nWarfare Task Group Sixth Fleet:   Post Deployment Brief,\nToennies, P., Little Creek, VA, pp. 2-3.\nNaval Special Warfare Group TWO presentation, jReorgranization Concept:  NSW *2000,*   Toennies, P., Little Creek, VA, pp. 3-4.\n\nRosen, S., Winning  the Next  War:   Innovation  and  the Modern\nMilitary,   Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1991.\nSchoomaker, P., Special  Operations Forces:   The  Way Ahead,\nCommander-in-Chief, United States Special Operations\nCommand Pamphlet, 1999.\nInterview between P. Toennies, CAPT(ret-), USN, Naval\nSpecial Group TWO, San Diego, CA, and the author, 03\nNov 2000.\nUSCINSOC, USCINCSOC 1998  Quality Team *Award,*   pp. 1-6, 1998.\n\nUnited States Special Operations Command, MKV SOC Program Standardized Information *Document,*   pp. 1-2.\n\nWilson, J., *Bureaucracy,*   New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1989.\n\n## Initial Distribution List\n\n1. Defense Technical Information Center\n8725 John J. Kingman Rd. Ste 0944\nFort Belvoir, VA 22060-6218\n2. Dudley Knox Library\nNaval Postgraduate School 411 DyerRd. Monterey, CA 93943\n3. Professor David Tucker\n(Code CC)\nNaval Postgraduate School\nMonterey, CA 93943\n4. GEN Charles Holland\nCommander in Chief\nUS Special Operations Command MacDill AFB, FL 33608-6001\n5. United States Special Operations Command\nSOOP-JE\n7701 Tampa Point Blvd\nMcDillAFB,FL 33621-5323\n6. COL Donn Kegel\nNational War College\n300 D Street\nFort McNair Washington, DC 20319-5078\n7. Jennifer Duncan\nSpecial Operations Academic Group\nCode (CC/Jd)\nNaval Postgraduate School Monterey, CA 93943-5000\n8. Library\nArmy War College\nCarlisle Barracks, PA 17013\n9. Library\nNaval War College Newport, RI02840\n10. Strategic Studies Group (SSG)\nNaval War College Newport, RI 02840\n11. Department of Military Strategy\nNational War College (NWMS)\nFt. Leslie J. McNair\nWashington, DC 20319-6111\n12. US Army Command and General Staff College\nATTN: Library Ft. Leavenworth, KS 66027-6900\n13. Library\nAir War College Maxwell AFB, AL 36112-6428\n14. US Military Academy\nATTN: Library West Point, NY 10996\n15. US Naval Academy\nATTN: Library Annapolis, MD 21412\n16. Maraquat Memorial Library\nUS Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center Rm. C287,Bldg3915 Ft. Bragg, NC 28307-5000\n17. US Air Force Special Operations School\nEDO, Alison Bldg, 357 Tully St.\nHurlburtFldFL 32544-5800\n18. LCDR Thomas A. Rainville\n206 Remagen Rd.\nSeaside, CA 93955\n19. Commander, Naval Special Warfare Command\n2000 Trident Way San Diego, CA 92155-5599\n20. CAPT Bill McRaven\nNaval Special Warfare Group ONE\n3632 Guadalcanal Rd. San Diego, CA 92155-5583\n21. CAPT Robert Schoultz\nOffice of ASD SOLIC Pentagon RM 1A674B\nWashington, DC 20301\n22. CDR Roger Herbert\nSEAL Delivery Vehicle Team TWO\n1875 Intercove Rd, Bldg 3813\nNorfolk, VA 23521-9998"
    },
    {
        "text": "# Allegations Of Iraqi Chemical Weapons Transported To Syria And Possible Tunnel Adits At Al-Bayda, Syria Version Of 2014-06-22\n\nSummary: In early January, 2004, an expatriate Syrian journalist gave interviews on Dutch and British television describing information he had received from an informant in the Syrian military.  The informant wrote that Iraq, before the American invasion in 2003, had shipped chemical weapons to Syria, where they were stored in three sites.  One of those sites was said to be in a tunnel in a mountain next to the village of Al Bayda, two kilometers south of Masyaf.  Available satellite imagery confirms that there is a high, steep mountain immediately to the east of Al Bayda and that, at the foot of the mountain, there are three structures that appear to be tunnel (\"adit\") entrances.  The quality of the available imagery is, as yet, too poor to allow any further conclusions to be drawn.\n\n# Http://Heavenawaits.Wordpress.Com/The-Syria-Wmd-Conspiracy/\n\nA senior Syrian journalist reports Iraq WMD located in three Syrian sites\n06 January, 2004 AFP\nNizar Nayuf (Nayyouf-Nayyuf-Najoef), a Syrian journalist who recently defected from Syria to Western Europe and is known for bravely challenging the Syrian regime, said in a letter Monday, January 5, to Dutch newspaper \"De Telegraaf,\" that he knows the three sites where Iraq's Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) are kept. The storage places are: -1- Tunnels dug under the town of al-Baida near the city of Hama in northern Syria. These tunnels are an integral part of an underground factory, built by the North Koreans, for producing Syrian Scud missiles. Iraqi chemical weapons and long-range missiles are stored in these tunnels. -2- The village of Tal Snan, north of the town of Salamija, where there is a big Syrian air force camp. Vital parts of Iraq's WMD are stored there.\n\n-3-. The city of Sjinsjar on the Syrian border with the Lebanon, south of Homs city.\nNayouf writes that the transfer of Iraqi WMD to Syria was organized by the commanders of Saddam Hussein's Special Republican Guard, including General Shalish, with the help of Assif Shoakat , Bashar Assad's cousin. Shoakat is the CEO of Bhaha, an import/export company owned by the Assad family. In February 2003, a month before America's invasion in Iraq, very few are aware about the efforts to bring the Weapons of Mass Destruction from Iraq to Syria, and the personal involvement of Bashar Assad and his family in the operation. Nayouf, who has won prizes for journalistic integrity, says he wrote his letter because he has terminal cancer.\n\nFirst Message from the Syrian source to Nizar Nayouf\n\"Dear Nizar. We received confirmations that the Iraqi weapons, which were moved to Syria by the help of General Zoul-Himla Chalich are now hidden in three places inside Syria:\n\n## First Place: A Tunnel Dug In The Mountain Close To The Al-Baidah Village, Which Is Roughly Two Kilometers From Misyaf Village. This Place Is Under The 489 Safety Cipher Documents' Office Control .\n\nSecond place: the factory of the Air Armed Forces in the village of Tal Sinan, between the town of Hama and Salamiyyah. This factory is under the Air Force control. Third place: the location of Shinsar, 40 kilometers south of Homs, two kilometers east of the Homs - Damascus road. There are underground tunnels there, controlled by Brigade 661 of the armed air Forces. It is a Brigade of air Patrol. The tunnels are several tens of meters deep. The weapons were transported in large wooden cases and barrels, under the supervision of the General Zoul-Himla Chalich and the son of his brother Assef, who works at Al-Bachaer company. The company is owned by the Assad family and has offices in Beirut, Damascus and Baghdad. This company also undertook the illegal Iraqi oil importation in Syria, and supplied weapons to Saddam. I will try to send you all the new information as i get . Take care and be safe.\"\n\n## Second Message To Nizar Nayuf\n\n\"Dear Nizar. I have sent you another chart of the positions which tells where the weapons which were sent from Iraq into Syria, are hidden. Because the preceding chart that I sent you earlier is not clear. Until now, the authorities in Syria did not worry of what was being published by the Dutch television news about this subject. New information: The weapons were evacuated by the means of ambulances. Mohammed Mansoura also took part in the operation. There are other serious, detailed pieces of information concerning the money of Saddam being moved into Syria and into Lebanon and those who took part in moving it - Syrians and Lebanese.Also there are more details about the assassination of the General Moustapha Tajer which took place last summer. Take care of yourself. Damascus, January 7, 2004.\"\n\n## January 12, 2004 8:34 Am The Wmd Road To Damascus\n\nAre Iraq's missing weapons in Syria? An exiled Syrian journalist says \"yes.\" It's the question that has dominated the postwar Iraq debate: Where are Saddam Hussein's weapons of mass destruction? Do they exist, or did none remain in Iraq's arsenal after they were used on the Kurds? If they do, why have American inspection teams not found them in the nearly yearlong period since the war ended? One of the most troubling and intriguing theories has been the idea that Hussein smuggled them to Syria or some other nation before the war began. Now Nizar Nayyouf, an exiled Syrian journalist now living in Paris, claims to have contact with a Syrian military intelligence official who is confirming that theory. Speaking to the British television station ITN Friday, Nayyouf said that his source says he knows three sites where Iraq's WMDs are kept. \"It has been confirmed that the Iraqi weapons which were smuggled into Syria through the intermediary of Colonel Zu Alhima Shalish are now located in three different places,\" the Syrian source reportedly wrote in Arabic to Nayyouf. \"The first of these places is a tunnel on the mountain slope near the village of Baida, which is situated two kilometers from Misyaf. This place is under the jurisdiction of Department 489, which deals with coded messages and documents.\" \"The second of these places is a factory owned by the air force in the village of Tal Sinan, which is situated between the two cities of Hamma and Salmiyah. The third of these places is the town of Shinshar, which is situated 40 kilometers to the south of Hums and 3 kilometers to the east of the Damascus-Hums highway. There are underground tunnels there, which belong to Brigade 661 of the air force. This is a reconnaissance force. These tunnels are several meters deep.\" Nayyouf's source contends that the weapons, likely missile parts and chemicals, were transferred in large wooden boxes and barrels, under the supervision of Colonel Zu Alhima Shalish and his nephew Assef, who works for the Albashair Company, which is owned by the Assads and has offices in Beirut, Damascus, and Baghdad. The source says that this company was also responsible for the smuggling of Iraqi oil to Syria and providing weapons to Saddam's regime. The source also shared one more interesting detail: the weapons were smuggled across the border to these sites in ambulances. \"The persons who were responsible for such actions know of course that American satellites will see the big cars, and maybe they will estimate that something is dangerous,\" Nayyouf said. \"So they put them in ambulance carswhen I see ambulance cars of course I will think everything is ok, people are being carried to hospital, to other countries, no one will suspect.\" The British Foreign Office and the Central Intelligence Agency confirmed to ITN that they are aware of the allegations. The first question that comes up from hearing this rumor is, Why would Saddam ship weapons to a state he had never liked and often had disagreements with? \"Syria decided to [position itself] against the Coalition, against the attack,\" Nayyouf told ITV. \"It has a problem with the U.S. and U.K. because of that. In my opinion, when Saddam discovered that he will lose everything, including the weapons, he decided to send them to Syria in order not to lose them for nothing. And Syria, according to my information, Syria agreed with the regime of Saddam before he collapsed. They sent intelligence men inside Iraq to help the Iraqi resistance.\" Then next natural question is, What did Syrian President Bashar Assad have to gain? Why would he take an action that would put him squarely in the American crosshairs? \"Firstly money,\" Nayyouf told ITV. \"The Syrian regime like to be in federation of mafias. I think this description is right.... This business man doesn't understand anything except money, like any mafia man, not for political reasons.\" Nayyouf added that, \"Like Saddam's regime [Assad] must be punished. But I hope we don't see an American army in Damascus.\" The idea of Syria taking Iraq's weapons is theoretically possible, but highly unlikely, says Joseph Cirincione, senior associate and director of the Non-Proliferation Project at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. \"We got into a lot of trouble in Iraq by listening to exiles and dissidents,\" he says, speculating that some dissidents may exaggerate or invent claims for attention, money, asylum, or influence. He says that he doesn't want to dismiss an exile's reports that Syria has Iraq's weapons, but that he would want to see a great deal more supporting evidence before considering this source credible. Cirincione just completed work on a Carnegie Endowment report concluding that the Bush administration had systematically misrepresented the weapons threat from Iraq. \"It is unlikely that Iraq could have destroyed, hidden or sent out of the country the hundreds of tons of chemical and biological weapons, dozens of Scud missiles and facilities engaged in the ongoing production of chemical and biological weapons that officials claimed were present without the United States detecting some sign of this,\" the report states. Cirincione believes that Iraq's ability to produce chemical weapons on a large scale was destroyed by the 1991 Gulf war and by U.N. sanctions and inspections. Carnegie's report, entitled \"WMD in Iraq: Evidence and Implications,\" urges the Bush administration to discard its policy of unilateral preventive war. However, the report also states that Iraq still apparently maintained an active program to produce missiles capable of flying beyond the range permitted by the U.N. Security Council. And it states Iraq could have been able to resume banned programs, such as biological weapons production, quickly in the future. Detailed and fascinating as Nayouf's information might be, it won't actually change anything unless the CIA, MI6, or some other intelligence agency can produce some corroborating evidence. If ITV and NRO readers know about this information, then it's safe to assume Assad knows it's out there as well, and those weapons, if they exist in Syria, have presumably been moved. Perhaps that other NRO, the National Reconnaissance Office, can show ambulances moving objects to that site from before the war, or from that site now. Or perhaps a source on the ground could detect traces of the chemicals stored there. But until that happens, the situation regarding Saddam's weapons in Syria will be a mirror image of the situation before the Iraq war...suspicions, rumors, and circumstantial evidence, without a smoking gun. Jim Geraghty, a reporter for States News Service in Washington, D.C., is a contributor to NRO\n\n# 'Vernietigingswapens Irak Verstopt In Syrie' Door De Redactie Ma 05 Jan 2004, 00:22\n\nAMSTERDAM - De Iraakse massavernietigingswapens De dissidente journalist Nizar Najoef - die in 2000 in gevangenschap de Unesco-prijs voor persvrijheid kreeg toegekend - speelde zaterdag een brief en landkaart met de exacte locaties van zeer geheime bergplaatsen door aan De Telegraaf. Najoef noemde tijdens een ontmoeting in een cafe te Parijs de precieze plaatsen, waar zich onder meer chemische wapens bevinden, die de Amerikanen en Britten al lange tijd koortsachtig zouden zoeken. Om te beginnen gaat het om een tunnel in een berg bij Al-Baida, op twee kilometer van Masjaf. Een tweede bergplaats is een fabriek van de Syrische luchtmacht in het dorpje Tal Snan, gelegen tussen Hama en Salamijja. Een derde vindplaats ligt bij Sjinsjar, oostelijk van de weg tussen Hama en Damascus. Op enkele tientallen meters diepte liggen hier wapens opgeslagen in tunnels, die het 661e bataljon van de luchtmacht in gebruik heeft. De drie hotspots liggen in het westelijk deel van Centraal- Syrie. Volgens de opsteller van de brief, zijn de wapens met houten kisten en vaten aangevoerd, onder verantwoordelijkheid van de chef van de presidentiele lijfwacht, generaal Zoel Himma Sjaliesj. Hierbij kreeg deze steun van zijn neef Asaf, werkzaam bij de firma Bacha-Ir, dat eigendom is van de presidentiele familie Assad. Het bedrijf heeft vestigingen in Beiroet, Damascus en Bagdad. De schrijver acht diezelfde onderneming eerder al verantwoordelijk voor het smokkelen van Iraakse olie naar Syrie en - vanuit dat land - van wapens naar Irak.\n\n## Op De Hoogte\n\nNaar de overtuiging van Najoef zouden de schuilplaatsen naast wapens voor chemische oorlogvoering, ook onderdelen van raketsystemen bevatten, die Saddam Hoessein voor naderend onheil in veiligheid bracht. Najoef is er wonderlijk genoeg vast van overtuigd dat de VS allang over de genoemde informatie beschikken, maar er om politieke redenen geen ruchtbaarheid aan willen geven. De Amerikanen zouden namelijk nog niet van het bewind in Damascus af willen, zo redeneert de journalist. Deze opstelling verdedigt met name de op diplomatiek overleg leunende minister van Buitenlandse Zaken, Colin Powell. Die zou om die reden overhoop liggen met zijn Defensiecollega Donald Rumsfeld, die een heel andere koers voor ogen heeft. \"Tegen de tijd dat de VS erover uit zijn dat ze zich willen ontdoen van de Syrische heersers, dan willen ze de vondsten natuurlijk plotseling als groot nieuws brengen\" , zo merkt Najoef laconiek op. \"Want dan speelt het verhaal ze namelijk wel in de kaart.\" Najoef openbaart graag de geheimen die aan hem zijn toevertrouwd. Na bijna tien jaar in Syrische gevangenissen te hebben doorgebracht - vanwege de overheid onwelgevallige publicaties - ziet hij niets in het diplomatieke sparen van de kool en de geit, volgens de Powell-methode. \"Ik ken het Syrische regime; het lijkt als twee druppels op dat van Saddam Hoessein van weleer. \" Met zijn ontboezemingen wil Najoef vooral verhinderen dat het grote publiek onvolledig over Syrie wordt geinformeerd. \"Als ik lees hoe Franse, Britse, maar ook Nederlandse kranten berichten dat Basjir Assad, na alle wandaden van zijn vader, nu democratie komt brengen in zijn land, lach ik me helemaal dood. Als je ook ziet hoe de Europese Unie zich opstelt tegenover Damascus. Dat is schandelijk! Afgelopen december heeft de EU met Syrie een overeenkomst gesloten over economische en culturele samenwerking. Daarin werd alleen in een klein zinnetje de suggestie aangereikt dat het land misschien iets aan de mensenrechtensituatie zou kunnen doen. En dat terwijl de unie tijdens eerdere onderhandelingen met de mediterrane staten stevige druk uitoefende en het respecteren van de mensenrechten voor het aanhalen van de betrekkingen als een absolute voorwaarde stelde.\" Zie verder De Telegraaf\n\n## Top Syrian Journalist Says Iraqi Wmd In Three Sites In Syria Posted By Ryan Mauro On January 8Th, 2004\n\nAn award-winning Syrian journalist, Nizar Najoef, has defected to a Western European country. Upon defecting, he told the Dutch press that his best sources told him that Iraq had hid its WMDs in three sites in Syria: 1) Tunnels under al-Baida, two kilometers from Misyaf Village near Hama in northern Syria. This site is said to have an underground facility and rumored to have been built by the North Koreans to store and produce Scud missiles. Iraqi ballistic missiles are said by Najoef to be at this location. 2) Tai Snan, north of Salamija, between Hama and Salamiyyah. Najoef says this is a secret Syrian Air Force base and factory. 3) Sjinsjam located on the Lebanese border south of Homs. Najoef says this site is under the control of Brigade 661 of the Air Force's Air Patrol. These are the same three sites identified by Generals Tom Mcinerney and Paul Vallely in their book, \"End Game.\" The individual claiming to be Iraqi General Ali Ibrahim al-Tikriti, said to have defected in 1990, says his sources also identified these three sites. Of course, to be fair, this can be seen either as circular reporting, or as corroboration. The investigation continues.\n\n## What Is Assad Hiding In His Backyard?\n\nSatellite photos of secret Syrian site depict at least five guarded installations whose purpose is unclear. By Avi Scharf May 30, 2010 | 2:37 AM\nThe images depict at least five guarded installations whose purpose is unclear. In the center is a new residential complex with at least 40 multistory buildings whose shape and structure are distinct from the architecture in the rest of the town. A number of Google Earth users said they saw passageways to bunkers leading to installations underneath the mountains surrounding Masyaf. Other users noted that Syrian journalist and human rights activist Nizar Nayouf told the Dutch newspaper De Telegraaf in 2004 that Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein smuggled his arsenal of chemical and biological weapons into Syria just prior to the United States' invasion of Iraq in 2003. In the interview, Nayouf claimed that Iraqi weapons of mass destruction were stashed in three separate sites in Syria, including an underground military base beneath the village of AlBaida, one kilometer south of Masyaf. Nayouf was imprisoned by Syrian authorities for 10 years. In 2001, he was granted political asylum in France. Similar accusations of Iraqi weapons smuggling into Syria were made by then-prime minister Ariel Sharon during an interview with Channel 2 news. Former Israel Defense Forces chief of staff Moshe Ya'alon made similar claims in an interview with the now-defunct New York Sun. The latest photographs of the area were taken in January, when tensions between Israel and Syria reached a fever pitch. Syrian President Bashar Assad, his foreign minister Walid Moallem and Israeli Defense Minister Ehud Barak, exchanged warnings over a possible war in the absence of progress toward a peace treaty. Last month, media reports indicated that the transfer of Scud missiles and advanced M-600 rockets from Syria to Hezbollah led to the latest round of accusations between Jerusalem and Damascus. The news of the weapons delivery prompted the United States to delay the assignment of its ambassador to the diplomatic post in Syria. In light of the escalating tensions, the IDF cancelled a comprehensive military enlistment drill so that Syria would not interpret the exercise as a preparation for war. DigitalGlobe refused to say who requested the satellite photos. Two weeks before the September 2007 destruction of the nuclear reactor in northeast Syria, the company placed an order for numerous photographs of the installation. Yedioth Ahronoth reported that the photos were ordered by Israel so that it could show them to the press after the bombing. According to the newspaper, Israel sought to demonstrate its military capabilities without revealing its sources.\n\n## Imagery And Topographic Maps"
    },
    {
        "text": "## E\n\nEven foreign governments are coming forward with intentions of forming partnerships.\n\nThe reception from other agencies has been almost universally positive, because our approach is inclusive and nonthreatening. It's a model that, if you envision a molecule or cell with a nucleus, where the Open Source Center is the nucleus and the cells around that nucleus are other organizations' open source information making the overall cell stronger. As I said earlier, 50 percent of my report card as director of the center is how well we build that larger enterprise while still contributing to that daily collection and production we do.\n\nThe second thing that changed, in addition to the two prisms through which we are now judged, is that our visibility and responsibility within CIA rose. When the center was established, those who created it said we probably could not act as a community center if we remained an office in a directorate in CIA.\n\nFrom a psychological standpoint and a programmatic standpoint, it just would not work. This was not a criticism of the DS&T, FBIS' host directorate. It was not a criticism of any directorate. General Hayden just believed that the center needed to be separate from any of CIA's directorates to be effective as a DNI center. It took General Hayden's assignment as DCIA to actually make that happen. So almost exactly one year ago we were extracted out of the Directorate of Science and Technology to work directly under the DCIA.\n\nAlthough my lifestyle has changed in that I spend a lot of time on the Dulles Toll Road between Reston and Langley going to various Agency meetings, it's a small price to pay for having a seat at the corporate table.\n\n1 won't quite call us a directorate, and I think that would probably discomfort some people if I did call us a directorate. But I believe it's fair to refer to us as a\n\"directorette.\"\nOkay. So what have we actually done over the past few years?\n\nFor those of you who remember the old FBIS, one of the things I promised myself when I became director of FBIS was to establish an organization that would never have to face the situation FBIS faced in the\n1990s - \"seven lean years\" marked by downsizing, serious morale problems, and general lack of appreciation.\n\nWe quickly went to work to build an organization around what we wanted our \"brand\" to be: our identity.\n\nFor 50-some years, our brand and our self-identity had been, in my opinion, as a translator of foreign media. I\nbelieve that restricted us greatly and got us into trouble in terms of limiting our potential. And that was before all these new media such as YouTube, Skype, PalTalk, and blogs. If we continued to focus on translations, we were going to miss opportunities to contribute even greater value.\n\nWe have people with multiple languages. These same people also have critical thinking skills. Their valueadded was not in the translations, per se, but in the analysis or \"So what?\" of the material with which they worked. If they applied all their skills, they should be able to tell me something I can't read in the Washington Post. In other words, I challenge our folks to tell me something I wouldn't otherwise know from reading the newspapers. Analysis of these open sources has helped move our brand to one of \"insight and context,\" and not just translation, although I do no mean to underestimate the value of a quality and well-selected translation.\n\n'We have also evolved and developed our analysis to the point we're starting to move some of it overseas.\n\nRemember those people that I said had 25-30 years of experience? They possess unique cultural knowledge as well as unmatched knowledge of media in their countries. They know if the North Koreans use a certain word in a certain context it means something totally different than when that word is used in another context. So we are getting this 25-30 years of knowledge out of their heads and, increasingly, into our analysis.\n\nOne of the benefits of having been in the DS&T for 30\nyears is the affinity with technology we developed and, especially, the discipline and understanding to manage technology. As a result, I believe we are ahead of many in the Intelligence Community in terms of applying technology to enhance our mission. If someone gives a speech on TV or on a web video, we can get the video up on our website within two hours, with subtitles we translated into English. We're able to do video analysis using technology we couldn't have done just a couple years ago.\n\nIf we had continued to focus on translations, we would not have developed a capability that gives anyone with Internet access the ability to access video and other multimedia we collect from anywhere in the world. In fact, our website just won an award for Government Standard of Excellence. And we just migrated our site to the classified side on\n1 October.\n\nSo in our collection, analysis/dissemination role, we've made a lot of progress. In our other role, supporting the community, we have, for example, centralized Open Source skills training. This training includes everything from media analysis to advanced Internet exploitation, way beyond Googling. And we're making these courses available to the entire government. In fact, half the people we trained in FY07 were from outside CIA. That should make our DNT stakeholders happy, because that's what their investment is buying.\n\n'We also buy commercial databases like Jane's, Lexis-\nNexis, and Stratfor and make them available to the entire community. So we relieve other agencies of that overhead. We negotiate with vendors and make their databases available on our website. Other agencies can then cancel their contracts, save money, and put it back into their missions.\n\nFinally, we have a community effort to do what I call\n\"large-scale internet exploitation\": Ingesting large pieces of the Internet and looking at how we can use large volumes to discern patterns from link analysis and machine translation or otherwise find nuggets others might not find.\n\nWith that image of, \"Tell me what I can't read in the Washington Post,\" if I see a piece of analysis in the my first question is, \"Why didn't we do that first?\" And second, \"Where can we take this beyond what they've done?\" So FBIS has evolved significantly in the past few years.\n\nI loved FBIS: I grew up and spent most of my career there. But our environment and continuous assessment of how we can have the most impact have turned us into an entirely different organization.\n\nLooking to the future, I was thinking on my way here as to points that might be of interest.\n\n1 find the level of discussion around Open Source exploitation still not where I'd like it to be. When one starts thinking about a legacy, and despite everything that's happened and all the good things around open source, I'd like to leave a legacy of having raised the level of discussion around Open Source exploitation and intelligence. I'd like that discussion to be a little bit more sophisticated than I find it today. I'll explain what I mean. Even for those who say they are fans of Open Source, I'm not sure many really understand why they're proponents, at least beyond \"Well, there are a lot of open sources out there, so we should put more resources against them.\"\nFor those of you who saw the movie, Animal House, at the beginning of the movie there's a statue of the college founder, and the inscription on the statue says,\n\"Knowledge is Good.\" And everybody in the theater laughs. Well, sometimes I feel that's as far as the discussions about Open Source have gone. It's \"Open Source is Good.\" But I find very few people really understand why it is good, at least in an intelligence context. On the one hand, we have what I call the Open Source zealots. I don't mean that pejoratively, because it's nice to have cheerleaders. But they are at one end of the spectrum, where Open Sources can solve all our problems - if only we put more resources in, and so on. I can tell you that, based on my experience, open sources can't solve all our problems.\n\nAlso, I sometimes perceive that too many people believe they know how to manage open source without having actual experience in using it in an intelligence context. It's as if they say, \"Well, I got an 'A' on a term paper once in college, so I know how you guys can run Open Source better.\" Or \"I wrote a magazine article that was published, so I can tell you guys how to run Open Source.\" I've seen a lot of that over the last two decades. I can't imagine anybody who hasn't actually been in the clandestine service telling the director of NCS, \"You know you guys really need to do is this or that.\" That would be laughable. Yet in the Open Source business, somehow that's fair game, because I believe there isn't really a deep understanding of how Open Source relates to intelligence, unless one has actually been involved in working with open sources in an intelligence context.\n\nAt the other end of the spectrum, we work in an environment that favors secrets. All of us have heard the statement by leaders at one time or another that\n\"Our business is stealing secrets.\" Or \"Our business is espionage.\" While I deeply respect that, and I\nunderstand where that's coming from, from my Open Source perspective, I'm thinking that's like a football coach saying, \"Our mission is to pass the ball.\" Or\n\"Our mission is to run the ball.\" Well, not exactly. It's to win football games.\n\nSo on the other hand, I have an education issue even within my agency, in terms of updating my colleagues on what open sources can do. We aren't just the people who read newspapers and do translations. We are the people who can really help you solve some big problems. And this is not my customers' or colleagues'\nproblem. This is my challenge.\n\nSo this is where we are. We've made tremendous progress. We've got a DCIA who is a champion of Open Source and has lifted us up in terms of status, and certainly takes his executive agent role very seriously. But we still have an education problem on both ends, both with the folks who are proponents of open source but perhaps don't know exactly why, and folks internally who are still wondering why I am sitting at the same table they are.\n\nSo how are we doing this? First, we have a big education program. We've had a lot of visitors to the Center, including highlevel visitors. And there's not one visitor who leaves without saying a variation of,\n\"I had no idea you guys were doing X.\" Or, \"I had no idea you guys could do X. We need to do more together.\" So that is part of our plan. I know we have a good story to tell. Getting out and telling that story is part of what we need to do.\n\nYet we also need to do more than just tell our story.\n\nWe are continuously trying to increase that \"So what?\"\nvalue. We want to be sitting at the table doing more of the congressional briefings, although I know that's amixed blessing. We want to briefing the Director more. We want to go downtown arminarm with our colleagues in NCS and DI, telling stories to the first customer. And to do that, we're going to be continuously looking at where we can provide that unique and extra value.\n\nWe also have to stay ahead of the media: where it's going. As I said, our all-source colleagues have all sources to deal with. But we're going to be the first to identify some new trends. And we have, in some cases. A couple years back we identified Iranian blogs as a phenomenon worthy of more attention, about six months ahead of anybody else.\n\nWe're looking now at YouTube, which carries some unique and honest-togoodness intelligence. There are methodologies involved. We're looking at chat rooms and things that didn't even exist five years ago, and trying to stay ahead. We have groups looking at what they call, \"Citizens MediaTM: people taking pictures with their cell phones and posting them on the Internet. Then there's Social Media, phenomena like MySpace and blogs. And then there's what we call Mobile Media. In Africa, they skipped a whole generation of communications. People carry photo albums on their cell phones and share the photos.\n\nTheir cell phones are big parts of their lives. All these phenomena affect not only the content of Open Source, but how people interact.\n\nAnd by staying ahead of the media curve is how we're trying to add that value. So 100 years from now, people will depend on the Open Source folks even more than they do today. In that vein, we are also trying to work much more closely with our colleagues inside the community. Rather than sit in our cubicles in Reston and doing our Open Source analysis, we're getting out overseas and into customer and partner spaces. Or we're going to wherever there's an activity against an issue and saying, \"We've got some specialized skill. We can help.\" By putting our people to work on a team in those activities, embedded in an integrated mission, our people have reachback to the Open Source Center \"mothership.\" This helps us become more focused and actually make ourselves more relevant to larger problems. It's the integration with other areas that's key. It's a long process for us, but is very exciting. I joke that, based on the type of folks we're hiring now, that I couldn't get hired today. However, T shouldn't make that too public. There's excitement, enthusiasm and belief in the mission\n-particularly when our people see themselves working with other colleagues from other directorates. It makes us confident we're going in the right direction.\n\nThen finally we have this community responsibility.\n\nFor the first time, we have somebody that feels, as somebody put it to me, that we're morally responsible for every piece of Open Source information out there. And we have to make that available to people throughout government. If it's somebody in the San Diego police department that needs to see it or somebody in the Border Patrol in El Paso that needs to see it, we will make sure they get it.\n\nSo in 25 minutes, that's kind of a tour d'horizon on what's happened to FBIS. Hopefully, you can see it's alive and well in its new guise. It's all the folks who went before us who really got us sold on the value we can have exploiting openly available informaiton. It's up to us, though, to figure out how to adapt to the 21st Century. That's what we're in the process of doing now, and we're very optimistic about the next century.\n\nWith that, I'll be quiet and open it up to any questions you might have.\n\nQ: What is the role of the print media? At one point,\n90 percent of valuable information was in the printed press.\"\nA: A couple of points. What we're seeing is actuality is a decline, a relatively rapid decline, in the impact of the printed press - traditional media. If you just look at newspaper circulations around the US, you'll see rapid reductions in even newspapers like the New York Times and the Washington Post. Some would say they're struggling. You'll even see advertisements taking up more space. Generally, people are gradually, and again, I don't want to exaggerate, people are getting their information more and more online. Plus, you have a generation coming up - the digital natives or Generation Y - who don't like to read as much. For example, I cannot get my younger daughter to read, and she's a relatively intelligent human being. But that's not how she processes or gets her information.\n\nThis is, I think, being reflected in declining circulation. A lot more is digital, and a lot more is online. It's also a lot more social. Interaction is a much bigger part of media and news than it used to be.\n\nBut I have to admit it's different in different parts of the world. It's not onesizefitsall. In many parts of Africa, the most popular way people get information is still FM or shortwave radio. In most parts of the world, in the Middle East and in China, it's TV. So one of the things we do, in terms of when we have to triage choices of what sources to go after, is to look at what media are most used in a particular part of the world.\n\nWhat are people in those populations actually listening to or aware of? What do opinion leaders use to get their message out? I would say, generally speaking, that traditional press is declining, however.\n\nNow on the other hand, we have what we call gray information: pamphlets, leaflets, and white papers that are produced locally. This information is actually growing in importance, in terms of our knowledge about certain areas like weapons or science and technology. Whatever drop you might see in traditional press is more than compensated for by this very localized press. This has forced us not to depend too much on the Internet and to even expand some of our efforts overseas to make sure we have the access we need. So the whole question of media is something we have to follow constantly. Not just in terms of the content, but *\"Who uses what?\"\" What does it matter if something's on the Internet if only two percent of the people in County X have access to the Internet? They may get their information somewhere else.\n\nQ: Regarding blogs, I know there are private sector organizations that look at blogs. Is this something the Open Source Center does, or is it done somewhere else in the Agency?\n\nA: Again, without over generalizing, I'd say from my experience, that we - the Open Source Center - have the lead on monitoring foreign blogs in the Agency.\n\nRegarding the private sector, we do in fact have partnerships with certain private sector organizations.\n\nWe have to check them out, because not all of them have ties with which we are comfortable. But we have one person, for example, who've we actually hired to blog on terrorist Internet messaging.\n\nPrivate sector partnerships are important to us. Part of what we have to do, however, is understand the background, or pedigree, of each company and to make sure that it's not representing a certain political view. So we're very careful to caveat what we get and what we put in our products.\n\nI believe the DI, at least what I'm seeing so far, is depending on us to cover that particular niche on blogs. An example would be in Russia. I'm told that over the last six months, blog activity in Russia has gone up 75 percent. This is a prelude to the elections in Russia. A lot of political parties who can't get airtime"
    },
    {
        "text": "ADVANCED COMMAND, CONTROL, COMMUNICATIONS, & INTELLIGENCE (C3I) SYSTEMS ANALYSIS AND TRADE-OFFS\n\nCACI Technologies, Incorporated APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE; DISTRIBUTION UNLIMITED.\n\nAIR FORCE RESEARCH LABORATORY\nINFORMATION DIRECTORATE\nROME RESEARCH SITE\nROME, NEW YORK\n\n## Stinfo Final Report\n\n\n\nThis report has been reviewed by the Air Force Research Laboratory, Information Directorate, Public Affairs Office (IFOIPA) and is releasable to the National Technical Information Service (NTIS).  At NTIS it will be releasable to the general public, including foreign nations.\n\nAFRL-IF-RS-TR-2004-49 has been reviewed and is approved for publication APPROVED:         /s/\nROBERT M. FLO Project Engineer FOR THE DIRECTOR:             /s/\n\nJAMES W. CUSACK, Chief Information Systems Division Information Directorate\n\n## Report Documentation Page\n\n2. REPORT DATE\n3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED\nFinal  Dec 01 - Sep 03\nMARCH 2004\n\nPublic reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing this collection of information.  Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden to Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA  22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project (0704-0188), Washington, DC 20503\n1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank)\n\n\n## 4. Title And Subtitle Advanced Command, Control, Communications & Intelligence (C3I) Systems Analysis And Trade-Offs\n\n5.  FUNDING NUMBERS\nC     - F30602-00-D-0221/Task 0009 PE   - 62702F PR   - 281A TA   - QF WU  - 11\n\n## 6. Author(S) Jack Mineo\n\n7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)\nCACI Technologies, Incorporated\n14151 Meadow Drive\nChantilly Virginia 20151\n\n\n      AGENCY REPORT NUMBER\nAFRL-IF-RS-TR-2004-49\n\n9.  SPONSORING / MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)\nAir Force Research Laboratory/IFSB\n525 Brooks Road\nRome New York 13441-4505\n\n## 11. Supplementary Notes Afrl Project Engineer:  Robert M. Flo/Ifsb/(315) 330-2334/ Robert.Flo@Rl.Af.Mil 12A. Distribution / Availability Statement Approved For Public Release; Distribution Unlimited.\n\n13. ABSTRACT (Maximum 200 Words)\nThis report details the system analysis activities conducted within AFRL/IF to extend C3I capabilities of on-going research.  The research areas were diverse and included a number of program areas (i.e., impacts of Effects Based Operations on Dynamic Planning and Execution, extension of Sensor-to-Decision Maker-to-Shooter concepts and Network Distributed Remote Sensor Concepts) that cut across AFRL directorates, were funded by multiple sources and had joint service and coalition involvement.  The analysis focused on meeting current needs, outlining technical design difficulties and research and transition opportunities.  The analysis became an integral part of the AFRL/IF programs and strategy.\n\n15. NUMBER OF PAGES\n14. SUBJECT TERMS\nC2 System Analysis, ISR Fusion and Planning, Time Critical Targets, Dynamic Planning and Execution, Effects Based Operations, Sensor Concepts\n16. PRICE CODE 20. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT\n17. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF REPORT\n\n18. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE\n\n\n## 19. Security Classification Of Abstract\n\n\nOverview\n\n\nThis report details the system analysis activities conducted within Air Force Research Laboratory's (AFRL's) Information Directorate (IF) to extend C3I capabilities of ongoing research. The research areas were very diverse and included analysis of a number of program areas. Specifically, the following areas were further developed: Extension of Sensor to Decision-maker to Shooter (SDS) concepts, impacts of Effects Based Operations\n(EBO) concepts on Distributed Planning & Execution (DP&E) and Advanced Technology Air Operations Center (AOC) concepts, Network Distributed Remote Sensor concepts, Terabit Wideband Network Fiber technologies, and finally major initiative in Information warfare planning.  Many of these programs cut across AFRL directorates, are funded by multiple sources and have joint service and coalition partner involvement. The analysis focused on meeting current needs as well as outlining technical design difficulties, and research and transition opportunities. The analysis became an integral part of the IF programs and strategy. Initial review of the analysis conducted herein for SDS program was detailed in the Task 03 final technical report completed under this contract. This report will extend results reached in that study and add analysis of a number of new emphasis areas.\n\nAFRL/IF has done an excellent job in gaining support and funding for key programs outlined above. Strong partnerships continue to be established across the Air Force (AF), Joint and Coalition communities, putting AFRL/IF in a great position to make significant technical contributions leading to unique technological capabilities and fully compliant fielded capability.\n\n\n\n1.0  Introduction:\n\n\nThe objective of this task was to perform system tradeoff analysis of information technologies for Air Force integrated Command & Control Intelligence, Surveillance &\nReconnaissance (C2ISR) systems. The details outlined in this report provide some insight into tasks performed. In many cases, the interaction with program offices were in much more depth on problems at hand as well getting program managers to work together towards a common goal. The analysis completed included a review of ongoing Air Force initiatives, coordination of joint Air Force/Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA)/OSD initiatives and recommendation of responsive programs. These programs were based on concepts that met user needs by leveraging ongoing government and commercial technologies. Each program had a unique set of system challenge problems based on the maturity of the technology and various system concepts. It was critical to keep overall C3I issues in focus as the individual technical - concept issues were being evaluated. The following is a quick intro into each of programs reviewed and problems to be solved. Details of analysis will be provided in the report.\n\nSDS Concept Extension: The difficult challenge is based on integrating Intelligence, Surveillance, Planning and Weapon sub systems into an integrated Command & Control Intelligence, Surveillance & Reconnaissance system responsive to time sensitive threats such as moving or pop up targets. This system must not only provide an integrated picture of the threat but also portrayed to allow rapid decision making and then rapid execution using available weapon targeting systems. This complex system of systems challenge requires close coordination of all assets in a common infrastructure framework. This is difficult as many of these sub systems were built to perform their unique functions in a specific infrastructure or operating environment e g: Intelligence.\n\n\nEBO-AT-ATO:  The objective is to design, develop and demonstrate an end-to-end capability for effects-based planning, execution and assessment.  Tools to implement the framework of monitor, assess, plan and execute within an Aerospace Operations Center will result. This effort will build upon recent accomplishments in the areas of Situational Awareness, Real Time Sensor to Decision-Maker to Shooter, Collaboration and Visualization, and Effects-Based Operations. The focus is on developing/building a new AT-AOC concept which provides the capabilities and flexibility to allow 21st century Command and Control (C2) capabilities.\n\n\nTerabit Wideband Fiber Based Network:  The objectives of this Congressional directed program were to primarily design and demonstrate an Optical CDMA network using PICs and secondarily design and demonstrate a 28 GHz wireless low cost radio. The proposed payoff was to extend photonic technology, enhance fiber network utilization and develop a new market for photonic devices.\n\n\nNetwork Distributed Remote Sensors (SensIT & Argus): DARPA has sponsored the Sensor Information Technology (SensIT) program to design and develop advanced software technology for building ad hoc, multi-tasked, distributed sensor networks for tactical surveillance operations. The SensIT program is founded on the concept of a networked system of cheap, pervasive platforms that combine multiple sensor types, embedded processors, positioning ability and wireless communication. Specifically, the mission of SensIT was to develop all necessary software for networked micro sensors. A\nnetwork of SensIT nodes provides target detection, classification, and tracking, and communication within and outside of the network. The program is based on the integration of projects from over 20 universities and companies to ensure the successful development and field demonstration of the SensIT system. In parallel with this activity, ESC has sponsored an acquisition program entitled ARGUS to acquire a remote sensor system to counter the ground moving target threat. However, this concept is not multiple networked sensor approach but is a single sensor package design. The two programs are strongly complementary.\n\n\nInformation Warfare:  Increasing priority has been given to defending against terrorism and protecting our nation and information infrastructure due to events such as September\n11th. Information warfare (IW), along with information-in-warfare, is one of the two subsets of information operations. IW is focused on the attack and defense functions of information operations. Counter-information is the term used to describe the Air Force's information warfare capabilities. Like the counter-air or counter-space functions, the counter-information function helps establish information superiority by neutralizing or influencing adversary information activities. Combined counter-air and counter-space, counter-information creates an environment where friendly forces conduct operations with the requisite freedom of action while denying, neutralizing, or influencing adversary information activities as required.\n\n\n\n2.0  Program Analysis Review\n\n\n## 2.1 Extension Of Sensor To Decision Maker To Shooter Concepts\n\nIn terms of review, the current SDS challenge is embraced in the Time Critical Targeting (TCT) problem as outlined by the Scientific Advisory Board (SAB), plus meeting tenets of General Jumper's Global Strike Task Force (GSTF) effective quick response concepts. It required a thorough systems engineering based approach to optimally manage the operational AF theater assets in a \"Sensor-to Decision Maker - to Shooter\" framework to meet ATO planned and TCT unplanned activities.  The primary issue in the TCT problem is the time factor.  The time factor issues are as outlined by the SAB: see Figure #2-1-1.  This figure compares the current response time *(NOW)* with future operational requirements *(FUTURE).*  Recommended *CHANGES* to the *NOW* system to meet *FUTURE* requirements are also shown. The SAB set up the case per following:\n\n\n\"Recent conflicts have highlighted the difficulties in rapidly attacking TCTs. The timelines from recognition of the existence of a targetable object until the \"kill\" is excessively long. Experience in Operation Desert Shield, Storm and Operations Noble Anvil (in Kosovo) showed that timelines of 4+ hours were typical. The goal expressed by the leadership is to reduce the time from target detection to target strike to single digit from current multiple hours.\"\n\nThe Task 0003 final technical report of this contract stated that many fundamental issues still exist before integrated SDS initiative goals can be realized. It further stated the approach to date has been based on integrating stand-alone programs with specific objectives to meet the specific user program needs. It outlined the ongoing technology programs in IF in sensor, fusion and communications technology. A main conclusion was that the development of critical infrastructure needs is a fundamental driver to enable a responsive system. These issues are the information network, access/sharing key information and planning databases (both friendly and threat) and higher levels fusion, which turns data in information for all levels of conflict. Also, the focus of the baseline sensor to decision to shooter program was very platform/weapon centric. With that view, the operational advantage was focused on conflict area and not overall warfighter strategic issues.  A more global look at the problem was presented to develop such a system to meet the challenge problem and gain the military global effect that the Air Force needed.\n\nThe task at hand was to understand the (above) timelines in terms of system needs, technology capabilities and testing/validation methods. The system needs are based on decision process, weapons capability, technology drivers and advanced integration concepts being pursued. A snap shot of this interaction was highlighted in the DOD Network Centric Collaborative Concepts program. The idea is to get information early without a long C2 decision process time delay. The case is based on time constraints of the threat and the leverage provided by integrating assets together. Figure 2-1-2 takes a look at the payoff by mapping multiple sensors versus fixed target in terms of time and accuracy needed to effectively launch a weapon. It also provides a framework for trading off the throw away costs of weapons versus the fixed cost of networked and fused sensors.\n\nThe most interesting issue is that multiple sensors/platforms, which provided different look angles and supporting information (Sigint/GMTI), provide the best capability (e.g.: accuracy with target discrimination factors). The chart is based on the premise that discrimination detection significantly aids target location and accuracy needs. This then allows cheaper weapons to provide kinetic effect required.\n\n## Create Target Quality Information On Tcts - Fast!\n\nAs pointed out in the Task 03 final technical report, this Network Centric Collaborative Concepts Technology (NCCT) architecture must embody a wideband communications interaction among Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) assets to provide high confidence detection, tracking and targeting within TCT time frame allocated for this function. The function must include planning, decision making and execution functions as part of the process. Establishing a network system controller is a critical step in meeting diverse information needs.  The network controller integrates quality of service judgments based on available information and requirements, attributes of available data, processing power of the fusion/decision making algorithms and information that is already available to members of the network.  Further, the network can be leveraged to obtain and process information needed to implement Effects Based decision making tradeoffs as well as supporting Effects Based targeting/retargeting. NCCT is recommending a wideband data link be the backbone of the ISR system that then links to IP based world for field extension operations.  The approach being pursued is the IF developed Multi Platform Common Data Link (MPCDL) system. The IF MPCDL has developed this highly waveform flexible data link for a number of years and contains the inherent connectivity and processing power to meet NCCT needs. It has been adopted already by many of the ongoing sensor programs as the preferred (common) approach. It also has significant potential to provide a cost effective weapon data link using miniaturization methods. It appears that NCCT program is going in the correct direction to develop a highly capable and flexible system and IF is a key contributor.\n\n\nBased on the above, IF currently has an opportunity to leverage the ongoing Intel, Sensor & fusion processing and communications technological programs expertise into a system design testbed which demonstrates ISR capabilities for the future. The ongoing or planned DOD initiatives include utilization of IF technology or have requested that IF be a main contributor or leader. The challenge at hand is to integrate IF technologies, system designs or ongoing programs into a networked testbed which will demonstrate and develop capabilities which can be achieved. The key issues of a recommended program, presented to IF staff, to develop and demonstrate this integrated C2ISR Operations as outlined below in Fig 2-1-3.\n\n## Integrated C2Isr Theatre Operations\n\nDevelop & Demo Flexible IP Based Network for C2-Sensor\n- GSTF Requirements Met - Shooter Operations responsive to the TCT Challenge Problem\nLink Theatre and  Strategic Operations Provide Framework for Flexible Data Base Operations &\nMulti Int Fusion\nMixed Resolution, Bandwidth Data, Accuracy\nNetworks Responsive ISR, Battle Mgm't, Decision Making,\nTargeting and Weaponeering Process\nEnables Effects Based Operations\nEmploy A Design Approach Which Leverages Strong Tech Base\n- GMTI, SAR, Sigint Technology/System Demos\n- Deployable Theatre Info Grid Designs - Multi-Platform Common Data Link Capabilities\n- Fusion Technology\n\n\n The challenge that is critical to theatre operations is the development of concepts that provides **Integrated** C2ISR Theatre Operations. Sensor data and weapon delivery are the bookends of this process. Developing a framework that allows effective battlefield operations including the decision makers is the real challenge in the future. Clearly, the sensor, fusion and network communications work being done to enhance ISR operations is critical and can be exploited as it matures. However, the changes in threat and warfare conditions requires new integrated approaches be devised and implemented.\n\n\n\nThe approach being recommended is to implement a cross-cutting program which leverages technologies from all IF divisions, and other AFRL Directorates, to jointly plan and develop a test program. The test program will link the assets in the labs allowing both technology development and demonstrations. Further the testbed will allow connectivity, to outside interested parties e.g.: Users, DARPA, etc, to become players in the testbed. A\nbasic outline of the testbed is shown in fig. 2-1-4 - In-house IF C2ISR Testbed.\n\nThis testbed leverages the assets in each of the IF facilities to emulate an integrated C2ISR system. It takes it a step further by emulating the operational ISR & C2 entities (i.e.: JSTARS, AWACS, RJ, AOC), as well as the communications methods and test aircraft.\n\nThe design provides significant flexibility to develop test and transition in both today's operational structure and tomorrows as being presented in the AT-AOC concepts and the MC2C aircraft concepts. Overall it leads to near term transitions and means to move technology further.  The concept links the validated sensor platform simulations in Building 240 (IFE) with AOC and EBO battle management concepts and capabilities in Building 3 (IFS & IFT) while adding the network and data link designs in IFG. Further, it allows the integration of a flexible KC-135 test aircraft at IFG in Wright Patterson Air Force Base (WPAFB) and cockpit emulations in WPAFB. Here the amount, resolution and accuracy of data needed in the cockpit can be evaluated versus processing methods and communication protocols. The isolated Building capabilities can be linked via secure networking concepts. It allows tradeoffs to be made between more sensor data, greater information processing fusion versos timelines to reach C2 decision process. It adds emulation with simulation under the control of hands on analyst and decision makers. This integrated lab testbed approach has been on the books for a long time. The challenge is to make this approach the baseline to not only develop new technologies but also to provide insight into the system issues. It will tackle a strong commitment of IF staff to mandate such an approach, as well as recognize the importance of taking a system view of the issues. Now there is a challenge problem and user support to develop the approach. The other issue is obvious team building among IF technical personnel. It already has been implemented in a number of cases in a smaller scale. Recommend it be implemented here.\n\nObviously, it will take some baby steps test conducted to recognize the importance and payoff.\n\n\n\n## 2.2  Effects Based Operation - At-Aoc 2.2.1  Purpose/Objective Of Initiative\n\nThis Advance Technology (AT) Aerospace Operations Center (AOC) program initiative is being planned to address the needs identified in the AC2ISRC C2 CONOPS\ndefining a Dynamic Aerospace Command, the Air Force Fusion Roadmap, and the top five needed critical capabilities agreed to at CORONA TOP in June 2000 (Distributed collaborative process linking all centers; visualize the Global to Tactical Battlespace; Find, Fix, Track Time Critical Targets; Dynamic effects-based targeting, weapon pairing and control; and Automated and timely effects-based assessment). The issue is to develop a new architectural framework for the AOC, which provides the flexibility and growth to allow Effects Based Operations in a GSTF environment leading to enhanced multi-level planning, execution and decision-making. A spiral development approach has been planned so that new capabilities with immediate warfighter utility can be transitioned quickly. Some of the important tenants of an AT-AOC are as follows:\n\n\n-\nDistributed Collaborative Planning and Execution\no Integrated Wing Collaboration o Planning Details to Crews o Predictive Effects Based Operations o Flexible Info Representation\n-\nDynamic Air Execution Order\n-\nFramework to Integrate/Leverage New Weapon Systems(UCAV, etc)\n-\nImprove Operations with Fewer People\n-\nReduce Life Cycle Costs\n-\nProvide Growth for New Platforms\n Figure 2-2-1 provides the basic structure of the AT-AOC program as developed from the Joint Air Operations Center (JAOC) process perspective including technology/mission areas being integrated. It provides a structure to examine the problem generically. It provides a framework to view the various technology areas being reviewed and their interactions.\n\nThe objective of the EBO program is a fundamental piece of this new AT-AOC concept approach. The EBO program goals are to design, develop and demonstrate an end-to-end capability for effects-based planning, execution and assessment. It includes the tools needed to implement the framework of monitor, assess, plan and execute within an AOC. This effort is planned to build upon recent accomplishments in the areas of Situational Awareness, Real Time Sensor to Decision-Maker to Shooter, and Collaboration & Visualization. EBO will enable improved planning and more economical and rapid application of force.  Military operations will cost less and result in reduced fratricide and fewer collateral casualties. As a continuous process EBO integrates planning, execution and intelligence. Planners become more aware of execution changes and executing personnel (either at the tasking or the executing unit level) more fully understands how any changes might impact the overall plan. Tasking organizations and executing units are also more fully aware of each other's limitations. This reduces re-work, as executing units are less likely to be tasked for missions they are incapable of. In short, EBO will allow operational level commanders to more closely control operations. A fundamental issue is to develop and communicate an effects based plan on a continuous basis. Under this issue are the following fundamental capabilities are needed:\n\n-\nCurrent Process is manually intensive\n-\nInformation management process needs improvement\n-\nImproved quality of decision making\n-\nAddition of cognitive element in Course of Action (COA) process\n-\nImproved computational capability (H/W-S/W)\n-\nEffects Based Assessment\n-\nEnhanced Information Infrastructure\n\n2.2.2  Program Description\nEBO Program Discussion: The EBO program will be provided first to set the tone for the development of AT-ATO concepts, which are based on EBO as well as SDS and Situational Awareness initiatives, outlined earlier in the report. It is being developed to address the above listed capability needs list and At-AOC structure. It will develop those capabilities meet the following attributes:\n\n\n-\nEfficient determination of Effects Based Campaign Strategy\n-\nDevelopment of Consistent Campaign Planning & Combat Tools\n-\nLinked Situational Awareness and Course of Action Development\n-\nTimely Collection/Distribution /Display of Relevant High Confidence Information\n-\nAutomated/Structured Multi-Level Decision Information (Provide\nAppropriate/Consistent Info at Correct Level to Decision Task at hand)\n The EBO initiative is focused on the development and demonstration of technology that is centered on a scenario, which exploits a broad range of key capabilities in the Situational Awareness, Real Time Sensor to Decision-Maker to Shooter, Collaboration and Visualization, and Effects-Based Operations areas.  For example, a scenario that would show the capability to plan, execute, and assess a limited, small scale campaign centered around a regional crisis or Operation Other Than War (OOTW). After receipt of the initial planning guidance, the demonstration will start with the development of a Common Operational Picture/Common Tactical Picture (COP/CTP) that provides users with access to complete battlespace information.  The battlespace information is comprised of ISR, C2, logistics, operations, weather, socio-economic and red, blue, gray forces information for a given geographic area.  In parallel, operational planners will develop and assess, in real time, various courses of actions (COAs) that are based upon the Commander's intent and COP/CTP and the Aerospace Component Picture information.  The COAs will then be combined with other component plans to produce a comprehensive, coherent and integrated Joint Aerospace Operations Plan (JAOP) that is traceable to the Commander's objectives. As the planners assemble the various COAs, the temporal reasoning capabilities provided by a Campaign Assessment Tool (CAT) will provide an a priori assessment regarding the likelihood that COAs match user-selected success criteria including the effects to be caused and to be sensed for appraising campaign success.  A Strategy Development Tool (SDT) will then be used to perform center of gravity analysis and COA\ngeneration.   The result is a fairly robust set of high fidelity options that can be developed and quickly war-gamed.  Based on the evaluated options, the JAOP will be developed using a Dynamic Tasking Toolkit (DTT).  In addition, the DTT's Information Strategist's Request-for-Information (RFI) generator provides an intelligent query capability that sends out search agents to all appropriate databases and ISR collection capabilities to garner the missing or uncertain information, update with any new information it discovers and provide for effects assessment. Using a spiral development approach, the EBO ATD is concentrating on developing tools and technologies for planning effects-based operations.\nThe tools will provide methods to generate multiple courses of action with their respective effects based on commander's intent.  The ongoing EBO ATD will also provide an initial cut at integrating targeting, campaign assessment, and scheduling tools. This capability will be enabled by an information infrastructure such as the Joint Battlespace Infosphere (JBI).  In those cases where there is a lack of firm data, the CAT probabilistic reasoner will generate partial plans.  Finally, once the decision-makers arrive at an executable COA the mission data is rapidly assembled and sent to the executing units via connections between the SDT, an Asset Pairing Tool (APT) and a Dynamic Aerospace Execution Order (DAEO) Generation Tool (DGT).  This allows the decision-makers to quickly seize possible fleeting opportunities and more closely control missions that might be extremely politically sensitive.  In addition to the obvious efficiency gains, the DTT\napproach will enhance flexibility and responsiveness to all planned military operations from Operations other Than War (OOTW) through Major Regional conflict (MRC).\n\n\nThe flexibility and responsiveness requirements for the DTT will be significantly tested when dealing with time sensitive targets (TST) or time critical targets (TCT).  TSTs or TCTs are designated by the Joint Forces Commander (JFC) and generally fall into one of several categories: aircraft, missiles (especially ballistic and cruise), and certain surface targets.  The location and time factors generally differentiate TST and TCT.  Aircraft parked on a runway somewhere might be a TST or TCT, one attacking friendly forces most certainly will be.  A key point for the classic planning, execution and assessment cycle is that TST/TCT must go through the entire cycle fairly quickly.  For a theater ballistic missile preparing to launch the time may be minutes at best.  Kill chain/TCT/TST demonstrations will be performed in linked and stand-alone facilities (both at RRS and WRS), which will characterize and measure overall warfighter system performance for selected CONOPS. The ultimate vision is a DTT that will provide commanders and their staff within an Aerospace Operations Center the capability to conduct end-to-end effectsbased planning, execution, and assessment.\n\nThe closing of the EBO loop, a model of the battlespace will process incoming intelligence reports (BDA) then link with both CAT and SDT to reason and create a set of effectiveness measures. These measures describe the state of the campaign with visualization tools as well as to provide new criteria for the CAT to reinitialize in the EBO process. This state-of-the-art model both self corrects and runs in real-time.  For example, this initiative will develop indicators for predicting effects (both physical and behavioral), conditions, measures, and the crucial connections to collection management functions for feedback into the combat assessment and campaign assessment process.  In the same way that dynamic planning integrates planning and execution, EBO provides the tight integration of operational intelligence with planning to an unprecedented extent.  The establishment of cause-effect relationships between actionable events and effects, or in the reverse direction, the inferring of the occurrence of events from the observation of effects, is a paradigm that requires intelligence to become an integral part of dynamic C2.  Specific tools planned for development and integration include asset sourcing and pairing tools, complexity-reduction tools and techniques (e.g., model abstraction) for performing multiple Courses of Action in real-time, and effects-based campaign and combat assessment.\n\nOperational technology supporting ISR asset feeds to the EBO DTT will be developed and demonstrated.  Decision making technology to support Time Critical Target prosecution such as Sensor to Decision-Maker to Shooter, Real Time Intelligence into the Cockpit  (RTIC) and Real Time Intelligence Out of the Cockpit (RTOC) will be developed, as required, and assessed for incorporation into the DTT.  The full kill chain process will be modeled and simulated (using existing capabilities and facilities, where possible) to allow system performance tradeoffs to be performed with high fidelity.  Issues involving collection management, target nomination, shooter-weapon-target pairing, RTIC/RTOC, communication choices, alert launch, diversion en route mission re-planning due to threats and new targets, autonomous air space deconfliction, kill package, weapon launch, and battle damage assessment will be directly addressed, optimized, and set in accordance with existing and newly derived CONOPS for extended mission capability.  Interfaces to executing units will be developed to seamlessly integrate the EBO DTT into the Air Tasking Order process.\n\nAT-AOC Discussion: The challenge to the AT-AOC program is to develop a framework, which allows the integration of the mission functionality and the technologies into an approach which is flexible and provides a powerful force multiplier This C2 ISR enabling framework must operate across all the GSTF areas and the various Air & Space Expeditionary Forces currently under development. His case was strongly made by General Buehler at the C2 summit and endorsed by the SAB. This case is shown in Fig 2-2-3. The AT-AOC must enable operations across all the Force CONOPS as well as leveraging cross cutting capabilities allowing effects based operations. The capabilities detailed by General Buehler, matches the approach outlined herein in terms of developing an integrated C2ISR foundation to attack the larger system problem.\n\nThe challenge is to take a system architecture approach, which provides cross collaboration and effective C2 operations within a specific CONOPS. The architecture framework must share the available assets in a way, which maximizes operational effectiveness. A review of available architecture led to acceptance of a common architecture framework as shown in Fig 2-2-4. The idea is to use the C2ISR tools across the various CONOPs in basic building block format.\n\n\n## At- Aoc Requirements/Capabilities C2&Isr Enablers Cross-Cutting C2&Isr Capabilities Cross-Cutting C2&Isr Capabilities\n\nSource:\nC2 Summit Maj Gen Behler\n\nEffects-Based Operations\nHorizontal & Vertical Integration\nDynamic Engagement Control\nPredictive Battlespace Awareness\nGlobal Battlespace Visualization\nNetworked On-Demand Information\nPersistent Battlespace ISR\nEffects-Based Operations\nHorizontal & Vertical Integration\nDynamic Engagement Control\nPredictive Battlespace Awareness\nGlobal Battlespace Visualization\nNetworked On-Demand Information\nPersistent Battlespace ISR\nEffects-Based Operations\nHorizontal & Vertical Integration\nDynamic Engagement Control\nPredictive Battlespace Awareness\nGlobal Battlespace Visualization\nNetworked On-Demand Information\nPersistent Battlespace ISR\nEffects-Based Operations\nHorizontal & Vertical Integration\nDynamic Engagement Control\nPredictive Battlespace Awareness\nGlobal Battlespace Visualization\nNetworked On-Demand Information\nPersistent Battlespace ISR\n\nC2&ISR Capabilities Cross-cut All Task   Forces\n\n## Objectives Objectives Objectives Objectives Objectives Objectives Effects Effects--Based Analysis Based Analysis Effects Effects--Based Analysis Effects Based Analysis Effects--Based Analysis Based Analysis\n\nCampaign Assessment\n\nCampaign Assessment\nCampaign Assessment\nCampaign Assessment\nCampaign Assessment\n\n## Objectives-Based Plan Representation The \"Horizontal\" Linkage\n\nThe challenge is the development of a framework, which allows both horizontal and vertical integration. This vertical framework must allow linkage of Commander's objectives to the Air Commander, Air Tasking Units finally to the execution and engagement units. Under DARPA sponsorship in the JFACC program a common plan representation approach was successfully used to provide such integration. That approach was reviewed and found to be powerful and recommend for application to the AT-AOC concept development. Figure 2-2-5 is a representation of the common plan structure and the value of such an approach. The center of the figure details the basic function of each of the elements 9CC to Units). On the left is graphic description of the current (CINC's OPLAN - JFACC's OPORD -Master Air Attack Plan-Air Tasking Order)\nprocess/documentation plan being used today. With this approach each vertical step requires independent development and any cross collaboration between steps are a cumbersome process. Changes are messy as it can affect all vertical levels. CONOP\ninteraction is very difficult. In contrast, the right side of the figure outlines the tomorrow approach, which integrates cross-domain approaches into the plan from the beginning. Integrated issues are considered from the beginning and synchronized operations are planned. Now the effects on changes in plans can readily implemented with minor inter CONOPs impacts. In simple terms today's operations are segmented planning/execution processes and the tomorrow common planned approach is a linked operation. This approach has been used under the DARPA activities and was shown to be very powerful. It is recommended that a detailed design of AT-AOC be undertaken using this approach.\n\n\n\nIn conclusion, the AT-AOC needs to be given a thorough system engineering scrubbing. The issues with current AOC have been well documented; needs have been defined and the way ahead outlined by General Jumper in the GSTF concept. The advent of UCAV technology and the planned Multi Function C2 Aircraft capability needs a framework to host these enhanced capabilities. Figure 2-2-6 is being offered to outline the system engineering issues and technologies underway, which need to be considered.\n\nCommander's Viewport Security Management Security Management\n\nTechnical:\nKnowledge Management\n- Discovery, update, association\n- Allocation and Scheduling\n- Continuous Planning\n- Repairable Planning\nData management/access\n- DBMS, JBI, Web Services\nInformation Assurance\n- Inherent security\nSystem Management\n- Enterprise Management System\n- Master Caution Panel\n\n\n2.3\nTerabit Wideband Fiber-Based Network The analysis conducted under this task was to review the technical status of the congressionally supported Terabit program and determine technology maturity and payoff in terms of military utility and general commercialization. The objectives of the program were to primarily design and demonstrate an Optical Code Division Multiple Access (CDMA) network using PICs and secondarily design and demonstrate a 28 GHz wireless low cost radio for local multi point communication. The radio would extend the connectivity to remote non-fiber connection points.  The terabit technology program is providing research and development toward CDMA Photonic Integrated Circuits (PIC), high-speed wireless interfaces, and applications.  Optical CDMA provides a method for network users to encode their data over a span of wavelengths (colors).  The goal was to enhance the capability to use existing fiber networks. The primary research focus of this work is in the development of quality components and the degree to which they can be implemented in a PIC.  The program will integrate the components into optical CDMA transceivers and demonstrate them in networks along with a wireless wideband interface via a 28GHz radio.\n\n\nThe work is being done by Research Development Laboratories (RDL), and represents development over a number of years. The work reviewed covered the latest of several contracts with a total value greater than $18M over 7-8 years.  The history of the contracts including goals, face value, and time frame of these contracts are as follows:\n\n\n1995-1997\nPhase I & II SBIRs (Phillips Lab)\n\n\n- Proof of concept using discrete bulk optic components\n1998-2000\nF30602-98-C-0183\n$8.7M\n\n- Demo'd OCDMA PIC testbed 2 node, fixed coded 16 channel, @ OC-12 rates\n\n\n- Satellite cross-link demo\n\n\n- Demo'd 28 GHz 2 node simplex radio@ OC-3, rates\n2000-2003\nF30602-00-C-0224\n$9.3M\n\n-  Design deliver and test 3 node, fixed 32 channel, OC-12, OCDMA PIC\ntestbed - -delayed due to wafer issues\n\n- Fiber Bragg Grating  encoder/decoder and Ge-based OCDMA receiver\ndemo'd\n\n\n- Demo'd 28 GHz 2 node full duplex radio@ OC-3 rates\n\n\n\n- Provide a Commercialization report - not complete yet\n\n\n2003+ Recent ECP Tasks\n\n\n- 2 node, programmable 32 channel, OC-12, OCDMA PIC testbed.\n\n\n\n- 2 node, OC-3, full duplex, 8\" antenna, 28 GHz radio.\n\n\n- Develop concept for aircraft optical data bus including a MEMS optical\n\ninterconnect switch.\n\n- Demonstrate coexistence of OCDMA, WDM, and Single Mode signals\n During numerous meetings with RDL they clearly stated they were most proud of their results on the Photonic Integrated Circuit (PIC) design.  This program called for a demonstration of the PIC circuit in an Optical Code Division Multiple Access application over a fiber optic network.  However, the milestones for this accomplishment have continued to slip over the contracts.  In some cases, RDL has substituted other than full PIC methods to demonstrate the multi-network Optical CDMA principles. The demos to date have been a fixed mode PIC and a fiber bragg grating multi network demonstration. In general, they have had manufacturing problems with their vendors and design problems encoding the programmable and reconfigurable PIC. Vendor interest has elevated and they appear to be providing much better substrates. Clearly, full development of the PIC\ntechnical program area will have the biggest impact on the community if all technical goals are achieved. However, there are still some technical issues with CDMA design based on expert opinion that I'll synopsize herein. In terms of the Optical CDMA transceivers and 28 Ghz radio there are some overwhelming problems dealing with commercialization that will also be presented! A number of design issues were brought up during the interchange on the CDMA\ndesign. The demonstrations were productive although not always using technology planned as noted above. However, a recognized expert, Peter Guilfoyle of Opticomp Corp, gave the key technical analysis of the RDL approach for the Optical CDMA design. He provided a fundamental review of Optical CDMA design and assumptions, including analysis of impact of errors, signal variances, bit error rate (BER), and uniformity.  The analysis was based on RDL design under near optimal conditions. His bottom line was that the RDL design would limit its utility to a 3-node (user) system.  Dr Chan, the RDL technical lead, countered his conclusions with the statement that these issues were identified and reviewed early in the contract and that his design supports more users.  The consensus opinion was that Dr. Chan was inferring that up to 8-10 users could be supported.  The problem is that even if Dr. Chan is correct, the RDL approach will not meet large or medium network needs.  Most networks need user access in terms of thousands of users. The utility for commercialization in small networks is very limited. The review of the 28 Ghz radio did not lead to any major technical design issues that appeared to be showstoppers. Their approach was straightforward using available technology leading to an inexpensive (Est. < $3K/radio) short-range (3000ft) radio. If there was a problem, the design did not include available efficient modulation or coding techniques, which could have made a significant difference in link/bandwidth performance. They did not use these techniques even though government staff provided technical foundation for their inclusion. There were some problems during testing due to antenna pointing issues.\n\n\n\nThe big issue in this program is the opportunity for commercialization of all the products. Commercialization was one of the major goals of a congressionally funded program. RDL provided chart in fig 2-3-1, which details the growth in internet users 98-03.\n\n\nThe case they are making is the need will considerably outpace the capability and there will be a need for RDL products-both CDMA & 28 Ghz radios. Currently the supply of broadband network capacity exceeds demands at the carrier network backbone supported mainly with fiber optic infrastructures. However, the case made by RDL is that d this is not true at local network access and corporate network domain, as surges in bandwidth demand from end users drive the need for high bandwidth pipe available directly to individual end user presence that other available technologies (i.e.: point-to-multipoint broadband wireless, cable, DSL, satellite) are not adequate.\n\nA network commercialization consultant, George Frank, conducted an independent analysis. His analysis was a little different. He basically said that the current market is weak based on numerous companies whom have overextended equipment buys (bankruptcy, chapter, fraud, etc) for network services capability and the deal is with the buyer. However, he does say that this will not last forever and at sometime (approx.3-5 years) this could change. I conclude that at sometime in the future the market would wake up. The real question is will RDL products be competitive. The CDMA will not for the general case if the number of users is limited. It may have use for special design configurations. The radio will need to compete with other wireless designs being developed my numerous venders. Time will tell.\n\nThe issue for IF was is there a market for these products in the Department of Defense (DoD). The primary AF buyer of these products is ESC. In an attempt to establish a market for the 28 GHz wireless part of this program, for RDL, a meeting was set up with ESC/DIG personnel working on the Theater Deployable Comm. (TDC) program.  A\ntechnical program review was provided.  The ESC staff did not significantly question the technical design issues but they did question the utility of a radio with ranges of 300-3000\nft and the technical basis of the 28 GHz design.  ESC's approach for wireless relay is to buy radios from commercial vendors (COTS) and package them with other system components (interface boxes, power supplies, mux/demux, modems, etc) for system use.  Their current approach is use of the 15 GHz band and Lasercom radios to satisfy their needs.  These radios have much longer ranges than 28 GHz design, and can carry the same data rates, but are much larger, heavier, costlier, and require more power than the 28 GHz ones designed under this program.  Further, the question of worldwide use of 28 GHz was questioned concerning frequency band approval.  This approval for OCONUS & foreign governments typically takes 2-3 years.  ESC/DIG stated that if the radio was commercialized, if it had an approved frequency allocation, and if it had 5-15 km range, they would be interested, but only as a commercial buyer if the equipment had advantages over what they were already buying or planned to buy.\n\nSecondly, RDL spoke with ESC/DIG personnel working on the Combat Information Transport System (CITS) program.  They have little need for wireless but they do use fiber extensively.  They stated that their fiber networks typically handle 300-1000\nusers minimum, and the fiber is installed in multiple bundles, eliminating the need for efficiency.  So there was little interest in CDMA multi wavelength designs.\n\nIn conclusion, the utility of the products developed under this program is to be determined. In the near term the commercialization appears to be weak given current business practices. From a military viewpoint, the current products lack interest. If they become commercially competitive interest will develop based on ESC's acquisition strategy. The PIC technology may have significant merit if it leads to applications, which leverage the attributes of the fundamental capabilities of a highly integrated powerful integrated photonic circuit.\n\n\n2.4 Network Distributed Remote Sensors\n\nThe analysis in this Network Distributed Remote sensor area focused on the capabilities of the technology being developed for the DARPA SensIT program. It included a review an analysis of ongoing initiatives and developing a transition path to the AF acquisition community. The primary target for the AF acquisition was the ESC ARGUS program. Many of the needs of the ARGUS program can be significantly extended using the technology being developed in SensIT. The interaction between the two programs was at the management planning level and also at the technical collaboration and testing level. Arrangements were made two develop testbeds at IF and at Mitre, share technology progress and then provide direct transition opportunity into ARGUS spiral activities. The following will be an outline of the various programs and more detail on resulting collaboration.\n\nThe DARPA-sponsored SensIT program is to design and develop advanced software technology for building ad hoc, multi-tasked, distributed sensor networks for tactical surveillance operations (see fig 2-4-1). The SensIT program is founded on the concept of a\n\nnetworked system of cheap, pervasive platforms that combine multiple sensor types, embedded processors, positioning ability and wireless communication.\n\nFurther, SensIT sponsored multi-disciplinary networked sensor technology development program in which the sensor tasking, data collection, integration and analysis was to be fully automated to enable operation within time constraints far shorter than could be achieved by human operators. The objective of the program was to develop the software and networking technologies to more effectively use Commercial-Off-the-Shelf (COTS) sensors. The program is based on the integration of projects from over 20 universities and companies to ensure the successful development and field demonstration of the SensIT\nsystem. SensIT researchers develop algorithms and software for sensor, signal and network processing in highly dynamic, ad hoc, networked sensor environments. Technologies being developed include collaborative processing, diffusion networking, dynamic re-tasking, and declarative languages, among others. Innovative work includes:\n\n\n- **Network Routing:** Non IP-based diffusion routing techniques use node location\nand data semantics to determine how to move data around the network most\nefficiently and reliably.\n- **In-network Collaborative Signal Processing:** Application processing is\naccomplished within the network, leveraging the distributed computing environment in the sensor nodes to efficiently extract useful, reliable, and timely\ninformation from the deployed sensors. Distributed fusion processing algorithms\ncollaborate to improve data analysis and enhance target detection and tracking\nconfidence.\n- **Distributed Query:** Dynamic tasking and querying enable interaction with and\nprogrammability of the sensor network.\n- **Network multi-tasking:** SensIT can handle multiple, simultaneous applications\ntasked from multiple locations, and can provide results in various forms to multiple end- users.\n- **Network Survivability:** The software and system design support built-in\nautonomy, survivability, and low probability of detection.\n\nExamples of specific applications are a Military Operations in Urban Terrain\n(MOUT) environment and the locating of Transporter/Erector Launchers (TELs). Eventually, a UAV that is smaller than a sheet of paper will be able to deploy a wireless network of sensors that are smaller than a piece of gravel.  This work will take military sensor information gathering capabilities to a new level. Specifically, the mission of SensIT\nis to develop all necessary software for networked micro-sensors. A network of SensIT nodes provides target detection, classification, and tracking, and communication within and outside of the network. As part of the project, AFRL/IF, acting as the agent for DARPA, and several contractors performed a series of demonstrations/experiments to monitor the progress of the integration of the various project technologies. The first experiment took place at the Marine Corps Air and Ground Combat Center\n(MCAGCC), 29 Palms, California.  Occurring 27 Jul-11 Aug 00, it was scheduled during a Combined Arms eXercise (CAX) to provide military targets of opportunity.  The military traffic enabled engineers to test recent advances in sensor network technologies in a realworld environment.  The experiment resulted in the collection of large amounts of previously unavailable data and many lessons learned.  The data collected and experience gained are important steps toward the fielding of sensor network technology that will dramatically improve the warfighter's ability to safely and effectively complete his mission. Deployment of this technology will improve the collection of reconnaissance and intelligence information, greatly increasing situational awareness.  With better information about enemy numbers, components, location, speed and direction, our forces will have a decisive advantage on the battlefield. The second of these demonstrations was held 13-15 March 2001, also at MCAGCC.\n\nThe primary contractors that participated in the demonstration / experimentation were BAE Systems, Rockwell Science Center, UC at Berkley and BBN. As part of the demonstration/experiment, selected military organizations were invited to observe the experiment to inform them of what future sensor network technology is coming and to solicit comments and recommendations on how to enhance this work for military purposes. Observers were personnel from MCAGCC, Army (ARDEC and NVESD) and Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory. MCAGCC personnel were so impressed by the work that they published an article about it that was distributed worldwide.\n\n\n\nThe third of these demonstrations was held 29 October -16 November 2001 again MCAGCC. This test involved the initial deployment of 70 second generation multi-modal ground sensor 'nodes' that were used to integrate and test an end-to-end system functionality intended to autonomously detect, localize and track vehicles moving through a strategic crossroad or chokepoint.  The vehicle track was to be displayed as an icon on a Command Post display and an imager, centrally located within the sensor field, was to be cued by the tracker for image capture and transmission to the Command Post.  The results of this initial test were limited.  However, the many lessons learned cleared the way for future work.  Regardless, an extensive target signature series was collected on a wide variety of military vehicles including: HMMWV, 5-Ton Truck, Dragonwagon, LAV, AAV, M1A1 Tank and a former Soviet BMP-2.  In addition, one week of experimentation was dedicated to advanced developmental software algorithms that will be integrated as future enhancements to the baseline system functionality.  On Friday, 9 Nov01, visitors were invited to observe SensIT experimentation and a variety of other advanced sensor technology demonstrations.  Observers were MCAGCC personnel, Marines Corp Warfighting Laboratory, and DARPA representatives from the newly formed Information Exploitation Office.\n\n\n\nThe analysis and design task conducted under this task had two major thrusts. The first thrust involved developing AF requirements transition paths for the technology. That involved finding planned acquisition initiatives or ongoing programs, which would benefit from the demonstrations ongoing in the SensIT program.  The second thrust involved developing a plan to accept the nodes and control systems residue from the program and establishing a test program to extend the technology integrate capabilities into AFRL/IF\nprogram and continue to reinforce technology transition. A in detail research of ongoing AF programs uncovered the USAF Advanced Remote Ground Unattended Sensor (ARGUS) program at ESC. The program was based on the need to develop and deploy\n(hand in placed or air dropped) unattended ground sensors, which would provide detection and identification of ground moving targets otherwise hidden in trees. The program had a long history leading all the way back to Vietnam and the Igloo White program. The program had already undergone a number of iterations via Advanced Critical Technology Demonstrations (ACTDs) and flight demonstrations to show that the concept was feasible.\n\nNotional concept of the program is detailed in figure 2-4-3. It provides multiple sensor heads at a location with relay communications back to a C2 decision location for integration with other info.\n\n\n\n## Notional Conops\n\nSOF\nGround Station The SensIT program provides a number of technologies that will enhance operations; however the key difference is the distributed nature of nodes, which provide multiple local looks at the target and the self-organizing coordination between the nodes. It extends the detection, ID and utility of the concept from a single node to distributed network sensor field and all the important attributes associated with that. Further, it developed technologies that have the capability to reduce cost at the same time while extending utility of deployment significantly.\n\n\nThis rationale was shared in detail with the ARGUS program office that resulted in joint planning with ESC staff and joint technology sharing with Mitre. In fact, Residue nodes were provided to Mitre testbed to extend technology development and transition opportunities. The results from the testbed at Mitre will be compared with results being obtained from an IF testbed using same nodes and networks to extend cooperative development.\n\nIn the mean time the DARPA SensIT experiments have been extended, along with the residual equipment and software, and apply them to the Military Operations in Urban Terrain (MOUT) environments.  The testing was in August 2003. A MOUT training facility exists in proximity to the Air Force Research Laboratory, Rome Research Site, at the Army's Fort Drum, in northern New York State.  It is a natural and efficient way to further the technology and potential applications for the SensIT technology.\n\n\n\nThe network of sensor nodes and sensors were deployed in and around the MOUT\nfacility.  Personnel and vehicles were used to test the system's ability to detect and locate traffic, despite the MOUT building obstructions.  The results of this initial informal testing outlined some field issues with deployment the nodes to more effectively locate traffic. It also provided detailed insight into network control issues.\n\nThe joint activities between Mitre and IF continue to leverage the technologies developed under SensIT via shared test programs. The DARPA program provided a wealth of technologies and concepts that will extend the future capabilities of Distributed Networked Sensor concepts for a long time. Attached below is the list of the major contributors to SensIT program.\n\n| SensIT PI/Contact                                                                 |\n|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------|\n| Auburn Univ.                                                                      |\n| Alvin Lim                                                                         |\n| lim@eng.auburn.edu                                                                |\n| 334-844-6326                                                                      |\n| Distributed Services for Self-Organizing Sensor Networks: We develop              |\n| distributed services that enable distributed sensor network applications to self- |\n| organize, reconfigure, relocate, survive sensor failures and respond rapidly to   |\n| real-time changes in sensor tasks and ad-hoc network topology.   They support     |\n| continuous operation of distributed applications such as sensor fusion, target    |\n| detection, target classification and collaborative tracking.                      |\n| SensIT system integration, test and demonstration.  Coordinate and support PI     |\n| development activities.                                                           |\n| BBN Technologies                                                                  |\n| Ken Theriault                                                                     |\n| theriault@bbn.com                                                                 |\n| 617-873-3139                                                                      |\n| Cornell University                                                                |\n| Johannes Gehrke                                                                   |\n| Distributed data server and query management                                      |\n| Sensor deployment for coverage, target localization, and energy management,       |\n| real-time operating systems, and dynamic power management.                        |\n| Duke University                                                                   |\n| Krish Chakrabarty                                                                 |\n| krish@ee.duke.edu                                                                 |\n| Fantastic Data                                                                    |\n| Tom Hammel                                                                        |\n| Storageless web database and data management system                               |\n| ISI-East                                                                          |\n| Brian Schott                                                                      |\n| Power aware routing and processing techniques and portable browser based          |\n| topographical map interface                                                       |\n| ISI-West                                                                          |\n| Deborah Estrin                                                                    |\n| Network communications via Directed Diffusion                                     |\n| Collaborative localization via multisensor fusion, panoramic image processing     |\n| for detection, tracking, compression and fusion                                   |\n| MIT Lincoln                                                                       |\n| Laboratory                                                                        |\n| Gary Shaw                                                                         |\n| shaw@ll.mit.edu                                                                   |\n| Collaborative signal processing, sensor net resource management, target           |\n| tracking                                                                          |\n| PARC                                                                              |\n| Feng Zhao                                                                         |\n| zhao@parc.com                                                                     |\n| Reinhold Behringer                                                                |\n| Rockwell Scientific                                                               |\n| rbehringer@rwsc.com                                                               |\n| Distributed Kalman Filter for tracking on sensor nodes network: Architecture of   |\n| a generalized concept for distributed target tracking via Kalman Filter,          |\n| exemplary demonstrated by an implementation of acoustic tracking of a moving      |\n| target through RMS volume measurement samples.                                    |\n| Rutgers Univ.                                                                     |\n| Badri Nath                                                                        |\n| Prediction models; WebDust Info Server I and data space data management           |\n| Sensoria Corp.                                                                    |\n| Billy Merrill                                                                     |\n| Wireless Integrated Network Sensor Next Generation (WINS NG) 2.0                  |\n| platform used within the SensIT program:  following generation WINS NG 3.0        |\n| 310-641-1331x212                                                               |\n|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------|\n| Reactive sensor networks, Self-configuring networks, Distributed target        |\n| tracking, Cooperative data interpretation                                      |\n| The Pennsylvania State                                                         |\n| Univ.  Richard Brooks                                                          |\n| rrb@acm.org                                                                    |\n| 814-863-5698                                                                   |\n| The Pennsylvania State                                                         |\n| Univ.                                                                          |\n| Shashi Phoha                                                                   |\n| sxp26@psu.edu                                                                  |\n| (814) 863-8005                                                                 |\n| Semantic Information Fusion in scalable, fixed and mobile node networks: This  |\n| project addresses the severe power and processing constraints on the           |\n| internetworking of mobile and fixed microsensors by devising knowledge based   |\n| methods for their efficient utilization.  We formulate mathematical techniques |\n| for local processing of raw sensor data into semantic information, which are   |\n| communicated and fused for collaborative event detection, identification and   |\n| tracking.                                                                      |\n| Energy-efficient Mobile-Agent-based task-adaptive collaborative processing in  |\n| distributed sensor networks                                                    |\n| U. Tennessee / LSU /                                                           |\n| Duke  Hairong Qi, U.                                                           |\n| Tennessee                                                                      |\n| hqi@utk.edu                                                                    |\n| U. of Maryland                                                                 |\n| V.S. Subrahmanian                                                              |\n| Task management, declarative query, spatio-temporal tasking                    |\n| U. of Wisconsin                                                                |\n| Parmesh Ramanathan                                                             |\n| Location-centric distributed signal processing and computation                 |\n|                                                                                |\n\n## 2.5  Information Warfare\n\nThe activity under this task area involved the development of system concepts and technology thrusts, which would advance the state of the art of Information Warfare and Cyber Operations activities. It included a review of technology thrusts and development of concepts that meet AF and other user needs. As a background, AFRL/IF has developed a responsive Information Warfare Research and Development (R&D) technology program. The objective is to meet the needs of the Air Force's Information Operations doctrine. Specifically, it is focused on Information Assurance, Computer Network Defense, Cyber Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance, and Computer Network Attack as defined in AFDD 2-5.\n\n\n---- Information Assurance comprises those measures to protect and defend information and information systems by ensuring their availability, integrity, authenticity, confidentiality, and nonrepudiation.\n\n---- Computer Network Defense (CND) is actions taken to plan and direct responses to unauthorized activity in defense of Air Force information systems and computer networks. Commanders should provide CND planning guidance to the staff, as well as supporting and subordinate commanders, as part of the \"commander's intent.\" CND actions include analyzing network activity to determine the appropriate course of action to defend Air Force networks.\n\n\n\n---- Computer Network Attack operations are conducted using information systems to disrupt, deny, degrade, or destroy information resident in computers and computer networks, or the computers and networks themselves.\n\n\n---- Cyber Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) are functions in cyberspace that result in the ability to gather information about the adversary, their intentions, and their capabilities.\n\n\nInformation is now being placed at the level of major dimensions of power along with political, economical and military and is the lifeblood that flows through national defense mission critical functions, systems and infrastructures. Air Force Doctrine Document 2-5 states, \"Information superiority, like air and space superiority, is an element of combat power.\" DoD and the Services are very dependent on correct information and critical information infrastructures, and recognize the importance of networks and information systems as a key component to the successful execution of their respective missions. In fact, a recent Defense Science Board report stated, \"Information, information processing, and communications networks are at the core of every military activity.\"\n\nThe Air Force links transformation with its existing core competencies. These core competencies are air and space superiority, information superiority, global attack, precision engagement, rapid global mobility, and agile combat support. Of particular relevance would be to focus more carefully, for example, on information assurance as part of air and space superiority, and complex systems as a critical part of information superiority, and computer network attack as part of global attack. It is clear that in today's day and age it would be quite difficult to achieve both air and space superiority without also dominating the information realm. The AF has also recently formulated a number of capabilities-based task forces that will lay the foundation for transformation to a capabilities focused expeditionary air and space force. These crisis response task forces are global strike, global response, global mobility, space and C4ISR, homeland security, air and space expeditionary forces, and nuclear response, many of which have an information assurance component and have a significant need for information assurance technologies which will require prolonged Science and Technology investment to achieve the stated goals. The Information Warfare Threats can be characterized on a continuum from script kiddies to organized nation states bent on carrying out attacks. The Defense Science Board describes the groups that comprise the threat as follows: hackers driven by a technical challenge, disgruntled employees or customers seeking revenge, crooks interested in personal financial gain or covering criminal activity, organized crime, organized terrorist groups, foreign espionage seeking to exploit information for economic, political or military purposes, tactical countermeasures intended to disrupt specific US military weapons or command systems, multifaceted tactical information warfare applied in a broad, orchestrated manner to disrupt a major U.S. military mission, and large organized groups or nation states  intent on overthrowing the United States. Probably the most dangerous threat that we face today is what is termed the Information Warrior. The Information Warrior is a military adversary who uses attacks on the target's ability to wage war. The interesting aspect of the Information Warrior is that they use the same equipment as us (Internet, GPS, Windows, TCP/IP, etc...) and may have been educated in U.S. colleges and universities. The attacks carried out by this class of threat include destruction, denial, corruption, and surveillance of the targets information systems and networks. Also, the organized Information Warfare threat tends to make use of covert attacks based upon long-term surveillance and reconnaissance of the potential target's information systems. Many countries currently have or are developing information warfare capabilities. Most noticeably, China has set up an Information Warfare agency to break encryption and codes used by foreign firms and governments\n\n\nThe U.S. Intelligence Community (IC) is a large and complex structure of many different Federal organizations. The essential role of the IC is to provide timely, relevant information to U.S. policymakers, decision makers, and war fighters. Accomplishing this mission involves tasking, collecting, processing, analyzing, and disseminating intelligence to a variety of customers.  It requires a specialized information infrastructure and a unique security environment that must work behind the scenes and often in highly charged international situations where intelligence information has the potential to remain highly sensitive for many years. In this environment, the stakes are high and confidentiality, integrity, and availability of IC information is extremely critical. For example, due to inadequate security, entire generations of collection or cryptanalytical systems may be compromised, thus reducing intelligence capabilities and wasting large amounts of investments. Further, leaks of information may have international political ramifications and cause lives to be in danger. The risk of compromise will increase as the IC continues to use commercial technologies and share its information electronically among intelligence officers, across agencies and with ad hoc coalition partners. The IC has always been responsible for ensuring that its information is secure. In the non-cyber arena, the IC developed robust systems and procedures to defend its data, sources, and methods. The IC's cyber environment demands the same risk management approach.\n\nAn analysis was conducted for the Advanced Research and Development Activity\n(ARDA) to provide foundation for development of innovative solutions for advanced cyber-defensive capabilities for the IC information infrastructure.  Intelligence is as much a key part of cyber-defense as it is in kinetic warfare.  There are two major components to cyber defense: IA situational awareness and cyber indications and warning. Both of these capabilities help IC decision makers understand the defensive status of the IC information infrastructure and what could happen in cyberspace between a potential adversary and the defenders of the IC information infrastructure. These two components of cyber-defense are needed to better defend the IC systems and networks. They are also necessary to derive meaningful conclusions from the security incident data the IC collects, to understand the\n\"Big Picture\" of the IC networks security state, and to pinpoint security weaknesses for correction.  Both cyber defense capabilities are immature and require advanced technologies to include: presentation techniques, modeling of IC mission dependency versus IC system services, and fusion of cyber data with real-world information such as news stories and intelligence reports.\n\nThe objective of the program plan, which led to an approved ARDA contracting initiative, was for innovative demonstrable solutions, i.e. proofs of concept, to advance the state of the art in cyber-defense capabilities for the Intelligence Community's information infrastructure.  Efforts that leverage existing technologies as a means of achieving research goals are acceptable, but efforts that are largely engineering in nature or that represent only incremental improvements to existing capabilities will not be funded.\n\nThe technologies sought under this program had to be highly resistant to subversion or circumvention by a sophisticated adversary.  Respondents must demonstrate confidence in the effectiveness of their solution to resist attack through assurance arguments that address techniques, processes, methodologies, etc. employed to resist subversion and circumvention. Also, ARDA wanted the following basic desirable features incorporated into any proposed solution:\n\n\n- Ease of Use:  User interfaces should be easy to use and be free of internal\ncomplexities.  Complexity in the user interface fosters disuse and/or potential security breaching work-arounds.\n- Operational Transparency:  Solutions should minimize the visibility of protection\nand tracking mechanisms, thereby complicating user formulation of breaching\nstrategies.\n- Portability: Wherever possible solutions should be effective across a broad\nspectrum of platforms and technologies within the IC information infrastructure.\n\nSolutions should be capable of dynamically accommodating a potentially fastchanging security environment, including changes to threat conditions, mission imperatives and personnel status.\n\nThe analysis under this task also included providing similar technology foundation trade off analysis for programs with IOTC and DISA. In each of these areas the analysis served as a basis for program planning and development, whether it was for subsequent contracting or in-house testing initiatives.\n\n\n3.0  Conclusion:\n\n\nThe system analysis conducted under this task cut across a number of AFRL/IF's programs. It represents a look at a number of ongoing technology development initiatives. The common challenge in each of these areas was developing a fit into the user's needs, which are then supported by plans. These plans must provide means for technology validation and collaboration with user's to allow transition. The challenge here is to understand user constraints and providing means to keep technology state of the art current while spirally off mature products into acquisition programs.\n\nA single means to accomplish this transition/development need does not currently exist. It takes collaboration with all involved. The collaboration may be in terms of joint planning, testing or common effort on joint activities. Assuming a technology fits with a program or acquisition activity because it extents technology or capability generically is not enough. It must meet the needs of the joint activities developed through iterative study and planning.\n\n\nThis process is also true if the product is only a technology development activity. In any case, a system view provides a framework to discuss, plan, execute, test and transition products throughout the development cycle."
    },
    {
        "text": "# U.S. Department Of Justice Office Of Justice Programs\n\n810 Seventh Street N.W. Washington, DC 20531\nEric H. Holder, Jr.\n\nAttorney General Laurie O. Robinson Assistant Attorney General John H. Laub Director, National Institute of Justice This and other publications and products of the National Institute of Justice can be found at:\n\n## National Institute Of Justice\n\nwww.nij.gov\n\n## Office Of Justice Programs\n\nInnovation - Partnerships - Safer Neighborhoods www.ojp.usdoj.gov\n\n## Contents Iii Preface\n\n11\nChapter 1: History\n21\nChapter 2: Anatomy and Physiology of Adult Friction Ridge Skin\n31\nChapter 3: Embryology and Morphology of Friction Ridge Skin\n41\nChapter 4: Recording Living and Postmortem Friction Ridge Exemplars\n51\nChapter 5: Systems of Friction Ridge Classification\n61\nChapter 6: Automated Fingerprint Identification System (AFIS)\n71\nChapter 7: Latent Print Development\n81\nChapter 8: The Preservation of Friction Ridges\n91\nChapter 9: Examination Process\n10-1\nChapter 10: Documentation of Friction Ridge Impressions:\nFrom the Scene to the Conclusion\n11-1\nChapter 11: Equipment\n12-1\nChapter 12: Quality Assurance\n13-1\nChapter 13: Fingerprints and the Law\n141\nChapter 14: Scientific Research Supporting the Foundations of\nFriction Ridge Examinations\n151\nChapter 15: Special Abilities and Vulnerabilities in Forensic Expertise\nA1\nAppendix A: Author and Reviewer Biographies\nB1\nAppendix B: The Origin of the Scientific Working Group on Friction\nRidge Analysis, Study and Technology (SWGFAST)\nC1\nAppendix C: Members of SWGFAST\nD1\nAppendix D: SWGFAST Standard Terminology of Friction Ridge Examination, Ver. 3.0\n\n## Preface\n\nThe idea of *The Fingerprint Sourcebook* originated during a meeting in April 2002. Individuals representing the fingerprint, academic, and scientific communities met in Chicago, Illinois, for a day and a half to discuss the state of fingerprint identification with a view toward the challenges raised by Daubert issues. The meeting was a joint project between the International Association for Identification (IAI) and West Virginia University (WVU). One recommendation that came out of that meeting was a suggestion to create a sourcebook for friction ridge examiners, that is, a single source of researched information regarding the subject. This sourcebook would provide educational, training, and research information for the international scientific community. The Scientific Working Group on Friction Ridge Analysis, Study and Technology (SWGFAST) prepared an outline of the subjects that should be included in the sourcebook. Charles Illsley, a SWGFAST member, prepared a grant proposal for submission to the National Institute of Justice (NIJ) for funding of the project, with Frank Fitzpatrick as the project director and Alan and Debbie McRoberts as the sourcebook editors. Although many participants in the project were, and some remain, active members of SWGFAST, participation in the project was not restricted to SWGFAST members. NIJ provided grant funding to the WVU Forensic Science Initiative to support the project and a call for authors and reviewers was extended throughout the forensic community. The prospective authors were asked to prepare a detailed outline and an introduction (approximately 250 to 750 words) for each chapter that they hoped to write. They were also asked to provide a curriculum vitae. Two or more individuals volunteered for most chapters and some chapters had as many as seven volunteers. Reviewers critiqued the introductions and outlines for the various chapters, and Frank Fitzpatrick and I made the final selection of chapter authors. Multiple reviewers for each chapter participated and are listed at the end of each chapter. The curricula vitae for all of the authors and most reviewers are included in the appendix. After the selection of authors was made and the chapters were assigned to the various authors and coauthors, the chapters were written and multiple rounds of author revisions and review were completed. The chapters were then edited and reviewed again. The chapters were then submitted to NIJ, where additional review and editing occurred. During the NIJ edit and review process, Chapter 15 (Special Abilities and Vulnerabilities in Forensic Expertise) was added to the project because of contemporary importance placed on that research. Those NIJ employeesand contractors, in particular Danielle Weiss and David Fialkoffwho participated in reviewing, editing, and finalizing this book should be congratulated for their efforts in bringing this project to completion. For those of us who have worked in the field of fingerprint identification during the last 50 years, the influence of the Federal Bureau of Investigation's (FBI's) leadership in providing fingerprint training is well known. However, with the creation of SWGFAST in 1995, the FBI showed great leadership in providing a mechanism to promote consensus standards within our diverse forensic community. A\nbrief sketch about the origin of SWGFAST and a list of the past and current members of SWGFAST are included in the appendix. In the history of fingerprints, no previous effort of this magnitude has been made to assemble as much reviewed information into a single source. I would like to extend my appreciation and the appreciation of future readers to all those authors and reviewers who contributed so much time and effort to make this book a reality.\n\nAlan McRoberts, Editor\n\n## C H A P T E R History Jeffery G. Barnes C O N T E N T S\n\n11\n1.6  20th Century\n3\n1.1 Introduction\n17\n1.7  Conclusion\n3\n1.2  Ancient History\n17\n1.8  Reviewers\n4\n1.3  221 B.C. to A.D. 1637\n17\n1.9  References\n5\n1.4  17th and 18th Centuries\n18\n1.10  Additional Information\n6\n1.5  19th Century\n\n## Chapter 1 History Jeffery G. Barnes 1.1 Introduction\n\nThe long story of that inescapable mark of identity has been told and retold for many years and in many ways. On the palm side of each person's hands and on the soles of each person's feet are prominent skin features that single him or her out from everyone else in the world. These features are present in friction ridge skin which leaves behind impressions of its shapes when it comes into contact with an object. The impressions from the last finger joints are known as fingerprints. Using fingerprints to identify individuals has become commonplace, and that identification role is an invaluable tool worldwide. What some people do not know is that the use of friction ridge skin impressions as a means of identification has been around for thousands of years and has been used in several cultures. Friction ridge skin impressions were used as proof of a person's identity in China perhaps as early as 300 B.C., in Japan as early as A.D. 702, and in the United States since 1902.\n\n## 1.2 Ancient History\n\nEarthenware estimated to be 6000 years old was discovered at an archaeological site in northwest China and found to bear clearly discernible friction ridge impressions. These prints are considered the oldest friction ridge skin impressions found to date; however, it is unknown whether they were deposited by accident or with specific intent, such as to create decorative patterns or symbols (Xiang-Xin and Chun-Ge, 1988, p 277). In this same Neolithic period, friction ridges were being left in other ancient materials by builders (Ashbaugh, 1999, pp 1213). Just as someone today might leave impressions in cement, early builders left impressions in the clay used to make bricks (Berry and Stoney, 2001, pp 89).\n\nOther ancient artifacts have been found that have ridge patterns on them that were clearly carved rather than left as accidental impressions. Examples of ancient artifacts displaying what might be considered friction ridge designs include megalithic artworks in the tomb of Gavr'inis on an island just off the west coast of France and in the tomb at Newgrange on the coast of Ireland (Figure 11).\n\n## 1.3 221 B.C. To A.D. 1637\n\nThe Chinese were the first culture known to have used friction ridge impressions as a means of identification.\n\nThe earliest example comes from a Chinese document entitled \"The Volume of Crime Scene InvestigationBurglary\", from the Qin Dynasty (221 to 206 B.C.). The document contains a description of how handprints were used as a type of evidence (Xiang-Xin and Chun-Ge, 1988, p 283). During the Qin through Eastern Han dynasties (221 B.C. to 220 A.D.), the most prevalent example of individualization using friction ridges was the clay seal. Documents consisting of bamboo slips or pages were rolled with string bindings, and the strings were sealed with clay (Xiang-Xin and Chun-Ge, 1988, pp 277278). On one side of the seal would be impressed the name of the author, usually in the form of a stamp, and on the other side would be impressed the fingerprint of the author. The seal was used to show authorship and to prevent tampering prior to the document reaching the intended reader. It is generally recognized that it was both the fingerprint and the name that gave the document authenticity. The fingerprint impressed into the clay seal is a definite example of intentional friction ridge skin reproduction as a means of individualization. It is clear that the Chinese understood the value of friction ridge skin prior to the Christian era (Laufer, 1912, p 649). After the invention of paper by the Chinese in A.D. 105, it became common to sign documents using friction ridge skin. It was standard practice in China to place an impressioneither palmprints, phalangeal (lower finger joint) marks, or fingerprintson all contract-type documents (Xiang-Xin and Chun-Ge, 1988, pp 282284). In A.D. 650, the Chinese historian Kia Kung-Yen described a previously used means of identification, writing, \"Wooden tablets were inscribed with the terms of the contract and notches were cut into the sides at the identical places so that the tablets could later be matched, thus proving them genuine; the significance of the notches was the same as that of the fingerprints of the present time\" (Ashbaugh, 1999, p 17).\n\nThis statement tends to confirm that fingerprints were used for individualization in China. The use of friction ridge skin impressions in China continued into the Tang Dynasty (A.D. 617907), as seen on land contracts, wills, and army rosters. It can be postulated that with the Chinese using friction ridge skin for individualization and trading with other nations in Asia, these other nations might have adopted the practice. For example, in Japan, a \"Domestic Law\" enacted in A.D. 702 required the following: \"In case a husband cannot write, let him hire another man to write the document and after the husband's name, sign with his own index finger\" (Ashbaugh, 1999, p 1718; Lambourne, 1984, p 24). This shows at least the possibility that the Japanese had some understanding of the value of friction ridge skin for individualization. Additionally, in India, there are references to the nobility using friction ridge skin as signatures:\nIn A.D. 1637, the joint forces of Shah Jahan and Adil Khan, under the command of Khan Zaman Bahadur, invaded the camp of Shahuji Bhosle, the ruler of Pona (in the present day Maharashtra). The joint army defeated Shahuji, who was compelled to accept the terms of peace:\nSince the garrison (of Shahuji) was now reduced to great extremities ....[,] Shahuji wrote frequently to Khan Bahadur in the most humble strain, promising to pay allegiance to the crown. He at the same time solicited a written treaty ... stamped with the impression of his hand. (Sodhi and Kaur, 2003a, pp 126136)\nThe above text is an example of the nobility's use of palmprints in India to demonstrate authenticity of authorship when writing an important document. It is believed that the use of prints on important documents was adopted from the Chinese, where it was used generally, but in India it was mainly reserved for royalty (Sodhi and Kaur, 2003a, pp 129131). The use of friction ridge skin as a signature in China, Japan, India, and possibly other nations prior to European discovery is thus well documented.\n\n## 1.4 17Th And 18Th Centuries\n\nIn the late 17th century, European scientists began publishing their observations of human skin. Friction ridge skin was first described in detail by Dr. Nehemiah Grew (Figure 12) in the 1684 paper Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of London. Dr. Grew's description marked the beginning in the Western Hemisphere of friction ridge skin observations and characterizations (Ashbaugh, 1999, p 38; Lambourne, 1984, p 25). In 1685, Govard Bidloo, a Dutch anatomist, published Anatomy of the Human Body, which included details of the skin and the papillary ridges of the thumb but failed to address individualization or permanence (Ashbaugh, 1999, p 39; Felsher, 1962, pp 612). In 1687, the Italian physiologist Marcello Malpighi (Figure\n13) published *Concerning the External Tactile Organs,* in which the function, form, and structure of friction ridge skin was discussed. Malpighi is credited with being the first to use the newly invented microscope for medical studies. In his treatise, Malpighi noted that ridged skin increases friction between an object and the skin's surface; friction ridge skin thus enhances traction for walking and grasping (New Scotland Yard, 1990; Ashbaugh, 1999, p 40). In recognition of Malpighi's work, a layer of skin (stratum Malpighi) was named after him.\n\nAlthough friction ridge skin had been studied for a number of years, it would be 1788 before the uniqueness of this skin was recognized in Europe. J. C. A. Mayer, a German doctor and anatomist, wrote a book entitled Anatomical Copper-plates with Appropriate Explanations, which contained detailed drawings of friction ridge skin patterns. Mayer wrote, \"Although the arrangement of skin ridges is never duplicated in two persons, nevertheless the similarities are closer among some individuals. In others the differences are marked, yet in spite of their peculiarities of arrangement all have a certain likeness\" (Cummins and Midlo, 1943, pp 1213). Mayer was the first to write that friction ridge skin is unique.\n\n## 1.5 19Th Century\n\nEnglish wood engraver and ornithologist Thomas Bewick (17531828) published many books with wood engravings of birds and other animals. Three woodcuts (made in 1809, 1818, and 1826) included a fingermark, and the latter two marks. (Courtesy of the Natural\nHistory Society of Northumbria,\nHancock Museum.)\nPurkinje's nine types of finger patterns.\n(A: Transverse curves, B: Central\nlongitudinal stria, C: Oblique stria,\nD: Oblique sinus, E: Almond, F: Spiral, G: Ellipse or elliptical whorl, H: Circle or circular whorl, and I: Double whorl).\n\n(Reprinted with permission from\nCumming and Midlo (1943). Copyright\n1943 Dover Publications Inc.)\nhad the legend \"Thomas Bewick, his mark\" (Herschel, 1916, 3233). The woodcuts (Figure 14) were very detailed, but it is unknown whether Bewick understood the value of friction ridge skin for individualization (Galton,\n1892, p 26; Lambourne, 1984, p 26). In his 1823 thesis titled \"Commentary on the Physiological Examination of the Organs of Vision and the Cutaneous System\", Dr. Johannes E. Purkinje (17871869), professor at the University of Breslau in Germany, classified fingerprint patterns into nine categories and gave each a name (Figure 15) (Lambourne, 1984, p 26; Galton, 1892, pp 8588). Although Dr. Purkinje went no further than naming the patterns, his contribution is significant because his nine pattern types were the precursor to the Henry classification system (Herschel, 1916, pp 3435; Galton, 1892, pp 67, 119). (For more on Purkinje, see Chapter 5. For more on the Henry system, see p 10.) German anthropologist Hermann Welcker (18221898) of the University of Halle led the way in the study of friction ridge skin permanence. Welcker began by printing his own right hand in 1856 and then again in 1897, thus gaining credit as the first person to start a permanence study. However, in the paper Welcker published in\n1898, he sought no credit, but rather seemed only to offer assistance to prior claims of permanence in reference to friction ridge skin (Wilder and Wentworth, 1918, pp 339340). Welcker is not cited often. Generally, the credit for being the first person to study the persistence of friction ridge skin goes to Sir William James Herschel. Herschel (Figure 16) was born in England and moved in 1853, at age 20, to Bengal, India, to serve as a British\nAdministrator for the East India Company. In 1858, he experimented with the idea of using a handprint as a signature by having a man named Rajyadhar Konai put a stamp of his right hand on the back of a contract for road binding materials. The contract was received and accepted as valid. This spontaneous printing of Konai's hand thus led to the first official use of friction ridge skin by a European. The success of this experiment led Herschel to begin a long exploration of friction ridge skin, and over the next year he went on to collect multiple fingerprints from family, friends, colleagues, and even himself. In 1860, he was promoted to magistrate and given charge of Nuddea, a rural subdivision in Bengal. While there, he recognized more identification possibilities for the use of friction ridge skin, especially in fighting and preventing fraud. Upon his appointment as Magistrate and Collector at Hooghly, near Calcutta, in 1877, Herschel was able to institute the recording of friction ridge skin as a method of individualization on a widespread basis. Herschel was in charge of the criminal courts, the prisons, the registration of deeds, and the payment of government pensions, all of which he controlled with fingerprint identification. On August 15, 1877, Herschel wrote what is referred to as the \"Hooghly Letter\" to Bengal's Inspector of Jails and the Registrar General, describing his ideas and suggesting that the fingerprint system be expanded to other geographical areas. While proposing even further uses of this means of individualization, the Hooghly Letter also explained both the permanence and uniqueness of friction ridge skin (Herschel, 1916, pp 2223). Herschel continued his study of the permanence of friction ridge skin throughout his lifetime. He published prints of himself taken in 1859, 1877, and 1916 to demonstrate this permanence (Herschel, 1916, pp 2231). In 1877, Thomas Taylor (18201910), a microscopist for the U.S. Department of Agriculture, gave a lecture concerning prints and their possible applications concerning crime. Taylor proposed the idea of using bloody prints found at crime scenes as a means to identify suspects. The lecture was published in the July 1877 issue of The American Journal of Microscopy and Popular Science (Ashbaugh, 1999, p 26).\n\nHenry Faulds (Figure 17) became interested in friction ridge skin after seeing ridge detail on pottery found on a Japanese beach (Faulds, 1880). He was born at Beith, in Ayrshire, in 1843, and entered Anderson's College in Glasgow, graduating as a Licentiate of the Royal Faculty of Physicians and Surgeons in 1871. Faulds, as a medical missionary, opened a hospital in Tsukiji, Japan, working there from 1873 until 1885 (Lambourne, 1984, p 33). During that time, Faulds conducted independent research by collecting prints of both monkeys and people. In a letter dated February 16, 1880, to the famed naturalist Charles Darwin, Faulds wrote that friction ridges were unique and classifiable, and alluded to their permanence (Lambourne, 1984, pp 3435). In October 1880, Faulds submitted an article for publication to the journal *Nature* in order to inform other researchers of his findings (Faulds, 1880, p 605). In that article, Faulds proposed using friction ridge individualization at crime scenes and gave two practical examples.\n\nIn one example, a greasy print on a drinking glass revealed who had been drinking some distilled spirits. In the other, sooty fingermarks on a white wall exonerated an accused individual (Faulds, 1880, p 605). Faulds was the first person to publish in a journal the value of friction ridge skin for individualization, especially its use as evidence.\n\n(For more on Faulds, see Chapter 5.) While Herschel and Faulds were studying friction ridge skin, another scientist was devising an alternate identification method. Alphonse Bertillon (Figure 18) was a clerk in the Prefecture of Police in Paris, France. In 1879, Bertillon began studying the body measurements of various individuals and devised anthropometry, which was first put to use in 1882. Anthropometry is the study of body measurements for identification purposes. Bertillon's anthropometric method measured height, reach (middle finger to middle finger of outstretched arms), trunk, length of head, width of head, length of right ear, width of right ear, length of left foot, length of left middle finger, length of left little finger, and length of left forearm. With the success of anthropometry, Bertillon was made the Chief of the Department of Judicial Identity in 1888 (Rhodes, 1956, p 103). (For more on Bertillon, see Chapter 5.) Anthropometry is a scientific and biometric way to individualize and was used on criminals throughout most of the world from its inception in 1882 until 1914. As friction ridge skin identification became more prevalent after experimentation Courtesy of West Virginia University Libraries.)\nproved its usefulness, fingerprints were added to anthropometric records. Thus, a complete anthropometric record would include the 11 body measurements, 2 photographs (front face and right side), and a set of all 10 fingerprints.\n\nEven though not officially adopted as a sole means of identification in France or elsewhere in Europe, the concept of using friction ridge skin for individualization was gaining momentum. In the United States, geologist Gilbert Thompson guarded his checks against forgery by signing across an impression of his finger. Thompson did this while working on a project in New Mexico in 1882 (Galton, 1892, p 27). In 1883, another American, Samuel Langhorne Clemens (18351910), better known as Mark Twain, wrote the story of his life in the book *Life on the Mississippi* and included a passage about the permanence and uniqueness of the print of the ball of the thumb (Twain, 1883, pp 160161). In\n1884, Clemens wrote the novel The Tragedy of Pudd'nhead Wilson. In it, he tells the story of a lawyer who spends his time collecting prints from the local townsfolk and then uses them to solve a murder. Not only does Clemens explain the permanence and uniqueness of friction ridge skin, the book also features several courtroom demonstrations: the first shows how each person's prints are different on each finger, the second shows that even identical twins have different prints from one another, the third shows how the prints made from the fingers can be individualized, and the last catches the murderer. The story is told using critical knowledge of friction ridge skin (Twain, 1884, pp 128137). Although anthropometry was the current method of identification in the early 1880s, Clemens's writings illustrate that the value of friction ridge skin to uniquely identify an individual was becoming increasingly well known. A publication in 1883 by Dr. Arthur Kollmann of Hamburg, Germany, The Tactile Apparatus of the Hand of the Human Races and Apes in Its Development and Structure, added to the research being conducted on friction ridge skin. Kollmann studied the embryological development of friction ridge skin, proposing that ridges are formed by lateral pressure between nascent ridges and that ridges are discernible in the fourth month of fetal life and are fully formed in the sixth (Galton, 1892, p 58). Kollman was the first to identify the presence and locations of the volar pads on the hands and feet (Hale, 1952, p 162; Ashbaugh, 1999, p 41). (For an explanation of volar pads, see chapter 3.) The studies of Kollmann were followed in\n1888 with the publication in Germany of On the Morphology of the Tactile Pads of Mammals by Hermann Klaatsch.\n\nKlaatsch studied the walking surfaces of mammals other than humans, which led to his theory that the orderly arrangement of sweat glands into rows was an evolutionary change (Galton, 1892, p 60).\n\n##\n\nThe scientific study of friction ridge skin was also taken up by a prominent scientist of the time, Sir Francis Galton (Figure 19). Galton was born February 16, 1822, in Sparkbrook, England, and was a cousin of Charles Darwin. Most of Galton's research focused on hereditary matters, which led him to the study of anthropometry and, later, fingerprints. Galton was looking to understand the hereditary nature of the physical body and what, if anything, it could tell about an individual (Caplan and Torpey, 2001, p 274). Visitors to his anthropometric laboratory were voluntarily measured seventeen different ways. These measurements were recorded on a card that was copied and given to the visitors as a souvenir (ca. 1885). From this data, he realized that forearm length correlated with height and derived the first example of what statisticians now call a correlation coefficient (a numerical value identifying the strength of the relationship between variables). Galton continued to take anthropometric measurements, and he added the printing of the thumbs and then the printing of all 10 fingers.\n\nAs the author of the first book on fingerprints (Finger Prints, 1892), Galton established that friction ridge skin was unique and persistent. He also concluded that there was no link between friction ridge skin and the character of the individual with that skin. Because Galton was the first to define and name specific print minutiae, the minutiae became known as Galton details (Figure 110).\n\ndetails consist of a uniting or dividing ridge (bif Galton's urcation), the end or beginning of a ridge (ending ridges), a short island (short ridge), and an enclosure (two bifurcations facing each other) (Galton, 1892, p 54). (For more on Galton, see Chapter 5.) While Galton conducted research that would further advance the science of fingerprints, fingerprints were being used practically as well. In 1886, I. W. Taber, a photographer in San Francisco, proposed using thumbprints to identify Chinese immigrants (Lambourne, 1984, pp 4647). In 1889, the Director-General of the Post Offices in India was collecting thumbprints from employees to prevent individuals who had been fired from being rehired. Using thumbprints for identity worked well to prevent fraudulent practices (Henry, 1934, pp 89). The French medical/legal scientist Rene Forgeot published a thesis in 1891 in which he proposed using powders and chemicals to develop latent prints at crime scenes in order to individualize the person who had touched an object (Galton, 1892, p 46). Another leading fingerprint researcher of this time period was Juan Vucetich. Vucetich was employed as a statistician with the Central Police Department in La Plata, Argentina, until his promotion to the head of the bureau of Anthropometric Identification. Vucetich, having studied Galton's research, began to experiment with fingerprints in 1891. He started recording the fingerprints of criminals and devised his own classification system (Lambourne, 1984, pp 5859). Vucetich's classification system and individualization of prisoners through the use of fingerprints were the first practical uses of the fingerprint science by law enforcement personnel. Other countries soon looked into using a fingerprint system to identify prisoners. (For more on Vucetich, see Chapter 5.) In 1892, in Buenos Aires, Argentina, a murder was solved using thumbprint evidence found at the crime scene. The two children of Francisca Rojas were found murdered. Rojas herself had a throat wound. She accused a man named Velasquez of the murder, stating that he was jealous because she refused to marry him since she was in love with another man. The local authorities brutally beat Velasquez hoping for a confession. When Velasquez did not confess, Inspector Eduardo Alvarez was brought in from La Plata to conduct a thorough investigation. Inspector Alvarez began by examining the scene of the crime and found a bloody thumbprint on the door. Having been trained by Juan Vucetich to compare fingerprints, Alvarez removed the section of the door with the print and compared the bloody thumbprint with the thumbprints of Francisca Rojas. When confronted and shown that her own thumbprint matched the thumbprint on the door, she confessed to the murders (New Scotland Yard, 1990, pp 89; Beavan, 2001, pp 114116).\n\nThe Rojas murder case is considered to be the first homicide solved by fingerprint evidence, and Argentina became the first country to rely solely on fingerprints as a method of individualization (Lambourne, 1984, pp 5859). The Troup Committee, named for its chairman, Charles Edward Troup, was formed in 1893 to investigate current and possible future methods of identifying habitual criminals in England. After extensive research into previous methods of identification (such as photographs and the memories of police officers) as well as the new methods of anthropometry and fingermarks, the Troup Committee came to a compromise. The committee, like Sir Francis Galton, recognized weaknesses inherent in the filing and retrieving of fingermarks. Anthropometry and fingerprints were both considered to be effective methods of identification, but at the time, fingerprints did not have an adequate classification system. The committee thus felt compelled to use both systems and recommended that five major anthropometric measurements be taken and used for primary classification and that fingermarks be attached as an additional component of the classification system. The committee's recommendations were followed in England and in Bengal. By 1894, all newly arrested criminals were Print Publishing\nAssociation (1919).\nCourtesy of West Virginia\nUniversity Libraries.)\nmeasured and fingerprinted in those two jurisdictions (Lambourne, 1984, pp 4651).\n\nIn 1894, Sir Edward Richard Henry (Figure 111), Inspector General of Police for the Lower Provinces, Bengal, collaborated with Galton on a method of classification for fingerprints. With the help of Indian police officers Khan Bahadur Azizul Haque and Rai Bahaden Hem Chandra Bose, the Henry classification system was developed. Once the classification system was developed and proved to be effective, Henry wrote to the government of India asking for a comparative review of anthropometry and fingerprints. Charles Strahan, Surveyor General of India, and Alexander Pedler, a chemist, were sent to Bengal to meet with Henry to investigate the two methods of identification. Toward the end of March 1897, they sent a report to the government of India that stated, \"In conclusion, we are of opinion that the method of identification by means of finger prints, as worked on the system of recording impressions and of classification used in Bengal, may be safely adopted as being superior to the anthropometrics method(1) in simplicity of working; (2) in the cost of apparatus; (3) in the fact that all skilled work is transferred to a central or classification office; (4) in the rapidity with which the process can be worked; and (5) in the certainty of the results.\" (Henry, 1934, p 79) Thus in 1897, the government of India sanctioned the sole use of fingerprints as a means of identification for prisoners. (For more on Henry, see Chapter 5.) Just as the use of friction ridge skin for individualization was becoming more prevalent, research to better understand its evolution and purpose was also proceeding.\nDavid Hepburn of the University of Edinburgh, Scotland, is credited with being the first to recognize that friction ridges assist with grasping by increasing the level of friction between the ridges and the grasped object. Hepburn's paper, \"The Papillary Ridges on the Hands and Feet of Monkeys and Men\", published in 1895 (Hepburn, 1895, pp 525537), dealt with the evolution of the volar pads and named two of the volar pads found in the palm: the hypothenar and thenar. As research into the form and function of friction ridge skin increased, so did the study on how to use fingerprints effectively as a means of individualization. Harris Hawthorne Wilder, Professor of Zoology at Smith College, was studying primates when he was struck by the resemblance of their volar friction ridges to those of humans. Wilder published his first paper in 1897, entitled \"On the Disposition of the Epidermic Folds Upon the Palms and Soles of Primates\". During the next three decades, Wilder continued research in morphology (the biological study of the form and structure of living organisms), the methodology of plantar and palmar dermatoglyphics (the study of friction ridges) (Cummins and Midlo, 1943, p 22), genetics, and racial differences. Wilder was the first to suggest that the centers of disturbance of primate friction ridge formations actually represented the locations of the volar pads. He also developed the hypothesis of a relationship between primate friction ridge patterns and volar pads.\n\nA criminal case in Bengal in 1898 is considered to be the first case in which fingerprint evidence was used to secure a conviction (Sodhi and Kaur, 2003b, pp 13):\nThe manager of a tea garden situated in the district of Julpaiguri on the Bhutan frontier was found lying on his bed with his throat cut, his despatch box and safe having been rifled and several hundred rupees carried away. It was suggested that one of the coolies employed on the garden had committed the deed, as the deceased had the reputation of being a hard taskmaster, or that his cook, upon whose clothes were some blood spots, might be the culprit. There was suspicion also against the relatives of a woman with whom the murdered man had a liaison, also against a wandering gang of Kabulis of criminal propensities who had lately encamped in the neighbourhood. A representation was also made that the deceased had an enemy in an ex-servant whom he had caused to be imprisoned for theft. Inquiry, however, satisfied the police that there was no evidence to incriminate the coolies or the relatives of the woman or the Kabulis, and it was ascertained that the ex-servant had been released from jail some weeks before, and no one could say that he had since been seen in the district. The cook's statement that the marks on his clothes were stains from a pigeon's blood which he killed for his master's dinner was supported by the Chemical Analyst's report. Fortunately amongst the papers in the despatch box was found a calendar in book form, printed in the Bengali character, with an outside cover of light-blue paper on which were noticed two faint brown smudges. Under a magnifying glass one smudge was decipherable as a portion of the impression of one of the digits of some person's right hand. In the Central Office of the Bengal Police, the finger impressions of all persons convicted of certain offences are classified and registered, and the impression on the calendar when compared there was found to correspond exactly with the right thumb impression of Kangali Charan, the ex-servant above referred to. He, in consequence, was arrested in Birbhum, a district some hundreds of miles away, and brought to Calcutta, where his right thumb impression was again taken, and the police in the meantime set about collecting corroborative evidence. The Chemical Examiner to Government certified that the brown marks on the calendar were mammalian blood, the inference being that the actual murderer or some associate had knocked his bloodstained thumb against the calendar when rummaging amongst the papers in the despatch box for the key of the safe. The accused was committed to stand his trial before a judge and assessors, charged with murder and theft, and finally was convicted of having stolen the missing property of the deceased, the assessors holding that it would be unsafe to convict him of murder as no one had seen the deed committed, but recording their opinion that the charge of theft had been conclusively established against him. This conviction was upheld by the judges of the Supreme Court, to which the case was taken on appeal (Henry, 1934, pp 5760).\n\nIn December 1900, the Belper Committee in England, chaired by Lord Belper, recommended that all criminal identification records be classified by the fingerprint system (Lambourne, 1984, p 64). With this recommendation, the Henry Classification System and the individualization of criminals by means of fingerprints became standard practice in England and would eventually be adopted in most English-speaking countries. During this transition, other events taking place would also demonstrate the advantage of recording friction ridge skin.\n\n## 1.6 20Th Century\n\nThe first trial in England that relied on fingerprint evidence involved Inspector Charles Stockley Collins of Scotland Yard. Collins testified to an individualization made in a burglary case. That 1902 trial and subsequent conviction marked the beginning of fingerprint evidence in the courts of England (Lambourne, 1984, pp 6768). In October 1902, Alphonse Bertillon, made an individualization in Paris, France, with fingerprints:\nOn October 17, 1902, he [Bertillon] was called to aid the investigation of the murder of Joseph Reibel. A glass panel from a nearby cabinet had been broken, and some bloody fingerprints were discovered on one of the broken pieces. These were dutifully photographed and preserved. After determining that they did not match the victim's prints, Bertillon began a search of his anthropometric cards, upon which, by that late date, he had added fingerprint impressions as a routine matter in addition to his measurements. Eventually he found a card which contained fingerprint impressions that showed areas that matched the prints taken from the crime scene. The report of the case describes the isolation of three points of resemblance in the thumb-print, four in the index and middle finger, and six in the print from the ring finger. The murderer, Henri Leon Scheffer, was apprehended and brought to justice. (Kingston and Kirk, 1965, p 62)\n\n## As A Result Of The Above Case, Bertillon Is Given Credit For Solving The First Murder In Europe With The Use Of Only Fingerprint Evidence.\n\nThe first systematic use of fingerprints in the United States was in 1902 by Dr. Henry P. de Forest of the New York Civil Service Commission. De Forest established the practice of fingerprinting civil service applicants in order to prevent imposters from taking tests for otherwise unqualified people. Applicants were fingerprinted when they submitted their applications, when they turned in each test, and when they officially reported to duty (de Forest, 1938, pp 1620). In 1903, after several months of fingerprinting criminals upon their release, Captain James H. Parke of New York state developed the American Classification System. The use of the American Classification System and subsequent fingerprinting of all criminals in the state of New York was the first systematic use of fingerprinting for criminal record purposes in the United States (McGinnis, 1963, pp 45). Although the American Classification System did not gain widespread acceptance throughout the United States, it did not take long before the science of fingerprints spread nationwide. Within fingerprint history, there is a famous story about an incident that signaled the downfall of the use of anthropometric measurements in favor of fingerprinting. A man was arrested in 1903 and brought to the Leavenworth prison in Kansas. The man claimed that his name was Will West and that he had never been previously arrested. Prison personnel took the man's Bertillon measurements and his photograph to facilitate a prison records check. The records showed that a man named William West, with very similar anthropometric measurements and a striking resemblance to the new inmate, was already incarcerated in Leavenworth prison. Guards sent to check William West's cell may have suspected they were dealing with an escapee; instead, they found William West asleep in his bed. After comparing records of both men, prison personnel seemed unable to tell the men apart. Upon taking and comparing the fingerprints of both prisoners, it was clear that the fingerprint method of identification could distinguish between the two men. (Cole, 2001, pp 140146; Chapel, 1941, pp 1113). The William and Will West story is somewhat sensationalized and omits prison record information, uncovered by later researchers, indicating that William and Will West both corresponded with the same family members and thus were probably related. Prison records also cite that Leavenworth inmate George Bean reported that he knew William and Will West in their home territory before prison, and that they were twin brothers (Nickell, 1980, pp 39). Their exact relationship is still unknown. What is factual is that the two West men were not unusual; many people have similar anthropometric measurements. It is generally accepted that identical twins will have the same or almost the same anthropometric measurements, yet easily differentiated fingerprints. The superiority of fingerprints over anthropometry is thus clear. At the 1904 World's Fair in Saint Louis, there were three booths demonstrating identification methods. One booth displayed the anthropometric method and was run by Emerson E. Davis from New York. Captain James J. Parke, from New York, and Inspector John Kenneth Ferrier, of New Scotland Yard, each set up a booth displaying the fingerprint method of identification. Inspector Ferrier discussed the fingerprint method with many individuals at the fair, several of whom were in charge of their own police departments throughout the United States. He also showed visitors an instance where the anthropometric measurements of two men varied by only a millimeter and how the fingerprints were different (Myers, 1938, p 19). After the fair, Ferrier remained in the United States to teach fingerprinting, including how to use powder to develop latent prints (Myers, 1938, pp 1921). Ferrier's students went on to teach fingerprinting to law enforcement and military communities throughout the rest of America. On October 19, 1904, Inspector Ferrier and Major M. W. McClaughry began fingerprinting all inmates at the Leavenworth, KS, federal prison. These fingerprint records became the beginning of the U.S. Government's fingerprint collection (Myers 1938, pp 1920). In 1904, Inez Whipple published the paper, \"The Ventral Surface of the Mammalian Chiridium\". Whipple's survey into mammalian palm and sole configurations formed an important part of the modern scientific knowledge on the subject and is considered a landmark in the fields of genetics and ridgeology (Ashbaugh, 1999, p 43). Her treatise was on the evolution of friction ridge skin and its development as mankind evolved. Whipple theorized that mammals lost hair from scales on volar surfaces; volar scales fused into rows; and ridges evolved according to the need for friction to facilitate locomotion and grasping. She gave locations of the volar pads and explained possible forces that affect ridge growth. (Whipple, 1904, pp 261368). Whipple, who became Inez Wilder after marriage, was undoubtedly influenced by her coworker and husband, Harris Hawthorne Wilder (see p 16). In 1905, Inspector Charles S. Collins of Scotland Yard testified to the individualization of a suspect's fingerprint on a cash box. The case involved the murder of a man and his wife. Two brothers, Alfred and Albert Stratton, were the defendants. Collins explained to the jury the classification of fingerprints and how to effect an individualization. Then, he demonstrated the characteristics he had marked on a chart as matching Alfred Stratton's right thumb. Collins claimed that in all his years of experience, he had never found two prints to have more than three characteristics in common. In this case, there were 11 characteristics in common. Supplementing eyewitness statements, the individualization of Alfred Stratton's right thumb impression was the strongest piece of evidence in the case. Both brothers were found guilty of the murders and sentenced to death. This case is referred to as the Deptford Murder Trial, in reference to the address of the crime, and it was the first murder trial in England in which fingerprints were used as evidence.\n\nAlso in 1905, in the case of Emperor v *Abdul Hamid,* a court in India decided that no expert was required to testify to the individualization of prints, and an appellate court agreed. They believed that participants in the court could just as easily make a comparison as anyone else and that an expert was not necessary (Cole, 2001, p 170). Other courts would later disagree with the position that no expertise is required to individualize fingerprints.\n\nMurder suspect Thomas Jennings was convicted in 1910 after testimony by four experts who individualized Jennings' fingerprints from a porch railing at the crime scene. The experts were Michael P. Evans, head of the Bureau of Identification of the Chicago Police Department; William M. Evans, previously of the Bureau of Identification of the Chicago Police Department; Edward Foster, an inspector with Dominion Police in Ottawa, Canada; and Mary Holland, a trainer of Navy* personnel and the first American female instructor of fingerprinting. All four witnesses testified that the fingerprints on the railing were made by Jennings. Other evidence also incriminated the defendant, such as Jennings's proximity to the murder scene 13 minutes after the murder while carrying a recently fired pistol containing cartridges similar to ones found at the murder scene. The defense appealed the case, claiming the fingerprint evidence was improperly admitted and that it was not necessary to use a fingerprint examiner as an expert witness. The opinion delivered by the Illinois appellate court confirming the conviction including the following:\nWe are disposed to hold from the evidence of the four witnesses who testified and from the writings we have referred to on this subject, that there is a scientific basis for the system of finger-print identification and that the courts are justified in admitting this class of evidence; that this method of identification is in such general and common use that the courts cannot refuse to take judicial cognizance of it.\n\nFrom the evidence in this record we are disposed to hold that the classification of finger-print impressions and their method of identification is a science requiring study. While some of the reasons which guide an expert to his conclusions are such as may be weighed by any intelligent person with good eyesight from such exhibits as we have here in the record, after being pointed out to him by one versed in the study of finger prints, the evidence in question does not come within the common experience of all men of common education in the ordinary walks of life, and therefore the court and jury were properly aided by witnesses of peculiar and special experience on this subject. [People v *Jennings* 1911, pp 910]\nAfter being upheld on appeal, People v *Jennings* became a landmark legal case because it was the first American appellate case regarding the admissibility of fingerprint expert testimony. The appellate court concluded that fingerprint identification is a science and that expert testimony was appropriate to aid members of the court in understanding fingerprint evidence. In 1911, Lieutenant Joseph Faurot, a New York Police Department fingerprint expert presented testimony in a burglary case. He individualized defendant Charles Crispi's fingerprint on a pane of glass removed from a door at the crime scene point of entry. In a dramatic courtroom demonstration, Faurot took the inked prints of the 12 jurors and other court personnel and then left the room.\n\n## A Timeline Of Fingerprint Firsts\n\nFaurot's assistant had a jury member place a print on a pane of glass to simulate the conditions of the burglary. Faurot returned to the courtroom, developed the print left on the glass, and identified the developed print to the proper juror. Next, Faurot gave each juror a set of charts showing marked characteristics in common between the known prints of Crispi and the print left on the piece of glass at the burglary scene. Each juror was then able to compare the prints along with Faurot. The demonstrations were so impressive that the defendant changed his plea to guilty. People v *Crispi* (1911) is considered to be the first conviction obtained with fingerprint evidence alone in the United States (despite the defendant's courtroom plea change) (Cole, 2001, pp 181185; Wilder and Wentworth, 1918, pp 283284). In 1914, Dr. Edmond Locard published \"The Legal Evidence by the Fingerprints\". Locard was Director of the Laboratory of Police at Lyons, France, and was a student of Alphonse Bertillon. Locard's 1914 article, and others published soon afterwards, explained the theory of poroscopy and how the use of pores could supplement a fingerprint comparison by lending supporting data. Dr. Locard's study into the sweat pores of friction ridge skin is one more example of law enforcement personnel conducting research into fingerprint science (Locard, 1914, p 321).\n\nIn 1918, Harris Hawthorne Wilder and Bert Wentworth (Police Commissioner of Dover, NH) collaborated to publish Personal Identification: Methods for the Identification of Individuals, Living or Dead, exemplifying how, through joint effort, the fields of science and law enforcement could function together. In their book, Wilder and Wentworth state, \"The patterns of the friction skin are individual, and, taken together, impossible to duplicate in another individual. The separate ridges, too, show numerous details, which are also so individual that a small area of friction skin, taken even in the most featureless portion, cannot be matched by any other piece\"\n(Wilder and Wentworth, 1918, p 134). This was the first scientific research supporting third level detail as permanent and unique.\n\nBecause of the use of friction ridge skin as a means of identification, prisons throughout the United States acquired large fingerprint collections. The collections from Leavenworth and the files of the National Police Bureau of Criminal Identification were combined (810,188 records) on July 1, 1924, establishing the Identification Division in the U.S. Justice Department's Bureau of Investigation. The Identification Division was placed under the charge of a young assistant director of the Bureau named John Edgar Hoover (Cole, 2001, pp 238, 245; Myers, 1938, p 8). Eventually the Bureau of Investigation would become the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), led by J. Edgar Hoover for many years. In April 1939, the Supreme Court of Washington State upheld the decision of the Superior Court of King County on the conviction of a habitual offender. This was a major step, because the case decision (State v *Johnson,* 1938)\nmade it possible to convict a habitual offender using certified copies of fingerprints as proof of identity as opposed to requiring officials from other locations to testify to prior convictions to establish the individual as a habitual offender (Myers, 1942, p 16). Fingerprint individualization has also been used in noncriminal matters, such as the identification of disaster victims.\n\nThe first United States disaster in which fingerprint individualization played a major role was when the USS Squalus **sank on May 23, 1939.** The submarine sank stern-first to the bottom of the ocean in 240 feet of water. James Herbert Taylor, Superintendent of the Identification Division, United States Navy, conducted the identification operation. All the bodies were identified through the use of fingerprints (Myers, 1942, p 18). In 1940, a court in Hamilton, TX, declared the fingerprint method of identification to be valid. Newton Grice was convicted of burglary based on his fingerprint on a pane of glass removed from a door. Grice appealed the conviction on the grounds that the fingerprint evidence was insufficient to prove that he had been at the location and handled the item in question. The appellate judge, Thomas Beauchamp, proclaimed that since thousands of prints had been taken, classified, and filed in the United States, with none being the same as any other, there was more than enough proof that fingerprints are unique. The judge ruled that defense attorneys need to take the time to actually find prints that are in common in two different individuals rather than simply make the argument that it is possible.\n\nJudge Beauchamp upheld the conviction and stated that he felt that fingerprints are unique, and he placed the burden of proof on the defense to prove that fingerprints are not unique (Myers, 1942, pp 2223).\n\nAlso in 1940, the FBI participated in disaster identification for the first time, when a Pan Am Central Airliner crashed in Lovettsville, VA, with an FBI agent and an FBI stenographer on board. The members of the FBI Identification Division's Single Fingerprint Section were dispatched to identify the bodies of the FBI employees. FBI fingerprint specialists helped identify the bodies of all 25 victims from the crash. This was the beginning of the FBI Disaster Squad, which still responds to disasters today. Several years later, Dr. Harold Cummins (18931976) of Tulane University in New Orleans, LA, conducted a great deal of research on friction ridge skin. By examining fetuses in various stages of growth and health, Cummins made many contributions to the modern understanding of friction ridge skin. Cummins's book Fingerprints, Palms, and SolesAn Introduction to Dermatoglyphics (published in 1943 with his coauthor Charles Midlo) describes the formation and development of volar pads on the human fetus. Cummins notes that volar pad regression takes place almost concurrently with the beginning of friction ridge development; that the size, location, growth, and configuration of the volar pad affects the friction ridge patterns; and that disease or birth defects have an effect on the growth of volar pads (Cummins and Midlo, 1943, pp 178186). In 1952, Dr. Alfred R. Hale, also of Tulane University, published a thesis titled \"Morphogenesis of the Volar Skin in the Human Fetus\". By studying cross sections of fetal skin, Hale was able to describe the formation of friction ridges during fetal development and the differential growth of friction ridges, which is the major premise of friction ridge identification (Ashbaugh, 1999, p 53). Salil Kumar Chatterjee (19051988) of Calcutta, India, published the book *Finger, Palm, and Sole Prints* in 1953, but Chatterjee is best known for his 1962 article \"Edgeoscopy\" (Chatterjee, 1962, pp 313), in which he described his theory of using specific ridge-edge shapes to supplement fingerprint individualization. He defined ridge shapes including straight, convex, peak, table, pocket, concave, and angle. Chatterjee believed that these edge shapes could be used to assist in making individualizations (Ashbaugh, 1999, p 160). (For more on Chatterjee, see Chapter 5.)\nIn 1976, Dr. Michio Okajima of Japan published the paper \"Dermal and Epidermal Structures of the Volar Skin\". The main contribution from his work is the study of incipient ridges, which appear as smaller ridges in friction ridge impressions (Ashbaugh, 1999, p 58). In 1984, Brigitte Lacroix, Marie-Josephe Wolff-Quenot, and Katy Haffen of Strasbourg, France, published \"Early Human Hand Morphology: An Estimation of Fetal Age\". The paper discussed the three phases of the development of the hand (Ashbaugh, 1999, pp 5859). Dr. William Babler of Marquette University in Milwaukee, WI, published \"Embryological Development of Epidermal Ridges and Their Configurations\" in 1991. That paper reviewed prior work by other scientists and the research Babler performed relative to the \"prenatal relationship between epidermal ridge dimension and bone dimension of the hand\" (Babler, 1991, p 106).\n\n## 1.7 Conclusion\n\nStudy, research, and experimentation have led to and supported fingerprints as a means of individualization and a forensic tool of incalculable value. The research and practical knowledge accumulated over the course of many centuries well supports the science.\n\nAs time moves forward and people continue to study any science, that science grows and becomes better understood. No one has said it better than Johann Wolfgang von Goethe: \"The history of a science is the science itself\" (Kline, 1980, p 7).\n\n## 1.8 Reviewers\n\nThe reviewers critiquing this chapter were Debbie Benningfield, Mike Campbell, Christine L. Craig, Laura A. Hutchins, Ginger A. Kobliska, William F. Leo, Bridget Lewis, Charles Richardson, Michelle L. Snyder, and Juliet H. Wood.\n\n## 1.9 References\n\nAshbaugh, D. R. Quantitative-Qualitative Friction Ridge Analysis:  An Introduction to Basic and Advanced Ridgeology; CRC Press: Boca Raton, FL, 1999.\nBabler, W. J. Embryologic Development of Epidermal Ridges and Their Configurations. In Dermatoglyphics:  Science in Transition; Plato, C., Garruto, R. M., Schaumann, B. A., Eds.; Birth Defects: Original Article Series; March of Dimes: New York, 1991; pp 95112.\n\nBeavan, C. Fingerprints: The Origins of Crime Detection and the Murder Case That Launched Forensic Science;\nHyperion: New York, 2001. Berry, J.; Stoney, D. A. History and Development of Fingerprinting. In *Advances in Fingerprint Technology,* 2nd ed.;\nLee, H. C., Gaensslen, R. E., Eds.; CRC Press: Boca Raton, FL, 2001; pp 140.\n\nCaplan, J., Torpey, J. Eds. Documenting Individual Identity: The Development of State Practices in the Modern World;\nPrinceton University Press: Princeton, NJ, 2001.\n\nChapel, C. E. Fingerprinting: A Manual of Identification;\nCoward McCann: New York, 1941.\n\nChatterjee, S. K. Edgeoscopy. *Finger Print and Ident. Mag.* 1962, 44 (3), 313. Cole, S. A. Suspect Identities:  A History of Fingerprinting and Criminal Identification; Harvard University Press:\nCambridge, MA, 2001.\n\nCummins, H.; Midlo, C. Finger Prints, Palms and Soles: An Introduction to Dermatoglyphics; Dover: New York, 1943.\nde Forest, H. P. The First Finger-Print File in the United States. *Finger Print and Ident. Mag.* 1938, 19, 1620. Faulds, H. On the SkinFurrows of the Hand. *Nature* 1880,\n22, 605. Faulds, H. A Manual of Practical Dactylography. London: The \"Police  Review\" Publishing Co., Ltd., 1922.\n\nFelsher, I. M. A Quick Look at Dermatoglyphics. Ident. News 1962, 12 (7), 612. Finger Print Publishing Association. *Finger Print Magazine*\n1919, 1 (1), cover photo.\n\nGalton, F. *Finger Prints;* MacMillan: New York, 1892.\n\nHale, A. Morphogenesis of Volar Skin in the Human Fetus.\n\nAm. J. Anat. 1952, 91 (1), 147173.\n\nNickell, J. The Two Will WestsA New Verdict. J. Police Sci. and Admin. 1980, 8 (4), 406413.\n\nHenry, E. R. *Classification and Uses of Fingerprints,* 7th ed.; H. M. Stationery Office: London, 1934.\n\nPearson, K. The Life, Letters and Labours of Francis Galton, Volume I: Birth 1822 to Marriage 1853. London: Cambridge University Press, 1914.\n\nPeople v Jennings (State of Illinois v *Jennings*), 252 Ill. 534,\n96 N.E. 1077 (1911).\n\nHepburn, D. The Papillary Ridges on the Hands and Feet of Monkeys and Men. Scientific Transactions of the Royal Dublin Society 1895, 5 (2), 525537. Herschel, W. J. *The Origin of Finger-Printing;* Oxford University Press: London, 1916.\n\nRhodes, H. Alphonse Bertillon: Father of Scientific Detection; Abelard-Schuman: London, 1956.\n\nSodhi, G. S.; Kaur, J. Indian Civilization and the Science of Fingerprinting. *Indian J. of Traditional Knowledge* 2003a, 2\n(2), 126136.\n\nKingston, C. R.; Kirk, P.L. Historical Development and Evaluation of the \"12 Point Rule\" in Fingerprint Identification. *Int. Crim. Police Rev.* 1965, 20 (186), 6269. Kline, M. *Mathematics: The Loss of Certainty*; Oxford University Press: New York, 1980.\n\nSodhi, G. S.; Kaur, J. World's First Conviction on Fingerprint Identification. *National Crime Records Bureau Gazette* 2003b, 15 (2), 13.\n\nLambourne, G. *The Fingerprint Story;* Harrap: London, 1984.\n\nState v Johnson (State of Washington v *Johnson*), 194\nWash. 438, 78 P. 2d 561 (1938).\n\nLaufer, B. *History of the Finger-Print System;* Smithsonian Institution: Washington, DC, 1912.\n\nTwain, M. *Life on the Mississippi;* James R. Osgood & Co.:\nBoston, 1883. (U.S. edition).\n\nTwain, M. *The Tragedy of Pudd'nhead Wilson;* C.L. Webster: New York, 1884.\n\nLocard, E. La Preuve Judiciaire par les Empreintes Digitales\n(The Legal Evidence by the Fingerprints). De Medecine Legale et de Psychologie Normale et Pathologique (Of Forensic Medicine and of Normal and Pathological Psychology) 1914, 29, 321. Locy, W. A. *Biology and its Makers;* Henry Holt and Co.:\nNew York, 1908; p 204.\n\nWhipple, I. L. The Ventral Surface of the Mammalian Chiridium. Zeitschrift fur Morphologie und Anthropologie (Journal of Morphology and Anthropology) 1904, 7, 261368. Wilder, H. H.; Wentworth, B. *Personal Identification*; The Gorham Press: Boston, 1918.\n\nMcClaughry, M. W. History of the Introduction of the Bertillon System Into the United States. *Finger Print Magazine*\n1922, 3 (10), 4.\n\nXiang-Xin, Z.; Chun-Ge, L. The Historical Application of Hand Prints in Chinese Litigation. *J. Forensic Ident.* 1988, 38 (6), 277284.\n\nMcGinnis, P. D. American System of Fingerprint Classification; New York State Department of Correction, Division of Identification: New York, 1963.\n\n## 1.10 Additional Information\n\nMyers, H. J. II. The First Complete and Authentic History of Identification in the United States. Finger Print and Ident. Mag. 1938, 20 (4), 331.\n\nAstrom, P.; Eriksson, S. A. Fingerprints and Archaeology. In Studies in Mediterranean Archaeology; Paul Astroms forlag:\nGoteborg, Sweden, 1980.\n\nMyers, H. J. II. Supplemental History of Identification in\nthe United States. Finger Print and Ident. *Mag.* 1942, 25\n(6), 328.\nCole, S. A. Grandfathering Evidence: Fingerprint Admissibility Rulings from Jennings to Llera Plaza and Back Again.\nAm. Crim. L. Rev. 2004, 41 (3), 11891276.\nKevles, D. J. In the Name of Eugenics, Genetics and the Uses of Human Heredity; Knopf: New York, 1985.\n\nNew Scotland Yard. Fingerprint History: A Synopsis of the Development of the System of Fingerprint Identification with Particular Reference to New Scotland Yard; Metropolitan Police, New Scotland Yard: London, 1990.\n\n## C H A P T E R Anatomy And Physiology Of Adult Friction Ridge Skin Alice V. Maceo C O N T E N T S\n\n3\n2.1  Introduction\n24\n2.5  Conclusion\n25\n2.6  Reviewers\n3\n2.2  Anatomy\n14\n2.3  Physiology\n25\n2.7  References\n16\n2.4  Persistence of the Friction\n\nRidge Skin\n\n## Chapter 2 Anatomy And Physiology Of Adult Friction Ridge Skin Alice V. Maceo 2.1 Introduction\n\nThe anatomy and physiology of the friction ridge skin form the basis for several critical elements that underlie the examination process. The anatomy and physiology explain how the features of the skin persist, how the features of the skin age, how the skin responds to injury, and why scars that form are unique. Another element explained by the structure of the skin is the mechanics of touch. Understanding how the friction ridge skin reacts when it contacts a surface can provide valuable assistance during the examination of friction ridge impressions.\n\n## 2.2 Anatomy 2.2.1 Outer Morphology Of Friction Ridge Skin\n\nThe outer morphology of the friction ridge skin is a direct reflection of its function. The ridges and sweat pores allow the hands and feet to grasp surfaces firmly, and the creases allow the skin to flex. Ridges, creases, and mature scars of the friction ridge skin are durable morphological features. Warts, wrinkles, blisters, cuts, and calluses may also appear on the friction ridge skin and are frequently transient morphological features. The anatomy and physiology of a feature determine whether the feature is durable or transient in nature. Figure 21 is an image of a left palm displaying the normal morphology of friction ridge skin.\n\n## 2.2.2 General Anatomy Of Skin\n\nThe skin is an organ composed of three anatomical layers: epidermis, dermis, and hypodermis. These anatomical layers together function to provide the body with a protective barrier, body temperature regulation, sensation, excretion, immunity, a blood reservoir, and synthesis of vitamin D (Tortora and Grabowski, 1993, p 127). The outer layer of skin is the epidermis. The epidermis prevents water loss through evaporation, acts as a receptor organ, and provides a protective barrier for the underlying tissues. Melanocytes, the pigment-producing cells of the epidermis, play a key role in the protective barrier. The pigmentation produced by the melanocytes shields the DNA of the keratinocytes (primary cell type of the epidermis) from the sun's harmful rays. Additionally, the melanocytes are responsible for the synthesis of vitamin D (Freinkel and Woodley, 2001, p 120). The dermis is a layer of connective tissue that supports the epidermis. It is a network of cells, fibers, blood vessels, and gelatinous material that provides structural support and nourishment for the epidermis. The dermis serves as a blood reserve and participates in sensory reception and temperature regulation. The hypodermis lies under the dermis and is a loose connective tissue that contains a pad of adipose cells (fat) that contour the body and serve as an energy reserve. Fibers link the epidermis to the dermis and the dermis to the hypodermis. The only skin appendage of the friction ridge skin is the eccrine sweat gland. Although sweat glands are distributed over almost the entire skin surface, the friction ridge skin has the highest concentration of eccrine glands, 2500 3000/2.5 cm2 (Freinkel and Woodley, 2001, p 49). The sweat glands of the friction ridge skin are also the largest on the body. Eccrine sweat glands participate in temperature regulation by secreting sweat and assist in the excretion of metabolic waste (e.g., urea) (Junqueira and Carneiro, 2003, p 369).\n\n## 2.2.3 Structure Of Friction Ridge Skin\n\nThe ridges and furrows on the surface of the friction ridge skin are firmly rooted in the dermis by primary ridges (under-the-surface ridges) and secondary ridges (under the valleys). Figure 22 illustrates the structure of friction ridge skin. The primary and secondary ridges are interlocked with the dermis to provide support and strength to the friction ridge skin. Additionally, sweat glands extend from the primary ridges and are anchored in the dermis or hypodermis.\n\n## 2.2.4 Epidermis\n\nThe epidermis is described as a \"stratified, continually renewing epithelium that exhibits progressive differentiation (keratinization, cornification) in a basal to superficial direction\" (Freinkel and Woodley, 2001, p 19). In other words, the epidermis is a layered tissue that must constantly replace the cells leaving the surface. New cells are generated in the basal layer and pushed toward the surface. As the cells move toward the surface, they undergo sequential changes in chemical composition. The epidermis is composed of several different types of cells: keratinocytes, melanocytes, Langerhans cells, and Merkel cells. The keratinocytes are the cells that undergo differentiation and are lost at the surface. The epidermis is the protective barrier; it is imperative that the skin balance the number of new keratinocytes created with the number of keratinocytes leaving the surface. This balance is achieved by communication and adhesion.\n\n## 2.2.5 Keratinocytes\n\nThe primary cell of the epidermis is the keratinocyte. Keratinocytes account for 9095% of the epidermal cells (Freinkel and Woodley, 2001, p 19). Even though keratinocytes change in chemical composition as they reach the surface, all keratinocytes are distinguishable by the presence of keratin intermediate filaments. Keratin is a durable protein organized into bundles (filaments) that extend throughout the cell and provide structural support. Keratin reinforces the skin cells so that they do not break when subjected to physical stress. There are about 20 varieties of keratin distributed throughout the epidermis, designated K1 through K20 (Freinkel and Woodley, 2001, p 20). The keratinocytes of the friction ridge skin express keratins not expressed elsewhere on the body, specifically K9, K6, and K16 (Swennson et al., 1998, p 770).\n\nKeratinocytes of the friction ridge skin also express a more complex pattern of keratin distribution than the rest of the skin. K9 is found only in the keratinocytes above the basal layer of the primary ridges (Swennson et al., 1998, p 770). The basal keratinocytes in the deepest part of the primary ridges express K17 (Swennson et al., 1998, p 771). The basal keratinocytes along the vertical segments of the primary ridges express K6 (Swennson et al., 1998, p 770). K16 is found only in the keratinocytes of the secondary ridges and in the keratinocytes above the dermal papillae (Swennson et al., 1998, p 771). Figure 23 illustrates the keratin distribution in the friction ridge skin.\n\nThe differences in the keratin produced and distributed across the friction ridge skin are attributed to the greater amount of mechanical stress on the friction ridge skin (Swennson et al., 1998, p 767). The keratin produced in the cells of the primary ridges (K9) is more durable than the keratin produced in the secondary ridges (K16). From a mechanical standpoint, the surface ridges withstand most of the compression when the friction ridge skin touches a surface, thereby necessitating enhanced durability. The more pliable keratin produced in the secondary ridges allows the furrows to act as a hinge between the stiffer surface ridges (Swennson et al., 1998, p 772).\n\n## 2.2.6 Layers Of The Epidermis\n\nFigure 24 is a color-coded illustration of the five layers of keratinocytes in the friction ridge skin epidermis: stratum basale, stratum spinosum, stratum granulosum, stratum lucidum, and stratum corneum. There is an informal layer, the suprabasal layer, between the stratum basale and the stratum spinosum in the primary ridges. Nearly all the cells illustrated in Figure 24 are keratinocytes. The only exceptions are the occasional brown, grey, and green cells that represent the melanocytes, Langerhans cells, and Merkel cells, respectively. The layers of the epidermis are named on the basis of microscopic appearance of the keratinocytes in slide preparations. The keratinocytes change in appearance and composition as they are pushed toward the surface and undergo differentiation. During the stages of differentiation, the cells become keratinized (filled with keratin).\n\n2.2.6.1 Stratum Basale. The stratum basale is the innermost layer of the epidermis and consists of a single layer of keratinocytes with occasional melanocytes and Merkel cells.\n\nThe keratinocytes in the basal layer continually divide and are the wellspring of all the keratinocytes in the upper layers. Figure 25 is an image of two adjacent basal keratinocytes. Each keratinocyte contains a large nucleus. The nucleus consists of a lighter-stained chromatin and a darker-stained nucleolus. Chromatin is the active DNA specific for that particular cell type (keratinocyte in this instance). The nucleolus is compacted DNA responsible for synthesizing ribosomes. Ribosomes are structures in the cell that help build proteins. The basal cells are connected to the basement membrane zone by hemidesmosomes. The hemidesmosomes link the basal cells to the dermis via the basal lamina. The basal lamina is broken down into two regions: lamina lucida and lamina densa. Desmosomes and focal tight junctions attach the basal keratinocytes to each other.\n\nThere are small spaces between the cells. These intercellular spaces allow nutrients and signals that have passed from the dermis via the basement membrane zone to diffuse throughout the keratinocytes of the basal layer.\n\nBasal Cell Mitosis. When a basal keratinocyte divides, it undergoes mitosis. Mitosis is the mechanism by which a cell replicates its DNA, the two copies of the DNA migrate to different sides of the cell, and the cell physically separates into two. Each cell contains a complete copy of the DNA. When a basal keratinocyte divides in the epidermis, the original cell remains in the basal layer (cell A in Figure 26) and the newly generated cell sits on top of it (cell B in Figure 26). When the basal keratinocytes divide again, the first generated cell (B) is displaced into the stratum spinosum by the newly generated cell (cell C in Figure\n26). The cycle continues, each new cell pushing the older cells toward the surface of the epidermis.\n\nBasement Membrane Zone. The keratinocytes of the stratum basale are associated with the dermis via the basement membrane zone. The basement membrane zone contains elements of both the epidermis and dermis. In addition to providing structural support to the skin, the basement membrane zone is the filter through which nutrients pass from the dermal blood vessels to the basal keratinocytes (Freinkel and Woodley, 2001, p 133). The basement membrane zone includes the portion of the plasma membrane of the basal keratinocytes that sits on the dermalepidermal junction. As shown in Figure 27, the basal keratinocytes have specialized attachment plaques, termed hemidesmosomes, that project anchoring filaments down toward the dermis (Freinkel and Woodley, 2001, p 134). The area just below the basal cells containing these anchoring filaments is called the lamina lucida.\n\nTwo adjacent basal cells (BC), each containing\na large nucleus (N). The basal lamina (lamina\nlucida and lamina densa) lies just below the\nplasma membrane of the basal keratinocytes.\nHemidesmosomes (H) occur regularly along\nthe plasma membrane. Intercellular spaces (IC)\nare spaces between cells where the cells are\nnot attached by desmosomes (D). Magnification\n= 2680 X. (Reprinted with permission from\nMontagna and Parakkal (1974), p 28.)\n\nSequence of mitosis of basal keratinocytes: (1)\ncell A replicates its DNA; (2) the DNA is pulled\nto opposing ends of the cell; (3) cell A divides;\n(4) cell B is created; (5) cell A replicates its DNA\nagain; (6) the DNA is pulled to opposing ends of\ncell A; (7) cell A divides to create cell C; (8) cell\nC pushes previously generated cell B upward,\nwhere it begins to differentiate and becomes\npart of the stratum spinosum.\n\nThe dermis contributes the lamina densa and sublamina\ndensa fibrillar zone to the basement membrane zone. The\nlamina densa contains protein (e.g., collagen fibers). The\nfilaments of the hemidesmosomes in the lamina lucida are\ninterwoven with the fibers of the lamina densa (Freinkel\nand Woodley, 2001, p 136). The sublamina densa fibrillar\nzone is the uppermost portion of the dermis and contains\nelastic fibers, additional collagen fibers, and anchoring\nplaques (Freinkel and Woodley, 2001, p 145). The fibers and\nanchoring plaques of the sublamina densa fibrillar zone are\ninterwoven with the fibers of the lamina densa.\n\nThe hemidesmosomes of the basal keratinocytes and the in-\nterlocking fibers throughout the basement membrane zone\nprevent the basal cells from migrating. The basal keratino-\ncytes are locked down to their position in the epidermis.\n\nAnchoring Cell Junctions: Desmosomes and Focal\nTight Junctions. The keratinocytes of the basal layer,\nand throughout the layers of the epidermis, are tightly\n\nbound to one another via desmosomes (Junqueira and Carneiro, 2003, p 370) and focal tight junctions (Tortora and Grabowski, 1993, p 97).\n\n Desmosomes are round plaques that bind together the plasma membranes of adjacent cells. Figure 28 shows (a) a scanning electron microscope (SEM) image and (b) a schematic of a desmosome. Keratin fibers extend from the desmosome plaque to the interior of each cell, creating an interior scaffold that supports the cell (Wan et al., 2003, p 378).\n\nDesmosomes exist between cells throughout the entire epidermis (friction ridge skin and nonfriction ridge skin). There is, however, variation. Desmosomes vary in size, depending on the body location of the skin. The desmosomes between the keratinocytes of the friction ridge skin are larger than those of nonfriction ridge skin (Wan et al., 2003, p 384). Along with larger desmosomes, the keratinocytes of the friction ridge skin also have a greater density of keratin (Wan et al., 2003, p 379). The increase in the size of the desmosomes and density of keratin indicates that desmosomes are site specific, depending on the amount of physical stress the particular area of skin must endure (Wan et al., 2003, p 386).\n\nDesmosomes also show variation within the layers of the epidermis. Desmosomes undergo modifications as the cells progress outward from the basal layer of the epidermis. In the friction ridge skin, the desmosomes increase in size as the cells enter the stratum spinosum (Wan et al., 2003, p 385). Desmosomes are continually reinforced as the cells are pushed toward the surface. Upon reaching the outer portion of the stratum corneum, the desmosomes are broken down to release the cells from the surface (Freinkel and Woodley, 2001, p 25). Focal tight junctions (Figure 29) are small \"spot welds\" of the cells' surfaces (Flaxman and Nelson, 1974, p 329). The cell membranes of adjacent cells are fused together, eliminating intercellular space. Focal tight junctions provide additional anchoring between cells and provide a lowresistance electrical pathway for communication between cells (Cavoto and Flaxman, 1972, p 373).\n\nBasal Cell Heterogeneity. The basal keratinocytes of the primary ridges are structurally different from the basal cells of the secondary ridges. The basal keratinocytes of the primary ridges contain less keratin than the basal cells of the secondary ridges. The junction of the basal cells of the primary ridges with the basement membrane is slightly undulated (Figure 210), whereas basal cells of the secondary ridges contain long projections that extend deep into the dermis (Figure 211) (Lavker and Sun, 1982, p 1240).\n\nThe differences in the structure of the basal cells in the primary and secondary ridges explain their differences in function. The basal cells of secondary ridges, with long projections into the dermis, serve an anchoring function (Lavker and Sun, 1982, p 1239). The basal cells of the primary ridges have a morphology similar to stem cells and can be induced to multiply by tissue demand or injury (Lavker and Sun, 1982, p 1239). The basal cells also differ in the rate at which they multiply. The basal cells of the secondary ridges divide more frequently than the primary ridges because the basal cells of the primary ridges give rise to cells that divide in the suprabasal layer.\n\nSuprabasal Layer. The basal keratinocytes of the secondary ridges continuously divideeach basal cell dividing to push one cell at a time into the stratum spinosum. The basal cells of the primary ridges behave a little differently.\n\nThe basal keratinocyte of the primary ridge divides to create a new cell. This new cell does not immediately enter the stratum spinosum and commit to differentiation. The newly generated cell, termed a transient amplifying cell, undergoes a couple of cell divisions while it sits in the suprabasal layer (Lavker and Sun, 1983, p 121). After cell divisions are complete, the transient amplifying cells are pushed upward into the stratum spinosum and begin differentiation. More cells are produced in the primary ridges than in the secondary ridges because of the transient amplifying cells. The cells of the primary ridges maintain the surface ridges, where more cells are needed because of greater abrasion.\n\n2.2.6.2 Stratum Spinosum. As the keratinocytes are pushed toward the surface, they begin to undergo differentiation. The cells become polyhedral in shape and desmosomes (cell junctions) are reinforced. Keratin production is increased, and the keratin filaments are organized concentrically around the nucleus and extend into the desmosomes (Freinkel and Woodley, 2001, p 23). New structures, lamellar granules, appear in the cells as the cells are pushed toward the limit of the stratum spinosum. Lamellar granules are pockets of lipids that first appear in the stratum spinosum but do not become active until the cells reach the stratum granulosum (Freinkel and Woodley, 2001, p 24). Figure 212 is a microscope slide preparation of the keratinocytes of the stratum spinosum and stratum granulosum. The stratum spinosum is so named because of the spiny appearance of the cells in microscope slide preparations. During the process of making the slide, the cells dehydrate, causing them to shrink away from one another. The spines are where the desmosomes are still holding the cells together.\n\n2.2.6.3 Stratum Granulosum. As the cells are pushed toward the surface, they continue structural and chemical modification. Keratinocytes entering the stratum granulosum contain characteristic keratohyalin granules (Figure 2-12). The keratinocytes are programmed to fill with keratin; the keratohyalin granules contain proteins (profilaggrin, keratin, and loricrin) that facilitate the process (Freinkel and Woodley, 2001, p 23). The lamellar granules become active as the cells reach the upper portion of the stratum granulosum. The lamellar granules release their lipid content into the space between the cells. The lipids coat the cells, providing the skin with a hydrophobic barrier (Freinkel and Woodley, 2001, p 24).\n\n2.2.6.4 Stratum Lucidum. The keratinocytes undergo an abrupt transition to the stratum lucidum. The cells are keratinized and have completed their programmed cell death\n(Freinkel and Woodley, 2001, p 24). Although the cells are no longer living, chemical activity continues inside the cells as the final modifications are made to the keratin.\n\n2.2.6.5 Stratum Corneum. With layer upon layer of nonviable, terminally differentiated keratinocytes, the stratum corneum is the significant epidermal layer that allows skin to act as a major barrier. The arrangement of keratinocytes is described as a \"brick-and-mortar model\".  The keratinfilled cells (bricks) are surrounded by the lipids (mortar) secreted while the cells were in the stratum granulosum (Freinkel and Woodley, 2001, p 25). Although they are dead, the cells of the stratum corneum continue to undergo modification as they are pushed from the deeper portion of the stratum corneum to the surface of the skin. The cells in the deeper portion of the stratum corneum are thicker and have more densely packed keratin, a weaker cell membrane, and more cell-to-cell attachments (Freinkel and Woodley, 2001, p 25). As the cells are pushed toward the surface, the cell membrane becomes more rigid and the desmosomes are degraded. These changes allow the cells to shed when they reach the surface (Figure 213).\n\n## 2.2.7 Nonkeratinocytes\n\nCommunication of the keratinocytes with the melanocytes, Langerhans cells, and Merkel cells is necessary for the skin to function properly. Melanocytes produce the pigments that are deposited into the keratinocytes. This pigment, melanin, protects the genetic material of the keratinocytes from ultraviolet damage (Junqueira and Carneiro, 2003, p 374). Melanocytes reside in the basal layer of the epidermis and, in addition to providing the surrounding keratinocytes with melanin, produce vitamin D.\n\nThe Langerhans cells are an extension of the body's immune system. Upon exposure to invading bacteria, Langerhans cells initiate an alert that causes the body to recruit more aggressive immune cells (T cells) to attack the invaders (Freinkel and Woodley, 2001, p 30). The Merkel cells are an extension of the nervous system and participate in the transmission of the sensation of touch: \"shape, size, and texture of objects and two-point discrimination\" (Dillion et al., 2001, p 577). Merkel cells occur sporadically in the basal layer of the epidermis and are associated with free nerve endings from the dermis.\n\n## 2.2.8 Dermis\n\n2.2.8.1 Papillary Dermis. The dermis is the connective tissue that supports the epidermis and binds it to the\nhypodermis. The dermis is composed of two layers: the papillary layer and the reticular layer. The outer papillary layer is a loose connective tissue containing anchoring fibrils and numerous dermal cells. The anchoring fibrils secure the dermis to the epidermis via the basement membrane zone. The papillary layer of the dermis forms the dermal papillae.\n\n2.2.8.2 Dermal Papillae. Dermal papillae are malleable, peglike projections of the papillary dermis between the primary and secondary ridges. The malleable nature of the dermal papillae is important because the epidermaldermal junction remodels with age and in response to sheering stress on the surface of the skin (Misumi and Akiyoshi, 1984, p 53; Chacko and Vaidya, 1968, p 107). During the remodeling, the epidermis forms sheets of tissue that cross-link adjacent primary and secondary ridges. These sheets of tissue are called anastomoses. As the epidermal anastamoses form, the dermal papillae are molded into increasingly more complex structures (Hale, 1952, p 153).\n\nThe detail of Figure 214 illustrates the dermal papillae and anastomoses. The formation of dermal papillae and epidermal anastomoses increases the surface area of attachment between the epidermis and dermis, thereby increasing the bond between the epidermis and dermis.\n\n2.2.8.3 Reticular Dermis. The reticular dermis is a compact connective tissue containing large bundles of collagen and elastic fibers. The organization of these fibers provides the dermis with strength and resilience (Freinkel and Woodley, 2001, p 38). The reticular dermis is connected to the hypodermis by a network of fibers.\n\n2.2.8.4 Circulatory System of the Dermis. There are two plexuses of arterial blood vessels in the dermis. One plexus lies between the papillary and reticular dermis and the other between the reticular dermis and the hypodermis\n(Junqueira and Carneiro, 2003, p 376). Capillaries extend from the arterial plexus and into the dermal papillae to form the dermal papillary loop (Figure 215) (Freinkel and Woodley, 2001, p 38). Blood passes from the arterial capillaries in the dermal papillae to the venous capillaries. Veins are organized into three plexuses: one associated with each arterial plexus and a third plexus in the middle of the reticular dermis (Junqueira and Carneiro, 2003, p 376).\n\n2.2.8.5 Nervous System of the Dermis. A vast network of sensory and autonomic nerve branches innervates the dermis. The autonomic nerve network is responsible for controlling blood flow and glandular secretions (sweat). The sensory system contains receptors for sensations: touch, temperature, pain, and itch (Freinkel and Woodley, 2001, p 153). The dermis participates in sensory perception via free nerve endings, Meissner corpuscles, Ruffini corpuscles, and Pacinian corpuscles. Free nerve endings and Meissner corpuscles are found in the dermal papillae.\n\nFree nerve endings are found in each dermal papilla and provide a rapid response to stimuli (Freinkel and Woodley, 2001, p 157). Meissner corpuscles (Figure 2-16) are found in about every fourth papilla and function as touch receptors (Freinkel and Woodley, 2001, p 160). Pacinian and Ruffini corpuscles are located throughout the dermis and also function in the transmission of pressure (Freinkel and Woodley, 2001, p 158).\n\n## 2.2.9 Sweat Glands\n\nAlthough the skin produces several appendages (e.g., hair, nails, sebaceous glands), the eccrine sweat gland is the only appendage of the friction ridge skin. Eccrine sweat glands are found all over the body surface and function primarily in thermoregulation. The sweat glands do not function individually but rather as groups or simultaneously over the entire surface of the body (Freinkel and Woodley, 2001, p 47). The sweat glands of the palms and soles are larger, more active, and denser than in any other area of skin. Figure 217 is an image of the friction ridge skin sweating. Eccrine sweat glands are classified as simple tubular glands whose ducts open at the skin surface (Junqueira and Carneiro, 2003, p 380). As shown in Figure 218, the coiled secretory portion of the gland is embedded in the dermis or hypodermis, and the duct extends through the epidermis. The fluid secreted by the eccrine sweat glands is predominantly water (99.099.5%) (Freinkel and Woodley, 2001, p 71). The remaining constituents of sweat include sodium chloride, potassium, ammonia, urea, lactate, uric acid, creatinine and creatine, amino acids, sugars, immunoglobulin A, epidermal growth factor, and select hormones, enzymes, and vitamins (Freinkel and Woodley, 2001, p 71).\n\n## 2.2.10 Hypodermis\n\nBeneath the fibrous reticular dermis there is an abrupt transition to the adipose tissue of the hypodermis. Adipose (fat) tissue serves as an energy reserve, cushions the skin, contours the body, and allows for mobility of the skin over underlying structures (Freinkel and Woodley, 2001, p 39). The dermis and hypodermis are physically connected through interlocking fibers and share blood vessel and nerve networks (Freinkel and Woodley, 2001, p 39). The primary cell of the hypodermis is the adipocyte. Adipocytes are organized in lobules by fibrous connective tissue and store the subcutaneous fat.\n\n## 2.3 Physiology\n\nThe epidermis exists in a dynamic, steady state. Cells lost at the surface must be replaced (dynamic) in order for the skin to maintain (steady) its protective barrier (state). The concept of keeping things the same despite constant input and output of materials and energy is referred to as homeostasis. Homeostasis is defined as \"the condition in which the body's internal environment remains relatively constant, within physiological limits\" (Tortora and Grabowski, 1993, p 9). Homeostasis is critical to the functioning of all organisms. Homeostasis of the skin is achieved through physical attachments and the careful regulation of cell production in the stratum basale via cell communication.\n\n## 2.3.1 Physical Attachments\n\nThere are structural features of the overall skin and of the skin cells that maintain the structure of the epidermis (even though skin cells are always sloughing at the surface). There are three levels of attachment in the friction ridge skin: the primary/secondary ridge attachment with anastomoses, the basement membrane zone, and cell-to-cell attachments.\n\n2.3.1.1 Primary and Secondary Ridges. The first level of attachment is the topography at the junction of the epidermis and dermis. The alternating system of primary and secondary ridges on the bottom of the epidermis provides general structural support for the surface ridges and furrows. The sweat glands of the primary ridges are firmly attached in the dermis or hypodermis. Additional reinforcement of this system is provided by dermal papillae and epidermal anastomoses.\n\n2.3.1.2 Basement Membrane Zone. The second level of attachment is the basement membrane. The basement membrane is a fibrous sheet that attaches the basal keratinocytes of the epidermis to the underlying dermis. The basement membrane is generated by the basal keratinocytes of the epidermis and the fibroblasts of the dermis. The basal cells of the epidermis have specialized attachment plaques, termed hemidesmosomes, which project fibers down toward the dermis. The dermis projects anchoring fibers back up toward the epidermis. These fibers originating from the epidermal basal cells and from the dermis are interwoven to create the fibrous sheet that locks the epidermis to the dermis. The hemidesmosomes and interlocking fibers prevent the basal cells from migrating. The basal keratinocytes are locked down to their position in the epidermis.\n\n2.3.1.3 Cell-to-Cell Attachments. The third level of attachment consists of the cell-to-cell attachments of the keratinocytes throughout the layers of the epidermis. Desmosomes and focal tight junctions attach the keratinocytes to one another. Desmosomes are reinforced as the cells move from the basal layer to the surface. Upon reaching the outer portion of the stratum corneum, the desmosomes and focal tight junctions are broken down to release the cells from the surface.\n\n## 2.3.2 Cell Communication\n\nSkin must maintain the protective barrier while existing in a dynamic steady state (i.e., cells leaving the surface must be replaced). The rate at which basal cells divide in the basal layer must coincide with the rate at which cells are leaving at the surface. There must be a mechanism in place to control the rate of cell division of the basal keratinocytes and to monitor the thickness of the skin. This mechanism is cell communication. The keratinocytes are in constant communication with one another and with the melanocytes, Langerhans cells, and Merkel cells. The keratinocytes are also in communication with the rest of the body via the dermis.\n\n2.3.2.1 Gap Junctions. Rapid communication between cells is achieved via gap junctions. Gap junctions are connections between the cell membranes of adjacent cells that permit the direct exchange of small molecules, ions, and hormones. Figure 219 contains a diagram and an electron micrograph of a gap junction between cells. Rapid communication via gap junctions results in the keratinocytes acting in a coordinated manner rather than as independent units (Junqueira and Carneiro, 2003, p 72).\n\n2.3.2.2 Cell Surface Receptors. In addition to the direct cell-to-cell communication through gap junctions, cells also have modified proteins embedded in the outer membrane that can respond to signals sent through the blood or from other cells in the epidermis. When a signal molecule binds to the outer surface of the membrane protein, it causes a cascade of reactions inside the cell to elicit the appropriate response.\n\n## 2.3.3 Regulation Of Keratinocyte Proliferation\n\n2.3.3.1 Cell Cycle. Cell communication is necessary for monitoring and adjusting the rate at which the basal cells divide. The cell cycle describes the stages of DNA replication and cell division. The five phases of the cell cycle are represented as G0, G1, S, G2, and M. G1 is the time gap that occurs after the cell has divided and before the cell begins replication of its DNA for the next division. G1 is the resting period between mitoses. The duration of G1 is the most variable phase of the cell cycle, and modifications to its duration greatly influence the number of basal cells produced (Freinkel and Woodley, 2001, p 202). During G1, the cell reaches a critical restriction point and monitors conditions to determine whether it will enter the next phase of the cell cycle, the S phase, synthesis. During the S phase, the cell replicates its DNA, a process that takes about 812 hours (Freinkel and Woodley, 2001, p 202). Once replication of the DNA is complete, the cell enters a second gap phase, G2, for approximately 8 hours. During the G2 phase, the cell reaches a second critical restriction point and evaluates the results of DNA replication before entering mitosis (Freinkel and Woodley, 2001, p 203). The M phase, mitotic phase, is the physical division of the cell into two, each containing a complete copy of the DNA. Upon completion of mitosis, the basal cells may enter into G1 and continue the cell cycle or they may enter G0. Basal cells entering G0 are no longer cycling but may reenter the cell cycle upon receipt of the appropriate signal (Freinkel and Woodley, 2001, p 203). The new cells created by the basal cells will either withdraw from the cell cycle and begin differentiation or cycle a few more times (transient amplifying cells) before differentiating. The cells that have started to differentiate are the cells entering the stratum spinosum.\n\n2.3.3.2 Regulation of Cell Cycle. There are many opportunities throughout the cell cycle to regulate the rate at which the basal cells undergo mitosis. Signals that stimulate proliferation are received via cell surface receptors. These signals include hormones, proteins, ions (particularly calcium), and vitamins A and D. Once received, the signal triggers the production of two types of partnered proteins inside the cell: cyclins and cyclin-dependent kinases (Freinkel and Woodley,\n2001, p 205). The kinases are responsible for advancing the cells through the G1 and G2 phases of the cell cycle. The kinases must bind the appropriate cyclins to accomplish this task. Cyclins are short-lived, unstable proteins. By controlling the availability of cyclins, the ability of the kinases to progress the cells through mitosis is also controlled. Calcium is also important for a cell's progression through the cell cycle. Calcium binds to a small protein, calmodulin. The calciumcalmodulin complex is a necessary component of the spindle apparatus that separates the two copies of the DNA produced during the S phase of the cell cycle. Calmodulin also makes structural changes inside the cell to induce replication of the DNA during the S phase (Freinkel and Woodley, 2001, p 204).\n\n2.3.3.3 Inhibitors of Mitosis. If the basal cells are responsible for balancing the number of cells produced with the number of cells leaving the surface, there must be some mechanism for them to \"know\" how many cells are in the outer layers so they can shut down production as needed. This process, common to all living organisms, is called a feedback mechanism. As the keratinocytes are pushed toward the surface, they undergo radical changes in their internal and external biochemistry. When the cells reach the stratum granulosum, they release the contents of the lamellar granules to provide the \"mortar\" between the cells. Molecules released by the differentiating cells, referred to as chalones, diffuse through the intercellular spaces and eventually reach the basal cells (Freinkel and Woodley, 2001, p 205). The basal cells, via cell surface receptors, monitor the concentration of chalones. The more cells that differentiate, the higher the concentration of chalones. If the concentration becomes too high, the chalones signal the basal cells to halt the cell cycle. In this manner, the chalones provide feedback to the basal cells regarding the number of differentiating cells in the outer layers.\n\n2.3.3.4 Genetics of Cell Cycle Regulation. Stimulatory signals and inhibitory signals act on oncogenes and tumor suppressor genes, respectively. Oncogenes are the genes that, when translated, generate the proteins necessary for a cell to undergo mitosis. Tumor suppressor genes are genes whose protein products inhibit mitosis. An example of the cell cycle genetic regulation in the epidermis would be as follows: (1) the basal cells bind a stimulatory hormone on a cell surface receptor; (2) a cascade of reactions takes place inside the cell that results in the genes for cyclins being translated; (3) the production of cyclins activates the kinases, pushing the cells through mitosis; (4) the concentration of chalones rises as the newly generated cells differentiate; (5) chalones diffuse to the basal cells and bind to the appropriate cell surface receptor; (6) a cascade of reactions inside the cells results in the translation of a tumor suppressant gene; and (7) the resultant suppressor protein binds to and inactivates the kinases, thereby halting the cell cycle.\n\n## 2.4 Persistence Of The Friction Ridge Skin\n\nThe friction ridge skin persists because of the physical attachments throughout the skin and the regulation of keratinocyte production and differentiation. The threedimensional morphology of the surface ridge is maintained by the combination of increased cell production in the suprabasal layer of the primary ridges (under-the-surface ridges) and the enhanced anchorage of the basal cells in the secondary ridges (under-the-surface furrows). The basal layer of keratinocytes provides the template for the surface ridges and furrows. Cell communication ensures that basal cell proliferation is stimulated and inhibited in a coordinated manner. As the basal keratinocytes divide, the cell-to-cell attachments ensure that the cells move toward the surface in concert.\n\n## 2.4.1 Aging Of Friction Ridge Skin\n\nAging is defined by Dr. Barbara Gilchrest as \"an irreversible process which begins or accelerates at maturity and which results in an increasing number and/or range of deviations from the ideal state and/or decreasing rate of return to the ideal state\" (Gilchrest, 1984, p 5). The friction ridge skin, although durable, undergoes subtle changes as a person ages. The arrangement of the friction ridges does not change; the ridges and furrows maintain their position in the skin. Advancing age has two effects on the friction ridge skin: (1) the surface ridges tend to flatten, making them appear \"less sharp\" (Okajima, 1979, p 193), and (2) loss of elasticity in the dermis causes the skin to become flaccid and to wrinkle.\n\n2.4.1.1 Flattened Ridges. The friction ridges tend to flatten because of a combination of atrophy of the epidermis and remodeling of the dermal papillae. The remodeling of the dermal papillae is the most striking change in the friction ridge skin. Dermal remodeling continues throughout an\nindividual's lifetime and varies across the surface of the palm and sole, depending on how much sheering stress has occurred in that particular area. Chacko and Vaidya (1968, p 105) describe three categories of dermal papillae (DRI, DRII, and DRIII) based on the increasing complexity and branching of the papillae. All three types of dermal papillae are found across the palm and sole but show greater variation on the palm (Chacko and Vaidya, 1968, p 107). The greater variation on the palm is attributed to the wider range of uses of the hand compared to the foot. In Figures 220 and 221, the epidermis has been removed and the dermal papillae stained with toluidine blue (Okajima, 1975, p 244). The dark-stained areas of Figures 220 and 221 are the tips of the dermal papillae. Figure 220 is the dermal surface of a 30-week-old fetus. Typical of fetal skin, the dermal papillae are arranged in a very orderly double row under each surface ridge. As the skin ages and is exposed to sheering stress, the existing dermal papillae branch out, and new small papillae form to increase the adhesion of the epidermis to the dermis (Misumi and Akiyoshi, 1984, p 49). Figure 221 is the dermal surface of an adult finger. The number of dermal papillae tends to increase with age, and the papillae become more crowded.\n\nOccasionally, new dermal papillae will also form underneath the furrows of the surface ridges (below the secondary ridges). Dermal papillae that form underneath the surface furrows can range from short and \"pebble-like\" to the same size as the dermal papillae under the surface ridges (Okajima, 1979, p 193). As the dermal papillae under the furrows become larger, the surface ridges become flatter. Flattening of the surface ridges usually occurs with age (Okajima, 1979, p 193). The increase in the complexity and number of dermal papillae as a person ages is not reflected in the configuration of the surface ridges and furrows (Misumi and Akiyoshi, 1984, p 53). The epidermis responds to the dermal papillae by forming complementary anastomoses to attach to the branching papillae. The dermal papillae/epidermal anastomoses formation does not affect the basal layer of keratinocytes. That layer is buffered from the dermal changes by the basement membrane and continues to reproduce the surface ridges.\n\nThe effects of age on the epidermis also contribute to the flattening of the surface ridges; however, that impact is significantly less compared to the changes in the dermis. The epidermis maintains the thickness of the stratum corneum throughout an individual's lifetime (Lavker et al., 1987, p 46). This is necessary, considering the role of the epidermis as the outer protective barrier. The capacity of the basal keratinocytes to proliferate, however, decreases by 3050% from the age of 30 to the age of 80 (Gilchrest, 1984, p 21). The slower rate of proliferation results in a thinning of the living layers of the epidermis (stratum basale, stratum spinosum, and stratum granulosum) (Lavker, 1979, p 60). The remodeling of the dermal papillae, particularly when the dermal papillae form under-the-surface furrows, and the overall thinning of the epidermis contribute to the flattening of the surface ridges that occurs naturally with age. The flattening of the ridges does not affect the sequence and lengths of the surface's ridges and furrows. However, as the ridges flatten, it may be increasingly difficult to follow the ridges and furrows in an impression of the friction ridge skin. Flattening may also diminish the visibility of the edges and contours of the ridges in an impression of the friction ridge skin. It should be noted that the friction ridge skin is quite durable and that the flattening of the ridges occurs slowly, over the course of several decades.\n\n2.4.1.2 Wrinkles. Wrinkles are the result of mechanical changes that take place in the skin as it ages (Kligman et al., 1985, p 41). In other words, there are no special structures formed by the epidermis or dermis at the site of a wrinkle (Kligman et al., 1985, p 40). The overall changes that take place in the skin, particularly in the dermis, as a person ages alter the mechanical properties of the skin. The dermis thins as the network of collagen and elastin fibers becomes compacted. Additionally, the collagen starts to unravel, and the elastin fibers lose their elasticity. The compaction and degradation of the fiber networks in the dermis causes the skin to be \"less stretchable, less resilient, more lax, and prone to wrinkling\" (Lavker et al., 1989, p 65). The skin becomes loose and simply folds in on itself, creating a wrinkle.\n\n## 2.4.2 Wound Healing\n\nThe friction ridge skin persists throughout an individual's lifetime. The morphology of the friction ridges can be altered only if the basal keratinocyte template is altered. Figures 222 through 230 are diagrams of a skin model that demonstrate the cellular response of the keratinocytes to a wound. Figure 222 shows the intact skin, and Figure 223 illustrates the skin after injury. Upon assault, keratinocytes have been removed and damaged, and the dermis has been injured.\n\nInjury causes the basal keratinocytes to undergo remarkable changes in their structure and physiology to repair the wound. The scar formed by the process of repair results in a new, unique, and persistent feature of the friction ridge skin. The process of wound healing is broken down into three phases, although there is considerable overlap: inflammation, proliferation and tissue formation, and tissue remodeling.\n\n2.4.2.1 Phase I: Inflammation. Inflammation begins immediately after the injury. The disruption of the blood vessels in the dermis causes blood to spill into the surrounding tissue. The platelets from the blood direct the clotting of the blood and send out signals to recruit cells from the immune system and the cells of the dermis (Freinkel and Woodley, 2001, p 282). The immune cells kill bacteria and scavenge damaged cells. The dermal cells (fibroblasts) are concentrated in the wound area to repair the dermis. Additionally, endothelial cells (cells from the blood vessels) begin to repair the damaged blood vessels. It should be noted that the repair of the dermis and epidermis occurs underneath the formed blood clot, although the blood clot is not shown in the following diagrams.\n\n2.4.2.2 Phase II: Proliferation and Tissue Formation. As the fibroblasts and endothelial cells continue to repair the dermis, the basal keratinocytes on the edge of the wound take control of the healing process to start Phase II. As a result of the injury, the basal keratinocytes are suddenly exposed to the dermis by disruption of the basement membrane. Contact with the dermis causes the basal keratinocytes to undergo dramatic changes: The desmosomes and hemidesmosomes dissolve, actin filaments form inside the periphery of the cell, and pseudopodia (footlike projections) are extended from the cell (Rovee and Maibach, 2004, p 61). The dissolution of the desmosomes and hemidesmosomes releases the basal keratinocytes from their firm attachments. The actin filaments, which act like miniature cell muscles, and the pseudopodia allow the skin cells to crawl across the wound. As the basal keratinocytes at the edge of the wound crawl, the basal keratinocytes behind them divide to create additional cells to help cover the wound (Rovee and Maibach, 2004, p 61).\n\nAs the opposing sheets of basal keratinocytes move toward one another, the dermis contracts the wound bed to shorten the distance keratinocytes have to migrate to cover the wound (Darby and Hewitson, 2007, p 145). In the friction ridge skin, this contraction creates the classic puckering of the ridges at the scar site. Figure 224 demonstrates the repair of the dermis and the beginning of the basal keratinocyte migration. Figure 225 demonstrates the puckering of the skin surface as the keratinocytes migrate and the dermis contracts to close the wound. Figure 225 also demonstrates the proliferation of the basal keratinocytes behind the migrating cells.\n\nRepair of the dermis and start of migration of basal keratinocytes at the edge of the wound.\n\nWhen the leading cells of migrating basal keratinocytes contact each other, they form gap junctions (Flaxman and Nelson, 1974, p 327). These gap junctions reestablish communication. The keratinocytes stop migrating and begin reconstituting the basement membrane (including hemidesmosomes) and the desmosomes and tight junctions between the keratinocytes. Once the basal layer is reestablished, the basal keratinocytes begin dividing, and the upward migration of cells occurs until the appropriate skin thickness is attained (Rovee and Maibach, 2004, p 64). Figures 226 through 230 illustrate the basal keratinocytes reforming the layers of the epidermis.\n\nOnce the appropriate barrier has been formed, the scab formed by the blood clot during Phase I is released, and the skin returns to its normal physiological state. The friction ridges are not reconstituted. The new basal layer of keratinocytes covering the wound forms the new template for the epidermis at that site. No primary or secondary ridges are formed; consequently, the epidermis does not regenerate the surface ridges and furrows. Additionally, sweat glands are not re-formed. When the sweat glands are damaged as a result of the injury, the cells of the gland also migrate to cover the wound, and the glands are lost (Freinkel and Woodley, 2001, p 284).\n\n2.4.2.3 Phase III: Tissue Remodeling. Once the epidermis has resurfaced, Phase III begins in the dermis. The dermis continues to remodel and reinforce the scar tissue for weeks or months after the injury (Freinkel and Woodley, 2001, p 292).\n\n2.4.2.4 Friction Ridge Skin Wound Healing Model. Figures 231 through 240 are diagrams created to illustrate wound healing in friction ridge skin. The skin undergoes the same series of events described above, but this model will focus on the layers, rather than the cells, as the skin heals. The layers of the epidermis are color-coded the same as Figure 24 (stratum corneumyellow, stratum lucidum\norange, stratum granulosumred, stratum spinosum dark pink, stratum basaleblue, dermislight pink), and the friction ridge skin is viewed from three-dimensional and aerial perspectives.\n\n2.4.2.5 The Outer Surface of Scars and the Resultant Impressions. The formation of the scars explains what is seen on the skin and subsequently on the impressions left by the skin. Scars may appear as a void, or may contain partial voids, in an impression because all or part of the newly formed epidermis sits below the level of the surface ridges. Like friction ridges, scars are three-dimensional structures with surface contours and edges. Also like the\n\n## Figure 228\n\nKeratinocytes undergo differentiation\nas they are pushed toward the surface.\n\n## Figure 229\n\nContinued differentiation of the keratinocytes.\n\n## Figure 230\n\nNew epidermis is completely formed.\n\nfriction ridges, the features of the scars will have some variability in appearance, depending on deposition pressure and movement. Figure 241 (p 224) is an image of a finger bearing a mature scar and an inked impression of the same finger.\n\n2.4.2.6 Uniqueness of Scars. Scars are unique for the very same reason the friction skin is unique: developmental noise (i.e., chance events that occur during development). Richard Lewontin, research professor at Harvard University, describes developmental noise in the following manner: \"Wherever cell growth and division are involved, we can expect such noise to contribute its effects. The\n\n## Figure 236\n\nFinal migration of basal keratinocytes and reconstitution of the basement membrane.\n\n## Figure 237\n\nBasal keratinocytes begin dividing and new\ncells differentiate to form the stratum spinosum.\n\n## Figure 238\n\nBasal keratinocytes continue to divide and the cells continue to differentiate, forming the stratum granulosum.\n\n## Figure 239\n\nFormation of the stratum lucidum.\n\n## Figure 240\n\nComplete repair of the epidermis, forming a nonridged scar.\n\nexact placement of hair follicles on our heads, the distribution of small moles on our bodies, a hundred such small details of our morphology, are largely under the influence of such random events in development\" (Lewontin, 1995, p 26). When the friction ridges are forming on the fetus and when the basal keratinocytes are activated by an injury, they are under the influence of developmental noise. The cells are rapidly proliferating and are tasked with forming the fetal skin or reconstituting injured skin. These cells are guided but not given specific instructions on their position in the epidermis. In the case of an injury, the cells rapidly proliferate and migrate. The reconstitution of the stratum basale (the new template for the surface) and the effects on the surrounding epidermis (pinching) are the result of this guided, yet random, process. Two injuries cannot duplicate the same scar (Maceo, 2005, p 160).\n\n2.4.2.7 Persistence of Scars. Scars persist for the same reason that the friction ridges persist: attachment sites and regulation of keratinocyte mitosis. The basal keratinocytes regenerate the basement membrane, reestablishing the attachment of the epidermis to the dermis. The keratinocytes also reestablish the cell-to-cell attachments: desmosomes and tight junctions. The keratinocytes resume communication with each other; with the melanocytes, Langerhans, and Merkel cells; and with the dermis. Communication allows for homeostatic regulation of cell division in the basal layer, ensuring that the epidermis retains its appropriate thickness. As the cells divide, they move outward in concert and maintain the surface features of the scar (Maceo, 2005, p 160). The impressions in Figure 242 were taken more than 14 years apart and demonstrate the persistent nature of scars.\n\n2.4.2.8 Comparison of Impressions Bearing Scars. The use of scars in the comparison of friction ridge impressions has the same basis, and follows the same application, as the use of friction ridges. Once formed, scars are unique and persistent. When an impression of the skin is made, the features of the scar will be reproduced at varying levels of clarity. The clarity of the detail in the impression may reveal the overall configuration of the scar, the position (path) of the scar in the skin, and detailed edge shapes of the scar. This detail makes the scar itself useful in the examination of friction ridge impressions.\n\n## 2.5 Conclusion\n\nThe persistence of the friction ridge skin is explained by the physical attachments of the skin and by the regulated replacement of cells lost at the surface of the skin. The persistent nature of the friction ridge skin makes it an ideal anthropological feature to use as a means of identifying individuals. The structure of the skin also provides a mechanism through which to describe distortion. Variation in the appearance of friction ridge impressions is due to the flexibility of the skin. Understanding that the skin distributes pressure into the more flexible furrows offers valuable insight during the analysis of friction ridge impressions.\n\nDespite its durability, the friction ridge skin is subject to injury and aging. Understanding the aging process provides a basis for variation in appearance of impressions from the same source taken many years apart. Aging processes are particularly critical when explaining the loss of the minute details along the edges of the ridges and the existence of wrinkles. The response of the skin to an injury and the later maintenance of the newly formed skin (scar) provide a basis for the unique features and persistence of scars. The unique and persistent nature of scars allows for their use during the examination of friction ridge impressions. The manner in which skin injuries heal provides an explanation for the variation in appearance of impressions of the skin before and after the injury. To rely upon the friction ridge skin as a means to identify people, it is necessary to understand why the impressions of the friction ridge skin can be used and what the physical limitations of the friction ridge skin are. If the variation in appearance between two impressions of the friction ridge skin goes beyond the physical limitations of the skin, the impressions cannot be from the same source.\n\n## 2.6 Reviewers\n\nThe reviewers critiquing this chapter were Jeffrey G. Barnes, Patti Blume, Mary Ann Brandon, Brent T. Cutro, Sr., Lynne D. Herold, Andre A. Moenssens, Michelle L. Snyder, John R. Vanderkolk, and Kasey Wertheim.\n\n## 2.7 References\n\nCavoto, F. V.; Flaxman, B. A. Communication Between Normal Human Epidermal Cells in Vitro. *J. Invest. Dermatol.* 1972, 59 (5), 370374.\n\nChacko, L. W.; Vaidya, M. C. The Dermal Papillae and Ridge Patterns in Human Volar Skin. *ACTA Anatomica (Basel)* 1968, 70 (1), 99108.\n\nDarby, I. A.; Hewitson, T. D. Fibroblast Differentiation in\nWound Healing and Fibrosis. *Int. Rev. of Cytol.* 2007, *257,*\n143179.\nDillion, Y.; Haynes, J.; Henneberg, M. The Relationship of the Number of Meissner's Corpuscles to Dermatoglyphic Characters and Finger Size. *J. Anatomy* 2001, 199 (5),\n577584.\n\nEroschenko, V. di Fiore's Atlas of Histology With Functional Correlations, 7th ed.; Lea & Febiger: Philadelphia, 1993.\n\nFlaxman, B. A.; Nelson, B. K. Ultrastructural Studies of the Early Junctional Zone Formed by Keratinocytes Showing Contact Inhibition of Movement in Vitro. J. Invest. Dermatol. 1974, 63 (4), 326330. Freinkel, R. K.; Woodley, D. T. *The Biology of Skin;* The Parthenon: New York, 2001.\n\nGilchrest, B. *Skin and Aging Processes;* CRC Press, Inc.:\nBoca Raton, FL, 1984. Hale, A. Morphogenesis of Volar Skin in the Human Fetus.\n\nAmerican J. Anatomy 1952, 91 (1), 147173. Junqueira, L. C.; Carneiro, *Journal of Basic Histology,* 10th ed.; Lange Medical Books: New York, 2003. Kligman, A.; Zheng, P.; Lavker, R. M. The Anatomy and Pathogenesis of Wrinkles. *British J. Dermatol.* 1985, 113\n(1), 3742.\n\nLavker, R. M. Structural Alterations in Exposed and Unexposed Aged Skin. *J. Invest. Dermatol.* 1979, 73 (1), 5966.\nLavker, R. M.; Sun, T. T. Heterogeneity in Epidermal Basal\nKeratinocytes and Functional Correlations. *Science* 1982, 215 (4537), 12391241. Lavker, R. M.; Sun, T. T. Epidermal Stem Cells. J. Invest. Dermatol. 1983, 81 (1) (Suppl.), 121127.\nLavker, R. M.; Zheng, P.; Dong, G. Aged Skin: A Study by Light, Transmission Electron, and Scanning Electron Microscopy. *J. Invest. Dermatol.* 1987, 88 (3) (Suppl.), 4451.\nLavker, R. M.; Zheng, P.; Dong, G. Morphology of Aged\nSkin. *J. Geriatric Dermatol.* 1989, 5 (1), 5367.\nLewontin, R. *Human Diversity;* Scientific American Library:\nNew York, 1995. Maceo, A. The Basis for the Uniqueness and Persistence of Scars in the Friction Ridge Skin. *Fingerprint Whorld* 2005,\n31 (121), 147161.\n\nMisumi, Y.; Akiyoshi, T. Scanning Electron Microscopic Structure of the Finger Print as Related to the Dermal Surface. *The Anatomical Record* 1984, 208 (1), 4955. Montagna, W.; Parakkal, P. The Structure and Function of Skin, 3rd ed.; Academic Press: New York, 1974.\n\nOkajima, M. Development of Dermal Ridges in the Fetus.\n\nJ. Med. Genet. 1975, 12 (3), 243250.\n\nSkin as an Adaptation to High Physical Stress. British J. Dermatol. 1998, 139 (5), 767775. Tortora, G.; Grabowski, S. R. Principles of Anatomy and Physiology, 7th ed.; Harper Collins: New York, 1993.\n\nOkajima, M. Dermal and Epidermal Structures of the Volar Skin. In *DermatoglyphicsFifty Years Later;* Birth Defects Original Article Series; March of Dimes: Washington, DC, 1979; pp 179198.\n\nRovee, D. T.; Maibach, H. I. The Epidermis in Wound Healing; CRC Press: New York, 2004.\n\nWan, H.; Dopping-Hepenstal, P.; Gratian, M.; Stone, M.; McGrath, J.; Eady, R. Desmosomes Exhibit Site-Specific Features in Human Palm Skin. *Experimental Dermatol.* 2003, 12 (4), 378388. Wolfe, S. *Molecular and Cellular Biology;* Wadsworth:\nBelmont, CA, 1993.\n\nSwensson, O.; Langbein, L.; McMillan, J. R.; Stevens, H. P.; Leigh, I. M.; McClean, W. H. I.; Lane, E. B.; Jeady, R. A. Specialized Keratin Expression Pattern in Human Ridged\n\n## C H A P T E R Embryology And Morphology Of Friction Ridge Skin Kasey Wertheim C O N T E N T S\n\n 3\n3.1  Introduction\n12\n3.7  Pattern Formation\n18\n3.8  Genetics\n\n4\n3.2  Embryology: Establishing\n\n\nUniqueness and Pattern Formation\n\nin the Friction Ridge Skin\n5\n3.3  Limb Development\n21\n3.9  Uniqueness: Developmental Noise\n7\n3.4  Differentiation of the Friction\n\nRidge Skin\n22\n3.10  Summary: Keys to Uniqueness and Pattern Formation\n22\n3.11  Reviewers\n8\n3.5  Primary Ridge Formation\n24\n3.12  References\n11\n3.6  Secondary Ridge\n\nFormation\n\n## Chapter 3 Embryology And Morphology Of Friction Ridge Skin Kasey Wertheim 3.1 Introduction\n\nFriction ridge skin has unique features that persist from before birth until decomposition after death. Upon contact with a surface, the unique features of friction ridge skin may leave an impression of corresponding unique details. Two impressions can be analyzed, compared, and evaluated, and if sufficient quality and quantity of detail is present (or lacking) in a corresponding area of both impressions, a competent examiner can effect an individualization or exclusion (identify or exclude an individual). The analysis, comparison, evaluation, and verification (ACE-V) methodology, combined with the philosophy of quantitativequalitative  examinations, provide the framework for practical application of the friction ridge examination discipline. But at the heart of the discipline is the fundamental principle that allows for conclusive determinations: the source of the impression, friction ridge skin, is unique and persistent. Empirical data collected in the medical and forensic communities continues to validate the premises of uniqueness and persistence. One hundred years of observations and statistical studies have provided critical supporting documentation of these premises. Detailed explanations of the reasons behind uniqueness and persistence are found in specific references that address very small facets of the underlying biology of friction ridge skin. This chapter brings together these references under one umbrella for the latent print examiner to use as a reference in understanding why friction ridge skin is unique and persistent. The basis of persistence is found in morphology and physiology; the epidermis faithfully reproduces the threedimensional ridges due to physical attachments and constant regulation of cell proliferation and differentiation. But, the basis of uniqueness lies in embryology; the unique features of the skin are established between approximately 10.5 and 16 weeks estimated gestational age (EGA) due to developmental noise.\n\n## 3.2 Embryology: Establishing Uniqueness And Pattern Formation In The Friction Ridge Skin 3.2.1 Introduction To Embryology\n\nThe uniqueness of friction ridge skin falls under the larger umbrella of biological uniqueness. No two portions of any living organism are exactly alike. The intrinsic and extrinsic factors that affect the development of any individual organ, such as human skin, are impossible to duplicate, even in very small areas. The uniqueness of skin can be traced back to the late embryological and early fetal development periods.\n\n3.2.2 Early Embryological Development:\n02 Weeks EGA (Raven and Johnson, 1992, pp 11581159)\nThe process of embryological development begins with fertilization of the egg and continues through a period of rapid cell division called \"cleavage\". In mammalian eggs, an inner cell mass is concentrated at one pole, causing patterned alterations during cleavage. Although egg cells contain many different substances that act as genetic signals during early embryological development, these substances are not distributed uniformly. Instead, different substances tend to be clustered at specific sites within the growing embryo. During growth, signal substances are partitioned into different daughter cells, endowing them with distinct developmental instructions. In this manner, the embryo is prepatterned to continue developing with unique cell orientation.\n\n## 3.2.3 Late Embryological Development: 38 Weeks Ega (Raven And Johnson, 1992, Pp 11601164)\n\nThe first visible results of prepatterning can be seen immediately after completion of the cleavage divisions as different genes are activated. Certain groups of cells move inward toward the center of the sphere in a carefully orchestrated migration called \"gastrulation\".  This process forms the primary tissue distinctions between ectoderm, endoderm, and mesoderm. The ectoderm will go on to form epidermis, including friction ridge skin; the mesoderm will form the connective tissue of the dermis, as well as muscle and elements of the vascular system; and the endoderm goes on to form the organs.\n\nOnce specialized, the three primary cell types begin their development into tissue and organs. The process of tissue differentiation begins with neurulation, or the formation of the notochord (the precursor to the spinal cord and brain)\nas well as the neural crest (the precursor to much of the embryo's nervous system). Segmented blocks of tissue that become muscles, vertebrae, and connective tissue form on either side of the notochord. The remainder of the mesoderm moves out and around the inner endoderm, forming a hollow chamber that will ultimately become the lining of the stomach and intestines. During late embryological development, the embryo undergoes \"morphogenesis\", or the formation of shape. Limbs rapidly develop from about 4 weeks EGA, and the arms, legs, knees, elbows, fingers, and toes can all be seen in the second month. During this time, the hand changes from a paddlelike form to an adult form, including the formation of the fingers and rotation of the thumb. Also during this time, swellings of mesenchyme called \"volar pads\" appear on the palms of the hands and soles of the feet. Within the body cavity, the major organs such as the liver, pancreas, and gall bladder become visible. By the end of week 8, the embryo has grown to about 25 millimeters in length and weighs about 1 gram.\n\n## 3.2.4 Fetal Growth: 912 Weeks Ega\n\nDuring the third month, the embryo's nervous system and sense organs develop, and the arms and legs begin to move. Primitive reflexes such as sucking are noticed, and early facial expressions can be visualized. Friction ridges begin to form at about 10.5 weeks EGA and continue to mature in depth as the embryo passes into the second trimester. From this point on, the development of the embryo is essentially complete, and further maturation is referred to as fetal growth rather than embryonic development.\n\n## 3.2.5 Second Trimester\n\nThe second trimester is marked by significant growth to 175 millimeters and about 225 grams. Bone growth is very active, and the body becomes covered with fine hair called lanugo, which will be lost later in development. As the placenta reaches full development, it secretes numerous hormones essential to support fetal bone growth and energy. Volar pads regress and friction ridges grow until about 16 weeks EGA, when the minutiae become set.\n\nSweat glands mature, and the epidermaldermal ridge system continues to mature and grow in size. By the end of the second trimester, sweat ducts and pores appear along epidermal ridges, and the fetus begins to undergo even more rapid growth.\n\n## 3.2.6 Third Trimester\n\nIn the third trimester, the fetus doubles in weight several times. Fueled by the mother's bloodstream, new brain cells and nerve tracts actively form. Neurological growth continues long after birth, but most of the essential development has already taken place in the first and second trimesters. The third trimester is mainly a period for protected growth.\n\n## 3.3 Limb Development 3.3.1 Hand Development\n\nDuring the initial phases of formation, the hand undergoes significant changes in topography. Until approximately 56 weeks EGA, the hand appears as a flat, paddlelike structure with small protrusions of tissue that will become fingers. From 6 to 7 weeks EGA, these finger protrusions in the hand plate begin to form muscle and cartilage that will become bone at later stages of hand growth (Figure 31). From 7 to 8 weeks EGA, the fingers begin to separate and the bone begins to \"ossify\" or harden. By 8 weeks EGA, the joints begin to form between the bones of the hand, and the external hand morphology appears similar in proportion to that of an infant.\n\n## 3.3.2  Volar Pad Development\n\nVolar pads (Figure 32) are transient swellings of tissue called mesenchyme under the epidermis on the palmar surface of the hands and soles of the feet of the human fetus (Figure 33). The interdigital pads appear first, around 6 weeks EGA, followed closely in time by the thenar and hypothenar pads. At approximately 78 weeks EGA, the volar pads begin to develop on the fingertips, starting with the thumb and progressing toward the little finger in the same radioulnar gradient that ridge formation will follow. Also at about 8 weeks EGA, the thenar crease begins to form in the palm, followed by the flexion creases in the fingers at around 9 weeks EGA (Kimura, 1991).\n\n## 3.3.3 Volar Pad \"Regression\"\n\nThe pads remain well rounded during their rapid growth around 910 weeks EGA, after which they begin to demonstrate some individual variation in both shape and position (Babler, 1987; Burdi et al., 1979; Cummins, 1926, 1929). During the period from 8 to 10 weeks EGA, thumb rotation is achieved (Lacroix et al., 1984, p 131). Also at about 10 weeks EGA, the flexion creases of the toes begin formation, followed at about 11 weeks EGA by the distal transverse flexion crease in the palm, and at about 13 weeks EGA by the proximal transverse flexion crease in the palm (Kimura, 1991). As a result of the volar pads' slowing growth, their contour becomes progressively less distinct on the more rapidly growing surface (Figure 34). This process has been defined as \"regression\" (Lacroix et al., 1984, pp 131133), A low-power scanning electron microscope view of a fetal hand displaying prominent digital and palmar volar pads. (Reprinted with permission from Carlson (1999), p 152.)\nNormally, 11 volar pads develop and regress on each limb (one on each digit and six on the larger surface of the palm or sole). The hypothenar pad of the palm is divided into distal (Hd) and proximal\n(Hp) portions. The first (I) interdigital\nvolar pad is also divided into two\nportions, making a total of 13 potential elevations on each surface. On plantar surfaces, the proximal portions of the hypothenar pad (Hp) and the thenar\npad (Thp) are absent, leaving 11 distinct plantar elevations. (Reprinted with\npermission from Cummins (1929), p 114.)\nDrawings that represent a volar pad from\ninitial formation until complete regression,\nexcluding growth of the size of the finger.\nActual EGA values are highly variable and\nare included only as approximations in this figure. (Reprinted with permission from\nWertheim and Maceo (2002), p 61.)\nbut it is important to understand that the pad is not actually shrinking; rather, the volar pads are overtaken by the faster growth of the larger surrounding surface. The volar pads of the palm begin to regress as early as 11 weeks EGA, followed closely by the volar pads of the fingers. By 16 weeks EGA, volar pads have completely merged with the contours of the fingers, palms, and soles of the feet (Cummins, 1929, p 117).\n\n## 3.4 Differentiation Of The Friction Ridge Skin 3.4.1 Development Of The Epidermis\n\nThe primitive epidermis is established at approximately 1 week EGA, when ectoderm and endoderm are separately defined. A second layer of epidermis forms at about 45 weeks EGA. The outermost of the three layers is the periderm. The middle layer, which is the actual epidermis, is composed of basal keratinocytes (named because of the keratins these cells manufacture). At about 8 weeks EGA, the basal cells between the epidermis and the dermis begin to consistently divide and give rise to daughter cells that move vertically to form the first of the intermediate cell layers (Holbrook, 1991b, p 64). At this point, the embryonic epidermis is three to four cell layers thick, but it is still smooth on its outer and inner surfaces. Keratinocytes are tightly bound to each other by desmosomes, and the cells of the basal layer are attached to the basement membrane by hemidesmosomes (Holbrook, 1991a, p 5).\n\n## 3.4.2 Development Of The Dermis\n\nThe first dermal components to originate from the mesoderm are fibroblasts. These irregular branching cells secrete proteins into the matrix between cells. Fibroblasts synthesize the structural (collagen and elastic)\ncomponents that form the connective tissue matrix of the dermis. During the period 48 weeks EGA, many of the dermal structures begin formation. Elastic fibers first appear around 5 weeks EGA at the ultrastructural level in small bundles of 20 or fewer fibrils (Holbrook, 1991b, pp 64101). Nerve development occurs in different stages from 6 weeks EGA onwards. Neurovascular bundles and axons with growth cones are seen in the developing dermis as early as 6 weeks EGA (Moore and Munger, 1989, pp 128130). In fact, axons can be traced to the superficial levels of the dermis, and in some cases they almost abut the basal lamina of the epidermis. By 9 weeks EGA, innervation (the appearance of nerve endings) of the epidermis has begun to occur, although there are some Merkel cells in the epidermis that are not yet associated with axons. In embryos older than 10 weeks EGA, Merkel cells are predominant in the developing epidermis, and their related axons and neurofilaments are present in the dermis (Moore and Munger, 1989, p 127; Smith and Holbrook, 1986). The dermis becomes distinguishable from deeper subcutaneous tissue due largely to a horizontal network of developing blood vessels. From 8 to 12 weeks EGA, vessels organize from dermal mesenchyme and bring muchneeded oxygen and hormones to the underside of the developing epidermis. Unlike other epidermal structures, blood vessels continue to alter with aging, as some capillary loops are lost and new ones arise from the interpapillary network. This continues into late adulthood (Figure 35) (Smith and Holbrook, 1986).\n\nA second vascular network forms deep in the reticular dermis by about 12 weeks EGA. Unlike the developing primary ridges, the vascular network is not a permanent structure. There is significant reorganization of capillary beds during the period 820 weeks EGA to keep pace with skin growth; even after birth, microcirculation continues to form and remodel (Holbrook, 1991b, p 100; Smith and Holbrook, 1986).\n\n## 3.5 Primary Ridge Formation 3.5.1 Initiation Of Primary Ridge Formation\n\nAt around 1010.5 weeks EGA, basal cells of the epidermis begin to divide rapidly (Babler, 1991, p 98; Holbrook and Odland, 1975, p 17). As volar epidermal cells divide, shallow \"ledges\" (Hale, 1952) can be seen on the bottom of the epidermis. These ledges delineate the overall patterns that will become permanently established on the volar surfaces several weeks later (Babler, 1991, p 101; Evatt, 1906). Primary ridges are the first visual evidence of interaction between the dermis and epidermis and are first seen forming as continuous ridges (Figure 36). The prevailing theory of events before the visualization of primary ridge structure involves centers of active cell proliferation (Figure 37), which will become the centers of sweat gland development (Babler, 1991, p 98).\n\nAccording to this theory, the \"units\" of rapidly multiplying cells increase in diameter, somewhat randomly, growing into one another (Figure 38) along lines of relief perpendicular to the direction of compression. Furthermore, according to this theory, as the series of localized proliferations \"fuse\" together, the resulting linear ridges of rapidly dividing epidermal cells fold into the dermis, creating the first visible ridge structure at the epidermaldermal junction (Ashbaugh, 1999, p 79). Another plausible theory is that developing nerves may interact with epidermal cells to stimulate clustered interactions that blend together in the early stages of ridge development. At the time of embryonic friction ridge formation, the central nervous and cardiovascular systems are undergoing a critical period of development (Hirsch, 1964). Researchers have reported innervation at the sites of ridge formation immediately preceding the appearance of friction ridges and suggest that innervation could be the trigger mechanism for the onset of proliferation (Bonnevie, 1924; Dell and Munger, 1986; Moore and Munger, 1989). Several researchers even postulate that the patterning of the capillarynerve pairs at the junction of the epidermis and the dermis is the direct cause of primary ridge alignment (Dell and Munger, 1986; Hirsch and Schweichel, 1973; Moore and Munger, 1989; Morohunfola et al., 1992). Early research on pattern distribution established \"developmental fields\", or groupings of fingers on which patterns had a greater tendency to be similar (Meier, 1981; Roberts, 1982; Siervogel et al., 1978). Later discoveries confirmed the neurological relation of spinal cord sections C6, C7, and C8 to innervation of the fingers (Heimer, 1995). Specifically, Kahn and colleagues (2001) reported that a large ridge-count difference between C8-controlled fingers 4 and 5 may predict a larger waist-to-thigh ratio and, therefore, an increased risk of some major chronic diseases such as heart disease, cancer, and diabetes. Other interesting hypotheses have been published regarding the connection between innervation and friction ridge patterning, but the main consideration for the purposes of friction ridge formation is that specific parts of the nervous system are undergoing development at the same time that ridges begin to appear on the surface of the hands. The presence of nerves and capillaries in the dermis before friction ridge formation may be necessary for friction ridge proliferation. It would seem that complex simultaneous productions such as friction ridge formation would benefit from being in communication with the central nervous system or the endocrine and exocrine (hormone) systems (Smith and Holbrook, 1986). However, it is doubtful that nerves or capillaries independently establish a map that directly determines the flow of the developing friction ridges. It seems more likely that the alignment of the nerves and capillaries is directed by the same stresses and strains on the developing hand that establish ridge alignment (Babler, 1999; Smith and Holbrook, 1986). It is well recognized in cell biology that physical pressure on a cellular system can trigger electrochemical changes within\n\n## Figure 38\n\nThese drawings represent the theory\nthat just before ridge formation, localized\ncellular proliferations grow together into\nwhat will appear as ridges at around 10.5\nweeks EGA. (Reprinted with permission\nfrom Wertheim and Maceo (2002), p 49.)\n\nthat system. Merkel cells occupy the epidermis just prior\nto innervation along those pathways (Holbrook, 1991a),\nsuggesting that even before ridge formation, the stresses\ncreated by the different growth rates of the dermis and\nepidermis are causing differential cell growth along invisible\nlines that already delineate pattern characteristics (Loesch,\n1973). Regardless of the trigger mechanism controlling the\nonset of the first primary ridge proliferations, the propaga-\ntion of primary ridges rapidly continues.\n\n## 3.5.2 Propagation Of Primary Ridge Formation\n\nPrimary ridges mature and extend deeper into the dermis (Figure 39) for a period of approximately 5.5 weeks, from their inception at 10.5 weeks EGA until about 16 weeks EGA. The cell growth during this phase of development is along the primary ridge, in what has been labeled the \"proliferative compartment\". The proliferative compartment encompasses basal and some suprabasal cells, ultimately governed by stem cells, and is responsible for new skin cell production of the basal layer of skin (Lavker and Sun, 1983).\n\n## 3.5.3 Minutiae Formation\n\nAlthough the exact mechanisms for formation of minutiae are unclear, the separate accounts of many researchers who have examined fetal tissue allow for a fairly accurate reconstruction of the morphogenesis of friction ridges in successive stages of the development process. Figure 310 illustrates the process of minutiae formation as hypothesized by a general consensus of the literature. Many events happen during this rapid period of primary ridge growth. The finger rapidly expands, new primary ridges form across the finger, and the existing primary ridges begin to separate because of growth of the digit. As existing ridges separate, the tendency of the surface to be continually ridged creates a demand for new ridges.\nHale reports that new ridges pull away from existing primary ridges to fill in these gaps, creating bifurcations by mechanical separation. Ending ridges form when a developing ridge becomes sandwiched between two established ridges. According to this theory, \"fusion between adjacent ridges [which have already formed] seems improbable, although there is no evidence for or against this process\" (Hale, 1952, p 167). Other models explain ridge detail in nature as a chemical reactionsuppression scheme in which morphogens react and diffuse through cells, causing spatial patterns (Murray, 1988, p 80). According to these models, hormones circulate first through newly formed capillaries just before ridge formation in the epidermis, offering another potential factor in the genesis of ridge formation (Smith and Holbrook, 1986).\n\nA recent model of the process of friction ridge morphogenesis has been likened to mechanical instability (Kucken and Newell, 2005). Building on the folding hypothesis of Kollmann (1883) and Bonnevie (1924), Kucken and Newell (2005) consider the basal layer as \"an overdamped elastic sheet trapped between the neighboring tissues of the intermediate epidermis layer and the dermis\", which they mathematically model as \"beds of weakly nonlinear springs\" (Figure 311). Their computer program models the results of forcing enough compressive stress to cause a buckling instability on a virtual three-dimensional elastic sheet constrained by fixed boundaries on two sides. The resulting ridge patterns are similar to all three major fingerprint pattern types oriented by the upper fixed boundary of the nailbed and the lower fixed boundary of the distal interphalangeal flexion crease (Figure 312). Regardless of the exact mechanism of minutiae formation (mechanical or static; fusion or chemical), the exact location of any particular bifurcation or ridge ending within the developing ridge field is governed by a random series of infinitely interdependent forces acting across that particular area of skin at that critical moment. Slight differences in the mechanical stress, physiological environment, or variation in the timing of development could significantly affect the location of minutiae in that area of skin.\n\nA drawing that represents the state of the\nepidermaldermal boundary just before\nridge formation. (Reprinted with permission\nfrom Kucken and Newell (2005), p 74.)\n\n## 3.6 Secondary Ridge Formation 3.6.1 Initiation Of Secondary Ridge Formation\n\nBy 15 weeks EGA, the primary ridges are experiencing growth in two directions: the downward penetration of the sweat glands and the upward push of new cell growth. Generally, the entire volar surface is ridged by 15 weeks EGA. Okajima (1982) shows a fully ridged palm of a 14-week-old fetus (Figure 313). Between 15 and 17 weeks EGA, secondary ridges appear between the primary ridges on the underside of the epidermis (Babler, 1991, p 98). Secondary ridges are also cell proliferations resulting in downfolds of the basal epidermis. At this time in fetal development, the randomly located minutiae within the friction ridge pattern become permanently set (Hale, 1952, pp 159160), marking the end of new primary ridge formation (Figure 314) (Babler, 1990, p 54).\n\n## 3.6.2 Propagation Of Secondary Ridge Formation\n\nAs the secondary ridges form downward and increase the surface area of attachment to the dermis, the primary ridges are pushing cells toward the surface to keep pace with the growing hand. These two forces, in addition to cell adhesion, cause infolding of the epidermal layers above the attachment site of the secondary ridges (Hale, 1952). As secondary ridges continue to mature from 16 to 24 weeks EGA, this structure is progressively mirrored on the surface of friction ridge skin as the furrows (Burdi et al., 1979, pp 2538) (Figure 315).\n\n## 3.6.3 Formation Of Dermal Papillae\n\nDermal papillae are the remnants of dermis left projecting upward into the epidermis when anastomoses bridge primary and secondary ridges (Figures 316 and 317). They begin to form at approximately 23 weeks EGA (Okajima,\n1975) and continue to become more complex throughout fetal formation and even into adulthood (Chacko and Vaidya, 1968; Misumi and Akiyoshi, 1984).\n\n## 3.7 Pattern Formation 3.7.1 Shape Of The Volar Pad\n\nIt is observed throughout the physical world that ridges tend to align perpendicularly to physical compression across a surface (Figure 318).\n\nRidges also form transversely to the lines of growth stress in friction skin. The predominant growth of the hand is longitudinal (lengthwise) and ridges typically cover the volar surface transversely (side to side). This phenomenon is seen in the ridge flow across the phalanges. Bonnevie first hypothesized in 1924 that volar pad height affects friction ridge patterns (Bonnevie, 1924, p 4). Disruptions in the shape of the volar surfaces of the hands and feet create stresses in directions other than longitudinal. The ridges flow in a complex manner across these threedimensional structures.\n\n## Figure 315\n\nA reconstruction of the secondary ridges\ncontinuing to form on the underside of the\nfetal volar epidermis between existing primary\nridges with sweat ducts. (Artwork by Brandon\nSmithson. Re-drawn from Hale (1952), p 153.)\n\n##\n\nA reconstruction of the underside of the\nepidermis of fetal volar skin that represents\nanastomoses bridging primary and secondary\nridges and cordoning off sections of dermis\nthat remain protruding upward as \"dermal pa-\npillae\" or \"papillae pegs\". (Artwork by Brandon\nSmithson. Re-drawn  from Hale (1952), p 154.)\n\n##\n\nA scanning electron microscope view of the\ncomplex understructure of human epidermis\nas the dermis has been removed (inverted).\nMagnification (approximate) = 8 X (left) and 80\nX (right). (Reprinted with permission from\nMontagna and Parakkal (1974), pp 3435.)\n\nThe distinction between the size, height, and shape of the\nvolar pad, and the effects of differences in each of these\nelements on a friction ridge pattern, is a difficult topic to\nstudy (Chakraborty, 1991; Jamison, 1990; Mavalwala et al.,\n1991). However, almost all research points to the conclu-\nsion that the shape of the volar pad influences the stress\nacross the skin that directs ridge alignment. One contrary\nviewpoint to this conclusion exists. In 1980, Andre G. de\nWilde proposed a theory that pattern formation is directed\nmuch earlier in fetal life, before volar pads form, while the\nhand is still in a paddlelike shape (De Wilde, 1980). He\n\nhypothesized that ridges direct the size and shape of the volar pads. However, no other theoretical or empirical support for this theory could be found. All other research indicates that friction ridges align according to volar pad shape and symmetry at approximately 10.5 weeks EGA.\n\n## 3.7.1.1 Symmetrical Volar Pad. The Growth And Regression\n\nof the volar pads produce variable physical stresses across the volar surface that affect the alignment of the ridges as the ridges first begin to form. Whether ridge flow will conform to a whorl or a loop pattern appears highly correlated with the symmetry of the stress across the surface of the finger. If the volar pad and other elements of finger growth are symmetrical during the onset of primary ridge formation, then a symmetrical pattern (a whorl or an arch) will result. Ridges will form concentrically around the apex of a volar pad that is high and round when the generating layer of friction ridge skin first begins to rapidly produce skin cells. The ridge flow from a symmetrical volar pad conforms to the navigational pattern of the loxodrome (Figure 319) (Mulvihill and Smith, 1969; Elie, 1987). Research in both the medical and mathematical fields suggests that this same physical model applies across the entire volar surface of the hands and feet (Cummins, 1926, 1929; Loesch, 1973; Penrose and O'Hara, 1973).\n\n3.7.1.2 Asymmetrical Volar Pad. The degree of asymmetry of the finger volar pad when ridges first begin to form determines the asymmetry of the pattern type. Many researchers have reported that asymmetrical \"leaning\" pads form looping patterns and that low or absent volar pads form arch patterns (Cummins, 1926, p 138). Babler perhaps conducted the most scientific validation of the correlation between pad symmetry and pattern type through extensive examination of fetal abortuses (Babler, 1978). Cummins published an extensive analysis of malformed hands to demonstrate the effect of the growth and topology of the hand on ridge direction (Cummins, 1926). Cummins also concluded that ridge direction is established by the contours of the hands and feet at the time of ridge formation. Penrose examined friction ridge pattern formation from a mathematical perspective, arriving at the same conclusion (Loesch, 1973; Penrose and Plomley, 1969). More recently, Kucken and Newell (2005) modeled stress fields across bounded three-dimensional, spherical virtual surfaces, creating relatively accurate-appearing ridge patterns (Figure 320). If the volar pad and other growth factors of the finger are asymmetrical during the critical stage, then that same degree of asymmetry will be reflected in the ridge flow of the resulting pattern. This biological process cannot be thought of as limited to the extremes of volar pad regression, occurring either completely symmetrically or asymmetrically (leaning all the way to one side). In fact, there is a continuum involved from whorl patterns to loop patterns.\n\nFigure 321\nillustrates several patterns from different individuals whose volar pads were theoretically the same approximate size at the critical stage (i.e., the volar pads had similar ridge counts), but differed in the degree of their symmetry. Subtle variations in the symmetry of a volar pad could affect the formation of a whorl pattern versus a central pocket loop whorl pattern, or a central pocket loop whorl pattern versus a loop pattern. Any one of the numerous genetic or environmental factors present during the critical stage could cause a slight deviation in the normal developmental symmetry of the volar pad and, therefore, affect the resulting pattern type.\n\n## 3.7.2 Size Of The Volar Pad 3.7.2.1 Pattern Size. The Size, Particularly The Height, Of The Volar Pad During Primary Ridge Formation Affects The Ridge Count From The Core To The Delta Of Normal Friction Ridge Figure 320\n\nComputer models demonstrating directional\nfield points (tic marks) stretched in the direction\nof stress. The white spot illustrates the degree\nof compressive stress and the location where\nridge formation takes place first (center of the\nwhite portion represents the apex of the pad).\n(Reprinted with permission from Kucken and\nNewell (2005), p 79.)\n\n## Figure 321\n\nSix different fingerprint patterns from different\nindividuals, representing the continuum of volar\npad symmetry at the onset of friction ridge\nproliferation, ranging from (1) nearly symmetrical\nto (6) very displaced. (Reprinted with permission\nfrom Wertheim and Maceo (2002), p 69.)\n\npatterns (Bonnevie, 1924; Mulvihill and Smith, 1969; Sier-\nvogel et al., 1978). Researchers have observed that ridges\nthat form on high, pronounced volar pads conform to the\nsurface as high-count whorl patterns. Conversely, ridges\nthat form on a finger with a low or absent volar pad create\nlow-count or arch-type patterns (Babler, 1987, pp 300301).\nHolt (1968) reported that the total finger ridge count (TFRC)\nof all 10 fingers, taken by adding the ridge counts from\nthe core to the delta in loops, or the core toward the radial\ndelta in whorls, is the most inheritable feature in dermato-\nglyphics. This combined information points directly to the\nconclusion that timing events related to volar pad and fric-\ntion ridge formation affect friction ridge patterns.\n\n3.7.2.2 Timing Events. The ridge count of a friction ridge\npattern is related to two different events: the timing of the\nonset of volar pad regression and the timing of the onset\nof primary ridge formation. Differences in the timing of\neither event will affect the ridge count of that particular\npattern. For example, early onset of volar pad regression\nwould lead to a volar pad that was in a more regressed\nstate at the time of the onset of primary ridge formation,\nand a relatively low-ridge-count pattern (or arch) would\nlikely result. Conversely, overall late onset of volar pad re-\ngression would mean that the pad was still relatively large\n\nwhen primary ridges began forming, and a high-ridge-count pattern would more likely result (Figure 322). This theory is supported by a study that found that \"late maturers\" had higher-than-average ridge counts, and \"early maturers\" had lower-than-average ridge counts (Meier et al., 1987). If the onset of volar pad regression occurred at the normal time, then earlier-than-average onset of primary ridge formation would occur on a larger-than-average volar pad, leading to a higher-than-average ridge count. Likewise, later-than-average onset of primary ridge formation would occur on a smaller-than-average volar pad, leading to a lower-than-average ridge count (Figure 322A). When both early and late timing of both factors are taken into account, the results become even more complex (Figure 322B). To make matters even more complex, the size of the volar pad with respect to the finger is also affected by many factors. Diet and chemical intake of the mother (Holbrook, 1991b), hormone levels (Jamison, 1990), radiation levels (Bhasin, 1980), and any other factors that affect the growth rate of the fetus during the critical stage could all indirectly affect the ridge counts of the developing friction ridges on the finger. It is important to remember that anything that affects the tension across the surface of the finger could affect the resulting ridge alignment and pattern type. However, Holt's findings seem to indicate that timing events, rather than environmental factors, play the dominant role in determining TFRC (Holt, 1968).\n\n3.7.2.3 Delta Placement. The onset of cellular proliferation, which begins primary ridge formation, occurs first in three distinct areas: (1) the apex of the volar pad (which corresponds to the core of the fingerprint pattern); (2) the distal periphery, or tip of the finger (near the nailbed); and\n(3) the distal interphalangeal flexion crease area (below the delta(s) in a fingerprint) (Figure 323). As ridge formation continues, new proliferation occurs on the edges of the existing ridge fields in areas that do not yet display primary ridge formation. These three \"fields\" of ridges converge as they form, meeting in the delta area of the finger. This wavelike process of three converging fields allows for the visualization of how deltas most likely form (Figure 324). The concept of \"converging ridge fields\" also offers a way to visualize the difference between the formation of highversus low-ridge-count patterns. If ridges begin forming on the apex (center) of the pad first and proceed outward before formation begins on the tip and joint areas, then by the time the fields meet, a relatively large distance will have been traversed by the field on the apex of the pad; in that instance, a high-count pattern will be formed (Figure 325). However, if the ridges form first on the two outermost portions and proceed inward, and formation begins at the last instant on the apex of the pad, then only a few ridges may be formed by the time the fields meet; in that instance, a very low-count pattern is observed (Figure 326). The combined observations of different researchers examining friction ridges on the finger during the critical stage of development further support the validity of this model (Babler, 1991, 1999; Dell and Munger, 1986; Hirsch and Schweichel, 1973).\n\n## 3.7.3 Combined Effect Of Timing And Symmetry On Ridge Formation\n\nWhen it is understood that timing and symmetry control two very different elements of ridge flow, it becomes easy to see how both small and large loop and whorl patterns form.\n\nA finger pad that regresses symmetrically will form a whorl pattern, regardless of early or late timing of friction ridge formation with respect to volar pad regression. If the timing of the onset of primary ridge formation in this situation is early in fetal life, then the volar pad will still be high on the finger, and the whorl pattern will have a high ridge count. If timing is later in fetal life, after the pad has almost completely been absorbed into the contours of the finger, then a low-count whorl pattern will result. With further regression, an arch pattern will form (Figure 327). Likewise, asymmetrical finger pads will form loop patterns and will also be affected by timing. If ridges begin forming early with respect to volar pad regression on an asymmetrical pad, then the pad will be large, and a high-count loop will result. Later timing leads to a low-count loop or arch-type pattern (Figure 328). Again, volar pad placement\n\n## Figure 323\n\nA drawing depicting the normal starting\nlocations of ridge formation and subse-\nquent coverage across the surface of a\nfinger. (Reprinted with permission from\nWertheim and Maceo (2002), p 66.)\n\n## Figure 324\n\nA drawing that depicts an easy way to\nvisualize how deltas form from three\nconverging ridge fields. (Reprinted with\npermission from Wertheim and Maceo\n(2002), p 66.)\n\n## Figure 325\n\nA drawing that depicts the likely progression\nof ridges on a high-ridge-count pattern.\n(Reprinted with permission from Wertheim\nand Maceo (2002), p 67.)\n\n## Figure 326\n\nA drawing that depicts the likely progression\nof ridges on a low-ridge-count pattern.\n(Reprinted with permission from Wertheim\nand Maceo (2002), p 67.)\n\nis not simply symmetrical or asymmetrical; a continuum of\nvolar pad symmetry occurs and accounts for the variety of\npattern types observed.\n\nA regression scheme seems to exist whereby the volar pad\nis symmetrical at the onset and becomes progressively\nmore asymmetrical as it regresses. This is supported by\ngeneral fingerprint pattern statistics that show that more\nthan one-half of all fingerprint patterns are ulnar loops. More\nspecifically, this scheme is supported by fetal research that\nhas determined that early timing of primary ridge formation\nleads to a higher percentage (95 percent) of whorls (Babler,\n1978, p 25). Also, low- and high-ridge-count patterns occur\nless frequently than average-count patterns (Cowger, 1983).\nAll research tends to indicate that volar pads regress from\nan early symmetrical position to an asymmetrical position\nlater in fetal life. Although this is the norm, it is certainly not\nwithout exception, because whorl patterns with extremely\n\nsymmetrical, volar pads (top). The drawings on\nthe top illustrate the likely fetal condition of the\nsymmetrical volar pad that produced the result-\ning print below it. From left to right, the images\nshow the results of the combined timing of the\nonset of friction ridge proliferation versus volar\n\npad regression. (Reprinted with permission\n\nfrom Wertheim and Maceo (2002), p 71.)\n\nThese different fingerprint patterns (bottom)\nwere formed on different, asymmetrical volar pads (top). The drawings on the top illustrate volar pad that produced the resulting print below it. From left to right, the images show low ridge counts and loop patterns with extremely high ridge counts can both be found with relative ease in even small collections of recorded fingerprints.\n\n## 3.8 Genetics 3.8.1 Introduction To Genetic Diversity And Friction Ridge Skin\n\nIn 1904, Inez Whipple presented research that provided a detailed theory of evolutionary progression of the volar surface (Whipple, 1904). Ashbaugh succinctly summarizes Whipple's proposition of the evolutionary genesis of friction ridges:\nEarly mammals were covered with a scale-like skin surface. Each scale had one hair protruding from it and an accompanying oil or sebaceous gland. On volar areas, which are the bottoms of the hands and feet, hairs slowly disappeared due to surface use. The pore that was related to the hair changed from a sebaceous gland to a sweat gland. Its purpose, to keep the surface skin damp which enhanced the grip of the volar surface.\n\nStarting in all likelihood as a mutation, scales started to line up in rows and fuse together. This further assisted the grip of the skin surface by increasing friction. Through natural selection, this mutation became prevalent. Scales slowly evolved into wart-like units with pore openings near the centre. The fusing of these wart formations into rows is the predecessor to the friction ridge, the individual wart being the equivalent of a ridge dot (Ashbaugh, 1991, p 27).\n\nFourteen years after Whipple's phylogenetic (evolutionary history) theory was presented, researchers diverged from her theory and presented an ontogenetic (individual developmental or embryonic history) model, suggesting that fusion of warts into ridges occurs during embryonic development (Wilder and Wentworth, 1918). In 1926, Cummins refuted the ontogenetic scheme (Cummins, 1926, p 134). However, Hale later included the ontogenetic model in his conclusions (Hale, 1952). Literature since that time has been mixed. Multiple researchers have demonstrated that the first visual evidence of interaction between the dermis and the epidermis is ridges, not a series of units, protruding into the dermis (Figure 36, p 3-8). Perhaps with advances in technology, the theory that localized cell proliferations grow together into linear ridges before the appearance of the ridge as a structure will be demonstrated. Until then, fusion of units into ridges remains a possible model of development that could provide individuality before the appearance of the first ridge structures. The term \"ridge unit\" might be limited to a description of an adult sweat pore and surrounding ridge (Ashbaugh, 1999, pp 25, 35), with the term \"localized proliferation\" being used to describe theoretical events of fetal formation (Babler, 1987, p 298).\n\n## 3.8.2 The Role Of Genetics\n\nEvery aspect of the growth and development of a single cell into a fully formed human is initiated by a genetic blueprint. The capacity to form friction ridges is inherent within the developing embryo. The patterns that these ridges form, however, are limited by nature and are defined by the fingerprint community as whorls, loops, arches, combinations and transitions of these basic patterns, or lack of a pattern (Hirsch, 1964). Although genetics may direct when and where ridges will form by providing the blueprint for proteins, nature provides the boundaries for patterning through physical mechanisms (Ball, 1999). Proteins direct cellular activity by facilitating biochemical processes within the cell. These processes depend not only on the protein derived from the gene but also on the many other nonprotein components of the cell such as sugars, lipids, hormones, inorganic elements (e.g., oxygen), inorganic compounds (e.g., nitric oxide), and minerals. Additionally, the physical environment around and within cells, including surface tension, electrical charge, and viscosity, contributes to the way the cell functions (Ball, 1999). Genetic information directs cellular function, serves as a link between generations, and influences an individual's appearance. Some aspects of appearance are similar for each individual of that species (i.e., those characteristics that define the species). However, within the species, for each aspect of an individual's appearance, many genes and external factors affect the final outcome of physical appearance. The genes involved with a specific attribute (e.g., skin color) produce the appropriate proteins, which in turn react with each other and with the many nongenetic components of the cell in complex biochemical pathways during the growth and development of the fetus (Ball, 1999). These biochemical pathways proceed under the omnipresent influence of external factors.\n\nAlthough DNA is crucial for providing the blueprint for the development of a particular model, there are so many steps between the genesis of the DNA-encoded protein and the final product that even two individuals who originated from the same DNA would produce two completely unique models. Perhaps Jamison best describes the interplay between genes and the environment in friction ridge skin:\nSince dermatoglyphic formation cannot be derived solely from either genetic or environmental factors, it must result from an interaction of the two types of factors. This interaction is probably far from being simple and it most likely involves a multiple step reciprocal positive feedback relationship (Maruyama, 1963) in which either a genetically or an environmentally-based factor causes a change in the uterine environment, leading to a genetic response (perhaps in the form of a \"switch mechanism\", as in Roberts (1986)), which then leads to an increasingly complex series of genetic-environmental interactive responses (Jamison, 1990, p 103).\n\nThe ultimate example of the role of the environment in friction ridge formation is monozygotic twins, who share identical genetic information and very similar intrauterine environments, but on many occasions have very different patterns. The role of genetics is currently understood by the indication that several main genes, in conjunction with a number of modifying genes, may be responsible for volar patterning, but it is well established that friction ridge patterning is also affected by the environment (Chakraborty, 1991; Hirsch, 1964; Loesch, 1982, 1983; Slatis et al., 1976; Weninger et al., 1976). Like many traits, genetics influences pattern formation indirectly by contributing to the timing of the onset of friction ridge skin, the timing of the onset of volar pad regression, the growth rate of the fetus, and other factors. Stresses across small areas of skin are not inherited, but rather they represent one of many environmental factors that influence pattern formation. Until recently (Chakraborty, 1991; Mavalwala et al., 1991), most researchers in the field of genetics and physical anthropology have traditionally viewed TFRC as evidence of direct genetic control of fingerprint pattern formation (Bonnevie, 1924; Holt, 1968). The research of Sara Holt (1968) regarding the inheritability of TFRC is a significant finding that supports the two-tiered development scheme suggested by this and other literary reviews of fingerprint pattern formation. Logic also supports this scheme. Genetically controlled timed events would be less susceptible to environmental variations, and, therefore, TFRC would be more inheritable than pattern type. Additionally, the wide range of patterns found on the palms (Malhotra, 1982) demonstrates the complex nature of factors that affect ridge alignment. Patterning and ridge counts are indirectly inherited and are not affected by only one developmental factor. However, ridge flow and ridge count are both affected by tension across the surface of growing fetal skin.\n\n## 3.8.3 Familial Studies\n\n3.8.3.1 Ethnic Variation. Thousands of anthropological studies have been conducted on distinct populations to identify trends in fingerprint pattern formation. Perhaps one of the most comprehensive reviews of this tremendous body of research was conducted by Jamshed Mavalwala, resulting in a 300-page bibliography of dermatoglyphic references (Mavalwala, 1977). The major result from this body of work was the demonstration that intratribal variations in friction ridge pattern frequencies were greater than intertribal variations. Likewise, intraspecies variations in primates were greater than interspecies variations. The body of literature on ethnic variation suggests that multiple genes affect pattern formation and that those genes interact with respect to final pattern characteristics.\n\n3.8.3.2 Abnormalities. The medical community has been, and continues to be, interested in dermatoglyphics (Durham et al., 2000; Kahn et al., 2001; Schaumann and Opitz,\n1991) and creases (Kimura, 1991) as indicators of abnormal fetal development during the critical stage. Although there is evidence that interest has waned in recent decades (Reed, 1991), it was reported in 1991 that significantly more than 3,500 articles in the international literature dealt with different aspects of dermatoglyphics (Mavalwala, 1977). Although many articles relate certain medical conditions to statistically significant occurrences of abnormal ridge pattern combinations, many researchers still heed the warning that \"dermatoglyphics may be of uncertain, if any, diagnostic value due to the lack of a specific dermatoglyphic stereotype in individual patients\" (Schaumann, 1982, pp 3334). Harold Cummins was perhaps one of the most prominent researchers on the specific reasons behind abnormal friction ridge pattern development (Cummins, 1923, 1926).\n\nFrom dozens of developmental-defect case studies, he concluded that \"whatever the nature of the defect, the [ridge] configurations occur as systems partly or wholly unlike the normal, but obviously conforming to the irregularities of the part\" (Cummins, 1926, p 132). Later in his career, Cummins established that the absence of dermal ridges can be caused by chromosomal abnormalities (Figure 329) (Cummins, 1965). Other research (Schaumann and Alter, 1976) has attributed a more pronounced condition, dysplasia, to localized deviation in normal nerve branching during fetal development (Figure 330). A third and much more extreme (and rare) condition involves the complete lack of ridge features on the fingers and palms of the hands as well as the toes and soles of the feet. Cummins hypothesizes that in epidermolysis, or the death and dissolution of the epidermis, the disintegrated epidermis sloughs, and the denuded surface is gradually covered by a growth of skin cells arising from the dermis after the capacity has gone for the epidermaldermal junction to produce ridges (Cummins, 1965). Other researchers indicate that this condition, also known as aplasia, appears to stem from a chromosomal abnormality linked to the complete lack of nerve development in the epidermis at the time ridges are supposed to form. In a 1965 article, Cummins postulates that epidermolysis can be inherited, citing three generations of a family, 13 of whom lacked ridges over fingers, palms, toes, and soles (Cummins, 1965). Schaumann and Alter (1976) reproduce a family tree showing 16 of 28 family members from four generations having congenital ridge aplasia, and go on to reference other evidence of the inheritance of ridge anomalies (Figure 331).\n\nGoradia and colleagues (1979) make a convincing argument that there is a continuum between normal epidermal ridges, disassociated ridges, and aplasia. They cite cases of overlap in the same person between normal and disassociated ridges as well as overlap between disassociated ridges and areas with no discernible pattern. Additionally, the authors bring to light that certain chromosomal abnormalities have been found to be associated with both disassociation and aplasia. Although not a typical abnormality, incipient ridges, also described as \"rudimentary\", \"interstitial\", or \"nascent\" ridges, are not present in the majority of friction ridge impressions. When they are present on an individual, studies have shown them to be hereditary (Penrose and Plomley, 1969). In 1979, Okajima examined incipient ridges and affirmed earlier research indicating that these structures are permanent, although they carry no sweat glands (Okajima, 1979) (Figure 332).\n\n## 3.9 Uniqueness: Developmental Noise 3.9.1 Ridge Path\n\nThe uniqueness of friction skin is imparted from the permanent base structure through a myriad of random forces, which, themselves, are affected by a seemingly infinite\n\nAn impression showing normal ridges\n(top right), mildly disassociated ridges\n(middle), and severely disassociated ridges\n(bottom left) in a patient with a chromosomal\nabnormality. (Reprinted with permission from\nSchaumann and Alter (1976), p 98.)\n\nImpressions of epidermis displaying\nmild (left) and severe (right) dysplasia.\n(Reprinted with permission from\nSchaumann and Alter (1976), pp 9496.)\n\nand Alter (1976), p 91.)\nnumber of factors. The fetal volar pads play a major role in affecting the tensions that directly influence pattern formation (volar pad symmetry) and ridge count (volar pad size), but minutiae formation occurs on a much smaller level. Localized stresses (tensions and compressions), resulting from growth of the tissue layers of the digit and interactions with existing ridge fields, create the foundations for second-level uniqueness.\n\n## 3.9.2 Ridge Morphology\n\nRidge morphology (third-level detail) is the surface manifestation of a unique heterogeneous cellular community along the basement membrane, which constantly feeds the epidermis a three-dimensional portrait of its uniqueness. It is completely inconceivable that the physical stresses and cellular distributions that create that community could be exactly duplicated, on any level, in two different areas of developing fetal tissue. Each individual section of every ridge is unique. Therefore, any ridge arrangement, regardless of quantity, cannot be replicated. Wide variations in the amount of detail that is recorded from the threedimensional skin to the two-dimensional impression during any given contact may result in the impossibility of individualization of some latent impressions, but the arrangement of features on the skin and the resulting details in the impression on a surface are still unique.\n\n## 3.9.3 Maturation Of The Skin\n\nAfter maturation of the primary and secondary ridges at 24 weeks EGA, anastomoses begin to cross through the dermis (Hale, 1952), linking primary and secondary ridges and molding the upper portion of the dermis into papillae pegs. Papillae continue to change form even into late adulthood and become complex (Misumi and Akiyoshi, 1984). Although the shape of the epidermaldermal boundary may change over time, the rate of skin cell production in the basal layer of skin does not become spatially incongruent. It is for this reason that changes in the shape of the basal layer \"sheet\" do not produce features that appear significantly different on the surface (Figure 333). The consistent rate of basal skin cell proliferation in neighboring areas of skin provides consistent unique detail to the surface of skin. The pattern increases many times over in size, but the sequence of ridges never changes throughout fetal and adult life, barring injury or disease that affects the basal layer of skin.\n\n## 3.10 Summary: Keys To Uniqueness And Pattern Formation 3.10.1 Uniqueness\n\nAs the skin progresses through the entire process of ridge formation (Figure 334), many factors contribute to the end result: complete structural uniqueness, from ridge path to ridge shape. Although genetics has been shown to play a role in pattern formation, it does not determine the arrangement of minutiae or ridge shapes within the pattern. The morphogenesis of these finer details is a product of the unique developmental noise that occurs in that area of skin during the critical period of friction ridge formation.\n\n## 3.10.2 Pattern Formation\n\nThe fetal volar pads play a major role in influencing pattern formation (volar pad symmetry) and ridge count (volar pad size), but the volar pads do not directly cause ridge alignment. Instead, the volar pads affect the topology of the surface and the overall tension and compression across the developing epidermaldermal junction, which in turn directly affects friction ridge alignment during the critical stage of ridge development. Any stress or strain on the developing finger during the critical stage (Figure 335) of friction ridge formation could affect ridge alignment.\n\n## 3.11 Reviewers\n\nThe reviewers critiquing this chapter were Jeffrey G. Barnes, Patti Blume, Mary Ann Brandon, Brent T. Cutro, Sr., Lynne D. Herold, Michelle L. Snyder, and John R. Vanderkolk.\n\n## Figure 333\n\nAn illustration of the progression of the structure\nof volar skin from fetal life (left) through late adulthood (right). (Reprinted with permission from Wertheim and Maceo (2002), p 39.)\n\n## Figure 334\n\nDrawings representing volar skin before (A), during\n(BE), and after (FH) the critical stage of friction\nridge formation: (A) undifferentiated friction ridge\nskin; (B) initiation of primary ridge formation at\nthe epidermaldermal border; (C) primary ridges\nincreasing in depth; (D) skin growth separating\nexisting primary ridges; (E) new primary ridge\ngrowth between existing primary ridges (sweat\nducts are forming); (F) initiation of secondary ridge\ngrowth between primary ridges; (G) secondary\nridge maturation combined with surface ridge\nappearance; (H) entire system begins maturation\nprocess (approximately 24 weeks EGA). (Reprinted\nwith permission from Wertheim and Maceo (2002),\np 56.)\n\n## Figure 335\n\nA chart showing the consensus of the literature\nregarding estimated time frames for the onset\n(becoming larger) and regression (becoming\nsmaller) of the volar pads, as well as the onset\nand growth of the primary and secondary ridges.\n\n## 3.12 References\n\nAshbaugh, D. R. Ridgeology. *J. Forensic Ident.* 1991, 41 (1),\n1664.\n\nAshbaugh, D. R. QuantitativeQualitative Friction Ridge Analysis: An Introduction to Basic and Advanced Ridgeology; CRC Press: Boca Raton, FL, 1999.\n\nBabler, W. J. Prenatal Selection and Dermatoglyphic Patterns. *Am. J. Physical Anthropol.* 1978, 48 (1), 2128.\n\nBabler, W. J. Prenatal Development of Dermatoglyphic Patterns: Associations with Epidermal Ridge, Volar Pad, and Bone Morphology. *Collegium Anthropologicum* 1987, 11 (2),\n297303. Babler, W. J. Prenatal Communalities in Epidermal Ridge Development. In *Trends in Dermatoglyphic Research;*\nDurham, N., Plato, C., Eds.; Kluwer Academic Press: Dordrecht, Netherlands, 1990; pp 5468. Babler, W. J. Embryologic Development of Epidermal Ridges and Their Configurations. In Dermatoglyphics: Science in Transition; Plato, C., Garruto, R., Schaumann, B., Eds.; Birth Defects Original Article Series; March of Dimes: New York, 1991; pp 95112. Babler, W. J. Marquette University, Milwaukee, WI. Personal communication, 1999.\n\nBall, P. The Self-Made Tapestry: Pattern Formation in Nature; Oxford University Press: New York, 1999.\n\nBhasin, M. Effect of Natural Background Radiation on\nDermatoglyphic Traits. *Acta Anthropogenetica* 1980, 4\n(12), 127. Bonnevie, K. Studies on Papillary Patterns on Human\nFingers. *J. Genetics* 1924, 15, 1112.\n\nBurdi, A.R., Babler, W. J., Garn, S.M. Monitoring Patterns of Prenatal Skeletal Development. In DermatoglyphicsFifty Years Later; Birth Defects Original Article Series 15(6);\nMarch of Dimes: Washington, DC, 1979; pp 2538.\n\nCarlson, B. *Human Embryology and Development Biology;*\nMosby: New York, 1999. Chacko, S; Vaidya, M. The Dermal Papillae and Ridge Patterns in Human Volar Skin. *Acta Anatomica (Basel)* 1968, 70 (1), 99108.\n\nChakraborty, R. The Role of Heredity and Environment on Dermatoglyphic Traits. In Dermatoglyphics: Science in Transition; March of Dimes: Washington, DC, 1991; pp 151191.\n\nCowger, J. F. Friction Ridge Skin: Comparison and Identification of Fingerprints; Elsevier Science: New York, 1983.\n\nCummins, H. The Configurations of Epidermal Ridges in a Human Acephalic Monster. *Anatomical Record* 1923, 26\n(1), 113. Cummins, H. Epidermal Ridge Configurations in Developmental Defects, with Particular References to the Ontogenetic Factors Which Condition Ridge Direction. Am. J. Anatomy 1926, 38 (1), 89151.\n\nCummins, H. The Topographic History of the Volar Pads\n(Walking Pads; Tastballen) in the Human Embryo. Contributions to Embryol. 1929, 20, 105126. Cummins, H. Loss of Ridged Skin Before Birth. Finger Print Ident. Mag. 1965, 46, 37, 23.\n\nDell, D.; Munger, B. The Early Embryogenesis of Papillary (Sweat Duct) Ridges in Primate Glabrous Skin: The Dermatotopic Map of Cutaneous Mechanoreceptors and Dermatoglyphics. *J. Comp. Neurol.* 1986, 244 (4),\n511532. De Wilde, A. G. A Theory Concerning Ridge Pattern Development. *Bull. Int. Dermatoglyphics Assoc.* 1980, 8 (1),\n218.\n\nDurham, N., Fox, K., Plato, C., Eds. The State of Dermatoglyphics: The Science of Finger and Palm Prints; Edwin Mellen Press: New York, 2000. Elie, J. A New Methodological Approach to Dermatoglyphic Variability. *Can. Rev. Physical Anthropol.* 1987, 6 (1), 5463.\n\nEvatt, E. J. The Development and Evolution of the Papillary Ridges and Patterns of the Volar Surfaces of the Hand. J. Anatomy 1906, 41, 6670.\n\nGoradia, R.; Davis, B.; DeLeon, R. Familial Ridge Dissociation-Aplasia and X-Chromosome Aneuploidy.\nIn *DermatoglyphicsFifty Years Later;* Birth Defects Original Article Series; March of Dimes: Washington, DC, 1979; pp 591607. Hale, A. Morphogenesis of Volar Skin in the Human Fetus.\n\nAm. J. Anatomy 1952, 91 (1), 147173.\n\nHeimer, L. The Human Brain and Spinal Cord: Functional Neuroanatomy and Dissection Guide, 2nd ed.; Springer-\nVerlag: New York, 1995.\n\nHirsch, W. Biological Aspects of Finger Prints, Palms, and Soles. *Fingerprint and Ident. Mag.* 1964, 317.\n\nHirsch, W.; Schweichel, J. U. Morphological Evidence Concerning the Problem of Skin Ridge Formation. J. Mental Deficiency Res. 1973, 17 (1), 5872.\n\nHolbrook, K. A. Structure and Development of the Skin. In Pathophysiology of Dermatologic Diseases, 2nd ed.; Soter, M., Baden, H., Eds.; McGraw-Hill: New York, 1991a; pp 343. Holbrook, K. A. Structure and Function of the Developing Human Skin. In *Biochemistry and Physiology of the Skin;*\nGoldsmith, L., Ed.; Oxford University Press: New York, 1991b; pp 64101. Holbrook, K. A.; Odland, G. F. The Fine Structure of Developing Human Epidermis: Light Scanning, and Transmission Electron Microscopy of the Periderm. *J. Invest. Dermatol.* 1975, 65 (1), 1638. Holt, S. B. *The Genetics of Dermal Ridges;* Charles C.\n\nThomas: Springfield, IL, 1968. Jamison, C. Dermatoglyphics and the Geschwind Hypothesis I: Theoretical Background and Palmar Results of Dyslexia II. Digital Results of Dyslexia and Developmental Implications. In *Trends in Dermatoglyphic Research;* Durham, N., Plato, C., Eds.; Kluwer Academic Press: Dordrecht, Netherlands, 1990; pp 99135.\n\nKahn, H.; Ravindranath, R.; Valdez, R.; Venkat Narayan, K. M. Fingerprint Ridge-Count Difference between Adjacent Fingertips (dR45) Predicts Upper-Body Distribution:\nEvidence for Early Gestational Programming. Am. J. Epidemiol. 2001, 153 (4), 338344.\nKimura, S. Embryological Development of Flexion Creases.\n\nIn *Dermatoglyphics Science in Transition;* March of Dimes:\nWashington, DC, 1991; pp 113129.\n\nKollmann, A. Der Tastapparat der Hand der menschlichen Rassen und der Affen in seiner Entwickelung und Gliederung (The Tactile Apparatus of the Hand of the Human Races and Apes in Its Development and Structure); Voss Verlag: Hamburg, Germany, 1883.\n\nKucken, M.; Newell, A. Fingerprint Formation. J. Theoretical Biol. 2005, 235 (1), 7183.\n\nLacroix, B.; Wolff-Wuenot, M.; Haffen, K. Early Human Hand Morphology: An Estimation of Fetal Age. Early Human Development 1984, 9 (2), 127136.\n\nLavker, R. M.; Sun, T. T. Epidermal Stem Cells. J. Invest. Dermatol. 1983, 81 (1) (Suppl.), 121s127s.\n\nLoesch, D. The Contributions of L.S. Penrose to Dermatoglyphics. *J. Mental Deficiency Res.* 1973, 17 (1), 117.\n\nLoesch, D. Genetic Studies of DermatoglyphicsAdvances and Limitations. *Progress in Dermatoglyphic Res.* 1982, 84,\n4577.\n\nLoesch, D. Quantitative Dermatoglyphics: Classification, Genetics, and Pathology; Oxford University Press: New York, 1983. Malhotra, K. Progress in Genetics of Palmar Pattern Ridge Counts in Man. *Progress in Dermatoglyphic Res.* 1982, 84,\n111128. Maruyama, M. The Second Cybernetics: Deviation-\nAmplifying Mutual Causal Processes. *Am. Scientist* 1963, 5 (2), 164179. Mavalwala, J. Dermatoglyphics: An International Bibliography; Mouton: Chicago, 1977.\n\nMavalwala, J.; Mavalwala, P.; Kamali, S. Issues of Sampling and of Methodologies in Dermatoglyphics. In Dermatoglyphics: Science in Transition; March of Dimes: Washington, DC, 1991; pp 291303. Meier, R. J. Sequential Developmental Components of Digital Dermatoglyphics. *Human Biol.* 1981, 53 (4), 557573.\n\nMeier, R. J.; Goodson, C. S.; Roche, E. Dermatoglyphic Development and Timing of Maturation. *Human Biol.* 1987, 59 (2), 357373.\n\nMisumi, Y.; Akiyoshi, T. Scanning Electron Microscopic Structure of the Finger Print as Related to the Dermal Surface. *The Anatomical Record* 1984, 208 (1), 4955. Montagna, W.; Parakkal, P. The Structure and Function of Skin, 3rd ed.; Academic Press: New York, 1974. Montagna, W.; Kligman, A.; Carlisle, K. Atlas of Normal Human Skin; Springer-Verlag: New York, 1992.\n\nMoore, S. J.; Munger, B. The Early Ontogeny of the Afferent Nerves and Papillary Ridges in Human Digital Glabrous Skin. *Dev. Brain Res.* 1989, 48 (1), 119141.\n\nRoberts, D. The Genetics of Human Fetal Growth. In Human Growth, A Comprehensive Treatise; Falkner, F.; Tanner, J., Eds.; Plenum Press: New York, 1986; vol. 3, pp 113143.\n\nMorohunfola, K.; Munger, B.; Jones, T. The Differentiation of the Skin and its Appendages. I. Normal Development of Papillary Ridges. *The Anatomical Record* 1992, 232 (4),\n587598.\n\nSchaumann, B. Medical Applications of Dermatoglyphics.\n\nProgress in Dermatoglyphic Res. 1982, 84, 3334.\n\nMulvihill, J. J.; Smith, D. W. The Genesis of Dermatoglyphics. *J. Pediatr.* 1969, 75 (4), 579589.\n\nSchaumann, B.; Alter, M. Dermatoglyphics in Medical Disorders; Springer-Verlag: New York, 1976.\n\nMurray, J. D. How the Leopard Gets Its Spots. Scientific American 1988, 80.\n\nSchaumann, B.; Opitz, J. Clinical Aspects of Dermatoglyphics. In *Dermatoglyphics: Science in Transition;* March of Dimes: Washington, DC, 1991; pp 193228.\n\nOkajima, M. Development of Dermal Ridges in the Fetus.\n\nJ. Med. Genet. 1975, 12 (3), 243250.\n\nSiervogel, R. M.; Roche, A.; Roche, E. Developmental Fields for Dermatoglyphic Traits as Revealed by Multivariate Analysis. *Human Biol.* 1978, 50 (4), 541556.\n\nOkajima, M. Dermal and Epidermal Structures of the Volar Skin. In *DermatoglyphicsFifty Years Later;* Birth Defects Original Article Series; March of Dimes: Washington, DC, 1979; pp 179188.\n\nSlatis, H.; Katznelson, M.; Bonne-Tamir, B. The Inheritance of Fingerprint Patterns. *Am. J. Hum. Genet.* 1976, 28 (3),\n280289.\n\nOkajima, M. A Methodological Approach to the Development of Epidermal Ridges Viewed on the Dermal Surface of Fetuses. In *Progress in Dermatoglyphic Research;* Alan R. Liss, Inc.: New York, 1982; pp 175188.\n\nSmith, L. T.; Holbrook, K. A. Embryogenesis of the Dermis\nin Human Skin. *Pediatr. Dermatol.* 1986, 3 (4), 271280.\nPenrose, L.; O'Hara, P. The Development of Epidermal Ridges. *J. Med. Genet.* 1973, 10 (3), 201208.\n\nWeninger, M.; Aue-Hauser, G.; Scheiber, V. Total Finger Ridge-Count and the Polygenic Hypothesis: A Critique.\nHuman Biol. 1976, 48 (4), 713725.\nPenrose, L.; Plomley, N. Structure of Interstitial Epidermal Ridges. *Zeitschrift fur Morphologie und Anthropologie* 1969, 61 (1), 8184.\n\nWertheim, K.; Maceo, A. The Critical Stage of Friction Ridge Pattern Formation. *J. Forensic Ident.* 2002, 52 (1),\n3585.\n\nRaven, P.; Johnson, G. *Biology,* 3rd ed.; Mosby Year Book:\nSt. Louis, MO, 1992.\n\nWhipple, I., The Ventral Surface of the Mammalian Chiridium, With Special Reference to the Conditions Found in Man. *Zeitschrift fur Morphologie und Anthropologie* 1904, 7, 261368.\n\nReed, T. Impact of Changes in Medical Genetics on Teaching and Disseminating Information on Dermatoglyphics. In Dermatoglyphics: Science in Transition; March of Dimes:\nWashington, DC, 1991; pp 305319.\n\nWilder, H. H.; Wentworth, B. *Personal Identification;* The\nGorham Press: Boston, 1918.\nRoberts, D. Population Variation in Dermatoglyphics: Field Theory. *Progress in Dermatoglyphic Res.* 1982, 84, 7991.\n\n## C H A P T E R\n\n# Recording Living And Postmortem Friction Ridge Exemplars Brent T. Cutro, Sr.\n\n## C O N T E N T S\n\n\n3\n4.1  Introduction\n17\n4.5  Summary\n18\n4.6  Reviewers\n3\n4.2  Equipment\n18\n4.7  References\n\n5\n4.3  Recording Fingerprints, Palmprints, and Footprints of Living Subjects\n10\n4.4  Recording Postmortem Friction Ridge Detail\n\n## Chapter 4 Recording Living And Postmortem Friction Ridge Exemplars Brent T. Cutro, Sr. 4.1 Introduction\n\nThe skin is both the largest organ and the first line of protection in the human body. Completely covering the body from head to toe, the skin is primarily consistent in nature everywhere except for the areas covering the palmar surfaces of the fingers and hands and the plantar surfaces of the toes and feet. The skin on these areas is referred to\nas *friction ridge skin*. Obtaining legible recordings of these areas of skin is crucial for subsequent comparisons to latent impressions recovered from crime scenes, for comparison against previous records, or for input into automated fingerprint identification systems (AFIS).\nInked prints, record prints, standards, and *exemplars* are all terms that are used to describe the recording of these unique details.\n\n## 4.2 Equipment\n\nVarious types of equipment, inks, scanning devices, and techniques are used to record friction ridge detail. Although the concept of recording friction ridge detail seems basic, care and determination should always be exercised in order to obtain the best quality recordings because complete and legible recordings are a necessity in latent print examinations.\n\nThe equipment that is needed to record friction ridge detail includes an ink roller, an inking plate (constructed of glass or a smooth metal, such as stainless steel), fingerprint or palmprint cards for recording the prints, and a quality black ink formulated for this purpose (Figure 41). These items can be obtained from various forensic or printing supply companies. Only inks formulated for forensic purposes should be used, because other types of inks (printer's ink, writing ink, or rubber stamp ink) are too light, too thin, or do not dry quickly enough on the recording cards; this retained moisture could cause subsequent smearing of the prints. An alternative to the ink-and-roller method is the use of micro-reticulated thermoplastic resin pads or ceramic inking pads, both of which are impregnated with special permanent and nonfading inks. These products contain enough ink to record up to 50,000 fingerprints and should last approximately two years without replenishing. Cleanup is easy, and the ink dries quickly on recording cards (Olsen, 1978, pp 9091). Advances in ink technology have improved certain characteristics of some of these inks, resulting in more user-friendly products. A fingerprint stand is also useful. The fingerprint stand can be placed at a height that is necessary to comfortably record friction ridge detail while conveniently holding within its built-in storage bins all of the equipment needed for this purpose.\n\nThe standard cards that are used to record prints are 8\" x 8\". This size has space for two rows of five rolled fingerprints and space for plain or flat prints of the fingers under the rows of rolled prints. These cards are white and are usually lightweight cardboard or heavy paper stock. Fingerprint cards are handled countless times and may be stored in files for many years. For these reasons, the texture and strength of the card must be such that it will withstand frequent handling (Olsen, 1978, pp 5960).\n\nFigure 42 shows two rows of fingerprints (rolled impressions) in the center of the card. The blocks begin with the thumb of the right hand as #1, the right index finger as #2, and so on through the right little finger, #5. The left hand then begins with the thumb, designated #6, the left index finger is #7, and so on through the left little finger, #10. Another set of impressions would appear below these. They\nare referred to as plain, *flat*, or *simultaneous* impressions and serve as a verification of the finger sequence of the rolled impressions (Olsen, 1978, pp 6062). See Figure 43. In addition to the spaces for the fingerprint impressions, there is room on the card to record information about the person being printed (e.g., name, date of birth), information about the agency, and space for the date and signatures of the subject and technician. Livescan technology replaces the process of using ink to record friction ridge detail. The friction ridge surfaces to be recorded are placed on a scanner that records the detail in a matter of seconds. High-resolution scanners can produce images that rival the quality of ink recordings, and the digital images are easily reproduced and distributed electronically. The process of rolling the finger impressions (and plain impressions) on the scanner platen is the same as for the actual recording of inked impressions on a card, but without the ink.\n\n## 4.3 Recording Fingerprints, Palmprints, And Footprints Of Living Subjects\n\nLegible and completely recorded fingerprint cards, such as the one in Figure 43, are adequate for classification or comparison purposes and for scanning into AFIS.\n\n## 4.3.1 Recording Fingerprints\n\nThe basic method of recording friction ridge detail on the hands or feet can be accomplished by applying a thin coat of black ink directly to the skin's surface using a roller or by coating an inking plate with the ink and rolling the fingers onto the plate. Next, the inked skin is pressed on a surface of contrasting color, such as a white piece of paper or a fingerprint card. The difference in elevation between the ridges and the furrows of the friction ridge skin leaves a print that is a recording of the unique detail of the friction ridge skin (Cowger, 1983, p 10).\n\nTo begin this process, if using the ink-and-roller method, a small amount of ink is deposited at the edge, center, and opposite edge of a thoroughly cleaned inking plate. The ink is then rolled and smoothed out. The ink should look black, not gray. A gray color means that there is not enough ink on the plate. The ink should not look wet. If the ink looks wet, too much ink has been placed on the plate, and this could result in a smearing of the print. After the proper amount of ink has been rolled onto the plate, the next step is to ink the fingers (Cowger, 1983, p 10). Before any ink is applied to the fingers, the fingers must be inspected to ensure that they are clean and dry, because contaminants can interfere with proper recording. If the subject's fingers are too dry, a moisturizing hand lotion may be applied sparingly to soften the fingers. If the subject's fingers are too moist, they must be dried individually or, in case of excess moisture, wiped with an alcohol wipe and then dried. Regardless of what method of recording is used (ink and roller, Porelon Pad, or scanning device), the fingers should be rolled away from the body, and the thumbs should be rolled toward the body (thumbs in, fingers out). This procedure allows the fingers and thumbs to be rolled from an awkward position to a more relaxed position and is less likely to produce smeared recordings. To completely roll each finger, with the subject standing in front of and facing the cardholder, the hand should be firmly grasped in such a manner that the finger is extended and the other fingers are out of the way. The inking plate and the cardholder should be side by side, with the cardholder nearest the operator (Olsen, 1978, p 66). The hand is then rotated so that the side of the finger can be placed on the inking plate. While one of the operator's hands grasps the hand of the subject, the operator's other hand holds the end of the finger or thumb being printed to keep it from slipping, to apply light pressure, and to guide the roll (Figure 44).\n\n Two key factors to remember are control and pressure (Cowger, 1983, p 11). For best results, the subject should not help with the process and should be asked to remain in a relaxed posture. The finger or thumb is then rotated 180 (i.e., nail edge to nail edge) and is immediately lifted from the plate and rolled in the same manner in the appropriate box on the fingerprint card that has been previously placed in the cardholder.\n\nThe fingers and thumbs should be rolled on the card or scanning device in the same sequence in which the spaces appear on the card, starting with the right thumb and ending with the left little finger (Olsen, 1978, p 66). The plain (i.e., flat or simultaneous) impressions are recorded by grouping the fingers from each hand and pressing them on the inking plate. The grouped fingers, numbers 25 and 710, are then pressed on the fingerprint card or scanning device in the appropriate boxes, taking care not to superimpose these impressions over the rolled impressions. The thumbs are inked and recorded separately in the same manner. The fingers and thumbs that are recorded in these boxes should not be rolled from side to side. As the fingers and thumbs are lifted from the card or scanning device, they should be rolled toward the tips of the fingers by keeping pressure on the fingers and lifting the subject's wrists so as to record as much friction ridge detail as possible toward the top of the pattern area.\n\n## 4.3.2 Recording Palmprints\n\nPalmprints are recorded in much the same manner as fingerprints; however, a cylindrical device is often used to facilitate the process to ensure complete recording of all friction ridge detail. The palms are not pressed on an inking plate. Rather, the roller is loaded with ink from the inking plate and the ink roller is used to apply a thin coat of ink directly to the hands from the base and edges of the palms to the tips of the fingers. Care must be exercised to ensure complete coverage of ink to all areas containing friction ridge detail. To record palmprints, a standard 8\" x 8\" card or heavy plain white bond paper is attached to a cylinder approximately 3\" in diameter. Removable adhesive tape or rubber bands may be used to attach the paper to the cylinder. (Some technicians prefer to let the paper \"ride\" across the cylinder without attaching it, taking care to prevent slippage.) The inked palm is then rolled either from the base of the palm toward the fingers or from the fingers to the base of the palm. Either way is acceptable and is generally left to the discretion of the technician. Most technicians prefer beginning at the base of the palm and rolling toward the fingers because this gives the technician more control over the subject and position of the print on the card (Olsen, 1978, p 74). The hand can simply be pulled rather than pushed across the surface, which also tends to help prevent lateral movement of the subject's hand. The palm must be recorded in one smooth, unceasing motion to prevent smudging or distortion (Figure 45).\n\n Light pressure should also be applied while rolling in order to maintain completeness and to adequately record the centers of the palms. (Extending the thumb to the side will also help eliminate voids in the center of the recorded palm.) The thumbs are recorded separately because of their position on the hand. The extreme side of the palm, opposite of the thumb, referred to as the \"writer's palm\" (i.e., the edge of the hypothenar area), is also recorded separately on the palmprint card. The card is removed from the cylinder and placed on a hard flat surface. This area of the palm is then pressed on the palmprint card, with the little finger extended, to the right of the previously recorded palmprint for the right hand and to the left of the previously recorded palmprint for the left hand, if space allows. The thumb area of the palm (thenar area) is then recorded in the same manner and placed to the left side of the previously recorded right palmprint and to the right side of the previously recorded left palmprint, again, if space allows. If adequate space does not allow for the thenar and hypothenar areas to be recorded on the same card, separate cards should be used for these recordings. An easy alternative method for recording palmprints is with the use of a white adhesive lifting material, such as Handiprint (Kinderprint Co.), and black fingerprint powder.\n\nThe fingerprint powder is lightly applied with a soft fingerprint brush to the entire surface of the palm. The adhesive material is separated from the backing and pressed onto the palm while smoothing from the center to the sides. The flexible adhesive conforms to the creases and crevices of the palm with minimal slippage, which aids in producing a high-contrast, completely recorded palmprint. The adhesive lifter is then peeled from the palm and placed onto a clear acetate cover, thus preserving the impression for subsequent comparisons.\n\n## 4.3.3 Recording Major Case Prints\n\nMajor case prints* (also referred to as *major criminal prints*)\nare a recording of all the friction ridge detail covering the hands. If necessary, this may also include a recording of all the friction ridge detail on the feet. In addition to legible and completely recorded fingerprints and palmprints, major case prints include a legible and completely recorded set of the tips of the fingers, from just below the nail to the center of the fingers, rolled from one side of the nail to the other, as well as completely recorded lower joints of the fingers, including the extreme sides. Major case prints are often required for comparison to unknown impressions that have been collected from crime scenes, and these impressions may include areas of friction ridge detail that are not routinely recorded. To begin, a complete set of the subject's fingerprints should be recorded as previously described. Next, all of the remaining friction ridge detail on the phalangeal areas of the thumbs and fingers is recorded using 8\" x 8\" cards or white bond paper firmly attached to the edge of a table. Beginning with the right thumb, a thin coat of ink is applied to all of the friction ridge detail with an ink roller, from the base of the thumb to the tip, including the extreme sides of the finger. Usually beginning at the lower left corner of the paper, the extreme left side of the thumb is firmly pressed on the paper. The thumb is removed by lifting from the base of the thumb to the tip. This will record the extreme left side of the thumb and tip. Next to this impression, the center of the thumb is placed on the paper and is removed in the same manner, thus completely recording the friction ridge detail from the base of the thumb to the tip. The extreme right side of the thumb is then placed to the right of the center portion, thus recording the extreme right side of the thumb and tip. Lastly, above the three recorded areas of the thumb, the extreme left side of the tip of the thumb is placed on the paper and rolled to the extreme right side with one continuous motion. This group of recorded friction ridge details of the thumb should be labeled \"#1\", or \"right thumb\", above the rolled tip (Figure 46). This process should be repeated with the remaining four fingers of the right hand, moving counterclockwise around the paper.\n\nAnother method that is preferred by some latent print examiners is to roll the entire finger with one continuous motion from extreme side to extreme side, including the lower phalanges, to ensure continuity of the impression.\n\nThe tip areas are also positioned and recorded above these impressions in the same manner. This procedure is then repeated for the left hand. To complete the major case print process, a legible and completely recorded set of palmprints is then recorded in the previously described manner.\n\n## 4.3.4 Recording Footprints\n\nOn occasion it may become necessary to record a subject's footprints. The same basic procedures as with recording palmprints are used; however, because of the large size of an adult foot, a larger cylinder and paper must be used. The cylinder used for this process should be approximately 5\" in diameter and should hold an 8.5\" x 14\" (legal size) sheet of heavy white bond paper attached to the cylinder, as previously described. The foot should be rolled across the paper in the same manner as the palmprints, in one smooth, continuous motion from the heel of the foot toward the toe, with the toes passing completely over the cylinder. Recordings of the feet may also be obtained by applying ink to the bottoms of the subject's feet with a roller and instructing the subject to walk across paper that has been laid out on the floor. This, however, requires cooperation from the subject and may not produce satisfactory recordings, because excessive pressure and movement of the feet may blur or smear the impressions. Another method (Olsen, 1978, p 75) is to mount a card or paper on a flat board. With the subject in a sitting position and with the leg elevated and supported, the paper is pressed against the subject's inked foot.\n\n## 4.3.5 Unusual Circumstances\n\nProblems ranging from temporary disabilities (e.g., wounds and blisters) to permanent disabilities (e.g., amputated fingers, extra fingers, webbed fingers, arthritis, or palsy) may be present when obtaining known standards. The occupation of the subject (e.g., brick layer) may also affect the ability to obtain legible recordings. In these cases, the friction ridge detail may be affected or worn to the point that a legible recording may be difficult. However, with patience, skill, and some ingenuity, it is possible to obtain satisfactory recordings. Obtaining legible recordings from injured fingers or palms can be difficult, so a notation of any temporary disabilities (e.g., fresh cuts, wounds, bandaged fingers, or large blisters)\nshould be made in the corresponding block on the fingerprint or palmprint card. If classification or input into an AFIS database is necessary, however, it is advisable to defer recording the fingerprints of the subject, if possible, until after the temporary injury has healed. Certain occupations can also pose problems to friction ridge skin, because people who consistently work with their hands tend to have worn, rough, dry, or damaged friction ridges on their fingers and palms, to the point that it is difficult to obtain legible recordings of their friction ridge detail. This problem may be overcome by applying skinsoftening lotion to the hands and fingers prior to recording. In addition, applying a very small amount of ink to the inking plate (so as not to get ink into the furrows and to ensure that only the tops of the ridges will be covered) may improve the fine detail (FBI, 1979, p 127). These same techniques are also useful when obtaining known standards from elderly individuals or small children with very fine ridge detail. The use of ice held against the friction ridge skin may also facilitate the recording of the fine detail (Olsen, 1978, p 83). On occasion, a subject's friction ridges may be so fine that the ink completely covers the ridges and furrows. In these cases, instead of using ink, using a brush to lightly dust the friction ridge skin with black fingerprint powder may be necessary to record the very fine friction ridge detail. White opaque lifting material\n(e.g., Handiprint) with a transparent cover is then used to record the impressions directly from the fingers (Olsen, 1978, p 84). The finger numbers should be marked on the transparent covers to prevent any confusion and to ensure the correct orientation of the impressions. The lifts are then cut to fit inside the appropriate blocks on the fingerprint card and are secured with clear tape. A notation of any permanent disabilities should be recorded in the appropriate block on the fingerprint card (e.g., \"missing at birth\" if the subject was born without certain fingers). In cases of amputation, a notation should be made in the appropriate block on the fingerprint card. If only a portion of the first joint of the finger is affected, it should be recorded as completely as possible and a notation should be made. In cases of bent or disfigured fingers, the tools (e.g., special ink rollers or spatulas and a curved strip holder) that are used for obtaining prints from deceased individuals can be used to record the friction ridge detail.\n\nIf a subject has more than 10 fingers (polydactyly), the thumb and the 4 fingers next to the thumb should be recorded on the fingerprint card in the usual manner. Any remaining fingers should be recorded on the other side of the card, and a notation should be made. Webbed fingers (syndactyly) should be recorded as completely as possible, also with a notation on the card concerning this congenital abnormality (FBI, 1979, p 128).\n\n## 4.4 Recording Postmortem Friction Ridge Detail\n\nOne of the most challenging, and also rewarding, aspects of latent print examination is the determination of the identity of deceased individuals. Various methods and techniques may be used to facilitate the successful recording and preservation of postmortem friction ridge detail. In circumstances involving unknown deceased infants, it is often necessary to obtain postmortem footprints, because hospital personnel usually record only footprint standards of newborn babies. When decomposition, desiccation (dryness), or maceration (separation and softening of skin by soaking in liquid) of the friction ridge skin precludes satisfactory recordings with traditional methods, the hands, fingers, or feet of the deceased may be surgically removed by a medical examiner and submitted to a laboratory, where advanced procedures may be conducted. Many techniques have been developed to effectively process postmortem friction ridge skin. It is important to realize that successful development, recording, and individualization of an often small area of available friction ridge skin could be the most valuable lead in solving a homicide case or in providing closure to a grieving family. Therefore, the latent print examiner must have experience and knowledge in this area. The condition of the friction ridge skin will dictate the various methods and techniques that should be used to successfully record valuable friction ridge detail. Recording the friction ridge detail from deceased individuals can, at times, present quite a challenge. Satisfactory recordings of recently deceased individuals can most often be performed much like recording the prints of live individuals, utilizing some specific tools to facilitate this process. Obtaining recordings of friction ridge detail from skin that is decomposed, mummified, charred, or macerated, however, may be much more difficult.\n\n## 4.4.1 General Recording Of Recently Deceased Subjects\n\nIf the hands are in reasonably good condition, obtaining satisfactory recordings of the friction ridge detail from the fingers is usually accomplished by straightening the fingers and flattening the palm. To facilitate this process, the deceased should be positioned with the face and palms down on a table (prone position) (FBI, 1979, p 136). The fingers and palms should be clean and dry. If rigor mortis (stiffening of the muscles) has set in, it is possible to break the rigor by forcibly straightening the digits, which can then be recorded by using equipment intended for this purpose (e.g., a spoon-shaped tool, as seen in Figure 47). As always, prior to handling any type of biohazardous material, care should be taken to ensure that personal protective equipment (e.g., gloves, face mask, and eye protection) is worn at all times.\n\nIf only the fingers are of concern, it is possible to print them by pressing on the finger just above the knuckle. This will straighten the finger and separate it from the others, facilitating proper recording. The palm can be recorded by bending it forward at the wrist. It may be possible to obtain adequate recordings by recording various areas of the palm separately (Cowger, 1983, p 29). If rigor mortis is present, \"It is better to take advantage of this condition than to try to overcome it, by bending the wrist still further toward the inner forearm and pressing the fingers one at a time toward the palm or wrist. In this position, they separate and straighten out in such a way that each finger can be printed without interference\" (Olsen, 1978, p 85). \"If breaking rigor is difficult or ineffective, or if the hand is so curled that the fingers or palm will not straighten sufficiently when pressed inward, it may be necessary to cut the tendons which cause the curling to occur\" (Cowger, 1983, p 29). (It is advisable that only legally designated persons perform this activity, because there are restrictions in some jurisdictions concerning the dissection of human remains.) There are many satisfactory methods of applying ink to the fingers of a deceased individual. One method is to use a spatula that contains a thin coat of ink that has been applied by an ink roller. The ink is then transferred to the fingers by manually rolling it around the fingers. A standard fingerprint card may then be cut into two strips of five blocks or into single blocks. A strip holder or spoon is used to hold the strip. The strip or block is then placed in the spoon with the top of the strip toward the handle of the spoon. The inked fingers are then rolled in their corresponding blocks from nail edge to nail edge, as previously described. This procedure is repeated on different strips until legible impressions are obtained. If individual cards are used, it is advisable to have more than 10 squares cut and ready in case some of them are ruined or the pattern area is not completely recorded (Olsen, 1978, p 86). Another method for extremely difficult cases is to use black fingerprint powder and white adhesive lifting material such as Handiprint.\n\n## 4.4.2 Recording Decomposed Friction Ridge Skin\n\nPutrefied skin (skin that is in a state of decomposition or\nrotting) is fragile. Such putrefaction is usually a result of various biological factors such as bacteria, fungi, or fermentation. Parasites may have also infiltrated this necrotic tissue. Extreme care should be exercised when examining and handling this fragile friction ridge skin. If, upon examination, friction ridge skin is present, discernible, and not badly damaged, it may be possible, using extreme care, to simply ink and record the friction ridge skin. However, if the friction ridge skin is rubbery and is separating from the underlying tissues or is too fragile for the technician to apply ink in the usual manner, the friction ridge skin may be removed from the underlying tissue. The skin must then be cleaned and dried and may be recorded by placing each finger, or friction ridge skin, over the technician's gloved finger or palm to ink and record as if the friction ridge skin were the technician's. As always, care in documenting which fingers are recorded is important. It is also recommended to photograph the visible ridge detail prior to any technique that may cause further deterioration of the friction skin. A 1015% soaking solution of formaldehyde may be used in extreme cases to firm up the skin to facilitate this process. Formaldehyde, however, can cause the skin to become very firm and brittle, causing the skin to split. The skin should soak for an hour or so until sufficiently firm. Once hardened, the friction ridge skin should be removed, patted dry, and recorded (FBI, 1979, pp 143144). Another similar method suggests soaking the fingers or friction skin in 10% formaldehyde solution for several hours. The skin is then rinsed gently with running water, rinsed in laboratory-quality isopropanol to remove any excess moisture, patted dry, and recorded as previously described (Miller, 1995, p 603). In many cases, especially if the decomposition is advanced, discernible friction ridge detail may not be present because the top layers of friction ridge skin may be completely decomposed or destroyed. In these instances, the bottom layers or underside of the friction ridge skin, as well as the dermis, may reveal discernible friction ridge detail and can be recorded successfully.\n\nOne method that is used to record the underside of friction ridge skin is lightly coating the underside of the epidermal layer of the friction ridge skin with fingerprint powder before applying ink. The underside of the friction ridge skin is then rolled on a section of the adhesive side of fingerprint lift tape (Rice, 1988a, p 100). To proceed, the friction ridge skin must be completely dried by placing the skin between paper towels. With the underside of the epidermal layer of the skin exposed, it is lightly dusted with black fingerprint powder and positioned over the technician's own gloved finger. The skin is then coated using an ink roller in the usual manner or rolled on an inking slab that has been coated with ink to apply a thin, even coat of fingerprint ink. The fingerprint powder is necessary to facilitate removal of the skin from the tape. The skin is then rolled across the adhesive side of a section of transparent or frosted fingerprint tape. It is important to note that the impression resulting from this method on the adhesive side of the tape will be in the correct orientation for comparison when placed adhesive-side down in the appropriate block on the fingerprint card, or, if recording palms, on the palmprint card. The impressions will be tonally reversed (white ridges) because the furrows (valleys), as opposed to the ridges, will be inked and recorded. If necessary, tonal reversal can be corrected photographically (Rice, 1988a, pp 98100). If the friction ridge skin is too brittle to attempt the previously described methods, the underside of the friction ridge skin may be photographed. To accomplish this, \"it may be advisable to trim the skin, flatten it out between two pieces of glass, and photograph it in that position\"\n(FBI, 1979, p 144). The skin is trimmed by carefully and meticulously removing the excess flesh by scraping, cutting, and trimming until only the friction ridge skin remains and can be flattened satisfactorily between two pieces of glass. Another method to further enhance friction ridge detail is to use transmitted lighting. This is accomplished by shining a light through the skin toward the lens of the camera when photographing. If the skin is still not transparent enough, soaking the skin in xylene for approximately five minutes before photographing or keeping the skin immersed in xylene while photographing is recommended. Once a suitable photograph is obtained, the negative may be printed as necessary to provide correct orientation of the impression for subsequent comparison to known standards (FBI, 1979, pp 145147).\n\n## 4.4.3 Recording Macerated Friction Ridge Skin\n\nMaceration occurs when friction ridge skin is immersed, usually in water, for an extended period of time. The epidermal layer absorbs water, often swells, and can loosen from the dermis within a few hours after immersion (FBI, 1979, p 151). If the friction ridge skin is not too badly damaged, the skin should be carefully cleaned, wiped with alcohol, and recorded as previously described for recently deceased subjects. If the skin has separated from the dermal layer and is wrinkled, it may be possible to pull the skin from the back of the finger to smooth out the pattern area by pinching the skin tightly. This will facilitate inking and recording (FBI, 1979, p 151). Stretching of the friction ridge skin in this manner may also facilitate the recording of palmprints and footprints. It is important to note that this type of process may enlarge the pattern area of the fingers, which may be significant when conducting an AFIS search with some systems. The epidermis from a \"de-gloved\" hand can be as much as 33% larger than the dermis. For this reason, if an AFIS search does not reveal an individualization using the original recording, the print should be searched again at 70% of its original size (Leas, 2006). In such instances when the skin is wrinkled but not pliable, thus not allowing the skin to be stretched smoothly across the pattern area, tissue builder or glycerin may be injected into the bulb of the finger to round out the pattern area. A string tied just above the injection site will help prevent the fluid from escaping. Often, the skin may be loose and somewhat damaged yet have most of the pattern area still intact. If this is the case, the friction ridge skin should be carefully removed, cleaned, and placed in alcohol for about one minute. The skin is then carefully placed over the technician's gloved finger to facilitate inking and recording (FBI, 1979, p 151). As always, friction ridge detail may also be photographed on the finger or cut and prepared, as previously described for decomposed friction ridge skin, to be placed between two pieces of glass and photographed with reflected or transmitted light. If no discernible friction ridge detail is present on the outer layers of the epidermis, it is possible that the underside of the epidermis or the top of the dermis may be recorded or photographed, as described previously for decomposed friction ridge skin. For situations in which the epidermis is missing or has been totally destroyed because of prolonged immersion in a liquid, a method known as osmotic rehydration (the boiling method) can produce very satisfactory results. This method produces the best results when used on hands or feet that are soft and pliable, with no epidermis present, and with the ridges of the dermis appearing flat. The hot water plumps the dermis, thus facilitating the recording of the ridges. To proceed, water is heated in a pot to just below boiling point (~200 F) and maintained at this temperature. The friction ridge skin being processed is immersed in the heated water for 10 seconds. A shorter time is recommended for fine ridge detail (e.g., as children have) or where advanced decomposition is present. A longer time, up to 30 seconds, may be necessary at the examiner's discretion. The raised friction ridge detail should be carefully cleaned, if necessary, with a soft-bristled toothbrush and water in the direction of the ridge flow, wiped with alcohol, and lightly dusted with black fingerprint powder. A white adhesive lifting material is then used to record and preserve the friction ridge detail (Leas, 2006) (Figure 48).\n\n## 4.4.4 Recording Desiccated Friction Ridge Skin\n\nTraditional methods to obtain recordings of friction ridge detail from desiccated skin usually involve removing the hands or feet and subjecting the skin to many hours of potentially destructive chemical rehydration soaking and softening techniques. Although these methods work well to rehydrate the friction ridge skin, and will be discussed in further detail, a much less destructive and time-consuming method is available. This method involves the use of a silicone product (Mikrosil) to successfully record friction ridge detail that has been subjected to various types of destructive conditions such as desiccation, hardening, or wrinkling. Removal of the hands or feet is not always necessary, and this procedure may be accomplished at the mortuary or morgue. To begin, the friction ridge skin must be cleaned and dried.\n\nThe fingers should be separated to keep the silicone casts from sticking together. A light coat of black fingerprint powder is applied with a soft fingerprint brush to the friction ridges. The casting material is then mixed according to the included instructions and applied to each finger or other areas of friction ridge skin. After approximately 15 minutes, the casts are peeled off one at a time and marked accordingly, thus revealing a \"high contrast, highly detailed, three-dimensional mold\" (Tomboc and Schrader, 2005, p 473) (Figure 49). These silicone casts may then be photographed and preserved. When the casts are examined, the friction ridge details will be black and will be in the same orientation as if they had been recorded on a fingerprint or palmprint card. On severely damaged or decomposed friction ridge skin, Greenwop powder, which fluoresces under ultraviolet light, and black casting material may also be used. The resulting casts are then photographed using ulraviolet light (Tomboc and Schrader, 2005, p 474). If this method should fail to produce discernible friction ridge detail, the traditional methods of rehydration and softening must be implemented. Once the skin is rehydrated and softened, the Mikrosil method may be used subsequent to the traditional methods to facilitate satisfactory recordings of any restored friction ridge detail.\n\n## 4.4.5 Traditional Rehydration Method\n\nThis method is used primarily when extreme drying and dehydration of the friction ridge skin has caused excessive shriveling and wrinkling of the tissues, thus precluding sufficient recordings using less destructive methods. Individual fingers or toes should be placed in separate 75 mL capped bottles, nail-side down. The bottles should be labeled with the subject's name, case number, and the finger or toe number. Photographs should be taken of any friction ridge detail prior to the rehydration process, because this procedure is potentially destructive to the tissues. It is advisable to start with one finger before processing the remaining fingers, in order to determine the degree of destruction caused by the process. The 75 mL capped bottles are filled with enough 1% to 3% sodium or potassium hydroxide (FBI, 1979, pp 147148) solution to cover the friction ridge detail. The capped bottles are refrigerated for approximately 24 to 48 hours (Rice, 1988b, p 153). Each bottle should be checked every 4 to 6 hours for excessive destruction. The friction ridge detail is checked periodically until the inner layers of skin are pliable such that the skin will give slightly under pressure. As previously mentioned, sodium and potassium hydroxide solutions are destructive to the tissues and will cause shedding of some of the outer layers of friction ridge skin. The outer layers of the friction ridge skin may be removed by gently brushing the skin (in the direction of the ridge flow) under warm running water with a soft-bristled toothbrush containing powdered hand cleaner. If the ridge detail is prominent, and the friction ridge skin is soft and pliable, the skin is then ready to be recorded. At this point, the epidermis should be white and soft. If, however, the friction ridge skin appears flat and stiff, it may then be soaked in a solution of dishwashing liquid and water in the same manner as with the hydroxide solution. (If this step is needed, one tablespoon of the dishwashing liquid should be placed in the 75 mL jar with enough warm water added to cover the friction ridge detail.) The friction ridge skin should soak at room temperature for approximately 24 to 48 hours, again being checked every 4 to 6 hours. This process may also cause further shedding of the tissues, which should be removed using a soft-bristled toothbrush, as described previously. Once the friction ridge skin is soft and pliable with prominent and discernible friction ridge detail, the friction ridge skin is ready to be recorded. The length of time the skin should soak in these solutions depends on the extent of desiccation. However, if left too long, the friction ridge skin could potentially be destroyed (Rice, 1988b, pp 152155).\n\n## 4.4.6 Recording Rehydrated Friction Ridge Skin\n\nAlthough the rehydration process should cause the friction ridge skin to become soft and pliable, the loose and wrinkled friction ridge skin may make recording difficult with some methods. As always, to avoid confusion, the fingers should be recorded one at a time. The previously described method of recording rehydrated friction skin (Tomboc and Schrader, 2005, pp 471479) has been found to be successful after rehydrating with traditional methods. However, another procedure (Rice, 1988b, pp 152155) involves the use of tissue builder or glycerin to \"fill out\" the friction ridge skin by carefully injecting the material into the tip of the finger, from the nail side toward the center of the finger, after the skin has been rehydrated. To begin, the fingers should be tied with string around the distal phalangeal joint (first joint) to prevent the material to be injected from escaping. Enough material is injected into the finger to round out the friction ridge skin, enabling successful recording. A locking hemostat is then clamped to the finger as an extension of the finger to facilitate the recording process. The finger must now be completely dry for proper adhesion of the fingerprint ink. To accomplish this, the finger should be gently dried with paper towels and lightly dusted with fingerprint powder. Excess moisture and powder may be removed by rolling the finger on paper towels until the fingers are sufficiently dry. The friction ridge skin is then coated with a thin layer of fingerprint ink, either by rolling on an inked plate or by rolling ink on the friction ridge skin with an ink roller. The finger is then recorded in the usual manner by applying light pressure to the nail side of the finger while rolling it on an index card or other suitable recording card. This process should be repeated until satisfactory results are obtained. The recorded prints are then placed in the appropriate blocks on a standard fingerprint card. If satisfactory results cannot be obtained using this inkand-roll method, it is possible to obtain satisfactory recordings using powder and lifting tape (Rice, 1988b, p 155). A light dusting of black fingerprint powder is applied to the friction ridge detail. A piece of lifting tape is then placed on the friction ridge detail at one side and lightly pressed over the friction ridge detail to the other side while smoothing. The tape is then removed and placed on a piece of clear Mylar-type plastic. One might also use white opaque lifting sheets with a transparent cover (Olsen, 1978, p 98).\n\nPutty can serve as a cushion on which to roll the finger. Putty (i.e., duct seal) is moldable and nondrying. (It is used in plumbing and electrical work and is available in hardware stores.) A ball of duct seal is placed on the working surface and flattened. A piece of a lifting sheet is placed on top of the duct seal and the powdered finger is rolled onto the lifting sheet (Figures 410 and 411). The duct seal allows the lifting sheet to mold into the extreme wrinkles of the finger, creating a fingerprint impression of the entire area of the finger (Figure 412).\n\nRegardless of the tape that is used, the recorded impression is now placed in the appropriate block (adhesive-side up) on the fingerprint card with the correct orientation. (When using transparent fingerprint tape, if the recorded impression were to be placed adhesive-side down on the fingerprint card, the fingerprint impression would be reversed.) The clear lift should then be marked directly on the lift with the correct orientation, finger number, and all other appropriate markings.\n\n## 4.4.7 Recording Charred Friction Ridge Skin\n\nOn occasion, it may be necessary to obtain recordings of friction ridge detail that has been subjected to intense fire. Charring of the skin can occur, producing very brittle, often easily destroyed skin. Care must be exercised not to destroy the epidermal layer of friction ridge skin should removal of the hands or feet become necessary. As a worst-case scenario for severely charred skin, photography of any discernible friction ridge detail using oblique (side-to-side) lighting may be the only method that will produce satisfactory results (FBI, 1979, p 150).\n\nThe correct procedure to record friction ridge detail that has been subjected to desiccation and charring will be determined by the level of destruction to the friction ridge skin. Fortunately, in some cases, the friction ridge skin on the fingers and palms is somewhat protected by the tightening of the flexor muscles, ligaments, and tendons in the hands and arms which, as a result of intense heat, draw the fingers into a tightly clenched fist (pugilistic attitude). Intense heat also tends to cause a separation of the epidermal layer from the dermal layer of the friction ridge skin. One method involves completing the separation of the epidermal layer from the dermal layer of the skin through refrigeration (Rice, 1992, pp 1825). To facilitate inking and recording, an ink roller is used to deposit a thin coat of ink onto the pattern (ridge side) of the skin. The skin is then flipped over and rolled on the backside, recording the friction ridge detail on a standard card. To begin this procedure, the hands (or feet) are removed by a medical examiner or pathologist and placed into separate containers labeled with appropriate markings. The containers are then refrigerated for approximately 5 to 7 days, checking each day for skin separation. When the skin separates, it is milky-white and looks \"like a wrinkled latex glove that is one size too large for the wearer\" (Rice, 1992, p 19). Subsequent to the removal of the skin, any loose, charred flesh or foreign material should be carefully removed by lightly brushing with a soft-bristled toothbrush to expose as much discernible friction ridge detail as possible. In addition, examinations should be conducted separately to prevent any mix-up of friction ridge skin. The friction ridge skin is then removed from the palms by carefully cutting along the outer edges with curved-tip scissors. Incisions are also made at the base of the palms, the base of the fingers, and at the base of the thumbs. Friction ridge skin from the feet is removed by making incisions along the outer edges of the feet, at the base of the heels, and at the base of the toes. The connecting tissue between the epidermal and dermal layers is then carefully cut with scissors pointed away\nfrom the skin. The epidermal layer of the skin is then lifted away from the dermal layer. The separated friction ridge skin is then immersed in warm water for a few seconds and is laid flat to enable further gentle cleansing. A small amount of dishwashing liquid is applied to a very soft-bristled toothbrush, which is then very carefully used to clean out any remaining debris by brushing in the direction of the ridge flow to prevent damage to the ridges. During this process, the skin should be rinsed frequently in clean, warm water. After the skin is sufficiently cleaned and rinsed, it should be carefully blotted dry with paper towels. To record the friction ridge detail from this skin, an ink roller is lightly coated with ink using an inking plate in the same manner as when recording inked standards from a live person. The friction ridge skin to be recorded is then placed on a hard flat surface, ridge-side up. With gentle pressure, and while the skin is held in place, the ink is rolled onto the skin. The skin is then flipped over, ridge side down, onto a standard 8\" x 8\" recording card, and while the skin is held in place, the roller is then gently rolled across the skin, pressing the ink onto the card. This method should be repeated until a satisfactory recording is produced. Fingers and toes can also be recorded in this manner, taking care to remove, label, and examine them separately to prevent confusion. To remove the friction ridge skin from toes and fingers, incisions at the base of the digits, along the extreme sides, and around the insides of the nail are recommended, being careful not to damage any of the pattern areas. The friction ridge skin is then removed by cutting the connecting tissue starting from the base, as with removal of the palm areas. Cleaning, drying, inking, and recording are performed in the same manner as previously described (Rice, 1992, pp 1825).\n\n## 4.5 Summary\n\nThe methods and techniques described in this chapter for recording living and postmortem friction ridge detail are appropriate for the vast majority of conditions and circumstances. However, it is possible that an unusual circumstance will arise that may require extra patience and skill to achieve the most desirable results. Quality recordings from live subjects are usually not too difficult to obtain, as long as the subject is cooperative. Recording postmortem friction ridge detail, however, may become more of a challenge because of the varying conditions of the friction ridge skin. There are also many levels of difficulty associated with this endeavor, which is why proper training, experience, and determination are essential.\n\n## 4.6 Reviewers\n\nOlsen, Sr., R. D., *Scott's Fingerprint Mechanics;* Charles C\nThomas: Springfield, 1978. Rice, K. A. Printing of the Underside of the Epidermal Surface of Decomposed Fingers. *J. Forensic Ident.* 1988a, 38 (3), 98100.\n\nThe reviewers critiquing this chapter were Herman Bergman, Patti Blume, Mike Campbell, Sue Manci Coppejans, Robert J. Garrett, Laura A. Hutchins, Bridget Lewis, Michelle L. Snyder, Lyla A. Thompson, Juliet H. Wood, and Rodolfo R. Zamora.\n\nRice, K. A. The Re-Hydration and Printing of Mummified Fingers. *J. Forensic Ident.* 1988b, 38 (4), 152156.\n\n## 4.7 References\n\nRice, K. A. Printing the Deceased Who Have Been Subjected to Fire. *J. Forensic Ident.* 1992, 42 (1), 1825.\n\nCowger, J. F. Friction Ridge Skin, Comparison and Identification of Fingerprints; Elsevier Science Publishing Company: New York, 1983.\n\nScientific Working Group on Friction Ridge Analysis, Study and Technology. Special NoticeName Change for Major Case Prints to Complete Friction Ridge Exemplars. J. Forensic Ident. 2006, 56 (4), 619627.\n\nFederal Bureau of Investigation, U.S. Department of Justice. *The Science of Fingerprints;* U.S. Government Printing Office: Washington, DC, 1979.\n\nTomboc, R.; Schrader, M. Obtaining Fingerprint and Palmprint Impressions from Decomposed Bodies or Burn Victims Using the Mikrosil Casting Method. J. Forensic Ident. 2005, 55 (4), 471479.\n\nLeas, R. L. Program Manager, FBI Disaster SquadVictim Identification Unit, Quantico, VA. Personal communication, 2006. Miller, R. D. Recovery of Usable Fingerprint Patterns from Damaged Postmortem Friction Ridge Skin. J. Forensic Ident. 1995, 45 (6), 602605.\n\n## C H A P T E R Systems Of Friction Ridge Classification Laura A. Hutchins C O N T E N T S\n\n 3\n5.1  Introduction to Classification\nSystems\n\n18\n5.7  Computer Automation\nand Print Classification\n24\n5.8  Conclusion\n3\n5.2  Criminal Identification\nof the Past\n24\n5.9  Reviewers\n4\n5.3  Beginnings of Classification\n24\n5.10  References\n7\n5.4  Birth of Modern Classification\n\nSystems\n25\n5.11  Additional Information\n10\n5.5  Single-Fingerprint Systems\n12\n5.6  Footprint and Palmprint\n\nClassification Systems\n\n## Chapter 5 Systems Of Friction Ridge Classification Laura A. Hutchins 5.1 Introduction To Classification Systems\n\nThe concept of friction ridge individualization as an infallible means of individualization is rooted in the history of man and our inherent need to individualize ourselves, and be individualized, in an ever-expanding world. As populations grew and cities filled with differing classes of people, the populations of jails and prisons grew also. The ability to accurately identify repeat offenders was critical to the effectiveness of criminal justice institutions. It became paramount that an accurate method of individualization be developed.\n\n## 5.2 Criminal Identification Of The Past\n\nPrior to any type of scientific criminal identification, the criminal justice community used purely visible methods to determine identity. These methods involved tattoos or scarification to denote criminals. However, this type of identification was seen as barbaric and inefficient. It was not until the advent of photography that a more humane method of criminal identification was devised. This method involved taking photographs of all those who were arrested and incorporating the photographs into a compendium of identification, known as a rogues' gallery. (For more on rogues' galleries, see Chapter 8.) The use of the rogues' gallery as means of criminal identification soon proved nonscientific and ineffective because, when offenders were released, they could change their appearance. A simple haircut and change of clothes could render the offender unrecognizable. Additionally, many police departments lacked the insight to standardize the photographs that were taken of those who were arrested (Dilworth, 1977, p 1).\n\nFor example, women kept their hats on and veils down, with their heads tilted, when being photographed for the gallery. Yet, for the criminal justice community, photography was the only means of documenting the identity of criminals.\n\n## 5.2.1 Alphonse Bertillon And Anthropometry*\n\nAlphonse Bertillon began his public service career in 1879 when, having fulfilled his military service in the French army, he joined the Paris Prefecture of Police as a clerk in the Identification Division. He was tasked with the monotonous job of recording on index cards the physical descriptions of individuals who had been arrested. At the time, this was the only method that was available to identify recidivists. Bertillon's first contribution to the reorganization of the department's criminal files was to incorporate the use of standard photography. Previous photography had been haphazard and inconsistent. Within a month of his appointment as a records clerk, he started an organized and standard system of photography. This system entailed the taking of full-face and profile portraits of the criminals entering the criminal justice system. In 1882, having contributed greatly to the existing substandard method of criminal identification, Bertillon took on the task of establishing the identity of recidivists through a more scientific means (Rhodes, 1956, pp 71101). Reflecting upon his family's professions as statisticians, demographers, and physicians, he embarked on the creation of a standard method of identification that was based on the measurement of specific body parts: anthropometry. He believed that by recording the body measurements of a criminal, he was establishing that criminal's body formula which would apply to that one person and would not change. By 1883, Bertillon believed that he had devised a complete system of criminal identification. The information that was recorded was divided into three sections: (1) descriptive data such as height, weight, and eye color; (2) body marks such as scars, tattoos, and deformities; and (3) body measurements. He chose 11 specific body measurements that he thought could be easily and accurately measured. To create a system of classification that would be manageable and productive, each of the 11 measurements was further subdivided into three variation range groups. This classification system became the first scientific system that was used to identify criminals. In fact, in 1884, Bertillonage, as his system came to be known, identified\n241 repeat offenders (Beavan, 2001, p 91). Because of this impressive track record, other European and American criminal justice institutions quickly adopted Bertillonage. As more police institutions began to maintain Bertillon records, it became apparent that the system was flawed and was merely a band-aid on the still-evident problem of reliable criminal identification. The foremost problem was that measurements taken by different officers were either different enough to preclude future identifications or similar enough to identify two individuals as the same person. Another problem was that the 243 basic categories in the system were sufficient for an agency handling 5,000 to 10,000 records, but collections that exceeded 10,000 records presented problems; officers found themselves searching through categories that contained an unwieldy amount of cards. The time that was required to check for duplicate records increased from a few minutes to several hours. Additionally, the aging process could affect the accuracy of the measurements, especially if the measurements on record had been taken when the individual was not fully grown. The realization of these challenges, along with the introduction of fingerprints as a method of identification, would eventually bring an end to use of the Bertillon system. Yet it was not until the early 20th century that anthropometry was completely dismissed as a method of criminal identification in Europe and in the United States.\n\n## 5.3 Beginnings Of Classification 5.3.1 Johannes Evangelist Purkinje\n\nJohannes Evangelist Purkinje was a Czech professor of pathology and physiology at the University of Breslau in Prussia. He was a prolific scientist who made numerous contributions to the field of medicine. He researched sweat pores and skin, introduced the word *plasma*, devised new methods of preparing microscope samples, and researched visual phenomena (Jay, 2000, p 663).\n\nIn 1823, Purkinje published his most famous medical thesis, Commentatio de Examine Physiologico Organi Visus et Systematis Cutanei (A Commentary on the Physiological Examination of the Organs of Vision and the Cutaneous System). In this thesis, he described nine classifiable fingerprint patterns (Ashbaugh, 1999, p 40): (1) transverse curve, (2) central longitudinal stria, (3) oblique stripe, (4) oblique loop, (5) almond whorl, (6) spiral whorl, (7) ellipse, (8) circle, and (9) double whorl. At this time, this was the only detailed description of fingerprint patterns to appear in the scientific record. Although it is obvious that he recognized the classification element of friction ridge formations, he did not associate them with any type of classification system for use in personal identification (Faulds, 1905, p 33).\n\n## 5.3.2 Dr. Henry Faulds' Syllabic System Of Classification\n\nDr. Henry Faulds was a Scottish physician and superintendent of Tsukji Hospital in Tokyo, Japan. In the late 1870s, Faulds developed a friendship with the American archaeologist Edward S. Morse. While assisting Morse during an excavation, Faulds noticed the patent impression of a fingerprint in a piece of broken clay. It was at this moment that the connection between fingerprints and individualization was formulated in his mind (Beavan, 2001, p 69). Faulds devised a method of using ink to record the fingerprint impressions of all 10 fingers on cards and soon had collected thousands of fingerprint cards. His collection became invaluable when the police accused a member of his medical staff of attempted burglary, committed by scaling the hospital wall and entering through a window. He compared a latent print that had been found on the wall with the accused staff member's fingerprints in his collection and determined that the latent print had not been left by his staff member. Realizing that fingerprints could be the solution to the burgeoning problem of criminal identification, Faulds was determined to prove that fingerprints were the key to accurate and reliable personal individualization. To prove his theory, Faulds researched the permanence and individuality of fingerprints. To prove individuality, he compared the thousands of fingerprint cards he had collected and determined that the fingerprints on each card were unique. To prove permanence, Faulds and his medical students used various meansrazors, pumice stones, sandpaper, acids, and causticsto remove their friction ridges. As he had hoped, the friction ridges grew back exactly as they had been before.\n\nFaulds also needed to prove that fingerprints did not change during the growth process. To this end, he observed the fingerprints of growing children over a period of two years and determined that friction ridges changed only in size and not in uniqueness. Having determined the individuality and permanence of fingerprints, Faulds published his findings in the journal Nature (Faulds, 1880, p 605). In the article, he suggested the use of fingerprints in criminal investigations and the use of printer's ink in obtaining fingerprints. In addition, he mentioned two categories of fingerprint patterns: loops and whorls. During the next few years, Faulds developed a syllabic system for classifying fingerprints (Faulds, 1912, pp 83100). He felt that learning this type of classification system would be natural and quite easy for an identification official. His idea was based on his perception that the human brain can quickly associate an object with a sound. In his system, each hand was represented by five syllables, one syllable for each finger, with each syllable separated by a hyphen. Syllables were constructed from an established list of 21 consonants and 6 vowels representing set fingerprint pattern characteristics (Table 51). For example, one hand may be represented and spoken as \"RA-RA- RA-RA-RA\". (In more complex examples, fingers may be represented by two or more syllables).\n\nBased solely on the primary breakdown of the consonants alone, Faulds produced a classification system that had the potential to create nearly 17 trillion classifications (Beaven, 2001, p 131). In addition to creating a strand of syllables to represent each hand, Faulds believed that there should be a singlefinger index. This index would prove useful in comparing latent prints from a crime scene, provided that the syllable of the latent print could be derived from the known single prints on file. In 1886, Faulds offered to establish a fingerprinting bureau in Scotland Yard, at his expense, and to institute his fingerprint classification system (Russell, 2004). However, Scotland Yard declined the offer and maintained Bertillonage as the agency's method of criminal identification.\n\n| Consonant                             | Pattern Description              |\n|---------------------------------------|----------------------------------|\n| CH                                    | Hook with short leg facing right |\n| J                                     | Hook with short leg facing left  |\n| B                                     | Convex bow with left lineation   |\n| P                                     | Convex bow with right lineation  |\n| T                                     | Pear-shaped, free-floating       |\n| D                                     | Pear-shaped, fixed by stem       |\n| K                                     | Spindle with one stem            |\n| G                                     | Spindled with stems on both ends |\n| W                                     | Clockwise whorl                  |\n| V                                     | Counter-clockwise whorl          |\n| Q                                     | Large circle/oval w/elements     |\n| M                                     | Volcanic mountain peak           |\n| N                                     | Flag-staff on mountain top       |\n| L                                     | Loop with straight axis          |\n| R                                     | Loop with curved axis            |\n| S                                     | Sinuous with no angles           |\n| Z                                     | Zigzag with angularity           |\n| X                                     | Nondescript                      |\n| F                                     |                                  |\n| Aspirate used strictly for            |                                  |\n| pronunciation                         |                                  |\n| H                                     |                                  |\n| Aspirate used strictly for            |                                  |\n| pronunciation                         |                                  |\n| Vowel                                 | Pattern Description              |\n| A                                     | Interior empty, simple           |\n| E                                     | Three short ridges/dots          |\n| I                                     |                                  |\n| Simple detached line/no more than two |                                  |\n| lines in heart of encircling pattern  |                                  |\n| O                                     | Small circle/oval/dot in core    |\n| U                                     | Fork with 2+ prongs in core      |\n| Y                                     |                                  |\n| Fork with prongs turning away from    |                                  |\n| concavity                             |                                  |\n\n## 5.3.3 Sir Francis Galton And The Tripartite Classification\n\nSir Francis Galton, cousin of Charles Darwin, was a noted English scientist. Galton developed an interest in fingerprints in 1888 when he was asked to present a lecture on personal identification. To prepare for the lecture, he researched Bertillonage, the then-current method of personal identification. After investigating the use of anthropometry for criminal identification, he became a critic of the technique. His criticism stemmed from the observation that Bertillon measurements did not take into account the correlation between stature and limb length (Galton, 1889, pp 403405). He believed that the continued use of Bertillonage as a method of criminal identification would lead to an unacceptably high rate of false identifications. He noted also that the taking of Bertillon measurements was timeconsuming and the measurements could vary, depending on who was taking them. As a result of his distaste for anthropometry, Galton researched the use of fingerprints for personal individualization. His research led him to Faulds' article in *Nature* and a rebuttal letter that same year by Sir William Herschel that stated that he had discovered fingerprint individualization first and had been using it in India since 1860 (Herschel, 1880, p 76). Soon after, Galton began corresponding with Herschel and obtained his collection of fingerprint data. After four years of intensive study and research, Galton published his famous book *Finger Prints* (1892) in which he established that fingerprints are both permanent and unique. He also realized that for fingerprints to become a viable method of personal individualization, a systematic, understandable, and applicable system of fingerprint classification had to be developed. In his book, Galton formulated a classification system that was based on the alphabetical enumerations of the three fingerprint patterns: L represented a loop, W represented a whorl, and A represented an arch. To classify a set of fingerprints, the pattern for each finger was labeled with one of these three letters. The letters for the right hand's index, middle, and ring fingers were grouped together, followed by the letters for the left hand's index, middle, and ring fingers. After this string of letters, the letters for the right thumb and right little finger were recorded, followed by the letters for the left thumb and left little finger. For example, a person with the right hand possessing all whorls except for the little finger having a loop, and the left hand having all loops except for the little finger having a whorl, would have the following classification: WWWLLLWLLW. This classification code would then be recorded on a card and the card filed alphabetically by this classification. Two years after the publication of his book, Galton's elementary fingerprint classification system was incorporated into the Bertillonage files at Scotland Yard. Although this was a success for him, his classification system proved too rudimentary for a large number of files and would not stand on its own as a method of cataloging and classifying criminals.\n\n## 5.4 Birth Of Modern Classification Systems 5.4.1 Juan Vucetich And The Argentine System\n\nJuan Vucetich was born in Croatia and immigrated to Argentina in 1882. Within four years, he was working at the Buenos Aires Police Department, collecting arrest and crime statistics. Within a few more years, Vucetich became head of the Office of Identification. During his tenure, Vucetich came to the realization that Bertillonage was an ineffective method of criminal identification. Concern regarding the mobility of criminals in and out of Argentina prompted him to search for a more effective method of identification. His search ended when he read the French journal *Revue Scientifique* (1891) detailing Galton's research into the scientific use of fingerprints as a means of individualization. After reading this article, he began his campaign to incorporate the use of fingerprinting into the criminal justice system of Argentina. His campaign paid off, and that same year (1891), fingerprints replaced Bertillonage at the Office of Identification. This was the first occurrence of fingerprint individualization officially usurping anthropometry. Having achieved a major milestone, Vucetich realized that for the science of fingerprints to be accepted worldwide, a useful and manageable classification system had to be created. Working from Galton's overly general three-pattern classification system, he quickly created a classification system that used subcategories to classify, file, and locate fingerprint cards. He initially called his system icnofalangometrica, meaning \"finger track measurement\". In 1896, he renamed the system *dactiloscopia,* meaning \"finger description\" (Rodriguez, 2004). Vucetich's system was an expansion of the three patterns established by Galton: the arch, the loop, and the whorl. However, Vucetich further divided the loop into internal loop (left slope) and external loop (right slope) categories, creating four types of patterns: arch, internal loop, external loop, and whorl. The classification consisted of four single letters, representing the pattern on the thumb, and four single numbers, representing the patterns on the remaining fingers (Table 52). Like Galton's classification system, Vucetich's system started with the right-hand thumb and ended with the left little finger.\n\n| Pattern       | Thumbs   |   Other Fingers  |\n|---------------|----------|------------------|\n| Arch          | A        |                1 |\n| Internal loop | I        |                2 |\n| External loop | E        |                3 |\n| Whorl         | V        |                4 |\n\nThe Vucetich classification system consisted of a basic classification (called the *primary*) and a more descriptive secondary classification using extensions. The primary classification was divided into two groups: the numerator and the denominator. The numerator was termed the series and represented the right hand. The denominator was termed the *section* and represented the left hand. The right thumb (called the *fundamental*) and the remaining right-hand fingers (called the *division*) represented the series. The left thumb (called the *subclassification*) and the remaining left-hand fingers (called the *subdivision*) represented the *section.* For example, if both the numerator and denominator were A1141, then both the right hand and the left hand had arches in all the fingers except for the ring fingers, which had whorls.\n\nThe secondary classification further subdivided the fingerprints into five subtypes: 5, 6, 7, 8, and 9. Each number represented a further description of the pattern, applied to either hand, and was placed as a superscript in parentheses (Table 53). When the pattern type was a normal loop variety, the superscript defaulted to ridge count values (Table 54).\n\n| Pattern          | Superscript    | Description    |\n|------------------|----------------|----------------|\n| Arch             | 5              | Vaulted/Normal |\n| 6                | Left-inclined  |                |\n| 7                | Right-inclined |                |\n| 8                | Tent-shaped    |                |\n| 9                | All others     |                |\n| Internal loop    | 5              | Normal flow    |\n| 6                | Invaded        |                |\n| 7                | Interrogatory  |                |\n| 8                | Hooked         |                |\n| 9                | All others     |                |\n| External loop    |                |                |\n| Designation same |                |                |\n| as Internal loop |                |                |\n| Whorl            | 5              | Normal         |\n| 6                | Sinuous        |                |\n| 7                | Ovoid          |                |\n| 8                | Hooked         |                |\n| 9                | All others     |                |\n| Ridge Count Spread   |   Superscript Value |\n|----------------------|---------------------|\n| 15                  |                   5 |\n| 610                 |                  10 |\n| 1115                |                  15 |\n| 1620                |                  20 |\n| Over 20              |                  25 |\n\nFor example, a person whose right-hand fingers all have external (right slope) loops and whose left-hand fingers all have internal (left slope) loops would have a Vucetich classification of:\n\nE(20) 3(10) 3(5) 3(15) 3(10) I(10) 2(5) 2(10) 2(10) 2(5)\nIn 1896, Vucetich published his new classification system in a pamphlet entitled General Instructions for the Province of Buenos Aires System of Identification. In 1904, he published the book that would take his classification system across the world: Dactiloscopia Comparada (Comparative Fingerprinting): The New Argentine System.\n\n## 5.4.2 Sir Edward Henry And The Henry Classification System\n\nIn the early 1890s, Sir Edward Henry was the new Inspector General of the Bengal District Police in India and was experiencing a common problem of the day: the inability to accurately identify the native people. After reading Galton's Finger Prints, he was convinced that he could create a logical and applicable system of fingerprint classification that would enable fingerprints to become the sole system of personal and criminal identification. Henry returned to England in 1894 and developed a personal and professional relationship with Galton. Galton provided him with his personal research material, along with that of Herschel and Faulds. With this information in hand, Henry returned to India to solve the fingerprint classification problem. Even without a classification system, in 1896 he ordered his police officers to begin taking fingerprints along with anthropometric measurements of Bengali prisoners. Meanwhile, Henry assigned two of his police officers from the Calcutta Anthropometric Bureau to work on the fingerprint classification project. By 1897, the two officers, Azizul Haque and Hem Chandra Bose, formulated a mathematical method of dividing fingerprint records into a large number of primary groupings that were based on Galton's fingerprint pattern types. The Henry system began with the formulation of the primary. The primary was determined by assigning a value to each of the 10 fingers, starting with the right thumb and ending with the left little finger. This value was based on the presence of a whorl on a particular finger (Table 55). If the finger did not contain a whorl, it was assigned a value of zero.\n\n| Finger       |   Number |   Value if Whorl |\n|--------------|----------|------------------|\n| Right thumb  |        1 |               16 |\n| Right index  |        2 |               16 |\n| Right middle |        3 |                8 |\n| Right ring   |        4 |                8 |\n| Right little |        5 |                4 |\n| Left thumb   |        6 |                4 |\n| Left index   |        7 |                2 |\n| Left middle  |        8 |                2 |\n| Left ring    |        9 |                1 |\n| Left little  |       10 |                1 |\n\nThe primary was expressed in ratio form, with the numerator representing the whorl values of the even fingers plus 1 and the denominator representing the whorl values of the odd fingers plus 1. For example, if an individual had a fingerprint record with a pattern series of all whorls, the corresponding primary classification would be 32 over 32. If a person had loops in the right and left index fingers, the primary classification chart would be as follows:\n\nRight\nthumb\nRight\nindex\nRight\nmiddle\nRight\nring\nRight\nlittle\n16\n0\n8\n8\n4\nLeft\nLeft\nthumb\nLeft\nindex\nmiddle\nLeft\nring\nLeft\nlittle\n4\n0\n2\n1\n1\n\nThe chart is then calculated as follows:\n\n1 + (Sum of Even\nFinger Values)\n1 + (15)\n16\n_______________\n=\n______\n=\n__\n1 + (Sum of Odd\n1 + (29)\n30\nFinger Values)\n\nThis classification system allowed for 1,024 primary groupings. To the right of the primary was the secondary. The secondary was determined by the pattern types in the #2 and #7 fingers and was shown in the formula by capital letters representing the pattern (A for arch, T for tented arch, R for radial loop, U for ulnar loop, and W for whorl). To account for the rarity of arches, tented arches, and radial loops in nonindex fingers, these patterns were indicated by lower case letters (a, t, r) and placed after the secondary. If one of these patterns was present in the thumb(s), the small letter was placed to the left of the primary. The subsecondary was to the right of the secondary and represented the ridge counts for loops or ridge tracing for whorls in the remaining fingers. This new classification system was so successful that in March of 1897, the British Indian government instituted the Henry classification system as the official method of criminal identification. By 1900, the success of the Henry system in India made Scotland Yard review its own identification system. This review resulted in the abandonment of Bertillonage and the adoption of the Henry system. In\n1901, Henry was transferred to Scotland Yard, where he set up its first central fingerprint bureau and began training officers in fingerprint classification.\n\n## 5.4.3 Offshoots Of The Henry And Vucetich Classification Systems\n\nBoth Vucetich and Henry gained international recognition in the arena of scientific criminal identification. Vucetich traveled the world promoting his book, and Henry gained the backing of the modern European world. Both systems were considered superior to Bertillonage, and both systems had equal recognition in international police and scientific circles.\n\n| Parent System                   | Modified System (Location)    |\n|---------------------------------|-------------------------------|\n| Henry                           | Australian (Australia)        |\n| Budapest (Budapest)             |                               |\n| Valladares (Portugal)           |                               |\n| Pateer (Amsterdam)              |                               |\n| Windt Kodicek (Germany)         |                               |\n| Spirlet (The Hague)             |                               |\n| Steegers (Cuba)                 |                               |\n| Conlay (Federated Malay States  |                               |\n| Police)                         |                               |\n| American (New York City)        |                               |\n| Flak Conley (Newark, NJ)        |                               |\n| RCMP (Canada)                   |                               |\n| FBI Extensions (Washington, DC) |                               |\n| Vucetich                        | Bertillon (France)            |\n| Pottecher (Indo-China)          |                               |\n| Mirando Pinto (Chile)           |                               |\n| Pessoa (Unkown)                 |                               |\n| Henry-Vucetich                  | Daae (Norway)                 |\n| Protivenski (Prague)            |                               |\n| Oloriz (Madrid)                 |                               |\n| Martinez (Mexico)               |                               |\n| Borgerhoff (Belgium)            |                               |\n| Harvey Pacha (Egypt)            |                               |\n| Cabezas (Valparaiso)            |                               |\n| Klatt (Berlin)                  |                               |\n| Brussels (Belgium)              |                               |\n| Roscher (Hamburg)               |                               |\n| Japanese National               |                               |\n| Lebedoff (Russia)               |                               |\n| When (Berlin)                   |                               |\n| Smallegange (Holland)           |                               |\n| Gasti (Italy)                   |                               |\n| Portillo (Barcelona)            |                               |\n| Lyonnese (Lyon)                 |                               |\n\nJouenne (Colonial Service in French West Africa)\n\n| Based on Existing         | Original Single-    |\n|---------------------------|---------------------|\n| Classification Systems    | Fingerprint Systems |\n| Collins                   | Born                |\n| Larson                    | Moran               |\n| Oloritz                   | Code                |\n| Borgerhoff                | Sagredo             |\n| Stockis                   | Dresden             |\n| Gasti Register            | Barlow              |\n| Lyonnese                  | Jaycox              |\n| Neben Register of Roscher | Crosskey            |\n| Battley                   |                     |\n| Giraud and Henquel        |                     |\n| Jorgensen                 |                     |\n| Monodacylus               |                     |\n\nAs other agencies began to adopt these classification systems, the systems were often modified (Table 56). Modifications involved the creation of extensions to produce classification systems that could handle larger populations (McGinnis, 1963, p 115). For example, the United States Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) incorporated extensions relating to the ridge counts and whorl tracings of specific fingers to split up the rapidly populating primary and secondary groupings.\n\n## 5.5 Single-Fingerprint Systems\n\nAlthough the known-print classification systems were useful for the identification of repeat offenders, they did not aid in the apprehension of criminals by identifying latent prints left at crime scenes. To address this limitation, numerous single-fingerprint classification systems were developed. Some of these systems were based on existing known-print classification systems and some were fully original (Table 57). Of all these single-fingerprint classification systems, Chief Inspector Henry Battley and Detective Superintendent Fredrick Cherrill of New Scotland Yard developed the most popular system.\n\n| Pattern           | Subdivisions   |   Designation |\n|-------------------|----------------|---------------|\n| Arches            | Plain arch     |             1 |\n| Left-sloping      | 2              |               |\n| Right-sloping     | 3              |               |\n| Tented arches     | AH            |               |\n| Circle reading    |                |               |\n| (summit of first  |                |               |\n| platform ridge)   |                |               |\n| Radial loops      | #              |               |\n| Ridge count       |                |               |\n| between delta     |                |               |\n| and core          |                |               |\n| Predetermined     |                |               |\n| core definition   |                |               |\n| AL               |                |               |\n| Circle reading of |                |               |\n| delta             |                |               |\n| AH               |                |               |\n| Ulnar loops       | #              |               |\n| Ridge count       |                |               |\n| between delta     |                |               |\n| and core          |                |               |\n| Predetermined     |                |               |\n| core definitions  |                |               |\n| AL               |                |               |\n| Circle reading of |                |               |\n| delta             |                |               |\n| AH               |                |               |\n| AH               |                |               |\n| Whorls / Central  |                |               |\n| pocket loops      |                |               |\n| Circle reading of |                |               |\n| first recurving   |                |               |\n| ridge             |                |               |\n| A.1               |                |               |\n| A.2               |                |               |\n| A.3               |                |               |\n| Predetermined     |                |               |\n| core definitions  |                |               |\n| limited to small  |                |               |\n| spirals in \"A\"    |                |               |\n| circle reading    |                |               |\n| A.4               |                |               |\n| Circle reading of |                |               |\n| left delta        |                |               |\n| AH               |                |               |\n\n## 5.5.1 Battley Single-Fingerprint System\n\nIn 1929, Battley and Cherrill developed the idea of a single-fingerprint system that did not require all 10 known fingerprints of an individual. They postulated that latent fingerprints found at a crime scene could be individualized using a known print of the same finger of the offender. The Battley system used 10 main patterns followed by additional subdivisions, depending on the pattern designation (Table 58). These additional subdivisions included radial or\n\n| Ridge tracing     | I, M, O         |\n|-------------------|-----------------|\n| Circle reading of |                 |\n| right delta       |                 |\n| AH               |                 |\n| #                 |                 |\n| Ridge count       |                 |\n| between left      |                 |\n| delta and core    |                 |\n| #                 |                 |\n| Ridge count       |                 |\n| between right     |                 |\n| delta and core    |                 |\n| Twinned loops     | R,U             |\n| Radial or ulnar   |                 |\n| slope of          |                 |\n| descending loop   |                 |\n| AH               |                 |\n| Circle reading    |                 |\n| of core of        |                 |\n| descending loop   |                 |\n| Ridge count       |                 |\n| between loops     |                 |\n| #                 |                 |\n| #                 |                 |\n| Ridge count       |                 |\n| between core      |                 |\n| and delta of      |                 |\n| descending loop   |                 |\n| Circle reading of |                 |\n| left delta        |                 |\n| AH               |                 |\n| Ridge tracing     | I, M, O         |\n| Circle reading of |                 |\n| right delta       |                 |\n| AH               |                 |\n| R, U              |                 |\n| Lateral pocket    |                 |\n| loop              |                 |\n| Radial or ulnar   |                 |\n| slope of majority |                 |\n| of ridges         |                 |\n| #                 |                 |\n| Ridge count be-   |                 |\n| tween delta and   |                 |\n| core of innermost |                 |\n| loop              |                 |\n| Composite         | No subdivision  |\n| Accidental        | No subdivision  |\n| Severely scarred  | Cannot classify |\n\nulnar inclination, ridge counts, ridge tracings, formation of the core(s), position of the delta(s), and circle readings. A specific subdivision, known as a circle reading, was derived using a special magnifying glass with a plain glass window at the base. This base window consisted of a center circle with a dot in the middle, designated as area A, and seven concentric circles, each 2 mm in width, designated B through H. The center dot was placed over a designated point of the impression, and circle readings were taken that were based on the position of specific formations.\n\nIn the system, the known fingerprints from an arrest card would be individually classified according to pattern and established in 10 collections, one for each finger, from the right thumb to the left little finger (i.e., No. 1 collection through No. 10 collection). Single-fingerprint cards were constructed by mounting the specific fingerprint on a card and filling in particular information in designated areas. This information included the number and name of the digit, the criminal's reference number, the Henry classification, and the Battley classification (Table 59).\n\n| TYPE                     |\n|--------------------------|\n| Subgroup Designation     |\n| Subgroup Designation     |\n| Criminal ID No.          |\n| Subgroup Designation     |\n| Finger No. & Description |\n| Subgroup Designation     |\n| Henry Classification     |\n| Subgroup Designation     |\n| Subgroup Designation     |\n| Adhered Fingerprint      |\n| Subgroup Designation     |\n| From Known Exemplar      |\n| Subgroup Designation     |\n| Subgroup Designation     |\n\nThe Battley system required a great deal of labor to classify and maintain the collections. Eventually, the collections became too large, and it became impossible to accurately and quickly individualize a latent print from a crime scene with a known single print on file.\n\n## 5.5.2 Additional Single-Print Systems\n\nAs previously mentioned, there were single-print systems other than the Battley system. Like Battley, these other systems were based on the classification of individual fingerprints, independent of the other fingers. These systems were frequently based on existing systems or a combination of existing systems and definitions used by those systems.\n\nSimilar to Battley, most of the other systems were based on predetermined pattern types (i.e., whorl, arch, and loops) with further subclassifications, such as core formations, delta position, ridge counts, and ridge tracings. Although some systems were similar to the Battley system, they differed in some respects because of added subdivisions (Table 510). Some systems went into great detail describing the patterns, some divided each print into sections or zones and recorded the location of ridge characteristics within that area, and some further defined the shapes of deltas (Bridges, 1963, pp 181213).\n\n## 5.6 Footprint And Palmprint Classification Systems\n\nThe next logical step in the evolution of friction ridge classification systems was the establishment of palmprint and footprint classification systems. Footprints and palmprints were being detected on evidence with enough frequency to warrant the development of classification systems.\n\n## 5.6.1 Classification Of Footprints\n\nAlong with the need for a footprint classification system based on latent impression evidence, there was also a need for such a classification system for filing the footprints of newborn babies, military airmen, and people lacking arms. Two main footprint classification systems were developed and used over the years: the Federal Bureau of Investigation system and the Chatterjee system.\n\n5.6.1.1 The FBI's Footprint Classification System. The FBI's classification system was a highly modified version of the system developed by Wentworth and Wilder in their landmark book *Personal Identification* (1918). The basis of the FBI's classification system was the observance of the ball area of the foot, directly below the large toe. This area typically exhibits one of three types of pattern groups: arch, loop, or whorl. Each group was designated by a letter and was further divided by type and ridge count (for loop and whorl patterns only) (FBI, 1985, p 24). Arch patterns were designated by the letter \"O\".  The O group was further subdivided according to the flow of the ridges. Type 1 subdivision (O1) indicated a vertical ridge flow (i.e., ridges flowing from the big toe to the heel). Type 2 subdivision (O2) indicated a horizontal ridge flow (i.e., ridges flowing from the big toe to the little toe). Looping\n\nName of Single-\nPrint System\nSubdivisions\nCollins\nPattern types Ridge counts Ridge tracing Ridge characteristics\nLarson\nPattern types Inclination of pattern Core type Ridge characteristics Delta type Ridge tracing Combinations\nOloriz\nPrimary from Oloriz tenprint system Core type Limiting lines (type lines) Delta type Apex angle\nBorgerhoff\nPattern types Ridge counts Ridge tracing\nStockis\nPattern types Ridge counts Apex angle Core type Delta type Ridge tracing\nGasti\nTaken from Gasti (tenprint) classification for each finger\nBorn\nPattern type Zone scheme with marked minutiae\n| Sagredo                       | Primary from Oloritz ten-   |\n|-------------------------------|-----------------------------|\n| print system                  |                             |\n| No delta pattern type         |                             |\n| One delta pattern type        |                             |\n| Two delta pattern type        |                             |\n| Pattern inclination           |                             |\n| Ridge counts                  |                             |\n| Ridge tracing                 |                             |\n| Delta type                    |                             |\n| Dresden                       | Pattern type                |\n| Ridge counts                  |                             |\n| Pattern inclination           |                             |\n| Neben Register of Roscher     | Taken from Roscher ten-     |\n| print classification for each |                             |\n| finger                        |                             |\n| Lyonnese                      | Pattern type                |\n| Centro-basal angle from       |                             |\n| Oloritz                       |                             |\n| Ridge tracing                 |                             |\n| Barlow                        | Pattern type                |\n| Core type                     |                             |\n| Pattern inclination           |                             |\n| Ridge counts                  |                             |\n| Jaycox                        | Pattern type                |\n| Pattern inclination           |                             |\n| Core type                     |                             |\n| Ridge characteristics of      |                             |\n| core                          |                             |\n| Jorgenson                     | Pattern type                |\n| Pattern inclination           |                             |\n| Ridge counts                  |                             |\n| Core type                     |                             |\n| Delta position                |                             |\n| Core to delta angle           |                             |\n| Core diameter (whorl)         |                             |\n| Crosskey                      | Pattern type                |\n| Core type                     |                             |\n| Ridge counts                  |                             |\n| Presence of scar              |                             |\n\npatterns were designated by the letter \"L\" and were further subdivided into four types. Type a subdivision (La) indicated a ridge flow entering and exiting toward the toes. Type b and c subdivisions (Lb and Lc) indicated a ridge flow entering and exiting the big toe-side of the foot. (Type b indicated the right foot and Type c indicated the left foot.) Type d subdivision (Ld) indicated a ridge flow entering and exiting toward the heel of the foot. Whorl patterns were designated by the letter \"W\" and were further subdivided into three types. Type w subdivision (Ww) indicated a whorl pattern that was either a plain whorl or a central pocket loop whorl. Type d subdivision (Wd) indicated a double loop whorl. Type x subdivision (Wx) indicated an accidental whorl. Like the Henry classification, the footprint classification was expressed as a fraction, with the right foot as the numerator and the left foot as the denominator. The fraction was made up of the primary, secondary, final, and key. The primary was the pattern group (O, L, or W) and was always expressed as a capital letter. The secondary was the type of subdivision and was placed to the right of the primary (e.g., Ww). The final was the ridge count of the loop or whorl pattern on the right foot and was placed to the right of the secondary (e.g., Ww 25). The key was the ridge count of the loop or whorl pattern on the left foot and was placed to the left of the secondary (e.g., 25 Ww).\n\nA complete footprint classification looked like:\n\nLa 32 25 Wd\n\n## 5.6.1.2 Chatterjee Footprint Classification System. A System Developed By Sri Salil Kumar Chatterjee Divided The Footprint Into The Following Six Areas:\n\nArea 1: Ball of the foot, below the big toe. Areas 24: Interspaces below the toes. Area 5: Center of the foot. Area 6: Heel.\n\nChatterjee used an alpha representation for the pattern in Area 1 and a numeric representation for the pattern in the remaining areas (Table 511) (Chatterjee, 1953, pp 179183).\n\n(Moenssens, 1971, p 212).\n| Pattern          | Area 1   |   Areas 26 |\n|------------------|----------|-------------|\n| None             | O        |           0 |\n| Arch             | A        |           1 |\n| Tented arch      | T        |           2 |\n| Right-slope loop | R        |           3 |\n| Upward-slope     |          |             |\n| loop             |          |             |\n| U                | 4        |             |\n| Left-slope loop  | L        |           5 |\n| Loop with        |          |             |\n| downward slope   |          |             |\n| D                | 6        |             |\n| Whorl            | W        |           7 |\n| Central pocket   |          |             |\n| loop             |          |             |\n| C                | 7        |             |\n| Lateral pocket   |          |             |\n| loop             |          |             |\n| S                | 8        |             |\n| Twin loop        | S        |           8 |\n| Accidental       | X        |           9 |\n\nThe Chatterjee footprint classification was also expressed as a fraction, with the right foot as the numerator and the left foot as the denominator. The primary was the Area 1 pattern designation and the secondary was a five-digit number, representing Areas 2 through 6, and was to the right of the primary.\n\n## 5.6.2 Classification Of Palmprints\n\nThe classification of palmprints was a worthwhile endeavor because of the frequency of latent palmprints at crime scenes. Three classification systems were established for palmprints: one in Western Australia, one in Liverpool, England, and another in Denmark.\n\n5.6.2.1 Western Australian Palmprint Classification. This classification consisted of a numeric primary and an alpha and numeric secondary in the form of a fraction (Baird, 1959). The classification was based on the tripartite division of the palm into the interdigital, thenar, and hypothenar areas (Figure 51).\n\n| Area of Consideration                           |   Value |\n|-------------------------------------------------|---------|\n| Interdigital #5 finger delta to ulnar edge      |       1 |\n| Interdigital #4 finger delta to #3 finger delta |       2 |\n| Interdigital #3 finger delta to radial edge     |       4 |\n| Thenar                                          |       8 |\n| Hypothenar                                      |      16 |\n| No pattern in area                              |       0 |\n\nTo obtain the primary classification, the three areas were allotted a value based on the ridge flow in that area (Table 512). If there was no discernible pattern in the specified area, a value of 0 was given. Notably, the values were the same as those for the primary in the Henry classification; however, this classification was not dependent on the presence of whorls but on the presence of any type of pattern. Because an arch pattern was typically considered to lack a true pattern area because there was no core and delta, this pattern was only given a value when it was present in the interdigital area. As with the Henry classification, a value of 1 was added to the total.\n\nThe secondary classification was divided into two parts. The first division was the type of pattern present in the thenar and hypothenar areas. This subdivision was expressed in the form of a fraction, with the thenar as the numerator and the hypothenar as the denominator. The second division, known as the secondary subclassification, concerned the area between the thumb and the index finger and the interdigital area. The thumb to index area was considered as a part of the thenar and was placed in the numerator; the interdigital area was considered as part of the hypothenar and was placed in the denominator. The classification formula was written as follows:\nThe Western Australian system used pattern definitions derived from the agencies' known-print classification system, which was a modification of the Henry classification system. The patterns were given specific alpha symbols according to their locations in the palm (Table 513). A further subdivision of the secondary classification involved ridge counts and ridge tracings and was expressed as a fraction to the right of the secondary classification.\n\n5.6.2.2 Liverpool Palmprint Classification System. The palmprint classification system that was established in Liverpool, England, was considered a more user-friendly classification system than that used in Western Australia. The Liverpool system also concentrated on the three divisions of the palm.\n\nThis system was divided into four parts and consisted of alpha and numeric symbols. The primary division pertained to the cumulative patterns in all three sections: interdigital, thenar, and hypothenar. The secondary division involved patterns in the hypothenar and included a subsecondary classification. The tertiary division involved patterns in the thenar. The quaternary division included patterns in the interdigital section of the palm and had three additional sections: part 1, part 2, and part 3. This classification used a coding box, where each square contained the alpha or numeric symbol for each part of the classification (Figure 52, p 5-17).\n\n| Pattern          | Location        | Symbol   |\n|------------------|-----------------|----------|\n| Arch             | Thenar          | A        |\n| Thumb-index      | None            |          |\n| Hypothenar       | A               |          |\n| Interdigital     | a               |          |\n| Exceptional arch | Thenar          | E        |\n| Thumb-index      | e               |          |\n| Hypothenar       | E               |          |\n| Interdigital     | e               |          |\n| Joined arch      | Thenar          | J        |\n| Thumb-index      | J               |          |\n| Hypothenar       | J               |          |\n| Interdigital     | J               |          |\n| Joined arch #1   | Hypothenar only | J1       |\n| Joined arch #2   | Hypothenar only | J2       |\n| Vertical arch #1 | Hypothenar only | V1       |\n| Tented arch      | Thenar          | T        |\n| Thumb-index      | t               |          |\n| Hypothenar       | T               |          |\n| Interdigital     | t               |          |\n| Tented arch # 1  | Hypothenar      | T1       |\n| Tented arch # 2  | Hypothenar      | T2       |\n| Radial loop      | Thenar          | R        |\n| Thumb-index      | r               |          |\n| Hypothenar       | R               |          |\n| Interdigital     | r               |          |\n\nThe primary division was formulated by the sum of set values, as determined by the presence of a pattern in the three palmar sections. The numeral 2 was given for the presence of a pattern in the thenar. The numeral 3 was given for the presence of a pattern in the interdigital area. The numeral 4 was given for the presence of a pattern in the hypothenar. The value of 1 was recorded if the palm\n\n| Radial loop #1   | Hypothenar   | R1   |\n|------------------|--------------|------|\n| Radial loop #2   | Hypothenar   | R2   |\n| Radial loop #3   | Hypothenar   | R3   |\n| Radial loop #4   | Hypothenar   | R4   |\n| Ulnar loop       | Thenar       | U    |\n| Thumb-index      | U            |      |\n| Hypothenar       | U            |      |\n| Interdigital     | U            |      |\n| Ulnar loop #1    | Hypothenar   | U1   |\n| Ulnar loop #2    | Hypothenar   | U2   |\n| Ulnar loop #3    | Hypothenar   | U3   |\n| Ulnar loop #4    | Hypothenar   | U4   |\n| Distal loop*     | Interdigital | L    |\n| Whorl            | Thenar       | W    |\n| Thumb-index      | w            |      |\n| Hypothenar       | W            |      |\n| Interdigital     | w            |      |\n| Central pocket   |              |      |\n| loop             |              |      |\n| Thenar           |              |      |\n| Thumb-index      |              |      |\n| C                |              |      |\n| c                |              |      |\n| Hypothenar       | C            |      |\n| Interdigital     | c            |      |\n| Double loop      | Thenar       | D    |\n| Thumb-index      | d            |      |\n| Hypothenar       | D            |      |\n| Interdigital     | d            |      |\n| Accidental       | Thenar       | X    |\n| Thumb-index      | x            |      |\n| Hypothenar       | X            |      |\n| Interdigital     | x            |      |\n\n* Distal loop only noted when there was another pattern present in the interdigital area.\n\nwas devoid of patterns in all three areas. When a palmar area contained more than one pattern, it was given a single value, as if there was only one pattern in the area. When patterns were present in more than one palmar area, the values were added together. The specific summed values also indicated which palmar area contained a pattern (Table 514).\n\n|   Primary Value | Pattern Indication               |\n|-----------------|----------------------------------|\n|               1 | None                             |\n|               2 | Thenar only                      |\n|               3 | Interdigital only                |\n|               4 | Hypothenar only                  |\n|               5 | Thenar and interdigital only     |\n|               6 | Thenar and hypothenar only       |\n|               7 | Interdigital and hypothenar only |\n|               9 | Patterns in all three areas      |\n\nThe secondary and subsecondary classification pertained only to the patterns in the hypothenar. Table 515 details the patterns and representative symbols that were used in this classification system. If the hypothenar area contained more than one pattern, the coding box was separated by a diagonal line from the lower left corner to the upper right corner, with the left upper half of the box designated for the pattern symbol of the pattern closest to the interdigital area and the lower right half designated for the pattern symbol of the pattern closest to the wrist. The secondary subclassification involved two distinct subclassifications. For a single loop in the hypothenar, the number of ridge characteristics in the core area was recorded. For a hypothenar devoid of a pattern, the type of delta was recorded (Alexander, 1973, pp 8690).\n\nCoding box for\nthe Liverpool\npalmprint\nclassification.\n\nSymbols used in the Liverpool Palmprint Classification System.\nPattern\nSymbol\nWhorl A (circular)\nA\nWhorl B (elliptical)\nB\nTwinned loop\nTL\nLateral pocket loop\nLP\nCentral pocket loop\nCP\nAccidental/composite\nACC\nTented arch\nT\nLoop core inward\nI\nLoop core outward\nO\nLoop core downward\nD\nLoop core upward\nU\nLoop core nutant\nK\nNondescript\nN\nPlain arch\nN\nNo pattern High carpal delta\nH\nLow carpal delta\nL\n\nThe tertiary division pertained to the thenar area of the palm. If there were two patterns in this area, the coding box was again separated by a diagonal line from the lower left corner to the upper right corner, with the left upper half designated for the pattern symbol of the pattern closest to the interdigital area and the lower right half designated for the pattern symbol closest to the wrist. Part 1 of the quaternary division pertained to the type(s) of pattern in the interdigital area of the palm. If more than one pattern appeared in the interdigital area, the box was separated by three diagonal lines, with the upper left third dedicated for the pattern closest to the index finger and the bottom right third dedicated for the pattern closest to the little finger. Part 2 of the quaternary division involved a predetermined numerical value indicating the position of the pattern in relation to the fingers (Table 516). If more than one pattern was present, the numerals were combined for a single value. If a pattern was between the base of two fingers, the higher value was recorded.\n\nPart 3 of the quaternary division involved the recording of ridge counts for tented arches or loops (inward core, outward core, downward core loops) when only one of these patterns was present in the interdigital area.\n\n5.6.2.3 The Brogger Moller Palmprint Classification\nSystem. The Brogger Moller palmprint classification system was formulated by Kaj Brogger Moller of the National Identification Bureau in Copenhagen, Denmark (Moenssens, 1971, p 199). As with the previous two systems, this classification was based on the three defined areas of the palm (i.e., hypothenar, thenar, and base areas). However, this system employed the use of a special measuring glass. This glass contained four separate measuring areas. The areas\n\n| Position of Pattern   |   Value |\n|-----------------------|---------|\n| Under index finger    |       8 |\n| Under middle finger   |       4 |\n| Under ring finger     |       2 |\n| Under little finger   |       1 |\n\nwere defined by three concentric circles measuring 2, 4, and 6 cm from a center dot. Each area was numbered 1 through 4, with 4 marking the area outside the last concentric ring. A second measuring area, known as the 16 scale, contained five lines, each 6 cm in length and 3 mm apart. The area between each line was numbered 1 through 6, with 1 representing the top of the scale. A third measuring area, known as the 09 scale, looked like a ladder with the right leg missing. This scale contained 10 lines, each 1 cm in length and placed 4 mm apart. Each area between the lines was numbered 0 to 9, with 0 representing the bottom of the scale. The classification of palm prints under this system was based on the ridge pattern(s) in the three areas of the palm and on the primary, secondary, and tertiary values. The measuring glass was used to determine some of the values (Tables 517 to 519). The classification was recorded in a table, with the hypothenar on the left, the interdigital in the middle, and the thenar on the right side of the table. For each area, the primary was recorded on the bottom, with the secondary above the primary, followed by the tertiary on the top (Figure 53).\n\n## 5.7 Computer Automation And Print Classification\n\nAs federal, state, and local agencies received and retained more and more known exemplars, the need for a more efficient means of known-print individualization became paramount. The identification service divisions of these agencies were tasked with the manual searching of suspect prints with known prints, often taking months to reach a decision of individualization or nonindividualization. This lengthy turnaround time posed an obvious problem if a suspect could not legally be detained pending an answer from the identification division. The solution to this problem came with the invention of the computer.\n\n## 5.7.1 Birth Of Computerized Classification\n\nThe first experiment with computer automation of knownprint cards took place at the Federal Bureau of Investigation. In 1934, the FBI's Identification Division was starting to feel the effects of a large known-print database that was becoming increasingly difficult to search manually. The FBI's attempt at automation of known prints involved the\n\n| Ridge Pattern                  | Primary   | Secondary   |\n|--------------------------------|-----------|-------------|\n| No design (carpal delta only)  | 1         |             |\n| 2                              |           |             |\n| Distal loop opening toward     |           |             |\n| interdigital, with core point- |           |             |\n| ing to ulnar side              |           |             |\n| 3                              |           |             |\n| Outward loop opening           |           |             |\n| toward ulnar side, with core   |           |             |\n| pointing toward thenar         |           |             |\n| Whorls                         | 4         |             |\n| Double loops                   | 5         |             |\n| Using 09 scale, measure       |           |             |\n| distance between two cores     |           |             |\n| None                           |           |             |\n| Arches                         | 6         |             |\n| 1 = arches                     |           |             |\n| 2 = tented arches              |           |             |\n| None                           |           |             |\n| 7                              |           |             |\n| Loops opening toward wrist,    |           |             |\n| with core pointing toward      |           |             |\n| ulnar side of palm             |           |             |\n| 8                              | None      | None        |\n| Composite patterns (any        |           |             |\n| pattern not conforming to      |           |             |\n| above patterns)                |           |             |\n\nBrogger Moller\npalmprint classification box.\n\nNone\nUsing circle measurement, dot at carpal delta and read circle where lowest ridge of carpal area falls\n8 = only when core has\ndistinct inclination toward\nUsing 09 scale, measure distance between carpal delta and core of loop\ncarpal/radial area\nNone\nUsing 09 scale, measure distance between carpal delta and core of loop\nNone\nUsing 09 scale, measure distance between carpal delta and core (for double whorls, using core closest to carpal delta)\nNone\nUsing 09 scale, measure distance between core and delta above it\n| Ridge Pattern                 | Primary   | Secondary   |\n|-------------------------------|-----------|-------------|\n| One loop in base area         | 1         |             |\n| Tented arch                   | 2         |             |\n| Double loops                  | 3         |             |\n| Two loops in same inter-      |           |             |\n| digital area and tented       |           |             |\n| arches and loops in other     |           |             |\n| areas                         |           |             |\n| 4                             |           |             |\n| Plain arches                  |           |             |\n| 5                             | None      | None        |\n| One loop and one tented       |           |             |\n| arch                          |           |             |\n| 6                             |           |             |\n| Three loops or combinations   |           |             |\n| of three loops and tented     |           |             |\n| arches                        |           |             |\n| 7                             |           |             |\n| Long transversal loop below   |           |             |\n| one or several digital deltas |           |             |\n| 8                             | None      | None        |\n| One or several whorls         |           |             |\n| appear alone or in combina-   |           |             |\n| tions with loops and tented   |           |             |\n| arches                        |           |             |\n| 9                             |           |             |\n2 = if loop is between index\nand middle fingers\n3 = if loop is between\nmiddle and ring fingers\nUsing 16 scale, measure height of loop (from deltas to core)\n4 = if loop is between ring\nand little fingers\nUsing 16 scale, measure height of arch (from base of arch to summit)\n1 = arch below index finger 2 = arch below middle finger 3 = arch below ring finger 4 = arch below little finger 2 = if loop is between index\nand middle fingers\n3 = if loop is between\nmiddle and ring fingers\nUsing 16 scale, measure height of ulnar loop (from deltas to core)\n4 = if loop is between ring\nand little fingers\n2 = if two-loop combination\nis between index and middle fingers\n3 = if two-loop combination\nNone\nis between middle and ring fingers\n4 = if two-loop combination\nis between ring and little fingers\n2 = if loop is between index\nand middle fingers\n3 = if loop is between\nmiddle and ring fingers\nUsing 16 scale, measure height of loop (from deltas to core)\n4 = if loop is between ring\nand little fingers\nNone\n2\nThree loops = height of loop between ring and middle fingers Combination of three loops and tented arches = height of pattern located next to ulnar side of palm 2 = if whorl is between\nindex and middle fingers\n3 = if whorl is between\nNone\nmiddle and ring fingers\n4 = if whorl is between ring\nand little fingers\n| Ridge Pattern                | Primary   | Secondary   |\n|------------------------------|-----------|-------------|\n| No pattern (or plain arch)   |           |             |\n| 1                            |           |             |\n| None                         | None      |             |\n| Various patterns             | 2         |             |\n| Patterns with peculiar ridge |           |             |\n| formations                   |           |             |\n| 3                            | None      | None        |\n| 4                            |           |             |\n| One distal loop opening      |           |             |\n| toward web of thumb with     |           |             |\n| core pointing downward       |           |             |\n| Three different patterns     | 5         |             |\n| Four different patterns      | 6         |             |\n| 7                            | None      | None        |\n| Two collateral distal loops  |           |             |\n| both opening toward web of   |           |             |\n| thumb                        |           |             |\n| 8                            | None      | None        |\n| Two proximal loops, either   |           |             |\n| both opening toward carpal   |           |             |\n| area or one toward radial    |           |             |\n| area and one toward carpal   |           |             |\n| area                         |           |             |\n| Any pattern not discussed    |           |             |\n| 9                            | None      | None        |\n| 1 = one proximal loop opens    | Using 09 scale, measure    |\n|--------------------------------|-----------------------------|\n| distance between core and      |                             |\n| nearest delta                  |                             |\n| toward radial side with        |                             |\n| core pointing to web of        |                             |\n| thumb or center of palm        |                             |\n| 2 = one proximal loop and      |                             |\n| one distal loop                |                             |\n| Using 09 scale, measure       |                             |\n| distance between core of       |                             |\n| proximal loop and nearest      |                             |\n| delta                          |                             |\n| 3 = one proximal loop and      |                             |\n| one whorl                      | None                        |\n| 4 = one proximal loop and      | None                        |\n| one double loop                |                             |\n| None                           |                             |\n| Using 09 scale, measure       |                             |\n| distance between core and      |                             |\n| delta (not carpal delta)       |                             |\n| 1 = one single whorl           |                             |\n| None                           |                             |\n| 2 = one whorl and one          |                             |\n| None                           |                             |\n| distal loop                    |                             |\n| 3 = two whorls                 |                             |\n| None                           |                             |\n| 1 = one double loop            | None                        |\n| 2 = one double loop and        | None                        |\n| one distal loop                |                             |\n| 3 = one double loop and        |                             |\n| None                           |                             |\n| one whorl                      |                             |\n| 4 = two double loops           |                             |\n| None                           |                             |\n\nuse of punch cards and sorting machines. Classifications of known-print cards were keyed into the punch cards and sorted according to the information contained on the card. Card-sorting machines could then extract cards containing a specific punched classification, and, from this extraction, examiners could pull the corresponding known-print cards for examination. Although this method was novel at the time, the FBI determined the experiment to be unsuccessful, and it was abandoned (Stock, 1987, p 51).\n\n## 5.7.2 National Crime Information Center Fingerprint Classification\n\nIn 1965, the Federal Bureau of Investigation recognized the country's need for a centralized electronic criminal database. Within two years, the National Crime Information Center (NCIC) was born, connecting 15 metropolitan and state computers with the FBI's NCIC central computer. By 1971, all states and the District of Columbia were connected to NCIC. The NCIC is made up of millions of records that have been sorted into separate databases. Criminal justice agencies can search these databases for information. One part of the NCIC database is the NCIC fingerprint classification. This alphanumeric classification system is pattern-specific to each individual finger and, unlike the Henry classification system, does not involve the combination of fingers. Like the Henry system, however, NCIC classification can assist only in eliminating or narrowing the search of records for the potential suspect. The NCIC system consists of a 20-character code, in which each fingerbeginning with the right thumb and ending with the left little fingeris represented by two characters (Table 520). For example, a person with all plain arches, except tented arches in the index fingers, would have an NCIC classification code of AATTAAAATTAAAA.\n\n## 5.7.3 First Attempt By Fbi To Create An Automated System\n\nIn the 1950s, the first commercially available computer came on the market and, by the 1960s, computers had reached the law enforcement community (Ruggles et al., 1994, p 214). Because of previous experience in the use of computer-aided known-print individualization and the continued growth of the fingerprint card databases, an earnest\n\n| Pattern                             | NCIC Code   |\n|-------------------------------------|-------------|\n| Ulnar loop ridge count              |             |\n| (actual ridge count)                |             |\n| 0149                               |             |\n| Radial loop ridge count             |             |\n| (actual ridge count plus 50)        |             |\n| 5199                               |             |\n| Plain arch                          | AA          |\n| Tented arch                         | TT          |\n| Plain whorl, inner tracing          | PI          |\n| Plain whorl, outer tracing          | PO          |\n| Plain whorl, meet tracing           | PM          |\n| Central pocket whorl, inner tracing | CI          |\n| Central pocket whorl, outer tracing | CO          |\n| Central pocket whorl, meet tracing  | CM          |\n| Double loop whorl, inner tracing    | dI          |\n| Double loop whorl, outer tracing    | dO          |\n| Double loop whorl, meet tracing     | dM          |\n| Accidental whorl, inner tracing     | XI          |\n| Accidental whorl, outer tracing     | XO          |\n| Accidental whorl, meet tracing      | XM          |\n| Missing or amputated finger         | XX          |\n| Complete scarring or mutilation     | SR          |\n\neffort was put forth by both local agencies and the Federal Bureau of Investigation to establish a computer program to permanently assist with fingerprint automation.\n\n## 5.7.4 Automation Research In New York\n\nIn 1965, the New York State Information and Identification System began research into the use of minutiae to classify fingerprints (Stock, 1987, p 54). The endeavor began with the manual recording of enlarged fingerprint minutiae on clear overlays and progressed to the use of a magnified rear projection system. The extracted minutiae data was then used for the programming of minutiae extraction software. Shortly after the state contracted with a firm for the development of a minutiae encoding system, budgetary restraints caused the program to be eliminated.\n\n## 5.7.5 The Royal Canadian Mounted Police Automated System\n\nIn 1970, the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) initiated an automated classification system that used video images of known-print cards. These video images were filed according to the RCMP Henry classification. When a card was submitted for a known-print search, it was classified and that classification was then searched in the video file. The computer would generate a video file containing all the possible matching known-print cards. This file was then compared on screen with the known print in question.\n\n## 5.7.6 Automation Research At The Fbi\n\nIn 1963, the FBI reinitiated its research into the complete automation of its criminal known-print repository. At this time, all attention was directed toward known-print automation and solving the Identification Division's backlog pertaining to its known-print individualization service. In the mid-1960s, initial research confirmed the feasibility of the project and, by the late 1960s, Cornell Laboratories was chosen to build a prototype automatic fingerprint reader (Stock, 1987, p 55). In 1972, this prototype, known as AIDS (Automated Identification System), was installed in the Identification Division in Washington, DC. The actual classification of fingerprints went through three different phases during program development. The first phase attempted to emulate the Henry classification system's pattern definitions. It was assumed that if a trained fingerprint technician could easily determine a pattern type by looking at computer-generated ridge flow, so could the computer. However, this proved to be time-consuming, even for the computer, and, in the second phase, the Henry system was replaced with the classification code from NCIC. In the early 1980s, the third and final phase of automatic fingerprint classification was instituted. The system, called AFIS (Automated Fingerprint Identification System), was based solely on the computerized extraction of minutiae. This extraction, in effect, creates mathematical maps of each impression in a finger block and of the card as a whole. Each map contains the computer-determined pattern type (Table 521) and minutiae location and direction.\n\n| Description        | AFIS Code   |\n|--------------------|-------------|\n| Arch               | AU          |\n| Left-slant loop    | LS          |\n| Right-slant loop   | RS          |\n| Whorl              | WU          |\n| Amputation         | XX          |\n| Complete scar      | SR          |\n| Unable to classify | UC          |\n| Unable to print    | UP          |\n\nThus, the computer scientists created a system whereby numbers could be compared. Today, when a suspect's known-print card is submitted to an automated fingerprint identification system, an algorithm compares one mathematical map to another. The conclusion of the comparison is a list of candidates with the highest matching algorithmic number.\n\n## 5.7.7 Current Developments In Friction Ridge Automation\n\nThe computer software technology that resulted from the research at the Federal Bureau of Investigation has led to numerous companies' creation of software packages for the automation of friction ridge impressions. These software packages are independent of the Federal Bureau of Investigation and are available for purchase by any institution. However, with the inception of the FBI's national Integrated Automated Fingerprint Identification System (IAFIS) in 1999 came mandated standards regarding the transmission of digital information incorporated into IAFIS (Criminal Justice Information Services, 1999; Jain and Pankanti, 2001).\n\n## 5.7.8 Automated Palmprint Classification Systems\n\nOnce again, history is repeating itself. This time it is the need for an automated palmprint identification system (APIS). In response, the biometric software community is aggressively pursuing solutions. Numerous companies are providing software packages containing palmprint individualization systems. Integral to the use of a palmprint system is the digital storage of known palmprint cards.\n\nThe FBI is currently converting all of its inked palmprint cards to a digital format in anticipation of integrating an APIS function into IAFIS.\n\n## 5.8 Conclusion\n\nIn any scientific field, the combination of mental acuity and technological innovation always creates the desire for bigger and better things. This is certainly true of friction ridge classification systems. As populations grew, the need for a system that was not dependent upon the limited workforce of the law enforcement community became increasingly important. Rudimentary systems grew into advanced systems that now provide the criminal justice community with a workable solution to the problem of identifying recidivists. Advancements in computer microprocessors and programming, and the marriage of friction ridge impressions and computers, have led the fingerprint community to the current day, where a known-print card can be searched in minutes.\n\n## 5.9 Reviewers\n\nThe reviewers critiquing this chapter were Mike Campbell, Michael Perkins, Charles Richardson, and Lyla A. Thompson.\n\n## 5.10 References\n\nAlexander, H. Classifying Palmprints: A Complete System of Coding, Filing, and Searching Palmprints; Charles C\nThomas: Springfield, IL, 1973.\n\nAshbaugh, D. R. Quantitative-Qualitative Friction Ridge Analysis: An Introduction to Basic and Advanced Ridgeology; CRC Press: Boca Raton, FL, 1999. Baird, A. J. System Used by the Western Australian Police Force for the Classification and Filing of Palmprints; 1959\n(unpublished).\n\nBeavan, C. Fingerprints: The Origins of Crime Detection and the Murder Case that Launched Forensic Science;\nHyperion: New York, 2001.\n\nBridges, B. C. *Practical Fingerprinting;* Funk and Wagnalls:\nNew York, 1963.\n\nChatterjee, S. K. *Finger, Palm and Sole Prints;* Artine Press:\nCalcutta, India, 1953. Criminal Justice Information Services, Federal Bureau of Investigation. *CJIS Informational Letter;* U.S. Department of Justice, U.S. Government Printing Office: Washington, DC, August 20, 1999.\n\nDilworth, D., Ed. Identification Wanted: Development of the American Criminal Identification System 1893-1943;\nInternational Association of Chiefs of Police: Gaithersburg, MD, 1977.\n\nFaulds, H. On the SkinFurrows of the Hand. *Nature* 1880, 22 (October 28), 605. Faulds, H. *Guide to Finger-Print Identification;* Wood, Mitchell & Co. Ltd.: Hanley, Stoke-On-Trent, U.K., 1905.\n\nFaulds, H. *Dactylography or the Study of Finger-Prints;*\nMilner and Company: Halifax, London, 1912.\n\nFederal Bureau of Investigation, *Classification of Footprints;*\nU.S. Department of Justice, U.S. Government Printing Office: Washington DC, 1985. (Revised and reprinted from Law Enforcement Bulletin, September 1971.) Galton, F. *Finger Prints;* MacMillan: New York, 1892. Galton, F. Human Variety. Journal of the Anthrological Institute of Great Britain and Ireland 1889, 18, 401419. Herschel, W. J. Skin Furrows of the Hand. *Nature* 1880, 23\n(578), 76.\n\nJain, A.; Pankanti, S. Automated Fingerprint Identification and Imaging Systems, 2nd ed.; CRC Press: New York, 2001. Jay, V. The Extraordinary Career of Dr. Purkinje. Archives of Pathology and Laboratory Medicine 2000, 124 (5),\n662663.\n\nMcGinnis, P. D. American System of Fingerprint Classification; New York State Department of Correction Division of Identification: New York, 1963.\n\nMoenssens, A. A. *Fingerprint Techniques;* Chilton Book Company: Philadelphia, 1971.\n\nRhodes, H. Alphonse Bertillon: Father of Scientific Detection; Abelard-Schuman: London, 1956.\n\nRodriguez, J. South Atlantic Crossing: Fingerprints, Science, and the State in Turn-of-the-Century Argentina.\n\nThe *American Historical Review,* April 2004 [Online], *109.2,*\nhttp://www.historycooperative.org/journals/ahr/109.2/\nrodriguez.html (accessed June 23, 2006). Ruggles, T.; Thieme, S.; Elman, D. Automated Fingerprint Identification Systems: North American Morpho System. In Advances in Fingerprint Technology; Gaensslen, R. E., Lee, H., Eds.; CRC Press: New York, 1994; pp 212226.\n\nRussell, M. Print Pioneer Identified at Last. *The Herald,*\n2004.\n\nStock, R. M. An Historical Overview of Automated Fingerprint Identification Systems. Federal Bureau of Investigation, U.S. Department of Justice, U.S. Government Printing Office: Quantico, VA, 1987; pp 5160.\n\n## 5.11 Additional Information\n\nCherrill, F. R. The Finger Print System at Scotland Yard: A Practical Treatise on Finger Print Identification for the Use of Students and Experts and a Guide for Investigators when Dealing with Imprints Left at the Scenes of Crime;\nHer Majesty's Stationery Office: London, 1954.\n\nFaulds, H. A Manual of Practical Dactylography: A Work for the Use of Students of the Finger-Print Method of Identification; The Police Review: London, 1923. Federal Bureau of Investigation. The Science of Fingerprints; U.S. Department of Justice, U.S. Government Printing Office: Washington, DC, 1979.\n\nHerschel, W. J. *The Origin of Finger-Printing;* Oxford University Press: London, 1916.\n\nHenry, E. R. *Classification and Uses of Fingerprints,*\n1st ed.; Routledge & Sons: London, 1900.\n\nPurkinje, J. E. Commentatio de Examine Physiologico Organi Visus et Systematis Cutanei (A Commentary on the Physiological Examination of the Organs of Vision and the Cutaneous System); Vratisaviae Typis Universitatis: Breslau, Prussia, 1823.\n\nVucetich, J. Dactiloscopia Comparada (Comparative Fingerprinting): The New Argentine System; 1904. (Translation for FBI Laboratories by Patrick J. Phelan, August 27, 1954.)\nWentworth, B.; Wilder, H. H. *Personal Identification;*\nGorham Press: Boston, 1918.\n\n## C H A P T E R Automated Fingerprint Identification System (Afis) Kenneth R. Moses\n\nContributing authors Peter Higgins, Michael McCabe, Salil Prabhakar, Scott Swann\n\n## C O N T E N T S\n\n31\n6.5  Summary\n3\n6.1  Introduction\n32\n6.6  Reviewers\n9\n6.2  AFIS Operations\n32\n6.7  References\n15\n6.3  Standards\n33\n6.8  Additional Information\n20\n6.4  Digitization and Processing\n\nof Fingerprints\n\n## Chapter 6 Automated Fingerprint Identification System (Afis) Kenneth R. Moses\n\nContributing authors Peter Higgins, Michael McCabe, Salil Prabhakar, Scott Swann\n\n## 6.1 Introduction\n\nPrior to the industrial revolution and the mass migrations to the cities, populations lived mostly in rural communities where everyone knew everyone else and there was little need for identification. Indeed, there were no police forces, no penitentiaries, and very few courts. As cities became crowded, crime rates soared and criminals flourished within a sea of anonymity. Newspapers feasted on stories of lawlessness, legislatures quickly responded with more laws and harsher penalties (especially for repeat offenders), and police departments were charged with identifying and arresting the miscreants. Identification systemsrogues' galleries, anthropometry, Bertillon's \"portrait parle\", and the Henry systememerged and quickly spread worldwide at the end of the 19th and beginning of the 20th century. The late 1960s and early 1970s witnessed another era of civil turmoil and an unprecedented rise in crime rates, but this era happened to coincide with the development of the silicon chip. The challenges inherent in identification systems seemed ready-made for the solutions of automatic data processing, and AFISAutomated Fingerprint Identification Systemwas born. During this same period, The RAND Corporation, working under a national grant, published The Criminal Investigative Process (Greenwood et al., 1975), a comprehensive study and critique of the process by which crimes get solvedor do not. Generally critical of traditional methods used by detectives, the study placed any hopes for improvement on physical evidence in general and latent prints in particular. In a companion study, Joan Petersilia concluded that:\nNo matter how competent the evidence technician is at performing his job, the gathering of physical evidence at a crime scene will be futile unless such evidence can be properly processed and analyzed. Since fingerprints are by far the most frequently retrieved physical evidence, making the system of analyzing such prints effective will contribute the most toward greater success in identifying criminal offenders through the use of physical evidence. (Petersilia, 1975, p 12)\nThough new technology was already in development at the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), it would be a popular movement at the local and state levels that would truly test Petersilia's theory.\n\n## 6.1.1 Need For Automation\n\nIn 1924, the FBI's Identification Division was established by authority of the United States congressional budget appropriation bill for the Department of Justice. The identification division was created to provide a central repository of criminal identification data for law enforcement agencies throughout the United States. The original collection of fingerprint records contained 810,188 records. After its creation, hundreds of thousands of new records were added to this collection yearly, and by the early 1960s the FBI's criminal file had grown to about 15 million individuals. This was in addition to the 63 million records in the civilian file, much of which was the result of military additions from World War II and the Korean conflict. Almost all of the criminal file's 15 million individuals contained 10 rolled fingerprints per card for a total of 150 million single fingerprints. Incoming records were manually classified and searched against this file using the FBI's modified Henry system of classification. Approximately 30,000 cards were searched daily. The time and human resources to accomplish this daily workload continued to grow. As a card entered the system, a preliminary gross pattern classification was assigned to each fingerprint by technicians. The technicians could complete approximately 100 fingerprint cards per hour. Complete classification and searching against the massive files could only be accomplished at an average rate of 3.3 cards per employee per hour. Obviously, as the size of the criminal file and the daily workload increased, the amount of resources required continued to grow. Eventually, classification extensions were added to reduce the portion of the criminal file that needed to be searched against each card. Nonetheless, the manual system used for searching and matching fingerprints was approaching the point of being unable to handle the daily workload. Although punch card sorters could reduce the number of fingerprint cards required to be examined based on pattern classification and other parameters, it was still necessary for human examiners to scrutinize each fingerprint card on the candidate list. A new paradigm was necessary to stop the increasing amount of human resources required to process search requests. A new automated approach was needed to (1) extract each fingerprint image from a tenprint card, (2) process each of these images to produce a reduced-size template of characteristic information, and\n(3) search a database to automatically produce a highly reduced list of probable candidate matches (Cole, 2001, pp 251252).\n\n## 6.1.2 Early Afis Development\n\nIn the early 1960s, the FBI in the United States, the Home Office in the United Kingdom, Paris Police in France, and the Japanese National Police initiated projects to develop automated fingerprint identification systems. The thrust of this research was to use emerging electronic digital computers to assist or replace the labor-intensive processes of classifying, searching, and matching tenprint cards used for personal identification.\n\n## 6.1.3 Fbi Afis Initiative\n\nBy 1963, Special Agent Carl Voelker of the FBI's Identification Division realized that the manual searching of the criminal file would not remain feasible for much longer. In an attempt to resolve this problem, he sought the help of engineers Raymond Moore and Joe Wegstein of the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST).1 After describing his problem, he asked for assistance in automating the FBI's fingerprint identification process. The NIST engineers first studied the manual methods used by human fingerprint technicians to make identifications. These methods were based on comparing the minutiae (i.e., ridge endings and ridge bifurcations) on fingerprint ridges. If the minutiae from two fingerprints were determined to be topologically equivalent, the two fingerprints were declared to be identicalthat is, having been recorded from the same finger of the same person. After this review, and after studying additional problems inherent with the inking process, they believed that a computerized solution to automatically match and pair minutiae could be developed that would operate in a manner similar to the techniques used by human examiners to make fingerprint identifications. But to achieve this goal, three major tasks would have to be accomplished. First, a scanner had to be developed that could automatically read and electronically capture the inked fingerprint image. Second, it was necessary to accurately and consistently detect and identify minutiae existing in the captured image. Finally, a method had to be developed to compare two lists of minutiae descriptors to determine whether they both most likely came from the same finger of the same individual. The Identification Division of the FBI decided that the approach suggested by Moore and Wegstein should be followed. To address the first two of the three tasks, on December 16, 1966, the FBI issued a Request for Quotation (RFQ) \"for developing, demonstrating, and testing a device for reading certain fingerprint minutiae\" (FBI, 1966). This contract was for a device to automatically locate and determine the relative position and orientation of the specified minutiae in individual fingerprints on standard fingerprint cards to be used for testing by the FBI. The requirements stated that the reader must be able to measure and locate minutiae in units of not more than 0.1 mm and that the direction of each minutiae must be measured and presented as output in units of not more than 11.25 degrees (1/32 of a full circle). The initial requirements called for a prototype model to process 10,000 single fingerprints (1,000 cards). Contractors were also instructed to develop a proposal for a subsequent contract to process 10 times that number of fingerprints. The 14 proposals received in response to this RFQ were divided into 5 broad technical approaches. At the conclusion of the proposal evaluation, two separate proposals were funded to provide a basic model for reading fingerprint images and extracting minutiae. Both proposed to use a \"flying spot scanner\" for capturing the image. But each offered a different approach for processing the captured image data, and both seemed promising. One contract was awarded to Cornell Aeronautical Labs, Inc., which proposed using a general-purpose digital computer to process binary pixels and develop programs for detecting and providing measurement parameters for each identified minutiae. The second contract was awarded to North American Aviation, Inc., Autonetics Division, which proposed using a special-purpose digital process to compare fixed logical marks to the image for identifying, detecting, and encoding each minutia. While the devices for fingerprint scanning and minutiae detection were being developed, the third task of comparing two minutiae lists to determine a candidate match was addressed by Joe Wegstein (Wegstein, 1969a, 1970, 1972a/b, 1982; Wegstein and Rafferty, 1978, 1979; Wegstein et al., 1968). He developed the initial algorithms for determining fingerprint matches based on the processing and comparison of two lists describing minutiae location and orientation. For the next 15 years, he continued to develop more reliable fingerprint matching software that became increasingly more complex in order to account for such things as plastic distortion and skin elasticity. Algorithms he developed were embedded in AFISs that were eventually placed in operation at the FBI and other law enforcement agencies. By 1969, both Autonetics and Cornell had made significant progress on their feasibility demonstration models. In 1970, a Request for Proposal (RFP) was issued for the construction of a prototype fingerprint reader to reflect the experience gained from the original demonstration models with an additional requirement for speed and accuracy. Cornell was awarded the contract to deliver the prototype reader to the FBI in 1972. After a year's experience with the prototype system, the FBI issued a new RFP containing additional requirements such as a high-speed card-handling subsystem. In 1974, Rockwell International, Inc., was awarded a contract to build five production model automatic fingerprint reader systems. This revolutionary system was called Finder. These readers were delivered to the FBI in 1975 and 1976. The next 3 years were devoted to using these readers in the conversion of 15 million criminal fingerprint cards (Moore, 1991, pp 164175). As it became apparent that the FBI's efforts to automate the fingerprint matching process would be successful, state and local law enforcement agencies began to evaluate this new technology for their own applications. The Minneapolis St. Paul system in Minnesota was one of the first automated fingerprint matching systems (after the FBI's) to be installed in the United States. Further, while the United States was developing its AFIS technology in the 1960s, France, the United Kingdom, and Japan were also doing research into automatic fingerprint image processing and matching.\n\n## 6.1.4 French Afis Initiative\n\nIn 1969, M. R. Thiebault, Prefecture of Police in Paris, reported on the French efforts. (Descriptions of work done by Thiebault can be found in the entries listed in the Additional Information section of this chapter.) France's focus was on the solution to the latent fingerprint problem rather than the general identification problem that was the concern in the United States. The French approach incorporated a vidicon (a video camera tube) to scan photographic film transparencies of fingerprints. Scanning was done at 400 pixels per inch (ppi), which was less than an optimal scan rate for latent work. This minutiae matching approach was based on special-purpose, high-speed hardware that used an array of logical circuits. The French also were interested in resolving the problem of poor fingerprint image quality.\n\nIn order to acquire a high-contrast image that would be easy to photograph and process, a technique was developed to record live fingerprint images photographically using a principle of \"frustrated total internal reflection\" (FTIR). Although not put into large-scale production at that time, 20 years later FTIR became the cornerstone for the development of the modern-day livescan fingerprint scanners. These are making the use of ink and cards obsolete for nonforensic identification purposes today. By the early 1970s, the personnel responsible for development of France's fingerprint automation technology had changed. As a result, there was little interest in pursuing automated fingerprint identification research for the next several years. In the late 1970s, a computer engineering subsidiary of France's largest financial institution responded to a request by the French Ministry of Interior to work on automated fingerprint processing for the French National Police. Later, this company joined with the Morphologic Mathematics Laboratory at the Paris School of Mines to form a subsidiary called Morpho Systems that went on to develop a functioning. Currently, Morpho Systems is part of Sagem (also known as Group SAFRAN).\n\n## 6.1.5 United Kingdom Afis Initiative\n\nDuring the same period of time, the United Kingdom's Home Office was doing research into automatic fingerprint identification. Two of the main individuals responsible for the United Kingdom's AFIS were Dr. Barry Blain and Ken Millard. (Papers produced by Millard are listed in the Additional Information section of this chapter). Like the French, their main focus was latent print work. By 1974, research was being done in-house with contractor assistance from Ferranti, Ltd. The Home Office developed a reader to detect minutiae, record position and orientation, and determine ridge counts to the five nearest neighbors to the right of each minutia. This was the first use of ridge count information by an AFIS vendor (Moore, 1991).\n\n## 6.1.6 Japanese Afis Initiative\n\nLike France and the United Kingdom, Japan's motivation for a fingerprint identification system was directed toward the matching of latent images against a master file of rolled fingerprints. Japan's researchers believed that an accurate latent system would naturally lead to the development of an accurate tenprint system.\n\nBy 1966, the Osaka Prefecture Police department housed almost 4 million single fingerprints. An early automation effort by this agency was the development of a pattern classification matching system based on a 17- to 20-digit number encoded manually (Kiji, 2002, p 9). Although this approach improved the efficiency of the totally manual method enormously, it had inherent problems. It required a great deal of human precision and time to classify the latents and single fingerprints; was not fully suitable for latent matching; and produced a long list of candidates, resulting in expensive verifications. Within a few years, the fingerprint automation focus of Japanese researchers had changed. By 1969, the Identification Section of the Criminal Investigation Bureau, National Police Agency of Japan (NPA), approached NEC to develop a system for the computerization of fingerprint identification. NEC determined that it could build an automated fingerprint identification system employing a similar minutiae-based approach to that being used in the FBI system under development. At that time, it was thought that a fully automated system for searching fingerprints would not be realized for 5 to 10 years. In 1969, NEC and NPA representatives visited the FBI and began to learn about the current state of the art for the FBI's AFIS plans. During the same period, NPA representatives also collaborated with Moore and Wegstein from NIST. Additional AFIS sites were visited where information was acquired regarding useful and worthless approaches that had been attempted. All of this information was evaluated and used in the development of the NEC system. For the next 10 years, NEC worked to develop its AFIS.\nIn addition to minutiae location and orientation, this system also incorporated ridge-count information present in the local four surrounding quadrants of each minutiae under consideration for pairing. By 1982, NEC had successfully installed its system in the NPA and started the card conversion process. Within a year, latent inquiry searches began. In 1980, NEC received a U.S. patent for automatic minutiae detection. It began marketing its automated fingerprint identification systems to the United States a few years later.\n\n## 6.1.7 The Politicization Of Fingerprints And The San Francisco Experiment\n\nEarly development and implementation of automated fingerprint systems was limited to national police agencies in Europe, North America, and Japan. But the problems associated with huge national databases and the newborn status of computer technology in the 1970s limited the utility of these systems. Government investment in AFIS was justified largely on the promise of efficiency in the processing of incoming tenprint records. But funding these expensive systems on the local level would demand some creativity (Wayman, 2004, pp 5052). Following the success of the FBI's Finder, Rockwell took its system to market in the mid-1970s. Rockwell organized a users group for its Printrak system and sponsored an annual conference for customers and would-be customers. Starting with a beta-site in San Jose, California, more than a dozen installations were completed in quick succession. Peggy James of the Houston Police Department, Joe Corcoran from Saint Paul, Donna Jewett from San Jose, and others devoted their energies toward educating the international fingerprint community on the miracle of the minutiae-based Printrak system. Each system that came online trumpeted the solution of otherwise unsolvable crimes and the identity of arrested criminals. A users group newsletter was published and distributed that highlighted some of the best cases and listed the search statistics of member agencies. Ken Moses of the San Francisco Police Department had attended several of those Printrak conferences and became a staunch crusader for fingerprint automation. In three successive years, he persuaded the Chief of Police to include a Printrak system in the city budget, but each time it was vetoed by the mayor. After the third mayoral veto, a ballot proposition was organized by other politicians. The proposition asked citizens to vote on whether they wanted an automated fingerprint system. In 1982, Proposition E passed with an 80% plurality. The mayor refused to approve a sole-source purchase from Rockwell, even though it was the only system in the world being marketed. She insisted on a competitive bid with strict evaluation criteria and testing. While on a trade mission to Japan, the mayor learned that the Japanese National Police were working with NEC to install a fingerprint system, but NEC stated that the system was being developed as a public service and the company had no plans to market it. After meeting with key Japanese officials, NEC changed its mind and agreed to bid on the San Francisco AFIS.\n\nWhen the bids were opened, not only had Printrak and NEC submitted proposals, but a dark horse named Logica had also entered the fray. Logica had been working with the British Home Office to develop a system for New Scotland Yard. San Francisco retained systems consultant Tim Ruggles to assist in constructing the first head-to-head benchmark tests of competing in-use fingerprint systems. The test was most heavily weighted toward latent print accuracy, and a set of 50 latent prints graded from poor to good from actual past cases was searched against a prescribed tenprint database. All tests were conducted at the respective vendor's home site.2 NEC was awarded the contract and installation was completed in December 1983. Besides being the first competitive bid on 1980s technology, what differentiated the San Francisco system from those that had gone before was organizational design. AFIS was viewed as a true system encompassing all aspects of friction ridge identificationfrom the crime scene to the courtroom. The AFIS budget included laboratory and crime scene equipment, training in all phases of forensic evidence, and even the purchase of vehicles. In 1983, a new crime scene unit was organized specifically with the new system as its centerpiece. Significant organizational changes were put into effect:\n\n1.  All latents that met minimum criteria would be\n\nsearched in AFIS.\n2.  A new unit called Crime Scene Investigations was\ncreated and staffed on a 24/7 schedule.\n3.  Department policies were changed to mandate that\npatrol officers notify crime scene investigators of all felonies with a potential for latent prints.\nThis has made it extremely difficult for researchers and prospective purchasers to evaluate competing systems. The veil of secrecy has generally carried over to the sharing of AFIS operational performance data by agency personnel who often develop a strong sense of loyalty to their AFIS vendor.\n\n4. All crime scene investigators who processed the crime\nscenes were trained in the use of the system and encouraged to search their own cases.\n5.  Performance statistics were kept from the beginning,\nand AFIS cases were tracked through the criminal justice system to the courts.\nThe result of the San Francisco experiment was a dramatic 10-fold increase in latent print identifications in 1984. The district attorney demanded and got five new positions to prosecute the AFIS cases. The conviction rate in AFIS- generated burglary cases was three times higher than in burglary cases without this type of evidence (Figure 61; Bruton, 1989).\n\nAt a time when burglary rates were steeply rising in cities across the nation, the burglary rate plummeted in San Francisco (Figure 62; Bruton, 1989). Reporters, academics, and police administrators from around the world inundated the San Francisco Police Department for demonstrations and information. The importance of politics and publicity was not lost on other agencies. Los Angeles even enlisted the backing of film stars to stir up public support. The identification of serial killer Richard Ramirez, the infamous Night Stalker, through a search of the brand-new California State AFIS made worldwide headlines and guaranteed the future funding of systems in California.\n\n## 6.1.8 Afis Proliferation\n\nThe widely publicized success in San Francisco provided the spark for the rapid proliferation of new AFIS installations along with a methodology of benchmark testing to evaluate the claims of the growing number of competing vendors. Governments quickly provided funding so that, by 1999, the International Association for Identification's (IAI's)\nAFIS Directory of Users identified 500 AFIS sites worldwide (IAI, 1999). The burgeoning market in these multimillion-dollar systems put forensic identification on the economic map. Commercial exhibits at IAI's conferences that had formerly featured companies hawking tape and powder now expanded to digital image enhancement, lasers and forensic light sources, and the latest in new developments from Silicon Valley. The San Francisco Crime Lab received its first digital imaging system in 1986. This 3M/Comtal system was dedicated to friction ridge enhancement. Fingermatrix installed the first livescan device in the San Francisco Police Identification Bureau in 1988. AFIS brought crime scene and forensic identification out of the basement; no local or state law enforcement administrator wanted to be accused of being left behind. However, the frenzied expansion of AFIS was not always logical and rational. By the early 1990s, the four biggest vendorsPrintrak, NEC, Morpho, and Cogentwere in competition, each offering proprietary software that was incompatible with the others, especially in latent print searching. Expansion was often based on political considerations and competing mission priorities. Local and state agencies expressed differences in priorities in terms of system design, with states generally emphasizing criminal identification or tenprint functions, while cities and counties focused on crime solving or latent print functions. Generally, the demands of latent print processing on computer resources far exceeded the requirements of tenprint processing, and states balked at the additional expense and technical complexity. As a result, cities, counties, and states often went their separate ways, installing dissimilar systems that could not communicate with neighboring jurisdictions or with the central state repository. Vendors eagerly encouraged this fragmentation in an attempt to gain market share and displace competitors whenever possible. The evolution of electronic transmission standards (see section 6.3) ameliorated this problem for tenprint search but not for latent search.\n\n## 6.2 Afis Operations 6.2.1 Afis Functions And Capabilities\n\nIdentification bureaus are legislatively mandated to maintain criminal history records. Historically, this meant huge file storage requirements and cadres of clerks to maintain and search them. Demographic-based criminal history computers were established well ahead of AFIS, first as IBM card sort systems and then as all-digital information systems with terminals throughout the state and, via the National Crime Information Center (NCIC) network and the National Law Enforcement Teletype System (Nlets), throughout the nation. These automated criminal history systems became even more labor-intensive than the paper record systems they supposedly replaced. In many systems, more paper was generated and placed into the history jackets along with the fingerprint cards, mug shots, warrants, and other required documents. AFIS revolutionized state identification bureaus because it removed from the paper files the last document type that could not previously be digitizedthe fingerprint card. State identification bureaus could now bring to their legislatures costbenefit analyses that easily justified the purchase of an automated fingerprint system through the reduction of clerical personnel. Local and county jurisdictions did not usually enjoy the economic benefits of state systems. Pre-AFIS personnel levels were often lower and controlled more by the demands of the booking process than by file maintenance. AFIS generally increased staffing demands on the latent and crime-scene-processing side because it made crime scene processing dramatically more productive. Local and county AFIS purchases were usually justified on the basis of their crime-solving potential.\n\n6.2.1.1 Technical Functions. Law enforcement AFISs are composed of two interdependent subsystems: the tenprint (i.e., criminal identification) subsystem and the latent (i.e., criminal investigation) subsystem. Each subsystem operates with a considerable amount of autonomy, and both are vital to public safety. The tenprint subsystem is tasked with identifying sets of inked or livescan fingerprints incident to an arrest or citation or as part of an application process to determine whether a person has an existing record. In many systems, identification personnel are also charged with maintaining the integrity of the fingerprint and criminal history databases. Identification bureau staffs are generally composed of fingerprint technicians and supporting clerical personnel. An automated tenprint inquiry normally requires a minutiae search of only the thumbs or index fingers. Submitted fingerprints commonly have sufficient clarity and detail to make searching of more than two fingers unnecessary. Today's AFIS can often return a search of a million records in under a minute. As databases have expanded across the world, some AFIS engineers have expanded to searching four fingers or more in an effort to increase accuracy. The latent print or criminal identification subsystem is tasked with solving crimes though the identification of latent prints developed from crime scenes and physical evidence. Terminals used within the latent subsystem are often specialized to accommodate the capture and digital enhancement of individual latent prints. The latent subsystem may be staffed by latent print examiners, crime scene investigators, or laboratory or clerical personnel. The staff of the latent subsystem is frequently under a different command structure than the tenprint subsystem and is often associated with the crime laboratory. The search of a latent print is more tedious and timeconsuming than a tenprint search. Latent prints are often fragmentary and of poor image quality. Minutiae features are normally reviewed one-by-one before the search begins. Depending on the portion of the database selected to be searched and the system's search load, the response may take from a few minutes to several hours to return. Most law enforcement AFIS installations have the ability to perform the following functions:\n\n- Search a set of known fingerprints (tenprints) against\nan existing tenprint database (TPTP) and return with results that are better than 99% accurate.3\n- Search a latent print from a crime scene or evidence\nagainst a tenprint database (LPTP).\n- Search a latent from a crime scene against latents on\nfile from other crime scenes (LPLP).\n- Search a new tenprint addition to the database against\nall unsolved latent prints in file (TPLP).\nEnhancements have been developed to allow other functions that expand AFIS capabilities, including:\n\n- Addition of palmprint records to the database to allow\nthe search of latent palmprints from crime scenes.\n- Interfacing of AFIS with other criminal justice information systems for added efficiency and \"lights out\"4\noperation.\n- Interfacing of AFIS with digital mug shot systems and\nlivescan fingerprint capture devices.\n\n- Addition of hand-held portable devices for use in identity\nqueries from the field. The query is initiated by scanning one or more of the subject's fingers, extracting the minutiae within the device, and transmitting to AFIS, which then returns a hit or no-hit (red light, green light) result. Hit notification may be accompanied by the thumbnail image of the subject's mug shot.\n- Multimodal identification systems, including fingerprint,\npalmprint, iris, and facial recognition, are now available.\n\n## 6.2.2 System Accuracy\n\nMost dedicated government computer systems are based on demographic data such as name, address, date of birth, and other information derived from letters and numbers.\n\nFor example, to search for a record within the motor vehicle database, one would enter a license number or operator data. The success of the search will be dependent on the accuracy with which the letters and numbers were originally perceived and entered. The inquiry is straightforward and highly accurate at finding the desired record. Automated fingerprint systems are based on data extracted from images. Although there is only one correct spelling for a name in a motor vehicle database, a fingerprint image can be scanned in an almost infinite number of ways. Success in searching fingerprints depends on the clarity of the images and the degree of correspondence between the search print and the database print (compression and algorithms are two other factors that can affect accuracy). In the case of searching a new tenprint card against the tenprint database, there is usually more than enough image information present to find its mate 99.9% of the time in systems with operators on hand to check respondent lists (rather than true \"lights out\" operations). A latent print usually consists of a fragmentary portion of a single finger or piece of palm, though the quality of some latent impressions can exceed their corresponding images of record. The amount of information present in the image is usually of lesser quality and often is contaminated with background interference. Entering latents into the computer has a subjective element that is based on the experience of the operator. Based on latent print acceptance test requirements commonly found in AFIS proposals and contracts, the chances of a latent print finding its mate in the database is about 70 to 80%. Naturally, the better the latent image, the higher the chances of success. Inversely, the chance of missing an identification, even when the mate is in the database, is 25%. Especially in latent print searches, failure to produce an identification or a hit does not mean the subject is not in the database. Other factors beyond the knowledge and control of the operator, such as poor-quality database prints, will adversely affect the chances of a match. Because of the variability of the images and the subjectivity of the terminal's operator, success is often improved by conducting multiple searches while varying the image, changing operators, or searching other systems that may contain different copies of the subject's prints. It is common that success comes only on multiple attempts.\n\n## 6.2.3 Peripheral Benefits\n\n6.2.3.1 Community Safety. There is no national reporting mechanism for the gathering of AFIS (or latent print) statistics, so the measurable benefits are illusive. However, to provide some recognition of those benefits, the author of this chapter conducted a survey of latent hits in the 10 largest states by population for the year 2005 (Table 61). Prior attempts to provide this type of information have revealed inconsistencies in how identifications are counted and how the hit rate is determined (Komarinski, 2005, pp 184189).\n\nBased on the author's survey, an estimated 50,000 suspects a year in the United States are identified through AFIS latent searches. In conducting the survey, if the contacted state bureaus did not have statewide figures, attempts were made to also contact the five largest cities in that state. (In no instance was it possible to contact every AFIS-equipped jurisdiction in a state, so the total hits are the minimum number of hits.) Also, only case hits or suspect hits were counted, depending on what data each agency kept. (When agencies reported multiple hits to a single person, this was not included in data presented.) Extrapolating from the table, if the remaining 40 states and all agencies of the federal government each had just one latent hit per day, the total estimate of latent hits for the entire United States would surpass 50,000.\n\nRank by\nLatent Hits\nPopulation\nState\nAFIS\n1\nCalifornia\n8,814\n2\nTexas\n3,590\n3\nNew York\n2,592\n4\nFlorida\n6,275\n5\nIllinois\n1,224\n6\nPennsylvania\n1,463\n7\nOhio*\n1,495\n8\nMichigan**\n1,239\n9\nGeorgia\n980\n10\nNew Jersey\n1,506\nTotal\n29,178\n\n* Cleveland not available. ** Detroit not available.\n\nFew studies have been done to measure what effect, if any, a dramatic increase in the rate of suspect latent print identifications from AFIS has had on public safety overall. The burglary data from San Francisco in the late 1980s (Figure 62) is probative but must be narrowly construed. FBI Uniform Crime Reports show a steady decline in most serious offenses that coincide with the proliferation of AFIS, but no cause-and-effect relationship has been explored by academia or government. During the 1990s, many states passed \"three strikes\" laws increasing the punishment for felony offenses that some theorists have held are responsible for the decline in crime. But before harsher penalties can be applied, perpetrators must be identified and apprehended.\n\nBurglary is the offense most impacted by AFIS. Assume that an active burglar is committing two offenses per week when he is apprehended on the basis of an AFIS hit. He is convicted and, based on harsh sentencing laws, sent to prison for 5 years. In this case, that one AFIS hit will have prevented 100 crimes per year over the course of the 5 year sentence. If this one arrest is then multiplied by some fraction of the totals from the table above, a truer appreciation of the impact that AFIS is having on society can be gained.\n\n6.2.3.2 Validation of Friction Ridge Science. There are many ways to test the efficacy of a theoretical proposition. Corporate and academic laboratories pour tremendous resources into building models that they hope will closely duplicate performance in the real world. Even after successfully passing such testing, theories fail and products get recalled after weathering the rigors of the real world. In-use models invariably trump laboratory models. During the past 100 years, many models have been constructed to test the theory that no two friction ridge images from different areas of palmar surfaces are alike and to determine what minimum number of minutiae is sufficient to support an individualization decision. Automated fingerprint systems have been effectively testing identification theory millions of times a day every day for more than 20 years. These systems tend to validate what friction ridge examiners have propounded since Galton first set forth his standards. AFIS has also served as a catalyst to help examiners expand their image-processing knowledge and skills. Some errors occur every year in both manual and automated systems, and it is through the study of errors that both systems can be improved in the future. According to Dr. James Wayman, Director of the National Biometrics Test Center, \"Error rates (in friction ridge identification) are difficult to measure, precisely because they are so low\" (Wayman, 2000)\n\n## 6.2.4 Iafis\n\nThe Integrated Automated Fingerprint Identification System, more commonly known as IAFIS, is the world's largest collection of criminal history information. Fully operational since July 28, 1999, IAFIS is maintained by the FBI's Criminal Justice Information Services (CJIS) Division in Clarksburg, WV, and contains fingerprint images for more than 64 million individuals. The FBI's CJIS Division system's architecture and the identification and investigative services provided by the division form an integrated system-of-services (SoS) concept. These identification and information services enable local, state, federal, tribal, and international law enforcement communities, as well as civil organizations, to efficiently access or exchange critical information 24 hours a day, 365 days per year. The SoS provides advanced identification and ancillary criminal justice technologies used in the identification of subjects. The systems within the CJIS SoS, including IAFIS, have evolved over time, both individually and collectively, to add new technological capabilities, embrace legislative directives, and improve the performance and accuracy of their information services. During its first year of inception, IAFIS processed nearly 14.5 million fingerprint submissions. Today, IAFIS processes similar tenprint volumes in as little as 3 to 4 months. Although designed to respond to electronic criminal transactions within 2 hours and civil transactions within 24 hours, IAFIS has exceeded these demands, often providing criminal search requests in less than 20 minutes and civil background checks in less than 3 hours. Likewise, IAFIS provides the latent print examiners with a superlative investigative tool, allowing fingerprint evidence from crime scenes to be searched in approximately 2 hours rather than the 24-hour targeted response time. Although declared a successful system early within its deployment, IAFIS continues to improve as a vital asset to law enforcement agencies more than 10 years later. Today's transient society magnifies the need for an economic, rapid, positive identification process for both criminal and noncriminal justice background checks. IAFIS processes are regularly improved to allow for a quick and accurate fingerprint-based records check, whether related to terrorists trying to enter the United States or applicants seeking positions of trust. Figure 63 illustrates the states that currently interface with IAFIS electronically. The increasingly complex requirements of the SoS architecture demand a well-structured process for its operations and maintenance. Each of these systems has multiple segments consisting of computer hardware and software that provide the operating systems and utilities, database management, workflow management, transaction or\nmessaging management, internal and external networking, communications load balancing, and system security. IAFIS consists of three integrated segments: the Identification Tasking and Networking (ITN) segment, the Interstate Identification Index (III), and AFIS (Figure 64). Within IAFIS, the ITN segment acts as a \"traffic cop\" for the fingerprint system, providing workflow/workload management for tenprint, latent print, and document processing. The ITN provides the humanmachine interfaces, the internal interfaces for communications within the IAFIS backbone communications element, the storage and retrieval of fingerprint images, the external communications interfaces, the IAFIS back-end communications element, and user fee billing. The III provides subject search, computerized criminal history, and criminal photo storage and retrieval. The AFIS searches the FBI fingerprint repository for matches to tenprint and latent fingerprints. Supporting IAFIS is the CJIS-wide area network (WAN), providing the communications infrastructure for the secure exchange of fingerprint information to and from external systems. The external systems are the state control terminal agencies, state identification bureaus, and federal service coordinators. Also submitting fingerprint information to IAFIS is the Card Scanning Service (CSS). The CSS acts as a conduit for agencies that are not yet submitting fingerprints electronically. The CSS makes the conversion of fingerprint information from paper format to electronic format and submits that information to IAFIS. Another system providing external communications for IAFIS is Nlets. The purpose of Nlets is to provide interstate communications to law enforcement, criminal justice, and other agencies involved in the enforcement of laws. Figure 65 depicts the highlevel IAFIS architecture. Users wishing to interface with IAFIS electronically must comply with the FBI's Electronic Fingerprint Transmission Specification (EFTS).\n\nElectronic access to and exchange of fingerprint information with the world's largest national repository of automated criminal and civil records is fulfilling the CJIS mission:\nThe CJIS Division mission is to reduce terrorist activities by maximizing the ability to provide timely and relevant criminal justice information to the FBI and to qualified law enforcement, criminal justice, civilian, academic, employment, and licensing agencies concerning individuals, stolen property, criminal organizations and activities, and other law enforcement-related data.\n\n## 6.2.4.1 Iafis Status As Of Early 2006. Because Of The Evolutionary Changes To The American National Standards Institute (Ansi)/Nist Standard In 1997, 2000, And 2006, The\n\nFBI has not always had the financial resources or corporate commitment to update IAFIS and keep it current. One area where it has moved forward is the acceptance and processing of \"segmented slaps\" for civil transactions. These transactions use a modified livescan platen that is 3 inches high so the four fingers of each hand can be placed as a \"slap\" in a straight up-and-down position. Similarly, both thumbs can be captured simultaneously for a total of three images (type 4 or type 14 as defined in sections 6.3.2.1 and 6.3.3). The resultant transaction's three-image files are easy to segment with the capture device software. The three images and relative location of the segmented fingers within the images are all transmitted. This dramatically reduces collection time and improves the captured-image quality from a content perspective due to the flat, straight, 3-inch placement.\n\nOne drawback to IAFIS is that it cannot store and search palmprints, though several production AFISs can do so. Also, at least one foreign production and several domestic AFIS sites accept and store 1,000-pixels-per-inch tenprint imagesIAFIS cannot yet do this. The FBI recognizes its need to expand its services and has (1) tested small palm systems and (2) started a project known as the Next Generation Identification Program (NGI). Driven by advances in technology, customer requirements, and growing demand for IAFIS services, this program will further advance the FBI's biometric identification services, providing an incremental replacement of current IAFIS technical capabilities while introducing new functionality. NGI improvements and new capabilities will be introduced across a multiyear time frame within a phased approach. The NGI system will offer state-of-theart biometric identification services and provide a flexible framework of core capabilities that will serve as a platform for multimodal functionality.\n\n6.2.4.2 Universal Latent Work Station. AFISs that are fully ANSI/NIST compliant can send image-based transactions from site to site. But in the latent community, most practitioners want to edit the images and extract the minutiae themselves, that is, perform remote searches rather than submittals. This model also plays well with the ability of most agencies to provide the skilled labor required for imaged-based submittals from other agencies. The FBI CJIS Division addressed this issue by working closely with Mitretek and the four major AFIS vendors to develop a set of tools that would permit the creation of remote searches for any of their automated fingerprint identification systems and for IAFIS. The result is a free software product called the Universal Latent Workstation (ULW). This software can run on a stand-alone PC with either a flatbed scanner or a digital camera interface. It can also run on vendor-provided latent workstations. At a minimum, when specifying an AFIS in a procurement, one should mandate that the AFIS be able to generate remote searches to IAFIS. It is further recommended that the procurer ask for the ability to perform the ULW function so the vendors can integrate ULW into their systems. The ULW also provides the ability to launch latent print image searches into IAFIS without the need to manually encode minutiae when working with high-quality latent prints.\n\n## 6.3 Standards 6.3.1 Background\n\nStandards are mutually agreed upon attributes of products, systems, communication protocols, and so forth. Standards are what permit people to purchase light bulbs made in Hungary, the United States, or Japan and know they will fit in a standard lamp socket. Industries and governments establish standards not just for the convenience of the consumer but to permit competition for the same product. Each nation has its own standards bureau or management body. In the United States, it is ANSI. At the international level, there are several such bodies. They include the United Nation's International Labor Organization (ILO) and International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), the International Criminal Police Organization (Interpol), the International Standards Organization (ISO), and the International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC). Other than the United Nations and Interpol, these standards bodies do not \"invent\" or \"create\" standards but rather provide processes that authorized bodies can use to propose standards for approval at the national level and then at the international level. The United Nations and Interpol tend to build on these national and international standards bodies' standards rather than starting from scratch. ANSI has offices in both New York and Washington, DC. ANSI has authorized more than 200 bodies to propose standards. If all the procedures are followed correctly and there are no unaddressed objections, then the results of the efforts of these bodies become ANSI standards. The 200 organizations include the following:\n\n- The Department of Commerce's NIST - IAI - The American Association of Motor Vehicle\n Administrators\n- The International Committee for Information\n\n## Technology Standards (Incits) 6.3.2 Fingerprint Standards\n\nLaw enforcement agencies around the world have had standards for the local exchange of inked fingerprints for decades. In 1995, Interpol held a meeting to address the transfer of ink-and-paper fingerprint cards (also known as forms) between countries. The local standards naturally had different text fields, had different layouts of text fields, were in different languages, and were on many different sizes of paper. Before that effort could lead to an internationally accepted fingerprint form, Interpol moved to the electronic exchange of fingerprints. In the ink-and-paper era, the standards included fiber content and thickness of the paper, durability of the ink, size of the \"finger boxes\", and so forth. With the move in the early 1990s toward near real-time responses to criminal fingerprint submittals, there came a new set of standards.\n\nThe only way to submit, search, and determine the status of fingerprints in a few hours from a remote site is through electronic submittal and electronic responses. The source can still be ink-and-paper, but the images need to be digitized and submitted electronically to address the growing demand for rapid turnaround of fingerprint transactions. The FBI was the first agency to move to large-scale electronic submission of fingerprints from remote sites. As part of the development of IAFIS, the FBI worked very closely with NIST to develop appropriate standards for the electronic transmission of fingerprint images. Starting in 1991, NIST held a series of workshops with forensic experts, fingerprint repository managers, industry representatives, and consultants to develop a standard, under the ANSI guidelines, for the exchange of fingerprint images. It was approved in November 1993, and the formal title was \"Data Format for the Interchange of Fingerprint Information (ANSI NIST-CSL 1-1993)\".  This standard was based on the 1986 ANSI/National Bureau of Standards minutiae-based standard and ANSI/NBS-ICST 1-1986, a standard that did not address image files. This 1993 NIST standard (and the later revisions) became known in the fingerprint technology world simply as the \"ANSI/NIST standard\". If implemented correctly (i.e., in full compliance with the standard and the FBI's implementation), it would permit fingerprints collected on a compliant livescan from any vendor to be read by any other compliant AFIS and the FBI's yet-to-be-built (at that time) IAFIS. The standard was deliberately open to permit communities of users (also known as domains of interest) to customize it to meet their needs. Some of the customizable areas were image density (8-bit gray scale or binary) and text fields associated with a transaction (e.g., name, crime). The idea was that different communities of users would write their own implementation plans. The mandatory parts of the ANSI/NIST standard were the definitions of the record types, the binary formats for fingerprint and signature images and, within certain record types, the definition of \"header\" fields such as image compression type.\n\n6.3.2.1 Record Types. For a transaction to be considered ANSI/NIST compliant, the data must be sent in a structured fashion with a series of records that align with ANSI/NIST record types as implemented in a specific user domain (e.g., Interpol).\n\n- All transmissions (also known as transactions) have\nto start with a type 1 record that is basically a table of contents for the transmission, the transaction type field (e.g., CAR for \"criminal tenprint submissionanswer required\"), and the identity of both the sending and receiving agencies.\n\n- Type 2 records can contain user-defined information\nassociated with the subject of the fingerprint transmission (such as name, date of birth, etc.) and the purpose of the transaction (arrest cycle, applicant background check, etc.). These fields are defined in the domain-ofinterest implementation standard (e.g., the FBI's EFTS). Note that type 2 records are also used for responses from AFISs. They fall into two sets: error messages and search results. The actual use is defined in the domain specification.\n- Types 3 (low-resolution gray scale), 4 (high-resolution\ngray scale), 5 (low-resolution binary), and 6 (highresolution binary) were set up for the transmission of fingerprint images at different standards (500 ppi for high resolution and 256 ppi for low resolution) and image density (8 bits per pixel for grayscale) or binary (1 bit per pixel for black and white). Note that all images for records type 3 through 6 are to be acquired at a minimum of 500 ppi; however, low-resolution images are down-sampled to 256 ppi for transmission. There are few, if any, ANSI/NIST implementations that support type 3, 5, or 6 images (see explanation below). None of these three record types are recommended for use by latent examiners and fingerprint technicians.\n- Type 7 was established for user-defined images (e.g.,\nlatent images, faces) and, until the update of the ANSI/ NIST standard in 2000, it was the record type for exchanging latent images. This record type can be used to send scanned copies of identity documents, and so forth. Again, the domain specification determines the legitimate uses of the type 7 record.\n- Type 8 was defined for signatures (of the subject or per-\nson taking the fingerprints), and it is not used in many domains.\n\n- Type 9 was defined for a minimal set of minutiae that\ncould be sent to any AFIS that was ANSI/NIST-compliant.\nThe first such implementation plan was the FBI's EFTS issued in 1994. The EFTS limited what record types, of the nine defined in the ANSI/NIST standard, the FBI would use, and defined the type 2 data fields. The key decision the FBI\nmade was that it would only accept 500-ppi gray-scale images or, in ANSI/NIST parlance, type 4 images. As a result of that decision, all law enforcement systems since then have specified type 4 images and do not accept types 3,\n5, or 6, which as a result have fallen into disuse for these applications in the United States. The type 4 records start out with header information in front of the image. The headers tell the computer which finger the image is from, whether it is from a livescan or an inked card, the image size in the number of pixels of width and height, and whether the image is from a rolled impression or a flat or plain impression.\n\n6.3.2.2 Image Quality. Both the ANSI/NIST standard and the EFTS lacked any metrics or standards for image quality. The FBI then appended the EFTS with an image quality standard (IQS) known as Appendix F. (Later, a reduced set of image quality specifications were added as Appendix G because the industry was not uniformly ready to meet Appendix F standards.) The IQS defines minimal acceptable standards for the equipment used to capture the fingerprints. There are six engineering terms specified in the IQS. They are:\n\n1.  Geometric image accuracythe ability of the scanner\nto keep relative distances between points on an object (e.g., two minutiae) the same relative distances apart in the output image.\n2.  Modulation transfer function (MTF)the ability of the\nscanning device to capture both low-frequency (ridges themselves) and high-frequency (ridge edge details) information in a fingerprint at minimum standards.\n3.  Signal-to-noise ratiothe ability of the scanning device\nto digitize the information without introducing too much electronic noise (that is, with the pure white image parts appearing pure white and the totally black image parts appearing totally black).\n4.  Gray-scale range of image dataavoiding excessively\nlow-contrast images by ensuring that the image data are spread across a minimal number of shades of gray.\n\n5.  Gray-scale linearityas the level of gray changes in a\nfingerprint capture, the digital image reflects a corresponding ratio of gray level across all shades of gray.\n6.  Output gray-level uniformitythe ability of the scan-\nning device to create an image with a continuous gray scale across an area on the input image (tested using a special test image) that has a single gray level.\n\nInterestingly, only two of these six image quality standards apply to latent scanning devices: geometric image accuracy and MTF. In fact, the FBI does not certify (see below for a discussion of certified products) scanners for latent use but recommends that latent examiners purchase equipment they are comfortable with using from an imagequality perspective. But EFTS Appendix F does mandate that latent images be captured at 1,000 ppi. There are no standards for the quality of the actual fingerprint, but livescan and AFIS vendors have rated fingerprint quality for years. They know that fingerprint quality is possibly the strongest factor in the reliability of an AFIS's successfully matching a fingerprint to one in the repository. These ratings are often factored into the AFIS algorithms. In a paper titled \"The Role of Data Quality in Biometric Systems\" (Hicklin and Khanna, 2006), the authors wrote the following:\nNote that this definition of data quality goes beyond most discussions of biometric quality, which focus on the concept of sample quality. Sample quality deals with the capture fidelity of the subject's physical characteristics and the intrinsic data content of those characteristics. However, an equally important issue for any operational system is metadata quality: databases need to be concerned with erroneous relationships between data elements, which generally come from administrative rather than biometric-specific causes.\n\nAlthough no standard exists for fingerprint image quality, NIST has researched the relationship between calculated image quality (using algorithms similar to those employed by AFIS vendors) and successful match rates in automated fingerprint identification systems. This led NIST to develop and publish a software utility to measure fingerprint image quality. The software is entitled NIST Fingerprint Image Software 2. It was developed by NIST's image group for the FBI and the U.S. Department of Homeland Security and is available free to U.S. law enforcement agencies as well as to biometrics manufacturers and researchers. The CD contains source code for 56 utilities and a user's guide.\n\nThe following summary is from the NIST Web site in 2007:\nNew to this release is a tool that evaluates the quality of a fingerprint scan at the time it is\nmade. Problems such as dry skin, the size of the fingers and the quality and condition of the equipment used can affect the quality of a print and its ability to be matched with other prints. The tool rates each scan on a scale from 1 for a high-quality print to 5 for an unusable one. \"Although most commercial fingerprint systems already include proprietary image quality software, the NIST software will for the first time allow users to directly compare fingerprint image quality from scanners made by different manufacturers,\" the agency said.\n\n6.3.2.3 Certified Products List. To assist the forensic community to purchase IQS-compliant equipment, the FBI established a certification program. The vendors can self-test their equipment and submit the results to the FBI where, with the technical assistance of Mitretek, the results are evaluated. If the results are acceptable, a letter of certification is sent to the vendor. It is important to know that, for capture devices, it is a combination of the optics (scanner), image processing software, and the operating system that is tested. Therefore, letters of certification are not issued for a scanner but for a scanner and PC configuration that includes a specific scanner model, connected to a PC running a specific operating system, and any imageenhancement scanner drivers used. At the rate at which manufacturers upgrade scanners, it can be hard to purchase previously certified pieces of equipment. A complete list of all certified equipment is maintained on the FBI's Web site under the CJIS section.\n\n6.3.2.4 Compression. About the same time as the writing of the EFTS, the FBI decided on the compression standard for ANSI/NIST transmissions. Given that the data rate (bandwidth) of telecommunications systems was very low in 1993 compared to today's rates and that the cost of disk storage was quite high, the FBI elected to compress fingerprint images using a technique called wavelet scalar quantization (WSQ). The initial plan was for tenprint transmissions to be compressed with WSQ at 20:1 and for latent images to remain uncompressed. An FBI fingerprint card in the early 1990s had a surface area for fingerprints that was 8 inches wide and 5 inches high for a total of 40 square inches. Scanning at 500 ppi in both the 8-inch direction (X) and the 5-inch direction (Y) yielded a total of 10 million bytes of information (10 MB). Compression at 20:1 would produce a half (0.5) MB file that was much easier to transmit and store.\n\nAt the 1993 IAI Annual Training Conference in Orlando, Fl, the IAI Board of Directors expressed its concerns to the IAFIS program director about the proposed compression rate of 20:1. The FBI agreed to support an independent assessment of the impact of compression on the science of fingerprint identification by the IAI AFIS committee, under the Chairmanship of Mike Fitzpatrick of Illinois (IAI AFIS Committee, 1994). As a result of the study, the FBI agreed to reduce the average compression to 15:1 (Higgins, 1995, pp 409418).5\nAs other domains of interest adopted the ANSI/NIST standard around the world (early adopters included the Royal Canadian Mounted Police and the United Kingdom Home Office), they all used the EFTS as a model and all incorporated the IQS standard by reference. With one or two exceptions, they also adopted WSQ compression at 15:1. With the move to higher scan rates for tenprint transactions, the compression technology of choice is JPEG 2000, which is a wavelet-based compression technique. Currently (as of 2007), there are at least five 1000-ppi tenprint, image-based automated fingerprint identification systems using JPEG 2000. Both Cogent and Motorola have delivered 1000-ppi systems. It is anticipated that the other vendors will deliver such systems as the demand increases. Given that older livescan systems operating at 500 ppi can submit transactions to these new automated fingerprint identification systems, it is important that they be capable of working in a mixed-density (500-ppi and 1000-ppi) environment. All four major AFIS vendors demonstrated the capability to acquire, store, and process 1000-ppi tenprints and palmprints during the 2005 Royal Canadian Mounted Police AFIS Benchmark. It is important to note that these systems acquire the known tenprint and palm images at 1000 ppi for archiving but down-sample them to 500 ppi for searching and creating an image to be used in AFIS. Currently, 1000-ppi images are used primarily for display at latent examiner workstations. As automated fingerprint identification systems move to using third-level features, it is assumed that the higher resolution images will play a role in the algorithms.\n\n## 6.3.3 Updates To The Ansi/Nist Standard\n\nSince 1993, the ANSI/NIST standard has been updated three times, most recently in 2007 and 2008. The key changes are as follows:\n\n- In 1997, type 10 transactions were added to permit facial,\nscar marks, and tattoo images to be transmitted with fingerprint transactions. The title of the document was changed to reflect that: \"Data Format for the Interchange of Fingerprint, Facial & SMT (Scar, Mark, and\nTattoo) Information (ANSI/NIST-ITL 1a-1997)\".\n- In 2000, types 13 through 166 were added to support\nhigher density images, latent images in a new format, palm images, and test images, respectively (ANSI/\nNIST-ITL 1-2000).\n- NIST held two workshops in 2005 to determine whether there were any new areas that should be added. The major changes desired were the addition of standard record types for biometric data types beyond fingers and faces (e.g., iris images) and the introduction of XML data in the type 2 records. Several other changes and additions were also proposed. (See the 2007 and 2008 revisions, ANSI/NISTITL 12007 and 22008.)\n\n## 6.3.4 Early Demonstrations Of Interoperability\n\nBy 1996, the IAI AFIS Committee was organizing and managing (under the chairmanships of Mike Fitzpatrick, Peter Higgins, and Ken Moses) a series of demonstrations of interoperability of tenprint-image transactions originating from Aware software, Comnetix Live Scan, and Identix Live Scan and going to Cogent Systems, Printrak (now Motorola), and Sagem Morpho automated fingerprint identification systems. The second year of these demonstrations (1998) saw the same input being submitted between operational AFIS sites from the same three AFIS vendors all over the Nlets network (AFIS Committee Report, 1998, p 490).\n\n## 6.3.5 Latent Interoperability\n\nWhen IAFIS was being developed, the FBI established (in the EFTS) two ways for latent impressions to be run through IAFIS from outside agencies.\n\n6.3.5.1 Remote Submittals. The agency with the latent impression can send (electronically or via the mail) the impression (as an image in the case of electronic submittal) to the FBI, and FBI staff will perform the editing, encoding, searching, and candidate evaluation. The FBI will make any identification decision and return the results to the submitting agency. This process mimics the pre-IAFIS workflow but adds the option of electronic submittal.\n\n6.3.5.2 Remote Searches. The agency with the latent impression performs the editing and encoding and then sends (electronically) a latent fingerprint features search (LFFS) to IAFIS for lights-out searching. IAFIS then returns a candidate list, including finger images, to the originating agency to perform candidate evaluation. The submitting agency makes any identification decision. To support LFFS remote search capability, the FBI published the \"native\" IAFIS feature set definition. Many civil agencies and departments have wanted to be able to offer remote tenprint searches, but the feature sets for the major AFIS vendors are proprietary. In 2006, NIST performed a study on interoperability of the native feature set level of many AFIS and livescan companies and compared those with the performance of INCITS 378 fingerprint template standard minutiae (the basic set A and the richer set B).\n\nThe MINEX report (Grother et al., 2006) shows that minutiae-based interoperability is possible (with some loss of reliability and accuracy) for single-finger verification systems. The report is careful to point out that the use of INCITS 378 templates for remote criminal tenprint and latent searches is unknown and cannot safely be extrapolated from the report. Because most AFISs (other than IAFIS) do not have remote LFFS functionality (as of 2007), latent interoperability at the image level usually requires labor on the part of the searching agency. The desire to move that labor burden to the submitting agency is natural because many have some level of excess capacity that could possibly support remote latent searches during off-hours.\n\n## 6.4 Digitization And Processing Of Fingerprints 6.4.1 Algorithms\n\nDemands imposed by the painstaking attention needed to visually match the fingerprints of varied qualities, the tedium of the monotonous nature of the manual work, and increasing workloads due to a higher demand on fingerprint recognition services prompted law enforcement agencies to initiate research into acquiring fingerprints through electronic media and to automate fingerprint individualization based on digital representation of fingerprints. As a result of this research, a large number of computer algorithms have been developed during the past three decades to automatically process digital fingerprint images. An algorithm is a finite set of well-defined instructions for accomplishing some task which, given an initial state and input, will terminate in a corresponding recognizable end-state and output. A computer algorithm is an algorithm coded in a programming language to run on a computer. Depending upon the application, these computer algorithms could either assist human experts or perform in lights-out mode. These algorithms have greatly improved the operational productivity of law enforcement agencies and reduced the number of fingerprint technicians needed. Still, algorithm designers identified and investigated the following five major problems in designing automated fingerprint processing systems: digital fingerprint acquisition, image enhancement, feature (e.g., minutiae) extraction, matching, and indexing/retrieval.\n\n## 6.4.2 Image Acquisition\n\nKnown fingerprint data can be collected by applying a thin coating of ink over a finger and rolling the finger from one end of the nail to the other end of the nail while pressing the finger against a paper card. This would result in an inked \"rolled\" fingerprint impression on the fingerprint card. If the finger was simply pressed straight down against the paper card instead of rolling, the resulting fingerprint impression would only contain a smaller central area of the finger rather than the full fingerprint, resulting in an inked \"flat\" or \"plain\" fingerprint impression. The perspiration and contaminants on the skin result in the impression of a finger being deposited on a surface that is touched by that finger. These \"latent\" prints can be chemically or physically developed and electronically captured or manually \"lifted\" from the surface by employing certain chemical, physical, and lighting techniques. The developed fingerprint may be lifted with tape or photographed. Often these latent fingerprints contain only a portion of the friction ridge detail that is present on the finger, that is, a \"partial\" fingerprint. Fingerprint impressions developed and preserved using any of the above methods can be digitized by scanning the inked card, lift, item, or photograph. Digital images acquired by this method are known as \"off-line\" images. (Typically, the scanners are not designed specifically for fingerprint applications.) Since the early 1970s, fingerprint sensors have been built that can acquire a \"livescan\" digital fingerprint image directly from a finger without the intermediate use of ink and a paper card. Although off-line images are still in use in certain forensic and government applications, on-line fingerprint images are increasingly being used. The main parameters characterizing a digital fingerprint image are resolution area, number of pixels, geometric accuracy, contrast, and geometric distortion. CJIS released specifications, known as Appendix F and Appendix G, that regulate the quality and the format of fingerprint images and FBI-compliant scanners. All livescan devices manufactured for use in forensic and government law enforcement applications are FBI compliant. Most of the livescan devices manufactured to be used in commercial applications, such as computer log-on, do not meet FBI specifications but, on the other hand, are usually more user-friendly, compact, and significantly less expensive. There are a number of livescan sensing mechanisms (e.g., optical, capacitive, thermal, pressure-based, ultrasound, and so forth) that can be used to detect the ridges and valleys present in the fingertip. However, many of these methods do not provide images that contain the same representation of detail necessary for some latent fingerprint comparisons. For example, a capacitive or thermal image may represent the edges and pores in a much different way than a rolled ink impression. Figure 66 shows an off-line fingerprint image acquired with the ink technique, a latent fingerprint image, and some livescan images acquired with different types of commercial livescan devices. The livescan devices often capture a stream of fingerprint images from a single scan instead of just one image. Depending on the application for which the livescan device was designed, it may run one or more algorithms using either a resource-limited (memory and processing power)\nmicroprocessor on-board or by using an attached computer. For example, the livescan booking stations usually run an algorithm that can mosaic (stitch) multiple images acquired as a video during a single rolling of a finger on the scanner into a large rolled image. Algorithms also typically run on an integrated booking management system to provide real-time previews (graphical user interface and zoom) to assist the operator in placing or aligning fingers or palms correctly. Typically, a fingerprint image quality-checking algorithm is also run to alert the operator about the acquisition of a poor-quality fingerprint image so that a better quality image can be reacquired from the finger or palm. Typical output from such an automatic quality-checker algorithm is depicted in Figure 67.\n\nFingerprint images from\n(a) a livescan FTIR-based optical scanner;\n(b) a livescan capacitive scanner;\n(c) a livescan piezoelectric scanner;\n(d) a livescan thermal scanner;\n(e) an off-line inked impression;\n(f) a latent fingerprint.\n\nAlthough optical scanners have the longest history and\nhighest quality, the new solid-state sensors are gaining\ngreat popularity because of their compact size and the\nease with which they can be embedded into laptop com-\nputers, cellular phones, smart pens, personal digital assis-\ntants (PDAs), and the like. Swipe sensors, where a user is\nrequired to swipe his or her finger across a livescan sensor\nthat is wide but very short, can offer the lowest cost and\nsize. Such sensors image a single line or just a few lines\n(slice) of a fingerprint, and an image-stitching algorithm is\nused to stitch the lines or slices to form a two-dimensional\nfingerprint image (Figure 68).\n\nDepending on the application, it may be desirable to\nimplement one or more of the following algorithms in the\nlivescan device:\n\n- Automatic finger-detection algorithmThe scanner\nautomatically keeps looking for the presence of a finger on its surface and, as soon as it determines that there is a finger present on its surface, it alerts the system.\n- Automatic fingerprint-capture algorithmImmediately\nafter the system has been alerted that a finger is present on the surface of the scanner, it starts receiving a series of images, and the fingerprint-capture algorithm automatically determines which frame in the image sequence has the best image quality and grabs that frame from the video for further image processing and matching.\n\n- Vitality detection algorithmThe scanner can determine\nwhether the finger is consistent with deposition by a living human being.\n- Image data-compression algorithmCompressed\nimage will require less storage and bandwidth when transferred to the system.\n- Image-processing algorithmsCertain applications will\nbenefit from feature extraction carried out on the sensor itself; the transfer of the fingerprint features will also require less bandwidth than the image.\n- Fingerprint-matching algorithmCertain applications\nwould like the fingerprint matching to be performed on the sensor for security reasons, especially for on-board sequence checking.\n- Cryptographic algorithms and protocol(s)Implemented\nin the scanner to carry out secure communication.\n\nAs the user sweeps his or her finger on\nthe sensor, the sensor delivers new\nimage slices, which are combined into\na two-dimensional image.\n\n## 6.4.3 Image Enhancement\n\nFingerprint images originating from different sources may have different noise characteristics and thus may require some enhancement algorithms based on the type of noise. For example, latent fingerprint images can contain a variety of artifacts and noise. Inked fingerprints can contain blobs or broken ridges that are due to an excessive or inadequate amount of ink. Filed paper cards may contain inscriptions overlapping the fingerprints and so forth. The goal of fingerprint enhancement algorithms is to produce an image that does not contain artificially generated ridge structure that might later result in the detection of false minutiae features while capturing the maximum available ridge structure to allow detection of true minutiae. Adapting the enhancement process to the fingerprint capture method can yield the optimal matching performance over a large collection of fingerprints. A fingerprint may contain such poor-quality areas that the local ridge orientation and frequency estimation algorithms are completely wrong. An enhancement algorithm that can reliably locate (and mask) these extremely poor-quality areas is very useful for the later feature detection and individualization stages by preventing false or unreliable features from being created. Fingerprint images can sometimes be of poor quality because of noise introduced during the acquisition process. For example: a finger may be dirty, a latent print may be lifted from a difficult surface, the acquisition medium (paper card or livescan) may be dirty, or noise may be introduced during the interaction of the finger with the sensing surface (such as slippage or other inconsistent contact). When presented with a poor-quality image, a forensic expert would use a magnifying glass and try to decipher the fingerprint features in the presence of the noise. Automatic fingerprint image-enhancement algorithms can significantly improve the quality of fingerprint ridges in the fingerprint image and make the image more suitable for further manual or automatic processing. The image enhancement algorithms do not add any external information to the fingerprint image. The enhancement algorithms use only the information that is already present in the fingerprint image. The enhancement algorithms can suppress various types of noise (e.g., another latent print, background color) in the fingerprint image and highlight the existing useful features. These image enhancement algorithms can be of two types.\n\n6.4.3.1 Enhancement of Latent Prints for AFIS Searching.\n\nIn the case of latent searches into the forensic AFISs, the enhancement algorithm is interactive, that is, live feedback about the enhancement is provided to the forensic expert through a graphical user interface. Through this interface, the forensic expert is able to use various algorithms to choose the region of interest in the fingerprint image, crop the image, invert color, adjust intensity, flip the image, magnify the image, resize the image window, and apply compression and decompression algorithms. The forensic expert can selectively apply many of the available enhancement algorithms (or select the parameters of the algorithm) based on the visual feedback. Such algorithms may include histogram equalization, image intensity rescaling, image intensity adjustments with high and low thresholds, local or global contrast enhancement, local or global background subtraction, sharpness adjustments (applying high-pass filter), background suppression (low-pass filter), gamma adjustments, brightness and contrast adjustments, and so forth. An example of local area contrast enhancement is shown in Figure 69. In this example, the fingerprint image enhancement algorithm enhances only a small, square, local area of the image at a time but traverses over the entire image in a raster scan fashion such that the entire image is enhanced. Subsequent fingerprint feature extraction can then be either performed manually or through automatic fingerprint feature extraction algorithms.\n\n6.4.3.2 Automated Enhancement of Fingerprint Images.\n\nIn the case of lights-out applications (frequently used in automated background checks and commercial applications for control of physical access), human assistance does not occur in the fingerprint individualization process. Enhancement algorithms are used in the fully automated mode to improve the fingerprint ridge structures in poor-quality fingerprint images. An example of a fully automated fingerprint imageenhancement algorithm is shown in Figure 610. In this example, contextual filtering is used that has a low-pass (smoothing) effect along the fingerprint ridges and a band-pass (differentiating) effect in the direction orthogonal to the ridges to increase the contrast between ridges and valleys. Often, oriented band-pass filters are used for such filtering. One such type of commonly used filters is known as Gabor filters. The local context is provided to such contextual filters in terms of local orientation and local ridge frequency.\n\n## 6.4.4 Feature Extraction\n\nLocal fingerprint ridge singularities, commonly known as minutiae points, have been traditionally used by forensic experts as discriminating features in fingerprint images. The most common local singularities are ridge endings and ridge bifurcations. Other types of minutiae mentioned in the literature, such as the lake, island, spur, crossover, and so forth (with the exception of dots), are simply composites of ridge endings and bifurcations. Composite minutiae, made up of two to four minutiae occurring very close to each other, have also been used. In manual latent print processing, a forensic expert would visually locate the minutiae in a fingerprint image and note its location, the orientation of the ridge on which it resides, and the minutiae type. Automatic fingerprint feature-extraction algorithms were developed to imitate minutiae location performed by forensic experts. However, most automatic fingerprint minutiae-extraction algorithms only consider ridge endings and bifurcations because other types of ridge detail are very difficult to automatically extract. Further, most algorithms do not differentiate between ridge endings and bifurcations because they can be indistinguishable as a result of finger pressure differences during acquisition or artifacts introduced during the application of the enhancement algorithm.\n\nenhancement algorithm.\n\nOne common approach followed by the fingerprint feature extraction algorithms is to first use a binarization algorithm to convert the gray-scale-enhanced fingerprint image into binary (black and white) form, where all black pixels correspond to ridges and all white pixels correspond to valleys. The binarization algorithm ranges from simple thresholding of the enhanced image to very sophisticated ridge location algorithms. Thereafter, a thinning algorithm is used to convert the binary fingerprint image into a single pixel width about the ridge centerline. The central idea of the thinning process is to perform successive (iterative) erosions of the outermost layers of a shape until a connected unit-width set of lines (or skeletons) is obtained. Several algorithms exist for thinning. Additional steps in the thinning algorithm are used to fill pores and eliminate noise that may result in the detection of false minutiae points. The resulting image from the thinning algorithm is called a thinned image or *skeletal image.* A minutiae detection algorithm is applied to this skeletal image to locate the x and y coordinates as well as the orientation (theta) of the minutiae points. In the skeletal image, by definition, all pixels on a ridge have two neighboring pixels in the immediate neighborhood. If a pixel has only one neighboring pixel, it is determined to be a ridge ending and if a pixel has three neighboring pixels, it is determined to be a ridge bifurcation. Each of the algorithms used in fingerprint image enhancement and minutiae extraction has its own limitation and results in imperfect processing, especially when the input fingerprint image includes non-friction-ridge noise. As a result, many false minutiae may be detected by the minutiae detection algorithm. To alleviate this problem, often a minutiae postprocessing algorithm is used to confirm or validate the detected minutiae. Only those minutiae that pass this postprocessing algorithm are kept and the rest are removed. For example, if a ridge length running away from the minutia point is sufficient or if the ridge direction at the point is within acceptable limits, the minutia is kept.\n\nThe postprocessing might also include an examination of the local image quality, neighboring detections, or other indicators of nonfingerprint structure in the area. Further, the image can be inverted in gray scale, converting white to black and black to white. Reprocessing of this inverted image should yield minutiae endings in place of bifurcations, and vice versa, allowing a validity check on the previously detected minutiae. The final detected minutiae are those that meet all of the validity checks. Figure 611 shows the steps in a typical fingerprint feature-extraction algorithm; the extracted minutiae are displayed overlapping on the input image for visualization. Note that the stages and algorithms described in this section represent only a typical fingerprint minutiae-extraction algorithm. A wide variety of fingerprint minutiae-extraction algorithms exist and they all differ from one another, sometimes in how they implement a certain stage and sometimes in the stages they use and the order in which they use them. For example, some minutiae extraction algorithms do not use a postprocessing stage. Some others do not use a ridge-thinning stage, and the minutiae detection algorithm works directly on the result of the ridge location algorithm. Some work directly on the enhanced image, and some even work directly on the raw input image. Additional stages and algorithms may also be used. Many other features are often also extracted in addition to minutiae. These additional features often provide useful information that can be used in the later matching stages to improve the fingerprint-matching accuracy. For example, minutiae confidence, ridge counts between minutiae, ridge count confidence, core and delta locations, local quality measures, and so forth, can be extracted. These additional features may be useful to achieve added selectivity from a minutiae-matching process. Their usefulness for this purpose may be mediated by the confidence associated with each such feature. Therefore, it is important to collect confidence data as a part of the image-enhancement and feature-extraction process to be able to properly qualify detected minutiae and associated features.\n\nThe early fingerprint feature-extraction algorithms were developed to imitate feature extraction by forensic experts. Recently, a number of automatic fingerprint featureextraction (and matching) algorithms have emerged that use non-minutiae-based information in the fingerprint images. For example, sweat pores, which are very minute details in fingerprints, smaller than minutiae points, have been successfully extracted by algorithms from highresolution fingerprint images. Other non-minutiae-based features are often low-level features (for example, texture features) that do not have a high-level meaning, such as a ridge ending or bifurcation. These features are well suited for machine representation and matching and can be used in place of minutiae features. Often, a combination of minutiae and non-minutiae-based features can provide the best accuracy in an automatic fingerprint individualization system. Forensic experts use such fine features implicitly, along with normal ridge endings and bifurcations features, during examination.\n\n## 6.4.5 Matching\n\nFingerprint matching can be defined as the exercise of finding the similarity or dissimilarity in any two given fingerprint images. Fingerprint matching can be best visualized by taking a paper copy of a file fingerprint image with its minutiae marked or overlaid and a transparency of a search fingerprint with its minutiae marked or overlaid. By placing the transparency of the search print over the paper copy of the file fingerprint and translating and rotating the transparency, one can locate the minutiae points that are common in both prints. From the number of common minutiae found, their closeness of fit, the quality of the fingerprint images, and any contradictory minutiae matching information, it is possible to assess the similarity of the two prints. Manual fingerprint matching is a very tedious task. Automatic fingerprint-matching algorithms work on the result of fingerprint feature-extraction algorithms and find the similarity or dissimilarity in any two given sets of minutiae. Automatic fingerprint matching can perform fingerprint comparisons at the rate of tens of thousands of times each second, and the results can be sorted according to the degree of similarity and combined with any other criteria that may be available to further filter the candidates, all without human intervention. It is important to note, however, that automatic fingerprintmatching algorithms are significantly less accurate than a well-trained forensic expert. Even so, depending on the application and the fingerprint image quality, the automaticfingerprint-matching algorithms can significantly reduce the work for forensic experts. For example, in the case of latent print matching where only a single, very poor quality partial fingerprint image is available for matching, the matching algorithm may not be very accurate. Still, the matching algorithm can return a list of candidate matches that is much smaller than the size of the database; the forensic expert then needs only to manually match a much smaller number of fingerprints. In the case of latent print matching when the latent print is of good quality, or in the case of tenprint-to-tenprint matching in a background check application, the matching is highly accurate and requires minimal human expert involvement.\n\nAutomatic fingerprint-matching algorithms yield imperfect results because of the difficult problem posed by large intraclass variations (variability in different impressions of the same finger) present in the fingerprints. These intraclass variations arise from the following factors that vary during different acquisition of the same finger: (1) displacement, (2) rotation, (3) partial overlap, (4) nonlinear distortion because of pressing of the elastic three-dimensional finger onto a rigid two-dimensional imaging surface, (5) pressure, (6) skin conditions, (7) noise introduced by the imaging environment, and (8) errors introduced by the automatic feature-extraction algorithms. A robust fingerprint-matching algorithm must be able to deal with all these intraclass variations in the various impressions of the same finger. The variations in displacement, rotation, and partial overlap are typically dealt with by using an alignment algorithm. The alignment algorithm should be able to correctly align the two fingerprint minutiae sets such that the corresponding or matching minutiae correspond well with each other after the alignment. Certain alignment algorithms also take into account the variability caused by nonlinear distortion. The alignment algorithm must also be able to take into consideration the fact that the feature extraction algorithm is imperfect and may have introduced false minutiae points and, at the same time, may have missed detecting some of the genuine minutiae points. Many fingerprint alignment algorithms exist. Some may use the core and delta points, if extracted, to align the fingerprints. Others use point pattern-matching algorithms such as Hough transform (a standard tool in pattern recognition that allows recognition of global patterns in the feature space by recognition of local patterns in a transformed parameter space), relaxation, algebraic and operational research solutions, \"tree pruning,\" energy minimization, and so forth, to align minutiae points directly. Others use thinned ridge matching or orientation field matching to arrive at an alignment. Once an alignment has been established, the minutiae from the two fingerprints often do not exactly overlay each other because of the small residual errors in the alignment algorithm and the nonlinear distortions. The next stage in a fingerprint minutiae-matching algorithm, which establishes the minutiae in the two sets that are corresponding and those that are noncorresponding, is based on using some tolerances in the minutiae locations and orientation to declare a correspondence. Because of noise that is introduced by skin condition, recording environment, imaging environment, and the imperfection of automatic fingerprint feature-extraction algorithms, the number of corresponding minutiae is usually found to be less than the total number of minutiae in either of the minutiae sets in the overlapping area. So, finally, a score computation algorithm is used to compute a matching score. The matching score essentially conveys the confidence of the fingerprint matching algorithm and can be viewed as an indication of the probability that the two fingerprints come from the same finger. The higher the matching score, the more likely it is that the fingerprints are mated (and, conversely, the lower the score, the less likely there is a match). There are many score computation algorithms that are used. They range from simple ones that count the number of matching minutiae normalized by the total number of minutiae in the two fingerprints in the overlapping area to very complex probability-theory-based, or statistical-pattern-recognitionclassifier-based algorithms that take into account a number of features such as the area of overlap, the quality of the fingerprints, residual distances between the matching minutiae, the quality of individual minutiae, and so forth.\n\nFigure 612 depicts the steps in a typical fingerprint matching algorithm. Note that the stages and algorithms described in this section represent only a typical fingerprint minutiae-matching algorithm. Many fingerprint minutiae-matching algorithms exist and they all differ from one another. As with the various extraction algorithms, matching algorithms use different implementations, different stages, and different orders of stages. For example, some minutiae-matching algorithms do not use an alignment stage. These algorithms instead attempt to prealign the fingerprint minutiae so that alignment is not required during the matching stage. Other algorithms attempt to avoid both the prealignment and alignment during matching by defining an intrinsic coordinate system for fingerprint minutiae. Some minutiaematching algorithms use local alignment, some use global alignment, and some use both local and global alignment. Finally, many new matching algorithms are totally different and are based on the non-minutiae-based features automatically extracted by the fingerprint feature-extraction algorithm, such as pores and texture features.\n\n## 6.4.6 Indexing And Retrieval\n\nIn the previous section, the fingerprint matching problem was defined as finding the similarity in any two given fingerprints. There are many situations, such as controlling physical access within a location or affirming ownership of a legal document (such as a driver's license), where a single match between two fingerprints may suffice. However, in a large majority of forensic and government applications, such as latent fingerprint individualization and background checks, it is required that multiple fingerprints (in fact, up to 10 fingerprints from the 10 fingers of the same person) be matched against a large number of fingerprints present in a database. In these applications, a very large amount of fingerprint searching and matching is needed to be performed for a single individualization. This is very time-consuming, even for automatic fingerprint-matching algorithms. So it becomes desirable (although not necessary) to use automatic fingerprint indexing and retrieval algorithms to make the search faster. Traditionally, such indexing and retrieval has been performed manually by forensic experts through indexing of fingerprint paper cards into file cabinets based on fingerprint pattern classification information as defined by a particular fingerprint classification system. Similar to the development of the first automatic fingerprint feature extraction and matching algorithms, the initial automatic fingerprint indexing algorithms were developed to imitate forensic experts. These algorithms were built to classify fingerprint images into typically five classes (e.g., left loop, right loop, whorl, arch, and tented arch) based on the many fingerprint features automatically extracted from fingerprint images. (Many algorithms used only four classes because arch and tented arch types are often difficult to distinguish.) Fingerprint pattern classification can be determined by explicitly characterizing regions of a fingerprint as belonging to a particular shape or through implementation of one of many possible generalized classifiers (e.g., neural networks) trained to recognize the specified patterns. The singular shapes (e.g., cores and deltas) in a fingerprint image are typically detected using algorithms based on the fingerprint orientation image. The explicit (rule-based) fingerprint classification systems first detect the fingerprint singularities (cores and deltas) and then apply a set of rules (e.g., arches and tented arches often have no cores; loops have one core and one delta; whorls have two cores and two deltas) to determine the pattern type of the fingerprint image (Figure 613). The most successful generalized (e.g., neural network-based) fingerprint classification systems use a combination of several different classifiers. Such automatic fingerprint classification algorithms may be used to index all the fingerprints in the database into distinct bins (most implementations include overlapping or pattern referencing), and the submitted samples are then compared to only the database records with the same classification (i.e., in the same bin). The use of fingerprint pattern information can be an effective means to limit the volume of data sent to the matching engine, resulting in benefits in the system response time. However, the automatic fingerprint classification algorithms are not perfect and result in errors in classification. These classification errors increase the errors in fingerprint individualization because the matching effort will be conducted only in a wrong bin. Depending on the application, it may be feasible to manually confirm the automatically determined fingerprint class for some of the fingerprints where the automatic algorithm has low confidence. Even so, the explicit classification of fingerprints into just a few classes has its limitations because only a few classes are used (e.g., five), and the fingerprints occurring in nature are not equally distributed in these classes (e.g., arches and tented arches are much more rare than loops and whorls). Many of the newer automatic fingerprint classification algorithms do not use explicit classes of fingerprints in distinct classifications but rather use a continuous classification of fingerprints that is not intuitive for manual processing but is amenable to automatic search algorithms. In continuous classification, fingerprints are associated with numerical vectors summarizing their main features. These feature vectors are created through a similarity-preserving transformation, so that similar fingerprints are mapped into close points (vectors) in the multidimensional space. The retrieval is performed by matching the input fingerprint with those in the database whose corresponding vectors are close to the searched one. Spatial data structures can be used for indexing very large databases. A continuous classification approach allows the problem of exclusive membership of ambiguous fingerprints to be avoided and the system's efficiency and accuracy to be balanced by adjusting the size of the neighborhood considered. Most of the continuous classification techniques proposed in the literature use the orientation image as an initial feature but differ in the transformation adopted to create the final vectors, and in the distance measure. Some other continuous indexing methods are based on fingerprint minutiae features using techniques such as geometric hashing. Continuous indexing algorithms can also be built using other non-minutiae-based fingerprint features such as texture features.\n\nChoosing an indexing technique alone is usually not sufficient; a retrieval strategy is also usually defined according to the application requirements, such as the desired accuracy and efficiency, the matching algorithm used to compare fingerprints, the involvement of a human reviewer, and so on. In general, different strategies may be defined for the same indexing mechanism. For instance, the search may be stopped when a fixed portion of the database has been explored or as soon as a matching fingerprint is found. (In latent fingerprint individualization, a forensic expert visually examines the fingerprints that are considered sufficiently similar by the minutiae matcher and terminates the search when a true correspondence is found.) If an exclusive classification technique is used for indexing, the following retrieval strategies can be used:\n\n- Hypothesized class onlyOnly fingerprints belonging\nto the class to which the input fingerprint has been assigned are retrieved.\n- Fixed search orderThe search continues until a match\nis found or the whole database has been explored. If a correspondence is not found within the hypothesized class, the search continues in another class, and so on.\n- Variable search orderThe different classes are visited\naccording to the class likelihoods produced by the classifier for the input fingerprint. The search may be stopped as soon as a match is found or when the likelihood ratio between the current class and the next to be visited is less than a fixed threshold.\nFinally, many system-level design choices may also be used to make the retrieval fast. For example, the search can be spread across many computers, and specialpurpose hardware accelerators may be used to conduct fast fingerprint matching against a large database.\n\n## 6.4.7 Accuracy Characterization\n\nAlthough manual fingerprint matching is a very tedious task, a well-trained forensic expert is not likely to make individualization mistakes, especially when the fingerprint image quality is reasonable. Automatic fingerprint algorithms, on the other hand, are not nearly as accurate as forensic experts and have difficulty in dealing with the many noise sources in fingerprint images. Accuracy of fingerprint algorithms is crucial in designing fingerprint systems for real-world usage. The matching result must be reliable because many real-world decisions will be based on it. Algorithm designers usually acquire or collect their own fingerprint database and test the accuracy of their fingerprint algorithms on this database. By testing new algorithms, or changes in the old algorithm, or changes in algorithm parameters on the same database, they can know whether the new algorithm or changes improve the accuracy of the algorithm. Further, the algorithms' developers look closely at the false-positive and false-nonmatch errors made by their algorithms and get a better understanding of the strengths and limitations of their algorithms. By comparing the errors made by different algorithms or changes, the algorithm designers try to understand whether a change improves false positives, false nonmatches, both, or neither, and why. The algorithms' designers can then come up with algorithmic techniques to address the remaining errors and improve their algorithms' accuracy. It is desirable to have as large a database of fingerprints as possible from as large a demography as possible so that the algorithms are not overly adjusted to any certain variety of fingerprints and the accuracy obtained in the laboratory generalizes well in the field. Public organizations (e.g., NIST) perform periodic testing of fingerprint algorithms from different vendors on a common database to judge their relative accuracy. There is a trade-off between the false positives and falsenonmatch error rates in fingerprint matching. Either of these two errors can be lowered at the expense of increasing the other error. Different applications have different requirements for these two types of errors. Interestingly, different fingerprint algorithms may perform differently, depending on the error rates. For example, algorithm A\nmay be better than algorithm B at a low false-positive rate, but algorithm B may be better than algorithm A at a low false-nonmatch rate. In such cases, the algorithm designers may choose a certain algorithm or specific parameters to be used, depending on the application.\n\n## 6.5 Summary\n\nFingerprint technology has come a long way since its inception more than 100 years ago. The first primitive livescan fingerprint readers introduced in 1988 were unwieldy beasts with many problems as compared to the sleek, inexpensive, and relatively miniscule sensors available today. During the past few decades, research and active use of fingerprint matching and indexing have also advanced our understanding of individuality, information in fingerprints, and efficient ways of processing this information. Increasingly inexpensive computing power, less expensive fingerprint sensors, and the demand for security, efficiency, and convenience have led to the viability of automatic fingerprint algorithms for everyday use in a large number of applications. There are a number of challenges that remain to be overcome in designing a completely automatic and reliable fingerprint individualization system, especially when fingerprint images are of poor quality. Although automatic systems have improved significantly, the design of automated systems do not yet match the complex decision-making of a well-trained fingerprint expert as decisions are made to match individual fingerprints (especially latent prints). Still, automatic fingerprint matching systems hold real promise for the development of reliable, rapid, consistent, and costeffective solutions in a number of traditional and newly emerging applications. Research in automatic fingerprint recognition has been mostly an exercise in imitating the performance of a human fingerprint expert without access to the many underlying information-rich features an expert is able to glean by visual examination. The lack of such a rich set of informative features in automatic systems is mostly because of the unavailability of complex modeling and image-processing techniques that can reliably and consistently extract detailed features in the presence of noise. Perhaps using the human, intuition-based manual fingerprint recognition approach may not be the most appropriate basis for the design of automatic fingerprint recognition systems. There may be a need for exploring radically different features rich in discriminatory information, robust methods of fingerprint matching, and more ingenious methods for combining fingerprint matching and classification that are amenable to automation.\n\n## 6.6 Reviewers\n\nThe reviewers critiquing this chapter were Patti Blume, Christophe Champod, Wayne Eaton, Robert J. Garrett, Laura A. Hutchins, Peter D. Komarinski, and Kasey Wertheim.\n\n## 6.7 References\n\nAFIS Committee Report. International Association for Identification: Mendota Heights, MN, 1994.\n\nAFIS Committee Report. *J. Forensic Ident.* 1998, 48 (4),\n489500.\n\nAmerican National Standards for Information Systems Data Format for the Interchange of Fingerprint Information;\nANSI/NIST-CSL 1-1993; National Institute of Standards and Technology, U.S. Government Printing Office: Washington, DC, 1993.\n\nAmerican National Standard for Information Systems Data Format for the Interchange of Fingerprint, Facial & SMT (Scar, Mark, and Tattoo) Information; ANSI/NIST-ITL\n1a-1997; National Institute of Standards and Technology, U.S. Government Printing Office: Washington, DC, 1997.\n\nAmerican National Standard for Information Systems Data Format for the Interchange of Fingerprint, Facial, & & Scar Mark & Tattoo (SMT); ANSI/NIST-ITL 1-2000, NIST\nSpecial Publication #500-245; National Institute of Standards and Technology, U.S. Government Printing Office: Washington, DC, 2000.\n\nAmerican National Standards for Information Systems Data Format for the Interchange of Fingerprint, Facial, & Other Biometric InformationPart 1 (Traditional Format);\nANSI/NIST-ITL 1-2007, NIST Special Publication #500-271; National Institute of Standards and Technology, U.S. Government Printing Office: Washington, DC, 2007. Available online at http://www.nist.gov/customcf/get_pdf.cfm?pub_ id=51174.\n\nAmerican National Standards for Information Systems Data Format for the Interchange of Fingerprint, Facial, & Other Biometric InformationPart 2 (XML Version); ANSI/\nNIST-ITL 2-2008, NIST Special Publication #500-275; National Institute of Standards and Technology, U.S. Government Printing Office: Washington, DC, 2008. Available online at http://www.nist.gov/customcf/get_pdf.cfm?pub_ id=890062.\n\nBruton, T. Annual Report of the Crime Scene Investigations Unit; San Francisco Police Department: San Francisco, CA,\n1989.\n\nCole, S. *Suspect Identities;* Harvard University Press:\nCambridge, MA, 2001.\n\nFBI Request for Quotation No. 66-1, December 16, 1966.\n\nGreenwood, P. W.; Chaiken, J. M.; Petersilia, J. The Criminal Investigative Process (Vols. 13); Technical Report R-1777-DOJ; RAND Corporation: Santa Monica, CA, 1975.\n\nGrother, P.; McCabe, M.; et al. MINEX: Performance and Interoperability of INCITS 378 Fingerprint Template; NISTIR\n7296; National Institute of Standards and Technology, March 21, 2006.\n\nHicklin, A.; Khanna, R. The Role of Data Quality in Biometric Systems; Mitretek Systems: Falls Church, VA, 2006.\n\nHiggins, P. Standards for the Electronic Submission of Fingerprint Cards to the FBI. *J. Forensic Ident.* 1995, 45 (4),\n409418.\n\nInternational Association for Identification. AFIS Directory of Users; IAI: Mendota Heights, MN, 1999. Kiji, K. *AFIS 30-Year History;* NEC Internal Corporate Report; NEC Solutions: Tokyo, Japan, 2002.\n\nKomarinski, P. Automated Fingerprint Identification Systems; Elsevier: New York, 2005.\n\nMoore, R. T. Automatic Fingerprint Identification Systems.\n\nIn *Advances in Fingerprint Technology,* 1st ed.; Lee, H. C.;\nGaensslen, R. E., Eds.; Elsevier, NY, 1991; pp 163191. Moses, K. R. Consumer's Guide to Fingerprint Systems.\n\nIdent. News 1986, 36 (6), 57, 10. National Institute for Standards and Technology. MINEX: Performance and Interoperability of INCITS 378 Fingerprint Template (NISTIR 7296); March 6, 2005.\n\n## 6.8 Additional Information\n\nPetersilia, J. The Collection and Processing of Physical Evidence; WN-9062-DOJ; RAND Corporation: Santa Monica, CA, 1975.\n\nWayman, J. *Biometric Systems.* Springer: New York, 2004.\n\nAsai, K.; Kato, Y.; Hoshino, Y.; Kiji, K. Automatic Fingerprint Identification; In Proceedings of the SPIE, vol. 182Imaging Applications for Automated Industrial Inspection and Assembly, 1979; pp 4956. Lee, H. C.; Gaensslen, R.E., Eds. Advances in Fingerprint Technology; 2nd ed.; CRC Press: Washington, D.C., 2001.\n\nWegstein, J. H. A Computer Oriented Single-Fingerprint Identification System; Technical Note 443; National Bureau of Standards, U.S. Department of Commerce: Washington, DC, 1969a.\n\nMillard, K. An Approach to the Automatic Retrieval of Latent Fingerprints; In Proceedings of Carnahan Conference on Electronic Crime Countermeasures, Lexington, KY,\n1975; pp 4551.\n\nWegstein, J. H. A Semi-Automated Single Fingerprint Identification System; Technical Note 481; National Bureau of Standards, U.S. Department of Commerce: Washington, DC, 1969b.\n\nMillard, K. Development on Automatic Fingerprint Recognition; In Proceedings of the Carnahan Conference on Security Technology, Zurich, Switzerland, 1983; pp 173178.\n\nWegstein, J. H. *Automated Fingerprint Identification;*\nTechnical Note 538; National Bureau of Standards, U.S. Department of Commerce: Washington, DC, 1970.\n\nPrabhakar, S.; Jain, A.; Maltoni, D.; Maio, D. Handbook of Fingerprint Recognition; Springer-Verlag: New York, 2003.\n\nWegstein, J. H. *The M40 Fingerprint Matcher;* Technical Note 878; National Bureau of Standards, U.S. Department of Commerce: Washington, DC, 1972a.\n\nRatha, N.; Bolle, R., Eds. Automated Fingerprint Recognition Systems; Springer-Verlag: New York, 2004.\n\nWegstein, J. H. Manual and Automated Fingerprint Registration; NBS Technical Note 730; National Bureau of Standards, U.S. Department of Commerce: Washington, DC, 1972b.\n\nRoberts, D. F. Dermatoglyphics and Human Genetics. In DermatoglyphicsFifty Years Later; Birth Defects Original Article Series; Wertelecki, W., Plato, C., Paul, N. W., Eds.; Alan R. Liss Inc.: New York, 1979; pp 475494.\n\nWegstein, J. H. An Automated Fingerprint Identification System; NBS Special Publication 500-89; National Bureau of Standards, U.S. Department of Commerce: Washington, DC, 1982.\n\nThiebault, R. Automatic Process for Automated Fingerprint Identification; In Proceedings of the International Symposium on Automation of Population Register Systems, 1967;\npp 207226.\n\nWegstein, J. H.; Rafferty, J. F. The LX39 Latent Fingerprint Matcher; Special Publication 500-36; National Bureau of Standards, U.S. Department of Commerce: Washington, DC, 1978.\n\nThiebault, R. An Automatic Procedure for Identifying\nFingerprints. *International Criminal Police Rev.* 1970, 25, 210. Uchida, K. Fingerprint Identification. NEC J. Advanced Technology 2005, 2 (1), 1927.\n\nWegstein, J. H.; Rafferty, J. F. The Automated Identification of Fingerprints. In *DermatoglyphicsFifty Years Later;*\nMarch of Dimes: Washington, DC, 1979.\n\nWayman, J.; Jain, A.; Maltoni, D.; Maio, D., Eds. Biometric Systems, Springer-Verlag: New York, 2005.\n\nWegstein, J. H.; Rafferty, J. F.; Pencak, W. J. Matching Fingerprints by Computer; Technical Note 466; National Bureau of Standards, U.S. Department of Commerce: Washington, DC, 1968.\n\n## C H A P T E R Latent Print Development\n\nBrian Yamashita and Mike French Contributing authors Stephen Bleay, Antonio Cantu, Vici Inlow, Robert Ramotowski, Vaughn Sears, and Melissa Wakefield\n\n## C O N T E N T S\n\n28\n7.10  Fluorescence Examination\n3\n7.1  Introduction\n34\n7.11   Vacuum Metal Deposition\n6\n7.2  The Composition of\n\nLatent Print Residue\n11\n7.3  Latent Print Powders\n37\n7.12  Blood Enhancement\n\nTechniques\n42\n7.13  Aqueous Techniques\n14\n7.4  Ninhydrin and Analogues\n53\n7.14  Formulations for\n\nChemical Solutions\n18\n7.5  1,8-Diazafluoren-9-one\n(DFO)\n55\n7.15  Reviewers\n20\n7.6  1,2-Indanedione\n55\n7.16  References\n22\n7.7  5-Methylthioninhydrin\n\n(5-MTN)\n66\n7.17  Additional Information\n22\n7.8  Modifications for Use on\nChemically Treated Papers\n23\n7.9  Cyanoacrylate Fuming\n\n## Chapter 7 Latent Print Development Brian Yamashita And Mike French\n\nContributing authors Stephen Bleay, Antonio Cantu, Vici Inlow, Robert Ramotowski, Vaughn Sears, and Melissa Wakefield\n\n## 7.1 Introduction\n\nLatent fingerprint development may be achieved with a wide array of optical, physical, and chemical processes, most having evolved during the past century. Because some techniques are often intricately related and continuously changing, it is imperative that those involved in laboratory and crime scene processing are well trained and well practiced (Trozzi et al., 2000, pp 49; Kent, 1998). For those involved in crime scene and laboratory work, safety is paramount. It is important to follow safe work practices when using the processes described in this chapter. This can be accomplished by observing manufacturer warnings, reading material safety data sheets, and observing one's own institutional policies regarding evidence handling and fingerprint development. It is also important for those working with potentially hazardous materials or equipment to wear the appropriate personal protective equipment, such as gloves, lab coats, eye protection, and respirators; to use engineering controls such as fume hoods; and to practice proper laboratory procedures to reduce exposure to pathogens or harmful chemicals (Masters, 2002).\n\n## 7.1.1 Types Of Prints\n\nFingerprints found at crime scenes or developed in the laboratory are categorized by some examiners as patent, latent, or plastic impressions (Lee and Gaennslen, 2001, p 106), although all three types are routinely associated with the term latent print.\n\nA patent print is simply a visible print. Many of these types of prints are wholly visible to the unaided eye, and only some form of imaging is needed for preservation. A good example of a patent print would be a greasy impression left on a windowpane. Patent prints can also be left in blood, paint, ink, mud, or dust. Lighting is a very important consideration in the search for this type of fingerprint; a good flashlight or forensic light source is especially useful in the hunt for patent impressions.\n\nThe word *latent* means hidden or unseen. Latent prints are undetectable until brought out with a physical or chemical process designed to enhance latent print residue. Many of these processes and techniques are discussed in the remainder of this chapter. A plastic print is created when the substrate is pliable enough at the time of contact to record the three-dimensional aspects of the friction skin. These impressions are formed when the raised friction ridges are physically pushed into the substrate, creating a mold of the friction skin ridge structure. Clay, putty, soft wax, melted plastic, heavy grease, and tacky paint are all substrates conducive to forming and retaining plastic impressions. Plastic impressions are usually photographed under oblique lighting that enhances the contrast of the ridges and furrows. These prints may also be preserved with silicone-type casting materials.\n\n## 7.1.2 Deposition Factors\n\nDeposition factors that influence the quality, or even the presence, of latent prints include the conditions surrounding the contact between friction skin and those objects that are touched. These conditions are described as follows:\nPre-transfer conditions include the condition or health of the donor's friction skin and the amount and type of residue on the skin (Olsen, 1978, pp 118120). These conditions are affected by age, gender, stimuli, occupation, disease, and any substances the subject may have touched prior to deposition.\n\nTransfer conditions also dictate whether a suitable impression will be left (Olsen, 1978, pp 117122). These are the conditions of the surface (substrate) being touched, including texture, surface area, surface curvature or shape, surface temperature, condensation, contaminants, and surface residues. The pressure applied during contact (deposition pressure), including lateral force, also contributes to transfer conditions.\n\nPost-transfer conditions, also called environmental factors, are forces that affect the quality of latent prints after deposition (Olsen, 1978, pp 121122). Examples of these factors are physical contact from another surface, water, humidity, and temperature.\n\n## 7.1.3 Surface Types\n\nCorrectly identifying the type of surface expected to bear a fingerprint is an important step toward successful development. Surfaces are generally separated into two classes: porous and nonporous. This separation is required to select the proper technique or reagent and the appropriate sequential order for processing. Porous substrates are generally absorbent and include materials like paper, cardboard, wood, and other forms of cellulose. Fingerprints deposited onto these media absorb into the substrate and are somewhat durable. Amino acid techniques are particularly useful here because the amino acids tend to remain stationary when absorbed and do not migrate (Almog, 2001, p 178). Nonporous surfaces do not absorb. These surfaces repel moisture and often appear polished. They include glass, metal, plastics, lacquered or painted wood, and rubber. Latent prints on these substrates are more susceptible to damage because the fingerprint residue resides on the outermost surface. Cyanoacrylate (CA), dye stains, powders, and vacuum metal deposition are usually the best choices to use on these surfaces. A type of substrate that does not easily fit into the first two categories but should be mentioned is considered semiporous. Semiporous surfaces are characterized by their nature to both resist and absorb fingerprint residue. Fingerprint residue on these surfaces may or may not soak in because of the absorbent properties of the substrate and the variable viscous properties of the fingerprint residue. These surfaces include glossy cardboard, glossy magazine covers, some finished wood, and some cellophane. Semiporous surfaces should be treated with processes intended for both nonporous and porous surfaces. Textured substrates can be porous or nonporous and present the problem of incomplete contact between the friction ridge skin and the surface being touched. (An example might be the pebbled plastic of some computer monitors.) This often results in fingerprints being discontinuous and lacking fine detail when developed. Additionally, these surfaces often do not respond well to a conventional brush and powder. The brushing action and tape lift typically develop the texture of the substrate, leaving fingerprints difficult or impossible to visualize.\n\nVarious techniques, such as the use of very fine powder or flexible lifting media, may be used to reduce the problems caused by textured surfaces (Guerrero, 1992; Kelly et al., 2001, pp 712; Knaap and Adach, 2002, pp 561571).\n\n## 7.1.4 Process Selection\n\nFingerprint reagents and development techniques are generally intended to be used in combination and sequential order. These methods are often specific to either porous or nonporous substrates; however, some techniques have universal applications. Deviation from the recommended order could render subsequent processes ineffective. Refer to Trozzi et al. (2000), Kent (1998), and Champod et al. (2004, pp 217225) for examples of guidelines for sequential ordering, and to Champod et al. (2004, pp 105179) for a recent review that includes many fingerprint development techniques. The following general procedures are appropriate during a systematic search for latent fingerprint evidence:\n\n- Visual inspection with a bright light, forensic light\nsource, or laser\n- Sequential latent print processing - Documentation of developed prints at each step\nIt is important to note that not all processes are used invariably. Some discretion will remain with individual agencies and practitioners both at the crime scene and in the laboratory. The following factors may influence the choice of development techniques as well as the level of resources used in any situation:\n\n- Type of latent print residue suspected - Type of substrate - Texture of substrate - Condition of substrate (clean, dirty, tacky, sticky,\ngreasy, etc.)\n- Environmental conditions during and following latent\nprint deposition\n- Length of time since evidence was touched - Consequences of destructive processing methods - Subsequent forensic examinations\n- Sequential ordering of reagents - Seriousness of the crime\n\n## 7.1.5 Evidence Handling\n\nProper evidence handling begins with the use of latex, nitrile, PVC, or other suitable gloves. Some glove manufacturers or safety supply distributors will list gloves recommended for use with various chemicals. The use of gloves protects the evidence from contamination and the user from exposure to pathogens or hazardous chemicals. It does not, however, guarantee that latent prints will be preserved because even a gloved hand may destroy fragile latent prints on contact. This is especially true on nonporous surfaces where the latent print resides on the extreme surface of the evidence. To prevent damage to fingerprints on these surfaces, evidence should be handled in areas not normally touched or on surfaces incapable of yielding viable fingerprints. It should also be noted that the use of gloves does not preclude the transfer of friction ridge detail from the examiner to the exhibit (Willinski, 1980, pp 682685; St-Amand, 1994, pp 1113; Hall, 1991, pp 415416).\n\n## 7.1.6 Packaging\n\nPackaging helps ensure the integrity of the evidence by keeping contaminants away, keeping trace evidence intact, and helping to guarantee chain of custody. Cardboard boxes, paper bags, and plastic bags are the most common forms of evidence packaging. Most experts recommend paper packaging because it is breathable and cost effective, although plastic bags are also widely used. Any items that have been wet should be allowed to air-dry prior to packaging because excess moisture trapped in any package will increase the probability of destructive fungal growth. Moisture can also be trapped in plastic bags when evidence is gathered in high-humidity environments. Items of nonporous evidence should not be allowed to rub together. Nonporous evidence should be stored singly, secured inside an appropriately sized package in a manner that prevents shifting and rubbing. Under no circumstances should fillers such as shredded paper, wood shavings, or packing peanuts be used inside the package with the evidence because they may easily wipe off fragile fingerprints. (However, they can be used outside the evidence container, inside the mailing container.) Porous evidence can be secured in boxes, bags, and envelopes and can be stored together because latent prints are not likely to rub off on contact. Once evidence is secured, the package should be sealed with evidence tape so that there are no entry points. The tape should be signed by the person securing the evidence, and the appropriate identifying information should be placed on the package as specified by the agency responsible for collection. The remainder of this chapter is intended to describe, in some detail, the nature of latent print residue and the most commonly used fingerprint development techniques. Experimental and novel techniques have not been included, nor have processes considered by the authors to be redundant, impractical, or overly hazardous. However, the omission of reference to a particular technique does not indicate its unsuitability as a fingerprint development technique. Several formulations for various chemical solutions have been collected in Section 7.14.\n\n## 7.2 The Composition Of Latent Print Residue 7.2.1 Introduction\n\nThe composition of sweat that is deposited when friction ridge skin makes contact with a surface is a complex mixture (Ramotowski, 2001, pp 63104; Bramble and Brennan, 2000, pp 862869). Recent studies have identified hundreds of compounds present in human sweat (Bernier et al., 1999, pp 17; Bernier et al., 2000, pp 746 756). A considerable number of studies into the nature of sweat have been performed by both the dermatology and forensic science communities. In particular, a number of studies have investigated how the chemical composition of these residues changes with time, which is a critical problem for the fingerprint examiner. Although knowledge of the composition of sweat produced in the various glands throughout the body is of interest and provides a baseline for comparison purposes, this information does not accurately represent what is actually going on in the deposited print at a crime scene. Studies have shown that significant changes begin to occur in the latent print almost immediately after deposition. If the latent print is to be successfully visualized, a thorough understanding of these changes is needed. This section will begin with a very brief overview of skin anatomy, which will be necessary to gain a better understanding of how the chemical compounds in a latent print are secreted onto the surface of friction ridge skin. Next, there will be a detailed look at the chemical composition of the secretions from each of the glands responsible for contributing to latent print residue. Another section will cover how the composition of some of these secretions changes as the donor ages. Finally, recent studies that have investigated how latent print residue changes with time will be summarized.\n\n## 7.2.2 Anatomy Of Skin\n\nThis topic is covered in more detail elsewhere in this sourcebook, so the treatment here will be very brief. Readers are directed to Ramotowski (2001, pp 63104) for more detail. Skin is the largest organ in the human body (Odland, 1991). The total area of skin on the body exceeds 2 m2; yet, on most parts of the body, the thickness is no more than 2 mm. Skin serves several functions, including regulation of body temperature, moisture retention, protection from invasive organisms (e.g., viruses, bacteria), and sensation. It is composed of two primary and distinct layers, the epidermis and dermis. The epidermis is composed of several distinct layers (Ramotowski, 2001, pp 63104; Odland, 1991). The layer situated just above the dermis is the stratum germinativum (basal cell layer), and the top layer is the stratum corneum (cornified layer). In this stratum, eleiden is converted to keratin, which is continually sloughed off the surface of the epidermis, resulting in a constant need to replenish the keratin that is lost. A cell beginning in the stratum germinativum typically travels through to the stratum corneum in about 28 days. The dermis is composed of a variety of different connective tissues, including collagen, elastin fibers, and an interfibrillar gel composed of glycosaminproteoglycans, salts, and water (Odland, 1991). This layer also contains the two major sudoriferous and sebaceous glands.\n\n## 7.2.3 The Production Of Sweat\n\nThree primary glands contribute to the production of sweat. These are the sudoriferous glands (eccrine and apocrine) and the sebaceous glands. Each gland contributes a unique mixture of chemical compounds. These compounds either exude from pores onto the friction ridges or are transferred to the friction ridges through touching an area (e.g., the forehead, underarm, etc.).\n\nThe eccrine gland is one of two types of sudoriferous (or \"sweat\") glands present in the body. Several million of these glands are distributed throughout the body, most commonly on the palms of the hands and soles of the feet and least numerous on the neck and back (Anderson et al., 1998, p 1561). These glands produce a secretion that is mostly water but contains many compounds in trace quantities (Brusilow and Gordes, 1968, pp 513517; Mitchell and Hamilton, 1949, p 360; Sato, 1979, pp 52131; Bayford, 1976, pp 4243; Olsen, 1972, p 4). The average quantity of secretions produced during a typical 24-hour period varies between 700 and 900 grams. The pH of sweat has been reported to vary from 7.2 (extracted directly from the gland), to 5.0 (recovered from the skin surface at a low sweat rate), to between 6.5 and 7.0 (recovered from the skin surface at a high sweat rate) (Kaiser and Drack, 1974, pp 261265).\n\nThe eccrine gland also secretes organic compounds. Of primary importance to the development of latent print ridge detail are the amino acids. Table 71 summarizes the average values of abundance for the amino acids listed (Hadorn et al., 1967, pp 416417; Hamilton, 1965, pp 284285; Oro and Skewes, 1965, pp 10421045). Serine is the most abundant amino acid, and thus all other values are normalized to a value of 100 for that compound. Proteins are also found in eccrine sweat (Nakayashiki, 1990, pp 2531; Uyttendaele et al., 1977, pp 261266). One study found more than 400 different polypeptide components present (Marshall, 1984, pp 506509). Lipids have also been detected in eccrine sweat. There is some difficulty in accurately determining the amounts of these compounds present in eccrine secretions because sweat often mixes with sebaceous compounds on the skin surface. However, one study reported detectable amounts of both fatty acids and sterol compounds (Boysen et al., 1984, pp 13021307). Other miscellaneous compounds, including drugs, have been found in eccrine secretions (Sato, 1979, pp 52131; Lobitz and Mason, 1948, p 908; Forstrom et al., 1975, pp 156157). One study reported the presence of sulfonamides, antipyrine, and aminopyrine (Johnson and Maibach, 1971, pp 182188). Another reported that L -dimethylamphetamine and its metabolite L -methamphetamine had been detected (Vree et al., 1972, pp 311317). Ethanol has also been detected in eccrine sweat (Naitoh et al., 2000, pp 27972801), which has led to the suggestion of using\n\n| Amino Acid       |   Average Abundance |\n|------------------|---------------------|\n| Serine           |               100   |\n| Glycine          |                60   |\n| OrnithineLysine |                45   |\n| Ornithine        |                41   |\n| Alanine          |                30   |\n| Aspartic acid    |                18   |\n| Threonine        |                15   |\n| Histidine        |                15   |\n| Valine           |                10   |\n| Leucine          |                 9   |\n| Glutamic acid    |                 8   |\n| Isoleucine       |                 7   |\n| Phenylalanine    |                 6   |\n| Lysine           |                 7.5 |\n| Tyrosine         |                 5   |\n\nsweat as a means of noninvasively determining a person's serum ethanol concentration (Hawthorne and Wojcik, 2006, pp 6571). Acetaminophen has also been reported in a person's sweat a day after taking the medication (Mong et al., 1999).\n\nThe other sudoriferous gland present in skin is the apocrine gland. These sweat glands are associated with the coarse hair of the armpits and pubic area. They are larger than eccrine glands and secrete a thicker fluid (Anderson et al., 1998, p 1561). The gland's duct typically empties into a hair follicle (above where a sebaceous gland duct would be) before the secretions reach the skin's surface (Robertshaw, 1991). Because the contents of the apocrine gland often mix with sebaceous secretions prior to reaching the skin's surface, it is difficult to obtain uncontaminated \"pure\" apocrine secretions for analysis. One of the few published studies of apocrine secretions described them as milky in appearance and stated that they dried to a plasticlike solid, which fluoresced and had an odor (Shelley, 1951, p 255). Compounds reported to have been isolated from apocrine secretions include proteins, carbohydrates, cholesterol, iron (Knowles, 1978, pp 713721), C19-steroid sulfates, and\n16-steroids (Toth and Faredin, 1985, pp 2128; Labows et al., 1979, pp 249258).\n\nSebaceous glands are relatively small saclike organs and can be found in the dermis layer of skin. They are found throughout the body and are associated with body hair. They are particularly abundant on the scalp, face, anus, nose, mouth, and external portions of the ear (Anderson et al., 1998, p 1464). They are not found on the palms of the hands or soles of the feet. The secretions from the sebaceous gland typically empty into a hair follicle before reaching the skin's surface, although in some regions they do reach the skin's surface directly (e.g., lips). The purpose of sebaceous secretions appears to be to help prevent sweat evaporation (and thus retain body heat) and to lubricate hair and surrounding skin. The primary compounds present in sebaceous secretions are lipids. Table 72 lists the approximate percentage values for the various lipid classes present in sebaceous secretions, as reported by Goode and Morris (1983). Knowles (1978, pp 713721) reported similar concentration ranges.\n\n| Lipid              |   Percentage |\n|--------------------|--------------|\n| Glycerides         |           33 |\n| Fatty acids        |           30 |\n| Wax esters         |           22 |\n| Cholesterol esters |            2 |\n| Cholesterol        |            2 |\n| Squalene           |           10 |\n\nFree fatty acids in sebum are derived primarily from the hydrolysis of triglycerides and wax esters. About half of the fatty acids are saturated, with straight chain C16 and C14 being the most common (Green, 1984, pp 114117). Monounsaturated fatty acids comprise about 48% of sebum, and polyunsaturated acids comprise the remaining 23% (Nicolaides and Ansari, 1968, pp 7981). Branched chain fatty acids have also been reported (Green, 1984, pp 114117).\n\nWax esters comprise about 2025% of sebum. These compounds contain a fatty acid that has been esterified with a fatty alcohol. A significant percentage of these compounds (27%) have been reported to contain branched chain fatty acids (Nicolaides et al., 1972, pp 506517). Sterol esters are thought to be produced secondarily by certain strains of bacteria (Puhvel, 1975, pp 397400). Squalene, which comprises about 10% of sebum, is a major precursor for steroid production in the body (including the steroid alcohols, lanosterol and cholesterol).\n\n## 7.2.4 Variation In Sebum Composition With The Age Of The Donor\n\nThe free fatty acid composition in sebum changes dramatically with age of the donor (Ramasastry et al., 1970, pp 139144). The approximate percentage of fatty acids in newborns (approximately 5 days old) has been reported to be only about 1.5% of the overall sebum composition. This value rises dramatically to about 2023% in young children (age 1 month to 4 years). The value then stabilizes to 1619% for adolescent and postadolescent subjects (up to approximately 45 years of age). Triglycerides also vary significantly. Newborns were found to have triglycerides making up approximately 52% of their sebum. This value decreased to 38% in infants (1 month to 2 years of age). Subsequently, the value peaked at 50% in young children (ages 24 years) and then slowly decreased to 41% in postadolescent subjects. In newborns, 26.7% of sebum was composed of wax esters. This value began to decrease in infants (17.6%)\nand continued until reaching a low of 6.9% in subjects between the ages of 4 and 8 years. The values then began to increase in preadolescents (17.8%) and continued to rise until reaching a maximum of 25% in postadolescents (up to 45 years of age). The value of cholesterol in sebum tended to peak in preadolescents (7.2%). Newborns were reported to have 2.5% cholesterol in their sebum, whereas postadolescents had the lowest values, 1.4%. Cholesterol ester composition tended to vary in an unpredictable way. A value of 6.1% was reported for newborns, which increased to 10.3% for infants (1 month to 2 years of age). This value then decreased to 8.9% for young children (ages 24 years) and then increased to 14.6% in subjects of ages 48 years. This value then decreased dramatically to 5.7% in preadolescent children and continued to decline to 2.1% in postadolescent subjects (up to 45 years of age).\n\nAlthough squalene composition changes with donor age, the range is not very significant. The concentration of squalene begins at 9.9% for newborns and reaches a low of 6.2% in children of ages 24 years. The concentration then slowly begins to rise in children 48 years in age (7.7%) and peaks at a value of 12% in postadolescents.\n\n## 7.2.5 Latent Print Residue\n\nA latent print is a mixture of some or all of the secretions from the three types of glands. The amount of material contained in a latent print deposit is rather small, typically less than 10 g, and has an average thickness of about 0.1 m (Scruton et al., 1975, pp 714723). The latent print secretion is a complex emulsification of these numerous and varying compounds. When deposited on a surface, nearly 99% of the print is composed of water. As this water begins to evaporate rapidly from the deposit, the print begins to dry out. This process begins to alter certain reagents' ability to visualize the print. Fingerprint powder, for example, will not work as well on a dried-out latent print, but other processes, like ninhydrin and physical developer, have developed prints several years old (McDiarmid, 1992, pp 2124). Latent print residue is generally divided into two basic categories, water-soluble and water-insoluble. The watersoluble portion of the print deposit is typically composed of eccrine secretions like salts (e.g., NaCl) and amino acids (e.g., serine, glycine). Chemicals like ninhydrin (which reacts with amino acids) and silver nitrate (which reacts with sodium chloride) are effective reagents for visualizing this water-soluble portion of the residue. However, an eccrine-rich latent print that is exposed to water most likely will not be recovered with these methods. This is why, before the introduction of physical developer in the 1970s, there was no reliable method for recovering prints from water-soaked documents. The water-insoluble portion can really be divided into two subcategories. One fraction of this residue is composed of large, water-insoluble molecules (e.g., proteins) and the other fraction is composed mainly of nonpolar lipids (e.g., fatty acids). Reagents like physical developer are thought to react with compounds similar to the first fraction, and reagents like Oil Red O or Nile Red react with lipids from the second fraction.\n\n## 7.2.6 Aging Of Latent Print Residue\n\nA number of laboratories have looked into studying the changes in the composition of latent print residue and have determined that the composition of latent print residue can change dramatically over time. The foundation work in this area was conducted during the 1960s and 1970s by the U.K. Home Office Scientific Research and Development Branch and Central Research Establishment (Bowman et al., 2003, pp 23). Additional studies have been conducted by some of the Home Office Forensic Science Service laboratories and several Department of Energy National Laboratories.\n\n## 7.2.7 Home Office Scientific Development Branch (U.K.)\n\nThe U.K. Home Office sponsored a number of research efforts, which were carried out by two groups: the Scientific Research and Development Branch (also known as the Police Scientific Development Branch [PSDB] and currently known as the Scientific Development Branch) and the Central Research Establishment. A number of studies conducted in the mid- to late 1960s looked at determining the amount of certain inorganic compounds (chlorides) (Cuthbertson, 1969) as well as lipids (Wilson and Darke, 1978) in latent print residue. These studies did not address the changes in composition with time. However, one study monitored the change in chlorides, amino acids (as leucine), and urea concentration in a deposit over the course of 236 days (Knowles, 1978, pp 713721). After 236 days, the chloride concentration had changed from 0.223 g/cm2\nto 0.217 g/cm2. The amino acid content had changed from\n0.083 g/cm2 to 0.046 g/cm2, and the urea content from\n0.083 g/cm2 to 0.028 g/cm2.\n\nThe PSDB recently sponsored some work in this area (Fitzgerald, 2003). A project was started in February 2002 between the University of Lincoln and PSDB to look into the gas chromatographymass spectroscopy (GCMS) analysis of the composition of latent print residue and how it changes over time.\n\n## 7.2.8 Home Office Forensic Science Service (U.K.)\n\nThe U.K. Home Office Forensic Science Service (FSS) has also been active in the area of latent print chemistry. The FSS conducted an early preliminary study in conjunction with the University of Lausanne in 1999 (Jacquat, 1999). This study compared the aging of prints exposed to light and darkness over the period of 1 month. The six most abundant peaks found in the residue were oleic acid,\npalmitic acid, cholesterol, squalene, and two wax esters. Data were collected from four donors at the time of deposition (t = 0), after 2 weeks, and finally after 4 weeks. Palmitic acid in a print kept in the dark and squalene in a print kept in the light showed a significant decrease over the first 2 weeks and then stabilized. Cholesterol and oleic acid showed a regular decrease in prints stored in the dark. No other observable trends were detected for the other compounds. A recent study funded by the Technical Support Working Group (TSWG), an interagency working group that funds projects related to counter-terrorism, looked at the changes in lipid content of a print over time and under different environmental conditions (Jones et al., 2001a). The FSS study used methyl-N-trimethylsilyltrifluoroacetamide as a derivitizing agent. Samples were analyzed at selected intervals and stored in either light or dark conditions at 25 C and 20% relative humidity. Several general trends were observed. Squalene was found to degrade rather quickly and was rarely detected in older prints. In some cases, certain fatty acid concentrations initially increased before tending to decrease over time. This may have been due to the breakdown of wax esters, which may have contributed fatty acids to the residue before the compounds began to break down. Similar trends were observed for samples stored in the dark; however, the decreases were less rapid than for samples stored in the light. The FSS is currently continuing to investigate this topic with a research grant issued by the U.K. Engineering and Physical Sciences Research Council. Another effort conducted by the FSS involved the use of microfluidic systems for the chemical analysis of latent print residues (Valussi, 2003). The objective of this work was to develop a microfluidic device, based on capillary electrophoresis (CE), that would enable sampling, preconcentration, and analysis of latent print residues. The proposed micro-TAS (total analytical system) used microchip technology to allow for ultrafast and highly efficient separations. The analysis involved placing a print directly onto a gel-coated CE chip. An applied voltage caused polar components of the residue to migrate into the chip. After preconcentration, the residue was separated and then analyzed. The project demonstrated that the CE chip method is capable of separating certain components of latent print residue; however, additional refinements will be necessary to separate specific compounds (or groups of compounds) of interest.\n\n## 7.2.9 Pacific Northwest National Laboratory\n\nThe Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) performed a series of aging experiments for latent prints deposited on glass fiber filter paper (Mong et al., 1999). This TSWG-funded R&D effort was done during the late 1990s. The results obtained from the aging experiments were generally as expected. Most of the unsaturated lipids (e.g., squalene and fatty acids such as oleic and palmitoleic acids) diminished significantly during the 30-day study period. The saturated compounds (e.g., palmitic and stearic acids) remained essentially stable during the same 30-day period. Overall, as the sample print aged, there was a tendency to form more lower molecular weight breakdown products (e.g., octanoic and nonanoic acids) over time. It was hypothesized that these low molecular weight compounds would either break down further or evaporate.\n\n## 7.2.10 Savannah River Technical Center\n\nThe Savannah River Technical Center (SRTC), in a project jointly funded by the Department of Energy and TSWG, also studied how latent print residue changes with time (Walter, 1999). This study focused on what changes occur as lipids in the print begin to age. The ultimate goal was to determine whether any of the breakdown products would be suitable for visualization by chemical reagents. A limited number of conditions (e.g., UV exposure, indoor and outdoor conditions, addition of a catalyst) were also evaluated as part of this study. The primary breakdown products for the lipids studied by SRTC were found to be a class of compounds known as hydroperoxides. The standard mixture used in this experiment involved a combination of cholesterol, triglycerides, fatty acids, wax esters, cholesterol esters, and a catalyst, protoporphyrin IX dimethyl ester (approximately 0.01% of the overall mixture). This mixture was then exposed to the various environmental conditions. As with the PNNL study, the SRTC found that unsaturated compounds were rapidly depleted from the samples, even ones stored in relatively cool, dark conditions. One experiment that looked at the aging of squalene on a glass slide found that after 1 month of exposure to ambient laboratory conditions, 10% of the sample had been converted to hydroperoxides. The SRTC was going to pursue chemiluminescent methods for visualizing these hydroperoxides. However, because hydroperoxides themselves are somewhat unstable, it is not known how long these compounds remain in aged print residues and whether additional compounds found in actual prints would speed up their breakdown.\n\n## 7.2.11 Conclusion\n\nThe chemistry of latent print residue is very complex, yet its physical characteristics and properties are due to more than just the hundreds (or potentially thousands) of chemical compounds that comprise the residue. These compounds form a complex three-dimensional matrix, an emulsion of water and organic and inorganic compounds. The interaction of all of these different compounds as they are exposed to a variety of environmental conditions over a period of time can produce dramatic changes in the physical properties of the latent print. These changes can explain why some reagents, like powders, and iodine fuming, tend to work on relatively fresh prints, whereas a reagent like physical developer has been known to develop decades-old prints. It is only by obtaining a better understanding of the chemical composition of latent print residue and how it changes with time that we can make improvements to existing reagents and design novel compounds for specialized conditions or surfaces. Such data will also assist in better understanding how latent print development reagents actually work (as well as what they actually react with in the residue). Only then can we develop a methodical approach for reagent design that will yield useful new techniques in the future for visualizing latent print residues.\n\n## 7.3 Latent Print Powders 7.3.1 Background\n\nLatent print visualization with powder, or \"dusting\", involves the application of finely divided particles that physically adhere to the aqueous and oily components in latent print residue on nonporous surfaces (Sodhi and Kaur, 2001, pp 172176). This technique is one of the oldest and most common methods of latent print detection, with one of the earliest references dating back to 1891 (Forgeot, 1891, pp 387404). Early practitioners used a variety of locally available ingredients to make their own dusting powders, including charcoal, lead powder, cigar ashes (Moenssens, 1971, pp 106107), powdered \"washing blue\", powdered iron, soot (Lightning Powder Inc., 2002, pp 23), and talc (Olsen, 1978, pp 212214).\n\n## 7.3.2 Theory\n\nFingerprint dusting is relatively simple and relies on the adherence of powder to the latent print residue to provide good visibility and definition of fingerprint detail. Latent print powder has an affinity for moisture and preferentially clings to the residue deposited by friction ridge skin. It is well accepted that the mechanical attraction between these particles and the moisture and oily components in a print causes adhesion, with absorption being a factor (Olsen, 1978, pp 212214; Lee and Gaensslen, 2001, pp 108109). Particle size, shape, relative surface area (Olsen, 1978, pp 212214), and charge (Menzel, 1999, p 143) appear to play roles as well. Most commercial powders rely on at least two essential elements to provide adhesion to latent print residue without \"painting\" the substrate. These elements are referred to as pigment and binder. The pigment in fingerprint powder provides for effective visualization, offering contrast and definition against the background surface. The binder (also referred to as the carrier in some applications) provides for maximum and preferential adhesion to latent print residue (Menzel, 1999, p 143). Some pigment powders offer enough adhesion to be used individually. Background painting occurs when an undesirable amount of powder adheres to the substrate as well as the latent print, hindering detection.\n\nVisualization will occur via reflected light (light powders), absorbed light (dark powders), and luminescence (fluorescent powders). Sometimes powders are combined for effectiveness on both light and dark substrates. This is the case with bichromatic powder, which uses highly reflective aluminum powder mixed with black powder to achieve visualization on both light and dark surfaces. A disadvantage of mixing different types of pigment particles is that extremely faint impressions, with few particles adhering to the print, may suffer from having only a fraction of the necessary pigment needed for visualization. This problem can be overcome by tagging a single type of pigment particle with a fluorescent dye stain, thus creating a particle with dual uses rather than combining different types of particles.\n\nCommercial powder manufacturers tend to label powders by color, such as black, white, silver, gray, and so forth, rather than labeling the ingredients. Particles that serve as good fingerprint powders include carbon black (colloidal carbon), lamp black, talc, kaolin, aluminum, metal flake, and dolomite (Lee and Gaensslen, 2001, pp 108109), among others. Good binders include iron powder (Lee and Gaennslen, 2001, pp 108109), lycopodium, corn starch, rosin, and gum arabic (Menzel, 1999, p 143). One of the most common latent print powders, known for its versatility and effectiveness, is carbon black. When mixed with a carrier, this powder works on a wide range of surfaces and causes little substrate painting (Cowger, 1983, pp 7980). Carbon black mixtures produce a dark gray-black image that can be visualized on varying colored surfaces. This type of powder will also show up on glossy black surfaces, conversely appearing light in color (Cowger, 1983, pp 7980). Interestingly, black fingerprint powder can also be prepared or \"tagged\" with a fluorescent dye stain (Thornton, 1978, pp 536538), giving it the dual purpose as a photoluminescent technique as well. Other effective and widely used latent print powders are flake metal powders made from aluminum, zinc, copper, brass, stainless steel, iron, cobalt, and nickel. Some data indicate that flake powders are more sensitive than nonflake powders (Kent, 1998). However, flake powders also sometimes tend to \"paint\" the substrate more than nonflake particles do. Flake powders are manufactured by ball-milling spherical metallic particles into flakes ranging from 1 to 50 m in diameter (James et al., 1991, pp 13681375). The increased surface area of the flake relative to the weight of the particle contributes to this powder's adhesion. It appears that commercially available flake powder with a mean diameter of 10 m and an average thickness of 0.5 m is optimum for latent print development. It is also important to note that the addition of stearic acid, intended to influence flake morphology during milling, increases the adhesion value of the flakes as well (James et al., 1990, pp 247252). Aluminum flake powder that was washed of its stearic acid content resulted in poor fingerprint development, whereas aluminum flakes produced with approximately 10 weight-percent of stearic acid produced good results (James et al., 1991, pp 13681375). Another study indicated that a range of flake metals produced optimum results with 35 weight-percent of stearic acid levels (James et al., 1993, pp 391401).\n\n## 7.3.3 Application\n\nAll manufacturer warnings, including those in material safety data sheets, should be heeded when using fingerprint powder. Although commercial suppliers of latent print powder have discontinued using known hazardous ingredients such as lead, mercury, and cadmium, it is strongly recommended that the practitioner wear a dust mask or work on a downdraft table as minimum precautions while using any powder. Powders are typically applied to nonporous surfaces with a soft brush. Powdering is not recommended for porous or highly absorbent surfaces such as uncoated paper or raw wood because other chemical treatments outperform powder on these surfaces. The softness of the bristles is particularly important to prevent damage to fragile latent print residue. Latent prints with a high moisture or oil content are easily damaged by a brush that is too stiff or is used with excessive force. Conventional brushes are typically made with animal hair, fiberglass filaments, or sometimes feathers. Although fingerprint brushes are largely taken for granted these days, a study of brushes has been carried out (Bandey, 2004). Powders applied with a traditional filament brush consist of very fine particles and are usually low density or \"fluffy\" in nature. This enables particles to be easily picked up or \"loaded\" onto the brush filaments. The low density of this powder also allows it to easily become airborne during the dusting process, making a dust mask or respirator necessary at the crime scene. It is important to keep brushes clean, dry, and relatively free of tangles. To apply fingerprint powder with a conventional brush, the filament tips are lightly dipped into a sterile, wide-mouth container holding a small amount of powder. This is called \"loading\" the brush. Excess powder is then shaken, spun, or tapped from the brush. The powder is then applied evenly to all areas of the substrate. An area of the surface (or a substrate similar in nature) should be tested before fully processing the item. This is done to establish the optimum amount of powder to be used on that substrate and to avoid background painting. Brushing is accomplished with light and even strokes that resemble painting. It is important always to begin by lightly powdering and slowly building to heavier applications to minimize fingerprint damage.\n\nWhen latent prints appear, they can be lightly brushed by adding powder and subsequently brushing excess powder away. This is done in the direction of the ridge flow to prevent damage to the impression.\n\nAnother type of powder, called magnetic or magna powder, allows for application with a magnetized rod that has no bristles. This type of powder can be light, dark, or fluorescent and utilizes the ferromagnetic properties of iron powder mixed with pigment powders. The magnetized applicator (magna brush) is dipped into the powder, picking up a ball of the iron and particle mixture, essentially forming its own brush (Figure 71). This ball serves as an effective carrier for pigment particles and is passed back and forth over the substrate to develop latent impressions. It is important to note that the magnetic powder ball formed with a magna brush is much softer than conventional filament brushes and typically causes less damage to fragile latent prints (MacDonell, 1961, pp 715). Magnetic powders are usually less effective on ferromagnetic substrates such as steel or nickel and are therefore not recommended on those substrates. The magnetic attraction may cause contact between the applicator and substrate, damaging latent prints in the process. In addition, magnetized particles from the powder will cling to the substrate and resist removal. There are two ways to record or preserve a powdered impression. The most common and simplest method is lifting. To lift a print, good-quality transparent tape is placed onto the surface bearing a powdered impression. Common tape size for fingerprint lifting is 1.52 in. wide. While it is being applied, the tape is rubbed to remove air bubbles and to ensure good adhesion to the latent prints. It is then removed and placed on a backing card that contrasts with the color of the powder. Probably the most common lift is of black fingerprint powder placed on a white backing card. Other adhesive lifting media are hinge lifters, where the adhesive square is attached to the backing card by a hinge; opaque adhesive gel lifters, typically black or white; and silicon-type materials that are spread onto the surface and allowed to harden to a flexible rubbery medium before lifting. Care must be taken during the comparison process to note which lifting techniques cause the print to appear reversed. If the impression will be photographed in situ, the importance of powder color increases. Documenting powdered impressions this way requires combining proper selection of powder and photographic lighting that will produce ample contrast against the substrate. Another type of powder that produces excellent results on a wide variety of surfaces is fluorescent powder. Fluorescent powder relies on the principle of luminescence to provide contrast between fingerprint and background. Fluorescent powders are typically created by adding a laser dye in solution to a binder and allowing the mixture to evaporate (Menzel, 1999, pp 6265). The resulting dried mass is then ground into latent print powder. Fluorescent powdering is highly sensitive when used with a good forensic light source and the appropriate barrier filters. In theory, luminescent fingerprint powder should be more sensitive than conventional methods (Menzel, 1999, pp 47). It is important to test tape and lift cards used with fluorescent powders for any inherent fluorescence because fluorescence caused by lifting media will interfere with the quality of the impression.\n\nAnother use of fingerprint powder, or the components of fingerprint powder, is in a suspension, for use on wet surfaces or on adhesive tapes. Conventional small-particle reagent, for developing fingerprints on wet, nonporous surfaces, uses molybdenum disulphide in suspension, but other reagents have been developed (Frank and Almog, 1993, pp 240244). A similar suspension, Sticky-side powder (Burns, 1994, pp 133138), used to develop prints on the adhesive side of tape, has also been reformulated using fingerprint powder (Bratton et al., 1996, p 28; Wade, 2002, pp 551559). Finally, a word of caution may be in order. Although using fingerprint powder is quick and inexpensive, concerns have been raised recently concerning the possibility of contamination due to the transfer of DNA through the use of fingerprint brushes (van Oorschot et al., 2005, pp 14171422). Crime scene examiners are being warned to be aware of this possibility.\n\n## 7.4 Ninhydrin And Analogues 7.4.1 Ninhydrin History\n\nNinhydrin was first described in 1910 when Siegfried Ruhemann mistakenly prepared the compound (Ruhemann, 1910a, pp 14381449). Ruhemann observed that the new compound reacted with skin and amino acids to produce a purple product (Ruhemann, 1910b, pp 20252031), and he published a series of papers detailing this and other reactions (Ruhemann, 1911a, pp 792800; 1911b, pp 13061310; 1911c, pp 14861492). He proposed a structure for the deeply colored product (Ruhemann, 1911c, pp 14861492), today known as Ruhemann's purple, and commented on the possible application of the reaction to the detection of trace amounts of amino acids and protein products in biological samples (Ruhemann, 1911a, pp 792800). Following Ruhemann's discovery, ninhydrin found widespread use in analytical chemistry and biochemistry applications. As early as 1913, the reaction with amino acids was an important diagnostic test for the presence of protein and amine compounds in biological samples\n(Crown, 1969, pp 258264; Friedman and Williams, 1974, pp 267280). With the advent of chromatography, the reaction became even more useful for the location of amino acids on paper chromatograms or in fractions produced by liquid chromatography (Crown, 1969, pp 258264; Smith and Agiza, 1951, pp 623627). Ruhemann's purple and other by-products of the ninhydrin and amino-acid reaction were also used to quantitatively measure amino acid content of samples (Yemm et al., 1955, 209214; Smith and Agiza, 1951, pp 623627). The reagent was so powerful and versatile that some authors suggested it was the most widely used reaction in analytical laboratories (Friedman and Williams, 1974, pp 267280). This use of ninhydrin was frequently accompanied by warnings to avoid contact between bare skin and any surfaces to come into contact with the reagent (Crown, 1969, pp 258264). This was due to the strong reaction between ninhydrin and sweat, which would cause the appearance of fingerprints on chromatograms (Crown, 1969, pp 258 264; Oden and von Hofsten, 1954, pp 449450). Despite these warnings, which clearly indicated the ability of ninhydrin to develop fingerprints, the reagent was not applied in a forensic context until 1954 (Oden and von Hofsten, 1954, pp 449450). Following this initial report, ninhydrin rapidly became an indispensable tool in the detection of latent fingerprints, with widespread use among jurisdictions being documented as early as 1959 (Speaks, 1964, pp 1113, 23). The technique is now amongst the most popular methods for fingerprint detection on paper and other porous substrates (Champod et al., 2004, pp 114136). This method has limitations, however, and chemists have addressed these limitations by the synthesis of analoguescompounds structurally related to ninhydrin that exhibit similar reactions with amino acids to improve the clarity of the developed fingerprint (Almog, 2001, pp 177209). Several of these analogues were highly successful (e.g., 1,8-diazafluoren-9-one [DFO], 1,2-indanedione, and 5-methylthioninhydrin), although none have been able to completely replace ninhydrin as the most frequently used technique (Almog, 2001, pp 177209).\n\n## 7.4.2 Theory 7.4.2.1 Fingerprint Detection By Amino Acid Reagents. Some Fingerprints Are Created By The Deposition Of Sweat From The Fingers When They Come Into Contact With A Sur-\n\nface. This sweat consists mainly of aqueous components, which comprise 98% of the volume of a fingerprint (Pounds and Jones, 1983, pp 180183). These aqueous deposits contain a small, but detectable, amount of amino acids, averaging about 250 ng per fingerprint (Hansen and Joullie, 2005, pp 408417). After the water evaporates from the surface, the amino acids remain as solid material (Knowles, 1978, pp 713720). For porous surfaces such as paper, amino acids are desirable targets for fingerprint development reagents (Almog, 2001, pp 177209). Although uncontrollable variables (such as the total amount of sweat deposited by the finger, the amino acid concentration of the individual's excretions, and the age of the fingerprint) influence the amount of amino acids transferred to the paper (Everse and Menzel, 1986, pp 446454), amino acids are always present in perspiration in some amount (Speaks, 1970, pp 1417). On contact with paper, these amino acids impregnate the surface of the paper, where they are retained by their high affinity for cellulose (Champod et al., 2004, p 114; Almog, 2001, pp 177209; Hansen and Joullie, 2005, pp 408417). Because of this affinity, amino acids do not migrate significantly from their initial deposition sites; however, the amount of amino acids retained in the fingerprint decreases gradually over time (Knowles, 1978, pp 713720). Furthermore, amino acids react with a wide variety of chemicals to produce colored compounds (Hansen and Joullie, 2005,\npp 408417). These qualities have been exploited to produce clear, sharp images of fingerprints that were up\nto 40 years old (Champod et al., 2004, p 114). At least 14 amino acids may be present in fingerprint residues (Knowles, 1978, pp 713720; Hier et al., 1946, pp 327333). To produce the best-developed fingerprint, the ideal reagent must be nonspecific to a particular amino acid (i.e., reacts well with all). Ninhydrin is one of many chemicals that acts as a nonspecific amino acid reagent and is, therefore, highly suitable for fingerprint development (Champod et al., 2004, p 114; Almog, 2001, pp 177209).\n\n7.4.2.2 Properties of Ninhydrin. Ninhydrin is a crystalline solid that is colorless to pale yellow in color and is highly soluble in polar solvents such as water and methanol (McCaldin, 1960, pp 3951). When heated, the solid becomes pink to red in color at approximately 125 C (Almog, 2001, pp 177209), melts at 130140 C, and decomposes at 241 C. The compound is found as the stable hydrate in the presence of any water but will assume a triketone structure in anhydrous conditions (Hansen and Joullie, 2005,\npp 408417). This equilibrium is illustrated in Figure 72.\n\n7.4.2.3 Reaction of Ninhydrin with Amino Acids. The first observation of ninhydrin's reaction with skin to form a deep purple compound was reported in 1910 (Ruhemann, 1910a, pp 14381449). Subsequent studies indicated that the purple color resulted from the reaction between ninhydrin and amino acids and described the product of this reaction as diketohydrindylidenediketohydrindamine (Ruhemann, 1910b, pp 20252031; 1911a, pp 792800; 1911c, pp 14861492), which is now known as Ruhemann's purple.\n\nBy-products of this reaction include an aldehyde derivative of the amino acid and carbon dioxide (Friedman and Williams, 1974, pp 267280; Yemm et al., 1955, pp 209214). Multiple attempts have been made to determine the mechanism of this reaction (Friedman and Williams, 1974, pp 267280; Hansen and Joullie, 2005, pp 408417; McCaldin, 1960, pp 3951; Retinger, 1917, pp 10591066; Bottom et al., 1978, pp 45; Grigg et al., 1986, pp 421422; Grigg et al., 1989, pp 38493862; Joullie et al., 1991, pp 87918830; Schertz et al., 2001, pp 75967603). The mechanism that is most accepted today is the one proposed by Grigg et al. (1989, pp 38493862) and illustrated briefly in Figure 73. Acid and water are other reagents required for this reaction to occur.\n\nStructural studies of the reaction product have confirmed that Ruhemann's original product structure was correct and that the reaction with amino acids produces the ammonium salt of Ruhemann's purple (Ruhemann, 1911c,\npp 14861492; Grigg et al., 1986, pp 421422; 1989, pp 38493862). This reaction is complex and requires a finely tuned set of conditions in order to progress at a reasonable rate. The pH of the reaction must be above 4 (Friedman and Williams, 1974, pp 267280; Bottom et al., 1978, pp 45) and ideally should be between 4.5 and 5.2 (Grigg et al., 1989, pp 38493862). Development in a high-humidity environment is of utmost importance (Champod et al., 2004, pp 116117; Almog, 2001, pp 177209) because water is a necessary reactant. Finally, because Ruhemann's purple is known to degrade in the presence of light and oxygen, the treated fingerprint should be stored in a dark, cool place (Friedman and Williams, 1974, pp 267280; Joullie et al., 1991, pp 87918830). Ninhydrin-treated fingerprints are colored purple and exhibit excellent contrast and clarity of detail (Champod et al., 2004, p 117; Almog, 2001, pp 177209).\n\n7.4.2.4 Optical Enhancement of Ninhydrin-Developed Fingerprints. Ninhydrin treatment provides excellent contrast under ideal conditions (e.g., fresh fingerprints on white paper). On colored paper or with aged fingerprints, however, the results can often be less than optimal (Crown, 1969, pp 258264; Everse and Menzel, 1986, pp 446454; Speaks, 1970, pp 1417; Grigg et al., 1989, pp 38493862; German, 1981, pp 34; Herod and Menzel, 1982a, pp 200204; Lennard et al., 1986, pp 323328). Several methods have been developed to increase the contrast between ninhydrin-developed fingerprints and a colored substrate or to enhance weakly developed fingerprints. The UV-to-visible light spectrum of Ruhemann's purple shows two *absorption maxima*wavelengths of light that are strongly absorbed by the compound. These maxima, at  = 407 nm and  = 582 nm (Lennard et al., 1986, pp\n323328), can be used to increase the contrast between the developed fingerprint and a nonabsorbing background. When lasers became available to the forensic community in the late 1970s to early 1980s, a treatment with zinc chloride was described for enhancing weak ninhydrin prints by using the light of an argon ion laser (German, 1981, pp 34; Herod and Menzel, 1982a, pp 200204). This method was capable of drastically increasing the number of identifiable latent fingerprints developed by the ninhydrin process. With the current ubiquity of forensic light sources, both absorption bands of Ruhemann's purple can be exploited to produce high-contrast fingerprints (Champod et al., 2004, p 117).\n\n7.4.2.5 Post-Treatment with Metal Salts. The reaction between Ruhemann's purple and metal salts such as zinc, cadmium, cobalt, and copper was used in a biochemical context to preserve ninhydrin spots on chromatograms (Kawerau and Wieland, 1951, pp 7778). Formation of a metal-salt complex alters the color of Ruhemann's purple from deep violet to red or orange, depending upon the salt used (Stoilovic et al., 1986, pp 432445). The lighter hue may provide a greater contrast against a dark-colored background, especially when observed at 490510 nm, where the metalRuhemann's purple complex has an absorption maximum (Stoilovic et al., 1986, pp 432445). It has been reported that viewing zinc-complexed ninhydrintreated fingerprints under an argon ion laser could induce fluorescence of even weakly developed prints (Herod and Menzel, 1982b, pp 513518). This discovery had a profound impact on fingerprint development because fluorescent reagents are more sensitive than chromogenic ones and can be viewed more clearly against colored backgrounds (Champod et al., 2004, p 120). Subsequent studies revealed that intense laser light was not necessary if the zinc-treated samples were cooled to the temperature of liquid nitrogen (-196 C or 77 K); the fluorescence could be observed under a xenon arc lamp. This technique required submersion of the document in liquid nitrogen, a glass plate being placed between the sample and the light source and camera, and a heat source to prevent condensation on the glass (Kobus et al., 1983, pp 161170). Later research showed that cadmium complexes provided an improved luminescence under these conditions (Stoilovic et al., 1986, pp 432445).\n\nStructural studies of the Ruhemann's purplemetal salt complexes have identified the structure in Figure 74 (Lennard et al., 1987, pp 597605; Davies et al., 1995a, pp 565569; 1995b, pp 18021805).\n\n## 7.4.3 Application\n\n7.4.3.1 Ninhydrin Formulations. Several ninhydrin formulations have been reported in the literature (Crown, 1969, pp 258264; Oden and van Hofsten, 1954, pp 449450; Speaks, 1964, pp 1113, 23; Champod et al., 2004, pp 117120; Almog, 2001, pp 177209; Everse and Menzel, 1986, pp 446454; Clay, 1981, pp 1213). Ninhydrin solutions are typically prepared in two steps: first, a stock solution is prepared that has a high proportion of polar solvent to facilitate the stability of the mixture; second, a portion of the stock solution is diluted with a nonpolar carrier solvent to produce a reagent suitable for application to evidential items. Application of ninhydrin working solutions can be performed by dipping, spraying, or brushing (Oden and van Hofsten, 1954, pp 449450; Speaks, 1964, pp 1113, 23), with the dipping method preferred in most instances. The item to be examined is briefly submerged in the working solution and allowed to air-dry to evaporate the solvent (Champod et al., 2004, pp 116117). Following treatment with ninhydrin solution, development should ideally proceed at room temperature, in a dark and humid environment (5080% humidity), for a period of 12 days (Champod et al., 2004, pp 116117). If ambient humidity is low, development in a specialized, humidity-controlled fingerprint development chamber may be necessary (Almog, 2001, pp 177209). The development may be accelerated by the application of steam or heat, but this may result in a greater degree of background development, reducing the clarity and contrast of the resulting fingerprints (Almog, 2001, pp 177209). Steaming can be achieved by holding a steam iron above the exhibit; heat can be delivered in a press, oven, fingerprint development cabinet, or by a microwave oven and should not exceed 80 C (Almog, 2001, pp 177209). Ninhydrin crystals may be ground in a mortar and pestle to form a fine powder and applied directly to the fingerprints with a fingerprint brush (Almog, 2001, pp 177209). This method is slow and produces only faint prints but may be suitable for some types of heat- or solvent-sensitive paper (Wakefield and Armitage, 2005). Ninhydrin may also be applied by a fuming method; a forensic fuming cabinet is used to heat the ninhydrin until it sublimes, allowing gaseous ninhydrin to deposit on the fingerprint residues (Schwarz and Frerichs, 2002, pp 12741277). The reagent is most suited to paper, although any porous substrate may give visible results, and some nonporous substrates have been reported to produce visible fingerprints (Herod and Menzel, 1982a, pp 200204; Speaks, 1966, pp 35).\n\n7.4.3.2 Metal Salt Post-Treatment. The application of zinc or cadmium salts to ninhydrin-developed fingerprints will result in an immediate color change from purple to orange or red, respectively (Lennard et al., 1987, pp 597605). Note that the use of zinc is preferred to cadmium because of cadmium's toxicity. Dipping the exhibit into the solution is preferred over spraying because of the toxicity of some of the reagents. If humidity is low, a short blast of steam may be required to produce development. However, the humidity must be carefully controlled if zinc salts are used because high moisture levels cause the formation of an unstable, nonfluorescent, red complex that will reduce the contrast of the resulting fingerprint (Stoilovic et al., 1986, pp 432445; Davies et al., 1995a, pp 565569). Post-treated fingerprints may be further enhanced by viewing under 490 nm light (for zinc-treated residues) or 510 nm light (for cadmium-treated residues) (Champod et al., 2004, p 120; Stoilovic et al., 1986, pp 432445). Fluorescence may be induced by submerging the article in liquid nitrogen and exciting the treated fingerprint with the abovementioned wavelengths of light. The fluorescent emissions should be viewed using a 550570 nm band-pass filter or a 550 nm long-pass filter (Champod et al., 2004, pp 121124).\n\n## 7.5 1,8-Diazafluoren-9-One (Dfo) 7.5.1 History\n\n1,8-Diazafluoren-9-one (DFO) was first prepared in 1950 (Druey and Schmidt, 1950, pp 10801087), but its reaction with amino acids was not explored until 1990, when it was first applied as a fingerprint development reagent. The preliminary results of this study were promising; DFO treatment resulted in faint red or pink fingerprints that were intensely fluorescent at room temperature (Pounds et al., 1990, pp 169175; Grigg et al., 1990, pp 72157218). This presented clear advantages over the metal complexationinduced fluorescence of ninhydrin-developed fingerprints, and DFO was rapidly identified as the best fluorescent reagent for fingerprint development (Almog, 2001, pp 177209). The reagent is now widely used in sequence with ninhydrin to develop fingerprints on porous surfaces (Wilkinson et al., 2005).\n\n## 7.5.2 Theory\n\nAlthough DFO is not a direct analogue of ninhydrin (Hansen and Joullie, 2005, pp 408417), the structures of the two compounds, and the outcome of their reactions with amino acids, are similar (Grigg et al., 1990, pp 72157218; Wilkinson, 2000a, pp 87103). Like ninhydrin, DFO contains a central ketone center activated by the nearby presence of electron-withdrawing groups. The structure of DFO is illustrated in Figure 75; the nitrogenous rings act similarly to the flanking ketone groups in ninhydrin (Hansen and Joullie, 2005, pp 408417).\n\nMechanistic studies of DFO's reaction with amino acids have shown that the presence of methanol is essential. This allows the DFO to form a hemiketal (Figure 76), which is less stable than the parent structure and therefore more reactive, producing a more sensitive response to amino acid residues in fingerprints (Wilkinson, 2000a, pp 87103). The red reaction product has been fully characterized and resembles Ruhemann's purple (Grigg et al., 1990, pp 72157218; Wilkinson, 2000a, pp 87103).\n\nThe product of this reaction is pink to red in color with max of approximately 560 nm and a weaker absorption at 520 nm (Pounds et al., 1990, pp 169175; Wilkinson, 2000a, pp 87103). Under excitation by either of these wavelengths, the product is strongly fluorescent at room temperature, emitting intense light of 576 nm (Stoilovic, 1993, pp 141153). An illustration of a DFO-developed fingerprint in both white light and under fluorescent conditions appears in Figure 77. Unlike the ninhydrin reaction, the DFO reaction requires a high-temperature, low-humidity environment (Pounds et al., 1990, pp 169175). Post-treatment with metal salts and subsequent cooling to liquid nitrogen temperatures does not significantly affect the intensity of the DFO product's fluorescence (Conn et al., 2001, pp 117123). DFO is reported to be a more sensitive fingerprint development reagent than ninhydrin, producing a greater number of identifiable latent fingerprints (Wilkinson et al., 2005; Stoilovic, 1993, pp 141153; Cantu et al., 1993, pp 4466). This sensitivity is due to the fact that a weakly fluorescing fingerprint is easier to see than a weakly colored fingerprint (Almog, 2001, pp 177209). Despite this observation, if ninhydrin is applied after DFO treatment, additional development occurs, producing Ruhemann's purple. The conventional explanation for this phenomenon is that, although DFO-developed fingerprints are more visible when fluorescing, DFO does not react to completion with every amino acid in the fingerprint residue, thus leaving some amino acids available to react with ninhydrin (Wilkinson, 2000a, pp 87103). The combination of DFO followed by ninhydrin develops more latent fingerprints than DFO or ninhydrin alone (Wilkinson et al., 2005), and this is the recommended sequence of examinations for porous surfaces such as paper (Champod et al., 2004, pp 128131; Almog, 2001, 177209).\n\n## 7.5.3 Application\n\nSeveral DFO formulations have been reported in the literature (Champod et al., 2004, pp 230231; Almog, 2001, pp 177209; Pounds et al., 1990, pp 169175; Grigg et al., 1990, pp 72157218; Wilkinson et al., 2005; Wilkinson, 2000a, pp 87103; Stoilovic, 1993, pp 141153; Didierjean et al., 1998, pp 163167). DFO solution can be applied to specimens by dipping, spraying, or brushing, although dipping is the preferred method (Champod et al., 2004, pp 128131). The exhibit is allowed to dry and then heated to promote development. Several heating methods are suitable: heating in a 100 C oven for 1020 minutes (Champod et al., 2004, p 128; Almog, 2001, pp 177209; Pounds et al., 1990, pp 169175; Didierjean et al., 1998, pp 163167), applying a 160 C iron for 2030 seconds (Stoilovic, 1993, pp 141153), or applying a 180 C ironing press for 10\nseconds (Almog, 2001, pp 177209; Stoilovic, 1993, pp 141153). The reaction must be carried out in a dry environment with low humidity because moisture interferes with the development reaction (Champod et al., 2004, p 129; Almog, 2001, pp 177209; Wilkinson, 2000a, pp 87103). After DFO application and heating, developed fingerprints can be observed using 530 nm excitation light and a 590 nm barrier filter, or 555 nm excitation light and a 610 nm barrier filter (Almog, 2001, pp 177209). The exhibit may then be treated with ninhydrin as previously described.\n\n## 7.6 1,2-Indanedione 7.6.1 History\n\nThe fingerprint-developing capabilities of 1,2-indanedione were first considered after a related compound, 6-methylthio-1,2-indanedione, was found to produce fluorescent fingerprints (Hauze et al., 1998, pp 744747). This prompted researchers to synthesize the parent compound and several other analogues and to evaluate their utility as fingerprint reagents (Ramotowski et al., 1997, pp 131139). The results were similar to DFO in that a faint, pink-colored product was produced that fluoresced brightly at room temperature (Ramotowski et al., 1997, pp 131139). Further research indicated that these reagents are more sensitive than other current methods and, because of the ease of synthesis, can be a cheaper alternative (Cava et al., 1958, pp 22572263; Dayan et al., 1998, pp 27522754; Joullie and Petrovskaia, 1998, pp 4144). In the eight years following these discoveries, 1,2-indanedione has become a standard reagent in Israeli laboratories and has been investigated for use in many other countries (Almog, 2001, pp 177209).\n\n## 7.6.2 Theory\n\n1,2-Indanedione is a close analogue of ninhydrin and is theorized to react with amino acids in a very similar fashion (Petrovskaia et al., 2001, pp 76667675). The structure of 1,2-indanedione has been characterized (Wilkinson, 2000b, pp 123132) and is illustrated in Figure 78(A). Mechanistic studies of 1,2-indanedione's reaction with amino acids have indicated that the presence of methanol desensitizes the reagent (Wilkinson, 2000b, pp 123132). Like DFO, indanedione forms a hemiketal with methanol; however, unlike DFO, this hemiketal is more stable than the parent compound and thus its formation prevents the reaction with amino acids. Because 1,2-indanedione is completely converted to the less sensitive hemiketal (Wilkinson, 2000b, pp 123132), some suggest that alcohols should be avoided in any indanedione formulations (Wilkinson et al., 2005; Wiesner et al., 2001, pp 10821084). Other studies have not corroborated this lack of sensitivity in methanolic solution (Roux et al., 2000, pp 761769). Similar ambiguity exists on the addition of acetic acid (Lennard et al., 2005, p 43); some authors have found that a small amount of acetic acid improves the results (Hauze et al., 1998, pp 744747; Joullie and Petrovskaia, 1998, pp 4144), whereas others have experienced blurry, unclear fingerprints when using acidified solutions (Almog, 2001, pp 177209; Wiesner et al., 2001, pp 10821084; Kasper et al., 2002). These discrepancies have been linked to the acid content of the paper produced in the authors' various countries (Wilkinson et al., 2005).\n\nProduction of the compound shown in Figure 78(B) during the reaction between amino acids and 1,2-indanedione has been confirmed. However, this compound does not fully explain the coloration of the developed print or its fluorescence. The possibility of a Ruhemann's purple analogue has not been ruled out (Petrovskaia et al., 2001, pp 76667675); such a compound is illustrated in Figure 78(C). Further studies are currently under way to elucidate the structure of the fluorescent species, which is expected to be polymeric (Wallace-Kunkel et al., 2005). Whether or not metal salt post-treatment enhances the fluorescence of the developed fingerprint is another point of contention amongst authors. The varied results with each step of the indanedione development process indicate the influence that environmental conditions have upon the technique, and each research group should establish an optimal formula for use in its laboratory (Wilkinson et al., 2005; Lennard et al., 2005, p 43).\n\n## 7.6.3 Application\n\nBecause of regional variations in humidity, acid content of paper, and other environmental factors, a single 1,2-indanedione formulation cannot be recommended. Application of the 1,2-indanedione reagent can be carried out by immersion of the exhibit or by spraying of the reagent. Development can occur at room temperature but may require 45 days (Roux et al., 2000, pp 761769). In light of the established fact that heat treatment does not cause excessive background development, it is recommended that steam heat be applied to the treated fingerprints to expedite development (Almog, 2001, pp 177209; Ramotowski et al.,\n1997, pp 131139; Joullie and Petrovskaia, 1998, pp 4144; Roux et al., 2000, pp 761769). This heat can be applied in a humidity oven (100 C at 60% relative humidity) (Wiesner et al., 2001, pp 10821084; Roux et al., 2000, pp 761769;\nAlmog et al., 1999, pp 114118), by steam iron (Ramotowski et al., 1997, pp 131139; Joullie and Petrovskaia, 1998, pp 4144), or by a heat press (100 C for 25 minutes [Kasper et al., 2002] or 165 C for 10 seconds [Lennard et al., 2005, p 43]). Fluorescence can be observed under 520 nm illumination and viewed through a 590 nm filter (Joullie and Petrovskaia, 1998, pp 4144). Zinc salt post-treatment can be applied to enhance the color of the developed fingerprint (Roux et al., 2000, pp 761769) and may increase the fluorescent intensity (Almog, 2001, pp 177209; Hauze et al., 1998, pp 744747; Ramotowski et al., 1997, pp 131139; Lennard et al., 2005, p 43; Almog et al., 1999, pp 114118). 1,2-Indanedione develops more fingerprints than DFO, ninhydrin, or the DFOninhydrin sequence combined (Wiesner et al., 2001, pp 10821084; Lennard et al., 2005, p 43). The indanedione-DFO sequence is capable of visualizing even more latent fingerprints than 1,2-indanedione alone (Roux et al., 2000, pp 761769), and indanedione can also enhance ninhydrin-developed fingerprints (Kasper et al., 2002). However, ninhydrin treatment of indanedione-developed prints does not afford further enhancement (Wiesner et al., 2001, pp 10821084). Finally, on a somewhat negative note, Wilkinson et al. had very poor results with indanedione for a study carried out across Canada (Wilkinson et al., 2003, pp 818).\n\n## 7.7 5-Methylthioninhydrin (5-Mtn)\n\n5-Methylthioninhydrin (5-MTN) was first prepared and applied as a fingerprint reagent in 1990 as part of a U.S.\n\nSecret Service project (Cantu et al., 1993, pp 4446). This analogue reacts with amino acids in a manner identical to ninhydrin because the reactive, chromogenic core of the molecule is not changed by the addition of the sulfur group (Figure 79) (Elber et al., 2000, pp 757760). As a result, 5-MTN-developed fingerprints are a shade of purple similar to ninhydrin-developed fingerprints. Development of 5-MTN-treated fingerprints requires heat and humidity, much the same as ninhydrin development. This can be delivered in the same manner described previously for ninhydrin or by microwaving the treated exhibit for 23 minutes alongside a container of water (Almog et al., 1992, pp 688694). Care must be taken to avoid overheating the sample because significant background development may occur. The resulting fingerprint should appear deep purple in color, similar to a ninhydrin-developed fingerprint. On treatment with a zinc salt, the 5-MTN-developed fingerprint changes color from purple to pink (Almog et al., 1992, pp 688694). Accompanying this change is a strong fluorescence at room temperature when excited by light at 520 nm and viewed through a 590 nm filter (Cantu et al., 1993, pp 4466; Almog et al., 1992, pp 688694), with an intensity that is comparable to that of DFO. This is an obvious advantage over the continued use of ninhydrin (Cantu et al., 1993, pp 4466). A recent study confirmed that\n5-MTN could outperform ninhydrin but produced poorer fluorescent results than DFO or 1,2-indanedione (Wallace- Kunkel et al., 2006, pp 413). The fluorescence becomes even more intense if the exhibit is cooled to liquid nitrogen temperatures, but this step is not necessary (Almog et al., 1992, pp 688694). 5-MTN can be synthesized in small-scale operations in the forensic laboratory following methods reported in the literature (Heffner and Joullie, 1991, pp 22312256; Della et al., 1999, pp 21192123). Alternatively, it can be sourced from commercial forensic suppliers. However, some suppliers provide the ethanolic hemiketal of 5-MTN, which dissolves more readily but may require some alteration of the given formulation (Section 7.14) to ensure the appropriate concentration of 5-MTN in the solution (BVDA, 2010).\n\n## 7.8 Modifications For Use On Chemically Treated Papers 7.8.1 Chemically Treated Papers\n\nChemically treated paper is a class that encompasses thermal paper and carbonless specialty papers (Stimac, 2003a, pp 185197). These papers cannot be treated with the conventional amino acid reagent formulations described previously because the polar solvents react unfavorably with the chemical treatments applied to the paper during manufacture. This undesired interaction frequently causes the surface of the paper to blacken, obliterating the documentary evidence the paper contained (Stimac,\n2003a, pp 185197). To address this limitation, several solvent-free or low-polarity formulations have been devised for the treatment of these difficult substrates.\n\n## 7.8.2 Application Of Dfo To Chemically Treated Paper\n\nDFO may be applied to chemically treated paper by a process known as \"DFO-Dry\" (Bratton and Juhala, 1995, pp 169172). This technique does not require the application of a solvent to the exhibit under examination. Instead, filter paper is impregnated with a solution of 1 g DFO in 200 mL methanol, 200 mL ethyl acetate, and 40 mL acetic acid. The dried filter paper is applied to the exhibit, a towel is placed on top, and a steam iron filled with 5% acetic acid solution is applied for one minute. This transfers DFO onto the exhibit and provides the heat for development. This technique results in a less prominent color change but equal fluorescence to solvent-based methods (Bratton and Juhala, 1995, pp 169172).\n\n## 7.8.3 Ninhydrin Techniques\n\n7.8.3.1 \"Nin-Dry\". This method was described in 1996\n(McMahon, 1996, pp 45) and is similar to the previously described \"DFO-Dry\" process. Blotter or filter paper is soaked in a solution of 3050 g ninhydrin dissolved in 1.5 L acetone and allowed to dry. An exhibit is placed between two sheets of the impregnated paper and then sealed into a plastic bag for 3 days to 1 week. This technique develops high-contrast fingerprints while preserving the integrity and appearance of the document and is applicable to any fragile paper types, including chemically treated papers.\n\n7.8.3.2 Ninhydrin Fuming. The method proposed by Schwarz and Frerichs (2002, pp 12741277), and described above, can be applied to chemically treated papers with no loss of document detail.\n\n7.8.3.3 Nonpolar Solution. A ninhydrin solution can be prepared in a mixture of the nonpolar solvents HFE 71IPA and HFE 7100. The exhibit is immersed in the working solution and allowed to develop in dark, humid conditions for 23 days, avoiding high temperatures (Stimac, 2003a, pp 185197).\n\n## 7.8.4 Indanedione Formulation\n\nIndanedione is sufficiently soluble in nonpolar solvents that it can be effectively applied to thermal paper without causing any blackening (Stimac, 2003b, pp 265271). The exhibit is immersed in the prepared solution and allowed to develop for at least 1 day in dark, cool conditions. Fluorescence is induced as described previously.\n\n## 7.8.5 2-Isononylninhydrin (Inon)\n\n2-Isononylninhydrin, also known as INON, or commercially as ThermaNin, is a derivative of ninhydrin with greatly increased solubility in nonpolar solvents (Takatsu et al., 1991; Joullie, 2000). This compound, which is a product of the reaction between 3,5,5-trimethyl-1-hexanol and ninhydrin (Almog, 2001, pp 177209; Hansen and Joullie, 2005, pp 408417; Takatsu et al., 1992), has the chemical structure shown in Figure 710. Solutions of this reagent do not have a long shelf life, so working solutions should be prepared as needed (BVDA, 2010). The 2-isononylninhydrin solution is applied to the chemically treated paper by immersing the exhibit in the solution in an aluminum or plastic tray. The exhibit is allowed to dry and develop in dark, humid conditions for 2448 hours. Under these conditions, the ninhydrin hemiketal reacts with water absorbed by the paper to form ninhydrin and 3,5,5-trimethyl-1-hexanol. The freed ninhydrin reacts slowly with the residues in the fingerprint to develop a fingerprint that is somewhat less intensely colored than a traditionally ninhydrin-developed print. This may be due to the relatively lower concentration of ninhydrin present after the hydrolysis reaction occurs (Al Mandhri and Khanmy-Vital, 2005).\n\n## 7.9 Cyanoacrylate Fuming 7.9.1 Background\n\nThe liquid commercial adhesive, super glue, was inadvertently developed in the 1950s by researchers who were trying to develop an acrylic polymer for the aircraft industry. Besides its use as a glue, CA adhesive also found use as a field dressing in Vietnam in the 1960s, although it never received FDA approval for this use. In the late 1970s, researchers in Japan and the United Kingdom almost simultaneously discovered the latent fingerprint development capabilities of the fumes of the liquid adhesive. Shortly thereafter, latent print examiners from the U.S. Army Criminal Investigation Laboratory in Japan and the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms introduced this technique to North America. Once CA fuming proved practical, with the introduction of methods to make the technique faster and more effective, it quickly gained acceptance worldwide (German, 2005; Jueneman, 1982, p 15). Since those early discoveries, innumerable crimes have been solved through the routine use of CA ester (usually methyl or ethyl) fuming of evidence, and a substantial amount of research has been aimed at identifying the ideal environment for the technique. Today, CA fuming continues to be a versatile and effective development technique on virtually all nonporous surfaces, including glass, metal, coated papers, and all forms of plastics. The method is particularly effective on rough surfaces where physical contact with a fingerprint brush tends to develop the texture of the material along with the latent fingerprints. CA vapors are extremely sensitive to fingerprint residue, adaptable to many different crime scene and laboratory situations, and are relatively inexpensive to employ. Studies into the explicit polymerization initiators and the role of water in the development of latent prints are ongoing. These studies should eventually lead to a better understanding of latent print polymerization as it relates to latent print composition, pH, aging, and humidity.\n\n## 7.9.2 Theory\n\nSuper glue or CA development of latent prints is best explained as a three-stage process to produce polymer growth, thus enabling latent print visualization.\n\nThe first stage occurs when fumes of CA ester monomers (see diagram of ethyl CA monomer in Figure 711) are introduced to latent fingerprints and quickly bond with initiators in the residue. In the second stage, the monomer on the fingerprint residue reacts with another CA monomer in the vapor phase to form a dimer on the print. This reacts with yet another monomer, and another, eventually forming a polymer, a long chain of CA molecules. The final phase is when the polymer chain reaction is terminated. The overall development time is fast, especially when volatilization of the liquid glue is accelerated (Lewis et al., 2001, pp 241246). The polymerization process may, however, be restarted later if fingerprints prove to be underdeveloped with the first exposure to fumes.\n\nFully developed CA prints are a white three-dimensional matrix, often visible to the unaided eye, and can be further enhanced with a variety of techniques. CA-developed impressions are generally more durable than untreated fingerprints because of the plasticization of the print. Because of this, some authorities recommend CA treatment in the field before evidence packaging to protect otherwise fragile fingerprints during transportation and storage (Perkins and Thomas, 1991, pp 157162). For normal eccrine sweat fingerprints, CA polymerized under ambient laboratory environmental conditions appears as noodlelike, fibrous structures when viewed with a scanning electron microscope (SEM) (Figure 712). These polymer morphologies change, however, when variables such as the age of the latent print, the residue composition, and environmental conditions are altered.\n\nLewis et al. (2001, pp 241246) observed differences between clean and oily latent print residues and the effects of aging on each. Latent prints lacking sebum (clean prints)\ntended to suffer from the effects of aging to a far greater extent than prints containing sebum (oily prints, Figure 713). After 1 day of aging, clean prints showed a trend away from the previously mentioned fibrous morphology toward polymer structures that appeared rounded under SEM. Clean prints also became difficult, if not impossible, to develop after a period of only 2 weeks, whereas prints contaminated with sebum produced distinguishable polymer growth for periods of up to 6 months. Lewis et al. (2001, pp 241246) also observed that a low-humidity environment during latent print aging had a noticeable and adverse impact on development with CA, whereas prints aged under high humidity lasted longer and produced higher quality polymerization.\n\nInterestingly, latent prints developed in a vacuum chamber also produce smooth spherical or capsule-type formations\n\nScanning electron microscopy of\ncyanoacrylate polymerized eccrine\nresidue. (Reprinted, with permission\nfrom the Journal of Forensic Sciences,\n46 (2), copyright ASTM International, 100\nBarr Harbor Drive, West Conshohocken,\nPA 19428.)\n\nScanning electron microscopy of\ncyanoacrylate polymerized oily residue.\n(Reprinted with permission from the\nJournal of Forensic Sciences, 46 (2),\ncopyright ASTM International, 100 Barr\nHarbor Drive, West Conshohocken, PA\n19428.)\n\nobserved with SEM and tend to be more translucent to\nthe unaided eye (Watkin et al., 1994, pp 545554). This\n\nmay be due in part to exposing the print to the near zero-\nhumidity environment of the vacuum, presumably remov-\ning moisture from the fingerprints. The role of humidity in\nCA development of latent prints is not understood at this\ntime. During the mid-1990s, Kent empirically observed\nthat humid environments outperformed vacuum environ-\nments in the CA development of latent prints (Kent and\nWinfield, 1995; Kent, 2005, pp 681683), whereas Lewis\net al. (2001, pp 241246) observed that humidity during the\nlatent print aging process had a greater effect than during\npolymerization. Clearly, the role of humidity during aging\nand polymerization must be examined further.\n\nThe actual initiators that cause latent print polymerization\nare just recently being understood. Originally, it was be-\nlieved that CA primarily reacted with the water in finger-\nprint residue (Jueneman, 1982, p 15). However, current\nresearch indicates that water-soluble amines and carboxylic\n\ngroups in latent print residue are the primary initiators of CA polymerization. These two groups each produce significantly higher molecular weights of polymer growth than water alone. Furthermore, amines and carboxylic acid will polymerize in the absence of any water, leaving the role of water during the aging and development process unclear (Wargacki et al., 2005). The pH of the humidity to which the latent prints are exposed prior to CA treatment may also play an important role by rejuvenating latent prints prior to the polymerization process. Latent prints that are exposed to acetic acid vapors and then CA fumed have shown higher molecular weights than those not exposed. Conversely, basic humidity produced with ammonia vapors also appears to enhance CA development. Present research makes it clear that acidic and basic humidity environments will both individually enhance latent print polymer growth, with acidic enhancement proving more effective. Although the actual mechanism is not fully understood, it is currently thought that exposure to ammonia vapors primarily enhances the functionality of the amine groups, whereas acetic acid vapors favorably influence the more robust carboxylic initiators (Wargacki et al., 2005).\n\n## 7.9.3 Application\n\nIt is important to mention that liquid CA and its fumes can cause acute damage to skin, eyes, and mucous membranes, and the long-term effects of exposure are not fully known. The user must take care to use appropriate ventilation and personal protective equipment and to always practice safe handling. All manufacturer's warnings, including those given in material safety data sheets, must be heeded during use. The ideal result of CA development is polymerization on the latent print that sufficiently scatters light and does not coat the background, making the white impression slightly visible against the substrate. This type of \"minimal\" development produces the greatest amount of detail, especially when used in conjunction with fluorescent dye stains (Figure 714). Overfuming will leave prints appearing \"frosty\" with a lack of edge detail, making them difficult to differentiate from a background also coated with CA polymer. Sometimes, depending on latent composition and environmental conditions, developed impressions will appear translucent or glassy in nature and will be very difficult to detect without specific lighting or fluorescent dye staining.\n\nIn fact, most impressions will be aided by some form of enhancement before recording. Fuming with CA can be as simple and inexpensive as vaporizing the glue in a fish tank with a tight-fitting lid or as elaborate as using a commercially designed chamber with dynamic temperature and humidity controls. Both systems are intended to achieve the same result: vaporizing liquid glue in an environment suitable for polymerization of CA on latent prints. A common and effective approach to the volatilization of CA is to warm a small amount of liquid glue (approximately 0.5 g or less) in an aluminum evaporation dish on a heating block or coffee cup warmer. An aluminum dish is preferred because it inhibits polymerization (Olenik, 1983, pp 910). The warm fumes rise but soon fall to the bottom of the chamber as cooling sets in. Therefore, a circulation fan is often used during fuming to keep the vapors evenly dispersed around the evidence at all levels of the tank. Prints that are later determined to be underfumed can be fumed again, in effect restarting the polymerization process. A second approach to vaporizing CA utilizes a commercially available fuming wand. These wands typically use butane fuel to heat a small brass cartridge containing ethyl CA (Weaver and Clary, 1993, pp 481492). Fumes from the heated cartridge on the end of the wand can be directed toward the evidence or used to fill a chamber. The disadvantage of using a fuming wand in an open environment is that air currents easily sweep the CA vapors away from the evidence, making development difficult to control. The use of a fuming wand outside a fume hood also presents some health and safety challenges that must be considered (Froude, 1996, pp 1931). Vaporization can also be achieved without an external heat source. Instead, chemical acceleration is produced by the exothermic reaction that can be achieved by pouring liquid glue on a pad of high cellulose content pretreated with sodium hydroxide. Pretreatment simply involves a cotton ball prepared with a few drops of NaOH solution. CA fuming without acceleration can be achieved by increasing the total surface area of the liquid glue, thereby increasing the rate of evaporation. One way to achieve this is to sandwich a bead of liquid glue between two sheets of aluminum foil (Olenik, 1989, pp 302304). The sheets are then pressed together and an ink roller is used to evenly disperse the glue into a thin layer across the entire inside of the foil surfaces. These sheets are then opened and placed inside a chamber, exposing the relatively volatile layers of glue to the air. CA development time using this method will vary significantly with the size of the chamber.\n\nFuming in a vacuum chamber has also been suggested as a method of increasing the volatility of CA (Campbell, 1991, pp 1216; Yamashita, 1994, pp 149158; Harvey et al., 2000, pp 2931; Bessman et al., 2005, pp 1027). The reduced atmospheric pressure lowers the boiling point of the liquid glue and may vaporize it more rapidly at room temperature. The negative pressure also eliminates humidity in the tank, affecting the overall appearance of the developed impressions. Prints developed in a vacuum environment often appear translucent, making them hard to detect without liquid dye stains (Watkin et al., 1994, pp 545554). Some researchers have found, however, that this practice is less effective overall than the use of controlled humidity environments (Kent and Winfield, 1995; Kent, 2005, pp 681683).\n\nAlthough CA development in a laboratory chamber is preferred, makeshift chambers in the field can also be easily created. Chambers include cardboard boxes, small frames with clear plastic sheeting, large tents, vehicle interiors, and even entire rooms (Weaver, 1993, pp 135137; Bandey and Kent, 2003). The most common of these field chambers is probably the automobile interior. One method of fuming involves placing a hot plate (reaching approximately 60 C) in the center of the vehicle, with approximately 1 gram of glue in an evaporation dish. The interior is then sealed off by closing all the doors and windows. The fumes from the heated glue rapidly fill the vehicle interior, developing impressions throughout. This process takes approximately 1030 minutes, although the length of time is variable. In some cases, so as not to destroy the entire vehicle, parts of the vehicle may be removed and fumed separately (e.g., steering wheel, mirror). In some instances, CA fuming of a firearm may interfere with subsequent firearms examinations. The firearms\nexaminers may have to be consulted before any CA processing (Rosati, 2005, pp 36). Fuming times depend on the size of the chamber, the quantity of glue, the temperature of the heat source, and the nature of the substrate and latent print residue. Under all conditions, fuming should be terminated shortly after the first signs of the appearance of fingerprints. Some examiners will place a test strip with fingerprints in the chamber to watch for the development of prints. This not only helps to determine when processing should cease but also acts to ensure that the equipment is functioning properly. Fuming can be restarted later if impressions appear underdeveloped.\n\n## 7.9.4 Enhancement\n\nOnce prints have been developed, they can be enhanced optically with oblique, axial, reflected, and transmitted lighting techniques; chemically enhanced with fluorescent dye stains; and physically enhanced with the application of fingerprint powder, in that order. Fluorescent dye staining and examination with a laser or forensic light source usually produces the most dramatic results; however, not all CA-polymerized prints will accept dye stains. Dye staining simply requires preparing a commercially available fluorescent stain in solution and applying it to the polymerized fingerprints. For a comprehensive reference of fluorescent dye stain recipes, see the FBI Processing Guide for Developing Latent Prints (Trozzi et al., 2000) or the Home Office manual (Kent, 1998, 2004). Once a dye solution is chosen, it is applied to the nonporous surfaces treated with CA fumes by dipping or using a wash bottle to spray it. It is thought that dye-staining polymerized prints works like a molecular sieve, where the dye molecules get stuck in the polymer by filling voids in the compound (Menzel, 1999, p 162). For this reason, it is important to adequately rinse the surface bearing the fingerprints with the dye stain. The result is a print that produces intense fluorescence when viewed with a forensic light source or laser (Figure 714). At this stage, proper photography can go beyond simply documenting the image to enhance the visibility of the fluorescing print by recording detail imperceptible to the unaided eye. Powdering is also a good way to visualize and document polymerized impressions. Oftentimes, impressions are durable enough that they may be repeatedly brushed with fingerprint powder and lifted with tape until the right contrast is achieved in the lift (Illsley, 1984, p 15).\n\n## 7.9.5 Conclusion\n\nCA fuming is a proven and effective method of developing latent print impressions containing eccrine and sebaceous residues that has been in use since the late 1970s. The CA molecules bond to residue via polymerization to form a visible and durable compound that can be enhanced and recorded by fluorescence, photography, and lifting. Research is ongoing into the actual chemistry and mechanics of the CA reaction. Currently, the heat-accelerated technique in controlled high humidity (6080% relative humidity) is most often the suggested method of application. It is also recommended that CA development be done shortly after fingerprint deposition for maximum results. Although CA fuming has proven effective for considerable durations of time after deposition, CA fuming prior to evidence packaging can also be an effective means of stabilizing fragile latent impressions during storage and transportation.\n\n## 7.10 Fluorescence Examination 7.10.1 Background\n\nAs early as 1933, fluorescence examination with UV light was suggested as a method of visualizing latent prints dusted with anthracene powder on multicolored surfaces (Inbau, 1934, p 4). Before the late 1970s, UV fluorescent powder was used occasionally and appears to have been the only credible fluorescent method of latent print detection. In 1976, researchers at the Xerox Research Centre of Canada discovered inherent latent print fluorescence via continuous wave argon ion laser illumination. Shortly thereafter, the first latent print in a criminal case was identified, using inherent luminescence via laser excitation (fingerprint on black electrical tape) (Menzel and Duff, 1979, p 96). Since the late 1970s, advancements in the technology of fluorescence detection have greatly aided the hunt for many types of forensic evidence. Today, evidence that would be barely perceptible or even invisible under normal lighting is routinely intensified by fluorescence. Bloodstains, semen, bruises, bone fragments, questioned documents, flammable residues, fibers, and fingerprints all merit examination with a forensic light source or laser.\n\n## 7.10.2 Theory\n\nVisible light consists of electromagnetic radiation of different colors and wavelengths. When light passes through a prism, it is separated spatially according to wavelengths, resulting in the classic colors of the rainbow. Violet light has the highest energy and the shortest wavelength (approximately 400 nm, where a nanometer is one-billionth of a meter), whereas red light has the lowest energy and the longest wavelength (approximately 700 nm), with green, yellow, and orange being intermediate in energy and wavelength (Champod et al., 2004, pp 4176). Atoms and molecules have different unique arrangements of electrons around their nuclei, corresponding to different discrete \"energy levels\". When light falls on a surface, a photon of light is absorbed if the energy of the photon exactly matches the difference in energy between two of the energy levels of the molecules of the surface substance. If light of a particular color or energy does not match the difference in energy, it is reflected. The color of the surface is made up of the colors of light that are reflected and is not the color corresponding to the wavelengths of light that are absorbed. Objects that are different colors are absorbing and reflecting different wavelengths of light. For example, chlorophyll, which gives leaves their green color, absorbs strongly at the red and blue ends of the visible spectrum, but reflects green light. We see the world by observing the wavelengths of light reflecting off objects all around us. After a molecule absorbs light and is raised to a higher energy level, it tends to relax back to the lowest level or \"ground state\" by giving off energy as heat, usually through collisions with other molecules. In some molecules, however, the excess absorbed energy is given off in the form of light. This is photoluminescence. If the emission is immediate, it is termed fluorescence. If it is long-lived, it is phosphorescence. Fluorescence stops within nanoseconds when the forensic light source is turned off, whereas phosphorescence will continue. The glowing numbers of a darkroom timer are an example of phosphorescence. The excited molecule will lose some of its energy before it emits light as photoluminescence. As a result, the emitted light is of a different color or wavelength than the excitation light (Figure 715). The fluorescence is said to be \"redshifted\", meaning that it is to the red side of the electromagnetic spectrum in relation to the incident light from the forensic light source. The difference in the wavelengths of the exciting and emitted light is called the Stokes shift. When using fluorescence to view a fingerprint, the viewing or barrier filter blocks the reflected wavelengths of light from the light source while allowing the fluorescent wavelengths to pass through. Fluorescence examination of latent prints is extremely sensitive (Menzel, 1999, p 5). By using the correct barrier filters that will block out the light from the forensic light source being used, but not the fluorescence, a very high signal-to-noise ratio may be observed. If there is fluorescent chemical only on the fingerprint, the background will give off no signal, and the print will be easily seen glowing against a black background. Fingerprint examinations may produce fluorescence from four sources:\n\n- Native constituents in latent print residue - Foreign substances picked up by the hand and transferred through deposition\n- Intentional chemical enhancement - Substrate (background) fluorescence\nSome research has been aimed at identifying \"native\" or inherent luminescence within fingerprint residue. This fluorescence is typically weak and is thought to come from compounds such as riboflavin and pyridoxin (Dalrymple et al., 1977, p 106). Foreign contaminants in fingerprint residue, such as food or drug residue, also may appear luminescent. Treatment by chemical and physical means designed to produce fluorescence, however, is generally considered to be the most productive. Dramatic results are routinely achieved through the use of fluorescent powders, dye stains, and chemical reagents.\n\n## 7.10.3 Application\n\nThe use of lasers and forensic light sources pose real and sometimes irreversible health hazards. Lasers can generate enough intensity that even incidental or reflected light may damage the unprotected eye. Filtered lamps also produce intense light and, in addition, some will generate hazardous UV radiation. The appropriate eye protection must be used in coordination with the excitation wavelengths being employed. Please read all manufacturer warnings before using any forensic light source.\n\nTo visualize latent prints via fluorescence, a specific bandwidth of radiation must be shone on either an untreated latent print or one treated with a fluorescent chemical. The wavelengths chosen will be determined by the chemical involved and the luminescent nature of the substrate. The evidence is then examined through viewing goggles (Figure 716) or filter plates that block the incident light from the forensic light source. These goggles act as a barrier filter and are fundamental in separating the incident light generated by the light source and the weak fluorescing signal emitted by the latent print. This separation of incident and emitted light signals gives fluorescence examination its sensitivity. It is important to use the correct goggles to get the optimum results as well as for health and safety considerations. UV-only excitation does not necessarily require viewing goggles because of the invisibility to the human eye of the incident lighting; however, protective goggles, which can include clear polycarbonate lenses, should be worn during evidence examination to protect the eyes from reflected UV radiation. Not all UV light sources produce pure UV,\nand a yellow viewing filter will be required if visible light is present. Photography of UV-only excited fluorescence may also require the correct UV barrier filter on the camera because some films and digital media may be sensitive to the incident lighting even when the human eye is not. Protective clothing should be worn to minimize skin exposure to UV radiation. In general, yellow filters are used for incident light wavelengths from UV to 445 nm, orange filters for light sources of 445515 nm, and red filters for 515550 nm. Specific goggles and filters will vary in transmission values and should be matched to the light source being used. Viewing goggles are available through laser and forensic light source companies and most forensic supply houses. Once a fluorescing image is observed, it can sometimes be \"tuned\" by adjusting the excitation wavelengths emitted by the light source, and the barrier filter used for viewing, to minimize background fluorescence and maximize contrast. The resulting image must be photographed using a photographic filter that transmits the same wavelengths as the filter used for viewing.\n\n## 7.10.4 Light Sources\n\nThe light sources used to generate these narrow bandwidths come in several different varieties, including UV\nlamps, filtered lamps, and lasers. Each of these light sources has advantages and disadvantages, depending on the intended purpose and one's budget. Recently, \"alternate\" or \"forensic\" light sources (filtered lamps) have become heavily relied on in laboratories and at crime scenes because of improvements in power output, versatility, portability, and affordability when compared to lasers. These high-intensity lamps use long-pass, shortpass, and band-pass filters in front of a metal halide or xenon bulb to produce the desired wavelength ranges for examining evidence (Wilkinson and Watkin, 1994, pp 632651; Wilkinson et al., 2002, pp 515). Recently, handheld forensic \"flashlights\" have been introduced, many based on light-emitting diode (LED) technology (Wilansky et al., 2006). Lasers, on the other hand, have in the past been less portable and affordable but generated considerably more power than filtered lamps. Lasers are desirable when only very weak fluorescence is observed. Some examples of weak fluorescence include the inherent fluorescence of latent fingerprint residue or fingerprints developed with reagents such as crystal violet that emit a very weak fluorescent signal. New lasers (532 nm), which are air-cooled and portable, have recently come on the market. For a more comprehensive discussion of laser types, functionality, uses, and theory, see Menzel's Fingerprint Detection with Lasers (Menzel, 1999, pp 321) or the Home Office publication, Fingerprint Detection by Fluorescence Examination (Hardwick et al., 1990).\n\nBesides simply detecting evidence, a forensic light source or laser is often an effective means of image enhancement as well. This enhancement may come from intentionally causing a background to fluoresce to increase the contrast between a fingerprint and its substrate, or from muting a background pattern by selecting a wavelength range that reduces the background color. Bloody impressions are a good example of enhancement through absorption at a discrete wavelength. The maximum absorption wavelength for dried blood is approximately 420 nm. Illumination at this wavelength makes the bloodstained ridges appear darker. If the background fluoresces in this wavelength range, the bloody impression will be significantly enhanced (Figure 717) (Stoilovic, 1991, pp 289296; Vandenberg and van Oorschot, 2006, pp 361 370).\n\n## 7.10.5 Fluorescent Powders, Dye Stains, And Reagents\n\nMany fluorescent processes have been developed to aid the forensic examiner with tools that go far beyond using a light source alone. Fluorescent powders are abundant and widely available at forensic supply companies, with most companies marketing their own particular brand name.\n\nDye stains such as MBD [7-(p-methoxybenzylamino)-4-\nnitrobenz-2-oxa-1,3-diazole], rhodamine 6G (R6G), Ardrox, basic yellow, and basic red can be prepared in the lab and are extremely effective for enhancing fingerprints developed with cyanoacrylate. Some of these dye stains can be combined to produce a stain that will fluoresce across a broad spectrum. One such stain is RAM, a combination of R6G, Ardrox, and MBD. Because RAM can be used at various wavelengths, the practitioner can often \"tune out\" problematic backgrounds by selecting a wavelength that maximizes fingerprint fluorescence and suppresses background fluorescence. Treatments for paper are equally effective as those used on nonporous surfaces and include ninhydrin toned with zinc chloride and the ninhydrin analogues: DFO, 1,2-indanedione, and 5-MTN (5-methylthioninhydrin). Four excellent references containing recipes and instructions for fluorescent reagents are the FBI Processing Guide for Developing Latent Prints (Trozzi et al., 2000), the Home Office Manual of Fingerprint Development Techniques (Kent, 1998, 2004), Fingerprints and Other Ridge Skin Impressions (Champod et al., 2004, pp 142145, 228229), and *Advances in Fingerprint Technology* (Lee and Gaensslen, 2001, pp 105175). Table 73 is a list of common reagents and their corresponding wavelengths of peak absorption and emission. Precise adherence to a peak excitation and absorption wavelength is not always possible (depending on the available light source) and not always advisable because many substrates may interfere with visibility at these wavelengths. Because the absorption bands are generally quite wide, the excitation wavelength can differ from the absorption maximum and still induce significant fluorescence.\n\n## 7.10.6 Time- And Phase-Resolved Imaging\n\nAs mentioned earlier, background fluorescence may be generated intentionally to better visualize a fingerprint that is faintly absorbing light but not fluorescing. This condition will increase contrast by brightening the background, making the darker fingerprint stand out. However, background fluorescence is more often a hindrance, competing with a fluorescing fingerprint for visualization. Time-resolved imaging has been advocated as one possible means to solve this problem. This technique takes advantage of the difference between the time of emission of the substrate and the fluorescing fingerprint (Menzel, 1999, p 126). Early devices utilized a light source with a gated, rotating wheel that \"chops\" the light to exploit these differences in emissions. The light shines on the fingerprint and substrate when an opening in the wheel is in front of the light. The light source is then effectively turned off when a blade in the wheel passes in front of the light source. Shortly thereafter, an opening in the wheel passes in front of a detector. The size of the openings in the wheel, and the speed with which it turns, will determine the length of time that the print is exposed and the delay between excitation and detection. If the background fluorescence decays faster than the fluorescence of the chemical on the latent fingerprint, the background can be eliminated by adjusting the delay time (Menzel, 2001, p 216; Campbell, 1993, pp 368377).\n\nLater designs proved more practical by using an electronic light chopper in conjunction with a gateable charge-coupled device (CCD) camera, each component controlled by a computer with the image displayed on a monitor (Menzel, 1999, p 126). Time-resolved imaging is still considered impractical for widespread application. Phase-resolved imaging stands to be the next technological advance and is currently used in other fields of spectroscopy (Menzel, 2001, p 216).\n\n## 7.10.7 Conclusion\n\nFluorescence examination is firmly grounded in everyday latent print detection and imaging techniques. The sensitivity of this technique warrants application on all forms of forensic evidence. Specific bandwidths of radiation are shone on untreated prints as well as prints treated with powders and chemical reagents. When viewed with the appropriate barrier filters, sensitivity via photoluminescence detection may be achieved down to nearly the single photon. Absorption at discrete wavelengths, absent fluorescence, is also a beneficial enhancement technique on substances such as the purple impressions from ninhydrin or dried blood, rendering them darker and easier to view and photograph. Because background fluorescence is the biggest hindrance to fluorescence examination, experimental concepts such as time- and phase-resolved imaging have been proposed to address this problem.\n\n| Reagent/Substance                      | Absorption Maximum (nm)   |\n|----------------------------------------|---------------------------|\n| DFO                                    |                           |\n| 560                                    |                           |\n| (Champod et al., 2004, pp 129130)     |                           |\n| 1,2-Indanedione                        | 515                       |\n| 5-MTN                                  |                           |\n| 550                                    |                           |\n| (Wallace-Kunkel et al., 2006, pp 413) |                           |\n| Ninhydrin                              |                           |\n| 415560                                |                           |\n| *                                      |                           |\n| (Champod et al., 2004, pp 117118)     |                           |\n| Ninhydrin/ZnCl                         | 490                       |\n| 540                                    |                           |\n| Ardrox                                 | 380                       |\n| 500                                    |                           |\n| 445                                    |                           |\n| (Champod et al., 2004,                 |                           |\n| pp 142145, 228229)                   |                           |\n| Basic Yellow 40                        |                           |\n| 440                                    |                           |\n| (Lee and Gaennslen, 2001, p 124)       |                           |\n| MBD                                    | 465                       |\n| 515                                    |                           |\n| Basic Red 28                           | 495                       |\n| 490530                                |                           |\n|                                        |                           |\n| (Champod et al., 2004,                 |                           |\n| pp 142145, 228229)                   |                           |\n| Rhodamine 6G                           |                           |\n| 525                                    |                           |\n| (Lee and Gaennslen, 2001, p 124)       |                           |\n| Crystal Violet                         | 532                       |\n| **                                     |                           |\n| Acid Yellow 7                          | 527                       |\n| 550                                    |                           |\n| Acid Yellow 7 + Blood                  | 445480                   |\n| 485500                                |                           |\n| Untreated Dried Blood                  |                           |\n| 415                                    |                           |\n| *                                      |                           |\n| (Champod et al., 2004, p 168)          |                           |\n\n* Does not fluoresce but appears dark. ** Weak fluorescence requiring laser illumination.\n\n580\n(Champod et al., 2004, pp 129130) (Champod et al., 2004, pp 120124)\n(Lee and Gaennslen, 2001, p 124)\n495\n(Champod et al., 2004,\npp 142145, 228229 )\n490\n(Lee and Gaennslen, 2001, p 124) (Lee and Gaennslen, 2001, p 124)\n585\n(Champod et al., 2004,\npp 142145, 228229;\nLee and Gaennslen, 2001, p 124)\n565\n(Champod et al., 2004,\npp 142145, 228229)\n555\n(Lee and Gaensslen, 2001, p 124)\n(Sears et al., 2005, pp 741763) (Sears et al., 2005, pp 741763)\n\n## 7.11 Vacuum Metal Deposition 7.11.1 History\n\nVacuum metal deposition (VMD) is a long-established industrial technique for the application of metal coatings to components such as glass to form a mirror. In 1964, physics professor Samuel Tolansky (Royal Holloway College, University of London) noted that the deposition of silver in a vacuum system developed latent fingerprints accidentally deposited on a glass component. An investigation into the process as a fingerprint development technique was proposed. However, this was not pursued at the time by the U.K. Home Office because other techniques for fingerprint detection on glass were considered cheaper, easier to use, and sufficiently effective. In 1968, French workers reported (Theys et al., 1968, p 106) that VMD of a mixture of zinc, antimony, and copper powder was capable of developing latent prints on paper. As a consequence of this article, interest in the technique was revived in the United Kingdom, and Tolansky initiated a research program to investigate the optimum conditions and the potential applications for VMD. One of the early objectives of the research was to establish why the French composition was effective. Closer examination of deposited metal coatings produced by the French laboratory indicated that the coating was almost entirely zinc, the presence of antimony and copper not being necessary to develop prints (Hambley, 1972). The research program initiated by Tolansky (Hambley, 1972) investigated the deposition characteristics of a range of metals on paper substrates, identifying single metals and metal combinations giving the optimum print development. Research was also conducted into the ability of the technique to detect latent prints on fabrics. These experiments showed that although some print development was obtained by the use of single metals (e.g., gold, silver, copper, zinc, and cadmium), in general, the best results were obtained by the use of a combination of metals, typically gold or silver followed by cadmium or zinc. Initially, the gold and cadmium combination was selected as the optimum, although subsequent health and safety issues have resulted in the gold and zinc combination being recommended instead. Gold was preferred over silver as the initial deposition metal because silver can be degraded by fingerprint secretions and atmospheric pollutants.\n\nThe early experimental work was carried out on smallscale equipment with a bell jar, but research continued to develop larger equipment suitable for use in a fingerprint laboratory. By the mid-1970s, systems modified from standard industrial equipment had been developed (Kent, 1982) and were in use in several police forces and forensic providers within the United Kingdom. Later, manufacturers made refinements, increasing the size of the vacuum chamber and adding controls specific to the fingerprint development process. In the 1990s, the technique made its way from Europe to North America (Murphy, 1991, pp 318320; Misner, 1992, pp 2633; Masters and DeHaan, 1996, pp 3245). Specially constructed VMD equipment is now supplied by several manufacturers worldwide. Although VMD was originally investigated as a fingerprint development technique for use on paper and fabrics, it was established that other processes are capable of giving better results on paper. However, VMD was found to give excellent results on nonporous substrates and in comparative studies was found to outperform all other techniques in developing marks on plastic bags (Misner, 1992, pp 2633; Kent et al., 1975, 1978; Reynoldson and Reed, 1979). The process was also found to develop marks on substrates exposed to water and conditions of high humidity, giving substantial advantages over techniques such as CA fuming for articles that have been exposed to these conditions. Few modifications have been made to the process itself since the change in the second deposition metal from cadmium to zinc in the late 1970s. Recently, there has been further research on VMD in Australia, looking in detail at the various print development regimes that can be followed on different grades of polyethylene (Jones et al., 2001c, pp 7388) and how the surfaces could be \"reactivated\" to develop prints if excess metal deposition had occurred initially (Jones et al., 2001d, pp 512). The work was extended to investigate other polymer substrates, including polypropylene, polyvinylchloride, and polyethylene terephthalate (Jones et al., 2001b, pp 167177), and different deposition conditions were recommended for each class of polymer, in particular the amount of gold deposited prior to zinc deposition (polyethylene terephthalate and polyvinylchloride require significantly more gold to develop prints than polymer or polypropylene). However, there are situations where the performance of VMD leaves much to be desired. It is believed that the effectiveness of VMD can be detrimentally affected by the presence of body fluids (Batey et al., 1998, pp 165175) and drug residues (Magora et al., 2002, pp 159165). It has also been difficult to develop prints on heavily plasticized polymers (such as clingfilm and plasticized vinyl) using the VMD process. Recent work has indicated that deposition of silver as a single metal may give improved detection rates over the gold and zinc combination for these types of substrates, and the silver deposition process has now been published for operational use (Home Office Scientific Development Branch, 2005, pp 89).\n\n## 7.11.2 Theory\n\nThere is general agreement on the theory associated with normal development of prints by the VMD method. The reason that the metal combinations are postulated to work well is due to the condensation characteristics of zinc (and cadmium). These metals will not condense on grease, such as that found in fingerprint residues, even when the oily residues are present only as a monolayer. However, zinc will deposit on small nuclei of metal, and this is the reason that gold or silver deposition is carried out first. Gold and silver can be deposited over the entire surface and begin to form nuclei, the morphology of which depends on the nature of the surface (surface energy, chemical species present) upon which they are being deposited. The resultant gold coating is very thin (several nanometers only) and discontinuous. However, in the regions coated with the fatty residues of the latent fingerprint, the gold diffuses into the fat and hence there are no gold nuclei close to the surface. As a consequence, when zinc is subsequently deposited, it will condense on the regions of gold nuclei (i.e., the background substrate) but not on the regions of the fatty deposit (i.e., the fingerprint ridges). This theory of nucleation was discussed in more detail by Stroud (1971, 1972). The normal development process is depicted schematically in Figure 718, and a photograph of a mark produced by normal development is shown in Figure 719.\n\nTests carried out to determine which components of the latent print were most likely to be responsible for inhibiting metal deposition identified several substances, including stearic acid, palmitic acid, cholesterol oleate, glycerol trioleate, and amino acids L - arginine monohydrochloride, L - leucine, and DL - threonine. Most of these substances are non-water-soluble or long-chain fats or acids with low vapor pressure, which determines their stability and nonmigration over the surface during the VMD process. These findings were in accord with the observation that VMD was capable of developing prints on substrates exposed to water. Experiments to study the diffusion of gold into thin films of stearic acid (Thomas, 1978, pp 722730) demonstrated that 60% of the gold penetrated the stearic acid to a depth greater than the detection depth of the electron spectroscopy for the chemical analysis (ESCA) surface analysis technique and hence would probably not be sufficiently close to the surface for zinc to nucleate on it. Electron microscopy has also been used to confirm that the size and distribution of gold nuclei formed during the deposition process varied greatly according to the substrate and the chemical species present (Kent, 1981, p\n15). It was this difference in nuclei size and distribution, coupled with diffusion of gold into the fatty deposits, that subsequently delineated the print during VMD. In practice, many prints developed using VMD may be \"reverse developed\" (i.e., zinc preferentially deposits on the fingerprint ridges rather than the background). There are differences in opinion as to why this arises (Jones et al., 2001b, pp 167177; 2001c, 7378; Kent et al., 1976, p 93), but none of the theories have been categorically proven, and in some cases reverse and normal development may be observed on the same substrate (although it is stated that this is most common for [if not exclusive to] low-density polyethylene substrates). Figure 720 shows a reverse-developed mark on a polyethylene bag.\n\n## 7.11.3 Application\n\nThe equipment used for VMD may vary according to manufacturer, but the essential elements of the system are the same. The equipment consists of a vacuum chamber capable of being pumped down to very low pressure (< 3 x 10-4 mbar), filaments for evaporation of gold and zinc, and a viewing window so that the deposition of zinc can be monitored. The chamber may also contain a \"cold finger\", chilled to low temperature to help reduce pump downtimes by condensing some of the vapor in the chamber. Articles to be coated are attached to the inside circumference of the vacuum chamber, above the coating filaments. A typical system is illustrated in Figure 721. The filaments (\"boats\") used for deposition of gold and zinc are typically formed from thin sheets of molybdenum. The gold filament usually consists of a shallow dimple in a thin strip of molybdenum. Gold deposition takes place when the chamber has reached a pressure of 3 x 10-4 mbar or lower, and the current to the filament is increased until the filament reaches a yellow-to-white heat. Deposition of gold should be complete within 10 seconds, but if any residue is observed on the filament as the current is reduced, the temperature should be increased again until all gold has been evaporated. Once gold deposition is completed, the pressure in the chamber is increased to ~5 x 10-4 mbar and the current to the zinc deposition filament(s) is turned on. The reason for increasing the pressure in the chamber is to reduce the speed of zinc deposition by introducing more air molecules with which the zinc may collide. Some substrates can coat very quickly, so the slower deposition process gives the operator more control. The zinc deposition filaments are larger and significantly deeper than the gold filament, and the quantity of zinc added is greater, typically 1 g per run. For zinc deposition, the current is increased until the filament glows a cherry-red to dull orange color. Once this occurs, the operator should observe the deposition process through the viewing window, ceasing deposition as soon as marks become visible on the substrate. After zinc deposition, the gold filament should be briefly heated to yellow-to-white heat to burn off any zinc contamination. The process is described in more detail elsewhere (Kent, 2004). There is great variability in the speed at which different substrates coat, and it may take more than 10 minutes to obtain a suitable coating on some types of material. In some cases, it may be necessary to carry out multiple deposition runs in order to obtain satisfactory results or to develop all the marks present. The presence of surface contamination, release agents, or plasticizers may mean that it is not possible to obtain a zinc coating at all; in these circumstances, the deposition of 60 mg of silver, using the same deposition conditions for gold, may yield additional marks. The VMD technique was initially adopted as an operational technique for the detection of latent prints on thin polyethylene sheets, and it was shown to be superior to other processes developed subsequent to the initial comparison trials. VMD has now been used operationally for many years and has been shown to be an effective technique for a wider range of materials than polyethylene. Recent results have shown VMD to produce results on a range of substrates (e.g., a ticket coated with ferromagnetic ink, and on expanded polystyrene) (Suzuki et al., 2002, pp 573578). The use of the technique has also begun to increase in North America, and successful results have been obtained from plastic bags, in some cases several years old and exposed to moisture (Batey et al., 1998, pp 165175).\n\nThe range of specimens that have been successfully treated using VMD is extensive and includes:\n\n- Plastic bags and packaging. - Glass and plastic bottles. - Firearms. - Glossy card, photographic paper, and magazine covers. - Clean leather items (including handbags and shoes). - Adhesive tapes (nonsticky side).\nIt is evident that there is much overlap between the types of articles that can be treated with VMD and those that are treated using CA fuming. In many cases, the deciding factor as to which technique is to be used is whether the article has been wetted because VMD remains effective on wetted items, whereas CA fuming does not. In practice, it is possible to use the two processes in sequence, and more marks may be detected in this way because the two processes work on different fingerprint constituents. However, at present, there still seems to be some debate as to which of the two techniques should be done first.\n\n## 7.12 Blood Enhancement Techniques 7.12.1 History\n\nBlood is one of the most common known contaminants of fingerprints found at scenes of crime. The use of blood evidence in the history of forensic investigation dates back over 150 years. The earliest tests were of two types, both relying on the presence of the heme group: those that produced crystals and those that relied on its catalytic nature.\n\nThe crystal or confirmatory tests were formulated by Teichmann in 1850 (Thorwald, 1966, p 23) and Takayama in 1912 (Gerber and Saferstein, 1997, pp 1819). However, these tests require the blood to be scraped from the surface and, therefore, give no regard to the forms of physical evidence such as fingerprints, footwear impressions, or spatter patterns. Catalytic or presumptive tests that attempted to keep much of the physical evidence intact were produced by Van Deen and Day in 1862 and were based on guaiacol (Gerber and Saferstein, 1997, pp 1819); by Schonbein in 1863, using hydrogen peroxide; and by Adler and Adler around 1900, using benzidine (Thorwald, 1966, p 23). Adler and Adler pioneered the use of leucomalachite green in 1904 (Eckert and James, 1989, p 2); Medinger modified their method in 1931 to make it more sensitive (Soderman and O'Connell, 1935, p 226). Other presumptive tests for blood were developed by Kastle and Sheed in 1901 and Kastle and Meyer in 1903, using phenolphthalein; by Ruttan and Hardisty in 1912, using o-tolidine; by Specht in 1937, using luminol (3-aminophthalhydrazide); and by Gershenfeld in 1939, using o-toluidine (Eckert and James, 1989, p 2). In 1911, Abderhalden and Schmidt (1911, p 37) reported the development of fingerprints on the bottle label of triketohydrindene hydrate (ninhydrin). This discovery was not exploited for the detection of fingerprints or blood until 1954, when Oden (Oden and von Hofsten, 1954, p 449) produced his ninhydrin formulation based on acetone. The use of this method for the enhancement of fingerprints in blood revolutionized thinking in this area of forensic investigation. The emphasis was shifted away from presumptive tests for heme, which generally require expert opinion to interpret the test results correctly, and onto easier-to-use reagents that produce intensely colored products with other components of blood, usually protein or its breakdown products. Use of the protein dye, amido black (acid black 1), quickly became popular with forensic investigators. Its use by the Metropolitan Police Laboratory, in a solvent base of methanol and acetic acid, was discussed at a forensic science symposium in 1961 by Godsell (1963, p 79). This formulation, with a change in the method for fixing blood from the use of heat to immersion in methanol\n(Faragher and Summerscales, 1981), along with a waterbased formulation of the same dye (Hussain and Pounds, 1989a) continued to be recommended for the enhancement of fingerprints in blood by the U.K. Home Office until\n2004 (Kent, 2004), when a new formulation by Sears and Prizeman (2000, p 470) was adopted. Many other protein stains for the enhancement of both fingerprints and footwear impressions in blood have also been proposed: coomassie blue (acid blue 83) and Crowle's double stain (acid blue 83 and acid red 71) by Norkus and Noppinger in 1986 (Norkus and Noppinger, 1986, p 5); fuchsin acid (acid violet 19, Hungarian Red), patent blue V (acid blue 1), and tartrazine (acid yellow 23) by Barnett and colleagues in 1988 (Barnett et al., 1988); benzoxanthene yellow and acid violet 17 by Sears and colleagues in 2001 (Sears et al., 2001, p 28); and acid yellow 7 by Sears and colleagues in 2005 (Sears et al., 2005, p 741). Although the use of protein dyes became most popular for enhancing fingerprints in blood, research on presumptive enhancement methods continued and, in 1976, Garner et al. (1976, p 816) proposed the use of tetramethylbenzidene (TMB) as safer and just as reliable as benzidine. Suggestions for other presumptive tests continue: tetraamino-biphenyl (TAB) and diaminobenzidine (DAB) in 1989 by Hussain and Pounds (1989b); fluorescein in 1995 by Cheeseman and DiMeo (1995, p 631); and leucocrystal violet (LCV) in 1996 by Bodziak (1996, p 45). In addition, many modifications have been made to ninhydrin formulations to increase its effectiveness and safety: by Crown in 1969 (Crown, 1969, p 258) and Morris and Goode in 1974 (Morris and Goode, 1974, p 45). Further changes were forced on the fingerprint community because of \"The Montreal Protocol on Substances That Deplete the Ozone Layer\" (United Nations Environ Programme, 1999), and new formulations were proposed by Watling and Smith in 1993 (Watling and Smith, 1993, p 131) and Hewlett and colleagues in 1997 (Hewlett et al., 1997, p 300). The use of transition metal toners to change the color or make the reaction product between amines and ninhydrin fluoresce has also been proposed by Morris in 1978 (Morris, 1978), Everse and Menzel in 1986 (Everse and Menzel, 1986, p 446), and Stoilovic and colleagues in 1986 (Stoilovic et al., 1986, p 432). It was also suggested that the use of one of several ninhydrin analogues would improve sensitivity, and many have been proposed: benzo(f)ninhydrin in 1982 by Almog et al. (1982, p 912), 5-methoxyninhydrin in 1988 by Almog and Hirshfeld (1988, p 1027), DFO in 1990 by Grigg et al. (1990, p 7215), and indanedione in 1997 by Ramotowski et al. (1997, p 131).\n\nIn the late 1970s and early 1980s, those developing highintensity light sources observed that shorter wavelengths of light in the UV and violet regions of the spectrum make surfaces fluoresce strongly. This can give extra detail if a fingerprint is in a strongly light-absorbing material such as blood (Hardwick et al., 1990). This is an especially valuable method for the enhancement of fingerprints in blood, as the heme group absorbs light throughout much of the visible part of the spectrum (Kotowski and Grieve, 1986, p 1079). All these developments meant that by the late 1990s, there were so many reagents and formulations for the enhancement of blood-contaminated fingerprints and footwear impressions, with little or no comparative data, that it was causing immense confusion amongst practitioners. Also, the emergence of DNA analysis heaped even more uncertainty onto which techniques could or should be used for the enhancement of blood, such that vital evidence was likely to be lost by the wrong choices. Therefore, the U.K. Home Office set out to clarify the situation and began a program of work to review and compare the most commonly used of these techniques (Sears and Prizeman, 2000, p 470; Sears et al., 2001, p 28; 2005, p 741). Resulting from this colossal task were a number of key findings that were incorporated in a comprehensive update to The Manual of Fingerprint Development Techniques in 2004\n(Kent, 2004).\n\n## 7.12.2 Theory\n\nBlood consists of red cells (erythrocytes), white cells (leukocytes), and platelets (thrombocytes) in a proteinaceous fluid called plasma, which makes up roughly 55% of whole blood volume. The red cells principally contain the hemoglobin protein but also have specific surface proteins (agglutinogens) that determine blood group. The white cells, which form part of the immune system, have a nucleus that contains DNA. Hemoglobin makes up roughly 95% of red cells' protein content and is made of four protein subunits, each containing a heme group. The heme group is made of a flat porphyrin ring and a conjugated ferrous ion.\n\nChemical blood enhancement methods fall broadly into two typesthose that use the heme grouping to prove or infer the presence of blood and those that react with proteins or their breakdown products. The latter are not at all specific for blood; however, because of the high content in blood of protein and protein breakdown products, these techniques are the most sensitive available to the forensic investigator (Sears et al., 2005, p 741).\n\n## 7.12.3 Tests For Heme\n\nTwo kinds of tests use the heme group in hemoglobin: crystal tests and catalytic tests. Crystal tests are specific or confirmatory for the presence of heme, but not whether the blood is human or not. The two best-known crystal tests are those formulated by Teichmann and Takayama. The Teichmann test results in the formation of brown rhombohedral crystals of hematin, and the Takayama test results in red-pink crystals of pyridine hemochromogen (Palenik, 2000, p 1115; Ballantyne, 2000, p 1324). Both these tests have to be carried out ex situ so are of no use for fingerprint enhancement. The catalytic tests are only presumptive or infer the presence of heme because they are subject to false-positive and false-negative reactions caused by a variety of nonblood substances. Consequently, individual results require careful interpretation by experts. These tests all rely on the peroxidase activity of the heme group (i.e., the ability to reduce hydrogen peroxide to water and oxygen). This reaction may then be coupled to the oxidation of colorless reduced dyes (e.g., phenolphthalein, leucocrystal violet, tetramethylbenzidine, and fluorescein) that, when oxidized, form their colored counterparts (Ballantyne, 2000, p 1324).\n\nH2O2 + colorless                     H2O + colored\n   reduced dye\n\n    oxidized dye\n\n\n(Lee and Pagliaro, 2000, p 1333).\n\nThe luminol test also relies on the peroxidase activity of the heme group but uses sodium perborate instead of hydrogen peroxide. This then produces a product that luminesces in the presence of blood. The bluish-white chemiluminescence is faint and must be viewed in the dark by an operator who is fully dark-adapted to gain the best from this test. Even with careful application of luminol, it is all too easy to damage the fine detail of blood-contaminated fingerprints. This technique should be used only when fine detail is not required and when other techniques might be compromised by surface type or impracticality, such as dark or patterned carpets (Sears et al., 2005, p 741). The major concern with the catalytic tests for blood is that they can produce false-positive results in the presence of chemical oxidants and catalysts; salts of heavy metals such as copper, nickel, and iron; and plant peroxidases such as those found in horseradish, citrus fruits, and numerous root vegetables (Lee and Pagliaro, 2000, p 1334). A two-stage test can obviate this. The reduced colorless dye is applied initially and if no color change is observed, then the hydrogen peroxide is added. A color change at this point is more likely to indicate the presence of blood. It is generally accepted that a negative result with a catalytic test proves the absence of blood; however, strong reducing agents, such as ascorbic acid, may inhibit such tests (Eckert and James, 1989, p 121).\n\n## 7.12.4 Tests For Protein And Its Breakdown Products\n\nThere are two types of techniques for proteinsthose that stain proteinaceous material and those that react with amines. Blood contains more protein than any other material, so these techniques are inherently more sensitive than those for heme, although they are not at all specific for blood.\n\n-) groups, usually the sodium (Na+) salt.\n\nThe most effective protein dyes for the enhancement of fingerprints in blood are a group known as acid dyes. They are often characterized by the presence of one or more sulphonate (-SO3\nThese groups function in two ways: first, they provide for solubility in water or alcohol, the favored major solvents from which to apply these dyes; and, second, they assist the reaction by virtue of their negative charge (anionic). If acidic conditions are used (acetic acid being the favored option), the blood protein molecules acquire a positive charge (cationic) and this attracts the acid dye anions. Also, hydrogen bonding and other physical forces, such as van der Waals, may play a part in the affinity of acid dyes to protein molecules (Christie et al., 2000, pp 1920). The presence of a short-chain alcohol in the dyeing solution helps to prevent the blood from diffusing during the dyeing stage (Sears and Prizeman, 2000, p 470). Ethanol is preferred because this offers lower toxicity and flammability than methanol. The use of water as the major solvent gives the solution a flash point of around 30 C, enabling this formulation (containing water, ethanol, and acetic acid) to be used at crime scenes with a few simple precautions (Kent, 2004).\n\nIf acid dye formulations are applied directly to fingerprints in blood without a fixing stage, the blood will solubilize and ridges will diffuse or be completely washed away. A number of different fixing agents have been used, but the most effective are 5-sulphosalicylic acid and methanol. Which one is used depends on the major solvent used in the dyeing process: if water is the main solvent, then a solution of 5-sulphosalicylic acid is most effective, whereas if the main dyeing solvent is methanol, then methanol is the best fixing agent (Sears and Prizeman, 2000, p 470). These fixing agents act in different ways; the 5-sulphosalicylic acid precipitates basic proteins, and methanol dehydrates the blood. The use of solutions based on methanol has waned for a number of reasons, including its toxicity, flammability, and tendency to cause damage to surfaces (e.g., paints, varnishes, and some plastics), which has a negative effect on fingerprint development. This fixing stage gives the protein dyes another advantage over the presumptive tests for blood: as well as being a more sensitive test, it often produces more sharply defined fingerprint ridges and the detail is clearer. A washing stage is required post-dyeing. On nonporous surfaces, this just removes excess dye; however, on porous surfaces, this also acts as a destainer, removing dye that has been absorbed by the background surface. The wash solution has to be carefully constructed so that it solubilizes the dye, does not diffuse or wash away the dyed fingerprint, and retains the intensity of color of the dye in the fingerprint. For this reason, the same solvent mix as that used for the dyeing process, or some small variation of it, is generally most effective (Sears and Prizeman, 2000, p 470). Ninhydrin and DFO react with amines and are the two most widely used techniques to develop latent fingerprints on porous surfaces (Figure 722). They are also very effective for the enhancement of blood (Sears et al., 2005, p 741). They both react with amino acids similarly to form products that contain two deoxygenated molecules of the starting product, bridged by a nitrogen atom that is donated from the amine (McCaldin, 1960, p 39; Wilkinson, 2000a, p 87). Although the reaction mechanisms and products have similarities, the method of their visualization is entirely different. Ninhydrin, under the right conditions, produces an intensely colored product (Ruhemann's purple), and DFO\nproduces a pale pink, extremely fluorescent product. Ruhemann's purple can be made to fluoresce by complexing it with metal salts, but this additional process is still not as sensitive as DFO (Stoilovic, 1993, p 141). DFO requires heat for the reaction to proceed (Hardwick et al., 1993, p 65), whereas ninhydrin will react at room temperature, provided moisture is available, although the process proceeds much faster at elevated temperatures and humidities.\n\n## 7.12.5 Fluorescence\n\nThe use of fluorescence to enhance fingerprints in blood can be extremely effective. There are two ways this may be achieved: (1) by exciting fluorescence in the background surface on which the blood is deposited or (2) by treatment with a chemical that either breaks the heme group or turns the blood into a fluorescent species, or does both of these. Many materials fluoresce when excited by high-intensity light in the UV and violet regions of the spectrum. This is coincidentally where the heme group is most absorbent, with a peak around 421 nm (known as the Soret Band) (Kotowski and Grieve, 1986, p 1079). This absorbency is why blood-contaminated fingerprints will appear dark against a light background. Fluorescence examination may be used before any other fingerprint enhancement techniques because it is nondestructive, and if long-wave UV or violet light (350450 nm) (Hardwick et al., 1990) is used, then DNA typing is also unaffected (Kent, 2004). The use of ninhydrin, acid black 1, or acid violet 17 can further intensify the contrast between fingerprint and background by increasing the light absorption properties of the blood. The use of a strong organic acid in conjunction with hydrogen peroxide breaks up the heme group so that it is no longer as effective at absorbing light. Then, when excited by green (500550 nm) light, it will fluoresce orange. This effect has also been noted as blood ages. DFO and acid yellow 7 both produce fluorescent species with blood that can be excited by green (510570 nm) and blue (420485 nm) light, respectively. Both can be less effective on heavy deposits of blood because the heme group retains its ability to absorb both the excitation light and that emitted as fluorescence.\n\n7.12.5.1 Application. Currently it is considered that fluorescence examination, two amino acid reagents, and three acid dyes are the most effective means of enhancing fingerprints in blood (Sears et al., 2005, p 741). The most appropriate techniques to use for maximum effectiveness, either individually or in sequential order, depend on the porosity of the surface to be treated. This applies to both latent fingerprint development and enhancement of bloodcontaminated fingerprints. Testing of the surface for fluorescence should always be carried out before any other technique. High-intensity light sources with outputs between 350 and 450 nm are most effective. When the blood-contaminated or latent fingerprints are on porous surfaces, the most effective sequence of techniques is DFO, ninhydrin, either acid black 1 or acid violet 17 (after carrying out a spot test to see which is most suitable), and then finally physical developer (Sears et al., 2005, p 741). When the blood-contaminated or latent fingerprints are on nonporous surfaces, the most effective sequence of techniques is VMD, powders, acid yellow 7, acid violet 17, then finally either physical developer or solvent black 3 (sudan black). Superglue may be used instead of VMD or powders, but this will inhibit the dyeing process for blood by preventing the dye from reaching the blood (Sears et al., 2005, p 741). DFO and ninhydrin working solution should be applied by dipping or by brushing with a soft brush on larger articles or surfaces. It is recommended that DFO be heated to 100 C for 20 minutes; however, when this is not possible, temperatures as low as 50 C may be used, but the rate of reaction is much slower (Hardwick et al., 1993, p 65). It is recommended that ninhydrin-treated articles or surfaces be heated to 80 C and humidified to 65% RH. However, the reaction will proceed at room temperature and humidity, but more slowly.\n\nHigh-intensity light sources capable of emitting wavelengths between 510 and 570 nm must be used to excite fluorescence from blood reacted with DFO. The fluorescence emitted is between 550 and 650 nm. Benefit may also be gained by using shorter wavelengths, between 350 and 450 nm, to excite background fluorescence after ninhydrin treatment. The three recommended acid dyes, acid black 1 (CI 20470), acid violet 17 (CI 42650), and acid yellow 7 (CI 56205), should all be applied to blood fixed for at least 5 minutes with a solution of 5-sulphosalicylic acid. Dyeing of fixed blood is most effective if the area of interest is immersed in the dyeing solution for at least 3 minutes for acid black 1 and acid violet 17 and for at least 5 minutes in the case of acid yellow 7. Areas heavily contaminated with blood require longer dyeing times. If it is not possible to immerse the bloodied fingerprints, then the dyeing solution should be applied above the area of interest and allowed to flow down over it, keeping the area damp for the specified time. A well may be constructed around the area of interest on horizontal surfaces, which may be flooded and drained as appropriate. Areas of interest will then need to be washed or destained to remove excess dye. The most effective solution for doing this is the same solvent composition as the dye solution, washing as required to remove excess dye or destain the background. High-intensity light sources capable of emitting wavelengths between 420 and 485 nm must be used to excite fluorescence from blood dyed with acid yellow 7. The fluorescence emitted is between 480 and 550 nm. The use of shorter wavelengths between 350 and 450 nm, to excite background fluorescence after acid black 1 or acid violet 17 treatment, may be beneficial. Work carried out by the U.K. Home Office has demonstrated that positive DNA identification may be made after fluorescence examination and any single chemical treatment, provided that simple guidelines are followed. If more than one fingerprint development technique is used in sequence, then the chances of successfully carrying out DNA identification are much reduced (Kent, 2004). The U.K. work has shown that the most effective formulation for the acid dyes is as follows (Sears et al., 2005, p 741):\n\n\nFixing Solution46 g 5-sulphosalicylic acid dehydrate\ndissolved in 1 L water.\n\nStaining Solution1 g acid dye dissolved in 700 mL\ndistilled water, 250 mL ethanol, and 50 mL acetic acid.\n\nWashing Solution700 mL water, 250 mL ethanol, and\n50 mL acetic acid.\nThe staining and washing solutions are flammable. Safety precautions must be taken if these solutions are used outside a fume cupboard with ambient temperatures above 28 C (Kent, 2004).\n\n## 7.13 Aqueous Techniques\n\nThis section covers four commonly used aqueous metal deposition methods: those involving silver nitrate reagents, silver physical developers, multimetal deposition processes, and gun blueing reagents. Each of these methods involves reagents with metal salts dissolved in an aqueous carrier (or an alcohol, as in the case of some silver nitrate reagents). These reagents reveal water-resistant latent prints such as sebaceous prints (except for the silver nitrate reagents used on porous surfaces that target salt). Here, the metal ions are reduced to metal particles on the latent print residue (except for the case of latent prints on metal, where the print residue resists the deposition).\n\n## 7.13.1 Silver Nitrate Reagents\n\n7.13.1.1 History and Background. One of the first reagents used for developing latent prints on porous surfaces was a 13% aqueous solution of silver nitrate, AgNO3.\n\nIt was used as early as 1891 for this purpose (Forgeot, 1891; Rhodes, 1940, p 10). Most formulations now include an alcohol to hasten drying and to increase the wetness (reduce the surface tension) (Lee and Gaensslen, 2001, pp 105175). The silver ions in silver nitrate react with the chloride ions in salt (sodium chloride, NaCl) contained in the latent print residue to form silver chloride (AgCl), a highly insoluble salt (Ksp = 1.8x10-10) (Dean, 1985).\n\nAg+ + Cl\n AgCl  Kformation = 1/Kdissociation = 1/Ksp = 5.6 x 107\nThere are at least two reasons the silver nitrate treatment works well on porous surfaces. One is that the precipitation process is much faster than the dissolution process; that is, the reaction to form the insoluble AgCl is quicker than the ability of the aqueous carrier to dissolve away the soluble NaCl salt. The second reason is that the insoluble AgCl gets trapped within the structure or \"micro-roughness\" (Kerr et al., 1981, pp 209214) of the porous surface;\nthat is, the fresh latent print residue is in an aqueous or semiaqueous form that soaks into the porous surface, carrying its constituents with it. An ethanol-based 3% (w/v) silver nitrate reagent (90% ethanol and 10% water) develops prints on water-repelling surfaces such as waxed paper, cardboard with a wax finish, and Styrofoam (Trozzi et al., 2000). Here, the ethanol is used to reduce the dissolution of the NaCl in the fingerprint residue, to better wet the surface (because these surfaces are usually water-repellent), and to give faster evaporation. As expected, because of the low porosity of such surfaces, developed prints on these surfaces are more fragile than those on porous surfaces like paper and wood. Under ordinary room light, the silver chloride gradually converts by photo-reduction to elemental silver; however, this is hastened with UV radiation. The most efficient development occurs with short-wavelength UV radiation (254 nm); however, the safer, long-wavelength UV radiation (366 nm) also develops prints, but less efficiently (Goode and Morris, 1983).\n\nAgCl + h Ag + 12Cl2\nThe elemental silver formed is colored dark brown to black (not a silver color). The reason for this is that the silver deposits as an aggregate of tiny (colloidal-size) silver particles, which makes for a highly porous surface that traps much of the light that strikes it. The formation of dark, light-trapping silver happens because the silver ions are reduced very quickly.\n\n7.13.1.2 Application (Porous and Water-Repelling Surfaces). The silver nitrate reagent is usually applied to specimens by dipping them in the solution or by spraying the solution on the specimens. The FBI (Trozzi et al., 2000, pp\n3839) recommends the 3% AgNO3 water-based formulation for porous surfaces and the 3% AgNO3 ethanol-based formulation for water-repellent surfaces. Champod et al. (2004, pp 153154) recommend the 2%\nAgNO3 methanol-based reagent for porous surfaces. After drying, the specimens are exposed to a high-intensity light source, UV light, or sunlight to develop the prints. As soon as the prints develop, they are photographed and the specimens are stored in the dark. Over time, the background darkens because of the gradual reduction of any residual silver nitrate in the specimens (this reduction is accelerated if exposed to light). Rinsing the specimens after development and then drying them in the dark does little to slow down the background development. Goode and Morris (1983) reported in 1983 that immersing specimens in disodium ethylenediaminetetracetic acid\n(Na2EDTA) complexes excess silver ions, which are then easily rinsed away with water. Their modified silver nitrate (MSN) procedure uses a 1% aqueous silver nitrate solution that also contains 5% Na2EDTA and 3% K2CO3. The MSN\nprocedure involves (1) treating the specimens with this modified reagent for just enough time to wet the surface,\n(2) transferring them to a 1% (w/v) Na2EDTA solution and leaving them in for 1 minute, (3) removing and washing thoroughly with distilled water, and finally (4) placing this in a 5% thiourea solution containing 1% KOH for about 30 seconds to 2 minutes. The first step creates the silver chloride from the chloride ions in the latent print, and the last step converts this to black silver sulfide. Later in 1998, Price and Stow (1998, pp 107110) recommended dipping the specimens in a \"stopping solution\" consisting of an aqueous solution of 40% methanol, 20% acetic acid, and 2% glycerol to suppress the further development of the background.\n\n35S. The\n7.13.1.3 Enhancement. According to Lennard and Margot\n(1988, pp 197210), weakly developed prints could be enhanced by treating the specimens with a diluted silver physical developer solution. The dilution factor is 1:10. Goode and Morris (1983) discuss a radioactive enhancing method that converts a silver print to a radioactive,\n-emitting silver sulfide print, which is then imaged using radiographic film (this image-recording process is sometimes called autoradiography or -radiography). If the original silver nitrate treatment did not significantly stain the background with silver, then this method will bring out only the developed prints with little or no interfering background. The process, described by Goode and Morris (1983) and reviewed by Cantu (2001, pp 2964), involves converting the silver in the silver image to silver bromide (AgBr), using brominating (bleaching) methods, and then treating this with either sodium sulfide or thiourea (where the sulfur is radioactive 35S) to convert AgBr to Ag2\n35S.\n\nprocess is called radioactive toning. If the MSN procedure is used, which yields a silver sulfide print, then radioactive thiourea is used to form Ag2\n7.13.1.4 Limitation. The major drawback of the silver nitrate method is that the chloride ions in the latent print residue diffuse over time, and humidity accelerates this diffusion. This will affect the resolution (ridge detail) of the developed print. Normally, prints no older than 1 week will develop well; however, one should attempt to examine the evidence as soon as possible to avoid this diffusion. According to Goode and Morris (1983), in an indoor environment in the United Kingdom, prints on porous surfaces last longer (months) in the winter than in the summer (days to weeks). However, they state that these effects depend on factors such as the type of surface (prints last longer on paper than on raw wood) and, of course, the relative humidity. For this reason, the silver nitrate reagent is used now in special cases. The silver physical developer and multimetal deposition methods are more commonly used for waterinsoluble components but do not target chlorine ions.\n\n7.13.1.5 Use of Silver Nitrate on Metals. The discussion so far has been on the use of silver nitrate on porous and certain glossy (water-repellent) surfaces to develop chloride-bearing prints. Silver nitrate has also been used on certain metal surfaces, such as cartridge cases, to develop prints by depositing silver everywhere (giving a gray-toblack metallic appearance) except where the latent print sits (Olsen, 1978; Cantu et al., 1998, pp 294298). That is, the silver nitrate brings out \"lipid-bearing prints\" because such prints protect the metal surface on which they lie from reacting with the silver nitrate. (If chloride ions are present in the latent print residue, silver chloride is formed; however, the contrast of the print against the background remains and may even be enhanced upon the reduction of silver chloride to dark silver.) The usual reaction of the silver ions (Ag+) with the metal surface is\n\nnAg+ + M nAg + Mn+\nHere, M represents the metal and Mn+ is a corresponding ion. Silver is said to displace the metal M. By observing the placement of the silver in the electromotive series (see Table 74), we see that silver can displace copper, iron, nickel, zinc, lead, and aluminum.\n\n2Ag + Cu2+      Eo\n2Ag+ + Cu\nredox = 458 mV\n3Ag + Al3+      Eo\n3Ag+ + Al\nredox = 2461.6 mV\n\nHere, for example, Eo redox (Ag+/Ag; Cu/Cu2+) = Eo red (Ag+ +\ne\nox (Cu Ag) + Eo Cu2+ + 2e) is computed from the standard reduction potentials (Table 74) (Dean, 1985;\nWeast, 1986). A positive value of Eo redox indicates that the redox reaction is thermodynamically favorable but does not say anything about the rate or speed of the reaction. Another consideration is that these metals oxidize, some more readily than others, and this creates an oxide film on the metal surface. If a print was placed before the metal oxidized, the print may naturally show up, given enough time (some refer to this as the \"print getting etched\" on the metal). However, if it was placed after the oxide film formed, it is often difficult for the silver nitrate reagent to further oxidize the metal in this oxide film; thus, the deposition of silver and subsequent development of the print may occur but not as readily. The formation of a protective, impermeable oxide layer is called passivation (Atkins, 1990, p 927).\n\n(E\no) in mV\nHalf Reaction\nStandard Potential\nH2O2 + 2H++ 2e-\n2H2O\n+ 1776\nAu3+ + 3e\nAu\n+ 1498\n2Cl2 + 2e\n2Cl\n+ 1358\nOCl + H2O + 2e\nCl +\n2OH\n  + 810\nAg+ + e\nAg\n  + 799.6\nFe3+ + e\nFe2+\n  + 771\nH2SeO3 + 4H+ + 4e\n  + 740\nSe + 3H2O\n++ e\nAg(NH3)2\n  + 373\nAg + 2NH3\nCu2+ + 2e\nCu\n  + 341.9\nAg2O + H2O + 2e\n  + 342\n2Ag + 2OH\n2H+ + 2e\nH2\n         0.0\nFe3+ + 3e\nFe\n    - 37\nPb2+ + 2e\nPb\n  - 126.2\nNi2+ + 2e\nNi\n  - 257\nFe2+ + 2e\nFe\n  - 447\nZn2+ + 2e\nZn\n - 761.8\nAl3+ + 3e\nAl\n- 1662\n\n## 7.13.2 Silver Physical Developers\n\n7.13.2.1 History and Background. The silver physical developer originated in photographic chemistry as an alternate method to the chemical developer for developing film (Cantu, 2001, pp 2964; Bunting, 1987, p 85; Cantu and Johnson, 2001, pp 242247). Exposing silver bromide or silver iodide crystals to light causes specks of silver to form on the crystal surface (Walls and Attridge, 1977, pp 104 108). These become \"developing centers\" (or \"triggering sites\") for either chemical or physical development. A silver physical developer deposits silver on exposed silver bromide crystals, whereas a chemical developer reduces the exposed silver bromide to silver. The fixing bath, in the former case, removes the unexposed silver bromide crystals and also the exposed silver bromide crystals (leaving behind the silver deposited on them) whereas, in the latter case, it only removes the unexposed silver bromide because the exposed silver bromide has been converted to silver. Because of this process, the silver physical developer soon became known as one of the most sensitive reagents for detecting trace amounts of silver (Feigl and Anger, 1972, pp 423424). Latent print examiners (Collins and Thomas) in the United Kingdom recognized this during the early 1970s (Goode and Morris, 1983) and applied it first to prints submitted to vacuum metal deposition. Then they expanded its use to other substances like fabrics and paper. It was found early on that the silver physical developer works better on porous than nonporous surfaces. Also, no one really knew which substances in latent print residue were responsible for causing the silver physical developer to work. That is, no one knew what was in fingerprint residue that acted as a developing center or triggering site (like the silver specks). It was not until recently that some plausible or reasonable explanations emerged. A silver physical developer is an aqueous solution containing silver ions and a reducing agent that reduces the silver ions to silver, but it also contains two other sets of chemicals: one set keeps the reducing agent from reducing the silver ions to elemental silver unless a \"triggering substance\" is present (e.g., exposed silver bromide crystals in photographic film), and the other set keeps the solution stable. The first set suppresses the reducing ability of the reducing agent to the point that reduction occurs only when triggering sites are present. It, therefore, *suppresses the formation* of elemental silver in solution. However, due to this delicate balance, some spontaneous reduction occurs whereby colloidal-sized silver particles (nanoparticles) are formed in solution and, because these are triggering sites (i.e., they are silver specks), they grow. They grow in an autocatalytic way; that is, the silver that is formed triggers the reduction of more silver. Thus, the second set of chemicals suppresses this growth. The silver physical developer currently used for latent print development on porous surfaces contains silver ions (silver nitrate) and ferrous ions (ferrous ammonium sulfate) as the principal components; citric acid and ferric ions (ferric nitrate) as the set of chemicals that suppress the formation of spontaneously formed colloidal silver particles; and a cationic and non-ionic surfactant as the set of chemicals that suppress the growth of such particles. The net equation for the silver-deposition reaction is\n\nAg+ + Fe2+   Ag + Fe3+             E o redox = 28.6 mV\nE\no redox is computed from Table 74.\n\nAdding citric acid reduces the concentration of ferric ions through the formation of ferric citrate and shifts the equilibrium of Ag+ + Fe2+\n Ag + Fe3+ to the right (forming elemental silver), Fe3+ + H3Cit FeCit + 3H+      Kformation = 0.398 at 25 C\nHowever, for every ferric citrate molecule formed, three protons are released and these drive the equilibrium to the left (suppression of the formation of elemental silver). The overall reaction is\n\nAg${}^{+}$ + Fe${}^{2+}$ + H${}_{3}$Cit -- Ag + FeCit + 3H${}^{+}$ -- $\\rm{E}^{0}_{\\rm{redox}}$ = 5.0 mV\nThus, adding citric acid reduces the E\no redox from 28.6 mV to\n5 mV. This reduction facilitates adjusting the concentrations of the components (citric acid and the ferric, ferrous, and silver salts) so that the reduction of silver ions to elemental silver nanoparticles occurs only on the triggering sites and not in solution. However, even with this suppression of their formation rate, those that do form become nucleating (triggering) sites for further deposition of silver (the process is autocatalytic) and consequently grow until they precipitate. This will eventually deplete most of the silver ion solution (depending on the concentration of ferrous ions initially present). To bring stability to the solution, the silver particles formed must somehow have their triggering ability blocked. This is where surfactants become important.\n\nWhen silver nanoparticles are spontaneously formed, they get surrounded by citrate ions (each of which carries three negative charges) in solution and thus acquire a negative charge. The main surfactant used to suppress the growth of any spontaneously formed silver nanoparticles is a positively charged cationic surfactant, n-dodecylamine acetate. The reason for choosing a cationic surfactant is that it helps suppress the negative charge of the silver nanoparticles formed. This will then reduce the attraction of positive silver ions toward the particles and thus reduce the possibility of their growth (by the reduction of silver on their surface). The cationic surfactant surrounds the negatively charged silver particle in a staggered way, with as many positive ends pointing toward the particle as pointing away from the particle (Cantu, 2001, pp 2964; Cantu and Johnson, 2001, pp 242247; Jonker et al., 1969, pp 3844). This surfactant-encapsulated particle is said to be encased in a *micelle*. A non-ionic surfactant, Synperonic-N, is used in conjunction with n-dodecylamine acetate to aid the dissolution of the latter. On exposed photographic film or paper, the silver physical developer works by reducing its silver ions on the silver specks (nucleating sites) found on the surface of exposed silver bromide crystals and nowhere else. Being an autocatalytic process, the deposition of silver on the nucleating sites continues until it is stopped, for example, by removing the sample from the solution and rinsing it with water. The surfactant-stabilized silver physical developer remains stable and active for several weeks. If silver ions come in contact with hydroxyl ions, insoluble silver hydroxide (AgOH) is formed, which converts to brownish-black silver oxide (Ag2O). Today, most paper is alkaline (basic) because it contains calcium carbonate (CaCO3) as filler. When wet, it is basic and will turn black when dipped in a silver nitrate solution and will dry to a brownish-black color. Consequently, alkaline paper must be neutralized before submitting it to silver physical development. Any acid that does not furnish chlorides (which react with silver to form insoluble AgCl) will neutralize the CaCO3. The neutralization reaction involves the release of carbon dioxide bubbles:\n\nCaCO3 + 2H+          Ca2+ + H2O + CO2 (gas)\nThe following are the rudiments of some concepts that help explain how the silver physical developer visualizes latent prints on porous surfaces.\n\nThe Charge of Latent Print Residue (at low pH). It is fortuitous that the silver physical developer is acidic, with a\n+). Therefore, one possibility is that latent print pH of about 1.38 because this helps explain why it works in developing latent prints on porous surfaces. It is known (Saunders, 1989) that when latent print residue (on a porous or nonporous substrate) is immersed in a colloidal gold solution of pH < 3, colloidal gold nanoparticles selectively deposit on the residue. This suggests that at pH < 3, the latent print residue acquires a positive charge. It is also known that colloidal gold at low pH is used to \"stain\" proteins and this happens because, at low pH, the amine groups (e.g., R-NH2) in proteins acquire a positive charge upon protonation (R-NH3\nresidue contains proteins that initially were dispersed in latent print residue but, after drying, became nondispersible. It is also known that alkenes (olefins) can acquire a positive charge in an acidic environment (either a carbonium ion or a protonated alcohol is formed). Therefore, another possibility is that latent print residue contains olefins.\n\nThe Surface Area of Proteins in Porous Surfaces and Their Binding to Cellulose. It was recognized early on that the silver physical developer works best on porous surfaces, particularly cellulose-based surfaces such as paper and cardboard. When latent print residue is placed on such surfaces, the surfaces' porosity causes the residue to penetrate and thus cover a large surface area; this then exposes more nucleating (triggering) sites for silver physical development than if it did not spread out (as in a nonporous surface). Furthermore, if amines are present (as in proteins), they can form hydrogen bonds with the hydroxyl groups in the cellulose.\n\n+) of several surfactant molecules, which eventually The Deposition of Silver Particles on Latent Print Residue.\n\nIn the silver physical developer, a newly formed silver nanoparticle is negatively charged (due to adhered citric acid ions) and attracts the positive amine \"head\" (R-\nNH3\nenvelop the entire particle (in the staggered configuration mentioned above). However, the nanoparticle also gets attracted to the positively charged latent print residue. Once one of these nanoparticles reaches the residue, it gets neutralized. The avalanche of silver particle deposition occurs on this initial particle (because each silver particle is now a nucleating sitethe autocatalytic effect) and it grows. The final result is an agglomeration of numerous \"grown\" particles (about 1040 m in diameter) along the latent print residue.\n\nFormulation. The formulation of the silver physical developer reagent provided in Section 7.14 is the original British formulation (Kent, 1998), which is very close to the Dutch formulation (Jonker et al., 1969, pp 3844) used in the photofabrication of circuit boards. The procedure for visualizing prints on porous surfaces, however, involves three steps: a pretreatment step, the silver physical development step, and a post-treatment step. Other formulations for the silver physical developers exist (Cantu, 2001, pp 2964), but one that is currently used by many is based on using high-purity water, such as that produced by water purification units that use reverse osmosis and deionizing technologies (the water is referred to as RO/ DI water). By using such water, less detergent is needed (2.8 g of each, instead of 4.0 g) (Kent, 1998), although the performance is adversely affected. However, Burow et al. (2003, pp 10941100) showed that one can also reduce the amount of several other components and end up with a reagent that performs as well or better than the traditional reagent (it does, however, involve adding malic acid to the reagent); the cost reduction is about 16%. Seifert, Burow, and Ramotowski (from the U.S. Secret Service forensic laboratory) showed (unpublished results) that Tween 20 can be used instead of Synperonic-N.\n\no The hypochlorite step is an enhancing step. It does two things: it lightens (bleaches) the paper and darkens the silver print. The print becomes darker through the formation of silver oxide (OCl + 2Ag Ag2O + Cl E\nredox = 550 mV;\nsee Table 74). Other enhancement methods are treated by Cantu (2001, pp 2964) as well as bleaching methods. One bleaching method, used successfully in bringing out a developed print found on highly patterned printing, converts the silver print to a whitish silver iodide print and darkens the background through the starchiodine reaction (Cantu et al., 2003, pp 164168).\n\n7.13.2.2 Application. The procedure for using the silver physical developer involves three treatments in sequence and *in the same glass tray.* The latter point is important in that it simplifies the process and saves time. It is based on the fact that residual reagent from one treatment does not affect the performance of the next treatment. The three treatments are the acid pretreatment, the silver physical developer treatment, and the hypochlorite post-treatment. Occasionally, a distilled water pretreatment precedes these to remove any dirt or soil from the specimens. This, as well as the other treatments, removes any prints developed with ninhydrin, and writing or printing made with water-soluble inks (e.g., some roller ball pen inks and inkjet printing inks). Also, a tap water post-treatment is done between the silver physical development and the hypochlorite posttreatment. Again, all this is done in one glass tray.\n\nWater PretreatmentThis is designed to remove dirt and soil, if present.\n\nAcid PretreatmentThis reacts with calcium carbonate in alkaline paper, causing release of carbon dioxide as bubbles, and neutralizes the paper.\n\nSilver Physical Developer TreatmentThis is done in subdued light to avoid the photo-reduction of silver ions to elemental silver (which results in background development and weakens the reagent). The tray is rocked back and forth; within 10 minutes, prints begin to develop and continue with increasing contrast. Good development occurs within 1030 minutes.\n\nWater Post-TreatmentThis is done with running tap water for about 5 minutes to remove excess silver physical developer (and any silver chloride that may form).\n\nHypochlorite Post-TreatmentThe treatment time is about\n23 minutes. This lightens the background and darkens the silver print.\n\nWashing and DryingThe specimens are washed in tap water and dried (e.g., by using a photodryer or by air-drying on blotter paper).\n\n## 7.13.3 Multimetal Deposition Methods\n\n7.13.3.1 History and Background. In the late 1980s, Dr.\n\nGeorge Saunders, then with the Los Alamos National Laboratory in Los Alamos, NM, visited the U.S. Secret Service forensic laboratory to share ideas about techniques for latent fingerprint development. He presented a novel idea that he initially called a Universal Process for Fingerprint Detection and later, because it involved the deposition of two metals, the multimetal deposition (MMD) method. He based his idea on an existing method used for staining proteins, antibodies, and other macromolecules (e.g., proteins separated on membranes or gels). This method involved staining with colloidal gold (whereby colloidal gold binds to the macromolecule) and enhancing (or amplifying) this gold \"signal\" or stain with a silver physical developer. The binding of colloidal gold to proteins was first observed in 1939 by Kausche and Ruska (1939, pp 2124). In 1971, Faulk and Taylor (1971, pp 10811083) used this property to bind rabbit anti-Salmonella antiserum, and the resulting coated colloid was then used to label the surface of Salmonella bacteria. The labeling mechanism was detectable through the electron microscopic image of the gold.\n\nIn 1983, DeMey (1983, pp 82112) used uncoated gold to directly stain proteins on membrane surfaces. Also in 1983, Holgate et al. (1983, pp 938944) showed that a gold stain can be intensified with silver staining. They basically recognized that gold colloids are (1) highly negatively charged particles that bind to many macromolecules and (2) activation (triggering) sites for silver physical development. The colloidal gold particles acquire their negative charge through the adsorption of citrate ions (each carries three negative charges) on their surface (the citrate ions come from the sodium citrate used in the formulation). Saunders knew that fingerprint residue contains macromolecules like proteins and lipoproteins and, therefore, should be able to be visualized through the staining and enhancing ability of the colloidal gold and physical developer technique. He formulated his own colloidal gold solution using the Frens method (Frens, 1973, pp 2022) and silver physical developer. He called the latter the *modified* physical developer to distinguish it from the traditional silver physical developer used to visualize latent prints on porous surfaces. By formulating his own reagents, he was able to optimize them. The process was soon found to visualize latent prints on porous and nonporous surfaces; the latter includes surfaces like glass, metal, ceramic, and plastic, whether they are dark or light. Thus, the MMD process is basically a silver physical development process that is preceded by a colloidal gold treatment; the gold treatment provides the latent print residue with the nucleating sites (gold colloids) for silver physical development. Like the silver physical developer, the MMD process develops the water-insoluble components of latent print residue (e.g., the sebaceous portion of the residue). For visualizing latent prints on porous surfaces with the MMD process, Saunders provided two important comments for the users. One is that, on porous surfaces, extensive rinsing must be done after the colloidal gold treatment to reduce possible background development. This is because colloidal gold particles get trapped in the pores and become triggering sites for silver physical development. The other is that the zinc salt treatment, sometimes done after the ninhydrin process, should be avoided. Divalent ions such as Zn2+ have a tendency to bind to colloidal gold and, therefore, trapped divalent ions in the surface's pores attract the colloidal gold particles and the entire surface is subject to silver physical development.\n\n7.13.3.2 Formulation (MMD). The MMD process involves two reagents used in sequence: the colloidal gold solution and the modified silver physical developer. There are two points of note regarding the modified silver physical developer: One is that Tween 20, a non-ionic surfactant, is used instead of a more stabilizing cationic surfactant. Cantu and Johnson (2001, pp 242247) speculate that this may be because a cationic surfactant would surround bound gold particles (that still carry some negative charge) and therefore hinder the physical development process on them. The second point is that the silver ion concentration of the working solution is only 0.2%, and this is apparently low enough that no \"blackening\" (formation of silver oxide) occurs on the surface of alkaline (basic) paper. Thus, no acid pretreatment is needed to neutralize such paper (which normally contains calcium carbonate). The colloidal gold solution has a pH of about 2.8 and, therefore, causes some neutralization of such paper, but the divalent calcium ions that are generated apparently do not significantly destabilize the gold solution (they may on the surface where they are formed). Examples of latent prints developed (on a variety of surfaces) using the MMD process are found in Figure 723.\n\n7.13.3.3 Formulation (MMD II). In 1993, Dr. Bernard Schnetz presented his work, carried out at the Institut de Police Scientifique et de Criminologie of the University of Lausanne, on biochemical techniques for amplifying colloidal gold-treated latent prints. He treated latent prints with colloidal gold, attached a protein to the colloidal gold particles (already bound to latent print residue), and amplified these with enzymes or stains that form colored or fluorescent products (Schnetz, 1993). In 1997, he reported on an update to this work and also on his variation of the multimetal deposition (MMD II) process (Schnetz, 1997), and in 2001, he and Margot published their work on its optimization (Schnetz and Margot, 2001, pp 2128). Like the MMD process, this is a two-step process, but it uses siliconized glassware, colloidal gold with a particle size of 14 nm diameter (compared to 30 nm for the Saunders colloidal gold), and a silver physical developer quite different from the Saunders modified silver physical developer. Dr. John Brennan, recently retired from the Forensic Science Service (London, U.K.), has successfully used the MMD and MMD II processes on several evidence types and tends to favor the MMD II (J. Brennan, private communication). Dr. Naomi Jones presented her doctoral thesis several metal deposition methods; she also found that the MMD II process surpassed the MMD process in performance (Jones, 2002).\n\n## 7.13.4 Gun Blueing Reagents\n\n7.13.4.1 History and Background. Gun blueing is used to refinish gun barrels with a bluish sheen. One is warned not to leave fingerprints on the barrel because the gun blueing solution will not work there (Angier, 1936, p 6). The Bundeskriminalamt (BKA) in Germany discovered that this was also true on bullet cartridges (Cantu et al., 1998, pp 294298). Thus was the birth of gun blueing solutions for visualizing latent prints on metal surfaces, particularly those of bullet cartridges.\n\n7.13.4.2 Metal Deposition and Etching. Gun blueing of metals involves the simultaneous deposition of two metals, selenium and copper, on a metal surface. The bimetal deposited is blue-black in color. As discussed previously for silver nitrate, the sebaceous print resists the deposition, and silver deposits (as a grayto-black metal) everywhere, except where the fingerprint exists. To be more precise about what is occurring, we should note that the deposition process is always accompanied by an etching process. For silver on copper, silver ions deposit (the deposition or reduction process) as cupric ions are removed (the etching or oxidation process). There a computer disk. Bottom left: paper label of computer disk. Bottom right: plastic credit card. Notice that the developed prints appear dark on light-colored surfaces and light on dark-colored surfaces.\n\nare, however, etching processes that do not involve metal deposition (e.g., etching with acidified hydrogen peroxide) (Cantu et al., 1998, pp 294298), and these processes are also hindered by sebaceous material. Other one-metal deposition methods for revealing latent prints on cartridge cases include the use of palladium (Migron and Mandler, 1997, pp 986992) and selenium (Bentsen et al., 1996, pp 38). Besides showing that palladium can reveal sebaceous prints on metal, Migron and Mandler did an extensive analytical study of how the deposition process works on brass surfaces containing sebaceous prints. The work by Bentsen and colleagues on the deposition of selenium is similar to what gun blueing does and is, therefore, discussed below, along with gun blueing.\n\n7.13.4.3 General Composition. There are several manufacturers of gun blueing solutions, and no two solutions have exactly the same formulation, but all contain the three necessary active ingredients: selenious acid, a cupric salt, and an acid. An acidified solution of selenious acid is a relatively strong etching (oxidizing) reagent, as noted by the oxidation potential (Table 74):\n\no = +740 mV     H2SeO3 + 4H+ + 4e       Se + 3H2O     E\nNote that acid (H+) is needed, and this is why the blueing solution also contains an acid. Table 74 shows that an acidic solution of selenious acid can oxidize and etch copper, lead, nickel, zinc, and aluminum. A solution of cupric ions is also a strong etching (oxidizing) reagent capable of oxidizing lead, nickel, zinc, and aluminum.\n\nAs *each* of these reagents etches, the metal ions get deposited on what is etched. For example, on aluminum, the oxidation and reduction (etching and deposition) reaction is\n\n3H2SeO3 + 12H+ + 4Al 3Se + 9H2O + 4Al3+ Eo redox = 2402 mV 3Cu2+ + 2Al 3Cu + 2Al3+    E o redox = 2003.9 mV\nIf *both* reagents are present together, as in the gun blueing solution, then the ratio of Cu to Se that deposits depends on the speed (kinetics) of each of the two competing reactions; it is possible that a 1:1 CuSe alloy is formed, but it is not certain. The final result is a blue-black metallic coating (everywhere except where a sebaceous latent print exists). The composition of some gun blueing solutions is given in Table 75. Note that all involve selenious acid (one involves selenium dioxide, which is the anhydrous form of selenious acid), a cupric salt, and an acid. Interestingly, Bentsen et al. (1996, pp 38) used a 0.4% selenious acid solution (without cupric ions or acid) to develop prints on metal surfaces such as spent cartridge cases. This deposits selenium metal on the metal being treated and this solution, along with the vacuum cyanoacrylate ester treatment, was rated highly among other methods tested.\n\n7.13.4.4 Formulations. Cantu et al. (1998, pp 294298)\nrecommend a 1:80 dilution of a commercial gun blueing solution. Leben and Ramotowski (1996, pp 8, 10) recommend a stronger solution (a 1:40 dilution) and indicate that an improvement over just using the diluted gun blueing reagent is to treat the metallic specimens first (e.g., cartridge cases) with CA fumes. Table 76 is a summary of their recommendations.\n\n7.13.4.5 Application. Since its introduction by the BKA, gun blueing is now used in several laboratories because of its ease. As mentioned above, a CA ester treatment prior to gun blueing improves the detection of latent prints on metal. After treatment, there is a tendency for the gun blueing solution to continue its deposition, and several arresting methods have been proposed (Cantu et al., 1998, pp 294298). These include dipping in a sodium bicarbonate solution, dipping in clear varnish (Bentsen et al., 1996, pp 38), applying a lacquer spray (private communication from Anton Theeuwen and Josita Limborgh, Netherlands Ministry of Justice, Forensic Science Laboratory), and using fingernail polish (private communication from Vici Inlow, U.S. Secret Service forensic laboratory).\n\nIf overdevelopment occurs, then acidified hydrogen peroxide is recommended for removing excess gun blue deposit (Cantu et al., 1998, pp 294298). If we assume the copper selenium alloy is a 1:1 adduct, then the net reaction for its removal is\n\n3H2O2 + 2H+ + CuSe H2SeO3 + Cu2+ + 3H2O\nA suggested composition for the acidified hydrogen peroxide solution is 5 volumes of household vinegar (5% acetic acid) and 7 volumes of household hydrogen peroxide (3% hydrogen peroxide). This is based on stoichiometry of the above equation. However, a 1:1 mixture also works well.\n\n7.13.4.6 Comments on Etching. Etching without metal deposition can also reveal prints on metal surfaces by the contrast formed between the etched background and the unetched latent print. From Table 74 it can be seen that acid can displace iron, lead, nickel, zinc, and aluminum. Acidified hydrogen peroxide, however, will also displace copper. Cantu et al. (1998, pp 294298) noted that acidified hydrogen peroxide visualizes prints rather well on many metal surfaces. They provide a lengthy discussion and explanation of why the etching process should be carefully watched: the metals that are etched out as ions can redeposit as the process continues. Schutz et al. (2000, pp 6568) compared etching and gun blueing methods with the multimetal deposition method on their ability to develop latent prints on cartridge cases. They found that (1) gun blueing excelled in visualizing sebaceous prints on brass cartridge cases, (2) for aluminum cartridge cases, MMD worked best (the modified physical developer step, performed after the colloidal gold step, brought out the print contrast), and (3) nothing worked well for lacquered steel cartridge cases. For the latter, they recommend CA fuming.\n\n## 7.13.5 Sudan Black B\n\n7.13.5.1 History and Background. Sudan black B (herein referred to as Sudan black) was initially used in laboratories for biological testing or chemical screening for fatty components (Figure 724). The reaction produces a blue-black product or image. Sudan black was initially reported for use as a friction ridge development technique in 1980 by Mitsui, Katho, Shimada, and Wakasugi of the Criminal Science Laboratory in Nagoya-shi, Japan (Mitsui et al., 1980, pp 910; 1981, pp 8485).\n\n| Manufacturer                  | Birchwood-Casey   | Brownells   | Outers     |\n|-------------------------------|-------------------|-------------|------------|\n| E.                            |                   |             |            |\n| Trade name                    |                   |             |            |\n| Perma Blue                    |                   |             |            |\n| Perma Blue                    |                   |             |            |\n| Perma Blue                    |                   |             |            |\n| Liquid Gun                    |                   |             |            |\n| Immersion                     |                   |             |            |\n| Paste Gun                     |                   |             |            |\n| Blue PB22                     |                   |             |            |\n| Blue PBIM                     |                   |             |            |\n| Blue SBP 2                    |                   |             |            |\n| Used for                      |                   |             |            |\n| Steel                         | Steel             | Steel       | Steel      |\n| Selenious Acid                | 3                 | 4           | 2          |\n| Selenium                      |                   |             |            |\n| Compounds                     |                   |             |            |\n| Selenium                      |                   |             |            |\n| Dioxide                       |                   |             |            |\n| 3                             |                   |             |            |\n| Cupric Chloride               | 3                 |             |            |\n| Cupric Salt                   |                   |             |            |\n| Cupric Nitrate                | 4                 |             |            |\n| Cupric Sulfate                | 3                 | 4           | 4          |\n| Zinc Salt                     |                   |             |            |\n| Zinc Sulfate                  | 5                 |             |            |\n| Nickel Salt                   |                   |             |            |\n| Nickel Sulfate                | 1                 | 2           |            |\n| Hydrochloric                  |                   |             |            |\n| Nitric                        | 3                 | 2           | 4          |\n| Phosphoric                    | 4                 | 4           | 4          |\n| Acid                          |                   |             |            |\n| Fluoboric                     | 2                 |             |            |\n| Amido sulfonic                | 12                |             |            |\n| Solution pH (dilution factor) |                   |             |            |\n| 2.3 (1/40)                    | N/A(1/40)         | 1.5         | 2.3 (1/80) |\n| Polyethylene                  |                   |             |            |\n| Stearyl Ether                 |                   |             |            |\n| 15                            |                   |             |            |\n| Octylphenoxy                  |                   |             |            |\n| Polyethoxyethanol             |                   |             |            |\n| 1                             |                   |             |            |\n| Other                         |                   |             |            |\n| Ammonium                      |                   |             |            |\n| Molybdate                     |                   |             |            |\n| 4                             |                   |             |            |\n| Ammonium                      |                   |             |            |\n| Bifluoride                    |                   |             |            |\n| 1                             |                   |             |            |\n\n*All concentrations are as maximum percent. Except for pH, all information is obtained from Material Safety Data Sheets.\n\nKettner\nSuper Blue\nBrass Black\nAluminum\nFormula\nGunslick\nWaffen-\nExtra\nMetal\nBlack PAB\n44/40\nGun Blue\nBrunierung\nStrength\nTouch Up\n17\nInstant Gun\nBB2\nBlue\nAluminum\nSteel\nSteel\nSteel\nBrass, Bronze, Copper\nCartridge Type\nSuggested Treatment\nAfter Superglue\nGun Blue (GB) Dilution\nComments\nNickel Plated Brass\nBrass Black\n1 mL GB in 40 mL\nBrass\nFormula 44/40 Instant\nGun Blue\nLacquered Steel\nSuper Glue Only\nNone of the gun blue solutions produced identifiable detail.\nAluminum\nAluminum Black\n0.5 mL GB in 40 mL\n\nSudan black is a dye stain used for the detection of sebaceous components of friction ridge skin residue on nonporous and some semiporous substrates (e.g., latex gloves and some ceramics) (Figure 725). This dye stain also detects friction ridge skin detail where the friction ridge skin or the substrate has been contaminated with grease, food residue, or dried deposits of soda or sweetened (e.g., by fructose or sucrose) drinks. It has also been used to enhance friction ridge detail previously treated by the CA fuming technique. The color and porosity of the substrate will need to be considered. Porous substrates tend to absorb the dye, resulting in a lack of contrast between the friction ridge detail and the item background. Because of the blue-black color of the dye stain, there will be a lack of contrast between the friction ridge detail and dark-color items. It is recommended that other processing techniques be used on these items (Stone and Metzger, 1981, pp 1314). Dried Sudan black-processed prints have been lifted using conventional lifting tape (as used with the powder processing technique). It has been successful on waxy coated,\n\ndistilled water\nOther solutions also worked well on these casings.\n0.5 mL GB in 40 mL\ndistilled water\nOther solutions also worked well on these casings.\ndistilled water\nThis is the only solution that worked on this metal.\n\nglossy, and smooth substrates. However, it has been less successful on heavily contaminated, uneven, and semiporous substrates.\n\n7.13.5.2 Validation of Reagent and Application Technique. As in the application of all reagents and processes, it is suggested that the Sudan black solution be validated before use. To validate the solution, contaminate a nonporous substrate with the targeted matrix (e.g., sebaceous-, grease-, fructose-, sucrose-, or food-contaminated friction ridge detail or material), then apply the Sudan black solution to the substrate in the manner noted below. If no reaction is observed, the solution or the validation matrix will require further evaluation. It is sound practice to be familiar with the application technique and the reaction(s) with the substrate and matrix before applying them to evidence.\n\nReview the material safety data sheets for safety, handling, and storage information.\n\n7.13.5.3 Reagent Solution. The reagent solution consists of 15 g of Sudan black dissolved in 1 L of ethanol or methanol, creating a blue-black color solution, which is then added to 500 mL of distilled water and stirred until completely mixed. The shelf life of the solution is indefinite.\n\n7.13.5.4 Sequential Methodology and Processing Technique. Before processing with sudan black, view the item with a forensic light source to detect any inherent fluorescence of the friction ridge residue or the substrate. Photograph any visible detail.\n\n- Place the Sudan black solution in a clean glass or metal\ndish, pouring in a sufficient amount to submerge the item being processed. The solution can also be applied by spraying. It is recommended that the immersion technique be used to prevent inhalation of airborne particulate spray.\n- Allow item to be immersed in the solution for approximately 2 minutes. If the item has been previously processed using the CA fuming technique, the item may require longer immersion time in the solution.\n- Rinse item under cool or cold, slow-running tap water,\nor place item in a clean dish containing cool or cold water until excess dye is removed from the background.\n- Allow item to dry at room temperature. - View the developed blue-black image; faint images have\nbeen improved by a second treatment with the Sudan black solution (follow the previous application steps). It is suggested that the item be viewed with a forensic light source after Sudan black processing because the background may fluoresce, creating enhanced contrast.\n\n- Any developed images will need to be photographed for\ncomparison, documentation, and archival purposes.\n\n## 7.14 Formulations For Chemical Solutions\n\n7.14.1 Ninhydrin (Kent, 1998; Champod et al.,\n2004, p 239)\nStock Solution: 25 g ninhydrin dissolved in 225 mL absolute ethanol, 10 mL ethyl acetate, 25 mL glacial acetic acid.\n\nWorking Solution: 52 mL of stock solution diluted to 1000\nmL with HFE 7100.\n\n## 7.14.2 Zinc Chloride Solution (Champod Et Al., 2004, P 240)\n\nStock Solution: 8 g zinc chloride dissolved in 180 mL ethanol, 20 mL glacial acetic acid.\n\nWorking Solution: 6 mL of stock solution diluted to 100 mL\nwith carrier solvent (e.g., HFE 7100).\n\n## 7.14.3 1,8-Diazafluoren-9-One (Dfo) (Kent, 1998; Champod Et Al., 2004, P 230)\n\n0.25 g of DFO dissolved in 30 mL methanol and 20 mL glacial acetic acid. Add this to 725 mL HFE 7100 and 275 mL HFE 71DE.\n\n## 7.14.4 Nonpolar Ninhydrin (Stimac, 2003A, Pp 185197)\n\nStock Solution: 1.5 g ninhydrin dissolved in 100 mL HFE\n71IPA (may require refluxing at low temperature).\n\nWorking Solution: 15 mL of stock solution diluted with 100\nmL HFE 7100.\n\n## 7.14.5 1,2-Indanedione\n\nWorking Solution: 900 mL stock solution #1. Add 40 mL\nof stock solution #2 and stir for 5 minutes. Add 50 mL of stock solution #3 and stir for 5 minutes. Shelf life is 12 weeks.\n\n0.25 g 1,2-indanedione dissolved in 90 mL ethyl acetate and 10 mL glacial acetic acid. Add this to 1 L of HFE 7100\n(Merrick et al., 2002, pp 595605).\n\n## Or\n\nHypochlorite Post-Treatment Solution: 100 mL of household chlorine bleach (~6% NaOCl) is mixed with 100 mL water.\n\n2 g 1,2-indanedione dissolved in 70 mL ethyl acetate. Add this to 1 L HFE 7100 (Almog et al., 1999, pp 114118).\n\n## 7.14.10 Multimetal Deposition (Saunders, 1989, 1996, 1997) 7.14.6 5-Methylthioninhydrin (5-Mtn) (Wallace-Kunkel Et Al., 2006, Pp 413) Colloidal Gold Solution\n\nStock Solution #1: 10% (w/v) tetrachlorauric acid\n(HAuCl4.3H2O) in high-purity (RO/DI) water.\n\n1.7 g 5-MTN dissolved in 52.5 mL ethyl acetate, 50 mL methyl tert-butyl ether, 12.5 mL absolute ethanol, and 5 mL glacial acetic acid. Add this to 360 mL HFE 7100.\n\nStock Solution #2: 1% (w/v) trisodium citrate (Na3Cit.2H2O)\nin high-purity water.\n\n## 7.14.7 2-Isononylninhydrin (Inon, Thermanin) (Al Mandhri And Khanmy-Vital, 2005)\n\nStock Solution #3: 0.5 M (10.5% w/v) citric acid (H3Cit.H2O)\nin high-purity water.\n\n45 g INON dissolved in 15 mL ethyl acetate, 5 mL isopropanol, and 980 mL HFE 7100.\n\nStock Solution #4: 1% Polyethylene glycol.\n\n7.14.8 Silver Nitrate (Trozzi et al., 2000,\npp 3839)\nDissolve 30 g silver nitrate in 1 L distilled water. or Working Solution: Add 1 mL of stock solution #1 to 1 L of high-purity water and bring to a boil. Rapidly add 10 mL of stock solution #2 and boil gently for 10 minutes. Add 5 mL of Tween 20 (or Tween 80) and mix well. Add 10 mL of stock solution #4 to the cooled solution and adjust the pH to 2.7 using stock solution #3. Restore total volume to 1 L with high-purity water. Shelf life is 3 months.\n\nDissolve 30 g silver nitrate in 100 mL distilled water and add to 1 L ethanol.\n\n## Modified Silver Physical Developer Solution 7.14.9 Physical Developer (Kent, 1998)\n\nAcid Pretreatment: 30 g of maleic acid is dissolved in 1 L\ndistilled water. Indefinite shelf life.\n\nStock Solution #1: Dissolve 33 g ferric nitrate nonahydrate in 1 L of high-purity water. Add 89 g of ferrous ammonium sulfate hexahydrate to the solution. Add 22 g of citric acid to the solution. Add 1 mL of Tween 20 to the solution.\n\nStock Solution #2: 20% (w/v) silver nitrate in high-purity water.\n\nStock Solution #1: 30 g ferric nitrate nonahydrate dissolved in 900 mL distilled water. 80 g ferrous ammonium sulfate hexahydrate dissolved in this solution. 20 g anhydrous citric acid dissolved in this solution. Shelf life may be several months.\n\nWorking Solution: Add 1 part of stock solution #2 to 99\nparts of stock solution #1. Only stable for 15 minutes.\n\n## Application\n\nStock Solution #2: 4 g n-Dodecylamine acetate dissolved in 1 L distilled water. 4 g (4 mL) Synperonic N added to this solution. Indefinite shelf life.\n\nPrewashing: Porous items should be washed several times in high-purity water.\n\nStock Solution #3: 20 g silver nitrate dissolved in 100 mL\ndistilled water. Indefinite shelf life.\n\n## Silver Physical Developer Solution\n\nColloidal Gold: Soak items in colloidal gold solution for\n30120 minutes, but avoid overdevelopment.\n\nStock Solution #1: 24 parts 25.5% (w/v) citric acid solution, 22\nparts 23.5% sodium citrate solution, and 50 parts high-purity water. Adjust to pH 3.8 with additional citric acid or sodium citrate solution.\n\nIn-Between Rinsing: Rinse items in high-purity water. For porous items, use several water changes for 15 minutes or more.\n\nStock Solution #2: 0.2% (w/v) silver acetate solution.\n\nSilver Physical Developer: Place items into freshly made solution. Silver amplification occurs within 1015 minutes.\n\nStock Solution #3: 0.5% (w/v) hydroquinone in stock solution #1.\n\nPostwashing: Rinse with tap water. Air dry.\n\nRinsing Solution: 0.25% (w/v) hydroquinone (1 part stock solution #3 and 1 part high-purity water).\n\n## 7.14.11 Mmd Ii (Schnetz And Margot, 2001, Pp 2128) Silanization Of Glassware\n\nWorking Solution: One part stock solution #2 and one part stock solution #3. Unstable, so prepare just before use.\n\n## Application\n\nPrewashing: Porous items should be washed with high-purity water for 2 minutes. Nonporous items need only brief washing in high-purity water.\n\nSoak glassware for 8 hours in 10% Extran MA 01 alkaline liquid (Merck). Rinse with high-purity hot water, then highpurity cold water. Dry in an oven at 100 C. Soak for 5 seconds in 2% (v/v) 3-aminopropyltriethoxysilane in acetone. Rinse twice with acetone, then water. Dry in an oven at 42 C for 8 hours.\n\n## Colloidal Gold Solution\n\nColloidal Gold: Soak items in colloidal gold solution for 515\nminutes with mild agitation.\n\nIn-Between Rinsing: Rinse briefly in high-purity water.\n\nStock Solution #1: 10% (w/v) tetrachlorauric acid in highpurity water.\n\nIn-Between Hydroquinone Rinsing: Rinse for 25 minutes in hydroquinone rinsing solution.\n\nStock Solution #2: 1% (w/v) sodium citrate in high-purity water.\n\nStock Solution #3: 0.5 M citric acid in high-purity water.\n\nSilver Physical Development: Place items in silver physical developer for about 18 minutes.\n\nStock Solution #4: 1% (w/v) tannic acid in high-purity water.\n\nPostwashing: Rinse with high-purity water.\n\nWorking Solution #1: Add 0.5 mL of stock solution #1 to\n400 mL of high-purity water. Heat to 60 C.\n\nFixing: Fix with 1:9 dilution of photographic fixer for 25\nminutes, rinse with tap water, air dry.\n\n## 7.15 Reviewers\n\nWorking Solution #2: Add 20 mL of stock solution #2 and\n0.1 mL of stock solution #4 to 75 mL of high-purity water. Heat to 60 C.\n\nThe reviewers critiquing this chapter were Christophe Champod, Sue Manci Coppejans, Christine L. Craig, Robert J. Garrett, Deborah Leben, Bridget Lewis, Jon T. Stimac, Juliet H. Wood, and Rodolfo R. Zamora.\n\n## 7.16 References\n\nOnce both solutions reach 60 C, rapidly add working solution #2 to working solution #1 and mix vigorously. Heat the mixture to boiling, cool, and adjust to 500 mL with highpurity water. Solution can be stored in a plastic bottle at 4 C. Before use, bring to room temperature, add 0.5 mL Tween 20 (or Tween 80), and adjust pH to 2.7 with stock solution #3.\n\nAbderhalden, E.; Schmidt, H. Utilization of Triketohydrindene Hydrate for the Detection of Proteins and Their Cleavage Products. *Z. Physiologische Chem.* 1911, 72, 37.\n\nAl Mandhri, A.; Khanmy-Vital, A. Detection of Fingerprints on Paper with 2-Isononyl-Ninhydrin. Presented at the 17th Meeting of the International Association of the Forensic Sciences. Hong Kong, 2005.\n\nAlmog, J. Fingerprint Development by Ninhydrin and Its Analogues. In *Advances in Fingerprint Technology;* Lee, H. C., Gaensslen, R. E., Eds.; CRC Press: Boca Raton, FL, 2001. Almog, J.; Hirshfeld, A. 5-Methoxyninhydrin: A Reagent for the Chemical Development of Latent Fingerprints That Is Compatible with the Copper Vapour Laser. *J. Forensic Sci.* 1988, 33 (4), 10271030.\n\nAlmog, J.; Hirshfeld, A.; Klug, J. T. Reagents for the Chemical Development of Latent Fingerprints: Synthesis and Properties of Some Ninhydrin Analogues. *J. Forensic Sci.* 1982, 27 (4), 912917.\n\nAlmog, J.; Hirshfeld, A.; Frank, A.; Grant, H.; Harel, Z.; Ittah, Y. 5-Methylthio Ninhydrin and Related Compounds: A Novel\nClass of Fluorogenic Fingerprint Reagents. *J. 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L.; Kent, T. Superglue Treatment of Crime ScenesA Trial of the Effectiveness of the Mason Vactron SUPERfume Process; HOPSDB Report 30/2003; Home Office Police Scientific Development Branch: Sandridge, U.K., 2003.\n\nBarnett, K. G.; Bone, R. G.; Hall, P. W.; Ide, R. H. The Use of Water Soluble Protein Dye for the Enhancement of Footwear Impressions in Blood on Non-Porous SurfacesPart I; Technical Note 629; Forensic Science Service: Birmingham, U.K., 1988. Batey, G.; Copeland, J.; Donnelly, D.; Hill, C.; Laturnus, P.; McDiarmid, C.; Miller, K.; Misner, A. H.; Tario, A.; Yamashita, A. B. Metal Deposition for Latent Print Development.\nJ. Forensic Ident. 1998, 48 (2), 165176. Bayford, F. Sweat. *Fingerprint Whorld* 1976, 1, 4243.\n\nBentsen, R. K.; Brown, J. K.; Dinsmore, A.; Harvey, K. K.; Kee, T. G. Post Firing Visualization of Fingerprints on Spent\nCartridge Cases. *Sci. Justice* 1996, 36 (1), 38.\nBernier, U. R.; Booth, M. M.; Yost, R. A. 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Educ.* 1978, 6 (1), 45.\n\nBowman, V., Sears, V., Bandey, H., Hart, A., Bleay, S., Gibson, A., Fitzgerald, L., Eds. What Is the Oldest Fingerprint You Have Developed? In Fingerprint Development and Imaging Update. Home Office Scientific Development Branch:\nSandridge, U.K., 2003; pp 23.\n\nBoysen, T. C.; Yanagawa, S.; Sato, F.; Sato, K. A Modified Anaerobic Method of Sweat Collection. *J. Applied Physiol.* 1984, 56 (5), 13021307.\n\nCantu, A. A.; Leben, D. A.; Ramotowski, R.; Kopera, J.; Simms, J. R. Use of Acidified Hydrogen Peroxide to Remove Excess Gun Blue from Gun Blue-Treated Cartridge Cases and to Develop Latent Prints on Untreated Cartridge Cases. *J. Forensic Sci.* 1998, 43 (2), 294298.\n\nBramble, S. K.; Brennan, J. S. Fingerprints (Dactyloscopy):\nChemistry of Print Residue. In Encyclopedia of Forensic Science; Siegel, J., Saukko, P., Knupfer, G., Eds.; Academic Press: London, 2000; pp 862869.\n\nCantu, A. A.; Leben, D. A.; Kelley, W. 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Forensic Ident.* 1995, 45 (6), 631646.\n\nBureau voor Dactyloscopische Artikelen (BVDA). Product Information for 5-Methylthioninhydrin and Thermanin. http://www.bvda.com (accessed Jan 5, 2010).\n\nChristie, R. M.; Mather, R. R.; Wardman, R. H. The Chemistry of Colour Application; Blackwell Science, Ltd.: Oxford,\n2000.\n\nBurns, D. S. Sticky-Side Powder: The Japanese Solution.\nJ. Forensic Ident. 1994, 44 (2), 133138.\n\nClay, W. E. Fluorisol: The Solvent of Choice for Ninhydrin Detection of Latent Fingerprints. *Ident. News* 1981, 31\n(4), 1213.\n\nBurow, D.; Seifert, D.; Cantu, A. A. Modifications to the Silver Physical Developer. *J. Forensic Sci*. 2003, 48 (5),\n10941100. Campbell, B. M. Vacuum Chamber Cyanoacrylate Technique Evolution. *RCMP Gazette* 1991, 53 (12), 1216.\n\nConn, C.; Ramsay, G.; Roux, C.; Lennard, C. The Effect of Metal Salt Treatment on the Photoluminescence of DFO-Treated Fingerprints. *Forensic Sci. Int.* 2001, 116 (2),\n117123.\n\nCowger, J. F. 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Comparison of Development Techniques Sudan Black B Solution/Black Magna Powder for Water-Soaked Porous Items. *Ident. News* 1981, 31 (1),\n1314.\n\nStroud, P. T. Some Comments on Finger Print Development by Vacuum Deposition; AWRE Nuclear Research Note 5/71;\nAtomic Weapons Establishment (AWRE): Aldermaston, U.K., 1971.\n\nStroud, P. T. Further Comments on Finger Print Development by Vacuum Deposition; AWRE Nuclear 10/72; Atomic Weapons Establishment (AWRE): Aldermaston, U.K., 1972.\n\nSuzuki, S.; Suzuki, Y.; Ohta, H. Detection of Latent Fingerprints on Newly Developed Substances Using the Vacuum Metal Deposition Method. *J. Forensic Ident.* 2002, 52 (5),\n573578. Takatsu, M.; Kageyama, H.; Hirata, K.; Akashi, S.; Yoko Ta, T.; Shiitani, M.; Kobayashi, A. Development of a New Method to Detect Latent Fingerprints on Thermal Paper with o-Alkyl Derivative of Ninhydrin. *Rep. Natl. Res. Inst. Police Sci.* 1991, 44 (1), 16.\n\nTheys, P.; Lepareux, A.; Chevet, G.; Ceccaldi, P. F. New Technique for Bringing Out Latent Fingerprints on Paper:\nVacuum Metallisation. *Int. Criminal Police Rev.* 1968, *217,*\n106109.\n\nThomas, G. L. The Physics of Fingerprints and Their Detection. *J. Phys. E: Sci. Instrum.* 1978, 11 (8), 722730.\n\nThornton, J. I. Modification of Fingerprint Powder with Coumarin 6 Laser Dye. *J. Forensic Sci.* 1978, 23 (3), 536538. Thorwald, J. Crime and Science: The New Frontier in Criminology; Brace and World, Inc: New York, 1966.\n\nToth, I.; Faredin, I. Steroid Excreted by Human Skin: II.\n\nC 19-Steroid Sulphates in Human Axillary Sweat. Acta Medica Hungarica 1985, 42 (12), 2128. Trozzi, T.; Schwartz, R.; Hollars, M. Processing Guide for Developing Latent Prints; Federal Bureau of Investigation, Laboratory Division, U.S. Department of Justice, U.S. Government Printing Office: Washington, DC, 2000.\n\nUnited Nations Environ Programme. The Montreal Protocol on Substances That Deplete the Ozone Layer; United Nations Environ Programme: Nairobi, Kenya, 1999. http:// www.un-documents.net/mpsdol.htm (accessed Jan 5, 2010). Uyttendaele, K.; De Groote, M.; Blaton, V.; Peeters, H. Analysis of the Proteins in Sweat and Urine by Agarose-Gel Isotachophoresis. *J. Chromatogr.* 1977, 132 (2), 261266.\n\nValussi, S. Microfluidics Systems for the Chemical Analysis of Fingerprint Residues. Presented at the International Fingerprint Research Group Meeting, St. Albans, U.K., 2003. van Oorschot, R. A. H.; Treadwell, S.; Beaurepaire, J.; Holding, N. L.; Mitchell, R. J. Beware of the Possibility of Fingerprinting Techniques Transferring DNA. J. Forensic Sci.\n\n2005, 50 (6), 14171422.\n\nVandenberg, N.; van Oorschot, R. A. H. The Use of Polilight in the Detection of Seminal Fluid, Saliva, and Bloodstains and Comparison with Conventional Chemical-Based\nScreening Tests. *J. Forensic Sci.* 2006, 51 (2), 361370.\nVree, T. B.; Muskens, A.; Van Rossum, J. M. Excretion of Amphetamines in Human Sweat. Archives Internationales de Pharmacodynamie et de Therapie 1972, 199 (2),\n311317. Wade, D. C. Development of Latent Prints with Titanium Dioxide (TiO2). *J. Forensic Ident.* 2002, 52 (5), 551559.\n\nWakefield, M. A.; Armitage, S. Canberra Institute of Technology, Canberra, Australia. Unpublished Results, 2005.\n\nWallace-Kunkel, C.; Stoilovic, M.; Lennard, C.; Roux, C. A0571: 1,2-Indanedione as a Finger Mark Reagent Optimisation and Characterisation. Presented at the 17th Meeting of the International Association of the Forensic Sciences, Hong Kong, 2005. Wallace-Kunkel, C.; Lennard, C. J.; Stoilovic, M.; Roux, C. Evaluation of 5-Methylthioninhydrin for the Detection of Fingermarks on Porous Surfaces and Comparison. Ident. Canada 2006, 29 (1), 413. Walls, H. J.; Attridge, G. G. Basic Photo Science: How Photography Works; Focal Press: London, 1977. Walter, S. Latent Print Visualization of Aged Lipid Residues;\nStatus Report, April 1999; Savannah River Technical Center: Aiken, SC, 1999. Wargacki, S.; Dadmun, M. D.; Lewis, L. Identifying the True Initiator in the Cyanoacrylate Fuming Method. Presented at the 2005 International Association for Identification Conference, Dallas, TX, 2005. Watkin, J. E.; Wilkinson, D.; Misner, A. H.; Yamashita, A. B. Cyanoacrylate Fuming of Latent Prints: Vacuum Versus Heat/Humidity. *J. Forensic Ident.* 1994, 4 (5), 545554.\n\nWatling, W. J.; Smith, K. O. Heptane: An Alternative to the Freon Ninhydrin Mixture. *J. Forensic Ident.* 1993, 43 (2),\n131134.\n\nWeaver, D. E. Large Scale Cyanoacrylate Fuming. J. Forensic Ident. 1993, 43 (2), 135137.\n\nWeaver, D. E.; Clary, E. J. A One-Step Fluorescent Cyanoacrylate Fingerprint Development Technology. J. Forensic Ident. 1993, 43 (5), 481492. Weast, R. C., Ed. CRC Handbook of Chemistry and Physics, 67th ed.; CRC Press: Boca Raton, FL, 1986.\n\nWiesner, S.; Springer, E.; Sasson, Y.; Almog, J. Chemical Development of Latent Fingerprints: 1,2-Indanedione Has Come of Age. *J. Forensic Sci.* 2001, 46 (5), 10821084.\n\nWilansky, M.; Jomphe, A.; Kovacs, G.; Lawrence, J.; LeBlanc, D.; St-Pierre, M.; Wilkinson, D.; Yamashita, A. B.\n\nA Comparison of Hand-Held Forensic Light Sources; FIRS\nTechnical Report #16; Royal Canadian Mounted Police: Ottawa, 2006.\n\nWilkinson, D. Study of the Reaction Mechanism of 1,8-\nDiazafluoren-9-one with the Amino Acid, L - Alanine. Forensic Sci. Int. 2000a, 109 (2), 87103.\n\nWilkinson, D. Spectroscopic Study of 1,2-Indanedione.\n\nForensic Sci. Int. 2000b, *114,* 123132.\n\nWilkinson, D.; Watkin, J. E. A Comparison of the Forensic Light Sources: Polilight, Luma-Lite, and Spectrum 9000. J. Forensic Ident. 1994, 44 (6), 632651.\n\nWilkinson, D.; Yamashita, A. B.; Annis, K. A Comparison of Forensic Light Sources: Luma-Lite, Mini-Crimescope 400, Omniprint 1000A, Polilight PL500, and Quaser 2000/30.\n\nIdent. Canada 2002, 25 (1), 515.\n\nWilkinson, D.; Mackenzie, E.; Leech, C.; Mayowski, D.; Bertrand, S.; Walker, T. The Results from a Canadian National Field Trial Comparing Two Formulations of 1,8-Diazafluoren-\n9-one (DFO) with 1,2-Indanedione. *Ident. Canada* 2003, 26\n(2), 818. Wilkinson, D.; Rumsby, D.; Babin, B.; Merrit, M.; Marsh,\nJ. The Results from a Canadian National Field Trial Comparing 1,8-Diazafluoren-9-one (DFO) with Ninhydrin and the Sequence DFO Followed by Ninhydrin; Technical Report TR-\n03-2005; Canadian Police Research Centre: Ontario, 2005. Willinski, G. Permeation of Fingerprints Through Laboratory Gloves. *J. Forensic Sci.* 1980, 25 (3), 682685.\n\nWilson, J. D.; Darke, D. J. The Results of Analyses of the Mixtures of Fatty Acids on the Skin: Part I. Commentary;\nAERE Report No. G-1154; Atomic Energy Research Establishment: ca 1978.\nYamashita, A. B. Use of a Benchtop Desiccator for Vacuum Cyanoacrylate Treatment of Latent Prints. *J. Forensic Ident.* 1994, 44 (2), 149158.\n\nYemm, E. W.; Cocking, E. C; Ricketts, R. E. The Determination of Amino-Acids with Ninhydrin. *Analyst* 1955, 80,\n209214.\n\n## 7.17 Additional Information\n\nAlmog, J.; Gabay, A. A Modified Super Glue Technique The Use of Polycyanoacrylate for Fingerprint Development.\n\nJ. Forensic Sci. 1986, 31 (1), 250253.\n\nBeecroft, W. Enhancement of PD Prints. *RCMP Gazette,* 1989, 21, 17.\n\nBoniforti, L.; Passi, S.; Caprilli, F.; Nazzaro-Porro, M. Skin Surface Lipids. Identification and Determination by Thin-Layer Chromatography and Gas-Liquid Chromatography. Clin. Chim. Acta 1973, 47 (2), 223231.\n\nBurns, T. D.; Brown, J. K.; Dinsmore, A.; Harvey, K. K. Base- Activated Latent Fingerprints Fumed with a Cyanoacrylate Monomer: A Quantitative Study Using Fourier-Transform Infra-Red Spectroscopy. *Anal. Chim. Acta* 1998, 362 (2),\n171176. Champod, C.; Egli, N.; Margot, P. A. Fingermarks, Shoesole and Footprint Impressions, Tire Impressions, Ear Impressions, Toolmarks, Lipmarks, BitemarksA Review: 2001 to\n2004. In Proceedings of the 14th Interpol Forensic Science Symposium; Lyon, France, 2004; pp 227244.\n\nForgeot, R. Des empreintes digitales etudiees au point de vue medico-judiciaire; A. Storck: Lyon, France, 1891.\n\nHamm, E. D. Chemical Developers in Footwear Prints.\n\nFingerprint Whorld 1984, 9, 117118.\n\nLoveridge, F. H. Shoe Print Development by Silver Nitrate.\n\nFingerprint Whorld 1984, 10 (38), 58.\n\nMorton, S. Shoe Print Development by PD Treatment.\nFingerprint Whorld 1983, 9 (34), 6061. Siegel, J., Saukko, P., Knupfer, G., Eds.; Encyclopedia of Forensic Sciences; Academic Press: London, 2000. Yong, A. S. J. Detection of Latent Fingerprints with Cyanoacrylates: New Techniques Involving Coloured and Photoluminescent Compounds; Australian National University:\nCanberra, ACT, Australia, 1986.\n\n## C H A P T E R The Preservation Of Friction Ridges Laura A. Hutchins\n\nContributing author Robert E. May\n\n## C O N T E N T S\n\n3\n8.1  Introduction\n16\n8.6  Other Methods of Friction\nRidge Preservation\n3\n8.2  History of Photography\n19\n8.7  Conclusion\n5\n8.3  Photography in the Criminal\n20\n8.8  Reviewers\nJustice Community\n6\n8.4  The Fingerprint Camera\n20\n8.9  References\n7\n8.5  Modern Photography\n\n## Chapter 8 The Preservation Of Friction Ridges\n\n# Laura A. Hutchins Contributing Author Robert E. May\n\n8.1 Introduction Inherent in the criminal justice community, and specifically the crime laboratory, is the policy that the information derived from evidence must be preserved to the extent possible. With regard to friction ridge detail, methods of preservation include film and digital photography, latent print lifts, and the use of casting material. Although the two latter methods do create secondary evidence in the form of a lift or cast, the photographing of the friction ridge detail on the lift or the cast is still important to generate additional secondary evidence. Certainly with respect to state and national labs, evidence submitted with a case must be returned to the contributor. With this in mind, the preservation of all relevant friction ridge information derived from evidence is mandatory, and the production of an archival image enables most of that information to be retained within the case file.\n\n## 8.2 History Of Photography\n\nPhotography dates back to the time of Aristotle and his study of light, specifically his reference to the passing of light through a pinhole and the creation of a reverse image on the ground (London, 2005, p 368). In the 10th century, the Arabian scholar Alhazen described in detail the discovery of the camera obscura, meaning \"dark chamber\" (London, 2005, p 368). He explained how light could pass through a single hole in a wall of a dark room and project inverted images from the outside onto the opposite wall of the darkened room. Alhazen made specific references to the ability to view a solar eclipse by this method. Eventually, the camera obscura became the size of a box, and a lens for focusing and a mirror for adjusting the light were incorporated. The original use of the camera obscura was for artists as an aid for drawing in perspective (Davenport, 1999, p 4). The word photography (derived from two ancient Greek words, *phos,* meaning light, and *graphos,* meaning to write) was coined by Sir John Herschel in 1839 (Redsicker, 1994, p 1). The first application of recording images by the action of light on a sensitive material was 12 years prior to Herschel's use of the word. It was in 1827 when the French inventor Joseph Nicephore Niepce took the first successful sun-exposure picture. Pewter coated with a mixture of bitumen of Judea (an asphaltlike substance) and lavender oil was placed inside a camera obscura that was aimed at the courtyard outside his window. After 8 hours, the pewter plate was removed from the camera obscura and was rinsed in lavender oil. The bitumen mixture had hardened on areas of the plate that had been exposed to light, whereas the bitumen mixture on the areas not exposed remained soluble and was washed away in the rinse (London, 2005, p 368). The result was a permanent scene of the view outside Niepce's window on the pewter plate. In 1829, Niepce formed a partnership with a chemist, Louis Jacques Mande Daguerre. The partnership was formed in order to improve the process discovered by Niepce. Unfortunately, after four years of unfruitful experimentation, Niepce died of a stroke. Daguerre continued experimenting in order to find a way to reduce the necessary exposure time and permanently fix the photographic image. By 1837, Daguerre had discovered that by coating a copper plate with silver and exposing it to iodine crystals, a chemical reaction took place, producing a light-sensitive silver iodide compound. The plate was put inside a camera obscura and was exposed, and a latent image was recorded on the plate. The plate was then removed and exposed to mercury vapors that caused an alloy to form where the silver iodide had been exposed to light. The unexposed silver iodide was washed away in a salt fixer solution, leaving the bare metal. The resulting plate contained an image; the silver alloy Congress collection, available\nonline at www.memory.loc.gov.)\nformed the light areas of the picture and the bare metal formed the dark areas (London, 2005, p 369). He named the end result a *daguerreotype* (Figure 81). Obviously, the use of a single plate for photography posed another problem: how did one make copies?\n\nThis question was answered by Englishman William Henry Fox Talbot. Talbot was experimenting with photography at the same time as Daguerre; however, Talbot was using paper instead of copper plates. Talbot used paper sensitized with silver chloride, a compound formed by combining table salt with silver nitrate and gallic acid. The sensitized paper was exposed for a couple of minutes, producing a latent image. This image was visualized by treating the paper with silver nitrate and gallic acid and was fixed in a solution of potassium iodide of hypo (Davenport, 1999, p 9). This negative was then was placed over another light-sensitive piece of paper and exposed, creating a *positive* image. This technique, known as a calotype, was the first negative-positive process (London, 2005, p 370). Unfortunately, the sharpness of the final image paled in comparison with that of the daguerreotype, and the daguerreotype continued to thrive. In 1851 another Englishman, F. Scott Archer, discovered the use of wet *collodion* in photography. This process was a blend of the *calotype* (a negative and positive image print on paper) and the daguerreotype (with its sharpness). This technique used glass plates coated in collodion, which is guncotton (nitrocellulose, a flammable compound) dissolved in ether or alcohol. The glass plates were sensitized, exposed, and developed, all while the collodion was still wet (Davenport, 1999, pp 1819). Although the technique was complicated by the fact that the glass plates had to remain wet, it was much cheaper than the Daguerre method, produced negatives that were much sharper than calotypes, and reduced exposure time to a few seconds. Because Archer never patented his discovery, the use of this type of photography was adopted worldwide and supplanted the previous two methods. For the next 20 years, the wet method of photography continued to thrive. In 1871, Richard Leach Maddox produced the first viable dry plate that retained light sensitivity (Davenport, 1999, pp 2223). Maddox's discovery was prompted by health problems caused by overexposure to the ether vapor used in the wet collodion process. Being an enthusiast of photography, he searched for an alternate method of adhering the silver salts to the glass plate. He discovered that instead of using wet collodion, he could coat the glass with an emulsion of gelatin that the sensitizing material adhered to and the glass would still retain its light-sensitive properties (Harrison, 1888, p 61). As more and more photographers began using this method, the desire for the process to be more available to amateur photographers and the general public became the focal point of one man, George Eastman. By 1888, Eastman had initiated a method of mass producing dry paper film rolls contained within a simple box camera, called the Kodak.\n\n## 8.3 Photography In The Criminal Justice Community 8.3.1 Identifying The Criminal: Rogues' Galleries Of The Past\n\nWith the coming of the second Industrial Revolution (18711914), city populations became flooded with people coming and going on steam-powered ships and railways. As cities grew, so did the criminal element. It was an easy time to be a criminal. The criminal justice community had no established method of recognizing repeat offenders. It was very easy for recidivists to deny their true identity by merely giving the authorities another name. In fact, at the time, the only method of criminal recognition was the memory of police officers. When the daguerreotype was discovered, the criminal justice community quickly implemented the photograph as a way of documenting criminals. Collections of photographs of criminals for identification purposes became known as *rogues' galleries.* Rogues'\ngalleries were displayed in police departments for reference while checking in suspects and, after the invention of photographic negatives, served as the template for \"wanted\" posters. By the late 1800s, extensive rogues' galleries could be found in many police departments. Eventually, Alphonse Bertillon (see Chapter 1, p 8) incorporated *portraits parle,* now known as mug-shots (Figure\n82), into his system of identification (Phillips, 1997, p 20). From this standard front and side mug-shot technique, books were produced. In essence, the rogues' gallery from the wall became a pocket book.\n\n(Reprinted with permis-\nsion from the R.A. Reiss\nphotographic collection\nat the Institut de Police\nScientifique, Universite\nde Lausanne.)\n\n## 8.3.2 Documenting The Crime\n\nThe advantages of the camera went beyond the mere accumulation of rogues' galleries. It was a natural progression from documenting the criminal to documenting the crime itself (Figure 83).\n\n The value of permanently recording a true and accurate depiction of a crime came to be an invaluable investigative tool. Not only could the photographs say what a witness could not, but they were seen as objective recordings (Buckland, 2001, p 27). As early as 1859, photographs began to appear in the courtroom, ranging from photographs comparing forged and nonforged signatures to photographs establishing the true identity of a corpse (Moenssens). With the advent of the crime laboratory, evidence that was photographed at the crime scene could be analyzed and photographed in a controlled environment. By the 1930s, full-service crime laboratories were springing up across the world (e.g., FBI Laboratory in 1932, London's Metropolitan Police Forensic Laboratory in 1935). The advent of the crime laboratory occurred in conjunction with several forensic science milestones. The 1930s witnessed the ushering in of typewriter standard files, fraudulent check files, automotive paint files, firearms reference collections, use of the polygraph, the first use of the ABO blood testing on forensic evidence, metallurgical services, gunshot residue analysis, DNA secretor analysis, luminol as a presumptive test for blood, and the establishment of the Single Fingerprint Section at the FBI. As methods of forensic detection were established in crime laboratories, the recording of results through photography became standard procedure.\n\n## 8.4 The Fingerprint Camera\n\nThe first camera designed specifically for fingerprint work was made by Folmer & Schwing Manufacturing Company of New York in the early 20th century. The camera was self-sufficient, providing a fixed focus lens and lighting contained within an oblong box (Figure 84). The lens was positioned at a fixed point that produced a focused life-size image on the negative (1:1) and the lamps were activated by the movement of the shutter, thus exposing the 2\" x 3\" glass plate (Lightning Powder Co., Inc., 2003, p 5). A photograph was taken by positioning the open end of the oblong camera over the print and pressing the exposure button. The creation of this type of camera enabled a person who was not trained in the art of photography to take photographs of latent prints. This type of fingerprint camera remained in existence until the 1970s. Technological advances were incorporated into the design over the years, but the basic concept and ease of use continued. Advances involved additional lens types, variable shutter speeds, adjustable apertures, electronic flash bulbs, and the use of roll film or Polaroid-type films of sizes varying from 2 1/4\" x 3 1/4\" to 4\" x 5\" (Olsen, 1978, p 178).\n\n## 8.5 Modern Photography\n\nAs with any type of specific-use technology, the cost of specialized equipment leads to the need for more affordable equipment that can also be used for other purposes. Smaller police departments could not afford to purchase a fingerprint camera, so they began to outfit the cameras they owned with attachments for fingerprint photography (Olsen, 1978, p 147). A general-purpose camera could be adapted for fingerprint work with the use of a camera stand, proper lighting, and an appropriate lens. Another factor that allowed for the easy transition to traditional camera usage was the ease with which irregularly shaped objects could be photographed. The fingerprint camera was perfectly suited to flat evidence, but evidence that was irregular in shape posed depth of field problems. Additionally, although the fingerprint camera was appropriate to basic fingerprint processing techniques such as powdering, the advent of forensic light sources demanded the use of nonspecific camera equipment.\n\n## 8.5.1 Film Photography\n\nModern film is composed of plastic sheets that are coated with an emulsion containing silver halide salts bonded by gelatin. The grain size of the silver halide salt determines the sensitivity of the film and the resulting resolution. Film with a smaller grain size, known as *slow film,* requires a longer exposure but produces a photograph of finer detail. When the silver halide salts are exposed to a form of light, an invisible image is recorded on the film. Film-developing chemicals are then applied to the exposed film in order to visualize the latent images. This process causes the conversion of the silver halide salts to metallic silver. The metallic silver blocks the transmission of light and forms the black portion of a negative.\n\nThere are generally three camera formats available: small, medium, and large. In photography, the term \"format\" refers to the size of the film that is used in the camera. Small format cameras use film that is 35 mm and smaller. The main disadvantage of using a small format camera is that the small negative must be enlarged in the printing process. A medium format camera uses film that is fixed at 6 cm in width but varies in length, ranging from 4.5 cm to 7 cm. Large format cameras use film that is 4\" x 5\" or larger. The advantage of having a larger format camera is the higher resolution that is achieved.\n\n## 8.5.2 Digital Photography\n\nThe history of the digital camera is rooted in the technology that gave rise to the television and the first videotape recorder. This technology allowed for the conversion of information into electrical impulses that could be recorded onto magnetic tape. In 1970, Willard Boyle and George Smith of AT&T Bell Labs invented the *charge coupled device* (CCD)\n(Boyle, 1970). Essentially, a CCD is an image recording sensor containing picture elements, commonly referred to as *pixels,* on a grid (Bidner, 2000, p 25). The pixels on the sensor record light electronically (i.e., light is converted into electrons). Generally, the greater the number of pixels on the CCD, the sharper the image. This electronically recorded light is then converted into digital data.\n\nWith regard to photography, a digital camera records the image with a CCD instead of recording the image on film (Ippolito, 2003, p 36). Specifically, an image is focused on the sensor through the lens. The sensor for the digital camera contains millions of CCD cells (pixels) on a grid. Each CCD records a color and a brightness (tonal) value that is stored as a series of numbers in the camera's memory. These stored numbers are then reassembled and sent as an image to a printer or a computer screen. Because of the volume of pixels on the grid, the human eye views the recorded image as continuous tones, just as one would view a photograph (London, 2005, p 200). Key to the understanding of digital camera technology is pixel resolution. Pixel resolution refers to the number of pixels in an image. For example, a 1000 x 1000 pixel image printed in a one-inch square would have 1000 pixels per inch (PPI).\n\nTraditional film photography cameras are based upon film format; digital camera file format is based upon the storage of data. Most digital cameras offer a choice of file formats for saving images. There are two main types of formats:\ncompressed and uncompressed. Compressed file formats produce smaller image files that allow for more storage space. Images are reduced in size by the discarding, or loss, of pixel information. Every time an image is saved in a compressed format, information is lost. Because of this loss, compression file formats are referred to as *lossy.* The most common type of lossy compression format is JPEG (Joint Photographic Experts Group). Uncompressed file formats are those in which no pixel values are lost and the image can be retrieved in its original form (Federal Bureau of Investigation, 2004, p 14). Uncompressed file formats include TIFF (tagged information file format) and RAW formats (i.e., the camera's native or unprocessed file format). Both formats store an image in its original form, thus requiring more storage space. For the purpose of recording friction ridge impressions, the use of TIFF or RAW images in digital photography is valuable to ensure that the integrity of the evidence is preserved. A vital aspect of maintaining the integrity of the evidence is the acquisition of a digital camera that meets or exceeds the guidelines set forth by the Scientific Working Group on Friction Ridge Analysis, Study and Technology (SWGFAST) (SWGFAST, 2009) and the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST). NIST has established that the minimal resolution of an image taken by a digital camera that is used for latent impression evidence be 1000 PPI at 1:1 (SWGIT, 2002; SWGFAST, 2009, p 2).\n\nAnother key aspect to digital photography in relation to the criminal justice community is the maintenance of the original digital image. The original image must be stored in an unaltered state. The original images can be stored on the following media: silver-based film negative, write-once compact disk-recordable (CD-R), and digital versatile diskrecordable (DVD-R) (SWGIT, 2006, pp 3-4). If digital processing is needed, it must be performed on a duplicate image. In addition to the acquisition of fingerprint impressions with a digital camera, impressions on relatively flat surfaces may be digitized through the use of a flatbed scanner and the image(s) can be imported into a computer. A flatbed scanner consists of a flat piece of glass, known as a *platen,* a light source under the platen and in the lid, and a CCD image recording sensor on a track underneath the platen. Items to be scanned are placed face down on the platen, and the CCD sensor track moves beneath the item, recording the image(s). The type of item to be scanned dictates the location of the light source for the scan (opaque versus transparent lifts). For opaque items, the light on the tract below the platen is used. As the tract moves below the item, the CCD sensor records the light that is reflected off the item. This is known as reflective scanning. Transmissive scanning is used to record image(s) on a transparent item. With transmissive scanning, the light from the lid is transmitted through the item and onto the CCD. Like the digital camera, the flatbed scanner must be able to produce the PPI requirement for latent impressions set forth by NIST, and the original images should be recorded on the appropriate medium.\n\n## 8.5.3 Properties Of Light\n\nPhotography is the recording of images on sensitive material by the reaction of light, and the photographer will benefit by knowing something about its properties and how to control it. Light travels as waves. Light waves ordinarily travel in straight lines, passing through some substances, and being absorbed or reflected by others. Forms of energy transmitted by waves of any nature are classified according to their wavelength into a system called the electromagnetic spectrum. This classification is important because it allows the assignment of a given wavelength to each form of energy with which photography is concerned. For fingerprint photography, the wavelengths that are most important are those in the invisible short- and long-wave ultraviolet light and the visible light spectrum.\n\nThe term spectrum refers to the entire range of electromagnetic radiation. In their basic nature, there are no differences between light waves and other kinds of electromagnetic waves. The various types of electromagnetic waves that make up the electromagnetic spectrum are gamma rays, x-rays, ultraviolet radiation, visible light, infrared radiation, radar, and radio waves (Figure 85) (Langford, 1973, p 23). 8.5.3.1 Luminescence. When certain materials, such as some solids, liquids, or gases, are subjected to electromagnetic radiation, such as ultraviolet radiation or monochromatic light, they will emit light of a longer wavelength\n(Miller, 1998, p 205). This occurrence is called luminescence. The two particular types of luminescence are known as *fluorescence* and *phosphorescence.* If the luminescence ceases within a fraction of a second (i.e., less than 10-6\nsecond) (Menzel, 1980, p 68) after removing the exciting radiation, the phenomenon is called fluorescence. Although fluorescence ceases almost immediately after removing the exciting radiation, some substances continue to emit luminescence for some time. This phenomenon is called phosphorescence (Miller, 1998, p 205). For most fingerprint imaging purposes, the differences between fluorescence and phosphorescence are inconsequential.\n\nInvisible ultraviolet radiation (UV) is that portion of the electromagnetic spectrum that can induce visible luminescence in certain materials. Invisible long-wave ultraviolet radiation in the electromagnetic spectrum ranges from 320 nm to 390 nm. *Visible light* is that portion of the electromagnetic spectrum that normally stimulates sight. Visible light in the electromagnetic spectrum ranges from 390 nm to 700 nm. When materials absorb light and re-emit this light at longer wavelengths, the difference between absorption and emission is known as *Stokes shift* (Figure\n86) (Menzel, 1980, p 9). 8.5.3.2 Filters Used in Luminescent Photography. A\nbarrier filter of optical photographic quality and particular absorption and transmission properties is needed to visualize and photograph luminescing latent prints. The barrier filter will absorb or reflect most of the excitation and will transmit the sufficiently longer wavelength to enable photographic imaging (Figure 87). Without the barrier filter, the excitation light tends to compete with and wash out luminescing friction ridge detail. In some instances, a barrier filter may help block interfering fluorescence. Modern forensic light sources come with an array of nanometer choices and barrier filters that allow for the visualization and resulting photography of luminescing latent prints (Table 81). For most forensic light sources (e.g., laser, alternate lightsource, LEDs), the customary barrier filters are orange (amber), yellow, and red.\n\n| Emitted Light         | Corresponding   | Barrier Filter   |\n|-----------------------|-----------------|------------------|\n| (Color)               | Nanometers      | (Color)          |\n| Invisible Ultraviolet | 320400         | Pale Yellow      |\n| 350469               | Yellow          | 476              |\n| Yellow/Orange         | 510, 515        |                  |\n| Violet/Blue           |                 |                  |\n| Orange                | 529, 550        |                  |\n| Red                   | 593             |                  |\n| 352519               | Yellow/Orange   | 510, 515         |\n| Blue                  |                 |                  |\n| Orange                | 529, 550        |                  |\n| Red                   | 593             |                  |\n| 468526               | Orange          | 529, 550         |\n| Blue/Green            |                 |                  |\n| Red                   | 593             |                  |\n| 473546               | Orange          | 549              |\n| Green                 |                 |                  |\n| Red                   | 593             |                  |\n| Green/Yellow          | 503591         | Red              |\nCommon Barrier\nFilter\n\nUsing long-wave ultraviolet radiation, latent impressions\ndeveloped with chemical treatments, dye stains, and fluorescent powders are often visible without the use of a filter. However, when photographing latent impressions that luminesce, with black and white film or a digital format, using a UV barrier filter will block the invisible light that the film or the digital sensor is sensitive to, thus eliminating the chance of distortion or overexposure of an image.\n\n## 8.5.4 Close-Up Photography Equipment\n\nMedium and small format cameras need a *macro lens*\nin order to take close-up photographs. A macro lens is classified as a *flat field lens,* meaning that the images are produced on an even plane, thereby maintaining the sharpness on the edges (Eastman Kodak Company, 1988, p 41).\n\nConversely, a standard lens is classified as a curved field lens, meaning the images are produced on a bowed plane.\n\nThis makes a standard lens less desirable for close-up photography because the edges will lose their sharpness. Additional methods for achieving close-up photography are close-up lenses, *reversing ring adaptors,* and bellows units.\n\nClose-up lenses are clear glass lenses that are used to increase the magnification of the standard lens. Close-up lenses screw into the filter mounting threads on the front of the lens. The lenses are numbered from 1 to 10, with the higher number representing the increased strength of the lens. A reversing ring adaptor allows the lens to be turned so that the rear element of the lens faces toward the subject. This increases the distance between the film plane and the lens, thereby increasing the image size. A flexible bellows unit extends the lens forward, allowing closer focusing.\n\n## 8.5.5 The Use Of Filters\n\nThe use of black and white film in latent print photography allows for the use of color filters for heightened contrast. These filters will lighten or darken the images and are dependent upon the background color; a colored filter will lighten the tone of the same color and darken the tone of a complementary color (Table 82).\n\n## 8.5.6 Lighting\n\n8.5.6.1 Equipment. The source of the illumination may be a photographic laboratory lamp, photographic slide viewer, electronic flash, forensic light source, or photographic negative viewing light. A *diffuser* is used in order to provide an even illumination of the entire object being photographed. Any type of translucent covering (e.g., plexiglass or thin white paper) can be used as a diffuser. The diffuser is placed between the object being photographed and the light source, about 6 to 12 inches away from the light source. (When the diffuser and the light are too close, the light will be brighter in the center of the area.)\n8.5.6.2 Lighting Techniques. The type of evidence that is to be photographed determines the type of lighting technique employed. For example, evidence that is reflective will require a lighting technique far different from evidence that is transparent. In order to take accurate and clear photographs, the photographer must have an understanding of the varied lighting techniques that are available.\n\n| Background    | Filter Used to    | Filter Used to    |\n|---------------|-------------------|-------------------|\n| Color         | Lighten           | Darken            |\n| Blue          | Blue              | Red               |\n| Red           | Red               | Blue              |\n| Green         | Green             | Red or Blue       |\n| Orange        | Yellow            | Blue              |\n| Yellow        | Yellow            | Blue              |\n\nDirect Lighting. Direct lighting provides strong lighting from a source without the light first having been reflected off another surface. This type of lighting produces substantial contrast between the light and dark areas of the object being photographed. Direct lighting is set up with two or four lights equally balanced and set 45 degrees above the object, with the light shining directly onto the object (Figure 88).\n\nDirect Reflection Lighting. Direct reflection lighting uses one light source set approximately 10 degrees from the object, with the object set at approximately 10 degrees from the camera lens. This technique can only be used on flat surfaces and creates very high contrast. Latent prints developed with black, gray, or silver powder will always photograph dark (black) on a light gray (white) background (Figure 89).\n\nFront Directional Lighting. Front directional lighting (axial or axis lighting) uses one light source set at 90 degrees from the axis of the camera lens. The object to be photographed is mounted directly under the camera lens. A piece of glass is placed in the axis of the camera lens at a 45-degree angle to reflect the light down onto the object. Front directional lighting is used when photographing latent prints on mirrors or prints inside curved items (e.g., glasses or cups) (Figure 810).\n\nTransmitted Lighting. Transmitted lighting is also referred to as *back lighting.* When employing this technique, the illuminator is placed behind the object being photographed, with the light from the illuminator directed through the evidence toward the camera (Figure 811). Transmitted lighting is used when photographing an object that is transparent or translucent. Another distinct advantage for transmitted lighting is the recording of watermarks in paper.\n\nOblique Lighting. Oblique lighting is also called side lighting or *cross lighting.* Oblique lighting uses low-angle illumination to show detail by creating shadows. For this type of lighting, a single light source should be positioned at a low angle to skim across the surface, highlighting the raised portions (Figure 812). If shadows become a problem, a second light is required. When two lights are used, they are placed opposite each other to light up both sides of the impressed area. The proper angle for the light source can be found by viewing the item through the view finder and adjusting the height of the light source.\n\nBounced Lighting. Bounced light is light that does not travel directly from the illumination source to the object being photographed but is reflected off another surface (Figure 813). Bounced lighting illuminates the object with a shadow-reducing softer light. Bounced lighting is ideal for photographing objects that are concave or convex.\n\n## 8.5.7 Processing And Evidence-Dependent Photography\n\nThe key to latent print photography is the proper usage of the equipment in relation to the type of evidence being photographed and the processing that was performed. For example, knowing the best lighting technique for a certain type of evidence can mean the difference between excellent photographic evidence and evidence that needs to be re-photographed.\n\n8.5.7.1 Ninhydrin Impressions. The ability to adjust color is based upon the components of color and how a change in one color component affects other colors. A color wheel aids in the determination of color change (Figure 814). Looking at the color wheel, if a color is to be darkened (more contrast), an increase in the opposite color achieves this effect. If a color is to be lightened, or decreased, colors adjacent to that color are added. Latent impressions processed with ninhydrin (a chemical reagent) develop in the visible red range. Looking at the color wheel, the color opposite red is green. Green (#58) and yellow-green (#11) filters have been found to enhance latent impressions developed with ninhydrin. Additionally, ninhydrin impressions should be photographed using balanced direct lighting.\n\n## 8.5.7.2 Superglued Impressions On Multicolored Objects. Multicolored Smooth Objects (E.G., Magazines,\n\nphotographs, and product packaging) often pose a problem when it comes to photographing latent impressions that cross over background color variations. A solution to this is a reflected ultraviolet imaging system (RUVIS), which eliminates the multicolored background by absorbing UV light. Using the RUVIS, fingerprint residue treated with superglue may appear light or dark, untreated sebaceous prints may appear as black, and untreated sweat prints reflect white (Lin, 2006, pp 21372153).\n\n8.5.7.3 Luminescent Photography. When exposing an item with luminescent latent impression(s) to a forensic light source, the luminescence of the latent impressions may diminish or completely disappear. This phenomenon is called photodecomposition or *photodegradation* and can occur within seconds. Because of this, objects with luminescent latent impression(s) should not be exposed to a forensic light source for longer than necessary (Hardwick, 1990, p 38). Sometimes the latent impression(s) can be redeveloped to make them luminesce again. This is normally not the case if the latent impression(s) are inherently luminescing.\n\n8.5.7.4 Impressions on Reflective Surfaces. Latent impressions on reflective surfaces (e.g., chrome, silver, or nickel) are usually processed with gray or light-colored powder because the reflective surface photographs black or dark gray when employing direct lighting. Direct lighting photography used with reflective surfaces produces light ridges on a dark background and therefore the negative may be color reversed.\n\nBounced lighting may also be used when photographing flat reflective surfaces. A distinct advantage of using bounced lighting over direct lighting for photographing reflective surfaces is that bounced lighting normally produces dark ridges on a light background. This is because bounced lighting highlights the object and not the ridges.\n\n8.5.7.5 Indented Impressions. Oblique lighting is primarily used for photographing \"plastic\" impressions (e.g., those in putty, casting material, wax, grease, butter, dust, blood, or any pliable surface). The use of this technique allows shadows to be cast into the areas impressed by the ridges. Care should be exercised when photographing this type of evidence to prevent heat generated by the lights from degrading the impressions.\n\n8.5.7.6 Impressions on Irregular Surfaces. Latent prints on concave or convex surfaces often pose a problem for the photographer. Because of the curvature of the surface, total illumination of the latent prints and adequate depth of field is difficult to achieve. Even illumination of the latent print with bounced lighting can overcome this problem. A distinct advantage to this is that friction ridges will be depicted black or dark gray and the furrows and background will be white or light gray. When using bounced lighting to illuminate latent prints for photographic purposes, the lens of the camera should be extended through the center of a pliable white matte surface material. A filter adaptor ring may be used to hold the matte in place. Once the matte material surrounds the camera lens, the material is positioned as a concave reflector partially surrounding the object being photographed.\n\nWith the camera and reflective matte material in place, the photographic light is then positioned to illuminate the concave matte material. The light will reflect off the matte material and back onto the surface of the object being photographed.\n\n8.5.7.7 Transparent Latent Print Lifts. Transparent tape can be used to lift latent impressions developed with any color of fingerprint powder. Transparent tape that is mounted on either a white or black backing card is photographed using direct lighting or may be digitally recorded using a scanner. Transparent tape that is mounted onto clear plastic may be photographed using direct lighting if the lift is placed on contrasting material before being photographed. Another option for photographing transparent lifts is using transmitted lighting. Using transmitted lighting has two benefits: improved contrast is achieved and the spoiling effects of excessive powder on the lifts are decreased. When items are processed with powder, there is a possibility that excess powder will adhere to the background and will be lifted along with the latent impressions. By using transmitted lighting, the light transmits through the thinner background powder but is not transmitted through the thicker powder adhering to the latent impression(s). Transparent lifts may also be used as a photographic negative for recording through direct contact with unexposed film or photographic paper on a darkroom enlarger or similar setup.\n\n## 8.6 Other Methods Of Friction Ridge Preservation\n\nAs mentioned previously, latent print preservation is also achieved through the use of latent print lifts and casting material. Typically, these types of preservation methods are used at the crime scene. Often the evidence that needs to be processed for latent prints is too large to be removed or is immovable and must be processed in the field. Another factor dictating the use of latent print lifts and casting material is when photography cannot adequately record the latent impression(s). When this occurs, the impression should be imaged insofar as possible before lifting or casting procedures are used, to retrieve the latent print detail. At this point, the lift or cast can be imaged again for additional preservation.\n\n## 8.6.1 Fingerprint Lifters\n\nFingerprint lifters are used after the application of fingerprint powders. The powder clings to latent print deposits or contaminants already on a substance. A lift is usually made with tape or a similar lifting material having the correct amount of adhesive to remove enough of the fingerprint powder without destroying the original item. Fingerprint lifters come in a variety of types that vary in color, size, flexibility, and tackiness (stickiness). In general, there are four types of commercially produced fingerprint lifts: (1) transparent tape lifters (Figures 815 and 816), (2) hinge lifters, (3) rubber-gelatin lifters, and (4) lifting sheets. The tape may be clear or frosted and is dispensed from a roll. The tape should be unrolled in one continuous motion to the desired length. If the tape is pulled in stages, the tape will contain hesitation marks where each pull was stopped. Such marks may obscure lifted impressions. The color of the powder that is used determines the color of the backing to which the tape is adhered. The chosen backing should contrast adequately with the color of the powder that was used. When a transparent backing is used, it is up to the photographer to use an appropriately contrasting background. An advantage of using transparent tape lifters is the fact that the latent impressions on the lift will be in the proper viewing position. Some stretchable polyethylene tapes are formulated to lift latent prints off textured surfaces. These tapes are thicker and more pliable and are able to lift powder from the contours of the textured surface, whereas traditional lifting tape only lifts powder from the top of the textured surface.\n\n8.6.1.2 Hinge Lifters. As the name implies, the hinge lifter is composed of lifting tape and a backing card hinged together on one side. The adhesive side of the hinge lifter is protected by a plastic cover. When preparing to lift a latent impression, the divider is removed and discarded. The exposed adhesive is then placed on the latent impression, lifted off the surface, and then folded back onto the hinged backer (Figures 817 and 818). Hinge lifters are manufactured in various sizes and contain markings that indicate the correct side for viewing when used as designed. Hinge lifters are available with white, black, or transparent backings.\n\n8.6.1.3 Rubber-gelatin Lifters. Of the different types of lifters, rubber-gelatin lifters tend to be the least tacky and most pliable. This type of lifter is commonly chosen when a latent impression is on a surface that is considered either fragile (peeling paint from a wall) or irregularly shaped (e.g., doorknob). Rubber-gelatin lifters include a cover sheet, a low-adhesion gelatin layer, and a high-quality elastic sheet of rubber (Lightning Powder Co., Inc., 2000). These types of lifters are available in various sizes in black, white, or transparent sheets. The rubber sheet contains adhesive material and is applied to the powdered latent impression. Once it is removed from the surface, the clear and clean plastic covering is\nreapplied (Figures 819 and 820). Because the latent impression adheres to the rubber and is viewed through the covering, the print will be in reverse position.\n\n8.6.1.4 Lifting Sheets. Lifting sheets are made specifically for the recording of forensic impressions and are commonly used in the processing of human remains. The sheets are flexible and have a smooth adhesive coating. The sheets come in various sizes and can be cut according to need. For processing human remains, sheets are cut slightly larger than the size of the finger-block on a standard fingerprint card. Because of the slight elasticity of the material, it is easy to wrap the material around a finger that has been lightly coated with fingerprint powder. Once a print is obtained, the lifter is cut down to finger block size and is placed in the correct location on the back of a transparency that has had a standard fingerprint card printed on it. When the transparency is viewed from the front, the printed friction ridges are in the correct position, with the correct color, in the appropriate finger-block.\n\n## 8.6.2 Casting Material\n\nCasting material is advantageous when dealing with patent impressions, powdered latent impressions on textured surfaces, or when processing the friction ridges of deceased individuals. Casting materials are available in several colors and have been manufactured to dry quickly and release easily. In addition to use in photographic recording, casting material can be powdered or inked and then lifted or impressed on lifting sheets. The resulting image will be a reverse position image of the friction ridges.\n\n## 8.7 Conclusion\n\nThe recording of friction ridge detail dates back to the early 1900s. From the very beginning, the value of accurate\npreservation was realized, and preservation methods improved as new technologies and techniques were introduced to the forensic community. The forensic science community has witnessed the discovery of groundbreaking fingerprint detection and preservation techniques, ranging from the simple to the complex. Throughout, innovation has been the norm in crime laboratories.\n\n## 8.8 Reviewers\n\nThe reviewers critiquing this chapter were Herman Bergman, Jeri Eaton, Robert J. Garrett, Alice Maceo, Kenneth O. Smith, Jr., Kasey Wertheim, and Juliet H. Wood.\n\n## 8.9 References\n\nBellis, M. George EastmanHistory of Kodak and Rolled Photographic Film. http://www.inventors.about.com/od/ estartinventors/ss/George_Eastman.htm, accessed July 17, 2006.\n\nBidner, J. Digital Photography: A Basic Guide to New Technology. The Kodak Workshop Series; Silver Pixel Press:\nNew York, 2000. Boyle, W. S.; Smith, G. E. Charge-Coupled Semiconductor Devices. *Bell Systems Technical Journal* 1970, 49, 587. Buckland, G.; Evans, H. Shots in the Dark: True Crime Pictures; Bulfinch Press: New York, 2001.\n\nDavenport, A. *The History of Photography;* University of New Mexico Press: Alubquqerque, NM, 1999, p 4.\n\nEastman Kodak Company. Handbook of Kodak Photographic Filters (Publication B-3); Eastman Kodak Company:\nRochester, NY, 1990.\n\nEastman Kodak Company. Photography with Large Format Cameras; Eastman Kodak Company: Rochester, NY, 1988. Federal Bureau of Investigation. Latent Print Operations Manual, Standard Operation Procedures for Digital Images;\nFederal Bureau of Investigation, U.S. Department of Justice: Washington, DC, 2004.\n\nHardwick, S. A.; Kent, T.; Sears, V. Fingerprint Detection by Fluorescence Examination: A Guide to Operational Implementation; White Crescent Press, Ltd.: Luton, 1990.\n\nHarrison, W. J. A History of Photography Written as a Practical Guide and an Introduction to its Lastest Developments. The County Press: London, 1888. Ippolito, J. A. *Understanding Digital Photography;*\nThomson/Delmar Learning: New York, 2003, p 36.\n\nLangford, M. J. *Basic Photography,* 3rd ed.; The Focal Press: Woburn, 1973.\n\nLeggat, R. A History of Photography from Its Beginnings Till the 1920's. http://www.rleggat.com/photohistory (accessed July 2, 2006).\n\nLightning Powder Co., Inc. Fingerprint Camera. *Minutiae,* 2003, 74, 5.\n\nLightning Powder Company, Inc. Rubber-Gelatin Lifters: Technical Note 1-2072; Lightning Powder Company, Inc.: Jacksonville, FL, 2000. Lin, S. S.; Yemelyanov, K. M.; Pugh, Jr. E. N.; Engheta, N. Polarization-Based and Specular-Reflection-Based Noncontact Latent Fingerprint Imaging and Lifting. J. Opt. Soc. Am. 2006, 23 (9), 2137-2153. London, B.; Upton, J.; Stone, J.; Kobre, K.; Brill, B. Photography; Prentice Hall: Upper Saddle River, 2005. Menzel, E. R. *Fingerprint Detection with Lasers,* 1st ed.;\nMarcel Dekker, Inc: New York, 1980.\n\nMiller, L. S. *Police Photography,* 4th ed.; Anderson Publishing Company: Cincinnati, 1998. Moenssens, A. A. The Origin of Legal Photography. http:// www.forensic-evidence.com/site/EVID/LegalPhotog.html (accessed September 10, 2010).\n\nOlsen Sr., R. D. *Scott's Fingerprint Mechanics;* Charles C.\n\nThomas: Springfield, 1978.\n\nPhillips, S. S.; Haworth-Booth, M.; Squires, C. Police Pictures: The Photograph as Evidence; San Francisco Museum of Modern Art and Chronicle Books: San Francisco, 1997.\n\nRedsicker, D. R. Principles in Photography. In The Practical Methodology of Forensic Photography; Redsicker, D. R., Ed.; CRC Press: Boca Raton, Fla., 1994.\n\nScientific Working Group on Friction Ridge Analysis, Study and Technology (SWGFAST). Standard for Friction Ridge Digital Imaging (Latent/Tenprint). 2009. Available online at http://www.swgfast.org/documents/imaging/090914_ Standard_Imaging_1.1.pdf Scientific Working Group on Imaging Technology (SWGIT). General Guidelines for Capturing Latent Impressions Using a Digital Camera, Version 1.2, December 6, 2001. Forensic Sci. Communications 2002, 4 (2) (online journal).\n\nSWGIT. Overview of SWGIT and the Use of Imaging Technology in the Criminal Justice System, Version 3., 2006, pp 1-8. Available online at http://www.theiai.org.\n\n## C H A P T E R Examination Process John R. Vanderkolk C O N T E N T S\n\n3\n9.1  Introduction\n20\n9.6  Simultaneous, Adjacent,\nor Aggregate Fingerprints\n7\n9.2  Fundamentals of Comparison\n20\n9.7  Summary\n12\n9.3  ACE-V Examination Method\n21\n9.8  Reviewers\n17\n9.4  Decision Thresholds\n21\n9.9  References\n22\n9.10  Additional Information\n19\n9.5  The Examination\n\n## Chapter 9 Examination Process John R. Vanderkolk 9.1 Introduction\n\nThe purpose of an examination is to determine or exclude the *source* of a *print.** This chapter will discuss a method used by examiners to determine a print's source by looking at and comparing the general ridge flow in two fingerprints, the sequences and configurations of ridge paths, and if needed, the sequences and configurations of morphological details of a particular ridge and nearby ridges. This chapter also addresses the philosophies of perception and decision-making that all fingerprint examiners need to understand before turning to the mechanics of a comparison. Many authors (Seymour, 1913; Bridges, 1942; Osterburg; 1977; Stoney, 1985; Stoney and Thornton, 1986; and Hare, 2003) have sought to describe an examination method or thresholds of sufficiency for source determination [Olsen, 1983, pp 415; Stoney, 1985; 1986, pp 11871216; Hare, 2003, 700706]. These explanations usually involve visual aids or physical tools that demonstrate a sequence or configuration of a number of points (e.g., details of ridge endings, bifurcations, and dots). Some of these involve the use of transparent grids, tracings, overlaid prints, pinholes through photographic enlargements of the specific points in the prints, or an enlarged chart documenting corresponding points. These efforts attempt to (and in some instances do) help to illustrate portions of the examination process. The examination method of analysis, comparison, evaluation, followed by verification (ACE-V) is the established method for perceiving detail in two prints and making decisions. A thorough understanding of the sufficiency threshold within the method is essential. Merely arriving at a predetermined, fixed mathematical quantity of some details of a friction ridge impression (i.e., point counting) is a simplistic and limited explanation for why two prints originated from the same unique and persistent source or originated from different unique and persistent sources.\n\nevidence prints and intentionally recorded impressions from any palmar and plantar surface). Unless indicated otherwise, *source* in this chapter will refer to a specific area of friction ridge skin. The source can be the palms or soles, the fingers or toes, specific areas of ridges, or a specific area of one ridge.\n\nThere is much more to prints than the arrangement of Galton points. The examiner must use knowledge and understanding gained from training and experience to make judgments about the features of the sources and details in prints to reach a conclusion about the origin of the print in question. Cognitive science explains the processes of perception, decision-making, and development of expertise. Research in cognitive science is helping to explain how experienced examiners differ from novices [Palmer, 1999; Busey and Vanderkolk, 2005]. A philosophy of how examiners can determine or exclude a source of a print must be established for an examination method to be effective. Examiners draw from many philosophies to develop a particular examination method.\n\n## 9.1.1 Philosophy Of Uniqueness\n\nPattern formations in nature are never repeated in their morphological structures (or, as the saying goes, \"nature never repeats itself\") [Kirk, 1963; McRoberts, 1996]. This statement is supported and explained in part by biology, chemistry, and physics, and through practice and experience of observing natural patterns [Ball, 1999]. The morphogenesis of friction skin and the many developmental factors that influence the unique arrangement of friction ridges prior to birth provide the fundamental explanation of why volar skin is unique. Basic print minutiae are defined and used in mathematical formulas for traditional classification, statistical modeling, and automated fingerprint identification systems\n(AFIS). These formulas consider some of the variations in friction ridge skin arrangements, but not all of the detail that is present. In spite of these limitations, no model and application has provided evidence that prints are not unique. Instead, the study of pattern formations in nature, and pattern formations in friction ridge skin in particular, have determined the formations in friction ridge skin to be unique. The friction ridge skin features of creases, furrows, scars, cuts, and natural imperfections are also unique.\n\n## 9.1.2 Philosophy Of Persistency\n\nThe morphological surface structure of friction ridge skin is persistent. Often, the friction ridge arrangement (ridge flow and minutiae) has been described as permanent. However, the cellular surface of the friction ridge skin is not permanent. Surface cells are replaced on a regular basis. The competing forces of regenerating skin cells and the effort of maintaining the form and function of the organ of skin produces a persistent, not permanent, naturally patterned surface with all of its minute and microscopic features. In other words, the process strives to reproduce, but cannot perfectly reproduce, the patterns of the preceding cells so that the arrangements of replacement cells can follow the form and function of the replaced cells. Microscopic variations do occur. Aging of skin is an example of persistency; although patterns in friction ridge skin are not perfectly permanent, they are remarkably persistent over time. For friction ridge skin to be valuable for the examination of two prints, the unique features of ridges, creases, scars, and imperfections in the skin that had been recorded as details in two prints must be persistent between the two occurrences when each print was made. Persistency is all that is needed, not permanency.\n\n## 9.1.3 Philosophy Of Examination Logic\n\nDeduction, induction, and abduction are three types of logic [Burch, 2001; McKasson and Richards, 1998, pp 73-110] an examiner can use to determine answers to questions in friction ridge examinations. A simple explanation of logic and inference could be found in the statements:\nif A and B, therefore C\n\nif B and C, therefore A or if A and C, therefore B\nReplacing \"A\" with \"Case\", \"B\" with \"Rule\" and \"C\" with \"Result\", the examiner can explain which logic is used.\n\n9.1.3.1 Deductive Logic. \"Case and Rule, therefore Result\" becomes \"The two prints came from the same source and individualization is possible because the features of friction ridge skin are unique and persistent, therefore, the details in the two sufficient prints agree.\" Deductive logic starts with and infers the general and ends with the particular. Deductive logics infers that the particular of the details between two prints agree if the examiner knows the two sufficient prints did come from the same source, or a specific area of skin, and that friction ridge skin is unique and persistent. Deductive logic is used in training examiners. The trainer and trainees know the two prints came from the same source, the trainer and trainees know the rule of uniqueness and persistency of friction ridge skin, and so the trainer and trainees know the details in these two prints agree. Deductive logic helps the examiner understand tolerance for variations in appearance or distortion of two prints from the same source. With variations in appearances or distortions of the two prints, deductive logic is used during training exercises to learn agreement of details in sequences and configurations from the same source and to learn disagreement of details from different sources.\n\n9.1.3.2 Inductive Logic. \"Case and Result, therefore Rule\"\nbecomes \"The two prints came from the same source and the details in the two sufficient prints agree, therefore, individualization is possible because the features of friction ridge skin are unique and persistent.\" Going from the particular to the general, or from results and case determination toward the rule, is an example of inductive logic. Determining that the details in two sufficient prints agree and making a conclusion that they originated from the same source supports the rule of friction ridge skin being unique and persistent. The determination that the details in two sufficient prints disagree and that they originated from different sources also supports the rule of friction ridge skin being unique and persistent. Studying all known sources is impossible. Examiners can thus never prove uniqueness of the source through inductive logic; it can only be inferred.\n\n9.1.3.3 Abductive Logic. \"Rule and Result, therefore Case\" becomes \"Individualization is possible because the features of friction ridge skin are unique and persistent and the details in the two sufficient prints agree, therefore, the two prints came from the same source.\" In actual case work, examiners start with the fundamental principles of friction ridge skin being unique and persistent, conduct an examination to determine agreement or disagreement of details in two sufficient prints, and make the determination whether the prints came from the same source. Starting with a rule, determining a result of comparison, and reaching a conclusion in a particular case is abductive logic. As one author explains:\nNotice how both deduction and induction are involved in abduction: induction helps to generate the formulation of the given and deduction helps to show a logical relation of the premises of the given. Further, when abductive logic generates a Case, deductive logic explains the logical relation of Rule and Result, and inductive logic provides a relation of the Case to the Rule. If, by the performance of this logic, the scientist can show a universal truth, the scientist claims an adductive logic. Abductive reasoning treats the particular;\nadductive treats the *universal.*\nRecall that \"universal\" does not mean \"absolute.\" Universal refers to the breadth of the truth of the rule, its result and its case, as determined by the scientific community reviewing it: all who should know, agree. (\"Absolute\", on the other hand, refers to the quality of the truth of the rule and demands that the rule be unconditional, or \"perfectly true\".) Universal is a term that implies \"everyone\" when what we mean is \"everyone who takes the same given,\" or for \"the world\" when what we mean is \"the real world in which I and my colleagues operate.\" Universality involves subjective consensus: it is what \"everyone knows\" and accepts and is the basis for such hypotheses as \"identity exists.\" It is our \"given\" by which we proceed to investigate the observations we are making. [McKasson and Richards, 1998, p 80]\nIf the rule of all pattern formations in nature being unique could definitely be demonstrated as false, or falsified, the rule would have to be altered. This falsification has never occurred. Based on observation, experimentation, and knowledge of pattern formations in nature (volar skin, other natural pattern formations, and their prints), the rule of law in forensic comparative sciences is: pattern formations in friction ridge skin cannot be replicated, and their prints can be individualized.\n\n## 9.1.4 Philosophy Of Belief\n\nThe general context of belief is the collaboration of mankind in the advancement and the dissemination of knowledge. For if there is such a collaboration, then men not only contribute to a common fund of knowledge but also receive from it. But while they contribute in virtue of their own experience, understanding, and judgment, they receive not an immanently generated but a reliably communicated knowledge. That reception is belief, and our immediate concern is its general context. [Lonergan, 1992, p 725] Because collaboration is a fact, because it is inevitable, because it spreads into a highly differentiated network of interdependent specialties, the mentality of any individual becomes a composite product in which it is impossible to separate immanently generated knowledge and belief. [Lonergan, 1992, p 727]\nOne expert cannot generate all knowledge about everything that is used in examinations of prints. The expert must rely on valid collaboration and beliefs. In order to know and have confidence in a conclusion, the examiner must be tolerant for variations in appearances of the two prints, because each independent deposition of a print does not produce a perfect replication of a previously deposited print. With each independent touching of a substrate (the surface being touched), there are always variations in appearances or distortions of the source friction ridge skin. The less clear a print, the more tolerant for variations the examiner must be. The clearer the print, the less tolerant for variations the examiner should be. The examiner must not stretch tolerance too far. Tolerance for variations in appearances, or distortions, must be within the limits of the substrate, the pliability of the skin, the effects of friction, and the motion of touching of friction ridge skin to the substrate. The examiner must study distorted friction ridge skin and its prints to understand tolerances for variations in appearances of prints. Doubt must be overcome when determining actual agreement or disagreement between the details of the two prints. The examiner starts with no knowledge whether agreement or disagreement exists, begins doubting whether sufficient agreement or disagreement actually exists, continues the examination and works through doubt, and then makes a determination whether the details in the two prints actually agree or disagree. As the examiner works through doubt by asking and answering all relevant and appropriate questions [Lonergan, 1992, pp 296300], predictions start to take place. The examiner predicts to find agreement or disagreement of details. Once reliable prediction [Wertheim, 2000, p 7] takes place by correctly predicting then validly determining the details, and all relevant questions have been asked and answered correctly based on ability, training, experience, understanding, and judgments, the examiner removes the irritation of doubt about actual agreement or disagreement of details and can make a determination whether the prints originated from the same source. The examiner must prevent prediction from becoming a bias that improperly influences the determination of agreement or disagreement. All relevant questions must have been asked and answered correctly for the prediction to be reliable. The examiner transitions through the examination by analyzing, comparing, and evaluating the details of the prints through critical and objective comparative measurements of the details of general ridge flow, specific ridge paths and ridge path lengths, the sequences and configurations of ridge paths and their terminations, and the sequences and configurations of edges or textures and pore positions along ridge paths. The examiner makes a transition from insufficient knowledge, through doubt, to knowing and belief. The examiner bases this knowing on the previous training, experience, understanding, and judgments of self and a belief in the legitimacy of the training, experience, understanding, and judgments of the collaborated community of scientists. The examiner critically asks all relevant and appropriate questions about the subject (prints), correctly answers all the relevant questions about the subject, knows the determination, removes the irritation of doubt, and becomes fixated on belief [Peirce, 1877, 115]. Some of the relevant and appropriate questions involve the uniqueness and persistency of the friction ridge skin, the substrate, the matrix, distortion of the friction ridge skin, deposition pressure, deposition direction, development technique, clarity of details, quantity of details, sufficiency of sequence of details, threshold to determine sufficiency, and examination method. The scientific or examination method asks questions throughout the process to remove doubt from the examiner's conclusion. The examiner is seeking the truth or reality of the relationship between the two prints. By asking all relevant and appropriate questions; correctly answering all relevant questions based upon previous training, experience, understanding, and judgments of self and others within the collaboration of forensic scientists; and removing the irritation of doubt, the examiner knows what is believed as truth. The collaboration of scientists and dissemination of knowledge is what science is about. The collaboration of scientists and dissemination of knowledge generate the relevant questions that need to be asked and determine the correctness of the answers. This process parallels the description of scientific method by making observations, forming hypotheses, asking questions, collecting data, testing data, reaching a conclusion, sharing the conclusion, and being able to replicate the conclusion. If two examiners reach opposing conclusions of individualization and exclusion about the source of the same unknown print, one of the examiners has failed to ask and correctly answer relevant and appropriate questions about the prints. One of the examiners is wrong. As these rare dilemmas occur, part of the conflict resolution needs to determine whether all relevant and appropriate questions about the prints had been asked and correctly answered by the examiners. Humans can and do make mistakes. The resolution needs to confront the training, experience, understanding, judgments, and knowledge and beliefs of the examiners and their collaborators. Science must learn from mistaken beliefs through inquiry and collaboration of the scientists. Something has led the erroneous examiner to his or her mistaken belief. If the inquiry and collaboration fail to determine the cause for the mistaken belief, that belief will continue, for there is no reason to change. [Lonergan, 1992, pp 735736]\n\n## 9.2 Fundamentals Of Comparison\n\nExaminer understanding of friction ridge skin and the associated features of ridges, furrows, creases, scars, cuts, warts, wrinkles, blisters, and imperfections is needed before examination of prints takes place. In order to reach conclusions from the examination process, fundamental principles of the source, or skin, must be established. Uniqueness and persistency of skin are the fundamental principles [SWGFAST, 2002a, p 1; SWGFAST, 2004, p 1]. Every science has nomenclature that is needed for communication purposes. Adequately describing something that is unique is a difficult challenge. After all, unique implies nothing else is just like it. Labels are attached to the features of friction ridges and details of their prints for communication and classification purposes. Whorls, loops and arches, ending ridges, bifurcations, and dots are some of the generic labels used to generally describe the morphological structures of friction ridges and the details in prints. Examiners need to be attentive to the actual uniqueness of the features of the ridge and not allow the use of generalized descriptive labels to diminish the examiner's understanding of the actual value of the feature. If an examiner is looking for just ridge endings or bifurcations, the examiner might only see a ridge that ends or bifurcates. Conversely, if an examiner looks for the overall inherent morphology of the ridge, the shapes and dimensions of the ridge, where it starts, the path it takes, where it ends, the widths, the edges, the pore positions, and the morphology of the neighboring ridges, the examiner will become more perceptive of the details within the prints. Pattern formations in nature can never be completely described through the use of commonly labeled unique features [Grieve, 1990, p 110; Grieve, 1999; Vanderkolk, 1993].\n\nOften, prints of the same source are recorded at two significantly different times, before and after trauma to the skin. As an example, scars might be present in a more recent print and not in a previous recording of the same source. By having a basic understanding of the biology, healing, and regeneration of skin, the examiner will understand the persistency issues related to the source that made the two prints. As long as there is sufficient persistency of any natural, traumatic, or random unique feature of the skin between the times of deposition of the two prints, the details of any unique and persistent features of the skin can be used in conjunction with the details of other unique and persistent features. There is no reason to ignore any of the details of any of the unique and persistent features in the source.\n\n## 9.2.1 Variations In Appearances\n\nExaminer understanding of variations in appearances among prints is needed before examination of a print takes place. Each independent print from the source will vary in appearance from every other independent print from the same source. Many factors influence the variations in appearances of prints. The surface areas of the friction ridge skin that touch substrates influence the variations in appearances. The exact surface area of skin touching the first substrate will not be the exact surface area of skin that touches the second substrate. Each time the skin touches a substrate, the surface area will vary. The manner in which friction ridge skin touches a substrate influences the variations in appearance. Each independent touching has different influences that cause variations in the appearances of the prints. Flat touching, rolling, sliding, or twisting will influence the skin's pliability, causing distortions. Studying the manners of touching and distortion will aid the examiner in examination of prints. The substrates or surfaces being touched influence the variations in appearance. Each independent touching of differing substrates has different influences that cause variations. The cleanliness, texture, contour, or porous nature of the substrate will influence the prints.\n\nThe matrices, or residues, on the friction ridge skin when the skin touches a substrate influence the variations in appearance. Sweat, oil, and blood are common matrices that cause variations. The matrices on the substrate that is touched by friction ridge skin also influence the variations. Oils, dust, blood, or other residues are common matrices on substrates. The types and amounts of matrices and their interactions will influence variations with each touching of the substrate. The actual transfers of matrices between skin and substrate will vary because each independent touching has different influences that cause variations. Variations in temperature, humidity, or weather before, during, and after independent touching of substrates influence the matrices upon a given substrate. These variations also influence the transfers of matrices between skin and substrate. As skin is traumatized with imperfections and regenerates, variations in the morphology of the skin can occur. The healing process occurs over time. Realizing the persistency issues of healing and aging of various features is thus needed to understand variations. Variations in different latent print processing or development techniques, and variations in the application of these techniques, will influence variations in appearances of an unknown or latent print. Heavy or light powdering, cyanoacrylate fuming, chemical processing, or fluorescent processing will cause variations in appearance. The same is true for variations in different standard print capturing techniques, and variations in the application of these techniques. The components and amounts of inks, chemicals, powders, substrates, or electronics used to capture, record, or print known or standard prints influence variations in appearance. The handling, packaging, or storing of an undeveloped or nonfixed print can further influence its appearance. The matrix might evaporate, rub off, get scratched, transfer to the package, or blend into the substrate. Surface contact, environment, temperature, humidity, and light all can influence the appearance of a captured print, just as they can with a latent print. Additionally, the techniques used to view or enlarge prints will influence variations in appearance. Magnification, photographic equipment, computers, facsimile or copy machines, and other media used for printing, viewing, copying, and enlarging prints can cause variations.\n\nThe plethora of influences that occur during independent touching, processing, capturing, recording, storing, and viewing of unknown and known prints will cause each independent print to vary in appearance from every other recording. The examiner needs to realize this when examining prints. Each print will have various quality and quantity of details of recorded features. These variations do not necessarily preclude determination or exclusion of the source of the print. Rather, they are expected. Just as pattern formations in nature are unique, the prints made by each independent touching will produce a pattern that is just not like any other, as depicted in Figure 91. There is no such thing as a perfect or exact match between two independent prints or recordings from the same source. Each print is unique; yet, an examiner can often determine whether unique prints originated from the same unique source.\n\n## 9.2.2 Levels Of Detail In Prints\n\nA way to describe features by using three levels of detail in prints was introduced by David Ashbaugh [Ashbaugh, 1999, pp 9597, 136144]. McKasson and Richards talk of levels as sets, subsets, and sub-subsets [McKasson and Richards, 1998, pp 94100]. Levels of detail in prints are simple descriptions of the different types of information throughout the print. Depending on the clarity of the print, various levels may be detectable.\n\n9.2.2.1 First Level Detail. First level detail of friction ridge features is the general overall direction of ridge flow in the print. First level detail is not limited to a defined classification pattern. Every impression that is determined to be a friction ridge print has a general direction of ridge flow, or first level detail. Impressions of fingers, phalanges, tips, sides, palms, or soles have first level detail. The perceived general direction of ridge flow is not considered to be unique. General direction is shared by many other sources. Figure 92 depicts three prints showing general direction of ridge flow.\n\n9.2.2.2 Second Level Detail. Second level detail is the path of a specific ridge. The actual ridge path includes the starting position of the ridge, the path the ridge takes, the length of the ridge path, and where the ridge path stops. Second level detail is much more than the specific location of where a ridge terminates at a ridge ending or bifurcation, or its Galton points. Sequences and configurations with other ridge paths are part of second level detail.\n\nThe ridge path and its length with terminations are unique. The sequences and configurations of a series of ridge paths are also unique. Second level details in a print cannot exist without first level details. The general direction of ridge flow must exist for a specific ridge path to exist. Figure 93 depicts three prints with first and second levels of details.\n\n9.2.2.3 Third Level Detail. Third level details are the shapes of the ridge structures. This level of detail encompasses the morphology (edges, textures, and pore positions) of the ridge. Fingerprint scientists Edmund Locard and Salil Chatterjee contributed to the field's awareness of the edges and pores of the ridge [Chatterjee, 1953, pp 166169]. The features of third level details are unique in their shapes, sequences, and configurations. Clarity of the print might limit an examiner's ability to perceive the morphology, sequences, and configurations of third level details. Third level details cannot exist without first and second levels of detail. The general direction of ridge flow and a specific ridge path must exist for morphology or pore positions of a ridge to be visibly present as third level detail in a print. Figure 94 depicts three prints with first, second, and third levels of detail.\n\n9.2.2.4 Levels of Detail of Other Features. First, second, and third levels of detail can also describe other features\n\nRight thumbprint with differing\nfactors demonstrated in inked\nimpressions: (a) a typical\nimpression, (b) more pressure\nexerted, causing a color\nreversal and recording a\nlarger area; (c) an impression\nrolled from one side to the\nother; (d) an impression with\nsome pressure toward the top\nof the finger and rolled\nforward to record more of the\ntip; (e) an impression with\nexcessive pressure, resulting\nin a poorly recorded print.\n\n(e.g., creases, scars, incipient ridges, and other imperfec-\ntions) from volar skin represented in a print. First level\ndetails describe the general directions and positions of\nthe features. Figure 95 depicts the general direction of\ncreases, scars, and imperfections.\n\nSecond level details of creases, scars, or imperfections are\nthe actual paths of the specific features. The actual path in-\ncludes the starting position of the detail, the path it takes,\nthe length of the path, and where the path stops. A second\nlevel detail is much more than the location where a feature\nstops or bifurcates. Second level details of these features\ndo not require the path termination to occur. A continuous\npath from one end of the print to the other end of the print\nis included within the definition of second level details.\nSecond level details of other features cannot exist without\nfirst level details of the same features. Figure 96 depicts\ngeneral direction and specific paths of creases, scars, and\nimperfections.\n\nThird level details of creases, scars, or imperfections are\nthe morphologies or shapes within their structures. This\nlevel of detail encompasses the morphological edges and\ntextures along or upon the feature. Third level details of a\ncrease, scar, or imperfection cannot exist without first and\nsecond levels of these details. Specific shapes and edges of\ncreases, scars, and imperfections are depicted in Figure 97.\n\nAn emphasis needs to be placed on persistency. No matter which unique feature is considered, persistency of the feature on the source must be sufficient between the two events of touching for details of the feature to be significant in an examination.\n\n## 9.2.3 Ranges Of Clarity\n\nThe ability to completely describe the clarity of a print is difficult, if not impossible, because there are ranges of clarity within each level of detail, and levels of detail are not equally clear throughout each level within a print. The ranges of clarity within each level of detail exist because the clarity within each level varies within each print [Vanderkolk, 2001]. Clear first level details have more\nsignificance than less clear first level details. Likewise, clear second level details have more significance than less clear second level details and clear third level details have more significance than less clear third level details. As clarity improves, the power or significance of the details within each level improves. Ranges of clarity and their significance within each of the three levels of detail are depicted in Figure 98 [Vanderkolk, 2001]. The quality axis represents the clarity of details of the friction ridge features. Quality can approach perfectly clear recordings of the friction ridge features, but will never reach perfect clarity. The axis approaches, but does not reach, 100% recorded quality of the features of the source.\n\nQuality is difficult to accurately quantify. That is why no numerical scale is placed on the quality axis. This scale simply depicts the relationship between quality and significance. As the quality of the print increases, the significance of the detail observed increases. Quality also cannot exist without a quantity of details. Any figure depicting the quality aspect should also include a quantity of those details. As those details are observed and comparatively measured, the quantity of details increases across the horizontal axis and the quality of those same details are represented with the vertical axis. (For more on the relationship between quality and quantity, see section 9.4.)\nThe bottom of Figure 98 starts at 0. There is no image, no details, no significance. The diagram is separated into first, second, and third levels. An undefined width of quantity of details exists across the horizontal axis. Heights occur within each level, depicting the undefined increments that detail will have as the quality of the image increases. All first level details are not equally clear. All second level details are not equally clear. All third level details are not equally clear. The details within each level and among the levels have different significance or power, depending upon their clarities. As clarity increases, the significance of the details increases. As clarity decreases, the significance of the details decreases. Notice that there is no top to third level details. Again, the clarity of the image and third level details can approach, but never reach, perfect recording of the features of the skin. An undefined breadth of gray area in Figure 98 separates each level. These gray areas represent expertise and doubt by the examiner. The black lines within the gray areas represent reality. The examiner cannot perfectly determine when the clarity of details transitions from one level to the next; doubt exists. The examiner must default to lower significance when in doubt. Just as importantly, the examiner must not give too much significance to details within a white level area. Too much significance must not be given to any particular detail [Grieve, 1988; Ashbaugh, 1999, pp 9597, 143, 217226; Vanderkolk, 1999; Vanderkolk, 2001].\n\nAs in ranges of clarity within levels of details of friction ridge features, there are ranges of clarity within first, second, and third levels of details of crease, scar, and imperfection features.\n\n## 9.3 Ace-V Examination Method\n\nThe examination method of analysis, comparison, evaluation (ACE) and verification (V) has a history of progression [Huber, 1959 60; Huber, 1972; Cassidy, 1980; Tuthill, 1994; Ashbaugh, 1999; Vanderkolk, 2004]. ACE V is the examination method described in the Scientific Working Group for Friction Ridge Analysis, Study, and Technology (SWGFAST) documents [SWGFAST, 2002a, p 2]. Variations of the descriptions used elsewhere parallel the phases of ACE\nin other scientific applications [Palmer, 1999, pp 413416] and ACE-V in other forensic disciplines [McKasson and Richards, 1998, pp 131138]. ACE is a simple explanation of the phases involved in perception and decision-making. ACE gives the expert specific phases of examination that can be used to document the perception, informationgathering, comparison, and decision-making that takes place during an examination of prints. Scientific method is often described as observation, hypothesis formulation, experimentation, data analysis, and conclusion. ACE is one description of a method of comparing print details, forming a hypothesis about the source, experimenting to determine whether there is agreement or disagreement, analyzing the sufficiency of agreement or disagreement, rendering an evaluation, and retesting to determine whether the conclusion can be repeated. Describing information-gathering and decision-making is difficult. ACE is a structured approach to gathering information about the details in prints. ACE is not a linear method in which analysis is conducted once, comparison is conducted once, and then a decision is made once in the evaluation. ACE can and does recur during informationgathering and decision-making. However, the three phases of ACE need to be discussed independently. The analysis and comparison must be conducted so that the comparative measurements and sequences can be accurately determined to reach a valid evaluation. The examiner must avoid allowing biases to influence each phase of the examination. Improper adjustments of determinations in the analysis and comparison phases because of biases do not validate a conclusion made in the evaluation. Thus, improper determinations can result from biases [Dror, 2005, pp 799809; Dror, 2006, pp 7478; Dror, 2006, pp 600610; Byrd, 2005].\n\n## 9.3.1 Analysis\n\nAnalysis is the assessment of a print as it appears on the substrate. The analysis of the print proceeds by systematically separating the impression into its various components. The substrate, matrix, development medium, deposition pressure, pressure and motion distortion, and development medium are analyzed to ascertain the variations in appearances and distortions. An analysis of clarity establishes the levels of detail that are available to compare and the examiner's tolerance for variations [Ashbaugh, 1999, pp 94]. The examiner makes a determination, based upon previous training, experience, understanding, and judgments, whether the print is sufficient for comparison with another print. If one of the prints is determined to be insufficient, the examination is concluded with a determination that the print is insufficient for comparison purposes. If the known print is insufficient, better known standards are needed for further comparison.\n\n## 9.3.2 Comparison\n\nThe direct or side-by-side comparison of friction ridge details to determine whether the details in two prints are in agreement based upon similarity, sequence, and spatial relationship occurs in the comparison phase [Ashbaugh, 1999, pp 109136, SWGFAST, 2002a, p 3]. The examiner makes comparative measurements of all types of details and their sequences and configurations. This comparative measurement is a mental assessment of details, not just a series of physical measurements using a fixed scale. The comparative assessments consider tolerance for variations in appearances caused by distortions. Because no print is ever perfectly replicated, mental comparative measurements must be within acceptable tolerance for variations. Comparative measurements of first, second, and third level details are made along with comparisons of the sequences and configurations of ridge paths. To repeat, comparative measurement involves mentally measuring the sequences and configurations of the elements of all levels and types of details of the first print with the same elements of the second print.\n\nAs stated earlier, because each independent touching of a substrate produces a unique print with a variation in appearance, comparative measurement tolerance must be considered during the comparison phase. The less clear or more distorted either print is, the more tolerant for variations the examiner must be. The clearer and less distorted either print is, the less tolerant for variations the examiner must be. Because the examiner is more tolerant for variations in poor-quality prints, the examiner will require more details when making an agreement or disagreement determination. Because the examiner is less tolerant for variations in good-quality prints, the examiner can make a determination using fewer details. And, also as previously stated, understanding the causes for distortion will support the explanations for variations in appearances. The examiner needs to study a variety of known distorted prints to understand acceptable tolerance for variations in appearances in prints. Actual agreement or disagreement of similar details in sequences and configurations between two prints is the determination sought by the examiner during the comparison. Because the prints will vary in appearance, judgments must be made throughout the process. After determinations of actual agreement or disagreement of first, second, or third levels of details in the comparison phase, evaluation is the next step.\n\n## 9.3.3 Evaluation\n\n\"Evaluation is the formulation of a conclusion based upon analysis and comparison of friction ridge skin\" (prints) [SWGFAST, 2002a, p 3]. Whereas in the comparison phase, the examiner makes determinations of agreement or disagreement of individual details of the prints in question, in the evaluation phase the examiner makes the final determination as to whether a finding of individualization, or same source of origin, can be made. During the evaluation, the examiner cannot determine two prints originated from the same source with agreement of only first level details. If the examiner determines sufficient agreement of first and second level details, or of first, second, and third levels of detail, after analysis and comparison, an evaluation of individualization is made. Figure 99 represents two prints with first, second, and third levels of agreement. (Not all details are marked in Figure 99.)\nIf a determination is made that first, second, or third level details actually disagree, evaluation of the analysis and comparison results in an exclusion determination as depicted in Figures 910 to 912. It is important to note that excluding a finger as having made the unknown print is not the same as excluding a person as having made the unknown print. The examiner needs to indicate whether the source being excluded is a person, a hand or foot, a finger or toe, or ridges. Sufficiently complete and clear recordings of detail from the volar surfaces is needed to make any exclusion. The inability to determine actual disagreement does not result in a determination of individualization. Instead, if after analysis and comparison no determination of sufficient agreement or disagreement of details can be made, an inconclusive determination is warranted [SWGFAST, 2002a, p 4]. The details might seem like they could agree or like they could disagree, but there is doubt. The examiner cannot determine whether the details agree or disagree, or perhaps cannot even determine whether the sequences and configurations of details are sufficient to decide. This could be due to insufficiency of the unknown print, insufficiency of the known print, or a combination of both. The examiner cannot determine which factor is insufficient, and must default to an inconclusive determination.\n\n## 9.3.4 Recurring, Reversing, And Blending Application Of Ace\n\nThe human mind is much too complex to only conduct one linear and single application of analysis, comparison, and evaluation during an examination. Figure 913 represents a model to help explain and illustrate the complexity of the variety of perceptual phases that occur and recur during an examination. The critical application of ACE is represented in the model by red area A, green area C, and blue area E. There are no arrows in the model. The examination starts with analysis, then comparison, then evaluation. However, the examiner can change the phases with little effort. The phases of the examination often recur. The examiner often re-analyzes, re-compares, and re-evaluates during the examination. The recurring application of each phase is a natural occurrence. The examiner can easily change directions in the examination. If unable to determine the significance of the examination with the details and information gathered in the current phase, the examiner can reverse the direction of application and return to a previous phase. The actual phases of the examination cannot be completely isolated from the other phases. After analysis of the first print, the analysis of the second print starts. During this second analysis, the examiner begins to mentally compare the details in the first print to the details being determined in the second print. As this second analysis takes place, a mental comparison begins; the analysis and comparison phases seem to blend together. Even while analyzing and comparing the second print, an evaluation of the analysis and comparison phases starts to take place. The evaluation is blended into the analysis, which is blended with the comparison. This happens within all phases of the examination. The blending of phases is most apparent when quickly excluding a source as having made both prints when the first level details are extremely different. During the comparison, re-analyzing takes place. As critical comparative measurements are made, the detail is re-analyzed to verify the previous analysis. During the comparison, evaluations start to take place. During the evaluation, re-analyzing and re-comparing takes place. All these processes seem to occur at the same time in the mind of the examiner. The examiner needs to critically examine the prints while in each phase and understand the recurring, reversing, and blending potential of each phase. Biases can potentially influence the perceptions taking place in each phase. The examiner must resist using what is determined to be present in one print as justification for finding that detail in the other print. The analyses, comparisons, and evaluations must not be contaminated by the examiner's justification of details that do not exist. The details must be determined from proper analyses of the first print followed by proper analyses of the second print. As comparisons are taking place, the analyses will be reconsidered. As evaluations are taking place, the analyses and comparisons will be reconsidered. The examiner must consciously apply each\n\n## Figure 910\n\nFirst level details not in agreement.\n\n## Figure 911\n\nSecond level detail not in agreement.\n\n## Figure 912\n\nThird level detail not in agreement.\n\nindependent phase of ACE. Critical perception needs to take place in the separate phases of ACE, and critical decisions must be made within each phase as well. The examiner needs to critically attend to the prints during the examination. The actual examination is represented in the model by the three smaller circles with capital A, C, and E in the red, green, and blue parts of the circles. The colors of the circles represent the attention dedicated to The recurring, reversible, and blending\nprimary phases of ACE are represented by the small interlocking circles with the following colors: A = red; C = green;  E = blue. The blending phases of A/C = yellow; C/E = blue/green;\nA/E = magenta; A/C/E = white.\n\nThe recurring, reversible, and blending complementary phases of ACE expertise are represented by the larger interlocking circles with the following colors: a = red; c = green;\ne = blue. The blending phases of a/c = yellow;\nc/e = blue/green; a/e = magenta; a/c/e = white.\n\nThe black dot in the center represents the subconscious processing of detail in which perception can occur.  The gray (that encircles the ACE/ace circles) represents other expert knowledge, beliefs, biases, influences, and abilities. The white that encircles the gray represents the decision has been made.\n\n(Reprinted from the Journal of Forensic Identification, 2004, 54 (1), p 49.)\nthe examination. The black dot in the middle of the model represents subconscious perception. The white center area represents a blended ACE that occurs very quickly. Yellow, cyan, and magenta also represent blended phases. Conscious, critical perception and decisions need to be made during the examination, represented by the red, green, and blue parts of the phases. The examiner bases decisions made during the examination upon expertise or the knowledge and beliefs from previous training, experience, understanding, and judgments of his or her own and in collaboration with other scientists. This expertise is represented by the larger colored and overlapping circles labeled with lower case letters of a, c, and e that encircle the smaller current examination of colored circles. The current examination takes place within the larger expertise circles. Each ACE examination is based on knowledge gained in previous ones. In the diagram, the current examination happens within the blended phases of previous analyses, comparisons, and evaluations. Also, each of the three phases of the current ACE examination is analyzed (a), compared (c), and evaluated (e) in consideration of previous examinations and training, experience, understanding, and judgments to determine the print's significance or sufficiency. That is why the model represents the current examination taking place within the white overlapping area of the larger expert phases of the model. Numerous analyses, comparisons, and evaluations take place within the ACE phases. The first print (the unknown or latent print) is analyzed numerous times as needed. Then the second print (usually the known or standard print) is analyzed numerous times, as needed. Then, the first print is compared with the second print numerous times, as needed. Many comparative measurements take place to determine the agreement or disagreement of various levels of details. Many evaluations take place. Eventually, the final analysis and comparison lead to the final evaluation.\n\nMany influences can affect the current ACE examination. Knowledge and beliefs of uniqueness, persistency, and impression evidence in other types of forensic comparative sciences can influence the examination. Biases, pressures, or expectations can influence the examination. The examiner needs to be aware of other influences and conduct the examination so that these influences do not negatively affect the examination. These other influences are represented by the gray that encircles the colored circles. The white around the circles represents the decision made after critical analysis, comparison, and evaluation examination of the prints. After sufficient ACE examination within expertise and influences, the examiner makes a determination.\n\n## 9.3.5 Verification\n\n\"Verification is the independent examination by another qualified examiner resulting in the same conclusion\" [SWGFAST, 2002a, p 4]. In Figure 913, verification is represented by +V. Having a second examiner apply the ACE methodology between the unknown and known prints without indications of a previous conclusion by the original examiner is one method of applying verification. Reworking the case with indications of decisions made by the original examiner is another method of applying verification. Conducting an examination between two enlarged and charted prints provided by the original examiner is another method of applying verification. There are many methods of applying the verification phase of an examination beyond these examples. The method of verification must be selected so that the verifier is not improperly influenced by the original examiner's decisions or work products. The verifier must be able to reach an unbiased conclusion. SWGFAST states verification is required for all individualizations. Verification is optional for exclusion or inconclusive determinations [SWGFAST, 2002a, p 4].\n\n## 9.4 Decision Thresholds\n\nEach print examined must have sufficient details or recording of the features of the skin to determine or exclude the source. Lack of clarity in the prints diminishes the examiner's ability to determine or exclude a source of the print. Because the prints have reduced quality of details, the prints must have sufficient quantity of details of these features to determine or exclude a source.\n\nDecisions must be made within each phase of ACE. Whether to go forward, backward, or to stop in the examination must be decided. Selecting a threshold of sufficiency is the challenge. During the last 100 years, various models of sufficiency have been presented. Locard presented his tripartite rule in 1914; he indicated that more than 12 clear minutiae establishes certainty [Champod, 1995, p 136]. In 1924, the New Scotland Yard adopted a policy (with some exceptions) of requiring 16 points [Evett, 1996, pp 5154]. At some time prior to 1958, the Federal Bureau of Investigation abandoned the practice of requiring a set number of points [Hoover, 1958]. During the 1970 conference of the International Association for Identification (IAI), a resolution was passed to form a committee for the purpose of determining \"the minimum number of friction ridge characteristics which must be present in two impressions in order to establish positive identification\" [McCann, 1971, p 10]. Three years later, that committee reported that \"no valid basis exists at this time for requiring that a predetermined minimum number of friction ridge characteristics must be present in two impressions in order to establish positive identification\" [McCann, 1973, p 14]. The standardization committee report has been reaffirmed and continues to date as the IAI position, and has been reaffirmed in various other forums [Grieve, 1995, pp 580581; SWGFAST, 2004, p 1]. In North America, the prevailing threshold of sufficiency is the examiner's determination that sufficient quantity and quality of detail exists in the prints being compared. This is the quantitativequalitative threshold (QQ), and can be explained simply as: For impressions from volar skin, as the quality of details in the prints increases, the requirement for quantity of details in the prints decreases. As the quantity of details in the prints increases, the requirement for quality of details decreases. So, for clearer prints, fewer details are needed and for less clear prints, more details are needed. This follows the law of uniqueness in pattern formations in nature. When challenged to predetermine how much is needed to individualize, it depends on how clear the prints are and how many details are present. QQ represents the most natural threshold for recognition of details of unique features. Natural recognition relies upon how clear a print is and how many details are in the print. The QQ threshold can be used in all forensic comparative sciences that rely upon uniqueness and persistency in the source to make determinations. Artificial, predetermined quantities of limited and generically labeled details of unique features of the source are not adequate for\n(Adapted from the Journal of Forensic Identification, 2001, 51 (5), p 464.)\nexplaining agreement. Sufficiency for same source determinations depends on a quality/quantity relationship.\n\nFigure 914 depicts the QQ threshold curves [Vanderkolk 1999, Vanderkolk 2001]. For any impression from volar skin, quality relies upon quantity just as quantity relies upon quality. Under the curve is insufficiency. Insufficiency is represented by black. Upon leaving the black and interfacing with the gray curve, sufficiency is reached. This sufficiency threshold is based on the value of 1. (X times Y = 1, or Q times Q = 1, is the curve.) One unit of uniqueness in agreement is the theoretical minimum needed to determine the prints had been made by the same unique and persistent source. One unit of uniqueness in disagreement is the minimum needed to determine the two prints had been made by different unique and persistent sources. This is why the threshold model is based on the value of quality times quantity equaling one. However, the examiner cannot determine the actual threshold of absolute minimum sufficiency of one unit of uniqueness. Therefore, the examiner must go beyond the theoretical minimum threshold of one, through the gray doubt area to the curves, and transition to knowing and believing the determination. An understanding of sufficiency becomes fixated beyond the gray doubt, in the white area. Defining the physical attributes of one unit of uniqueness using common terms is difficult, if not impossible, because each unit of uniqueness is itself unique. Less clarity of many details increases the need to have more quantity of details to equal one unit. Sequences and alignments of details and features must be studied to develop expertise and understand uniqueness. The understanding of the physical attributes of uniqueness is based on previous training, experience, understanding, and judgments of the expert and the beliefs of the collaborating scientific community.\n\nThe gray quality and quantity axes intersect at zero. If the QQ curves were to intersect with either axis, there would be no print: A print with no quality of details could not exist. Neither could a print with no quantity of details. The QQ curves continue along both axes. The prints can approach perfect and complete recording of all the details of all the features of the skin, but will never reach perfection. Since nature is unique, there can never be a perfect and complete print, or replication of uniqueness. If complete replication of uniqueness would occur, uniqueness would cease. The curves stop in the model because the examiner can only perceive details to a practical level. The curves actually continue. The quality axis approaches, but cannot reach, 100% clarity of the original source. The quantity axis approaches, but cannot reach, complete recording of all features within the recorded area of the skin. The model depicts reality and practicality at the same time. The curve on the right side represents sufficiency of agreement of details for the evaluation phase. This curve also represents sufficiency of details in the analysis and comparison phases. The curve on the left side represents sufficiency of disagreement of details for the comparison and evaluation phases. These are two separate and distinct positive curves, mirror images of each other. The curves must be separate and distinct. Actual agreement and disagreement of unique details in two prints from unique and persistent source(s) cannot exist at the same time. Two prints from different unique and persistent sources cannot have two, four, six, or any number of details that actually match. (If an examiner states this is possible, the examiner is confused about uniqueness, confused about persistency, confused about actual agreement, confused about actual disagreement, or a combination of all of these.)\nThe ability to perceive agreement or disagreement is limited by a combination of the imperfectly recorded prints and human beings' perceptual abilities. If sufficiency does not exist for source determination or exclusion, the examiner cannot determine whether the details of unique features of the source(s) agree or disagree. Therefore, gray doubt exists between, or connects, the two insufficient areas under the QQ curves of agreement and disagreement. The examiner cannot determine whether the details of unique and persistent features of the skin actually agree or disagree. The examiner cannot determine the sufficiency of sequences and configurations of the details that are perceived. The model also depicts the three decisions that can be reached after conducting analyses, comparisons, and evaluations:\n\n- Agreement (white area): Sufficient details agree and\nsupport a determination that the prints came from the same source.\n\n- Disagreement (white area): Sufficient details disagree\nand warrant a determination that the prints came from different sources.\n- Inconclusive (gray and black areas): The examiner cannot determine whether the details actually agree or disagree, or cannot determine sufficiency of sequences and configurations.\nThe interface position between black and gray is fixed. The black area under each curve is also fixed. The black is insufficiency, less than the value of 1. The width of the gray varies. The upper limit of the gray can expand away from the black to represent less expertise or more doubt, or contract toward the black to represent more expertise or less doubt. Each examiner varies in their width of the gray. The width varies with expertise, training, experience, understanding, and judgments of their own and of others. The width of the gray also represents individual daily variations within the examiner. The examiner must avoid examinations when unable to properly attend to the examination. The human factor must be considered when making determinations. The examiner must remember, \"when in doubt, don't\" and \"do not be wrong\". The gray also represents the interaction of the examiner with the method and threshold. The examiner is part of the method and makes the determinations using the QQ threshold as a model.\n\n## 9.5 The Examination\n\nAn ACE examination starts with the analysis of the first print. The examiner then selects and stores some of the details of the first print as a target group in memory. The size or area of the print that contains the target group should not be too large because the examiner cannot perfectly store all the details of a large group in memory. These details are most likely some of the first level of general direction with, possibly, limited sequences and configurations of some second- and third-level details. Details of ridges, creases, scars, and imperfections can also be included within the first selected target group. Persistency of the features of the skin must be considered when selecting and then searching for a target. The examiner normally selects targets that are distinct and occur near the delta, core, or interfaces of details of ridges, creases, scars, and imperfections, because it should be easy to determine whether these exist in the second print. Next, the analysis of the second set of prints starts. An example would be a tenprint card. Definitely different prints are quickly excluded based on very different first level direction of general ridge flow. This is an example of analysis, comparison, and evaluation blending. During the analysis of the second print, the target group of the first print's details is recalled as comparisons and evaluations start to take place. The first level ridge flow and sequences and configurations of the target group of details of the first print are searched in the second print. If a potential target group is not located in the second print, a second target group in the first print is then selected. This second target group is then searched in the second print. As always, the selection of a number of target groups of first, second, and, if needed, third levels of details of ridges, creases, scars, or imperfections is based on expertise of training, experience, understanding, and judgments of previous searching. Once a similar target group is located in the second image, critical and recurring comparative measurements of sequences and configurations of first and second or third levels of details take place. If sufficiency is determined for actual agreement in the target and neighboring details, the examiner determines the two prints were produced by the same source. If the target groups from the first image cannot be found in the second print, and the examiner determines the details of the persistent features actually cannot exist in the source of the second print, after recurring analyses and comparisons of various sufficient target groups, exclusion of the particular source is warranted. If the target groups from the first print seem to be found in the second print, but the determination of agreement or disagreement of comparative measurements of all levels of available details throughout the prints cannot be determined between the two prints, or the target groups of the first print cannot be actually excluded from occurring in the features of the source of the second print, an inconclusive evaluation is warranted. If the examiner is unable to explain the variations of appearances, distortions, discrepancies, differences, agreement, or disagreement between the two prints, the inconclusive determination is similarly warranted.\n\n## 9.6 Simultaneous, Adjacent, Or Aggregate Prints\n\nIf a group of unknown prints are analyzed and determined to have been deposited within tolerance for simultaneity from one personbased on substrate, matrix, pressure, motion, and quality and quantity of levels of details in the printsthe prints can be analyzed, compared, and evaluated as an aggregate unit from one person. The individual prints within the aggregate are from individual areas or ridge sources, all from the one aggregate source of one person.\n\nAs in many aspects of forensic comparative science, challenges are made about aggregate prints. Just as with individual prints, the examiner needs to be able to defend the aggregate based on research, training, experience, understanding, and judgments. Whether the source can be determined depends on the quality and quantity of details and the examiner's expertise with aggregate prints [Ashbaugh, 1999, pp 134135; FBI, pp 34; Cowger, pp 154158; SWGFAST, 2002b; Black, 2006]. Figure 915 depicts the examination of details in an aggregate to reach a decision.\n\n## 9.7 Summary\n\nAn expert conducts an examination based upon knowledge and beliefs from training, experience, understanding, and judgments. An acceptable explanation of a method to document expert perception is analysis, comparison, and evaluation, and the demonstration of repeatable determinations with verification.\n\nLevels of clarity exist within all prints made by a unique and persistent source. A description of first, second, and third levels of detail of the features of the source is used to describe the clarity. Ranges of clarity exist within each of the three levels of details. Details in prints have various significances based on clarity. Decisions are made throughout the perceptual process. A threshold, based on unique detail and expertise, is used to make decisions throughout the process. Quality of details of unique features of the source need a corresponding quantity of details to go beyond doubt to sufficiency in the QQ threshold. Likewise, quantity of details of unique features of the source need a corresponding quality of details to go beyond doubt in the QQ threshold. The examination method needs the examiner to make decisions throughout the process. The examiner needs to ask and correctly answer all relevant questions to reach the proper conclusion in the examination. The examiner transitions from not knowing, through the irritation of doubt, to knowing and believing. The examiner does not simply make a leap of faith. What is needed is for scientists to collaborate more to better explain the foundations and processes examiners experience when making judgments throughout this process. There is more to print comparisons than counting to a predetermined threshold of a limited number of generically labeled parts within the wonderfully unique tapestries of skin and prints.\n\n## 9.8 Reviewers\n\nThe reviewers critiquing this chapter were Debbie Benningfield, Herman Bergman, Patti Blume, Leonard G. Butt, Mike Campbell, Brent T. Cutro, Sr., Robert J. Garrett, Laura A. Hutchins, Alice Maceo, Charles Richardson, Jon T. Stimac, Kasey Wertheim, and Rodolfo R. Zamora.\n\n## 9.9 References\n\nAshbaugh, D. R. Quantitative-Qualitative Friction Ridge Analysis: An Introduction to Basic and Advanced Ridgeology; CRC Press: Boca Raton, 1999.\n\nBall, P. The Self-Made Tapestry: Pattern Formation in Nature; Oxford University Press: New York, 1999.\n\nBlack, J. Pilot Study: The Application of ACE-V to Simultaneous (Cluster) Impressions. *J. Forensic Ident.* 2006, 54 (6),\n933971. Byrd, J. S. Confirmation Bias, Ethics, and Mistakes in Forensics. *J. Forensic Ident.* 2006, 56 (4), 511523. Burch, R. Charles Sanders Peirce. In The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Fall 2001 ed.; Zalta, E., Ed.; 2001.\n\nBusey, T.; Vanderkolk, J. Behavioral and Electrophysiological Evidence for Configural Processing in Fingerprint Experts.\n\nVision Res. 2005, 45 (4), 431448. Cassidy, M. J. *Footwear Identification;* Public Relations Branch of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police: Ottawa, 1980. Champod, C. Edmond Locard--Numerical Standards and\n\"Probable\" Identifications. *J. Forensic Ident.* 1995, 45 (2),\n136163.\n\nChatterjee, S. K. *Finger, Palm and Sole Prints;* Artine Press:\nCalcutta, 1953, pp 166169.\n\nCowger, J. F. Friction Ridge Skin, Comparison and Identification of Fingerprints; Elsevier Science: New York, 1983.\n\nDror, I. E.; Peron, A. E.; Hind, S.; Charlton, D. When Emotions Get the Better of Us: The Effect of Contextual Top-Down Processing on Matching Fingerprints. Applied Cognitive Psychol. 2005, 19 (6), 799809.\n\nDror, I. E.; Charlton, D.; Peron, A. E. Contextual Information Renders Experts Vulnerable to Making Erroneous Identifications. *Forensic Sci. Int.* 2006, 156 (1), 7478. Dror, I. E.; Charlton, D. Why Experts Make Errors. J. Forensic Ident. 2006, 56 (4), 600616.\n\nEvett, I.; Williams, R. L. A Review of the Sixteen Points Fingerprint Standard in England and Wales. *J. Forensic Ident.* 1996, 46 (1), 4973.\n\nFederal Bureau of Investigation. An Analysis of Standards in Fingerprint Identification. *FBI Law Enforcement Bull.* 1972, 46 (6), 16.\n\nGrieve, D. L. The Identification Process: Attitude and Approach. *J. Forensic Ident.* 1988, 38 (5), 211224.\n\nGrieve, D. L. Reflections on Quality StandardsAn American Viewpoint. *Fingerprint Whorld* 1990, 110.\n\nPeirce, C. S. The Fixation of Belief. *Popular Sci. Monthly* 1877, 12 (November), 115.\n\nGrieve, D. Symposium Report. *J. Forensic Ident.* 1995, 45\n(5), 578584.\n\nStoney, D. A. A Quantitative Assessment of Fingerprint Individuality; Ph.D. Thesis, University of California, 1985.\n\nGrieve, D. L. The Identification Process: TWGFAST and the Search for Science. *Fingerprint Whorld* 1999, 25 (98),\n315325.\n\nStoney, D. A.; Thornton, J. I. A Critical Analysis of Quantitative Fingerprint Individuality Models. *J. Forensic Sci.* 1986, 31 (4), 11871216.\n\nHare, K. Proportional Analysis: The Science of Comparison.\n\nJ. Forensic Ident. 2003, 53 (6), 700706.\n\nSWGFAST. Friction Ridge Examination Methodology for Latent Print Examiners, 2002a. SWGFAST. Training to Competency for Latent Print Examiner. 2002b.\n\nHoover, J. E. Re: Points of Identity in Latent Prints. (Letter to Lt. James Blake, Dated March 12, 1958.) *The Print* 1994, 10 (7), 7.\n\nSWGFAST. Standards for Conclusions. *J. Forensic Ident.* 2004, 54 (3), 358359.\n\nHuber, R. A. Expert Witness. *Criminal Law Quarterly* 1959, 2, 276-295.\n\nThornton, J. I. The Snowflake Paradigm. *J. Forensic Sci.* 1986, 31 (2), 399-401.\n\nHuber, R. A. The Philosophy of Identification. RCMP Gazette, 1972, pp 914.\n\nTuthill, H. Individualization: Principles and Procedures in Criminalistics; Lightning Powder Co.: Salem, MA, 1994.\n\nKirk, P. L. The Ontogeny of Criminalistics. J. Criminal Law, Crimin. and Police Science 1963, 54, 235238.\n\nVanderkolk, J. R. Class Characteristics and \"Could Be\"\nResults. *J. Forensic Ident.* 1993, 43 (2), 119125.\n\nLonergan, B. *Insight: A Study of Human Understanding,*\n5th ed.; University of Toronto Press: Toronto, 1992.\n\nVanderkolk, J. R. Forensic Individualization of Images Using Quality and Quantity of Information. *J. Forensic Ident.* 1999, 49 (3), 246256.\n\nMcCann, P. Interim Report of the Standardization Committee of the International Association for Identification. Ident. News 1971, 21 (10), 1013.\n\nVanderkolk, J. R. Levels of Quality and Quantity of Detail. J. Forensic Ident. 2001, 51 (5), 461468.\n\nMcCann, P. Report of the Standardization Committee of the International Association for Identification. *Ident. News* 1973, 23 (8), 1314.\n\nVanderkolk, J. R. ACE+V : A Model. *J. Forensic Ident.* 2004,\n54 (1), 4551.\n\nWertheim, P. Scientific Comparison and Identification of Fingerprint Evidence. *The Print* 2000, 16 (5), 18.\n\nMcKasson, S.; Richards, C. Speaking as an ExpertA Guide for the Identification Sciences From the Laboratory to the Courtroom; Charles C Thomas: Springfield, 1998. McRoberts, A. Nature Never Repeats Itself. *The Print* 1996, 12 (5), 13.\n\n## 9.10 Additional Information\n\nIAI-Resolution VII. *Ident. News* 1979, 29 (8), 1. IAI-Resolution VII Amended. *Ident. News* 1980, 30 (8), 3.\n\nOlsen Sr., R. D. Problem Solving Techniques in Latent Print Identification; Federal Bureau of Investigation, U.S. Department of Justice, U.S. Government Printing Office: Washington, D.C., 1983.\n\nA False Impression. *Fingerprint Whorld* 1983, 8 (32), 107.\n\nPalmer, S. E. *Vision Science--Photons to Phenomenology;*\nThe MIT Press: Cambridge, 1999.\n\nThe Science of Fingerprints: Classification and Uses; Federal Bureau of Investigation, U.S. Department of Justice; U.S. Government Printing Office: Washington, D.C., 1984.\n\nAshbaugh, D. R. Edgeology. *RCMP Gazette,* 1982.\n\nBrown, W. Here We Go Again. *Finger Print Mag.* 1947, pp\n58.\n\nAshbaugh, D. R. Identification Specialist and Trainer. RCMP Gazette, 1982.\n\nButler, M. Criminals Use Their Loaf. Fingerprint Whorld\n1979, 89.\n\nAshbaugh, D. R. RidgeoscopyThe Time is Now. Fingerprint Whorld, 1982, 8 (30), 3638.\n\nChampod, C.; Lennard, C.; Margot, P. Alphonse Bertillon and Dactyloscopy. *J. Forensic Ident.* 1993, 43 (6), 604625.\n\nAshbaugh, D. R. Ridgeology: Our Next Evaluative Step.\n\nRCMP Gazette, 1983.\n\nChapel, C. E. *Fingerprinting: A Manual of Identification;*\nCoward McCann: New York, 1941.\n\nAshbaugh, D. R. Fingerprint Identification Today. Ident. News 1983, 33 (8-9, 1415).\n\nChatterjee, S. K. *Speculation in Fingerprint Identification;*\nSrijib Chatterjee: Calcutta, India, 1983.\n\nAshbaugh, D. R. The Key to Fingerprint Identification. Ident. News 1985, 35 (7), 1315.\n\nChatterjee, S. K.; Hague, R. V. Fingerprints or Dactyloscopy and Ridgeoscopy; Srijib Chatterjee: Calcutta, India, 1988.\n\nAshbaugh, D. R. Poroscopy. *Ident. Canada* 1986, 9 (1), 3.\n\nClark, J. D. ACE-V: Is it Scientifically Reliable and Accurate?\n\nJ. Forensic Ident. 2002, 52 (4), 401408.\n\nAshbaugh, D. R. Palmar Flexion Creases Identification. J. Forensic Ident. 1991, 41 (4), 255273.\n\nClements, W. W. *The Study of Latent Fingerprints;*  Charles C Thomas: Springfield, IL, 1987.\n\nAshbaugh, D. R. Ridgeology. *J. Forensic Ident.* 1991, 41 (1),\n1664.\n\nCook, T. A Wise Decision. *Finger Print and Ident. Mag.*\n1974, 2.\n\nAshbaugh, D. R. Incipient Ridges and the Clarity Spectrum.\n\nJ. Forensic Ident. 1992, 42 (2), 106114.\n\nCowger, J. F. Moving Towards Professionalization of Latent Print Examiners. *J. Forensic Sci.* 1979, 24 (3), 591595.\n\nAshbaugh, D. R. Defined Pattern, Overall Pattern and Unique Pattern. *J. Forensic Ident.* 1992, 42 (6), 503512.\n\nCummins, H.; Midlo, C. Finger Prints, Palms and Soles: An Introduction to Dermatoglyphics, 3rd ed.; Research: South Berlin, MA, 1976.\n\nAshbaugh, D. R. The Premise of Friction Ridge Identification, Clarity, and the Identification Process. J. Forensic Ident. 1994, 44 (5), 499516.\n\nDavis, J. E. Pressure Distortion in Latent Prints. Finger Print and Ident. Mag. 1946, 35.\n\nBalshy, J. C. The Fingerprint Did Not Lie. *Ident. News* 1976,\n26 (3), 34.\n\nDavis, J. E. Further Thoughts on Fingerprint Comparisons.\n\nFinger Print and Ident. Mag. 1955.\n\nBerry, J. Editor's Observations. *Fingerprint Whorld* 1980, 5,\n103104.\n\nDeutscher, D.; Leonoff, H. *Identification Evidence;*\nCarswell: Toronto, 1991.\n\nBerry, J. The Map Reference. *Ident. News* 1985, 35 (9),\n1213.\n\nDillon, D. J. The Identification of Impressions of Nonfriction-\nRidge-Bearing Skin. *J. Forensic Sci.* 1963, 8 (4), 576582.\n\nBlake, J. W. Identification of the Newborn by Flexure Creases. *Ident. News* 1959, 9 (9), 35.\n\nDondero, J. Comparing Finger Prints for Positive Identification; Faurot, Inc: New York, 1944.\n\nBlank, J. P. The Fingerprint that Lied. *Reader's Digest* 1975,\npp 8185.\nEnklaar, F. Principles and Problems in the Process of Identification. *Ident. News* 1964, 14 (8), 410.\n\nBridges, B. C. *Practical Fingerprinting;* Funk & Wagnalls\nCompany: New York, 1942.\nGalton, F. *Finger Prints;* MacMillan: New York, 1892.\n\nGalton, F. *Decipherment of Blurred Finger Prints;* Mac-\nMillan: London, 1893.\n\nJevons, W. S.; Nagel, E. The Principles of Science--A Treatise on Logic and Scientific Method; Dover: New York,\n1958.\n\nGregory, R. L. *Eye and Brain, The Psychology of Seeing;*\nMcGraw-Hill: New York, 1981.\n\nJohnson, R. W. Manufactured Fingerprints. Fingerprint Whorld 1978, 61.\n\nGribben, A. A. Fingerprint Testimony in Court. The Literary Dig. 1919.\n\nJohnson, R. W. Fraudulent Fingerprints. Police Product News, 1984, p 58.\n\nGrieve, D. L. The Identification Process: Traditions in Training. *J. Forensic Ident.* 1990, 40 (4), 195213.\n\nJolly, J. S. Is This Enough. *Ident. News* 1986, 36 (11),\n1112.\n\nGrieve, D. L. The Identification Process: The Quest for Quality. *J. Forensic Ident.* 1990, 40 (3), 109113.\n\nKilkuchi, S. Concerning the Appearance of Linear Dots in Fingerprints. *Finger Print and Ident. Mag.*, 1977.\n\nGrieve, D. L. Decision: Responsibility or License. J. Forensic Ident. 1993, 43 (6), 559562.\n\nKingston, C. R. Probabilistic Analysis of Partial Fingerprint Patterns. University of California, 1964.\n\nGrieve, D. L. Faulds, Faults, and Forensic Fundamentals. J. Forensic Ident. 1994, 44 (4), 353356.\n\nKingston, C. R.; Kirk, P. L. The Use of Statistics in Criminalistics. *J. Criminal Law and Crimin.* 1964, 55, 514516.\n\nGrieve, D. L. Eliminate the Impossible. *J. Forensic Ident.* 1994, 44 (3), 245250.\n\nKingston, C. R. Applications of Probability Theory in Criminalistics-II. *J. Am. Statistical Assoc.* 1965, 60 (312),\n10281034.\n\nGrieve, D. L. Long Road to Deadwood. *J. Forensic Ident.* 1995, 45 (4), 347372. Grieve, D. L. Rarely Pure, and Never Simple. J. Forensic Ident. 1995, 45 (3), 245249.\n\nKingston, C. R.; Kirk, P. L. Historical Development and Evaluation of the \"12 Point Rule\" in Fingerprint Identification. *Int. Criminal Police Rev.* 1965, 20 (186), 6269.\n\nGupta, S. R. Statistical Survey of Ridge Characteristics. Int. Criminal Police Rev. 1968, 218 (130).\n\nKrupowicz, T. E. Frictional Ridges, Characteristics, the Identity Factor. *Ident. News* 1986, 36 (3), 3, 69.\n\nHalle, L. *Out of Chaos;* Houghton Mifflin Co.: Boston, 1977.\n\nLanigan, R. The Human Science of Communicology: A Phenomenology of Discourse in Foucault and Merleau-Ponty;\nDuQuesne University Press: Pittsburgh, 1992.\n\nHazen, R. J.; Phillips, C. E. The Expert Fingerprint Witness; Federal Bureau of Investigation, U.S. Department of Justice, U.S. Government Printing Office: Washington, DC, 1981.\n\nLarkin, J.; McDermott, J.; Simon, D.; Simon, H. Expert and Novice Performance in Solving Physics Problems. *Science* 1980, *208* (4450), 13351342.\n\nHenry, E. R. *Classification and Uses of Fingerprints,* 1st ed.; Routledge & Sons: London, 1900.\n\nLee, H. C.; Gaensslen, R. E. Advances in Fingerprint Technology, 2nd ed.; CRC Press: Washington, DC, 2001.\n\nHepburn, D. The Papillary Ridges on the Hands and Feet of Monkeys and Men. The Scientific Transactions of the Royal Dublin Society 1895, 5 (2), 525537.\n\nLohnes, R. C. Infant Footprint Identification By Flexure Creases. Quantico, VA,1987.\n\nHough, W. Thumb Marks. *Sci. Mag.* 1886, p 166.\n\nMairs, G. T. Identification of Individuals by Means of Fingerprints, Palmprints, and Soleprints. *Scientific Monthly* 1918, 7 (4), 299319.\n\nHuberman, M. J. Anatomy of a Problem: Proving the Identity of Fingerprints in Limiting Situations. *The Advocate* 1983, 41 (2).\n\nMairs, G. T. Novel Method of Print Comparison. Finger Print Magazine, 1948, 2023.\n\nOlsen Sr., R. D. *Scott's Fingerprint Mechanics;* Charles C\nThomas: Springfield, IL, 1978.\n\nMassey, S. L. Persistence of Creases of the Foot and Their Value for Forensic Identification Purposes. J. Forensic Ident. 2004, 54 (3), 296315.\n\nMoenssens, A. A. *Fingerprints and the Law;* Chilton Book Company: Philadelphia, PA, 1969.\n\nOlsen Sr., R. D. Friction Ridge Characteristics and Points of Identity: An Unresolved Dichotomy of Terms. *Ident. News* 1981, 31 (11), 1213. Olsen Sr., R. D. Cult of the Mediocre. *Ident. News* 1982, 32\n(9), 36.\n\nMoenssens, A. A. Poroscopy--Identification by Pore Structure. *Finger Print and Ident. Mag.* 1970. Moenssens, A. A. *Fingerprint Techniques;* Chilton Book Company: Philadelphia, 1971.\n\nOsterburg, J. W. An Inquiry into the Nature of Proof:\nThe Identity of Fingerprints. *J. Forensic Sci.* 1964, 9 (4),\n413427.\n\nMoenssens, A. A. Testifying as a Fingerprint Witness.\n\nIdent. News 1972, 22 (8, 9), 5.\n\nOsterburg, J. W. *The Crime Laboratory;* Indiana University Press: Bloomington, 1968.\n\nMoenssens, A. A.; Starrs, J. E.; Henderson, C. E.; Inbau, F.\n\nE. *Scientific Evidence in Civil and Criminal Cases,* 4th ed.;\nThe Foundation Press, Inc.: Westbury, CT, 1995.\n\nOsterburg, J. W. Fingerprint Probability Calculations Based on the Number of Individual Characteristics Present. Ident. News 1974, 24 (10), 39.\n\nMontgomery, G. Seeing with the Brain. *Discover Mag.,*\n1988.\n\nMontgomery, R. B. Sole Prints of Newborn Babies. Am. J. Med. Sci. 1925, 169 (6), 830.\n\nOsterburg, J. W.; Parthasarathy, T.; Raghaven, T. E. S.; Sclove, S. L. Development of a Mathematical Formula for the Calculation of Fingerprint Probabilities Based on Individual Characteristics. *J. Am. Statistical Assoc.* 1977, 72\n(360), 772778.\n\nMontgomery, R. B. Sole Patterns--A Study of the Footprints of Two Thousand Individuals. *The Anatomical Record* 1926,\n33 (2).\n\nPadney, S. N. Muzzle Printometry in Bovines. Indian J. Animal Sci. 1979, 49 (12), 10381042.\n\nMorfopoulos, V. Anatomy of Evidence. *Ident. News* 1970, 20 (12), 1011.\n\nPadney, S. N. Note on Muzzle Printometry for Determining Age of Cattle. Indian *J. Animal Sci.* 1982, 52 (11), 1102\n1104.\n\nMyers, H. J. I. The First Complete and Authentic History of Identification in the United States. Finger Print and Ident. Mag. 1938, 331.\n\nPadney, S. N. Note on the Ridges of Cattle Muzzle Prints.\n\nIndian *J. Animal Sci.* 1982, 52 (11), 11041107.\n\nMyers, H. J. I. Supplemental History of Identification in the United States. *Finger Print and Ident. Mag.* 1942, 328.\n\nPeirce, C. S. How to Make Our Ideas Clear. Popular Sci. Monthly 1878, 12 (January), 286302.\nMyers, H. J. I. A Third History of Identification in the United States. *Finger Print and Ident. Mag.* 1948.\n\nPeirce, C. S. Deduction, Induction, and Hypothesis. Popular Sci. Monthly 1878, 13 (June), 470482.\nNewell, A.; Simon, H. *Human Problem Solving;* Prentice-\nHall, Inc.: Englewood, NJ, 1972.\n\nPeirce, C. S. Selected Writings (Values in a Universe of Chance); Dover: New York, 1958.\nNielson, J. P. The Identification Process. *Ident. News* 1986, 36 (9), 59.\n\nPlater, D. Suspicion of Foolproof Fingerprints. The Fire and Arson Investigator 1985, 36 (1), 2930.\n\nOatess, R. Elbow Print Identification. *J. Forensic Ident.* 2000, 50 (2), 132137.\n\nPutter, P. J. Nose Prints on Cattle. *Fingerprint Whorld* 1981, 6 (24), 9091.\n\nO'Hara, C. E.; Osterburg, J. W. An Introduction to Criminalistics; MacMillan: New York, 1949.\n\nPutter, P. J. An Investigation to Ascertain Whether Muzzleprints of Cattle Can Be Individualized by Applying the Same Techniques as Those Used in Dactyloscopy. Fingerprint Whorld 1982, 6 (27), 5559.\n\nTiller, C. D. Identification by Fingerprints--The Real Anatomy. *Advocate* 1983, 41 (4).\n\nSantamaria, F. A New Method for Evaluating Ridge Characteristics. *Finger Print and Ident. Mag.* 1955, 36 (11), 36.\n\nTriplett, M.; Cooney, L. The Etiology of ACE-V and its Proper Use: An Exploration of the Relationship Between ACE-V\nand the Scientific Method of Hypothesis Testing. J. Forensic Ident. 2006, 56 (3), 345355.\n\nSchmidt, S. Non-Logical Processes in Science and Elsewhere. *Analog* 1981, 51 (February), 511.\n\nTsuchihashi, Y. Studies on Personal Identification by Means of Lip Prints. *Forensic Sci.* 1974, 3 (3), 233248.\n\nSeymour, L. *Fingerprint Classification;* Private: Los Angeles,\n1912.\n\nTuthill, H. Analysis, Comparison, Evaluation: The Philosophy and Principles of Identification. *Ontario Police College* 1987,\n(July), 2.\n\nSolis, J. A.; Maala, C. P. Muzzle Printing as a Method for Identification of Cattle and Carabaos. Philippine J. Veterinary Med. 1975, 14 (1), 7. Sorrentino, U. Identity of Digital Prints. Finger Print and Ident. Mag. 1960, 35.\n\nVanderkolk, J. R. RidgeologyAnimal Muzzle Prints and Human Fingerprints. *J. Forensic Ident.* 1991, 41 (4),\n274284.\n\nSteinwender, E. Dactyloscopic Identification. Finger Print and Ident. Mag., 1960.\n\nVanderkolk, J. R. Correction: RidgeologyAnimal Muzzle Prints and Human Fingerprints. *J. Forensic Ident.* 1991, 41\n(5), 317.\n\nTaylor, R. A. Flexure Creases--Alternative Method for Infant Footprint Identification. *Ident. News* 1979, 29 (9), 1214.\n\nVanderkolk, J. R. Forensic Science, Psychology and Philosophy. *J. Forensic Ident.* 2002, 52 (3), 252253.\n\nThompson, D. W. *On Growth and Form;* Dover: New York,\n1992.\n\nWertheim, P. A. Explaining Fingerprints to the Layman. Bulletin of the Oklahoma Division IAI 1987 (April).\n\nThornton, J. I. The One-Dissimilarity Doctrine in Fingerprint Identification. *Int. Criminal Police Rev.* 1977, 306 (March),\n89.\n\nWertheim, P. A. The Ability Equation. *J. Forensic Ident.* 1996, 46 (2), 149159.\n\nTiller, C. D. Identification of Fingerprints--How Many Points Are Required? RCMP Gazette.\n\nWilder, H. H.; Wentworth, B. *Personal Identification;* The Gorham Press: Boston, 1918.\n\nTiller, C. D. That's Him But. *Ident. Newsletter* 1979, 2 (4).\n\nWilton, G. *Fingerprints;* Wm Hodge: London, 1938.\n\nTiller, C. D. Are You a Professional? *Ident. Newsletter* 1980, 3 (4).\n\nZiman, J. The Force of Knowledge; The Scientific Dimension of Society; Cambridge University Press: New York,\n1976.\n\n## C H A P T E R\n\n# Documentation Of Friction Ridge Impressions: From The Scene To The Conclusion Alice V. Maceo\n\n## C O N T E N T S Documentation Of Friction Ridge Impressions: From The Scene To The Conclusion Alice V. Maceo 10.1 Introduction\n\nThe goal of documentation, regardless of the jurisdiction or even the subject matter, is to provide transparency of information. Activities, data, methods, standards, and results are documented to provide the collector of the information with a detailed history that does not rely on memory and allows another person to review the information.\n\n## 10.1.1 Analytical And Experimental Laboratories\n\nIn science, documentation is crucial to evaluate results and to test the validity of experimental research. Laboratories operate in two realms: (1) using established methods under standard operating procedures to answer routine questions or (2) using experimentation to develop new methods to answer novel questions. An example of the former laboratory would be an analytical laboratory that routinely tests water samples for the concentration of dissolved oxygen. This laboratory uses established methods and procedures for each sample and reports the results. An example of the latter type of laboratory would be a research laboratory that develops a new, more efficient method for testing the concentration of dissolved oxygen. This new method, once validated, may be implemented by the analytical laboratory. Depending on the type of laboratory, analytical or research, the level of documentation will vary. Analytical laboratories typically have a reference collection of methods and procedures. Documentation of analysis centers around the activities and data associated with each sample: origin of the sample, preservation of the sample, chain of custody of the sample, controls, and results of analysis. Research laboratories, however, must document the basis and the development of the method. This level of documentation will include how the method was derived, the theoretical hypothesis predicting the feasibility of the method, the data used to test the method, the results of testing, and the evaluation of the theoretical hypothesis with the results of testing. If the results of rigorous testing support the theoretical hypothesis, a new method has emerged. The method must be published and validated before an analytical laboratory will adopt it.\n\n## 10.1.2 Forensic Laboratories\n\nMost of forensic science operates in the analytical realm. Established methods and procedures are detailed in technical or operational manuals. Analysts are responsible for documenting the activities, methods, and results of their examinations in the case record. Because anything can potentially become evidence, forensic science must occasionally enter the realm of research to test novel procedures. Experimentation must follow accepted scientific research practices and demonstrate reliability prior to implementation. The examination of friction ridge impressions follows the ACE-V modelanalysis, comparison, evaluation, and verificationand falls into the analytical category. Latent prints are examined following an established method outlined in the technical or operational manuals for the laboratory. The activities and data are documented in the case record. Unlike other analytical processes, the examination of friction ridge impressions is nondestructive and the samples (latent prints and exemplars) are not consumed. The original samples can be maintained in the case record, permitting re-examination. If the original samples cannot be retained, examination-quality reproductions or legible\ncopies of the samples can be maintained. Development, recovery, and examination of friction ridge impressions must follow the accepted methods in the technical and operational manuals of the laboratory. Documentation must permit transparency of all activities and data generated, must support the reported conclusions, and must contain sufficient detail, \"such that, in the absence of the examiner(s), another competent examiner or supervisor could evaluate what was done and interpret the data\" (ASCLD/LAB, 2005, p 32).\n\n## 10.1.3 Tiers Of Documentation\n\nLaw enforcement agencies have adopted many administrative protocols for the recovery and examination of friction ridge impressions. In some agencies, one person responds to the crime scene, processes all the evidence for patent and latent impressions, and examines the prints. In other agencies, one person responds to the scene and collects items of evidence, another person processes the evidence for latent prints, a third person photographs the latent prints, and a final person examines the latent prints. For ease of explanation, documentation will be approached from three different starting points. These starting points will be referred to in a manner that generally reflects when the latent print examiner (LPE) enters the chain of custody:\nprimary custody, secondary custody, and *tertiary custody.*\nPrimary Custody. Primary custody refers to the situation in which an LPE maintains custody of the latent print evidence from its discovery through its examination. In this situation, the LPE responds to a crime scene, recovers latent prints from the scene, and transports items of evidence back to the laboratory for latent print development and recovery. The LPE is the first link in the chain of custody for all latent prints generated in the case.\n\nSecondary Custody. Secondary custody refers to the situation in which an LPE receives items of evidence secured by other personnel, such as a crime scene analyst (CSA), who responded to the crime scene. The LPE develops and recovers latent prints from evidence collected and secured by someone else. The LPE starts the chain of custody for the recovered latent prints but does not start the chain of custody for the item of evidence.\n\nTertiary Custody. Tertiary custody refers to the situation in which an LPE receives latent prints recovered by other personnel. For instance, a CSA develops and recovers all of the latent prints associated with a case and submits the photographs and lifts to an LPE for examination. The LPE does not start the chain of custody for the latent prints and typically does not see the original surfaces from which the latent prints were recovered.\n\n## 10.1.4 Case-Wide Documentation\n\nCase-wide documentation of friction ridge impressions, regardless of when the LPE enters the chain of custody, must include the significant information and activities related to the impressions. Case-wide documentation should include:\n\n- Information linking the latent prints to the appropriate\nsurface or item of evidence related to the crime scene.\n- Condition of the item or surface processed for latent\nprints (e.g., the ledge was dusty, the tire iron was rusty).\n- Development and recovery techniques used to visualize\nthe latent prints.\n- Quality controls used during development of the latent\nprints.\n- Chain of custody for the items of evidence. - Chain of custody for the latent prints. - Information referencing the exemplars used for\ncomparison.\n- Automated Fingerprint Identification System (AFIS)\ndatabase searches.\n- Conclusions of the examination of each latent print. - Verified conclusions. - Disposition of evidence (items of evidence and\nlatent prints).\nIf more than one person is involved in the recovery and examination of the latent prints (e.g., a CSA and an LPE), their combined documentation should detail the history of the latent print from its discovery to the conclusions rendered from the examination. Different agencies have different criteria for documentation. For instance, some agencies require that examinationquality photographs be taken of all latent prints developed with powders prior to lifting, whereas others do not. Even within an agency, the standard may vary with the circumstances, for instance, with the type of crime. Additionally, the manner in which the documentation resides in the case record varies among agencies. Some agencies use the original lift cards or photographs as part of the case record and place all of the documentation related to the latent prints on the lift cards or photographs. Some agencies use worksheets or forms and may only retain legible copies of the latent prints and known prints in the case record because the original lift cards and photographs must be returned to a submitting agency. The purpose of this chapter is not to address every possible agency-based documentation criterion and case record requirement. Appropriate documentation for the primary, secondary, and tertiary custody scenarios will be addressed from the perspective of the LPE. The goal is to give generalized information with examples.\n\nThe documentation for the three custody scenarios will overlap in some areas. Special considerations and generalities will be noted, and sometimes the reader will be directed to a previous section containing the information.\n\n## 10.2 Primary Custody Documentation 10.2.1 General Crime Scene Documentation\n\nDocumentation of friction ridge impressions begins at the crime scene. General crime scene documentation is accomplished through a combination of photographs, sketches, and notes. The case notes typically begin with:\n\n- The case number. - The crime scene address. - The name of the victim. - The dates and times the LPE arrived at and departed\nfrom the scene.\n- The name of the LPE.\nThe LPE should document pertinent information regarding the crime from the first responder. This initial information will guide the LPE to areas or items at the scene that may have latent print evidence. Each page of the crime scene notes should contain the case number, page number, total number of pages (e.g., 2/3 or 2 of 3), and the initials of the LPE.\n\n## 10.2.2 Collecting Items Of Evidence\n\nDocumentation should indicate where items of evidence were located in the scene and the condition of the evidence prior to collection. For example, if the victim was assaulted with a knife and a bloody knife (potentially holding latent prints) was found in a hallway, the knife should be documented in its original location, orientation, and condition. Documentation may include sketches, measurements, and photographs of the knife, showing the general location (Figure 101), orientation (Figure 102), and condition (Figure 103). It is recommended that an\nevidence marker be included with the case number and item number in the orientation and condition photographs. After documentation, the item can be recovered and preserved for additional analysis in the laboratory. Items recovered from the scene can be placed in a temporary storage container for transport. The temporary storage container should have a label, either on the container or inside the container, that contains the case number, item number, and date and time of recovery. The LPE should have some method for ensuring that all evidence taken from the scene is protected from loss or deterioration. Packaging, sealing, and labeling typically occur after the evidence has been examined by the LPE at the laboratory or before it is submitted to other personnel (e.g., an evidence control section for entry into an electronic evidence tracking system).\n\n## 10.2.3 Latent Print Development And Recovery On Scene\n\nLatent prints that are of sufficient value for recovery must be documented. When processing a crime scene or an item of evidence, it may be difficult to determine whether the latent print contains sufficient quality and quantity of detail (i.e., of value) for comparison. The LPE generally cannot perform a critical analysis until the photographs and lifts are examined in the proper setting at the laboratory. Latent prints that are of sufficient value may later be deemed insufficient for comparison. This is to be expected in a conservative approach that ensures all possible evidence is preserved.\n\n10.2.3.1 Documenting the Surface Prior to Processing.\n\nIf not already annotated in the general crime scene documentation (photos, sketches, or notes), the LPE should document the areas of the scene to be processed for latent prints prior to applying latent print development techniques. For example, if a patio door was the point of entry, its original orientation and condition (e.g., opened, closed, damaged, dusty) should be documented. Figure 104 demonstrates photo documentation of the exterior of a patio door.\n\n10.2.3.2 Designating and Labeling Latent Prints on the Surface. There are many administrative ways to designate latent prints on a surface or item. The key is to make sure that the LPE can reconstruct the location and orientation of the latent prints recovered. In addition to referencing the surface or item from which the latent print was recovered, the location and orientation of a latent print may provide the following valuable information:\n\n\n(1) The manner in which a surface or item was touched.\n\n(2) An explanation for any distortion in the latent print.\n\n(3) The anatomical source of the latent print (e.g., which\n\narea of the hand touched the surface).\nOne method of designation is to choose a sequential numbering or lettering system (e.g., L1, L2, L3, etc.). The notes, sketches, photographs, and lifts reference each latent print by its designator. Often, there are multiple latent prints in a small area that are photographed or lifted together. In these instances, the designator may actually refer to two or more latent prints. Depending on agency policy, if there is more than one suitable latent print on a lift or photograph, each suitable latent print may be attributed a subdesignator. For example, if L2 has three impressions, they may be designated A, B, and C. L2A would reference print A on photograph (or lift) L2. The LPE may choose to label the latent prints on the surface as part of the photographic documentation. Labeling latent prints can be accomplished two ways: marking directly on the surface or using a label. The nature of the surface or agency policy may dictate how latent prints are labeled.\n\n10.2.3.3 Patent Prints. The LPE should first examine surfaces at the scene for visible impressions (patent prints). The surfaces that were examined and the results of the examination should be documented. Returning to the patio door in Figure 104, if there were no impressions of sufficient value for recovery, it should be noted (e.g.,\"Visual inspection: No patent prints of value were noted on the interior or exterior of the patio door\"). If there were no impressions, it should be noted (e.g., \"Visual inspection: No patent prints were visible on the interior or exterior of the patio door\").\n\n10.2.3.4 Location and Orientation of Patent Prints. If there are patent prints of sufficient value for recovery, they should be assigned designators and their location and orientation documented through photography, sketches, or notes. A sample note may say, \"Visual inspection: L1 on exterior glass of patio door\". A location photograph containing a label (Figure 105) is an effective method to document the location of the patent print. 10.2.3.5 Examination-Quality Photographs. Because patent prints must be recovered through photography, it is imperative to be able to establish the dimensions or scale for the photographs. This is normally accomplished by including a scale in the photograph. Notes should reflect that examination-quality photographs were taken and include the designator for each print photographed. 10.2.3.6 Development Techniques. The LPE should document which surfaces were processed, which technique(s) were applied, and the results. For example, the notes may reflect,\"Kitchen counter top was processed with black powder; no latent prints of value developed\".\n\nReturning to the patio door in Figure 104, if the LPE decides to use powder to process the door, his or her notes should reflect the results of the processing and display the designator of any latent prints photographed or lifted. The LPE may use a combination of notes, sketches, and photography to document the location and orientation of the designated latent prints. The LPE may note, \"Patio door processed with black powder: L1 developed further; L2 developed on exterior of glass; L3 developed on exterior door knob\".  The LPE should note whether any examinationquality images were taken and whether lifts were made;\nfor example, \"L1, L2, and L3 photographed and lifted after development with black powder\".  Figures 106 and 107\ndemonstrate the photographic documentation of the location of developed latent prints. For each processing technique applied at the scene, the documentation should include:\n\n- The development technique applied. - The surfaces or items to which the technique was\napplied.\n- An indication of whether no latent prints, no latent\nprints of value, or latent prints of value were developed.\n- The location and orientation of the developed latent\nprints.\n- The method of recovery.\n\n## 10.2.4 Marking Photographs And Lifts\n\n The photographs and lifts recovered from the scene must be marked in a manner that reflects the origin of the latent print lift or photograph. The lift or photograph should include:\n\n- The case number.\n- The date recovered. - The address of the investigation. - The surface or item from which the latent print\nwas obtained.\n- The name or a unique marking of the LPE (e.g., initials). - The development technique (if a photograph). - The latent designator.\nFigure 108 is an example of a latent lift card containing the recommended information. The \"up\" designation indicates the orientation of the latent prints to the surface.\n\n## 10.2.5 Exemplars Prepared By The Latent Print Examiner\n\nIt is sometimes necessary for the LPE to prepare known prints of certain individuals connected to the scene, typically victims or witnesses. Regardless of how the exemplars are recorded, they should bear:\n\n- The name of the donor. - An identifier for the donor (e.g., date of birth). - The donor's signature. - The area of friction ridge skin recorded (e.g., left hand,\nright hand, or finger name or number).\n- The case number, the date, and the name (and signature or initials) of the LPE.\nAt the completion of the case, the LPE may retain the exemplars in the case record. Figure 109 is an example of known prints taken from the left hand of the victim at the scene.\n\n## 10.2.6 Latent Print Development On Items Of Evidence\n\nCompletion of the crime scene response often segues into latent print processing of critical items of evidence at the laboratory. The LPE must be cognizant of the presence of additional types of evidence, such as DNA, trace evidence, or indented writing on an item. In some laboratories, the LPE is responsible for the documentation and collection of the additional evidence prior to latent print processing. In other laboratories, the LPE may need to coordinate with analysts from other sections to document and collect the additional evidence. In either case, the LPE should note who evaluated the item, whether any samples were collected, and the disposition of the collected samples.\n10.2.6.1 General Notes. Many agencies use worksheets or free-form notes to document the latent print development activities and observations by the LPE. The date(s) of the activities should be recorded, and each page of the notes should contain the case number, page number, total number of pages, and the initials of the LPE. The latent print processing notes generated at the lab may be a continuation of the notes started at the crime scene or may be a separate set of notes. Separation of the notes depends on whether the agency reports the crime scene response in a separate report from that for the latent print development and examination at the laboratory. 10.2.6.2 Description and Condition of the Evidence. The notes typically begin with the item number and description of the evidence (e.g., \"Item 1: J. P. Schmenckels International kitchen knife\"). Items that have serial numbers, such as firearms, should contain the serial number in the description.\n\nThe LPE should indicate the condition of the item. The condition may include whether a surface is smooth or textured and whether the item is dusty, rusty, or contains any residue.\n\n10.2.6.3 Initial Observations. Prior to using any development techniques, the item should be carefully examined for the presence of any patent impressions. If there are no impressions of value noted during the initial observations, the notes should reflect that no patent prints or no patent prints of value were observed. If patent impressions of value are present, their location and orientation on the item should be documented (through notes, sketches, or photographs) and an examination-quality photograph should be taken. Once again, the LPE must establish the scale for the examination-quality photographs.\n\n## 10.2.6.4 Latent Print Development And Recovery. Once The Initial Observations Are Complete, The Lpe Must Select And Determine The Sequence Of Development Techniques Appro-\n\npriate for the item. The notes should reflect the techniques used and the observations of the LPE after each technique. In some laboratories, the LPE may also need to document the lot numbers of the chemicals used and the results of any controls processed concurrently with the evidence.\n\nItem 1, the knife mentioned above that was recovered from the crime scene, was processed with cyanoacrylate (CA) and a fluorescent dye stain (RAM). Figure 1010 is photographic documentation of the location and orientation of latent print L4 developed on the knife after CA processing. Figure 1011 is an examination-quality photograph of L4 after CA processing. Figure 1012 is an examinationquality photograph of L4 after RAM processing. The notes for Item 1 may include the following:\nItem 1: J. P. Schmenckels International kitchen knife Visual: Possible blood on blade of knife; sample of blood from right side of blade obtained and retained by DNA Analyst Watson. Handle has slightly rough surface.\n\nNo patent prints of value visible on the blade; no patent prints visible on handle.\n\nCA: Photo L4 on left side of blade near handle; no latent prints of value developed on handle.\n\nRAM: Re-photo L4; no additional latent prints of value developed on blade; no latent prints of value developed on handle.\n\n10.2.6.5 Marking Items of Evidence. Once processing of the items collected from the crime scene is complete, each item of evidence should be marked for identification prior to final packaging and sealing (ASCLD/LAB, 2005, p 20). The LPE may write the case number and item number directly on the item to serve as a unique identifier. The knife in Figure 1010 could be marked \"06-9999/1\" indicating case number 06-9999 and item number 1. The manner in which evidence is marked should be detailed in the technical or procedural manual of the LPE's agency. If the item is too small or writing directly on the item will alter or destroy any evidentiary value, the item may be placed inside a container. The container should then be marked with the unique identifier (ASCLD/LAB, 2005, p 21). For example, if a bullet casing was taken from the scene, the casing could be placed in an envelope that is marked with a unique identifier (e.g., case number and item number). The casing, inside the marked envelope, can then undergo final packaging and sealing.\n\n10.2.6.6 Disposition of the Evidence. Once the evidence has been properly packaged and sealed, the LPE should document its final disposition. The LPE should document the date the evidence was released and to whom or where the evidence was released. For some agencies, the evidence is placed in long-term storage by the LPE. For other agencies, the LPE releases the evidence to other personnel responsible for storing the evidence. 10.2.6.7 Marking Photographs and Lifts. If latent prints were recovered from evidence processed at the laboratory by the LPE, the photographs and lifts should contain the same information as those recovered from the crime scene:\n\n- The case number.\n- The date recovered. - The address of the scene (may be omitted because the\naddress is the laboratory).\n- The surface or item from which the latent print was\nobtained.\n- The name and a unique marking of the LPE. - The development technique (if a photograph). - The latent designator.\nFigure 1013 is an example of a labeled photograph.\n\n## 10.2.7 Examination Of Friction Ridge Impressions\n\n10.2.7.1 General Notes. After all of the latent prints associated with a case have been properly labeled, the LPE enters the examination phase: analysis, comparison, evaluation, and verification (ACE-V) of the latent prints. The level of documentation can vary among agencies; however, the key is to make sure the LPE indicates:\n\n-  Which latent prints are suitable for comparison. -  The source of known prints to be compared. -  The results of the comparisons. - Who verified any conclusions.\n10.2.7.2 Elements of Analysis. The elements to be considered in the analysis of friction ridge impressions should be detailed in the technical or operational manual for the laboratory. Elements of the analysis should include (SWGFAST, 2002, pp 23):\n\n-   The existence and clarity of level-one, level-two, and\nlevel-three detail.\n-  The possible anatomical source. -  The factors influencing the clarity of the impressions.\nThe quality of level-one, level-two, and level-three detail is influenced by the following factors: pressure distortion, deposition pressure, development medium, matrix, and substrate (Ashbaugh, 1999, p 109).\n\nMinimal Documentation of Analysis. Documentation of analysis may be minimal, using symbols to mark directly on the lift cards and photographs. This is particularly effective when the original lifts or photographs are part of the case record. If symbols are used to document the analysis, the proper use and meaning of the symbols should be detailed in the technical or operational manual. Figure 1014 is an example of analysis notes documented directly onto lift cards L1 and L2; the blue arrows point to the analysis symbols used by the LPE.\n\nIf L1 and L2 are part of the case record, they should contain all of the basic elements of the analysis. L1 and L2 are black powder lifts (that is, black powder is the developmental medium) and indicate the location from which the latent prints were recovered (substrate). The latent prints deemed suitable for comparison are marked with symbols. The symbols also indicate the anatomical source and orientation of each impression. L1 has a bracket delineating the base of a palm impression. L2 has an arch over the top of each finger impression. It is understood that the LPE considered all of the elements of analysis and factors of quality detailed in the technical or operational manual in order to make the determination of suitability for comparison.\n\nExpanded Documentation of Analysis. Worksheets or free-form notes may be used to document the analysis. The notes must contain enough detail to discern which photograph or lift was examined and the results of the analysis of the latent prints. The amount of information to be included on the worksheets or notes should be outlined in an agency's technical or procedural manual. If the original lifts or photographs are not retained as part of the case record, the LPE needs to be able to connect which latent prints were suitable for comparison on each latent lift and photograph. Without the original or legible reproductions of the original latent lifts and photographs in the case record, this connection would not be possible. The notes for L1 and L2 in Figure 1014 may be as follows:\n\n## L1Exterior Patio Door Glass Analysis:\n\nBlack powder lift: One palm impression suitable for comparison, appears to be a left hypothenar, normal matrix, average deposition pressure, no discernible pressure distortion.\n\n## L2Exterior Patio Door Glass Analysis:\n\nBlack powder lift: Three finger impressions suitable for comparison (A, B, & C) are consistent with simultaneous\n#7, #8, & #9* fingers, normal matrix, average deposition pressure, pressure distortion caused by apparent downward movement of fingers on surface. Expanded documentation of the analysis of a complex impression may include photographic enlargements of the impression and detailed notes regarding all of the elements of analysis and factors of quality. Figure 1015 is an image of a latent print from lift L2 in Figure 1014. The latent print in Figure 1015 is referred to as L2A (latent print A from lift L2). Expanded documentation of the analysis of latent print L2A in Figure 10-15 may include the marked photographic enlargement and the following notes:\n\n## L2Exterior Patio Door Glass Analysis:\n\nBlack powder lift: Three finger impressions suitable for comparison (A, B, & C) are consistent with simultaneous #7, #8, & #9 fingers.\n\n* #1 is right thumb, and #10 is left little finger.\n\n## L2A Analysis:\n\nSubstrate: The appearance of the latent lift is consistent with the indicated substrate glass from a patio door.\n\nAnatomical aspect: Based on adjacent impressions, L2A\nis consistent with an impression of a left index finger.\n\nMatrix: Consistent with normal residue. Deposition pressure: Average deposition pressure across the entire impression, possibly a bit lighter toward the tip of the finger.\n\nPressure distortion: Caused by apparent downward movement of fingers on surface. Indicators of pressure distortion are marked in the photographic enlargement as a, b, c, d, and e. The original touch of the finger is indicated as \"a\". As the finger slid across the surface, the detail in this area was obliterated. The direction of travel is noted in the striations present in the impression; one such striation is marked \"b\". Another indication of pressure distortion is the change in furrow width across the impression. The furrows are widest at the base of impression \"c\" (also an indication of downward movement). The furrows are slightly narrowed toward the top of impression \"d\" and are barely discernible on the left side of impression \"e\".\n\nLevel One: Good clarity; small count, left-slant loop; approximately 4 ridges from delta to core.\n\nLevel Two: Good clarity overallridge paths discernible through most of the impression; some become unclear along the edges of the impression. Ridge paths are difficult to follow just above the core of the impression.\n\nLevel Three: Areas of good, fair, and poor quality throughout the impression. Whether minimal or expanded, the case record should reflect which latent lifts and photographs were analyzed, who analyzed the latent prints and photographs, and the results of the analysis. The amount of detail in the documentation of the analysis will be dependent on the requirements outlined in the applicable technical or operational manual. 10.2.7.3 Comparison. The next phase of the examination involves the comparison of the unknown friction ridge impressions (latent or patent prints) to the exemplars. The LPE must have some means to document the source of the known prints compared and the evaluation of each comparison. The exact method by which the exemplars are documented should be detailed in the technical or operational manual. At a minimum, the case record should indicate the name and an identifier for each source of exemplars compared. This is sometimes annotated in a list in the case notes or on the envelope or packet containing the latent lifts and photographs. For example, some agencies may place all latent prints developed by the LPE in a preprinted envelope. The envelope and its contents are considered part of the case record. The exterior of the envelope typically contains the basic case information and may include a section that lists the names and identifiers of the exemplars compared. The names and identifiers of the exemplars may also be listed in the case notes. Original or legible copies of the exemplars to be compared should be maintained with the case record or be readily available. This is particularly critical for exemplars associated with one or more of the latent prints (i.e., used to determine an individualization). The original or legible copies of the exemplars may be included in the case notes or placed in the envelope with the latent lifts and photographs. The LPE should also indicate in the case record if additional or better quality exemplars are needed from any of the individuals compared. The LPE should document which, if any, latent prints were searched through AFIS. Documentation should be sufficient to indicate:\n\n-  Which latent prints were searched. -  Which AFIS databases were searched.\n-  The date(s) the searches were completed. -  Who launched the search. -  Who evaluated the results.\n10.2.7.4 Evaluation. The LPE should document the conclusion of each comparison conducted. This documentation may be minimal or quite detailed, depending on the agency's requirements.\n\nMinimum Documentation of Evaluation. Minimum documentation for individualizations should include annotation on the notes, lifts, or photographs with the following:\n\n-  The name and identifier of the source of the impression. -  The anatomical source (e.g., which finger or palm).\n-  The identifier (e.g., initials) of the LPE. -  The date the conclusion was rendered.\nIn lieu of, or in addition to, making the lift or photograph, comparisons may be documented in the notes as follows:\nJohn DOE (ID# 123456): negative 9/22/05. Susana SMITH (ID# 987654): negative 9/22/05. Jane DOE (DOB 11/27/78): L2A = #7 LI, L2B = #8 LM, L2C = #9 LR, 9/23/05.\n\nUnder minimum documentation, impressions that are compared but not individualized are typically documented in a default manner without markings. In other words, the individualizations are annotated and, by default, all other comparison results (exclusion and inconclusive) in the case are not. Frequently, wherever the LPE lists the names and identifiers of the sources of the exemplars, there is a reference as to whether the person was identified. As in Figure 1016, the notes, lifts, and photographs containing the annotations are the case documentation by which latent prints were associated with the exemplars. If there are no associations indicated on the lift or photograph, all persons listed were compared with negative results, as recorded in the notes.\n\n## Expanded Documentation Of Evaluation. The Case Notes (Worksheets Or Free-Form Notes) May Also Contain Expanded Documentation Of The Conclusions. The Notes\n\nmust document the conclusion of the comparison of each latent print with each exemplar. The information included on the worksheets or notes should be outlined in the technical or procedural manual. If the original lifts or photographs are not retained as part of the case record, the LPE should retain legible reproductions of the original latent lifts and photographs in the case record. Case note documentation of the comparison of L2 with the exemplars of three individuals may be as follows:\n\n## L2Exterior Patio Door Glass Analysis:\n\nBlack powder lift: Three finger impressions suitable for comparison (A, B, & C) are consistent with simultaneous #7, #8, & #9 fingers, normal matrix, average deposition pressure, pressure distortion caused by apparent downward movement of fingers on surface.\n\nExpanded documentation of an individualization may include enlargements demonstrating a subset of the data used to support the LPE's conclusions. Figure 1017 is an example of an enlargement demonstrating a limited portion of the level-one, level-two, and level-three detail of a different comparison to support an individualization.\n\n## Exemplars Compared And Conclusions:\n\nJohn DOE (ID# 123456): negative 9/22/05. Susana SMITH (ID# 987654): negative 9/22/05.\n\nJane DOE (DOB 11/27/78): L2A = #7 LI, L2B = #8 LM, L2C = #9 LR, 9/23/05.\n\nWhether minimal or expanded, the goal of documentation is to ensure that the LPE or a person reviewing the case can discern:\n\n-  Which latent prints are suitable for comparison. -  The source of the exemplars compared to the suitable\nlatent prints.\n-  The conclusions reached from each comparison.\nThe activities and results of the examination by the LPE should be clear and understandable. 10.2.7.5 Verification. Verification of any conclusions should be documented in the case record. The technical or procedural manual should indicate which conclusions must be verified and how the verification is documented. (Instances where blind verification is required may require special documentation procedures to preclude the verifier from knowing the original examiner's results.) For some agencies, only the individualizations are verified; for other agencies, all conclusions are verified. Sometimes, verification of all conclusions is dependent on certain criteria, such as the type of case. The person verifying the conclusions should place his or her personal marking and date in the case record. The personal marking and date may go on each lift containing verified conclusions, on the envelope containing the latent prints, or in the case notes. 10.2.7.6 Disposition of Lifts and Photographs. The LPE should indicate the disposition of the latent lifts and photographs after the examination is complete. In some agencies, it is only necessary to indicate if the latent lifts and photographs are not secured in the normal manner. For instance, it may be standard procedure that the latent prints are stored in a secured file cabinet and that the LPE must indicate on the envelope the date that the envelope was secured in the file cabinet. It may also be standard procedure that digital images are stored on a CD in the case file or in an image management database. As long as the standard procedures are followed, no notations are required. If the original latent lifts and photographs are released to a submitting agency, there should be documentation in the case record as to when the latent prints were released and to whom the latent prints were released.\n\n## 10.3 Secondary Custody Documentation 11.3.1 Latent Print Development On Items Of Evidence\n\nWhen an LPE receives an item of evidence recovered from a crime scene by other personnel (e.g., a crime scene analyst), additional documentation is needed concerning the chain of custody for the evidence and the packaging of the evidence. General notes and documentation regarding the description and condition of the evidence, initial observations, latent print development and recovery, marking items of evidence, disposition of evidence, and marking photographs and lifts is detailed in section 10.2.6, Latent Print Development on Items of Evidence.\n\n10.3.1.1 Chain of Custody. The LPE should indicate the date the items were received and from whom. The LPE may receive the item directly from responding personnel or from a secured storage facility.\n\n## 10.3.1.2 Packaging Of The Evidence. The Lpe Should Indicate Whether The Items Were Packaged And Sealed Properly.\n\nFor example, the notes may reflect that Items 6, 7, and 8 were received in a sealed brown paper bag. The LPE should also note whether there is any internal packaging. The notes may contain the information as follows:\nSealed brown paper bag received from vault 6/2/06 containing Items 6, 7, and 8. Inside sealed brown paper bag: Item 7 in a manila envelope and Item 8 in a plastic vial; no inner packaging for Item 6.\n\nThere are times when an LPE may receive evidence prior to final packaging by the personnel who responded to the scene. This may occur when there is concern that packaging may destroy the latent print evidence. In this circumstance, the LPE should document who delivered the evidence and the date and condition in which the evidence was delivered. After the LPE has completed the latent print development and recovery, the item should undergo final packaging and sealing. The LPE may package and seal the evidence, or the evidence may be returned to the person who initially recovered the item from the scene. Either circumstance must be indicated in the notes.\n\n## 10.3.2 Examination Of Friction Ridge Impressions\n\nThe examination of the friction ridge impressions recovered by the LPE from items of evidence submitted by other personnel follows the same documentation discussed in section 10.2.7, Examination of Friction Ridge Impressions.\n\n## 10.4 Tertiary Custody Documentation\n\nWhen an LPE receives photographs and lifts of latent prints recovered by other personnel (e.g., a crime scene analyst), additional documentation is necessary to establish the chain of custody for the evidence.\n\n## 10.4.1 Chain Of Custody\n\nLatent lifts and photographs are considered evidence and should be properly packaged and have a chain of custody.\nThe LPE should document all of the pertinent information:\n\n- The case number. - The address. - Who recovered the latent prints. The date the latent\nprints were recovered.\n- An inventory of what was received (e.g., the number\nof lifts, photographs, any sketches or notes, and any elimination prints submitted).\n\n## 10.4.2 Marking Lifts And Photographs With A Unique Identifier\n\nEach latent lift and photograph should be marked with a unique identifier. The submitted latent lifts and photographs should already bear the case number, which should be annotated on each photograph and lift by the person who recovered the latent prints. The LPE may choose to include a sequential alphabetical or numerical designator to serve as the unique identifier for each lift and photograph. The LPE's initials followed by a sequential number is an effective method for marking the photographs and lifts (e.g., avm 1, avm 2, avm 3, etc.). It is sometimes helpful to have one system of labeling latent prints developed by the LPE (L1, L2, L3, etc.) and another system of labeling latent prints submitted by other personnel (dbf 1, dbf 2, dbf 3, etc.). Within one case, the LPE may be responsible for examining latent prints he or she recovered, and the LPE may be responsible for examining latent prints recovered by other personnel. A different labeling system readily distinguishes the two in the case record.\n\n## 10.4.3 Examination Of Friction Ridge Impressions\n\nAfter documenting the chain of custody and placing a unique identifier on the lifts and photographs, the examination of the latent prints proceeds. The documentation of examination (analysis, comparison, evaluation, and verification) of the friction ridge impressions is discussed in section 10.2.7, Examination of Friction Ridge Impressions.\n\n## 10.5 Conclusion\n\nIn order to properly review a case record, the case record should contain sufficient information to illuminate the activities and the results of any conclusions. Documentation of friction ridge impressions begins at the crime scene. A surface or item of evidence should be documented at the scene. The location and orientation of any latent prints developed at the scene should be documented in a manner that connects the latent print to the original surface.\n\nSubsequent development of latent prints on items recovered from the scene should demonstrate the location and orientation of any latent prints developed on the item.\n\nExamination of the recovered latent prints should contain sufficient information that a person reviewing the case record can discern:\n\n- The origin of the latent prints. - Which latent prints are of sufficient value for\ncomparison.\n\n- The donor of the exemplars compared to the\nlatent prints.\n- The conclusions reached.\nFigure 1018 is an example of how photography may be used to connect all of the elements of documentation for one case. Latent print examiners should follow the policies and procedures outlined in the technical or operational manual of their agency. It is important that these policies and procedures follow sound scientific practices and are sufficiently detailed to permit an accurate review of the case record. Proper documentation is often the critical component in the admissibility of the evidence.\n\n## 10.6 Reviewers\n\nThe reviewers critiquing this chapter were Leonard G. Butt, Brent T. Cutro, Sr., Robert J. Garrett, and Michael Perkins.\n\n## 10.7 References\n\nAmerican Society of Crime Laboratory Directors/Laboratory Accreditation Board (ASCLD/LAB). *ASCLD/LAB Manual;*\nAmerican Society of Crime Laboratory Directors/Laboratory Accreditation Board: Garner, NC, 2005.\n\nAshbaugh, D. R. Quantitative-Qualitative Friction Ridge Analysis: An Introduction to Basic and Advanced Ridgeology;\nCRC Press: Boca Raton, FL, 1999. Scientific Working Group on Friction Ridge Analysis, Study and Technology (SWGFAST). Friction Ridge Examination Methodology for Latent Print Examiners; Scientific Working Group on Friction Ridge Analysis, Study and Technology, 2002.\n\n## C H A P T E R Equipment Julieanne Perez-Avila C O N T E N T S\n\n3\n\n11.1  Introduction\n12\n11.5  Credits and Reviewers\n12\n11.6  References\n3\n11.2  Crime Scene\n\nEquipment\n7\n11.3  Laboratory Equipment\n13\n11.7  Equipment Suppliers\n12\n11.4  Conclusion\n\n## 11.1 Introduction Chapter 11 Equipment Julieanne Perez-Avila\n\nFingerprints, although they may be found 50 years after being deposited on a piece of paper, are at the same time very fragile and easily destroyed. The arrival of a fingerprint technician at a crime scene marks a critical point in an investigation. It is what he or she decides to do, even unwittingly, that may affect the success or failure of fingerprint evidence collection. A technician must be knowledgeable about the equipment that is available both in the field and in the laboratory. With this knowledge, the technician will be able to select the best method for developing and preserving a print. This chapter focuses on equipment that can be used easily in the field and equipment that would be found in the laboratory setting. There will, of course, be some overlap between the crime scene and laboratory equipment.\n\n## 11.2 Crime Scene Equipment 11.2.1 Light Sources\n\nA light source may include any item that produces electromagnetic radiation of any wavelength (from ultraviolet to infrared). Light sources are indispensable to a crime scene responder and a variety of them are useful. 11.2.1.1 Flashlight. A flashlight is an important item that should be in every fingerprint kit. It should be of good quality and produce a strong, even light. A flashlight is typically handheld, lightweight, and powered with batteries. It can be held at an angle to any surface that is being examined. 11.2.1.2 Forensic Light Sources. In the early 1980s, a modified xenon arc lamp* was developed by the Forensic Science Research Unit of Australia, the \"Quasar\" light source was developed by the Scientific Research Branch of the United Kingdom's Home Office, and the \"Lumaprint\" light was developed by the National Research Council of Canada. Currently, there are many types of forensic light sources (Lee and Gaensslen, 2001, pp 152153). Many delivery systems using diffraction gratings or filters with various lamps provide a variety of configurations and models. In more recent years, several forensic light sources have been designed to use light-emitting diodes instead of lamps. The principle for all forensic light sources is basically the same: a high-powered lamp produces a white light consisting of a wide range of wavelengths. An investigator selects certain wavelengths of light through the use of a filter or a diffraction grating. The selected wavelengths pass through an aperture to produce a beam, or the light is directed through the use of an optical device (e.g., fiber optics, liquid light guides). This ability to select various wavelengths can be a benefit not found in most lasers. (For more on lasers, see section 11.3.3.) The intensity of a forensic light source (FLS) is not as strong as a laser; however, an FLS does have the benefit of being less expensive and more easily transported than a laser (Wilkinson and Watkin, 1994, pp 632651; Fisher, 1993, p 111). Forensic light sources are used by shining the light over the evidence or room to help investigators detect latent prints. Contaminants in, and constituents of, a latent print will sometimes cause an inherent luminescence when exposed to certain wavelengths. Certain chemicals and powders can also be used to make latent prints visible.\n\nNot all substances become visible at the same wavelength (Fisher, 1993, p 111).\n\nInvestigators should wear goggles with filters when using any FLS. The type of goggle needed depends on the type of light used (Masters, 1995, pp 133142).\n\n## 11.2.2 Fingerprint Powder Applicators\n\n11.2.2.1 Traditional Fingerprint Powder Applicators. Fingerprint powder applicators come in many shapes, sizes, and fiber components. They may be made from camel hair, squirrel hair, goat hair, horse hair, feathers, synthetic or natural fibers, carbon filaments, or fiberglass. These brushes are used to lightly apply powder to a surface; soft brushes reduce the risk of damaging the fragile print (Fisher, 1993, pp 101104). 11.2.2.2 Magnetic Fingerprint Powder Applicators.\n\nThe magnetic brush, or *magna brush,* was developed by Herbert MacDonell in 1961 (MacDonell, 1961, p 7). Since his early design, many variations have been manufactured (Figure 111), from large wide-headed applicators to applicators that have a plastic disposable cover for use in situations where potentially hazardous material could contaminate an application (James, Pounds, and Wilshire, 1992, pp 531542; Lightning Powder Company, 1999, p 3). Most have a similar design: a magnetized steel rod within a nonmagnetic case. The magnetic rod is moveable and can be retracted within the case. When the rod is not retracted, the head of the applicator is magnetized. To use the magnetic applicator, it is lowered into the magnetic powder. The magnet allows the fingerprint powder to cling to the end of the applicator. The powder that adheres to the applicator will create a bristlelike brush consisting of only powder. This very soft brush is then carefully brushed across the desired surface. The ends of the powder will adhere to the constituents of the latent print and make the print visible. Care should be exercised to touch only the ends of the suspended powder, not the applicator itself, to the surface being processed. This provides a very delicate brush with minimal abrasion to fragile prints. Excess powder can be removed by first retracting the magnetic rod and releasing the unused powder from the applicator back into the powder jar (or appropriate disposal container, if the powder has become contaminated) and then passing the applicator over the area again to allow any excess powder to re-adhere to the magnet.\n\n## 11.2.3 Latent Print Backing Cards And Lifting Materials\n\n11.2.3.1 Latent Print Backing Cards. Latent print backing cards are used for recording prints that have been lifted with tape. They typically have a glossy side and a nonglossy side and come in either white or black. The card is usually preprinted with areas for information about the lift (date, case number, location, who made the lift, etc.) and space where a sketch may be recorded. 11.2.3.2 Lifting Tape and Hinge Lifters. Over the years, different types of tapes to lift latent prints have been developed. Aside from the standard clear and frosted tapes, there is a polyethylene tape that has some stretch to it, allowing for lifts to be more easily taken from curved surfaces. Tapes that are thicker than the clear and frosted tapes were developed to conform better to textured surfaces, allowing for more of the print to be lifted. Adhesive tape from a roll may be torn or cut to any length and then affixed to the developed print. Care should be exercised to remove a suitable length of tape in one continuous motion to avoid lines that are created by intermittent stops during the removal of the tape from the roll. (Many examiners prefer not to detach the piece of tape from the roll but instead use the roll as a secure handle for the tape.) After an item has been processed with powder, the edge of the lifting device (e.g., end of the tape) is pressed onto the surface adjacent to the latent print and the device is carefully smoothed over the print. The tape is then peeled off and placed on a backing card of contrasting color to the powder.\n\nThere are also precut hinge lifters of various sizes. These are small pieces of backing material with a same-size piece of adhesive tape attached. They allow an examiner to place the adhesive tape on an impression and then press it directly onto the attached backing to mount it. 11.2.3.3 Rubber/Gel Lifters. Rubber/gel lifters come in precut elastic sheets. They have a low-tack adhesive gelatin layer on the backing material, which is covered with clear acetate. The low-tack adhesive and flexibility of the backing material make these lifters desirable for lifting prints off curved and delicate surfaces such as light bulbs, doorknobs, and paper. The lifters are available in white, black, and with transparent backing material. The transparent lifters can be affixed directly to a lift card, whereas lifters with either a black or white backing material are instead protected with a clear cover sheet and compared as a reversed (mirrored) image.\n\n## 11.2.4 Casting Materials\n\nWhen the surface of an item is rough or textured, a casting material can be used to fill the crevices, providing a greater chance of lifting the entire print. Casting material can also be useful to preserve and record fingerprint impressions in semisolid surfaces (e.g., fresh putty used to secure panes of glass in a window) (Bay, 1998, pp 130132). Casting material is available in a variety of compounds (e.g., silicone, putty, rubber) and colors. A color that will contrast with the print powder should be selected (Morris, 2005).\n\n## 11.2.5 Cameras\n\nAny type of camera that has accessories for close-up work can be used in fingerprint and palmprint photography (Moenssens, 1971, p 151). However, a camera system with a lens for macrophotography works best. Photographic flood lights or an off-camera flash system for lighting is necessary. These, in combination, form a system that can be used to photograph evidence in the laboratory or in the field. The press or view camera using 4\" x 5\" sheet film was the most commonly used camera until it was replaced by easy-to-use 35 mm cameras. The newer high-resolution digital single-lens reflex cameras are also suitable for fingerprint photography (Dalrymple, Shaw, and Woods, 2002, pp 750761; Crispino, Touron, and Elkader, 2001, pp 479495).\n\n## 11.2.6 Tenprint Cards\n\nTenprint cards are included as a part of the standard equipment for on-scene print recording. Often, investigators collect latent prints from a scene without obtaining the victim's elimination prints. In most cases, elimination prints can be easily obtained at the scene, but often they are overlooked. If the time is taken to obtain the elimination prints, comparisons can be made and lab personnel are less likely to need to run victim prints through the FBI's\nAutomated Fingerprint Identification System or the Integrated Automated Fingerprint Identification System.\n\n## 11.2.7 Miscellaneous Equipment\n\nAdditional items that should be included in a crime scene evidence kit (Figure 112):\n\n1.  Retractable tape measure 2.  Rulers (metal machine ruler and small plastic rulers; a\nlaser ruler may be helpful as well)\n3.  Scales to indicate dimensions in photographs (nonadhesive and adhesive for placing on walls, if necessary)\n4.  Packaging containers (to preserve the evidence in the\ncondition it is found and to prevent contamination)\na.  Paper bags b.  Boxes of various sizes c.  Manila envelopes of various sizes d.  Plastic evidence bags\ne.  Evidence tubes (for holding knives,\nscrewdrivers, etc.)\n5.  Packaging and tamper-resistant evidence tape\n(for sealing the packaging containers)\n6.  Warning labels (for biohazard and chemically\nprocessed evidence)\n7.  Dust masks (for use with powders, especially in\n\nan enclosed area) and respirators (for use with\n\nchemical reagents that require protection)\n8.  Clear goggles for use with powder (in addition to\ngoggles with filters for use with FLS)\n9.  Disposable gloves 10. Handheld magnifier 11. Pens and permanent markers 12. Plastic sleeves for tripod legs (in case of\n contaminated scenes)\nSometimes evidence needs to be collected for processing at the laboratory. Tools to help the technician collect evidence include:\n\n1.  Screwdrivers 2.  Socket wrenches 3.  Reciprocating saw 4.  Pry bar\nAs a technician gains experience and finds what works and what does not, he or she can modify his or her personal kit as needed.\n\n## 11.3 Laboratory Equipment 11.3.1 Cyanoacrylate Fuming Chambers\n\nCyanoacrylate ester (CA or CAE) fuming, commonly referred to as *superglue fuming,* was introduced into the United States in the early 1980s as a way to develop latent fingerprints (Norkus, 1982, p 6; Kendall, 1982, pp 35). The prints are developed when CA vapor molecules react with components in the latent print residue. As these molecules collect, they begin to form clusters, often becoming visible to the naked eye. These clusters may then be photographed or processed with powder or chemicals.\n\nCyanoacrylate fuming chambers have two basic equipment requirements in addition to glue. First, the fumes must be contained. Anything from a commercially made chamber (Figure 113) to a simple plastic bag, garbage can, or fish tank (Figure 114) can be used. The second requirement is proper ventilation. Both of these requirements are used to contain the fumes and limit the operator's exposure to them, since they may be irritating to eyes and mucous membranes.\n\nThe development process may be accelerated by adding a heat source, such as a coffee cup warmer. This heat causes the glue to vaporize, thereby developing the latent print more rapidly (Lee and Gaensslen, 2001, p 119). Small containers, known as *boats,* are used to contain the liquid CA\nfor placement on the heat source. The chamber should also include a system to separate and suspend the specimens that are being processed. The vacuum fuming chamber (Figure 115) was developed by the Identification Division of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, and a description of its usage and results was published in the early 1990s (Lee and Gaensslen, 2001,\npp 119120). This chamber vaporizes fumes from cyanoacrylate under vacuum conditions without the white buildup of residue that might typically occur when fuming in a conventional chamber. In addition, unlike with ordinary containers, there is no need to spread out items to be processed when they are placed in the chamber; everything will still be fumed evenly (McNutt, 2004, p 6). The use of this chamber also makes overfuming less likely, avoiding the possibility of excessive buildup of the residue.\n\n## 11.3.2 Vacuum Metal Deposition Chamber\n\nA vacuum metal deposition chamber, used for developing latent prints, is typically a steel cylindrical chamber with a door at one end. The chamber is attached to a system of valves and vacuum pumps that work to reduce the pressure to a level where the evaporation of metals may occur. Theys, Turgis, and Lepareux first reported in 1968 that the \"selective condensation of metals under vacuum\" settles on the sebum (fat) films, revealing latent prints. This procedure sequentially evaporates small amounts of gold or zinc in a vacuum chamber, and a very thin metal film is deposited onto the latent print, making it visible (Lee and Gaensslen, 2001, p 140). This procedure is effective on smooth, nonporous surfaces (e.g., plastic bags).\n\n## 11.3.3 Laser\n\nThe word *laser* is an acronym for \"light amplification by stimulated emission of radiation.\" According to Fisher (1993, p 111), \"Not all lasers are suitable for fingerprint work. The color or wavelength of the output, as well as the light intensity or power output, is important.\" The concept for the laser was first noted in 1957 by Gordon Gould, a Columbia University graduate student (Taylor, 2000, pp 1011). It took him until 1988 to resolve a complex patent dispute and legal battle regarding this remarkable invention (Taylor, 2000, p 284). An article by Dalrymple, Duff, and Menzel (1977, pp 106115) introduced the use of the laser to fingerprint examiners around the world (Ridgely, 1987, pp 512). This article described how natural components in some latent fingerprints luminesce under laser illumination. There are various types of lasers, but they all basically work the same way. To understand how they work, one must understand the basics of atoms. In simplified terms, atoms\n\n2.0\n2.5\n3.0\n3.5\n4.0\n4.5\n5.0\n5.5\n  t - t' t\n68\n83\n78\n74\n70\n66\n\n\n\n69\n83\n78\n74\n70\n66\n\n\n\n70\n83\n79\n75\n71\n67\n\n\n\n71\n83\n80\n76\n72\n68\n\n\n\n72\n83\n80\n76\n72\n68\n65\n\n\n73\n84\n80\n76\n72\n69\n65\n\n\n74\n84\n80\n76\n72\n69\n65\n\n\n75\n84\n80\n77\n73\n69\n66\n\n\n76\n84\n81\n77\n74\n70\n67\n\n\n77\n84\n81\n77\n74\n70\n67\n\n\n78\n84\n81\n77\n74\n70\n67\n\n\n79\n85\n81\n78\n74\n71\n67\n\n\n80\n85\n82\n78\n75\n71\n68\n65\n\n81\n85\n82\n78\n75\n71\n68\n65\n\n82\n85\n82\n78\n75\n72\n69\n65\n\n83\n85\n82\n78\n75\n72\n69\n65\n\n84\n86\n82\n79\n76\n72\n69\n66\n\n85\n86\n82\n79\n76\n72\n69\n66\n\n86\n86\n83\n79\n76\n73\n70\n67\n\n87\n86\n83\n79\n76\n73\n70\n67\n\n88\n86\n83\n80\n77\n73\n70\n67\n65\n89\n86\n83\n80\n77\n73\n71\n68\n65\n90\n86\n83\n80\n77\n74\n71\n68\n65\n\nThe left column is the dry bulb reading (t). The top horizontal row is the difference between the dry bulb reading and the wet bulb reading (t - t'). Find the cell at the intersection of the dry bulb reading and the difference of the bulb readings. For example, if the dry reading is 85 and the wet bulb reading is 81, the difference is 4. Look at the chart and find 85 on the far left and 4 on the top row. Read down and across to meet at 72; that is the relative humidity.\n\nhave a nucleus containing protons and neutrons, encircled by an electron cloud. Within the cloud, electrons exist at various energy levels (levels of excitation), depending on the amount of energy to which the atom is exposed by heat, light, or electricity. When the atom gets excited by\na specific quantity (*quantum*) of energy, the electrons are excited from their ground state energy level to higher energy states or levels (*orbitals*). When electrons drop back into the ground state energy level, the atom releases energy in the form of a particle of light (*photon*).\n\nA laser contains a mirror at each end that is used to reflect photons. As the photons bounce back and forth between the two mirrors, they stimulate other atoms to release more photons of the same wavelength. This is called stimulated emission. One mirror is only partially reflective. This allows a portion of the coherent radiation (a *laser beam*) to be emitted (Menzel, 1980, pp 121).\n\n## 11.3.4 Humidity Chamber\n\nHumidity chambers (also known as environmental chambers) (Figure 116) regulate the moisture and temperature inside them so optimum conditions for a specific process (e.g., ninhydrin processing) can be achieved. A very basic way to determine humidity is simply to have one wet bulb thermometer and one dry bulb thermometer inside the chamber. The wet bulb thermometer has a piece of muslin tightly wrapped about its bulb. This cloth is dampened with distilled water; as the water evaporates, the thermometer cools. The rate of cooling depends on how much water vapor is in the air. The dry bulb thermometer measures the surrounding air temperature in the chamber. Table 111\nprovides an easy way to determine relative humidity based on the readings of the wet and dry bulb thermometer measurements (Olsen, 1978, pp 197199). Experience and research have determined that the best prints obtained from treatment with ninhydrin are those that have been exposed to relative humidity of 6580% (Kent, 1998; Nielson, 1987, p 372). Digital thermo-hygrometers are also available to monitor the processing of humidity and temperature. In the absence of a humidity chamber, some technicians will use a common household iron to provide a warm and moist environment to accelerate the development of ninhydrin prints. Although this technique is frequently used with success, excessive moisture could damage the prints being developed.\n\n## 11.3.5 Cameras\n\nAs in field work (see section 11.2.5), most cameras and accessories that are capable of close-up photography should be suitable for fingerprint photography in the lab. Special-purpose fingerprint cameras were developed that employed a fixed focus and were placed directly over the print to be photographed. These cameras were equipped with batteries and small bulbs for illumination. They primarily used 2.25\" x 3.25\" or 4\" x 5\" sheet film. Press and view cameras (e.g., 4\" x 5\" Crown and Speed Graphics) were also used and had the advantage of being useful for general crime scene photography.\n\nDuring the 1960s, the Polaroid Corporation introduced the MP-3 copy camera and, later, the MP-4 (Figure 117). The MP-4 became a widely used tool for fingerprint photography within the laboratory setting because it allowed for the use of glass plate holders, sheet film holders, roll film adapters, film pack holders, and ground glass focusing. The use of 4\" x 5\" sheet film to record fingerprints at a life-size scale on the negative is still common in some agencies. However, the trend of using 35mm and digital equipment (cameras and scanners) is becoming more common. Digital equipment is convenient and produces results that are instantly viewable. Issues of quality are measured in many ways, with resolution and bit depth being two important issues. \"Friction ridge impressions should be captured (color or grayscale) at 1000 ppi or higher resolution. Grayscale digital imaging should be at a minimum of 8 bits. Color digital imaging should be at a minimum of 24\nbits\" (SWGFAST, 2002, p 277).\n\n## 11.3.6 Comparison Tools\n\nThe customary tools used to perform comparisons include a magnifier, ridge counters, and a comfortable working environment with good lighting. Additional tools that are useful are a light box, a comparator, and an image enhancement system. 11.3.6.1 Magnifiers. A magnifier (Figure 118) is a basic piece of equipment for comparing latent prints. A good fingerprint magnifier is a solidly built magnifying glass that has an adjustable eyepiece to allow for individual eyesight variations. Magnification is typically 4.5X with the use of good lighting (Olsen, 1978, pp 171175). The magnifier's purpose is to allow the examiner to see sufficient ridge characteristics while still keeping a sufficient field of view. This allows the examiner to evaluate the qualities of ridge details while considering the position of these ridge characteristics relative to one another. Some examiners use two magnifiers (one for each of the prints being compared) and switch their attention (view) back and forth between the prints being compared. Other examiners fold the photograph or latent lift card along the edge of the print in question so that it may be placed adjacent to the exemplar print underneath a single magnifier.\n\nSome magnifiers allow for a *reticle* to be inserted in the base. These discs have a line, or lines, going through them that can be placed over the core and delta of the print to help when doing classifications (Olsen, 1978, pp 171175).\n\n11.3.6.2 Ridge Counters. A ridge counter (or teasing needle) is a pencil-like instrument with a thick needle attached to one end (Figure 118). Other similar instruments with retractable pins are also commercially available.\n\nRidge counters are used to maintain a point of reference during the examination process. They help an examiner keep track of where he or she is when examining or classifying a print. The proper use of ridge counters requires a light touch to avoid pricking the tape on latent lift cards or damaging exemplars. 11.3.6.3 Light Box. A light box contains a light source and has a semitransparent top made of plastic or glass. It is used for evaluating photographic negatives and transparent lifters (Olsen, 1978, pp 184185). 11.3.6.4 Comparator. A fingerprint comparator is a desktop projection system that has a light source that magnifies and displays images on a screen. Known and unknown prints (which have been placed on platforms) are displayed sideby-side on a split screen. This allows the examiner to study both prints and is especially helpful during training and when multiple examiners are reviewing and discussing prints. Analog and digital imaging systems were introduced to the fingerprint community during the early 1980s (German, 1983, pp 811), and by 1985, numerous laboratories had initiated their use (German, 1985, p 11). Side-by-side fingerprint examinations are now also accomplished using a standard computer with readily available image-editing software.\n\nKendall, F. G. Super Glue Fuming for the Development of Latent Fingerprints. *Ident. News* 1982, 32 (5), 35.\n\n## 11.4 Conclusion\n\nKent, T., Ed. Manual of Fingerprint Development Techniques, 2nd ed.; Home Office, Police Scientific Development Branch: Sandridge, U.K., 1998.\n\nLee, H.; Gaensslen, R. E., Ed. Advances in Fingerprint Technology, 2nd ed.; CRC Press: Washington, DC, 2001.\n\nWhether processing a crime scene or processing evidence in a laboratory, it is important to have a good working knowledge of the equipment and what it can do to obtain the best possible results in each case.\n\nLightning Powder Company. Disposable Magnetic Brush.\n\nMinutiae 1999, 53 (March-April), 3.\n\n## 11.5 Credits And Reviewers\n\nMacDonell, H. L. Bristleless Brush Development of Latent Fingerprints. *Ident. News* 1961, 11 (3), 79, 15.\n\nAll photographs by Aaron Matson, Imaging Specialist, Wisconsin State Crime Laboratory, Milwaukee, WI.\n\nMasters, N. E. Safety for the Forensic Identification Specialist; Lightning Powder Company: Salem, OR, 1995.\n\nThe reviewers critiquing this chapter were Robert J. Garrett, Bridget Lewis, Michael Perkins, and Juliet H. Wood.\n\nMcNutt, J. Advancement in Latent Print Processing:\nVacuum Cyanoacrylate Fuming. *The Print* 2004, 20 (2), 67.\n\n## 11.6 References\n\nMenzel, E. R. *Fingerprint Detection With Lasers;* Marcel Dekker, Inc.: New York, 1980.\n\nBay, A. L., Jr. Additional Use for Mikrosil Casting Material.\n\nJ. Forensic Ident. 1998, 48 (2), 130132.\n\nMoenssens, A. A. *Fingerprint Techniques;* Chilton Book Company: Philadelphia, 1971. Morris, M. Casting a Wide Net: Lifting Fingerprints From Difficult Surfaces. *Forensic Magazine* 2005, 4 (2), 812.\n\nCrispino, F.; Touron, P.; Elkader, A. A. Search for a Digital Enhancement Protocol for Photoshop Software. J. Forensic Ident. 2001, 51 (5), 479495.\n\nNielson, J. P. Quality Control for Amino Acid Visualization Reagents. *J. Forensic Sci.*1987, 32 (2), 370376.\n\nDalrymple, B. E.; Duff, J. M.; Menzel, E. R. Inherent Fingerprint FluorescenceDetection by Laser. J. Forensic Sci. 1977, 22 (1), 106115.\n\nNorkus, P. M. Glue It. *Ident. News* 1982, 32 (5), 6.\n\nOlsen R. D., Sr. *Scott's Fingerprint Mechanics;* Charles C\nThomas: Springfield, IL, 1978.\n\nDalrymple, B.; Shaw, L.; Woods, K. Optimized Digital Recording of Crime Scene Impressions. *J. Forensic Ident.* 2002, 52 (6), 750761.\n\nRidgely, J. E., Jr. Latent Print Detection by Laser. Ident.\n\nNews 1987, 37 (4), 512.\n\nFisher, B. A. J., Ed. Techniques of Crime Scene Investigation, 5th ed.; CRC Press: Washington, DC, 1993. German, E. R. Analog/Digital Image Processing. Ident. News 1983, 33 (11), 811.\n\nScientific Working Group on Friction Ridge Analysis, Study and Technology (SWGFAST). Friction Ridge Digital Imaging Guidelines, version 1.0. *J. Forensic Ident.* 2002, 52 (3),\n276278. [Version 1.1, effective 9/14/09, available online at http://www.swgfast.org/CurrentDocuments.html.]\nGerman, E. R. Electronic Latent Print Detection: A 1985 Update. Presented at 70th Annual Conference of the International Association for Identification, Savannah, GA, July 1985.\n\nTaylor, N. LASER: The Inventor, the Nobel Laureate, and the Thirty-Year Patent War; Simon & Schuster: New York, 2000.\n\nJames, J. D.; Pounds, C. A.; Wilshire, B. New Magnetic Applicators and Magnetic Flake Powders for Revealing Latent Fingerprints. *J. Forensic Ident.* 1992, 42 (6), 531542.\nWilkinson, D. A.; Watkin, J. E. A Comparison of the Forensic Light Sources: Polilight, Luma-Lite, and Spectrum 9000.\nJ. Forensic Ident. 1994, 44 (6), 632651.\n\n## 11.7 Equipment Suppliers\n\nArmor Forensics Lightning Powder Company, Inc.\n\n13386 International Parkway Jacksonville, FL 32218 (800) 852 0300 (904) 485 1836 http://www.redwop.com Arrowhead Forensic Products 11030 Strang Line Road Lenexa, KS 66215 (913) 894 8388 (800) 953 3274 info@arrowheadforensics.com http://www.crime-scene.com BVDA International b.v. Postbus 2323 2002 CH Haarlem The Netherlands +31 (0)23 5424708 info@bvda.nl http://www.bvda.com/EN/index.html CSI Equipment Ltd. Locard House Deethe Farm Estate Cranfield Road Woburn Sands United Kingdom MK17 8UR +44 (0)1908 58 50 58 info@csiequipment.com sales@csiequipment.com CSI Forensic Supply P.O. Box 16 Martinez, CA 94553 (925) 686 6667 (800) 227 6020 http://www.csiforensic.com Evident Crime Scene Products 739 Brooks Mill Road Union Hall, VA 24176 (800) 576 7606 contact@evident.cc http://www.evidentcrimescene.com Faurot Forensic Products P.O. Box 99146 Raleigh, NC 27624\n(919) 556 9670 http://www.faurotforensics.com Lynn Peavey Company P.O. Box 14100 Lenexa, KS 66285 (913) 888 0600 (800) 255 6499 lpv@peaveycorp.com http://www.lynnpeavey.com Morris Kopec Forensics, Inc. 631 Palm Springs Drive, Suite 107 Altamonte Springs, FL 32701 (407) 831 9921 rjkopec@aol.com or mkforensics@aol.com QPST P.O. Box 8408 Warnbro 6169 Western Australia +61 (0) 8 9524 7144 info@qpst.net http://www.qpst.net Sirchie Finger Print Laboratories, Inc. 100 Hunter Place Youngsville, NC 27596 (919) 554 2244 (800) 356 7311 sirchieinfo@sirchie.com http://www.sirchie.com SPEX Forensics 19963 W. 162nd Street Olathe, KS 66062 (800) 657 7739 (913) 764 0117 questions@mail.spexforensics.com http://www.spexforensics.com\n\n## C H A P T E R Quality Assurance M. Leanne Gray C O N T E N T S\n\n3\n12.1  Introduction\n11\n12.5  Reviewers\n11\n12.6  References\n4\n12.2  Quality Assurance\n\nProgram\n11\n12.7  Additional Information\n9\n12.3  Additional Quality Assurance\nMeasures That May Be Added\n\nto a Quality Assurance Program\n11\n12.4  Conclusion\n\n## Quality Assurance M. Leanne Gray 12.1 Introduction\n\nThe purpose of a quality assurance program is to ensure that all examiners meet the quality standards set by the discipline and by the individual laboratory. A quality assurance program includes \"those planned and systematic actions necessary to provide sufficient confidence that a laboratory's product or service will satisfy given requirements for quality\" (ASCLD/LAB, 2005, p 66). A quality assurance program sets the guidelines for development and implementation of standards that address examiner qualifications, report writing, document control, quality control measures, procedural validation and documentation, organizational structure, infrastructure requirements, and evidence control. There are two fundamental principles in friction ridge examination: (1) all latent print examiners must be trained and found to be competent to perform casework prior to beginning independent casework, and (2) all individualizations (i.e., identifications) must be verified by another competent and qualified examiner (SWGFAST, 2006, p 122). The processing of evidence to develop and preserve latent prints can involve various processing techniques and preservation methods. Although no standard sequence can be applied to all items to be processed, standardized sequences within an agency should be established for particular circumstances (e.g., type of evidence, type of case). Friction ridge examination requires that an examiner analyze and determine the suitability of the ridge detail, compare the ridge detail with known exemplars, and evaluate the sufficiency of visual information to reach a conclusion. Possible conclusions are individualizations (identifications), exclusions, or inconclusives (SWGFAST, 2004, pp 358359). Quality issues that arise from inconsistencies, clerical or administrative errors, or erroneous conclusions may occur.\n\nA quality assurance program will allow for the tracking of any of these quality issues. A quality assurance program will ensure that all examiners are following proper protocol in order to minimize the number of issues that are\nproduced. Because the forensic science community is constantly growing and changing, and, therefore, the rules governing quality assurance continue to change, this chapter will discuss generalities of a quality assurance program. For specific guidelines and the most up-to-date resources, please refer to the appendix of related references on quality assurance programs and accreditation and certification organizations, section 12.6.\n\n## 12.2 Quality Assurance Program 12.2.1 Quality Assurance Documents\n\nA quality assurance program should be written and contained in a set of documents or in a single document (e.g., quality manual). Included in the quality manual should be documentation for the following areas: processing techniques; preparation, use, and storage of chemicals; laboratory safety procedures; material safety data sheets; evidence handling procedures; proficiency testing; minimum notation requirements on examination worksheets; report wording guidelines; technical and administrative case reviews; training and competency records; equipment calibration and maintenance logs; validation records; policy and procedure manuals for electronic fingerprint systems;\nand testimony reviews (SWGFAST, 2006, pp 117118).\n\nA quality manual should also outline the responsibilities\nof personnel regarding adherence to the quality assurance program and delineate the procedures to follow when dealing with quality issues. In addition, documents may address such areas as minimum standards and controls, qualifications of a verifier, organization and management requirements, personnel requirements, and facility requirements.\n\n## 12.2.2 Competency Testing\n\nAn agency must have a method to initially test for competency when an examiner first joins the agency or an examiner completes an internal training program. This initial competency testing may include oral, written, or practical tests. If an agency is large and has multiple worksites, any required tests should be consistent from one worksite to another. This will ensure that each examiner's overall quality and minimum level of competency are consistent throughout the agency. No examiner should be allowed to begin independent casework until he or she has satisfied all aspects of the initial competency testing phase.\n\n## 12.2.3 Evidence Handling And Quality Audits\n\nEach agency must establish a policy for the handling of all evidence within its control. A chain of custody shall be maintained from the time that the evidence is collected or received until it is released. Procedures shall establish how evidence is collected, received, and stored. The procedures shall preserve the identity, integrity, condition, and security of the item. The policy should include information about how evidence is to be packaged, seal requirements, and what to do when evidence is lost or if there is a discrepancy. Included in this policy should be periodic audits of all evidence within the agency's control. The time frame for these audits to occur (e.g., monthly, quarterly, semiannually, or annually), as well as what percentage of evidence will be examined and who will conduct the audit, should be established. In addition, an agency should establish a policy for auditing all other aspects of the agency's quality system, including a time frame for these audits to occur as well as who will conduct these audits. An agency may choose to bring in auditors from outside agencies or have internal auditors conduct the inspections.\n\n## 12.2.4 Preparation, Use, And Storage Of Chemicals\n\nAn agency must have a policy in place describing proper procedures for preparation, use, and storage of all chemicals that are maintained within the agency. This policy may address such issues as markings required on the chemicals when received, length of time a chemical can be kept and used if commercially purchased, shelf life of each reagent solution that is prepared within the agency, and a list of chemicals and reagent solutions that must be tested prior to use with casework. An agency should create and maintain a list of all chemicals and reagent solutions that are used in each section of the agency. In addition, an agency should have a plan for proper disposal of chemicals and reagent solutions, including contact information for any outside vendors that may be needed to implement the disposal of outdated or no longer used chemicals or reagent solutions.\n\n## 12.2.5 Processing Techniques\n\nAn agency must have a policy in place to delineate what validated processing techniques are sanctioned by the agency. Any changes, updates, or deletions to a processing technique must be made available to all agency examiners. An agency may wish to include a guideline for examiners to follow that details what processing techniques are appropriate at each step of an examination. However, any list should be viewed as merely a guide.\n\n## 12.2.6 Policies And Procedure Manuals For Electronic Fingerprint Systems\n\nAn agency must have policies and procedure manuals delineating the requirements for use, maintenance, and updates to any electronic fingerprint systems that are accessible to examiners within the agency. These policies and procedure manuals should be reviewed routinely to ensure that any changes, updates, or deletions are current. These policies and procedure manuals may include, but are not limited to, such things as training that an examiner must successfully complete prior to having access to the electronic fingerprint system(s); documentation requirements, such as paperwork or images that must be maintained; and report wording requirements when an electronic fingerprint system is used in casework.\n\n## 12.2.7 Examination Procedures\n\nAn agency must establish procedures for the processing and examination of evidence, note taking, and report writing. These procedures should describe established protocols and types of examinations performed. Additionally, they shall require that at the time of collection (whether in the field or in the laboratory), all latent print evidence shall be marked with minimal information (i.e., a unique case identifier, personal markings) and when relevant, information to explain the orientation or position of the latent. The substrate information should also be included. This may include the use of a diagram. An agency must establish procedures for the comparison of friction ridge detail (SWGFAST, 2002, p 324). These procedures should describe established protocols (e.g., Are all latents to be compared or should the comparisons be concluded after the first latent is individualized?).\n\n## 12.2.8 Verification\n\nAn agency should establish rules governing the qualifications that are needed to be a verifier. These qualifications may include a minimum number of hours of training, a minimum number of continuing education credits, or a minimum number of cases completed without quality issues. It is important to remember that, when setting a standard for the qualifications of a verifier, the number of years of service is not as important as the quality of work that has been produced. 12.2.8.1 Verification. Verification of a latent print comparison is \"the confirmation of an examiner's conclusion by another competent examiner\" (SWGFAST, 2006, p 122). An agency must establish rules governing the verification process. These rules may be limited to individualizations but may also include exclusions or inconclusives.\n\n12.2.8.2 Blind Verification. \"Blind verification is the confirmation of an examiner's conclusion by another competent examiner who has no expectation or knowledge of the prior conclusion\" (SWGFAST, 2006, p 122). This process would require that the initial case examiner not place any markings of any kind, including conclusion notations, on any of the evidence needed for the verification examination, thus assuring that another examiner given the same evidence will be unaware of the initial examiner's findings. The Scientific Working Group on Friction Ridge Analysis, Study and Technology (SWGFAST) recommends blind verification \"in cases involving an individualization, exclusion, or inconclusive of a person based on only a single latent print\" (SWGFAST, 2006, p 122). An agency should establish policies regarding what cases require using a blind verification process.\n\n## 12.2.9 Conflict Resolution\n\nBecause of the inherent variables (e.g., skill, experience) and the possibility of examiner error, an examiner and a subsequent verifier may provide results that are not consistent. An agency shall define what constitutes an inconsistency and conduct a quality review to resolve all inconsistencies in examination results. The quality review must ensure that all policies are followed and that personal preferences are not allowed to take precedence over minimum standards and controls\nor policy interpretation. Some quality reviews may resolve the inconsistencies by having the affected examiners document their analyses, followed by an unmediated discussion of the issue(s). The documented analyses should become a permanent addition to the case file. If the inconsistency is resolved following the examiner discussion, the decision should be documented in the case file and reported to management. If the inconsistency is not resolved at this level, an agency may need to use another examiner or may create a committee with representatives from both management and peer examiners to review the analyses and the case file. The committee would then attempt to resolve the inconsistency. Some agencies may need or elect to have a complete reexamination of the case made by an independent external examiner or agency. To determine the root cause of the inconsistency, it may be necessary to review training records, the training program, and prior work performance. All quality reviews should be documented and provide a determination of the correct results, the root cause(s) of the inconsistency, and whether the inconsistency would require any corrective action. Some quality reviews may be minor tasks that require a quick review, determination, and very little documentation. However, other quality reviews may require a great deal of effort to complete and may result in complex decisions.\n\n## 12.2.10 Training\n\nIf an agency decides to establish an internal training program, the depth and scope of the training program must be included. In addition, any training that an agency provides should be in compliance with generally accepted practices and processing techniques within the scientific community. Copious records must be maintained of all training received by each examiner to aid in establishing competency records. A formal training program should include a detailed description of the training to be provided to each trainee. For a training program to be successful, qualified trainers must be identified and given ample time and resources to create and maintain the training program. A training program must also exist if an examiner who has already been trained to competency needs remedial training. An agency that has not established an internal training program must have a mechanism in place for examiners already trained to competency to receive required remedial training from a reliable source.\n\nCare should also be taken when interviewing and hiring trainees. Some agencies emphasize that the trainee must have a solid educational background in science and math. However, it is also essential that the trainee be evaluated for aptitude and ability to work in a highly structured environment that requires detailed analysis and where work is often accomplished autonomously. Although the testing to date is limited, it might be helpful to test prospective trainees for pattern recognition ability (Byrd, 2003, pp 329330). It may also be beneficial to regularly test new trainees and current employees for visual acuity and overall eye health to ensure continued excellence and quality of work. An agency that wishes to develop an internal training program is encouraged to review the SWGFAST Training to Competency for Latent Print Examiners document and contact agencies that have established training programs.\n\n## 12.2.11 Proficiency Tests\n\nTo measure individual performance and provide demonstrative evidence of each examiner's comparison ability, each agency must establish proficiency testing requirements. These requirements shall include that each latent print examiner be tested at least annually (SWGFAST, 2009, p 679). This policy should delineate the type of testing and how often it must be completed. As part of the proficiency testing policy, documentation requirements should be delineated and maintained. The proficiency testing policy should also indicate whether the tests are to be taken independently and whether verifications of individualizations are required. The test design may include agency procedures such as documentation, evidence handling, and related administrative actions. Test designs can include open testing (examiners are aware they are being tested), blind testing (examiners are unaware they are being tested), or doubleblind testing (the agency and examiners are unaware they are being tested). 12.2.11.1 Internal Proficiency Tests. The internal proficiency test, after being created, should be reviewed by either a senior section member of the agency's staff or an outside source prior to distribution of the test. This review will ensure that the quality of the test is commensurate with cases that are routinely analyzed.\n\nA quality assurance program should set parameters for internal proficiency tests, including that they shall contain multiple latent friction ridge impressions and known standards (SWGFAST, 2009, p 678). These parameters may also include the additional requirement of evaluating nonsuitable prints. 12.2.11.2 External Proficiency Tests. The use of a commercially prepared external proficiency test has the advantage of being nonbiased because the agency purchasing the test has no input into the makeup of the test and no advance notice of the test answers prior to submission of the test for grading. External proficiency testing ensures that the examiner is compared against the manufacturer's validated results. The results can also be compared with the results of other test takers. 12.2.11.3 Blind Proficiency Tests. An agency may use blind proficiency tests to verify the quality of an examiner's work without his or her knowledge. The agency may generate mock evidence and then assign it as a regular case. The case examiner may never know that he or she worked a blind proficiency test, unless the quality of work that was produced required a quality review. 12.2.11.4 Double-Blind Proficiency Tests. Having another agency submit mock evidence as a regular case can provide a double-blind test to evaluate the performance of the individual(s) completing the case and the agency's overall performance with respect to that case.\n\n## 12.2.12  Technical Case Review\n\nA technical case review is a useful tool to regularly determine the quality of casework and ensure reliable results. An agency must establish what constitutes a technical review, who shall conduct technical case reviews, and the frequency of the reviews. The American Society of Crime Laboratory Directors/ Laboratory Accreditation Board (ASCLD/LAB) defines a technical review as a \"review of notes, data and other documents which form the basis for scientific conclusion\" (ASCLD/LAB, 2005, p 68). SWGFAST further explains that \"these reviews concentrate on whether the appropriate tests and examinations have been performed to support the results and conclusions reported and on whether sufficient supporting documentation is present. They also focus on whether the conclusions are consistent with the documentation and are within accepted practices\" (SWGFAST, 2006, pp 124125).\n\nA technical review may include a partial or complete reworking of the case, and, therefore, technical case reviews must be conducted by another qualified latent print examiner.\n\n## 12.2.13 Administrative Review\n\nAn agency must establish what constitutes an administrative review and who shall conduct administrative reviews. ASCLD/LAB defines an administrative review as \"a procedure used to check for consistency with laboratory policy and for editorial correctness\" (ASCLD/LAB, 2005, p 61). SWGFAST indicates that \"administrative reviews shall be conducted by a supervisor or designee\" (SWGFAST, 2006, p 125). An administrative review may include reviewing all documentation within a case file for technical accuracy or may simply be a review of the documentation verifying that no clerical errors, such as typographical errors, are on the worksheet or written report. An agency must have a mechanism in place for dealing with cases in which an administrative review identifies a quality issue. If the issue is minor, then communication between the reviewer and the original case examiner may be sufficient to correct the issue. If the issue is major and the individual conducting the administrative review is not management, then management should be notified immediately. Management should then notify the quality manager and the quality reviewer (when applicable) to begin a formal review process to determine whether the error is singular in nature or systemic. An agency may outline specific provisions in the quality manual regarding confidentiality when dealing with issues. An examiner identified as having an issue has a right for that issue not to become public knowledge among his or her coworkers. If nonmanagement personnel discover a quality issue, the agency may mandate that the original administrative reviewer cease involvement in any additional quality reviews that result from the initial issue being identified. In addition, the administrative review examiner should be required to maintain confidentiality regarding the issue and the original case examiner indefinitely, unless given specific permission by management to discuss these facts.\n\n## 12.2.14  Testimony Review\n\nEach agency should have a mechanism in place to review the testimony of each examiner within that agency. SWGFAST recommends that testimony reviews be done annually (SWGFAST, 2006, p 126). This review should encompass both the technical accuracy of the testimony and the overall presentation and ability of the examiner to provide an accurate and articulate accounting of all examinations conducted and any conclusions or opinions noted. An agency may require that the reviewer be a manager (preferably one with a background in the specialty being testified to), an individual from the training department (when applicable), or a peer. An agency may allow for a verbal or written contract with court officials. An agency may also incorporate the use of a preprinted evaluation survey containing specific questions that can be provided to either or both of the attorneys involved, as well as the judge, as another means of determining the quality of the testimony provided by the examiner.\n\n## 12.2.15 Corrective Action\n\nIt may be necessary to take corrective action to remedy an issue related to the quality of the work product and to prevent further related issues. An agency must have a general description of what corrective action is appropriate according to the type of issue identified. This corrective action may include such options as removing an examiner from casework responsibility, a review of prior casework, requiring an examiner to receive and complete additional training in the area the issue was made, or reviewing additional casework completed by the examiner to determine whether the issue was singular in nature or systemic. Corrective actions should not be construed as disciplinary actions. They are an important part of any quality review to detect and remedy any errors or issues relating to the quality of the work product.\n\n## 12.2.16 Laboratory Safety Procedures\n\nEach agency must establish safety procedures and policies for its system. The safety procedures and policies should be in compliance with Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) and state regulations. The safety procedures and policies should include such areas as personal protective equipment use, safe storage and disposal of chemicals, and how access to the facility is controlled. (See also section 12.2.4 on storing chemicals.) An agency may wish to include policies on blood-borne pathogens and chemical hygiene in its safety procedures.\n\n12.2.16.1 Designation of a Safety Manager. An agency should designate a safety manager (irrespective of other responsibilities) who \"has the defined authority and obligation to ensure that the requirements of the safety system are implemented and maintained\" (ASCLD/LAB, 2005, p 67). Policies should be stated regarding the scope and depth of responsibilities for the safety manager. The requirements for and duties expected of the safety manager should be outlined in the safety documents and may contain such information as the qualifications of the safety manager; time limits, if any, that a person shall be designated as safety manager; reviewing and updating any written safety policies; disseminating all safety policies and updates to all examiners and management; maintaining all safety records; tracking all safety issues; and producing a written report annually detailing the safety record of the agency. 12.2.16.2 Material Safety Data Sheets. Material safety data sheets are provided by or can be acquired from all companies selling chemicals. Each agency must design a program for the collection, storage, and maintenance of the material safety data sheets for all chemicals purchased or used within the agency. Material safety data sheets provide vital safety information about chemicals and are a valuable tool to maintain safety within an agency.\n\n## 12.2.17 Equipment Calibration And Maintenance\n\nPerformance checks are used by agencies to ensure that equipment and instruments are functioning to established criteria. An agency must establish a system to verify that each piece of analytical equipment is examined regularly to ensure proper working order. All equipment that requires calibration should have written documentation, such as a logbook, to verify the date that the equipment was examined, the person or business that examined the equipment, and any adjustments or calibrations that were performed on that instrument. An agency may establish a schedule that requires regular internal inspections, such as quarterly reviews, and an annual external review.\n\n## 12.2.18 Method Validation Records\n\nEach processing procedure must be validated and documentation must be maintained prior to use in casework. An agency must establish internal minimum standards for the validation process and sequence of processing techniques. An agency may decide to accept an outside agency's published validation study. An agency may adopt another agency's or laboratory's procedure but must still demonstrate the protocol works as intended. This means that the agency must demonstrate that agency examiners using available equipment and instruments can achieve the established requirements. Processing techniques should be reviewed periodically to ensure that the techniques are current and still effective. This review will allow for updates and revisions to be made to the processing procedure. Each agency must establish an appropriate time frame for these reviews (e.g., one year, five years).\n\n## 12.2.19 Continuing Education\n\nAn agency should create and maintain a policy outlining and encouraging all examiners to pursue additional educational opportunities. These educational opportunities may include such coursework as undergraduate or postgraduate classes or degrees, academic or service-related seminars, and educational conferences provided by professional organizations (e.g., the International Association for Identification (IAI), the Canadian Identification Society, and the Fingerprint Society). An agency may wish to include in this policy the tracking of individual requests or attendance at any of the abovementioned continuing education opportunities. By tracking these requests and attendance records, an agency may better identify which individuals strive to further their knowledge about their profession, which may be acknowledged during a performance review.\n\n## 12.3 Additional Quality Assurance Measures That May Be Added To A Quality Assurance Program\n\nIn addition to the basic components, an agency can add other components to its quality assurance program.\n\n## 12.3.1 Quality Manager\n\nA quality assurance program may have one individual who \"has the defined authority and obligation to ensure that the requirements of the quality system are implemented and maintained\" (ASCLD/LAB, 2005, p 66). In a large organization, this person may have the job title of quality manager and this may be his or her primary function at that agency. For smaller agencies, the quality manager may be a parttime position. The quality manager may have casework responsibilities along with managing the quality assurance program. It is important that an agency document the specific requirements and duties expected of this position. These may include, but are not limited to, qualifications of the quality manager; time limits, if any, that a person shall be designated as quality manager; reviewing and updating the quality manual; disseminating quality assurance program policies and updates to all examiners and management; completing all case file reviews or overseeing the work produced by quality reviewers; maintaining all quality records; tracking all quality issues; and producing a written report annually detailing the quality record of the agency.\n\n## 12.3.2 Minimum Standards And Controls\n\nAn agency may establish a set of minimum standards and controls to ensure that all analysts within the agency understand exactly what is expected regarding the quality of casework being produced. These minimums should be clear and precise to allow for easy understanding and should include all requirements for evidence handling, evidence examination, evidence preservation, examination documentation, evidence disposition, and report wording. If an agency establishes minimum standards and controls, it must establish a policy for reevaluating them. This reevaluation should include a timetable to ensure that all standards and controls are accurate and current with generally accepted scientific practices. Minimum standards and controls for each aspect of casework should be documented either in the agency's quality manual or in the agency's procedures manual, when applicable.\n\n## 12.3.3 Organization And Management Requirements\n\nAn agency may establish organization and management requirements for all staff members. Organization and management requirements may include the delineation of organizational structure, administrative practices, and delegation of authority. Organization and management requirements should be documented either in the agency's quality manual or in the agency's overall policy manual.\n\n## 12.3.4 Personnel Requirements\n\nAn agency may establish personnel requirements for all staff members. These requirements may include minimum educational requirements, specific undergraduate or postbaccalaureate class-specific requirements, and employee development by attending professional organization meetings and seminars. Personnel requirements should be documented either in the agency's quality manual or in the agency's overall policy manual.\n\n## 12.3.5 Facility Requirements\n\nAn agency should ensure that the working facility is designed for maximum case productivity while maintaining the highest level of safety available. This policy should address safety showers, eye wash stations, fire extinguishers, fume hood air flow requirements, and time frames for verifying the working condition of these safety features. In addition, a facility requirement policy should contain specific time frames and conditions, such as the minimum number of staff required onsite to ensure the safety of staff when engaging in certain activities, such as chemical processing or laser examination. Specific safety requirements and guidelines can be found by contacting OSHA. State regulations should also be identified and followed. Facility requirements should be documented either in the agency's quality manual, safety manual (if such a manual exists), or overall policy manual.\n\n## 12.3.6 Use Of External Laboratory Services\n\nAgencies may find it necessary, because of large backlogs or the inability to perform a specific service, to pursue the use of external laboratory services. If that is the case, it is the agency's responsibility to ensure that any external laboratory service with which it initiates a contract adheres to all of the agency's quality assurance policies and procedures regarding all aspects of casework, including evidence handling and evidence processing.\n\n## 12.3.7 Agency Accreditation And Certification\n\nExaminer certification and laboratory accreditation have become demonstrative measures of quality within the forensic disciplines. These programs have been promoted to provide the criminal justice system with generally accepted methods for quality assurance. Examiner certification demonstrates a level of competency and ability for the individual, and accreditation demonstrates agency compliance with accepted policies and procedures for quality assurance.\n\n12.3.7.1 International Association for Identification -\nLatent Print Certification Program. The IAI established the program in 1977. This certification program requires a minimum of two years' experience and a bachelor's degree. (Years of experience can be substituted for the educational requirement.) Basic testing requirements include a written test, a fingerprint pattern interpretation test, and a comparison test.\n\n12.3.7.2 American Society of Crime Laboratory Directors/Laboratory Accreditation Board (ASCLD/\nLAB) Legacy Program. The ASCLD/LAB Legacy Program has an extensive process to accredit agencies. This accreditation process involves reviewing an agency's written policies, procedures, and casework and then inspecting that agency to confirm that it is following minimum accreditation standards and the policies it has set forth. ASCLD/LAB evaluates an agency according to three criteria: essential, important, and desirable. The definition of essential is \"standards which directly affect and have fundamental impact on the work product of the laboratory or the integrity of the evidence\" (ASCLD/LAB, 2005, p 63). The definition of important is \"standards which are considered to be key indicators of the overall quality of the laboratory, but may not directly affect the work product nor the integrity of the evidence\" (ASCLD/LAB, 2005, p 64). The definition of desirable is \"standards which have the least affect on the work product or the integrity of the evidence but which nevertheless enhance the professionalism of the laboratory\" (ASCLD/LAB, 2005, p 63).\n\nIn addition, ASCLD/LAB has set new standards on many issues that continue to push the forensic community to a higher level of quality. An ASCLD/LAB accreditation must be renewed every five years. This renewal involves the same process as the initial accreditation process and is outlined extensively by ASCLD/LAB in its manual.\n\n12.3.7.3 International Organization for Standardization (ISO). ISO works in conjunction with the International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC) to create a worldwide standardization system. ISO is the world's largest developer of standards. ISO's principal activity is the development of technical standards. ISO has created a technical standard (17025) for any testing and calibration laboratory; this standard is applicable to forensic laboratories. The function of ISO does not include accreditation programs. It sets standards that allow agencies to pursue ISO accreditation through accrediting bodies. Currently, ASCLD/LAB and Forensic Quality Services (FQS) have programs that allow forensic agencies to pursue accreditation that is based on ISO/IEC standard 17025. The ASCLD/LAB International Accreditation Program is based on the requirements of ISO/IEC 17025, plus supplemental requirements that are based on the International Laboratory Accreditation Cooperation (ILAC) Guide 19 (Guidelines for Forensic Science Laboratories) and the ASCLD/LAB Legacy Program requirements. Forensic Quality Services-International's (FQS-I) accreditation program is based on the requirements of ISO/IEC 17025, ILAC Guide 19, and FQS-I field-specific criteria. The field-specific criteria include \"Forensic Requirements for Agencies that Perform Latent Print Testing\", developed by a technical advisory committee of latent print examiners specifically for the FQS-I program (FQS-I, 2006).\n\n## 12.4 Conclusion\n\nThe forensic science community must continue to push for higher standards of forensic excellence. An examiner must always remember that the work produced in a forensic agency has the potential to have a dramatic effect not only on a suspect in a criminal case, but also on the victim and both the suspect's and victim's families. As examiners, we owe it to the community we serve to produce a quality work product each time we work a case, no matter what the offense.\n\n## 12.5 Reviewers\n\nThe reviewers critiquing this chapter were Patti Blume, Deborah Friedman, Alice Maceo, Kenneth O. Smith, Jr., Lyla A. Thompson, and Juliet H. Wood.\n\n## 12.6 References\n\nAmerican Society of Crime Laboratory Directors/Laboratory Accredition Board. *ASCLD/LAB Manual.* ASCLD/LAB:\nGamer, NC, 2005.\n\nByrd, J.; Bertram, D. Form-blindness. *J. Forensic Ident.* 2003, 53 (3), 315341.\n\nForensic Quality Services-International. Forensic Requirements for Agencies that Perform Latent Print Testing.\n\nFQS-I: Largo, FL 2006.\n\nScientific Working Group on Friction Ridge Analysis, Study and Technology (SWGFAST). Friction Ridge Examination Methodology for Latent Print Examiners. *J. Forensic Ident.* 2002, 52 (3), 324328. SWGFAST. Standards for Conclusions. J. Forensic Ident. 2004, 54 (3), 358359.\n\nSWGFAST. Quality Assurance Guidelines for Latent Print Examiners. *J. Forensic Ident.* 2006, 56 (1), 117127.\n\nSWGFAST. Guidelines for Latent Print Proficiency Testing Programs. *J. Forensic Ident.* 2009, 59 (6), 677680.\n\n## 12.7 Additional Information\n\nArter, D. R. *Quality Audits for Improved Performance,* 3rd ed.; ASQ Quality Press: Milwaukee, WI, 2003.\n\nBauer, J. E.; Duffy, G. L.; Westcott, R. T., Eds. The Quality Improvement Handbook, 2nd ed.; ASQ Quality Press:\nMilwaukee, WI, 2006.\n\nBenbow, D. W.; Elshennawy, A. K.; and Walker, F. The Certified Quality Technician Handbook; ASQ Quality Press:\nMilwaukee, WI, 2003.\n\nClark, T. J. Success Through Quality: Support Guide for the Journey to Continuous Improvement; ASQ Quality Press:\nMilwaukee, WI, 1999.\n\nCrosby, P. B. *Philip Crosby's Reflections on Quality;*\nMcGraw-Hill: New York, 1996.\n\nCrosby, P. B. *Quality Is Free;* McGraw-Hill: New York, 1979. Crosby, P. B. *Quality Is Still Free;* McGraw-Hill: New York,\n1996.\n\nGriffiths, D. N. *Management in a Quality Environment;* ASQ\nQuality Press: Milwaukee, WI, 1995.\n\nHartman, M. G., Ed. Fundamental Concepts of Quality Improvement; ASQ Quality Press: Milwaukee, WI, 2002. Okes, D.; Westcott, R. T., Eds. The Certified Quality Manager Handbook, 2nd ed; ASQ Quality Press: Milwaukee, WI, 2000.\n\nRussell, J. P. *The Internal Auditing Pocket Guide;* ASQ Quality Press: Milwaukee, WI, 2003.\n\nRussell, J. P., Ed. *The ASQ Auditing Handbook,* 3rd ed.;\nASQ Quality Press: Milwaukee, WI, 2006.\n\nSinger, D. C., Ed. A Laboratory Quality Handbook of Best Practices and Relevant Regulations; ASQ Quality Press:\nMilwaukee, WI, 2001.\n\nSinger, D. C.; Upton, R. P. Guidelines for Laboratory Quality Auditing; Marcel Dekker: New York, 1993. St. Clair, J. *Crime Laboratory Management;* Elsevier: New York, 2003.\n\nSWGFAST. Training to Competency for Latent Print Examiners. http://www.swgfast.org/documents/\nqualifications-competency/020822_Competency_ Latent_2.1.pdf.\n\nTague, N. R. *The Quality Toolbox,* 2nd ed.; ASQ Quality Press: Milwaukee, WI, 2004.\n\n## C H A P T E R Fingerprints And The Law Andre A. Moenssens And Stephen B. Meagher C O N T E N T S\n\n3\n13.1  Introduction\n25\n13.5  Conclusion\n26\n13.6  Reviewers\n4\n13.2  The Expert and the\n\n\nRules of Evidence\n26\n13.7  References\n11\n13.3  Daubert Challenges to\n\"Fingerprinting\"\n22\n13.4  Historical Account of Fingerprints,\nPalmprints, and Footprints in U.S.\n\nCourts\n\n## Chapter 13 Fingerprints And The Law Andre A. Moenssens And Stephen B. Meagher 13.1 Introduction\n\nFingerprints, palmprints, and impressions of bare soles have been widely recognized and accepted as a reliable means to identify a person. A reproduction of the friction ridge arrangements on a fingerprint, palmprint, or footprint may be left on an object when it is touched. This permits the impression to be used for the personal identification of individuals in criminal investigations. Thus, the forensic science of fingerprints, palmprints, and footprints is utilized by law enforcement agencies in support of their investigations to positively identify the perpetrator of a crime. This forensic science is also used for exculpatory or elimination purposes. This chapter will address the laws and rules of evidence as they apply to friction ridge impression evidence. Historical court decisions and recent appellate and United States Supreme Court rulings will be addressed. This chapter will primarily address federal court decisions and the Federal Rules of Evidence, which may not be applicable to all states. The term \"friction ridge impression\" will be used to refer to any impression made from human friction ridge skin (e.g., the skin on the palm side of fingers and hands and the soles of the feet). There are two different types of friction ridge impressions: those of known individuals intentionally recorded, and impressions from one or more unknown persons on a piece of evidence from a crime scene or related location; the latter are generally referred to as latent prints.\n\nThe scope of this chapter will include legal aspects associated with experts and evidence, and legal challenges to the admissibility of friction ridge impression evidence. The basis of the material will be the U.S. legal system at the federal level. The text makes occasional references to laws or court decisions of specific states or foreign countries when notable. The reader is strongly encouraged to consult those legal sources that more particularly govern the jurisdiction in which the expert will be testifying.\n\n## 13.2 The Expert And The Rules Of Evidence 13.2.1 Introduction\n\nThe term \"forensic science\" implies the use of a scientifically based discipline as it intersects with and provides evidence for legal proceedings. The Federal Rules of Evidence (FRE) set out the framework within which evidence is admitted into court. The primary rules that apply to expert witnesses are FRE 702, Testimony by Experts; and FRE 703, Bases of Opinion Testimony by Experts. FRE 701, Opinion Testimony by Lay Witnesses, permits a better understanding of the distinction between opinion testimony offered by an expert and those instances where even a lay witness may offer opinions in a court of law. How these rules affect examiners of friction ridge impressions will be discussed later. At this point, the discussion is limited to defining the terms the law of evidence uses in connection with legal proceedings.\n\n## 13.2.2 Federal Rules Of Evidence - Rule 702\n\nThe definition and uses of expert testimony, which are also applicable to persons performing forensic friction ridge impression examinations, are expressed in FRE 702. Currently, the rule provides:\nIf scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise, if (1) the testimony is based upon sufficient facts or data, (2) the testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods, and (3) the witness has applied the principles and methods reliably to the facts of the case. (As amended Apr. 17, 2000, eff. Dec. 1, 2000.) (FRE, 2004, p 13)\nThe rule encompasses a number of issues. In the order of their mention in the rule, each will be discussed, first in a general sense, and then as they apply to the expert in friction ridge impression examinations. The key purpose of Rule 702 is to determine whether a witness warrants expert status and will be permitted to offer opinion testimony.\n\n13.2.2.1 Qualifications of the Expert Witness. A witness who will be offering opinion testimony must first be shown to be qualified as an expert. That step involves the expert taking the stand, being sworn to tell the truth, and providing answers to questions posed by an attorney relating to the witness's competence. At the conclusion of direct testimony, the counsel proffering the witness will ordinarily move that the witness be recognized by the court as an expert. Opposing counsel is given an opportunity to question the witness to challenge his or her expert qualifications. At the conclusion of this process, the judge decides whether the witness may offer opinion testimony as an expert. In deciding, the judge may limit the extent to which the expert will be permitted to testify. The jury has no role in this preliminary step; the determination whether a proffered witness qualifies as an expert is a legal decision. (The process is sometimes referred to as the voir dire of an expert.) 13.2.2.2 Testimony about the Facts of a Case. It is only after the preliminary stage of qualifying the witness as an expert is completed that the witness can offer opinions about the case in which the witness was called to court. In a jury trial, the jurors act as the arbiters of the facts. When facts are in dispute, the jurors decide what they believe happened. When the experts testify, the jurors ultimately decide also whether they will accept the opinions expressed by the experts as true facts. Before the jury deliberates, the judge will instruct them that they are free to either believe or disbelieve, in whole or in part, the testimony of any witness, including an expert. The credibility instruction on lay and expert witnesses shows how important it is for the expert to offer concise, credible, understandable, and convincing testimony.\n\n13.2.2.3 Is the Examination of Friction Ridge Impressions a Science? The first seven words of FRE 702, \"If scientific, technical or other specialized knowledge...\", evoke an immediate question for the expert: Is a forensic friction ridge impression examination scientific, technical, specialized knowledge, or a combination of two or three of these choices? The question can be logically followed with several more: Is it important to distinguish between them and choose just one? Does the court require the expert to state under which aspect of the rule the expert purports to testify? These questions have been answered by the U.S. Supreme Court in its decision in Kumho Tire Co. v *Carmichael,* 526\nU.S. 137, 119 S. Ct. 1167 (1999). The court clearly stated that the same criteria used in Daubert v Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 113 S. Ct. 2786 (1993), to determine whether testimony offered as scientific knowledge is reliable should also govern the admissibility of testimony under the \"technical\" and \"other specialized knowledge\" prongs of Rule 702 to the extent these criteria may be applicable to them. (*Daubert* and *Kumho Tire* are discussed more in depth in sections 13.3.1.3 and 13.3.1.4.) Therefore, distinguishing between science, applied science, technology, or experience-based expertise is not paramount or even required. (These two important cases will be revisited later in a discussion of challenges to the admissibility of fingerprint evidence.) Though the \"science versus experience\" issue may not be important under Rule 702, it is nevertheless an intriguing question that warrants further discussion. If one postulates that the discipline of forensic friction ridge impression examination represents \"science\", then *Daubert* requires a showing of the scientific underpinnings that make the discipline reliable. Is forensic friction ridge impression examination a scientific endeavor such as, for instance, chemistry or biology? Or is it more of an applied technical field based in several sciences? The Scientific Working Group on Friction Ridge Analysis, Study, and Technology (SWGFAST), a recognized body charged with formulating guidelines for the friction ridge impression examiners' discipline, posits that forensic friction ridge impression examination \"is an applied science based upon the foundation of biological uniqueness, permanence, and empirical validation through observation\" (SWGFAST, Press Kit). This is logical when one understands that the fundamental premises on which friction ridge impression \"individualizations\" (identifications) rest are (1) friction ridge uniqueness and (2) persistence of the friction ridge arrangements. Without an understanding of the biological aspects underlying the formation of friction ridges prenatally, experts would never be justified in reaching a conclusion, reliable or otherwise, that an individualization has been effected (i.e., a positive identification of one individual who was the source of an impression to the exclusion of all other possible persons). The SWGFAST position thus supports the claim that forensic friction ridge impression examination is scientific. But is it possible that forensic friction ridge impression examination is also technical? Furthermore, does it also require specialized knowledge and training on the part of the expert? Any expert trained to competency in forensic friction ridge impression examinations will certainly admit that, in addition to its scientific underpinnings, the task at hand also requires specialized technical knowledge if one is to achieve a reliable conclusion. Therefore, forensic friction ridge impression examinations can be proffered as any or all three of the prongs contained in FRE 702.\n\n13.2.2.4 Whom Must the Expert Convince? The next phrase in FRE 702 indicates whom the expert, through testimony, is expected to assist: it is the \"fact finder\". Because the Federal Rules of Evidence, and therefore FRE 702 as well, apply whether the expert testifies at a pretrial hearing or at the trial itself, the expert must understand that at a pretrial admissibility hearing based on a *Daubert*\nchallenge, the judge also acts as the fact finder. The expert testimony at such a hearing is provided solely to assist the judge in determining whether the *Daubert* challenge will be sustained or rejected. The expert testimony given at trial, by contrast, is initially directed to the judge for the determination of whether the witness qualifies as an expert and, once found to be qualified, then to the jury, if any, for the purpose of presenting the results, conclusions, and expert opinions obtained during the examination process. In a nonjury (bench) trial, the judge will also act as the fact finder.\n\n13.2.2.5 Testifying about Qualifications. The next phrase in FRE 702 states, \"a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise\". This phrase describes how courts are to determine whether one is an expert as proffered. The expert needs to be prepared to identify specific information for each of the five criteria listed in the rule: knowledge, skill, experience, training, and education. A well-prepared expert should have the pertinent details for these criteria set out in a curriculum vitae. The direct testimony on the qualifications typically includes a recital of the person's education (formal and otherwise); specialized training received, including detailed information of the nature, length, and detail of that training; the professional certifications obtained; continuing education pursued; membership and activities in professional societies; awards received; written materials prepared and courses taught; and previous expert testimony offered. Persons seeking to qualify as expert witnesses need to continually update their curriculum vitae so that lawyers seeking to present their testimony will have an accurate copy available for the court. A well-written, professional curriculum vitae goes a long way to shorten what can otherwise be a lengthy qualification process and possibly avert some cross-examination questions by opposing counsel regarding the expert's qualifications. An impressive curriculum vitae may actually result in the defense offering to stipulate to the expert's qualifications. Under this scenario, the opposing counsel makes a conscious strategic decision to stipulate so that the judge and jury will not be overly influenced by impressive credentials. There are other reasons the defense may stipulate to the expert's qualification (e.g., a simple desire to save time; no intent to aggressively contest the expert's testimony in an effort to downplay its significance; or, when the fingerprint identification is uncontested, as in a self-defense or insanity defense case). 13.2.2.6 Is Expert Opinion Testimony Warranted? The ultimate question on whether expert testimony is warranted at all in a particular case requires the judge to determine, from a common sense perspective, whether an untrained lay person (judge or juror) presented with factual evidence can determine what happened alone, without an expert's assistance. If so, then expert opinion testimony is not warranted. But if the expert's opinion would be helpful to the fact finder in understanding the significance of factual data, then the expert witness is essential and opinion evidence is admissible.\n\n13.2.2.7 Further Requirements of Revised FRE 702.\n\nOnce the judge determines that an expert is qualified to give opinion evidence under FRE 702, then the expert can so testify. In April 2000 (effective December 2000), the Federal Rules of Evidence were amended to include three further requirements which must also be met. They are\n\"(1) the testimony (must be) based upon sufficient facts or data, (2) the testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods, and (3) the witness has applied the principles and methods reliably to the facts of the case\". These three requirements were added by the FRE committee to conform opinion testimony to the mandates of the Daubert and *Kumho Tire* decisions. The revision makes it easier to present effective scientific and technical expert testimony whenever such evidence is warranted and also provides a basis for excluding opinion testimony that cannot be said to be based on a reliable methodology. The first one of these three requirements necessitates that the expert's testimony rest on a sufficient basis that supports a reliable conclusion. Under ideal conditions, known facts or data would present themselves with clearcut answers and would be totally based upon objective measurements. The reality is that this rarely occurs. In fact, it is in the nature of science that some premises remain in a gray area where a degree of subjectivity is unavoidable. How many data and facts are needed to allow the judge to find a \"sufficient\" basis for the opinion? That question is still being debated among legal scholars. What does the forensic science of friction ridge impression examinations offer to the court on that same issue of sufficiency? It has been established by sound and repeated studies that friction ridge examination evidence permits the uncontroverted association of a particular individual with a particular scene or object. If the scene or object is part of a crime, the individualization evidence would certainly offer a logical connection to a case, permitting a jury to draw conclusions as to guilt or innocence of the individualized person. The second requirement asks whether the testimony will be the product of reliable principles and methods. Here, the expert must not only be able to state the principles and the methods used but be familiar with any research or testing that has demonstrated the reliability. In this regard, friction ridge examination follows an established SWGFAST- approved methodology designed to lead to reliable and verifiable conclusions if the prescribed methodology is followed by a competent examiner. The third requirement mandates that the witness has applied the principles and methods reliably to the facts of the case. Here the court must determine whether everything the witness testified to previously in connection with the first and second requirements was adhered to in the particular case. It would be a blunder of monumental proportions for an expert to lay out the details of the specific process in satisfying the first and second requirements and then completely abandon that process for the case at hand. It must be recognized, however, that occasionally exceptions to the use of recommended processes are warranted, indeed required, by the particular circumstances of a case. Methodologies and examination protocols are designed to deal with the normal course of an investigation to the extent that a \"normal\" course can be anticipated. The nature of criminal activity occasionally does not always follow anticipated paths. Deviating from recommended \"standard\" processes requires a lot of thought and experience on the part of an examiner, but the justification for the deviation must always be clearly documented in the examiner's notes.\n\n## 13.2.3 Federal Rules Of Evidence - Rule 703\n\nFRE 703, the basis of opinion testimony by experts, states:\nThe facts or data in the particular case upon which an expert bases an opinion or inference may be those perceived by or made known to the expert at or before the hearing. If of a type reasonably relied upon by the experts in the particular field in forming opinions or inference upon the subject, the facts or data need not be admissible in evidence in order for the opinion or inference to be admitted. Facts or data that are otherwise inadmissible shall not be disclosed to the jury by the proponent of the opinion or inference unless the court determines that their probative value in assisting the jury to evaluate the expert's opinion substantially outweighs their prejudicial effect.\n\nThis rule describes the different types of testimony experts can offer.\n\n13.2.3.1 Testimony about First-Hand Knowledge; The Hypothetical Question. An expert, like any ordinary fact witness, may testify to observations the expert made in examining evidence, the methods used and factual data found, and then express an opinion derived from such first-hand knowledge possessed by the expert. That is one of the traditional forms of expert testimony. But in addition, the first sentence of FRE 703 also permits an expert to offer opinions on facts of which the expert may not have known prior to coming to court, but of which the expert was apprised at the hearing or trial. That is what is known as the typical \"hypothetical question\" wherein an expert is asked to assume a series of facts stated by the direct examiner (or cross-examiner) and, after these facts have been stated, the expert is asked whether he or she has an opinion based on these facts. These two forms of expert evidence have long been sanctioned by the common law of evidence.\n\n13.2.3.2 Testimony Based on Reports or Examinations Made by Others. The second sentence of Rule 703 represents a change from what previously was the law. It is a change that even today is not followed in all jurisdictions. Normally, if an expert has arrived at an opinion based on facts that the expert was told by someone else, the basis for that opinion is \"hearsay\", and, at one time, such an opinion was inadmissible in most state and federal jurisdictions. When the Federal Rules of Evidence were written, the drafters decided to do away with this long-standing prohibition and to permit opinion testimony based on hearsay, provided the hearsay is of the kind that experts in the particular field rely on to make ordinary professional decisions in their careers. Under this portion of the rule, for instance, doctors are now permitted to testify to X-ray reports received from an X-ray technician or information contained in nurses' reports without first having to call the X-ray technician or nurse to court. In or out of hospitals, doctors do rely on such reports to make life and death decisions, and the drafters of the FRE decided to focus on the reliability of such evidence as determined by the practitioners in the field rather than as determined simply by technical rules such as the common law prohibition against the use of hearsay evidence. Thus, the FRE significantly broadened the potential scope of expert testimony. FRE 703 now permits professionals to rely upon reports of others without first having to call any of these \"others\" as witnesses, as long as to do so is a recognized practice in their discipline. The final sentence of FRE 703 states that the information provided to the expert by third parties who are not in court need not even be shown to be independently admissible in evidence. But the judge decides whether the jury may be informed about that potentially inadmissible evidence. For example, a crime scene investigator develops a latent print at a crime scene, submits a lift or photograph of the latent print to the laboratory, and then advises the expert as to how and what method was used to process the evidence. In such a case, the expert may testify to the development method used by the investigator even though the expert was not present when the latent print was made visible. Such inadmissible hearsay may be presented to the jury if, in the judge's estimation, its probative value in assisting the jury to evaluate the expert's opinion substantially outweighs any prejudicial effect it may have.\n\n## 13.2.4 Federal Rules Of EvidenceRule 701\n\nFRE 701 on opinion testimony by lay witnesses states:\nIf the witness is not testifying as an expert, the witness' testimony in the form of opinions or inferences is limited to those opinions or inferences which are (a) rationally based on the perception of the witness, and (b) helpful to a clear understanding of the witness' testimony or the determination of a fact in issue, and (c) not based on scientific, technical, or specialized knowledge within the scope of Rule 702.\n\nThe intent of FRE 701 is to provide a contrast for a better understanding of FRE 702. FRE 701 outlines the conditions under which even a nonexpert may testify to an opinion or draw a conclusion from known facts.\n\nGenerally speaking, lay (nonexpert) witnesses may offer opinion testimony in those cases where their opinions are (1) rationally based on their perception and (2) when to do so would be helpful to the jury. Thus, nonexpert witnesses may offer the kind of opinions that ordinary persons would make in their daily lives. Lay witnesses who testify can utter opinions like, \"he was drunk\", or \"he was going way too fast\", or \"I could hear everything through the wall and they were having an argument\". The law prohibits lay persons, however, from offering opinions on the ultimate issue to be determined. For example, an opinion that \"the defendant was grossly negligent\" is not considered to be \"helpful\" to the jurors in forming their own conclusions (rather, it attempts to draw the conclusion for them) and is therefore not permitted. It may be that all persons witnessing the same occurrence would have come to the same conclusion, and therefore the opinion was rationally based on perception. Nevertheless, the type of opinion by a lay witness that goes to the ultimate issue is not permitted under Rule 701. The law is different for expert testimony. Rule 704(a) of the FRE specifically provides that \"testimony in the form of an opinion or inference otherwise admissible is not objectionable because it embraces an ultimate issue to be decided by the trier of fact\". This provision effectuated a change from the commonlaw prohibition against \"ultimate issue\" opinions of all witnesses. That prohibition had already been eroded significantly in many jurisdictions, at least for expert testimony, at the time the FRE were drafted. There is only one exception where FRE 704 on expert testimony retains the prohibition on ultimate issue testimony and that is for behavioral experts testifying to the mental state of an accused in criminal cases. This exception was added as FRE 704(b) in 1984 after a battle of psychiatric experts in the trial of John Hinckley, accused of attempting to assassinate President Reagan, resulted in Hinckley's acquittal. The last provision of FRE 701, section \"c,\" makes clear that the need to prove the reliability of true expert opinion testimony under *Daubert* and *Kumho Tire* cannot be avoided by seeking to offer the opinion as a lay opinion under FRE 701. Although a person can offer testimony both as an expert and as a lay person in the same case, the 2000 amendment to FRE 701, which added section \"c\", makes clear that any part of the testimony that is based on \"scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge\" will be governed by FRE 702, and not by FRE 701. The admissibility of expert opinion testimony by a friction ridge examiner and about friction ridge examinations will be governed by Rule 702. It cannot qualify as a lay opinion.\n\n## 13.2.5  The Judge's Instructions To The Jury\n\nDuring litigation, each side will have an opportunity to request what jury instructions should be sent to the jury. The judge will decide what final instructions will be presented to the jury. These instructions will cover many topics appropriate for the testimony provided and the charges proffered. If expert witness testimony is provided, it is almost certain that the judge will include instructions regarding this type of testimony as well. The following is a typical jury instruction related to expert witness testimony:\nYou have heard the testimony of experts in this case. The credibility or worth of the testimony of an expert witness is to be considered by you just as it is your duty to judge the credibility or worth of the testimony of all other witnesses you have heard or evidence you have seen. You are not bound to accept expert testimony as true, and you may weigh and credit testimony of expert witnesses the same as that of other witnesses, and give it the weight to which you think it is entitled. (Adapted from Pattern Jury Instructions approved by several jurisdictions.)\nSuch an instruction will typically be given to the jury after it has been instructed that it is the sole judge of the credibility of all the evidence it has heard and that it may accept or reject the testimony of any witness, in whole or in part, if the jury finds such evidence (or any part of it) to be unconvincing or not worthy of belief. One or more additional instructions on the duty of the jury in weighing evidence may be given. It is also permissible for the judge to supplement the standard expert witness jury instruction with special provisions more applicable to a particular case. However, in charging the jury, the judge may not refer to the testimony of any particular witness and may not single out certain testimony or evidence. Training courses for fingerprint experts should include an awareness of these jury instructions because it may result in altering how the expert articulates certain information during his or her testimony, especially if a defense expert will also be testifying.\n\n## 13.2.6 The Expert And Potential Impeachment Information\n\nThere are three significant cases that mandate what information the prosecution must provide to the defense. Two of these cases apply uniformly across the country as a matter of constitutional law; the third was decided by the 9th Circuit Court of Appeals in an unpublished decision, which is therefore technically not entitled to precedential value. The first two cases are Brady v *Maryland,* 373 U.S. 83 (1963) and Giglio v *United States,* 405 U.S. 150 (1972). The third is United States v *Henthorn,* 930 F.2d 920 (9th Cir. 1991), affirming United States v *Henthorn,* 931 F.2d 29\n(9th Cir. 1991).\n\nIn Brady v *Maryland,* the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that anyone accused of a criminal matter has the right to be informed of any potentially exculpatory information within the prosecutor's control that may be favorable to the accused and may be material to either guilt or punishment. Materiality of the evidence means that there is a reasonable probability that had the evidence been disclosed in a proceeding, the result of the proceeding would have been different. If the prosecution is uncertain whether certain materials requested by the defense must be disclosed, it may ask the court to inspect the material in chambers to make that determination. In effect, if a fingerprint expert knows of any information from an examination of the evidence that could be considered exculpatory to the accused, such information must be provided to the prosecutor and, ultimately, to the court and defense.\n\nIn Giglio v *United States,* the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that the government is constitutionally required to disclose any evidence favorable to the defense that may impact a defendant's guilt or punishment, including any information that may bear on the credibility of its witnesses, even if the defendant fails to request such information.\n\nIn United States v *Henthorn,* the Circuit Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit ruled that the government has a duty to review the personnel files of its testifying officers and to disclose to the defense any information which may be favorable to the defendant that meets appropriate standards of materiality. Obviously, this is information that would go to the qualifications of the experts. Such matters as past errors, required retraining, or any actions that may reflect on the integrity or credibility of the expert are susceptible to this ruling. Although this is not a U.S. Supreme Court rule, it is being followed widely by other jurisdictions.\n\n## 13.2.7 Federal Rules Of Criminal Procedure Rule 16\n\nThe Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure set forth guidelines for a wide range of issues. One of these rules of special interest to fingerprint expert witnesses is Rule 16, Discovery and Inspection, and specifically, Rule 16(a)(1)(F), Reports of Examinations and Tests, and (G) Expert Witnesses. Unlike the material constitutionally required to be disclosed by the decisions in the preceding section (*Brady* and *Giglio*), these disclosure provisions apply only in federal courts. The various states may or may not have similar discovery provisions in their rules of procedure.\n\nRule 16(a)(1)(F), *Reports of Examinations and Tests,* states:\nUpon a defendant's request, the government must permit a defendant to inspect and to copy or photograph the results or reports of any physical or mental examination and of any scientific test or experiment if:\n(i) the item is within the government's posses- sion, custody or control;\n\n(ii) the attorney for the government knowsor\nthrough due diligence could knowthat the\n\nitem exists, and;\n(iii) the item is material to preparing the defense\n\nor the government intends to use the item in\n\nits case-in-chief at trial.\nRule 16(a)(1)(G), *Expert Witnesses,* states:\nAt the defendant's request, the government must give to the defendant a written summary of any testimony that the government intends to use under Rules 702, 703, or 705 of the Federal Rules of Evidence during its case-in-chief at trial. If the government requests discovery under subdivision (b)(1)(C)(ii) and the defendant complies, the government must, at the defendant's request, give to the defendant a written summary of testimony that the government intends to use under Rules 702, 703, or 705 of the Federal Rules of Evidence as evidence at trial on the issue of the defendant's mental condition. The summary provided under this paragraph must describe the witness's opinions, the bases and reasons for those opinions, and the witness's qualifications.\n\nIt is apparent from the wording in these two subsections to Rule 16 that fingerprint experts must be prepared to provide copies of their examination documents and to provide a written report setting forth the bases for their conclusions and opinions. Generally, most forensic laboratory reports set forth the conclusions but seldom are the bases for the conclusions included. Therefore, expert witnesses should be aware of Rule 16 and be prepared to respond to discovery requests under Rule 16. Recently, defense attorneys submitting requests for Rule 16 discovery regarding fingerprint identification and expert testimony have included not only disclosure of the basis for the identification but also information on the scientific bases for the fingerprint discipline. This, of course, goes directly to the *Daubert* issue, which is discussed later in this chapter. The expert will need to be prepared to concisely present the *Daubert*-related information in a succinct report. Lastly, subsection (G) states the need to provide accurate information on the witness' qualifications. As previously discussed under FRE 702, the fingerprint expert would be well served in maintaining an up-to-date curriculum vitae that could be quickly provided in compliance with a Rule 16 request. A third subsection of Rule 16 also has direct application to fingerprint expert witnesses. This is Rule 16 (a)(1)(D),\nDefendant's Prior Record, and states:\nUpon a defendant's request, the government must furnish the defendant with a copy of the defendant's prior criminal record that is within the government's possession, custody, or control if the attorney for the government knowsor through due diligence could knowthat the record exists.\n\nBecause most of the law enforcement agencies in the United Sates rely on fingerprint records to assimilate prior arrest activity, this subsection of the rule is quite important to the booking officer and the fingerprint expert. Often, the arrest record is provided to the defendant and little regard is given to the fact that fingerprints are the basis for this individual's arrest record. However, with the advent of *Daubert* challenges to latent print examinations, it is possible that similar challenges may come to this aspect of the fingerprint discipline as well. It is believed that tenprint fingerprint records will easily withstand such a challenge because these fingerprints are obtained under controlled conditions with the individual arrested being present for each recording or arrest. Recent activities within the fingerprint discipline are being undertaken to further bolster the discipline in these matters. For example, the International Association for Identification has implemented a Tenprint Fingerprint Examiner Certification program for those individuals who would be testifying to such arrest records. This testimony would be based on the defendant's fingerprints being recorded during the booking process after each arrest to demonstrate that the same person was arrested in each instance, regardless of alias names or other false documentation the person may have provided. This certification of tenprint fingerprint examiners will provide the courts with a meaningful measure of competence for the expert's qualifications.\n\n## 13.2.8 Other Federal Rules Of Evidence As They Pertain To Fingerprints And Related Expert Testimony\n\nThe conclusions reached by the expert performing a forensic latent print examination ordinarily cannot be stated until the evidence has been admitted. Although the responsibility for presenting the expert's testimony in court lies with the prosecuting attorney to ensure that the foundation of the evidence is properly established, the expert witness, in testifying, must stay within the limits of permissible court testimony.\n\nForensic laboratories should have standard operating procedures along with a quality assurance program that provides for the integrity of the evidence. Such matters as chain of custody and evidence security from the time it is initially received to the time it leaves the laboratory are crucial for ensuring that evidence will be admitted in court. FRE 401 demands that the evidence be relevant to the case at hand. Although this may seem obvious, its intent is to preclude the introduction of evidence that serves no benefit in determining the ultimate questions in the case. FRE 401 defines relevant evidence as \"evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence\".\n\nFRE 403 allows a judge to exclude certain relevant evidence as a matter of judicial discretion. The rule states: \"... [R]elevant[ ] evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.\" And FRE 402 rounds out the matter by simply stating that any irrelevant evidence is inadmissible. FRE 201 addresses the issue of judicial notice of adjudicative facts. When the court takes judicial notice of a certain fact, the proponent of that fact is excused from proving the fact. Judicial notice of a certain fact adds considerable weight to the evidence because it is typically accompanied by an explanation for the jury that it may take the noted fact as proven and that no further evidence on that point is required. There are, however, limitations on the type of evidence that a judge may judicially note. FRE 201 states:\nA judicially noticed fact must be one not subject to reasonable dispute in that it is either (1) generally known within the territorial jurisdiction of the trial court or (2) capable of accurate and ready determination by resort to sources whose accuracy cannot be reasonably be questioned.\n\nIn United States v *Mitchell* (discussed more in depth in section 13.3.2.1), the first *Daubert* hearing challenging the science of fingerprints, Judge J. Curtis Joyner took judicial notice that friction ridge skin is unique and permanent, even for small areas. This ruling was stated to be in error by the appellate court. Although the uniqueness of full finger patterns of friction skin may be properly noted judicially and the fact is supported by sound biological evidence indeed, even the defense ordinarily no longer challenges itthe issue in *Mitchell* was whether small areas of a latent impression were also unique. That fact was found not to be established with certainty because its proof required presentation of conflicting evidence over the better part of a week. Therefore, the uniqueness of incomplete and partially distorted friction ridge impressions is not one that a court could judicially notice. Therefore, it is important that the uniqueness of partial latent prints be thoroughly explained by the expert because it is critical in establishing the rationale for stating that conclusions from even partial fingerprints can only have the three possible answers as set forth by the SWGFAST Standards for Conclusion:\nindividualization, exclusion, or inconclusive comparison (SWGFAST, 2004, 358359). Article X, Rules 1001 through 1008, of the FRE addresses the contents of writings, recordings, and photographs. These rules set forth the definitions and requirements regarding what constitutes originals or duplicates and the admissibility of each, even if the original is lost or destroyed. A fingerprint expert's case examination documentation is governed by these rules, as well as any photographs of the latent prints, AFIS searches, and known exemplars from an arrest record (see also FRE 902 (4), Self-Authentication, Certified Copies of Public Records).\n\nThe FRE govern most aspects of presenting evidence and getting it successfully admitted. A fingerprint experts' training program should include a discussion of these rules. This knowledge will certainly assist the examiner in having the evidence and the resulting testimony regarding the evidence admitted.\n\n## 13.3 Daubert Challenges To \"Fingerprinting\" 13.3.1 The Legal Origins\n\n13.3.1.1 Frye v *United States.* Early in the past century, a researcher came up with the idea to combine people's instinctive notion about bodily changes that occur when one attempts to deceive with a medical device that was designed to measure blood pressure. The device was a systolic blood pressure cuff; the man was William Marston, who, in 1917, claimed to be able to tellin an objective fashion and by applying a \"scientific\" methodwhether a person was engaged in verbal deception. After James Adolphus Frye was charged with murder in the District of Columbia and maintained he was innocent, Marston was asked to examine Frye. After attaching the systolic blood pressure cuff and asking Frye a number of questions, Marston was prepared to testify that Frye spoke truthfully when he denied knowledge of the crime and professed his innocence. The \"systolic blood pressure deception test\", essentially a rather crude precursor of the modern polygraph, had revealed this fact to the purported expert. But the court would not let Marston testify. On appeal, the issue was whether the trial court had erred in refusing to permit Marston to testify about the test result. The appellate decision became the basis for a most important legal principle that continues to have an impact on expert opinion testimony of types very different from lie detection: it is the case of Frye v *United States,* 293 F. 1013\n(D.C. Cir. 1923).\n\nThe court in *Frye* suggested how courts contemplating whether to admit novel expert testimony ought to proceed:\nJust when a scientific principle or discovery crosses the line between the experimental and demonstrable stages is difficult to define. Somewhere in this twilight zone the evidential force of the principle must be recognized, and while the courts will go a long way in admitting expert testimony deduced from a well-recognized scientific principle or discovery, the thing from which the deduction is made must be sufficiently established to have gained general acceptance in the particular field in which it belongs. (Emphasis added.)\nThe court went on to conclude that the polygraph test had not yet gained such general acceptance in the disciplines of human physiology and psychology; these were the fields wherein the court believed the \"lie detector\" belonged. One might wonder what test courts used in deciding whether to admit novel expert testimony prior to *Frye.*\nThe admissibility of scientific evidence in reality depended on whether the person offered as a witness wanting to express opinion testimony was qualified as an expert. If the witness was, then that person was typically competent to render expert opinion testimony. And, prior to the 1923\nFrye decision, that competence was largely measured by the expert's success in real life. If a person earned a living selling his or her knowledge in the marketplace, then that person would be considered an expert who could testify at trial. Although not very sophisticated, this early principle of \"marketplace acceptance\" (a concept we might in the post-*Daubert* parlance equate to some early form of peer review) served the law in a more or less acceptable manner for a great number of years.\n\nInitially, the *Frye* rule evoked little interest. Cited only as the rule that held that \"lie detector\" (polygraph) evidence was inadmissible, the opinion was ignored by most other courts, which is not surprising considering it was only two pages in length and contained no citations of authority or other court precedents supporting the startling new principle that was announced. When, however, the crime laboratories of the 1960s, fueled by massive federal assistance programs, began to flood the courtrooms with novel types of expert testimony in the post-World War II era, *Frye* was suddenly rediscovered and was applied to a wide variety of different types of expert opinion testimony. *Frye* was, however, applied mainly in criminal cases; at the time of the *Daubert* decision, the Frye test had only been discussed in two civil cases: Christopher v *Allied-Signal Corp.,* 503 U.S. 912 (1992) and Mustafa v *United States,* 479 U.S. 953 (1986). But in criminal cases, it reigned supreme. In short order, the *Frye* test was used to determine the admissibility of opinions derived from voiceprints, neutron activation analysis, gunshot residue tests, bite mark comparisons, questioning with sodium pentothal (\"truth serum\"), scanning electron microscope analysis, and many other fields. 13.3.1.2 The Adoption of Federal Rule 702. With the approval of the U.S. Supreme Court, Congress passed the FRE in 1975. They became effective July 1, 1975, for all federal courts. The rules thereafter served as a model for law reform and for departing from the fairly rigid common law rules of evidence in a significant number of states as well. FRE 702 deals particularly with expert testimony. It provided, at the time of its passage:\nIf scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise. (Federal Rule of Evidence 702, as first enacted in 1975.)\nThis rule of Evidence, when taken in conjunction with other Federal Rules, was sometimes referred to as being based on a liberal \"general relevance\" standard of admissibility. It treated novel scientific evidence the same as any other evidence: evidence was admissible as relevant, under FRE 401, if it had \"any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence\" (FRE, 2004, p 3). Thus, the FRE contained no special rule that, when dealing with \"scientific\" evidence, novel or otherwise, ensured that science-based testimony is reliable and, therefore, admissible. All evidence was admissible if relevant, provided its use in court was not outweighed by undue prejudice, misleading of the jury, or requiring an undue consumption of time. The FRE also did not distinguish between the admissibility of expert opinion evidence in criminal as opposed to civil cases. They applied the same standard of admissibility except in a few situations that are specifically earmarked or shaped by constitutional principles. The next step in legal developments occurred in 1993, when the U.S. Supreme Court handed down a momentous decision that would drastically change the landscape of expert evidence. That decision was Daubert v Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. *Daubert* was later followed by another important court case, Kumho Tire v *Carmichael.* Both Daubert and *Kumho Tire* arose out of civil lawsuits.\n\n[Author's note: As the following discussion of case law appears in a nonlegal document, internal citations for all quotations will not be provided in order to aid readability.]\n\n## 13.3.1.3 Daubert V *Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals.* In Daubert, Two Infants Sued The Defendant Pharmaceutical Company, Alleging That They Suffered Limb Reduction Birth Defects As A Result Of Their Mothers' Ingestion Of The Drug Bendectin, Manufactured By The Defendant. The Drug Was Administered To The Plaintiff-Mothers During Their Pregnancy In Order To Combat Morning Sickness.\n\nThe defendant, Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., moved for summary judgment in the trial court, contending that Bendectin does not cause birth defects in humans. In support of their motion, Steven H. Lamm, a physician and epidemiologist with impressive credentials who had served as a birth-defect epidemiology consultant for the National Center for Health Statistics, stated that he had reviewed all the relevant literature and that no study found that Bendectin caused human birth defects. Interestingly, the plaintiffs did not dispute Dr. Lamm's characterization of the medical literature or his conclusion on the lack of a causal connection between the drug and birth defects. However, the plaintiffs responded by offering the testimony of eight equally well-credentialed experts of their own, who had concluded that Bendectin can cause birth defects. Their conclusions were based on animal cell studies, live animal studies, and chemical structure analyses. They also based their conclusions on recalculations of data in the studies upon which the defendant's argument rested.\n\nThe district court agreed with the defendant and granted the motion for summary judgment. The court concluded that, based on the enormous amount of epidemiological data which had concluded that Bendectin did not cause birth defects, plaintiffs' contrary expert opinion was not admissible to establish causation because the expert's methodology was not \"sufficiently established to have general acceptance in the field to which it belongs\" (U.S. District Court opinion, reported at 727 F. Supp. 570, 572 (S.D. Cal. 1989)). Furthermore, plaintiffs' experts' recalculations were held to be inadmissible because they had been neither published nor subjected to peer review. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's ruling because plaintiffs' evidence was \"generated solely for use in litigation\" rather than based on published and peer-reviewed scientific knowledge (Daubert v *Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,* 951 F.2d 1128 (9th Cir. 1991)). The U.S. Supreme Court agreed to review this decision because of the \"sharp divisions among the courts regarding the proper standard for the admission of expert testimony\".\n\nA unanimous court held, simply, that *Frye* did not survive the enactment of the Federal Rules of Evidence and that the admissibility of scientific evidence should be judged according to the FRE evidentiary standard of relevance. The court stated that *Frye's* \"rigid\" general acceptance standard was in conflict with the \"liberal thrust\" of the FRE and their \"general approach of relaxing the traditional barriers to 'opinion' testimony\". The court found that *Frye's* \"austere standard\" of general acceptance, being \"absent from and incompatible with the Federal Rules of Evidence\", is no longer to be considered as the guide to admitting testimony based on novel \"scientific knowledge\".\n\nIn interpreting FRE 702, the *Daubert* court stated that if a litigant challenges the admissibility of scientific evidence, it is the function of the trial court to act as a gatekeeper to determine whether the proffered opinion evidence is \"relevant\" and \"reliable\". To guide the district courts, the U.S. Supreme Court articulated several \"flexible\" factors that they ought to consider in deciding whether a scientific field was sufficiently reliable to warrant admission of opinion evidence based on the discipline.\n\nIn 1999, the U.S. Supreme Court applied the *Daubert*\nrequirement of proof of reliability to all forms of expert opinion testimonywhether based on science, applied science, technology, skill, or experiencewhen it decided Kumho Tire.\n\n13.3.1.4 Kumho Tire Corp. v *Carmichael.* Plaintiff Carmichael brought a products liability action against a tire manufacturer (Kumho Tire) and a tire distributor (Samyang Tires, Inc.) for injuries he sustained when the right rear tire on his vehicle failed and the vehicle overturned, killing a passenger and injuring others. Plaintiff sought to prove the causal connection between the accident and the defective tire by presenting the testimony of a \"tire failure analyst\" who wanted to testify that in his opinion a defect in either the tire's manufacture or its design had caused the blowout. He had subjected the tire to a \"visual and tactile inspection\" to formulate his conclusion. Defendant Kumho Tire moved to exclude the expert's testimony on the ground that the witness' methodology failed to satisfy FRE 702\nand the *Daubert* decision. The district court excluded the evidence because it found insufficient indicia of reliability in the expert's methodology. At the same time, the court, as had the trial court in *Daubert,* also granted defendants'\nmotion for summary judgment. The intermediate appellate court reversed, however, reviewing the question of whether the trial court's decision to apply *Daubert* to this case was appropriate. It did not think it was, and said that the U.S. Supreme Court had intended to apply *Daubert* only to \"scientific knowledge\"\nand not to \"skill- or experience-based observation\".\n\nWhether *Daubert* should be applied to all expert testimony was an issue that had divided trial courts interpreting it\nand had sparked intense debate on what constituted science and what did not qualify as scientific knowledge. Co-defendant Kumho Tire petitioned for review by the U.S.\n\nSupreme Court, which agreed to decide whether *Daubert*\napplied to experts in the \"technical\" or \"other specialized knowledge\" fields as well. FRE 702 includes expert opinions in those areas.\n\nThe court held that the *Daubert* requirement of proof of reliability was not limited to scientific knowledge, though that was the way the issue had been presented in Daubert.\n\nIt stated, \"Th[e] language [of FRE 702] makes no relevant distinction between 'scientific' knowledge and 'technical' or 'other specialized' knowledge.\" The court added that *Daubert* and the rules of evidence make clear that all experts may testify to opinions, including those not based on firsthand knowledge or observation.\n\nThus, without equivocation, the court held that the obligation imposed on trial judges by *Daubert* to act as gatekeepers on the reliability of expert opinion evidence applies equally to all expert opinion testimony, even in areas where the expert opinion was based more on skill and experience, andthis is importanteven in cases dealing with fields of expertise that had already been judicially recognized as yielding admissible expert opinion testimony. The court said that to require trial judges to draw a distinction between scientific knowledge and technical or other specialized knowledge would make their job of \"gatekeeper\" difficult, if not impossible. The court explained:\nThere is no clear line that divides the one from the others. Disciplines such as engineering rest upon scientific knowledge. Pure scientific theory itself may depend for its development upon observation and properly engineered machinery. And conceptual efforts to distinguish between the two are unlikely to produce clear legal lines capable of application in particular cases (Kumho Tire Co. v Carmichael, 526 U.S. at 148, 119 S. Ct. at 1175).\n\nDoes this also mean that all of the *Daubert* factors should be applied to technical or experience-based expertise? The court answered that question by saying the factors may be applied to such expert knowledge. That much is obvious from the *Daubert* court's description of the factors of testing, peer review, known error rates, and general acceptance, commanding use of a flexible inquiry. But the court further stressed, \"We agree with the Solicitor General that the factors identified in *Daubert* may or may not be pertinent in assessing reliability, depending on the nature of the issue, the expert's particular expertise, and the subject of his testimony.\" By the same token, the *Daubert* factors may be useful in assessing the reliability of some forms of expertise. Here is a very significant quotation from the Kumho Tire opinion for forensic scientists:\nDaubert is not to the contrary. It made clear that its list of factors was meant to be helpful, not definitive. Indeed, those factors do not all necessarily apply in every instance in which the reliability of scientific testimony is challenged. It might not be surprising in a particular case, for example, that a claim made by a scientific witness has never been the subject of peer review, for the particular application at issue may never previously have interested any scientist. Nor, on the other hand, does the presence of *Daubert's* general acceptance factor help show that an expert's testimony is reliable where the discipline itself lacks reliability, as, for example, do theories grounded in any so-called generally accepted principles of astrology or necromancy (Kumho Tire Co. v Carmichael, 526 U.S. at 151, 119 S. Ct. at 1175).\n\nThe court expounded on the latitude that trial courts have in deciding how to test an expert's conclusion and to decide whether or when appropriate hearings ought to be conducted to investigate the claims of reliability. The court instructed that a trial judge's inquiry is a flexible one and that the gatekeeping function, of necessity, must be tied to the particular facts of a case. The factors identified in *Daubert* are not supposed to be talismanic, nor do they constitute a definite checklist or a litmus test. Whatever decision a trial court makes on either the admissibility or inadmissibility of proffered opinion evidence, or indeed on whether the evidence is relevant, will be judged by the standard of \"abuse of discretion\". In making this point, the court was emphasizing that after Daubert, but before the *Kumho Tire* decision was handed down, the U.S. Supreme Court had already applied the abuse-of-discretion standard as the test to use when\nreviewing the decision of a district court to either admit\nor deny admission of expert testimony. The case was General Electric Co. v *Joiner,* 522 U.S. 136, 118 S.Ct. 512 (1997).\n\n(That decision raises the specter that the issue of reliability of a technique might be decided differently in separate district courts, and that, on appeal, both seemingly inconsistent holdings will have to be affirmed if, on the record, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in arriving at its decision.)\nWhat do the decisions in *Daubert* and in *Kumho Tire* mean to forensic scientists beyond the obvious holdings already discussed? There are at least two additional points to be made:\n\n1.  It means that the definition of science, the scientific\nmethod, and scientific evidence can no longer be used as loosely as experts have been doing. It is no longer sufficient to call yourself a forensic scientist in order to be considered a scientist. It is no longer sufficient to say that something is a subject of forensic science in order for a court to agree that it is dealing with science. Simply saying it does not make it so. The courts may, and many will, require the experts to show that they know what the scientific method consists of and provide the scientific basis for their conclusions. By the same token,\neach discipline will be judged by its own standards and upon its own experience. The DNA model of expertise, much vaunted for its scientific basis by critics of the forensic sciences, may not be the basis by which other disciplines need or should be judged.\n\n2.  It also means that forensic scientists can no longer\nexpect to rely on the fact that courts have long accepted and admitted evidence of their expert conclusions. The court can relitigate the admissibility of a certain type of expert evidence if a litigant can make a credible argument that there has been no previous scientific inquiry of the validity of the assumptions on which a forensic field has long rested. Decades of judicial precedent no longer preclude reviewing whether existing precedent\nsatisfies *Daubert* and *Kumho Tire.* Long-recognized\nforensic disciplines have been and are being challenged, with more to come.\n\n## 13.3.1.5 The *Daubert* Factors And Their Relation To The Frye **Test Of \"General Acceptance\".** How *Daubert* \"Reliability\" Is To Be Established Still Remains An Issue Of Some Controversy. The Court Explained This Requirement In These Words:\n\nOrdinarily, a key question to be answered in determining whether a theory or technique is scientific knowledge that will assist the trier of fact will be whether it can be (and has been) tested. Scientific methodology today is what distinguished science from other fields of human inquiry ... [internal citations of the court omitted]. Another pertinent consideration is whether the theory or technique has been subjected to peer review and publication. Publication (which is but one element of peer review) is not a sine qua non of admissibility; it does not necessarily correlate with reliability ... Some propositions, moreover, are too particular, too new, or of too limited interest to be published. But submission to the scrutiny of the scientific community is a component of \"good science,\" in part because it increases the likelihood that substantive flaws in methodology will be detected. [Internal citations omitted.] The fact of publication (or lack thereof) in a peer reviewed journal thus will be a relevant, though not dispositive, consideration in assessing the scientific validity of a particular technique or methodology on which an opinion is premised.\n\nAdditionally, in the case of a particular scientific technique, the court ordinarily should consider the known or potential error,. . . [internal citations omitted] and the existence and maintenance of standards controlling the technique's operation [internal citations omitted]. Finally, \"general acceptance\" can yet have a bearing on the inquiry. A \"reliability assessment does not require, although it does permit, explicit identification of a relevant scientific community and an express determination of a particular degree of acceptance within that community.\" (Daubert v Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals Inc., 509 U.S., 509;\n593594)\nLooking at the *Daubert* factors more closely, it is evident that one factor in determining whether evidence is \"scientific knowledge\" is whether a theory or technique can be or has been tested by a scientific body. However, this aspect became less importantperhaps even totally irrelevantafter the decision in *Kumho Tire,* wherein the court applied *Daubert's* required proof of reliability to all expert testimony, including technological as well as skilled and experience-based expert testimony.\n\nAfter the U.S. Supreme Court decided *Daubert,* Congress enacted an amendment to FRE 702 in 2000 to incorporate the concerns expressed in the *Daubert* case as well as in the *Kumho Tire* case. At the conclusion of the original text of FRE 702 (quoted above in section 13.3.1.2), Congress added the following language (replacing the period after \"otherwise\" with a comma, and continuing as follows):\nif (1) the testimony is based on sufficient facts or data, (2) the testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods, and (3) the witness has applied the principles and methods reliably to the facts of the case. (As amended, April 17, 2000, effective December 1, 2000.)\n13.3.1.6 Effect of *Daubert* on Criminal Prosecutions in the Various States. The FRE apply to all proceedings in federal courts. Because the matter of what the rules of evidence mean does not involve federal constitutional rights, the *Daubert* decision was intended to apply only as an interpretive guide to the FRE in federal courts. Nevertheless, the U.S. Supreme Court decisions on expert testimony have had a significant impact on state evidence law as well. Many states have evidence codes or rules of evidence patterned on the FRE. Mostthough not allof these states chose to follow the *Daubert* and *Kumho Tire*\ninterpretations as a way of interpreting their own state-law equivalent of FRE 702.\n\nSome states that followed the *Frye* rule of general acceptance before 1993 disagreed with the new U.S. Supreme Court decisions even though those states did have FRE- based rules of evidence. These states rejected, post-\nDaubert, the latter's more flexible standards and mandated a strict adherence to *Frye* as the standard for admissibility of novel scientific evidence. Indeed, some states that never explicitly followed the *Frye* rule in the past have since been persuaded to adopt it. In many of the states that do not have FRE-based evidence rules and where case law had adopted the *Frye* test for the admissibility of expert evidence prior to 1993, the *Frye* standard remains alive and well as a stand-alone test for admissibility.\n\nOf course, even though *Frye* was nominally discarded in the federal courts, *Frye* survives as one of the four main Daubert factors. The only difference in the application of the \"old\" standard and its modern-day equivalent is that some state and federal courts still tend to analyze the admissibility decision in terms of pre-*Daubert* case law. The reasons for rejecting the *Daubert* principles and choosing to retain general acceptance as the sole criterion for admissibility may be found in the firm belief that *Daubert's*\ngeneral relevancy concepts are too flexible, too lenient, or too easy to satisfya proposition that has not proven true in the interpretation of the law in some *Daubert*\njurisdictionsand that the more conservative approach of general acceptance as the sole standard is better designed to screen out unreliable evidence. Thus, in State v *Bible,*\n175 Ariz. 549, 589, 858 P.2d 1152, 1181 (1993), the court stated that *Frye* was more likely to avoid placing the difficult task of evaluating the worth of scientific testimony on nonscientist judges or jurors and leaving the decision on the scientific validity of expert opinion testimony upon the shoulders of the expert's peers.\n\nRepresentative of the states rejecting *Daubert* expressly and choosing to adhere to the *Frye* rule were Arizona, Colorado, Florida, Illinois, Kansas, Missouri, Nebraska, New Hampshire, and Washington. Some other states\n(e.g., California) retained their *Frye*-like rule without expressly rejecting *Daubert*. Yet others (e.g., Massachusetts) equally retained the venerable *Frye* standard but added a Daubert-like inquiry for some cases (as is explained in the discussion of the 2005 Commonwealth v *Patterson* decision in section 13.3.2.5).\n\nIt is clear that those who expounded in the aftermath of the *Daubert* decision that *Frye* was dead were premature in their assessment. The *Frye* rule, indeed, lives on as an independent principle in some states and as one of the Daubert factors in other states and in the federal system. Daubert, without a doubt, has encouraged a continuation of the trend toward greater judicial scrutiny of scientific evidence. If there was ever a belief that rejection of *Frye*\nby the U.S. Supreme Court would signify a reduction in the number of pretrial hearings to determine admissibility of novel scientific evidence, that belief has been convincingly shown to be in error. Trial courts hold as many, or more, and as lengthy, or lengthier, hearings on in limine motions challenging admissibility of expert opinions as they did prior to 1993.\n\nThat the *Daubert* factors are more lenient and will admit more expert opinion testimony than was the experience under *Frye*a suggestion the U.S. Supreme Court itself madehas not been shown to be the way the Court's decisions are being interpreted. Even though the Court declared the new standard to be a more flexible and easierto-meet test than *Frye,* experience has shown so far that trial courts tend to be more rigid in judging the validity of expert opinion testimony in the post-*Daubert* era. Lawyers presenting novel scientific testimony have sought to introduce evidence crossing all the \"t\"s and dotting all of the \"i\"s by presenting evidence on all factors of *Daubert.*\nOpponents of such evidence, likewise, have sought to present testimony to dispute all of the arguments of their adversaries. Courts bound by the new rules are likely to engage in lengthier hearings to determine admissibility and write longer opinions justifying their decisions to admit or deny admission than was the case heretofore.\n\n## 13.3.2 Daubert Challenges Against \"Fingerprints\" After 1993\n\n13.3.2.1 Challenges to the Admissibility of Friction Ridge Individualizations. The first challenges to forensic evidence were brought against forensic document examiners (FDEs). A few U.S. District Court decisions wherein the admissibility of expert testimony of handwriting identifications was challenged had resulted in partially prohibiting experts from testifying to the ultimate conclusion that a defendant had written, or did not write, a questioned document in issue. In most cases, though, the admissibility challenges were soundly rejected by trial courts and handwriting identification evidence was found to satisfy Daubert. Even when partially successful, judges generally did not exclude the FDE testimony altogether. It is significant that, to date, no federal court of appeals has held that handwriting identification testimony is inadmissible for failure to satisfy the *Daubert* and *Kumho Tire* requirements.\n\nPerhaps emboldened or encouraged by the partial success in a few trial court cases wherein district court judges prohibited forensic document examiners from offering their opinions that a questioned writing was authored by the defendant, academic critics of the forensic sciences in general next turned their attention to fingerprinting. There are four important cases with which all friction ridge impression examiners should be familiar.\n\n13.3.2.2 United States v *Mitchell.* The first serious Daubert challenge occurred in the 1999 case of United States v *Mitchell* (Cr. No. 964071), in which Judge J.\n\nCurtis Joyner denied the defense's motion in limine to bar the government's fingerprint experts from testifying. The trial court's decision was not officially reported. Pennsylvania U.S. District Court Judge Joyner had conducted a 5-day Daubert hearing in 1999, at the conclusion of which the judge ruled that fingerprint evidence satisfied all *Daubert*\nfactors. He also took judicial notice that \"human friction ridges are unique and permanent throughout the area of the friction ridge skin, including small friction ridge areas, ... \" With the pretrial evidentiary issues settled, Mitchell was thereafter tried and convicted in 2000. Not surprisingly, he appealed. On April 29, 20042 years after the *Llera Plaza* trial court decision by a judge in the same district (discussed below) had taken the fingerprint world by stormthe U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, in an opinion written by Circuit Judge Edward R. Becker, decided Mitchell's appeal and upheld the conviction as well as Judge Joyner's conclusion that fingerprinting evidence was admissible. The reviewing court, however, did hold that Judge Joyner improperly took judicial notice of the uniqueness and permanency aspects of fingerprints. The appeals court decision is reported as United States v *Mitchell,* 365 F.3d 215 (3rd Cir. 2004), cert. denied 125 S. Ct. 446 (2004). It did affirm the trial court's admission of fingerprint evidence on the ground that the discipline satisfied the *Daubert* validity factors.\n\nIn its opinion, the court of appeals ignored an issue that had been hotly debated at the *Daubert* hearingwhether fingerprint identification was a science. Recall that the\n1999 U.S. Supreme Court decision in *Kumho Tire* had made it unnecessary to draw a distinction between scientific and nonscientific expert testimony, inasmuch as Kumho Tire had held that the gatekeeper role of the trial judge in keeping unreliable opinion evidence out of court applied to all expert opinions, whether deemed scientific, technical, or experience-based.\n\nThe appeals court in *Mitchell* explored each one of the Daubert factors. In doing so, the court's decision, although ultimately favorable to the prosecution, was not overwhelmingly laudatory.\n\nThe First Factor - Testability. Testability refers to \"whether the premises on which fingerprint identification relies are testableor, better yet, actually tested\". The court concluded that the premises that friction ridge arrangements are unique and permanent, and that a positive identification can be made from fingerprints containing sufficient quantity and quality of detail, were testable and had been tested in several ways. In that regard, the court referred to the FBI's AFIS computer comparison of 50,000 left-sloped patterns against a database of another 50,000 sets of tenprints, a process involving 2.5 billion comparisons. The experiment showed there were no matches of prints coming from different digits. The court referred to several other tests, such as those involving the prints of identical twins, and the fact that an FBI survey showed no state identification bureaus had ever encountered two different persons with the same fingerprint. The second part of the testability factor involved the fact that making a positive identification depends on \"fingerprints containing sufficient quantity and quality of detail\".\n\nThe court was somewhat troubled that the standard of having a point system had been abandoned and that the FBI relied on an \"unspecified, subjective, sliding-scale mix of 'quantity and quality of detail'\", but because the FBI expert testifying at the hearing had identified 14 points of level 2 detail when matching Mitchell's right thumbprint to the crime scene latent, the court saw the issue in this case as simply whether having 14 points of level 2 detail was enough for a positive identification. Referring again to the AFIS computer check with simulated latents (exhibiting only 1/5 of the size of a rolled fingerprint) and the survey that showed no identification bureau had ever found two matching prints on different digits, the court found this to be \"the strongest support for the government on this point\". It concluded that the \"hypotheses that undergird the discipline of fingerprint identification are testable, if only to a lesser extent actually tested by experience\".\n\nThe Peer Review Factor. The court did not seem overly impressed by the government's argument that the verification step of ACE-V constitutes effective peer review. Dr. Simon Cole, testifying for the defense, had suggested that fingerprint examiners have developed an \"occupational norm of unanimity\" that discourages dissent. Although acknowledging that the \"cultural mystique\" attached to fingerprinting may infect the verification process, the court nevertheless concluded that when looking at the entire picture, \"the ACE-V verification step may not be peer review in its best form, but on balance, the peer review factor does favor admission\" of friction ridge comparisons and individualizations.\n\nThe Error Rate. This is where the experts on both sides had waged the greatest battle at the *Daubert* hearing. The appeals court distinguished between two error rates: false positives and false negatives. The defense included and emphasized errors where examiners had failed to make identifications that could and should have been made. In that regard, the court recognized that a high false negative rate may not be desirable as a matter of law enforcement policy, but said that \"in the courtroom, the rate of false negatives is immaterial to the Daubert admissibility of latent fingerprint identification offered to prove positive identification because it is not probative of the reliability of the testimony *for the purpose for which it is offered* (i.e., for its ability to effect a positive identification\" (italics in the original). False positives, on the other hand, would be most troublesome. But the court concluded that, \"where what is sought to be proved is essentially a negative (i.e., the absence of false positives) it seems quite appropriate to us to use a burden-shifting framework\". Where the government experts testify to being unaware of significant false positive identifications, the burden of producing contrary evidence may reasonably be shifted to the defense. Although the error rate may not have been precisely quantified, the court was persuaded that the methods of estimating it showed it to be very low. (This testimony occurred before the FBI misidentification of Brandon Mayfield in the Madrid, Spain, train bombing terrorist attack (Stacey, 2004, pp 706718; OIG report, 2006).)\nThe Maintenance of Standards. The *Mitchell* appeals court found this standard to be \"lacking in some measure\". The procedural standards of ACE-V were deemed to be \"insubstantial in comparison to the elaborate and exhaustively refined standards found in many scientific and technical disciplines\" and the court found that this factor did \"not favor admitting the (fingerprint) evidence\". As an aside, the question often arises, not surprisingly, whether subjectivity plays a part in the ultimate decision that two impressions were produced by the same skin, and the related question, whether subjectivity negates reliability. In comparing latent impressions of unknown origin with prints of known origin to determine whether a \"match\" exists, some subjectivity is involved, but the factors that guide the exercise of judgment are clearly spelled out in the detailed observations that are required to be made when going through the first three steps of ACE-V. The view, often advocated by critics, that fingerprinting is unscientific simply because some subjective judgment is involved in declaring a match, had already been rejected by Judge Louis H. Pollak in the *Llera Plaza II* case. He quoted a statement by the United Kingdom's Lord Rooker, who said, \"In determining whether or not a latent mark or impression left at a crime scene and a fingerprint have been made by the same person, a fingerprint examiner must apply set criteria in carrying out their comparison. The criteria are objective and can be tested and verified by other experts\" (*Llera Plaza II,* 188 F.Supp.2d at 569). And although sometimes critical of fingerprint identification techniques, the second opinion in *Llera Plaza* nevertheless concluded that ACE-V satisfied the *Daubert* and *Kumho* Tire requirements of proof of reliability (*Llera Plaza II,* 188 F.\n\nSupp. 2d at 575). But the rhetorical question remains: Can an opinion obtained without statistical probability studies be said to be scientific? Defense expert Dr. David Stoney joined scientific expert witnesses testifying for the government in *Mitchell* and *Llera Plaza II* in expressing the view that a profession can engage in science despite the absence of statistical support. This is not new to the scientific community, in which the absence of statistical probability studies does not necessarily characterize the process as unreliable or unscientific. Stoney stated that valid science is something that is capable of being proven wrong, and that ACE- V can easily be tested by review of the evidence by other qualified individuals.\n\nThe General Acceptance Factor. Little needs to be said on this factor, which the court found to be clearly weighing in favor of admitting the evidence.\n\nTo conclude, the *Mitchell* appeals court's decision was that, on the record presented to it, an analysis of the *Daubert*\nfactors showed that \"most factors support (or at least do not disfavor) admitting the government's\" evidence on friction ridge individualizations. Thus, it held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting it.\n\nThis is by no means a strong endorsement, even though it may be seen as such in the practical effect the opinion will likely have. The *Mitchell* decision addressed several other issues:\nIndividual Error Rates of Examiners. The first and perhaps most important issue deals with the court's recommendation that, in future cases, prosecutors seek to show the individual error rates of expert witness examiners. The National Academy of Sciences has adequately addressed the issue of confusing practitioner error rates and methodological error rates in its discussion of this issue with regard to DNA. As its position is well-stated and is applicable to any of the forensic sciences, no further discussion is required here. What must be understood is the distinction between how the academic scientific community wants to define error rate and what *Daubert* requires may not be one and the same. It has been argued that the U.S. Supreme Court got it wrong and should modify its ruling to ensure the practitioner is included. Others oppose such a change because it would complicate the judge's gatekeeping responsibility even further.\n\nThe Critics' Voices. An additional comment by the court suggested there be no limitation placed on the defense's right to present expert testimony. In that regard, the court noted, \"Experts with diametrically opposed opinions may nonetheless both have good grounds for their views, and a district court may not make winners and losers through its choice of which side's experts to admit when all experts are qualified\". (Emphasis added.) But the court went further and said that if there were any question about a proffered expert's competence on a given issue, the court should err on the side of \"admitting any evidence having some potential for assisting the trier of fact\". A lot of space was devoted in the latter part of the court's opinion to a discussion of the limitations believed to have been imposed on the testimony of some defense experts. No limitations should be imposed, the court said. What saved the case from a reversal on that point was perhaps the failure of the defense to effectively preserve its objections.\n\nWill Daubert *Hearings Continue?*  The *Mitchell* court further addressed the question of whether there will be more or fewer *Daubert* hearings in the future. On that issue, the court's opinion was somewhat obscure. First, it said that its *Mitchell* decision did not announce \"a categorical rule that latent fingerprint identification evidence is admissible in this Circuit\". But then it also said that nothing in the opinion \"should be read to require extensive *Daubert* hearings in every case involving latent fingerprint evidence\". Further muddling (or perhaps clarifying) what went before, the opinion then stated that \"a district court would not abuse its discretion by limiting, in a proper case, the scope of Daubert hearings to novel challenges to the admissibility of latent fingerprint identification evidenceor even dispensing with the hearing altogether if no novel challenge was raised\". What this probably means is that District Courts of the Third Circuit will now refuse to conduct *Daubert* hearings unless the defense raises arguments not considered in the *Mitchell* litigation.\n\n## Judicial Notice Of The Reliability Of Fingerprint Identification. At The Pretrial Hearing, District Judge Joyner Had Taken Judicial Notice That \"Human Friction Ridges Are Unique . . . Including Small Friction Ridge Areas . . . .\"\n\nWhat does taking judicial notice really mean? Instead of requiring the parties to present proof of a given fact, a court is permitted to take judicial notice of that fact without requiring proof thereof if the fact is \"not subject to reasonable dispute\" or \"is capable of ready determination\" by reference to existing studies or reports. Although there have been reviewing court decisions by state appellate or supreme courts going back 40 or more years taking judicial notice of the uniqueness of fingerprints, the court found these decisions not only not binding on the court, but clearly distinguishable, since the decisions dealt with the uniqueness of complete fingerprints. Uniqueness of each fingerprint was not the issue here; the issue was uniqueness of small areas of friction skin such as are typically visible in a latent impression. As to that issue, the appellate court felt that the very fact that it took 5 days of testimony to establish the uniqueness of small areas of friction skin showed that the fact was by no means generally known or capable of ready determination. Therefore, Judge Joyner's judicial notice ruling was in error. Because it was not deemed to likely have altered the outcome of the case, it was considered to be harmless error not requiring a reversal.\n\n13.3.2.3 United States v *Llera Plaza.* The second very significant case that all friction ridge examiners should be cognizant of is the *Llera Plaza* case. Perhaps the case has lost some of its persuasive effect because it was followed in short order by the appeals court decision affirming Mitchell, but defense attorneys continue to argue that the criticism leveled toward fingerprinting expertise by Judge Louis H. Pollak in *Llera Plaza* remains valid.\n\nAfter first ruling, on January 7, 2002, that the government's expert testimony on the ultimate issue of whether there was a match between defendant's known print and a crime scene print would be inadmissible, (United States v Llera Plaza, 179 F. Supp. 2d 492 (E .D. Pa., 2002) (Llera Plaza I))\nJudge Pollak, of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, reconsidered and reversed his earlier decision 2 months later in what is now frequently referred to as Llera Plaza II (United States v *Llera Plaza,* 188 F. Supp.\n\n2d 549 (E.D. Pa., 2002)). Why did he reverse himself? \"In short,\" he wrote, \"I have changed my mind.\"\nWhen he decided *Llera Plaza* originally, the judge had not held an evidentiary hearing. Both parties had stipulated that the judge could consider the record generated in the Mitchell case as well as some written submissions of the attorneys. In his first order, the judge took judicial notice of the uniqueness and permanency of fingerprints and accepted \"the theoretical basis of fingerprint identification namely, that a showing that a latent print replicates (is a 'match' of) a rolled print constitutes a showing that the latent and rolled prints are fingerprints of the same person\".\n\nHowever, Judge Pollak also held, in his *Llera Plaza I* order, that the ACE-V method generally used to arrive at match or nonmatch conclusions did not meet the first three *Daubert*\nfactors, and only met the general acceptance factor in the technical as opposed to scientific community of fingerprint examiners. He therefore would allow fingerprint experts for both prosecution and defense to testify to all of the examinations they had performed in an individual case, but would preclude them from testifying that the latent and inked prints were, or were not, from the same person. The government moved not only for reconsideration of the judge's January 7, 2002, order, but also petitioned for leave to enlarge the record through the presentation of additional evidence. The district judge granted the motion and hearings were held on February 2527, 2002. Both sides presented additional expert testimony, after which the judge made his now famous statement, \"I have changed my mind.\"\nJudge Pollak admitted that the rehearing offered new information or information he had not \"previously digested\". It appears he was particularly impressed by the FBI expert, Stephen Meagher; and defense expert, Allan Bayle, formerly with New Scotland Yard and now a fingerprint consultant. Meagher, whose testimony in the *Mitchell* case the judge had already read, now became not merely a name in a transcript but \"a real person\". Allan Bayle, while seeking to aid the defense's arguments by pointing to shortcomings in the FBI's annual proficiency testing method, ended up confirming that the FBI's fingerprint methodology was \"essentially indistinguishable\" from Scotland Yard's ACE-V methodology. Bayle, to whom the judge deferentially referred as \"this formidably knowledgeable and experienced veteran of the Yard\", testified that he believed in the reliability of the ACE-V methodology \"without reservation\". Clearly, the defense's \"formidably knowledgeable\" Allan Bayle in Llera Plaza II ended up aiding the prosecution's case.\n\nDespite Judge Pollak's continuing reservations on the \"science\" controversy as it pertains to fingerprint methodology when tested against the *Daubert* standards, he decided that by applying the legal mandates expressed in the *Daubert* and *Kumho Tire* cases, (1) judicial notice would be taken of the permanence and individuality of friction skin (fingerprint) patterns, and (2) experts in the field would be permitted to express their opinions on a match of two impressions. This occurred after he heard or read the explanations of law enforcement-trained examiners and university-based scientists in genetics, histology, and fetal development regarding the biological and physiological factors that result in ultimate pattern uniqueness during the prenatal development of friction skin.\n\nIf the contention remains that there are shaky parts in the friction ridge examination methodology, the argument does not support exclusion or limitation of testimony, but falls squarely within the U.S. Supreme Court's *Daubert* admonition, \"Vigorous cross-examination, presentation of contrary evidence, and careful instruction on the burden of proof are the traditional and appropriate means of attacking shaky but admissible evidence.\" (Daubert v Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. at 596) An interesting footnote to Judge Pollak's March 2002 Llera Plaza II decision is that in considering the *Daubert* factor of\n\"publication and peer review\", none of the scientific books and other publications by scientists were quoted or relied on. Judge Pollak stated that the \"writings to date\" do not satisfy *Daubert's* publication prong because the voluminous fingerprint literature was not peer reviewed. This no doubt came as a tremendous surprise to those highly credentialed and respected scientists who published studies and to the editors of the refereed journals in which many of these publications occurred.\n\n13.3.2.4 United States v *Havvard.* The third case of note in the admissibility battles is United States v Havvard, 117 F. Supp. 2d 848 (D.C. Ind. 2000), holding that fingerprint identification meets all *Daubert* and Kumho Tire requirements. That decision was affirmed in United States v *Havvard,* 260 F.3d 597 (7th Cir. 2001). Because the decision is \"older\" than the previous two cases, and the opinion is readily available on the Internet, it will not be discussed here. Suffice it to say that this was the first federal circuit court of appeals case after *Daubert* that gave an unqualified seal of approval to friction ridge impression evidence.\n\n13.3.2.5 Commonwealth v **Patterson.** Commonwealth v *Patterson,* 445 Mass. 626 (2005), was decided by the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court on December 18,\n2005. Like the first *Llera Plaza* opinion of Judge Pollak, the Patterson case caused significant concern throughout the community of friction ridge evidence examiners. *Patterson*\ndiffers from *Llera Plaza* in at least four significant aspects: (1) *Patterson* is a decision by a state's highest appellate tribunal, and therefore is a binding precedent only on Massachusetts courts; (2) the decision was unanimous and therefore not likely to be altered unless significant progress in scientific research on the issues involved can be demonstrated to the court in another case on the same issues; (3)\nMassachusetts is a *Frye* jurisdiction but, in deciding the issue before it, the high court applied the *Daubert* factors as well as the general acceptance test; (4) *Patterson* affected only one specialized application of friction ridge examination methodology, that is, simultaneous latent impressions, and gave unqualified approval to normal individualization evidence of latent impressions. Although critical of one specialized aspect of friction ridge examinations, the court found much of which it approved. Fingerprint individualizations, as well as the ACE-V method, were given a broad seal of approval as meeting both the Frye test and the *Daubert* factors. Furthermore, the state high court recognized SWGFAST as a guideline-setting authority in the field of friction ridge examinations. What did not pass muster was the admissibility of what are known as identifications based on \"simultaneous prints\" when none of the individual impressions contain enough information to justify individualization independently.\n\nFactually, the case is unremarkable. *Patterson* was identified as the maker of four latent impressions on a car that were said to have been simultaneously impressed. Although none of the latent prints contained sufficient detail for individualization on its own, the Boston Police Department's latent print examiner testified that collectively, in his opinion, they could be identified as having been made by the defendant. *Patterson* had been convicted in a first trial, but the conviction was reversed on grounds unrelated to the fingerprint evidence and a retrial was ordered. Before the retrial could occur, the defense moved to bar the admission of fingerprint evidence in general and simultaneous prints evidence in particular. A hearing was held in 2005, as a result of which the trial court denied the defense motions in all regards. On review to the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, that tribunal affirmed two parts of the trial judge's order and reversed one part. Fingerprint identification and ACE-V methodology were held to have satisfied the general acceptance test of the Frye decision as well as the reliability assessment dictated by *Daubert,* and therefore those parts of the trial judge's order were affirmed. The high court held, however, that the state had not fulfilled its burden of showing that the process of individualizing latent prints on less than the normal quantum of needed data, solely because they had been said to have been impressed simultaneously, was generally accepted in the profession; nor had the state shown that the process was otherwise validated because no studies dealing with simultaneous impressions had been shown to exist. Why did the court, while expressing the determination to continue to adhere to *Frye,* consider whether individualizations based on simultaneous prints satisfied the *Daubert* factors? It held that if a technique cannot meet the *Frye*\nstandard for lack of proven general acceptance, a court can still consider whether the expert's findings ought to be admitted, and such admission depends on whether the technique can satisfy a more lenient assessment of reliabilityin other words, a *Daubert*-type of inquiry. When it did engage in such a *Daubert* analysis, the court found simultaneous print individualizations wanting.\n\nThe court also decided that the verification part of ACE-V, although a generally accepted methodology under *Frye,* nevertheless could not satisfy the *Daubert* factor of peer review because the verifiers know that an identification has already been effected and also know the name of the party who has been identified. The court said, \"We share the (trial) judge's consternation with the current verification process.\" One important aspect of the decision rejects a mantra upon which critics have relied in the past. Critics of forensic identification evidence have asserted repeatedly that general acceptance must be conferred by a community of scientists, not by users of the technique. That assertion was rejected. The Massachusetts high court held that the community of professionals who judge the reliability and general acceptance of a technique need not contain either academics or research scientists. As long as the community is sufficiently broad so that critics or dissenters within the group have an opportunity to be heard and their arguments considered, the community's approval will suffice to confer general acceptance. The court added, \"A technical community, or a community of experts who have some other specialized knowledge, can qualify as a relevant Daubert community in the same way as a scientific community can.\" The fingerprint community was found to meet that requirement.\n\n13.3.2.6 Afterthoughts in the Wake of the Challenges.\n\nAlthough there are ways in which some aspects of friction ridge impression comparisons can be legitimately challenged, as has been seen in Commonwealth v *Patterson,*\nchallenges after 2005, if any, will probably be focused closely upon specific applications and narrow issues. Broad-brush generalizations and condemnations of everything connected with fingerprint identification are perhaps the clearest examples of unscientific analyses that are unlikely to merit court approval.\n\n## 13.4 Historical Account Of Fingerprints, Palmprints, And Footprints In U.S. Courts\n\nThe following brief synopsis of early friction ridge impression evidence decisions is presented to provide an historical account of some of the early United States court cases. Most of these cases are from state trials, because fingerprints were utilized generally by state law enforcement agencies prior to their wide utilization by federal law enforcement.  Although fingerprints were first utilized by the Federal Bureau of Investigation in 1924 for establishing prior arrest records, it was not until 1933 that fingerprints were used by the FBI as a forensic tool in support of criminal investigations. This portion of the chapter seeks to recognize, as well as possible, a few of the earliest occasions in which specific aspects of friction ridge impression evidence were first approved by the courts.\n\n## 13.4.1 The First Appellate Decision Admitting Fingerprint Evidence In American Courts People V Jennings, 252 Ill. 534, 96 N.E. 1077 (1911)\n\nThe defendant Thomas Jennings was arrested for murder when four impressions of his left-hand fingers were discovered impressed in fresh paint at the rear of the victim's home near the window through which entry had been gained. The freshly painted railing had been removed by the Chicago Police Department. Jennings was identified using fingerprints on file at the Chicago Police Department, recorded when he had been arrested and returned to the penitentiary for violation of his parole. After his arrest, he was fingerprinted again and, along with other evidence, enlarged fingerprint exhibits were used as evidence at his trial. Four expert witnesses testified that, in their opinion, the impressions on the railing were made by Jennings. After conviction, Jennings appealed, arguing basically that the field of fingerprinting was too novel to support a conviction.\n\nThe Illinois Supreme Court, in an exhaustive opinion, rejected defendant's contentions related to fingerprinting and affirmed the conviction, holding that persons experienced in the matter of fingerprint identification may testify to their opinion on whether fingerprints found at the scene of a crime correspond with those of the accused. Justice Orrin N. Carter's opinion also stated:\nWe are disposed to hold from the evidence . . . and from the writings we have referred to on this subject, that there is a scientific basis for the system of finger-print identification, and that the courts are justified in admitting this class of evidence; that this method of identification is in such general and common use that the courts can not refuse to take judicial notice of it. . . .\n\nFrom the evidence in this record we are disposed to hold that the classification of finger-print impressions is a science requiring study. . . . [T]he evidence in question does not come within the common experience of all men of common education in the ordinary walks of life, and therefore the court and jury were properly aided by witnesses of peculiar and special experience on this subject.\n\n## 13.4.2 Admissibility Of Palmprints As Proof Of Identity State V Kuhl, 42 Nev. 195, 175 P. 190 (1918)\n\nA United States mail stage driver was killed in Elko County, Nevada. A key piece of evidence against Defendant Kuhl was an envelope, secured from one of the rifled mail sacks, on which there was a bloody impression of the palm of a human hand. After Kuhl and another were arrested, experts determined that the palmprint was made by Kuhl. He was convicted of murder in the first degree and appealed. His argument, like that of Jennings in the preceding case, contended that it was improper to use the palmprint evidence and also for expert witnesses to use a \"projectoscope\" and enlarged photographic images to illustrate their testimony. The Nevada Supreme Court recognized that the papillary ridges which form the basis of individualization in fingerprint impression extend over the entire palm of the hand and, indeed, over the soles of the feet. The original research done on the individuality of friction skin was not confined to an examination of the finger skin, but also included the skin on the palmar surfaces of the hands and the plantar surfaces of the feet. In rejecting defendant's arguments and affirming Kuhl's conviction, the Nevada Supreme Court, speaking through Justice Patrick McCarran, stated:\nWe have gone at length into the subject of palm print and finger print identification, largely for the purpose of evolving the indisputable conclusion that there is but one physiological basis underlying this method of identification; that the phenomenon by which identity is established exists, not only on the bulbs of the finger tips, but is continuous and coexisting on all parts and in all sections and subdivisions of the palmar surface of the human hand.\n\n## 13.4.3 Admissibility Of Footprints As Proof Of Identity Commonwealth V Bartolini, 299 Mass. 503, 13 N.E.2D 382, Cert. Denied 304 U.S. 562 (1938)\n\nBartolini had been identified as the maker of a bare sole print found on the linoleum floor of the bathroom where a murder was committed. The courtroom battles about the admissibility of this type of evidence were fierce. Several pioneers in friction ridge impression evidence were called as expert witnesses to buttress the testimony of the Massachusetts State Police expert who, although qualified as a fingerprint expert, was not found to have sufficient experience with footprints. Bert Wentworth, co-author of the influential and scholarly book *Personal Identification,* and Fredrick Kuhne of New York, who had served as an expert in cases involving the footprints of babies in hospitals, testified that the friction skin on the soles of the feet was as unique as that on the fingers and palms. After hearing Wentworth and Kuhne's testimony, Bartolini was convicted. The conviction was affirmed in a relatively brief opinion. The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court stated, in part:\nThere was no error in permitting the expert Wentworth to testify that footprints of a naked foot on the linoleum of the bathroom at the house of the deceased were made by the same person who had made prints at the police station identified as those of the defendant. There was ample evidence of special study and knowledge by this witness of the subject of footprints as well as of finger prints. . . . There was also ample evidence that footprints, like finger prints, remain constant throughout life and furnish an adequate and reliable means of identification.\n\n## 13.4.4 Admissibility Of Photographs Of Latent Impressions State V Connors, 87 N.J.L. 419, 94 Atl. 812 (1915)\n\nIt was permissible to show, by photographs, the fingerprints found upon the columns or balcony posts of a house without the columns being produced in court. See also the case of State v *Kuhl.*\n\n## 13.4.5 Fingerprinting Not A Violation Of Constitutional Rights\n\nIn a number of early cases, courts held that requiring a lawfully arrested defendant to submit to fingerprinting did not violate the defendant's constitutional rights. Perhaps one of the earliest ones was State v *Cerciello,* 86 N.J.L. 309, 90\nAtl. 1112 (1914), a case involving bloody fingerprints found on a hatchet at the scene of a murder. In affirming the conviction, the court held that the defendant's rights had not been violated. The most influential relatively early decision on that issue, however, was United States v *Kelly,* 55 F.2d\n67 (2d Cir. 1932). After being arrested upon the misdemeanor charge of having sold gin to federal prohibition agents, Kelly was fingerprinted. A U.S. District Court judge held, however, that the taking of fingerprints, in the absence of a statute, violated defendant's constitutional rights and ordered that Kelly's fingerprints be returned to him. The government appealed this order and, in an exhaustive opinion, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals, speaking through influential Judge Augustus N. Hand, reversed the district court, deciding that the taking of fingerprints upon a lawful arrest, even in the absence of a statute so authorizing, does not violate the arrestee's constitutional rights. Judge Hand said:\nWe find no ground in reason or authority for interfering with a method of identifying persons charged with crime which has now become widely known and frequently practiced both in jurisdictions where there are statutory provisions regulating it and where it has no sanction other than the common law. [Kelly] argues that many of the statutes and the decisions in common law states have allowed fingerprinting only in cases of felonies. But, as a means of identification it is just as useful and important where the offense is a misdemeanor, and we can see no valid basis for a differentiation. In neither case does the interference with the person seem sufficient to warrant a court in holding finger printing unjustifiable. It can really be objected to only because it may furnish strong evidence of a man's guilt. It is no more humiliating than other means of identification that have been universally held to infringe neither constitutional nor common law rights. Finger printing is used in numerous branches of business and of civil service, and is not of itself a badge of crime. As a physical invasion it amounts to almost nothing, and as a humiliation it can never amount to as much as that caused by the publicity attending a sensational indictment to which innocent men may have to submit.\n\n## 13.4.6 Fingerprint Evidence Alone Is Sufficient To Support A Conviction Stacy V State, 49 Okl. Crim. 154, 292 P. 885 (1930)\n\nDefendant was convicted principally on his identification as the person who left his latent prints on the door of a vault that was breached. He argued that a conviction based on evidence of fingerprints found in the place where the crime was committed, and not corroborated by other facts or circumstances, was insufficient to support a conviction. The court disagreed and affirmed. After going through a detailed account of the historical studies on fingerprints and their use as evidence of identity, the court stated:\nFrom an examination of the authorities cited and others, it appears that an allusion to finger print impressions for the purposes of identification is referred to in writings as early as 600 A.D., and they are traced back to a period some 100 years before Christ. Finger prints were first used as a manual seal to give authenticity to documents. They are found on Assyrian clay tablets of a very early date in the British Museum, and they were also used in the same way by the early Egyptians. From the literature on the subject and from the reported cases, we learn that finger prints have long been recognized as the strongest kind of circumstantial evidence and the surest form of identification. . . . We have no doubt but that the finding of the finger prints of the defendant on the door of the vault, with the further proof that defendant did not have access to and had not been at the place burglarized so that the prints could be accounted for on any hypothesis of his innocence, is a circumstance irresistibly pointing to his guilt. . . .\n\n## 13.4.7 Fingerprints To Identify Individual As A Habitual Criminal State V Smith, 128 Or. 515, 273 P. 323 (1929)\n\nA person who had been previously convicted of a burglary and similar offenses between 1906 and 1920 was charged with the crime of receiving stolen propertya misdemeanor when committed by a first offenderand was sentenced to life imprisonment as a fourth felony offender under the Habitual Criminal Act. The Supreme Court of Oregon, interpreting an Oregon Habitual Criminal Act statute patterned on the one upheld by New York's highest court in People v *Gowasky,* 244 N.Y. 451, 155 N.E. 737, held that it was appropriate to use fingerprints for the purpose of identifying him as the perpetrator of the earlier felonies.\n\nAs early as 1917, the New York court, in People v Shallow, 100 Misc. 447, 165 N.Y. Supp. 915 (1917), held that the use of fingerprints to establish that a defendant had been previously convicted and was therefore eligible for increased punishment violates neither the Fifth Amendment's privilege against compelled self-incrimination nor its state constitutional equivalent. The case was noted in the Columbia Law Review and the *Yale Law Review.* The court stated, in part:\nBy the requirement that the defendant's finger prints be taken there is no danger that the defendant will be required to give false testimony. The witness does not testify. The physical facts speak for themselves; no fears, no hopes, no will of the prisoner to falsify or to exaggerate could produce or create a resemblance of her finger prints or change them in one line, and therefore there is no danger of error being committed or untruth told.\n\n## 13.5 Conclusion\n\nFriction ridge impression examinations, whether tenprint to tenprint comparisons or latent print to tenprint comparisons, have been utilized in support of legal proceedings within the United States as well as worldwide since the early 1900s. Latent print evidence, known exemplars of fingerprints and palmprints, and the expert must each individually and collectively pass muster under the scrutiny of the legal requirements in order to be meaningful and useful in assisting the court in determining guilt or innocence. Just as science progresses and changes occur over time, so has the legal system.\n\nGiglio v *United States,* 405 U.S. 150 (1972).\n\n## 13.6 Reviewers\n\nKumho Tire Co. v *Carmichael,* 526 U.S. 137, 119 S. Ct.\n\n1167 (1999).\n\nThe reviewers critiquing this chapter were Donna Brandelli, William F. Leo, James L. May III, and Lisa J. Steele.\n\nPeople v *Gowasky,* 244 N.Y. 451, 155 N.E. 737 (1927). People v *Jennings,* 252 Ill. 534, 96 N.E. 1077 (1911).\n\n## 13.7 References\n\nPeople v *Shallow,* 100 Misc. 447, 165 N.Y. Supp. 915 (1917). Stacy v *State,* 49 Okl. Crim. 154, 292 P. 885 (1930).\n\nFederal Rules of Criminal Procedure. The Committee on the Judiciary, House of Representatives; U.S. Government Printing Office: Washington, DC, 2004.\n\nState v *Bible,* 175 Ariz. 549, 589, 858 P.2d 1152,\n1181 (1993).\n\nFederal Rules of Evidence. The Committee on the Judiciary, House of Representatives; U.S. Government Printing Office: Washington, DC, 2004.\n\nState v *Cerciello,* 86 N.J.L. 309, 90 Atl. 1112 (1914). State v *Connors,* 87 N.J.L. 419, 94 Atl. 812 (1915). State v *Kuhl,* 42 Nev. 195, 175 P. 190 (1918).\n\nOffice of the Inspector General. A Review of the FBI's Handling of the Brandon Mayfield CaseUnclassified Executive Summary. U.S. Department of Justice: Washington, DC, March 2006.\n\nState v *Smith,* 128 Or. 515, 273 P. 323 (1929). United States v *Havvard,* 260 F.3d 597\n(7th Cir. 2001).\n\nStacey, R. Report on the Erroneous Fingerprint Individualization in the Madrid Train Bombing Case. J. Forensic Ident. 2004, 54 (6), 706718.\n\nUnited States v *Havvard,* 117 F. Supp. 2d 848\n(D.C. Ind. 2000).\n\nSWGFASTStandards for Conclusions. *J. Forensic Ident.* 2004, 54 (3), 358359.\n\nSWGFAST. Press Kit; May 14, 2004, www.swgfast.org.\n\nUnited States v *Henthorn,* 930 F.2d 920 (9th Cir. 1991), affirming United States v *Henthorn,* 931 F.2d 29 (9th Cir.\n\n1991).\n\n## Court Citations\n\nUnited States v *Kelly,* 55 F.2d 67 (2d Cir. 1932).\n\nBrady v *Maryland,* 373 U.S. 83 (1963).\n\nUnited States v *Llera Plaza,* 479 F. Supp. 2d 492\n(E.D. Pa., 2002) *(Llera Plaza I)*.\n\nCommonwealth v *Bartolini,* 299 Mass. 503, 13 N.E.2d\n382, *cert. denied*  304 U.S. 562 (1938). Commonwealth v *Patterson,* 445 Mass. 626 (2005).\n\nUnited States v *Llera Plaza,* 188 F. Supp. 2d 549 (E.D. Pa., 2002) *(Llera Plaza II)*. United States v *Mitchell,* Cr. No. 964071.\n\nDaubert v *Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,* 509 U.S.\n\n579, 113 S. Ct. 2786 (1993).\n\nUnited States v *Mitchell,* 365 F.3d 215 (3rd Cir. 2004), cert. denied S. Ct. 446 (2004).\n\nDaubert v *Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,* 951 F.2d\n1128 (9th Cir. 1991).\n\nFrye v *United States,* 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923). General Electric Co. v *Joiner,* 522 U.S. 136, 118 S. Ct.\n\n512 (1997).\n\n## C H A P T E R Scientific Research Supporting The Foundations Of Friction Ridge Examinations\n\nGlenn Langenburg\n\n## C O N T E N T S\n\n3\n14.1  Introduction\n27\n14.5  Conclusions\n27\n14.6  Reviewers\n3\n14.2  The Nature of Scientific\nInquiry\n27\n14.7  References\n7\n14.3  Scientific Research Related to\nFriction Ridge Examination\n26\n14.4  Future Directions for Research\n\nRelated to Friction Ridge\n\nExamination\n\n## Chapter 14 Scientific Research Supporting The Foundations Of Friction Ridge Examinations Glenn Langenburg 14.1 Introduction\n\nWhen some people think of research, what comes to mind are images of individuals in white lab coats, looking up intermittently to take data measurements and jot down notes. This is a very limited and narrow view of research. Investigative reporters, attorneys, police detectives, engineers, authors, actors, and, of course, scientists, all perform research. The scientist, however, performs scientific research. Simply defined, research is an inquiry into any subject or phenomenon. Scientific research, then, can be defined as a scientific inquiry into a subject or phenomenon. What makes an inquiry \"scientific\"? What is science? What is scientific method? What are the rules for a scientific inquiry? The answers to these questions are not simple, and are the subject of an entire realm of philosophy of science. This chapter will review some of these topics, relating the issue to friction ridge skin science. The reader, however, is encouraged to read more regarding the philosophy of science to better understand the complexity of science and scientific inquiry.\n\n## 14.2 The Nature Of Scientific Inquiry 14.2.1 Science And Falsifiability\n\nThe word *science* is derived from the Latin *scientia* (meaning knowledge), which is itself derived from the Latin verb *scire* (to know). Science can be defined as a body of knowledge obtained by systematic observation or experimentation. This definition is very broad, and, under such a permissive definition, many fields of study may be defined as science. Scientific creationism, theological science, Freudian psychoanalysis, and homeopathic medicine could arguably be classified as sciences. Sir Karl Popper (19021994) recognized the difficulty of defining science. Popper, perhaps one of the most respected and widely known philosophers of science, separated science from nonscience with one simple principle:\nfalsifiability. Separation, or demarcation, could be done if a theory or law could possibly be falsified or proven wrong (Popper, 1959, 1972). A theory or law would fail this litmus test if there was no test or experiment that could be performed to prove the theory or law incorrect. Popper believed that a theory or law can never be proven conclusively, no matter the extent of testing, data, or experimentation. However, testing that provides results which contradict a theory or law can conclusively refute the theory or law, or in some instances, give cause to alter the theory or law. Thus, a scientific law or theory is conclusively falsifiable although it is not conclusively verifiable (Carroll, 2003). Although the Popperian view of science is a widely held view amongst scientists, it is important to note that the U.S. Supreme Court has also taken this view of science\n(*Daubert,* 1993, p 593). Justice Blackmun, writing for the majority, cited Popper, specifically noting that a scientific explanation or theory must be capable of empirical testing. The issue of falsification was also raised during the *Daubert* hearing for the admissibility of latent print evidence during *U.S. v Mitchell* (July 13, 1999). (For an explanation of *Daubert* hearings, see Chapter 13.)\n\n## 14.2.2 Scientific Laws And Theories\n\nThere is a grand misconception, even within the scientific community, that scientists first make observations; then they postulate a hypothesis; after rigorous testing, the hypothesis is accepted, thus becoming a theory; then the theory, after enjoying many years of success, without any instances of being refuted, is accepted as a scientific law. This hierarchical structure is a myth (McComas, 1996).\n\nSchoolhouse Rock (Frishberg and Yohe, 1975) described such a hierarchy for bills on their journey to becoming laws. Such is not the case in science. Scientific laws and theories, though related, represent different knowledge within science. McComas stated, \"Laws are generalizations, principles or patterns in nature and theories are the explanations of those generalizations\". Scientific laws describe general principles, patterns, and phenomena in the universe. Scientific theories explain why these general principles, patterns, and phenomena occur. The verbs associated with laws and theories speak to the nature of these concepts: scientific laws are discovered; scientific theories are invented (McComas, 1996). Exactly what defines a law and exactly what defines a theory is contested within the philosophy of science. In fact, some philosophers of science (Van Fraassen, 1989, pp 180181) believe that no laws exist at all. However, the majority of modern philosophers of science believe that laws exist and there are two popular competing definitions:\nsystems and *universals* (Thornton, 2005).\n\nThe systems definition of a law defines a law within a deductive system. Axioms are stated that allow deductive conclusions. The strength of the law is within the truth of the generalized statement and its simplicity. As an example, if \"all human friction ridge skin is unique\", and I am a human, then one can deduce from the law (if true) that my friction ridge skin is unique. Instances of nonunique friction ridge skin would obviously show the law to be false. The universals definition of a law defines the law as a relationship or \"contingent necessitation\" between universals (universals being just about anything). The wording of such a law would be similar to:\n\n- Humans exist. - Unique friction ridge skin exists. - The law is the relationship of these two entities:\nHumans possess unique friction ridge skin.\n\nIn either case, laws can be described by the following features (Hempel and Oppenheim, 1948; Zynda, 1994):\n\n- Laws are universal. - Laws have unlimited scope. - Laws contain no designation of individual, particular\nobjects.\n- Laws contain only \"purely qualitative\" predicates.\nTheories, on the other hand, are explanations for laws. For example, Sir Isaac Newton discovered the \"Law of Gravity\". This law is universal, unlimited, not just applicable to a unique object, and is descriptive and predictive. However, this law does not explain how and why gravity works. Scientists of Newton's era proposed waves of gravity emitted from objects, attracting each other, operating similarly to magnetism. The attractive forces of gravity comprised the Theory of Gravity. Later, Albert Einstein found instances where the theory did not hold up (e.g., light bending toward massive objects in space). According to the accepted theory of the time, Einstein's observations were not possible. Einstein proposed a new and revolutionary theory of gravity to explain this phenomenon. Einstein's new theory was called the \"General Theory of Relativity\" and described curvatures in the spacetime continuum. These curvatures were due to massive objects exerting their force of gravity on the spacetime continuum, very similar to bowling balls placed on an outstretched blanket. Einstein's proposed theory was not initially accepted, but after years of tests and experiments, his theory gained acceptance. This is the true nature of science. Laws are discovered. Theories are invented to explain them. The laws and theories are tested by experiments, observations, and hypothesis testing. Hypotheses are woven together into the theories as the theories are modified. Theories are never proven, only continually tested and updated. Theories can be accepted for hundreds of years, but with the advent of newer technology, theories are subjected to new tests and rigors, and eventually outdated or incomplete theories give way, absorbed into new, mature theories. The science of friction ridge skin has experienced exactly such trials.\n\n## 14.2.3 Laws And Theories In Friction Ridge Examination\n\nIf we accept the definition that a scientific law is a generalized description of patterns and phenomena in nature and a scientific theory is the explanation for that law, then what theories and laws exist within the discipline of friction ridge science? The two most basic laws are:\n\n1) Human friction ridge skin is unique.\nEach individual possesses a unique arrangement of friction ridge skin. Specifically, the ridge arrangements, the robust arrangements of the minutiae within the ridge patterns, and the shapes and structures of the ridges all combine to form a unique arrangement of friction ridge skin in the hands and feet of each individual.\n\n2) Human friction ridge skin is persistent (permanent)\nthroughout the individual's lifetime.\n\nSpecifically, what is meant by persistence is that\nthe sequence of the ridges and the arrangement of the robust minutiae do not change throughout a person's lifetime. This is not to say that the friction ridge skin does not change over time. It does. Friction ridge skin expands as people grow from childhood to adulthood. Skin cells constantly slough off. The substructure of the skin changes over time and ridge heights decrease (Chacko\nand Vaidya, 1968). The number of visible incipient ridges increases as we age (Stucker et al., 2001). Hairline creases and wrinkles proliferate as we age. All these factors describe a dynamic and changing friction ridge skin. Yet the arrangement of the minutiae and the ridge sequences is very robust and reproducible. There is evidence to support that third-level details (e.g., ridge shapes and pore locations) are persistent; this is explored later in the chapter (see section 14.3.2.2).\n\nThe next question of interest is, Are these scientific laws? According to Popper, to satisfy the criteria for scientific laws, these laws must be falsifiable. Clearly, both laws are easily falsifiable. One must simply find instances where different individuals have indistinguishable friction ridge skin or instances where the arrangement of the ridges in friction ridge skin is observed to naturally change over time (excluding injury or trauma, of course). However, in the history of this discipline, no such instances have been demonstrated. Suppose one individual, in the entire world, actually did have a fingerprint that matched someone else's fingerprint. Obviously, the forensic community would be shocked, and the verity of the law would be questioned. But in a purely Popperian view (Thornton, 2005):\nNo observation is free from the possibility of errorconsequently we may question whether our experimental result was what it appeared to be. Thus, while advocating falsifiability as the criterion of demarcation for science, Popper explicitly allows for the fact that in practice a single conflicting or counter-instance is never sufficient methodologically to falsify a theory [or law], and that scientific theories [or laws] are often retained even though much of the available evidence conflicts with them, or is anomalous with respect to them.\n\nThus, Popper advocated constant testing to refute a theory or law. A single instance of falsifiability should spawn additional testing. Fundamental theories exist that explain the two laws of uniqueness and persistency. Uniqueness is explained by biological variations (genetic influences and random localized stresses) within the developing fetus. Persistence is maintained by the substructural formations of the developing skin (hemidesmosomes, papillae, and basal layer).\n\nThese are theories that explain the laws. These theories have empirical evidence and testing that support, but do not conclusively prove, them. Additional information may be learned that will cause these theories to be adjusted and incorporate the new data. Thus, science is evolving and dynamic.\n\n## 14.2.4 Hypothesis Testing\n\nTheories and laws are commonly challenged through hypothesis testing. The results of testing a hypothesis can support or refute a theory or law. In some instances, the results will call for modifications to be made to a law or theory, which in turn leads to further hypotheses to test under the new or modified law. Although there are no rigorous formulas or recipes for testing hypotheses and designing experiments (nor should there be), a generic model for hypothesis testing can be described. The steps of this model are often referred to as \"scientific method\". Huber and Headrick (1999) noted that the term scientific method is a misnomer. They stated that scientific method is derived from epistemology (the study of knowledge and justified belief, according to the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy). Francis Bacon defined a basic approach to scientific method encapsulated in four steps: (1) observe, (2) measure, (3) explain, and (4) verify (Huber and Headrick, 1999). This description in modern times has been modified into a hypothesis testing model. The basic steps of the hypothesis testing model have been described as:1\n\n- Observation.\n- Hypothesis formulation. - Experimentation. - Data analysis and conclusion. - Reproducibility. - Communication of results.\nThe researcher must first make a specific observation or note a general problem or query. Then a hypothesis is formulated (often referred to as the \"null hypothesis\"). The hypothesis is testable and falsifiable. A counter-hypothesis is also formulated. A suitable experiment is designed to test the specific hypothesis. Data from the experiment are collected. These data may be qualitative or quantitative. The data are evaluated, often statistically (though that is not a requirement), and conclusions are drawn whether to accept the hypothesis or reject the hypothesis and accept the null hypothesis. The results of the experiment should be reproducible by another scientist following the methodology. Finally, the results should be communicated to others. This is important not only for sharing the knowledge but also for peer review and critical analysis.\n\n## 14.2.5 Comparison Methodology And Theory\n\nAs an extension of the law that friction ridge skin is unique, if during the deposition of a latent print, the details of the friction ridge skin are sufficiently recorded on a surface via residues on the friction ridge skin, then theoretically the latent print image can be individualized to the source\nfriction ridge skin.\n\nThis is what Hempel and Oppenheim (1948) refer to as a derived theory (as opposed to a fundamental theory). The derived theory allows application of the principle to specific objects or individuals that would be prohibited by the universality and generality requirements of a law or fundamental theory. However, the theory that latent prints can be attributed to a unique source of friction ridge skin raises some questions that are difficult to answer. Even if the friction ridge skin is unique down to the cells and ridge units, this issue is secondary to whether a latent print (which will not contain all of the information in the source skin) can be correctly attributed to its source. How much information must be transferred for the examiner to reliably individualize the latent print? What happens to the reliability of the details when subjected to distortions? What tolerances are acceptable regarding distortions and the flexibility of skin? Ultimately, the latent print will be compared to a source (via known standard reproductions) by an expert. The comparison methodology generally accepted in the United States is the ACE-V methodology. This is an acronym for analysis, comparison, evaluation, and verification. The stages of ACE-V\nmethodology are defined as: *Analysis*Assessment of the quantity and quality of ridge detail present in an impression; *Comparison*A side-by-side comparison of the two impressions; *Evaluation*The decision process to declare an individualization, exclusion, or inconclusive opinion;\nVerificationVerification of the result by another competent examiner. The ACE process was initially described by Huber as a logical, methodological process for the comparison of handwriting evidence (Huber, 1959). (For more about ACE-V, see Chapter 9.) It has been argued elsewhere that ACE-V \"methodology\" is not in any real sense a methodology and is more akin to a \"protocol\" (Champod et al., 2004). A methodology would typically encompass very explicit steps, instructions, criteria, and a transparent decision model. This has not been accomplished. The ACE-V protocol, however, serves as an appropriate model and descriptor for performing any sort of forensic comparative examination, whereby evidence from an unknown source is compared against appropriate known exemplars to reach an opinion regarding the source of the evidence. As such a protocol, it offers good suggestions for general forensic examinations such as (1) analysis of the unknown should be done separately, prior to comparison to the known exemplar, and (2) there must be verification of the conclusion and peer review of the reasoning used to reach the proffered conclusion. Wertheim has suggested that ACE-V is analogous to the scientific method (Wertheim, 2000, pp 18). Huber and Headrick made a similar analogy for the ACE process with respect to handwriting comparisons (Huber and Headrick, 1999, pp 351355). The analysis is the assessment (observation) that a latent print has detail sufficient for a comparison. A hypothesis is formed: the latent print originated from Individual A; a null hypothesis is formed: the latent print did not originate from Individual A. The images are compared and agreement is found or not found (experimentation). Based on the degree of agreement (data), one concludes that there is sufficient evidence during the evaluation stage to individualize or exclude (support or reject the hypothesis as a conclusion). The process is then verified by another expert during verification (reproducibility). As Hughes (1998, pp 611615) has noted, the practice of friction ridge examination is an applied science. The discipline borrows from other sciences to support and justify the practice of comparing friction ridge images by a specific comparison methodology.\n\n## 14.3 Scientific Research Related To Friction Ridge Examination 14.3.1 Friction Ridge Skin Is Unique\n\nIn order to prove the axiom of unique friction ridge skin to be true, every area of friction ridge skin on the planet (and all the skin of past and future generations) would need to be examined. Obviously, this will never be possible. Therefore, to support this premise, the discipline looks to three areas of support:\n\n- Empirical observations and evidence. - The theory of the formation of friction ridge skin (i.e.,\nthe biological formation).\n- Fingerprint individuality models based on probability\nand statistics.\n14.3.1.1 Observations. The empirical evidence, for many years, was generally viewed by the discipline as the piece de resistance of evidence for the claim that friction ridge skin is unique. An expert would anticipate under vigorous cross-examination during trials to be asked, \"Well, how do you *know* that no two fingerprints are alike?\" The typical answer of course was, \"Because in all the history of fingerprints, all the billions of comparisons worldwide, no two fingerprints have ever been found to be identical, from different sources, and this includes identical twins.\" Although this fact is important and should not be dismissed, it does not satisfy the argument and does not prove that one person's particular print does not have a matching mate somewhere out there on the planet. All that can be inferred from this fact is that, presently, no two people have been found to have matching fingerprints. Taking it a step further, it does not satisfy that one particular latent print, with just enough distortion and low clarity, might not be mistaken to be from a different source, given that the false source was very similar in appearance to the true source of skin. Latent print examiners should be cautious about resting merely on empirical evidence to support the uniqueness of friction ridge skin. Furthermore, the number of actual comparisons that have been performed, when compared to the total number of possible comparisons available (i.e., every human's friction ridge skin against every other human's friction ridge skin), is only the smallest fraction (cf. by inference, \"The Snowflake Paradigm\"\nby Thornton, 1986). Therefore, given what would undoubtedly be an exceptionally small probability (i.e., matching fingerprints between two different people), an impossibly large number of comparisons would need to be done to even have a realistic chance of finding such a match in the population. So even if matching fingerprints were to exist in the population, the chance of discovering them is simply too remote. The literature lacks research that was specifically conducted to prove that no two areas of friction ridge skin are alike. The absence of such a study stems from (1) as discussed previously, its impossibility, and (2) the profession's consistent reliance on its collective experience and case studies to demonstrate the point. Additionally, it could be argued that, until U.S. v *Mitchell* (1999), the premises and validity of friction ridge skin examinations had not been seriously challenged or scrutinized; therefore, the impetus to scientifically test the law, under the rigors of present-day science, has not existed. Still, although there is not (and cannot be) any definitive way to prove that all friction ridge skin is unique, there exists empirical evidence that supports the premise. Evidence from \"look-alikes\" (i.e., close nonmatchesfriction ridge skin impressions from two different sources that are very similar in appearance) (IEEGFI-II, 2004, p 13) has been helpful. Evidence from look-alikes can be found in monozygotic twin research and two Automated Fingerprint Identification System (AFIS) studies.\n\nStudies of Monozygotic Twins. If one wanted to find areas of matching friction ridge skin from two different individuals, it would seem that the population of monozygotic twins would be a good place to start the search. Galton (2005, pp 185187, originally published in 1892) first explored this avenue. He found similarities in patterns, but the minutiae were different. Similarly, other researchers, exploring the hereditary aspects of fingerprints, have examined the prints of monozygotic twins. The works of Wilder, Gruneberg, Bonnevie, and Newman are summarized by Cummins and Midlo (1943, pp 210245). These researchers all investigated the similarities of fingerprints between monozygotic twins. Their findings mirrored the conclusions of Galton. Okajima (1967, pp 660673) found a higher correlation for the number of minutiae present between the fingerprints of identical twins than the number of minutiae present between the fingerprints of fraternal twins. Lin and colleagues (1982, pp 290304) further investigated this relationship. They examined the correlations for fingerprint pattern, ridge count, and minutiae positioning for 196 pairs of twins (including both identical and fraternal twins). They found that the correlations followed the trend (in decreasing order of correlation): identical twins, fraternal twins, related siblings, and lastly, unrelated individuals. Their work echoed that of previous researchers noted by Cummins and Midlo (1943, pp 235245). Lin and colleagues (1982) concluded that \"although fingerprints [of identical twins] may have a high degree of similarity . . . variations in minutiae distribution still permit their differentiation\" (Lin et al., 1982, p 304).\n\nIn more recent times, German (U.S. v *Mitchell,* July 8, 1999, pp 256), in preparation for a *Daubert* hearing, performed similar analyses as Lin and colleagues (1982) with a database of fingerprints of 500 pairs of twins (including both identical and fraternal twins). Again, similarities in patterns, ridge count, and minutiae locations were noted between identical twins, but the prints were still differentiable. German further noted that even in the smallest areas of agreement (clusters of two to three minutiae located in similar positions), he could differentiate the prints based on third-level detail (i.e., the shapes of the ridges and pore locations). However, it should be noted that the work of German was not published. Therefore, it was not peer reviewed and can only be found in the testimony during the *Daubert* hearing in the *Mitchell* case.\n\nMoreover, unlike Lin and colleagues (1982), the German study was not conducted with well-defined hypotheses to be tested, the methods to test the hypotheses were not clear prior to the commencement of the work, and it is not clear what metrics were used to determine the strength of the similarities and dissimilarities when comparing mated monozygotic twin prints. Srihari and colleagues also conducted a large study of twins' fingerprints (Srihari et al., 2008). They used 298 sets of twins and 3 sets of triplets. The researchers used a minutiae-based automatic fingerprint identification algorithm to compute comparison scores. The researchers compared each identical twin to his or her mated identical twin. They also compared scores between twins' fingerprints and unrelated twins' fingerprints, fraternal twins, and non-twins. Comparing the distributions of scores produced, the researchers found that twin pairs have more similarities in level 1 detail and level 2 detail than the general population, but are still discriminable.\n\nAll of the previous studies with twins dealt exclusively with known exemplars of their friction ridge skin. What is lacking from the literature is whether an examiner can correctly attribute a latent impression to the correct friction ridge skin source when identical twins have deposited latent prints. The only data of this nature can be found in the 1995 Collaborative Testing Services (CTS) latent print examiner proficiency test (CTS, 1995; Grieve, 1996, pp 521528). This particular CTS proficiency test included a bloody impression from an individual whose fingerprint exemplars were not provided for the proficiency test. Instead, the fingerprint exemplars from the donor's identical twin, who did not create the bloody impression, were provided. Approximately one in five participants in this proficiency test erroneously individualized the impression to the incorrect source.\n\nEmpirical Data. It is unknown exactly which individual or culture first recognized the individuality of fingerprints. From the ancient Middle East to the ancient Chinese, there is evidence in these cultures of an awareness of the uniqueness of fingerprints. (For a timeline of fingerprint science, see Chapter 1.) It was not until 1788 that Dr. J. C. A. Mayer recorded:\nAlthough the arrangement of skin ridges is never duplicated in two persons, nevertheless the similarities are closer among some individuals. In others the differences are marked, yet in spite of their peculiarities of arrangement all have a certain likeness. (Cummins and Midlo, 1943, p 13)\nMayer is considered the first individual to record the assertion that friction ridge skin is unique.\n\nMany more early pioneers investigating this phenomenon followed, including Sir William Herschel and Dr. Henry Faulds. However, neither Herschel nor Faulds published hard data in support of their theories. In his 1880 letter to *Nature* (Faulds, 1880, p 605), Faulds reported several conclusions, including \"absolute identity\" of criminals from crime scene latent impressions. However, Faulds never provided the data for his basis, stating only that he examined a \"large number of nature-prints\" taken from individuals in Japan. His later writings (Faulds, 1911) refer to his examination of \"many thousands of living fingers\". In 1970, the International Association for Identification (IAI) organized a committee known as the Standardization Committee. The primary task of the committee was \"to determine the minimum number of minutiae of friction ridge characteristics which must be present in two impressions in order to establish positive identification\" (McCann, 1971, p 10). For 3 years, the committee addressed this issue and in 1973, the Standardization Committee reached a consensus: \"No valid basis exists at this time for requiring that a pre-determined minimum number of friction ridge characteristics must be present in two impressions in order to establish positive identification. The foregoing reference to friction ridge characteristics applies equally to fingerprints, palm prints, toe prints and sole prints of the human body\" (McCann, 1973, p 13). This conclusion was arrived at through interviews with professionals in the field, a review of the literature, surveys sent to various international identification bureaus, and the generally accepted view of the profession. It is important to note that during the interviews and surveys, no agency reported any knowledge of an instance where two individuals were found to have matching fingerprints or any other matching areas of friction ridge skin (Moenssens, 2006). As for concrete empirical studies, two are notable. Fingerprint expert Stephen Meagher (U.S. v *Mitchell,* July 8,\n1999, pp 56229; July 9, 1999, pp 231), in preparation for a *Daubert* hearing, conducted a survey. He sent images of two latent prints (the images that had been identified to the defendant in this case) to all 50 state laboratories.2 All agencies were asked to search the two latent prints in their local AFIS databases. Only one agency reported identifications: Pennsylvania, the state in which the defendant had been arrested. Eaton (2005, 2006) reported similar findings in an unpublished pilot study. A single common loop latent print with 12 minutiae, and a second image of the same print, cropped to show 8 minutiae, were sent to 50 agencies (in 9 countries). These agencies searched the images in their AFIS databases. The only agency to report an individualization was the Western Identification Network, which was the only agency that maintained a copy of the civilian tenprint card for the donor of the latent print in this experiment. Although neither of these results offer substantial proof that all friction ridge skin is unique, it is important to note that, after comparing these latent prints to hundreds of millions of fingerprints combined in the AFIS databases, no agency reported a match to anyone other than the correct known source. In effect, Meagher and Eaton were not able to falsify the individuality of fingerprints in these noteworthy, albeit limited, instances.\n\n14.3.1.2 Biological Basis. On the basis of a holistic and qualitative understanding of the morphogenetic processes of friction ridge skin formation, latent print examiners have predominantly supported the statement: Nature never repeats itself (McRoberts, 1996; Thornton, 1986). This position has been further supported by the views of numerous biologists, zoologists, and anatomists who have explored the proffered model for friction ridge skin formation (Wilder and Wentworth, 1918, 1932; Cummins and Midlo, 1943; Hale, 1952; Okajima, 1967; Misumi and Akiyoshi, 1984; Montagna and Parakkal, 1974, Montagna et al., 1992; Babler, 1978, 1990, 1991). Early authors generally referred to the variability of minutiae alone, and thus a probabilistic approach to fingerprint individuality, as evidence for the uniqueness of friction ridge skin (Galton, 2005, pp 100113; Wilder and Wentworth, 1932, pp 309328). Cummins (2000, pp 7990) and Hale (1952, pp 147173) recognized that the variability in minutiae formations and appearance were attributable to random mechanical stresses during friction ridge formation. The patterns of friction ridge skin and the arrangement of the minutiae, in conjunction with variability in the edge formations (Chatterjee, 1962), pore locations (Locard, 1912; Faulds, 1912, pp 2939), and ridge widths and heights (Cummins et al., 1941; Ashbaugh, 1999, pp 6165), provide a seemingly infinite palette of variation, even in the smallest regions. Montagna and colleagues have generally noted that skin (friction ridge and nonfriction ridge skin) differs from individual to individual and is not repeated elsewhere in regions on each individual (Montagna and Parakkal, 1974; Montagna et al., 1992). Montagna and colleagues noted in their observations and study of friction ridge skin and nonfriction ridge skin:\nThe palmar and plantar surfaces are filigreed by continuous and discontinuous alternating ridges and sulci [furrows]; the details of these markings and their configurations are collectively known as dermatoglyphics. Each area has unique regional and individual structural variations not matched elsewhere in the same or in any other individual. (Montagna et al., 1992, p 8)\nThe biological model for the morphogenesis of friction ridge skin supports the perspective for the uniqueness of friction ridge skin. Although not necessarily providing concrete evidence to test the uniqueness of friction ridge skin, the theory does explain why the law holds true. The biological basis for flexion crease formation has been studied by several researchers (Kimura and Kitigawa, 1986, 1988; Popich and Smith, 1970). With respect to the study of palmar features, empirical frequencies have been reported by Tietze and Witthuhn (2001). They reported frequencies of creases, ridge flow, patterns, and other distinct formations from 35,000 pairs of palmprints. Although these observations do not show \"uniqueness\" of palmar features, these data are helpful for assessing the rarity of these features.\n\n14.3.1.3 Probability Models for Fingerprint Individuality. Though many early pioneers recorded their empirical observations, it was Sir Francis Galton who developed the first probability model for individuality, resulting from his systematic analysis and study of fingerprints. From Galton's model in 1892 to the present, there have been approximately two dozen or so models, each improving or refining aspects of previous models. This section will summarize the significant research and models available. The summaries given are very basic and brief. Excellent summaries, discussions, and critiques of these models, including the assumptions, limitations, and strengths of each, have been provided elsewhere (see Stoney and Thornton, 1986a, pp 11871213; Stoney, 2001, pp 327387; Pankanti et al., 2001, pp 805812).\n\nThe Galton Model (1892) (Galton, 2005, pp 100113).\n\nAlthough Galton devised the first probability model for fingerprint individuality, it was very crude. Using enlargements of fingerprints, Galton dropped square pieces of paper of varying size randomly over the enlargements. He then attempted to predict whether the pieces of paper covered minutiae. Galton built his model on his ability to predict the occurrence of minutiae, dependent on the configuration of the surrounding ridges. He did not base his model on the actual frequencies and distributions of minutiae. Furthermore, he used unrealistic factors to estimate probability of differing pattern types and the number of ridges in a particular region of the print. From these calculations, he arrived at the probability of finding any given arrangement of minutiae in a fingerprint to be 1.45 x 10-11\n(i.e., 1 in 68 billion).\n\nThe Henry Model (1900) (Henry, 1900, pp 5458). The second model, proposed by Sir Edward Henry, was a drastic deviation from Galton's approach. Henry proposed that each minutia was an independent, identically distributed event\n(each occurrence of minutia has the same probability and is not dependent or influenced by any other minutiae). The probability of a minutiae event was 1/4 (.25). The probability of finding 12 matching minutiae was then (1/4)12 = 6 x 10-8 (i.e., approximately 1 in 17 million). To account for pattern type, according to Henry's model, pattern type was deemed equivalent to two more minutiae (multiplying the previous results for minutiae by 1/16). Thus, if given a whorl print with 12 minutiae, the probability of finding a whorl print with 12 matching minutiae is (1/4)14 or 4 x 10-9 (i.e., approximately 1 in 270 million).\n\nThe Balthazard Model (1911) (Balthazard, 1911, pp\n18621864). Using Henry's approach, Dr. Victor Balthazard (a French medical examiner) also used the probability of a minutia event equal to 1/4, but while Henry's was arbitrary, Balthazard based his use of 1/4 on whether a bifurcation or ridge ending pointed to the left or to the right. He proposed that each of these four possibilities (bifurcation left or right, ridge ending left or right) is equally likely to occur, and thus he arrived at a probability of 1/4 for a minutia event. His model did not include a factor for pattern type. He then reasoned that, in order for his model to satisfy the expectation of only one person on the planet to have a matching configuration to the print, 17 minutiae in agreement would need to be found. By his model, finding 17 matching minutiae had a probability of (1/4)17 = 6x10-11 (i.e., 1 in 17 billion). He also conceded that if one was certain the donor was restricted to a certain geographical region, then a positive identity could be established with a lower number of minutiae (e.g., 10 to 12 minutiae). In effect, Balthazard proposed the first \"minimum point\" threshold.\n\nThe Locard Model (1914) (Locard, 1914, pp 526548;\nChampod, 1995, pp 136163). The Locard model is not a statistical model, but rather a pragmatic opinion derived from the statistical models of Dr. Edmond Locard's era. Locard established his tripartite rule:\n\n1)\nIf more than 12 concurring minutiae are present and\nthe fingerprint is very clear, then the certainty of identity is beyond debate.\n2)\nIf 8 to 12 concurring minutiae are found, then identification is marginal and certainty of identity is dependent on:\na. the quality (clarity) of the fingerprint, b. the rarity of the minutiae type, c. the presence of a core and delta in a clear area\nof the print,\nd. the presence of pores, and e. the perfect agreement of the width of the ridges\nand furrows, the direction of the ridge flow, and the angular value of the bifurcation.\n3)  If a limited number of characteristic features are present, the fingerprint cannot provide certainty for an identification, but only a presumption proportional to the number of points available and their clarity.\nIn instances of parts 1 and 2 of the rule, positive identification can be established following discussion of the case by at least two competent and experienced examiners. Locard arrived at these conclusions based on his own experience and observations and the works of Galton, Balthazard, and Ramos.3 Part 3 of the rule, as noted by Champod (1995, pp 136150), is highly suggestive of a probabilistic approach to fingerprint evidence and conclusions.\n\nThe Bose Model (1917) (Roxburgh, 1933, pp 189214).\n\nRai Sahib Hem Chandra Bose used the Henry model and also used a probability of 1/4 for a minutia event; however, he clearly did so on a poor assumption. He chose 1/4 as a probability on the basis of his contention that there are four types of minutiae events, all equally likely to occur: a dot, bifurcation, ending ridge, or continuous ridge. Clearly, there are many more continuous ridge events than minutiae and certainly more ridge endings and bifurcations than dots distributed in a typical fingerprint.\n\nThe Wilder and Wentworth Model (1918) (Wilder and Wentworth, 1918, pp 319322). Dr. Harris Wilder and Bert Wentworth used the Henry model as well, but instead of an assumed probability of minutia occurrence of 1/4, they used 1/50. They gave only this reason as justification:\nWe have no definite data for knowing the percentage of occurrence of [minutiae in a specific pattern]. . . . As a matter of fact it is absurd to use anywhere near as small a ratio as 4 to 1, for the percentage of occurrence of any one of these details; it would be rather 1 in 50, or 1 in 100 . . .\n\n(Wilder and Wentworth, 1918, p 321).\n\nThe Galton model only recognized and used approximately 35 minutiae on the \"bulb\" of the finger (i.e., in the central portion of the tip of the finger) (Galton, 2005, pp 9798). Wilder and Wentworth (as did Balthazard) recognized that there are \"60 to 100 separate details\" in a full fingerprint (Wilder and Wentworth, 1932, p 319).\n\nThe Pearson Model (1930) (Pearson, 1930, p 182). Karl Pearson, an eminent mathematician and statistician of the late 19th century (famous for his many contributions to the field of statistics, including the well-known chi-square test), did not create a fingerprint model per se. Rather, in writing the biography of his good friend and colleague Sir Francis Galton, Pearson critiqued Galton's model. Pearson suggested that a more appropriate estimate of the probability of a minutiae event was 1/36, rather than 1/2 as Galton had used.\n\nThe Roxburgh Model (1933) (Roxburgh, 1933, pp 189\n214). T. J. Y. Roxburgh's model incorporated several innovative concepts. First, it included a factor for the number of intervening ridges from a minutia to the origin, using a polar coordinate system. All previous (and subsequent) models used rectangular areas or Cartesian coordinate systems. Second, Roxburgh included a clarity factor, recognizing that clarity can be low due to smearing or smudging and sometimes the type of minutiae present in a print may be ambiguous. The factor, termed \"Q\" for quality, allowed for the adjustment of probabilities based on the quality of a minutia. The Roxburgh model also incorporated factors for pattern type and minutiae type (the latter similar to the Balthazard model). Roxburgh also provided a table of probabilities for matching crime scene latent prints as a measure of the probability of finding that arrangement of minutiae. The table listed probabilities for 1 through 35 matching minutiae for 4 classes of clarity: \"ideal\", \"good\", \"poor\", and \"worst\". On the basis of these calculations, he provided a second table (Table 141) for the minimum number of minutiae needed to declare a positive identification between a crime scene latent print4 and a known exemplar. Roxburgh included a factor for error, with upper and lower limits of margin of error of 1/500,000 (if the finger designation is unknown) and 1/50,000, respectively. Roxburgh wrote:\nTaking the value of 1/50,000 as the margin of safety, we see then that with a good average print, 8 to 9 points are sufficient for safety; for a poor average print, 9 to 10 points are required;\nand for a poor print 11 points; and for a very poor print, not showing the form and centre, 15 or 16 points. For a very good print (approaching an ideal print), 7 to 8 points would suffice. (Roxburgh, 1933, p 212)\nRoxburgh essentially calculated minimum thresholds based on a quantitativequalitative examination.\n\nThe Cummins and Midlo Model (1943) (Cummins and Midlo, 1943, pp 147155). The model used by Dr. Harold Cummins and Dr. Charles Midlo is identical to the Wilder and Wentworth model, with the exception of a factor for pattern type. They reasoned that the probability of obtaining the most common fingerprint pattern (an ulnar loop) with similar ridge counts (based on 11 ridges) was 1/31. Thus, as an upper bound, this factor is multiplied with the probability of a minutiae arrangement.\n\nThe Amy Model (19461948) (Amy, 1946a, pp 8087;\n1946b, 188195; 1948, pp 96101). Lucien Amy developed a model that incorporated two essential factors of individuality: the number and position of minutiae and the type of minutiae. Amy first derived data for the type of minutiae from observing frequencies of occurrence in 100 fingerprints. All previous models either arbitrarily assigned frequencies or assumed equal frequencies. Amy used the Balthazard criteria of bifurcation to the left or right and ridge ending to the left or right, but found that these minutiae types were not uniformly distributed. From these distributions, Amy calculated a factor for minutiae type (including orientation). Amy then calculated the total number of possible minutiae arrangements, given a number of minutiae. He did so using a binomial distribution. This sort of probability distribution and modeling would be akin to calculating how many different ways you can arrange a certain number of cars in a parking lot with a fixed number of spaces, where each car would be parked in a space, but not all spaces filled, and finally, the lot itself having a fixed, given size.\n\nPopulation or\n(i)\n(ii)\nNumber in Class2\nIdeal\nGood Average\n101\n2\n3\n3\n3\n8\n102\n3\n3\n4\n4\n9\n103\n4\n4\n5\n6\n10\n104\n4/5\n5\n6\n7\n11\n105\n5\n6\n6/7\n8\n12\n106\n6\n7\n7/8\n9\n13\n107\n7\n8\n8\n10\n14\n108\n7\n8\n9\n11\n15/16\n109\n8\n9\n10\n12\n16/17\n1.6 x 109 (world)\n8\n9\n10/11\n12/13\n17\n1.6 x 1010 (finger unknown)\n9\n10\n11\n13\n18\n\n## Notes\n\n(1) Table 141 shows the number of points that are required for safety for five types of prints. The first four columns are based on decreasing levels of quality; the fifth column was obtained by using the lowest quality print and taking a margin of error of 1/50,000.\n\n(2) The figures are given in each case for the designation of the finger being known. If unknown, the class is multiplied by 10, and the number of points required is as for the next class below in the table.\n\n(Adapted from Roxburgh, 1933.)\nTo calculate the probability of duplicating a given minutiae arrangement, Amy multiplied these two factors (minutiae type and minutiae arrangements) together and added a correction factor for clusters of minutiae. Amy also calculated, based on his model, the chance of a false match. Amy showed that as the number of comparisons for a particular arrangement increased, so did the probability of finding a match and so did the chance of a false match. The chance of finding similar configurations in a billion people is much higher than when comparing against one or two individuals. Amy's observations follow directly from the concept that even the rarest of events have expectations of occurrence when the number of trials is very large. This is a critical concept, especially when the potential effects of large AFIS databases are considered, and the possible correlation to recent events (e.g., the\n\nCharacter of Print\n(iii)\n(v)\nPoor Average\n(iv)\nPoor\nWorst Case\n\nBrandon Mayfield incidentsection 14.3.3.4) must be considered (Stacey, 2004, pp 706718). Amy suggested that if a minutiae configuration is compared against one or two suspects and a match is declared, this is stronger evidence than if a minutiae configuration is compared against one billion individuals. Thus the strength of the match is decreased for a large number of comparisons and the likelihood of a false match is increased, or the criteria for a match must become more stringent when comparing against a large population to achieve the same level of reliability. However, Amy's position is that the truth of the conclusion depends both on the strength of the evidence (the match) and the size of the relevant population. With respect to a similar debate regarding DNA evidence and DNA database searches, Donnelly and Friedman treated the strength of the evidence (the rarity of a profile) and the strength of the identification decision (the chance the profile originated from the defendant) separately (Donnelly and Friedman, 1999, pp 19). According to them, a DNA match either comes from a single suspect provided by police investigation (what they referred to as a \"confirmation\" case) or the match comes from a large database search (what they referred to as a \"trawl\" case). In either case, the rarity of the profile does not decrease.5 However, the chance the profile originated from the defendant (and thus the strength of the prosecutor's case) would depend on whether the suspect was selected from a trawl case or confirmation case. From a statistical approach, the prior probabilities for the prosecutor's hypothesis (guilt) are drastically different in a confirmation case versus the trawl case. In the confirmation case, the police presumably had prior information through investigation to arrive at a particular suspect. The DNA match now adds significant weight to the case. In the \"trawl\" case, absent any other evidence to tie the suspect to the scene, the prosecutor's case is much weaker given only the DNA match produced from a large database, where there is a greater potential for a false match. The parallels to friction ridge examinations and AFIS databases are important to note, especially as the profession explores a probabilistic approach to friction ridge examinations.\n\nThe Trauring Model (1963) (Trauring, 1963, pp 938940).\n\nThe model by Mitchell Trauring was not a model for calculating fingerprint individuality per se, but rather for estimating the probability of a false match to an *individual* if searched in a proposed theoretical automated fingerprint identification system. The Trauring model is very similar in assumptions and calculations to the Balthazard model and was derived from the Galton model. However, instead of using the probability of 1/2 (0.50) for a minutia event, Trauring calculated the probability of a minutia event to be 0.1944. This value was based on his observations of minutiae density and his estimate of finding \"test\" minutiae in a quadrilateral region bounded by a set of \"reference\" minutiae.\n\nThe Kingston Model (1964) (Kingston, 1964; Stoney and Thornton, 1986a, pp 12041209). The model by Charles R. Kingston is similar in approach and complexity to the Amy model. Kingston calculated three critical probabilities for assessing fingerprint individuality: (1) observed number of minutiae for a region of a given size, (2) observed arrangements for the minutiae, and (3) observed minutiae type. Kingston's first factor, probability of observed number of minutiae, was calculated from observations of minutiae density from 100 fingerprints. Kingston found this distribution followed a statistical model known as a Poisson distribution. (Amy had used a binomial distribution, but under these conditions, the binomial distribution is approximately a Poisson distribution.) Thus for a fingerprint area of a specific size, Kingston could calculate the probability of finding x number of minutiae in this space.\n\nAlso similar to Amy and to the previous analogy of cars in a parking lot, Kingston calculated the number of positions and arrangements for a given number of minutiae. The analogy of the parking lot is even more apropos to Kingston's model, as Kingston's model was based on the assignment of the first minutia into a position, then the second minutia would occupy another position, and so forth. This is similar to cars queued up to park where, after the first car has parked, the second car must find another spot, and so forth. Kingston's final factor, the minutia type, was based on observed frequencies for almost 2,500 minutiae. Unlike the previous models, which assumed and estimated various distributions, or relied solely upon simple bifurcations and ridge endings, Kingston calculated relative frequencies for ridge endings, bifurcation, dots, enclosures, bridges, triradii, and \"other\" minutiae.\n\nThe Gupta Model (1968) (Gupta, 1968, pp 130134;\nStoney and Thornton, 1986a, p 1191). The model by S. R. Gupta is the last of the simple models based on the Henry model. Gupta made observations of minutiae position frequencies from 1,000 fingerprints. Unlike his predecessors, he was not examining the frequency (rarity) of a particular type of minutiae; rather, he examined how often a particular type of minutiae appeared in a specific position. Referring back to the parking lot analogy, it is akin to observing how often a Ford parks in a particular parking spot (versus a Chrysler, General Motors, or Toyota vehicle). He estimated that bifurcations and ridge endings generally appeared in a particular position with a frequency of 1/10, and less common features (e.g., dots, spurs) with a frequency of 1/100.\n\nGupta also included a factor for pattern type and ridge count for the pattern.\n\nThe Osterburg Model (19771980) (Osterburg et al., 1977, pp 772778; Sclove, 1979, pp 588595; 1980, 675695). The Osterburg model was proposed by Osterburg, Parthasarathy, Raghavan, and Sclove in 1977. The model was modified by additional work by Sclove in 1979 and 1980. The basic Osterburg method was to divide a fingerprint into square cells, with each cell possessing an area of 1 sq mm. Osterburg observed the relative frequencies of 13 different ridge events in all of these cells. These events included no event (an empty cell), ending ridge, bifurcation, island, dot, and so forth. He calculated the rarity of these events. Notably, he only used 39 fingerprints to do so. He then reasoned that the rarity of a fingerprint arrangement would be the product of all the individual minutiae frequencies and empty cells. Given a partial 72 sq mm fingerprint, if one has 12 ridge endings (each occupying 1 cell) and 60 empty cells, the probability of this event is (0.766)60 (0.0832)12 = 1.25 x 10-20, where 0.766 and 0.0832 are Osterburg's observed frequencies of an empty cell and a ridge ending, respectively. Finally, Osterburg corrected for the number of possible positions this grouping of minutiae can take. This factor was dependent on the size of this partial fingerprint physically fitting into all the fully rolled fingerprint blocks on a tenprint card. Again referring back to the parking lot analogy, it is similar to taking a row of cars and empty spaces from a lot and seeing how many ways you can physically fit that chunk into the entire parking lot. This approach is somewhat similar to Amy's. One of the largest problems with the Osterburg model is the assumption that each cell event is independent. For example, if a cell contains a minutia, it is unlikely that the surrounding eight cells will also contain minutiae. Minutiae generally do not all group together. Sclove recognized that the presence or absence of minutiae in a group of cells will influence the presence or absence of minutiae in neighboring cells. Sclove modified Osterburg's event frequencies to reflect this dependency.\n\nThe Stoney and Thornton Model (19851989). Chronologically to this point, knowledge of fingerprint individuality models in the fingerprint community was scarce. Stoney and Thornton, in part to satisfy a portion of Stoney's thesis requirement, critically reviewed all the previously mentioned models, noting each model's flaws and strengths (Stoney and Thornton, 1986a, pp 11871216). On the basis of their review, Stoney and Thornton then proposed a set of criteria that the ideal model would possess for calculating the individuality of a print, as well as determining the probabilistic strength of a match. Stoney and Thornton identified that the ideal model must include the following features:\n\n1)  Ridge structure and description of minutiae locations\n\nRidge counts must be considered for measuring\ndistances between features. For features on the same ridge, linear distances should be used, provided there are acceptable tolerances for distortion. (Though this author would suggest, when clarity is sufficiently high, one could count the intervening ridge units, which would not be subject to linear distance distortion.)\n2)  Description of minutia distribution\n\nMinutiae are not uniformly distributed across a fingerprint and can vary in density (as noted by Kingston) and conditional relationship (as noted by Sclove). An accurate distribution of minutiae for a specific region must be a property of the ideal model.\n3)  Orientation of minutiae\n\nWith the exception of the dot or very short ridge, minutiae possess an orientation along the ridge flow that must be considered.\n4)  Variation in minutiae types\n\nRelative frequencies for minutiae must be considered\nand the ideal model should have consideration for the absence of minutiae (similar to the Osterburg/Sclove model).\n5) Variation among prints from the same source\n\nThe ideal model should account for the flexibility of\nskin where some features (e.g., ridge flow and linear distances) would not be as robust as other features (e.g., minutiae location on a ridge and ridge counts between minutiae). Poor clarity, distortion, and variability within the source must all be considered.\n6) Number of orientations and comparisons\n\nThe number of ways to orient a fingerprint fragment can\nvary. For example, a delta could logically be oriented in three different ways. Also, on an individual with a loop pattern on each finger and toe, and several deltas in the palms and on the soles of the feet, a single delta formation could be compared nearly 60 different ways to one individual alone. The more orientations a print can assume will result in more comparisons that are possible. As Amy\nobserved, the more comparisons that are performed, the more opportunities that occur for a false match.\n\nThe model proposed by Stoney and Thornton was a study of minutiae pairs, within the ridge structure of the print. They performed statistical analyses on 2645 minutiae pairs from 412 fingerprints (all male distal tips of thumbs) (Stoney and Thornton, 1987, pp 11821203) and attempted to meet all of the ideal conditions that they had proposed. They were able to meet most of their conditions and developed a model for describing minutiae (Stoney and Thornton, 1986b, pp 12171234). In the Stoney and Thornton model, each pair of minutiae is described by the minutiae events (i.e., type of minutiae, orientation, intervening ridge count, and linear distance) and spatial position of the pair within the entire fingerprint pattern. The combination of all the minutiae pairs is a measure of individuality for that print. Thus Stoney and Thornton described a model that incorporated many of the essential components for determining the individuality of friction ridge arrangements.\n\nChampod and Margot Model (19951996) (Champod and Margot, 1996a, 1996b; Stoney, 2001, pp 373378). Until this point, all previous calculations and minutiae observations had been done by hand and involved small databases of fingerprints (Stoney and Thornton's model thus far used the largest database of 412 prints, albeit thumbtips). The Champod and Margot model was the first to utilize a computerized algorithm to process the fingerprint images. They used a database of 977 fingerprints composed of ulnar loops from the middle and index fingers and whorls from the middle finger. Champod and Margot, similar to Stoney and Thornton, first performed a systematic statistical description of the minutiae in the fingerprints. They calculated the minutiae density and distribution of minutiae for various regions in the print, the frequencies of the minutiae types, the orientation of the minutiae, and lengths of compound minutiae (e.g., short ridges, enclosures). Using their data, they then calculated probabilities for specific minutiae configurations and combinations. These probabilities indicate the probability of reoccurrence for a specific minutiae configuration and thus can be expressed as a measure of the strength of the match.\n\nThe Meagher, Budowle, and Ziesig Model (1999) (U.S. v *Mitchell,* July 8, 1999, pp 157198; July 9, 1999, pp\n29139). This model, often referred to as the \"50K versus 50K study\", was an experiment conducted by the FBI in conjunction with Lockheed Martin, Inc., in response to the first *Daubert* challenge in *U.S. v Byron Mitchell.* This study has not been published, but descriptions of the study and data are found within the documents and testimony provided by Stephen Meagher, Bruce Budowle, and Donald Ziesig in *Mitchell.*\nThe primary experiment conducted by Meagher and colleagues utilized AFIS computer algorithms to compare each of 50,000 fingerprint images (all left loops from white males) against itself6 and then the remaining 49,999 images in the database. The result of each comparison produced a score proportional to the degree of correlation between the two images. It is critical to note that all previous models possess calculations of individuality based on predicted minutiae arrangements; however, the scores in this model are a function of the AFIS algorithms and matcher logic. Presumably, the highest score would result when an image is compared against itself. All of the other 49,999 comparison scores were then normalized (to fit a standard normal curve) to the highest score. The top 500 scores for each print were then examined. From these data, Meagher et al. concluded that, on the basis of the highest normalized score (averaged from all 50,000 trials), the probability of two identical, fully rolled fingerprints is less than 1 x 10-97. Meagher and colleagues conducted a second experiment, identical to the first, with the exception that in these trials, \"simulated\" latent prints were used. These simulated latent prints were cropped images of the original, showing only the central 21.7% area of the original image. The value of 21.7% was used because it constituted the average area of a latent print from a survey, conducted by this group, of 300 actual latent prints. Each simulated latent print was searched against its parent image and the other 49,999 other images. The scores were calculated, ordered, and the top 500 scores examined.\nThe scores were stratified for minutiae counts in the simulated latent prints; the counts of minutiae in these simulated prints ranged from 4 to 18 minutiae. Meagher and colleagues calculated probabilities of a false match in this second experiment ranged from 1 x 10-27 (for 4 minutiae) to 1 x 10-97 (for 18 minutiae).\n\nThe Pankanti, Prabhakar, and Jain Model (2001)\n(Pankanti et al., 2001, pp 805812). The model proposed by Pankanti, Prabhakar, and Jain is more of an assessment for probabilities of false match rates in an AFIS model than an assessment for the individuality of a fingerprint. The model essentially calculates the number of possible arrangements of ridge endings and bifurcations, as seen from the view of an AFIS. However, an important new inclusion is the introduction of intraclass variation for a specific print (i.e., how much variance can be observed for a single fingerprint when several standards are taken from the same fingerprint). Pankanti and colleagues determined the tolerance for minutiae from a database of 450 mated pairs. These images were pairs of the same fingerprint taken at least one week apart. For each minutia, the corresponding minutia was located in the mate. The spatial differences were calculated for all the corresponding minutiae in the pairs and, on the basis of the best fit of their data, they calculated the theoretical tolerance for locating minutiae. It is important to note that their calculated metric for tolerance is a spatial one (with linear [x,y] and angular [] components), not a ridge-based one (as previously noted by Stoney as a critical component). Thus in this model, the computer would accept \"matching\" minutiae if they possessed a similar location in space (x,y, ) even if the ridge counts differed significantly from a fixed point. Using an electronic capture device, Pankanti and colleagues collected a total of 4 images from each of 4 fingers from 167 individuals, for a total of 668 fingerprint images, each in quadruplicate. They repeated this process for a second capture device. They created two databases, one for each of the two capture devices. Given that each fingerprint in the database had four images of the same finger, captured separately, Pankanti and colleagues measured the differences in the minutiae locations for each image to determine the acceptable tolerance based on natural variations for that finger. On the basis of these calculations, Pankanti and colleagues derived an expression to calculate the probability of a matching fingerprint pattern, given the specific size of a print and the number of minutiae available to match. They calculated that to match 36 minutiae out of an arrangement of 36 minutiae (similar to Galton's proposed 35 minutiae in an average print and including only ridge endings and bifurcations) the probability was 5.47 x 10-59. To match any 12 of these minutiae, given the same parameters, the probability was 6.10 x 10-8. (This, of course, implies that 24 of these minutiae do not match, and this would be unacceptable as a model for comparative analysis.) The group calculated the probability for matching all 12 minutiae, given only a 12 minutiae arrangement. This probability was 1.22 x 10-20. The group also calculated, using similar parameters and some basic assumptions, a table that was based on many of the previous models for the probability of matching 36 minutiae (considered by this model a full fingerprint) and 12 minutiae (12 on the basis of the \"12-point rule\", which some have attributed to Locard's tripartite rule). Amy's, Kingston's, and Champod's models were not included because these models were more complex than the other models and included variables not considered by this group (e.g., Kingston's inclusion of minutiae type). The author of this chapter chose to perform calculations for eight minutiae, given his personal experiences. The author has witnessed examiners in the United States effecting individualizations with eight minutiae and little to no thirdlevel detail. In effect, individualizations have been declared solely on an arrangement of eight minutiae, with minimal, if any, consideration for the frequency of the minutiae type, locale in the print (i.e., delta versus periphery), or complexity of the arrangement. The author calculated as a lower bound, on the basis of the equations provided by Pankanti and colleagues, probabilities for matching eight common minutiae from these models. Pankanti and colleagues' calculations, the author's additional calculations for eight minutiae using the Pankanti parameters, and select values for the remaining models not included by Pankanti and colleagues (i.e., Champod, Amy, Meagher, and Kingston) can all be found in Table 142 and the accompanying footnotes.\n\nSummary of Probability Models. There are two very important comments that must be made when one examines the previous proposed probability models for individuality. The first comment is that no matter which model is chosen (and among all the experts who have visited this topic, it is quite clear), one can fairly quickly reach staggeringly small probabilities that two individuals will share an arrangement of minutiae. All of these models demonstrate\n\nProbability of Matching a Specific Configuration of:\nAuthor and Year\n36 Minutiae\n12 Minutiae\n8 Minutiae\nGalton (1892)\n1.45 x 10-11\n9.54 x 10-7\n6.06 x 10-6\nHenry (1900)\n1.32 x 10-23\n3.72 x 10-9\n9.54 x 10-7\nBalthazard (1911)\n2.12 x 10-22\n5.96 x 10-8\n1.53 x 10-5\nBose (1917)\n2.12 x 10-22\n5.96 x 10-8\n1.53 x 10-5\nWilder and Wentworth (1918)\n 6.87 x 10-62\n4.10 x 10-21\n2.56 x 10-14\nPearson (1930)\n1.09 x 10-41\n8.65 x 10-17\n1.22 x 10-12\nRoxburgh (1933)\n3.75 x 10-47\n3.35 x 10-18\n2.24 x 10-14\nCummins and Midlo (1943)\n2.22 x 10-63\n1.32 x 10-22\n8.26 x 10-16\nTrauring (1963)\n2.47 x 10-26\n2.91 x 10-9\n2.04 x 10-6\nGupta (1968)\n1.00 x 10-38\n1.00 x 10-14\n1.00 x 10-10\nOsterburg et al. (19771980)\n1.33 x 10-27\n3.05 x 10-15\n3.50 x 10-13\nStoney and Thornton (19851989)\n1.20 x 10-80\n3.50 x 10-26\n7.50 x 10-17\nPankanti et al. (2001)a\n5.47 x 10-59\n1.22 x 10-20\n1.56 x 10-14\nAmy (19461948)b\n<<6.2 x 10-18\n3.4 x 10-14\n1.8 x 10-8\nKingston (1964)c\n3.90 x 10-97\n3.74 x 10-32\n1.97 x 10-20\nChampod (19951996)\nTwo configurations: 4 minutiae = 1 x 10-27\nMeagher et al. (1999)\n18 or more minutiae = 1 x 10-97 fully rolled print = 1 x 10-97\n\n## Notes\n\nUsing data and equations provided by Pankanti et al. (2001, pp 805812) and based on the previously listed models, additional calculations have been made to include all the models listed in this chapter and the probabilities for arrangements of eight minutiae. With the exception of Champod, these calculations were based on ridge ending and bifurcation arrangements only and do not include rarer ridge events. In addition, with the exception of Roxburgh's \"Quality Factor\", none of the models account for clarity or the presence of third-level detail.\n\na Eight-minutiae probability calculated using the parameters (M, m, n, q) equal to (57, 8, 8, 8). The value for M was arrived at by an estimate of A based on an exponential fit to the data, which included all tolerance adjustments, provided in the Pankanti calculations (Pankanti et al., 2001, pp 805812).\n\nConfiguration #1: five ridge endings and two bifurcations = a probability of 2.5 x 10-5 Configuration #2: three ridge endings, one enclosure, one spur, and one opposed bifurcation = a probability of 7.0 x 10-10\n\nthat fingerprint minutiae are highly discriminating features, and, generally, the more minutiae that are shared between impressions, the less likely it becomes to randomly observe these features elsewhere in the population. Although AFIS technology and access to larger databases of images make this possibility more likely, it is still a rare event. Exactly \"how rare\" is what must be fleshed out. The technology and databases currently exist to adequately estimate these events. The second comment is that these models have not been validated. The staggeringly low probabilities proposed by the models have not been tested in real-world, large databases. These probabilities may be accurate or they may grossly underestimate or overestimate the truth. It is simply an unknown at this time. The models have value and are important to the development of the discipline, of course. But the fundamental steps of testing, validation, and then refinement, followed by further testing and validationthe very fabric of scientific testing that was outlined at the beginning of this chapteris missing. Stoney has aptly noted (Stoney, 2001, p 383):7\nFrom a statistical viewpoint, the scientific foundation for fingerprint individuality is incredibly weak. Beginning with Galton and extending through Meagher et al., there have been a dozen or so statistical models proposed. These vary considerably in their complexity, but in general there has been much speculation and little data. Champod's work is perhaps the exception, bringing forth the first realistic means to predict frequencies of occurrence of specific combinations of ridge minutiae. None of the models has been subjected to testing, which is of course the basic element of the scientific approach. As our computer capabilities increase, we can expect that there will be the means to properly model and test hypotheses regarding the variability in fingerprints.\n\nIt is imperative that the field of fingerprint identification meets this challenge. Although the theory of biological formation certainly supports the notion of friction ridge skin individuality, it must be supported by further empirical testing. Statistical modeling is a crucial component to achieving this goal, and more research and study in this arena is needed.\n\nAll of the previous models dealt exclusively with minutiae configurations. With respect to sweat pore location, significant advances have occurred since Locard's time. Ashbaugh rekindled interest in pores with case examples of sweat pore use for individualization purposes (Ashbaugh, 1983, 1999). Ashbaugh described two methods for comparing pore location (Ashbaugh, 1999, pp 155157). Significant contributions to sweat pore modeling have been advanced by Roddy and Stosz (Stosz and Alyea, 1994; Roddy and Stosz, 1997, 1999). Most recently, Parsons and colleagues reported further enhancements to pore modeling (Parsons et al., 2008). They concluded that sweat pore analysis can be automated and provide a quantitative measure of the strength of the evidence.\n\n## 14.3.2 Persistence\n\n14.3.2.1 Persistence of First- and Second-Level\nDetail. Although Herschel and Faulds were two of the most prominent early pioneers investigating the persistency of friction ridge skin, it was Galton who provided the first actual data and study. Herschel and Faulds claimed to have examined hundreds, perhaps thousands, of prints to reach this conclusion. Herschel had been employing fingerprints for identifications for approximately 20 years and he had noticed no apparent changes in the ridge formations. Using a collection of inked prints provided by Herschel, Galton, on the other hand, conducted a very thorough investigation into every single minutiae present in the finger (and in some instances palmar) impressions from 15 individuals (Galton, 2005, pp 8999). The longest interval between subjects was 31 years; the shortest interval was\n9 years. Interestingly, Galton noted a single instance where a discrepancy existed (Galton, 2005, p 97). In this instance an inked impression taken from a young boy (age 2 1/2) was compared against an impression from the same finger when the boy was 15. In the earlier print, a bifurcation is visible that is not present in that region (that is, the ridge is continuous) in the later impression (Figure 141). Galton compared, in total, approximately 700 minutiae between these time intervals. He found only the one instance of a discrepancy. Misumi and Akiyoshi postulated that changes in the dermal substructure may have caused the anomaly observed by Galton (Misumi and Akiyoshi, 1984, p 53). They observed several changes with age in the dermal substructure (e.g., papillae proliferation and changes in adhesive forces between the epidermis and dermis) that may affect the appearance of the epidermal ridges and furrows.\n\nWilder and Wentworth (1932, pp 126131) performed a similar study on the minutiae of one subject, taking prints in approximately 2-year intervals from a young girl starting at 4 years and 11 months old until she was 14 years and 6 months old. Amongst these six time periods of collection, no change was observed in the minutiae of the subject. However, Wilder and Wentworth did note a proliferation of visible incipient ridges as the subject aged. This phenomenon has been observed and explored elsewhere (Stucker et al., 2001, 857861). Other instances where impressions have been examined for persistence after extended intervals have been noted in the literature. Herschel made successive impressions of his own fingerprints, starting at age 26, and throughout his life until age 83 (57 years in total) (Cummins and Midlo, 1943, p 40). No changes in minutiae were observed. Welcker (Cummins and Midlo, 1943, pp 4041) made impressions of his fingers and palms at age 34 and then again later at age 75 (a 41-year interval). Another case is reported by Jennings (Cummins and Midlo, 1943, p 41) of palmprint impressions compared 50 years apart (taken at age 27 and then again at age 77). Finally, Galton continued to investigate the persistency of skin, increasing the number of individuals he compared to 25, with the longest time span\nbeing 37 years between prints (Wilder and Wentworth, 1932, p 128). With the exception of Galton's single instance, no other investigator reported any changes in minutiae.\n\n14.3.2.2 Persistence of Third-Level Detail and Creases.\n\nWith respect to pores, Locard (1913, pp 530535) noted that the relative positions of the pores remain unchanged throughout life. Meagher, in a *Daubert* hearing, provided images of a latent print and an inked print, said to be from the same donor with an interval of 10 years (Figure 142). The images of the prints contained only two minutiae, but an extraordinary amount of clarity, clearly showing edges and pores. The third-level detail remained unchanged in that 10-year span. However, the example provided by Meagher is anecdotal. The current literature lacks a comprehensive study demonstrating the persistence of third-level detail. More specifically, what is missing for latent print examiners is a comprehensive study, over a long period of time, demonstrating the persistence of third-level detail in impressions captured from the friction ridge skin. Persistency of palmar flexion creases was observed by Herschel (Ashbaugh, 1999, p 190). Ashbaugh compared\n50 sets of palmprints taken from subjects at two different times, ranging from intervals of 1 to 60 months (Ashbaugh, 1999, p 189). Ashbaugh found that the flexion creases were in agreement, but noted some variation in appearance or prominence due to age, flexibility of skin, or other typical factors. Similarly, Evin and Luff (Ashbaugh, 1999, pp 193194; Luff, 1993, p 3) reported persistency of palmar flexion creases after performing 600 comparisons (from roughly 100 individuals) with significant times between sample collection.\n\n## 14.3.2.3 Theory Supporting Persistency Of Friction Ridge Skin. The Biological Mechanisms For Maintaining Friction Ridge Skin Persistency Lie Directly In The Regenerating Layer Of Skin Found At The Interface Of The Dermis And\n\nepidermis. This layer is known as the basal layer or stratum basale (germinativum). The persistency of the friction ridge skin is maintained by the basal layer and the connective relationship of these cells through desmosomes and hemidesmosomes. Wertheim and Maceo have reviewed and presented supporting pertinent medical research in this area (Wertheim and Maceo, 2002, pp 3585; see Chapters 2 and 3).\n\n## 14.3.3 Comparison Methodology\n\n14.3.3.1 Overview of Comparison Methodologies. With respect to a *Daubert* challenge, at issue for admissibility of the evidence is whether the scientific principles or methodology upon which the conclusions are based are reliable. The previous sections have demonstrated core research supporting the basic principles of friction ridge skin science (i.e., uniqueness and persistence). The second half of this\n\nExhibits 5-14 and 5-15\nfrom U.S. v Mitchell,\nDaubert Hearing, July 8,\n1999, testimony of Stephen\nMeagher. The image on the\ntop is a perspiration print\nleft on glass in 1982. The\nimage on the bottom is an\ninked impression on paper\nfrom the same donor taken\nin 1992.\n\nequation is the comparison methodology employed to\ncompare two images, usually a latent print and a known\nexemplar.\n\nIt must first be noted that although ACE-V methodol-\nogy is the generally accepted methodology in the United\nStates (SWGFAST, 2002, p 2), Canada, Australia, and New\nZealand, ACE-V methodology is not the only methodology\navailable. For example, many European countries subscribe\nto the \"Method for Fingerprint Identification\" as described\nby the Interpol European Expert Group on Fingerprint Iden-\ntification (IEEGFI) (IEEGFI-II, 2004). Although this methodol-\nogy is very similar in most aspects to ACE-V methodology,\nit has some notable differences.8 Additionally, probabilistic\nmethodologies have been suggested by some authors\n(Locard, Stoney, Evett and Williams, Champod), but pres-\nently, this approach has been generally rejected as a viable\nmethodology worldwide by examiners and professional\nbodies representing examiners (SWGFAST, 2002, p 4;\n\nIEEGFI-II, 2004; Ashbaugh, 1999, p 147;9 IAI, 1979, p 1).\n\nIn fact, the penalty for using a probabilistic approach is so harsh that an expert found to give opinions of \"probable, possible, or likely individualization\" can be decertified and denied continued membership in the IAI (IAI, 1979, p 1). Academically speaking and from a perspective of evolving paradigm shifts in forensic science, exploring the viability of probabilistic evidence may have its benefits. Such efforts should not be summarily dismissed by the profession, because these methods may produce tools to aid or enhance current practices.\n\n14.3.3.2 Research Pertaining to Fingerprint Comparison Methodology. Presently, there are few studies in the literature directly pertaining to the testing and validation of fingerprint comparison methodology. In fact, such works cannot be found prior to the 1993 *Daubert* decision.\n\nOsterburg (1964). Osterburg conducted the first published survey of latent print examiner practices (Osterburg, 1964, pp 413427). He sent surveys to 180 agencies throughout all 50 states. He received responses from 82 (46%). The surveys asked experts to subjectively rank the relative frequency of 10 types of minutiae characteristics (ending ridges, trifurcations, spurs, islands, etc.) based solely on the expert's training, experience, and personal recollection. Osterburg tabulated the ranked features. He also conducted a literature search to determine the minimum number of minutiae (points) needed to effect a positive identification (individualization). At the time, he found that individuals and agencies used between 6 and 18 minutiae to reach an individualization; the mean response was 12. He found that when experts were willing to reach an opinion below\n12 minutiae, it was because they had \"unusual characteristics\". His study was an attempt to determine what an expert meant by \"unusual\".  Years later, Osterburg and colleagues (1977) empirically measured the frequency of these features. The empirical counts of these features were very similar to the experts' intuitive assessment of rarity.\n\nEvett and Williams (1996). The first actual study of fingerprint comparison methodology was performed by Evett and Williams (1996, pp 4973). Their research, though conducted in 19881989, was not published until 1996, although it was presented at an international symposium in Ne'urim, Israel (Grieve, 1995, p 579). Their work predated the widespread knowledge, articulation, and general\nacceptance of ACE-V methodology among examiners. Evett and Williams investigated the basis for the 16-point threshold in place at the time in England and Wales. In their study, 10 sets of comparisons were provided to and returned by 130 experts from various bureaus in England and Wales. In addition, the researchers visited bureaus in the United States, Canada, Holland, France, and Germany. They provided experts in these countries with sets of comparisons as well, but did not include these results. They only reported the United Kingdom data, while giving the international results general commentary. The results of the United Kingdom data showed a surprisingly high level of variation among experts (Figure 143), not only in the reported number of corresponding minutiae that the expert saw, but also in whether the experts found sufficient agreement to determine an individualization. It is interesting to note that no expert reported an erroneous individualization. However, in one trial with two impressions that did originate from the same source, 8% of the United Kingdom experts erroneously excluded the images from having originated from the same source. Evett and Williams also found no statistical evidence that the number of individualizations reported by the United Kingdom experts was related to the years of experience of the examiner. As a result of their research, the authors, while recommending standardization for training, certification testing, regular proficiency testing, regular audits of case files, and external blind proficiency testing, unequivocally stated that there is no need for a national predetermined numerical point standard if it can be demonstrated that each expert is operating above a minimum level of competence.\n\nGuidelines for individualization may be desirable, but these should be general recommendations and the expert should be allowed the freedom to exercise his/her own professional skills. In these circumstances, a rigid numerical point count is not only unnecessary, it is irrelevant. (Evett and Williams, 1996, p 72).\n\n14.3.3.3 Error Rate Studies. With respect to the methodology, another testable *Daubert* factor is the known or potential rate of error (*Daubert,* 1993). In estimating latent print examiner error rates, some critics (Cole, 2005, pp 9851078; Saks and Koehler, 2005, pp 892895) have looked to performances of standardized latent print examiner proficiency tests administered through the external testing agency Collaborative Testing Services. Saks and Cole have also looked to anecdotal occurrences in case studies as indicators of a larger-than-reported error rate (Cole, 2005, pp 9961034; Saks, 2005). Understandably, in the absence of any data produced from within the profession, they had little else to examine. In an attempt to address the error rate issue, and thus provide the profession, the courts, and critics a better estimate of error than those previously available, Langenburg, Wertheim, and Moenssens conducted a twostage error rate study (Langenburg et al., 2006, pp 5592). During the first stage of the study, the researchers evaluated the comparison results of participants in a training course in which the participants compared friction ridge skin impressions (latent prints versus known exemplars). In the approximately 6000 comparisons performed by nearly 100 experts (as defined by the study, these experts possessed over one year of experience in comparing latent prints), the researchers found a total of 61 errors made at the highest level of confidence: 2 erroneous individualizations and 59 clerical errors. Although 59 errors were deemed clerical errors, 2 of these clerical errors wrongly associated the incorrect individual with the evidence; the other 57 were to the correct individual but listed the wrong finger or palm. Criteria were provided in the study for the determination of a clerical error versus an erroneous individualization. In the second stage of this study, 16 experts were asked to independently verify the results of a previous examiner. Each\n\nOne graph (re-created) from the\nEvett and Williams (1996) study,\ndepicting comparison of images\nmarked \"B\". In reporting the\nnumber of minutiae found in\nagreement between the latent\nprint and the known exemplar,\nrespondents showed great\nvariability. Most notable was\nthe absence of any respondents\nreporting \"15\", which was one\nshy of the 16-point threshold\nto declare a positive match (for\ncourt) in the United Kingdom.\n\nparticipant was provided with a packet that contained 10\ncomparisons and the stated results of a previous examiner.\nEight of the individualizations for the verifier were accurate.\nTwo of the results were errors and included one of the two\nerroneous individualizations from the previous stage. The\nother error would have been a clerical error or a second\nerroneous individualization, depending on which pack the\nparticipant randomly received. The verifier was not alerted\nthat errors would be present in the verification packet. No\nexpert verified any of the errors presented to them in this\nstudy. The study listed numerous limitations, most notably\nthe absence of nonmatches (thus false negatives were\nnot studied) and the fact that the experiments were not\nconducted under \"casework\" conditions.\n\nFinally, it is important to note the empirical observations of\nforensic practitioners worldwide. Although these data can-\nnot be readily seen in the literature, one must take into ac-\ncount the collective experiences of the tens of thousands\nof latent print examiners from around the globe during\nthe last 100 years who have witnessed repeated success,\napplication, and accuracy of the methodology during the\ntraining of new examiners, administration of internal com-\npetency tests, and other training tools (where the answers\nare known beforehand by the test administrator). Were the\ncomparison methodology not very accurate, it would be\ncommonplace to see errors frequently during the testing\nand measuring of examiner competency. This simply is\nnot the case and has not been the author's experience in\nspeaking with trainers here in the U.S. and abroad.\n\nAlthough these empirical observations should not be dismissed, there are counterarguments to the weight of their support. The pros and cons of using proficiency testing data have been explored elsewhere (Saks and Koehler, 2005, pp 892895; Langenburg et al., 2006; Cole, 2006b, pp 39105; Gutowski, 2006). It has been argued that without the ground truth established for the comparison, anything else does not constitute a fair assessment of reliability (Cole, 2006a, pp 109135). And even with the ground truth established in training exercises, without a standardized and validated model for comparison, the meaning of such results is questionable. For example, let us assume 10 experts all correctly individualize 10 latent prints to the correct 10 sources, for a grand total of 100 correct results and 0 errors. Presumably, these individualizations would exclude all other sources on the planet. The counterargument is that although these 100 conclusions were correct with respect to the ground truth, the relevant question becomes, Were there sufficiently discriminating features in agreement, and no observed differences, to actually exclude the world's population as the source of the latent prints? In other words, agreement among examiners is not necessarily de facto proof to support the strength of the evidence and the conclusion thus rendered. 14.3.3.4 Studies of Bias During Comparisons. A rising concern in the literature (Saks et al., 2003, pp 7790; Steele, 2004, pp 213240; Haber and Haber, 2004, pp 339360), and in light of the Mayfield case (Stacey, 2004, pp 706718), is the issue of whether biases affect the judgments and conclusions of forensic experts and specifically the judgments of the more subjective forensic comparative disciplines (i.e., handwriting, fingerprints, firearms examinations). Although there are many types of bias (e.g., culture, confirmation), some researchers are currently studying contextual information bias with respect to fingerprint examination. The first study produced by Dror, Peron, Hind, and Charlton (2005, pp 799809) found strong evidence that contextual information influenced the decision-making processes of nonexperts who participated in the study. Twenty-seven nonexperts (college student volunteers) were provided pairs of images (a latent print and a known exemplar) and asked whether the pair was a match. In addition to the images, the participants were exposed to varying levels of stimuli and contextual information. Dror and colleagues (2005) found that contextual information biased judgments when the matches were more ambiguous (i.e., had a lower quantity and quality of ridge detail or were look-alikes).\n\nThey found that when the images were disparate in appearance and clear in detail, contextual information did not influence the participants. The group postulated that either fingerprint experts may be more resistant to these influences because of training and expertise or fingerprint experts may actually be more susceptible to these influences because of overconfidence and rationalization of differences. A second study by Dror, Charton, and Peron (2006, pp 7478) involved testing contextual information bias on five experts. For the study, the researchers selected five experts who were aware of the FBI's erroneous individualization in the Madrid Train Bombing case, but had not seen the actual images from the case. The experts were told that these images were from the Madrid Train Bombing case and had been incorrectly individualized by the FBI to Brandon Mayfield (Stacey, 2004, pp 706718). The experts were asked whether they thought it was a valid match or was erroneous. However, the experts were not provided with images from the Mayfield case; rather, they were each provided with a pair of prints which that expert had personally individualized in casework 5 years prior to the study. Thus each expert was re-examining his own evidence. When provided with these images under the false contextual information, three of the five experts reversed their original opinions and stated the pair was not a match (exclusion), one expert changed his original opinion of a positive match to \"inconclusive\", and the final expert did not change his opinion but maintained a positive match, in spite of the strong contextual information. A number of concerns regarding the limitations of the study have been raised and discussed online (www.clpex.com), but the study suggests that experts are not immune to contextual information bias. In the most recent study, Dror and colleagues (2006, pp 7478) utilized a similar study design to the Madrid Train Bombing context-bias experiment. Six experts were presented their own previous work, but under less extreme circumstances of context bias than the previous study by Dror and colleagues (2005). Eight comparisons, on which the expert had previously provided conclusions several years prior to the study, were presented to each expert. Thus, there were 48 trials for the 6 experts. Twenty-four trials had no context bias and were control trials, 12 trials represented \"easy\" comparisons under routine bias, and 12 trials represented \"difficult\" comparisons under routine bias (see Table 143). Routine bias was represented by context bias that might be experienced by an expert in daily routine\n\n| 1           | 2           | 3             | 4             | 5          | 6          | 7          | 8          |\n|-------------|-------------|---------------|---------------|------------|------------|------------|------------|\n| individual- | individual- | individual-   | individual-   |            |            |            |            |\n| Past        |             |               |               |            |            |            |            |\n| Decision    |             |               |               |            |            |            |            |\n| ization     | ization     | ization       | ization       |            |            |            |            |\n| exclusion   | exclusion   | exclusion     | exclusion     |            |            |            |            |\n| Level of    |             |               |               |            |            |            |            |\n| Difficulty  |             |               |               |            |            |            |            |\n| difficult   | difficult   | not difficult | not difficult | difficult  | difficult  |            |            |\n| not         |             |               |               |            |            |            |            |\n| Contextual  |             |               |               |            |            |            |            |\n| Information |             |               |               |            |            |            |            |\n| none        |             |               |               |            |            |            |            |\n| suggest     |             |               |               |            |            |            |            |\n| exclusion   |             |               |               |            |            |            |            |\n| none        |             |               |               |            |            |            |            |\n| suggest     |             |               |               |            |            |            |            |\n| exclusion   |             |               |               |            |            |            |            |\n| none        |             |               |               |            |            |            |            |\n| Expert A    |             |               |               |            |            |            |            |\n| consistent  | consistent  | consistent    | consistent    | consistent | consistent | consistent | consistent |\n| Expert B    |             |               |               |            |            |            |            |\n| change to   |             |               |               |            |            |            |            |\n| exclusion   |             |               |               |            |            |            |            |\n| consistent  | consistent  | consistent    | consistent    | consistent | consistent | consistent |            |\n| Expert C    |             |               |               |            |            |            |            |\n| consistent  |             |               |               |            |            |            |            |\n| change to   |             |               |               |            |            |            |            |\n| exclusion   |             |               |               |            |            |            |            |\n| consistent  | consistent  | consistent    | consistent    | consistent | consistent |            |            |\n| Expert D    |             |               |               |            |            |            |            |\n| consistent  |             |               |               |            |            |            |            |\n| change to   |             |               |               |            |            |            |            |\n| exclusion   |             |               |               |            |            |            |            |\n| consistent  |             |               |               |            |            |            |            |\n| change to   |             |               |               |            |            |            |            |\n| exclusion   |             |               |               |            |            |            |            |\n| change      |             |               |               |            |            |            |            |\n| Expert E    |             |               |               |            |            |            |            |\n| consistent  |             |               |               |            |            |            |            |\n| to cannot   |             |               |               |            |            |            |            |\n| consistent  | consistent  | consistent    | consistent    | consistent | consistent |            |            |\n| decide      |             |               |               |            |            |            |            |\n| Expert F    |             |               |               |            |            |            |            |\n| consistent  | consistent  | consistent    | consistent    | consistent | consistent | consistent | consistent |\n\n## Note\n\nSix experts were presented with eight comparisons on which they had previously rendered opinions. During the re-presentation, the comparisons were presented with context bias one might encounter in daily casework (knowledge of suspect confession, suspect criminal history, etc.).\n\n(Reprinted from Dror et al., 2006, p 610.)\ncasework (a police officer's assertion of the suspect's guilt, knowledge of a confession, etc.). In the 48 trials, 6 trials resulted in responses that were not consistent with the original result provided by the expert. It is further interesting to note, of the six inconsistent results, two were in control trials (i.e., no context bias was provided). Dror and colleagues suggested two possible explanations for these inconsistencies in the control trials. The first possibility is that the experiment may not have been without bias even in the control conditions or, at a minimum, the conditions during the re-evaluation were not identical to the conditions under which the original decision was made. The second possibility is that there is less-than-ideal and less-thanexpected reproducibility of expert results, even \"within sample\". In other words, the decision of an expert, when presented with the same evidence in multiple trials over time, may not be reproducible, and the expert is producing\n\ndifficult\nnot difficult\nsuggest\nindividualnone\nsuggest\nindividualization\nization\nconsistent\nconsistent\nconsistent\nchange to\nindividualization\n\nconflicting, inconsistent results. Dror and colleagues suggested further study of this phenomenon. With respect to the remaining four out of six trials of inconsistent responses, Dror and colleagues attributed these inconsistencies to the context bias in the trials, noting that three out of four inconsistencies reflected the bias prompt. However, as with the previous Madrid context-bias experiment, little to no information was provided about the experts or the presentation of the images to the experts, nor are the images available for review. In contrast to the effect Dror and colleagues observed with respect to the *evaluation* of a latent print and an exemplar\n(i.e., the decision resulting in an individualization, exclusion, or inconclusive opinion), Schiffer and Champod (2007)\nreported no effect due to context bias in the *analysis* phase.\n\nSchiffer and Champod provided forensic science students at the University of Lausanne, Switzerland, with images of latent prints prior to the students' formal instruction series. Two experiments were conducted. The first experiment provided 39 students with 12 images of latent prints. The students were asked to annotate the minutiae in the images using a standard guideline. Upon completion of an intensive fingerprint instruction course, 29 of these students were provided with the same images to annotate again. Schiffer and Champod found a statistically significant increase in the number of minutiae reported and a decrease in the variation among student responses. Additionally, the number of reported instances declaring the print \"exploitable\" (i.e., \"of value\") and \"identifiable\" significantly increased after the training period. In the second study, 11 images of latent prints were provided to 2 groups of students (48 total students) after the fingerprint instruction course. The images were presented to the students under various context bias circumstances: no bias, presence of a matching exemplar, low-profile property crime case, high-profile terrorist case, and so forth. Students were asked to annotate the images and report the value of each print. Schiffer and Champod reported no difference for any of the factors examined between the two groups. They argued that not all stages of the ACE-V process are similarly vulnerable to bias, and their results supported the robustness of the analysis phase.\n\n## 14.4 Future Directions For Research Related To Friction Ridge Examination 14.4.1 United States Government-Sponsored Research Available For Accepted Grant Applicants\n\nAlthough some professional bodies (e.g., the Robert L. Johnson Foundation, created by the IAI) offer small stipends for research, these funds are generally not sufficient to conduct a large-scale study (e.g., a validation study) or a complicated study (e.g., the development of a quantitative model for measuring distortion), which would undoubtedly involve multiple experts and statisticians, a large computerized database, and software and hardware appropriate to the tests. Government agencies or academic institutions must properly fund this research. One agency which has supported open proposals for large-scale friction ridge research is the National Institute of Justice (NIJ). NIJ issued solicitations for Research and Development on Impression Evidence in 2009 and for Research and Development on Pattern and Impression Evidence in 2010. Both solicitations yielded a number of responsive friction ridge analysis project proposals, and multiple grant awards were made for both years (information is available at www.ojp.usdoj.gov/\nnij/awards/welcome.htm).\n\n## 14.4.2 Recommended Topics For Research\n\nThe Scientific Working Group for Friction Ridge Analysis, Study, and Technology (SWGFAST) has posted on its Web site (www.swgfast.org) a list of recommended areas for study and research. Another source for recommended research was provided by Budowle, Buscaglia, and Perlman (2006). Some of their notable \"high-priority\" recommendations include:\n\n- Develop guidelines for describing the quality of ridge\nfeatures in an image.\n- Develop guidelines for sufficiency in declaring a positive\nmatch.\n- Determine the minimum number of features (if any) that\nare needed pragmatically for an examiner to declare a positive match in casework.\n\n- Rigorous testing (validation) of the ACE-V methodology\nas applied by experts.\n- Testing for persistence of third-level features.\nMany of their suggestions should be strongly considered by serious researchers, because the results of the work could be extremely beneficial and enlightening to the friction ridge identification discipline. Another major area that needs to be addressed is an objective understanding of distortion and the development of an acceptable metric for tolerance. It was clear from statements made by the investigating bodies in the Brandon Mayfield case (Office of the Inspector General, 2006, pp 610) that the examiners had discounted dissimilarities between the latent print and Mayfield's exemplar. However, a posteriori, it was determined that the dissimilarities were outside of acceptable tolerance and an exclusion should have been the correct conclusion. Determining acceptable ranges of tolerances, or determining an appropriate weighting scheme for a feature based on the feature's departure from \"normality\" due to distortion, would be critical updates to any comparison methodology.\n\nFinally, as previously discussed and highlighted by Stoney (see page 1415), the development of a more complete probability model for fingerprint individuality is needed. The development of this model must be followed up by empirical testing of the model with real-world samples and large databases.\n\n## 14.5 Conclusions\n\nIn a post-*Daubert* environment, there is a need for additional research in the field of friction ridge science. Certainly, any science wishes to expand the depth and breadth of knowledge of the discipline. We in the fingerprint expert community must attempt to challenge and study further the laws and theories that comprise our discipline. Specifically, we must focus our efforts to reevaluate the basic tenets of individualizing friction ridges using modern and enhanced technologies that were not available in Galton's day. There are many unanswered or partially answered questions regarding the individuality of friction ridge skin and the forensic comparison of friction ridge impressions. Although significant advances have been made, many of them in just the last two decades, this is really only the tip of the iceberg. With the advent of newer, more powerful technologies, software, and computer algorithms, we have opportunities to explore our vast fingerprint databases and quickly growing palmprint databases. We need to assess and quantify the full extent of variation of friction ridge features, starting with perhaps the most basic (patterns and minutiaeif one can truly call this \"basic\") and then attempt to assess and quantify other features such as creases, scars, edge shapes, and so forth.\n\nIt should be clear that there are aspects of this discipline that have been well-established and well-studied (particularly the biological theory of friction ridge formation and persistency). However, it should also be clear that there are areas of study that are woefully lacking (e.g., distortion, tolerance). The absence of available published research into some aspects of the discipline speaks volumes about what our mission should be.\n\n## 14.6 Reviewers\n\nThe reviewers critiquing this chapter were Leonard G. Butt, Christophe Champod, Deborah Friedman, Robert J. Garrett, Andre A. Moenssens, Michael Perkins, Jon T. Stimac, Michele Triplett, John R. Vanderkolk, and James L. Wayman.\n\n## 14.7 References\n\nAmy, L. Valeur de la preuve en dactyloscopie. Journal de la Societe de Statistique de Paris 1946a, 88, 8087. Amy, L. Valeur de la preuve en dactyloscopie II. Journal de la Societe de Statistique de Paris 1946b, 88, 188195.\n\nAmy, L. Recherches sur l'identification des traces papillaires. *Societe de Medecine Legale* 1948, 28 (2), 96101. Ashbaugh, D. R. Poroscopy. Royal Canadian Mounted Police Gazette 1983, 45, 1217. Ashbaugh, D. R. QuantitativeQualitative Friction Ridge Analysis: An Introduction to Basic and Advanced Ridgeology; CRC Press: Boca Raton, FL, 1999.\n\nBabler, W. J. Prenatal Selection and Dermatoglyphic Patterns. *Am. J. Phys. Anthropol.* 1978, 48 (1), 2128.\n\nBabler, W. J. Prenatal Communalities in Epidermal Ridge Development. In Trends in Dermatoglyphic Research;\nDurham, N., Plato, C., Eds.; Kluwer Academic Press: Dordrecht, Netherlands, 1990; pp 5468. Babler, W. J. Embryologic Development of Epidermal Ridges and Their Configurations. In Dermatoglyphics: Science in Transition; Plato, C., Garruto, R., Shaumann, B., Eds.; March of Dimes: New York, 1991; pp 95112.\n\nBalthazard, V. De l'identification par les empreintes digitales. *Comptes Rendus, des Academies des Sciences* 1911, *152,* 18621864.\n\nBudowle, B.; Buscaglia, J.; Perlman, R. Review of the Scientific Basis for Friction Ridge Comparisons as a Means of Identification: Committee Findings and Recommendations.\n\nForensic Sci. Communic. 2006, 8 (1).\n\nCarroll, J. W. Laws of Nature; 2003; plato.stanford.edu/ archives/fall2003/entries/laws-of-nature/ (accessed June 30, 2009). Chacko, L. W.; Vaidya, M. C. The Dermal Papillae and Ridge\nPatterns in Human Volar Skin. *ACTA Anatomica (Basel)* 1968, 70 (1), 99108.\n1999, 97 (4), 931984.\n\nChampod, C. Edmond LocardNumerical Standards and\n\"Probable\" Identifications. *J. Forensic Ident.* 1995, 45 (2),\n136163.\n\nDror, I. E.; Peron, A. E.; Hind, S.; Charlton, D. When Emotions Get the Better of Us: The Effect of Contextual Top-\nDown Processing on Matching Fingerprints. Appl. Cognitive Psych. 2005, 19 (6), 799809.\n\nChampod, C.; Margot, P. Analysis of Minutiae Occurrences on FingerprintsThe Search for Non-Combined Minutiae.\n\nIn Proceedings of the 14th Meeting of the International Association of Forensic Sciences, Tokyo, Japan, 1996a.\n\nDror, I. E.; Charlton, D.; Peron, A. E. Contextual Information Renders Experts Vulnerable to Making Erroneous Identifications. *Forensic Sci. Int.* 2006, 156 (1), 7478.\n\nEaton, J. Fingerprints are Still Unique: A Pilot AFIS Study. Presented at the International Association for Identification Conference, Dallas, TX, August 11, 2005.\n\nChampod, C.; Margot, P. Computer Assisted Analysis of Minutiae Occurrences on Fingerprints. In Proceedings of the International Symposium on Fingerprint Detection and Identification. Almog, J., Springer, E., Eds.; Israel National Police: Jerusalem, 1996b; pp 305318.\n\nEaton, J. King County Sheriff's Office. Seattle, WA: Personal communication, 2006.\n\nChampod, C.; Lennard, C.; Margot, P.; Stoilovic, M. Fingerprints and Other Ridge Skin Impressions; CRC Press: Boca Raton, FL, 2004.\n\nEvett, I.; Williams, R. L. A Review of the Sixteen Points Fingerprint Standard in England and Wales. *J. Forensic Ident.* 1996, 46 (1), 4973.\n\nChatterjee, S. K. Edgeoscopy. *Finger Print Ident. Mag.* 1962, 44 (3).\n\nFaulds, H. On the SkinFurrows of the Hand. *Nature* 1880, 22, 605.\n\nCole, S. A. More than Zero: Accounting for Error in Latent Print Identification. *J. Crim. L. and Criminol.* 2005, 95 (3),\n9851078.\n\nFaulds, H. Finger Prints: A Chapter in the History of Their Use for Personal Identification. *Sci. Am. Suppl.* 1911, *1872,*\n326327.\n\nCole, S. A. Is Fingerprint Identification Valid? Rhetorics of Reliability in Fingerprint Proponents' Discourse. Law and Policy 2006a, 28 (1), 109135.\n\nFaulds, H. *Dactylography or the Study of Finger-Prints;*\nMilner and Company: Halifax, 1912.\n\nCole, S. A. The Prevalence and Potential Causes of Wrongful Conviction by Fingerprint Evidence. Golden Gate Univ. L. Rev. 2006b, 37 (1), 39105.\n\nFrishberg, D.; Yohe, T. I'm Just a Bill (Song lyrics); Schoolhouse Rock, American Broadcasting Company: 1975.\n\nGalton, F. *Finger Prints;* Dover: Mineola, NY,  2005.\n\nCollaborative Testing Services. Latent Print Examination Report # 9508; Collaborative Testing Services, Inc.: Herndon, VA, 1996.\n\nGrieve, D. L. Symposium Report Israel National Police: International Symposium on Fingerprint Detection and Identification. *J. Forensic Ident.* 1995, 45 (5), 578584.\n\nCummins, H. Dermatoglyphics: Significant Patternings of the Body Surface. *Yale J. Bio. Med.* 2000, 73 (16), 7990.\n\nGrieve, D. L. Possession of Truth. *J. Forensic Ident.* 1996, 46 (5), 521528.\n\nCummins, H.; Midlo, C. Finger Prints, Palms and Soles: An Introduction to Dermatoglyphics; Dover: New York, 1943.\n\nGupta, S. R. Statistical Survey of Ridge Characteristics. Int. Crim. Police Rev. 1968, 218 (130), 130134.\n\nCummins, H.; Waits, W. J.; McQuitty, J. T. The Breadth of Epidermal Ridges on the Fingertips and Palms: A Study of\nVariation. *Am. J. Anat.* 1941, 68, 127150.\nGutowski, S. Error Rates in Fingerprint Examination: The View in 2006. *Forensic Bulletin* 2006, *Autumn,* 1819.\n\nDaubert v *Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.* 509 U.S.\n\n579,1993. Donnelly, P.; Friedman, R. DNA Database Searches and the Legal Consumption of Scientific Evidence. *Mich. L. Rev.*\nHaber, R.; Haber, L. Error Rates for Human Latent Fingerprint Examiners. In Automatic Fingerprint Recognition Systems; Ratha, N., Bolle, R., Eds.; Springer Verlag: New York, 2004; pp 339360.\n\nHale, A. Morphogenesis of Volar Skin in the Human Fetus.\n\nAm. J. Anat. 1952, 91 (1), 147173.\n\nLocard, E. La preuve judiciaire par les empreintes digitales.\n\nArchives d'anthropologie criminelle, de medicine legale et de psychologie normale et pathologique 1914, 29 (145),\n321348.\n\nHempel, C.; Oppenheim, P. Studies in the Logic of Explanation. *Philos.Sci.* 1948, 15 (2), 135175.\n\nLuff, K. Letter to Fingerprint Society. *Fingerprint Whorld* 1993, 19 (71), 3.\n\nHenry, E. R. *Classification and Uses of Fingerprints;* 1st ed.; Routledge & Sons: London, 1900.\n\nHuber, R. A. Expert Witness. *Crim. L. Quarterly* 1959, 2,\n276295.\n\nMcCann, P. Interim Report of the Standardization Committee of the International Association for Identification. Ident. News 1971, 21 (10), 1013.\n\nHuber, R. A.; Headrick, A. M. Handwriting Identification: Facts and Fundamentals; CRC Press: Boca Raton, FL,\n1999.\n\nMcCann, P. Report of the Standardization Committee of the International Association for Identification. Identification News 1973, 23 (8), 1314.\n\nHughes, G. Losing Sight of the Shore. *J. Forensic Ident.* 1998, 48 (5), 611615.\n\nMcComas, W. Ten Myths of Science: Reexamining What We Think We Know. ... *School Sci. Math.* 1996, 96, 10.\n\nIAI-Resolution VII. *Identification News* 1979, 29 (8), 1.\n\nMcRoberts, A. Nature Never Repeats Itself. *The Print* 1996, 12 (5), 13.\n\nIEEGFI-II. *Method for Fingerprint Identification;* Interpol European Expert Group on Fingerprint Identification II: Lyon, France, 2004.\n\nMisumi, Y.; Akiyoshi, T. Scanning Electron Microscopic Structure of the Finger Print as Related to the Dermal Surface. *Anatom. Record* 1984, 208 (1), 4955.\n\nKimura, S; Kitagawa, T. Embryological Development of Human Palmar, Plantar, and Digital Flexion Creases. Anatom. Record 1986, 216 (2), 191197.\n\nMoenssens, Andre A. Columbia City, IN. Personal communication, 2006.\n\nMontagna, W.; Parakkal, P. The Structure and Function of Skin, 3rd ed.; Academic Press: New York, 1974.\n\nKimura, S; Kitagawa, T. Embryological Development and Prevalence of Thumb Flexion Creases. *Anatom. Record* 1988, 222 (1), 8389.\n\nMontagna, W.; Kligman, A.; Carlisle, K. Atlas of Normal Human Skin; Springer-Verlag: New York, 1992.\n\nKingston, C. R. Probabilistic Analysis of Partial Fingerprint Patterns, Ph.D. Thesis, University of California, 1964.\n\nLangenburg, G.; Wertheim, K.; Moenssens, A. A. A Report of Latent Print Examiner Accuracy During Comparison Training Exercises. *J. Forensic Ident.* 2006, 56 (1), 5592.\n\nOffice of the Inspector General. A Review of the FBI's Handling of the Brandon Mayfield CaseUnclassified Executive Summary. U.S. Department of Justice: Washington, D.C., March 2006.\n\nLin, C. H.; Liu, J. H.; Osterburg, J. W.; Nicol, J. D. Fingerprint Comparison I: Similarity in Fingerprints. J. Forensic Sci. 1982, 27 (2), 290304.\n\nOkajima, M. Frequency of Epidermal-Ridge Minutiae in the Calcar Area of Japanese Twins. *Am. J. Hum. Genet.* 1967, 19 (5), 660673.\n\nLocard, E. Les Pores et l'identification des Criminels. Biologica 1912, 2 (24), 357365.\n\nOsterburg, J. W. An Inquiry into the Nature of Proof:\nThe Identity of Fingerprints. *J. Forensic Sci.* 1964, 9 (4),\n413427.\n\nLocard, E. La poroscopie. Archives d'anthropologie criminelle, de medicine legale et de psychologie normale et pathologique 1913, 28, 528546.\n\nOsterburg, J. W.; Parthasarathy, T.; Raghaven, T. E. S.; Sclove, S. L. Development of a Mathematical Formula for the Calculation of Fingerprint Probabilities Based on Individual Characteristics. *J. Am. Stat. Associ.* 1977, 72 (360),\n772778.\nPankanti, S.; Prabhakar, S.; Jain, A. On the Individuality of Fingerprints. In Proceedings of Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences (IEEE), Maui, HI, December\n2001; pp 805812.\n\nSchiffer, B.; Champod, C. The Potential (Negative) Influence of Observational Biases at the Analysis Stage of Fingermark Individualisation. *Forensic Sci. Int.,* 2007, 167 (23),\n116120.\n\nSclove, S. L. The Occurrence of Fingerprint Characteristics as a Two-Dimensional Process. *J. Am. Stati. Associ.* 1979, 74 (367), 588595.\n\nParsons, N. R.; Smith, J. Q.; Thonnes, E.; Wang, L.; Wilson, R. G. Rotationally Invariant Statistics for Examining the Evidence from the Pores in Fingerprints. Law, Probabil. and Risk 2008, 7 (1), 114.\n\nSclove, S. L. The Occurrence of Fingerprint Characteristics as a Two-Dimensional Poisson Process. Communic. in Stati. Theoret. Meth. 1980, A9 (7), 675695.\n\nPearson, K. Person Identification. In The Life, Letters, and Labours of Francis Galton, vol. IIIA; Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, England, 1930; p 182.\n\nSrihari, S. N.; Srinivasan, H.; Fang, G. Discriminability of Fingerprints of Twins. J*. Forensic Ident.* 2008, 58 (1),\n109127.\n\nPopich, G; Smith, D. The Genesis and Significance of Digital and Palmar Hand Creases: Preliminary Report. *J. Pediatr.* 1970, 77 (6), 10171023. Popper, K. The *Logic of Scientific Discovery;* Hutchinson Education: London, 1959.\n\nStacey, R. Report on the Erroneous Fingerprint Individualization in the Madrid Train Bombing Case. Journal of Forensic Identification 2004, 54 (6), 706718.\n\nPopper, K. Conjectures and Refutations: The Growth of Scientific Knowledge; Routledge & Kegan Paul: London, 1972.\n\nSteele, L. The Defense Challenge to Fingerprints. Crim. L. Bull. 2004, 40 (3), 213240.\n\nStoney, D. A. Measurement of Fingerprint Individuality. In Advances in Fingerprint Technology; Lee, H. C., Gaensslen, R. E., Eds.; CRC Press: New York, 2001; pp 327387.\n\nRoddy, A. R.; Stosz, J. D. Fingerprint FeaturesStatistical Analysis and System Performance Estimates. Proceedings of the IEEE, 1997, 85 (9), 13891421.\n\nStoney, D. A.; Thornton, J. I. A Critical Analysis of Quantitative Fingerprint Individuality Models. *J. Forensic Sci.* 1986a, 31 (4), 11871216.\n\nRoddy, A. R.; Stosz, J. D. Fingerprint Feature Processing Techniques and Poroscopy. In Intelligent Biometric Techniques in Fingerprint and Face Recognition. Jain, L. C., Halici, U., Hayashi, I., Lee, S. B., Tsutsui, S., Eds.; CRC Press: Boca Raton, FL, 1999, pp 37105.\n\nStoney, D. A.; Thornton, J. I. A Method for the Description\nof Minutia Pairs in Epidermal Ridge Patterns. J. Forensic Sci. 1986b, 31 (4), 12171234.\nRoxburgh, T. On the Evidential Value of Finger Prints.\n\nSankhya: Indian J. Stat. 1933, 1 (50), 189214.\n\nStoney, D. A.; Thornton, J. I. A Systematic Study of\nEpidermal Ridge Minutiae. *J. Forensic Sci.* 1987, 32 (5),\n11821203.\nSaks, M. Legal Consideration of Fingerprints. Presented at the 1st International Web Conference on Human Identification E-Symposium, April 14, 2005. Saks, M.; Koehler, J. The Coming Paradigm Shift in Forensic Identification Science. *Science* 2005, 309 (5736), 892895.\n\nStosz, J. D.; Alyea, L. A. Automated System for Fingerprint Authentication Using Pores and Ridge Structure. In Proceedings of SPIE, Automatic Systems for the Identification and Inspection of Humans; Mammone, R. J., Murley, J. D., Eds.; 1994, Vol. 2277; pp 210223.\n\nSaks, M.; Risinger, D. M.; Rosenthal, R.; Thompson, W. C. Context Effects in Forensic Science: A Review and Application of the Science of Science to Crime Laboratory Practice in the United States. *Sci. and Justice* 2003, 43 (2),\n7790.\n\nStucker, M.; Geil, M.; Kyeck, S.; Hoffman, K.; Rochling, A.; Memmel, U.; Altmeyer, P. Interpapillary LinesThe Variable Part of the Human Fingerprint. *J. Forensic Sci.* 2001, 46 (4),\n857861.\n\n## 15.8 Additional Information\n\nSWGFAST. Friction Ridge Examination Methodology for Latent Print Examiners, version 1.01; 2002; www.swgfast. org.\n\nThornton, J. I. The Snowflake Paradigm. *J. Forensic Sci.* 1986, 31 (2), 399401.\n\nChampod, C. Reconnaissance automatique et analyse statistique des minuties sur les empreintes digitales. Ph.D., Thesis, Universite de Lausanne, Institut de Police Scientifique et de Criminologie, 1996a.\n\nThornton, S. Karl Popper. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy; 2005; plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2005/\nentries/popper (accessed June 30, 2009).\n\nEpstein, R. Fingerprints Meet *Daubert:* The Myth of Fingerprint \"Science\" Revealed. *S. Cali. L. Rev.* 2002, 75,\n605658.\n\nTietze, S. Witthuhn, K. Papillarleistenstruktur der menschlichen Handinnenflache. Luchterhand: Berlin, Germany, 2001.\n\nHolt, S. B. *The Genetics of Dermal Ridges;* Charles C\nThomas: Springfield, IL, 1968.\n\nTrauring, M. Automatic Comparison of Finger-Ridge Patterns. *Nature* 1963, *197,* 938940.\n\nLoesch, D. Quantitative Dermatoglyphics: Classification, Genetics, and Pathology; Oxford University Press: New York, 1983.\n\nU.S. v *Mitchell.* CA-No. 96-407, *Daubert* hearing transcript, July 79, 1213, 1999.\n\nVan Fraassen, B. *Law and Symmetry;* Clarendon Press:\nOxford, 1989.\n\nNational Institute of Justice. Forensic Friction Ridge (Fingerprint) Examination Validation Studies; National Institute of Justice, U.S. Department of Justice; U.S. Government Printing Office: Washington, DC, 2000. Okajima, M. Frequency of Forks in Epidermal-Ridge Minutiae in the Finger Print. *Am. J. Phys. Anthropol.* 1970, 32\n(1), 4148.\n\nWayman, J. L. When Bad Science Leads to Good Law: The Disturbing Irony of the Daubert Hearing in the Case of U.S. v. Byron C. Mitchell; Biometrics Publications: San Jose State University, San Jose, CA, 2000.\n\nOkajima, M. Epidermal-Ridge Minutiae in the Hallucal Area.\n\nMitteilungen der Anthropologischen Gesellschaft in Wien 1977, 34, 285290.\n\nWertheim, K.; Maceo, A. The Critical Stage of Friction Ridge Pattern Formation. *J. Forensic Ident.* 2002, 52 (1),\n3585. Wertheim, P. A. Scientific Comparison and Identification of Fingerprint Evidence. *The Print* 2000, 16 (5).\n\nOkajima, M. Quantitative and Genetic Features of Epidermal Ridge Minutiae on the Palm of Twins. *Hum. Heredity* 1984, 34 (5), 285290.\n\nWilder, H. H.; Wentworth, B. *Personal Identification;* The Gorham Press: Boston, 1918.\n\nOkros, S. T*he Heredity of Papillary Patterns;* Publishing House of Hungarian Academy of Sciences: Budapest, 1965.\n\nWilder, H. H.; Wentworth, B. *Personal Identification;* 2nd ed.; T. G. Cooke: Chicago, 1932. Zynda, L. Lyle Zynda's Lectures on the Philosophy of Science;1994; www.soc.iastate.edu/sapp/phil_sci_lecture00. html (accessed June 30, 2009).\n\nRoberts, D. F. Dermatoglyphics and Human Genetics. In D*ermatoglyphicsFifty Years Later;* Wertelecki, W., Plato, C., Paul, N. W., Eds.; Alan R. Liss Inc.: New York, 1979; pp 475494. Samuels, J. Letter regarding \"Forensic Friction Ridge (Fingerprint) Examination Validation Studies\". National Institute of Justice. U.S. Department of Justice: Washington, DC, June 20, 2000.\n\n## C H A P T E R Special Abilities And Vulnerabilities In Forensic Expertise\n\nThomas A. Busey and Itiel E. Dror\n\n## C O N T E N T S\n\n3\n15.1  The Relevance of the Human Mind\n20\n15.4  Summary and Conclusions\n4\n15.2  Cognitive Psychology\n20\n15.5  References\n16\n15.3  Cognitive and Psychological\nElements in Fingerprint Identification\n\n## Chapter 15 Special Abilities And Vulnerabilities In Forensic Expertise Thomas A. Busey And Itiel E. Dror* 15.1 The Relevance Of The Human Mind\n\nLatent print examinations are complex perceptual and cognitive tasks. Examiners rely on their visual systems to find similarities in pairs of prints. They then must compare the degree of perceived similarity against that found in previous examinations, and ultimately must decide whether the commonalities found between prints (as well as regions of unexplainable disagreement) merit the conclusion that the prints either did or did not come from the same source (or are inconclusive). This process involves perception, similarity judgments, memory, and decision-making. These abilities vary among people and can be improved with training and experience. They are also subject to potential biases and external influences. This chapter will illustrate, based on knowledge from the visual and cognitive sciences, how an understanding of the human mind is relevant and critical to the fingerprint domain. Such an understanding clearly shows the unique cognitive processes and special abilities of experts, along with their vulnerabilities. This chapter begins with a quick overview of foundational findings in cognitive science and then discusses how these research areas have been extended to latent print examiners. Where possible, links are drawn between basic science findings and the relevant domains of training, selection, and procedures of latent print examinations. In expert domains, as well as in everyday life, humans process information. Information is perceived, encoded, represented, transformed, stored, retrieved, compared to other information, and evaluated, to name just a few processes. However, the human mind is not a camera and we do not passively process information. It is naive to think that humans construct and experience reality passively and perceive the environment as \"it really is\". *Perception is*\nfar from perfection (Dror, 2005a; see also Humphreys, Riddoch, and Price, 1997; Snyder, Tanke, and Bersheid, 1977). People engage in a variety of active processes that organize and impose structure on information as it comes in from the external world. Information is then further interpreted and processed in ways that highly depend on the human mind and cognition, and less on the environment and the actual content of the information itself. As we dynamically process information, we affect what we see, how we interpret and evaluate it, and our decision-making processes. Thus, to understand expert performance, especially in a highly specialized domain such as human identification, one needs to examine the roles of the human mind and cognition (Dror, in press; Dror and Fraser-Mackenzie, 2008). Human cognition has been neglected by the fingerprint community, both by the forensic experts themselves as well as by those who design and develop related technology. This chapter is a step toward addressing this oversight; fingerprint identification will be presented within its appropriate contextthat of human cognition. The reader will first be introduced to principles that underlie much of cognition and perception, which serve to illustrate human information processing. These principles are illustrated with examples of psychological phenomena that have been chosen for their direct relevance to the latent print examination process. The chapter then turns to a discussion of the development of expertise and how the tools of cognitive neuroscience can be used to describe differences between experts and novices. Finally, important vulnerabilities in the development of expertise are discussed. Throughout this chapter, the authors will argue that it is incumbent upon practicing examiners to treat their professional practice as a scientific endeavor in which they continue to question all aspects of their examinations, gather data on the effectiveness and accuracy of their decisions, and refine training and best practices procedures to avoid cognitive contamination and optimize their decision-making.\n\n## 15.2 Cognitive Psychology\n\nThe human mind is a complex machine. It is incredible in its range and scope, and it is dynamic, flexible, and adaptive. Although complex and intriguing, the essence of the human mind is nevertheless an information-processing machine. As information comes in through our sensory systems, it is processed. This processing may include transformations, comparisons and consolidation with\ninformation already stored in the system, evaluations, making decisions, and so forth. Humans are fortunate to have such a strong computing mechanism as our brain at our disposal because the comparison of two different fingerprints requires a number of cognitive and perceptual capacities that hardware-based computers have yet to equal. Factors such as attention, motivation, perceptual processing, and decision-making all must be brought to bear on the task. In the section below, we briefly cover some of the basic findings in cognitive psychology in order to lay the groundwork for the application of these findings to latent print examinations. It should be noted that a rather large gulf still exists between these basic findings and specific questions related to the forensic sciences. As a result, these topics may seem somewhat abstract but, where possible, links to specific training prescriptions and suggestions for changes in procedures will be made where the science can make a strong case for them.\n\n## 15.2.1 Studying Human Information Processing\n\nScience without data is not science. Although theorizing and arguments have a role, scientists rely primarily on a dispassionate and agenda-free evaluation of data collected in experiments that are designed to find the truth. Data underlie theory rather than vice versa. Data can come directly from behavioral experiments, in which subjects perform tasks similar to latent print examinations, or data can be gathered indirectly by the use of eyetracking, electrophysiological recordings, computer modeling, or brain imaging.\n\nThese data require models for interpretation, which can take the form of verbal descriptions, mathematical formulas, or computer programs, and the field of cognitive psychology has been developed to apply models to such psychological data. An example perhaps familiar to many readers is that of AFIS, which can serve as a model of the fingerprint matching process. This model does not capture the full performance of human experts. Selecting one model out of a set of candidate models or explanations is accomplished on the basis of the level of consistency with the data gathered in experiments. It does not matter whether the data come from behavioral or cognitive neuroscience experiments because the ultimate goal is to use converging methods to place constraints on what the most viable model might be.\n\nIn recent years, cognitive psychology has evolved into cognitive neuroscience. In cognitive neuroscience, the study of human information processing has been further advanced by relating it to the human brain (Kosslyn and Koenig, 1992). Examination and studies of the human brain are used to constrain and guide information-processing theories. Although the mind is as distinct from the brain as software is from hardware, the brain provides many important insights into the nature and characteristics of the mind. In cognitive neuroscience, the underlying hardware mechanisms are regarded as being relevant for understanding the higher level mental processes, but that is as far as the interest goes. Thus, in cognitive neuroscience, the neuroscience is a tool for cognitive study rather than a goal itself. The development of cognitive neuroscience came about from novel ways of conceptualizing the brain as an information-processing system. This was achieved, in part, through advanced technologies that allowed new ways to view and study the brain and its operations (CT and MRI, and in particular the functional images PET and fMRI). Such technologies have already been applied to the study of fingerprint expert performance (Busey and Vanderkolk, 2005), as discussed below.\n\n## 15.2.2 Principles And Key Issues In Understanding Human Cognition\n\nThree issues are especially critical for understanding human cognition: (1) the brain is a limited resource with limited processing capacity. (2) it processes information in an active and dynamic fashion, and (3) performance is dependent on, and limited by, mental representations and how information is stored (as much as what information is actually stored). These issues will be explained and illustrated. The brain is a finite machine and thus its capacity to process information is limited. Information processing has evolved to working within (and overcoming) the confines of this resource. For example, because humans have limited resources, we cannot process all incoming information and thus focus our attention on a subset of the input we perceive and disregard the rest (Sperling, 1960). Our limited resources have, in fact, given rise to much of human intelligence. For instance, because we can only attend to a subset of the information, we need to prioritize which information is the most important to be processed. Thus, we developed sophisticated mechanisms (i.e., intelligence) so as to overcome the limitations in our informationprocessing capacity and best utilize available resources.\n\nOther ways we deal with our limited resources include data compression. In addition to selective attention, we have developed ways to reduce cognitive load by compressing information to more computationally efficient bits of information (Dror, Schmitz-Williams, and Smith, 2005). The way information is organized and represented has profound effects on how we process it, what we can do with it, and what information is available. For example, how we represent numbers is not a technical and trivial matter; whether we use \"3\" or \"III\" has far-reaching implications on the mathematical operations we can (or cannot) perform. Indeed, Marr (1982, p 21) claims, \"This is a key reason why the Roman culture failed to develop mathematics in the way the earlier Arabic cultures had.\" The representation of information is also determined by the way people internally encode it. For example, people will find it easy to name the months of the year by their chronological order but impossible to name them by alphabetical order (try it!). In many cases, the same information can be represented in a variety of ways and the specific way that it is represented will later determine how the information can be used and manipulated. The way the mind will mentally manipulate images is highly dependent on how the images are initially represented and encoded (e.g., holistic vs. piecemeal) (Smith and Dror, 2001), and this depends on a variety of factors, including the available cognitive resources (Dror, Schmitz-Williams, and Smith, 2005). These issues are especially acute in experts and affect expert performance in a variety of domains, such as military, medical, policing, financial, and forensics (Dror, in press).\n\nMental and cognitive representations are essential to the latent print comparison process because individual bits or features of one print must be held in memory long enough to compare against a second image. This process would be impossible without mental representations, and one element of expertise may be an improvement in the ability to hold more information in memory for longer periods of time (Busey and Vanderkolk, 2005). Before illustrating how these principles and key issues manifest themselves in perceptual, cognitive, and psychological phenomena, it is important to make a distinction between bottom-up and top-down processes (e.g., Humphreys et al., 1997). The bottom-up processes are data driven. The incoming information from the external environment guides the processing mechanisms and the content of information. These types of processes are passive and are dependent on the input itself. Top-down processes are those that depend on the processor (humans in this case) and less on what is processed. In these processes, the state of mind and the information already contained in the system drives the processes. The top-down processes do not depend on the input itself as much as on what is already in the mind of the person processing the information. Every cognitive process, such as learning, thinking, identifying, comparing, matching, decision-making, problem-solving, and all other processes contain at least some elements of top-down processing. It is not a matter of choice or even conscious processing; the information already contained in the brain, one's state of mind, and many other factors are deeply intertwined in how information is perceived, interpreted, and processed. The dynamic nature of cognition and how the mind works is a clear characteristic of intelligent systems. In fact, as individuals get more experienced and become real experts, the top-down processes play a greater role in how they process information (Dror, in press). At the psychological level, as attention is turned to the nature and architecture of the human mind, one can observe how the mind has a major role in determining if and how humans understand and interpret information.\nAn intuitive illustration would be when you (or your partner) are pregnant and you start to notice many pregnant women. This is not because there are more pregnant women, but rather your own mental circumstances affect whether and what you see. It is beyond the scope of this paper to give a detailed account of how the mind works and its implications. However, there are many such influences,\nfor example, self-fulfilling prophecies, that illustrate how the mind and psychological elements (such as what we want and wish for) affect what we actually see and are able to do. If we are thirsty, we are more likely to perceive images as containing characteristics of water; our state of thirst modulates our perception (Changizi and Hall, 2001). Our emotional state and mood are further examples of effects of the mind on how we interpret information (Byrne and Eysenck, 1993; Halberstadt et al., 1995; Niedenthal et al., 2000). Other elements relate to decision-making. As people weigh alternative choices, they consider the evidence for choosing each one. Sequentially moving toward different decision options, one accumulates evidence toward a decision threshold (Dror, Busemeyer, and Basola, 1999).\n\nThese decision thresholds and evaluating information in support of decision choices are dependent on psychological elements. Furthermore, one needs to distinguish when information is sought in order to make a decision, and when information is sought out selectively to support an already chosen (or preferred) choice alternative. When information is collected, examined, and interpreted to generate and consider different alternative choices, then information and data are driving the decision-making process; this is a bottom-up progression. However, before information is even collected and processed, people usually already have a preference. This top-down component is often unconscious. Even during the decision-making process itself, even if the decision-maker comes initially with no preconceived decisions or notions, as decisions are considered and made, information is gathered and processed for the purposes of examining, confirming, and validating these decisions. These processes are highly dependent on psychological elements and processes rather than purely on the relevant information. Thus, our mind and mental states play active roles in whether and how we acquire, process, and interpret information as well as in our decision-making (Dror, 2008).\n\n## 15.2.3 Visual Expertise And Latent Print Examinations\n\nThe preceding section illustrates how seemingly simple tasks such as recognition and comparison can be influenced by many different factors. This section discusses results from vision experiments that attempt to explain how practice and experience can improve performance on visual tasks. The discussion is limited somewhat by\nthe fact that relatively little data have been collected on latent print examiners, but fortunately the vision community has adopted a stimulus called a *sine-wave grating*\nthat, with its patterns of light and dark bars, is actually fairly similar to a small patch of a latent print. The following sections summarize the data from different experiments that illustrate how practice can improve performance and offer specific models that explain these improvements. One caveat must be made up-front: the perceptual learning experiments discussed very often have a scale of training on the order of days and weeks, rather than the years that experts often acquire. Thus, smaller differences would be expected between the trained and the untrained subjects in these experiments than when latent print examiners are tested.\n\n15.2.3.1 Overview and studies of perceptual learning.\n\nPerceptual learning is the process by which the sensory system selectively modifies its behavior to important environmental input. The challenge faced by the brain is that, although it needs to change its connectivity and strengthen its neural synapses in order to learn new information, it must also protect itself from unwanted modification that would degrade existing knowledge (Fusi et al., 2005; Kepecs et al., 2002). At the same time, the visual system must select which is the relevant information to be learned. (Using technology and science-based training, the visual system can learn this more efficiently and effectively. See Dror, Stevenage, and Ashworth, 2008.) Humans are consciously aware of only a small part of the visual world, and the bulk of visual processing and visual learning takes place without conscious awareness (Turk-Browne et al., 2005). Somehow, the processes and functionality that make up the visual system, with contributions from higher level conscious processes, must extract the regularities from a set of images or scenes and alter their connectivity to highlight these regularities. The key to this process is the detection of *structure* in a set of images or objects. Without the ability to detect regular structure that brings objects together, the visual system would be forced to adjust its processing anew in response to the latest image received. Fingerprints, including latent prints, contain regular features that provide structure to guide the learning process. This structure includes the regularity of ridge widths and the existence of eight broad classes of fingerprints as well as smaller features such as minutiae and individual ridge units. The human visual system is well-designed to exploit this regularity. What follows is a discussion of the changes that can occur in the visual system, how these changes are affected by attention and feedback, and how environmental conditions such as the presence of \"noise\" in latent prints alters the learning process. Once visual input enters the visual processing stream, it must be interpreted. For the identification sciences, including latent print comparison, the examiner must consider two prints or images and determine whether they come from the same source. This is essentially a similarity computation, since the two versions will never be exact copies. A great deal of work in cognitive science has focused on how humans determine similarity between two objects, and how expertise affects this computation (Dror, in press). This literature can be applied to understanding how latent print examiners consider similarity in the context of a latent print identification, that is, the nature of the features that are used in latent print examinations, how they are processed, and how experience changes how these features are perceived by experts. In order to determine whether two source images such as two fingerprints match, an examiner must first perceive features from one source image and compare them with a second image. Determining the nature of these visual features and the relation between themand how these features are compared across different instances of an object to enable identification or categorizationis a central goal of the vision sciences. For stimuli such as faces, we suspect that the features are likely to be elements such as the eyes, nose, and mouth. Yet, even with faces, there is much debate in the literature about the exact feature set of faces: these could include eyes and mouths, or even parts of these, or possibly their relation to each other (Zhang and Cottrell, 2004). Less is known about fingerprints, although the features likely include the shape and flow of the ridges, macro-features of core and delta, minutiae and ridge path, ridge edges, and pore shapes and positions. The next section addresses the nature of the development of expertise and looks at studies that help delineate what constitutes a feature from a human perceptual and cognitive perspective.\n\n15.2.3.2 Creation of new feature detectors. One of the reasons that the feature set is so hard to pin down is that the human visual system is extremely flexible, in that it can adapt its responses to novel stimuli and learn new features. When applied to multiple dimensions, this process is called *unitization.* The neural basis of this kind of perceptual learning was extensively studied by Leventhal and Hirsch (1977), who reared kittens in deprived visual environments and recorded their responses to different patterns. Kittens reared in environments that contained only vertical lines had cells in the visual system that produced only weak responses to horizontal lines. Thus the visual system develops much of its sensitivity to features through experience. These changes in neural processing due to experience can also support new abilities. Unitization creates perceptual units that combine object components that frequently co-occur, such that components that were once perceived separately become psychologically fused together (Schyns and Rodet, 1997). Both Goldstone (2000) and Shiffrin (Shiffrin and Lightfoot, 1997) have addressed the role of unitization in the development of expertise, as discussed below. Many of the processes of individualizing a print involve comparison of individual features. Unitization may improve the way that candidate features (such as minutiae or ridge features) are extracted from \"noisy\" stimuli. Latent fingerprints are often corrupted by visual noise when the development medium sticks to the recording surface due to substrates other than the oil left by skin. Experts likely learn to overcome this noise; as one expert put it, their job is to \"see through the noise\". (This also seems to be an important ability of military fighter pilots; see Dror, Kosslyn, and Waag, 1993, Experiment 5, illustrated in Figure 151). Several possible mechanisms might enable such learning, such as internal noise reduction and improved strategies on the part of observers, and a later section discusses how techniques developed to study visual processing allow tests of these mechanisms. There are specific demonstrations of unitization in the literature. Goldstone (2000) gave participants extended practice in learning to place a complex collection of doodles into Catagory 1, and all of\n\"Seeing through noise\" in Dror et al.,\n(1993), Experiment 5, examining the abilities of novices and expert fighter pilots to determine if the 'X' probe is on or off the shaded area with and without visual noise.\n\nDoodles in two categories. The letters indicate which segment in the Category 2 items is different from the doodle in Category 1.\n\nthe \"near misses\" to this pattern belonged in Category 2, as shown in Figure 152.\n\nThis task encourages unitization. All of the pieces of the Category 1 pattern must be attended to in order to accurately categorize it because each piece is also present in several Category 2 patterns. After 20 hours of practice with these stimuli, participants eventually were able to categorize the Category 1 doodle very accurately and more quickly than would be predicted if they were explicitly combining separate pieces of information from the doodle together. Consistent with other work on perceptual unitization (Gauthier et al., 1998; Shiffrin and Lightfoot, 1997), the theory here is that one way of creating new perceptual building blocks is to create something like a photographic mental image for highly familiar, complex configurations. Following this analogy, just as a camera store does not charge more money for developing photographs of crowds than pictures of a single person, once a complex mental image has been formed, it does not require any more effort to process the unit than the components from which it was built. A more complete definition of such a \"gestalt\" can be found in O'Toole et al. (2001). Blaha and Townsend (2006) have shown that changes in capacity can occur when unitization has taken place. However, the mental representation of the information is critical, and this is highly dependent on the way the objects are presented during learning (e.g., their orientation) and their relative similarity (see Ashworth and Dror, 2000). Czerwinski et al. (1992) have proposed a process of perceptual unitization in which conjunctions of stimulus features are \"chunked\" together so that they are perceived as a single unit (see also Newell and Rosenbloom, 1981). Figure 153 illustrates this type of stimuli. Shiffrin and Lightfoot (1997) argued that separated line segments can become unitized following prolonged practice with the materials. Their evidence came from subjects' performance in a feature search task where observers had to scan a visual display of eight items looking for a particular target item. The target item could be either quite similar to the other items (called distracters) or relatively dissimilar. When participants learned a difficult search task in which three line segments were needed to distinguish the target from distracters, impressive and prolonged decreases in reaction time were observed over 20 hour-long sessions.\n\nStimuli used by Shiffrin and\nLightfoot (1997). Over time,\nobservers began to treat the\nindividual line segments as\nunitary features.\n\nThese prolonged decreases were not observed for a\nsimple search task requiring attention to only one compo-\nnent. In addition, when participants were switched from\na difficult task to a simple feature search task, there was\ninitially little improvement in performance, suggesting that\nparticipants were still processing the stimuli at the level of\nthe unitized chunk that they formed during the conjunctive\ntraining component. The authors concluded that train-\ning with difficult stimuli that requires attention to several\nfeatures at once leads to unitization of the set of diagnostic\nline segments, resulting in fewer required comparisons.\nSimilar conclusions were drawn by Ahissar and Hochstein\n(1997) in their work on the \"Eureka effect\" , in which\nlearned stimuli appear to be recognized effortlessly and in\nan all-or-none fashion.\n\nAlthough this work has yet to be extended to latent prints,\nunitization in the context of fingerprints may come about\nthrough the analysis of constraints that occur in the devel-\nopment of the friction ridges. For example, ridges have a\nvery even spacing, and features such as ridge endings are\nassociated with nearby ridges shifting inward to preserve\nthis spacing. Fingerprint experts have found that they can\nuse these features in their identifications.\n\nWhat would it mean for fingerprint experts to develop\nnewly differentiated features? This would change the field's\nperceptual vocabulary. A perceptual vocabulary is the set of\nfunctional features that are used for describing objects. A\nfunctional feature is defined as any object property that can\n\nbe selectively attended to and is relevant to the task. This implies that the visual system treats it as a unique part of an object. For example, feature X can be used to describe an object if there is evidence that X can be considered in isolation from other aspects of the object. Tying the uniqueness of a feature to selective attention conforms to many empirical techniques for investigating features. Garner (1976) considers two features or dimensions to be separable if categorizations on the basis of one of the features are not slowed by irrelevant variation on the other. Treisman (e.g., Treisman and Gelade, 1980) argues that features are registered separately on different feature maps, giving rise to efficient and parallel searches for individual features and the automatic splitting apart of different features that occupy the same object. Within fingerprints, there are several highly correlated features that are candidates for unitization. As noted, the width between the ridges is very regular, which may provide constraints on how information in degraded areas is interpreted if clear detail is present in adjacent areas. Likewise, y-branching, cores, and deltas are all stereotypical features in prints that are composed of smaller features that have the potential to be joined into a new feature in an hierarchical manner through unitization. One implication of these studies for training of latent print examiners is that we find fairly consistent and long-lasting effects of perceptual learning after relatively brief training (weeks to months). These studies have not identified how long these changes persist, however.\n\n15.2.3.3 Configural processing of images. Work by Busey and Vanderkolk (2005) looked at configural processing as one technique by which fingerprint examiners could improve the quality of information coming from fingerprint impressions, especially when the prints are corrupted by visual noise. Configural processing is related to unitization in that it allows for the combination of individual features into a larger representation that codes relational information and possibly treats the entire image as a unitary image rather than a collection of features. Because relatively few studies have addressed the expertise exhibited by latent print examiners, these experiments are described in detail below. Busey and Vanderkolk (2005) tested 11 experts and 11 novices with 144 experimental trials. In each trial they presented a fingerprint briefly for one second and then, after a short delay, they presented two prints: one that was a rotated version of the same print, and one that was chosen by human experts to be a very similar print but from a different source. Figure 154 shows examples of the test stimuli, and Figure 155 shows the technique by which partially masked fingerprints are created.\n\nThe researchers modified the two test prints to be either whole or partial prints embedded in visual noise and asked the subjects to identify which print they had seen before. They used the accuracy in the partial print condition along with a mathematical model known as probability summation to make a prediction for performance in the whole image condition. They found that experts exceeded this prediction, which is consistent with configural processing. They followed this finding with an electroencephalogram (EEG) experiment that found similar evidence for configural processing in fingerprint experts (but not novices). Upright faces produce a different brain response than inverted faces when the two EEG waveforms are compared; this has been attributed to configural processing that occurs only for upright faces. In their experiment, they found that experts showed differences for faces as well as fingerprints when both stimuli were inverted. Novices showed differences only for faces. Thus, the signature of configural processing evidence in the EEG waveform for faces generalizes to fingerprints in latent print examiners. Due to the complex nature of EEG data and analyses, the reader is referred to the primary article (Busey and Vanderkolk, 2005) for more information. These two experiments demonstrate that experts use configural processing to improve their perception of individual features by using evidence from nearby features.\n\n15.2.3.4 Statistical learning of visual input without\nattention or awareness. What brain processes might support the creation of new features through unitization and holistic representations through configural processing? The basis for this learning is rooted in the notion of co-occurrences, which are statistical descriptions of the fact that, in images and objects, two features tend to occur simultaneously. For example, it is the rare face that has only one eye, and this fact does not escape the visual system, which will begin to build up a representation such that when one eye is present, it more readily codes the presence of the other eye. Eventually, cells may emerge in the visual processing stream that code only the conjunction of the two eyes. Evidence with novel stimuli for this process at the single neuron level comes from Baker et al. (2002). Recent work by Turk-Browne et al. (2005) suggests that this statistical learning (i.e., learning that two features or parts are related to each other in that they tend to cooccur) can occur automatically. Attention is required to select the relevant population of stimuli or features, but learning takes place automatically after that. This work is an extension of prior studies by Fiser and Aslin (2001), who tested a proposal originally put forth by Barlow (1990), which posited that the visual system initiates learning by detecting \"suspicious coincidences\" of feature or elements. They presented observers with sets of well-defined simple shapes and varied the likelihood that one feature would appear with another. They gave the observers no instructions about what to do, and no feedback that might identify the nature of the relations among the objects. Despite this, observers spontaneously learned a variety of relations, including which features were presented most often, where they tended to occur on the display, the positions of pairs (regardless of position), and finally which shapes occurred together (regardless of position). These results are important because models of object recognition (presumably including fingerprints) require that the visual system learn these types of relations among features. Similar arguments have been made by Anderson and Schooler (1991), who argued that the structure of human memory may have been influenced by the structure present in the environment.\n\nThe fact that learning is relatively automatic and unconscious suggests that the mere act of looking at fingerprints will allow the visual system to extract the statistical regularities that are contained in prints. AFIS operators, for instance, might not perform the actual identifications in large labs but are good candidates for latent print work because of their incidental exposure to fingerprints.\n\n15.2.3.5 How noise and feedback affect learning. Experts who work with visually noisy images (e.g., radiologists, fighter pilots, satellite image analysts, radar operators, and latent print examiners) must learn which aspects of their images are meaningful and which are visual noise. The issue is one of learning to separate the image information from the noise of the images. Dosher and Lu (2005)\naddressed the question of whether it is better to train using noisy images or clear images. Perhaps surprisingly, participants who trained with clear images were able to generalize this knowledge to noisy images, whereas participants who trained with noisy images were only expert with noisy images and acted like novices with clear images. They attributed this to the existence of two independent processes: external noise filtering and improved amplification or enhancement of weak stimuli. Both of these processes will lead to better performance, but external noise filtering only works when there is noise to filter. Thus, training with clear items allows both processes to develop. When experts learn in noisy images, they can perform what is called \"signal enhancement\", which is the process by which the neural detectors in the visual system match their profiles to fit the to-be-perceived features. This could include the process of learning what to look for in an image, which has been demonstrated in the \"Eureka phenomenon\" (Ahissar and Hochstein, 1997) and more recently has received support from Gold et al. (1999) and Lu and Dosher (2004). A very faint fingerprint image is limited not by visual noise but by the examiner's ability to discern the structure in the print. One implication of this is that novices (including latent print trainees) should receive much of their training using relatively clear prints shown at different levels of brightness so they can learn both the features they need to attend to and how to improve the amplification of very faint images. This perceptual learning should then generalize to noisy images, which can be introduced later in training.\n\nThe notion that expertise relies on conscious and intentional processes as well as unconscious and incidental processes has been addressed by Maddox and Ing (2005). They suggest that the role of the conscious system is to develop and test hypotheses related to a particular task. In their studies, the task was to categorize an object into one of several categories. The unconscious system performs primarily as an information integration process similar to the statistical learning described earlier. When a task involves a simple rule (i.e., red objects belong in one category and blue objects in another), the hypothesis testing system is primarily involved. Not only does feedback improve performance in this task, but delaying the feedback for 5 seconds has no deleterious effects. However, for tasks that involve combinations of dimensions (i.e., Category 1 is small red objects and large green objects, and Category 2 is large red objects and small green objects), delaying the feedback by 5 seconds hurts performance. This suggests that immediate feedback can aid the learning process, at least when the features or dimensions that are necessary for a task are easy to express verbally. However, feedback need not be required, and reliable perceptual learning can be obtained in the absence of feedback (Fahle and Edelman, 1993; Wenger and Rasche, 2006). For fingerprint examinations, when examiners rely on print information that is not easy to verbalize (such as the amount of curvature along a ridge path), they should refine their learning by training on stimulus sets for which the ground truth is known and can be immediately verified.\n\n15.2.3.6 Computing similarity between features. Any comparison between a latent print and a candidate known print will involve some computation of similarity because the latent print is never an exact copy of the inked print. This comparison may be performed on the basis of individual features or the general direction of the first-level general ridge flow, or class characteristics (often used to quickly eliminate a known print from consideration). In some sense, the entire latent-to-inked print comparison can be viewed as a similarity computation with a decision stage at the back end. Within the domain of facial recognition, Steyvers and Busey (2001) have looked at models of the similarity computation process and how similarity ratings can be used to construct dimensional representations that provide input to process-based memory models (Busey, 1998; Busey and Tunnicliff, 1999). This work has built upon prior work from the perceptual learning and categorization literature, done in part by Goldstone (1996,\n1999, 2000). This prior experience highlights two areas that are readily generalized to fingerprints. These relate to how experts create psychological dimensions of stimuli (described in detail below) and how they integrate and differentiate these dimensions, depending on the nature of the task.\n\nA *feature* is a unitary stimulus element, and a *dimension* is a set of ordered values. Dimensions for shape could include length, width, curvature, or size. To a novice observer, the many dimensions that make up a complex stimulus may be fused together, whereas an expert may separate out these dimensions through a process called *differentiation.* In the present context, latent prints correspond to one set of dimensions, and the noise that accompanies the prints corresponds to a second set. Experts may learn to separate the two sets of dimensions through dimensional differentiation, although this has not been extended empirically. Goldstone and Steyvers (2001) looked at how training affects dimension differentiation and found that, although experts learn to differentiate dimensions from each other (akin to perceiving the height of an object without being affected by its width), they can sometimes have difficulty switching their attention to previously ignored dimensions. In the process of learning to differentiate dimensions and, in the process, learning to ignore the irrelevant dimensions, experts perform poorly if meaningful variation is introduced into the previously irrelevant dimensions. Thus, fingerprint experts may have difficulty when asked to make judgments that depend in part on differences that exist in the noise dimensions, which presumably they have learned to ignore. Burns and Shepp (1988) measured the similarity relations between color chips. They found that although novice observers tended to treat the dimensions of hue, saturation, and brightness as integral, experts were more likely to differentiate these dimensions. Goldstone (1996) extended this work to show that people who learn a categorization become sensitized to the relevant dimensions. The categorization work described above suggests that experts learn to separate out the relevant dimensions, which helps them more accurately gauge the similarity of two objects. This dimensional approach has proven useful in the domain of face recognition, which reveals not only the nature of the dimensions of faces but also provides a psychological space that can be used to make predictions for memory experiments. A *psychological space* is an abstract representation that places more similar faces close together (Valentine, 1991). Busey (1998) gathered a large set of similarity ratings between all possible pairs of 104 faces. These ratings were analyzed using a multidimensional scaling (MDS) analysis package, which attempts to reduce the dimensionality of the data to relevant psychological dimensions that describe how humans compute similarity. The resulting psychological space not only proved interpretable but was then used to make predictions for memory experiments (Busey and Tunnicliff, 1999). Later work by Steyvers and Busey (2001) demonstrated the matches and mismatches between a physical representation computed from images and psychological spaces computed from similarity ratings. In part, the differences come from the fact that some features are more diagnostic than others; experts may use this diagnosticity to adjust their psychological space of fingerprints accordingly. The different processes used by experts result in enhanced performance but also, paradoxically, have degradation as a result of cognitive tradeoffs (Dror, 2009a). This work suggests that one element of training involves the discovery of relevant psychological dimensions that differentiate fingerprints. These dimensions are not yet known but could be something like general ridge flow, overall fingerprint type, density of minutiae in particular regions, and even idiosyncratic features such as particular constellations of ridges.\n\n15.2.3.7 Similarity vs. categorical decision-making. The previous section describes how the psychological work on similarity computation applies to latent print examinations. There may appear to be a gulf between similarity judgments, which one may think of as a continuous measure, and the type of decision arrived at by latent print examiners. The language may be different in various jurisdictions, but typically examiners testify that two prints either came from the same source or did not come from the same source. They may or may not attach some kind of confidence rating to this conclusion. This might suggest that the similarity literature may have little to do with latent print examinations. However, the authors of this chapter would argue that the decision arrived at by the examiner is, in fact, an implicit similarity judgment. No two prints are ever identical; therefore, the task always requires some element of comparison and similarity computation. Examiners then translate this to a categorical judgment, presumably using some rule such as: \"These two prints are more similar to each other than any other close non-match that I have observed\" or \"The two prints are sufficiently similar that I can conclude that they come from the same source\" (see Dror, 2009a, for a discussion of sufficient similarity). One may want to draw a distinction between the actual underlying cognitive processes involved in fingerprinting, the terminology and language used to express a conclusion, and how this is explained in court. Here, the focus is on the cognitive processes, which result from comparing the similarity of two images. The way fingerprint examiners explain their conclusions, and the way they express their decisions, may vary from one place to another and may change over time; however, the cognitive processes that are the focus of this chapter remain the same.\n\n15.2.3.8 Interim summary. This chapter thus far has summarized the findings from the perceptual learning literature as explored by cognitive scientists. What emerges from this summary is a view that the human visual system is remarkably good at extracting the structure that exists in a class of stimuli. This learning process occurs with very little conscious direction beyond the initial selection of relevant features. All that is required is a constant set of example stimuli that provide the kinds of statistical regularities among features or parts that are extracted by the visual processing mechanisms, as well as some selection of what are the relevant features required for the task. This is not to imply that this is an easy process; in fact, the field should argue for more hours of training to provide the large number of examples that are required to identify weak statistical relations. Such complex learning can be enhanced by developing scientific-based training and utilizing technology (see Dror, Stevenage, and Ashworth, 2008).\n\nExperts often ask the question, how much matching information is enough? The perceptual learning literature does not provide a direct answer, but the tools from cognitive science illustrate how different factors trade off. In the next section, a computation modeling approach is used to address the relation between quantity and quality. Image quality could be measured in several ways but, in general, it represents the degree of visible print information relative to the amount of noise caused by dust or other artifacts created when the print was lifted. Image quantity represents the surface area of usable print information, which could be measured in units of ridge widths or square centimeters. Although image quantity and quality can be seen as going together, in principle it is possible to separate the two factors.\n\n## 15.2.4 Weaknesses And Vulnerabilities In Perceptual, Cognitive, And Psychological Phenomena\n\nAlthough the active and dynamic nature of cognition is the basis of intelligence and expertise, it also introduces a multitude of elements that make humans vulnerable to distorting information and thus making errors (Dror, in press). As many of these processes are unconscious (e.g., Greenwald, 1992), they are especially problematic and dangerous. This section elaborates and illustrates how human information processing can distort information in a variety of ways. The next section shows how these phenomena relate to fingerprint identification. Our perceptual information processing can also distort our perception of images. Although the two black shapes above, in Figure 156, are identical, they are perceived as being totally different (Shepard, 1981). The active and dynamic nature of the perceptual system not only has the potential to distort the incoming data, as already illustrated, but it can also add information and make us perceive things that are not actually there. For example, in Figure 157, one perceives imaginary subjective contours making a white square on top of the black square (Kanizsa, 1976). Furthermore, this imaginary white square incorrectly seems to be of a different shade than its surroundings (compare the shade in points A and B, which are in fact identical). These examples demonstrate that even the lower level sensory mechanisms are not passive or isolated from a variety of factors that can affect and distort what is perceived. Thus, much of what is perceived, even at the lower level mechanisms, is dependent on the perceiver rather than reflecting an \"objective reality\".  The attention different interpretation based on visual or mental context.\n\nmechanisms at the perceptual level, as well as at higher levels of information processing (discussed earlier in section 2.2), select only a subset of the information available for further processing. In this way, people actually do not process much of what they see. De facto, they disregard and miss possibly critical information in an image. Because of these as well as other cognitive mechanisms, the same visual image can, in fact, get different interpretations depending on the context in which it is presented. The middle pattern in Figure 158 can either be interpreted as the letter \"B\" or as the number \"13\"; either can be induced by providing different contextual information (\"13\" with the vertical contextual information or \"B\" with the horizontal contextual information). Because our minds and psychological state play a central role in how people process information, here too they are subject to vulnerabilities. In fact, the mind can \"play many tricks\" and cause a wide range of phenomena. The common saying that \"love is blind\" is a reflection of this effect.\n\nMost people have experienced that when they expect and hope to see something, then they see it even when it is not there (and, similarly, when they are afraid of something, they see it even where it is not). In these situations, the context is not provided by the environment but rather by one's \"state of mind\" or mental context. At a more scientific level, this can be demonstrated by showing that interpretation of the central image in Figure 8 as either a \"13\" or a \"B\" can be affected by one's state of mind. Rather than manipulating the external context of \"A, B, C\" vs. \"12, 13, 14\", the psychological state of mind, in terms of motivation, can be manipulated. If the central image is presented in a context that motivates people to see a number, then they will see it as \"13\", in contrast to seeing the same image as \"B\" when they are motivated to see it as a letter (Balcetis and Dunning, 2006). For example, one can be highly affected by states of wishful thinking, cognitive dissonance, escalation of commitment, or confirmation bias. In these cases, the collection and interpretation of information are driven to justify and verify a decision that has already taken place or to confirm a pre-existing preference or bias. Again,even if the decision-maker comes initially with no preconceived decisions or biases, as decisions are considered and made, information is gathered and processed for the purposes of confirming and validating these decisions. As already illustrated, these processes are highly dependent on psychological elements and processes rather than purely on the relevant information. Thus, one's mind and mental states can distort and interfere with whether and how information is collected, processed, and interpreted (e.g., Baumeister and Newman,1994; Kunda, 1990). These effects happen most often without any awareness (e.g., Greenwald, 1992).\n\n## 15.3 Cognitive And Psychological Elements In Fingerprint Identification\n\nIt is clear that fingerprint identification cannot be performed in isolation from human cognition. A whole range of perceptual, cognitive, and psychological elements play an integral role in all the stages of the identification process: from finding and collecting prints, perceiving them, and their analysis, comparison, and evaluation, to reaching judgments, making decisions, and verification. In the sections below, psychological and cognitive phenomena are tied together and related to the world of fingerprint identification, and research that directly examines the fingerprint domain is then presented. Finally, some practical implications and applications of these elements are discussed. Finding ways to move forward and enhance fingerprint identification can only be achieved once we are willing to accept that these influences exist.\n\n## 15.3.1 Relevance Of Cognitive Phenomena To Fingerprint Identification\n\nIt is obvious that fingerprint experts, like experts in other domains and nonexperts in everyday life, are susceptible to perceptual, cognitive, and psychological phenomena. However, not all psychological and cognitive phenomena are directly related to fingerprint identification. It is important to consider which ones are relevant, and how. For example, if fingerprint identification requires comparing the length of ridges, then the Muller-Lyer illusion (1889) may be very relevant. In Figure 159, the top horizontal line is perceived as shorter than the bottom horizontal line, although the two lines are in fact identical in length (Restle and Decker, 1977). This is a demonstration of some potential psychological and cognitive phenomena that may be directly related to fingerprint identification. This and other phenomena have been researched within the general scope of psychological investigations. Other scientific investigations have been conducted to directly address fingerprint identification.\n\n## 15.3.2 Cognitive Research On Fingerprint Expertise And Identification\n\nA number of research studies have examined the possible influence of context on decisions about whether fingerprints match or not (see, for example, Langenburg et al., 2009; Schiffer and Champod, 2007; Dror, Peron, Hind, and Charlton, 2005; Dror and Charlton, 2006; Dror, Charlton, and Peron, 2006). In one study (Dror, Peron, Hind, and Charlton, 2005), pairs of fingerprints were presented to nonexperts. Some pairs of prints were clearly a match, some were clearly not a match, and others were ambiguous. Then, prior to the participants examining the fingerprints, contextual information about the crime at issue (including photos from the crime scene) was presented. Half of the time, the context was neutral. Participants had to judge whether there was sufficient information to make a sound judgment and, if so, whether the prints matched. However, the other half of the prints were presented within a highly emotional condition, with photos that were scientifically proven to provoke emotional reactions (Lang et al., 1995), such as the photograph in Figure 1510. The results of the study showed that emotional context and mood affected how fingerprints were matched. However, the effect of emotional context was dependent on the difficulty of making the match. The emotional manipulation only affected matching decisions when the pairs of fingerprints were ambiguous and there was not enough data to make a clear and simple identification or exclusion decision. (For details, see Dror, Peron, Hind, and Charlton, 2005.)\nThe 2005 study was conducted on nonexperts. However, emotional experiences do seem to play a role in the work of fingerprint examiners (Charlton et al., in press). Even studies with real experts do not capture the reality in the workplace because the research is laboratory based. In fact, even in the normal working environment, experts behave differently if they know they are being observed, taking part in research, or being tested. As an analogy, if one wants to test and examine how people drive, then examining their driving during an official driving test, or even when they know they are being watched (or within the range of a speed camera), will hardly reflect how they actually drive every day in practice on the road (see Dror and Rosenthal, 2008; Dror, 2009b).\n\nTo collect ecologically valid and robust data, Dror and Charlton (2006) and Dror, Charlton, and Peron (2006) employed covert data collected from fingerprint experts during their routine work. A within-subject experimental design was used in which the same experts made judgements on identical pairs of fingerprints, but in different contexts. This is a very robust and powerful experimental paradigm, as participants act as their own controls. This not only provides more meaningful and interpretable data, but each data point carries more statistical power. Furthermore, this allows the researcher to isolate, focus on, and examine the contextual influences themselves rather than revealing possible individual differences between experts. Accordingly, pairs of fingerprints were collected (from archives) that the same experts being examined had examined and judged approximately 5 years earlier as a clear and definite match or exclusion. These previous identifications/exclusions were taken from real criminal investigations. In these studies, the very same pairs of fingerprints were re-presented to the same experts, only now they were presented within an extraneous context that might bias them to evaluate the prints differently. A control condition included pairs of prints that were presented without manipulating the context. In these two studies, a total of 53 pairs of prints were presented to 11 experienced latent fingerprint experts (none of whom participated in both studies). In a combined meta-analysis of these two experiments (Dror and Rosenthal, 2008), the reliability and biasability of the fingerprint experts was analyzed and determined. Eight out of the 11 experts made some inconsistent decisions that conflicted with their previous decisions on the same pair of fingerprints. These conflicting decisions mainly occurred in the more difficult prints and with prints that were originally judged as identifications. However, some inconsistent decisions also occurred with relatively easy prints and with prints that were originally judged as exclusions. Furthermore, some inconsistent decisions were observed in the control condition, in which the prints were presented without any contextual manipulation. (For full details and discussion of these results, see the studies; full citations are listed in the References.) A number of new studies have followed up on this work (e.g., Langenburg et al., 2009; Hall and Player, 2008; Schiffer and Champod, 2007). Although there is some divergence on the interpretations of the different studies (see Dror, 2009b), all consistently and clearly show that biasing effects exist, although they do not necessarily change decision outcomes and their effects vary depending on circumstances. As stated in Langenburg et al. (2009), \"There is strong evidence that some fingerprint specialists can be biased by contextual information. The decision made by a specialist is not necessarily based solely on the ridge detail when comparing images. More importantly, the bias effect was most often observed during complex comparison trials\" (page 577; italics in the original). These studies illustrate some of the potential interferences of psychological and cognitive elements in fingerprint identification. These issues can be further exacerbated by technology (see Dror and Mnookin, 2010) and working procedures, as specified in section 15.3.3.\n\nThe changes in the low-level perceptual mechanisms, identified using brain recordings as described in section 15.2.3.3, illustrate that training affects the nature of the information processing mechanisms. As the quality of the information acquired by the visual system improves, the structure of the decision process also changes. For example, as an examiner begins to acquire more experience with harder images, he or she may feel more comfortable \"calling\" more difficult prints. This entails a change in the implicit decision criteria such that less evidence, if it is of higher quality, might be sufficient to make a determination. Models of decisionmaking, such as signal detection theory, actually support such a shift in the decision criteria to balance the tradeoffs between correct identifications, correct exclusions, misses, and erroneous identifications. The preceding section, however, does reinforce the conclusion that as an examiner shifts his or her decision criteria with changes in experience, care must be taken to avoid shifting them too much. Central to any shift in criteria must be a set of procedures to obtain accurate feedback from know fingerprints, either in the form of formal proficiency testing or informal practice working with a community of examiners.\n\n## 15.3.3 Applications And Implications Of Cognitive Research And Phenomena To Fingerprint Analysis And Comparisons\n\nIt is clear by now that cognition plays a critical role in fingerprint identification. Nevertheless, there has been relatively little attention to the cognitive and psychological perspectives, and only a small number of studies that are specifically directed at the fingerprint domain have been conducted to explore this or related issues (e.g., Busey and Vanderkolk, 2005; Schiffer and Champod, 2007; Wertheim et al., 2006; Haber and Haber, 2004; Dror, Schmitz- Williams, and Smith, 2005; Dror and Charlton, 2006; Dror, Charlton, and Peron, 2006; Dror, Stevenage, and Ashworth, 2008; Langenburg et al., 2009). The need for systematic research into the cognitive and psychological issues cannot be overstated.\n\n15.3.3.1 Selection and Screening. Although many experts were biasable and unreliable in their judgments (Dror and Rosenthal, 2008), some experts seem to have been relatively immune to many cognitive and psychological influences. Why were those experts not as susceptible as the others? What was it about those experts that made them so consistent, reliable, and unbiasable? More systematic research needs to be done before it can be determined if it had to do with their personalities, cognitive style, training, working culture, or other factors. However, what is clear is that, whatever it is, it is something good that should be sought in every fingerprint expert. But what are those things that make up a fingerprint expert? What are the cognitive skills and aptitudes that are needed for conducting fingerprint identification? As a first step to further professionalize and enhance fingerprint identification, the field must screen and select the correct people to become experts in this domain. In order to do this, the field first needs to understand the skills and cognitive styles that underpin the ability to conduct fingerprint identification. However, in contrast to other domains of expertise (e.g., Air Force pilots; see Dror, Kosslyn, and Waag, 1993), there has been no research to this effect in the fingerprint domain; thus, there is a lack of standardized and scientifically based testing of screening applicants.\n\nOnly with systematic research into the skills and aptitudes needed for fingerprint identification can the field construct a cognitive profile of fingerprint experts. Then those abilities that are relatively hard-wired and do not change with training will be used for initial selection and screening (e.g., Dror, 2004). There is a need to establish a standardized test for recruitment screening of fingerprint examiners that is based on research and understanding. Proper screening and selection is critical for finding the best candidates for this profession. Investment in initially selecting the right people for the profession is not only very cost-effective but will also avoid problems in the long run.\n\n15.3.3.2 Training. Trainingwhether it is the initial training involved in becoming an expert, or continuing professional development over the years via workshops and other training opportunitiesis a critical aspect in fingerprint expertise. Training in all its forms needs to address the psychological and cognitive influences that may affect the workings of fingerprint experts. Such training can help minimize the elements that can lead to misjudgments and to error. However, such training is practically nonexistent. This essential training would involve theoretical discussion and hands-on exercises on how to avoid error due to psychological and cognitive factors. To elucidate such training programs would require a whole book in its own right, but generally such training would need to intertwine knowledge of cognition, expert performance, and fingerprint identification. Along with training, continuous blind testing of expert performance is an important aspect that is not currently implemented in most places. Testing experts in nonblind conditions, when they know they are being tested, only examines their theoretical ability to match fingerprints. Just as driving tests do not reflect how people actually drive on the road, non-blind testing of experts does not reflect their practical performance in casework. Choosing the right people to become fingerprint experts, training them properly, and continuously testing their performance will address many of the issues raised in this chapter, but only at a personal and individual level. Tackling the complexity of cognitive and psychological influences requires addressing these issues both at the individual expert level and at the organizational administrative level (Dror, 2009a).\n\n15.3.3.3 Procedures. Correct working procedures are essential for minimizing psychological and cognitive interferences in making fingerprint matching decisions. Such procedures have to be pragmatic and adapted to the specific realities in which they are implemented. The procedures must consider the cognitive and psychological influences from the initial evaluation of the latent print to the final verification. In the initial evaluation, for example, there is the issue of whether this should be done in isolation from seeing any potential tenprints (Dror, 2009a). Examining and evaluating the latent print by itself allows judgments to be independent; when such examinations are done with the accompanying tenprint, there are a number of potential problematic issues. The tenprint provides a context and a motivation that can change the way the latent print is examined and evaluated: It can affect the selective allocation of attention, change thresholds and standards for assessing information, cause the perception of characteristics that are not there and/or the dismissal of characteristics that are there, and many other unconscious cognitive and psychological phenomena that have been elaborated upon throughout this chapter. However, the examination of a latent print against a suspect tenprint may also allow examiners to notice certain bits of information by directing their attention to those areas that do require special attention and further processing (Dror, 2009a). Thus, there is no simple solution and the problems are complex. A possible solution may entail an initial examination and analysis of the latent print in isolation but also allow for retroactive changes after comparison to the tenprints. There is a danger here, too, as this can bring about acceptance of low-quality latent prints that do not contain sufficient information as well as all the other cognitive and psychological issues discussed already. A way to move forward may be an initial examination of a latent print in isolation, and an analysis of it that comprises distinguishing characteristics that are strong and cannot be changed, with weaker characteristics considered when later examining the tenprints (see details at Dror, 2009a). This is only an illustration of the procedural changes that might address cognitive and psychological influences. These types of issues continue throughout the entire procedure of fingerprint identification (and exclusion), all the way to the final verification procedures. Many existing verifications are perhaps no more than a rubber stamp. The very fact that identifications will be verified (sometimes by more than one verifier) introduces a whole range of issues, from diffusion of responsibility (Darley and Latane, 1968) to conformity, attention, self-fulfilling prophecies, and wishful thinking. Quality assurance would require that look-alike exclusions would be put together along with the real\ncasework verifications, to keep the verifiers alert and to guarantee quality assurance. These issues and development of science-based procedures require further research.\n\n15.3.3.4 Technology. The introduction and development of technologies has had a profound impact on fingerprint identification. These technologies offer great capabilities and opportunities and, with efforts in biometric identification, the field can expect new technologies to continue and emerge in the future. Many times, the overestimation and promise of technology, and the underestimation of the human mind and human experts, lead to a false expectation that machines and technology will take over human performance (Dascal and Dror, 2005). As powerful as these technologies are and will be in the foreseeable future, they will not replace latent print examiners. The important thing is to take advantage of these new technologies and harness them to enhance fingerprint identification. To achieve this, technologies need to be integrated properly with the human experts. This means designing and integrating the technology to work with experts and to complement their work (Dror, 2005b, 2006; Dror and Mnookin, 2010). Although these technologies will not replace human experts, they will have a great impact on fingerprint identification (Davis and Hufnagel, 2007). In terms of some of the cognitive and psychological issues discussed in this chapter, some issues will be eliminated with the technological developments but other problems will not be affected. In fact, some issues will be exacerbated and new problems may even be created (Dror and Mnookin, 2010). For example, the Automated Fingerprint Identification System (AFIS) gives rise to giant databases that contain larger and larger numbers of fingerprints. With such large databases, the relative similarity of fingerprints found by pure coincidence will increase. With increased similarity and look-alike prints, the difficulty in matching will increase. With greater difficulty in the bottom-up matching of prints, greater opportunity and vulnerability is created for the topdown contextual and motivational components to distort and interfere with the matching process (see Dror et al., 2005; Dror and Mnookin, 2010).\n\nTechnological developments in the fingerprint domain are not limited to AFIS. For example, technology offers \"image enhancements\" (such as color and 3-D transformations). Such enhancements can offer clarity and improved accuracy, but at the same time they present great opportunities to strengthen and enable cognitive and psychological distortions. As before, there are no simple solutions, and the issues and problems are complex. Technology is an important ally to fingerprint experts but must be designed, developed, used, and integrated in a way that enhances fingerprint identification (Dror, 2005b; Dror and Mnookin, 2010).\n\n## 15.4 Summary And Conclusions\n\nThe dynamic and active nature of human information processing enables us to become experts but also makes us distort incoming data and make erroneous decisions. These vulnerabilities are not limited to fingerprint experts and apply equally to other domains. However, the importance of fingerprint evidence being reliable and unbiasable requires that these potential weaknesses be addressed. 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Perceptual Learning in Contrast Detection: Presence and Costs of Shifts in Response Criteria. *Psychonomic Bull. Rev.* 2006, 13 (4), 656661.\n\nWertheim, K.; Langenburg, G.; Moenssens, A. A Report of Latent Print Examiner Accuracy During Comparison Training Exercises. *J. Forensic Ident.* 2006, 56 (1), 5593.\n\nZhang, L.; Cottrell, G. W. When Holistic Processing Is Not Enough: Local Features Save the Day. In Proceedings of the 26th Annual Cognitive Science Conference, Chicago, IL, 2004.\n\n## Appendix A: Author And Reviewer Biographies Jeffery G. Barnes\n\nJeffery G. Barnes double majored at Virginia Wesleyan College, earning a bachelor of arts degree in chemistry and philosophy. He completed graduate school at Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University, receiving a master of science degree in chemistry. He worked for approximately five years with the City of Virginia Beach Police Department as a forensics services technician, where he earned several awards for his outstanding work. He has been with the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) for almost six years and has earned four on-the-spot awards for excellent performance of duties. As a physical scientist forensic examiner with the latent print operations unit of the FBI Laboratory, he teaches and continues to research the history of the fingerprint science. Author of Chapter 1 - History. Chapters reviewed: 2, Anatomy and Physiology of Adult Friction Ridge Skin; 3, Embryology, Physiology, and Morphology\n\n## Debbie Benningfield\n\nDebbie Benningfield is retired from the latent print laboratory section of the Houston Police Department, where she served for nearly 31 years. Her assignments included tenprint work, automated fingerprint identification systems manager, and deputy administrator. Currently, she is an instructor for Ron Smith and Associates, Inc. She is a certified latent print examiner. In 2003, she was appointed a member of the Scientific Working Group on Friction Ridge Analysis, Study, and Technology and in 2004, she was appointed to the International Association for Identification (IAI) Latent Print Certification Board. In January 2006, the Governor of Texas appointed her as the presiding officer over the newly created Texas Forensic Science Commission. In June 2006, Ms. Benningfield was elected president of the Texas Division of the IAI. Chapters reviewed: 1, History; 9, Examination Process\n\n## Herman Bergman\n\nHerman Bergman started his career in 1995 at the tenprint section of the Dutch Criminal Intelligence Service (CRI). He received in-house education and training in fingerprint history, biology, classification, and automated fingerprint identification systems. He moved to the latent fingerprint section in 1999 and received additional training in development techniques, palmprint comparison, methodology, and AFIS processing. He was certified as a latent print examiner at the Crime Control and Investigation Training Institute in the Netherlands. He is a member of the Ridgeology Working Group (the group's purpose is to assess the desirability of adopting a non-numeric system in the Netherlands), and he has participated in developing a curriculum for latent print examiners seeking certification at the Police Academy. He was also a visiting instructor in the certification program at the Crime Control and Investigation Training Institute. He is a member of the International Association for Identification and the Scientific Working Group on Friction Ridge Analysis, Study, and Technology. Chapters reviewed: 4, Recording Living and Postmortem Friction Ridge Exemplars; 8, The Preservation of Friction Ridge Information; 9, Examination Process\n\n## Steve Bleay\n\nSteve Bleay obtained a bachelor of science degree in materials science from the University of Bath in 1988 and remained at the University of Bath carrying out postgraduate research in electron microscopy of composite materials until 1993. He was awarded a doctor of philosophy degree in 1991. He joined the Defence Research Agency (later QinetiQ) in 1993 and spent 10 years developing stealth materials and carrying out research into the production of novel fibre systems. He joined the Home Office Scientific Development Branch in May 2003 and has been working on novel vacuum metal deposition techniques, recovery of fingerprints from arson scenes, development and production of the IRIS workstation, and digital imaging. Contributing Author of Chapter 7 - Latent Print Development\n\n## Patti Blume\n\nPatti Blume has more than 28 years of experience working for the Orange County (California) Sheriff's Department.\n\nCurrently, she is a senior forensic specialist assigned to the automated fingerprint identification system (AFIS) unit as the system administrator. Previously, she worked in the Sheriff's Identification Bureau and was assigned to special projects while performing crime scene investigations, impression evidence examinations, latent print comparisons, and evidence processing. Her special projects have included being a project coordinator for accreditation by the American Society of Crime Laboratory Directors/Laboratory Accreditation Board, and she is currently coordinating accreditation for her agency's AFIS system. She has been a regular instructor for the California Department of Justice/ California Criminalistics Training Institute, teaching latent print comparisons and latent print techniques. Currently, she is on the editorial board of the Journal of Forensic Identification and has participated on the FBI Permanency Project on the persistency of ridge detail. She has an associate of science degree in evidence technology and a bachelor of science degree in public administration, and belongs to various forensic professional organizations. Chapters reviewed: 2, Anatomy and Physiology of Adult Friction Ridge Skin; 3, Embryology, Physiology, and Morphology; 4, Recording Living and Postmortem Friction Ridge Exemplars; 6, Automated Fingerprint Identification Systems (AFIS); 9, Examination Process; 12, Quality Assurance\n\n## Donna Brandelli\n\nDonna Brandelli has a bachelor of science degree in criminal justice from California State University and a master of science degree in forensic science from National University. She is completing her doctor of philosophy degree in human behavior with a focus on criminal justice through Capella University. She is a recipient of the William C. Battles Achievement Award in Criminal Justice and past president of the local division of the Alpha Phi Sigma Criminal Justice Honor Society. She is a member of the American Academy of Forensic Sciences, the Academy of Criminal Justice Sciences, and the International Association for Identification, and is on the editorial board of the Journal of Forensic Identification. She has testified as an expert witness in the areas of fingerprint comparison, chemical processing, and crime scene investigation. She created and presented a training class on crime scene preservation geared to first responders, which has been presented to municipal, county, and federal agencies across the country. She is a research partner with the FBI regarding the permanence of friction ridge skin. As an adjunct faculty member, she has taught Introduction to Forensic Science, Introduction to Criminology, and Introduction to Policing and Contemporary Issues in Law Enforcement at the University of Phoenix and American InterContinental University. Chapter reviewed: 13, Fingerprints and the Law\n\n## Mary Ann Brandon\n\nCriminalist Mary Ann Brandon, certified latent print examiner, has been involved in friction ridge science with the Portland (Oregon) Police Bureau for more than 29 years. With two other examiners, she researched and published\n\"Cloned\" Primates and the Possibility of Identical Fingerprints. Sponsored by the Portland Police Bureau and the International Association for Identification, she initiated the TwinPrint Study in 2000. She taught Forensic Science and Criminal Investigation at Portland Community College for eight years and recently obtained her certification as a medicolegal death investigator in Oregon. She has served on the Scientific Working Group on Friction Ridge Analysis, Study, and Technology for 10 years.\n\nChapters reviewed: 2, Anatomy and Physiology of Adult Friction Ridge Skin; 3, Embryology, Physiology, and Morphology\n\n## Thomas Busey\n\nThomas Busey received his bachelor of arts degree from Cornell University in 1988 and his doctor of philosophy degree in cognitive psychology from the University of Washington in 1994. He has been on the faculty at Indiana University in the Department of Psychological and Brain Sciences since 1994. He is currently funded by the National Institute of Justice to identify the nature of human expertise in latent print examiners with the goal of improving the understanding of the quantitative analyses of fingerprints.\n\nCoauthor of Chapter 15 - Special Abilities and Vulnerabilities in Forensic Expertise\n\n## Leonard G. Butt\n\nLeonard G. Butt is currently employed with the Maryland State Police, Forensic Sciences Division as a forensic scientist. Previously, he worked as a fingerprint specialist for the Drug Enforcement Administration. He is retired from the Baltimore County, Maryland Police Department. His assignments there included crime scene technician, latent print examiner, identification unit supervisor, and interim crime laboratory director. He served on the Printrak AFIS Users' Group Executive Committee and represented the International Association for Identification in the Federal Bureau of Investigation's IAFIS Working Group. Mr. Butt is a certified latent print examiner and a graduate of the FBI National Academy. He is the current chairman of the Scientific Working Group on Friction Ridge Analysis, Study, and Technology. Chapters reviewed: 9, Examination Process; 10, Documentation of Friction Ridge Impressions: From the Scene to the Conclusion; 14, Scientific Research in the Forensic Discipline of Friction Ridge Individualization\n\n## Mike Campbell\n\nCaptain of Police Mike Campbell (retired) is a 28 year veteran of the City of Milwaukee Police Department, and served as the commanding officer of its identification division. Upon retirement, he took a position as a training coordinator with Ron Smith and Associates, Inc., a forensic training and consulting company based in Collinsville, Mississippi. He had more than 20 years of experience as a crime scene and fingerprint identification specialist with the department. He was responsible for the day-to-day operation of the crime scene response unit; all evidence photography and digital imaging systems; and the procurement and operation of the department-wide booking, AFIS, and criminal history systems. He has taught more than 250\ncourses and lectured numerous times on these matters to several thousand students in 25 states and Canada during the last 15 years. He is a member of the Scientific Working Group on Friction Ridge Analysis, Study, and Technology and serves on the International Association of Chiefs of Police Forensic Committee and on the Board of Directors for the International Association for Identification (IAI). Mr. Campbell is a past president of the Wisconsin Law Enforcement Executive Development Association and the Wisconsin Division of the IAI. He also holds active memberships in the Canadian Identification Society and the Midwest Association of Forensic Scientists. Chapters reviewed: 1, History; 4, Recording Living and Postmortem Friction Ridge Exemplars; 5, Systems of Friction Ridge Classification; 9, Examination Process\n\n## Antonio A. Cantu\n\nAntonio Cantu's interests include the chemistry of documents and the chemistry of fingerprints. He received his doctor of philosophy degree in chemical physics from the University of Texas in Austin, Texas. He began his government career in 1972 with what is now the National Institute of Justice. A year later he joined the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms. He then joined the Federal Bureau of Investigation in 1983. In 1985, Dr. Cantu joined the U.S. Secret Service and devoted his first eight years to the area of technical security. For the next three years, he developed scientific methods for determining the source of counterfeit currency. After that, he was with the Forensic Services Division, becoming the Chief Scientist. He retired from the U.S. Secret Service in April 2007. He has published many articles, mostly regarding ink analysis and latent print chemical development. In 1980, he received the Forensic Scientist of the Year Award from the Mid-Atlantic Association of Forensic Scientists and in 2002, he received the highly coveted Paul L. Kirk Award from the American Academy of Forensic Sciences.\n\n## Contributing Author Of Chapter 7 - Latent Print Development Christophe Champod\n\nChristophe Champod received his master of science degree and doctor of philosophy degree (summa cum laude) in forensic science from the University of Lausanne in 1990\nand 1995, respectively. He remained in academia until holding the position of assistant professor in forensic science. From 1999 to 2003, he led the Interpretation Research Group of the Forensic Science Service (United Kingdom), before taking a professorship position at the School of Criminal Sciences (ESC)/Institute of Forensic Science (IPS) of the University of Lausanne. Mr. Champod co-authored the book *Fingerprints and Other Ridge Skin Impressions*\n(CRC Press, 2004). He is in charge of education and research on identification methods (detection and identification). He is a member of the International Association for Identification and of the Scientific Working Group on Friction Ridge Analysis, Study, and Technology. His research is devoted to the statistical evaluation of forensic identification techniques. The value of fingerprint evidence is at the core of his interests. Chapters reviewed: 1, History; 6, Automated Fingerprint Identification Systems (AFIS); 7, Latent Print Development; 14, Scientific Research in the Forensic Discipline of Friction Ridge Individualization\n\n## Sue Manci Coppejans\n\nSue Manci Coppejans has worked in the forensic science field with the Alabama Department of Forensic Sciences since June 1992. She is a certified latent fingerprint examiner. She has a bachelor of science degree from the University of South Alabama. She served on the International Association for Identification Latent Fingerprint Certification Board from 1999 to 2003. She has served as a member of the Scientific Working Group on Friction Ridge Analysis, Study, and Technology for the past four years. She has taught numerous classes and given presentations on the topic of fingerprints at international and local meetings. Chapters reviewed: 4, Recording Living and Postmortem Friction Ridge Exemplars; 7, Latent Print Development\n\n## Christine L. Craig\n\nChristine Craig is a crime scene analyst and a footwear and tire track examiner at the Seminole County Sheriff's Office in Sanford, Florida. She is a member of the International Association for Identification and is a certified footwear examiner and certified crime scene analyst. She is also a regional team leader for the fingerprinting section of the Florida Emergency Mortuary Operations Response System.\n\nMs. Craig has a master of science degree in biology from Virginia Commonwealth University and is currently obtaining a doctor of philosophy degree in ecology at the University of Florida.\nChapters reviewed: 1, History; 7, Latent Print Development\n\n## Brent T. Cutro, Sr.\n\nBrent Cutro, currently employed by the Illinois State Police Forensic Sciences Command, began his career in forensic sciences in 1981 after receiving a bachelor of science degree in biology from George Williams College. He has held various positions relating to the science of latent print examination. Some of these positions include latent print section quality assurance coordinator, latent print section advisory committee member, research advisory committee member, and section supervisor. Additionally, he served on Illinois' first AFIS committee in its inaugural year. He is a member of the International Association for Identification and the Midwestern Association of Forensic Scientists, and is a Fellow of the Fingerprint Society. He has been involved with various research projects, most notably including one entitled \"A Water Soluble Non-Carcinogenic Fluorescent Pigment as an Alternative to Rhodamine 6G,\" which was presented at the FBI International Forensic Symposium on Latent Prints held in Quantico, Virginia. In addition to his duties as a latent print examiner for the Illinois State Police, Mr. Cutro has taught many latent print courses, workshops, and classes. He continues to lecture for several colleges and universities and is currently an instructor with North East Multi-Regional Training, Inc., an Illinois law enforcement training organization. Author of Chapter 4 - Recording Living and Postmortem Friction Ridge Exemplars. Chapters reviewed: 2, Anatomy and Physiology of Adult Friction Ridge Skin; 3, Embryology, Physiology, and Morphology; 9, Examination Process; 10, Documentation of Friction Ridge Impressions: From the Scene to the Conclusion\n\n## Itiel E. Dror\n\nDr. Itiel Dror has expertise and a proven track record in conducting scientific research as well as in improving human performance in applied expert domains. He has a Ph.D. from Harvard University in Psychology and Cognitive Science, and he has published over 75 scientific articles. Dr.\n\nDror has provided training workshops and consultancy to medical doctors, surgeons, frontline police, military fighter pilots, financial executives, forensic examiners, and experts in other domains, all aimed at enhancing decisionmaking and performance. Dr. Dror has worked with a variety of governmental bodies (such as the U.S. Air Force, the U.K. Army and MoD, the U.K. Passport and Identity Services, and Police Forces in the United States, United Kingdom, the Netherlands and Israel). His work focuses on perception, judgement, and decisionmaking, and how expertise, training, and technology can improve performance at the workplace. Dr. Dror divides his time between academia, at University College London (UCL), and applied research and consultancy, at Cognitive Consultants International (CCI). More information is available at: www.cci-hq.com. Coauthor of Chapter 15 - Special Abilities and Vulnerabilities in Forensic Expertise\n\n## Jeri Eaton\n\nJeri Eaton worked for the King County Sheriff's Department for 20 years and was the supervisor of the latent fingerprint unit. Prior to King County, she worked for the Iowa Division of Criminal Investigation as a latent examiner, crime scene investigator, and forensic photographer. She chairs the Pacific Northwest Region Latent Print Certification Board and is a member of the International Association for Identification (IAI) Crime Scene Certification Board as well as a member of the IAI AFIS Committee. For the past seven years, she has been a member of the Scientific Working Group for Friction Ridge Analysis, Study, and Technology.\n\nMs. Eaton is a past president of the Pacific Northwest Division of the International Association for Identification. She is a certified latent print examiner and certified senior crime scene analyst. She has made presentations and published articles for the IAI and recently conducted a worldwide study on the uniqueness of latent fingerprints for which publication is pending. Chapter reviewed: 6, Automated Fingerprint Identification Systems (AFIS); 8, The Preservation of Friction Ridge Information\n\n## Wayne Eaton\n\nWayne Eaton is the forensic operations manager for the King County Sheriff's Office Regional AFIS System. Prior to King County, he managed automated fingerprint identification system (AFIS) and livescan implementation projects for several state and local law enforcement agencies, including integration with other criminal justice systems.\n\nHe worked with international standards organizations and international focus groups to facilitate AFIS interoperability. Mr. Eaton was manager of systems engineering for 10 years for Sagem Morpho, an AFIS vendor. Before that he worked as a forensic scientist for the Iowa Division of Criminal Investigation Crime Laboratory. He holds a bachelor of science degree in chemistry from Central University of Iowa and a master of business administration degree from City University. Chapter reviewed: 6, Automated Fingerprint Identification Systems (AFIS)\n\n## Michael K. French\n\nMichael K. French is a certified latent print examiner with 13 years of experience in law enforcement and private consultation. He has extensive experience in the development, imaging, examination, and electronic searching of fingerprint evidence, as well as expertise in writing laboratory development, hygiene, and safety guidelines. As a consultant, he specializes in reviewing lab procedures, auditing fingerprint-related casework, and training students in forensic evidence techniques. He worked for the King County Sheriff's Office from 1994 to 2006, where he was a lead examiner during the Green River Homicide Investigation. He has a bachelor of arts degree in public safety from Central Washington University.\n\nCoauthor of Chapter 7 - Latent Print Development\n\n## Deborah Friedman\n\nDeborah Friedman holds a master of science degree in forensic chemistry and a masters in business administration. She has more than 25 years of working experience in a crime laboratory. This experience encompasses the forensic science disciplines of trace evidence, biology, latent prints, controlled substances, and crime scene investigations. During the last seven years, she has been employed as the quality manager for the Broward Sheriff's Office Regional Crime Laboratory. Deborah Friedman is one of the founding members and current president of the Association of Forensic Quality Assurance Managers.\n\nChapters reviewed: 1, History; 12, Quality Assurance; 14,Fingerprints and the Law\n\n## Robert J. Garrett\n\nRobert J. Garrett spent more than 30 years in law enforcement. He attended Rutgers University and is a graduate of the New Jersey State Police Academy. Before retiring, he was the supervisor of the crime scene unit of the Middlesex County Prosecutor's Office in New Jersey. Mr. Garrett has authored many articles relating to crime scene subjects and has testified as an expert on a variety of forensic disciplines. He has been a lecturer at state, regional, and international conferences and serves on the editorial board of the *Journal of Forensic Identification.* He served on the Board of Directors of the International Association for Identification and is currently its second vice president, and chairs the association's professional review board. He is certified by the IAI as a senior crime scene analyst and latent print examiner. He is a Fellow of the Fingerprint Society of Great Britain. Chapters reviewed: 4, Recording Living and Postmortem Friction Ridge Exemplars; 6, Automated Fingerprint Identification Systems (AFIS); 7, Latent Print Development; 8, The Preservation of Friction Ridge Information; 9, Examination Process; 10, Documentation of Friction Ridge Impressions: From the Scene to the Conclusion; 11, Equipment; 14, Scientific Research in the Forensic Discipline of Friction Ridge Individualization\n\n## M. Leanne Gray\n\nM. Leanne Gray earned her bachelor of science degree at Northeast Missouri State University. She is a forensic scientist in the United States specializing in latent fingerprint and footwear examination at a state crime laboratory system. She has worked thousands of cases during the past 20 years and has acted as a quality assurance coordinator for both the latent fingerprint and footwear sections. In addition, she has been a training coordinator and was responsible for developing and implementing a comprehensive training program in the area of latent fingerprint examination. She also provides training and consultation via her private business, Gray's Forensic Fingerprint Training & Consultation, which is based in Oregon, Wisconsin. She is a certified latent print examiner.\n\nAuthor of Chapter 12 - Quality Assurance. Chapter reviewed: 9, Examination Process\n\n## Lynne D. Herold\n\nLynne Herold received her bachelor of science degree from Kent State University in 1974 and her doctor of philosophy degree in biology sciences from the University of Southern California in 1984. She taught Histology at the University of Southern California while completing her doctorate degree and has worked as an adjunct faculty member for the Union Institute and University. She began her career in criminalistics in 1984 with the Los Angeles County Coroner's office. In 1989, she transferred to the Los Angeles Sheriff's Department Scientific Services Bureau, where she is currently employed as a senior criminalist. Her biological studies and specific interest in the microscopic identification of botanical and animal tissues and their structure has been instrumental in providing a foundation for her testimony in many cases in the United States and internationally. She has presented papers and made poster presentations at numerous symposiums and professional seminars conducted by the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the California Association of Criminalists, and the American Academy of Forensic Sciences. Chapters reviewed: 2, Anatomy and Physiology of Adult Friction Ridge Skin; 3, Embryology, Physiology, and Morphology\n\n## Peter T. Higgins\n\nPeter T. Higgins earned a master of science degree in mathematics and computer science from Stevens Institute of Technology in Hoboken, New Jersey. He began his professional career as a mathematician with the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency. He served in various capacities at that agency, to include establishing the Chief Information Technology office and managing research in biometrics. He then joined the Federal Bureau of Investigation in 1992, where he was responsible for the development of the integrated automatic fingerprint identification system (IAFIS). He became the deputy assistant director and was in charge of engineering in the FBI Criminal Justice Information Services Division. He retired from the FBI in 1995 and has been involved with fingerprint agencies in several countries, providing consulting services. He chaired the IAI AFIS committee for five years. He has published in biometrics and AFIS technology. He has lectured at the university level on AFIS and biometric technology. Contributing Author of Chapter 6 - Automated Fingerprint Identification Systems (AFIS)\n\n## Laura A. Hutchins\n\nLaura A. Hutchins has over nine years of experience as a latent fingerprint examiner and is currently employed at the United States Secret Service. Ms. Hutchins received her training at the Federal Bureau of Investigation's (FBI) Laboratory Latent Print Unit. In addition to her FBI latent print certification, she is certified by the International Association for Identification (IAI). Ms. Hutchins is extremely active in the field of friction ridge identification. She has been a member of the Scientific Working Group on Friction Ridge Analysis, Study, and Technology (SWGFAST) since 2005 and is a current board member of and Web editor for the IAI. Additionally, she is a technical reviewer for the *Journal of Forensic Identification* and is the editor for the Chesapeake Bay Division of the IAI. Ms. Hutchins is a member of an Intra-agency working group established by the National Science and Technology Council. Additionally, she has experience business process mapping crime laboratories in order to streamline and implement process improvement. Ms. Hutchins received a Bachelor of Arts degree in anthropology from Marquette University and a Master of Science degree in biological anthropology from the University of Wisconsin. Author of Chapters: 5, Systems of Friction Ridge Classification; 8, The Preservation of Friction Ridge Information. Chapters reviewed: 1, History; 4, Recording Living and Postmortem Friction Ridge Exemplars; 6, Automated Fingerprint Identification Systems (AFIS); 9, Examination Process\n\n## Charles P. Illsley\n\nCharles P. Illsley is a certified latent print examiner with 30 years of experience in various types of forensics examinations. He has testified as an expert witness in laser and forensic light technology, fingerprint identification, and clandestine drug lab manufacture in California, Idaho, Utah, and New York. He retired after 25 years of service with two Utah police departments. Now Mr. Illsley is a part-time forensic consultant for the Utah Attorney General's Office and also consults with various law enforcement agencies on cold case forensics examinations. Mr. Illsley is a life active member of the International Association for Identification. He served on the International Association of Identification Board of Directors and as president in 1998. He is a published author and lectures throughout the United States and Canada on various forensic and expert witness issues.\n\nHe currently serves on the editorial board of the Journal of Forensic Identification. He is also a past president of the Utah Division of the IAI and now serves as chairperson for the Utah Latent Print Certification Committee. Mr. Illsley was a member of SWGFAST from 1996 to 2005 and wrote the cooperative grant proposal that funded the publication and distribution of this sourcebook. Author of Sourcebook cooperative grant proposal.\n\n## Vici Kay Inlow\n\nVici Kay Inlow is the identification branch chief for the United States Secret Service, Washington, D.C. Prior to working with the Secret Service, she was the senior forensic specialist with the Orange County Sheriff Coroner in Santa Ana, California. She has been involved in the various aspects of forensic identification, crime scene investigation, and research for more than 30 years. Ms. Inlow has taught crime scene investigation, latent impression processing techniques, and friction ridge comparison at various colleges and professional conferences. Contributing Author of Chapter 7 - Latent Print Development\n\n## Ginger A. Kobliska\n\nGinger A. Kobliska holds a master of science degree in forensic science and is a latent print and footwear examiner for the Indiana State Police at the Indianapolis Regional Laboratory. She is an active member of the American Academy of Forensic Sciences, the International Association for Identification, and the Midwestern Association of Forensic Scientists. She has been a board member of the Indiana Division of the International Association of Identification for several years and has served as its secretary treasurer. In addition, she organizes forensic team building exercises and is a contractor for Ron Smith and Associates, Inc. Chapter reviewed: 1, History\n\n## Peter D. Komarinski\n\nPeter D. Komarinski is a biometric consultant with more than 20 years of experience with automated fingerprint identification systems (AFIS). He is retired from the New York State Division of Criminal Justice Services where he was an AFIS manager. His responsibilities included testing system enhancements and the particular application of latent print identification to AFIS. He is the author of Automated Fingerprint Identification Systems (Elsevier Press)\nand is chair of the IAI AFIS Committee. He has written, lectured, and testified as an expert regarding AFIS. Chapter reviewed: 6, Automated Fingerprint Identification Systems (AFIS)\n\n## Glenn Langenburg\n\nGlenn Langenburg is currently employed by the Minnesota Bureau of Criminal Apprehension as a certified latent print examiner and crime scene investigator. He earned a bachelor of science degree in forensic science from Michigan State University in 1993 and a master of science degree in analytical chemistry in 1999 from the University of Minnesota. He is a doctor of philosophy candidate in the forensic science program at the University of Lausanne, Switzerland. His thesis research centers on the application of the ACE V methodology for fingerprint comparisons. Mr. Langenburg is an adjunct faculty member at Metropolitan State University in St. Paul, Minnesota. He teaches an introductory forensic science course. He has lectured nationally and internationally at forensic science conferences in the United States, Canada, and Europe on topics including Daubert issues, research, and fingerprint methodology. He also teaches several fingerprint comparison workshops. He has the privilege of serving the fingerprint community as a member of the Scientific Working Group for Friction Ridge Analysis, Study, and Technology. Author of Chapter 14 - Scientific Research in the Forensic Discipline of Friction Ridge Individualization\n\n## Deborah Leben\n\nDeborah Leben has been employed with the U.S. Secret Service (USSS) as a fingerprint specialist for 17 years. During this time, she has conducted research, along with other laboratory scientists, relating to the development of latent prints. Other duties include managing information technology projects within the Department of Homeland Security and the USSS. She has a master of science degree in forensic science, a master of science degree in technology management, is a project management professional through the Project Management Institute, and is a certified latent print examiner. She is currently president of the Chesapeake Bay Division of the International Association for Identification (IAI), a member of the editorial board of the *Journal of Forensic Identification,* and a member of the board of directors for the IAI. Chapter reviewed: 7, Latent Print Development\n\n## William F. Leo\n\nWilliam Leo has been a fingerprint examiner for 35 years, and is the lead instructor in the Los Angeles Sheriff Department's Latent Print Examiner Training Program. He has a Bachelor of Science degree in Criminal Justice and a Master of Science degree in Criminology from Indiana State University. He has lectured extensively and has provided expert witness testimony on the scientific and legal foundation of friction ridge identification. He has served as an Adjunct Professor of Administration of Justice at three Southern California Colleges. He has authored numerous papers and the textbook, *Fingerprint Identification.* He is a Past-President of the Southern California Association of Fingerprint Officers. Chapters reviewed: 1, History; 13, Fingerprints and the Law\n\n## Bridget Lewis\n\nBridget Lewis received an associate of arts degree from the Des Moines Area Community College. She started her career in law enforcement in 1979 as a police cadet with the City of Des Moines, Iowa Police Department. In 1985, she transferred to the identification section and became responsible for the investigation of crime scenes. Since 1996, she has been employed at the Iowa Division of Criminal Investigation as a criminalist in the identification section of the criminalistics laboratory. There she conducts analyses and comparisons on fingerprint, footwear, and tire impression evidence. Ms. Lewis is a certified latent print examiner. She is currently on the board of directors for the International Association for Identification and is also a member of the Scientific Working Group for Friction Ridge Analysis, Study, and Technology.\n\nChapters reviewed: 1, History; 4, Recording Living and Postmortem Friction Ridge Exemplars; 7, Latent Print Development; 11, Equipment\n\n## Alice Maceo\n\nAlice Maceo is currently the forensic laboratory manager for the latent print detail of the Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department. She has worked in the latent print discipline since 1997 and achieved latent print certification by the International Association for Identification (IAI) in 2001. She is an active speaker at forensic conferences in the United States, Canada, and Europe. She has published articles in the Journal of Forensic Identification and Fingerprint Whorld. Since 2001, she has had the honor of participating in the Scientific Working Group on Friction Ridge Analysis, Study, and Technology. In 2004, she earned distinguished member status with the IAI. She has a bachelor of science degree in biology from the University of Alaska. Author of Chapters: 2 - Anatomy and Physiology of Adult Friction Ridge Skin; 10 - Documentation of Friction Ridge Impressions: From the Scene to the Conclusion. Chapters reviewed: 8, The Preservation of Friction Ridge Information; 9, Examination Process; 12, Quality Assurance\n\n## James L. May Iii\n\nJames L. May III has been working in law enforcement since 1993. During his career he has focused on a variety of forensic disciplines, most notably crime scene investigations and infant death investigations. In January 2004, he was recruited by the Centers for Disease Control to assist in co-authoring the book Sudden, Unexplained Infant Death Investigation. Mr. May currently works for Tooele City Police Department as a Detective/Forensic Investigator. Over the length of his career, Mr. May has been an instructor for numerous agencies nationwide. He also serves on the editorial board of the Journal of Forensic Identification.\n\n## Chapter Reviewed: 13, Fingerprints And The Law R. Michael Mccabe\n\nR. Michael McCabe retired as a computer scientist from NIST and is currently a senior consultant for Identification Technology Partners. He is a graduate of John Carroll University and American University. Having worked closely with the FBI on fingerprint and other AFIS related projects, he was responsible for the development of the ANSI/ NIST-ITL 2007 fingerprint standard in addition to several ANSI and ISO fingerprint standards.\n\nContributing Author of Chapter 6 - Automated Fingerprint Identification Systems (AFIS)\n\n## Stephen B. Meagher\n\nFingerprint Specialist Stephen B. Meagher is a 35-year veteran of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and has been actively involved in the forensic latent print discipline for 29 years. He has conducted forensic examinations in hundreds of criminal cases and has testified as an expert throughout the United States and in Canada. He has held several management positions, including FBI chief for a latent print unit. He is currently managing a program related to legal aspects of the latent print discipline as well as coordinating and conducting research regarding latent print identification. Mr. Meagher planned, coordinated, and led a team of experts in response to the first legal Daubert challenge to the fingerprint science. He has since testified in 19 Daubert hearings in federal and state courts. He has been an instructor or lecturer on every aspect of the forensic latent print discipline to fingerprint experts, the general scientific community, researchers, attorneys, judges, developers, and manufacturers of fingerprint related technology. He has been actively involved in establishing fingerprint standards through the efforts of the National Institute of Standards and Technology. He is a member of the International Association for Identification Board of Directors; vice chair of the Scientific Working Group for Friction Ridge Analysis, Study, and Technology; and vice chair of the Interpol Fingerprint Monitoring Expert Group.\n\n## Coauthor Of Chapter 13   Fingerprints And The Law Andre A. Moenssens\n\nAndre A. Moenssens is a forensic consultant and retired professor with emeritus status from two universities. He began his training in fingerprints in Belgium in 1950. He earned a Juris Doctor degree with honors in 1966 and a Master of Laws degree from Northwestern University in 1967. He has qualified as an expert in state and federal courts, and has consulted widely in the U.S. and abroad. Author of several texts on fingerprinting and on scientific evidence, he is also an Editor-in-Chief of the Wiley Encyclopedia of Forensic Science's print version and online update service. He is a member of the International Association for Identification, a Distinguished Fellow of the American Academy of Forensic Science, and member of other professional societies. Coauthor of Chapter 13 - Fingerprints and the Law. Chapters reviewed: 2, Anatomy and Physiology of Adult Friction Ridge Skin; 14, Scientific Research in the Forensic Discipline of Friction Ridge Individualization\n\n## Kenneth Moses\n\nKenneth Moses has over 40 years of experience in the forensic sciences. A graduate of the University of California at Berkeley, Mr. Moses established the Crime Scene Investigations Unit of the San Francisco Police Department in 1983 and was instrumental in promoting automated fingerprint systems throughout the United States. He served as a member of SWGFAST and as chairman of the AFIS Committee for the IAI, where he vigorously encouraged live scan and digital palmprint technologies. Author of Chapter 6 - Automated Fingerprint Identification Systems (AFIS)\n\n## Julieanne Perez Avila\n\nJulieanne Perez Avila is currently employed at the Wisconsin State Crime Laboratory in Milwaukee as a forensic scientist/latent print examiner. She earned her Bachelor of Arts degree in criminal justice from the University of Wisconsin in 1990 and a Master of Science degree in forensic science from the University of New Haven in 1992. She is a member of the American Academy of Forensic Science, the Midwestern Association of Forensic Scientists, the International Association for Identification, and the Wisconsin Association for Identification. Author of Chapter 11 - Equipment\n\n## Michael Perkins\n\nMichael Perkins is a Crime Scene Analyst Supervisor with the Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department. He is a distinguished member of the International Association for Identification; serves on the editorial board of the Journal of Forensic Identification; and is certified as a latent print examiner, senior crime scene analyst, bloodstain pattern examiner, and forensic photographer. Chapters reviewed: 5, Systems of Friction Ridge Classification; 10, Documentation of Friction Ridge Impressions: From the Scene to the Conclusion; 11, Equipment; 14, Scientific Research in the Forensic Discipline of Friction Ridge Individualization\n\n## Salil Prabhakar\n\nSalil Prabhakar is a leading expert in biometrics and large scale identity systems. He is the chief scientist and director of R&D at DigitalPersona Inc., California. He recently designed the biometric system for the Unique Identification Authority of India as a volunteer. Salil is a co-author of more than 40 technical publications and holds two patents.\n\nHe co-authored the *Handbook of Fingerprint Recognition*\n(Springer 2003, 2009), which received the Professional/ Scholarly Publishing Division award from the Association of American Publishers. He has co-chaired several Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE), International Association of Pattern Recognition, and SPIE conferences; has been associate editor for four international journals including IEEE Transactions on Pattern Analysis and Machine Intelligence; and is a senior member of IEEE and VP Finance for IEEE Biometrics Council. He received his B. Tech. degree from the Institute of Technology, Banaras Hindu University, Varanasi, India in 1996 and his Ph.D. degree from Michigan State University in 2001, both in Computer Science and Engineering. Contributing Author of Chapter 6 - Automated Fingerprint Identification Systems (AFIS)\n\n## Robert Ramotowski\n\nRobert Ramotowski is employed as a research chemist with the United States Secret Service Forensic Services Division. He has been employed with the U.S. Secret Service in this capacity since 1994. His position involves coordinating research activities within the division in the areas of fingerprint visualization, document examination, ink chemistry, and optical and chemical tagging and tracking technologies. He received a bachelor of science degree in chemistry in 1993 and a master of science degree in chemistry in 1997 from George Washington University. Contributing Author of Chapter 7 - Latent Print Development\n\n## Charles Richardson\n\nCharles \"Chuck\" Richardson has been employed in the science of fingerprints since 1963. He was a senior fingerprint specialist with the FBI for 18 years, a fingerprint specialist with the United States Secret Service for 10 years, and a senior fingerprint specialist and program manager with the Drug Enforcement Administration for 11 years. He is a certified latent print examiner. Mr. Richardson has been an instructor in all phases of the science of fingerprints at both the FBI and the Department of Justice Academies. He has assisted in the training of FBI and Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) fingerprint specialists; DEA forensic chemists; and FBI, DEA, and United States Air Force, Office of Special Investigations, special agents. He has also assisted in the training of Assistant United States Attorneys at the Department of Justice's Judge Advocate General's School. In addition, he has conducted 40 hour courses for local police agencies in advanced latent fingerprints and courtroom testimony throughout the country. He currently serves as an instructor for IAI-sponsored training classes. Mr. Richardson is a former member of the Board of Directors of the IAI and a former member of the IAI's Latent Print Certification Board. He has testified in excess of 100 times in federal, state, and military courts in 30 states and Puerto Rico. He is currently a member of the Scientific Working Group on Friction Ridge Analysis, Study, and Technology. Chapters reviewed: 1, History; 5, Systems of Friction Ridge Classification; 9, Examination Process\n\n## Vaughn Sears\n\nIn 1981, Vaughn Sears obtained a bachelor of science degree in biochemistry from the University of Sussex. In June 1981, he joined the United Kingdom's Home Office to work in the Fingerprint Development Group. Since then he has carried out research and development on almost all of the Home Office-recommended fingerprint development processes. He was responsible for the HFE-based ninhydrin and DFO formulations and the blood enhancement dyes acid black 1, acid violet 17, and acid yellow 7. He also carried out many studies of the image capture of fingerprints, including equipment and capture media. He has published more than a dozen scientific papers on fingerprint topics and is the publication manager for both The Home Office Manual of Fingerprint Development Techniques and The Fingerprint Development Handbook. He is a member of the Royal Society of Chemistry and in 2005, the Royal Photographic Society awarded him the position of an Accredited Imaging Scientist and Associate of the Society. Contributing Author of Chapter 7 - Latent Print Development\n\n## Kenneth O. Smith, Jr.\n\nKenneth O. Smith, Jr., has been a latent print analyst since 1965. He retired in 2006 as the assistant laboratory director of the United States Postal Inspection Service. He is currently a self-employed forensic latent print examiner. His past credentials include: member of the Scientific Working Group on Friction Ridge Analysis, Study, and Technology; International Association for Identification (IAI) Board of Directors; IAI Representative for Latent Print Proficiency Testing; Chair and Secretary of the IAI Latent Print Certification Board; Virginia Scientific Advisory Committee; and the International Review Committee of the FBI Madrid Bombing case.\n\nChapters reviewed: 8, The Preservation of Friction Ridge Information; 12, Quality Assurance\n\n## Michelle L. Snyder\n\nMichelle L. Snyder is employed as a forensic scientist at the Ohio Bureau of Criminal Identification and Investigation. She has a Bachelor of Science degree in Pre-Medical Biology and a Bachelor of Arts degree in Sociology from Indiana University of Pennsylvania, as well as a Master of Science Degree in Forensic Science from Marshall University. Ms. Snyder serves as the forensic science coordinator for the latent print section to ensure section compliance with ASCLD-LAB accreditation guidelines. She is a member of the International Association for Identification (IAI) and the Chesapeake Bay Division of the IAI.\n\nChapters reviewed: 1, History; 2, Anatomy and Physiology of Adult Friction Ridge Skin; 3, Embryology, Physiology, and Morphology; 4, Recording Living and Postmortem Friction Ridge Exemplars\n\n## Lisa J. Steele\n\nLisa J. Steele practices law in Bolton, Massachusetts. She is a graduate of Mount Holyoke College and Western New England College School of Law. Ms. Steele has been representing indigent defendants in criminal appeals in Massachusetts and Connecticut since 1995. She was the author of the amicus brief (for the NACDL, Massachusetts Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, and The Committee for Public Counsel Services) in *Commonwealth* v Patterson, a Massachusetts Supreme Court case regarding fingerprint evidence. She is the author of several law review articles about criminal law and science, including The Defense Challenge to Fingerprints, 40:3 Crim. L. Bultn.\n\n213 (2004). Chapter reviewed: 14, Fingerprints and the Law\n\n## Jon T. Stimac\n\nJon T. Stimac has supplemented early research on the solvent HFE-7100 and introduced to the forensic community the use of Un-du as an alternative adhesive separator. For the development of latent print impressions on thermal and carbonless papers, he introduced a specialized ninhydrin formulation and the use of 1,2-indanedione. He has published several technical articles covering these and other topics in international forensic identification journals. Mr. Stimac is a member of SWGFAST and is also active in several regional and international forensic identification organizations. Chapters reviewed: 7, Latent Print Development; 9, Examination Process; 14, Scientific Research in the Forensic Discipline of Friction Ridge Individualization\n\n## B. Scott Swann\n\nB. Scott Swann is with the Federal Bureau of Investigation's (FBI) Criminal Justice Information Services (CJIS)\nDivision. During his 15 year tenure, he has served as an engineer to ensure the integrity of FBI IAFIS repositories, supported multiple technology refreshment implementations, and served as the Unit Chief responsible for directing, coordinating, and administering related biometrics technologies and services. Currently, Mr. Swann is the Science and Technology Lead for Identity Intelligence as part of a joint duty assignment with the Office of the Director of National Intelligence.  Mr. Swann is a certified project management professional through the Project Management Institute and holds a master of science degree in software engineering from West Virginia University.\n\n## Contributing Author Of Chapter 6 - Automated Fingerprint Identification Systems Lyla A. Thompson\n\nLyla A. Thompson is the Section Supervisor in the latent print section of the Johnson County, Kansas Criminalistics Laboratory.  She has more than 35 years of experience as a latent print examiner employed in Johnson County, Kansas, and with the Independence, Missouri Police Department. She is a member of the Scientific Working Group on Friction Ridge Analysis, Study and Technology. She is a certified latent print examiner currently serving as chair of the International Association for Identification Latent Print Certification Board. Chapters reviewed: 4, Recording Living and Postmortem Friction Ridge Exemplars; 5, Systems of Friction Ridge Classification; 12, Quality Assurance\n\n## Michele Triplett\n\nMichele Triplett is a certified latent print examiner with the King County Sheriff's Office in Seattle, Washington. She holds a bachelor of science degree in mathematics and statistics from Washington State University and has been employed in the friction ridge identification discipline for more than 13 years. She currently serves on the editorial board of the *Journal of Forensic Identification* and is a member of the International Association for Identification General Forensics Subcommittee.\n\nChapter reviewed:14, Scientific Research in the Forensic Discipline of Friction Ridge Individualization\n\n## John R. Vanderkolk\n\nJohn R. Vanderkolk, Indiana State Police, has a B.A. in Forensic Studies and Psychology from Indiana University and is the manager of the Indiana State Police Fort Wayne Regional Laboratory. He is a member of the Scientific Working Group on Friction Ridge Analysis, Study, and Technology; the Expert Working Group on Human Factors in Latent Print Analysis; and the editorial board for the Journal of Forensic Identification. He is a distinguished member of the International Association for Identification and serves as the chair for its Forensic Identification Standards committee. Mr. Vanderkolk consulted with the Office of the Inspector General in reference to the erroneous fingerprint identification in the Brandon Mayfield case. He also authored the textbook Forensic Comparative Science - Qualitative Quantitative Source Determination of Unique Impressions, Images, and Objects (Elsevier/Academic Press 2009). Author of Chapter 9 - Examination Process. Chapters reviewed: 1, History; 2, Anatomy and Physiology of Adult Friction Ridge Skin; 3, Embryology, Physiology, and Morphology; 14, Scientific Research in the Forensic Discipline of Friction Ridge Individualization\n\n## Melissa Wakefield\n\nMelissa Wakefield holds a bachelor of applied science (forensic investigation) from the Canberra Institute of Technology and has studied chemistry with the Australian National University. During these studies, she undertook an independent and ongoing research project to investigate a novel method for developing latent fingerprints on thermal paper. Ms. Wakefield is currently completing a research honours program with the University of Canberra's National Centre for Forensic Studies, with the support of the Australian Federal Police, while teaching fingerprint development techniques and forensic analytical chemistry for CIT's Centre for Forensic Science.\n\nContributing Author of Chapter 7 - Latent Print Development\n\n## James L. Wayman\n\nJames L. Wayman received a Ph.D. in engineering in 1980 from the University of California, Santa Barbara. He joined San Jose State University in 1995 to direct the Biometric Identification Research Program, serving as director of the U.S. National Biometric Test Center at San Jose State from 1997 to 2000. He is co-editor of *Biometric Systems*\n(Springer, London, 2005). He is a Fellow of the British Institution of Engineering and Technology; a Principal UK Expert to ISO/IEC JTC1 SC37 standards committee on biometrics; editor of ISO/IEC 19794-13, \"Voice Data Format\"; and former editor of ISO/IEC 19794-3, \"Finger Pattern Spectral Data Format\". He was a member of the U.S. National Academies of Science committees \"Whither Biometrics\", \"Authentication Technologies and Their Implications for Privacy\", and \"Panel on Information Technology\". Mr. Wayman has served as a paid biometrics advisor to nine national governments. Chapter reviewed: 15, Scientific Research in the Forensic Discipline of Friction Ridge Individualization\n\n## Michael J. Wenger\n\nMichael J. Wenger has a doctor of philosophy degree in experimental psychology from Binghamton University and postdoctoral training from Indiana University in mathematical psychology. Mr. Wenger's research focuses on the dynamic interactions of perceptual and memory processes, facial perception and memory, perceptual and cognitive expertise, and latency accuracy relations in perception and cognition. Central to each of these research endeavors is a commitment to developing and testing formal (mathematical and computational) models of the hypotheses and phenomena under consideration, with an emphasis on the tools of computational neuroscience.\n\nChapter reviewed: Visual Expertise and Latent Print Examinations [Replaced in this volume with Chapter 15 - Special Abilities and Vulnerabilities in Forensic Expertise]\n\n## Kasey Wertheim\n\nKasey Wertheim established his forensic career as a Forensic Scientist for the Mississippi Crime Laboratory, and launched his technical career with a small forensic technology company, LumenIQ, as their director of forensic services. In 2004, he established the Department of Defense Biometric Examination Services Team and formed his own consulting company, and has worked on fingerprintand technology-related problems for federal clients. Mr. Wertheim has lectured, conducted workshops, published papers, and participated in research projects in the latent print discipline. He earned Distinguished Member status with the International Association for Identification (IAI), served as the chair of the Latent Print Subcommittee of the IAI for two years, was a certified crime scene analyst for five years, serves on the editorial board of the Journal of Forensic Identification, and is a certified latent print examiner. Author of Chapter 3 - Embryology, Physiology, and Morphology. Chapters reviewed: 2, Anatomy and Physiology of Adult Friction Ridge Skin; 6, Automated Fingerprint Identification Systems (AFIS); 8, The Preservation of Friction Ridge Information; 9, Examination Process\n\n## Juliet H. Wood\n\nJuliet H. Wood is the Automated Fingerprint Identification System Program Manager at the U.S. Army Criminal Investigation Laboratory and a certified latent print examiner. She served as editor of the Georgia State Division of the International Association for Identification  from 2002 to\n2006 and is currently on the editorial board of the Journal of Forensic Identification. She has a Master of Forensic Science from George Washington University and a Bachelor of Science in Engineering from Columbia University. Chapters reviewed: 1, History; 4, Recording Living and Postmortem Friction Ridge Exemplars; 7, Latent Print Development; 8, The Preservation of Friction Ridge Information; 11, Equipment; 12, Quality Assurance\n\n## Brian Yamashita\n\nBrian Yamashita received a Bachelor of Science (honors) degree in Chemistry from the University of Manitoba and a Ph.D. in Physical Chemistry from the University of Western Ontario in London, Ontario. He joined the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) in 1989, where he currently does research and development work in forensic science with an emphasis on forensic identification. He is on the editorial boards of the *Journal of Forensic Identification* and the RCMP Gazette, and is the editor of the Canadian Society of Forensic Science Journal. He is a member of both SWGSTAIN and SWGTREAD. Coauthor of Chapter 7 - Latent Print Development\n\n## Rodolfo R. Zamora\n\nMr. Zamora works with the Chandler Police Department, an Internationally Accredited Lab (ISO). He has over 30 years experience doing crime scene work, evidence processing, latent print analysis, and restoring mummified friction skin. He has been involved in teaching around the state of Arizona in these same areas. He is a past president of the Arizona Identification Council (IAI), and past member of the Scientific Working Group on Friction Ridge Analysis, Study, and Technology. He has testified in juvenile, superior, federal, and Iraqi Courts. Chapters reviewed: 4, Recording Living and Postmortem Friction Ridge Exemplars; 7, Latent Print Development; 9, Examination Process\n\n## Appendix B: The Origin Of The Scientific Working Group On Friction Ridge Analysis, Study And Technology (Swgfast)\n\nWith the development of the field of DNA analysis, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) implemented a technical working group to develop best-practice guidelines for the community. Having witnessed the success of the program, in 1992 they explored the concept of promoting the development of additional Technical Working Groups (TWGs) in support of other forensic disciplines. Three members of the latent print community were introduced to this initiative when they attended a meeting with Kenneth Nimmich at the FBI Academy in Quantico, Virginia. They heard about the program that provided for a structured means to develop consensus standards to preserve and improve the quality of service within the DNA discipline. Following this informal presentation, they were asked whether there would be any value in establishing a similar working group to address the latent print discipline. Stephen Meagher from the FBI Laboratory, Curtis Shane of the Naval Investigative Services, and Leonard Butt with the Baltimore County, Maryland, Police Department were all in agreement that they would support such a program. The meeting ended, and time passed.\n\nOn June 10, 1995, a group of 15 distinguished individuals came together at the first meeting of what became known as the Technical Working Group on the Forensic Aspects of Friction Ridge Analysis. The following people represented this founding body: David Ashbaugh (Royal Canadian Mounted Police); Margaret Black (Orange County Sheriff's Office, California); Diane Bowman (Oakland Police Department, California); Robin Bratton (Michigan State Police); James Johnson (United States Secret Service); John Nielson (Wisconsin Department of Justice); Curtis Shane (Naval Investigative Services); James Springs (South Carolina Law Enforcement Division); and, from the FBI, Danny Greathouse, John Massey, Stephen Meagher, Eugene Mulholland, Kenneth Nimmich, James Ridgely, and Claude Sparks. The discussions that took place over the next 11 days served to lay the foundation for what this technical working group would attempt to accomplish. Amazingly, the thought was that this would be a short-term project. Expectations were that it would terminate upon the completion of the issuance of a set of guidelines to satisfy their selfimposed goal.\n\nFrom the minutes of that first meeting:\nThe basic proposed purpose of the group is: Create guidelines for latent print practitioner knowledge, analytical methodology, and ability to perform friction ridge examinations. To establish and promulgate methods for research and validation of innovative techniques. That the guidelines be recognized by forensic administrators and the judicial arena as the standard for acceptable practices of friction ridge examinations.\n\nBy definition, technical working groups are formed to address specific tasks. When the tasks are completed, the group is disbanded. The FBI determined that the established TWGs were to become long-term functioning bodies and they were reestablished as scientific working groups. To reflect this, the name Scientific Working Group on Friction Ridge Analysis, Study and Technology (SWGFAST) was officially adopted in 1998. Over the years, the primary topics that have been the subject of consideration by the group have not changed very much. These include minimum qualifications and training, certification, proficiency testing, quality assurance, integrity, advancement of the technology, and adoption of guidelines. When appropriate, as events have occurred over the years that had the potential to impact the practicing community at large, attempts have been made to address them individually. There has never been a want of topics to be considered by SWGFAST. As the role of SWGFAST evolved, its objectives became more refined and are more accurately reflected by the following:\n\n- To establish standards and guidelines for the development and enhancement of friction ridge examiners' knowledge, skills, and abilities.\n- To discuss and share friction ridge examination methods\nand protocols.\n- To encourage and evaluate research and innovative\ntechnology related to friction ridge examination.\n- To establish and disseminate standards and guidelines\nfor quality assurance and quality control.\n\n- To cooperate with other national and international organizations in developing standards.\n- To disseminate SWGFAST studies, standards, guidelines, and findings.\nSWGFAST's policy is to publish all guidelines and standards for comment from the community prior to being accepted as final documents. By design, this process is meant to ensure that the final work actually represents and satisfies the needs of practitioners as well as the science community and provides a vision that extends beyond that of just the SWGFAST membership. After being discussed a minimum of three times over the years, in 2007 the decision was made to expand the role of SWGFAST beyond that of the latent print discipline. This was accomplished through the establishment of a standing committee of representatives from the tenprint community. Although it was recognized that each discipline has its own specific responsibilities, the underlying principles and interest are the same. Furthermore, tasks performed by latent print examiners are dependent on the services performed within the tenprint community. Experiences gained as a result of this expansion have revealed that the true differences between the disciplines are really quite minimal. Evolution in the SWGFAST program is further demonstrated by the diversity represented among its members. SWGFAST has up to 40 Parent Body members and up to 10 members on the Tenprint Committee. Initially, the membership represented managers and practitioners from the latent print community. As consideration was given to new members, it was recognized that there would be significant value in providing a broader representation of backgrounds and interests. Currently, members come from diversified backgrounds and include latent print examiners, tenprint examiners, defense experts, researchers, academics, and managers. This group's diversity provides an objective, yet varied, perspective on all matters of interest to the group. The demographics represented by such a group serve to assure the inclusion of many justified, yet oftentimes opposing, perspectives that are to be discussed during the normal deliberations. This equates to a process that is better able to serve the community by injecting an internal measure of balance and objectivity when considering work on a particular task.\nSWGFAST maintains a continued commitment to the overall needs of the friction ridge science community. As part of that commitment, the group makes recommendations that extend beyond the practicing community in order to support the discipline. A primary example of that can be found in this Fingerprint Sourcebook.\n\nAs with the SWGFAST documents, there will be a continuing need to update the materials contained in the Fingerprint Sourcebook. Provisions for such updating bring additional merit to the work as being a living document conceptualized to provide ongoing and current support for the profession.\n\nScientific Working Group on Friction Ridge Analysis, Study and Technology\n\n## Appendix C: Members Of Swgfast Parent Body\n\n| NAME                 | AGENCY                              | DATES              |\n|----------------------|-------------------------------------|--------------------|\n| ARMSTONG, Benjamin   | Plano Police, Texas                 | 1996 to 1998       |\n| ASHBAUGH, David      | Royal Canadian Mounted Police       | 1995; 2001 to 2005 |\n| BELL, Jackie         | Federal Bureau of Investigation     | 1997 to 2002       |\n| BENNINGFIELD, Debbie | Houston Police, Texas               | 2004 to present    |\n| BERGMAN, Herman      | Oakland Police, California          | 2006 to present    |\n| BLACK John           | Private Examiner                    | 2007 to present    |\n| BLACK, Maggie        | Orange County Sheriff, California   | 1995 to present    |\n| BLUME, Patti         | Orange County Sheriff, California   | 1996               |\n| BOWMAN, Diane        | Oakland Police, California          | 1995               |\n| BRANDON, Mary        | Portland Police, Oregon             | 1996 to 2007       |\n| BRATTON, Robin       | Michigan State Police               | 1995 to 2002       |\n| BUTT, Lenny          | Maryland State Police               | 2002 to present    |\n| CAMPBELL, Mike       | Milwaukee Police, Wisconsin         | 2003 to 2007       |\n| CARTER, Danny        | Texas Dept. of Public Safety        | 1996 to 1998       |\n| CHAMPOD, Christophe  | University of Lausanne, Switzerland | 2005 to present    |\n| CLARK, John          | Western Identification Network      | 1999 to present    |\n| COPPEJANS, Mary Sue  | Alabama Department of Science       | 2003 to 2008       |\n| CURRIE, Ian          | Royal Canadian Mounted Police       | 2007 to 2011       |\n| NAME               | AGENCY                            | DATES           |\n|--------------------|-----------------------------------|-----------------|\n| EATON, Geraldine   | King County Sheriff, Washington   | 1998 to 2009    |\n| FISCHER, Deborah   | Florida Dept. of Law Enforcement  | 1999 to 2002    |\n| FITZPATRICK, Frank | Orange County Sheriff, California | 1997 to present |\n| FUTRELL, Ivan      | Federal Bureau of Investigation   | 1996            |\n| GARRETT, Robert    | Private Examiner                  | 2008 to present |\n| GERMAN, Edward     | United States Army Crime Lab      | 1996 to present |\n| GETTEMY, James     | Florida Dept. of Law Enforcement  | 1998 to 2008    |\n| GISHE, Melissa     | Federal Bureau of Investigation   | 2007 to present |\n| GREATHOUSE, Danny  | Federal Bureau of Investigation   | 1995            |\n| GRIEVE, David      | Illinois State Police             | 1996 to 2008    |\n| GRIMM, Michael     | Virginia Div. Forensic Science    | 1998 to 2005    |\n| HANKERSON, Larry   | Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, GA    | 1999 to 2004    |\n| HASTY, Danny       | Washington County Sheriff, FL     | 1996 to 2008    |\n| HECKER, Scott      | Federal Bureau of Investigation   | 2008 to present |\n| HICKLIN, Austin    | NOBLIS                            | 2009 to present |\n| HOLLARS, Mitch     | Federal Bureau of Investigation   | 2003 to present |\n| HUTCHINS, Laura    | United States Secret Service      | 2006 to present |\n| ILLSLEY, Charles   | West Valley Police, Utah          | 1996 to 2005    |\n| INLOW, Vici        | United States Secret Service      | 1998 to 2006    |\n| JOHNSON, James     | United States Secret Service      | 1995 to 2007    |\n| KILGORE, John      | Iowa Crime Lab                    | 1996 to 1997    |\n| LANGENBURG, Glenn  | MN Bureau of Criminal Invest.     | 2004 to present |\n| LEWIS, Bridget     | Iowa Crime Lab                    | 2002 to present |\n| MACEO, Alice       | Las Vegas Metro Police, Nevada    | 2001 to present |\n| MARTIN, Kenneth    | Massachusetts State Police        | 2000 to 2002    |\n| MASSEY, John       | Federal Bureau of Investigation   | 1995 to 1999    |\n| MASTERS, Nancy     | California Department of Justice  | 1996            |\n| MCFARLANE, Walter  | Alaska Crime Lab                  | 1996 to 2001    |\n| MCROBERTS, Alan    | Private Examiner                  | 1996 to present |\n| MEAGHER, Steven    | Federal Bureau of Investigation   | 1995 to 2007    |\n| MICHAUD, Gregoire  | Michigan State Police             | 2006 to 2009    |\n| MOENSSENS, Andre   | University of Missouri            | 2005 to present |\n| MOSES, Ken         | San Francisco Police, California  | 1996 to 1997    |\n| MULHOLLAND, Eugene | Federal Bureau of Investigation   | 1995            |\n| NEUMANN, Cedric    | Pennsylvania State University     | 2008 to present |\n| NAME                   | AGENCY                               | DATES           |\n|------------------------|--------------------------------------|-----------------|\n| NEUNER, John           | North Carolina State Crime Lab       | 1995            |\n| NIELSON, John          | Wisconsin Department of Justice      | 1995 to 1996    |\n| NIMMICH, Ken           | Federal Bureau of Investigation      | 1995 to 1996    |\n| PARKER, Charles        | Corpus Christi Police, Texas         | 1996 to 2002    |\n| PASE, Barbara          | Federal Bureau of Investigation      | 1996 to 2002    |\n| REES, Alison           | Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, MD       | 2008 to present |\n| RICHARDSON, Charles    | Drug Enforcement Agency, VA          | 1996 to present |\n| RIDGELY, JAMES         | Federal Bureau of Investigation      | 1995            |\n| ROBERTS, Maria Antonia | Federal Bureau of Investigation      | 2008 to present |\n| ROONEY, Larry          | Suffolk County Police, New York      | 1996 to 1997    |\n| SAUNDERS, John         | Federal Bureau of Investigation      | 1996            |\n| SCHENCK, Rodney        | United States Army Crime Lab         | 2008 to present |\n| SCHWARZ, Matt          | Private Examiner                     | 2011 to present |\n| SHANE, Curtis          | Federal LE Training Center, GA       | 1995 to 1996    |\n| SIBERT, Robert         | Federal Bureau of Investigation      | 2000 to 2001    |\n| SIMONS, Allyson        | Federal Bureau of Investigation      | 1996 to 2000    |\n| SOLTIS, Greg           | Federal Bureau of Investigation      | 2004 to present |\n| SPADAFORA, Anthony     | Wisconsin Department of Justice      | 11996 to 2000   |\n| SPARKS, Claude         | Federal Bureau of Investigation      | 1995            |\n| SPECKELS, Carl         | Phoenix Police, Arizona              | 2008 to present |\n| SPRINGS, James         | South Carolina Law Enforcement       | 1995 to 1997    |\n| STIMAC, Jon            | Oregon State Police                  | 2000 to present |\n| STONEY, David          | Private Examiner                     | 2011 to present |\n| THOMPSON, Lyla         | Johnson County Sheriff, Kansas       | 1998 to present |\n| TRIPLETT, Michele      | King County Sheriff, Washington      | 2007 to present |\n| TROZZI, Tim            | Federal Bureau of Investigation      | 1996 to 1999    |\n| VANDERKOLK, John       | Indiana State Police                 | 1996 to present |\n| WALLACE, James         | Las Vegas Metro Police, Nevada       | 2007 to 2009    |\n| WEIR, Maria            | Los Angeles Sheriff's Department, CA | 2010 to present |\n| WERTHEIM, Kasey        | Mississippi Crime Laboratory         | 2003 to present |\n| WERTHEIM, Pat          | United States Army Crime Lab         | 1996 to present |\n| WIENERS, Mike          | Federal Bureau of Investigation      | 1996 to 2004    |\n| WILLIS, Bill           | FL Department of Public Safety       | 1996 to 2005    |\n| ZABINSKI, Mark         | Rhode Island State Crime Lab         | 2000 to 2009    |\n| ZAMORA, Rodolfo        | Mesa Police, Arizona                 | 1999 to 2008    |\n| ZERCIE, Kenneth        | Connecticut State Police             | 1996 to 2005    |\n\n## Standing Tenprint Committee\n\n| NAME               | AGENCY                        | DATES           |\n|--------------------|-------------------------------|-----------------|\n| BLUE, Kenneth      | TN Bureau of Investigation    | 2008 to 2011    |\n| BOURQUE, Camille   | Los Angeles Police Dept., CA  | 2008 to present |\n| BURKE, Kevin       | Andover Police Department, MA | 2008 to present |\n| COTTON, David      | FBI - CJIS Division           | 2008 to present |\n| CRAIG, Jamie       | DHS Fingerprint Center, CA    | 2011 to present |\n| GORDEN, Michael    | FBI - CJIS Division           | 2008 to present |\n| MAYNARD, Mona Lisa | Ohio Bureau of Crim. Ident.   | 2008 to 2009    |\n| MEANS, Joseph      | SC Law Enforcement            | 2008 to present |\n| MILLER, Judith     | TX Dept. of Public Safety     | 2008 to present |\n| SMITH, Charles     | FBI - CJIS Division           | 2010 to present |\n| WHITNEY, Candy     | FBI - CJIS Division           | 2008 to 2010    |\n| YADA, Kimberly     | Portland Police, OR           | 2008 to present |\n\n## Appendix D: Swgfast Standard Terminology Of Friction Ridge Examination, Ver. 3.0\n\nPreamble This document provides standard definitions for relevant terminology used in the friction ridge discipline. Common definitions found in other reference sources may not be included. ACE-V. The acronym for a scientific method; Analysis, Comparison, Evaluation, and Verification (see individual terms). AFIS. The acronym for Automated Fingerprint Identification System, a generic term for a fingerprint matching, storage, and retrieval system.\n\nAnalysis. The first step of the ACE-V method. The assessment of an impression to determine suitability for comparison. APIS. The acronym for Automated Palmprint Identification System, a generic term for a palmprint (or complete friction ridge exemplar) matching, storage, and retrieval system. Arch - plain. A pattern type in which the friction ridges enter on one side of the impression and flow, or tend to flow, out the other side with a rise or wave in the center. Arch - tented. A pattern type that possesses either an angle, an upthrust, or two of the three basic characteristics of the loop.\n\nArtifact. 1. Any distortion or alteration not in the original friction ridge impression, produced by an external agent or action. 2. Any information not present in the original object or image, inadvertently introduced by image capture, processing, compressions, transmission, display, or printing. Bias. See cognitive bias, confirmation bias, and contextual bias. Bifurcation. The point at which one friction ridge divides into two friction ridges. Blind verification. The independent examination of one or more friction ridge impressions at any stage of the ACE process by another competent examiner who is provided with no, or limited, contextual information, and has no expectation or knowledge of the determinations or conclusions of the original examiner. Bridge. A connecting friction ridge between, and generally at right angles to, parallel running friction ridges. Characteristics. Distinctive details of the friction ridges, including Level 1, 2, and 3 details (also known as features).\n\nCognitive bias. The effect of perceptual or mental processes on the reliability and validity of one's observations and conclusions.\n\nDiscrepancy. The presence of friction ridge detail in one impression that does not exist in the corresponding area of another impression (compare with dissimilarity).\n\nDissimilarity. A difference in appearance between two friction ridge impressions (compare with discrepancy).\n\nComparison. The second step of the ACE-V method. The observation of two or more impressions to determine the existence of discrepancies, dissimilarities, or similarities.\n\nDissociated ridges. 1. Disrupted, rather than continuous, friction ridges.\n\nCompetency. Possessing and demonstrating the requisite knowledge, skills, and abilities to successfully perform a specific task.\n\n2. An area of friction ridge units that did not form into friction ridges, generally due to a genetic abnormality. Distortion. Variances in the reproduction of friction skin caused by factors such as pressure, movement, force, and contact surface.\n\nComplete friction ridge exemplars. A systematic recording of all friction ridge detail appearing on the palmar sides of the hands. This includes the extreme sides of the palms, joints, tips, and sides of the fingers (also known as major case prints).\n\nDot. An isolated friction ridge unit whose length approximates its width in size. Edgeoscopy. 1. Study of the morphological characteristics of friction ridges.\n\nComplex examinations. The encountering of uncommon circumstances during an examination (e.g., the existence of high distortion, low quality or quantity, the possibility of simultaneity, or conflicts among examiners).\n\n2. Contour or shape of the edges of friction ridges.\n\nConclusion. Determination made during the evaluation stage of ACE-V, including individualization, inconclusive, exclusion.\n\nElimination prints. Exemplars of friction ridge skin detail of persons known to have had legitimate access to an object or location.\n\nConfirmation bias. The tendency to search for data or interpret information in a manner that supports one's preconceptions.\n\nEnclosure. A single friction ridge that bifurcates and rejoins after a short course and continues as a single friction ridge.\n\nConflict. A difference of determinations or conclusions that becomes apparent during, or at the end of, an examination.\n\nEnding ridge. A single friction ridge that terminates within the friction ridge structure.\n\nConsultation. A significant interaction between examiners regarding one or more impressions in question.\n\nErroneous exclusion. The incorrect determination that two areas of friction ridge impressions did not originate from the same source.\n\nContextual bias. The effect of information or outside influences on the evaluation and interpretation of data. Core. 1. The approximate center of a fingerprint pattern.\n\nErroneous individualization. The incorrect determination that two areas of friction ridge impressions originated from the same source.\n\n2. A specific formation within a fingerprint pattern, defined by classification systems such as Henry.\n\nEvaluation. The third step of the ACE-V method wherein an examiner assesses the value of the details observed during the analysis and the comparison steps and reaches a conclusion.\n\nDelta. The point on a friction ridge at or nearest to the point of divergence of two type lines, and located at or directly in front of the point of divergence. Also known as a tri-radius. Deviation. 1. A change in friction ridge path.\n\nExclusion. The determination by an examiner that there is sufficient quality and quantity of detail in disagreement to conclude that two areas of friction ridge impressions did not originate from the same source.\n\n2. An alteration or departure from a documented policy or standard procedure.\n\nInconclusive. The determination by an examiner that there is neither sufficient agreement to individualize, nor sufficient disagreement to exclude.\n\nExemplars. The prints of an individual, associated with a known or claimed identity, and deliberately recorded electronically, by ink, or by another medium (also known as known prints).\n\nFeatures. Distinctive details of the friction ridges, including Level 1, 2, and 3 details (also known as characteristics).\n\nIndividualization. The determination by an examiner that there is sufficient quality and quantity of detail in agreement to conclude that two friction ridge impressions originated from the same source.\n\nFingerprint. An impression of the friction ridges of all or any part of the finger.\n\nJoint (of the finger). The hinged area that separates segments of the finger. Page 7 of 11\nFocal points. 1. In classification, the core(s) and the delta(s) of a fingerprint. 2. Another term for target group.\n\nKnown prints (finger, palm, foot). The prints of an individual, associated with a known or claimed identity, and deliberately recorded electronically, by ink, or by another medium (also known as exemplars).\n\nFriction ridge. A raised portion of the epidermis on the palmar or plantar skin, consisting of one or more connected ridge units.\n\nLatent print. 1. Transferred impression of friction ridge detail not readily visible.\n\nFriction ridge detail (morphology). An area comprised of the combination of ridge flow, ridge characteristics, and ridge structure.\n\n2. Generic term used for unintentionally deposited friction ridge detail.\n\nFriction ridge examiner. A person who analyzes, compares, evaluates, and verifies friction ridge impressions.\n\nLevel 1 detail. Friction ridge flow, pattern type, and general morphological information.\n\nFriction ridge unit. A single section of ridge containing one pore.\n\nLevel 2 detail. Individual friction ridge paths and associated events, including minutiae.\n\nFurrows. Valleys or depressions between friction ridges.\n\nLevel 3 detail. Friction ridge dimensional attributes, such as width, edge shapes, and pores.\n\nGalton details. Term referring to friction ridge characteristics (also known as minutiae) attributed to the research of English fingerprint pioneer, Sir Francis Galton.\n\nLift. An adhesive or other medium used to transfer a friction ridge impression from a substrate.\n\nHenry Classification. An alpha-numeric system of fingerprint classification named after Sir Edward Richard Henry used for filing, searching, and retrieving tenprint records. IAFIS. The acronym for Integrated Automated Fingerprint Identification System, the FBI's national AFIS. Identification. 1. See individualization. 2. In some forensic disciplines, this term denotes the similarity of class characteristics.\n\nLoop. A pattern type in which one or more friction ridges enter upon one side, recurve, touch or pass an imaginary line between delta and core and flow out, or tend to flow out, on the same side the friction ridges entered. Types include left slant loops, in which the pattern flows to the left in the impression; right slant loops, in which the pattern flows to the right in the impression; radial loops, in which the pattern flows in the direction of the radius bone of the forearm (toward the thumb); and ulnar loops, in which the pattern flows in the direction of the ulna bone of the forearm (toward the little finger).\n\nImpression. Friction ridge detail deposited on a surface. Incipient ridge. A friction ridge not fully developed that may appear shorter and thinner than fully developed friction ridges.\n\nMajor case print. A systematic recording of the friction ridge detail appearing on the palmar sides of the hands. This includes the extreme sides of the palms, joints, tips, and sides of the fingers (also known as complete friction ridge exemplars).\n\nRidge path. 1. The course of a single friction ridge.\n\nMark. Term commonly used in the United Kingdom and some Commonwealth countries to designate a latent print.\n\n2. A component of Level 2 detail.\nRidge unit. See friction ridge unit.\n\nMatrix. The substance that is deposited or removed by the friction ridge skin when making an impression.\n\nSegment (of the finger). The proximal, medial, or distal section of the finger.\n\nMinutiae. Events along a ridge path, including bifurcations, ending ridges, and dots (also known as Galton details).\n\nShort ridge. A single friction ridge beginning, traveling a short distance, and then ending.\n\nMissed individualization. The failure to make an individualization when in fact both friction ridge impressions are from the same source.\n\nSimultaneous impression. Two or more friction ridge impressions from the same hand or foot deposited concurrently.\n\nNGI. The acronym for Next Generation Identification, the updated version of IAFIS.\n\nSource. An area of friction ridge skin from an individual from which an impression originated.\n\nOriginal image. Primary image; with respect to digital images, an accurate replica (bit-for-bit value) of the primary image.\n\nSpur. A bifurcation with one short friction ridge branching off a longer friction ridge.\n\nPalmprint. An impression of the friction ridges of all or any part of the palmar surface of the hand.\n\nStand-alone. A segment of a simultaneous impression that has sufficient information to arrive at a conclusion of individualization independent of other impressions within the aggregate.\n\nPattern classification. Sub-division of pattern type, defined by classification systems such as Henry or National Crime Information Center (NCIC) classifications.\n\nSubstrate. The surface upon which a friction ridge impression is deposited.\n\nPattern type. Fundamental pattern of the ridge flow: arch, loop, whorl. Arches are subdivided into plain and tented arches; loops are subdivided into radial and ulnar loops; whorls are subdivided into plain whorls, double loops, pocket loops, and accidental whorls.\n\nSufficiency. The product of the quality and quantity of the objective data under observation (e.g., friction ridge, crease, and scar features).\n\nPhalanx/Phalange. 1. A bone of the finger or toe.\n\nSufficient. The determination that there is sufficiency in a comparison to reach a conclusion at the evaluation stage.\n\n2. Sometimes used to refer to a segment of a finger.\n\nPoroscopy. A study of the size, shape, and arrangement of pores.\n\nSuitable. The determination that there is sufficiency in an impression to be of value for further analysis or comparison.\n\nPrimary image. The first recording of an image onto media.\n\nTarget group. A distinctive group of ridge features (and their relationships) that can be recognized.\n\nProficiency. The ongoing demonstration of competency. Quality. The clarity of information contained within a friction ridge impression.\n\nTechnical review. Review of notes, documents, and other data that forms the basis for a scientific conclusion (see ASCLDLAB 2008 Manual).\n\nQuantity. The amount of information contained within a friction ridge impression.\n\nTenprint. 1. A generic reference to examinations performed on intentionally recorded friction ridge impressions.\n\nRidge flow. 1. The direction of one or more friction ridges.\n\n2. A controlled recording of an individual's available fingers using ink, electronic imaging, or other medium.\n\n2. A component of Level 1 detail.\n\nTolerance. The amount of variation in appearance of friction ridge features to be allowed during a comparison, should a corresponding print be made available.\n\nTrifurcation. The point at which one friction ridge divides into three friction ridges. Type lines. The two innermost friction ridges associated with a delta that parallel, diverge, and surround or tend to surround the pattern area. Verification. The independent application of the ACE process as utilized by a subsequent examiner to either support or refute the conclusions of the original examiner; this may be conducted as blind verification. Verification may be followed by some level of review as specified by agency policy. Whorl - accidental. 1. A pattern type consisting of the combination of two different types of patterns (excluding the plain arch) with two or more deltas.\n\n2. A pattern type that possesses some of the requirements for two or more different types of patterns. 3. A pattern type that conforms to none of the definitions of a pattern. Whorl - central pocket loop. A pattern type that has two deltas and at least one friction ridge that makes, or tends to make, one complete circuit, which may be spiral, oval, circular, or any variant of a circle. An imaginary line drawn between the two deltas must not touch or cross any recurving friction ridges within the inner pattern area. Whorl - double loop. A pattern type that consists of two separate loop formations with two separate and distinct sets of shoulders and two deltas. Whorl - plain. A fingerprint pattern type that consists of one or more friction ridges that make, or tends to make, a complete circuit, with two deltas, between which, when an imaginary line is drawn, at least one recurving friction ridge within the inner pattern area is cut or touched.\n\n## About The National Institute Of Justice\n\nOur principal authorities are derived from:\n\n- The Omnibus Crime Control and\nSafe Streets Act of 1968, amended (see 42 USC  3721-3723)\nThe National Institute of Justice - the research, development and evaluation agency of the Department of Justice - is dedicated to improving our knowledge and understanding of crime and justice issues through science. NIJ provides objective and independent knowledge and tools to reduce crime and promote justice, particularly at the state and local levels.\n\n- Title II of the Homeland Security Act\nof 2002\nNIJ's pursuit of this mission is guided by the following principles:\n\n- Justice For All Act, 2004\n- Research can make a difference in individual lives, in the\nsafety of communities and in creating a more effective and fair justice system.\nTo find out more about the National Institute of Justice, please visit:\n\n- Government-funded research must adhere to processes of\nfair and open competition guided by rigorous peer review.\nwww.nij.gov or contact:\n\n- NIJ's research agenda must respond to the real world needs\nof victims, communities and criminal justice professionals.\n- NIJ must encourage and support innovative and rigorous\nresearch methods that can provide answers to basic research questions as well as practical, applied solutions to crime.\n\nNational Criminal Justice\nReference Service\nP.O. Box 6000\nRockville, MD 20849-6000\n800-851-3420\nwww.ncjrs.gov\n\n- Partnerships with other agencies and organizations, public\nand private, are essential to NIJ's success."
    },
    {
        "text": "ARAB MEDIA OUTLOOK  2009 - 2013\nISBN 978-9948-15-422-8\nP.O. BOX 39333, Dubai, United Arab Emirates Tel: +971 4 361 6666, Fax: +971 4 368 8000\nwww.dpc.org.ae\n20\n\n## Arab Media Outlook\n\nINSPIRING LOCAL CONTENT\n\nF O R E C A S T S  A N D  A N A L Y S I S  O F\nT R A D I T I O N A L\n                        A N D\n                                  D I G I T A L\nM E D I A  I N  T H E  A R A B  W O R L D\n\nCopyright 2010 This document is provided by Dubai Press Club and Value Partners for guidance only, and does not constitute the provision of legal advice, accounting services, investment advice or professional consulting of any kind. The information provided herein should not be used as a substitute for consultation with professional advisers. Before making any decision or taking any action, you should consult a professional advisor who has been provided with all the pertinent facts relevant to your particular situation.\n\nThe information is provided \"as is\", with no assurance or guarantee of completeness, accuracy or timeliness of the information, and without warranty of any kind, express or implied, including but not limited to warranties of performance, merchantability and fitness for a particular purpose. Dubai Press Club holds all copyrights to this report and no part thereof may be reproduced or replicated without prior explicit and written permission. In producing this report, Dubai Press Club was assisted by Value Partners. Requests for permission should be addressed, in writing, to Maryam bin Fahad, Executive Director, Dubai Press Club, P.O. Box 39333, Dubai, UAE (email: info@dpc.org.ae). For additional information or to acquire further copies of this publication please visit www.dpc.org.ae\n\n# Arab Media Outlook 2009-2013 Inspiring Local Content\n\nFORECASTS AND ANALYSIS OF TRADITIONAL AND DIGITAL MEDIA IN THE ARAB WORLD\n\n## Production Acknowledgement For Dubai Press Club\n\nMaryam Bin Fahad, Executive Director Adel Ibrahim, Senior Manager Operations Sadiq Jarrar, Communications & PR Manager Mohammad Sabra, Marketing Manager Sabah Qussous, Senior Customer Relations Executive Mohab Mazen, Assistant Events Manager Nour Aldin Al Yousuf, Senior Executive Multimedia Afra Matar, Media Relations Executive Lubna Otaibi, Media Relations Coordinator\n\n## For Value Partners\n\nSantino Saguto, Managing Director MENA Region Alessandro Araimo, Global Head of Media Practice Janice Hughes, Senior Director Tabitha Elwes, Head of Broadcasting Practice Emmanuel Durou, Senior Manager Anurag Arora, Senior Consultant Leila Hamadeh, Consultant Riwa Sawaya, Consultant\n\n## For Jiwin (Arabic Translation)\n\nMusab Zakarya, Editorial Manager - Arabic\n\n## For Impact Bbdo (Report Design)\n\nSpiro Malak, Account Director Paul Fayad, Creative Director\n\nForewords: Dubai Press Club\n\n\n6\nForeword: Value Partners\n\n\n10\nAcknowledgements\n\n\n11\nExecutive Summary\n\n\n12\n1\nSection 1: Arab Media in a Global Context\n\n15\n1.1\nIntroduction\n\n\n15\n1.2\nPrint\n\n\n25\n1.3\nTV\n\n\n43\n1.4\nOnline & Mobile\n\n\n67\n2\nSection 2: Regional Update\n\n\n81\n2.1\nIntroduction\n\n\n82\n2.2\nIn-focus countries\n\n\n83\n2.3\nCountry-by-country update\n\n\n122\n\n## Contents\n\n|                       |                                                      |     |    | 3    | Section 3: Inspiring Local Content     |     |     |   159 |\n|-----------------------|------------------------------------------------------|-----|----|------|----------------------------------------|-----|-----|-------|\n| 3.1                   | Introduction                                         |     |    |      |                                        |     |     |   159 |\n| 3.2                   | Overview of the Current Status                       |     |    |      | 160                                    |     |     |       |\n| 3.3                   | Stimulating local content in the Arab media industry | 164 |    |      |                                        |     |     |       |\n| 3.4                   | Conclusion: Bridging the value gap for local content |     |    |      |                                        |     |     |       |\n| 189                   |                                                      |     |    |      |                                        |     |     |       |\n| Methodology           |                                                      |     |    |      |                                        |     |     |       |\n|                       |                                                      |     |    |      |                                        |     | 191 |       |\n| Glossary              |                                                      |     |    |      |                                        |     |     |       |\n|                       |                                                      |     |    |      |                                        |     |     |   193 |\n| Appendix: Data Tables |                                                      |     |    |      |                                        |     |     |       |\n|                       |                                                      |     |    |      |                                        | 194 |     |       |\n\nThe past one year and a half has been a period of unprecedented changes for the media industry in the Arab world and elsewhere. Within a short period of one year since the release of the second edition of the Arab Media Outlook, the contours of the world economy underwent transformations that shocked even the most pessimistic observers. The media could not have remained unaffected by such a cataclysmic turn of events. Even as we present you the third edition of the Outlook, we are acutely aware that the challenges before the media in our region, as well as around the world, are huge, but they are by no means insurmountable. Our research into the changing dynamics of the media in our part of the world taught us that very many new opportunities abounded alongside the challenges. Therefore, you will notice that the overall tone of the report in your hands is one of cautious optimism; we are confident that the fundamentals of the media in our region are strong enough to not only withstand the storms of the times, but also to forge ahead, learning lessons from the past and making amends for things that went wrong. Just one example suffices here to corroborate our approach of cautious optimism with regard to the immediate future of the media in the Arab world. Our study confirmed that even though the region's print media had to go through significant structural changes in these trying times, it has weathered the storm much better than other markets, with the overall daily circulation and the number of titles continuing to rise. The new media laws that came into being in several countries have helped this growth considerably. Even print revenues in the region have proved more stable and resilient than most other markets. That these welcome facts did not stand in the way of keeping pace with the 'digital times' is actually very encouraging. The growth in the popularity of social media, as analyzed in detail in the report, goes to show that a healthy balance between conventional media and the digital means is already struck by\n\n## Foreword: Dubai Press Club\n\nthe Arab media consumers. When it comes to monetisation of online content, there are areas of concern, but the picture that emerges from our study is one of consistent and successful experimentation. The report has shown that various models are being tried to effectively monetise online content, with the 'freemium' model emerging on top. I would like to humbly submit that this third edition of the Arab Media Outlook represents a paradigm shift compared to the previous editions in terms of both the scope of coverage and depth of analysis. I am sure you will agree with me that this is not only a delightful source of a wealth of data and information, but also a reliable reference on all aspects of the media industry in our region. We hope this report will trigger new studies and researches into the dynamics of the media in our region. Sincerely yours, DUBAI PRESS CLUB Dubai Press Club is pleased to present the third edition of the Arab Media Outlook 2009-2013. Arab Media Outlook is one of the pioneering media development initiatives of Dubai Press Club along with Arab Media Forum and Arab Journalism Award. The objective behind the report is to not only bring out an assessment of the media scene in the region in its entirety, but also to help build a knowledge base on the media for the benefit of industry stakeholders, policy makers, media scholars, students and the general public. The report this year is far more exhaustive in its scope and reach than the previous editions and is backed for the first time, by extensive market research in four significant media markets in the region, the UAE, Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Lebanon on shifting media consumption habits. We have expanded the coverage of the report to include 15 Arab countries, namely, Bahrain, Egypt, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Morocco, Oman, Palestine, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Sudan, Tunisia, the UAE and the Yemen. The last edition of the report came out soon after the onset of the global financial crisis, leaving out little scope for incorporating a detailed analysis of its impact on the media industry. We have tried to more than compensate for that in the present edition, providing a much more focused assessment of the media industry against the backdrop of the financial meltdown. The impact of the crisis, needless to say, varies from country to country, depending on the extent to which each market is exposed to global markets. The country-wise assessment given in the report takes into account the specificities of each market covered.\n\n## Foreword: Dubai Press Club\n\nOur knowledge partner Value Partners, a leading global management consultancy firm with strong experience in telecom and media, and the staff at Dubai Press Club have worked together to make the report as comprehensive and accurate as possible. In addition to relying on primary and secondary research on the subject, we have also interviewed representatives of over 125 media organizations from the countries covered. The report has been particularly enriched through the incorporation of interview findings that played an important role in getting direct industry feedback. I must also commend The Nielsen Company, a global marketing research firm, for the successful and timely completion of the market research, the results of which add immense value to this edition of the report. At the very outset, let me share the good news that a majority of media stakeholders that we interviewed across the 15 countries covered in the report thought future prospects for the media in the region were positive in spite of the impact of the economic downturn. We also noticed a growing preference for local Arabic content in countries that produce local content such as Egypt and Lebanon, indicating further maturation of the media industry and media consumers away from generalized regional or global media content. You will notice the structure of the report has changed considerably from the two previous editions. While the first section offers an extensive overview of the media market in the region across the different platforms, print, TV and online, in relation to the global scenario, the second section narrows down on each of the 15 countries covered, with special focus on the four countries where the market research was conducted. We then move on to the last section, which forms the main thematic focus of the report, an assessment of the creation and dissemination of local/regional content in Arab media. A number of case studies, offering interesting comparisons or contrasts, have been included in all the sections, illustrating the myriad ways in which the media is evolving in the Arab world, even as it grapples with multiple challenges and opportunities. I trust that the insights and analyses, as well as the data and projections that this report contains will serve as a reliable source of reference for media owners and experts, policy makers, journalists, students and the general public.\n\nWe welcome you to the third edition of the Arab Media Outlook, the most comprehensive publication to cover major media industry developments and changing consumption trends in the Arab world. We are delighted to have contributed to this edition of the report, leveraging our extensive international media and content experience. Working closely with the Dubai Press Club team, we have had the opportunity to appreciate the very high standards of professionalism of the whole organization. This year's edition of the Arab Media Outlook builds upon the foundations of the previous two editions and deals with some significant extra material. It includes coverage of three additional markets and, for the first time, it gives a detailed analysis of consumer habits and trends in four selected markets. It also provides projections for the local advertising industry over the period 2009-\n2013, across all major media platforms and the 15 countries considered. This report presents a detailed assessment of both the status and prospects of the media industry in the region. Positive advertising expenditure growth is forecast across all of the countries covered, following the decline that has affected the global and regional media sector over the last two years. This edition also highlights the growing importance of local content from the point of view of both production and consumption, as reflected in the title, Inspiring Local Content, and in the thematic topic of Section 3. Throughout this year's report, carefully selected, rich case studies provide a means to compare and contrast the developments of the Arab media industry with the international one, across both developed and emerging markets. According to our analysis, which included interviewing over 125 representative industry leaders in the region, the sector shows strong potential for growth across all dimensions: talent, which is affecting the creation of quality local content; content production, leveraging the expanding network of media free zones; consumption across traditional and new, digital platforms; and monetisation, through better targeting of audiences and new revenue streams. The industry is also expected to take advantage of the high proportion of young people in the Arab population. It is this segment that is best placed to drive content development and exploitation in this increasingly international and multi-platform sector, while at the same time preserving the values, culture and heritage of the Arab world. The analysis highlights the presence of several areas of excellence, distributed across countries which, together, constitute the foundation for regional industry growth. We would like to sincerely thank everyone who has contributed their time, knowledge and effort towards the production of this report. Most importantly, we are proud to have partnered with the prestigious Dubai Press Club organization during the development of this third edition of the Arab Media Outlook and thank DPC's leaders and team for their support.\n\n## Foreword: Value Partners Acknowledgements\n\n14th October Newspaper, Yemen 26 September Newspaper, Yemen Abu Dhabi Media Company (ADMC), UAE Al Ahdath Newspaper, Sudan Al Ahdath Al Maghribia Newspaper, Morocco Al Ahram Centre for Translation and Publishing, Egypt Al Ahram Newspaper, Egypt Al Akhbar Newspaper, Egypt Alaan Website, Kuwait Al Arab Al Yawm Newspaper, Jordan Al Arab Newspaper, Qatar Al Arabi Training Centre, Syria Al Arabi Magazine, Kuwait Al Atheer Media, Palestine Al Ayam Newspaper, Morocco Al Bayader Magazine, Palestine Al Bayan Newspaper, UAE Al Bakri Radio Channels, Palestine Al Bilad Newspaper, Bahrain Ad-Dustour Newspaper, Jordan Al Hayat Al-Jadedah, Palestine Al Hayat Newspaper, Jordan Al Hayat Newspaper, pan-Arab Al Horria Newspaper, Tunisia Al Jazeera Talk, Qatar Al Jazeera TV, Qatar Al Jazirah Newspaper, Saudi Arabia Al Jazeera Media Centre for Training and Development, Qatar Al Khartoum Newspaper, Sudan Al Manar TV, Lebanon Al Mehwar TV, Egypt Al Qabas Newspaper, Kuwait Al Quds Newspaper, Palestine Al Rai Newspaper, Jordan Al Riyadh Newspaper, Saudi Arabia As-Safir Newspaper, Lebanon Asharq Al Awsat Newspaper, pan-Arab Al Thawra Newspaper, Syria Al Waseet Newspaper, UAE Al Watan Newspaper, Syria Al Watan Newspaper, Qatar Al Watan TV, Palestine All4media, UAE American University of Beirut American University of Dubai An-Nahar Newspaper, Lebanon Arab Media Group, UAE Arabian Anti-Piracy Alliance, UAE Associated Press, UAE Al Ayyam Newspaper, Palestine Ayyam Wa Layali magazine, Sudan BBC Arabic, pan-Arab Cairo News Company, Egypt Centre for Arab Women Training & Research, Tunisia Dar Al Hayat, Lebanon Dar Al Sharq, Qatar Day Press (dp-news), Syria Dubai Media Incorporated, UAE\n\ndu, UAE\nElaph, pan-Arab\nEndemol Middle East, Lebanon\nEs-Sahafa, Tunisia\nEtisalat, UAE\nFilmworks, UAE\nFuture TV, Lebanon\nGulf Journalist Association, Bahrain\nInMediaPlus, Lebanon\nInternational Media Support, Yemen\nJeeran, Jordan\nJordan Media City\nJordan TV\nKnowledge View, pan-Arab\nKoulouna Shouraka Online, Syria\nKuwait Journalists Association\nKuwait News Agency\nLaha Magazine, Lebanon\nLammtara Pictures, UAE\nLBC, Lebanon\nMaan News Online, Palestine\nMBC, Saudi Arabia\nMediaedge:cia Middle East, UAE\nNational Media Council, UAE\nNew TV, Lebanon\nO3 Productions, Saudi Arabia\nOman Daily Newspaper\nOman Journalists Association\nOman Mobile\nOrange Jordan\nOrbit, Bahrain\nPalestine TV\nPetra Agency, Jordan\nPyramedia, UAE\nQatar News Agency\nQtel, Qatar\nRealites Magazine, Tunisia\nRotana Digital, Saudi Arabia\nSaba News Agency, Yemen\nSamacom, UAE\nSharjah University, UAE\nSherezade Films, Bahrain\nShowtime Arabia, UAE\nSignature Productions, Lebanon\nSNRT, Morocco\nStarcom Mediavest MENA, UAE\nSudanese Journalists' Union\nTariq Al Mahaba Production\nCompany, Palestine\n\nTBWA Raad, UAE\nTECOM Business Parks, UAE\nThe Frame, UAE\nTeshreen Daily Newspaper, Syria\nTwofour54, UAE\nUAE Journalists Association\nWalt Disney Company, pan-Arab\nWatwet, Jordan\nWejhat Nazar Magazine, Egypt\n\nThe third edition of the Arab Media Outlook aims to provide a comprehensive overview of the state of the Arab media industry, including projections for the industry from 2009 to 2013. We have built upon the foundations of the previous two reports, which covered twelve key markets in the Arab world (Bahrain, Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Kuwait, Morocco, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Tunisia, Yemen, and the UAE) and added three additional countries to our analysis: Palestine, Sudan and Syria, to present a more complete view of the Arab Region.1 Our analysis includes quantitative projections for the region between 2009 and 2013, examining advertising revenues by platform, newspaper circulation and pay-TV subscriptions, among others. Our projections are based on a combination of factors, including historic figures from renowned media research companies, macro-economic and industry forecasts, qualitative information from the 125 interviews we carried out with industry professionals and, ultimately, the projection model. We have also conducted consumer market research studies in Egypt, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia and the UAE, for which we partnered with The Nielsen Company. The research was performed across a representative sample of between 400 and 500 per country. The report and projections will of course require periodic review, particularly considering the acceleration of changes impacting the media industry globally and regionally, including globalization, online development, new mobile access devices, new media zones etc. All these trends have been analyzed in this edition which forms a base to monitor industry progress, in anticipation of the next trends.\n\n## Executive Summary\n\nThe economies of the Arab Region have been affected by the global economic crisis, displaying a reduction in nominal GDP of 10% on average in 2009. The media industry has also been directly impacted, with advertising revenues in the region dropping by 14% in 2009. However, in spite of these challenging times, fast recovery is expected. Based on our projections, advertising revenues will return to their pre-crisis 2008 levels by the end of 2011 and will continue to see growth at a CAGR of 8% from 2009 until 2013. Furthermore, the industry itself is optimistic about the future, with nearly 60% of industry stakeholders that we interviewed feeling positive about the state of the Arab media industry in 2010. Indeed, we are seeing some positive trends in the industry, particularly with the growth in digital media and the structural changes that the industry is witnessing, including consolidation, which is helping to create a more efficient industry structure. Section 1 of this report constitutes a comparative analysis between media trends in the Arab Region and those in the rest of the world. We assess the current status of the Arab media industry, relative to both developed and emerging markets, and identify key opportunities for growth. Firstly, an assessment of the region's print sector shows that it, like the global print industry, has been undergoing significant structural changes, ranging from cost transformation and rationalisation of title portfolios to cross-platform consolidation and transfer to new platforms. However, unlike many other markets, the print industry in the region continues to show continued growth in both the number of titles and overall circulation. While the emergence of the internet as a viable platform for news consumption is beginning to affect traditional newspapers in the region, most organizations are using the internet to complement their print edition. Going forward, although we expect the rate of growth for the print industry to slow, we still believe there is further potential to be unlocked. The market in the Arab Region remains unsaturated, with low newspaper concentration in many countries, as well as strong potential to increase advertising revenues through increased auditing of circulation figures and industry consolidation. Secondly, the Arab television industry faces very different challenges which are being taken increasingly seriously by industry players and governments alike, including the low advertising revenues faced by free-to-air channels and the low penetration of pay-TV. The free-to-air market is fragmented, having grown to reach nearly 600 channels today, while remaining dominated by a few major broadcasting groups. However, there is significant potential for growth, which will be driven by the adoption of accurate audience measurement systems, an increase in consolidation in the sector and the introduction of new technologies which will enable improved targeting of advertising. Meanwhile, the pay-TV sector faces strong challenges, both from high levels of piracy and competition from the freeto-air sector. Yet the recent consolidation of two major players into the Orbit Showtime Network, coupled with increased investments in anti-piracy technology, is likely to drive growth. In addition, new digital platforms are making their mark in the region, including increasing penetration of DTT in North Africa and IPTV in some of the Gulf countries, while new services such as Video on Demand are gradually being introduced by pay-TV players as a means of differentiation from free TV.\n\nFinally,\n           online\n                     and\n                            mobile\n                                       are\n                                              becoming\nincreasingly important platforms for media\nconsumption\n                 in\n                       the\n                             region.\n                                        While\n                                                  online\n\nadvertising currently represents just 1% of total\nspend in the region, it is expected to become the\nfastest growing media sector over the coming\nyears. As broadband penetration increases, online\nadvertising will also grow, led by an increase in\nsearch advertising and the rising use of social\nmedia. Similarly, mobile broadband is becoming\nincreasingly popular, driving the use of the mobile\nphone as a serious media platform and enabling\ngrowth of applications, particularly for news\ndelivery, in some Arab countries.\n\nSection 2 of the report provides an in-depth\nanalysis of the media markets, along with an\nupdate of advertising forecasts of all 15 markets,\nsplit by platform. While the first part focuses on\nthe results of the market research conducted in\nfour \"in-focus\" markets, Egypt, Lebanon, Saudi\nArabia and the UAE, the second part provides\na country-by-country update of the remaining\nmarkets, including pan-Arab.\n\nThe market research highlights the importance\nof the unique demographic composition of the\nArab Region and a strong demand for local Arabic\ncontent. Firstly, the large youth demographic\n(people below the age of 30) in the region, an\nelement common across all 15 markets covered in\nthe report, largely drives the consumption of media\non the internet. In particular, social networks play\na significant role, with social networking cited\namong the favourite activities online and one of\nthe top methods of communication. On average,\n70% of the people in the four markets researched\nuse social networking in some capacity and about\n15% use social networking sites at least once a\nday. This is particularly noteworthy as the average\ntime spent on the internet, at about three hours\nper day, is already on par with that of TV. Finally,\nthe research confirms that the more \"local\" the\ncontent, the more popular it is with consumers\n,with over 60% preferring browsing in Arabic, 80%\npreferring watching TV in Arabic, a high preference\nfor regional online portals and social networking\nsites and, in countries producing local content\nsuch as Egypt, a strong preference for internet\ncontent specific to and from their own country.\n\nIn the second part of section 2, we present a brief\nassessment of the remaining eleven markets, as\nwell as the pan-Arab market, with a breakdown of\nadvertising expenditure by platform. While building\neach country advertising forecast, we have taken\ninto account the impact of the economic crisis,\nwhich was not fully felt in the region until the\nlatter half of 2009. While the impact varied across\n\nmarkets in the Arab Region, it induced a shift in\nadvertising dollars away from traditional media.\nWhile newspapers and pan-Arab TV attract the\nmajority of advertising spend in the GCC region,\nlocal television remains the dominant platform\nin a few markets in North Africa and the Levant.\n\nIn Section 3 of this year's report, we focus on a\ntopic of great relevance to both media industry\nprofessionals and to consumers with the\npotential to generate significant value for the\nindustry: the stimulation and exploitation of\nlocal content in the Arab media industry. We take\ninto account the two aspects of \"local\" content,\nanalyzing it from a pan-Arab point of view, which\nincludes content produced for and consumed\nby a pan-Arab audience (e.g. channels such as\nMBC, newspapers such as Asharq Alawsat) as\nwell as from a national point of view, including\ncontent on terrestrial channels, in national\nnewspapers and on local websites. Currently,\nthere remains a major gap in the value of local\ncontent in the Arab world when compared to\nother regions. Although the situation varies by\nplatform, the value gap is most pronounced on\nTV and online. In the TV industry, for example,\nwe estimate the cost per hour of original content\non the top channels in the UK to be worth two to\nfour times as much as the average Arabic series\non the top 15 pan-Arab channels. However,\nthere is strong potential for growth in the quality\nand quantity of content produced in the Arab\nworld. We believe that the industry's potential\ncan be realized through the creation of a local\ncontent virtuous circle, by addressing the key\nissues of monetisation, funding and talent,\nwith government intervention and technology\nimprovement as the key enablers of that circle.\n\nFrom a monetisation point of view, it is clear that\nthere is strong demand from the Arab population\nfor content that is developed in the region.\nYet, there remain several barriers to effective\nmonetisation on the supply side, from effective\nuse of cross-platform advertising techniques,\nto endemic issues such as the lack of audience\nmeasurement systems and the abundance of\npiracy, among others. However, the situation is\nchanging fast, particularly in the TV sector, with\nbroadcasters ramping up their investments in\ndeveloping original Arabic formats. In addition,\nalternative methods of funding are increasingly\nbeing adopted in the region, including product\nplacement,\n              advertiser-funded\n                                    programming\nand other new revenue streams, as evidenced\nby popular Arab programmes such as Freej\nand Tash Ma Tash. Talent is the third element\nto be tackled, primarily through an increased\nemphasis on education and training of media\nprofessionals. Government organisations are\nkey to developing the local media talent pool,\nwhile international companies can also play an\nimportant role in helping to grow the local talent\nbase through partnerships and co-productions.\nTechnology\n               and\n                     government\n                                     intervention,\nmeanwhile, are two further factors that need to\nbe addressed. Broadband adoption, both mobile\nand fixed, will be a key factor to local content\nexploitation, while governments have a major\nrole to play, not only in promoting infrastructure\ninvestment, but also in providing incentives\nfor local production, for example through the\nimplementation of quotas, and to encourage\nforeign investment in local media.\n\n## 1.1\n\n2009 has been a historic year for the international media industry, with the global economic crisis impacting every region of the world and driving significant waves of structural and financial changes in the industry. The Arab Region1  has certainly not been immune to the crisis but, compared to other markets, it was hit slightly later. While the impact of the crisis was already starting to be felt significantly in 2008 in Western Europe and the USA, it was not until 2009 that the media industry in the Arab Region saw its advertising revenues start to plummet and, as a consequence, the industry began to reshape. Of course, the crisis has been coupled with the migration to digital and online platforms, which are playing an increasingly prominent role in the media industry of many parts of the world, and are leading to some dramatic changes in how traditional media companies are running their businesses. The margins of media companies today are under huge pressure as their core advertising revenues are eroded and competitive dynamics are transformed. In the Arab Region, digital migration is still in its very early years, but nevertheless is being driven by the high proportion of young demographic in many Arab countries. With 55% of the Arab Region population under the age of 252, this segment is expected to drive the growth of digital media. Since international players have been experimenting with online content and business models for some time, the Arab Region now has the opportunity to learn from the mistakes and successes of the European, North American and Asian media markets to really drive growth.\n\n## Introduction\n\nIn this section, we aim to use a comparative analysis between the Arab Region and the rest of the world to assess the current state of the media industry and identify key opportunities for growth. We will assess the similarities between the media industry in the Arab Region and the global landscape, such as changing consumption trends, the evolution of new platforms and new monetisation models. We will also analyze the unique characteristics of the Arab Region, including its demographic composition, rapidly transforming economic climate and distinctive culture and history, all of which have a direct impact on the media sector.  We will refer throughout the report to responses from interviews that we have carried out with media industry professionals across the region, and which will feed into many of the conclusions that we draw. Indeed, it is worth noting from the outset that in spite of the significant challenges that the media industry in the region is currently facing, there remains plenty of optimism among industry players, with 85% of the media professionals we have spoken with feeling either positive or neutral about the prospects for the Arab media industry in 2010.\n\nWhile the Arab Region economies have been impacted by the crisis, a fast recovery is expected\n\nThe global economic crisis has had a significant\nimpact on local economies all over the world, with\nworld GDP not expected to return to its 2008 level\nuntil 2011.3 The Arab Region's collective GDP also\ndeclined by 10% in 2009, demonstrating a marked\nreduction relative to other regions of the world.\n\nFor the 15 countries that we have studied for the Arab Media Outlook 2009-2013, their collective GDP is expected to exceed 2008 levels by 2010 and grow substantially over the following three years.\n\nHowever, the Arab Region is expected to bounce\nback faster than most markets, and with a forecast\ngrowth of 10% in 2010 and the same CAGR until\n2013, it is expected to return to its position as one\nof the fastest growing regions in the world.\n\nJordan\n1,617\nSource: IMF October 2009, Value Partners analysis Source: IMF October 2009, Value Partners analysis Source: IMF October 2009, Value Partners analysis The decline in GDP that has been seen in the Arab Region in 2009 was clearly felt more severely in the oil-producing countries, whose economies were significantly affected by the falling oil prices during the year. However, over the projection period 2009- 2013, these countries are also expected to display the strongest recovery, showing significant GDP\nMorocco\n\ngrowth. In particular, Qatar and Sudan are forecast\nto see the strongest growth between 2009 and\n2013, growing at 17% and 14% CAGR respectively.\nMeanwhile, the majority of countries from the\nLevant and North Africa are also anticipated to\ngrow, but at a pace of between 6% and 11%.4\n\n## Likewise, Advertising Revenues In The Arab Region Have Been Hit By The Economic Crisis\n\nAdvertising revenues in the Arab Region have been severely impacted by the economic crisis, and on a comparative level between 2008 and 2009, it has been one of the most significantly affected regions in the world. It is worth noting, however, that the effects of the crisis were already starting to be felt quite substantially in 2008 by many regions, particularly in Western Europe and North\n\nAmerica. Meanwhile, regions like Central and\nEastern Europe, as well as the Arab Region itself,\nsaw their most significant drop in 2009. Turkey, in\nparticular, saw a 22% drop in advertising revenues\nin 2009, having remained almost static in 2008,\nwhich is a good indication that the characteristics\nleading to \"late\" drops in advertising are a\nregional phenomenon.\n\nWhile the Arab Region had been the fastest growing\nregion in the world in terms of advertising revenues\nprior to the crisis, it has also been significantly\naffected and, based on our projections, we expect\nto see advertising revenues return to their 2008\nlevels only by 2011. Our interviews with advertising\nagencies and media buyers suggest that this is, in\npart, due to the fact that 2008 was a particularly\nsuccessful year for the region in terms of\nadvertising revenues, displaying over 30% annual\ngrowth from 2007.  Indeed, the sectors which had\npreviously fuelled the growth of the industry in\nthe region, notably the real estate and financial\nservices sectors, are also those that were affected\nmost by the recession.\n\nWe are also seeing some new trends in the way\nadvertising dollars are being spent, mirroring the\ntrends of global markets. The economic crisis has\ntriggered a shift in many markets, including the\nArab Region, towards below the line advertising5,\nwith organizations generally looking for the most\nefficient ways of spending their marketing budgets\nand with the fastest results. There has also been an\n\nincrease in cross-platform advertising, with major\nmedia owners offering cross-platform packages to\nmarketers that ensure broader audience coverage.\nFor example, newspapers that operate online are\nincreasingly offering a combined package for\nadvertising in their print and online editions. As a\nresult, the advertising business model is evolving\nto a situation where advertisers are increasingly\ndedicating portions of their overall budgets to\nspecific media groups, rather than paying on a\nrate card basis.\n\nGoing forward, we expect a slight shift in the\ngrowth rates in advertising for the different\nArab countries: while Egypt had been one of the\nfastest growing Arab countries in 2008, with\nadvertising revenues increasing 43% on 2007,\nits growth is expected to slow down to a CAGR\nof 7% between 2009 and 2013. Meanwhile, based\non our projections, Qatar and UAE are expected\nto be the fastest growing countries in terms of\nadvertising in the GCC region, both showing a high\nCAGR of 11%.\n\n## Exhibit 6: Advertising Revenue Projections For The Arab Region, 2007-2013 (Us$ M)\n\n5,296\n726\nPan-Arab refers to advertising spend by regional media outlets that cover multiple countries in the Arab Region\n\n## On The Whole, Arab Region Advertising Revenues Are Very Low Relative To Other Markets\n\nFor a region where advertising revenues are already low relative to its size and GDP, the recent drop has further exacerbated the situation for the industry. The region's advertising spend, at just US$ 22 per capita on average, is already very low compared to other similar markets, even when compared to other developing markets.\n\nThis low level of advertising revenues is a result of several factors which are specific to each platform. However, our interview findings confirm that there are some challenges which span across platforms and it will be essential to make steps towards the resolution of these challenges if the industry is to see strong, sustainable growth. These include: - The lack of accurate and widely accepte audience\nmeasurement systems for TV and audited circulation figures for print\n- The prevalence of media organizations across all\nsectors which are not run for pure commercial reasons\n- For the TV sector in particular, the fact that\nsatellite television is the most popular form of pan-Arab viewing and does not cater for targeted advertising by country\n\n## In Spite Of The Economic Downturn, We Are Seeing Some Positive Trends In The Industry And Growth Is On The Way\n\nAlthough advertising revenues globally have significantly contracted, the media industry is seeing many positive developments which are likely to drive growth in the long-term. Firstly, we have seen strong resilience from the pay-TV and broadband sectors against the\n\nThe TV sector in the Arab Region, in particular,\ndemonstrates the lowest performance in terms\nof advertising revenues relative to the size of the\nmarket, not only due to the reasons above, but\nalso as a result of some concentration in the TV\nmedia selling sector.\n\nAs we analyse these key issues during the course\nof the report, we will also identify some major\nopportunities for advertising, and therefore the\nmedia industry, going forward.\n\neconomic crisis. From a consumption point of view,\nthe crisis appears to have had a lesser impact on\nmedia than on other entertainment activities. Our\nprimary research indicates that consumers are\nspending more time at home watching TV and are\ncutting their expenses on outdoor entertainment\nactivities, such as the movies.\n\n## Exhibit 8: Impact Of Economic Crisis On Media Consumption Habits1,2\n\nAs seen in most markets around the world and\nthe Arab Region, although the pace of pay-\nTV growth has declined in the past two years,\nthe sector has not suffered a contraction of its\nrevenues in the same way as free-to-air (FTA) TV.\nFor example, Showtime Arabia's6 subscription\nbase grew at a CAGR of 18% between 2004 and\n2007, and continued to grow between 2007 and\n2009, albeit at a lower rate of 9%,\n                              7 demonstrating\nthat subscription-based media services are not\n\nThe UK has seen particularly dramatic growth\nin internet advertising revenues, and 2009 saw\na major turning point for the industry when\ninternet advertising overtook TV for the very\nfirst time, accounting for 26% of total revenues.\n\n6 Referred to as Showtime in the remainder of the report\n7 Informa TM\nimpacted by economic fluctuations to the same extent as advertising.\n\nSecondly, another impact of the crisis has been\nthe acceleration in pace of digital migration. The\nproportion of advertising spend on the internet\nhas already grown substantially to make up 12% of\ntotal global spend in 2009, and is forecast to reach\n18% by 2013, as seen in the exhibit below.\n\nIndeed, with newspaper spend currently only 2%\nhigher than the internet, online advertising is\nabout to become the strongest sector in the UK\nadvertising market.\n\n## Exhibit 10: Share Of Advertising Spend By Platform, Uk\n\nIn the Arab Region, discussions with industry\nstakeholders suggest that online advertising\ncurrently constitutes around just 1% of total\nadvertising. This is, in part, due to the low\npenetration of broadband  in many Arab countries,\nas was discussed at length in the Arab Media\nOutlook 2008-2012.  However, it is also due to the\nstructure of online advertising spend in the region,\nwhereby the strongest sector in other markets,\nsearch advertising, is largely underdeveloped\nin the Arab world.  While online advertising is\nforecast to become the fastest growing sector in\nthe region, over the projection period it will remain\na small proportion of total advertising spend,\nunless disruptive technologies emerge in the next\nfew years.\n\nThirdly, the Arab Region's media industry is\nchanging fast and starting to generate real\ninterest from international players. The fact\n\nthat 2009 has seen several new government\nand private media initiatives across the region,\ncoupled with the opportunity for the Arab Region\nto learn from other more developed markets,\nsuggests that the industry will see high growth\nover the next five years. We expect to see growth\nacross all platforms in Arab media. While internet\nwill display the strongest growth, TV advertising\nrevenues will also substantially increase, driven\nby pan-Arab spend. The pan-Arab FTA satellite\nindustry is seeing increased interest in audience\nmeasurement systems, as well as many initiatives\nto improve the quality of local content, both of\nwhich are expected to contribute to an increase in\nadvertising revenues in the long-term. Meanwhile,\nprint advertising will continue to grow, against the\ntrend that we are seeing in the more developed\nmarkets. However, the pace of growth will likely\nslow down as print is increasingly replaced by\ndigital platforms.\n\nCAGR (2009-13)\n1,903\n\n## 1.2 Print\n\nPrint companies all over the world have been dealing with serious economic difficulties over the past few years due to the gradual decline in circulation levels and advertising revenues, led mainly by the migration of consumers online and compounded by the recent economic crisis. Meanwhile, journalism in the Arab world has always undergone a great deal of scrutiny from both local and international industry players. At a time when newspapers and magazines all over the world are being forced to tighten budgets and, in many cases, close down due to economic pressures, the Arab journalism industry has the additional burden of tight regulation. Throughout this section, we will evaluate the various factors affecting the regional and international print industries, as well as the opportunities we foresee for the sector over the next five years. Indeed, in spite of the challenges, interviews with industry experts suggest that 56% of respondents from the print sector in the region feel positive about the prospects for the industry in 2010, and a further 33% feel neutral.\n\n## The Region's Print Industry Is Starting To Experience Significant Structural Changes Already Initiated Internationally\n\nOn an international level, newspapers have\nbeen taking steps to restructure the way they\noperate in order to cope with the significant loss\nof circulation felt as a result of digital migration\nand the severe loss of advertising revenues. The\nstructural changes have taken many different\nforms around the world, depending on the market\nand the context in which companies deal with\nthese economic challenges.\n\n- Many publishing groups have begun rationalising\ntheir portfolios by shutting down loss-making titles. A prime example is major US publishing group Conde Nast, which shut down four key titles in Fall 2009. Similarly, rising costs in India have forced many publications to defer\nlaunches or close down. For example, Metro\nNow, an English newspaper published in Delhi,\nborn of a joint venture between Hindustan Times Media and Bennett, Coleman and Company, has deferred its plan to enter the state capitals, reduced its print run for the Delhi region and shelved the idea of a Sunday newspaper. BCCL's\nplans to take its flagship publication, The Times\nof India, to smaller towns are on hold, while\nBusiness Standard has shut down the newlylaunched Rajkot edition of its Gujarati newspaper\nand 70-year old The National Herald was forced\nto temporarily suspend operations in 2008.\n- The evening press has been particularly affected\nand is virtually disappearing from many markets. The London regional market in the UK is a prime\nexample, with two free evening newspapers, The\nLondon Paper and London Lite being shut down\nwithin three months of each other in 2009. 180-\nyear old London paper The Evening Standard\nalso ended its long history of paid circulation and became a free paper in a significant change of strategy.\n- Some\ncompanies\nhave\nbeen\nundergoing\nmajor cost transformation by optimising their production centres. Johnson Press in the UK, for example, has reduced the number of production centres it operates and, in the process, significantly downsized its workforce.\n- Another common response has been a change\nin newspaper formats in order to minimise\nproduction costs. An example is the San\nFrancisco Chronicle, which made some key\nalterations to its layout and design, including a reduction in size of the paper, in order to keep up with changing reader demographics and achieve cost efficiencies in production. Similarly, Polish publishing company Polskapresse took an innovative step back in October 2007, as\ndiscussed in the next exhibit. Furthermore, other newspapers are abandoning their expensive print editions and moving to a purely online publication.\n- There have also been some examples of\nconsolidation in the print industry,  for example in Russia which has seen high levels of M&A activity since 2008.  However, in many markets, consolidation has been less common than anticipated and large publishing groups have adopted the route of closing down titles and streamlining staff, rather than merging with other companies.\n\nIn the Arab Region, these trends have been felt\nto a lesser extent than other markets. However,\ninterviews with industry experts suggest that Arab\npublications have still been hit to some extent by\nsimilar difficulties as global markets and that the\nstructural changes have been accelerated by the\neconomic crisis.\n\n- As in other markets, many Arab newspaper titles\nhave also closed down across the region. Kuwait's\nAssawt, which only launched in October 2008,\nceased its operations in February 2009. Egypt's\nEl Badeel, which launched in 2006, closed\ndown in July 2009.  Groupe Maroc Soir, a major Moroccan publishing company, also closed\ndown two of its titles, Assabahia and Assada\nEl Massaia, in 2009. Similarly, The Daily Star in\nLebanon, the only English language newspaper, has been battling a difficult financial situation since January 2009 when it closed down before re-launching, and continues to have an uncertain future.\n- We have also seen some rationalisation of\nproduction among Arab newspapers, such as\nfree newspaper 7 Days in the UAE which made\nthe decision to close its Friday publication in 2009\nin an effort to increase efficiency.\n- New formats are also being introduced into the\nmarket and, in the same way that has been seen in international markets, some newspapers are moving to pure online editions. Saudi Arabia's\nAl Majalla is a case in point, which transferred to\nan e-paper format in April 2009 and is discussed further in the next exhibit. Similarly, UAE sports\nmagazine Super dropped its print edition in 2009\nand became a purely online publication.\n- There has also been an increase in cross-platform\nconsolidation across the region during 2009. In the UAE, for example, several media assets including three newspaper titles, Noor Dubai Radio & TV\nand Masar Printing & Publishing Company, were transferred from Arab Media Group to Dubai Media Inc. in Fall 2009 in an effort to optimise the media industry structure in Dubai.\n- The Arab Region has seen a limited amount of\nredundancies in print organizations relative to other markets, but nevertheless some companies have downsized their operations. Indeed, of the print industry organisations we interviewed\nacross the Arab Region, 15% went through a redundancy plan.\n\n## Exhibit 12: Responses To Circulation Decline: Global And Arab Case Studies Poland: Polska Ksa: Al Majalla Responses To Circulation Decline: Global And Arab Case Studies\n\nPoland: Polska\nKSA: Al Majalla\n- Faced with a strong decline in advertising\nrevenues in late 2007, major Polish publishing company Polskapresse took an innovative step in merging six of its regional dailies with several newly launched newspapers to create one nationwide daily under the \"Polska\" brand\n\nFaced with a strong decline in advertising\nrevenues in late 2007, major Polish publishing company Polskapresse took an innovative step in merging six of its regional dailies with several newly launched newspapers to create\none nationwide daily under the \"Polska\" brand\n\nPolska co-operates with *The Times* on this\npaper, featuring its logo on the front cover and selected editorial content from the publication;\nit triggered several other partnerships with\n- Polska co-operates with The Times on this\npaper, featuring its logo on the front cover and selected editorial content from the publication; it triggered several other partnerships with international titles among Polish newspapers, including Rzeczpospolita with The New York\nTimes and Dziennik with The Wall Street Journal\n\nAl Majalla is published online weekly and\nit triggered several other partnerships with\ninternational titles among Polish newspapers,\nincluding *Rzeczpospolita* with The New York\nTimes and *Dziennik* with The Wall Street\nJournal\n\nHowever, the new *Polska* brand was  unable to\nhalt the decline in advertising sales and the combined circulation of titles has continued to decrease year on year since the launch; in fact,\nthe title *Express Illustrowany,* which was not\nincluded in the project lost its readers at a\n- However, the new Polska brand was unable to\nhalt the decline in advertising sales and the combined circulation of titles has continued to decrease year on year since the launch; in fact, the title Express Illustrowany, which was\nnot included in the project, lost its readers at a slower pace than other newspapers in the group\nincluded in the project, lost its readers at a\nslower pace than other newspapers in the\nNewspapers and magazines all over the world have felt severely the impact of the economic crisis. Combined with the overall decline in paid circulation and rising costs, this challenge has prompted companies to respond in different ways, from new print designs to online editions etc.\n\nThe Arab world can expect to see more of these responses over the next few years as players adapt to the h i ld d th changing world around them\n\nNewspapers and magazines all over the world have felt severely the impact of the economic crisis. Combined\n-\nNote:     (1) Saudi Research & Marketing Group Source: WAN, MENA Media Guide\nwith the overall decline in paid circulation and rising costs, this challenge has prompted companies to respond in different ways, from new print designs to online editions etc. The Arab world can expect to see more of these responses over the next few years as players adapt to the\n-\nchanging world around them\nNote       (1)Saudi Research & Marketing Group Source: WAN, MENA Media Guide\n\n-  SRMG's1 political affairs magazine, Al Majalla,\nmarked a big transition in April 2009 by moving into the world of e-publishing\n- The move to an online format was part of\na wider strategy to explore a new style in\nArab journalism, and also demonstrates an innovative response to the print industry crisis, representing an effective way of reducing costs and exploring new platforms\n\nSRMG's1 political affairs magazine, Al\nMajalla, marked a big transition in April 2009\nby moving to e-publishing\n\nThe move to an online format was part of a\nwider strategy to explore a new style in Arab\njournalism, and also demonstrates an\ninnovative response to the print industry crisis, representing an effective way of reducing costs and exploring new platforms\n- Al Majalla is published online weekly and\ndiscusses a wide range of topics, as well as featuring a daily update of key news and events in both Arabic and English\n- The website aims to provide an interactive\nservice that includes images and social\n\nAl Majalla is published online weekly and\ndiscusses a wide range of topics, as well as featuring a daily update of key news and events in both Arabic and English\n\nThe website aims to provide an interactive\nservice that includes images and social networking sites, such as links to Facebook and a video library of important political discussions\n\nnetworking sites, such as links to Facebook and a video library of important political\n\ndiscussions\n\n## Despite This Challenging Environment, The Print Industry In The Region Has Weathered The Storm Better Than In Other Markets\n\nIn spite of these major issues, on the whole, the print industry is looking healthier in this region than most other parts of the world. Overall daily circulation and total number of titles are continuing to increase year on year in the region, while in most developed markets circulation levels and number of titles have consistently decreased. Over the past few years, the number of titles in the Arab Region has been steadily increasing, supported by new licences being awarded - for example, a total of 10 new licences have been awarded in Kuwait since 2006 which led to a flood\n\nOverall daily circulation in the Arab Region is\nalso continuing to increase, contrary to the\ndevelopments being seen in many other markets.\nFor example, the US saw a 4% decline in total\ncirculation between 2003 and 2008.9 Meanwhile\n\n9 Editor and Publisher International Yearbook: Referring to total paid-for dailies & Sundays\n\nof new titles in 2007 and 2008. In fact, 2009 was\nthe first time in many years that the number\nof newspaper titles in the region has actually\nremained almost constant. However, there has\nbeen some movement, with the number of titles\nclosing down in 2009 almost equalling the number\nof new titles launched.\n\nInternationally, however, the picture is much\nbleaker. In the US, the number of newspaper\ntitles available has been decreasing steadily\nsince 2004.8\n\nin the Arab Region, in spite of the total number of\ndaily newspaper titles stalling between 2008 and\n2009, circulation has continued to increase, as\ndemonstrated by the exhibit below.\n\nWhile other markets are struggling to maintain, let alone increase circulation of newspapers, in the Arab Region we expect the circulation of daily newspapers to continue to grow over the next five years, albeit at a slower pace than before. Following a growth rate of 5.5% CAGR between 2007 and 2009, we expect the rate to slow to 2.3% from 2009 to 2013. Growth will be driven not only by a strong increase in circulation in the largest market Egypt,\n\nbut also by some of the smaller Gulf countries,\nsuch as Bahrain and Qatar. As such, growth will\nstem from those countries where newspapers\nare the preferred media. Egypt, in particular, is\nhome to a thriving newspaper industry, with  some\nof the oldest newspapers in the world and, more\nrecently, several new independent newspapers\nwhich have launched following the success of Al\nMasry Al Youm.\n\n## Print Revenues In The Region Have Suffered From The Recession But Have Shown More Resilience Than International Markets\n\nInternationally, advertising spend on newspapers continues to decline and the economic recession has only accelerated an already perceptible decline in the share of total advertising spend on newspapers. Newspaper advertising spend has been hit on many fronts, all of which have contributed to the overall decline of the media spend. The classified sector in developed markets has all but disappeared in print, substituted, for the most part, by online. In the UK, for example, over 60% of the reduction in total newspaper advertising revenue between 2004 and 2008 came from classifieds, which accounted for a reduction of over $1 billion10.  Similarly, in the US, the classified advertising sector fell by 40% in 2Q 2009 alone, largely due to the availability of cheaper online alternatives such as Craigslist.11 Meanwhile, the display sector has also been negatively impacted, but the effect has not been quite as severe.\n\nIn the Arab Region, although sales figures from\nprint copies have remained steady in 2009,\nthere has been a decline in total revenues in the\nnewspaper industry due to pressure on advertising\nrevenues.  Overall in the Arab Region, we estimate\nthat nearly 40% of newspaper revenues currently\ncome from copy sales, while just over 60% is\ngenerated through advertising. Interviews with\nnewspapers across the Arab Region suggest that\napproximately 20-30% of advertising revenues\ncontinue to be derived from classifieds, while\naround 70-80% of advertising revenues are\nfrom display.\n\n3,686\n\nCPMs12 for newspapers in the region have also\nincreased steadily over the past few years, in spite\nof the pressure in 2009 as a result of the economic\ndownturn. 90% of newspaper and magazine\nindustry professionals who we interviewed in the\nregion believe that standard rate cards have either\nstayed the same or increased over the past few\nyears. However, CPM rates for newspapers in the\nArab Region remain relatively low when compared\nto the rest of the world. We estimate that CPMs for\nnewspapers in the Arab Region are, on average,\n\n## As In Other Regions, A Market Correction For Free Press Is Anticipated\n\nThis specific segment of the print industry was hit harder than traditional paid press by the sharp decline in advertising revenues. This is, in part, due to the fact that the segment had grown ahead of itself before the onset of the crisis. The number of free titles had mushroomed since their introduction in the late 1990s in the US, and later in Europe and the rest of the world. In recent years, these free titles have undergone significant economic difficulties - for example, one of Europe's major publishing groups for free newspapers, Metro, which continues to operate in a total of 15 different markets, was forced to close five of its 61 free daily titles. Denmark is another poignant example, where the total number of free dailies has significantly reduced from 10 different dailies with 20 editions in 2006 to just three dailies, each with three editions in 2009.\n\n30% lower than in Western Europe.  Meanwhile, for\nthe magazine sector in the Arab world, CPM rates\nare in fact higher when compared with Western\nEurope.  A comparison of 2008 figures suggests\nthat the average CPM rates for magazines in the\nArab Region were 70% higher than in Western\nEurope13. On the whole, industry experts in the\nregion suggest that the magazine market in the\nArab Region is stronger than that of newspapers\nin terms of advertising revenues.\n\nIn the Arab Region, free press has followed a\nsimilar path, with rapid growth in the number of\nfree newspaper titles in selected markets, such as\nEgypt, Oman and the UAE. However, as in other\nmarkets, many readers of free newspapers are\neither \"new\" readers or read both paid and free\npapers14, so the growth of free dailies did not\nsignificantly impact paid dailies. The UAE is an\ninteresting case, with free dailies constituting a\nsignificant proportion of total circulation (25%),\nthough it is generally accepted that there has been\nlimited growth in circulation. 7 Days, for instance,\none of the four free dailies in the UAE, has seen\nflat circulation over the past years. As a result,\nmost markets, including the UAE, are starting to\nsee a market correction for free press.\n\n## The Internet Has Started To Impact The Print Industry In The Region\n\nThe industry also faces increasing pressure from the internet where consumers, both globally and in the Arab Region, are spending an increasing amount of time. With news being one of the most popular forms of content among the In 000s\n\nyoung demographic in the Arab Region, it is not\nsurprising that consumption is moving online,\nwith 40% of news readers accessing news via the\ninternet in 2009.\n\n## Exhibit 17: Sources For Reading News In The Arab Region1,2\n\nIn particular, the concept of blogging for news is one that is particularly important for the Arab Region. In this respect, competition for printed news comes not only in the form of official news and current affairs websites, but also from individual bloggers, as was discussed at length in the AMO 2007-2011. The concept of blogging is becoming increasingly popular in the Arab world, where the internet provides a free platform for expression. Even international news players are increasingly turning to bloggers as a source for reporting on local events in the Arab world, an example of which can be seen in the next exhibit.\n\nIn spite of the strong popularity of user-generated\ncontent (UGC) in the region, it is worth noting\nthat over 80% of industry experts interviewed\nsaid that they do not feel threatened by UGC. This\nsuggests that while from a consumer point of view,\nblogging and other forms of UGC offer a popular\nplatform for news consumption, they are seen by\nthe industry more as an opportunity than a direct\ncompetitive threat.\n\n## Exhibit 18: User-Generated Content User-Generated Content: Global And Arab Case Studies Iraq: The Baghdad Blogger\n\n-  A young Iraqi architect operating underthe pseudonym Salam\nPax, became known around the world for his blog reporting events during the war in Iraq\n-  As Salam Pax charted the everyday reality of life in Baghdad\nduring the war, his writing attracted media attention worldwide\nat a time when foreign journalists were having difficulty accessing areas and sources for coverage on the war\n-  As a result of his journalistic adventures, Salam Pax went on\nto publish the book \"The Baghdad Blog\" in 2003, followed by another \"Where is Raed?\" in association with UK newspaper The Guardian\n-  The Baghdad Blogger is a prime example of the impact that\nUser-Generated Content can have on Arab and international media in the region\nNews organizations and consumers have been increasingly relying on the internet and, in particular on user -\n-\nNews organizations and consumers have been increasingly relying on the internet and, in particular on usergenerated content sites, as a source of news Rather than posing a threat to traditional news providers in the Arab Region, UGC sites are supporting\norganizations in the provision of photographs, videos and written content\ngenerated content sites, as a source of news Rather than posing a threat to traditional news providers in the Arab Region, UGC sites are supporting organi-\n-\nzations in the provision of photographs, videos and written content\nAs the global print industry is increasingly affected by online news, organizations are compensating in various ways for their reduced revenues. In some markets, newspapers are moving online and using the internet as a platform to offer additional services. On an international level, the newspaper industry continues to search for the right business model. While news content online has traditionally been offered for free and been funded by advertising, players are looking for new ways to supplement the relatively low revenues gained from online advertising by charging consumers for content online. Various\n\ncharging mechanisms are being explored, from\nsubscriptions to micropayments, to varying\ndegrees of success, but the debate continues over\nwhether consumers are in fact willing to pay for\ngeneral news content online. Rupert Murdoch,\non behalf of his global organisation News Corp.\nhas been particularly vocal in the debate, opting\nstrongly for a micropayment business model, and\nhaving achieved some success from publications\nsuch as The Wall Street Journal.  However, this is\nyet to be proved on his more general news sites\nsuch as The New York Post, Fox News, or any of his\nBritish newspapers.\n\nIn addition, News Corp. and others are looking for alternative ways to monetise their online news content through Search. While Murdoch has publicly threatened to block search engines such as Google from displaying his companies' news content on their sites15, the advent of Microsoft's alternative search engine, Bing, may prove to change the dynamics of the online news industry. If Microsoft, as reports suggest, is willing to pay news organizations for featuring their content on its site, news providers could stand a strong chance in improving monetisation of their content online.\n\nMeanwhile, many news organizations offering specialist content, such as business news, have proved that it is possible to successfully monetise specialist content online. Not only The Wall Street Journal, but other major international titles, such as The Financial Times and The Economist have had success in charging for their content online.\n\nMeanwhile in the Arab Region, there are further\nchallenges to charging for content online, such as\nlow credit card penetration and low take-up of online\npayment, but there remains a sense of optimism.\nIndeed, nearly 70% of the industry respondents\ninterviewed across the Arab Region believe there\nis a future for charging for content online.  As\nwith international markets, it is already clear\nthat consumers are willing to pay for specialized\nnews content online - particularly catering to the\nbusiness community - as the successful case of\nZawya in the Middle East demonstrates.\n\n## Exhibit 19: Business Models For Online News: Global And Arab Case Studies Business Models For Online News: Global And Arab Case Studies International: The Economist Uae: Zawya.Com Business Models For Online News: Global And Arab Case Studies Business Models For Online News: Global And Arab Case Studies International: The Economist Uae: Zawya.Com\n\n-  The Economist, traditionally a printed\npublication, has taken steps to maintain\nInternational: The Economist\nUAE: Zawya.com\n\npositive growth in its turnover, including\nBusiness models for online news: Global and Arab Case Studies\nInternational: The Economist\nUAE: Zawya.com\n\ninnovative use of the internet\nInternational: The Economist UAE: Zawya.com\n\n-  It has a focused investment in brand\nmarketing, creating local online campaigns\n\nusing the local language\n-  It has created better management of\nmarketing expenses, using the internet to\n\nThe Economist, traditionally a printed\npublication has taken steps to maintain positive growth in its turnover, including innovative use of the internet\n\nIt has a focused investment in brand\nmarketing, creating local online campaigns\nusing the local language\n\nIt has created better management of\nmarketing expenses, using the internet to\nacquire new print subscribers and adopting\n\nacquire new print subscribers and adopting\n\ncross marketing techniques, e.g.\n\nThe Economist, traditionally a printed\npublication has taken steps to maintain positive growth in its turnover, including innovative use of the internet\n\nIt has a focused investment in brand\nmarketing, creating local online campaigns using the local language\n\nIt has created better management of\nmarketing expenses, using the internet to\nacquire new print subscribers and adopting\n\nEconomist.com features are advertised on\n\nThe Economist, traditionally a printed\npublication has taken steps to maintain positive growth in its turnover, including innovative use of the internet\n\nIt has a focused investment in brand\nmarketing, creating local online campaigns using the local language\n\nIt has created better management of\nmarketing expenses, using the internet to\nacquire new print subscribers and adopting\nacquire new print subscribers and adopting\ncross marketing techniques, e.g. Economist.com features are advertised on\nthe print version\n\nThe Economist, traditionally a printed\npublication has taken steps to maintain positive growth in its turnover, including innovative use of the internet\n\nIt has a focused investment in brand\nmarketing, creating local online campaigns using the local language\n\nIt has created better management of\nmarketing expenses, using the internet to\nacquire new print subscribers and adopting\n\nthe print version\nacquire new print subscribers and adopting\ncross marketing techniques, e.g. Economist.com features are advertised on\nthe print version\nacquire new print subscribers and adopting\ncross marketing techniques, e.g. Economist.com features are advertised on\nthe print version\nacquire new print subscribers and adopting cross marketing techniques, e.g. Economist.com features are advertised on the print version comes from electronic sources\n\n17% of the turnover\ncomes from electronic\nsources\n17% of the turnover\ncomes from electronic\nsources\n17% of the turnover\ncomes from electronic\nsources\n\nWhile many news companies have had online presence for some time,  specialist business news sites have had particular success internationally While many news companies have had online presence for some time,  specialist business news sites have had particular success internationally In the Arab Region, a similar model has proved successful with Zawya, but whether or not players could successfully charge for online content on mainstream news sites remains to be seen\n\nWhile many news companies have had online presence for some time, specialist business news sites have\n-\nWhile many news companies have had online presence for some time,  specialist business news sites have had particular success internationally In the Arab Region, a similar model has proved successful with Zawya, but whether or not players could successfully charge for online content on mainstream news sites remains to be seen had particular success internationally While many news companies have had online presence for some time,  specialist business news sites have had particular success internationally In the Arab Region, a similar model has proved successful with Zawya, but whether or not players could successfully charge for online content on mainstream news sites remains to be seen In the Arab Region, a similar model has proved successful with Zawya, but whether or not players could\n-\n\nsuccessfully charge for online content on mainstream news sites remains to be seen\nExamples in other markets also highlight the importance of offering alternative content online to the print editions. Currently, the majority of newspapers in the Arab Region offer the same content between print and online editions; based on our interviews, over 80% of industry companies in the region do so. However, it has been proven that this approach has not been successful in other markets. Newspaper sites around the world have now started to differentiate themselves from their print editions in alternative ways, for\n\n-  Zawya is an online Middle East business\ninformation company servicing the business\n\nand financial professional community\n-  With ~212,000 subscribers, Zawya provides:\n- Profiles of 12,500 companies and 2,300\n\n   projects\n\n- Aggregated newspaper stories from all\n\n   countries in the MENA region\n\n- Live news coverage through partnerships\n\n   with various news outlets\n\nZawya is an online Middle East business\ninformation company servicing the business and financial professional community\n\nWith ~212,000 subscribers, Zawya provides:\n- Profiles of 12,500 companies and 2,300\nprojects\n- Aggregated newspaper stories from all\ncountries in the MENA region\n- Live news coverage through partnerships\n\n- Live financial news coverage through the\n\n   Dow Jones newswire service\n\nZawya is an online Middle East business\ninformation company servicing the business and financial professional community\n\nWith ~212,000 subscribers, Zawya provides:\n- Profiles of 12,500 companies and 2,300\nprojects\n- Aggregated newspaper stories from all\ncountries in the MENA region\n- Live news coverage through partnerships\n\nZawya is an online Middle East business\ninformation company servicing the business and financial professional community\n\nWith ~212,000 subscribers, Zawya provides:\n- Profiles of 12,500 companies and 2,300\nprojects\n- Aggregated newspaper stories from all\ncountries in the MENA region\n- Live news coverage through partnerships\n\nZawya is an online Middle East business\ninformation company servicing the business and financial professional community\n\nWith ~212,000 subscribers, Zawya provides:\n- Profiles of 12,500 companies and 2,300\nprojects\n- Aggregated newspaper stories from all\ncountries in the MENA region\n- Live news coverage through partnerships\n-  Zawya uses a unique online business model,\nproviding its customers with a limited amount\n\nof information for free, supported by\n\nadvertising, as well as offering various\n\nsubscription packages for access to\n\npremium content\nwith various news outlets\n- Live financial news coverage through the\nDow Jones newswire service\n\nZawya uses a unique online business model,\nproviding its customers with a limited amount of information for free, supported by advertising, as well as offering various subscription packages for access to premium content\nwith various news outlets\n- Live financial news coverage through the\nDow Jones newswire service\n\nZawya uses a unique online business model,\nproviding its customers with a limited amount of information for free, supported by advertising, as well as offering various subscription packages for access to premium content\nwith various news outlets\n- Live financial news coverage through the\nDow Jones newswire service\n\nZawya uses a unique online business model,\nproviding its customers with a limited amount of information for free, supported by advertising, as well as offering various subscription packages for access to premium content\nwith various news outlets\n- Live financial news coverage through the\nDow Jones newswire service\n\nZawya uses a unique online business model,\nproviding its customers with a limited amount of information for free, supported by advertising, as well as offering various subscription packages for access to premium content\n\ndevelopment\n| -             | Prices start    |\n|---------------|-----------------|\n| at $1,250 for |                 |\n| 6 months      |                 |\n| -             | Prices start at |\n| $1,500 for 6  |                 |\n| months        |                 |\n| -             | Prices start at |\n| $3,100 for 6  |                 |\n| months        |                 |\n| -             | Prices start    |\n| at $1,250 for |                 |\n| 6 months      |                 |\n| -             | Prices start at |\n| $1,500 for 6  |                 |\n| months        |                 |\n| -             | Prices start at |\n| $3,100 for 6  |                 |\n| months        |                 |\n| -             | Prices start    |\n| at $1,250 for |                 |\n| 6 months      |                 |\n| -             | Prices start at |\n| $1,500 for 6  |                 |\n| months        |                 |\n| -             | Prices start at |\n| $3,100 for 6  |                 |\n| months        |                 |\n| -             | Prices start    |\n| at $1,250 for |                 |\n| 6 months      |                 |\n| -             | Prices start at |\n| $1,500 for 6  |                 |\n| months        |                 |\n| -             | Prices start at |\n| $3,100 for 6  |                 |\n| months        |                 |\n\nexample by offering audiovisual content online. For\nexample, in Canada, many newspaper companies\nare partnering with news agency The Canadian\nPress to offer video content on their websites.\nMeanwhile, in the Arab Region, pioneers like Gulf\nNews are having great success by offering video\nnews on their websites. Others, such as Koulouna\nShouraka', a Syrian online news website, are\naggregating video content from different sources,\nthough unlike Western markets, no official\npartnerships are in place.\n\n## Exhibit 20: Online News Videos: Global And Arab Case Studies Canada: The Canadian Press Uae: Gulf News Online News Videos: Global And Arab Case Studies\n\n-  The Canadian Press offers a variety of video\nnews packages to newspaper websites in\nCanada: The Canadian Press\nUAE: Gulf News\n\nCanada wishing to offer alternative online\n\ncontent to their print editions\n-  Major Canadian newspapers The Globe and\n\nMail and Toronto Star, as well as notable\n\nwebsites Yahoo.ca, AOL Canada Inc. and\n\nCyberpresse are all using The Canadian\n\nPress video content on their websites\n\n## ,\n\n\nThe Canadian Press offers a variety of video\nnews packages to newspaper websites in Canada wishing to offer alternative online content to their print editions\n\nMajor Canadian newspapers The Globe and\nMail and *Toronto Star,* as well as notable\nwebsites Yahoo.ca, AOL Canada Inc. and Cyberpresse are all using The Canadian Press video content on their websites\n\nFor Canadian news, websites can select\n-  For Canadian news, websites can select\nfrom:\n\n- News Summaries: 1-2 minute round-ups of\n\n   daily news, updated twice daily\n\n- News Segments: Focus on individual\n\n   stories from around Canada as they break\nfrom:\n- News Summaries: 1-2 minute round-ups of\ndaily news, updated twice daily\n- News Segments: Focus on individual\nstories from around Canada as they break\n\nFor international news, websites can draw on\nThe Canadian Press' international partner,\nVideo news is a positive way for news websites to differentiate their online offering from their print edition\n-\nmany markets, video news providers have been partnering with newspapers to provide content for their websites This concept could work well in the Arab Region , with the story of Gulf News demonstrating the positive impact that video content can have on page hits, and could act as a clear differentiator to most sites which currently\ncontinue to publish the same content that is available in their print editions\nand in many markets, video news providers have been partnering with newspapers to provide content for their websites\nNote: Daily reach is percentage of global internet viewers who visit each site\nSource: Alexa.com\nThis concept could work well in the Arab Region, with the story of\n-\nGulf News demonstrating the positive\nimpact that video content can have on page hits, and could act as a clear differentiator to most sites which currently continue to publish the same content that is available in their print editions\nSource: Alexa.com A number of video news aggregation sites are also emerging in the English language, such as 1Cast in the USA.  Such sites are yet to be seen in the Arab\n\n## The Print Industry In The Region Has Further Room To Grow\n\nAlthough print currently constitutes nearly 60% of total advertising spend in the Arab Region, placing it in a much healthier position than most markets, we still believe there is further value to be unlocked and we anticipate growth in the Arab print market for a variety of reasons. Firstly, the\n\n-  Gulf News is one of the few newspapers in\n\nthe Arab Region to offer video content on its\n\nwebsite\n- Gntv news videos are provided for a\nselection of daily news stories, put together\n\nby Gulf News reporters and videographers\n- When compared to other UAE newspaper\nwebsites, page hits for Gulf News are\n\nsubstantially higher, partly as a result of its\n\nvideo news offering\ng\n\nGulf News is one of the few newspapers in\nthe Arab Region to offer video content on its website\n\nGntv news videos are provided for a\nselection of daily news stories, put together by Gulf News reporters and videographers\n\nWhen compared to other UAE newspaper\nwebsites, page hits for *Gulf News* are\nsubstantially higher, partly as a result of its\nvideo news offering\n0.06\nRegion, but could potentially provide a significant opportunity for the industry.\n\nnewspaper industry in the Arab Region is currently\nan unsaturated market in the majority of countries.\nThe concentration of newspapers in the region\nrelative to its population remains low compared to\nWestern Europe, North America and even Eastern\nEurope, as shown in the next exhibit.\n\n1.0\nHowever, it is worth noting that there is a wide disparity between countries in the region. Some of the Gulf states such as Bahrain, Qatar and Kuwait could be seen as \"saturated\" with titles, while others continue to present room for growth.\n\nEvidently, newspaper concentration is dependent\non several factors, including not only population\nbut also literacy rates, as displayed in the exhibit\nbelow. However, some key markets, including\nJordan, Saudi Arabia and Syria, could benefit from\nan increase in newspapers.\n\n## Exhibit 22:  Title Concentration Vs. Literacy Rates\n\n2\nFurther value creation in the Arab print industry will come from an increase in auditing, which is already well underway Another means of achieving growth in the industry would be to increase the level of auditing on circulation figures for Arab publications. Currently, out of the 189 daily newspaper titles available in the Arab Region, only 27 are audited using an official auditing body. Morocco has the highest number of audited newspapers in the region, with 77% of the region's audited newspapers being published in Morocco. The only other countries to practice (limited) auditing are in the Gulf region, namely Oman, UAE and, recently, Saudi Arabia. Indeed,\n\nSaudi Arabia's Al Jazirah newspaper underwent\nits first circulation audit in November 2009. Other\nefforts to stimulate auditing in the region include\nthe supporting body CASTOR (Circulation Audit\nSteering Organisation), which was formed in the\nUAE in 2005 as a joint initiative by the IAA, the\nGCC Advertisers' Business Group and the Media\nAgencies' Council, with the goal of promoting the\nadoption of circulation auditing in order to increase\nindustry transparency and credibility.\n\nUAE\nKSA\n\n## Growth Of The Industry Will Be Fuelled By Consolidation And Survival Of The Fittest\n\nIn many markets, we expect to see the survival of only the strongest companies over the difficult times that the next few years present. The strongest players are likely to emerge in two forms: those big players who have either consolidated or succeeded in making their operations more efficient in other ways, and the very small companies who have\n\nconsistently had low overheads and been able to\nweather the storm in a more manageable way. The\nones at a disadvantage in this equation may be the\nmedium-sized players, whose existence is likely to\ndiminish substantially in the long-term future of\nthe industry.\n\n## Exhibit 24: Consolidation In The Media Industry: Global And Arab Case Studies Consolidation In The Print Industry: Global And Arab Case Studies Consolidation In The Print Industry: Global And Arab Case Studies Consolidation In The Print Industry: Global And Arab Case Studies Malaysia: Mpb / Nstp Arab Region: Cross-Platform Consolidation Malaysia: Mpb / Nstp Arab Region: Cross-Platform Consolidation Malaysia: Mpb / Nstp Arab Region: Cross-Platform Consolidation Malaysia: Mpb / Nstp Arab Region: Cross-Platform Consolidation\n\n-  In October 2009, Media Prima Berhad (MPB)\nannounced its proposal to acquire Malaysia's\n\noldest and largest newspaper publisher, The\n\nNew Straits Times Press (NSTP), to create\n\none of the country's most powerful and\n\nlargest media groups\n-  The enlarged entity of MPB and NSTP will\ncreate a \"truly integrated media group\n\noffering advertisers the widest reach in terms\n\nof TV viewership, radio, outdoor, new media\n\nIn October 2009, Media Prima Berhad (MPB)\nannounced its proposal to acquire Malaysia's oldest and largest newspaper publisher, The New Straits Times Press (NSTP), to create one of the country's most powerful and largest media groups\n\nThe enlarged entity of MPB and NSTP will\ncreate a \"truly integrated media group offering advertisers the widest reach in terms\nof TV viewership radio outdoor new media\n\nand print via a full range of multi-media\n\nIn October 2009, Media Prima Berhad (MPB)\nannounced its proposal to acquire Malaysia's oldest and largest newspaper publisher, The New Straits Times Press (NSTP), to create one of the country's most powerful and largest media groups\n\nThe enlarged entity of MPB and NSTP will\ncreate a \"truly integrated media group offering advertisers the widest reach in terms\nof TV viewership radio outdoor new media\n\nIn October 2009, Media Prima Berhad (MPB)\nannounced its proposal to acquire Malaysia's oldest and largest newspaper publisher, The New Straits Times Press (NSTP), to create one of the country's most powerful and largest media groups\n\nThe enlarged entity of MPB and NSTP will\ncreate a \"truly integrated media group offering advertisers the widest reach in terms\nof TV viewership radio outdoor new media\n\nchannels\" (MPB)\n-  The two media companies will be\nconsolidated through a share swap, with the\n\nresulting entity expected to generate around\n\nUS$200 million in annual revenue\nof TV viewership, radio, outdoor, new media\nand print via a full range of multi-media channels\" (MPB)\n\nThe two media companies will be\nconsolidated through a share swap, with the resulting entity expected to generate around US$200 million in annual revenue\nof TV viewership, radio, outdoor, new media\nand print via a full range of multi-media channels\" (MPB)\n\nThe two media companies will be\nconsolidated through a share swap, with the resulting entity expected to generate around US$200 million in annual revenue\nof TV viewership, radio, outdoor, new media\nand print via a full range of multi-media channels\" (MPB)\n\nThe two media companies will be\nconsolidated through a share swap, with the resulting entity expected to generate around US$200 million in annual revenue\n\n## Consolidation Has Been A Common Theme In The Pressured Print Industry Over The Past Year, With Many Companies Merging For Survival To Cope With Rising Costs And Strong Competition Between Entities In The Arab World, Consolidation Has Been Taking Place \"Cross-Platform\" And We Expect To See An Increase In The Number Of Mergers In A Bid To Reduce Costs And Optimise Industry Structure\n\nConsolidation has been a common theme in the pressured print industry over the past year, with many\n-\n\n## Consolidation Has Been A Common Theme In The Pressured Print Industry Over The Past Year, With Many Companies Merging For Survival To Cope With Rising Costs And Strong Competition Between Entities In The Arab World, Consolidation Has Been Taking Place \"Cross-Platform\" And We Expect To See An Increase In The Number Of Mergers In A Bid To Reduce Costs And Optimise Industry Structure Consolidation Has Been A Common Theme In The Pressured Print Industry Over The Past Year, With Many Companies Merging For Survival To Cope With Rising Costs And Strong Competition Between Entities In The Arab World, Consolidation Has Been Taking Place \"Cross-Platform\" And We Expect To See An Increase In The Number Of Mergers In A Bid To Reduce Costs And Optimise Industry Structure\n\ncompanies merging for survival to cope with rising costs and strong competition between entities\n\nIn the Arab world, consolidation has been taking place \"cross-platform\" and we expect to see an increase in\n-\nthe number of mergers in a bid to reduce costs and optimise industry structure\n\nOverall, we believe that although the print industry\ncontinues to suffer many setbacks, the Arab\njournalism industry has more potential for survival\nthan most markets and we continue to expect\nsmall, but steady growth over the next five years.\nThe combination of an unsaturated market in many\n\n\nIn Autumn 2009, several media properties owned by Arab Media Group were transferred to Dubai Media Inc. as part of a strategy to optimise the industry structure\n\nIn Autumn 2009, several media properties owned by Arab Media Group were transferred to Dubai Media Inc. as part of a strategy to optimise the industry structure\n\nIn Autumn 2009, several media properties owned by Arab Media Group were transferred to Dubai Media Inc. as part of a strategy to optimise the\nindustry structure\n-  In Autumn 2009, several\nmedia properties owned by Arab Media Group were transferred to Dubai Media Inc. as part of a strategy to optimise the industry\nstructure\n-  In 2008, Prince Al Waleed Bin\nTalal, owner of Rotana,\n\nincreased his stake in LBC to\n\nIn 2008, Prince Al Waleed Bin Talal, owner of Rotana, increased his stake in LBC to 85%, paving the way for FTA\n\nIn 2008, Prince Al Waleed Bin Talal, owner of Rotana, increased his stake in LBC to 85%, paving the way for FTA\n\nIn 2008, Prince Al Waleed Bin Talal, owner of Rotana, increased his stake in LBC to 85%, paving the way for FTA\n\n85%, paving the way for FTA\n\nconsolidation\n-  This follows LBC's acquisition\nof pan-Arab newspaper Al\nconsolidation\n\nThis follows LBC's acquisition\nof pan-Arab newspaper Al Hayat in 2002\nconsolidation\n\nThis follows LBC's acquisition\nof pan-Arab newspaper Al Hayat in 2002\n\nHayat in 2002\nconsolidation\n\nThis follows LBC's acquisition\nof pan-Arab newspaper Al Hayat in 2002\n\nAl Jazeera acquired six sports\nchannels from ART in October 2009, along with its associated sports rights\n\nAl Jazeera acquired six sports\nchannels from ART in October 2009, along with its associated sports rights\n\nAl Jazeera acquired six sports\nchannels from ART in October 2009, along with its associated sports rights\n-  Al Jazeera acquired six\nsports channels from ART in October 2009, along with its associated sports rights\n\nArab countries, the expected increase in auditing\nleading to increased advertising revenues and the\npotential to leverage best practice examples in\nother markets, such as optimum online strategies,\nsuggest that the Arab print industry has plenty of\nroom for further growth.\n\n## 1.3 Tv\n\nThe Arab television industry is unique to the rest of the world, largely due to the fragmentation of its audience across a region of approximately 7.5 million square kilometres, a population of over 250 million people and an extensive number of spoken dialects20.   The broadcasting industry is currently dominated by the free-to-air (FTA) sector, with close to 600 channels available on free satellite. Before the boom of FTA, however, terrestrial TV was the main source of entertainment and information in the Arab Region and some domestic TV channels, many of which are also available via satellite today, are still very popular.  The penetration levels of FTA satellite are particularly high in the Levant, while terrestrial is the most popular platform in North Africa and pay- TV is strong only in a few Gulf countries, most notably the UAE.\n\n44%\n42%\nIn spite of the low pay-TV penetration, revenues from pay-TV currently constitute 30% of total TV revenues in the region and are continuing to Pay Satellite rise, with the proportion of advertising revenues expected to reduce over time, as the exhibit below demonstrates.\n\nThe TV advertising revenues shown in the exhibit above are split between pan-Arab advertising and 'local' TV advertising on a country basis, with growth expected to be driven by the pan-Arab market. When comparing the structure of the Arab TV industry with other markets around the world, there are two noticeable observations:\n\n- The Arab Region has a far higher proportion of\nfree satellite than other countries in both the developed world and other emerging markets\n- While 95% of TV households in the region access\nfree TV, just 70% of TV revenues come from advertising\n\n## 1.3.1 Free-To-Air Tv\n\nFTA TV, and in particular pan-Arab FTA satellite, is the dominant sector in the Arab broadcasting industry, and yet overall advertising revenues across the TV sector in the Arab Region remain limited to approximately $1.5bn in 2009, split between nearly $900m for pan-Arab satellite and just over $600m for local channels. For a market with a population of over 250 million - making it almost the same size as the USA, which saw annual advertising revenues of $53bn in 2009- this figure is\n\n## While The Fta Market Is Extremely Fragmented, It Is Dominated By A Few Large Broadcasting Groups\n\nWith around 450 FTA satellite channels available at\nthe beginning of 200917, the number has increased\n                                                          rapidly year-on-year and is estimated to stand at\n                                                          nearly 600 channels today.\n\nWith such a high number of channels available, there is a wide variety of genres and content types on offer for the pan-Arab audience. While the majority are still 'general interest' channels, there are also a growing number of specialized\n\nvery low.  Even when compared to other developing\nmarkets, the Arab TV industry suffers significantly\nfrom an undervalued advertising market. For\nexample, Brazil's TV advertising market was worth\n$7.4bn in 2009. This puts the Arab Region on par\nwith a country like Turkey, whose population is just\n70 million but TV advertising is worth over $1bn.\nThere are several reasons for the low value of the\nArab TV advertising sector, which we explore in\nthe remainder of the section.\n\nchannels catering to different segments of the\nArab audience. In particular, religious channels\nmake up the second highest number of channels\nafter 'general interest', with 45 religious channels\navailable in 2009.\n\nOthers\n\nIn spite of the large number of players, the pan-\nArab FTA market is dominated by a small number\nof channels, which form the bulk of both viewing\nshare and advertising revenues.\n\nWhile the top 15 pan-Arab channels make up\n64% of audience share, they constitute 80%18\nof the nearly $900m pan-Arab advertising revenues, suggesting that - as is the case in other international markets - those leading channels with the highest audiences are able to command a premium on their advertising. In turn, these channels are held by a few groups from the Gulf, namely MBC, Rotana / LBC, Abu Dhabi Media Company, Dubai Media Inc., and Al Jazeera. Other media owners, in Egypt for instance (Melody and Dream), are within the top 10 media groups in the region in terms of advertising revenues. It is worth noting that the relative importance of each pan-Arab channel varies across the Arab Region, particularly between the Gulf, Levant and North Africa. For example:\nCooking\n\n- In Saudi Arabia and the rest of the Gulf MBC\ndominates the market\n- In Egypt and the rest of North Africa there\nis a stronger hold of the national terrestrial channels, and\n- In Lebanon (and to some extent surrounding\nLevant countries), the Lebanese channels dominate\n\nThe MBC Group is the dominant broadcasting group,\naccounting for over 40% of total viewing share and\n50% of total advertising across its channels.19 This\nis due, in part, to the range of channels, languages\nand genres over which the group spans, including\na 24-hour news channel, Al Arabiya, as well as\ndedicated drama and entertainment channels in\nArabic, English and Farsi. Yet most of the audience\nis down to their anchor channel MBC1, which\ncaters to the mainstream Arab population with\ngeneral family entertainment.\n\n## Exhibit 29: Mbc Group Channel Offerings\n\nMBC Group channel offerings\nFree\n/ Pay\nFocus\nHighlights / Key Shows\nChannel\nAudience\nShare\nMain\nLanguage\nChannel\nAudience\nShare1\nMain\nLangu-\nFree\n/ Pay\nFocus\nHighlights / Key Shows\nage\n22%\nArabic\nFTA\nGeneral\nFamily\nEntertainment\n22%\nArabic\nFTA\nGeneral\nFamily Entertainment\n7%\nEnglish\nFTA\nMovies\n- Mostly movie repeats up to 17:00 daily,\ng\ny\np\np\ny,\n7%\nEnglish\nFTA\nMovies\n- Mostly movie repeats up to 17:00 daily,\nfollowed by foreign premieres and\naction movies during  primetime\n2%\nArabic\nFTA\nChildren's\nEntertainment\n- Blue Dragon (Children's)\n- The Book of Pooh (Children's)\n- Zach and Cody (Children's)\n- Eish Survivor (Children's reality)\n2%\nArabic\nFTA\nChildren's\nEntertainment\n- Blue Dragon(Children's) - Ben Ten (Children's) - Fantastic Four (Children's) - Eish Safari (Children's reality)\n7%\nEnglish\nFTA\nGeneral Entertainment\nwith focus on\nforeign series\n7%\nEnglish\nFTA\nGeneral\n- Turkish series\n7%\nEnglish\nFTA\nGeneral\nEntertainment with focus on foreign series\nn/a\nEnglish\nFTA\nMovies\n- Variety of mainly US movies, some of\nwhich have recently started being dubbed into Arabic\nn/a\nEnglish\nFTA\nMovies\n- Variety of mainly US movies, some of\nwhich have recently started being dubbed into Arabic\n3%\nEnglish\nFTA\nAction series\n- Lost (US drama)\n- Gladiators (US entertainment)\n- The Amazing Race (US entertainment)\n3%\nE\nli h\nFTA\nA ti\ni\nV\ni\nDi\ni\n(US d\n)\n3%\nEnglish\nFTA\nAction series\n- Vampire Diaries(US drama)\n- Gladiators (US entertainment) - Prison Break(US drama)\nn/a\nFarsi\nFTA\nGeneral\nEntertainment\n- Largely Arabic series with Farsi\nsubtitles\nn/a\nFarsi\nFTA\nGeneral\nEntertainment\n- English movies with Farsi subtitles\nn/a\nArabic\nPay\nPer\nArabic and Turkish series\nn/a\nArabic\nPay Per\nView\nbefore they air on MBC1 for Pay TV\nPer\nView\nArabic and Turkish series\n- Airs the MBC Arabic Drama series\nbefore they air on MBC1 for Pay-TV\ncustomers, for example Turkish drama\nis aired 24 hours earlier on MBC\nDrama Plus\nTurkish series\nbefore they air on MBC1 for Pay-TV\ncustomers, for example Turkish drama is aired 24 hours earlier on MBC Drama Plus\n5%\nArabic\nFTA\n24-hour News\n- Core programming includes news,\ndocumentaries, talk shows and\neconomic programmes\n5%\nArabic\nFTA\n24-hour News\n- Core programming includes news,\ndocumentaries, talk shows and economic programmes\n\nSource:\nArab Advisors Group, Corporate website, Value Partners analysis\n\nNote:\nS\n(1) Audience share based on PARC KSA data, 2008 PARC MBC G\nSource:\nPARC, MBC Group While MBC Group offers only one pay-TV channel in its current bouquet, its FTA channels have historically acted in many ways like pay-TV channels themselves in the type of content that they offer. In Western markets, premium content such as Hollywood movie regional premiers and premium sports content tend to be available only via subscription services. Meanwhile, in the pan-Arab satellite market, the traditional windowing strategies of US studios are not always applied in the same way, with some studios (mostly independent) partnering with FTA players like MBC to offer first or second run rights of Hollywood movies.\n\nRecent examples include deals with Summit Entertainment to air *Twilight* and with Celador/Film4 on Slumdog Millionaire. In addition, industry experts suggest that the issue of recency of content which pay-TV operators rely on to add value over free TV in many markets, is not such a key issue for viewers in the Arab Region. The\n\n\nWhile MBC Group offers only one pay-TV channel in its current bouquet, its FTA channels have historically acted in many ways like pay-TV channels themselves in the type of content that they offer. In Western markets, premium content such as Hollywood movie regional premiers and premium sports content tend to be available only via subscription services. Meanwhile, in the pan-Arab satellite market, the traditional windowing strategies of US studios are not always applied in the same way, with some studios (mostly independent) partnering with FTA players\n\n- Man Sa Yarbah Al Million (Arabic\ngameshow)\n- Kalam Nawaem ( Arabic talkshow)\n- Akher Man Yaalam ( Arabic talkshow)\n- Bab El Harra ( Arabic drama)\n- NuqtatTahawul ( Arabic talkshow)\n- Man Sa Yarbah Al Million (Arabic\ngameshow)\n- Kalam Nawaem ( Arabic talkshow) - Akher Man Yaalam ( Arabic talkshow) - Bab El Harra ( Arabic drama)\n- Nuqtat Tahawul ( Arabic talkshow)\nfollowed by foreign premieres and action movies during  primetime\n- Noor (Turkish drama) - The Lost Dream (Turkish drama)\n- Rachael Ray (US talkshow)\n- American Idol (US entertainment)\n- Turkish series - America's Got Talent (US talkshow) - American Idol (US entertainment) - Oprah (US talkshow)\n- Airs the MBC Arabic Drama series\n\nlike MBC to offer first or second run rights of\nHollywood movies. Recent examples include deals\nwith Summit Entertainment to air Twilight and\nwith Celador/Film4 on Slumdog Millionaire. In\naddition, industry experts suggest that  viewers in\nthe Arab Region are less sensitive to new releases\nthan in other markets. For example, viewers are\nless likely to pay a premium to access very recently\nreleased Hollywood movies, but would rather wait\nfor several months and watch the content for free,\nimpacting the traditional business model of pay-\nTV operators. Thus, FTA players, such as MBC,\n\nare able to secure deals with Hollywood studios to acquire rights for movies that are three to five years old, which are very popular with viewers.\n\nAnother trend in the Arab FTA broadcasting sector is that channels, such as MBC, are increasingly looking for new ways to offer premium content which will distinguish them from the free content offered on their core channels.  The trend is towards an increasing number of large, consolidated groups which span a range of genres, languages and, increasingly, a mix of FTA and pay-TV channels - particularly in the GCC region. This allows groups like MBC to maximise the exploitation of their expensive FTA content in alternative ways - in MBC's case, via transmission of its Arabic drama series on a pay-TV channel before they air on MBC1. For example, immediately after transmission of some of its Turkish drama series on MBC1, MBC offers the next day's episode for its paying customers 24 hours in advance on a 'turn over now' basis. Other major broadcasting groups, including some government owned organizations, are also increasingly catching up in terms of quality and breadth of content and we are beginning to see some market share transferred back to other players. Broadcasting groups in the Gulf region have been particularly active in developing strategies that include expanding their presence in the FTA sector, entering the pay-TV sector and investing heavily in premium content.\n\n- Al Jazeera, traditionally a FTA Arabic news\nchannel since 1996, has expanded its bouquet of channels to include sports, children's and English language news. Al Jazeera now offers a total of seven FTA channels and 14 pay-TV channels. Most notably, Al Jazeera's acquisition of six ART sports channels in November 2009 is a bold move deeper into the world of pay-TV. Al Jazeera now has the exclusive rights to several major international sports leagues, including the UEFA Champions League, FIFA World Cup 2010 and 2014, and the African Cup of Nations 2010-2016. While carrying out heavy investments in sports rights, including $180 million for the Champions League, and charging low subscription prices of around $5 / month, Al Jazeera has been vocal about its aim to boost subscriptions from around 1 million in 2009 to 3 million over the next\ntwo years.20\n- Similarly, Abu Dhabi Media Company's TV\nbroadcast division offers a total of six Arabic FTA channels across general entertainment, sports and documentary (via its recently launched\nNational Geographic Abu Dhabi channel), as well as one pay-TV sports channel. ADMC also started investing heavily in sports rights in 2009, purchasing the rights for the English Premier League for a reported  $350 million over three years (from 2010), which it will air on its pay- TV channel, demonstrating a strong move into premium content.\n- Dubai Media Inc. is in the process of growing its\nbouquet of channels, having launched one new sports channel and acquired a further channel from Arab Media Group in 2009. DMI now offers a total of six Arabic FTA channels across the genres of general entertainment, sports and religious, as well as one English language general entertainment channel offering content acquired through a deal with Warner Brothers International TV Distribution. Dubai TV is also investing in local content, having produced\nStruggle on the Sand in 2008, a $6m historical\nepic  representing the highest ever budget for an Arab TV series at the time. The channel is also home to one of the most popular local series in\nthe region, animated programme Freej.\n- Rotana Media Group, with its bouquet of Arabic\nmusic and movie channels, as well as two Foxbranded channels through a partnership with News Corp., is also investing heavily in content. In December 2009, Rotana announced a US$ 26.7m four-year deal with Walt Disney Company to air Disney and ABC content on FTA channels Fox Movies and Fox Series. The deal will see\npremium Disney content such as movies Pirates\nof the Caribbean, Wall-E and Chronicles of\nNarnia, as well as major Disney series, airing\non pan-Arab Fox channels. Furthermore, News Corp. has announced that they are in final discussions to buy a stake in Rotana Media, which will be finalized in 2010. This increasing interest from major international media conglomerate News Corp. could have a significant impact on Rotana's overall strategic positioning in the region.\n\nMeanwhile, broadcasting groups with more limited\nbudgets in other markets across the region\nhave managed to capture significant portions\nof audience share, particularly in North Africa\nwhere new channels are emerging to challenge\nhistorically strong broadcasters from the Levant.\n\n- LBC has been the market leader in Lebanon\nand popular throughout the region for many years, focusing on local talkshows and imported entertainment formats adapted to the local\nmarket. While facing strong competition on a pan-Arab basis, its ties to Rotana could see it improve its positioning over the next five years.\n- In North Africa, as the market opens up and new\nprivate networks start challenging historically dominant broadcasters, the region is emerging as a key market in the FTA TV sector. Egypt's\nAl Hayat TV, Melody TV and Dream TV are all\n\n## The Fta Market Suffers From Very Low Advertising Revenues\n\nRelative to the large audiences available to pan-\nArab TV channels, FTA suffers from very low\nadvertising revenues. This is clearly apparent\nfrom the CPM rates, which we estimate to be\naround 60% lower for pan-Arab TV than they are\nin Western Europe.21 The low advertising revenues\nexperienced in the region can be explained by\nseveral factors, many of which are issues that\nhave existed for many years, but are now being\ntaken increasingly seriously by industry players\nand governments alike, and which have potential\nfor significant improvement over the next\nfive years.\n\nThe first contributing factor, as we have seen, is\nthe fact that the pan-Arab audience is fragmented\n\nsuccess stories in their country, and even\nbeyond; meanwhile Tunisia's Nessma TV and\nMorocco's 2M are both popular channels that\nhave the potential to become significant pan-\nArab players, at least in North Africa, as they\nstart to invest further in content and generate\ninterest from across the region.\n\nIt is clear that the trend in the FTA sector is towards\ndomination by a few consolidated broadcasting\ngroups, as well as, simultaneously, the continued\nentry of new, smaller players.\n\nacross nearly 600 channels.  This fragmentation\nlimits the market both at the top and the bottom.\nAt the bottom, as the top five channels on FTA\nSatellite make up 47% of total viewing share,\nthere are hundreds of channels with extremely low\nviewing shares which can barely be commercially\nviable. When compared with a market like Spain,\nwhich has only 72 FTA channels (via DTT, not\nsatellite) and the top five channels constitute\n65% of the viewing share, it is even clearer that\nthis fragmentation of audience is a serious issue\nfor those major channels which are attempting to\nbe commercially viable as they are competing for\naudiences with such a high number of smaller,\nniche channels.\n\n## Exhibit 30: Channel Viewing Shares Spain Vs. Pan-Arab, 2008\n\nAt the other end, the top five channels on pan-Arab TV constitute a lesser proportion of total viewing when compared to other markets. As a result, the opportunities for channels to bring in mass audiences are seriously reduced. Meanwhile, the remaining 469 channels on pan-Arab TV share account for just 53% of total viewing, making it increasingly difficult for them to extract value from advertisers as the number of channels continues to increase. Another key factor, which is related to audience fragmentation and serves, in part, to explain the high number of satellite channels available, is the fact that not all channels in the region are run for purely commercial reasons. This puts severe pressure on any channel which is trying to operate commercially, since competition for content and, therefore, viewers is extremely stiff. This unusual\n\nbusiness model means that there is little pressure\nfrom the industry to increase advertising prices\nwhen TV channels have other sources of funding.\nSimilar disruption can be seen as a result of public\nfunding in some Western markets - for example,\nthe radio sector in the UK is led by the BBC\nchannels which constitute the bulk of the radio\nmarket. Thirdly, and arguably most importantly\nfor the industry, is the lack of accurate and widely\naccepted audience measurement systems in the\nregion. Unlike other markets, which generally\nhave accepted systems for providing the industry\nwith accurate audience data upon which many\nbroadcasting decisions are made, the Arab Region\nrelies on consumer surveys carried out by market\nresearch firms, some of whom have ties to the\nbroadcasters themselves. This further contributes\nto the low advertising revenues for the region and\nthe severe undervaluing of spot advertisements.\n\nFinally, the fact that pan-Arab satellite TV does not offer targeted advertising by country is a further hindering factor. The fact that Arab advertisers are able to reach pan-Arab audiences is, on the one hand, a large opportunity, but, on the other, also creates difficulties with charging appropriately high rates for the size of the audience. This challenge is compounded by the fact that the average demographic of the Arab audience is relatively low income, which has traditionally turned off global advertisers.  As a result, the top two pan-\n\n## In Spite Of These Multiple Monetisation Issues, Fta Looks Set To Grow In The Coming Years\n\nWe believe that the FTA sector will display strong growth over the next five years, with net TV advertising revenues increasing from nearly $900m today to almost $1.1bn in 2013 for pan-Arab advertising and from $1.5bn to around $1.9bn for total TV advertising in the Arab countries in scope, driven by an increase in pan-Arab advertising spend and a reduction in discounts to media buying agencies. Firstly, from a consumer point of view, the TV sector in the Arab Region is in a strong position relative to other markets.  While in other markets consumers are increasingly moving away from TV and spending more time on other platforms, viewers in the region continue to be some of the\n\nArab advertisers in 2008 were, understandably,\nSaudi Telecom and Zain, telecom companies for\nwhom the target Saudi market constitutes a large\nproportion of the total pan-Arab audience, making\nit commercially viable to advertise on the platform.\nMeanwhile, the highest proportion of advertising\non pan-Arab media came from hygiene and house\ncare products - i.e. brands which are present in\nmultiple Arab countries and can maximize the\nvalue of reaching such a broad audience.\n\nhighest consumers of television in the world. In\nterms of the amount of time spent watching TV,\nthe Arab Region watches 13% more television per\nday than Europe and 53% more than Asia Pacific,\nbehind only North America. Specifically, Kuwait\nis the nation with the highest level of television\nviewing in the world, with Saudi Arabia and the UAE\nalso in the top five22.  Consequently, the Arab TV\nindustry has the potential to be one of the biggest\nin the world from a consumption point of view.\n\nSecondly, some Arab governments and media\nindustry players are starting to appreciate the\npotential to unlock value in the TV industry via the\nintroduction of audience measurement systems.\n\nThese are still in their early stages and often face multiple obstacles, such as the introduction of the People Meter system in the UAE, which has been given the go-ahead by the telecommunications and media regulators but continues to face some resistance. Similarly, Saudi Arabia has been discussing the possibility of a People Meter system over the past two years, but any direct action is yet to be seen.  Although overcoming the various obstacles in terms of implementation of audience measurement systems will be a tough battle, industry representatives suggest that their introduction could lead to a significant increase in the value of advertising. However, it is also clear that for an audience measurement system to be a success and to be widely accepted, it must also be backed by an independent, neutral organization. As industry players and governments become increasingly aware of the value of audience measurement, we expect the number of initiatives to increase between today and 2013, which in turn will drive the growth of the industry. Thirdly, one of the key factors hindering net advertising revenues in the region is the practice of extremely high discounting on advertising rates\n\nby broadcasters to media buyers. Interviews with\nindustry experts in the region suggest that these\ncan reach up to 90%, depending on the platform\nand the market.  However, as we see increasing\npressure for transparency on industry players, we\nexpect this practice to become less extreme, and\ndiscounting rates to be reduced. This will ultimately\ndrive the growth of net advertising revenues in a\nsignificant way.\n\nA final element that we expect to see introduced\nto the Arab TV industry and help further its\ngrowth is more targeted advertising. While this\nis an expectation for the long-term future of the\nindustry, if the technology were to be introduced\nto enable addressable advertising on pan-Arab\nsatellite TV, this could change the face of the\nindustry. For the majority of FTA satellite channels,\nadvertisers are reaching pan-Arab audiences who\nmay or may not be part of their target market. In\nthe USA, however, cable companies have always\nbeen able to target customers in individual\nstates/cities, while satellite companies are now\nstarting to implement a technology that will\nfacilitate a similar approach.\n\n## Exhibit 32: Us Satellite Industry\n\n-  In the USA, the TV market is strongly dominated\nby Cable, which contributes to 58% of total TV penetration\n-  The satellite sector, which makes up 28% of the\ntotal market, consists of two key players, DirectTV and Dish Network\n-  The satellite industry has traditionally faced\nstrong competition for advertising from cable, largely because of the ability of cable technology to deliver locally targeted advertising\n-  In the last twelve months, US satellite operators\nhave announced deals with Invidi to use a new technology that will allow them to offer TV advertising which targets subscribers by a variety of geographic breakdowns\nIn the US, new technology could make Satellite TV a much stronger threat for cable by allowing targeted ad-\n-\nSource:\nScreen Digest\nvertising by geography In the Arab world, a similar concept would allow satellite channels to offer advertising aimed at particular\n-\ncountries and demographic groups and would likely have a very strong impact on overall revenues\nSource: Screen Digest In the Arab Region, a market with several different time zones, viewing patterns and media consumption habits, this concept of targeted advertising could add significant value to the pan- Arab satellite industry. There have been some attempts by pan-Arab broadcasters which are currently focused on their home markets in the Gulf to launch dedicated North African channels. For example, in 2006 MBC launched MBC Al Maghreb Al Arabi.\n\nIn conclusion, while FTA satellite in the Arab\nregion is currently a largely undervalued market,\nwe believe that there is huge potential for growth.\nWith Arab media industry players understanding\nthe vital role that audience measurement systems\nplay and a reduction in discounting practices,\nwe expect to see substantial growth over the\nnext five years.\n\n## 1.3.2 Pay-Tv The Pay-Tv Market In The Arab Region Faces Strong Competition\n\nThe pay-TV market in the Arab Region is still emerging compared to other regions, largely due to the extensive threat to the sector posed by FTA satellite. Free satellite and terrestrial combined are the platforms adopted by 95% of TV households in the region, leaving just 5% for pay-TV platforms. When compared to other developed and emerging markets, the pay-TV sector in the Arab Region is one of  the smallest. There are several reasons for the low pay-TV penetration in the region, including:\n\n- The existence of such an abundance of FTA\nchannels and their behaviour as pay-TV channels in other markets\n- The widespread issue of piracy in the region,\nparticularly in the form of dreamboxes\n- The limited amount of premium content available\nin the Arabic language\n- The fragmentation of the market (prior to the\nOrbit Showtime merger in Summer 2009) among\nthree major operators, plus a number of smaller players, which has hindered revenues of the major operators and, therefore, their investment in content\nThe pay-TV sector in the Arab Region is made up of pay satellite, which constitutes 3.8% of TV households, and cable and IPTV which, combined, are accessed by just 1.6% of TV households.  While pay-TV is low in many emerging markets, that is certainly not to say that it is a characteristic of all developing countries and there are plenty of examples to suggest that pay-TV can be a strong force in an emerging market economy.  The markets of India and China are cases in point, being countries with low income levels, high rates of piracy and yet strong pay-TV sectors. In India, cable reaches 62% of TV households, making it the country's dominant platform, as a result\n\nof a variety of low priced packages, starting at\njust US$1.60 per month. Meanwhile, China has\nthe largest cable market in the world with 165\nmillion subscribers and accounting for 43% of\nTV household penetration, as discussed in the\nexhibit below.\n\nThe strategies adopted in these markets represent\na potential opportunity for the Arab pay-TV market\nby, for example, developing tiering strategies,\nwhich include an entry bouquet with some 'teaser'\npremium content in order to differentiate from\nfree satellite, as well as an upgrade option with 'a\nla carte' channels and relevant packages.\n\n## Exhibit 34: Cable Tv Market In China Cable Tv Market In China China: Cable Tv Market\n\n-  With 165m cable TV households, China is the largest\ncable TV market in the world, ahead of the US\n-  The cable TV sector in China has grown steadily from its\nlaunch in the 1980s to reach 43% penetration in 2009\n-  Industry collaboration was key to the growth with a\ngovernment led effort to merge existing local oriented\ncable networks into province-based operators\n-  Cable TV ARPU is one of the lowest in the world in\nabsolute and relative value at just 0.5% of disposable income\n-  However, the situation will be rapidly evolving with the\ndigitalisation of the cable TV network in China:\n-  While an analogue subscription costs from US$ 1.50 -\nUS$ 1.70 per month, the digital entry bouquet is priced at US$ 3\n-  In addition premium channels and VOD packages are\npriced at an additional fee (e.g. US$ 5 per month for a VOD package)\nChina has become the largest cable TV market in the world in terms of number of subscribers, with an existing base which can be upgraded to premium services with the roll-out of digital cable The China example proves the viability of pay TV models even in markets with low disposable incomes and high piracy rates and high piracy rates For the Arab world, this could prove a good example of a \"tiering\" approach whereby the pay-TV operators can attract users to the platform at low fees and gradually build upon premium services\n\nChina has become the largest cable TV market in the world in terms of number of subscribers, with anexisting\n-\nbase which can be upgraded to premium services with the roll -out of digital cable\nNote:\nSource:\n(1)\nAs percentage of total cable TV subscribers EIU, Paul Buddle report on china\n\nThe China example proves the viability of pay TV models even in markets with low disposable incomes and\n-\nhigh piracy rates\nFor the Arab world, this could prove a good example of a \"tiering\" approach whereby the pay -TV operators can\n-\n\nattract users to the platform at low fees and gradually build upon premium services\nNote: (1) As percentage of total cable TV subscribers Source: EIU, Paul Budde report on China While there had been three key players in the Arab pay-TV market, the merger of Showtime and Orbit in Summer 2009 suggests that the market leader in terms of subscriptions, ART, will now face strong competition for its subscribers. Although ART continues to have the highest\n\npropotion of subscribers, Orbit/Showtime now\nhave a combined subscriber base of approximately\n40% of the market and might become a stronger\nthreat to ART as the lines between their target\nmarkets blur.\n\n## Exhibit 35:  Overview Of Pay-Tv Market In The Arab Region1 Overview Of Pay-Tv Market In The Arab Region1\n\nNotes:\nSource:\nUntil now, the various pay-TV operators in the market have adopted quite distinct strategies, but the landscape is changing, due to recent consolidation and the entry of new players.\n\n- ART, with the highest market share and the lowest\nARPU of the two major operators, has traditionally focused on Arabic content, becoming one of the largest producers of Arabic movies in the region and holding several exclusive deals with Arabic content channels. Sport has also been a key area of focus, with ART investing in rights for the Arab leagues. However, with the recent sale of six of its sports channels to Al Jazeera, and most of its sports rights along with them, ART may have to adapt its strategy.\n- Orbit and Showtime, recently merged into one\nentity, have always targeted the higher income segments of the region, gaining the highest ARPUs of all pay-TV operators in the region. Orbit is an Arab company producing many of its own Arabic drama series in-house, while Showtime\nsports\n\nhas always had a skew towards Western content.\nTogether, the two companies have a combined\ncontent offering of 75 pay-TV channels, eight\ndifferent packages and first run rights deals\nwith several major Hollywood studios, including\nWarner, HBO and Universal.\n\n- Al Jazeera, which could also be classified as a \"low\nARPU\" pay-TV provider, has been making some very heavy investments in premium content, with the purchase of both the rights and the channels from ART sports content. Al Jazeera will have to increase subscriptions substantially over the coming years in order to pay off its investment in premium sports rights.\n- In addition, there are several smaller operators\nin the market, who operate at mid-level ARPU and specialize in specific genres. For example, Almajd Satellite offers a mix of general interest and specialized programming, with a focus on religious content across its six pay-TV channels.\n\n## Exhibit 36: Pay-Tv Offerings: Orbit Showtime Network And Art\n\nSports\n(1)\nSource:\nArab Advisors Group, Value Partners analysis As the exhibit above shows, Orbit Showtime Network now offers the broadest content offering of the pay-TV operators. However, if it is to strenghthen its subscriber base against ART, the challenge will be to compete for the more mainstream segments of the Arabic-speaking population.\n\n## In This Context, We Foresee Growth Of The Pay-Tv Market In Three Main Areas\n\nWhile we forecast growth for the FTA sector in terms of advertising revenue growth, we believe that the pay-TV sector will grow simultaneously. The sector is forecast to grow 45% from 2.2 million Note:\n(1) Includes only full pay-TV providers not companies providing channel bouquets only e g Al Jazeera Note:\nSource:\n(1) Includes only full pay-TV providers, not companies providing channel bouquets only, e.g. Al Jazeera This growth in subscriptions and penetration will be driven by four key elements: consolidation among pay-TV operators, the effective exploitation of premium content, such as domestic football, the continued fight against piracy and the introduction of new services and platforms which will help increase reach.\n\nsubscriptions in 2009 to 3.2 million in 2013, still low compared to other markets but demonstrating substantial growth for the region.\n\nFirstly, consolidation of the sector, which has\nalready begun with the merger of two of the\nregion's pay-TV players, Orbit and Showtime,\nwill help drive growth of the industry through\nrationalisation of investment in content.\n\n## Exhibit 38: Consolidation In The Pay-Tv Industry Consolidation In The Pay-Tv Industry Sh Ti / O Bit M Showtime  / Orbit Merger\n\n- **Date Established:** 1996\n- **Date Established:** 1996\n\n- In July 2009, the region's pay-TV market witnessed the merger of two of its largest platform  owners\n- The Arabic pay-TV market now has only two players, Orbit Showtime Network (\"OSN\") and ART - The merger is likely to result in:\nThe merger is likely to result in:\n- Less competition for premium rights, potentially reducing the 'rate of inflation' of these rights - Synergies on rights and transmission, hence a more commercially viable pay-TV sector - Better positioning for Orbit Showtime to compete against other existing pay-TV players, predominantly\nART and new comers such as Al Jazeera Sports\n- Increased overall pay-TV penetration, with more exhaustive packages and improved content offerings\n- The new company, OSN, is accelerating investments to tackle piracy, including new STB technology\nwhich will be swapped in 2010\nSource:\nInforma TM\nFrom global markets where significant pay-TV mergers have taken place in the past, it is clear that significant gains can be made from sector consolidation, both in terms of increasing revenues and by gaining cost synergies, thus boosting the\n\npay-TV sector. The increase in profitability gained\nthrough consolidation has enabled operators to\nplug more investment into content. The merger of\nTPS and Canal Plus in France at the beginning of\n2007 is a case in point.\n\n## Exhibit 39:  Canal Plus / Tps Merger\n\nSecondly, effective exploitation of premium content by pay-TV operators in the region will be key to ensuring growth of the sector. For example, European pay-TV has grown significantly over the past ten years, largely as a result of the exclusive broadcast of domestic football leagues on pay-TV platforms. While domestic leagues in the Arab Region are still in the very early stages of their growth, it is expected that, as the leagues expand and mature, there will be a significant opportunity for pay-TV operators to extract further value from the associated broadcast rights. Thirdly, the fight against piracy is an ongoing and challenging battle, but certain markets are seeing significant improvements in the way piracy is being tackled which will have a long-term positive impact on the pay-TV sector.\n\n- Governments are playing an increasingly active\nrole to create and enforce intellectual property (IP) laws, such as the recently created IPR\ndivision23 within the Jordanian Policy as well\nas an IP division at the Customs Department in Jordan. Lebanon also has a special IPR police unit which has been operating since 2006 and in Saudi Arabia several ministries are beginning to crack down on TV decoder boxes that give viewers free access to subscription-based channels.\n- Similarly, private initiatives such as the Arabian\nAnti-Piracy Alliance (AAA) have had great success in the Gulf countries through their efforts to enforce piracy laws and lobby governments for necessary changes in regulation. The AAA have carried out major raids of illegal operations in the UAE, Bahrain and Saudi Arabia, totalling 239 raids across the Gulf, 159 arrests and the seizure of 8,823 illegal decoders since the\nbeginning of 2008.24\n- In addition, pay-TV operators themselves are\ncreating new technical solutions to tackle piracy, such as new \"anti-pirate\" set-top boxes. For example, ART recently introduced a new generation of anti-hacker technology in its set-top boxes. ART signed an agreement with French company Viaccess and Korean company Opentech to roll out new boxes that contain a \"Praha\" card (\"proactive against hacker attacks\") which combats illegal card sharing.\n\nGoing forward an increase in such initiatives by\ngovernments, pay-TV operators and other private\norganizations, are expected to lead to a gradual,\nbut significant improvement in the fight against\npiracy and, therefore, an increase in  the value\nof pay-TV.\n\nFinally, growth of the pay-TV sector will be driven\nby a significant improvement in the services\n\noffered by operators and the introduction and growth of new platforms for TV content distribution. Advanced features such as PVRs and interactive services are becoming essential elements of pay-TV offerings in most markets and we expect these features to advance in the Arab\n\n## 1.3.3 New Services\n\nOn an international level, advanced features such as PVRs, EPGs and interactive services are becoming an increasingly important way of differentiating the offerings of pay-TV from free TV, particularly when it comes to facing the challenges of free online content. Thus, in all markets we are seeing an increased focus on these services by pay-TV providers to try and ensure value add over FTA. In the Arab Region, many of these pay- TV features  are still in their early stages and the development of more user-friendly pay-TV features (e.g. improved EPG) could drive takeup. From discussions with industry stakeholders, we understand that no revenues are currently being made from these advanced features by pay- TV operators in the region, while in Europe they constitute 10-20% of pay-TV platform revenues.25\n\nHigh Definition is another area of increasing\nstrategic focus for many broadcasters around the\nworld, lauded by many as the biggest breakthrough\nin broadcasting since colour television. Globally,\nHD services have grown to become an essential\npart of any significant pay-TV offering, with all the\nmajor operators including HD channels in their\npackages, often at extra cost. In the Arab Region,\nthe first HD TV service in the Middle East went live\nin July 2009 with Etisalat's e-Vision platform, on\n\n## 1.3.4 New Platforms\n\nFinally, we anticipate the development of new platforms by the broadcasting sector in the Arab Region. One platform which is becoming increasingly popular in Western Europe and is starting to take off in the Arab Region, particularly in North Africa, is Digital Terrestrial Television (DTT). This is mainly due to the characteristics of the TV landscape in the North African region which are slightly different from other parts of the Arab world. Some of the key market conditions that need to be satisfied for successful DTT take-up that we have seen in other parts of the world include a\n\nRegion too. It is these major developments across\nthe industry, including consolidation of the sector,\nthe fight against piracy and the introduction of new\nplatforms and services, that will drive growth in the\npay-TV sector to reach 3.2 million subscriptions\nand 7% penetration by 2013.\n\nwhich Abu Dhabi TV, Fashion TV and Al Jazeera\nSports all became available in HD. In addition,\nsome production companies are making the\nsignificant and expensive leap to shooting in HD.\nWe expect to see further operators introducing HD\nin the coming months, as well as an increase in\nthe number of HD-enabled television sets and set-\ntop boxes.\n\n3D is another area of interest that broadcasters\nin some of the more mature markets are taking\nincreasingly seriously.  Most notably, the UK's\nChannel 4 aired a week-long special's worth of\n3D programming in November 2009, during which\nits viewers were able to watch the content using\ndedicated 3D glasses. Also in the UK, Sky's 3D\nbroadcasts are due to start in 2010 for those with\nSky HD, though viewers will not only have to acquire\nthe glasses, but also upgrade their television sets.\nSony and Panasonic have announced that they will\nrelease home 3D television systems in 2010, while\nMitsubishi and JVC are reported to be working on\nsimilar products. While it may be a while before\n3D television is introduced and gains traction\nin the Arab Region, it could eventually present a\nsignificant opportunity, particularly among the\nyounger demographic.\n\nhigh proportion of TV households still accessing\nanalogue terrestrial television, investments by\ngovernments and private sectors to roll out the\nDTT network, and strong existing FTA channels\nwho are ready to commit to DTT.\n\nAlthough DTT continues to face strong competition\nfrom FTA satellite, these conditions are being\nincreasingly met in Morocco and other North\nAfrican countries where DTT is becoming more\nprevalent and governments are pushing for\nanalogue switch-off by 2015.\n\n## Western Europe Morocco Dtt: Global And Arab Case Studies\n\n-  In Western Europe, DTT is becoming the\nleading primary TV platform, with 37% of TV\n\nHouseholds expected to receive DTT as their\n\nprimary signal by 2013\nWestern Europe\nMorocco\n-  In many territories, the low cost of set-top\nboxes has led to cable and satellite homes\n\nroutinely adopting DTT for use in secondary\n\nviewing locations. When these homes are\n\nincluded, DTT penetration rises to 65% by 2013\n-  DTT often provides a similar channel line-up to\nanalogue cable, usually for no monthly fee, so\n\nIn Western Europe, DTT is becoming the\nleading primary TV platform, with 37% of TV Households expected to receive DTT as their\nprimary signal by 2013\n\nIn many territories, the low cost of set-top\nboxes has led to cable and satellite homes routinely adopting DTT for use in secondary viewing locations. When these homes are included, DTT penetration rises to 65% by 2013\n\nis benefiting from churning cable customers\n\nDTT often provides a similar channel line up to\n-  The phenomenon of DTT is leading to a\nchange in the dynamics of the TV industry, by:\n\n- Accelerating audience fragmentation\n\n- Leading to an increased number of new\n\n   independent channels\n\n- Fostering the development of terrestrial HD\n\nThe Maghreb countries of Algeria, Libya,\nMauritania, Morocco and Tunisia have agreed to switch off their analogue terrestrial TV signals in 2015\n\nIn March 2007, the public broadcast\nauthority in Morocco, SNRT, which oversees state-controlled channels Radio- Television Marocaine (TVM) and 2M, launched a digital terrestrial TV (DTT)\nservice\n\nDTT often provides a similar channel line-up to\nanalogue cable, usually for no monthly fee, so is benefiting from churning cable customers\n\nThe phenomenon of DTT is leading to a\nchange in the dynamics of the TV industry, by:\n- Accelerating audience fragmentation - Leading to an increased number of new\nIn Europe, DTT is fast becoming the leading platform for TV, offering usually free multi-channel TV service In the Arab world, DTT faces strong competition from free satellite, however it is becoming increasingly prevalent\n\nIn Europe, DTT is fast becoming the leading platform for TV, offering usually free multi -channel TV service\n-\nSource: Informa TM, Value Partners analysis\nIn the Arab world, DTT faces strong competition from free satellite, however it is becoming increasingly\n-\nprevalent in North Africa where several governments are pushing for analogue switch-off by 2015 So far, the content offerings on DTT have been limited, but we expect the growth on this platform driven by\n-\ngovernment efforts\nSource: Informa TM\nAnother platform for which we expect to see further developments in the Arab Region is IPTV. IPTV penetration in the Arab world is increasing in certain markets, depending on the availability of broadband, and is now offered by seven service providers in six countries in the region - Algeria,\n\n-  The Maghreb countries of Algeria, Libya,\nMauritania, Morocco and Tunisia have\n\nagreed to switch off their analogue\n\nterrestrial TV signals in 2015\n-  In March 2007, the public broadcast\nauthority in Morocco, SNRT, which\n\noversees state-owned channels Radio-\n\nTelevision Marocaine (TVM) and 2M,\n\nlaunched a digital terrestrial TV (DTT)\n\nservice\n- In addition to digital versions of TVM and\n2M, the service launched with three niche\nservice\n\nchannels - Arriyadiya, Arrabia and\n\nAssadissa. The DTT offering increased to\n\nsix channels in May 2008 when SNRT\n\nlaunched film-focused AflamTV and a\n\nfurther channel in the Amazigh language\n\nlaunched in January 2010\n-  The service is currently available to 77% of\nthe Moroccan population, with extension to\n\na total of 20 cities scheduled for the end of 2009\n-  Some 100,000 DTT receivers had been\nsold by mid-2008 but the relatively high\n\nprice tag has held back even greater\n\ngrowth ($50 for a set-top box) and the\n\nextensive channel line-up provided by DTH\n\nalso counts against the limited content\n\nIn addition to digital versions of TVM and\n2M, the service  launched with three niche channels - Arriyadiya, Arrabia and Assadissa. The DTT offering increased to six channels in May 2008 when SNRT launched film-focused Aflam TV and a further channel in the Amazigh language launched in January 2010\n\nThe service is currently available to 77% of\nthe Moroccan population with extension to the Moroccan population, with extension to\na total of 20 cities scheduled for the end of 2009\n\nSome 100,000 DTT receivers had been\nsold by mid-2008 but the relatively high price tag has held back even greater growth ($50 for a set-top box) and the extensive channel line-up provided by DTH also counts against the limited content available on the DTT platform\n\navailable on the DTT platform\n\nJordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Qatar and the UAE -\nwhile several other Arab countries are considering\ndeployment.  Indeed, the smaller Gulf countries\ncould represent a success story in IPTV deployment,\nboth regionally and on an international level.\n\nIt is worth noting that IPTV deployments globally have generally been linked to very specific market conditions. For example, France is currently one of the most successful markets in terms of IPTV\npenetration, largely due to the urban planning laws which prohibit satellite dishes on multidwelling units and the lack of competing cable propositions which have allowed IPTV to develop\n\n## Hong Kong: Pccw Uae: Etisalat\n\n-  At 37% in 2008, Hong Kong has the highest\nIPTV penetration by household in the world\nIPTV operators: global and Arab Case Studies\n-  This strong penetration has been driven by\nPCCW positioning, including the following\nHong Kong: PCCW\nUAE: Etisalat\n\nkey success factors:\n\n- Dense urban environment, allowing Now\n\n   TV to target over 90% of its broadband\n\n   base from launch\n\n- Weak existing proposition in the market\n\n   from the cable operators\n\n- Offering premium content, including\n\n   sports and films to higher end customers\n\nAt 37% in 2008, Hong Kong has the highest\nIPTV penetration by household in the world\n\nThis strong penetration has been driven by\nPCCW positioning, including the following key success factors:\n- Dense urban environment, allowing Now\nTV to target over 90% of its broadband base from launch\n- Weak existing proposition in the market\n\n   with exclusive deals (EPL, HBO, Star etc)\nf\nth\nbl\nt\n\n- Good local content offering\n\n- Free STB, installation and household\n\n   wiring for new broadband customers\n-  In recent years, Now's growth rate has,\nhowever, stalled and the company is taking\n\nnew measures to maintain growth:\n\n- Longer term subscriptions to reduce churn\nfrom the cable operators\n- Offering premium content, including sports\nand films to higher end customers with exclusive deals (EPL, HBO, Star etc)\n- Good local content offering - Free STB, installation and household\nwiring for new broadband customers\n\nIn recent years, Now's growth rate has,\nhowever, stalled and the company is taking\nnew measures to maintain growth:\n\n- Innovative features including an all -in-one\n\n   set top box, recording function and\n\n   programme scheduling from mobile,\n       HDTV etc.\nExamples from global markets show that under certain conditions, IPTV can have a significant impact on the\n-\n\n## Examples From Global Markets Show That Under Certain Conditions, Iptv Can Have A Significant Impact On The Pay- Tv Sector\n\nIPTV is likely to be a niche phenomenon overall in the Arab Region but provides a good opportunity in selected\n-\nmarkets, particularly the Gulf countries where broadband penetration is high In those markets where IPTV does become successful, both pay-TV operators and content owners will benefit\n-\nas it provides a more secure alternative to satellite\n\nvery successfully. In the Arab world, Qatar and the\nUAE are already becoming competitive on a global\nscale in terms of IPTV deployment and we expect\nthe platform to prove a success in the Arab Region\ngoing forward, especially in the smaller countries\nwhere broadband penetration is already high and\nnew real estate developments are paving the way\nfor IPTV services.\n\n-  While IPTV penetration in the Arab Region\nremains very low, it has been relatively\n\nsuccessful in the UAE with 11% penetration\n-  IPTV in the UAE was driven by the high\nproportion of new developments\n-  In addition, Etisalat, the incumbent operator\nin the UAE, is transitioning its existing cable\n\nTV service, eVision (45% penetration) to\n\neLife, which includes an IPTV service over\n\nits FTTH network and is expected to reach\n\nover 1m HHs by the end of 2010. This will\n\nbring the UAE to one of the most highly\n\nWhile IPTV penetration in the Arab Region\nremains very low, it has been relatively successful in the UAE with 11% penetration\n\nIPTV in the UAE was driven by the high\nproportion of new developments\n\nIn addition, Etisalat, the incumbent operator\nin the UAE, is transitioning its existing cable TV service, eVision (45% penetration) to eLife, which includes an IPTV service over\nits FTTH network and is expected to reach\n\npenetrated markets for IPTV\nits FTTH network and is expected to reach\nover 1m HHs by the end of 2010. This will bring the UAE to one of the most highly penetrated markets for IPTV\nUnlike some other markets that have strong competition for IPTV customers from cable, the Arab Region's popular satellite platform offers little in the way of interactivity, opening up the way for IPTV and its interactive services.  Indeed, as the pace of broadband rollout increases and telecom operators improve their multi-play packages, we expect to see growth in IPTV in the Arab Region.\n\nIt is also worth considering that it is not just\nconsumers\n             who\n                   are\n                         benefiting\n                                     from\n                                            new\n\n## Menos Broadcast System Overview Of Menos Broadcast System\n\n\nMENOS, or Multimedia Exchange Network Over Satellite, is a broadband IP-based networking concept used to\nexchange multimedia content over satellite\n\nThe project is a partnership between leading MENA satellite operator Arabsat, Tunisia-based ASBU (Arab States\nBroadcasting Union) and Newtec, based in Belgium\n\nThe MENOS system will be of particular value to live broadcasting, providing lower operational and terminal costs,\nfaster delivery time and higher flexibility on the use of bandwidth\nThis system could have an impact on the broadcasting sector in general, and the delivery of live content such as news in particular,\n\nTV platforms, but as technology advances,\nbroadcasters are also discovering new methods\nof distributing content on a B2B basis. One of\nthe major initiatives that have been developed\nin the Arab Region in recent years is the MENOS\nBroadcast system, a partnership between Arabsat,\nASBU and Newtec which enables companies to\ntransmit multimedia via broadband over satellite.\n\nby providing fast delivery between players at low cost.\n\n## 1.4 Online & Mobile\n\nThe arrival of online media and its impact on traditional platforms is undeniably one of the most dramatic changes affecting the global media industry. The online industry in the Arab world, while a few years behind its counterparts in some other markets, is starting to take off, driven by the strong proportion of the youth demographic in the region. However, from a supply point of view, the maturity level of the industry is highly disparate across the different Arab markets, primarily due to the differing degrees of broadband, in particular, but also mobile penetration. While many companies seem to be experimenting with the online platform, the offerings of Arabic websites have room for further development. For example, while over 85% of the Arab newspapers we spoke with currently operate an online platform, only around 2% of their advertising revenues are derived from online. There are significant opportunities for the regional online industry to develop its offerings and grow its user base.\n\n## Broadband Penetration In The Arab Region Remains Low When Compared To Other Markets But With Disparities Between Countries\n\nOn average, the Arab Region has a low broadband penetration of 12%. However, it must be pointed out that the range across Arab countries is Over the course of the next five years, we expect broadband penetration to increase across the board in every Arab country, stimulating growth of the media industry in the region. The growth extreme, ranging from 0-1% in emerging markets like Syria and Sudan and up to 84% in Qatar.\n\nwill be driven largely by Egypt and Saudi Arabia, who together will make up 70% of total broadband subscriptions by 2013.\n\nAs broadband penetration increases in the region over the next five years, we expect to see strong growth in internet usage and developments in\n\n## Online Advertising Is Currently Low In The Region But We Forecast Strong Growth\n\nThe online advertising market in the Arab world is yet to take off in a significant way, and is currently in a position that was seen in markets like the UK around the year 2000.  With the online platform currently forming close to 1% of overall advertising spend in the Arab Region and worth only $56 million, we expect it to grow substantially over the next few years to nearly $266 million. However, compared to traditional platforms it will still contribute a very small proportion of advertising revenues, at approximately 4% in 2013. There are several reasons for this. Firstly, overall broadband penetration will remain low when compared to Western markets.  In addition, Bahrain the Arab online media industry, particularly in the areas of online advertising, social media and mobile applications.\n\nwhile Arabic language websites are the most\npopular in most Arab countries, neither the\nquality nor quantity of online content catering to\nthe Arab world is yet comparable to that seen in\ndeveloped English-speaking markets like the\nUS or UK.\n\nIt is not only the volume of overall online advertising\nspend that is currently low in the Arab world, but\nalso the structure of the advertising spend that\ndiffers. Search is not yet fully developed, mainly\ndue to a lack of awareness of its value among\nlocal companies.\n\n## Exhibit 45: Search Advertising: Global And Arab Case Studies Europe: Mature Search Advertising Market Arab World: Just Starting Out Search Advertising: Global And Arab Case Studies\n\n-  Over the past eight years, Europe has seen\na massive growth in the value of search\nEurope: Mature search advertising market\nArab world: Just starting out\n\nadvertising\n-  Paid search has moved from a hardly known\nmedium and a small percentage of marketingbudgets in 2000, to a strong\nopposition to Display and Classified, forming the highestpercentage of internet advertising\n     in 2008\n\nOver the past eight years, Europe has seen\na massive growth in the value of search advertising\n\nPaid search has moved from a hardly known\nmedium and a small percentage of marketing budgets in 2000, to a strong opposition to\nonline content in the region:\nSearch advertising has come to be one of the most commonly used platforms by brands in other markets,\n\nSearch advertising has come to be one of the most commonly used platforms by brands in other markets,\n-\nparticularly where internet penetration is already high In the Arab world, search advertising is likely to grow significantly as the quality and quantity of Arabic\n-\ncontent improves and advertisers become more aware of the value of search\nSource: Jupiter Display advertising is currently a much more popular option for online advertisers in the region, and still retains significant potential for growth, particularly with the uptake of social media and the introduction of more targeted advertising. Display\n\n## Arab Portals Have Attracted Strong Audiences But Face Tough Competition From International Players\n\nThe international portal giants, such as MSN, Yahoo! and Google have traditionally dominated the web space in most markets. These sites are among the top 10 most visited in almost all Arab countries as well, although local Arabic sites are increasingly creeping up the list, particularly in\n\n-  In the Arab world, the value of paid search is\nnot yet fully maximized, largely due to the\n\nlow levels of local Arabic content available\n-  In a survey carried out in 2009, Google\nfound that of the online search portal users\n\nin the UAE, 58% prefer google.com to\n\ngoogle.ae\n-  However, Google has already started taking\nmeasures to improve the offering of local\n\nonline content in the region:\n\nIn the Arab world, the value of paid search is\nnot yet fully maximized, largely due to the low levels of local Arabic content available\n\nIn a survey carried out in 2009, Google\nfound that of the online search portal users in the UAE, 58% prefer google.com to google.ae\n\nHowever, Google has already started taking measures to improve the offering of local\nonline content in the region:\n\n- Educating local companies on the\n\n   importance of functioning websites\n\n- Adapting existing products to Arabic while\n\n   developing new bespoke products\n\n- Google News, Blogger and Chrome all have Arabic versions\n\nadvertising in the form of banners has been a key\npart of brands' advertising campaigns for around\nfive years and the trend we are starting to see is\nadvertisers looking for more advanced, innovative\nand creative ways of using banners. the case of Maktoob, since its recent merger with\nYahoo!. In a few rare foreign markets, however,\nlocal sites have succeeded in dominating the online\nportal market - China being a prime example, as\nthe following exhibit demonstrates.\n\n## Exhibit 46: Online Portals: Global And Arab Case Studies China: Baidu Jordan: Maktoob Online Portals: Global And Arab Case Studies\n\n-  Baidu is China's number one search engine, with\n300 million users and a range of additional services\nJordan: Maktoob\n-  It accounts for approximately 1.5% of global daily\npage views, making it the 9thmost popular website in the world\n-  In 1997, Baidu became the first Chinese\ncompany to be listed on the NASDAQ-100\n\nBaidu is China's number one search engine, with\n300 million users and a range of additional services\n\nIt accounts for approximately 1.5% of global daily\npage views, making it the 9th most popular website\nin the world\n\nIn 1997, Baidu became the first Chinese company\nto be listed on the NASDAQ-100\n\nIn 2008, Baidu had revenues of $469m, operating\nfit\nf $161\nd\n6 000\nl\n\nIn August 2009, the Arab world's largest\nonline community Maktoob was acquired by internet giant Yahoo!\n\nThe deal will allow Yahoo! to offer Arabic language content for the first time, as well as Arabic versions of its services, such as instant messaging and email\n\nThe deal could enable Maktoob/Yahoo! to\nreach the list of Top 5 websites on a pan-\nArab basis\nprofit of $161m and over 6,000 employees\nArab basis\n-  In 2008, Baidu had revenues of $469m, operating\nprofit of $161m and over 6,000 employees\n\nBaidu is China's number one search engine, with\n300 million users and a range of additional services\n\nIt accounts for approximately 1.5% of global daily\npage views, making it the 9th most popular website\nin the world\n\nIn 1997, Baidu became the first Chinese company\nto be listed on the NASDAQ-100\n\nIn August 2009, the Arab world's largest\nonline community Maktoob was acquired by internet giant Yahoo!\n\nThe deal will allow Yahoo! to offer Arabic language content for the first time, as well as Arabic versions of its services, such as instant messaging and email\nThe example of Baidu in China demonstrates that it is possible for local portals to have stronger success than international companies in markets outside the US Although in the Arab world international sites such as MSN and Google are still the most popular, Maktoob has the potential to take this spot following its acquisition by Yahoo!\n\nSource: Maktoob Although in the Arab world international sites such as MSN and Google are still the most popular, Maktoob has the potential to take this spot following its acquisition by Yahoo!\n\nSource: Maktoob The example of Baidu in China demonstrates that it is possible for local portals to have stronger success\n-\n\nthan international companies in markets outside the US Although in the Arab world international sites such as MSN and Google are still the most popular, Maktoob\n-\nhas the potential to take this spot following its acquisition by Yahoo!\nSource: Maktoob\n\n## Social Media Has Rocketed In The Arab Region And With New Sites Launching, It Continues To Grow\n\n\nSocial media in the Arab world is currently undergoing significant developments. There are three key categories of social media sites in the Arab Region, which are co-existing in the market. Firstly, international sites such as Facebook have managed to gain the most popularity in the region, due to their strong brand names and their early entry into the market. Secondly, international players such as Twitter and FMyLife have introduced Arabic interfaces in the past twelve months which we expect to grow in popularity over the next five years as internet penetration\n\n-  In August 2009, the Arab world's largest\nonline community Maktoob was acquired by\n\ninternet giant Yahoo!\n-  The deal will allow Yahoo! to offer Arabic\nlanguage content for the first time, as well as\n\nArabic versions of its services, such as\n\ninstant messaging and email\n-  The deal could enable Maktoob/Yahoo! to\nreach the list of Top 5 websites on a pan-\n\nArab basis\n7th / 5th\n7th / 5th\n\nin the bigger Arabic-speaking markets, such as\nEgypt and Saudi Arabia, increases and awareness\ngrows. Thirdly, local companies such as Maktoob,\nJeeran and UAE Women's Network are growing\ntheir user bases since their launch in the past\nfew years and, while they face strong competition\nfrom international players, those which are\noffering additional services to pure social media\nlike Maktoob are performing particularly well\nand have the potential to grow significantly in\nthe long-term.\n\n## Exhibit 47: Social Media: Global And Arab Case Studies Worldwide: Facebook Arabic Jordan: Jeeran\n\n-  In March 2009, Facebook launched an Arabic\nversion in an attempt to expand its presence in the region\n- Even before the launch of its Arabic version,\nFacebook was largely popular in the Arab region with over 900,000 users in Egypt, over 300,000\nusers in Lebanon and over 250,000 users in Saudi Arabia\n-  Facebook Arabic now poses increased\ncompetition to Arab social media sites\n- However, the use of the Arabic language is\njust one element in the localisation of content and Facebook in the Arab world is still largely considered to be a brand created for an international user base\nGlobal brand Facebook remains the most popular social networking site in the world, including in the Arab\n-\nregion where it is in the Top 5 most visited websites for most countries However, there is also an opportunity for homegrown brands such as Jeeran to grow substantially in the\n-\nArab world, with their unique selling point being a better understanding of Arab internet user needs and an ability to tailor content for a local audience\n\nMany companies and famous Arab personalities are also embracing social media, recognizing its potential as a useful marketing tool, allowing interaction with customers that other platforms do not provide.\n\n-  Jeeran was launched in 2000 by two Jordanian\nentrepreneurs as a web hosting site similar to Yahoo!'s Geocities\n-  In 2005, Jeeran launched an Arabic blogging\nplatform and, by 2007, added a variety of social media tools, including video and photo sharing\n-  Today, Jeeran is the largest site in the Arab\nworld for User-Generated Content :\n\n- 8 million unique visitors / month\n\n- 1.6 million registered users / month\n\n- 160,000 blogs\n-  Jeeran has successfully adapted the social\nmedia concept to the Arab audience, providing a different offering from international sites\n- Originally funded by venture capitalists, Jeeran\nis one of many online companies that have emerged in Jordan over the past few years and has helped fuel a technologyfocused talent base in the country\n\nThe most notable example and the biggest social\nmedia phenomenon of 2009 has been the sudden\nuptake of Twitter, embraced by consumers,\ncorporations and celebrities alike.\n\n## Exhibit 48: Twitter: Global And Arab Case Studies Worldwide: Twitter Arab Region: Twitter Twitter: Global And Arab Case Studies\n\n- Twitter is the 14th most popular website in the\nworld and has seen massive growth in almost every market over the past year\nTwitter: Global and Arab Case Studies\nArab Region: Twitter\nArab Region: Twitter\n-  The site has been adopted by a diverse range\nof users - by companies as a marketing tool, by internet users keeping in touch with their\nfriends, and by media celebrities communicating with fans\n\nTwitter is the 14th most popular website in the world\nand has seen massive growth in almost every market over the past year\n\nThe site has been adopted by a diverse range of\nusers - by companies as a marketing tool, by internet users keeping in touch with their friends, and by media celebrities communicating with fans\n\nFor the newspaper industry, social networks like\nTwitter were originally seen as competition, but they\nare starting to be embraced by print companies,\nwho are using them as a way of interacting with\nreaders while they are away from their core platform\n\n\nThe site has been adopted by a diverse range of users - by companies as a marketing tool, by\ninternet users keeping in touch with their friends,\nand by media celebrities communicating with fans\n\nFor the newspaper industry, social networks like Twitter were originally seen as competition, but they\nare starting to be embraced by print companies,\nwho are using them as a way of interacting with\nreaders while they are away from their core platform\n-  For the newspaper industry, social networks\nlike Twitter were originally seen as competition, but they are starting to be embraced by print companies, who are using them as a way of interacting with readers while they are away from their core platform\nin many countries around the world and now expanding its reach beyond the so-called 'Net Generation', with the median age of Twitter users standing at 31 years In the Arab world, some media companies are starting to embrace Twitter by interacting with  its users,  but there is further potential for organizations to take advantage of their tweeting customer base Source: Spot-On PR, Ofcom Twitter has been the biggest phenomenon to hit social media in 2009, becoming one of the most popular websites in many countries around the world and now expanding its reach beyond the so-called 'Net Generation', with the median age of Twitter users standing at 31 years In the Arab world, some media companies are starting to embrace Twitter by interacting with  its users,  but there is further potential for organizations to take advantage of their tweeting customer base\n\nTwitter has been the biggest phenomenon to hit social media in 2009, becoming one of the most popular\n-\nSource: Spot-On PR, Ofcom\nwebsites in many countries around the world and now expanding its reach beyond the so-called \"Net Generation\", with the median age of Twitter users standing at 31 years In the Arab world, some media companies are starting to embrace Twitter by interacting with its users, but\n-\nthere is further potential for organizations to take advantage of their tweeting customer base\nSource: Spot-On PR, Ofcom\n\nNews companies are also making the most of\nsocial media, in some cases in very innovative\nways, using the sites not only to provide news\nand interact with their users, but also as a way\nof contributing to their research and supporting\nthe paper. In the UK, The Guardian newspaper, in\nparticular, is adopting an 'Embrace, don't replace'\nphilosophy when it comes to Twitter, using its\nfollowers to contribute to research. For example,\nduring the recent parliamentary expenses scandal\nin the UK, The Guardian asked its Twitter followers\nto go through 140,000 documents relating to the\n\n- In October 2009, Twitter introduced an Arabic\ninterface at artwitter.com, which is likely to increase its share in the region\n-  Competing directly with its original Arabic\ncounterpart Watwet, Twitter is becoming\n\nincreasingly popular as a micro-blogging force\nin the Arab world\n\nIn October 2009, Twitter introduced an Arabic\ninterface at artwitter.com, which is likely to increase its share in the region\n\nCompeting directly with its original Arabic\ncounterpart Watwet, Twitter is becoming increasingly popular as a micro-blogging force in the Arab world\n\nAmong the media industry community, some\ncompanies are embracing Twitter to interact with users, but there are plenty of further opportunities\n-  Among the media industry community, some\ncompanies are embracing Twitter to interact with users, but there are plenty of further opportunities\n\nIn October 2009, Twitter introduced an Arabic\ninterface at artwitter.com, which is likely to increase\nits share in the region\n\nCompeting directly with its original Arabic\ncounterpart Watwet, Twitter is becoming increasingly popular as a micro-blogging force in the Arab world\n\nAmong the media industry community, some\ncompanies are embracing Twitter to interact with users, but there are plenty of further opportunities\n14%\nUAE\n14%\nUAE\n\nscandal and attracted 14,000 Guardian readers to\nvolunteer to work on the reports. Newspapers in\nthe Arab Region could learn from these success\nstories to experiment with using social media sites\nin other innovative ways.\n\nIn some parts of the world, we are also seeing\nsocial networks becoming complete multimedia\ndistribution platforms, commissioning their own\noriginal content and providing a good opportunity\nfor replication by their Arabic counterparts, as\nillustrated in the exhibit below.\n\n## Uk: Kate Modern Lebanon: Upcoming Web Drama\n\n- Kate Modern was a web drama in the UK\ndevised on the back of the success of webbased\n\nvideo series lonelygirl15 which launched on YouTube\n-  The drama tracks the video blog of teenage\nfictional character Kate Modern and is\n\nproduced by EQAL, in partnership with Bebo\n-  Social network Bebo commissioned two\nseries of the web drama, with the second\n\nseries peaking at 2.5 million hits daily\n- Videos were also broadcast on YouTube at\nleast 24 hours after each original broadcast\n-  KateModern was the first truly interactive\nshow online, which utilized the tools available\n\non Bebo to help fans interact\nOriginal web dramas have potential to dramatically increase the way content is viewed online and can be\n-\nproduced at very low budget The potential upside for social networks can be huge, including increased traffic to the website for\n-\n\"appointment to view\" online content, but an interactive element to the content is key to engaging users on a social network\nWe expect to see an increase d number of web dramas being produced in the Arab world, particularly in\n-\nthose \"hot zones\" for content creation: Lebanon, Egypt and, increasingly, the UAE\nMeanwhile, media players are harnessing the value of online Video on Demand (VOD) in the region and elsewhere\n\nOnline VOD is proving to be one of the most popular\nforms of content consumption on the internet\nas well as one of the most difficult for content\nproviders to monetise successfully. The Western\nworld has seen a diverse range of VOD sites being\ndeveloped by broadcasters, producers, aggregators\nand even telco operators as they all experiment\nwith different business models. However, the\nvery existence of such a range of sites means that\naudiences remain very fragmented and it is not yet\nclear whether VOD sites will be able to bring in the\nsame kind of mass audiences as TV.  In spite of the\n\n-  In October 2009, the BBC World Service\nannounced a call for auditions and for\n\nscriptwriters for the first Arabic web drama ,\n\nfunded by the BBC World Service Trust and\n\nto be produced by Batoota Films in\n\nassociation with Zico House\n- The drama is to be distributed online only,\nmost likely in early 2010, on social network\n\nsites such as Facebook and YouTube\n-  The announcement marks a big step for the\nArab media industry, demonstrating an\n\nacknowledgement that content consumers\n\nare moving online and that Arabic content on\n\nthe internet is vital to maintaining growth of\n\nthe industry\n\nmarket's uncertainty , there are a few sites that are\nemerging as the big players in online VOD in some\nof the more mature markets and also some efforts\nby regional Arab players to introduce online VOD.\nIn the US, Hulu has emerged as one of the major\nplayers, combining NBC Universal, Fox and ABC\ncontent on one site. In the UK, the BBC's iPlayer has\nhad significant success, with total views exceeding\n390 million by March 200927,  while aggregator\nsites such as Joost and Babelgum have not so far\nmanaged to gain as much traction.\n\n\nMeanwhile, in the Arab Region, there have been a limited number of attempts at broadcaster VOD or aggregated content sites, but some of the major players such as LBC, MBC and Rotana have made steps towards implementing more advanced\n\n## Exhibit 50: Online Vod: Global And Arab Case Studies Usa: Hulu Lebanon: Lbc Online\n\nOnline VOD: Global and Arab Case Studies\n-  Hulu is the most well-known example of a\nsuccessful aggregated content VOD site, with:\n\n- Over 33m unique monthly viewers\nUSA: Hulu\nLebanon: LBC Online\n\n- 380m views in March 2009 (2.5/week/UU)\n\n- 75% of users watch Hulu off -site\n\n- 5-6 unskippable ads per 30 min programme\n\n   plus sponsor pre -roll\n\n- Revenues ~$70m, 15% margin in Year 1,\n\n   revenues estimated $180m in Year 2\n-  Based in the USA, Hulu operates an\nadvertising-funded model and is a joint venture\n\nHulu is the most well-known example of a\nsuccessful aggregated content VOD site, with:\n- Over 33m unique monthly viewers - 380m views in March 2009 (2.5/week/UU) - 75% of users watch Hulu off -site - 5-6 unskippable ads per 30 min programme\nplus sponsor pre -roll\n- Revenues ~$70m, 15% margin in Year 1,\nrevenues estimated $180m in Year 2\n\nLBC is one of the few broadcasters in the\nMiddle East to offer an online VOD service\n\nThe website offers free video streaming for\nlive news or a pay option for VOD content and live streaming of entertainment and drama series, as well as links to other popular LBC entertainment shows\n\nLBC's VOD site offers a variety of\nsubscription payment options: VOD content\ncan be purchased quarterly for $30 or\n$\n\nbetween NBC Universal, Fox, and ABC, with\n\nfunding by Providence Equity Partners which\n\nholds a 10% stake\n-  The site uses specially designed ad campaigns,\nsuch as Alec Baldwin's \"Huluwood\" d uring the Superbowl in Feb 2009\n\nBased in the USA, Hulu operates an\nadvertising-funded model and is a joint venture between NBC Universal, Fox, and ABC, with funding by Providence Equity Partners which holds a 10% stake\n\nThe site uses specially designed ad campaigns,\nsuch as Alec Baldwin's 'Huluwood' during the Superbowl in Feb 2009\n\nHulu's free model has made it very popular\namong consumers but it has been announced\n-  Hulu's free model has made it very popular\namong consumers, but it has been announced\n\nthat the site will most likely introduce a\namong consumers, but it has been announced\nthat the site will most likely introduce a subscription model for at least some of its content by 2010\n\nsubscription model for at least some of its\n\ncontent by 2010\nIn the Arab world, broadcasters are increasingly experimenting with online VOD\nThe popularity of different VOD sites depends largely on the market, so while Hulu is the most popular VOD site in the US thanks to the breadth of content from three different broadcasting groups, in the UK sites such as the BBC\niPlayer are at the top of the list The popularity of different VOD sites depends largely on the market, so while Hulu is the most popular VOD\n-\n\nsite in the US thanks to the breadth of content from three different broadcasting groups, in the UK sites such as the BBC iPlayer are at the top of the list In the Arab world, broadcasters are increasingly experimenting with online VOD\n-\n\nIn the Arab world, we expect to see broadcasters introducing more online VOD sites catering to Arabs, though it is essential that for this to work there needs to be a sufficient volume of original\n\ndigital strategies. MBC, for example, succeeded in\ngaining over 10.4 million views on its VOD website\nduring the Ramadan period in 2009, while LBC's\nVOD site is outlined in the exhibit below.\n\n-  LBC is one of the few broadcasters in the\nMiddle East to offer an online VOD service\n-  The website offers free video streaming for\nlive news or a pay option for VOD content\n\nand live streaming of entertainment and\n\ndrama series, as well as links to other\n\npopular LBC entertainment shows\n-  LBC's VOD site o ffers a variety of subscription\npayment options: VOD content can be purchased quarterly for $30 or annually for $110 and Live TV is offered at extra cost\n-  LBC funds the website through a\ncombination of advertising and sponsorship\ncan be purchased quarterly for $30 or\nannually for $110 and Live TV is offered at extra cost\n\nLBC funds the website through a\ncombination of advertising and sponsorship\nlocal content to which rights are held locally. Eventually, we would expect to see a successful aggregated content site in the Arab world.\n\n## The Models For Monetisation Of Online Content Are Developing, With The 'Freemium' Model Coming Out Top\n\n\nA range of business models are being used to fund VOD sites globally, including advertising-funded, subscription, sponsorship, transaction-based and some hybrid models. While Hulu works well on an advertising-funded model, it has announced a move that will combine free content with pay content. Online sites have generally found that customers, of course, prefer to watch for free but they can be willing to pay for premium content. This has led many sites to adopt a hybrid model in this way. This so-called 'freemium' model, with users lured in by free content and subsequently paying a fee for 'premium' content, seems to be emerging as the most successful option and companies are learning from the highly successful online gaming industry on ways to use this model effectively. Indeed, the online social gaming industry is already making significant revenues from paid content.\n\n## High Mobile Penetration In The Arab Region Will Drive Take-Up Of Value Added Services On Mobile And The Growing Applications Market\n\n\n\nAs discussed at length in the Arab Media Outlook\n2008-2012\n            edition,\n                      mobile\n                                is\n                                    increasingly\nbecoming\n           a\n               powerful\n                          platform\n                                     for\n                                          media\nconsumption in the Arab Region, as in the rest of the\nworld. With mobile penetration already very high,\nthe region is expected to reach virtual universal\n\nSocial games, such as Farmville, attract users by\noffering the game for free and charge small sums\nof money for additional goods which enhance the\nuser's performance. It is not only in the Western\nworld that players have been able to successfully\nmonetise content; even emerging markets with low\nincome demographics and less advanced payment\nsystems have found successful ways to monetise\nonline content. For example, online gaming in\nChina has become a strong and vibrant industry\nworth around $1.4bn in 2009, compared to the\nconsole/handheld gaming market, which is worth\njust $92m.28   In the Arab Region, although there\nare several barriers to the growth of the online\nVOD market, 69% of industry expert respondents\nbelieve there is a future for charging for content\nonline in the region.\n\nmobile penetration by 2013. As mobile penetration\nincreases, the handset is becoming an increasingly\nsignficant platfom for content consumption and we\nare seeing an increasing number of collaborative\npartnerships between telecom operators and media\ncontent providers.\n\n10\n\n\nBesides high mobile penetration, the successful deployment of content-rich applications on mobile, such as Mobile TV, has been a further major contributor to new media exploitation. Different technologies are co-existing for the delivery of audiovisual content, including 3G (and its upgrade path to LTE) and mobile broadcasting technologies including DVB-H, the leading technology in the\n7\n\nregion. In fact, the Middle East has been a leader\nin Mobile TV development with the recent launch\nof services in Iraq and the award of the Mobile TV\nlicence in the UAE, with further developments also\ntaking place in Libya and Qatar. Internationally, the\nsuccess of Mobile TV has been mixed with success\nstories in Italy, Japan and South Korea.\n\n## Exhibit 52: Mobile Tv: Global And Arab Case Studies Mobile Tv: Global And Arab Case Studies Italy: 3 Italia Uae: Mobile Tv Consortium\n\nUAE: Mobile TV consortium\n-  3 Italia was the first operator to successfully\nlaunch broadcast mobile TV in 2006\nUAE: Mobile TV consortium\n-  11 channels in 2006, 14 in 2007 and 17 in 2008 -  Built content offering around exclusive football\noffering and launched the service for World Cup\n2006\n\n3 Italia was the first operator to successfully\nlaunch broadcast mobile TV  in 2006\n\n11 channels in 2006, 14 in 2007 and 17 in 2008\n\nBuilt content offering around exclusive football\noffering and launched the service for World Cup\n2006\n\nThe mobile TV service registered strong\nsubscriber growth in its first year of launch, as seen below\n\n3 Italia was the first operator to successfully\nlaunch broadcast mobile TV  in 2006\n\n11 channels in 2006, 14 in 2007 and 17 in 2008\n\nBuilt content offering around exclusive football\noffering and launched the service for World Cup 2006\n\nThe mobile TV service registered strong\nsubscriber growth in its first year of launch, as seen below\n- The mobile TV service registered strong\nsubscriber growth in its first year of launch, as seen below\nNote:\nSource: TRA, Informa TM, Value Partners analysis Source: TRA, Informa TM, Value Partners analysis\n\nMobile broadcasting technology has had varying degrees of success in markets around the world, proving a\n-\nstrong challenge in many countries\nMobile broadcasting technology has had varying degrees of success in markets around the world, proving a strong\nchallenge in many countries\n-\nNote:\nGlobal mobile TV forecasts as at end-2008\nas well as strong market conditions given the high mobile penetration rates and the availability of high-end handsets\nSource: TRA, Informa TM, Value Partners analysis\nSource: TRA, Informa TM, Value Partners analysis\nNote: Global mobile TV forecasts as at end-2008 Source: TRA, Informa TM\n\n##\n\nAnother major trend on mobile in 2009 has been the rise of mobile broadband and the increase in consumption of content such as social media sites over mobile. This trend has been brought about by many favourable market conditions, most significantly the reduction in the price of data usage on mobile, the upgrade of 3G networks to HSPDA and, of course, the increase in penetration of smartphones and in particular the iPhone. The implications for the Arab Region are significant, particularly in those countries where fixed broadband penetration is currently low, such as Saudi Arabia and across the Levant\n\n-  Based on a TRA announcement In October 2009, the\nTRA has issued a ten-year mobile TV licence to the Emirates Mobile Television Corporation consortium\n-  The mobile TV service will be based on the DVB-H\nstandard and is slated for launch in the fourth quarter of 2010\n-  The concession reportedly includes the exclusive\nrights to broadcast mobile TV services for five years\n\nBased on a TRA announcement In October\n2009, the TRA has issued a ten-year mobile TV licence to the Emirates Mobile Television Corporation consortium\n\nThe mobile TV service will be based on the\nDVB-H standard and is slated for launch in the fourth quarter of 2010\n\nThe concession reportedly includes the\nexclusive rights to broadcast mobile TV\nservices for five years services for five years\n\nBased on a TRA announcement In October\n2009, the TRA has issued a ten-year mobile TV licence to the Emirates Mobile Television Corporation consortium\n\nThe mobile TV service will be based on the\nDVB-H standard and is slated for launch in the fourth quarter of 2010\n\nThe concession reportedly includes the\nexclusive rights to broadcast mobile TV\nservices for five years services for five years\n-  The consortium is made up of local telcos Etisalat\nand du, as well as Abu Dhabi Media Company, Dubai Media Incorporated, MBC, and Emirates Communications and Technologies Company, a subsidiary of TECOM Investment\n\nThe consortium is made up of local telcos\nEtisalat and du, as well as Abu Dhabi Media Company, Dubai Media Incorporated, MBC, and Emirates Communications and Technologies Company, a subsidiary of TECOM Investment\n\nThe consortium is made up of local telcos\nEtisalat and du, as well as Abu Dhabi Media Company, Dubai Media Incorporated, MBC, and Emirates Communications and Technologies Company, a subsidiary of\nHybrid Satellite Hybrid Satellite and North Africa, where mobile broadband can act as a substitute.\n\nA particularly interesting phenomenon has been\nthe development of the Applications Store by\nhandset manufacturers and mobile operators.\nWhile the iPhone \"App Store\" with 2 billion\napplications downloaded at the time of publication\nhas been leading the way, other players (e.g. Nokia\nwith Ovi) are catching up. In the Arab Region, news\nconsumption through mobile is developing fast\nand market players like Al Jazeera are rapidly\nincorporating mobile as a key delivery platform.\n\n## Exhibit 53: Mobile News Applications: Global And Arab Case Studies Mobile News Applications: Global And Arab Case Studies France: France 24 Qatar: Al Jazeera\n\nFrance: France 24\nQatar: Al Jazeera\n- French news channel France 24 was the first live\nTV channel to become available worldwide on the iPhone via 3G when it launched in February 2009\n- The move built on the initial success of the\nFrance 24 Live application, which launched on the Apple App Store earlier in the year, and\nenabled users to watch the channel in French, English and Arabic\n\nFrench news channel France 24 was the first\nlive TV channel to become available worldwide on the iPhone via 3G when it launched in February 2009\n\nThe move built on the initial success of the\nFrance 24 Live application, which launched on the Apple App Store earlier in the year, and enabled users to watch the channel in French, English and Arabic\n- At that time, the application had been\ndownloaded more than 100,000 times\n\nAt that time the application had been\n- The mobile service caters for a range of\nhandsets and allows customers to watch the news channels live and the videos on demand free of charge\n- The application is developed by mobile TV\nspecialist Mobiclip\n\nOn the other hand Al Jazeera's journalists\n\nAt that time, the application had been\ndownloaded more than 100,000 times\n\nThe mobile service caters for a range of\nhandsets and allows customers to watch the news channels live and the videos on demand free of charge\n\nThe application is developed by mobile TV\nspecialist Mobiclip\n\n## The Recent Dramatic Increase In Mobile Broadband Has Prompted Many Media Companies To Initiate Mobile - Applications For Their Content, Particularly News Applications The Recent Dramatic Increase In Mobile Broadband Has Prompted Many Media Companies To Initiate Mobile Applications For Their Content, Particularly News Applications We Expect To See More Mobile Applications Launched In Other Arab Countries And An Increasing Number Of Players Adopting The 360 Degree Approach ,Using Mobile As A Platform For Journalists To Ingest Content To The Server\n\nWe expect to see more mobile applications launched in other Arab countries and an increasing number of\n-\nplayers adopting the 360 degree approach ,using mobile as a platform for journalists to ingest content to the server\n\n##\n\nAs a result, in part, of the increasing availability\nof such content, mobile is also growing fast as\na platform for advertising. Given the very small\nproportion of total advertising that it currently\nconstitutes, revenues from mobile advertising\nhave been included in our projections for the\ninternet. Indeed, mobile advertising on a global\nscale continues to constitute a small proportion\nof total spend. However, both globally and in the\nArab Region, we expect the size of the mobile\nadvertising market to increase significantly\nover the projection period, driven by advertising\nvia SMS and around mobile content, as well as\nmobile search.\n\n- Al Jazeera has developed a reputation for\nadopting a 360 degree approach to mobile news content\n- On the one hand, Al Jazeera offers a cutting\nedge mobile TV service to customers, providing live streaming on the iPhone and other\nsmartphones (with LiveStation and Mobiclip) and VOD content (news bulletins four times a day for English-language subscribers)\n\nAl Jazeera has developed a reputation for\nadopting a 360 degree approach to mobile news content\n\nOn the one hand, Al Jazeera offers a mobile\nTV service to customers, providing live streaming on the iPhone and other smartphones (with LiveStation and Mobiclip) and VOD content (news bulletins four times a day for English-language subscribers)\n- On the other hand, Al Jazeera's journalists are\nusing Al Jazeera reports application, by which they can record and upload content to the server.  Al Jazeera is the only news broadcaster in the region to be using to be using mobile video uploads on such a large scale.\n\nOn the other hand, Al Jazeera s journalists are using Al Jazeera reports application, by which they can record and upload content to the server.  Al Jazeera is the only news broadcaster in the region to be using to be using mobile video uploads on such a large scale.\n\nBeyond mobile, there are an increasing number\nof other portable entertainment devices that are\ngaining interest in the region and around the\nworld, including the \"e-book\" and the much tooted\niSlate. On the whole, while the online platform is\nclearly becoming increasingly popular in the Arab\nRegion, there are many developments that need\nto be made by media companies in the region to\nkeep up with international markets. On mobile,\nhowever, the Arab Region is significantly ahead\nof many other world regions in terms of its very\nhigh penetration and significant technological\nadvancements.\n\n## Regional Update With A Special Focus On Egypt, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia And The Uae\n\nIn this \"Regional Update\" section, we present a country by country analysis of the 15 markets that are covered in this edition of the Arab Media Outlook, including a detailed analysis of the advertising market and forecasts over the projection period from 2009 to 2013. Last year's edition included a detailed assessment of twelve key Arab markets: Bahrain, Egypt, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Morocco, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Tunisia, UAE and Yemen. This year, we have included three additional markets: Palestine, Sudan and Syria. These additional markets have been selected on the basis that they display interesting characteristics within the regional media industry, from the point of view of both production and consumption of media. For example, Palestine and Sudan, as conflict zones, have noteworthy characteristics in terms of media consumption, while Syria has a vibrant TV production industry.\n\n## Introduction\n\nIn light of the fact that media consumption in the region is rapidly changing, we have also conducted extensive market research in four major media markets - Egypt, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia and the UAE. In the first part of this section, we will share the results of the market research under each of these respective countries. These markets, due to their size and significance in the Arab Region, serve as reliable benchmarks of how media consumption is evolving in the rest of the Arab Region. It is worth noting that the market research results are based on spontaneous recall of how people consume media across different platforms. Hence, they represent a snapshot of media consumption patterns in the region. In the second part of this \"Regional Update\", we will consider the remaining 11 countries and the developments we foresee for these markets, as well as an assessment of pan-Arab media.\n\n## 1.2 Egypt Exhibit 54: Egypt: A Snapshot29 Egypt\n\n- **Population:** 76.7m - **Area:** 1,001,450 km2 - **GDP per capita:** US$ 2,160\n- **Media Zones:** Egyptian Media Production\nCity\n- **Size of the ad market:** US$ 719m\n- **Number of daily newspapers**: 19\n- **Total dailies circulation**: 4.0m - **Total TV Penetration:** 93%\n- **Broadband Penetration:** 7.4% - **Mobile Penetration:** 72%\nWith a population of over 76 million, Egypt is the most populated country of the in-scope countries, with the majority living near the Nile River. Egypt's GDP of US$187 billion in 2009 has experienced significant growth since its government triggered economic reforms and liberalisation policies in 2004. Over 60% of Egypt's population is below the age of 30 and the country's current literacy rate is 71%. With a vibrant print and audiovisual content production sector, the media industry in Egypt is well established in the Arab Region. Egypt has one of the region's oldest media zones, Egyptian Media Production City, which launched in 1997 with the goal of producing and promoting media across all platforms. Mobile and broadband penetration rates in the country, at 72% and 7% respectively in 2009, are low compared to many other Arab countries and present significant room for growth, particularly in the development of new platforms.\n\nCompared to other major advertising markets\nin the region, Egypt showed strong resilience\nduring the financial downturn. The country\nhad the second largest advertising market in\nthe region in 2009, representing 16% of total\nregional advertising spend. The majority of\nadvertising came from the public sector and the\ntelecommunications industry.\n\nWhile the advertising market grew by over 40%\nin 2008, we expect growth to stabilise going\nforward. As major advertisers revise their\nadvertising budgets upwards, as confirmed\nduring our interviews in Egypt, we expect the\nadvertising market to grow at a CAGR of 7% over\nthe projection period, from nearly US$720 million\nin 2009 to US$936 million by the end of 2013. It is\nworth mentioning that media consumers in Egypt\nremain cost-conscious in terms of their choice\nand consumption of media.\n\n2007\n2008\n2009\n2010\n2011\n2012\n2013\n(09-13)\nTotal\n458\n654\n719\n789\n851\n896\n936\nTotal\n458\n654\n719\n789\n851\n896\n936\nInternet\n1.0\n2.1\n5.3\n13\n22\n31\n41\nRadio\n22\n27\n31\n34\n37\n38\n40\nOut-of-home (includes Cinema)\n25\n29\n28\n30\n31\n32\n33\nMagazine\n28\n36\n40\n42\n45\n47\n49\nTelevision\n146\n190\n203\n217\n232\n244\n249\nNewspapers\n236\n370\n412\n453\n484\n504\n524\n\nSource: Zenith Optimedia, Value Partners analysis\n\n## Print\n\nIn line with the overall market in the Arab Region, the advertising market in Egypt remains concentrated in print media, with newspapers accounting for over 55% of total advertising spend in 2009 and magazines for approximately 6%. The newspaper industry in Egypt saw several developments in 2008, with the award of five new licenses for privately owned newspapers and revocation of 14 news publications. While the print\n936\n\n6.8% 67% 6.7% 3.9% 5.4% 5.2%\n6.2%\n\nmedia is diverse in Egypt, it remains largely owned\nby the state and other political parties. With one of\nthe oldest Arabic newspapers, Al Ahram, and a large\nnumber of other newspapers, journals and magazines,\nthe print sector remains popular in the country. The\nmarket research that was carried out in Egypt provides\nan in-depth assessment of the newspaper sector, as\nsummarised in the exhibit below.\n\n5%\n\nKey findings from our market research on the newspaper market in Egypt:\n- **Top read newspapers**: Al Ahram was cited\nas the most read newspaper (in line with its claimed circulation numbers of over one\nmillion30 (highest in the country), while daily\nindependent newspaper Al Masry Al-Youm also\nranked highly\n- **Newspaper consumption**: Egypt displays\nconsistent\nattributes\nfor\nnewspaper\nconsumption across various demographic segments, with a slight gender bias towards men\n- **Newspaper content**: 'Best news coverage'\nand 'habit' rank highly among the reasons for reading in line with other markets, while sports is the top read topic, significantly more popular than in other countries\n- **Buying habits**: Low newspaper subscription\nrates with most people buying from newsstands, but the highest frequency of buying with 93% buying newspapers more than once a week\n- **Online news consumption**: Newspapers remain\nthe dominant form of news consumption but 33% read news online, with a higher proportion among the younger demographic segment\n- **Local news online**: Five out of the top eight news\nwebsites are local newspaper sites; a further two are local news portals Masrawy (with frequently updated news and providing interactive content) and Yalla Kora (a football news site)\nOver the projection period, we believe that the newspaper industry will remain strong and expect it to continue to maintain its hold in advertising and grow from US$ 412 million in 2009 to US$ 524 million in 2013.\n\nKey findings from our market research on the magazine market in Egypt:\n- **Top read magazines**: The top four magazines are\npublished in tabloid newspaper format, whose lower price has led to their broader appeal, with the top two being affiliated  with popular\nnewspaper Al Akhbar\n- **Magazine consumption**: Varies significantly\n\n by demographic segment; celebrity magazine\n Akhbar Al Nogoom ranks top, with high\n concentration among women and young people,31\n while Akhbar Al Hawadeth, a sensationalist\n tabloid, has broader appeal across genders\n- Top read topics: The strong sports interest\n displayed in newspaper consumption also\n applies to magazines, with Al-Ahly and Akhbar\n Al Riyada in the top four magazines, and sports\n the favourite topic\n\nOver the projection period, we expect magazines to\nmaintain their share of total advertising spend and\ngrow steadily at a CAGR of around 5%.\n\n0%\n\n## Television\n\nTelevision remains the second largest advertising platform in Egypt, constituting 28% of total advertising spend in 2009. In 2009, there were over 19 million TV households in Egypt, the highest in the Arab Region. While over 40% of TV households have satellite TV, all TV households have access to terrestrial TV. As a major regional media hub, Egypt remains among the largest producers and consumers of content.  As a result, unlike most other Arab markets where satellite is the dominant platform, terrestrial TV in Egypt offers a strong alternative, offering locally customised and appealing content across the country. The popularity of terrestrial TV is the largest contributing factor to the high proportion of total advertising that terrestrial television constitutes. The Egyptian Radio and Television Union (ERTU), a government entity, remains the sole organisation to broadcast terrestrially and owns all 17 terrestrial channels. Channel 1 and Channel 2 are the network's main channels and broadcast across Egypt. The other six channels, although regional, also broadcast across the country. State-owned Nile TV, which also\n1%\n\nbroadcasts on satellite, offers a bouquet of nine\nchannels in different genres and remains very popular\namong Egyptians. Two private satellite stations, Al-\nMehwar and Dream, are also in operation, and the\ngovernment has a financial stake in both channels.\nDream, Melody and Al Hayat all represent success\nstories for the Egyptian TV industry. While Dream,\none of the earliest channels to be launched, became\npopular for its customised Egyptian programming\n(talk shows, drama, news, sports etc.), Melody, which\nstarted as a music video channel and later diversified\ninto entertainment and films, has performed well\namong the youth segment.\n\nKey findings from our market research on the TV market in Egypt:\n- **TV consumption**: Egyptians watch nearly 3.5\nhours of TV on weekdays, the highest in all four markets, and almost an hour more on weekends, with high viewing among both the youngest and oldest age groups32\n- **Top genres**: Sports ranks number one, driven\nby a strong football following by males under\n30, movies come second with appeal across all\nsegments, and news (high among those over 50)33\nand general entertainment (high for women)34\ncomplete the top four\n- **Preferred channels**: Consumers prefer local\nEgyptian content, with six of the top eight channels being Egyptian. General entertainment channel Al Hayat is reported as the most popular, despite being relatively new, with a\nstrong female following.35  Rotana Cinema (pan-\nArab, airing a high  proportion of Egyptian films) is second, while Dream channels-broadcasting local Egyptian entertainment and the Egyptian\nEl Beit Beitak\n6%\nIn line with the strong terrestrial TV content offering and its audience share in Egypt, we expect that local TV advertising will maintain its share of total\n35One in every two males and two in every three females reportedly watch Al Hayat 36While the program airs on Orbit, its large audience is attributable to high piracy\n\nfootball league - and Melody Aflam, airing Egyptian movies, confirm the bias  towards Egyptian content\n- **Top viewed programs**: Talk show Al Qahira El\nYoum is the most popular program,  particularly\nwith higher socio-economic classes despite\nairing on a pay channel.36 The remaining top\nprograms also indicate the preference for local Arabic movies and regional news talk shows. As expected, nearly 90% of Egyptians prefer to watch TV in Arabic\nadvertising spend at around 30% over the projection period growing at a CAGR of 5% to reach nearly US $250 million at the end of 2013.\n\nKey findings from our market research on the pay-TV market in Egypt:\n- Piracy is high, as reported by the IIPA37- while\nnearly 25% of respondents claim to have pay-TV,\npenetration is significantly lower at just 4%38\n- Besides\nthe\nmain\npan-regional\npay-TV\noperators, Cable Network Egypt also operates\n\n## Internet\n\nIn line with the forecasts in the 2008 edition of\nArab Media Outlook, we believe that the strongest\npercentage growth in advertising will come from the\ninternet. This will transpire as advertisers shift their\nbudgets to the internet not only to gain an increased\naudience share, but also to get a more accurate\nand measurable return on investments. We expect\ninternet advertising to rise from nearly 0.7% in 2009\nto over 4% of total advertising spend by 2013, growing\nat a CAGR of 67%.\n\nKey findings from our market research on the online market in Egypt:\n- **Internet usage**: Egyptians spend nearly three\nhours a day online, similar to the amount of time\n\nan MMDS (\"wireless cable\") in Cairo. Of the\nmain pay-TV operators,  ART's strong presence\nin Egypt is confirmed by the results, thanks to\nits investment in Egyptian film production and\nits strong focus on sports39\n\nspent watching TV, with internet usage particularly\nhigh among the younger generations40\n- **Content preference**: As a result of a strong\nlocal content production industry, the majority of Egyptians (63%) prefer content originating from their country\n- **Top Arabic sites**: The top sites confirm the high\nconsumption of local Egyptian content, with Egyptian news portal Masrawy ranking first, followed by local football portal Yalla Kora, Egyptian movies download site Myegy, and Egyptian music portal Mazzika\nKey findings from our market research on the social networking market in Egypt:\n- **Social media consumption**: High popularity\nof social networking sites, with 60% using\nPreference for Arabic content origination other parts of Arab Region Social Networking\n10%\n\nsocial media and an average visit frequency of over seven times a week\n- **Favourite activities**: Social networking is the\nfourth favourite activity online and the fourth\n\n favourite way to communicate (almost on par\n with SMS), moving up to third position on both\n counts in younger age groups41\n- Most popular sites: Facebook is reported as the\n most visited site but it  is not as clear a leader as\n in other markets, with popularity spread across\n\nWith broadband penetration expected to increase\nfrom 7% in 2009 to over 30%42  by the end of 2013,\nwe expect internet advertising to increase in\nproportion to broadband subscriptions. It is worth\nmentioning that the very low prevalence of online\nbuying habits in Egypt, in line with other markets,\nwill pose a challenge for implementing any online\ncontent charging model.\n\n## Radio And Out-Of-Home\n\nRadio and out-of-home advertising together represent around 8% of total advertising spend in Egypt, split almost equally between the two platforms. Collectively, advertising on the two platforms accounted for almost US$ 60 million in 2009 and is expected to rise to around US$ 73 million by 2013. Radio advertising has seen a strong surge since private radio stations began to operate in what was previously a state-owned\n\ninternational sites (Hi5, MySpace) and Arab sites (Maktoob, ArabFriendz, Jeeran)\n- **User-generated content consumption**: Almost\na third visit a UGC video site at least three times\na week\n\n55%\n\nAnother emerging digital advertising platform in\nEgypt will be mobile, with 40% of consumers, 30\nyears or below, reportedly accessing internet on their\nmobile phones. While currently still in its infancy we\nexpect the mobile platform to become a compelling\nand differentiating advertising medium as mobile\npenetration in the country increases and mobile\nbroadband infrastructure and prices improve.\n\nsector controlled by ERTU. Of the twelve radio stations\nin Egypt, only two stations, Nile FM and Nugoom FM,\nare private. We expect both radio and out-of-home\nplatforms to maintain their current share of total\nadvertising spend over the projection period.\n\n## 2.2.2 Lebanon Exhibit 64: Lebanon: A Snapshot43 Lebanon\n\n- **Population:** 3.9m - **Area:** 10,452 km2 - **GDP per capita:** US$ 7,710\n- **Media Zones:** Beirut Media City under\nconsideration\n- **Size of the ad market:** US$ 225m\n- **Number of daily newspapers:** 13\n- **Total dailies circulation:** 396,000\n- **Total TV Penetration:** 93.4%\n- Satellite TV Penetration: 88%\n- Cable TV Penetration: 1.4% - IPTV Penetration: 0.1%\n- **Broadband Penetration:** 19%\n- **Mobile Penetration:** 61%\nWith a population of approximately 4 million, Lebanon's economy is service-oriented and the main growth sectors include banking and tourism. It has a high proportion of young people, with 34% under the age of 15 and 51% under the age of 30, as well as a high literacy rate of 87%. Lebanon has a well developed media landscape especially in the TV and audiovisual production sectors, and is home to a number of the most popular satellite channels, in the region, as well as many regional production companies. The banking sector in Lebanon, one of the top advertising\n\ncontributors alongside real estate, was less affected\nthan other markets in the region by the global\nfinancial crisis, due to more conservative financial\nservices regulation. During 2009, advertising spend\nfrom the telecommunications sector in Lebanon,\nanother top advertiser, was also on the rise as\ncompetition in the market intensified.\n\nTotal advertising expenditure in Lebanon increased\nby almost 4% in 2009.  We expect it to grow at a\nCAGR of 5.7% over the projection period to reach\nUS$ 280 million.\n\n## Exhibit 65: Lebanon Advertising Projections\n\nTotal\n188\n217\n225\n241\n256\n268\n280\nInternet\n-\n2\n3\n6\n11\n13\n14\n2\n3\n6\n11\n13\n14\nRadio\n12\n14\n14\n15\n15\n16\n16\nOut-of-home (includes Cinema)\n29\n38\n39\n42\n43\n44\n46\nMagazines\n29\n34\n32\n36\n38\n40\n43\nTelevision\n89\n96\n99\n105\n110\n115\n119\nNewspapers\n29\n34\n37\n38\n39\n40\n41\n\n## Print\n\nNewspaper advertising expenditure represents\napproximately 16% of total advertising spend.\nNewspaper advertising increased by 7% in 2009,\nin line with the total, mainly driven by the increase\nin spend by the banking and real estate sectors.45\nWe expect newspaper advertising expenditure to\ngrow modestly at a CAGR of 3% over the projection\nperiod 2009-2013.\n\nMost newspaper owners in Lebanon are politically\naffiliated and newspapers, therefore, mostly reflect\ntheir respective political party's point of view. The\n\n5.7%\n\n5.7% 47%\n\n47% 3.8%\n\n3.7% 7.4% 4.8% 2.9%\n\nFrench edition of Al Balad newspaper launched in\n2009, increasing the number of daily newspapers in\nLebanon to 14: eleven in Arabic, two in French, and\none in English. In mid-January 2009, The Daily Star,\nLebanon's only English newspaper, was closed by\na court order over financial issues, only to resume\npublishing a few weeks later. All newspapers in\nLebanon have established a presence online and\nL'Orient Le Jour, one of the French newspapers,\nlaunched an online paid subscription model.\n\nKey findings from our market research on the newspaper market in Lebanon:\n- **Top read newspapers**: Al Balad, offering\nheavy subscription discounts and promotions, is reported as the most read newspaper in\nLebanon, followed by Annahar, and Al Safir\n- Newspaper\nconsumption:\nNewspaper\npreferences are more linked to political affiliations than to population demographics\n- **Newspaper content**: 'Best news coverage',\n'opinions/analysis' are the top reasons for choosing newspapers in Lebanon, uniquely to this market, with most read topics showing a much higher interest in political and current affairs than any other markets and sports ranking much lower\n- **Buying habits**: Low newspaper subscription\nrates, except for Al Balad which aggressively\nCurrent Affairs\n56%\n18%\n\npromotes subscriptions: lower frequency of buying than other markets with most Lebanese \"casual readers\", i.e. over half of the people buy between one and three times a week and 84% buy newspapers more than once a week\n- Online\nnews\nconsumption:\nNewspapers\nremain the dominant form of news consumption but nearly 35% read news online, with 11% preferring the internet to print\n- **Local news online**: \"Pure play\" news portal\nTayyar (linked to OTV) is reported as the most popular, with Annahar in second place due to advanced online features, Al Manar and Future TV news portals are not far behind, and politically affiliated websites Lebanese forces and 14March  also make it into the top ten\n40%\nMagazines form approximately 14% of total advertising spend in Lebanon. Magazines in Lebanon attracted most of their advertising from the banking, luxury goods, automotive and FMCG sectors. In 2009, magazine advertising spend decreased by 5% making it the only platform in Lebanon to experience a decline in advertising as a result of higher exposure to international brands.\n\nKey findings from our market research on the magazine market in Lebanon:\n- **Top read magazines**: The top magazines in\nLebanon, Al Jaras and Al Shabaka are both\ncelebrity magazines\n- **Magazine consumption**: Top magazine Al Jaras\nis more popular among women and readers\nbelow 30, while Nadine, Laha, Hasna', Hia and\nSnob Al Hasna' are all women's magazines.\nAl Jaysh is the only current affairs magazine to make it to the top eight, published by the Lebanese army with a largely male following46\n\n- **Top read topics**: Broadly in line with other\nmarkets, with celebrities and fashion scoring\nhigher than others due to the higher proportion of women reading magazines\n- **Language preference**: While almost 40%\nprefer to read magazines in Arabic, nearly 35% are indifferent to the language, a much higher proportion than in Egypt and Saudi Arabia, showing a higher penchant among Lebanese for non- Arabic content\nGoing forward, we expect magazine advertising expenditure to recover at a CAGR of 7% to reach over US$40 million by the end of 2013.\n\n## Exhibit 68: Magazines In Lebanon: Market Research Results\n\nSnob Al Hasna'\n\n## Television\n\nLocal Television is the dominant advertising platform\nin Lebanon, with nearly 45% share of total advertising\nspend. Advertising on TV increased by 4% in 2009,\nalmost in line with  the total advertising market.\n\nThe domestic broadcasting scene in Lebanon is\nwell developed with eight terrestrial TV channels.\nOnly one of these channels, Tele Liban, is state-\nowned and was established in 1957. While the\nchannel was shut down temporarily in 2001, due to\nsome financial difficulties, it was re-launched later\nthat year. LBC was launched as the first private\nTV network in Lebanon in 1985. Other terrestrial\nTV channels include Future TV, Al Manar TV and\nNBN. Two more recent channels, Al Jadeed TV and\nOrange TV, launched in 2001 and 2007 respectively.\nMTV, which shut down in 2002, later re-launched in\n2009. All the terrestrial TV channels are available\non satellite. LBC and Future TV account for a large\nshare of TV advertising expenditure.47  It is also\nworth noting that Lebanon boasts a vibrant local TV\nproduction industry, due to   the high level of talent\navailable as well as the lower cost of production\nrelative to other countries.\n\nReligion edition and Arabic translation\n\nKey findings from our market research on the TV market in Lebanon:\n- **TV consumption**: Although the majority prefer\nto watch TV in Arabic, over 25% cited English as their choice of language, implying a higher inclination towards  Western content compared to 11% in Egypt, 7% in Saudi Arabia, or even to the UAE where 22% preferred English\n- **Top genres**: News, general entertainment and\nmovies are the favourite genres of TV, with sport scoring significantly lower than in other markets; a higher proportion of men watch news and a higher proportion of  women watch general entertainment than in other markets, with hardly any women watching sports\n- **Preferred channels**: Established channels\nLBC and Future TV are reportedly among the most popular, offering Arabic versions\nof international shows such as Superstar,\nStar Academy, and The Weakest Link etc.\nMeanwhile, relatively new channels such as Al Jadeed, most popular among higher socioeconomic classes, OTV and MTV  are also in the top five.  MBC4 is the only MBC channel in the\ntop 10, most likely due to the presence of Oprah\nin its line-up, with 30% of women watching the channel compared to 10% of men\n- **Top viewed programs**: LOL, a comedy show\nfeaturing celebrities, reportedly ranks as the number one programme and is watched\n\nWe expect TV advertising expenditure to grow\nalmost in line with the total advertising market at\n                                                  a CAGR of nearly 5%, to reach close to US$ 120\n                                                  million by 2013.\n\nacross all demographics, followed by Ahmar\nBil Khat El Areed, a talk show covering taboo\nissues, and Kalam EI Nass, a political talk\nshow watched by more than twice as many men\nthan women. Meanwhile, women watch Arabic\nshows including Oprah, Sara, and Assi.\n\n## Exhibit 70: Pay Tv In Lebanon: Market Research Results 1,2\n\nKey findings from our market research on the pay- TV market in Lebanon: - Piracy through local cable distributors is high,\nwith the key reason for people not subscribing to pay-TV being \"the local (pirated) cable TV subscription\" that they already have. Genuine (legal) pay-TV  penetration standing at just 2%, one of the lowest in the region and, much lower than the  figure reported by the research\n\n## Internet\n\nInternet advertising experienced the highest\nyear-on-year growth among all platforms in 2009,\nalbeit starting from a much smaller base. This\nincrease is mainly driven by increasing broadband\nsubscriptions which grew by more than three\ntimes between 2007 and 2008. With broadband\npenetration at nearly 20% in 2009, and expected to\nincrease to close to 40% by 2013,48 we believe that\nthere is strong potential for internet advertising\nto grow as well, as confirmed by industry players\nduring our interviews. Consequently, we expect\ninternet advertising expenditure to grow the fastest\namong all platforms, at a CAGR of nearly 50%\nduring the projection period from 2009 to 2013.\n\nKey findings from our market research on the\nonline market in Lebanon:\n\n- There are two licensed cable companies,\nCablevision and Econet, an IPTV service in Beirut by France Telecom and Solidere, and hundreds of pirate cable operators offering a service for US$ 10 or less and providing all the channels from Showtime, Orbit and ART. Movies and series are the main drivers of \"pay- TV\" subscription in Lebanon, with sports a distant third\n- **Internet usage**: The average Lebanese person\nspends almost 2.5 hours a day on the internet, in line with findings in the UAE and Saudi Arabia, and 45% spend more than two hours a day online (almost 50% higher in the 'below 30' age group)\n- **Language preference**: Uniquely to Lebanon,\nthe majority of users prefer to browse websites in English, with 82% preferring English and only 56% browsing in Arabic (and, of these, the majority of people below 40 years old)\n- **Content preference**: While over 40% have a\npreference for Arabic content irrespective of its origin, almost 50% expressed their preference for local Lebanese content, in part explained by the country's strong local media production\n- **Top Arabic sites**: The top viewed websites\n\ninclude Tayyar and Annahar which were also\nthe most visited news websites, confirming\n                                                  the strong preference for news content\n                                                  consumption in Lebanon\n\nKey findings from our market research on the social networking market in Lebanon:\n- **Social media consumption**: 77% of the\npopulation use social networking sites in some capacity, in line with the other markets, with frequency of usage being the highest at ten\nPreference for Arabic content origination\n10%\n\ntimes per week on average\n- **Most popular sites**: Facebook tops the list of\nthe most visited social networking sites, with an overwhelming majority preferring the English to the Arabic version (much higher than in other markets)\nO ce a day\n\n## Radio And Out-Of-Home\n\nOut-of-home advertising in Lebanon accounts for just over 17% of total advertising spend. Driven largely by advertising from sectors including FMCG, banking, hospitality and automotive, we expect out-of-home advertising to maintain its share of the total over the projection period. We expect that out-of-home advertising will grow at a modest CAGR of nearly 4% to reach around US$ 46 million by the end of 2013.\n\nRadio\n       advertising\n                    expenditure\n                                  experienced\ngrowth of 4% between 2008 and 2009 and\n\nwe expect it to continue to grow at a similar\nrate until 2013. The majority of advertising\nspend on radio has come from the media and\nentertainment, hospitality, FMCG and banking\nsectors. The Conseil National de L'Audiovisuel\nis responsible for granting licenses to all radio\nstations that want to operate in Lebanon. All\noperating radio stations are privately owned\nwith Sawt El Ghad being the most popular with a\npeak adult audience of 44,000 in 2008.49\n\n## 2.2.3 Saudi Arabia Exhibit 74: Saudi Arabia: A Snapshot50 Saudi Arabia\n\n- **Population:** 25.5m - **Area:** 2,149,690 km2 - **GDP per capita:** US$ 18,850\n- **Media Zones:** Media City under planning - **Size of the ad market:** US$ 679m\n- **Number of daily newspapers:** 15\n- **Total dailies circulation:** ~1.9m\n- **Total TV Penetration:** 91%\n- Satellite TV Penetration: 95% - IPTV Penetration. 0.2%\n- **Broadband Penetration:** 37%\n- **Mobile Penetration:** 130%\n\nWith the petroleum sector accounting for 45%51\nof total GDP, Saudi Arabia has the highest GDP\nin the Arab Region. Between 2008 and 2009, the\nperiod of the global financial crisis, Saudi Arabia's\nGDP fell by 19% in nominal terms. The Kingdom\nalso has the largest population in the Gulf region\nwith a high proportion of young people: 37% under\nthe age of 15 and 67% under the age of 30. The\ncountry's literacy rate is approximately 80%.\n\nWe estimate that Saudi Arabia's total advertising\nexpenditure decreased between 2008 and 2009 by\n20%. Going forward, we expect total advertising\nspend to recover at a CAGR of nearly 10% over the\nprojection period, as the economy recovers and\nadvertisers increase their budgets again.\n\nTotal\n710\n853\n679\n726\n820\n904\n980\nInternet\n-\n3\n7\n15\n28\n39\n47\n3\n7\n15\n28\n39\n47\nRadio\n13\n17\n16\n19\n23\n27\n29\nOut-of-home (includes Cinema)\n54\n74\n60\n63\n68\n70\n73\nMagazines\n48\n55\n38\n44\n52\n59\n67\nTelevision\n45\n56\n39\n34\n33\n32\n32\nNewspapers\n550\n648\n519\n551\n616\n677\n732\n\n## Print\n\nNewspapers remain the dominant advertising platform in Saudi Arabia, accounting for over 75% of total advertising expenditure. While newspaper advertising spend decreased in 2009, it maintained its share of the total market, which contracted as advertisers revised their budgets due to the global downturn. Saudi Arabia has a total of 15 daily newspapers, two of which are English dailies - Arab News and\n\n9.6% 59%\n\n59%\n\n15% 5.3% 15%\n-4.8%\n9.0%\n\nThe Saudi Gazette. Al Bilad newspaper is the oldest\nArabic daily in the country and it launched in 1932.\nAl Jazirah became the first audited newspaper\nin the Kingdom when it committed to auditing by\nBPA Worldwide in 2008. Based on their claimed\ncirculations, Okaz (250,000) and Al Hayat (Saudi\nEdition, 270,000), both Arabic dailies, appear to\nbe the most popular newspapers in the country,52\nwhich is confirmed by the market research.\n\n14%\n\nKey findings from our market research on the newspaper market in Saudi Arabia:\n- **Top read newspapers**: Okaz, preferred by Saudi\nnationals and younger consumers, and Al Hayat,\nconsistently popular across all demographics, are reportedly the most popular; pan-Arab publications are clearly  popular, with two of the\ntop newspapers, Al Hayat and Asharq Alawsat,\nbeing pan-Arab dailies\n- **Newspaper content**: In contrast to other\nresearched markets, specific journalists were ranked as one of the top reasons for reading publications, with current affairs, sports and politics the most popular topics\n- **Buying habits**: Subscription rates are generally\nlow at 5% or lower, except for Al Hayat, which\nis subscribed to by over 10% of respondents. Saudis buy four newspapers per week on\nSports\n53%\nClassifieds\n23%\n\naverage, with a very high proportion buying more than once a week (close to 90%)\n- **Online news consumption**: Although print\nremains the dominant platform for reading news, nearly 75% of people read news online more than once a week, with consumption across all demographics in line with other researched markets\n- **Local news online**: The Al Jazeera website is the\nmost popular source of online news, the most visited website by nearly a third of respondents,\nparticularly among expatriate Arab males.53\nOverall, Saudi Arabia has a lower proportion of newspaper sites among the top ranked sites than other markets, with Al Arabiya in second place, predominantly popular among people from higher socio-economic classes and under 40 years of age\nGoing forward, we expect newspaper spend to recover at a CAGR of 9% over the projection period, in line with total advertising spend, and to roughly maintain its share of the market. Magazines also remain popular in Saudi Arabia across all demographics. As major advertisers from automotive, real estate, luxury goods, and banking were affected by the economic crisis, total magazine advertising expenditure decreased by 30% in 2009.\n\nKey findings from our market research on the magazine market in Saudi Arabia:\n- **Top read magazines**: The top three magazines,\nSayidati, Zahrat Al Khaleej and Laha, are pan-\nArab women's magazines, and women form  the majority of magazine readers in Saudi Arabia\n- **Magazine consumption**: A significantly higher\nproportion of women not only read magazines, but also buy them on a regular basis, most commonly picking them up from news-stands\n- **Language preference**: Readers in Saudi\nArabia show the strongest preference of all markets for the Arabic versions when it comes to reading international magazines\nGoing forward, we expect advertising expenditure on magazines to pick up and grow at a CAGR of 15% over the projection period.\n\n## Exhibit 78: Magazines In Saudi Arabia: Market Research Results\n\nLaha\n3%\n\n## Television\n\nSimilar to other Gulf markets, the local TV market in\nSaudi Arabia is small, accounting for approximately\n6% of total advertising expenditure. Between 2008\nand 2009, total local TV advertising spend decreased\nby 30%. The terrestrial broadcast sector in Saudi\nArabia is state-owned through the Ministry of Culture\nand Information (MOCI). There are four terrestrial\nTV channels (two general entertainment channels,\none sports and one news channel), the first of which,\nChannel 1, was launched in 1963. In April 2009, plans\nto launch a fifth terrestrial TV channel in the Kingdom\nwere announced.54 After its trials in 2004 and 2005 in\nJeddah, Digital Terrestrial Television (DTT) launched in\nJuly 2006 and covered five major cities. To continue DTT\ntransition and extend the service across the Kingdom,\nthe MOCI signed a contract with Thomson, a solutions\nprovider for the communication and media industries, in\nMay 2008.\n\nAlthough satellite dishes have been officially banned since 1990, Saudi Arabia has the second highest satellite TV penetration in the Arab Region, at 95%. In addition, two of the largest pan-Arab satellite TV broadcasters, Middle East Broadcasting Corporation (MBC) and Rotana, are Saudi owned. Since there are edition and Arabic translation no licenses for private TV channels in Saudi Arabia, many Saudi owned satellite channels continue to operate from the free media zones in the region.\n\nKey findings from our market research on the TV market in Saudi Arabia:\n- **TV consumption**: The preferred language to\nwatch TV programming is overwhelmingly Arabic, which is much less pronounced in the UAE and Lebanon\n- **Top genres**: Similar to other markets, top genres\ninclude movies and sports, driven by males, and general entertainment, driven by females\n- **Preferred channels**: In line with the rest of the\nGulf, the top viewed channel line-up includes several MBC channels, with MBC 1 the strongest, enjoyed by over 70%; interestingly, Saudi TV 1 / Channel 1 does not appear in the top channels in the country\n- **Top viewed programmes**: Four out of the seven\ntop programs are broadcast on MBC 1, with men and Saudi nationals preferring sports programme\nSada al Malaeb, despite airing late at night, and\na strong majority of women over 50 tuning into\nKalam Nawaeim, a women's talk show\n\n## Exhibit 79: Television In Saudi Arabia: Market Research Results\n\nReligious\n7%\nAs evidenced by the market research, advertisers are likely to continue to spend significantly more on pan-Arab channels than on local TV to reach out to the larger audience base in Saudi Arabia.\n\nConsequently, we expect local TV advertising expenditure to further decrease by a CAGR of 5% over the projection period.\n\n## Exhibit 80: Pay Tv Market In Saudi Arabia: Market Research Results 1,2\n\nKey findings from our market research on the pay- TV market in Saudi Arabia: - Consistent with the other researched markets\nthe two biggest reasons that people cited for not subscribing to pay-TV were the availability of free satellite channels and high costs of subscribing to the service\n- The\nmain\nmotivations\nbehind\npay-TV\n\n## Internet\n\nThe internet became available in Saudi Arabia in\n1998 and the Telecommunication and Information\nTechnology Authority is responsible for licensing\nInternet Service Providers (ISPs). Total internet\nadvertising expenditure experienced the highest\nincrease between 2008 and 2009. This can be\nattributed to the large increase in broadband\nsubscriptions that grew at a rate of around 60% in\n2009. As broadband subscriptions are expected to\ncontinue to grow at high rates over the projection\nperiod, we expect internet advertising expenditure\nto grow at a high CAGR of 32%.\n\nKey findings from our market research on the online market in Saudi Arabia:\n- **Internet usage**: Saudis spend nearly 2.7\nhours per day online, which is likely to rise significantly with the expected increase in\n5560% of the 'below 30' group spend over two hours per day and almost  20% from the same age group spend over five hours online\n\n## Reasons For Not Subscribing To Pay-Tv\n\nsubscriptions are sports and movies, followed by series and family entertainment\n- While 34% claim to subscribe to pay-TV, the\nactual penetration is significantly lower at around 9% at the end of 2009. In terms of platforms, research indicates that ART has the largest share of subscriptions\nbroadband penetration, with more time spent\nby the younger demographic;55 time spent\nonline is only marginally lower than time spent watching TV (three hours on weekdays)\n- **Content preference**: As in Egypt, Saudis prefer\nto browse in Arabic but given the relatively low proportion of internet content generated by Saudi Arabia, the majority of users do not have a preference for local Saudi content over other Arabic content\n- **Top Arabic sites**: All the top websites involve\na significant amount of interactivity, UGC, and social media; Muntadyat, a news portal where people can share news, is the most visited Arabic website, Facebook Arabic and YouTube also compete for top positions, and Alam Hawaa, a community site targeting women, is not far behind\nKey findings from our market research on the social networking market in Saudi Arabia:\n- **Social media consumption**: Almost 65% use\nsocial networking sites - a figure that is on the low side compared to the other researched markets - visiting such sites 5.4 times a week on average; more strikingly, one in every five people below 30 visited social networking sites once a day\n- **Favourite activities**: The majority of people\nOnce a day\n14%\n\n## Radio And Out-Of-Home\n\nRadio currently accounts for a small proportion,\napproximately 2%, of total advertising spend in\nSaudi Arabia. MBC has been the sole private radio\nbroadcaster in Saudi Arabia since 1994 when it\nlaunched MBC FM. Similar to the other traditional\nplatforms in the country, radio experienced a\ndecrease of 5% in total advertising expenditure\nbetween 2008 and 2009 (although this represents\na much smaller decrease relative to other\nplatforms). Going forward, we expect total radio\nadvertising expenditure to increase at a CAGR of\n15%, second only to internet, as the market opens\nto competition and more private radio stations\nbegin operation in the country. As of 2009, more\nthan 30 radio stations continued to await operating\n\n  spend time gathering information online, while\n  a much smaller percentage  are engaged\n  in social networking sites; social media is\n  preferred by nearly 20% as one of the top\n  methods to communicate, behind only mobile\n  phones, SMS and email\n- Most popular sites: Facebook Arabic is by far\n  the most popular social networking site, with\n  the rest fragmented among the remaining,\n  largely Arabic, social networking sites\n\nlicenses.56  As a result we expect competition in\nthe radio market to increase over the projection\nperiod as the government has announced plans to\ncreate four additional FM stations in 2010.\n\nTotal out-of-home advertising accounts for\napproximately 9% of  total advertising spend in\nSaudi Arabia. Expenditure decreased between 2008\nand 2009 by 20%. Affected largely by advertising\nfrom the telecommunications sector, which forms\nover 50% of the platform's total advertising spend,\nwe expect out-of-home advertising to increase\nat a CAGR of 5% over the projection period,\ndriven amongst other things by digital billboards\nin malls.\n\n## Exhibit 84: Uae: A Snapshot57 United Arab Emirates\n\n- **Population:** 4.9m\n- **Area:** 83,600 km2\nGDP per capita: US$ 55 000\n- **GDP per capita:** US$ 55,000 - **Media Zones:** Dubai Media City, Dubai\nStudio City, Fujairah Creative City,\nInternational Media Production Zone, RAK Media City, twofour54 ,\n- **Size of the ad market:** US$ 784m\n- **Number of daily newspapers:** 14\n- **Total dailies circulation:** ~1.1m\n- **Total TV Penetration:** 84%\nSatellite TV Penetration: 48%\n- Satellite TV Penetration: 48% - Cable TV Penetration: 47% - IPTV Penetration: 13%\n- **Broadband Penetration:** 69% - **Mobile Penetration:** 231%\nWith a population of just under 5 million and a GDP of US$ 228 billion in 2009, the UAE boasts a high GDP per capita, second only to Qatar in the Arab Region. The UAE has the highest number of free trade media zones in the region. The UAE's nominal GDP grew by over 45% in 2008 on the back of rising oil prices and a construction boom. The economic crisis also had a significant impact on the UAE, whose nominal GDP contracted by 13% in 2009, due to a steep decline in oil prices, real estate and the tight international credit market. Almost 50% of the UAE population is below 30 and its literacy rate is 78%. The media market in the UAE continues to be of particular interest, not only because of its youthskewed population profile, but also because of its cultural diversity with expatriates of varying backgrounds, languages and media preferences, forming over 80% of the population. The diverse composition of the population strongly influences preferences in consumption patterns, as can be seen in the market research results.\n\nAmong all the countries covered, the UAE's\nadvertising market displayed the strongest\ngrowth in 2008, increasing by over 45%, while\nalso displaying the largest contraction in 2009,\ndecreasing by over 35%. The reasons for this\nsignificant drop in 2009 were that the real estate\nand banking sectors, which together accounted\nfor well over half of total advertising spend\nin 2008, declined considerably at the onset of\nglobal recession.\n\nAs the UAE's economy bounces back from the\neconomic downturn, we also expect the advertising\nmarket to recover at a CAGR of 11% over the\nprojection period, one of the highest growth rates\nin the Gulf region, from US$ 784 million in 2009 to\nreach nearly US$1.2 billion by the end of 2013.\n\nTotal\n839\n1,229\n784\n950\n1,042\n1,120\n1,181\nInternet\n9\n12\n19\n38\n49\n62\n72\n39%\n9\n12\n19\n38\n49\n62\n72\nRadio\n5\n14\n15\n16\n16\n16\n16\nOut-of-home (includes Cinema)\n19\n28\n20\n23\n26\n27\n28\nMagazines\n129\n150\n80\n96\n120\n134\n147\nTelevision\n27\n43\n32\n35\n38\n40\n43\nNewspapers\n650\n982\n618\n742\n793\n841\n875\n\nIn line with the Gulf region and many other\ncountries in the Arab Region, the advertising\nmarket in the UAE remains concentrated in print\nmedia (newspapers and magazines), accounting\nfor nearly 90% of total advertising spend. The\n\n## Print\n\nWhile newspapers accounted for 80% of total\nadvertising spend in 2008, they also remained the\nmost vulnerable as nearly 50% of spend came\nfrom real estate companies that suffered the\nbrunt of the economic crisis in the country. The\ntotal number of dailies in the UAE grew from 13 in\n2008 to 14 in 2009 (eight Arabic and six English),\nwith the launch of Alrroya Aleqtissadiya in March\n2009. On the other hand, some publications\nfelt the effects of the financial crisis with Al\nAlam and MK Nasha Gazetta shutting down\nand English freesheet 7Days ending its Friday\nissue in 2009. The sector (and, beyond print, the\nmedia industry) is regulated by the National\nMedia Council.\n\n11% 39% 1.5% 8.9% 17% 7.0% 9.0%\n\nrest of the market remains fragmented among\nother media platforms, all of which are expected\nto grow over the projection period, albeit at\ndifferent rates.\n\nIn an attempt to optimize the industry structure,\nprint organizations underwent some consolidation\nin 2009, for example with the transfer of many\ntitles from Arab Media Group to Dubai Media\nIncorporated.\n               According\n                            to\n                                 our\n                                       estimates,\nnewspaper advertising declined nearly 40% in\n2009 from approximately US$ 980 million in 2008.\nIt is expected to recover at a CAGR of 9% to reach\nUS$ 875 million by 2013.\n\nKey findings from our market research on the newspaper market in the UAE:\n- **Top read newspapers**: Al Khaleej, particularly\npopular among readers over 50, is reported\nas the most popular newspaper58 followed by\nGulf News and Al Ittihad; while Al Khaleej, and Al Ittihad, both Arabic newspapers, are read\nby Arab consumers, the readership of English\nlanguage Gulf News is concentrated among\nnon-Arab expatriates; The National, an English\nbroadsheet launched in 2008, has also been praised by many industry respondents for its formats and editorial content\n- **Newspaper content**: 'Best news coverage' and\n'habit' are among the top reasons for choosing newspapers, while 'specific journalists' are ranked at the bottom; in line with other markets,\nPolitics\n65%\nArts and Culture\n37%\n\nfavourite topics include current affairs, politics and celebrity\n- **Buying habits**: Close to 90% buy newspapers\nat least once a week, but subscription rates\nremain below 5%, except for Gulf News, which\nis subscribed to by 17% of respondents, all non-Arab expatriates\n- **Online news consumption**: Print remains the\ndominant platform for news, but almost a quarter of respondents use the internet either as often or more than print, nearly half of whom read news online more than five times a week\n- **News websites**: The Gulf News website is\nreported as the most popular source of news online, with almost a third of those who read news online visiting the site, in part due to its audiovisual content offering\nMagazines remain the second most dominant advertising platform after newspapers. While magazines represented 10% of total advertising spend in 2009, down from 12% in 2008, we expect this share of spend to recover going forward. Of the four researched countries, the UAE remains the only market with a high number of international editions, mainly English, in print media. This is a unique reflection of the country's demographic profile that includes both Arabs and non-Arabs.\n\nKey findings from our market research on the magazine market in the UAE:\n- Top\nread\nmagazines:\nWhile\nthere\nare\napproximately 20 magazines in the UAE, few have emerged as clear leaders in the market research in terms of their readership and sales.\nKull Al Usra, an Arabic lifestyle magazine, and Zahrat Al Khaleej, a weekly family lifestyle\nmagazine, were reportedly the most read and bought magazines across the country. Closely\nfollowing these two magazines was Friday, an\nEnglish magazine\n- **Magazine consumption**: Kull Al Usra and Zahrat\nAl Khaleej are read entirely by Arabs (nationals\nand expatriates) with marginally more women\nreading them than men, while Friday is vastly\npopular among non-Arab expatriates. These three magazines were also cited as the most\nbought magazines in the UAE, with Zahrat Al\nKhaleej being bought largely by Arab women\n- **Top read topics**: Current affairs, celebrities\nand fashion are the most read categories in magazines, with the latter two topics read by a much higher proportion of women\n\nSimilar to newspapers, where the majority of\nmagazine advertising came from industries\naffected by the economic downturn, we expect\nmagazine advertising to recover by a CAGR of 17%\nover the projection period to almost reach its 2008\nlevels by the end of 2013.\n\n## Exhibit 88: Magazines In Uae: An Overview\n\nLaha\n\n## Television\n\nLocal TV, in line with other markets in the Gulf region, displays lower advertising revenues than pan-Arab satellite TV, which attracts a significantly higher proportion due to its regional reach and larger audience share. We estimate that, at just over US$ 32 million in 2009, TV accounted for arround 4% of total advertising spend. In 2009, the UAE had thirteen terrestrial channels, most of them in Arabic, the second highest number of terrestrial channels in the Arab Region. All terrestrial channels remain state-owned and the majority broadcast on satellite TV as well. The two main media organisations, Abu Dhabi Media Company (ADMC) and Dubai Media Incorporated (DMI), operate five terrestrial channels each, with the remaining channels owned by the governments of Ajman, Ras Al-Khaimah and Sharjah. Along with their line-up of terrestrial channels, both ADMC and DMI have ventured into the free satellite TV arena. DMI has created a TV channel line-up that includes Dubai One, Sama Dubai, Noor Dubai and Dubai Racing. ADMC, besides offering its terrestrial channels on satellite, also offers Abu Dhabi Sports channels and National Geographic Abu Dhabi. Both Business and Economy edition and Arabic translation\n\norganisations have also diversified their content\noffering through the purchase of sports rights. Both\nADMC and DMI acquired five-year broadcast rights\nfor the UAE Football League, which reorganised\nitself into a professional legal and commercial\nentity in 2008. Furthermore, in 2009 ADMC also\nbought the English Premier League's three year\nexclusive broadcast rights in the Middle East.\n\nIn an attempt to provide advertisers with more\nmeasurable returns, the National Media Council\nand the TRA in the UAE launched an initiative\nin 2009 to introduce an automated TV audience\nmeasurement system, the People Meter. This\ninitiative will allow advertisers to gauge the\neffectiveness of their marketing strategies and re-\nevaluate their TV advertising spend.\n\nKey findings from our market research on the TV market in the UAE:\n- **TV consumption**: UAE audience preferences\nreflect the country's diverse population, showing appreciation for a wide variety of genres, channels and programs, both in Arabic and other languages\n- **Top genres**: News and sports are popular\ngenres, driven mostly by men, while general entertainment is preferred by women, in particular expatriate Asian women; among\nUAE men, sports are more popular among UAE nationals and expatriates prefer to watch a higher proportion of news\n- **Preferred channels**: MBC channels top the list\nof preferred channels while ADMC's flagship general entertainment terrestrial channel,\nDocumentary\n2%\nAl Ittijah Al Moakes\n2%\nWhile the TV market research provides clear leaders in terms of genres, channels and language preference, we believe that it does not tell the complete story in the UAE, which remains a complex media market for advertisers due to its highly fragmented nature. When one looks at the top channels viewed by nationality of UAE residents, the picture becomes much clearer.  For instance, although most channels are enjoyed by particular demographic segments, MBC2, a free-\n\nAbu Dhabi Al Oula, was also cited among the top watched channels\n- **Top viewed programmes**: With the exception\nof sports programme Sada Al Malaeb, Al Ittijah\nAl Moakes and daily morning show Sabah Al\nKhair Ya Arab, a daily morning show, no other\nprogramme was cited with much unanimity, with UAE audiences preferring specific types of programming over particular shows\n52%\n\nto-air movies channel, is the only one to appeal\nto all ethnic segments, unanimously popular with\nviewers of all nationalities. In addition, international\nbroadcasters have realized the opportunities to\ndiscuss the various population segments in the\nUAE. For example, there is a full range of Indian\nTV channels available, including Zee TV, reported\nas the most popular channel among expat Asians,\nand the Star bouquet of channels.\n\nAbu Dhabi Al Over the projection period, we expect local TV advertising to maintain its share of 4% of total advertising spend and to grow at a CAGR of 7% from between 2009 and 2013. With the Telecommunications Regulatory Authority (TRA) in the UAE granting the region's first broadcast mobile TV license and Etisalat, the incumbent telecom\n\noperator, deploying a comprehensive FTTH-based\nIPTV service, new \"local platforms\" are expected\nto be introduced. However, we believe that their\ngrowth will not yet be enough to take significant\nadvertising value away from pan-Arab satellite TV\nover the projection period.\n\nKey findings from our market research on the pay- TV market in the UAE: - Approximately 50% of respondents indicated a\nvariety of reasons for not subscribing to pay-TV, with the majority suggesting they are satisfied with the FTA content on offer; meanwhile, movies, series and family entertainment are the most common reasons for subscribing to pay-TV, with sports, unlike other markets, ranking only in third position\n- Actual overall pay-TV penetration in the UAE is\nclose to 72%, the highest in the region, in spite\n\n## Internet\n\nThe internet is expected to experience strong\ngrowth over the projection period as a platform for\nmedia consumption and advertising. We estimate\nthat internet advertising grew by nearly 70% in\n2009 to represent around 2.5% of total advertising\nspend. With broadband penetration touching\n70% in 2009, one of the highest in the region, we\nbelieve that the internet will present an attractive\nplatform for advertising. While the economic crisis\nnegatively impacted advertising levels on all other\nplatforms, it actually encouraged advertisers to\ninclude the internet as a significant platform for\n\nof the abundant use of unauthorised services in the UAE, such as Dish TV. The research results also indicate a higher share of Orbit/Showtime compared to ART in terms of subscriptions\n- Cable and IPTV are both offered in the UAE,\nand as Etisalat, the incumbent operator, lays its FTTH fibre optic network, it is expected that the country's cable TV (eVision) subscribers will transition into IPTV (eLife or du) subscribers, allowing advertisers to develop new ways to reach audiences, and pay TV operators to deliver new services\n\nmedia planning (as also confirmed by our industry\ninterviews in the UAE). One major reason cited by\nadvertisers in the course of our interviews was that\nas advertisers increasingly look to gauge returns\nfrom their advertising dollars, digital platforms,\nspecifically the internet, offer more attractive\nalternatives.\n\nGoing forward, we expect internet advertising to\ngrow strongly in the UAE, at a CAGR of close to\n40%, and to increase its share of total advertising\nspend to approximately 6% by the end of 2013.\n\nKey findings from our market research on the online market in the UAE:\n- **Internet usage**: 35% of internet users in the\nUAE spend more than two hours a day online.\nOn average, UAE consumers spend 2.7 hours online, i.e. a greater amount of time than that spent watching TV (two hours per day during the week)\n- **Content preference**: While nearly half of UAE\nrespondents prefer to browse in Arabic, an\n11%\n\n even greater proportion prefer to browse\n in English (with a clear distinction between\n Arabs and non-Arabs). For those preferring\n Arabic, close to 75% are more interested in\n the language of the content than the country of\n origin, not necessarily preferring to consume\n content specifically from the UAE\n- Top Arabic sites: The top three visited websites\n in the UAE are Facebook Arabic, regional portal\n Maktoob and video-sharing website YouTube\n\nKey findings from our market research on the social networking market in the UAE:\n- **Social media consumption**: Besides Facebook\n(both English and Arabic), other top social networking sites in the UAE include Maktoob, Orkut, Hi5, Twitter English, MySpace, Jeeran and Yamli. It is no surprise that these social networking sites from different regions and languages also reflect diverse backgrounds and preferences of the country's population\nPreference for Arabic content origination\n3%\n\n- **Favourite activities**: While social networking\nis the second most popular activity online and used by over 70% of the internet users in the UAE, frequency of visit is relatively low at 5.4 times per week, in line with the Saudi market but much lower than that seen in Egypt and Lebanon\nOnce a day\n16%\nFurther, in part due to the recent award of the DVB-H mobile TV license in the UAE, we expect mobile platforms to play an increasing role in one of the largest advertising markets in the Arab Region. While only 12% of total respondents reported that they regularly access the internet\n\non their mobiles (a low proportion compared to\nother researched markets), as infrastructure and\ncontent offering on mobile improves, combined\nwith increased use of smartphones, including\nthe iPhone, the platform will start to attract an\nincreasing share of total spend.\n\n## Radio And Out-Of-Home\n\nFinally, approximately 5% of total advertising spend in the UAE is represented by both radio and out-of-home advertising. The radio industry, with 24 radio stations spread across the country, remains state-owned. While the Ministry of Information and Culture owns these stations, the TRA remains responsible for issuing licenses. While radio stations are popular in the UAE, especially as a result of the commuter society (with people spending long periods of time in their cars) the low advertising spend can be explained by the same principle as in the TV industry, with significant audience fragmentation. While about half of these radio stations are broadcast in Arabic, the remaining ones are broadcast in other\n\nlanguages, such as English, Hindi, Urdu, Filipino,\nand Malayalam. Over the projection period, we\nexpect radio advertising to grow modestly at\n1.5% CAGR.\n\nOut-of-home advertising in the UAE has been on\nthe rise over the past few years, driven primarily\nby the surge in the construction industry in the\ncountry. In 2008, the real estate sector accounted\nfor over 50% of out-of-home advertising. Hence,\nit comes as no surprise that advertising spend on\nthe platform contracted by nearly 30% in 2009.\nGoing forward, we expect out-of-home advertising\nto recover and to regain its 2008 levels by 2013,\nimplying a CAGR of 9% over the projection period.\n\n\n## Country-By-Country Update 2.3.1 Bahrain Exhibit 95: Bahrain: A Snapshot59 Bahrain\n\n- **GDP per capita:** US$ 27,260\n- **Size of the ad market:** US$ 75m\n- **Number of daily newspapers:** 9\n- **Total dailies circulation:** 189,000\nBahrain has one of the highest GDP per capita in the Arab Region. Bahrain has a relatively young population, with 26% below the age of 15 and 50% below the age of 30, and a literacy rate of 87%. While Bahrain is the least populated country in the Arab Region, it plays a role in the regional media landscape. In addition, Bahrain has placed particular focus on developing its services and telecommunications sectors. Total advertising in Bahrain decreased between 2008 and 2009 by 12%, as the country's advertising\n\nindustry felt the effects of the global economic\ncrisis. Going forward, we have projected the\nadvertising market in Bahrain to grow at a CAGR\nof 6% over the projection period as the economy\nrecovers and advertisers increase their budgets\nagain. Aside from TV, a significant proportion of\nthe growth will be led by online advertising, as\nthe country has one of the highest broadband\npenetration rates in the region.\n\n## Exhibit 96: Bahrain Advertising Projections\n\n95\n13%\n\nTotal\n76\n85\n75\n79\n85\n90\n95\nInternet\n1.0\n2.1\n3.2\n5.5\n6.5\n7.5\n8.5\nRadio\n1.5\n1.5\n1.5\n1.5\n1.5\n1.5\n1.5\nOut-of-home (includes Cinema)\n7.2\n6.5\n6.2\n6.5\n6.9\n7.7\n8.5\nMagazines\n6.0\n7.5\n6.7\n7.0\n7.3\n7.8\n8.2\nTelevision\n11\n14\n12\n12\n15\n16\n17\nNewspapers\n49\n54\n46\n47\n49\n50\n52\n\nNewspaper advertising accounts for the largest\nshare of total advertising expenditure in Bahrain,\nwith 61% share. However, in 2009, newspaper\nadvertising decreased by 15%, making it, alongside\nTV, the platform most affected by the economic\ncrisis. This decrease can be partially attributed to\nthe correction in the real estate sector - heavily\naffected by the crisis and one of the drivers of\nBahrain's economic growth - which was one of\nthe highest sources of advertising revenues for\nnewspapers, with around 20% of total advertising\nspend in 2008. While Bahrain has a high literacy rate\nand the advertising market is expected to recover,\nwe expect newspaper advertising expenditure to\ngrow at a CAGR of 3% over the projection period.\n\nThe first daily newspaper in Bahrain was established\nin 1976. The 2002 press law guarantees freedom\nof speech and, as of 2009, Bahrain had nine daily\nnewspapers - seven in Arabic and two in English -\nas well as four weekly newspapers. The number of\ntitles continued to grow in Bahrain in 2009 with the\naddition of the weekly title Aswaq. Bahrain has, by\nfar, the highest concentration of newspaper titles\nby population60 in the region. The claimed daily\ncirculation for Akhbar Al Khaleej newspaper is\n\n6.3% 28% 0.0% 8.4% 5.1% 10% 3.2%\n\nreported at 36,000, the highest claimed circulation\namong all newspapers. Bahrain's newspapers\nalso have a strong online presence: out of a total\nof 13 newspapers (dailies and weeklies), only one\nnewspaper is not present on the internet.\n\nMagazine advertising expenditure decreased\nby 10% between 2008 and 2009. While the real\nestate sector accounted for one of the highest\nproportions of spend in magazines, other sectors,\nsuch as hospitality, also accounted for a high share\nof advertising expenditure.  A new introduction\nto Bahrain's magazine portfolio was Time Out\nBahrain, introduced in March 2009.\n\nLocal Television remains the second most\nimportant advertising platform after newspapers,\nwith a15% share of the total advertising market.\nWhile TV advertising spend decreased by 15% in\n2009, going forward, we believe it will recover over\nthe projection period and increase by 10% driven\nby two factors. Firstly, Bahrain's media activities\nwere brought to the forefront by the relocation of\nDTH player Orbit from Rome to Bahrain in 2006\nand the selection of Bahrain by MBC to be the base\nof its MBC2 channel. Secondly, the public service\n\nbroadcaster Bahrain Radio & TV Corporation (BRTC) is investing heavily to modernize the local TV. It operates six terrestrial channels, three of which also broadcast on satellite. The government has reportedly contracted several companies with a Digital Terrestrial Television (DTT) tender to revamp BRTC and, in parallel, to build a fully automated HD (High Definition) ready playout centre. However, similar to other markets in the Gulf, the Bahraini local TV market competes for advertising spend with pan-Arab satellite TV. While satellite dishes are officially banned, satellite TV reaches virtually all Bahraini households.\n\nPay-TV platforms in Bahrain have benefited from\na significant reduction in piracy levels, which\nhave decreased from 80% in 2002 to 20% in\n2007.61 Compared to other countries in the region,\nBahrain has a relatively high penetration of pay-\nTV, with a portion of it over cable (MMDS, 'wireless\ncable' service from BRTC). It is important to note\nthat although Orbit is headquartered in Bahrain,\nART appears to be the dominant pay-TV platform\nin the country.62\n\nInternet advertising in Bahrain was the only form\nof advertising that continued to grow despite the\neconomic crisis. We estimate that it grew by 52%\nin 2009. The main reasons behind this growth are\nthe high broadband penetration in the country\nand the shift of advertisers' budgets to search\n\nfor more effective, readily measurable, and high-\nreach platforms. Over the projection period, we\nexpect that internet advertising will grow at a\nCAGR of 28%. We believe that the high degree of\ncompetition in the internet market in Bahrain (22\nInternet Service Providers and a number of WiMAX\nplayers), coupled with the government's plans to\nreach universal service for broadband over this\nperiod, will only support and accelerate internet\nadvertising spend. Further, the government has\nalso embarked on initiatives to promote creativity\nand innovation in the development of local\nonline content.63\n\nWith a 2% share, radio advertising accounts for a\nvery small share of total advertising in Bahrain. We\nbelieve that radio advertising will remain stable\naround this level during the projection period as\nthere are no major developments expected. Voice\nFM 104.2 remains the only commercial radio\nstation and it does not target the local Bahraini\ncommunity as it broadcast in Hindi, Malayalam,\nand Tamil.\n\nWith a 5% decrease in expenditure in 2009, out-\nof-home advertising expenditure was not as badly\naffected as the other platforms. We expect out-\nof-home advertising spend to maintain its share\nof total advertising over the projection period and\ngrow at a CAGR of 8%.\n\n## 2.3.2 Jordan Exhibit 97: Jordan: A Snapshot64 Jordan\n\n- **Population:** 5.9m\n- **Area:** 89,342 km2\nGDP\nit\nUS$ 3 630\n- **GDP per capita:** US$ 3,630 - **Media Zones:** Jordan Media City\n- **Size of the ad market:** US$ 105m\n- **Number of daily newspapers:** 8\n- **Total dailies circulation:** 313,000\n- **Total TV Penetration:** 95%\n- Satellite TV Penetration: 78% - Cable TV Penetration: 1% - IPTV Penetration: 0.1%\nB\ndb\nd P\nt\nti\n15%\n- **Broadband Penetration:** 15% - **Mobile Penetration:** 95%\nJordan's GDP grew by 6% in nominal terms in 2009. Similar to most of the Arab countries, Jordan has a high proportion of young people, with 36% of the population under the age of 15 and 65% under the age of 30. It also has a literacy rate of around 90%, the third highest in the Arab Region. Although total advertising expenditure in Jordan increased by 20% between 2007 and 2008,\n\nits growth slowed to 1% in 2009. The major\ncontributors to advertising spend in the country\nare the telecommunications, banking, and real\nestate sectors. Advertisers in the latter two sectors\nrevised their budgets as a result of the economic\ncrisis. Going forward, we expect total advertising\nexpenditure to increase at a CAGR of 9% over the\nprojection period.\n\n## 2.5 Jordan\n\n0.0\n1.0\n2.2\n5.4\n7.7\n9.9\n12\nRadio\n2.0\n3.0\n3.6\n4.1\n4.4\n4.7\n4.9\nJordan's GDP grew by 6% in nominal terms in 2009. Similar to most of the Arab countries, Jordan has a\nOut-of-home (includes Cinema)\n5.6\n8.0\n7.3\n7.0\n7.1\n7.3\n7.5\nMagazines\n5.3\n6.3\n5.6\n6.3\n6.9\n7.6\n8.2\nyoung population with 36% under the age of 15 and 65% under the age of 30. It also has a high literacy rate of\nTelevision\n5.2\n5.6\n4.0\n4.6\n5.1\n5.5\n5.7\naround 90%, the third highest literacy rate in the Arab region.\nNewspapers\n68\n80\n82\n85\n92\n101\n111\nAlthough total advertising expenditure in Jordan increased by 20% between 2007 and 2008, total advertising\n\nSource: Value Partners\n\nexpenditure growth slowed to 1% in 2009. The major contributors for advertising growth in the country are the\n\ntelecommunications, banking, and real estate sectors out of which the latter two revised their advertising budgets due to the economic crisis. Going forward, we expect total advertising expenditure to increase at a CAGR of 8% over the projection period 2009-2013.\n\nTotal magazine advertising expenditure decreased\nby 11% in 2009 as a result of the automotive, real\nestate, and luxury items sectors decreasing their\nadvertising budgets. However, the effect of this\ndecrease on total print advertising was offset by the\nincrease in newspaper advertising, which accounts\nfor 94% of total print advertising, by 3%. Over the\nprojection period, we expect total newspaper and\nmagazine advertising expenditures to grow in line\nwith the overall advertising market, at a CAGR of\n8% and 10% respectively.\n\nThe Jordanian press is regulated by the Press and\nPublications law, which was amended in March\n2007, allowing for higher freedom of speech\nand, for example, allowing journalists to cover\ncourt proceedings.\n\n\nThe transformation of Assabeel newspaper from\na weekly to a daily in February 2009 increased the\nnumber of Arabic dailies in Jordan to seven, while\nThe Jordan Times continues to be the only English\ndaily in the country. Al Rai newspaper, launched\nin 1971, is considered to be the most popular daily\nnewspaper in Jordan, with a claimed circulation\nof 90,000.65  All daily newspapers in Jordan have\nan online presence.  Compared to other markets\n\n65Jordan Media Survey published by IREX in 2009\n66MENA Media Guide\n\n8.0% 0.8% 10% 8.9% 8.0%\n\nin the region, the number of daily titles in Jordan\nis low relative to the country's population and the\nhigh literacy rate, with 1.7 titles per adult million.\nThere are over 20 magazines in Jordan including\na number of English magazines, such as Business\nToday, Jo, On Campus Magazine, etc. Layalina,\na monthly Arabic magazine which covers social\nevents in Jordan, is considered one of the most\npopular magazines in the country with a claimed\ncirculation of 12,00066 in 2008.\n\nThe local TV market is small, accounting for only\n4% of total advertising expenditure. Between 2008\nand 2009, TV advertising was the most negatively\naffected platform, decreasing by 29%. This can\nbe attributed to the high penetration of satellite\nTV, at around 80% in 2009, which offers leading\npan-Arab channels that attract the bulk of the TV\nadvertising dollars.\n\nIn 2003, the Jordanian broadcast sector was\nliberalized.\n           State-owned\n                         Jordan\n                                 Radio\n                                        and\nTelevision Corporation (JRTVC) operates the\ncountry's only terrestrial TV channel, Channel1,\nwhich is also available via satellite. Channel1\nbecame the sole terrestrial TV channel after two\nother terrestrial channels - Channel 2, the sports\n\nchannel, and Channel 3, the movies channel, were\nshut down in May 2008. The launch of the first\nprivately-owned terrestrial TV network, ATV, has\nbeen postponed several times since its original\nexpected launch in 2007 and is finally expected to\nlaunch in early 2010. The launch of ATV is expected\nto drive competition in the local TV market. Going\nforward, we expect local TV advertising spend to\ngrow at a CAGR of 9% over the projection period.\n\nPay-TV penetration is estimated at 4%69 of TV\nhouseholds and is available in Jordan through various platforms: - Pan-Arab DTH players, Orbit / Showtime and\nART\n- Jordan Cable Services (JCS) which launched a\ncable TV platform in 2005\n- An IPTV service that was launched in 2008 by\nOrange Jordan. The service offers VOD and parental control\n\nJordan is one of the major producers of Arabic\nTV series and is home to some key production\ncompanies in the Arab region, such as Arab\nTelemedia Productions (ATP). Al Ijtiyah (The\nInvasion), which is produced by ATP, became the\nfirst Arabic series to win an International Emmy\naward in November 2008.\n\nJordan Media City was established in 2001 and,\nunlike most other media cities in the Arab region,\nit is privately owned. It acts as a teleport and\nproduction house, operating 215 TV channels\ncovering Australia, Europe, Middle East, and\npart of Africa. Its play out centre caters to 70 TV\nchannels. According to our industry interviews\nin Jordan, JMC is in the process of upgrading its\ninfrastructure for High Definition (HD). There are\nalso plans to convert the studios to HD in 2010.\n\nInternet advertising, albeit starting from a small\nbase, experienced the highest growth rate in\nadvertising\n             expenditure\n                            between\n                                       2008\n                                              and\n2009, with over 130% growth. Currently at 15%,\n\nbroadband penetration is projected to increase\nsignificantly by 2013 to reach over 50%. Jordan\nhosts a number of large internet companies,\nincluding Maktoob and Jeeran, two of the most\npopular names in social media in the region.\nJeeran was launched in 2000 as the first Arab\nweb hosting community and has gone on to\nattract eight million unique visitors per month in\n2009.  Maktoob was also founded in 2000 when it\nbecame the first Arabic web-based email solution\non the internet. It is one of the biggest online\nsuccess stories in the Arab Region, displaying a\nstrong user base and being acquired by Yahoo! in\nSummer 2009. Consequently, we expect internet\nadvertising expenditure to increase strongly to\nrepresent nearly 8% of the total advertising spend\nover the projection period.\n\nWith four new radio stations in 2009, the total\nnumber of stations in Jordan increased to 28. Total\nradio advertising expenditure increased between\n2008 and 2009 by 20%. Since the liberalization of\nthe broadcast market in 2003, the number of private\nradio stations has increased, upto 18 in 2009. We\nexpect total radio advertising expenditure to grow\nat a CAGR of 8%, in line with the total advertising\nmarket, over the projection period 2009-2013.\n\nOut-of-home advertising represent approximately\n7% of total advertising spend. As major advertisers\non the platform reduced their budgets in 2009,\nout-of-home spend declined by 9%. Outdoor\nadvertising was affected after rooftop billboards\nin Jordan were banned in 2007. Going forward, we\nexpect outdoor advertising to marginally decline\nin terms of its share of total advertising spend, to\naccount for nearly 5% of the total market.\n\n## 2.3.3 Kuwait Exhibit 99: Kuwait: A Snapshot70 Kuwait\n\n- **Population:** 3.5m\nopu at o\n3 5\n- **Area:** 17,818 km2 - **GDP per capita:** US$ 45,920\n- **Media Zones:** Under planning - **Size of the ad market:** US$ 361m\n- **Number of daily newspapers:** 17\n- **Total dailies circulation:** 961,000\n- **Total TV Penetration:** 99%\n- Satellite TV Penetration: 91% - Cable TV Penetration: 9%\n- IPTV Penetration: 0.1%\n- **Broadband Penetration:** 24.5%\n- **Mobile Penetration:** 109%\nKuwait has one of the highest GDP per capita in the Arab Region. Kuwait's economy is dependent on hydrocarbons, with oil revenues accounting for more than 50% of GDP. Kuwait's economy has been significantly affected by the global economic crisis, with the country's GDP experiencing the highest decrease in GDP in the Arab Region of 27% in nominal terms. However, real GDP growth correction was not as pronounced, decreasing by\n\n1.5%. Total advertising expenditure decreased by\n13% in 2009 and we expect it to increase at a CAGR\nof 7% over the projection period as the country's\neconomy recovers from the downturn. Over this\nperiod we expect the internet to become a strong\ncontributor to growth in the advertising market.\n\n## Exhibit 100: Kuwait Advertising Projections 2.5 Jordan\n\nTotal\n358\n415\n361\n388\n416\n443\n472\nNote:\nInternet\n0\n0.9\n2.1\n6.1\n11\n14\n15\n0\n0.9\n2.1\n6.1\n11\n14\n15\nAll figures refer to 2009 except GDP per capita which refers to a 2008 est.\nTV Penetration are based on TV households and total TV penetration is based on all households\nCIA World Factbook, IMF, Informa TM, MENA Media Guide, Value Partners Analysis\n\nRadio\n4.4\n4.0\n3.4\n3.7\n4.2\n4.5\n5.0\nOut-of-home (includes Cinema)\n39\n30\n36\n39\n43\n49\n54\n\nJordan's GDP grew by 6% in nominal terms in 2009. Similar to most of the Arab countries, Jordan has a\n\nMagazines\n33\n35\n28\n30\n32\n34\n37\nyoung population with 36% under the age of 15 and 65% under the age of 30. It also has a high literacy rate of\nTelevision\n15\n27\n22\n23\n24\n25\n27\naround 90%, the third highest literacy rate in the Arab region.\nNewspapers\n267\n318\n270\n286\n302\n317\n334\n\nAlthough total advertising expenditure in Jordan increased by 20% between 2007 and 2008, total advertising Source: Zenith Optimedia, Value Partners analysis expenditure growth slowed to 1% in 2009. The major contributors for advertising growth in the country are the telecommunications, banking, and real estate sectors out of which the latter two revised their advertising budgets due to the economic crisis. Going forward, we expect total advertising expenditure to increase at a CAGR of 8% over the projection period 2009-2013.\n\nThe print sector accounted for over 80% of the\ntotal advertising market in Kuwait in 2009. After\nstrong growth of around 20% in 2008, newspaper\nadvertising spend decreased by 15% from 2008 to\n2009 to reach US$ 270 million, mainly because the\nmajor advertisers in newspapers in Kuwait (real\nestate, banking and automotive sectors)71 were\nmore affected by the economic crisis than others\nand, as a consequence, decreased their advertising\nbudgets. Magazines were the most affected sector,\nwith a drop in advertising expenditure of 20% in\n2009, largely due to the fact that the majority of\nthe top magazine advertisers were global brands\nwhich were the most severely affected.\n\n\nThe introduction of the 2006 Press and Publications\nLaw in Kuwait, which allowed the issuing of\nlicenses for dailies, led to the launch of several\nnew titles. The number of daily newspapers in\nKuwait grew from eight in 2006 to 17 in 2009 -\n14 in Arabic and three in English. On the other\nhand, Assawt newspaper - which only launched\nin October 2008 - closed in February 2009 due\nto financial difficulties. All newspapers in Kuwait\nhave an online presence, including advanced online\nfeatures, such as archives and advanced search\n\n6.8% 63%\n\n63%\n\n10% 11% 6.7% 4.7% 5.4%\n\noptions. Our interviews with prominent newspaper\norganizations\n               in\n                   Kuwait\n                             further\n                                      confirmed\nthat the number of readers of online news is\nconstantly increasing.\n\nAs a result of new liberal media laws and a high\nliteracy rate in Kuwait, we believe that print will\ncontinue to flourish over the projection period with\na CAGR of approximately 6%.\n\nLocal television attracted a small share of total\nadvertising in 2009 (6%). Aside from the fact\nthat pan-Arab satellite TV continues to attract a\nsignificant proportion of advertisers' budgets, the\nfinancial downturn led to a further decrease of\n18% in 2009. However, going forward we expect TV\nadvertising expenditure to demonstrate moderate\ngrowth of 5% CAGR over the projection period.\n\nTerrestrial TV transmission started in Kuwait in the\n1960s. The government operates three terrestrial\nTV channels KTV1, KTV2, and KTV3. Since 2004, two\nprivate TV channels have been launched - Al Rai\nTV in 2004 and Al Watan TV in 2007. Al Watan has\nquickly become one of the most popular channels\nin the country by concentrating, primarily, on the\n\nKuwaiti audience, while Al-Rai has tried to branch out to a wider viewing base. Satellite TV is very popular in Kuwait, with over\n90% of TV households tuning to satellite channels. Although terrestrial TV is reportedly viewed by a significant proportion of households, pan-Arab TV remains the dominant platform, explaining the relatively small size of the local TV advertising market. Pay-TV penetration in Kuwait was around 23% at the end of 2009, relatively high when compared to the rest of the Arab Region. Kuwait Cable Vision (KCV), which was launched in 1997, is the sole cable operator in Kuwait. In 2004, it launched VOD, as well as other interactive services in cooperation with LuxSat. Total cable TV penetration in Kuwait currently stands at 9%. While the fixed incumbent operator, Zain, has not yet launched IPTV, some services have been developed or are set to launch: IPTV services are being offered in Kuwait by Anevia and Ihsan and a new IPTV service may be launched in the near future by Kalimat Telecom.72\n\nInternet advertising indirectly benefited from the\neconomic downturn, as confirmed by our interviews,\nas advertisers migrated from traditional advertising\nplatforms to the internet. Although growing from a\nsmall base, total internet advertising expenditure\nmore than doubled between 2008 and 2009,\nshowing the highest increase among all platforms.\nThe internet market is competitive in Kuwait with\nseveral ISPs competing for subscribers, including\nFast\n      Telecommunications,\n                              United\n                                        Networks,\nand Wataniya Telecom. Broadband penetration\nin Kuwait increased from 10% in 2006 to around\n25% in 2009 and is expected to continue to\nincrease in the future, driving further growth in\ninternet advertising. Therefore, we expect online\nadvertising to increase at a CAGR of 63% over the\nprojection period.\n\nOut-of-home advertising remained resilient in\nthe face of the economic crisis, demonstrating a\n20% increase between 2008 and 2009. We expect\nout-of-home advertising expenditure to continue\nto increase at a CAGR of 11% over the projection\nperiod 2009-2013.\n\n## 2.3.4 Morocco Exhibit 101: Morocco: A Snapshot73 Morocco\n\n- **Population:** 31.8m\n- **Area:** 446,550 km2\nGDP\nit\nUS$ 2 830\n- **GDP per capita:** US$ 2,830 - **Size of the ad market:** US$ 284m - **Number of daily newspapers:** 20\n- **Total dailies circulation:** 710,000\n- **Total TV Penetration:** 89%\n- **Broadband Penetration:** 12% - **Mobile Penetration:** 88%\nOnce almost entirely based on agriculture, the Moroccan economy has substantially diversified in recent years, with an increasingly important service sector. While 57% of Morocco's population is under the age of 30, the country's literacy rate remains low at 52%. Morocco's economy was less affected by the economic crisis than other markets. Both nominal and real GDP increased by 2% and 5% respectively.\n\nIn line with the growth in GDP, the advertising\nmarket in Morocco increased by 6% in 2009. As\npointed out during interviews with industry experts,\nthere was a significant increase in advertising in\nthe telecommunication sector due to intensified\ncompetition in the market.74  Going forward, we\nexpect total advertising expenditure to increase at\na CAGR of 10% over the projection period.\n\n## Exhibit 102: Morocco Advertising Projections\n\nTotal\n231\n268\n284\n309\n338\n373\n408\nInternet\n0\n0.9\n1.9\n3.1\n4.5\n6.2\n8.2\n0\n0.9\n1.9\n3.1\n4.5\n6.2\n8.2\nRadio\n12\n14\n15\n16\n18\n19\n19\nOut-of-home (includes Cinema)\n50\n57\n58\n64\n70\n78\n85\nMagazines\n18\n18\n18\n15\n14\n16\n17\nTelevision\n128\n154\n167\n190\n209\n230\n253\nNewspapers\n23\n24\n24\n21\n22\n24\n26\n\nAdvertising in the print sector (newspaper and\nmagazines) remains relatively small in Morocco\nas compared to other countries in the Arab\nRegion, accounting for less than 15% of the total\nadvertising value in 2009. Affected largely by low\nlevels of literacy and readership,75 newspaper and\nmagazine advertising expenditure is expected to\nform approximately 10% of total advertising spend\nby 2013.\n\nThe print sector remains regulated by the Code\nde la Presse of 1958. The Code was amended in\n2002 to allow for increased freedom of expression.\nMorocco had the highest number of audited\nnewspapers in the Arab Region, with many audited\nby L'Organisme de Justification de la Diffusion\n(OJD), a circulations bureau in Casablanca. The\nsector remains fragmented with 20 national\nnewspapers competing for advertising dollars.\n2009 saw the closure of two newspapers published\nby Groupe Maroc Soir, Assabahia and Assada\nAl Massaia.\n\nLocal TV remains the dominant advertising platform,\naccounting for approximately 60% of total advertising\nexpenditure. TV advertising expenditure increased by\n\n9.6% 45%\n6.0% 10%\n-1.4%\n11% 2.1%\n\nnearly 9% in 2009, driven, largely, by the continued\ndevelopment of the Moroccan TV sector. The Moroccan\nlocal TV market developed further in recent years\nwith the launch of IPTV by Maroc Telecom in 2006\nand the introduction of DTT, which covered 77% of the\npopulation as of June 2007. The national broadcaster,\nSNRT, aims to complete digital switchover by 2015.\nTaking these developments into account, we expect\nTV advertising to increase at a CAGR of over 10%\nover the projection period, representing an above-\naverage performance relative to the region as\na whole.\n\n2M channel was the first privately owned terrestrial\nTV channel to launch in Morocco in 1989, but due to\nfinancial difficulties, around 70% of its shares were\nbought by the government and it became publicly\nowned. While a law for the liberalization of the\nradio and TV sector was introduced in January 2005\nallowing for private investment in both sectors, it\nwas revoked by the High Authority of Audiovisual\nCommunication (HACA) in 2008. At the time,\nMedi1sat channel, a privately owned TV channel,\nbecame publicly owned after a public company\nacquired more than 50% of its shares. Amazigh TV,\na new TV channel in Amazigh,a language spoken by\n\nalmost half of the Moroccan population, launched in January 2010 and increased the number of terrestrial TV channels in Morocco to seven. All seven terrestrial TV channels remain state-owned by Societe Nationale de Radiodiffusion et de Television (SNRT). There is no cable TV in Morocco and satellite TV is widely available, with two thirds of the population having access to it. Interview research reveals that the distinctive feature of the Moroccan TV market is the success of local TV channels: two of them, TVM channel and 2M channel, jointly account for around 50%\nshare of viewing in the country while satellite TV channels account for the remaining share. The availability of locally produced Moroccan series on these channels is the main driver of their popularity amongst Moroccan viewers. Out-of-home advertising accounts for a significant proportion of total advertising spend, at approximately 20%. High levels of out-of-home advertising, along with a concentration in TV advertising, are a direct result of low newspaper readership in Morocco. Over the projection period, we expect out-of-home advertising to maintain its share around 20% and grow by a CAGR of 10%. Radio advertising expenditure maintained its share of 5% of total advertising spend in 2009. The state monopoly over radio broadcasting was broken after the law for liberalization of radio and TV was introduced in 2005. Currently, eleven radio stations are run by the private sector while\n\n16 are run by the government. In addition, HACA\nhas granted licenses for four private radio stations\nwhich are expected to launch in 2010. Over the\nprojection period, we expect radio advertising\nspend to increase by 6% and maintain its share of\nthe total advertising market.\n\nInternet advertising expenditure more than\ndoubled between 2008 and 2009. The continuous\nincrease in broadband subscriptions since 2003\nis the key reason behind this. Going forward, we\nexpect internet advertising expenditure to increase\nat a CAGR of 45% over the projection period 2009-\n2013, displaying the strongest growth rate amongst\nall platforms, as there is still room for growth in\nbroadband penetration (currently standing at a\n12%) and availability of relevant content.\n\nWith sustained mobile subscriber growth over the\nyears, which should even accelerate with further\ncompetition to Maroc Telecom (MT) and Meditel\ndue to the licensing of new market entrant Wana,\nmobile is increasingly seen as an alternative\nplatform for content consumption. SNRT launched\nDVB-H-based FTA Mobile TV in May 2008, allowing\nusers to watch five channels over their mobile\nphones. Later in January 2009, MT was allowed\nby HACA to commercialize its mobile TV offering.\nThus, we believe that the mobile platform also has\nthe potential to gain momentum in the coming\nyears, although real adoption by advertisers has\nyet to be seen.\n\n## 2.3.5 Oman Exhibit 103: Oman: A Snapshot76 Oman\n\n- **Population:** 2.8m\n- **Area:** 309,500 km2\nG\nS$\n- **GDP per capita:** US$ 21,650\n- **Media Zones:** Halley Media City - **Size of the ad market:** US$ 85m\n- **Number of daily newspapers:** 8\n- **Total dailies circulation:** 274,000\n- **Total TV Penetration:** 86%\n- Satellite TV Penetration: 48% - IPTV Penetration: 0.1%\n- **Broadband Penetration:** 9.7%\nM bil\nP\nt\nti\n130%\n- **Mobile Penetration:** 130%\nOman has one of the smallest advertising markets in the GCC region. It has a high proportion of young people, with over 40% of the population below the age of 15, and a high literacy rate of over 80%. The government's seventh five-year development plan (2006-2010) aims at increasing private and foreign investment in various projects including telecommunications and media. While the drop in oil prices led to a drop in Oman's nominal GDP in 2009, real GDP grew at around 4%.\n\nIn line with other markets in the GCC, Oman's\nadvertising market also underwent a correction,\nmainly due to the financial downturn, with a\ndecrease of 18% in 2009 from its 2008 levels.\nHowever, we expect the market to rebound and\ngrow at a CAGR of 7% over the projection period.\nPan-Arab media continues to be the preferred\nmedium for reaching audiences in countries like\nOman, primarily due to their small size.\n\nAll figures in US$ million\n2007\n2008\n2009\n2010\n2011\n2012\n2013\nCAGR\n(09-13)\nTotal\n74\n105\n85\n92\n102\n108\n113\nInternet\n0.0\n0.6\n1.3\n2.7\n4.1\n5.6\n7.2\nRadio\n0.1\n0.1\n0.1\n0.1\n0.1\n0.1\n0.1\nOut-of-home (includes Cinema)\n2.7\n3.2\n3.3\n3.4\n3.7\n3.7\n4.0\nMagazines\n1.1\n1.4\n0.7\n0.8\n1.1\n1.2\n1.3\nTelevision\n12\n12\n10\n11\n14\n15\n16\nNewspapers\n58\n88\n70\n74\n79\n82\n84\n\nThe print industry suffered the brunt of the\neconomic downturn as newspaper advertising,\nwhere over 80% of the advertising spend remained\nconcentrated in 2009, went down by 20% on the\nprevious year. The magazine industry, declining\nby 50% over the same period, remains very\nsmall and thus small shifts in advertising spends\nhave led to high fluctuations in its growth rates.\nThe print sector was particularly hit in Oman as\nlarge advertisers such as real estate companies\nand government institutions, historically major\nadvertisers on newspapers, decreased their\nbudgets significantly. Going forward, we believe\nthat print advertising will recover at a 5% CAGR\nover the projection period.\n\nThe print industry in Oman experienced growth in\nthe number of newspaper titles, with the launch of\nMuscat Daily in October 2009, the fourth English\nnewspaper. As of 2009, Oman had eight daily\nnewspapers, four in Arabic and four in English, as\nwell as a number of weekly newspapers. Two free\nweekly newspapers, English news magazine The\nWeek and its Arabic counterpart Al Isbou'a were\nlaunched by Apex in 2003 and 2006 respectively.\nWith both newspapers audited by BPA Worldwide,\nOman remained one of the few countries in the\n\n7.1% 53% 0.0% 5.0% 16% 13% 4.5%\n\nregion with audited circulation numbers. In terms\nof magazines, unsurprisingly, pan-Arab magazines\nare leading the way. Zahrat Al Khaleej, which is a\npan-Arab women's magazine, has the highest\nreported adult readership.\n\nLocal television advertising, accounting for 12%\nof total advertising spend in 2009, remains small\nin Oman as most of the TV viewing remains\nconcentrated on pan-Arab channels. Due to the\nimpact of the economic downturn, TV advertising\nspend retracted by 15% in 2009. Although the\nMinistry of Information allowed the licensing of\nprivate radio and television stations in 2004, a\ncommercial TV channel is yet to be launched in\nthe country. Consequently, the government still\nowns the only terrestrial channel, Oman TV. Oman\nTV produces the majority of its content in-house\nand is planning to invest in a new HD TV studio\ncomplex.77 Oman TV launched a youth-oriented\nsecond channel in 2006, Oman TV2, to cater to\nthe large youth segment. The channel broadcasts\non free-to-air satellite (Arabsat) and is not\navailable terrestrially.\n\nAlthough, generally, advertisers are increasingly\nlooking at generating higher return on investments\n\nby focussing on higher reach mediums (e.g. pan- Arab TV, online), Oman tells a different story; we expect advertising expenditure on TV to increase at a healthy CAGR of 13% over the projection period to increase its share of total advertising to 14% by the end of 2013, notably driven by live events in the outlook period (Oman will be hosting the Asian Beach Games in 2010). On the pay-TV side, Oman has high piracy rates. However, the fact that the International Intellectual Property Alliance (IIPA) has not issued a report on Oman since 2007 is an indication that the level of piracy has decreased in the past two years.\n\nInternet advertising has continued to grow significantly, albeit from a very low base. We estimate that internet advertising doubled to around US$ 1.3 million between 2008 and 2009 and represented 1.5% of total advertising spend, driven primarily by advertisers searching for a more cost efficient medium, as confirmed by our industry interviews. Going forward, we expect online advertising expenditure to increase at a CAGR of 53% over the projection period, highest among all platforms, to reach over 6% of total advertising. A key driver behind online advertising growth in Oman will be the growth in broadband penetration. Broadband penetration, just below 10% in 2009, is considered low when compared to its Gulf peers, but is expected to increase significantly to reach close to 30% household penetration by 2013. Omantel has undertaken intensive efforts to roll out ADSL\n\nand in June 2009 introduced residential ADSL2+\nbroadband services with connection speeds of up\nto 8Mbps. In addition, broadband growth should\nalso be fuelled by further competition from\nNawras, which was awarded the second fixed line\nlicense in 4Q08, as well as the development of\nnew technologies (mobile broadband, WiMAX etc).\nSeveral initiatives are also underway in Mobile TV\nwith Oman Mobile having recently launched its\n3G mobile services in 2009, competing with those\nalready launched by competitor Nawras at the\nend of 2007; there has also been some interest in\nDVB-H following the consultation organized by the\nTRA in 2008.\n\nThe government runs four radio stations - General\nProgram, Shabab Program, English Program, and\nthe Holy Quran Program. The Private Radio and\nTV Companies Law in 2004 allowed for private\nradio stations to be introduced and in 2007 Hala\nFM became the first privately owned radio station.\nCurrently, the private sector owns three radio\nstations. Radio still accounts for a very small\nproportion of the total advertising. Nonetheless,\nthe launch of the first private station is recent\n(2007) and we believe that there is potential\nfor growth.\n\nOut-of-home constituted approximately 4% of\ntotal advertising spend in 2009 but it proved to\nweather the financial downturn rather well. While\nout-of-home advertising still remains largely\nconcentrated in Muscat, Oman's capital, we expect\nout-of-home advertising expenditure to increase\nat a CAGR of 5% over the projection period.\n\n## 2.3.6 Palestine Exhibit 105: Palestine: A Snapshot78 Palestine Territories\n\n- **Population:** 4.0m\n- Area:\nG\nSt i\n360 k\n2\n- Gaza Strip: 360 km2\n- West Bank: 5,860 km2\n- **GDP per capita:** US$ 1,680\n- **Size of the ad market:** US$ 2.8m\n- **Number of daily newspapers:** 4\n- **Total dailies circulation:** 80,000\n- **Total TV Penetration:** 93% - **Broadband Penetration:** 15%\n- **Mobile Penetration:** 25%\nThis is the first year that the Palestinian Territories (Gaza Strip and West Bank) are included in the Arab Media Outlook report. One contributing factor for its addition is the unique features it displays as a media market in a conflict area in the region. For our analysis, in addition to limited secondary market research, we relied on interviews with industry players in the Palestinian media market and we noticed the high level of engagement on the part of these players as we received one of the highest numbers of interview responses from Palestine. Both the West Bank and Gaza have experienced a decline in economic conditions, mainly due to the ongoing conflict with Israel. Palestine has a\n\nhigh proportion of young people, with 40% of the\npopulation under the age of 15 and around 70%\nunder the age of 30, as well as a literacy rate of\n92%, the highest in the Arab region.\n\nTotal advertising expenditure in the country\ndecreased between 2008 and 2009 by 5%,\npartially affected by the global financial economic\ncrisis and partially due to the adverse security\nconditions of the country. Going forward, we\nexpect total advertising expenditure to increase at\na moderate CAGR of 5% over the projection period\n2009-2013 to reflect the uncertain prospects\nof this market, which are highly dependent on\npolitical developments.\n\n2009\n2010\n2011\n2012\n2013\n(09-13)\nTotal\n2.5\n3.0\n2.8\n2.9\n3.0\n3.2\n3.5\nInternet\n0 0\n0 0\n0 0\n0 0\n0 0\n0 04\n0 05\nInternet\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n0.04\n0.05\nRadio\n1\n1.3\n1.3\n1.3\n1.3\n1.4\n1.5\nOut-of-home (includes Cinema)\n0.2\n0.2\n0.2\n0.2\n0.2\n0.2\n0.2\nMagazines\n0.2\n0.2\n0.2\n0.2\n0.2\n0.2\n0.2\nTelevision\n0.1\n0.2\n0.1\n0.1\n0.1\n0.1\n0.1\nNewspapers\n1\n1.1\n1.1\n1.1\n1.2\n1.2\n1.3\n\nWith an estimated 40% share, newspapers account for the second highest share of total advertising expenditure after radio. Between 2008 and 2009, total newspaper and magazine advertising expenditures decreased by 3% and 16% respectively as the print market felt the effects of the global economic crisis and the impact of the end of 2008 attack in Gaza. This was further confirmed by our interviews with print companies, which showed that the economic crisis had a negative effect on print advertising revenues in 2009. Going forward, we expect total newspaper and magazine advertising expenditure to increase over the projection period at a CAGR of 4% and 5% respectively.\n\nIn general, the press follows the 1995 Press\nand Publications Law. Palestine has four daily\nnewspapers, the largest of which in terms of\ncirculation is Al Quds newspaper, which is based\nin Jerusalem. Palestine's newspaper industry is\nhighly affected by politics and the conflict with\nIsrael and many of Palestine's papers are affiliated\nto political organizations. This has led to the\npolarization of the Palestinian press. Palestinian\nnewspapers are starting to make use of the online\n\n5.1% 3 7%*\n\n3.7%*\n\n5.9% 1.1% 5.3% 4.6% 3.7%\n\nplatform, with all our print respondents stating\nthat they have established an online presence. It is\nimportant to note, however, that these companies\nhave not, so far, been able to commercialize\ntheir websites.\n\nLocal TV in Palestine is small, accounting for only a\n4% share of total advertising spend. Representing\na very small base, it experienced a negative year-\non-year growth rate of 33% between 2008 and\n2009. However, we expect total TV advertising\nexpenditure to increase at a CAGR of nearly 5%\nover the projection period 2009-2013, given a\nstable political condition.\n\nThe Ministry of Information is the governmental\nbody responsible for the issuing of TV and radio\nlicenses. Palestinian radio and television stations\nstarted to emerge following the Oslo accords\nand, by February 2009, 30 private TV channels\nhad licenses to broadcast in the Palestinian\nterritories, the latest of which, Star, was launched\nin 2004. Palestine also has a public TV channel\ncalled Palestine TV which is run by the Ministry of\nInformation. It has a presence both on terrestrial\nand on satellite. The popularity of Palestine TV\n\nled to its re-launch in 2009 on Talfazat, an online Arabic TV network that streams up to 35 popular live Arabic TV channels and on-demand Arabic videos. Interview research indicates that a new Palestinian broadcasting law is under study but no major decisions have yet been taken. The Internet service was launched in Palestine in 1994, followed by the establishment of the Palestinian National Authority for the Internet in 2001, with the aim of managing the internet in the country. More than 45 ISPs operate in Palestine today, all of which act as resellers to the Palestinian Telecommunications Company (Paltel).\n\nInternet advertising expenditure in Palestine remains non-existent.\n\nRadio is one of the major advertising platforms\nin Palestine, accounting for an estimated 45%\nof total advertising expenditure. Palestine has a\nlarge number of private radio stations and only\none public radio station, Palestine Voice, which\nis operated by the Palestinian Broadcasting\nCorporation (PBC). Evidence from interviews\nshow that the number of private radio stations in\nthe country increased in 2009 with the entry of\nnew players to the market. We expect total radio\nadvertising spend to increase at a CAGR of 6%\nover the projection period 2009-2013.\n\n## 2.3.7 Qatar Exhibit 107: Qatar: A Snapshot79 Qatar\n\n- **Media Zones:** Under consideration - **Size of the market:** US$ 205m\n- **Number of daily newspapers:** 7\n- **Total dailies circulation:** 211,000\nQatar has one of the highest GDP per capita in the world, primarily due to its ownership of 15% of the world's gas reserves, spread across a small population of 1.2 million. Qatar boasts a young population, with 50% below the age of 30 and a high literacy rate of 89%. While nominal GDP decreased sharply in 2009 with falling oil and gas prices, Qatar experienced double-digit real GDP growth of 11.5%. As a consequence, the decrease in advertising expenditure of 1% in 2009 was less pronounced than in other markets in the GCC. We expect the country's advertising spend to increase at a CAGR of 11% over the projection period, with only two platforms mainly contributing to its growth: print and, to a lesser extent, the internet. The key growth sectors for Qatar's advertising market in 2008 included financial services, automotive, and real estate.80\nThe government of Qatar has taken significant steps to encourage and promote journalism and communication in the country. Qatar Foundation\n\n(QF) was established in 1995, with the aim of\ninvesting in human capital through focusing on\neducation, scientific research and community\ndevelopment. QF's importance and profile in\nthe region has grown in recent years enabling\nit to become a key regional player investing in\nthe build-up of a knowledge society in the Arab\nRegion. One of the key projects of QF is Education\nCity, home to six international institutions offering\nworld-class\n             programs,\n                        including\n                                   journalism\nand communication.\n\nSignificant progress has also been made to\npromote freedom in the press and in media, in\ngeneral. Media laws, which had been governed\nby the 1979 Press and Publications Law, were\nmodified in 1995. More recently, the Doha Media\nFreedom Centre was set up in October 2008 to\nencourage media freedom.\n\n## Exhibit 108: Qatar Advertising Projections\n\n| 2007                          |   2008 |   2009 |   2010 |   2011 |   2012 |   2013 |\n|-------------------------------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|\n| CAGR                          |        |        |        |        |        |        |\n| (09-13)                       |        |        |        |        |        |        |\n| Total                         |        |        |        |        |        |        |\n| 163                           |  207   |  205   |  238   |  266   |  290   |  313   |\n| Internet                      |        |        |        |        |        |        |\n| 1.0                           |    2.8 |    6.8 |   14   |   19   |   22   |   25   |\n| Radio                         |        |        |        |        |        |        |\n| 1.2                           |    1.3 |    1.3 |    1.3 |    1.4 |    1.5 |    1.6 |\n| Out-of-home (includes Cinema) |        |        |        |        |        |        |\n| 4.0                           |    3.5 |    3.2 |    3.3 |    3.6 |    3.8 |    4   |\n| Magazines                     |        |        |        |        |        |        |\n| 2.2                           |    2.9 |    1.5 |    2.1 |    2.6 |    3   |    3.4 |\n| Television                    |        |        |        |        |        |        |\n| 9.2                           |   12   |   10   |    8   |    8   |    8   |    8   |\n| Newspapers                    |        |        |        |        |        |        |\n| 145                           |  184   |  182   |  209   |  232   |  251   |  271   |\n\nThe advertising market remains concentrated in\nnewspapers, which accounted for nearly 90% of\ntotal advertising expenditure in 2009. The high\nliteracy rate in the country is a contributing factor\nto this high concentration, as well as the limited\nscale of local TV in a market, which is dominated\nby pan-Arab TV. The launch of Al Arab daily\nnewspaper in 2007 brought the total number of\ndailies to seven (four Arabic and three English).\n\nAs advertisers, particularly in the real estate and\nfinancial services sectors that formed a significant\nproportion of print advertising, revised their\nbudgets, newspaper advertising declined by 1%\nin 2009. Over the projection period, however, we\nexpect newspaper advertising to recover and grow\nat a rate of 11%. Magazine advertising spend remains very small,\n1% of total advertising spend in Qatar in 2009.\nHence, small fluctuations in its advertising levels\nlead to large changes in growth rates. We estimate\nthat magazine advertising spend declined by 50%\nin 2009. However, we expect magazine advertising\nexpenditure to grow at a CAGR of 23% over the\n\n11% 38%\n\n38%\n\n5.9% 6.4% 23%\n-5.0%\n11%\n\nprojection period and reach its 2008 levels by 2012.\nQatar Today and Qatar El Yawm, both of which\ncover news and current affairs, remain the most\ncirculated magazines with claimed combined total\ncirculation of around 50,000.81 Other magazines lag\nfar behind with a maximum circulation of 10,000.\n\nWhile the television advertising market in Qatar\nalso declined by 15% in 2009, it accounted for\njust 5% of total advertising spend. The majority\nof television advertising spend is attracted by\npan-Arab TV, which, despite the fact that satellite\ndishes are officially banned, continues to serve\nmost of the households in Qatar. Consequently, we\nexpect TV advertising spend to actually decline in\nQatar and account for approximately 4% of total\nadvertising spend in 2010.\n\nTerrestrial TV continues to lose ground in Qatar.\nThe government runs two terrestrial TV channels -\nQTV1 (Arabic), and QTV2 (English). The state-owned\nsatellite broadcaster, Al Jazeera, has undergone\na transition from being just one news channel to\nbecoming one of the major media outlets in the\nregion. The international recognition of Al Jazeera\n\nhas played an important role in raising the profile\nof the TV industry in Qatar, enabling it to become\none of the leaders in international news, covering\na range of issues which are deemed sensitive\nin many other countries. It launched its Arabic\nchannel in 1997, followed by an English one in\n2006. Al Jazeera has expanded its portfolio beyond\nnews, into sports, and is evolving into a significant\nplayer in the pay-TV market (with approximately\n1m subscribers by the end of 2009), although with\nvery low ARPU. Al Jazeera has also pioneered\nthe use of new platforms in the region, including\nmobile and social media (YouTube channel) as part\nof its content offering.\n\nPay-TV penetration is relatively high in Qatar,\naround 48% in 2009, when compared to the other\nmarkets that we have covered. The cable TV\nmarket is operated by the incumbent telco, Qtel,\nwhich offers cable services via MMDS82 through\nits subsidiary Qatar Cablevision (QCV). Recently\nQtel embarked upon migration of its existing\ncable customers to its IPTV platform (Mozaic TV+,\nlaunched in 2007). In addition, the operator has\nbeen offering 3G mobile services since 2007 and,\nafter trialling Mobile TV on DVB-H, is preparing\nto launch a commercial broadcast mobile\nTV service.\n\nFrom a content development point of view, there have been initiatives to stimulate a film industry in the country. Alnoor Holdings, a new media group in Qatar that launched in October 2009, started a US$ 200 million fund to invest in at least 10 films over the next five years. Aside from movie production,\n\nQatar has been promoting itself to hold major\nsporting events, starting with the hosting of the\nAsian Games in 2006, followed by a string of events\nincluding the WTA women tennis masters in 2009,\nand some high-profile international friendlies\nin football (England-Brazil in November 2009),\npaving the way for its latest candidacy to host the\n2022 FIFA World Cup.\n\nWith broadband penetration at 84% in 2009, the\nhighest in the Arab Region, internet advertising\nspend more than doubled in 2009. High penetration\nand increased quality of broadband in the country\nprovide a solid platform for advertisers to not\nonly target their audiences on a wider scale,\nbut also benefit from a platform that can readily\nprovide an accurate measurement of their\nreturn of investment. In parallel, the quality of\nbroadband services will also be driven by the\nentry of competition into the telco market in Qatar\n(Vodafone in 2009) which now competes with Qtel\nboth on mobile and fixed services. Going forward,\nwe expect internet advertising spend to increase\nat a CAGR of 38% over the projection period.\n\nRadio advertising expenditure accounts for a\nnegligible proportion (approximately 1%) of the total\nmarket. The Qatari radio broadcast is controlled\nby Qatar Radio and Television Corporation (QRTC).\nQatar Broadcasting Service, which is state owned,\nlaunched its first radio station, Qatar Radio -\nArabic, in 1968. We expect radio advertising\nspend to increase at a CAGR of 6% over the\nprojection period.\n\n## 2.3.8 Sudan Exhibit109: Sudan: A Snapshot83 Sudan\n\n- **Population:** 39.1m\n- **Area:** 2,505,813 km2\nG\nS$\n- **GDP per capita:** US$ 1,520\n- **Media Zones**: Under consideration\n- **Size of the market:** US$ 14m\n- **Number of daily newspapers:** 29\n- **Total dailies circulation:** 96,000\n- **Total TV Penetration:** 17% - **Broadband Penetration:** 0.3%\n- **Mobile Penetration:** 39%\nThis is the first year we have included Sudan in the Arab Media Outlook report. While we have included a detailed analysis on Sudan and its media market based on our market research and direct industry interviews, it is worth noting that we have also had to rely on anecdotal evidence and limited data from secondary research to provide a complete picture of the media industry in the country.\n\nSudan is one of the largest countries in terms of population among the countries covered in the Arab Region. While Sudan's economy has experienced significant growth since it started exporting crude oil in 1999, its GDP per capita remains low, with\n\n80% of its work force employed in the agriculture\nsector, which constitutes a third of the country's\nGDP. Further, political and civil unrest over the\nlast two decades has largely limited the country's\neconomic growth and has negatively impacted\nits infrastructure.\n\nBesides these macro-economic factors, including\nthe lack of infrastructure, that deter any\nsignificant improvement in development across\nmost industries, including media, specific industry\nissues further limit growth in the country's\nmedia sector.\n\nAll figures in US$ million\n2007\n2008\n2009\n2010\n2011\n2012\n2013\nCAGR\n(09-13)\nTotal\n13.3\n14.8\n14.0\n17.5\n20.3\n22.6\n26.1\nInternet\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n0.1\n0.2\n0.2\nRadio\n3.3\n3.7\n3.6\n4.7\n5.5\n6.1\n6.9\nOut-of-home (includes Cinema)\n5.1\n5.8\n5.4\n7.0\n8.2\n9.3\n10.8\nMagazines\n0.2\n0.2\n0.2\n0.2\n0.2\n0.1\n0.1\nTelevision\n2.6\n3.0\n2.9\n3.8\n4.4\n4.9\n5.7\nNewspapers\n2.1\n2.1\n1.8\n1.8\n2.0\n2.2\n2.5\n\nOur estimates show that the total advertising\nmarket in Sudan remained low at $US 14 million in\n2009 and, going forward, we expect it to increase\nat a CAGR of 17% over the projection period to\nreach US$ 26 million in 2013.\n\nThe country's first newspaper, Al Sudan, was\nlaunched in 1903 and the first daily newspaper, Al\nNil, was launched in 1935. While the market is open\nfor privately owned non-political publications, and\nwith the 1993 Press and Publications Act allowing\nfor the publishing of political newspapers, the print\nsector remains partly affected by two main factors\nwhich continue to hamper the advertising levels\non the platform: a very high proportion of young\npeople, with over 40% of the population below the\nage of 14 and a low literacy rate of 61%.\n\nThere are over 40 different newspaper publications,\nincluding 29 dailies in Sudan and interview\nresearch points to some consolidation in the print\nindustry in recent years (e.g. in 2003). Interviews\nindicate increased freedom of speech as a result\nof the Peace Agreement that was signed between\nNorth Sudan and South Sudan in 2005; this had\na positive impact on newspaper circulation and\nadvertising revenues. It is also interesting to note\n\n17%\n73%1\n17% 19% -18% 18% 7.4%\n\nthat, despite low broadband penetration, all our\nnewspaper interview respondents stated that they\nhave an online presence. Total claimed circulation\nin Sudan remained low at 96,000 for a country with\na population of almost 40 million.\n\nWhile there are efforts being made, there remains\nsignificant room for improvement in the newspaper\nsector.  International Media Support (IMS), an\ninternational\n                non-government\n                                     organisation\nbased in Copenhagen which supports local\nmedia in conflict countries,  trained journalists in\nNorthern and Southern Sudan during October and\nNovember 2009 on the professional and ethical\nreporting of elections. The main aim of the training\nwas to boost the analytical and reporting skills of\nSudanese editors and journalists ahead of the\nupcoming elections.\n\nOver the projection period, we expect print\nadvertising (newspaper and magazine) to form\napproximately 10% of total advertising spend by\nthe end of 2013.\n\nThe broadcast media in Sudan, including TV and\nradio, is state-owned. There are no private TV\nstations broadcasting in Sudan and the government\n\noperates TV channels through the Sudanese Radio and Television Corporation. While satellite dishes are common in affluent areas and pan-Arab channels are popular, terrestrial TV is the dominant platform. Sudan TV is the main terrestrial TV channel and it also broadcasts on satellite. Aside from Sudan TV, there are a number of regional channels that are broadcast in specific regions in the country. With 17% TV household penetration in 2009, television advertising accounted for approximately 20% of total advertising spend in Sudan and we expect it to increase at a CAGR of 18% over the projection period 2009-2013.\n\nThe high number of radio stations, which increased by 10% to reach 18 in 2009 and out of which 11 stations were private, leads us to believe that radio represents a strong platform for advertising. This\n\ncan be attributed to the high effectiveness of radio\nin covering a large segment of the population,\nbeing widely available in all areas in Sudan.\nConsequently, we estimate radio advertising to\nremain strong and grow at a CAGR of 17% over the\nprojection period.\n\nSimilarly, out-of-home represents an effective\nmedium for advertising in Sudan. The overall\nsmall size of the advertising market, the\nunderdevelopment of other advertising platforms,\nand the high reach and visibility that the out-\nof-home platform offers led it to constitute\napproximately 40% of total advertising expenditure\nin 2009. We expect it to continue to increase at a\nhigh CAGR of 19% over the projection period.\n\n## 2.3.9 Syria Exhibit 111: Syria: A Snapshot84 Syria\n\nOne of the reasons we have included Syria in this year's edition is that it displays a promising advertising market in the Arab Region. It is important to note, however, that while the breakdown of the advertising market is based on both our market research and some industry interviews, we have also had to rely on anecdotal evidence in order to ensure that a comprehensive picture of the Syrian media industry is captured. The Syrian economy grew by an estimated 3% in real terms in 2009. Although foreign investment in Syria is limited, the government has introduced economic reforms in recent years to the country, relaxing controls on foreign investment. The private sector has been developing rapidly since 2004, with the introduction of economic and financial services reforms fostering private investment in the economy. The growth of the\n\nprivate sector has accelerated the growth of the\nmedia industry as private companies started to\nramp up their advertising budgets. In turn, total\nadvertising expenditure in Syria experienced\na year-on-year growth of 2% between 2008\nand 2009. Going forward, and as the economic\ntransformation of the country continues to unfold,\nwe expect advertising expenditure to increase at a\nCAGR of 14% over the projection period.\n\nDespite this growth, the Syrian media market\nremains small, accounting for less than 1% of total\nadvertising spend in the Arab Region. However,\nSyria's media market holds potential for growth,\nwith a high proportion of young people, with\nalmost 50% of the population under the age of 30,\na high literacy rate of 80%, and a buoyant media\nproduction market.\n\n30\n\nTotal\n30\n40\n41\n47\n52\n59\n68\nInternet\n0.0\n0.0\n0.0\n0.3\n0.5\n0.8\n1.0\nRadio\n0.6\n1.0\n1.0\n1.2\n1.6\n1.8\n2.0\nOut-of-home (includes Cinema)\n9.2\n12\n13\n14\n14\n16\n17\nMagazines\n2.4\n3.4\n3.6\n4.2\n4.9\n5.7\n6.8\nTelevision\n3.0\n4.0\n4.5\n5.1\n6.8\n8.3\n10\nNewspapers\n15\n19\n19\n22\n25\n28\n31\n\nNewspapers remain the main advertising platform\nand constitute over 45% of total advertising\nspend in Syria. We expect newspaper and\nmagazine advertising expenditures to increase\nat a CAGR of 13% and 17%, respectively, over the\nprojection period.\n\nIn 2001, a new press law was introduced that\nopened up the print market for private and\nindependent publications. The state monopoly\nover the print sector actually ended in 2006 with\nthe launch of two private daily newspapers Al\nWatan and Baladna. The government runs three\nnational Arabic dailies, Al Baath, Al Thawra, and\nTeshreen. Baladna English, which launched in\nDecember 2009, became the only English daily in\nSyria. It is interesting to note that newspapers in\nSyria are making good use of the online platform,\nas our interviews suggest that all newspapers\nhave already established their online presence.\n\nConsolidation in the Syrian print market occurred\nin recent years between Al Wahda Foundation,\nwhich publishes Al Thawra daily newspaper, and\nTeshreen Foundation, which publishes Teshreen\ndaily newspaper. Both government-owned entities\n\n46%1\n46% 19% 7.3% 17% 23% 13%\n\nmerged into what is known as Al Wahda Foundation for Press, Printing and Publishing.\n\nLocal TV advertising expenditure experienced\nstrong growth of 12% between 2008 and 2009.\nAlthough we estimate that local TV accounts for\njust over 10% of total advertising spend, year-\non-year growth was high, partially reflecting\nthe developments that Syrian TV, the country's\ndominant local broadcaster, is undergoing.\nGoing\n       forward,\n                 we\n                     expect\n                              TV\n                                  advertising\nexpenditure to increase at a CAGR of 23% over the\nprojection period.\n\nSyria's terrestrial broadcast market is state-run\nthrough the General Organization of Radio and\nTelevision Syria (GORTVS). GORTVS operates two\nterrestrial TV channels (Syria TV1 and Syria TV2)\nwith Syria TV1 being the oldest and the dominant\none. The government liberalized the TV sector\nby introducing a law that allows the emergence\nof private satellite TV channels. In addition to\nthe terrestrial channels, GORTVS operates two\nsatellite channels and is reportedly planning to\nlaunch an official Syrian satellite news channel\nin the coming one to two years. The first private\n\nsatellite TV channel, Sham TV, was launched in 2006 and several channels followed. The latest private TV channel to launch was Orient TV, which launched in 2009. Satellite TV is indeed popular in Syria, with 74% of TV viewers tuning to satellite channels. Internet services were introduced to Syria in 2000. In 2005, the first private Internet Service Provider (ISP) entered the market. Internet advertising in Syria is negligible, as broadband penetration is very low at just 0.5%. While we expect internet advertising to grow over the projection period with an increase in broadband penetration, the value of the internet advertising market will still be minimal in Syria in 2013.\n\nBased on our interviews with industry players\nin the online media market in Syria, there has\nbeen significant growth in the number of online\ncompanies in the country in the past few years.\nHowever,\n          real\n                competition\n                             is\n                                 concentrated\n\nbetween three or four online publications that\nhave managed to become well established in\nthe market.\n\nOut-of-home is the second most important\nplatform in terms of advertising expenditure in\nSyria, constituting approximately 30% of the total.\nWe estimate out-of-home advertising expenditure\nto continue to increase at a CAGR of 7% over the\nprojection period.\n\nSince the liberalization of the TV and radio\nbroadcast sector, a number of private radio stations\nhave launched in Syria. Currently, the government\nruns four radio stations and the private sector\nruns thirteen radio stations. The market for radio\nadvertising is still very small and constitutes 3% of\ntotal advertising spend. Going forward, we expect\nradio advertising expenditure to increase at a high\nCAGR of 19% over the projection period.\n\n## 2.3.10 Tunisia Exhibit 113: Tunisia: A Snapshot85 Tunisia\n\n- **Size of the ad market:** US$ 40m\n- **Number of daily newspapers:** 10\n- **Total dailies circulation:** 399,000\n\nTunisia's GDP per capita is the highest among the\ncountries covered in North Africa. Its economic\ngrowth has been fuelled by strong growth in the\nservices sector which accounts for more than 50%\nof GDP. Similar to other Arab countries covered in\nthis report, the majority of Tunisia's population,\n51%, remain below 30 years of age, while the\ncountry's literacy rate is 74%.\n\nThe advertising market in Tunisia, which attracted\nmost of its dollars from the telecommunications\nand FMCG91 sectors, has remained concentrated\nin television and out-of-home advertising. The\ntelecommunications sector, in particular, is\n\nexpected to drive advertising growth on most\nof the platforms. This will be driven by further\ncompetition in the market following the award of a\nthird mobile license in June 2009 to a consortium\nof France Telecom and Divona Telecom. With an\nincrease of 3% in total advertising expenditure in\n2009, the Tunisian advertising market experienced\na slowdown in the advertising growth rate\ncompared to previous years (39% in 2008), which\ncould be explained by the reluctance of companies\nto advertise as a result of the financial downturn.\nGoing forward, we expect total advertising\nexpenditure to increase at a CAGR of nearly 7%\nover the projection period.\n\nAll figures in US$ million\n2012\nTotal\n28\n39\n40\n42\n45\n48\n52\nInternet\n0 0\n0 9\n1 2\n1 5\n1 9\n2 3\n2 9\nInternet\n0.0\n0.9\n1.2\n1.5\n1.9\n2.3\n2.9\nRadio\n1.0\n1.2\n1.1\n1.1\n1.1\n1.3\n1.4\nOut-of-home (includes Cinema)\n5.8\n8.3\n8.8\n9.2\n10\n11\n11\nMagazines\n1.4\n1.6\n1.6\n1.6\n1.6\n1.6\n1.6\nTelevision\n17\n23\n23\n24\n25\n26\n28\nNewspapers\n3.2\n4.4\n4.6\n4.9\n5.4\n5.9\n6.3\n\nNewspapers\n            and\n                 magazines\n                            accounted\n                                       for\napproximately 15% of total advertising spend,\nwith newspapers accounting for 11% of the total\nmarket; a low amount when compared to other\nmarkets in the Arab region. Since the French\nlanguage is very common in Tunisia, a significant\nnumber of French newspapers are available in the\ncountry, the most circulated of which is La Presse\nde Tunisie, launched in 1936. Among Arabic daily\nnewspapers, Al Chourouk claims to have the\nhighest daily circulation at 110,000.87  In 2006,\nthe law requiring the government to approve all\nprinted material prior to publishing was removed.\nOver the projection period, we expect newspaper\nand magazine advertising to increase at a CAGR of\n8% and 1% respectively.\n\nTelevision has, historically, been the dominant\nmedia platform in the country, accounting for\nthe majority of advertising spend, with the FMCG\nand telecommunications sectors contributing\nthe most. The state-owned Tunisian Radio and\nTelevision Establishment (ERTT) operates two of\nthe four terrestrial channels in the country: Tunis7,\nthe network's main channel, and Tunis21, which\n\n6.5% 24%\n\n24%\n\n7.5% 6.5% 0.9% 5.5% 7.9%\n\nlaunched in 1994 and focuses on entertainment,\ncatering to the youth population. Hannibal TV\nremained the only private terrestrial channel until\nNessma TV was commercially launched in 2009.\nOver the projection period, we expect television\nadvertising expenditure to increase at a CAGR\nof 6%, partially due to the increased competition\nin the local TV market following the commercial\nlaunch of Nessma TV.\n\nThe Tunisian market is unique in the sense that\nwhile satellite television penetration remains\nabove 90%, and pan-Arab satellite TV commands\nlarge audiences, terrestrial TV also continues to\nattract a large share of the Tunisian audience, with\nHannibal TV gaining almost 20% of audience share,\nfollowed by Tunis 7 with around 13%.88  The growth\nof Hannibal TV, which started just four years ago\nand managed to attract a significant audience\nshare with varied programming, is a prime example\nof a success story within commercial channels\nin North Africa. Nessma TV is also following in\nthe footsteps of Hannibal, with programming\nbased on a mix of local entertainment and\ninternational formats.\n\nOut-of-home is the second most significant advertising platform, accounting for over 20% of total advertising spend year-on-year. Driven largely by the FMCG and the telecommunications sectors, we expect out-of-home advertising to remain strong over the projection period and grow at 7% CAGR. We have revised the projections from the previous AMO for internet advertising in Tunisia, based on our discussions with industry players. With an estimated 24% CAGR over the projection period, internet advertising is set to become the platform with the highest percentage growth in Tunisia. On the back of rapidly increasing broadband penetration from 11% in 2008 to almost 25% in 2009, we believe that advertisers have started including internet in their advertising budgets, as confirmed during our interviews. We estimate that internet advertising will represent 6% of total spend by 2013.\n\nChoof TV, an exclusive internet channel targeting\nan audience between 15 and 35 years, is expected\nto be launched in the near future. 60% of Choof\nTV's production will be in Tunisia in an attempt\nto capture and encourage Tunisian talent. The\nchannel is also planning to provide catch-up TV\nand video-on-demand service.\n\nIn the radio sector, the government's monopoly\nover radio broadcasting was broken with the\nlaunch of \"Mozaique FM\" in 2003. By July 2009,\nthere were twelve radio stations, nine of which\nare government-owned through ERTT, and three\nof which are privately owned. Radio advertising\nrepresents the smallest proportion of total\nadvertising spend. We expect the platform\nto maintain its advertising levels over the\nprojection period.\n\n## 2.3.11 Yemen Exhibit 115: Yemen: A Snapshot89 Yemen\n\n- **Population:** 23.7m - **Area:** 527,968 km2 - **GDP per capita:** US$ 1,170\n- **Size of the ad market:** US$ 13m\n- **Number of daily newspapers:** 6\n- **Total dailies circulation:** 170,000\n- **Total TV Penetration:** 61% - **Broadband Penetration:** 1.6%\n- **Mobile Penetration:** 34%\nYemen has the lowest GDP per capita of all countries in the GCC. Yemen has a very high proportion of young people, with more than 70% of the population under the age of 30 and more than 40% under the age of 15, as well as a very low literacy rate of 50%, the lowest in the Arab Region. With limited exposure to the global economy, the Yemeni economy was relatively shielded\n\nfrom the effect of the global downturn. As\na result, total advertising expenditure in\nYemen\n        actually\n                 increased\n                            between\n                                      2008\nand 2009 by 21%, in spite of the global\neconomic crisis. Going forward, we expect\ntotal advertising expenditure to increase at\na CAGR of 8% over the projection period of\n2009-2013.\n\n| 2007                          |   2008 |   2009 |   2010 |   2011 |   2012 |   2013 |\n|-------------------------------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|\n| CAGR                          |        |        |        |        |        |        |\n| (09-13)                       |        |        |        |        |        |        |\n| Total                         |        |        |        |        |        |        |\n| 8                             |   10   |   13   |  13    |  14    |  16    |  17    |\n| Internet                      |        |        |        |        |        |        |\n| 0.0                           |    0   |    0   |   0.01 |   0.02 |   0.04 |   0.06 |\n| Radio                         |        |        |        |        |        |        |\n| 0.1                           |    0.1 |    0.2 |   0.2  |   0.2  |   0.2  |   0.3  |\n| Out-of-home (includes Cinema) |        |        |        |        |        |        |\n| 7.3                           |    9   |   10.7 |  10.9  |  11.5  |  12.2  |  13.3  |\n| Magazines                     |        |        |        |        |        |        |\n| 0.1                           |    0.1 |    0.1 |   0.2  |   0.2  |   0.2  |   0.2  |\n| Television                    |        |        |        |        |        |        |\n| 0.6                           |    0.9 |    1.2 |   1.3  |   1.6  |   1.9  |   2.1  |\n| Newspapers                    |        |        |        |        |        |        |\n| 0.2                           |    0.3 |    0.4 |   0.5  |   0.7  |   1    |   1    |\n\nUnlike many other markets in the region, the print industry in Yemen represents a small proportion of total advertising spend, at  approximately 4% of total advertising spend. The small media market in the country is dominated by out-of-home advertising. Newspaper advertising expenditure increased by 31% between 2008 and 2009, albeit from a very small base. We expect newspaper advertising to increase at a CAGR of 27% over the projection period 2009-2013. While this CAGR appears to be on the high side, it should be considered in light of the very small base. Journalism in the country flourished following the unification of North and South Yemen in 1990, with the introduction of a regulation that allowed the licensing of private newspapers representing the views of all political parties. However, the situation worsened after the war restarted in 2004. Despite low literacy rates in Yemen, a large number of publications are available to the Yemeni public - nine government-owned newspapers and a large number of independent and party newspapers\n(approximately ten and 30 respectively).90  Our\n\n7.6%\n68%1\n7.5% 5.4% 15% 15% 27%\n\ninterviews\nconfirm\nthat\nmany\npublications\nwere launched in 2009; however, there is a high \"mortality\" rate in the newspaper industry in Yemen, with eight newspapers suspended in 2009. Our interviews with players in the media market in Yemen verify that the effect of the financial crisis on the media industry was limited, although some Yemeni papers have experienced budget cuts from the government. This has prompted them to search for alternative sources of revenue, such as price increases and growth in services. Interviews also suggest that newspapers are making good\nuse of the online platform; for example, 14 October\nnewspaper runs a news site in partnership with BBC.\n\nLocal television is the second largest advertising\nplatform in Yemen and accounts for a 9% share\nof total advertising. TV advertising expenditure\nincreased by 31% between 2008 and 2009. Indeed,\ngiven the low literacy rate in Yemen, TV remains\nthe main source of news for Yemenis, thus\n\nensuring higher reach for advertisers than other platforms. Going forward, we expect TV advertising expenditure to increase at a CAGR of 15% over the projection period, with TV continuing to be the dominant platform in the country. The broadcasting sector is state-owned through the Public Corporation for Radio and Television. There are two terrestrial TV channels, Al Yemen and Yamania, both of which are also available on satellite. Due to the high price of satellite dishes relative to disposable income terrestrial TV\nchannels are by far the most popular. Similarly, radio is considered a more effective medium than newspapers in reaching the target audience. All radio stations are also governmentowned. The first radio station, Sana'a Radio, was launched in 1947. Radio advertising expenditure doubled between 2008 and 2009 and we expect it to increase at a CAGR of 8% over the projection period 2009-2013. Internet advertising expenditure remains very low in Yemen, mainly because of low broadband penetration, which stood at 1.6% at the end of 2009.\n\nHowever, feedback from our interviews reveals\nsome signs of growth in the online media platform,\nwith some newspapers even starting to monetise\ntheir online presence. The government owns the\ncountry's two Internet Service Providers (ISPs),\nwhich are TeleYemen and YemenNet. Overall,\nlow computer literacy will limit the uptake of the\nonline platform and, therefore, we have remained\nconservative on the prospects of online advertising\nexpenditure over the projection period.\n\nOut-of-home advertising is by far the largest\nadvertising platform in Yemen, accounting for\nover 80% of total advertising expenditure. This\ncan be attributed to the current low base of the\nother platforms in the country. However, we\nexpect the balance of media to change over the\noutlook period, with other media catching up and\nthe overall dependence of the advertising market\non out-of-home to drop below 80%. Nonetheless,\nwe expect out-of-home advertising expenditure to\ngrow at a CAGR of 5% over the projection period\n2009-2013.\n\n## 2.3.12 Pan-Arab\n\nPan-regional advertising expenditure refers to advertising spend by regional media outlets that cover multiple countries in the Arab Region.91 Pan-\nArab advertising is predominantly concentrated on satellite TV.  Due to the direct impact of the economic crisis, advertisers revised their budgets CAGR (09-13)\n\n2007\n2008\n2009\n2010\n2011\n2012\n2013\nTotal\n802\n1,053\n965\n1,049\n1,141\n1,196\n1,252\nInternet\n1.0\n1.3\n1.8\n5.3\n7.1\n9.2\n12\nRadio\n8.0\n11\n13\n16\n18\n20\n21\nMagazines\n80\n104\n72\n83\n101\n111\n121\nTelevision\n702\n926\n870\n935\n1,004\n1,044\n1,086\nNewspapers\n11\n11\n8.2\n9.3\n11\n11\n12\n\nSatellite television continues to represent the majority of regional pan-Arab advertising spend, accounting for 90% of the total. Satellite TV continues to attract a significant proportion of advertising dollars away from local TV markets in most of the region, largely due to the fact that it reaches a far broader audience. It is worth noting that in Saudi Arabia, one of the largest markets for advertisers in the region, pan-Arab media outlets, TV in particular, account for a major proportion of media consumption. Furthermore, major regional broadcasters such as MBC, Al Jazeera, LBC and Abu Dhabi Media Company broadcast their flagship channels, if not all their channels, on satellite and are well received by audiences across the Arab Region.\n\ndownwards and pan-Arab advertising expenditure\ndecreased by 8% in 2009. Over the projection\nperiod, we expect it to recover at a CAGR of nearly\n7%, to reach over US$ 1.2 billion in 2013.\n\n6.7% 60% 13% 14% 5.7%\n11%\n\nMajor advertising contributors on pan-Arab\ntelevision come from the telecommunications,\nFMCG, real estate and financial services sectors. In\n2009, pan-Arab television advertising declined by\n6% from its 2008 levels as many of the advertisers\nin these sectors reduced their advertising budgets.\nHowever, the decline in television advertising was\nlower than the overall drop in the advertising\nmarket. It was also significantly lower than the\ndecline seen in advertising levels on pan-Arab\nprint media.\n\nWe expect pan-Arab television to remain an effective\nmedium to target consumers across the Arab\nRegion in the foreseeable future. Consequently,\nwe expect pan-Arab television advertising spend\n\nto grow at a CAGR of 6%, while maintaining its\nshare of advertising spend in the total pan-Arab\nmarket over the projection period.\n\nRegional print media constitutes a small share\nof pan-regional advertising spend, with 9% share\nof the total in 2009. Unlike individual markets in\nthe Arab Region where newspapers represent the\npreferred advertising platform, magazines account\nfor the lion share of print advertising expenditure\nin the pan-Arab market.\n\nPan-Arab magazines have gained high popularity\nin the Arab Region, especially in the Gulf countries.\nBased on the results of market research conducted\nin Saudi Arabia and the UAE, two of the largest\nadvertising markets in the Arab Region, two pan-\nArab women's magazines Sayidati and Zahrat El\nKhaleej were cited among the favourite and most\noften bought magazines.\n\nAlthough magazine advertising declined by 30%\nin 2009, representing the highest reduction on\nall platforms, we expect it to recover faster than\nthe overall advertising market over the projection\nperiod and grow at a CAGR of 14% from 2009\nto 2013.\n\nNewspapers form approximately 1% of total\nadvertising expenditure on pan-Arab media. Pan-\nArab newspapers, such as Al Hayat and Asharq\nAlawsat, are largely targeted at Arab expatriates\nin Europe, as well as other Arab markets. Since\nnewspaper advertising spend forms a small base\nin pan-Arab media, relatively small fluctuations in\nlevels lead to higher percentage declines. While\nadvertising on newspapers declined by over 25%\nin 2009, we expect it to maintain its share of total\npan-Arab advertising spend over the projection\nperiod and grow at a CAGR of over 10%.\n\nBoth\n      radio\n            and\n                  internet\n                           combined\n                                     form\napproximately 1.5% of total pan-Arab advertising\nspend and were relatively unaffected by the\neconomic crisis. Although starting at much lower\nbases, radio and internet advertising increased\nat 22% and 40% respectively in 2009. Going\nforward, we expect advertising expenditure on\nboth platforms to grow at CAGRs of 13% and 60%\nrespectively over the projection period.\n\n## 3.1\n\nFor this year's edition of the Arab Media Outlook, we have decided to focus on a topic that we believe is of great significance to all sectors of the media industry, as well as to consumers themselves: that is, the stimulation and exploitation of local content in the Arab media industry. The theme of local content has become a key issue for media professionals and consumers throughout the region and has great potential for growth over the coming years. Both the market research carried out for this report and our interviews with Arab media industry professionals have confirmed that stimulating local content has the potential to generate significant value for the industry. The concept of 'local' content can be viewed from two distinct angles, based on language, geography and target audience. Firstly, on a pan-Arab level we can define local content as content that is produced in the Arabic language  and in the Arab world for a pan-Arab or even international viewer, reader or user. For example, pan-Arab TV channels such as MBC, or newspapers such as Asharq Alawsat, would be included in this category.  However, the Arab countries that are covered in this report represent a broad and diverse region with strong discrepancy between countries in terms of the status and maturity level of the local content industry. On the other hand, local content on a more national level could be considered as content that is produced at a country level for a national viewer, reader, or user. This would include terrestrial TV channels, as well as locally targeted newspapers, magazines and websites.\n\n## Introduction\n\nThroughout  this section of the report, we will keep in mind both the pan-Arab and national perspectives of local content. However, we will be focusing largely on the concept of generating a local content industry that will be sustainable on a pan-Arab basis and will benefit the Arab Region as a whole.  In doing so, we will address firstly the current status of local content within the Arab media industry, followed by an assessment of the key challenges for industry stakeholders in generating local content in the Arab world, as well as an overview of the key opportunities for the industry in terms of stimulating local content further. While we will continue to ensure coverage of the key platforms addressed in Section 1 - that is, print, TV and online and mobile - it is the audiovisual content sector, including both TV and film, on which we will place particular emphasis. This is because, as we will see in the next sub-section, an assessment of the current status of local content in the region suggests that this is the sector which both has the strongest need of and presents the most significant opportunities from an increase in the volume and quality of local content. It is also worth noting that the creation of quality local content was highlighted during our interviews with industry respondents as one of the four key issues affecting the monetisation of content in the Arab world.\n\n## Exhibit 118: Key Issues For Arab Media In Monetising Content\n\nWhile these factors are all worthy of individual analysis, they are also all very much interlinked. Therefore, this section, which aims to consider the opportunities for local content in the region, will\n\n## 3.2 Overview Of The Current Status\n\nThe media industry in the Arab world, and in particular the television and online sectors, has strong opportunities for growth over the coming years.  A key element of this growth will be based upon the generation of quality local content.  While the industry has seen significant progress in this area in recent years, local content has plenty of room for further growth. This will require not only\n\n## 3.2.1 Local Content By Platform\n\nThrough\n          interviews\n                      with\n                             media\n                                     industry\nprofessionals across the region, we have been\nable to carry out an assessment of the local\ncontent industry across the Arab Region. Firstly,\nacross all media sectors that we studied in the\nregion, the print sector is the one where the\nproportion of local content is the highest. In the\nArab newspapers and magazines analyzed for\nthis report, we have found that over 90% of total\ncontent output is original Arabic writing, with\nless than 10% of content translated from foreign\nwriters. While the selection criteria for foreign\nwriters vary between publications and countries, it\nis often the case that the more specialized content,\nfor example in science or technology supplements,\ncontains a higher proportion of translated content\nthan general news. However, the market research\n\nalso consider the interdependent factors which also play an important role in the overall Arab content industry.\n\nfinding new ways to generate value from content\nin the region, but also growing the talent pool,\nimproving infrastructure and developing new\nbusiness models.  With these elements addressed,\nthere is no reason to suggest that local content\nemanating from the Arab Region across the print,\naudiovisual and online sectors cannot compete\neffectively on the global stage.\n\nsuggests that there are also some areas of general\nnews content that could be addressed, particularly\nin terms of focusing more heavily on readers'\ninterests and ensuring content is not only about\nevent coverage, but also about analysis.\n\nAn assessment of local content in the TV and film\nindustries produces a different story. We believe\nthat TV is the sector with the strongest potential to\nbenefit from further investment and interest in local\ncontent. In the Arab television market, there are\ncurrently three distinct types of content: original\nprogrammes that are developed and produced\nin the Arab world, international formats that are\nadapted to the local market, and programmes that\nare acquired from international rights owners and\nsubtitled or dubbed into Arabic.\n\nWhile\n       the\n             first\n                   type\n                          of\n                              content,\n                                         original\nprogramming, is the only truly local content, the\nproduction of local versions of international formats\nare a key way of stimulating the local industry and\nlearning from other markets. In this respect, there\nis a clear disparity between different genres of TV\ncontent. For example, while news production and\ndrama (particularly during the Ramadan season)\nare typically local, entertainment formats are\noften imported from other markets.\n\nA comparative analysis of local content on the top\n15 pan-Arab channels (by audience share) and the\nfive main networks in the UK, as a best practice\nexample of local production, suggests that there\nis room for growth in the region, in terms of both\nthe quantity of local content output and the level of\ninvestments in that content. Firstly, we estimate\nthat across the top 15 pan-Arab channels, on\naverage 30-40% of total output is first-run original\nArabic content,92 a further 30-40% of TV content\nis imported from other markets (either subtitled\nor dubbed into Arabic), and the remaining 20-\n40% of output is constituted of repeats and news\nprogramming. In the UK, which has a healthy\nand competitive local production market, the\nlevel of first-run original programming on the\nfive main networks is close to 50% of total\nhours.93 While this gap in quantity of original\noutput is not exceptional, there is nevertheless\nsubstantial room for growth.\n\n## 3.2.2 Local Content By Country\n\nAn assessment of the individual Arab countries\nproducing content shows that while every country\nin the Arab Region has developed its own unique\nmedia industry, some markets are emerging\nas stronger players in different sectors of the\nindustry. Some of the larger markets, such as\nEgypt, have been able to build up significant local\ncontent industries catering for their own domestic\nmarkets as well as, to some extent, the wider Arab\nRegion. Meanwhile, other countries, such as the\nGCC nations, are increasingly targeting the wider\nGulf region in an effort to expand their customer\nbase.\n\nEgypt was the first Arab country to create a\nthriving film and TV production industry. For many\nyears, Egypt has been producing films and drama\nseries renowned across the Arab world, as well\n\nSecondly, an assessment of the expenditure per\nhour on original Arabic content, as compared\nto the UK, produces a more staggering result.\nWe estimate that the cost per hour of first-run\noriginal Arabic content is approximately $30-\n60,000 on average.94 In the UK, the equivalent\ncost per hour of first-run content by the five main\nnetworks is almost $130,000, while first-run\noriginal programming constitutes 93% of their\noverall budgets. With UK content worth two to\nfour times as much as the average Arabic series,\nit is clear that there is a significant gap in content\ninvestment and higher production budgets need to\nbe provided in order to boost the quality of original\nArabic programming. An increase in investment\nwould most likely lead to higher quality content,\nan improved talent base, larger audiences and,\nfinally, stronger advertising revenues.\n\nOn the online and mobile platforms, the situation\nis different again: the level of local content,\nrelative to foreign content, available to consumers,\nis minimal. In the online world, unlike print and,\nto some extent, TV, foreign content is almost as\neasy to access as local content. What differs is the\nrelative quality and quantity of content available\nin the Arabic language. Relative to the size and\npopulation of the Arab Region, there is little Arabic\nonline content currently produced in the region\nand we will address the reasons for this and the\nopportunities to develop the industry over the\ncourse of this section.\n\nas developing a successful print industry. While\nother Arab countries have recently been taking an\nincreasing interest in media, many lessons can be\nlearned from the Egyptian market.\n\nLebanon, too, has built up a significant TV\nproduction industry, with one of the largest talent\npools in the region (particularly for entertainment)\nas well as a strong print industry. Indeed, the\nindustry has developed to such an extent that it\nis very common for Gulf-based TV companies to\nshoot their programmes in Lebanon, even when\nthe concept has a distinctly 'local' Gulf flavour. A\nrecent example is Endemol programme Mahlaha\nBladi, adapted from international format I Love\nMy Country, which is currently airing on Qanat Al\nEmarat. The show is entirely dedicated to Emirati\ncultural heritage and traditions and features six\n\nnew Emirati guests each episode. Yet the whole series was filmed in Beirut where, even with the travel and accommodation costs taken into account, production costs were still lower than they would have been in the UAE. Similarly, Syria has become another strong player in content production, particularly for drama series, with successes such as the well-known Bab Al Hara Ramadan series based in Syria. More recently, as broadcasters are attempting to become more 'localized' in their strategies, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait have started to increase their drama and comedy output, particularly for Gulf-based channels such as MBC. In the online space, Jordan has developed a reputation for fostering a young and vibrant IT community, the results of which can be seen in the regional successes of online companies, such as Maktoob, Jeeran, and Watwet, among others. The relatively recent emergence of media zones across the region has had a significant impact on the growth of the industry around certain areas, resulting in the clustering of media companies around particular 'hubs'. For example, following the introduction of Dubai Media City in 2001, the UAE became a favourite spot for media companies\n\nin the region. For the TV industry, as we have seen,\nproduction remains mostly concentrated outside\nthe Gulf. However, the UAE is playing a significant\nrole in the areas of sales, marketing and distribution\nfor media companies. Media organizations from\nacross the region are continuing to set up either\nprimary or secondary offices in the UAE.\n\nSimilarly, the existence or upcoming launch of\nseveral other media zones across the region is\nchanging the dynamics of the industry. Generally,\nthe zones act as industry clusters for media\ncompanies, providing infrastructure and facilities\nfor companies housed within them and offering\nspecial 'free zone' privileges such as reduced\nor waived taxation and lighter regulation. Many\nmore are in the works, with media zones expected\nto be developed across the Gulf and Levant in\nparticular over the next few years, as illustrated in\nthe exhibit below. It is important to note, however,\nthat the term 'media zone' here is used loosely,\nas there is significant discrepancy between the\nofferings and unique selling points of each of the\nindividual zones described below, some of which\nare private,e.g. Halley Media City in Oman, rather\nthan government entities.\n\nAs we explore the challenges and opportunities for\nexploiting local content in the region, it is important\n                                                         to bear in mind how the industry is developing in\n                                                         all these different media hotspots.\n\n## 3.1.3 Local Content Virtuous Circle\n\nAcross all markets and in all sectors, there\nare many challenges for the Arab local content\nindustry to overcome, as well as some significant\nopportunities for growth. As we consider how local\ncontent can be exploited further in the region and\nits value can be maximized, we will assess each of\n\nthe key areas affecting the local content industry\nover the coming sections of the report. These key\nareas, all of which are vital for the overall growth\nof the local content industry, are summarized in\nthe exhibit below.\n\nAs can be seen from the exhibit above, the local\ncontent virtuous circle revolves around three key\nissues: monetisation, funding and talent. Once\ngreater revenues are derived from local content,\nmedia platforms are able to invest further in the\ndevelopment and production of content, produce\nhigher quality content and afford to pay, retain\n\n## 3.3 Stimulating Local Content In The Arab Media Industry 3.3.1 Monetisation Although Advertising Revenues Are Low In The Region, There Is Strong Demand For Local Content\n\nWhen we refer to 'monetisation' of content, we are indicating the potential to generate value from that content, whether it is through direct sales to consumers or through advertising revenues that are generated as a result of capturing eyeballs. On all platforms, annual advertising revenues, valued at $4.6 bn in the Arab Region, are low compared to other markets. However, the single most important driving factor for advertising revenues is the number of\n\nand develop local talent. In addition, government\nregulation and technology are the key \"enablers\"\nof these three components. Addressing each of\nthese areas will help generate a virtuous circle\nin which local content is successfully developed,\nexploited and consumed.\n\nconsumers that media owners, and therefore\nadvertisers, are able to capture. When it comes\nto media, there is a clear demand from the Arab\npopulation for content that is developed locally.\nAs we have discussed, one aspect of local content\nat a macro level is language, and the primary\nmarket research shows that Arabic is, by far,\nthe preferred language for media consumption\nin the region.\n\n## Exhibit 121: Language Preferences For Media Consumption In The Arab Region1,2\n\ntranslation As the exhibit above demonstrates, consumers in all four markets that we have studied prefer to consume newspapers, magazines, TV and the internet in Arabic over any other language.\n\nIt is also clear from the research that the more\n'local' the content, the more popular it is with\nconsumers.\n              The\n                    exhibit\n                             below\n                                     represents\nthe preferences of Arab internet users and\ndemonstrates that in all four markets where we\n\nusing English websites:\n\ninterviewed final users, a significant proportion of\nusers prefer content that originates from their own\ncountry. This is particularly true of those countries\nwith a strong history in content production, such\nas Egypt, where 63% of users prefer content from\ntheir own country. By contrast, in those countries\nthat have only recently moved into the field, such\nas the UAE, this figure reduces to 20%. Overall,\nonly 6-10% of users prefer content from other\nparts of the Arab Region.\n\n## Exhibit 122: Preference Of Internet Content From Own Country In Arab Region Preference Over Source Of Online Content\n\nPrefer content from other parts of the Arab region\n48%\nThis research shows that local content at both country and pan-Arab level is in strong demand by Arab consumers, and wherever the consumers go, the advertisers will follow. Therefore, from\n\n## Newspapers Continue To Be A Major Source Of Local Content In The Region And Could Benefit From An Increase In Analytical Content\n\nIn many Arab countries, newspapers continue to be the preferred type of media and they remain the dominant platform for advertising spend in the region. In addition, as we have seen, the majority of newspaper content in the region is already 'local', in that it is written both in the Arab world and in the Arabic language. Therefore, we believe that there are two key areas that could benefit from increased focus by Arab newspapers in terms of satisfying customer demand for content. Firstly, an analysis of newspaper content in the region and discussions with industry experts suggests that certain types of content could benefit from increased analytical reporting and less focus on direct event coverage. This is particularly true of, for example, economic and business news, which often relies heavily on press releases and leaves little room for differentiation between local\n\na monetisation point of view, the local content\nchallenge is to ensure that the quantity and\nquality are high enough to attract and retain those\nconsumers.\n\nnewspapers. Of course, it is important to consider\nthat the level of analysis in news coverage varies\nsignificantly both by country and by newspaper -\nfor example, in Lebanon newspapers are more\nprone to providing strong political opinions in their\nreporting. It is also worth noting that on some,\nlargely international and pan-regional issues, such\nas the conflicts in Iraq and Palestine, newspapers\nin the region focus much more heavily on drawing\nopinions than they do on other, often more local\nissues. However, on the whole, we believe that\nnewspapers in the region could benefit from an\nincrease in analytical coverage on some topics.\nIndeed, the market research shows that the top\nreasons for choosing newspapers in the Arab\nRegion are because readers believe \"its coverage\nof news is the best\" and because they \"have\nalways read this newspaper, or out of habit\", as\ndemonstrated in the exhibit below.\n\n## Exhibit 123: Reasons For Newspaper Preferences In The Arab Region1,2\n\nAn increased focus on opinions and analysis by newspapers in certain types of content could help engage readers further and act as a differentiating factor between newspapers in the region, thus increasing the percentage of readers who base their newspaper selection on its \"opinions / analysis\" and for \"specific journalists\". Secondly, from interviews with editors across the region, we believe it is safe to conclude that newspapers in many Arab countries commonly practice some degree of self-censorship in their coverage of local, and, particularly, state-related issues. While this practice is crucial in terms of ensuring that cultural and social boundaries are not over-stepped, it is also more important than ever that reporting stands out and truly represents readers' interests in these difficult economic times. If newspapers are to survive the drops in advertising revenues and threats from new platforms that they face, it will be essential for them to earn and maintain further credibility from readers by uncovering appealing stories. Indeed, as media mogul Rupert Murdoch recently pointed out in reference to the future survival of the newspaper industry:\n\n\"From\n       the\n             beginning,\n                        newspapers\n                                     have\nprospered for one reason: the trust that comes\nfrom representing their readers' interests and\ngiving them news that's important to them. That\nmeans covering the communities where they live,\nexposing government or business corruption,\nand standing up to the rich and powerful.95\n\nWhile this kind of investigative reporting is not,\non the whole, common practice in the region, we\nhave seen an increase in the number of private\nnewspapers in recent years and some markets\nhave achieved significant increases in newspaper\nsales as a result. In Egypt, for example, the entry\nof government opposition paper Al Masry Al\nYoum into the market has had a positive effect on\nthe industry, enabling it to reach a circulation of\n180,00096 and inspiring further entrants into the\nmarket. Therefore, we believe that while demand\nfor newspapers is already high in the region, local\nnews coverage could benefit from an increase in\nanalytical and investigative reporting and a move\ntowards less timid coverage of local issues in\norder to drive an increase in sales.\n\n## There Is Strong Demand For Local Content On Tv, Presenting Potential For Growth In Monetisation\n\nFrom a consumer point of view, the fact that Arabic\nis the preferred language for TV viewing for 68%\nof consumers demonstrates that there is strong\ndemand for local TV content from the Arab world.\nExamples of successful local programming in the\nregion, such as popular UAE animated series Freej\n\nThe quality of Arabic programmes is worse than English Source: The Nielsen Company An analysis of the market research shows that the discrepancy in proportions between countries is due to several factors, including exposure to Western culture and command of the English language. For example, in Lebanon, where there is, generally, a strong understanding of English, as well as strong exposure to Western culture, the difference in quality between Arabic and English programming is more keenly felt, in favour of English programming. This is partly due to the fact that local productions are, typically, produced on low budgets relative to other markets, with only a small number of Arabic series produced on budgets over a few million dollars per series, compared to many imported US TV series which\n\n- which has been Sama Dubai's number one show\nduring Ramadan for three years running - further\nsupport this. Moreover, viewers in the four markets\nthat we analysed do not feel there is a problem\nwith the quality of content being generated from\nthe region. This is reflected in the exhibit below.\n\nare worth several millions of dollars per episode.\nIn spite of the discrepancies in budgets, the\nmajority of audiences in the Arab Region believe\nthat the quality of Arabic content is better than\nEnglish language content, largely due to the closer\ncultural links and relevance to the audience of\nArabic content. This leads us to believe that there\nis considerable potential to increase TV audiences\nand revenues in the region via an increase in the\nquality of local productions, given the extremely\nstrong demand. If budgets and, therefore, quality\nof local productions were to increase to the level of\nforeign content, we could see remarkable growth\nin the value of those programmes.\n\n## Despite The Prevalence Of International Websites In The Region, There Is A Strong Appetite For Local Content Online\n\nWhile Arab consumers are spending an increasing amount of time online, the market research suggests that the most popular activity for internet As demonstrated in the exhibit above, there is clearly a high consumption of online news in the region.  In addition, in all four markets that we researched, we found that the vast majority of top news websites were local, with the number one websites for news being Masrawy in Egypt, Tayyar in Lebanon, Al Jazeera in Saudi Arabia and Gulf News in the UAE. Out of the top 10 most popular websites in these markets, around 7-8 in every country are either local websites or electronic versions of newspapers. This is noteworthy, suggesting that while international sites continue to gain the bulk of the traffic among Arab internet users in the region is ''getting information'' (i.e.\n\nnews consumption), with 43% of respondents citing this as a common online activity.\n\nusers, there is a strong preference for local sites in\nterms of news content. Although monetisation of\nall news websites in the region are hindered by the\nlow availability of content, there is clearly strong\ndemand for local sites over international ones for\nnews consumption.\n\nA breakdown of the most popular social networking\nsites in the region shows that while Facebook\nEnglish is top of the list, Facebook Arabic is\nnot far behind considering its relatively recent\nlaunch in 2009. Local site Maktoob manages to\ngain third position.\n\n## Exhibit 126: Top 10 Most Preferred Social Networking Sites In The Arab Region1,2\n\nTwitter Arabic\n4%\nNotes:\nSource:\n(1)\nThis data represents a consolidated view of the market research in Egypt, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia and UAE\nThis suggests that while international sites such as Facebook, Twitter and Hi5 have several advantages in terms of scale, brand image and being the first movers, the fact that local site Maktoob has managed to gain a wide following in the Arab world against such tough competition is a positive sign for local sites. In addition, it is worth considering that demand for\n\ncontent on the web stretches, to some extent, to a\nwillingness to pay for content online. The market\nresearch confirms that online shopping remains\na rare activity in the region, with less than 1% of\nrespondents in all four markets ever having made\na purchase online. However, we also find that\nbetween 7%-28% of respondents who use the\ninternet as a source for news are willing to pay for\nthat content.\n\nNot willing to pay While there are still a majority of consumers who are not currently willing to pay for content online, we expect this to grow substantially as the quality of online content improves in the coming years.\n\nIndeed, nearly 70% of the industry experts we spoke with feel that there is a future for charging for content online in the Arab Region. Furthermore, experience in other markets suggests that the\n\n## While Demand For Local Content Is High, There Remain Several Barriers To Effective Monetisation On The Supply Side\n\nEffective monetisation of content on all platforms in the Arab Region is not only impacted by demand, but will require several actions to be taken by both industry and government players on the supply side too.  For the print sector, the lack of auditing as common practice in most Arab countries has led to a market which is not fully transparent and, in turn, is hindering the potential for advertising revenues.\n\nHowever, the sector does have significant growth\npotential in terms of diversifying its products, not\nonly on new platforms but also in the newspapers\nthemselves. One option to explore could be the\nconcept of covermounts, which have been utilised\nin many markets as a method of increasing sales.\nFor example, popular newspaper The Daily Mail\nin the UK has been using covermounts regularly\nsince 2003, often offering DVDs of classic dramas\nas a promotional addition to the paper and they\nare thought to have gained an additional 100,000\ncopy sales per day as a result.97  Although there\nhas recently been some debate over the long-\nterm impact of covermounts on sales in the UK,\nit is certainly a technique that could be explored\nin this region as a point of differentiation for\nnewspapers.\n\nFurther monetisation of print content could also\nstem from diversification of news online. Although\nthe majority of newspapers in the Arab Region\noperate websites, the content that is found online\nis, on the whole, exactly the same as the content\nfound in print editions. We have seen from other\nmarkets that the websites which are able to\nmonetise online content most effectively are those\nwhich have adapted their content to the online\n\ncurrent levels of willingness to pay for online\ncontent in the region are actually quite promising.\nThis is explained by the fact that websites do not\nneed to charge all their customers for all their\ncontent to operate a successful business model\nonline, rather they could charge customers just\nfor premium content, for which they would only\nrequire a small proportion of customers to pay.\n\nplatform. Furthermore, successful online news\ncontent is, generally, more concise and more\ntargeted than print content. From the market\nresearch, we found that Current Affairs, Sports and\nPolitics are the most preferred newspaper topics\namong males, while Arts & Culture, Celebrity and\nPersonal / Self-Improvement are more popular\namong females. Therefore, effective exploitation\nof a news website could involve ensuring that\nadvertising is targeted around the key segment at\nwhich the content is aimed.\n\nFinally, newspaper websites could further exploit\nthe popularity and knowledge of bloggers in\nthe Arab Region. One way of attracting users to\nnewspaper websites could be through providing a\nsection of the website dedicated to the aggregation\nof blogs. The benefits of this concept are two-fold.\nFirstly, the newspapers are providing an improved\ncustomer service to readers who save time by\nonly accessing one website for all their news\nrequirements. Secondly, bloggers could create a\nviral marketing campaign for the newspaper and\nits website. While a relatively small number of\nwebsites have adopted this strategy worldwide,\nsome companies in the region have had some\nsuccess by providing at least the opportunity\nfor bloggers to interact with the website. For\nexample, the CNN Arabic website offers bloggers\nthe opportunity to send in their URL, as well as\nproviding a dedicated blogging segment on the\nwebsite one day per week. The initiatives not only\nincrease the interest of bloggers in the website,\nbut also enable CNN Arabic to gain useful leads\nfor news stories. This is an opportunity that could\nbe explored further in this region and expanded to\nnewspaper websites.\n\nIn the TV sector, the monetisation of content faces\nslightly different challenges and opportunities.\nThe fragmentation of audiences across almost\n500 FTA channels, the lack of accurate and widely\naccepted audience measurement systems and the\ninability of satellite to offer targeted advertising\nare all contributing to an undervalued advertising\nmarket. Furthermore, pay-TV channels suffer\nfrom high levels of piracy in the region and\nstrong competition from the FTA sector which\nplace additional pressure on their ability to\nmonetise content effectively. The opportunities for\nimproving monetisation of original content on TV\nare, therefore, manifold. In order to boost the local\ncontent industry in the region, it is essential that\nsome of the key obstacles are tackled, including:\n\n- The introduction of accurate and widely accepted  audience measurement systems - Increased transparency in the media selling sector - Further government efforts to tackle piracy - Increased focus on advanced services and new TV platforms\n\nThese efforts will help drive an increase in\nadvertising\n            and\n                 subscription\n                               revenues,\n                                          by\nimproving both transparency and efficiency.\n\nMonetising local content on the internet, meanwhile,\nremains a challenge for media companies globally,\nbut in particular in the Arab Region.  Although\nbroadband penetration in the region is increasing\nsignificantly and consumers are spending more\ntime online, advertising has not yet caught up with\nconsumption trends. From an advertising point of\n\n## 3.2.2 Funding\n\nEffective monetisation of content is one step in the targeted virtuous circle which, in turn, will enable increased funding of local content. The platform that suffers the most significantly from a lack of adequate funding for local content in the region is TV. As we have seen, the commercial players in broadcasting face many challenges with the monetisation of content, particularly with regard to advertising, which is preventing them from investing large sums of money in content. The solution for many, therefore, is to either acquire the content from third parties outside the Arab region, which is a much cheaper option (excluding the very high prices that can be paid for premium rights), or to produce / commission original content on low budgets. The quality of content, therefore,\n\nview, the web offers several opportunities for cost-\nefficient campaigns, particularly given the ability\nof the online platform to offer targeted advertising.\nWeb companies in the Arab Region are beginning\nto exploit this opportunity and we expect to see an\nincrease in the number of Arabic websites targeted\nat specific demographic segments going forward.\nFor example, portal Onousa has been particularly\nsuccessful at targeting the female community\nin the Gulf and has managed to attract 0.5-1m\nimpressions per month, as well as advertisers\nwith female-oriented products.  Furthermore,\nOnousa is currently in the process of testing a\nbeta solution for 'behavioural targeting' which will\nenable them to serve their customers with adverts\nthat are relevant to their individual interests. This\ntype of innovation represents a major opportunity\nin terms of stimulating advertising in the online\nsector.\n\nAnother key factor in the monetisation of online\ncontent is the lack of credit and debit cards as a\npopular method of payment in the Arab Region.\nThis makes the concept of charging for content\nonline particularly challenging and will require\nsignificant developments in banking penetration\nand a move away from the 'cash culture' in the\nregion.\n\nTherefore, enabling improved monetisation of local\ncontent on all media platforms will take time and\nrequires significant effort by both industry players\nand governments. However, it is a key element of\nthe local content virtuous circle, without which\ninvestment into further content cannot be made.\n\nis limited to what is affordable within these low\nbudgets. Furthermore, our interviews with key\nplayers in the Arab TV industry suggest that\nthere is an element of wariness about spending\nsignificant amounts of money on local content\nbecause the returns on investment have not yet\nbeen proved, aside from a few exceptional cases.\nThis is particularly true of the entertainment\ngenre more so than drama, as broadcasters are\ninclined to spend significant portions of their\nbudgets on local drama, particularly during the\nRamadan season. For entertainment, therefore,\nimporting and acquiring content from abroad is\nconsidered more of a 'safe bet' in terms of return\non investment.\n\n## The Introduction Of The Global Format Concept Has Dramatically Changed The Way Content Is Funded\n\nHowever, there have been some success stories in the creation of local entertainment content on TV and broadcasters are increasingly taking this type of programming more seriously. The case for producing local content was, in a sense, triggered by the relatively recent introduction of the 'format'\nWhile many of the programmes in the exhibit above have been success stories, others have struggled to take off in the same way as in other markets. As many broadcasters and production companies have pointed out to us, the key issue with taking an international format and adapting it to an Arab\n\nconcept into the global market and the success of\nthe original international format that made it to\nthe Arab world, Who Wants To Be A Millionaire? in\n2000.  Since then, many international formats have\nbeen brought to the Arab world and adapted for\nthe local market, with varying degrees of success.\n\naudience is ensuring a good cultural fit. Formats\nsuch as Big Brother and Survivor, for example,\nwere unable to achieve large scale success in the\nArab world, largely due to a mismatch between\nthe aim of the show and the cultural values\nof its audience.\n\nThis notion is supported, for instance, by the fact\nthat a format such as Perfect Bride, imported\nfrom Turkey, adapted for the local Arab audience\nby Signature Productions and aired on LBC has\nbeen a significant success for the channel. Turkey,\nwith its close cultural ties to the Arab world, has\nbeen able to develop many formats that are readily\n\n## Interest And Investment In Local Arab Formats Is On The Rise\n\nFollowing the success of these large-scale\ninternational formats in the Arab world, local\nproducers have significantly ramped up their\ninterest and investment in developing original\nArab formats based on the values and culture\nof the Arab world.  While there have been some\n\n- *Million's Poet* is one of the most popular\nprimetime shows in the Middle East - a talent show where contestants from all over the Arab world compete for the title of best Nabati poet\n- The show launched its fourth series in\nDecember 2009 after three successful\nf th\nll\nit\nyears of the programme, as well as its\nsister show Prince of Poets\n- *Million's Poet* represents a part of the effort\nby the Abu Dhabi Authority for Culture and Heritage (ADACH) to promote Nabati poetry, a major part of the cultural heritage in the Gulf and the wider Arab Region\n- The winner is selected through a\ncombination of audience votes and the judges' decisions as the contestants battle through several rounds over the course of the series; it also includes an accompanying musical segment, during which top Arab singers and musicians are\nfeatured each week another highly featured each week, another highly\nrespected art form in the region\nSource: ADACH, Pyramedia, Value Partners analysis\n\ntransferable to the Arab TV screen by dealing with\nissues that are at the heart of both Turkish and Arab\nsocieties. The concept of adapting formats to local\naudiences is also, gradually, being transferred to\ndrama. For example, in 2010, MBC is launching\nMen Wanted, a telenovela adapted from a Latin\nAmerican format for its local Arab audience.\n\nsubstantial successes in this area, an example of\nwhich can be seen in the exhibit below, it is still the\ncase that extracting funding from broadcasters for\nsuch formats, particularly in the early stages of\nthe show's lifecycle, remains a serious challenge.\n\nWhile there have been other similar success\nstories in the entertainment genre, particularly\nwith talkshows such as Al Qahira Al Youm, one of\nthe most popular shows in Egypt, it is clear that\nfunding this kind of programming continues to\npose a challenge. Indeed Million's Poet itself is\n\n## Alternative Funding Methods Are Becoming Increasingly Popular\n\nAs we have seen, broadcasters and producers in\nthe Arab world face several challenges in terms\nof sourcing funding for local content productions,\nparticularly for a new concept in its first season.\nAs a result, a significant proportion of many\nproductions, particularly in the entertainment\ngenre, are funded by sponsorship for at least\ntheir first season. In addition, there are several\nalternative funding methods that have begun to\nbe explored in the region and which we believe\nwill become increasingly popular over the\nnext five years.\n\nFirstly, since traditional spot advertising is not\ncurrently generating adequate levels of funding\nfor quality local content production, many players\nhave turned to product placement. The concept of\nproduct placement has been present in the global\nmedia industry for many years, particularly in the\nUS film industry, and is becoming an increasingly\n\nfortunate enough to have the backing of ADACH,\nwhereas many other potentially strong formats\nare unable to find the funding, with broadcasters'\npockets often being emptied by drama series and\nrights to foreign shows.\n\npopular method of funding Arabic TV series. A\nnotable example is the Saudi primetime comedy\nseries Tash Ma Tash, which has been broadcast\ndaily during Ramadan since the early 1990s,\noriginally on Saudi TV1 and more recently on MBC.\nTash Ma Tash has featured a large number of\nbrands, including dairy products, airlines, fast food\nchains, and most notably Saudi chicken fast food\nchain Al Tazaj, integrated into the show. Al Tazaj\nhas, reportedly, signed a multi-year agreement\nwith Tash Ma Tash whereby it provides investment\nin return for being featured as part of the show.\nProduct placement is an essential source of funding\nfor TV content which could be exploited further\nby content providers in the Arab Region. Indeed,\nas the exhibit below demonstrates, the market\nresearch shows that while many Arab viewers\nare on the whole aware of product placement in\nprogramming, the vast majority do not feel that it\ndistracts them for the TV viewing experience.\n\nThe fact that over 70% of TV viewers have noticed product placement in programming, and yet only 15% are actually significantly disturbed or distracted by it suggests a significant opportunity for producers in the funding of TV content. Secondly, advertiser-funded programming (AFP), a form of branded entertainment, is another method of funding programming that has potential to stimulate the growth of the local content industry. AFP has been increasing in popularity all over the world. TV production companies, broadcasters and advertising agencies are increasingly introducing dedicated branded entertainment divisions units to try and find new ways of funding programmes, particularly as a result of the reduced revenues from spot advertising since the global economic\n\ncrisis. In many regions, AFP has had a slow\nstart, with communication barriers between\nbrands, advertisers, production companies and\nbroadcasters making the process of producing a\nshow that satisfies all four parties a challenge.\nIn the Arab world, we have already seen several\nexamples of AFP, such as Pepsi Football Street\nChallenge, Pepsi Stars and even Hydra Executives,\nwhich was funded by real estate company Hydra\nProperties. Advertising agency Starcom Mediavest\nis among those that have recently established\nbranded\n         entertainment\n                        divisions,\n                                  and\n                                       have\ncontributed to a variety of advertising-funded\nprojects, such as Because Health is Beauty, a\nsegment of MBC's morning show Al Sabah Al\nKhair Ya Arab, in the exhibit below.\n\n## Exhibit 131: Advertiser-Funded Programming: Because Health Is Beauty Advertiser-Funded Programming: Because Health Is Beauty\n\nFormat:\n- Sensodyne funds a 5-10 minute\nsegment of MBC's morning show,\n\nin-house by MBC for 10 weekly\n- The segment airs between 11am-\n\n## Benefits To All Players\n\n- Aired Dec 2008-Jan 2009 - Involved a dentist discussing a\ndifferent dental health topic in each episode, with Sensodyne branding in the background\nmorning show which is fully funded by Sensodyne\nSeason 2:\n- Airing Dec 2009-Jan 2010 - Involves a dental makeover  and a\ndiscussion on dental health entitled\nBecause Health is Beauty\n- Has a more personal feel with less\novert Sensodyne branding:\n- Part shot on the couch for a more\nintimate setting\n\nintimate setting\n\n- Interactive element with viewers\napplying for makeover online\n- Branded tickers conveying dental\ntips from Sensodyne\n- Opening and closing bumpers\n\nAFP provides a significant opportunity as an\nalternative method of funding local content and\n                                                  we expect the interest in this concept to grow in\n                                                  the coming years.\n\n## New Revenue Streams Are Being Explored By Rights Owners Which Will Help Fund Future Content Development\n\nIt is not only through alternative means of funding, but also through exploring new revenue streams that content providers in the Arab world can continue to boost the local production industry. Ancillary revenues from rights exploitation are one of the key profit drivers for TV companies in other markets and, in turn, are able to drive the development of new content. Brand extension via merchandising and licensing is becoming more\n\n- MBC gains an informative and\nentertaining segment for its\n- Sensodyne is able to interact with\nits customers on a more human level than can be achieved through traditional spot ads\n\ncommon in the Arab world, but there are plenty\nof further opportunities which we expect to see\nexploited in the future. Freej, as explored in the\nexhibit below, is a prime example of a TV programme\nthat has successfully developed multiple revenue\nstreams, to the extent that today 48% of their total\nrevenues are derived from sources other than\nbroadcasting and sponsorship.\n\n## Exhibit 132: Brand Extension: Freej Brand Extension: Freej Freej: Lesson To Be Learnt On Local Content Examples Of Brand Extension\n\n- *Freej* is a pioneering local production that tells a - *Freej* is a pioneering local production that tells a\nsuccess story for local content, both on air and via brand extension\n- Created by Mohammed Harib at Lammtara\nPictures, *Freej* is a 3D animated series which\nstarted out as a self-funded pilot in the UAE. Unable to get broadcaster funding for the pilot or the first three series of the show, Harib attached a major sponsor telecom operator du attached a major sponsor, telecom operator du,\nto fund the show's production\n- Today, with the three year sponsorship deal\ndrawing to a close and a fourth season of the show in production,  the show has grown to such a size and popularity that the brand has\nmultiple sources of revenues:\nworth around 20% of the company's total worth around 20% of the company s total revenues\n- Other ancillary revenues from theatre\nproductions, a theme park and even character appearances\n- Simultaneously, *Freej'*s audience on Sama\nDubai has grown year on year, from a rating of 16.4 in Season 1 to 54.4 in Season 3 - it has\nbeen Sama Dubai's number 1 show during\nRamadan every eason\nSimilarly, digital platforms are playing an increasingly important role in the development of ancillary revenues.  As we have seen in other markets, production companies today are beginning to pitch 360 degree proposals to broadcasters and many new programme ideas are now developed with digital platforms in mind. Interviews with industry professionals suggest that many of the larger scale programmes airing on the major pan-Arab channels today have their own dedicated websites and the concept of revenue sharing between producers and broadcasters on those sites is growing in trend. Another brand extension opportunity which has recently been introduced into the Arab world is gaming. Gaming is forecast to be the biggest growth area of the media industry worldwide and is proving to be a significant revenue generator for media companies all over the world. We believe\n\nthat the gaming industry also has significant\npotential for growth in the Arab world. In August\n2009, Abu Dhabi Media Company and Gazillion\nEntertainment signed an agreement to create\nthe region's first Massively Multiplayer Online\nGame (MMOG)98 studio in Abu Dhabi, in an attempt\nto develop the path towards creating content in\nArabic for the Arabic gaming market. The first\ngame to be launched by the studio is an Arabic-\nlanguage MMOG based on the popular TV character\nMajid and further games are said to be in the\npipeline. While the Western world may thrive off\nsubscription models for online gaming, the Arab\nworld can learn from the model adopted in many\nemerging markets, which have been successful\nin spite of high levels of piracy and low internet\npenetration: that is, providing games for free\nand successfully generating revenues from both\nadvertising and, in particular, micro-transactions.\nAs broadband penetration increases, we expect\n\nto see strong growth in this sector, which will support the generation of revenues for the local content industry.\n\nOn a longer term basis, a sign of real development in the local content industry would be for locally\n\nAlthough it is perhaps more of a long-term\ngoal for local Arab formats to regularly travel\ninternationally, there is no reason to suggest\nthat those countries which have similar cultures\nto the Arab world, such as Turkey, should not be\nimporting Arab formats in the future, rather than\nthe other way around.  Indeed, it could eventually\nbe key to the sustainability of the local content\nmarket by bringing in new sources of revenue.\n\nIn the meantime, we could expect to see more\ninnovative types of production in the region. For\n\ndeveloped formats to be sold internationally. We\nhave even seen already small steps in this direction,\nwith locally developed Endemol format, The\nManager, which aired on Rotana Music for the first\ntime in 2009, being picked up by its international\narm Endemol Worldwide Distribution.\n\nexample, the relatively recent trend of dubbing\nTurkish content into Arabic that was pioneered\nby MBC on soap operas has had huge success.\nIn particular, Turkish drama Noor has proven\nvery successful for MBC, not only on TV but also\non digital platforms, to the extent that it has even\nbeen greenlit for a feature film version. Dubbing of\nforeign programming, although not strictly 'local'\ncontent, is an example of an innovative production\ntechnique that has contributed to generating value\nfor the industry.\n\n## Governments Also Have A Vital Role To Play In Providing Funding For Some Aspects Of The Content Industry\n\nFinally, governments have a key role to play\nin providing funding for the stimulation of the\nlocal content industry. Arab governments are\ntaking increasing interest in supporting funding\nof the media industry, with several initiatives,\nparticularly for film, having been launched in the\nlast few years.  Notable examples include the Abu\nDhabi Film Fund, which was launched by ADACH\nin January 2009 with the objectives of assisting\nthe development of the Film and TV industry in\nAbu Dhabi, nurturing new talent and contributing\nto the promotion of Arab culture through film.\nSimilarly, the Royal Film Commission in Jordan\nwas developed with the aim of establishing a\ncompetitive film industry in the country by offering\neducation and training for aspiring professionals,\nproviding logistical services to producers and\norganizing thematic screenings throughout the\nyear to enrich the film culture in Jordan.\n\nThere are also opportunities for governments to\nboost funding of the online media sector in the\nregion and an essential part of that is about creating\nthe right cultural environment for entrepreneurs to\nsucceed.  The best global example is leading high-\ntech hub Silicon Valley in the US, home to a large\nnumber of cutting-edge entrepreneurs, engineers\n\n## 3.3.3 Talent\n\nA knowledgeable and experienced talent base is one of the most important foundations for a successful local media industry.  It is also one of the areas that industry players most commonly struggle with. In fact, a staggering 98% of the Arab media professionals that we spoke with felt that\n\n## Education And Training Are Key To Developing The Local Media Talent Pool\n\nThe first issue to address regarding media education\nand training, is the quality of media courses on\noffer in Arab education systems. The Arab Region\nhas advanced considerably in terms of the number\nof journalism courses available to young people,\nto the extent that many Arab universities offer\njournalism courses today. However, in order to\nencourage the quality of local journalism even\nfurther, there is some potential for increasing\nthe scope and breadth of these courses. One area\nof focus could be to emphasise the importance\n\nand venture capitalists. The growth of Silicon\nValley was, in part, fuelled by the emergence of the\nVenture Capital industry which has enabled many\ninternet companies to start up. Even in the Arab\nworld, Jordan has built up an industry of internet\nstart-ups as a result of a combination of factors.\nFirstly, King Abdullah II's reforms at the beginning\nof the decade to help turn Jordan into the high-\ntech capital of the Arab world by focusing on ICT\nin the education system have enabled Jordanian\nuniversities to produce 6,000 ICT graduates every\nyear and develop into a knowledge economy. The\nJordanian government has strongly supported the\nsector and heavily invested in ICT over the past few\nyears, contributing strongly to its growth. Secondly,\nJordan has traditionally shown a higher tolerance\nthan many Arab countries for the media and the\ninternet, including for the blogging industry, which\nhas played a vital part in stimulating interest in\nthe web. Finally, the number of venture capital\nfunds  which have been attracted to the country,\nare contributing significantly to funding of the\nonline sector. Today, the country has more internet\nstart-ups than other country in the Middle East\nand operates a model that could be imitated\nby other Arab nations hoping to stimulate the\nonline industry.\n\ntalent availability is affecting the creation of quality\nlocal content. The issue of talent is one which is\naffecting all sectors of the Arab media industry,\nfrom finding quality journalists for newspapers to\nputting together a top production crew for a movie,\nand presents challenges on many different levels.\n\nof language in journalism. In North Africa, for\nexample, the majority of journalism courses are\noffered either only in Arabic, or in a combination\nof Arabic and French. Meanwhile, in the Gulf,\njournalism programmes have traditionally been\ntaught in Arabic. While it is, of course, essential\nthat the Arabic aspect of any university course is\ntaken very seriously, adding an English element to\nsome of these programmes could help highlight\nthe important role that the language plays in global\njournalism and enable students to access a far\n\nwider coverage of news. Being multi-lingual could also broaden the ability of aspiring journalists to gather and analyze accurate information from all over the world.  While a few universities have begun to adopt American models, with the pre-requisite of following courses in English, extending this practice to other institutions could have a positive impact on the skills of journalism graduates.\n\nFurthermore,\n               widening\n                         the\n                               curriculum\n                                            of\njournalism courses in the Arab world could also\nplay in role in improving the breadth of knowledge\nof young media graduates. For example, recent\nmeetings held by UNESCO99  in Morocco and\nBahrain focused on the importance of quality\njournalism education to help emerging markets find\na voice through media. Suggestions for additions to\nthe curricula of Arab journalism courses included\nthe integration of human rights content into some\neducational modules, the inclusion of the subject\nof ethics in all courses and a focus on national\nmedia laws. The suggestions could have a positive\neffect on the quality of journalism education in the\nregion and was well received by the GCC countries\nwhich renewed their commitment to adapt fully, or\npartially, to UNESCO's model curricula.\n\nThere is a secondary factor which compounds this\nsituation at a university graduate level, which is\nthat the industry has not yet managed to build up\na positive, aspirational image for itself. While in\nsome markets, the media industry has developed\na strong, and even glamorous image, in many Arab\ncountries media continues to be regarded as a\nfairly insignificant industry. This is perhaps partly\ndue to the fact that in financial terms, the majority\nof jobs in the Arab media industry do not offer the\nsame salary levels as many other industries (e.g.\nthe public sector). While in the West, this issue is\ncountered by the positive image of the industry\nthat attracts top talent in spite of the lower pay\npackages, in the Arab Region the industry is not\nyet able to provide that. This presents several\nchallenges for the industry in attracting top quality\ntalent right from the early stages of their career.\n\nAfter education, the second key element in the\ndevelopment of the media talent pool is training.\n\nThis is, arguably, the area that could benefit the\nmost from increased focus in the Arab Region.\nTraining talent can take many forms, ranging\nfrom dedicated training courses at media\ninstitutions to offering work experience schemes\nwithin media companies, and even knowledge\nexchange through partnerships with international\ncompanies. Although in recent years we have seen\nan increasing number of all three types of training\nemerging in the Arab world, there is still plenty of\nroom to further develop the talent pool in this way.\nSelected examples include the Al Jazeera Centre\nfor Training & Development which trains young\naspiring journalists in Qatar, the internships\noffered by UAE production company Pyramedia for\ncreative talent and the upcoming training school in\nJordan Media City.\n\nWe are also seeing increased participation by\ninternational experts in the training of media\nprofessionals in the region and an increased\ninterest by International Media Support (IMS) in\nthe region. For example, in October and November\n2009, IMS held a training course for journalists in\nNorthern and Southern Sudan on the professional\nand ethical reporting of elections, ahead of\nthe upcoming Presidential and Parliamentary\nSudanese elections in April 2010. Similarly, Arab\nReporters for Investigative Journalism (ARIJ),\nwhich is supported by IMS, organized a major\nconference in Amman in November 2009 to\nengage Arab reporters and editors in investigative\njournalism. The first manual for investigative\njournalism tailored for the Arab Region, entitled\nA Story Based Inquiry was launched at the\nconference in three languages, Arabic, English\nand French, to enable wide distribution. These\ndevelopments suggest positive steps for the\njournalism talent pool, encouraging participation\nand interaction with international media experts\nand a thorough understanding of the key elements\nof quality journalism.\n\nThere is also potential for large scale talent\ndevelopment projects, such as twofour54's tadreeb\ntraining academy, which is a long-term project to\ngrow the Arab media talent pool.\n\n## Exhibit 134: Training Academies: Twofour54 Tadreeb Twofour54 Tadreeb\n\nWhile twofour54 tadreeb is a prime example of a positive effort made by an Arab government to stimulate the local media talent base and, in turn, promote the creation and exploitation of local content, there are many more opportunities for\n\n## International Companies And Professionals Can Play An Important Role In Helping To Grow The Local Talent Base\n\nOne route which has had success in almost every\nindustry, including media, is the importation of\nknowledgeable and experienced talent from other\nparts of the world in order to transfer knowledge\nand stimulate interest locally. This has been seen\nin parts of the media industry as well and is evident\nnot only in the form of individuals re-locating to\nwork in local Arab media companies, but also\nthrough the setting up of international companies\nin the region.  For example, the print sector has\nseen the successful introduction of  Middle East\nversions of international papers, as well as many\ninternational journalists working on local papers\n\ndeveloping the regional talent pool in other parts\nof the Arab world. The development of Arab media\ntalent, which will help generate quality local\ncontent, is a key element of the targeted local\ncontent virtuous circle.\n\nand helping the industry to grow. However, there\nare further opportunities for the introduction of\nforeign media companies into the region which\ncould help generate growth.\n\nThe broadcasting sector, for example, has\nhad relatively little interest from international\ncompanies\n           compared\n                      to\n                          other\n                                 emerging\nmarkets. One way of growing expertise, talent\nand, eventually, content, is for local channels\nand production companies to partner with\ninternational companies. This could be in the\nform of co-productions on the production side and\n\nchannel partnerships on the broadcasting side. We have recently seen a number of local versions of international channels, particularly in the genre of news, launching in the Arab Region. However,\n\n## Exhibit 135: Local Versions Of International Channels (Non-Exhaustive) Local Versions Of International Channels\n\nThe Hindi TV industry has seen the entrance of multiple international players over the last ten years - most notably, Sony Pictures and News Corp's Star TV. The Arab Region does appear to be gradually attracting more interest from foreign players, for example with News Corp's potential\n\nwhen compared to a market like India, as seen\nin the exhibit below, we discover that there are\nfurther opportunities for attracting international\nbroadcasters to the market.\n\n10% stake in Rotana announced in December 2009.\nThis interest, however, has plenty of potential for\nfurther growth and could be increased by the\noffering of further incentives to foreign companies\nfor setting up in the region.\n\n## Incentives And Competitions Also Play A Role In Creating Awareness And Interest In The Industry\n\nIn addition to education and training, it is worth noting the value that well publicized competitions and award institutions can add to generating interest in an industry. In the Arab world, the journalism industry has seen growth in the number of such institutions which are playing a vital role in maintaining interest in the sector, such as the Arab Journalism Awards, and The Times Middle East Journalism Awards.  Similarly, other incentives targeting industry players have a role to play in encouraging quality of productions. For example, during Ramadan 2009, Dubai Media Inc. offered a cash award of US$1 million for the best\n\n## Exhibit 136: Arab Media Competitions Open To Non-Professionals (Non-Exhaustive) Media Competitions\n\n\"Calling All Innovators - Bil3\nbi\"\n- In 2009, Nokia opened a competition to all mobile and web application developers and\nindividuals to submit entries for Arabic content in any category within Ovi Store\n(A\nli\ni\nd Wid\nVid\nP\nli\ni\nG\nA di\nFl\nh & A i\nidl\nBil3arabi\",\nNokia\n(Applications and Widgets, Video, Personalization, Games, Audio, Flash & Active idle\nwidgets)\n- The $100,000 prize went to \"Here I am\" from Enpronomics in Egypt. It is a geopresence application with personal safety features that enables users to call for help in\nemergencies, share their location with family, close friends and know the location of\ntheir beloved\nDubai International Film Festival\n\nFilm Festival\n\n- Part of DIFF's mission is to \"nurture and develop local and international talent,\naccelerating and fostering growth of the industry, while also providing an invaluable\ncultural benefit to the people of Dubai and the UAE\" cultural benefit to the people of Dubai and the UAE\n\n- The festival has grown from presenting 76 films in 2004 to 181 in 2008, gaining\nsignificant growth in attendance of key international and regional filmmakers and\nindustry professionals\n- Prestigious awards are offered for Arab filmmakers in a range of categories, including\ndocumentaries, feature films and shorts\n- Arabisk is a competition launched in 2009 to select the best Arabic blogs, written in the\nArabic language and in the Arab region\n\nThe contest is being organized by Kalima Press and its owner Mohammad El Sahli,\n\"Arabisk\", Kalima Press g g y\n,\n\nwho describes himself as the first Arab full-time blogger\n- The competition is to be an annual event and in its first year focuses on specialized\nblogs - that is, blogs that focus on a certain subject. There will therefore be prizes for\nthe best specialized blog as well as the best general or personal blog\n\nSuch government and private sector initiatives\nto encourage interest in the media industry and\na sense of entrepreneurialism among young\npeople in the Arab Region are vital to stimulating\nthe media talent pool. These efforts, coupled with\n\nArabic drama production to be featured during the period on the Dubai TV and Sama Dubai channels.\n\nThis concept is also being rolled out to non-\nprofessionals, which is key to encouraging\nentrepreneurialism in the media industry.  For\nexample, sectors which have traditionally had\nmuch higher barriers to entry than journalism,\nsuch as film production, are now being very\nmuch encouraged by grass roots initiatives such\nas the Abu Dhabi Film Commission's short film\ncompetition launched in 2009. Further examples\nin the region are examined in the exhibit below.\n\nincreased investments in both education and\ntraining of media professionals, could contribute\nto creating a healthy talent pool to complete the\nvirtuous circle of developing the local Arab content\nindustry.\n\n## 3.3.4 Technology\n\nWhile monetisation, funding and talent are all key\ntriggers in the local content virtuous circle, there\nare two further areas that must be addressed if\nthe circle is to succeed: technology and regulation.\nAs we have seen in Section 1, the media industry is\nintrinsically linked to developments in technology.\nThe clearest example of this is the development\nof broadband that has completely changed the\nway media is consumed on a global scale.  For all\nmedia players, the emergence of broadband will\nhave a long-term impact on their business, even if\nit has not yet been felt significantly in all parts of\nthe Arab world. For print companies, broadband is\noffering a secondary platform to reach readers, as\nwell as an alternative source of information; for the\nTV sector, there are brand extension opportunities\nfrom broadband, as well as a new distribution\nplatform providing VOD; indeed, the online media\nsector has developed out of nothing, as a result of\nbroadband, to the fastest growing media platform\nin the region.100  For the local content industry to\nhave a long-term and sustainable future, therefore,\nit is essential that the region achieves the right\nlevel of infrastructure in the areas of both access\nand backbone, as well as international capacity.\nUltimately, the region should be targeting high-\nspeed quality broadband access on a ubiquitous\nbasis, which is not yet the case.\n\nBroadband access on mobile presents another area\nof opportunity, for which the region already has\nsome solid foundations. The Arab Region boasted\naverage mobile penetration of 74% in 2009, strong\ntake-up of mobile broadband in markets such as\nSaudi Arabia, and some significant advancements,\nparticularly in the world of Mobile TV. The gap in\nthe region lies in the exploitation of mobile content,\nwith content revenues for mobile operators\ncurrently very low compared to their international\ncounterparts. However, the recent introduction of\nthe iPhone in the region and the high proportion\nof smartphones now available are contributing\n\nto a rise in mobile content revenues which is expected to continue.\n\nFor the TV sector too, technology is advancing at a\nfast pace. New TV platforms, such as IPTV in selected\nmarkets, and DTT in North Africa, are paving the\nway for new services. The new generation of set-\ntop boxes which include advanced features such\nas Personal Video Recorders (PVRs), searchable\nElectronic Programme Guides (EPGs) and, of\ncourse, access to High Definition (HD), are key to\nhelping generate value from the content industry.\nThese features are particularly important for the\nregion, where the previous set-top boxes were\ndeveloped prior to the internet age. Furthermore,\nprogress in technology is contributing to the fight\nagainst piracy, whereby pay-TV operators in the\nArab world are launching a new generation of anti-\nhacker technology in their set-top boxes in 2010.\nAll of these new features will support the growth\nof the content industry by providing improved\ntechnological platforms.\n\nGoing forward, the advances of many of\nthese\n       platforms\n                 and\n                      services\n                                will\n                                     be\ndependent on continued, and in some cases\nincreased, government investments in broadband\ninfrastructure. Governments around the world have\nbeen taking several measures to ensure rollout\nof broadband and the Arab world is also making\nsignificant progress in this respect, particularly\nin the Gulf countries which are leading the way in\nhigh speed broadband.  Bahrain, for example, has\nplans to develop a universal service broadband\npolicy, while in the UAE, Etisalat has reportedly\nachieved full FTTH  network coverage in Abu\nDhabi, with plans for universal coverage. National\nBroadband Policy from Arab governments is a key\npart of this investment in broadband infrastructure\nand is necessary for several media industry\ndevelopments.\n\n## 3.3.5 Government Regulation\n\nFrom a regulatory point of view, the content industry in the Arab world presents many challenges, not least due to the fact that media is consumed on a pan-Arab basis over several countries that are regulated by different governments. However, we are seeing some significant advances in regulation\n\n## Piracy Regulation And Enforcement Is Key To Ensuring Growth Of The Local Content Industry On All Platforms\n\nOne key aspect of regulation that must be\naddressed for the local content industry to survive\nis piracy. Many steps have already been taken to\ntackle piracy by local governments, encouraged by\n\n## Exhibit 137: Middle East Anti-Piracy Initiatives (Sample) Arab Region Anti-Piracy Initiatives (Sample)\n\n|                                                                                             |                                                                                          | Country    | Anti-Piracy Developments                                                                 |\n|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|\n| - Bahrain                                                                                   | - The Ministry of Information has carried out 19 raids and 26 arrests relating to piracy | - Bahrain  | - The Ministry of Information has carried out 19 raids and 26 arrests relating to piracy |\n| since February 2008, including seizure of 1,501 illegal decoders and 105 blocked            |                                                                                          |            |                                                                                          |\n| servers                                                                                     |                                                                                          |            |                                                                                          |\n| - Jordan                                                                                    | - In 2008, the Jordanian government established an IPR division within the Jordanian     |            |                                                                                          |\n| Police , as well as an IP division at the Customs Department                                |                                                                                          |            |                                                                                          |\n| - Kuwait                                                                                    | - In February 2008, the Ministry of Information ordered all ISPs to block all Torrent    |            |                                                                                          |\n| sites                                                                                       |                                                                                          |            |                                                                                          |\n| - Since then over 380 sites have been blocked and 4 ISPs                                    |                                                                                          |            |                                                                                          |\n| Since then, over 380 sites have been blocked, and 4 ISPs                                    |                                                                                          |            |                                                                                          |\n| - Lebanon                                                                                   | - Lebanon has created a special IPR Police unit, which came into operation in March      |            |                                                                                          |\n| 2006                                                                                        |                                                                                          |            |                                                                                          |\n| - Morocco                                                                                   | - The US-Morocco Free Trade Agreement came into force in January 2006                    |            |                                                                                          |\n| - Rights holders suggest that a review of the Morocco Copyright Act, which was              |                                                                                          |            |                                                                                          |\n| amended in 2005, revealed some significant compliance issues with the FTA                   |                                                                                          |            |                                                                                          |\n| - Saudi Arabia                                                                              | - The Saudi Ministry of Culture and Information (MoCI), in collaboration with the        |            |                                                                                          |\n| Mi i t                                                                                      | f C                                                                                      | d th       | Mi i t                                                                                   |\n| set-top boxes that can be used to access encrypted services illegally in April 2009         |                                                                                          |            |                                                                                          |\n| - In the last two years, authorities have cracked down on piracy, carrying out 130 raids    |                                                                                          |            |                                                                                          |\n| and banning over 2,000 illegal decoders                                                     |                                                                                          |            |                                                                                          |\n| - UAE                                                                                       | - The UAE has seen over 70 raids since the beginning of 2008, as well as over 5,000      |            |                                                                                          |\n| decoders seized and nearly 150 illegal sites blocked                                        |                                                                                          |            |                                                                                          |\n| - In 2009, UAE authorities tightened restrictions targeting illegal distributors of  Indian |                                                                                          |            |                                                                                          |\n| pay-TV operator Dish TV's services in the country, reiterating that violators will face     |                                                                                          |            |                                                                                          |\n| i                                                                                           | i                                                                                        | l h        | criminal charges                                                                         |\n\nSource: IIPA, Arabian Anti-Piracy Alliance\n\nAs demonstrated in the exhibit above, anti-piracy\nmeasures are increasing significantly across the\nArab Region, particularly with the creation of\nIPR divisions to enforce copyright protection and\n\nin some countries on a micro level and there is an\nopportunity for Arab governments to learn from\nbest practice examples among neighbouring\ncountries in order to improve regulation across\nthe board.\n\nindustry-wide bodies like the Arabian Anti-Piracy\nalliance, but the industry is still a long way from\neradicating this problem.\n\nwith the increasing number of raids on illegal\nproviders. However, there needs to be significant\nprogress on this front for the content industry to\nhave a sustainable future.\n\n## Other Markets Have Successfully Stimulated The Local Production Industry By Imposing Mandates For Local And Private Sector Production\n\nFor the TV industry, experience from other markets\nsuggests that one way to stimulate quality local\nproduction and healthy competition is through\nthe introduction of mandates for local content\noutput. The European Union states, for example,\noperate under the Television Without Frontiers\ndirective 111  which requires European TV channels,\nwhere practicable, to reserve at least half their\nbroadcasting time for films and programmes made\nin Europe. The requirement reflects concerns\nthat American productions will otherwise control\na majority share of the European audiovisual\nmarket. In addition, the EU's Media policy helps to\nensure expansion of Europe's film and TV quality\noutput by providing financial support. The Media\nprogrammes started in 1990, with the current one\nrunning from 2007 - 2013 and operating a total\nbudget of around $1 billion112. As well as pan-\nEuropean mandates, individual countries have\nalso been seen to impose quotas for 'local' (i.e.\nnational) productions. France is a prime example,\nrequiring that television stations maintain a\nminimum of 60% European content, with 40% of\nthat being original French programming.\n\nBeyond Europe, too, there are local content quotas\nfor television in a range of countries such as Canada,\nSouth Africa, South Korea, China and Brazil. These\nhave proved to have a significant impact on the\nlocal content output of the relevant countries and\ncould be adopted in a similar manner in the Arab\nworld.  In particular, it could be beneficial for Arab\ngovernments to consider implementing quotas on\ntwo levels. Firstly, quotas could be considered on a\n\nregional level for the production of Arabic content\nthrough region-wide collaboration in a similar\nmanner to the European Union.  Secondly, since the\nmajority of 'local' content comes from two to three\nmajor production markets which serve the entire\nArab Region, individual Arab countries could apply\nquotas for national productions in order to boost\nthe content industry within those countries. Of\ncourse, it is essential that several considerations\nare taken into account for the implementation of\nsuch regulations, such as ensuring that quotas\nare realistic, practicable and to be achieved by\nbroadcasters progressively over a period of time.\nThe concept should be considered as a long-term\nsolution to enhancing both the quality and quantity\nof local content output in the region.\n\nIn some countries, this concept is taken one step\nfurther, with the introduction of mandates for\nprivate sector production.  In the early stages of\na content industry, it is usual for broadcasters\nto act as the providers of the majority of content\nvia in-house production units. This, therefore, is\nsimilar to the situation that we see in the Arab\nworld. However, the introduction of quotas for\nproduction by independent companies introduces\nmore competition to the market which, in turn,\nhas the effect of improving production values and\nleading to a better quality of content. The most\nnotable and successful example of stimulating\na content industry in this way is the UK market,\nwhich has one of the most vibrant and competitive\nproduction industries in the world.\n\n## Exhibit 138: Uk Public Service Broadcasting Quotas Uk Psb Quotas\n\nThis method of supporting the generation of a healthy content production industry is one that could work well in the Arab world.\n\n## Governments Could Also Explore Offering Incentives To Foreign Companies For Local Investments In Media\n\nOne route for governments to act in order to support growth of the local content industry would be to attract further interest from foreign companies. This concept is applicable to all sectors of the industry, but in different ways. We have already seen the efforts that many Arab governments have made by setting up media zones that offer tax and other incentives. However, there are many other aspects of the local media industry that would benefit from the introduction of more international companies in the region. The region's TV industry could benefit from an increase in co-productions and channel\n620\n\npartnerships that could support improvement in\nthe local talent base. The film industry in the Arab\nRegion could also be promoted via introduction of\nincentives to attract foreign productions.  A step\nin the direction of growing a strong local film\nindustry could be by having a larger number of\ninternational films produced in the region. This\nis a strategy that has been adopted by many\ngovernments internationally in order to attract\ninvestment in the film industry. For example,\nGermany has successfully managed to create a\n$30bn industry with major films such as Munich\nand Valkyrie becoming box-office hits.\n\nMany international films are selecting Germany as their filming location, simply through the offer of strong incentives in the form of rebates on production spend. In return, the government reaps the benefits that the films bring in terms of spend on hospitality and travel, employment opportunities and a growing film production talent base etc. In the Arab world, few countries have been able to attract international films on a large scale. Morocco is one Arab country which has managed to build up a reputation for foreign films, producing around 10-12 films per year due to the experienced talent base. The offer of incentives for filming could be a key means for countries to build their film talent base and increase interest from outside players. Similarly, increasing foreign interest in the region for the print industry could also be achieved through improved incentives. Local publications with international branding have\n\n## 3.4 Conclusion: Bridging The Value Gap For Local Content\n\nThe local content industry in the Arab world is in the very early stages of its formation and growth. An increase in investment in local content on all platforms of the Arab media industry could lead to improved quality and quantity of local content, generating increased advertising revenues and\n\nbecome increasingly popular in the region and\ncould pave the way for further entrants into the\nmarket. For the online sector, it is necessary for\ngovernments to encourage further an open and\nentrepreneurial culture in order for the industry to\ngrow and attract foreign investment. As discussed\nin detail earlier in this section, Jordan is one Arab\ncountry which has successfully managed to build\nan entrepreneurial society in the online sector,\nand the recent acquisition of Jordanian company\nMaktoob by international giant Yahoo! is evidence\nof the positive effects that this can have.\n\nOn the whole, international examples have proven\nthat attracting foreign investors plays a vital role\nin the growth of any local media industry. Further\nencouragement and offering of incentives by Arab\ngovernments to international players could have\na significant impact on the growth in quality and\nquantity of local content in the region.\n\nattracting further interest from international\nplayers. If measures were to be taken by players at\neach stage of the value chain, local content could\nbe stimulated on both a pan-Arab and a national\nlevel in the Arab world.\n\n## Exhibit 139: Creating Value For Local Content\n\nValue creation in the local content virtuous circle\n\nContent creators\nplatforms\n- Journalists - Producers - Rights holders\n- Publications - TV channels - Web - Mobile\n- Increase focus\non analytical side of news\n- Practice circulation\nauditing\n- Diversify content\nofferings\n- Increase\ninvestment in new\n\ninvestment in new platforms\n\n- Invest further in\noriginal local formats\n- Invest further in\nprivate sector production\n- Explore\nalternative funding options\n- Investigate new\nrevenue streams\n- Explore innovative\ntypes of production\n- Maximise USPs\nagainst international players, e.g. Localized content\n- Produce localized\ncontent and applications\n- Maximize\nopportunities on internet to reach targeted audiences\n- Invest in audience measurement systems - Increase efforts to tackle piracy - Encourage entrepreneurial activities in the media sector - Improve educational and training facilities for media undergraduates & professionals - Continue / improve investments in broadband infrastructure\n- Impose quotas for local and private sector production - Improve content regulations (e.g. advertising standards)\n- Improve incentives for foreign companies for local investments in media\n\nWhen compared to other markets, the industry clearly has significant potential for growth, in terms of both quantity and quality of content. By building upon some of the initiatives already launched in the region and implementing the\n\n- Telco operators - Cable / Satellite\nproviders\n- Readers - Viewers - Users\n- Brands - Media buyers - Advertising\nagencies\n- Increase crossplatform campaigns\n- Invest in local\nmobile news applications\n- Improve\ntransparency in media selling sector\n- Push for improved\naudience measuremment\n- Explore innovative\n- Increase investment\nin anti-piracy tecnhology\n- Improve advanced\nfeatures on pay-TV\n- Utilize new platforms - Explore targeted\nadvertising\n| advertising on TV       |\n|-------------------------|\n| - Explore innovative    |\n| advertising             |\n| techniques online       |\n| - Increase              |\n| investments in          |\n| Search                  |\n| - Build technical       |\n| enablers to support     |\n| online advertising      |\n| techniques (e.g.        |\n| Behavioural targeting)  |\n| - Invest in mobile (3G/ |\n| DVB-H) and              |\n| broadband (including    |\n| FTTH) infrastructure    |\n\nmeasures outlined in the table above, the industry\ncould make significant progress towards building\na solid foundation for a vibrant and sustainable\nlocal content industry.\n\n## Methodology\n\nIn the Arab Media Outlook 2009-2013, we present a snapshot of the media industry and its expected evolution in 15 countries in the Arab Region. Our analyses of the media industry include a qualitative assessment of the media industry and projections, primarily for advertising expenditure and newspaper circulation in the region. The advertising revenue forecasts cover the period from 2009 to 2013 and are further split among media platforms - newspapers, magazines, television, radio, out-of-home (outdoor and cinema) and internet, according to their estimated shares of total spend in each market. For newspaper circulation, 2008 estimates of actual circulation were used as the base year and projected for the years 2009 to 2013. For each country, projections were developed taking into account historic growth rates and were based on developments in the media sector, maturity and expected evolution of the print media and other macro factors, such as literacy rates. While the circulation projections were also informed by industry interviews it should be noted that these projections are largely based on claimed circulation, which was used for base year figures. Where audited circulations for newspapers were available, we have used them instead. Other forecasts included in the report, including revenues for circulation and pay-TV, are largely based on data sourced from secondary sources and benchmarked against interview findings. For advertising expenditures, we derived historic estimates for 2007 and 2008 from gross figures published by media research companies, mostly ZenithOptimedia and Pan-Arab Research Centre (PARC). Next, the estimated figures for 2009 and forecast advertising revenues were developed based on the Value Partners projection model developed for the Arab Media Outlook. These projections were triangulated by taking into account the relationship between advertising spend and GDP, as well as expected evolution of the advertising market based on in-depth interviews and a review of market conditions, both locally and globally. Particularly on the global front, it is important to mention that while the economic crisis emerged during 2008, its full impact was not realised until the latter half of 2009, especially in the Arab Region where many markets were impacted later than the Western world. Consequently, we have revised downwards the advertising estimates of many of the countries, especially for 2009, before their expected recovery afterwards.\n\nThese advertising expenditures were split among\nthe key platforms based on their importance and\nhistoric performance in the industry and their\nexpected evolution going forward. It is worth\nnoting that one of the major impacts of the\neconomic crisis was the beginning of the shift\nin advertising dollars from traditional to digital\nplatforms, specifically the internet. With this direct\nfeedback from our interviews in each market, the\nadvertising spend forecasts for the internet were\nadjusted accordingly over the projection period.\n\nWhile public advertising revenue estimates for the\nregion are generally in gross figures, we believe that\nthey are of limited use as they do not correspond\nto market revenue or to market spending. Hence,\nwe have adjusted our advertising projections for\ndiscounts that media owners offer to advertising\nagencies, while recognising the uncertainties\ninherent in this estimate. The level of these\ndiscounts varies across markets, and platforms\nwithin each market, and is highly commercially\nsensitive, which means that publicly available data\nmay not be reliable. Media specific discount rates\nwere derived from in-depth industry interviews\nconducted\n            with\n                   media\n                            owners,\n                                       advertising\nagencies and advertisers and were applied to\nmedia platforms. These revenues, hence, are from\nthe point of view of media owners. While these\nadvertising figures provide a useful indication of\nindustry trends, individual figures may be subject\nto substantial uncertainty due to the practice of\ndiscounting in the region. As a result, comparisons\nbetween countries may not be valid.\n\nFor the consumer market research studies\nconducted in Egypt, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia and\nthe UAE, we partnered with The Nielsen Company,\nwhich carried out the research fieldwork. The\nresearch was conducted across a large sample\nof population (over 500 each in Egypt and Saudi\nArabia and over 400 in Lebanon and the UAE)\nwhichwas diverse across different demographic\ngroups in the proportion of their representation\nwithin the general population and  was conducted\nin major cities in each of the four markets - Egypt\n(Cairo, Alexandria and Mansoura), Lebanon\n(Mount Lebanon, Beirut and Tripoli), Saudi Arabia\n(Dammam, Jeddah and Riyadh), and the UAE\n(Abu Dhabi, Dubai and Sharjah). The research\n\nwas conducted among respondents aged 15+ who qualified as socio-economic classes A,B & C and have watched TV, read a newspaperand surfed the internet at least once in the past week. Responses relating to media usage are reported as mentioned by the respondents and are not representative of the incidence rates, penetration rates etc. and, therefore, may not be consistent with any published data on viewership, readership and any such related measure. The results of the market research are reported at 95% level of significance with a margin of error of 4.4%.\n\nWhile all efforts are made to provide an overall picture of the advertising market in the Arab countries, it is important to emphasize that the projections should not be used as a basis for any form of investment decision. This is mainly due to the fact that robust and consistent data across all 15 countries for the historic revenue breakdown for 2007 and 2008 (the base years for the projections) are not available. This is particularly true for the three new markets covered in this year's report - Palestine, Sudan and Syria, for which there are no official advertising data available. Consequently, for these countries, we have based our projections on the findings of in-depth\n\ninterviews, anecdotal evidence gathered through\npublic sources or consensus among interviewees\nand our assessment of advertising markets in\nthese countries. The views presented on the\nadvertising industry and its expected evolution,\nincluding expectations of key opportunities\nand concerns, are based on a combination of\nsecondary research and interviews with industry\nprofessionals. However, it is important to note\nthat the advertising industry in the region is still\nin its early stages of growth and, going forward,\nits evolution depends on a number of factors,\nincluding actions that industry stakeholders\nwill take.\n\nMacroeconomic data used in the report (GDP,\npopulation etc.) are taken from IMF. Data including\nnumber of households, TV households, and\npenetration levels related to platforms including\nsatellite, mobile and broadband are taken from\nInforma Telecom and Media. In some cases, it has\nbeen necessary to use multiple sources, which\nmeans that direct comparisons across countries\nmay not be valid.\n\nValue Partners welcomes any comments or\nfeedback on analysis and forecasts presented in\nthis report.\n\n## 5 Glossary Glossary\n\nThe following terms throughout the report will have the following meaning unless otherwise stated.\n\n| Term                                                                             | Definition                                                      |\n|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------|\n| AFP                                                                              | Advertiser-Funded Programming                                   |\n| AMO                                                                              | Arab Media Outlook 2009-2013                                    |\n| Arab Region                                                                      |                                                                 |\n| Region includes 15 in-scope countries - Bahrain, Egypt, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, |                                                                 |\n| Morocco, Oman, Palestine, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Syria, Tunisia, UAE, and   |                                                                 |\n| Yemen                                                                            |                                                                 |\n| ARPU                                                                             | Average Revenue Per User                                        |\n| B2B                                                                              | Business-to-business                                            |\n| CAGR                                                                             | Compound Annual Growth Rate                                     |\n| CPM                                                                              | Cost Per Mille or Cost Per Thousand                             |\n| DTH                                                                              | Direct-To-Home                                                  |\n| DTT                                                                              | Digital Terrestrial Television                                  |\n| DVB-H                                                                            | Digital Video Broadcast-Handheld                                |\n| EPG                                                                              | Electronic Program Guide                                        |\n| FMCG                                                                             | Fast Moving Consumer Goods                                      |\n| FTA                                                                              | Free-To-Air                                                     |\n| HD                                                                               | High Definition                                                 |\n| HSDPA                                                                            | High-Speed Downlink Packet Access (3G)                          |\n| IPR                                                                              | Intellectual Property Rights                                    |\n| IPTV                                                                             | Internet Protocol Television                                    |\n| ISP                                                                              | Internet Service Provider                                       |\n| MMDS                                                                             | Multichannel Multipoint Distribution Service (\"Wireless Cable\") |\n| Projection Period                                                                | Projection period refers to the period from 2009 to 2013        |\n| PSB                                                                              | Public Service Broadcaster                                      |\n| PVR                                                                              | Personal Video Recorder                                         |\n| VOD                                                                              | Video-On-Demand                                                 |\n| UGC                                                                              | User-Generated Content                                          |\nPopulation (000s)\nCountry\n2007\n2008\n2009\n2010\n2011\n2012\n2013\nCAGR\n(09-13)\nBahrain\n764\n779\n795\n811\n827\n844\n860\n2.0%\nEgypt\n73,600\n75,200\n76,704\n78,238\n79,803\n81,399\n83,027\n2.0%\nJordan\n5,723\n5,854\n5,989\n6,126\n6,267\n6,411\n6,558\n2.3%\nKuwait\n3,310\n3,443\n3,536\n3,606\n3,715\n3,826\n3,941\n2.7%\nLebanon\n3,759\n3,808\n3,857\n3,908\n3,958\n4,010\n4,062\n1.3%\nMorocco\n31,000\n31,436\n31,879\n32,328\n32,783\n33,244\n33,712\n1.4%\nO\n2 743\n2 769\n2 796\n2 823\n2 850\n2 877\n2 905\n1 0%\nOman\n2,743\n2,769\n2,796\n2,823\n2,850\n2,877\n2,905\n1.0%\nPalestine\n3,762\n3,883\n4,008\n4,137\n4,270\n4,407\n4,548\n3.2%\nQatar\n930\n1,098\n1,218\n1,352\n1,501\n1,666\n1,866\n11.3%\nSaudi Arabia\n24,289\n24,897\n25,519\n26,157\n26,811\n27,481\n28,168\n2.5%\nSudan\n37,159\n38,126\n39,117\n40,134\n41,177\n42,248\n43,346\n2.6%\nSyria\n19,405\n19,880\n20,368\n20,867\n21,378\n21,902\n22,438\n2.4%\nTunisia\n10,225\n10,327\n10,429\n10,533\n10,637\n10,743\n10,849\n1.0%\nTunisia\n10,225\n10,327\n10,429\n10,533\n10,637\n10,743\n10,849\n1.0%\nUAE\n4,488\n4,764\n4,907\n5,054\n5,206\n5,362\n5,523\n3.0%\nYemen\n22,290\n22,978\n23,687\n24,4398\n25,130\n25,884\n26,660\n3.0%\nArab Region\n243,447\n249,242\n254,809\n260,472\n266,313\n272,304\n278,463\n2.2%\n\nSource: International Monetary Fund October 2009, except for Palestine\n\n| Country      | 0-14   | 15-24   | 25-34   | 35-44   | 45-59   |\n|--------------|--------|---------|---------|---------|---------|\n| Bahrain      |        |         |         |         |         |\n| 26%          | 17%    | 14%     | 15%     | 21%     | 7%      |\n| Bahrain      |        |         |         |         |         |\n| 26%          | 17%    | 14%     | 15%     | 21%     | 7%      |\n| Egypt        |        |         |         |         |         |\n| 33%          | 19%    | 17%     | 11%     | 13%     | 7%      |\n| Jordan       |        |         |         |         |         |\n| 36%          | 20%    | 16%     | 12%     | 9%      | 7%      |\n| Kuwait       |        |         |         |         |         |\n| 26%          | 20%    | 29%     | 12%     | 8%      | 5%      |\n| Lebanon      |        |         |         |         |         |\n| 26%          | 16%    | 20%     | 17%     | 11%     | 10%     |\n| Morocco      |        |         |         |         |         |\n| 29%          | 19%    | 17%     | 13%     | 13%     | 8%      |\n| Oman         |        |         |         |         |         |\n| 43%          | 17%    | 13%     | 10%     | 13%     | 5%      |\n| Palestine    |        |         |         |         |         |\n| 40%          | 21%    | 15%     | 11%     | 9%      | 5%      |\n| Qatar        |        |         |         |         |         |\n| 22%          | 15%    | 23%     | 22%     | 15%     | 3%      |\n| Saudi Arabia |        |         |         |         |         |\n| 38%          | 18%    | 21%     | 13%     | 6%      | 4%      |\n| Sudan        |        |         |         |         |         |\n| 41%          | 21%    | 15%     | 11%     | 9%      | 4%      |\n| Syria        |        |         |         |         |         |\n| 36%          | 22%    | 16%     | 11%     | 9%      | 5%      |\n| Tunisia      |        |         |         |         |         |\n| 23%          | 19%    | 18%     | 15%     | 15%     | 10%     |\n| UAE          | UAE    |         |         |         |         |\n| 20%          | 14%    | 30%     | 22%     | 12%     | 2%      |\n| Yemen        |        |         |         |         |         |\n| 44%          | 21%    | 15%     | 8%      | 8%      | 4%      |\n| Arab Region  |        |         |         |         |         |\n| 35%          | 20%    | 17%     | 12%     | 11%     | 6%      |\n\nNote:     2009 data Source: US Census Bureau International Database\n\n## Exhibit 142: Nominal Gdp ($Us Bn)\n\nNominal GDP ($US billion)\nCountry\n2007\n2008\n2009\n2010\n2011\n2012\n2013\nCAGR\n(09-13)\nBahrain\n18\n21\n19\n22\n23\n24\n26\n7.5%\nEgypt\n130\n163\n188\n208\n229\n251\n275\n10.0%\nJordan\n17\n21\n23\n24\n26\n29\n31\n8.3%\nKuwait\n112\n158\n115\n135\n146\n154\n164\n9.4%\nLebanon\n25\n29\n33\n35\n38\n40\n43\n7.2%\nMorocco\n75\n89\n91\n98\n105\n112\n120\n7.3%\nOman\n42\n60\n52\n60\n64\n68\n72\n8.1%\nPalestine\n5\n7\n6\n6\n6\n6\n6\n-0.3%\nQatar\n71\n102\n93\n128\n153\n161\n171\n16.6%\nSaudi Arabia\n384\n469\n380\n443\n479\n515\n557\n10.0%\nSudan\n47\n58\n54\n65\n73\n81\n91\n13.7%\nSyria\n41\n55\n54\n61\n68\n74\n82\n10.8%\nTunisia\n36\n41\n40\n42\n44\n47\n50\n5.9%\nUAE\n180\n262\n229\n256\n276\n299\n326\n9.3%\nYemen\n22\n27\n26\n32\n35\n37\n40\n11.1%\nArab Region\n1,205\n1,563\n1,402\n1,617\n1,764\n1,899\n2,053\n10.0%\nSource: International Monetary Fund October 2009, EIU\n\n## Exhibit 143: Households (000S)\n\nHouseholds (000s)\nCountry\n2007\n2008\n2009\n2010\n2011\n2012\n2013\nCAGR\n(09-13)\nBahrain\n121\n124\n127\n130\n133\n136\n139\n2.3%\nEgypt\n19,758\n20,341\n20,942\n21,560\n22,140\n22,735\n23,330\n2.7%\nJordan\n1,060\n1,106\n1,153\n1,193\n1,225\n1,259\n1,292\n2.9%\nKuwait\n592\n616\n640\n666\n693\n720\n749\n4.0%\nLebanon\n992\n1,006\n1,020\n1,034\n1,048\n1,062\n1,076\n1.3%\nMorocco\n5,052\n5,110\n5,170\n5,230\n5,277\n5,325\n5,372\n1.0%\nOman\n454\n472\n490\n509\n528\n548\n568\n3.8%\nPalestine\n638\n664\n691\n719\n748\n778\n808\n4.0%\nQatar\n131\n133\n134\n135\n135\n136\n137\n0.6%\nSaudi Arabia\n4,476\n4,659\n4,828\n5,003\n5,180\n5,355\n5,529\n3.4%\nSudan\n6,102\n6,265\n6,433\n6,606\n6,782\n6,963\n7,145\n2.7%\nSyria\n3,324\n3,434\n3,546\n3,663\n3,778\n3,897\n4,016\n3.2%\nTunisia\n1,965\n1,990\n2,015\n2,040\n2,061\n2,082\n2,103\n1.1%\nUAE\n891\n905\n917\n926\n935\n943\n950\n0.9%\nYemen\n3,213\n3,335\n3,462\n3,593\n3,725\n3,862\n3,999\n3.7%\nArab Region\n48,770\n50,159\n51,568\n53,006\n54,389\n55,801\n57,215\n2.6%\nSource: Informa TM\nTV Households (000s)\nCountry\n2007\n2008\n2009\n2010\n2011\n2012\n2013\nCAGR\n(09-13)\nBahrain\n117\n120\n124\n127\n130\n134\n137\n2.6%\nEgypt\n18,272\n18,866\n19,479\n20,112\n20,765\n21,388\n22,030\n3.1%\nJordan\n995\n1,044\n1,096\n1,140\n1,180\n1,216\n1,252\n3.4%\nKuwait\n581\n605\n631\n658\n684\n712\n740\n4.1%\nLebanon\n906\n929\n952\n969\n986\n1,001\n1,016\n1.6%\nMorocco\n4,449\n4,516\n4,583\n4,652\n4,722\n4,781\n4,841\n1.4%\nOman\n387\n404\n423\n442\n461\n482\n504\n4.5%\nPalestine\n596\n618\n645\n674\n705\n735\n766\n4.4%\nQatar\n118\n121\n125\n127\n128\n129\n131\n1.1%\nSaudi Arabia\n4,057\n4,219\n4,388\n4,552\n4,723\n4,909\n5,103\n3.8%\nSudan\n988\n1,033\n1,079\n1,128\n1,179\n1,232\n1,287\n4.5%\nSyria\n2,953\n3,063\n3,178\n8,298\n3,421\n3,549\n3,683\n3.8%\nTunisia\n1,827\n1,846\n1,864\n1,887\n1,911\n1,940\n1,969\n1.4%\nUAE\n740\n755\n770\n782\n793\n805\n817\n1.5%\nYemen\n1,995\n2,067\n2,160\n2,257\n2,359\n2,459\n2,563\n4.4%\nArab Region\n38,981\n40,206\n41,497\n47,805\n44,147\n45,472\n46,838\n3.1%\nSource: Informa TM\nDailies circulation (000's)\nCountry\n2007\n2008\n2009\n2010\n2011\n2012\n2013\nCAGR\n(09-13)\nBahrain\n178\n203\n189\n194\n199\n204\n210\n2.8%\nEgypt\n3,627\n3,774\n4,018\n4,177\n4,342\n4,511\n4,686\n3.9%\nJordan\n302\n327\n313\n317\n322\n326\n329\n1.3%\nKuwait\n550\n986\n961\n979\n994\n1,008\n1,022\n1.6%\nLebanon\n386\n381\n396\n400\n404\n407\n410\n0.8%\nMorocco\n754\n761\n710\n722\n731\n742\n757\n1.6%\nOman\n234\n249\n274\n275\n276\n277\n278\n0.4%\nPalestine\n80\n86\n80\n80\n86\n86\n86\n1.8%\nQatar\n204\n209\n211\n216\n221\n226\n232\n2.5%\nSaudi Arabia\n1,756\n1,855\n1,878\n1,903\n1,934\n1,956\n1,980\n1.3%\nSudan\n92\n94\n96\n98\n100\n102\n104\n2.0%\nSyria\n358\n361\n379\n382\n385\n388\n391\n0.8%\nTunisia\n355\n369\n399\n404\n408\n413\n418\n1 1%\nTunisia\n355\n369\n399\n404\n408\n413\n418\n1.1%\nUAE\n993\n1,101\n1,092\n1,111\n1,128\n1,142\n1,153\n1.4%\nYemen\n165\n167\n170\n171\n172\n173\n175\n0.6%\nArab Region\n10,035\n10,831\n11,164\n11,427\n11,701\n11,961\n12,231\n2.3%\nTotal advertising by country (US$ million)\nCountry\n2007\n2008\n2009\n2010\n2011\n2012\n2013\nCAGR\n(09-13)\nBahrain\n76\n85\n75\n79\n85\n90\n95\n6.3%\nEgypt\n458\n654\n719\n789\n851\n896\n936\n6.8%\nJordan\n86\n104\n105\n112\n123\n136\n150\n9.4%\nKuwait\n358\n415\n361\n388\n416\n443\n472\n6.8%\nLebanon\n188\n217\n225\n241\n256\n268\n280\n5.7%\nMorocco\n231\n268\n284\n309\n338\n373\n408\n9.6%\nOman\n74\n105\n85\n92\n102\n108\n113\n7.1%\nPalestine\n2.5\n3.0\n2.8\n2.9\n3.0\n3.2\n3.5\n5.1%\nQatar\n163\n207\n205\n238\n266\n290\n313\n11%\nSaudi Arabia\n710\n853\n679\n726\n820\n904\n980\n9.6%\nSudan\n13\n15\n14\n18\n20\n23\n26\n17%\nSyria\n30\n40\n41\n47\n52\n59\n68\n14%\nTunisia\n28\n39\n40\n42\n45\n48\n52\n6 5%\nTunisia\n28\n39\n40\n42\n45\n48\n52\n6.5%\nUAE\n839\n1,229\n784\n950\n1,042\n1,120\n1,181\n11%\nYemen\n8\n10\n13\n13\n14\n16\n17\n7.6%\nPan Arab\n802\n1,053\n965\n1,049\n1,141\n1,196\n1,252\n6.7%\nArab Region\n4,068\n5,296\n4,600\n5,096\n5,577\n5,974\n6,346\n8.4%\n\nNote:      Total may not fully add up due to rounding error. For country breakdowns refer to each country section Source: Value Partners analysis\n\nTotal advertising by platform (US$ million)\nPlatform\n2007\n2008\n2009\n2010\n2011\n2012\n2013\nCAGR\n(09-13)\nNewspapers\n2,107\n2,819\n2,294\n2,547\n2,753\n2,937\n3,104\n7.9%\nMagazines\n384\n456\n330\n367\n428\n468\n511\n11.6%\nTelevision\n1,213\n1,566\n1,501\n1,610\n1,731\n1,818\n1,903\n6.1%\nRadio\n87\n114\n122\n135\n148\n160\n167\n8.2%\nOut-of-home\n263\n313\n298\n321\n345\n370\n395\n7.3%\nInternet\n13\n29\n56\n117\n171\n222\n266\n48%\nTotal\n4,068\n5,296\n4,600\n5,096\n5,577\n5,974\n6,346\n8.4%\n\nNote: Advertising revenues includes pan-Arab advertising Source: Value Partners analysis\n\nPrint revenues breakdown (US$ m)\nSource of\nrevenues\n2007\n2008\n2009\n2010\n2011\n2012\n2013\nCAGR\n(09-13)\nCirculation\n1,251\n1,350\n1,392\n1,424\n1,459\n1,491\n1,525\n2.3%\nAdvertising\n2,107\n2,819\n2,294\n2,547\n2,753\n2,937\n3,104\n7.8%\nTotal\n3,358\n4,169\n3,686\n3,971\n4,211\n4,428\n4,628\n5.9%\nPay-TV revenues breakdown (US$ m)\nSource of\nrevenues\n2007\n2008\n2009\n2010\n2011\n2012\n2013\nCAGR\n(09-13)\nAdvertising\n1,213\n1,566\n1,501\n1,610\n1,731\n1,818\n1,903\n6.1%\nPay-TV\nsubscription\n480\n569\n642\n724\n820\n922\n1,030\n12.5%\nTotal\n1,693\n2,134\n2,143\n2,334\n2,551\n2,740\n2,933\n8.2%\nBroadband Penetration (% of HH)\nCountry\n2007\n2008\n2009\n2010\n2011\n2012\n2013\nCAGR\n(09-13)\nBahrain\n58%\n73%\n68%\n71%\n73%\n77%\n81%\n4.4%\nEgypt\n2%\n3%\n7%\n15%\n23%\n28%\n32%\n44%\nJordan\n8%\n14%\n15%\n23%\n34%\n44%\n53%\n36%\nKuwait\n15%\n23%\n25%\n28%\n29%\n28%\n28%\n2.9%\nLebanon\n3%\n13%\n19%\n23%\n28%\n33%\n37%\n18%\nMorocco\n9%\n10%\n12%\n15%\n17%\n19%\n21%\n15%\nOman\n4%\n1%\n10%\n14%\n18%\n23%\n29%\n31%\nPalestine\n8%\n11%\n15%\n19%\n23%\n25%\n28%\n16%\nQatar\n53%\n78%\n84%\n84%\n83%\n84%\n83%\n-0.2%\nSaudi Arabia\n15%\n24%\n37%\n46%\n56%\n66%\n74%\n19%\nSudan\n0%\n0%\n0%\n0%\n0%\n1%\n1%\n17%\nSyria\n0%\n0%\n1%\n1%\n1%\n1%\n1%\n29%\nT\ni i\n6%\n11%\n24%\n40%\n49%\n52%\n53%\n21%\nTunisia\n6%\n11%\n24%\n40%\n49%\n52%\n53%\n21%\nUAE\n42%\n66%\n69%\n71%\n72%\n71%\n71%\n0.6%\nYemen\n0%\n1%\n2%\n2%\n2%\n2%\n3%\n16%\nArab Region\n5%\n8%\n12%\n17%\n22%\n26%\n29%\n25%\nSource: Informa TM, Value Partners analysis\nMobile Penetration (% of population)\nCountry\n2007\n2008\n2009\n2010\n2011\n2012\n2013\nCAGR\n(09-13)\nBahrain\n146%\n187%\n209%\n225%\n236%\n242%\n247%\n4.2%\nEgypt\n41%\n56%\n72%\n82%\n88%\n92%\n93%\n6.7%\nJordan\n83%\n90%\n95%\n98%\n100%\n101%\n109%\n3.6%\nKuwait\n84%\n98%\n109%\n118%\n123%\n125%\n127%\n3.8%\nLebanon\n32%\n39%\n61%\n81%\n93%\n101%\n108%\n15.2%\nMorocco\n64%\n72%\n88%\n96%\n103%\n106%\n108%\n5.4%\nOman\n91%\n116%\n130%\n141%\n150%\n156%\n161%\n5.5%\nPalestine\n15%\n20%\n25%\n27%\n29%\n30%\n31%\n5.6%\nQatar\n136%\n153%\n169%\n173%\n170%\n164%\n154%\n-2.3%\nSaudi Arabia\n95%\n114%\n130%\n142%\n149%\n153%\n155%\n4.6%\nSudan\n22%\n30%\n39%\n46%\n52%\n54%\n63%\n12.8%\nSyria\n33%\n39%\n45%\n51%\n56%\n61%\n66%\n9.9%\nTunisia\n77%\n83%\n87%\n93%\n98%\n100%\n101%\n3 9%\nTunisia\n77%\n83%\n87%\n93%\n98%\n100%\n101%\n3.9%\nUAE\n169%\n206%\n231%\n246%\n256%\n264%\n268%\n3.8%\nYemen\n20%\n27%\n34%\n40%\n44%\n46%\n49%\n9.5%\nArab Region\n50%\n62%\n74%\n83%\n89%\n92%\n96%\n6.5%\n\nSource: Informa TM, Arab Advisors Group, Value Partners analysis"
    },
    {
        "text": "OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE\n\n# (U) Domestic Violent Extremism Poses Heightened Threat In 2021\n\n 01 March 2021\n\n\n## (U) Executive Summary\n\n(U) The IC assesses that domestic violent extremists (DVEs) who are motivated by a range of ideologies and galvanized by recent political and societal events in the United States pose an elevated threat to the Homeland in 2021. Enduring DVE motivations pertaining to biases against minority populations and perceived government overreach will almost certainly continue to drive DVE radicalization and mobilization to violence. Newer sociopolitical developmentssuch as narratives of fraud in the recent general election, the emboldening impact of the violent breach of the US Capitol, conditions related to the COVID-19 pandemic, and conspiracy theories promoting violencewill almost certainly spur some DVEs to try to engage in violence this year.\n\n(U) The IC assesses that lone offenders or small cells of DVEs adhering to a diverse set of violent extremist ideologies are more likely to carry out violent attacks in the Homeland than organizations that allegedly advocate a DVE ideology. DVE attackers often radicalize independently by consuming violent extremist material online and mobilize without direction from a violent extremist organization, making detection and disruption difficult.\n\n(U) The IC assesses that racially or ethnically motivated violent extremists (RMVEs) and militia violent extremists (MVEs) present the most lethal DVE threats, with RMVEs most likely to conduct mass-casualty attacks against civilians and MVEs typically targeting law enforcement and government personnel and facilities. The IC assesses that the MVE threat increased last year and that it will almost certainly continue to be elevated throughout 2021 because of contentious sociopolitical factors that motivate MVEs to commit violence.\n\n(U)  The IC assesses that US RMVEs who promote the superiority of the white race are the DVE actors with the most persistent and concerning transnational connections because individuals with similar ideological beliefs exist outside of the United States and these RMVEs frequently communicate with and seek to influence each other. We assess that a small number of US RMVEs have traveled abroad to network with like-minded individuals. (U) The IC assesses that DVEs exploit a variety of popular social media platforms, smaller websites with targeted audiences, and encrypted chat applications to recruit new adherents, plan and rally support for inperson actions, and disseminate materials that contribute to radicalization and mobilization to violence.\n\n\n(U)  The IC assesses that several factors could increase the likelihood or lethality of DVE attacks in 2021\nand beyond, including escalating support from persons in the United States or abroad, growing perceptions of government overreach related to legal or policy changes and disruptions, and high-profile attacks spurring follow-on attacks and innovations in targeting and attack tactics.\n\n\n(U) DVE lone offenders will continue to pose significant detection and disruption challenges because of their capacity for independent radicalization to violence, ability to mobilize discretely, and access to firearms.\n\n\n\n## (U) Scope Note\n\n(U) As part of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) mission to lead and support Intelligence Community (IC) integration and deliver insights, the ODNI has leveraged IC components to provide a comprehensive intelligence assessment on domestic violent extremists (DVEs). This assessment was prepared under the auspices of the DNIin consultation with the Attorney General and Secretary of Homeland Securityand was drafted by the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC), Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), and Department of Homeland Security (DHS), with contributions from the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA). The FBI and DHS lead the IC's counter DVE missions and are thus positioned to bring domestic collection to bear in understanding and addressing this issuewhile the NCTC supports them. Other IC elements, such as CIA and DIA, contribute their unique accesses or expertise, including on ties that foreign elements have to DVEs. All agencies are mindful of the duty to respect privacy, civil rights, and civil liberties and to act within the authorities granted to them as they seek to put together as complete an intelligence and analytic picture as is possible. (U) For the purposes of this assessment, the IC defines a DVE as an individual based and operating primarily in the United States without direction or inspiration from a foreign terrorist group or other foreign power and who seeks to further political or social goals wholly or in part through unlawful acts of force or violence. This assessment does not evaluate the actions of individuals engaged solely in activities protected by the First Amendment or other rights secured by the Constitution of the United States.\n\n## (U) Ic Categories Of Domestic Violent Extremists"
    },
    {
        "text": "Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board\n\n## Report On The Government's Use Of The Call Detail   Records Program Under The Usa Freedom Act\n\nWorking to ensure that efforts by the Executive Branch to protect the nation from terrorism appropriately safeguard privacy and civil liberties.\n\nFebruary 2020\nPrivacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board - PCLOB.gov - info@pclob.gov\n\n  Board Members\nAdam I. Klein, Chairman\n    Jane E. Nitze\n  Edward W. Felten\n   Travis LeBlanc\n   Aditya Bamzai\n\n## Table Of Contents\n\n| (U) Executive Summary 1                                              |                                                           |\n|----------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------|\n| I.                                                                   |                                                           |\n| (U) Introduction 4                                                   |                                                           |\n| II.                                                                  | (U) NSA's Collection of CDRs under the USA Freedom Act 13 |\n| III.                                                                 | (U) Operational Use of the USA Freedom Act CDR Program 25 |\n| IV.                                                                  | (U) Legal Analysis 33                                     |\n| V.                                                                   | (U) Analysis of Privacy Risks 53                          |\n| VI.                                                                  | (U) Statement of Chairman Adam Klein 59                   |\n| VII. (U) Statement of Board Members Ed Felten and Travis LeBlanc 68  |                                                           |\n| VIII. (U) Statement of Board Members Aditya Bamzai and Jane Nitze 79 |                                                           |\n| (U) Appendix A 86                                                    |                                                           |\n| (U) Appendix B 97                                                    |                                                           |\n\n## (U) Executive Summary\n\n(U) The Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board (the \"Board\") presents this report to provide greater transparency and clarity about the collection of phone call detail records (\"CDRs\") under the USA Freedom Act.  This authority is scheduled to sunset on March 15, 2020.\n(U) The Board commenced work on this report in January 2019.  Subsequently, in early\n2019, NSA suspended its collection of CDRs under the USA Freedom Act.  NSA halted the program \"after balancing the program's relative intelligence value, associated costs, and compliance and data-integrity concerns caused by the unique complexities of using these provider-generated business records for intelligence purposes.\"1  The Board proceeded to complete the report, which it offers to enhance the public's understanding of the program and to assist Congress as it considers the reauthorization of statutory language related to the CDR program.\n\n## (U) Program Legality And **Operation**\n\n(U) The USA Freedom Act amended the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (\"FISA\")\nto expressly bar the government from using its business records collection authority for bulk collection.  This prohibition effectively ended the bulk telephony metadata program that the government had operated under the then-existing version of Section 215 of the USA Patriot Act.\n(U) At the same time, the USA Freedom Act allows the government to obtain CDRs on a broader basis than other business records authorized for collection under the Act.  Put simply, it authorizes the government to collect CDRs within two hops*e.g.*, a person's contacts, and those contacts' contactsof a specific selection term.  Specific selection terms, such as a phone number or International Mobile Equipment Identity number, must be associated with a foreign power engaged in international terrorism and be approved by the FISA court.  The Act also provides that CDRs cannot include the contents of any communication; the name, address, or financial information of a subscriber or customer; or cell-site location or global positioning system information.  In 2018, the government obtained a relatively low number of FISA court orders14and collected a large number of CDRsmore than 434 million, including an unknown number of duplicates, involving 19 million phone numbers.\n\n1 Classified By: Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board Derived From: ODNI CG Declassify On: 20441231\n\n## (U) Findings\n\n- (U) The CDR program was constitutional under settled Supreme Court precedent. - (U) NSA's collection of two hops of CDR data on an ongoing basis was statutorily\nauthorized.\n- (U) The Board found no abuse of the program; nor did it find any instance in which\ngovernment officials intentionally sought records that they knew were statutorily prohibited.\n- (U) NSA acquired landline and wireless phone call records under the USA Freedom Act.\nThe Board found no evidence that NSA received any of the statutorily prohibited\ncategories of information, such as name, address, financial information, cell-site location information, or global positioning system information from providers during the program's operation.\n- (TS//NF) NSA did not use this authority to obtain metadata associated with\n\n, or\n.\n\n## (U) Program Use And Value (U) Findings\n\n- (U) NSA typically used the CDR program in response to a terrorist attack or a known\nterrorist threat.  For example, NSA produced intelligence reports that were derived in whole or in part from the USA Freedom Act CDR program in its analysis of the Pulse nightclub shooting in 2016 and the Ohio machete attack in 2016.\n- (U) USA Freedom Act CDRs were cited in 15 intelligence reports over the program's\nfour-year operation.\n- (S//NF) Of the 15 reports citing USA Freedom Act CDRs, FBI received unique\ninformation from two of the intelligence reports.  Based on one report, FBI vetted an individual, but, after vetting, determined that no further action was warranted.  The second report provided unique information about a telephone number, previously known to US authorities, which led to the opening of a foreign intelligence investigation;\n\n## (U) Data-Integrity Concerns And Compliance Incidents\n\n(U) The program experienced a series of compliance incidents and data-integrity problems, which led NSA to issue about a dozen notices to the FISA court since 2016.  After repeatedly discovering anomalies in the data it received, NSA suspended the collection of CDRs in early 2019.  NSA subsequently deleted all CDRs collected under the USA Freedom Act.2\n(U) Some of the compliance incidents were of types that could have arisen in other intelligence or equivalent law enforcement collection authorities.  These include incidents involving information inadvertently omitted from a FISA court application, certain NSA officers who had access to data without required training, and a provider's production of data beyond the end date of an order.\n(TS//SI//NF) Other incidents raise questions unique to the contours of the USA Freedom Act.  Beginning in 2016, NSA identified a series of data-integrity problems related to\n\n and other data errors.  In most of these cases, NSA systems unknowingly relied on inaccurate first-hop data to determine which second-hop requests to issue. Additional compliance incidents arose from other data errors, such as overwriting of data fields with incorrect or unrelated data.\n(U) These problems, taken together, contributed to NSA's decision to delete the USA\nFreedom Act CDR data in 2018 and again in 2019, and its decision to eventually suspend the program.\n\n## (U) Findings\n\n- (U) Based on a review of the facts, the Board determined that the compliance incidents\nwere inadvertent, not willful.\n- (U) NSA took steps to remedy each compliance incident, including notifying appropriate\noversight entities, imposing additional limits on data requests, and deleting erroneously obtained data.\n- (U) In response to each compliance incident that raised questions about the scope of\npermitted collection under the statute, NSA chose to follow a narrower, rather than a more expansive, understanding of its authority under the USA Freedom Act.\n\n\n## I. (U) Introduction\n\n(U) The Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board (the \"Board\") presents this report to provide greater transparency and clarity on how the government implemented certain authorities created or extended by the USA Freedom Act.  In particular, the report examines collection of phone call detail records (\"CDRs\") under the USA Freedom Act, which has proven to be of great public interest.  CDRs include some of the information that typically appears on a customer's phone bill: the date and time of a call, its duration, and the participating phone numbers.  CDRs never include the content of phone conversations.  The CDRs received under the USA Freedom Act also did not include names, street addresses, financial information, global positioning system information, or cell-site location information.\n\n(U) The Board hopes this report will help Congress, executive branch agencies, and the public understand the government's use of these authorities and any related privacy and civil liberties concerns, particularly in light of the impending sunset.  The Board worked with other government agencies to declassify information to achieve the greatest degree of transparency consistent with the protection of classified or otherwise privileged information.  As a result, some of the facts presented in this report are being disclosed to the public for the first time.  The Board looks forward to further collaboration with Congress and other executive branch agencies to \"ensure that liberty concerns are appropriately considered in the development and implementation of laws, regulations, and policies related to efforts to protect the Nation against terrorism.\"3\n\n## A. (U) Fisa And The Pre-2015 Bulk Collection Program\n\n(U) Since 1998, the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (\"FISA\")4 has permitted the government to obtain business records for use in national-security investigations.  Under the first iteration of this provision, the government could obtain business records associated with car rentals, storage units, public accommodations, and common carriers.5  Any request for business records in an investigation of a US person must be based on a counterterrorism or\n\n3 (U) 42 U.S.C.  2000ee(c)(2).\n\ninvestigatory techniques for national security purposes.  Among other things, FISA created a special court, comprised of Article III judges, to hear government applications to use those techniques.  *See* 50 U.S.C.  1801 et seq.\n\ncounterintelligence investigation that is not premised solely on activities protected by the First Amendment.6\n(U) After the 9/11 attacks, Congress passed the USA Patriot Act,7 which revised the business records provision of FISA.  Specifically, Section 215 of the USA Patriot Act expanded the business records provision to allow the government to request a FISA court order compelling the production of any \"tangible things,\" including books, records, papers, and documents that are relevant to an authorized FBI investigation.\n(U) Under Section 215, the FISA court authorized the government's collection of virtually all CDRs held by certain US phone providers.8  This collection program was commonly referred to as the \"bulk\" CDR program.9  Approximately every 90 days, the government filed an application with the FISA court requesting an order that providers continue to produce their CDRs to NSA.10  When the FISA court approved an application, the court issued orders, including secondary orders directly addressed to providers.11  The secondary orders required the providers to produce their CDRs to NSA \"on an ongoing daily basis\" for the ninety-day duration of the order.12\n(U) NSA stored these CDRs in a database that trained analysts could access as part of NSA's counterterrorism mission.13  In 2013, NSA stated that the program enabled Requiring the Production of Tangible Things, No. BR 13158 (FISA Ct. Oct. 11, 2013).\n\n9 (U) The phrase \"bulk\" collection does not appear in FISA; rather, it is commonly used in this context to refer to the collection of large amounts of data that is not limited by a specific selection term or individualized suspicion.  Cf.\n\nPresidential Policy Directive 28 (2014) (defining bulk collection as \"collection of large quantities of signals intelligence data . . . which is acquired without the use of discriminants (e.g., specific identifiers, selection terms, etc.)\").  Collection of data that is not \"bulk,\" as commonly understood, may nonetheless result in the government's acquisition of very large volumes of data.\nTangible Things from [Redacted], No. BR 0605, 23 (FISA Ct. May 24, 2006) (\"CDR Order\").\n\n\n(U) In 2013, unauthorized disclosures of classified documents by Edward Snowden revealed the nature and scope of the CDR program (among other intelligence activities).  The President and House Minority Leader asked the Board to review aspects of the CDR program.20\nThe President also ordered a separate review group to evaluate the program and consider modifications to its operations.21\n\n## B. (U) The Board's Section 215 Report\n\n(U) The Board issued its report on the CDR program in 2014 (the \"2014 Board Report\").22  In that Report, the Board concluded that the program was not authorized by Section\n215 of the USA Patriot Act and conflicted with another federal statute, the Electronic Communications Privacy Act.23\n(U) The 2014 Board Report made two major recommendations concerning the CDR\nprogram: (1) the US government should discontinue the bulk collection program;24 and (2) to the extent the program continued, the executive branch should add certain privacy safeguards.25  The Report contained an additional ten recommendations for enhancing oversight and transparency.26\n(U) In light of these recommendations and the report of the President's review group,27\nthe President ordered NSA to query the CDRs collected under the CDR program only if (1) a FISA court judge first approved the seed number for such queries based on a judicial finding, or\n(2) in the case of a true emergency.28  Seed numbers were generally phone numbers, but could\n\noffice/2013/08/12/presidential-memorandum-reviewing-our-global-signals-intelligence-collec.\n\n22 (U) 2014 Board Report.\n\n23 (U) 2014 Board Report at 810 (\"That statute prohibits telephone companies from sharing customer records with the government except in response to specific enumerated circumstances, which do not include Section 215 orders.\").\n\n24 (U) 2014 Board Report at 16872.  Two of the five Board Members did not believe the program should be discontinued before an adequate alternative was instituted.  *See* 2014 Board Report at 20818.\n\n25 (U) 2014 Board Report at 16872. 26 (U) 2014 Board Report at 173206.\n\n\nhave also been other unique identifiers, such as an International Mobile Subscriber Identity (\"IMSI\") or International Mobile Equipment Identity (\"IMEI\") number associated with a SIM\ncard or phone, respectively.29  Additionally, the President limited query results to CDRs within two hops of the query target instead of the previous three.30  In other words, although NSA still received the same CDRs from the same providers, NSA analysts could only retrieve the first two hops.31\n(U) The Board continued its oversight of the CDR program after releasing its report.\nInitially, the Board concentrated on reviewing the government's response to its recommendations, which the Board summarized in its 2015 Recommendations Assessment Report.32  That report concluded that the government had not implemented the Board's recommendation to end the bulk collection of CDRs.\n\n## C. (U) The Usa Freedom Act\n\n(U) After hearings and debate, Congress enacted the USA Freedom Act on June 2, 2015.\nThe President signed it into law that day.  The Act amended FISA's provisions governing the collection of business records, imposing new requirements on the government's collection of and access to CDRs.33\nbattery.\n30 (U) The White House, *Remarks by the President on Review of Signals Intelligence* (Jan. 17, 2014), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2014/01/17/remarks-president-review-signals-intelligence;\nsee also The White House, Fact Sheet: The Administration's Proposal for Ending the Section 215 Bulk Telephony Metadata Program (Mar. 27, 2014), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2014/03/27/fact-sheetadministration-s-proposal-ending-section-215-bulk-telephony-m.\n\n31 (U) The White House, *Remarks by the President on Review of Signals Intelligence* (Jan. 17, 2014), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2014/01/17/remarks-president-review-signals-intelligence;\nsee also The White House, Fact Sheet: The Administration's Proposal for Ending the Section 215 Bulk Telephony Metadata Program (Mar. 27, 2014), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2014/03/27/fact-sheetadministration-s-proposal-ending-section-215-bulk-telephony-m.\n\nAct of 2015, Pub. L. No. 11423, 129 Stat. 268 (2015).  Although officially written as the \"USA FREEDOM Act,\" we have used \"USA Freedom Act\" for readability.  As defined in the USA Freedom Act, \"[t]he term 'call detail\n\n(U) The USA Freedom Act amended Section 215 to expressly bar the government from using FISA's business records collection authority for bulk collection of CDRsthat is, collection not based on a \"specific selection term\" (such as a phone number) or individualized suspicion.34  NSA no longer obtains CDRs in bulk from providers.\n\n(U) At the same time, the USA Freedom Act also allowed the government to continue to obtain CDRs on a broader basis than other business records.  Specifically, it authorized the government to compel providers to produce both \"a first set of call detail records using the specific selection term\" and \"a second set of call detail records using session-identifying information . . . identified by\" the first request.35  Put simply, the USA Freedom Act enabled the government to collect CDRs within two hops of a specific selection term on an ongoing basis.\n(U) By statute, a specific selection term must be a term that \"specifically identifies an individual, account, or personal device.\"36  In practice, NSA does not use names or \"accounts\" as specific selection terms, and instead uses terms associated with particular electronic devices, such as phone, IMSI, and IMEI numbers.37\n(U) To obtain a court order compelling providers to produce CDRs, the USA Freedom Act requires the government to identify a \"specific selection term\" and demonstrate reasonable articulable suspicion to the FISA court that the term is associated with a foreign power or agent of a foreign power that is engaged in international terrorism or activities in preparation for\n\nrecord' (A) means session-identifying information (including an originating or terminating telephone number, an International Mobile Subscriber Identity number, or an International Mobile Station Equipment Identity number), a telephone calling card number, or the time or duration of a call, and (B) does not include (i) the contents . . . of any communication; (ii) the name, address, or financial information of a subscriber or customer; or (iii) cell site location or global positioning system information.\"  50 U.S.C.  1861(k)(3).\n\n34 (U) *See* 50 U.S.C.  1861(c)(3) (\"No order issued under this subsection may authorize the collection of tangible things without the use of a specific selection term that meets the requirements in subsection (b)(2).\"); *see also*\ndiscussion of \"bulk collection\" in footnote 9 above.\n\n35 (U) 50 U.S.C.  1861(c)(2)(F) (\"An order under this subsection . . . shall . . . (iii) provide that the Government may require the prompt production of a first set of call detail records using the specific selection term . . . [and] (iv)\nprovide that the Government may require the prompt production of a second set of call detail records using sessionidentifying information or a telephone calling card number identified by the specific selection term used to produce call detail records under clause (iii)[.]\").\n36 (U) 50 U.S.C.  1861(k)(4)(B) (\"For purposes of an application submitted under subsection (b)(2)(C), the term\n'specific selection term' means a term that specifically identified an individual, account, or personal device.\"). FREEDOM Act Business Records FISA Implementation 4 (Jan. 15, 2016); *see also* NSA briefing to the Board (Jan.\n\n23, 2019); Part III(A).\n\n\ninternational terrorism.38  The statute includes an emergency exception, which allows the Attorney General to temporarily authorize collection.39\n(U) If the FISA court approves a specific selection term, NSA may use that specific selection term to obtain two hops of CDRs.40  The technical architecture that NSA created to collect those CDRs from providers is discussed in greater detail below.\n(U) The USA Freedom Act also implemented a number of other surveillance reforms and oversight mechanisms.  For example, the Act created a panel of cleared amici (technical and legal experts) from whom the FISA court can solicit additional perspectives on matters of privacy and civil liberties, communications technology, and other technical or legal matters presented by its cases.41  The Act also required that the Director of National Intelligence, in consultation with the Attorney General, conduct a declassification review of each decision by the FISA court that includes a novel and significant interpretation and make publicly available to the greatest extent practicable each decision.42  Further, the Act required the Attorney General and Director of National Intelligence to report to Congress the total number of applications approved by the FISA court under the CDR provision each year.43\nthings before an order authorizing such production can with due diligence be obtained[.]\").  The definition of Attorney General in FISA includes certain senior level officials in the Department of Justice.  *See* 50 U.S.C.\n\n 1801(g).\n\n40 (U) 50 U.S.C.  1861(c)(2)(F)(i) (\"An order under this subsection . . . shall authorize the production on a daily basis of call detail records for a period not to exceed 180 days[.]\").\n\n41 (U) 50 U.S.C.  1803(i)(1) (\"The presiding judges of the courts established under subsections (a) and (b) shall, not later than 180 days after June 2, 2015 jointly designate not fewer than 5 individuals to be eligible to serve as amicus curiae, who shall serve pursuant to rules the presiding judges may establish.\").\n42 (U) 50 U.S.C.  1872(a) (\"[T]he Director of National Intelligence, in consultation with the Attorney General, shall conduct a declassification review of each decision, order, or opinion issued by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court or the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court of Review . . . that includes a significant construction or interpretation of any provision of law, including any novel or significant construction or interpretation of the term 'specific selection term', and, consistent with that review, make publicly available to the greatest extent practicable each such decision, order, or opinion.\").\n\n43 (U) *See* 50 U.S.C.  1861(b)(4) (\"In April of each year, the Attorney General shall submit to the House and Senate Committees on the Judiciary and the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence and the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence a report setting forth with respect to the preceding calendar year . . . the total number of\n\n## D. (U) Effects Of The Impending Sunset\n\n(U) Unless reauthorized, several provisions extended or amended by the USA Freedom Act will expire, or \"sunset,\" on March 15, 2020.\n(U) Most notably, NSA's explicit statutory authority to obtain two-hop CDRs associated with an approved specific selection term will expire.  In addition, the explicit prohibition on using the business records provision to collect records that are not based on a specific selection term will expire.  The resulting statute would not explicitly authorize the government to collect business records beyond one degree of separation from the target, but it would not explicitly bar it from doing so either.44\n(U) A sunset would also significantly curtail the broader, \"traditional\" FISA business records authority, which would revert to its pre-9/11 text.  Before 9/11, the statute was limited to\n\"records\" from common carriers, public accommodation facilities, storage facilities, and vehicle rental facilities.  Consequently, the government would no longer be authorized to seek broader business records productions from other, non-enumerated entities.\n(U) The evidentiary standard required to compel production of these records would also become more stringent.  Specifically, the standard would shift from a showing that the records sought are \"relevant to an authorized investigation\"the current standardto requiring \"specific and articulable facts giving reason to believe that the person to whom the record pertains is a foreign power or agent of a foreign power.\"45\n(U) Finally, the USA Freedom Act extended the sunsets of two other FISA provisions:\nthe lone wolf and roving wiretap authorities.46  Without congressional action, these authorities will also expire on March 15, 2020.47\n46 (U) Under the lone wolf authority, the government can obtain a FISA court order for electronic surveillance of a non-US person upon a showing of probable cause that such person is engaged in international terrorism or activities in preparation for international terrorism without having to show that the non-US person is doing so on behalf of a foreign power.  The government has never used this broadened definition operationally.  The roving wiretap authority modified FISA to permit the government to seek a FISA court order to conduct electronic surveillance without having to specify the entities from whom technical assistance will be required.  This authority enables continued surveillance should an individual switch from one provider to another.\n\n## E. (U) The Board's Continuing Oversight Of Cdr Collection\n\n(U) The Board's oversight of the government's CDR collection continued after passage of the USA Freedom Act.  In 2016, the Board reviewed the government's response to the 2014\nBoard Report recommendations and issued a second recommendations assessment report.48  In that report, the Board found that the government had addressed most of its recommendations.49\n(U) Since then, NSA has provided the Board with regular written and oral notifications about significant developments in the operation of the CDR program.  The Board received multiple in-person briefings from relevant government agencies and received responses to written and oral questions, as well as document requests.  Additionally, the Board hosted a public forum in May 2019 to hear from a range of experts on the USA Freedom Act.50  The discussion focused on the history and implementation of the Act, present challenges, and the path ahead.\nThe panelists included academics, former government officials, and representatives from nongovernmental organizations.  The Board appreciates the time and observations contributed by the participants.\n\n\n\n## Ii. (U) Nsa's Collection Of Cdrs Under The Usa Freedom Act\n\n(U) NSA worked with telephony providers to create a technical architecture to collect and use CDRs under the USA Freedom Act.51  This included technical processes and infrastructure to use approved specific selection terms to obtain, analyze, and control access to the CDRs.\nNSA released an unclassified description of this architecture in January 2016.52  The architecture remained essentially constant throughout the life of the program until NSA began dismantling it in the summer of 2019, after the program was suspended.53\n(U) Some of these technical processes were developed to ensure compliance with the minimization procedures approved by the FISA court in 2015, when the program began.  The procedures governed NSA's handling, retention, and dissemination of the CDRs obtained from providers under the USA Freedom Act.  For example, the minimization procedures required an initial review of records to confirm that the CDRs were generally responsive to the court's order, mandated specific storage standards, and imposed rules for sharing US person information.54\n\n## A. (U) Program Architecture Used To Collect Cdrs Under The Usa Freedom Act\n\n(U) Under the USA Freedom Act, CDRs could be collected and used in emergency situations (a terrorist attack or an imminent threat) or in day-to-day counterterrorism investigations.  In the immediate aftermath of a terrorist attack, collection of USA Freedom Act CDRs may have occurred as an emergency authorization, which had to be approved by the Attorney General.55  To seek an emergency authorization, NSA personnel would collaborate with FBI counterparts to prepare the proposed authorization for the Attorney General's review.56\nOnly after the Attorney General approved the request could the government direct the providers\n\nGovernment under this section or to implement the amendments made to this section by the USA FREEDOM Act of 2015.\").\n52 (U) NSA Civil Liberties and Privacy Office, Transparency Report: The USA FREEDOM Act Business Records FISA Implementation (Jan. 15, 2016) (\"NSA USA Freedom Act Transparency Report\").\n(S//NF) Once the FISA court approved a specific selection term under the USA Freedom Act, NSA did not immediately send the specific selection term to providers and request corresponding CDRs.  Instead, NSA first queried for contacts with the specific selection term in the an internal repository containing metadata previously collected by NSA.66  These queries were governed by NSA's policies and procedures, including the NSA's Attorney General-approved Supplemental Procedures Governing Communications Metadata Analysis (\"SPCMA\").67  SPCMA allows identifiers associated with both non-US persons and US persons to be used to query phone metadata and electronic communications metadata that NSA already obtained through other lawful collection methods.  By doing so, NSA was able to find first-hop contacts in telephone metadata already in its own holdings, such as intercepted telephone communications metadata collected pursuant to FISA or Executive Order 12333.68\n(U//FOUO) After it queried the internal metadata repository, NSA included the specific selection terms and direct contacts found through the searches in its holdings when it sought further records from the providers.69  The system for sending specific selection terms and direct contacts to the providers and for receiving CDRs in return was referred to as which we refer to here as \"System 1.\"70  System 1 marked the specific selection term and direct contacts for internal record-keeping.71\n(U) The providers received the specific selection terms and direct contacts and searched for any responsive CDRs showing contacts between these numbers and others.  Those records were produced to NSA in a standardized format that had about 50 fields per record.72  The fields included information such as the call participants' phone numbers, unique device identifiers of participants (if applicable), and the date, time, and duration of the call.73  Each record also contained information about the legal authority under which it was obtained, including a code indicating the specific FISA court order.74  Under the USA Freedom Act, CDRs could not include the contents of any communication, the name, address, or financial information of a subscriber or customer, or cell-site location or global positioning system information.75\nNSA represents that, since the start of the program in November 2015, it never received any prohibited categories of information from providers under the program.76\n(U) NSA then used System 1 to check the validity of CDRs produced by the providers.\nAmong other things, the system checked the code indicating the FISA court order to ensure the collection occurred pursuant to a valid order.77  This step did not allow NSA to verify that the CDR accurately described a phone call that had in fact occurred, or that the data did not contain errors.78  Rather, NSA used this validation effort to ensure that the CDR fields were plausible\nthat is, it sought to detect when, on its face, a CDR could not have been a valid response to the specific selection term.  For example, if a field should have a date, NSA systems confirmed there was a valid and appropriate date in that field.  In other fields, NSA systems checked for a particular number of digits or a particular formatting, with the goal of ensuring the CDRs were properly formatted and not facially incorrect.79  If one of these validation checks failedfor example, a field that should have a date did not have onethe records were held for review by technical personnel to identify the nature of the anomaly.80  This prevented NSA analysts from accessing certain types of potentially unauthorized or incorrect CDRs.\n(U) If the CDRs from the provider passed the validation steps, they were passed by System 1 into other repositories, including the internal metadata repository, where they could be accessed by NSA analysts.81  NSA regularly checked its internal repository to obtain further CDRs.  Related CDRs associated with a specific selection term (first-hop CDRs) were automatically distributed to the other providers to obtain second-hop records.82  Similarly, first-\n\n75 (U) 50 U.S.C.  1861(k)(3)(B) (\"The term 'call detail record' . . . does not include the contents . . . of any communication; the name, address, or financial information of a subscriber or customer; or cell site location or global positioning system information.\").\n76 (U) NSA briefing to the Board (May 23, 2019). 77 (U) *See* NSA USA Freedom Act Transparency Report at 14 (\"NSA's minimization procedures . . . require the Agency to inspect CDRs received from a provider through manual and/or automated means to confirm that the CDRs are responsive to the FISC's production order.\"); NSA briefing to the Board (Mar. 26, 2019).\n\n78 (U) The system did not enable NSA to verify the accuracy of the records maintained by the providers themselvesa reason it took years to discover the data-integrity issues discussed in Part II(B) of this report.  See NSA USA Freedom Act Transparency Report at 14 (\"NSA plays no role in ensuring that the provider-generated CDRs accurately reflect the calling events that occurred over the provider's infrastructure[.]\"); NSA briefing to the Board (May 23, 2019).\n\n79 (U) *See* NSA USA Freedom Act Transparency Report at 5; NSA briefing to the Board (Mar. 26, 2019). 80 (U) *See* NSA USA Freedom Act Transparency Report at 5; NSA briefing to the Board (Mar. 26, 2019). 81 (U) *See* NSA USA Freedom Act Transparency Report at 58; NSA briefing to the Board (Jan. 23, 2019). 82 (U) *See* NSA USA Freedom Act Transparency Report at, 58; NSA briefing to the Board (Jan. 23, 2019).\n\nhop numbers derived from NSA's metadata collection were sent to providers to enable them to return any second-hop results.83  The providers sent any responsive CDRs, including historical records, back to NSA on an ongoing, automated basis for the life of the order.84  In other words, NSA was able to obtain a second hop of CDRs by sending providers the first-hop contacts it found in its internal repository.  Thus, at any given point, the providers were only returning a single hop of data.\n\n## (U)\n\n(U) This resulted in an iterative process whereby new CDRs from any provider or new contacts from NSA's own metadata collection could result in additional responsive CDRs being produced to NSA automatically for counterterrorism analysis.  For example, if two weeks into an order one provider produced to NSA CDRs showing that a specific selection term contacted another number, NSA would automatically transmit that new number to the providers as a firsthop contact.  With the new contact added, other providers might identify new responsive secondhop CDRs that they would then produce to NSA.  Likewise, if NSA found contacts between the specific selection term and another individual via its Executive Order 12333 collection, the other individual's number could be sent to each of the providers as a first-hop contact.85  Finally, it\n\nwas also possible for second-hop contacts to become first-hop contacts if they directly contacted a FISA court-approved86 specific selection term.  Because that individual would now be a firsthop contact, NSA could seek CDRs for its contacts from all providers.\n\n## 2. (U) Analyzing Cdrs\n\n(U) When NSA received valid CDRs, they were processed and placed into its repository.87  NSA repositories are subject to access controls and cannot be directly reviewed by NSA analysts.  Rather, NSA analysts use software interfaces that validate what data they are authorized to access, and return information from a repository in response to the analysts'\nqueries.88\n(U//FOUO) To view metadata records, NSA analysts use general metadata viewing tools, including\n, which we refer to here as Tool 1.  Tool 1 enables NSA analysts to query one or more datasets to which they have access, including multiple types of NSA metadata records.89  Primarily using Tool 1, NSA analysts can input different terms which they reasonably expect to return foreign intelligence information and query those terms against several different pools of metadata.90\n(U) Prior to the passage of the USA Freedom Act, CDRs were maintained in such a way that NSA analysts could not query CDRs collected under the former CDR program alongside other metadata records collected by NSA in Tool 1.91  NSA later determined that it could use a single tool, Tool 1, it had earlier produced to search all metadata records the analyst was authorized to review, though this was not caused by the passage of the USA Freedom Act.92\nTool 1 allowed an analyst to search against all available metadata and to use all query terms at once, saving time and providing insights that might otherwise be difficult to uncover.93\n(U) Using this tool to query different types of metadata, while operationally efficient, had an anomalous side-effect for NSA's efforts to count metadata query terms.  A simple example illustrates the anomaly:  A query in Tool 1 about an email address and a US phone number could automatically ping against CDRs obtained under the USA Freedom Act.  This would count as\n\n\n88 (U) NSA briefing to the Board (May 23, 2019). 89 (U) NSA briefing to the Board (May 23, 2019). 90 (U) NSA briefing to the Board (May 23, 2019). 91 (U) NSA briefing to the Board (May 23, 2019). 92 (U) NSA briefing to the Board (May 23, 2019). 93 (U) NSA briefing to the Board (May 23, 2019).\ntwo query terms of USA Freedom Act CDRs even though using an email address as a query term in Tool 1 would never return USA Freedom Act CDRs.94  (Those CDRs did not include email addresses or other unique online identifiers.95)  As a result, the reported number of USA\nFreedom Act CDR query terms96 included terms that, by their nature, could never have returned those CDRs.\n(U) Using Tool 1 for its operational benefits produced ancillary benefits for oversight and compliance.  The minimization procedures that apply to USA Freedom Act CDRs address the handling, retention, and dissemination of CDRs, but do not regulate querying.97  Thus, NSA was not required to trackand did not need to have a particularized foreign intelligence justification for runningUS person queries of CDR program data.  However, Tool 1 is designed to automatically require analysts to justify and track US person queries and requires a foreign intelligence purpose for each query run in order to comply with NSA's other procedures.  Using Tool 1 effectively imposed these requirements as a matter of practice on the CDR program.98\n(S//NF) When an analyst ran a query that returned CDRs, the analyst would naturally want to know additional information about the individuals involved, even to the point of identifying communicants if possible.  However, with identifying information as they entered its repositories.  For example, it did not to the CDR produced by the provide\n99  For example, an NSA analyst could have Tool 1 indicate whether any CDRs were associated with an NSA target of foreign-intelligence interest.100  An NSA analyst could also ask Tool 1 to display certain the contact in the query results,\n\n## 3. (U) Access Controls, Logs, And Data Deletion\n\n(U) Access to NSA systems that contained USA Freedom Act information was controlled.102  NSA systems are built to ensure that only users with a valid mission need and appropriate training are allowed to access stored foreign intelligence information.103  For backend systems not accessible to analysts, including System 1, only particular authorized users can access those systems or files.104  Thus, a pool of analysts had the training and authority to query CDR program records in Tool 1, and a smaller number of technical personnel were able to view records that arrived in System 1, including those that failed NSA's initial validation check.105\n(U) Subject to certain exceptions, NSA minimization procedures required NSA to eventually destroy records obtained under the USA Freedom Act.106  The minimization procedures required NSA to promptly destroy records that were determined not to contain foreign intelligence information.107  No CDRs were destroyed under this provision.108  Records collected under the program were otherwise scheduled to be destroyed after five years.109  This was to be accomplished by deleting them from the internal metadata repository and any other pertinent systems.  However, some residual information would remain, such as documentation that a provider had produced CDRs.110  Additionally, the minimization procedures allowed NSA\nto retain CDRs that were the basis of an approved disseminationthat is, intelligence reporting circulated to other agencies.111  In practice, NSA deleted all USA Freedom Act CDRs in 2018\nand again in 2019; however, CDRs that were used in intelligence reporting were not deleted, though those records were no longer available in the internal metadata repository.112\n\n## B. (U) Compliance And Data-Integrity Challenges\n\n(U) Between early 2016 and mid-2019, the government filed approximately a dozen notices to the FISA court regarding compliance and data-integrity issues experienced while\n\n104 (U) NSA briefing to the Board (Jan.  23, 2019). 105 (U) NSA briefing to the Board (Mar. 26, 2019). 106 (U) NSA Minimization Procedures for CDRs. 107 (U) NSA Minimization Procedures for CDRs at 7. 108 (U) NSA briefing to the Board (May 23, 2019). 109 (U) NSA Minimization Procedures for CDRs at 7. 110 (U) NSA briefing to the Board (Jan. 23, 2019). 111 (U) NSA Minimization Procedures for CDRs. 112 (U) *See* note 2.\noperating the USA Freedom Act CDR program.  A classified appendix describes these incidents in more detail.\n\n## 1. (U) General Compliance Matters\n\n(U) Some of the notices filed with the FISA court, which are described in this section, dealt with compliance incidents which could occur when using other intelligence or equivalent law enforcement collection authorities and were the result of two types of government error and one type of provider error.\n\n## A. (U) Omitted Information From Fisa Application\n\n(U) In one instance, the same day the FISA court approved the government's application under the USA Freedom Act, FBI informed NSA that it possessed intelligence which called into question facts the government relied on in its application.113  FBI attributed its failure to share this intelligence with NSA and the Department of Justice to an internal oversight.114  NSA asked the providers to stop producing CDRs for certain specific selection terms affected by the omissions and asked the providers to continue production for the specific selection term that was not affected by the omissions and continued to meet the statutory requirements.\n\n## B. (U) Overproduction\n\n(S//NF) Three days after a valid FISA court order expired, a provider transmitted CDRs associated with the expired order to NSA.  Upon receiving the files, NSA's automated initial review in System 1 determined that the CDRs should not have been produced and, as a result, ensured that NSA analysts did not gain access to the files.  NSA destroyed all CDRs erroneously transmitted by the provider within a few days.\n\n## C. (U) Training Compliance Incidents\n\n(U) NSA discovered that a number of NSA personnel were unintentionally granted access to USA Freedom Act CDRs even though the personnel did not have training required by the minimization procedures.  NSA confirmed that this issue was caused by human error.  Among other corrective steps, NSA revoked access credentials for personnel.  In light of this incident, NSA sped up its efforts to shift from manual verification of training toward automated verification.  Additionally, NSA analysts improperly shared CDR information via email with NSA analysts who had not had the formal USA Freedom Act training.  In this instance, NSA\nrecalled the improperly shared CDR information.  No additional improper access occurred during the duration of the program.\n\n## 2. (U) Data-Integrity Issues\n\n(U) Beginning in 2017 and continuing until the program's suspension in 2019, NSA\nsought to diagnose and overcome complex data-integrity issues in the CDRs produced by phone companies, which implicated a large number of records.115  The government's notices to the FISA court described these issues.  This section summarizes NSA's repeated discovery of anomalies in the data it received and the agency's response to these incidents.\n\n## A. (U) Production Of Inaccurate First-Hop Numbers\n\n(TS//SI//NF) In the first data-integrity incident, a provider produced inaccurate first-hop numbers to NSA in a subset of CDRs.  The provider's system had been incorrectly populating terminating numbers (the field for a number used by the party receiving a call) with\n\n\nWhile System 1 was designed to detect data which may not be authorized for collection, these non-responsive similarly to data regularly accepted by System 1.  Accordingly, the system did not reject the data and instead requested second-hop records using the erroneous first-hop response.  As a consequence, NSA requested records numbers \"one hop\" away from the\n.\n(TS//SI//NF) While investigating this incident, the provider identified a separate incident:\n records incorrectly produced to NSA as a result of a\n\n.  This error was separate from the errors related to the\n\n.\n(TS//SI//NF) The provider implemented a technical solution to prevent incorrect CDRs from being delivered to NSA.  NSA identified and purged CDRs that contained these\n\nterminating numbers.  NSA did not identify any incorrect CDRs that were used in an application to the FISA court or as the source of reporting.\n\n## B. (Ts//Si//Nf) Production Of Inaccurate Data Associated With\n\n(TS//SI//NF) In another data-integrity incident, a provider produced to NSA almost CDRs with inaccurate data.  The inaccurate data was populated by the provider's CDR production system, which assembles the data into CDRs,\n\n  Specifically, when\n\n.  These inaccurate CDRs were created by the provider's CDR production system over a two year period.\n\n(U) The same day it identified the problem, NSA stopped issuing new requests to the provider for data and also stopped processing data received from the provider into its repositories.  This ensured analysts stopped receiving access to new inaccurate CDRs.  NSA\ninformed its analysts of the inaccurate information produced by the provider and cautioned them not to rely on CDRs from the affected time period.  The provider ultimately implemented a technical solution to its system to prevent delivery of inaccurate records to NSA.\n(S//NF) Subsequent internal NSA investigations discovered that prior to the discovery of the data-integrity issue, some inaccurate CDRs were used to support four applications to the FISA court seeking USA Freedom Act authorization\n.  On April\n11, 2018, the government filed a notice informing the FISA court of the inaccurate information produced by this provider.  The government also notified the FISA court of the four applications that relied on the inaccurate information.  NSA deleted CDRs acquired as a result of these four applications and recalled one disseminated intelligence report generated based on the inaccurate CDRs.\n\n## C. (U) Expanding Accuracy Concerns Lead Nsa To Delete Cdrs\n\n(TS//SI//NF) In connection with its investigation into the provider's production of inaccurate data associated with\n, NSA searched for similar anomalous data from the other providers and found a number of questionable CDRs.  In one instance, NSA brought the possibility of inaccurate CDRs to the attention of the provider.  That provider confirmed that it also produced CDRs with inaccurate data in situations.  In addition, the provider had also reported to NSA a separate tranche of inaccurate CDRs.  Those CDRs included fields which had been overwritten with unrelated data.\n(U) By May 2018, NSA realized that the providers could not identify for NSA all the affected records, and NSA had no way to independently determine which records contained inaccurate information.  Thus, NSA did not have a viable way to remove the affected records and retain unaffected records.  In response, NSA initiated the deletion of all data produced under the USA Freedom Act by providers.116  NSA also successfully revalidated all reports produced by NSA by that time and confirmed they did not rely upon inaccurate CDRs produced in error by the providers.  NSA issued a public statement regarding its deletion of USA Freedom Act CDRs.117\n\n## D. (U) Additional Compliance Issues And Concerns\n\n(S//NF) Later in 2018, NSA noticed a larger than expected number of data values in specific fields of CDRs from one provider.  The provider discovered that it had produced more CDRs with incorrect data associated with authorized specific selection terms.\nWorking with this provider, NSA was unable to rectify the inaccurate data problem.\n\n(TS//SI//NF) Further discussion with this provider, and with the other providers, led NSA\nto gain a better appreciation for how all providers maintain their business records in\n\n.  The government maintains that CDRs created by all providers in are valid session identifying information under the statute because with the specific selection term and are included in CDRs showing a contact and/or connection with the Court-authorized specific selection term.  The government informed the FISA court of this position.  The FISA court did not explicitly address this issue in any orders or hearings.\n\n## E. (U) Suspension Of The Program\n\n(S//NF) NSA allowed its last FISA court order issued under the USA Freedom Act to expire in early 2019.118  Since then, NSA has not requested any CDRs from providers.  On\n\n NSA informed the Board that it would begin dismantling the System 1 architecture and would reallocate any remaining funds to other intelligence programs.119  NSA's decision to end its collection of CDRs under the USA Freedom Act, delete previously acquired records, and decommission the technical architecture created to effectuate it, was \"made after balancing the program's relative intelligence value, associated costs, and compliance and data-integrity concerns caused by the unique complexities of using these provider-generated business records for intelligence purposes.\"120  NSA subsequently deleted data collected under the USA Freedom Act.121\n\n## Iii. (U) Operational Use Of The Usa Freedom Act Cdr Program\n\n(U) This section describes how an NSA analyst would use the CDR program to assist his or her counterterrorism mission; how the CDR program provided analytic material for intelligence reporting since 2015; and how FBI used NSA's intelligence reporting in its counterterrorism and investigative efforts.\n\n## A. (U) How Nsa Analysts Used The Usa Freedom Act Cdr Program\n\n(U) As part of its signals intelligence mission, NSA collects foreign intelligence from communications and information systems to support intelligence needs across the government.122\nTo answer terrorism-related requests, NSA maintains an office of counterterrorism within its operations directorate.123  That office brings all lawful authorities and intelligence relationships to bear in its collection and analysis of signals intelligence, providing valuable insight into the terrorist threats to the country.124\n(U) When a new terrorism threat is discovered or a terrorist attack occurs, NSA's office of counterterrorism uses all its legal authorities to collect and analyze intelligence.125  Its analysis informs policymakers and law enforcement about the threat and aids in their decision-making processes.126  Time is of the essence in the immediate aftermath of an attack or when an imminent threat is discovered, so NSA analysts routinely leverage intelligence relationships and utilize a broad array of authorities to obtain and access the highest quality information they can, as quickly as they can.127\n(S//NF) For example, hypothetically, if a terrorist attack occurred in New York City, an NSA analyst would seek information from an FBI analyst liaison\n\n.  The FBI analyst would attempt to ensure that any information relating to the attack in FBI's possession that could legally be shared with NSA was quickly relayed to NSA.  Likewise, NSA would pass any pertinent intelligence to FBI, subject to applicable legal\n\n125 (U) NSA briefing to the Board (May 23, 2019). 126 (U) NSA briefing to the Board (May 23, 2019). 127 (U) NSA briefing to the Board (May 23, 2019).\n\nrestrictions.  On the other hand, if a terrorist attack were to occur at a US embassy abroad, an NSA analyst would seek information held by NSA's foreign partners.\n(U) When reaching out to its intelligence partners, NSA would be particularly interested in any specific selection terms related to the attack or attackers.128  Without such leads, including specific selection terms shared by partners or discovered by NSA, it is harder for NSA analysts to query its intelligence repositories, conduct metadata analysis, and employ other analytic techniques.129\n(U) Once NSA obtains information about the attack and attacker, an analyst would search NSA's intelligence repositories to find information previously collected under NSA's various legal authorities, such as Executive Order 12333 or FISA.130  The results of these queries could, for example, help the analyst conduct contact chaining to better understand the attacker's contacts and communications.\n(U) The NSA analyst might also work with FBI and the Department of Justice to seek authority to collect CDRs under the USA Freedom Act.131  If approved, the analyst could use the resulting CDRs to reveal connections between the attacker and other individuals in the United States or abroad.132  The analyst would write a report describing any foreign intelligence findings\n(or, in some cases, simply listing phone numbers or other identifiers associated with the attacker).  That information could then be disseminated, pursuant to the minimization procedures, to other government agencies involved in counterterrorism, including FBI.\n\n## B. (U) Usa Freedom Act Cdrs In Intelligence Reporting\n\n(U) The number of orders the government sought under the CDR program has declined sharply since its inception.  From 2016 to 2018, the government received 94 FISA court orders under the USA Freedom Act CDR provision.133  In 2018, the government received 14 FISA\ncourt orders, a steep drop from the two prior years.134  Despite the relatively low number of orders, NSA collected, in absolute terms, a large number of CDRs.  In total, NSA estimates that\n\n128 (U) NSA briefing to the Board (May 23, 2019).\n\n129 (U) NSA briefing to the Board (May 23, 2019). 130 (U) NSA briefing to the Board (May 23, 2019). 131 (U) NSA briefing to the Board (May 23, 2019). 132 (U) NSA briefing to the Board (May 23, 2019). 133 (U) 2018 Statistical Transparency Report at 28.  Those orders related to 93 unique targets. 134 (U) 2018 Statistical Transparency Report at 28.\n\nit received more than 151 million CDRs from providers in 2016, 534 million CDRs in 2017, and\n434 million CDRs in 2018.135\n(U) NSA used these CDRs as part of its contact-chaining analysis.  NSA's goal in contact chaining was to map an attacker's (or potential attacker's) network or find connections between the attacker and other individuals known to NSA.136  To conduct contact chaining, an NSA\nanalyst would use Tool 1 to query the internal metadata repository.  NSA estimated that NSA analysts used 22,360 such query terms associated with US persons to conduct such queries in\n2016, 31,196 in 2017, and 164,682 in 2018.137  (Note, however, that some of these query terms were non-telephony identifiers that could not have returned CDRs.)  NSA used the results of these queries, combined with information from other sources, in intelligence reports.  These reports were disseminated to other US government agencies, including FBI, to assist their counterterrorism efforts.\n(U) It is the Board's impression that, when combatting terrorism, NSA felt it had to use all available authorities, including the CDR program.  This was done in case the data revealed an intelligence lead or a terrorist plot that otherwise would have been unknown.  However, NSA told the Board that traditional telephony metadata, like that obtained through the CDR program, was unlikely to show a suspected terrorist's complete social network because it did not account for other modes of communication.138  Further complicating matters, NSA was aware of dataintegrity issues with the CDRs, which made them hesitant to rely solely on USA Freedom Act CDRs.139\n(S//NF) In measuring value, NSA often looks to the number of reports that is generated by a collection platform or methodology.140  NSA issued relatively few reports based on CDRs collected under the USA Freedom Act.  Over a span of four years, NSA wrote and disseminated\n136 (U) NSA briefing to the Board (May 23, 2019). 137 (U) 2018 Statistical Transparency Report at 31.  The intelligence community's annual statistical transparency report includes an estimate of the number of search terms associated with a US person used to query USA Freedom Act CDR data.  It is likely, however, that these numbers overstate NSA analysts' \"true\" queries of information concerning a US person because NSA analysts group query terms together to run against multiple repositories that the analyst is authorized to query.  The result is that a query containing a large amount of non-telephony metadata could be run against NSA's USA Freedom Act CDR holdings, along with data collected under other authorities more relevant to the analysis.  Each of those query items would count in the numbers reported in the annual Statistical Transparency Reports, even though some queries would not conceivably return USA Freedom Act CDRs.\n\n138 (U) NSA briefing to the Board (May 23, 2019). 139 (U) NSA briefing to the Board (May 23, 2019). 140 (U) NSA briefing to the Board (May 23, 2019).\n\nreport to provide feedback.161  Neither NSA nor FBI is aware of any contemporaneous feedback from FBI or others suggesting that any of the 15 intelligence reports were, or were not, useful for these earlier stage investigatory and analytical activities.  However, FBI subsequently conducted a review of the CDR program's contributions.   During a briefing to Board staff, FBI explained that while most of the NSA intelligence reports provided redundant information, two reports provided unique information to FBI.162\n(U) During its review of the contributions of the CDR program, FBI determined that, of the 15 reports, 11 duplicated information that was already present in FBI files.163  Of the remaining four reports, FBI determined that two contained information that was duplicated by FBI through information that FBI had received from the use of other lawful process.164  This duplication reflects the fact that FBI can acquire one-hop metadata using a variety of other legal authorities, including grand-jury subpoenas.  Agents can then progressively expand their map of a suspect's network by seeking a series of individualized court orders as new information comes in.\n\n(TS//SI//NF) FBI received unique information from the remaining two intelligence reports.  The first report\n165\n166  FBI decided to open a foreign intelligence investigation based on the information contained in NSA's USA Freedom Act intelligence report, which included relevant \"first hop\" information from the USA Freedom Act and relevant information from another legal authority.167\n\n\n161 (U) NSA briefing to the Board (May 23, 2019). 162 (U) FBI briefing to the Board (Oct 23, 2019). 163 (U) FBI briefing to the Board (June 11, 2019). 164 (U) FBI briefing to the Board (June 11, 2019). 165 (U) FBI briefing to the Board (June 11, 2019). 166 (U) FBI discussion with Board staff (Aug. 16, 2019). 167 (U) FBI briefing to the Board (June 11, 2019). 168 (U) FBI discussion with Board staff (Aug. 16, 2019).\n(TS//SI//NF) FBI used information in the second report to vet one other individual.170\nAfter doing so, FBI decided not to open an investigation or take further action.171\n\n\n\n## Iv. (U) Legal Analysis\n\n(U) The Board's statute authorizes us to review \"actions by the executive branch relating to efforts to protect the nation from terrorism to determine whether such actions . . . are consistent with governing laws, regulations, and policies regarding privacy and civil liberties.\"172\nWe understand our statutory mandate to reflect Congress's desire that it receive a full, fair, and impartial assessment of a program's legality when the Board issues reports.173  Congress no doubt recognized that some programs, such as the now-suspended CDR program under the USA\nFreedom Act, might never give rise to litigation.174  Moreover, many of the facts underlying a program's operation might remain classified, thereby raising questions in Congress as well as the public whether the government has complied with its legal obligations in implementing the program.  Finally, Congress itself might want additional legal advice as it fulfills its constitutional duty to enact the nation's laws.175\n(U) For these reasons, we consider the USA Freedom Act CDR program in light of the Constitution's Fourth Amendment and the text of the statutory framework.\n\nrelied on a \"highly speculative fear\" that plaintiffs' communications would be collected, rather than demonstrating that alleged injuries were \"certainly impending\"); *cf. American Civil Liberties Union v. Clapper*, 785 F.3d 787, 801\n(2d Cir. 2015) (plaintiffs challenging bulk CDR program \"need not speculate that the government has collected, or may in the future collect, their call records\").  The Second Circuit's holding in *ACLU v. Clapper* rested on the fact that FISA court orders underpinning the bulk CDR program required \"the production of all call detail records or telephony metadata,\" *ACLU v. Clapper*, 785 F.3d. at 797 (internal quotation marks omitted), an approach to collection prohibited under the USA Freedom Act.\n175 (U) Our colleagues question the \"utility of a constitutional analysis\" given the Board's \"limited time and resources.\"  Statement of Ed Felten & Travis LeBlanc at 70.  They suggest that is so because the USA Freedom Act CDR program \"has been suspended,\" \"its existence and primary contours were publicly known and debated, and it was subject to oversight by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court.\"  Statement of Ed Felten & Travis LeBlanc at 70.  Respectfully, we disagree.  Although the CDR program may currently be suspended, Congress is considering the reauthorization of a statutory provision under which the program could be restarted.  In addition, the facts of the program are not \"publicly known\"; although many such facts have been released to the public for the first time as a result of the Board's report, some remain classified.  Finally, FISA court opinions often remain classified, precluding public knowledge of the conclusionsconstitutional and otherwisethe court reaches.  Whether the government has, in the past, acted consistent with the Constitution in implementing a classified program is of significant relevance to public debates over the appropriate statutory regimes to govern such programs.\n\n## A. (U) Fourth Amendment Analysis 1. (U) Summary\n\n(U) The CDR collection program authorized by the USA Freedom Act was constitutional.  Governing Supreme Court case law makes clear that collection of telephone dialing and routing information is not a \"search\" or \"seizure\" under the Fourth Amendment.  The Supreme Court's recent decision in *Carpenter v. United States* expressly reaffirmed that the key precedent establishing this principle, *Smith v. Maryland*, remains the law of the land.176\nMeanwhile, the USA Freedom Act barred the government from collecting the content of calls or cell-site location information, two types of data that typically require a warrant under Supreme Court precedent.\n\n(U) Our conclusion accords with the Board's unanimous conclusion in 2014 that the previous bulk CDR collection program was constitutional.177  That program was more expansive and had fewer safeguards than this one: it involved bulk collection, rather than targeted collection based on individualized suspicion, and did not require judicial approval of individual selection terms.  If that program was constitutional, it is difficult to see how this much narrower program would not be.  The Board's conclusion in its 2014 Report on the bulk CDR program remains valid:  \"Until the Supreme Court rules otherwise, *Smith v. Maryland* and the third-party doctrine remain in force today.  Government lawyers are entitled to rely on them when appraising the constitutionality of a given action.\"178\n(U) Finally, we note that our conclusion accords with Congress's view when it enacted the USA Freedom Act.  Sixty-seven Senators and 338 Members of the House voted for the Act.\nSenators who supported the Act believed that it would \"protect[] the privacy of individuals\"179\nwhile defending national security in a manner that is \"respectful of the . . . letter and the spirit of the Fourth Amendment.\"180  Senate and House Members, including long-serving members of the Judiciary Committee, argued that \"the USA FREEDOM Act represents a return to the basic principle of the Fourth Amendment\"181 and effected \"historic and sweeping reforms to the\n\n\ngovernment's surveillance program and powers.\"182  These Members believed themselves to be protecting the Constitution, not violating it.  We agree that the law they enacted was constitutional.\n\n## 2. (U) The Cdr Program Complied With The Fourth Amendment\n\n(U) The Fourth Amendment provides that the \"right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.\"183\n(U) We first consider whether the collection of telephony metadata under the CDR\nprogram constituted a \"search\" or \"seizure\" under the Amendment's text as interpreted by relevant Supreme Court cases.  We believe it did not, and that the program was constitutional for this reason alone.  We then consider whether, even assuming it effected a \"search\" or \"seizure,\" the program was nevertheless \"reasonable\" and, thus, constitutional.  Consistent with the Board's analysis in its 2014 report, and its disinclination to offer constitutional opinions where unnecessary, we do not arrive at a conclusion on reasonableness; rather, we preview the analysis that a court would likely undertake.  We conclude with our thoughts on the separate statement authored by our colleagues.\n\n## A.\n\n(U) To begin, the collection of CDRs under the CDR program does not constitute a\n\"search\" or \"seizure\" under controlling Fourth Amendment precedent.  The Supreme Court held in *Smith v. Maryland* that the government's acquisition of telephone dialing information using a pen register does not constitute a \"search\" under the Fourth Amendment, and therefore does not trigger the Amendment's protections.184  In *Smith*, the Court rejected the argument that a caller has a \"'legitimate expectation of privacy' regarding the numbers he dialed on his phone,\" finding it \"too much to believe that telephone subscribers. . . harbor any general expectation that the numbers they dial will remain secret.\"185  It further held that even if a caller had a subjective expectation of privacy in the numbers dialed, it would not be \"one that society is prepared to recognize as 'reasonable.'\"186  \"This Court,\" it explained, \"consistently has held that a person has no legitimate expectation of privacy in information he voluntarily turns over to third parties,\"187 a principle which has since become known as the \"third-party doctrine.\"188\n(U) That holding remains good law, even as the Supreme Court has clarified the Fourth Amendment's application to new technologies, including cellular networks.  Most recently (in 2018), in *Carpenter v. United States*, the Court held that a demand issued to a third party for cellsite location information triggered the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement.189  The USA\nFreedom Act explicitly excludes cell-site location information from collection under the CDR\nprovision.190  And while *Carpenter* \"decline[d] to extend *Smith* and *Miller* to the collection of\n[cell-site location information],\" the Court also reiterated that \"the third-party doctrine applies to telephone numbers\" and explicitly confirmed *Smith*'s continuing viability:  \"We do not disturb the application of *Smith* . . . .\"191\n(U) Likewise, four years earlier (in 2014), in *Riley v. California*, the Court held that the search-incident-to-arrest exception to the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement does not extend to accessing content stored on the arrestee's smartphone.192  In doing so, the Court briefly addressed the relationship between its holding and *Smith*.  The Court reaffirmed that *Smith* had held that \"the use of a pen register was not a 'search' at all under the Fourth Amendment.\"193  It went on to find *Smith* inapplicable because there was \"no dispute [in *Riley*] that the officers engaged in a search of [the] cell phone.\"194  In other words, *Smith* does not allow the government to collect phone numbers when the government first gains access to those numbers by include . . . cell site location or global positioning system information[.]\").\n\n191 (U) *Carpenter*, 138 S. Ct. at 2220 (emphasis added).  The Supreme Court's decision in *United States v. Miller*,\n425 U.S. 435 (1976), upheld the collection of bank records by subpoena and without a warrant, *see Miller*, 425 U.S. at 440, and is often grouped with *Smith* as a case involving the \"third-party doctrine.\" (U) Lower courts have since held *Carpenter* inapplicable \"to grand jury subpoenas sent to an internet service provider (ISP) and an email provider for subscriber information associated with an ISP account and an email address,\" \"to fixed video monitoring, location-revealing bank records, and online-shopping histories.\"  Alan Z.\n\nRozenshtein, *Fourth Amendment Reasonableness After Carpenter*, Yale L.J. Forum 943, 95051 (2019) (footnotes omitted).  While we do not necessarily endorse the reasoning or holdings of these lower court cases (a result unnecessary to our opinion in this report), they demonstrate that *Smith* remains a live part of the jurisprudence after Carpenter.\n\n192 (U) 573 U.S. 373, 386 (2014). 193 (U) *Riley*, 573 U.S. at 400. 194 (U) *Riley*, 573 U.S. at 400.\n\nconducting a \"search.\"195  Collecting CDRs under the USA Freedom Act does not involve any antecedent search by the government; under the Act, the government serves companies with court orders comparable to those they receive every day in criminal investigations.\n(U) *Riley* is different from the CDR program for a second reason.  In *Riley*, the government argued that even if other information on a phone was constitutionally protected, it\n\"should always be able to search a phone's call log.\"196  The Court rejected that argument, noting that smartphone call logs \"typically contain more than just phone numbers; they include any identifying information that an individual might add, such as the label 'my house.'\"197  The CDR\nprovision, by contrast, explicitly prohibits the government from obtaining the contents of any communication, \"the name, address, or financial information of a subscriber or customer,\" or location information.198  Telephony metadata, unlike smartphone call logs, does not include \"any information that an individual might add\"; rather, it comprises dialing and routing information recorded by the company.199  The type of information that the government may collect under the USA Freedom Act CDR provision resembles the information collected by the pen register in Smith rather than the call logs in *Riley*.200  In short, there is no evidence that *Riley* intended to government could not then argue that obtaining the list of phone numbers was not a \"search\" under the Fourth Amendment.  The government's immediately preceding actionsnamely, breaking into the house without the requisite cause and warrantwould constitute a \"search\" under the Fourth Amendment, thereby triggering the Constitution's protections.  See *United States v. Turner*, 839 F.3d 429, 434 n.2 (5th Cir. 2016) (\"There was no dispute in *Riley* that reviewing the contents of a cell phone involved a search.  At issue was only whether such a search was permissible without a warrant when conducted during an arrest.\"); *United States v. Guerrero*, 768 F.3d\n351, 360 n.7 (5th Cir. 2014) (\"The [*Riley*] Court's concerns were thus cabined to the unique circumstances of the search-incident-to-arrest doctrine, and did not overrule the separate line of cases, including *Smith*, dealing with information already in the possession of an identifiable third party.\").\n\n196 (U) *Riley*, 573 U.S. at 400. 197 (U) *Riley*, 573 U.S. at 400. 198 (U) 50 U.S.C.  1861(k)(3).\n199 (U) *See* FISC Order No. 0007-10, at 2 (May 2, 2007) (\"Telephony meta data includes comprehensive communications routing information, including but not limited to session identifying information (e.g., originating and terminating telephone number, communications device identifier, etc.), trunk identifier, telephone calling card numbers and time and duration of call\") [declassified, redacted opinion].\n200 (U) *Compare* 18 U.S.C.  3127(3) (pen register records \"dialing, routing, addressing, or signaling information\"\nbut not \"the contents of any communication\"), *with* 50 U.S.C.  1861(k)(3) (CDRs may include \"session-identifying information (including an originating or terminating telephone number, an International Mobile Subscriber Identity number, or an International Mobile Station Equipment Identity number), a telephone calling card number, or the time or duration of a call,\" but not \"the contents . . . of any communication,\" \"the name, address, or financial information of a subscriber or customer,\" or \"cell site location or global positioning system information\"); see also Riley, 573 U.S. at 400 (distinguishing digital call log from \"pen register\" at issue in *Smith*); NSA USA Freedom Act Transparency Report at 10 (\"CDRs, per the statute, contain only telephone metadata and not, for example, the contents of any personal communication or the caller's name or location of any phone call.\").\n\nalter *Smith*a point reaffirmed when, as noted above, the Court subsequently made clear in Carpenter that it had not \"disturb[ed] the application of *Smith*.\"201\n(U) One-hop collection of CDRs under FISA's business-records provision,202 also known as Section 215 (after the section of the USA Patriot Act that brought this authority close to its current form), is comparable to the type of CDR production common in criminal investigations. Much as grand-jury subpoenas can be used to obtain business records relevant to criminal inquiries, Section 215 authorizes the FISA court to issue orders compelling the production of\n\"tangible things,\" including business records, in national-security investigations.203  Ordinary application of Section 215 to collect one \"hop\" of CDRs seeks to place the government in the same position when it compels production of information in national-security cases as when it compels production in criminal cases.\n\n(U) While the use of Section 215 to obtain \"one hop\" of CDRs would operate much like the use of the pen register in *Smith v. Maryland*, this program raises the additional question of whether collecting a \"second hop\" of dialing information, as authorized by the USA Freedom Act, affects the constitutional analysis.\n(U) The inclusion of \"second hop\" information results in the collection of a large number of records.204  The Court's decision in *Smith* does not suggest, however, that the *number* of phone records determines whether collection constitutes a Fourth Amendment \"search\" for purposes of the warrant requirement.205  To the contrary: *Smith* and more recent cases focus on the *nature* of call metadata records, rather than the number of data points gathered by the foreign intelligence information not concerning a United States person or to protect against international terrorism or clandestine intelligence activities, provided that such investigation of a United States person is not conducted solely upon the basis of activities protected by the first amendment to the Constitution.\"  50 U.S.C.  1861(a)(1).\n\n204 (U) This is disclosed by the intelligence community's Annual Statistical Transparency Reports.  *See, e.g.*, 2018\nStatistical Transparency Report.\n\n205 (U) The District Court opinion in *Klayman v. Obama*, a challenge to the bulk CDR program, would have taken the alternative view.  *See* 957 F. Supp. 2d 1, 3536 (D.D.C. 2013) (\"Admittedly, what metadata is has not changed over time.  As in *Smith*, the *types* of information at issue in this case are relatively limited: phone numbers dialed, date, time, and the like.  But the ubiquity of phones has dramatically altered the *quantity* of information that is now available, and, more importantly, what that information can tell the government about people's lives.\"), vacated and remanded by Obama v. Klayman, 800 F.3d 559 (D.C. Cir. 2015).  That opinion was vacated by the D.C. Circuit, however, and its reasoning as to telephone metadata has not been adopted by other courts.  Moreover, its holding arose in the context of the government's program collecting CDRs in *bulk*.  The court did not have occasion to consider whether the same analysis would apply if the government collected solely the second \"hop\" of metadata. See, e.g., *Klayman v. Obama*, 957 F. Supp. 2d at 3536 (relying on the \"all-encompassing, indiscriminate\" nature of the collection under the previous bulk telephony program).\n\ngovernment on a programmatic level.  The Court in *Carpenter v. United States*, for example, distinguished cell-site location data from *Smith*'s pen register by noting that the former is more revealing:  \"After all, when *Smith* was decided in 1979, few could have imagined a society in which a phone goes wherever its owner goes, conveying to the wireless carrier not just dialed digits, but a detailed and comprehensive record of the person's movements.\"206  Similarly, Smith explained that \"pen registers do not acquire the contents of communications,\" \"do not hear sound,\" and \"disclose only the telephone numbers that have been dialed.\"207  To be sure, collection of telephone metadata at this scale raises legitimate policy concerns about its implications for privacy and civil liberties.  But the Supreme Court has not elevated those concerns to a constitutional dimension by holding that collection of telephone call metadata can constitute a Fourth Amendment \"search\" or \"seizure.\"208\n\n## B.\n\n(U) *Even assuming* that the collection of CDRs under the CDR program could constitute a \"search\" or \"seizure\" under the Fourth Amendment, the program could find a constitutional basis under a separate strand of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence arising in the national security context.  The Supreme Court has acknowledged that the Fourth Amendment may require different \"safeguards\" in the national security context than in ordinary criminal cases.209  Indeed, in *Carpenter*, the Court explained that its \"opinion d[id] not consider other collection techniques involving foreign affairs or national security.\"210\n(U) Based on such language, lower courts, including the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court of Review, have embraced a \"foreign intelligence\" exception to the Fourth Amendment's warrant and probable cause requirement.211  These courts have held that foreign Amendment analysis with respect to other types of information.  *Cf. Carpenter*, 138 S. Ct. at 2217 n.3.\n\n209 (U) *Katz v. United States*, 389 U.S. 347, 358 n.23 (1967); *United States v. U.S. Dist. Court for E. Dist. of Mich.*,\n407 U.S. 297, 30809 & n.8 (1972).\n210 (U) *Carpenter*, 138 S. Ct. at 2220. 211 (U) *See In re Directives Pursuant to Section 105B of Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act*, 551 F.3d 1004, 1010\n(FISA Ct. Rev. 2008); *United States v. Truong Dinh Hung*, 629 F.2d 908, 915 (4th Cir. 1980); accord United States v. Butenko, 494 F.2d 593 (3d Cir. 1974); *United States v. Brown*, 484 F.2d 418 (5th Cir. 1973).  Our colleagues would not here rely on the foreign intelligence exception to the warrant requirement or, more generally, the special needs exception.  See Statement of Ed Felten and Travis LeBlanc at 71 n.336.  Yet they do not make clear whether any other exception would apply.  Their \"reluctan[ce]\" to rely on the special needs exception is grounded in a citation of a decades-old *dissenting* opinion of the Supreme Court.  Statement of Ed Felten and Travis LeBlanc at 71\nn.336 (citing *Skinner v. Railway Lab Execs. Ass'n*, 489 U.S. 602 (1989) (Marshall, J., dissenting)), but that exception has long been treated as settled law by the Supreme Court, see, e.g., *Los Angeles v. Patel*, 135 S. Ct. 2443,\n2452 (2014) (\"Search regimes where no warrant is ever required may be reasonable where special needs . . . make the warrant and probable-cause requirement impracticable, and where the primary purpose of the searches is\n\nintelligence searches must satisfy the Fourth Amendment requirement of \"reasonableness,\" rather than the usual requirement that the government obtain probable cause and a warrant.\n\n(U) The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court of Review has explained current doctrine in the following manner:\n(U) When law enforcement officials undertake a search to uncover evidence of criminal wrongdoing, the familiar requirement of a probable-cause warrant generally achieves an acceptable balance between the investigative needs of the government and the privacy interests of the people.  But it has long been recognized that some searches occur in the service of \"special needs, beyond the normal need for law enforcement,\" and that, when it comes to intrusions of this kind, the warrant requirement is sometimes a poor proxy for the textual command of reasonableness.\n. . . (U) [I]n this context, the warrant requirement is ill-suited to gauge what is reasonable.  The textual command of reasonableness\"the ultimate touchstone of the Fourth Amendment,\"still governs.  Indeed, it retains its whole force.212\n(U) Reasonableness analysis \"examine[s] the totality of the circumstances and weigh[s]\nthe promotion of legitimate governmental interests against the degree to which the search intrudes upon an individual's privacy.\"213  Various factors would be relevant to assessing the Fourth Amendment reasonableness of the CDR program.  The presence of \"privacy protecting measures,\" including \"FISC-approved targeting and minimization\" procedures, forms one\n212 (U) *In re Certified Question of Law*, 858 F.3d 591, 605, 607 (FISA Ct. Rev. 2016) (citations omitted).  The court's holding is instructive on the question we address here.  The court held: \"when the government, acting pursuant to a program of surveillance involving a legitimate objective that goes beyond everyday crime control, seeks to use a pen register directed at a person located in the United States who is reasonably believed to be engaged in clandestine intelligence activities on behalf of a foreign government, it may do so without obtaining a probablecause warrant even if its monitoring of post-cut-through digits constitutes a search under the Fourth Amendment.\" In re Certified Question of Law, 858 F.3d at 605.  In other words, the court held that, even if the particular collection at issue in the case would constitute a \"search\" and therefore require a warrant in the criminal context, a \"probablecause warrant\" was not required in the context of a foreign-intelligence search.  The court went on to hold that \"[t]he search, assuming it is one, is reasonable.\"  *In re Certified Question of Law*, 858 F.3d at 607.\n\n213 (U) *United States v. Mohamud*, 843 F.3d 420, 441 (9th Cir. 2016) (quoting *Maryland v. King*, 569 U.S. 435, 448\n(2013) (brackets and internal quotation marks omitted)).\n\n\"important component of the reasonableness inquiry.\"214  Others include the nature of the information collected, the privacy interest that attaches, and the government interest in the collection.\n\n(U) In conducting this analysis, courts assess whether a proposed investigatory activity was reasonable *given what the government knew at the time*, rather than with the benefit of hindsight.  In other words, rather than assess the success of a particular wiretap or a particular program based on what the government discovered, a court conducts a reasonableness analysis by placing itself in the shoes of a government investigator at the time of the government \"search.\"  As then-Judge Scalia put the point, \"just as 'a search is not to be made legal by what it turns up,' the fact that, *ex post*, a wiretap is seen to have been unsuccessful in developing national-security information does not establish that, *ex ante*, it was not reasonable to conduct it for that purpose.\"215  Similarly, then-Judge Ruth Bader Ginsburg explained \"[t]hat probable cause may have been absent when viewing the arrest *ex post* does not in and of itself establish that the officer acted in an objectively unreasonable manner *ex ante*.\"216  Indeed, the contrary rule would mean that every government search that was lawfully predicated at the time would ultimately be \"unreasonable\" if it failed to discover evidence related to a crime or foreign intelligence.  On that logic, every time the government properly elected, as a matter of sound policy, to shut down a program, the program would become unconstitutional because the government had effectively conceded that the program's costs outweighed its benefits.217\n(1987) (observing that the relevant Fourth Amendment inquiry is whether \"in the light of preexisting law the unlawfulness\" of government action was \"apparent\" and describing the question as an \"objective (albeit factspecified) [inquiry into] whether a reasonable officer could have believed\" action was legal).  For other cases using a similar approach in a variety of Fourth Amendment-related circumstances, see *Bruce v. Guernsey*, 777 F.3d 872 (7th Cir. 2015) (\"Guernsey also argues that the fact that Bruce was ultimately admitted to the hospital and later involuntarily committed to a behavioral health center for three days demonstrates that he had probable cause to seize her.  But the Fourth Amendment requires an *ex ante*, not an *ex post*, analysis.\"); *United States v. Green*, 560 F.3d\n853, 857 (8th Cir. 2009) (rejecting *ex post* analysis regarding whether a particular dresser could completely conceal a person).\n217 (U) That is why we focus on the perspective of those who established the CDR program.  As for \"whether an extension of that authority would be constitutional in light of the facts and circumstances known today,\"  Statement of Ed Felten and Travis LeBlanc at 71, we do not believe that a statute enacted by Congress to reauthorize the CDR program would be \"facially\" unreasonable, and hence unconstitutional, under the Fourth Amendment.  The Court has made clear that \"claims for facial relief under the Fourth Amendment\"direct attacks on the constitutionality of a statute, as opposed to the statute's application to a particular set of facts\"are unlikely to succeed when there is substantial ambiguity as to what conduct a statute authorizes.\"  *City of Los Angeles v. Patel*, 135 S. Ct. 2443, 2450 (2015).  That is because, to succeed on such a facial challenge, a \"plaintiff must establish that a law is unconstitutional in all of its applications.\"  *Patel*, 135 S. Ct. at 2451 (emphasis added, quotation marks\n(U) Viewing the CDR program from the \"*ex ante*\" perspective of those who initiated it, many factors weigh in favor of finding the program reasonable for constitutional purposes.  To obtain FISA court approval for each \"specific selection term\" that was the basis for CDR\ncollection, the government was required to demonstrate a \"reasonable, articulable suspicion\" that the specific selection term was associated with international terrorism.218  The program was implemented under FISA court oversight, minimization procedures mandated by Congress and approved by the court, and internal oversight by NSA.219  Moreover, the USA Freedom Act's CDR provision expressly limits collection to information comparable to a pen registerdialing and routing information, a category of information about which, the Supreme Court held in Smith, callers have \"no legitimate expectation of privacy.\"220  And the program was inarguably run in furtherance of \"the paramount interest in investigating possible threats to national security.\"221  That interest, the Supreme Court has held, \"is an urgent objective of the highest order.\"222\n(U) On the other hand, the CDR program reached out to the second hop, capturing metadata about calls in which neither of the participants was the object of the \"reasonable, articulable suspicion\" reviewed by the court.  And given the inherent math of multi-hop collection, the number of records collected at each succeeding hop would foreseeably be exponentially larger than those at the preceding hop.223  The result would be that the largest targeting decisions were made pursuant to court-approved procedures but not individually reviewed by the FISA\ncourt.  843 F.3d at 44344.  (The court in *Mohamud* also held, in the alternative, that the 702 collection in that case did not require a warrant because it \"was targeted at a non-U.S. person with no Fourth Amendment right.\"\nMohamud, 843 F.3d at 439 (citing *United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez*, 494 U.S. 259 (1990))).\n\n219 (U) *See* NSA USA Freedom Act Transparency Report at 13 (\"Analysts will require appropriate and adequate training, and must have both an international terrorism mission purpose and a need to know in order to be provided access to the CDRs obtained through the USA Freedom Act.  Analyst queries of records acquired under the USA\nFreedom Act will be intended to determine or identify persons of foreign intelligence interest who may be engaged in international terrorism.  All queries will be subject to post-query auditing.  The USA Freedom Act data will be used to produce intelligence reports, following reporting and minimization procedures.\").  Cf. In re Certified Question of Law, 858 F.3d at 608 (relying, to assess Fourth Amendment reasonableness, on \"the fact that FISA pen register interceptions are conducted only with the approval and under the supervision of a neutral magistrate, in this case a FISC judge\" and that \"minimization procedures are available, and are regularly employed\").\n\nproportion of communicants in the records collectedthe second-hop contactswould be people who were neither the objects of \"reasonable, articulable suspicion\" themselves nor in direct contact with the object of that suspicion.224\n(U) In weighing these factors, Fourth Amendment reasonableness analysis resists clear rules or rigid formulas.225  It is informative, however, that in the past few years, both the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court of Review and the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit have upheld as reasonable under the Fourth Amendment the incidental (but foreseeable)\ncollection of *content* in the context of FISA surveillance.226  (Notably, the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court of Review's analysis also presumed that collecting a second tranche of\n\"dialing information,\" beyond the first number dialed, raised no constitutional problem.227)\nWhile the collection of a second hop here is intentional rather than incidental, the privacy interest attached to the category of information collectedtelephone dialing and routing information\nis, under settled Supreme Court precedent, qualitatively weaker, and the program was surrounded by comparable (in some respects, stronger) oversight safeguards.228\n(U) Because the Board concludes that the program was constitutional under the Smith line of precedent described above, we need not resolve whether it separately would be constitutional under a reasonableness analysis.  This accords with the Board's 2014 report229 and reflects the Board's disinclination to offer constitutional opinions where unnecessary; it is not a view of the merits.230\n\nLaw, the \"content\" at issue consisted of certain \"additional digits\" dialed after a telephone call is connected, which \"do not constitute dialing information, but instead constitute a form of content information.\"  858 F.3d at 594. These could include \"a password, a personal identification number, . . . a bank account number,\" \"a credit card number,\" \"or a Social Security number.\"  *In re Certified Question of Law*, 858 F.3d at 594.  By contrast, the USA Freedom Act's CDR provision authorized the government to receive only limited categories of non-content information: \"session-identifying information . . . , a telephone calling card number, or the time or duration of a call.\"  50 U.S.C.  1861(k)(3)(A).\n\n227 (U) *See In re Certified Question of Law*, 858 F.3d at 594 & n.2. 228 (U) For example, under Section 702, targeting decisions are made by agencies themselves, subject to courtapproved procedures.  Under the USA Freedom Act CDR provision, the FISA court must approve each specific selection term used as the basis for collection.  *See Mohamud*, 843 F.3d at 44344.\n\n229 (U) The Board's 2014 report on the bulk CDR report limited its constitutional analysis to the *Smith*-based rationale.  *See* 2014 Board Report at 126.\n\n230 (U) To the extent our colleagues mean to suggest the program is vulnerable on First Amendment grounds, see Statement of Ed Felten and Travis LeBlanc at 76-77, we disagree.  Assuming an intelligence program consistent with the Fourth Amendment could violate the First Amendment, *cf. Am. Civil Liberties Union v. Clapper*, 959 F. Supp. 2d 724, 753 (S.D.N.Y. 2013), aff'd in part, vacated in part, *remanded*, 785 F.3d 787 (2d Cir. 2015)\n\n## C.\n\n(U) As explained elsewhere in this Report, we share our colleagues' judgment that the CDR program's value did not appear to outweigh its \"risks and cost.\"231  As for the program's constitutionality, we agree with our colleagues \"that *Smith* remains good law\" and that \"the government had a reasonable legal argument\" that the CDR program \"was consistent with the Fourth Amendment at its inception.\"232  But we part ways with our colleagues' judgments on the role that the Board can and should play in providing clear guidance to lawmakers and policymakers who seek to respect constitutional limits in designing intelligence programsand who may be considering whether to reauthorize the two-hop provision of the USA Freedom Act. We worry that a conclusion that the entirety of Fourth Amendment doctrine is up for grabs may cast a cloud of legal uncertainty over the now-shuttered CDR program, without providing a clear theory of constitutional infirmity.  Although it would intimate (while not concluding outright)\nthat the program may have been unconstitutional, it would do so without offering the lawmakers who passed it and the government employees who implemented it a concrete explanation for why they may have violated the law, despite their sincere beliefs to the contrary.  Our constitutional analysis has therefore sought to chart a reasonable middle ground of providing predictability where we see it in the doctrine, while not resolving questions unnecessary to a bottom-line constitutional analysis.  We believe that this approach is the way that the Board may most effectively serve Congress, the Executive Branch, and the public.  It is rare that a novel program does not diverge from prior cases, such as, here, *Smith* and its progeny; the question is how those distinctions affect the legal analysis.  That is the question we have sought to address.\nAnd on that point, our colleagues' statement is largely silent.233  Their statement posits, for example, that *Carpenter* and *Riley* \"carry more significance in assessing the constitutionality of the CDR program . . . than the majority affords them,\"234 yet does not explain what that significance might be.\n\n(U) More concretely, our colleagues' statement does not make clear how to apply Smith and subsequent cases to an analysis of the CDR program or other metadata-collection authorities.\n\n(finding \"well-supported\" the government's argument that \"surveillance consistent with Fourth Amendment protections . . . does not violate First Amendment rights\"), the collection of CDRs under the USA Freedom Act is not such a program.  \"[A]ny alleged chilling effect here arises from [a person's] speculative fear that the Government will review telephony metadata related to [their] telephone calls.\"  *ACLU v. Clapper*, 959 F. Supp. 2d at 754.  Such a fear was found insufficient to establish a First Amendment violation in the context of the bulk telephony program, *ACLU v. Clapper*, 959 F. Supp. 2d at 754; cf. 2014 Board Report at 136; 2014 Board Report at\n210 (statement of Rachel Brand) (\"I agree with the Board's ultimate conclusion that the program is constitutional under existing Supreme Court caselaw.\"), and by extension would be insufficient here as well.\n\n\nIt questions whether the CDR program is \"similar enough\" to *Smith* for that case to control, citing facts about the most recent incarnation of the CDR program.235  Specifically, it notes that, in *Smith*, \"the police collected the numbers the defendant dialed . . . but did not collect information about the duration of the defendant's calls or whether the calls were completed\"; that, in *Smith*, the police did not \"collect information about incoming calls to the defendant's telephone line\"; and that \"*Smith* involved a short duration of use of a pen register (no more than\n2 days) and the dialing information of just one person.\"236\n(U) The apparent implication of reciting these differences is that *Smith* should be strictly limited to those types of dialing information collected by the relatively primitive pen register available in the late 1960s.  But if that is right, the USA Freedom Act CDR authority would be just one casualty among many: the Pen Register Statute237 and the Stored Communications Act,238 which are used every day in criminal cases, would be similarly vulnerable.  So would the FISA business records provision, which allows the government to obtain non-content records based on reasonable, articulable suspicion rather than a probable-cause warrant.239  Accepting the statement's narrow view of *Smith* would destabilize criminal and national-security investigations across the United States.\n\n(U) Our colleagues note the potential that CDRs might allow for information about a user's location in a way that would undermine *Smith*'s applicability and bring the program \"into an intermediate area between *Smith* and *Carpenter*.\"240  Yetand as the prior Board pointed out in discussing the bulk telephony program it found constitutionaltelephony metadata will often provide general insights into location.  For example, area codes and telephone prefixes offer some indicia of location.  The possibility our colleagues raise would not appear to be categorically distinct from these well-understood and expected indicia.  For example, the mere fact that a subscriber of company A roams into company B's network would not trigger the creation of a CDR; rather, the subscriber would have to place or receive a call.  And even then, doing so would indicate only that they were in a company B coverage area, not *which* area.\n\n235 (U) Statement of Ed Felten and Travis LeBlanc at 74. 236 (U) Statement of Ed Felten and Travis LeBlanc at 73. 237 (U) The Pen Register Statute authorizes the collection of both numbers dialed and incoming calls for a duration of 60 days, with the possibility of further 60-day extensions.  18 U.S.C.  3123 (c); *see also*  3127(3)(4) (\"pen register\" obtains \"dialing, routing, addressing, or signaling information\"; \"trap and trace device\" \"captures the incoming electronic or other impulses which identify the originating number or other dialing, routing, addressing, and signaling information reasonably likely to identify the source of a wire or electronic communication\").\n\n238 (U) 18 U.S.C.  2073(c)(d) (court order to obtain non-content information about subscribers and \"electronic communication service or remote computing service\" to issue upon a showing of \"specific and articulable facts showing that there are reasonable grounds to believe that the contents of a wire or electronic communication, or the records or other information sought, are relevant and material to an ongoing criminal investigation\").\n\nRoaming, then, would not appear to provide more specific location information than was understood and accepted at the time of *Smith*or, for that matter, more specific location information than is collected under any other authority that allows the government to receive telephony metadata.  Perhaps for that reason, the Board is unaware of any information to support the suggestion that NSA actually used the CDRs in the manner suggested by our colleagues. Now, perhaps technology will change and available location information will become more exact.  But the program was suspended.  The information available to the government at the time of its operation simply is not the \"near perfect surveillance\" created by the type of location information discussed in *Carpenter*.241\n(U) Reasonable people can, of course, disagree in good faith about the legality of a national security program.  Yet we worry when Members of the Board cast doubt about the constitutionality of a program (one that operated for years and collected data relating to millions of Americans) without explaining where lawmakers and policymakers may have erred in their efforts to follow the lawor what they can do differently in the future to place programs on surer legal footing.242\n\n## B. (U) Statutory Analysis\n\n(U) In reviewing the operation of the USA Freedom Act CDR program, from its incarnation until its suspension in 2019, the Board considered whether the implementation of the program comported with the text of the statute.  The Board concluded that the program was statutorily authorized.  Moreover, the Board found no abuse of the program; nor did it find any instance in which government officials intentionally sought records they knew were statutorily prohibited.  As noted in Part II(B) of this report, the program did not always function as intended: during its lifetime, a series of compliance incidents and data-integrity concerns arose.\nThese compliance incidents raise technical questions about how to interpret the USA Freedom Act's authorities in light of complicated and continually evolving telephony infrastructure. Importantly, in response to each compliance incident that raised questions about the scope of permitted collection under the statute, NSA chose not to retain or collect data, even where a reading of the statutory text might have justified it.\n\n## 1. (U) The Usa Freedom Act Cdr Program Was Statutorily Authorized\n\n(U) Beginning in 2006, the FISA court accepted the government's argument that the then-existing version of FISA's business-records provision, known as Section 215, permitted bulk collection of CDRs.243  Once the bulk CDR program was revealed to the public, that interpretation became subject to wider scrutiny.  In 2014, the Board's report on Section 215\nconcluded that NSA's bulk telephony program was not statutorily authorized.244  In May 2015, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reached the same conclusion.245  The next month, Congress enacted the USA Freedom Act.246\n(U) Unlike the previous bulk program, CDR collection under the USA Freedom Act rested unambiguously on statutory authority.  By the time the Act was being debated, the details of the previous bulk program were known publicly.  The program had been the subject of multiple press reports; the President had ordered a review of the program and instructed the Department of Justice and Director of National Intelligence to make changes to its implementation;247 and the Board had released its public report.  During the debates themselves, Congress heard from an array of government officials and interest groups, many of whom testified to the potential benefits and drawbacks of the program.248\n(U) The resulting statute took clear positions on the issues being debated:  It authorized the government to compel with a court order the production of CDRs \"on a daily basis\"249 and to require the \"prompt production of a second set of [CDRs]\" based on information produced in\n244 (U) 2014 Board Report at 16872.  Two of the five Board Members did not concur with this analysis.  2014\nBoard Report at 20918.\n\nsecurity-oversight-of-fisa-foreign-intelligence-surveillance-act-surveillance-programs.\n\nresponse to the initial specific selection term.250  In short, it authorized the government to obtain two hops of CDRs on an ongoing basis.\n(U) The statutory framework also imposed boundaries on CDR collection.  A notable limitation arose from the definition of \"call detail record,\" which the statute defined to exclude the contents of a communication, the name of a subscriber or customer, and cell-site location or global positioning system information.251  The Board is aware of no instance in which NSA\nsought to circumvent this or any other statutory limitation related to the program.252  For example, the Board is not aware of any instance in which NSA sought or obtained global positioning system information, cell-site location information, or the names of subscribers.\n\n(U) The technical architecture created by NSA to collect CDRs under the USA Freedom Act was designed to comport with the statute.253  As described in Part II of this report, the system contained a series of safeguards; many could be mapped directly to the statutory limitations, while others were implemented for policy and compliance purposes.  For example, when receiving CDRs from providers, NSA's validation checks could detect if a provider had accidentally sent additional data fields forbidden by the statute, such as subscriber name or cellsite location information.  The system was technically unable to ingest information not contained in the roughly fifty specified data fields.254\n\n## 2. (U) Compliance Incidents And Data-Integrity Concerns\n\n(U) Beginning in 2016, NSA identified a series of compliance and data-integrity concerns.  These can be divided into two categories: those that could arise in other areas of FISA or equivalent law enforcement authorities, and those unique to the USA Freedom Act's statutory framework.\n(U) The incidents involving information omitted from a 2016 application to the FISA\ncourt,255 certain NSA officers' missing required training,256 and a provider's production of data\n252 (U) Other statutory requirements include that collection be based on a specific selection term, that the government have approved minimization procedures, and that it destroys information as required by those procedures.  50 U.S.C.  1861(c)(2)(A), (F)(vii).\n253 (U) See Part II(A) for an explanation of this architecture.  *See also* NSA USA Freedom Act Transparency Report. 254 (U//FOUO) *See* NSA Final Answers to PCLOB Questions (Nov. 22, 2019). 255 (U) Part II(B)(1)(a). 256 (U) Part II(B)(1)(c).\n\nbeyond the end date of an order do not uniquely implicate CDRs or the fact that the USA Freedom Act provides a two-hop collection authority.  Based on our review of the facts, the Board determined that these incidents were inadvertent, not willful, and that NSA handled each case seriously.  Whether purposeful or incidental, such compliance incidents are not trivial.  In each instance, the government notified the FISA court and took steps to remediate the issue, including by deleting the affected data.257\n(TS//SI//NF) Other incidents raise questions that are unique to the contours of the USA\nFreedom Act.  Specifically, the incidents involving\n258\n259 raise other statutory questions.  In these incidents, NSA systems automatically pushed requests to providers that were based on data received by NSA in response to a prior request.  These incidents present intricate questions about the application of statutory terms to the telephony infrastructure.260\n(TS//SI//NF) In the first set of CDR-specific incidents, NSA's system automatically requested a second hop of data based off\n, rather than the ultimate recipient of a call.261  Note, however, that the statute does not actually use the colloquial term\n\"hop.\"  Rather, the relevant text of the statute permits a FISA court order issued under the Act to \"provide that the Government may require the prompt production of a second set of call detail records using session-identifying information . . . identified by the specific selection term used\"\nas the basis for the first request for CDRs.262  The question is thus whether is the type of information the government can use to \"require the prompt production of a second set of call detail records\"; that is, in statutory terms, whether constitutes records . . . [shall] provide that the Government may require the prompt production of a first set of call detail records\n. . . [shall] provide that the Government may require the prompt production of a second set of call detail records using session-identifying information . . . identified by the specific selection term use to produce [the first set of] call detail records[.]\").  Those statutory terms are then incorporated by the court in the primary orders issued to the agency and secondary orders issued to providers.  The Board is not aware of any FISA court opinions that address the compliance incidents discussed here and their implications for compliance with the statute or relevant court orders.\n\n261 (U) Re: Preliminary Notice of Compliance Incident Regarding Applications of the Federal Bureau of Investigation for Orders Requiring the Production of Call Detail Records, Various Docket Numbers (Nov. 22, 2017).\n\n262 (U) 50 U.S.C.  1861(c)(2)(F)(iv).\n\n\"session-identifying information . . . identified by the specific selection term used to produce\"\nthe first set of CDRs.263\n(U) Although the statute does not define \"session-identifying information,\" it does provide a non-exclusive list of examples, specifying that \"call detail record\" means, among other things, \"session-identifying information (including an originating or terminating telephone number, an [IMSI] number, or an [IMEI] number).\"264  The word \"including\" indicates that these enumerated examples are illustrative, not exclusive.  Accordingly, \"session-identifying information\" might include other things too.265\n(TS//SI//NF) But what other things?  Could used to connect a call constitute \"session-identifying information\" under the statute?\n\n  Furthermore, the statute excludes from its examples of session-identifying information other information that is part of a CDR, specifically \"a telephone calling card number, or the time or duration of a call.\"  On the other hand, reading the phrase \"session-identifying\" to encompass only information about the endpointsone possible attribute of a session, but not the only onewould effectively transform \"session-identifying\" into \"user-identifying\" or \"endpoint-identifying.\"  Without more specific language in the statute, it remains uncertain whether the use of as\n\"session-identifying information\" would have been appropriate under the statute as the basis for a request for a second set of CDRs.  Moreover, this statutory question must be considered alongside other textual features of the Act, including Congress's prohibition on the bulk collection of metadata.\n\n(TS//SI//NF) In the end, however, the agency adopted a narrow reading of the statute and acted accordingly, ending the inadvertent collection, deleting the records it produced, and notifying the FISA court.266\n265 (U) See, e.g., *Federal Land Bank of St. Paul v. Bismarck Lumber Co.*, 314 U.S. 95, 100 (1941) (\"[T]he term\n'including' is not one of all-embracing definition, but connotes simply an illustrative application of the general principle[.]\").\n\n266 (U) Another intricacy here is that NSA was unaware of the underlying infirmities in the first-hop results when its system automatically pushed them out to providers as the basis for second-hop collection.  Whatever the legal significance of this fact for purposes of assessing NSA's compliance with court orders, NSA took prompt corrective action once it became aware of the problem.  See Re: Supplemental Notice of Compliance Incident Regarding\n(TS//SI//NF) A second set of CDR-specific incidents, which involved\n\nraises equally complex statutory questions.  There,\n\n267  According to its subsequent public press release, NSA stated that \"[t]hese irregularities . . . resulted in the production . . . of some CDRs that NSA was not authorized to receive.\"268  NSA deleted the data that it had acquired as a result of these issues, a fact the agency then disclosed publicly.269\n(TS//SI//NF) The government subsequently considered whether it could, in fact, lawfully request an additional production of CDRs\n  It concluded that it *could* obtain CDR records based on reasoning that are . . . valid session identifying information because in contact with are included\n\n270  Out of an abundance of caution, however, the government also determined that NSA would not forward any such information to its corporate repositories.271\n(TS//SI//NF) In statutory terms, this incident raises subtle questions about the precise terms of the statute.  Could be considered that could then be used to \"require the prompt production of a second set of call detail records\"?272\nCould\n\n because of its role in routing the call?273  The answers to these questions are murky, and we are aware of no on-point precedent interpreting the relevant terms.\n, out of an abundance of caution, NSA did not forward\n\n270 (U) Supplemental Notice of Compliance Incident Regarding Multiple Dockets In Re Applications of the Federal Bureau of Investigation for Orders Requiring the Production of Call Detail Records (CDRs) Pursuant to Title V of FISA, as amended by the USA FREEDOM Act (Mar. 4, 2019).\n\n271 (U) Supplemental Notice of Compliance Incident Regarding Multiple Dockets In Re Applications of the Federal Bureau of Investigation for Orders Requiring the Production of Call Detail Records (CDRs) Pursuant to Title V of FISA, as amended by the USA FREEDOM Act (Mar. 4, 2019).\n\ninformation derived from these providers into its long-term repositorieseven though the Department of Justice believed that it could.274\n(U) Other data-integrity errors involved inaccurate data transmitted to NSA by providers.\n\nIn one such incident, a provider overwrote certain CDR fields with unrelated data.  If the inaccurate fields were used as the basis for subsequent collection, it would raise the question whether an automated request for second-hop results based on irrelevant data returned by a firsthop request would constitute a request based on \"session-identifying information . . . identified by the specific selection term used\" in the first-hop request.275  NSA responded by (1) notifying the FISA court to describe each of these data-integrity errors and (2) deleting all of the affected records.\n\n(TS//SI//NF) Given the decision not to use the information obtained in incidents involving\n, as well as the subsequent decision to suspend the program, the government never litigated to a conclusion complications surrounding these issues.  The agency's decisions to err on the side of caution meant that abstract questions about the application of statutory text to these esoteric compliance incidents were never resolved.  At bottom, this analysis reveals an inherent indeterminacy in the statutory text, which incorporates terms (most notably, \"session-identifying information\") whose precise meaning is hinted at but not conclusively defined.  NSA resolved statutory uncertainties related to compliance incidents by proceeding cautiously, opting to rely on narrow interpretations rather than more expansive alternatives.  Nevertheless, this experience counsels close attention to the range of potential meanings of statutory terms relating to technology by drafters, overseers, and agencies themselves.  This is particularly important when an agency will be tasked with applying these terms to large-scale data collection involving complex technical infrastructure whose precise contours may not yet be known.  Ultimately, these incidents serve mostly to illustrate the unanticipated complications that can arise even within a seemingly straightforward statutory framework.\n\n## V. (U) Analysis Of Privacy Risks\n\n\n(U) The government has suspended the USA Freedom Act CDR program and deleted the CDRs it collected under the program.276  As the statutory sunset approaches, however, Congress will consider whether to reauthorize or modify the CDR provision or allow it to expire.  For that reason, we consider the privacy and civil liberties risks arising from the type and scale of twohop CDR collection permitted by the statute and the role that various safeguards play in mitigating those risks.\n\n## A. (U) Scale And Sensitivity Of The Data Collected\n\n(U) Although this program did not collect CDRs in bulk, the volume of records ingested was large.  According to the Office of the Director of National Intelligence's 2018 Statistical Transparency Report, NSA received more than 151 million CDRs in 2016, 534 million in 2017, and 434 million in 2018.277  (These include \"duplicate records\" and \"numbers used by business entities for marketing purposes.\"278)  In 2018, NSA collected records pertaining to more than 19 million unique phone numbers.279\n(U) It is critical to remember that CDRs collected under the USA Freedom Act contained limited information.  Under the statute, CDRs cannot include a call's content, the name, address, or financial information of a subscriber or customer, or cell-site or geolocation information.280\nRather, acquired CDRs contained a set of fields including phone numbers, device-identifying numbers (*e.g.*, IMEI), subscriber-identifying numbers (*e.g.*, IMSI), a telephone calling card number, various routing and status information, and call time and duration.\n(S//NF) In theory, the connections documented by CDRs may reveal intimate information about an individual's personal life.  They could indicate sensitive personal facts (such as a specific health condition), relationships, occupation, age, or sex.  However, as noted in Part II(A)(2),\n  Moreover, Tool 1the metadata viewer that NSA analysts used to retrieve USA Freedom Act CDRshad limited\n\n[FISA Title V as amended by the USA Freedom Act] and deleted the call detail records acquired under this authority.\").\nmechanisms for analysts to annotate CDRs, and there was no mechanism\n281\n(U) Researchers have concluded that phone numbers can be combined with public data to reidentify individuals with \"trivial\" effort, and that it \"appears feasiblewith further refinementto draw Facebook-quality relationship inferences from telephone metadata.\"282 The feasibility of doing so augments the potential risks and harms associated with unauthorized users and malicious actors who, if they had access to records, could de-anonymize CDRs or infer sensitive data about individuals in that manner.  However, as noted below, the Board is aware of no instance in which USA Freedom Act CDR data was accessed by unauthorized or malicious actors, and accordingly is aware of no instance in which this risk materialized during the life of the program.\n\n## B. (U) Privacy Risks Arising From Two-Hop Cdr Collection\n\n(U) Unlike legal processes that allow the collection of one-hop CDRs (*e.g.*, grand jury subpoenas), the USA Freedom Act authorizes the collection of a second hop.   A two-hop program on this scale raises various privacy risks.  Some could arise in any program that involves the large-scale collection of sensitive data.  Distinctive features of two-hop collection, however, could have unique effects on the makeup of the dataset exposed to those risks.\n\n(U) Specifically, privacy risks that arise from any large-scale collection of sensitive datasets about Americans include the risk that authorized users could misuse their access to view, steal, or leak sensitive data for personal, ideological, or other inappropriate ends; the risk of theft or breach by unauthorized users or malicious outsiders; or the possibility that future shifts in applicable law, policy, or available technology could alter the balance between privacy risks and programmatic benefits.283  Limits on retention, technological controls, and the agency's compliance culture play an important role in mitigating these risks, but cannot eliminate them. While these risks are not specific to the USA Freedom Act CDR program, the exponential increase in the scale of collection that results from adding a second hop expands significantly the pool of data exposed to them.\n\nthe CDR, this could have revealed additional information about the originator or recipient of a call.  Learning more about the associates of people suspected of involvement in terrorism is, of course, one of the important purposes for which NSA collects and analyzes this information in the first place.\n\n282 (U) Jonathan Mayer, Patrick Mutchler, & John C. Mitchell, Evaluating the privacy properties of telephone metadata, 113 PNAS 5536, 5538 (May 17, 2016), https://www.pnas.org/content/pnas/113/20/5536 full.pdf.\n283 (U) For example, future statutory changes could expand the purposes for which NSA is permitted to use or share the information.  Technological changes could also create unanticipated risks; improved analytical tools might allow, for example, the government to draw more sophisticated inferences from the data than is possible today.\n\n(U) Two distinctive features of two-hop collection affect the type of records exposed to those risks.  The first arises from the possibility of errors in first-hop results.  In a two-hop program, errors in first-hop records, if not caught and corrected, could lead to the collection of a large number of second-hop records that should not have been collected.  For example, if a technical error caused a first-hop record to include an incorrect phone number as the call recipient, all second-hop records associated with that number could be erroneously collected.  In a one-hop program, a human agent or analyst would identify relevant first-hop results to use as the basis for seeking additional collection; this potentially lessens (although does not eliminate entirely) the risk of erroneous additional collection based on first hops.\n\n(U) The second distinctive feature of two-hop collection is that the government is likely to receive far more second-hop records, which include information about individuals who are indirectly connected to the target, than first-hop records, which relate to the target and the target's *direct* contacts.  The result is that in a two-hop program, any privacy risks arising from the collection disproportionately affect individuals with no direct connection to the individualized suspicion on which the surveillance rests.\n(U) These two distinctive features of two-hop collection manifested themselves during the life of the CDR program.  At several points, incorrect first-hop results returned by providers were automatically used as the basis for second-hop requests.284  (Once these incidents were discovered, NSA notified the FISA court and deleted the resulting data.)  With respect to volume, 14 orders produced more than 400 million records in 2018, and NSA has acknowledged the exponential growth in the number of records that results from adding a second hop.285\n(U) The Board is not aware of any instances in which the abuses described above as potentially arising from large-scale data collectionbreaches, leaks, theft, and so forth materialized during the short life of the CDR program.  The Board has no information suggesting that CDRs were leaked, breached, or misused by anyone within the agency.  NSA implemented technological and process controls, discussed below, to reduce the risk of loss or misuse of CDRs.\n\n## C. (U)  Program Limits And Controls\n\n(U) The program operated subject to statutory limits, internal controls, and oversight, both within NSA and outside the agency.  By statute, NSA may only seek CDRs based on seed numbers relevant to an authorized investigation to protect against international terrorism.286  The agency's minimization procedures, which were adopted by the Attorney General and approved by the FISA court, limit when and for what purpose analysts may access USA Freedom Act CDR data.287  Specifically, NSA may only grant access to personnel who are trained on the procedures and restrictions that govern the handling and dissemination of that data and who have a need to know.288  The procedures also prohibit NSA from retaining CDRs for more than five years after they were delivered to NSA unless the relevant CDR contained information that formed the basis for a foreign intelligence report.289\n(U) Internal policies and guidance impose further limits.290  Queries could only be initiated when \"intended to determine or identify persons of foreign intelligence interest who may be engaged in international terrorism,\" and were subject to audit.291  These limits and controls played a role in mitigating the privacy risks posed by the program during its operation.\n(U) Like other NSA activities, the USA Freedom Act CDR program was overseen by various elements within NSA.  The Board's oversight, including demonstrations of NSA's compliance technology, indicates that the agency has made significant investments in internal compliance and accountability processes.  For instance, NSA had measures in place to ensure that only the right people could see CDR program information on NSA's systems and that those people could use the information only for authorized purposes.  Every query by an NSA analyst is logged and later reviewed by a human auditor familiar with the analyst's mission, and NSA has deployed technology to augment the capabilities of these human auditors.  Software developers seek to build minimization and compliance rules into the design of the user interfaces that analysts use, reducing the need to rely on human recall and judgment to ensure Strategy for Trusted Identities in Cyberspace, Appendix A (Apr. 2011).\n288 (U) NSA USA Freedom Act Transparency Report at 6.  These restrictions relate to the FIPPs principle of \"use limitation,\" which provides that organizations should use personal data for the stated purposes and share it in ways that are compatible with such purposes,\" and the principle of \"data quality\", which states that steps should be taken to ensure that personal data is \"accurate, relevant, timely, and complete.\"  The White House, National Strategy for Trusted Identities in Cyberspace, Appendix A (Apr. 2011).\n289 (U) NSA USA Freedom Act Transparency Report at 7. 290 (U) *See* Part II(A)(2). 291 (U) NSA USA Freedom Act Transparency Report at 13.  Query limits reinforce the FIPPs principle of use limitation.  NSA's training, compliance, and auditing practices address the FIPPs principle of auditing.  *See* The White House, *National Strategy for Trusted Identities in Cyberspace*, Appendix A (Apr. 2011).\n\ncompliance.292  Automated checks now ensure that analysts whose training has lapsed lose access to systems for which the training is required.\n\n## D. (U) Transparency And Public Understanding\n\n(U) Since the unauthorized disclosures by an NSA contractor in 2013, the intelligence community has taken important steps to enhance transparency, oversight, and compliance.  Some of these steps were initiated by NSA; others were mandated by Congress in the USA Freedom Act and other laws.293\n(U) As noted in Part I of the report, the CDR program was based on a publicly debated statute that clearly authorized the government to obtain records out to two hops from the target number on an ongoing basis.294\n(U) The plain text of the USA Freedom Act enabled Members of Congress, the media, outside experts and advocacy groups, and ordinary Americans to anticipate the broad attributes of the CDR collection that it authorized, even if specific operational details would remain classified.\n\n(U) Further, the CDR program was subject to ongoing oversight from all three branches of government.  Outside NSA, these included the FISA court, congressional committees, and the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board.  NSA and the Department of Justice notified the FISA court, Congress, and the Board of compliance incidents and data-integrity issues as they were discovered.295  NSA also issued several public disclosures about these issues over the life of the program and published a detailed, unclassified description of the program's technical architecture shortly after it began.296\n(U) The government also provided quantitative data about its use of the CDR authority and the number of records NSA received.  Each year, beginning in 2014, ODNI has released an Annual Statistical Transparency Report that provides detailed information about the volume of collection and the number of targets surveilled under various authorities, including the USA\n2015) (citing reliance on \"manual checks that analysts perform before querying data\" as factor contributing to noncompliant queries).\n\n293 (U) *See, e.g.*, USA Freedom Act, Pub. L. No. 114-123, 129 Stat. 268,  40102, 502, 60105 (June 2, 2015). 294 (U) 50 U.S.C.  1861(b)(2)(C), (c)(2)(F); *see also* H.R. Rep. 114-109, at 17 (May 8, 2015).\n\n295 (U) External oversight was relevant to several principles: it enhanced the program's transparency, helped to ensure data quality, and made provided accountability.  *See* The White House, National Strategy for Trusted Identities in Cyberspace, Appendix A (Apr. 2011).\n\n296 (U) NSA USA Freedom Act Transparency Report.\n\nFreedom Act.  The data in these reports conveyed the CDR program's scale, both in absolute terms and relative to the number of orders issued by the FISA court.297  As noted above, for example, NSA collected 434,238,543 records based on 14 court orders in 2018.  That report also disclosed for the first time the number of unique phone numbers contained within those records:\nmore than 19 million.298  The reports have provided progressively greater detail about how NSA\nand other agencies conduct these counts and why they opt for certain approaches over others. The significant effort that NSA, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, and other agencies invest in compiling and declassifying this information is an important investment in public understanding of these activities.\n\n## Vi. (U) Statement Of Chairman Adam Klein\n\n(U) When the Board began to review NSA's collection of call detail records under the USA Freedom Act, the program was active.  By the end of our review, NSA had publicly announced that it had suspended the program and decommissioned the equipment used to gather CDRs from the providers.\n\n(U) This project thus differs from the Board's past reports in an important respect:  The program it describes is no longer operational.  Nonetheless, the short life of CDR collection under the USA Freedom Act offers lessons for crafting and implementing future surveillance authorities.\n\n(U) I join the Board's report in full and am grateful to our staff for their hard work in preparing it.  Our work has profited immeasurably from their diligence, expertise, and judgment.\n\n## I. (U) Balancing Security And Liberty\n\n(U) As Congress recognized in the law that created our Board, \"[t]he choice between security and liberty is a false choice . . . .  Our history has shown us that insecurity threatens liberty.  Yet, if our liberties are curtailed, we lose the values that we are struggling to defend.\"299\nThe USA Freedom Act, like other post-9/11 legislation, reflects a delicate balancing aimed at preserving those two indispensable goods.\n\n(U) Counterterrorism programs that entail large-scale collection and retention of sensitive information about Americans should be initiated and preserved only if the value they provide outweighs the costs, including risks to privacy and civil liberties, and there is no better way to obtain the same value.  Even where an authority provides great value, policymakers should take all reasonable steps to mitigate privacy and civil liberties risks.300\n(U) This program did not involve bulk collection, but it took in large numbers of records.\n\nDuring 2017 and 2018, NSA collected nearly 1 billion call detail records under the USA\nis granted, there must be adequate guidelines and oversight to properly confine its use.\").\n\nFreedom Act.301  (This includes an unknown number of duplicates.302)  The scale of the collection is also proportionally large relative to the number of seed numbers associated with international terrorism.  Last year, the government obtained 14 FISA court orders based on a\n\"reasonable articulable suspicion\" that a specific selection term was associated with international terrorism.303  Those 14 orders enabled the government to collect 434 million records pertaining to more than 19 million unique phone numbers.304  Given the exponential math of two-hop collection, it is reasonable to assume that most of these were second-hop contactscallers two degrees of separation removed from the initial suspicious actor.  Our report describes the privacy considerations that arise from domestic collection and storage of call detail records on this scale.\n\n(U) On the other side of the balance is the operational need for this collection.\n\nInternational terrorism remains a dangerous threat.  Al Qaeda, ISIS affiliates, and other international terrorist groups continue to menace the United States.  Terrorists have capitalized on modern communications technologies, including social media and encrypted messaging, to identify, radicalize, and even direct from afar potential attackers in the US homeland.305\n(U) Given terrorist groups' reliance on digital communications, electronic surveillance will continue to play an indispensable role in protecting the nation from terrorism.  This includes collection and analysis of communications metadata.  The insightful discussion by Board Members Nitze and Bamzai illustrates how metadata analysis, including multi-hop contactchaining, can \"add significant intelligence value to national security investigations.\"306  Indeed, metadata analysis may become even more important for counterterrorism as content is increasingly protected by strong, end-to-end encryption.\n\n(U) The question is what role USA Freedom Act CDRs can play in that defense.  The upcoming sunset of the Act's CDR authority arrives against the backdrop of terrorist groups' widely documented shift away from telephony to newer, more secure modes of communication. Researchers have observed that \"[a]fter the Snowden leaks revealed how valuable terrorists' unencrypted communications were for US counterterrorism efforts, terrorist groups swiftly\n302 (U) *See* Office of the Director of National Intelligence, Statistical Transparency Report Regarding Use of National Security Authorities, Calendar Year 2017, at 35 (Apr. 2018) (\"[T]he number reported above . . . includes duplicate records[.]\").\n\n303 (U) 2018 Statistical Transparency Report at 30. 304 (U) 2018 Statistical Transparency Report at 30. 305 (U) *See, e.g.*, Bipartisan Policy Center, *Digital Counterterrorism: Fighting Jihadists Online*, 5, 15 (May 2018). 306 (U) Statement of Aditya Bamzai and Jane Nitze, Part I.\n\ntightened up their operational security.\"307  Their shift to IP-based communications, including social media and encrypted chat apps, has not made telephony irrelevant to counterterrorism\npeople still use phonesbut, as academic researchers have noted, it has become less central.308\n\"We are dealing with a challenge right now: New technologies that enable encryption and allow them to be fairly confident that they are communicating in a way that can't be detected,\" one US\nofficial told the news organization ProPublica in 2016.309  \"They know how to communicate securely.\"310\n(U) This shift suggests that focusing on the full spectrum of digital communications technologies, rather than voice telephony in isolation, would likely yield greatest counterterrorism value going forward.  Whether the complexities that led to compliance and data-integrity problems during the life of this program are likely to persist into the future depends on predictive judgments about the future of telephony networks and company billing practices, as well as the possibility that the government could develop technical approaches to mitigate these complexities.  The technical experts at NSA and outside technologists familiar with the intricacies of telephony networks would be best positioned to render those predictive judgments.  Given the persistence of terrorist threats to the homeland, Congress may wish to ask agencies whether they need alternative tools to meet the operational need that the USA Freedom Act and the prior bulk CDR program were designed to address.\n\n(U) It is also important to note that USA Freedom Act CDRs were only one of several avenues by which NSA and FBI can obtain and analyze communications metadata for counterterrorism purposes.  NSA collects phone metadata and electronic communications metadata as part of its global signals-intelligence mission carried out under Executive Order 12333.  This metadata, stored in an internal repository, can be used to protect the homeland from international terrorism: NSA's Supplemental Procedures Governing Communications Metadata Analysis allow \"identifiers associated with both non-US persons and US persons to be used to query phone metadata and electronic communications metadata that NSA obtains through other lawful collection methods.\"311  NSA can also collect communications metadata under Section\n702 of FISA, and FISC-approved procedures permit NSA to run US-person queries of 702 data if those queries are \"reasonably likely to retrieve foreign intelligence information.\"312\n(U) FBI receives a small subset of NSA's 702 collection and can query that data in search of foreign-intelligence information or evidence of a crime.313  Ordinary FISA business records requests can be used to obtain one hop of CDRs and metadata from other modes of digital communication.  Given that terrorism-related conduct is often a crime, FBI can also use grandjury subpoenas, which are less burdensome to obtain than FISA orders, to obtain first-hop CDRs in terrorism cases.\n\n(U) NSA is well-positioned to assess which of its various capabilities provide the greatest operational value.  It chose to suspend this program \"after balancing the program's relative intelligence value, associated costs, and compliance and data integrity concerns.\"314  Facts detailed earlier in this Report support that conclusion, even independent of the privacy concerns raised by domestic collection on this scale.  The low volume of intelligence reporting produced by the program15 reports over several yearsis particularly informative, especially when coupled with NSA's assessment that it would expect a program of this scale and expense to generate hundreds or thousands.315\n(U) That candor is creditable.  It is not easy for any government agency to acknowledge that a program was not successful, despite the resources and effort it consumed.  Agencies should be encouraged to periodically reassess their collection activities and terminate them when they outlive their usefulness or when their costs outweigh their value, with privacy and civil liberties considerations forming an integral part of that analysis.  Scrutiny of intelligence programs is an essential corrective in our democratic system.  However, outside observers should be careful to distinguish between abuse or overreachneither of which we found hereand programs that, despite good faith efforts, yield less than anticipated.  Intelligence is a complex enterprise in which uncertainty is pervasive.  It is not always clear in advance whether or not a program will yield benefits commensurate with its costs and risks.  If agencies feel compelled to defend rather than abandon unproductive programs, the principal casualty will be the privacy of those Americans whose data continues to be collected.\n\n## Ii. (U) Root Causes Of The Compliance Incidents And Data- Integrity Challenges\n\n(U) The Board reviewed in detail each compliance incident or data-integrity problem reported during the program's life.  We found no malfeasance or intentional abuse by NSA personnel in implementing this program.  Nor did we find any instance in which the agency intentionally sought to obtain information that it may not have been authorized to receive.  NSA personnel worked diligently to diagnose, report, and repair the problems encountered during the program's operation and to delete erroneously provided information once it was discovered.\n\n(U) The compliance incidents arose, with limited exception,316 from issues that were latent in the records NSA received from the providers.  Phone companies' billing systems are understandably designed to meet their own business needs.  By contrast, NSA's mission of extracting reliable intelligence from these CDRs while complying with statutory restrictions, court orders, and other legal obligations required a high level of precision and certainty about the attributes of the data.\n\n(U) While we found no intentional attempts to collect more data than authorized, unintentional over-collection, triggered by anomalies in the first-hop data returned by providers, proved a recurrent problem.  The program involved a complex, machine-to-machine technical architecture, with limited human intervention once initial, court-approved selection terms entered the system.  One side effect was that errors in the data could \"cascade[] across large numbers of records, with lagging human awareness.\"317  In other words, the system, by design, automatically pulled in second-hop records before a human could evaluate the first-hop results.  With ordinary requests for one hop of CDRs, by contrast, a human FBI agent or analyst would review the initial results.  Before using any first-hop results to seek additional, second-hop records, that agent or analyst would work to distinguish meaningful connections from irrelevant or erroneous data, including by using information acquired under other legal authorities.\n\n(U) By all accounts, NSA technical and analytical personnel demonstrated diligence and considerable ingenuity in uncovering, diagnosing, and working to repair each problem as it arose.  NSA also built checks into the system in an attempt to prevent collection errors before they occurred, and updated those checks as new problems were discovered.318  The fact that irregularities continued despite these exertions reflects the unique technical and compliance challenges that attended this program.\n\n(U) The lesson here is not that Congress should prescribe the precise technical mechanisms by which surveillance authorities may be implemented, or that automated, iterative mechanisms will never be appropriate.  To the contrary:  In some cases, they may be the only choice, particularly as the expanding volume of data makes constant human oversight of every technical process less feasible.  What's more, automated mechanisms may be more privacyprotective in some respects, by keeping human eyes off of the data and removing human bias and temptation as a point of failure.\n\n(U) The point, rather, is that a program may present qualitatively different implications for privacy, civil liberties, and compliance if implemented using an automated, machine-tomachine architecture with limited human intervention, than if it relies on human-to-human fulfillment of one-off requests.  The remedy is not prescriptive technical specifications, but to remain aware of the potential implications of program architecture as outside bodies conduct oversight and the agency itself structures its compliance and audit mechanisms.\n\n## Iii. (U) The Role Of Statutes In Regulating Domestic Surveillance\n\n(U) I agree with much of the insightful statement penned by Board Members Nitze and Bamzai.  I take a somewhat more sanguine view, however, of two topics they address: the ability of Congress to constructively regulate in the area of domestic surveillance, and the utility of specifying particular technologies in statutory text.\n\n(U) Since 1978, Congress has created a comprehensive statutory architecture to govern domestic surveillance for national-security purposes.  That system, which began with FISA and which Congress has continued to expand and diversify since then,319 has helped protect privacy and civil liberties.  But it has also been good for the agencies themselves.  Codification places domestic surveillance practices on a publicly enacted legal foundation, empowering agencies to act with the confidence that comes from explicit authority conferred by the people's representatives.  The contrast between the reaction to the 2013 leaks that revealed the bulk callrecords program, which rested on a secretly approved legal interpretation, and the reaction to this program, which rested on clear, publicly debated, publicly enacted statutory authority, is illustrative.\n\n(U) Of course, the risk that statutes will produce unintended consequences is ever present, in intelligence statutes as in any other, and calls for careful drafting.  I share my colleagues' view that the accidental, unavoidable compliance errors that can occur in any large enterprise, private or public, should not by overly granular codification be transformed into statutory violations, triggering disproportionate consequences and undesirable risk-aversion.\n\n(U) In my view, however, FISA generally achieves the right balance in this regard by requiring agencies to create minimization, targeting, and querying rules, requiring the FISA court to review them, and requiring the intelligence community to declassify them as far as possible.320\nCongress has not sought to supply this intricate web of permissions and prohibitions by statute, but instead opted to mandate that they exist and provide mechanisms to verify their adequacy.\n(U) Finally, we should remember that the possibility of unintended consequences runs both ways: it arises equally when Congress declines to act, allowing agencies to develop domestic surveillance programs without explicit statutory authority or boundaries.  To legislate, or merely to oversee: there is no universally right choice.\n\n(U) My colleagues also consider the disadvantages created by the USA Freedom Act's limitation of two-hop collection to *telephone* metadata, rather than other, newer technologies. Technology-neutrality, is, of course, often well-advised in crafting statues in this era of rapid technological change.  I agree with my colleagues on that.  Yet I see the implications somewhat differently, both with respect to this statute and the principle of technology neutrality more generally.\n\n(U) First, it is true, as my colleagues note, that by tying the USA Freedom Act's two-hop authority to telephone metadata, Congress \"limited the statute's usefulness.\"321  But we should also remember why it did that.  It is not because Congress was unaware of the benefits of technology-neutral authorities: witness Section 702, a technology-neutral collection authority that has proved \"highly valuable.\"322  FISA's business-records provision, which is also up for reauthorization this March, provides technology-neutral authority to collect one hop of metadata. The government reports that that provision is very useful, precisely because it embraces the latest communication technologies.323  Rather, Congress limited two-hop collection in the USA\n322 (U) *See* Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board, Report on the Surveillance Program Operated Pursuant to Section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act 10410 (2014) (\"Since 2008, the number of signals intelligence reports based in whole or in part on Section 702 has increased exponentially,\" and 702 is \"highly valuable\" for other foreign-intelligence purposes.\").\n323 (S//NF) FBI briefing to the Board (Mar. 12, 2019).  Specifically, the Bureau told the Board of the 56\nbusiness records requests in 2018 sought electronic communications transaction records, or ECTRs, which FBI described to the Board as arguably the most valuable use of this authority.\n\nFreedom Act to telephone metadata because the law was designed to achieve a very specific end:\nproviding a narrower replacement for the previous bulk CDR program.324\n(U) Second, while I agree that, when crafting surveillance laws, technology-neutrality should be the default, there are times when it will make sense for a law to pick out particular technologies.  The churn of technological innovation will inevitably spit out new modes of communication and other technologies whose privacy implications we cannot presently foresee. For that reason, it may be rational for Congress to specify that an authority permits use of a known, present-day technology, while excluding emerging or yet-unknown technologies that may prove more invasive.\n\n(U) Consider a hypothetical technology-neutral statute authorizing an agency to employ\n\"biometric analysis.\"  Congress might reasonably prefer to allow an agency to use fingerprinting, and perhaps some forms of facial recognition, while excluding \"rapid DNA identification devices, which are making positive identifications possible in as little as 90 minutes,\" or other intrusive biometric checks yet unimagined.325  Or legislators might choose to permit facial recognition where photos are taken at a clearly identified checkpoint in a secure area, but to prohibit it where images are taken in public, or by stealth.\n\n(U) The point is that enacting a technology-specific statute is not always a blunder.\n\nRather, where consciously chosen, technology-specificity may reflect a considered judgment to rule out applications that would transform the authority at issue into something more intrusive than Congress intended.  The USA Freedom Act supplies a real-world example:  Congress approved two-hop CDR collection, but specifically barred the government from collecting \"the contents . . . of any communication,\" \"the name, address, or financial information of a subscriber or customer,\" and \"cell site location or global positioning system information,\" presumably based on its view that these types of data would be qualitatively more revealing than other data that CDRs ordinarily contain.326\n(U) Indeed, technology-specific legislation, with its effect of anchoring levels of intrusion in the present, may become more common as technology races forward.  Avulsive technological change seems to arrive every few years: the internet, IP-based messaging, social media, smartphones, biometrics, big data, the internet of things, and AI, each galloping past with irresistible momentum, with quantum computing and more on the horizon.  Congress may choose to legislate more frequently to ensure that, as new technologies emerge, the statutory dispensation continues to balance security and liberty in the manner it intends.\n\n## Vii. (U) Statement Of Board Members Ed Felten And Travis Leblanc327\n\n(U) We appreciate the tireless work of the PCLOB staff, the thoughtfulness of our colleagues, and the unyielding dedication of the men and women of the national security establishment who every day commit themselves to protecting our great country.  The threat of terrorismboth domestic and foreignis very real and has taken a long toll on our nation's history.  It is in this context that the Board conducts oversight of the USA FREEDOM Act CDR program, mindful of our mission to balance privacy and civil liberties with national security.\nTogether, we join the Board in issuing this Report to enhance transparency and public understanding of this discontinued program.\n\n(U) We write separately to stress our view that the USA FREEDOM Act CDR program should remain shuttered and the program should not be reauthorized.  We reach this conclusion for three reasons.  First, the program produced minimal national security value.  Second, the program's expense is disproportionate to its value.  And third, the program intruded on the privacy and civil liberties of millions of Americans who were not subjects of individualized suspicion.  On balance, the privacy and civil liberties impacts, combined with the program's costs, outweighed the program's national security value.  Also, we do not join the Board's constitutional analysis for the reasons stated below.  Finally, we disagree with suggestions that the same program with data from different media would solve the problems experienced with the USA FREEDOM Act CDR program.\n\n## I. (U) The Value Of The Cdr Program Was Not Worth The Risks And Cost.\n\n(U) In August 2019, following three years of operation of the USA FREEDOM Act CDR\nprogram, the Director of National Intelligence acknowledged in a letter to select Members of Congress that\n[NSA] has suspended the [USA FREEDOM Act] call detail records program . . . and deleted the call detail records acquired under this authority.  This decision was made after balancing the program's relative intelligence value, associated costs, and compliance and data integrity concerns caused by the unique\n327 (U) Statement from Travis LeBlanc: While I do join the Board in issuing this document to provide transparency about the facts and history of the program so that Congress and the public may scrutinize its value, I respectfully complexities of using these company-generated business records for intelligence purposes.328\n(U) The program remains dormant today.  Over the three years this program was operational, it cost over $100 million.\n\n(U) As discussed in detail in the Report, since implementing the revised CDR program, NSA encountered multiple data integrity and compliance problems.  While NSA expended considerable effort to diagnose and remediate the problems as they arose and mitigate the likelihood of recurrence, the errors nevertheless recurred.  To NSA's credit, in response to \"technical irregularities in some data received from telecommunications service providers[,]\"\nNSA ultimately concluded that \"it was not feasible to identify and isolate properly produced data\"329 from improperly produced data so it deleted data collected under the program.330\n(U) There is no indication that the conditions that led to the compliance errors are likely to change.  If the program were reauthorized and restarted, it is hard to see what NSA could do to avoid further data integrity problems and accesses to data beyond the boundaries envisioned by the statute.\n(U) Further, advancements in communications technology have already reduced the potential value of the CDR program.  Independent experts331 and academics332 have argued that telephony data is of decreased value given the shift to different communications protocols, such as encrypted messaging.  Both NSA333 and FBI334 agree that communications patterns and platforms have changed and that the current environment is unlike what it was years ago.  These communication platforms and technologies will continue to change and develop.  And, as\n\n331 (U) *See, e.g.*, Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board, Transcript of Public Forum to Examine the USA\nFreedom Act, Telephone Records Program (May 31, 2019) (statement of Mr. Michael Bahar), http://pclob.gov (\"[I]t's fair to say the terrorists know as much as you can to stay off your phones.  Or if you stay on your phone . . .\n\nstart transitioning to encrypted communication . . .  And if you've got everything, you've got nothing.\").\n\n332 (U) *See, e.g.*, Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board, Transcript of Public Forum to Examine the USA\nFreedom Act, Telephone Records Program (May 31, 2019) (statement of Professor Susan Landau), http://pclob.gov (\"There are a number of changes that have happened since the summer of 2001.  Technically and socially in the way we communicate, in the way terrorists communicate.\").\n\n333 (U) NSA briefing to the Board (May 23, 2019). 334 (U) FBI briefing to the Board (June 19, 2019).\n\ncounterterrorism targets increasingly rely upon non-phone communications modalities,335 the utility of phone metadata analysis in counterterrorism will continue to decrease.\n\n## Ii. (U) We Cannot Join The Board's Constitutional Analysis.\n\n(U) The majority devotes over a dozen pages of the report to a constitutional analysis of the USA FREEDOM Act CDR program.  We respectfully part ways with our colleagues in two ways.\n\n(U) First, we question whether a constitutional analysis of the CDR program was prudent.\n\nWhile we can contemplate a circumstance where assessment of the constitutionality of a program would be helpful and informative, given our Board's limited time and resources, we question the utility of a constitutional analysis of this particular program.  The USA FREEDOM Act CDR\nprogram has been suspended.  Its existence and primary contours were publicly known and debated, and it was subject to oversight by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court.\nHowever, in light of the constitutional analysis provided by our colleagues we address our thoughts below.\n(U) Second, the majority does not go as far as we would have gone in discussing a full picture of complex and evolving constitutional law.  As the courts are continuing to grapple with how to apply the Fourth Amendment to new technologies, and especially to records held by communications providers, we would have preferred a discussion of this challenging area of law, rather than a conclusion of constitutionality resting on a formalistic application of case law that the Board declined to endorse in its 2014 report.  Further, the majority's constitutional assessment is silent on the First Amendment implications of the USA FREEDOM Act program.\nAssuming *arguendo* that \"reasonableness\" is the appropriate Fourth Amendment standard for evaluating any resumption of the USA FREEDOM Act CDR program, we would have instead assessed not the reasonableness of the program at its inception, but whether a resumption of the program as we know it now would be constitutional.  Because the point of a Fourth Amendment reasonableness analysis is to weigh privacy intrusions on individuals against government national security and law enforcement interests, we would have preferred a forwardhappening over the telephone network. . . .  When I look at the question of records, what I see is a change in communication modality.\"), https://www.pclob.gov/reports/report-public-forum; Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board, Transcript of Public Forum to Examine the USA Freedom Act, Telephone Records Program (May 31, 2019) (statement of Mr. Michael Bahar) (\"[I]t's fair to say the terrorists know as much as you can to stay off your phones.  Or if you stay on your phone . . . start transitioning to encrypted communication[.]\") https://www.pclob.gov/reports/report-public-forum.\n\nlooking analysis that factored in the now-known minimal national security value of the program balanced against its privacy impacts.336\n\n## A. (U) Whether The Board Should Conduct A Constitutional Analysis Of The Cdr Program.\n\n(U) The Board has a statutory responsibility to provide independent oversight of government activities that involve more personnel than the Board employs and greater resources than the Board possesses.  It is essential that the Board exercise careful discretion in both its selection of matters to review and in how it conducts its reviews.  In much the same way that courts practice judicial economy, we recommend that the Board responsibly adhere to a similar principle of oversight economy.  We should prioritize providing constitutional and legal analysis where the Board has an institutional comparative advantage that will inform the Executive Branch, Congress, courts, and the American people.  In contrast to the circumstances surrounding the Board's constitutional analysis of the 215 bulk records program, for the reasons noted above, we would have focused the Board's time and resources elsewhere.\n\n## B. (U) The Majority's Constitutional Analysis Of The Cdr Program Does Not Go Far Enough.\n\n(U) A conclusion that a now defunct program was constitutional at its inception is not as helpful as a discussion about whether the current landscape of facts and jurisprudence would find it so.  Accordingly, we would ask not whether Congress acted appropriately when it passed the USA FREEDOM Act CDR provision, but rather whether an extension of that authority would be constitutional in light of the facts and circumstances known today.337  This, we believe, would be Constitution, any more than there is a communism exception or an exception for other real or imagined sources of domestic unrest. [A]bandoning the explicit protections of the Fourth Amendment seriously imperils 'the right to be let alonethe most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized men.'\"  Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n., 489 U.S. 604, 641 (1989) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (citation omitted) (quoting Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)). Accordingly, we are also reluctant here to assert that the \"special needs\" exception to the Fourth Amendment may apply.\n\n337 (U) We are taking the *ex ante* position that Congress must now contend with a different landscape of known facts and circumstances than those which advised its decision in 2015.  That altered landscape includes new facts about the value of the program and difficulties operating it, new Supreme Court jurisprudence, and a new understanding of both the privacy intrusions fostered by this program as well as the government interest furthered by the program.\nmost helpful to Congress and the public as they consider what to do with the program in the future.  To be clear, we do not reach a conclusion here.  We do, however, raise points that we believe should be considered by Congress.   We conclude that there are considerable distinctions between precedent on which our colleagues rely and the reasonable expectations of privacy in a modern world.\n(U) The crux of the majority's position is this:  In *Smith v. Maryland*, the Supreme Court held that law enforcement collection of certain types of call records is not a \"search\" under the Fourth Amendment.  The USA FREEDOM Act CDR program involved the collection of call records.  *Ipso facto*, the CDR program is not a search or seizure under the Fourth Amendment.\n\n(U) In 2014, however, the Board expressed doubts about whether that legal argument was right as applied to bulk collection of call detail records.  In its prior report, the Board explained that basic argument, and then discussed factual, policy, and legal reasons why *Smith* and the \"third-party doctrine\" may not have been a sufficient constitutional basis for the bulk CDR program.  Importantly, the 2014 report did not reach a conclusion on the constitutionality of the bulk program.  Instead, the Board provided an accurate and evenhanded perspective: it indicated that the government's reliance on *Smith* was a reasonable legal position, that courts had reached differing conclusions about that position, and that the law in this area is challenging, rapidly changing, and difficult to predict.338  We believe the Board's assessment from 2014 remains spot-on, and subsequent legal developments like *Riley v. California* and Carpenter v. United States lend further support to that perspective.\n\n(U) We take issue with the majority's characterization that the 2014 Board was\n\"*unanimous\"* in finding the pre-2015 bulk telephony program constitutionalnotwithstanding the factual differences between that program and *Smith*.  As the Board wrote in 2014: \"it is possible that the contemporary Supreme Courtif called upon to evaluate [the bulk collection telephony CDR program] under the Fourth Amendmentwould not consider *Smith v. Maryland*\nto have resolved the question.\"  And in congressional testimony just weeks after the 2014 report was released, our then-Chairman David Medine explained:  \"The Board also believes that the NSA's bulk telephone records program raises concerns under both the First and Fourth Amendments to the United States Constitution.  Our report explores those concerns, explaining that while government officials are entitled to rely on existing Supreme Court doctrine in formulating policy, the existing doctrine does not fully answer whether the Section 215 program is Knowing what we know now, we have serious doubts going forward about whether the USA FREEDOM Act CDR\nconstitutionally sound.\"339  As the majority points out, the Board also noted in its 2014 report the following:  \"Until the Supreme Court rules otherwise, *Smith v. Maryland* and the third-party doctrine remain in force today.  Government lawyers are entitled to rely on them when appraising the constitutionality of a given action.\"340  Were we serving on the Board in 2014, we would have entirely agreed, as we do now.  To us, however, both can be true: the Board's analysis of the constitutionality of the 215 bulk program raised questions about the constitutionality of the program under both the First and Fourth Amendments, but notwithstanding those concerns, the government was entitled to rely on the law as it stood at the time to govern the contours of its intelligence program.  We would reach the same conclusion about the USA FREEDOM Act CDR program now.\n\n(U) Because *Smith* and the third-party doctrine are so central to Fourth Amendment analysis of the USA FREEDOM Act CDR program, we briefly outline some of the Board's 2014 concerns and discuss how subsequent legal and technical developments reinforce those concerns in the context of the CDR program as we know it now.  We do not endeavor to rehash the Board's 2014 report, and we encourage the public to read this report in tandem with the 2014 report.\n\n(U) In the 2014 report, the Board outlined key factual differences between the bulk telephony CDR program under Section 215 of the USA PATRIOT Act and the *Smith* case.341\nFor example, the Board noted that the bulk telephony CDR program gathered significantly more information about each telephone call and about far more people than did the pen register in Smith.  In *Smith*, the police collected the numbers the defendant dialed after the pen register was installed, but did not collect information about the duration of the defendant's calls or whether the calls were completed, nor about calls made previously by the defendant.  Nor did the police in *Smith* collect information about incoming calls to the defendant's telephone line.  Further, Smith involved a short duration of use of a pen register (no more than 2 days) and the dialing information of just one person.  Finally, in 1979, there was no ability to aggregate dialing records with those of other individuals and gain additional insight from that analysis.342\n(U) We will have to agree to disagree with our colleagues on the significance of the ways in which the USA FREEDOM Act CDR program differs from the underlying facts in *Smith*.  It is our view that those differences are more significant than the majority believes them to be and that nothing in the intervening five years has undercut them.343  If anything, recent research has put the Board's concerns from 2014 on an even more solid factual foundation: there is a significant privacy impact associated with large-scale telephone record collection.344\n(U) We do not dispute that *Smith* remains good law.  Nor do we dispute that the government has a reasonable legal argument, grounded in *Smith*, for why the shuttered USA FREEDOM Act CDR program was consistent with the Fourth Amendment at its inception.  But, just like the Board in 2014, we are not prepared to endorse that argument given what we believe to be the serious factual differences from *Smith*.  In short, we question whether a court considering the specific facts of the USA FREEDOM Act CDR program would find them similar enough to the underlying facts of the primitive \"pen register\" in *Smith* to extend that forty-year-old precedent to cover the USA FREEDOM Act CDR program.  We believe that the majority places much greater weight on *Smith* than is warranted.345\n(U) There are additional facts about the USA FREEDOM Act CDR program that remain classified, and that bolster our view that *Smith* may not be as dispositive as suggested by the majority.\n\n(U) In *Smith*, the police collected a list of called numbers.  In the CDR program, a record can be returned if a selection term matches the record's originating number, dialed number, terminating number, billing number, IMSI (unique identifier for a phone subscriber), IMEI (unique identifier for a phone handset), equipment serial number, or calling card number.  In addition, the CDR program collected about 50 data fields for each call, including information about the caller, callee, their phone carriers, and various routing and status information.346  The information collected appears consistent with the statute, but it goes well beyond what the court v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2223, 223335 (2018) (Kennedy, J., dissenting).  However, in *Carpenter*, the majority of the Supreme Court embraced the same caution we urge today:  As Justice Frankfurter noted when considering new innovations in airplanes and radios, the Court must tread carefully in such cases, to ensure that we do not 'embarrass the future.'\"  *Carpenter*, 138 S. Ct. at 2220 (quoting *Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Minnesota*, 322\nU.S. 292, 300 (1944)).\n\n344 (U) Jonathan Mayer, Patrick Mutchler, & John C. Mitchell, Evaluating the privacy properties of telephone metadata, 113 PNAS 5536, 5538 (May 17, 2016) (finding \"that telephone metadata is densely interconnected, can trivially be reidentified, enable automated location and relationship inferences, and can be used to determine highly sensitive traits\"), https://www.pnas.org/content/pnas/113/20/5536.full.pdf.\n\n345 (U) *Riley v. California*, 573 U.S. 373, 400 (2014) (citing *Smith v. Maryland*, 442 U.S. 735 (1979)). 346 (U) See Appendix B.\n\nconsidered in *Smith*.  As an example, CDRs could include information about whether a mobile phone involved in a call was roaming and on which network it was roaming.  This might serve as a proxy for a phone's location within broad coverage areas.  For example, if a CDR records that a phone whose home provider is Company A was roaming on Company B's network, this implies the phone was very likely in a location covered by B's network but not by A's.  In addition, a CDR can contain information about which switching equipment handled a call, which can convey further location information.347\n(U) It is facts like these that take the USA Freedom Act CDR program further from Smith and into an intermediate area between *Smith* and *Carpenter*.348  In *Carpenter*, the Court determined that warrantless collection of cell site location information violated the Fourth Amendment, and Chief Justice Roberts noted that \"[a] majority of this Court has already recognized that individuals have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the whole of their physical movements.\"349  The more precise location data becomes, the more such data has the potential to reveal personal details of one's life.350  Although NSA did not collect cell site information in CDRs, and the statute expressly prohibited such collection, the fact that CDRs contained information indicative of more coarse-grained location does make *Carpenter* relevant. We cannot say how the Court would ultimately rule on the facts of the USA Freedom Act CDR program, but in viewing the Court's most recent Fourth Amendment decisions, the picture becomes less clear than the majority would suggest.\n\n(U) Legal developments since the 2014 report strengthen our argument that *Smith* may not be as definitive as the majority suggests.  We note, as our colleagues do, that as technology evolves, so too has the Supreme Court's Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.  While the Court has not considered facts similar to the USA FREEDOM Act CDR program, and has not overturned Smith, we believe that *Riley* and *Carpenter* carry more significance in assessing the constitutionality of the CDR program based on the facts as we know them now than the majority affords them.  In *Riley v. California*, the Supreme Court addressed a longstanding rule in Fourth Amendment law: that law enforcement need not obtain a search warrant before conducting a search incident to a suspect's lawful arrest.  The Court held that the search-incident-to-arrest exception to the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement does not apply to cell phones: \"Our answer to the question of what police must do before searching a cell phone seized incident to an arrest is accordingly simple get a warrant.\" 351\n(U) More recently, and even more relevant to the USA FREEDOM Act CDR program, the Court held in *Carpenter v. United States* that law enforcement access to a week or more of cell-site location records constitutes a Fourth Amendment \"search\" and ordinarily requires a search warrant based on probable cause.  In *Carpenter*, the government argued that *Smith* and the third-party doctrine should lead to the conclusion that because cell-site location records are held by telephone companies, or third-parties, government access to them is not subject to the Fourth Amendment.  But the Court didn't go that way.  The Court expressly distinguished *Smith* and explained that the volume of data, the sensitivity of the data, and the unavoidability of the data collection by the third-party all weighed in favor of Fourth Amendment protection.\n(U) The majority makes much of the Supreme Court's insistence in *Carpenter* that Smith remains good law.  This we likewise do not contest.  But the *Carpenter* discussion does not address how *Smith* applies to the USA FREEDOM Act CDR program.  *Carpenter*like Riley and *United States v. Jones*352instructs that that is not an easy question.\n\n(U) While *Riley* and *Carpenter* do not overturn *Smith*, each contains commentary that presents a window into the Court's view of the intersection of new technology and the Fourth Amendment.  It is against this backdrop that we would have preferred the Board's constitutional analysis to have been set.\n\n(U) In addition to presenting an incomplete picture of how the Fourth Amendment may intersect with the USA FREEDOM Act CDR program as we now know it to be, the majority does not assess the program's First Amendment implications.  This large-scale CDR program surely sweeps in the CDRs of protestors, journalists, political activists, whistleblowers, and ordinary people.  The First Amendment protects fundamental rights including the freedoms of speech and association.  The Board's 2014 analysis of the First Amendment challenges to the previous bulk CDR program largely extends to the USA FREEDOM Act CDR program, especially with respect to the potential chilling effect created by a program that collects the phone records of millions of people, without individualized suspicion.353  One would expect a court's review of the reasonableness of the constitutionality of the USA FREEDOM Act's CDR\nprogram to also consider the program's implications on the First Amendment rights of Americans.\n\n(U) We do not know whether a court, presented with the facts available to us, would find the USA FREEDOM Act CDR program to be constitutional.  That is the same basic conclusion that the Board reached in 2014 about the bulk telephony CDR program.  We do not believe, however, that the majority's analysis presents a complete picture of the current First and Fourth Amendment landscapes to establish that reauthorization and reoperation of the program, knowing what we know today, would be constitutional.\n\n## Iii. (U) The Same Program With Data From Different Media Is Not The Answer.\n\n(U) Finally, in assessing the USA FREEDOM Act CDR program's national security value, it has been suggested, including by some of our fellow Board Members, that a multi-hop metadata collection program governing other types of communication media may prove more valuable than the CDR program.  While this has not been a part of the Board's oversight review of the CDR program and is not something the Board investigated, we think it is important to note our disagreement with these suggestions.\n\n(U) On this point, we are in general agreement with Chairman Klein.  Congress knew what it was doing when it chose to limit this authority to telephony.  The prior bulk 215 program had been focused on telephony, and the USA FREEDOM Act framework was designed to authorize a version of that program.  The limitation of the bulk program to two hops had already been adopted as a matter of policyso Congress was authorizing the program more or less as it was operating at the time.\n\n(U) Even with the limitation to telephonya technology with a 100-year historythere was substantial debate about legislating clear boundaries for its use in the CDR program.  Had Congress instead tried to legislate over a broader and more rapidly evolving set of technologies, the definitional and boundary-drawing problems would have been vastly more difficult.\n(U) And there is no reason to think the compliance or data quality issues encountered in the CDR program would have been less severe for other types of communications media. Working with a sector where developing new capabilities without fully examining downstream impacts is a common business practice would not have been conducive to stability and data accuracylet alone compliance.  Congress chose to scope the program to cover a more established technology operated by stable, long-lived, and historically regulated American companies.\n\n(U) All of that said, there is and will continue to be significant intelligence value in firsthop communications metadata, and in additional hops where there is specific analytical justification for acquiring them.  What experience with the CDR program has taught is that domestic multi-hop metadata, without specific justification for its collection, is likely to have little impact on national security but would undermine the privacy of large numbers of Americans.\n\n## * * *\n\n(U) The USA FREEDOM Act CDR program was implemented with knowledge of the Board's findings in 2014 regarding the bulk collection program, finding that the government could not demonstrate a strong enough showing of efficacy to justify the privacy and civil liberties implications of the program.  The Board noted that \"[i]f the government and Congress seek to develop a new program to replace the Section 215 program, any such new program should be crafted far more narrowly, and the government should demonstrate that its effectiveness will clearly outweigh any intrusions on privacy and civil liberties interests.\"354\nThis balance has not been realized in the USA FREEDOM Act CDR program.  In the end, whether for concerns over constitutional implications or for policy reasons, we concur with NSA's decision to end the program and believe the program should remain shuttered.\n\n## Viii. (U) Statement Of Board Members Aditya Bamzai And Jane Nitze\n\n(U) Congress's consideration of legislation to reauthorize the call detail records program of the USA Freedom Act provides occasion to assess not only the program's costs and benefits, but also the manner in which Congress can legislate best in rapidly evolving technological areas. When the Board reviewed NSA's bulk telephony metadata program in 2014, it was divided.  Key findings on the program's value split the Board three to two.  In Congress and the public sphere, too, there were disputes, we believe largely in good faith, about the merits of the program.  Five years after the USA Freedom Act was enacted and a new CDR program established, there is less room for debate.  The program was statutorily authorized and constitutional under controlling precedents.  It also was expensive, plagued with data-integrity concerns, and produced minimal intelligence relative to other national security programs.  It is, of course, incumbent on us not to fall into a cycle of \"timidity and aggression,\"355 or to assume we are safe irrespective of, rather than because of, our security programs.  But we have a hard time looking at this *particular* program as it *actually* operated and concluding much other than that the game is not worth the candle.  That's not to say, though, that a well-designed metadata program, one not restricted by some of the USA Freedom Act's statutory limitations, couldn't succeed.\n\n## I.\n\n(S//NF) To get some figures down:  Over its short lifetime the CDR program cost, at a minimum, 100 million dollars.  NSA estimates over were given to the providers alone, on top of the administrative costs of running the program and the resources expended unpacking and then resolving each of the compliance concerns.  Against these costs, the specific benefit that the CDR program provided was the ability to get a \"second hop\" of CDRs in a relatively expeditious manner, without the need for a FISA business-records order for each \"first-hop\" number.356  Yet as noted in Part III(B) of the Board's report, the program An order under this subsection . . . shall . . . (iii) provide that the Government may require the prompt production of a first set of call detail records using the specific selection term . . . [and] (iv) provide that the Government may require the prompt production of a second set of call detail records using session-identifying information or a telephone calling card number identified by the specific selection term used to produce call detail records under clause (iii)[.]\nresulted in the issuance of only 15 intelligence reports.  While we may not expect metadata collection activities to produce as many reports as content collection activities, the government itself noted the program's limited relative value.357  The Board was informed, moreover, that FBI\nfound the reports largely (though not wholly) redundant: in only two instances did FBI receive unique information from USA Freedom Act CDRs.\n(TS//SI//NF) Some of the reasons the CDR program did not produce a large volume of useful intelligence can be traced back to evolutions in technology since the first iteration of a post-9/11 telephony metadata program.  Experts in and out of government have noted a shift away from traditional telephony, with terrorists increasingly using chat applications and encrypted messaging.  Yet CDRs collected under the USA Freedom Act did\n.  As a result, the program could not have detected the 2019 analog of the reason it was created: to see\n  The blame does not rest with NSA.\nTraditional telephone records simply do not carry the same importance they once did; no version of a domestic metadata program fixed solely on traditional telephony was likely to have produced intelligence reflective of its costs.\n\n(U) That should not, however, distract us from the reality that multi-hop analysis can have important intelligence value.  Simple commonsense examples illustrate how.  First, consider the case of a terrorist organization using a trusted intermediary, or \"cutout,\" for communications.  The government may be investigating a particular target (\"A\") who communicates with a person (\"B\"), who in turn communicates with a senior terrorist leader (\"C\").  Investigators know of both A's and C's connection to the terrorist network, but do not know with whom C is communicating.  If investigators are unaware of B, single-hop collection would show only that A is communicating with an unknown party, B.  Because B is unknown, the government may be unable to establish the \"reasonable articulable suspicion\" necessary to secure process for further hops.358  Two-hop collection, by contrast, allows the government to see that A and C may be communicating through an intermediary, thereby bringing B's potential significance as a cutout to investigators' attention.\n\n(U) This is but one of many examples that illustrate how contact-chain analysis may add significant intelligence value to national-security investigations.  Here are two more.  Consider that the target of an investigation (\"A\") could be communicating directly with a senior terrorist leader (\"C\") and also, at the same time, with an unknown party (\"B\").  The government may have no reason to investigate B until second-hop data shows that B, too, is communicating with C. Or consider that second-hop data may reveal a hub-and-spoke organization to a terrorist network, with an intermediary in communication with other parties of interest whose call records the government does not have.  Contact chain analysis could give investigators the ability to identify the relevant persons within a networkleaders and critical individuals worthy of further investigative time and resources.\n\n(U) Consider, as well, that in areas where the government is required to obtain orders from the FISA court for collection, multi-hop collection may allow the government to acquire information faster and more efficiently than single-hop authorities.  With regard to the FISA\ncourt: there are, no doubt, salutary benefits to requiring the government to express in writing its justifications for surveillance and to seek approval from an independent entity before obtaining sensitive data.  Yet, as the Board's report explains, the drafting and approval process for applications to the FISC can take \"days or weeks.\"359  And we wonder if the time lost and the resources required might not sometimes deter investigators from seeking perfectly lawful and appropriate orders.  By allowing more data to be acquired with fewer FISA court applications, multi-hop collection lessens these potential drawbacks and carries efficiency advances as compared to single-hop authoritieseven in spaces in which equivalent data may be theoretically available under other authorities.\n\n(U) All this is not to say that multi-hop analysis is without its costs.  Like for any national security program, policymakers have to weigh the resources required to run multi-hop analysis against its intelligence value.  They also should consider that by its nature, multi-hop analysis inevitably results in the collection of an exponentially larger amount of data than single-hop analysis.  Just imagine for a moment all the numbers you dialand that dial youranging from restaurants from which you order takeout, to banks with whom you check your account balance, to telemarketers who call you unannounced.  Then imagine all of the numbers that those numbers call and all the other people who call those numbers.  Even when the CDR program operated as designed, multi-hop collection acquired all those numbersalong, of course, with the numbers of terrorists A, B, and C in the examples above.\n\n(U) The difficulty of quantifying costs and benefits in this area is not a unique feature of multi-hop programs.  Indeed, more often than not people disagree in good faith about the relative costs and benefits of particular intelligence programs.  On rare occasions, though, the balance will be fairly apparentas it was to NSA (and to us) in the case of the USA Freedom Act CDR\nprogram.  The value of multi-hop analysis in the abstract may be substantial; the value of this particular multi-hop program, in our view, was not.\n\n## Ii.\n\n(U) Many will pointas we doto changing times and technologies in assessing the relative value of the CDR program.  But that obvious truth should not pull us away from the harder question of how law and policy affect intelligence programs in both intended and unintended ways, potentially altering both their operational utility and invasiveness.  In reviewing the transition from the bulk collection program to the operation, and then suspension, of the CDR program, we see the following worth noting.\n\n(U) *First*, by tying the USA Freedom Act to telephony metadata alone, Congress limited the statute's usefulness as terrorists moved away from traditional telephony as their primary mode of communication.  Experts have noted that the codification of surveillance authority in one technological medium will naturally push those seeking to evade government detection to substitute alternative methods of communications.360  And yet the Act did not provide multi-hop authority for the myriad other ways in which terrorists may communicate, from emails to encrypted messaging.  That proved to be a problem.  Thus, in the future, for surveillance authorities to be useful in a world of rapidly advancing technology, they should be neutral as to communications methods.361\n(TS//SI//NF) *Second*, several of the compliance incidents arose when Congress codified in statute a two-hop architecture, a framework that seems to assume that telephone communications occur between two parties (*i.e.*, A calls B).  But in a world where communications can occur through intermediaries, the two-hop statutory framework results in ambiguities as to how to determine the scope of a particular communication.  The compliance incidents related to were created by this statutory ambiguity and premised on the fundamental question left open by the statute:  What's a hop?  In this fashion, the USA Freedom Act itself created the potential for compliance difficulties, prompted by statutory confusion when the application of law to technology arose in unforeseen circumstances.362\nregister/trap-and-trace provision was to make those provisions applicable not just to telephony, but to all forms of wire and electronic communications.\").\n\n(U) *Third*, some compliance incidents were caused simply because telephone providers turned over incorrect data to NSA.363  The government would appropriately request first- and second-hop data from a provider, only to receive data that did not meet the statute's expectations.\nThere are, of course, many authorities, such as the Pen Register Statute364 and the Stored Communications Act,365 under which the government seeks telephony metadata.  We do not know the number of compliance incidents under those separate authorities and whether the rates of incorrect data from providers under the CDR program were higher than rates under other programs.  We would like to know the numbers, and if any differences were due to unique features of the USA Freedom Act.366  At a minimum, we believe the issue warrants further inspection.\n\n(U) All the foregoing suggests that we should be wary of overly strict statutory regimes that limit technological flexibility; under some circumstances, rigorous use of oversight functions may even be superior in ensuring that government activities properly balance security and privacy interests.  The President ordered significant changes to the bulk telephony metadata program after internal executive review, and the Board reported that after one year (and prior to the passage of the USA Freedom Act) the government had \"accept[ed] many of the recommendations\" in its report.367  Although these assessments did not occur until unlawful disclosures of the program led to public debate, that doesn't mean we should reflexively seek answers in unduly prescriptive statutory regimes that offer little by way of technological flexibility to implementing agencies.\n\n(U) To be sure, law is essential to ensuring that the government does not overreach and that our national security apparatus remains democratically accountable to the people.  Yet explicit and detailed codification of intelligence practices carries risk to both operations and privacy.  It carries operational risk when it is unduly rigid, given the ever-changing threats our country faces.  And it carries risk to our civil liberties when it serves as a continued source of positive authority even as technology evolves.  Some of the laws governing access to electronic\n366 (U) It is possible the error rate under the USA Freedom Act CDR program was either higher or lower than is found in records collected under other authorities.  Given time limitations, we were unable to determine if it was even feasible to answer this question, never mind account for any differences in the error rate.\n\ncommunications that precede the commercial internet (not to mention the smartphone) exemplify these risks.368\n(U) The impact on intelligence and privacy of the changes wrought by the USA Freedom Act is particularly difficult to assess.  For example, under the bulk collection program NSA approved only about 300 query terms in 2012.  Yet under the USA Freedom Act, which prohibited bulk collection of call detail records, 164,682 US person query terms were run against NSA's data last year alone, perhaps in part because queries no longer required pre-approval either from designated agency officials or from the FISA court.369  At the same time, the number of intelligence reports dropped precipitously from one program to the next.  In the three-year period between 2006 and 2009, NSA issued 277 intelligence reportsmore than ten times the number produced during the life of the USA Freedom Act CDR program.  It's not immediately obvious to us how to compare bulk collection with limited querying against more limited collection with more extensive querying; we also do not know if the drop in reports was due largely to changes in technology.  At a minimum, though, it strikes us that a case can be made that the USA Freedom Act rendered the collection of CDRs less operationally valuable while augmenting the very privacy concerns it sought to lessen.\n\n## *\n\n(U) The threats we face have not abated and technology continues to evolve.  We encourage legislators to work with the executive branch as well as technology experts to understand any gaps in current authorities and how technology may be leveraged to better protect privacy while respecting national security imperatives.370  To retain operational value over time, counts queries; many of the 164,682 query terms would never return USA Freedom Act CDRs.  However, that number is still over 500 times higher than the number of annual query terms during the operation of the bulk program.  Even substantial overcounting would not appear to make up for the difference.\n\n370 (U) Our colleagues suggest that a multi-hop metadata program not limited to telephony metadata could never prove more valuable than the CDR program.  See Statement of Ed Felten and Travis LeBlanc at 77.  On the basis of this record, none of us can know.  In light of the theoretical advantages of multi-hop analysis we have described above, it should be unsurprising that the intelligence community has identified contact-chain analysis as a significant tool that is worth the cost of collection and compliance under appropriate circumstances.  Perhaps, though, we agree on more than we disagree.  Our colleagues say there \"is and will continue to be significant intelligence value in firsthop communications metadata, and in additional hops where there is specific analytical justification for acquiring them.\"  Statement of Ed Felten and Travis LeBlanc at 7778 (emphasis added).  It seems we agree that there is value in exploring that potential.\nnew communications surveillance authorities should be technologically neutral, allowing the government's implementationboth in gathering intelligence and in protecting civil liberties to evolve alongside technology and the manner in which our adversaries plot and threaten our Nation.  We look forward to working with Congress on these issues.\n\n## (U) Appendix A\n\n(U) Part II includes an unclassified description of the compliance and data-integrity issues NSA experienced with the USA Freedom Act CDR program.  The Board worked with the intelligence community to declassify and include as many facts related to these issues as possible in Part II.  However, many facts necessarily remain classified because their release could be expected to cause exceptionally grave damage or serious damage to the national security.  To protect this information, but also to ensure additional transparency for appropriately cleared individuals, including members of Congress, this annex describes those issues and NSA's response in a more comprehensive, classified manner.\n\n## A. (U) General Compliance Matters 1. (U) Omitted Information From Fisa Application\n\n2.\n(U) Overproduction\n\n## 3. (U) Training Compliance Incidents\n\n3.\n(U) Expanding Accuracy Concerns Lead NSA to Delete All\nCDRs\n\n## 4. (U) Additional Compliance Issues And Concerns"
    },
    {
        "text": "# An Analysis Of The Systemic Security Weaknesses Of The U.S. Navy Fleet Broadcasting System, 1967-1974, As Exploited By Cwo John Walker\n\n\nA thesis presented to the Faculty of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree\n\nMASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE\nMilitary History by\n\nLAURA J. HEATH, MAJ, USA\nM.S., Georgia Institute of Technology, 2001\nFort Leavenworth, Kansas\n2005\nApproved for public release; distribution is unlimited.\n\n\n\n## Report Documentation Page\n\nPublic reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing this collection of information.  Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden to Department of Defense, Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports (0704-0188), 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA  22202-4302.  Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to any penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number.  PLEASE DO NOT RETURN YOUR FORM TO THE ABOVE ADDRESS.\n\n1. REPORT DATE (DD-MM-YYYY)\n\n17-06-2005\n2. REPORT TYPE\nThesis\n3. DATES COVERED (From - To)\nAug 2004 - Jun 2005\n5a. CONTRACT NUMBER\n\n\n4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE\n\nAN ANALYSIS OF THE SYSTEMIC SECURITY WEAKNESSES OF THE U.S. NAVY\nFLEET BROADCASTING SYSTEM, 1967-1974, AS EXPLOITED BY CWO JOHN WALKER\n\n\n6. AUTHOR(S)\n\nMajor Laura Heath\n7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)\nU.S. Army Command and General Staff College\n\n\nATTN: ATZL-SWD-GD 1 Reynolds Ave. Ft. Leavenworth, KS 66027-1352\n\n\n|                              | 9. SPONSORING / MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)   | 10. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S ACRONYM(S)   |\n|------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------|\n|                              |                                                             |                                    |\n|                              |                                                             |                                    |\n|                              |                                                             |                                    |\n| 11. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S REPORT |                                                             |                                    |\n|                              |                                                             |                                    |\n| NUMBER(S)                    |                                                             |                                    |\n|                              |                                                             |                                    |\n\n12. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT\n\nApproved for public release; distribution is unlimited.\n\n13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES\n\n14. ABSTRACT\nCWO John Walker led one of the most devastating spy rings ever unmasked in the US.  Along with his brother, son, and friend, he compromised US Navy cryptographic systems and classified information from 1967 to 1985.  This research focuses on just one of the systems compromised by John Walker himself:  the Fleet Broadcasting System (FBS) during the period 1967-1975, which was used to transmit all US Navy operational orders to ships at sea.  Why was the communications security (COMSEC) system so completely defenseless against one rogue sailor, acting alone?  The evidence shows that FBS was designed in such a way that it was effectively impossible to detect or prevent rogue insiders from compromising the system.  Personnel investigations were cursory, frequently delayed, and based more on hunches than hard scientific criteria.  Far too many people had access to the keys and sensitive materials, and the auditing methods were incapable, even in theory, of detecting illicit copying of classified materials.  Responsibility for the security of the system was distributed between many different organizations, allowing numerous security gaps to develop.  This has immediate implications for the design of future classified communications systems.\n\n## 15. Subject Terms Espionage, Walker Spy Ring, Fleet Broadcasting System, Kw-7, Orestes System\n\n18. NUMBER OF PAGES\n17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT\n16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF:\n19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON\n100\n19b. TELEPHONE NUMBER (include area\ncode)\n\na. REPORT Unclassified\nb. ABSTRACT Unclassified\nc. THIS PAGE Unclassified\nUU\n\n\n## Thesis Approval Page\n\nName of Candidate: MAJ Laura J. Heath Thesis Title: An Analysis of the Systemic Security Weaknesses of the U.S. Navy Fleet Broadcasting System, 1967-1974, as Exploited by CWO John Walker Approved by:\n, Thesis Committee Chair Donald P. Wright, Ph.D.\n\n, Member Mr. Kendall D. Gott, M.A.\n\n, Member CDR Brett W. Wiseman, M.A. Accepted this 17th day of June 2005 by:\n, Director, Graduate Degree Programs Robert F. Baumann, Ph.D. The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)\n\n## Abstract\n\nAN ANALYSIS OF THE SYSTEMIC SECURITY WEAKNESSES OF THE U.S.\n\nNAVY FLEET BROADCASTING SYSTEM, 1967-1974, AS EXPLOITED BY CWO JOHN WALKER, by MAJ Laura J. Heath, 99 pages. CWO John Walker led one of the most devastating spy rings ever unmasked in the US. Along with his brother, son, and friend, he compromised US Navy cryptographic systems and classified information from 1967 to 1985. This research focuses on just one of the systems compromised by John Walker himself: the Fleet Broadcasting System (FBS) during the period 1967-1975, which was used to transmit all US Navy operational orders to ships at sea. Why was the communications security (COMSEC) system so completely defenseless against one rogue sailor, acting alone? The evidence shows that FBS was designed in such a way that it was effectively impossible to detect or prevent rogue insiders from compromising the system. Personnel investigations were cursory, frequently delayed, and based more on hunches than hard scientific criteria. Far too many people had access to the keys and sensitive materials, and the auditing methods were incapable, even in theory, of detecting illicit copying of classified materials. Responsibility for the security of the system was distributed between many different organizations, allowing numerous security gaps to develop. This has immediate implications for the design of future classified communications systems.\n\n## Acknowledgments\n\nI would like to thank my committee members for their support and good advice that was so critical to this thesis. I sincerely appreciate the time and effort provided.\n\n## Acronyms\n\nCMS\nClassified Materials System\nDASD(C3I)\nDeputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Command, Control,\nCommunications, and Intelligence\nDGDP\nDirectorate of Graduate Degree Programs\nDIS\nDefense Investigative Service\nDoD\nDepartment of Defense\nDUSD(P)\nDeputy Undersecretary of Defense for Policy\nFBS\nFleet Broadcasting System\nGDP\nGraduate Degree Programs\nKW-7\nA type of encryptor used by the U.S. military, CIA, and allied nations\nduring the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s. Also called the Orestes system.\n NAVCAMS Naval Communications Area Master Station OSD\nOffice of the Secretary of Defense\nPERSEREC\n(Defense) Personnel Security Research Center\n\n\n## Chapter 1 Introduction\n\nEveryone makes a big deal out of the fact that I became a spy. It's because spying is such an unusual crime, but what they don't understand is that I became a spy because that is what I had access to. If I'd worked in a bank, I would have taken money. If I'd had access to dope, I would have sold drugs. The fact that I became a spy is really insignificant. The point is that I became a spy because I needed money. It was as simple as that.1\nJohn Walker, quoted in *Family of Spies*\nCWO John Walker led one of the most devastating spy rings ever unmasked in the United States. Along with his brother Arthur, his son Michael, and his friend Jerry Whitworth, he compromised U.S. Navy cryptographic systems and classified information from 1967 to 1985--such a large quantity of information that, according to one report by a prominent Soviet defector, the KGB was forced to build an entirely new building to house all of the analysts working on it.2 Despite the enormity of the compromises, however, the spy ring was caught only because John Walker's ex-wife turned him in to the FBI in a fit of drunken spite over unpaid hush money. That is, the communications security system in use was utterly unable to prevent or even detect enormously largescale, long-term and devastating compromises.\n\nMany people have asked the question, \"Why did John Walker spy for the Soviets?\" The answer is both amply documented and utterly simple: he was greedy. He wanted money, and he did not care whom he had to hurt to get it. Greed and selfishness are an unfortunate fact of human nature; there always have been, and always will be, pathologically greedy and selfish people in any organization as large as the U.S. Navy.\n\nGiven that this is well known to anyone who deals with human beings, a new question arises: since the presence of corrupt or corruptible insiders should have been a basic and obvious assumption, why was the communications security (COMSEC) system so completely defenseless against it? The purpose of this report is to answer that question.\n\nTo date, no unclassified study has been done to analyze the structure of the communications systems in use, to determine what design features failed (or were never implemented) which made them so vulnerable to an insider threat. A full accounting of the information that John Walker and his confederates compromised would be well beyond the scope of a report of this length. Accordingly, this research will focus on just one of the systems compromised by John Walker: the Fleet Broadcasting System (FBS), and further narrowed to focusing only on the period 1967-1974. It is a particularly instructive example for several reasons. First, FBS was the system used to transmit all U.S. Navy operational orders to ships at sea. This meant in practice that the full details of all U.S. Navy operations during the most intense fighting in the Vietnam conflict were transmitted using FBS and, consequently, were fully available to the Soviet Union while those operations were underway. Second, the cryptographic equipment used to secure FBS, called the KW-7, was the most widely used encryption device in the Western world, seeing service with all branches of the U.S. armed forces, other agencies of the U.S.\n\ngovernment (such as the CIA and State Department), and many U.S. allies, such as North Atlantic Treaty Organization nations.3 John Walker has confessed to giving the Soviet Union the complete technical specifications of the KW-7; this information, plus the fact that the Soviets are presumed to have obtained functional KW-7 encryptors from the USS\nPueblo (seized by the North Koreans in January, 1968) and aircraft crash sites in North Vietnam, would have allowed them to manufacture new KW-7 encryptors at will.4 This means that the failure of the security measures taken for FBS also caused critical compromises in unrelated communications networks that used the same equipment. Lastly, focusing on the time period 1967-1974 is particularly illuminating because John Walker was working alone. This means that the security system failed when faced the simplest of all possible threats: a single, greedy sailor, working entirely alone. Looking at the simplest case gives the clearest possible view of the systemic weaknesses that resulted in the compromise.\n\n## Overview Of The Thesis\n\nThis report, then, will look at FBS as a system, to analyze what was, or was not, done to take into account the unavoidable risk of rogue insiders betraying the secrets with which they are entrusted. The system had an elaborate and extensive security architecture. It was thought that numerous, overlapping security policies and procedures would make it much harder for a security breach to occur, because multiple, independent security subsystems would have to fail simultaneously for classified information to be compromised. This report will look in detail at three main areas of the security system and will show that in fact, there was no redundancy in the security design: a compromise in one area would lead to additional compromises in the other areas.\nThe first area to discuss is *personnel security*--policies and procedures which govern who is given (legitimate) access to classified information. They include how personnel are vetted prior to their first access to classified information, how they are monitored and revalidated during the period that they have access, and how their access is rescinded, either because they no longer need it to do their jobs or because of some indicator of unreliability. In the case of John Walker, this is where the primary failure occurred. His case is an excellent, concrete demonstration of how poorly designed and executed the personnel security system was.\nThe second area to be studied is *technical security*--the security features designed into COMSEC devices (in this case, the KW-7 encryptor) that make recovering classified data from the transmitted message impossible for anyone except the legitimate recipient. The National Security Agency (NSA) was responsible for these technical security measures; by law, the NSA was solely responsible for design, testing, and manufacture of all COMSEC devices used by the U.S. government. Technical security is of critical importance because what the Soviet Union wanted most of all was a catastrophic failure of the technical security of the KW-7, which would allow them to decrypt any message that had been encrypted with a KW-7 as soon as it was received. CWO Walker was able to facilitate this primarily because he had easy access to the repair manuals and modification work orders for the device. This enabled the Soviets to reverse engineer new copies of the KW-7 whenever they wished, and to thoroughly examine the design for possible flaws.\nThe third security area to be studied is the issue of *key management*. A\ncryptographic key is a long random number that the encryptor uses to encrypt a message. (More details about how encryptors work are given below.) Cryptographic designers assume that the enemy will capture tactical encryptors eventually, such as by shooting down an aircraft that has one on board. Thus, they try to design and test their systems so that, even if the enemy has an identical encryptor, he will not be able to decrypt the data unless he also gets the key. Clearly, then, the distribution of the key is of primary importance to the overall security of the system. All of the authorized recipients must have the correct key, or else they will not receive critical messages; but no unauthorized person can get the key, because this would allow them to decrypt secret messages if they do. These two imperatives conflict to some degree, and the issue calls for a delicate balancing of risks. Chapter four will cover the details of the key management system, and show how a highly insecure key management system was produced and used. It will show that the key distribution system, as actually implemented for FBS, was actually a substantial aid to John Walker in his espionage activities.\n\nAnother part of the key management system to consider is the auditing procedures used. Since it was known that the security of FBS depended on keeping the keys out of the wrong hands, there was a detailed and precise paperwork requirement at every stage of key handling. It gave the impression of being an extremely well thought-out, almost ironclad process. Yet obviously the audit procedures utterly failed to detect any compromise in this case. This report will examine why this was so, and will show that the audit and accounting procedures could not have caught any but the most naive spy. CWO Walker was able to compromise almost every key that he touched between 1967 and\n1974, yet the auditing system would not have been able to detect his espionage, even if every person in the audit chain had been 100 percent perfect in executing his duties.\n\nThis report will conclude with a chapter discussing the implications of the design and implementation problems of FBS. The KW-7 has long since been removed from the active inventory of cryptographic devices, but the lessons learned from this compromise have important implications for the design of current and future systems and for the risk analysis and management of classified materials. In particular, designers must take a much more realistic view of the likelihood of insider malfeasance; indeed, they must assume that rogue users are present in every widely used communications or computer system, and design the other features of the system to detect and counter such users.\n\n## How Do Encryptors Work?\n\nSince this report will deal extensively with encryption systems, it is worth starting the discussion with a brief description of how machine encryption systems actually function. Concealing the meaning of a secret message depends on creating a *code*, or a systematic method of substituting random-appearing letters and numbers for the true secret message. The most common method used prior to the invention of machine encryptors was a codebook system. This required the sender to use pre-printed codebooks to look up each word in the secret message (called the *plain text*) and find its equivalent code word (called the *cipher text*). The receiver would have to look up each code word in the codebook and write down the equivalent plain text word.\n\nFor example, to encrypt the plain text message \"Attack at dawn,\" the sender would look up \"attack=MJWZJ,\" \"at=RRVBX,\" and \"dawn=PZAMQ\" in his codebook. He would then transmit the cipher text \"MJWZJ RRVBX PZAMQ.\" The receiver would use his copy of the codebook to look up \"MJWZJ=attack,\" \"RRVBX=at,\" and \"PZAMQ=dawn\" to get the correct plain text. If the code was properly designed and used, and if adversaries did not get a copy of the codebook, then the cipher text message was unintelligible. Using a codebook was slow and tedious, but it was effective for text messages sent by hand in Morse code.\n\nTechnology advances soon made manual codebooks impractical, however.\n\nTeletype machines could transmit hundreds or thousands of characters per minute, making a manual lookup far too slow to be useful. Even more difficult was the case of pure data traffic, such as facsimile messages. How could a codebook be used to encrypt an image? However, the same technology advances that caused the problem also offered one possible solution. Consider the plain text message as simply a string of binary digits-- ones and zeroes. Then suppose that, instead of a preprinted codebook with randomlooking code words, both the sender and the receiver had the same, very long string of random-looking ones and zeroes to serve as a code. The sender prepares his plain text message, then lines it up digit-by-digit with his code. He then uses a simple substitution rule: if the plain text digit is the same as the code digit, he transmits a zero; if they are different, he transmits a one. Since the receiver has the identical string of code digits, he can reconstruct the plain text digit from the received cipher text; but to anyone without an identical copy of the code digits, the cipher text is unintelligible.\n\nThere remains the problem of ensuring that both the sender and the receiver have identical strings of code digits. The string of code digits must be as long as the message for this method to work--which meant billions of digits long, to handle a full day's data traffic at the transmission rates in use during 1967-1974. This meant that pre-positioning was a practical impossibility. Instead, cryptographic designers settled on a method called key generation to solve the problem. In this case, the human operator loads a single number, called the key, into the encryptor. The encryptor uses that number as a start point for iterating a complex mathematical formula to generate the string of code digits, also called the *keystream*. If the encryptor is properly designed, the resulting keystream will appear completely random to anyone who does not have the key--even someone who has the mathematical formula. Anyone who *does* have the key and the mathematical formula embedded in the encryptor will be able to reproduce the keystream at will and will be able to easily decrypt the message.\n\nThe specific encryptor this report will examine was called the KW-7, or Orestes system. Physically, the KW-7 was a gray box, weighing about 75 pounds. It was based on a combination of vacuum-tube and transistor technology, and in 1967 it was the most widely used encryptor in the U.S. inventory.5 To operate it, the radioman first had to key it, with a new key every 24 hours. Early models had a plugboard system, which required the operator to manually rewire a complicated pattern on a board on the front of the machine. For these machines, the key was the detailed wiring information, and it was delivered on a four-page booklet, containing six days worth of keying information. Later models were modified to take an IBM-type punchcard, with one key per punchcard.6 The operator inserted the punchcard into a card reader on the front of the device to key it. The KW-7 was then ready to encrypt and decrypt messages.\n\n## Overview Of The Fleet Broadcasting System\n\nEstablishing secure, reliable communications, both between ships at sea and shipto-shore, has always been a major problem for navies worldwide. The development of effective high-frequency (also called short-wave) radios in the 1920s and 1930s produced a fundamental change in naval communications. These radios had ranges of hundreds or thousands of miles and allowed, for the first time in history, real-time coordination of naval action beyond line-of-sight. By the 1940s, voice and Morse code transmitters were being upstaged by radio teletypewriters and facsimile machines, enabling naval commanders to send extensive reports, and even charts and weather maps, around the world in minutes. By 1947, the U.S. Navy was installing teletype and facsimile machines in every warship.7\nDuring the period under study in this paper (1967-1974), the U.S. Navy's highfrequency radio-teletype system was the primary communications path. The main system for transmitting wartime information, orders, and status reports to, from, and between ships at sea was the Fleet Broadcast System (FBS). FBS has had many different configurations over the years; the design during this period had been implemented in\n1964.8 Every ship in the Navy had a teletype system that was capable of sending or receiving typed messages. The teletypewriter connected to the KW-7 encryptor, which automatically encrypted messages before transmission and decrypted messages on receipt.\nThe Navy's high-frequency radios had a long range, but not long enough to circle the globe. Accordingly, the world was divided into four theaters (Eastern Pacific, Western Pacific, Atlantic, and Mediterranean), each with one Naval Communications Area Master Station (NAVCAMS).9 The NAVCAMS was responsible for all communications in its area and for supporting all ships operating (or transiting through)\nthere. The NAVCAMS was also responsible for maintaining all of the keying material used on its networks and for ensuring that all ships received copies of the keys that they would need prior to entering its area. John Walker began his spying activities when he was given access to the master key vault for the submarine forces, Atlantic command (CINCSUBLANT) and over the course of the following seven years managed to compromise key material from all four NAVCAMs at some point.\n\n## Overview Of The John Walker Spy Case\n\nJohn Walker was born on 28 July 1937, the second son of James and Peggy Walker. His home life was tempestuous, to say the least; his father was a violent alcoholic who eventually drove the family to bankruptcy and then abandoned them. As an adolescent, John Walker became first a troublemaker, then a petty criminal. When he was 17, he was finally caught by the police for burglarizing a gas station and a men's clothing store, after a high-speed chase through town. His older brother, Arthur Walker, had joined the Navy directly out of high school, and intervened to convince the judge to allow John to join the Navy also. It was common enough at the time to solve the problem of a disruptive young man by forcing him into the military. The general thought that military would straighten him out and give him discipline and direction in his life.10\nThat certainly seemed to be the case for John Walker. He entered the Navy in\n1956, as a Radioman, and seemed to thrive. There was no record of discipline problems, and he made a very favorable impression on his superiors. He made rank quickly, achieving a rating of RM1 (E-6) in only six years, and his evaluation reports were almost perfect (4.0) ratings.11 He got his girlfriend, Barbara Crowley, pregnant, but he \"did the right thing\" and married her in 1957. They had their first child, Margaret Ann, that same year, and a second daughter, Laura, followed in early 1960. He volunteered for submarine duty, on the recommendation of his brother Arthur (who was also a submariner), and in June 1960 he was accepted for submarine training, followed by an assignment to the USS *Razorback* (SS-394), a World War II-era diesel submarine based in San Diego, CA. In 1962, he was reassigned to the newly commissioned USS Andrew Jackson (SSBN-619), one of the first nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines, home ported in Charleston, SC.12 On the surface, then, John Walker seemed to have put his dodgy past behind him and grown up to be a responsible petty officer and family man.\n\nDigging a little deeper reveals a much different situation. While his duty performance remained high, his home life was growing ever more acrimonious. Both John and Barbara Walker were drinking heavily, and John Walker was spending more and more of his time carousing with his fellow sailors rather than home with his family.\nHe was first submitted for a Top Secret clearance while he was assigned to the USS *Andrew Jackson*, and it was granted without comment on 29 December 1964. The following year, he was promoted to chief petty officer and reassigned to the USS Simon Bolivar (SSBN-641), a newly commissioned nuclear ballistic missile submarine also home ported in Charleston, SC. In 1966, he was promoted to warrant officer. That same year, he decided to start a business of his own. He thought a bar and snack shop would be a sure-fire winner near a Navy base and so took out over $20,000 in loans to set up the Bamboo Snack Bar. Unfortunately for him, the business lost money the entire time it was open. By 1967, the Walkers were on the verge of bankruptcy, adding the stress of financial difficulty to the already highly dysfunctional atmosphere at home.13\nIn November, 1967, John Walker was reassigned as a watch officer in the submarine fleet message center, NAVCAMS, Atlantic fleet, at Norfolk naval base. Barbara Walker and the children remained behind in South Carolina, to run the Bamboo Snack Bar. Quite unexpectedly, in December 1967, he returned with several hundred dollars in cash, plus Christmas gifts, and more money to pay off some of the most critical overdue loans. He claimed he had gotten a second job, but Barbara Walker did not believe him--she assumed he was into some sort of criminal activity. She was even more suspicious when the family joined him in Norfolk in 1968. She discovered that he had rented a luxurious apartment, and together they spent over $10,000 in cash on new furnishings. While snooping around the apartment, she found a set of instructions for delivering classified materials to his handlers; when she confronted John Walker with this evidence, he confessed to her that he was spying for the Soviet Union. He claimed they were paying him $4,000 a month, plus bonuses, for stealing secrets from the NAVCAMS\nvaults. (For comparison, his legitimate salary as a warrant officer was $725 a month.)14\nAlthough the money was good, he was feeling highly stressed about his espionage. He later testified that he felt like he was in constant danger from the FBI while he was so near Washington, D.C. The stress was also taking its toll on his duty performance; in fact, the period 1968-1969 was the only time in his career where his duty ratings were less than excellent. He was convinced that his supervisors were beginning to get suspicious of him. Interestingly, that was not true. His supervisors thought he was careless, obnoxious smart-aleck, and they held him in contempt for his open womanizing, but they apparently never considered the fact that he might by selling secrets.15\n Nonetheless, he decided to ask for a transfer away from Norfolk in mid-1969 and was reassigned as an instructor at the radioman school in San Diego, California. During this assignment, he realized that it would be less risky for him if he could recruit someone else to do the actual spying and serve instead as a go-between or spymaster. He carefully probed his students for weaknesses, and would eventually recruit one of them, Jerry Whitworth, to spy for him after his retirement in 1974. He also realized that he needed the Soviets' money. They had cut his \"salary\" in half, to $2,000 a month, because he no longer had access to key materials. That proved to be too little for John Walker to carry on the lavish lifestyle he had become accustomed to, and so he volunteered to transfer to a sea duty billet to gain access to a COMSEC vault again.16\nIn late 1971, he was reassigned to the USS *Niagara Falls* (AFS-3), a resupply ship based in Oakland, CA, but due to sail in support of operations off the coast of Vietnam shortly. He was given the position of Classified Material System (CMS) custodian, which gave him full access to all cryptographic and classified material onboard. While off the coast of Vietnam, he repeatedly volunteered to serve as a courier for classified materials, both between Navy ships and between shore bases and ships-- primarily because the Soviets were paying him a \"bonus\" if he could get additional classified information.17\nHe had been hiding the cash that the Soviets were paying him in a can, buried under one corner of his garage. When he returned from his Vietnam deployment, he found out that his family had discovered the location of his stash and spent all the money.\n\nHe was flat broke. It was the last straw for him, and he filed for divorce from his wife. He told her that, if she stayed quiet about his spying, he would pay her an extra $1,000 a month in \"alimony,\" above the $500 a month that the court ordered in child support. (His legitimate salary was only $18,000 a year, so the amount he was offering was 100 percent of his total legitimate income.) He also realized that Barbara Walker, embittered and alcoholic, was hinting to people around her that he was spying, and he decided that he had to get out of the Navy to protect himself. He spent the last two years of his career supervising the distribution of classified material in Norfolk, VA, and then retired on 31\nJuly 1976.18\nAfter his retirement, he was nominally working as a private investigator in the Norfolk, VA area. In fact, most of his income came from running a spy ring that grew to include his former student Jerry Whitworth, his brother Arthur Walker, and his son Michael Walker. And it was this recruitment of his family members that, ironically, led to his capture. Barbara Walker reported him to the local FBI office in Hyannis, MA, in November 1984 because he had stopped paying her the agreed-on hush money, and because she was outraged that he had tried to recruit their daughter, Laura Walker, and Laura Walker's ex-husband was using this fact to blackmail her to prevent her from getting custody of their son. The FBI agent who interviewed her thought that she was drunk and rambling, and that she was making up a story to get revenge on an ex-husband;\nnevertheless, since the crime was alleged to have taken place in Norfolk, the report was forwarded to the Norfolk FBI office for final disposition--with a recommendation that it simply be closed and filed. The report went to Special Agent (SA) Robert Hunter, who was in charge of espionage cases at that office. He thought that the story rang true, somehow, and he began some preliminary investigation to see if some of the details might be corroborated. Somewhat to everyone's surprise, the details did check out, and the investigation began to gain momentum. After months of painstaking work, the FBI managed to catch John Walker in the act of leaving a bag containing 129 classified documents, disguised as a bag of trash, by the side of the road for pickup by a KGB\nofficer assigned to the Soviet Union's Washington, DC embassy.19\n\n(Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute Press, 1999), 202. It is worth mentioning that there are some remaining doubts about Yurchenko's testimony. He defected in 1986, after the public announcement of Walker's arrest but before his trial, and seemed very eager to credit the Walker ring virtually all of the Soviet Union's intelligence successes. Yurchenko subsequently snuck away from his FBI handler and returned to the Soviet Union, claiming that he had been kidnapped by the US government. Some agents believed that his \"defection\" was simply a KGB ruse. Following this line of reasoning, the KGB knew that Walker would talk, even brag, about his spying; hence, he could be a convenient scapegoat for information leaks that in reality came from other Americans then actively spying for the USSR, such as Aldrich Ames and Robert Hansen. This particular fact, however, is probably true; this report will show that the Soviet Union was decrypting hundreds of thousands, possibly millions, of classified messages yearly due to the Walker spy ring's activities.\n\n3Jerry Proc, \"KW-7\" (date unavailable), http://www.jproc.ca/crypto/kw7.html (13\nJanuary 2005).\n\n4Early, 72.\n\n5Proc, \"KW-7\"\n6Testimony of John Walker in *U.S.A. vs. Jerry Alfred Whitworth* (U.S. District Court, District of Northern California, Case No. 85-552, vol. 24), 24-2817.\n\n7 Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, U.S. Naval Communications Chronological History, 1961.\n\n8OPNAV Report 5750-5, History of the US Naval Communications Center Norfolk, 1 January 1965-31 December 1965, pp. 28-31.\n\n9Early, 58.\n\n10Pete Early, *Family of Spies: Inside the John Walker Spy Ring* (New York:\nBantam Books, 1988), 20-34, and Pete Early, \"Court TV's Crime Library, Criminal Minds and Methods: The John Walker Spy Ring\" page 2 (date unavailable), available at http://www.crimelibrary.com/terrorists_spies/spies/walker/2.html?sect=23; Internet.\n\n11Robert W. Hunter and Lynn Dean Hunter, Spy Hunter: Inside the FBI\nInvestigation of the Walter Espionage Case (Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute Press, 1999), 25-26.\n\n12Early, 34-43. 13Ibid., 52-57.\n\n14Ibid., 58 and 63-74.\n\n\n15Ibid., 78-81.\n\n16Ibid., 84-97.\n\n17Ibid., 98-108.\n\n18Ibid., 108-143.\n\n19Hunter, 3-71.\n\n## Chapter 2 Personnel Security\n\nCWO-2 Walker is intensely loyal, taking great pride in himself and the naval service, fiercely supporting its principles and traditions. He possesses a fine sense of personal honor and integrity, coupled with a great sense of humor. He is friendly, intelligent and possesses the ability to work in close harmony with others. He is especially at ease in social situations and has an active selfimprovement program which includes enrollment in the commercial instrument flying course and the completion of naval intelligence correspondence course. He is an active sailboat enthusiast and an accomplished aircraft pilot...1\nJohn Walker's 1972 fitness report, quoted in *Family of Spies*\n\n## Personnel Security Overview\n\nPersonnel security is an overarching term for the collection of laws, policies and procedures that attempt to ensure that only trustworthy persons get access to classified information. Clearly, this is fundamentally important to preventing enemies from getting access to classified information. It is arguably the most difficult part of the security system to get right. Human beings are inherently complex, even contradictory, and have a wide range of possible motivations for their actions. Policy has to be written that takes into account what people might do when driven by impulse, malice, greed or fear, yet not compromise the rights of innocent citizens or overburden the administrative system. In fact, even that is not enough; well-intentioned people can compromise data through ignorance, carelessness or the immediate pressure to accomplish a mission, and the policy must take that into account as well. Lastly, policy must be implemented--primarily by personnel who were selected, rewarded and promoted for their success as *sailors*, not as security experts. When inevitable conflicts arise between the demands of security policy and mission accomplishment, the personnel who will have to resolve the dilemma will be primarily focused on mission requirements and may not have a clear idea of what the security implications of their actions are.\n\nThe sheer number of persons to be evaluated for trustworthiness and reliability was daunting. The Stilwell commission, looking at the Department of Defense in 1985, found that almost four million people needed access to classified information to do their jobs. More than three million people held current Secret or Top Secret clearances, and almost one million new Secret or Top Secret clearance requests were submitted every year.2 Attempting to write a single set of policies and procedures that would identify the possible security risks from such a large pool of people is clearly a major challenge.\n\nAmazingly, no one had actually attempted to do such a comprehensive analysis of threats, risk, operational needs, and resources available. Personnel security policies in the U.S. Navy were based on a variety of sources, including federal laws, executive orders, and directives from the Secretary of Defense, Secretary of the Navy, and the Navy chain of command. Most of these laws and orders were enacted to remedy specific vulnerabilities (often after compromises had been discovered) rather than to create or implement an overarching system. No single person or office had control, final approval authority, or even complete knowledge of, personnel security policy. Within DoD, responsibility for developing security policy was divided between the Deputy Undersecretary of Defense for Policy (DUSD(P)) and the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence (DASC(C3I)); both the DoD Inspector General and the DoD General Counsel also had statutory oversight roles. Other policy was also written by the Director of Central Intelligence and the Office of Personnel Management, which affected DoD personnel working on some, but not all, classified programs.3 The DUSD(P) had a Directorate of Counterintelligence and Security Policy; with a staff of just 25 personnel, it was responsible for writing policy and overseeing its implementation in areas as diverse as personnel security, information security, physical security, release of classified information to foreign governments, industrial security, special access programs, operations security, counterintelligence and more. There was no formal process for staffing changes to regulations and directives among these disparate organizations, and there were no clear instructions on what to do if different directives conflicted.4\nThe personnel security system that resulted from this mish-mash of directives had three main components. First, it sought to ensure that only reliable and trustworthy persons were granted access to classified information by investigating applicants' background and bona fides prior to granting security clearances. For high-level security clearances, personnel were supposed to be re-investigated on a periodic basis as well. Second, both supervisors and co-workers were expected to report behavior that indicated a security risk or personal unreliability. Lastly, professional law-enforcement and counterintelligence agents were charged with investigating possible espionage and prosecuting those who were guilty. John Walker had little trouble bypassing all three elements of this system.\n\n## Granting Initial Secret Clearances\n\nSecurity clearance requests are initiated by the organization where the nominee works, and are supposed to be requested only if the nominee requires access to classified information to perform his mission. The nominee would fill out a personal history statement, and his unit would then forward it to the Defense Investigative Service (DIS) for a background investigation and granting of a clearance. For a Secret clearance, the investigation consisted entirely of a National Agencies Check (NAC), which looks for the nominee in the FBI's criminal record database and the Defense Central Index of Investigations. This check would only show federal convictions or previous investigations by the Department of Defense; state and local offenses, even felonies, would not appear. If the nominee did not volunteer the information on his personal history statement, it would not be found.5 Since the great majority of criminal investigation and prosecution is done at the state or local level, the NAC was almost useless for its stated purpose of preventing criminals from gaining Secret security clearances. There was no attempt at all to identify personnel who had any noncriminal indicators of potential security weakness, such as a history of mental illness or financial difficulties.\n\nJohn Walker is an excellent example of the limitations of such a cursory investigation. He entered the Navy in 1955, after being arrested for a string of ten breakins and burglaries, culminating in a high-speed chase and shots fired at a policeman.6 He confessed and was convicted, but the judge reduced his sentence to probation, due to the fact that he had no previous record and was only seventeen years old at the time of the crimes.7 His brother, Arthur Walker, who was a Navy petty officer at the time, came home on leave and decided that the Navy could straighten him up. As Arthur Walker tells the story:\nWe walked in [to the recruiter] and I was in my Navy blues and I said, \"I got my brother here and he wants to join up,\" and this recruiter starts going crazy because he is so happy. Well, John went through the basic questions and when the recruiter came to the one about having committed any criminal acts, John said that he had been arrested and the recruiter slowed down a bit, and then the recruiter says, \"What did you do?\" and John tells him, and this guy flips out and says,\n\"Sorry, we can't take you unless you get the judge to lift your probation.\" So John and I walked across the street to the courthouse and went up and I found the judge and said, \"Your Honor, my brother wants to join the Navy and I think it would really help him out.\" Well, we talked for a while and the judge agreed and called the recruiter, and the next think you know, John is in the Navy. I went back to submarine duty and John went off to boot camp.8\n John Walker was given the rating of Radioman, and a Secret clearance, the following year.9 There are two things to note about this incident. First, notice that, although John Walker had a proven history of antisocial behavior, it was impossible for the people who made the decision to give him a Secret clearance to know about it. He was convicted under state law, not federal, and so the NAC would not reveal the misconduct. He had also been convicted as a minor, which meant that his records were sealed. In many states, juvenile court records were not released to anyone, including federal investigators, without a warrant.10 Second, notice that it was clearly against stated policy for John Walker to join the Navy in any capacity. He was able to enlist because four people--his recruiter, the judge, his brother, and he himself--colluded to keep the information about his criminal behavior out of official files. Their motivations to do so varied considerably. The recruiter was rewarded for enlisting new sailors, not for turning potential recruits away. If John Walker could be brought from just below to just above the minimum requirements for enlistment, then the recruiter was happy to help make that happen. The judge was interested in removing a juvenile delinquent from his community. Forcing someone to join the military was a fairly common way of dealing with troublesome, disruptive young men in those days, and the judge probably thought that it was an easy way to make a problem go away. Arthur Walker, on the other hand, was motivated by concern both for his brother and for the rest of his family. He thought that the Navy would be able to give his brother the discipline and maturity that he so desperately needed, and in so doing would stop him from causing further pain to his family. And lastly, John Walker himself was simply looking for a way out of a jam. He had discovered that his criminal record made him essentially unemployable in his home town, and he was looking for a fresh start and a new place to live.\nIn short, the U.S. Navy had a screening system in place to prevent people like John Walker from entering military service or being granted access to Secret information.\n\nHowever, that system's effectiveness depended on the people involved with the system actively assisting in the discovery of derogatory information and the denial of security clearances. That was a highly unrealistic assumption, for two main reasons. First, many of the people who were responsible for protecting the Navy from criminal entrants were not themselves members of the Navy--the applicants themselves, judges, law enforcement personnel, and so on--who could not reasonably be expected to have any loyalty toward the Navy or even any knowledge of its regulations. Second, the system rewarded the concealment and punished the revelation of derogatory information on applicants. It is almost as if the system was perversely designed to *not* find derogatory information on applicants for a Secret clearance. This combination of skewed rewards and dependence on the altruism of strangers produced a system that allowed John Walker to easily gain access to the nation's secrets.\n\n## Granting Initial Top Secret Clearances\n\nObtaining a Top Secret clearance was a much more thorough process. The most notable change was that clearances required a field investigation by the Defense Investigative Service (DIS)--that is, a professional investigator would conduct interviews to verify the nominee's bona fides and look for indicators of unreliability.11 The results of the investigation would be forwarded to an adjudicator, who would determine if the nominee should or should not be granted a clearance. There was an additional layer of oversight, called the crypto access program, for personnel (like John Walker) who had highly sensitive or long-term access to cryptographic devices or materials. Persons in the crypto access program were to be identified and specially managed by the personnel system; some billets were restricted to only those sailors enrolled in the program.\n\nThese safeguards would seem to be a solid defense against unreliable personnel getting access to classified material. Yet the John Walker case gives some excellent examples of how troubled the system was. He was first nominated for a Top Secret clearance in 1962. The investigator did know about his juvenile conviction, and in fact was able to read the sealed court records; however, he thought that it was just one incident (rather than ten or more). Furthermore, John Walker had been in the Navy for nine years at that point, and his file showed a consistently outstanding level of performance.12 He had been promoted very quickly, rising to Petty Officer 1st Class in only six years and Chief Petty Officer in only nine.13 By 1962, he was married and had three children, and to the investigator, it seemed that he had put his youthful indiscretions behind him. He would hardly have been the first troubled young man to have been straightened out by the Navy. The investigator asked his neighbors and references questions about whether he might be homosexual, an alcoholic or drug user, whether he had financial troubles, and whether he had any contacts with foreigners. No one raised any red flags, and the investigator recommended granting him a TS-Crypto clearance. He was granted Top Secret/Crypto access clearance on 29 December 1964.14\nYet red flags there should have been. According to Donald Clevenger, one of John Walker's shipmates, \"I think all of us had a drinking problem during those years.\n\nOur life-styles were built around parties and booze. There always seemed to be a group of people at Johnny's house, a special gang. Usually they were radio people from the boat.\"15 John Walker's wife was also an alcoholic, and their marriage was obviously troubled. In one particularly vivid example, when Barbara Walker went into labor with their third child, John Walker dropped her off at the hospital and then went to a softball game with his shipmates. He had also been involved in a string of more-or-less open extramarital affairs and liaisons with prostitutes.16 All of this was done in plain sight of his shipmates and friends, yet no one mentioned a thing to the investigator.\n\nOne lesson to draw from this episode is that people look at and report on a coworker's behavior relative to the culture and command climate in their immediate work area. As seen in Mr. Clevenger's comments above, the radio section of John Walker's submarine was comprised in large part of heavy drinkers. Alcohol binging was a considered normal and expected way to relieve stress and enjoy time off, and even outright alcohol abuse carried little social stigma. Arguably, the Navy culture of the time was so strongly pervaded with heavy alcohol use that he would have been more suspicious looking to his shipmates if he had been a teetotaler than an alcoholic. Likewise, extramarital affairs and open involvement with prostitutes were tolerated, at least for enlisted sailors during port calls overseas. Certainly, John Walker never felt the need to hide his behavior--quite the contrary, he often invited his shipmates along--nor did he ever face negative consequences of any kind for moral turpitude.\n\nA thornier issue is the question of what characteristics or behaviors actually represent an increased risk of security compromise. Clearly, the decision to grant or withhold access to classified materials should depend on how likely the applicant is to mishandle those materials. Yet in 1985 the Stilwell Commission found that there was little or no empirical evidence available for adjudicators to use when making their decisions; there was also no formal training or certification program in place for adjudicators either. Adjudicators were told simply to use their \"overall common sense\"\nand, if it was \"not clearly inconsistent\" with national security, to grant access to the individual. This standard was so hazy that different adjudicators could easily come to different conclusions about whether to grant access, even based on identical facts. Some adjudicators would apparently grant access to almost anyone; overall, the rejection rate was only about 2.5 percent, and for contractors the rate was a miniscule 0.2 percent.17 To further muddy the waters, the U.S. Navy treated the adjudicator's decision as merely advice to the applicant's commanding officer. Commanders could grant or deny access to Top Secret information to sailors under their command irregardless of the results of the investigation--or even irregardless of whether any investigation had been done at all. Yet these commanders had no training at all on the wider implications of granting access to individuals without vetting them thoroughly.18\nAs an example of this, consider the question of heavy alcohol use. It may seem obvious common sense that a heavy drinker is a higher security risk than a nondrinker. Yet hard statistical evidence about how much alcohol affects a person's reliability was sorely lacking. How much alcohol consumption indicates an increase in the risk of mishandling classified material? One drink a week? One a day? Six a day? Is a binge drinker worse than a steady drinker? What should be the cutoff, and how will the relevant information be discovered? It may seem \"obvious\" that a heavy drinker is likely to be unreliable, but many sailors who served with John Walker were heavy drinkers, yet espionage was literally unthinkable to anyone but him. Likewise, it would be very hard to characterize John Walker's espionage as related to his alcohol use. As matters stood in 1965, the only information about an applicant's alcohol use that would appear in his file would be whether or not his neighbors and co-workers thought he had a problem with alcohol. All this really showed was whether the applicant was more-or-less congruent with the current social mores in his small circle of acquaintances, rather than any objective standard of alcohol abuse or dependence. Then, the individual adjudicator made a personal, \"common sense\" decision about how \"bad\" the reported alcohol use was, and he recommended either for or against granting the applicant a Top Secret clearance. This was subject to being overridden by the applicant's commanding officer, again based solely on individual \"common sense\" about the security risks. Clearly, this is not a rigorous and fair method for evaluating potential espionage threats.\n\nAn even better example of the weakness of the security investigations is the question of homosexuality. In 1965, when John Walker was investigated for his Top Secret clearance, homosexual orientation was categorized as a mental illness, and homosexual behavior was both illegal and grounds for immediate dismissal from the service. By the \"common sense test\" of the time, it was an obvious disqualification for holding a security clearance. Following a notorious espionage case at the National Security Agency (NSA) in 1960 that involved two homosexual employees defecting to the Soviet Union, every security investigation included an explicit evaluation of whether the applicant might be homosexual.19 John Walker's investigation dutifully noted that he was not.20 Yet over the years, society's opinions about homosexuality underwent radical changes. The American Psychiatric Association removed homosexuality from its list of mental illnesses in 1973; instead, it announced that, \"homosexuality, per se, implies no impairment in judgment, stability, reliability, or general social or vocational capabilities.\"21 Over the next twenty years, through a series of court cases, executive orders, and guidelines memoranda, homosexuality policy was completely reversed:\ninstead of requiring investigators to determine an applicant's sexual orientation and denying security clearances to homosexuals, they were *forbidden* from asking about sexual orientation and from using homosexual orientation as a basis to deny a clearance.22 Note, however, that neither the original policy nor any of the subsequent changes were based on any empirical knowledge of whether homosexual behavior changed the likelihood of the applicant mishandling classified materials. When homosexuality was considered \"sexual deviance,\" it was considered an obvious reason to deny someone a clearance; no proof of this assumption was ever offered, or even sought. Likewise, the changes were introduced as civil rights and antidiscrimination measures, rather than in response to empirical evidence that homosexual behavior is irrelevant to security reliability. This is one more example of security imperatives being subordinated to other obligations.\n\n## Reinvestigations\n\nThe regulations also called for reinvestigating Top Secret clearance holders every five years. It was known that, in principle, reinvestigations are more important than initial investigations. This is because almost all spies are recruited *after* they get access to classified material; very few initially apply for access intending to spy.23 In the case of John Walker, the first thing that the Soviets asked him to bring them was not classified or cryptographic material at all--it was the names and biographies of everyone else working in the communications center, plus any information about possible personal weaknesses that the Soviets could exploit.24 In other words, the Soviets' first priority was to develop new spies, rather than to obtain classified material directly--even though John Walker was able to give them extremely sensitive and valuable data. Yet in practice, conducting initial investigations always took precedence over periodic reinvestigations when time or resources were tight. It is not hard to see why. Sailors who were awaiting the results of their initial clearance were unable to work in their intended jobs, which meant that the radio or cryptographic section was short handed, while a \"perfectly good\" sailor twiddled his thumbs. Sailors who were due a reinvestigation were allowed to continue working;\nthey were seen as \"proven\" trustworthy, and the reinvestigation was seen as simply an administrative chore that some other organization was responsible for.\n\nIn John Walker's case, he should have been due a five-year reinvestigation in late\n1969. He started spying at the end of 1967, and by 1969 he was living very conspicuously beyond his means. His Navy salary as a warrant officer was $120 a week; the Soviets had been paying him $4,000 a month, plus substantial bonuses for specific items, since January 1968.25 However, DIS was so seriously backlogged on the initial investigations that reinvestigations were suspended entirely for several years. John Walker did not come up for a periodic reinvestigation until 1972.\n\nHe expected to fail the reinvestigation. He had been spending almost ten times his yearly salary for five years, routinely abused alcohol and marijuana, had a series of blatant extra-marital affairs (including taking his mistresses to the Officer's Club on post), and his wife, who was also an alcoholic, had been complaining to her friends and co-workers about his spying, among other indicators of trouble.26 His solution was ingenious: he stole his own personnel records, plus the records of another sailor who had just completed a periodic reinvestigation. He found that the proof of a completed reinvestigation was simply a one page form which had been stamped with the FBI seal. He carefully copied the seal onto tracing paper, then took the traced design to a local print shop to have a duplicate stamp made. (He went in uniform and implied that he needed it for official business.) He stole a blank form from the ship's stores, forged a completed reinvestigation form on himself, and replaced the stolen files. John Walker bragged later that it cost him less than $3 to fool the security officer into thinking that he had already been submitted and cleared on the reinvestigation.27\nThis is a clear indication that the security reinvestigation process was seen as just an administrative chore, rather than a critical piece of the overall security system. The forms involved were treated just like any other personnel form--kept in an unlocked file cabinet, easily available to anyone who might want one. Sailors had access both to their own files and other sailors' files, and there was no means of determining if anything had been added to or subtracted from the file. The verification process was such a minor issue that no one expected the officer in charge to remember whether he had submitted a particular sailor or not. The proof of a completed investigation was a rubber stamp on a piece of paper--a trivial thing to counterfeit.\nAll in all, the system treated reinvestigation in an almost shockingly casual way.\n\nIt stands in dramatic contrast to areas where the Navy took administrative requirements seriously--such as training and certification requirements for pilots. For example, it simply beggars belief that a Navy pilot would have been allowed to fly for three years without a current flight physical, because the medical system was backlogged. The Navy understood that naval aviation was a vital part of modern naval operations, but that it carried with it the inherent chance for catastrophic disaster. To minimize that chance, the Navy invested huge amounts of time and effort in ensuring that pilots were fully trained, carefully monitored and evaluated throughout their careers, and removed from duty if their behavior or skills warranted it. Nevertheless there is no evidence that the Navy, as an institution, ever realized that the same facts were true about its high-speed digital communications networks--they were indispensable to modern naval operations, but they could cause catastrophic disaster if penetrated. As a consequence, the investigation and reinvestigation portion of the personnel security system was never resourced adequately, and when personnel security requirements were seen as too burdensome, they were ignored.\n\n## Reporting And Acting On Suspicious Behavior\n\nThe personnel system was not designed to rely solely on periodic reinvestigations to ensure that cleared people were and remained trustworthy. Everyone involved with handling classified material was charged with looking for and reporting any possible security concerns. With reference particularly to personnel security, the regulations specified that, if a sailor knew or suspected that someone was committing espionage, he was required to report the facts to his commanding officer or the Naval Investigative Service (NIS). The problem with this requirement is that the evidence shows that very, very few individuals will ever consider espionage as a possible explanation for a coworker's behavior. John Walker worked closely with hundreds or even thousands of sailors over a twenty year spying career. Many, even most, of those sailors had first-hand knowledge of his unethical behavior and suspiciously large financial expenditures. In fact, John Walker was actively probing a number of them to see if they were good candidates for recruitment into his spy ring. Yet not one of them ever considered that he might be spying.28\nThe issue is even cloudier when one considers issues that are of security interest, but are not in and of themselves crimes--such as heavy alcohol use, personal crisis, or financial difficulty. As seen in the section above on granting Top Secret clearances, reliable information about the security implications of specific behavior or character traits was not available even to the professional, full-time investigators and adjudicators in the DIS. The sailors who should have been looking for and reporting on security risks did not even have the benefit of vague instructions to think about security and use common sense to guide them that DIS agents had. There was no standardized program, or even clear guidance, on reporting misbehavior or possible security risks. Sailors had little reason to think that their observations were security-relevant or grounds for taking action, nor did they have any clear picture of what options for action were feasible or appropriate.29\nReporting possible security issues also went against a powerful cultural component of American society in general and the military in particular. As the PERSEREC study of espionage cases puts it:\nExecutive Order 12968, *Access to Classified Information*, states that \"Employees are encouraged and expected to report any information that raises doubts as to whether an employee's continued eligibility for access to classified information is clearly consistent with national security.\" This expectation cuts across the strong disinclination in American culture to \"rat\" on a peer, as well as across the determination to mind one's own business as the best way to get along with coworkers.30\nThis tendency was much more pronounced in the military, because the only means to report such security concerns was the command channel. That meant in practice that sailors were highly reluctant to voice any unease that they had over the disarray in a colleague's personal life, because such a comment could very easily result in criminal or administrative prosecution, demotion, or disciplinary discharge from the Navy. Is it any surprise that the average sailor, who had no reason to know what the security implications of his colleague's unsavory lifestyle were, would keep quiet rather than make a complaint and start a process that may have ruinous results for a shipmate? Furthermore, there are clear negative consequences for a sailor being labeled an \"informant,\" particularly if he is living and working on a ship with the same small group of sailors who saw him causing problems--or indeed, living and working in close proximity with the subject of the complaint himself.31 Far better to simply keep quiet. As Arthur Walker later said, \"a lot of people just tend to mind their own business.\"32\nNot only are sailors reluctant to report possible problems to their commanders;\ntheir commanders are often unenthusiastic about receiving such reports and forwarding derogatory information up the chain of command. In addition to the same forces listed above, commanders and supervisors faced additional pressures. First, they were worried about reducing morale in their units. More than anything else, military leaders are charged with developing cohesive, highly motivated units. After all, any sailor might be called on to give his life trying to save his ship or his shipmates--possibly without warning, on immediate instinct; possibly with enough time to be fully aware of what is being asked of him. It is impossible to achieve this level of motivation and self-sacrifice if the sailors believe that co-workers are \"spying\" on each other and passing on innuendo and rumor behind their backs. Likewise, it is impossible to achieve if sailors believe that any sign of weakness or disarray in their personal affairs will result in loss of their security clearance, job, rank or pay.\nSupervisors and commanders also know that they are rated by their superiors in large measure on how their unit appears from the outside--in efficiency, discipline, and morale. This gives them a powerful incentive to keep messy personal problems quiet. This does not mean that Navy supervisors were behaving in an unethical way by covering up known security predicament. Rather, it means that commanders and supervisors had never been given any reason to be aware of the security implications of some of their subordinates' behavior. There was no guidance on what should be reported, or to whom. There was not even any central clearinghouse for security information that they could reference. What little written policy existed was vague to the point of incoherence. A good example is found in the Stilwell report:\nIt is improper to impose suspension or termination of a security clearance as a penalty for security violations. Nevertheless, adjudicative authorities should be permitted to suspend a security clearance in cases where an individual has clearly demonstrated an unwillingness or inability to protect classified information, pending readjudication of the clearance.33\nSo what should a supervisor do? It appears that the committee is saying that it is \"improper\" to suspend a person's clearance for security violations, but that it nevertheless should be done, at least until the adjudicator's decision is overridden by someone else. And remember, this guidance was written *after* 1985, the \"Year of the Spy,\" and is the committee's attempt to clarify and tighten the personnel security system.34 Nor is it apparent what is expected of supervisors in cases where a subordinate has not \"clearly demonstrated an unwillingness or inability to protect classified information,\" but is instead going through a personal crisis (like financial difficulty) or demonstrates unsavory or unethical behavior that is not work-related (like heavy gambling or marital infidelity). John Walker's supervisors apparently never thought that he showed an unwillingness or inability to safeguard classified information, even though they believed him to be morally compromised. Typical is Bill Metcalf, John Walker's supervisor in the submarine fleet message center at Norfolk during 1968:\nThe problems with Johnny Walker involved moral turpitude. The guy just didn't have any moral standards as far as I was concerned. He constantly bragged about women and if a woman looked twice at him, why he'd be unzipping his britches.\n\nBut there was never any hint that he was mishandling cryptographic material.35\nIt is not clear, even in retrospect, that John Walker's supervisors had sufficient grounds to remove his security clearance under the policy and guidance they had been given.\n\nThe personnel security system explicitly depended on supervisors spotting individuals with problematic behavior and removing them from access to sensitive information. Indeed, supervisors were seen as the people *most likely* to identify security risks and were considered *more* reliable at weeding out bad security risks than DIS\ninvestigations or records checks.36 Yet there is virtually no evidence that anyone told the supervisors themselves of this key role; certainly, they were never given even the absolute minimum level of information (what to report, and to whom) that they would need to carry out their duties effectively.\n\nOne final factor contributed to the weakness of the personnel security system:\nsome commanders compounded the problem with a casual or disdainful attitude toward security matters as well.37 Their approaches toward compliance with security regulations had an enormous impact on the outlook and actions of their subordinates. This was particularly true in the Navy, because both by law and by tradition, ship captains have near absolute authority over everyone and everything that happens aboard their ships. As mentioned previously, the Navy gave commanding officers the authority to allow or deny any of their sailors access to any information, equipment, or spaces onboard the ship. A commander who treated security restrictions as irritating nuisances or as optional recommendations set a powerful precedent for violating regulations. Indeed, he could easily place his subordinates in a position where they felt *forced* to violate security policy. Given that, for a system like FBS that depends on cryptographic keys for its security, a security compromise *anywhere* meant a security compromise *everywhere*, this was almost guaranteed to cause a systemwide failure.\n\nThe whole problem of co-worker and supervisor responsibility to report and act on potential security violations can be summed up in two words: divided responsibility. No one seemed to have overall responsibility for identifying and acting on security risks. The administrators who wrote the personnel security policy and the professional investigators in DIS assumed that the cleared person's supervisor and co-workers were best positioned (and hence primarily responsible for) detecting security-relevant facts. It is not an unreasonable assumption--after all, they have much more extensive contact with the subject than an outside investigator could possibly have, and they should know if and when the subject's personal situation changed for the worse. The extremely low rejection rates for security clearances seems to indicate that the DIS investigators were assuming that anyone submitted for a clearance had already been thoroughly vetted by his supervisor and found to be trustworthy, and their job was to report by exception.38 Yet no one provided supervisors with even the minimum level of information to carry out their duties. It appears that, in light of this total absence of clear policy and institutional support, most supervisors assumed that the primary responsibility for evaluating security risks remained with the professional investigators. If the professionals, who (presumably)\nhad access to additional information, detailed criteria for decision making, and thorough knowledge of the applicable policies and protocols, thought that a given person was trustworthy, then surely they must be. And so the personnel security system, as implemented, was left with a gaping hole in it. Very little derogatory information was ever brought forward for action, even in cases where there was a very clear pattern of security issues with a given individual.39\n\n## Investigating Espionage\n\nThe final part of the personnel security system was the professional investigation of possible espionage by law enforcement agencies. Yet even here, the system was far more complex and ad hoc than necessary. To start with, questions of which organization was responsible for the investigation were far from clear. By law, the FBI is the lead agency for tracking suspected foreign intelligence agents in the US. Counterintelligence investigations were done by the FBI within U.S. territory, and as a joint FBI/CIA task force if overseas. At least some overseas involvement occurs in many counterintelligence investigations; for example, in the John Walker case, all but two of his meetings with his KGB handlers occurred overseas, in places such as Vienna, Hong Kong, and Morocco.40\nAdditionally, the Army Intelligence and Security Command, Naval Investigative Service\n(NIS), and Air Force Office of Special Investigations were tasked to investigate crimes by members of their service departments; but this was in addition to, not instead of, the FBI and CIA responsibilities in the case. Thus, once the John Walker case finally broke in 1985, the case was being worked simultaneously by the FBI and NIS, with some involvement by the CIA as well.41\nSA Robert Hunter, the FBI special agent who arrested John Walker had this to say about the Navy's in-house investigators: \"During my 23 years of contact with the Naval Investigative Service, I reached the conclusion that it was one screwed-up outfit.\"42 He identified four reasons for its poor performance. First, NIS investigators were very poorly trained. Indeed, in some cases they sent out to the field completely untrained!43 Second, the investigators were civilian employees who were working directly for line officers in the Navy, who had no investigative experience at all. This led to a number of serious problems with prioritization and investigative guidelines. Investigators had little authority or latitude in working cases. SA Hunter further believed that most Navy officers were more concerned about protecting their careers than seeing criminals prosecuted, and so they would meddle in investigations to prevent bad news from surfacing.44\nNavy officers were not the only ones who had reason to want to bury espionage investigations. There is an inherent conflict of interest within the government regarding the prosecution of espionage cases. Most importantly, putting a suspected spy on trial requires the government to reveal precise details of the classified material that the accused handed over and details of how he had been identified as a spy. Since in most cases this involved highly sensitive \"sources and methods\" information--that is, the identities of US intelligence agents and foreigners spying for the US or details of the government's ability to intercept and decrypt foreign governments' communications--\nthere was a genuine concern that prosecuting spies would cause more harm than good. From the mid-1950s to the mid-1970s, the US government was extremely reluctant to prosecute accused spies in open court, even when evidence of their guilt was overwhelming. Indeed, during the period under study in this report (1967-1974), fewer than eleven individuals were prosecuted for espionage or attempted espionage.45 As the PERSEREC report on espionage by US citizens puts it:\nThe Justice Department during these years [1947-1977] agreed with the position of the intelligence agencies: that prosecuting spies did more harm than good because it was likely to invite retaliation against Americans abroad; it ruined intelligence agents as assets for future use; and it revealed to our adversaries what we did and did not know. The preferred approach was to identify and quietly neutralize spies in order to control the loss of secrets and to avoid the admission of failure that a spy represents.46\nDr. Herbig and Dr. Wiskoff also note that counterintelligence efforts were further impaired by political meddling from the Johnson and Nixon administrations: the FBI was directed to divert counterintelligence resources to surveillance and disruption of American antiwar and civil rights groups. The CIA also diverted resources into investigating possible foreign influences on American groups opposing US government policies, leaving less available for overseas counterintelligence missions.47 Ironically, had John Walker been exposed in 1974, or been discovered based on classified intercepts, he may very well have escaped punishment for his crimes.\nA major change in US counterespionage policy occurred in the mid-1970s. The political decision was made to begin prosecuting spies, even at the risk of compromising US sources and methods. Congress passed two laws that became the key to counterintelligence investigations: the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) in\n1978, which established panels of specially cleared District judges to issue wiretap warrants for counterintelligence investigations, and the Classified Information Protection Act (CIPA) in 1980, which set rules for the handling classified materials during court proceedings. In particular, CIPA allowed the trial judge to hold private evidentiary hearings to rule on whether defense attorneys could compel the revelation of classified materials, and it allowed the judge to enter unclassified summaries of classified documents into evidence. These provisions removed the risk of a defendant making threatening to reveal classified information if the government pushed for conviction on serious charges (so-called \"greymail\"). FISA and CIPA have been critical in all subsequent prosecutions of accused spies in the United States. The evidence against John Walker and his confederates was collected using FISA warrants, and the subsequent trials were conducted under CIPA rules, which made convictions much easier to obtain.48\nThe key point to remember about this is that FISA and CIPA were not available to prosecutors when the version of FBS under study in this report was being designed and implemented. The official position at the time was that individuals who were behaving suspiciously would be turned over to professional investigators at the NIS or FBI. Those investigators would uncover the facts and prosecute the guilty; furthermore, persons who were considering espionage would be deterred by the chance of being caught and prosecuted. Yet this whole chain of events was demonstrably flawed. Extremely few\n\"suspicious\" cases were turned over to law enforcement investigators. The agencies charged with investigating were underresourced, misdirected, and suffering from extensive personally or politically motivated meddling. Investigators had no means of getting legal wiretap orders without revealing classified material; resorting to illegal wiretaps meant that the evidence gained would be inadmissible in court, among other problems. Even when the evidence was legally acquired and totally clear, the US government policy was so strongly against prosecution that virtually no spies were convicted. The personnel in charge of designing and implementing FBS should have known that counterintelligence investigations and prosecution under the federal espionage laws were almost entirely empty threats.\n\nJohn Walker's reaction to his arrest by the FBI is a good illustration of how spies viewed the risks of a counterintelligence investigation. He was arrested in a motel, while in possession of detailed information about how and where to leave a large bag of classified information for his Soviet handler to get it, and where to pick up his payment of money. He knew that the FBI had caught him with enough information to prove he had been spying. Yet he spent his first day under arrest confidently awaiting the arrival of Justice Department lawyers, who would present him with a deal--immunity from prosecution, if he would explain what he had compromised and how he had pulled off his daring feat; or perhaps work as a double agent, passing bogus information to the Soviets and being paid by both sides. When it slowly dawned on him that no deal was coming, he was outraged. It was only the minor, amateur spies that got treated as common criminals; he was a major, important spy, and he had never seen big-league spies treated as he was being treated. The decades of poor-quality counterintelligence work and failure to prosecute spies had eliminated any thoughts of deterrence from his mind.49\n\n## Summary\n\nIn summary, the personnel security system appeared to be a solid, workable solution to the need to keep classified information out of untrustworthy hands. However, on closer inspection, the system was far less comprehensive than it seemed. The process for investigating personnel for Secret-level clearances was extremely cursory--it was incapable of uncovering the great majority of criminal convictions, and it made no effort whatsoever to check any other security-relevant areas, such as finances. Even such a minimal vetting process was routinely undermined by people with vested interests in concealing information. Granting Top Secret clearances involved a more elaborate series of checks; however, the results were still highly untrustworthy. DIS and the adjudication system were chronically underfunded and undermanned, there was virtually no reliable scientific information on which to base decisions, and the Navy allowed commanding officer to override the adjudicators' decisions anyway. Periodic reinvestigations were almost always backlogged by several years and could, in any event, be easily avoided by tampering with personnel records. Policy existed that required supervisors and coworkers to report suspicious behavior to the authorities, yet almost no one did; however, the policy makers apparently made no effort to find out whether their policies were being followed, or even if sailors knew the policy existed. Even if sailors had reported suspicious behavior, the law enforcement agencies charged with investigating and prosecuting espionage were divided, distracted by political meddling, and had few good legal methods available to them for collecting and presenting evidence in court. The official government policy towards espionage made covering up the crime more important than punishing criminals; the result was a climate of minimal deterrence for potential spies. All of these facts should have been known to decision makers who were designing FBS in the mid-1960s, if they had looked into the matter; yet no one did look into it in a systematic way until the Stilwell commission in 1986.\n\n\n\n1Early, 108.\n\n2Richard G. Stilwell, General, USA, Ret. (Chairman), Keeping the Nation's Secrets: A Report to the Secretary of Defense by the Commission to Review DOD\nSecurity Policy and Practices, November 19, 1985; available from http://www.fas.org/sgp/library/stilwell.html, Executive Summary and Requests for Initial Clearances; Internet.\n\n3Ibid., Organizational Arrangements.\n\n4Ibid., Organizational Arrangements. 5Ibid., Initial Investigations.\n\n6Early, 30-31.\n\n7Ibid., 31.\n\n8Ibid., 32-33.\n\n9Ibid., 33.\n\n10Stilwell, Initial Investigations.\n\n11Ibid., Initial Investigations.\n\n12Early, 50-51.\n\n13Hunter, 26.\n\n14Early, 51. 15Ibid., 52. 16Ibid., 45 and 50-55.\n\n17Stilwell, Adjudication.\n\n\n18Ibid., Adjudication.\n\n19James Bamford, *The Puzzle Palace: A Report on America's Most Secret Agency*\n(Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1982), 82.\n\n20Early, 51-52.\n\n21American Psychiatric Association, \"Position Statement on Homosexuality and Civil Rights,\" *American Journal of Psychiatry, 131 (4)*, (15 December 1973), 497.\n\n22United States General Accounting Office, Security Clearances: Consideration of Sexual Orientation in the Clearance Process. Report to Congressional Requesters, GAO/NSIAD-95-21, 24 March 1995, 1-3 and 9-10.\n23Stilwell, Periodic Reinvestigations; and Katherine L. Herbig and Martin F.\n\nWiskoff, Defense Personnel Security Research Center, Espionage Against the United States by American Citizens 1947-2001, PERSEREC Technical Report 02-5, July 2002, xiii.\n\n24He said that he did provide the information requested; however, a thorough counterintelligence investigation after John Walker's confession failed to turn up any evidence of espionage by his co-workers in the NAVCAMS. See Early, 68.\n\n25Ibid., 56.\n\n26Ibid., 68-103.\n\n27Ibid., 109. 28After John Walker had been captured by the FBI, the NIS attempted to interview every sailor that had ever either worked with him or had had any social contact with him- -even those who had only gone to the same cocktail party as him. Many of these interviewees were polygraph tested as well. It was wholly wasted effort; there was no evidence that any of them had ever considered espionage as an explanation for his behavior. See Hunter, 155-159. It is worth noting that some spies have been apprehended based on co-workers' reports. Herbig and Wiskoff specifically highlight the cases of Jonathan Pollard, Michael Allen, and Samuel Morison as resulting from co-worker tipoffs to investigators. However, these cases are a tiny minority of the 150 documented cases of espionage they compiled in the PERSEREC database. They present a number of counterexamples, including the case of Jeffrey Carney, where he himself asked his supervisors cancel his security clearance and relieve him of his duties due to his psychiatric problems. They refused, citing a shortage of replacements with Top Secret/SCI security clearances. Sgt. Carney began spying for the East Germans shortly afterward. See Herbig, 56-59.\n\n\n30Herbig, 59.\n\n31Stilwell, Acquiring Information from Additional Sources.\n\n32Herbig, 59.\n\n33Stilwell, Taking Effective Action Against Those Who Violate the Rules.\n\n34A total of 35 US citizens were active in, and eventually convicted of, espionage or attempted espionage during 1985. This includes the four members of the Walker spy ring. See Herbig, 61.\n\n35Early, 81-82.\n\n36Stilwell, Continuing Command/Supervisory Evaluations and Commander/Supervisor Emphasis.\n\n37Ibid., Commander/Supervisor Emphasis.\n\n38The Stilwell commission found that rejection rates were between 2.5 percent and 0.2 percent, depending on the group of applicants considered. It is worth noting that this is for initial investigations. It was perhaps unwise for DIS to assume that an applicant's supervisor had vetted him at all, since most of them probably could not start working for the organization that submitted them until after receiving the approval. See Stilwell, Adjudication.\n\n39Ibid., Continuing Command/Supervisory Evaluations.\n\n40Early, 65. 41Hunter, 154. 42Ibid., 154.\n\n43Ibid., 154.\n\n44Ibid., 154.\n\n45Nine military members were prosecuted for espionage in the period 1966-1975, as compared to only two civilian government employees. The number of persons suspected of espionage during that period has never been published in an unclassified document; it would appear that most suspects were either eased out of their jobs or pressured to become double agents, giving their handlers bogus information. The clearest examples of known spies escaping prosecution come from the Venona intercepts. These were Soviet diplomatic cables transmitted in the 1940s and 1950s; the NSA was able to decrypt some of these messages and has subsequently declassified and published them during the 1990s. The material includes reports from KGB agents operating under\n\ndiplomatic cover at the UN mission and at the Soviet embassy in Washington, DC, and identified a number of US citizens by name as spies. The intelligence community convinced the Justice Department that revealing the Venona intercepts in court would reveal the NSA's ability to decrypt their cables and cause a catastrophic loss of critical intelligence. Accordingly, a number of the named individuals were able to stonewall the FBI and escape prosecution entirely. For example, Theodore Hall was a physicist who passed the Soviets information on the US atomic bomb program in 1943; although both his identity and the secrets he passed were known from the intercepts, he was never prosecuted and lived out the rest of his life in Cambridge, England. See Herbig, 7-10.\n46Ibid., 8.\n\n47Ibid., 8.\n\n48Ibid., 8-12; Hunter, 71-92. 49Earley, 11-14.\n\n## Chapter 3 Technical Security\n\nThe KWR-37 has stopped breaking. With other systems [including the KW-7], there is no problem. But KWR-37 won't break anymore.1\nJohn Walker's KGB handler, at a meeting on 30 June 1979, quoted in *Breaking the Ring*\n\n## Overview Of Technical Security\n\nTechnical security is a general term for the security features designed into COMSEC devices that make recovering classified data from the transmitted message impossible for anyone except the legitimate recipient. Another way of saying this is that it is the cryptographic equipment's ability to withstand cryptanalytic attack without compromise. This sort of attack is commonly called \"code breaking,\" and it is trying to decipher an encrypted message without knowledge of the key, and possibly without any knowledge of the encryption algorithm either. (The issue of controlling access to the keys will be addressed in the next chapter.) In the most general terms, cryptanalysis involves two steps. First, the adversary must intercept a copy of the encrypted message. As stated in the introduction, FBS was a long-distance, wide-area broadcast, and so interception was very easy; it was assumed that the Soviets (and indeed, anyone else who cared to listen) would get a copy of every encrypted message. The adversary's next step is to apply mathematical formulas to attempt to extract some information out of the encrypted message. This report will not go into the mathematical details of this process. A few general comments will suffice: first, cryptanalysis is usually an iterative process. That is, the analyst makes some assumptions about the cryptographic system and message, calculates some trial-and-error results, and then refines his assumptions based on the statistical results of his trials. The more the analyst knows about the system and the message, the easier and faster it will be to break the code. Second, the mathematical methods used can hinge on some extremely subtle clues. Some good examples of this can be found in the published reports on the breaking of the German Enigma machines in World War II. For example, the British code breakers took advantage of a German procedural rule that the machine's settings could not be repeated; that meant that, once one day's settings had been determined, the code breakers could positively rule out that particular setting for the next 28 days' worth of traffic--and since there were only 60 possible settings, the steady accumulation of knowledge about multiple days' worth of messages could potentially cut the analytic workload by almost half. They even made effective use of small quirks, like the fact that so many German messages began with the phrase \"Heil Hitler,\" to further narrow their searches.2\nBeing able to break an encryption system without access to the key is the ultimate prize for a national intelligence service, since it allows total access to an adversary's information, essentially without risk. In such a case, there would not be any further need for a spy to steal keys. Indeed, a good measure of its value is the resources which countries will devote to causing such a failure in their adversaries' systems. The U.S. government budget for such activities was (and still is) classified, but during the time period under study (1967-1974), estimates for U.S. government expenditures have ranged as high as $10 billion--in other words, more than the budget for the rest of the intelligence community, combined.3\n\n## The National Security Agency\n\nThe U.S. government has centralized both the protection of its own information and the exploitation of other countries' communications into one agency: the National Security Agency (NSA), formally a part of the Department of Defense but in practice almost entirely autonomous. It was given sole responsibility for both the exploitation of foreign signals intelligence (SIGINT) and for the protection of U.S. government communications (COMSEC); that is, it both tried to break other countries' codes and produce U.S. government codes. It handles some of the most sensitive information that the United States has, and so was (and remains) one of the most secretive government agencies--to the extent that it officially denied its own existence for many years. Under Public Law 86-36, passed in 1959, gives the NSA virtually blanket authority to maintain secrecy: \"Nothing in this Act or any other law... shall be construed to require the disclosure of the organization or any function of the National Security Agency, or of any information with respect to the activities thereof, or of the names, titles, salaries, or number of the persons employed by such Agency.\" A running joke in the U.S. government held that \"NSA\" actually stood for either \"No Such Agency\" or \"Never Say Anything.\"4 Almost everything that the NSA did was considered Top Secret compartmented information, never shared with anyone outside of the agency itself. The agency also had a well-deserved reputation for technical competence and excellent engineering skills--primarily based on its proven ability to obtain highly valuable intelligence by exploiting a wide variety of foreign communications systems.\n\nDuring the time period under study (1967-1975), the NSA was organized into a number of suborganizations. The one of primary interest here was the Office of Communications Security, also called S Organization. It was responsible for the design, testing, procurement, certification and life cycle management of all encryption systems used by the U.S. government. It provided the technical expertise for principles and policy recommendations, which determined the details of how a particular device could be used, who could have access to it, what could be transmitted using it, and so on. S Organization also ran a large production facility and print shop, producing most of the key materials and printed matter pertaining to COMSEC devices. In a sense, the S Organization was the sole point of contact between \"customers\" (in this case, the U.S. Navy) and NSA; it was the source of all COMSEC equipment, manuals, policy, and key that the Navy used.5 S\nOrganization was supported with NSA by several other organizations, which did more theoretical research in mathematics, physics, and related fields; the most noteworthy of these was the Standard Technical Engineering Division (STED), later renamed the Cryptographic Equipment Division, which was responsible for research and development of cutting-edge technologies which might eventually prove useful in cryptographic devices.6\nOfficially, all COMSEC policy for the U.S. government was set by the United States Communications Security Committee, which was a cabinet-level committee within the National Security Council. A procedure was in place whereby, in the event of disagreement at the committee level, the proposed decision would be given to the Secretaries of Defense and State for resolution; if they were unable to resolve the dispute, the question would be decided by the President directly. Policy decisions would then be handed to the Department of Defense, as executive agent; the DoD then tasked the NSA, its subordinate, to implement the policy. In actual practice, the decision flow was exactly the reverse. The USCOMSEC Committee only met once a year and served primarily to rubber stamp decisions made by technical subcommittees; these, in turn, were wholly dominated by the NSA employees, who alone had the detailed technical knowledge necessary, and who were often unwilling to share information with anyone else. Indeed, in at least one instance, the NSA refused to even inform the committee members about what a particular issue was, on the grounds that it was too sensitive for the full committee\n(that is, the President's Cabinet) to know.7\n\n## Designing Cryptographic Systems\n\nAs mentioned above, the NSA is solely responsible for designing cryptographic systems. The design process for a cryptographic device begins when a user designs a new communication system (in this case, the U.S. Navy designing FBS). Cryptographic engineers from NSA first had to evaluate the proposed communication system to determine what potential security weaknesses it might have. Encryptors cannot simply be added to a radio or teletypewriter, because very minor and subtle details might give an adversary highly valuable clues useful in breaking an encryption system. This analysis phase could take several years. Once that stage was complete, the NSA engineers determined if an existing encryption device could be used (or modified for use) in the communications system, or if a totally new device was needed.8\nThat decision was influenced by a number of factors, and the decision to develop the KW-7 is a good example of the process. Before the fielding of the KW-7, teletypewriters had been secured with encryptors such as the KL-7 and KL-47, which used a series of spinning rotors to shuffle the characters in the output. This is the same method used by the Japanese \"Purple\" and German Enigma machines in World War II.9\nOne problem with rotor-based systems is that there are limits to how fast the rotors can spin; the Navy's new, faster teletypewriters were pushing (or exceeded) the physical restrictions of such encryptors. This was an excellent reason to justify why a totally new device needed to be developed--a development effort that would take years, potentially cost hundreds of millions of dollars, and had a real risk that the end product would be unsuitable for its true operating environment once it was fielded to the fleet.10\nThere was a much more persuasive argument for designing a new family of encryptors, fully known to the NSA at the time but apparently never discussed with anyone outside the Agency. The NSA (and its predecessor organizations) had been breaking rotor-based systems since the 1930s, most notably the Japanese \"Purple\" codes and the German Enigma. As these successes demonstrated, rotor-based encryptors were unquestionably vulnerable to cryptanalytic attack if the adversary had sufficient computing power available. The KL-47 was more complex than the Enigma, but the power of computers was increasing exponentially fast since World War II as well. It was clear that it was only a matter of time before the complexity of computers caught up with the encryptor. But remember: the story of the breaking of the Enigma machine was not revealed in public until 1979, and then by a British code breaker; during the time period under study, the information was still Top Secret compartmented data. There is no record that the NSA ever told anyone outside of its own organization that rotor-based encryptors similar to the KL-47 had been broken in the past and were growing increasingly vulnerable to attacks using modern computers. Indeed, the KL-47 remained certified for use with Top Secret data and was still in active use in some locations as late as the mid-\n1970s.11\nThe importance of this fact is that the U.S. Navy, which was responsible for the data to be protected by these cryptographic devices, was deliberately left in ignorance about the true risks of using the devices. The NSA only issued a certification packet stating that a particular device, used in a particular way, was approved for use with data up to a particular security classification. The implication was that the NSA's own code breakers had attempted to penetrate the system and failed; and since the NSA code breakers were the best in the world, then naturally every other country's code breakers would also fail. Privately within the NSA, there were some concerns that this might not really be true. Lt. Gen. Marshall Carter, a former director of NSA, had this to say in 1982:\nWe operated on the alleged mystique that anything COMSEC did was ground through the operational side of the cryptologic branch to see if they could get into it. . . . That was what we were supposed to do; that was what we said we were doing . . . [but] I wasn't technically oriented enough to know whether in fact we did do it.12\nThe problem is more difficult than simply wondering whether the NSA followed up on its commitments to test thoroughly. Any security evaluation will involve assumptions--some about what the adversary is capable of and what resources he will devote to this particular target, some about what the operators will do, some about the equipment and environment, and so on. There is no evidence that these assumptions were ever checked for validity in any systematic way, or even stated to the end user. For example, there is no evidence that the NSA ever asked the U.S. Navy any questions about how likely it would be for the sailors operating the encryptor to cut corners when implementing particular policy proposals. It is obvious that the more burdensome the policy on the operator, the more likely that it will be bypassed in practice, and equally obvious that the U.S. Navy officers and petty officers are best placed to know what their sailors are probably going to do in an operational environment. Yet there is no evidence that the NSA asked Navy leaders questions about possible compliance rates for given policy restrictions. It would appear that 100 percent compliance was assumed, irregardless of how burdensome the requirements placed on the operators were.\nThe case of the KL-7 and KL-47 shows another problem with assumptions. The device was certified in the early 1950s, based in part on some assumptions about the technological capabilities of the Soviet Union. At that time, the USSR had essentially no computer capability at all and little perceived code breaking ability; consequently, the KL-7 and KL-47 were considered secure against any reasonable attack that the USSR\nmight mount against them, and they were certified for Top Secret data. While those assumptions *might* have been true in 1950, they were obviously false by 1970. In other words, even if all of the initial assumptions are true, they can become false over time.\n\nThe NSA may have done some internal re-evaluations of the vulnerability of the KL-7 and KL-47 in light of the major improvements in computing capability available, but there is no evidence that any such re-evaluation was briefed to the organizations actually using the devices to protect their data. All indications are that the Navy (and other organizations) were simply told that the NSA had tested the device, and it was certified for use with classified data.\n\n## The Soviet Approach To Breaking The Kw-7\n\nClearly, the Soviets were extremely interested in causing a technical security failure of the KW-7. They knew that they could not ensure that John Walker (or another spy) would always be placed to give them the keys in a timely manner; if they could decrypt the messages without the key, they would have permanent, uninterrupted access to every broadcast. This raises the question: what things would they need to have to mount a systematic attack on the encryptor? They boil down to two major items: as much data as possible on the device's internal workings--ideally, one or more working copies of the encryptor, plus the complete operation and repair manuals--and detailed specifics on any changes that might be made to the device from time to time.\n\nOne of the very few things John Walker did not give the Soviets was a working copy of an encryptor. Unfortunately, they did not need him to do so, as the U.S. Navy was about to all-but-deliver functional KW-7s to the Soviets, in the shape of the USS\nPueblo (AGER-2). She was a minimally armed, barely seaworthy cargo ship that had been modified to perform electronic intercept missions off the coast of North Korea. On 23 January 1968, she was attacked by North Korean gunboats and aircraft and was captured. She had been carrying very large amounts of classified material, plus a number of encryption and intercept devices, and despite valiant attempts, the crew was able to destroy less than 10 percent of the material. According to Oleg Kalugin, a former KGB major general, the North Koreans captured and passed on to the Soviet Union working copies of the KW-7, as well as a complete set of operation and repair manuals.13\nNonetheless, a close analysis of the details shows that John Walker probably did have a role in causing the USS *Pueblo* incident. From the Soviet standpoint, instigating the capture of a U.S. Navy ship, even second hand, would be a highly risky move, and would only be done if they thought that there was a correspondingly large payoff. Capturing one or more working copies of encryptors might fit the bill; but there is one problem: they could reasonably expect that the U.S. would respond to such an obvious compromise by making some changes to the encryptor, which would render the seized copies unusable. The U.S. did, in fact, do so; and the Soviets had John Walker giving them copies of the change orders that allowed them to modify the seized devices when the changes were made.14\nSince the USS *Pueblo* incident happened so soon after John Walker began spying, and since John Walker was placed to give the Soviets exactly what they needed to make the best use of the items seized from the ship, it naturally raises the question of whether the two events were related. While the conclusion is not iron-clad, the balance of the evidence indicates that they were: that the Soviets asked the North Koreans to capture the USS *Pueblo*, because they knew that they would have the information they needed to exploit the seized equipment to the maximum extent.\n\nThere are two sources of evidence for this: John Walker himself, and Oleg Kalugin, the KGB general. Kalugin claims to have been John Walker's first handler, and to have knowledge about a shipment of some 792 pounds of equipment and documents seized from the USS *Pueblo* and sent from North Korea to the USSR.15 He gave an interview to Special Agent Robert Hunter, the lead FBI agent on the Walker case, and said that he thought that the USS *Pueblo* seizure happened too soon after John Walker began spying for the Soviets to have used the information he gave them to influence the seizure--although he admitted that the Soviets \"definitely\" would have asked the North Koreans to seize the ship if they could have known where it was, or what it had on board.16\nThat would seem to exonerate John Walker from responsibility for the USS\nPueblo seizure. Yet Mr. Kalugin is probably not being totally honest in his descriptions of events. He is not a defector. After clashing with his superiors in 1990, he was fired from the KGB and stripped of his pension. He won a seat in the Russian parliament on a reform platform, but only served one term. After that, he published a book and has made his living giving speeches, interviews and lectures about his time as a KGB agent, but he is not formally cooperating with Western intelligence agencies. This is important, because in his book he makes it clear that he retains some loyalty to the spies he worked with. A close reading of his book bears this out. Spies who have never been publicly identified are described in an extremely vague way, such as \"an ambassador from a large Arab country... [who] passed me cables and other documents\"17--never enough details to identify the person, or the precise information they revealed. In the cases of those spies who *have* been identified previously, he sticks very close to the published accounts of their doings. In John Walker's case, he strictly follows the details laid out in the book Family of Spies by Pete Early, which is based on jailhouse interviews Mr. Early conducted with John Walker while he was awaiting sentencing.18 That is very interesting, because it is now clear that some of those details are definitely false.\n\nJohn Walker's original story about how he began spying was that it was an impulsive action, taken in a moment of extreme financial and family stress in December,\n1967. He gave a very detailed description of how he copied whatever classified documents he had easily available while on the night shift, and how he walked into the Soviet embassy to volunteer to spy. Those details tripped him up. His description both the inside and outside of the Soviet embassy in Washington, DC was absolutely accurate-- except that he described it as it appeared after a new security fence was installed in 1974, rather than how it appeared in late 1967.19\nFurthermore, the FBI gave him extensive polygraph tests20 as part of his counterintelligence debriefing, and John Walker repeatedly failed polygraphs on the original, \"overwhelming impulse\" version of how he started to spy. He did, however, pass a polygraph on the following statement:\nI know you believe I'm lying about the beginning of the operation because of [my failing] the polygraph and the fence story. Let me give you a scenario: [my brother] Arthur got in some type of financial trouble, probably in New York, and became involved with a number of New York loan sharks. Art needed money desperately, and I gave him some classified documents to sell. After Art sold the documents and got some money, he became frightened and wanted to drop out. I\nsaw no harm in selling the information to the Soviets, as the countries were not at war and would never go to war. I felt it was an easy chance to make some money, so I walked into a Soviet embassy somewhere in the world.21\nThus a more likely story is this: John Walker had first stolen some classified information for his brother, probably sometime around 1965-66. He was pleasantly surprised to find out how easy it was and how much money could be made doing it; and when his brother got cold feet, he decided that he would continue on his own. He pilfered or copied some documents while at sea onboard the USS *Simon Bolivar* (SSBN-641),22\nand at a port call \"somewhere in the world,\" he walked into a Soviet embassy, gave them the documents as proof of his bona fides, and offered to spy for them. He told them that he was going to be assigned as a watch officer at NAVCAMS Atlantic fleet, and he would have high-level access to cryptographic materials there for a number of years. The Soviets were extremely pleased, paid him enough money on the spot to whet his appetite for more, and gave him a \"shopping list\" and instructions on how to do his first dead drop in the Washington, DC area--with the time set for mid-December, 1967, a few weeks after he signed in at Norfolk. Barbara Walker was certain that John Walker first showed up with a lot of unexplained money just before Christmas, 1967, so by then he was definitely making deliveries of classified material to the Soviets.\n\nThe timing is important for determining if the USS *Pueblo* seizure was related to John Walker's decision to start spying. If the Soviets knew several months in advance that they would have an agent who could get them the KW-7 keys and any manuals or change orders that might come out, then the value of seizing a functional KW-7 increased dramatically. Kalugin made some vague and rather coy comments that the Soviet Union \"definitely\" would have asked the North Koreans to seize the ship if they had enough advance knowledge... and it seems extremely likely that they did, in fact, have considerable advance knowledge that John Walker was going to start delivering highquality COMSEC material in December 1967. Thus, the balance of probabilities is that the Soviets instigated the USS *Pueblo* seizure as a means to further exploit the material that John Walker began providing in late 1967.\n\n## Was The Kw-7 Broken?\n\nThus, it is clear that the Soviet attempts to break the KW-7 seem to have had three steps: recruiting John Walker to provide them key material and manuals, seizing a physical copy of the KW-7 from the USS *Pueblo*, and extensively analyzing the machines and manuals they had to determine a way to break the KW-7 *without* getting a copy of the keys. But did they succeed? Were they able to decrypt material encrypted by the KW-7 *without* getting the keys, due to their knowledge of the inner workings of the device?\nThat question has never been answered in an unclassified publication. The only people who know for certain are the Soviet intelligence agencies, who were examining the intercepted messages. They obviously do not publish the details of their sources and methods, so concrete proof is not to be had. The US government presumably conducted a detailed analysis of the possibility of the KW-7 being compromised, based on John Walker's espionage, but no such analysis has been published in the unclassified literature. Thus, we are left with drawing only tentative conclusions, based on circumstantial evidence; however, the evidence that is available hints that the Soviets were successful in breaking the KW-7.\n\nThe first major source of information is the unclassified portions of John Walker's debriefings, plus his comments to a handful of reporters prior to his sentencing. The first bit of evidence is that John Walker said that his Soviet handlers changed their emphasis on how important the prompt delivery of key materials was over time. In particular, he reports that, at the beginning of his spying career, his handlers were pushing him strongly to deliver key material to them very regularly. According to SA Hunter, the \"average\"\nSoviet spy delivered a package of materials to his handler once or twice a year; in contrast, John Walker was delivering material every two to three months at the beginning.23 This is important, because spies and their handlers are most vulnerable to capture during the handoff of material--indeed, that is in fact how the FBI caught John Walker. So the Soviets were willing to risk losing such a valuable spy in order to get the material faster, in 1968 and 1969. But John Walker reported that, beginning in 1970, his handlers began pushing him to hand off material less frequently--only once every six months.24 This means that his handlers were abruptly much less interested in \"hot\" data.\n\nOne explanation for this is that, after two years of studying the captured KW-7s and the manuals and the key material that John Walker had been giving them, they were able to decrypt some or all of the messages without having the key. That alone is not conclusive, however. It may mean simply that the Soviets had recruited another spy and were getting the keys from someone else, for example. Alternately, they could have changed their minds about the risk/benefit balance between the short-term value of \"hot\" keys versus the long-term benefit of keeping John Walker hidden from the authorities and providing material for many years.\n\nYet there is still more evidence of compromise of the KW-7 to be found in John Walker's public statements. He said that he had a meeting with his KGB handler in Vienna on 30 June 1979. By this point, John Walker had stopped spying directly and had only recruited one spy, Jerry Whitworth, into his ring. He remembered his handler telling him that they could no longer break the KWR-37. Some internal modification must have been made, and they needed the technical specifications urgently. The KGB agent mentioned in passing that there was no trouble with the other systems, which included the KW-7.25 Again, this implies that the Soviets were able to decrypt the KW-7 traffic without further assistance from their spies.\n\nMore evidence is available from the public statements made by several highranking individuals in the Navy in the aftermath of the capture and trial of John Walker. Most important of these are comments by Secretary of the Navy Lehman made to the Washington Post in an article published on 13 October, 1986, which implied that the Soviets knew enough to break some systems without having a key.26 His comments, and similar comments made by other officials both in the press and at the Walker spy ring trials, do not identify the KW-7 specifically. This is important, because John Walker is known to have compromised a number of systems, including older and less-capable systems such as the KL-47; Secretary Lehman may have been referring to one of these systems rather than the KW-7. Likewise, these comments do not give an estimation of how much information the Soviets would have recovered, or what delays they would have encountered in attempting to decrypt messages without keys. As mentioned previously, if the Soviets had both the key and a working KW-7, they would have been able to decrypt 100 percent of the messages real time--that is, as fast as the US Navy recipients could decrypt them. In historical examples of cases where cryptanalysts do not have the keys to a system directly available, decryptions take far longer and typically result in decryption of only part of the message traffic. For example, in the spring of 1942, American cryptanalysts managed to decrypt an average of 10 to 12 percent of the Japanese Naval messages, with an average delay of two to three weeks.27 So even if Secretary Lehman's comments are specifically about the KW-7, it may be that only part of the message traffic was available to the Soviets without the keys, and there might have been significant delays in getting that part of the information as well.\n\nIn conclusion, one cannot say with absolute certainty, based on the unclassified evidence available, that the Soviets were able to read traffic encrypted with the KW-7\nwithout the traffic keys. However, there is strong circumstantial evidence that they were able to retrieve some, perhaps all, the information from the KW-7 even without getting the daily keys from a spy.\n\n\nhttp://www.vectorsite.net/ttcode8.html#m3, \"Bletchley Park Against Enigma,\" downloaded on 5 March 2005.\n\n\n\n4Ibid., 281.\n\n5Ibid., 93.\n\n6Ibid., 96-97.\n\n7The end result was that the NSA's deputy director for COMSEC personally briefed the Secretary of State and Secretary of Defense. They both approved the policy change that NSA had requested. All other details about this incident have remained highly classified. See Bamford, 94.\n\n8Ibid., 95.\n\n9The KL-47 was another one of the systems that John Walker compromised.\n\nWhen the FBI searched his house after his arrest, they found a special device that the KGB had given him in 1967, which revealed the complicated internal wiring which performed the shuffling of characters. John Walker also admits to giving the Soviets full copies of the manuals, which would have allowed them to construct a duplicate KL-47 at will, and complete key lists. Since the Soviets were able to give him the device within three weeks of him starting to spy, and since another Soviet spy, Army Sergeant Joseph Helmich, was caught with an identical device in the mid-1970s, we can assume that Walker was definitely not the first person to sell out the KL-47. See Hunter, 85-86.\n10An example of a failed project was the KY-28, a voice radio encryptor designed during the Vietnam War for use in fighter aircraft. More than $110 million was spent to develop and field KY-28s, and over 2,200 were manufactured and installed. Combat pilots refused to use them, however, because the lag between transmission and receipt of the message was a dangerous distraction in combat. The result was that US air to ground communications remained unencrypted and vulnerable to enemy exploitation throughout the war. See Bamford, 95.\n\n11Jerry Proc, \"KL-47\" (date unavailable), http://www.jproc.ca/crypto/kl47.html and \"KL-7,\" http://www.jproc.ca/crypto/kl7.html (13 January 2005)\n12Bamford, 95-96.\n\n13Virtually everything failed the crew that day. The ship had an incinerator, but it was located on the deck and consequently was exposed to North Korean gunfire. A backup method was to put materials in weighted bags and throw them overboard, but the bags proved to be too heavy to lift; the ship was also in water shallow enough that they would probably have been recovered easily. There were no explosive or incendiary devices on board, nor were there any means to scuttle the ship. Crew members tried lighting documents on fire in waste paper baskets, which left their work spaces full of choking smoke, and smashed at the cryptographic devices with sledgehammers and fire axes--only to find that the machines had been carefully designed to withstand rough treatment without damage; in some cases, the intelligence devices broke the\n\nsledgehammers, rather than the other way around. Some sailors tried ripping documents into fragments by hand. One panicked crewman was seen trying to flush documents down the toilet, which had ceased working when general quarters was called. The total lack of effective destruction methods is all the more startling when one realizes that both the USS\nLiberty (AGTR-5) and the *USS Banner* (AGER-1) had been attacked during previous cruises. See Mitchell B. Lerner, The Pueblo Incident: A Spy Ship and the Failure of American Foreign Policy (Lawrence, Kansas: University Press of Kansas), 79-83.\n\n14Early, 72. 15Lerner, 83.\n\n16Hunter, 216.\n\n17Oleg Kalugin and Fen Montaigne, *The First Directorate (*New York: St.\n\nMartin's Press, 1994), 77.\n\n18Ibid., 84-90.\n\n19Hunter, 122. 20Polygraph tests are sometimes called \"lie detector tests,\" but this is a misnomer.\n\nThey are not able to detect truth or falsehood. Rather, they measure some unconscious physiological responses to stress (such as sweating, heart rate increases, and breathing changes). Most people find it more stressful to lie than to tell the truth, so a polygraph can indicate the difference between someone attempting to deceive the tester and someone who is not. A typical test consists of yes-or-no questions. The tester begins with some innocuous questions, such as \"Is today Tuesday?,\" and he instructs the subject to answer truthfully to some and falsely to others. Once a pattern of physical responses to true and false answers is established, the tester moves on to the target questions, such as \"Have you tried to deceive me today?\" The subject is said to \"pass\" the polygraph if the pattern of his responses to the target questions matches the pattern of his responses to true answers of the innocuous questions; he \"fails\" if they do not. Nonetheless, some caution is due. Polygraph tests are inadmissible in court, because the same stress responses can be caused by emotions (such as embarrassment) that are unrelated to lying, and because the phrasing of the questions, experience level of the tester and details of how the test was conducted can greatly influence the results. Special Agent Robert Hunter states that the FBI's best polygraphers were assigned to the John Walker case, and he has a high degree of confidence that the results are accurate. See Hunter, 120-121.\n\n21Ibid., 118-122.\n\n22He served as a radioman onboard the *USS Simon Bolivar* from August 1965 to December 1967 and would have had routine access to all of the cryptographic materials on board, including KW-7 keys and classified manuals. Additionally, the ship's captain is known to have allowed him to see the Single Integrated Operations Plan, which specified\n\nthe full details of the US plans for launching a nuclear strike on the Soviet Union and its allies (including air-, land-, and sea-based strikes). See Early, 49-53.\n\n23Hunter, 185-186.\n\n24Early, 86.\n\n25Jerry Whitworth did get the modification work order that had directed an alteration of the KWR-37 and passed it to the Soviets, via John Walker, in November 1980. See Barron, 186.\n\n26Ibid., 210.\n\n27Yet even this small amount of information, delayed by several weeks, was vital to the US victory at Midway. Specifically, the information gave Admiral Nimitz sufficient advance warning that the Japanese would attempt a submarine cordon so that he could order his ships to sea before it arrived. He also knew that Japanese seaplanes would attempt to refuel from submarines at Frigate Shoals, and so he stationed ships there to prevent it. He knew that there were four carriers in the Japanese task force, which contributed to his decision to rush the *USS Yorktown*'s repairs into a near-miraculous two days, and he knew that the Japanese did not expect her to be in action. The information also indicated that the Japanese attack toward the Aleutians was a feint, and it could be ignored. All of this, plus enormous luck and courage, was critical to the Americans successfully overcoming a major disparity in combat power between the fleets. See Barron, 31.\n\n## Chapter 4 Key Management\n\nThey usually had forewarning of the B-52 strikes. Even when the B-52s diverted to secondary targets because of weather, they knew in advance which targets would be hit. Naturally, the foreknowledge diminished the effectiveness of the strikes because they were ready. It was uncanny. We never figured it out.1\nTheodore Shackley, CIA station chief in Saigon from 1968-1973, quoted in *Breaking the Ring*\n\n## Overview Of Key Management\n\nKey management describes the methods and policies used to handle key material.\n\nThis report will focus on two major subcomponents of the FBS key management system. The first is the FBS key distribution plan--how key material was distributed to all of the people and places that needed it. This chapter will show that, while in theory the distribution of key material was tightly restricted on a need-to-know basis, in practice this principle was trumped by the need to ensure that all Navy ships had all the key material they might need for any potential mission worldwide. The second major subcomponent to be studied is the auditing system. This was the main method that the Navy used to ensure that keys were not lost, stolen or mishandled by the personnel who are legitimately issued the keys. While highly elaborate and regarded with significant apprehension by the sailors who had to face them, this report will show that they were totally incapable of detecting illicit copying of the key material, even if the audits had been carried out 100\npercent perfectly.2\n\n## The Fbs Key Distribution System\n\nBefore beginning to study the key distribution system for FBS, it is worth discussing general design criteria for key distribution. Clearly, the distribution of the key is of primary importance to the overall security of the system. But during the time period under study (1967-1974), there were some fundamental misunderstandings about how to look at security conceptually, which contributed to the weakness of the key management system ultimately implemented for FBS. The most important of these conceptual errors was to focus almost exclusively on securing the communications path, rather than on securing the data itself. Ultimately, what end users want is easy access to, and secure protection of, their data. Likewise, the enemy wants the data; it is irrelevant to him whether it was acquired by a radio intercept, photocopied in a message center, or handed over by its ultimate recipient.\n\nOnce a designer focuses on the data, rather than a communications path, it becomes clear that there are two separate design criteria to consider. The first is ensuring that no unauthorized people get access to the data. This is called *data confidentiality*, and it is the feature that most people immediately associate with a communications security system. But good designers also have to take into consideration a second issue: ensuring that every legitimate user who needs the data can get access to it, at the time and place that he needs it. This is called *data availability*. Obviously, these two imperatives conflict to some degree, and the issue calls for a delicate balancing of risks. Yet the fact that there are two separate imperatives was not understood at the time that FBS was designed. Instead, the NSA designers focused almost exclusively on data confidentiality--ensuring that the KW-7 hardware and security policies ensured that intercepted communications would remain undecipherable to the enemy. If that meant that it was expensive, hard to use, and required extremely restrictive and awkward policy, or if it might lock out legitimate users from time to time, then so be it.\nBut once the nascent FBS system left the NSA laboratories, the emphasis on security above all changed dramatically. The people who approved the final design of FBS, including the key management architecture--how many different keys were used, how long they were used, how many were issued to ships or stations at a time, who shared keys, and others--were not security experts at all. They were the Navy line officers who commanded the fleet. Although they were unable to put it into words, their actions show that they were far more concerned with data availability rather than data confidentiality. There were two main factors to this mindset: first, there was a genuine ignorance about the real rates of personnel reliability, with commanders grossly underestimating the likelihood of potential problem sailors getting security clearances and access to keys. Second, any ship or station which became isolated by lack of key became an immediate, high-level issue and prompted numerous and vigorous complaints. A key compromise, by contrast, was a totally silent affair for the commander. Thus, commanders were prodded toward approving very insecure systems both by ignorance and by their legitimate concern about leaving ships isolated.\n\nSpecifically referring to FBS, recall that the Navy communications architecture system in the mid-1960s to mid-1970s divided the world into four major regions, each with its own NAVCAMS. Within each region, different communications nets used different keys--the submarine fleet used a different key than the surface fleet, for example. This design was both a security feature, given that the enemy acquiring one key would only compromise part of the entire system, and a logistical convenience feature, in that each NAVCAMS would operate entirely independently of the others.\nThe problem with this concept is that Navy ships move worldwide. Ships can and do circumnavigate the world, and they do not necessarily know ahead of time where they will be going or when they will get there. There is also no saying whether it will be physically or operationally possible to reach the ship from shore, so there is no guarantee that a ship could be resupplied with keys in a short period of time if it moved into a different NAVCAMS' area unexpectedly. Accordingly, the Navy decided that every ship would be issued with a copy of every possible key that it might need, for every NAVCAMS in the world, for a period well in excess of its planned cruise, just to be sure that no ships became accidentally isolated.\nEssentially, the design was based on a series of logical deductions. If the enemy does not get access to the keys, then the KW-7 is secure. If the keys are only issued to trustworthy people, then the enemy will not get the keys. And since cleared people are trustworthy, then the KW-7 system will be secure if the system carefully checked that only cleared people get access to the keys. While this works well as a logic problem, it falls apart in the real world if the assumptions built into it are not true. As was demonstrated in chapter two, the assumption that the clearance process would identify and exclude all potentially untrustworthy individuals is simply wishful thinking. The rest of the logical edifice built on it then collapses.\n\nConsider for a moment the fact that any personnel security system, however well designed, managed and resourced, will have a minimum level of error. That is, even the best system will sometimes allow an untrustworthy person to slip by. It follows that the risk that any given secret will be revealed to one of these untrustworthy people is simply the rate of error, whatever that might be, times the total number of people who have access to the secret. Chapter two looked at the factors influencing the error rate in the late-1960s and early 1970s; now let us turn our attention to the question of how many people had access to the FBS keys in the same period.\n\nThe question is surprisingly hard to answer, and in fact may never be fully known.\n\nThere was no central list of sailors who were permitted to receive the FBS keys. Essentially, it appears that anyone with a Secret clearance was considered trustworthy enough to handle FBS keys; additionally, every ship commander had the authority to authorize *anyone* onboard his ship to handle classified material, if he thought it prudent and justified by mission needs.3 During this period, the Navy had around 800 ships in service--the exact number varied as ships moved in and out of dry dock and were commissioned and decommissioned4--and each ship would have had somewhere between a handful and several dozen sailors who were assigned to operate the radios and teletypewriters. All of these sailors would have had routine access to FBS keys as part of their daily duties. Communications centers in shore stations were normally even larger than communications sections onboard ships, with scores or hundreds of sailors working in each. Many more sailors worked with key material in other ways, including as couriers and COMSEC equipment repairmen.5 Thus the minimum number of sailors with routine access to FBS keys as part of their daily duties was measured in tens of thousands--\nalthough, again, it appears that no one was keeping a detailed listing of who should have had access, and when, so it is impossible to say exactly. If one adds in the personnel who might have gotten access intermittently, or by fraud or deception, the number may have been above 100,000.6 With such a large number of personnel handling the key material, even a very small error rate in clearing personnel with possible security concerns would result in a highly risky system overall.\n\nJohn Walker's case shows clearly how high those risks actually were. As mentioned before, John Walker was assigned to the supply ship USS *Niagara Falls* in\n1971 as she prepared to deploy to the waters off Vietnam. The ship's deployment was planned to be ten months; furthermore, it is believed that the ship had an additional six months of \"reserve on board\" key as well. Since the ship was a supply ship and had a COMSEC vault on board, it was also used to ferry new key and classified materials to other ships, including submarines and aircraft carriers, and held a large amount of key used for the land forces in Vietnam as well. He was thus able to compromise every key in use in FBS, worldwide, for a period well in excess of one year, in one single delivery before he left. And John Walker remained assigned to the USS *Niagara Falls* for a total of three years (1971-1974). During that period, the quantity of material that he divulged was so large that during his counterintelligence debriefing John Walker was unable to recall precisely all of the things he compromised. He did remember that the Soviets had given him a Minox camera to photograph the key cards, and that he used it so heavily that it wore out. He had to buy a new one to continue his spying.7\n\n## The Fbs Auditing System\n\nThe second major part of the key management system to consider was the auditing process. The purpose of audits was to determine whether key material had been handled properly in accordance with policy and regulations. To do this, those who handled key material had to fill out and file forms that detailed exactly when each key was received, what was done with it, where it was stored, when and where it was loaded into a machine, and when it was destroyed. Some steps, such as the destruction of a key card, required two people to sign off on it; others required the signature of the supervisor of the Classified Materials System (CMS) custodian, or the person overall in charge of the cryptographic materials onboard a ship or in a communications section ashore. Most sailors looked at the whole issue with apprehension, as the documentation was burdensome drudgework--but drudgework that was easy to get wrong and could easily get someone in serious trouble. Many of them, even those in charge of the communications systems, avoided it as much as possible.8 Yet John Walker was never in any danger of being caught by the audit procedures. Quite the contrary: it is likely that the sheer elaborateness of the audit system was a major help to him in his spying.\n\nEven if they had been executed perfectly, the audit procedures in place were unable to detect what he was doing. All the audit did was to verify that the correct persons signed for the keys at each step, and that they were stored in a correctly configured vault. These restrictions were utterly irrelevant to what John Walker was actually doing--he was the \"correct person,\" the CMS custodian, and he did keep them stored in the vault. He was not attempting to steal the key cards outright, or to conceal the fact that he had access to them. Instead, he was making duplicate copies of them--at first, using the photocopier in the vault, and later using a camera. No kind of paperwork would have documented this, and hence no audit of the paperwork would have caught the problem.\nBut the situation was even worse than useless: it is arguable that the audit system in place actually made his spying easier. He made extensive use of the \"mystique\" of COMSEC procedures to keep his superiors from asking questions, and he had a readymade excuse for spending long hours in the vault by himself, working with classified paperwork. He was the CMS custodian, and he could easily say that he was busy keeping the paperwork up to date. His performance evaluations repeatedly commend him for his deep dedication to keeping the COMSEC account in excellent order and routinely note that he spent quite significant extra hours working in the vault, in fact. And since the procedures for handling classified material were so burdensome, it was easy to convince other people to let him handle their classified materials for them--storing classified materials for them in his vault, serving as a courier between ships and from ship to shore, and signing for extra classified material. However in this way, he was able to take control of classified material that he should not have had access to, simply because it was very convenient for other people to leave it to him to do. One of the many examples of this are the codes used by the US Air Force and US Navy to secure the transmission of the air tasking orders specifying bombing targets in southeast Asia. The USS *Niagara Falls* was a resupply ship and had no direct mission requirement whatsoever for these keys--so how did John Walker get possession of them to compromise them? Simply put, it was easier to leave the material in John Walker's vault for a future rendezvous with an aircraft carrier than to deliver the keys directly from NSA to the carrier every month. The quote from CIA station chief Theodore Shackley at the beginning of this chapter is the result. To be fair to him, it would have been impossible for him to figure out how the missions were compromised. After all, who would have guessed that keys used to secure the transmission of orders to US Air Force B-52s in Guam were being stored on a US Navy resupply ship in the South China Sea, photographed, and passed to the KGB during port calls in the Phillipines or Hong Kong? When he was recruiting Jerry Whitworth, he emphasized how easy it all was, and how safe--and of course, how good the \"bonuses\"\nwere when he was able to get additional material.9\nA larger issue is the question of what is being audited. The FBS audit system checked the chain of custody on the key cards, on the implicit assumption that the key cards were what needed to be guarded. It attempted to exhaustively document who handled them, from their creation to their ultimate destruction, on the assumption, once again, that if only cleared personnel got access to the key cards, then they would be safe from compromise. Using the modern concepts of data confidentiality and availability, however, it is clear that the *data* was what needed to be protected. Control of the paper key cards was important, but only because of the data punched onto them--which means, for example, that having two-man control over the destruction of key cards is irrelevant if there are no controls at all on the photocopier. In fact, focusing on the data, rather than the paper, makes it obvious that there should be no photocopier present in classified spaces.\n\nIn summary, when evaluated from the conceptual standpoint of data availability and data confidentiality, it is clear than the FBS key management system was very poorly designed. Far too many people had access to the keys; indeed, it is difficult in retrospect to put an upper limit on how many people might have gotten access to them.\n\n\n1Barron, 23. 2Key management, as a whole, contains other design criteria as well--for example, the length of time that a particular key is used. As these other criteria had little or no effect on John Walker's compromise of FBS, they will be omitted in this report.\n\n\n4When a warship was placed into dry dock for repair and refitting, its COMSEC\nequipment was removed for safekeeping and it was no longer issued cryptographic key material. Navy ships are typically sent to dry dock for refitting every few years, but the exact timing of when they enter and leave varies considerably. See Bamford, 183-184.\n\n5John Walker routinely volunteered both to work as a courier of classified material and to store materials in his vault for other people, in order to copy them for the Soviets. In this way he was able to compromise key material to systems and networks that he would not normally have had any need-to-know or access, such as the cryptographic keys for ground forces' communications nets in Vietnam. See Hunter, 186- 188.\n\n6The PERSEREC report shows that about one quarter of the Americans convicted of espionage between 1947 and 2001 had no clearance at all when they committed their crimes, so this is not an unrealistic concern. One of the spies without a clearance was Michael Walker, who managed to pilfer over 1,500 classified documents by a variety of subterfuges and taking advantage of security lapses of his superiors. See Herbig, xi and\n66; Hunter, 99; Bamford, 219.\n\n7Early, *Family of Spies*, 104-106; Hunter, 87.\n\n8Barron, 125.\n\n9Early, 60-61, 98 and 106-107.\n\n## Chapter 5 Conclusion\n\nHad we been engaged in any conflict with the Soviets, [the secrets revealed by the Walker ring] could have had the devastating consequences that Ultra had for the Germans.1\nSecretary of the Navy John F. Lehman, quoted in Breaking the Ring\n\n\n## Overview\n\nThis report has looked at the factors which went into the design and implementation of FBS during the period 1967-1974. Three main areas were studied: personnel security, technical security, and key management. In all three, the procedures and methods followed to ensure security were starkly inadequate to achieve the results desired--and furthermore, this inadequacy should have been obvious to a contemporary analyst looking for security weaknesses in the system. Unfortunately, there was no one who had the responsibility to look at the system as whole and direct resources intelligently to minimize the overall risk of compromise. Instead, responsibility was divided between organizations and between different people within an organization who were designing and implementing different pieces of the system. It appears that the designers of each subsystem simply assumed that the other parts would be secure and always implemented according to policy; for example, the key distribution system was designed based on the assumption that all cleared personnel would be trustworthy, so the only remaining issue was to prove that only cleared personnel handled the keys.\n\nThere is no way to go back in time and undo the mistakes and bad assumptions that led to the compromise of FBS in 1967. It is, however, imperative that these lessons\n\nare applied in the design of future systems and the implementation of current systems. Accordingly, this report advances three main conclusions for security design: designers must have a realistic understanding of what the personnel security system can achieve; they must severely limit the distribution of key material and important technical security information; and they must identify all of their assumptions and actively seek to falsify them.\n\n## How Effective Can The Personnel Security System Be?\n\nThis report has demonstrated that the personnel security system present in 1967-\n1974 was unable to detect or respond to even obvious behavioral problems. A large number of changes to the personnel security system were proposed in the wake of the Walker spy ring in 1986-1987, and further study during the intervening years has identified even more proposals. This chapter will not restate them. Suffice it to say that the personnel security system is vital to the overall success of any secure communications system, and secure, reliable communications are fundamental to way that the United States wages war, collects intelligence, and performs most government functions. This report will take it for granted that there should be continuous efforts to improve the effectiveness of the personnel security system.\nYet as mentioned before, no system that deals with human beings will ever reach\n100 percent effectiveness--there will always be people who should not get access to classified materials that will slip by. Investigators and commanders will make mistakes. But is it possible to get some general idea of what the level of error might be? To get a direct answer to that question, we would have to know the total number of personnel with security clearances and the total number of those personnel who are spies. Those numbers are obviously not available, as we will never achieve a 100 percent capture and conviction rate for spies; indeed, there is little information available to know even approximately what percentage of spies are eventually caught and convicted.2 There are two things which give us some hints about the level of success that might be achieved, however: the success rate of investigations into other questionable behavior, and the rates in the general population of questionable behavior compared to the approval rates for security clearances.\n\nThe personnel security system depends on background investigations to weed out potentially unreliable individuals. Since one can assume that the subject of the investigation will actively try to hide indicators of unreliability, the key measure of effectiveness is the investigation's ability to detect behavior or traits that the subject wants to keep hidden. One good historical example of such investigations is the search for homosexuals at NSA during the 1960s. Recall that the NSA conducted a major operation to root out homosexuals in the early and mid-1960s in response to the defection of two homosexual employees. In response, the NSA made inquiries on an employee's sexual proclivities a major part of the personnel security system. As a component of both the application process and periodic security reinvestigations, all employees were given polygraph tests with an \"embarrassing personal questions\" section, to determine if they were at risk of blackmail. In it, they were explicitly asked if they had had any same-sex sexual contact after age 18. Investigators were also required to ask co-workers, friends, and family members about the subject's sexual behavior and to submit a formal evaluation of whether the subject might be homosexual.3\nSo how effective was this all-out attempt to eliminate homosexuals from NSA?\n\nTo answer this question, we must first determine how many total employees worked at the NSA. The exact number of employees at the NSA is classified, but James Bamford estimates the number at more than 70,000 during the 1960s.4 Then we must estimate the prevalence of homosexuality among those 70,000 people. That is a complicated question to answer, largely because it is difficult to come to a single definition of homosexuality--\nas distinct from bisexuality, experimentation, or self-perception of sexual orientation, for example. Since the NSA investigators were asking about sexual behavior, let us consider solely the question of how prevalent same-sex sexual behavior is in the general population. One of the largest scientific studies which researched this was the National Health and Social Life survey, conducted by the National Opinion Research Center at the University of Chicago in 1992. According to this study, 2.7 percent of American men report sexual contact with another man in the last year, and 4.9 percent reported sexual contact with another man after age 18.5 This level of incidence would translate to about\n1,900 employees with same-sex sexual contacts within the past year and 3,400 employees with same-sex sexual contacts since age 18. Yet the multiyear investigation resulted in only 26 personnel being identified as homosexual and either fired or forced to resign.6\nThus, even using polygraphs and professional investigators, the system was able to identify between 0.5 percent and 1.5 percent of the people for whom it was searching.\n\nAnother hint about what kind of results one can expect from the personnel security system is to look at the rates of questionable behavior in the general population, as compared to the rejection rate for security clearances. Currently, security clearances are granted or withheld based on the Adjudicative Guidelines for Determining Eligibility for Access to Classified Information, which became effective in 1997. This document identifies 13 general areas of concern that could be the basis for denial of a security clearance: alcohol consumption; disloyalty to the United States; criminal conduct; drug involvement; emotional, mental and personality disorders; financial considerations; foreign influence; foreign preference; misuse of information technology systems; outside activities; personal misconduct; security violations; and sexual behavior. Dr. Herbig and Dr. Wiskoff note that about 80 percent of the Americans convicted of espionage or attempted espionage from 1947-2001 exhibited signs of violating one or more of these guidelines. However, they also note that there are no comparable statistics to show what the prevalence of such questionable behavior is in the general population--these are very broad categories, and it may well be that large minorities, or even majorities, of the individuals in sensitive positions exhibit one or more of them. For example, they cite the case of Jonathan Pollard, whose strong commitment to the well being of the state of Israel induced him to pass classified information to the Israelis. Yet they note that such concern for Israel is common among American Jewish households, but has apparently only been a factor in one case of espionage.7 Likewise, misuse of information technology is a very broad area and can include relatively common violations of security policy, such as writing down passwords.\n\nOne further example is the case of mental illness, which is clearly an area of concern under the *Adjudicative Guidelines*. According to Mental Health: A Report of the Surgeon General, 19 percent of the general population of the United States has a diagnosable mental illness, 6 percent have an addictive disorder, and 3 percent have both a mental illness and an addictive disorder. Most of the sufferers continue to function more-or-less well outwardly, despite the internal turmoil: only between a third and a quarter of these illnesses result in diagnosable functional impairment or are severe enough to interfere with social functioning. The others may or may not be detectable by an untrained observer, even though they can seriously compromise the sufferer's judgment and ability to comply with security policy.8 Note also that some of these diseases are episodic--for example, an individual becomes clinically depressed following a divorce--which might not be present at all during the individual's security background investigation. As has been documented in chapter two, co-workers and supervisors are reluctant to report someone who is going through a major life difficulty as a security risk, for fear of making a bad situation worse. Yet such episodic emotional or mental problems can be a major indicator of security risk.9\nOne can conclude that the rates of problematic behavior and security risk indicators are relatively high in the general population. Even assuming that these rates are significantly lower among personnel submitted for security clearances, the overall numbers can remain quite high. For example, even if the rate of alcohol and substance abuse is 99 percent lower among the cleared population than the general population, it would still indicate that about one in 1,000 clearance-holders has an active substance abuse problem at any given time. Note further that, first, a 99 percent effectiveness rate in weeding out substance abuse is highly unlikely given what we have seen about the lack of success in weeding out homosexuals, and second, substance abuse is only one possible security problem. One must conclude that the personnel security system, while vital, will never be able to screen out many personnel exhibiting security risks, and the rest of the security system must be designed with this in view.\n\n## What Can Key Management And Auditing Achieve?\n\nBased on the previous discussion of personnel reliability rates, what can one say about the design of a key management and auditing system?\n\nThe first obvious conclusion is that the distribution of the keys must be tightly restricted. The minimum level of objectionable behavior among even cleared individuals requires it. Planners must assume that, once the number of people who have knowledge of a particular secret--whatever it might be--exceeds a few hundred to a few thousand, then one or more highly questionable people will get access to it. Military commanders throughout history have known this fact and exploited it by, for example, restricting knowledge of an upcoming operation to a very small group of planners; or alternately, by deliberately involving a large number of personnel in a planning process, with the intent to deceive the enemy. The same timeless principle applies to key material and cryptographic information as well. The FBS system, with tens or hundreds of thousands of sailors handling the keys, was inherently insecure and unsecurable. Future systems must be designed differently.\n\nA related issue is that designers must be realistic about what an audit can and cannot do. What system managers truly want to audit is *data*: they want to determine who has gotten access to the classified data. The trouble with this is that it is for practical purposes impossible, because one cannot effectively rule out duplication. John Walker duplicated keys with a camera or photocopier; modern systems use electronic keys, which can be duplicated any number of times easily and without any trace whatsoever. The auditor will not have direct access to the most important information and will be forced to rely on the proxy information of who has entered a particular secured area or signed out a particular keying device. An analogy with the more familiar world of financial audits is instructive: it is as if a financial auditor was unable to count the actual money and instead was forced to rely on details of who entered a store and who was operating the cash register at the time. Few people would put much faith in the ability of such a system to prevent embezzlement or theft; yet this is exactly the position that the cryptographic audits are in. Indeed, there is little evidence that cryptographic audits were ever instrumental in identifying a case of espionage; at best, they seem to have been useful in developing damage reports or as supplemental evidence once a person is already under investigation as a spy. So while they are certainly necessary, audits are in no way sufficient to ensure that keys are not mishandled or duplicated.\n\n## How Should One Handle Assumptions?\n\nPerhaps more than anything else, the Walker spy case is a study in assumptions.\n\nTime and again, individuals made decisions based on assumptions that proved to be woefully incorrect. In many cases, these assumptions were based on nothing more than wishful thinking, or on the fact that it would be very convenient if certain things were true. There is little or no evidence that decision makers attempted to verify or falsify them, even when such an attempt would be easy to make. For example, there was no attempt to verify whether or not the policies written at NSA were being implemented as specified in the fleet, or even to verify if the policies *could* be implemented with the time, resources and personnel available.\n\nAnother military truism is that successful planners must clearly distinguish between facts and assumptions. All real-world plans will require some assumptions, as information will never be perfect. However, a successful planner will then try to verify or falsify his assumptions, continuing to do so until successful--either proving the assumption true, making it into a fact, or proving it false. Much of the technical security built into the KW-7 and its key management plan relied on a series of assumptions which were highly unlikely to be met in practice. Some of those assumptions were never shared with critical decision makers or the personnel who had to implement the solution; many of these assumptions were simply wrong, and would have been identified as such if any follow-up investigation had been done.\n\n## Conclusion\n\nOne of the most startling facts about the John Walker spy case is that there was ample evidence available at the time to indicate that a serious breach of communications security had occurred. Navy intelligence officers noticed a number of worrying indicators, beginning in the early 1970s. Soviet Navy submarines suddenly got dramatically quieter and developed an ability to stay just outside the effective range of US sonobuoys--exactly as if they knew the full details how the US was detecting them. They also started showing up outside US submarine bases just before American submarines were scheduled to put to sea. The Soviet Navy showed an uncanny ability to get intelligence collection ships at the right place and time to capture data from fleet exercises. \"It was as if they had a copy of the OpPlans [operational plans] or something,\"\none frustrated admiral said at the time.10\nWe now know that they did, in fact, have a copy of the OpPlans--and everything else of any importance to the US Navy, for a period of almost twenty years. Richard Haver, the deputy director of Naval Intelligence, said that they had wondered at the time if there was a communications security breach, but there was no proof. Even in retrospect, it is not clear how they could have gotten such proof. The design of FBS was such that, even if a Soviet spy had brought verbatim copies of FBS intercepts to the CIA, it would have been impossible to produce a comprehensive list of potential suspects, even a list that was tens of thousands of names long.\nAnd that fact was the fundamental problem with the system design of FBS: that the system in place at the time depended on perfect awareness and flawless execution by thousands of people, over the course of decades, around the world--any lack in any area could (and did) cause catastrophic failure of the entire system. That the system was deeply flawed should not be surprising, since FBS was not in fact designed as a system at all. Each component and subsystem was designed in isolation and based on a series of assumptions. No one had overall responsibility for verifying whether the assumptions were realistic, or even for ensuring that the designers of other subsystems and the Navy chain of command were aware of them. Decision makers did not have the information that they needed to make good choices about resourcing, risk assessment, and operational methods and procedures; they made their decisions based on what they did know, and that resulted in a system that was far more unsafe than anyone realized.\nIt is all very well to look back at the period 1968-1974 and criticize the poor judgment and bad decisions of the individuals involved. Yet this report has demonstrated that the security system as a whole was so poorly designed that it virtually guaranteed bad choices would be made at every level--from the admirals and senior executives responsible for adequately funding the security system without having a full understanding of the dangers being run, to the engineers designing equipment in isolation from the real day-to-day constraints faced in the fleet; from the investigators, who had no hard, trustworthy evidence of what to look for and hopelessly inadequate tools to uncover critical information, to the first-line supervisors who were expected to spot and stop potential spies without the benefit of training or clear guidance--and while simultaneously maintaining 100 percent operational readiness.\n\nWell-designed systems must take into account the actual conditions and characteristics of its subcomponents. In the case of a communications security system, such as FBS, some of those \"subcomponents\" are human beings, with all of their foibles and failings. From a design standpoint, it is just as wrong to assume that all of the people involved will execute policy flawlessly as it would be to assume that a mechanical part will never fail. Just as good design involves finding out how the encryptor behaves as the battery loses its charge or the device gets splashed with water, so also good system design should take into account what happens when the operators do not behave as they ought to--whether through malice, carelessness, or simple inability to carry out the requirements with the resources available. The latter two cases can be minimized or even eliminated through better design: that is, the designer must make it as easy as possible to do the right thing and as hard as possible to do the wrong thing. This needs to be an iterative process, based on close observation of what ordinary sailors actually do during fleet deployments, and incorporating improvements and innovations as they become available.\n\nBut how does good design address intentional violations? In this case, there are two main issues. First, the operational chain of command must be made thoroughly aware that deliberate compromise is an unavoidable risk, and that that risk rises exponentially with the number of personnel who have access to the transmission. (This means that common-use channels with shared keys, such as FBS was, are effectively impossible to protect against this threat.) They must also be aware that this risk *cannot* be eliminated, even by the best personnel security system, and that the rate of security relevant misbehavior in the cleared population is relatively high and will remain so under any reasonable set of assumptions. Second, a primary focus of the security system should be actively and continuously seeking evidence of the compromise of a given communications system. These two elements can only be satisfied if the individuals who have access to a particular item--such as a cryptographic key, or an OpPlan--are identified *by name* ahead of time. While that sounds very burdensome, it is in fact common procedure for the distribution of paper copies of sensitive documents, such as war plans, to be restricted to those individuals named on such a short list. Such constraints are essential, since it is impossible to do any sort of forensic analysis if a compromise is suspected without some list of possible suspects. Alternately, if the operational command decides that such restraints are not possible, it needs to be clearly understood that the data in question is at a high, and possibly extreme, risk of compromise.\nMilitary operations always involve a measure of risk. There is no way to completely eliminate the risk of a rogue insider betraying his country. As mentioned at the beginning of this report, there have always been, and there will always be, pathologically greedy people in any organization as large as the US Navy. The important point to draw from this analysis of the John Walker spy case is that commanders must be aware of those risks, minimize them as much as feasible with coherent, well designed security systems and operational plans, and seek continuous improvement in the field.\n\n\n1Barron, 212.\n\n2A good historical example of this is the Soviet espionage efforts before and during World War II. After the collapse of the Soviet Union and large-scale declassification of signal intercepts now shows that there were several hundred spies active in the United States; however, only a small handful were detected at the time, and fewer than a dozen were tried and convicted of espionage. See Herbig, x.\n\n3Bamford, 107.\n\n4Ibid., 4.\n\n5The equivalent percentages for women were 1.3 percent within the last year and\n4.1 percent since age 18. However, since both the U.S. Navy and the NSA were almost entirely male during the 1960s, this report will only use the data for American men. See the National Opinion Research Center, University of Chicago, The National Health and Social Life Survey (\"The Sex Survey\") Summary, (posting date unavailable, study data collected in 1992); available from http://cloud9.norc.uchicago.edu/faqs/sex.htm; Internet.\n\n6Bamford, 149.\n\n7Note also that, if 80 percent of the convicted spies exhibited one or more questionable behaviors or traits, then conversely one in five spies exhibited no reason for suspicion at all. See Herbig, 52-55.\n\n8United States Surgeon General, Mental Health: A Report of the Surgeon General, (date unavailable); available from http://www.surgeongeneral.gov/library/ mentalhealth/chapter2/sec2_1.html, Epidemiology of Mental Illness; Internet.\n\n9Dr. Herbig and Dr. Wiskoff found that 27 percent of convicted spies began their espionage in the wake of a major life trauma, such as divorce, death of a loved one, or extramarital affair. See Herbig, 55.\n\n10Barron, 22-25.\n\n\n\n## Glossary Comsec. Communications Security.\n\nCryptologic. The mathematical algorithm used by an encryptor to determine which\ncharacter will substitute for another.\nKeystream. A stream of pseudorandom characters that is generated by the encryptor. The\nmessage is encrypted by mixing the keystream and the unencrypted message.\nPersonnel Security. Policies and procedures which govern who is given (legitimate)\naccess to classified information.\nPhysical security. Measures taken to ensure the physical control of the areas where\nclassified material is stored, and control of physical access to the encryptors and their associated information and equipment.\nTechnical security. The security features designed into COMSEC devices that make\nrecovering classified data from the transmitted message impossible for anyone except the legitimate recipient. This report specifically addresses only the technical security measures taken for the KW-7 encryptor.\n\n## Bibliography\n\nAmerican Psychiatric Association, \"Position Statement on Homosexuality and Civil\nRights,\" *American Journal of Psychiatry, 131 (4)*, (15 December 1973), 497.\nAndrew, Christopher and Vasili Mitrokhin. The Sword and the Shield: The Mitrokhin\nArchive and the Secret History of the KGB. New York: Basic Books, 1999.\nBamford, James. *The Puzzle Palace: A Report on America's Most Secret Agency.* Boston:\nHoughton Mifflin, 1982.\nBarron, John. *Breaking the Ring.* Boston: Houghton-Mifflin, 1987.\nBucher, Lloyd M. *Bucher: My Story.* New York: Doubleday & Co., 1970.\nEarley, Pete. *Family of Spies: Inside the John Walker Spy Ring.* New York: Bantam\nBooks, 1988.\nHerbig, Katherine L. and Martin F. Wiskoff, Defense Personnel Security Research\nCenter. *Espionage Against the United States by American Citizens 1947-2001*,\nPERSEREC Technical Report 02-5, July 2002.\nHunter, Robert W. and Lynn Dean Hunter. Spy Hunter: Inside the FBI Investigation of\nthe Walter Espionage Case. Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute Press, 1999.\nKahn, David. The Code Breakers: The Comprehensive History of Secret Communication\nfrom Ancient Times to the Internet. 2d ed. New York: Scribner, 1996.\nKalugin, Oleg and Fen Montaigne. *The First Directorate.* New York: St. Martin's Press,\n1994.\nLerner, Mitchell B. *The Pueblo Incident.* Lawrence, Kansas: University Press of Kansas,\n2002.\nNational Opinion Research Center, University of Chicago, The National Health and\nSocial Life Survey (\"The Sex Survey\") Summary, (posting date unavailable, study data collected in 1992); available from http://cloud9.norc.uchicago.edu/faqs/ sex.htm; Internet\nStilwell, Richard G., General, USA, Ret. (Chairman). Keeping the Nation's Secrets: A\nReport to the Secretary of Defense by the Commission to Review DOD Security\nPolicy and Practices. Delivered to the Secretary of Defense on 19 Nov 85. Downloaded from http://www.fas.org/sgp/library/stilwell.html.\nUnited States General Accounting Office, Security Clearances: Consideration of Sexual\nOrientation in the Clearance Process. Report to Congressional Requesters,\nGAO/NSIAD-95-21, 24 March 1995, 1-3 and 9-10.\n\nUnited States Surgeon General, *Mental Health: A Report of the Surgeon General*, (date\nunavailable). Downloaded from http://www.surgeongeneral.gov/library/\nmentalhealth/chapter2/sec2_1.html.\nWalker, Laura and Jerry Horner. Daughter of Deceit: The Human Drama Behind the\nWalker Spy Case. Dallas: Word Publishing, 1988.\n\n## Initial Distribution List\n\nCombined Arms Research Library U.S. Army Command and General Staff College 250 Gibbon Ave. Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-2314 Defense Technical Information Center/OCA 825 John J. Kingman Rd., Suite 944 Fort Belvoir, VA 22060-6218 Dr. Donald P. Wright CSI\nUSACGSC 1 Reynolds Ave. Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-1352 Mr. Kendall D. Gott CSI USACGSC 1 Reynolds Ave. Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-1352 CDR Brett W. Wiseman Department USACGSC 1 Reynolds Ave. Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-1352\n\n## Certification For Mmas Distribution Statement\n\n1. Certification Date: 17 June 2005\n\n2. Thesis Author: Laura Heath 3. Thesis Title: An Analysis of the Systemic Security Weaknesses of the U.S. Navy Fleet Broadcasting System, 1967-1974, as Exploited by CWO John Walker\n4. Thesis Committee Members:\n\nSignatures:\n\n\n5. Distribution Statement: See distribution statements A-X on reverse, then circle appropriate distribution statement letter code below: A   B   C   D   E   F   X                 SEE EXPLANATION OF CODES ON REVERSE If your thesis does not fit into any of the above categories or is classified, you must coordinate with the classified section at CARL.\n\n6. Justification: Justification is required for any distribution other than described in Distribution Statement A. All or part of a thesis may justify distribution limitation. See limitation justification statements 1-10 on reverse, then list, below, the statement(s) that applies (apply) to your thesis and corresponding chapters/sections and pages. Follow sample format shown below: EXAMPLE\n Limitation Justification Statement\n/\nChapter/Section\n/\nPage(s)\n\n\n|                                                         |      |                 |     |         |\n|---------------------------------------------------------|------|-----------------|-----|---------|\n| Direct Military Support (10)                            | /    | Chapter 3       | /   | 12      |\n| Critical Technology (3)                                 | /    | Section 4       | /   | 31      |\n| Administrative Operational Use (7)                      | /    | Chapter 2       | /   | 13-32   |\n|                                                         |      |                 |     |         |\n| Fill in limitation justification for your thesis below: |      |                 |     |         |\n|                                                         |      |                 |     |         |\n| Limitation Justification Statement                      | /    | Chapter/Section | /   | Page(s) |\n|                                                         |      |                 |     |         |\n|                                                         |      |                 |     |         |\n| /                                                       |      | /               |     |         |\n|                                                         |      |                 |     |         |\n| /                                                       |      | /               |     |         |\n|                                                         | /    |                 | /   |         |\n|                                                         |      |                 |     |         |\n| /                                                       |      | /               |     |         |\n|                                                         |      |                 |     |         |\n| /                                                       |      | /               |     |         |\n\n 7. MMAS Thesis Author's Signature:\n\n\nSTATEMENT A: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. (Documents with this statement may be made available or sold to the general public and foreign nationals). STATEMENT B: Distribution authorized to U.S. Government agencies only (insert reason and date ON\nREVERSE OF THIS FORM). Currently used reasons for imposing this statement include the following:\n1. Foreign Government Information. Protection of foreign information.\n\n\n2. Proprietary Information. Protection of proprietary information not owned by the U.S.\nGovernment.\n3. Critical Technology. Protection and control of critical technology including technical data with\npotential military application.\n4. Test and Evaluation. Protection of test and evaluation of commercial production or military\nhardware.\n5. Contractor Performance Evaluation. Protection of information involving contractor performance\nevaluation.\n6. Premature Dissemination. Protection of information involving systems or hardware from\npremature dissemination.\n7. Administrative/Operational Use. Protection of information restricted to official use or for\nadministrative or operational purposes.\n8. Software Documentation. Protection of software documentation - release only in accordance\nwith the provisions of DoD Instruction 7930.2.\n9. Specific Authority. Protection of information required by a specific authority.\n\n10. Direct Military Support. To protect export-controlled technical data of such military significance that release for purposes other than direct support of DoD-approved activities may jeopardize a U.S. military advantage.\n\n\nSTATEMENT C: Distribution authorized to U.S. Government agencies and their contractors: (REASON\nAND DATE). Currently most used reasons are 1, 3, 7, 8, and 9 above. STATEMENT D: Distribution authorized to DoD and U.S. DoD contractors only; (REASON AND\nDATE). Currently most reasons are 1, 3, 7, 8, and 9 above.\n\n\nSTATEMENT E: Distribution authorized to DoD only; (REASON AND DATE). Currently most used reasons are 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, and 10.\n\n\nSTATEMENT F: Further dissemination only as directed by (controlling DoD office and date), or higher DoD authority. Used when the DoD originator determines that information is subject to special dissemination limitation specified by paragraph 4-505, DoD 5200.1-R.\n\n\nSTATEMENT X: Distribution authorized to U.S. Government agencies and private individuals of enterprises eligible to obtain export-controlled technical data in accordance with DoD Directive 5230.25;\n(date). Controlling DoD office is (insert)."
    },
    {
        "text": "## Report On The Impact Of Climate Change On Migration\n\n\n\nOCTOBER 2021\n\nA REPORT BY\nTHE WHITE HOUSE\n\n\n## Table Of Contents\n\nI. Introduction ........ 4\nII. Geopolitical Implications:  The Global Political, Economic, and Security Dynamics of Climate-Related Migration ........ 6\nThe Relationship between Climate Change, Migration, and Conflict ........ 7 Impacts of Climate Change-Related Migration on Political Instability ........ 8 Non-State Armed Actors and Climate Change-Related Migration ........ 9\nMalign State Actors and Climate Related Migration ........ 9\nLooking Forward:  Risks and Opportunities ........ 10\nIII. U.S.  Foreign Assistance ........ 12\nExisting Programs with Potential to Reduce the Risk of Forced Migration and Displacement ........ 12\nAssistance to Build Local and National Capacity for Using Climate Information in Decision Making ........ 12 Programs that Support Adaptation to the Impacts of Climate Change ....... 12\nAssistance to Support Migrants, Displaced People, and their Host Communities ........ 13 Regional Considerations ........ 14\nCross-Cutting Issues ........ 15\nAnalysis of Additional Needs ........ 15\nIV. Protection and Resettlement of Affected Individuals ........ 17\nAnalysis of Protection Frameworks ........ 17 Internal Displacement ........ 19\nStatelessness ........ 20\nRefugee Resettlement Considerations ........ 21 Equity and Inclusion of People in Situations of Vulnerability ........ 21 Relocation and Evacuation, including from Small Island States ........ 22\nV. Multilateral Engagement ........ 25\nMultilateral Initiatives and Mechanisms ........ 25\nRole of UN Resolutions ........ 26 Government Efforts on Climate and Migration ........ 26\nGovernment-Led Initiatives and Working Groups ........ 26 Regional Engagement ........ 27\nCivil Society Engagement ........ 27\nThe Role Civil Society Should Play in Climate Change and Migration ........ 28\nOpportunities for and Barriers to Civil Society Engagement ........ 28\nVI. Recommendation ........ 29\nEstablish a Standing Interagency Policy Process on Climate Change and Migration ........ 30\nLines of Effort to Consider through the Standing Interagency Policy Process on Climate Change and Migration ........ 30\n     U.S.  Government ........ 30\nImproved Analytics ........ 31 Programming and Investments ........ 31 Legislative ........ 32\nAnnex I:  Glossary of Terms ........ 33\nAnnex 2:  Examples of Climatic Trends and Extremes that Influence Migration ........36\n\n\n## I. Introduction\n\nThe climate crisis is reshaping our world, as the Earth's climate is now changing faster than at any point in the history of modern civilization.1  Defined by changes in average weather conditions that persist over multiple decades or longer, climate change includes changes in temperature, precipitation patterns, the frequency and severity of certain weather events, and other features of the climate system.2  When combined with physical, social, economic, and/or environmental vulnerabilities, climate change can undermine food, water, and economic security.  Secondary effects of climate change can include displacement, loss of livelihoods, weakened governments, and in some cases political instability and conflict.\nIn recognition of this, on February 9, 2021, President Biden signed Executive Order (E.O.) 14013, \"Rebuilding and Enhancing Programs to Resettle Refugees and Planning for the Impact of Climate Change on Migration,\" in which he directed the National Security Advisor to prepare a report on climate change and its impact on migration.  This report marks the first time the U.S. Government is officially reporting on the link between climate change and migration.\nThe United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) reports that an average of 21.5 million people were forcibly displaced each year by sudden onset weather-related hazards between 2008 and\n2016, and thousands more from slow-onset hazards linked to climate change impacts.3  Policy and programming efforts made today and in coming years will impact estimates of people moving due to climate related factors.  Tens of millions of people, however, are likely to be displaced over the next two to three decades due in large measure to climate change impacts. Migration in response to climate impacts may range from mobility as a proactive adaptation strategy to forced displacement in the face of life-threatening risks.  This mobility may occur within or across international borders.  Specifically, one model forecasts that climate change may lead to nearly three percent of the population (totaling more than 143 million people) in three regions - Sub-Saharan Africa, South Asia, and Latin America - to move within their country of origin by 2050.4  To date, this mobility has been mostly internal and increasingly an urban phenomenon, with many of those displaced and migrating moving to urban areas.  Although most people displaced or migrating as a result of climate impacts are staying within their countries of origin, the accelerating trend of global displacement related to climate impacts is increasing cross-border movements, too, particularly where climate change interacts with conflict and violence.5\nAs the effects of climate change intensify, it is important to understand the underlying factors that may mitigate or exacerbate migration, and develop strategies to both proactively and humanely manage these impacts and be considered in the context of any geographic or environmental factors that would contribute disproportionately to the destabilization of economically or politically important regions.\n\nClimate migration or climate displacement are terms that describe a multitude of climate change related migration scenarios.6  Each, however, has a more specific meaning, and both are distinct from planned relocation.  Migration may be temporary, seasonal, circular, or permanent and may be forced by increasingly severe conditions or occur as a proactive strategy in the face of climate impacts to livelihoods and wellbeing.  Planned relocation is, generally, a relocation of an entire community made by relevant governments and, ideally, in partnership with affected communities. Climate change related-migration, as used in this report, is an umbrella term describing the spectrum of climate change's relationship with human mobilityincluding the circumstances of \"trapped populations\" for whom migration is not an option despite exposure to climate-related threats.  Even in the United States, one extreme event can result in a relatively high degree of permanent relocation of low-income populations exposed to chronic and worsening conditions over time.7\nFrom those forced to move to those left behind, U.S. policy can aid in supporting human security by, among other things, building on existing foreign assistance to a reconsideration and development of legal mechanisms to support those who migrate.  While this report focuses on international climate change-related migration, domestic climate-change related displacement is also a current and future security risk as sea-level rise, permafrost thaw, drought, and wildfires threaten U.S. populations.8\nThe use of U.S. foreign assistance is one lever to respond to climate change related migration.  The foreign assistance infrastructure brings together a powerful combination of tools, including development and humanitarian assistance funding, convening power, technical expertise, capacity building, and partnerships to address many elements of the complex issues of climate change and migration.  However, current funding levels, structure, and coordination of U.S. foreign assistance is inadequate to meet the challenge of comprehensively addressing climate-related migration and displacement.  Looking forward, it is vital for the United States Government (USG) to focus on the complex interplay between climate change and migration, rather than approaching these as separate issue sets.\n\nIt is also critical to support people who desire to stay as long and as safely as possible in their home areas through investments in disaster risk reduction (DRR) measures and local adaptation, including capacity building to assist countries with managing environmental risks and land use.  When migration presents as the preferable form of adaptation, or in situations when people are forced to flee the impacts of climate change, the United States has a compelling national interest in strengthening global protection for these displaced individuals and groups.  Those protections are rooted in humanitarian objectives and inextricably linked to U.S. interests in safe, orderly, and humane migration management, regional stability, and sustainable economic growth and development. Often, the individuals most at risk are the least able to relocate.  Resilience and adaptation plans must consider accessibility, child protection, disability rights, gender equity, Indigenous rights, and protection needs for populations in vulnerable situations.  To assure equity and inclusion, consultations with individuals and communities vulnerable to climate change should inform the United States' responses and plans to address the climate change impacts on migration.  Any planned relocations must respect and maintain household, community, social cohesion, and kinship ties and avoid separating families.\nContext of Climate Change: Normative Gaps and Possible Approaches,\" Legal and Protection Policy Research Series, UNHCR, Division of International Protection, Feb.  2012, PPLA/2012/.\n\n7 Fussell, E. (2018) \"Routledge Handbook of Environmental Displacement and Migration, Population displacements and migration patterns in response to Hurricane Katrina,\" (https://www.taylorfrancis.com/chapters/edit/10.4324/9781315638843-\n22/population-displacements-migration-patterns-response-hurricane-katrina-elizabeth-fussell).\n8 Burkett, M; Bavishi, J; Shew, E. 2017. \"Climate Displacement, Migration, and Relocation: And the United States,\" Climate Law 7 (4) 227-231, (https://heinonline.org/HOL/Page?handle=hein.journals/climatla7&id=237&collection=journals&index=).\nExisting legal instruments to protect displaced individuals are limited in scope and do not readily lend themselves to protect those individuals displaced by the impacts of climate change, especially those that address migration across borders.  Given the growing trend in displacement related to climate change, expanding access to protection will be vital.  The United States will need to strengthen the application of existing protection frameworks, adjust U.S. protection mechanisms to better accommodate people fleeing the impacts of climate change, and evaluate the need for additional legal protections for those who have no alternative but to migrate. The United States is in a unique position to build on and integrate longstanding local, regional, and international multilateral mechanisms and initiatives to strengthen global commitment and cooperation to more effectively address migration impacted by climate change.  While multilateral engagement on this issue is not new, too often these multilateral mechanisms and initiatives lack consistency, coherence, synergies, and complementarity in addressing climate change related migration. Effectively addressing migration impacted by climate change will require action from all stakeholders, including ensuring people most affected can make informed decisions in response to the effects of climate change.  There are valuable upcoming opportunities through which the United States can assert a bold leadership role, innovatively and smartly shaping multilateral outcomes affecting our national security and global stability.  U.S. leadership can improve multilateral coordination and bolster contributions not just from governments and international organizations, but all stakeholders including the private sector and civil society actors representing affected communities that traditionally face barriers in shaping multilateral mechanisms.  The United States can also contribute to the ability of other nations to predict and adapt to various forms of climate change so that migrations may be planned, or in some cases, avoided altogether. The amount of investment needed to respond to and minimize climate drivers of migration and displacement goes far beyond the resources of the United States alone.  It will require the full convening and leveraging power of the U.S. Government.  Partnerships should also include those with local actors and civil society on defining durable solutions, and the private sector for innovation, scaling and sustainability of adaptation approaches.  Climate financing is a key component supporting vulnerable communities to respond to, prepare for, and adapt to climate and migration risks.  The United States needs to leverage its leadership role with international financial institutions to ensure vulnerable migrants, refugees, and internally displaced persons (IDPs) are adequately included.  U.S. foreign assistance, if leveraged, resourced, and targeted appropriately, could have a much larger influence that leads to better climate and migration-related outcomes.  Additionally, engaging the U.S. and international science agencies and institutions responsible for covering and understanding climate drivers and climate change impacts will be essential to developing competent and responsible detection, prevention, preparedness, and mitigation programming pertaining to climate-related migration.  As an example, space-based technologies, and space-derived information play a key role in climate knowledge, science, monitoring and early warning.  Space-based information can contribute to assessments of the vulnerability of communities to climate change and can help monitor the effectiveness of adaptation strategies.\nThis report provides an overview of climate change and its impact on migration that informs a proposal for how U.S. foreign assistance can better address the effects of climate change impacts on displacement and migration.  It goes further to outline options for protection and resettlement of individuals displaced directly or indirectly from climate change and identifies opportunities for the United States to work with other stakeholders, including through multilateral engagement, to address migration resulting directly or indirectly from climate change.  The report concludes with a primary recommendation and a list of considerations for further evaluation that may guide the United States' approach to climate migration, if funding and policy priorities allow.  Most notably, this report recommends the establishment of a standing interagency policy process on Climate Change and Migration to coordinate U.S. Government efforts to mitigate and respond to migration resulting from the impacts of climate change that brings together representatives across the scientific, development, humanitarian, and peace and security elements of the U.S. Government.\n\n## Ii. Geopolitical Implications:  The Global Political, Economic, And Security Dynamics Of Climate- Related Migration\n\nClimate-related migration has potentially significant implications for international security, instability, conflict, and geopolitics.  Disaggregating climate change from the many other factors influencing individuals' decisions to migrate is difficult, as is the ability to understand indirect links between climate change and other drivers.  To frame the discussion, the focus of this section is on the direct and indirect geopolitical security implications of *climate-related migration* and not the consequences of migration more generally or the non-migration implications of climate change.\n\n## The Relationship Between Climate Change, Migration, And Conflict\n\nExtreme weather events9 and conflict are the top two drivers of forced displacement globally, together responsible for the annual movement of nearly 30 million people from their homes.10 There is a strong correlation between countries and regions most vulnerable to climate change and those that are fragile and/or experiencing conflict or violence.  Climate-related impacts may further stress vulnerable communities, increasing the risk of conflict and displacement in the absence of effective prevention efforts, and vice versa.  Climate-related impacts also pose an increased risk to marginalized communities displaced by conflict related to the impacts of climate change.  This risk is more acute in regions with weak governance and dispute resolution infrastructure, and in growing peri-urban areas where many migrants are heading. Climate change can cause or exacerbate resource scarcity, which may drive conflict directly as well as induce migration of populations in vulnerable situations attempting to secure safety or livelihoods elsewhere.11  Moreover, changes to biodiversity have strong intersections with climate change that also can affect migration, and threaten food and economic security.12  The subsequent movement of large numbers of people, by force or by choice, brings new groups into contact with one another, potentially shifting power balances, causing further resource scarcity, or igniting tensions between previously separated groups.13  Where climate-related migrations occur within or near population centers, or in locations important for political or economic stability, such as within many nations' coastal zones, the destabilizing forces associated with climate change may result in outsized affects overall.14\n\nlowest 5% or 10% of historical measurements.  Other times they describe events by how far they are from the mean, or by their While conflict is a well-understood driver of displacement, empirical studies examining the climatemigration-conflict nexus have failed to produce consistent evidence for a causal connection linking migration to subsequent conflict.15\nInstead, it is widely agreed that specific context - geographic, demographic, environmental, economic, political, and cultural - determines the existence, strength, and direction of these relationships.  For instance, longstanding tensions have existed between seasonally migratory pastoralists and sedentary farming communities in the Sahel,16 but until recently only occasionally led to violence,17 suggesting that the proximate cause of violence is not migration, but rather a failure to prevent tensions from escalating.18\n\n## Impacts Of Climate Change-Related Migration On Political Instability\n\nClimate-related migration may induce political instability in several ways.  Large migration flows are frequently framed as a threat to both domestic and international stability and social cohesion.19\nInadequate policy frameworks to manage large migration flows may exacerbate resource inequalities, stress public budgets, and contribute to xenophobia that increases political tensions.  Anti-immigration political actors may seize on both real and perceived challenges of uncontrolled or large migration flows to improve political standing, inflaming existing tensions and undermining efforts to appropriately respond to acute migration or refugee crises, such as those caused by the Syrian civil war20 or extreme weather and violence in Central America.21  These risks highlight the importance of considering not only those who move following a climatic shock, but communities receiving higher rates of in-migration. Surging irregular migration flows to the United States have increased domestic attention on the politics of immigration, and climate change has the potential to compound related political and social challenges by causing additional displacement.  The lack of bipartisan agreement on humane border procedures and immigration polices complicates U.S. efforts to mobilize global support for protecting refugees, asylum seekers, and other vulnerable migrants.  The current migration situation extending from the U.S.-Mexico border into Central America presents an opportunity for the United States to model good practice and discuss openly managing migration humanely, highlight the role of climate change in migration, and collaborate with other governments to address these challenges.\nPolicy responses in the developed world will have a direct impact on political stability elsewhere.  As forced migration increases and countries struggle to manage migration flows within and across borders, the cost of migration to migrants and sending communities, already exceedingly high for many conflictaffected countries, is likely to increase.  As costs of migrating increase and high income countries implement increasingly restrictive policies to deter migration, middle-income countries with fewer resources will become relatively more attractive alternative destinations.  This has implications for political instability in a larger set of countries that may already be struggling to provide services to their citizens.\n\n## Non-State Armed Actors And Climate Change-Related Migration\n\nNon-state actors, including violent extremist organizations (VEOs), transnational criminal organizations (TCOs), and other \"hybrid and non-state armed groups\" (H/NSAGs), exploit existing gaps or corruption in governance, perceived or actual marginalization of local populations, and intercommunal tension to embed themselves in communities and develop sources of income.  These groups can exacerbate the effects of climate change on migration, by exploiting climate-related migration to further political, social, and economic objectives.  H/NSAGs may respond to resource scarcity driven by acute environmental shocks (e.g., floods and droughts) by forcibly gaining access to resources such as cropland to maintain food security, exacerbating drivers of migration.22\nTCOs, VEOs, and other H/NSAGs23 are involved in human trafficking, illegal mining, and resource extraction, and other economic activities directly related to migration.  These groups can capitalize on climate-related migration of populations in vulnerable situations as both a source of income and recruitment.24  In the face of increased climate related migration, if destination countries do not have reception capacity or limit legal migration pathways, migrants will likely seek to move irregularly in increasing numbers.  Human smuggling organizations will financially gain as they facilitate growing smuggling operations.  These smuggling operations will likely lead to a net increase in state corruption in countries of origin, transit, and destination while correspondingly contributing to the erosion of state stability. Compounding these risks is the expectation that climate change will exacerbate existing patterns of political and economic marginalization and shift the distribution of valuable resources, including water and arable land.  H/NSAGs may also hamper interventions designed to mitigate the impact of climate disasters and prevent acute migration events, especially those groups that see value in targeting aid workers and key infrastructure. Predicting how specific non-state groups will respond to the impacts of climate change, including their ability to exploit climate impacts, requires a comprehensive examination of their motivations and strategies, existing activities and areas of control, tactical capabilities, supporting communities and networks, and connections and competition among non-state groups and with local elites and international actors.  In addition, there is a need for a detailed and competent understanding of the primary climate change risks in a particular area in which non-state groups operate.\n\n## Malign State Actors And Climate Related Migration\n\nClimate change driven migration will likely cause migrants to desire to emigrate to the nearest stable democracies that adhere to international asylum conventions and have strong economies.  Many of these countries are U.S. allies/partners and many have experienced waves of migration.  Many countries that adjoin destination countries have experienced domestic instability as migrant populations increase along destination country borders (Greece/Turkey, UK/France, Spain/Morocco, Italy/Libya, Syria/Jordan/Lebanon, and U.S./Mexico).  Climate change related migration could cause greater instability among U.S. allies/partners and thereby cause a relative strengthening in adversary states.  In addition, adversaries could incite or aid irregular migration to destabilize U.S. allies/partners. Absent a robust strategy from the United States and Europe to address climate-related migration, the People's Republic of China (PRC), Russia, and other states could seek to gain influence by providing direct\n\nsupport to impacted countries grappling with political unrest related to migration.25  Security assistance from these actors may increase conflict risks by aggravating human rights abuses and promoting authoritarian trends, e.g. by providing irresponsible advisors and mercenaries or invasive surveillance technology.  The PRC's pursuit of minerals important to the green economy may produce its own form of climate-related migration to fragile states through immigration of Chinese labor and managers for mines owned by Chinese firms.  This can create resentment among local populations, as can displacement of local populations to clear mining areas, poor labor conditions if locals are hired, or poor standards leading to environmental damage (which can also drive migration of local populations).\nRussia also sees some benefits in the destabilizing effects of large-scale migration to the EU, particularly as it relates to the rise of xenophobia and political parties skeptical of the European project and the broader liberal order.26  Despite likely challenges around the effects of weather extremes, including Arctic warming, flooding and increased forest fires, Russia may on balance benefit from climate change via the expansion of areas available for cultivation, resource extraction, and previously inaccessible maritime routes.  Russia may also seek to bolster its global image by accepting certain refugees and migrants, even as this potential influx of climate refugees would likely exacerbate existing tensions around labor migration in the country.27\n\n## Looking Forward:  Risks And Opportunities\n\nMigration is an important form of adaptation to the impacts of climate change and in some cases, an essential response to climate threats to livelihoods and wellbeing; therefore it requires careful management to ensure it is safe, orderly, and humane.  It is critical to mitigate risks to the human security of migrants and receiving communities, such as risks to food and water security, access to necessary resources, and conflict at both the local and intercommunal levels.  Large-scale migrations in response to destabilizing climate events within areas of particular economic or political importance can result in a disproportionate impact to a nation's condition overall.  This will likely be the case for the world's coastal populations where sea level rise is predicted to displace a disproportionate number of people.28  Enhancing a nation's ability to predict sea level rise at the local scale is one mechanism to address potentially large-scale climate migrations before they occur and may influence a nation's climate policy writ large.29  Addressing the climatic stressors and resultant second-order impacts that influence populations to move, permanently or seasonally, is important for preventing displacement in the first place, as well as supporting relocation when necessary.\n\nThe geopolitical implications inherent to the necessary shifts towards a low-carbon economy may create new, easily overlooked vulnerabilities that could also affect migration patterns.  These vulnerabilities are likely to be acute in places with high volumes of critical minerals and limited or weak governance structures, as well as economies that include significant fossil fuel extraction or refining sectors.30\nIdentifying these patterns and proactively addressing these vulnerabilities is likely to decrease the likelihood of negative adaptation outcomes, increase economic stability, lower intergroup tensions, decrease political marginalization, and bolster resilience in geographies prone to conflict or violent extremist recruitment, and support partner governments in their transition.\nThe movement of populations more broadly into coastal areas, along with accelerated rates of climate\n\nchange and subsequent impacts along coasts worldwide is an emerging issue of concern.31  In addition, the flow of migration to urban and peri-urban areas in developing countries, which are seeing massive population increases, is overwhelming already strained essential services.  Globally, for example, it is thought that two-thirds of IDPs reside in urban and peri-urban areas.32  These urban centers often lack local preparedness and accompanying national-level or foreign assistance to prioritize migrationrelated support services and infrastructure.  In particular, a 2019 assessment found that the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) has limited and constrained institutional structures, dedicated funding and internal capacity building efforts supporting the implementation of its Urban Policy33 and urban programming more broadly.34\n\n## Early-Warning Systems\n\nU.S. Customs and Border Protection recognizes the value in early-warning systems to monitor climate change impacts and adds that the utility of said systems for identifying and addressing climate change related migration may be compounded by integrating early warning systems with migratory movement systems such as U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement's Biometric Identification Transnational Migration Alert Program (BITMAP) as well as foreign counterpart migratory movement systems.  This in turn could inform host and receiving nation humanitarian resource Existing development and humanitarian assistance programs help address underlying causes of forced migration and displacement in the face of insecurity. Some examples include drawing upon predictive analytics to address food security, such as the Famine Early Warning System Network,35 to providing education and job training to diversify livelihoods, to supporting governance capacity and the political inclusion and participation of marginalized and displaced populations, in regions facing severe impacts of climate change.  Likewise, the U.S. Government can increase individual-level human security by supporting partner governments in areas receiving migrants to ensure they have access to social services such as health, education, remittance assistance, job training, and educating receiving communities to combat xenophobia and racism.\n\n\nAddressing individuals' human security through these sorts of efforts can decrease the likelihood of migration and the second-order implications for international security.  It is critical to approach these efforts in a way that acknowledges that in almost all cases climate change is not the sole driver of migration.\n\n\n\n## Iii. U.S.  Foreign Assistance\n\nMultiple U.S. Government agencies, including the Department of State, the Department of Defense\n(DOD), the Department of Agriculture, and USAID address climate-related migration through a mix of development and humanitarian assistance programs.  Development assistance strengthens adaptation and resilience capacities that increase food and water security; provides livelihood opportunities; protects human rights, including of those marginalized and displaced by climate change; and advances democracy and governance and contributes to durable solutions to displacement.  Humanitarian assistance supports preparedness, early warning, and immediate response and recovery when climaterelated events and displacement overwhelm local systems and capacities.\n\n## Existing Programs With Potential To Reduce The Risk Of Forced Migration And Displacement\n\nAssistance to Build Local and National Capacity for Using Climate Information in Decision Making The U.S. Government works with host governments and communities to enhance observations, models, and forecasts that enable monitoring and warnings for floods, droughts, cyclones, and extreme temperatures, as well as food insecurity, conflict, and humanitarian hotspots.  Information about climate change impacts, combined with non-climate information such as crop conditions, together with early warning systems and adaptation options, have the potential to empower governments and communities to take timely and appropriate actions to avert and prepare for forced displacement and migration.  These actions can save lives, protect assets and livelihoods, as well as promote safe return and early recovery. This information can also reduce pressures to migrate by minimizing losses from climate-related events through risk-informed decision making in essential services such as agriculture and food security, water resource management, transportation, and health.\n\nU.S.-led adaptation, resilience, disaster risk reduction, and nature-based solutions programs help communities and countries prepare for, and manage climate change impacts and protect critical economic and development gains.  These programs have the potential to avert or minimize pressures to forcibly migrate and serve as instruments to support migration with dignity.\n\nPrograms that Support Adaptation to the Impacts of Climate Change U.S. Government adaptation assistance supports people, institutions, policy development and investment mobilization to address climate risks.  USAID partners with over 30 countries on adaptation and resilience initiatives that support global food and water security, bring actionable climate information to decision makers, prevent the spread of vector-borne disease, and reduce conflict over resources.\nPrograms also integrate climate adaptation and ensure equitable outcomes in governance, planning and budgeting processes, in accordance with countries' national priorities. More broadly, U.S. resilience programming explicitly recognizes shocks and stresses as perennial features (not anomalies).  These programs seek to strengthen the capacity of individuals, communities, and systems to absorb, adapt to, and recover from shocks and stresses, using layered, sequenced, and integrated development and humanitarian assistance.  The associated disaster risk reduction programs emphasize early warning, preparedness and prevention, as well as supporting diversified, resilient livelihood strategies.  Activities include building local community and government capacity to develop risk assessments and manage disaster response, as well as supporting national and local disaster risk reduction plans, policies and strategies, and private sector partnerships.  Overarching U.S. Government efforts, such as the 2019 Global Fragility Act, recognize the link between climate change, migration and stability; and include a strong focus on assessing, anticipating, and mitigating climate-driven instability.\nUSAID, in partnership with NASA and NOAA, supports nature-based solutions for managing floods and cyclones, such as restoring mangroves and tree cover, which also maintains key livelihood activities.  In addition, U.S. foreign assistance includes robust investments in land protection and resource management, supporting ecosystem services and livelihood sources critical for human well-being.  Other development assistance programs involve environmental and social impact analysis to ascertain potential risks of investments and development infrastructure.  These programs are critical as environmental and ecosystem degradation can be underlying and contributing factors to disaster risks, conflict, and potential displacement.  Protecting, sustainably managing, and restoring natural or modified ecosystems through partnerships with national governments and local communities can reduce exposure and vulnerability.  Capacity building programs by U.S. science organizations can support the training of climate scientists in vulnerable countries to help them better assess potential for short-term and longer-term climate change and cascading impacts that would influence migration.\n\nDOD supports civilian U.S. Government agencies' humanitarian assistance, disaster relief, and disaster risk reduction programs.  When requested by State or USAID, DOD supports humanitarian assistance efforts by utilizing applicable authorities that are funded by the Overseas Humanitarian, Disaster, and Civic Aid (OHDACA) fund.  DOD also uses those authorities to support humanitarian assistance in collaboration with partner nation civilian agencies.  DOD periodically conducts joint training exercises with allies and partners to enhance interoperability and effectiveness of humanitarian assistance and disaster relief operations.  In addition, DOD has developed the Defense Climate Assessment Tool (DCAT), which uses data from past weather events together with projections of future climate changes to provide high-level assessments of exposure to climate change at locations of interest to the military.  DOD is committed to sharing the DCAT with allies and partners in order to assist with building resilience to climate change.\n\n## Assistance To Support Migrants, Displaced People, And Their Host Communities\n\nU.S. humanitarian assistance supports people forcibly displaced by conflict and violence, persecution, and climate events, as well as those unable to flee.  In Fiscal Year 2020, the U.S. Government provided nearly $10.5 billion in life-saving humanitarian assistance and protection, supporting IDPs, conflict victims, refugees, stateless persons, and migrants in vulnerable situations, many of whom climate change disproportionately impacts.  Recognizing that migration can be an important adaptation strategy, U.S. Government programming has supported safer migration that is more likely to benefit migrants and their families. Humanitarian assistance programming also supports resilience and adaptation programming for IDPs, conflict victims, refugees, and migrants in vulnerable situations.  For example, with funding from the U.S. Government, UNHCR, the International Organization for Migration (IOM), and the United Nations\n(UN) World Food Program (WFP) have worked together to make site improvements so that refugee settlements in Cox's Bazaar, Bangladesh, are more resilient to the risks of landslides and flooding during monsoon season.  In parallel, USAID supported reforestation to reduce risks of landslides and flooding, promote resilience, and improve governance to address disaster risks in the host community.\n\nU.S. development assistance has long experience (although limited funding) to support programs that strengthen urban resilience, municipal systems, and public service provisions for migrants, particularly in terms of health and education and livelihood support.  Further investments address governance and human rights issues that are often a key factor in driving migration and migrants' success in destination communities.  These investments support democratic governance and human rights as critical components of sustainable development and lasting peace, including access to justice, accountable and transparent governance, and an independent and politically active civil society.\n\nState administers targeted, regional humanitarian assistance, primarily through IOM, to build the capacity of countries to manage their international immigration systems and prepare for emergencies that displace people.  Going forward, these projects will incorporate activities that include climate change impacts and responses, including programs to help take into account the linkages between climate change and migration into countries' national migration strategies and policies.  State's approach will support development of an online course in migration and climate change, which will be accessible as an integral part of training curriculums of governmental and academic institutions and workshops and will highlight climate change as a migration driver.\nU.S. foreign assistance provides funding to key partners for critical institutional support and data analysis related to displacement including support to:\n\n-\nUNHCR, the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance (UNOCHA), IOM,\nInternational Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC), and the International\nCommittee of the Red Cross (ICRC) to bolster their humanitarian assistance interventions, as well as develop global strategies and international legal and policy frameworks that mitigate the humanitarian impacts of climate change;\n\n-\nThe Internal Displacement Monitoring Center (IDMC) for development of an annual global\nreport, and the Joint IDP Profiling Service (JIPS) to gather in-depth, individual- or householdlevel information on the demographics and needs of internally displaced populations;\n-\nUNHCR for its statistical information on refugees, asylum seekers, stateless persons, and other\npersons of concern, as well as the World Bank-UNHCR Joint Data Center on Forced Displacement.\nThis information aids in the planning and provision of assistance, and improves policymaking, development planning and advocacy outcomes;\n-\nIOM's Displacement Tracking Matrix (DTM), which captures, processes, and shares information\nin order to better understand the movements and evolving needs of displaced populations.\n\n## Regional Considerations\n\nAfrica:  Climate impacts, such as shifting precipitation patterns and drought, are already driving mobility in Africa.  In response, U.S. foreign assistance focuses on addressing climate risk on the continent by managing droughts; promoting resilience to shocks and stresses; increasing water and food security; diversifying livelihoods; and improving access to affordable, quality health services through universal health care.  In the Sahel, USAID programming aims to enhance the benefits of local migration for rural populations by building the capacity of youth to obtain better paying jobs and send funds back to their villages, as well as improving remittance fund transfers.  Additionally, State programming focuses on supporting governments to anticipate, prepare for and respond to climate change-related migration movements through community programming and durable solutions for rural communities.\nAsia:  Frequent typhoons, floods, droughts, landslides, and storm surges across Asia can result in displacement, loss of lives, homes, infrastructure, and livelihoods.  USAID provides funding and technical assistance for DRR programs and capacity building for disaster management agencies in the Mekong Sub-Region, including Vietnam.  In Mongolia, USAID supports disaster preparedness and mitigation for herder families and other rural and urban communities, while in the Philippines, USAID funds DRR programs that build the capacity of the national government, local communities, and NGOs.  To understand regional migration related to climate change more broadly, a State funded program will study the mobility impacts of climate change-induced extreme weather in the Greater Mekong Sub-Region, and will draw out specific, operational recommendations that could guide future programming interventions, as well as potential relocation plans for affected communities.\nCentral America:  In Central America, particularly El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras, climate change disproportionately affects populations in vulnerable situations and can contribute to the decision to migrate.  Accordingly, USAID is working to address the contribution of climate change impacts to the root causes of irregular migration by investing in nature-based climate solutions that support populations in vulnerable situations and conserve biodiversity and forests in key landscapes.  Other work includes expanding the generation and application of climate information, and promoting climate-smart agricultural practices.  Throughout the Western Hemisphere, State partners with IOM to build capacity and implement international guidelines36 with respect to climate change as a migration driver.\nOn July 29, 2021, the Administration released the U.S. Strategy for Addressing the Root Causes of Migration in Central America37 that includes a dedicated line of effort focused on building resilience to address climate change and food insecurity.  On the same date, the Administration released the Collaborative Migration Management Strategy, which includes a line of effort to provide and mobilize assistance to address the increased humanitarian needs in the region, including those stemming from the impacts of climate\n\nchange.  These efforts will also include galvanizing additional international support and coordinating assistance activities.\nMiddle East and North Africa (MENA):  The MENA region is already the most water-scarce region in the world.  MENA includes twelve of the seventeen most water stressed countries38 globally, with 60 percent of the region's population exposed to high water stress.  U.S. foreign assistance supports countries to manage vital resources in the region through environmental activities that focus on climate adaptation, food and water security, and natural resource management.  U.S. Government programming in this region, as in other areas of Africa, also focuses on supporting governments to anticipate, prepare for, and respond to climate change-related migration movements.\nSmall Island States:  Small Island States are particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change and disproportionately exposed to extreme weather such as floods and tropical storms.  In order to mitigate the adverse effects of natural disasters, USAID supports capacity building and DRR interventions in the Pacific so that partner countries can lessen the impacts of disasters and respond more effectively when they strike.  Programs in the Pacific increase countries' abilities to access and effectively manage financing from international funds, promote regional coordination and the adoption of adaptation policies, build capacity to manage broad adaptation programs, and build multi-sectoral approaches to climate resilience.  USAID also supports disaster preparedness, relief and reconstruction in the Federated States of Micronesia and the Republic of Marshall Islands.  In addition, the Department of the Interior provides financial and technical assistance to the Freely Associated States of the Federated States of Micronesia, the Republic of the Marshall Islands, and the Republic of Palau to mitigate the impacts of natural disasters and climate change including sea level rise, flooding, and storm surge.\nIn the Maldives, USAID focuses on adaptation actions for the critical tourism sector faced with an existential threat by rising sea levels.\nState coordinates the U.S.-Caribbean Resilience Partnership, which provides support to Caribbean islands to strengthen their disaster resilience and enhance their adaptive capacity from the impacts of climate change.  USAID's DRR interventions are strengthening the ability of Caribbean countries to respond to emergencies while also helping communities adapt to the impacts of hurricanes, earthquakes and droughts in the long term.  USAID partners with Inter-American Foundation to strengthen communityled disaster preparedness by channeling direct, flexible funding to grassroots organizations and mobilizing matching local resources.  USAID also builds energy sector resilience across the region by helping island energy sectors bounce back more quickly from both environmental and market shocks.\n\n## Cross-Cutting Issues\n\nCross-cutting issues such as inclusivity of marginalized groups, justice and equity, gender equality and a commitment to work closely with local communities are salient across all types of U.S. foreign assistance.\nIndigenous peoples, women and girls, youth, persons with disabilities, and other marginalized populations face the brunt of the climate crisis and potential displacement, yet have limited access to or influence over decision-making.  These individuals and groups often experience disproportionate effects on their stability, health, and livelihoods.\nState and USAID have extensive technical expertise in integrating the unique needs of individuals with marginalized identities into foreign assistance, as well as guidance on how to consider inclusivity broadly across all programs.  USAID also has a robust history of engaging in locally-led development, exemplified by projects designed in close collaboration and partnership with local actors, including Indigenous communities who hold critical knowledge gained through long-standing stewardship of natural resources.  State's expertise in refugee protection, including the resettlement of more than three million vulnerable individuals since 1975 through the U.S.  Refugee Admissions Program (USRAP) will help focus much needed attention on those made more vulnerable by climate change impacts.\n\n## Analysis Of Additional Needs\n\nSignificant additional development and humanitarian resources are needed to address the root causes of migration, support climate adaptation, build capacity at local, national, and regional levels, and harness the potential positive development impact of migration.  Migration can be a warranted adaptation strategy, yet little assistance is dedicated for planned and voluntary migration.  Current assistance focuses on fixed locations, missing opportunities to invest in human capacity, assets and safety nets that are mobile and can support people when they migrate.  Supporting migration and investing in mobile social protection and cash options are relatively nascent areas of work and the USG can become a technical leader by investing in pilot projects, research, and ultimately moving to scale. U.S. foreign assistance currently brings together a powerful combination of tools, including convening power, technical expertise, capacity building, and partnerships to address many elements of the complex interplay between climate change and migration.  However, the current structure and coordination of U.S.\n\nforeign assistance is inadequate to meet the challenge of comprehensively addressing climate-related migration and displacement.  The U.S. Government lacks a coordinating structure bringing together the relevant interagency stakeholders that work on the nexus of climate change and migration, limiting its ability to maximize the impact of U.S. foreign assistance in this area.  Pro-active coordination, coherent policy, and effective programming across the humanitarian-development-peace nexus in the face of unprecedented ethical dilemmas and fast-moving situations is essential to address migration and displacement issues in the continuum from response to adaptation. Given the current and rapidly rising level of humanitarian need related to displacement and the importance of U.S. leadership in this space, maintaining robust humanitarian assistance funding is essential.  Further, greater investment in adaptation, risk reduction, and resilience will reduce the burden on humanitarian assistance when disasters strike.  To prevent loss of lives and save resources, the U.S.\n\nwould need to increase support to the current range of impactful assistance and capacity-building programs such as early warning and DRR, adaptation and resilience, and government partnerships to integrate climate and migration in policies, practices and legislation.  The United States should also help bring about durable solutions to climate-related displacement by systematically including at risk IDPs and refugees in USAID and International Development Finance Corporation (DFC) development programming.  Further, USAID's forthcoming climate strategy will guide the Agency's mitigation and adaptation efforts, and further integrate climate change considerations into international development and humanitarian assistance programs across all sectors.  A 2019 Government Accountability Office\n(GAO) report flagged that funding for USAID's climate change adaptation activities decreased under the prior administration, highlighting the constraints posed by funding realities even as the need is projected to grow.39\n\n## Iv. Protection And Resettlement Of Affected Individuals\n\nThe United States has a compelling national interest in strengthening global protection for individuals and groups displaced by the impacts of climate change.  This is rooted in U.S. foreign policy objectives, and inextricably linked to U.S. interests in safe, orderly, and humane migration management, regional stability, and sustainable economic growth and development.  The United States seeks to avert and respond to displacement through alternative safe, regular migration pathways, and strengthen access to assistance and protection for people displaced by the impacts of climate change both across borders and within their countries of origin.  The United States should identify ways to apply existing protection frameworks in the context of climate change-related displacement and to identify gaps where the United States should forge new legal pathways to protection. The United States is particularly concerned about the impacts of climate change and displacement on people already in vulnerable situations.  Climate change has disproportionate impacts on marginalized communities, compounding situations of vulnerability and increasing risks of displacement.  At the same time, displacement often creates new situations of vulnerability through family separation, disrupted community support structures, loss of documentation, exclusion from public services, and other challenges.  U.S. efforts to strengthen protection should prioritize those facing a nexus of vulnerabilities related to climate change and displacement to promote equity in support and access.\n\n## Analysis Of Protection Frameworks\n\nThe use of existing legal instruments to protect individuals displaced across borders by the impacts of climate change is limited in scope, and the United States should endeavor to maximize their application, as appropriate, to such individuals.  Although displacement as a result of climate change is not itself a basis for a claim for protection under the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol, people fleeing in the context of the adverse effects of climate change and disasters may, in limited instances, have valid claims for refugee status.  To qualify as a refugee under U.S. law, an individual must generally be outside his or her country of nationality (or if the individual is stateless, outside his country of last habitual residence), and be unable or unwilling to return to that country because of persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of a protected characteristic including race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group, or political opinion.\nThere is an interplay between climate change and various aspects of eligibility for refugee status.  As UNHCR has recognized,40 \"where the effects of climate change and disaster interact with violence, conflict, or persecution leading to displacement, individuals may be refugees under the 1951 Refugee Convention.\"  For example, if a government withholds or denies relief from the impacts of climate change to specific individuals who share a protected characteristic in a manner and to a degree amounting to persecution, such individuals may be eligible for refugee status.  Similarly, adverse impacts of climate change may affect whether an individual has a viable relocation alternative within their country or territory.  Climate activists, or environmental defenders, persecuted for speaking out against government inaction on climate change may also have a plausible claim to refugee status.\nGlobal displacement trends already show that displacement due to conflict and violence is occurring alongside the increasing impacts of climate change resulting in an increase in valid refugee claims.  In January 2020, UNHCR appointed a Special Advisor on Climate Action whose role is to drive UNHCR's engagement on the climate emergency, serve as a global advocate, and is responsible for providing oversight and expertise to shape UNHCR's climate action agenda, which has three main areas of focus: (1) law and policy; (2) operations; and (3) UNHCR's environmental footprint.  U.S. efforts to promote accessions and strengthen foreign governments' adherence to their obligations under the Refugee\n\nConvention and Protocol must be part of further efforts to strengthen international protection for people displaced across borders by the impacts of climate change.\nStrengthening applications of regional instruments in Africa41 and Latin America42 may provide broader protection for people fleeing the impacts of climate change across borders.  These regional instruments include in their refugee definition people fleeing their country of origin because of events or circumstances seriously disturbing public order.  It is not clear the extent to which climate-related impacts fall within such \"events or circumstances.\" These instruments remain limited and - particularly outside the African and Latin American contexts -\ndo not apply to the majority of people displaced by the impacts of climate change.  A number of nonbinding global policy frameworks address the issue of climate-related displacement and merit enhanced U.S. engagement.  The Global Compact on Refugees (2018) recognizes that \"climate, environmental degradation and natural disasters increasingly interact with the drivers of refugee movements,\" though they are \"not in themselves causes of refugee movements.\"43  The Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration similarly recognizes the adverse effects of climate change as drivers of displacement, and suggests taking measures to better understand and address such movements while ensuring\n\"respect, protection, and fulfillment of the human rights of all migrants.\"44\nThe success of these voluntary frameworks and processes depends heavily on good faith, deliberate participation, and cooperative implementation by individual states.  In this respect, there are two modes of state action that serve to strengthen protection for people displaced across borders by the impacts of climate change without affirmatively providing protection on the basis of climate impacts.\nFirst, regional cooperation by some states has resulted in free movement agreements or guidelines for protection in disaster contexts in various regions including the Horn of Africa45, Caribbean,46 Pacific Islands,47 and Central48 and South America.49  These regional mechanisms and tools offer potential models for consideration in other regions and for implementation through standard operating procedures. Second, there is increasing recognition in law and in practice, including in the United States, that individuals may need protection from removal to countries where the impacts of climate change render the return of such individuals unsafe.  The United States may designate nationals of a foreign state (or part of such foreign state) for Temporary Protected Status (TPS) in the United States due to conditions in the country that temporarily prevent the country's nationals from returning safely, which may include climate-related factors.  These conditions must satisfy at least one of the three statutory bases required for a TPS designation:  (1) ongoing armed conflict; (2) environmental disaster; or (3) extraordinary and temporary conditions.\nFollowing designation of a country for TPS, eligible nationals who are already in the United States when the designation goes into effect and apply for the status may be granted TPS, and as a result, temporary protection from removal.  Although the TPS criteria may accommodate the provision of protection to foreign nationals facing the impacts of climate change-related events in their country of origin, this protection is limited.  More specifically, TPS does not protect individuals who arrive after the date of designation, making it likely to exclude many of those forced to flee because of the disaster or event that is the basis for a TPS designation.  The TPS statute also requires that a foreign government officially request TPS designation in cases of environmental disaster, which limits its application for nationals of countries without sufficient government will or capacity to request TPS.  Furthermore, as a temporary status, the intent of TPS is not to provide a permanent solution for individuals unable to return home because of the long-term impacts of climate change.\nThe United States also holds certain discretionary authorities to provide accommodations to individuals affected by natural catastrophes and other extreme situations caused by climate change on a case-bycase basis.  For example, Special Student Relief is the suspension of certain regulatory requirements by the United States for individuals on nonimmigrant academic student (F-1) status from parts of the world that are experiencing emergent circumstances, such as natural catastrophe or armed conflict.  These accommodations are limited in that their intent is to address individuals already in the United States unable to return to impacted countries due to climate change.\n\n## Un Human Rights Committee Case Study\n\nIn January 2020, the UN Human Rights Committee noted in its views adopted in the case of Ioane Teitiota, who sought protection in New Zealand from return to Kiribati due to the impacts of climate change there, that \"States must refrain from deporting an individual when there are substantial grounds for believing there is a real risk of irreparable harm such as that contemplated by Article 6 (right to life) and Article 7 (prohibition of torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.\"50 While the Committee found that New Zealand did not violate Teitiota's right to life when they deported him, the Committee observed that \"without robust national and international efforts, the effects of climate change in receiving States may expose individuals to a violation of their rights under articles 6 or 7 of the Covenant, thereby triggering the non-refoulement obligations of sending States.\"  The European Court of Human Rights has also developed a body of case law prohibiting refoulement under Articles 2 (right to life), or 3 (prohibition of inhuman and degrading treatment) of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). The United States interprets its *non-refoulement* obligations strictly according to the relevant 1951 Refugee Convention (and its1967 Protocol) and Convention Against Torture (CAT) provisions.  It does not accept that the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), to which the United States is party, includes obligations prohibiting *refoulement*, nor does it interpret the Article 6 prohibition on the arbitrary deprivation of life to encompass a positive duty to protect life in the face of all possible external threats. The United States does not consider its international human rights obligations to require extending international protection to individuals fleeing the impacts of climate change.  However, as a matter of policy, the United States does have a national interest in creating a new legal pathway for individualized humanitarian protection in the United States for individuals who establish that they are fleeing serious, credible threats to their life or physical integrity, including as a result of the direct or indirect impacts of climate change.  This new legal pathway should be additive to and in no way infringe upon or detract from existing protection pathways to the United States, including asylum and refugee resettlement.\n\n\n\n## Internal Displacement\n\nAlthough the vast majority of climate-related displacement occurs within countries' own borders, substantial gaps remain in international frameworks, domestic implementation, and multilateral operations to protect IDPs.  The UN Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement provide a widely accepted definition of IDPs that includes people forced to flee elsewhere within a state as a result of, or in order to avoid the effects of \"armed conflict, situations of generalized violence, violations of human rights or natural or human-made disasters.\"  All effects related to climate change in certain contexts.\nThese Guiding Principles identify rights and guarantees relevant to the protection of persons from forced displacement and to their protection and assistance during displacement, as well as during return or resettlement and reintegration, but they are non-binding and implementation remains weak.  The United States continues to support the adoption and implementation of national action plans and national legislation to protect and assist IDPs in line with the UN Guiding Principles.\n\nThe Kampala Convention,51 adopted in 2009, is the only binding international legal instrument specific to IDPs and explicitly states, \"Parties shall take measures to protect and assist persons who have been internally displaced due to natural or human made disasters, including climate change.\"52  The United States continues to encourage accession to the Kampala Convention and implementation through national legislation, particularly in countries acutely affected by climate-related internal displacement, such as the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Ethiopia, Libya, and Sudan, among others. Protection-mandated agencies, including UNHCR, the UN Children's Fund (UNICEF), the OHCHR, and ICRC, each have made significant efforts to advance policies for protection of people displaced by the impacts of climate change, particularly where climate change fuels conflict and disproportionately impacts marginalized communities.  OHCHR's Special Rapporteur on the Human Rights of IDPs and its coordination with IOM have been important for understanding the human rights of IDPs and migrants, including in the context of climate change.\nThis multilateral protection system has demonstrated agility in its emergency response to sudden-onset disasters and conflict related to climate change.  However, operational coordination in response to protection needs arising from slow-onset climate impacts is less well established.\n\n## Statelessness\n\nA stateless person is one not considered a citizen or national under the operation of the laws of any country.  Forced displacement, especially when it is long lasting or permanent, carries inherent risks of statelessness, particularly for the children of those forcibly displaced and subsequent generations.53\nThe risk factors that can lead to statelessness when people move across borders include:\n\n-\nLoss of identity documentation;\n-\nChallenges accessing consular assistance to replace lost or expired documentation;\n-\nLoss of ties to the country of origin over time, without acquisition of a new nationality;\n-\nChallenges obtaining birth registration and/or proof of nationality for children;\n-\nState succession;\n-\nGender discrimination in nationality laws; and\n-\nConflicts of laws leading to some children being born without entitlement to any nationality.\nFor these reasons, it is important to consider the risks of statelessness associated with cross-border, permanent displacement due to the impacts of climate change, and the likelihood that such circumstances will lead to uncertain rights and legal status for affected communities, potentially over generations.  To address and mitigate these risks, governments should put in place statelessness determination procedures (with a path to citizenship for stateless persons) as well as legal safeguards and policies to prevent statelessness at birth.  UNHCR, as the UN Agency with the mandate for statelessness, has the technical capacity to assist and advise States in this regard.\n\n## Refugee Resettlement Considerations\n\nUSRAP admits tens of thousands of refugees to the United States each year according to a target established by the President following Cabinet-level consultations with the Congress.\nState works closely with UNHCR to identify refugees of humanitarian concern to the United States at both the individual and population level.  While UNHCR recognizes that climate change and environmental harm frequently interact with other drivers of displacement that fit into the established refugee definition, the organization does not explicitly incorporate climate considerations into referral criteria. The Department of Homeland Security's U.S.  Citizenship and Immigration Service (USCIS) adjudicates asylum and refugee applications for individuals seeking protection.  Applicants must meet the refugee definition under INA Section 101(a)(42). As noted earlier, the United States does not have well-established alternative pathways to complement refugee resettlement through which the United States can admit individuals facing serious threats to their life because of climate change as a permanent solution to their need for protection.  While granting parole on a case-by case basis for urgent humanitarian reasons or a significant public benefit is possible, it is *ad hoc*, temporary, and not designed to be a long-term solution.  Using parole to provide a legal, safe, and structured system for individuals, who otherwise lack a basis to enter the United States, to enter the United States for a temporary time due to an emergency is an option.  Designed to address temporary situations on a case-by-case basis, parole is not in itself a viable alternative pathway to complement refugee resettlement at scale.\nExamples of alternative or complementary pathways employed by other countries include humanitarian visas, labor mobility schemes, and education programs that are accessible to refugees and other forcibly displaced persons and provide a path to permanent residency.  The United States is developing a private sponsorship program for refugees, which may include university sponsorship.  Some countries, such as Canada and the United Kingdom, use private and/or community sponsorship programs to increase opportunities for local communities to support refugee resettlement.  The U.S. program will require privately sponsored refugees to meet all the criteria for refugee resettlement and will count against the annual refugee target set by the President.  These considerations reinforce the report's recommendation for the Executive Branch to work with Congress to create a new legal pathway for individualized humanitarian protection in the United States for individuals facing serious threats to their life because of climate change. In July 2021, the United States along with UNHCR, assumed the co-chair of the Annual Tripartite Consultations on Resettlement (ATCR), which will culminate in a meeting in Geneva in June 2022 with resettlement stakeholders from thirty or more countries.  As the chair, the U.S. Government intends to use the position to advocate for increased resettlement slots worldwide and work with UNHCR and Refugee Council USA (RCUSA) to incorporate discussions on climate-related implications for third country resettlement into the ATCR as well as the related Working Group on Resettlement envisioned taking place in the United States in February 2022.\n\n## Equity And Inclusion Of People In Situations Of Vulnerability\n\nAssuring equity and inclusion in preparation and response to climate change impacts on migration is essential to effective program and policy development.54  Resilience and adaptation plans must consider concerns such as accessibility, child protection, disability rights, gender equity, Indigenous rights, and protection needs for other populations in vulnerable situations, including situations of forced displacement or migration.  These factors point to the need for tailored protective services, which include psychosocial support, gender-based violence (GBV) prevention and response, and child protection.\nInclusive climate action focuses on the human rights of migrants and displaced persons and recognizes that individuals are vulnerable in unique ways determined by the intersectionality of the various factors contributing to their mobility, independence, and access to basic needs.55\nThe adverse effects of climate change, such as sea level rise, forest fires, extreme temperatures, hurricanes, droughts, and floods, can seriously impact the enjoyment of human rights for all those affected, and populations with heightened vulnerabilities are disproportionately affected.56  Existing vulnerabilities related to age, gender, sexuality, disability, race, ethnicity, religious affiliation, poverty, family unit, and indigenous community membership, provide fewer options making it more difficult for individuals to adjust to both slow and rapid onset climate events.   Xenophobia, prejudice, and stigmatization toward people in vulnerable situations further aggravates their ability to respond to climate change pressures.\n\nThe intersection of multiple factors compounds the risk of harmful climate impacts.  A study conducted by OHCHR on climate change and persons with disabilities determined that poverty exacerbated the exposure of persons with disabilities to adverse impacts of climate change.57  Persons with disabilities are often among those most adversely affected in a crisis and are among those least able to access emergency support.58  They are also often less mobile and more dependent on assistance devices or other individuals, leaving them at risk of exclusion or abandonment before or during migration.\nGender is also a major factor to consider, especially in the context of GBV.  For context, women and girls are typically left behind during slow-onset events as men seek livelihoods elsewhere, making displacement a situation of last resort for them.  Women, girls, and gender diverse persons are disproportionately impacted and face heightened GBV risks as they are on the move and in new and unfamiliar environments.59\nPlanning and policy decisions for climate change impacts on migration should include engagement with marginalized populations to ensure that U.S. responses consider and address their needs.  The process should include opportunities to empower individuals to advocate for specific responses that account for their skills, culture, traditions, and goals.  This will require analysis of the various contextual factors discussed in this section, as well as other variables like conflict and insecurity and their combined effects on the resilience of individuals and communities in the context of climate-related migration.\n\n## Relocation And Evacuation, Including From Small Island States\n\nWhen there exists an anticipated or actual displacement of communities due to disasters or environmental degradation that render areas permanently or temporarily unsafe, planned relocation or evacuation may be necessary to safeguard people from foreseeable harm, including loss of life.  While planned relocation refers to a long process of moving households or communities in safe, alternative places of permanent residence, evacuation refers to short-term emergency measures undertaken in response to an acute and usually fast-developing threat to life and safety.  A number of international schema60 acknowledge that planned relocation for communities residing in areas assessed to be already or increasingly unsafe for habitation, can be a necessary and effective means of adaptation, disaster risk reduction, and increasing vulnerable persons or groups' resilience to the adverse impacts of climate change.\nHowever, planned relocation and evacuation may also entail significant risks for people and communities in vulnerable situations who have to move and should be undertaken only when necessary.  To avoid negative consequences in the near to long term and to ensure the inclusion and protection of people with specific vulnerabilities and concerns, such as women, children, older people, people with disabilities and Indigenous communities, such measures should be prepared for and implemented with respect for human rights.  This includes the meaningful participation of communities at risk of becoming displaced, as well as those in receiving areas, in emergency preparedness measures and long-term planning decisions, with due attention to supporting socio-economic prosperity and cultural practices.\nThe Sydney Declaration of Principles on the Protection of Persons Displaced in the Context of Sea Level Rise recommends that evacuations be undertaken by States only if provided for by law and necessary to protect life and health, and that all evacuations must be carried out with full respect for life, dignity, liberty, and security of evacuees.  There is existing guidance concerning planned relocation and evacuations in the context of climate change and disasters that involves population movements *internal*\nto the home country of affected communities.  While experiences of international cooperation in the management of *cross-border* evacuations in disaster contexts are relatively few, some new practice and guidance is developing in this area, including through initiatives of the Platform on Disaster Displacement.61  There is a need to identify examples of cross-border planned relocations related to climate change impacts and develop guidance explicitly to address such measures. Permanent planned relocation should be a measure of last resort.  It is important to support people to stay as long and as safely possible in their current home areas through investing in measures to reduce disaster risk and enable local adaptation.  Such measures may include facilitating migration as an adaptive strategy and evacuation preparedness.  UNHCR and other partners recommend identifying a \"risk threshold\" beyond which it is no longer considered safe for people to remain in place.  Determining if the threshold is reached should be accomplished by combining the local knowledge and perspectives of concerned communities with robust economic analysis and scientific evidence.\nAdvanced planning by countries of origin, where there is potential for displacement by disaster and a lack of domestic solutions to displacement may facilitate individuals' access to protection, assistance and solutions elsewhere.  These plans also help ensure that people are able to move out of harm's way, receive protection, and have their rights and dignity respected.  Bolstering migration pathways that include labor, family reunion, and education provides mechanisms for people to move both proactively and reactively.  States in the Americas have demonstrated the good practice of expanding labor mobility channels, using \"ordinary\" and \"exceptional\" migration categories to accommodate migration challenges linked to environmental factors and have expedited visa or permanent residency applications for people from affected States.\nTo mitigate against further displacement within and from urban areas, states can conduct forwardlooking urban planning to assess the need for preparedness in support of local integration, and the reduction of disaster risk and strengthening of climate resilience.  States should seek to ensure a sound legal basis and institutional frameworks and responsibilities for evacuation and relocation.  Planning with thresholds, evidence, and due consideration to human rights protection, avoids the risk of forcibly evicting people without their participation in an informed consent process.\n\nA number of countries have taken a community-centered approach that involves multiple stakeholders including those taking part in planned relocation, host communities, and others likely to be affected; this ensures they are informed, consulted, and enabled to participate in decision-making.  Vanuatu, New Zealand, Sao Tome & Principe and other countries have implemented participatory decision making by including communities at every step of the planned relocation process.\nStates should seek to ensure needs and standards of living are met while people are on the move, including safe shelter, suitable livelihoods, and basic infrastructure and services, including education and health.  Where relationships with land are complex, pay special attention to land rights during the move.\nPlanned relocation should respect and maintain household, community, social cohesion, and kinship ties and should avoid separating families.  Colombia and Brazil have exemplified good practices related to fulfilling social service needs.  The Colombia Health Secretariat provided day courses to relocated\n\npopulations on environmental sanitation, food security, safe drinking water practices, and urban agriculture.  In Brazil, an internal resettlement advisory council composed of experts from Brazil's secretariats of housing, education, health, environment, and culture, along with community representatives, was established to assess health care and social service needs of relocated and host communities. Ensuring accountability by undertaking monitoring and evaluation is essential in planned relocations. Monitoring and evaluation can be used to determine if relocated persons have restored or improved living standards, if host communities have maintained or increased living standards, or if they are experiencing xenophobia or violence once the relocation is complete.\n\n## Compacts Of Free Association\n\nThe U.S. has a historical relationship with its former Pacific Ocean territories, now known as the Freely Associated States (FAS), including the Republic of the Marshall Islands, Palau, and Federated States of Micronesia.  Climate impacts are one factor that may contribute to a decision to relocate by citizens in the FAS, typically from the smaller and less-populated islands and atolls to more densely populated ones, such as Majuro Atoll and Ebeye Island (Kwajalein Atoll) in the Marshall Islands and Pohnpei in Micronesia.  Eligible citizens from the Federated States of Micronesia, the Marshall Islands, and Palau (combined 2021 population: approximately 182,000) may travel to the United States to live, work, and study without a visa.  Climate impacts may be one factor that contributes to decisions made by citizens of these three countries to travel or relocate to the United States in addition to education and/or employment opportunities.  The hazards posed by climate change, including sea-level rise, coastal flooding, and temperature and precipitation change are likely to increase.  There are deep impacts to infrastructure, freshwater supplies, agriculture, and habitats for threatened and endangered species on U.S. and U.S.-affiliated atoll islands.62 Therefore, bilateral and multilateral agreements may provide a pathway for migration.\n\n\n\n## V. Multilateral Engagement\n\nThe multi-faceted challenges of migration and the global effects of climate change are increasingly the focus of international discussions and processes.  The below sections analyze the role of key multilateral engagement initiatives, mechanisms, events, and stakeholders to identify opportunities for U.S. engagement.\n\n## Multilateral Initiatives And Mechanisms\n\nMultilateral initiatives and mechanisms drive global engagements that elevate the issues and forge solutions around migration and climate change.  The Nansen Initiative, launched by Switzerland and Norway, was created as a government-led, bottom-up consultative process intended to build consensus on the development of a protection agenda addressing the needs and legal rights of people displaced across international borders in the context of disasters and the effects of climate change.  At the conclusion of the three-year (2012-2015) Nansen Initiative, the Platform on Disaster Displacement\n(PDD) followed the recommendations of the Nansen Agenda to build partnerships between policymakers, practitioners, and national engagement.  The PDD is a group of states working together to forge durable solutions for displaced persons in the context of disasters and climate change.  The PDD also leverages close partnership between governments, civil society groups, universities, and other key stakeholders, such as IOM, UNHCR, and the UN Environment Program (UNEP), by providing governments with a toolbox to address these challenges and build consensus, through knowledge sharing and consultations.\n\nThe 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, adopted by all UN Member States in 2015, recognized forcibly displaced people, including IDPs, as a vulnerable group in need of particular attention and calls for full respect of human rights.  The Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) recognize the positive contribution of migration to sustainable development, and the SDG's motto to \"leave no one behind\" is a clear call for sustainable development to be inclusive of the furthest left behind, including migrants and the forcibly displaced.  Since then, the mechanisms used to provide opportunities for stakeholders to work together, including meetings, initiatives, working groups, and other facets, have been amplified to address the interconnection of climate change and migration, providing adaptation assistance, and supporting people on the move. The UN Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (UNCOPUOS) has 95 Member States and helps raise awareness of specific matters that are relevant to the broader international space community.\n\"Space and Climate Change\" is a standing agenda item at UNCOPUOS and allows Member States to share information highlighting the unique vantage point space provides to provide critical data to decision makers to mitigate climate change. The Paris Agreement creates an unprecedented framework for global action to avoid potentially catastrophic planetary warming and for building global resilience to the climate impacts we are already experiencing.  The decision adopting the Paris Agreement established a task force on displacement, under the Warsaw International Mechanism for Loss and Damage (WIM), to provide recommendations on integrated approaches to avert, minimize, and address displacement related to the adverse impacts of climate change.  The task force issued its first set of recommendations in 2018.63\nThe international community also works to address adaptation and reduce the risk to communities through a variety of different initiatives.  For instance, the Sendai Framework on Disaster Risk Reduction aims to achieve the substantial reduction of disaster risk and losses in lives, livelihoods, and health and in the economic, physical, social, cultural, and environmental assets of persons, businesses, communities and countries by 2030.\n\nThe international community also developed the non-legally binding Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration (GCM), which aims through its 23 objectives, to promote better management of migration at local, national, regional and global levels, including migration resulting from climate risks.\nThrough Objective 5, the GCM supports the enhancement of pathways for regular migration, including cooperation to identify solutions for migrants compelled to leave their countries of origin due to the adverse effects of climate change, such as planned relocation and visa options.  It also aims to mitigate the adverse drivers and structural factors that hinder people from building and maintaining sustainable livelihoods in their countries of origin.  To support GCM implementation, the UN Network on Migration established the Migration Multi-Partner Trust Fund (MPTF) in May 2019 as the first pooled funding instrument focusing on migration, strengthening multilateral commitment and international cooperation.  One of the fund's objectives specifically calls for States to support programs to address the adverse effects of climate change while ensuring respect and protection for the human rights of migrants.64\n\n## Role Of Un Resolutions\n\nUN bodies such as the Security Council and General Assembly have increasingly debated climate risks and impacts.  Increased U.S. diplomatic engagement of like-minded as well as other governments, especially those most impacted by climate change and displacement, can help generate more attention and resources to implement key agreements and resolutions that aim to address climate change and migration.  Going forward the United States will engage in key UN resolutions with the following approaches:\n\n-\nEnable a whole-of-government multilateral approach to foster greater diplomatic coherence and\nunity of messaging across U.S. agencies.\n-\nEnsure greater consistency, coherence, synergies, and complementarity in framing climate change-related migration across various UN resolutions addressing climate change, migration,\nhumanitarian response, refugee protection, human rights, development, peace and security, stabilization, and disaster risk reduction.\n-\nApproach key UN resolutions as strategic opportunities to foster greater urgency for governments to act on climate and migration issues, establish standards and greater shared understanding of challenges, and deepen international collaboration, coordination, and partnerships toward durable solutions and burden-sharing.\n-\nSeek to collaborate more frequently with like-minded governments, civil society groups, academia, the private sector, and other stakeholders to engage on shared interests and best practices sharing with Group of 77 (G-77) countries, whose security, stability, and development so often depend on improving approaches to climate change and migration.  Many good opportunities exist, including UN resolutions and platforms on disaster risk reduction and humanitarian assistance, as these can bring into focus more narrowly defined security-related\nand other impacts, as well as preventive approaches fostering economic development.\n-\nLeverage appropriate resolutions to more effectively call on, incentivize, and otherwise convince\nUN Member States to implement key agreements to which they are parties, such as the Paris\nAgreement, and mainstream efforts to strengthen resilience and reduce risks of displacement in\nthe context of disasters, environmental degradation, and climate change into national planning processes.\n\n## Government Efforts On Climate And Migration\n\nSignificant action to address migration affected by climate change needs the buy-in and leadership from governments and other national stakeholders working together across borders.\nGovernment-Led Initiatives and Working Groups Many ongoing efforts are achieving progress in bringing environmental migration and disaster displacement to the center of government and multilateral attention because of joint efforts and active collaboration between UN entities, NGOs, academia, governments, the private sector, and other stakeholders.\n\n\n\nThe Migrants in Countries in Crisis (MICIC) Initiative is a government-led effort co-chaired by the United States and the Philippines, aimed at improving the protection of migrants when the countries in which they live, work, study, transit, or travel experience a conflict or natural disaster.\nThe intergovernmental Group on Earth Observations (GEO) aims to improve access to, synergies between, and the use of data and other information about Earth's physical, chemical, and biological systems.  GEO monitors and assesses the status of and changes in our environment with the goal of fostering collaboration toward a more sustainable planet.  GEO is constructing a Global Earth Observation System of Systems that will link together the many thousands of scientific observation instruments that have until now been operating in isolation.  GEO aims to promote open, coordinated, and sustained data sharing and infrastructure for better research, forecasting, strategies, policy-making, investment decisions, and actions across many disciplines.\nRegional Engagement Governments are also working together regionally to address the impacts of climate change on migration.  Regional engagements, through conferences, consultations, working groups, and other facets, allow governments to collaborate and find solutions in their unique situations.\n\nThe Regional Conference on Migration (RCM or Puebla Process) is a regional consultative process that is voluntary, non-binding, and operates by consensus with 11 permanent members (including the United States) in North and Central America.  This multilateral forum works to foster regional efforts to strengthen migration governance, protect the human rights of migrants, promote appropriate linkages between migration and sustainable development, and other priorities that strengthen, modernize, and manage borders.  In 2016, the United States demonstrated leadership on climate displacement by endorsing the RCM guide, which provides best practices for protection of people moving in the context of disasters.65  The RCM guide supports the exercise of discretion on humanitarian grounds as provided for under immigration law and is based on existing best practices.\n\nThe Pacific Resilience Partnership and its Technical Working Group (TWG) on Human Mobility brings together regional organizations, governments, development partners and civil society organizations to engage on the topic of human mobility.  It was used to prepare a dialogue with the High-Level Panel on Internal Displacement,66 and plans to draft a regional framework to address climate related mobility.\nThe TWG is part of the Pacific Islands Forum's resilience partnership and chaired by IOM.\n\nIn East Africa, including the Horn of Africa, member states under the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) and the East African Community (EAC) engage to launch regional initiatives and address migration and climate change in the East Africa context.  In 2020, IGAD and its member states established the Protocol on Free Movement of Persons (FMP) to ensure regional integration through free movement of persons, fostering socio-economic development, facilitating trade and investment, while affording equal protection under the law.67 The EAC Secretariat is developing a Climate Change Policy and strategies to address the adverse impacts of climate change in the region and guide partner states and other stakeholders on the preparation and implementation of collective measures to address in the region.68\nCivil Society Engagement Many of the driving initiatives and mechanisms above would not be possible without the local expertise of civil society organizations, NGOs, and local governments.  The section below analyses the role civil society plays in the multilateral engagement and identifies opportunities for the United States to strengthen its coordination.\n\nThe Role Civil Society Should Play in Climate Change and Migration Civil society provides in-depth, specialized knowledge of the communities and locations that the multilateral engagements seek to support, including:\n\n-\nCivil society, NGOs, and local leaders have the advantage of understanding the context and intricacies of communities impacted by climate change, while also having engagement in global processes with the UN, INGOs, governments, and others.\n-\nCivil society organizations are often the first to respond when a disaster strikes and play a pivotal role to responding and understanding displacement by climate change.\n-\nThey also provide a gate to accessing further civil societies, local governments, and community networks to ensure success in response.  For example, the Climate Action Network unites 1,500\ncivil society organizations across 130 countries to undertake collective action to address climate crisis and social and racial justice.\n-\nThe civil science agencies and institutions in the U.S. Government and academia maintain robust\npredictive analytic models, tools, and capabilities related to understanding climate impacts to\nhuman systems that could precipitate migration.\n-\nCivil science agencies can support adaptive capacity (including in the development of forecasting tools and assessment generation) in multilateral engagement.\n-\nMost civil science agencies have as their primary mission a focus internal to the United States, and so additional authorization and funding mechanisms that would allow them to expand their examination of climate change and climate change impacts as a global problem and in a global perspective may be helpful.\nOpportunities for and Barriers to Civil Society Engagement\nBy being closest to the people most affected by climate change, civil society provides a range of opportunities for addressing climate-related migration, but also faces many barriers.  These opportunities and barriers become prevalent in legal, organizational, political, security, and economic spaces. Civil society organizations provide crucial input in addressing migration and climate change in their communities.  Responder engagement with civil society facilitates access to timely, reliable data and evidence of a direct voice that allows for a more accurate and targeted response.  Civil society organizations also often engage with the commercial and private sector in the location and ensure that communities have access to the information they need to make informed decisions regarding migration.\nCivil society organizations can bring innovative thinking to the table to address issues within their communities.  For example, NRC and local partners engaged national authorities to develop DRR and other DRR-relevant policy instruments to address disaster displacement with the goal to support governments in developing or revising their DRR strategy using the UNDRR and NRC Words into Action on disaster displacement guide.  In South Africa, the National Disaster Management Centre asked for NRC's support to develop specific guidelines on internal disaster displacement as part of a broader effort to enhance its work and the implementation of the National Disaster Management Framework so a national-level task team to develop these guidelines on internal disaster displacement was set up with technical support from the NGO.\n\nHowever, being in the same location as slow-onset or sudden-onset climate events means civil society is susceptible to the same disasters.  Civil society groups and local NGOs face greater localized barriers as they are reliant on local infrastructure, economies, and resources.  Although civil society organizations may have more in-depth knowledge of the effects climate change is having on a specific population or region, they can also struggle to be heard within larger fora that include national and international actors.  Since civil society and NGOs possess fewer legal flexibilities and the security resources often provided to larger international actors, they may struggle to access and attend multilateral engagements, especially in highly politicized settings.\nCertain UN member states also work to obstruct NGO access to these fora.  NGOs undertaking efforts to address displacement spurred by conflicts affected by climate change, including through droughts and increased competition for precious resources, are too often subject to violent attacks and intimidation by state and non-state parties to conflicts, as well as legal risks related to operating in areas controlled by terrorist groups.  To overcome these barriers and ensure that global responses to migrant and refugee issues both reflect and address realities on the ground for migrants and the communities, civil society engages governments and multilateral bodies, such as UNGA and the UN Human Rights Council, on support for local actors, protection of NGO workers and other civilians, and respect for international law.\nCivil society also creates networks and councils, such as the Mayors Migration Council (MMC), to empower and enable civil society with access, capacity, knowledge, and connections to engage in migration diplomacy and policymaking at the international, regional, and national level.69\nIn addition, civil society faces significant legal, policy, and organizational hurdles for multilateral engagement.  Engaging across these sectors, though important and vital for a holistic and whole-ofgovernment and whole-of-society response to migration, often experiences differences in priorities and organizational cultures.  One example includes the security and classification rules, guidelines, and policies that limit law enforcement and national security experts from engaging with non-security partners, including those in the Federal science agencies, foreign policy community, academia, commercial industry, and non-governmental organizations, despite these organizations often having the most direct experience and knowledge pertaining to climate-related migration.  Additionally, many of the tools, models, and capabilities within organizations like academia and the U.S. civil science agencies (i.e., USGS, NOAA, and NASA) are primarily focused on domestic U.S. mission areas and problem-sets, though they have the methodological capability - through downscale country and regional modeling - to be applied internationally.\n\nCivil society organizations and local communities continue to play a pivotal role in global multilateral engagement effectively addressing climate change-related migration.  Raising the voices of local actors and front-line stakeholders will continue to be a priority of United States multilateral diplomacy as we address climate change and migration.\n\n\n\n## Vi. Recommendation70 Establish A Standing Interagency Policy Process On Climate Change And Migration\n\nEstablish a standing interagency policy process on Climate Change and Migration to coordinate U.S.\ngovernment efforts to mitigate and respond to migration resulting from the impacts of climate change that brings together representatives across the scientific, development, humanitarian, democracy and human rights, and peace and security elements of the U.S. Government.\nThe standing interagency policy process on Climate Change and Migration should analyze the structure and coordination of U.S. policy, strategy and budgeting affecting populations vulnerable to climate change and migration and foreign assistance for climate change impacts on migration, review gaps and advance work around report recommendations.  The standing interagency policy process on Climate Change and Migration should also take a holistic view of opportunities to address climate migration through supporting better understanding of climate and migration, assistance to governments and civil society to mitigate and respond to climate change, assistance to support people to adapt in place and people on the move, and assistance to migrants and host communities in destinations. Given that climate-induced weather extremes will grow in severity in unexpected ways, the standing interagency policy process on Climate Change and Migration will provide a venue for developing longterm strategies consistent with the evolving scientific understanding of climate impacts, such as those communicated through the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change and the U.S. National Climate Assessment.\n\n## Lines Of Effort To Consider Through The Standing Interagency Policy Process On Climate Change And Migration U.S.  Government\n\n-\nConsider developing a complementary report that addresses the impacts of climate change on migration/relocation within the United States to include special consideration in areas of rapid\nclimate change and dense populations.  The U.S. Government will evaluate coordination\nmechanisms to assist domestic communities already in need, as well as those expected to be at\nrisk in the near future, given that a number of U.S. communities are already experiencing severe impacts from sea-level rise, permafrost thaw, drought, and wildfires.\n-\nEncourage increased collaboration among climate scientists, sustainable development\npractitioners, human rights defenders and activists, and displacement experts, in consultation\nwith other governments, local authorities, and communities with experience of planned and\nvoluntary relocation.  Identify and share best practices from across federal agencies engaged in\nclimate resilience and preparedness activities with other nations to be further integrated into a suite of climate preparedness services as a means of reducing the number of forced migrations\ndue to climate change.\n-\nAssess how climate change may intersect with the criteria for refugee status, including claims:\no\nbased on environmental defense or climate change activism;\no\nin which individuals may not have a viable internal relocation alternative because of the impacts of climate change;\no\nin which individuals may experience the withholding or denial of relief from climate change impacts based on a shared protected characteristic, such as race or ethnicity; and\no\nin which climate change may impact the state's willingness or ability to protect\nindividuals fleeing persecution.\n\n## Improved Analytics\n\n-\nAssess investments in predictive tools that forecast conditions correlated with migration and displacement and provide information in an accessible, open-access format to policy makers and program managers.  Integrate these systems into agency planning processes.\n-\nEmpower the federal civil science agencies to increase provision of and support for analytic models and tools to international mission-areas to ensure climate science informs climate migration assessments and tracking.\n-\nConsider investments in research, analysis, and programming to understand and address\nimportant questions about the likely evolution and consequences of climate related migration,\nincluding:\no\nHow do different social, economic, geographic, political, and other characteristics mitigate or exacerbate the effects of climate change on migration?\no\nWhat geographies' conditions are most associated with the risk of immobility and trapped populations?\no\nWhat is the role of migration in supporting adaptation and resilience from the household to national scales?\no\nWhat are the likely risks associated with both new conflict flashpoints that may emerge in response to temporary or protracted forced displacement as well as the impact of climate driven migration on pre-existing conflict flashpoints, such as those associated with seasonal migration (e.g., farmer herder conflict)?\no\nWhat are the likely responses of adversary and competitor states, as well as non-state and hybrid armed groups, in response to environmental shocks and climate driven\nmigration?\n\n## Programming And Investments\n\n-\nAssess how the United States can contribute to durable solutions for climate-related\ndisplacement by systematically including at risk IDPs and refugees in development programming\nby U.S. Government agencies including USAID and the International Development Finance\nCorporation (DFC).  Review U.S. Government positions with International Financial Institutions and Multilateral Development Banks.\n-\nEvaluate increased investments in resilience-building measures and local climate adaptation\nefforts, including capacity building, employing principles of locally led, equitable, and just\ndevelopment and ensuring that marginalized groups, people, and communities are intentionally and robustly included from the inception of activities.  Researchers agree the pathway from\nclimate-related migration to conflict is not direct and can be interrupted by robust institutions, inclusive and accountable governance, and rapid response that is equitable and culturally responsive.\n-\nConsider scaling up support to urban areas to help localities plan for, accommodate, and\nintegrate migrants and those displaced.  This involves helping municipalities and communities build resilient urban systems, and ensuring migrants and displaced persons, particularly women and youth, have access to livelihood opportunities, health care, civic and political life, and labor and human rights protections in urban and peri-urban destination areas.  This also involves\nenhancing integration of migration and displacement planning in climate adaptation, risk reduction, national development policies, internal migration governance, and increasing mobile\nsocial protection to further support people on the move.\n-\nEvaluate how to implement measures, including best practices for the private sector, to ensure\nthat climate actions to limit warming and increase resilience do not inadvertently displace populations in vulnerable situations, especially Indigenous people and marginalized groups\n(e.g., deforestation to make room for large-scale solar power farms exacerbates climate change).\nImplement measures, including best practices for the private sector, to ensure the exploration for and extraction of green energy minerals does not inadvertently create or exacerbate new resource-based conflict.\n\n-\nConsider engaging and coordinating more consistently with key multilateral stakeholders to take\non a bold, cross-cutting leadership role in regional initiatives and multilateral mechanisms,\nwhere the United States can lead in providing transparent and prioritized sharing of information between domestic and international stakeholders, bridging the gap between climate change and migration actors.as well as sending observers to other regional engagements to expand state-tostate collaboration.\n-\nEvaluate how to address critical gaps in development, humanitarian, and climate finance by committing funding toward the UN Network on Migration-established Migration Multi-Partner\nTrust Fund (MPTF) and other mitigation and adaptation efforts, and track the impacts in existing funding while avoiding burdening front line actors.\n-\nAssess how to increase climate and/or environmental impact assessments in program planning\nand resource distribution to mitigate contextual climate drivers of migration.\n\n## Legislative\n\n-\nEvaluate opportunities for funding for development and humanitarian programming to provide aid to people when displaced, help them recover rapidly for safe returns to their homes, support climate risk reduction actions, address the root causes of migration, support climate adaptation, build capacity at local, national, and regional levels, and harness the potential positive development impact of migration.  In particular, increase social protection investments, including through economic inclusion models that target women, youth and groups in vulnerable situations, labor mobility and shock responsive and mobile safety nets.\n-\nExplore with the Congress and stakeholders the need for additional protections for individuals\nwho can establish that they are fleeing serious, credible threats to their life or physical integrity\nas a result of climate change.\n-\nEvaluate whether reforms to the TPS statute would offer appropriate protection needs arising from climate-related displacement such as by removing the requirement that governments\nrequest TPS designation in cases of \"environmental disaster,\" establishing a legal mechanism to\nallow all TPS beneficiaries who otherwise qualify to apply for adjustment to permanent status\nunder existing law, and updating the criteria for designation or re-designation.\n\n## Annex I:  Glossary Of Terms\n\nAdaptation:  Process of adjustment to actual or expected climate change and its effects.  Adaptation seeks to moderate or avoid harm or exploit beneficial opportunities.  In some natural systems, human intervention may facilitate adjustment to expected climate change and its effects.\nAdaptive capacity:  Ability of systems, institutions, humans, and other organisms to adjust to potential damage, take advantage of opportunities, and respond to consequences of climate impacts.\nAgro-pastoralism:  Combination of agriculture, crop-based livelihood systems, and pastoralism.\nBiodiversity:  Variety of plant and animal life in the world or in a particular habitat or ecosystem. Climate change:  A change in the state of the climate that can be identified (for example, using statistical tests) by changes in the mean and/or the variability of its properties, and that persists for an extended period, typically decades or longer.  It refers to any change in climate over time, whether due to natural variability or as a result of human activity.\nClimate changerelated migration (shorthand internal climate migration):  Climate change-related migration is migration that can be attributed largely to the slow-onset impacts of climate change on livelihoods owing to shifts in water availability and crop productivity, or to factors such as sea level rise or storm surge. Climate migrant/migration:  Climate migrants are people who move - within or between countries -\nbecause of climate change-related migration (see above).\nCoastal erosion:  Erosion of coastal landforms that results from wave action, exacerbated by storm surge and sea level rise. Deforestation:  Conversion of forest to non-forest.\nDesertification:  Land degradation in arid, semi-arid, and dry sub-humid areas, collectively known as drylands, resulting from many factors, including human activities and climatic variations.  The range and intensity of desertification have increased in some dryland areas over the past several decades Displacement:  Forced removal of people or people obliged to flee from their places of habitual residence.\nEnvironmental mobility:  Temporary or permanent mobility as a result of sudden or progressive changes in the environment that adversely affect living conditions, either within countries or across borders.\nEvacuation:  Moving people and assets temporarily to safer places before, during or after the occurrence of a hazardous event in order to protect them. Extreme heat event:  Three or more days of above-average temperatures, generally defined as passing a certain threshold (for example, above the 85th percentile for average daily temperature in a year).\nExtreme weather event:  Weather event that is rare at a particular place and time of year with characteristics of extreme weather varying from place to place in an absolute sense.  When a pattern of extreme weather persists for some time, such as a season, it may be classified as an extreme climate event, especially if it yields an average or total that is itself extreme (for example, drought or heavy rainfall over a season). Forced migration:  Migratory movement in which an element of coercion exists, including threats to life and livelihood, whether arising from natural or human-made causes.  This includes movements of refugees and internally displaced persons as well as people displaced by natural or environmental disasters, chemical or nuclear disasters, famine, or development projects.\nGender Based Violence:  An umbrella term for any harmful threat or act directed at an individual or group based on actual or perceived biological sex, gender identity and/or expression, sexual orientation, and/or lack of adherence to varying socially constructed norms around masculinity and femininity.  It is rooted in structural gender inequalities, patriarchy, and power imbalances.  GBV is typically characterized by the use or threat of physical, psychological, sexual, economic, legal, political, social and other forms of control and/or abuse.   GBV impacts individuals across the life course and has direct and indirect costs to families, communities, economies, global public health, and development.\n\nHazard:  The potential occurrence of a natural or human-induced physical event or trend or physical impact that may cause loss of life, injury, or other health impacts, as well as damage and loss to property, infrastructure, livelihoods, service provision, ecosystems and environmental resources. Human Security:  UN  Member States affirmed the universal value of human security in General Assembly resolution 66/290, adopted in 2012 where it is agreed that human security is an approach to assist Member States in identifying and addressing widespread and cross-cutting challenges to the survival, livelihood, and dignity of their people. Immobility:  Inability to move from a place of risk or not moving away from a place of risk due to choice.\nInternal migration (migrant):  migration within national borders.\nInternational migration (migrant):  Migration that occurs across national borders. Irregular Migration:  Movement of persons that takes place outside the laws, regulations, or international agreements governing the entry into or exit from the State of origin, transit or destination.\nMigration:  Movement of persons that results in a change in the place of usual residence.\nMitigation (of climate change):  Human intervention to reduce the sources or enhance the sinks of greenhouse gases.\nMobility:  Movement of people, including temporary or long-term, short- or long-distance, voluntary or forced, and seasonal or permanent movement as well as planned relocation. Parole:  The Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) authorizes the Secretary of Homeland Security to use their discretion to parole any alien applying for admission to the United States temporarily for urgent humanitarian reasons or a significant public benefit.  Parole allows an individual, who may be inadmissible, removable or otherwise ineligible for admission to the United States, to be paroled into the United States for a temporary period.  Parole ends when the parole period expires, when the parolee leaves the United States, or when the parolee obtains an immigration status, whichever occurs first.\nIndividuals can self-petition for parole and can also be petitioned by a third party such as State. Planned relocation:  People moved or assisted to move permanently away from areas of environmental risks. Rainfed agriculture:  Agricultural practice relying almost entirely on rainfall as its source of water.\nRapid-onset event:  Event such as cyclones and floods which take place in days or weeks (in contrast to slow-onset climate changes that occur over long periods of time).\nRefoulement:  The act of forcing a refugee or asylum seeker to return to a country or territory where he or she is in danger of persecution or torture.\n\nRepresentative Concentration Pathway (RCP):  Trajectory of greenhouse gas concentration resulting from human activity corresponding to a specific level of radiative forcing in 2100.\nRegular Migration:  Migration that occurs in compliance with the laws of the country of origin, transit and destination.\nSea level rise:  Increases in the height of the sea with respect to a specific point on land.\nSlow-onset climate change:  Changes in climate parameterssuch as temperature, precipitation, and associated impacts, such as water availability and crop production declinesthat occur over long periods of time.\nA smallholding or smallholder farmer:  A small farm operating under a small-scale agriculture model. Definitions vary widely for what constitutes a smallholder or small-scale farm, including factors such as size, food production technique or technology, involvement of family in labor and economic impact. Stateless person:  A person who is not considered as a national by any State under the operation of its law.\n\nStressor:  Event or trend that has important effect on the system exposed and can increase vulnerability to climate-related risk.\nSubsistence agriculture:  Occurs when farmers grow food crops to meet the needs of themselves and their families on smallholdings.  Subsistence agriculturalists target farm output for survival and for mostly local requirements, with little or no surplus.\nSustainable livelihood:  Livelihood that endures over time and is resilient to the impacts of various types of shocks including climatic and economic.\nSystem dynamics model:  A model which decomposes a complex social or behavioral system into its constituent components and then integrates them into a whole that can be easily visualized and simulated. Vulnerability:  Propensity or predisposition to be adversely affected.  Vulnerability encompasses a variety of concepts and elements including sensitivity or susceptibility to harm and lack of capacity to cope and adapt.\n\n\n## Annex 2:  Examples Of Climatic Trends And Extremes That Influence Migration\n\n| Environmental change                | Pathways/effects that influence    |\n|-------------------------------------|------------------------------------|\n| human security                      |                                    |\n| Manifestations                      |                                    |\n| of climate                          |                                    |\n| change                              |                                    |\n| Increasing warm                     |                                    |\n| days and nights                     |                                    |\n| Decreases in surface and            |                                    |\n| groundwater;                        |                                    |\n| desertification                     |                                    |\n| Arable/grazing land degradation;    |                                    |\n| drought stress on flora and fauna;  |                                    |\n| lack of water for human             |                                    |\n| settlements and agriculture; local  |                                    |\n| economic decline; limitations to    |                                    |\n| outdoor activities under extreme    |                                    |\n| temperatures                        |                                    |\n| Heat waves                          |                                    |\n| increasing over                     |                                    |\n| land and ocean                      |                                    |\n| Increase in temperature             |                                    |\n| extremes, exceeding                 |                                    |\n| heat stress tolerance               |                                    |\n| level of humans and                 |                                    |\n| ecosystems                          |                                    |\n| Increase in excess death rate;      |                                    |\n| impacts on food safety and          |                                    |\n| changing ecological patterns of     |                                    |\n| vector-borne, zoonotic, and         |                                    |\n| environmentally sourced (e.g.,      |                                    |\n| from water-, soil-, or dust-borne   |                                    |\n| pathogens) infectious diseases;     |                                    |\n| increase in wildfire; coral         |                                    |\n| bleaching events; more frequent     |                                    |\n| harmful algal blooms                |                                    |\n| Declining lake storage,             |                                    |\n| streamflow, and                     |                                    |\n| groundwater                         |                                    |\n| Increases in the                    |                                    |\n| intensity and                       |                                    |\n| duration of                         |                                    |\n| drought                             |                                    |\n| Water resource shortages and food   |                                    |\n| insecurity; land degradation;       |                                    |\n| reduction in crop, forest, and      |                                    |\n| livestock production; increase in   |                                    |\n| wildfire                            |                                    |\n| Increase in heavy                   |                                    |\n| precipitation                       |                                    |\n| events                              |                                    |\n| Flooding, erosion,                  |                                    |\n| channel modification,               |                                    |\n| debris flows                        |                                    |\n| Loss of life; impacts on homes and  |                                    |\n| infrastructure; damage to crops     |                                    |\n| and increase flood insecurity       |                                    |\n| Increases in                        |                                    |\n| intense tropical                    |                                    |\n| cyclone activity                    |                                    |\n| Loss of human life and livelihoods; |                                    |\n| impacts to the built environment;   |                                    |\n| salinity impacts on crops           |                                    |\n| Storm surge flooding,               |                                    |\n| landslides, coastal                 |                                    |\n| erosion, saltwater                  |                                    |\n| intrusion in soils and              |                                    |\n| surface water,                      |                                    |\n| deforestation                       |                                    |\n| Rising sea levels                   | Erosion and inundation             |\n| of coastal shorelines and           |                                    |\n| low-lying environments              |                                    |\n| Impacts on the built environment,   |                                    |\n| degradation of water supplies,      |                                    |\n| economic losses; enhanced           |                                    |\n| vulnerability to extreme events     |                                    |\n| Thawing                             |                                    |\n| permafrost                          |                                    |\n| Collapse and retreat of             |                                    |\n| Arctic coastal shorelines           |                                    |\n| Impacts on housing and              |                                    |\n| infrastructure, ecosystems and      |                                    |\n| release of GHGs; acceleration of    |                                    |\n| warming                             |                                    |\n| Ocean warming                       |                                    |\n| andacidification*                   |                                    |\n| Changes in marine                   |                                    |\n| species distribution, loss          |                                    |\n| Loss or movement of fish stocks;    |                                    |\n| loss of tourism, subsistence        |                                    |\nObserved or potential influence on migration\nDecline in pastoral land use, African Sahel; rural to urban migration in Malawi concurrent with increasing frequency and severity of drought since 1970\nHeat wave deaths in India (2015), Europe (2019); impacts of weather extremes in highly vulnerable economies (e.g. Dominican Republic, Jamaica); agricultural land degradation Migration and conflict over water in Burkina Faso (ongoing); migration from droughtstricken lands in Ethiopia, Iraq and Somalia (2019) Flash floods in Nepal (1993, 2020); monsoonal floods and abrupt migration in Bangladesh (1987-1988, 2004, 2007) Migration from Caribbean\nislands in the aftermath of\nHurricanes Irma and Maria (2017) and after Tropical Cyclone Gorky, south-eastern Bangladesh (1991) Overwash and groundwater contamination in Pacific and Indian Ocean atolls (e.g., 5 m King tides, Republic of Marshall Islands, 2014) Relocation of Indigenous communities on the Arctic shoreline Economic losses, large-scale coral bleaching, e.g.  Guam and\nof coral and other calcifying organisms\nlivelihoods, and other economic impacts\nGlobal increase in mean sea level\nInundation of low-lying coastal landforms and small islands\nLoss of freshwater resources; chronic flooding of coastal communities; impacts on the built environment\nDecline in snow, land-based ice, and sea ice\nDecline of dry-season water supplies, affecting sustainability of natural and human systems; effects on dam stability; acceleration of warming\nChanges in the seasonality and volume of meltwater discharge; pluvial flooding and glacial lake outbursts; ecosystem changes\n\n\n* Ocean acidification is not the result of the warming global temperatures, but climate change and ocean acidification are both caused by greenhouse gas emissions, particularly of CO2.\n\nthe Commonwealth of the Mariana Islands (2014-2017), Fiji (2020), Australia (2016) Planned relocation of all or parts of small island nations, such as Tuvalu, Vanuatu, the Cartaret Islands of Papua New Guinea, and the Marshall Islands Increasing flood threats in parts of China, the Andes, and the Indian sub-continent impacts on subsistence hunting"
    },
    {
        "text": "OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE\n\n# Preliminary Assessment: Unidentified Aerial Phenomena\n\n\n25 June 2021\n\n## Scope And Assumptions Scope\n\nThis preliminary report is provided by the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) in response to the provision in Senate Report 116-233, accompanying the Intelligence Authorization Act (IAA) for Fiscal Year 2021, that the DNI, in consultation with the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF), is to submit an intelligence assessment of the threat posed by unidentified aerial phenomena (UAP) and the progress the Department of Defense Unidentified Aerial Phenomena Task Force (UAPTF) has made in understanding this threat. This report provides an overview for policymakers of the challenges associated with characterizing the potential threat posed by UAP while also providing a means to develop relevant processes, policies, technologies, and training for the U.S. military and other U.S.\n\nGovernment (USG) personnel if and when they encounter UAP, so as to enhance the Intelligence Community's (IC) ability to understand the threat.  The Director, UAPTF, is the accountable official for ensuring the timely collection and consolidation of data on UAP.  The dataset described in this report is currently limited primarily to U.S. Government reporting of incidents occurring from November 2004 to March 2021.  Data continues to be collected and analyzed. ODNI prepared this report for the Congressional Intelligence and Armed Services Committees.\nUAPTF and the ODNI National Intelligence Manager for Aviation drafted this report, with input from USD(I&S), DIA, FBI, NRO, NGA, NSA, Air Force, Army, Navy, Navy/ONI, DARPA, FAA, NOAA, NGA, ODNI/NIM-Emerging and Disruptive Technology, ODNI/National Counterintelligence and Security Center, and ODNI/National Intelligence Council.\n\n## Assumptions\n\nVarious forms of sensors that register UAP generally operate correctly and capture enough real data to allow initial assessments, but some UAP may be attributable to sensor anomalies.\n\n## Executive Summary\n\nThe limited amount of high-quality reporting on unidentified aerial phenomena (UAP)\nhampers our ability to draw firm conclusions about the nature or intent of UAP.  The Unidentified Aerial Phenomena Task Force (UAPTF) considered a range of information on UAP\ndescribed in U.S. military and IC (Intelligence Community) reporting, but because the reporting lacked sufficient specificity, ultimately recognized that a unique, tailored reporting process was required to provide sufficient data for analysis of UAP events.\n\n- As a result, the UAPTF concentrated its review on reports that occurred between\n2004 and 2021, the majority of which are a result of this new tailored process to better capture UAP events through formalized reporting.\n- Most of the UAP reported probably do represent physical objects given that a\nmajority of UAP were registered across multiple sensors, to include radar, infrared,\nelectro-optical, weapon seekers, and visual observation.\nIn a limited number of incidents, UAP reportedly appeared to exhibit unusual flight characteristics.  These observations could be the result of sensor errors, spoofing, or observer misperception and require additional rigorous analysis.\nThere are probably multiple types of UAP requiring different explanations based on the range of appearances and behaviors described in the available reporting.  Our analysis of the data supports the construct that if and when individual UAP incidents are resolved they will fall into one of five potential explanatory categories: airborne clutter, natural atmospheric phenomena, USG or U.S. industry developmental programs, foreign adversary systems, and a catchall \"other\" bin.\n\nUAP clearly pose a safety of flight issue and may pose a challenge to U.S. national security. Safety concerns primarily center on aviators contending with an increasingly cluttered air domain.  UAP would also represent a national security challenge if they are foreign adversary collection platforms or provide evidence a potential adversary has developed either a breakthrough or disruptive technology.\n\nConsistent consolidation of reports from across the federal government, standardized reporting, increased collection and analysis, and a streamlined process for screening all such reports against a broad range of relevant USG data will allow for a more sophisticated analysis of UAP that is likely to deepen our understanding.  Some of these steps are resource-intensive and would require additional investment.\n\n\n## Available Reporting Largely Inconclusive Limited Data Leaves Most Uap Unexplained...\n\nLimited data and inconsistency in reporting are key challenges to evaluating UAP.  No standardized reporting mechanism existed until the Navy established one in March 2019.  The Air Force subsequently adopted that mechanism in November 2020, but it remains limited to USG reporting.  The UAPTF regularly heard anecdotally during its research about other observations that occurred but which were never captured in formal or informal reporting by those observers. After carefully considering this information, the UAPTF focused on reports that involved UAP largely witnessed firsthand by military aviators and that were collected from systems we considered to be reliable.  These reports describe incidents that occurred between 2004 and 2021, with the majority coming in the last two years as the new reporting mechanism became better known to the military aviation community.  We were able to identify one reported UAP with high confidence.  In that case, we identified the object as a large, deflating balloon.  The others remain unexplained.\n\n- 144 reports originated from USG sources.  Of these, 80 reports involved observation\nwith multiple sensors.\no Most reports described UAP as objects that interrupted pre-planned training or\nother military activity.\n\n## Uap Collection Challenges\n\nSociocultural stigmas and sensor limitations remain obstacles to collecting data on UAP. Although some technical challengessuch as how to appropriately filter out radar clutter to ensure safety of flight for military and civilian aircraftare longstanding in the aviation community, while others are unique to the UAP problem set.\n\n- Narratives from aviators in the operational community and analysts from the military\nand IC describe disparagement associated with observing  UAP, reporting it, or attempting to discuss it with colleagues.  Although the effects of these stigmas have lessened as senior members of the scientific, policy, military, and intelligence communities engage on the topic seriously in public, reputational risk may keep many observers silent, complicating scientific pursuit of the topic.\n- The sensors mounted on U.S. military platforms are typically designed to fulfill\nspecific missions.  As a result, those sensors are not generally suited for identifying UAP.\n- Sensor vantage points and the numbers of sensors concurrently observing an object\nplay substantial roles in distinguishing UAP from known objects and determining whether a UAP demonstrates breakthrough aerospace capabilities.  Optical sensors have the benefit of providing some insight into relative size, shape, and structure. Radiofrequency sensors provide more accurate velocity and range information.\n\n\n## But Some Potential Patterns Do Emerge\n\nAlthough there was wide variability in the reports and the dataset is currently too limited to allow for detailed trend or pattern analysis, there was some clustering of UAP observations regarding shape, size, and, particularly, propulsion.  UAP sightings also tended to cluster around U.S. training and testing grounds, but we assess that this may result from a collection bias as a result of focused attention, greater numbers of latest-generation sensors operating in those areas, unit expectations, and guidance to report anomalies.\nAnd a Handful of UAP Appear to Demonstrate Advanced Technology In 18 incidents, described in 21 reports, observers reported unusual UAP movement patterns or flight characteristics.\nSome UAP appeared to remain stationary in winds aloft, move against the wind, maneuver abruptly, or move at considerable speed, without discernable means of propulsion.  In a small number of cases, military aircraft systems processed radio frequency (RF) energy associated with UAP sightings.\n\nThe UAPTF holds a small amount of data that appear to show UAP demonstrating acceleration or a degree of signature management.  Additional rigorous analysis are necessary by multiple teams or groups of technical experts to determine the nature and validity of these data.  We are conducting further analysis to determine if breakthrough technologies were demonstrated.\n\n## Uap Probably Lack A Single Explanation\n\nThe UAP documented in this limited dataset demonstrate an array of aerial behaviors, reinforcing the possibility there are multiple types of UAP requiring different explanations.  Our analysis of the data supports the construct that if and when individual UAP incidents are resolved they will fall into one of five potential explanatory categories:  airborne clutter, natural atmospheric phenomena, USG or industry developmental programs, foreign adversary systems, and a catchall \"other\" bin.  With the exception of the one instance where we determined with high confidence that the reported UAP was airborne clutter, specifically a deflating balloon, we currently lack sufficient information in our dataset to attribute incidents to specific explanations. Airborne Clutter: These objects include birds, balloons, recreational unmanned aerial vehicles\n(UAV), or airborne debris like plastic bags that muddle a scene and affect an operator's ability to identify true targets, such as enemy aircraft.\nNatural Atmospheric Phenomena: Natural atmospheric phenomena includes ice crystals, moisture, and thermal fluctuations that may register on some infrared and radar systems. USG or Industry Developmental Programs: Some UAP observations could be attributable to developments and classified programs by U.S. entities.  We were unable to confirm, however, that these systems accounted for any of the UAP reports we collected. Foreign Adversary Systems: Some UAP may be technologies deployed by China, Russia, another nation, or a non-governmental entity.\n\nOther: Although most of the UAP described in our dataset probably remain unidentified due to limited data or challenges to collection processing or analysis, we may require additional scientific knowledge to successfully collect on, analyze and characterize some of them.  We would group such objects in this category pending scientific advances that allowed us to better understand them.  The UAPTF intends to focus additional analysis on the small number of cases where a UAP appeared to display unusual flight characteristics or signature management.\n\n## Uap Threaten Flight Safety And, Possibly, National Security\n\nUAP pose a hazard to safety of flight and could pose a broader danger if some instances represent sophisticated collection against U.S. military activities by a foreign government or demonstrate a breakthrough aerospace technology by a potential adversary.\n\n## Ongoing Airspace Concerns\n\nWhen aviators encounter safety hazards, they are required to report these concerns.  Depending on the location, volume, and behavior of hazards during incursions on ranges, pilots may cease their tests and/or training and land their aircraft, which has a deterrent effect on reporting.\n\n-\nThe UAPTF has 11 reports of documented instances in which pilots reported near\nmisses with a UAP.\n\n## Potential National Security Challenges\n\nWe currently lack data to indicate any UAP are part of a foreign collection program or indicative of a major technological advancement by a potential adversary.  We continue to monitor for evidence of such programs given the counter intelligence challenge they would pose, particularly as some UAP have been detected near military facilities or by aircraft carrying the USG's most advanced sensor systems.\n\n## Explaining Uap Will Require Analytic, Collection And Resource Investment Standardize The Reporting, Consolidate The Data, And Deepen The Analysis\n\nIn line with the provisions of Senate Report 116-233, accompanying the IAA for FY 2021, the UAPTF's long-term goal is to widen the scope of its work to include additional UAP events documented by a broader swath of USG personnel and technical systems in its analysis.  As the dataset increases, the UAPTF's ability to employ data analytics to detect trends will also improve.  The initial focus will be to employ artificial intelligence/machine learning algorithms to cluster and recognize similarities and patterns in features of the data points.  As the database accumulates information from known aerial objects such as weather balloons, high-altitude or super-pressure balloons, and wildlife, machine learning can add efficiency by pre-assessing UAP reports to see if those records match similar events already in the database.\n\n- The UAPTF has begun to develop interagency analytical and processing workflows\nto ensure both collection and analysis will be well informed and coordinated.\nThe majority of UAP data is from U.S. Navy reporting, but efforts are underway to standardize incident reporting across U.S. military services and other government agencies to ensure all relevant data is captured with respect to particular incidents and any U.S. activities that might be relevant.  The UAPTF is currently working to acquire additional reporting, including from the U.S. Air Force (USAF), and has begun receiving data from the Federal Aviation Administration\n(FAA).\n\n- Although USAF data collection has been limited historically the USAF began a sixmonth pilot program in November 2020 to collect in the most likely areas to encounter UAP and is evaluating how to normalize future collection, reporting, and analysis across the entire Air Force.\n- The FAA captures data related to UAP during the normal course of managing air\ntraffic operations.  The FAA generally ingests this data when pilots and other airspace users report unusual or unexpected events to the FAA's Air Traffic Organization.\n- In addition, the FAA continuously monitors its systems for anomalies, generating\nadditional information that may be of use to the UAPTF.  The FAA is able to isolate data of interest to the UAPTF and make it available.  The FAA has a robust and effective outreach program that can help the UAPTF reach members of the aviation community to highlight the importance of reporting UAP.\n\n## Expand Collection\n\nThe UAPTF is looking for novel ways to increase collection of UAP cluster areas when U.S. forces are not present as a way to baseline \"standard\" UAP activity and mitigate the collection bias in the dataset.  One proposal is to use advanced algorithms to search historical data captured and stored by radars.  The UAPTF also plans to update its current interagency UAP collection strategy in order bring to bear relevant collection platforms and methods from the DoD and the IC.\n\n## Increase Investment In Research And Development\n\nThe UAPTF has indicated that additional funding for research and development could further the future study of the topics laid out in this report.  Such investments should be guided by a UAP Collection Strategy, UAP R&D Technical Roadmap, and a UAP Program Plan.\n\n## Appendix A - Definition Of Key Terms\n\nThis report and UAPTF databases use the following defining terms: Unidentified Aerial Phenomena (UAP): Airborne objects not immediately identifiable.  The acronym UAP represents the broadest category of airborne objects reviewed for analysis. UAP Event: A holistic description of an occurrence during which a pilot or aircrew witnessed (or detected) a UAP. UAP Incident: A specific part of the event.\n\nUAP Report: Documentation of a UAP event, to include verified chains of custody and basic information such as the time, date, location, and description of the UAP.  UAP reports include Range Fouler1 reports and other reporting.\n\n\n## Appendix B - Senate Report Accompanying The Intelligence Authorization Act For Fiscal Year 2021\n\nSenate Report 116-233, accompanying the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2021, provides that the DNI, in consultation with the SECDEF and other relevant heads of USG\nAgencies, is to submit an intelligence assessment of the threat posed by UAP and the progress the UAPTF has made to understand this threat. The Senate Report specifically requested that the report include:\n\n1. A detailed analysis of UAP data and intelligence reporting collected or held by the\nOffice of Naval Intelligence, including data and intelligence reporting held by the UAPTF;\n2. A detailed analysis of unidentified phenomena data collected by:\na. Geospatial Intelligence;\nb. Signals Intelligence; c. Human Intelligence; and d. Measurement and Signatures Intelligence\n3. A detailed analysis of data of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, which was derived\nfrom investigations of intrusions of UAP data over restricted U.S. airspace;\n4. A detailed description of an interagency process for ensuring timely data collection\nand centralized analysis of all UAP reporting for the Federal Government, regardless of which service or agency acquired the information;\n5. Identification of an official accountable for the process described in paragraph 4; 6. Identification of potential aerospace or other threats posed by the UAP to national\nsecurity, and an assessment of whether this UAP activity may be attributed to one or more foreign adversaries;\n7. Identification of any incidents or patterns that indicate a potential adversary, have\nachieved breakthrough aerospace capabilities that could put U.S. strategic or conventional forces at risk; and\n8. Recommendations regarding increased collection of data, enhanced research and\ndevelopment, additional funding, and other resources."
    },
    {
        "text": "# Russian Robotics: A Look At Definitions, Principles, Uses, And Other Trends\n\nSponsor: US Army Futures and\nConcepts Center\nDept. No.: N213\nContract No.: W56KGU-18-D-\n0004\nProject No.: 0721A150-MD\n\nThe views expressed in this\ndocument are those of the\nauthor and do not reflect the\nofficial policy or position of\nMITRE, the Department of\nDefense, or the US\ngovernment.\n\nApproved for Public Release,\nDistribution Unlimited. Public\nRelease Case Number 21-\n0503.\n\n\nAuthor: Timothy Thomas\n\nFebruary 2021\n\n 2021 The MITRE Corporation. All rights reserved. McLean, VA\n\n\n## Introduction\n\nRobots have been used in combat in one form or another since at least World War II, and they have also seen use in local conflicts of the last century. However, these robotic devices were simpler in form than those of today. Their integration with other devices was simply not possible. Now the paradigm has changed. The current robotization of combat operations involves devices that are powered with digital and artificial intelligence (AI) command and control devices. With the addition of such technologies, new ways to use robotics have appeared, such as the integrated use of robotics with nonlethal weapons, along with new ways to execute (and potentially control) missions autonomously. Initially the special and essential attribute for using robots was their ability to help minimize end strength personnel losses in combat, which continues to motivate developments. However, today robotic devices are being outfitted with kinetic components that can destroy an opponent's force from air, land, and sea. And, as a closer examination of their capabilities has revealed, robots may be becoming so advanced and autonomous that humans are losing command and control over them. Russia's military has developed numerous robotic capabilities, to include the following:\ncombat vehicle fire systems; multiple-launch rocket systems; radiological reconnaissance; logistic transport; use in space; crewless ships and submarines; and robotic swarms and group interactions, among many others. Military leaders have ascertained that there are mechanisms in place to ensure control over these assets which are to be used only in limited situations. Russian plans to use robotics in numerous operations may indicate, however, that their use may not be as limited as predicted. In the military sphere, where quickly seeking advantage takes center stage to outdo opponents.\nThe following summary first offers several ways that Russian theorists have defined a robot, starting in 1991. Second, the analysis compares Russian and U.S. approaches to employing robotics (from a Russian perspective) as well as tasks and principles of their use. Third, some of the uses of robotics in Russia are detailed, focusing on descriptions in military periodicalsin urban environments, in conjunction with engineer support, in unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) use, with artillery, and their use in Syria. Fourth, legal and organizational issues of contention are examined that affect robotic use worldwide and regarding Russia. Fifth, the numerous problem areas are covered that Russia has encountered in its development of robotic capabilities, followed by a few conclusions. There are two appendixes. Appendix One lists some robotic employment principles and Appendix Two offers some photos of robots under development in Russia along with their operating parameters (and several not shown in the photographs). Russian Definitions of Robots\nRussian military authors understand that finding the correct terminology for a robot is difficult, since technology keeps evolving and changing robotic capabilities. A toy radio-controlled car, a batch-produced model drone, and even a smart missile are all sometimes described as robots.\n\nIt would be rational, in the opinion of one group of authors, to \"refer to a system with artificial intelligence possessing a high or total level of autonomy (independence) from a human as a robot.\"0F1 There have been a few military definitions of a robot. In 1991, for example, Colonel A.\n\nA. Korabelnikov stated that robots would be classified by equipment type: combat, combat support, special-technical support, and logistic support robots. He offered the following definition: It would appear that the military robot represents a set (system) of military equipment outfitted with information-measurement and actuation systems and an automatic control device intended for performing combat missions or comprehensive support missions both with man's direct involvement as well as with a wired-in instruction.1F2 An expanded discussion of the definition of a robot took place in a 2016 article in Russia's Independent Military *Review,* which included three earlier definitions. First, the article offered a definition from the *1983 Military Encyclopedic Dictionary*, which defined a robot as follows:\n\nAutomatic system (machine) equipped with sensors which receive information from the environment, and with actuating mechanisms, is capable, with the aid of a control unit, of performing in a purposeful manner under changing situations. A\ncharacteristic feature of robots is the capability partially or entirely to perform the functions of a human operator. Robots are employed in conditions of relative inaccessibility, in environments which are dangerous or harmful to man, etc.\n\nIndustrial robotsautomated manipulatorsare the most common.2F3\n\n\nSecond, the 1989 *Polytechnic Dictionary* stated that \"A robot is a machine with anthropomorphic (humanlike) behavior that partially or fully performs human functions in its interaction with the surrounding world.\"3F4 The newspaper article noted that first-generation robots are controlled devices and the most widespread. Second-generation systems are semi-autonomous devices, while the transition to third-generation combat robots, autonomous devices, requires selflearning systems that involve artificial intelligence with advanced technologies of navigation, visual identification, weaponry, independent power sources, camouflage, and other technologies.4F5\nA third definition, from the 1995 *Interpretive Dictionary of the Russian Language*, stated that \"A\nrobot is an automation carrying out actions similar to human actions.\"5F6\n\nIn 2015, Igor Denisov, deputy general director of the Advanced Research Foundation, noted that robots are \"remote-controlled platforms and systems that make decisions automatically\n\nand systems that make decisions in conditions of less than full knowledge of the environment.\"6F7\nAn ideal robot is a totally autonomous system that thinks like a person and resolves tasks like a person, but right now it is hard to describe a military system like that. They currently are systems that operate under human control, either directly or by functions that acquire decisions from automated systems.7F8 But robots are clearly under development to become more autonomous in Russia. In an article in Russia's *Army Journal* in 2017, author A. Kalistratov, in an article titled \"Robots! Into Battle!\" noted that \"A military robot (military robotic asset) is an automated device that replaces a human in hostilities to preserve life or to operate in conditions beyond human capabilities, for military purposes: reconnaissance, doing battle, mine clearing, and so on.\"8F9 Another 2017 article in the same journal defined a robot as \"a mechanized complex capable of assimilating information from its environment and on the basis of that performing defined actions either autonomously or with an operator at a control panel.\"9F10 It noted that a robot is composed of systems such as communication devices, sensors that assimilate and process information on the environment, control devices, and drives and propulsion mechanisms of various types. Robots incorporate elements of artificial intelligence and provide a degree of autonomy. It is expected that by 2025\nthe proportion of robots in the army's weaponry and hardware structure should reach 30 percent.10F11 Finally, the **most recent definition of a robot** was found in a 2019 article in Military Thought that stated it is:\n\n\nA complex technical system with artificial intelligence, which functions independently of a human being and which can execute any of a set of embedded functions, according to an algorithm (program) created by this system, considering\nthe current condition of the system and the external environment.11F12\n Other fields of interest for the development of robots are cybernetics, automated control systems, nanotechnologies, bionics, brain studies, and so on. It is expected that autonomous humanoid robots will be available somewhere in the 2020s-2030s.12F13 Russian Robotics: Important Tasks and Principles Russian ground force analysts stated in 2019 that the nation's robotic force must not simply duplicate weapons that already exist but rather supplement them with new functions. For these\n\nauthors, the overriding priority was deciding what new functions to develop. The U.S. use of robotics, they note, involves five tasks: increasing the situational awareness of the human operator; reducing his load; improving logistics; optimizing maneuver on the battlefield; and providing protection and fire support. While all these areas are important, the analysts singled out as Russia's most important task \"increasing the role and improving the robotization of equipment, first and foremost, on-board fire resources,\" which is reflected in the creation of robotic strike complexesVikhr, Uran-9, Soratnik, Nerekhta, and Platforma-M.13F14 In another 2019 article, different analysts discussed the formation of new (in make-up and capabilities) specialized assault subunits using robotic strike complexes (RTK). Functional systems of design were focused on information, support, control, destruction, mobility, protection, and support subsystems. After identifying tasks and goals for each, uncertainties were identified\n(conditions of employment, internal linkages, etc.), operational-tactical requirements developed, and assignments made to specific weapon systems. The projected level of technological development for the forecasted period must be taken into consideration as well. Military-economic assessments for alternative variants are made based on continued research. The authors ended their article noting the following:\nThe creation of specialized assault subunits based on models of weapons and military equipment that have fundamentally new integration capabilities necessitates the development of new approaches to forming their weapons system that will ensure flexibility of employment, stability against enemy effects, and autonomy when executing combat tasks.\"14F15 The last three tasks are expanded below. Flexibility of employment P. A. Dul'nev and V. V. Korablin, also writing in 2019, wrote on the capabilities of robotic strike complexes. Military-grade robotic complexes, in their opinion, reduce losses and increase the effectiveness for resolving tasks and refurbishing outdated weapons. Increasing the strike capabilities of these RTK systems was emphasized. The Uran-9 is designed to destroy mobile and immobile targets, such as buildings and installations. Its modular structure includes 23- and 30-\nmm automatic guns, the 7.62-mm Kalashnikov tank machine gun, and an antitank missile system. The Soratnik strike RTK conducts reconnaissance and patrolling of important facilities. It uses interchangeable weapons, such as automatic grenade launchers, heavy machine guns, and the\n\"Kornet\" guided missile.15F16 The Vikhr strike RTK is designated for fire support during urban and reconnaissance operations and the destruction of important structures or lightly armored targets. It can issue targeting data for aviation and artillery and other strike RTKs. Its capabilities are determined by different combat modules: the Bumerang-BM that uses the 30-mm 2A42 cannon, RKTM coaxial tank machine guns (RKTM), and the Kornet antitank system; smaller dimension modules (perhaps the BMP-3) that carry two machine guns (12.7-mm and 7.62-mm) and an automatic grenade launcher; and the Au-220M \"Baikal\" combat module with a 57-mm automatic cannon.16F17  One source noted that it is hard for an opponent to identify the Vikhr as a robotic device when it is among other military vehicles, such as traveling in a column. The device has four quadcopter UAVs that, one source noted, could be used for \"kamikaze\" attacks on high-value targets.17F18 A lighter strike RTK is the Nerekhta multifunctional modular RTK, a universal robotic platform on a tracked chassis. It has three variants, the fire support RTK (remote control 12.7-mm KORD machine gun or 7.62-mm Kalashnikov RKTM); reconnaissance RTK with artillery module; and RTK with a transport platform.18F19 Two final combat considerations are the Platforma-M RTK and Unikum systems. The former is designed for visual and technical reconnaissance, the detection and destruction of enemy equipment, and fire support of units involved in reconnaissance and patrolling. Weapons include a 7.62-mm RKTM and four RPG-26 antitank grenade launchers. These and other technical tactical requirements are determined by the fire tasks required, which include enumerating the types and nature of targets designated for destruction; determination of the range of destruction; and a determination of the totality of employment conditions. A problem task is determining when to open fire. Currently (2019) the decision to open fire is trusted only to a human who uses a remotecontrol method.19F20 The Unicum is a robotic group control system oriented on the mass employment of machines. For example, Unikum can control ten robotic complexes simultaneously. It can assign roles within a grouping, control a grouping, independently send robots to the most favorable positions, and search for a target. An operator is responsible for the attack of detected targets.20F21 Stability against enemy effects In 2020, Russian military analysts noted that soon onboard artificial intelligence (AI) will be responsible for protecting ground combat systems from interference. Without protection, ground based robotic complexes (NRTK) cannot search, detect, and identify targets. Some of the information effects directed against NRTK include the placement of malware in software systems ahead of a robot's use; contaminating equipment with computer viruses; and generating false information commands, such as robot self-destruction ones.21F22 To control such eventualities Russia is searching for an integrated protection system that would include five systems: intelligence and information exchange; weapons; protection; support; and mobility systems.22F23 Protection systems must be responsive and possess anticipatory reaction capabilities, so that unbalanced situations are quickly identified and proper decisions made.23F24 The authors concluded noting that \"The idea of this approach provides protection control systems with the functional capabilities of a crew.\"\nImplementation rests with AI technology to use only resources needed for a specific situation;\nobtain new protection methods; and transfer experiences to other robotic devices. The effectiveness of an integrated protection system may not depend as much on a specific level of protection as on the \"capability of restructuring, adapting to changing conditions, and selforganization.\"\n24F25\n\n## Autonomy When Executing Combat Tasks\n\nFull autonomy appears to be a goal but not a current capability of Russian robotics. For now, just the integration of crew and robotic capabilities appears to be the norm. Russian military analyst S. A. Sychev, who writes often on robotic issues, noted in 2019 that the employment of military robotic systems includes four principles: the principle of functional inequality and imbalance; the principle of structural and functional reconfiguration; the principle of functional integration; and the principle of synchronization of results.25F26 Each is discussed at Appendix One.\n\n\nIt appears that these four principles are to be used to confront the correlation of the structure and functions of an opposing side's tasks and the situational context under consideration. Both sides are now using robotics and traditional force components. These principles help to create an understanding of how to develop organizational structures and determine the best methods for RTK employment. Combined arms formations equipped with both crew and robotic models of weapons and equipment are thus creating combat systems with new properties. Combat formations can function better in uncertain environments that have not been mapped with a crew and RTK\ncombination, since they offer both combat and functional stability.26F27 The authors of this 2019 article noted, in regard to the classification of RTKs, that an RTK's\n\"intellectualization\" must be considered, since robotic devices (complexes, systems) are technical systems with elements of artificial intelligence. They function independently of humans and use algorithms to conduct functions. They take into consideration the system's current state and the external environment. Three varieties of RTK were noted: programmed, adaptive, and intelligent.\n\nThe first operates according to a strict program assigned beforehand. The second is capable of selfadjustment under changing conditions. Some situational control is foreseen based on a set of known situations. The third is capable of self-organization of targeted actions under real combat conditions. The human's role is one of passive control and perhaps decision-making about the conduct of operations.27F28 The \"effectiveness\" of a robot often depends on a combination of the time for resolving a fire task and on the probability of a hit or target destruction, among other factors.28F29 Thus, a typical RTK represents an aggregate of elements and, depending on the algorithm and other factors noted above, can perform final reconnaissance of targets; assessment of results of weapon employment; search and surveillance missions; patrols; communication and electronic intelligence collection; engineer reconnaissance of terrain; radiological reconnaissance; and weather reconnaissance, among other missions. Specific Russian Robotic Use Various branches of Russia's Armed Forces are employing robotic equipment. This section begins with two schematics from a 2017 Russian article in the journal Armeyskiy Sbornik (Army Journal). The first schematic is of a potential separate robotic battalion of a combined-arms formation and a potential separate army regiment of robotic assets. The second schematic is a potential role for a separate army regiment of combat robots in a defensive operation. That section is followed with examinations of Russian robotic use in urban operations, engineer and artillery applications, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), unmanned underwater vehicles (UUV), and robotic uses in Syria. The section concludes with a variety of some specific robotic applications, such as their use as exoskeletons. 2017 Article in Armeyskiy Sbornik Author A. Kalistratov wrote that for military purposes robots conduct reconnaissance, go into battle, perform mine clearing, and so on. They must also have artificial intelligence or substantial elements of it as part of the robotic complex. Kalistratov described several types of robots (listed in Appendix Two) and included in his article a proposed RTK organization at the battalion and regimental levels (figure 10 below). These units could be used as part of a covering force, to cover gaps in defensive positions, to block assaults, act as a reserve, prevent in-depth breakthroughs, secure freedom of maneuver, and offer use as an outer or inner encirclement element. Also listed was a schematic of a proposed RTK defense, figure 11, also attached.29F30\nIn each:\n1 combat vehicle,1 command vehicle, 2 trucks Total 36 combat robot kits in regt.\n\nFigure 11. Possible place and role of separate army regiment of combat robots in defensive operation\n(option)\nvoyska prikrytiya = covering force\nmsb = motorized rifle battalion\noap brts = separate robot regiment\nomsbr = separate motorized rifle brigade\nAAG, AGR = artillery, artillery group\nombr = separate mechanized brigade\nrbr = missile brigade\nPTRez = (?antitank reserves)\nOVRez = (?mineclearing reserves)\nPDRez = (?airborne assault reserves)\nArmeyskiy tyl = army rear\n\n\n\n## Robotic Use In Urban Operations\n\nIn 2017, P. A. Dul'nev discussed robotic use in urban operations in detail in an article for the *Journal of the Academy of Military Science*. Urban operations, he pointed out, are conducted at close quarters on several levels simultaneously (streets and squares, different floors of buildings, on rooftops, and underground). They lack a continuous front, with fighting turned into a series of isolated battles in small areas making forces vulnerable and requiring more security.30F31 Experience gained from the fighting in Syria has helped advance Russia's use of robots in urban operations. To capture urban structures, where the greatest loss of personnel occurs, robotic assault formations are important. RTKs formed into assault \"detachments\" are battalion sized, while assault \"groups\" are company sized. A detachment usually contains 2-3 assault groups, a reserve, a covering group, a fire support group, and an obstacle-clearing group (and on occasion a demolition group). Assault groups may include the following subgroups: penetration, fire support, ground reconnaissance-fire, air reconnaissance-fire, long-range air reconnaissance, command and control, logistics, and a reserve.31F32 As a result, the following types of RTKs need to be developed in Dul'nev's opinion:\n\n- Heavy RTK platforms: with tank-type armor protection to destroy highly\nprotected enemy objectives and with bulldozer attachments to overcome mixed minefields.\n- Medium RTK platforms: with BMP-type protection to cover flanks and hold\ncaptured regions as well as to provide fire support for heavy RTKs.\n- Light RTK platform 1: with a weight up to 1000 kilograms, it has \"anti-small\narms\" protection and can destroy unarmored equipment and defend command\nposts.\n- Light RTK platform 2: with a weight up to 300 kilograms, it offers anti-shrapnel\nprotection and can conduct audio-video reconnaissance of the enemy and\nterrain.\n- RTK transport platforms: with a weight up to 100 kilograms, it can support\noperations by assault subunits.\n- Multi-copter and airplane-type reconnaissance and recce-strike UAVs: they are\ndesignated to conduct reconnaissance and destroy small targets.32F33\n\n##\n\nAn RTK-assisted attack would unfold with a recce-fire support subgroup of light RTKs, an air recce-strike group to destroy enemy fire resources (mortars, heavy machine guns, etc.), and a long-range reconnaissance group of UAVs for surveillance. Artillery fire would cover the advance of a penetration subgroup of heavy RTKs that conduct direct fire against opponents. RTKs would create passages through obstacles, and a fire support subgroup of medium and light RTKs would perform three missions: cover the penetration subgroup's actions; cover the advance of remote-controlled platforms advancing toward targets with explosives; and sweep the objective.33F34\n\nProblems remain. Reconnaissance RTKs, the light platform 2, multi-copter/airplane-types, and recce-strike UAVs cannot detect underground lines of communication or identify in detail engineer obstacles, most importantly, mixed minefields. Further, cooperation among subgroups is still difficult since each RTK has a control system developed under a specific type of model. General requirements that still need work include the following:\n\n\n- Maximum conformity, modularity, compatibility, and integration capability\ninto existing and future structures\n- Development of unified, jam-free communication channels and data\ntransmission capabilities\n- Integration into a unified system of tactical-level command and control, and\noutfitting RTKs with combat information control systems and \"friend-foe\"\nequipment\n- Information exchange capabilities among RTKs and the ability to maintain\nstability against unsanctioned software effects from an enemy force.\n- Provisions for the electromagnetic compatibility of military RTKs with other\nradiating objects, such as radio-electronic warfare resources.34F35\n\nAnother source, describing personnel working with minimal robotic assistance, noted that, initial positions are taken up some 200 meters from a building that is to be taken, and robotic devices are used for reconnaissance, detection, and even the engagement of enemy forces. Once a building is taken, a perimeter defense is organized to ensure any counterattack would not work. Nighttime seizures of buildings are more difficult. It was stressed that the first objectives to be seized are those that might entail the disruption of the entire enemy defensive system.35F36 Once underway, personnel are told to avoid movements along streets, where only fighting vehicles should advance. The authors stated that Article 230 of the *Ground Field Manual Part II*\nshould be changed to reflect the following composition of an assault team:\n\n- 3 motorized rifle (airborne, air assault) platoons - 1 tank platoon - 1 flamethrower squad (three flamethrower operators) - 1 ZSU (self-propelled air defense mount, Shilka or Tunguska) - 1 engineer obstacle-clearing vehicle\n- 1 UR 77 (mine clearing vehicle)\n- 1 combat engineer platoon - 1 medical team (physician and corpsmen)\n- 1 technical support squad36F37\n\nAnother robotic combat vehicle under development is the Marker, which can provide reconnaissance and the destruction of an enemy target. It would be equipped with kamikaze drones, a rocket launcher, and machine gun.37F38 Its modular design allows it to function as a combat vehicle, infantry support unit, or drone. It is designed to be fully autonomous, with the operator only providing target designation. The robot decides how to move to the target based on terrain type and obstacles to overcome and then selects the optimal type of weaponry. The Marker's open architecture offers developers the opportunity to test their own robotic components in it.38F39 If used in swarms, their integrated use with UAVs and other weaponry would test any defense. Engineer Use of Robots in Operations: Obstacle-Clearing and Reconnaissance Engineers robotics are used in a variety of operations, but especially during assaults on urban terrain. It is their job to clear obstacles and ensure troop movement. Assault engineering robots are usually based on a tracked chassis and equipped with a 12.7 mm machine gun and grenade launcher. Main operating equipment includes excavating equipment and either a multipurpose bucket or hydraulic hammer.39F40 These robots are maneuvered from mobile control points or a portable remote-control panel. They can use explosives or conduct mechanical breaching of brickwork or concrete obstacles. Robotic missions can be performed under fire and in conjunction with armored and motorized infantry units in the main attack. They get into position when preparatory fire begins, and a technical support element advances with required support materials. Breaches are marked. Mobile control points move behind the robots to advance mission fulfillment. Robots are initially attached to the assault party and if that advance slows, then they are attached to the assault breaching party. The robot moves behind tanks and fighting vehicles and moves in front when the latter confront obstacles.40F41 For obstacles up to 1.5 meters high, bulldozer equipment is used. For obstacles over 1.5 meters high, excavator equipment with a multipurpose bucket is used along with bulldozer equipment. For strong building structures, hydraulic hammers are used. A pavement breaker is used against extra strong material (steel load beams, bars, etc.).\n\nOne other piece of equipment is called haulage gear, where a thimble hook for hauling removes obstacles with a winch. Usually, one robot is assigned to each assault party.41F42 Another Russian article on engineer trends noted ways to improve ground complexes, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), and unmanned underwater vehicles (UUV). Ground complexes should develop ways to survey road conditions and the type of obstacles before them; ways to develop module complexes capable of being assembled for carrying out certain tasks; and ways to develop self-propelled control systems, such as self-moving mines that can move about the area and exchange information with other mines.42F43\n\nUAVs are tasked to estimate if terrain is passible so that robotic routes can be planned; to uncover mine fields and neutralize explosive items along troop movement routes; and to conduct mine-laying with precision. Work is required on increasing flight distances and time in the air, countering adversary electronic warfare capabilities, improving load-carrying capacity, and improving UAV swarm tactics.43F44 UUVs are used to reconnoiter water obstacles to be negotiated and to offer a 3D profile of the bottom of an underwater crossing, to include installing markers for clearing mines and other issues.44F45 The following efficiency factors were noted in relation to the use of robotics (in general):\n\n\n- Up to 50 percent of engineering support will be accomplished with robotic\nassistance\n- Robotics will raise the efficiency of dangerous ground missions by 1.6 to 1.8\ntimes and reduce casualties among personnel by 30-35 percent\n- UUVs will improve unit efficiency by 25 to 35 percent when conducting\nreconnaissance.45F46\n\n## Uav Use\n\nRussia classifies UAVs as robotic devices that have civilian and military uses. For civilians, UAVs help with land registry, trips to a bank or store, examining pipeline damage, delivering pharmaceutical drugs to remote populated areas, and disposing of nuclear waste, with the latter in the hands of FEDOR anthropomorphic robots. Flight altitudes and the command and control of UAVs in areas of aircraft congestion must be sorted out. Oleg Martyanov, the Head of the National Robotics Technology and Base Elements Development Center, noted that the Taiga Project UAV work, done in cooperation with the Aeronet UAV Developers Association and Tomsk Oblast Administration, is analyzing the market for oil customers such as Gazprom, Lukoil, and Rosneft, and for banking and search and rescue organizations such as Rosseti, the Ministry of Extraordinary Situations, Sberbank, and others.46F47\nIn the military, a 2017 report noted that micro-robots and miniature drones will be equipped with Reset digital communications and video transmission systems. This 30-gram microchip provides secure radio channels with high throughput. It can transmit at distances up to 400 meters in urban environments and up to 1 kilometer in woodlands. Reportedly the system's signal cannot be silenced by means of electronic warfare or be hacked, as signals are encrypted using an algorithm that changes frequency ranges and alters the radiation patterns on antennas.47F48\nA 2018 report noted that UAVs and ground-based robots are replacing forward air controllers. The AI-equipped UAV will guide aircraft with precision based on the combined use of four factors: a laser rangefinder, a high-resolution video camera, a thermal imager, and a navigation system. The robot determines the type of target in front of it and the AI determines the type of weapon to use. It has a friend and foe system as well. Data will be transmitted directly to a command post or to an airplane.48F49 Another 2018 report noted that Russia is developing a solarpowered UAV (no name provided) with a wingspan of 50 meters, or nearly the length of Russia's White Swan Tu-160 bomber. The increased lift will enable it to increase its payload fivefold. It will cruise at altitudes of up to 30 kilometers and be capable of flying for an unlimited time and over unlimited distances. It can remain over a designated point in the stratosphere for months and thus is an excellent alternative to satellites. Uses for this UAV include monitoring the Earth's surface and the condition of pipelines, relaying communication signals, and monitoring space objects. Problems that remain include creating large-capacity batteries that recharge in daytime and are used at night. Energy-efficient solar panels are needed as well.49F50\nA report on adversary drone swarms listed concerns of some Russian analysts. Small or miniature UAVs could produce substantial damage, since they could conduct reconnaissance rather effectively, vector precision-guided munitions to important targets, and attack targets themselves. Or, acting as decoys, they could \"uncover\" air defense systems, enabling electronic warfare systems to scan the frequencies on which radars and C2 systems operate. If frequencies are discovered, false beacons or dummy frequencies could be inserted into an opponent's systems.50F51\nIn 2019, an important interview on UAVs involved Vitaly Lopota, leader of the Sector for Programs on Robotics Engineering at the ERA Military Innovation Technopolis. Initially he discussed an aerobot, a research platform on a quadrocopter multi-rotor UAV that is equipped with artificial vision and powerful on-board computer systems. The aerobot is a flying laboratory designed to research high-speed operations in various degraded conditions (absence of auxiliary navigation signals or global navigation GPS systems, limited optical visibility, limited space due to forests, residential facilities, etc.). Interest in multi-copters was due to their maneuverability at low speeds, hover capability, and ability to take off and land vertically.51F52 Another innovative option is to place both optical devices and multifunctional software-supported radar stations (RLS) on UAVs and land-based robots. Optics are not able to distinguish enemy positions concealed in buildings or behind natural obstacles or \"see things\" or \"discern\" objects through fog. The desired range for RLS is 5 to 8 kilometers.52F53\nExperience demonstrates that the optimum altitude for video camera and thermal imaging for long-range UAVs is up to 300 meters and for short-range UAVs up to 1,000 meters. A UAV target run should be made from the direction of the sun. UAVs should be launched from the forward edge into friendly rear territory to hide its launch position. When it gains altitude it should be turned toward the enemy. A high degree of reconnaissance, communications, and command and control assets is needed. Electro-optical systems enable detection and surveillance up to 6-8 kilometers.53F54  UAV tasks include not only reconnaissance and target designation but also control over the results of troop actions, communication retransmission, and other uses.54F55 Drone strike operations were rehearsed in 2019 and reported in the paper *Izvestiya.* The order of attacks on adversary targets were, first, headquarters and communications centers, and then transport infrastructure, the approach of reserves, and frontline air defense systems. UAVs are deployed in attack groups (numbers vary and include Granat, Zastava, Eleron, Orlan [tested in Syria], and Leyer UAVs), with one of the lead vehicles conducting visual reconnaissance at 1-1.5\nkilometers above the ground, followed by a second one carrying the Leyer-3 radio electronic warfare assets to suppress enemy ground communication equipment, and closing with a third UAV that relays information to the base from a height of 4.5 to 5 kilometers.55F56\nThe Russian Forpost UAV surpasses the Orlan in reconnaissance capability with a flight range that exceeds 250 kilometers to the Orlan's 100 kilometers. It is fitted with two cameras, one being infra-red that allows for around the clock use. A Forpost-M version is undergoing testing that will carry precision-guided bombs with a load capacity in excess of 100 kilograms.56F57 The Forpost-M, one 2018 report noted, has a \"Russian-made strapdown inertial navigation system that allows the drone to fly without the use of GLONASS or GPS global systems,\" which offers advantages when flying in enemy air defense and electronic warfare sectors. It can reach speeds of more than 200 kilometers per hour and stay airborne for up to 17 hours. Its maximum altitude is 5,000 meters and weights more than 450 kilograms.57F58 Also, in 2019 the Altius UAV carried out its first flight and is able to conduct patrolling operations for 48 hours at up to 12,000 meters. Its operational range is about 10,000 kilometers. It has ultralong range radar and optoelectronic systems so that it can conduct all-around observation of water surfaces and airspace from great distances. Finally, the massive Okhotnik (Hunter) strike drone was mentioned in 2019. It weighs 20 tons, is 19 meters long, and has a wingspan of 14\nmeters. It can carry both cruise missiles and guided aerial bombs.58F59 Other sources implied that the Okhotnik will eventually be armed with hypersonic weapons and be used to expand a fighter's radar field and thus target designation for long-range aviation.59F60 UAVs can be used in search and rescue missions, electronic warfare, information confrontations, air defense, terrain engineering, control over forces, and cargo drops. They can be used as temporary reconnaissance strike- and fire-loops as well. If placed in the first wave of an attack, they can draw fire from an adversary's air defense system, thereby exposing them for destruction by the second wave of combat aircraft. Short-range UAVs were used in an experiment due to their relatively low vulnerability from adversary air defense systems and ability to perform reconnaissance and fire destruction missions.60F61 The preliminary use of UAVs for reconnaissance and strike actions diminishes the risk of piloted aircraft from getting hit. UAVs are distributed by task. UAV \"directors\" for an operation take part in defining the combat formation used and its parameters, to include UAV types, degree of destruction required, sortie rate, and execution by stage.61F62 To control UAV assets, a groundbased robot-technical system has been developed to replace/work with forward observers. The system consists of the following subsystems: information processing and command; control over the system; combat aircraft control; a power supply system; and an executive-technical system. It is launched into action either in autonomous automated mode using a timer or through remote control.62F63\n\nThere were also numerous innovative and creative methods for employing UAVs. First, in an article on the Grom UAV, the device was described as equipped with a turbojet engine that is launched from the Smerch multiple rocket launcher system. It will be used for reconnaissance purposes.63F64 The article did not note how many UAVs could be launched simultaneously.\n\nSecond, and perhaps most creative, was a method of making UAVs appear to be just another flying creature. Russian scientists made a UAV that closely resembles a polar owl. It was produced by servicemen of the ERA Technology Park. The UAV can remain airborne for 40\nminutes with a flight range of 20 kilometers and, of course, appears as nature and not a UAV.\n\nArmed with a laser range finder and video monitoring instruments, it weighs five kilograms and can be controlled by one person. Made of composite materials, it is hard to view on radars.64F65\nThird, the Karnivora strike UAV has a creative method to capture an opponent's UAV.\n\nThe Karnivora has a wingspan of 5 meters, a take-off weight of 40 kilograms, and a speed of 150 kilometers an hour. It can loiter for 10-15 hours, can monitor an area up to 150 kilometers in operator mode or 500 kilometers in autonomous mode, and has day and nighttime camera capabilities. Karnivora has two modes. It can either intercept an opponent's UAV by casting a net to seize quadcopters and then deploy a parachute to lower the drone to earth; or employ its strike mode, which can include the use of fragmentation grenades, antitank aerial bombs, or antipersonnel fragmentation charges and aerial bombs. There were plans to test it in Syria.\nFourth, a creative method was to pair UAVs with the AZK-7 acoustic complex that measures the sound of artillery and mortar fire. This increases the establishment of the precise location of a target, even those 15 kilometers away. The equipment takes bearings, determines the location of acoustic signals, and forwards information to command centers.65F66\nFifth, the KYB self-detonating UAV utilizes a creative method of flying to a target\n\"regardless of the targets covertness or the relief of the local terrain, at both low and high altitudes\" at high speed and explodes, acting as a suicide UAV. It can achieve speeds of 130 kilometers per hour and fly for 30 minutes. It has a maximum payload of three kilograms, a body length less than one meter, and a wingspan of 1.2 meters.\nFinally, the Central Military District created separate UAV units as part of artillery troops.\n\nHaving such units offers artillery troops a method to adjust fire in a real-time mode after detecting enemy command posts up to 12 kilometers away through radio waves.\n\n66F67 The Russian military base in Tajikistan has such a new UAV battalion, according to the Central Military District. UAVs with the unit are Orlan-10, Leer-3, Eleron, Granat, and Takhion. It is not known if the battalion is associated with the artillery units there.67F68 Another report noted that the Forpost UAV will be included in the detachment, offering a long-range capability.68F69\nOf interest was that in 2020, trials of the VM Dan M UAV with an MGTD-125E engine took flight. The main components of the UAV were printed on a 3D printer. The flight lasted 19 minutes, reached a maximum speed of 676 kilometers per hour, and attained an altitude of over\n2,000 meters. Its takeoff weight was 370 kilograms.69F70\n\n## Countering An Opponent's Uavs\n\nTo counter an opponent's UAVs (or airborne robots, from a Russian perspective), several systems have been promoted. Most fall into the classification of electronic warfare (EW) or sniper/air defense artillery fires. First, EW systems include equipment such as the Borisoglebsk-2, which has an expanded frequency electronic intelligence collection and suppression capability that it uses to suppress enemy UAVs.70F71 Another EW system, the Krasukha-4, in conjunction with the Pantsir-S1 surface-to-air missile system, is said to have provided a protective dome over forces for a radius of several tens of kilometers against enemy UAVs in exercises.71F72 The Central Military District noted that it utilizes the Zhitel, Silok, Lesochek, and other EW complexes to combat enemy UAVs.72F73 A featured segment on Russia's *Zvezda TV* promoted the \"Repellent\" anti-UAV vehicle, which creates a \"solid, impenetrable\" electronic barrier.73F74 The system supposedly can block UAV\nmovement with \"invisible walls\" at any altitude in a radius of 30 kilometers. The system detects radio signals emitted by drones.74F75 Finally, the Valdai UAV counter system locates radio emission sources, detects targets and identifies their types, intercepts control channels and global navigation system data, and issues target designations to other counter means.75F76 The system can operate in bad weather and both in daytime and nighttime. Strategic Missile Troops deputy head Dennis Sakhnov stated that the system can detect and down any type of UAV.76F77\n69 Central Military District Press Service, \"Russian Military Base in Tajikistan Reinforced by UAV Battalion,\"\nMinistry of Defense of the Russian Federation (in English), 14 January 2019.\n\n70 No author provided, \"Russia Tests Dan Jet UAV,\" *Lenta.ru,* 16 September 2020.\n\nSystem has an Expanded Frequency Band for Electronic Intelligence Collection and Electronic Suppression Equipment,\" *TASS*, 9 January 2019.\n\n72 Tatyana Vorobyeva, \"Servicemen in Urals Cover Command Post against 'Swarm' of UAVs,\" Rossiyskaya Gazeta Online, 13 February 2019.\n\nHardening in Syria,\" *Rossiyskaya Gazeta Online*, 20 August 2018.\n\n74 No author or title provided, *Zvezda TV*, 21 April 2019. 75 Ibid.\n\n76 No author or title provided, *Izvestiya Online,* 3 April 2019.\n\n77 No author provided, \"Russia's Strategic Missile Troops Have Deployed the New Valdai Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Jamming System for the First Time in an Exercise in Tver and Novgorod Region,\" *Zvezda TV*, 4 April\n2019.\n\nSecond, there are developments underway to shoot down enemy UAVs. The Moscow Aviation Institute has developed a combat UAV armed with an automatic gun. It weighs 23 kilograms, can stay airborne for 40 minutes, has a wingspan of 3 meters, and is armed with a 12- mm automatic carbine.77F78 Another report noted that sniper pairs were involved in repelling UAVs during exercises.78F79 Snipers first are warned by radar sites that an opponent's UAV is inbound, and they then advance to positions from which to conduct visual surveillance. The snipers in one exercise conducted fire up to 1.5 kilometers away.79F80 The 57-mm Derivatsiva-PVO anti-aircraft artillery system is designed to combat cruise and air-launched missiles, UAVs, and helicopters.80F81\nThe system's electro-optical detection and sighting system offers a 360-degree view to monitor individual sectors. It can detect \"a small-dimension drone through thermal imagery at a range of at least 700 meters\" and can use its optics to identify aircraft up to 6.5 kilometers away. Airborne targets can be engaged at up to 4.5 kilometers and the rate of fire of the 57-mm automatic cannon is 120 rounds per minute. The system has five types of rounds, the main one being a multipurpose projectile that can \"be remotely programmed to detonate alongside a target.\"81F82\nIn a similar manner, the Strela-10 portable antiaircraft missile system crew destroyed UAVs in a Western Military District exercise. The integrated use of EW and PVO was based on experiences gained in Syria.82F83 The Buk-M3 ZRK anti-aircraft missile system can be used to shoot down UAVs83F84 as can the Zu-23/30M1-4 artillery piece, which is a mobile system with the name SAMUM (meaning Ultramobile Upgraded Multirole Artillery Piece). It has two variants. The artillery variant can engage targets at altitudes of 1.5 kilometers and a range of 2.5 kilometers, while the missile variant can engage targets at a range of 6 kilometers and an altitude of 3.5 kilometers. The latter is equipped with Igla or Verba MANPADS-type surface-to-air guided missiles.84F85\nAnother method to attack UAVs is a system such as the Ataka-DBS automated system, which is designed to identify drones and intercept their penetration. It blocks communication and satellite navigation channels and causes the UAV to lose connection, forcing it to either return to its point of launch or make an emergency landing. It suppresses control channels in civilian bands from 2-6 GHz. The system prevents video observation and industrial espionage by establishing a no-fly zone for unsanctioned drones. Detection is possible up to 1.5 kilometers and suppression at 1 kilometer.85F86\n\n## Unmanned Underwater Vehicles (Uuv)\n\nIn September 2017, the Defense Ministry's Main Directorate for Research and Development (GUNID, whose deputy head is Roman Kordyukov) ran trials off the coast of Syria of the Galtel submarine robot. This is a yellow, torpedo-shaped device that is known as a robotic unmanned underwater vehicle (UUV) that can move in circles or a spiral and is not connected to wires or cables. Developed at the Vladivostok-based Institute of Marine Technology Problems, the Galtel system is composed of two UUVs, with each having an endurance of 24 hours and a range of up to 100 kilometers, a remote-controlled submersible, and a control center. The Galtel has photo and video capability and a side-scan sonar. In 2019, the Galtel system conducted more tests in Syria's coastal waters. The system orients underwater based on elements of hydroacoustic navigation systems. The system sets out coordinates and a reference point can be fixed with the help of the underwater beacons, since GPS and GLONASS signals do not penetrate to the bottom. The Galtel system includes an unmanned television guided underwater vehicle and two autonomous unmanned submarines with an autonomous cruising range of up to 24 hours and up to 100 kilometers.86F87 Another UUV is the Glidel, an autonomous reconnaissance device with stealth capability.\n\nIt is not active-search like Galtel, but a passive-search device.87F88 Data from the device is received in the Galtel's control room. It was noted that the underwater drone can survey four square kilometers in just over 12 hours, has a remotely operated camera capable of operating at depths up to 300 meters, and identified the Institute's lead designer as Vladimir Kostenko.88F89 Alexander Mironov, head of the Main Department of Research and Technological Support of Advanced Technologies at the Russian Defense Ministry, stated that sea robotics would be demonstrated on Lake Komsomolskoye at Army 2017.89F90 The Morskaya Ten is a multifunctional instrument designed to collect and process large amounts of data in the world's oceans. It can loiter autonomously for up to six months in the water. The research and design projects for UUV's are located in the following areas: control systems and algorithms26; mechanical engineering16; marine technologies14; medical RTK9;\nand space5.90F91 In 2018, Russia's Klavesin-2 UUV was designated the 2R52. It is larger and heavier that the Klavesin-1. The -2 looks like a miniature submarine and has a diving depth of 6 kilometers and a range of 50 kilometers.  It can carry sonar sets, electromagnetic sensors, and video cameras.91F92 Russian deep-water equipment allows it to look for missing submarines, build underwater pipelines for hydrocarbon shipments, and construct fiber optic communication systems on the ocean floor.92F93 UUVs can move at depths of over 1000 meters at high speed and remain invisible.\n\nIt will have a nuclear propulsion unit.93F94\nThe existence of a nuclear-powered underwater drone, the Poseidon, is a creative method that Russia, in their opinion, can use to offset the advantages of the U.S.'s Prompt Global Strike Weapon. The Poseidon would be armed with a nuclear warhead of two megatons and would target an opponent's aircraft carrier group or the shore-side installations of cities. A nuclear reactor provides power and offers unlimited range and a speed of 200 kilometers per hour. President Vladimir Putin stated that the drone travels at \"extreme depths, intercontinentally, at a speed multiple times faster than the speed of submarines, cutting-edge torpedoes, and all kinds of surface vessels...\"94F95 News agency *TASS* quoted a source that stated 32 such drones would be on combat duty. Two submarines in the Northern Fleet will each carry eight drones and two submarines in the Pacific Fleet will do the same. It was noted, however, that 16 drones will also be in the Barents Sea region.95F96\nFinally, a comment is warranted about what Russia describes as the sea-bottom based nuclear missile \"Skiff\" that appears to have robotic relevance. Whether the concept is a real one or one aimed at just intimidating opponents is unknown, but the description of the missile system is fascinating and an interesting additional deterrent to an already expanding number of Russian missile systems.\nOf primary concern is whether this is a new version of the \"Dead Hand\" system known as Perimeter from the Cold War days, which was described so well by David Hoffman in the book by that name. Can the Skiff system be launched individually or in mass (how many are there and where are they?) if the football/suitcase code system is unable to function and administer release codes?  Hoffman's Perimeter/Dead Hand weapon did just that. Knowledge of the system was based on an interview with Russian missile expert Valery Yarynich after the demise of the Soviet Union. Regarding the Yarynich interview:\nIt outlined how the 'higher authority' would flip the switch if they feared they were under nuclear attack. This was to give the 'permission sanction.' Duty officers would rush to their deep underground bunkers...if all communications were lost [with Kremlin leaders], then the duty officers in the bunker could launch the command rockets. If so ordered, the command rockets would zoom across the country, broadcasting the signal 'launch' to the intercontinental ballistic missiles.96F97 Thus, Perimeter was a type of \"Dead Hand\" system (as if rising from the grave) that would launch rockets that literally \"threw down\" the codes to intercontinental ballistic missiles, enabling their launch without receiving the codes from Moscow if all communications were lost. The discussion of the Skiff system implies the potential use of a system similar to but unlike Perimeter. Skiff, lying on the seabed, works in the following manner via remote control:\nUpon receipt of the launch command a partial inflation allows the container to assume the quality of a roly-poly toy, i.e., it assumes a vertical position. It then continues to inflate, and the container begins to surface. An opinion exists that the missiles are expelled from the container using solid-fuel boosters at a depth of 50\nmeters, as this occurs in submarines.97F98\n\nThe missile reportedly can remain in stand-by mode for a long period of time and upon command attack ground or sea targets. Reports are that the Sarov submarine released the missile. The submarine's nose section had an expanded diameter in its torpedo launch section and also had ballast tanks. The latter compensated for the weight of the missile when it was off-loaded and thereby helped maintain stability.98F99 Thus while the missile system is not \"robotic\" in the sense of moving on land or in the air, it \"comes alive\" upon remote command and is able to fulfill the functions of a robotic-type asset, to include the ability to move to other locations.\n\nSince the Skiff is a one-time launch vehicle, it would make no difference if the missile launched from the surface instead of below it. A significant advantage is gained when the Skiff is placed on alert on the seabed of the Arctic shelf, since flight time to the U.S. would be shortened. The flight time from the Arctic, one article noted, would offset the flight time of any mediumrange ballistic missiles that the U.S. would put in Europe. Of concern was that the missile would need to remain for a decade or longer in an ocean environment without any technical servicing.\n\nReports are that the missile was first tested in 2008.99F100 As one article noted:\nSkiff is a ballistic missile, which can remain in standby mode on the sea or ocean bottom so that when it is needed it can be fired on command to strike ground and naval targets. Its installation is accomplished from a submarine. And this is important, as indeed it is the main element in providing for the covertness of such an installation.100F101\n\nSkiff is probably a modification of the Sineva or Layner sea-based intercontinental ballistic missiles, since all three were developed at the Makeyev Center. Its placement on the seabed bottom was probably assisted by the Lasharik, an AS-12 deep-diving nuclear device able to dive to 6 kilometers. The system is deemed to belong in the category of nuclear deterrence weapons.101F102\nOccasionally, information about the Skiff still appears in the press. In 2019, for example, there was a report that mini submarines bearing the name Skiff were designed in the Akademik Makeyev State Missile Center jointly with the Rubin Central Design Bureau (TsKB), with the design being to inflict surprise strikes from the ocean depths. Initially the article repeated what was already known about the Skiff, that it is not a submarine but rather a bottom-based ballistic missile. It lies on the ocean bottom for long periods of time and upon receipt of a command can strike a target at ranges beyond 300 kilometers. The report then added information that was more concerning. It noted that \"even if a potential enemy pin points the area in which a Russian submarine positions the 'Skiffs,' they can be repositioned at significant distances and only then lie in wait on the bottom.\"102F103 That is, it appears that the system can change its position on its own prior to its use. The article did not explain how it would reposition its start position but noted that when first deployed, Skiff emits a sound like the operation of a submarine power plant, which gives the submarine a chance to depart the area. Skiff then becomes noiseless and lies in wait of commands.103F104 Thus, in 2019 new elements were added to the system's capabilities. If a real capability, it is important to ascertain where they are located in oceans or seas, and how many of these systems there are. If some are stationed next to the U.S. or other nations, they could easily be in range of the U.S. with their strike capabilities. This would be a new and asymmetric way to guarantee Russia's concept of \"equal security.\"\n\n## Artillery Use Of Robotics\n\nNot much has been written on a general robotic system designed to support artillery.\n\nHowever, several separate pieces have appeared. First, in 2016 it was noted that the Koalitsiya-SV was a first step toward the robotization of artillery systems. The system has an unmanned combat section and a process of aiming and loading the gun without human involvement. In the \"firestorm\" mode, the system fires several shells from the same gun at different angles, but they all reach the target at the same time.104F105 Second, there was a 2019 discussion of suggested robotic technical systems (RTS)\ndesigned to carry out Missile and Artillery Ground Force (GF MF&A) tasks. Artillery RTSs consist of four to six robot self-propelled artillery pieces and one mobile control post. The artillery pieces are based on a caterpillar chassis that can proceed at speeds of up to 45 kilometers per hour over most terrain and up to 50 kilometers per hour on highways. Each artillery piece should consist of the following modular pieces and aim to fire up to 15 rounds per minute:\n\n\n- 120mm artillery piece\n- Automated ammunition storage for 60 rounds\n- A gun aiming control system\n- A loading control system\n- A loading initiation system - And an automatic fuse setter.105F106\n If firing separately, the entire number of rounds (60 x 6 pieces) would be expended in 24 minutes\n(at 15 rounds per minute for each piece).106F107 In addition, the systems include unmanned self-propelled artillery pieces with remote control homing, firing, and navigation components and a remote-controlled self-propelled antitank missile system. UAVs offer reconnaissance capabilities in support of artillery pieces, as described above. Long-and medium-range UAVs such as Forpost support missile systems and large-caliber multiple rocket launch systems (MRLS), while short-and close-range UAVs such as Orlan-10 and Eleron-3SV support artillery and some MRLS. Ground-based reconnaissance RTSs are required for security, movement routes, and other tasks.107F108\n\nThird, in 2020 the Defense Ministry announced that the Southern Military District will be armed with the latest 2S19M2 \"Msta-SM\" artillery.  These robotic guns have enhanced fire range and accuracy features that still require a crew. The guns use \"smart\" highly precise projectiles. The system includes an automated guidance and fire control component on each of the howitzers. A satellite navigation system has been added to the artillery mounts, so the exact location of the gun is known. The article added that:\nEach armored vehicle has obtained the capability to automatically exchange information with the battalion and battery command post and artillery radars and to obtain and transmit information about each shot. If necessary, one can even guide it remotely from the command post. It only remains for the crew to confirm opening fire.108F109\n\n## Robotics In Syria\n\nThe use of robotic systems was tested often under combat conditions in Syria. For example, one blogosphere report noted that a \"high-technology\" assault had utilized Russian robots along with Syrian infantry and Russian artillery under the control of an UAV and the Andromeda-D\n\nbattlefield command and control system.109F110 Another system tested was the Skarabey, a small robotic platform on wheels with a high-resolution video camera, a microphone, and a heat sensor. It is used in tunnel searches since it is only 15 centimeters high and with an electronic motor it is almost noiseless.110F111 Other reports of robotic use in Syria included the Uran-9, which is a reconnaissance robot, tank-killer, and mobile fire support asset; Uran-6, a mine-clearing robot; the Nerekhta, which can be produced as an artillery reconnaissance module or transport module; and the Soratnik, an unmanned armored vehicle used as a fire support or mobile relay robot or for mine-clearing terrain or evacuating wounded.111F112 A 2019 article in the Russian journal *Military Thought* discussed the use of UAVs in Syria.\nIn a single flight, a UAV might have conducted aerial reconnaissance, designated targets, controlled air strikes, or adjusted artillery fire. They assisted in the control of ceasefire regimes, delivering humanitarian cargo, and performing other tasks. On one occasion they assisted in the creation of a 3D simulation of the city of Palmira. Cameras, radio, and integrated multi-tiered technical reconnaissance, television, and infrared video cameras were used. Most were short-range UAVs used by commanders in sectors, although medium and long-range units were used to reconnoiter the entire territory of Syria. Problems associated with Russia's UAV deployment in Syria consist of the following:\n\n\n- The difficulty of identifying the military facilities, personnel concentrations,\nand equipment of an adversary\n- The dynamically changing surface situation - The need to carry out aerial reconnaissance in mountainous and desert terrain\nas well as in populated areas\n- The adversary's use of every available means to hit UAVs - Using UAVs in the same air space as piloted aircraft.112F113\n It was noted that UAVs should be used in conjunction with aircraft and artillery and should fly at altitudes where they cannot be visually detected or heard, spending only a few minutes over adversary facilities. UAV efficiency depends on ensuring the prompt processing of data and using UAVs jointly with other reconnaissance forces and assets. Of course, combat in Syria also exposed the need to counter adversary UAVs since insurgents either purchased light-class UAVs at retail or bought spare parts and made them.113F114\nDefense Minister Sergey Shoygu, speaking at a conference in 2018, stated that UAVs had allowed Russian troops to take control of the situation throughout Syria. Daily, up to 70 UAVs carried out operations, with Forpost and Orlan-10 UAVs used most frequently.114F115 The Orion-E\nUAV, Russia's largest UAV with a weight of over a ton, was spotted in Syria. It has a wingspan of 16 meters and is 8 meters long. Its maximum payload is 200 kilograms with a flight speed of between 120-200 kilometers per hour. It can climb to an altitude of 7,500 meters and can operate for 24 hours before landing. It was spotted with two small bombs suspended beneath the fuselage in a video, so it may be Russia's first strike UAV.115F116\nHowever, there apparently have been numerous shoot-downs of Russian UAVs in Syria.\n\nOne Russian article noted that among the use of Orlan-10, Forpost, Eleron, and Granat UAVs, some 23 (specific type not listed) have been shot down. Most of these losses occurred in 2018. It is thought that some of the salvaged parts were then turned into drones by ISIS and used for attacks on the Khmeyshim Russian military air base.116F117\nThe commander of the Southern District, Colonel General Aleksandr Dvornikov, noted that UAVs are used often at Russian training bases. They have monitored potential areas liable to flood in the district; assessed target destruction and corrected artillery fire on the district's ranges;\naccompanied patrols and monitored the state of military facilities; and used infrared photographic and video modules to detect camouflaged targets including at nighttime.117F118\n\n## Exoskeletons, Chemical Reconnaissance, And So On\n\nRussia has invested in several types of robotic equipment. One of those is the use of exoskeletons for civilian, special, and military purposes. Tasks include working with heavy equipment and rigging and loading operations. The exoskeleton takes the strain off a soldier's musculoskeletal system. The system was reportedly tested in Syria in 2017. It was also noted that inventors have considered using flamethrowers on drones, especially small ones.118F119\nThe third generation Ratnik (Sotnik) combat equipment set will be equipped with minirobots and drones, a module for evaluating a fighter's physiological status, and an active exoskeleton. The drones will be contained in a container no larger than the magazine of a semiautomatic rifle. A fighter will have 3-4 such drones and the ability to launch them for reconnaissance purposes during urban or forest combat. The drone connects to the communications system of Ratnik for video observation. The fighter controls flight on his tablet, and images can be transmitted to an entire group participating in the operation. The UAV is of the helicopter class and is so small that it can be affected by wind. Its range is just 150 meters. The exoskeleton allows for speeds up to 20 km/h. The Ratnik system's power supply is only good for 3-4 hours. Future versions of Ratnik also envision a modular helmet with a visor which includes data on the position of units on the battlefield, a friend or foe identification system, and a guidance system for precisely directing weapons to targets.119F120\nA robotic complex is under development in the Russian chemical warfare units. The complex will be composed of ground units and UAVs. It will conduct reconnaissance of battlefield conditions to determine if areas are contaminated for Chemical, Radiological, and Biological units.\n\nIt will work to mitigate the consequences of an adversary's use of mass destruction weapons. The complex will also be used in peacetime to handle chemical accidents in the civilian sector.120F121\nVitaliy Davydov, deputy General Director and Chairman of the Fund for Advanced Research's (FPI) Scientific-Technical Council, discussed the FEDOR121F122 robot in 2018. He stated that it is a robotic platform with human-like or anthropomorphic traits. FEDOR researchers are experimenting with numerous technologies, such as artificial vision, autonomous navigation, adaptive control systems, high precision actuating arms, and so on. These technologies may be applied to not just FEDOR but numerous robotic systems: UAVs, quadrocopters, autonomous selfpropelled platforms, and unmanned submersibles. Missions determine the type of requirements for a robot. The FEDOR for the State Corporation for Atomic Energy (Rosatom) could differ from the FEDOR for the State Corporation for Space Activities (Roskosmos).\nThe \"Spasatel (lifeguard)\" project will be part of Rosatom but other consumers, such as the Emergency Ministry, will develop variants of the technologies for their own purposes. It is designed for use in emergency situations, mostly civilian, when accidents occur. The contractor for the Spasatel project was the Android Technology (Androidnaya Tekhnika) Science-\nManufacturing Association.122F123\nIn 2017, a *Military Thought* article discussed tasks before electronic warfare specialists to disable adversary UAVs and other robotic controls. Operators will use special software to disorganize foreign robotic parameters, while simultaneously protecting friendly control systems from UAV and robotic weapon jamming. Electronic warfare specialists were instructed to know the types of foreign employments, the equipment functioning order and guidance systems of foreign nations, their weapon control systems, and the processes involved with disorganizing UAVs and robot controls. Key capabilities to be attained were revealing foreign equipment points of failure, employing electronic warfare in order to disorganize foreign UAVs and robotic control, and identifying reconnaissance and software tasks for use against foreign electronic assets.123F124\nIn 2018, it was noted that fully robotic multiple-launch rocket systems would be available in a few years, adding that many operations (but not all!) will happen without human input.124F125\nAlso Russian sappers would be armed with \"death robots,\" a new mine system that can find and destroy enemy armor. A TM-83 antitank mine is mounted on a robotized platform. The system has a friend or foe recognition system and acts as a kamikaze robot, searching out enemy armor and firing a missile at it. It does so when a seismic sensor registers ground vibration and switches the mine to combat mode, activating an infrared detector that seeks out the vehicles heat emissions. The system then fires a weapon that creates an 80 mm-diameter hole in the armor from 50\nmeters.125F126\n In 2020, a *Military Thought* article discussed Russia's disorganization concept and linked it with robotics. Similar to the 2017 article (two of the three authors were the same writers of the\n2017 article) on training EW operators, the authors again discussed the need to acquire the necessary skills to disorganize robotic complexes in foreign armies. The article repeated the notion that operators must be familiar with foreign army control systems, their vulnerable links, and the best radio-jamming targets to make decisions on the employment of such skills.126F127 Thus it is clear that Russia's military is closely following robotic advances in other armies so that its operators will not only train properly but be prepared for potential conflicts with foreign forces.\n\n## Robots And The Laws Of Warfare: How Russia Is Approaching The Topic\n\nNations everywhere are examining robotic use and for good reason. As a recent article in The Economist titled \"Battle Algorithm\" noted, while important, robotics must be used with caution: \"Robots are cheaper, hardier, and more expendable than humans. But a machine capable of wandering the battlefield, let alone spilling blood on it, must be intelligent enough to carry that burden.\"127F128 Others think machines, not a machine, will wander the battlefield. \"Wars of the future will be between autonomous robots able to combine in groups and units,\" stated Russian Vyacheslav Pshikhopov, director of the Southern Federal University Research Institute of Robotics and Control processes. Autonomous robots will undoubtedly possess a measured dose of artificial intelligence (AI)\nwith the requisite skillsperception and navigation and co-ordination with other agentsto carry out activities. However, AI can introduce bigger problems than it can cure. Algorithms imbedded in robots clearly enhance their coordination of effort and the precision of strikes but can cause serious problems regarding the law and ethics of robotic use if they escape operator/algorithm control. They would violate Issac Asimov's first law of robotics, which is that the robot shall not harm humans.\n\nThe laws of warfare require proportionality and necessity. Will a robot's software be able to choose a target, explain why, and, more importantly, to know if its choice was made in accordance with the laws of war? Will its response to engagements be proportional and based on necessity? A dangerous scenario that might evolve was described as follows:\nAble to think faster than humans, an AI-enabled command system might cue up missile strikes on aircraft carriers and airbases at a pace that leaves no time for diplomacy and in ways that are not fully understood by its operators. On top of that, AI systems can be hacked and tricked with manipulated data.128F129\n\nIt is not known if software can be developed that imbeds such protective and vital considerations into robots, software that: controls actions in line with the laws of war, prevents deception, allows for diplomacy, and forestalls events, for example, where robots might inadvertently fire on friendly forces. Further, will control be possible over the interconnected AI systems of robots that choreograph combat, or will decisions be made so rapidly that they are beyond the capabilities of human cognition to control the future automated battlefield?  Software that calculates probabilistic interactions on battlefields faster than humans may even allow robots to overtake decision-making. This might include decisions involving a political chain of events resulting from specific moves.129F130\n\nThere are reports that the Chinese have named robotic decisions that move faster than human cognition as a \"battlefield singularity\" issue, while some U.S. strategists have dubbed such actions as \"hyperwar.\" Each describes a battlefield out of human control, whether on the ground, at sea, or in the air. It is impossible at this time, for example, to know what software imbedded in drones of various nations will doact autonomously or allow for remote control.130F131 Such potential catastrophic scenarios should also, it seems, be included when conducting AI-assisted robotic battlefield simulations and war games in the U.S. That would be prudent. Only with prior planning can forces comprehensively prepare for such eventualities. Peacetime opportunities are available to develop counters or blocks to keep such scenarios from ever occurring. Russian authors understand well the implications of a robot powered by AI. One 2018\nreport noted that automated systems and robots \"have the ability to learn from their own experiences and perform actions beyond the scope of those intended by their creators.\"131F132 Such systems could operate independently from its creators or operators and complicate the task of determining responsibility. These independent actions could even vary from country to country since \"algorithms can be biased, for example, in the process of self-learning, they can absorb and adopt the stereotypes that exist in society or which are transferred to them by developers and make decisions based on them.\"132F133 But if programmers are made liable for the actions of specific systems and the system does something catastrophic (take out another nation's capital), does liability even matter in such cases?\n\nAnother Russian article has stated that its decision-makers are against imposing an international ban on the threat of so-called \"killer robots.\"133F134 In line with that decision, Russia continues to discuss the building and employment of autonomous military robot technical systems. The goal is to create a \"Concept for Developing Autonomous Military Ground-Based Robot Technology.\" In a *Military Thought* article, the following military-science and organizational-legal problems of autonomous robot-technical units (RU) were offered in a schematic:134F135 The authors noted that the use of autonomous RU would offer the following advantages:\n\n- Considerably improve jamming immunity in RU - Increase RU range limited only by the size of the power unit - Fewer mistakes by human operators - Fewer operators and demands on them - Potentially able to integrate large numbers of RU - Eliminate man-machine dialogue and delays\n- Expand the set of areas for RU use.135F136\n There was no discussion of problem issues.\n\nIn a 2019 *Interfax* article, experts at the 3rd Central Scientific Research Institute of the Russian Defense Ministry stated that  the military must develop \"methods for analyzing situations, scene identification, and target identification as applied to the functions of ground-based robotic systems.\"136F137 The experts suggested \"introducing in military robotics intellectual systems for making decisions at command stages, including group, autonomous movement, and use of equipment according to its purposes, including weapons.\"137F138 Thus, the Defense Ministry appears to support the concept of equipping robots with intellectual systems that enable them to use weapons independently, a dangerous step.\n\n## Ground Force And Uav Problems\n\nGround force robotic problems were addressed in 2015. The problems are traced to the diversity of methods and models used to justify the need for developing robot units. Methodologically, models are constructed in an arbitrary fashion with no reference to the system where it is to be applied. Thus, there is a misunderstanding between developers and users that needs to be fixed. How to train operators, ensure system reliability (ability to confront various electromagnetic and other radiations), rectify incomplete or uncertain data inputs from the robot to the operator, and limiting manpower losses are all areas that need to be improved. Second, special algorithms need to be developed so that operator efficiency can be magnified. Subtasks must be sorted out according to function (attack to kill, reconnaissance, mobility maintenance, protection, support, etc.), which may be the most difficult phase of robot operations, since some operations require a group of operators working together. Energy resources are currently easily depleted, so more work is required in that area. Further, remote control of ground force robots was limited to line of sight.138F139 Robotic use of artificial intelligence introduced several problems. Technical system feedback could come from anomalous or irregular changes in the situation for which an intelligent robot-driven unit is not prepared. Referred to as \"unbalanced situations,\" they are caused not only by situational uncertainty but also by a deficiency of information for decision-makers, the speed of information flows when data is available, and the emergence of sudden interference from outside sources such as noise.139F140 Perhaps many of these 2015 problems have been rectified, especially with the creation of the ERA Technopolis and other organizations designed to address such issues.\n\nRegarding UAV problems, a 2018 article noted that for the past five years (since 2013)\nthere have been at least 600 in-warranty failures. These were due to: low quality of material used\n(1 percent); commercial component defects (80 percent); faults in design (9 percent); assembly faults (3 percent); and other cases (7 percent). The main reasons for such malfunctions were the violation of maintenance rules, equipment complexity, firmware faults, intensive use in tough environments under special conditions, and personnel that were insufficiently trained. It was also noted that up to 80 percent of UAV components were imported, resulting in repair complexity.140F141\nIt was not stated if these parts were imported from Israel, China, or the U.S. This prompted the following list of priorities in 2018:\n\n- Developing and analyzing the results of operations and repairs - Forming UAV technical maintenance bodies in the Ground Forces' large units\nand formations\n- Specifying the functions of mobile repair shops - Organizing unmanned aircraft specialist training - Working out maintenance documents\n- Working out recommendations for operations under specific conditions - Seeking Russian analogs for foreign components - And increasing control over the quality of commercial components.141F142\n In 2019 a significant problem during RTK exploitation was eliminating delays when firing. Another problem was the technical maintenance of such weapons, especially cleaning them and thought was given to mechanizing the cleaning of barrels. Other support task issues requiring attention were eliminating malfunctions and repairing RTK under field conditions.142F143 Conclusions There is no overarching commentary on robotics that indicate the absolute direction in which Russian robotics are heading. General Staff Chief Valery Gerasimov mentioned robotics in five of his seven presentations at the Academy of Military Science but offered no specific direction other than the growing importance of UAVs in 2017 and 2019. Here are his assessments:\n\n\n- 2013: Precision weapons, weapons based on new physical principles, and\nrobotics are being introduced into military affairs.143F144\n- 2014: Special attention is required in the areas of robotics, telecommunication\ninfrastructure, and strategic deterrence and aerospace forces.144F145\nComplexes of Military UAV Significance in the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation,\" Voennaya Mysl' (Military Thought), No. 7 2018, pp. 82-83.\n\n142 Ibid., p. 84.\n\n143 Dul'nev and Korablin, p. 134.\n\n144 V. V. Gerasimov, \"Principal Trends in the Development of the Forms and Methods of Employing Armed Forces and Current Tasks of Military Science Regarding their Improvement,\" Vestnik Akademii voennykh nauk (Journal of the Academy of Military Science), No. 1 2013, p. 26. Dr. Harold Orenstein translated all the Gerasimov presentations below from Russian to English.\n\n145 V. V. Gerasimov, \"The Role of the General Staff in the Organization of the Country's Defense in Accordance with the New Statute on the General Staff,\" Vestnik Akademii voennykh nauk (Journal of the Academy of Military Science), No. 1 2014, p. 21.\n\n\n\n- 2017: The employment of various types of robotic complexes will increase the\neffectiveness of troop operations and ensure a substantial reduction in personnel losses. A substantive feature of contemporary military conflicts is the increasing employment of the latest robotic complexes and unmanned aerial vehicles with varied designations and actions.145F146\n- 2018: The principal features of future conflicts will be the extensive\nemployment of precision weapons and other types of new weapons, including robot technology.146F147\n- 2019: Gerasimov underscored specific directions for strategy's development,\nand singled out the use of military robotic complexes, especially UAVs.147F148\n\nGerasimov's focus on robotics and their future use will undoubtedly lead to new correlation of forces (COF) assessments among Russian theorists. That is an important consideration for planners to take into consideration. The development of UAV swarms and integrated Unicum robotic formations on the ground will affect COF in many ways. Unikum, as mentioned in the analysis, can control ten robotic complexes simultaneously. It can assign roles within a grouping, control a grouping, independently send robots to the most favorable positions, and search for targets. The COF factor is reflected (but not named) in the models under creation and in the following discussion:\nOne more prospective trend to support the achievement of superiority [that is, an advantage in COF] over an enemy in future military conflicts is the employment of fundamentally new types of weapons, which include military robotic systems and resources equipped with weapons based on new physical principles...At present, individual models of robotics are already being employed to carry out tasks of limited complexity, e.g., for operations from ambushes and as fire support resources. Soon it is proposed to implement their group employment both independently and in cooperation with combined arms formations.148F149\n\n\nAnother Russian focus has been UAVs. Innovative options for UAVs include the placement of both optical devices and multifunctional software-supported radar stations (RLS) on them, which enable the exposure of fighters concealed in buildings, fighters hiding behind natural obstacles, and the ability to \"discern\" objects through fog. An important UAV discussion centered on the order of attacks against adversary targets, first, headquarters and communications centers, and then transport infrastructure, the approach of reserves, and frontline air defense systems. UAVs are deployed in attack formations/groups much like ground force assault formations. While the numbers of UAVs involved may vary (and include Granat, Zastava, Eleron, Orlan [tested in Syria], and Leyer UAVs), it was noted that lead vehicles would conduct visual reconnaissance at 1-1.5 kilometers above the ground, followed by a second wave of Leyer-3 radio electronic warfare assets to suppress enemy ground communication equipment, and closing with a third UAV flight that relays information to the base from a height of 4.5 to 5 kilometers.149F150\nAlso of concern is Russian planning to conduct autonomous robotic group employment tactics. Many analysts in other nations seriously doubt that robots can be taught to fight with proportionality and necessity in mind. For example, what if swarm tactics were used as a form of robotic cyber operationswould such an attack option know when to cease work? Proportionality and necessity may currently be beyond reach of other capabilities as well, such as cyber ones.\n\nFinally, it was noted that combined arms formations today at the tactical level will be conditioned by the creation of robotic ground force formations that employ precision weapons, radio-electronic warfare resources, information and command and control systems, and other capabilities for different functional purposes. The discussion above has underscored that the role of robotic units in such operations is growing quickly, whether it be under urban conditions or on the open battlefield. It was noted that robots will be placed around the country's exterior as sentries who will guard it borders, which are too huge to man with people. It is unknown if this will be accomplished through the use of sensors or if it will rely on, from Russia's perspective, \"increasing the role and improving the robotization of equipment, first and foremost, on-board fire resources.\"\nLimitations on robotic developments exist for several reasons, to include internal equipment problems and legal issues. But this has not kept Russia from further exploring their potential use. In fact, the nation's leaders have been quick to ignore discussions of limiting the use of so-called killer robots. The military leadership understands well the importance and spreading use of robotic systems in the militaries of potential opponents and do not want to be limited in the application of their own robotic developments to the contemporary battlefield.\n\nIt should be expected that in the coming months, both at the ERA Technopolis and elsewhere, that substantial improvements will be made in the algorithms and artificial intelligence components that are driving robotic improvements. The use of Russian military robotic systems has been codified in several documents, such as the Concept for the Employment of Military Robotic Complexes for the Period up to 2030.150F151 The concept's main objective is to provide the means of armed warfare with a new quality that increases the effectiveness of combat mission execution and lowers the loss of personnel through improving control means, communication and navigation assets, video surveillance, photography (thermal imaging), and other related equipment.151F152 This concept was approved by the Russian General Staff on 22 August 2014 and resulted in the establishment of a more limited and quicker target program for the Creation of Advanced Military Robotics up to 2025.152F153\nThus, the interest in robotic systems and the creation of new models by scientific research institutes continues to expand in Russia's military. It is to be expected that the targeted programs under examination will be highlighted in the coming years and their progress and effectiveness tabulated. Russia's robotic use will require the continued attention of the West to ensure not only that their use is in line with international law but that they have not developed specific or asymmetric robotic capabilities against which the West has not contemplated a responsebut needs to in the immediate future.\n\n\n\n## Appendix One: Robot Employment Principles\n\nS. A. Sychev, in his article above titled \"Principles of Employing Combined Arms Ground Forces Formations Equipped with Military Robotic Systems,\" listed four employment principles. They are described here. The \"principle of functional inequality and imbalance\" is used when facing an opponent with an equal or superior level of technological development. The use of RTK helps achieve functional imbalance in four ways: accomplishing tasks normally associated with high losses of personnel; using groups of RTK to gain an advantage in the speed of using the reconnaissancedestruction cycle; the joint use of RTK capabilities; and the use of RTK in inaccessible or limited access areas.153F154 The \"principle of structural and functional reconfiguration\" offers design, structural, and functional flexibility when various and dissimilar robotic resources are integrated. This principle is achieved in two ways: with the creation of a formation that redistributes robotic resources or creates new elements while a task is being carried out; and the centralization of command and control of robotic resources with diverse tasks and the redistribution of their functional load depending on the situation.154F155 The \"principle of integration\" involves effects produced from using multifunctionality, joint autonomy, and integrated responses. Multifunctionality involves combining several functions into a single formation, such as the creation of a recce-strike complex, where reconnaissance, C2, and fire destruction are integrated to shorten the reconnaissance-destruction cycle. Joint autonomy is implemented with the synchronization of information within a group of varied robotic resources that can correct the sequence of their actions when executing a task. Exchanging information within a group of RTK (when any of the systems on one RTK fails) helps increase their later survivability. Algorithms can achieve responses under complex, changing situations that human capabilities cannot handle.155F156\n\nThe final principle was the \"principle of synchronization,\" where embedded algorithms enable the synchronization of results at the software level. They achieve the following three results:\nensuring the optimization of robotic actions under specific situations; forecasting potential enemy threats and warning the RTK about them in a timely fashion; and automatically updating priority goals in accordance with developing situations.156F157\n\n\n## Appendix Two: Robot Types And Parameters\n\nThis list of robotic developments in Russia is designated by year. There are several descriptions of systems that are repeated from one year to the next, but they are listed anyway for reference purposes.\n\n2017 Galtel: In September, the Defense Ministry's Main Directorate for Research and Development (GUNID, whose deputy head is Roman Kordyukov) ran trials off Syria of the **Galtel** submarine robot. This is a yellow torpedo-shaped device that is a robotic unmanned underwater vehicle (UUV) that can move in circles or a spiral and is not connected to wires or cables. Developed at the Vladivostok-based Institute of Marine Technology Problems, the Galtel system is composed of two UUVs, with each having an endurance of 24 hours and a range of up to 100 km, a remotecontrolled submersible, and a control center. The Galtel has photo and video capability and a sidescan sonar. The Grachyonok anti-sabotage vessel is where the Galtel's control center is located.\nGlidel: Another UUV is the **Glidel**, an autonomous reconnaissance device with stealth capability.\n\nIt is not active-search like Galtel, but a passive-search device.157F158 The underwater drone can survey four square kilometers in just over 12 hours and has a remotely operated camera capable of operating at depths up to 300 meters. The institute's lead designer was identified as Vladimir Kostenko.158F159 It was also noted by Alexander Mironov, head of the Main Department of Research and Technological Support of Advanced Technologies at the Russian Defense Ministry, that sea robotics will be demonstrated on Lake Komsomolskoye at Army 2017.159F160\nKoalitsiya-SV: Another important armament is the 2S35 Koalitsiya-SV self-propelled artillery complex, whose specifications \"essentially represent a combat robot capable of automatically executing fire missions with minimal human involvement.\"160F161\nNerekhta: This combat robot is designed at the Degtyarev Plant, with three modulescombat, artillery reconnaissance, and transport. Various modifications allow for its arming with the\n12.7mm Kord Machinegun, the 7.62mm Kalashnikov machinegun, the AG-30m automatic grenade launcher, or even an anti-tank missile. In October it was announced that the Nerekhta system was recommended for service with the Russian Army. It is to be used as a scout, a sapper, and a supporting mechanism for the infantry. Oleg Pomazuyev, head of the Innovation Research Department at the Main Research Directorate for the Russian Defense Ministry, made this revelation. Soratnik:  Produced by the Kalashnikov Group, this is a fire support, reconnaissance, evacuation, and ammo or fuel support vehicle.  With speeds up to 40 kilometers per hour, it can reach 10\nkilometers from remote control or radio line of sight. It can carry 7.62 mm and 12.7mm machineguns, a 30mm AG-17A grenade launcher, and a 40mm automatic grenade launcher.\nUran-9: This complex is designed at the 766 UPTK company for reconnaissance, fire support, and anti-tank warfare. It can destroy targets at 5 km in daytime and 3 km at night. It is armed with a 30mm 2A72 automatic gun, a 7.62mm machinegun, Shmel-M flamethrowers, and an Ataka complex armed with guided anti-tank missiles.161F162 A later report stated that the Uran-9's 30-mm cannon has a firing rate of 350-400 rounds per minute and can accommodate 4 Ataka antitank missiles. All systems have had trial runs in Syria, the article noted.162F163\nVikhr and Morskaya Ten: The Vortex or Whirlwind (**Vikhr**) and Sea Shadow (**Morskaya Ten**) were discussed further. **Vikhr** is based on the BMP-3 with a remote-controlled armament module that includes a 57-mm or 30-mm cannon, automatic grenade launcher, and machine gun. The maximum speed is 60 kph. It was noted that the main task is creating automated control system software. The **Morskaya Ten** is a multifunctional instrument designed to collect and process large amounts of data in the world's oceans. It can loiter autonomously for up to six months in the water.163F164\nAnother description of **Vikhr** noted that it is a reconnaissance-strike robot system, weighing 14.7 tons with significant firepower and maneuverability. Controlled by an operator, the robot has good off-road movement to include water obstacle crossing capability. It can fire while stationary and on the move. The module (clearly not the entire vehicle weighing tons) has been observed on a Su-25 ground-attack plane and on a Ka-52 helicopter. The system's turret rotates 360 degrees.\n\nOnce locked onto a target it can track it and fire on it until the target is destroyed.164F165\nA 2017 article in Armeyskiy Sbornik (Army Journal) listed the following types of robots:\n\n- **Vikhr**: Irina Zayko was one of its developers. - **Prokhod-1:** This is a heavy robotic mine clearing complex based on the T-90\ntank.\n- **Mars:** This is a robotic tracked amphibious transport platform, that can be\nairdropped by parachute and carry up to 500 kilograms of cargo at 35 kph on land and 5 kph on water.\n- **Spetsialist:** This is a forward area tracked robotic platform, an infantry type\nvehicle that can deliver ammunition, water, food, and medical supplies to the\nfront line and evacuate casualties on the way back.\n- **Khishchnik**: This is a zoomorphic robot resembling a spider the size of a large\ndog that can traverse rough terrain carrying payload and armed with a 12.7-mm Kord machine gun, seek targets autonomously, and engage them on command\nfrom its operator.\n- **Shnek:** This is a miniature robotic platform, weighing about 15 kg. It has offroad mobility and is armed with four mortars with thermobaric rounds.\n- **Tigr:** This is an armored vehicle, fitted with the same control packages as the\nUran-9.\n- **Boyets:** This is a robotic wheeled platform with a 30-mm automatic grenade\nlauncher.\n- **MRK-27BT:** It is armed with a 7.62-mm Pecheneg, 2 RShG-2 assault rocket\ngrenade launchers, and 2 Shmel infantry rocket launchers with a control range\nof 500 meters.165F166\n\n## 2018\n\nBMP-3: Georgiy Zakamennykh, general director of the Burevestnik Research Institute, stated that the **BMP-3** will become a robot with an AU-220M 57-mm weapon unit, firing 80 rounds a minute.\n\nThis is because the gun can be controlled remotely.166F167\nKlavesin-2: This is an unmanned underwater complex (UUV) with the designation 2R52. It is larger and heavier that the Klavesin-1. The -2 looks like a miniature submarine and has a diving depth of 6 km and a range of 50 kilometers.  It is able to carry sonar sets, electromagnetic sensors, and video cameras.167F168 Russian deep-water equipment allows it to look for missing submarines, build underwater pipelines to convey hydrocarbons, and put fiber optic communication systems on the ocean floor.168F169 UUVs can move at depths of over 1 km at high speed and remain invisible.\n\nIt will have a nuclear propulsion unit.169F170 Kobra: The **Kobra** 1600 robotic system was designed for remotely defusing explosive devices. It uses television cameras and detachable equipment and can be controlled by cable for four to eight hours at a time. It can cross barriers up to 160 mm high and water up to 120 mm deep.170F171\nNerekhta: The electronic magazine *Armeyskiy Standard* noted that the **Nerekhta** multirole robotic system has completed testing. Its unique drones can function as transporter, support vehicle, reconnaissance system, sapper robot, combat platform, or adjuster of artillery fire. It can reach a speed of 32 kph.171F172 Soratnik: The system is used as a reconnaissance and relay, patrolling and demining, and obstacle removal robot. Aleksey Krivoruchko, general director of the Kalashnikov Concern, said the robot can operate in passive mode up to 10 hours. It can operate with other automated assets, including UAVs.172F173 TM-83: These antitank mines are placed on special robotized platforms. The mines will have friend or foe recognition systems and the robots that carry them will be small with high terrain mobility. The mine switches to combat mode via seismic sensor vibrations and when activated, seeks heat emissions from an engine. If no target is detected in three minutes, the TM-83 returns to standby mode.173F174\nUAVs: There are several UAVs that have parameters listed in publications. The **Okhotnik** heavy attack-reconnaissance UAV was produced at the Novosibirsk Aircraft Plant. It is being designed by the Sukhoy Design Bureau (KB) and has speeds of up to 1,000 kilometers per hour. The Altius- O medium-class attack UAV has concluded its flight tests. It can hover for 48 hours and carry up to a ton of payload. Its flight range is 10,000 kilometers with speeds between 150-250 kph. Its service ceiling is 12 kilometers.174F175\nUran-9: This robot's main function is combat reconnaissance and fire support. It has its own air defense, the Igla-S guided antiaircraft missiles. It can fire from behind cover as it has a boom that can reach a height of 3.7 meters. Due to its limited weight it has weak protection, which can be overcome with reactive and active protection modules.175F176 The **Uran-9** has a system warning against laser radiation, and the system puts up a smokescreen from which the laser is coming. The multifunction robot was developed by the 766 Production and Fabrication Directorate.176F177 The system can target personnel, antitank and weapon assets, and low-flying, low-velocity aerial targets such as helicopters and UAVs of the tactical level.177F178 Flaws in the Uran-9's performance in Syria included management, mobility, firepower, reconnaissance, surveillance functions of the robot, an inability to fire on the move, and a lack of ability to conduct reconnaissance and determine targets at distances of more than two kilometers.178F179 UR-15: This is a self-propelled rocket-launcher demining system codenamed \"Meteor\" (nickname\n\"Dragon Gorynych\"). It will be robotic and provided with armor protection. The range is 200-500\nmeters and creates a passage 6 meters wide and 80 meters in length. Reloading takes 40 minutes.179F180 Vikhr and MRP-100 Platform: The Geodeziya Research Institute Federal State Enterprise hosted a demonstration of the **Vikhr** robotic system. The **Vikhr** software was reportedly created by the Signal Research Institute Science and Production Corporation Joint Stock Company, according to deputy head Denis Barabin. The system facilitates robotic system movements while following a route while independently identifying and avoiding obstacles, moving by beacon, and moving in convoy. Aleksey Bogachev, head of the Advanced Developments Department of the ROKAD\nNTTs, developed the **MRP-100 platform**. The latter creates a ground pressure of .1 kilogram per square centimeter when moving, has a load-bearing capacity of 100 kilograms (with options for\n300 and 500 kilograms), and a current speed of 7 kph with a future speed of 25 kph.180F181\nRobots without specific characteristics: Kalashnikov tested the **Nakhlebnik** combat module.  A\nKungas multi-role robotic system was tested but it did not specify if it was attached to Kalashnikov.181F182 Russia announced the creation of the **Argo** and **Platforma-M** robots, with the latter used by the Pacific Fleet's military police in a counter-terrorism exercise in 2016.182F183 The Armata unmanned tank will be named the **Tachanka-B**.183F184 Uralvagonzavod (UVZ) General Director Aleksandr Potapov stated this was possible in February, and two years ago UVZ deputy director Vyacheslav Khalitov mentioned the possibility.184F185\n\n## 2019\n\nGaltel: The robotic system **Galtel,** an intelligence collector and sapper, was tested in Syria's coastal waters. It orients itself underwater based on elements of a hydroacoustic navigation system. The system sets out coordinates and a reference point can be fixed with the help of the underwater beacons, since GPS and GLONASS signals do not penetrate to the bottom. The **Galtel** system includes an unmanned television guided underwater vehicle and two autonomous unmanned submarines with an autonomous cruising range of up to 24 hours and up to 100 kilometers.185F186 Marker: A **Marker** ground robot platform is under testing, with components associated with synthetic vision and group command and control.186F187 Paladin: This combat robot complex was displayed by High-Precision Complexes Holding Company (part of Rostec) at the Army-2019 forum. Basic hardware is the Dragun unmanned fighting module on a robotized BMP-3 chassis. It has two 100-mm and 30-mm guns and can operate in both autonomous and remotely controlled modes. Sergey Abramov, Rostec Industrial Director, said the complex can perform fire support, hold bridgeheads, break through lines of enemy defense, and transport personnel.187F188\nPoseidon: The Russian UUV **Poseidon**, previously codenamed **Status-6** and **Kanyon** by NATO, is said to have speeds of 200 kph. The UUV's path to a target will not be a straight line but rather is a constantly changing route.188F189 Poverkhnost: This smart minefield contains explosive charges that can identify ships, other vessels, and submarines by their magnetic field or acoustic footprint. Its AI system decides which target to blow up and when.189F190\nSarma and Vityaz: The **Sarma** robot will initially operate on classic batteries.190F191 The Malakhit Design Bureau oversees two departments that are associated with maritime robotics. Igor Denisov, Deputy General Director of the FPI, noted that Russia is working on the **Sarma** Project, a superautonomous unmanned submersible. The submersible has energy autonomy and a cruising range of 10,000 kilometers.  It has civilian use as well. The **Vityaz** Project is under testing. It is a superdeep-sea submersible with self-sufficient days of use and a design depth of 12 kilometers.\nSfera and Skarabey: These are miniature wireless examination systems, meant to collect and transmit audio and video data from areas that are difficult to access or dangerous for humans. **Sfera**\ncontains four video cameras and is equipped with a system of vertical positioning. It is remotecontrolled and weighs no more than 610 grams. It has a 20-minute battery from no less than 50 meters.191F192 It can destroy an explosive device with a mass of up to one kilogram of TNT equivalent. The **Skarabey** and **Sfera** reconnaissance and surveillance systems can be thrown several meters onto a hard surface, or to the top floor of a building or into the ruins of a destroyed building.  The Skarabey has a 45-minute power supply. The devices can offer information about hidden enemy fighters or hidden explosives.192F193 Skiff: Mini submarines designed in the Akademik Makeyev State Missile Center jointly with the Rubin Central Design Bureau (TsKB), bear the name **Skiff,** with the purpose being to inflict surprise strikes from the ocean depths. Essentially, the article notes, the **Skiff** is not a submarine but rather a bottom-based ballistic missile. It lies on the ocean bottom for long periods of time and upon receipt of a command can strike a target at ranges beyond 300 kilometers.193F194\nUran-6: This mobile robotic mine clearance system has four video cameras. It can precede an operator by up to 800 meters. The robots console can be carried on the back of an operator with the use of an exoskeleton frame. The EO-1 passive exoskeleton was tested in Syria. The multi-lift transport system loads the Uran-6 onto a Kamaz truck, according to Vitaliy Kushnir, deputy chief of the Engineering Troops Directorate Combat Training Department.194F195\n\n## Uavs (All Citations From 2019):\n\nOrlon-10 carries munitions on board and can conduct operations at a distance of up to 100 km. It has been used in Syria and can stay in the air for up to 14 hours, rising to a height of 5 km. It can independently conduct electronic or visual reconnaissance and detect target coordinates by collecting signals of cell phone and wireless devices. Newer models have 12 high-resolution cameras. They are usually deployed in attack groups along with other UAVs. **Orlan-10** and Forpost were used to support the Northern Fleet for the first time. Missions included escorting a large group of warships to provide reconnaissance to detect potential enemies and to assure missile strike precision. Airfield bases located near the Arctic can be used to base the UAVs.195F196\nA peacekeeping use of UAVs involved the **Orlan-10**, a four-drone system that can conduct reconnaissance up to 100 kilometers from the ground control station. It is equipped with secure telemetry and a command channel, a two-state jam-resistant encoding, and a secure channel of transmission of photo- and video information. It conducts reconnaissance deep behind defensive lines of warring sides for peacekeeping forces.196F197 Another article noted that the **Orlan-10** has a launch weight of 14-18 kilograms and can carry a payload of five kilograms. It can attain a speed of 170 kilometers per hour and transmit pictures from 120 kilometers. Some UAVs are for specific reconnaissance use. An unnamed UAV was described as a helicopter class UAV armed with a radio reconnaissance station. It can conduct intelligence collection at an altitude of 4.5 kilometers and has an operational radius of 100 kilometers.197F198 Other UAVs, such as **Altair**, have specific reconnaissance and strike operations. Under development since 2015 by the Kazan-based Simonov Design Bureau, it is designed to be a reconnaissance and strike UAV. It is made of composite materials with only the engine mounts metallic. It has optics and a lateralscan radar, and few weight limitations in terms of light modes (the craft itself is said to weigh six or seven tons). The need for such a system was motivated by Russia's combat experience in Syria, where each offensive operation depended first on aerial reconnaissance using UAVs. It is uncertain when the **Altair** will be deployed.198F199 One report noted that its payload is two tons, and that the craft is capable of flying 10,000 kilometers and able to climb to 12 kilometers, with an autonomous flight of two days.199F200 Other Western reports have stated it is now only a reconnaissance UAV.\n\nThe **Okhotnik S-70** is designed to be a strike UAV. Developed by the Sukoy Company, it is designed to be a heavy stealthy reconnaissance-strike UAV. Its takeoff weight is 25 tons, of which 2.8 tons is weaponry. At low altitude it can achieve a supersonic speed of 1,400 kilometers per hour and a flight range of 5,000 kilometers. It is limited in its maneuverability (it has no vertical tail assembly).200F201 The Central Military District reported that UAVs were used as reconnaissance strike and fire complexes with the employment of aircraft and artillery systems. The operator's control panel can simultaneously command and control four other drones.201F202 Since 2015, **Granat-1, Granat-4,** and **Zastava** UAVs have been in the Far East and now Orlan-\n10s are there. The latter are deployed in detachments of three UAVs, with the first collecting intelligence at an altitude of 1-1.5 kilometers; the second carries EW equipment and is located higher; and the third operates at altitudes of 4.5-5 kilometers and retransmits video and other data to the base. **Orlan-10s** can carry a bomb payload and be equipped with day and night cameras, thermal imagers, and stay in the air up to 14 hours.202F203\nRussia reportedly has three UAVs under development for use in the Arctic. The **ZALA** Arctic UAVs can perform missions that ensure maritime safety navigation, perimeter protection, and coastline and territorial water monitoring. The **ZALA 421-08M** and **421-16Ye** systems can work in sub-zero temperatures to conduct reconnaissance operations. They are fitted with automatic identification systems that can detect and identify (name, dimensions, heading, speed) ships at distances up to 100 kilometers. **ZALA** incorporates its own GIRSAM alternative navigation system. Other systems, such as the VRT 300 Arctic Supervision vehicle, a helicopter-type UAV, whose coaxial contra-rotating rotors increase stability in strong winds, is under development, weighing 300 kilograms and able to use a payload weighing 70 kilograms. Finally, the **Triada**\nconvertiplane is an aircraft/helicopter hybrid with a vertical takeoff and horizontal landing capability. It has a range of between 80 and 1,600 kilometers. It can photograph objects up to 5\nkilometers and can stay airborne for eight hours.203F204\n204 Aleksandr Khokhlov, \"In Both Heat and Cold: New Russian UAVs Adapted for Operations in the Arctic,\"\nYezhenedelnik Zvezda, 9 January 2019.\n\n\nTop set of six photos, left to right: Assault Engineer Robot: N. V. Babin, O. N. Ivanyushenko, and N. N. Magdalinov, \"Several Aspects for the Combat Use of Engineering Robot Technical Complexes during Assaults and Obstacle Clearing,\" Voennaya Mysl' (Military Thought), No. 6 2019, p. 145. Uran-9: V.T. Bebeshev, D. N. Metelev, \"Provision of the Comprehensive Security for Ground-based Military Robotic Units,\" *Voennaya Mysl' (Military Thought*), No. 2 2021, p. 120. Vikhr, Sorotnik, and Mars (last two in bottom layer, left to right): A. Kalistratov, \"Robots, Into Battle! Military Robotic Devices in the Warfare of Today,\" *Armeyskiy Sbornik (Army Journal*), No. 10 2017, Vikhr p. 40, Sorotnik and Mars p. 41. Uran-6 (last photo on the right, bottom layer): M. A. Moklyakov and A. M. Bylenkov, \"Present-Day Development Trends in Engineer Troops Robotechnology,\" *Voennaya Mysl' (Military Thought),* No. 4 2019, p. 46."
    },
    {
        "text": "# Identity Intelligence:  From Reactionary Support To Sustained Enabler\n\nDIA Identity Intelligence Project Office (I2PO)\nDalton Jones, DIA Senior Expert for Biometrics Duane Blackburn, MITRE\n21 August 2012\nThis briefing is classified UNCLASSIFIED\n\n## A Look Back At Fielded Dod Biometric Capabilities\n\nMobile identification technology\n\nStores and matches fingerprint, iris and face\n\nMatches against an onboard database and/or watchlist\nAuthoritative database\n| -   | Forensic analysis of latent biometric samples    |\n|-----|--------------------------------------------------|\n| -   | Link an individual to an event                   |\n\n## 2006 - Creation Of The Bewl Defense Intelligence Agency Now:  A Changing (Diametric?) Environment\n\n Advancement of capabilities\n Improved accuracy and usability  User-focused systems\n Decreases in funding\n Sharp losses in Supplementals  Reduction of Core funding\n\n Draw down in Iraq and Afghanistan\n Increase in global operations requiring biometrics\n Strategic collections  Data Sharing:  interagency and international\n\nCOMMITTED\n           TO\n               EXCELLENCE\n                           IN\n                              DEFENSE\n                                       OF\n                                           THE\n                                               NATION\n\n## Identity Intelligence Project Office (I2Po)\n\nThe Identity Intelligence Project Office (I2PO) is the Agency focal point for DoD Identity Intelligence (I2). The office is organized to harmonize and advocate for DoD I2 requirements and capabilities, as well as ensure integration with national-level I2 plans and programs.  Function for this office include\n\n\nDefining Policy\n\nDefining the role of I2 in Post-War Security Environment\n\nEstablishing Data Standards\n\nFostering Interagency and Foreign Partner Information\nSharing\n\n## I2Po Stakeholder Relationships I2 - What's  It  All  About?   Individual Attributes Today We Train Our Analysts To Fixate On Threat Groups As A Whole - Things,\n\nintent, and capability\n Name based identification by most organizations are centered on Counter\nTerrorist,  Drug  Traffickers,  Human  Smugglers  and  Financiers  ...but  who  are  they\nreally...  biometrics provides positive identification and serves as the linchpin for\nfull exploitation of information\n Upon determining the Identity of an individual, Identity Intelligence (I2) captures\nand analyzes all of the informational attributes associated with the individual to fully illuminate their identity.\n Attributes include all biographic, digital signatures, familial connections, social networks,\nand criminal information as well as linkages to other people, places, events, locations, and weapons.\n While historically used in a tactical environment the associated Identity Intelligence\nis becoming of immense strategic value to combat global terrorism, weapons\nproliferation and support Homeland Security and International Partners\n\n## Long-Term Stabilization What Does The Future Hold?\n\n\n\"For  terrorists,  travel  documents  are  as  important  as  weapons.\nTerrorists must travel clandestinely to meet, train, plan, case targets, and gain access to attack. To them, international travel presents great danger, because they must surface to pass through\nregulated channels, present themselves to border security officials,\nor  attempt  to  circumvent  inspection  points.  \"  (**9-11 Commission**)\n\n\nBorder control systems based on biometric applications have become the solution of choice in identifying potential threats - expected to earn a double digit,  Compounded Annual Growth Rate of 17.6% from 2011 to 2019*\n\nBorder Control Market Assessment, estimates that the market will\nearn revenues of $8.74 billion by 2019, compared to $1.97 billion in\n2010*.\n# Dia Identity Intelligence Project Office (I2Po)\n\nDalton Jones, DIA Senior Expert for Biometrics Dalton.Jones@dodiis.mil; 703-907-0335\nDuane Blackburn, MITRE\nDBlackburn@mitre.org; 434-964-5023\n\n# 21 August 2012 This Briefing Is Classified\n\nUNCLASSIFIED"
    },
    {
        "text": "# Russian Disinformation Apparatus Taking Advantage Of\n\n## Coronavirus Concerns\n\n\n\nREPORT: The Global Engagement Center (GEC), through coordination with a trusted-partner, tracked the global activity of Russian state-linked false personas and proxies which often push disinformation and propaganda. Coronavirus has been a top subject for these accounts since 24 January. The Coronavirus, as a topic, is being propagated by these Russia-linked accounts in English, Spanish, Italian, German and French - indicating that this disinformation campaign is intended for a global audience.\n\nThese same Russia-linked accounts have previously been tracked by the GEC because of their involvement in the Chilean protests, the Yellow Jacket protests in France, the conflict in Syria, and other geopolitical events. (See companion document for an example of how one of these accounts pivots between the topics.)\n\n## Russia-Linked Accounts\n\n\n\nThe drastic increase in posts related to the Coronavirus, depicted in the above graph, is reflective of the global media coverage of the issue. Russia, following its known tactics, likely sees this as an opportunity to shape the global conversation against the United States and Western countries. Specifically, the false narratives being propagated by false Russian personas and proxies include:\n\n1. **Speculation about the origin of the virus:** Attributing the development of the virus to\nglobal bat community research conducted at the Wuhan Institute of Virology in China, and naming the scientist involved as the \"man behind the global coronavirus pandemic.\"\n\n\n2. Exacerbation of general concerns related to the Coronavirus by:\n- Amplification of a video originally posted by the *China Global Television Network*\nreporting that a second hospital in Wuhan had been expanded to accommodate additional beads.\n- Using catchy headlines to cause panic such as:\no \"BREAKING: Japan and Germany confirm coronavirus cases in individuals\nwho never travelled to Wuhan, China\"\no \"BREAKING: Japan confirms coronavirus case in individual who never\ntravelled to Wuhan, China.\n\n3. Blaming Bill Gates for running a simulation test six weeks prior to the outbreak in\nChina.\n\n4. Describing the Coronavirus as an engineered bioweapon.\n\n5. Attributing the appearance of the virus in China to the CIA:\n\n On 3 February, the narrative shifted to reports of Sinophobia circulating online, as demonstrated in the below tweet: Finally, the suspension of the ZeroHedge Twitter account led to another flurry of disinformation narratives. ZeroHedge's most recent post received high engagement (10,999 retweets and 14,300 likes), and focused on supposedly organic matter burning in Wuhan, as judged by increased levels of sulfur dioxide.\n\nANALYST COMMENT\nThe false claim accusing the United States of artificially creating the Coronavirus appears to have emerged in the Russian media on 20 January. The key disinformation narratives were set by the Russian observer on chemical and biological weapons Igor Nikulin, who reportedly had served on the UN Commission for Chemical & Biological Weapons from 1998 to2003. In an interview with Zvezda TV, an outlet run by the Russian Ministry of Defense, Nikulin stated that Coronavirus was potentially an American bioweapon aimed to pressure China. Nikulin also suggested that U.S. corporations could have created the virus in order to profit from selling pharmaceuticals to fight the disease. Nikulin mentioned that the United States operates around\n400 military bio labs around the world, where it conducts \"unsanctioned experiments.\"1\n\nThe anti-American conspiracy theory was picked up by a variety of Russian pro-Kremlin and state media. On 22 January, the issue was discussed on \"Vremya Pokazhet\" the political talk show broadcast on the state-funded television channel *Perviy Kanal*.2 One of the guests proposed that \"somebody is testing bioweapons and it is not the Chinese.\" On 25 January, the state news agency *RIA Novosty* quoted Vladimir Zhirinovsky, a controversial leader of the Russian party LDPR, who said that the Coronavirus was an American provocation to hurt China economically. Zhirinovsky pointed to similar past U.S. provocations such as H5N1\"bird flu\" and Creutzfeldt-\nJakob \"mad cow\" disease.3 As of 29 January, about two dozen additional media outlets also reported on his false claims.4 On 26 January, Zhirinovsky repeated disinformation during his appearance on \"Voskresniy Vecher with Vladimir Solovyov,\" the flagship political talk show on the stat TV channel *Rossiya 1*.5 Another popular political talk show on *Rossiya 1*, \"60 Minut\"\ndiscussed the conspiracy theory on 27 January, with one guest suggesting that the virus was possibly developed by either the United States or China.6 Nikulin's \"perspective\" reappeared in the media on 26 January, when he was quoted on *REN TV*, a TV channel known for sensational, conspiracy theory-driven content; in Moscovskiy Komsomoletz, a mass circulation print daily with a tabloid reputation; and in the state news agency *RIA Novosti*.7 Nikulin said that the outbreak looked like a subversive activity against China conducted by one of the 400 U.S. military bio labs. *REN TV* added that in one such lab, the Lugar Center in Georgia, scientists had reportedly developed drones carrying malariainfected mosquitos.\n\nAccording to Nikulin, both the location and the timing of the outbreak were suspicious. Wuhan is a transportation hub and the outbreak took place on the eve of the Chinese New Year, when masses of people plan to travel abroad. He said that the U.S. Consulate in Wuhan could have delivered the virus. \"Everywhere where the American biolabs are present, there are outbreaks of diseases, which are often unknown,\" Nikulin added, citing an example of the lab in Georgia where \"more than 100 people died...in the vicinity of the lab in one month,\" but no journalists were allowed to enter the lab to investigate. On 1 and 8 February Nikulin appeared on Perviy Kanal's political talk show \"Bolshaya Igra,\" repeating his false assertions.8 On 5 February, the\n\nCoronavirus disinformation was featured on Perviy Kanal's main news program \"Vremya.\"9 As of 29 January, Nikulin was quoted in about 20 outlets.10\nDisinformation on Coronavirus was also promoted on Russian state propaganda outlets targeting foreign audiences and appears to have been picked up globally:\n\n- *Sputnik Azerbaijan*: it is very probable that the United States is using Coronavirus to\nundermine the Chinese economy and reduce the Chinese population.11\n- *Sputnik Mundo*: the United States may be purposely spreading panic about Coronavirus\nto isolate China.12\n- *Sputnik Belarus*: Coronavirus is the West's revenge for China refusing to become hostile\ntowards Russia.13\n- RT Arabic, Face Iraq, Assennara, Veto Gate, Sana, Syria Friends, Sada News, Alwasat\nToday, Almayadeen, Lebanon Today, Shafaqna, AlKuwait Online, Shamra, Albawabh News, Wattan TV, Oman Info, Asian Society Information Agency, al-Azmenah, Akhbarak.net, Iraq Orl, Almasdar, Sada 4 Press, Iraq Akhbar, EM News, Akhbaar, News Sinaa, Head Topics, National Iraqi News Agency, Syrian News Station, Bawabaa News,\nAlmogaz, al-Qalam Centre, and *Min al-Akher*: the United States is behind the spread of\ncoronavirus.14\n- A video released by *Shri Lankan Hiru TV* on social media, reporting on the trending\npiece that states that Russian scientists claim that the novel Coronavirus is a biological weapon created by the United States, trended heavily on online including on WhatsApp\nand Viber.15\nrussia/"
    },
    {
        "text": "## The Spring '90 Symposium\n\nTHE\nCENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY\nLANGLEY, VIRGINIA\n\n## We Gratefully Acknowledge Support To The Fall '90 Symposium Provided By\n\nMr. Jake Ackerman\nCentral Intelligence Agency\nMr. Dave Bond\nCentral Intelligence Agency\nMs. Mary Bourne\nCentral Intelligence Agency\nMr. James Bryant\nNational Security Agency\nMs. Donna Cooper\nCentral Intelligence Agency\nMr. George Cotter\nNationa l Security Agency\nMs. Linda Godwin\nGuest Services Inc.\nMr. James Hirsch\nCentral Intelligence Agency\nMr. Mike Lewis\nCentral Intelligence Agency\nMr. Damian Martineau\nGuest Services Inc.\nMs. Beth Meier\nCentral Intelligence Agency\nMs. Rose Miller\nCentral Intelligence Agency\nMr. Melvin Turner\nNational Security Agency\nMr. Jim Wood\nCentral lntelligency Agency\n\n## The Security Affairs Support Association Welcome:\n\nOn the threshold of the new decade, SA SA is\n\nlooking ahead to the challenges emerging in the\nwake of the dramatic developments that have\ntaken place recently--and continue to un-\nfold--on the world scene. Clearly, these\nhappe nings will alt er o ur natio n 's\nmodus vivendi of many years. There is, how-\never, much to be resolved before anything\napproaching clari1y removes the prevailing uncertainties. As we seek to understand what has and is happening, SASA\nwill continue it's traditional focus on the national intelligence endeavor\nand in so doing will place new programatic emphasis on the identifica-\ntion and examination of those particular elements of change to which\nthe endeavor will most likely have to respond. In consonance with that\nintention, the Spring '90 program has been designed as our initial\nexploration of world events and their possible implications f or the\nnational intelligence endeavor in thefurure.\n\nAs is readily apparent f rom a review of the program, we have again\n\nbeen ex1remely f ortunate in being able to arrange for the participation\nof an outstanding group of key professionals from government and\nindustry to enlighten us with their perspectives on the occurrences of\nreLent months--to each of them, we are deeply indebted.\n\nAnd to our host, the Central!melligence Agency, for permilling us\n\nonce more to enjoy their superb facilities and warm hospitality, we are most grateful.\n\nSincerely,\n\n## The Security Affairs Support Association Saturday, 21 April 1990\n\n0700-0830\nRegistration\n\n## Administrative Announcements\n\n0830- 0835\n0835 -0845\n\n## Opening Remarks\n\n:The Honorable E. C. .. .f!;!! .. Aldridge, Jr.\nPresident, SASA\n\n0845-0930\n\n## Keynote Address\n\nThe Honorable Duane P. Andrews\nAssistanJ *Secrewry* t~[ Dt'finw\nCommand. Control. Communitativm and lnulligt'nce\n\n## Session I\n\nThe session wi/J deal with major intelligence topio ami providt' a strategic forecast for each area.\n\n|                        |                            |            |        |          |         |       |     | 0930-   |  1000    |\n|------------------------|----------------------------|------------|--------|----------|---------|-------|-----|---------|----------|\n| U.                     | S.                         | MILITARY   | FORCES | AND      | THE     | C     | HAN | GING    | THREAT   |\n| Gene                   | r                          | a          | l~fr   | ed       |         |       |     |         |          |\n| M.                     | Gray,                      | USMC       |        |          |         |       |     |         |          |\n| Commandant,            | United States Marine Corps |            |        |          |         |       |     |         |          |\n| 1000-                  | 1030                       |            |        |          |         |       |     |         |          |\n| WEAPONS                | SYSTEMS                    | AND        | ARMS   | CONl     | ROL     |       |     |         |          |\n| Mr.I3JII>df            | Foo                        | rd         |        |          |         |       |     |         |          |\n| ~                      |                            |            |        |          |         |       |     |         |          |\n| '-                     |                            |            |        |          |         |       |     |         |          |\n| Dire<tor. Office      | of                         | Scientific | and    | Wt      | ap      | ons R | e.  | \\      | eanh    |\n| Cemra                  | lflll                      | elligence  | Agency |          |         |       |     |         |          |\n| 1030-                  | 1050                       |            |        |          |         |       |     |         |          |\n| Br                     | eak                        |            |        |          |         |       |     |         |          |\n| 1050-                  | 1120                       |            |        |          |         |       |     |         |          |\n| ECONOMICS              | AND                        | TRADE      |        |          |         |       |     |         |          |\n| Ms                     | .                          | ~K.        |        |          |         |       |     |         |          |\n| Van                    | Clene                      |            |        |          |         |       |     |         |          |\n| Assi.Hant Director. N- | ational                    | Security   |        |          |         |       |     |         |          |\n| A.ffair.~              |                            |            |        |          |         |       |     |         |          |\n| Office                 | of                         | Stience   | and    | Tec      | hnology |       |     |         |          |\n| Poli                   | ( l'                       |            |        |          |         |       |     |         |          |\n| Executive              | OJTice                     | oft        | he     | Presidnn |         |       |     |         |          |\n| 1120 - 1150            |                            |            |        |          |         |       |     |         |          |\n\n## Unconventional Targets\n\n| I                   | ,\\..                |\n|---------------------|---------------------|\n| Mr                  | . Karl              |\n| W.                  |                     |\n| Ruyle               |                     |\n| Deputy Chief, o     | ffi                 |\n| 11                  | 50-                 |\n| COUNTERINTELLIGENCE |                     |\n| Mr                  | .                   |\n| Ug!)E              | .                   |\n| Pri                 | ce                  |\n| 71fii;):J           |                     |\n| Associate           | Deputy              |\n| for                 | Counterintelligence |\n| 12                  | 20 - 1330           |\n| Lunch               |                     |\n\n## Session Ii\n\n11ri:-. se\\'l'ion ll'iJI dNtl,with imefiiKl'me disciplim.\\ {J/1{/ whdisciplines\n1\\\"ith .\\fJeaker., d('.H'r*ihin*x the 1/rtllc'K i<' direnio/1.\\' tluJI they se' ahead:\nmajm l'rohlcm' ami ;,,\\'11'.\\: t'mphmi., 011 ll't'hnolo).!y needs.\n\n## Sess Ion K Ey~Ote Address\n\nl.lJ0 - 1400\nThe llonorable ~\nC Faga /71A11!-7}<\nb\\ilfmll Seattarr oft he Atr l'orN! (Space)\nA .H'IIior l'roxram Mmw!{c'r\\ \\'W\\\\'ofthedtmmulsand{Jre:o.sufl'.l. cross\n{Jrogram iiHf'Natht'.' hridgmg from rt'qllirtmtlll.\\' aml cu.Hmners to\n{m g/'(*1/1/*.\\ am/ .l_l'.l'tt'llll.\n\n1400- 1430\n\n## S L~~~~~~:,;W Ja<-1'\n\nCme( o( Swfl I\\'atiunal St'ctnity A,t:l' III 'J'\n\n| ELl        | NT                      | I N     |\n|------------|-------------------------|---------|\n| 14         | 30 - 1500               |         |\n| ('u        | lnnel Gerald F. Custin, | USAF    |\n| {)l'fJI(tJ | '                       |         |\n| Chiet:     |                         |         |\n| Ojjlce     |                         |         |\n| t~(        |                         |         |\n| EL         | IN'T                    |         |\n| /'         | 1                       | /miona/ |\n| St         | c                      | urity   |\n| Agt        | '                       | lllT    |\n| Break      |                         |         |\n| 1500 - 1   |                         |         |\n| 52         | 0                       |         |\n\n## N . .\\ L\"Tiral Language Sys I Fms\n\n1520 - 1550\nMr. Mnrris B. J..e,ine\n/??1?4 e.,_.;:-\nChit~/: *0(1/('('* t ~f' Tcdmic'al Support\n\nl\\'tuional Stnlfitl' !lgt'll(l'\n\n| I          | NH>RMA     | li          |\n|------------|------------|-------------|\n| TECH~OLOGY |            |             |\n| 1          |            |             |\n| 550-       |            |             |\n| H>         | 20         |             |\n| Mr.        | David      |             |\n| L.         |            |             |\n| Austin     |            |             |\n| ~;9~G'\"    |            |             |\n| A          | 1.11\\'tlmt |             |\n| f          | )tpt~ty    |             |\n| /Jm        | t'lor.    |             |\n| /'&        | CS         |             |\n| (Tel       | '          | lllwlo~op') |\n\n!Vat irma! St'ntrity A,i,'t'llt')'\n\n|          | MAS      | I   | NT        |\n|----------|----------|-----|-----------|\n| 16       | 20 -     | 16  | 50        |\n| Mr       | .        | Ah  | in Bales |\n| I        |          |     |           |\n| t        | ee       |     |           |\n| ChmnHon. |          |     |           |\n| n        | Ci       | :\\ |           |\n| MAS/NT   | Commit   | tee |           |\n| lh       | :ccption |     |           |\n| 1700 - 1 | '100     |     |           |\n\n## Sunday, 22 Ai'Ril 1990\n\nRegistration\n\n0700 - OH30\n\nIMAGERY OVERVI EW\n\n0830 - 0900\n\nMr .~\nStrand Chairman. IJCI :\\ COM/R EX Committee\n\n0900 - 0930\n\n## Imager Y Collection And Processi Ng System S\n\n| Mr           |  .   |  ~    |\n|--------------|------|-------|\n| J.           |      |       |\n| Ruocco       |      |       |\n| Dtr          | tc  | tur   |\n| National Plu | nog  | raplt |\n| 0930 -       |      |       |\n| 1000         |      |       |\n\n## Imagery Dissemi Nation Systems Mro~;:~~~D~!~~ ~!;Am ~&~ Collection Tmd Imagery Activities Defen!'Je Lmelligence Agenc_1\n\n1000 - 1030\n\n## Mr. T~~:,!~~:Etten ~\n\n| Associau Depw y    | Dm                            | t       | torfor    | Optfilflmt.\\    |\n|---------------------|-------------------------------|-----------|-----------|------------------|\n| Cn                  | ural /nullixtnn A),\"t'm'l' |           |           |                  |\n| 10                  | 30 -                          | 10        | 50        |                  |\n| Br                  | ci.l                          | k         |           |                  |\n| 10                  | 50-                           | 1         | 22        | 0                |\n| I N                 | DU                            | STRY      | ROUND     | T                |\n| All                 |                               |           |           |                  |\n| of                  |                               |           |           |                  |\n| 1/                  | w                             |           |           |                  |\n| round10             | hh                           | participt | mt        | s are            |\n| nwm                 | hns                           |           |           |                  |\n| of                  | industry u                    | i        | th        |                  |\n\nextensi\\'t' expt,;ence in U. S. illlelligence. 11wy will exrlumgt with altendees. th*eir* per.~p eCi ives on a broad sptttrum of concem J and uncertaimies regarding future intelligence actilities.\n\n## Moderator\n\nOr. Robert J. I-Iermann Viet Presitlem . Sl'ienct' & Technology Unitld Teclmologil.<i Corporation\n\n## Members\n\nThe Honorable E:. C. \"Pete\" Aldridge, Jr.\n\nPreshhnr McDonne/J Douglas Ehcrronic Sysums Company Mr. William Crowell Vice Pre.\\itlnu and Direcror Command. Cow rol, Communications aml lrllelligence Programs\n1\\ . A tlamic A er{)jpace Ehctronics Corpumtion Mr. R. Evans l-lineman Viet Presidem The Ana~J ' Iic Sciences Corpurmion The Honorable Donald C. Latham Presitlem. Cl J System Division Lockheed Missiles & Space Company. Inc.\n\n1220-1230\n\n## Closing Remarks\n\nThe Honorable E. C. \"Pete'' Aldridge, Jr.\n\nPresidem, SASA\n\n## The Honorable Duane P. Andrews\n\nMr. Andrews is the Assistant Secretary of Defense f~r Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence. His appointment dates from 20 November 1989.\n\nCommissioned a Second Lieultnant as a distinguished military graduate of the Air Force R.O.T.C.\n\nprogram, Mr. Andrews entered active duty in April\n1967, and served untill977 in assignments dealing with various intelligence analysis (including foreign command, control and communications systems) and resource/\nsystems management positions at the Foreign Technology Division, Wright-Patterson AFB, Ohio; 20th Tactical Air Support Squadron, DaNang Air Base, Republic of Vietnam; and the Directorates of Operational Intelligence and Resource Management, Headquarters US\nAir Force, Washington, D.C.\n\nIn 1977, Mr. Andrews became a Professional Staff Member, Subcommittee on Program and Budget Authorization, House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence as the principal reviewer for Department of Defense cryptologic, tactical intelligence and intelligence related activities includ'ing communications and computer security, electronic warfare. and strategic command, control and communications programs. In 1984, he became the principal program and budget reviewer for CIA programs and DOD cryptologic activities.\n\nMr. Andrews holds a OS Degree from the University of Florida(l967) and a Masters Degree in Management and Administration from Central Michigan University (1974). His military awards include the Bronze Star Medal, two Meritorious Service Medals, Air Force Commendation Medal and Republic of Vietnam Cross of Gallantry.\n\nGENERAL ALFRED M. GRAY, USMC\nGeneral Gray is the Commandant of the Marine Corps. He enlisted in the Marine Corps in 1950 and early tours included service with lith and 7th Marines,\n1st Marine Division in Korea, and Headquarters Marine Corps, during which he saw service in Guantanamo Bay and Vietnam.\n\nAs a Major, General Gray joined the 12th Marines.\n\n3rd Marine Division, Vietnam, in 1965, serving concurrently as regimental communications officer, regimental training officer, and artillery aerial observer. He commanded the Composite Artillery Battalion and U.S. Free World Forces at Gio Linh in April 1967; in September he was reassigned to the Ill Marine Amphibious Force in Da Nang where he commanded the 1st Radio Battalion elements throughout 1 Corps until February 1968. Following a brief tour in the United States, he returned to Vietnam in 1969 in conjunction with surveillance and reconnaissance matters.\n\nAfter his Vietnam tour, General Gray served as Commanding Officer of the 1st Battalion,\n2nd Marines: Battalion Landing Team 1/2; and 2nd Marines; the 4th Marines; and Camp Commander of Camp Hansen, Okinawa. While Commanding the 33rd Marine Amphibious Unit and Regimental landing Team-4, and concurrently serving as Deputy commander, 9th Marine Amphibious Brigade, General Gray directed the Southeast Asia evacuation operations in 1975.\n\nAdvanced to Brigadier General in 1976, General Gray served as Commanding General, Landing Force Training Command, Atlantic, and the 4th Marine Amphibious Brigade.\n\nPromoted to Major General in 1980, he assumed command of the 2nd Marine Division, FM F, Atlantic in 1981. Following his promotion to Lieutenant General in 1984, he was assigned as Commanding General, FMF, Atlantic/Commanding General, II MAF, and Commanding General, FMF, Europe. General Gray was promoted to General and became Commandant nn\n\nMr. Foord is the Director of Scientific and Weapons Research, Central Intelligence Agency.\n\nHe graduated from the United States Naval Academy in 1961 and entered immediately on active duty serving with the U.S. Pacific Fleet as a Weapons Officer and Operations Officer. In 1965, he resigned from active duty with the Navy and entered the CIA Career Development Program after which in I967hebecameananalystintheagency's8allistic\n_ Missile Systems Branch. He assumed the post of Chief of the branch in 1973, remaining there until\n1977 when he was appointed to head the Offensive\n\"\nand Space Systems Division. In 1979, Mr. Foord became the Chief, Naval Systems Division and was designated as the CIA representative to the Weapons and Space Systems Intelligence Committee. He was appointed as Chief of the Science and Technology Division in 1981 and the Chairman of the Scientific and Technical Intelligence Committee remaining in those posts until 1984 when he became the Deputy Director of the Office of Scientific and Weapons Research.\n\nIn 1988, he was transferred to the Staff of the CIA Inspector General. Mr. Foord was reassigned to the Office of Scientific and Weapons Research as its Director, in 1989.\n\nTHE HONORABLE MARTIN C. FAGA\nMr. Faga is Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Space. He is responsible for overall supervision of Air Force space matters, with primary emphasis on policy, strategy and planning. He advises the Secretary and the Chief of Staff on space policies, plans, programs, budgets and operations. He develops broad goals, policies and guidance for USAF\nspace programs, and ensures comprehensive, integrated planning of those activities. Mr. Faga serves as the focal point for DOD and interagency matters concerning program and policy interactions involving the Air Force. This includes maintaining cooperative relations with the other military services, NASA, and the Executive departments responsible for commercial space activities. He assumed his present position in September 1989.\n\nMr. Faga was commissioned as a Second Lieutenant, USAF through the R.O.T.C.\n\nprogram. He was an R&D officer in the Air ForcefromJ963to 1968, working in the field of infrared reconnaissance and the application oflaser technology to reconnaissance. He worked briefly for the Perkin-Elmer Corp. before joining The MITRE Corp. in 1969 as a member of the technical staff, working in the field of remote sensors.\n\nIn 1972, Mr. Faga joined the Central Intelligence Agency, working on advanced technical systems for intelligence collection. He became a member of the professional staff of the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, U.S. House of Representatives in 1977, assigned to the Program and Budget Authorization Subcommittee. In 1984, he became head of the subcommittee staff. His responsibilities included staff oversight of technical collection programs and coordination of all subcommittee work.\n\nMr. Faga holds a BS Degree (1963) and an MS Degree (1964) both in Electrical Engineering from Lehigh University.\n\n# B G\n\nMr. Devine is the Chief of Staff, National Security Agency.\n\n..\n\nPrior to assuming his current position, Mr. Devine was Deputy Director for Plans and Policy, NSA, from July 1987 to March 1989. He served as Assistant Deputy Director for Research and Engineering (Systems Acquisition) from July 1986 to July 1987; as Assistant Deputy Director for Plans and Policy from January to July 1986 and as Director of Plans, Plans and Policy Organization, 1984 to 1986\nMr. Devine was Chief of the Joint Programs Group in the Research and Engineering Organization during\n1983-84 and managed the development of a major NSA\nprogram from 1979 until 1983. Mr. Devine entered employment with NSA in 1960 as a design engineer and later served in a nuinber of system engineering and program management positions. He held a field assignment in Germany between 1966-68.\n\nMr. Devine was awarded the Presidential Rank Award of Meritorious Executive in 1983.\n\nHe received the NSA Exceptional Civilian Service Award in 1984 and the Presidential Rank Award of Distinguished Executive in 1989.\n\nMr. Devine holds a BS Degree in Electrical Engineering from Villanova University (1960)\nand performed graduate studies at Catholic University (1960-1964).\n\nNational Security Agency.\n\nHe was commissioned in March 1963 and was assigned to _undergraduate navigation training. He completed training as an Electronic Warfare (EW)\nOfficer in October 1964.\n\nFrom November 1964 until mid-1967, he was assigned as anEW Officer at the4713th Defense System Evaluation Squadron at Stewart AFB, New York.\n\nIn 1968, he was assigned to the 4 1st Tactical Electronic Warfare Squadron, Takhli RTAFB, Thailand.\n\nDuring this tour, he flew EB-66B/C/E aircraft and completed over 130 sorties. He was next assigned to the 7405 Support Squadron, Wiebaden flying special air missions in C-97 aircraft. In May 1970, he was rcasigned to HQ USA FE Intelligence until mid-1973 when he was. assigned to NSA. In 1975, he attended ACSC, Maxwell AFB, Alabama and upon graduation assigned to HQ Allied Air Force Southern Europe, Naples, Italy.\n\nHe completed the Air War College in 198 1 and was assigned to Electronic Security Command, Kelly AFB, Texas where he served as Chief, Exploitation Division within the Directorate of Offensive Operations through December 1982. In January 1983, Colonel Costin was assigned to Ramstein AB, Germany with Headquarters Electronic Security Division, Europe, and served as Director of Operations and Plans. In April 1984,he was reassigned as the Commander, European Defense Analysis Center, Stuttgart, Germany.\n\nColonel Custin holds a Bachelor's Degree in Political Science from St. Joseph's College\n(1962) and an MA Degree in Counseling from Ball State University (1972).\n\n# B 0 G R A P H E S\n\nMr. Levine is Chief, Office of Technical Support, NSA.\n\nUntilJune 1988, Mr. Levine was Deputy Director RAMPAGE Special Program Office and Senior DDO representative to the SPO. The SPO was an integrated DDR/DDOjDDT organization established to deliver the next generation of advanced resources processing systems. During 1986-87, he was Chief of a joint NSA-lntelligence Community organization directing the operational use of national resources. From 1983 to 1986, he was Chief of the Advanced Systems Planning organization in the Operations Directorate. In 1980-83, he served as Deputy Chief of Operations at a major overseas facility. During the period 1976 to 1980, Mr. Levine was assigned to an NSA Operations Group staff, where he directed planning for a major new system upgrade. From 1962 to 1976, Mr. Levine served in a variety of assignments, both in the Air Force until 1967 and as a civilian thereafter. His career includes two years in industry, from 1968 to 1970.\n\nMr. Levine holds a BA Degree in Russian Studies from the University of Missouri\n(1962) and an MS Degree in Systems Management from the University of Southern California (1967).\n\nPrior to his present post which he assumed in\n1989, Mr. Austin was the Chief of the office responsible for Automatic Data Proeessing and Communications Plans and Project Development within the National Security Agency.\n\nBefore joining NSA, Mr. Austin was an Electronic Engineer with General Electric with ADP\ndevelopment responsibilities for a large missile tracking and guidance project.\n\nMr. Austin holds an MS Degree in Electronic Engineering from Syracuse University and has performed graduate studies in communications and computer design at George Washington University.\n\nHe received the DCI National Intelligence Medal of Achievement and the Meritorious Executive Achievement in the Senior Cryptologic Executive Service, a Presidential Rank Award in 1984.\n\n## B 0 G R A P H E S Mr. Alvin S. Bales\n\nMr. Bales was appointed Vice Chairman of the DCI's Measu~eme~t and Signature ln~elligence (MASINT)\nComm1ttee m October 1989.\n\nPrior to his current assignment, he served as Deputy Chief, SDIO Support Branch, in the DIA 's recently formed Weapons Acquisition Support Office.\n\nMr. Bales first joined the DIA as a naval analyst in\n1977. In 1981 , he accepted a rotational assignment with the Directorate for CoUections, DIA, which led to a progression of collection management assignments all relating to improved national intelligence support to operational commanders.\n\nMr. Bales served as a regular naval officer during the period 1966 to 1977. His early fleet assignments included: Heavy Photographic Squadron Six Two:\nCINCUSNAVEUR, and Carrier Division Six. Following a brief shore assignment with the Defense Intelligence Agency, he was reassigned to Southeast Asia in 1974-75 as Senior Vietnam Analyst, Commander, United States Support Activities Group (formerly MACV).\n\nHis duties involved current intelligence analysis and threat analysis support to the Joint Casualty Resolution Center and Special Operations Forces. Mr. Bales returned to CONUS as the Operations and Requirements Officer for the Navy's Task Force 157. He left active naval service in 1977 but remains active in the naval reserve.\n\nMr. Bales holds a BS Degree in Experimental Psychology from the University of Georgia\n(1966). He was awarded an MA Degree in Organizational Psychology by George Mason University in 1983.\n\nMr. Strand is Chairman of the DCI's Committee on Imagery Requirements and Exploitation (COMIREX).\n\nMr. Strand joined the CIA in 1963 and during his first two years was assigned to the National Photographic Interpretation Center. In 1965 he returned to his parent organization, the forerunner of the Office of Imagery Analysis, to work Warsaw Pact Ground Forces. Mr. Strand moved into the first of his management positions in 1967 as Chief of the Ground Forces Branch.\n\nDuring the next ten years he was assigned to different, increasingly responsible management positions within the Office of Imagery Analysis. In 1977, he was designated as Deputy Director of the office and in 1980 was appointed as Directoroftheoffice.ln 1985, Mr. Strand entered an academic year in the State Department Senior Seminar. He returned from the seminar in May 1986 to assume his current position as Chairman, COMIREX.\n\nMr. Strand was awarded the Certificate of Distinction in 1969 for his work in developing new innovative methods to analyze Soviet and Chinese ground forces from imagery. He received the CIA Meritorious Officer Award in 1985 and the CIA Distinguished Officer Award in 1989.\n\nHe holds a Bachelor's Degree in Geography from Carroll College (1960) and a Master's Degree in Geography and Geology from Michigan State University (1963).\n\n# 0 G R  A P H E S\n\nMr. Ruocco is the Director of the National Photographic Interpretation Center.\n\nHe was commissioned in the U.S. Navy in 1961\nand thereafter served for three years with the Naval Security Group in Charleston, South Carolina.\n\nMr. Ruocco joined the Central Intelligence Agency in 1965 and served in the Office of Strategic Research\n(OSR) and its predecessor organization until 1980.\n\nHe completed the Naval War College in 1975 and upon his return to the Agency was appointed a Branch Chief in OSR, a Deputy Division Chief in April 1978 and a Division Chief in May 1979.\n\nMr. Rucco was named Deputy Director of Imagery Analysis in May 1980. In November 1982, he became Chief, Collection Requirements and Evaluation Staff. He was appointed Director of Central Reference in February 1985 and in June 1986 became the Director of the newly formed Office of Information Resources. He assumed his present post as Director of the National Photographic Interpretation Center in February\n1988.\n\nMr. Ruocco holds a BA Degree in Economics from St. Peter's College, New Jersey\n(1961).\n\nMr. Langsam is the Deputy Director for Collection and Imagery Activities, Defense Intelligence Agency.\n\nHe joined DIA in 1964. Subsequently, from April\n1971 until October 1972, he was designated a Supervisory Intelligence Operations S.pecialist in the Exploitation Branch, Imagery DivisiOn, Director3te for Collection and Surveillance. From October 1972\nthrough June 1980, he served as a Supervisory Intelligence Specialist in the Exploitation Management Branch of the Imagery Division of the Directorate for Collection.\n\nIn June 1980, he became a Supervisory Intelligence Research Specialist in the Imagery Analysis Division of the Directorate for Research, and in March 1982, he was designated Chief of the Imagery Analysis Division where he remained until January 1986 at which time he was appointed Assistant Deputy Director for Imagery Exploitation in the Directorate for Foreign Intelligence. He assumed his present post in December 1988.\n\nMr. Langsam holds a Bachelor's Degree in History from Gettysburg College ( 1959). He attended the Industrial College of the Armed Forces ( 1977-78).\n\n# 8 0 G R A\n\nDr. Hermann was elected Vice President, Science and Technology, United Technologies Corporation in March,\n1987. In this position, Dr. Hermfnn is responsible for assuring the development of the company's technical resources and the full exploitation of science and technology by the corporation. He also has responsibility for the United Technologies Research Center and the United Technologies Microelectronics Center.\n\nPreviously he had been the Vice President-Systems Technology and Analysis in UTC's Defense and Space Systems Group. Dr. Hermann joined the company in 1982\nas Vice President, Systems Technology, in the Electronics Sector. He was named Vice President-Advanced Systems, Defense Systems Group in 1984.\n\nDr. Hermann served 20 years with the National Security Agency with assignments in Research and Development, Operations, and NATO. In 1977, he was appointed Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense fo r Communications, Command, Control and Intelligence. He was named Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Research, Development and Logistics in 1979, and Special Assistant for Intelligence to the Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering in 198 1.\n\nNaval Studies Board. He served as President, SASA, 1983-86.\n\nMr. Hineman is Vice President of The Analytic Sciences Corporation.\n\nFrom 1956-1958, Mr. Hineman served as a Technical Intelligence Officer with the Army Ordnance Corps. Following his military service, Mr. Hineman was employed as a Mechanical Engineer with the Army Ordnance Technical Intelligence Agency in Arlington, Virginia, and in 1962\njoined the Army Foreign Science and Technology Center as an Aerospace Engineer.\n\nIn 1964, Mr. Hineman joined CIA as a Physical Scientist assigned to the newly formed Trajectory Analysis Division of the Foreign Missile and Space Analysis Center\n(FMSAC). He held several responsible positions with FMSAC within the next nine years, including those of Chief oft he Project Staff and Chief, Systems Division. In\n1973, Mr. Hineman was appointed Deputy Director of Weapons a position held until June 1976 at which time he was appointed Director of Weapons Intelligence.\n\nIn October 1979, Mr. Hineman became Deputy Director, National Foreign Assessment Center, and remained in that post until January 1982 when, after a complete reorganization of NFAC, he became Associate Deputy Director of Intelligence.\n\nMr. Hineman was the CIA member to the Guided Missile and Astronautics Intelligence Committee(GMAIC) of USIBfrom 1967-1972. In June 1972, he becameChairmanofGMAIC until January\n1976when he was appointed Chairman of the Weapon and Space Systems Intelligence Committee, a newly formed DCI committee_ He continued as Chairman of WSSIC until October 1979 when he became Deputy Director, NFAC.\n\nIn July 1982, Mr. Hineman was appointed Deputy Director for Science and Technology and remained in that post until he retired from CIA in August 1989\nMr. Hineman holds a B.S. Degree in Mechanical Engineering from lafayette College (1956).\n\nMR. WILLIAM P. CROWELL\nMr. Crowell is Vice President and Director of Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence Programs, Atlantic Aerospace Electronics Corporation.\n\nUntil November 1989, Mr. Crowell was a memberofthe National Security Agency where he had served since 1962\nPrior to leaving NSA, he was Deputy Director for Programs and Resources.\n\nMr. Crowell was Chief of NSA's largest analytic group within the Operations Directorate from June 1985 to April\n1988. During this assignment, Mr. Crowell was a member of numerous senior advisory panels within the Intelligence Community and the CNO Advanced Technology Panel.\n\nFrom November 1983wJune 1985, he served as Chief of the Operations Group principally responsible for all Scientific and Technical Intelligence within NSA. He was January 1982.\n\nMr. Crowell was the Chairman of the Collection Suppon Requirements Subcommittee of the Joint Strategic Target Planning Stafr (JSTPS) Scientific Advisory Group (SAG) in which he served for three years. Recently, he was an advisor to the Defense Science Board Task Force on U.S.\n\nStrategic Weapons Modernization Program and is presently serving on the DNI Consultants Panel.\n\nMr. Crowell holds a BA in Political Science from Louisiana State University(l962). He attended George Washington University from 1962 to 1966, the Harvard University Program for Senior Executives in National and International Security Affairs in 1985, and the Harvard University Programs Defense Policy Seminar in June of 1988.\n\nTHE HONORABLE EDWARD C. ALDRIDGE, JR.\n\nMr. Aldridge is the President of McDonnell Douglas Electronic Systems Company (MDESC).\n\nHe was the Secretary of the Air Force from June 1986\nuntil December 1988. Previously, from 1981 to 1986, he served as the Under Secretary of the Air Force. In addition to his management responsibilities in this position, he provided overall direction, guidance and supervision for Air Force space programs.\n\nPrior to joining the Departmfi.~t of Defense initially in\n1967, Mr. Aldridge held varioU.s .. Staff and management positions with Douglas Aircraft Co., Missile and Space Divison, in Santa Monica, CA and in Washington, D.C.\n\nIn 1967, he joined the staff oft he Assistant Secretary of Defense for Systems Analysis as an operations research analyst and then served as Director of the Strategic Defensive Division until 1972.\n\nHe re-entered private industry in 1972 as a senior manager with LTV Aerospace Corp. in Dallas for a year until he was named senior management associate in the Office of Management and Budget.\n\nReturning to the Department of Defense in February 1974, Mr. Aldridge served as Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategic Programs until March 1976 when he was appointed, Director, Planning and Evaluation, a principal adviser to the Secretary of Defense in the planning and program evaluation of U.S. military forces and support structure.\n\nHe was named Vice President, National Policy and Strategic Systems Group for the System Planning Corporation, Arlington, VA, in March 1977 and remained with SPC until 1981.\n\nMr. Aldridge holds a B.S. Degree in Aeronautical Engineering, Texas A&M University (1960) and an M.S. Degree in Aeronautical Engineering, Georgia Institute of Technology (1962).\n\n## The Honorable Donald C. Latham Mr. Latham Is President Cji Division, Lockheed\n\nMissiles and Space Company. Prio'tto his current position he was Vice President, Systems Group, Computer Sciences Corporation. Mr. Latham served as the Assistant Secretary of Defense CJI from August 1984 until July 1987. Previously he had served as the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense CJJ from July 1981. Prior to his Pentagon assignments, he was Division Vice President, Engineering, RCA Government Systems Division, since December 1978. Before joining RCA, Mr.\n\nLatham was Director, Research and Engineering, for Martin Marietta Aerospace, Orlando, Florida.\n\nStarting as a member of the technical staff at Martin Marietta Aerospace in Baltimore in 1963, Mr. Latham was transferred to the Orlando Division in 1965 and promoted to Manager, Advanced Programs. In 1968, he Oecame Manager, Air and Ballistic Missile Defense Systems at the Orlando Facility.\n\nIn 197 1, he left Martin Marietta to become Chief-Engineering Staff, of the NSA European Headquarters. In 1974, NSA appointed Mr. Latham as Deputy Chief, Office of Microwave Space and Mobile Systems. In January 1977, he accepted the Research and Engineering directorship at Martin Marietta.\n\nAs an Air Force officer, Mr. Latham was assigned to research and development activities at NSA from 1957 to 1959.\n\nMr. Latham holds a B.S. Degree in Electrical Engineering from The Citadel ( 1955). He was awarded an M.S. Degree in Electrical Engineering and an advanced Electrical Engineering Degree from the University of Arizona in 1957 and 1965, respectively.\n\n(See next page for additional Biographies)\nMS. MICHELLE K. VAN CLEAVE\nMs. Van Cleave was reappointed Assistant Director for National Security Affairs and Counsel, White House Office of Science and Technology Policy, on I October 1989--positions she had held from August 1987 through February 1989. Prior to rejoining OSTP, Ms. Van Cleave served as Republican Counsel to the Committee on Science, Space, and Technology, U.S. House of Representatives.\n\nFrom 1981 through July 1987, Ms. Van Cleave was Assistant for Defense and Foreign Policy to Congressman Jack Kemp(R-NY), sen.ing concurrently as National Security Assistant to the House Republican Conference and Associate Staff Member, House Appropriations Subcommittee on Foreign Operations.\n\nMs. Van Cleave was Coordinator and Staff Attorney in the Office of the General Counsel,\n1981 Presidential Inaugural Committee, and assisted in the work of the Department of Defense Transition Team Office of President-elect Reagan 1980. At the Republican Convention in 1984, Ms. Van Cleave was a member of the Platform Committee Staff, with responsibility for foreign policy.\n\nMs. Van Cleave has served as a member of the Board of Advisors, Center fo r Security Policy, and as consultant to the Heritage Foundation, the Fund for an American Renaissance, and the American Security Council. She also served as a Congressional Staff Advisor to the U.S. delegation to the United Nations Second Special Session on Disarmament.\n\nMs. Van Cleave holds B.A. and M.A. Degrees in International Relations from the University of Southern California and a J.D. from the U.S.C. School of Law. She is a member oft he State Bar of California.\n\nMR. KARL W. RUYLE\nMr. Ruyle is the Deputy Chief, DCI's Counterterrorist Center.\n\nHe joined the Central Intelligence Agency in 1967 through the agency's Career Training Program and since that time has had numerous positions within the Directorate of Intelligence. His many assignments included, Chief, Arab-Israeli Division; Chief, Persian Gulf Division; and Chief, Product Evaluation Staff.\n\nIn 1986, Mr. Ruyle was designated Vice Chairman of the OCt's SIGINT Committee and in I 989, he became Deputy Chief of the DCI's Counterterrorist Center, a post he presently holds.\n\nMR. THOMA!' A. TWETTEN\nMr. Twetten is the Associate Deputy Director for Operations, Central Intelligence Agency. Mr. Twetten entered U.S. Government service in 1961. He was appointed to his present position in June 198ft ..\n\nHe has served overseas for 19jrears to incluCJe.tours in Nigeria, Libya, Ghana, India and Jordan.\n\nMr. Twetten holds a B.S. Degree in Psychology from Iowa State University (1957) and an M.A. Degree in International Affairs from Columbia University (1961).\n\n{No Photo Available)\nSASA is pleased to note the attendance of individuals from the following organizations. o o Aerojet Electro Systems\n*AIL Systems, Inc.\n\nAir Force Electronic Security Command American Nucleonics Corporation American Systems Corporation Ampex Corporation Analytics, Inc.\n\n*ARC Professional Services Group ARGOSystems, Inc.\n\nAssistant Secretary of Air Force (Space)\nAssistant Secretary of Defense CJI\nAT&T Federal Systems Atlantic Aerospace & Electronics Corp.\n\nAutometric, Inc.\n\nBall Aerospace Systems Group BDM International, Inc.\n\n*Betac Corporation *Boeing Aerospace Company Bolt, Beranek & Newman, Inc.\n\n*Booz, Allen & Hamilton, Inc. *BTG, Inc.\nCalifornia Microwave, Inc.\nCentral Intelligence Agency Codem Systems, Inc.\nCommunications Systems Technology, Inc.\ncomputer Sciences Corporation\nComsat Corporation\n*CONTEL Federal Systems, Inc.\nControl Data Corporation\n*Cray Research, Inc.\n*Dan Hearn, Consultant\n*Datatape, Inc.\n*DBA Systems, Inc.\nDCI's COM I REX Committee\nDCI's MASINT Committee\nDefense Communications Agency Defense Intelligence Agency\nDepartment of State DGM&S, Inc.\n\n*Digital Equipment Corporation Digital Signal Corporation DoD Security Institute E-Systems, Inc. - CAPA\n*E Systems, Inc.- Garland Division\n*E-Systems, Inc. - Melpar Division Eastman Kodak Company Electrospace Systems, Inc.\n\nEngineering Research Associates Eos Technologies, Inc.\n\n*ESL, Inc.\n\n*Essex Corporation\n*Fairchild Communications & Electronics Co.\n\nFederal Emergency Management Agency\n*Ford Aerospace & Communications Corporation G E Aerospace\n*General Dynamics Electronics Division\n*General Electric Company Space Systems Division Geo-Com., Inc.\n\nGoldberg Computer Consultants, Inc.\n\nGrumman Space Systems Division\n*GTE Government Systems Corporation\n*Harris Corporation Harvard University House Permanent SeleCt Committee for Intelligence\n*HRB Systems, Inc.\n\nHughes Aircraft Co., GSG\nHughes Aircraft Co. Elec.- Opt. & Data Systems\n*Hughes Aircraft Company- Washington Office\n*Hughes Danbury Optical Systems, Inc.\n\nHughes Research Laboratories Hull & Company\n*IBM Corporation Ideas, Inc.\n\nIntelligence<:ommunity Staff International Imaging Systems, Inc.\n\nJAYCOR\nJet Propulsion Laboratory Joseph R. Lucas & Company LDF, Inc.\n\n*Litton ltck Optical Systems Lockheed Corporation\n*Lockheed Missiles & Space Company, Inc.\n\nLockheed Sanders, Inc.\n\n*Logicon. Inc. *Lora! Electronics Systems\n*LTV Missiles & Electronics Group\n\n Magna vox Electronics Systems.., Inc.\n*Martin Marietta Corporation\n Marti n Marietta Information Sys'.cms Group\n*Martin Marietta Space Systems Company, Inc.\n Maxim Techno logies, Inc.- Consultant\n\n*McDonnell Do uglas Electronic Systems Company\n*Mirage Systems\n\nM K-Fcrguson Compa ny\n\n*M otorola Strategic Electronics Division\n*MRJ. Inc.\n\nNational Security Agency\nNPI C\nOffice of Management & Budget\nOrincon Corporation\nPacific-Sierra Research Corporation\nPAR Government Systems Corporation\nPerlstein Associates, Ltd.\nPetite Research Group, Inc.\nPFIAB\n\n*PRC Government Information Systems\nQua lity Systems. Inc.\nQucsTech, Inc.\n R&D Associates, Inc.\nRaymond Tate Associates. Inc.\nSAIC Comsystems Division\n*SAIC Systems Technology Group\n*Scitor Corporation\nScope, Incorporated\nSEDC\n*Space Applications Corporat ion\n\nSR I International\n\nStrategic Planning & Development, Inc.\nS umner Gro up, Inc.\nSystems Planning Corporation\nSystems Research l.aboratorics\nrAP A, Inc.\n\n*Technology lor Communications lntcrna tion <..ll\n*The Analytic Sciences Corpo ra tion\nThe Charles Sta rk Draper Lab. Inc.\n fhe Marek Enterprise\n\n. *The MITRE Corporation The MVM Group, Inc.\n\nT itan Corporation Tracor Elsin TRW Avionics & S urveillance Group TRW Elocclronic Systems Group TRW Space & Defense Secto r TRW Space & 1 cchnologics Group\n*TRW Systems Integratio n Group TSC. Inc.\n\n*UIIrasystcms Defense & Space Systems. Inc.\n\n*Unisys Defense System~\nUnited States Mari ne Corps\n*United Technologies Corporation\n*United Tcchologics N arde n Systems, Inc.\n\nUnited Technologies Research Center\n*Vitro Corporation Wa ng Laborato ries, Inc. Watk ins-John\"ion Compa ny Wc~t in g housc rlcct ric Co rp ort.~ ti nn Xerox Corporation\n3M Federal Systems Depart ment\n\n- SASA Sponsors\n\n## Sasa Officers And Board Of Directors\n\nPresident E. C. .. Pete\" Aldridge, Jr. President.\n\nMc Donnell Douglas Electronil 5)stems Co.\n\nExecutive Vice President John E. Morrison, Jr.\n\nSecretary/ Treasurer William 1-1 . Parso n ~\nGeneral Counsel DcHlicl B. Silver. Esq., Clearr. Gofllith. Suen & Hamilton Chairman or the Board Mcrcadc A. Cramer. Presidnll & CEO, Vitro Corp.\n\nMembers Maynard C. Anderson, Assistalll Deputy Under Secrewry of Dtfense Cuwuerim eJfigenn & Security M. Sam Araki, l::xecuthe Vin President, Pfwu & Program.\\, Luck freed MiHiles. ~pace & /:Jectronic Systems Group Mellon C Baird, Tracur. bu.\n\nCharles Barron, Presidntl, A I L 5)stems. Inc.\n\nC. J ames Dorrenbacher. Pre\\idlnt & CEO.\n\nMcDonmfl Doug/a.\\ Space Systetm Co.\n\nRussell W. Frame, Pre.\\ident. JJA 1A TAPE Incorporated Penman R. Gilliam. Depwy /Jirl'ctor. Mmwgemenl & Tetfrnufogy.\n\nDt'}lnw Mapping Aglnc_l Cha rles A. Hawkin ~. Deputy A.u islllnl Secretary of Defense\n(Jmelligena)\nLt. Gen. Edwa rd J. llcinz. USAF. (Ret.)\nMark V. Hughcs, lll. Senior Vin l)rlsident & General Manager.\n\nPlanning Rl'.\\\"l'arch Corporation. DSSD\nRobert J. Kohler, Vice Presidem & General ManagF.r TR WA vivnics & Surreillance Group James W. McAnally, Pn~itllllt . Marti11 Mariella Spaa Systems Lt. Ge n. !-larry E. Soyster, USA , Director. Defnue lmelligenn Agency Vice Adm. Wil liam 0 . Studeman, USN, Direuur. National Sl'Curity A_g-ency Kenneth R. Swimm. General Manag<r. Military & Data Systems Opns., Generol /ectrif' Company\n\n## About The Association .. .\n\nThe Security 'Affairs Support Association (SASA) is chartered as a professional association by the State of Maryland. It was established in April 1979 to \"enhance the relationships and understanding among those in government, industry and academe who are involved in and concerned with the well-being and success of the national intelligence endeavor\".\n\nIn the eleven years which have passed since its creation, SASA has become an active and useful force in the Intelligence Community. Satisfying a communications need long felt in the community, issues of interest to government and industry alike have been discussed in its forum. Key policy, operational and administrative issues of legitimate concern to its membership are being continually explored.\n\nIn 1984, SASA inaugurated its award program when the DCI presented the SASA Medal of Achievement to Dr.\n\nWilliam Oliver Baker \"for his enduring contributions to National Security and Freedom\". The medal is now designated the William Oliver Baker Award and is presented annually to an individual from government, industry, or academe who has performed -distinguished service in support of the national intelligence endeavor. Senator Barry Goldwater received the award in 1985, Ambassador Vernon Walters, 1986; Ambassador Richard Helms, 1987; Dr.\n\nEdwin Land, 1988; and Admiral Bobby R. Inman, 1989.\n\nSASA continues to pursue its objective o(\"enhancing relationships and understanding\" among all who support the national intelligence endeavor, through a series of symposia on topics of high ctlrrrent interest which have included, TACTICAL INTELLIGENCE and RELATED\nACTIVITIES (TIARA)**SOFTWARE TRENDS in the INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY**INTELLIGENCE\nSUPPORT to NATO**INFOSEC FOR THE\nNINETIES**SECURITY TRENDS and IMPACTS**TECHNOLOGY SECURITY**\nMANAGING CHANGE**TECHNOLOGY SHORT- FALLS IN INTELLIGENCE ARCHITECTURES\n**GLASNOSTand PERESTROIKA- IMPLICATIONS\nFOR U.S. INTELLIGENCE**TREATY MONITORING\nAND VERIFICATION-IMPLICATIONS FOR U. S.\n\nINTELLIGENCE**EUROPE '92.\n\nIn January, 1987, SASA implemented its Security Support Program. Under this program, SASA is now prepared to receive from its members, on a non-attribution basis, generic unclassified industrial security issues and problems for appropriate action.\n\nSASA is a non-profit organization operated by its members through an elected Board of Directors and Officers who manage its affairs and programs in accordance with\nits by-laws. The activities of the association, and other topics of interest to the Intelligence Community are reported in its newsletter--COLLOQUY.\n\n\"On rc\\ 1Cw1ng the SAS A ~ plan ~ for thc1r 1990 en: nt ~ . the As~ i ~tant Scc r~1ary ol l.>cfen-.c ( Pubhc Affilis) find!<> thc:.c C\\ cnts mccl the ' tandards for p<HIIClpallon b ~ lluD fl(:rsonnd under DoD\nln.,truclion 5500.7. I h1s finding d oc~ not constnutc Do D e nd u r~mc nt ul attcmhlncc ~h1c h mu~ t be determined b yc <~ch DoD component.\"\n\n## Security Affairs Support Association\n\nSASA is headquartered in Annapolis, Maryland Requests for additional information by telephone or mail are welcomed.\n\nSecurity Affairs Support Association Suite 120, 2662 Riva Road Annapolis, Maryland 21401\n(301) 841-6555\nFAX (301) 266-7554"
    },
    {
        "text": "## Review Of Domestic\n\n# Sharing Of Counterterrorism\n\nInformation\n\nPrepared by the Inspectors General of the:\nINTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY\nDEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY\nDEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE\nMARCH 2017\n\n## Review Of Domestic Sharing Of Counterterrorism Information Table Of Contents\n\n\n\n| EXECUTIVE SUMMARY i                                                                       |     |\n|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----|\n| INTRODUCTION 1                                                                            |     |\n| B                                                                                         |     |\n| ACKGROUND                                                                                 |     |\n| 1                                                                                         |     |\n| F                                                                                         |     |\n| IELD                                                                                      |     |\n| -B                                                                                        |     |\n| ASED                                                                                      |     |\n| C                                                                                         |     |\n| OUNTERTERRORISM                                                                           |     |\n| I                                                                                         |     |\n| NFORMATION                                                                                |     |\n| S                                                                                         |     |\n| HARING                                                                                    |     |\n| 3                                                                                         |     |\n| FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 7                                                            |     |\n| INTEGRATION, COORDINATION, AND NATIONAL STRATEGY 7                                        |     |\n| E                                                                                         |     |\n| XAMPLES OF                                                                                |     |\n| I                                                                                         |     |\n| NFORMATION                                                                                |     |\n| S                                                                                         |     |\n| HARING AND                                                                                |     |\n| C                                                                                         |     |\n| OORDINATION                                                                               |     |\n| 7                                                                                         |     |\n| S                                                                                         |     |\n| UMMARY OF                                                                                 |     |\n| C                                                                                         |     |\n| HALLENGES                                                                                 |     |\n| 8                                                                                         |     |\n| I                                                                                         |     |\n| NTERCONNECTED                                                                             |     |\n| M                                                                                         |     |\n| ISSIONS OF                                                                                |     |\n| F                                                                                         |     |\n| EDERAL                                                                                    |     |\n| P                                                                                         |     |\n| ARTNERS                                                                                   |     |\n| 9                                                                                         |     |\n| S                                                                                         |     |\n| TRATEGY AND                                                                               |     |\n| C                                                                                         |     |\n| OORDINATION IN                                                                            |     |\n| D                                                                                         |     |\n| OMESTIC                                                                                   |     |\n| I                                                                                         |     |\n| NTELLIGENCE AND                                                                           |     |\n| I                                                                                         |     |\n| NFORMATION                                                                                |     |\n| S                                                                                         |     |\n| HARING                                                                                    |     |\n| 11                                                                                        |     |\n| DHS                                                                                       |     |\n|                                                                                           |     |\n| I                                                                                         |     |\n| NTELLIGENCE                                                                               |     |\n| E                                                                                         |     |\n| NTERPRISE                                                                                 |     |\n| 14                                                                                        |     |\n| Limited Cohesiveness and Coordination of Effort across the DHS Intelligence Enterprise 14 |     |\n|                                                                                           |     |\n| I&A Staffing Issues 16                                                                    |     |\n|                                                                                           |     |\n| Insufficient Reporting of Counterterrorism Information 17                                 |     |\n|                                                                                           |     |\n| Delays in I&A Intelligence Product Review and Approval 18                                 |     |\n|                                                                                           |     |\n| DHS Lacks Consistent Access to C-LAN and SCIFs in the Field 20                            |     |\n|                                                                                           |     |\n| DOJ                                                                                       |     |\n|                                                                                           |     |\n| S                                                                                         |     |\n| UPPORT OF                                                                                 |     |\n| C                                                                                         |     |\n| OUNTERTERRORISM                                                                           |     |\n| I                                                                                         |     |\n| NFORMATION                                                                                |     |\n| S                                                                                         |     |\n| HARING                                                                                    |     |\n| 21                                                                                        |     |\n| DOJ Strategy for Internal Counterterrorism Information Sharing 22                         |     |\n|                                                                                           |     |\n| JTTF Executive Board Meeting Participation and Content 23                                 |     |\n|                                                                                           |     |\n| Anti-Terrorism Advisory Council (ATAC) 27                                                 |     |\n|                                                                                           |     |\n| FBI Threat Review and Prioritization 29                                                   |     |\n|                                                                                           |     |\n| ODNI                                                                                      |     |\n|                                                                                           |     |\n| F                                                                                         |     |\n| IELD                                                                                      |     |\n| B                                                                                         |     |\n| ASED                                                                                      |     |\n| E                                                                                         |     |\n| LEMENTS                                                                                   |     |\n| S                                                                                         |     |\n| UPPORT TO                                                                                 |     |\n| C                                                                                         |     |\n| OUNTERTERRORISM                                                                           |     |\n| I                                                                                         |     |\n| NFORMATION                                                                                |     |\n| S                                                                                         |     |\n| HARING                                                                                    |     |\n| 31                                                                                        |     |\n| The Domestic DNI Representative Program 31                                                |     |\n|                                                                                           |     |\n| The NCTC Domestic Representative Program 38                                               |     |\n|                                                                                           |     |\n| F                                                                                         |     |\n| USION                                                                                     |     |\n| C                                                                                         |     |\n| ENTERS                                                                                    |     |\n| 42                                                                                        |     |\n| Federal Investment and Support to Fusion Centers 42                                       |     |\n|                                                                                           |     |\n| National Network Maturity Model 47                                                        |     |\n|                                                                                           |     |\n| Need to Coordinate Granting of Security Clearances 49                                     |     |\n|                                                                                           |     |\n| National Mission Cell Initiative 50                                                       |     |\n|                                                                                           |     |\n| CONCLUSION 51                                                                             |     |\n| APPENDIX A:  OBJECTIVES, SCOPE & METHODOLOGY 52                                           |     |\n| APPENDIX B:  RECOMMENDATIONS 54                                                           |     |\n| APPENDIX C:  THE OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE'S RESPONSE TO THE DRAFT  |     |\n| REPORT 63                                                                                 |     |\n| APPENDIX D:  THE DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY'S RESPONSE TO THE DRAFT REPORT 67        |     |\n| APPENDIX E:  THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE'S RESPONSE TO THE DRAFT REPORT 77                  |     |\n| APPENDIX F:  THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION'S RESPONSE TO THE DRAFT REPORT 80        |     |\n|                                                                                           |     |\n\n## Review Of Domestic Sharing Of Counterterrorism Information Executive Summary\n\n\nFifteen years after the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on the United States, the terrorist threat remains in the United States and abroad, as evidenced by recent attacks in Paris, France; San Bernardino, California; Brussels, Belgium; Orlando, Florida; and Nice, France.  The U.S.'s national security depends on the ability to share the right information with the right people at the right time.  This requires sustained and responsible collaboration among federal, state, local, and tribal entities, as well as the private sector and international partners. In response to a request from the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, the Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee, and the Senate Judiciary Committee, the Offices of Inspector General (OIG) of the Intelligence Community (IC), Department of Homeland Security (DHS), and the Department of Justice (DOJ) conducted a review of the domestic sharing of counterterrorism information. The OIGs concluded that the partners in the terrorism-related Information Sharing Environment - components of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI), DHS, DOJ, and their state and local partners - are committed to sharing counterterrorism information.  The partners' commitment to protecting the nation is illustrated by the actions taken before, during, and following terrorism-related incidents, as well as by programs and initiatives designed to improve sharing of counterterrorism information. However, the OIGs also identified several areas in which improvements could enhance information sharing.\nTo share information effectively, the federal, state, and local entities actively involved in counterterrorism efforts must understand each other's roles, responsibilities, and contributions, especially with the involvement of multiple agencies, such as the DOJ's Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and DHS' U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), in complex investigations.  Updating or establishing new information sharing agreements among such entities should enhance coordination and collaboration, and reaffirm and formalize the roles and responsibilities of partners in the current information sharing environment.  Similarly, although there is a national information sharing strategy, its implementation has been viewed to be uneven. The OIGs believe that the ODNI, DHS, and DOJ should review the interagency information sharing memorandum of understanding (MOU) and take necessary actions to update intelligence information sharing standards and processes among the departments, which we believe would result in better implementation of the strategy.\n\n\n\nThe OIGs also identified improvements in various practices and processes of the partners involved in counterterrorism.  At DHS, a lack of unity in its Intelligence Enterprise, issues in the field related to staffing and access to classified systems and facilities, as well as problems with intelligence reporting processes, have made the DHS Intelligence Enterprise less effective and valuable to the IC than it could be.  DOJ can improve its counterterrorism information sharing efforts by developing and implementing a consolidated internal DOJ strategy, and evaluating the continued need and most effective utilization for the United States Attorney's Offices' Anti-Terrorism Advisory Council (ATAC) meetings.  Further, the FBI should spur participation associated with Joint Terrorism Task Forces (JTTF) and improve its efforts to obtain partners' input in the process of identifying and prioritizing counterterrorism threats.  Within the ODNI, the Domestic DNI Representative program is hindered by large geographic regions, as well as the lack of a clear strategic vision and guidance.  In addition, the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) Domestic Representative program, although well received in the field, has also struggled to sufficiently cover its regions.  At the state and local level, due to unpredictable federal support, fusion centers are focused on sustaining operations rather than enhancing capabilities.  Further, varying requirements for state and local security clearances sponsored by federal agencies can impede access to classified systems and facilities.\nOur review resulted in 23 recommendations to help improve the sharing of counterterrorism information and ultimately, enhance the Nation's ability to prevent terrorist attacks.  We discuss our findings in detail in the Findings and Recommendations section of the report.\n\n\n\n## Introduction\n\n The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, the Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee, and the Senate Judiciary Committee requested that the Inspectors General (IG) of the Intelligence Community (IC), Department of Homeland Security (DHS), and Department of Justice (DOJ) conduct a performance audit of federally supported entities engaged in field-based domestic counterterrorism, homeland security, intelligence, and information-sharing activities in conjunction with state and local law enforcement agencies.  The oversight committees requested that the joint audit examine these entities' overall missions, specific functions, capabilities, funding, personnel costs to include full-time employees and contractors, and facility costs. In response to this request, the Offices of the Inspector General (OIG) of the IC, DHS, and DOJ conducted a coordinated, joint review focusing on domestic sharing of counterterrorism information.  The objectives of this review were to:  (1) identify and examine the federally supported field-based intelligence entities engaged in counterterrorism information sharing to determine the overall missions, specific functions, capabilities, funding, and personnel and facility costs; (2) determine if counterterrorism information is being adequately and appropriately shared with all participating agencies; and (3) identify any gaps or duplication of effort among these entities. The review was conducted by three teams from the OIGs of the IC, DHS, and DOJ.  The OIGs interviewed more than 450 individuals, including senior Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI), DHS, DOJ, and state and local officials.  In addition, the OIGs reviewed policies, procedures, and other relevant documentation, as well as prior studies.  While the OIG teams shared relevant documents, attended briefings, and participated jointly in interviews of officials and subject matter experts, each OIG team was responsible for evaluating the actions of, and information available to, its respective agencies.\n\n\n\n## Background\n\nPost 9/11 investigations proposed sweeping change in the IC, resulting in congressional passage of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (IRTPA).1  As a result of the IRTPA, the ODNI was officially established to lead and integrate the 16 members of the Intelligence Community, and the IRTPA codified the establishment of the National\n\nCounterterrorism Center (NCTC) as part of the ODNI.2  The IRTPA also directed the establishment of an Information Sharing Environment (ISE) for the sharing of terrorism information.3  In addition, the IRTPA required the President to \"designate an individual as the Program Manager (PM) for information sharing across the Federal Government,\" as well as an interagency Information Sharing Council (ISC) to advise the President and PM.4 EO 13388, Further Strengthening Terrorism-related Information Sharing, established the policy framework for the terrorism-related ISE.  In particular, ISE Presidential Guideline 2 - Sharing Among and Between Federal, State, Local, Tribal, and Private Sector Entities and its Report expanded the scope of the terrorism-related ISE to crimes of national security concern and involved a step forward from initial interagency information sharing established earlier. Under the statute, both the PM-ISE and ISC would expire after 2 years.\nIn August 2007, the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act permanently established the PM-ISE and ISC.  The PM-ISE is responsible for facilitating the sharing of terrorism information among all appropriate federal, state, local, and tribal entities, as well as the private sector, through the use of policy guidelines and technologies.  The office of the PM-ISE facilitates the development of responsible information sharing by bringing together mission partners and aligning business processes, standards and architecture, security and access controls, privacy protections, and best practices.  The IRTPA mandated the PM-ISE to annually report to Congress on the ISE's progress, status of efforts, and targeted next steps. In October 2007, the White House issued a national strategy for terrorism-related information sharing (2007 NSIS), which provided the Administration's vision for the information sharing environment.5  In 2009, the White House established the Information Sharing and Access Interagency rescinded by Executive Order 13470 because the IRTPA codified the establishment of the NCTC. homeland security, intelligence, defense, and foreign affairs.  The people in these communities may work for federal, state, local, tribal, or territorial governments.\n\n\nPolicy Committee (ISA IPC).6  The ISA IPC is co-chaired by the National Security Staff's Senior Director for Information Sharing Policy and the PM-ISE.7  The ISA IPC's mission is to implement the national information sharing strategy and to lead information sharing policy on national security issues across the federal government.8  The President issued an updated national strategy in December 2012 (2012 Strategy).9  The 2012 Strategy outlined 5 goals and 16 priority objectives for the national security information sharing environment.\n\n\n\n## Field-Based Counterterrorism Information Sharing\n\nVarious components of the ODNI, DHS, DOJ, and state and local law enforcement are among the ISE partners that contribute to the nation's field-based homeland security and counterterrorism missions and information sharing.  Within the ODNI, the NCTC serves as the federal government's primary organization for analyzing and integrating all intelligence possessed or acquired pertaining to terrorism or counterterrorism (except intelligence pertaining exclusively to domestic terrorists and domestic counterterrorism). In addition, the NCTC ensures that agencies have access to and receive intelligence support needed to execute their counterterrorism plans to perform independent, alternative analysis and serves as the \"central and shared knowledge bank on known and suspected terrorists and international terror groups, as well as their goals, strategies, capabilities, and networks of contacts and support.\"10  The NCTC is staffed by personnel from multiple departments and agencies from across the IC, including the CIA, FBI, DHS, Department of State, Department of Defense, and other federal entities.  In addition to the NCTC, the following ODNI programs and entities are involved in domestic fieldbased sharing of counterterrorism information.\n\n\n\nBudget; Office of the Secretary of Defense; Central Intelligence Agency (CIA); National Security Agency; Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI); and the Departments of Agriculture, Commerce, Energy, Health and Human Services, Homeland Security, Interior, Justice, State, Transportation, and Treasury. 8  In a July 2009 memorandum, the Assistant to the President for Homeland Security and Counterterrorism made clear that the Administration regarded information sharing as extending beyond terrorism-related issues to encompass the sharing of information more broadly to enhance the national security of the United States and the safety of the American people.\n\n      Entity\n\n     Mission\n\n\nDomestic Director of National Intelligence Representative Program\nRepresent the DNI within the U.S. to senior field representatives of each IC element and lead the IC effort to create a single IC enterprise that is coordinated, integrated, agile, and effective.\nNCTC Domestic Representative Program\nProvide tailored counterterrorism-related information and serve as the liaison for the NCTC Director with IC agencies and counterterrorism officials at the federal, state, and local levels.\nProgram Manager- Information Sharing Environment\nProvide and facilitate the means for sharing terrorism information among all appropriate federal, state, local, and tribal entities, as well as the private sector through the use of policy guidelines and technologies.\n\n    Source:  NCTC, ODNI Partner Engagement, and PM-ISE documentation The *Homeland Security Act of 2002*, as amended, created DHS and established its primary mission to prevent terrorist attacks in the United States and enhance security.  While not all DHS components have specific programs or groups dedicated to domestic field-based counterterrorism information sharing, they contribute to this mission through their areas of expertise and authorities.\nThe Office of Intelligence and Analysis (I&A) is one of DHS' two IC\nelements and is obligated and authorized to access, receive, and analyze law enforcement information, intelligence information, and other information from federal, state, and local government agencies and private sector entities, and to disseminate such information to those partners.11  I&A's Field Operations consists of intelligence officers, reports officers, and regional directors deployed nationwide to manage DHS' role in information sharing with state and local entities.  The U.S. Coast Guard is the other DHS element of the IC and has the authority to \"collect (including through clandestine means), analyze, produce, and disseminate foreign intelligence and counterintelligence including defense and defense-related information and intelligence to support national and departmental missions\" and to \"conduct counterintelligence activities.\"12  Other DHS components, such as the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) and U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS), also have intelligence programs though they are not IC elements.  These programs, in addition to I&A and the U.S. Coast Guard, compose the DHS Intelligence Enterprise.\nDHS components, such as U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), and Federal Protective Service (FPS), deploy representatives nationwide to leverage their law enforcement authorities in counterterrorism investigations with federal, state, and local partners.  For example, CBP personnel at land, air, and sea ports of entry have the authority to search people and their belongings entering the United States and collect personal information for all travelers entering or leaving the United States.  ICE Homeland Security Investigations (HSI) agents across the country enforce more than 400 federal statutes focused on the illegal movement of people, goods, and currency.  Table 2 lists the DHS components engaged in this review and their respective missions.\n\nEntity\nMission\nI&A\nEquip the Homeland Security Enterprise with the intelligence and information it needs to keep the homeland safe, secure, and resilient.\nU.S. Coast Guard\nEnsure the safety, security, and stewardship of the Nation's waters.\nCBP\nSafeguard America's borders thereby protecting the public from dangerous people and materials while enhancing the Nation's global economic competitiveness by enabling legitimate trade and travel. Build, sustain, and improve the Nation's capability to prepare for, protect against, respond to, recover from, and mitigate all hazards.\nFederal Emergency Management Agency FPS\nPrevent, protect, respond to, and recover from acts of terrorism and other hazards threatening the U.S. Government's critical infrastructure and essential services.\nICE\nPromote homeland security and public safety through the criminal and civil enforcement of federal laws governing border control, customs, trade, and immigration. Lead the national effort to protect critical infrastructure from all hazards by managing risk and enhancing resilience through collaboration with the critical infrastructure community.\nNational Protection and Programs Directorate U.S. Secret Service\nProtect the Nation's leaders and the financial and critical infrastructure of the United States.\nTSA\nProtect the nation's transportation systems to ensure freedom of movement for people and commerce.\nUSCIS\nDetermine eligibility for immigration and citizenship benefits, promote an awareness and understanding of citizenship, and ensure the integrity of the U.S. immigration system.\n\nSource:  DHS OIG compilation of DHS information Within DOJ, there are two components that are primarily involved in the field-based sharing of counterterrorism information - the FBI and the U.S. Attorney's Offices (USAO).  By law, the FBI is the lead agency within the federal government responsible for investigating crimes involving terrorist activity within the statutory jurisdiction of the United States.13  Each U.S. Attorney is the chief federal law enforcement officer within his or her particular jurisdiction.  The following table shows the missions of specific entities within the FBI and USAOs that are predominantly involved in the field-based sharing of counterterrorism information.\n\n      Entity\n\n     Mission\n\n\nFBI - Joint Terrorism Task Forces\nLeverage the collective resources of federal, state, and local agencies for the prevention, preemption, deterrence, and investigation of terrorist acts that affect the United States' interests, and for the purpose of disrupting and preventing terrorist acts and apprehending individuals who may commit or plan to commit such acts.\nFBI - Field Intelligence Groups\nCoordinate, manage, and execute all functions of the intelligence cycle, including collection, analysis, production, and dissemination, for the FBI in field offices throughout the country.\nCross-section of federal, state, and local law enforcement, first responders, and private sector security personnel who coordinate counterterrorism efforts in their communities.\nU.S. Attorney's\nOffices - Anti-Terrorism Advisory Councils\nSource:  FBI and Executive Office for U.S. Attorneys documentation\n\nAs acknowledged in the 2007 NSIS, state, local, and tribal governments serve as the nation's first \"preventers and responders,\" and are critical to the nation's efforts to prevent future terrorist attacks and to respond if an attack occurs.  Often, these state, local, and tribal entities are best able to identify potential threats that exist within their jurisdictions.  In our review, we identified the National Network of Fusion Centers and the Regional Information Sharing Systems (RISS) as the two primary state and local counterterrorism information sharing entities.  The following table provides the missions of these non-federal entities.\n\n        Entity                                             Mission\nFusion Centers\nServe as a focal point within the state and local environment for the receipt, analysis, gathering, and sharing of threat-related information between the federal government and state, local, tribal, territorial, and private sector partners.\nRegional Information Sharing Systems\nSupport regional law enforcement, public safety, and homeland security efforts to combat major crimes and terrorist activity, as well as to promote officer safety by linking federal, state, local, and tribal criminal justice agencies through secure communications.  In addition, provide users with information sharing resources, analytic and investigative support, and training.\n\n## Findings And Recommendations Integration, Coordination, And National Strategy\n\nIn general, the OIGs found that federal, state, and local entities are committed to sharing counterterrorism information.  The participating entities have shown their commitment to this effort by undertaking programs and initiatives that have improved information sharing, yet the participating entities were unable to quantify the significant personnel and funding resources dedicated to this effort.  The OIGs also identified areas that require improvement to further strengthen the sharing of counterterrorism information.\n\n## Examples Of Information Sharing And Coordination\n\nDuring our review, several terrorism-related incidents occurred.  We believe that many actions taken by federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies prior to, during, and following these incidents reflect their commitment to sharing counterterrorism information.  For example:\n\n In June 2015, Ali Saleh, a resident of New York, was arrested after he\nsystematically made multiple attempts to travel to the Middle East to join Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL).  Saleh, who allegedly was inspired by ISIL propaganda, expressed his support for ISIL online, and took steps to carry out acts encouraged in the ISIL call to arms.  This arrest resulted from the efforts of the New York Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF) working collaboratively with its federal, state, and local task force officers.\n In June 2015, the Boston JTTF stopped and ultimately used deadly force\nagainst Usaamah Rahim, who had been under investigation and surveillance.  According to an FBI affidavit, Rahim, along with coconspirators, was initially plotting to kill a prominent blogger but had abandoned that plot and instead targeted police officers.  During the course of the review, we learned that the successful disruption of this plot was based, in large part, on information shared between federal and local law enforcement authorities in Boston.\n During and following recent terrorism-related events, such as those in\nChattanooga, Tennessee; Paris, France; and San Bernardino, California, fusion centers along with their federal, state, and local partners used the Homeland Security Information Network (HSIN) to share real-time updates, submit and respond to information requests, and support one another nationwide.  The majority of fusion center personnel interviewed considered the use of HSIN as a best practice in information sharing across the National Network of Fusion Centers.\n Following the Paris, France; San Bernardino, California; and Brussels,\nBelgium, terrorist attacks, the FBI linked partner agencies using technology, including Secure Video Teleconference (SVTC), to quickly provide up-to-date threat information.  For example, on the day of the Paris attacks, November 13, 2015, the FBI conducted a 3-hour conference call with representatives from all 78 Fusion Centers, DHS, executives from national law enforcement associations, the Criminal Intelligence Coordinating Council (CICC), Governor's Homeland Security Advisors, and state and local law enforcement.\nIn addition to these specific events, federal, state, and local partners exhibited a continued commitment to certain programs or initiatives, which further enhanced the sharing of counterterrorism information.  For instance:\n\n The National Fusion Center Association, with federal support from DHS,\nDOJ, FBI, and the PM-ISE, is leading an initiative to share Real-time Open Source Analysis of Social Media (ROSM).  The goal of the ROSM initiative focuses on how law enforcement agencies can and should analyze and share social media information and related criminal intelligence to help identify common indicators that can support intervention with potentially violent extremists and thereby prevent and/or disrupt attacks.\n In FY 2015, state and local partners initiated 623 terrorist watchlist\nnominations through I&A's Watchlisting Enterprise, 79 percent of which were accepted.\n As of FY 2014, about half of the almost 18,000 state and local law\nenforcement agencies in the United States had staff members who participated in their respective fusion center's Fusion Liaison Officer (FLO) Program.  In FY 2014, there were a reported 40,187 FLOs, representing a 104-percent increase from about 19,700 in FY 2011.\n The FBI and DHS-led Nationwide Suspicious Activity Reporting Initiative\nis a collaborative effort for federal, state, and local law enforcement entities to share information on suspicious activities.  Suspicious activity reporting increased by 96 percent between FY 2012 and FY 2015, with a majority of reports coming from the FBI's partners, including fusion centers.\n\n## Summary Of Challenges\n\nAlthough the above examples evidence positive and proactive information sharing between federal and non-federal partners, the OIGs identified several areas in which improvements could strengthen the sharing of counterterrorism information, as summarized below.\n\n Because both the FBI and DHS have counterterrorism-related missions\nand a role in gathering and disseminating counterterrorism information,\n some DHS and FBI officials expressed concerns about potential overlaps in their counterterrorism missions and activities.\n\n Although there is a national-level information sharing strategy, the PM-\nISE determined that its implementation across the information sharing environment has been uneven.\n The DHS Intelligence Enterprise is not as effective and valuable to the IC\nas it could be.  For example, there is a lack of unity across the DHS Intelligence Enterprise, problems with I&A staffing levels in the field, issues with the internal intelligence product review and approval processes, and difficulty accessing classified systems and facilities in the field.\n  DOJ can improve its counterterrorism information sharing efforts by\nimplementing a consolidated internal DOJ strategy and evaluating the continued need and most effective utilization for the USAOs' Anti- Terrorism Advisory Council (ATAC) meetings.  In addition, the FBI should spur participation associated with JTTFs and improve its efforts to obtain partners' input to the process for identifying and prioritizing counterterrorism threats.\n Within the ODNI, the Domestic DNI Representative (DDNIR) program is\nhindered by large geographic regions, as well as the lack of a clear strategic vision and guidance.  In addition, the NCTC Domestic Representative program has also struggled to sufficiently cover its regions.\n At the state and local level, fusion centers are focused on sustaining\noperations rather than enhancing capabilities due to unpredictable federal support, including potential reductions in grant funding. Further, varying requirements for state and local security clearances sponsored by federal agencies can impede access to classified systems and facilities.\nBased on the results of this review, the OIGs concluded that sharing of counterterrorism information among federal, state, and local partners could be strengthened.  Details of the above issues are contained in the following sections, including recommended actions to further improve the sharing of counterterrorism information.  We believe that implementing these recommendations will help enhance and coordinate information sharing, which, in turn, can lead to a more comprehensive picture of the terrorist threat and greater national security.\n\n\n## Interconnected Missions Of Federal Partners\n\nBoth the FBI and DHS have counterterrorism-related missions and both have a role in gathering and disseminating counterterrorism information.  The working relationships between DHS components and the FBI relating\n\n to counterterrorism investigations reflect the challenges of these interconnected missions.  During our review, some DHS and FBI officials expressed concerns about potential overlaps in law enforcement and counterterrorism missions and activities.\nThe FBI is the primary federal government agency responsible for handling counterterrorism investigations.  However, these complex investigations often involve multiple possible violations of law, some of which may fall under another agency's primary jurisdiction, and thus, require information and expertise from different source agencies, such as travel information, nuclear regulatory information, or watchlist information.  An executive within the FBI's Counterterrorism Division told the DOJ OIG that the FBI relies upon the JTTF concept to provide the coordination, information sharing, and deconfliction of investigative efforts.  For example, multiple entities contributed to the investigation of the April 2013 bombing at the Boston Marathon, including the Boston JTTF, CBP, TSA, and USCIS.14\nAlthough officials said that they generally understood the missions of the other partners, the involvement of multiple agencies in counterterrorism investigations increases the risk that field personnel may interpret sharing requirements and guidance differently than what is articulated in the interagency information sharing MOU.15  The actions resulting from those differences in interpretations may contribute to a lack of trust among law enforcement agents, perpetuate negative perceptions about the other agency's ability and willingness to share information, and foster an atmosphere in which individuals rely on their personal relationships with other law enforcement partners rather than establishing standardized coordination mechanisms that remain in place despite any personnel changes.\n\nThe OIGs found that the quality of the working relationships between DHS components and the FBI varies widely in the field.  For example, ICE HSI and FBI officials reported a challenging working relationship.  According to the FBI, its field division leadership has consistently expressed to headquarters its concerns with ICE HSI performing work within the FBI's mission.  ICE HSI has learned of these reports, which has perpetuated its negative perceptions about the FBI's willingness to work cooperatively with other law enforcement agencies.  In general, ICE HSI said it believes the FBI does not sufficiently\n\nunderstand or recognize ICE HSI's functions, capabilities, and abilities to contribute to counterterrorism investigations and information sharing.  ICE HSI officials reported similar issues when discussing their involvement in the JTTFs.\n\nHowever, CBP reported that it generally has good working relationships with FBI field offices and personnel.  Some CBP officials suggested that this is most likely because CBP has distinct authorities and unique access to information about travelers, which is often used in counterterrorism investigations.  CBP officials said their relationship with the FBI has come a long way in recent years so that it feels more like a partnership than previously when it was one-sided with CBP sharing information with the FBI but not vice versa.  CBP officials added that their involvement in the JTTFs has led to better awareness by the FBI of CBP functions and capabilities.\nBecause agency missions are connected, it is critical that all partners understand and value the roles and contributions of its partners.  The OIGs concluded that the issues cited above largely reflect struggles for this type of respect and cooperation in the counterterrorism arena.  To achieve a shared vision and foster greater and more consistent cooperation, entities involved in counterterrorism should standardize practices and processes, as well as update and implement information sharing agreements.  Throughout this report, the OIGs make recommendations to encourage and institutionalize such coordination through improvements to various practices and processes of the parties involved.\n\n## Strategy And Coordination In Domestic Intelligence And Information Sharing\n\nTo move away from personality-based coordination and codify interagency information sharing, the federal partners involved in counterterrorism efforts need formal agreements at the national level.  The formal agreement governing information sharing, which includes priorities, requirements, and responsibilities, is outdated.  The OIGs believe reviewing the interagency information sharing MOU and taking necessary actions to update intelligence information sharing standards and processes among the departments would reaffirm and formalize the roles and responsibilities of partners in the current information sharing environment.  The agencies involved in counterterrorism should also establish processes to implement the overall strategy in the field.  Clearly designating a capstone coordination and engagement body for the terrorism-related ISE would further assist in implementing the overall strategy and establishing field-level processes.\nAs previously noted, in October 2007, the White House issued the National Strategy for Information Sharing: Successes and Challenges in Improving Terrorism-Related Information *Sharing*, which outlined the Administration's vision for the information sharing environment.  The White\n\nHouse issued an updated national strategy, the National Strategy for Information Sharing and Safeguarding in December 2012 (2012 Strategy).  The 2012 Strategy outlined goals and priority objectives for the information sharing environment.  In December 2013, the PM-ISE issued its Strategic Implementation Plan for the National Strategy for Information Sharing and Safeguarding, which established a construct for executing the 2012 Strategy.16 However, in its annual report to Congress for 2014, the PM-ISE reported that federal department and agency implementation of the 2012 Strategy had been uneven.  The PM-ISE attributed some of the challenges in implementing the 2012 Strategy to the broad-based nature of the 2012 Strategy's priority objectives, as well as differences in department and agency prioritization, maturity, and operating environments.\nIn addition, although the White House updated the national strategy and the PM-ISE issued a strategic implementation plan, the Memorandum of Understanding between the Intelligence Community, Federal Law Enforcement Agencies, and the Department of Homeland Security Concerning Information Sharing dates back to 2003.  This MOU outlines information sharing priorities, reciprocity and transparency, sharing requirements, coordination and deconfliction, and officials responsible for information sharing.  However, the MOU predates the establishment of the ODNI and NCTC.\nThe ODNI, DHS, and DOJ need to review the interagency MOU and determine what actions are necessary to update intelligence information sharing standards and processes among the departments.  Such standards and processes should reflect the current structure, roles, and responsibilities of the ISE and the current threat environment and priorities.  Based on these determinations, the NCTC, I&A, and FBI should continue to develop guidance for future intelligence information sharing, particularly in the field, that accounts for the roles and responsibilities the agencies have according to statute.  Such guidance would enhance the sharing of intelligence information among federal representatives in the field and help create a unified and consistent federal contribution for state and local partners.\nThe OIGs identified multiple entities (to include boards, committees, and councils) that are involved in the coordination and governance of domestic counterterrorism information sharing.  Table 5 below provides examples of these entities and their missions.\n\n## Table 5:  Examples Of Information Sharing Coordinating Entities\n\n| Entity                                                       |                                                          |\n|--------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------|\n| Information Sharing and Access                               |                                                          |\n| Interagency Policy Committee                                 |                                                          |\n| (ISA IPC)                                                    |                                                          |\n| Established by the White House to implement a national       |                                                          |\n| information sharing strategy and to lead information         |                                                          |\n| sharing policy across the federal government.                |                                                          |\n| Information Sharing Council                                  |                                                          |\n| (ISC)                                                        |                                                          |\n| Advises the President and the PM-ISE in developing           |                                                          |\n| policies, procedures, guidelines, roles, and standards       |                                                          |\n| necessary to establish, implement, and maintain the ISE.     |                                                          |\n| Homeland Security & Law                                      |                                                          |\n| Enforcement Partners Board                                   |                                                          |\n| Established by the ODNI as an External Advisory Body         |                                                          |\n| that provides the DNI and IC leaders with external           |                                                          |\n| perspectives on the intelligence and information needs,      |                                                          |\n| equities, and capabilities of state, local, and tribal       |                                                          |\n| governments.                                                 |                                                          |\n| Intelligence Community                                       |                                                          |\n| Information Sharing and                                      |                                                          |\n| Safeguarding Executive                                       |                                                          |\n| As the DNI's senior accountable officer, provides            |                                                          |\n| oversight and program management of all Offices of the       |                                                          |\n| ODNI and IC information sharing efforts; as well as leads,   |                                                          |\n| coordinates, facilitates, and as appropriate, manages all    |                                                          |\n| ODNI and IC information sharing.                             |                                                          |\n| Serves as a Federal Advisory Committee to advise             | Global Justice Information                               |\n| Sharing Initiative (Global)                                  | the U.S. Attorney General on justice information sharing |\n| and integration initiatives.                                 |                                                          |\n| 17                                                           |                                                          |\n| Global supports the broad                                    |                                                          |\n| scale exchange of pertinent justice and public safety        |                                                          |\n| information and promotes standards-based electronic          |                                                          |\n| information exchange to provide the justice community        |                                                          |\n| with timely, accurate, complete, and accessible              |                                                          |\n| information in a secure and trusted environment.             |                                                          |\n| Criminal Intelligence                                        |                                                          |\n| Coordinating Council (CICC)                                  |                                                          |\n| Supports state, local, and tribal law enforcement and        |                                                          |\n| homeland security agencies in their ability to develop and   |                                                          |\n| share criminal intelligence nationwide.  The CICC helps      |                                                          |\n| to facilitate the nationwide coordination on various         |                                                          |\n| efforts and initiatives to improve law enforcement's ability |                                                          |\n| to share information and intelligence.                       |                                                          |\n| Homeland Security Advisory                                   |                                                          |\n| Council (HSAC)                                               |                                                          |\n|                                                              |                                                          |\n|                                                              |                                                          |\n|                                                              |                                                          |\n| Serves as a Federal Advisory Committee to provide            |                                                          |\n| organizationally independent, strategic, timely, specific,   |                                                          |\n| and actionable advice to the DHS Secretary and senior        |                                                          |\n| leadership on matters related to homeland security.  The     |                                                          |\n| HSAC comprises leaders from state and local                  |                                                          |\n| government, the private sector, and academia.                |                                                          |\n\nSource:  OIGs' compilation of White House, ODNI, DHS, and DOJ information\n\n17  Federal advisory committees,which may also be designated as commissions, councils, or task forces, are used to collect various viewpoints on specific policy issues.  These committees are often created to help the government manage and solve complex or divisive issues.  Such committees may be mandated by congressional statute, created by presidential executive order, or required by fiat of an agency head to render independent advice or make recommendations to federal agencies.\n\nThese multiple entities, with their differing roles and jurisdictions, lack an interconnectedness to facilitate collaboration, coordination, and integration of domestic information sharing.  The OIGs believe that codifying an overarching engagement and coordination body for the terrorism-related ISE would help further these objectives.\n\n## Recommendations: The Ic Ig And Dhs And Doj Oigs Recommend That The Odni, Dhs, And Doj:\n\n1. Review the 2003 interagency MOU on information sharing and\ndetermine what actions are necessary to update intelligence information sharing standards and processes among the departments.\n2. Codify an overarching engagement and coordination body for the\nterrorism-related ISE.\n\n## Dhs Intelligence Enterprise\n\n The DHS Intelligence Enterprise is not as effective and valuable to the IC as it could be.  For example, there is still a lack of unity among I&A and other DHS component intelligence programs, which also affects intelligence reporting.  In addition, DHS OIG concluded that I&A staffing levels in the field may be making it difficult to fully support the DHS Intelligence Enterprise.  Complications in its relationship with the FBI, as well as internal issues associated with the review and approval process are also negatively affecting I&A's production of intelligence reports. DHS must provide its stakeholders with information needed to disrupt and prevent terrorist threats and attacks. However, DHS intelligence personnel in the field have inconsistent access to the systems and facilities needed to receive, view, store, and share classified information above the Secret level.\n\n## Limited Cohesiveness And Coordination Of Effort Across The Dhs Intelligence Enterprise\n\nThe DHS Intelligence Enterprise is fragmented, with elements operating independently and with few repercussions or incentives to coordinate better outside of actual events.  The Under Secretary for Intelligence and Analysis, as\n\nDHS' Chief Intelligence Officer (CINT), is responsible for integrating and standardizing DHS component intelligence program products, including products with terrorism information and national intelligence, but has not fully exerted its authority over the DHS Intelligence Enterprise.  The DHS components involved have their own intelligence programs with their own cadre of intelligence professionals.  Further, I&A is subject to IC directives and standards, but component intelligence programs are not, unless IC directives and standards have been institutionalized into DHS guidance.\nI&A is taking several steps to help unify the DHS Intelligence Enterprise.\nFor example, in 2014 I&A established a DHS Intelligence Rotational Assignment Program to promote a broader understanding of the various intelligence missions and functions across the intelligence enterprise and fusion centers.  Efforts are also underway to ensure all intelligence products, briefings, and production plans are shared more evenly across the intelligence enterprise.  However, the CINT has been unable to effectively require other DHS components to comply with its policies or to compel DHS component personnel to participate in its initiatives.  Therefore, the CINT and key intelligence officials from the components should create incentives to encourage compliance and participation.\nTo enhance cooperation with other DHS components, I&A needs to better communicate its mission and role to component management.  DHS OIG observed increased collaboration between I&A and DHS components where intelligence enterprise meetings are held regularly.  This best practice builds relationships, conveys missions and roles, and enhances information sharing across DHS components.  Although I&A intelligence officers are now required to hold such meetings quarterly, the differing locations of component field offices, caps on the number of I&A intelligence officers, and reshuffling of assignments have caused meetings in some areas to lose momentum.\nThere is also a lack of coordination between I&A and DHS components in intelligence reporting, but steps are being taken to address this issue.  In 2012, DHS components established their own reporting programs, and at the same time, the Under Secretary for Intelligence and Analysis ended I&A's production of intelligence reports based on information from the components.  According to officials from I&A Field Operations, some DHS components are now working with I&A on pilot programs to facilitate intelligence reporting.  For example, the ICE HSI Intelligence Unit Chief sends information to an I&A senior reports officer in the field who then sends it to the region it impacts.  I&A reports officers in the field then produce ICE intelligence reports for which both components receive reporting credit.  CBP, TSA, and USCIS have expressed interest in developing similar pilots.  Because DHS component intelligence programs have limited personnel in the field and the majority are not authorized to produce intelligence reports, these efforts could lead to more efficient and effective intelligence reporting.  Rather than sending intelligence information to component headquarters to produce reports, DHS field officials\n\nwith subject matter expertise, access to information systems, and an understanding of local context could work with I&A field officials to produce reports.\n\n## Recommendations: Dhs Oig Recommends That I&A:\n\n3. In conjunction with the key intelligence officials from DHS components, ensure DHS component intelligence programs comply with policies and create incentives for personnel to participate in initiatives that enhance the cohesion of the DHS Intelligence Enterprise. 4. Formalize agreements that enable I&A field officials to develop intelligence reporting with DHS components in the field, based on pilot program results.\n\n## I&A Staffing Issues\n\nThe *Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2014* required I&A to limit the number of intelligence officers in the field.  As of December 2015, I&A had 59 intelligence officers in the field, primarily located at the nation's 78 fusion centers, serving as the IC's lead conduits to state, local, tribal, and territorial governments.18  Nineteen of the 78 fusion centers did not have a dedicated I&A intelligence officer, although two of those centers are in the same location as fusion centers that have a dedicated intelligence officer.  Nine intelligence officers and one regional director each serve two or three fusion centers; five of the nine intelligence officers serve fusion centers located more than 100 miles apart.  Two regional directors are the only I&A personnel at their respective area's fusion centers.  State and local entities expressed concern that recent changes to I&A Field Operations, such as the removal of some intelligence officer positions, have stretched these officers too thinly. Because they are thinly staffed, I&A intelligence officers cannot fully support the DHS Intelligence Enterprise in the field.  For example, I&A does not have intelligence officers at all the fusion centers near major DHS component field concentrations, such as along borders, including those fusion centers in El Paso and San Antonio, Texas; and San Diego, California.  In addition, most DHS component intelligence program personnel are located at headquarters with few in the field, and intelligence-related work is largely a\n\ncollateral duty for component field personnel.  I&A could potentially fill this role through its intelligence officers assigned to fusion centers, but I&A does not have sufficient staffing in the field.\n\n\n## Insufficient Reporting Of Counterterrorism Information\n\nTo develop a comprehensive and accurate threat picture, I&A field officials are expected to share information related to the missions of DHS and its components (e.g., information on homeland security, terrorism, and weapons of mass destruction) with state, local, and tribal entities.  I&A field officials are also responsible for reviewing homeland security-relevant information, creating intelligence and other information products, and disseminating the products to the appropriate federal, state, local, and tribal government entities.19  Given that DHS is largely responsible for travel-related security (e.g., borders, transportation, and immigration), DHS has unique access to information about travelers, including known or suspected terrorists, and is well-situated to intercept and identify travel by potential terrorists and foreign fighters.  I&A field officials could use this information to enhance state and local information to identify and analyze trends.  Although I&A has increased its focus on intelligence reporting by sending all intelligence officers and regional directors to reports officer training, converting some intelligence officer positions to reports officer positions, and developing additional reporting lines, it does not have formal guidance for field officials on the collection and coordination needed to create these reports.\nIn addition, none of the I&A field officials with whom DHS OIG spoke said they regularly develop intelligence reports from terrorism and counterterrorism information.  I&A has a responsibility to produce intelligence reports based on counterterrorism information from state and locals for the IC, and the FBI has a responsibility to investigate terrorism-related matters and share counterterrorism information with the IC and outside agencies.  Fulfilling these responsibilities can create tension because intelligence reports go to the IC while information that contributes to an investigation is generally closely held within the investigative team.  Thus, I&A and the FBI may have difficulty coordinating these interrelated counterterrorism missions.  Also, I&A has not asserted its reporting responsibility, leading the majority of I&A field officials to feel they needed permission from FBI field offices to develop counterterrorism reports.  Without clear guidance on how to balance and coordinate these responsibilities, and with the desire to maintain good relationships with the FBI, about 43 percent of the I&A field officials interviewed said they no longer try to report on terrorism and counterterrorism information and about 21\n\npercent have developed ad hoc arrangements with their respective FBI field office regarding reporting in general.  For example, one I&A field official said he has informally agreed to write reports with information the FBI cannot or chooses not to report.  Following DHS OIG's fieldwork, one I&A field official said I&A was working with the FBI to establish an agreement allowing I&A to create reports based on terrorist watchlisting. I&A should help its field officials fulfill their responsibilities by developing and implementing guidance for intelligence reporting.  In addition, better coordination with the FBI and other partners would help to create intelligence products that address investigative concerns and include terrorism- and counterterrorism-related information.  Therefore, I&A should also clarify its role and improve coordination with its federal partners, including the FBI, by formalizing agreements and policies regarding intelligence reporting.\n\n## Recommendations: Dhs Oig Recommends That I&A:\n\n5. Develop and implement guidance for intelligence reporting in the field. 6. Coordinate with the FBI to formalize guidance and policies for the reporting of terrorism and counterterrorism information.\n\n## Delays In I&A Intelligence Product Review And Approval\n\nAccording to I&A field officials, approval and dissemination of I&A\nintelligence reports is often delayed, which could be the result of several factors.  All I&A intelligence reports from the field must first be sent to I&A's Reporting Branch for review and approval.  Then, the clearing offices - DHS Privacy Office, Civil Rights and Civil Liberties (CRCL), Office of the General Counsel-Intelligence Law Division, and I&A Intelligence Oversight - concurrently review the reports.  However, reports are emailed, and there is no formal system to log and track the review process.  Further, although each clearing office is supposed to complete its review reports within 2 business days, it is not clear how long it actually takes.20  The Reporting Branch's review and approval appears to take the most time, which may be due in part to the branch's staffing levels and reviewing assignments.  By the fall of 2015, the 59\n20  DHS OIG requested statistics on review times from each clearing office and the Reporting Branch but did not receive comprehensive statistics from each office.  The statistics received from the DHS Privacy Office, CRCL, Office of the General Counsel-Intelligence Law Division, and the I&A Intelligence Oversight indicated a review time of less than 1 business day.\n\n\nI&A intelligence officers in the field completed reports officer training.  In addition to the 26 reports officers in the field, these 59 intelligence officers can now produce intelligence reports, but Reporting Branch staff have not had commensurate increases.  Ten senior reports officers review all reports from the field.  In addition, by assigning reviews to senior reports officers based on regions, the Reporting Branch may be creating backlogs for officers responsible for regions with a greater number of reports or more complex reporting. During our review, I&A field officials also said they did not have local release authority, that is, the authority to send intelligence reports directly to the clearing offices for review and approval without first sending them to the Reporting Branch.  The Under Secretary for Intelligence and Analysis recently approved granting local release authority to I&A field officials, but formal guidance had not been issued prior to the end of DHS OIG's fieldwork.\nBecause of the delays in I&A reporting, even though they would like to develop joint products, many fusion centers had given up on doing so.  In one often cited example, a joint product with the New Jersey, New York, and New Hampshire fusion centers about homegrown violent extremists targeting military assets was in production for about 2 years.  Several fusion centers said they still coordinate products with I&A field personnel who contribute informally, but without joint seals or official reporting credit.  These types of timeliness issues were raised in an October 2012 Senate report and a July 2013 House report.21\nFor more flexibility and continued coordination with and support from fusion center partners, I&A has introduced new intelligence products and reports, such as Field Analysis Reports and Field Intelligence Reports.  Field Analysis Reports are finished intelligence products designed to highlight analysis from the National Network of Fusion Centers on national, regional, and local issues of concern.  Topics must meet I&A's statutory missions and authorities and should contain unique state, local, tribal, or territorial and/or DHS Intelligence Enterprise information or perspectives.  Field Intelligence Reports are used to formally report raw, unevaluated information of potential intelligence value that responds to departmental requirements but not IC requirements.  These new products have been well received by I&A stakeholders, including Congress, who had expressed concern about I&A's production levels. Although I&A has taken steps to increase the timeliness and number of intelligence products, establishing formal review mechanisms and implementing formal guidance would further improve its intelligence reporting.\n\n Recommendation: DHS OIG recommends that the DHS clearing offices:\n7. Develop and implement a formal mechanism for reviewing I&A intelligence reporting from the field, including a logging and tracking process. Recommendation: DHS OIG recommends that I&A:\n8. Develop and implement guidance for field officials granting them local release authority for intelligence reporting.\n\n## Dhs Lacks Consistent Access To C-Lan And Scifs In The Field\n\nAccess to the C-LAN and Sensitive Compartmented Information Facilities\n(SCIF) are necessary for DHS intelligence personnel to fulfill their duties and to meet the goals of the DHS Information Sharing and Safeguarding Strategy.22 However, while DHS I&A and other DHS Intelligence Enterprise personnel in the field have Top Secret/Sensitive Compartmented Information (TS/SCI) security clearances, they lack the supporting infrastructure to receive, view, store, and share information classified above the Secret level.  Altogether, DHS components have SCIFs located at 19 sites outside of the National Capital Region that field personnel may reasonably use, such as to access the C-LAN. Of these 19, only 2 are I&A-certified SCIFs..\nI&A's effectiveness as an IC member, in particular, is hampered by its limited access to classified systems and facilities.  Nearly all I&A field personnel work in fusion centers, which now all have access to Secret-level classified information through the Homeland Secure Data Network (HSDN).  However, counterterrorism information is often classified above the Secret level.\n\n Several DHS field personnel have brokered informal agreements through personal relationships with Department of Defense facilities and other federal field offices to gain access to the C-LAN.  Some of these facilities require personnel to drive up to 3 hours, thereby limiting the frequency with which personnel may use them.  Some DHS field personnel rely on the FBI for access to TS/SCI systems and space.  For example, DHS task force officers have access to FBI SCIFs and systems through their participation in JTTFs, but this applies only to special agents.  Of the 96 I&A field officials surveyed, about 43 percent hold active FBI badges similar to those that DHS task force officers receive and about 20 percent have access to FBI systems such as FBINet or the Top Secret/Sensitive Compartmented Information Operational Network (SCION).\nTo enhance the efficiency and effectiveness of counterterrorism information sharing, DHS needs to increase field personnel's access to classified systems and facilities above the Secret level.  DHS should determine whether establishing more SCIFs in the field, formalizing agreements with other federal agencies, or pursuing a combination of the two, will resolve this issue and take the appropriate action.\n\n9. Develop and implement a plan that will allow DHS intelligence officials in the field practical access to classified systems and infrastructure above the Secret level.\n\n## Doj Support Of Counterterrorism Information Sharing\n\n The DOJ OIG identified improvements that could be made to internal DOJ processes, JTTFs, and other field-based activities to enhance counterterrorism information sharing. Specifically, the DOJ OIG found that DOJ does not have a consolidated internal strategy to ensure that DOJ's counterterrorism information sharing efforts align with the President's strategic plan and that all DOJ components understand their respective roles and responsibilities.  In addition, the FBI should further promote the JTTF Executive Board concept by increasing Board membership and spurring participation in Board meetings through standardization of content.  Moreover, the DOJ OIG believes the ATAC meetings often duplicate other field-based counterterrorism information sharing efforts, and we believe that DOJ should evaluate the ATAC program to ensure the purpose of the ATAC meetings are not duplicative of other\n\n counterterrorism information sharing partner initiatives. Finally, although the FBI has a well-defined process to identify and prioritize counterterrorism threats in each field division's jurisdiction, it could improve its efforts to obtain its partners' input on regional threats and mitigation strategies.\n\n## Doj Strategy For Internal Counterterrorism Information Sharing\n\nBased on discussions with an official from the Office of the Deputy Attorney General (ODAG), DOJ has not developed an internal strategy for counterterrorism information sharing separate from the President's strategic plan.  This official stated that DOJ determined that its existing framework of policies and procedures constitutes DOJ's information sharing strategy.\n\nThe DOJ OIG believes that additional DOJ leadership is needed to ensure that DOJ's overall information sharing efforts and investments align with the 2012 Strategy and are coordinated and prioritized both within DOJ and with external partners.  The DOJ OIG team discussed this issue with the DOJ Chief Information Officer (CIO) who agreed that coordination among the various DOJ components could be improved.  According to the DOJ CIO, DOJ lacks an internal forum singularly dedicated to reviewing information sharing initiatives and investments across all DOJ components.  The Law Enforcement Information Sharing Coordinating Committee (LCC), which was created in December 2006 by the Deputy Attorney General, was responsible for ensuring a department-wide collaborative and integrated focus on information sharing policy objectives.  However, this group stopped meeting in 2009 because the group determined that it had accomplished its goal of enhancing interconnectivity with the Department's law enforcement partners following the establishment of the National Data Exchange.23 The lack of an internal strategy and forum for sharing information may hamper DOJ's ability to define and execute a comprehensive and unified plan for its information sharing initiatives and investments across all of DOJ's components.  Officials from each DOJ component attend other information sharing working groups.  For example, the DOJ CIO said that DOJ uses the Criminal Intelligence Coordinating Council (CICC) as a forum for components to discuss information sharing initiatives with external partners.  The DOJ OIG is concerned that because DOJ does not have a consolidated internal strategy,\n\nthere is a risk that DOJ components may present or discuss initiatives that do not align with DOJ's unified vision. The DOJ CIO said that he had recently proposed the establishment of a new council, the Law Enforcement Information Sharing Council (LEISC), that would be led by the Deputy Attorney General and help coordinate the information sharing efforts within DOJ.  The proposed LEISC would provide a platform for DOJ entities to discuss and develop a unified vision regarding information sharing initiatives and investments, as well as ensure that DOJ actions are consistent with the 2012 Strategy.  The DOJ CIO stated that DOJ is evaluating the LEISC, or a similar initiative, to determine how best to meet DOJ's operational and strategic planning needs.  The DOJ OIG believes that the LEISC or a similar initiative could provide a valuable forum for the discussion and coordination of DOJ information sharing efforts, including overall strategy and investments.  Information gleaned from this council's discussions could then be used during discussions with the PM-ISE and the CICC.\n\n\n\n10. Develop a comprehensive internal counterterrorism information sharing strategic plan based on a review of the President's strategic plan and in consultation with relevant partners. 11. Implement a council, led by a senior Department official, for the internal coordination of DOJ information sharing strategy and investments, and ensure that relevant components designate senior-level officials responsible for monitoring their component's efforts and communicating their efforts to DOJ as requested.\n\n## Jttf Executive Board Meeting Participation And Content\n\nJTTFs, which are squads within each of the FBI's Field Divisions and select Resident Agency Offices, focus primarily on addressing terrorism threats and preventing terrorist incidents.  The JTTFs leverage the resources and expertise of multiple member agencies to collect and share counterterrorism information.  As of March 2016, the JTTFs were comprised of 54 federal agencies and 449 state, local, and other agencies.  For example, DHS has more than 600 agents who participate on the 104 JTTFs nationwide.  These DHS personnel help enhance the JTTFs' efforts through their unique expertise in areas such as immigration and customs enforcement. In 2003, FBI field divisions were instructed to establish a JTTF Executive Board if they did not already have one.  While the JTTFs conduct joint\n\ncounterterrorism investigations, JTTF Executive Boards are forums for sharing critical terrorism threat intelligence and ongoing investigative efforts to address those threats with law enforcement executives in their respective jurisdictions. As a result, the JTTF Executive Boards encompass a wider coverage of agencies within each respective jurisdiction because not all agencies are able to participate on a JTTF due to restrictions such as resources.  In 2005, FBI field divisions were instructed to ensure that the JTTF Executive Board met on an as-needed basis but at least three times per year.  The 2005 guidance further said that JTTF Executive Boards should be comprised of key federal, state, local, and tribal law enforcement officials, but at a minimum, include the heads of the agencies that have full-time agents and/or officers assigned to the JTTF within the respective field division's territory.\nDuring the review, the DOJ OIG found that the JTTF Executive Board meetings in the sites the team visited were generally occurring at least quarterly.  However, we are concerned with the number of agencies not represented on the JTTF Executive Boards and with the level of participation of those agencies on the JTTF Executive Boards.  To assess the level of engagement and participation of executive management of the agencies that have full-time agents or officers assigned to a JTTF, the team reviewed JTTF task force officer and JTTF Executive Board member rosters and meeting attendance records maintained by the FBI for the eight FBI field divisions visited.24\nAs shown in the following table, 167 agencies assigned at least one task force officer to the JTTFs in the 8 locations reviewed.  However, we found that 34, or 20 percent, of the 167 agencies did not have an agency representative on the JTTF Executive Board.  For example, the FBI Boston Division's JTTF Executive Board only had representation from 40 percent of the agencies participating on the Boston JTTF.\n\n\n\nNumber of Agencies:\nNot Attending More\nWith an\nFBI Field\nLocation\nWith a JTTF Task\nThan Half of the\nExecutive Board\nWithout an\nExecutive\nExecutive\nForce Officer\nBoard Member\nBoard Member\nMeetings (excludes\nagencies without a\nBoard Member)\nBoston\n20\n12\n8\n3\nChicago\n16\n0\n16\n3\nDallas\n20\n2\n18\n3\nDenver\n18\n1\n17\n7\nHouston\n37\n7\n30\n19\nNew York\n39\n12\n27\n6\nPortland\n12\n0\n12\n10\nSpringfield\n5\n0\n5\n1\nTotal\n167\n34\n133\n52\n\nSource:  DOJ OIG analysis of Federal Bureau of Investigation Data Using the FBI-provided meeting attendance records, we found that 39\npercent of the 133 agencies represented on the JTTF Executive Board did not attend at least half of the JTTF Executive Board meetings, as shown in preceding table.25  This 39 percent included federal, state, and local agencies.\nThe Special Agents in Charge (SAC) in two FBI field divisions we visited told us that the need to obtain appropriate security clearances prevented some state and local law enforcement representatives from attending the JTTF Executive Board meetings.  Officials from federal agencies reported that they may miss meetings because of competing work demands, such as training and other meetings.  While we recognize that individuals may not be able to attend every meeting, agency representation at the JTTF Executive Board meetings is\n25  According to the FBI, not everyone who attends a JTTF Executive Board meeting may have signed the meeting attendance sheet.  Because there was no other documentation available to confirm attendance, the DOJ OIG considered an individual to have regularly attended the meetings if she/he attended more than half of the meetings within the date ranges provided by the FBI based upon the meeting attendance sheets.\n\n\nimportant, and we believe that the FBI and participating agencies should place greater emphasis on attendance because these meetings provide another avenue for obtaining relevant information concerning their jurisdictions that they may not obtain otherwise.  To help place greater emphasis on these meetings, we believe it is essential that the FBI ensure that a management representative (and an alternate) from each agency with a task force officer assigned to the JTTF has been designated as a JTTF Executive Board member and ensure that those individuals are notified of upcoming meetings. During the review of JTTF Executive Board data, the DOJ OIG found that representatives from agencies without full-time JTTF task force officers also attend JTTF Executive Board meetings.  For example, regional representatives from the NCTC, I&A, and fusion centers attended meetings although these agencies did not have full-time JTTF task force officers. The DOJ OIG also noted that representatives from local fire departments attended the JTTF Executive Board meetings in some FBI field divisions.  The DOJ OIG discussed this issue with the Assistant Director for the FBI's Office of Partnership Engagement who said that he believed it was a \"best-case scenario\" to have first responders, such as fire departments, attend JTTF Executive Board meetings.  He further indicated that if state and local first responders cannot participate on the JTTF Executive Board, then the first responders should be engaged with the fusion center.  This official also stated that it was important to have the first responders on the JTTF so that they are aware of the threat picture and have situational awareness so they may respond appropriately in the event of a terrorist attack, such as Paris or San Bernardino.  Therefore, the DOJ OIG recommends that the FBI ensure its field divisions encourage agencies that do not participate on the JTTF, including first responders, to attend JTTF Executive Board Meetings.\n\nIn addition to our concerns with the engagement and participation on the JTTF Executive Board, we believe the content of the meetings needs to be more standardized.  Representatives from partner agencies who attended the JTTF Executive Board meetings reported the meetings provided valuable opportunities to share investigative and operational information, and that the meetings have improved in content and depth in recent years.  The DOJ OIG attended a JTTF Executive Board meeting hosted by the FBI's Chicago Division. The meeting included an overview of the FBI's current threat environment, a roundtable discussion about emerging counterterrorism issues, and in-depth briefings on open terrorism investigations and threats, which were presented by various agencies, including the FBI, DHS, NCTC, and the area's two fusion centers -- the Illinois State Terrorism and Information Center (STIC) and the Chicago Crime Prevention and Information Center (CPIC).\n\nHowever, in other locations, some partner agency officials reported that the depth to which the topics were covered varied from meeting to meeting, and that in some instances, the varying coverage coincided with changes in FBI\n\nfield division management.  For example, a DHS official who attends the FBI Denver Division's JTTF Executive Board meetings said the meeting content varied in conjunction with three changes in the FBI Denver Division's leadership.  This DHS official said that it would be more useful if the meetings were more consistent and provided both an overview of terrorism threats and specific cases.  An official from the Colorado Division of Homeland Security and Emergency Management also said that he would like more strategic analysis of emerging threats, and that this type of information would assist him in his duties for the state of Colorado.\n\nAlthough the DOJ OIG recognizes that some level of flexibility is needed to accommodate local needs, we believe the FBI should ensure that the JTTF Executive Board meetings across FBI field divisions consistently approach sharing information, which may well improve attendance at the meetings. Therefore, the DOJ OIG recommends that the FBI identify the structure and content of JTTF Executive Board meetings that would give attendees the most meaningful information on a consistent basis.  The FBI should then inform field divisions to use this structure and content, perhaps as a template, at a minimum when planning their JTTF Executive Board meetings.\n\n## Recommendations: Doj Oig Recommends That The Fbi:\n\n12. Require FBI field divisions to stress to participating agencies the importance of designating an individual and an alternate to serve as their representatives to the JTTF Executive Board, as well as of regularly attending the meetings. 13. Ensure FBI field divisions encourage agencies that do not participate on the JTTF, including first responders, to attend JTTF Executive Board Meetings. 14. Identify an appropriate structure and content of JTTF Executive Board meetings that FBI field divisions should use at a minimum when conducting these meetings.\n\n## Anti-Terrorism Advisory Council (Atac)\n\n\nIn 2001, the Attorney General established the ATAC program.  As part of this program, each USAO designated an ATAC Coordinator to help enhance the nation's counterterrorism efforts.  Each USAO also formed a committee comprised of federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies and often pertinent public health and safety and security officials from private industry. The program has three primary functions, including:  (1) convening the ATAC (or committee) to facilitate counterterrorism efforts and information sharing in their communities; (2) supporting the investigative efforts of the JTTFs; and (3)\n\nfacilitating counterterrorism information sharing between DOJ field and headquarters components regarding threats, litigation, criminal enforcement, intelligence, and training.  Each USAO was required to complete an ATAC Plan that defined how each office implemented the ATAC Program, and each USAO is supposed to update its plan every 6 months.26\nBeginning at a March 2010 ATAC training event and continuing thereafter at training events, the ATAC National Program Coordinator instructed the ATAC Coordinators to coordinate their efforts with other entities within their jurisdiction to reduce duplication as it pertained to convening the committee to share counterterrorism information.  For example, the USAO may not need to maintain its own distribution list for sharing counterterrorism information if the fusion center provides the primary information sharing responsibilities for national security matters within the district.  Nonetheless, the USAO must remain a full-time participant with the agencies leading counterterrorism information sharing efforts and be willing to certify that the USAO is actively engaged in information sharing.  Similarly, if the JTTF in the USAO's district conducts effective meetings and trainings that include the same law enforcement partners as the ATAC, then the USAO is not required to conduct duplicative ATAC meetings or trainings.  However, the ATAC Coordinator should have a substantial role in developing the agenda, presenting information, and participating in the JTTF meeting or training.\n\nTo assess the USAOs' efforts to reduce the potential duplication between ATAC meetings and those of their partners, the DOJ OIG reviewed the 2006 and the most recent version of the ATAC plans for the USAOs located within eight FBI field division jurisdictions.27  The DOJ OIG found that half of the USAOs' ATAC Plans had not been updated for nearly 10 years (from the initial submission in 2006 until the DOJ OIG requested them).  As a result, the DOJ OIG was unable to determine the evolution of the ATACs and the USAOs' efforts to reduce the potentially unnecessary duplication of counterterrorism information sharing.\n\nassist on counterterrorism matters, ensuring that the USAO has established a mechanism for effectively distributing time-sensitive information throughout the district, outlining collaboration between the ATAC Coordinator and DOJ's National Security Division, and ensuring the USAO has a plan for convening the ATAC. 27  We requested the most recent ATAC Plans for the USAOs located in the headquarter cities of the FBI field divisions we visited.  The ATAC Plans for six of the USAOs were dated September 2015, one was dated April 2013, and one was not dated.  We did not speak to the ATAC Coordinators about the plans because we were not informed of them until after our site visits.\n\nIn addition, the DOJ OIG found that several of the most recent ATAC\nPlans indicated fewer ATAC meetings being held or a consolidation of ATAC meetings with JTTF Executive Board meetings (the latter of which might or might not be consistent with the instructions to increase coordination and reduce duplication).  Moreover, based on the review of attendance rosters, the DOJ OIG determined that, in general, representatives from the USAOs regularly attended JTTF Executive Board meetings within the eight FBI field divisions visited, and that the ATAC Coordinators said they participated in the meetings.\nGiven the progression of other counterterrorism information sharing efforts by other field-based entities, it is recommended that DOJ assess the ATAC program and ensure that the purpose of the ATAC meetings are not duplicative of other counterterrorism information sharing partner initiatives and are used in the most effective manner.  For instance, instead of holding separate ATAC meetings, USAOs could be committed to fully participating in the JTTF Executive Board meetings and fusion center meetings, thereby standardizing the ATACs' roles and reducing possible duplication of efforts. Following this evaluation, the DOJ should ensure that each USAO updates its ATAC plan accordingly and that the plans are updated as required by the program.\n\n15. Ensure that each USAO updates its ATAC Plan as required by the program. 16. Evaluate the ATAC program to ensure the purpose of the ATAC meetings is not duplicative of other counterterrorism information sharing partner initiatives and is used in the most effective manner.\n\n## Fbi Threat Review And Prioritization\n\nThe FBI Directorate of Intelligence implemented the Threat Review and Prioritization (TRP) process to assess, triage, and prioritize threats.  The TRP process was designed to integrate intelligence and operations to provide a construct that synchronizes prioritization between FBI headquarters and field divisions.  FBI field divisions use FBI National Threat Priorities and nationallevel mitigation strategies developed by FBI headquarters in completing their individual TRP process.\nAccording to FBI policy, appropriate representatives from the USAO must be invited to participate in the TRP process.  Officials from the USAOs the team visited said that USAO representatives participate in the TRP process and\n\nbelieve the USAOs being involved in this process is beneficial.  For example, an ATAC Coordinator from one of the USAOs visited said that she attended TRP meetings, and it helped her to understand the FBI's priorities and thought processes, which enhanced the USAO's awareness of the threat environment in the area.  In addition, she said that she believes having the USAO participate in the TRP adds credibility to the TRP process and shows the FBI that the USAO cares about its issues.\n\nAlthough not required by FBI policy, FBI SACs in two of the field divisions the team visited said that JTTF task force officers and other partner agencies participate in the TRP process.  For example, the SAC for the FBI Denver Division said that the Denver Police Department attends the annual TRP meeting.  Similarly, the SAC for the FBI Houston Division said that the USAO and JTTF task force officers participate in the TRP process.  Further, he said that there would be a benefit to have even more agencies participate in the TRP process.  However, some JTTF task force officers in the locations the teams visited said that they did not participate in the TRP meetings.\nThe DOJ OIG believes that it is important for the FBI to obtain its partners' input regarding the threats and mitigation strategies for the region. As a result, we recommend that the FBI direct FBI field divisions to identify and invite key stakeholders to TRP sessions.\n\nThe DOJ OIG also noted differences as to the individuals and entities with whom FBI field divisions shared their TRP results and, specifically, their prioritization of threats in their regions.  For example, the FBI Boston Division shared its TRP outcomes with the command staff of the fusion center and the JTTF task force officer home agencies.  In contrast, in the FBI Houston Division the JTTF task force officers who participate in the TRP process are responsible for providing such information to the management of their home agencies.\nThe results of the FBI's TRP process could provide important information to the FBI's counterterrorism information sharing partners.  For example, the SAC for the FBI Houston Division said that there could be value in sharing the TRP results with JTTF Executive Board members, as well as the Texas Homeland Security Advisor.  Similarly, the Homeland Security Advisor for the state of Colorado said that he believed it would be helpful to obtain the FBI Denver Division's TRP results for both the Denver area and the state of Colorado.  As such, the DOJ OIG recommends that the FBI determine with whom it could share its counterterrorism-related TRP results and implement a process by which it shares counterterrorism TRP results with the appropriate partners on a systemic and regular basis.\n\n17. Direct FBI field divisions to identify and invite key stakeholders to TRP sessions. 18. Determine the agencies with which it should share its counterterrorism-related TRP results and implement a process to ensure the TRP results are appropriately shared with those agencies on a systemic and regular basis.\n\n## Odni Field Based Elements Support To Counterterrorism Information Sharing\n\n The ODNI has two programs focused on the field-based sharing of counterterrorism information:  the Domestic DNI Representative (DDNIR) program and the NCTC Domestic Representative program.  The OIGs found that although the DDNIR program has gained momentum and progress has been made, the program is hindered by large geographic regions, as well as the lack of a clear strategic vision and guidance for it to reach its full potential.  The OIGs found that the NCTC Domestic Representative program, although well received in the field, has also struggled to sufficiently cover its regions.\n\n## The Domestic Dni Representative Program\n\nThe DDNIR program plays a role in facilitating the sharing of counterterrorism information.  A November 2011 Memorandum of Agreement (MOA), \"Domestic Director of National Intelligence Representatives,\" governs the DDNIR program between the ODNI and the FBI under Intelligence Community Directive 402, \"Director of National Intelligence Representatives.\" Domestic DNI Regions - The Director of National Intelligence and the FBI\nlaunched the DDNIR program in February 2012 and designated 12 FBI executives as DDNIRs.  As shown in the map below, the DDNIRs are the Assistant Directors in Charge of Los Angeles, New York, and Washington DC, and the SACs of Atlanta, Boston, Chicago, Denver, Houston, Miami, Pittsburgh, San Francisco, and Seattle, with each representative being responsible for covering a designated geographic region.28\n28  The OIGs were unable to find any documentation describing how the selection of the initial DDNIR locations were determined.  However, officials familiar with the history of the program told us the regions were originally selected by identifying cities with a large presence of multiple IC elements.\nThe DHS Chief Intelligence Officer designated the I&A regional directors to serve as the DHS senior field representatives to the DDNIR program in specified geographic regions.  I&A regional directors serve as the DHS focal point for all engagements with the DDNIR program.  They maintain awareness of all DDNIR or ODNI staff visits to DHS components in their specified geographic region, coordinate actions with affected elements of the DHS Intelligence Enterprise, share program-related data, and work collaboratively with the U.S. Coast Guard national intelligence element to support its interaction with DDNIRs and ensure unity of effort and consistency in departmental messaging of DHS activities.  While in some regions DHS Intelligence Enterprise field personnel participate in the program, the DDNIR is not authorized to task DHS components that are not elements of the IC.  The scope of the DDNIR's authorities extends only to those DHS components that are elements of the IC:  I&A and the U.S. Coast Guard's intelligence and counterintelligence elements.\n\nDomestic DNI Quarterly Meetings - DDNIRs hold quarterly meetings with the IC representatives in their region to help foster collaboration, effective partnerships, and integration of the IC team in the domestic field.  Quarterly meetings generally focus on a particular threat or issue that is of interest to the region.29  To help ensure that the DDNIR program meetings are productive and support the primary mission of the program, the FBI has incorporated metrics into its field division performance measures.  To actively participate in the DDNIR program, FBI field divisions are required to complete a combination of the following activities:  serve as lead on a DDNIR region product; chair a subgroup; substantively contribute to a sub-group or region product; host a quarterly meeting; and/or complete a collaborative interagency action item.\n\nThe OIGs found that the differing sizes of some of the 12 geographic regions cause challenges for some of the DDNIRs when conducting quarterly meetings.  For example, the DDNIR for the Rocky Mountain Region is responsible for the coordination of nine states in his region.30  The Program Coordinator within that region reported challenges in identifying DDNIR meeting topics because issues and threats throughout the region differ Montana, and Utah), Denver Division (Wyoming and Colorado), and the Albuquerque Division (New Mexico).  In terms of geographic territory, the Salt Lake City Division, Minneapolis Division, and the Denver Division are the 2nd, 3rd, and 4th largest territories in the FBI, respectively, trailing only the Anchorage Division (Alaska), making for an immense territory within the DDNIR Rocky Mountain Region.\n\n\nconsiderably.31  When her team surveyed meeting attendees for discussion topics, they often received no input.\nIn contrast, in the much smaller Northeast Region, the DDNIR found it easier to collaborate and plan meetings because he was close to the other SACs in his region and the field divisions have similar interests.  According to the DDNIR for the Northeast Region, it is difficult for larger regions that are more geographically dispersed to collaborate and find commonality on topics.\n\nAccording to officials with whom the IC IG spoke, the DNI had originally considered designating all heads of the 56 FBI field divisions as DDNIRs, which would have made the domestic program more closely resemble the overseas DNI representative program in which all CIA Chiefs of Station are designated as DNI representatives.  Others with whom the team spoke, such as a former ISA- IPC chair, felt the idea had merit, stating that he never understood why some SACs are designated as representatives and others are not.  In contrast, a senior FBI official currently assigned to the ODNI expressed the belief that having 56 DDNIRs may not be practical given that there are many competing priorities within the FBI.\n\nThe DHS OIG also discussed the geographical structure of the DDNIR\nprogram with I&A officials because Congress directed I&A to realign its field operations to the DDNIR Program regional construct.32  Effective November 2014, I&A transitioned from 9 regions to the 12 DDNIR program regions. However, several I&A officials said they do not believe this structure makes sense for I&A.  They expressed concern that conforming to the DDNIR regional construct hampered DHS' internal Unity of Effort message and that I&A should have realigned with other DHS regional constructs, in particular, FEMA regions.  FEMA regions are well-established and already known by state and local entities that are primary customers for I&A field officials.  DHS OIG concluded that should the DDNIR program modify its regional structure, I&A would likely be required to as well, thereby further impacting I&A personnel and resource allocation.\n\n31  As part of the FBI implementation of the program, each of the 12 DDNIRs has designated an analyst within their office to serve as a DDNIR Program Coordinator.  These Program Coordinators, who are typically located in the field division's Field Intelligence Group, are responsible for the day-to-day operation of the program to include coordinating with the other FBI field divisions and IC elements in their region to develop the agendas for the quarterly meetings, arrange speakers, and conduct a variety of other administrative and logistical tasks associated with the program.  In some regions, FBI field divisions have full-time positions dedicated to the program coordinator role while in others it is a corollary duty. The role of the DDNIRs is an additional duty and DDNIRs do not receive any additional funding or personnel to execute their DDNIR responsibilities. Per the MOA, the DNI and FBI may, through mutual agreement, add or remove ADICs or SACs as DDNIRs.  While it may not be feasible to designate the heads of all 56 FBI field divisions as DDNIRs, in light of the current challenges posed by the large geographic regions, it may be feasible to designate some additional DDNIRs to help improve counterterrorism information sharing and coordination within larger existing regions.  The OIGs recommend that the DNI, in coordination with the FBI, evaluate the existing DDNIR regional structure to ensure that regions are appropriately sized and defined to better align common areas of interest and geographic coordination among participating partners.\n\nMission and Program Guidance - The OIGs found that the DDNIR\nprogram lacks in-depth guidance and a well-defined strategy for ensuring the program is well-understood and implemented consistently across regions.  All DDNIRs are required to attend a four-hour orientation at the ODNI before assuming their DDNIR role.  However, we found that some of the DDNIRs want more guidance and clarification on what the DNI expects them to do. 33\nThe OIGs also found that the objectives of the program had not been clearly communicated to the IC-member representatives.  According to the DDNIR Southeast Region's October 2014 semi-annual report, despite messaging from ODNI and FBI leadership regarding the importance of the program, many of the participants in the region continue to express uncertainty as to the purpose of the DDNIR program and regional integration.34 For example, one official who regularly attended meetings in the DDNIR Southeast Region stated that if the objective of the program is to \"foster relationships,\" then the program is working well; but if the goal of the program is to collaborate on regional issues and produce a regional product, then the program is not succeeding.  The DDNIR Southeast Region's October 2014 semiannual report also noted that many of the region's partners have few or no analytic resources, and that for many, the analysis is conducted at the headquarters level.\n\n33  Similarly, the Congressionally directed 9/11 Review Commission found in their March 2015 report, \"The FBI:  Protecting the Homeland in the 21st Century,\" that the DDNIR program is experiencing \"growing pains,\" and that, \"It is not well defined by the ODNI or well understood by the ADICs and SACs who serve in this capacity.  Some confusion stems from the question of which functions the ADIC/SAC is performing for the DNI as opposed to performing as part of his/her FBI responsibilities, because the stakeholder groups are not the same.  Most ADICs/SACs understand that the Domestic DNI Representative role is to lead coordination, but are not clear what should be coordinated, and to what end.  ADICs/SACs did not believe that they had adequate guidance on how to manage the Domestic DNI Representative responsibilities beyond their own field office's geographic area, given that some of the 12 regions are quite large.\" In reviewing the DDNIR quarterly meeting agendas and minutes, the DOJ OIG found that the meetings are generally maturing in structure and detail and that the depth of content covered has increased.35  However, in some regions, the DDNIR quarterly meetings were seen primarily as networking opportunities where various officials also were invited to give topical presentations.  In other regions, the DDNIRs were more involved in proactively establishing joint working groups and sub-working groups to address areas of common concern within the region ranging from border security to threats involving the oil and gas industry and ISIL.\nAt an annual meeting in May 2015, FBI Director Comey and DNI Clapper directed the DDNIRs to examine the Homegrown Violent Extremist (HVE) threat associated with ISIL in each of their regions in order to identify key intelligence gaps.  The product was due October 31, 2015.  However, specific guidance and project expectations were not provided to the DDNIRs until July 2015, which the DOJ OIG and IC IG were told resulted in significant confusion and wasted effort.  According to an official from the ODNI's Office of Partner Engagement, most of the DDNIR regions produced External Intelligence Notes, which involve a much longer turn-around time due to various FBI requirements.  This official said that by the time the products were available, the information was no longer valid or helpful to inform the DNI and FBI Director on emerging trends. Although this assignment provided a good opportunity to highlight interagency cooperation and further maturation of the DDNIR program in order to identify existing ISIL challenges at the regional level, the OIGs believe that this instance highlights the need for the program to have explicit and timely guidance on specific tasks.  Although the DDNIR program needs to be sufficiently flexible to adapt to each region's issues and culture, clarifying guidance as to the intended outcomes of the meetings, as well as the roles and responsibilities of partners would be beneficial.  Therefore, the OIGs recommend that the ODNI, in coordination with the FBI, develop and disseminate to IC-member partners more guidance and a strategy for ensuring the DDNIR program is implemented consistently across regions.\nIn addition to the need for more guidance, the OIGs noted that the original MOA, signed in 2011, is outdated and no longer reflects the current state of the program.  Moreover, the MOA does not provide guidance on the\n\ninclusion of non-IC members, such as state and local entities, in the DDNIR Program.36\nIn that regard, according to one regional representative, the DDNIRs should be better leveraging other partners, including fusion centers, state and local law enforcement, and the private sector.  In his October 2014 semiannual report to the ODNI, the former DDNIR for the Central Region indicated that he believed that incorporating both IC and non-IC members into the DDNIR process would encourage greater participation and exhibit trust in regional partners, which builds confidence in domestic intelligence collection, analysis, and reporting.  The DDNIR for the Central Region suggested that perhaps the quarterly meetings should be expanded to two dayswith one day for federal partners to meet and a second day for the DDNIR to meet with fusion center personnel.  Conversely, DHS officials expressed varied opinions on the inclusion of non-IC partners in the program.  The IC IG believes that non-IC partners may provide valuable information and perspective regarding the regional threat environment and recommend that the DNI, in coordination with the FBI, evaluate the regional structure and issue additional guidance, and explore the feasibility of also incorporating non-IC members into the DDNIR program in an appropriate fashion. Recommendations: The IC IG recommends that the DNI, in coordination with the FBI:\n\n19. Evaluate the existing DDNIR regional structure, in consultation with I&A, to ensure that regions are appropriately sized and defined to provide common areas of interest and geographic coordination among participating partners. 20. Develop and disseminate to IC-member partners additional guidance and a strategy for ensuring the DDNIR program is implemented consistently across regions and update the 2011 Memorandum of Agreement to more accurately reflect the current state of the program. 21. Evaluate the feasibility of incorporating non-IC members into the DDNIR program in an appropriate fashion.\n\n\n## The Nctc Domestic Representative Program\n\nNCTC's Domestic Representative Program was established through an MOU with the FBI.  Currently, there are NCTC Domestic Representatives stationed at 11 locations across the United States.  These representatives serve as the front-line liaison for the Director of NCTC with regional IC agencies and counterterrorism officials at the federal, state, and local levels.  NCTC Domestic Representatives typically sit in FBI spaces and have a wide-range of job duties. One of their primary responsibilities is to deliver tailored counterterrorismrelated intelligence support to a range of customers in the region, including FBI field divisions; regional FBI Field Intelligence Groups and JTTFs; DHS elements; local police; and other federal, state, and local entities.  In addition, the NCTC representatives act as a liaison between NCTC and FBI field elements and between NCTC and the regional police departments by facilitating collaboration to enable the targeting, collection, processing, and reporting of targets of mutual interest.  The NCTC retains primary control of the representatives and is responsible for covering the costs of all salary and official travel expenses.\n\nThe NCTC representative program has domestic representatives in 11\nmajor cities across the country.  Each representative is responsible for providing coverage to a distinct geographic region that aligns in some but not all of the regions covered by the 12 DDNIRs.  DDNIRs and NCTC representatives are in the same locations, except in Pittsburgh, which has a DDNIR but not an NCTC representative.  The geographic regions covered by the DDNIRs and the NCTC representatives differ in the Washington, DC, Chicago, Denver, and Seattle regions. NCTC Representative Coverage - NCTC representatives frequently travel throughout their regions to perform their duties.  Several representatives told the OIGs that they struggle to provide sufficient coverage for their region.  For example, according to the NCTC representative in Los Angeles, his biggest challenge is the sheer number of customers he is responsible for supporting, which includes the FBI, DHS, fusion centers, and state and local entities dispersed across the three FBI field divisions (Los Angeles, Phoenix, and Las Vegas) that his area of responsibility encompasses.  Accordingly, he must carefully pick and choose his engagements and make time to visit the more distant offices in Phoenix and Las Vegas.\nSimilarly, the NCTC representative in Atlanta, whose region covers five states, seven FBI field divisions, and five state fusion centers, told the OIGs that she would like to visit the major port citiesCharleston, Savannah, and Mobileand other cities in her region, such as Memphis and Raleigh more frequently.  Even the NCTC representative in Boston, whose area of responsibility includes six states relatively easy to visit by carConnecticut, Massachusetts, Maine, New Hampshire, Rhode Island, and Vermontstated that his principal challenge was finding the time to adequately support all six states and not wanting to turn down opportunities when asked to provide support.\n\nIn light of the regional differences between the NCTC Representative program and the DDNIR program, the DOJ OIG and IC OIG received feedback for the need for additional NCTC representatives.  For instance, the DOJ OIG talked to the SAC in the FBI Pittsburgh Division who said that the NCTC representatives were an invaluable resource for their intelligence expertise and training and that having an NCTC representative would enhance collaboration in the area.  The NCTC representative for New York (whose area of responsibility currently includes Pittsburgh) agreed that it might make sense to assign an NCTC representative to Pittsburgh but stated that the workload in Pittsburgh was lighter than in New York, and that NCTC might be better served by adding a representative in New York.\nAccording to the NCTC representative for New York, the New York area generates enough work for two representatives, and one representative could stay fully occupied solely supporting the New York JTTF.  If an NCTC representative were to be assigned to Pittsburgh, the NCTC representative for New York suggested that person could assume responsibility for some of the area of responsibility that currently falls within the NCTC representative for Chicago's region.\nAnother location that we were told should receive consideration for the assignment of an NCTC representative is Detroit.  Currently, the NCTC representative for Chicago also has responsibility for Detroit but has difficulty providing adequate coverage because the area of responsibility is so large.  It was suggested to the IC IG that the workload might be more manageable if\n\nChicago were to have its own NCTC representative and new representatives were added to cover the region outside of Chicago.  An NCTC representative told the IC IG that she has heard from USAOs and other officials in the Midwest that they would like to establish closer relationships with and have more access to NCTC representatives.\n\nAs the OIGs conducted their fieldwork, they observed that some NCTC\nrepresentative regions and the FBI Field divisions they support had more counterterrorism activity than others.  For example, the NCTC representative for Denver explained that her region has less activity, which has impacted negatively her ability to obtain briefers from NCTC Headquarters to support her customers.  Similarly, the NCTC representative for Miami estimated that she spends 85 to 90 percent of her time supporting the FBI Miami Division.  Due to the FBI Miami Division's demands for her time, the NCTC representative for Miami had not yet had an opportunity to visit the FBI or state and local entities in Jacksonville, or the primary Florida Fusion Center in Tallahassee.\nNCTC Representatives' Reception in the Field - During field visits, the OIGs received positive feedback on the contributions that the NCTC representatives are making to the FBI field divisions (e.g., one FBI field division stated that it would like to obtain an additional representative) and the Fusion Centers with respect to their role in furthering the sharing of counterterrorism information.  NCTC representatives attend weekly FBI JTTF meetings, as well as quarterly JTTF Executive Board and DDNIR meetings where they brief on current threats and counterterrorism products.  They provide case support ranging from conducting name traces through NCTC's Operations Center to arranging deeper dives on subjects of FBI investigations.\nIn addition, NCTC representatives request and coordinate on-site briefings and trainings by NCTC Headquarters subject matter experts on topics of interest, such as the Terrorist Screening Center and the Terrorist Identities Datamart Environment and their capabilities.  NCTC representatives are highly valued for their ability to send information from the FBI field divisions directly to NCTC leadership.\nNCTC representatives also work closely with I&A field personnel in their regions.37  For example, the NCTC representative for Houston stated that his\n\nbest set of customers are the I&A intelligence officers at the fusion centers. The NCTC representative for San Francisco also explained that she collaborates with the I&A intelligence officers at the Northern California Regional Intelligence Center, the State Threat Assessment Center, and Central California Intelligence Center to conduct joint briefings for the Fusion Center Terrorism Liaison Officer program.\n\nThe majority of I&A field officials the team interviewed said that the NCTC representatives serve as force-multipliers and that they complement the I&A intelligence officers as the representatives are in similar positions as themselves, \"armies of one\" alone in areas without field offices.  Many I&A field officials conduct joint briefings with the NCTC representatives because the representatives have different access and provide greater insight into IC processes.  Overall, both I&A field officials and NCTC representatives seem to value these joint briefings as they present \"one government voice\" to state and locals.  However, there are some within I&A who are concerned about mission overlap.  As the NCTC representative program continues to mature, further clarification of its roles and responsibilities and formalized coordination with I&A field officials will continue to be essential to avoid any potential duplication of effort or conflicting lines of inquiry. Recommendation: The IC IG recommends that the Director, National Counterterrorism Center:\n22.  Consider assigning additional NCTC representatives to the field and/or revising the existing territorial regions, potentially to align with the DNI domestic regions, to ensure effective NCTC representation within the domestic field.\n\n## Fusion Centers\n\n State and local entities own and operate fusion centers, but to develop and mature into the best partners, they depend on direct support and funding from federal agencies.  Fusion centers also receive grant funding from FEMA indirectly; however, FEMA cannot identify how much funding fusion centers receive and spend on counterterrorism efforts. Based on self-reported data from fusion centers, direct federal expenditures for fusion centers are decreasing and state and local expenditures are increasing.  Finally, the majority of state and local officials told DHS OIG that rather than enhancing and maturing their capabilities, given the unpredictability of resources, they are focused on sustaining operations.\n\n## Federal Investment And Support To Fusion Centers According To The 2007 Nsis, State And Major Urban Area Fusion Centers\n\nare vital assets to sharing terrorism-related information.  Because fusion centers are state and locally owned and operated, federal influence to develop and mature fusion centers into the best potential partners depends on direct support and grant funding. In June 2011, the PM-ISE issued the Federal Resource Allocation Criteria (RAC) Policy, which provides objective criteria for federal agencies to use when making resource allocation decisions to fusion centers.  According to the RAC Policy, federal agencies will prioritize federal resource allocation in the following order:  primary fusion centers, recognized fusion centers, and nodes.38  Entities within each category must meet certain criteria for federal entities to continue their prioritization. To guide federal resource allocation, the Federal RAC Policy Implementation Guidance, published in September 2014, offers best practices and recommendations about how to better develop, implement, and adhere to the Federal RAC Policy.\n\nI&A is required to provide the Office of Management and Budget (OMB)\nand the PM-ISE an annual inventory of all federal funding and personnel dedicated to the National Network of Fusion Centers.  Direct federal expenditures are primarily salaries and benefits for federal personnel assigned to or directly supporting fusion centers, but also include federal information technology systems deployed to fusion centers, security clearances sponsored by federal agencies, and training and other resources specifically intended to help fusion centers build and sustain capabilities.  The majority of fusion centers occupy space with other federal, state, or local agencies, resulting in commingled operating costs.  Therefore, it is difficult to identify the total cost of fusion centers to the federal government because agency support serves multiple functions and purposes.  For example, for the 14 fusion centers collocated with the FBI, providing access to IT systems may not be an additional cost to the FBI as their installation and maintenance would occur regardless of the presence of the fusion center.  In addition, supporting a fusion center may be a part-time or collateral duty for DHS and DOJ personnel.  Table 7 below provides the federal personnel support levels as reported to I&A for its annual inventory; Table 8 denotes whether those staff provided full- or part-time support to fusion centers as gathered by I&A.  These numbers reflect a decline in total federal personnel support to fusion centers and of those personnel, fewer are full-time than when the reporting of such information began in FY 2011.\n\nFY\nDHS Personnel\nDOJ Personnel\nOthers\nTotal\n2011\n272\n125\n--\n397\n2012\n246\n124\n--\n370\n2013\n258\n122\n10\n390\n2014\n241\n116\n9\n366\n\nSource:  2011 and 2012 Federal Cost Inventory and 2013 and 2014 National Network of Fusion Centers Final Reports\n\n| FY                                                            |                                        |\n|---------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------|\n| Full                                                          |                                        |\n|                                                              |                                        |\n| Time                                                          |                                        |\n|                                                              |                                        |\n| Time                                                          |                                        |\n| Total                                                         |                                        |\n| 2011                                                          | 321 (81% of total)  76 (19% of total)  |\n| 2012                                                          | 293 (79% of total)  77 (21% of total)  |\n| 2013                                                          | 268 (69% of total)  122 (31% of total) |\n| 2014                                                          | 266 (73% of total)  100 (27% of total) |\n| Source:  2014 National Network of Fusion Centers Final Report |                                        |\n\nWithin its 2014 report on the National Network of Fusion Centers, I&A\nidentified three significant challenges associated with collecting, validating, and analyzing federal investment data:\n\n\n\n1. Funding to support fusion centers is generally not a budget line item for\nmost federal departments and agencies, so collecting and reporting investment data requires significant time and effort.\n2. Some department and agency field offices directly support fusion centers\nat the field level, but the existence and extent of this support is not frequently shared with headquarters elements.\n3. For those departments and agencies with organizationally separate\noperations and intelligence units or functions, one unit may engage with fusion centers without the knowledge of the other.\nIn addition to direct federal support, DHS indirectly provides grant funding to fusion centers through FEMA's Homeland Security Grant Program (HSGP).39  However, FEMA cannot identify how much grant funding fusion centers receive and spend on counterterrorism efforts.  Fusion centers do not directly receive HSGP funding but instead apply for funding and request reimbursements from the state.  The governor-appointed State Administrative Agency applies for and administers HSGP funds.  FEMA grant guidance simply requires that of the 25 percent of grant funding set aside for \"law enforcement terrorism prevention activities,\" a portion must go to fund fusion centers; state and local governments determine that portion from year to year.  The majority of interviewed state and local officials involved in the process said they would prefer that fusion centers be a specific line item in state and local budgets or FEMA grant requirements.\nFEMA currently tracks grant funding through self-reported data received through state-submitted investment justifications and Biannual Strategy Implementation Reports.  FEMA relies on states to appropriately and consistently categorize funding for all fusion center projects, but as GAO noted in a November 2014 report, this data is unreliable.40  GAO reported cases in which projects supported broader capabilities not directly related to fusion centers, as well as some that did not specifically support center operations. For example, one grantee reported $14 million given to a fusion center for automated license plate readers and video surveillance equipment, although the fusion center was one of a number of system users.\nand Results, but Need to More Accurately Account for Federal Funding Provided to Centers (GAO-15-155) (November 2014). Further complicating accurate accounting is FEMA's 3-year performance cycle under which fusion centers can spend up to 3 years of grant funding at any given time.  Although the 3-year performance cycle is beneficial and welcomed by grant recipients, it makes it difficult to determine the portion of funds that has been expended each grant year.  In addition, each of the 12 states DHS OIG visited operates on different fiscal year calendars than DHS; only the District of Columbia follows DHS' fiscal year calendar.\n\nBased on self-reported data from fusion centers during the annual assessment process, direct federal expenditures for fusion centers are decreasing and state and local expenditures are increasing.  In addition to decreased direct federal expenditures, the total amount of FEMA HSGP funding available for which U.S. states and territories may apply and thus may distribute to fusion centers has declined since its overall peak in FY 2010 as shown in Figure 1 below. Although the total level of grant funding made available by FEMA has decreased, state and local agencies reported expending about 41 percent more grant funding on fusion centers in FY 2014 than in FY 2011.  This is generally indicative of state and local governments' commitment to fusion centers, which are considered valuable, worthwhile investments.  As a result of this commitment by the state and local agencies that own and operate fusion centers, fusion centers are in a better position to sustain capabilities.  Table 9 below displays sources of funding to fusion centers as reported by fusion centers.\n\nTable 9:  Sources of Funding to Fusion Centers, FY 2011-FY 201441\nSource\nFY 201142\nFY 201243\nFY 2013\nFY 2014\nDirect Federal Expenditures\n$97,456,195\n$76,888,66244 $69,653,432\n$68,216,940\n$52,258,930\n$71,219,656\n$65,231,769\n$73,499,366\nFederal Grants Expended by State, Local, Territorial, and Tribal Agencies State\n$83,338,580\n$90,980,473\n$102,150,253 $113,297,136\nLocal\n$34,144,222\n$63,778,109\n$70,304,104\n$71,519,890\nTribal45\nData not available\n$0\n$100,256\n$0\nTerritorial46\nData not available\n$57,000\n$153,658\n$860,307\nPrivate Sector\nData not available\n$1,293,000\n$642,770\n$892,685\nTOTALS\n$267,197,927\n$304,216,900\n$308,236,242 $328,286,324\n\nSource:  DHS OIG Analysis of DHS Data\n\n41  Data for FY 2015 was not available at the time of this draft report. 42  Federal grant, State, and local expenditure data for 60 of 72 fusion centers. 43  Federal grant, State, local, territorial, tribal, and private sector expenditure data for the 77 fusion centers designated at the time. 44  These estimates are from the 2011 Federal Cost Inventory and reflect only costs for the 72 fusion centers designated at the time; Federal staff costs are estimated. 45  SLTT Government Fiscal Year varies and may include multiple-year grant awards. 46  SLTT Government Fiscal Year varies and may include multiple-year grant awards. Although increased state and local funding is a positive development, there are some concerns related to a decrease in federal funding.  With DHS support decreasing, DHS may lose oversight and influence over fusion centers. Only fusion centers receiving FEMA grant funding must participate in DHS annual assessments of fusion centers.  In recent years, Alaska, for instance, has not used FEMA grants to fund its fusion center and has declined to participate in the annual assessment process.  Although DHS officials have worked with Alaska to ensure its participation in the assessment process for the time being, without a link to grant funding, DHS lacks enforcement capability.\nIn addition, fusion centers utilizing FEMA grant funds must meet I&A\nrequirements, such as conducting exercises and addressing resulting corrective actions, developing privacy policies, and completing annual training.  These requirements establish standards for the national network and hold fusion centers more accountable to the public.  Although all 78 fusion centers have complied with the requirement examples above aimed at the development and maturation of the national network, fusion centers losing or choosing not to accept FEMA grant funding may cut some of these important programs and activities to cover other mission-essential areas.  Further, one fusion center director said, \"if DHS has no skin in the game, the state and locals will not give them anything.\"  Fusion centers must balance the sometimes conflicting priorities of state and local partners providing more funding with those of the federal government.\n\n## National Network Maturity Model\n\nDHS and DOJ worked together to establish fusion center guidelines for developing and operating a fusion center within a state or region.  Additionally, they worked with fusion center leadership to outline four Critical Operational Capabilities (COC), which reflect the operational priorities of the National Network of Fusion Centers, and four Enabling Capabilities (EC), which provide a programmatic foundation for the fusion process.  I&A is responsible for the annual fusion center assessments, which began in 2011, to measure individual fusion center compliance with the guidelines and achievement of the COCs and ECs.\n\nIn its last annual assessment in FY 2014, I&A determined the National Network of Fusion Centers had reached the \"Emerging Stage\" on the National Network Maturity Model, as shown in Figure 2.  The Maturity Model is a multistage framework designed to evaluate and categorize the overall progress of the national network as a whole in achieving the COCs and ECs.  The Maturity Model consists of 46 attributes aligned to the four distinct stages.  For each stage, the community established an outcome-oriented, qualitative definition and aligned capability attributes based on each attribute's contribution to the defined outcome for that stage.  The National Network advances through each of the four stages of the maturity model when 75 percent of fusion centers achieve all of the attributes associated with that level.\n\nAt the Fundamental Stage, fusion centers across the National Network have approved plans, policies, or standard operating procedures for each of the four COCs and EC 1 (Privacy, Civil Rights, and Civil Liberties Protections).  At the Emerging Stage, the National Network has the systems, mechanisms, and processes needed to implement the plans, policies, or standard operating procedures and the COCs and ECs as a whole.  At the Enhanced Stage, the National Network has the operational capability to produce products and provide services to federal, state, and local customers.  Finally, at the Mature Stage, the National Network has the full capability to leverage the collective resources among individual fusion centers and adjust to both the changing threat environment and evolving requirements.  Based on this model, the National Network is currently halfway through the stages to achieve maturity. However, the majority of state and local officials DHS OIG interviewed said given the unpredictability of resources allocated, fusion centers are focused on sustaining rather than enhancing operations and capabilities.47 Need to Coordinate Granting of Security Clearances Access to classified information, systems, and facilities is vital for the domestic sharing of counterterrorism information.  State and local analysts at fusion centers require security clearances to receive classified information, and these clearances may be granted by multiple federal agencies, including DHS and the FBI.  By Executive Order, all clearances granted to state and local personnel by one agency are to be accepted reciprocally by other agencies.48 However, DHS' and the FBI's various and sometimes differing requirements for obtaining clearances and accessing classified information can complicate this reciprocity.  Without full coordination, these various requirements may lead to duplication of effort in conducting background investigations or gaps in information sharing due to the inability to access classified areas and attend meetings.  Currently, there are no formal agreements among the federal partners on state and local security clearance reciprocity; such agreements might mitigate the effects of varying requirements and improve information sharing.\n\nFor example, DHS OIG and DOJ OIG identified one instance at the New York State Intelligence Center (where some fusion center analysts are co-\n\nlocated with FBI personnel and systems) in which state and local representatives had difficulty accessing the FBI's \"open storage areas.\" Specifically, in January 2015, the FBI revised its security policy to require Single Scope Background Investigations (SSBI) and Top Secret clearances for individuals to have unescorted access to the FBI's open storage areas.  As a result, fusion center personnel with Secret clearances granted by DHS had to be escorted into the FBI areas.  After reviewing the situation, to meet information sharing and MOU requirements, the FBI agreed to waive the SSBI requirement for the New York State Intelligence Center.\n\n23. Coordinate with the ODNI and FBI to develop and implement a strategy to efficiently and effectively provide security clearances and reciprocity to state and local personnel.\n\n## National Mission Cell Initiative\n\nThe National Mission Cell (NMC) concept was designed to help fusion centers fulfill their mission to support counterterrorism threat analysis and information sharing by standardizing and formalizing the processes for information collection, production, and dissemination.  Personnel from the National Fusion Center Association, PM-ISE, DHS, and the FBI devised an NMC pilot program for four fusion centers, which ran from January 2014 through July 2015.  NMCs were intended to be small standardized cells of intelligence analysts within a fusion center, consisting of a limited number of existing personnel from DHS, the FBI, and state and local partners.  The entities involved in conceptualizing the NMC believed the concept would advance federal counterterrorism efforts; enhance information sharing; advance fusion centers' intelligence capabilities and accelerate their maturity; and increase integration, interaction, coordination, and intelligence sharing within the fusion centers and with other partners.\nAccording to the FBI, it had witnessed significant maturation of the National Network of Fusion Centers with increased coordination, cooperation, and information sharing between FBI field offices and the fusion centers.  At the same time, the threat from ISIL-inspired individuals and homegrown violent extremists had increased significantly.  To address the threat, the FBI plans to enhance FBI field office engagement with fusion centers.  I&A intends to remain fully engaged with and continue support to fusion centers.  A new pilot phase will be conducted in six fusion centers, and the partner agencies will leverage their respective authorities and existing resources.\n\n## Conclusion\n\nEnsuring the United States is well-prepared to counter the threat of terrorism requires efficient and effective information sharing.  The OIGs found that components of the ODNI, DHS, and DOJ are committed to sharing counterterrorism information.  However, we also believe that the components can more fully commit to and improve their practices in this arena.  The numerous partners involved in this vital endeavor must fully understand each other's missions and have clearly defined roles and responsibilities at the federal, state, and local level.  Further, partners need to implement strong overall governance at the national level to ensure their field representatives fully embrace their roles according to the national strategy.  Representatives in the field need to actively participate in information sharing forums, have access to information, and work in concert to leverage their resources and expertise and to expand their knowledge of national security threats.  These improvements are paramount to national security partners effectively cooperating with each other to mitigate gaps and overlaps in sharing information, which is crucial to the United States' ability to prevent terrorist attacks.\n\n\n## Appendix A:  Objectives, Scope & Methodology\n\nThe Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, the Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee, and the Senate Judiciary Committee requested that the Inspectors General (IG) of the Intelligence Community (IC), Department of Homeland Security (DHS), and Department of Justice (DOJ) conduct a performance audit of federally supported entities engaged in field-based domestic counterterrorism, homeland security, intelligence, and information-sharing activities in conjunction with state and local law enforcement agencies.  The oversight committees requested that the joint audit examine the entities' overall missions, specific functions, capabilities, funding, personnel costs to include full-time employees and contractors, and facility costs.\n\nIn response to this request, the OIGs for the IC, DHS, and DOJ\nconducted a coordinated, joint review focusing on domestic sharing of counterterrorism information.  The objectives of this review were to:  (1) identify and examine the federally supported field-based intelligence entities engaged in counterterrorism information-sharing to determine the overall missions, specific functions, capabilities, funding, and personnel and facility costs; (2) determine if counterterrorism information is being adequately and appropriately shared with all participating agencies; and (3) identify any gaps or duplication of effort among these entities.\n\nThe review was conducted by three teams from the OIGs of the IC, DHS, and DOJ.  The OIGs reviewed previous studies and conducted interviews with more than 450 individuals, including senior Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI), DHS, DOJ, and state and local officials.  While the review teams shared relevant documents, attended briefings, and participated jointly in interviews of certain officials and subject matter experts, each OIG was responsible for evaluating the actions of, and information available to, its respective department or agency.  The teams attended, at least in part, meetings of the DNI's Homeland Security and Law Enforcement Partners' Board, interviews with DNI representatives and members of multiple JTTFs, and a teleconference with the Criminal Intelligence Coordinating Council (CCIC). In total, the teams visited field-based domestic information sharing entities in 25 cities in 13 states and the District of Columbia:\n\n Massachusetts:  Boston, Maynard\n California:  Sacramento, Los Angeles, San Francisco  Illinois:  Chicago, Springfield  Colorado:  Denver  Texas:  Dallas, Houston, Garland, McKinney  Missouri:  Kansas City, Jefferson City, St. Louis  New Hampshire:  Concord  Virginia:  Fairfax\n New York:  Albany, New York City  New Jersey:  Trenton  Oregon:  Salem, Portland  Rhode Island:  Providence  Washington, DC  Washington:  Seattle\nOf those reviews, all three teams travelled together to five cities:  Denver, Colorado; Dallas, Houston, and Garland Texas; and New York, New York.  Over 70 meetings were conducted by at least two of the OIGs.\nThe OIGs conducted their work in accordance with the Council of Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency's 2012 Quality Standards for Inspection and Evaluation.  Those standards require an OIG plan and perform its work to obtain sufficient and appropriate evidence, provide reasonable bases for the findings, and put forth conclusions based on stated objectives. The evidence obtained in this review provides a reasonable basis for the findings and conclusions based on the objectives.\n\n## Appendix B:  Recommendations\n\nThis appendix lists the report recommendations. Recommendations: The IC IG and DHS and DOJ OIGs recommend that the ODNI, DHS, and DOJ:\n\n1.  Review the 2003 interagency MOU on information sharing and determine what actions are necessary to update intelligence information sharing standards and processes among the departments. Joint OIG Analysis and Summary of Actions to Close Recommendation 1 Open.  DHS and DOJ concurred with the recommendation as shown in Appendices D and E.  ODNI provided comments on the recommendation as shown in Appendix C.  The joint OIG team will continue to collaborate and monitor the actions of the components throughout the resolution phase to ensure each relevant component has taken the necessary steps to adequately address the recommendation.\n\n2.  Codify an overarching engagement and coordination body for the terrorism-related ISE. Joint OIG Analysis and Summary of Actions to Close Recommendation 2 Open.  DHS and DOJ concurred with the recommendation as shown in Appendices D and E.  ODNI provided comments on the recommendation as shown in Appendix C.  The joint OIG team will continue to collaborate and monitor the actions of the components throughout the resolution phase to ensure each relevant component has taken the necessary steps to adequately address the recommendation.\n\n\n\nRecommendations: DHS OIG recommends that I&A:\n3.  In conjunction with the key intelligence officials from DHS components, ensure DHS component intelligence programs comply with policies and create incentives for personnel to participate in initiatives that enhance the cohesion of the DHS Intelligence Enterprise. DHS OIG Analysis and Summary of Actions to Close Recommendation 3 Open.  DHS concurred with the recommendation as shown in Appendix D.  This recommendation can be closed when DHS OIG receives evidence that the DHS' Chief Intelligence Office (CINT) has implemented changes that will better integrate the DHS Intelligence Enterprise. 4.  Formalize agreements that enable I&A field officials to develop intelligence reporting with DHS components in the field, based on pilot program results. DHS OIG Analysis and Summary of Actions to Close Recommendation 4 Open.  DHS concurred with the recommendation as shown in Appendix D.  This recommendation can be closed when DHS OIG receives evidence, once finalized, of DHS' instruction for the process by which I&A reports officers will work with DHS Intelligence Enterprise field elements to produce Intelligence Information Reports at the local level. Recommendations: DHS OIG recommends that I&A:\n5.  Develop and implement guidance for intelligence reporting in the field. DHS OIG Analysis and Summary of Actions to Close Recommendation 5 Open.  DHS concurred with the recommendation as shown in Appendix D.  This recommendation can be closed when DHS OIG receives evidence of the finalized guidance for intelligence reporting in the field and documented implementation of such guidance. 6.  Coordinate with the FBI to formalize guidance and policies for the reporting of terrorism and counterterrorism information. DHS OIG Analysis and Summary of Actions to Close Recommendation 6 Open.  DHS concurred with the recommendation as shown in Appendix D.  This recommendation can be closed when DHS OIG receives evidence of formal, written guidance, developed in coordination with the FBI, on the reporting of terrorism and counterterrorism information.\n\nRecommendation: DHS OIG recommends that the DHS clearing offices:\n7.  Develop and implement a formal mechanism for reviewing I&A intelligence reporting from the field, including a logging and tracking process. DHS OIG Analysis and Summary of Actions to Close Recommendation 7 Open.  DHS concurred with the recommendation as shown in Appendix D.  This recommendation can be closed when DHS OIG receives evidence that the clearing offices - Privacy Office, Civil Rights and Civil Liberties (CRCL), Office of the General Counsel-Intelligence Law Division, and I&A Intelligence Oversight - are using this SharePoint tracking tool to document each office's review of I&A field intelligence reporting. Recommendation: DHS OIG recommends that I&A:\n8.  Develop and implement guidance for field officials granting them local release authority for intelligence reporting. DHS OIG Analysis and Summary of Actions to Close Recommendation 8 Open.  DHS I&A concurred with the recommendation as shown in Appendix D.  This recommendation can be closed when DHS OIG receives evidence of the final establishment and implementation of a field release capability.\n\nRecommendation: DHS OIG recommends that DHS:\n9.  Develop and implement a plan that will allow DHS intelligence officials in the field practical access to classified systems and infrastructure above the Secret level. DHS OIG Analysis and Summary of Actions to Close Recommendation 9 Open.  DHS concurred with the recommendation as shown in Appendix D.  This recommendation can be closed when DHS OIG receives evidence of the development and implementation of plans to ensure DHS intelligence officials in the field have practical access to classified systems and infrastructure above the Secret level. Recommendations: DOJ OIG recommends that DOJ:\n10.  Develop a comprehensive internal counterterrorism information sharing strategic plan based on a review of the President's strategic plan and in consultation with relevant partners. DOJ OIG Analysis and Summary of Actions to Close Recommendation 10 Open.  DOJ concurred with the recommendation as shown in Appendix E.  This recommendation can be closed when the DOJ OIG receives, once established, the comprehensive internal DOJ counterterrorism information sharing strategic plan. 11.  Implement a council, led by a senior Department official, for the internal coordination of DOJ information sharing strategy and investments, and ensure that relevant components designate senior-level officials responsible for monitoring their component's efforts and communicating their efforts to DOJ as requested. DOJ OIG Analysis and Summary of Actions to Close Recommendation 11 Open.  DOJ concurred with the recommendation as shown in Appendix E.  This recommendation can be closed when the DOJ OIG receives documentation that it implemented a council, led by a senior DOJ official, that is responsible for the internal coordination of DOJ information sharing strategy and investments.  Further, DOJ OIG will need to receive evidence that each relevant component has designated senior-level officials who are responsible for monitoring their component's efforts and communicating their efforts to DOJ leadership as requested.\n\n## Recommendations: Doj Oig Recommends That The Fbi:\n\n12.  Require FBI field divisions to stress to participating agencies the importance of designating an individual and an alternate to serve as their representatives to the JTTF Executive Board, as well as of regularly attending the meetings. DOJ OIG Analysis and Summary of Actions to Close Recommendation 12 Open.  The FBI concurred with the recommendation as shown in Appendix F.  This recommendation can be closed when the DOJ OIG receives evidence that the FBI notified its field divisions to stress to JTTF participants the importance of designating representatives to the JTTF Executive Board, as well as regularly attending meetings.  Further, the DOJ OIG will need evidence that FBI field divisions, in turn, communicated to the participating agencies the importance of the JTTF Executive Board meetings, including designating representatives and regularly attending. 13.  Ensure FBI field divisions encourage agencies that do not participate on the JTTF, including first responders, to attend JTTF Executive Board Meetings. DOJ OIG Analysis and Summary of Actions to Close Recommendation 13 Open.  The FBI concurred with the recommendation as shown in Appendix F.  This recommendation can be closed when the DOJ OIG receives evidence that the FBI instructed its field divisions to encourage agencies that do not participate on the JTTF, including first responders, to attend JTTF Executive Board meetings.  Further, DOJ OIG will need evidence that the FBI field divisions, in turn, reached out to such agencies to encourage participation on the JTTF Executive Board. 14.  Identify an appropriate structure and content of JTTF Executive Board meetings that FBI field divisions should use at a minimum when conducting these meetings. DOJ OIG Analysis and Summary of Actions to Close Recommendation 14 Open.  The FBI concurred with the recommendation as shown in Appendix F.  This recommendation can be closed when the DOJ OIG receives evidence of the FBI's review and establishment of an appropriate structure and content of JTTF Executive Board meetings, and that FBI field divisions have been notified of the new structure and content.\n\nRecommendation: DOJ OIG recommends that DOJ:\n15.  Ensure that each USAO updates its ATAC Plan as required by the program.\n\n## Doj Oig Analysis And Summary Of Actions To Close Recommendation 15\n\n Open.  DOJ concurred with the recommendation as shown in Appendix E.  This recommendation can be closed when the DOJ OIG receives evidence that DOJ has developed a mechanism for ensuring USAOs update their ATAC Plans as required by the program.\n\n16.  Evaluate the ATAC program to ensure the purpose of the ATAC meetings is not duplicative of other counterterrorism information sharing partner initiatives and is used in the most effective manner. DOJ OIG Analysis and Summary of Actions to Close Recommendation 16 Open.  DOJ concurred with the recommendation as shown in Appendix E.  This recommendation can be closed when the DOJ OIG receives the results of DOJ's evaluation of the ATAC program and whether the purpose of the ATAC meetings are not duplicative of other counterterrorism information sharing partner initiatives and are used in the most effective matter.\n\n\n17.  Direct FBI field divisions to identify and invite key stakeholders to TRP sessions. DOJ OIG Analysis and Summary of Actions to Close Recommendation 17 Open.  The FBI concurred with the recommendation as shown in Appendix F.  This recommendation can be closed when the DOJ OIG receives the FBI's guidance to FBI field divisions about identifying and inviting key stakeholders to TRP sessions.  Further, the DOJ OIG will need evidence that FBI field divisions, in turn, identified and invited key stakeholders to attend the TRP sessions. 18.  Determine the agencies with which it should share its counterterrorism-related TRP results and implement a process to ensure the TRP results are appropriately shared with those agencies on a systemic and regular basis. DOJ OIG Analysis and Summary of Actions to Close Recommendation 18 Open.  The FBI concurred with the recommendation as shown in Appendix F.  This recommendation can be closed when the DOJ OIG receives evidence of the agencies with which the FBI should share counterterrorism-related TRP results and of the process for ensuring the TRP results are shared with these agencies on a systemic and regular basis.  Further, the DOJ OIG will need evidence that FBI field divisions have been notified of this process, and that FBI field divisions are sharing the TRP results with the identified agencies on a regular basis.\n\nRecommendations: The IC IG recommends that the DNI, in coordination with the FBI:\n19.  Evaluate the existing DDNIR regional structure, in consultation with I&A, to ensure that regions are appropriately sized and defined to provide common areas of interest and geographic coordination among participating partners. IC IG Analysis and Summary of Actions to Close Recommendation 19 Open.  ODNI provided comments on the recommendation as shown in Appendix C.  This recommendation can be closed when the IC IG receives an update on the status of their activity to meet the intent of the recommendation. 20.  Develop and disseminate to IC-member partners additional guidance and a strategy for ensuring the DDNIR program is implemented consistently across regions and update the 2011 Memorandum of Agreement to more accurately reflect the current state of the program. IC IG Analysis and Summary of Actions to Close Recommendation 20 Open.  ODNI provided comments on the recommendation as shown in Appendix C.  This recommendation can be closed when the IC IG receives an update on the status of their activity to meet the intent of the recommendation. 21.  Evaluate the feasibility of incorporating non-IC members into the DDNIR program in an appropriate fashion. IC IG Analysis and Summary of Actions to Close Recommendation 21 Open.  ODNI provided comments on the recommendation as shown in Appendix C.  This recommendation can be closed when the IC IG receives an update on the status of their activity to meet the intent of the recommendation.\n\nRecommendation: The IC IG recommends that the Director, National Counterterrorism Center:\n22.  Consider assigning additional NCTC representatives to the field and/or revising the existing territorial regions, potentially to align with the DNI domestic regions, to ensure effective NCTC representation within the domestic field. IC IG Analysis and Summary of Actions to Close Recommendation 22 Open.  ODNI provided comments on the recommendation as shown in Appendix C.  This recommendation can be closed when the IC IG receives an update on the status of their activity to meet the intent of the recommendation.\n\nRecommendation: DHS OIG recommends that DHS:\n23.  Coordinate with the ODNI and FBI to develop and implement a strategy to efficiently and effectively provide security clearances and reciprocity to state and local personnel. DHS OIG Analysis and Summary of Actions to Close Recommendation 24 Open.  DHS concurred with the recommendation as shown in Appendix D.  This recommendation can be closed when DHS OIG receives evidence that a strategy has been developed and implemented to efficiently and effectively provide security clearances and reciprocity to state and local personnel.\n\n\n\n## Appendix C:  The Office Of The Director Of National Intelligence's Response To The Draft Report\n\n\n## Appendix D:  The Department Of Homeland Security's Response To The Draft Report\n\n\n\n## Appendix E:  The Department Of Justice's Response To The Draft Report49\n\n\n\n## Appendix F:  The Federal Bureau Of Investigation's Response To The Draft Report"
    },
    {
        "text": "## Interrogation World War Ii Vietnam And Iraq\n\nnational defense intelligence college\n\n# Interrogation World War Ii, Vietnam, And Iraq\n\nNATIONAL DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE COLLEGE WASHINGTON, DC September 2008\nTh e views expressed in this book are those of the authors and do not refl ect the offi  cial policy or position of the Department of Defense, the Defense Intelligence Agency, or any other agency of the U.S. Government.\n\nTh e National Defense Intelligence College supports and encourages research on intelligence issues that distills lessons and improves Intelligence Community capabilities to policy-level and operational consumers\n\n## Interrogation:  World War Ii, Vietnam, And Iraq\n\nTh is book presents the work of three NDIC graduate students. All three worked under Professor John A. Wahlquist of the College, with external guidance from a group of scholars and recognized subject matter experts under the leadership of Dr. Robert A. Fein of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Th e book follows the NDIC Press's Educing Information - Interrogation: Science and Art, Foundations for the Future. By adding historical and practical context going back to U.S. policy and practice in interrogations during World War II, the Vietnam confl ict, and the ongoing war in Iraq, this newest volume contributes to the high-profi le public dialogue on how U.S. military and civilian agencies can best obtain information from prisoners of war and other categories of legal and illegal combatants without compromising the principles upon which the nation was founded.\n\nTh is publication has been approved for unrestricted distribution by the Offi  ce of Security Review, Department of Defense. Th e editor acknowledges the gracious assistance of D. Lee Galloway III of the College's John T. Hughes Library, who was indispensable in obtaining copyright clearances for the illustrations in this book. Electronic copies of this and other Center publications are available at http://www.ndic.edu. For more information on this or other publications contact the editor at the address below or by commercial phone at (202) 231-4193.\n\nii |\nWilliam.Spracher@dia.mil, Editor Center for Strategic Intelligence Research ISBN Library of Congress Control Number\n978-1-932946-23-9\n2008933262\n\n## Contents\n\nFOREWORD . . . . . . . .v COMMENTARY . . . . . . . . vii INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . .1\n Mr. John A. Wahlquist, NDIC Faculty\nInterrogation of Japanese POWs in World War II:\nU.S. Response to a Formidable Challenge . . . . . . . . 17\n Special Agent James A. Stone, U.S. Air Force\nUnveiling Charlie: U.S. Interrogators' Creative Successes Against Insurgents . . . . . . . . 77\n Special Agent David P. Shoemaker, U.S. Air Force\nTh e Accidental Interrogator: A Case Study and Review of U.S. Army Special Forces Interrogations . . . . . . . . 147\n Major Nicholas R. Dotti, U.S. Army\nAPPENDIXES . . . . . . . .217-236\nBIBLIOGRAPHY . . . . . . . .237\nINDEX  . . . . . . . . 249\nABOUT THE AUTHORS . . . . . . . . 253\n\n## Foreword\n\nRobert A. Fein, Ph.D. Member, Intelligence Science Board Chairman, ISB Study on Educing Information In September 2004, the Intelligence Science Board, an advisory board appointed by the Director of National Intelligence, initiated the Study on Educing Information (EI). Th is study is an ongoing eff ort to review what is known scientifi cally about interrogation and other forms of human intelligence collection and to chart a path to the future.\n\nAs part of our eff orts, we have worked closely with faculty and students of the National Defense Intelligence College. Th e NDIC Press published Educing Information: Interrogation: Science and Art, Foundations for the Future, a book based on Phase I of the Study on EI. Th ree students, Special Agent James Stone, U.S. Air Force; Special Agent David Shoemaker, U.S. Air Force; and Major Nicholas Dotti, U.S. Army, completed master's thesis studies during Academic Year 2006-07 on topics related to interrogation. Each thesis is a remarkable and useful document.\n\nSpecial Agent Stone researched U.S. eff orts during World War II to develop language and interrogation capacities to deal with our Japanese enemy. He found that military leaders, oft en working with civilian counterparts, created and implemented successful strategies, building on cultural and linguistic skills that substantially aided the war eff ort for the U.S. and its Allies.\n\nSpecial Agent Shoemaker studied the experiences of three successful interrogators during the Vietnam War. Like S/A Stone, S/A Shoemaker suggests that policymakers and practitioners have much to learn from professionals who served eff ectively for years in the fi eld educing information. And like Stone, Shoemaker highlights the importance of a deep understanding of the language, psychology, and culture of adversaries and potential allies in other countries.\n\nMajor Dotti examined recent policy and practice with regard to tactical and fi eld interrogations, especially with regard to the eff orts of Special Forces soldiers in Iraq. He concludes that the \"letter\" of current doctrine contradicts its \"intent.\" Major Dotti off ers recommendations that he believes are both consistent with the intent of military doctrine and likely to increase the eff ectiveness of U.S. interrogation practices in the fi eld.\n\nEach of these studies demonstrates that thoughtful, pragmatic research can produce stimulating and useful knowledge that may aid 21st century decision-makers. Together these reports suggest that, by looking at both the distant and recent past, planners and operators can gain insights that may lead to future successes in educing information from adversaries.\n\nIn publishing these studies, the National Defense Intelligence College continues to serve the military, law enforcement, and intelligence communities, and the nation in general, by supporting and disseminating information and perspectives that sharpen and improve our thinking in key national security arenas.\n\n## Commentary\n\nMr. Bryan Vossekuil Member, ISB Study on Educing Information\n\n## From *Ad Hoc* Interrogation To An Educing Information Profession?\n\nQ: Has the U.S. faced an adversary in the past that appeared unusually and confoundingly alien?\n\nQ: Can one persuade such an adversary to provide useful information aft er capture?\n\nQ: Can valuable information be obtained using interrogation methods that are consonant with American values? Can one build an eff ective operational accord with an exceedingly diffi  cult adversary? Are there successful examples from the past that speak to these questions?\n\nQ: Has the U.S. ever had a successful, government-wide, systems approach to educing informationthat is, to interrogation?\n\nTh e answers to these questions all seem to be \"yes.\" Special Agent Stone tells us that the Japanese were seen as a formidable and \"otherworldly\" adversary in 1941. Th e U.S. was poorly prepared to face such an adversary. Few military or civilian Americans spoke Japanese, which was regarded by many as an impossible language (in 1940, for example, the Navy had only a dozen sailors and offi  cers regarded as fully profi cient in Japanese). Th ere were few Americans who understood the culture and psychology of Japan, which was seen as profoundly alien. Th e Japanese soldier seemed to fi ght with religious zeal, was willing to be a kamikaze pilot (a suicide bomber), and was feared as one who would rather die than be captured. Gathering vital intelligence through interrogation under these circumstances seemed a nearly impossible challenge. Developing a national program to do so seemed even harder.\n\nTh rough cooperation of military and civilian counterparts, such a program was created during WW IIa program so successful that it is credited, by some observers, with shortening the war in the Pacifi c by two years. Th is program was founded upon knowledge of Japanese culture and psychology, language profi - ciencyand pointedly humane treatment of those captured. Its success was also largely due to a decision, controversial at the time, to employ Nisei interrogators.\n\nviii |\nTh is experience, as described by Special Agent Stone in his essay, implicitly invites comparison to our current confl icts in Iraq and elsewhere.\n\nSpecial Agent Shoemaker details U.S. interrogation eff orts in the insurgent confl ict in Vietnamanother confl ict in which our country encountered challenges in understanding the enemy's culture and language. He provides case studies of successful counterinsurgency interrogators. Using their experiences, he describes eff ective interrogation strategies and highlights a handful of successful interrogators. Interestingly, in a number of examples cited, success seemed to be generated at least in part by what happened *outside* the interrogation session. Th ese stories remind the reader of the power of appealing to individual interests and of cultural understanding, in forming a personal relationship or building an operational accord in order to get information. Shoemaker also argues that our reputation in the international community is strongly infl uenced by our interrogation practices.\n\nMajor Dottia highly trained member of Army Special Forces\ncalled himself the \"Accidental Interrogator.\" He off ers a fi rst-person account of some of the challenges of fi eld interrogations in the current confl ict in Iraq. He raises specifi c questions about authorization, preparation, and oversight of interrogations in the fi eld. What is really appropriate? Who is best suited to conduct fi eld interrogations when there are serious time imperatives? How ought interrogators be trained and supported? Do we need some modifi cation of war plans and doctrine to plan for the future?\n\nTh e three essays taken together remind us that our nation has lost sight of some of the wisdom of the past. Th e reader may refl ect on whether the U.S.\n\nneeds a government-wide systems approach and long-term strategic planning for future intelligence-driven interviewing eff orts.\n\nTh ere are many diffi  cult questions for the future that touch on interrogation, educing information, and intelligence interviewing. For example, who, in addition to uniformed and terrorist combatants, might have critical information? In which countries and cultures will these needs arise *next* year? How can we develop permanent capacities to obtain the information we need, especially from so-called High Value Persons? How should we deal with potentially knowledgeable children, very old people, women, and badly injured civilian casualties? How can we deal with the obvious need for many more professional female interrogators?\n\nOur nation needs this work to be professionalized in order to educe information eff ectively over the coming years, in ways consonant with American values. It needs Educing Information Professional Teams, resource planning, case studies, and research for continuous improvement. In all likelihood, we will need to maintain a cadre of highly trained professionals on a robust, ongoing basis. Th is book from NDIC suggests that the U.S. has had some success in the past that may help inform the future.\n\n## Enhancing Interrogation Introduction\n\n[Th e] barbarous custom of whipping men suspected of having important secrets to reveal must be abolished. It has always been recognized that this method of interrogation, by putting men to the torture, is useless. Th e wretches say whatever comes into their heads and whatever they think one wants to believe. Consequently, the Commander-in-Chief forbids the use of a method which is contrary to reason and humanity. Napoleon Bonaparte to Major General Louis-Alexandre Berthier, during the French military campaign in Egypt, 1798 Some may argue that we would be more eff ective if we sanctioned torture or other expedient methods to obtain information from the enemy. Th ey would be wrong. Beyond the basic fact that such actions are illegal, history shows that they also are frequently neither useful nor necessary. Certainly, extreme physical action can make some \"talk;\" however, what the individual says may be of questionable value. In fact, our experience in applying the interrogation standards laid out in the Army Field Manual (2-22.3)\non *Human Intelligence Collector Operations* that was published last year shows that the techniques in the manual work eff ectively and humanely in eliciting information from detainees. General David H. Petraeus, U.S. Army, Commanding, to Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen, Marines, and Coast Guardsmen serving in Multi-National Force-Iraq, 2007\n| 1\nTh e issue of so-called \"enhanced interrogation techniques\" has occupied the national agenda almost continuously since the fi rst public revelations in April 2004 of Iraqi prisoner abuse by U.S. Army soldiers in Baghdad's Abu Ghraib prison. Intelligence interrogation, as interpreted and applied in a variety of ways throughout history, is one of humankind's oldest practices.1 Th e objective of this volume, *Interrogation: World War II, Vietnam, and Iraq*, based on student research at the National Defense Intelligence College in conjunction with the Director of National Intelligence's ongoing Intelligence Science Board Study on Educing Information, is to inform a broad audience of intelligence professionals, policymakers, and the general public about intelligence interrogation techniques that truly enhance our chances for success in the Global War on Terrorism. Th e work reviews the current legal and operational status of enhanced interrogation techniques, as well as their origin. Th at is the subject of this essay.\n\n## A Presidential Veto\n\nOn 8 March 2008, President George W. Bush vetoed the proposed Intelligence Authorization Act of 2008. In his message to the House of Representatives explaining his veto, the President focused on his disagreement with Congress over its attempt to restrict the Central Intelligence Agency's continued use of enhanced interrogation techniques. Section 327 of the legislation stipulated that all intelligence interrogation methods conform to those currently authorized in U.S. Army Field Manual (FM) 2-22.3 for use by Department of Defense (DoD) interrogators.2\nEssentially, the intent of the legislation was to extend the same interrogation requirements specifi ed for DoD in the *Detainee Treatment Act of 2005* to all elements of the Intelligence Community.3 In response, President Bush emphasized that accepting such restrictions would jeopardize national security. \"It is vitally important that the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)...conduct a separate and specialized interrogation program for terrorists who possess the most critical information in the War on Terror [which] has helped the United States prevent a number of attacks.\"4\nCommenting on the interrogation technique known as \"waterboarding\"\n(a harsh procedure simulating drowning that CIA Director Michael Hayden earlier acknowledged his agency has used against certain senior al Qaeda operatives5), President Bush clarifi ed that his disagreement was \"not over any particular interrogation technique...[but] the need...to shield from disclosure to al Qaeda and other terrorists the interrogation techniques they may face upon capture.\" Addressing the legal and moral outcry against waterboarding and other enhanced procedures that some have alleged to be torture, President Bush was resolute: \"Th e United States opposes torture, and I remain committed to following international and domestic law regarding the humane treatment of people in its custody.\"6 In his weekly radio address to the American people that same day, the President intimated that CIA's special interrogation program was a key factor in the United States escaping further attacks by al Qaeda during the past six and a half years. Conceding to Congress, according to the President, by restricting the \"CIA to methods in the Field Manual...could cost American lives. We have no higher responsibility than stopping terrorist attacks. And this is no time for Congress to abandon practices that have a proven track record of keeping America safe.\"7\nCongressional critics immediately challenged the President's command of the facts regarding how much safer the American people are as a result of the CIA's aggressive methods. Chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, John D. (Jay) Rockefeller IV, claimed that despite the President's assertions I have heard nothing to suggest that information obtained from enhanced interrogation techniques has prevented an imminent terrorist attack. And I have heard nothing that makes me think the information obtained from these techniques could not have been obtained through traditional interrogation methods used by military and law enforcement interrogations. On the other hand, I do know that coercive interrogations can lead detainees to provide false information in order to make the interrogation stop.8\nMilt Bearden, a 30-year veteran of CIA clandestine operations, agrees. Writing in the *Washington Independent,* Bearden takes the administration to task for its repeated assurances that, by revealing terrorist plots before they were hatched, enhanced interrogation techniques have saved American lives. Bearden maintains, \"Th e administration's claims of having 'saved thousands of Americans' can be dismissed out of hand because credible evidence has never been off erednot even an authoritative leak of any major terrorist operation interdicted based on information gathered from these interrogations in the past seven years.\" Rather Bearden sees administration statements refl ecting the battle raging since 9/11 between the \"old hands\" in CIA, who reject coercive techniques because they consider them ineff ective and, even worse, undermining of American values, and the \"take off  the gloves group,\" most of whom are not interrogators, but who rose to positions of prominence aft er 9/11 by playing to the administration's desire to get tough with the terrorists.9\n\n## Th E Water Cure\n\nAccording to research by historian Paul Kramer, published in the February 2008 *New Yorker*, recent events are not the fi rst time an American administration has had to account for employing harsh tactics when interrogating enemies, including the practice of waterboarding or, as it was called in 1902, the \"water cure.\" Beginning in 1901, U.S. soldiers in the Philippines and returning veterans of what was then called the Philippine Insurrection (1899-1902), a confl ict between the United States and indigenous Filipinos fi ghting for independence from U.S. occupation, recounted stories of unfl attering conduct by U.S. soldiers. Picked up by anti-imperialists in Congress who were opposed to U.S. colonial aspirations in the Philippines as well as the ensuing war, the stories gained traction with the public. Amid vivid accounts of murder, mayhem, and torture committed by both sides was the description of a specifi c interrogation technique referred to as the water cure that was generally attributed to U.S. troops. So ubiquitous were these accounts that new U.S. President Th eodore Roosevelt, who had replaced the assassinated William McKinley in September 1901, was constrained to allow members of his administration to appear before Congress to answer allegations of torture.10 At least in terms of its notoriety, the water cure was the Abu Ghraib of its day. However, in spite of being \"tolerated and under-punished,\" as Kramer points out, the water cure was \"not...formally authorized at the highest levels in Washington.\"11\nFuture President and Chief Justice of the Supreme Court William Howard Taft , who was at the time the fi rst civilian Governor-General of the Philippines, testifi ed in early February 1902 to the Senate Committee on the Philippines about \"instances of water cure, that torture which I believe involves pouring water down the throat so that the man swells and gets the impression that he is going to be suff ocated and then tells what he knows, which was a frequent treatment under the Spaniards.\" Despite this lurid account, Taft  downplayed the severity of the problem and emphasized that American offi  cials did not tolerate such abuses and swift ly brought those involved to justice.12\nIn follow-on testimony, Secretary of War Elihu Root reminded committee members of the \"barbarous cruelty common among uncivilized races,\" like the Filipino insurgents. Th e United States, on the other hand, the Secretary said, was conducting its military operations with \"scrupulous regard for the rules of civilized warfare, with careful and genuine consideration for the prisoner and the noncombatant, with self-restraint, and with humanity never surpassed, if ever equaled, in any confl ict, worthy only of praise, and refl ecting credit on the American people.\" Undeterred when further accusations surfaced of the alleged use of torture, including the water cure, Root ordered a court martial for the alleged perpetrator. However, before it convened he confi ded to the presiding offi  cer his belief that \"the violations of law and humanity, of which these cases, if true, are examples, will prove to be few and occasional, and not to characterize the conduct of the army generally in Philippines.\"13 His future counterpart, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, made a similar argument in a May 2004 Pentagon news conference referring to the abuse at Abu Ghraib as an \"exceptional, isolated...case,\"14 a theme reiterated by President Bush who characterized it as \"disgraceful conduct by a few American troops who dishonored our country and disregarded our values.\"15\nPresident Roosevelt, sworn to uphold the law, but angry at his anti-imperialist political opponents who he felt were using the issue of torture to undermine not only his legitimacy but also the country's moral standing within the international community,16 was uncertain of how to respond. On one hand he declared, \"determined and unswerving eff ort must be made, and has been and is being made, to fi nd out every instance of barbarity on the part of our troops, to punish those guilty of it, and to take, if possible, even stronger measures than have already been taken to minimize or prevent the occurrence of all such acts in the future.\"17 However, in words echoed over a century later in President Bush's \"forward strategy of freedom\" for justifying the U.S. military intervention\n13 Kramer, \"The Water Cure: Debating Torture and CounterinsurgencyA Century Ago.\"\nin Iraq,18 President Roosevelt explained that \"not only the surest but the only eff ectual way of stopping [cruelties] is by the progress of the American arms.\" In a Decoration (Memorial) Day speech at Arlington Cemetery on 30 May 1902, he posed the following question and answer: \"Peace and freedomare there two better objects for which a soldier can fi ght? Well, these are precisely the objects for which our soldiers are fi ghting in the Philippines.... [Th ey] do more than bring peace, do more than bring order. Th ey bring freedom.\"19\nTh e Philippine-American War offi  cially ended on 4 July 1902, with the United States declaring victory and off ering amnesty to Filipino fi ghters. Th is action, plus President Roosevelt's policy of vigorously prosecuting service members accused of torture, specifi cally the water cure, sidetracked the momentum of administration critics and ensured that its practice was no longer tolerated within the ranks of the U.S. Army.20 It took over forty years before waterboarding again captured the popular attention of Americans and then it was because they were its victims. Th e torture and abuse of U.S. and Allied prisoners of war held by the Japanese during World War II was a defi ning event for the United States. Th e Japanese Empire, which was not a signatory of the Geneva Convention of 1929, infl icted extreme hardship and suff ering on military and civilian prisoners during interrogation and custodial detention. Following the war, the victorious Allies both collectively and individually convened legal proceedings to prosecute Japanese soldiers for violations of the Law of War. According to Judge Evan Wallach, writing in *Th e Washington Post*, in the 1946-1948 International Military Tribunal for the Far East (Tokyo War Crimes Trials), \"leading members of Japan's military and government elite were charged, among their many crimes, with torturing Allied military personnel and civilians.\" In light of current events, it is noteworthy that \"the *principal proof* upon which their torture convictions were based was conduct that we would now call waterboarding.\"21\nIn stark contrast to the international tribunal's fi ndings from over sixty years ago was testimony to a subcommittee of the House Judiciary Committee by Steven G. Bradbury, acting chief of the Justice Department's Offi  ce of Legal Counsel, in February 2008. Bradbury testifi ed that, aft er reviewing the CIA's plans in 2002 for its enhanced interrogation program, the Department of Justice determined that waterboarding and other enhanced techniques were legal. According to Bradbury, \"the historical examples that have been referenced in the public debate [involving Japanese use of waterboarding during World War II] have all involved a course of conduct that everyone would agree constituted egregious instances of torture.... Th e only thing in common [with CIA methods] is, I think, the use of water.\" Although \"something can be quite distressing, uncomfortable, even frightening,\" Bradbury said, \"if it doesn't involve severe physical pain, and it doesn't last very long, it may not constitute severe physical suff ering.\"22 His testimony is supported by a heavily redacted, recently declassifi ed memo originally issued by Assistant Attorney General Jay S. Bybee to the CIA on 1 August 2002. In it Bybee argued that to violate the statute [on torture], an individual must have the specifi c intent to infl ict severe pain or suff ering. Because specifi c intent is an element of the off ense, the absence of specifi c intent negates the charge of torture.... Accordingly, if an individual conducting the interrogation has a good faith belief that the procedures he will apply, separately or together, would not result in prolonged mental harm, that individual lacks the requisite specifi c intent.23\n\n## Tougher Interrogation Equals Better Intelligence?\n\nHuman intelligence is the oldest of the intelligence disciplines and the questioning of captured enemies to obtain information of potential intelligence value is equally ancient. Th roughout the long history of interrogation there persists the seductive simplicity, especially common among impatient leaders who demand quick solutions to complex problems, that tougher interrogation invariably equals better intelligence. In an October 2006 interview, Vice President Dick Cheney agreed with his host that the use of waterboarding on high value detainees was a \"no-brainer\" because it \"provided us enormously valuable information\" that contributed to saving American lives.24 Speaking to the Heritage Foundation on 23 January 2008, the Vice President further elaborated on this subject. \"Among the most eff ective weapons against terrorism is good intelligenceinformation that helps us fi gure out the movements of the enemy, the extent of their operations, the location of their cells, the plans that they're making, the methods they use, and the targets that they want to strike. Information of this kind is also the very hardest to obtain.\" So how does the United States get access to this information? Not surprisingly, according to the Vice President, we get it by talking to the terrorists themselves, specifi cally \"the ones that we've captured\" and are holding at the detention facility in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. For the really hard-core terrorists, however, like 9/11 mastermind Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, Mr. Cheney advocates a \"tougher program run by the CIA.\" Th e result of this program, the Vice President confi ded to his audience, is a \"wealth of information that has foiled attacks against the United States; information that has saved countless, innocent lives.\" Th e implied connection between coercive interrogations and critical intelligence is clear.25\nTh is connection is not surprising in the wake of President Bush's issuance in July 2007 of an Executive Order determining \"that a program of detention and interrogation approved by the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency fully complies with obligations of the United States under Common Article 3 [of the Geneva Conventions of 1949].\" Th e order essentially confi rmed the Director of the CIA's authority to conduct interrogations under diff erent rules than those governing the Department of Defense.26\n\n## Th E Cia And Special Interrogation Rules\n\nIn public remarks to the Council on Foreign Relations in September\n2007, the CIA Director, General Michael Hayden, made the case for his agency's special interrogation rules. According to General Hayden (now retired from the Air Force), over seventy percent of the information used to construct a recent National Intelligence Estimate on terrorist threats to the homeland was gleaned from detainee debriefi ngs. \"Th ese programs are targeted and they are selective. Th ey were designed only for the most dangerous terrorists and those believed to have the valuable information, such as knowledge of planned attacks.\" Interestingly, despite General Hayden's spirited defense of the usefulness of the CIA's special rules, he admitted that \"a lot of what you hear about our interrogation and debriefi ng techniques is not only false, it actually tends to obscure a point that we and our offi  cers understand very well. When face to face with a detained terrorist, the most eff ective tool bar is knowledge. Th at means things like familiarity with the subject's background, knowing the correct questions to ask, countering lies with facts.\"27 As any veteran interrogator will attest, the application of superior knowledge in an intelligence interrogation is neither dependent on the coercive interrogation measures the CIA is so reluctant to give up nor restricted in any way by complying with the approved techniques in the Army Field Manual.\n\nYet, having made his point about the importance of knowledge to successful interrogations (one would surmise he means all successful interrogations, not just those conducted by the CIA), it is ironic that General Hayden believes that \"what it is we do as an agency is diff erent from what is contained in the Army Field Manual.\"28 Elaborating on this theme in later testimony before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence in February 2008, General Hayden was dismissive of the prescriptions in the Army Field Manual to the point of being condescending:\nOn the face of it it would make no more sense to apply the Army's fi eld manual to CIAthe Army Field Manual on interrogations, than it would be to take the Army Field Manual on grooming and apply it to my agency, or the Army Field Manual on recruiting and apply it to my agency, or for that matter, take the Army Field Manual on sexual orientation and apply it to my agency.... We should not confi ne our universe of lawful interrogation to a subset of those techniques that were developed for one purpose.29\nIf by \"one purpose\" General Hayden is referring to the Army's doctrinal and operational interest in tactical interrogations, which occupies the largest share of the Army's attention, then he clearly is overlooking the broader intent of FM 2-22.3 to provide guidance for the conduct of interrogations \"at all echelons in all operational environments.\" In his eff ort to justify retaining enhanced techniques, General Hayden misses the point that all interrogations, whether done by a CIA offi  cer or an enlisted soldier, share a common purpose\"to procure information to answer specifi c collection requirements by direct and indirect questioning techniques of a person who is in the custody of the forces conducting the questioning.\" And, more importantly, all interrogations should be \"conducted in accordance with the Law of War, regardless of the echelon or operational environment in which the HUMINT collector is operating.\"30\nDespite General Hayden's protests, applying the techniques in FM 2-22.3 is less about diff erences between tactical and strategic interrogation strategies than it is about adopting a common standard of compliance with international and domestic law and policy.\n\nIn making his case to the Council on Foreign Relations about the appropriateness of special interrogation rules for the CIA, General Hayden notes that CIA interrogators are older (average age 43) and presumably more experienced than their military counterparts. He also says CIA interrogators get 240 hours of training for this \"specifi c activity.\"31 What is misleading about these statements is that they suggest CIA had a seasoned corps of veteran interrogators waiting in the wings to question and exploit high-value detainees when the Global War on Terrorism began. Th e opposite was true. According to investigative reporter and author Jane Mayer, when it took custody of several senior al Qaeda insurgents captured in Afghanistan and Pakistan, \"the CIA had no experience really in interrogating prisoners. Th ey had never really held prisoners before. And so, they really had no idea how to go about getting information out of people.\" Th e answer the CIA came up with, Mayer says, was to seek out military and civilian specialists, including behavioral scientists, who train military personnel to resist coercive interrogation techniques that they might encounter if captured by our enemies.32\nIn hearings before the Senate Armed Services Committee on 17 June\n2008, Senator Carl Levin explained how military students who attend one of the Survival, Evasion, Resistance, and Escape (SERE) schools are subjected to physically abusive treatment such as stress positions, hooding, sleep disruption, temperature extremes, loud music, and even waterboarding. Th e goal of the training is to prepare service members \"so that should they be captured and subject to harsh treatment, they will be better prepared to resist.\" Th e role players who pose as interrogators in administering this training are \"not real interrogatorsnor are they qualifi ed to be.\"33 Among the documents released as part of Senator Levin's hearing was an excerpt from a study done for the Air Force in the 1950s by sociologist Albert D. Biderman, examining the eff orts by the Chinese Communists to extract false confessions from captured American airmen.34 Adopting Biderman's research on how the Communists used coercive methods to elicit compliance, the CIA reverse engineered defensive training into off ensive enhanced interrogation techniques for use on detainees. Ironically, what CIA missed in the process was Biderman's overall conclusion that coercive methods primarily produced false confessions.35\nGeneral Hayden's implication that CIA interrogators are necessarily better equipped, because of their maturity and training, to extract information of intelligence value from hard-core terrorists, is not supported by the evidence from Senator Levin's investigation nor by new revelations emerging about the interrogations. Based on the declassifi ed documents from Senator Levin's hearing, the 240 hours of training in a \"specifi c activity,\" which General Hayden referred to above, appears to focus almost exclusively on the dubious application of enhanced interrogation techniques adapted from SERE training to highvalue detainees.36 Recently disclosed information about at least one of the CIA\noffi  cers who interrogated high-profi le terrorists such as Khalid Shaikh Mohammed, Zayn al-Abidin Muhammed Hussein (aka Abu Zubaydah), and Ramzi bin al-Shibh suggests those chosen, although older than many of their military counterparts, were not trained or certifi ed as interrogators by the CIA or any other government agency. Th is information was reported by Scott Shane of Th e New York Times.37\nShane quotes A.B. \"Buzzy\" Krongard, the CIA's Executive Director, at the time third in the agency hierarchy behind Director George Tenet: \"I asked, 'What are we going to do with these guys when we get them?' I said, 'We've never run a prison. We don't have the languages. We don't have the interrogators.'\"38\nIn light of these disclosures, General Hayden's attempt to rationalize why the CIA's program should be exempt from the rules that apply to DoD interrogations seems more like an attempt to conceal the program's inadequacies than to safeguard its special character and capabilities.\n\nIn spite of this rough start, the CIA argues that the ad hoc interrogators eventually elicited valuable information from their hard-core al Qaeda interlocutors.39 CIA operations offi  cer John Kiriakou oversaw the capture and interrogation of Abu Zubaydah. Th is interrogation, according to Kiriakou in an interview with *ABC News* correspondent Brian Ross, led to major intelligence breakthroughs that \"disrupted a number of attacks, maybe dozens of attacks.... Once the information started coming in and we were able to corroborate it with other sourcesand able to...disrupt other...al Qaeda operations, that was a big victory.\"40 Th e question that remains unanswered is whether \"success at building rapport with the most ruthless of terrorists\" can be attributed to subjecting them to enhanced interrogation techniques or to the positive relationship interrogators developed with them while using traditional, non-coercive methods.41\nKiriakou, who chose not be to be trained in enhanced techniques,42 nonetheless believes their use to break down Abu Zubaydah's resistance had a powerful emotional eff ect on convincing him to cooperate. Kiriakou says that shortly aft er Abu Zubaydah was waterboarded \"he told his interrogator that Allah had visited him in his cell during the night and told him to cooperate because his cooperation would make it easier on the other brothers who had been captured. And from that day on he answered every question just like I'm sitting here speaking to you.\" 43\nReporting by Dan Eggen and Walter Pincus in *Th e Washington Post* notes that Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) offi  cials are skeptical about the accuracy and completeness of the information extracted from Abu Zubaydah aft er CIA interrogators subjected him to waterboarding and other enhanced techniques. Offi  cials from both the FBI and CIA agree that Abu Zubaydah provided crucial information during earlier non-coercive interrogations. For example, he confi rmed the identities of 9/11 operations chief Khalid Shaikh Mohammed and American al Qaeda operative Jose Padilla. However, questions about the truthfulness of information Abu Zubaydah supplied aft erward have raised a furor between the two agencies.44\nSpecial Agent Dan Coleman, who, until he retired in 2004, was the FBI's lead investigator on Osama bin Laden and al Qaeda, contradicts former Director of Central Intelligence George Tenet's contention that \"Abu Zubaydah had been at the crossroads of many al-Qaeda operations and was in position toand did share critical information with his interrogators.\" As a result of the harsh methods used by CIA to interrogate Abu Zubaydah, Coleman declared, \"I don't have confi dence in anything he says, because once you go down that road, everything you say is tainted.... He was talking before they did that to him, but they didn't believe him. Th e problem is they didn't realize he didn't know all that much.\" Coleman, having carefully studied Abu Zubaydah's diary, which was confi scated when he was taken into custody, believes he exaggerated his own role in al Qaeda. Th e CIA, on the other hand, was convinced Abu Zubaydah was just resisting interrogation. When he was not forthcoming with information the CIA expected him to know, CIA interrogators used enhanced techniques to break his spirit. In reality, Coleman contends, aft er being waterboarded, Abu Zubaydah became more talkative, but not more truthful. Th e threat information Abu Zubaydah provided post-waterboarding was \"crap,\" according to Coleman. \"Th ere's an agency mind-set that there was always some sort of golden apple out there, but there just isn't, especially with guys like him.\"45 Given that the CIA Director of Operations in November 2005 ordered the destruction of videotapes documenting the interrogations of Abu Zubaydah and other alleged senior al Qaeda leaders, the debate as to the signifi cance of their revelations and the value of enhanced interrogation techniques in obtaining them may never be known.\n\n## Enhancing Interrogation\n\nIt is important to remember that intelligence interrogation is not an end in itself. Adapting a quotation from the classic book *Front-Line Intelligence*, we see that, just like that of all other intelligence personnel, the interrogators' purpose is to \"facilitate the accomplishment of the mission, and to save lives.\n\nWhen they fail, all the wrong people are hurt.\"46 Certainly, those who developed enhanced interrogation techniques believed they were serving the mission of the Global War on Terrorism and saving lives; likewise, those who adamantly reject such methods fi nd justifi cation for the same reasons. So how do we know which course to choose? Th e safe bet is reliance on a standard that keeps interrogators' conduct well away from gray areas that might be interpreted as torture, based on which legal interpretations might currently be fashionable.47\nTh at standard, established by the *Detainee Treatment Act of 2005*, is found in FM 2-22.3, *Human Intelligence Collector Operations.*\nTh e danger in not adopting such a standard is that we fall prey to exigencies and rationalizations of the moment that appear to create special cases. Colonel Morris Davis, the Chief Prosecutor for the Military Commissions at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, from 2005 to 2007, tells this story:\nTwenty-seven year ago, in the fi nal days of the Iran hostage crisis, the C.I.A.'s Tehran station chief, Tom Ahern, faced his principal interrogator for the last time. Th e interrogator said the abuse Mr. Ahern had suff ered was inconsistent with his own personal values and with the values of Islam and, as if to wipe the slate clean, he off ered Mr. Ahern a chance to abuse him just as he had abused the hostages. Mr. Ahern looked the interrogator in the eyes and said, \"We don't do stuff  like that.\"48\nSadly, the record shows what we have done in the past when confronted with enemies we deemed so barbarous and alien to our sensibilities that we consider them beyond humanity's pale. As Paul Kramer implies, Filipino insurgents were widely regarded as such enemies by American soldiers fi ghting them during the Philippine-American War at the turn of the twentieth century. Not surprisingly, captured insurgents were treated to the water cure. \"U.S. military actions are dictated by the mandates of an 'exceptional' kind of war against a uniquely treacherous and broadly-defi ned 'enemy',...[which] produced a troubling normalization of the atrocious.\"49\nMore recently, President Bush described our enemies in the Global War on Terrorism and the actions we needed to take to defeat them in \"exceptional\" terms:\nWith the Twin Towers and the Pentagon still smoldering, our country on edge, and a stream of intelligence coming in about potential new attacks, my administration faced immediate challenges: We had to respond to the attack on our country.\n\nWe had to wage an unprecedented war against an enemy unlike any we had fought before. We had to fi nd the terrorists hiding in America and across the world, before they were able to strike our country again. So in the early days and weeks aft er 9/11, I directed our government's senior national security offi  -\ncials to do *everything in their power*, within our laws, to prevent another attack.50\nIt is not surprising then to hear John Kiriakou repeat over and over \"it's a diff erent world,\" in his interview with ABC's Brian Ross, unconsciously applying the President's theme of \"exceptional\" circumstances to the interrogation of suspected terrorists like Abu Zubaydah, \"an enemy unlike any we had [faced]\nbefore.\" \"Al Qaeda is not like a World War Two German POW. It's a diff erent world. Th ese guys hate us more than they love life.... You're not gonna convince them that because you're a nice guy and they can trust you and they have a rapport with you that they're going to confess andand give you their operations.\n\nIt'sit's diff erent. It's a diff erent world.\"51\nUnfortunately, though our enemies have changed over the years, the standard we must uphold in interrogations has not. Perhaps Senator John McCain, no stranger to torture as a POW in North Vietnam from 1967 to 1973, makes the strongest case for fi rm standards in intelligence interrogation. In a statement to the U.S. Senate in 2005 he said:\nTh e intelligence we collect must be reliable and acquired humanely, under clear standards.... To do diff erently not only off ends our values as Americans, but undermines our war eff ort.... [Although] the enemy we fi ght has no respect for human life or human rights...this isn't about who they are.\n\nTh is is about who we are. Th ese are the values that distinguish us from our enemies, and we can never, never allow our enemies to take those values away. 52\n\n# Interrogation Of Japanese Pows In World War Ii: U.S. Response To A Formidable Challenge\n\n## Introduction\n\nTh is study documents how the U.S. military overcame the challenges of recruiting and preparing Japanese interrogators for service in the Pacifi c Th eater and their remarkable accomplishments in conducting wartime interrogations. Despite numerous obstacles, the Army and Navy designed and implemented eff ective interrogation programs credited with shortening the Pacifi c war by two years. Many of the basic principles used to develop and execute these programs still apply today.\n\nTh e primary objective of the study is to expand the U.S. Intelligence Community's existing body of knowledge concerning interrogation approaches by illuminating past experiences. Numerous lessons can be drawn from the study; in fact, in some cases these lessons echo suggestions and recommendations made by successful interrogators during and immediately following World War II. Targeted recruitment eff orts and comprehensive language training, coupled with kind treatment and a thorough understanding of the enemy's culture and psychology by U.S. military interrogators, enabled the U.S. military to penetrate the enemy's psyche and obtain information vital to the war eff ort.\n\nGathering vital intelligence through the interrogation of enemy prisoners is one of the greatest challenges our nation faces today in the struggle against terrorism. In many respects, the jihadists we confront in the Global War on Terrorism share many of the attributes of the fanatical enemy encountered in World War IIthe Japanese soldier. During the weeks and months following Japan's attack on Pearl Harbor, anti-Japanese hysteria spread throughout the U.S. and wartime propaganda fueled existing prejudices. Many Americans considered the Japanese uncivilized, treacherous fanatics. Th ey were savages or crazed samurai as ready to kill themselves as others.53 Th e Western media were frequently even more apocalyptic in their expressions. Th ey declared the war in Asia very diff erent from that in Europe, for Japan was a \"racial menace\" as well as a cultural and religious one, and if Japan proved victorious in the Pacifi c, there would be \"perpetual war between Oriental ideals and Occidental.\"54 At the time, the war was perceived as a true clash of civilizations and evidence of extremism illuminated the hostility and rage. In various areas of the U.S., Americans boycotted Japanese goods.55\nMilitary and civilian leaders faced the diffi  cult challenge of cutting through this wrath to develop realistic responses. Th is was particularly complicated, as many of these leaders shared the same emotions. Th e U.S. also faced the dilemma of understanding how this enemy would behave in a time of war and beyond. Th e Japanese soldier had many characteristics of an ideal fi ghting man. Among these qualities were courage, endurance, physical strength, no fear of death, and a fanatical sense of patriotism and loyalty to the Emperor.56 Still, many unanswered questions remained: Did the Japanese consider themselves a superior race? Would they surrender or fi ght to the last man? If captured, could they be convinced to talk? Leaders recognized that a more nuanced understanding of the culture and psychology of the Japanese would prove critical to the successful prosecution of the Second World War and the occupation that followed.\n\nTo complicate matters further, the U.S. faced an enemy who spoke a remarkably complex language. Japanese offi  cers were not concerned about the security of their sensitive military communications because they thought Westerners could never learn to read and write Japanese, especially the abbreviated styles of writing known as *gyosho* and *sosho*.57 Th ese cursive styles of Japanese calligraphy are as similar to the printed Japanese character as a shorthand symbol is to an English word. To read and write anything beyond the simplest and most basic text, one needed knowledge of thousands of Chinese characters. To make matters worse, the written language was not just a visual representation of everyday spoken Japanese, but an intricate system that refl ected the infl uence of Chinese linguistic forms as well as older Japanese forms.58\n24, accessed via ProQuest Historical Newspapers on 27 January 2007.\n\n56 Hallett Abend, \"Japan's SoldiersUnsoldierly Yet Fanatic,\" The New York Times (1857 -\nCurrent file), 11 January 1942, SM12, accessed via ProQuest Historical Newspapers on 27 January 2007.\n\n57 \"The Military Intelligence Service Language School,\" n.d.; Correspondence and Reports Relating to the Operation of Language Schools, 1943-1949; Records of the War Department General and Special Staffs; Record Group 165; NARA, College Park, MD, 2. Cited hereafter as \"The Military Intelligence Service Language School,\" NARA.\n\n58 Christopher Seeley, \"The 20th Century Japanese Writing System: Reform and Change,\"\nThe Journal of Simplified Spelling Society J19 (1995), URL: <www.spellingsociety.org/journals/\nj19/ japanese. php>, accessed 5 February 2007.\n\nAt the time of the attack on Pearl Harbor, very few Americans of military age were fl uent in Japanese. Th e U.S. relied on previously trained military offi  -\ncers, Caucasian-Americans who had grown up and studied in Japan, and *Nisei*\n(second generation Japanese-Americans living in the United States) to address this linguistic challenge. Employing *Nisei* presented the greater challenge, as many Americans doubted the *Nisei* could stand the decisive test of battle against their own race and blood. Civilian and military leaders were very suspicious of their loyalty. In fact, on 19 February 1942, President Roosevelt signed the infamous Executive Order (EO) 9066 authorizing the internment of tens of thousands of American citizens of Japanese ancestry.\n\nTo develop a comprehensive understanding of Japanese psychology and culture, and address the growing need for qualifi ed linguists, the U.S. Army and Navy established separate Japanese language schools to train military interrogators and interpreters as they deployed military forces across the Pacifi c. Th roughout the war, prisoner of war (POW) interrogation played a crucial role in gathering valuable information about Japanese military operations and intentions. Many senior military offi  cers believed that the Allied success in harvesting this crucial intelligence shortened the war eff ort by as much as two years.59\nAn evaluation of how U.S. military interrogation methods were used against the Japanese during World War II can assist in identifying costs and benefi ts associated with modern-day interrogation training and techniques applied during the Global War on Terrorism. In addition, it may help determine whether current U.S. military interrogation training refl ects changes in warfare and incorporates lessons learned from past confl icts. Th is study of World War II interrogation answers a critical question: What can we learn from the U.S. experience during World War II of recruiting and preparing interrogators and conducting interrogations of Japanese POWs that will inform current and future doctrine and practices related to educing information?\n\nSome important historical and cultural context that infl uenced Japanese soldiers during the war will be provided. Th e objective is to provide the reader with a suffi  cient understanding of Japanese thought processes and mental attitudes in order to appreciate the challenges U.S. interrogators faced in executing their mission. Th is brief historical review also provides insight into Japanese loyalty to the Emperor, the disgrace of surrender, and U.S. expectations of the prisoners' implacability.\n\nAlso important is the U.S. Army's experience in preparing for and conducting interrogations of Japanese prisoners. It follows the evolution of the Army's Military Intelligence Service Language School (MISLS), where students received extensive training in language, interrogation, document translation, and cultural awareness. A wartime case study designed to illustrate the Army's methodology is off ered.\n\nTh e U.S. Navy developed a unique training approach. Th e historical progression of the Navy's Oriental Language School is evaluated, along with details of the Navy's methods of wartime interrogation. Another case study illustrates the Navy's method. Th e essay concludes with an examination of the numerous lessons drawn from analysis of the Army and Navy case studies presented, plus recommendations for additional research.\n\nPreliminary review of available literature reinforced the need to study the U.S. experience during World War II of recruiting and preparing linguists and conducting interrogations. Th e case study method was selected as a mechanism to examine and compare these events thoroughly.\n\nRobert K. Yin emphasizes the technically critical features of this strategy in his 2-part defi nition. Th e fi rst part begins with the \"scope\" of the case study:\n1. A case study is an empirical inquiry that\n\n- investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context,\nespecially when\n- the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly\nevident.60\nSecond, because context and phenomenon are not always obvious in real-life situations, a set of technical characteristics, including data collection and data analysis strategies, completes the second half of Yin's defi nition:\n2. *Th e case study inquiry*\n\n- copes with the technically distinctive situation in which there will be\nmany more variables of interest than data points, and as one result\n- relies on multiple sources of evidence, with data needing to converge\nin a triangulating fashion, and as another result\n- benefi ts from the prior development of theoretical propositions to\nguide data collection and analysis.61\n20 |\nTh e key point Yin makes is that the case study method is much more than a \"logic of design,\" as Jennifer Platt suggests in her historical overview of the case study in American methodological thought. Instead, it represents a deliberate approach to covering contextual conditions, as well as the logic of design, data collection techniques, and specifi c approaches to data analysis.62\n\n## Th E Multiple-Case Design\n\nTh is study employs a \"multiple-case\" or \"comparative\" design methodology, exploring two carefully selected cases to predict similar results (a literal replication) or contrasting results for predictable reasons (a *theoretical replication*).\n\nTh is method is oft en considered more robust than a single-case design, because the evidence is more compelling. On balance, the conduct of a multiple-case study oft en requires extensive resources and time beyond the means of a single investigator.63 Th e replication approach applied to this study is illustrated in Figure 2-1.\n\n## Asking The Right Question\n\nFigure 2-1 indicates that the fi rst step in designing the study consists of posing a key research question: What can we learn from the U.S. experience during World War II of recruiting and preparing interrogators and conducting interrogations of Japanese POWs that will inform current and future doctrine and practices related to educing information?\n\n## Case Selection And Data Collection\n\nCase selection and defi nition of specifi c data measures represent important steps in the design and data collection process. Two cases were chosen for analysis, the U.S. Army and the U.S. Navy, because during World War II the Army and Navy were the only U.S. military services recruiting, preparing, and employing military interrogators.64 For the purpose of this study, data collection protocols include an overview of the case study, fi eld procedures (access to case materials, sources of information, etc.), and specifi c case study questions.\n\nTh e study relied heavily on previously classifi ed archival records maintained at the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA) in College Park, Maryland. Because of the Nazi War Crimes Disclosure Act of 1998, NARA made thousands of previously classifi ed U.S. military records (from 1939\nto 1976) available to the public. Th ese newly released records provide insight into U.S. military intelligence activities in the Pacifi c during World War II and the subsequent occupation of Japan. NARA's declassifi cation eff orts enabled the author to gain access to reports, memoranda, policy documents, prisoner of war interrogation fi les, training records, various analytical products, and general topics of intelligence interest. To supplement the NARA records, a comprehensive oral history interview was conducted with a veteran interrogator from World War II to provide a fi rsthand, human interest perspective.\n\nTh e heart of the protocol encompasses a set of questions developed to guide the investigation, listed below as they relate to the case study project:\n\n- How did the Army or Navy project Japanese language requirements\nin the event of war with Japan? What methods of recruitment were employed by each service?\n-\nHow did Executive Order 9066 aff ect recruitment eff orts?\n-  How were U.S. military personnel trained in the Japanese language\nand interrogation? What sources of training material were used?\n-\nDid they receive training in Japanese psychology and culture?\n-\nWhat role did the Nisei have in training?\n-\nHow was training diff erent between the services?\n-\nWere methods taught in the classroom employed in the fi eld?\n-  Was there debate over interrogation methods or techniques that\nwere more \"humane\" than others?\n- What interrogation methods were employed that proved most\nsuccessful?\n- What lessons learned might apply to current and future educing\ninformation doctrine?\n\n## Case Study Questions. Source: Compiled By The Author. Conducting And Writing The Cases\n\nAccording to Yin, \"Each individual case study consists of a 'whole' study, in which convergent evidence is sought regarding the facts and conclusions for the case; each case's conclusions are then considered to be the information needing replication by other individual cases.\"65 Th e fi rst case examines the Army's approach to recruiting and training *Nisei* as linguists and interrogators.\n\nIt off ers a general assessment of success or failure in convincing enemy prisoners to cooperate and provide information through direct interrogation methods. Th e second half of the study highlights the wartime experiences of one U.S. hero, Sergeant Grant Hirabayashi, a Japanese-American World War II veteran who served as a Military Intelligence Service interrogator.\n\nTh e second case illustrates the Navy's contrasting approach of employing and educating American linguists. Unlike the Army, the Navy focused its recruitment and training eff orts on Caucasian-Americans. Aft er the Japanese attack at Pearl Harbor, the Navy refused to recruit *Nisei*, as the Army had done.\n\nA presentation of the Navy's approach is followed by a summary of the experiences of one of the school's best-known graduates, Lieutenant Otis Cary, the son of a missionary, who was raised in Japan. Cary was commissioned in the U.S. Navy and went on to become one of the most highly successful and wellrespected interrogators during the Second World War.\n\n## Cross-Case Conclusions And The Summary Report\n\nFollowing the presentation of the Army and Navy cases, cross-case analysis completes the study. Th e overall summary report draws conclusions from the fi ndings and refl ects the results.\n\nSpirit Warriors: Psychology and Culture of the Japanese During World War II\nKnow your enemy and know yourself; in a hundred battles, you will never be defeated. When you are ignorant of the enemy but know yourself, your chances of winning or losing are equal. If ignorant both of your enemy and of yourself, you are sure to be defeated in every battle.\n\nSun Tzu\n\n## Historical Setting\n\n24 |\nIn the early 17th century, Ieyasu Tokugawa, a skilled warrior and fi rst Shogun of the Tokugawa Shogunate that ruled Japan as the true governing power until the 1868 Meiji Restoration, created a plan to bring lasting peace to the nation. His vision focused on a complete reordering of Japanese society and the expulsion of the *gaijin* (outside people). It resulted in *Taihai* (the \"Great Peace\")over 250 years without war. Japan became ideologically sealed, and for nearly two and a half centuries had no standing army or navy. Tokugawa held that large military forces were not necessary because his system guaranteed that no external or internal confl icts would occur. Th is amazing stretch of absolute peace was unmatched by any other country over a comparable period of time.66\nRegrettably, it did not last.\n\nBy the mid-1800s, a look across the Sea of Japan made it clear that seclusion and tranquility were a thing of the past. Western merchants had exploited China and imposed opium on its citizens. Farther south, the Dutch had conquered Indonesia; the French ruled Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia; and the British held colonies in India, Burma, Malaya, Singapore, and Hong Kong. To the north, Russia was growing in size and conquering everything in its path.67\nIt is no surprise that Japanese leaders felt obligated to build a strong military to protect their citizens and national sovereignty.\n\nWhen he came to the throne in 1868, Emperor Meiji declared an imperial \"restoration\" and stripped the Shogunate of its powers. As a result, a new era of Japanese society began. As in the early days of Japan's history, the Emperor became a centerpiece of national life and a symbol that united the country ideologically. Emperor Meiji was determined to make Japan a strong and modern nation; however, isolationism was no longer an option for achieving that goal.\n\nIn 1894-95, Japan invaded and defeated China, proving to the rest of the world that Japan was a powerful nation. Th e country's military obsession did not end with China, but instead continued for nearly 50 years. On 7 December 1941, the Japanese launched the infamous attack on Pearl Harbor, which forced the U.S. into World War IIa confl ict that John Dower, professor of Japanese history at the University of California at San Diego, appropriately termed a \"War Without Mercy.\" Th e surprise attack and the ruthless war that followed presented unique challenges to educing information from enemy POWs.\n\nTo appreciate the challenges faced by U.S. military interrogators in obtaining intelligence from enemy prisoners, it is necessary to examine briefl y the rich cultural history and psychology of the Japanese. For simplicity, this discussion is divided into four sections: the Emperor-tradition, the Japanese soldier and armed forces, the shame of capture and surrender, and the fear of torture.\n\n## Th E Emperor-Tradition\n\nOne of the critical questions regarding Japanese psychology concerned the head of the Imperial Family, *Tenno* (the Emperor). What control did His Majesty have over the Japanese people? Japan was clearly an Emperor-centered nation with an imperial line extending back farther than the royal line of any other country. Historically, Japan's citizens viewed the Emperor as the rallying point of devotion and the radiating center of government.68 Th is general sense of unrestricted and unconditional loyalty to the Emperor by the Japanese people was a crucial concern that U.S. military forces needed to understand and address.\n\nMany Americans believed that the Emperor had been merely an indistinct fi gurehead throughout Japan's seven feudal centuries. However, those who lived in Japan before World War II knew that nothing infuriated the Japanese, and reinforced their morale, more than a negative comment about the Emperor or an outright attack against him. Th e testimony of Japanese POWs confi rmed this assumption. Many POWs attributed their extreme militarism to the Emperor and claimed they were \"carrying out his will\" and \"dying at the Emperor's command.\" As one prisoner explained, \"Th e Emperor led the people into war and it was my duty to obey.\"69\nTh e idea that the entire population internalized this view was unprecedented by Western standards; however, prisoner interrogations clearly showed this was the unifi ed viewpoint of Japan, even aft er its defeat. Interrogators concluded early on in the war that it was unnecessary to write \"Refuses to speak against the Emperor\" on each interview record. In fact, a survey of POW interrogation records revealed only three interviews that were even mildly anti- Emperor and only one prisoner went so far as to say, \"It would be a mistake to leave the Emperor on the throne.\"70\nTh roughout the Meiji Restoration and the period leading up to the attack on Pearl Harbor, citizens received thorough conditioning from Japanese authorities on providing proper respect to the Emperor. For example, as a form of super-patriotism and super-nationalism, the Japanese government suggested that all public and private schools display a portrait of the Emperor inside their facilities. Th is was not just any photograph, framed and hung on the wall. Th is portrait had a certain size requirement, was specially prepared and furnished by the Department of Education, and was installed with a formal ceremony. Th e case surrounding the portrait had curtained doors and the Japanese considered it a shrine. Schools seldom opened the curtains, but during formal ceremonies they were drawn and students were required to bow in unison at the direction of the staff . As time went on, the imperial portrait assumed even greater signifi cance and the government required schools to house the photograph in an entirely separate fi reproof building. Th is was costly to the schools and took up additional space.71\n\n26 |\nTh e Japanese Soldier and Armed Forces\nOn 14 December 1941, in a letter to *Th e Washington Post* titled \"Our Enemy's Strength,\" Seymour DeKoven wrote, \"Th e other night Lieutenant Commander Gene Tunney said something over the air that should make all Americans more aware of what lies ahead than most of what we've been hearing of late...He emphasized the fact that the Japs are not only not going to be a pushover, but that unless we learn to modify greatly some of our fi ghting ethics, we may be in for some severe disappointments.\" Th e author goes on to describe the Japanese soldier as having \"been trained for decades to be the most ruthless death-dealer on earth.\" He says, \"Th e nearest things to [the Japanese soldier]\nmight be a Nazi or a jungle head-hunter; but even these latter pale into insignifi -\ncance when compared with the warrior of the Rising Sun.\"72\n\n## Th E Japanese Soldier\n\nTh e true warriors and backbone of the Japanese armed services were the simple country boys. Th eir superiors commonly referred to these draft ees as\n\"issen gorin.\" *Issen gorin* meant \"one yen, fi ve rin\"the cost of mailing a draft\nnotice - less than a penny. For most, basic military training resembled a brutal gulag and, in many regards, the Japanese Army they served was like a feudal slave system. At the top were the imperial offi  cers, who demanded the highest level of respect. \"Th e offi  cer class in general had the status and authority of feudal lords. Th e privates, especially the new recruits, were at the miserable bottom of the pyramid. Th ey had no human rights. Th ey were non-persons.\"73 \"Brutality and cruelty were the rule rather than the exception in the Japanese army. It was the last primitive infantry army of modern times.\" Offi  cers would slap, kick and beat new recruits on a daily basis.74\nSince a new recruit's former life on the farm was rigorous and physically demanding, the transition to military life was not overly challenging. Moreover, once he completed training, he became one of the \"Emperor's soldiers,\" establishing him as a model of perfection and discipline within the nation. Th e fact that each soldier wore the uniform of his Emperor raised his status in his own estimation and in that of his fellow citizens. In keeping with the ethics of his spiritual belief, he considered himself endowed with superhuman power.75\nOn the battlefi eld, the typical Japanese soldier wore the standard-issue olive-green uniform and a dome-shaped steel helmet. Inside the helmet was a Rising Sun fl ag presented to the soldier by his friends before leaving home and inscribed with their names. He also wore a bellyband, or *Senninbari* (a belt of a thousand stitches), which conferred invulnerability, each stitch having been sewn by a diff erent person while he or she prayed for the well-being of the wearer.76\nIn addition to their standard equipment, most soldiers carried a copy of the Imperial Rescript of 1882, the offi  cial code of ethics for Japanese military personnel. On January 4, 1882, Emperor Meiji presented this document to the Army Minister in a special ceremony held at the Imperial Palace. Th is action symbolized the personal bond between the Emperor and the military, making the military, in eff ect, the Emperor's personal army. By design, the code stressed absolute personal loyalty to the Emperor, which calls to mind one prominent image of loyalty and sacrifi cethat of the \"*Kamikaze*\" pilot.\n\n## Th E *Kamikaze* Pilot\n\nIn the latter stages of the war, particularly in the Okinawa campaign, the Japanese Air Force was in dire straits and knew Allied forces were close to invading the Japanese mainland. To compensate for their military inferiority, the Japanese resorted to the most fanatical forms of defense. Th e employment of \"*Kamikaze*\" or suicide attacks proved to be the most extreme form of these measures. When Genghis Khan's invading fl eet threatened their homeland in the thirteenth century, a \"divine wind\" drove him back and overturned his ships, but this time the Japanese contrived a \"divine wind\" of their ownthe Kamikaze or Special Attack Corps.\n\nIn 1944, a Japanese Army plane attacked a ship near the Andaman Islands in the Bay of Bengal. When the pilot ran out of bombs without achieving any hits, he decided to do his part for the Emperor by fl ying his plane into the target. A Japanese garrison on a neighboring island watched the event unfold, including the resulting explosion, and saw the plane, pilot, and ship disappear. Th ereaft er, word reached Imperial Headquarters that a secret weapon had been discovered.77\nLieutenant Colonel Naomichi Jin, a staff  offi  cer at Imperial General Headquarters and a Japanese intelligence offi  cer on Okinawa during the war, explained to his interrogators, \"I think there were four main reasons\" the Japanese used suicide units:\n28 |\n(1) Th ere were no prospects of victory in the air by employment of orthodox methods.\n\n(2) Suicide attacks were more eff ective because the power of impact of the plane was added to that of the bomb, besides which the exploding gasoline caused fi refurther, achievement of the proper angle eff ected greater speed and accuracy than that of normal bombing. (3) Suicide attacks provided spiritual inspiration to the ground units and to the Japanese public at large. (4) Suicide attack was the only sure and reliable type of attack at the time such attacks were made (as they had to be) with personnel whose training had been limited because of shortage of fuel.78\nLieutenant General Masakazu Kawabe, former Commanding General, Deputy Chief of the Army General Staff , and Director of *Kamikaze* Operations during the Philippine and Okinawa Campaigns, told his interrogators following the occupation of Japan, \"Th e Japanese to the very end, believed that by spiritual means they could fi ght on equal terms with you, yet by any other comparison it would not appear equal. We believed our spiritual confi dences in victory would balance any scientifi c advantages and we had no intention of giving up the fi ght.\" General Kawabe also cautioned, \"I wish to explain something, which is a very diffi  cult thing and which you may not be able to understand. You call our *Kamikaze* attacks 'suicide' attacks. Th is is a misnomer and we feel very badly about you calling them 'suicide' attacks. Th ey were in no sense 'suicide.' Th e pilot did not start out on his mission with the intention of committing suicide. He looked upon himself as a human bomb, which would destroy a certain part of the enemy fl eet for his country. Th ey considered it a glorious thing, while suicide may not be so glorious.\"79 Based on their ethics and spiritual beliefs, Kamikaze pilots and the traditional Japanese soldier proved formidable adversaries against the U.S. and its Allies.\n\n## Th E Japanese Armed Forces\n\nMajor Sherwood F. Moran, a U.S. Marine interrogator who joined the Corps in 1942 at the age of 57, aft er spending the previous 20 years in Japan, described three groups of Japanese men whom he referred to as the true \"hellbent military\":\n(1) Certain higher offi  cers, professional fi re-eaters, such as Admiral Suetsugu and General Araki, to mention just two; holding high motives according to their limited light, and thinking of nothing but the national prestige of a Greater Japan, and their Emperor's expanding glory.\n\n(2) Groups of younger offi  cers, particularly of the army, itching for action, thinking they could \"lick the world,\" contemptuous of democracy and modern international obligations, whose only code they express with the phrase the \"Imperial Way\" (*Kodo*).\n\n(3) Fanatics among the laymen, narrow super-patriots, ranting against any spirit of internationalism, taking the Emperor-myth literally, and witchhunting for any who do not swallow it whole. Th e Black Dragon Society80\nwith the elderly fanatic, Tomaya, in Tokyo, is a primary spark plug of this group.81\nMoran explained that these three groups would stop at nothing to accomplish their ends, even against their own government. In fact, a few years before the war, one of the young offi  cers described above killed one of the highest offi  cers in the Army, the Inspector General of Military Training, with his own sword. Th e young offi  cer declared the Inspector was negligent in his duties in that he did not adequately realize the grievous conditions into which the country was heading. Moreover, the young offi  cer argued that in a time of emergency and danger to the fundamental principles of the Imperial Way the Inspector had no right to hold a position of such importance in His Majesty's armed services. Regrettably, this group of \"hell-bent\" military fanatics supplied the leaders who controlled Japan during the Second World War and were responsible for selling the war to its people.82\n\n## Th E Shame Of Capture And Surrender\n\nWhile American forces succeeded in capturing and interrogating some Japanese prisoners, most soldiers fought to the death or committed *hara-kari* (*seppuku*).83 As the Imperial Army and Navy fell on the defensive and began to face defeat in all theaters of the war, groups of armed forces began to kill fellow citizens and take their own lives in desperate acts of suicide. U.S. soldiers witnessed the all-too-familiar \"banzai charge\" and the reluctance of the Japanese to surrender in battle aft er battle, from Guadalcanal to Tokyo.84\nOn 9 July 1944, to the horror of American troops advancing on Saipan, mothers clutching their babies hurled themselves off  the cliff s to avoid capture. Not only were there virtually no survivors of the 30,000-strong Japanese garri-\n30 |\nson on Saipan, two out of every three civilianssome 22,000 in all - also died.85\nTh e Saipan operation, however, represented the Americans' fi rst experience in the Pacifi c area in handling a large number of POWs, and they did it without developing a detailed plan before the campaign. Interrogators had to persuade a large percentage of the prisoners to come out of caves, dugouts, and other hiding places.86\nSeveral distinct beliefs infl uenced the decisions of Japanese soldiers and civilians regarding surrender and required a commensurate approach by interrogators. By and large, Japanese citizens feared their family and country would disown them and they would become outcasts. Th is belief system could be traced back to three contributing factors of daily life: *Shinto, Hoko*, and *Bushido*.87\n\n## Shinto (Way Of The Gods)\n\nAmong the most prominent factors that shaped the attitude of the Japanese people was Shintoism, the native religion of Japan and the offi  cial state religion until the end of World War II. It involved the worship of several diff erent Kami (gods). Th e term *Shinto* was coined in the sixth century using the Chinese characters *shen* (divine being) and tao (the way). As such, *Shinto* is commonly translated as, \"Th e Way of the Gods.\" Th e origins of *Shinto* are blurred in the fog of the prehistory of Japan. Th e religion has no founder, no offi  cial sacred scriptures, and no fi xed system or doctrine.88 In eff ect, *Shinto* provided the underlying value orientation of the Japanese people that formed the foundation of their culture and overall way of thinking.\n\nTh e *Kojiki*, referred to in English as the \"Records of Ancient Matters,\"\nmaintained that the Japanese people were direct descendants of Amaterasu, the sun goddess, who created Japan. Amaterasu populated this \"divine\" nation through her direct descendant Jimmu, Japan's fi rst Emperor. According to mythology, Emperor Jimmu assumed the throne in 660 B.C. Fundamentally, therefore, the *Shinto* religion is based on the belief that the Japanese people are direct descendants of the sun goddess, and therefore divine. According to this belief, the Emperor was the highest-ranking divine person and thereby god of the Japanese people.\n\n## Hoko\n\nHoko, or the communal \"spy-hostage\" system, was the structure that made all members of every group of ten neighboring houses punishable for a crime or the failure to report any wrongdoing. Th ere was a \"warden\" for each house, each group of ten houses, and each group of 100 houses. Th ese wardens had to be acceptable to the police and were actually spy-hostages who ensured all required measures were carried out.\n\nHui-Yu Caroline Ts'ai, a student at Columbia University in New York, wrote a doctoral dissertation centered on the functional organization, development structure, and operational mobilization of the *Hoko* system. Hui-Yu began the study by examining the system as a political mechanism for social control. During peacetime, the system evolved into an \"administrative base for local governments.\" In the 1930s, Japan used the system as a vehicle for its wartime mobilization. Hui-Yu concludes, however, that the *Hoko* system should be regarded as a social organization as well as a political institution. As such, \"the Hoko functioned largely within a moral society; the organization relied heavily on the mediating role of a local elite, which shared a set of values based on acknowledged status and established trust with the rest of society.\" Consequently, \"the system worked less for social reform than for social control and mobilization.\"89\n\n## Bushido (Way Of The Samurai)\n\n32 |\nAlong with the religious foundation of Japanese culture, the Japanese developed a unique set of laws during the 11th and 13th centuries known as Bushido. Th is code of conduct involved blind loyalty to superiors, disregard of death in carrying out duty, and continuous attack climaxed by annihilating the enemy in hand-to-hand combat. It taught all Japanese from birth the principles of honor, courage, loyalty, the ability to endure pain, self-sacrifi ce, reverence for the Emperor, and contempt of death.90 Th e principles of the *Bushido* code formed an integral part of Japan's national identity and its citizens were indoctrinated with the idea that to die for the Emperor was the most glorious achievement to which they could aspire.\n\nBecause of the teachings of *Shinto, Hoko,* and *Bushido*, the Japanese soldier did not even consider surrender until the instinct of self-preservation overcame his beliefs. As evident from the small number of Japanese prisoners taken during the war, the majority of Japanese soldiers preferred death to capture. Th ose who did surrender always feared the unknown, and many believed that Americans would kill or torture them.\n\n## Fear Of Torture\n\nIn a report dated June 1945, the U.S. Offi  ce of War Information (OWI)\nnoted that 84 percent of one group of interrogated Japanese prisoners (many of them injured or unconscious when captured) said they expected to be killed or tortured by the Allies if taken prisoner. Th e OWI analyst described this as typical, and concluded that fear of the consequences of surrender, \"rather than Bushido,\" was the motivation for many Japanese battle deaths in hopeless circumstances.91 As such, fear of torture may have contributed equally or even more than the previously mentioned factors.\n\nEvidence obtained through interrogation of enemy prisoners suggested this fear was not a result of propaganda by the Japanese military but instead arose because most Japanese soldiers had previously served in China and witnessed atrocities fi rsthand.92 Th e Japanese truly believed the Chinese guerrilla forces took no prisoners, and those captured were tortured and put to death. Th e Japanese considered the Chinese to be masters in the art of torture. Aft er training and serving under these conditions in China for years, as many Japanese soldiers had, it is hardly surprising these troops expected such a fate, regardless of the opponent.\n\nActions by U.S. Marine and Army soldiers did little to change this perception. Reports indicated the Japanese were known to come out of the jungle unarmed with their hands raised above their heads, crying, \"Mercy, mercy,\"\nonly to be mowed down by machine-gun fi re.93 In many battles, neither U.S.\n\nsoldiers nor their commanders wanted to take POWs. Th ough not offi  cial policy, it was common practice in the Pacifi c. On one occasion, a Marine Raider Battalion on patrol stumbled across a Japanese hospital bivouac area and killed over 400, including patients and corpsmen. During this attack, U.S. Marines took no prisoners. American forces justifi ed this behavior on the basis of stories of Japanese treachery. It was rumored that Japanese soldiers would approach American lines indicating surrender and ultimately attack using hand grenades when U.S. forces were in range. Another story told of a wounded Japanese soldier who drew a grenade from his pocket while being transported on a stretcher by four American soldiers, and pulled the pin to detonate the device.94\n\n## Conclusion\n\nDuring World War II, the confl ict in Asia diff ered greatly from that in Europe, for Japan was considered to be a \"racial menace\" as well as a cultural and religious one. If Japan proved victorious in the Pacifi c, there would be \"perpetual war between Oriental ideals and Occidental.\"95 At the time, the confl ict was perceived as a true clash of civilizations.\n\nTh e U.S. thus faced the dilemma of understanding how this enemy would behave in a time of war and beyond. Th e \"divine\" citizens of Japan truly believed they were a superior race and forged a powerful sense of super-patriotism. Th ey were raised in a society that prohibited free thought and one in which outside infl uence was severely limited based on strict immigration laws. Th e addition of national loyalty to the Emperor and a strong sense of military fanaticism created a cohesive nation whose morale and spirit seemed impossible to undermine.\n\nU.S. military interrogators confronted the remarkably diffi  cult challenge of harvesting vital intelligence from an enemy who would rather fi ght to the death or commit *hara-kari* (ritualized form of suicide) to avoid capture. A thorough understanding of the rich cultural history and psychology of the Japanese was critical to the collection of human intelligence and to the successful prosecution of the Second World War and the Allied occupation that followed.\n\n## Secret Soldiers: Japanese-American Interrogators Serving In The U.S. Army During World War Ii\n\nOne of the great lessons that the Army learned from the last war is the tremendous value of intelligence. Lack of knowledge of the enemy can lead to catastrophe. Eff orts to increase have led to the establishment of many agencies and specialties, which were little known prior to the war. Th ese consist of the techniques of photographic interpretation, prisoner of war interrogation, exploitation of signal intelligence, the use of airplanes to gain information, Counterintelligence Corps activities, operation behind the enemy lines, and your own specialty of lnguage interpretation. Each one of these specialties has played a vital role in winning the war, and it is not exaggerated to say that the rapid progression of military events in the Pacifi c was assisted in no small measure by the timely and accurate intelligence produced by Japanese linguists, most of whom are graduates of this school.\n\nGraduation speech presented to the fi nal class of Military Intelligence Service Language School students, Fort Snelling, Minnesota, 8 June 1946\n\n## Forecasting Language Requirements\n\nBefore the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, a small group of U.S. Army offi  cers working within the War Department's General Staff  recognized that few Americans, military or civilian, could speak the Japanese language. As tensions rose between the U.S. and Japan, these former language offi  cers realized the U.S. needed qualifi ed Japanese linguists if the country were to successfully prosecute a war against Japan. Japanese offi  cers had boasted the security of Japanese military documents posed no problem at all, as Westerners could never learn to read or write Japanese, especially the abbreviated style of writing known as sosho (Japanese \"fl uid grass\" style).96\n| 35\nAs tensions escalated, the military had little time to train non-Japanesespeaking personnel. In June 1941, Major Carlisle C. Dusenbury, a former Japanese language student working in the Intelligence Division of the War Department, suggested using *Nisei* to solve the linguist problem. Lieutenant Colonel Wallace Moore, a former missionary who had served in Japan, agreed and subsequently planned the organization of the Army's fi rst Japanese language school.97\nTh e decision to employ *Nisei* personnel was considered risky since many in the U.S., including senior leadership within the Department of the Navy, felt they were not trustworthy. Like other Americans, *Nisei* were subject to the draft  of 1940, and many were serving in the Army when the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor. Shortly aft er the attack, many *Nisei* soldiers were discharged and reclassifi ed as enemy aliens. Moreover, aft er the war broke out, some *Nisei*\nlearned their family members were trapped in Japan for the remainder of the war. Although U.S. citizens, the Japanese government treated them as Japanese nationals and many were forced to serve in the Japanese armed forces.98\nTo inaugurate the new school, Lieutenant Colonel (later Lieutenant General) John Weckerling, a linguist and former military attache in Tokyo, was recalled from duty in Panama. His assistant, Captain (later Colonel) Kai Rasmussen, a West Point graduate, had also served as a military attache in Tokyo.99 Since the majority of Japanese-Americans lived on the West Coast of the U.S. at the time, Colonel Weckerling and Captain Rasmussen decided to open the school in California. Th eir fi rst task was to locate and recruit qualifi ed students.\n\nIn a survey of nearly 4,000 *Nisei*, Colonel Weckerling and Captain Rasmussen discovered that very few had advanced language skills. It was soon evident that many Nisei had become \"too\" Americanized and that those who did speak Japanese had little or no training in military vocabulary or special forms of Japanese writing. On one of the screening tours of *Nisei* already serving in the military, John Fujio Aiso, who was very profi cient in Japanese, was discovered. Aiso was a cum laude graduate of Brown University and received a juris doctorate from Harvard. He had studied legal Japanese at Chuo University while working as an attorney for British businesses in Japan. Ironically, the U.S. Army was using him as an enlisted mechanic in a motor maintenance battalion, although he knew little about mechanics. Weckerling and Rasmussen chose Aiso as their Director of Academic Training.100 Aiso became the heart and soul of the new school, bringing his language skills and cultural understanding of his Japanese ancestors. In addition to Aiso, Weckerling and Rasmussen discovered three other highly qualifi ed Japanese-American civilians eager to help launch the new school: Akira Oshida, Tetsuo Imagawa, and Shigeya Kihara.101\n\n## Fourth Army Intelligence School\n\nOn 1 November 1941, the Fourth Army Intelligence School began operations in an abandoned airplane hangar on Crissy Field at the Presidio of San Francisco. Th e War Department began its fi rst Japanese language course with eight instructors and 60 students. 58 of the students were *Nisei*, and two were Caucasians who had studied Japanese at the University of California and the University of Washington.102 Th e War Department allocated a meager\n$2,000 budget for the new program and essentials needed for instruction were extremely scarce.103\n36 days aft er classes began, the Japanese bombed Pearl Harbor. Immediately following the attack, the War Department issued an order that Nisei were not allowed to serve overseas. Since the policy would have crippled the Army's eff ort to employ *Nisei* linguists, advocates on the G-2 staff  fought back in response and the War Department rescinded the order, allowing the new school to proceed as planned.\n\nIn May 1942, the fi rst class graduated 45 of its 60 original students; 15 dropped the program aft er failing to meet academic standards. Th e Army deployed all but ten of the enlisted students to combat zones in small teams. Th e remaining ten, all Kibei (a *Nisei* sent by his or her parents at a young age to be educated in Japan), stayed on as instructors.104 Th e foundation of the Army's language program rested on the rich heritage and cultural experience of these original *Kibei* instructors.\n\n## Executive Order 9066 Relocates Japanese\n\nOn 19 February 1942, President Franklin D. Roosevelt signed his controversial EO 9066 authorizing the internment of Japanese-Americans. Shortly thereaft er, all U.S. citizens of Japanese descent were prohibited from living, working, or traveling on the Pacifi c Coast. Initially, the exclusion was designed to be a voluntary relocation, but the policy failed and eventually the U.S. Army forcibly removed these citizens from their homes. Lieutenant General John L. DeWitt, the Fourth Army's West Coast military commander responsible for ordering the evacuation, was quoted as saying, \"A Jap is a Jap. It makes no diff erence whether the Jap is a citizen or not.\"105\nMany of the citizens removed were eventually allowed to leave the camps to join the Army, attend college, or pursue private employment outside the West Coast. In fact, over 33,000 Japanese-Americans joined the armed forces, many serving honorably in the Military Intelligence Service (MIS).106 A larger number of internees spent the war years behind barbed wire until the order was lift ed in December 1944. EO 9066 ultimately led to the detention of 120,000 Japanese- Americans and Japanese residents of the U.S. Th is made the task of recruiting additional students and instructors from within the military and civilian communities extremely challenging.\n\n## Military Intelligence Training Center: Camp Ritchie, Maryland\n\n38 |\nOn 19 June 1942, shortly aft er President Roosevelt signed EO 9066, the War Department activated the Military Intelligence Training Center (MITC) at Camp Ritchie, Maryland, to off er specialized intelligence training for qualifi ed commissioned and enlisted personnel (including *Nisei*). Th e regular course of instruction was eight weeks long and divided into three sections: General Instruction, Specialized Instruction, and Terrain Exercises.107\nTh e \"general instruction\" consisted of basic military intelligence training provided to all students as follows:108\n\n| 1. Terrain Intelligence                                |          |          |                | 50 hours       |\n|--------------------------------------------------------|----------|----------|----------------|----------------|\n| 2. Signal Intelligence                                 |          |          |                | 25 hours       |\n| 3. Staff  Duties                                       |          |          |                |                |\n| 4. Counterintelligence in Th eater of Operation        |          | 21 hours |                |                |\n| 5. Enemy Armies                                        |          |          |                |                |\n| 6. Aerial Photo Interpretation                         |          |          | 28 hours       |                |\n| 7. Military Intelligence Interpreters and Foreign Maps | 28 hours |          |                |                |\n| 8. Combat and Operations                               |          |          |                | 27 hours       |\n| 9. Visual Demonstration                                |          |          | Included above |                |\n| 10. Order of Battle                                    |          |          |                | Included above |\n\nTh e \"specialized instruction\" consisted of unique training given to qualifi ed groups concurrently with the \"general instruction,\" which included 82\nhours of instruction in the following areas:109\n\n1. Interrogation of Enemy Prisoners of War and Identifi cation and Translation of Documents 2. Aerial Photo Interpretation 3. Military Intelligence Interpreters (Allied and neutral)\n4. Terrain Intelligence 5. Signal Intelligence\n\nAft er 265 hours of general instruction and 82 hours of specialized training, students participated in an 8-day \"terrain exercise.\" During this training period, students completed 20 intelligence-related problem-and-solution exercises, a 48-hour patrol, and night compass training. Students assumed the roles of various intelligence positions and rotated through each position to enable diverse training.110\nTh e \"Visual Demonstration Section\" of the training center was particularly interesting. Th e section was comprised of professional actors who presented a number of theatrical demonstrations to emphasize the most important intelligence lessons. Among the performances was one play focused on POW interrogation designed to illustrate the correct and incorrect methods of search, segregation, and interrogation. By June 1944, the War Department provided this production to approximately 150,000 personnel in Army Maneuver Areas, Special Service Schools, the Command and General Staff  College at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, the U.S. Military Academy at West Point, and the U.S. Marine Base at Quantico, Virginia.111\nAnother production presented by the Visual Demonstration Section staff\nwas a 3-scene play titled \"A Scrap of Paper.\" Th e cast included a Caucasian Language/Interrogation Team Captain and a *Nisei* Language/Interrogation Team Sergeant. Th e stage was set on the island of Formosa (Taiwan). At the beginning of the play, the lights in the theater were dimmed and a spotlight illuminated a Japanese soldier standing center stage at the position of attention. Th e announcer began:112\nTh is is a Jap! Th is is the enemy! Perhaps the chief weapon a soldier can have against his enemy is knowledge of him. Th is demonstration penetrates into some aspects of his thinking and behavior. Th e Jap is a person! Th e Jap is a soldier (lights fade and soldier disappears). Th is is a story of a scrap of paper...a Japanese attack order, from the moment it was written to the time when information obtained from it aided our forces in reducing a vital enemy strong-point. Observe the Japanese military behavior, his relationship to people, both his own and others. Watch how a Language Team handles a Japanese prisoner. Notice how the various Intelligence agencies operate in close liaison to make more eff ective their individual jobs. Observe all this...\"\nAs the play progresses, the storyline demonstrates the emphasis military leaders placed on humane treatment of Japanese prisoners and the vital importance of the *Nisei* to the war and their loyalty to America. During one exchange between the Caucasian interrogator and another U.S. military offi  - cer, the interrogator said, \"You can't interrogate a Jap as you would an Italian or a German...here, our humaneness must be shown. Kindness...just...simple kindness...that's how you get a Jap to talk.\"113 Equally important, this play illustrates a unique method of training presented to U.S. service members during the Second World War.\n\n## Military Intelligence Service Language School: Camp Savage\n\nBecause of EO 9066, the Fourth Army Intelligence School was forced to move to Camp Savage, Minnesota, in June 1941. In fact, the school had outgrown its facilities at the Presidio of San Francisco and needed to relocate to a community that would accept Japanese-American citizens. Except for Governor Harold Stassen of Minnesota, every western state governor rejected the transfer of Japanese-Americans to their areas.114 Colonel Rasmussen, the school's Commandant, said, \"We needed roomnot just physical room, but room in people's hearts. We could work here without interruption, or prejudice, or bias.\"115\nTh e War Department assumed control of the institution and renamed it the Military Intelligence Service Language School (MISLS). Th e Army recalled Colonel Weckerling to Washington to serve on the intelligence staff  and Captain Rasmussen remained in charge of the school. Th e MISLS was charged with:\n\n1. Operating a Japanese language school at Camp Savage to prepare Interpreter-Interrogator-Translator Teams and individual Japanese linguists for duty with United States fi eld forces and other special assignments as directed by the Assistant Chief of Staff , G-2.\n2. Operating a radio station at Camp Savage to train personnel in radio intercept, radio monitoring, and voice broadcast. 3. Operating an Army language school at the University of Michigan in Ann Arbor to provide offi  cers, warrant offi  cers,\nand enlisted men with instruction in the Japanese language prior to assignment at Camp Savage.\n4. Providing intelligence training to educate intelligence specialists in their duties as intelligence team members (i.e., the collection, evaluation, and dissemination of military intelligence).\n\n5. Conducting courses in specialized intelligence. 6. Coordinating activities with sister and allied services. 7. Making certain students, previously approved by the G-2,\navailable for special missions. 8. Maintaining a complete up-to-date intelligence library on activities in all Pacifi c Th eaters.\n9. Conducting experiments in order to develop new methods of intelligence procedure and instruction techniques, off ering a basis for improvement.\n\n10. Maintaining a pool of trained language offi  cers.116\nTh e greatest challenge the MISLS faced aft er moving to Camp Savage was locating and recruiting an adequate number of students to carry on the recently expanded program. Evacuation from the West Coast had been completed and thousands of Japanese-Americans were relocated to internment camps across the U.S. Within these relocation camps, loyal *Nisei* and pro-Japanese elements found themselves in violent confl ict over support for the war. Pro-Japanese elements apparently dominated the relocation centers and loyal *Nisei* were reluctant to volunteer for Army service. Furthermore, the *Nisei* felt that placing them and their families in camps surrounded by barbed wire and patrolled by armed soldiers violated their rights as U.S. citizens. Aft er the War Department implemented the policy of recruiting Japanese-American volunteers, many believed the school would never meet its projected goals.117\n\n## Recruitment Of *Nisei* Linguists\n\nTh e military's need to recruit personnel profi cient in the Japanese language for use as translators and interrogators had reached a critical stage. Japanese was arguably one of the most diffi  cult languages in the world and very few Caucasian-Americans were profi cient. Moreover, almost no one was qualifi ed to translate the language.\n\nBased on experience gained in the training and utilization of *Nisei* interpreter, translator, and interrogation teams in the school's fi rst year, along with reports and observations from the Pacifi c Th eaters, the Army estimated that unfi lled future demands would reach about 650 Caucasian offi  cers and 2,850\nenlisted. Th e enlisted estimates were based primarily on *Nisei* personnel, and included expected casualties and necessary replacements.118 Th e total suggested a coming shift  of U.S. strength toward Japan and away from Europe. It included the need for a source of qualifi ed personnel who could support additional establishments within the U.S. vital to the war eff ort.\n\nBy early 1943, the Army had furnished Japanese linguists to Great Britain, Australia, New Zealand, the U.S. Marine Corps, and others lacking qualifi ed personnel. Th e War Department conservatively projected that specially selected Caucasian-Americans required at least two years to learn the language well enough to meet military requirements.119 However, the U.S. Navy would prove that qualifi ed linguists could be trained in 12 months.\n\nNisei living in the U.S. and Hawaii formed the only pool from which future linguists could be drawn without an unacceptable, long-term training delay. When the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor, approximately 126,000 persons of Japanese ancestry were living in the continental U.S. and 157,000 in Hawaii. In early 1944 the War Department estimated there were about 900 male Japanese-Americans suitable for intelligence training from all untapped sources.120 Offi  cials believed Japanese-American soldiers would fi nd genuine acceptance as translators, interpreters, and interrogators in combat areas overseas, as well as in offi  ces within the U.S.\n\nGiven these statistics, the Assistant Chief of Staff  for Intelligence urged the senior staff  to exercise great care so that the small fraction of personnel qualifi ed for development as interrogators and translators would be reserved for this purpose. Th ere were no other practical solutions for meeting the U.S. Army's requirement for such specialists. However, the War Department did propose the use of Japanese-American women to replace male translators in the U.S. and theater rear areas.121 Th e Army estimated it could obtain 300 qualifi ed Japanese-American women for this purpose and on 10 April 1944 the Secretary of War approved the recommendation.122 Shortly thereaft er, the Army recruited the fi rst *Nisei*\nwomen into the Women's Army Auxiliary Corps (WAAC) and assigned them to the MISLS at Fort Snelling, Minnesota, where the school relocated in August 1944 aft er outgrowing its space at Camp Savage. Following graduation, several remained at the school as instructors; others were assigned to Camp Ritchie, Maryland, at the Pacifi c Military Intelligence Research Section (PACMIRS) and, later, to a document translation center in Washington, DC, where they worked with translators from allied countries deciphering Japanese diaries, journals, manuals, and books. Aft er the war ended, 11 *Nisei* WAACs served in Japan at the Allied Translator and Interpreter Service (ATIS), a joint U.S. and Australian intelligence element under the command of General MacArthur.123\nEventually, between the male and female *Nisei*, the Army had enough volunteers to meet its requirements. Th e loyal *Nisei* who did volunteer confronted both emotional and physical hardshipsin many cases, their *Issei* (fi rst-generation) parents disowned them and pro-Japanese elements within the relocation centers physically attacked them because of their decision. Regardless, they reported by the hundreds. Many of the early volunteers were well over the age of 30, fl uent in Japanese, and had an intense desire to clear themselves of any suspicions of disloyalty to America.124\nMilitary Intelligence Service Language School: Fort Snelling\n44 |\nBy the time the MISLS moved from Camp Savage to Fort Snelling, the Army's recruiting eff orts had paid off  and the school had nearly 3,000 students.\n\nTh ey were primarily *Nisei*, although there were Caucasian offi  cer candidates and a few enlisted men of Chinese and Korean descent. Th e teaching staff  included 162\ncivilian and military members and was composed entirely of *Nisei* born in the U.S.\n\nor the Hawaiian Islands.125 Th e campus consisted of 125 classrooms along with the usual administrative support facilities and barracks. In addition to the language training section, the school had translation, research, and liaison sections.\n\nTh e MISLS routine and classroom studies were extremely demanding and constituted total immersion in the Japanese language. When students arrived at the school, they were immediately given language aptitude tests and then divided into\n22 diff erent class levels. Th e curriculum consisted of translation of textbooks from Japanese to English; learning military terminology; interrogating POWs (roleplaying); translating intercepted radio communications and captured documents;\nand learning about Japanese culture, customs, and national characteristics.126\nMonday through Friday, 8:00 a.m. until 5:00 p.m. and 7:00 p.m. to 9:00\np.m., were devoted to classroom instruction. Th e staff  reserved Saturdays for examinations and the \"school of the soldier\" - traditional military-related training.127 In preparation for examinations, many students stayed up well past their\n10:00 p.m. \"lights out\" curfew to resume their studies in the latrine. \"At one time, they had to place a guard [at the latrine], to accommodate those who went there for legitimate reasons,\" recalled Sergeant Grant Hirabayashi, a veteran World War II interrogator and a 1942 graduate of the school.128 Sunday was a day of rest.\n\nBy the end of the war, nearly 6,000 interpreters and interrogators had completed advanced military intelligence and language training at the MISLS. Most of the students were Japanese-American, including a number of female *Nisei* volunteers who served in the WAAC. Upon graduation, these linguists were ordered to various assignments within the Military Intelligence Service, the predecessor of the current U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command (INSCOM). Th eir duties consisted of interrogation, translation, radio intercept, radio monitoring, and psychological warfare. Graduates worked quietly with American combat teams at Guadalcanal, Attu, New Georgia, New Britain, the Philippines, Okinawa, Burma, India, China, and Tokyo itself during the occupation. Th eir eff orts saved countless lives and accelerated the U.S. victory in the Pacifi c.\n\nIn July 1946, the school returned to what would be its fi nal home at the Presidio of Monterey, California, the current home of the Defense Language Institute Foreign Language Center. During a graduation ceremony, Major General Clayton Bissell, Chief of the Military Intelligence Division of the War Department General Staff , aft er reviewing the exploits of MISLS graduates, said, \"If you Japanese-Americans are ever questioned as to your loyalty, don't even bother to reply. Th e magnifi cent work of the graduates of the Military Intelligence Service Language School in the fi eld has been seen by your fellow Americans of many racial extractions. Th eir testimony to your gallant deeds under fi re will speak so loudly that you need not answer.\"129\nSergeant Grant Jiro Hirabayashi: MISLS, Class No. SAV '42-12\n\nGrant Jiro Hirabayashi, Chungking, China, 1945.\nSource: Library of Congress, Experiencing War: Grant Jiro\nHirabayashi, URL:<1cweb2.loc.gov/cocoon/vhp-stories/loc.\nnatlib.afc2001001.28498/>, accessed 20 May 2007.\n\n| 47\n48 |\nOne distinguished MISLS alumnus, Sergeant Grant Hirabayashi, a top graduate of the class of 1942 at Camp Savage, shared his experiences as an American of Japanese ancestry serving the Army as a Military Intelligence Service interrogator during World War II. Hirabayashi, a native of Kent, Washington, enlisted in the U.S. Army Air Corps three days before the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor with hopes of becoming an airplane mechanic.130 When he reported to Jeff erson Barracks in St. Louis, Missouri, the Army placed him in protective custody and confi ned him along with 22 other Japanese-American soldiers. Th is was necessary since Caucasian service members harassed the Nisei, forcing the Army to segregate them into separate examination rooms. It also provided the FBI an opportunity to conduct background investigations to determine if the *Nisei* posed a threat to national security. At the time, the government had discharged numerous Japanese-American service members and reclassifi ed them as enemy aliens. Th e Army stripped those who remained, like Hirabayashi, of their weapons and relegated them to menial jobs until the background investigations were complete.\n\nAft er 40 days, the Army released Hirabayashi and assigned him to his unit, where he worked as a fl ight clerk and a plans and training technician. In mid-1942, Hirabayashi was released from the Air Corps and reassigned to Fort Leavenworth Station Hospital, Kansas, where he served as a sick and wounded clerk. Unfortunately, he was never able to attend airplane mechanic school. Shortly aft er beginning his new job, Hirabayashi received a letter from Colonel Kai Rasmussen, Commandant of the MISLS at Camp Savage, Minnesota, asking for his resume with an emphasis on his Japanese language education.\n\nHirabayashi was a *Kibei* (an American citizen of Japanese ancestry who received his primary education in Japan before returning to the U.S.). When he was a young boy living in Washington State, he had a conversation with two of his closest friends about their experiences visiting Japan during summer vacation. Th ey talked about how the Japanese drove on the wrong side of the street, slept on the fl oor, took off  their shoes when entering their houses, and used an abacus to perform mathematical operations. Th is discussion aroused his curiosity and inspired him to travel to Japan himself to have the same experience his friends had. Aft er much determination, he fi nally convinced his father to send him to *chugakko* (Japanese middle school) with the understanding he would study for two years in Japan. When young Grant entered *chugakko*, his father told him his return ticket would be forthcoming aft er he fi nished school. In 1940, aft er eight years of education in Japan, he graduated. At the time, his brother, who was attending Kyoto Imperial University, warned him relations between the United States and Japan were deteriorating and that Grant should return home, which he did.\n\nShortly aft er receiving the request from Colonel Rasmussen, Hirabayashi mailed off  his resume and was subsequently reassigned to the MISLS at Camp Savage. Aft er six months of intense language, culture, and intelligence-related training, he applied for leave to visit his family. Regrettably, his parents and siblings were no longer living at home in Washington State. Soon aft er the war broke out on 7 December 1941, they had been forcibly evacuated to the Tule Lake internment camp in the northern California desertthe largest and most controversial of the ten War Relocation Authority camps used to carry out the U.S. government's system of exclusion and detention of persons of Japanese descent.\n\nWhen Hirabayashi arrived at the camp, he was shocked to see rows and rows of tarpaper barracks behind a perimeter of barbed wire. Th e feature that troubled him most was that the armed sentries who were guarding the compound were wearing the same uniform he was and facing inward instead of out. Although his visit was brief, he described this event as one of the most unpleasant experiences of his life. He was understandably very confused to fi nd himself, an American soldier who had taken an oath to uphold the Constitution of the United States and fi ght for liberty and justice, agonizing over the treatment of his family. Remarkably, his parents encouraged him to serve honorably and do his part as a U.S. citizen in defending the nation. It was aft er this visit that Hirabayashi said he understood the true meaning of freedom and completely realized the challenge ahead.\n\nAft er returning from leave, Hirabayashi relocated to Fort Snelling along with several other recent MISLS graduates awaiting overseas assignment. Shortly aft er his arrival, he learned about a call for volunteers for what President Franklin D. Roosevelt described as \"a dangerous and hazardous mission.\" Over 200 graduates stepped forward to answer the call and the Army selected Hirabayashi, along with 13 other Japanese-Americans, based on their physical stamina and command of the Japanese language, to serve in the Burma Campaign under the command of Brigadier General Frank D. Merrill. Th e unit was christened \"Merrill's Marauders\" and offi  cially designated the 5307th Composite Unit (Provisional)codenamed *Galahad*.\n\nMerrill's Marauders was an elite commando unit responsible for clearing North Burma of Japanese military forces and capturing the town of Myitkyina and its strategic airfi eld. Control of the town ensured the free fl ow of war materials by air and surface to Chinese nationalist forces. Over seven months, the Marauders fought their way through 700 miles of Burmese jungle and achieved their mission. Th ey defeated the Japanese 18th Division, the conquerors of Malaya and Singapore, in fi ve decisive battles and over 30 smaller engagements.\n\nArmed with his fi rsthand knowledge of the Japanese language and culture, along with the intense training he received at MISLS, Hirabayashi served General Merrill as a Military Intelligence Service interrogator responsible for collecting enemy information crucial to the successful prosecution of the Burma campaign. Surprisingly, he was nearly disqualifi ed from combat duty aft er discovering he was allergic to K-rations, the primary source of sustenance for an Army soldier, and he fractured his arm during jungle warfare training in India. When the unit declared he was unfi t for combat duty, Hirabayashi pleaded with his commander to be allowed to stay on, which was eventually granted.\n\nTh roughout the campaign, Hirabayashi interrogated dozens of enemy prisoners. His approach was simple; he always treated POWs with kindness and dignity. First, he made sure prisoners received proper medical care. He frequently off ered them cigarettes and asked if they had heard from their families and been able to communicate with them. Many wept because of this unexpected treatment. Hirabayashi explained that prisoners truly believed that U.S. soldiers were going to kill them and noted that the POWs were completely unaware of the rights aff orded to them under the rules of international law, codifi ed in the Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, 27 July 1929 (the Geneva Convention of 1929). Th e convention set guidelines on how POWs were to be treated by their captors. Th e U.S. ratifi ed this convention and recognized the rights of all prisoners. Th e Japanese, however, decided not to ratify the treaty because, \"according to the Imperial soldier's belief, it was contrary to all expectations that he might become a prisoner\"a belief codifi ed in Japanese *Bushido*.131 Th e Japanese believed that, while the international treaty was technically reciprocal, in practice only Japan would have to assume obligations under the treaty. Japan would have to provide food and housing for prisoners, while other countries were spared this obligation since there would be no Japanese prisoners. In their eyes, this made the Geneva Convention a unilateral agreement.132\nHirabayashi explained that throughout his time as a student in the Japanese school system he had never once heard about the Geneva Convention and explained, \"[Students] were always told to destroy themselves before they were captured, so they didn't know how to act as a POW.\" Prisoners were genuinely ashamed concerning their status as an enemy prisoner and this was at the forefront of their minds. \"Knowing how the Japanese POWs felt, I was able to empathize with them by treating them as equals,\" he said.\n\nIn 2007 Hirabayashi called to mind one interrogation from nearly 65\nyears ago. Late one evening during the Battle of Myitkyina, U.S. soldiers delivered a Japanese lieutenant on a stretcher for interrogation. Th e Gurkhas, a highly respected group of elite Indian soldiers, had captured the Japanese offi  - cer, and when he attempted to escape they stabbed him with a bayonet three diff erent times in his buttocks, arm, and thigh. Consequently, the prisoner was severely wounded and covered in blood. As it was late and the prisoner required medical attention, Hirabayashi instructed the military policemen (MPs) to take the prisoner to the fi rst aid station and bring him back the next morning for questioning.\n\n131 Straus, 21. 132 Straus, 21.\n\nTh e next morning, the MPs returned the POW for interrogation. Hirabayashi sat him down and began the interview. When asked if he had received proper medical care, the Japanese offi  cer responded, \"You're a traitor.\" Th e prisoner's response stunned Hirabayashi, who countered, \"If we were to cut our veins, the same blood would fl ow.\" Hirabayashi told the prisoner, \"I am an American soldier. I'm an American fi ghting for my country and you are fi ghting for your country.\" He continued with the interrogation, but the Japanese lieutenant refused to respond. At one point, Hirabayashi raised his voice and, again, the prisoner responded, \"You're a traitor.\" Seeing the interview was going nowhere, Hirabayashi had a guard remove the POW and place him in the center of the enlisted man's stockade.\n\nSometime later, Hirabayashi approached the prisoner inside the stockade and the offi  cer tugged at his trousers and pleaded, \"Mr. Interpreter, I want to die.\" Hirabayashi asked him how he wished to die and he responded, \"I want to be shot.\" He told the offi  cer he did not have any bullets to waste on him, but that they had captured a sword from another Japanese offi  cer and he could use it to demonstrate how to commit *hara-kari*. He then left . Hirabayashi returned half an hour later and the prisoner admitted he had experienced a change of heart. He asked Hirabayashi to release him from the stockade and promised that, in return, he would cooperate during the interview. From that point forward, the Japanese offi  cer answered all the questions he was asked.\n\nTh e next day, Hirabayashi ran into his offi  cer-in-charge (OIC), who told him, \"Grant, that's what the old man was looking for.\" He was referring to the intelligence information Hirabayashi developed the day before during the interrogation of the Japanese lieutenant. Hirabayashi said he never followed up on the comment, but recalled this was the fi rst time he had received any feedback following a prisoner interrogation. \"Normally...they interrogate, they write a report, they submit it, and that's it. You seldom received feedback.\"\nOn 10 August 1944, following victory in the battle of Myitkyina, the Marauders' mission was complete and the unit disbanded. Brigadier General Merrill concluded, \"As for the value of the *Nisei*, I couldn't have gotten along without them.\"133 Hirabayashi returned to India and was sent to the Southeast Asia Translation and Interrogation Center (SEATIC) in New Delhi. At SEATIC, he was assigned to the British Royal Air Force, where he provided translation and interrogation services. Later, the Army reassigned him to the Sino Translation and Interrogation Center (SINTIC) in Chungking, China, as the senior interrogator in charge of Japanese Air Force POWs.\n\nHirabayashi recalled that during his tour at SINTIC he interrogated another POW, a scientist who had reported that Japan had been researching and developing an atomic weapon. During the interrogation, the scientist pushed a small Chinese matchbox in front of Hirabayashi and told him the bomb was that small and capable of destroying an entire city. Th e prisoner explained that the research was being conducted at both Imperial Universities in Tokyo and Kyoto, and at Osaka University. He continued to describe the technical aspects of the bomb, but Hirabayashi soon found the discussion beyond his level of technical comprehension. Aft er reporting the interrogation to his superiors in hopes of obtaining assistance in developing further details, they dismissed the report as ludicrous.\n\nWorld War II ended while Hirabayashi was stationed in Chungking. Five days before the offi  cial surrender took place aboard the USS *Missouri* on 13\nSeptember 1945, the Army ordered him to Nanking, China, to serve as personal interpreter to Brigadier General McClure, the U.S. observer to the Japanese surrender ceremony in China. Hirabayashi stated, \"It was a short, simple and dignifi ed ceremony. It ended with General Ho Ying-chin's radio announcement to the Chinese people of a successful conclusion of the surrender ceremony and of a dawn of peace on earth.\"\nUpon his discharge from the Army on 8 November 1945, Hirabayashi returned to Minneapolis, Minnesota, and took an instructor position with the MISLS at Fort Snelling and later at Monterey, California. Following his service at the schoolhouse, he transferred to the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (SCAP) Legal Section, Tokyo, Japan, in November 1947 and worked with the War Crimes Tribunal located in Yokohama. He functioned as an interpreter, translator, interrogator, court interpreter, and court monitor. Upon completion of the trials, he served with the War Crimes Parole Board. In essence, his career had come full circle: he functioned fi rst as an interrogator of war crimes suspects, was then responsible for apprehending them, and fi nally performed as an offi  cer with the parole board.\n\nAft er his lengthy deployment in the Pacifi c, Hirabayashi decided it was time to return to the U.S. to take advantage of the GI Bill. Aft er earning a Bachelor and Master of Arts in International Relations from the University of Southern California, he served with the Department of State, Cultural Exchange Program, Library of Congress, and retired from the National Security Agency in 1979. Today, Mr. Hirabayashi is an active member of the Japanese-American Veterans Association, which promotes the spirit of patriotism and national pride among the younger generation, particularly those of Japanese ancestry.\n\n## Sharper Than The Sword: U.S. Navy Interrogators In The Pacifi C During World War Ii\n\nKnowledge of Japanese will be not only a weapon in wartime, but also a powerful means of establishing international relations again when peace returns.\n\nFlorence Walne, Director of the Oriental Language Department, University of Colorado at Boulder\n\n## Scarcity Of Japanese Linguists\n\nTh e Navy's language program was much smaller than the Army's and, as noted earlier, employed an entirely diff erent strategy in recruiting and training Japanese linguists. Th e Navy focused its recruitment eff orts on male Caucasians who had previously lived and studied in Japan, were college graduates, and were between the ages of 20 and 30. Additionally, the Navy targeted university students with a distinct aptitude for linguistics and individuals of high intelligence.134 Unlike the Army, the Navy refused to consider Japanese-Americans for its program, presumably because of the attitude of the Navy's senior leaders following the attack on Pearl Harbor.\n\nIn essence, the Navy streamlined a 3-year language course off ered to U.S. military attaches in Tokyo since the early 1920s into 12 months of intense class work in the U.S. Th e school was of incalculable value to the nation during World War II and the occupation of Japan that followed. Graduates also played a crucial role in gathering vital intelligence regarding Japanese intentions and operations through interrogation of POWs.\n\nBy December 1940 the U.S. Navy had realized that, although the U.S.\n\nwas on the verge of war with Japan, the number of Naval offi  cers competent in Japanese was woefully inadequate. Th e Navy had been sending its offi  cers to a 3-year language program in Tokyo since 1922, but only 65 offi  cers had completed the course by the end of 1940, and of those only a dozen were regarded as \"fully profi cient\" in written and spoken Japanese. It was discouraging that only 12 out of over 200,000 sailors serving at the time were qualifi ed to speak and write Japanese. Equally disappointing was that the Navy had no system to identify or track civilian employees profi cient in Japanese. At the time, six American universities were off ering Japanese language courses; however, the Navy believed they were impractical for the military's purposes due to their length and focus on the arts.135\n\n## A Revolutionary Vision\n\nIn early December 1940, Lieutenant Albert E. Hindmarsh, a U.S. Naval Reserve (USNR) offi  cer, brought this situation to the attention of the Offi  ce of Naval Intelligence (ONI). Hindmarsh suggested the Navy conduct a nationwide survey of Japanese linguists, with a short-term goal of developing a new Japanese language program for the Department of the Navy. He envisioned a program designed to produce junior USNR offi  cers capable of reading, writing, and speaking Japanese at a level suffi  cient to meet the Navy's potential wartime needs.\n\nBetween March and June 1941, Hindmarsh identifi ed 600 men in the U.S. who \"allegedly\" possessed knowledge of the Chinese or Japanese language. Aft er initial testing, half of those identifi ed were found to be unqualifi ed. Of the remaining 300, only 65 were recognized as having the necessary background and required level of profi ciency to form the foundation of the Navy's Japanese language program. Each civilian selected was a white, male, native-born U.S. citizen, who volunteered, once identifi ed, to serve in the Navy. Most had previously resided and studied in Japan or China, had college degrees, and were between 20 and 30 years old.136\nIn July 1941, Hindmarsh attended a conference at Cornell University of all Japanese language teachers in the U.S. along with representatives from the Army, the FBI, the American Council of Learned Societies, and the Rockefeller Foundation. Th e conference discussed the various methods and techniques for teaching Japanese at the seven universities represented. At the conclusion of the conference, it was obvious that the universities were confused about how to develop an eff ective Japanese language program. Teachers complained about the scarcity of teaching materials, the lack of students, and alleged lack of interest on the part of the government. At the time, only 60 Caucasian students were studying Japanese in the U.S. and nearly all were studying the language from a literary, artistic, or philosophical point of view. Th is approach fell short of meeting the government's need for students with a practical working knowledge of the language. Consequently, Hindmarsh outlined a 12-month course designed to produce competent interrogators and translators. His plan specifi ed the necessary teaching materials as well as a detailed day-by-day curriculum. Although the comprehensive plan impressed the teachers, they were skeptical such a course could be taught outside Japan.137\n\n## Navy School Of Oriental Languages\n\nOn 26 August 1941, the U.S. Navy approved a plan to establish two training centers, one at Harvard University, the other at the University of California, Berkeley. Serge Elisseeff , chairman of the Oriental Languages Department and a recognized scholar in oriental languages, led the program at Harvard. At Berkeley, Florence Walne, head of the Department of Oriental Languages, a Radcliff e graduate and longtime resident of Japan, directed the studies. By late September 1941, both universities signed contracts governing relations between them and the Navy.\n\nInitially, the Navy invited 56 students to take the intensive language program, which would qualify them as Japanese interpreters and translators. During the 12-month program, students were classifi ed fi rst as \"naval agents\" under a civilian contract and, as soon as it became feasible (typically aft er the fi rst month), they were inducted as yeomen second-class, V-4, USNR, and placed on active duty.138\nIn either status, the Navy paid students approximately $125 per month throughout the duration of the language program. When the students completed the course successfully, the Navy commissioned them as ensigns I-V(S), USNR.139\n\n## Th E Naganuma Japanese Language Course\n\nBecause of inadequate teaching materials at the universities, the Navy provided textbooks prepared by Naoe Naganuma, a Japanese professor who had trained language offi  cers in Tokyo since the early 1920s. Th ese readers served as the foundation for the Navy's intensive set of courses.140\n56 |\nTh e Navy had been sending its prospective Japanese Language Offi  cers to Japan, providing them a special \"allowance\" to locate a teacher and fund their education. By about 1925, several students had clustered around one teacher, Naoe Naganuma; all the Naval offi  cers eventually became his students.\n\nNaganuma made teaching Japanese a profession, and in 1929 he published the fi rst three volumes of a carefully planned curriculum. He later published another four volumes, which comprised an entire 3-year course. He called the course \"Hyojun Nihongo Tokuhon,\" or \"Standard Japanese Readers.\"141 Th e U.S. Naval Attache in Tokyo sent 50 complete sets of the course to the U.S. Th e Navy immediately reproduced the materials and provided them to the universities for the beginning of class on 1 October 1941.142\nTh e Naganuma course normally required three years in Tokyo, but the Navy streamlined the program into 12 months of intense class work in the U.S. Th e nature of the new version was quite diff erent from any academic language program off ered at the time. Students worked 14 hours a day, six days a week, 50 weeks per year. Aft er the fi rst few lessons, professors eliminated all classroom discussions in English. Th e program required students to use Japanese outside the classroom as well. At least one meal a day had to be Japanese and be served by a Japanese waiter.\n\nIn addition, the universities required students to watch Japanese movies for entertainment. Finally, the student newspaper, school song, and daily radio broadcasts were all presented in Japanese.143 Th e two universities limited their class sizes to four or fi ve students per teacher, largely recruited from the *Nisei* population.\n\nDuring the last two weeks of the program, the schools introduced the students to special materials designed to familiarize them with Japanese military and naval terms. In addition to the Naganuma language readers, the Navy provided supplementary materials to compensate for the lack of military instruction given during the program. Where one or two dictionaries were suffi  cient for most Western languages, Japanese presented additional problems. Instead of one or two dictionaries, the Navy provided each student an entire reference library with approximately 20 volumes of material. In addition to normal dictionaries, these texts included special dictionaries containing military and naval terms; scientifi c, engineering, and other specialized vocabularies; books of Japanese surnames and given names; and reading material on the Japanese Navy, Japanese geography, and *sosho*, the Japanese cursive style of writing.\n\nAs one might imagine, the process for recruiting students was very selective. Th e Navy focused its eff orts on the brightest college-educated men with a distinct proclivity for language. Others had backgrounds in Japan as newspapermen, missionaries, diplomatic staff  members, and students. Nearly all had bachelor's degrees, some had master's degrees, and a few even had earned doctorates.144\n\n## Harvard University\n\nTh e course at Harvard proved unsuccessful because Professor Elisseeff\ndid not follow the Navy's proposed plan. From the beginning, he was reluctant to use the Navy's materials, as he had just published a Japanese language text of his own and was eager to advance its use. In February 1942, aft er conducting an inspection of the entire program, the Navy decided to let the Harvard contract expire. Th e Navy concluded \"there was at Harvard a continuing reluctance to recognize the practical needs of the Naval Service and constant underhanded criticism of the whole idea of intensifi ed training because it did not conform to the usual academic set-up as exemplifi ed in the leisurely and highly theoretical teaching of Professor Elisseeff .\"145\n\n## University Of California At Berkeley\n\nOn balance, the Berkeley program proved an enormous success for the Navy. Th e same inspection team that visited Harvard reported the Berkeley teachers and program administrators had \"given so wholeheartedly of their time and eff ort that the students, although in general not so well prepared initially as those sent to Harvard, were making greater progress toward the objective set for the course by the Navy.\"146 Unfortunately, Berkeley's success did not lack diffi  -\ncult challenges of its own. When the Berkeley school opened, the Navy decided to make the existence of the program a military secret. Very few people outside the classroom knew the school was teaching these students until aft er President Roosevelt issued EO 9066 in February 1942, evacuating all persons of Japanese ancestry from western military combat zones, including the entire state of California.147 Anticipating problems with the California-based program, the Navy began to look for an alternate location. On 23 June 1942, the school was forced to relocate since, at the time, the faculty included 11 professors of Japanese origin who were essential to the program's success.148\n\n## University Of Colorado At Boulder\n\n58 |\nAft er an exhaustive search eff ort, the Navy selected the University of Colorado at Boulder as the new site for the program. Th e Navy draft ed a contract for signature by the university president, which guaranteed the employment of Professor Walne and her entire teaching staff  from Berkeley. Gradually, the school overcame administrative diffi  culties associated with the transition and the University of Colorado program fl ourished.149 Boulder ultimately accepted students from the Navy, the Marine Corps, and the Coast Guard, as well as a select number of British and Canadian Naval students.150\nBy the spring of 1943, like the Army, the Navy initiated a program to recruit women in the language school for eventual commissioning in the WAVES (the Navy's organization for women).151 From June to July 1943, the Navy interviewed over 600 applicants, many of whom enrolled and later graduated from the Boulder school. Th ese offi  cers went on to serve in a variety of jobs in intelligence, communications, supply, medicine, and administration.\n\nBy late 1943, the Navy had received 6,500 applications and interviewed over 3,000 candidates for the Japanese language school. Th e majority of students selected were of college age, 25 being the average age for all students enrolled. A third of the students had graduate-level college degrees, nearly half had college degrees, and a third were also members of Phi Beta Kappa. It is interesting to note, however, that just over 20 percent of the students had no college degrees. Of these, most had acquired knowledge of Japanese or had been born in Japan.152\nOne of the most intriguing dynamics observed in the Navy's language program was the diversity of its students. Th e Navy recruited personnel from a wide variety of backgrounds and a broad range of life experiences. Moreover, the diversity went well beyond the traditional creativity, insight, and experiences of people of diff erent race, religion, ethnicity, or gender. With regard to previous occupations, 38 percent were students; the remainder came from all sectors of business and government. Interestingly enough, 13 percent were former teachers. 12 percent of the students were foreign-born and 17 percent were either born in or had lived in the Far East. Many of the students had unusual backgrounds, illustrating the unique composition of the school's student body. For example, one student was secretary to the U.S. Ambassador to Japan. Another was a former cab driver. One was a missionary in China; another was a radio commentator. One student managed a nightclub, and another was an orchestra leader. Others chosen included a ship fi tter, an actor, a miner, an artist who spent 19 years in France, a former liquor store proprietor, a banker, and a newsreel camera operator.153\nTh e history of the Japanese Language School illustrates a signifi cant problem the Navy faced regarding language training - the delicate nature of public relations. With feelings running high against the Japanese following the attack on Pearl Harbor, it took all the tact and persuasive powers of the senior administrative staff  at Boulder to sell the necessity of the program to local citizens.\n\nIn the end, the reception accorded the school by the Boulder community was quite diff erent from that in California. In a special article published in the Christian Science Monitor, Bert Bemis wrote, \"It is obvious that these Japanese are welcome; their presence occasions no surprise, no challenges as enemy aliens. Boulder citizens have for them only the friendliest greetings, for they know them to be loyal subjects of Uncle Sam, doing a diffi  cult and very important work for him and doing it well.\"154\nIn April 1945, the Navy established an additional Naval School of Oriental Language at Oklahoma A&M College (now Oklahoma State University) in Stillwater. Th is school received approximately 700 students between April and August of 1945. Because of his long experience and particular success in dealing with Japanese language students, Dr. Glenn Shaw, director of the Boulder school, assumed responsibility as the general advisor to both schools.\n\nTh e Navy's Japanese Language School proved its value to the nation during the Second World War and the subsequent occupation of Japan. During the war, employing interrogators and translators with command of the enemy's language had obvious advantages. By the time they graduated from the school, students were able to read and write approximately 1,800 Japanese characters and maintain a vocabulary of nearly 7,000 words. Graduates played a critical role in gathering valuable intelligence information about Japanese military operations and intentions.\n\n## Lieutenant Otis Cary: Nsol Class Of 1942\n\nWhen Otis Cary interrogated Japanese prisoners during World War II, he soft ened them with gift s of magazines, cigarettes, and chocolates. He broke through their reserve with humor. And he spoke to them in fl awless Japanese - shocking from a blond-haired American.\n\nOtis Cary's Obituary, Honolulu Advertiser, 24 April 2006\nTh e experience of one Boulder graduate, Lieutenant Otis Cary, illustrates the success of the Navy program and its contributions. His deep understanding of the Japanese culture and command of the language enabled him to educe intelligence information vital to the war eff ort. Cary was born on 20 October 1921 in the city of Otaru on Hokkaido, Japan. As a son and grandson of New England missionaries, he was raised in Japan, which supplied the foundation for his remarkable cultural and linguistic expertise. Cary attended a Japanese school through the fourth grade before returning to the U.S., where he fi nished grade school and continued his education at Amherst College in Massachusetts.\n\nWar between the U.S. and Japan broke out while Cary was attending college and, following graduation, he enlisted in the Navy. Aft er completing Japanese language school at Boulder, he was commissioned as an ensign and sent to Hawaii to serve in Admiral Nimitz's Central Pacifi c Command. Cary went on to become one of the most highly successful and well-respected interrogators in the Navy during World War II.\n\nLike most Boulder graduates, Cary was assigned to the Joint Intelligence Center Pacifi c Ocean Area (JICPOA), which was responsible for POW interrogation as well as document translation, radio interception, code work, and other intelligence-related activities. While many alumni performed in-garrison work at JICPOA, several of the Naval offi  cers were routinely embedded with Marine Corps units throughout the Pacifi c. Th ese offi  cers typically landed in the third assault wave to interrogate enemy prisoners and write summaries of captured documents.155\nIn May 1943, Cary accompanied U.S. Naval forces in the fi rst off ensive operation of the Pacifi c Th eater, the recapture of Attu in the Aleutian Islands.156\nPlanners believed a successful assault on Attu would isolate the Japanese on Kiska, Attu's eastern neighbor, and make its strategically signifi cant capture much easier. Bad weather postponed the initial landing until 11 May and, aft er three weeks of fi erce fi ghting, the 1,000 surviving Japanese soldiers launched a fi nal *banzai* attack toward U.S. positions, killing hundreds on both sides. On 30\nMay, Japan announced the loss of Attu; each side sustained heavy casualties. Of the 15,000 U.S. troops involved in the operation, 550 died and nearly 1,500 were wounded. On the Japanese side, of a force of nearly 2,500 soldiers, fewer than 30 survived and were taken prisoner; the rest were killed in action or committed *hara-kari*.157\nIronically, the fi rst prisoner Cary interrogated had grown up in Otaru, the city where he was raised as a child, which off ered an ideal opportunity to establish instant rapport. As it turned out, the prisoner had returned from nearby Kiska, the focal point of the next U.S. assault, just days before his capture. Consequently, Cary was able to elicit detailed information from the prisoner regarding the status of Japanese military forces on the island.158 Th is detailed order of battle was extremely valuable to fi eld commanders preparing to invade Kiska.\n\nPacific Theater during World War II. Source: U.S. Army Center of Military History.\n\n62 |\nCary's next combat operation took place in June 1944, when American troops invaded Saipan.159 As mentioned earlier, this was the fi rst time U.S.\n\nforces secured a relatively large number of enemy prisoners in the Pacifi c Th eater; between 15 June and 16 July, U.S. forces captured 3,076 native civilians and\n79 military POWs.160 Although eff orts by U.S. troops to persuade the Japanese to surrender were mostly futile, Cary did manage to persuade one prisoner to return to a particular cave and convince several civilians hiding there that U.S. soldiers would not kill them if they capitulated.\n\nCary's success was due in large part to his ability to communicate with the natives using Japanese slang as opposed to the more formal dialect traditionally taught in Japanese schools. One prisoner wanted to make sure his motivation to cooperate was clear. He told Cary, \"We are doing this for ourselves. It's not for your side and we are not going to become your pawns. Don't misunderstand us.\" It was evident from Cary's success in interrogating prisoners throughout the war that he clearly understood the subtext of what this prisoner was saying.161\nCary always dealt with enemy prisoners in a decent, humane manner and treated them not as enemies, but as human beings, who he believed deserved to have a future in a post-war Japan. He pointed out the Japanese were accustomed to resisting the coercive techniques they had witnessed in China; however, they could not resist the humane treatment off ered by U.S. interrogators. A review of former Japanese prisoner autobiographies by Ulrich Straus makes no reference to U.S. employment of coercive interrogation techniques and his comprehensive assessment of interrogation records on fi le at the U.S. National Archives indicated such threats were not made.162\nIn early 1945, the impact of Cary's kind treatment reached a pinnacle when he infl uenced a small group of Japanese prisoners held at a POW camp near Pearl Harbor to consider cooperating in America's war eff orts. Aft er convincing his immediate superiors he had the right group of men who could work together, Cary proposed an experiment designed to engage the Japanese prisoners directly in winning the war against their native country, and perhaps provide a foundation for the future \"democratization\" of Japan. Navy leadership approved the proposed plan and the select group of prisoners was relocated to an isolated site away from other Japanese POWs so they could perform their\n\"mission\" in secrecy.163\nAs a fi rst task, the prisoners draft ed a constitution articulating the purpose of their newly formed group. Th ey claimed, \"We have decided to manifest our unceasing patriotism in a small way by helping the American military campaigns and propaganda wars. When the war ends and Japan resumes its path towards a bright future, we will be in our homeland, and we swear to do our utmost for its reconstruction.\" In essence, they were about to embark on a mission their fellow soldiers and nation would classify as treasonous. Regardless, these men trusted Cary and were willing to risk their lives for the future of their country.164\nTh e fi rst project in which the group participated was improving the eff ectiveness of an American propaganda newsletter, the Mariana Jiho (Mariana Bulletin). Th is particular publication was designed to undermine the morale of Japanese forces at the front. In the past, the U.S. military considered this tool\n\n161 Straus, 113.\n162 Straus, 120.\n163 Straus, 215.\n164 Straus, 216.\n\nrelatively ineff ective because of poor translation and limited content. Cary's\ngroup added instant credibility and reality by off ering a document written by\nnative linguists as opposed to a Japanese translation of a Western-style article.\nIn addition, they made up \"advertisements\" of well-known Japanese depart-\nment stores to add further credibility to the facade. 165\n\n      While the newsletter was a worthy endeavor, the most signifi cant project\nthe group accepted was the rapid translation of the Potsdam Declaration in July\n1945.166 Aft er Allied leaders defi ned the terms by which Japan could surrender,\nthe Japanese government prohibited the media from publishing the details in\nfull. When the group completed its Japanese translation, the document was sent\nto Saipan, printed in leafl et form, and loaded aboard B-29 aircraft  for wide-\nspread distribution across Japan to inform the public of its lenient terms. Ulrich\nStraus, author of Anguish of Surrender, believed that \"the leafl et campaign, by\ninforming the war-weary Japanese public of the Allies' terms, considered lenient\nand fair compared to what they had feared, contributed to their government's\ndecision, fi nally, to accept the declaration.\"167\n\nOn refl ection, Cary's \"democratization experiment,\" as labeled by Straus, planted the seeds for a stable and prosperous government and provided a foundation for the future \"democratization\" of postwar Japan. Six decades aft er this devastating war, the Japanese constitution, promulgated in 1946 during the occupation by the Allied powers, remains in place. Th e remarkable eff orts of Otis Cary and a few patriotic (although some might argue otherwise) Japanese prisoners serve as a lasting legacy to the people and nation of Japan.\n\nCary had a distinguished record of treating his prisoners with humanity and respect. His superior Japanese skills and deep understanding of Japanese culture enabled him to get past the psychological barriers that stymied other U.S. military interrogators. Despite strict conditioning, Cary helped many Japanese POWs overcome the shame of surrender and off ered them hope for a better Japan. Aft er Cary completed his military service, he returned to Japan, assumed a position as visiting professor at Kyoto's prestigious Doshisha University, and lived in Kyoto until he retired. On 14 April 2006, Cary died of pneumonia at the age of 84. He will be remembered as one of the fi nest and most compassionate wartime interrogators in U.S. history.\n\n## Historical Perspective: Lessons From World War Ii\n\nWe can learn from history how past generations thought and acted, how they responded to the demands of their time and how they solved their problems. We can learn by analogy, not by example, for our circumstances will always be diff erent than theirs were. Th e main thing history can teach us is that human actions have consequences and that certain choices, once made, cannot be undone. Th ey foreclose the possibility of making other choices and thus they determine future events.\n\nGerda Lerner, Historian\n\n## Introduction\n\nFollowing the surprise attack on Pearl Harbor, U.S. military interrogators found themselves face-to-face with an implacable enemy in the brutal, merciless battlefi eld of the Second World Warthe Pacifi c Th eater. Th e American public reacted to the attack and reports of Japanese atrocities against American prisoners that followed with fear and angerpromptly branding the enemy as subhuman. On the heels of public outrage, U.S. interrogators faced the extraordinary challenge of collecting human intelligence from this seemingly ruthless foe. Th ey encountered an enemy who spoke an impenetrable language and whose culture and psychology were incomprehensible to the Western mind.\n\nTh e study of this chaotic period in our nation's history provides a unique and practical look at similar challenges faced by U.S. military interrogators operating around the globe today. Th is study documents how the U.S. Army and Navy overcame these obstacles and illuminates the U.S. military's remarkable accomplishments in conducting wartime interrogations. What can we learn from the U.S. experience during World War II of recruiting and preparing interrogators and conducting interrogations of Japanese POWs that will inform current and future doctrine and practices related to educing information? Th e answer to this question can be drawn from a comparative analysis of the U.S. Army and Navy case studies reviewed previously. Th is eff ort documents numerous lessons learned and highlights basic principles of eff ective interrogation that still apply today. Additionally, it off ers recommendations for further research.\n\n## U.S. Army Recruitment Eff Orts\n\nMost experienced interrogators agree that successful interrogation of POWs requires command of enemy languages and a genuine appreciation for enemy cultural sensitivities. As such, recruitment eff orts must fi rst concentrate on personnel with required language capabilities and a thorough understanding of each enemy's country, folklore and myths, customs, manners, and psychology. During the Second World War, the Army directed its recruitment eff orts toward \"heritage speakers,\" a term used by Cliff ord Porter, Command Historian at the Defense Language Institute Foreign Language Center (DLIFLC) in Monterey, California, the U.S. government's premier institution for foreign language education today. Dr. Porter describes these unique individuals as \"U.S. military personnel whose fi rst language is not English or who have acquired foreign language skills outside of the military.\"168\nFaced with few options, the U.S. Army turned to *Nisei* (second-generation Japanese-Americans) to solve its language problem. Initially, American suspicion of *Nisei* loyalty hindered the Army's recruitment eff orts and limited the *Nisei'*s overseas assignments. However, following the *Nisei'*s early success on the battlefi eld, the Army expanded the program and ultimately trained and employed nearly 6,000 *Nisei* (men and women) by the end of the war.\n\n## Strengths Of The Army's Recruitment Eff Orts\n\n66 |\nTh e recruitment of *Nisei* presented the Army distinct advantages to alternative options considered in addressing its Japanese language defi ciency.\n\nTh e *Nisei'*s greatest benefi t was an existing Japanese language capability. Since all *Nisei* recruits spoke some Japanese (although their language skills varied greatly), the required training period for employment was much shorter. Th is enabled the Army to train new recruits and send them into battle quickly.\n\nTh e cultural knowledge of the *Nisei* interrogators proved invaluable in dealing with Japanese POWs. In addition to language skills, most *Nisei* had an understanding of Japanese values and psychology not obtainable in a classroom. Many absorbed the Japanese culture in their homes and in aft er-school Japanese programs, while others experienced it fi rsthand by spending part of their childhood living and attending school in Japan. Th e latter, known as Kibei (a *Nisei* sent by his parents at a young age to be educated in Japan), were treasured recruits.\n\n## Weaknesses Of The Army's Recruitment Eff Orts\n\nDespite the benefi t of recruiting *Nisei* heritage speakers during World War II, there were some drawbacks. First, many Americans considered the Nisei a national security risk. Since *Nisei*, like other Americans, were subject to the draft , many were serving in the Army when the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor. Following the hysteria on the West Coast of the U.S., many *Nisei* soldiers were discharged and reclassifi ed, along with their parents and siblings, as enemy aliens. Th ose who remained, like Grant Hirabayashi, were stripped of their weapons and relegated to menial jobs until the Army could complete extensive background investigations.\n\nMany Americans also refused to believe the *Nisei* could stand the decisive test of battle against their own race and kindred. Because some *Nisei* family members were trapped in Japan and required to serve in the Japanese armed forces, *Nisei* soldiers might, in essence, be asked to take up arms against their brothers.\n\nFinally, ethnic heritage does not equate to language skill. Many Nisei were not suffi  ciently literate in English or Japanese to translate accurately for the Army's military intelligence program. As indicated by Dr. Porter, \"of the\n1,400 *Nisei* interviewed in 1941, the Army only found 60 capable of learning Japanese beyond 'kitchen-heritage speaking,' and only two were suffi  ciently profi cient in both Japanese and English to translate accurately, and they were used as instructors.\" Th is remains a common problem with Spanish-heritage soldiers today.169\n\n## U.S. Navy Recruitment Eff Orts\n\nTh e question of loyalty was the most signifi cant factor contributing to the Navy's decision to recruit solely Caucasian interrogators. While the Navy had been sending language specialists to Japan for language immersion since 1922, fewer than 56 offi  cers trained using this method were available at the outset of World War II.\n\nTh e Navy's recruitment goals were much lower than the Army's, but even these were diffi  cult to achieve. Although the Navy interviewed thousands of potential applicants, very few met its high academic standards. Of the select number of Caucasian-Americans who could speak and understand Japanese, only a small percentage were also profi cient at reading and writing Japanese, a critical skill required at the time.\n\n## Strengths Of The Navy's Recruitment Eff Orts\n\nLike the Army's *Nisei,* a large percentage of the Caucasians recruited by the Navy had experienced Japanese culture and had at least limited exposure to the Japanese language. Of the Navy's initial 56 recruits, the majority had lived and studied in Japan. As such, they shared, to a degree, the *Nisei'*s benefi t of cultural understanding, which proved very useful when dealing with Japanese POWs. Many interrogators, like Otis Cary, were able to develop close relationships with the Japanese soldiers and earn their respect and cooperation in providing U.S. Naval intelligence with information vital to the war eff ort.\n\nIn addition to possessing language skills and cultural knowledge, most Caucasians, unlike the *Nisei,* were seen to pose little or no security risk and were able to obtain the necessary security clearance with minor diffi  culty. Most Caucasian recruits, as well as immediate family members, were native-born, which enabled U.S. government offi  cials to conduct background investigations quickly and easily, whereas the *Nisei'*s foreign roots were diffi  cult to verify.\n\nSince most Americans living in the U.S. during World War II were Caucasian, the Navy had a much larger pool of potential applicants than the Army. Th e Navy could therefore be far more selective in its recruitment eff orts and thus targeted potential applicants with college-level educations, prior exposure to Far Eastern culture, and a proclivity for learning a foreign language.\n\n## Weaknesses Of The Navy's Recruitment Eff Orts\n\n68 |\nOn balance, because several of the Navy's applicants had limited or no Japanese language profi ciency, the time required to bring them up to the necessary skill level was much longer than that needed by the Army. In fact, the Navy's language school took twice as long as the Army's training program, although remarkably the Navy was still able to educate recruits in less than 12 months. Th is extra time was necessary to develop the students' skills and build a level of confi dence necessary to accommodate eff ective employment in the fi eld.\n\nWith exception of the Caucasian recruits who had spent a considerable amount of time in Japan, most had no more than 12 months of Japanese cultural exposure in an academic setting, while the *Nisei* had experienced Japanese culture on a daily basis. No classroom-based education system can substitute for true cultural immersion. However, the Navy went to great lengths to make the students' experience as realistic as possible and was remarkably successful.\n\n## Th E U.S. Army's Japanese Language Program\n\nTh e Army established its intense, 6-month-long training program to educate soldiers, primarily *Nisei*, in a broad range of topics, ranging from Japanese language and culture to interrogation and translation of Japanese military documents. During the course of the war, the MISLS graduated nearly 6,000 soldiers, enabling the Army to penetrate the enemy's psyche and obtain information vital to the war eff ort. In essence, the Japanese soldier was no longer able to barricade himself behind the intricate characters and syntax of his complex language.\n\n## Strengths Of The Army's Language Program\n\nTh e greatest strength of the Army's Japanese language program rested on the deep heritage and cultural experience of its *Kibei* instructors, who had spent a good portion of their childhood in Japan. While many *Nisei* students learned Japanese from their families and in aft er-school programs, few had had the opportunity to travel abroad and experience the culture fi rsthand. Th is rich, direct exposure was critical to understanding the culture and psychology of the enemy.\n\nSince all students attending the Army's language school spoke at least some Japanese, the Army could focus its instruction on the Japanese military and off er specialized training in topics such as POW interrogation. While interrogation training was largely limited to role-playing and general interrogation principles, it off ered graduates an introduction to the type of work expected by fi eld commanders and exposure to techniques that would prove benefi cial to the war eff ort.\n\n## Weaknesses Of The Army's Language Program\n\nDespite an astute staff  and broad range of training topics, the Army's approach had its weaknesses. Th e compressed 6-month training regimen stretched the students to the absolute limit in order to meet the school's rigorous academic requirements and the service's growing need for qualifi ed linguists on the battlefi eld. Classes ran from 8:00 a.m. to 9:00 p.m., Monday through Saturday, and many students were forced to stay up well past their 10:00 p.m. curfew to complete required homework and prepare for the next day's lessons. Saturday's \"school of the soldier\" training and frequent military-type inspections placed additional burdens on the already overtaxed students.\n\nAdditionally, the broad range of language profi ciency among the student population made it diffi  cult for students to receive focused instruction at the appropriate speed. For some, the pace of instruction was too slow; for many, they had all they could do to keep up with their classmates.\n\n## Th E U.S. Navy's Japanese Language Program\n\nTh e Navy's Oriental Language School off ered, in reality, what amounted to a \"fellowship-type\" program to educate Caucasians with limited Japanese language capabilities at U.S. universities. Following a rocky start, the Navy developed a revolutionary language school that produced offi  cers thoroughly competent in reading and writing Japanese. Unlike the Army's program, the curriculum focused almost exclusively on mastering the basic Japanese language and postponed any specialized training until students graduated and moved on to their next assignments. Th e exemplary performance of its graduates testifi ed to the success of the Navy's program.\n\n## Strengths Of The Navy's Language Program\n\nTh e Naganuma language course, which served as the foundation for the Navy's intensive set of courses, proved invaluable to the academic curriculum. Although the program typically required three years of instruction in Japan, the Navy streamlined the program to 12 months of intense class work in the U.S. In addition to the eff ective course of instruction, culture and language immersion off ered throughout the program played a signifi cant role in the school's overall success. Finally, the Navy attributed much of the school's accomplishment to the program's concentration on the basic Japanese language (as opposed to military and technical terminology). By off ering this academic approach, the faculty was able to provide intense language instruction without distracting students with military inspections or training that interfered with the primary educational goal. Ultimately, the Navy accomplished what many had believed to be an impossible task - training relatively competent Japanese language experts in less than a year's time. Graduates, many of whom started with no Japanese language experience, were able to read and write approximately 1,800 Japanese characters and maintain a vocabulary of nearly 7,000 words.\n\n## Weaknesses Of The Navy's Language Program\n\n70 |\nPostponing any specialized or military training until students graduated and moved on to their next assignments did have some drawbacks. Th e Navy (with the exception of its Marine Corps students) did not anticipate interrogating Japanese prisoners, but instead expected they would employ their graduates at regional intelligence centers translating enemy documents. Although the graduates required these skills, the assumption they would not act as interrogators proved false, as many students, such as Lieutenant Otis Cary, ended up operating in combat zones within Marine units and interrogating Japanese POWs.\n\nIn addition, since the Navy's program placed only limited emphasis on military-related education (such as military terminology and general Japanese military instruction), Naval offi  cers deployed to the fi eld were forced to transport trunks full of reference materials to meet the needs of the intelligence service. Much of the tactical intelligence developed through prisoner interrogation included order of battle information such as military unit strength, location, tactics, and equipment condition. Moreover, many graduates were deployed into combat zones without receiving any formal instruction in interrogation.\n\nTo remedy this apparent shortcoming, Major Sherwood F. Moran, a senior Marine interrogator who spent 40 years in Japan as a missionary prior to World War II and who supervised numerous Boulder graduates in combat, authored a treatise titled \"Suggestions for Japanese Interpreters Based on Work in the Field,\" and distributed it throughout the Pacifi c Th eater. Th e essay laid out criteria for an eff ective interrogator. It concentrated on the attitude of interrogators toward the enemy prisoners and knowledge and use of the enemy's language.\n\nMoran opposed stern interviewing tactics and favored talking to prisoners ningen to *shite* (human to human). In essence, it provided novice interrogators a series of guiding principles with which to carry out their interviews.170\n\n## Wartime Interrogation Of Japanese Prisoners\n\nU.S. military interrogators overcame numerous challenges during the Second World War, not only in developing an eff ective wartime interrogation system but also in persuading fellow soldiers and fi eld commanders of the intelligence value of enemy prisoners. In early campaigns, Americans captured very few Japanese soldiers, primarily because of the racist attitude of the combat forces, both enlisted and offi  cer.171 Hatred of the enemy was so fi erce that many fi eld commanders believed taking prisoners would expose their troops to unnecessary risk. Moreover, military leaders were certain the Japanese would never disclose valuable intelligence information. To overcome this challenge, Nisei and Caucasian interrogators personally indoctrinated members of their own units about the enemy's worth to ensure POWs were available for questioning. Eventually, U.S. military leaders came to realize it was not only ethically and legally right (as defi ned by Geneva Convention) to take prisoners, but that the work of U.S. interrogators was key to American success in the Pacifi c intelligence campaign.\n\nWartime experiences in the Pacifi c Th eater revealed that captured Japanese POWs in fact seldom resisted interrogation. My research highlighted several factors that contributed to this phenomenon. Th e following reasons illustrate why, in my estimate, Japanese prisoners cooperated with American interrogators and provided valuable intelligence information that assisted the war eff ort.\n\n## Reciprocity For Kind And Respectful Treatment\n\nTh e most successful interrogators during the war treated Japanese prisoners as individual human beings, rather than as animals or fanatical enemy soldiers. Th ese interrogators off ered sincere kindness and understanding and ensured timely access to food, clothing, and medical care. Japanese prisoners were truly shocked to learn they were receiving the same food and medical care as their captors and recognition of this common humanity left  a lasting impression. Moreover, Japanese society customarily valued reciprocal giving and receiving.\n\n## Employment Of *Nisei* Interrogators\n\nTh e U.S. Army's use of *Nisei* as combat interrogators greatly improved the Allied intelligence collection eff ort. Th eir linguistic skills were far superior to those of their Caucasian counterparts, and most *Nisei* had a profound appreciation for Japanese culture and psychology. Th ese skills, coupled with their physical resemblance to the enemy, put the Japanese prisoners at ease, which enabled eff ective interrogation. Major General Charles Willoughby, the top intelligence offi  cer in the Pacifi c Th eater under the command of General MacArthur, summed up the *Nisei* contributions best by stating, \"Th e 6000 *Nisei* shortened the Pacifi c War by two years.\"172\n\n## Reciprocal Curiosity Of The Caucasian Linguists\n\n72 |\nOnce Caucasian interrogators established a dialogue with Japanese prisoners, the prisoners were oft en just as curious to learn about the white Americans who spoke their native tongue as the Caucasian interrogators were to learn about their Japanese captives. Th e unique ability to carry on informal discussions generally put the POWs at ease. Th is style of elicitation was not as eff ective for *Nisei* interrogators. Oft en times the Nisei were regarded with suspicion by the prisoners, as illustrated by Sergeant Hirabayashi's exchange with the Japanese offi  cer who repeatedly called him a \"traitor.\"\n\n## Learning Th Ey Were Not Alone\n\nMany Japanese POWs felt isolated when facing U.S. interrogators. Compared to POWs captured in the European Th eater, the number of Japanese\n172 Nakasone, 54.\n\nprisoners captured was extremely small. Aft er being cut off  from their fellow soldiers, Japanese POWs experienced an overwhelming sense of loneliness and were shocked to learn that other Japanese soldiers had been taken prisoner too. Once they discovered they were not alone, they experienced a sense of relief, which facilitated a sort of \"relaxed\" state. Being put at ease, coupled with good treatment and medical care, encouraged the POWs to talk freely.\n\n## Fear Of Dishonoring Their Families\n\nTh e Japanese had a strong sense of national unity; soldiers were very loyal to their country and their Emperor. Th ey lived by the *Bushido* code; they believed death in battle was an honor and that capture and surrender were akin to treason, renunciation of religion, and eternal disgrace to the soul, family, and country. Once captured, Japanese POWs felt abandoned by their country and feared their families would learn of their detention and be disgraced. American interrogators exploited this fear by promising not to send a prisoner's name back to Japan if he cooperated. Th is technique, coupled with kind treatment, proved extremely eff ective as well.\n\n## Lack Of Security Indoctrination\n\nTh e Japanese belief that capture and surrender were a disgrace to family and country meant that military leaders considered it unnecessary to give their soldiers security training to ensure that POWs knew how to safeguard classifi ed and sensitive information. Moreover, many Japanese offi  cers were not concerned about the security of their sensitive military communications because they believed Westerners would never learn to read and write Japanese. Th e lack of security indoctrination, particularly in the earlier campaigns, was very apparent to U.S. interrogators.\n\n## Fear Of Torture\n\nMany Japanese prisoners told their interrogators they had expected to be killed or tortured if taken prisoner. Evidence obtained through POW interrogation suggested this fear did not result from Japanese propaganda, but from the soldiers' fi rsthand experience in China. Aft er training and serving under these conditions for years, as many Japanese soldiers had, it is hardly surprising that these troops expected any opponent to treat them brutally.\n\n## Hope For A Better Tomorrow\n\nMany Japanese POWs felt that the kind and respectful treatment off ered by U.S. military interrogators like Otis Cary and Grant Hirabayashi contributed to a realization of their self-worth in the reconstruction of Japan. Ulrich Straus, a former Consul General of Okinawa and U.S. Army language offi  cer who served in Japan during the occupation, highlighted this recurring theme aft er he interviewed dozens of former Japanese POWs and studied numerous memoirs refl ecting this feeling.\n\n## Recommendations For Additional Research\n\n74 |\nOver four months of research at the National Archives and Records Administration in College Park, Maryland, revealed a treasure trove of information pertaining to World War II interrogation eff orts in the Pacifi c Th eater.\n\nTh e volume of materials available surpasses that which could be reasonably addressed by a lone investigator and documented in a single study. Th is unique source of research material off ers numerous opportunities to conduct further examination and develop additional case studies that might inform current and future doctrine and practices related to educing information - an eff ort currently underway by the Director of National Intelligence-chartered Intelligence Science Board Study on Educing Information, chaired by Robert A. Fein and supported by the National Defense Intelligence College.\n\nOne area of research that would off er signifi cant historic value would be an examination of the model of interrogation employed by the British during World War II. In the summer of 1941, the U.S. Offi  ce of Naval Intelligence instructed the head of the Special Activities Branch responsible for interrogation to examine and develop an organization for the interrogation of Naval POWs.173 In response, the Navy dispatched a reserve offi  cer to the British Admiralty in London to study and receive training in British methods of interrogation. An examination of this study could reveal diff erences, advantages, and disadvantages between the American and British interrogation programs.\n\nAnother promising area of research would be a comprehensive study of Camp Tracy, the U.S. West Coast secret interrogation facility located in Byron Springs, California, used to interrogate Japanese prisoners during World War II. Initial research indicates the facility was less eff ective than the East Coast facility located at Fort Hunt, Virginia, where information was educed from high-level German POWs during the same period. Th e interrogation activities at Fort Hunt are well documented by a former graduate of the National Defense Intelligence College, Colonel (then Major) Steven Kleinman, U.S. Air Force Reserve. Th e Camp Tracy study could reveal additional factors infl uencing eff ective interrogation practices.\n\nA fi nal area worth consideration would be to compare and contrast the operational environments present in the Pacifi c during World War II and the current Global War on Terrorism to determine what parallels might be drawn. Such a study could examine whether prisoners in these settings were similarly infl uenced by the nature of their delivery into detention (capture or surrender) an examination that could produce additional lessons learned.\n\n## Unveiling Charlie: U.S. Interrogators' Creative Successes Against Insurgents Meeting Today's Interrogation Challenges By Revisiting Our Past\n\nOn 6 September 2006 President George Bush delivered a major public address from the East Room of the White House that was designed to explain and defend U.S. interrogation practices in the Global War on Terror (GWOT). Seeking to justify to Americans and a chorus of international critics controversial measures, the President highlighted the sense of urgency which infl uenced U.S. interrogation practices aft er the stunning Al Qaeda attacks in New York, Washington, and Pennsylvania. \"Th e attacks of September the 11th horrifi ed our nation. And amid the grief came new fears and urgent questions: Who had attacked us? What did they want? And what else were they planning?\"174\nTh e public's demands for explanation, justice, and protection presented the U.S. Government with a daunting challenge. Many intelligence collection systems and techniques that had been devised for use against traditional state-based adversaries during the Cold War suddenly had limited utility. A new, shadowy enemy in the form of the Al Qaeda terrorist network presented an elusive target to collectors of signals and imagery intelligence. Instead of observing physical manifestations of enemy intentions and capabilities, U.S.\n\nintelligence collectors now had no choice but to speak directly with individuals who belonged to terrorist organizations. Acquisition of human intelligence (HUMINT) via interrogation was recognized as the best means of protecting Americans from further attack. President Bush succinctly explained this new challenge during his address:\nTh e terrorists who declared war on America represent no nation, they defend no territory, and they wear no uniform. Th ey do not mass armies on borders or fl otillas of warships on the high seas. Th ey operate in the shadows of society. Th ey send small teams of operatives to infi ltrate free nations. Th ey live quietly among their victims. Th ey conspire in secret, and then they strike without warning. In this new war, the most important source of information on where the terrorists are hiding and what they are planning is the terrorists themselves.... [T]his is intelligence that cannot be found any other place.\n\nWhile acknowledging the importance of interrogation to U.S. success in the GWOT, many critics have questioned the means by which U.S. interrogators have collected intelligence from alleged terrorist operatives. Th ese questions have largely centered around the moral and political ramifi cations of coercive interrogation practices, not on whether these practices produce accurate intelligence. While certainly an important ingredient in policy formulation, public debate concerning interrogation techniques has artifi cially obscured consideration of the many actors and variables in play during an interrogation session.\n\nTh is study seeks to foster a richer discourse about interrogation. Aft er all, the quantity and quality of intelligence derived from an interrogation session do not depend entirely upon the techniques used. In fact, all interrogation sessions involve at least two human beings with oft en divergent objectives, loyalties, cultures, and languages. Th erefore, at its core, interrogation is a dynamic interaction between an interrogator and a prospective source. Th e attributes of these two individuals dramatically aff ect the outcome of an interrogation, regardless of the techniques used.175\n78 |\nMany factors bear upon the eff ectiveness of an interrogator, to include motivation, experience, education, training, communications ability, cultural understanding, and personal disposition. Th us, two interrogators employing identical techniques may experience radically diff erent levels of eff ectiveness with the same source. Th is being the case, it is natural to ask why some interrogators are more eff ective than others. Specifi cally, is it possible to defi ne a general recipe for successful interrogation? Th is study identifi es personal attributes and tradecraft  that have advanced the purposes and eff ectiveness of experienced counterinsurgency interrogators.\n\n## Reliving Challenges From The Past\n\nTh e diffi  culty of setting out the requirements for a fi rst class interrogator is more apparent than real. In theory, remarkable attainments are essential. In practice an average offi  cer is posted and the best use is made of the limited qualifi cation, enthusiasm and experience. If and when any headway is made he is usually required for service elsewhere or the war comes to an end. Certainly no machinery exists for the retention of his services; he is lost for any future emergency and the lessons must be learnt, in the hard way, by trial and error in time of peril, all over again. In the next war there will be no time for this parlous procedure.176\nR.W.G Stephens, British MI5 Interrogator writing aft er WWII\nFrom the mid-1960s to 1975, U.S. interrogators in South Vietnam played a critical role in combating an aggressive Vietcong insurgency. Th ey employed a wide array of interrogation strategies in response to challenges similar to those faced by their present-day successors in Iraq and Afghanistan. Unfortunately, generational turnover within the U.S. Intelligence Community (IC) has limited today's application of lessons learned more than three decades ago in Vietnam. Stephens' sobering depiction of Britain's inability to retain interrogation profi ciency during the World War II era appears to apply equally well to the U.S. Government of today. For this reason the U.S. interrogation experience in Vietnam was selected for critical examination.\n\n## Parallels In Interrogation: Vietnam And Today\n\nLike current confl icts in Iraq and Afghanistan, the Vietnam confl ict was characterized by a widespread insurgency. Th e defi ning characteristic of insurgents is their ability to transition quickly between the roles of combatant and civilian. In contrast to traditional force-on-force warfare where the enemy wears easily identifi able markings, Vietcong insurgents relied upon their anonymity to neutralize the considerable technical advantages possessed by U.S. and South Vietnamese forces. By waging asymmetric warfare, insurgents prevented U.S. forces from fully capital-\n176 R.W.G. Stephens, *Camp 020: MI5 and the Nazi Spies*, ed. Oliver Hoare (London: United\n80 |\nizing on their superior technology, discipline, and size. Th is occurred because U.S. and South Vietnamese forces could not easily identify discrete targets against which to project their superior fi repower. As in current confl icts, the value of HUMINT\nwas amplifi ed and interrogators were urgently needed to assist in identifying insurgents as well as their hideouts, plans, targets, tactics, and supply sources.\n\nInterrogation operations in support of counterinsurgency objectives presented unique requirements to curb potential alienation of the contested population. Just as wielders of kinetic weapons must limit collateral damage, interrogators must consciously balance their desire to obtain intelligence quickly with the longer-term objective of winning the hearts and minds of the contested populace. If U.S. interrogations were perceived by the South Vietnamese as unjust or cruel, detainees and their associates were likely to entertain, or increase, support for the Vietcong insurgency. In addition, North Vietnamese and Vietcong claims to moral legitimacy would be bolstered by interrogation strategies that tacitly confi rmed communist accusations of cruelty by the U.S.\n\nAs in the GWOT, U.S. interrogators in Vietnam were required to tailor their interrogation strategies to the unfamiliar culture, laws, procedures, and language of their host nation ally. As guests of the South Vietnamese government, U.S. interrogators were frequently required to coordinate their operations with South Vietnam counterparts. Oft en this coordination proved diffi  cult due to divergent interests, jealousies, and dissimilar levels of competency. Collectively, these limitations constituted barriers to eff ective counterinsurgency interrogation in Vietnam.\n\nNevertheless, outstanding interrogators managed to surmount these barriers and obtain signifi cant intelligence for the U.S. by creatively exploiting the opportunities and resources available to them. Th is study seeks to identify the attributes of a successful counterinsurgency interrogator by analyzing the professional development of three U.S. interrogators who published detailed reports on their experiences in Vietnam. Th e accounts of Orrin DeForest (Central Intelligence Agency), Stuart Herrington (U.S. Army offi  cer), and Sedgwick Tourison (U.S. Army noncommissioned offi  cer) represent the most substantial fi rst-person narratives of U.S. interrogation eff orts in Vietnam:\nDeForest, Orrin, and David Chanoff . Slow Burn: Th e Rise and Bitter Fall of American Intelligence in Vietnam. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1990.\n\nHerrington, Stuart A. Silence Was a Weapon: Th e Vietnam War in the Villages. Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1982.\n\nTourison Jr., Sedgwick D. Talking with Victor Charlie: An Interrogator's Story. New York: Ballantine Books, 1991.\n\nIn reviewing the interrogators' experiences, this study endeavors to answer the following question: How did U.S. interrogators in Vietnam overcome barriers to eff ective counterinsurgency interrogation?\n\nA. What attributes characterized successful counterinsurgency interrogators? B. Which interrogation strategies were most eff ective in producing\nactionable intelligence on Vietcong insurgents?\n\n## Th E Case Study Approach\n\nIn *Case Study Research: Design and Methods*, Robert Yin succinctly defi nes case studies and indirectly advances the rationale for their use as an appropriate construct to study interrogation:\nA case study is an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context, especially when the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident.177\nIndeed, the primary challenge when studying interrogation eff ectiveness is separating the act from its environment. Arguably, it is impossible to do so in light of the pervasive impacts stemming from physical, linguistic, cultural, and intra-/interpersonal factors. For this very reason, case studies are ideally suited to our challenge.\n\nTh e present research eff ort features DeForest, Herrington, and Tourison as the subjects of three comparative case studies because of their reported successes as interrogators, proven capacity for introspection, and diverse professional backgrounds. Together, the written works of DeForest, Herrington, and Tourison form the corpus of literature pertaining to interrogation in Vietnam. Th ey off er a nuanced and comprehensive depiction of counterinsurgency interrogation in Vietnam, especially because their operational environs, methods, military ranks, and service periods varied considerably.\n\nUsing a Grounded Th eory approach, the researcher analyzed the written works of the interrogators to develop hypotheses that suggest which personal attributes and strategies facilitated eff ective interrogation in Vietnam. Th e Grounded Th eory approach was developed by two psychology researchers, Barney Glaser and Anselm Strauss, to \"discover the theory implicit in the data.\"178 To elaborate, Grounded Th eory enables a researcher to analyze a set of data for the purpose of explaining the patterns and causal factors present within the data. Resulting hypotheses can then be tested.\n\nTh e researcher's generation of hypotheses was informed by a comprehensive literature review, which considered barriers to interrogator success and lessons off ered by an array of experienced wartime interrogators. Th e literature review led the researcher in selecting foci for the three case studies presented subsequently. Although the case studies are designed to elucidate specifi c topical areas (foci), each is presented chronologically so as to depict seamlessly the professional development of the interrogator described. Th is chronological focus approach also aids comprehension. Of course, the interrogators' experiences were much greater in number than the few highlighted by the case studies. However, the featured interrogations are particularly instructive thanks to their concise distillation of the interrogators' modus operandi.\n\n## Methodological Considerations\n\nTo contextualize the reported fi ndings accurately, the reader must be mindful of several considerations that are endemic to the methodology:\nFirst, each of the featured interrogators obviously had a vested interest in casting a favorable light upon his interrogation performance. Consequently, they all had reason to relate information selectively in their publications and interview. Such selectivity could potentially alter perceptions of the interrogators' eff ectiveness, or reduce presentation of coercive interrogation techniques that might be abhorrent to their audiences. Indeed, if the featured interrogators had utilized unreported coercive techniques, they might have feared censure or prosecution for reporting such activities.\n\nTh e goal of the study is to generate hypotheses as to how the professional development of these interrogators contributed to their eff ectiveness. Yet, in highlighting the approaches utilized by each interrogator, we must acknowledge that their achievements in Vietnam may not be easily replicated in other operational environments. Cultural and historical peculiarities may preclude full transfer of the interrogators' approaches in an Asian culture to predominantly Arab cultures. For example, religious ideology generally played less of a role in motivating Vietnamese sources than it does for those who are members of Muslim extremist organizations.\n\nWe shall consider an interrogator to be *eff ective* when a source wittingly or unwittingly provides information that an impartial observer would view as detrimental to the welfare of the source's originating combatant organization or cause. Naturally, an interrogator can exhibit varying levels of eff ectiveness on a continuum ranging from limited to total.\n\nTh ree case studies do not suffi  ce to *confi rm* hypotheses developed through Grounded Research. Instead, these case studies served to *generate* hypotheses for future exploration and testing. Realistically, such testing is only valid with larger data sets than are examined here.\n\n## Overview\n\nTh e fi rst section provides a brief history of U.S. involvement in Vietnam.\n\nBy extension, it also highlights the complex political and operational environment encountered by DeForest, Herrington, and Tourison in Vietnam.\n\nTh e next section reviews the existing literature associated with wartime interrogation. In so doing, it identifi es the many variables weighing upon the outcome of an interrogation. Many of these variables can best be described as *barriers to success*. Diversifi cation of such barriers has presented unprecedented challenges to U.S. interrogators during the early years of the GWOT. Th us, the literature review focuses on successful interrogators from history who off ered informed advice to their present-day counterparts. Specifi cally, it considers the lessons off ered by Hanns Scharff , Sherwood Moran, R.W.G. Stephens, and Michael Koubi. Th eir observations comprise a helpful context for analyzing the experiences of U.S. interrogators in Vietnam.\n\nTh e subsequent three sections present individual case studies that narrate the professional development and interrogations of Tourison, Herrington, and DeForest, respectively. Th e case studies are presented in a manner that highlights the perceived enablers of the interrogators' successes. At the conclusion of each section, the researcher highlights the most prominent of the enabling factors.\n\nTh e fi rst centers on Sedgwick D. Tourison of the U.S. Army. As a noncommissioned offi  cer assigned to the Combined Intelligence CenterVietnam\n(CICV) in Saigon from 1965 to 1967, Tourison interrogated enemy prisoners of war in battlefi eld and detention center environments. He employed a diverse range of interrogation techniques and relied heavily upon document exploitation to support his eff orts.\n\nTh e second study features Stuart A. Herrington, a captain in the U.S.\n\nArmy. Herrington served as an intelligence advisor for the Phoenix Program in Hau Nghia province, South Vietnam, from 1971 to 1973. Frustrated by lack of support for the Phoenix Program among his South Vietnamese counterparts, Herrington focused instead on recruitment and operational employment of former NVA and Vietcong operatives for intelligence collection.\n\nTh e third study focuses on Orrin DeForest, who from 1968 to 1975 served as an interrogator for the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in Bien Hoa, South Vietnam. DeForest created and managed an elaborate interrogation center that employed unorthodox techniques to obtain intelligence from persons who defected from the NVA or the Vietcong. He developed a comprehensive intelligence databank to support the interrogations and intelligence collection operations conducted by his subordinates.\n\nTh e fi nal section advances hypotheses as to why Tourison, Herrington, and DeForest succeeded as interrogators. Th ese hypotheses could inform future research on the eff ectiveness of interrogation techniques as well as selection criteria for eff ective interrogators.\n\n## U.S. Involvement In Vietnam: Th E Historical Context179 84 |\n\nSouth Vietnam prior to Communist victory. Source: Central Intelligence Agency.\n\nTo appreciate the complex operational environment encountered by DeForest, Herrington, and Tourison, the reader must understand the modern history of Vietnam. Th e following historical summary provides a context to explain U.S. involvement in Southeast Asia.\n\nAt the conclusion of World War II, France sought to reassert control of traditional colonial possessions in Southeast Asia that had fallen under Axis control following France's surrender to Germany in 1940. One of these possessions was Vietnam, which had become a French colony in the late 19th century. In 1946, Vietnamese nationalists (Viet Minh) under the leadership of the communist Ho Chi Minh reacted to French aspirations by undertaking an armed insurrection aimed at expelling the French. Th is insurrection was eventually supported by the Soviet Union (USSR) and the People's Republic of China (PRC), both of which saw an opportunity to advance communism in Vietnam.\n\nBeginning in 1950, the U.S. provided fi nancial, material, and advisory support to France via the Military Assistance Advisory Group, Indochina. Nonetheless, this support was insuffi  cient to prevent the Viet Minh from decisively defeating French forces, which surrendered in 1954 and withdrew per the negotiated terms of the Geneva Accords.\n\nTh e U.S. supported France for reasons of political expediency. American leaders wished to strengthen their relationship with France in preparation for a potential confl ict with the Soviet Bloc in Europe. Furthermore, U.S. leaders subscribed to the then-prevalent belief that French withdrawal from Vietnam would create a power vacuum that would leave the fl edgling nation vulnerable to communist takeover. Aft er all, the U.S. was then engaged in a fi erce ideological struggle with communism, which it perceived as a growing menace threatening to spread from the Soviet Bloc, China, and North Korea to vulnerable \"domino\" states in Southeast Asia. Nonetheless, this support did not prevent the French defeat.\n\nTh e Geneva Accords granted Vietnam independence from France and temporarily partitioned the country at the 17th Parallel, pending the outcome of nationwide democratic elections scheduled for 1956. In the north, Viet Minh leaders established a de facto communist state that was soon recognized by the USSR and the PRC. Th e south, with the support of the U.S., formed a non-communist government whose leaders later declined to participate in the planned democratic election of 1956. Th ey feared Ho Chi Minh would win the election and southerners would be forced to accept communist rule from the North. Th us, the temporary division of Vietnam led to an ideological fault line, with communist nations supporting North Vietnam and democratic nations supporting South Vietnam.\n\nFearful that communists in the North would succeed in their eff orts to overthrow the anti-communist government of the South, U.S. President John F. Kennedy pledged military and fi nancial support to President Ngo Dinh Diem in\n1961. Th e newly formed U.S. Military Assistance Command Vietnam (MACV) faced North Vietnamese Army (NVA) forces infi ltrating from the North as well as irregular Vietcong forces in the South which sought to overthrow the notoriously corrupt government through guerrilla warfare. Th roughout the early 1960s the U.S. consistently increased its commitments to South Vietnam, but aft er passage of the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution in August 1964 U.S. forces assumed primary combat responsibilities. Indeed, by 1968 the U.S. had over\n537,000 troops in country.180\nMACV forces consistently defeated NVA and organized Vietcong units during infrequent battles between large opposing forces. However, Vietcong insurgents proved an elusive and lethal foe. Using snipers, sappers, assassins, and ambushes, the Vietcong attrited MACV and South Vietnamese forces. Yet, MACV's massive infusion of arms, troops, and training during the administration of President Lyndon B. Johnson enabled the South Vietnamese government to regain daytime control of many rural villages and suppress the Vietcong insurgency. U.S. personnel, such as Army interrogator Sedgwick Tourison, rightly believed the capabilities of communist forces in South Vietnam were steadily diminishing.181 Nonetheless, these gains came at a high cost to the U.S.: in 1967\nalone, the nation endured over 11,000 combat deaths, and a growing, but vocal, minority of Americans questioned the wisdom of U.S. involvement.182\nFrustrated by their lack of military progress, communist leaders in North Vietnam undertook a radical shift  in strategy that would stun American leaders and reverse MACV's battlefi eld successes by shattering U.S. public support for the war. During the Tet holiday of 1968, NVA and Vietcong forces launched a daring nationwide off ensive that would prove a tactical military disaster but a strategic psychological victory over their U.S. and South Vietnamese enemies.\n\nTold by the Johnson Administration and MACV that NVA and Vietcong forces were in terminal decline due to U.S. successes on the battlefi eld, the American public was stunned on 30 January when NVA/Vietcong forces launched nearsimultaneous attacks on 36 out of 44 provincial capitals, 5 out of 6 major cities, 58\nsmaller towns, and numerous U.S. military bases in Vietnam.183 NVA/Vietcong attackers also penetrated the walls of the U.S. Embassy in Saigon while American news cameras documented the surprise assault. However, the greatest eff ect of the attack was political. Tet opened a chasm of distrust between the American people and their government. So great was public disillusionment aft er Tet that it would heavily infl uence President Johnson's decision not to run for re-election and mark the beginning of the U.S. disengagement from Vietnam.\n\nFrom 1969 to 1973, U.S. combat forces gradually withdrew from South Vietnam and U.S. personnel resumed the advisory roles they held prior to \"Americanization\" of the confl ict under presidents Kennedy and Johnson. During this \"Vietnamization\" phase of the confl ict, President Nixon dispatched advisors such as Stuart Herrington and Orrin DeForest to prepare their South Vietnamese counterparts for the inevitable onslaught from the North. With the signing of the Paris Peace Accords in January 1973, the U.S. ended all direct military action against North Vietnam and left  the South Vietnamese to determine their own fate.\n\nTh ough they had benefi ted from U.S. military equipment and many years of joint training, South Vietnamese forces proved inept at stemming NVA off ensives during the spring of 1975. On 30 April 1975, NVA forces captured South Vietnam's capital, Saigon, as Americans and desperate South Vietnamese fl ed the grounds of the U.S. Embassy by helicopter. Among them were Herrington and DeForest. Aft er immense commitments spanning a quarter century, the U.S.'s frustrating ordeal in Vietnam had fi nally ended.\n\nWhile costly to America, the war exacted an even heavier toll on the South Vietnamese, whose unlucky fate placed them on the fault line between competing political ideologies. In all, approximately one-half million died.184\n\n## Barriers To Interrogator Success: A Framework For Viewing Interrogation\n\nDepictions of interrogation on television frequently leave viewers with the impression that interrogators are individuals of uncanny intuition who are singularly capable of tricking or frightening prisoners into revealing information of interest. While an interrogator must indeed be perceptive and assertive, this frequently does not suffi  ce to gain a source's cooperation. In fact, the wise interrogator seeks to bring many sources of leverage to bear in devising a synergistic interrogation strategy that is suffi  cient to overcome barriers to success. Most of these barriers arise naturally in a wartime interrogation environment.\n\nConsequently, they can be characterized as *endemic*. However, additional barriers are specifi c to the individual relationship between a particular interrogator and a particular source. Th e interrogator can directly infl uence these relationship-specifi c barriers.\n\nEndemic barriers result from the inherently adversarial nature of interrogation. By virtue of their affi  liation with an adversarial force or movement, prisoners will almost always seek to withhold information of interest to the interrogator. Oft en this information would harm the prisoner's cause if disclosed. Even in instances where the prisoner has no ideological motivations, the revelation of information might endanger the prisoner's close associates, implicate the prisoner in illegal acts, or expose a greater degree of subject knowledge than the prisoner wishes to acknowledge.\n\nCompounding the inherently adversarial nature of interrogation are naturally occurring linguistic, cultural, and interpersonal barriers, described by Steven Kleinman in \"Barriers to Success: Critical Challenges in Developing a New Educing Information Paradigm.\"185 In their totality these systemic barriers can be represented conceptually as a brick wall separating the interrogator and the prisoner. Th e wall hides the prisoner's knowledge from the view of the interrogator. Oft en the prisoner will seek to heighten the wall's protective value by personally adding a layer of barriers in the form of bluff s, denial, obfuscation, or vitriol. As we shall see, skilled interrogators can oft en reduce sources' motivations for hardening their negotiating positions with these additional relationship-specifi c barriers.186\nHoping to scale the wall, prudent interrogators will employ the full array of resources at their disposal. Resources such as analytical support, subject matter experts, intelligence databases, technical surveillance, and informants comprise a ladder upon which interrogators may stand and increase their ability to surmount the barriers to success that prevent access to a source's knowledge.\n\nOnce an interrogation session begins, interrogator and source each has opportunities to create leverage through skillful maneuver. As he/she sees fi t, the interrogator controls the prisoner's physical movements, allows or disallows external stimuli (such as correspondence, news, and companionship), and provides incentives for cooperation and disincentives for resistance. While signifi cant, these sources of leverage are arguably inferior to those controlled by the prisoner.187\n88 |\nIf the interrogator ultimately succeeds in securing the prisoner's cooperation, the prisoner may remove the personal resistance barriers added to the wall and actively assist the interrogator by swift ly dismantling the portions of the wall composed of naturally occurring barriers. For instance, a prisoner may ultimately become an informant and pleasantly surprise the interrogator by revealing that he is fl uent in the primary language of the interrogator, yet the informant may choose to keep other sections of the wall in place.\n\nTh e prisoner's ability to eliminate naturally occurring barriers to wartime interrogation highlights the advantages of a \"pull\" vs. \"push\" interrogation strategy. As Kleinman astutely observes, many benefi ts potentially accrue to the interrogator who attracts, rather than compels, a prisoner's cooperation. Most important, the prisoner can lead the interrogator to information he did not suspect to be within the prisoner's sphere of knowledge. 188\nIn instances where the source appears to cooperate, the interrogator must realize that his/her cooperation is of an indeterminate duration. A source who loses confi dence in the interrogator may revert to an overtly or covertly uncooperative state. Furthermore, the interrogator would be wise to realize that even cooperative sources will likely withhold some information as insurance for the future. By carefully meting out disclosures of desirable information the source can increase his/her leverage and prolong favorable treatment by the interrogator.\n\n## Endemic Barriers Language\n\nInterrogators, or at least their interpreters, must typically possess fl uency in the language(s) spoken by their sources;189 otherwise, the interrogator is irreparably handicapped in his/her eff orts to understand and persuade the source. Yet, despite being a superpower with a need to conduct military operations throughout the world, the U.S. frequently struggles to recruit and train an adequate supply of linguistically and culturally qualifi ed interrogators.190 To rectify this shortfall during the Vietnam War and GWOT, the U.S. Government hired foreign national interpreters on a temporary basis and stepped up eff orts to recruit native speakers in the U.S.\n\nClearly, employment of language-qualifi ed interrogators is preferable to reliance upon interpreters. Th e use of interpreters creates numerous communications, logistical, and security concerns. First, translation unavoidably slows the fl ow of communication between the interrogator and the source. Second, an interpreter's imperfect knowledge of the interrogator's intentions can potentially distort communication. Moreover, diff erences in emphasis and body language mean that even an interpreter with perfect understanding of the interrogator's intentions may not be fully able to convey the interrogator's intended message. Together, these limitations can degrade interrogators' confi dence that they can successfully orchestrate a given interrogation strategy. Besides decreasing interrogation eff ectiveness, reliance on foreign national interpreters increases the logistical and managerial footprint of mobile interrogation teams. Furthermore, security and counterintelligence resources must be allocated toward ensuring the trustworthiness of the interpreters.191\n\n## Culture\n\nRegardless of the particulars of an interrogation, a professional interrogator will typically seek to off er sources an attractive rationale for cooperation with the interrogator. However, this fundamental goal of interrogation can be quickly derailed if the interrogator does not possess keen insight into the source's culture. For instance, the guilt-based strategies that many U.S. interrogators consider useful in a Western societal context may have little or no impact upon a source who hails from a shame-based society in Asia or the Middle East.192 Th us, the interrogator must remain mindful of cultural peculiarities when devising and implementing an interrogation strategy. Nevertheless, the acquisition of cultural intelligence requires considerable exposure to the source's culture and increases the time needed for the U.S. Government to fi eld a large component of profi cient interrogators in any given theater of war. Th is limitation affl  icted the U.S. in both Vietnam and the GWOT.193\n\n## Interpersonal And Intrapersonal Dynamics\n\nEven without barriers of language and culture, a multitude of subtle interpersonal and intrapersonal dynamics inevitably complicates any relationship between two individuals. Th roughout the interrogation process, the interrogator must constantly assess the status of the interrogation not only from his/her own perspective, but also from that of the source. Without mentally placing himself in the source's circumstances the interrogator cannot devise an appealing rationale for the source's cooperation. Th erefore, the interrogator must strive constantly to understand and exploit the unique \"drivers\" underpinning the source's negotiating position. Of course, this is easier said than done, for it entails the treacherously imprecise task of anticipating another person's objectives and reactions. Aft er all, the source's verbal and non-verbal feedback to the interrogator may be limited, contradictory, or incomprehensible. Nonetheless, the interrogator has little choice but to rely upon such feedback as a real-time diagnostic assessment of his/her strategy. Upon deciding that a given interrogation strategy is failing, the interrogator must adroitly modify his/her approach while ensuring overall consistency with past and planned statements to the source.194\n\n## Th E Unknown\n\nPrior to beginning discourse with a prospective source, an interrogator should seek to obtain all available information about the source. By securing basic biographical information the interrogator can assess the likelihood that the source knows information that the interrogator is seeking. In addition, the interrogator's possession of biographical data will reduce the source's latitude to deny his/her true identity or falsely claim ignorance. While the acquisition of simple biographical information would seem easy, it is oft en surprisingly diffi  cult for a number of reasons. Enemy combatants are oft en captured in large numbers and have limited identifi cation documentation. Even if a detainee's name is known, it may prove diffi  cult to query intelligence databases because of ambiguities in deciphering foreign naming conventions and distinguishing among common names. In most cases, intelligence databases are unlikely to contain useful information simply because the information has not been developed previously.\n\n## Sources Of Interrogator Leverage Teams\n\nOnce the source's identity is known the interrogator seeks to obtain specifi c intelligence data from him/her. Some topics, such as military order of battle, are of a suffi  ciently general nature that even an inexperienced interrogator can comprehend the information. However, high-ranking or technically-oriented sources possess knowledge about topics that may exceed the expertise and comprehension of the average interrogator. In such cases, the interrogator benefi ts from access to intensive analytical support and counsel from subject matter experts. Th ough helpful before and aft er interrogation sessions, these assisting individuals oft en cannot provide detailed inputs to the interrogator during the actual interrogation.195\nAs an interrogator himself, the researcher can confi rm that interrogation is mentally draining for both the source and interrogator. Th us, in many situations it is also advantageous to work jointly with another interrogator. As Kleinman notes, the interrogator must constantly view interrogation proceedings from multiple vantage points. Having a partner eases this strain by reducing the number of conversational, contextual, and informational inputs that a lone interrogator must process in a given period of time. Additionally, using two interrogators gives the source an opportunity to select the one with whom he or she would prefer to converse. If it proves benefi cial from a resource or eff ectiveness standpoint, the less favored interrogator can disengage from subsequent interrogations.\n\n## Technical Monitoring And Informants\n\nIn many cases, experienced interrogators turn to a range of specialists for assistance that sometimes yields greater quantities of intelligence than interrogations themselves. When suitable facilities are available, technicians can oft en install listening devices in detainees' quarters to secretly capture ostensibly private conversations. In instances where the interrogator wishes to prompt a detainee to speak about a specifi c topic, the interrogator may insert a cooperative detainee (known as a \"stool pigeon\" or \"birdie\") into the immediate environment of a targeted detainee. Th e resulting conversation can be picked up by technicians manning listening equipment; alternatively, the informant can be debriefed and quietly rewarded for his/her betrayal of compatriots.\n\n## Review Of U.S. Government Research\n\nIn view of the considerable barriers to successful wartime interrogation, one might reasonably expect the U.S. Government to have regularly conducted interrogation research to assist its practitioners. However, this is not the case. While it may strain the reader's credulity, it is nonetheless true that the CIA's declassifi ed KUBARK manual of 44 years ago represents the U.S. Government's latest social science research in this fi eld so important for national security.196\n\n## Cia Kubark Manual\n\n92 |\nIn 1963 the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) produced the KUBARK Counterintelligence Interrogation Manual to guide its interrogators during the height of the Cold War.197 When declassifi ed in 1997, KUBARK attracted criticism due to its discussion of coercive interrogation techniques.198 Despite containing contentious material, KUBARK is actually a thoughtful and nuanced guide to interrogation.\n\nIn \"KUBARK Counterintelligence Interrogation Review: Observations of an Interrogator,\" Steven Kleinman points out that the KUBARK manual off ers numerous lessons to interrogators, particularly by stressing their need to develop rapport with their sources systematically. For instance, KUBARK encourages the interrogator to ask himself the following question before beginning an interrogation: \"How can I make him (the source) want to tell me what he knows?\"\nrather than *\"How can I trap him into disclosing what he knows?\"*(emphasis in the original).199 KUBARK also recommends that interrogators treat each source as a unique individual and tailor interrogation plans in a manner that makes it attractive for the source to provide the intelligence desired.200\nWhile acknowledging that \"some interrogators are more able than others;\nand some of their superiority may be innate,\"201 KUBARK identifi es four characteristics as essential for an eff ective interrogator:\n(1) enough operational training and experience to permit quick recognition of leads; (2) real familiarity with the language to be used; (3) extensive background knowledge about the interrogatee's native country; and (4) a genuine understanding of the source as a person....Of the four traits listed, a genuine insight into the source's character and motives is perhaps most important but least common.202\nWith respect to the fourth attribute, KUBARK stresses the importance for the interrogator to have a basic understanding of human psychology, whether he employs it in a conscious or unconscious manner during interrogations.203\nFar from depicting the gathering of intelligence as the sole pursuit of the interrogator, KUBARK stresses the need for subject matter experts, analysts, screeners, and monitoring devices to focus and bolster the interrogator's personal eff orts. Th e manual counsels the interrogator to exploit every available advantage aggressively, rather than off er his source a \"fair\" match in the interrogation room.\n\nTh is pragmatic, yet holistic, approach is eloquently stated: \"[T]he KUBARK questioner should aim not for a personal triumph but for his true goalthe acquisition of all needed information by any authorized means.\"204\nHaving noted the near absence of formal wartime interrogation research, let us turn our attention to other valuable sources of informationinterrogation narratives and interrogators' observations.\n\n## A Vietnam Case Study: Nguyen Tai\n\n\"Th e Man in the Snow White Cell\" is an interrogation case study by Merle Pribbenow, formerly a Vietnamese translator and operations offi  cer for the CIA. \"Cell\" is unusual because it draws upon open source materials written by both the interrogators and their source, Nguyen Tai. Th e highest-ranking North Vietnamese intelligence offi  cer ever interrogated by the U.S. and South Vietnam, Tai represented a potential treasure trove of information because he knew the identities of communist spies in South Vietnam and was well connected to North Vietnamese elites. In an eff ort to open this treasure, South Vietnamese and Americans alternately interrogated Tai for more than two years. Whereas American interrogators used polygraph tests and psychological tests, and exploited Tai's desire\n\n201 KUBARK, 1.\n202 KUBARK, 10-11.\n203 KUBARK, 1.\n204 KUBARK, 14.\n\nfor companionship, South Vietnamese interrogators tortured Tai with electric shocks, beatings, simulated drowning, and painful stress positions. Nonetheless, Tai generally succeeded in withstanding these combined pressures by focusing on his desire to honor the communist party and his family. In fact, Tai systematically manipulated his interrogators to misdirect their queries, protect his comrades, and even improve his own conditions in detention. Th e case study highlights the fundamentally adversarial nature of interrogation, as well as interrogators' limitations when confronting a skilled and motivated source. 205\n\n## Review Of Interrogators' Personal Accounts\n\nA handful of professional wartime interrogators recorded their experiences by writing detailed memoirs or granting in-depth interviews. A review of their accounts provides a useful context for case studies of our three Vietnamera interrogators. Each of the interrogators selected for this portion of the literature review was a highly experienced, full-time practitioner during wartime or sustained confl ict. Th e interrogators are presented chronologically.\n\nLieutenant Colonel R.W.G. Stephens,\nCommandant of M15's Camp 020.\nSource: Photograph courtesy of the\nImperial War Museum, London, UK,\nNegative #66769, 26 June 2008.\n\n\n\n## R.W.G. \"Tin Eye\" Stephens\n\nDuring World War II the British counterintelligence service, MI5, detained and interrogated 480 suspected Nazi spies at a specially confi gured facility in London known as Camp 020.206 Lieutenant Colonel Robin William George (R.W.G.) \"Tin Eye\" Stephens served as the commandant of Camp 020 throughout its existence and aft er the war authored a Top Secret account of its accomplishments titled *A Digest of Ham*. Originally written for internal MI5\nuse, *A Digest of Ham* was released to the British public in 1999 and was soon featured in the book *Camp 020 and the Nazi Spies*.\n\nAs commandant, Stephens frequently elected to conduct the initial interrogation of suspected Nazi spies. Without exception, Stephens sought to \"break\" a source's initial resistance by creating a tense physical and psychological setting akin to a formal military court-martial. To create this setting, the source was marched into the initial session, ordered to remain standing at attention, and barraged with rapid-fi re questions and statements from Stephens. For maximum eff ect, Stephens was surrounded by a large supporting panel of offi  cers who functioned as an intimidating backdrop. During interrogations, additional Camp 020 staff  aided Stephens by fulfi lling pre-assigned roles as reports offi  -\ncers, stenographers, and translators.\n\nStephens believed there were two necessary types of interrogators: \"breakers\" and \"investigators.\" Following the initial interrogation by a breaker such as Stephens, subordinates employed as investigators would conduct subsequent sessions. Th e job of the breaker was to quickly obtain an initial admission of guilt and a written confession from the source, whereas the investigator was to exploit the \"break\" and obtain detailed intelligence for reports. At this point, the interrogator's relationship with the source would become less adversarial. Stephens perceived the greater responsibility to be histhat of the breaker. Regardless, the overarching objective of both interrogator types was \"Truth in the shortest possible time.\"207\nStephens opined that an eff ective breaker \"is born and not made.\"208 Th e breaker must be highly motivated by an \"implacable hatred for the enemy,\" which results in an \"aggressive approach,\" \"disinclination to believe\" without corroboration, and \"relentless determination.\" Stephens also sought interrogators with \"common sense\" born of life, travel, and war experiences. He viewed such experiences, along with wide-ranging personal interests, as essential for stimulating and sustaining conversations with sources. Stephens concluded that an interrogator's eff ectiveness depended largely upon subjective characteristics such as personality, mood, and acting ability.209 Noting that some interrogators would necessarily be incompatible with certain types of sources, Stephens praised interrogators who, without jealousy, could step aside and allow a colleague to assume control of an interrogation, with the odds of success increased as a result. While all Camp 020 interrogators were bilingual, Stephens noted that linguistic ability was helpful but by itself insuffi  cient to qualify as an interrogator.\n\nIn many respects, Stephens described himself. Before assuming command of Camp 020 at age 40, Stephens had traveled to at least fi ft een countries and claimed varying levels of profi ciency in seven foreign languages. In addition, Stephens had experienced armed combat as a military offi  cer stationed in India and served as a journalist, magistrate, and assistant judge advocate. It is unclear what formal interrogation training Stephens received aft er joining MI5\nin 1939.210 However, Stephens' writings leave no doubt that he truly hated the Nazi enemy.\n\nEven though Nazi spies were not considered prisoners of war (POWs), and thus not protected under the Geneva Convention, Stephens refused to authorize or use physical force against them: \"For one thing it is the act of a coward. For another, it is unintelligent, for the spy will give an answer to please, an answer to escape punishment.\"211\nRather than violence, Stephens considered the information stored in intelligence databases as the interrogator's greatest source of leverage. Such intelligence, typically derived from communications intercepts, captured documents, and interrogations of other spies, was used to refute sources' cover stories and denials. Indeed, Stephens stressed that an interrogation session was only the highlight of a much broader intelligence collection system supported by numerous personnel who spent less time in the limelight than the breaker: \"Interrogation is only a part of the pattern.... It is the inexperienced interrogator who arrogates to himself credit for a break.\"212 At Camp 020, the British obtained much intelligence from electronic monitoring of source's private conversations and cultivation of informants within the prison population. In fact, many interrogation sessions were not designed to generate immediate admissions, but to serve as precursors for the sources' resultant conversations with peers.213\n96 |\n\nStephens recognized the practical and legal distinction between POWs\nand spies. Th e former knew of their protections under the Geneva Convention and thus responded less to pressure. In looking at the Vietcong we will see a class of combatants who oft en bridged the divide between POWs and spies. As such, Stephens' observations regarding both categories of sources are pertinent.\n\n209 Camp 020, 107-109.\n210 Camp 020, 8.\n211 Camp 020, 118.\n212 Camp 020, 113.\n213 Camp 020, 120-124.\n\npermission, 3 June 2008.\n\n## Hanns Scharff\n\nPerhaps the most esteemed of all wartime interrogators, Hanns Joachim Scharff  served with the Luft waff e (German Air Force) during World War II. From 1943 to 1945 Scharff  was responsible for interrogating U.S. and British airmen captured during combat missions over German-occupied Europe. Scharff  collaborated with author Raymond F. Tolliver to recount his interrogation exploits in a book titled Th e Interrogator: Th e Story of Hanns Scharff , Luft -\nwaff e's Master Interrogator.\n\nAlthough the Luft waff e and Allied POWs came to regard Scharff  as a singularly capable interrogator, Scharff 's emergence as one was largely accidental. When World War II broke out in 1939, Scharff  was happily employed in South Africa as the Director of the Overseas Division of Adlerwerke, a large German manufacturing fi rm. While vacationing in Germany during the summer of 1939, Scharff  was unable to return home aft er the outbreak of war. He was eventually draft ed into the German Army in 1943, then transferred to a translators' school because of his language skills, and ultimately assigned to the Luft - waff e Intelligence and Evaluation Center, Auswertestelle West, near Frankfurt, Germany. Th ere, Scharff  would capitalize upon the ten enjoyable years he had previously spent with Britons in England and South Africa. Indeed, Scharff 's understanding of the English language and British culture also stemmed from a more personal source: Scharff  was married to the daughter of a British squadron leader who as a fi ghter pilot had fought against Germany in World War I.\n\n\"Poker Face\" Scharff  was revered for his ability to convince enemy fl yers that he possessed encyclopedic information about them and their units. Th erefore, he would request prisoners simply \"confi rm\" information he ostensibly possessed in order to verify that they were legitimate POWs, not spies. Indeed, Scharff  did know a good deal about the fl yers and their units because he was aided by an extensive intelligence apparatus that methodically exploited fl yers' captured documents, intercepted radio transmissions, analyzed crash sites, combed Allied news publications, employed prison \"stool pigeons,\" and coordinated with German intelligence agents.\n\nWith fl yers' identities and truthfulness now \"proven\" through their disclosure of additional intelligence, Scharff  would tell prisoners their interrogations were concluded. Scharff  would then disarm and entertain his prisoners by sharing jokes, meals, cigarettes, and outdoor recreation with them. On one occasion, Scharff  even arranged for an enemy fl yer to pilot a German ME-109 fi ghter (albeit with little fuel and no armament). With their defenses lowered, fl yers would reveal information about themselves and their units that Scharff would use as leverage during later interrogations of future prisoners. So convincing was Scharff 's ruse of \"knowing all\" that many prisoners mistakenly believed their units in England were thoroughly infi ltrated by German spies.\n\nAlthough Scharff  benefi ted professionally from his collegial relations with prisoners, he appeared to enjoy their company and respect them as equals. So cordial was Scharff  that, like one of our featured interrogators, Sedgwick Tourison, he became a counterintelligence concern to his government. Perhaps the greatest validation of Scharff 's collegial approach is that many of his former enemies welcomed him as a compatriot. Aft er the war Scharff  emigrated to the U.S., where he pursued a third career and became a renowned mosaic artist.\n\nIn commenting on the attributes critical to an interrogator, Scharff  listed the following natural qualities: ambition, uprightness, conscientiousness, and a naturally ingratiating demeanor. Scharff 's writings imply an imperative that the interrogator be someone whom a source would view as an intellectual and social equal. Otherwise, the interrogator would have little ability to establish rapport with the source. Th us, Scharff  recommended that interrogators pursue a comprehensive general education and gain specialized life experiences of direct benefi t to their interrogation responsibilities. Scharff  also placed great emphasis on writing abilities, noting that an interrogator's worth could be measured by the number of quality intelligence reports he produced.214\n\n## Sherwood F. Moran\n\nFor a quarter century prior to World War II, American Sherwood Moran served as a Christian missionary in Japan. During this lengthy period he developed a sincere love for the Japanese people and their culture. However, he was deeply concerned by Japan's burgeoning militarism and requested a commission in the U.S. Marine Corps following Japan's attack on Pearl Harbor. Moran's intimate knowledge of the enemy made him a rare and tremendous asset to the Marines. Moran excelled as an interrogator during the Guadalcanal campaign and sought to share his approach with colleagues by writing an impassioned letter titled \"Suggestions for Japanese Interpreters Based on Work in the Field.\" Th e letter, dated 17 July 1943, encouraged interrogators to treat Japanese prisoners with humanity and sincerity since they were no longer active combatants. Moran characterized the ideal interrogator as follows:\nHe should be a man of culture, insight, resourcefulness, and with real conversational ability. He must have \"gags\"; he must have a \"line.\" He must be alive; he must be warm; he must be vivid. But above all he must have integrity, sympathy; yet he must be fi rm, wise (\"Wise as serpents but harmless as doves\"). He must have dignity and a proper sense of values, but withal friendly, open and frank. Two characteristics I have not specifi cally mentioned: patience and tact. 215\nMoran stressed that it was extraordinarily helpful for the interrogator to have lived in Japan, beyond simply knowing the country's language. Both attributes were essential to Moran's strategy of developing relational rapport aft er getting \"into the mind and into the heart of the person being interviewed.\"216 Moran encouraged interrogators to make the prisoners' troubles the center of conversation during warm, informal conversations that would be held over cigarettes or tea. In such an environment the interrogator was understandably encouraged to dispense with drab questions in favor of fl attering and entertaining ones that would nonetheless elicit desired intelligence. Clearly such animated conversations required a great deal of energy from the interrogator, who was cautioned to limit the duration of each encounter lest he become stale. In the unusual event of a stand-offi  sh prisoner, Moran advised the interrogator to \"shame\" the prisoner for his/her lack of courtesy, knowing from his experience in Japan that a prisoner would typically strive not to be shamed.\n\n100 |\n\n## Michael Koubi\n\nFor 21 years Michael Koubi served in Israel's General Security Services\n(Shabak). As the agency's chief interrogator from 1987 to 1993, he interrogated hundreds of Palestinian extremists. Koubi attributes his interrogation successes to four factors: meticulous preparation through review of background materials, mastery of the language spoken by Palestinian prisoners (Arabic), investigative follow-up to interrogations, and theatrics. Koubi explained his interrogation strategy during separate interviews with Michael Bond and Mark Bowden.\n\nNew Scientist published Bond's interview under the title of \"Th e Enforcer.\"217\nBowden's interview formed a part of his larger feature, \"Th e Dark Art of Interrogation,\" in the journal *Atlantic*.218\nPrior to beginning an interrogation session, Koubi sought to know everything possible about the prisoner's background, neighborhood, associates, and interests. For example, when Koubi interviewed the former leader of Hamas, Sheikh Yassin, he prepared by memorizing much of the Koran. Th e purpose of such arduous preparation was to create a sense that the interrogator was all-knowing, wise, and in control. Koubi explained, \"It's about making them (prisoners) think they cannot hide anything from you.... If you feel your detainee is wiser than you and you cannot stand head to head then you must change interrogators.\"219\nIn his youth, Koubi discovered a love for language and learned to speak Yiddish, Hebrew, and Arabic. He was so fl uent in Arabic that during interrogations he would frequently utilize diff erent regional dialects of Arabic to convince prisoners that he was familiar with the areas from which they hailed. Koubi complemented his language capabilities with an equally impressive penchant for acting and social engineering. For instance, he would cleverly arrange for prisoners to overhear their fellow prisoners making confessions that would seemingly implicate the prisoner under interrogation. In other cases Koubi would engineer ruses to convince prisoners that he would be willing to torture them if they did not cooperate. In fact, Koubi claims he never tortured, although he acknowledges using stress positions, slapping, and shaking to stun or soft en prisoners.\n\nKoubi claims that he was able to obtain intelligence from virtually all of the individuals he interrogated. In instances where he could not obtain a confession he would oft en inform prisoners their interrogations were fi nished. Th e prisoner would be returned to the general prison population, where Koubi had planted informants, or \"birdies,\" who would engage the prisoner in conversations that led to disclosure of the information the prisoner had carefully safeguarded from Koubi.\n\n## Common Th Reads\n\nTh e literature review suggests wartime interrogators benefi t greatly from using supporting assets such as informants, technical monitoring, databases, and background investigation. Also, all of the interrogators acknowledged that for the best results each prisoner must be treated as a unique case.\n\nScharff , Moran, and Koubi were aided by intimate familiarity with the cultures and languages of their prisoners; Stephens' prisoners generally spoke English by virtue of their assignments as alleged spies in Britain. Nonetheless, Stephens was highly traveled and multilingual. Scharff  and Moran clearly felt some aff ection for their adversaries aft er having lived in their homelands for many years. Despite lacking intelligence backgrounds, both quickly learned the interrogator's trade.\n\nUnlike his counterparts, Koubi found an advantage in the occasional use of physical violence. Stephens stressed the importance of tense confrontation to generate crippling psychological pressure on enemy spies. By contrast, Moran and Scharff  generally focused on the advantages of building warm and collaborative relationships with enemy prisoners. Each of the interrogators found enough merit in his respective approach to advocate it through publication of memoirs, training aids, and interviews.\n\nWhile the literature review focused upon all types of wartime interrogation, the nature of the Vietnam confl ict narrows our focus to interrogation of enemy insurgents who generally waged asymmetrical warfare. Nonetheless, the personal attributes and interrogation techniques identifi ed can be generalized within several broad categories that will inform the case studies of DeForest, Herrington, and Tourison. Th ese general categories, listed below, will comprise the organizing foci for the upcoming case studies.\n\n- Motivations\n for Interrogator Success: What factors motivated the\ninterrogators to excel? Possible fi ndings include professional ambition, mental challenge, ideology, patriotism, competitiveness, and strong feelings toward the enemy.\n\n102 |\n- Personal Disposition and Interpersonal Communication Abilities:\nWhat innate talents and life experiences facilitated the interrogators' development of interpersonal communication skills? Possible fi ndings include sheer intellect, acting ability, empathy, academic study, formal training, and participation in complex interpersonal relationships.\n\n- Cultural and Linguistic Expertise:\n Did the interrogators possess\nunusual insights into the culture and language of their adversaries? If so, possible contributing factors include foreign language training, foreign work experience, and relationships with foreigners.\n- Development of Tradecraft\n (Training and Experience): How did the\nsubjects learn to conduct interrogations? Possible infl uences include\nformal interrogation training, self-directed study, law enforcement experience, mentorship by peers, benchmarking of foreign counterparts, and real-world experimentation.\n\n- Application of Tradecraft :\n In what manner did the subjects conduct\ninterrogations? Th is discussion will highlight the subjects' interrogation abilities and identify the strategies contributing to their successes or failures. Possible fi ndings include use of leverage from external\nresources such as technical monitoring or informants, unusual rapport with sources, implied or explicit threats of harsh treatment, subversion of sources' ideological assumptions, and use of incentives to manipulate sources' evaluation of alternatives.\n- Diff usion of Knowledge\n to Peers and Subordinates: Did the interrogators\nsucceed in teaching peers to replicate their successes? Possible examples of diff usion include mentorship, organizational leadership,\nformal training venues, publication of memoirs, public commentary on U.S. interrogation practices, and academic teaching.\n\n## Sedgwick Tourison: A Case Study\n\n[A] persistent shortage of trained, Vietnamese-speaking interrogators had seriously curtailed American eff orts to exploit human sources.... Sergeant Sedgwick Tourison deserves special mention. His professionalism and dedication to duty were consistently outstanding. He proved to be invaluable in key interrogations on numerous occasions.220\n- Major General Joseph A. McChristian\n\n## A Travelin' Man\n\nIn late 1958, young Sedgwick Tourison left  Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, to begin his military career as a \"ditty bop\" trainee (Morse intercept operator) at Fort Devens, Massachusetts. Assigned to the Army Security Agency, Tourison saw much of the world during the next three years. Postings to Italy, Germany, and Turkey enabled him to travel broadly, even leading to an unsuccessful engagement to a lovely resident of Pordenone, Italy.221\nIn 1961 Tourison reenlisted for a second term of three years. Required to select a crypto-center specialist assignment in Asia, Tourison relied upon the advice of his grandfather in choosing Saigon: \"Th at's in Indochina, you know...\n\nGood looking women, lots of French, you'll love it!\"222 Shortly aft er arriving, Tourison celebrated his 21st birthday as one of only several hundred American service personnel then in Vietnam. In hindsight, given the massive U.S. buildup that occurred between late 1965 and 1968, Tourison mused that his Post Exchange (PX) card number indicated that only about 900 Americans had preceded him to Vietnam.223\n\n## Getting To Know The Vietnamese\n\n104 |\nIn April 1963 Tourison married Ping, a nineteen-year-old Vietnamese native of Chinese ancestry. However, this marriage to a foreign national prohibited Tourison from continuing to work in the sensitive cryptologic world. Th erefore, he and Ping left  Vietnam for Monterey, California, where Tourison attended one year of Vietnamese language training at the Defense Language Institute (DLI). Learning Vietnamese tapped into Tourison's love for foreign languages, enabling him for the fi rst time to excel in an academic setting. Previously, Tourison had studied French and Spanish at Girard College in Philadelphia, and had mastered Italian thanks to his earlier engagement and his travels in Italy.\n\nTourison returned to Saigon in July 1965 and initially fi lled a radio operator position before securing a transfer to a translator position on the intelligence staff  (J-2) of MACV. Unlike his service comrades, Tourison was accompanied to the combat zone by his wife and their newborn son, Kenneth. While superiors criticized Tourison's decision, he and his grandfather would have it no other way. Aft er all, Ping was still a Vietnamese citizen and could not be prevented from accompanying her husband at personal expense.224\n\n## Congratulations, Interrogator\n\nAft er three weeks at MACV J-2, Tourison was detailed as a translator/\ninterrogator to the Vietnamese J-2's Military Interrogation Center (MIC). He prepared for his new interrogator responsibilities by reading interrogation reports, as well as Army fi eld manuals on intelligence interrogation (FM 30-15) and general military intelligence (FM 30-5). Tourison quickly found the interrogation manual was poorly suited to the counterinsurgency environment, since it had been written in preparation for confl icts that resembled World War II. To develop a detailed understanding of the complex political situation involving North Vietnam and the Vietcong, Tourison consulted frequently with an experienced colleague, James Potratz.225 Despite these consultations, Tourison found he was oft en hamstrung by his inability to understand the political and battlefi eld lexicon of the communists.226\n\"Linguistically speaking, the United States was not prepared for Vietnam in 1965,\" notes Tourison.227 While the U.S. clearly did not have nearly enough Vietnamese linguists, the Defense Department also failed to prepare the few it had to hit the ground running in Vietnam. None of Tourison's instructors at DLI was well-versed in the political and battlefi eld terminology of the Vietcong. Consequently, Tourison and other colleagues found they needed 6-9 months of in-country on-the-job training to bolster their language abilities and become fully eff ective interrogators. Considering that standard military tours in Vietnam lasted only 12 months, Tourison found this training lag reduced operational eff ectiveness. Th e Army circumvented this delay in 1966 when it eliminated the requirement for deploying interrogators to receive Vietnamese language training.228\n\n## Th E First Test\n\nIn September 1965 Operation BIG RED, carried out by the U.S. Army's\n173rd Airborne Brigade, presented Tourison with his fi rst opportunity to conduct unsupervised interrogations. BIG RED was designed to disrupt Vietcong operations in the Long Nguyen Secret Zone, approximately 45 miles northwest of Saigon. Following the French withdrawal in 1955 the Secret Zone became a command and supply center for the Vietcong, whose fi rm control of the area was never seriously challenged by Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) forces. Because the 173rd Brigade lacked any interrogators with Vietnamese language fl uency, the MIC contributed a deployable \"Go Team\" to support the Brigade's assault on the Secret Zone.229\nDuring the 173rd's initial sweep through a village within the Secret Zone, its troops captured two young girls clad in black pajamas who were blindfolded, restrained, and then transported to the 173rd's forward headquarters. Th ere, Tourison interrogated one of the two girls while an ARVN lieutenant interrogated the other. Tourison began by gathering basic biographical information from his prisoner, who appeared nervous. Th e prisoner's capture tag indicated her claim to be a 15-year-old cook. Noting the prisoner's unease, Tourison removed her blindfold while leaving her arms tied behind her back.230\nTourison questioned the prisoner's claimed age, telling her that her developed chest was not that of a fi ft een-year-old. Th e prisoner laughed and promptly admitted she was actually eighteen. Th e prisoner proceeded to tell Tourison that her presence in the Vietcong village was a result of falling in love with a young Vietcong agent who had withheld his full identity from her. Following her Vietcong boyfriend had resulted in her becoming employed as a cook at his Vietcong camp. Tourison gave the prisoner a piece of paper and pencil and directed her to draw a diagram of the camp where she was captured.\n\nWishing to coordinate his preliminary fi ndings with the ARVN lieutenant who was interrogating the other girl, Tourison left  his prisoner in the care of a military policeman (MP). Tourison found the lieutenant in the midst of screaming, \"You're lying, you stupid motherfucker!\" at the other girl. Clearly, the interrogation was not going well. Th e ARVN lieutenant broke off  his interrogation and joined Tourison, along with another American and an ARVN\ninterrogator, to discuss strategy over a quick meal.231\nDuring the meal the ARVN personnel took the liberty of sharing general interrogation tips with their U.S. colleagues. Being new to the fi eld, Tourison listened attentively as his counterparts made the following points:232\n1.    Th e girls were unlikely to know anything of perishable value. 2. Even truthful Vietcong sources never knowingly provided information that might bring harm to their immediate family or close friends. Th erefore, an unspoken accommodation was advisable. Truthful Vietcong sources should not be asked questions pertaining to their inner circle if they disclosed signifi cant information about distant acquaintances.\n\n3.  Prisoners' fear level must be carefully regulated. If they became too frightened they would invent false information in hopes of pleasing the interrogator. 4. Civilians in Vietcong territory faced a perilous situation aft er interrogation by ARVN or U.S. forces. Th e Vietcong punished villagers for suspected collaboration. 5.  Th e interrogator should seek to learn everything about a source by carefully examining his or her personal possessions, clothing, and physical condition (scars, calluses, tan lines). Such clues oft en bolstered or undermined sources' claims of identity.\n\nUpon resuming interrogation of the female Vietcong prisoner, Tourison applied the cultural knowledge gained from his ARVN peers. During the fi rst hour of the renewed interrogation, the prisoner proclaimed ignorance of topics about which she was presumably knowledgeable. Tourison recalled another bit of advice previously received from the ARVN lieutenant: Prisoners who claimed the \"3 No's\" (\"Know Nothing. Hear Nothing. See Nothing.\") were generally withholding information or claiming a false identity. Realizing he must change course, Tourison began laughing aloud. Th e prisoner was puzzled but said nothing. \"Th e three no's (*tam khong*),\" said Tourison as he continued to laugh. Th e prisoner smiled girlishly, then began to chuckle as well. Tourison sensed an opportunity and used bluster to enhance his bona fi des and leverage:233\n\nYou see, we're not as completely stupid as we might appear. We know the Vietcong very well. We know how they think and what they think. Take me, for example. I was born in Hai Phong. My parents were missionaries and I learned Vietnamese from playing with Vietnamese children. We left  with the last group\nto fl y out of the air base at Son Tay in April 1955. So you see, I'm not just another stupid foreigner with a long, high nose. I know you think the information you might give me will cause a lot of your friends to be killed, but let's face it, they're all gone. We aren't going to send bombs down on your old base\ncamp if no one is there. Sure, we have lots of ammunition, but\nthat would be wasteful. Nothing you can say now will cause\nany harm to come to your friends, so I'm going to let you think\nabout what I've said. You know I'm telling the truth, and there is no reason for me to lie to you. You've been captured, and all we're trying to do is determine whether you're the kind of person we want to *treat kindly because you're truthful or* whether\nyou're *a liar who must be dealt with by much harsher means*.\nTh e choice is up to you.\" (Emphasis added) 234\n\nTourison walked away from the prisoner and left  her to contemplate her situation. Meanwhile, Tourison checked the status of document exploitation (DOCEX) eff orts underway with materials seized by the 173rd at the camp where the two female Vietcong suspects were captured. Potratz, the other interrogator/interpreter, had determined that the camp in question was likely a provincial headquarters for the military, party committee, and the Liberation Front. Armed with this knowledge, Tourison and Potratz resumed interrogation of the Vietcong suspect.235\n\n108 |\nIn the ensuing session, the prisoner disclosed that she belonged to the Vietcong and that she and her female colleague had been ordered to remain in the camp because they could not travel as quickly as the other Vietcong personnel, who fl ed in anticipation of an American raid. Expecting that U.S. forces would not permanently occupy the Vietcong camp and would release the two girls, the Vietcong commander instructed the girls to return to camp the following morning and prepare breakfast for the other Vietcong, who would also return at daybreak. Th is meant that Vietcong forces would be returning to the camp in less than eight\nhours.236\n\nTourison rewarded the newly cooperative prisoner with food as he continued eliciting information from her. During a conversation about cooking, the prisoner subsequently disclosed that her Vietcong comrades typically ate breakfast beginning at 0530 hours in a clearing behind the camp's cultural school. Following his conversation with the prisoner, Tourison captured this perishable information in a spot report, which he supported with an oral briefi ng to the\n173rd's intelligence section (S-2). Tourison then concluded a long day's work by falling asleep in his tent.237\nAt daybreak Tourison awoke to the sound of outbound mortar and artillery fi re. Drawing on his intelligence, the 173rd had shelled the Vietcong camp and subsequently launched a follow-up ground assault. As suspected, U.S. troops found that Vietcong forces had returned to the camp with their documents, equipment, and radios shortly before being savaged by simultaneous rounds of artillery. Th e U.S. forces found extensive blood trails from wounded Vietcong fi ghters and captured many items abandoned near the camp. Th ese items were later exploited for their intelligence value. Th us, Tourison's persistent application of his peers' advice had resulted in a prisoner's unwittingly disclosing perishable intelligence that led to a signifi cant tactical defeat for her comrades.238\nAmong the many items captured at the camp were personal history statements about the various Vietcong personnel. Among them was a document pertaining to the prisoner Tourison had interrogated. When confronted with her personal history statement, the prisoner began to weep. Slowly, she corrected a variety of untruths she had previously communicated to Tourison. Contrary to her earlier statements, she had been a Vietcong member for three years, and was serving as a cook *and medic* at the Vietcong provincial headquarters. Tourison never sought to force the prisoner to admit she had lied to him. Instead, he allowed her to \"correct\" her previous statements. Both of them now understood that Tourison's documentary leverage was suffi  cient that she must cooperate in the hope of securing leniency. Not unexpectedly, the prisoner disclosed far more information than her personal history statement contained, because she could not be certain that other captured documents would not off er additional information about her.239\n\n## Developing Interrogation Expertise\n\nOperation BIG RED was only the fi rst of many in which Tourison would assist before leaving Vietnam in the summer of 1967. By combining interrogation work at the Saigon MIC with tactical interrogation support and DOCEX, Tourison steadily increased his understanding of the Vietcong and interrogation. He found value in the urgency that combat support gave to his work. As he noted, it was sometimes easy for interrogators in Saigon to forget that less than an hour away U.S. military personnel were engaged in fi erce fi refi ghts with Vietcong forces. Comprehensive and timely human intelligence could easily spell the diff erence between life and death in the fi eld. Despite self-imposed pressure for quick results, Tourison almost always relied upon gentle treatment and rapport. In only one interrogation did he report using a physical stress position to coerce tactical information from a defi ant source.240\nTourison's cumulative interrogation accounts reveal that he was tenacious and fl exible. Using pragmatic psychology and his encyclopedic knowledge of the Vietcong, he frequently baited sources by dangling infl ammatory statements before them. Whether questioning their competence or honor, Tourison frequently managed to elicit unexpected amounts of intelligence. Tourison explained:\nTh e fi rst step in breaking your source is getting him to talk.\n\nTh e one who clams up is just passing time; once they start to open up it's a diff erent matter. You have to talk about anything, the more controversial the better, any controversial item is bound to get some type of response.241\nWhile operating in the vicinity of Ben Suc the First Division came upon an individual who ran away aft er seeing the troops. One of the troops pursued and tackled the suspect, who put up such a fi ght that all his clothes were torn off .\n\nAft er binding the naked prisoner, the First Division delivered him to Tourison. At fi rst, the angry prisoner screamed viciously at Tourison but then subsided into total silence aft er noting he was not \"allowed to talk.\" Th is was an unusual development: the suspect was the fi rst in 18 months who had refused to talk with Tourison.242\n110 |\nOn the basis of the prisoner's silence, Tourison suspected he was a communist party member. Aft er all, regular fi eld soldiers were not instructed by their superiors to remain silent in the face of interrogation, for the simple reason that only offi  cers and communist party members were considered knowledgeable enough to warrant silencing.\n\nNoting that the prisoner (P) had a deformed hand of which he was obviously self-conscious, Tourison (TS) asked \"What's the matter with your hand?\"\nP: \"Nothing.\" TS: \"What do you mean 'nothing'? It looks like a claw! What's the matter, can't your stupid Vietcong doctors fi x it?\"\nP: \"If it wasn't for you Americans, I wouldn't have my hand looking this way. You and your artillery. Stop! I don't want to talk about it.\"243\nIn this fashion, Tourison continued to press his attack against the prisoner's weakness. Eventually the prisoner began a tirade about being shelled twice by the Americans even though he was only a \"journalist.\" Alternating between compassionate off ers of U.S. medical care and antagonistic questions, Tourison soon obtained information on the location and defenses of a Vietcong hospital.244\nLater, Tourison sought to exploit the prisoner's claimed identity. He challenged the prisoner to prove his journalistic abilities by writing a story describing how he had been wounded. Again, the prisoner took the bait and gave up too much information by placing a masthead at the top of his \"newspaper article.\" Th e masthead fi nally unraveled the identity of the prisoner: he had revealed his offi  ce location and his position on its editorial staff .245\n\n## Th E Gulf Of Tonkin Incident\n\nAs Tourison alternated between tactical and strategic interrogations, many interesting opportunities came his way. In the summer of 1966, General McChristian directed Tourison and a colleague to travel to Da Nang and assist the U.S. Navy, which was holding 19 prisoners from the North Vietnamese Navy (NVN) captured aft er the U.S. Navy sank their PT boats during an engagement in the Gulf of Tonkin. Tourison and Master Sergeant Grady Stewart traveled to Da Nang and boarded a Navy support ship where the prisoners were detained. Although the Navy had planned to send two additional Marine interrogators, their travel was delayed. Operating on their own, Tourison and Stewart began by collecting the prisoners' identifying information and reviewing background intelligence on the NVN. Additionally, Tourison and Stewart arranged for the prisoners to receive cigarettes and food more like their normal diet.246\nShortly aft er beginning their interrogations, they received notice that the highest-ranking prisoner, an NVN division commander named Tran Bao, requested to be debriefed by U.S. intelligence. Without further encouragement, the commander provided voluminous information about his navy, including the hidden locations of its vessels. Th e NVN commander was angry with his government for not seeking a negotiated resolution to disagreements with the U.S. Furthermore, he was infl uenced by CIA propaganda he had previously received, and doubted that North Vietnam could prevail militarily against the U.S.247\n| 111\nBefore Tourison and Stewart could arrange to transmit the intelligence received, the Navy ordered them to cease interrogations and communications until its Marine interrogators arrived 48 hours later. Undeterred, Tourison requested permission to continue \"chatting\" with the prisoners, rather than interrogating them. Th e captain of the Navy ship agreed, not recognizing that \"chatting\" is interrogation. By the time the Marine interrogators arrived, Tourison and Stewart had identifi ed the cooperative prisoners, which left  their colleagues with slim pickings and an uphill struggle.\n\nWith the Marines now on the scene, the ship's communications personnel were permitted to transmit the intelligence reports by Tourison and Stewart. Th e pair's fi rst report was over 100 pages long and took an entire day to transmit. On the basis of this information, collected in only 72 hours, the U.S. Navy's 7th Fleet launched air strikes that sank most of the craft  operated by the NVN.\n\nFollowing the fi rst wave of air strikes, the prisoners reviewed aerial reconnaissance photos with Tourison and Stewart. Amazingly, they cheerfully identifi ed additional targets and recommended new reconnaissance fl ight paths for fi nding the few NVN craft  that remained afl oat.248\nTourison's and Stewart's debriefi ng of division commander Tran Bao also led them into politically sensitive discussions about the mysterious Gulf of Tonkin incident that fi rst led President Johnson to order air strikes against North Vietnam in August 1964. Bao held unique insights on the incident because he had written the NVN's Aft er-Action Report. He explained that the U.S. Navy claims of being attacked by NVN torpedo boats in international waters on 4 August were ridiculous. First of all, Bao explained that the NVN attack boats lacked suffi  cient range to attack in international waters. Second, Bao had been responsible for monitoring NVN torpedo stocks at the time of the incident, and none was expended at the alleged time of the attack.249\nAft er senior U.S. Navy commanders in Hawaii read the details of the incident in Tourison's and Stewart's fi rst report, they issued a terse warning message: \"YOU WILL NOT REPEAT NOT DEBRIEF FURTHER CONCERN-\nING THE GULF OF TONKIN INCIDENT.\"250 Of course, Tourison could not resist the temptation to learn more about the incident from Bao, although he wisely refrained from reporting what he discovered in subsequent intelligence reports.251\n\n112 |\n\n## Focus And Frustration\n\nTourison's single-minded focus on acquisition and expedient transmittal of intelligence sometimes landed him in trouble with superiors more mindful of military protocol. In one instance, Tourison transmitted time-sensitive intelligence documents under his own signature, rather than that of his supervising offi  cer, because the latter was unavailable to sign the documents. When the supervisor learned of Tourison's action, he lambasted him before recalling the intelligence and signing it personally.252\nSimilarly, Tourison became frustrated by his successors' seeming disregard of the lessons he and other Vietnamese linguists had learned through experience. As the U.S. intelligence apparatus expanded throughout 1966 as part of the overall\n\"Americanization\" period of the war, U.S. interrogators were transferred to Vietnam from Europe. Th ough experienced, not a single one spoke Vietnamese or had any signifi cant appreciation of Asian culture. Tourison and his ARVN colleagues came to feel they were being pushed aside as U.S. intelligence became less concerned with Vietnam's cultural and linguistic intricacies and began to conduct a one-size-fi ts-all intelligence campaign.253 Forced to share a small pool of female Vietnamese interpreters, the non-fl uent interrogators were never able to bond suffi ciently with their interpreters to create the shared understanding needed for optimal results. Th us, delays in translation left  the interrogators unable to control the atmosphere during interrogations.254\n\n## Sharing Interrogation Knowledge\n\nIn the summer of 1967 Tourison completed his tour as an interrogator and returned to the U.S. A respected mentor, Colonel Ajima, whom he visited at Fort Holabird in November 1967, suggested that Tourison record all his observations about Vietnam and interrogation before forgetting them. Th roughout December\n1967 Tourison frenetically draft ed the manuscript that would later be titled Talking with Victor Charlie: An Interrogator's Story, observing that \"[I]f my children and grandchildren learn something from it, it will have served its purpose.\"255 Yet, for the next 22 years the draft  manuscript remained unpublished among Tourison's personal papers. Finally, in 1991, Tourison shared his experiences when Ivy Books published the manuscript for the benefi t of his successors, who oft en had little recollection of Vietnam or the lessons it off ered for counterinsurgency interrogation.\n\n## AsiaA Lifelong Commitment\n\n| 113\nTourison's fascination with Asian culture and language would drive the remainder of his career. Before retiring as a chief warrant offi  cer, Tourison served a third Asian tour in Th ailand and Laos from 1970 to 1974. He continued his quest for knowledge by studying Mandarin Chinese at DLI and in 1975 completed his Bachelor of Arts degree in political science (he is currently enrolled in a master's program). As a civilian, Tourison served as a GS-14 civil servant in the Special Offi  ce for POW/MIA Aff airs at the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA). Tourison and Ping now live in Maryland, where Tourison works in the court system as a Vietnamese interpreter.256\nIn retirement, Tourison has frequently commented on issues pertaining to Vietnam and the U.S. veterans who served there. For instance, he has supported requests for compensation submitted by Vietnamese civilians and U.S.\n\nveterans exposed to Agent Orange during the war.257 In addition, Tourison has advocated practical improvements to relations between Washington and Hanoi. Specifi cally, he advocated a constructive (non-punitive) U.S. Government position vis-a-vis Hanoi's requirement that religious organizations in Vietnam register with the government.258 He has also assisted a Vietnamese publishing house obtain the rights to publish Western books for the Vietnamese market. Tourison believes that Vietnam's increasing engagement with the world will lead the country to become a responsible global citizen. In short, Tourison holds no ill will toward the people of Vietnam and welcomes constructive opportunities for Vietnam veterans and their former enemies to heal from the wounds of a long war.259 In Tourison's case, these unseen wounds include a 90 percent offi  cial disability due to post-traumatic stress disorder and diabetes, which he believes were caused by exposure to Agent Orange.260\n\n## Tourison's Recipe For Success\n\nTh e classical theorist Sun Tzu encouraged soldiers to know their enemies. Th is is the primary objective of the intelligence professional, and Sedgwick Tourison pursued it with fervor. His enthusiasm resulted directly from his love for the Vietnamese language and a sincere desire to understand all aspects of Vietnamese society. Th e resulting knowledge easily off set Tourison's lack of formal interrogation training and made him a precious commodity, as demonstrated by General McChristian's praise.\n\nWith his encyclopedic knowledge of the Vietcong and their language, Tourison was adept at reading contextual clues to gauge sources' areas and lev-\n\n114 |\n256 *Talking with Victor Charlie*, 260-261, and author's biography.\nels of knowledge. Skillfully using basic psychology, he convinced sources they would receive better treatment if they cooperated. In cases where this motivation failed to prompt a dialogue, Tourison used carefully calculated mockery and controversy as a catalyst for discussion. Whenever feasible, Tourison also used his linguistic abilities to leverage documentary evidence that would bolster interrogation eff orts.\n\nRefl ecting upon his interrogation experiences during an interview with the researcher, Tourison highlighted one questioning technique that he found particularly eff ective for quickly screening large populations that contained suspected insurgents from outside the local area. Th e \"Must KnowShould KnowCould Know\" or \"Th ree Questions\" technique requires each member of a screened population to answer three questions tailored to their claimed identity. For instance, an individual claiming to be a local rice farmer must know how to plant rice, *should know* the name of the local pharmacy, and could know the name of the local insurgent commander. Such a screening approach separates \"the wheat from the chaff \" by focusing the interrogator's attention upon outsiders who lack the answers they should have known if they were truly locals. Tourison believes the technique might help his successors in Iraq and Afghanistan, if they are not already using it.261\n\n## Stuart A. Herrington: A Case Study A Reluctant Warrior\n\n\"I didn't want to go to Vietnam,\" admits Stuart Herrington.262 As a student of political science and international relations during his undergraduate and graduate education in Florida, Herrington understood the profound diffi  culties encountered by French forces in Vietnam during the 1950s. Consequently, he doubted America's ability to prosecute a war there successfully and counted himself as a\n\"dove\" even as America's involvement began in the early 1960s.263\nIn 1967 Herrington completed his university education and was commissioned through the Reserve Offi  cer Training Corps (ROTC) as a military intelligence offi  cer in the Army. While attending the Army's Infantry School and Intelligence School, Herrington oft en heard battle-experienced instructors respectfully describe the Vietcong, or \"Ol' Charlie,\" as brave and clever. Fully expecting an assignment to Vietnam aft er training ended, Herrington was surprised and relieved to receive orders for Germany. He greatly enjoyed his two years in Berlin and, aft er completing his ROTC service commitment, separated from the Army to avoid an assignment to Vietnam.264\nAft er seven mind-numbing months as a Procter & Gamble265 detergent sales manager charged with executing his company's \"Make W.A.R. (We Are Relentless), not Love\" campaign, Herrington once again saw the allure of military service and requested a recall to active duty. Th is time, he vowed to focus diligently upon his careerwhich he knew would lead him immediately to Vietnam. To prepare, he attended the Tactical Intelligence Offi  cer and Military Assistance Training Advisor (MATA) courses before undertaking eleven weeks of Vietnamese language training. Knowing that his duties as an advisor to the South Vietnamese Army would require in-depth knowledge of the language, Herrington demonstrated his careerist orientation by sacrifi cing three weeks of leave for additional voluntary language training. Fueling his eff orts was a growing interest in Vietnam, despite his continued pessimism as to whether the U.S. would achieve its objectives.266\n\n## Unexpected Setbacks\n\nAs a Phoenix Program267 advisor in Hau Nghia province, Herrington was responsible for advising the South Vietnamese military and its police\n116 |\n262 Stuart A. Herrington, *Silence Was A Weapon: The Vietnam War in The Villages* (Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1982), xv. Cited hereafter as *Silence Was a Weapon*.\n\n263 *Silence Was a Weapon*, xv-xvi. 264 *Silence Was a Weapon*, xvi. 265 **NOTE:** Bryan Vossekuil, a Senior Member of the ISB Educing Information Study, has noted that some Israeli interrogators are specifically recruited from sales and marketing backgrounds. Herrington noted to the researcher that he did not find his Proctor & Gamble experience helpful because sales pitches were generally \"canned\" (scripted).\n\n266 *Silence Was a Weapon*, xvi-xviii. 267 **NOTE:** The Phoenix Program was a joint U.S. and South Vietnamese effort to identify and neutralize members of the rural Vietcong shadow government by fusing the intelligence and operational capabilities of South Vietnam's local governments, police, and militias. During the \"Vietnamization\" period of the war, U.S. military officers were assigned as advisors to members of the South Vietnamese government.\n\ncounterparts as they coordinated initiatives to \"neutralize\" (kill, capture, or convince to surrender) Vietcong insurgents in Duc Hue district. Proximity to Vietcong staging areas in Cambodia made his area of responsibility one of the most infi ltrated districts in South Vietnam. For instance, Vietcong leaders cited one of Duc Hue's four villages, Tan My, as a \"model revolutionary village.\" Th is proclamation greatly irritated Herrington's hard-charging boss, Colonel Jack Weissinger, who made it abundantly clear to Herrington that he expected quick and decisive improvements in Tan My.268\nHerrington's hopes for the Phoenix Program quickly vanished. Standing in the way of Vietcong neutralizations were the South Vietnamese government offi  cials Herrington sought to support. However, he would not understand this puzzling lack of dedication among his allies until he cast aside Phoenix responsibilities and began unilateral debriefi ngs of Vietcong defectors. He reasoned that if the South Vietnamese government would not aggressively tackle the Vietcong, he *would*. Aft er all, Colonel Weissinger expected results one way or another. Although Herrington was not trained as an interrogator, his general intelligence training had prepared him to spot, assess, and handle defectors. Th ese mistrusted individuals would open his eyes to the realities of Vietnam.269\n\n## Comprehending The Real Vietnam\n\nNguyen Van Dung (\"Hai Chua\") had been the Vietcong village secretary of Hiep Hoa village before defecting to the South Vietnamese government via the *Chieu Hoi* (\"Open Arms\") program.270 As a \"rallier\" to the government, Dung was required to admit his identity and Vietcong position in exchange for amnesty and protection from his former colleagues. To prepare him for life as a productive citizen of the republic, the government gave him months of political reindoctrination. However, while the *hoi chanh* (defectors) were potential gold mines of intelligence, the government was generally lukewarm about debriefi ng these \"traitors.\" In Dung's case, South Vietnamese offi  cials briefl y questioned him but ceased their eff orts when he politely declined knowledge of recent Vietcong operations in his former village.271 Herrington hoped that Dung would respond to a more assertive debriefi ng eff ort by an American and made plans to conduct it himself.272\nSeeking to make Dung comfortable during two months of intensive debriefi ngs, Herrington secured a hospitable facility and modest funds to reimburse Dung for his time and to provide refreshments. Additionally, Herrington wore civilian clothes and worked without the assistance of a translator whenever possible; many sources were uncomfortable speaking through an interpreter because, unlike the American interrogator, the interpreter was perceived as a potential Vietcong informant.273 To ensure that he would command Dung's respect at their fi rst meeting, Herrington conducted research on the Vietcong movement in the rallier's former village of Hiep Hoaresearch that would also lessen the likelihood that Dung could mislead him. In pursuit of this goal, Herrington arranged to debrief simultaneously one of Dung's former associates who had defected during the same time frame. However, Herrington did not immediately inform Dung that his information would be corroborated.274\nHerrington's intensive preparation and safeguards proved benefi cial, because Dung attempted to lie early in their relationship.275 Aft er Herrington showed that he could not easily be misled, Dung became an invaluable source who opened Herrington's eyes to the harsh, but oft en hidden, realities of the insurgency in Vietnam. American failures to understand these realities had oft en hamstrung eff orts to build eff ective collaboration with South Vietnamese allies.\n\n1. Local government offi  cials oft en chose not to combat the Vietcong presence aggressively for two reasons. First, they feared that acknowledging a strong Vietcong presence in their jurisdiction would refl ect poorly upon their leadership performance. Second, offi  cials tacitly accommodated the Vietcong so that they would not be targeted for assassination. Typically, the Vietcong only murdered government offi  cials whom they perceived as threats to their revolutionary goals. Finally, offi  cials wished to preserve an uneasy peace in their villages to protect constituents from bloodshed.276\n2. Past occupations and interventions by China, Japan, and France, and now by the U.S., caused Vietnamese villagers to perceive themselves as perpetually under siege by foreigners. Th ey would not report Vietcong actions to the government because doing so could subject a fellow Vietnamese to persecution by the government's foreign allies.277\n3. Th e \"Vietnamese way\" demanded that the Vietnamese conceal their contempt for foreigners, such as their U.S. advisors. Th erefore, South Vietnamese offi  cials fl ashed the \"Asian smile\" and nodded agreement with their advisors' suggestions, only to disregard them in many cases.278 For example, this had been the case when Herrington proposed expansion of the Phoenix Program to his South Vietnamese counterparts. 4. Most villagers' loyalties shift ed with the political winds. Until it became clear whether the government or the communists would win the war, most villagers would diligently attempt to appease both sides. Th us, a villager might attend a nighttime Vietcong rally and then participate in government elections the next day. Not surprisingly, both the communists and the government held unrealistic views of their popular support.279\n5. Th e corrupt and heavy-handed South Vietnamese government was Hanoi's best ally. Villagers' frustration with the national government led most to tolerate, and a few to support, the Vietcong. In particular, the government's land reform and mandatory relocation policies angered the populace, which had watched its leaders repeatedly raid public funds for personal gain.280\n6. Th e Vietcong strategy allowed a minority of communist elites to control most of South Vietnam's rural areas by creating the sense that Vietcong were omnipresent. In a fi gurative sense they werebecause villagers could never be certain that their associates were not Vietcong informants. Moreover, fearing for their safety, government offi  cials would frequently allow themselves to be gradually frozen out of areas that the Vietcong could then more easily infl uence through propaganda and fear. As the Vietcong solidifi ed their control of an area their operatives could tax the harvests of local farmers to support operations elsewhere.281\nArmed with a new understanding of these realities, Herrington used another *hoi chanh*, Nguyen Van Phich, to create and manage a large network of informants in Tan My, the \"model revolutionary village.\" As a native of Tan My, Phich was related to many of its inhabitants, and had worked with many of its Vietcong operatives while previously serving as the executive offi  cer for the Vietcong local force company. Wounded twice, Phich had rallied to the South Vietnamese government aft er his forces were savaged in the Tet Off ensive and he became convinced that the communists could not prevail. Beginning in the spring of 1971, Phich traveled almost daily into Tan My to obtain information in exchange for cigarettes, food, and payments from Herrington. Armed with the resulting intelligence, an aggressive province chief, Colonel Th anh, launched military operations against the Vietcong and succeeded in breaking their hold on Tan My. Sadly, as oft en happened to those who aggressively pursued the Vietcong, both Th anh and Phich were assassinated shortly thereaft er.282\n\n## A Personal War\n\nTh e deaths of Th anh and Phich weighed heavily upon Herrington, for whom the war had now become very personal. No longer was Herrington simply trying to please his demanding superior offi  cer and return home alive; he was now fi ercely committed to preserving the freedom of his South Vietnamese friends:\n[M]any of us (Americans) found ourselves undergoing an irresistible tendency to identify with our counterparts. We even came to regard their districts and villages as our own, and to resent the Vietcong interlopers just as much as if they were penetrating the parks in our own hometowns and threatening our own wives and children, rather than the rice farmers of a land thousands of miles from home. (Explanation added to the original in parentheses.)283\nIn keeping with his newfound commitment, Herrington voluntarily extended his tour in Vietnam to complete the task of rolling back Vietcong infl uence in Duc Hue.\n\n282 Silence Was a Weapon, 62-75 and 136-138. 283 Silence Was a Weapon, 73.\n\n## Benchmarking Guru Deforest\n\nHerrington's commitment and success were recognized by his new supervisor, Lieutenant Colonel Gerald Bartlett, who requested that Herrington move to Bao Trai and become his advisor at the provincial level. In this new position, Herrington had opportunities to benchmark the accomplishments of another U.S. intelligence offi  cer in his vicinity, Orrin DeForest (see aforementioned case study).284 As the CIA's lead interrogator in Bien Hoa, DeForest enjoyed tremendous success in debriefi ng Vietcong defectors and prisoners because he earned their trust and aff ection. DeForest shared his strategy and methods with Herrington, who immediately applied them to a project of his own.285\n\n## Befriending The Enemy: Do Van Lanh\n\nAs the sole survivor of a decimated North Vietnamese Army unit, Do Van Lanh attracted Herrington's admiration by his bravery and spirit. Despite witnessing the annihilation of his unit, running out of ammunition, and sustaining a head wound, Lanh had surrendered only reluctantly to South Vietnamese troops. He was clearly committed to the powerful Nguyen Hue off ensive then threatening South Vietnam's survival.286\nFollowing his capture, Lanh underwent interrogation by a South Vietnamese colonel commanding the ARVN's 25th Division. In front of an audience including Herrington, Lanh made a fool of his haughty interrogator by nonchalantly defl ecting incoming questions and then defi antly asking embarrassing questions of the interrogator. Impressed by the plucky NVA prisoner, Herrington requested custody of him for an unorthodox experiment in interrogation and agent recruitment.287\nUpon receiving custody of the prisoner one hour later, Herrington extended his hand and introduced himself in Vietnamese. Th e scrawny 5'4\"\nprisoner was astonished that Herrington spoke his language and planned to take him to his own house for several days. Further, to the amazement of the South Vietnamese captain who released Lanh, Herrington did not want the uncharacteristically reserved Lanh to be shackled. Instead, Herrington motioned for the prisoner to walk with him.288\nHerrington and Lanh fi rst stopped at the home of a Filipino doctor who treated an undressed shrapnel wound below Lanh's eye. Aft erward, Herrington brought Lanh to his personal quarters, where Herrington provided him with a fresh meal, tea, a shower, and new civilian clothes. Herrington then showed Lanh to his room, directly across from Herrington's own. As he entered his new quarters, Lanh became wide-eyed at the sight of a television. Although the TV received only the American Armed Forces station and the Saigon government station, Lanh was enraptured. Needing to return to his workplace, Herrington informed Lanh that he regretted having to lock the bedroom door, but that Lanh could summon one of the house guards if he needed to visit the bathroom. Before he left , Herrington instructed the guard staff  to treat Lanh as a member of the family.289\nWhen he returned to his offi  ce Herrington retrieved Lanh's South Vietnamese interrogation report. Lanh had claimed he was a nineteen-year-old native of Ha Tinh village in southern North Vietnam who had been draft ed into North Vietnam's 271st Regiment one year earlier. He stated that he had attended basic training before his unit began its 100-day infi ltration movement into South Vietnam and had contracted malaria while traversing the Ho Chi Minh Trail southward, which sidelined him in a Cambodian dispensary until shortly before his capture. In fact, Lanh asserted he had not yet experienced combat, other than the brief battle leading to his capture. 290\nDuring the following week at the villa, Lanh avoided speaking to Herrington because he remained afraid of him. Instead, he struck up conversations with the Vietnamese guards and the maid. Finally, Lanh realized that Herrington would not harm him and began to ask him about his pay, his M-16, and his personal life. Herrington freely answered Lanh's questions but did not ask any himself.291\nAt the end of the fi rst week, Herrington took Lanh to the central market in Bao Trai so he could buy toiletries and even exchanged Lanh's North Vietnamese currency for the local currency. Lanh was astonished by the immense variety of goods at the market; he had never seen anything similar in North Vietnam. Aft er shopping for an hour, Lanh pledged not to attempt escape and the two ate together at a public restaurant.292\n\n122 |\nIn the face of Herrington's hospitality, Lanh began to relax, smile, and\neven joke. Nonetheless, he was understandably confused by his unanticipated circumstances. Aft er cornering Herrington at their residence, Lanh asked, \"How long will I be living here with you, Dai Uy (Captain)? .... I don't under-\nstand what is going on.\"293 Sitting Lanh down, Herrington took advantage of Lanh's concern to advance a nuanced recruitment pitch.294\nHerrington said that he had been impressed by Lanh's resilience under interrogation and that his bold performance proved he had the intelligence to perceive the realities of South Vietnamif only someone took the time to expose him to them. Noting the traumatic nature of Lanh's capture, Herrington explained that he had not questioned his prisoner because he wanted to facilitate his recovery. He reassured Lanh that he would not be questioned about his comrades because he would obviously not betray his friends. However, he would need Lanh's help if he were to save him from the POW camps. Herrington elaborated on the kind of help he desired by explaining that he sought to restore peace to Vietnam by fi rst obtaining an understanding of the views held by North Vietnamese soldiers like Lanh.295\nLanh expressed enthusiasm for Herrington's proposal and thanked his host for not seeking information about his former comrades in the 271st Regiment. He thanked his host for his kind reception and noted that he shared the goal of peace between North and South Vietnam. He agreed to answer all of Herrington's questions honestly, and subsequently poured out his life story.296\nWhile growing up in the North, Lanh had been indoctrinated continually in the virtues of communism. Teachers had convinced him and his classmates that Southerners lived \"under the brutal heel of the Americans and their puppets.\" Video footage of abused Southerners and passionate speeches by Ho Chi Minh stirred up patriotic outrage in North Vietnam, and attracted many youngsters to the \"solemn mission\" of \"liberating\" their South Vietnamese brothers. At eighteen, Lanh volunteered for the military and began the journey that led him southward into Herrington's hands.297\nHerrington made no eff ort to correct Lanh's stated beliefs. Instead, he sought to challenge Lanh's world view with a strong dose of reality. Th e television had already begun to shake Lanh's beliefs, and a trip to Saigon promised to compound his confusion. Days later, as the two drove toward the city in Herrington's jeep, Herrington suddenly pulled off  the highway near a large clay quarry. Stopping, Herrington grabbed his M-16 rifl e and climbed out. Lanh remained in the jeep with a puzzled look on his face. Herrington motioned for Lanh to join him but Lanh looked uncertain. Finally, he complied.298\nHerrington chambered a round and then shoved the rifl e into Lanh's hands, telling him, \"Go ahead and fi re it into the quarry. Go ahead. It's on automatic. Fire it. We've got to get to Saigon.\"299 Pivoting toward the quarry, Lanh fi red 20 rounds in two quick bursts, laughed, and returned the weapon while commenting \"It's light and doesn't kick like my AK-47.\"300\nAs they continued their drive to Saigon, Lanh began laughing again and then confi ded: \"Did you know, Dai Uy, that when you stopped the jeep back there, I thought for a second that you were going to shoot me? I was scared to death when I got out of the jeep.\" In response, Herrington began to laugh as well, \"You were scared! What about me? I'm the one who gave a POW a loaded M-16. I was so scared that my hands were sweating. You could have easily killed me on the spot.\"301\nDetour aside, the two arrived in Saigon to experience the joys of a cosmopolitan city. Flower-lined streets, music, bustling traffi  c, beautiful girls, markets overfl owing with goods, and a delectable lunch overwhelmed Lanh's senses. He had never experienced anything like Saigon in the police-state North. Herrington's account highlights the trip to Saigon as a pivotal moment in his relationship with Lanh: they now trusted one another.302\nShortly aft er returning from Saigon, Lanh and Herrington talked throughout nearly the entire night. Kind treatment, a television, and the sights of Saigon had completely altered Lanh's life-long conception of the South and Americans. Lanh expressed frustration that he had been propagandized in the North. Th e South was nothing like what he had imagined and its people did not want to be \"liberated.\"303\nTo capitalize upon Lanh's dismay, Herrington showed Lanh 8\" x 10\" photos of 65 North Vietnamese corpses. Lanh recognized many of the men as his former comrades, who had been butchered in battle due to the gross incompetence of their commander. Next, Herrington showed Lanh the captured aft eraction report of the incompetent commander, who had reported a \"great victory\" in which NVA troops had \"completely overrun\" a government outpost and killed \"twenty-nine puppet troops.\" Lanh was sickened by the obvious lies of the NVA\ncommander, who had concealed the self-infl icted slaughter from superiors.304\n124 |\nHerrington explained that Lanh's dead comrades \"died for a lie\" that had nearly killed Lanh as well. He urged Lanh to help him reverse the North's ongoing Nguyen Hue off ensive, of which Lanh was a small part, presenting him with stark alternatives. On the one hand, he could cooperate and retain his freedom; on the other, he could be released into normal POW channels. If he were included in a prisoner exchange, he might even have the pleasure of \"carrying an AK-47 down the Ho Chi Minh Trail for the second time.\" Herrington left\nLanh to ponder his choices during the coming day.305\n\n299 Silence Was a Weapon, 164.\n300 Silence Was a Weapon, 164.\n301 Silence Was a Weapon, 164.\n302 Silence Was a Weapon, 165-166.\n303 Silence Was a Weapon, 167-170.\n304 Silence Was a Weapon, 167-170.\n305 Silence Was a Weapon, 167-170.\n\n## Th E *Real* Do Van Lanh\n\nIn the evening, Lanh announced his choice as he sat on a sofa with Herrington. He wanted to help Herrington reverse the Nguyen Hue off ensive and bring peace to Vietnam. Moreover, he revealed the *real* Do Van Lanh. In vivid contrast to his previous statements, Lanh disclosed he was really a 22-year-old sergeant, with three years of military experience, which included training in elite sapper-reconnaissance operations. He admitted that he had not sat out the war in a dispensary aft er contracting malaria.306\nDespite misgivings, Lanh helped Herrington to direct air strikes against the locations where his unit had infi ltrated into South Vietnam. Soon thereaft er, aircraft  destroyed a command post, bunker complex, and abandoned rubber plantation inhabited by the NVA. In addition, the strikes savaged a platoon of enemy sappers. On another occasion, Lanh agreed to don his old NVA uniform and become a stool pigeon for Herrington, who needed to obtain order of battle intelligence from a captured NVA prisoner who refused to disclose his unit. Lanh quickly acquired the confi dence of the NVA prisoner and aft er two hours left  the prisoner's cell knowing the identity of his unit as well as its objectives and remaining capabilities. Lanh took no pleasure in such work and Herrington was careful not to remind him of its grisly results.307\nWhile Lanh's disclosure and elicitation of tactical information were clearly signifi cant, he also gave Herrington and U.S. superiors a new understanding of the enemy's psychology. So novel was the idea of a co-opted NVA soldier that Lanh was invited to share his thoughts with senior U.S. leaders in Vietnam. On one occasion, the former NVA sergeant even briefed President Nixon's personal envoy to Vietnam, Juan Trippe.308\nTo reward Lanh for his services, Herrington took the unusual step of lobbying the South Vietnamese for Lanh's freedom. However, as the war ground on endlessly, the South Vietnamese government draft ed Lanh into its army. As an M-16-carrying rifl eman, Lanh was injured during an ambush by his former comrades. Although he survived the attack, it is unlikely that he survived the war. As NVA troops swept through South Vietnam in 1975, they captured records of the defector program in which Lanh had taken part. Th e NVA forced defectors to return to their original units and receive punishment from their former peers.309\nAgainst his wishes, Herrington was ordered to return to the U.S. in the summer of 1972. While the Army had granted Herrington's requests for tour extensions on two occasions, it now required him to receive additional intelligence training stateside so that he could advance in his career.310 Still, Herrington did not put Vietnam aside for long. In 1973 he returned to monitor enforcement of the Paris Peace Accords that ended direct U.S. involvement in South Vietnam. However, the North would have nothing of peace until it completed its relentless drive to \"liberate\" the South. In April 1975, the communists fi nally overcame the many setbacks dealt to them by the United States and occupied Saigon. Th ere, Herrington and his former mentor, Orrin DeForest, were busy evacuating their South Vietnamese acquaintances and sources before fl eeing from the U.S. Embassy by helicopter.\n\n## Sharing Painful Lessons\n\n126 |\n\nIn 1982 Herrington published *Silence Was a Weapon* to educate Americans about why their nation lost the Vietnam War. Central to Herrington's thesis was analysis of the Vietcong insurgency at the village level. Herrington's keen understanding of the insurgency stemmed from his development of close interpersonal relationships with defectors such as Nguyen Van Dung and Do Van Lanh. Th ese relationships yielded signifi cant intelligence as well. By virtue of fl uency in Vietnamese, burning curiosity, and zealous dedication, Herrington came to understand the dilemmas of the Vietnamese people as well as any American reasonably could.\n\n## Into The Limelight\n\nCaptain Herrington enjoyed a successful military career and quickly became *Colonel* Herrington as he rose to a senior position in the Army's Military Intelligence branch. By directing military interrogation eff orts during Operation JUST CAUSE (Panama) and DESERT STORM (Iraq), Herrington had ample opportunity to apply the interrogation lessons he learned in Vietnam. In both instances, he instituted a large-scale \"guest house\" approach that obtained cooperation from 8090% of his sources.311\nAft er retiring from the Army in 1998, Herrington leveraged his counterespionage skills to protect the frequently counterfeited technologies of Callaway Golf. In his spare time, Herrington now occasionally writes op-ed pieces regarding the Iraq War and interrogation. Th ese pieces, along with two additional books *(Peace with Honor? An American Reports on Vietnam, 19731975*; and\n311 Interview of Herrington.\n\nTraitors Among Us: Inside the Spy Catcher's World) have solidifi ed Herrington's position as an expert on interrogation, counterinsurgency warfare, and counterintelligence. Th e national media routinely consult Herrington about these topics.312\nIn November 2006 Herrington lent his expertise to the group Human Rights First when he and a few other experienced U.S. interrogators visited producers of the television show \"24.\" Th e program distressed Herrington and Human Rights First because it frequently portrayed protagonist Jack Bauer violating U.S. laws by torturing terror suspects. Herrington provided the producers with a list of 17 legal interrogation techniques in an eff ort to help \"24\" producers more accurately depict the interrogation techniques typically used by professionals.313\nOn two occasions, Herrington has accepted U.S. Army requests to assess its interrogation operations. Aft er viewing interrogations at Abu Ghraib and Guantanamo Bay, he became a vocal critic of existing U.S. interrogation strategies. He remains frustrated by his nation's failure to develop a dedicated strategic interrogator corps and eschew the coercive interrogation methods that he believes run directly counter to U.S. strategic objectives in the GWOT. 314\nIn the absence of a strategic interrogator corps, Herrington took a practical step to infl uence U.S. interrogation practices. Herrington recently agreed to assist the Army in training its newly formed interrogation unit, the 201st Military Intelligence Battalion. Created in response to the Abu Ghraib controversy, the 201st MI Battalion consists predominantly of junior enlisted personnel. In the summer of 2006, Herrington helped to prepare these new interrogators for deployment to Iraq by providing them with three full days of training at Fort Hood, TX, where he lectured on his Vietnam experiences, as well as on the lessons off ered by Hanns Scharff .315\n\n## Orrin Deforest: A Case Study\n\nSource: David Chanoff, PhD, co-author with Orrin DeForest of Slow Burn: The Rise and Bitter Fall of American Intelligence in Vietnam (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1990). Used with written permission of the co-author, 30 May 2008.\n\n\"So this is how it happens...this is how the United States bugs out,\"316\nthought Orrin DeForest as he surveyed the panicked evacuation of his nation's embassy in Saigon. On 29 April 1975, DeForest's Vietnam years came to a disillusioning end despite his brilliant execution of intelligence operations during the preceding seven years. As North Vietnamese troops occupied the city, DeForest and other U.S. personnel escaped by helicopter but, despite his earnest eff orts, most of DeForest's loyal Vietnamese informants and friends were left\nbehind to be executed or condemned to brutal \"reeducation\" camps by the victorious communists.317\nBeginning in 1968, DeForest served as a supervisory interrogator and spy handler for the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in Vietnam's Military Region III. With his groundbreaking work during these diffi  cult years, DeForest provided a template for the successful penetration and neutralization of an insurgency. His methodologies came to be widely emulated by his American\n| 129\nand South Vietnamese peers. As noted earlier, one of those admiring adherents was Stuart Herrington, who credits DeForest with teaching him to interrogate eff ectively.318\n\n## Life Experience\n\nWhen Orrin DeForest began his CIA assignment in Vietnam as a 45-yearold, he brought a great deal of useful life experience to bear. He had begun his military career as a tail-gunner in a B-29 Superfortress assigned to bomb Nazi targets in Europe. Aft er returning to civilian life in a California aircraft  factory, the Korean War motivated DeForest to reenlist and become a Special Agent for the Air Force Offi  ce of Special Investigations (AFOSI). In this role, he developed skills essential to conducting interrogations, investigations, and counterintelligence operations.319\nWhile stationed with AFOSI in Japan, DeForest conducted investigations jointly with the Japanese National Police (JNP), whose counterintelligence mission resembled that of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) in the U.S. DeForest credited the JNP with teaching him to conduct counterintelligence investigations properly and admired the way in which they pursued\n\"Total Information\"320 in their eff orts to undermine Soviet espionage activities.\n\nBy making extensive use of databanks and wiring diagrams, the JNP detected relationships and trends that otherwise would have escaped their attention. DeForest incorporated such techniques as cornerstones of his intelligence work in Vietnam; today these tools are central to U.S. eff orts to identify and track terror networks.321\nDeForest's assignment in Japan ignited a lifelong interest in the Japanese language and in Asian culture. He studied Japanese at the University of Maryland and in a year-long course at the Foreign Language Institute, becoming fl uent in the language. Soon thereaft er, DeForest obtained his Bachelor of Arts degree in Far Eastern History from Sophia University in Japan. While pursuing the degree he also indulged his lifelong interest in the philosophers Aristotle and Plato.322\n130 |\nFollowing his tenure with AFOSI, DeForest transferred to the Army's Criminal Investigation Division (CID) as a warrant offi  cer. CID assigned him to Vietnam from 1966 to 1967. As an investigator in Vung Tau, and then an investigative supervisor in Qui Nhon, DeForest came to know the country that would become his home for nine years. However, DeForest never became fl uent in Vietnamese as he was in Japanese; at most, he would learn to speak about\n100 native words. DeForest's tenure with CID marked the completion of his 20-year military career and prepared him for additional service in Vietnam as a contractor to the CIA.323\nDuring his fi rst tour in South Vietnam, DeForest was dismayed by the National Police's lack of professionalism. In what proved a precursor to his later experiences with the South Vietnamese government, DeForest found the National Police obstinate in their refusal to employ the modern investigative techniques taught by their American advisors. While this could be attributed to pride, DeForest was amazed to fi nd that most of the National Police spent their supposed duty hours looking aft er their private business interests rather than those of the Vietnamese public.324\n\n## Breaking A Broken Mold\n\nDeForest came to value his own military, investigative, and academic experience when he joined the CIA in 1968. Expecting to be wowed by the\n\"First Team\"325 of intelligence, DeForest was instead dismayed by the ten weeks of unrealistic and irrelevant training that CIA headquarters provided to the contractors it had hired to work in a war zone. Hoping to be more impressed by the status of CIA operations on the ground in Vietnam, DeForest instead became more concerned as he received briefi ngs at the CIA Station in Saigon. Amazingly, the CIA did not have a single asset within the Vietcong. Instead of obtaining intelligence by penetrating the Vietcong with spies, the CIA had instituted four largely ineff ectual programs that made for impressive window dressing during briefi ngs to policymakers: Provincial Reconnaissance Units, the Census Grievance Program, the Rural Development Program, and Special Branch Police Operations and Training.326\nIn short order DeForest learned he was to support the last of these programs as the chief interrogator for Military Region Th ree. In this newly created position, he was charged with standing up the Provincial Interrogation Center (PIC), located 15 minutes north of Saigon in Bien Hoa. As the chief interrogator, he was expected to oversee interrogations of Vietcong prisoners housed at the PIC, train South Vietnamese interrogators, and spot prisoners who could be recruited as informants and used to infi ltrate their former Vietcong units.327\nTo help him in his work, DeForest was assigned a contingent of four\n\"experts\" from the Vietnamese Special Branch. Unfortunately, these \"experts\" were teenagers. Exasperated, DeForest managed to have them confi ned to the PIC while he assessed CIA collection eff orts throughout Region Th ree. On one visit to the PIC, DeForest walked in on his \"experts\" as they interrogated an approximately 15-year-old female prisoner. To aid questioning, the experts had forced a broomstick into her vagina.328 To his disgust, DeForest discovered that torture was a common interrogation technique among his South Vietnamese counterparts in the PICs because their failure to collect and catalogue intelligence for use in interrogations had resulted in a lack of leverage over prisoners. For this reason, DeForest eschewed future joint interrogations with the South Vietnamese.329\nDuring two weeks of home leave in San Diego, California, DeForest thought extensively about how to develop a successful interrogation and agent recruitment eff ort in Bien Hoa. He found the answer by refl ecting upon the\n\"Total Information\" approach espoused by his Japanese mentors. Returning to Vietnam in the spring of 1969, DeForest pitched an ambitious plan to the CIA Chief of Base, Loren Snowcroft , to create and populate a massive intelligence database on the Vietcong. He proposed interrogation of Vietcong defectors (hoi chanh).330\nMany thousands of *hoi chanh* were detained in *Chieu Hoi* or \"Open Arms\"\ncenters aft er \"rallying\" to the South Vietnamese government with potentially valuable intelligence information. Previously, the U.S. military had exploited this intelligence opportunity but the CIA had not.331 Without informing CIA\nsuperiors in Saigon, Snowcroft  and DeForest reallocated resources from the existing CIA programs to establish a small interrogation facility at the Bien Hoa Chieu Hoi Center.332\n\n## Building The Interrogation And Recruitment Center\n\nDeForest attacked the considerable task of developing an interrogation center with vigor. Using psychological testing derived from the work of Dr. John Gittinger at CIA, DeForest selected Vietnamese personnel for training as interrogators and taught the trainees how to establish relational rapport with interrogatees by treating them with sincerity and kindness. Because interrogatees typically expected at best a lukewarm reception from their former South Vietnamese enemies, the kindly attitude displayed by DeForest's interrogators was a surprising and welcome relief. As a result, even reluctant defectors would frequently provide intelligence on former comrades still with the Vietcong.333\nDeForest's focus upon cultivating the trust and friendship of interrogatees proved key to obtaining intelligence. Generally, this approach entailed warm meals and recreation for interrogatees. Such empathy and kindness came naturally to DeForest: \"[T]his approach was something I felt especially strongly about, partly because I really was sympathetic.... I wasn't at all sure that if I\nhad been in these villagers' places I wouldn't have been VC myself.\"334 DeForest clearly understood that the corruption of the South Vietnamese government had driven many decent people to join the Vietcong in the hope of securing a more promising future.\n\nTo simplify the process of selecting interrogatees who would likely provide useful information, DeForest developed a biographical screening form that all of the *hoi chanh* fi lled out prior to interrogation. Oft en, DeForest would also direct the *hoi chanh* to complete psychological profi les, which would provide interrogators with clues on how to establish rapport with them.335\nAs DeForest's interrogators began making inroads with the *hoi chanh*, the benefi ts of cataloguing the resulting intelligence became obvious. DeForest taught his administrative staff  how to build a massive card index database that allowed interrogators to verify and contextualize information provided by interrogatees. Over time, the database evolved into an encyclopedia of knowledge on the Vietcong's structure and personnel. Such knowledge markedly bolstered interrogators' eff ectiveness because they could focus collections, detect deception, and speak with greater authority.336\nDue to notable interrogation successes, DeForest's operation expanded from a handful of personnel in the summer of 1969 to over 30 staff  members. To accommodate the growth, DeForest eventually moved the operation to a new facility known as the Joint Interrogation Center (JIC). Here, four teams of three interrogators and two translators conducted compartmentalized interrogations and asset management under the tutelage of CIA personnel. Ten administrative assistants then added the intelligence to the now massive database. At any one time, the facility housed 50-60 sources and off ered medical care as well as entertainment via American television and movies. So advanced was the new facility that DeForest was able to monitor covertly the interrogations conducted by his subordinates, which allowed him to detect the rare occasions when his interrogators fabricated reports.337\nIn typically unorthodox fashion, DeForest used his large personal residence as an annex to the JIC. He would frequently invite potential sources and their interrogators to relaxed gatherings at his home, where his live-in Vietnamese mistress, Lan, would prepare drinks and fresh meals. However, as will become apparent, Lan actually served a more important function in the intelligencegathering eff ort by helping to assuage the reservations of prospective female sources who felt uncomfortable speaking to male interrogators. To accomplish this, Lan would host the sources as long-term guests in the DeForest home, assess their personalities, and provide guidance to their interrogators.338\nDeForest's interrogation operation was both comprehensive and eff ective, as the following section illustrates.\n\n## Recruiting \"Grandpa\"\n\nIn 1973 South Vietnamese police conducting routine searches of persons at a checkpoint discovered a young woman who was transporting one million piasters (South Vietnamese currency) hidden under her clothing.339 Aft er beating her, the South Vietnamese gave the prisoner to DeForest for interrogation. DeForest immediately recognized her importanceshe belonged to a secretive courier network known as B-22, which over the past eight years was estimated to have transported roughly $150 million from Cambodia to Vietcong forces throughout South Vietnam.340 DeForest had known about the network for the preceding 18 months, but despite painstaking investigative eff orts he had not identifi ed an opportunity to penetrate it.341\nTo further his objective, DeForest drove the young woman to his residence, where he instructed Lan to take tender care of her. For several days Lan cared for the demure prisoner while engaging her in innocuous conversation. Th ough casual, this conversation yielded valuable information such as the prisoner's name (Th i Nam) and village.\n\nAs Th i Nam's comfort level increased, DeForest introduced her to his most accomplished Vietnamese interrogator, Bingo. In the hope of developing rapport, Bingo discussed only neutral topics with her. Aft er a few days, Th i Nam revealed that she had previously been frightened of Americans and could not believe they had invited her into their home instead of putting her in jail. She asked Bingo to inform her family that she was safe despite her sudden disappearance. As he did in many other cases, DeForest passed a reassuring message to the girl's family.342\n\n134 |\nPleased with Th i Nam's increased receptivity, Bingo made a carefully\ncalculated pitch to her. Bingo told Th i Nam that he would like her to confi rm\nthe identities of the other couriers in the B-22 network. In reality, Th i Nam would not be confi rming the identities; she would be the fi rst to provide them\nto DeForest's interrogators. Bingo assured Th i Nam that American intelligence had no interest in apprehending her friends in the lowest rungs of the B-22 network, but wanted to identify its senior members. Bingo's pledge was sincere, but it was off ered in tandem with an unspoken threat. If Th i Nam did not cooperate she would likely be returned to the South Vietnamese police, who would certainly treat her in a less collegial fashion. Furthermore, if she did not assist the Americans in working their way into the upper echelons of B-22 they were likely to arrest the low-level members they claimed to have already identifi ed, and such an arrest would snare Th i Nam's friends. Faced with this stark choice, Th i Nam identifi ed twelve other couriers and the chief of the network: a seventy-fi ve-year-old man whom DeForest codenamed \"Grandpa.\" So central was Grandpa to the funding of Vietcong operations that he reported directly to a member of the Vietcong's Central Offi  ce for South Vietnam (COSVN). 343\nAs luck would have it, Grandpa's actual grandchild, \"Liem,\" had defected from the Vietcong to the South Vietnamese government 18 months earlier and was one of the guest sources housed at the JIC. Liem had provided some intelligence, but had withheld the fact that his grandfather was a senior Vietcong operative. DeForest now confronted Liem and compelled him to devise a suitable method for contacting Grandpa. Liem did not want to betray his grandfather, but knew that he would have to do so in order to preserve the comfortable lifestyle that DeForest had provided for Liem's immediate family in Bien Hoa. Liem agreed to send his wife, Ly, to visit Grandpa in Cut Trau with a ruse designed to bring Grandpa to a public area in Saigon. Ly was to tell Grandpa that his grandson Liem was ill in a Saigon hospital. Th ere, Grandpa would be quietly arrested by the South Vietnamese Special Police and interrogated by DeForest's team at a safe house.344\nGrandpa fell for the ruse and was soon facing DeForest's star interrogator, Bingo. Th e interrogator could scarcely believe that the man sitting in front of him was the mastermind of the infamous B-22 fi nance network; Grandpa was\n\"an absolutely typical old peasantpajamas, straw hat, rubber sandals, teeth stained black from chewing betel. With his wrinkled skin and ruined mouth, he seemed even older than his seventy-fi ve years.\"345 Even though Grandpa had never attended a single day of school, he was personally entrusted with fi nancing much of the Vietcong war eff ort and managed B-22 with great skill and diligence. For eight years he had kept his operations from being penetrated; he had evaded South Vietnamese checkpoints by selecting elderly ladies to transport currency. Th e South Vietnamese did not search these older women because of their low profi le, and because Grandpa ensured they possessed identifi cation cards issued by the South Vietnamese government.346\nBecause Grandpa was a hardline ideologue, Bingo knew that he would have to work a small miracle in order to recruit the older man in only two or three days - before COSVN would realize he had been captured. If this happened, DeForest would have no hope of penetrating COSVN and ascertaining its future war plans. To demonstrate that U.S. intelligence already knew all about B-22, Bingo confronted Grandpa with the extensive information provided by Th i Nam. Even as he did so, Bingo maintained respectful deference to Grandpa, referring to him as *bac* (uncle). To complement his friendly tone, Bingo also ensured that Grandpa was well fed. However, he accompanied the kind treatment with a frank threat to turn Grandpa over to the abusive South Vietnamese police and withhold future access to grandson Liem and his family. He made the thought of never seeing Liem again even more disturbing to Grandpa by not revealing that Liem was not actually ill. Grandpa quickly agreed to become a spy. As a reward, Bingo informed Grandpa that his grandson was not ill aft er all and allowed him to see Liem and his family.347\nAft er Grandpa had spent several minutes with Liem, DeForest joined the recruitment session. Giving Grandpa an aff ectionate pat on the shoulder, DeForest expressed professional admiration for the elderly man's skilled management of the B-22 network. Greatly surprising Grandpa, DeForest off ered not to arrest members of the network. While the ever-helpful Lan cared for Grandpa's greatgrandchildren, DeForest outlined his proposal. Grandpa would continue to operate B-22 as if nothing were amiss, but would be required to provide DeForest with advance notice of COSVN's off ensives in the Saigon area. Meanwhile, DeForest would protect Grandpa as well as Liem's family. Grandpa agreed to the arrangement and until war's end in 1975 kept U.S. intelligence apprised of Vietcong funding, operations, and political developments.348\nDescribed by DeForest as an \"adrenaline junkie,\" Grandpa delighted in the intrigue, challenges, and danger of espionage.349 Even as it became obvious in 1975 that South Vietnam was about to fall to invading North Vietnamese forces, Grandpa declined DeForest's off ers to evacuate him from Vietnam. Mindful of his age, he pointed out that the Vietcong were unaware of his collaboration with DeForest and would treat him as a hero aft er the war. Sadly, this was not to be. South Vietnamese forces fl ed from advancing North Vietnamese forces without destroying their records of Grandpa's collaboration with DeForest. Th e elderly man was almost certainly killed for his collaboration with the CIA.350\nFollowing his unhappy return to California, DeForest married his beloved Lan and campaigned publicly to ease the suff ering of Vietnamese refugees. Aft er making a public address he was approached by a member of the audience, David Chanoff . As an accomplished author and biographer, Chanoff immediately recognized that DeForest had a powerful story to tell. \"You've got a book in you,\" Chanoff  told DeForest.351 Later, the two began collaboration on Slow Burn: Th e Rise and Bitter Fall of American Intelligence in Vietnam.352\nSlow Burn details DeForest's methodology and accomplishments in an entertaining fashion, although the book is arguably marred by DeForest's frequent denunciation of personal rivals. Nonetheless, it off ers keen insights to a complex man whom his daughter described as \"hilarious, personable, likeable, focused and super patriotic.\"353 In fact, DeForest's former wife amusedly described him as a \"master manipulator\" who nearly always found an indirect path to his goals.\n\nAs a 4-year-old, the \"master manipulator\" amazed his parents by exhibiting salesmanship when dealing with his 2-year-old brother, Bud. As the boys played together one day at their home in rural California, Orrin coveted the tricycle Bud was riding. Orrin retrieved a stale piece of bread from their house and off ered to trade it to Bud for use of the tricycle. Aft er Bud declined, Orrin returned to the house, where he tore the piece of bread into smaller pieces that completely fi lled his hands. He then re-approached Bud with his new off ering. Th is time, Bud gave up the tricycle for the same piece of bread. Yet, DeForest's skill meant that his acquaintances never *felt* manipulated.354\nAsked to describe DeForest's professional demeanor, Herrington aff ectionately characterized his former mentor as \"ingenious, crusty, irascible, blunt, and uncompromising.\" He observed that, when DeForest was given a mission he believed in, he \"would move mountains to accomplish it.\" However, DeForest's considerable accomplishments and confi dence led him to resist supervisors' oversight, which he saw as petty meddling.355 By contrast, just as DeForest coddled sources, he treated his family gently and rarely argued with loved ones. Julie DeForest notes that her father had absolutely no stomach for disciplining children and was incapable of saying \"no.\"\nHis Vietnam experience had ravaged the compassionate side of Orrin DeForest. As his book makes clear, DeForest left  the rooft op of the U.S. Embassy in Saigon with feelings of extreme guilt, loss, and anger. DeForest felt personally responsible for the sad fate of his sources and railed against his nation's abandonment of the South Vietnamese who had helped the U.S. His unhappiness with U.S. political leadership and the CIA led him to resign and enter into a disillusioned retirement. Aft er the USSR's invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, the CIA contacted DeForest and asked him to organize interrogation operations in that country; he declined. Th ough writing *Slow Burn* temporarily buoyed DeForest's spirits, his depression later returned and possibly exacerbated his declining health throughout the 1990s. DeForest passed away of cancer in 2000.\n\nLan continues to reside in California.356\n\n## Distilling Deforest's Recipe For Success\n\nDeForest's methodology for interrogating and recruiting Vietcong operatives stands in stark contrast to the highly coercive interrogation techniques that the U.S. has acknowledged employing in the GWOT. In this sense, DeForest's success reminds us that aggressively collecting intelligence on an insurgency is not necessarily incompatible with simultaneously winning adversaries' hearts and minds. While jihadists almost certainly present a more diffi  cult recruitment profi le than the secular Vietcong, DeForest's experience suggests that it is possible to convince some committed insurgents to betray their cause by identifying and exploiting relevant psychological weaknesses. For example, DeForest undermined Th i Nam's and Grandpa's expectations of abusive treatment by U.S. intelligence and capitalized upon their surprise by off ering to protect their closest associates in exchange for information on higher-ranking persons of less personal concern to them.\n\nTh e case study of Orrin DeForest illustrates the value of an interrogator's initiative, life experience, information management skills, and empathy. DeForest could easily have resigned himself to maintaining existing CIA collection programs. Instead, he undertook the diffi  cult task of building a sophisticated interrogation center to produce potential spies. Th is display of initiative would likely have proven futile if not for DeForest's extensive life experiences with the military, investigations, counterintelligence, and Asian culture. Specifi cally, DeForest coupled his appreciation of Japanese counterintelligence methods (databases and wiring diagrams) with his appreciation for the power of psychology to overcome adversaries' resistance to interrogation and recruitment. His unusually strong empathy for individual Vietcong operatives made this skillful employment of psychology possible. By approaching each prospective informant as a human being, rather than as an enemy, DeForest greatly increased his eff ectiveness in gathering intelligence.\n\n## Our Journey Th Us Far\n\n138 |\nEarly on we identifi ed the pressing need to improve U.S. interrogation practices and obtain the human intelligence essential for victory in the GWOT, and noted the considerable parallels between today's interrogation challenges and those faced during the Vietnam insurgency. A targeted literature review examined the modus operandi of notable wartime interrogators and revealed a range of personal attributes and strategies that enabled interrogators to overcome barriers to success. Mindful of these attributes and strategies, we adopted a case study methodology and created a framework for examining the interrogation experiences of Sedgwick Tourison, Stuart Herrington, and Orrin DeForest. Th e case studies sought to capture the wisdom of these three U.S. interrogators, who achieved and reported on considerable successes in Vietnam.\n\nTh e next section discusses the fi ndings of the case studies, all of which were constructed to answer the original research question:\n\n- How did U.S. interrogators in Vietnam overcome barriers to eff ective\ncounterinsurgency interrogation?\nA.\nWhat\nattributes\ncharacterized\nsuccessful\ncounterinsurgency\ninterrogators? B. Which interrogation strategies were most eff ective in producing\nactionable intelligence on Vietcong insurgents?\n\n## Synthesizing The Case Studies Interrogator Attributes\n\nAs their case studies illustrate, Tourison, Herrington, and DeForest were all highly motivated interrogators who demonstrated their dedication to U.S. goals in Vietnam when each took the highly unusual step of voluntarily extending his tour. While Herrington acknowledged reservations about U.S. involvement in Vietnam, and initially pursued the Vietcong aggressively to advance his new career, he came to see the South Vietnamese plight as his own. Indeed, each of the interrogators was reluctant to leave Vietnam for home, even aft er long tours that approached seven years in DeForest's case. In contrast to R.W.G. Stephens, none felt a personal hatred for \"Ol' Charlie,\" although they despised the Vietcong's political objectives and savage tactics. Instead, all three obviously took pride in the improvement of their tradecraft  and their service to the cause of preserving South Vietnam's freedom from communist rule.\n\nTo meet interrogation challenges, the featured interrogators were able to call upon widely divergent life experiences and education. Whereas the middleaged DeForest had served in the Army Air Corps during World War II, as a criminal investigator in Vietnam, and as a counterintelligence agent in Japan, his younger counterparts had far less previous experience. However, all three shared a keen appreciation for Asian cultures and languages that dominated much of their scholastic pursuits.\n\nCaptain Herrington was armed with a graduate-level education, general military intelligence training, military service in Germany, and seven months of professional sales experience prior to his Vietnam tour. Combined with fl uency in Vietnamese and mentoring by former Vietcong members and U.S. interrogators, these experiences were suffi  cient to make him a highly eff ective interrogator.\n\nAs the youngest of the trio, Tourison demonstrated remarkable maturity and achievements for an interrogator only in his early twenties. Aft er he had traveled much of the world during his fi rst enlistment, Tourison's academic and cultural development blossomed with exposure to Asian language training. With the rare combination of fl uency in Vietnamese and in-house expertise on Asian culture thanks to his Chinese wife, Tourison developed an extensive knowledge of the Vietcong and of interrogation by understudying South Vietnamese and U.S. peers.\n\nTourison's and Herrington's rapid adaptation to interrogation suggests that their interpersonal, cultural, and language aptitudes were more valuable than formal interrogation training. Granted, neither was required to manage an entire interrogation center such as the one supervised by DeForest. Nonetheless, their success suggests the U.S. could potentially overcome shortages of cultural and linguistic aptitude by recruiting its brightest expatriates as interrogators in times of unforeseen confl ict. Such individuals could likely be trained as interrogators more quickly than average interrogators could fully adapt to foreign languages and cultures.\n\nTourison and Herrington were exceptionally quick to master Vietnamese.\n\nHowever, both had a passion for foreign languages and probably possessed considerable linguistic aptitude; for instance, Herrington had previously attained fl uency in German while preparing for his Berlin assignment. Herrington's experience in Germany drove him to seek the immersion opportunities that enabled him to learn Vietnamese.\n\nWhile Tourison and Herrington highlighted language abilities as pivotal to their accomplishments, DeForest succeeded with a vocabulary of only 100 Vietnamese words. Tourison and Herrington essentially functioned as solo operators within a larger intelligence apparatus, whereas DeForest illustrated his organizational genius by effi  ciently employing South Vietnamese interrogators to compensate for his limited fl uency. Even so, DeForest had a solid understanding of the host culture due to his academic background, extensive time in country, and Lan, his long-term assistant and future wife.\n\nPerhaps the salient attribute of DeForest and Herrington in this regard was their ability to cultivate and sustain productive interpersonal relationships with sources. Both were blessed with the personal disposition and prior training necessary to convince sources they cared about their needs. Th en again, in most cases, DeForest and Herrington really did care for their sources.\n\n## Interrogator Strategies\n\n140 |\nEach of the featured interrogators developed tradecraft  with obvious similarities to those used by the highly experienced interrogators described in the literature review. All took maximum advantage of available sources of leverage, such as databases and DOCEX. Of course, the availability of these resources varied just as the interrogators' operational environments varied. Tourison frequently provided operational support to combatants, where he exploited contextual clues to undermine sources' contrived identities. Once Tourison\ndetermined his source was presenting a false identity, he would use compassion, ridicule, or controversy as appropriate to stimulate dialogue.\n\nHerrington and DeForest were blessed with greater amounts of time, resources, and environmental control than Tourison. With these precious commodities, both ultimately implemented variations on what the researcher refers to as \"guest house\" interrogation. Th is approach placed sources in a comfortable long-term environment designed to shatter their preconceived notions about Americans and South Vietnamese in hopes of recruiting them as long-term informants. Herrington attributes his use of the methodology to mentoring he received from DeForest.\n\nTh e books written by the featured interrogators reveal that each was unusually inquisitive and introspective. Th e interrogators' desire to understand individuals' motivations and needs in a cultural context was a decisive advantage. Each felt that his experiences in Vietnam yielded a unique perspective on the Vietcong insurgency and on interrogation. Just as each learned his trade by understudying respected mentors, all three saw a need to pass along their hard-earned knowledge to future U.S. interrogators. By writing their respective books, these interrogators showed their commitment to the improvement of U.S. wartime interrogation. Th is commitment continues to shine through as the two surviving interrogators advocate for improvements to GWOT interrogation strategies.\n\n## Putting The Pieces Together: Th E Ideal Counterinsurgency Interrogator\n\nTh e attributes and strategies of our three counterinsurgency interrogators can be overlaid to create a hypothetical interrogator of extraordinary depth and value.\n\nHe or she would be intelligent (all), personable (all), tenacious (all), worldly\n(all), mature (all), fl uent (*Tourison/Herrington*), humane (all), experienced (*DeForest*), managerial (*DeForest*), and encyclopedically knowledgeable of the enemy (*all, Tourison especially*). Importantly, he/she would cultivate friendships\n(*DeForest/Herrington*) anchored in sincere admiration for the sources' culture\n(all). Finally, aft er a long and productive career, the interrogator would educate successors in hopes of improving their interrogation practices (all).\n\nWhile our hypothetical interrogator would bear some resemblance to each of the interrogators discussed in the literature review, it appears we have reincarnated Hanns Scharff . Although Scharff  did not manage a large-scale interrogation center, he otherwise embodied all of the other traits identifi ed in the preceding paragraph. It is little wonder, then, that many successors revere him as the modern archetype of a successful interrogator.357\nTo fi nd all of the identifi ed traits in a single interrogator would be exceedingly rare. Fortunately, the case studies illustrate that interrogators can still achieve success in many cases by using the many relevant traits they possess to compensate for those they lack. For instance, DeForest overcame a lack of fl uency by relying upon an abundance of the other traits identifi ed.\n\n## Adopting A Holistic Perspective\n\nTh e narratives of Tourison, Herrington, and DeForest signifi cantly improved the researcher's understanding of interrogation. In particular, the researcher now recognizes interrogation should not be isolated from its overall impact on U.S. strategic objectives. Th e researcher attributes this newfound understanding primarily to lessons learned from the \"Guest House\" approaches of Herrington and DeForest. Th ey chose this approach for its reported tendency to ease interrogation, yet it arguably yielded far greater benefi ts outside the interrogation room. Th e \"Guest House\" strategy is intriguing because it seamlessly blended the disciplines of interrogation, espionage, and ideological reorientation. Indeed, DeForest's and Herrington's accomplishments greatly exceeded the results normally attainable by interrogation alone. Not only did they obtain valuable intelligence during interrogation, but they oft en recruited sources to work against former comrades. As an added benefi t, some of the recruited sources underwent ideological reorientation that erased their desire to wage war against the U.S. following release.\n\nTh e beauty of the \"Guest House\" strategy is that it approaches warfare in a holistic, systems-oriented manner. In short, it off ers answers to three fundamental questions that demand constant attention during war:\n1. *Why have U.S. adversaries chosen to fi ght?* 2. *How can these adversaries be persuaded not to fi ght?*\n3. *If not persuaded, how may they be neutralized via kinetic means?*\nTraditionally, many interrogators have focused their eff orts on answering the third question. While this question is certainly important, concentrating on this issue oft en diverts attention from the two elementary questions preceding it. Th e answers to those questions might help interrogators to discourage enemy combatants from entering the battlefi eld in the fi rst place. Consequently, the third question would lose signifi cance thanks to a reduced need for kinetic attacks with all their undesirable costs, controversies, and collateral eff ects.\n\nA source who is dissuaded from resistance, or better yet recruited to subvert his former comrades, dramatically reduces the enemy's ability to fend off entropy and deny a U.S. victory. Resisting entropy is particularly important to insurgent and terrorist groups because they generally lack the ability to draft  combatants as would an organized state military. Instead, terrorists and insurgents must continually energize and attract new combatants, fi nanciers, suppliers, and supporters by demonstrating battlespace success as well as propagating an ideological message.358\nLike a corporation that must answer to profi t-oriented shareholders, interrogators respond to their government's demands for timely and accurate intelligence. However, just as a corporation must limit externalities (e.g., pollution, child labor, safety issues) that anger consumers, U.S. government interrogators must ensure that \"production\" of intelligence via interrogation does not result in externalities that undermine the government's strategic objective\nwinning the war and winning popular support for its objectives. While interrogators oft en adopt an interrogation approach they believe will yield maximum intelligence from a source, their choice can easily produce undesirable externalities, or unintended consequences, shared by all citizens in the court of world opinion.\n\nIn this sense, the eff ectiveness of an interrogation cannot be assessed simply by reviewing the intelligence obtained. Consequently, we must revisit the defi nition of interrogator *eff ectiveness* that the researcher adopted early: \"We shall consider an interrogator to be eff ective when a source wittingly or unwittingly provides information that an impartial observer would view as detrimental to the welfare of the source's originating organization or cause. Naturally, an interrogator can exhibit varying levels of eff ectiveness on a continuum ranging from limited to total.\"\nTh e researcher now believes the above defi nition is insuffi  cient. It should be supplemented by this stipulation: Information obtained by an interrogator must be valued in view of all externalities generated by the interrogator's methods.\n\nSuch a defi nition encourages interrogators, or their political masters, to devise strategies that complement overall U.S. strategic objectives. Th e U.S. must assess the consequences of interrogation methods that validate or increase a source's desire to wage war against the U.S., or risk outraging U.S. adversaries and aiding their recruitment or mobilization of supporters. Moreover, if U.S. interrogation methods disgust Americans they may decrease political support for the war. Merle Pribbenow, whose essay detailed the interrogation of Nguyen Tai, captures the feelings of many compatriots. \"[W]e, as Americans, must not let our methods betray our goals.... America is as much an ideal as a place.\" 359While specifi c discussions of interrogation morality are outside the scope of this study, practical consequences, such as erosion of U.S. *soft  power*,360 are an important consideration.\n\nTh e foregoing discussion illustrates the potential drawbacks of assessing interrogation eff ectiveness by considering only those events that occur inside\n\"the box\" (interrogation room).361 Our featured interrogators designed all of their \"outside the box\" interactions with sources to advance their interrogation objectives \"in the box.\" Now, GWOT interrogators must ensure their actions \"inside the box\" complement U.S. wartime objectives \"outside the box.\" As Stephen Dorril notes, \"We have almost reached the point where there are no secrets any more, only delayed disclosures.\"362 Indeed, whistleblowers, investigative reporters, and bloggers have increased transparency of the workings of corporations and governments alike. As a consequence, governments must remain ever mindful of their interrogators' impact upon the state's diplomacy. Harsh U.S. interrogation methods potentially have the undesirable eff ect of motivating combatants to resist interrogation, or increasing the number of enemy combatants whom the U.S. must face on the battlefi eld, and in the interrogation room.\n\n## Looking To The Future: From Interrogation To Educing Information\n\nIn December 2006 the Offi  ce of the Director of National Intelligence, through its affi  liated Intelligence Science Board (ISB), explored the current state of scientifi c knowledge regarding interrogation and related forms of human intelligence gathering, publishing its fi ndings in a report titled Educing Information: Interrogation: Science and Art, Foundations for the Future. Th e ISB discovered that the U.S. has not conducted rigorous research on interrogation strategies since the 1960s. While laws and agency policies infl uence U.S. interrogation practices, no defi nitive standard exists for validating their eff ectiveness. In eff ect, individual interrogators have been left  with little more than historical precedents, anecdotes, and personal experiences to guide them in the formulation of interrogation strategies.363\nAs the literature review demonstrated, interrogators must overcome many signifi cant barriers to their success. While the guest house strategy of Herrington and DeForest arguably eased the challenges of interrogation, it also required the architects to transition seamlessly to the complementary roles of spy handler and marketer. Th is development is consistent with the ISB's call to study all opportunities for *educing* information rather than to rely on interrogation alone. As Dr. Robert Fein, the leader of the ISB study, notes, the word \"interrogation\" can artifi cially restrict the ability to imagine promising opportunities to obtain human intelligence by immediately calling forth images of stylized confrontation,364 as depicted in \"NYPD Blue,\" \"24,\" and their Hollywood ilk. By contrast, educing information entails a broader range of human intelligence interactions that include debriefi ng, interviewing, interrogation, and elicitation. Clearly, when intelligence professionals such as DeForest or Herrington \"turned\" sources into spies, they employed a skill set that exceeded interrogation alone.\n\nGiven recent advances in the social sciences and their possible relevance to educing information, the ISB study recommends that the U.S. undertake social science research expeditiously to assess and inform U.S. interrogation practices.365 In the short term, however, U.S. intelligence and law enforcement interrogators confront immense pressure to extract large volumes of actionable intelligence from foreign insurgents captured or detained during the GWOT. Because the U.S. government has not conducted recent academic research to guide its interrogators,366 today's counterinsurgency interrogators may benefi t from examining the strategies employed by their predecessors during the Vietnam War, such as those discussed in this study.\n\nSuccessfully educing information in the 21st century may depend on stimulating and integrating social science research to transform the fi eld,367 just as U.S. scientists and engineers have exponentially improved technical intelligence collections. Such a radical improvement demands the dedicated attention of fi ne minds, whether in academe, intelligence, law enforcement, or marketing fi rms. By applying their eff orts eclectically to a fi eld oft en eschewed out of distaste for its practitioners' past transgressions, talented professionals will demonstrate foresight and courage. In tackling such an important challenge, they will capitalize upon the lessons off ered by Tourison, Herrington, and DeForest, who together showed successors the synergistic power of tenacity, maturity, environmental comprehension, and human understanding, and thus off er a promising preview of the potential for educing information in the future.\n\n# The Accidental Interrogator: A Case Study And Review Of U.S. Army Special Forces Interrogations\n\nTh e term \"tactical interrogation\" has disappeared from the lexicon, replaced by the terms \"tactical questioning,\" \"intelligence interrogation,\" and\n\"debriefi ng.\" In the wake of the Abu Ghraib scandal and the resulting fl urry of investigations, the Department of Defense has craft ed new doctrine on interrogation operationsArmy Field Manual (FM) 2-22.3. Areas of the new doctrine have received unprecedented public attention, especially prisoner status and prisoner treatment. Lost in the process, however, are other equally important doctrinal issues, such as the newly imposed strict delineation of who can and cannot conduct interrogations.\n\n Especially in prosecuting the Global War on Terrorism, Special Forces soldiers are on the cutting edge of battle, oft en the fi rst ones to engage the enemy. Because of this, they are also the fi rst ones to experience the eff ects of ill-conceived doctrine. Decisions made in Washington restrict the defi nition of interrogation by narrowly defi ning who is qualifi ed to conduct interrogations, leaving unconventional warfi ghters in a precarious position. Th e question that this study poses is: How can U.S. Army Special Forces accomplish assigned missions while still adhering to DoD doctrine on intelligence interrogation and tactical questioning?\n\nTo address this question, the author fi rst explains the evolution of the debate among senior U.S. government offi  cials, including the President, and then the development and distribution of a new manual governing interrogation. Th e abuses at Abu Ghraib prison and the myriad investigations it spawned form the capstone of this debate. Next the author provides a case study that encapsulates three unique, real-world interrogation scenarios drawn from his experience in Iraq before the Abu Ghraib scandal broke. Th ese fi rsthand accounts detail all elements surrounding each interrogation event and serve to (1) introduce the need for Special Forces to conduct tactical interrogation, and (2) identify techniques that will be useful to future interrogations, whether strategic, operational, or tactical. Th e accounts are cumulative and interactive to allow readers to draw their own inferences from the author's decisions. Th ey provide insights about how current interrogation policy and doctrine have hamstrung tactical intelligence gathering.\n\nTh e author concludes that the \"letter\" of the current doctrine on interrogation contradicts its \"intent.\" In particular, the doctrine's apparent reliance on \"tactical questioning\" to cover all situations where no trained interrogator is available is inadequate. It creates a moral dilemma. Th e need for the information remains, but the means of obtaining it is thwarted by the doctrine. Th e key to solving this problem is to integrate interrogation into Special Forces operations and not treat it as something removed from daily operational activities. Instead of restricting access to this tool, interrogation should be incorporated into Special Forces training along with appropriate checks and balances. If Special Forces are given \"special authorization\" to conduct interrogations, it must be done cautiously given past catastrophic failures in interrogation practices that have led to prisoner abuse and greater public scrutiny. Additionally, to grant authorization and not the requisite training would be a recipe for failure. Th e need for Special Forces soldiers to conduct interrogations exists; doctrine and training must converge to meet that need.\n\n## Tomorrow's Dilemma Today\n\n148 |\nRed-faced, and with veins bulging, the guerrilla leader (G chief) erupts in a tirade so close to the Special Forces detachment commander that saliva from the G chief is making the detachment commander wince. In one of his oversized paws the G chief holds the wrist of his cousin, a fi ghter in his elite commando unit, who was shot in the face and died minutes earlier. In his other manacle he is shaking the very much alive, yet delicate, hand of a well-groomed individual, who was one of a few men captured in the recent fi ght. Th e detachment commander does not need to hear the translation to know that the G chief wants to interrogate the \"pretty one,\" or worse.\n\nGently the detachment's warrant offi  cer, a mature, calm soldier with slightly graying hair, places his hand on his commander's shoulder and rotates him 90 degrees away from the pungent spray. In a calm voice intended to sound like his own conscience, the warrant tells the commander that there is no way they can permit any of the guerrillas with whom they have been working for the past weeks to take control of the detainees or the situation. \"Remember what the JAG368 said about detainees before we left ?\" he questions knowingly. Eyes closed, and with a sharp head nod, the commander signals his agreement.\n\nTurning back to meet the waiting, fi ery eyes of the G chief, the commander is still at a loss for words. Help comes in the form of the only other person in a couple of hundred miles who is more physically impressive than the G chiefthe detachment's team sergeant. He is the commander's equal and together they run the detachment. He lays a poncho over the dead commando, and leads the commander a few feet away from the impatient G chief.\n\nTh e results-oriented team sergeant lays out the situation: \"OK, sir, what are we looking at here? We have one pissed-off  G chief, who represents the feelings of his entire battalion-sized element of voracious fi ghters. Shoot, sir, they're sure this prisoner knows what is going on in that village over there as much as we do. We all know that of the 13 detainees we now have, there is something not right with him, that one. So far what has he said? He claims he is a construction worker like all the others, but he is from some town far away that no one has heard of. Additionally, his hands look like they haven't seen a day of hard work in his life. Sir, I will talk to this guy with one of the other team members and we will do an interrogation that won't abuse him, but we will still fi nd out who this guy is.\"\nSo far the commander has been told nothing that he doesn't already know. Minutes ago they were all pinned down by the enemy, only to be saved by an AC-130 gunship strike and to feel the elation of victory in battle and the calm that comes aft er. Th en there was the lone building they had to clear, the men and the money they found inside, and now things were escalating again over what to do with the detainees. All 13 detainees swore they were construction workers, and from the look of the half-fi nished battle emplacements their story was probably true. All save the \"pretty one,\" who was not captured with the other 12, looked soft  and refi ned, and had a briefcase full of U.S. dollars.\n\nTh e commander knows that it will not be easy to cool the blood of the guerrillas, who have lost four of their men; one, the G chief's cousin, was the most charismatic of the entire unit. He also knows what his warrant offi  cer meant about the JAG and the briefi ng they received on rules of engagement (ROE). Technically, no one in the detachment is authorized to conduct interrogations for a number of reasons. First, no one has been to the Joint Interrogation Course at Fort Huachuca, and even if they had there were no approved U.S. Army interrogation facilities or military police (MPs) anywhere on the continent where they were now fi ghting. One of the members of the detachment, the team sergeant, had been to an interrogation course, but that course allowed him to conduct interrogations only in the U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM)369\narea of responsibility. Th en, of course, there was \"tactical questioning.\" Tactical questioning could be done by anyone but had to be \"*expedient* initial questioning for information of *immediate value* (emphasis added).\"370 Even if he could get the guerrillas to buy off  on it, the commander knew that the questioning would have to be more than \"expedient.\" No one had said it yet, but everyone\n150 |\nwas hoping the \"thirteenth prisoner\" would have information on HVT29.371\nTh is information, what the guerrillas and the detachment really want, although not of \"immediate value,\" is critical to the team's mission.\n\nTh e detachment holds an ad hoc meeting to discuss options. Everyone agrees that this would be the perfect time to have a school-trained, Armyapproved interrogator. Th ey also agree it would be nice to have a U.S.-born, vetted interpreter. Another team member says it would be nice to have an anthropologist, clinical psychologist, diesel mechanic, electrical engineer, cook, and veterinarian. \"Perhaps that is what we are all supposed to be,\" says another member, \"a little bit of all of that so we can get by. Aft er all,\" he continues, \"we are all shooters fi rst and medics, or engineers, or communications geeks second. You can't go randomly attaching diff erent specialists for 'wouldn't it be nice' situations; this is just something we need to have internal.\"\nFirst, the commander decides he must deal with the brooding G chief. If he does not act convincingly, there will be a summary execution and he will not longer have to worry about interrogation versus tactical questioning. Carefully some detachment members pry the detainee away from the G chief while a few of his subordinates and the detachment commander try to calm him down. Now, the G chief is only insisting to \"speak\" to \"the pretty one,\" as he is calling the thirteenth prisoner. Once the G chief is convinced that the detachment commander will not let him execute the prisoner, the G chief tries to persuade the detachment commander to allow him to question the prisoners, as long as the questioning is done \"his way.\"\nRemembering current doctrine and the Geneva Convention, the detachment commander is certain that he cannot use physical or mental \"torture\" to interrogate the prisoners.372 Unable to cite any additional policy or legal convention, the commander decides he cannot \"render\" or turn custody of the detainee over to the guerrillas. Th e G chief is commanding a force not recognized by the United Nations, nor does it represent a signatory to the Geneva Convention. Th e commander reminds the members of the detachment of this fact. He also remembers that any prisoner who is in U.S. Department of Defense\n(DoD) custody must be treated in accordance with DoD doctrine.373 \"Oh, OK, I am understands, complete,\" pronounces the G chief with a wink as he continues to eyeball the prisoners. Finally, when it becomes clear the detachment commander is not going to allow the prisoners to be tortured, the G chief turns and stares at him in disbelief, like a goat looking at a wristwatch. Th is turn of events both amazes and infuriates the guerrilla unit. Focusing the G chief on his wounded and dead buys the detachment a little more time.\n\nSince receiving this mission two weeks ago back in Colorado Springs, detachment members have identifi ed HVT 29 as likely working in the sector they were assigned. Up until now they had not noticed how close they were to HVT 29's trail. Th e thirteenth prisoner was found in a room with another man who was holding an AK-47 and was shot dead when the detachment gained entry to the room. Prisoner 13 and the now-dead man who was with him both look remarkably like HVT 29. While team members joked when they fi rst got into country that \"everyone here looks like HVT 29,\" these two do look suspiciously similar to HVT 29. Th en there is the briefcase full of money that was found in the clutches of the thirteenth prisoner. Some papers now being translated seem to be instructions, from HVT 29 to the thirteenth prisoner, for paying fi ghters. Th e detachment knows there is a link here, but cannot fi gure out how to get the information from the prisoner without violating DoD doctrine.\n\nTh e detachment's communications sergeant has been trying to raise higher headquarters on voice and digital channels. So far, any real trouble or issues, like explaining friendly-fi re incidents or where you spent your contingency funds ($75,000 in cold U.S. greenbacks), have been taken care of during breaks in the fi ghting by calls on a secure satellite phone back to company headquarters, which is anywhere from 6 to 60 miles away. For real problems, the detachment commander has to call the lieutenant colonel in his chain of command, who is a continent away. Even the daily message traffi  c sent to the company has become a simple cut-and-paste function from previously sent messages: this many bombs dropped, this many enemy killed, no further info on HVT 29, send some Copenhagen chewing tobacco in the next parachute resupply.\n\nEveryone is hoping for some higher-ranking offi  cer to give the order to break with DoD policy and allow interrogation of prisoners. What the detachment knows will happen is that it will receive a message to \"stand by\" while each commander calls his boss, hoping the next guy up the chain will make that decision. Either way, detachment members know they have little time before the nearby village establishes an off ensive or defensive campaign against them and the guerrilla force. Th ey have little time before the G chief becomes agitated again. Th ey have little time to fi nd out if HVT 29 is nearby, in the village maybe. And, if HVT 29 is not in the village, then why not just bypass it? Th e detachment is in the middle of an austere, asymmetric, rapidly changing environment and the commander knows he cannot wait for approval on a case-bycase basis to conduct interrogations. He also suspects that the current policy on DoD interrogations was created more to satisfy politicians in Washington and lawyers than to provide tactical guidance to soldiers. Born out of a series of oft en contradictory memoranda granting special exemptions, the detachment is wary of trusting DoD policy in this new confl ict. But what else does the team have to go by?\n\nWalking into an enemy bunker aft er being within 100 meters of an AC-130\nstrike, and confronting and killing a man with a gun, is no problem for a Special Forces detachment. Typically, an Operational Detachment Alpha (ODA)374 is just mopping up the dead; it rarely is confronted with prisoners. Dealing with a live prisoner of suspicious origin is a problem. Th e detachment is careful to keep each of the detainees separate. Even before they decide to question them, team members process the detainees as much as they feel is appropriate. Th ey take down basic information on each man and take his photo. Th e detachment feels confi dent this does not exceed the restrictions of tactical questioning. Aft er fi nally establishing communications again, they send these names and digital photos along with an aft er-action report to the company, which sends it to the battalion, and so on. As detachment members wait to see what higher has to say about any of the detainees, they continue to discuss their current predicament: what to do with 13 live enemy prisoners.\n\nAft er receiving a legal defi nition but no clear guidance on whether or not the detachment can conduct an interrogation, the commander assumes risk and takes the following action. He \"offi  cially\" releases the 12 detained \"workers,\" while still keeping them in custody as local civilians they might want to\n\"debrief.\" Th rough this loophole the ODA discovers that HVT 29 was recently at this site, and that he and the thirteenth prisoner would talk and travel back and forth to the village regularly. Although the ODA has cleverly gleaned a lot of quality intelligence, it has not been able to fi nd a loophole to interrogate prisoner 13. Again the detachment commander steps up and assumes risk.\n\nHe is inspired by the \"legal-speak\" he received from higher headquarters and remembers a line from the current Army interrogation manual: \"Authority for conducting interrogations of personnel detained by military forces rests primarily upon the traditional concept that the commander may use all available resources and lawful means to accomplish the mission and to protect and secure the unit.\"375 Th is fl ies in the face of the ROE the detachment received and specifi cally the T.H.I.N.K.376 acronym used to hammer it home: Treat all detainees the same, Humane treatment is the standard, Interrogators interrogate (emphasis added), Need to report abuses, and Know the approved techniques and *approval authorities*. Th e \"interrogators interrogate\" and \"approval authorities\" are what give them trouble. It is not clear to any of the team members, under the circumstances, if interrogating prisoner 13 is (1) lawful, given the current doctrine; or (2) can be spun to support protecting and securing the unit; but (3) it does speak to accomplishing the mission, because capturing HVT 29 would be an important, though indirect, part of accomplishing their mission. So with that rationalization and the confi dence (hope?) that a jury in any court-martial would agree with him, the detachment commander gives the order to conduct the interrogation using the approved techniques that the team members learned in uncertifi ed classes and that are covered in the Army interrogation manual. As it turns out, prisoner 13 is a hardened extremist and the detachment's ability to use the shock of capture and its extensive background knowledge of HVT 29 yields actionable intelligence on the composition of the village and HVT 29's whereabouts in the village.\n\nTh is scenario is completely fi ctional. . .well, mostly. Th e part that is most fi ctional is. . .\"usually the ODA is just mopping up the dead; it rarely is confronted with prisoners.\" U.S. Army Special Forces training provides no interrogation, debriefi ng, or detainee handling training at any stage. Current exceptions to policy allow for some members to attend a small training event that permits them to conduct limited interrogations in one theater only (USCENTCOM) and only in approved locations. Th e Army is preparing to introduce a Joint Interrogation Course that would qualify its graduates to conduct interrogation at \"approved facilities.\" If an ODA were to deploy tomorrow to the Philippines, North Korea, Africa, or anywhere in South America, it would face many of the same dilemmas that the fi ctional ODA faced.\n\nToday in Iraq and Afghanistan there are ODAs operating without a clear understanding of what they can and cannot do with a terrorist suspect they have been looking for and have fi nally caught. Additionally, the ODAs are the subject matter experts on their environment and on the enemy that operates within that environment. It is my contention that ODA team members are oft en best equipped intellectually and situationally to interrogate the enemy combatants they capture.\n\nCurrent doctrine is very ambiguous and, from the rank of general to private, is interpreted diff erently. Many would argue that \"tactical questioning\" gives soldiers every tool they need. However, tactical questioning is subject to a very broad or very narrow interpretation based on the situation and mission. Take, for example, the scenario with prisoner 13. Suppose that aft er the detachment had conducted a three-hour interrogation, using many of the approved techniques in FM 2-22.3, the guerrillas had summarily executed the prisoner. And perhaps one of the guerrillas fi lmed the execution with his cell phone. In the subsequent investigation, under what authority would the detachment claim it interrogated the prisoner?\n\nAs illustrated, there are obvious loopholes in the current doctrine. Testing these loopholes in the fi eld is not a matter of whether it will happen, but when. Moreover, the current doctrine sends soldiers to the fi ght questioning its usefulness and, worse, fails to take into account realistic future combat scenarios. Company-level offi  cers will be the ones who end up making the decision as to when to interrogate. Th ey also will be the fi rst ones held responsible when things go awry. To address this sensitive and critical shortfall, I pose the following question: How can U.S. Army Special Forces accomplish assigned missions while still adhering to DoD doctrine on intelligence interrogation and tactical questioning?\n\n## Overview\n\n154 |\nTh e next section is a chronology of interrogation-related events from 11\nSeptember 2001 through the fi elding of FM 2-22.3 in the fall of 2006. Th is chronology explains the evolution of the debate on interrogation beginning with prisoner status, to the treatment of prisoners, through Abu Ghraib, and fi nally to the development and distribution of a new manual governing interrogations. Th e abuses at Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq and the investigations it spawned are the capstone of the section.\n\nTh e next section provides a \"thick\" case study that is the bedrock of the study. It encapsulates three unique, real-world interrogation scenarios drawn from the author's experience in Iraq before the Abu Ghraib scandal broke. Th ese fi rsthand accounts detail all the elements surrounding each interrogation event. Th e accounts are cumulative and interactive to allow the readers to draw their own inferences, as well as evaluate the author's decisions, from each one.\n\nTh en comes an analysis of the current DoD interrogation environment, and how events described earlier reveal the inadequacy of DoD interrogation doctrine. Additionally, the author draws out lessons learned from the case study that can help create more eff ective interrogations.\n\nNext the author presents the case for allowing U.S. Army Special Forces soldiers to conduct tactical interrogations. A clear line is drawn between tactical questioning, intelligence interrogations, and the more broadly defi ned tactical interrogation. Th e issues justifying Special Forces soldiers conducting tactical interrogation include accountability, uniformity, and training.\n\nFinally, the author concludes that the \"letter\" of the current doctrine on interrogation contradicts its \"intent.\" In particular, the doctrine's apparent reliance on \"tactical questioning\" to cover all situations where no trained interrogator is available yet mission-essential information is required from prisoners is inadequate. Th e key to solving this problem is to integrate interrogation into Special Forces operations and not treat it as something removed from daily operational activities. Instead of restricting access to this tool, interrogation should be incorporated into Special Forces training along with appropriate checks and balances. If Special Forces are given \"special authorization\" to conduct interrogations, it must be done cautiously, given past catastrophic failures in interrogation practices that have led to prisoner abuse and greater public scrutiny. Additionally, to grant authorization and not the requisite training would be a recipe for failure. Th e need for Special Forces soldiers to conduct interrogations exists; doctrine and training must converge to meet that need.\n\n## Chronology\n\nMilitary interrogators and military police, assisted by frontline tactical units, found themselves engaged in detention operations with detention procedures still steeped in the methods of World War II and the Cold War, when those we expected to capture on the battlefi eld were generally a homogeneous group of enemy soldiers. Yet, this is a new form of war, not at all like Desert Storm nor even analogous to Vietnam or Korea.\n\nTh e Final Report of the Independent Panel to Review DoD Detention Operations August 2004\nCurrent problems surrounding detention and interrogation began, unbeknownst to us, on 11 September 2001 (hereaft er referred to as 9/11). When the United States was attacked and war was declared, one of the fi rst issues to be recognized as a problem was the detention and treatment of people who fi ght not for a country but for a belief. On 13 November 2001, the President issued a military order on the \"Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain Non-Citizens in the War Against Terrorism.\"377 What followed was a constant back and forth of memoranda, fi ndings, authorizations, and promulgating/rescinding of orders dealing with U.S. policy regarding detention status and interrogation techniques.\n\nTh e debate over the \"status\" of our new enemy arose fi rst. Next, as a logical consequence to the answer to that question, came the issue of interrogation techniques. Th ese issues and DoD doctrine on interrogations are central to the issues presented in this paper. It is important, however, to understand the status of the debate in order to determine the causes that have shaped current doctrine.\n\n## Status Of Prisoners\n\nFollowing the November 2001 order, the President; the Department of Justice's Offi  ce of Legal Counsel (OLC), which provides legal counsel to the White House and other executive branch agencies; and DoD sent out numerous memoranda dealing with the issue of granting prisoner of war (POW) status to members of Al Qaeda and the Taliban. Th e facts were clear. To be granted POW\nstatus the Geneva Convention states that:\nPrisoners of war, in the sense of the present Convention, are persons belonging to one of the following categories, who have fallen into the power of the enemy:\n(1) Members of the armed forces of a Party to the confl ict, as well as members of militias or volunteer corps forming part of such armed forces. (2) Members of other militias and members of other volunteer corps, including those of organized resistance movements, belonging to a Party to the confl ict and operating in or outside their own territory, even if this territory is occupied, provided that such militias or volunteer corps, including such organized resistance movements, fulfi ll the following conditions: (a) that of being commanded by a person responsible for his subordinates; (b) that of having a fi xed distinctive sign recognizable at a distance; (c) that of carrying arms openly; (d) that of conducting their operations in accordance with the laws and customs of war. (3) Members of regular armed forces who profess allegiance to a government or an authority not recognized by the Detaining Power. (4) Persons who accompany the armed forces without actually being members thereof, such as civilian members of military aircraft  crews, war correspondents, supply contractors, members of labour units or of services responsible for the welfare of the armed forces, provided that they have received authorization from the armed forces which they accompany, who shall provide them for that purpose with an identity card similar to the annexed model.\n\n(5) Members of crews, including masters, pilots and apprentices, of the merchant marine and the crews of civil aircraft  of the Parties to the confl ict, who do not benefi t by more favorable treatment under any other provisions of international law.\n\n156 |\n(6) Inhabitants of a non-occupied territory, who on the approach of the enemy spontaneously take up arms to resist the invading forces, without having had time to form themselves into regular armed units, provided they carry arms openly and respect the laws and customs of war.378\nTh e Taliban and Al Qaeda fi ghters met *none* of these criteria. However, the issues U.S. leaders were trying to clarify were whether or not the U.S. should grant them POW status anyway and, if the fi ghters were not POWs, how they could be classifi ed. All these questions were addressed in the memoranda discussed below.\n\nOn 18 January 2002, President Bush decided that captured members of Al Qaeda and the Taliban were unprotected by the Geneva Convention. Th at decision was preceded by a memorandum dated 9 January 2002 from the OLC. Th e memorandum was written by Deputy Assistant Attorney General John Yoo and Special Counsel Robert J. Delahunty and submitted to William J. Haynes II, General Counsel to DoD. Th e Yoo/Delahunty memorandum provided the analytical basis for all that followed regarding blanket rejection of the applicability of the Th ird Geneva Convention to captured members of Al Qaeda and the Taliban. Its legitimacy has been analyzed and strongly debated.379\nOn 11 January 2002, the fi rst detainee arrived at the detention facility at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba (GTMO). At the end of the month the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) made its fi rst visit to GTMO. Th e ICRC\nhas the unique role of being the sole overseer of rights aff orded by the Geneva Convention. During the previous month the ICRC had visited the Bagram detention center in Afghanistan.380\nIn a memorandum dated 19 January 2002, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld ordered the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff  to inform combatant commanders that \"Al Qaeda and Taliban individuals...are not entitled to prisoner of war status for purposes of the Geneva Conventions of 1949.\" He ordered that \"commanders should...treat them humanely, and to the extent appropriate and consistent with military necessity, consistent with the Geneva Conventions of 1949.\" Th at order thus gave commanders permission to depart from the provisions of the Geneva Conventions when they deemed it appropriate and a military necessity.\n\nA 22 January 2002 memorandum from Jay Bybee, OLC, for Alberto R.\n\nGonzales, Counsel to the President, and William J. Haynes II, DoD General Counsel, Re: \"Application of Treaties and Laws to Al Qaeda and Taliban Detainees,\" follows the same structural pattern as the Yoo/Delahunty memorandum, but with additional analysis of certain issues pertaining to international law and the law of war.\n\nOn 25 January 2002, White House Counsel Gonzales sent a memorandum to President Bush regarding the Presidential decision on 18 January 2002that captured members of the Taliban were not protected under the Geneva POW\nConvention (GPW). Th e legal advisor to the Secretary of State had objected to this decision. Gonzales advised that \"there are reasonable grounds for you to conclude that (the) GPW does not apply...to the confl ict with the Taliban.\"381\nHe then identifi ed what he believed were the ramifi cations of Mr. Bush's determination. On a positive note, he felt they preserved fl exibility, stating that: \"Th e nature of (a 'war' against terrorism) places a high premium on...factors such as the ability to quickly obtain information from captured terrorists and their sponsors...and the need to try terrorists for war crimes.... [T]his new paradigm renders obsolete Geneva's strict limitations on questioning of enemy prisoners.\" His expressed concerns were that certain GPW language such as \"outrages upon personal dignity\" and \"inhuman treatment\" are \"undefi ned\"; that it is diffi cult to predict with confi dence what actions might constitute violations; and that it would be \"diffi  cult to predict the needs and circumstances that could arise in the course of the war on terrorism.\" He believed that a determination of inapplicability of the GPW would insulate [the government] against prosecution by future \"prosecutors and independent counsels.\"382\nMr. Gonzales then identifi ed the counter-arguments from the Secretary of State, which included:\n\nPast adherence by the United States to the GPW;\n-  Possible limitations on invocation by the United States of the GPW in\nAfghanistan; Likely widespread condemnation by allied nations;\n-  Encouragement of potential enemies to fi nd \"loopholes\" to not apply\nthe GPW; Discouraging turnover of terrorists by other nations;\n-  Undermining of U.S. military culture, \"which emphasizes maintaining\nthe highest standards of conduct in combat.\"383\nIn response, Mr. Gonzales says, \"Even if the GPW is not applicable, we can still bring war crimes charges against anyone who mistreats U.S. personnel.\"384\nTh e author fi nds this explanation especially troubling, as one of the soldiers who might possibly be mistreated (tortured, executed). Would soldiers endure their torture better if they knew that the U.S. could still charge Al Qaeda torturers with war crimes?\n\n158 |\nOn 7 February 2002, President Bush signed a landmark order accepting the reasoning of the Yoo and Gonzales memoranda and validating the order issued by Secretary Rumsfeld on 19 January 2002. From the sequence of events and discussion by White House Counsel, it is clear that the decision by President Bush, and the subsequent orders from Rumsfeld, were based on the Yoo/ Delahunty memorandum of 9 January 2002.\n\nTh e legal status of Al Qaeda and Taliban forces remains murky. Th e Detainee Treatment Act (DTA) of 2005 helped to clarify the issue. However, new questions have arisen over the DTA.385 In Iraq, status was never expected to be an issue and the GPW was to be extended to all detainees. Th e constant fl ow of orders and revocations muddied the water to the point where all detainee operations were under scrutiny. Th e genesis for most of these problems was the November 2001 Presidential order. In August 2002, the focus of the debate moved from prisoner status to treatment.\n\n## Treatment Of Prisoners\n\nA subsequent memorandum from Gonzales, at the time still Counsel to the President but later Attorney General of the United States, addressed guidelines for interrogations and established what amounts to an immoral standard.386 Th e memorandum, which has been called the \"torture memorandum,\"\nattempts to defi ne the terms \"torture\" and \"pain.\" It states:\nWe conclude that for an act to constitute torture as defi ned in Section 2340, it must infl ict pain that is diffi  cult to endure. Physical pain amounting to torture must be equivalent in intensity to the pain accompanying serious physical injury, such as organ failure, impairment of bodily function, or even death. For purely mental pain or suff ering to amount to torture... it must result in signifi cant psychological harm of signifi cant duration, e.g., lasting for months or even years.387\nWhen *Th e Washington Post* exposed this memorandum in June 2004, human rights experts were troubled by the Justice Department's legal reasoning. Tom Malinowski of Human Rights Watch called the interpretation \"by leaps and bounds the worst thing I've seen since this whole Abu Ghraib scandal\n| 159\nbroke....It appears that what they were contemplating was the commission of war crimes and looking for ways to avoid legal accountability. Th e eff ect is to throw out years of military doctrine and standards on interrogations.\"388\nWhat followed were requests to use techniques not found in the then-current military doctrine on interrogations, Army FM 34-52. In October 2002, U.S. Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM), responsible for the GTMO detention center, requested permission to use additional interrogation techniques. Th e Secretary of Defense responded by approving 20 new techniques in a memorandum dated 2 December 2002 (see Figure 1, column 2).\n\nTh ese techniques were not approved for long. In a memorandum dated\n15 January 2003, Secretary Rumsfeld rescinded almost all of the techniques he approved on 2 December. In the memorandum, Secretary Rumsfeld stated that if a particular technique was determined to be warranted he could approve its use on a case-by-case basis (see Figure 1, column 3). Secretary Rumsfeld directed the DoD General Counsel to establish a working group to study interrogation techniques. Th e working group, in turn, relied heavily on the OLC.389\nTh e members reviewed 35 techniques and recommended 24 be approved. Th ose\n24 were signed into eff ect on 16 April 2003.390 Th is begs the question: What were interrogators at GTMO using between 15 January and 16 April 2003? In fact, the techniques that were approved, but not in FM 34-52, were intended for use only at GTMO.\n\n## Evolution Of Interrogation Techniques - Gtmo\n\nJan 02\nDec 02\nInterrogation Techniques\nDirect questioning\nIncentive/removal of incentive\nEmotional love\nEmotional hate\nFear up harsh\nFear up mild\nReduced fear\nPride and ego up\nPride and ego down\nFutility\nWe know all\nEstablish your identity Repetition approach File and dossier\nMutt and Jeff\nRapid Fire\nSilence\nChange of Scene\nYelling\nDeception\nMultiple interrogators\nInterrogator identity\nStress positions, like standing\nFalse documents/reports\nIsolation for up to 30 days\nDeprivation of light/auditory stimuli\nHooding (transportation & questioning)\n20-interrogations\nRemoval of ALL comfort items, including religious items\nMRE-only diet\nRemoval of clothing\nForced grooming Exploiting individual phobias, e.g. dogs\nMild, non-injurious physical contact, e.g. grabbing, poking or light pushing Environmental manipulation\nSleep adjustment False flag\n\n*Techniques require SOUTHCOM approval and SECDEF notification.\n\nAt this point interesting events in the promulgation of interrogation techniques started coming to light. In February 2003, Special Operations Forces (SOF) Standard Operating Procedures (SOP) appeared in Afghanistan that listed \"approved\" interrogation techniques - techniques not found in FM\n34-52.391 What is noteworthy is that when the 519th Military Intelligence Com-\n391 Panel, DoD Detention Ops, 7.\n\nFM 3452\n(1992)\nSecretary of\nDefense\nMemo\nFM 3452\n(1992)\nwith some\nCat I\n16 Jan 03\n15 Apr 03\nSecretary of\nDefense\nApproved\nTiered System\n02 Dec 02\n15 Jan 03\n16 Apr 03\nPresent\nX\nX\nX\nX\nX\nX\nX\nX\nX\nX\nX\nX\nX X X X\nX X X X\nX X X X\nX X X X\nX X\nX X\nX X\nX X\nX X X X\nX X X X\nX X X X\nX X X X\nX\nX\nX\nX\nX*\nX X\nX\nX X X\nX X X\nX X X X X X\nX*\nX (Cat I) X (Cat I) X (Cat I) X (Cat I)\nX (Cat II) X (Cat II) X (Cat II) X (Cat II) X (Cat II) X (Cat II) X (Cat II)\nX*\nX (Cat II) X (Cat II) X (Cat II) X (Cat II)\nX (Cat III)\nX\nX\nX\n\nSource: Naval IG Investigation Appendix E\npany arrived at Abu Ghraib in July 2003 the list of interrogation techniques the unit brought with it was not the one in FM 34-52, but almost a \"near copy\"\nof those created by SOF in Afghanistan (see Figure 2).392 How these specially approved techniques migrated from GTMO to Afghanistan to Iraq is not clear. Soldiers and civilian interrogators probably carried these techniques around like a virus, infecting units that were not \"immunized\" against their eff ects.\n\n## Interrogation Policies In Guantanamo, Afghanistan And Iraq\n\n1. Some techniques specifically delineated in this memo are inherent to techniques contained in FM 34-52, e.g. Yelling as a component of Fear Up.\n2. Five Approved Techniques require SOUTHCOM approval and SECDEF notification.\n4. Figure includes one technique which requires CG approval.\n\nMost of these techniques that were for use at GTMO only, and some that the Secretary of Defense had already rescinded, were somehow approved by the CJTF-7 Commander, LTG Ricardo Sanchez, commander of all troops in Iraq, on 14 September 2003.393 Much as Secretary Rumsfeld issued and then revoked previously authorized techniques, LTG Sanchez rescinded the 14 September memorandum with another memorandum on 12 October 2003. Th is document should simply have directed the troops to use current doctrine, FM 34-52. However, it described a doctrine that was more in line with the outdated 1987 version of FM 34-52 than with the current (1992) version. Th e only signifi cant change between the two, which the Army apparently intentionally removed from the 1992 edition and CJTF-7 restored in the 12 October memorandum, authorized interrogators to control all aspects of the interrogation, \"includ[ing]\nlighting and heating, as well as food, clothing, and shelter given to detainees.\"394\nIt is between these dates, 14 September and 12 October, that the photographs were taken that document the abuses at Abu Ghraib.\n\nTh e abuse of prisoners at Abu Ghraib was revealed on 13 January 2004.\n\nSPC Darby of the 372nd MP Company turned in a CD-ROM containing photographs of the abuse to members of the Criminal Investigation Division (CID).\n\nAlthough most people believe that the media, specifi cally the *New Yorker* and\n60 Minutes II, broke this story in April 2004, the military actually held a press conference on 16 January 2004, just three days aft er the fi rst evidence was collected, revealing the abuse and the investigation that had been launched.395\nTh e interim report that was fi led with CJTF-7 in March 2004 either was not recognized or did not make it \"up the chain of command.\" Th is explains why everyone at the Pentagon was so ill prepared when the storyspecifi cally the picturesappeared in the press in April 2004. A recent article by controversial writer Seymour Hersh396 refutes the assertion that the Pentagon was \"ill prepared\" to respond to the documented abuse, citing comments from MG Antonio M. Taguba, who wrote one of the Army's investigative reports on the abuses at Abu Ghraib. However, the offi  cial fi ndings of the Independent Panel on DoD\nDetention Operations do not support Hersh.\n\nSo far there have been over 12 separate investigations into DoD detention operations. Of those, eight have centered on Abu Ghraib. Most of these inquiries were initiated in the spring of 2004 and completed before the end of the summer. Th e resulting reports listed hundreds of issues and recommendations. Th e reports and investigations found little evidence of problems with interrogations and abuse or any widespread problems: \"Conditions at Abu Ghraib refl ected an exception to those prevailing at other theater detainee facilities.\"397 Additionally the Taguba, Jones/Fay, and Independent Panels all reported that MPs' \"setting favorable conditions\" for interrogators had only \"some basis in fact at Abu Ghraib, but it was used as an excuse for abusive behavior toward detainees. Th e events that took place at Abu Ghraib are an aberration when compared to the situation at the other detention operations.\"398\n\n## Th E Origins Of Army Field Manual 2-22.3\n\nAnother set of revocations and declassifi cations of past memoranda resulted from the many investigations, the crescendo of abuse, and the perceived immorality. In June 2004, the Justice Department announced that the \"torture memorandum\" was withdrawn and on 30 December 2004 Justice delivered a replacement memorandum explaining the \"torture memorandum\" of August\n2002.399 To implement the recommendations of many of the investigations, DoD realized it needed to draw up new doctrine and stop implementing interrogation doctrine through policy memoranda.\n\nTh e investigations found that the policy, or lack thereof, or the alternation between policies, set the conditions for abuse. Additionally, the current doctrine guiding interrogators and soldiers did not address many of the most diffi  cult situations soldiers on the ground were faced with. Th e most complete report is from the Independent Panel on DoD Detention Operations. It compiled all past reports as well as the conclusions of its own investigating body. Its fi ndings included: \"Th e current doctrine and procedures for detaining personnel are inadequate to meet the requirements of these (OIF/OEF) confl icts.\"400 DoD addressed this issue on\n28 April 2005 when Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld announced the Army would begin working on a new interrogation manual.\n\nTh is was the origin of FM 2-22.3. Over the next year and a half the \"most senior leaders and combatant commanders\"401 (four-star generals) throughout DoD coordinated on a new manual to guide interrogations. In doing so, they completely disregarded the fi ndings in any of the investigations dealing with the impacts at the tactical level. For example, one of the investigations found:\nAt the tactical level, detaining individuals primarily for intelligence collection or because they constitute a potential security threat, *though necessary* [emphasis added], presents units with situations not addressed by current doctrine. Many units adapted their operating procedures for conducting detainee operations to fi t an environment not contemplated in the existing doctrinal manuals.402\nTh e new doctrine, FM 2-22.3, does little to address this. It fi rst specifi es who can and cannot conduct interrogations. Neither FM 34-52 nor any of the memoranda since 9/11 had raised this issue, nor was it cited in any of the investigations as being the root of abuse or mistreatment. More specifi cally, the Jacoby review403 of Special Operations Forces detention operations (those disallowed under current doctrine FM 2-22.3) found low levels of abuse, similar to those of conventional interrogation forces.404 If the levels of abuse by the trained and the untrained were similar, why should the doctrine exclude the untrained from conducting interrogations at all? No portion of the current doctrine addresses training or preparing Special Forces or infantrymen for detention operations. Again, this ignores the Jacoby investigation recommendations.\n\nTh e Panel also recommended: \"Th e nation needs more specialists for detention/ interrogation operations.... Accompanying professional development and career fi eld management systems must be put in place concurrently.\"405 Th e new FM does authorize this, but only for a select few. As noted earlier, past doctrine did not specify who could conduct an interrogation. Now that this has been specifi ed, the nation has fewer specialists who can conduct these valuable operations. At the very least, the FM should have addressed the second part of the recommendation and authorized some professional development for the soldier. Well-documented policy and procedures on approved interrogation techniques are imperative to counter the current chilling eff ect the reaction to the abuses have had on the collection of valuable intelligence through interrogations.406\nTh e above quotation from the Independent Panel cannot be emphasized enough. It is a point that must always be considered when discussing any aspect of same problems present in Iraq. There is a special section of the report that discusses Special Forces detention operations.\n\n404 Panel, DoD Detention Ops, 13. 405 Panel, DoD Detention Ops, 90. 406 Panel, DoD Detention Ops, 91.\n\ndetention operations, specifi cally interrogations. Some might argue that the intent of the new FM is not to disempower Special Forces operators who (1) rely heavily on interrogation operations and (2) fi nd themselves in unique situations where interrogation operations are a necessity. However, referring soldiers to the intent of the law regarding interrogation operations is no longer viable. In the \"current chilling\" environment, we must not ask soldiers to analyze the intent of doctrine rather than follow the letter of the law. In a unique instance the \"most senior leaders\" paid close attention to the Panel's words, but proposed an unfortunate remedy:\nInstead of capturing and rapidly moving detainees to secure collection points as prescribed by doctrine, units tended to retain the detainees and attempted to exploit their tactical intelligence value without the required training or infrastructure. Current doctrine specifi es that line combat units hold detainees no longer than 1224 hours to extract immediately useful intelligence.407\nTh e current doctrine states that the \"evacuation of detainees from the combat zone should be eff ected within the minimum time aft er capture.\"408 Th e manual goes even further. Instead of allowing for more time in an austere environment, in which troops might be under attack with the nearest detention center hundreds of miles away, it states that \"the fl uidity of operations, the wide dispersion of units, and the austerity of facilities may necessitate their *rapid* [emphasis added] evacuation409\"not their *delayed* evacuation. Th e doctrine suggests that in an austere environment the time it might take to evacuate a detainee would be under greater scrutiny. Th us, the authors of the manual ignored the reason and necessity for tactical units to keep and interrogate the detainees themselves. Instead of recognizing the need and providing for the appropriate training, they opted to reiterate the rapid movement of detainees to collection points. By emphasizing the bottom-up movement of detainees, they did nothing to address the complete lack of top-down information fl ow of the results from strategic/operational- level interrogations. Just as FM 34-52 has been criticized for being too \"Cold War,\"410 FM\n2-22.3 will soon face the same scrutiny for being \"too OIF.\"\n166 |\n\nInstead of fi xing the inadequacies of past doctrine, current doctrine\nfocuses on detention in fi xed facilities and a concrete list of approved techniques. Th is list was essential to interrogators and policymakers. However, the focus on \"techniques\" and paragraphs in the manual that deal with extravagant collection operations bog down the document and ignore the tactical application of the subject. Meanwhile, soldiers on the ground still face the issues outlined by the diff erent investigating offi  cers and committees.\n\n## Abuse Of Detainees: Th E Reality\n\nTh e U.S. has created its own interrogation nightmare. Th ere is a worldwide perception that America sanctions torture and that it is a common feature of the Global War on Terror.411 Th e facts, however, are diff erent. Since the country was attacked on\n9/11 there have been 300 incidents of alleged detainee abuse across the Joint Operations Area (GTMO, Iraq, Afghanistan).412 Investigations of 155 of those have been completed, and 66 resulted in a determination that detainees under the control of U.S.\n\nforces were abused.413 If we assume the same rate of abuse for the other 145 cases, that hypothetical number is 64. Comparing that number to the total number of detainees\nover 50,000414the percentage of abused detainees under the control of U.S. forces is\n0.26 percent. Without question, anything over 0.00 percent is unacceptable.\n\nOther facts support the argument that abuse occurs only in very rare instances. Th ose who still believe that U.S. forces have committed and continue to commit abuse on a wide scale, and that policy is to blame, should consider that in June 2006 the U.S. Supreme Court ruled in favor ofthat is to say, sided withOsama Bin Laden's bodyguard and personal driver in the case of Ramdan v. Rumsfeld.415 In other words, a man who lived with and was one of the most trusted confi dants of one of the most vilifi ed men in history sued the U.S.\n\nand the Secretary of Defense, in the U.S., during a time of war, and won.\n\nTh ese facts illustrate that, even though memoranda to the President and from the most senior military leadership seemed to sanction abuse, or \"severe pain,\" troops on the ground, both interrogators and soldiers, still conducted themselves according to a higher moral standardall except for that 0.26 percent. In the debate over rights and status, the Ramdan v. Rumsfeld case sheds a bright light on how that debate has unfolded. Th e press has diligently reported on U.S. abuses of detainees. Th e media have been the major drivers in swinging the pendulum away from any method that even resembles abuse.\n\nIn fear of appearing to condone abuse, DoD has pushed the pendulum even farther. On 14 December 2005, *Th e New York Times* reported that the Pentagon had rewritten the Army Field Manual, and that the old manual's interrogation techniques section could be read freely on the Internet. Th e new edition would include 10 classifi ed pages in the interrogation techniques section. Th e reporter speculated this would leave the public with no indication about what\n| 167\nthe government considers not to be torture.416 Instead, the manual was published in its entirety as an unclassifi ed document.\n\nLater, on 5 June 2006, *Th e Los Angeles Times* reported that the Pentagon's revisions would remove the proscription against \"humiliating and degrading treatment\" and other proscriptions from Article 3 of the Th ird Geneva Convention.417 When published, the manual listed the entire Th ird and Fourth Articles of the Geneva Convention, as well as numerous paragraphs throughout the manual reiterating that physical and mental abuse is not tolerated.\n\nOne would hope that the press did not infl uence these decisions and that the Army decided on its own to release the manual unclassifi ed and include articles of the Geneva Convention. In either case, the new manual represents the end point of a grand pendulum swing that started in November 2002 over debates on detainee status, then was transformed into the defi nition of torture and approved techniques, and culminated in abuse that might or might not have been the result of unclear policy. Th e major lesson learned is that DoD had to improve its doctrine so that it could provide an appropriate standard for military operations. Issuing reactive policy and a new memorandum for every new obstacle is ineff ective, and at a minimum sets conditions for abuse.\n\nDebates over detention operations have centered on status (where, when), treatment (why), and approved techniques (what). Th e next debate, and much of the discussion in the following sections, will focus on who is authorized to conduct interrogations.\n\nFM 2-22.3 stipulates, \"Interrogations may only be conducted by personnel trained and certifi ed in the interrogation methodology, including personnel in MOSs [military occupational specialties] 97E, 351M (351E), or select others as may be approved by DoD policy.\"418 Th erefore, if members of any MOS not listed above need to conduct interrogation operations they would require a special policy, which would probably come in a memorandum format, probably be rescinded, added to, and then adjustedand fi nally tried by court-martial.\n\nWell-documented policy and procedures on approved interrogations techniques are imperative to counter the current chilling eff ect the reaction to the abuses have had on the collection of valuable intelligence through interrogations.419\n\n168 |\n418 FM 2-22.3, 1-8. 419 Panel, DoD Detention Ops, 91.\n\n## Postscript\n\nIt should be noted that another interrogation manual recently has been uncovered: Al Qaeda's interrogation/torture manual. Th is manual sheds light on the subject and serves to educate the reader. It was found in Iraq and was being employed by Al Qaeda forces there. Along with the manual, U.S. forces found some of Al Qaeda's victims, including a 13-year-old boy with burns thought to be from a blowtorch.420 Th e manual's importance cannot be overstated, but the fi nd was reported only by CNN, Fox News, and a number of blog sites.\n\nTh e Accidental Interrogator: A \"Th ick\" Case Study\n\n## Th E Trouble With Adieb\n\n\"He's freaking catatonic,\" I announced to the Army medic still looking at Adieb, a 30-year-old Iraqi we had recently detained for having fi ve 155mm howitzer rounds in his trunkmaterials most commonly used for making Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs). Adieb had gone white as a sheet from the moment we entered his house and had yet to regain control of his faculties. I assumed he must have had some control, due to the fact he didn't fl inch when Gary took the *Stihl* \"quicky saw\" and cut unknowingly into a trunk full of explosives. Good old Adieb stood right next to the trunk as Gary sent sparks fl ying while gaining entry to the black Mercedes that Adieb had \"lost the keys to.\" We were all about as white as Adieb was when we saw what was in the trunk and how close Gary had come to cutting into an explosive projectile. Given Adieb's current disposition, which was scared silly, we all thought that building and playing on that fear would be the best way to extract information from Adieb. We wanted to know where he got the howitzer rounds. Whom was he giving them to? Did he really expect us to believe they were for fi shing?\n\nWe moved Adieb to a very intimidating environment: one of Saddam's old airfi elds that was now occupied by a U.S. armored battalion and still had many abandoned buildings that looked like they had seen a war. When the Iraqis fl ed this base in an awful hurry, they did their best to trash everything they left  behind. In the building to which we took Adieb there were smashed electronics, piles of papers and books in a wet slurry everywhere you stepped, and defecation. Th is might have been one of the best feats of coordination the Iraqi army pulled off  against the U.S. forces. I could only imagine how they did it, but in every room and in every building on this base some Iraqi had left  a special present for the Americans and in most cases it was more than one \"present\" per room. Of course by \"present\" I mean a ripe, stinking pile of feces. Th e small room we selected had only one \"present.\" Aft er all, we had to be in there too. We set up three chairs and cleared a little section in the debris for Adieb to sit/squat. Jay, Gary, and our interpreter, Samir, took their chairs. We marched Adieb in and took his hood off .\n\nTh e men I worked with were outstanding professional soldiers. At 30\nyears old I, the commander, was the youngest. I trusted all of them completely and never had a second thought about delegating any authority to them. We had found ourselves in many situations in Iraq for which we were not specifi -\ncally trained. To accomplish the mission we improvised or adapted. So, when we found ourselves with more and more detainees and no way to question them, we naturally assumed the mission. Although we hadn't been trained in interrogations, or been given the mission to specifi cally conduct them, interrogations just became an essential aspect of our operational cycle, which looked like this:\n\n(1) Gather information about a target; (2) Interdict the target; (3) Develop information from the interdiction (question the detainee);\n(4) Look to identify new targets from information provided by the detainee.\n\nIt was cyclical, and if you took any one of those pieces out then it was back to square one.\n\nFor a number of reasons I was the most involved in the interrogations phase. I think I had a desire almost to micromanage this aspect of the operation because I thought it was the most pivotal to \"keeping the ball rolling.\" I was both fascinated with the machinations of questioning detainees and concerned. As much as I trusted the other members of the detachment, and could never imagine one of them abusing someone in custody, I wanted to be sure. I made sure that even if I was not in the room I was right outside the room where an interrogation was ongoing. At the time I was not consciously making this choice, and was passing off  my continuous presence under the guise of \"the importance of intelligence collection.\" However, in hindsight, I believe there were some subconscious reasons for my persistent involvement.\n\nNone of this was in my head as I stood in the dark outside the room where Gary and Jay were questioning Adieb. Th e light from that room was providing some illumination, but there were only two *Dewalt* fl ashlights in the room, casting ghastly shadows among the debris and the faces of the players. I would like to say that we had set this stage like Wes Craven and that we were masterful interrogators; however, that simply isn't true. We stumbled through interrogations. We would conduct them in whatever room we could fi nd and clean up the room as much as we thought needed to present the desired environment.\n\nTh at environment was usually agreed upon fi ve minutes prior to starting and we kind of thought, \"Yeah, OK, let's try that.\" Th e room Adieb was now in had the look of a place not of this earth, and not being of this earth it was meant to give the impression that this room was a diff erent place, a place where rules and laws did not exist. Th e eff ect on Adieb would attest to that.\n\n\"What's your name?\" shouted Gary. \"Shooismak?\" shouted Samir. Adieb mumbled, \"Adieb.\" \"Adieb, what?\" Gary persisted. \"Adieb, shinoo?\" shouted Samir. \"Adieb Muhammed,\" said Adieb as his eyes welled with tears.\n\n174 |\nAnd so it went, from Gary to Samir to Adieb back to Samir, back to Gary or sometimes Jay. Tedious, frustrating. Fift een minutes in and we had Adieb's name, his occupation (taxi driver), and his father's name. All the while Gary and Jay were trying to keep Adieb on his heels. Adieb's crying was making it hard for Samir to translate. Gary and Jay became so frustrated that they skipped the normal protocol of getting all the background information fi rst, and they went right for the meat. I was OK with this, as we had all agreed that we needed to take advantage of Adieb's current emotional state and couldn't allow him to get his feet under him. If he did, he could possibly start employing resistance techniques that would cripple anything we amateurs could throw at him.\n\n\"What were you doing with all the explosives?\" Gary would yell. Th e translation would come back \"I fi sh.\"\nJay would jump up, making a show of anger, disgust, and frustration.\n\n\"You have to help us here, Adieb,\" Gary would say, trying to reassure Adieb. \"Guys with that many bombs go to Abu Ghraib or GTMO. I will have no choice but to send you there.\"\n\"I fi sh...,\" Adieb would try and respond.\n\nBack and forth Jay and Gary went with Adieb. By now the room was a real sty. Th e yelling and four bodies packed into the small area raised the temperature at least 10 degrees. Jay's constant up and down kicked up a bunch of slop on the ground and dispersed particles in the air. I could see the environment was taking its toll on Jay, Gary, and especially Samir. Adieb was even more fragile now than when we started and he appeared to be at the brink of \"breaking.\" I called Jay, Gary, and Samir out of the room. I told Samir to tell Adieb that his chance to cooperate had passed and that we would be back shortly. While Samir translated, I gave Adieb the most mischievous smile I could muster. He appeared unfazed. I took one of the fl ashlights and gave it to Jay and Samir. Gary put in a dip of tobacco and I lit a cigarette outside of the room to keep an eye on Adieb, while Jay and Samir got some water and fresh air. I wanted our whispers to let Adieb know we were close and that his future was uncertain. Gary and I talked about questions to bring up in the next round. Th e fi rst round had lasted all of 30 minutes and had exhausted the team.\n\nWe didn't think we could do another 30 minutes, and little did we know what a testament that was to our lack of understanding of interrogations. Aft er the cigarette, about fi ve to ten minutes, the team went back in. Th e three were all smiling and Gary started:\n\"We know you didn't want to transport the explosives.\" Th is was Gary just throwing out anything. Aft er Samir translated, Adieb just stared at the ground. \"Ask him again, Samir,\" Gary continued. Samir did, and still nothing.\n\n\"Hello,\" Jay sang.\n\nNothing. \"Samir, ask him anything,\" Gary ordered. Samir rattled off  a few phrases; nothing. By now I am in the doorway observing.\n\n\"Tell him we know who gave him the artillery rounds.\" Samir did and Adieb did not move, did not blink, nothing. Jay moved in close and pushed his fi ngers into the air in front of Adieb's shoulder in a way to gesture to me, \"Is it OK to touch him?\" I quickly nodded my head approvingly. Jay placed two fi ngertips just below Adieb's clavicle and gently pushed him. Adieb rocked slightly and continued to sit slumped on the fl oor staring at what we could only guess. Samir told him to stand up and Adieb unsurprisingly didn't move. Gary and Jay got on either side of him and lift ed him up. Adieb was as lifeless as is humanly possible. Until now I was sure this was all an act. I was now faced with this either being an Oscar-winning performance or something \"short-circuited\" in this guy.\n\n\"Jay, treat him,\" I said. Jay is also a trained medic and a very profi cient one at that.\n\n\"Well, sir, we really need to get him outta here,\" Jay suggested.\n\n\"OK, let's move him.\" Th e four of us struggled to get him out of the room, down the hall, and into the cool night air. Each one of us was visibly refreshed when we exited the decrepit buildingall of us except Adieb. I called over Cory, the highest-ranking non-commissioned offi  cer (NCO), and Andy, the other medic. Andy and Jay both instantly assessed that the best thing we could probably do for the detainee was give him intravenous (IV) fl uids. Th at sounded great, as I thought about having the guy that was just interrogating the prisoner now shoving needles in his arm. A prisoner who cannot understand \"stand up\" would now be asked to understand \"My name is Jay. I am an American medical professional. I am going to give you fl uids through an artery in your arm. I am doing this to help you and this will in no way harm you. Th ese are just normal fl uids and no drugs or medication will be pumped into your system.\" We all knew that this guy needed medical help and I instructed the guys to load Adieb back onto one of the vehicles. Th e Army medical station was a few hundred meters away and it would be best for Adieb to be seen by someone not affi  liated with the detachment. When we carried Adieb in, the reaction on the faces of the staff  was unremarkable.\n\n\"So, what's with this guy?\" the fi rst medic asked. \"You got me,\" Jay artfully explained.\n\n176 |\nTh ere were now a few medics gathered around Adieb, who was lying on a gurney and staring at the ceiling. I fi nally broke up a long discussion of what to do.\n\n\"I don't care what you do, but I know one thing... he's freaking catatonic.\"\nAdieb spent the night in U.S. care and in his own cell of the armored battalion's austere detention facility. We spent the night typing up reports and trying to make a strong packet that would lock Adieb up for a while. Th e next day he was processed up to Division level and we never heard a thing. Adieb could have been back on the street in a week, making up for the bombs he lost, or he could still be in an Iraqi jail.\n\nTh ere was never an investigation into our interrogation of Adieb or into what made him absolutely shut down. As much as I didn't fear an investigation, I didn't expect one either. I didn't expect anyone from higher headquarters to ask questions, just as I knew that as soon as a detainee left  my custody he was out of my hands. I would never know if a terrorist I captured provided strategic-level actionable intelligence or was released the next day. My assumption is that most of the enemies I captured only had intelligence that would have been valuable to me. Without any training in interrogations, I was incapable of getting that information, and the trained interrogators, positioned up the chain of command, who were capable, were only asking one question: \"Where is Saddam?\"\n\n## Th E Accident\n\nI carried the memories of Adieb with me, wanting to do better. I was determined not to make the same mistakes with Hadr. Even though I had forgotten about Hadr and he was now probably suff ering from the very early stages of hypothermia in the back of our HMMWV (\"Humvee\"), I thought about all we had done wrong with Adieb and yet I still knew we could eff ectively question Hadr.\n\nHadr was an accident in every aspect. On a cold and rainy night in the desert we all put on our \"business suits\" and went to work with the zeal of an insurance salesman who goes to a seminar on a sunny spring day in the country. We had been planning to conduct this mission for a while and had just got the word that the right mix of vehicles was outside Ali Saloom's house. I would have loved to have waited for a warmer, drier night but we knew this might be our only opportunity. So, with four HMMWVs, each with open cargo areas and no doors or windows, we started our short movement to Saloom's house.\n\nThe author preparing to go on patrol with the standard\nSF \"Gun Truck\" configuration of the time. We preferred\nto be porcupines, with our barbs being our weapons\npoking out in every direction, as opposed to turtles. The\ndevelopment of advanced IEDs in Iraq has made moving\nin this configuration no longer viable.\nSource: Author.\n\nWe had done so many of these missions by now they were part of our muscle memory. We all knew our jobs; talking and emotions were kept to a minimum. I have heard of some units listening to heavy metal music on the way to their objective or holding football-style motivation huddles. Th is simply wasn't us.\n\nI drove through the front gate. Bravo Team moved in fi rst and secured the courtyard. Alpha teams moved directly to the front door and entered the house. Whether it was a mansion in Samarra or a shack in Baghdad, if it was in a city, it had a gate, a courtyard, and a front door close by. Tonight we had another detachment paying us back for some support we had lent them. Th ey were providing an outer cordon to ensure no one who was on the objective could get out or squirt away. We called these people \"squirters.\" Th ey also made sure no one outside the objective area got in. We called these people \"suicide bombers.\"\nFrom the moment we breached the gate until we had the entire area secure was under fi ve minutes. Th e objective consisted of a three-room, singlestory \"living area\" and an unattached shed. Th e rain had turned the streets into a milkshake-like slop that only slightly hardened from the street to the front door and into the house. Th e typical Iraqi would wear slip-off  shoes or sandals and bear the slop in the street for the ease of slipping off  his shoes when he walked into his \"house.\" Th e average American wore the rugged desert combat boot. Th ese boots are great defense against dry or wet desert conditions, but the boots and the missions are not conducive to checking your footwear at the door. Th erefore, we were always bringing this dripping muddy milkshake with us into all the homes. Given that the Iraqis both eat and sleep on the fl oor, they must have found our muddy boots infuriating, although not one Iraqi, whether I was in his house to arrest him or reward him, ever mentioned the fi lth I was leaving behind.\n\nTh e squalor of Saloom's house started in the street and came right in the front door. It was unclear where the dirt ended and where the fl oor began. On this same dirt fl oor, seconds ago, everyone in the house had their two-inchthick foam sleeping mats sprawled over. Everything was orange - the fl oors, the walls, the ceiling. It all seemed to be made from what looked like the same earth. Th ere were no paintings or pictures on the walls and there were no windows. One room had a cord hanging from the ceiling with a single light bulb. Th e other room was lit with a large fl ashlight. Th e lighting and barren earthen walls cast ominous shadows. Th e fl oor heater made the place reek and unbearably hot, especially compared to the cold night. Th e icy wet night air was a welcome escape from the heat, dirt, mud, and people in the structure. Th ere was only one man at the house (there should have been more), two women, and three children. Th e man was not Saloom, our target, but some guy we had never seen or heard of before. His name was Hadr.\n\nMy frustration at missing Saloom was quickly quelled when Samir showed me the gym bag he found. Th e bag was black with white stripes and made of hard fake leather. It almost looked like a bowling ball bag, and it was full of dirty laundry, thankfully. Inside were scraps of paper of all sorts with handwritten notes on them. Samir held one up and said, \"Sir, this one says '5 RPG = 2,000 Dinar'; this one says 'to Abu, 20 AK-47, 20 120mm rockets, 3 mortars'; this one is his master price list for explosives.\" As I peered through the bag I asked him if there was anything else. He said just one thing, \"Th is was on top,\" and he handed me a photo ID of Ali Saloom. To date we had no picture of Saloom or any confi rmation that he lived in this house. We also had no evidence to show culpability for the shady business in which Saloom dealt. Of course, this bag would have been much sweeter if Saloom had been sitting a few feet away with an empty sandbag over his head and his hands in a pair of fl ex-cuff s.\n\nAft er combing through the rest of the house, we left  with our bag of evidence and some guy named Hadr. We hoped we would be getting something out of him shortly. Nevertheless, at that point I wasn't thinking about Hadr's upcoming interrogation. I was more worried about making sure we had everybody we came with and that there was a big sewage hole that Jonah had stepped in and I wanted to avoid. Just as I stepped shin-high in a hole of sludge, Cory called me over to his vehicle with Samir and an Iraqi policeman.\n\n\"Sir, this guy says he knows where Saloom is... right now,\" exclaimed Cory.\n\n\"Wait, what? How? Who?\" I questioned.\n\nIt turns out that the same lineup of vehicles in front of Saloom's house meant that he would go to a farmhouse out in the desert and pick up a shipment of arms to be sent out with the day's highest bidder. Th ere was still a lot about Saloom we were fi guring out. All we really knew at this point was that he was bad. It was theorized that since Saloom was not there he must be at this farmhouse, and he couldn't even know we were hot on his trail. He would certainly be hip to that in a few hours.\n\n\"Where is this farmhouse?\" I asked.\n\n\"Well, he says you have to go out of town, then at the place the goats cross you turn left . Th ere is not really a road there; you just turn off  the paved road into the desert. Th en aft er you drive west for about a mile you will hit a dirt road, go right, and once you pass the house that is covered over and looks like a mound of sand...\"\n\"OK, tell him he is coming with us and he better know where this place is,\" I ordered. \"Cory, pass the word to the boys, we just got a change to the mission. I will call higher and let them know. We should be ready to roll in fi ve minutes.\"\nFive minutes later we were heading to fi nd a real bad dude, a middle-level fi nancier who never gets his hands dirty. Now, not only were we going to catch him in the act, but we also had a bunch of receipts with his name on them, in presumably his handwriting. If we were really lucky we might even catch him with a weapon in his hand and therefore be able to dispatch him more effi  ciently under the rules of engagement. Th is incessant capturing of bad guys and their tactic of dropping their weapons and surrendering was utterly frustrating. In direct opposition to the conventional wisdom, killing a terrorist was much cleaner than capturing one. Th e night had gotten colder, and there wasn't one member of our team whose boots and pants weren't caked in thick, goopy mud from the Iraqi street. Th ere was still a light mist falling. However, our spirits were lift ed with the extension of our mission; we were off  the playbook a little and it heightened everyone's senses. We also really wanted to get this Saloom dirtball.\n\nIt always felt good to me to leave the close confi nes of the city. I would constantly have to go between having my night vision goggles on to see down a street and having them \"wash out\" under a street light. Th is night, heading out of a city to do a mission was a welcome change. It was past curfew and there were no cars or people. Th e busy highway on the north side of town was eerily empty. Suddenly we got an \"I think we turn here\" from our Iraqi policeman who \"knew exactly where the farmhouse was.\" Now the Detachment was really switched on. We were driving through the open desert, in the pitch black of night. Everyone was cold and wet and at any point we could be told that our objective was right beside us. Aft er a period of time that can only be described as \"too long,\" we were all wondering what we were doing or where we were going. Like when you know you should have turned around miles ago, but no one wants to give up all that you have invested in this wrong way.\n\nEveryone's patience was wearing thin as we covered what felt like every square inch of Iraqi desert. In my vehicle, the gunner standing in the middle and protruding from the roof to man the .50cal-mounted M-2 heavy machine gun stooped down from time to time to make eye contact with our Iraqi policeman. His stares summed up the atmosphere in our group. Our Iraqi policeman, I believe, could actually feel the stares of these \"12 angry men\" bearing down on him, when suddenly we heard \"Stop, this is it.\" Th e policeman was not convincing in his delivery.\n\n\"Th is is *what*?!\" I said in my head a split second before yelling it into the night.\n\nBeside us were two mounds of sand. Each looked the same as the other and like every other mound of sand in all Mesopotamia. However, upon further inspection these two were a little squared. While Cory, Gary, and I all gave the Iraqi policeman a piece of our mind for leading us on this wild goat chase, a few other guys broke out shovels and started digging away at this mound. Th e sound of the shovels hitting wood distracted us only slightly from making the policeman feel like the ass he was.\n\nAs it turned out, the guys digging found what used to be a window to a shed or house that was... completely empty. Our time in the desert tonight, measured in hours, all the ups and downs of emotions, from driving in the rain to raiding a house, to adding on a mission, to not knowing where we were, had taken its toll. \"Alright, that's freaking it. Everyone follow me. Let's get back to the team house. Th is night is over.\" I said the words in a crescendo that fell fl at at the end.\n\nCory and I looked over our GPS and reexamined the criss-cross route we had taken and picked the best way back to the main hardball road. Cory made sure everyone was ready to go while I jumped behind the driver's seat of one of the trucks and rested my forehead against the steering wheel. Samir, who had been sitting on a plywood slat in the seat right behind me, touched me on the shoulder and asked, \"Uh, sir, what about him?\"\nWithout lift ing my head I questioned back, \"Who?\"\n\"Th e guy from Saloom's house.\" \"Who?!\"\n\"Th at guy we grabbed from Saloom's house. We were going to bring him right back and ask about the bag, but then the police guy took us out here, and... man, he seems pretty freaking cold, sir.\"\nMy head was off  the steering wheel now and the only two thoughts in my head were \"Oh, yeah\" and \"Oh, shit.\"\n\"Andy!\" I yelled.\n\n\"Whoa, sir, what's up?\"\n\"Hey, remember that guy we grabbed from the fi rst house?\"\n\"Him, oh yeah, sir, why, do we still... shit, do we still got'm?\" Andy laughed, and then, realizing what he was saying, instantly switched on his medic hat.\n\nHadr looked like an Iraqi Tom Hankstaller than your average Iraqi at close to six feet and probably weighing in around 175 pounds. He had no muscular defi nition and that was what kept him from looking like the cold night winds were freezing his bone marrow. He wore plastic sandals. One had fallen off  when he was helped into the vehicle and he had somehow located it with his bound hands and placed it under his butt to keep him off  the frigid metal truck fl oor. Th e other sandal was caked with the same mud that covered us all. His thin worn sweatpants were the warmest article of clothing he had on. His shirt looked like a homemade set of hospital scrubs, only with lighter material. Surprisingly for an Iraqi, he had no facial hair. Hadr was in his late twenties to early thirties.\n\n\"Ask him if he's cold,\" I said. And then to refute the looks I whispered,\n\"Well, I know, but we have to at least ask.\"\n\"Yyyyyes.\" Hadr shivered.\n\nI quickly fi red back with \"Ask him why he hasn't been talking!\"\n\n182 |\nTh e question was born out of my disappointment with myself at forgetting\nabout him. It was then manifested in frustration with Hadr for not telling anybody that he was freezing. Just as an Iraqi would never complain to the guys with guns who just rammed his front gate that he was perturbed they were tracking mud on his \"bed,\" Hadr would never have complained he was dangerously cold to his captors - again, not because he would be showing weakness, but because he feared something worse, something that happened to people all the time under Saddam's rule. Th is also led to what he must have been thinking as we drove him,\nalone, out into the desert, broke out shovels, and started digging. I could only picture what games his own imagination was playing with him.\n\nAll these thoughts came rushing to my head. Meanwhile, somehow in the situation or translation it got lost that I was asking about him not reminding us he was still in the vehicle, and became why he wasn't talking about Saloom's operation. You could imagine our faces when the translation came back as a stream of information.\n\n\"I didn't know you wanted me to talk. I am here visiting from Baghdad.\n\nI got here two days ago. I came in a Mazda van with some of Ali's friends. I am his wife's brother. Ali said he would have a job for me. He ran out the back just as you arrived. I think he went to a friend's house near the pool hall. I would like to get married soon. Girls don't seem to like me. I have a key to one of Ali's taxis in my pocket you didn't fi nd when you searched me....\"\nIt didn't take long for me to realize how Hadr had interpreted the last few hours and how he interpreted my question. I told Hadr that was good and I hung an insulated fi eld jacket liner on his shoulders. We moved the policeman to the back, exposed part of the truck where Hadr was, and moved Hadr to the seat opposite Samir behind the front passenger's seat.\n\nOn par for the course of the night, one of the vehicles got a fl at tire on the way back to the team house. I still wasn't sure how to handle Hadr, so I just made sure he was safe and feeling better while we changed the tire. I made no attempt to question him, but I also did not tell him anything about where he was or what was going on. Additionally, I still had his hands bound and eyes covered. Aft er the tire change, the other team thanked us for a lovely evening, and split to get back to their own town.\n\nOur team house was a dark, quiet, welcoming sight. Th e small security element we had left  behind knew we were coming and soon had the place lit up like a Christmas tree as we pulled around the serpentine and through the gates. Both trucks pulled right up to the front door. Each man dismounted, took a stretch, and looked at me. I pointed at Chris to stay with Hadr and motioned to the rest of the team with my head to move inside. Th ere was no talking, although no one was told to \"shut up\" or keep quiet. Simultaneously, we all tromped across the gravel drive, up the short steps, and past the metal doors. Like Saloom's house, there was nothing on the walls and they had a heavy solid rock look to them. Our walls, however, were painted white and lacked the rough, bare, earthen tones of Saloom's house. Th e fl uorescent lighting seemed a bit industrial to us for a home. Yet, it was far better than a single bulb dangling from the ceiling. In this front entryway we all gathered, standing or sitting on plastic chairs, still in full kit with the desert's cold and rain visible on all of us.\n\n184 |\nAft er briefl y talking through the events of the night and thanking everyone for being safe, I brought up Hadr.\n\nI wanted Hadr's questioning to be diff erent. But that falsely suggests that I\ncan be credited with the positive outcome of Hadr's interrogation. I cannot. My fi rst concern was I wanted to get Hadr warmed up. I did not anticipate his physical warming to manifest itself in such positive ways. I selected Cory and Jonah to conduct the interview. Truth be told, I really wanted to handle it myself, but I knew that as the leader I couldn't aff ord to tie myself to that. Cory was mature and not your typical kill'em all, A+ type, Green Beret, Johnny Rambo personality. Jonah, who would take the lead, was chosen because he was the most adaptable. As a communications sergeant he was not one of the best, but he was very aff able and had shown the ability to think constructively and improvise while still achieving the desired end state.\n\nInstead of using the intimidating, hollowed-out building that was the armored battalion's holding area to question Hadr, as we had used with every other interrogation, I wanted to use our basement. Our basement was the most American room in the house. Th ere were wide stairs that curved down from the entryway to the basement. Th e walls down there were also painted a fl at white and the tile fl oor was shiny. Th e hardness of the fl oor and walls was made soft  by the extremely large Persian rug that sprawled almost to each corner. Th e rug was mostly shades of blue and ivory. At the far end of the room was a large-screen TV with a local Iraqi satellite dish connection, DVD, and Sony Playstation II. Th e TV was surrounded by one soft , winding sectional and another matching full couch. In the middle was a mirrored coff ee table. Continuing back toward the stairs and directly behind the sectional was a large table with six comfortable chairs. Th ere were remnants of a poker game that had been conducted there nights before. At the base of the stairs were a treadmill, elliptical machine, and Bowfl ex.\n\n I had one of the other interpreters put on a brew of Iraqi tea and assemble some snacks. I grabbed an extra blanket while Cory, Jonah, and Samir grabbed paper, pens, and sterilized maps. Th ey began to discuss their plan for talking to Hadr. Th en, I went outside and had Chris guide Hadr inside, down the stairs, and onto a seat at the end of the couch. Once he was seated Chris removed the sandbag that was still on his head. As the sandbag came off  the blanket went right over his shoulders. Not that I wanted or needed it back, but because I wanted to see his reaction, I asked Hadr if I could have my jacket liner back. I told him it was my only one and that I was very cold. As we all had hoped and expected, Hadr thanked me profusely for it and touched his heart as he handed it to me. I said nothing, smiled, and took a seat at the back of the room so that I could hear, but Hadr would not know that I was still in the room.\n\n Besides the feel of the warm blanket, Hadr also had in front of him two trays, one with little pickles and olives, and the other with an assortment of nuts. Th ere was also an ashtray and a pack of my favorite local cigarette, *Pine Lights*. We did not leave a lighter there so that Hadr would have to ask for one. Jonah had been given my prized golden Saddam lighter I had taken off Saddam's fi rst cousin when we captured him. Hadr went right past the food and took a cigarette. Jonah was right there with the light and Hadr reached in and touched Jonah's hand when he off ered the fl ame. On the opposing couch sat Cory and Jonah. Samir sat right next to Hadr. Th ough it took a while for Hadr to fi gure out, he learned that it was better to give his attention to Jonah on the couch to his right than constantly shift  his body between Jonah on his right front and Samir on his back left .\n\nFive minutes later, when the tea was brought down, Jonah had yet to ask a question. Hadr had been talking nonstop about how he got to Saloom's house. Without being asked, Hadr was going into important details that were so hard to uncover in an interrogation. Hadr talked about the man that Saloom had put him in touch with to get to his house, where in Baghdad they met, who the other men in the van were, that he was pretty sure they were all involved in anti-coalition activity, and that two of the guys in the van had tried to keep quiet but he still thought they wanted everyone else to hear that they were having a conversation about how to hide IEDs along roads. On and on Hadr went. Th is was all excellent stuff , but (1) it was not actionable. It was good stuff  to know for people responsible for Hadr's neighborhood, but not for us, and (2) it all came back to Saloom as the central fi gure whom Hadr had yet to volunteer any information about. It was almost an hour into Hadr's ranting before Jonah interrupted him in mid-sentence. Jonah hated to stop a detainee from talking but he had to get a question in somewhere. Given the tone so far he didn't mince words.\n\n\"Can you tell me about Saloom? What is his business? Where does he hang out? Do you know those sorts of things?\"\nHadr went quiet, and took a deep breath. Later we all admitted that we thought \"Oh, no!\"that asking Hadr to betray a specifi c older relative was too much of an off ense. He threw down a mouthful of nuts, fi nished his tea, and put out his cigarette. Th e smile on Samir's face foretold of something substantial coming in the following translation. Hadr continued with information on Saloom, or Ali, as Hadr called him, just as in-depth as he had before. We did not call anyone \"Ali\" or \"Muhammad\" whenever possible. Ali is the equivalent of John, James, Michael, Joe, Bill, and Chris all rolled up into one.\n\nFirst Hadr said he lied to us about Saloom. He said that Saloom was not at any \"friend's house near a pool hall.\" He admitted to saying that he wanted us to believe he knew exactly where Saloom was so that we would let him go and he could fi nd a place to get warm. However, if he had to guessand this is why Samir was smilingSaloom was probably making his way to a farmhouse where he kept his stash of weapons. In fact, Saloom had taken Hadr and two other men out to the farmhouse earlier that day.\n\n\"So, you know where the farmhouse is?\" questioned Jonah. \"Exactly,\" responded Hadr.\n\n186 |\n\"Can you show us on this map?\" Jonah asked, plopping down a rather large map of the area.\n\nAft er Hadr took it and turned it 720 degrees, folded it a few times, and made faces of excitement followed by looks of uncertainty, he handed the map back to Jonah and proclaimed, \"I can't read maps.\" Jonah, with the help of Samir, painstakingly talked Hadr through the map. \"Th is is the house were you where captured. Th is is the one main north/south road; here is the river, etc.\" Hadr's only response was, \"I don't understand.\" As we all scratched our heads for a second, Hadr broke the silence. Samir's second big smile of the night had all of us grinning before we even received the translation. \"He says, 'Why doesn't he just show you where it is? Th at way he can also show you Saloom's hangouts and where they all have been going the past few days.'\"\nSo, aft er hearing from Hadr that Saloom was a known weapons dealer, a fact that we knew and now had a mound of evidence to prove, we tried to end the evening/early morning. A few hours ago we had switched from tea to Red Bull and Hadr insisted that he try some. Hadr loved the stuff  and had just fi nished his third bottle when Jonah tried to close the conversation. It took another 45 minutes to get Hadr to shut up about whom Saloom was meeting with and about people in his neighborhood in Baghdad.\n\nWe coordinated with the armored battalion to give Hadr his own cell and to treat him like a VIP. We liked Hadr, but his information had not yet been validated, although the bit about the farmhouse served as temporary bona fi des. I still wasn't going to let him sleep in my secured house. I gave him a fresh pack of cigarettes, told him to get some sleep, and that we would be back to get him in a few hours. Aft er the sun was up and our reports were \"good enough,\" we all climbed onto our two-inchthick sleeping matsthe same type we had stomped on in Saloom's house and pulled Hadr off  of. Th ey were probably bought at the same shop in town. Ours, instead of being on the fl oor, were on individual sleeping units made from framing lumber and plywood, which had a desk and closet built into them. Home, sweet home.\n\n## Just Browsing\n\nTh at aft ernoon, aft er a few hours of sleep, we gathered our gear and prepared for our CTR (close target recon), of a pool hall, mosque, truck stop, two houses of Saloom's associates, and the infamous farmhouse. Rolling past any of these places in a couple of HMMWVs was no problem, as U.S. vehicles were constantly rolling through the busy town. However the farmhouse posed a problem. A U.S. military vehicle, coincidentally driving past a random farmhouse in the middle of the desert that just happens to be a large weapons cache, would probably tip off  whoever was living there. Th en there was the fact that we didn't know what or who was there, how well it was defended, or what the likely course of action would be if two highly armored vehicles started making their way across wide-open terrain with 12 men on board who didn't give the impression that they were \"just browsing.\"\nAt our house we kept a few vehicles covered and hidden in the back for just such situations. Th e plan was that all 6'4\" of my blond-haired, blue-eyed, Aryan frame would try and dress like an Iraqi and drive the van with Samir in the passenger seat. Samir is a native Iraqi whose family moved to Dearborn, Michigan, aft er the fi rst Gulf War. He looks and acts young, speaks Arabic with a Baghdadi accent and, more importantly, also speaks excellent English. Under our Iraqi clothes we both had on body armor. My rifl e was on the fl oor by my side, I had a pistol in a concealed holster on my waist, and my favorite, \"Bad Day,\" was on my lap. Bad Day was a 14-inch, sawed-off , Remington 870 Wingmaster 12-gauge shotgun with Pachmayr grips. Th e weapon was given to us as a breaching tool to disable locks. On this day, Bad Day would be a great intimidator for anyone who might want to get a closer look at this weird-looking Iraqi behind the wheel. It was also a tool that could be brought to bear quickly in a tight situation. I called it \"Bad Day\" not only because anyone on the receiving end was going to have a bad day, but also because if you are using a 14-inch shotgun to defend yourself in Iraq, rest assured that you too are having a very bad day.\n\nIn the back of the van, which had curtains over the windows, were Jonah and Hadr. Jonah was in his uniform and full kit. His primary job was to be in constant communication with the two fully-loaded gun trucks that would be shadowing our every move 10 to 30 seconds away. Jonah was also sniper-qualifi ed and the best shooter on our team. I wasn't sure what would happen to Hadr if things went bad but I knew the rest of us would be fi ne. Well, maybe I mean that Jonah and I\nwould make it until the rest of the team arrived. Actually, Jonah was the only one who stood any real chance of putting up a fi ght and surviving if we got hit.\n\n Th e recon went smoothly. We quickly moved through the city and the skills I learned driving on the streets of New Jersey came in handy. Th e hairiest part, without exception, was the farmhouse. During that phase we were the farthest from the supporting gun trucks we had been all day, but the terrain was wide open and they could have engaged from a much greater distance. Th e two cancelled each other out. Th at didn't make me feel any safer, though. Luckily, we were in the van because the ramshackle road brought us way too close to Saloom's farmhouse, which was abuzz with activity. We saw their guns before Hadr positively identifi ed the house, and my jaw tightened as the road kept taking us closer and closer. It appeared for an uncomfortable while that we were not on a road but on a driveway and would not be able to turn around before the men at the farmhouse realized that an American had just driven up to their front door... alone. Luckily the road, and our van, turned just as one man started to make his way down to the road to intercept the incoming van.\n\n Th e tires started to spin in the mud about 50 meters from a hardball road. Th e only path leading us back was through a small collection of a dozen houses. For a few precarious seconds I switched the transmission from reverse to forward, trying to rock the van over a slippery bump of mud. Th e van was sliding perpendicular to the road like a pendulum. Although they were now well in the distance, men from the farmhouse were still watching us. Forget about a U.S. vehicle; any vehicle on those roads was cause for suspicion. Jonah and I were hesitant to call for support. We couldn't have the vehicle that had just driven past the farmhouse be seen with U.S. Army vehicles. To make matters worse, a few of the locals who lived in the house 20 meters in front of us started to approach our vehicles. I was seconds away from giving Jonah the order to call up the trucks and stick Bad Day out the window at the inquisitive Iraqis when the wheels gained traction. I was able to turn the van so that the villagers got a better look at Samir than at me. Less than 60 seconds later we had the gun trucks in sight and they were escorting us from a distance back to the team house.\n\nIt was time to say farewell to Hadr. We had recorded all the information he provided and were already putting him in touch with other teams closer to his home. Reportedly, Saloom had already skipped town. UAV overfl ights of the farmhouse the next couple of days revealed no movement at all. We could only sit on Saloom's target packet and hope we hadn't scared him off  for good. If he was as dumb as we hoped, he would be back in a few weeks.\n\nGoing on faith and gut that Hadr had not been an incredible storyteller, we handed him some traveling money and sent him on his way. Hadr was eventually contacted by a team in Baghdad, aft er we insisted he was a good source of information. Hadr would later provide crucial information on the bombing of the UN building in Baghdad.\n\n## Twelve Angry Men\n\n190 |\nA few weeks later, we executed the plan to raid the farmhouse. We still had not yet moved on Saloom and we had no intelligence to indicate he had moved back to the area. Th e plan was simple but the timing critical. When raiding a house in the city, you can use the daily presence of HMMWVs as cover. Any convoy of HMMWVs looks just like the next. Add in the fact many of our targets lived minutes, if not seconds, from our front gate and the enemy had little to no time to react when the routine patrol was suddenly coming through their front door. Th e farmhouse was diff erent in that patrols were extremely rare out there. Additionally, the approach to the farmhouse was exposed for over a mile. Th e obvious solution was to go in the dark to mask our approach. However, since we anticipated a lengthy search of the surrounding area for buried weapons, it would be advantageous for us to have some light.\n\nTactically, the farmhouse would be our easiest raid yet. Not only could they see us on the approach but we could also observe them and there was no chance of someone slipping out of the objective and into the clamor of the city. If needed, we could use our superior fi repower to engage the enemy from a greater distance and we wouldn't have to worry about adjacent friendly buildings or teenagers with automatic weapons popping up around walls and on rooft ops. Finally, the open terrain also allowed us to secure the objective from farther away, which meant we could physically see everyone in both the group that would be going into the structures and the group providing the outer cordon. As commander, this was the most satisfying aspect as it greatly reduced the risk of fratricide.\n\nAlthough it caused some initial grumbling, everyone knew that a sunrise raid would be the only way to make everything work. For a week, we logged the time in the morning one could just begin to see. Th ose few minutes between ambient light and actual sunrise would be our golden time. Th is data could be found in Army operations orders and online. It is called Beginning of Morning Nautical Twilight, or BMNT. We knew it is better to actually know the time for ourselves and see the conditions on the ground than to blindly use a set time given to us.\n\nWe departed our team house with a platoon of infantrymen in the pitch black of early morning. Th e moon was already down and absolute darkness was something we all embraced. I reassured myself that the HMMWVs would not be too loud because everyone on the objective had to be asleep.\n\nJust as I slammed the HMMWV into \"park\" and stepped onto the farm there was enough light beginning to fi ll the air that I could see the fi rst stack of guys from the team fi ling into the main house. On the objective there were what appeared to be two semi-attached living quarters, a barn with attached goat stable, a dilapidated shed, and an unidentifi ed shed/building off  to the side. I was standing directly in front of the latter watching the team and ensuring the cordon was in its correct position, as I could see them now without my night vision goggles. My HMMWV with the gunner still manning the .50 cal machine gun was over my right shoulder. Suddenly, a full-grown adult male was standing in the doorway of this smaller, unremarkable building. Th en another and another.\n\nI found myself suddenly and very unexpectedly having six fi ghting-age males\n20 feet in front of me with the majority of my team in the process of going room to room in the house 50 feet away. Th e .50 cal machine gun, even though it would have burst my eardrums and possibly knocked me unconscious from the overpressure since I was directly in front of and below the barrel, was the only thing that allowed me to keep my cool. I was able to get on the radio quickly and the team shift ed to my location as the last two men were coming out of the small single-room structure.\n\nIn the farmhouse, we found the head of the house, who was a big man in his 60s, one of his sons who wasn't yet 20, and his two wives. In the other building were eight men, none of them related to the family who owned the farm, as some of them claimed, and all from Baghdad. We immediately separated everyone and began the interrogations right on the objective. Again, this was possible only because of the unique terrain of the farmhouse. Typically we did not like to hang out in one area for too long because any raid broadcasts your position and allows anyone the opportunity to take some shots at you, knowing it would be diffi  cult for us to break off  and pursue them. Anyone feeling bold could also quickly organize an attack on our hasty position. Th e farmhouse was diff erent in that we could see anyone approaching, as the sun was already up. I made sure we had 360 degrees of security and we got to the business of breaking out metal detectors to look for weapons while also trying to fi gure out who everyone was.\n\nWe fi rst talked separately to the two women. Th ey both independently gave us the same history of the farm and confi rmed the name and age of their husband and youngest son. When it came to the other eight men, each woman gave an entirely diff erent story for each one of them. Th e farm owner gave a different story and each one of the men gave a diff erent name and reason for being at the farm. I was instantly happy that we had moved to segregate all of them so quickly, something we had not always been able to do in the past.\n\nIt became instantly clear that this was a safe house. Th e location of the farmhouse off ered open access to the desert and possible training facilities. It also had direct access to the major north-south highway in the country. In an interesting paradox, we found no weapons. Th ere were two rather fresh graves allegedly for the parents of the owner of the house, the man in his 60s. Th e graves just seemed out of place and, as much as I was tempted, I just couldn't give the order to dig up a grave. Plus, I had obviously found something nefarious with all these unrelated 20-something males.\n\nTh e problem was that weapons are direct, and concrete. Having 8 or 20\nmales with suspicious stories was still just circumstantial. If weapons are found it's a closed case. You cannot, nor do you need to, interrogate a pile of explosives. I would argue that a pile of fi ghters is more incriminating than a pile of weapons. Any Iraqi can get a pile of weapons and we caught many. However, our mission was to go aft er the mid- to high-level facilitators of the insurgency. (At the time weSFwere the only ones calling it an \"insurgency.\") Th e situation at the farmhouse was one of two possible scenarios. One was that the man who ran the house was a low- to mid-level operative who was part of a much larger network of insurgents. Th e other was that there was no network, which would have meant the owner of the farm established everything and therefore was in the mid- to possibly high-level category.\n\nUnfortunately, we never found out. Due to our austere capabilities we could really only take the owner and four of the strange men. Th e ones who had displayed the most advanced capability to resist questioning were chosen, and we moved them back to our team house to see what else we could extract from them.\n\nMaybe it was because we could not instill shock or fear as we had unintentionally with Hadr, or because they were more loyal to their cause or felt they risked more by talking to us, but none of them incriminated himself or anyone else. Each man was assigned a lengthy packet detailing the events leading to his capture, and we sent them off  to the division holding area. I never heard back as to their fate. Th is section, which started with a lookout for an arms trader in the local market, who identifi ed a combination of cars that would be parked in front of Saloom's house when a deal was about to go down, which led to Hadr, and then to the farmhouse, had come to an end. Unless we could get our hands on Saloom.\n\n## From Small Talk To Policy, Or How I Finally Received Interrogation Training\n\nTh e following month, all the Special Forces detachments in the area got together for a rare meeting. Due to so many variables such meetings almost never took place. Th is meeting was called because the commanding general was fl ying in from Fort Bragg to talk and pat us on the back. Th e meeting was very informal; each detachment gave a prepared fi ve- to ten-minute spiel on current operations and an assessment of its sector.\n\nIn keeping with the laid-back nature of the meeting, the general held a huddle out front before he departed. As generals usually do, or I should say as good generals usually do, he asked us what we needed, what he could do for us.\n\nA salty old veteran was the fi rst to announce that the grain of our \"green tip\" 5.56mm rifl e ammunition was too high. In engagements under 100m (I\nwould say 97% of them), the rounds would be traveling too fast and just smoke right through the enemy. Th e sergeant gave an informative, technically competent dissertation on ballistics and the need for a lower grain round.\n\n\"Good, good stuff ,\" the general said. \"Make sure you got all of that,\" he said to his aide. Next, a younger guy, in a clumsy attempt to be heard, announced that \"we needed more intel support.\" He then went on to fail spectacularly when pushed for specifi cs. Th e general was about to leave when he looked toward me and I blurted out, \"Interrogation support.\" With a raised inquisitive eyebrow, the general asked me to elaborate.\n\n\"Well, sir,\" I said, \"everything I know about interrogations I learned at SERE* school.\" (*Editor's Note: Survival, Evasion, Resistance, and Escape, a course taught by the U.S. Air Force at Fairchild AFB, Washington) Th e expression on his face told me I probably could have stopped there, but the nods of my peers encouraged me to continue. I extrapolated on this and, although we all knew it, I had to state the obvious. I had not learned a thing about interrogations at SERE school. What I was trying to point out is that we were not instructed in *any way* to conduct interrogations or questioning. In fact, the only way we had ever been a party to any interrogation was to our own, and in ways that were not meant to extract intelligence from us. SERE, aft er all, was training and we didn't even have any real intelligence to off er in the SERE scenario.\n\nWithout getting into too much detail, SERE is meant to induce stress so one can realize how he might react when faced with capture. Th erefore, SERE tactics are in direct opposition to actual intelligence interrogations, tactical questioning, or debriefi ng.\n\nAs we all had brought up in each of our fi ve-minute spiels, interrogations played an important part in our operational cycle. However, none of us discussed that we were fumbling through it and it would be nice if we could get some people in here to support us. Additionally, we all agreed that all Special Forces soldiers need training in interrogations before coming to Iraq, probably during the units' Pre-Mission Training (PMT). I could tell as I laid this all out in a very ad hoc manner that the general understood what I was trying to say.\n\nHis last words as he left  assured us that we would get the interrogation support in combat and in training. We never saw any lower grain 5.56 rounds. However, when I was holding Saloom's ID card up to his face in the back of my vehicle on a warm night a few days later, I was excited at the prospect of having him questioned by a member of a Mobile Interrogation Team (MIT). I don't know where the MITs came from or how we got connected with them so fast, but when the decision was made to go for Saloom again, we made sure to have a MIT available.\n\nSaloom went down like clockwork; aft er all, we had already taken down his house once before. Four weeks later, almost to the night, I was driving the HMMWV back through his front gate. Inside his house were two women, two children, and one man. Th e man, who looked just like Saloom, gave us some weird name. Even with us holding his ID card right next to his face, he would not admit he was Ali Saloom. Aft er he was cuff ed and driven onto the Armored Battalion's base and right before we handed him over to the MIT, he fi nally admitted what was obvious to all of us: he was our Saloom.\n\n196 |\nIt was so good to hear him say it. Even this tiniest of victories felt good. I\nknew without a doubt that this was him. It was frustrating to hear him use the same lame excuses and ridiculous lies and alibis as all the other detainees had used. What was more off ensive was that Saloom tried to deny who he was with his ID card right in front of him. It felt good to get this man, whom I was hunting for months, to make the smallest of admissionsthe man whose name I had typed into countless reports, the man whom I had arrested and had talked to his family and friends about. It was good to know that he knew that I got him and that if he would admit his true name he might admit more. Th e best part about capturing Saloom was that it meant we could then start developing the information he gave us and hopefully working on his boss. It was with the information from guys like Saloom that I felt we could really make a lasting difference instead of just rearranging deck chairs on the Titanic.\n\nWe had already given the MIT all we had on Saloom, including the bag with the weapons receipt and the information from Hadr. As I watched them escort him into the interrogation room they had set up, I leaned back with a Pine Light and a Diet Coke and joked cheerfully with Cory, Jonah, and Dave. Fift een minutes later, when one of the two members of the team came out of the room, I was prepared to provide him the smallest bit of information I might know about Saloom that you can't just pass on in a report.\n\n\"Th is guy is good\" or \"this guy is clean\" or \"his story sounds legit\" - something to that eff ectis what the graying, older, fat, dopey-looking, professional interrogator said. He went on, aft er our restrained demand for an explanation, that Saloom had said he was the best taxi driver in town and that many people were jealous of him and would lie about him to Coalition forces. When we asked about the bag with the weapons receipts, with his name all over them, and in what looked like his handwriting, I almost had to be physically restrained when the interrogator said the receipts were just some papers he said he found in one of the buildings on the base that the Armored Battalion now occupied. Saloom thought they were cool and wanted to keep them. He also thought they were so cool he wanted to write his name on a few. Finally the interrogator said, \"Th ere is no way to 'prove' that was his handwriting.\" Dave, a burly 240-lb ex-Division I NCAA football player, did have to be physically restrained. I thanked the MIT for their timeabout 2 hours with the packet they didn't read and 15 minutes total with Saloomand told them to make sure the door didn't hit them in the butt on the way out.\n\nOver the next 30 hours I attempted to question Saloom three times. Th e fi rst time he was brimming with confi dence. Th ough he didn't speak English and was barely literate in Arabic, he knew some gullible American had bought the ridiculous story he had spun. I think that by the third session I might have broken down his instilled perception that all Americans were gullible. Th e audacity of his lies returned and frustrated me more than before.\n\nTh ere was more than enough information to keep Saloom locked up for a while, and I am fairly certain he spent a good amount of time in jail. We were left  with nothing. We had come as far up the food chain as we could go. Th e next day I did two things. First, I sat down with the detachment and looked at any information we had on low-level arms dealers or fi ghters to target so we could start working back up the chain of terrorists in Iraq. By this time the satellite Internet system we bought on the local economy was fi nally up and running. I\nwent on 'Amazon.com' and bought a book on interrogations.\n\n## Postscript\n\nAft er I was back from Iraq for a few months, another group of teams from my unit was preparing to go over. As part of their training they had been told to conduct a block of interrogation training. I was lucky enough to piggyback onto this training. It was a 40-hour course taught by a former FBI interrogator. Later we would certify most of our people conducting interrogations on the Reid Technique. Although these law enforcement models did not fi t well in Iraq, they still built confi dence in the team members and helped fi ll an obvious need.\n\n## A Tactical Soldier's InsightsCurrent Atmosphere\n\nIf our professionals don't have clear standards in the law, the program (Detainee Detention Act) is not going to go forward. You cannot ask a young intelligence offi  cer to violate the law. And they're not going to. Th ey will not violate the law....You can't ask a young professional on the front line of protecting this country to violate the law.... I got to give them the tools they need. And that is clear law.421\n- President George W. Bush September, 2006\n\n## Ignorantia Juris Non Excusat\n\nPresident Bush made these comments in a Rose Garden address in defense of his Detainee Detention Act. Th e much-needed and well-intentioned act brought clarity to Common Article III of the Geneva Convention and helped defi ne terms such as \"outrages upon human dignity.\" However, those making\n198 |\ndecisions at, and for, the strategic level on interrogations have done nothing to help the ground soldier. Worse, their decisions have had a ripple eff ect that has degraded U.S. intelligence-gathering eff orts.\n\nSoldiers in the fi eld, those \"young professional[s] on the front line of protecting this country\" that President Bush referred to, do not and cannot follow what is happening in Washington. Th e Detainee Detention Act pertained only to a select group of high-level detainees and was intended for the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and lawmakers, not for the soldier. What the soldier needed then and still needs today are clear rules on who can conduct an interrogation and where, when, and under what circumstances he can conduct an interrogation. Th is all presupposes that the soldier can distinguish right from wrong, and does not need a moral code dictated to him. Th e abuse and mistreatment of detainees is a separate issue. Th e President's leadership on this issue was and is needed, although that leadership is echelons above reality for a soldier who is not empowered to do his job.\n\nAt least one senior-level offi  cial stated that the new Army FM 2-22.3\ncontains all the answers regarding interrogation and that the category \"tactical questioning\" should cover everything else that tactical soldiers might face.422\nTh is approach disregards the intricacies that soldiers, especially Special Forces soldiers, face on today's battlefi elds.\n\nBased on the author's experience, most commanders have not read, nor do they understand, the current doctrine with regard to who can conduct interrogations. As a result, soldiers and commanders are now conducting interrogations in ignorance of current doctrine. In many cases, the mindset among commanders is one of intentionally not wanting to know the current doctrine on interrogations, out of fear that once they do know they will lose the ad hoc capability to conduct interrogations and therefore mission eff ectiveness will be degraded. At the same time, commanders are nervous about the rules governing interrogations because they have read the headlines and are aware of the debate. Interrogations not conforming to current doctrine are being conducted under a veil of secrecy, because to discuss interrogation doctrine would lead to tacit acknowledgment of violating it. If the unit or previous commander got away with skirting the rules, then such behavior may appear to be tolerated, as long as the mission succeeds. Th is is especially true for interrogations because the information they provide is so vital to operations. However, once a commander scratches the surface of the doctrine and realizes it prohibits his men from conducting interrogations, it creates a moral dilemma for him and his men. Th e need for the information remains, but their means of obtaining it is circumvented by the doctrine. Th erefore, the current doctrine creates an unintentional but real quandary for tactical soldiers that must be resolved. No act in warfare should ever be carried out in an atmosphere of fear, concern, and secrecy. Th e Latin phrase *ignorantia juris non excusat* (\"ignorance of the law does not excuse\") serves as warning.\n\nIn the course of his research the author talked with two Special Forces group commanders (both colonels, O-6), one acting group commander, a colonel in charge of Special Forces training, a Special Forces sergeant major in charge of training soldiers deploying to Iraq and Afghanistan, a Special Forces group JAG offi  cer, and countless team- and company-level Special Forces soldiers. All of these men were certain that they or their men were authorized to conduct interrogations. None of them could cite the authority giving them this confi dence. Some discussed interrogation training they had conducted at the group level. All of them viewed it as simply an integral part of fi ghting a war.\n\nTh e only offi  cial pre-mission training on interrogations that covered who is authorized to interrogate simply stated, \"Interrogators interrogate\n(period),\"423 with emphasis on the period. Th e military services have Army FM 2-22.3 today because of the linkages explained earlier. Most of the current doctrine results in large part from the abuses perpetrated at Abu Ghraib. Even though investigations found only questionable, non-linear links between intelligence interrogations and the abuses at Abu Ghraib,424 the Pentagon's reaction was swift  and sweeping. Additionally, almost all the behavior shown in the photographs occurred in the dead of night among military police, wholly separate from interrogations. Most abuse victims were not even scheduled to be interrogated, because they were of no intelligence value.425\nTh e best known and most discussed results of changes to U.S. military interrogation tactics in the wake of Abu Ghraib were that interrogators could no longer use stress positions and many controversial techniques. A lesser known issue is that additional rules were now published as to who is authorized to interrogate a detainee. Currently, for both the professional interrogator and the soldiers in harm's way, \"red tape now entangles the interrogation process, and detainees know that their adversaries' hands are tied.\"426\nTh is entanglement stems from the inability of senior-ranking offi  cers to understand the tactical level and the diff erences between the tactical and strategic levels. Every policy set forth on interrogations, every speech lawmakers and national leaders give, actually deals with strategic interrogations. However, these leaders extrapolate the presentations to the tactical framework, as though average soldiers, or even average military interrogators, would normally encounter the issues that arise in strategic interrogation. Th is simply does not happen.\n\nTh e diff erences between a tactical-level interrogation (a real tactical level, as discussed below) and a strategic-level interrogation are gargantuan. Yet interrogation plans are still written to encompass interrogations at every level. Th ey must be triple-checked all the way up to the Pentagon by offi  cers who have never conducted an interrogation.427 To complicate matters further, many of these offi  cers have never had tactical combat experience. In layman's terms, they have \"never heard a shot fi red in anger.\" Th ey are the ones now shaping the doctrine that guides the members of our military who possess tactical-level war experience.\n\n## Strategic Vs. Tactical Interrogations\n\n200 |\nLet us compare the characteristics of a strategic-level interrogation to those of a tactical-level interrogation. Th e cases presented earlier should provide a clear baseline of a \"real\" tactical interrogation. Strategic interrogations most closely resemble Hadr's interrogation, but include far more support and time. Th e defi ning aspect of a strategic interrogation as compared to a tactical one is time. Tactical interrogations must be expedient, whereas strategic interrogations take place over months and years. In these months the interrogator can draw on a much larger array of tools, the most obvious, of course, being time.\n\nAnother important diff erence is that strategic interrogations are performed by a team. An interrogation team might include as many as three interrogators, each with skills in the prisoner's language. Additional members of the team are the MPs who relieve the interrogators of any additional security responsibility. Th e interrogators might also have the direct support of a behavioral psychologist, a lawyer, an anthropologist, and a supervisor, all contributing to exploiting the prisoner. Unlike tactical interrogations, strategic interrogations are carried out in fi xed facilities, and security is rarely an issue.\n\nTh e cases cited earlier portray tactical interrogation. Th is study uses the term \"real\" tactical interrogations to counter the images of such interrogations presented in the press and shared by policymakers at the strategic level. For example, in reporting on the interrogations that led to identifying the whereabouts of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, Mark Bowden describes a special operations interrogation task force as working in a \"Battlefi eld Interrogation Facility.\"428\nA battlefi eld interrogation represents the lowest of tactical-level interrogations. However, Bowden later describes this facility as being on the 15-square-mile Balad Air Base, one of the largest in Iraq, complete with a Green Bean coff ee shop, Pizza Hut, and Burger King open around the clock.429 Th e base is also known as Camp Anaconda.\n\nHeather MacDonald came a little closer to reality in her description of tactical debriefi ng. She described a \"ramshackle detention facility\" outside Kandahar airport.430 She noted that the interrogation task force in Afghanistan would determine which prisoners were signifi cant enough to be shipped to Guantanamo Bay. Tactical interrogations are conducted in places far removed from the nearest Burger King, however, and the results do not determine if the prisoner is of signifi cant value to be shipped off  to GTMO.\n\nTh e Pentagon might believe interrogations described by Bowden and MacDonald are tactical interrogations, although they are really operationallevel interactions. Regrettably, that misunderstanding only serves to highlight policymakers' ignorance of a very complex series of events taking place at the tactical level. It also displays their lack of knowledge about the value of interrogations such as those described earlier.\n\nWe hear a lot these days about America's overpowering military technology; about the professionalism of its warriors; about the sophistication of its weaponry, eavesdropping, and telemetry; but right now the most vital weapon in its arsenal may well be the art of interrogation.431\nCurrent doctrine has robbed tactical forces of this \"most vital weapon.\"\nTh ose conducting strategic interrogations and those making policy decisions in Washington know the importance of interrogations at the strategic level. However, they are failing to recognize the impact of interrogations at the tactical level.\n\nOne tenet applying to all interrogations is that some detainees are \"lockboxes containing potentially life-saving information,\"432 and we pay for their silence with our blood.433 Because of either ignorance or lack of trust, the Pentagon does not believe these tenets apply equally to tactical and strategic interrogations. While a tactical interrogation carried out on the battlefi eld will not reveal details of the next major terrorist attack coming to U.S. soil, it can reveal intelligence to stabilize the local town or information that will save the life of the interrogator. Even so, the Pentagon feels compelled to diff erentiate between intelligence interrogations and tactical questioning. Th e rules allow only \"professional\" interrogators to conduct intelligence interrogations and leave everyone elsefrom a truck driver to a Special Forces intelligence sergeantwith only the tool of tactical questioning, which restricts them to asking expedient initial questions to discover information of only immediate value.\n\n## A Lesson From Tactical Interrogations: Th E Shock Of Capture\n\nJust as strategic interrogations have many tangible facets that make tactical interrogations look paltry, tactical interrogations have a great intangible advantage that strategic-level interrogators would be overjoyed to possess. Th e greatest advantage of a tactical interrogation is leveraging the shock of capture:\nTh e frustrated interrogators constantly discussed how to get it. Th e best hope, they agreed, was to re-create the \"shock of capture\"that vulnerable mental state when a prisoner is most frightened, most uncertain, and most likely to respond to questioning. Uncertainty is an interrogator's most powerful ally; exploited wisely, it can lead the detainee to believe that the interrogator is in total control and holds the key to his future.434\nTh e maximum opportunity for intelligence gathering comes in the fi rst hours aft er an arrest, before others in a group can possibly know that their walls have been breached.435\n202 |\nTh e bottom line is fear works. Th e best way to use this fear is when it is genuine and originates with the source. Fear that is not introduced artifi cially, but originates solely in the mind of the prisoner, is the most eff ective. However, it is when an interrogator tries to re-create the fear that can only accompany the shock of capture that he runs the risk of crossing the line into abuse.\n\nAn interrogator who has missed the opportunity to leverage the shock of capture has two options. Th e fi rst option is to try to re-create that fear. Th e longer the time elapsed between capture and the fi rst real interrogation the harder it will be to return the prisoner to that pinnacle of fear he felt hours or days ago. Th erefore, the interrogator must try other techniques to frighten the detainee. Th e most desirable method is for the interrogator to suggest harsher conditions and cause the detainee to create his own fear. Stress positions, which have been outlawed, and \"advanced techniques\" are other, more controversial, ways to make the detainee think his future is uncertain.\n\nHowever, even the least aggressive of these techniques has come into question. FBI agents at GTMO could not even suggest to the people whom they interrogated that they might possibly be sentenced to death, because \"Th at would be a violation of the Convention Against Torture.\"436 Th ey theorized that any covert threat might infl ict \"severe mental pain.\" Given this precedent, one is left  to ponder alternative circumstances under which an interrogator could induce, or try to employ the tactic of, fear other than on initial capture. We have not reached the point where a rational person could argue we should not capture terrorists because it could infl ict \"severe mental pain\"yet.\n\n## Shock\n\nAdieb and Hadr both serve as stark examples of the eff ects of capture.\n\nAdieb presents a case where the interrogators did not need to play on his fear. Th e fear Adieb felt was all too real from the minute the Special Forces team appeared, since he knew he had bomb-making material in his possession. Moreover, he stood 5-10 feet away from the material when a shower of sparks fi lled the area of his trunk containing the explosives. In the author's opinion, it was that brush with death that pushed him over the edge into hysteria. Th en the team intentionally added to that fear, not realizing Adieb's already unstable mental state. Th is combination of events led to his extreme reaction.437 He was no longer able to process his fear. Had the team possibly played on these fears to a lesser degree and then treated him in the same way they treated Hadr, that hot-to-cold eff ect could have resulted in an uncontrollable fl ow of information from the prisoner instead of his uncontrollable mental shutdown.\n\nTh e shock of capture can play out two ways. Th e fi rst results from the eff ect of getting the suspect on his heels. It is the act of getting inside the target's decision cycle. It keeps him in a state of observing and orienting and keeping him from making a thoroughly considered decision. An example is the abrupt transition from being asleep to being bound and traveling to an unknown destination with a group of armed men. Th e second, which has received less attention, is the shock a prisoner experiences when his captors treat him in a way that is diametrically opposed to his expectations. Th is second aspect is also aff ected greatly by the time between the actual capture and the time of the fi rst interview, i.e., the time between the fi rst and the second shock. Th e intent should be to minimize the time that elapses between the two.\n\nEssential to producing the eff ect is the dissociation of the interrogator from the prisoner's fear. If the interrogator created the fear, the shift  to kinder treatment or a better environment will seem unnatural to all parties involved.\n\n204 |\nIf, however, the fear comes from uncontrollable events, such as the weather, a long drive, or a near-death experience, then the interrogator and prisoner can empathize with each other at least on some level. It may also allow the interrogator to play the role of a savior and authority fi gure who can control everything about the detainee's environment. Both are very powerful tools. Of course, if the change from a hostile environment to a comfortable one (and one could theorize vice versa) is drawn out over even a few minutes, the shock could lose its eff ectiveness.\n\nHadr's case presents the best example. Hadr's fear came solely from himself. Once his captors recognized he was frightened, his anxieties were not abated until his interrogators were ready to remove them. Th e team could have exacerbated them by doing anything from staging a mock execution to simply leaving him in the desert, keeping him blindfolded and bound, and watching him from a distance for a few minutes. Because he was already frightened, because he was still operating under the shock of capture, they did not need to resort to any of those questionable tactics. Instead, the team adopted a policy guided by a recognition that \"the more we interact and involve ourselves in the detainee's thought process during this period, the more we could push him over the edge,\" as had happened with Adieb. Th e team members also believed the more interaction they had with Hadr during this phase the more it might facilitate his associating his fear with the individuals on the team. Conversely, the team could make a mistake and possibly relieve him of his fears.\n\nTh e team did not know why Hadr was so terrifi ed. Was it the cold, the unknown, the capture, not knowing what was next, the fear of being murdered? One could assume that if the team had tried to frighten Hadr further by mentioning his coming torture back at the base, it might actually have caused him to become more calm by removing his fear of being executed or abandoned.\n\nHadr's off er to accompany the team the next day is diffi  cult to analyze.\n\nOne possibility is that from early in the night Hadr was so entirely wrapped up in the events of the evening, the highs and lows, that he was no longer thinking before he spoke. Th e author believes that Hadr did not even realize the extent to which he had capitulated. His continued assistance the next day and his later assistance to the coalition in Baghdad came about either because of a sudden reformation or because he realized he had unconsciously switched teams and decided there was no turning back.\n\n\"An unfrightened prisoner makes an unlikely informer.\"438 Saloom was certainly frightened when the detachment fi nally captured him. As his paltry resistance withered (\"he was not the man we were looking for\"), he was unable to devise an alternate tactic while the team kept him on the defensive. Out of fear, Saloom decided to use the \"it wasn't me\" defense, but under the shock of capture he could not persevere in maintaining it. Only when he realized that the MIT team would accept his story did he not merely lose all fear, but actually become cocky, confi dent, and arrogant. Th is dynamic shift  occurred in a matter of a few minutes. Th ereaft er it took almost a day and a half to convince him that he was not invulnerable.\n\n## Th E Interrogator's Options\n\nTwo basic rules govern the ways of leveraging the shock of capture in the tactical environment. First, if the prisoner is already frightened and the team wants information from him, they should not try to aff ect the fear. Th ey should not try to play on it and heighten it, but should also not try to remove this burden from him... yet. Th e second rule is that the interrogators must be the ones who determine when the prisoner is freed of his fear. Th is not only demonstrates that the interrogators are in complete control of the environment but also conveys the subconscious notion that they are in control of the prisoner's emotions. If this belief can take root in the prisoner's mind, then it creates the conditions for the prisoner to capitulate. Time is of the essence, and the tactical team cannot risk keeping a detainee in the panic zone long enough to allow him to calm himself on his own and give him confi dence that he could relieve himself of his own fear. Th erefore, relying on an interrogator who may be hours if not days away is impractical.\n\nCaptors can alleviate a prisoner's fear through an improved environment, a tone of voice, some choice words, or a friendly gesture. To augment the shock of capture in a diff erent way and keep the detainee \"off  balance,\" interrogators should apply all of these techniques and confront the prisoner with a fl ood of the unexpected. Additionally, they should keep questions to a minimum. Th e goal would be to convey to the detainee that as long as he talks about topics that hold the interrogator's interest he could remain warm and comfortable and have food, Red Bull, and cigarettes. Hadr's torrent of conversation was diffi  - cult to stop because he knew that what he was experiencing was far better than whatever might happen next, even release into a cold, wet night.\n\nSome, maybe even most, of what a prisoner might say will be of no intelligence value. However, experience has shown that merely getting a detainee to communicate with his captors is sometimes the most diffi  cult step. Additionally, the detainee can only guess what his interrogators do and do not know. He may be describing something he believes to be common knowledge or already known to the interrogators, while they in fact are discovering or confi rming actionable intelligence.\n\nTh e most diffi  cult part of implementing this tactic is treating the prisoner kindly. Th e team had no qualms about heightening Adieb's fears; aft er all, Adieb had almost allowed them to be blown up. Conversely, the team found it easy to be pleasant to Hadr, primarily because they genuinely regretted that they had allowed him to become so cold. Moreover, they had little information about him or what he had done; they did not know if he was simply in the wrong place or was a cold-blooded killer. Finally, it was very diffi  cult to treat Saloom decently. Even aft er the positive experience with Hadr, the team could not bring themselves to pander to a terrorist who now was sitting comfortably in his tower aft er his victory over the MIT.\n\n\nPeople are afraid of the unknown. Th ey are afraid of being tortured, of being held for a long time. Try to see what it is like to sit with a hood over your head for four hours, when you are hungry and tired and afraid, when you are isolated from everything and have no clue what is going on. When the captive believes that anything could happen... the interrogator can go to work.439\n206 |\nImagine what happens in the prisoner's mind when the isolation and hunger end. No matter how they end, a progression has taken place. If the prisoner is tortured, he understands what his life will be like in captivity. If he is questioned in a stern manner and then returned to his cell or treated with kindness, some of the unknowns have been resolved.\n\nIf the interrogation begins with torture or the most extreme measure permissible, what other options does the interrogator have? For a while the prisoner will not know that the interrogator has exhausted his options, but he will discover it soon. What avenues remain? Conversely, if the interrogator answers the prisoner's questions about the unknown with the unexpected, he can obtain some expedient results. Th e key diff erence is that if the unexpected is at the farthest possible end of the spectrum from torture, then the interrogator still has many potential methods left  to exploit. If the detainee becomes too comfortable or complacent, nothing in regulations or custom prevents the interrogator from making his circumstances far worse.\n\nTh e emphasis should not be on the extent to which the interrogator can make the detainee uncomfortable, cause him physical pain, or increase his fear. Instead, it should be on the degree of change from one environment to the next.\n\nFor example, if a prisoner sleeps in a cell that contains a pot and a mat and the interrogator removes the mat, the prisoner's environment has changed. Th e small mat probably had great importance for him. An interrogator might give the prisoner only a pot for the fi rst few days of his captivity and ask no more than the prisoner's name and the names of his family members for the fi rst week. Th en, if the interrogator suddenly provided the prisoner with a bed, a shower, a toilet, and hot food, and seemed ready to listen to anything the prisoner wanted to discuss, the abrupt change might allow the interrogator to learn volumes about the enemy. Th is is merely one illustration of the methods recommended. Th e underlying premise is grounded at the tactical level. Soldiers could apply it over the course of a few hours; strategic-level interrogators could hone it to their own purposes.\n\nTh e insights in this section apply specifi cally to troops without interrogator support at the tactical level. Th ere are a lot of emotions at the tactical level that can hamper eff ective interrogations. Controlling those emotions and channeling behavior in ways known to be eff ective are not easy, but with proper training can be accomplished. Th ose who draw up doctrine must understand the intricacies and emotions involved. Decision makers, who decide which tools to provide the \"young professional[s] on the front line of protecting this country,\" must understand the environment in which the tools will be employed.\n\n## Th E Case For Special Forces Interrogations\n\nTh e Special Forces are mysterious, and the number of civilians who do not understand their mission is proportional to the number in the military's own ranks who do not understand how they accomplish the mission. Th e popular view is accurate: Special Forces will be tasked to conduct daring raids to capture a specifi c individual at a specifi c place and time. Th ey will receive a thick packet of intelligence and a complete plan for how the operation will take place. Th ey are a football team executing a play the coaches drew up. Th ese, however, do not constitute the majority of Special Forces missions.\n\nSpecial Forces are known as force multipliers; they do more with less.\n\nTh e typical mission involves living in the community and assimilating into the culture as much as possible to allow Special Forces to generate their own intelligence and develop their own plays. Th is very attractive feature of the Special Forces community draws many soldiers to its ranks from the lock-step \"Big Army\" lifestyle. It also creates a highly eff ective force that is not a burden to support. Without the ability to conduct interrogations at the tactical level, however, Special Forces are hamstrung.\n\nWhy does current doctrine not allow Special Forces operators to interrogate? Why did the Pentagon change the new Field Manual by specifying who can conduct interrogation? And why do policymakers not clarify the letter of the doctrine to refl ect its intent?\n\nTh e three reasons why interrogation operations were made more restrictive are *accountability, uniformity*, and *training*. Th e subsections below summarize the standard arguments for each rationale and then off er counterarguments.\n\n## Accountability\n\nTo allow Special Forces and units with similar missions to conduct interrogations is to give a very sensitive tool to a type of unit that operates in the shadows. ODAs receive little to no oversight. Th eir reporting and chain of command are sometimes hidden and evolve spontaneously on the battlefi eld. Conventional commanders are oft en confused about who \"owns\" these forces. At fi rst glance, allowing Special Forces to conduct their own interrogations would constitute a recipe for potential abuse.\n\nHowever, these soldiers are already allowed considerable fl exibility and autonomy in their daily operations. Do interrogations fall into such a sensitive category that they are potentially riskier than conducting raids, advising regional government offi  cials, or overseeing large construction projects? Th ese are all normal activities for Special Operators, if there were a \"normal\" operation for these unconventional troops.\n\nInterrogators at fi xed detention sites in Afghanistan also struggled to determine what was authorized under the rules for interrogations.440 Like a Special Forces team, these interrogators oft en operate as small independent groups; however, they are not nearly as senior or mature as Special Forces teams. While they debated what was allowed, a similar debate took place in Washington. Memoranda from the Pentagon, the CIA, the White House and, most notoriously, from the Justice Department allowed far more latitude than the soldiers had adopted.441 According to one commentator, \"Looking back through the lens of Abu Ghraib, the debates that took place among the interrogators at Bagram in early 2002 seem enlightened.\"442 It is misguided to believe that a unit the Army has deemed more mature and better trained than most soldiers would abuse its authority when conducting interrogations merely because it operates independently.\n\n## Uniformity\n\n208 |\nInterrogators in Afghanistan derived the tactics they used from their own\ntraining experiences. Th ey theorized that if the interrogator was enduring the\nsame sleeplessness as the detainees then the method could not be considered \"torture.\" Th ey called their techniques \"Monstering.\"443 Th e hardened soldiers of the Special Forces might adopt this thought process and disrupt the uniformity of interrogations, because these men are not representative of the average soldier. What they could endure and what a detainee could endure would be dramatically diff erent. Moreover, the sheer physical endurance is not as important as the mental endurance they possess. Special Forces soldiers do not think of themselves as extraordinary, but they have a \"suck it up and drive on\" mentality that might prove dangerous in an interrogation room. Certainly, the term \"outrages upon human dignity\" would elicit an array of colorful responses from a Special Forces team.\n\nHowever, Special Forces soldiers have another key characteristictheir drive to win. Special Forces soldiers are extremely outgoing. On tests such as the Myers-Briggs and Th omas-Kilmann they score off  the charts in the extrovert, assertive category. Put bluntly, they are Lee Cobb's character in \"12 Angry Men.\"444 Th is trait of Special Forces would override any desire to treat the detainee as harshly as they were treated in their own training. If these soldiers were shown a way to conduct an eff ective interrogation, then that would be the method they would use, because they would know that it represented their best chance of winning. Th at is also why such soldiers are probably conducting interrogations in Iraq now without the appropriate authority.\n\n## Training\n\nTraining, or the lack thereof, is paramount among the concerns. \"Preparing an interrogator means arming him beforehand.\"445 Clearly, there are good reasons for not letting Special Forces soldiersor anyoneconduct interrogations unless they are trained to do so. Nevertheless, establishing selective, competitive, diffi  cult-to-attend schooling does not constitute a reasonable approach to training them or allowing them to conduct interrogations. Interrogations play so important a role on today's battlefi eld and have become so politically sensitive that they must be addressed on a much larger scale.\n\nTh e number of enemy captured exceeds the number of enemy killed. By design, Special Forces training does not include a detainee-related exercise or dilemma. With interrogations becoming such a sensitive issue over the past few years, the U.S. Army Special Forces Command has intentionally distanced itself from interrogations.446 Yet, it should embrace the challenge, rather than evade it.\n\n210 |\n First, the Army should add a detainee treatment overview to the Special Forces Qualifi cation Course (SFQC), the course that makes Green Berets. Th is course is already brimming with skills the students must master in a very short period of time. Additional classes on detainee handling have joined a long list of suggestions that simply were not included in the lengthy, trying course that produces some of our country's greatest defenders. However, if one examines the amount of time a Special Forces soldier spends in Iraq dealing with detainees and how much he relies on them for information, adding a half-day class on detainee operations would inform the soldier and protect the command.\n\nTh e best option would be to modify the culminating exercise, \"Robin Sage,\" so that rather than making each mission one in which the trainees kill large numbers of the enemy they confront more realistic detainee-related dilemmas. Th ese soldiers should see in training the questions that actually arise when processing and questioning a detainee on an asymmetric battlefi eld.\n\nTh e focal points of a Special Forces team's interrogation training should be the team's warrant offi  cer and intelligence sergeant. Both of these positions require additional training. During these additional courses, soldiers should receive approximately 40 hours of interrogation training that would qualify and authorize them to conduct interrogations and supervise interrogations conducted by other graduates of the SFQC. Each Special Forces team has two of every specialty. Having both the team's warrant offi  cer and intelligence sergeant qualifi ed for this task would provide the needed redundancy. Warrant offi  cers who eventually leave the team could then apply their knowledge of interrogations to oversight at the company and battalion levels.\n\nTh e recommended training must focus on intelligence interrogations and not on law enforcement interrogations, which have vastly diff erent goals. In an attempt to train soldiers on this much-needed skill set, individual Special Forces groups have contracted for instruction on interrogations based on methods such as the Reid Technique. Th is is clear evidence Special Forces recognized a gap prior to the introduction of FM 2-22.3. While this was a satisfactory stopgap measure when it was authorized, this technique should not be viewed as the panacea to the much more complex issue.\n\nAllowing Special Forces to conduct their own training and interrogations would greatly enhance mission eff ectiveness. More important, it would provide much-needed protection against possible inquiries and prosecution. Th ere is already too much misunderstanding about interrogation from the highest to the lowest level. For that reason, soldiers are told the only tool available to them is tactical questioning: expedient questioning to obtain information. At the same time, the top U.S. commander in Iraq has stated the military does not sanction \"expedient methods to obtain information.\"447\n\n## Conclusion: Th E Letter Versus The Intent\n\nHow can U.S. Army Special Forces accomplish assigned missions while still adhering to DoD doctrine on intelligence interrogation and tactical questioning?\n\nConsider a situation like Hadr's in light of today's doctrine. A Special Forces team does not include anyone authorized to conduct interrogations in Iraq. Th e team captures a prisoner and encounters delays in moving him to an approved detention facility and turning him over to the MPs, as is required by doctrine.448 Moreover, even if the team included an approved interrogator it would still be forced to wait until it reached an approved facility before questioning him. It is rainy and dark, the team is having vehicle problems, and the town between it and the detention facility is currently the location of a fi refi ght.\n\nTh erefore, the team decides to risk holding the prisoner overnight. During the \"expedient initial questioning\" of the detainee for the purpose of gathering \"information of immediate value,\" which is allowed under the narrow defi - nition of tactical questioning, the detainee begins to reveal who bombed the team's base last month. Th e detainee also wants to tell them who has been paying and supplying all anti-coalition forces in the area. What should the team do? Th is information is not of immediate value and needs more than expedient questioning to elicit.\n\nAny general in Washington would look at this example and say, \"Of course they should get all the information they can.\" Th is would be especially true in cases such as Hadr's, where the team could not stop the detainee from talking. Would the team be allowed to keep the detainee for another day to assist in the reconnaissance of local terrorist safe houses? Does the team leadership have the authority to release the detainee of its own accord? Th e doctrine is unclear on all these specifi cs, but the restrictive wording of current doctrine would suggest that the team would have none of these options available to it. In other words, the generals in Washington would want the team to \"feel\" that it could pursue intelligence obtained during expedient questioning even though it is not \"of immediate value.\" However, those same generals have written doctrine that does not allow this. Th us, the letter of the law contradicts the intent of the law.\n\n212 |\nTh e intent of the law is to prevent individual teams from hosting private detention facilities and using tactics that are not approved. An additional intent of the law is probably to enable Pentagon spokespersons to assure the media that only specially trained \"interrogators\" have access to detainees. For this reason FM 2-22.3 reads as if it were written by lawyers for lawyers, rather than by soldiers for soldiers.\n\nTh e letter of the law is clearer. \"Interrogations may only be conducted by personnel trained and certifi ed in the interrogation methodology, including personnel in MOSs 97E, 351M (351E), or select others as may be approved by DOD policy.\"449 Current research has found only three programs that would certify a soldier as trained. Th e fi rst is the interrogator course at Fort Huachuca, which is restricted to the MOSs listed above. Th e second is another course at Fort Huachuca, the Joint Interrogation Course (JIC), which is not yet offi  cially receiving students.450 Th is course is designed for soldiers whose primary job is not interrogation, and would fi ll much of the need identifi ed in this study. However, it is rumored the JIC will still only allow interrogations to take place at an \"approved facility,\" which creates numerous problems. Moreover, every unit in the Army would try to enroll its soldiers in that course, and it would be overwhelmed immediately unless it had very selective admission criteria.\n\nVery little information is available about the third course, which is run by USCENTCOM and only approves soldiers to conduct interrogations in that area of operations. Th is is an eff ective, albeit stopgap, measure to allow a select fewonly those who can manage an assignment to attend the course to conduct interrogations in the current fi ght. It fails to address the greater issue or any current or future operations outside USCENTCOM's area of responsibility.\n\nEven if a soldier has received the requisite training, he still lacks coherent guidance on how to put it into practice. FM 2-22.3 only briefl y discusses tactical questioning and then directs the reader to ST 2-91, which provides no information about the use of tactical questioning as a tool to gather intelligence from a detainee. Instead, it off ers a detailed discussion of a patrol's use of tactical questioning in random conversation with locals who are not being detained. Th e level of guidance on tactical questioning was designed for members of a patrol. It is a good tool and a worthwhile text for a private in Advanced Individual Training (AIT). For a Special Forces team the text covers topics that have been part of Special Forces standard operating procedures (SOPs) since the 1940s. Moreover, tactical questioning restricts the type and duration of any interaction resembling a tactical interrogation. A soldier's concept of the \"fi eld\" diff ers greatly from what the authors of FM\n2-22.3 believe the fi eld to be:\nAlthough fi eld interrogations are conducted at all echelons and during all operations in which there are detainees, detention facilities where interrogation operations occur are normally located only at theater or JTF level.451\nIn fact, the theater level is greatly removed from the level at which Special Forces teams operate. Although they are involved in producing eff ects at the theater or strategic level, these teams move too fast or are dug in too deeply to have direct interaction with theater-level commanders or staff . Th e letter of the law states that interrogations can happen at \"all levels\" and during \"all operations,\" but only in rare cases is a soldier who is authorized to conduct them available at the tactical level. However, even if an interrogator is available, rarely would it be a viable option to insert any \"specialist\" into a Special Forces Detachment who does not have the basic skills all the organic detachment members possess. Rare exceptions to this \"rule\" are the Air Force's Combat Control Teams (CCTs) and some other unique servicemen who are occasionally attached to Special Forces teams. Th e CCTs and others are already well-versed in small unit tactics, amplify the team's capabilities, and do not get in the team's way.\n\nTh e scenario returns to the dilemma confronting the Special Forces team which has been in the desert for a long time on a cold, rainy night and has been seeking a new interrogation doctrine that conforms to its needs. Th e team has found only FM 2-22.3, and although it is ambiguous and disempowering, the Pentagon has invested too much eff ort in developing it to discard it now.\n\nTh e words of \"James,\" one of Britain's most experienced interrogators in Northern Ireland, should serve as a warning. Due to fear of reprisals, James now lives in an undisclosed location along the Mediterranean. James had no interrogation training and proudly boasts that \"We did not torture.\" In 1979 the British government decided to reform its interrogation practices in Northern Ireland and introduced restrictions:\n\"Every time they changed the rules, it was to benefi t murdering terrorists,\" James said, grinding the word \"terrorists\" with his teeth. \"We got no protection. Next we'll be tried as war criminals.\"452\nOur own most recent rule change limiting who can conduct interrogations has benefi ted the terrorists. It is now time to make a change to our doctrine that benefi ts our soldiers and our war eff ort.\n\n## Unfortunate Reality\n\nTh e scenario described above is the same one Mark Bowen discussed in his article \"Th e Dark Art of Interrogation,\" in which he interviews Jessica Montell, the executive director of B'Tselem, a human rights advocacy group in Jerusalem.\n\nIf I as an interrogator feel that the person in front of me has information that can prevent a catastrophe from happening... I imagine that I would do what I would have to do in order to prevent that catastrophe from happening. Th e state's obligation is then to put me on trial, for breaking the law. Th en I\ncome and say these are the facts that I had at my disposal. Th is is what I believed at the time. Th is is what I thought necessary to do. I can evoke the defense of necessity, and then the court decides whether or not it's reasonable that I broke the law in order to avert this catastrophe. But it has to be that I broke the law. It can't be that there's some prior license for me to abuse people.453\n\n214 |\nIn the situation confronting our Special Forces soldiers, the act of conducting an interrogation is the off ense, not the use of torture. As long as it remains against doctrine for soldiers to conduct interrogations, the soldier who engages in such operations must accept the risk. He must be prepared to stand up in court or before Congress, if necessary, and defend his actions. Special Forces soldiers will still use interrogation, because in some cases they will deem it worth the consequences. Still, many of them do not even fully understand the policy. Th is does not mean they will necessarily be punished. In any nation the decision to prosecute a crime is an executive one. A prosecutor, commander, or lawmaker must decide to press charges, and the likelihood that a soldier who\nconducted a humane interrogation would be prosecuted, much less convicted, is very small.454\nTh is debate is not about torture. Torture must remain illegal. Any interrogators who engage in torture would do so at their own risk, knowing they would be accountable to the full weight of the law. Instead, the issue raised in this study centers on allowing one group of soldiers to do what another group is already authorized to do. Th e current doctrine does not meet the President's promise of\n\"give[ing] them the tools they need. And that is clear law.\" Th e law is now clear;\ncurrent DoD doctrine is not.\n\n## Appendix A Appendix B Appendix C Appendix C  (Continued)\n\n222 |\n\n## Appendix D\n\n\n\n## Appendix E Appendix F Appendix G Appendix H Appendix I Appendix I  (Continued) Appendix J Appendix J  (Continued) Bibliography\n\n\"A Scrap of Paper.\" M14.1, 30 May 1945. 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Interview by the researcher, 14 July 2007.\nTourison, Jr., Sedgwick D. *Talking with Victor Charlie: An Interrogator's Story*.\nNew York: Ballantine Books, 1991.\nTourison, Jr., Sedgwick D. Telephonic interview by the researcher, 30 June\n2007.\nTourison, Ping. Wife of Sedgwick Tourison, Jr. Telephonic interview by the\nresearcher, 28 June 2007.\n| 247\nTracy, W.A., Captain, Headquarters, Army Ground Forces, Assistant Ground\nAdjutant General. Memorandum to the Commanding Generals. Subject: \"Intelligence Extracts of Special Action Reports - Saipan.\" 319.1/172. 24 January 1945. Correspondence and Reports Relating to the Operation of Language Schools, 1943 - 1949. Records of the War Department General and Special Staff s, Record Group 165. NARA, College Park, MD.\n\nU.S. Army. Field Manual (FM) 2-22.3. Human Intelligence Collection\nOperations. Washington, DC: Department of the Army, September\n2006.\nU.S. Army. Special Text (ST) 2-91.6. *Small Unit Support to Intelligence*. Fort\nHuachuca, AZ: U.S. Army Intelligence Center, March 2004.\nU.S. Department of Defense. \"Deployment of Military Personnel by Country\nas of 30 September 1968.\" URL: http://siadapp.dmdc.osd.mil/\npersonnel/MILITARY/history/hst0968.xls. Accessed 11 June 2007.\n\"Veterans Call for Justice for Agent Orange Victims in Vietnam.\" Veterans\nToday. URL: < http:www.veteranstoday.com/printout944.html>.\nAccessed 23 January 2007.\nWalton, Richard. Oral presentation of Nguyen Tai case study to ISB Educing\nInformation working group at NDIC, 16 December 2006.\n\"Wartime Fanaticism.\" *Christian Science Monitor (1908 - Current fi le)*, 12\nDecember 1941, 24. Accessed via ProQuest Historical Newspapers on 27 January 2007.\nYin, Robert K. *Case Study Research: Design and Methods*, 3rd ed. Th ousand\nOaks. CA: Sage Publications, 2003.\n\n## Index A\n\nAbu Ghraib 1, 4, 128, 147, 154, 159, 162-164, 175, 199, 208 Afghanistan 10, 79, 115, 137, 153, 157, 158, 161, 162, 165, 167, 199, 201, 208 Al Qaeda 2, 3, 10-13, 15, 77, 155, 157-159, 169-171\nB\nBushido 31-33, 51, 73\nC\nCary, Otis 24, 60-64, 68, 70, 73 Case studies 20, 65, 74, 81-83, 94, 102, 139, 142 Combat Control Team (CCT) 213 Combatant 5, 8, 79, 82, 91, 96, 99, 140, 142, 144, 153, 157, 164 Combined Intelligence CenterVietnam 83 Counterinsurgency 4-6, 14, 79-81, 105, 113, 128, 139, 141, 145 Counterintelligence 35, 39, 78, 90, 92, 95, 98, 128, 130, 138, 139 Counterintelligence Corps, Army 35 Cultural understanding/awareness 20, 37, 68, 78\nD\nDefense Language Institute Foreign Language Center 47, 66, 104 Detainee Detention Act 197, 198\n\n## E\n\nEducing information 2, 19, 23, 25, 65, 74, 78, 88, 116, 144, 145\nExecutive Order (EO), Presidential 8, 19, 23, 38\nF\n| 249\nField Manual (FM), Army 1-3, 9, 15, 147, 150, 164, 167, 207\nFourth Army Intelligence School 37, 41\nG\nGeneva Convention(s) 6, 8, 51, 71, 96, 150, 155-158, 168, 197, 240, 241 Global War on Terrorism (or Terror) 2, 10, 13, 14, 17, 19, 75, 77, 147, 167 Guantanamo Bay 7, 13, 128, 157, 201\n\n## Index (Continued) H\n\nHara-kari 30, 34, 52, 61\nHirabayashi, Grant J. 49-53, 67, 72, 73\nHoko 31-33\nHuman intelligence (HUMINT) 1, 2, 7, 9, 13, 34, 65, 77, 80, 110, 138, 144, 145, 150 Human rights 15, 27, 128, 159, 214\nI\nIntelligence Science Board (ISB) 2, 74, 78, 88, 144, 145\nIssei 44 Issen gorin 27\nK\nKamikaze 28, 29 Kibei 38, 48, 66, 69\nKoubi, Michael 83, 100-102\nL\nLanguage training 17, 45, 46, 60, 102, 104, 105, 116, 140 Law of War 6, 9, 157\nLuft waff e 98\nM\nMerrill's Marauders 49 MI5 79, 95, 96 Military Intelligence Service Language School (MISLS), Army 18, 20, 23, 35,\n37, 38, 41-50, 53, 69 Moran, Sherwood F. 25, 26, 29, 30, 71, 83, 99, 100, 102 Motivation 33, 62, 78, 87, 88, 102, 115, 141, 178\n\n250 |\nN\nNational Archives and Records Administration (NARA) 22, 63, 74 National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) 8 Nisei 19, 23, 35-48, 52, 57, 66-72 Noncombatant 5 Northern Ireland 213\n\n## Index (Continued) O Oriental Language School, Navy 20, 70\n\nP\nPhoenix Program 83, 116, 117, 119, 121 Prisoner of War (POW) 15, 19, 22, 26, 35, 40, 51-53, 61, 63, 69, 73, 74, 114, 123-125, 155, 157\nPropaganda 17, 33, 63, 73, 111, 119\nR\nRecruitment 17, 23, 43, 54, 66-68, 83, 121, 123, 132, 136, 138, 143 Reid Technique 197, 210\nS\nScharff , Hanns 83, 97, 98, 102, 128, 141\nShinto 31, 33\nSpecial Forces 147-154, 165, 166, 194, 195, 198, 199, 202, 203, 207-214 Stephens, R.W.G. 79, 83, 94-96, 102, 139 Stool pigeon 92, 98, 125 Survival, Evasion, Resistance, and Escape (SERE) 10, 11, 195\nT\nTaliban 155, 157-159 Torture 1, 3-6, 13-15, 25, 33, 73, 94, 101, 132, 150, 158-160, 164, 167-171, 199, 203-206, 209, 211, 213-215\nU\nU.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) 149, 153, 163, 212 U.S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) 160-162\n\n## W\n\n| 251\nWar crimes (trials) 6, 22, 53, 158, 160\nWaterboarding/Water Cure  2-7, 10, 12-14\n\n## Y Yin, Robert K. 20, 21, 23, 81 About The Authors\n\nJames A. Stone, a military Special Agent with the U.S. Air Force Offi  ce of Special Investigations (AFOSI), has served on active duty over 20 years. In this capacity, his primary responsibilities include identifi cation, exploitation, and neutralization of criminal, terrorist, and espionage threats to the Air Force, the Department of Defense, and the U.S. government. He has completed numerous assignments both within the United States and overseas and supported wartime operations during Operations DESERT SHIELD, DESERT STORM, and IRAQI FREEDOM. SA Stone is currently assigned as Commander, AFOSI Detachment 207, at Whiteman Air Force Base, Missouri. He graduated from Friends University in Wichita, Kansas, with a bachelor's degree in organizational management and leadership. He earned his master's degree in strategic intelligence from the National Defense Intelligence College (NDIC). He and his wife Deana have a daughter, Leah.\n\nDavid P. Shoemaker is a civilian Special Agent with AFOSI. He is currently assigned to OSI Headquarters at Andrews Air Force Base, Maryland, where he serves as Program Manager for Counterintelligence Investigations. Aft er earning a bachelor's degree in political science and English literature at Indiana University, he joined AFOSI in 1999 as an economic crimes investigator. He subsequently conducted and supervised a diverse array of criminal and counterintelligence investigations during both domestic and overseas postings. Th ese investigative experiences heightened SA Shoemaker's appreciation for the art and science of educing information and stimulated his graduate research at NDIC, where he earned his master's degree in strategic intelligence. His interests include adventure sports, mountain landscapes, economics, and U.S. history. He and his wife Leah have a son, Aston.\n\nNicholas R. Dotti is a U.S. Army major currently serving with Special Operations Command Central at MacDill Air Force Base, Florida, as Chief of the J8 Programs Division. He was commissioned in 1997 aft er graduating from Norwich University with a bachelor's degree in criminal justice. Aft er two tours of duty, one of them in Korea, he was accepted for Special Forces training. In addition to completing the Special Forces Qualifi cation Course, he is also a graduate of the following highly selective schools and courses: Ranger; Survival, Evasion, Resistance, and Escape (SERE); Airborne; Jumpmaster; and Military Freefall Parachutist. He speaks Serbian and has a working knowledge of Arabic. MAJ Dotti has completed two combat tours in Iraq as Commander of a Special Forces Operational Detachment, for which he earned the Bronze Star medal. He subsequently graduated from NDIC with a master's degree in strategic intelligence. He continues to focus his studies on tactical interrogations and Kurdish issues when not spending time with his wife, Martha, and their children, Maggie and John."
    },
    {
        "text": "1.\nunderstanding about:\na. the IC's mission and what the IC does to accomplish it\n(including its structure and effectiveness);\nb. the laws, directives, authorities, and policies that govern\nthe IC's activities; and\nc. the compliance and oversight framework that ensures\nintelligence activities are conducted in accordance with\napplicable rules.\n\n## Principles Of Intelligence Transparency For The Intelligence Community\n\n2. Be proactive and clear in making information publicly\navailable through authorized channels, including taking\naffiuwative steps to:\na. provide timely transparency on matters of public interest;\nb. prepare infouwation with sufficient clarity and context, so\nthat it is readily understandable;\nc. make infow.uation accessible to the public through a range\nof communications channels, such as those enabled by\nnew technology;\nd. engage with stakeholders to better explain infow.uation\nand to understand diverse perspectives; and\ne. in appropriate circumstances, describe why infow.uation\ncannot be made public.\nThe Principles of Intelligence Transparency for the Intelligence Community (IC) are intended to facilitate IC decisions on making information publicly available in a manner that enhances public understanding of intelligence activities, while continuing to protect in formation when disclosure would harm national security. These Principles do not modify or supersede applicable laws, executive orders, and directives, including Executive Order 13526, Classified National Security Information. Instead, they articulate the general norms that elements of the IC should follow in implementing those authorities and requirements.\n\n3. In protecting infow.uation about intelligence sources,\nmethods, and activities from unauthorized disclosure, ensure\nthat IC professionals consistently and diligently execute\ntheir responsibilities to:\na. classify only that infow.uation which, if disclosed without\nauthorization, could be expected to cause identifiable or\ndescribable damage to the national security;\nb. never classify infouwation to conceal violations of law,\ninefficiency, or administrative error, or to prevent\nembarrassment;\nc. distinguish, through portion marking and similar means,\nclassified and unclassified infouwation; and\nd. consider the public interest to the maximum extent\nfeasible when making classification deteLWiinations, while\ncontinuing to protect information as necessary to\nmaintain intelligence effectiveness, protect the safety of\nthose who work for or with the IC, or othe\nise protect\nnational security.\n4. Align IC roles, resources, processes, and policies to support\nof"
    },
    {
        "text": "e United States f\n, ndicator ofl'errorj!lt Threat r() t CilizclIship Likely an Unreliable\n!\nder Seerel:ary\ne DHS Acting UI l Sc{)pe Note: This paper \\vas prepared at the request. oft mysis. lt assesses the intcmatioM} tcrrorJst threat to ttle United States Md\nIntcl igence an.d AL\nvorldwide by cittzcns of lran, Iruq, l .. ibya, Somatia, Sudat\\, Syria, und Yemen. Cit.izens of\n\\\n). 13769\n' Seetion 3 of Executive Orci.er (fi.O\ntbese sevcn countries \\vcre impaeted b tr), into the {jnitoo States.\" 'rhe asst}$sment E\nProteetiI g the Nation from Foreign Terrorist\n\"\n-\nonsm\nustice press rcI.cases on tcr\nunclassified information from Department of\nrelies act. Department of State \\'isa\n~\nreiated cO(lvictions and terrorisf attuck perpetrotors killed in th ststistics. fue 2016 Wor!dwide hreat Assessment ofthc US Intelligence Comluunlty . and tbe\nDepartmcnt ofState Country Reports 011 Terrorism 2015. This paper does not assess the threat\n.\n\nof domestic terrorism\n\n## Key Findings\n\nD1\"J8 *l&A* assesses that country of cltizenship i5 unlikcly to be a reliable indi.cator of\n-\n\nlarc 1 2011. the\n~\nst 3ctivit)'. Since the begirn)itlg ofthc S)frian conflic.t in\npotcntia! terro\ntcrrorist\nbom primarity US-based individuals \\vho \"\"crc inspired by a foreig\n~\nforeis:n\nrelated activity \\\\'cre citizens of26 different\n~\n<Yrganization to participafe in. terronsln\n3.5 pereent of me forcignbom\ncQu.ntries, \\\\'ith nO onc counlry rcpresenting more than\n\nt(}t.al .\nRelatively few citizens ofthe sevcn co\\wtries imp3cted by E.O. 13769. compa:red to\n-\n.\nneighboring countries, tnaintain acces:s to tne United States\nTcrrorist groups in lraq. Syria. and Yemen pose a ilireat or attacks in thc United St.ates\n-\n.\nwllile groups jn lran, Libya, Somalia. and Sudan rcmain rcgio.nal.ly focused\n\n## Orism R Us-Based Te  Eeted By E.O. 13769 Rarely Implic:;A1Ed T Citizenj Ofcountries A\n\nDHS J&A asscsscs that country of citizensbip is unlikely 10 be a re!jable indicator ofpotentia1\nce t}lC bcginnjng oftbe S>'rian confiict in March 2011, at least 82 primarily i l.moris.t activity. S\nrelated\n~\nwerc convicted of any tcrrorism\nUS-based individoo(s, who died in the pUfsuit of ucc<>rding to a DHS s.tudy of , federal offcnse inspired by a foreign terrorist organizatio ed in the\ncOl1victi.ons and terrorist attacK perpetrators kil\nDepartment of lusti.ce press releases bom United States\n~\nslightiy more than half\\vere native\nact.l '- Ofthe 82 individuaJ.s we identified ltries. \\vith no one U\nC\ncitizens, Oftlle foreignbom individuals. they camc from 26 dit eren\n.\n\nuntry representing mote tban 13.5 percent. oftbe foreignborl\\ toial\nc\n\nThe top seven origin counlrics ofthe foreign .. bom i dividuals are: Pakistan (5). Soma1ia\n-\n2 .)\n3) and Baxlgla.desh, Cuba, Ethiopia. lraq, and UzbekisLan (\n(\n133B in\nd undw 18 U.S.C. Chnptc :te aU to individuats prosec ror tbe purposes of'rhi$ paper, we limited our d\n-\n\nWe exc}uded traveling 01' uttempting to trave t of or inspired by 11. F'oreign Tcrrorist Otgani.Zlttion .)(\nsuppo O and acnvitie.s unremted to FTOs, to include pureJy domestic terrorism.\noverseas to join a F\n\nn, and\n~\nmn, Suda\ned above\nis\not\n(e sevcn eountries impacted by' E.O. 13769 tM are\nOf t\n-\n.\nYemen 11ad 1 cach, and there \\vc.re no ifldividuals from Sy'ria\n\n## Limiteo Access To The United States By Cicizens ()F Impacte,D Countnes\n\n' E.O. 13769. cOJnp<tred to neighboring\n~\nRelatively fe\\v citizeos of the SC\\!CO cOLlntries impactcd b e seven countries aCCQU11t for more l nitcd Slates. Nonc of t\nai.ntain acccss to tbe , countries\n~\nantcd in their resion- thc Middle East and North Africa or Sub g\n. 7 percent of tbe US vi.sas tIan sa\n\"2015\nSahnra.n Africa- in Fiscal Year 2015, according to public!)' availablc Flsca.t Yeat t .\n\nt of State\nc Departmc\nce data from tl\nIssua mpacted Countries Ha,'e Terrorist Group1l that Tbreaten thc \\Vest\nc t Fe\\v of t tlPS in Iraq, Syria, and Yenlen pose a threa1 of attacks in the United St(ltes, \\vhile go error.ist\nccording to the 2016\nl.\n\nand Sudan are regionally fOCllSCd\nSomal.is\ngroups in lran . Libya\n.md the Departrnent ofState Vorld\\vide Threat Assessment ofthe US Intc ligence Community\n\\\n2015 .\n\nTerrorism\nReports :y C{)Unl relatcd -\ncontinued its terroris m error1sm in 1984, lr\nJran - Designated as a State Sponsor of and\nactivity in 2015. including support for Hizba!iall, Palestiniro1 (error1st groups in Gaza try Reports on .m g to the CO\ngroups in (raq and throughotlt the Middle Easl, accordit\no\nv ps-Qods Force (IROC-QF) to ltionnry Guard CO\n~\nTerrorism 2015.4 lrnn used the Islamic Revol S, and create instability\nce operati.ol\nimplement foreign policy goals. p:rov.ide cover tor inte[ligcI\n.\n\nis\"\nigrant\n. for botn Unmigran! and nOll-in1 u we have \\,1$3 issuancc da a f most re<:ent YC\nt Fiscal Year 201 S is U\ns 1,0\nimmigranl visas were excluded from tnese ca!culano -\nA.l. *A-2,* A-3. C-2, NATO, 0-1. *0-2,* 03, and 03 nCI\n.\n\n. 13769\nil'l E.O\nslstent witb $cction ){c\nbc CO\ng t ar)' mechanism for cultivating and supporn u\nthe MiddJe East. The IRGC.QF is Irnn's pr i\n.\n\nsls abro8d\nc.rrn\ncnt\nl C the pree.mi\nec\nd the Levanl (ISJL) has b 31 # The lslatnic State ofIraq\n~\nlraq and S,'ria\n,nd brnnches '\nip!13tc in Syria and lraq, it\nro sl1hreat because of its sclf-described ca\ntC\nin other c()ttntries, and tL<; inCre!15ing ability to direct and inspire attacks: ;c.\n\nemerging branch d\\vide 'r'meat\ne \\\\'or!d, accor(iing to the 20! 6 Wor\nd U\ns arou\nagainst a \\'iide rallge oft.argc Assessmerlt.s JSIL' s narrative supports jihadist rec:ruiting, at(racts othets 10 trave t() lraq and\nSyria. draws i.ndividuals and groups to deciarc allegiance to ISIL. and justifies attacks across the\n-\ng1()bc ents illld affiliated armed\nLibya - Libya has becn l()cked in civil \\\\'ar bet\\veen two rivat govem.I\ner 2015 5igning\nDeeC11\no the 2016 WorJd\\vide Threat Asses5.ment.6 Ttle\ngr()ups, accordif18\n-\ncnt ofNati()nal Aecord resulted Lrom a year\na GO\\cm.I1\n[I\ncnt to\nof a UN-brokcred agreen\n'\\ W\ng cjvil \\Yar and reconcile Libya'.s\nught to cnd thc ongoiI\nlong politieaJ diaiogue that s rorists havc cxploited the sccurit)' vacuum t() plan and aunch\ns. Extremists and te\ngovemmen\n.\n\nOughout the region 111\nattacks in Libya and O\nSomalia - ln 2015. al-Shabaab continued to commit deadly atta.cks in Soma1ia. secking Government ofSomalia and weaken the political \\vill of\nreverse pr()gress mnde by the redera ty rdin.g to the Coun ec\ntries, a\nthe Atncan Uni()n Mission in Somalia troop cont.ribu1ing cO\n. 2015\nerr()rism\nts on R.epo Sudan . Sttdan was designated as a 5latc Spo!1sor ot\"I\"errorism i1'l 199) due tO COl1cems about rism 2015.$ In rn\nn Te\nrist groups, according to the C()untry Reports rn\ntC\ntiQnn ar:\nt to inte suppo\n.vever, iJ1\nas were allo\\\\'ed to raise funds, travel, and live in Sudan, HO 2014, members ofHan IS! appeared t() nave declined. The designa c(l terrorist grOl\n12015 the use ofSudan by Pa)estiniu\n.\n\nlast known shipment \\\\'a5 interdicted by Israel i112014\nAI.Qa'ida in the Arabian PeniDsul.a remained a signifie.ant threat t() Yemen, tlle region, Vemc --\nand w the United Slates in 2015, as efforts t() counter the group were hatnpered by the ongoing amic State s\n  ferrori.snl 20) 5.9 The\n. according t() the C()tlntry Reports ty\n.ln conflict in that cO\nq and the LC\\'ant in Yemen also exploited the political and securit}' vacuum to sttengthen a\nof\n.\n\nits fOQthold inside the count:ry\n~\ndy\n-\nRepor1 16AnnuaIReport!FY16Annua\n(s!fY2\nuaIRepO\nhttps:j !travel.state.gov!content!dam!visas/Statisti(:s/ A"
    },
    {
        "text": "## Deception 101Primer On Deception\n\nJoseph W. Caddell December 2004\n\n\nThe views expressed in this report are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Department of the Army, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government.  This report is cleared for public release; distribution is unlimited.\n\n\nThis monograph was funded by the U.S. Army War College External Research Associates Program. Information on this program is available on our website, http://www.carlisle.army.mil/ssi/, at the Publishing button.\n\n\nThis monograph is based on a presentation made at the Conference on Strategic Deception in Modern Democracies: Ethical, Legal, and Policy Challenges, sponsored by the U.S. Army War College, the U.S. Naval Academy, and the Triangle Institute of Security Studies on October 31, 2003, at the William C. Friday Conference Center, Chapel Hill, North Carolina.\n\n\nComments pertaining to this report are invited and should be forwarded to:  Director, Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 122 Forbes Ave, Carlisle, PA  17013-5244.  Copies of this report may be obtained from the Publications Office by calling (717) 245-4133, FAX (717) 245-3820, or by e-mail at SSI_Publishing@carlisle.army.mil\n\n\nAll Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) monographs are available on the SSI\nHomepage for electronic dissemination.  SSI's Homepage address is:  http://www.\n\ncarlisle.army.mil/ssi/\n\n\nThe Strategic Studies Institute publishes a monthly e-mail newsletter to update the national security community on the research of our analysts, recent and forthcoming publications, and upcoming conferences sponsored by the Institute.  Each newsletter also provides a strategic commentary by one of our research analysts.  If you are interested in receiving this newsletter, please let us know by e-mail at *SSI_Newsletter@carlisle.army.mil* or by calling (717) 245-3133.\n\n## Isbn  1-58487-180-6 Foreword\n\n\nThis monograph reviews the basic concepts related to \"deception.\" The author, Dr. Joseph Caddell, defines terms, provides historical examples, and discusses problems associated with deception. His monograph provides a general overview, a \"primer,\" and is not directed at those who already possess a working knowledge of deception operations. Nevertheless, given the complex and ever changing nature of deception in the political-military environment, it may serve as a useful reminder of the basic assumptions and methods concerning the subject.\n\nThe Strategic Studies Institute is pleased to publish this work as part of our External Research Associates Program.\n\n\nDOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR. Director Strategic Studies Institute\n\n## About The Author\n\nDr. Joseph Caddell is a Lecturer on Military History at North Carolina State University in Raleigh.\n\n## Deception 101Primer On Deception Introduction.\n\n\nDeception is a traditional component of political and military conflict. Indeed, many argue that it is intrinsic to all human interaction. It is sometimes mistakenly confused with unintentional confusion or misinformation. Disinformation, intentional deception, should not be confused with misinformation. Deception depends on two criteria: first, it is intentional; and, second, it is designed to gain an advantage for the practitioner.1\n\nDeception in the forms of concealment and activity designed to mislead is common in nature. Protective coloration serves to protect some flora and faunaeither by making them difficult to see or by causing them to resemble something of little interest to predators. Some animals will feign injury to lure predators away from nests or offspring. Students of deception note these examples as evidence of the utility and effectiveness of disinformation even beyond the human experience.2\n\n## Fabrication And Manipulation.\n\n\nIn the economic and political arenas, deception may appear in a wide variety of forms. Indeed, cynical observers might argue that a synonym for economic disinformation is \"advertising.\" In any case, examining the use of deception in marketing helps illustrate the difference between \"fabrication and manipulation.\" If false information is created and presented as true, this is *fabrication*. It is fabricated for the purpose of disinformation and is simply not true.\n\nManipulation, on the other hand, is the use of information which is technically true, but is being presented out of context in order to create a false implication. This deception may be achieved by leaving out information or by associating valid information in such a way as to create false correlations. In the advertising world, companies usually avoid making false claims based on \"fabricated\" information. The laws against false advertising make such behavior problematical. Presenting \"true\" information \"manipulated\" to create a false impression, however, is difficult to prosecute. An example of such activity occurred in the gasoline shortages of the 1970s when some automobile manufacturers advertised cars with inefficient fuel consumption by noting how the *range* of their vehicles compared to smaller, more fuel efficient automobiles. They simply neglected to point out that their gas tanks were considerably larger than those in the smaller vehicles.\n\nThe distinction between fabrication and manipulation is relevant to military deception operations. Both forms have proven useful in the history of warfare. Dummy weapons and false orders \"leaked\" to the enemy are examples of fabrication. But when it is impossible to disguise the presence of large forces or an interest in a given area, partial truthsmanipulationmay prove more advantageous.3\n\n## Political Deception.\n\n\nSimilar considerations relating to fabrication vs. manipulation exist in the political realm. And, while disinformation in the business world is only tangentially of interest to a military audience, political deception may have a close relationship to and impact on military operations. This is not to say that political deception is limited to issues relating to defense or national security, but a quick review of American political history reveals that defense issues have certainly been subject to disinformationoften in the form of manipulation.\n\nHere are some examples.\n\nOn April 14, 1846, an American military patrol engaged a Mexican force south of the Nueces River in the newly annexed state of Texas. There were 16 American casualties. On May 11, President James K. Polk announced that \"Mexico has passed the boundary of the United States, has invaded our territory, and shed American blood upon the American soil.\" In fact, the presence of U.S. troops in the disputed area south of the Nueces was a questionable action. The area between the Nueces and Rio Grande rivers was disputed territory, and negotiations were underway to resolve the issue. Neither nation was supposed to have troops there. Somehow this fact was left out of Polk's impassioned call to arms. A young congressman from Illinois raised awkward questions about \"the sacred spot.\" Indeed, concern by young Mr. Lincoln and others in the Congress that information was being \"manipulated\" led to the famous \"Spot Resolution.\" This registered suspicion concerning Polk's rhetoric and signified a growing regional division, but it did not prevent the Mexican- American War.4\n\nIn 1898 the destruction of the U.S.S. *Maine* in Havana Harbor created a situation where manipulation of information, primarily by the media rather than by the government, played a critical role in precipitating the war with Spain. The explosion, which destroyed the *Maine* on the night of February 15, 1898, has been examined by investigators for the past 106 years. The conclusions are varied and often contradictory. The initial board of inquiry (March 1898) was unable to arrive at a definite conclusion.5\n\nAmerican newspapers, however, were not so ambivalent. Nor were they restrained. Speculation as to the Spanish motives for destroying the *Maine* ran rampant. The strained relations between Madrid and Washington deteriorated even further. The \"yellow press\" did not cause the subsequent Spanish-American War by itself, but its role was seminal.6\n\nThis event provides an interesting case study where political, military, and economic interests intertwined to the point that one is hard pressed to segregate them. To what extent is the government responsible for correcting false impressions which appear in a free press? What if a government takes advantage of fabricated or manipulated data to serve its own policy ends?\n\nExamples of specifically governmental disinformation can be found in the period prior to the U.S. entry into World War II. On a number of occasions, President Franklin Delano Roosevelt (FDR) played fast and loose with the truth. Everything from the Destroyer Deal of 1940 to the Lend-Lease Act of 1941 involved a certain amount of information manipulation. In the latter example, the President compared the Lend-Lease aid to Great Britain to the loan of a fire hose to a neighbor to put out a house fire. The analogy, made in a \"Fireside Chat\" radio address, was effective and generated empathy. Critics, however, pointed out that it was hopelessly inaccurate. Unlike the water hose mentioned in the analogy, the weapons, food, and fuel shipped to Great Britain could not be reeled up and returned \"after the fire is out.\"\nAn even better example of Roosevelt shading the truth involved a purported German plan to invade the western hemisphere. The plan centered on a map which apparently showed German designs on nations in South and Central America. In his Navy Day speech on October 27, 1941, Roosevelt said he had \"a secret map, made in Germany by Hitler's government by the planners of the new world order.\" The President continued by claiming, \"That map, my friends, makes clear the Nazi design not only against South America, but against the United States as well.\"7\nThe problem here is the simple fact that the map was part of a British disinformation operation, and that it is likely that FDR knew it. William Stephenson, a British intelligence operative (M.I.6 code name \"Intrepid\"), fabricated the map sometime in 1941 to create alarm in the United States. By September 1941, the State Department was onto Stephenson's ruses. The probability that Roosevelt knew that the map was false when he cited it on Navy Day is quite high. The President was concerned about the threat posed by Nazi Germany and was willing to be deceptive if it was necessary to rouse the American public. As he confided to Secretary of the Treasury Morgenthau in 1942, after the United States had entered the war, \"I may have one policy for Europe and one diametrically opposite for North and South America. I may be entirely inconsistent, and furthermore, I am perfectly willing to mislead and tell untruths if it will help us win the war.\"8\n\nRoosevelt is not usually castigated too severely by critics, because most sympathize with his desire to resist Axis aggression in World War II. Similarly, many sympathize with President Dwight D. Eisenhower's later attempt to \"cover\" the U-2 reconnaissance sorties over the Soviet Union by describing them as National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) weather research flights. In the U-2 case, however, the problems associated with deception being \"found out\" were exploited by the Soviets in their show trial of the U-2 pilot, Francis Gary Powers, after his shoot-down on May Day\n1960.9\nThe use of deception concerning national security issues could also be found in the domestic political arena during the Cold War. Senator Joseph McCarthy's infamous accusations concerning communist infiltration of the government ultimately demonstrated the cost of being caught practicing deception. But they also showed how effective someone could be in making accusations with virtually no concrete evidence if the limited evidence was couched in the right context.\n\nThe \"missile gap\" of the 1960 presidential campaign was an effective issue used by the Kennedy campaign to challenge Vice President Richard Nixon's supposed strength in foreign and national security policy experience. The fact that the \"missile gap\" did not exist may or may not have been known by Senator John  F.  Kennedy and his staff. If he did not know, this was an example of simple misinformation. If he did know, and many believe he did, it was equally simple disinformation.10\n\nThe recitation of political deception involving defense issues could go on to cover Nixon's claim in the 1968 presidential campaign that he had a plan to end the Vietnam War, to the Iran-Contra Scandal, and the stories of babies being ejected from incubators by Iraqi soldiers in Kuwait in 1990. In these cases, and others like them, national security issues were clouded by various forms of deception. The point here is that such behavior should not be unexpected. While it has proven effective on occasion, there is a price to be paid if a specific deception fails.\n\nFurthermore, an overarching cost, regardless of success or failure, has been the damage it has done to government credibility. Because governments have practiced deception involving issues as important as national security, it is difficult for many in the media, and the public at large, to discount totally the possibility that government announcements could be disinformation. Recent debates concerning the nature of the 2003 Iraq War have only added to preexisting skepticism.\n\nThe debate over whether a democratic republic should engage in deceptions which may deceive their own citizens rests outside the scope of this monograph. Nevertheless, anyone engaged in deception operations, offensively or defensively, should be aware of the credibility issues inherent to this subject. Often there is more at stake than a temporary political or military advantage. Military Deception.\n\nMany problems are associated with the study of military deception.\n\nMilitary deception is, by its very nature, covert or clandestine. It comes in a wide variety of forms, and there are disagreements regarding definitions. The Department of Defense (DoD) defines *deception* as:\n\"those measures designed to mislead the enemy by manipulation, distortion, or falsification of evidence to induce the enemy to react in a manner prejudicial to the enemy's interests.\"11\nDeception in warfare is probably as old as armed conflict itself.\n\nThe logic of confusing an adversary is obvious, and the rewards can be realized very quickly. Our first recorded history of war involves the Mycenaean Greek siege of Troy in the 12th century BC and also provides us with our first recorded example of deception in warfare, the famous Trojan Horse. The narrative of military history over the succeeding 3,200 years provides a wealth of examples.12\nA fundamental dichotomy to be found in this confusing world is the division of deception into \"active\" and \"passive\" categories.\n\nPut simply, passive deception is designed to hide *real* intentions and capabilities from an adversary. You are hiding something which really exists. Active deception, on the other hand, is the process of providing an adversary with evidence of intentions and capabilities which you do not, in fact, possess. Here you are showing your enemy something which is not real. This dichotomy is most often associated with camouflage, but is not limited to this field.\n\nAnother distinction is made in regard to the degree of \"specificity of deception.\" In their 1982 work, *Strategic Military Deception*, Donald Daniel and Katherine Herbig note the existence of what they term \"A-\ntype\" and \"M-type\" deception.13 A-type, or \"ambiguity increasing,\"\ndeception is designed to create general confusion and to distract an adversary by making \"noise.\" An example of this was the presence of Japanese Ambassadors Nomura and Kurusu in Washington, DC, prior to the attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941. By continuing diplomatic negotiations, the Japanese made it more difficult for the United States to ascertain Tokyo's intentions. The Americans had to consider a variety of possible Japanese intentions and objectives. This made it more difficult to narrow the analysis and to conclude that military action was the only Japanese option.14\nM-type, or \"misleading variety,\" deception is more ambitious in that it is designed to mislead an enemy into believing a specific deception plan. Here you engage in an array of deception operations which should supplement and complement one another, all designed to cause your opponent to believe an \"alternative\" to what you are actually doing. This \"alternative\" is, of course, not true. This type of deception is more complicated and more ambitious than simple \"ambiguity.\" It requires more preparation, more resources, and usually more time. A modern historical example often cited is Operation BODYGUARD, the deception plan designed to protect Operation OVERLORD, the allied landings in Normandy on June 6, 1944.\n\nBODYGUARD was actually an umbrella project that included a variety of deception plans of the \"M-type.\" The two most famous of these were Operations FORTITUDE NORTH and FORTITUDE SOUTH. These plans were designed to lead the Germans to believe that the main allied offensive in the West would land, respectively, in Norway or the Pas de Calais (Straits of Dover). Over time, FORTITUDE SOUTH became the most plausible, and the bulk of the deception resources were expended on convincing the Germans that the real invasion would cross the English Channel in the Straits of Dover, almost 100 miles from the Normandy beaches. Its success can be seen in that many German commanders believed that, when the actual invasion took place in Normandy, it was merely a diversion from the \"real\" invasion which would be occurring later at Calais.15\nThe Operation FORTITUDE deceptions included a number of military deception methodologies. The most common of these was camouflage. Camouflage, like deception, comes in both active and passive variants. When the word \"camouflage\" is used, most people think of *passive camouflage*the disguise or cloaking of forces and/or facilities to prevent their detection by an enemy. This can include hiding Greek infantry inside a large ceremonial horse, wearing clothing designed to blend into the surrounding terrain, placing cut branches from trees over important equipment, and an almost infinite variety of other techniques. It can even include disguising a bombed, but repaired, airfield runway to look like it is still cratered. Anytime you try to hide something that possesses real capabilities, you are practicing passive camouflage.16\nActive camouflage entails the artificial creation of the image or impression that you have a force or capability that does not actually exist. In the American Civil War, the Confederate Army charred large tree trunks to resemble artillery barrels and marched infantry units in circles to convince Union officers that they had more weapons and more troops than they actually did. In Operation FORTITUDE SOUTH, the allies used dummy tanks, trucks, aircraft, and landing vessels to give the impression they possessed weapons they did not have. To complement this, they used false radio messages to create the illusion of military units which did not exist. In recent operations in the Balkans and the Persian Gulf, American forces have encountered similar deceptions. Any attempt to create the illusion of a real capability where there is none is active camouflage.17\nCamouflage may simply be tactical deception designed to make it harder for an enemy to see where to attack your resources. It may be part of a larger deception plan. Active camouflage must always be used carefully. If one is too eager to reveal active camouflage, the enemy may become suspicious of obvious targets. Here the methodology becomes more complicated. If one is going to use active camouflage, say a dummy tank, it is a good idea to use passive camouflage to appear to be hiding the \"tank.\" Otherwise, the deception may not be convincing. Passive camouflage should be used on active camouflage in order to make the false image more credibleonly it must not be so good as to actually hide the dummy tank. It must be good enough to be credible, but not so good as to be effective. By the same token, it may be possible to place poorly done active camouflage over a real resource to mislead an enemy away from that resource. The complexities should never be underestimated.18\nCamouflage is often tied to the design of *diversions*. A diversion is the intentional distraction of an enemy's attention away from the area of interest or attack. There are two basic types, feints and demonstrations. A *feint* is an attack by friendly forces to distract enemy attention from the main area of interest or attack. Closely related to this is the concept of the demonstration. A *demonstration*\ninvolves the deployment of forces to distract an enemy, but such a deployment does not usually include actual contact or combat. The purpose of a diversion is simpleto mislead an enemy away from your real operations and objectives.19\nTwo other specialized terms utilized in military deception are conditioning and cover. *Conditioning* is the repetition of what could be preparations for a hostile action which you do not committhereby lulling the victim into a false sense of security. It is a variation of the \"familiarity breeds contempt\" theme. This is a concept which is often associated with the outbreak of warfare and relates to peacetime activities which might or might not be preparations for war. It could also, however, refer to repetitive behavior in the conduct of ongoing military operations which is used to desensitize an enemy to a threat.\n\nCover is the use of an apparently nonthreatening activity to disguise preparation for or initiation of a hostile act. A common example is the use of a training exercise to hide preparations for an attack. If the training exercise was the last in a long series of training exercises which had not led to actual hostile action in the past, this could also be an example of conditioninghence the tendency to refer to \"conditioning and cover.\" The two concepts are linked by their complementary definitions. In recent years, both the Yom Kippur War of 1973 and the Falklands War of 1982 were launched under the cover of training exercises similar to exercises which had occurred before.\n\n## Levels Of Military Deception.\n\n\nThe U.S. military community traditionally recognizes three levels of deceptionbased on the nature of the intent. Strategic Deception intends to \"disguise basic objectives, intentions, strategies, and capabilities.\" This contrasts with operational *deception*, which confuses an adversary regarding \"a specific operation or action you are preparing to conduct.\" And, last, but not least, in the American doctrines, there is *tactical deception*. This is intended to mislead\n\"others while they are *actively involved* in competition with you, your interests, or your forces.\"20\nWhat is important to note here is that the categorization of deception into these three levels is not based on the type of deception being practiced. Rather, it depends on the objective of the deception. Phony tanks or dummy aircraft could be examples of tactical deception if the purpose was to distract an attacker and cause them not to fire on real equipment and personnel. They could be operational deception if they were part of a larger deception plan designed to mislead an adversary about the timing, place, and nature of a specific military operation. Or, if they were part of an even larger deception plan intended to confuse an enemy as to a basic strategy or strategic objectives, they would be part of strategic deception. The taxonomy is based on objectives, not methodologies.\n\n## Conditions Affecting Deception.\n\n\nA quick review of the historical literature reveals scholarly interest in the nature of deception dating back to Sun Tzu, Vegetius, Machiavelli, and the oft-quoted Clausewitz. In more recent years, the evolution of the \"Principles of War\" in the American and British armies embraced the advantages of \"surprise\" and \"security.\" Intrinsic to both of these principles is recognition of the importance of fooling your opponent and, in turn, not being fooled yourself.\n\nWhat may be more problematical is finding consensus as to how deception works and how best to avoid being taken in. In broad terms, it is obvious that flaws in logical analysis and synthesis make being deceived more likely. Ignorance, arrogance, and fear all complicate one's ability to detect false information.\n\nPreconceived ideas or simple prejudice often lead to that phenomenon known as \"cognitive dissonance,\" where one ignores vital information simply because it interferes with preexisting concepts or theories. A similar, if less precise, problem is the so-called \"inertia of rest.\" This refers to a tendency of people to believe certain assumptions remain valid even after they have been undermined by events. In physics, \"inertia of rest\" refers to the tendency of an object at rest to remain at rest until acted upon by an outside force. Students of intelligence sometimes refer to the inertia of rest as the tendency in the mind of decisionmakers to remain at peace until acted upon by a hostile force. All of these issues can be used by practitioners of deception to their advantage.\n\nThe significance here is that effective deception is often based on exploitation of the victim's cognitive assumptions. German philosopher Goethe is remembered for his observation that \"We are never deceived, we deceive ourselves.\"21 This is more than a philosophical truism. It is both a recipe for formulating deception and a warning for those who wish to avoid being deceived. Deception and Intelligence Operations.\n\n\nSomeone practicing deception needs a route through which to send their disinformationtheir adversary's intelligence organizations often provide that route. All intelligence organizations vet the credibility and reliability of information they discover. Practitioners of deception know this and prepare their disinformation, at the least, to confuse and, at the most, to mislead the intelligence services of their enemy.\n\nAll intelligence collection methodologies are subject to deception.\n\nSignals intelligence (SIGINT) is susceptible to false signals, phony messages, bogus codes, and other forms of disinformation. Photographic or imagery intelligence (PHOTINT and IMINT) must deal with active and passive camouflage in a wide array of forms. Similar problems plague communications intelligence (COMINT), electronic intelligence (ELINT), acoustical intelligence (ACOUINT), and seismic intelligence (SEISINT). In any medium where information can be found, disinformation can be planted or devised.\n\nHuman intelligence (HUMINT) involves the use of double agents, the passing of false data, and the like. Human sources may serve as knowing or unknowing conduits of false information. Some in the counterintelligence business note that one can detect double agents by identifying sources which persistently provide false information. At the same time, because this is well-known, double agents can be given valid and verifiable information to establish their credibility a form of conditioning. Some cynics in this line of work, therefore, observe that you only have to be suspicious of those who provide you with good information and those who provide you with bad information. Detecting deception obviously can be trying work.22\nIntelligence organizations may practice deception in order to protect their own resources and capabilities. Most of this involves some form of passive deception. In addition to the use of double agents, false intelligence operations can be mounted to feign interest in something extraneous to your real interestsa form of diversion.\n\nIn recent years, intelligence agencies have even found themselves in the business of conducting training sessions for the media on how to spot deception. Given the importance of public opinion in international affairs, it is not enough that intelligence agencies be able to detect deception by their adversaries. It is essential that the deceptions be revealed to the world. And because no one is sure whom to believe in the deception game, it is sometimes important to have a nongovernment voice reveal the deceptions of others. Following the September 11, 2001, attacks, as preparation for military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) held briefings for the media to point out some basic methods for testing claims other nations might make concerning American atrocities. Based largely on the experience of Iraqi and Serb attempts to make false claims about U.S. bomb damage, DoD offered basic \"how to detect deception\" training sessions for members of the Fourth Estate.23 From this, it is clear that the Pentagon appreciates that deception is about more than immediate military utility.\n\n## Deception And Terrorism.\n\n\nDespite  the  fact that most  of  the historical examples of military\ndeception  discussed  to  this  point  allude  to  conventional  military\noperations, it is important to note that terrorists can use all of the techniques  discussed  in this monograph.   Terrorists rely upon both active  and  passive  deception  to  operate and to survive.   Passive deception  includes the use of aliases, secure methods  of  communication,  and  bases  in  areas  both  difficult  to reach  and to observe.\n\nActive deception may include diversions, conditioning, and cover often in combination.\n\nIf terrorists provide indications that they have hostile intentions against a specific set of targets but then fail to strike those targets, they may gain several advantages. They generate fear, force security forces to expend time and treasure, and create general aggravation and inconvenience (e.g., airlines flight cancellations over holidays). They may cause one to doubt your methodologies and to be less sensitive to such information in the future. Or, tangentially, they could use such information to distract one away from the target they actually mean to strike. Given that terrorism uses fear as a method to an ends, any activity that generates some degree of fear and uncertainty provides a partial success for the terrorists.\n\nAn oft-quoted sound byte which has come out of the \"War on Terrorism\" is the advice to \"think outside of the box.\" Politicians, media experts, academics, and others have repeated this cliche. Unfortunately, it is virtually useless. \"Outside the box\" defines all of *infinity*minus your \"box.\" Because terrorists use a wide array of deception techniques makes this problem all the more obvious.24\n\n## The Ethics Of Deception.\n\n\nNo discussion of the fundamentals of deception would be complete without a brief mention of the legal and ethical aspects of the subject. As one might expect, there has been considerable disagreement in this area for some time. Still, a few basic observations are in order.\n\nSurprising to many, the specific legal restraints on the use of deception are relatively clear and precise. Domestic law imposes few restrictions regarding military deception. Unless one tells a falsehood while under oath in a court of law or makes a false statement in some other setting where they are legally bound to be truthful, domestic law does not apply to military deception. As one legal scholar puts it, \"there is no constitutional principle that says that the President of the United States or the Executive Branch must tell the truth.\"25\n\nInternational law provides more limitations. Generally speaking, the United States recognizes the restrictions established in the Hague and Geneva Conventions over the past 140 years. In combination, these form the \"Laws of Warfare,\" recognized by the U.S. military and codified by official manuals. In the U.S. Army, this information is contained in Field Manual 27-10, *The Laws of Land Warfare*.26\n\nThe restrictions placed on \"stratagems\" or \"ruses of war\" include the prohibition of \"treachery or perfidy.\" Examples include the false use of flags of truce, wearing enemy uniforms or flying enemy colors while in combat, masquerading as international aid personnel, or using hospitals or other protected sites for military purposes. The prohibitions are explicit and specific.27\n\nWhen one enters the realm of ethical considerations, one encounters the complexities inherent to the justification of deception. Unfortunately (or fortunately), lawyers, philosophers, and ethicists do not always agree as to how one sets out to judge the ethical and moral dimensions of the subject. Broadly speaking, two general approaches, to such measurement exist. These include the idealist and the realist schools. Not everyone agrees how to define these approaches and each contains a number of subsets or permutations. Nevertheless, a basic distinction is generally accepted by all.\n\nThe idealists make moral and ethical distinctions based on an absolute set of standards. If disinformation and falsehoods are wrong, all examples of such behavior are wrong. The ends do not justify the means. This is absolute. There are no exceptions.28\nThe so-called realists, or pragmatists, argue that the question ultimately boils down to a cost-benefit analysis. Does the harm done by being deceptive outweigh the good the deception will accomplish? The nature of analysis required to answer that question and the values assigned to the various costs and benefits are subjective. In the eyes of the realists, the ethics of deception are both situational dependent and relative to the value structure of the observer.29\n\nThis is closely related to the operational cost-benefit analysis that must always accompany a decision to implement deception operations. Clearly no one wishes to conduct deception operations which cost more than they contribute to success. The realist perspective on the ethical implications follows a similar pathand may, on occasion, overlap the operational considerations.30\nOne reason nations agree to international restrictions on\n\"treachery,\" as noted above, is the realist concern that engaging in those acts could create problems out of proportion to the limited advantages such deception might provide. For example, the limitation on using hospitals or international aid symbols for military cover assumes that nations find the safety of such vital organizations more important than the limited advantages their abuse might afford.\n\nThe realist school also notes that there are potential ethical costs inherent to any deception operation. A political or military organization which indulges in disinformation loses a corresponding amount of credibility. Indeed, if one is practicing deception in order to affect public or international opinion, the \"blow back\" from loss of credibility can easily prove quite damaging. This consideration gained international attention when it was revealed in early 2002 that DoD had established an \"Office of Strategic Influence.\" While it was quickly asserted that this organization would not be deceptive, media sources implied that foreign media might be provided with manipulated information. This set off a flurry of charges and denials and the eventual closing of the office. Even the appearance of deception can be expensive.31\nThis is especially true in nations which are democratic republics with a valued tradition of press freedom. The ability of the public to make informed decisions about all political policies, especially military policies, relies on a well-informed media. When the military serving a democratic republic misleads the public or is involved in an action which misleads the public, it is difficult to imagine that there are many advantages that would justify that cost.\n\nThis is not to say that realists would deny military organizations the right to conduct deception operations. What they would advocate is a careful cost-benefit analysis of deception operations and a recommendation to favor those deception operations where it is possible to mislead the enemy without misleading your own people.\n\n## Dealing With Deception.\n\n\nA comprehensive methodology for dealing with deception will never be written. It is a nebulous and ever changing field of virtually infinite proportions. Indeed, to believe that such a methodology is possible would be to misunderstand the nature of deception.\n\nNevertheless, a few useful observations may be possible. Over the years, many pundits have quoted the Faber College motto from the movie *Animal House*\"Knowledge is good.\" Trite as it may sound, it is absolutely true regarding deception. The more that you know about your adversaries and about the events which are unfolding, the better prepared you will be to combat deception. Understanding your enemy's intentions and capabilities helps to define the general limits of their objectives and operations. Never rely on a limited number of sources of information or a limited number of collection methodologies. The more sources one has, the more cross references one can make. The more one knows, the harder it is for someone to manipulate information out of context. The more one knows, the more likely one will detect a fabrication.\n\nKnowledge should also include knowledge about oneself.\n\nRecognize the biases and assumptions one, one's organization, and one's culture possess. Beware of \"mirror imaging\"anytime one assumes that others will behave in a way similar to oneself, one is opening the door to self-deception.\n\nThe old intelligence advice to \"know your enemy\" must encompass advice to study your enemy's methods of deception. During the Cold War, western intelligence services studied Soviet Dezinformatsia and *Maskirovka* doctrines. This was quite helpful in detecting and dealing with many deceptions. Nevertheless, this familiarity never prevented the deception campaigns from posing a threat. Such study will never be fool-proofthere will always be new and unexpected techniques and approaches.\n\n## Summary.\n\n\nDeception comes in many forms and \"types.\" It has many objectives and can be accomplished by many methods. It may be active or passive. It operates on many levels. In short, there is much to know about deception.\n\nWhat is known about deception in the past is of considerable, if general, use in the present. We have developed terms to describe the different methods and levels of disinformation. This is useful. We know the dangers inherent to mirror imaging and cognitive dissonance. This is important. We can appreciate the need for the synthesis of intelligence methodologies. This is vital. But, despite these realizations, we can never be confident we are not being deceived.\n\nThese observations may seem self-evident to even a casual student of deception. Therefore, one might wonder why these obvious statements need repeating. The answer is simple. In successful deception operations, the perpetrator hopes that one or several of these self-evident observations will be over looked.\n\n## Glossary Of Terms Relating To Deception\n\n| Strategic Deception:                                  | Deception which disguises your                      |\n|-------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------|\n| basic                                                 | objectives,                                         |\n| intentions, strategies, and capabilities.             |                                                     |\n| Operational Deception:                                | Deception which confuses or diverts an adversary    |\n| in regard to a                                        | specific                                            |\n| preparing to conduct.                                 |                                                     |\n| Tactical Deception:                                   | Deception which misleads others while they are      |\n| actively involved                                     | in competition with you, your                       |\n| interests, or your forces.                            |                                                     |\n| \"A\" Type Deception:                                   | \"Ambiguity Deception\" geared toward creating        |\n| general confusion.                                    |                                                     |\n| \"M\" Type Deception:                                   | \"Misleading Deception\" designed to mislead an       |\n| adversary into a specific and preconceived            |                                                     |\n| direction.                                            |                                                     |\n| Fabrication:                                          | The                                                 |\n| creation                                              | of false information or images to                   |\n| mislead an adversary as to your intentions and/       |                                                     |\n| or capabilities. This is deception                    | via                                                 |\n| data (e.g., forgeries).                               |                                                     |\n| Manipulation:                                         | The use of true or factual data in such a way as to |\n| create a false impression. The information is not     |                                                     |\n| false, but through using it out of context, leaving   |                                                     |\n| out some of the details, or providing a false balance |                                                     |\n| of emphasis, the impression is skewed (e.g., being    |                                                     |\n| quoted out of context).                               |                                                     |\n| Active Deception:                                     | Any attempt to create the impression of intentions  |\n| and capabilities which you do not, in fact, possess.  |                                                     |\n| Passive Deception:                                    | Efforts designed to prevent detection of your       |\n| actual capabilities and intentions.                   |                                                     |\n| Denial:                                               | Methods used to conceal state and military secrets, |\n| particularly from foreign intelligence collection.    |                                                     |\n| Deception (as used in the    | The manipulation of information and perceptions       |\n|------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------|\n| combination \"Denial and      | to induce the target of that deception to take or not |\n| Deception\"):                 | take an action, thereby benefiting the deceiver.      |\n\nNote: \"Denial and deception are interrelated. Denial is the basis for a successful deception. One cannot manipulate or blur the truth or lie convincingly unless the truth is first concealed.\" John Yurechko, Defense Intelligence Agency, \"DoD Briefing on Iraqi Denial and Deception,\" Tuesday, October 8, 2002, 12:58 p.m.\n\nEDT.\n\n| Dezinformatsia                                       | :                                                    | The                                            |\n|------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------|\n| information intended to confuse, discredit or        |                                                      |                                                |\n| embarrass the enemy.                                 |                                                      | (Marshals of the Soviet                        |\n| Union A. A. Grechko and N. V. Ogarkov [successive    |                                                      |                                                |\n| Chairmen of the Main Editorial Commission],          |                                                      |                                                |\n| The Soviet Military Encyclopedia                     | ;                                                    | English Language                               |\n| Edition                                              | , Vol. 1, William C. Green and W. Robert             |                                                |\n| Reeves, ed. and trans., Boulder, CO: Westview        |                                                      |                                                |\n| Press, 1993, pp. 345-346.                            |                                                      |                                                |\n| Maskirovka                                           | :                                                    | \"A means of securing the combat operations and |\n| daily activity of forces; a complex of measures      |                                                      |                                                |\n| designed to mislead the enemy as to the presence     |                                                      |                                                |\n| and disposition of forces and various military       |                                                      |                                                |\n| objects, their condition, combat readiness and       |                                                      |                                                |\n| operations and also the plans of the commander       |                                                      |                                                |\n| . . .                                                | Maskirovka                                           | contributes to the achievement of              |\n| surprise for the actions of forces, the preservation |                                                      |                                                |\n| of combat readiness and the increased survivability  |                                                      |                                                |\n| of objects\" (Grechko and Ogarkov, pp. 277-280).      |                                                      |                                                |\n| Passive Camouflage:                                  | The disguise or cloaking of forces and/or facilities |                                                |\n| to prevent their detection by an enemy.              |                                                      |                                                |\n| Active Camouflage:                                   | The artificial creation of the image or impression   |                                                |\n| that you have a force or capability that does not    |                                                      |                                                |\n| actually exist.                                      |                                                      |                                                |\n| Diversion:                                           | The intentional distraction of an enemy's attention  |                                                |\n| away from the area of interest or attack. Two basic  |                                                      |                                                |\n| types: feint and demonstration.                      |                                                      |                                                |\n| Feint:                                               | An attack by friendly forces to distract enemy       |                                                |\n| attention from your main area of interest or         |                                                      |                                                |\n| attack.                                              |                                                      |                                                |\n| Demonstration:                                    |\n|---------------------------------------------------|\n| such a deployment does not usually include actual |\n| contact or combat. The purpose of a diversion is  |\n| simpleto mislead an enemy away from your real    |\n| operations and objectives.                        |\n\nConditioning:\nThe repetition of what could be preparations for a hostile action without conducting hostilities thereby lulling the victim into a false sense of security. This is a variation of the \"familiarity breeds contempt\" theme.\nCover:\nThe use of an apparently nonthreatening activity to disguise preparation for or initiation of a hostile act. A common example is the use of a training exercise to hide preparations for an attack.\nNote: Conditioning and cover may occur in combination with one anotherthey can be mutually supportive. A common example is a military training exercise.\n\n## Endnotes\n\n\n1. For a general review of concepts of deception, see Colonel Michael Dewar, The Art of Deception in Warfare, Newton Abbot, Devon, UK: David & Charles Publishers, 1989, pp. 9-22; Jon Latimer, Deception in War: The Art of the Bluff, the Value of Deceit, and the Most Thrilling Episodes of Cunning in Military History, from the Trojan Horse to the Gulf War, Woodstock, NY: The Overlook Press, 2001, pp. 1-5; and James F. Dunnigan and Albert A. Nofi, Victory and Deceit: Deception and Trickery at War, San Jose, CA: Writers Club Press, 2001, pp. 1-31.\n\n\n2. An excellent overview of camouflage in nature is provided in Marco Ferrari, *Colors for Survival: Mimicry and Camouflage in Nature*, Charlottesville, VA:\nThomasson Grant & Howell, 1993. How examples in nature have affected military deception is discussed in Guy Hartcup, Camouflage: A History of Concealment and Deception in War, New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1980, pp. 9-11; and in J. Bowyer Bell and Barton Whaley, *Cheating and Deception*, New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 1991, pp. 48-52.\n\n3. The process of choosing methods of deception is examined in Latimer, pp. 71-100; while Bell and Whaley, pp. 45-74, discuss characteristics of types of deception.\n\n4. An introduction to this crisis is available at Digital History under \"Western Expansion, The Mexican War,\" at http://www.digitalhistory.uh.edu/database/article_\ndisplay.cfm?HHID=316, accessed July 20, 2004. For a variety of opinions as to the motives of the Polk administration, see Archie P. McDonald, ed., The Mexican War: Crisis for American Democracy, Lexington, MA: D. C. Heath, 1969; and Ramon Eduardo Ruiz, *The Mexican War: Was it Manifest Destiny?* New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1963.\n\n5. See President McKinley's \"Report on the Findings of the Sampson Board's Inquiry into the *Maine's* Loss,\" March 28, 1898, accessed at http://www.spanamwar.\n\ncom/McKinleymaine.htm, July 15, 2004.\n\n\n6. Philip Knightley and John Pilger, The First Casualty: The War Correspondent As\nHero and Myth-Maker from the Crimea to Kosovo, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2002, provide a general survey of the role of the media in reporting events\nleading up to war and the wars themselves.\n7. John F. Bratzel and Leslie B. Rout, Jr., \"FDR and the 'Secret Map',\" The\nWilson Quarterly, Vol. 9, New Year's 1985, pp. 167-173.\n\n8. This is discussed in \"Ex-British Agent Says FDR's Nazi Map Faked,\" Foreign Intelligence Literary Scene, Frederick, MD: University Publications of America, December 1984, pp. 1-3; \"President Roosevelt's Navy Day Address on World Affairs,\" *The New York Times*, October 28, 1941; and Mark Weber, \"Roosevelt's 'Secret Map' Speech,\" *The Journal for Historical Review*, Vol. 6, No. 2, Spring 1986, p. 125.\n\n\n9. See Michael Beschloss, Mayday: The U-2 Affair: The Untold Story of the Greatest\nUS-USSR Spy Scandal, New York, Harper Collins, 1987.\n\n10. Robert McNamara's explanation of the \"missile gap\" can be accessed in his 1996 interview for the CNN series \"The Cold War,\" at http://www.cnn.com/\nSPECIALS/cold.war/episodes/12/interviews/mcnamara/.\n\n\n11. *The Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*, amended as of June 9, 2004, is available at *http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/doddict/*.\n\n\n12. Good background narratives discussing deception in warfare prior to the\n20th century can be found in Latimer, pp. 6-36; Dewar, pp. 23-34; and Dunnigan and Nofi, pp. 32-109.\n\n13. See Donald C. Daniel and Katherine L. Herbig, *Strategic Military Deception*, Oxford, Pergamon, 1982, pp. 5-7.\n\n14. The importance of \"noise\" in the intelligence failure regarding Pearl Harbor is most clearly explained in Roberta Wohlstetter's elderly, but seminal work, Pearl Harbor: Warning and Decision, Stanford, CA, Stanford University Press, 1962.\n\n\n15. The D-Day deceptions are recounted in many sources, but the best analysis to date is to be found in the British official history, Michael Howard, British Intelligence in the Second World War, Vol. 5, *Strategic Deception*, London, HMSO, 1990; Anthony Cave Brown, *Bodyguard of Lies*, New York, Harper & Row, 1975; and in Thaddeus Holt, The Deceivers: Allied Military Deception in the Second World War, New York, Scribner, 2004.\n\n\n16. For examples of chicanery with runway craters, see Alfred Price, Targeting the Reich, London: Greenhill Books, 2003, p. 86; and Seymour Reit, Masquerade:\nThe Amazing Camouflage Deceptions of World War II, New York: Hawthorn, 1978, photographs following p. 90.\n\n17. Biblical scholars will remember the accounts of Gideon in the Old Testament, and classical scholars will point to examples which range from the previously mentioned Trojan Horse to the ruses employed by Caesar in Gaul. For an overview of the origins of deception doctrines, see Everett L. Wheeler, Stratagem and the Vocabulary of Military Trickery, Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1988.\n\n\n18. In an unsubstantiated story told to the author by a World War II U.S.\n\nArmy Air Force pilot, American photo intelligence detected a number of Japanese dummy aircraft on dispersal sites on the island of Rabaul. These dummies fooled no one, and they were ignored by allied bombing raids. However, late in the war, when Rabaul had been by-passed by General MacArthur's island hopping campaign, it was used as a \"seasoning\" target for newly arrived allied aircrew. On one of these raids, an inexperienced bombardier struck the dummy aircraft by mistake. The result was a series of secondary explosions which went on for hours.\n\nThe Japanese had placed ammunition and fuel stockpiles under their obvious\n\"active camouflage.\" This story has not been confirmed by other sources to date, but, even if it is not true or is possibly embellished, the point remains validactive camouflage *could* be used as passive camouflage.\n\n\n19. Each of these terms is defined in The Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, amended as of June 9, 2004, and is available at http://\nwww.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/doddict/.\n\n\n20. Again, each of these terms is defined in *ibid*.\n\n\n21. See a collection of Johannes von Goethe's quotations in the John Petrie\nCollection at http://www.arches.uga.edu/~jpetrie/goethe.html.\n\n22. An examination of the counterintelligence problems associated with double agents can be found in David C. Martin, *Wilderness of Mirrors*, New York:\nHarper & Row, 1980.\n\n23. DoD provided these briefings to media audiences in Washington, DC, in 2001 and 2002, and examples are available online at http://www.defenselink.mil/\nnews/Oct2001/g011024-D-6570C.html and http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Oct2002/ t10082002_t1008dia.html.\n\n\n24. An interesting collection of essays is to be found in John Norton Moore, ed., Deception and Deterrence in \"Wars of National Liberation,\" State-Sponsored Terrorism and Other Forms of Secret Warfare, Durham, NC: Carolina Academic Press, 1997.\n\n\n25. Gene R. Nichol, Jr., \"US Domestic Legal Constraints on Deception\" at\nhttp://www.duke.edu/web/tiss/archives/conferencerecords/Deception/Nichol.html.\n26. FM 27-10, *The Laws of Land Warfare*, Foreword, at http://faculty.ed.umuc.\nedu/~nstanton/FWD.htm.\n\n27. *Ibid*., Chapter 2, Section V. at http://faculty.ed.umuc.edu/~nstanton/Ch2.\nhtm#s5; and Scott L. Silliman \"International Legal Constraints\" at http://www.duke. edu/web/tiss/archives/conferencerecords/Deception/Silliman.html.\n\n28. See the discussion in Elizabeth Kiss, \"Strategic Deception in Modern\nDemocracies: The Ethical Dimension\" at http://www.duke.edu/web/tiss/archives/\nconferencerecords/Deception/Kiss.pdf; Rushworth M. Kidder, \"Ethical Deception?\" at http://www.globalethics.org/newsline/members/issue.tmpl?articleid=11180122325517; and Major John Mark Mattox, \"The Moral Status of Military Deception\" at http:// www.usafa.af.mil/jscope/JSCOPE00/Mattox00.html. An interesting overview of the\nbasic issues can be found in Sissela Bok, Lying: Moral Choice in Public and Private\nLife, New York: Pantheon, 1978.\n\n29. Again, note the discussions to be found in Kiss and Mattox above.\n\n\n30. See Walter Jajko's overview of the role of ethical considerations in deception planning in his \"Deception: Appeal for Acceptance; Discourse on Doctrine; Preface to Planning\" at *http://www.poliscitaylorandfrancis.com/pdfs/cst/novdec02_jajko.pdf*.\n\n31. See the press coverage of this issue in CNN stories at http://www.cnn.\n\ncom/2002/US/02/19/gen.strategic influence and http://www.cnn.com/2002/US/02/26/\ndefense.office."
    },
    {
        "text": "## Civilapplications Committee\n\nDepartment of the Interior    Department of Agriculture     Department of Commerce\n Department of Transportation     Department of Energy     U.S. Environmental Protection Agency\n Federal Emergency Management Agency     National Aeronautics and Space Administration\n National Science Foundation     U.S. Army Corps of Engineers\n\n## The Civil Applications Committee Background\n\nThe Civil Applications Committee (CAC) is an interagency committee that coordinates and oversees the Federal civil use of classified collections. The CAC was officially chartered in 1975 by the Office of the President to provide Federal civil agencies access to National Systems data in support of mission responsibilities. In recent years, CAC activities have expanded beyond traditional mapping applications to a broad range of environmental and remote sensing applications central to Federal agency missions. Examples include monitoring volcanoes; detecting wildland fires; coordinating emergency response to natural disasters, such as hurricanes, earthquakes, and floods; monitoring ecosystems; and mapping wetlands. The CAC provides a forum through which the Federal civil agencies coordinate data requirements, develop tasking strategies, certify the proper use of data, and track and plan for the progress and evolution of National Systems. The CAC coordinates the use of imagery exploitation and application resources and supports remote sensing research and development activities at special facilities, such as the U.S. Geological Survey (USGS) Advanced Systems Center (ASC). At these facilities, appropriate capabilities and exploitation tools are available for CAC members to use for end-to-end data processing and developing custom products. Through the CAC, arrangements can also be made for technical support from military and intelligence community agencies.\n\n## Oversight\n\nOversight responsiblities of the CAC include disseminating information to Federal users on policies related to the proper nonintelligence use of the data and the protection of intelligence sources and materials. The CAC receives, reviews, and approves all civil requests, assigns priorities to such requests, and acts as the interface between the Federal civil agencies and the intelligence and military communities. Through the CAC, pertinent knowledge on the use of remote sensing capabilities is distributed to the civil community members. The CAC also represents the civil community in national security forums and serves as an advocate for policies and technology of common benefit to the civil, military, and intelligence communities.\n\n## Source Management\n\nThe CAC Data Acquisition and Management Team processes all classified imagery requests approved by the CAC and ensures that domestic imagery requirements are submitted and processed according to established policies and procedures. Data acquisition resources are provided by the USGS at the ASC. This team helps agencies define their imagery requirements, develops the collection parameters, forwards Phone:   703-648-7888\nFax:   703-648-7873\nE-mail:  cac@usgs.gov those requirements to the appropriate policy offices for approval, and distributes the acquired imagery to the requesting organization.\n\n## Forums\n\nCAC meetings are held once each month, usually at the USGS ASC in Reston, Va., to provide informational briefings and conduct routine business. CAC working groups are established to address specific CAC programs and issues and meet as needed.\n\n## Membership\n\nThe CAC is made up of voting representatives from the Federal civil community, including the following: U.S. Department of the Interior U.S. Department of Agriculture U.S. Department of Commerce U.S. Department of Energy U.S. Department of Transportation U.S. Environmental Protection Agency Federal Emergency Management Agency National Aeronautics and Space Administration National Science Foundation U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Nonvoting associate members include the following: National Imagery and Mapping Agency National Reconnaissance Office Director of Central Intelligence Environmental and Societal Issues Center (DESC)\nDepartment of State\n\n## Contacts\n\nFor more information on the CAC, contact: CAC Secretariat USGS, Advanced Systems Center, MS 562 12201 Sunrise Valley Drive Reston, VA 20192 Phone:  703-648-7888 Fax:  703-648-7873 E-mail:  cac@usgs.gov For more information on imagery requirements and collection, contact the CAC Data Acquisition and Management Team at the address indicated on the front of this page, or telephone 703-648-7822."
    },
    {
        "text": "## Final Report Guantanamo Review Taskforce\n\n# January 22, 2010\n\nDepartment of Justice Department of Defense Department of State Department of Homeland Security Office of the Director of National Intelligence Joint Chiefs of Staff\n\n## Executive Summary\n\nOn January 22,2009, the President issued Executive Order 13492, calling for a prompt and comprehensive interagency review of the status of all individuals currently detained at the Guantanamo Bay Naval Base and requiring the closure of the detention facilities there. The Executive Order was based on the finding that the appropriate disposition of all individuals detained at Guantanamo would further the national security and foreign policy interests of the United States and the interests of justice.\n\nOne year after the issuance of the Executive Order, the review ordered by the President is now complete. After evaluating all of the detainees, the review participants have decided on the proper disposition-transfer, prosecution, or continued detentionof all 240 detainees subject to the review.\n\nEach of these decisions was reached by the unanimous agreement of the agencies responsible for the review: the Department of Justice, Department of Defense, Department of State, Department of Homeland Security, Office of the Director of National Intelligence, and Joint Chiefs of Staff.\n\n## Review Process\n\nTo implement the President's order, the Attorney General, as the coordinator of the review, established the Guantanamo Review Task Force and a senior-level Review Panel. The Task Force was responsible for assembling and examining relevant information on the Guantanamo detainees and making recommendations on their proper dispositions. The Review Panel, consisting of officials with delegated authority from their respective agencies to decide the disposition of each detainee, reviewed the Task Force's recommendations and made disposition decisions on a rolling basis. Where the Review Panel did not reach consensus, or where higher-level review was appropriate, the agency heads (\"Principals\") named in the Executive Order determined the proper disposition of the detainee.\n\nKey features of the review process included:\n\n-\nComprehensive Interagency Review. The Task Force consisted of more\nthan 60 career professionals, including intelligence analysts, law enforcement\nagents, and attorneys, drawn from the Department of Justice, Department of\nDefense, Department of State, Department of Homeland Security, Central\nIntelligence Agency, Federal Bureau of Investigation, and other agencies\nwithin the intelligence community.\n-\nRigorous Examination ofInformation. The Task Force assembled large\nvolumes of information from across the government relevant to determining\nthe proper disposition of each detainee. Task Force members examined this\ninformation critically, giving careful consideration to the threat posed by the\ndetainee, the reliability of the underlying information, and the interests of\nnational security.\n-\nUnanimous Decision-Making by Senior Officials. Based on the Task\nForce's evaluations and recommendations, senior officials representing each\nagency responsible for the review reached unanimous determinations on the\nappropriate disposition for all detainees. In the large majority of cases, the\nReview Panel was able to reach a consensus. Where the Review Panel was\nnot able to reach a unanimous decision---or when additional review was\nappropriate-the Principals met to determine the proper disposition.\n\n## Results Of The Review\n\nThe decisions reached on the 240 detainees subject to the review are as follows:\n\n-\n126 detainees were approved for transfer. To date, 44 of these detainees have\nbeen transferred from Guantanamo to countries outside the United States.\n-\n44 detainees over the course of the review were referred for prosecution\neither in federal court or a military commission, and 36 of these detainees\nremain the subject of active cases or investigations. The Attorney General has\nannounced that the government will pursue prosecutions against six of these\ndetainees in federal court and will pursue prosecutions against six others in\nmilitary commissions.\n-\n48 detainees were determined to be too dangerous to transfer but not feasible\nfor prosecution. They will remain in detention pursuant to the government's\nauthority under the Authorization for Use of Military Force passed by\nCongress in response to the attacks of September 11, 2001. Detainees may\nchallenge the legality of their detention in federal court and will periodically\nreceive further review within the Executive Branch.\n-\n30 detainees from Yemen were designated for \"conditional\" detention based\non the current security environment in that country. They are not approved\nfor repatriation to Yemen at this time, but may be transferred to third\ncountries, or repatriated to Yemen in the future if the current moratorium on\ntransfers to Yemen is lifted and other security conditions are met.\n\n## Looking Ahead\n\nWith the completion of the review, an essential component of the effort to close the Guantanamo detention facilities has been accomplished. Beyond the review, additional work remains to be done to implement the review decisions and to resolve other issues relating to detainees. The Task Force has ensured that its analyses of the detainees and the information collected in the course of the review are properly preserved to assist in the resolution of these issues going forward.\n\n## Table Of Contents Of Contents\n\nINEPOAUCTION .ottt\ns e eee e e sitt e s e ae s ssbaaaaeanstsaesssbasasens\n1\nI.\nIntroduction ........ 1\nBacK@Iound .....ccooi ittt\net e e\ne\nnaee s 1\n1.\nII.\nBackground ........ 1\nThe President's Executive Order.... ..ot 2\n1.\nIll.\nThe President's Executive Order ........ 2\nImplementing the Executive Order: The Guantanamo Review Task Force ........ 3\nIV.\nIV.\nImplementing the Executive Order: The Guantanamo Review Task Force ........ 3\nA. Establishment of the Task FOrce ... 3\nA. Establishment of the Task Force ........ 3\nB. Task FOrce STrUCTUIE.......covveiiieeriiieeee ettt\ne e 3\nB. Task Force Structure ........ 3\nC. Guantanamo Review Panel........c.cooiieiiiin\ne 4\nC. Guantanamo Review Panel ........ 4\nD. Task Force Information Collection ........cocciivieeiiie e 5\nD. Task Force Information Collection ........ 5\nE. ReVIEW Phases .....coociiiieece et\ns\ne\ne\ne s s\nsnn e e 6\nE. Review Phases ........ 6\nDetainee Review GUIAEIINES .....ccovimiiiieeccieee e 7\nV.\nDetainee Review Guidelines ........ 7\nA. Transfer GUIAEINES ....ooueeviieieiiicc\ne\ne\ne 7\nA. Transfer Guidelines ........ 7\nB. Prosecution GUIAEIINES .....c..eviieiiiiciiiiec ettt 7\nB. Prosecution Guidelines ........ 7\nC. Detention GUIAELINES .....cccveriiiriererreereeeeieee\ne\nee e et\ne e sreeesee e ene e eeseebaeeeene s 8\nC. Detention Guidelines ........ 8\nD. Review of Information ........cccceeeiieeineiicieniiesece\ne\neecne e e 9\nD. Review of Information ........ ~ ........ 9\nResults 0f the ReVIEW ......c.ooiiii ettt 9\nVL\nVI.\nResults of the Review ........ 9\nA. OVerview 0f DECISIONS ..occvvvviiiiricne\net\neerreecsreessseeesseessaeaassanesanneesnnees 9\nA. Overview of Decisions ........ 9\nB. Overview of the Guantanamo Detainee Population ........c.c..occeiiiinnennen. 13\nB. Overview of the Guantanamo Detainee Population ........ 13\nVIL\nTransSTer DECISIONS . ....viiciiirierireeriree\nettt reeressstreenma e rereestraesre e e sebaesraassaaasnns 15\nVII.\nTransfer Decisions ........ 15\nAL Background........oooiii\ne\ne 15\nA. Background ........ 15\n|5\nT LT\n] o\no -SRI 16\nB. Decisions ........ 16\nC. Yement Detainees . ..ccccuiviiiieiieiiiiciieerciee\nittt\ne e\ns e srresaas e s nnne 18\nC. Yemeni Detainees ........ 18\nProsecution Decisions\n........ 19\nVIII.\nVIII. Prosecution Decisions ........ 19\nA, Background........oooioiiiicc\ns e aeenaaas 19\nA. Background ........ 19\nB DECISIONS. ..utiiii ittt\ne\ne\ne e\ne e\ns s\ne e\ne e\ns e e\ne n e nnaa e\ne\ne aeaae s 20\nB. Decisions ........ 20\nC. Detainees Who Cannot Be Prosecuted ........ooooiiiieiiieciiieeeceee\ne 22\nC. Detainees Who Cannot Be Prosecuted ........ 22\nIX.\nDetention DECISIONS .....coivciiiiriiiieeiies\nst\ns e e esree e essree e e srneesssneesssnneeeens 23\nIX.\nDetention Decisions ........ 23\nAL Back@round. ...t 23\nA. Background ........ 23\nLo TR\nB <o 1 T\no 1SS 23\nB. Decisions ........ 23\nC. Continued Reviews........ et\ntre e\ne e e teeeneea e\nbaeabb e e e bee et bt et b rasbeestaesnns 25\nC. Continued Reviews ........ \"; ........ 25\nConditional Detention Decisions: Yemeni Detainees ........ccoevvveerveriiveiniveevvverennnns 25\nX.\nConditional Detention Decisions: Yemeni Detainees ........ 25\nXI.\nXI.\nDiplomatic Efforts ........ 26\nDiplomatic Efforts........cccceevineennnn, heeeebeeeahee\ns e et e s arerheeeaabeeaaneentre e aeane s 26\nL0707\n1 el 1 13T}\no\n28\nXII.\nXII.\nConclusion ........ 28\n\n## I. Introduction\n\nAn essential component of the President's order calling for the closure of the detention facilities at the Guantanamo Bay Naval Base was the initiation of a new and rigorous interagency review of all individuals detained there. The purpose of the review was to collect and examine information from across the government to determine which detainees the United States should transfer or release from custody, prosecute, or otherwise lawfully detain.\n\nThis review is now complete. After carefully considering each case, the agencies responsible for the review-the Department of Justice, Department of Defense, Department of State, Department of Homeland Security, Office of the Director of National Intelligence, and Joint Chiefs of Staff-have unanimously agreed on the proper disposition of all 240 detainees subject to the review. While there remain other steps outside the scope of the review that must be taken before the detention facilities at Guantanamo can be closed, the completion of the review fulfills a central element of the President's order.\n\nThis report describes the process by which the review was conducted over the past year, the decisions resulting from the review, and the progress made toward implementing those decisions.\n\n## Ii. Background\n\nFollowing the terrorist attacks of September 11,2001, the United States was faced with the question of what to do with individuals captured in connecticru with military operations in Afghanistan or in other counterterrorism operations overseas. Starting in January 2002, the military began transferring a number of these individuals to the detention facilities at Guantanamo. By the end of 2002, 632 detainees had been brought to Guantanamo. In 2003, 117 additional detainees were brought to the base, with 10\nmore detainees added in 2004, 14 detainees in 2006, five detainees in 2007, and one detainee in 2008. Since 2002, a total of 779 individuals have been detained at Guantanamo in connection with the war against al-Qaida, the Taliban, and associated forces.\n\nFrom 2002 through 2008, most of the individuals detained at Guantanamo were transferred or released from U.S. custody, with the vast majority being repatriated to their home countries and others resettled in third countries willing to receive them. Of the 779\nindividuals detained at Guantanamo, approximately 530-almost 70 percent-were transferred or released from U.S. custody prior to 2009. The countries to which these detainees were transferred include Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Australia, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Belgium, Bosnia, Denmark, Egypt, France, Germany, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kuwait, Libya, Maldives, Mauritania, Morocco, Pakistan, Qatar, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Somalia (Somaliland), Spain, Sudan, Sweden, Tajikistan, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, the United Arab Emirates, the United Kingdom, and Yemen.\n\nBy January 20, 2009, the population of detainees at Guantanamo had been reduced to 242. Of the 242 remaining detainees, 59 had been approved for transfer by the prior administration and were awaiting implementation of their transfers.\n\n## Iii. The President's Executive Order\n\nOn January 22,2009, the President issued an Executive Order requiring the closure of the detention facilities at Guantanamo within one year. Noting the length of the detentions and the significant concerns they had raised both within the United States and internationally, the President determined that the \"prompt and appropriate disposition of the individuals currently detained at Guantanamo and closure of the facilities in which they are detained would further the national security and foreign policy interests of the United States and the interests of justice.\"\nAccordingly, the President ordered the Executive Branch to conduct a prompt and comprehensive interagency review of the factual and legal bases for the continued detention of all individuals remaining at Guantanamo. The President ordered that the review be coordinated by the Attorney General and conducted with the full cooperation and participation of the Secretary of Defense, Secretary of State, Secretary of Homeland Security, Director of National Intelligence, and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.\n\nThe first task given to the review participants under the Executive Order was to assemble, to the extent reasonably practicable, all information in the possession of the federal government pertaining to any individual then detained at Guantanamo and relevant to determining his proper disposition.\n\nThe Executive Order then set forth the following framework for the review participants to follow in determining the disposition of each detainee:\n\n-\nFirst, on a rolling basis and as promptly as possible, determine whether it is\npossible to transfer or release the detainee consistent with the national security\nand foreign policy interests of the United States and, if so, whether and how\nthe Secretary of Defense may effect the detainee's transfer or release;\n-\nSecond, with respect to any detainee not approved for transfer or release,\ndetermine whether the federal government should seek to prosecute the\ndetainee for any offenses he may have committed, including whether it is\nfeasible to prosecute such individual in a court established pursuant to Article\nIII of the United States Constitution *(i.e.,* federal court); and\n-\nThird, with respect to any detainee whose disposition is not achieved through\ntransfer, release, or prosecution, select other lawful means, consistent with the\nnational security and foreign policy interests of the United States and the\ninterests of justice, for the disposition of the detainee.\nThe Executive Order further directed that the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of State, and other review participants work to effect promptly the release or transfer of all individuals for whom release or transfer is possible, and that the Secretary of State expeditiously pursue and direct such negotiations and diplomatic efforts with foreign governments as are necessary and appropriate to implement the order.\n\nFinally, the Executive Order required that any individuals who remained in detention at Guantanamo at the time of the closure of the detention facilities be returned to their home country, released, transferred to a third country, or transferred to another United States detention facility in a manner consistent with law and the national security and foreign policy interests of the United States.\n\n## 'L! Iv. Implementing The Executive Orde~: ' The Guantanamo Review Task Force A. Establishment Of The Task Force\n\nTo implement the Executive Order, the Attorney General established the Guantanamo Review Task Force and appointed an Executive Director of the Task Force on February 20, 2009. The Task Force was charged with assembling and reviewing relevant information on the Guantanamo detainees and making recommendations to senior-level officials on the proper disposition of each detainee pursuant to the framework set forth in the Executive Order. To ensure that the expertise and perspectives of each participating agency were brought to bear on the review process, the Task Force was established as an interagency entity. Further, to maximize collaboration and exchange of information among Task Force members, all Task Force staff were located together in a secure facility, on a single floor devoted to Task Force work, and connected electronically through a stand-alone classified network.\n\n## B. Task Force Structure\n\nWith the assistance of the participating agencies, the Task Force assembled a staff of over 60 career professionals, drawn from the Department of Justice, Department of Defense, Department of State, Department of Homeland Security, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Central Intelligence Agency, and National Counterterrorism Center.\n\nIncluded in this wide range of representatives were senior military officers, federal prosecutors, FBI agents, intelligence analysts and officers, military prosecutors and investigators, national security lawyers, civillitigators, paralegals, and administrative assistants. During their tenure at the Task Force, these staff members worked full-time on the Task Force review.\n\nThe Task Force staff was initially organized into two review teams. The transfer team was responsible for evaluating whether detainees could be transferred or released consistent with the national security and foreign policy interests of the United States. l The team primarily evaluated the degree of threat posed by the detainee to U.S. national security, whether the threat could be mitigated through appropriate security measures, and the potential destination countries where it appeared possible to safely transfer the detainee. The transfer team was composed of representatives from each agency listed in the Executive Order.\n\nThe prosecution team was responsible for recommending whether the government should seek to prosecute certain detainees in either federal court or the military commission system. The prosecution team was staffed predominantly by experienced federal prosecutors, investigative agents, and criminal appellate specialists from the Department of Justice,2 as well as military commission prosecutors and investigative agents from the Department of Defense.\n\nThe work of the transfer and prosecution teams often overlapped, and the two teams worked in close coordination over the course of the review. As described below, after an initial review of all the detainees, the transfer and prosecution teams merged to conduct a further review of detainees whose cases had been deferred during the initial review.\n\nThe interagency makeup of the review teams was designed to ensure that all relevant agency viewpoints-including military, intelligence, homeland security, diplomatic, and law enforcement-were considered in the review process. Thus, proposed recommendations for transfer or continued detention were drafted, reviewed, and vigorously discussed ttl group deliberations by representatives of each of the participating agencies. After these extensive discussions on each detainee, any dissenting views of the agency representatives were noted in the recommendations or otherwise made known to the Review Panel.\n\n## C. Guantanamo Review Panel\n\nThe Task Force's recommend~tions, which contained detailed classified assessments of each detainee, were submitted on a rolling basis to the interagency Guantanamo Review Panel. The Review Panel was established in February 2009 along with the Task Force and was composed of senior-level officials from each of the agencies identified in the Executive Order. Review Panel members were delegated authority from their respective agency heads (\"Principals\") to decide the disposition of each detainee. Review Panel members were also responsible for ensuring that their respective agencies made relevant information in their possession available to the Task Force and in the Department of Justice.\n\n3 Senior officials from the Central Intelligence Agency and Federal Bureau ofinvestigation also regularly attended the Review Panel meetings to further inform the decision-making process.\n\nprovided the Task Force with personnel and other resources necessary for the Task Force to complete its review within the one-year time frame mandated by the President.\n\nBeginning in March 2009, the Review Panel met on a weekly basis to consider the recommendations of the Task Force. The Review Panel made disposition decisions only by unanimous agreement of the agencies identified in the Executive Order. Thus, each of the participating agencies had an equal voice in disposition decisions, and no decisions were made by the Review Panel over the objection of any agency. In the large majority of cases, the Review Panel was able to achieve consensus and reach decisions regarding the detainees considered. When Review Panel members did not reach consensus, or when higher-level review was appropriate, the cases were referred to the Principals for a decision. All of the cases referred to the Principals also ultimately garnered the unanimous agreement of the participating agencies.\n\nOnce a final decision was made regarding the disposition of a particular detainee, the decision was passed to the appropriate agencies for implementation. If a detainee was approved for transfer to a foreign country as a result of the review, the Department of State and Department of Defense worked together to make appropriate arrangements to effect the transfer in a manner consistent with the national security and foreign policy interests of the United States, including U.S. policies concerning humane treatment. If a decision was made by the Review Panel for prosecution, the case was referred to the Department of Justice for further investigation and review under a joint protocol established by the Department of Justice and Department of Defense to determine whether to pursue prosecution of the case in federal court or a military commission. The Review Panel was regularly updated on the implementation of transfer decisions and prosecution referrals, as well as any issues arising out of the implementation of these decisions requiring further interagency consideration.\n\n## D. Task Force Information Collection\n\nIn accordance with the Executive Order, the Task Force's initial responsibility was to collect all government information, to the extent reasonably practicable, relevant to determining the proper disposition of each detainee. The government did not have a preexisting, consolidated repository of such information. Rather, each federal agency stored information concerning Guantanamo detainees in its own systems, consistent with its particular mission and operating protocols.\n\nAccordingly, soon after it was formed, the Task Force initiated an effort to collect detainee information and make it available for review by Task Force members. As a result of this complex effort, the Task Force consolidated a large volume of information from the Department of Defense, Central Intelligence Agency, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Department of Justice, National Security Agency, National Counterterrorism Center, Department of State, and Department of Homeland Security.\n\nThe documents assembled by the Task Force include summaries ofbiographic and capture information; interrogation reports from custodial interviews of the detainees;\nrecords of Department of Defense administrative proceedings involving the detainees, i.e., Combatant Status Review Tribunals and Administrative Review Board proceedings;\nthe results of name traces run for detainees in certain intelligence databases maintained by the Central Intelligence Agency and National Security Agency; the results of name traces run for detainees in law enforcement databases maintained by the Federal Bureau of Investigation; investigative records maintained by the Office of Military Commissions-Prosecution (\"OMC\") and Criminal Investigative Task Force within the Department of Defense; records assembled by the Department of Justice for purposes of defending habeas litigation brought by detainees to challenge their detention; recidivism assessments concerning former detainees; finished intelligence products on the detainee population and on general topics of interest to the Task Force's work; and information concerning potential destination countries for detainees approved for transfer or release.\n\nThe Task Force also accepted written submissions made on behalf of individual detainees by their counselor other representatives.\n\nAdditionally, the Task Force had access to a variety of external networks containing additional information on the detainees, including documentary and physical evidence recovered through counterterrorism operations, and records concerning the behavior, disciplinary infractions, and physical and mental health of the detainees during detention. Over the course of the review, the Task Force also received briefings from the intelligence community on a number of topics relevant to the review.\n\nThe review of all this information was conducted in a classified environment using secure systems.\n\n## E. ~Eview Phases\n\nFollowing an initial period to stand up the Task Force and collect detainee information, the Task Force began to review detainees on March 5, 2009. The review was conducted in two phases. During the first phase, the Task Force reviewed all 240\ndetainees subject to the review.4 In accordance with the framework set forth in the Executive Order, the purpose of the first phase of the review was to identify those detainees who could be transferred or released consistent with the national security and foreign policy interests of the United States, those detainees as to whom prosecution appeared feasible, and those detainees who required further evaluation before a decision could be made on their appropriate disposition.\n\nThe purpose of the second phase of the review was to reevaluate those detainees who had been deferred during the first phase. Each detainee reviewed in the second phase was considered for transfer, prosecution, or-in the event that neither of these dispositions was deemed appropriate---continued detention pursuant to the government's authority under the Authorization for Use of Military Force (\"AUMF\") passed by Congress in response to the attacks of September 11, 2001.\n\n## V. Detainee Review Guidelines\n\nIn conducting its reviews, the Task Force followed detainee review guidelines\n(\"Guidelines\") developed specifically for the Executive Order review and approved by the Review Panel. The Guidelines set forth standards to apply in considering detainees for transfer, prosecution, or continued detention pursuant to the government's authority under the AUMF.\n\n## A. Transfer Guidelines\n\nThe Guidelines addressed three types of evaluations relevant to determining whether a detainee should be recommended for transfer or release.\n\nThe first evaluation required by the Guidelines was a threat evaluation. The Guidelines provided that a detainee should be deemed eligible for transfer if any threat he poses could be sufficiently mitigated through feasible and appropriate security measures.5\nThe Guidelines set forth a non-exclusive list of factors to be considered in evaluating the threat posed by a detainee. In applying those factors, the Task Force was instructed to consider the totality of available information regarding the detainee, and to give careful consideration to the credibility and reliability of the available information.\n\nThe seco~d evaluation required by the Guidelines was an evaluation of potential destination (i.e.~ teceiving) countries. The Guidelines left the Task Force with discretion whether to recommend a detainee for transfer only to specified countries or under I.\n\nspecified conditions. As with the threat evaluation, the Guidelines provided a nonexclusive set of factors by which to evaluate potential receiving countries.\n\nThe third evaluation required by the Guidelines was a legal evaluation to ensure that any detainee falling outside the government's lawful detention authority under the AUMF was recommended for transfer or release.\n\n## B. Prosecution Guidelines\n\nThe Guidelines also required cases to be evaluated by Task Force prosecutors to determine whether a federal court or military commission prosecution should be recommended for any offenses the detainees may have committed.\n\nFor the evaluation of whether a detainee should be prosecuted in federal court, the Guidelines set forth standards used by federal prosecutors across the country to determine whether to charge a case, as set forth in the *United States Attorneys' Manual.* Consistent r, with these standards, the Guidelines provided that a case should be recommended for prosecution if the detainee's conduct constitutes a federal offense and the potentially available admissible evidence will probably be sufficient to obtain and sustain a\n\\fl ,sonviction-unless prosecution should be declined because no substantial federal interest\n.', ~ \\vould be served by prosecution. Key factors in making this determination include the nature and seriousness of the offense; the detainee's culpability in connection with the offense; the detainee's willingness to cooperate in the investigation or prosecution of others; and the probable sentence or other consequences if the detainee is convicted.\n\nFor the evaluation of whether a detainee should be prosecuted in a\"h1ilitary commission, Task Force prosecutors examined the potentially available admissible evidence and consulted closely with OMC to determine the feasibility of prosecution.\n\nRecognizing the unique nature of these cases, the Guidelines provided that other factors were also significant in determining whether to recommend prosecution, including the need to protect classified information, such as intelligence sources and methods.\n\n## C. Detention Guidelines\n\nIn accordance with the Executive Order, the Guidelines provided that every effort should be made to ensure that all detainees who could be recommended for transfer, release, or prosecution consistent with national security and foreign policy interests and the interests of justice were recommended for such dispositions. Thus, the Guidelines provided that a detainee should be consider~d eligible for continued detention under the AUMF only if (1) the detainee poses a national security threat that cannot be sufficiently mitigated through feasible and appropriate security measures; (2) prosecution of the detainee by the federal government is not feasible in any forum; and (3) continued detention without criminal charges is lawful.\n\nThe Guidelines required the Task Force to consult with the Department of Justice in conducting a legal evaluation for each detainee considered for continued detention.\n\nThis legal evaluation addressed both the legal basis for holding the detainee under the AUMF and the government's case for defending the detention in any habeas litigation.6\nAs the Supreme Court has held, inherent within the authorization of the AUMF to\n\"use all necessary and appropriate force\" is the power to detain any individuals who fall within the scope of the statute? As the Court observed, \"by universal agreement and\n6 The AUMF authorizes the President to \"use all necessary and appropriate force against those any future attacks of international terrorism against the United States by such nations, organizations or practice,\" the power to wage war necessarily includes the authority to capture and detain combatants in order to prevent them from \"returning to the field of battle and taking .up arms once again.\"g The scope of the AUMF's detention authority extends to those persons who \"planned, authorized or committed or aided\" the September 11 attacks,\n\"harbored those responsible for those attacks,\" or \"were part of, or substantially supported, Taliban or al Qaeda forces or associated forces that are engaged in hostilities against the United States or its coalition partners.,,9 Accordingly, only detainees who satisfied this standard could be designated for continued detention.\n\n## D. Review Of Information\n\nConsistent with the Guidelines' requirement that the Task Force undertake a fresh and comprehensive evaluation of detainee information, the Task Force sought to make independent evaluations of the facts. In many instances, the Task Force largely agreed with prior threat assessments of the detainees and sometimes found additional information that further substantiated such assessments. In other instances, the Task Force found prior assessments to be overstated. Some assessments, for example, contained allegations that were not supported by the underlying source document upon which they relied. Other assessments contained conclusions that were stated categorically even though derived from uncorroborated statements or raw intelligence reporting of undetermined or questionable reliability. Conversely, in a few cases, the Task Force discovered reliable information indicating that a detainee posed a greater threat in some respects than prior assessments suggested.\n\nEven after careful examination of the intelligence, however, it was not always possible to draw definitive conclusions regarding a detainee's past conduct. Many of the detainees were captured in active zones of combat and were not previously the targets of investigation by U.S. law enforcement authorities or the intelligence community. Much of what is known about such detainees comes from their own statements or statements made by other detainees during custodial debriefings. The Task Force sought to ensure that the Review Panel and Prtncipals were apprised in their decision-making of any limitations of the available information.\n\n## Vi. Results Of The Review A. Overview Of Decisions\n\nBy the one-year mark of January 22, 2010, the review participants reached decisions on the appropriate disposition of all 240 detainees subject to the Executive Order. In sum, 126 detainees were approved for transfer; 36 detainees were referred for prosecution;lO 48 detainees were approved for continued detention under the AUMF; and\n30 detainees from Yemen were approved for \"conditional\" detention based on present security conditions in Yemen.\n\n## Overview Of Decisions\n\nAfter careful deliberation, all of these decisions were reached by unanimous agreement of senior officials from each agency respQPsible for the review. Thus, each decision carries the approval of the Department of Justice, Department of Defense, Department of State, Department of Homeland Security, Office of the Director of National Intelligence, and Joint Chiefs of Staff. A more detailed breakdown of the decisions follows.\n\n## Detainees Approved For Transfer\n\n-\n126 d~tainees were unanimously approved for transfer subject to appropriate security\nmeasures.\no 63 of the 126 detainees either had been cleared for transfer by the prior\nadministration, ordered released by a federal district court, or both.\no 44 of the 126 detainees have been transferred to date-24 to their home\ncountries, 18 to third countries for resettlement, and two to Italy for\nprosecution.\no\n82 of the 126 detainees remain at Guantanamo. Of these detainees:\n-\n16 may be repatriated to their home countries (other than Yemen)\nconsistent with U.S. policies on humane treatment. The State\nDepartment and Department of Defense are working with these\ncountries concerning the security conditions and timing of the\ntransfers. Some of these detainees have obtained injunctions that presently bar their repatriation and cannot be repatriated until these injunctions are lifted; litigation over the injunctions is ongoing.\n\n-\n37 cannot be repatriated at this time due to humane treatment or\nrelated concerns associated with their home countries (other than\nYemen). The State Department is seeking to resettle these detainees in\nthird countries. (A small number of these detainees may be transferred\nto third countries for prosecution rather than resettlement.)\n-\n29 are from Yemen. In light of the moratorium on transfers of\nGuantanamo detainees to Yemen announced by the President on\nJanuary 5, 2010, these detainees cannot be transferred to Yemen at this\ntime. In the meantime, these detainees are eligible to be transferred to\n. third countries capable of imposing appropriate security measures.\n\n## Detainees Referred For Prosecution\n\n-\nInitially, 44 detainees were referred for prosecution. As a result of further evaluation\nof these cases (detailed below), there are now 36 detainees who remain the subject of active cases or investigations.\no\n1 detainee (Ahmed Ghailani) has been transferred to the Southern District of\nNew York and will be tried for his alleged role in the 1998 bombings of the\nU.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania.\no 5 detainees will be tried in the Southern District of New York, for their\nalleged roles in the September 11 attacks, as announced by the Attorney\nGeneral.\no 6 detainees will be tried for offenses under the laws of war in a reformed\nmilitary commission system, as announced by the Attorney General.\no 24 detainees remain under review pursuant to the joint Department of Justice-\nDepartment of Defense protocol. No final determination has yet been made as\nto whether or in what forum these 24 detainees will be charged.\no\n8 other detainees were initially referred for prosecution but subsequently\ndesignated for other dispositions.\n-\n1 detainee was transferred pursuant to a court order in his habeas case.\n-\n7 detainees were referred back to the review participants after\nprosecution was deemed not feasible upon further evaluation (6 were\nsubsequently approved for continued detention under the AUMF, and\n1 was approved for transfer).\n\n## Detainees Approved For Detention\n\n-\n48 detainees were unanimously approved for continued detention under the AUMF\nbased on a finding that they pose a national security threat that could not be mitigated\nsufficiently at this time if they were to be transferred from U.S. custody.\no The Task Force concluded as to all of these detainees that prosecution is not\nfeasible at this time in either federal court or the military commission system.\no At the same time, the Task Force concluded that there is a lawful basis for\ncontinuing to detain these detainees under the AUMF.\n\n## Detainees Approved For Conditional Detention\n\n30 detainees from Yemen were unanimously approved for \"conditional\" detention based on current security conditions in Yemen.\n\no After carefully considering the intelligence concerning the security situation\nin Yemen, and reviewing each detainee on a case-by-case basis, the review\nparticipants selected a group of 30 Yemeni detainees who pose a lower threat\nthan the 48 detainees designated for continued detention under the AUMF, but\nwho should not be among the first groups of transfers to Yemen even if the\ncurrent moratorium on such transfers is lifted.\no These 30 detainees were approved for \"conditional\" detention, meaning that\nthey qw be transferred if one of the following conditions is satisfied: (1) the\n}w\"\"?\"l\n/~;H\nsecurity situation improves in Yemen; (2) an appropriate rehabilitation program becomes available; or (3) an appropriate third-country resettlement option becomes available. Should any of these conditions be satisfied, however, the 29 Yemeni detainees approved for transfer would receive priority for any transfer options over the 30 Yemeni detainees approved for conditional detention.\n\n## B. Overview Of The Guantanamo Detainee Population\n\nThe following section provides an overview of the 240 Guantanamo detainees reviewed under the Executive Order, including their threat characteristics and more general background information, including country of origin, point of capture, and date of arrival at Guantanamo.\n\nThreat Characteristics. As reflected in the decisions made in the review, there is a substantial degree of variation among the Guantanamo detainees from a security perspective. Although not all detainees can be neatly characterized, the following groupings provide a rough overview of the recurring threat profiles seen in the population.\n\n$ .\n\n-4eaders, operatives, andfacilitators involved in terrorist plots against US. targets.\nAt the high end of the threat spectrum are leaders, planners, operatives, and\nfacilitators within al-Qaida or associated groups who are directly implicated in\nterrorist plots against U.S. interests. Among the most notorious examples in this\ngroup are Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, the alleged mastermind of the September 11\nattacks; Ramzi bin al-Shibh, the alleged principal coordinator of the September 11 attacks; Abd aI-Rahim al-Nashiri, the alleged mastermind of the attack on the U.S.S.\nCole; Abu Faraj al-Libi, who allegedly succeeded Khalid Sheikh Mohammed as al-\nQaida's chief planner of terrorist operations; Hambali, the alleged leader of an al-\nQaida affiliate in Indonesia who directed numerous attacks against Western targets in\nSoutheast Asia; and Ahmed Ghailani, an alleged key participant in the 1998\nbombings of the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania. Roughly 10 percent of the\ndetainees subject to the review appear to have played a direct role in plotting,\nexecuting, or facilitating such attacks.\n-\nOthers with significant organizational roles within al-Qaida or associated terrorist organizations. Other detainees played significant organizational roles within al-\nQaida or associated terrorist organizations, even if they may not have been directly involved in terrorist plots against U.S. targets. This group includes, for example, individuals responsible for overseeing or providing logistical support to al-Qaida's training operations in Afghanistan; facilitators who helped move money and personnel for al-Qaida; a cadre of Usa rna bin Laden's bodyguards, who held a unique position of trust within al-Qaida; and well-trained operatives who were being groomed by al-Qaida leaders for future terrorist operations. Roughly 20 percent of the detainees subject to the review fall within this category.\n\n-\nTaliban leaders and members of *anti-Coalition militia groups.* The detainee\npopulation also includes a small number of Afghan detainees who occupied\nsignificant positions within the Taliban regime, and a small number of other Afghan\ndetainees who were involved in local insurgent networks in Afghanistan implicated in\nattacks on Coalition forces. Less than 10 percent of the detainees subject to the\nreview fall within this category.\n-\nLow-levelforeignfighters. A majority of the detainees reviewed appear to have been\nforeign fighters with varying degrees of connection to al-Qaida, the Taliban, or\nassociated groups, but who lacked a significant leadership or other specialized role.\nThese detainees were typically captured in combat zones during the early stages of\nU.S. military operations in Afghanistan, often by Northern Alliance troops or other\nallied forces, without being specifically targeted for capture by (or even known to) the\nU.S. military in advance. Many were relatively recent recruits to training camps in\nAfghanistan run by al-Qaida or other groups, where they received limited weapons\ntraining, but do not appear to have been among those selected for more advanced\ntraining geared toward terrorist operations abroad.\n-\nMiscellaneous others. The remaining detainees-roughly 5 percent-do not fit into\nany of the above categories.\nCountry of *Origin.* The Guantanamo detainees reviewed included individuals from a number of different countries, including Yemen, Afghanistan, China, Saudi Arabia, Algeria, Tunisia, Syria, Libya, Kuwait, and Pakistan. Approximately 40\npercent-97 detainees-were Yemeni, while over 10 percent were Afghan.\n\nPoint of *Capture.* The large majority of the detainees in the population reviewed-approximately 60 percent-were captured inside Afghanistan or in the Afghanistan-Pakistan border area. Approximately 30 percent of the detainees were captured inside Pakistan. The remaining 10 percent were captured in countries other than Afghanistan or Pakistan.\n\npercent-arrived at Guantanamo in 2002,\n\n## Vii. Transfer Decisions A. Background\n\nAs the first step in the review process, the Executive Order required the review participants to determine which Guantanamo detainees could be transferred or released consistent with the national security and foreign policy interests of the United States.\n\nThe Executive Order further required the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of State, and other review participants as appropriate, to \"work to effect promptly the release or transfer of all individuals for whom release or transfer is possible.\"\nPrior to the initiation of the review, 59 of the 240 detainees subject to review were approved for transfer or release by the prior administration but remained at Guantanamo by the time the Executive Order was issued. One reason for their continued detention was that more than half of the 59 detainees could not be returned to their home countries consistent with U.S. policy due to post-transfer treatment concerns. 11 Thus, many of the\n59 detainees required resettlement in a third country, a process that takes time and requires extensive diplomatic efforts.\n\nIn addition, 29 of the detainees subject to review were ordered released by a federal district court as the result of habeas litigation. Of these 29 detainees, 18 were relevant agencies to advise on the likelihood of persecution or torture in the given country and the adequacy and credibility of assurances obtained from the foreign government.\n\nordered released after the government conceded the case. 12 The remaining 11 detainees were ordered released after a court reached the merits of the case and ruled, based on a preponderance of the evidence, that the detainee was not lawfully held because he was not part of, or did not substantially support, al-Qaida, the Taliban, or associated forces. 13\nOf the 29 detainees ordered released, 18 were among the 59 who had been approved by the prior administration for transfer or release. Thus, a total of 70 detainees subject to the review were either approved for transfer during the prior administration or ordered released by a federal court.\n\n## B. Decisions\n\nBased on interagency reviews and case-by-case threat evaluations, 126 of the 240\ndetainees were approved for transfer by agreement of senior officials from the agencies named in the Executive Order.'\nThe 126 detainees unanimously approved for transfer include 44 who have been transferred to date-24 to their home countries,14 18 to third countries for resettlement, I 5\nand two to Italy for prosecution. Of the 82 detainees who remain at Guantanamo and who have been approved for transfer, 16 may be repatriated to their home countries\n(other than Yemen) consistent with U.S. policies concerning humane treatment, 38\ncannot be repatriated due to humane treatment or related concerns in their home countries\n(other than Yemen) and thus need to be resettled in a third country, and 29 are from Yemen. Half of all detainees approved for transfer-63 of the 126-also had been approved for transfer during the prior administration, ordered released by a federal court, or both.16\n,\"\nThere were considerable variations among the detainees approved for transfer.\n\nFor a small handful of these detainees, there was scant evidence of any involvement with terrorist groups or hostilities against Coalition forces in Afghanistan. However, for most of the detainees approved for transfer, there were varying degrees of evidence indicating that they were low-level foreign fighters affiliated with al-Qaida or other groups operating in Afghanistan. Thousands of such individuals are believed to have passed government transferred three ofthese detainees in December 2008; thus, they were not subject to the review. Of the 11 remaining detainees who were reviewed under the Executive Order, seven have been transferred to date. Ofthe four who have not been transferred, the United States is appealing the district court's ruling in two ofthe cases, and is still within the time period to appeal the remaining two cases.\n\n14 The 24 detainees transferred to their home countries were repatriated to Afghanistan (5), Algeria (2), Chad (1), Iraq (1), Kuwait (2), Saudi Arabia (3), Somalia (Somaliland) (2), the United Kingdom (1), and Yemen (7).\n\n15 T~'l8 detainees transferred to third countries for resettlement were transferred to Belgium (1), Bermuda (4), France (2), Hungary (1), Ireland (2), Portugal (2), and Palau (6).\n\n16 The review participants reviewed the detainees who had been approved for transfer by the prior Administration and designated seven such detainees (all of whom were from Yemen) for conditional detention instead of transfer.\n\nthrough Afghanistan from the mid-1990s through 2001, recruited through networks in various countries in the Middle East, North Africa, and Europe. These individuals varied in their motivations, but they typically sought to obtain military training at one of the many camps operating in Afghanistan; many subsequently headed to the front lines to assist the Taliban in their fight against the Northern Alliance. For the most part, these individuals were uneducated and unskilled. At the camps, they typically received limited weapons training. While al-Qaida used its camps to vet individuals for more advanced training geared toward terrorist operations against civilian targets, only a small percentage of camp attendees were deemed suitable for such operations. The low-level fighters approved for transfer were typically assessed by the review participants not to have been selected for such training. Many were relatively recent recruits to the camps, arriving in Afghanistan in the summer of 200 1. After the camps closed in anticipation of the arrival of U.S. forces in October 2001, some of these individuals were transported by camp personnel or otherwise made their way to the Tora Bora mountain range, where they joined fighting units, but subsequently dispersed in the face of U.S. air attacks.\n\nIt is important to emphasize that a decision to approve a detainee for transfer does not reflect a decision that the detainee poses no threat or no risk of recidivism. Rather, the decision reflects the best predictive judgment of senior government officials, based on the available information, that any threat posed by the detainee can be sufficiently mitigated through feasible and appropriate security measures in the receiving country.\n\nIndeed, all transfer decisions were made subject to the implementation of appropriate security measures in the receiving country, and extensive discussions are conducted with the receiving country about such security measures before any transfer is implemented.\n\nSome detainees were approved for transfer only to specific countries or under specific conditions, and a few were approved for transfer only to countries with pending prosecutions against the detainee (or an interest in pursuing a future prosecution). Each decision was made on a case-by-case basis, taking into account all of the information about the detainee and the receiving country's ability to mitigate any threat posed by the detainee. For certain detainees, the review participants considered the availability of rehabilitation programs and mental health treatment in the receiving country. The review participants also were kept informed of intelligence assessments concerning recidivism trends among former detainees.\n\nIt is also important to emphasize that a decision to approve a detainee for transfer does not equate to a judgment that the government lacked legal authority to hold the detainee. To be sure, in some cases the review participants had concerns about the strength of the evidence against a detainee and the government's ability to defend his detention in court, and considered those factors, among others, in deciding whether to approve the detainee for transfer. For many of the detainees approved for transfer, however, the review participants found there to be reliable evidence that the detainee had engaged in conduct providing a lawful basis for his detention. The review participants nonetheless considered these detainees appropriate candidates for transfer from a threat perspective, in light of their limited skills, minor organizational roles, or other factors.\n\n## C. Yemeni Detainees\n\nFrom the outset of the review, it was clear that the Yemeni detainees posed a unique challenge: there were 97 Yemenis subject to the review, by far the largest group in the Guantanamo population, and the security situation in Yemen had deteriorated. AI-\nQaida was gaining strongholds in certain regions of the country, and the government of Yemen was facing a rebellion in other regions. Potential options for rehabilitation programs and other security measures were carefully considered throughout the course of the review, but conditions in Yemen remained a primary concern.\n\nTaking into account the current intelligence regarding conditions in Yemen, and the individ~l backgrounds of each detainee, the review participants unanimously approved 3'(f of the 97 Yemeni detainees for transfer subject to appropriate security measures. The decision to approve these detainees for transfer, however, did not require immediate implementation. Rather, by making each transfer decision contingent on the implementation of appropriate security measures, the review participants allowed for necessary flexibility in the timing of these transfers. Under these transfer decisions, detainees wOlJ',\\d be returned to Yemen only at a time, and only under conditions, deemed appropriate fro~ a security perspective.\n\nTo date, only seven of the 36 Yemeni detainees approved for transfer have been transferred to Yemen. 17 One was transferred in September 2009 pursuant to a court order, and six wJe. transferred in December 2009. The six who were repatriated in December 2009 ~. 're selected by the unanimous agreement of high-level officials in the agencies named i 1:he Executive Order, after further individualized reviews of the detainees, including consideration of threat-related information, the evidence against the detainees, and the government's ability to successfully defend the lawfulness of their detentions in court. This decision involved high-level coordination within the government and reflected a determination that these six specific detainees should be returned to Yemen at that time.\n\nThere are 29 Yemenis approved for transfer who remain at Guantanamo. The involvement of AI-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula-the branch of al-Qaida based in Yemen-in the recent attempted bombing of an airplane headed to Detroit underscored the continued need for a deliberate approach toward any further effort to repatriate Yemeni detainees. In the wake of the attempted plot, the President publicly announced a moratorium on the transfer of detainees to Yemen. Accordingly, none of the 29 Yemeni detainees remaining at Guantanamo who are approved for transfer will be repatriated to Yemen until the moratorium is lifted. These detainees may be considered for resettlement in third countries subject to appropriate security measures, if such options become available.\n\n## Viii. Prosecution Decisions A. Background\n\nThe Executive Order provides that \"[i]n accordance with United States law, the cases of individuals detained at Guantanamo not approved for release or transfer shall be evaluated to determine whether the Federal Government should seek to prosecute the detained individuals for any offenses they may have committed, including whether it is feasible to prosecute such individuals before a court established pursuant to Article III of the United States Constitution *[i.e.,* federal court].\" In a speech at the National Archives on May 21,2009, the President reiterated that \"when feasible, we will try those who have violated American criminal laws in federal courts.\" As the President noted in his speech, federal prosecutors have a long history of successfully prosecuting all manner of terrorism offenses in the federal courts:\nOur courts and juries of our citizens are tough enough to convict terrorists, and the record makes that clear. Ramzi Y ousef tried to blow up the World Trade Center-he was convicted in our courts, and is serving a life sentence in U.S. prison. Zacarias Moussaoui has been identified as the\n20th 9111 hijacker-he was convicted in our courts, and he too is serving a life sentence in prison. Ifwe can try those terrorists in our courts and hold them in our prisons, then we can do the same with detainees from Guantanamo.\n\nThe President also stressed that military commissions \"have a history in the United States dating back to George Washington and the Revolutionary War\" and remained \"an appropriate venue for trying detainees for violations of the laws of war.\"\nAccordingly, the administration proposed, and Congress has since enacted, reforms to the military commissions system to ensure that the commissions are fair, legitimate, and effective.\n\nIn accordance with the President's guidance, the Task Force evaluated detainees for possible prosecution wherever there was any ba~is to conclude that prosecution in either federal court or a military commission was appropriate and potentially feasible.\n\nThe Task Force prosecutors focused their review at first on the 23 detainees who, as of the issuance of the Executive Order, were facing charges in the military commissions, as well as several other uncharged detainees whose cases were related to those of charged detainees. IS The Task Force then evaluated for possible prosecution the approximately\n40 additional detainees whom OM,.C had designated for potential prosecution. Finally, the Task Force reviewed every detainee for prosecutiol}, ~ho was deemed ineligible for transfer.\n\n,.\n\nIn conducting its reviews, the Task Force worked closely with OMC. Task Force members had access to OMC files, and OMC prosecutors briefed the Task Force on their cases. Upon request, Department of Defense investigators and FBI agents who had worked on investigations met with Task Force members to answer their questions. The Task Force also reviewed original source information pertaining to the detainees and was able to identify previously unexploited sources of evidence.\n\nAs the Task Force completed its prosecution reviews, it identified those cases that appeared feasible for prosecution in federal court, or at least potentially feasible, if certain investigative steps were pursued with success. In this regard, the Task Force identified a number of aveIN.Jes for strengthening important cases and developing them for prosecution. For example, the Task Force determined that there were more than a thousand pieces of potentially relevant physical evidence (including electronic media)\nseized during raids in the aftermath of the September 11 attacks that had not yet been systematically catalogued and required further evaluation for forensic testing. There were potential cooperating witnesses who could testify against others at trial, and key fact witnesses who needed to be interviewed. Finally, certain foreign governments, which had been reluctant to cooperate with the military commissions, could be approached to determine whether they would provide cooperation in a federal prosecution. Given the limited resources of the Task Force to pursue this additional work, the Review Panel referred cases ..,at appeared potentially feasible for federal prosecution to the Department of Justice for further investigation and prosecutorial review.\n\nThe Department of Justice and Department of Defense agreed upon a joint protocol to establish a process for determining whether prosecution of a referred case should be pursued in a federal court or before a military commission. Under the protocol-titled *Determination ofGuantanamo Cases Referredfor Prosecution-there* is a presumption that prosecution will be pursued in a federal court wherever feasible, unless other compelling factors make it more appropriate to pursue prosecution before a military commission. The evaluations called for under the protocol are conducted by teams of both federal and military prosecutors. Among the criteria they apply are: the nature of the offenses to be charged; the identity of the victims; the location of the clime;\nthe context j,p which the defendant was apprehended; and the manner in which the case was investig)fted and by which investigative agency. The Attorney General, in consultatiori with the Secretary of Defense, makes the ultimate decision as to where a prosecution will be pursued.\n\n## B. Decisions\n\nAs a result of the Task Force's review, the Review Panel referred 44 cases to the Department of Justice for potential prosecution and a decision regarding the forum for any prosecution.1 9 Decisions to seek prosecution have been announced in 12 of these cases; 24 remain pending under the protocol; and eight of the detainees initially referred were subsequently designated for other dispositions.\n\nOn May 21, 2009, the Department of Justice announced that Ahmed Ghailani, who had previously been indicted in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York for his alleged role in the 1998 bombings of the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, would be prosecuted in federal court.20 On June 9, 2009, Ghailani was transferred from Guantanamo to the Southern District of New York, where his case is pending.\n\nOn November 13,2009, the Attorney General announced that the government would pursue prosecution in federal court in the Southern District of New York against the five detainees who had previously been charged before a military commission for their roles in the September 11 attacks. They are:\n\n-\nKhalid Sheikh Mohammed, the alleged mastermind of the September 11 plot;\n-\nRamzi bin al-Shibh, the alleged coordinator of the September 11 plot who acted\nas intermediary between Khalid Sheikh Mohammed and the hijackers in the\nUnited States;\n-\nWalid Muhammed Salih Mubarak Bin Attash (a.k.a. Khallad Bin Attash), an\nalleged early member of the September 11 plot who tested airline security on\n'1\nUnited Airlines flights between Bangkok and Hong Kong;\n-\nMustafa Ahmed al-Hawsawi, an alleged facilitator of hijackers and money to the\nUnited States from his base in Dubai; and\n1/\"\n-\nAli Abdul Aziz Ali (a.k.a. Ammar Baluchi), a second alleged facilitator of hijackers and money to the United States from his base in Dubai.\nOn the same day, the Attorney General also announced that the prosecution against Abd aI-Rahim al-Nashiri, the alleged mastermind of the bombing of the U.S.S.\n\nCole, would be pursued before a military commission. The Attorney General further decided that four other detainees whose cases were pending before military commissions when the Executive Order was issued would remain before the commissions: Ahmed al-\nDarbi, Noor Uthman, Omar Khadr, and Ibrahim al-Qosi. In January 2010, the Department of Justice announced that Obaidullah, whom OMC had charged but whose case had not yet been referred to a military commission, will remain in the military commission system.\n\nTwenty-four of the referred cases remain pending with the Department of Justice under the protocol. No final decision has been made regarding whether or in what forum these detainees will be prosecuted.\n\nEight of the referred detainees are no longer under active consideration for prosecution. OIl4l detainee who had been referred for prosecution was transferred pursuant to a court order in his habeas case. Seven additional detainees who had been referred for prosecution were ultimately referred back to the Task Force, based on a determination that the cases were not feasible for prosecution in either federal court or the military commission system at this time. Six of these detainees were subsequently approved for continued detention under the AUMF without criminal charges, and one was approved for transfer. As a result of these subsequent decisions, there are currently\n36 cases with active prosecution referrals.\n\n## C. Detainees Who Cannot Be Prosecuted\n\nThe Task Force concluded that for many detainees at Guantanamo, prosecution is not feasible in either federal court or a military commission. There are several reasons for these conclusions.\n\n## 1.~. Lilo'\n\nFirst, the vast majority of the detainees were captured in active zones of combat in Afghanistan or the Pakistani border regions. The focus at the time of their capture was the gathering of intelligence and their removal from the fight. They were not the subjects of formal criminal investigations, and evidence was neither gathered nor preserved with an eye toward prosecuting them. While the intelligence about them may be accurate and reliable, that intelligence, for various reasons, may not be admissible evidence or sufficient to satisfy a criminal burden of proof in either a military commission or federal court. One common problem is that, for many of the detainees, there are no witnesses who are available to testify in any proceeding against them.\n\nSecond, many of the detainees cannot be prosecuted because of jurisdictional limitations. In many cases, even though the Task Force found evidence that a detainee was lawfully detainable as part of al-Qaida-e.g., based on information that he attended a training camp, or played some role in the hierarchy of the organization-the Task Force did not find evidence that the detainee participated in a specific terrorist plot. The lack of such evidence can pose obstacles to pursuing a prosecution in either federal court or a military commission. While the federal material support statutes have been used to convict persons who have merely provided services to a terrorist organization, *e.g.,* by attending a terrorist training camp, there are potential limitations to pursuing such a h\n.\n\nh d'\n21\nC arge agamst t e etamees.\n\n21 Among these limitations: First, the two relevant statutes-18 U.S.C.  2339A and 2339B-\nwere not amended to expressly apply extraterritorially to non-U.S. persons until October 2001 and December 2004, respectively. Thus, material support may not be available as a charge in the federal system unless there is sufficient evidence to prove that a detainee was supporting al-Qaida after October\n2001 at the earliest. Second, the statute of limitations for these offenses is typically eight years *(see* 18\nU.S.C.  3286), which may bar prosecution for offenses that occurred well before the detainee's capture.\n\nThird, because the statutory maximum sentence for material support is 15 years (where death does not result from the offense), sentencing consider~ns may weigh against pursuing prosecution in certain cases. Some of these considerations would not apply to material support charges brought in the military commissions; however, the legal viability of material support as a charge in the military commission system has been challenged on appeal in commission proceedings.\n\nNotably, the principal obstacles to prosecution in the cases deemed infeasible by the Task Force typically did not stem from concerns over protecting sensitive sources or methods from disclosure, or concerns that the evidence against the detainee was tainted.\n\nWhile such concerns were present in some cases, most detainees were deemed infeasible for prosecution based on more fundamental evidentiary and jurisdictional limitations tied to the demands of a criminal forum, as described above.\n\nSignificantly, the Executive Order does not preclude the government from prosecuting at a later date someone who is presently designated for continued detention.\n\nWork on these cases continues. Further exploitation of the forensic evidence could strengthen the prosecution against some detainees. Other detainees may cooperate with prosecutors. If either the Department of Justice or the Department of Defense concludes in the future that prosecution of a detainee held without charges has become feasible in federal court or in a military commission, the detention decisions made in the course of this review would permit the prosecution to go forward.\n\n## Ix. Detention Decisions A. Background\n\nUnder the Executive Order, the review participants were required first to consider whether it was possible to transfer, release, or prosecute each detainee. With respect to any detainees who were not deemed appropriate for transfer, release, or pfbsecution, the review participants were required to \"select lawful means, consistent with the national security and foreign policy interests of the United States and the interests of justice, for the disposition of such individuals.\"\nIn accordance with this framework, detainees were first reviewed to determine whether transfer or release was consistent with the national security and foreign policy interests of the United States and whether they could be prosecuted. If those options did not appear feasible, the review participants then considered whether the detainee's national security threat justified continued detention under the A UMF without criminal charges, and, if so, whether the detainee met the legal requirements for detention.\n\n## B. Decisions\n\nAs the result of this review, 48 detainees were unanimously approved for continued detention under the AUMF.\n\nAlthough each detainee presented unique issues, all of the detainees ultimately designated for continued detention satisfied three core criteria: First, the totality of available information-including credible information that might not be admissible in a criminal prosecution-indicated that the detainee poses a high level of threat that cannot be mitigated sufficiently except through continued detention; second, prosecution of the detainee in a federal criminal court or a military commission did not appear feasible; and third, notwithstanding the infeasibility of criminal prosecution, there is a lawful basis for the detainee's detention under the AUMF.\n\nBroadly speaking, the detainees designated for continued detention were characterized by one or more of the following factors:\n\n-\nSignificant organizational role within al-Qaida, the Taliban, or associated\nforces. In contrast to the majority of detainees held at Guantanamo, many of\nthe detainees approved for detention held a leadership or other specialized role\nwithin al-Qaida, the Taliban, or associated forces. Some provided operational,\nlogistical, financial, or fundraising support for al-Qaida. Others were al-Qaida\nmembers who were selected to serve as bodyguards for Usama bin Laden\nbased on their loyalty to the organization. Others were Taliban military\ncommanders or senior officials, or played significant roles in insurgent groups\nin Afghanistan allied with the Taliban, such as Hezb-e-Islami Gulbuddin.\n-\nAdvanced training or experience. The detainees approved for detention\ntended to have more, extensive training or combat experience than those\napproved for transfer. Some of these detainees were *veteranjihadists* with\nlengthy involvement in the training camps in Afghanistan. Several had\nexpertise in explosives or other tactics geared toward terrorist operations.\n-\nExpressed recidivist intent. Some detainees designated for detention have,\nwhile at Guantanamo, expressly stated or otherwise exhibited an intent to reengage in extremist activity upon release.\n-\nHistory of **associations with extremist activity.** Some of the detainees\napproved for detention have a history of engaging in extremist activities or\nparticularly strong ties (either directly or through family members) to\nextremist organizations.\nLawful basis for *detention.* Under the Executive Order, every detainee's disposition must be lawful. Accordingly, the Task Force consulted closely with the\n$'\nDepartment of Justice regarding every detainee approved for continued detention to ensure that the detainee fell within the bounds of the Government's detention authority under the AUMF, as described above.\n\nProsecution not currently feasible. Although dangerous and lawfully held, the detainees designated for detention currently cannot be prosecuted in either a federal court or a military commission. While the reasons vary from detainee to detainee, generally these detainees cannot be prosecuted because either there is presently insufficient admissible evidence to establish the detainee's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt in either a federal court or military commission, or the detainee's conduct does not constitute a chargeable offense in either a federal court or military commission. Though prosecution currently is not feasible for these detainees, designating a detainee for detention does not preclude future prosecution in either a federal court or a military commission should new evidence or other developments make a prosecution viable.\n\nTransfer or release not currently feasible. Finally, none of the detainees approved for detention can be safely transferred to a third country at this time. This does not mean that the detainee could never be safely transferred to a third country. Rather, designating the detainee for continued detention at this time indicates only that given the detainee's current threat and the current willingness or ability of potential destination countries to mitigate the threat, the detainee is not currently eligible for transfer or release. Should circumstances change *(e.g.,* should potential receiving countries implement appropriate security measures), transfer might be appropriate in the future.\n\n## C. Continued Reviews\n\nDetainees approved for continued detention under the AUMF will be subject to further reviews. First, in accordance with the Supreme Court's decision in *Boumediene* v.\n\nBush,22 each detainee has the opportunity to seek judicial review of their detention by filing a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in federal court. In such cases, the court reviews whether the detainee falls within the government's lawful detention authority. In cases where courts have concluded that the detainee is not lawfully held, the courts have issued orders requiring the government to take diplomatic steps to achieve the detainee's release. Thus far, federal district courts have ruled on cases brought by four of the 48\ndetainees approved for continued detention. In each of the four cases, the district court denied the habeas petition and upheld the lawfulness of the detention. Many other cases are pending in district court, and some are pending on appeal.\n\nSecond, as the President stated in his speech at the National Archives, \"a thorough process of peri.odi~ review\" is n~eded ~~ ensure th.at ':a~y pro~onged detentiq~ is carefully evaluated and Justlfied.\" Thus, In addItIOn to the JudIcial reVIew afforded tHrough habeas litigation, each detainee approved for continued detention will be subject to periodic Executive Branch review.\n\n## X. Conditional Detention Decisions: Yemeni Detainees\n\nAs discussed above, the review of the 97 Yemeni detainees posed particular challenges from the outset given the security situation in Yemen. After conducting a case-by-case review of the Yemeni detainees, the review participants unanimously agreed that 36 Yemenis (29 of whom remain at Guantanamo) are appropriate for transfer, subject to security measures, and that 26 Yemenis should continue to be detained under the A UMF in light of their individual threat. In addition, there are currently five Yemenis with active prosecution referrals, two of whom the Attorney General announced will be prosecuted in federal court for their roles in the September 11 attacks (Ramzi bin al-\nShibh and Walid Muhammed Salih Mubarak Bin Attash).\n\nThe remaining 30 Yemeni detainees were determined to pose a lower threat than the group of detainees designated for continued detention under the AUMF. Nonetheless, the review participants determined, based on a number of factors, that these 30 detainees should not be transferred to Yemen in the near future and should not be among the first groups of transfers to Yemen even if the current moratorium on such transfers is lifted.\n\nThus, these 30 detainees were approved for \"conditional\" detention, meaning that they may be transferred if one of the following conditions is satisfied: (1) the security situation improves in Yemen; (2) an appropriate rehabilitation program becomes available; or (3) an appropriate third-country resettlement option becomes available.\n\nShould any of these conditions be satisfied, however, the remaining 29 Yemeni detainees approved for transfer would receive priority for any transfer options over the 30 Yemeni detainees approved for conditional detention?3\nAt the time of the closure of the detention facilities at Guantanamo, the status of detainees approved for conditional detention will be reconsidered for possible transfer to Yemen, a third country, or a detention facility in the United States.\n\n## Xi. Diplomatic Efforts\n\nThe President's Executive Order recognized that diplomatic efforts would be essential to the review and appropriate disposition of individuals detained at Guantanamo. To implement the review decisions approving the transfer of detainees, the order provides that the \"Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of State, and, as appropriate, other Review participants shall work to effect promptly the release or transfer of all individuals for whom release or transfer is possible.\" The President emphasized this point during his speech at the National Archives, stating that for cases involving\n\"detainees who we have determined can be transferred safely to another country ... my Administration is in ongoing discussions with a number of other countries about the transfer of detainees to their soil.\"\nTo fulfill this mission, the Secretary of State created an office to lead the diplomatic efforts to transfer detainees and appointed an experienced career diplomat to serve as the Special Envoy for the Closure of the Guantanamo Bay Detention Facilities.\n\nThe highest levels in the administration supported these efforts. The President, Vice President, and Cabinet members-including the Secretary of State, Attorney General, and Secretary for Homeland Security-have discussed the closure of the Guantanamo detention facilities and the transfer of detainees outside the United States with their foreign government counterparts. To assist these diplomatic efforts, the National Counterterrorism Center facilitated the sharing of information about the detainees with foreign governments considering whether to accept them. In addition, the government arranged meetings between officials from interested countries and detainees at Guantanamo to facilitate resettlement and repatriation discussions.\n\nFrom the outset of the review, the State Department developed a diplomatic strategy for Guantanamo, focusing on efforts to resettle detainees who could not be sent to their home countries because of post-transfer treatment concerns. In June 2009, the United States and European Union concluded ajoint statement in support of the resettlement of a number of detainees in Europe, expressing the readiness of certain member states to resettle former Guantanamo detainees on a case-by-case basis.\n\nFollowing this joint statement, a number of European governments-such as Spain, Italy, Portugal, and Ireland-announced that they were prepared to work out arrangements to accept some detainees. In addition, the Government of Palau also announced its readiness to accept a number of Uighur detainees. Following these initial successes, the State Department intensified efforts to implement resettlements. The public offers by some European governments to resettle detainees encouraged other governments to make similar offers.\n\nTo date, the diplomatic efforts taken under the Executive Order have led to the resettlement of 18 detainees in the following seven locations: Belgium, Bermuda, France, Hungary, Ireland, Palau, and Portuga1.24 Resettlement negotiations are ongoing with a number of countries, *e.g.,* Spain, Switzerland, and Slovakia. In addition, Italy accepted two detainees for criminal prosecution on charges stemming from pre-91l1\nactivities. All efforts to resettle detainees include discussions with receiving governments about post-transfer security measures, as well as other issues such as the integration and humane treatment of resettled detainees.\n\nThe process for engaging a country on resettlement issues can be lengthy and complicated. The State Department has engaged in discussions with dozens of countries across the globe to initiate or further resettlement negotiations once it has been determined that a government is open to discussions. When this process is successful, initial receptiveness leads to discussions regarding individual detainees, foreign government interagency review, foreign government interviews of prospective resettlement candidates, the foreign government's formal decision-making process, integration plans, and, ultimately, resettlement. The length of the effort often has been influenced by political and other issues in potential rese~lement countries *(e.g.,* public perceptions of current \",nd past U.S. detention policies), third-country views (and\n~\nsometimes pressure) with respect to detainee resettlement, and public views of the Guantanamo detention facility generally. Depending on how these factors affect individual cases, the process can be very lengthy.\n\nOnce a resettlement has occurred, the State. Department and other agencies remain in contact with host governments following transfer on these issues. The State Department is engaged in ongoing discussions for the remaining detainees who cannot be repatriated due to post-transfer treatment concerns and is on track to find resettlement countries for most if not all of the detainees in this category.\n\nThe State Department also has worked to repatriate detainees to their home countries, in coordination with other agencies and with the National Security Council.\n\nThus far, 24 detainees have been repatriated since last January to nine different locations-Afghanistan, Algeria, Chad, Iraq, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Somaliland, the United Kingdom, and Yemen. All decisions to repatriate detainees have been made in light of the latest intelligence information and with the consent of all relevant agencies.\n\nIn light of such information, and following the attempted terrorist attack on December 25,\n2009, the President announced that repatriations to Yemen would be suspended for the foreseeable future. In addition, the government has adopted enhanced procedures for the implementation of repatriation decisions, requiring a cabinet-level review prior to going forward with any repatriation.\n\n## Xii. Conclusion\n\nThe review process established pursuant to the Executive Order is now complete.\n\nThe participating agencies have reviewed and unanimously agreed on dispositions for each of the 240 detainees subject to the review. The agencies responsible for the review will continue to handle operational issues involving detainees, including the implementation of the review determinations, and the National Security Council will coordinate the resolution of policy issues pertaining to Guantanamo. The Task Force has ensured that its analyses of the detainees and the information collected in the course of the review are properly preserved to assist in the resolution of these issues going forward."
    },
    {
        "text": "Geomagnetic Storms and Their Impacts on the U.S. Power Grid John Kappenman Metatech Corporation 358 S. Fairview Ave., Suite E Goleta, CA 93117 January 2010 Prepared for Oak Ridge National Laboratory Attn: Dr. Ben McConnell 1 Bethel Valley Road P.O. Box 2008 Oak Ridge, Tennessee 37831\nSubcontract 6400009137\nFOREWORD This report describes the threat of geomagnetic storms on the Earth caused by solar activity and further discusses their impacts (past and future) on the U.S. power grid.  The intention is to describe the seriousness of the threat through a description of past geomagnetic storms and their impacts.  In addition, the ability to model the interactions of the geomagnetic field with power grids allows an understanding of past events and the ability to predict the effects of future geomagnetic storms.  This report provides the baseline for determining the future recommendations for protecting the U.S. power grid from this threat in the future. This report is organized to provide in Section 1 a detailed overview of how geomagnetic storms affect the power grid through past experience and through the development of validated computer models at Metatech over many years.  Section 2 focuses more directly on the power system impacts caused by the March 13, 1989 Great Geomagnetic Storm in Canada and the United States.  Section 3 looks to the future and examines several possible geomagnetic storm scenarios and their effects on the U.S. power grid.  Section 4 provides more details on the specific impacts to at-risk EHV transformers in the United States.  Appendices A1 through A4 provide additional information to support the analyses and conclusions reached in the body of the report.\n\nTable of Contents\nSection\n\n\nPage 1 An Overview of the U.S. Power Grid Model for the Geomagnetic\n\nStorm Threat Environments........ 1-1\n1.1 Geomagnetic Storm Environment Model........ 1-4 1.2 Ground Models and Electric Field Calculation........ 1-7 1.3 U.S. Electric Power Grid Circuit Model........ 1-12 1.4 Transformer and AC Power Grid Performance Model........ 1-20 1.5 The Evolving Vulnerability of Electric Power Grids and Implications\n\nfor Historically Large Storms........ 1-29\n2 An Analysis of the Impacts of the March 13-14, 1989 Great\nGeomagnetic Storm on the U.S. and Quebec Power Grids ........ 2-1\n2.1 Simulations and Review of the Quebec Power System Collapse........\n2-5\n2.2 Simulations and Review of Storm Impacts on the U.S. Power Grid...... 2-14\n2.2.1 Substorm Interval 7:40-8:00 UT........ 2-14 2.2.2 Substorm Interval 10:50-12:00 UT........ 2-15 2.2.3 Substorm Interval 21:20-22:30 UT........ 2-16 2.2.4 Substorm Interval 0:30-2:00 UT March 14, 1989........ 2-21 2.2.5 Overview of U.S. Power Grid GIC Flows and Reactive\n\nPower Demands........ 2-23\n2.3 Overview of Transformer Internal Heating - Examples from\nMarch 13-14, 1989 Storm and Other Incidents........\n2-29\n3 An Assessment of the Threat Potential to the U.S. Electric Power Grids\nfrom Extreme Geomagnetic Storms........ 3-1\n3.1 Overview of Geomagnetic Disturbance Environments for Extreme\nStorm Scenarios........ 3-1\n3.2 Simulations and Review of Storm Impacts on the U.S. Power Grid...... 3-14\n4 An Assessment of Geomagnetic Storm-Related At-Risk EHV\nTransformers and Potential Damage Estimates........ 4-1\n4.1 Transformer Internal Heating - Empirical and Analytical Data........ 4-4\n4.2 Overview of Potential Impacts to EHV Transformers due to\nHigh GIC Levels........ 4-11\n4.3 Overview of Emergency of Replacement EHV Transformers........ 4-18 Appendix\n\n\nPage A1 Disturbance Impact Criteria for the U.S. Power Grid........\nA1-1\nA1.1 Overview of U.S. Transmission Grid Design Criteria........ A1-1 A1.2 Disturbance Intensity and Energy Thresholds for System Failure..... A1-4 A1.3 System Operating State Considerations........ A1-5 A1.4 An Overview of GIC Threats and Relay Misoperation Concerns....... A1-9\nA1.5 Capacitor Banks, General Relay and Overload Protection Concerns\n\ndue to GIC........ A1-10\nA2 Detailed Summary of Power System Impacts from March 13-14, 1989\nGeomagnetic Superstorm........ A2-1\nA3 Geomagnetic Storm Validation Simulations of U.S. Grid Model........ A3-1\nA3.1 Benchmarking the U.S. Grid Model - Feb 21, 1994 Storm........ A3-2 A3.2 Benchmarking the U.S. Grid Model - Oct 28, 1991 Storm........ A3-8 A3.3 Benchmarking the U.S. Grid Model - May 10, 1992 Storm........ A3-11 A3.4 Benchmarking the U.S. Grid Model - March 24, 1991 SSC Event..... A3-13 A3.5 Quebec Transmission Network Model Benchmark........ A3-19\nA4 Validation of Transformer and Power System Impact Modeling for GIC...\nA4-1\nA4.1 Transformer Modeling Background and Validations........ A4-1 A4.2 Simulation Results........ A4-2 A4.3 Field Tests of Large Power Transformer Performance under\nDC Excitation ........ A4-10\nA4.4 Transformer Reactive Power Modeling for Severe GIC\nEnvironments........ A4-20\nList of Figures\nFigure\n\n\nPage\n1-1\nSunspot cycles and the occurrence and intensity (using Ap index)\nof large geomagnetic storms........ 1-2\n1-2\nGrowth of the U.S. high voltage transmission network and annual\nelectric energy usage over the past 50 years.  In addition to increasing total network size, the network has grown in complexity with introduction of higher kV rated lines that subsequently also tend to carry larger GIC\nflows.  (Grid size derived from data in EHV Transmission Line Reference\nBook and NERC Electricity Supply and Demand Database; energy usage statistics from U.S. Dept of Energy-Energy Information Agency.)........ 1-3\n1-3\nVector intensity of geomagnetic field disturbances at numerous\nmagnetic observatories........ 1-5\n1-4\nEnvironment model using the vector data from Figure 1-3........ 1-6\n1-5\nPeak geo-electric field from a 2400 nT/min electrojet threat........  1-8\n1-6\nMultiple 1-D ground models for the U.S. grid........ 1-9\n1-7\nComparison of calculated and measured electric fields for 4 Nov 1993 ... 1-10\n1-8\nComparison of measured and calculated GIC at Chester Maine........ 1-11\n1-9\nMap of 345kV, 500kV and 765kV substations and transmission\nnetwork in U.S. Grid Model........ 1-13\n1-10\nMiles of 345kV, 500kV and 765kV transmission lines in\nU.S. Grid Model........ 1-13\n1-11\nNumber of 345kV, 500kV, and 765kV transformers in\nU.S. Grid Model........ 1-14\n1-12\nRange of transmission line resistance for the major kV rating classes for\ntransmission lines in the U.S. electric power grid infrastructure population. Also shown is a trend line of resistance weighted to population averages. The lower R for the higher voltage lines will also cause proportionately larger GIC flows in this portion of the power grid.  (Derived from data in EHV Transmission Line Reference Book and from U.S. Dept of Energy- Energy Information Agency and FERC Form 1 Database.)........ 1-15\n1-13\nDecrease in transformer DC resistance versus MVA rating for\ntransformers in U.S. Grid Model........ 1-16\n1-14\nAverage length of transmission lines in U.S. by kV rating ........ 1-17\n1-15\nWECC 345kV and 500kV transmission lines that are uncompensated\nand series compensated........ 1-18\n1-16\nMiles of 345kV and 500kVSeries compensated and uncompensated\ntransmission lines in WECC........ 1-19\n1-17\nTransformer MVAR increase versus GIC for 500kV single-phase\nand 3-phase, 3-legged core form........ 1-20\n1-18\nTransformer MVAR increase versus GIC for 345kV, 500kV and 765kV\ntransformers........ 1-21\n1-19\nDemographic estimates of 345kV transformers -\nsingle-phase vs. 3-phase........ 1-22\n1-20\nDemographic estimates of 500kV transformers -\nsingle-phase vs. 3-phase........ 1-22\n1-21\nDemographic estimates of 765kV transformers -\nsingle-phase vs. 3-phase........ 1-23\n1-22\nBPA 500kV transformer demographics -\nsingle-phase vs. 3-phase........ 1-24\n1-23\nBPA 230kV transformer demographics -\nsingle-phase vs. 3-phase........ 1-24\n1-24\nNormal excitation current in 500kV transformer........ 1-26\n1-25\nDistorted excitation current with 5 amps/phase of GIC........ ....... 1-26\n1-26\nDistorted excitation current with 25 amps/phase of GIC ........ 1-27\n1-27\nDistorted excitation current with 100 amps/phase of GIC ........ 1-27\n1-28\nTransformer total load current - normal conditions and with\n50, 100 and 150 amps/phase of GIC........ ....... 1-28\n1-29\nPattern of geo-electric Field and GIC flows in New England\nregion of Power Grid Model for May 4, 1998 storm at 4:16 UT..... ....... 1-29\n2-1\nRapid development of electrojet conditions over North America and\nprincipally along U.S./Canada border lead to Hydro Quebec collapse and other reported problems in Minnesota, Manitoba and Ontario at these times. These images depict the ground level geomagnetic intensification for over 4 minutes from 2:43 - 2:46 EST........ 2-1\n2-2\nRegions with the most disturbed geomagnetic field environments\non March 13-14, 1989........ 2-3\n2-3\nRegional GIC Index (RGI) on March 13-14, 1989........ 2-3\n2-4\nPeak RGI observed by region on March 13-14, 1989........ 2-4\n2-5\nSpecific storm intervals on March 13-14, 1989 selected\nfor forensic analysis........ 2-4\n2-6\nHydro Quebec - 1989 735kV transmission network........ 2-7\n2-7\nAverage GIC per transformer and reactive demand, for Hydro-Quebec,\nfor the time just before the system failure........ 2-8\n2-8\nFour minutes of space weather/GIC conditions leading to\nHydro Quebec collapse........ 2-9\n2-9\nDetails of 7:44 UT in the Hydro-Quebec collapse simulation........ 2-10\n2-10\nDetails of 7:45 UT in the Hydro-Quebec collapse simulation........ 2-10\n2-11\nSimulated geo-electric fields at three Hydro-Quebec locations,\njust before the collapse........ 2-11\n2-12\nGIC, levels at the Hydro-Quebec SVC locations that tripped ........ 2-11\n2-13\nGIC and geo-electric field conditions - 7:45 UT, March 13, 1989........ 2-15\n2-14\nSimulation of geomagnetic conditions at 11:26 UT, on March 13, 1989... 2-16\n2-15\nReported North American power system impacts,\nMarch 13, 1989, for time 6:06-6:30 EST (11:06-11:30 UT) ........ 2-16\n2-16\nReported North American power system impacts,\nMarch 13, 1989, for time 16:00-17:23 EST (21:00-22:23 UT) ........ 2-17\n2-17\nSimulated 21:50 UT, March 13, 1989, conditions........ 2-18\n2-18\nSimulated 22:00 UT, March 13, 1989, conditions. The intense geomagnetic\nfield disturbance region at mid-latitudes of the U.S. is caused by an eastward electrojet intensification, while the higher latitude intensification extending back towards Europe is due to a westward electrojet current in the ionosphere........ 2-18\n2-19\nSimulation of U.S. power grid conditions at 21:44 UT on March 13, 1989. 2-19\n2-20\nSimulation of U.S. power grid conditions at 21:51 UT on March 13, 1989. 2-20\n2-21\nSimulation of U.S. power grid conditions at 21:57 UT on March 13, 1989. 2-20\n2-22\nSimulation of U.S. power grid conditions at 22:09 UT on March 13, 1989. 2-21\n2-23\nReported North American power system impacts, March 13-14, 1989,\nfor  time 20:00-20:32 EST (1:00-1:32 UT)........ 2-22\n2-24\nSimulated 01:20 UT, March 14, 1989, conditions ........ 2-22\n2-25\nPeak sum GIC and MVAR demands for the U.S. power grid at four times\nduring March 13-14, 1989 geomagnetic storm........ 2-23\n2-26\nGIC and MVAR demand variations for the U.S. power grid during the\nMarch 13-14, 1989 geomagnetic storm from time 21:20 to 22:30 UT...... 2-24\n2-27\nA road map of the U.S. power pools........ 2-25\n2-28\nGIC and MVAR demand variations for the PJM pool during the\nMarch 13-14, 1989 geomagnetic storm........ 2-26\n2-29\nGIC and MVAR demand variations for the SERC pool during the\nMarch 13-14, 1989 geomagnetic storm........ 2-26\n2-30\nGIC and MVAR demand variations for the NYISO pool during the\nMarch 13-14, 1989 geomagnetic storm........ 2-27\n2-31\nGIC and MVAR demand variations for the ECAR pool during the\nMarch 13-14, 1989 geomagnetic storm........ 2-27\n2-32\nGIC and MVAR demand variations for the WECC pool during the\nMarch 13-14, 1989 geomagnetic storm........ 2-28\n2-33\nDamaged transformer at the Salem Nuclear Plant ........ 2-29\n2-34\nEstimated GIC at Salem Nuclear Plant........ 2-30\n2-35\nIC and transformer tank temperature for May 10, 1992\ngeomagnetic storm ........ 2-32\n2-36\nVarious transformer temperatures, as DC current (12.5 amps,\nthen 75 amps) is applied........ 2-32\n3-1\nSOHO image, June 9, 2002........ 3-1\n3-2\nAll major geomagnetic storms from September 1933 to 2006 ........ 3-2\n3-3\nWorld climatology and developing great storm scenarios ........ 3-4\n3-4\nLarge westward electrojet intensification at 22:00 UT March 13, 1989\n(left frame - view over Atlantic Ocean) right frame - view over North America........ 3-4\n3-5\nObservations of large geo-potential on the Stockholm-Toreboda rail\ncommunication circuit during July 13-14, 1982 storm event........ 3-7\n\n3-6\nDelta Bx at BFE and LOV for the July 13-14, 1982 and\nMarch 13-14, 1989 storms........ 3-8\n3-7\nObserved solar flares since 1972........ 3-10\n3-8\nRectified electric field from CME of July 15-16, 2002........ 3-11\n3-9\nCoupled solar wind energy and observed geomagnetic disturbance for\nJuly 15-16, 2000 event........ 3-12\n3-10\nSolar wind energy for some 2000 and 2001 storms........ 3-12\n3-11\nGeomagnetic field disturbances estimated over North America,\nJuly 14, 1982 at 23:54 UT........ 3-15\n3-12\nGeomagnetic field disturbances rotated by 120o longitude\nover North America, July 14, 1982 at 23:55 UT........ 3-15\n3-13\nGeomagnetic field disturbances rotated by 120o longitude and stretched\nsouthward by 5o latitude over North America, July 14, 1982 at 23:55 UT.. 3-16\n3-14\nSimulation of U.S. power grid conditions at 23:55 UT on July 13, 1982... 3-17\n3-15\nGIC and MVAR demand variations for the U.S. power grid during the\nJuly 13-14, 1982 geomagnetic storm........ 3-18\n3-16\nSimulation of U.S. power grid conditions........ 3-18\n3-17\nGIC and MVAR demand variations for the U.S. power grid during the\nJuly 13-14, 1982 geomagnetic storm with 120o longitude shift........ 3-19\n3-18\nSimulation of U.S. power grid conditions at 23:55 UT with 120o longitude\nand 5o latitude shift on July 13, 1982.... ........ 3-20\n3-19\nGIC and MVAR demand variations for the U.S. power grid during the July\n13-14, 1982 geomagnetic storm with 120o longitude and 5o latitude shift... 3-20\n3-20\nSimulation of U.S. power grid conditions at 23:55 UT with 120o longitude\nand 10o longitude shift on July 13, 1982........ 3-21\n3-21\nGIC and MVAR demand variations for the U.S. power grid during the July\n13-14, 1982 geomagnetic storm with 120o longitude and 10o latitude shift. 3-22\n3-22\nDisturbance regions for 450 and 500 geomagnetic latitude storms ........ 3-23\n3-23\nMVAR demands for the March 1989 storms, compared to various\nsimulated storms ........ 3-24\n3-24\n1 in 30 year storm scenarios - 2400 nT/min........ 3-24\n3-25\n100 Year geomagnetic storm - 50 degree geomagnetic disturbance\nscenario.  The above regions outlined are susceptible to system collapse due to the effects of the GIC disturbance........ 3-26\n3-26\n100 Year geomagnetic storm - 45 degree geomagnetic disturbance\nscenario.  The above regions outlined are susceptible to system collapse due to the effects of the GIC disturbance........ 3-26\n3-27\nGIC flows in southern Japan for November 6, 2001 storm........ 3-28\n3-28\nRing current intensification and GIC risk at low latitudes........ 3-28\n3-29\nGIC exposure and transformer internal heating/failure for a 1 in 30\nstorm - 2400 nT/min scenario. Simulations indicate that ~216 transformers may receive GIC cumulative exposures that exceed\nthe March 89 exposure of the Salem transformer........ 3-29\n4-1\nSevere geomagnetic storm with a 50-degree geomagnetic disturbance\nscenario. The above regions outlined are susceptible to system collapse due to the effects of the GIC disturbance........ 4-2\n4-2\nAge/manufacture dates of extra high voltage transformers in ECAR....... 4-4\n4-3\nGIC and transformer tank temperature for May 10, 1992 geomagnetic\nstorm........ 4-5\n4-4\nObserved dB/dt near Meadowbrook for May 10, 1992\ngeomagnetic storm ........ 4-6\n4-5\nObserved temperature from Hydro Quebec tests showing response\nbetween two levels of neutral GIC (12.5 amps and 75 amps) and\nmeasured temperatures in the transformer in easy-to-access spots........ 4-6\n4-6\nObserved SSC and sudden failure of New Zealand transformer,\nNov 6, 2001........ 4-7\n4-7\nSpecific storm intervals on March 13-14, 1989, selected for forensic\nanalysis using FRD observatory........ 4-9\n4-8\nEstimated GIC in Salem GSU on March 13, 1989........ 4-9\n4-9\nGIC versus loading for transformer (from Girgis, et. al.).  It is important\n\nto note that GIC plotted here is neutral current; therefore 90 amps\nwould be 30 amps/phase........\n4-10\n4-10\nTable of GIC time withstand, from Hurlet, et. al........\n4-10\n4-11\nTransformers with GIC-effective of 30 amps per phase or greater for\nthe model that includes 765kV, 500kV and 345kV transformer detail.\nThe threat environment is 4800nT/min at 50o latitude........ 4-12\n4-12\nComparison of peak transformer GIC levels for March 1989 storm\nand severe geomagnetic storm scenario........ 4-13\n4-13\nFuel types for power plants associated with at-risk transformers\nwith 30 amp/phase of GIC........\n4-17\n4-14\nFuel types for power plants associated with at-risk transformers\nwith 90 amp/phase of GIC........\n4-18\n4-15\nTop photo is transformer with EHV bushings and external oil cooling\nradiators removed for transport. Bottom photo is 230kV class transformer\nbeing relocated at a power plant site. The smaller size of this transformer and the short distance of move (within power plant property) did not require removing HV Bushings from transformer........ 4-20\n4-16\nDiversity of transformer operating voltages design type is quite high\nin the New England through Pennsylvania region of the U.S., making substitution of shared spares a largely unworkable concept........ 4-22\nA1-1 NY ISO voltage collapse threshold for system transfers........ A1-3 A1-2 Comparison of NY ISO load for July 15, 2000 storm date\nand peak load conditions on August 7, 2001........ A1-6\nA1-3 Power grid failure probability analysis from GIC threat scenario ........ A1-7 A1-4 Power grid failure probability analysis from GIC threat scenario\nand cross section at a particular grid operating posture ........ A1-7\nA1-5 Power grid failure probability analysis from GIC threat scenario\nand impact of secular changes to power grid operating reliability........ A1-8\nA1-6 One line diagram of example 500kV, 230kV, 138kV substation ........ A1-10 A1-7 Schematic of shunt reactor and shunt capacitor........ A1-11 A1-8 Normal and GIC-distorted 500kV capacitor bank current at\nThree Mile Island for severe geomagnetic storm threat ........ A1-11\nA1-9 Top plot - GIC current versus time in 500kV transformer,\nbottom  plot - AC current versus time of saturated 500kV transformer... A1-12\nA3-1 Benchmark areas and magnetic observatory locations for Feb 21, 1994\ngeomagnetic storm........\nA3-2\nA3-2 AEP Reported GIC observations at Marysville and Rockport\non Feb 21, 1994........\nA3-3\nA3-3 Geomagnetic storm conditions at 13:35 UT Feb 21, 1994........\nA3-3\nA3-4 Geomagnetic storm conditions at 14:04 UT Feb 21, 1994........\nA3-4\nA3-5 Intensity of geomagnetic storm in nT/min on Feb 21,1994, as measured\nat Ottawa (top) and Fredericksburg (bottom)........\nA3-5\nA3-6 Observed GIC (top) and calculated GIC (bottom) for Rockport on\nFeb 21, 1994........ A3-5\nA3-7 Observed GIC (top) and calculated GIC (bottom) for Marysville on\nFeb 21, 1994........ A3-6\nA3-8 Observed GIC and calculated GIC for Forbes on Feb 21, 1994 ........ A3-7 A3-9 Observed GIC and calculated GIC peaks at various locations on\nFeb 21, 1994........ A3-7\nA3-10 Intensity of geomagnetic storm in nT/min on Feb 21,1994, as measured at\nOttawa(top) and Fredericksburg(bottom)........ A3-8\nA3-11 Geomagnetic disturbance conditions at 15:39 UT on Oct 28, 1991........ A3-9\nA3-12 Locations of reported GIC observations on Oct 28, 1991 ........ A3-9 A3-13 Observed GIC (top) and calculated GIC (bottom) at South Canton\non Oct 28, 1991 ........\nA3-10\nA3-14 Comparison of observed and calculated peak GIC at various locations\non Oct 28, 1991........\nA3-10\nA3-15 Geomagnetic disturbance conditions at 9:10 UT on May 10, 1992........ A3-11 A3-16 Geomagnetic disturbance conditions at 9:43 UT on May 10, 1992........ A3-12 A3-17 Comparison of observed and calculated GIC at various locations on\nMay 10, 1992........ A3-12\nA3-18 Plot of calculated GIC at several locations on May 10, 1992........ A3-13 A3-19 Tuckerton, New Jersey geomagnetic observatory data of SSC event\non March 24, 1991........ A3-14\nA3-20 Limited high cadence geomagnetic observatory data from\nMarch 24, 1991 indicates large plane wave........ A3-14\nA3-21 Observed GIC and neutral AC current at Limerick on\nMarch 24, 1991 (times above are EST, not UT) ........ A3-16\n\nFigure A3-22 Meadowbrook GIC observed and calculated on March 24, 1991 ........\nA3-17\nA3-23 Neutral GIC and 3rd harmonic current observed at Pleasant Valley\non March 24, 1991........ A3-17\nA3-24 Calculated GIC at Pleasant Valley on March 24, 1991........ A3-18 A3-25 Comparison of observed and calculated Peak GIC levels at various\nlocations on March 24, 1991........ A3-18\nA3-26 Calculated system MVARs in Quebec grid on Oct 2, 1999........ A3-20 A4-1 The measured current results (512.5/242 kV, core form, single-phase).... A4-2\nA4-2 The exciting current waveform and frequency spectrum calculated\nfor a GIC of 11.5 amp/phase (512/242 kV single-phase transformer)  .... A4-3\nA4-3 Exciting current waveform and frequency spectrum calculated for a GIC\nof 75A in neutral (500/230 kV single-phase shell form auto-transformer). A4-3\nA4-4 The test result (500/230 kV, shell form, single-phase,\nauto-transformer)........ A4-4\nA4-5 The exciting current waveform and frequency spectrum calculated for\na GIC of 75 amps in neutral (230/115 kV, 3-legged, 3-phase core form auto-transformer)........ A4-5\nA4-6 The test results in Ref.3 (230/115 kV, 3-legged, 3-phase core form\nauto-transformer)........ A4-5\nA4-7 The exciting current waveform and frequency spectrum calculated for\na GIC of 75 amps in neutral (230/115 kV, 3-phase, shell form\nauto-transformer)........ A4-6\nA4-8 The test results (230/115 kV, 3-phase, shell form\nauto-transformer)........ A4-6\nA4-9a Measured transformer excitation current with 200 amps in\ntransformer neutral on 5-legged core form transformer........ A4-7\nA4-9b Calculated B phase (center phase) excitation current\nof 5-legged core form transformer........ A4-8\nA4-10a  Observed and calculated MVAR increases versus GIC for\n  5-legged core form transformer........ A4-8\nA4-10b  Observed harmonics at 200 amps GIC for 5-legged core\n  form transformer........\nA4-9\nA4-10c  Comparison of observed and calculated AC harmonics for\n  5-legged core form transformer ........\nA4-10\nA4-11 Normal and distorted AC current in 230kV 3-phase-3, 3-legged\ntransformer with and without GIC present........\nA4-11\nA4-12 Estimated excitation current in 230kV 3-phase, 3-legged transformer\nwith GIC present from Figure A4-11........\nA4-11\nA4-13 Excitation current from 230kV 3-phase shell form transformer\nwith GIC present........\nA4-12\nA4-14 Comparison of AC harmonics in transformer excitation currents\nfor 3-phase, 3-legged core form and 3-phase shell form 230kV transformers with GIC present ........ A4-13\nFigure\n\n\nPage A4-15 Measured neutral current for 3-phase, 3-legged core form transformer\nwith GIC present........\nA4-14\nA4-16 Measured neutral current for 3-phase shell form transformer\nwith GIC present........\nA4-14\nA4-17 Comparison of AC harmonics in transformer neutral currents for\n3-legged core form and shell form transformers........ A4-15\nA4-18 Excitation current for 500kV single phase transformer with\n16.7 amps/phase of DC current present........\nA4-16\nA4-19 Excitation current for 500kV single phase transformer with\n25 amps/phase of DC current present........ A4-16\nA4-20 Excitation current for 500kV single-phase transformer with\n33.3 amps/phase of DC current present........ A4-17\nA4-21 Comparison of AC harmonics in excitation current of 500kV\nSingle-phase transformer for various levels of DC excitation........ A4-18\nA4-22 Distorted AC current on adjacent 500kV transmission line due\nto DC excitation of 500kv single-phase transformer........ A4-18\nA4-23 GIC per phase in transformer from SSC and E3 threat........ A4-20\nA4-24 Simple equivalent one-line diagram of 500/230kV transformer model..... A4-21\nA4-25 Transformer reactive power loss versus time estimates due to low\nlevel GIC from SSC event........ A4-22\nA4-26 Transformer reactive power loss versus time estimates due to large\nGIC from E3 event........ A4-23\n\nList of Tables\nTable\n\n\nPage 2-1\nHydro-Quebec restoration........ 2-12\n4-1\nComparison of 345kV at-risk transformers for 90 amp/phase\nand 30 amp/phase GIC levels........\n4-14\n4-2\nComparison of 500kV at-risk transformers for 90 amp/phase\nand 30 amp/phase GIC levels........\n4-15\n4-3\nComparison of 765kV at-risk transformers for 90 amp/phase\nand 30 amp/phase GIC levels........\n4-16\n\n\nSection 1\nAn Overview of the U.S. Power Grid Model for the Geomagnetic Storm Threat Environments The ability to comprehensively assess the vulnerability of the U.S. power grid to the geomagnetic storm environment produced by solar activity stems from the parallel investigations that have been underway to understand the problems of power system vulnerability from high altitude nuclear-burst (HEMP) events.  Power system impacts from geomagnetic storms were first observed in 1940 and have been growing in importance as the power system has grown over the intervening years. Geomagnetic storms are created when the Earth's magnetic field captures ionized particles carried by the solar wind due to coronal mass ejections or coronal holes at the Sun.  Although there are different types of disturbances noted at the Earth surface, the disturbances can be characterized as a very slowly varying magnetic field, with rise times as fast as a few seconds, and pulse widths of up to an hour.  The rate of change of the magnetic field is a major factor in creating electric fields in the Earth and thereby inducing quasi-dc current flow in the power transmission network.  Unlike the HEMP threats, geomagnetic storms are a much more frequent occurrence, which also allows for extensive opportunities to fully benchmark each component of the simulation models and therefore provide greater confidence in the analysis of plausible severe threats, such as the threat posed by an extreme geomagnetic storm scenario. The context of the evolution of power system discoveries of vulnerability can be further understood by an overview of the geomagnetic storm phenomena, which is closely associated with the more familiar variability of the sunspot cycle.  Figure 1-1 provides a plot of the sunspot count as well as large geomagnetic storms over the last 70 years.\nBecause each sunspot cycle is typically ~11 years in duration, this plot provides the status of the current solar cycle (Cycle 23) back to Cycle 17, which began in ~1932.  As can be seen, not all sunspot cycles are of equal intensity and Cycle 19 (late 1950's-early 1960's) is in fact the largest sunspot cycle of human-record.  The most recent cycle, Cycle 23, exhibits a profile similar to that of Cycle 17.  As noted in this figure, at the time of Cycle\n19, much of the present U.S. power grid high-voltage transmission system of today did not exist.  To further explore the importance of the evolution of the power grid and its growing vulnerability, it is necessary to look at specific large geomagnetic storms, as the sunspot count does not provide sufficient correlations to impacts observed at the Earth. In classification of the intensity of geomagnetic storms an index called the Ap index is used, which provides a planetary measure of storm activity.  Many of these storms caused notable impacts to various terrestrial technology systems of their respective eras.  The storms of March 1989 and several in 1991 produced large and unprecedented operational impacts to power grids in the U.S. and at other world locations.  Also noteworthy is that large geomagnetic storms generally have not occurred around the peaks of sunspot activity.  For example, a storm in February 1986 caused power system problems all across the eastern U.S. but actually occurred at the absolute minimum between Solar Cycle 21 and 22.  Because sunspots only provide a gross measure of overall solar activity, it does not accurately reflect the discrete eruptive events from violent solar\n\nactive regions that, when Earth-directed, can trigger large geomagnetic storms.  Rather, it is clear from this comparison that large and threatening geomagnetic storms can occur at any time during the sunspot cycle, and pose a near continuous threat probability. When reviewing the occurrence of large storms, it is important to recognize that the problem of power system impacts is compounded by growing vulnerability of this infrastructure to geomagnetic disturbances.  The extent of the growth in vulnerability over time is due to factors stemming from the growth of the high-voltage transmission grid in the U.S., as well as changes within the grid that introduce new or enhance existing impact problems to the power grid.  Figure 1-2 shows the growth of the U.S. high voltage transmission grid over the last 50 years.  This geographically widespread infrastructure readily couples through multiple ground points to the geo-electric field produced by disturbances in the geomagnetic field.  As shown, from Cycle 19 through Cycle 22, the high voltage grid grew nearly tenfold.  In essence, the antenna that is sensitive to disturbances has grown dramatically over time.  As this network has grown in size, it has also grown in complexity.  As will be discussed in later sections, one of the more important changes in the technology base for the U.S. power grid that can increase impacts to geomagnetic storms is the evolution to higher operating voltages of the network.  The operating levels of the high voltage network has increased from the 115-\n230kV levels of the 1950's to networks that operate from 345kV, 500kV and 765 kV\nacross the continent.\n\n In order to quantify the impacts of the severe geomagnetic storm threats to the U.S. power grid is it necessary to develop a series of models that translate the disturbed space environment, or geomagnetic field environment, into specific impacts to the operation of the electric power grid.  This requires the following steps:\n- Modeling in detail the geographically wide-spread disturbances to the\ngeomagnetic field from natural geomagnetic storm processes.\n- Modeling the electromagnetic coupling between the disturbed space environment\nand the deep-earth ground conductivity that produces a geo-electric field across the surface of the Earth.\n- Modeling the interaction between the geo-electric field and the complex power\ngrid topology to calculate the flow of geomagnetically induced current (GIC) throughout the exposed power grid infrastructure.\n- Modeling of the operational impacts in the U.S. power grid due to GIC flows\ncaused by either E3 threats or severe geomagnetic storm conditions.\nWhile each of these models and associated environments are complex, these modeling\nefforts have been highly successful in accurately replicating geomagnetic storm events and performing detailed forensic analysis of geomagnetic storm impacts to electric power systems.  This capability has also been successfully applied towards providing predictive geomagnetic storm forecasting services to the electric power industry.  To further\ndescribe the methodology used in this analysis, a brief overview is provided for each of the key modeling steps that were undertaken. 1.1\nGeomagnetic Storm Environment Model An important facet of this investigation requires the simulation of geomagnetic storm events and the impacts that these storms caused to electric power grid operation, and to also investigate the potential impacts of very large storm events that have not recently been experienced by today's power systems.  Electric power system operators realize that large and severe geomagnetic storms  (such as the March 1989 storm) have the potential to cause important power system impacts.  However, the U.S. power industry in general have not developed comprehensive simulation models such as being developed in this effort to better quantify the nature of the threat environment.  The power industry also has a very limited perspective on the extremes of storm intensity due to the flaws of the K Index rating of storms.  While some past storms have severely threatened the U.S. grid, these storms do not represent the most severe storm events that are plausible.  Therefore, comprehensive models allow the development of improved understandings of the extremes of the geomagnetic environment and consequential impacts that future severe storms may pose to the integrity of this important infrastructure.  The forensic analysis of prior storm events provides two benefits: 1.) it allows for validation of the overall U.S. Power Grid Model accuracy by reproducing past observations of storm impacts on the infrastructure, 2.) the simulation allows for more detailed assessment of past critical storm events and levels of reactive power and voltage regulation stress that occurred across the U.S. power grid. Geomagnetic disturbances are caused by interactions of the solar wind with the Earth's magnetic field.  There are a number of ways that a geomagnetic storm can produce a ground-level geomagnetic field disturbance that could have the potential to impact power system operations.  One of the most important geomagnetic storm processes involves the intensification and flow of ionospheric currents known as electrojets.  These electrojets are formed around the north and south magnetic poles at altitudes of about 100km and can have magnitudes of ~1 million amps, which is sufficient in intensity to cause widespread disturbances to the geomagnetic field.  Because of the large geographic scale of the U.S. power grid, it would not be suitable to assume the application of a simple planewave model for the disturbance conditions.  Therefore, to simulate the geomagnetic storm environment, it is necessary to develop a geographically gridded specification of the complex spatial and temporal dynamics of the disturbances as they propagate across North American locations that are to be modeled.  Electrons injected into the ionosphere along geomagnetic field lines produce the ionospheric current systems and resulting electrojet current.  Geomagnetic storms can propagate geographically rapidly and in complex and wide-spread disturbance patterns.  In order to accurately model the groundlevel geomagnetic variations from these disturbance events, a data assimilation model has been developed utilizing a wide-spread array of ground-based geomagnetic observatories. In the calculation of power system impacts, it is primarily the horizontal components of the magnetic field disturbance that are of concern (the north-south and east-west variations).  Figure 1-3 shows the vector description of a disturbance of the geomagnetic field simultaneously observed at a number of locations across North America at time 9:10\nUT May 10, 1992. As shown in this example, many of the North American observatories are seeing a large and coherent southward-oriented vector disturbance in the locally observed geomagnetic field.  This pattern describes the physical attributes expected from a westward electrojet current system extending across the region.  The intensity of the vector also describes an observation point that is located with a relatively closer proximity to the ionospheric current source as well.  Using this data, an assimilative model can be developed to provide a more detailed definition to the disturbance environment that would be suitable for application on the U.S. Power Grid Model.  Figure 1-4 provides a depiction of this model's results for the same 9:10 UT time step.  This graphic more clearly defines the complex spatial disturbance pattern of the westward electrojet intensification that is occurring at this time.  By assimilating other simultaneous observation data it is possible to also accurately characterize the temporal dynamics of the storm event as well.  This modeling approach provides an averaging between inter-observatory intensities.  It is possible that there could be small regions of higher intensity between observation locations, but this was not assumed for modeling purposes.  In many of the storms that have been selected for evaluation, this uncertainty has been minimized by using as many observatories as possible and avoiding sparse data conditions. For all the geomagnetic storm simulations, discrete magnetic observatory data is used and depicted at the highest available data cadence available.  This is usually one-minute cadence, however some limited availability of 1 and 3-second data is also available for storm events.  In addition to important benchmark storms, this same storm environment modeling capability is also used to develop the storm environments and a detailed understanding of the climatology concerns for large and historically important storm threat conditions such as the Great Geomagnetic Storm of March 13-14, 1989 and possible larger storm threats to the U.S. power grid.\n\n1.2\nGround Models and Electric Field Calculation In order to compute the induced currents flowing in a power network, it is necessary to be able to establish the electric fields induced in the Earth by variations in the geomagnetic field.  Numerical models developed by Metatech require knowledge of the layered Earth conductivity to depths greater than 300 km.  Past experience has indicated that 1-D Earth conductivity models are sufficient to compute the local electric fields.  Because there is considerable heterogeneity in conductivity over North America, multiple 1-D models can be used where the conductivity variations are extremely large. Four different techniques are used to develop ground conductivity models.\n\n- Measurements of the conductivity versus depth for the top 10s of km.\n\n- Descriptions of the local geology, which can be used to infer an average conductivity versus depth.\n\n- Measurements of the deep conductivity for the region of interest (although continental data exists for most of the world).\n\n- Actual measurements of geomagnetic and electric fields along with resultant geomagnetically-induced currents (GIC) at locations and frequencies of interest.\n\nIn general across the U.S., information is available in each category, although the last technique is the most useful. Ground conductivity models need to accurately reproduce geo-electric field variations that are caused by the very low frequency ranges of geomagnetic storms.  These electromagnetic disturbances require models accurate over a frequency range from 0.3 Hz to as low as 0.00001 Hz.  Because of the low-frequency content of the disturbance environments, it is necessary to take into consideration ground conductivities to appropriate depths.  Numerous studies confirm that depths required are more than several hundred kilometers, although the exact depth is a function of the layers of conductivities present in a specific region.  In most locations, ground conductivity varies substantially at the surface.  These conductivity variations with depth can range 3 to 5 orders of magnitude.  While surface conductivity can exhibit considerable lateral heterogeneity across the U.S., conductivity at depth is more uniform. Because of this, models of ground conductivity can be successfully applied over meso-scale distances and can be accurately represented by use of layered conductivity profiles or models.  Frequent occurrences of geomagnetic storm events and subsequent measurement of these storm environments and associated impacts have provided opportunities to use this information to develop and validate models of the ground conductivity for the U.S. Power Grid Model. A severe electrojet disturbance can produce a rate-of-change intensity profile (or dB/dt) of 2400 nT/min or greater.  This disturbance is a very severe disturbance that could be possible at high to mid latitude locations throughout the U.S.  A waveform of this intensity was used to evaluate differing ground model responses in terms of the peak geoelectric field that would be produced by such a disturbance.  The comparative results of this evaluation for 18 differing ground models is shown in Figure 1-5.  In the case of peak magnitude alone, the difference between the most responsive and the least responsive ground model can be more than a factor of 7.  For the most responsive ground model, the peak geo-electric field exceeded 15 volts/km in intensity. Figure 1-6 provides an overview map of the ground models selected for each color-coded region in the U.S.  As shown, these models are applied in meso-scale dimensions throughout the U.S.  The specific models were assigned based upon selecting a group of ground conductivity models that were appropriate to the known geological profiles of the region.  The geological profiles provided were used to narrow the search to several candidate ground models for various regions.  Further refinements to select the most appropriate ground model were done through a series of simulations where the best model was selected by validation against local observations through the use of monitored data from prior geomagnetic storms (see Appendix 3). Because of the wide range of magnitude, as well as spectral response characteristics of the impulsive geomagnetic field disturbance environment, it is critical to select appropriate ground models for each region in order to produce valid simulation results.\nValidation of the ground models against forensic data provides the best means to assure that appropriate responses are being observed and to provide assurance that correct responses will result when simulations of more severe disturbances are undertaken. Several examples of model response versus actual observations are provided in this overview. Figure 1-7 provides an example of the validation of a ground model.  This figure shows a comparison of the observed North-South and East-West geo-electric field during a minor geomagnetic storm on Nov 4, 1993 in northern Minnesota (from Kappenman, Zanetti, Radasky, EOS Transactions of AGU, Jan. 28, 1997, pg 37-45).  Also provided are the results of the simulation, which indicate good agreement in magnitudes as well as wave shape.  These observations and simulations were conducted using a 1-second data cadence.  The ability to replicate over a broad frequency range provides for good overall fit between observed and simulated electric fields.  This example illustrates the ability to validate the ground model separately from the Power Grid Model. It is also possible to demonstrate the validation using measurements of GIC with the combined ground model and Power Grid Model.  An example of this is provided in Figure 1-8 for GIC measurements made in northern Maine during a storm on May 4, 1998.  In this case, the measured data was observed at a 10 second cadence, while the calculation was limited to a one-minute cadence due to availability of regional geomagnetic field disturbance data.  This will also limit the frequency response of the simulation and reduce some of the ability to replicate minor high frequency variations.  In spite of the data limitation for simulations, the close agreement between observed GIC\nand calculated GIC indicates that both the ground model and the Power Grid Model are accurately replicating the storm impacts.\n\n\n1.3\nU.S. Electric Power Grid Circuit Model As one of the four component models that are necessary to calculate GIC flows and the impacts on power system reliability due to GIC flows, the Power Grid Model is important for two reasons in determining the simulation results.  This portion of the model in particular defines the complex topology of the network circuit, as this topology couples with the equally complex geo-electric field environment that occurs from natural geomagnetic storm processes.  The other important aspect of the power grid circuit model is contained in the resistive impedance of the network circuit elements (primarily the transmission lines, transformers, and substation-to-ground resistance).  The values of these circuit resistances combined with the resultant geo-electric fields across the network define the pattern and magnitude of GIC flows. Because of the mature nature of this data and the many years of power industry experience in modeling AC flows in the network, it is expected that this portion of the U.S. Power Grid Model will be less uncertain than other portions of the overall model. The U.S. Power Grid Model was assembled by using publicly available load flow model data and available transmission asset maps to define approximate locations. In order to calculate the flow of GIC, the model needs to define not only the impedance of all circuit elements, but also their locations.  The definition of locations allows for proper determination of coupling with the complex 2D geo-electric field patterns that will occur due to various threat conditions that are to be examined.  In the estimation of substation position accuracy, in most cases, the position is accurate to within +/- 1 mile.  This accuracy will be sufficient given the large-scale nature of the overall U.S. simulation model that is being developed.  Due to the expedited nature of the investigation, the model for the CONUS region of the U.S. was limited to transmission network portions that are 345kV or higher in voltage.  As will be shown in subsequent analysis, the majority of all GIC flows will occur in the highest voltage portions of the network, hence this limitation accounts for most of the GIC flows and resulting impacts from those flows. Figure 1-9 provides a map of the overall transmission network included in the CONUS region model of the U.S. grid.  The major transmission voltages are color highlighted by operating voltage with the three operating voltages of 345kV, 500kV and 765kV (there are also several lines in the Washington state region that are operated at 300kV which are included in the model, and in the figure are combined with 345kV lines).  Figure 1-10 provides the mileage statistics for each of these three voltage classes that are represented in the U.S. model for the CONUS region.  As shown, the most common transmission voltage is the 345kV, which makes up about 64% of total transmission line miles.  The highest operating voltage is the 765kV and is primarily located in the Illinois, Ohio, Indiana, West Virginia and upstate New York regions of the U.S.  Both the 345kV and 500kV portions of the network are more widely distributed across the U.S.\n\n\nA total of 2146 high-voltage transformers will be modeled in the CONUS Region for the U.S. Power Grid Model.  The population of transformers by kV rating is shown in Figure 1-11.  The population of transformers by kV rating generally follows the population of transmission line miles as previously shown.  The simulation model will be able to calculate and estimate the flow of GIC in each of these transformers and provide estimates of the degree of half-cycle saturation and system impacts this saturation could cause to operation of the U.S. Power Grid. The operating voltage of the transmission network is an important factor in determining the level of GIC flow that will occur on each part of the U.S. power grid.  At the higher operating voltages, there are pronounced trends that: the average length of each line increases and the average circuit resistance decreases.  These trends result in larger GIC flows in the higher voltage portions of the network, given the same geo-electric field conditions.  To better illustrate the impact of kV rating and associated design factors that affect circuit resistance, a statistical analysis was performed on the network data that was available.  This analysis also reviewed some of the lower voltage transmission elements as well.  For example, when looking at the resistance per mile of transmission lines in the U.S., the resistance generally declines as larger and lower resistance conductors are used for the higher kV-rated facilities.  Figure 1-12 provides a summary of the average line resistance in the U.S. versus the kV rating of the transmission line.  This summary extends from the 115kV to the 765kV transmission voltages.  As shown in this figure, the per mile resistance decreases on average by approximately a factor of 10 as you increase from the 69kV line to the 765kV line.  It is also generally shown that for operating voltages of 345kV and above the resistances are generally very small (less than 0.1 ohms per mile).  There is some diversity in the overall population due to variation in conductors that are used on specific transmission lines.  The actual line resistance was used from the system model data that was available, reflecting actual conditions for each specific facility in the overall model. Transformers also exhibit a general characteristic of lower resistance as kV rating increases.  However, the trend in transformer design is even more pronounced as a function of MVA or current rating of the transformer.  It is generally consistent that the higher MVA rated transformers are also the highest kV rated transformers, though there can be a few exceptions.  Figure 1-13 provides a plot of the transformer winding resistance versus the current rating of the transformers in the U.S. population.  The blue scatter plot points illustrate specific transformers from the data available, while the red line shows the general best-estimate trend of this data.  As illustrated, there is also more than a factor of 10 reduction in transformer winding resistance as the current rating or MVA size of transformers increases.  Since these very large transformers generally tend to be located on the higher kV rated portions of the network, this will again result in significantly larger GIC flows in these portions of the network given the same geoelectric field exposures.  In the available transformer data, nearly 29% of all transformers modeled did not have available winding resistance data.  Therefore, in order to fill in this missing data, estimated data was used that conformed with the trend line of the population statistics shown.\n\nIn addition to the lower resistances at the higher kV rating lines on the network, average length of these lines also introduces a higher overall risk of GIC flows as well.  Figure 1- 14 provides a summary of average transmission line lengths in the U.S. by kV rating.  As illustrated, the average length of transmission lines also increases significantly with increased kV ratings.  The 765kV lines average over 60 miles in length while the 115kV\nlines are less than 15 miles in average length.  While predicting GIC flows, it is necessary to take into consideration the network topology as a integrated whole.  It is evident that on an individual line basis a combination of longer average length (and increased geoelectric potential between end points of the line) combined with lower average resistances will produce substantially larger GICs on average in the higher voltage portions of the power grid. The application of series capacitors on transmission lines will block the flow of GIC. In the entire eastern U.S. grid only two lines have series capacitors, however in the western grid a significant number of the lines are series compensated.  Figure 1-15 shows the extensive application of series capacitors on the transmission lines in the U.S. portion of the WECC pool, and is further described in the chart in Figure 1-16.  There are near equal total miles of both 500kV and 345kV transmission in the WECC pool.  Of the 500kV transmission, approximately 55% of these lines have series capacitors while for the 345kV only ~25% of these lines are series compensated.\n\n1.4\nTransformer and AC Power Grid Performance Model The flow of GIC in transformers is the root cause of all power system problems, as the GIC causes half-cycle saturation to occur in the exposed transformers.  While the extremes of the threat environment, the conductivity of the deep-earth ground, and the kV rating and topology of the power grid can all cause significant enhancements of the total GIC flows, the most significant enhancement of impacts due to GIC is how that GIC interacts within the transformer.  Only a few amps of GIC can result an amplification of impacts in the operation of AC current flows in the transformer.  In some cases the amplification effect can cause normal AC excitation current in a transformer to increase from less than 1 amp to nearly 300 amps, due to the flow of only 25 amps/phase of GIC. Transformer design is an important consideration. In particular, single-phase core design transformers are much more responsive to influence from GIC than most standard 3 phase designs.  Also, the higher the kV rating of the transformer, the higher the total reactive power increase will be that occurs due to GIC.  Figure 1-17 provides a comparison plot of the reactive demand increase that occurs in both a single-phase and three-phase 500 kV transformer for various levels of GIC per phase.  As shown, the simple difference between three-phase design and single-phase design causes a factor of four increase in total reactive power demand over the range of GIC flow levels.\n\nA similar increase in the impacts of GIC flows on transformer reactive power demands occurs for increases in transformer kV rating.  Figure 1-18 provides a comparison for a single-phase 345kV, 500kV and 765kV transformer.  As shown in this comparison, for the same level of GIC flow, the 765kV transformer will have nearly two times higher reactive power demands than the 345kV transformer.  A similar ratio of reactive power demand versus kV rating would also occur for three-phase transformers, though total reactive power levels will be smaller than those in comparable single-phase design transformers. As evident from these behavior characteristics, transformer design factors can be an important determinant in system behavior.  While transformer kV rating is fully defined for all transformers included in the U.S. Power Grid Model, there is some uncertainty about the context of the ratio of single phase and three-phase transformers in the overall transformer population.  Because the design of transformers were not readily available in all cases, estimates of single-phase/three-phase populations were therefore based upon MVA rating, in that transformers of 600MVA or larger in size were assumed to be singlephase design.  Based upon these estimates, it is estimated that 85% of the 345kV transformers will be three-phase (Figure 1-19).  For the 500kV population, only 34% of these transformers are three-phase (Figure 1-20) while the bulk of the population is the more susceptible single-phase design.  At the 765kV level, nearly all of these transformers are expected to be of single-phase design (Figure 1-21).\n\n## Us Grid Model 345Kv Transformer Core-Type Population\n\n Using this method of allocating transformer design is a possible source of uncertainty and one goal for this analysis is to not produce overly pessimistic results, which might occur if population estimates of single-phase transformer design in the U.S. grid are overestimated.  In order to test the assumptions applied to the U.S. grid as a whole regarding the transformer design population, a comparison was made with available transformer data from the BPA power grid in the Pacific Northwest region.  The BPA system is predominantly a 500kV and 230kV transmission system with a small number of 345kV facilities.  BPA has ~6% of the U.S. ownership of all 500kV transformers included in the Power Grid Model.  The population statistics on single-phase and three-phase design for their 500kV transformer is shown in Figure 1-22.  The transformer nameplate data confirms that the population is indeed heavily single-phase design, with 97% of all 500kV transformers in this region being single-phase units.  This population ratio is actually much higher than the U.S. 500kV population as a whole, which is modeled as being only 66% single-phase design.  BPA also has a large population of 230kV transformers, therefore population ratios of these transformers can be a somewhat relevant comparison for the estimated populations for the 345kV transformers estimated for the U.S. model.  As shown in Figure 1-23, the ratio of single-phase design in the BPA 230kv transformers is 25%.  This is also a higher ratio of single-phase units than assumed for the entire U.S. 345kV population, which is estimated to be only 15%.  This comparison suggests that the estimated 345kV population of single-phase design transformers may actually be larger than currently represented in the U.S. model.\n\n\nPublicly available data from the ECAR pool was also used to confirm the very high population of 765kv single-phase design transformers.  The ECAR power pool contains nearly all the 765kV transformers in the U.S., with the exception of a handful of 765kV transformers operating in upstate New York.  These verifications provide a level of confidence that simulation results, which are in part based upon population estimates of transformer design, will generally not be overly pessimistic and may in actuality be somewhat optimistic for this review. Transformers under half-cycle saturation pose a dual threat to system reliability; systemwide voltage collapse by increase in reactive power in each exposed transformer, and the increase of the disruptive effects of harmonics and AC waveform distortion on relay and protective systems.  Accurate estimates of both reactive power demand and AC waveform distortions are therefore necessary in models of transformer behavior.  Figures 1-17 and 1-18 (previously discussed) provided an overview of reactive power demand behavior of transformers.  The AC waveform distortions are more difficult to estimate and need to be considered on a case-by-case basis.  Some general examples can be provided to illustrate the nature of impacts that can occur on a wide-scale during disturbance threats.  Figure 1-24 provides a plot of the normal AC excitation current that would be observed in the high-side of a 500kV transformer, while Figures 1-25, 1-26, and 1-27 show the significant increases and distortion of transformer excitation current for 5 amps/phase of GIC (Figure 1-25) and also for 25 amp (Figure 1-26) and 100 amp GIC events (Figure 1-27).  These examples illustrate that AC peak excitation currents drawn from the power system by a transformer under various levels of GIC excitation can increase from less than 1 amp to over 800 amps.  These increased transformer excitation currents are highly distorted and rich in both even and odd harmonics and they combine with the normal load current on the transformer and propagate distortions throughout the power grid.  To illustrate the potential impact of these distortions, the primary current (including a load of 300 amps under normal conditions) can be synthesized during several severe GIC exposures.  Figure 1-28 shows the normal AC load current for a 500kV transformer (blue waveform) and the resulting AC currents under three different GIC conditions.  It is evident that not only are large distortions occurring, but also a significant peak of over-current will result.  Total waveform distortions of over 200% are expected to occur.  These simulations do not take into account additional waveform distortions that could occur due to simultaneous saturation of adjacent transformers and local resonance's, which could increase distortions further. In addition to the details of behavior by individual transformers on the power grid, the disturbance conditions can be summarized for the network as a whole, which provides a descriptive overview of the disturbance impact regions.  Figure 1-29 provides a summary of geomagnetic storm conditions for the mid-Atlantic through New England region of the U.S. for a storm event on May 4, 1998 at time 4:18 UT.  This graphic shows the geographic location of all transmission lines and stations across the region.  Also shown are the storm conditions and GIC flows at this moment in time.  The storm conditions in this example are illustrated by the blue vectors that depict the spatial complexity of the geo-electric field across the region.  These vectors depict both the orientation of the field as well as relative intensity.  As shown in this figure there is a strong southeasterly oriented geo-electric field over the New England region and this field rapidly diminishes in intensity and changes in orientation over mid-Atlantic locations.  The relative levels of GIC flows are shown at each substation by red or green colored dots.  The colors indicate polarity of GIC flow in transformers located at each of these stations.  Red means a flow of current into the transformer from ground while green indicates a flow of GIC from the transformer to ground.  The polarity of the GIC flow does not have any particular significance on the impact of that GIC to individual transformers, as either polarity of GIC will produce half-cycle saturation effects in a transformer.  The sizes of the colored dots also change in proportion to the magnitude of the GIC flow at each location.\nTherefore, the size of dots indicates the relative level of regional impacts. 1.5\nThe Evolving Vulnerability of Electric Power Grids and Implications for Historically Large Storms A simple way to summarize much of the discussion in this overview of the Power Grid Model is the interpretation that today's sprawling, high-voltage power grids are more susceptible to space weather impacts than ever before.  While almost all research into space weather impacts on technology systems has focused upon the dynamics of the space environment, the role of the design and operation of the technology system in introducing or enhancing vulnerabilities to space weather is often overlooked.  In the case of electric power grids, both the manner in which systems are operated and the accumulated design decisions engineered into present-day networks around the world have tended to significantly enhance geomagnetic storm impacts.  The result is to increase the vulnerability of this critical infrastructure to space weather disturbances. The space weather community and the power industry have not fully understood these operation and design implications.  The application of detailed simulation models has provided tools for forensic analysis of recent storm activity, and when adequately validated, can be readily applied to examine impacts due to historically large storms, as will be described in subsequent sections of this report.  However, even simple empirical extrapolations provide some perspective on the level of threat and the possible consequences of storms on present day infrastructures.\n\nHistorical records of geomagnetic disturbance conditions, and more importantly, geoelectric field measurements, provide a perspective on the ultimate driving force that can produce large GIC flows in power grids.  Because geo-electric fields and resulting GIC are caused by the rate of change of the geomagnetic field, one of the most meaningful methods to measure the severity of impulsive geomagnetic field disturbances is by the magnitude of the geomagnetic field change per minute, measured in nanoteslas per minute (nT/min). For example, the regional disturbance intensity that triggered the Hydro Quebec collapse during the 13 March 1989 storm only reached an intensity of ~480 nT/min. Large numbers of power system impacts in the United States were also observed for intensities that ranged from 300 to 600 nT/min during this storm. However, the most severe rate of change in the geomagnetic field observed during this storm reached a level of ~2000 nT/min over the lower Baltic.  The last such disturbance with an intensity of ~2000 nT/min over North America was observed during a storm on 4 August 1972 when the power grid infrastructure was less than half its current size. An analysis of the AT&T telecom cable (L4) failure in northern Illinois in a region of ~800 nT/min indicated the disturbance intensity caused a geo-electric field of at least 7\nV/km.  A dB/dt disturbance of >2000 nT/min was observed over central and southern Sweden on 13-14 July 1982.  A coincident peak geo-electric field of 9.1 V/km was observed in central Sweden during this storm on railroad communication circuits.\nSimilar observations from that region of 20 V/km occurred for a storm in May 1921, suggesting that a peak rate of change of ~5000 nT/min is possible. This disturbance level is nearly 10 times larger than the levels that precipitated the North American power system impacts of 13 March 1989.  While the magnetospheric drivers and deep-Earth conductivities that shape the geo-electric field response have not changed significantly over this period of time, power system infrastructures have experienced dramatic changes in size and complexity.  A recurrence of historically large storms, even like the recent 1982 storm, could have entirely different outcomes in terms of impacts on today's power systems. For any natural hazard, prudence requires that design and operational adjustments be made to mitigate such risks to infrastructures.  Power system designers and operators expect these systems to be challenged by the elements, and where those challenges were fully understood in the past, the system design has worked extraordinarily well.  Most of these challenges have been terrestrial weather related.  In cases of understood threats, system designers usually applied design and operational standards to harden or mitigate the consequences of these environments on the reliability of the power system.  Indeed, investments in arresters and transmission line shield wires to mitigate against lightning alone can be measured in the several billion-dollar range.  This has generally confined problems and usually limited the spread of outages that do occur to small regions at any one time.  In contrast, the awareness of the geomagnetic storm environments and their potential impacts are much less understood and have aspects that are inherently more threatening than more familiar hazards such as earthquakes and extreme terrestrial weather events (including hurricanes).  Geomagnetic storm environments can develop almost instantaneously over large geographic footprints.  They have the ability to essentially blanket the continent with an intense threat environment and have the capability to produce significant collateral damage to critical infrastructures.  Power networks are operated using what is termed an \"N-1\" operation criterion.  That is, the system must always be operated to withstand the next credible disturbance contingency without causing a cascading collapse of the system as a whole.  This criterion normally works very well for the well-understood terrestrial environment challenges, which usually propagate more slowly and are more geographically confined.  When a routine weather-related single-point failure occurs, the power system needs to be rapidly adjusted (10 minutes being the allowed time limit) and positioned to survive the next possible contingency.  Both EMP and space weather disturbances, however, can have a sudden onset and cover large geographic regions.  They therefore cause near-simultaneous, correlated, multipoint failures in power system infrastructures, allowing little or no time for meaningful human interventions.  In contrast to well-conceived design standards that have been successfully applied for more conventional threats, no comprehensive design criteria have ever been considered to check the impact of the geomagnetic storm environments.  Further, as this analysis demonstrates, the design actions that have occurred over many decades have greatly escalated the dangers posed by these storm threats for this critical infrastructure.\n\nSection 2\nAn Analysis of the Impacts of the March 13-14, 1989 Great Geomagnetic Storm on the U.S. and Quebec Power Grids The events that led to the collapse of the Hydro Quebec system in the early morning hours of March 13, 1989 illustrate the challenges that lie ahead in managing the risk of GIC flows in contemporary electric power grids.  Starting at 2:44 AM (EST), all operations on the Hydro Quebec power grid (which serves the entire Quebec province) were normal.  At that time a large impulse in the Earth's geomagnetic field erupted along the U.S./Canada border (Figure 2-1).  This started a chain of power system disturbance events that only 92 seconds later resulted in a complete collapse to the entire power grid in Quebec.  The rapid manifestation of the storm and impacts to the Quebec power grid allowed no time to even assess what was happening to the power system, let alone provide any meaningful human intervention.  The rest of the North American power grid also reeled from this great geomagnetic storm.  Over the course of the next 24 hours, additional large disturbances propagated across the continent, the only difference being that they extended much further south and came, at times, arguably close to toppling power systems from the New England and Mid-Atlantic regions of the U.S. to the Midwest.  The NERC (North American Electric Reliability Council) in their post analysis\n(Reference 2-1) attributed ~200 significant anomalies in the power grids across the continent to this one storm (Appendix 2). From the observations and reports available on this storm, the most intense storm activity across North America was observed principally in the broad areas highlighted in Figure 2-2.  While the discussion of this section will provide the details of GIC flows and impacts to the North American power grid, a brief overview of the storm conditions can provide a quick perspective.  One of the most meaningful ways to describe geomagnetic storm intensity from a perspective of GIC flows in exposed power grids is to consider the rate-of-change of the disturbed magnetic field. GIC levels are primarily driven by rate-ofchange (or dB/dt in units of nT/min) of local geomagnetic fields.  The higher the dB/dt, the higher the relative levels of GIC.  Predicting exact levels of GIC requires extensive models of power grid and deep-earth conditions.  But by knowing impulsive geomagnetic disturbance levels across regions, relative intensity comparisons can be provided between storms to classify size.  For purposes of this summary, the dB/dt information will be referred to as the RGI (regional GIC index).  Figure 2-3 provides a summary of the RGI\nintensity observed each minute over a 48 hour period between March 12-14, 1989 as observed at the Ottawa Canada observatory, which also provides a proxy for nearby regions in the New York, New England and Canada.  As noted in this figure, the Hydro Quebec system collapsed due to an impulse that was slightly greater than 400 nT/min at 2:45 EST.  More energetic disturbances exceeding 550 nT/min occurred even later at this site during this storm, many of which precipitated significant problems in portions of the U.S. grid.  The ~400 nT/min disturbance level that caused the Quebec collapse provides a useful threshold for analysis.  In Figure 2-4, the peak RGI observed at other locations during this storm in North America is noted, along with the time of the peak disturbance. The observations indicated that the largest RGI in North America was actually observed in southern Manitoba/northern Minnesota from the same westward electrojet intensification that triggered the Hydro Quebec collapse.  It is also evident that RGI levels of ~400 nT/min were observed as far south as Bay St Louis, Mississippi and from Colorado to Washington State.  The later incident times of the more southerly located peak RGI's are due to growth and equator-ward expansion during periods of intensification (i.e. sub storms) as large auroral electrojet currents extended well down into mid-latitude locations of the U.S.  To further evaluate the impacts of this storm on the U.S. grid, four specific periods of intense sub storm activity were selected over the time intervals shown in Figure 2-5.  For the Hydro Quebec system, since the collapse occurs during the first storm, only that interval is of concern.  Each of these four will be evaluated in Subsection 2.2.\n\n## Ny/Ne/Canada Rgi - March 13-14, 1989 Ny/Ne/Canada Rgi - March 13-14, 1989\n\n0:30-2:00UT\n7:40-8UT\n21:20-22:30UT\n10:50-12UT\n\n2.1\nSimulations and Review of the Quebec Power System Collapse Virtually all power equipment operation and protection problems due to GIC are traceable to two direct effects.  They are the half-cycle saturation of power transformers and the half-cycle saturation of current transformers used with protective relay systems.\nOf the two, the former, with its numerous secondary effects, has been the more serious. Large power transformer half-cycle saturation can lead to four serious problems:\n- The transformer suffers high values of exciting current, with extreme peaks on the\nsaturated half-cycle, overheating the unit and greatly increasing internal losses.\n- The transformer begins injecting even and odd harmonics of exceptional\nmagnitude into the power system, which can overload capacitor banks, SVC's,\nand cause malfunction of protective relays.\n- The transformer draws a tremendous increase in reactive power from the grid,\nwhich, when combined with many other transformers doing the same, can lead to voltage regulation problems and voltage collapse of the network as a whole.\n- The transformer suffers stray flux leakage effects, such as damage from localized\noverheating. One or more of these effects occurred, and as a result, triggered hundreds of incidents across many regions of the North American continent during the March 13-14, 1989 geomagnetic storm.  The effects on the Hydro Quebec system, in particular, are a prime example of how impacts can accumulate and compound upon themselves to a level that is sufficient to precipitate collapse of an entire modern power grid. Other sections of this report provide an overview of geological and design factors and influences that can introduce higher levels of susceptibility for power grids to geomagnetic disturbances.  The Hydro Quebec system has all the elements that contribute to susceptibility:\n- It is located in the northern latitudes, near the frequent location of the auroral\nelectrojet current.\n- It is in an area of relatively high resistive igneous rock. - It operates a very high voltage 735kV transmission network and, as a result,\nexperiences higher relative magnitudes of GIC flow than lower voltage networks.\n- It has a population of 735kV transformers that are predominantly single-phase\nunits, which readily saturate and, because of the high voltage rating, consume proportionately higher reactive power demands.\n- It has a transmission transfer capability that is highly dependent upon\nintermediate shunt capacitive compensation devices (in this case, multiple SVCs) to maintain proper voltage regulation at all times. In the aftermath of the March 1989 storm, Hydro Quebec has provided information via\npapers on the chain of events that caused their system to collapse during this storm (Reference 2-2).  They have also undertaken extensive efforts to install both hardware\nand operational procedures to prevent recurrences of such a collapse (Reference 2-3). However, there were very few direct measurements anywhere in the world of GIC levels during this important storm event.  The Hydro Quebec collapse was triggered by a dB/dt observed in the region that reached a peak of ~480 nT/min.  Climatology evidence also suggests that much higher levels of dB/dt are possible in the future, throughout much of the high latitude regions of the U.S. and southern Canada (Reference 2-4).  Prior to Metatech's analysis, no detailed forensic analysis modeling the geospace environment of the Quebec power grid was ever undertaken to more fully and accurately assess the conditions that precipitated the network collapse.  In addition, it is also evident that reliability of the U.S. grid is also closely tied to reliability of the interconnected power systems in Canada.  In March 1989, the Hydro Quebec grid had interconnection capacity capable of exporting ~2000 MW of generation to U.S. markets in the New York and New England regions.  Today, the export capability from Quebec has more than doubled, which suggests that collapse of the Quebec system under current conditions would cause a larger loss to the U.S. grid, presenting an even larger threat than before.  The development of a model and analysis of the failure of the Quebec power grid presents an opportunity for both understanding of how geomagnetic disturbances can trigger grid failures, as well as quantification of future risks that the Quebec network may imply for U.S. power grid reliability. As previously shown in Figure 2-1, the southern Quebec region was subjected to a sudden intensification of a westward electrojet which produced ground level geomagnetic disturbance intensities that exceeded 400 nT/min.  This created a geo-electric field across the surface of the Earth that lead to GIC flows predominantly in the southern portions of the Quebec grid.  The GIC began to flow into transformers across the network, which caused an increase in reactive power demands due to half-cycle saturation effects.  At this time the SVCs (static var compensators) on the network began to turn themselves on to supply the increased reactive demand due to the storm.  However, the GIC also created harmonics. These harmonics flowed into the SVCs, whose capacitive legs act as a sink to these higher frequencies, to such an extent that protective systems rapidly tripped the devices offline.  This left the entire system without the support of these voltage regulation devices, leading to rapid erosion of system integrity and ultimately complete collapse.  At the time of the disturbance, the Quebec operating posture can be summarized as shown in Figure 2-6.  The load demand of ~22,000MW is primarily concentrated in the greater Montreal region.  A large part of the load was supplied by remote hydrogeneration,\n~10,000MW from the James Bay and another ~5100MW from the Manicougan and Churchill Falls complexes. The progression of the storm impacts in the minutes leading up to the network collapse, as measured by total system reactive demand and average GIC flow per transformer, is shown in Figure 2-7, as estimated from the simulation model developed for the Quebec grid.  Low levels of GIC were occurring until the intensity of the storm began accelerating at time 7:43 UT (2:43EST).  By the time of the system collapse at 7:45:49 UT, the system reactive demand increase due to the storm was approximately 1600 MVARs, while the average GIC flow in each of the Quebec 735kV transformers was ~12 amps/phase.  In addition to these substantial increases in reactive demands, the rapid collapse of the Hydro Quebec grid was accelerated by a harmonic interaction/relay malfunction chain of events that literally pulled the legs out from under the voltage regulation infrastructure of the network, just as these voltage regulating SVCs were most needed to counter the reactive demand increases brought on by the storm.  Figures 2-8 shows the four minutes of GIC flows and geo-electric field conditions from 7:42-7:45 UT that depict the overall conditions and pattern of GIC flows leading up to the collapse.\nThe important chain of relay malfunction events are reviewed in more detail in Figures 2- 9 and 2-10, which show the simulation model results in more detail, with annotations of the relay actions.  Figure 2-9 shows the first 6 relay actions, which resulted in tripping 6 of the 7 SVCs on the Quebec grid, with the first trip initiating at 7:44:16 UT.  All of these SVCs provide voltage support for the heavy transfers on the 5 lines that tie the Montreal load region to the James Bay generation complex.  Figure 2-10 show the remaining relay actions leading up to the collapse.  By 7:45:16 UT, the seventh relay action in the chain was also the tripping of the seventh and final SVC on the James Bay transmission lines. All of these key devices were lost in an elapsed time of only 1 minute.  The loss of these devices in concert with storm impacts set up angular swing conditions between the load and generation regions, which progressed to the point that by time 7:45:25 UT, all five 735kV tie lines between Montreal and James Bay tripped by out-of-step relay action\n(relay actions #8-12).  Given the prior loss of the SVCs, this relay action is likely to be proper, however it sealed the fate of the Quebec grid in that nearly half of the generation capacity supplying the network was now lost.  Load shedding triggered by frequency decay is designed to equalize the level of load with available generation in order to preserve the network as a whole.  All levels of shedding operated, but were not designed to shed enough load fast enough to make up for this large loss of generation.  This problem was further compounded by similar out-of-step tripping of lines that tied to the 2200 MW of Churchill Falls generation.  By 7:45:49 UT, frequency in the remaining system had decayed, causing complete system collapse. Figure 2-11 provides a set of plots that summarize the geo-electric field intensities in the Montreal, James Bay and Churchill Falls region of Quebec.  As summarized here, and as shown by vector icons in prior system maps, it is likely the initial intensification of the geo-electric field in the southern Montreal region of Quebec triggered most of the problems.  The intensity of the geo-electric field is estimated to have only reached a level of ~1.5 V/km, a relatively low level compared to actual measurements that have approached 20 V/km during other more intense storms.  Figure 2-12 shows the level of GIC at transformers at the sites where SVCs tripped.  These results also indicate GIC levels sufficient to cause half-cycle saturation, but also levels that are not excessively large.  The largest GICs were located in the transformers north and south of these SVC locations, and it is likely that harmonics from these locations contributed to the distortion overloads.\n\nThere are a number of lessons learned that should be mentioned, especially as it applies to broader implications and strategies for mitigation in the U.S.  These lessons deal with the damage during the process of collapse that could occur from future GIC events, the difficulties posed by the restoration process itself, and GIC tripwires (such as new technology systems, i.e. SVC's) that are unknowingly present in today's system that will too easily initiate widespread grid collapse scenarios.  During the process of collapse, permanent damage was inflicted on the Quebec power grid.  The uncontrolled operation of circuit breakers in rapid succession across the grid added fuel to the fire, by causing temporary overvoltages (load-rejection overvoltages) on certain points in the network, which caused permanent damage to two 735kV transformers at the LG4 station in the James Bay complex, a 735kV shunt reactor at Nemiscau (located midway between James Bay and Montreal) and the failure of a 735kV lightning arrester.  The restoration process is clearly hampered by damage of this type, as it may involve a critical circuit path for restoration of power.  Fortunately, the Quebec system is almost exclusively hydro generation base, which means that restoration of generation is relatively simple and rapid. Even so, the restoration of a large complex network takes some time.  The table below provides the restoration timeline that Quebec was able to achieve.\n\n\nTime (EST)\nEvent\nStatus\n\n|   0245  | Collapse    | Hydro-Quebec blackout         |\n|---------|-------------|-------------------------------|\n|   0700  | Restoration | 25% load restored (5,000 MW)  |\n|   0900  | Restoration | 48% load restored (10,500 MW) |\n|   1100  | Restoration | 64% load restored (14,200 MW) |\n|   1300  | Restoration | 83% load restored (17,500 MW) |\n\n After 11 hours, 83% of the load was restored.  However, with the predominant population of steam electric generation in the U.S., the restoration process is much more difficult, and similar restoration performance to that shown above is highly unlikely. In retrospect, it is clear that the collapse occurred because of correlated multiple events causing a combination of the voltage regulation stress on the system from the storm, in combination with key relay malfunctions, separately caused by the storm.  It is also evident that the first 7 relay actions, causing loss of all SVCs, was due to inappropriate and overly conservative relay settings, which were intended to protect a piece of equipment.  This is too-often a preferred protection approach when the objective gets overly skewed towards limiting damage to the SVC device.  However, these relay settings were a tripwire for collapse.  When this protection philosophy is applied throughout the system and then that system is subjected to a common mode stress, the integrity of the system as a whole rapidly erodes.  Because power system operators and planners have not had the luxury of storm analysis simulations, as employed in this study, they also have had very few insights into the risks posed by this environment. One of the most important remedial actions that were undertaken was to revise the relay settings on the SVCs, and make other special protection modifications to allow more\n\ngenerous levels of harmonic current loading before initiating a trip.  It is also clear, from storm related events of this type in the U.S., that tripwires of this type might be waiting to surprise grid operators in future severe storms.\n\nReferences 2-1\nNERC Disturbance Analysis Working Group Report, The 1989 System\nDisturbances: March 13, 1989 Geomagnetic Disturbance, pages 8-9, 36-60, 1990. 2-2\nDenis Larose, \"The Hydro-Quebec System Blackout of March 13, 1989\", IEEE\nSpecial\nPublication\n90TH0291-5\nPWR,\nEffects\nof\nSolar-Geomagnetic\nDisturbances on Power Systems, 1989, pg. 10-13. 2-3\nAntonio Dutil, Impact of Geomagnetic Storms on Transenergie Transmission\nSystem-Situation at the Dawn of Year 2000, Report to NPCC, January 2000. 2-4\nJ.G. Kappenman, Chapter 13 - \"An Introduction to Power Grid Impacts and\nVulnerabilities from Space Weather\", NATO-ASI Book on Space Storms and Space Weather Hazards, edited by I.A. Daglis, Kluwer Academic Publishers, II Mathematics, Physics and Chemistry, Vol. 38, pg 335-361.\n\n## 2.2 Simulations And Review Of Storm Impacts On The U.S. Power Grid\n\nThe effects of the March 13-14, 1989 Great Geomagnetic Storm were also widely felt on power grids throughout the U.S.  The consequences of the storm in the U.S. were not as severe, compared to the complete blackout that occurred on the Hydro Quebec grid. However, the storm did pose serious and widespread threats to the operational integrity of the U.S. power pool at times.  The storm also caused several cases of severe transformer damage.  As previously discussed, four different substorm intervals were selected for detailed simulation and assessment using the U.S. Power Grid Model.  The selected intervals also happened to coincide with the bulk of the power system problems reported to NERC and contained in the summary in Appendix 2 of this report.  This forensic analysis allows for needed perspective on the levels of disturbance threat and resultant GIC flows that could trigger widespread power system problems.  This simulation provides a means of further calibrating the assessments that are necessary to evaluate the potential consequences of future and potentially larger geomagnetic storm events on the U.S. power grid infrastructure. 2.2.1 Substorm Interval 7:40-8:00 UT As previously described, the disturbance intensification primarily occurred in the vicinity of the U.S.-Canada border region.  In the eastern part of North America the disturbance triggered the collapse of the Hydro Quebec grid, but also propagated disturbances effects into the neighboring U.S. regions as well.  At the time of the Quebec collapse, the U.S. was importing 1949MW from Quebec.  All of this capacity was lost due to the collapse. The most important loss involved the 765kV AC tie line that runs from upstate New York to the Montreal region, where a DC interconnection is made with the Quebec system. As previously shown in Figure 2-4, the highest intensity observed from this storm in North America occurred in the southern Manitoba and northern Minnesota regions, reaching a peak of 892 nT/min at 7:45 UT.  This intense disturbance caused an increase in reactive demands that was also observed - in one case the reactive power output of synchronous condensers increased by 420 MVARs, at one Manitoba 500kV substation.\nFigure 2-13 provides a map of the simulated geo-electric field conditions and resulting GIC flow conditions in the U.S. grid at the peak disturbance time of 7:45 UT.  Also noted in this map are the locations of important reports of power system anomalies at this time, which clearly indicates they were caused by the storm environment.  It is likely that less severe system impacts resulted due to the time of day of this substorm, in that this was 2:45 EST to 23:45 PST.  These are all times of minimum system load across the U.S., and operating postures that would, in most cases, provide for highest reactive power reserves on the system. 2.2.2 Substorm Interval 10:50-12:00 UT The substorm event of this time interval had location characteristics similar to those of the previously discussed interval.  The source of the ground level geomagnetic field disturbance was an intensification of the westward electrojet, and the footprint of the disturbance primarily centered on the U.S.-Canada border.  Figure 2-14 provides a depiction of the area at 11:26 UT.  While the region is large, the intensity of this substorm was generally 20-50% less severe than the previous substorm.  The most intense portion of interest was over portions of the eastern U.S.  Figure 2-15 provides a summary map and table of a large number of reported power system events that were concentrated in this region over the time period from 6:60 to 6:30 EST (11:06-11:30 UT).\nThese events largely involve capacitor switching to provide MVARs in response to the storm.  Various alarms and associated event recorders were initiated, due to the highly unusual system events.\n\n## 2.2.3 Substorm Interval 21:20-22:30 Ut\n\nThe substorm activity during this time interval produced some of the largest and most widespread impacts observed across the U.S. power grid.  Figure 2-16 provides a map and table summary of reported events over the time period 16:00-17:23 EST (21:00- 22:23 UT).  As shown, a large number of events were reported across the entire continent, even as far south as Los Angeles.  The power system problems were caused by a more complex pattern of storm intensification during this time interval than prior intervals.  Also, the disturbance regions expanded to mid-latitude locations over the U.S., which exposed large portions of the U.S. grid to moderately intense disturbance conditions.  The disturbance conditions at times 21:50 UT and 22:00 UT are shown in Figures 2-17 & 2-18.  As shown, there was both a large westward electrojet extending from Europe to the center of the North American Continent and also a large eastward electrojet from the eastern U.S. through the Pacific Northwest.  It is also evident from comparison that these disturbance regions were very dynamic, as they significantly expanded in area over the time interval shown.  The environment was particularly harsh because of the lower latitude position of the eastward electrojet.  The disturbance region exposed a large fraction of the U.S. grid, causing the large number of events reported. Since the reporting of these events was voluntary, it is likely that further events occurred that were unreported.  This would be especially true for low latitude regions of the U.S.\n\nwhere most power system operators are much less familiar with GIC problems and may have dismissed anomalies to \"cause-unknown\".  The other likely aspect explaining the higher relative impacts was the time of the disturbance intensification.  The 16:00-18:00\nEST time interval is during the peak electrical demand periods of the day for the entire U.S.; whereas the other two time intervals previously discussed were during early AM\nhours and minimum system load conditions.\n\n\nThe storm impacts can be assessed further by reviewing the geo-electric field conditions and the estimated GIC flows across the U.S. power grid at several key times.  Figure 2-19 shows the conditions at time 21:44 UT.  At this time, an intense geo-electric field extends from the mid-Atlantic region into the upper Midwest.  Voltage regulation problems were reported in Wisconsin, along with a number of problem reports in the Pennsylvania and New Jersey regions.  Figure 2-20 shows the conditions at 21:51 UT.  Here, the storm is particularly intense over the Northeastern U.S.  This also caused four capacitor banks to trip in New York.  By 21:57 UT (Figure 2-21), the intense geo-electric field extends from the Mid-Atlantic/New England regions to the Pacific Northwest.  This triggered a large number of problems all across the U.S., as noted in the figure.  Figure 2-22 provides the conditions at 22:09 UT.  The disturbances at this time caused trips of transmission facilities in the western North Dakota/Montana region and also trips of capacitor banks in upstate New York. 2.2.4 Substorm Interval 0:30-2:00 UT March 14, 1989 The last interval of intense substorm activity occurred between 0:30-2:00 UT on March 14.  As shown in Figure 2-23 for the time period from 20:00-20:32 EST, a large number of power system events were reported, with the impacts being particularly significant from the New England region through the upper Midwest.  Figure 2-24 depicts one of the more intense disturbance periods during this interval.  The large disturbance over the New England/Mid Atlantic to Midwest regions of the U.S. is due to a westward electrojet intensification.  There are also less severe intensifications developing along the Florida panhandle and along the U.S./Mexico border region at this time as well.  It is at this time that a dB/dt intensity of 461 nT/min was observed at Bay St. Louis, Mississippi, a level that was very close to the intensity that initiated the Quebec collapse.  The EST time of this substorm also occurred during early evening peak load demand conditions on the U.S. grid.  This may have acted to trigger additional power system problems.\n\n## 2.2.5 Overview Of U.S. Power Grid Gic Flows And Reactive Power Demands\n\nWhile the previous summaries have provided important insights on the spatial and temporal features of disturbances across the U.S. power grid, from a power system operation and performance perspective, it is also useful to develop more aggregate measures of storm intensity and impacts as well.  A sum of all GIC flows and all increased reactive demands provides one of the most meaningful metrics for assessment and comparison purposes.  Figure 2-25 provides a comparison of the peak sum of GIC\nflows and associated sum of MVAR demands caused by the GIC for the U.S., along with the time-of-peak during each of the four major substorm intervals that were evaluated.  It should be noted that MVAR levels could be higher due to reaction of the AC network as increased transformer reactive demands flow through the network.  This would amplify the net impact even further.  As was previously discussed, the substorm during interval 21:20-22:30 UT March 13, 1989 was the most severe, followed by the substorm during interval 0:30-2:00 UT March 14, 1989.  Figure 2-26 provides a time plot of the variations in GIC and MVAR totals for the substorm during interval 21:20-22:30 UT, which further depicts the dynamic nature of the substorm.\n\nIt is even more important to review the regional manifestations of the storm events.  One of the more convenient ways of regionally classifying storm intensity and impacts is to summarize by power pool.  Figure 2-27 provides a map of the major power pools in North America.  Also noted on the map are two important subsets of the large NPCC pool, namely the NYISO and NEPOOL regions covering New York State and the New England regions respectively.  Using these region boundaries, the intensity by geographic region can be reviewed to better quantify the impacts.  Figure 2-28 provides a summary of the GIC and MVAR totals for the PJM pool. This region, like the U.S. totals, was most heavily impacted by the substorm during interval 21:20-22:30 UT.  The peak GIC and MVAR demand for this region is ~940 amps and ~1550 MVARs; the time-of-peak was also 21:44 UT, as was the U.S. time-of-peak.  The PJM region also experiences a secondary peak that is nearly as large, occurring at 22:13 UT.  Immediately to the south of the PJM region is the SERC region, which also experienced a peak of GIC and MVAR\ndemand during the 21:20-22:30 UT interval substorm.  Figure 2-29 provides the time plot of total GIC and MVAR demand for the region.  This region also experienced a time-ofpeak at 21:44 UT, the total GIC reached ~1060 amps, and MVAR demand was ~1780 MVARs.  To the immediate north of the PJM pool, the NYISO actually reached its peak GIC and MVAR demands during the latest substorm interval of 0:30-2:00 UT March 14, 1989.  This region reached a peak GIC flow of ~890 amps and peak reactive demand of ~950 MVARs at 1:17 UT March 14.  Progressing immediately west from the PJM pool is the ECAR pool, and the plot of GIC and MVAR demand is provided in Figure 2-31.\nThis region also experienced a time-of-peak at 21:44 UT, as did the PJM and SERC\nregions.  The total GIC was ~2420 amps and total reactive demand was ~2200 MVARs,\n\nlevels that are larger than either the PJM or SERC regions at this time-of-peak.  Figure 2- 32 provides the GIC flows and MVAR demands for the most westerly region in the model, the WECC.  The WECC region experienced its largest impacts at 22:08 UT, rather than the 21:44 UT time of eastern U.S. pools.  The aggregate totals for GIC flows and associated reactive demands for this region were ~1700 amps and ~2100 MVARs respectively.  In general, these pools represent the bulk of the aggregate storm impacts that were observed, which is logical, given the enormous sizes and miles of transmission circuit exposure these regions presented to the storm conditions.  Other mid to northern latitude pools such as NEPOOL, MAPP and MAIN did experience significant impacts, especially relative to their smaller sizes.  Regions such as ERCOT and FRCC and the southern portions of SERC were not as consistently exposed as the more northerly located pools.\n\n## There Is Some Sub-Groupings Between Reliability Regions And Power Pools\n\n2.3\nOverview of Transformer Internal Heating - Examples from March 13-14,\n1989 Storm and Other Incidents The discussion to this point has been primarily regarding the threat to reliability of the system as a whole, due to the widespread and simultaneous nature of the stress across a large interconnected network caused by the March 1989 storm.  Also of note from this particular storm is strong evidence that GIC-induced half-cycle saturation of transformers can indeed produce enough heat to severely damage or even destroy exposed large power transformers.  The most noteworthy event of this storm was the complete loss of a large (~1000MVA) generator step-up (GSU) transformer connected to the 500kV transmission grid at the Salem Nuclear Plant in Lower Alloways Creek, N.J.  Figure 2-33 provides a picture of one-phase of the transformer and several pictures of the extensive internal damage done to the 22kV low-voltage windings of the transformer.  In spite of these core and windings being immersed in oil for insulation and cooling, the heating was so intense that it not only burned away all the paper tape winding insulation, but caused extensive melting of the windings, which are normally rated for ~3000 amps. This damage was inflicted because of the high levels of stray magnetic flux and circulating currents that were occurring outside the transformer core due to half-cycle saturation.  When these fluxes concentrate and impinge on regions of the transformer, such as windings and internal structural or tank members not expected to receive such exposure for normal operation, they can lead to almost immediate and severe hot-spot heating insults to exposed internal windings and structures of the transformer.  Thermal damage to paper tape winding insulation causes cellulose breakdown and is permanent.\nAlso, damage may not be sufficient from one minor exposure to cause insulation failure, but can be accumulated over multiple insults to the point of failure.  Because many transformers are of custom design in regard to winding configuration and tank/support structures, general guidelines on permissible levels of GIC exposure are not entirely useful.  However, in general terms, the exposure risk for transformers is both a function of time and magnitude of the incident GIC.  Figure 2-34 provides the estimated GIC flows in amps/phase in the Salem transformer for the four major substorm intervals that were simulated for the March 13-14, 1989 storm.  As shown in this figure, the GIC per phase was estimated to reach a peak of ~90 amps/phase at 21:44 UT.  Because this transformer is in a southern mid-latitude location, the highest sustained levels of GIC exposure to this transformer occurred during this substorm interval when the electrojet intensifications were situated over these regions. The magnitude and duration of GIC events that transformers can withstand without damage are not well defined.  Several controlled tests, looking at heating on select points internal to a transformer, have been conducted.  However, the information from these staged-tests is limited because of the restricted accessibility for temperature measuring probe placement.  It is difficult to even estimate where these critical hot-spots will develop, but even more so, it is difficult to monitor in the internal high voltage environments of a transformer, even if that hot-spot was fully known.  In this regard, the March 89 storm provided another example of transformer stray-flux heating that helped to improve the understanding of the dynamics of transformer heating.  This transformer was operated by Allegheny Power at the Meadowbrook substation in Virginia.  This 500-\n138kV, 350MVA transformer was removed from service on March 14, 1989 because of high gas levels in the transformer oil, which is a sign of unusual core and tank heating. External inspection of the transformer tank turned up four small areas of paint blistered by intense heat from stray flux.  While no measurements were made for this storm, it is estimated that heat from the flux reached 400\noC in some spots.  Since the transformer was not damaged sufficiently to permanently take out of service, the opportunity was available to monitor both neutral GIC and temperature variations at this known external hot-spot when the unit was returned to service. During a storm on May 10, 1992 (a storm far less severe than March 13-14, 1989), observations were recorded of neutral GIC and tank wall temperature near the known hot-spot on the transformer.  Figure 2-35 provides a summary of both the GIC and resulting transformer hot-spot measurements during this May 10, 1992 storm, and illustrates the relationship between GIC and transformer internal heating.  As shown, the transformer neutral GIC increased to approximately 60 amps in a matter of about 10 minutes.  Two transformer temperatures are shown.  One is the top oil, which provides a measure of total bulk transformer temperature and did not experience any significant change over the brief monitoring window.  The other is the temperature of the monitored hot-spot.  This illustrates the rapid increase of hot-spot temperature on the transformer tank exterior, which increases to approximately 175\no C within a matter of minutes\n(interior hot-spot temperatures would be even higher) (Reference 2-5).  Other staged tests provide insights to thermal response given step changes in various magnitude of GIC (Reference 2-6).  Figure 2-36 shows the observed temperature changes due to the initial application of a 12.5 amp DC source, which was then followed by a 75 amp DC source. A number of different temperature locations and trends are shown in this plot, owing again to the limited flexibility of both knowing the location and then attempting to actually measure a hot spot from stray flux concentrations.  Of these measurements, only the \"top of tie plate\" location provides an observation that could be used as a workable proxy to an actual hot-spot behavior.  In particular, by analysis of the \"top of tie plate\" temperature, the impact of the higher DC excitation is primarily evident as both a higher internal temperature, but also an acceleration in temperature increase.  These limited observations suggest that the magnitude of GIC is the more important exposure concern, as opposed to the duration of the GIC exposure.  This also suggests that very large GIC\nexposures could further accelerate the onset of hot-spots. Other anecdotal evidence, post-March '89, suggested that many other important transformers in the network sustained damage that eventually precipitated failures.\nBecause the U.S. transformer population as a whole is very large and non-homogeneous, it is difficult to fully recognize trends, though studies have confirmed compelling associations between transformer failures over a 25-year period and geomagnetic storm activity (Reference 2-7).  Rather, a rash of failures in the small and more homogeneous population of nuclear plant GSU transformers (~100 units) in the U.S. suggested a compelling linkage to the March '89 storm and GIC exposure.  Within 2 years after the March '89 exposure, 11 nuclear plants noted failures of the large GSU transformers, in addition to the Salem failure (Reference 2-7).  The previously mentioned failure incident at Salem was a case where damage was fortunately confined to the low voltage (22kV) windings of the transformer and not on the 500kV primary winding.  In this case, the cooling oil in the transformer was able to provide sufficient insulation withstand to prevent a catastrophic failure of the transformer.  In fact, the unit was not removed from service until the day after the storm. This has not been the situation in other cases.  On April 3, 1994 a moderate intensity storm occurred.  During this storm a GSU transformer at Zion Nuclear plant (on the outskirts of Chicago) failed catastrophically.  The failure was so severe that the transformer tank, containing thousands of gallons of oil, ruptured and started a major fire in the yard at the plant, which eventually involved control circuits and other sensitive systems.  The fire also spread into the generator hydrogen cooled isobus inside the plant.\nIn many postmortem analyses of transformer failures, it is very difficult to assess the failure cause, given unknowns about the unique design variations and unique operational exposure of each transformer.  In particular, static electrification was a failure mode of transformers of this vintage, and would be unrelated to GIC exposure.  Considering the unknowns and multiple plausible failure causes, very few definitive failure diagnoses can be expected.  The operator of the plant facility has resisted the association of this failure with the geomagnetic storm event, however they had not been undertaking any effort to monitor for GIC in the transformer or at any other locations in their regional transmission network.  Observations of GIC were made at utilities elsewhere north, south, east and west relative to their location.  The space weather conditions that spawned the April 3,\n1994 storm were associated with long-duration and recurrent solar activity sources. Therefore, storm conditions occurred from early April to mid-April.  Over that same period of time, the local utility also experienced major GSU transformer failures at the Braidwood nuclear plant (April 5, 1994) and at the Powerton coal plant (April 15, 1994). Again, the operator has resisted the association of these failures with GIC, even though the timing of these events would appear to be extraordinarily coincidental. Transformers of this size class (600MVA+) are large and expensive devices to replace. Operators of facilities such as these generally do not have spares readily available.  In the best of cases, a large operator of a number of plants may have one or two un-energized spare transformers that could be re-located to one of many plants that they operate over a region.  If no transformer is readily available, the delivery time on a newly manufactured unit typically runs to ~12 months or longer.  Even with a readily available spare, the process of removing the old transformer, disassembling, shipping, assembling, and installing the spare transformer (which includes filling with oil and pre-heating the oil in adverse temperature situations) is a process with a timeline of a few weeks or longer. If this failure is for a GSU transformer, in the intervening time, the important and usually baseloaded capacity source of the affected power plant is lost to the system.  The GSU transformer is the only electrical path for plant output to the grid.  Failure of other transformers embedded in the transmission network are somewhat less problematic, in that there is consciously more redundancy designed into the pool, because of multiple flow paths.  However, multiple key failures in a network can also curtail or severely limit operating options in reconstituting a network.  An especially large storm or GIC event could plausibly create the potential for widespread failure of many exposed transformers and hamper rapid restoration capabilities.  In extreme cases, where replacements may take months, a situation may exist where the demand for electric service can only be partially supplied, raising the prospect of rationing and rotating blackouts to regions that are unable to be fully served. Generators are another important apparatus that is potentially at-risk for permanent and debilitating damage due to unusually large GIC exposures.  Prior investigative analysis has determined that there are two important aspects of vulnerability for generators that could lead to permanent damage (Reference 2-8).  The high levels of harmonic currents flowing in the generator transformer due to half-cycle saturation are the immediate cause of both exposure concerns.  The first concern is one of generator rotor electrical heating due to the coupling of various harmonic currents that act as negative sequence flows in the electrical windings of generators.  There is considerable concern that standard relays designed to protect for rotor heating would not act properly in sensing this added current flow.  The second and potentially more important concern arises from the interaction of the harmonic currents and the natural resonant frequencies of turbines on large MVA high-pressure turbine generators.  Events that excite vibrations in the turbines at their natural frequencies can readily lead to mechanical damage to these high-speed, highpressure blades.  Permanent and widespread damage to large MVA generators in the U.S. would likely cause especially long-term debilitating damage to the power grid.\n\nAdditional References 2-5\nPhilip Gattens, Allegheny Power Corp., \"Application of a Transformer\nPerformance Analysis System\", Presentation at the Southeastern Electric Exchange, May 28, 1992. 2-6\nP. Picher, et.al., Discussion to Paper \"Study of the Acceptable DC Current Limit\nin Core-Form Power Transformers\", IEEE Winter Power Meeting, Baltimore MD. 2-7\nJ. G. Kappenman, \"Geomagnetic storms and Their Impact on Power Systems:\nLessons Learned from Solar Cycle 22 and the Outlook for Solar Cycle 23\", IEEE Power Engineering Review, May 1996, pg 5-8.\n\n2-8\nR.A. Walling, A.H. Kahn, \"Solar-Magnetic Disturbance Impact on Power System\nPerformance and Security\", EPRI Proceedings: Geomagnetically Induced Currents Conference, EPRI TR-100450, June 1992, pg 4-1.\n\n\n## Section 3 An Assessment Of The Threat Potential To The U.S. Electric Power Grids From Extreme Geomagnetic Storms This Section Provides An Assessment Of Future Geomagnetic Storm Threats To The U.S. Power Grids.  Figure 3-1 Illustrates An Example Of A Massive Coronal Mass Ejection That Is The Initiating Event For Extreme Geomagnetic Storms.\n\n\n3.1\nOverview of Geomagnetic Disturbance Environments for Extreme Storm Scenarios The footprints of a great geomagnetic storm can be extensive, and as power grids grow in vulnerability to disturbances from the space environment, the probability also increases for global consequences to these worldwide infrastructures.  The previous section reviewed the impacts across North America during the March 13, 1989 storm.  For perspective, the level of storm severity that best describes the disturbances that trigger large geo-electric fields and resultant GIC flows is the rate-of-change (dB/dt) of the geomagnetic field.  At northern to mid latitude locations, the most severe impulsive geomagnetic disturbances are generally caused by rapid intensifications and movements of the over 1 million amp auroral electrojet currents at altitudes of ~100km.  These intensifications are usually regional in nature but can have, at times, continental footprints of high intensity.  At more equatorial and low-latitude locations, the ring current becomes the dominant influence on ground level geomagnetic disturbance patterns.  Both current systems are closely coupled and will simultaneously enhance as the intensity of the storm increases.  Other geomagnetic field disturbance processes have also been recently observed to cause high levels of GIC in power grids at all latitudes. Long-term detailed climatology data on geomagnetic field disturbances are not available;\nthe one-minute or faster cadence data from observatories needed for this type of analysis only extends back to the early 1980's.  Prior to that time, only index summaries of storm activity are available and cannot be reverse engineered to extract the more detailed and site-specific data necessary.  Therefore, the extremes of dB/dt impulses and the resulting equatorward boundaries of such impulses are not well documented.  Indices to classify the planetary severity of geomagnetic storms reach back somewhat further in time.  Using the oldest measure of planetary average or index for storm classification, the Ap index, it is possible to look back at only ~80 years of magnetic storm history.  Figure 3-2 provides a plot of all major geomagnetic storms (Ap>50) and the sunspot cycle from September 1933 through 2008.  The March 13-14, 1989 storm as previously discussed has an Ap intensity of 285.  Using the Ap Index as a guide to storm intensity only provides information back to 1932. However, considerable contemporary forensic evaluation has been undertaken to assess older storms dating back to famous storms from August/September 1859 and from May 1921.  In fact, the 1859 storm heralded the advent of space weather and the impacts on human technology systems.  Due to this storm, telegraph operations, a rather recent electrotechnology invention, were disrupted.  It was reported that Telegraph systems operating in the northeastern U.S. could at times be operated without the aid of batteries (Reference 3-2).  Using the Dst (an alternate storm index) as an estimate of the storm intensity, the 1859 storm is estimated to have reached a level of 1760, a level that is ~3 times larger than the March 13-14, 1989 Great Geomagnetic Storm (Reference 3-3).  The important limitation of this measure is that equatorially located observatories are used as the input to this classification.  Therefore, the Dst provides a more direct metric of the ring current intensification, leaving undefined the dynamics of electrojet intensifications at latitudes of concern for the U.S. power grid.  However, it is not an unreasonable premise to expect that, in the closely coupled environments between the ring current and electrojet current systems, dB/dt intensities from electrojet intensifications at mid-latitude locations would also experience periods of dramatic enhancement as well, enhancements that could exceed those that had been observed in the storm of March 13-14, 1989.\n\nIn assessing threat potentials for geomagnetic storms, it is useful to review peak dB/dt intensities from prior storms, and the equatorward expansion of these disturbances to characterize threat potentials.  Large rate-of-change impulses in the geomagnetic field from the March 13-14, 1989 storm and other large contemporary storms can provide guidance for characterizing larger storm events that have not been well monitored.  The Hydro Quebec collapse was triggered by a ~480 nT/min disturbance, which drove geoelectric fields of ~1.5 V/km in the region.  The largest dB/dt observed in North America was ~900 nT/min, which occurred in southern Manitoba (an equivalent geomagnetic latitude to southern Quebec) and caused very large reactive power swings in that region as well.  However, it should be noted that a large dB/dt (or associated electrojet intensification) in one location is due to coincidental aspects of the timing of substorm events, therefore these events can have equal probability of producing the same intensity disturbances at other locations around the world at equivalent geomagnetic latitudes\n(References 3-4a and 3-4b).  By considering other world locations, a more complete perspective can be developed on the maximum bounds of the threat possible for the U.S.\n\ngrid. Again considering the March 89 superstorm, the largest dB/dt observed, a value of 2000nT/min (more than twice as large as any observed in North America), occurred at\n~21:44 UT at a Danish magnetic observatory (Brorfelde or abbreviated BFE).  Figure 3-3 provides an iso-telluric map showing the location of the BFE observatory and equivalent geomagnetic latitude locations across North America.  As depicted, the disturbance, as observed at BFE, is at a geomagnetic latitude that extends well down into mid-latitude portions of the U.S.  This alignment suggests that had this particular substorm occurred 5- 7 hours later than 21:44-22:00 UT, then the location of this intense disturbance would have happened somewhere over mid-latitude portions of the U.S.  The detailed data assimilation models provide an even better perspective on the intensity and geographic extent of this particular electrojet intensification.  Figure 3-4 provides a synoptic of the ground-level geomagnetic field disturbance regions at 22:00 UT.  The BFE disturbance, as shown, is embedded in an enormous westward electrojet complex during this period of time.  The footprint of the westward electrojet disturbance region is so large that the depiction needs to be covered in two frames, the first frame showing a point of view over the Atlantic Ocean, the second frame from a perspective over North America.  Also shown over North America, is the Harang Transition to the eastward electrojet, which simultaneously occupies a region across the mid-latitude portions of the U.S.  However, the eastward electrojet is considerably weaker in intensity than the westward electrojet, yet this weaker structure was the source of the most serious U.S. power system threats from the storm.  Focusing again on the more energetic westward electrojet, the disturbance region extends from Eastern Europe to central North America, a footprint greater than 120\no in longitude.  The width of the most energetic portions of the disturbance region generally ranges between 5\no to 10\no in latitude.  The size of this structure, had it developed 5 to 7 hours later, would have extended from east coast to west coast of the entire northern-latitude portions of the U.S. power grid, and is likely to have produced much more significant consequential impacts than those caused by the weaker eastward electrojet that occurred over the U.S. during this substorm. In addition to magnetic observatory data, observations of geo-electric fields (or surrogate observations such as GICs, geo-potentials, etc. on technology systems) can provide valid scientific measurements that can extend the time horizons of forensic analysis of large and significant geomagnetic storm events beyond the limitations of current index classifications.  For example, on August 4, 1972 a large dB/dt event was observed over North America, with the major impulsive disturbance occurring ~22:42 UT.  This disturbance was estimated to be at an intensity of ~2200 nT/min over extensive portions of North America (References 3-5 and 3-6).  Electric power systems were impacted across the U.S. and Canada.  Some of the more noteworthy observations were a neutral GIC that went off-scale at greater than 100 amperes peak in a 345/22kV transformer at J.M. Stuart Station near Dayton, Ohio, a level of unprecedented size in this region over the last 30 years.  GICs of 100 amps were observed at Whitpain #1 transformer and 120 amps were seen at Whitpain #2 transformer near Philadelphia.  Also near Philadelphia, a GIC of 63 amps was seen at Peach Bottom Nuclear Plant.  GICs of over 100 amps (offscale) were observed at several Manitoba locations.  Large real and reactive power and voltage fluctuations were observed from Alabama, New Jersey, and Newfoundland and across to the BPA and Los Angeles regions on the western end of the continent; and nearly everywhere else in between.  In the Grand Forks North Dakota area, the voltage collapsed to 64%.  This area and surrounding regions of several states and provinces appeared to be near the epicenter of the disturbance (Reference 3-7).  These large scale GIC observations and impacts also happened to occur at an embryonic stage in the development of the U.S. power grid, as less than half of the present transmission system (voltages 230kV and above) existed at the time of this storm (Reference 3-10).  Higher GICs and associated system impacts would now be expected due to exposure to the same disturbance today, given the effectively larger GIC antenna of the present U.S. grid. A large AT&T mid-continent telephony cable (L4) failed due to this storm near Plano, Illinois.  Subsequent analysis indicated that the east-west geo-electric fields approached a level of at least 7 volts/km (Reference 3-5).  This work also confirmed the large continental footprint of the disturbance around 22:42 UT, which agrees very closely with the comparable power system impact regions previously discussed. Older storms provide even further guidance on the possible extremes of the environment. For example, the first reported power system problems associated with a geomagnetic storm occurred during a storm on March 24, 1940 (Reference 3-8).  This was an era in which 115kV was typically the highest operating transmission voltage.  Also, most power systems operated as islands instead of the tightly interconnection and geographically widespread pools common in the U.S. grid today.  An analysis done at that time indicated geo-electric fields of ~5 volts/km as far south as Georgia (Reference 3-9).  Correlations of geo-electric field measurements to simultaneous and high-resolution magnetic field observations provide opportunities for further contextual estimates of historically large events.  A set of important observations was actually conducted by the operators of a rail system communication circuit in Sweden that extends back further than 80 years.  Careful observations of telluric activity had been part of the normal operational practice of this facility.  Figure 3-5 provides the route of a communication circuit between Stockholm and Torreboda, and a chart of the measured geo-potential observed on that circuit during a large storm on July 13-14, 1982.  The communication circuit length is ~100km and the operators noted that the peak geo-potential observed during this event was 9.1 volts/km (Reference 3-11).  The topology of the circuit is predominantly east-west, therefore the Bx (or north-south) component of magnetic field provided the driving force for this geoelectric field.  This is also in the same region as the observation of the peak 2000 nT/min dB/dt during the March 13, 1989 superstorm.  Coincident with the observed geo-potential measurement on July 13-14 are two magnetometers just to the north and to the south of this circuit, the observatories Lovo (LOV) and Brorfelde (BFE).  The approximate locations of BFE and Lovo are shown also in Figure 3-5.  These observatories lie just north and to the south of the circuit and are separated north/south by ~5\no latitude.  Figure\n3-6 shows the delta Bx observed at BFE and Lovo during the hour of the peak disturbance on July 13, and for comparison purposes, the delta Bx observed at BFE on March 13, 1989 is also shown.  This comparison illustrates that the comparative level of delta Bx is twice as large for the July 13, 1982 event as that observed on March 13, 1989. The Lovo observatory is the closest observatory to the circuit, being just north of Stockholm.  The intensity of the dB/dt observed for this event at Lovo was ~2700 nT/min.  This paired observation defines both a very large impulsive environment as well as the geo-electric field response, and also confirms that both impulsive disturbances are embedded in a large westward electrojet intensification.  The large delta Bx peak of ~5000 nT, and rapid variations just before and after the peak on July 13-14, suggests that these large field deviations are very unstable and that even larger dB/dt's are possible, should a faster onset or collapse of the Bx field occur over the region.  As was done for the large westward electrojet of March 13, 1989, it is also possible to define the footprint of this disturbance of July 13, 1982.  The simultaneous observations of a similar magnitude delta Bx at BFE and Lovo reveals that the high intensity Bx disturbance was occurring north to south over the entire 5\no latitude separation between BFE and Lovo.\nOnly a limited number of other world observatories are available for this storm, however, the simultaneous observatories in North America confirm that the westward electrojet extended over to the Manitoba, Canada.  This defines the east to west dimensions of the westward electrojet extending at least 115\no in longitude, making this structure similar to the previously discussed westward electrojet of March 13, 1989. Using this same communications circuit in Sweden, a storm that occurred in May 13-15, 1921 measured a geo-potential on the circuit of ~20 volt/km (References 3-4b, 3-12, and 3-13).  This record provides the largest known geo-electric potential.  Anecdotal reports of the storm indicate (from Karsberg, et al., 1959) that induced currents caused fires in telegraph equipment in Sweden.  On the other side of the Atlantic, the New York Times reported in a May 15, 1921 article on a 14 May 1921 storm: \"The voltage on some of the wires leading out of the city [New York] would be 150 degrees positive in one instant and in the next would have gone down to zero and on to 150 degrees negative.  This fluctuation caused the wire to go up and down, in and out of service\".  There were also other reports about area impacts from Pittsburgh and Cleveland (Reference 3-14). While these are colorful reports, they largely serve an anecdotal basis.  However, Metatech has assembled other corroborating scientific information about this storm that adds support to the important 20 volt/km geo-potential observation.  Because this observation is consistent with prior observations in the region, the data can be used to assess the source disturbance (Reference 3-4b).  Therefore, this observation does make it possible to apply tendencies from prior disturbance events to further infer the parameters and context of this extreme event.  No Baltic-region magnetometer data is available and this storm pre-dated any of the historic storm indices used for classification of geomagnetic storms.  The forensic analysis of other available magnetometer data across North America and pacific equatorial regions indicates that this storm approached a DST index intensity of ~-1000, a level much larger than the March 1989 superstorm and nearly as intense as the level speculated for the 1859 storm.  Also, based on the July 1982 paired observations and the linear behavior of geo-electric field response to the incident magnetic field environment, it is plausible to project that the disturbance intensity approached a level of  ~5000 nT/min.  While disturbances in either Bx or By can be the source of moderate intensity impulsive disturbances, the most likely cause for disturbances of this size is that the disturbance is primarily driven from a disturbed Bx, similar to the March 89 and the July 82 events.  No information is available on local-time of the manifestation (this would provide a better indication of an eastward or westward electrojet source), but observation tendencies of large impulsive events tend to be more associated with the westward electrojet.  Assuming a westward electrojet, again tendencies further suggest that this local disturbance would be embedded within a geographically widespread westward electrojet structure of ~120\no longitudinal dimension and of at least 5\no latitudinal spread. Others have also reviewed the 1859 storm as an example of important space weather extreme events.  Previous to this work, Siscoe had done a more theoretical examination of self-consistent processes and had determined that the 1859 storm reached a Dst of\n-2000 (Reference 4-15).  While the later Tsurutani effort includes improvements, both estimates provide the same approximate bounds.  The work of Tsurutani et al., in classification of the 1859 storm, was based upon both terrestrial and solar observations of that era, and fitting these observations to contemporary understandings.  This work also provides a comprehensive overview on the source constraints for large geomagnetic disturbances and offers added insight towards the classification of an extreme geomagnetic storm scenario.  One of the important revelations of this work is that the solar activity (i.e. ejecta) that triggered the 1859 storm was not unique, and that there have been large flares that have been at least the equal, typically at intervals of at least one or more per decade over the intervening years.  This non-unique perspective also applies to the downstream processes from the Sun, which also contributes to the storm manifestation process.  What is of importance is the right convergence of factors from the sun, to the solar wind and its encounter with the Earth's magnetosphere that set the framework for the *Perfect Storm* scenario.  A brief overview can provide further perspective on the role and variability of factors in defining the storm development process. In looking at the solar source, the size of flares (as measured by X-ray emissions) provides one of the best and longest recorded classification methods.  Figure 3-7 provides a plot of the observed large flares since 1972 (when reliable X-Ray observations of solar flares became available).  The size scale of flares used by the NOAA Space Environment Center is a classification of M and X based on logarithmic decade change in the X-ray energy observed.  There are several flares that have exceeded even the X category by another factor of 10, and are classified as X+.  This is also a range in which instrument saturation begins to limit accuracy in determining total energy content of flares. However, the flare that was suspected of triggering the March 13, 1989 superstorm was only in the mid range of the X class, and not close to the most energetic events observed.\n\nWhat is more relevant is the location of the eruption on the solar disk and the resulting CMEs probable connection to the Earth.  In particular, the large X22+ flare event of April 2, 2001, while ~30 times larger than the March 89 flare, was located at the far west limb of the Sun, and the resulting CME ejecta was not Earth-directed and only provided a small glancing blow upon arrival at the Earth.\n\nAs the ejecta leaves the Sun, a structure that is commonly called a coronal mass ejection (CME) begins to travel through interplanetary space, and generally in the direction of initial acceleration from the source.  The CME, by the time it arrives at Earth, can be a massive structure, with a cross-sectional dimension measured along the Sun-Earth line that can be on the order of 0.5 AU or greater.  These CMEs contain a magnetic structure which greatly enhances the Interplanetary Magnetic Field (IMF).  The IMF intensity and orientation are important in defining the nature of the interaction with the Earth's magnetosphere.  The most favorable orientation to produce a storm is when the IMF Bz component is negative, or southward oriented, and therefore opposite of the Earth's bipolar field.  Under these conditions, a reconnection readily occurs between the IMF and the Earth's magnetosphere, allowing particles to enter and greatly enhance geomagnetic storm processes.  IMF speed is also an important contributor, as well, to defining the level of energetics that the solar wind IMF delivers to the magnetosphere.  The ability to continuously measure the solar wind has only been established over the past few years; therefore observations of this type are not available for the March 13-14, 1989 superstorm.  However, one of the larger storms in the just completed solar cycle was observed on July 15-16, 2000.  The nature of the coupling between the solar wind and the Earth's magnetosphere can be further illustrated.  Figure 3-8 provides a plot of the rectified electric field (a measure of storm energetics) for a large CME cloud passage during July 15-16, 2000.  Two plot areas are shown.  In blue is a plot of the total solar wind energy, which is based on speed and B total of the IMF.  As previously explained, it is only when Bz of the IMF is pointing southward that coupling with the magnetosphere occurs.  The red plot provides this fraction of the total solar wind cloud content that couples and produces storm activity.  Because the solar wind IMF exhibited a bi-polar rotation of Bz during the passage of the cloud, only a fraction of total energy was able to couple.  Figure 3-9 again shows the coupled solar wind energy, overlaid by a plot of the observed ground level geomagnetic field disturbances observed at Fredericksburg, MD (in nT/min) during the storm.  This comparison indicates a fairly close coupling of the intensity variations over the storm interval.  The July 15-16, 2000 event had many of the solar wind features that are considered to be approaching upper bounds.  However, the storm, in total, was limited by the coupling efficiency.  One way of measuring this coupling efficiency is to accumulate the energy content of the total solar wind and the coupled portion.  In actuality, the coupling efficiency for this cloud passage was only at\n~40% of total solar wind content.  Figure 3-10 shows the solar wind energy content comparisons (total and coupled) for this storm as well as other noteworthy storms of 2000\nand 2001.  This summary indicates that the July 2000 storm had the highest solar wind content of the storms examined, and also the highest coupled content, with considerable size variations possible.  It also indicates that the percentage coupling efficiency can be quite variable.  For example, in the events considered here, the coupling efficiency ranges from a low of ~3% to a high of ~85%.\n\nAgain referring to Figure 3-8, the solar wind cloud passage for the July 15-16, 2000 storm represents a typical time-span for the passage of a large high-speed CME cloud. The highest intensity portion of the cloud has a period of ~12-18 hours, as this cloud event was due to a single large CME ejecta from the Sun.  There are important contrasts when looking at the duration of great storms, such as March 13-14, 1989, which lasted over 24 hours.  The March 89 storm also had the most energetic substorms in late March 13 and into March 14 after about a 12 hour lull from substorms in the earlier AM hours of March 13.  This suggests the possibility of passage of a second CME cloud that triggered the late energetic substorms.  The magnetosphere has several modes of inertia and storage that play an important role in very long duration storms.  Secondary solar wind cloud passages would encounter a magnetosphere with considerable momentum in convection patterns and initial storage of energy in the magnetospheric tail, which would readily set the stage for increasingly more energetic substorms, such as those on late March 13 and early March 14.  From the historic data, other very large storms have also been multi-day events.  The 1859 geomagnetic storm raged over a period from Aug 28 to Sept 2.  The May 1921 storm lasted from the 13\nth to the 15\nth.  Therefore, it appears that a necessary condition for large ground-level impulsive events would be a compounding effect of multiple solar wind cloud passages.  Multiple CMEs are also not a unique feature of extremely active solar regions, as a number of regions appear each solar cycle that have produced multiple X-class flares over a several day period.  These regions can also imprint a polarity characteristic on the CME.  Therefore, a region that produces a CME with a favorable polarity for magnetospheric coupling can readily produce subsequent events as well.  As the storm extends in time and becomes more energetic, the auroral oval exhibits equatorward expansion.  This tendency infers that the later and very energetic impulsive events could occur at lower latitudes, which broadens the risk areas that need to be considered. These summaries indicate that factors from solar activity, the IMF, and geomagnetic fields all have variations, and that all independent variations need to favorably converge to produce storm events.  The extent of these convergences defines the character of the storm.  In addition, the terrestrially-local manifestation of storm intensifications needs to be considered to determine the approximate threat to the North American continent.  No organized effort has been expended by the space weather community to carefully document the dB/dt climatology of each storm and magnetic observations.  Therefore, the large impulsive events of importance have more often been tipped-off by the observance of an important impact on a technology system that was upset by the storm's dB/dt event. Therefore, the probability estimate can only be roughly determined and may be understated.  For example, the observation of a ~2000 nT/min dB/dt was observed in March 13, 1989 in Denmark, ~2700 nT/min in mid-Sweden in July 1982, ~2200 nT/min again in March 24, 1991 in southern Finland, and on Aug 4, 1972 in North America. This sampling indicates that a disturbance of this size class can be expected at a frequency of approximately once or twice per solar cycle, i.e. about a 1 in 10 year probability.  Since the most intense portion of these disturbances tend to be part of a large electrojet structure of ~120\no longitudinal dimension, the odds for this structure erupting over North America would be expected to be 1 of every 3 occurrences.  This provides a combined probability of ~1 in 30 years for a ~2400 nT/min disturbance for North America.  As previously reviewed, the large ~5000 nT/min observed in May 1921 has occurred before and therefore is likely to occur again.  More anecdotal data from other large storms over the years, such as the March 24, 1940 storm documented by McNish and Davidson, also indicate geo-electric field effects in the May 1921 event.  These two events, combined with the 1859 storm, a storm speculated to be somewhat larger than the 1921 storm, suggest that on a planetary basis, a cadence of 1 in 30 to 1 in 50 years is reasonable.  Though it would arguably take over 150 years of continuous impulsive disturbance data to verify this cadence, this is not possible given the lack of measurement history.  Locating the most severe impulsive event of the storm, such as a ~5000 nT/min disturbance, over North America produces a combined probability that places the overall risk closer to a ~1-in-100 year probability. 3.2\nSimulations and Review of Storm Impacts on the U.S. Power Grid Based upon the previously discussed observations and expected storm dynamics for extreme storm events, a number of simulation scenarios have been developed to review potential threat extremes to the U.S. Power Grid.  To perform this analysis several simulation methods will be utilized.  The first approach will focus on the July 13-14, 1982 storm that reached a large peak dB/dt value, which can be verified with modern digital data methods.  Since a reasonably good collection of data observatories are available it is also forensically possible to recreate the dynamics of this storm in our environment model.  The peak event occurred around 23:54-23:55 UT on July 13, 1982. Figure 3-11 provides a depiction of the geomagnetic field disturbances observed over North America at 23:54 UT (time of regional peak).  This was coincident with the large GIC observations reported in North America earlier in this report.  This disturbance region is demonstrably larger than the large disturbances centered around ~22:00 UT on March 13, 1989 (Figure 3-4).  Further, the intense dB/dt disturbance of ~2700nT was observed over the Baltic Sea region at this same time (~120o longitude from North America).\n\nThe location of this region of intense dB/dt, as previously discussed, usually is located in the midnight to 6 AM. local time portions of the planet.  The actual geographic laydown region is primarily a product of timing of the substorm event and could have equal probability of being centered over North America if this same substorm had been delayed by 6 to 7 hours in onset time.  The environment model that has been created for this storm can also be utilized to rotate this storm over North America, while maintaining precise fidelity to all other aspects of the observed environments.  This allows us to simulate for the today's U.S. Power Grid not only the actual 1982 storm that occurred, but also a more severe 1982 storm scenario where the intense dB/dt region is now centered over North America.  Figure 3-12 provides a plot of this intense dB/dt region at\n23:55 UT rotated by 120o longitude over North America.  As this illustrates, the environment over North America is now significantly more severe than any observed in the March 1989 storm.  Further enhancements in the storm laydown region can be simulated by stretching the boundaries of the intense electrojet regions by 5o and 10o southward from the observed locations for the 1982 storm.  This would represent a storm scenario that is only a slightly enhance version of the 1982 storm.  Figure 3-13 provides a plot of the geographic regions over North America for this scenario with a 5o latitude stretch. It is also feasible to use these environments to estimate the potential problems that could occur for the current model of the U.S. Electric Power Grid.  The peak time for the 1982 storm (non-shifted) was at 23:55 UT.  Figure 3-14 provides a plot of the GIC flows and geo-electric field vectors across the U.S. at that time.  In contrast to Figure 2-19, that\n\n\nprovided a similar plot for the peak of the March 13, 1989 storm at 21:44 UT, the levels of GIC flows are noticeably higher.  Similarly, Figure 3-15 provides a summary of the reactive power demands (MVARs) and GIC flows for this July 13-14, 1982 storm on the present day U.S. Power Grid.  This figure shows peak reactive demand reaching a level over 11,000MVARs, which contrasts to the results in Figure 2-26 for the March 13, 1989 storm where the peak was only 8000MVARs.  These simulations confirm that the environment for the July 1982 storm was somewhat larger than the March 1989 storm.\n\n1982/07/13 23:55:00.000\n\n\nThe examination of simulations with the intense dB/dt region shifted by 120o longitude so that it falls over the North American continent reveals the degree of impact that such a scenario would pose for the U.S. Power Grid.  Figure 3-16 provides a plot of the pattern of geo-electric fields and GIC flows in the U.S. Grid at 23:55 UT for this 120o location shift scenario.  As illustrated, both higher electric fields and patterns of GIC flows are evident.  Figure 3-17 provides a summary of total MVAR and GIC flows in the U.S.\n\nPower Grid for this time period with the 120o shift.  As this calculation indicates, both GIC and MVAR levels continue to increase, reaching a peak reactive demand of ~16000 MVARs, a level that is nearly 3 times larger than peak levels reached during the March 1989 Superstorm.\n\nIn addition to a longitude shift, both 5o and 10o latitude shifts were also simulated.  This would have the effect of placing the intense dB/dt disturbance region at lower latitudes with respect to the U.S. Power Grid infrastructure.  Figure 3-18 provides a map of the geo-electric field pattern and the pattern of GIC flows in the U.S. Power Grid for the 5o latitude shift case.  Again, in comparison to the results provided in Figure 3-16, this scenario poses a noticeable increase in GIC flows across the network.  This increase in impact is also confirmed by the analysis of total GIC flows and MVAR demand increases in the U.S. Grid as plotted in Figure 3-19.  The MVAR demands as summarized now reach peaks of over 32,000 MVARs, which is about 4 times larger than similar increases estimated for the March 1989 superstorm.\n\n\n\nFigure 3-20 provides an illustration of the geo-electric field and GIC flow patterns for the\n10o latitude shift storm scenario.  This scenario illustrates an increase of GIC flows in mid-latitude locations across the U.S. Grid, while also showing some decrease in GIC\nflows for northern locations when compared to the 5o shift scenario shown in Figure 3-\n18.  In examining the total GIC and MVAR increase levels for the U.S. Grid (Figure 3-\n21), only a  modest increase has now occurred in levels compared to Figure 3-19 (5o shift).  This suggests a possible plateau at this intensity level as location is shifted further southward across the U.S. Grid infrastructure. As these simulations illustrate, the manipulation of the 1982 electrojet structure reveals that the potential impact to the U.S. Power Grid could increase many times over the levels actually experienced by the U.S. Grid during the March 1989 superstorm.  As previously described, the intensity of the 1982 storm could also increase by about a factor of two as well.  These results also show impact variation due to location (latitude), in that southward expansion of the electrojets over the U.S. Grid appears to increase impacts markedly, up to a point.  To further explore both the impact of intensity variation and latitude locations that might be plausible in extreme storm events, further environment scenarios are simulated to allow a more rigorous examination of these features and potential impacts.  These scenarios are based upon various levels of dB/dt and location of a complex westward electrojet structure with an approximate size of a ~120\no longitudinal by ~5\no latitudinal band placed over various U.S. locations.  Three different levels of dB/dt have been selected at 2400 nT/min (~ intensity level similar to the 1982 storm), 3600 nT/min, and 4800 nT/min (~ intensity level for the 1921 storm).  The 2400nT/min represents the intensity that is likely for a 1-in-30 year scenario, while the more severe disturbances would be more representative of the estimated 1-in-100 year scenario.  The locations for each of these disturbance intensities will also be evaluated at various equatorward expansion locations over the U.S., with the disturbance intensity centered on\n55\no, 50\no, 45\no and 40\no geo-magnetic latitudes across North America.  Figure 3-22\nillustrates the footprint of the disturbance for the simulations where it is centered on 45\no and 50\no latitude locations. In this analysis of disturbance impacts, the level of cumulative increased reactive demands (MVARs) across the U.S. Power Grid provides one of the more useful measures of overall stress on the network.  As previously noted, this cumulative MVAR stress was also determined for the March 13, 1989 storm for the U.S. Power Grid, and can also be used for comparison purposes in the evaluation of these threat assessments.  Figure 3-23 provides a comparison summary of the peak cumulative MVAR demands that are estimated for the U.S. power grid for the March 89 storm, and for the 2400, 3600 and 4800 nT/min disturbances at the different geomagnetic latitudes.  As shown, all of these disturbance scenarios are far larger in magnitude than the levels experienced on the U.S. Grid during the March 89 superstorm.  The disturbance scenarios are sorted by geomagnetic location and, as shown, the highest MVAR demand at each disturbance intensity occurs for the disturbance at 50\no latitude and the lowest intensity occurs for the disturbance at 40\no latitude simulations.  The difference in impact is primarily due to the location of the disturbance relative to the density and voltage level of the U.S. Grid circuit topology.  The PJM, ECAR, and northern WECC regions in particular contain systems of dense 500kV and 765kV circuit topology. All reactive demands for the 2400 to 4800 nT/min disturbance scenarios would produce unprecedented in size reactive demand increases for the U.S. Grid.  The comparison with the MVAR demand from the March 89 superstorm further indicates that even the 2400\nnT/min disturbance scenarios would produce reactive demand levels at all of the latitudes that would be from 3 to 6 times larger than those estimated for the March 1989 storm.  At the 4800 nT/min disturbance levels, the reactive demand is estimated, in total, to exceed 100,000 MVARs.  It should also be noted that peak reactive demands occur in all cases (2400, 3600 and 4800n nT/min) with a electrojet intensification located at 50 degree geomagnetic latitude, as this provides the broadest footprint across the highest density of the U.S. power grid.  For the smallest disturbance scenario (2400 nT/min) a breakout of reactive demand by pool regions is provided for the 50\no latitude disturbance, as shown in Figure 3-24.  The comparison with the March 1989 storm is also provided for each pool. As shown, each of the pools in or near to the disturbance zone generally experience reactive demand levels that are ~ 5 times larger than estimated for the March 1989 storm event.\n\nThe increased reactive demand constitutes only one aspect of the power grid threat that needs to be considered.  The waveform distortion due to harmonics from transformer half-cycle saturation will also threaten network security, due to the high probability of relay and protective system malfunctions.  The relay operational concerns can initiate in any number of relay systems, such as generators, transformers, capacitors and both AC and HVDC transmission lines.  From a practical standpoint, this dual threat condition tends to make the estimates of reactive demands less relevant, in that collapse of the grid could occur at levels well below these estimated peak demands, as the loss of key system elements occurring simultaneously with a significant increase in storm MVAR stress can lead to rapid erosion of network security. This disturbance environment was further adapted to produce a footprint and onset progression that would be more geo-spatially typical of an electrojet driven disturbance. For this scenario, the intensity of the disturbance is decreased as it progresses from the eastern to western U.S.  The eastern U.S. is exposed to a 4800 nT/min disturbance intensity, while west of the Mississippi, the disturbance intensity decreases to 2400 nT/min.  This simulation was also performed for the two highest impact and likeliest latitude locations at 45\no and 50\no.  Using the impact criteria described in Appendix 1 and a\n2-minute time window during the disturbance peak, the regions of expected power system collapse can be estimated.  Figure 3-25 provides the outage regions that would be expected for a disturbance occurring at a 50\no latitude, while the regions for a 45\no disturbance latitude are shown in Figure 3-26.  Even though the 45\no latitude disturbance scenario has a weaker overall disturbance energy, the region of resultant outage estimated is substantially larger than that resulting from the 50\no location scenario.  While this would intuitively be unexpected by consideration of disturbance location alone and the prior peak MVAR summaries of Figure 3-23, the impacts continue to be sufficiently large to the regions just north of the disturbance to also cause failure.  These regions, while less disturbed for the 45\no scenario, still have sufficient disturbance energy to cause failure, primarily due to these regions' inherently higher susceptibility because of the high kV ratings of the systems.  In short, the 45\no location tends to have higher collateral impacts.\n\n\nA 1-in-100 year storm lasting several days and achieving very high intensities would also have the potential for global power system impact implications.  Most concerns of power system impacts have usually focused on power grids located at high latitudes that are directly exposed to electrojet intensifications.  However, recent work has also established that power system impacts are being observed at low and equatorially located regions, due to simultaneous intensifications of the ring currents located over these terrestrial regions.  While the disturbance intensity at these locations is greatly reduced, they can persist for very long periods of time.  The power grid design factors that enhance GIC exposures for U.S. latitudes are also responsible for exposure enhancements at these lower latitudes.  Figure 3-27 shows the onset of widespread GIC flows in the power grid of southern Japan (26\no geomagnetic latitude) during a storm on November 6, 2001.  This disturbance, while only of moderate intensity, indicates that GICs of relatively large magnitude can occur.  Modeling and benchmarking of this system can be used to extrapolate the threat conditions for more intense disturbance scenarios.  This has been done for a number of storms including the Dst 600 storm of March 13-14, 1989.  Figure\n3-28 shows that a linear trend line provides a first-order prediction of expected GIC levels for this region.  It would also be expected that a -1700 Dst 1-in-100 year storm may have the potential to produce ~3 times higher expected GIC levels at these equatorial and low-latitude locations than those anticipated for the March 1989 storm.  These levels of GIC could also cause the possibility of widespread power system problems in these regions as well.  For example, the Eskom grid (South Africa) sustained the loss of 14 large 400kV transformers over the October 29-31, 2003 geomagnetic storm.  Therefore, these lower latitude regions in combination with high latitude regions of North America and Europe could all experience substantial disruptive events from an extreme storm, effects that could include permanent damage to key power system apparatus such as transformers and generators.  In these scenarios, the world demand for replacement apparatus could dwarf the world capability to manufacture and supply replacement apparatus.  While it would be difficult to accurately estimate world damage, the U.S. Grid simulations can provide a rough estimate of potential GIC-caused thermal damage to transformers.  Using the 950 amp-min exposure determined for the Salem transformer from the March 89 storm, a review of transformers with this level of exposure and higher can be undertaken.  Using the 2400 nT/min disturbance peak at each location latitude along with the three smaller substorms of March 1989 (to simulate a long-duration storm), a map of at-risk transformers is provided in Figure 3-29.  This calculation estimates that ~216 large power transformers would be exposed to these at-risk levels.\n\n\n References 3-1\nCarovillano, R.L. and G.L. Siscoe, \"Energy and Momentum Theorems in\nMagnetospheric Processes\", Review of Geophys. and Space Phys., 11, 289, 1973. 3-2\nL.J. Lanzerotti, G.P. Gregori, \"Telluric Currents: The Natural Environment and\nInteractions with Man-made Systems, in the Earth's Electrical Environment\",\nNational Academy Press, Washington, 1986. 3-3\nB.T. Tsurutani, W.D. Gonzalez, G.S. Lakhina and S. Alex, \"The Extreme\nMagnetic Storm of September 1-2, 1859\", Accepted for publication in Journal of\nGeophysical Research, 2002. 3-4a\nJ.G. Kappenman, Chapter 13 - \"An Introduction to Power Grid Impacts and\nVulnerabilities from Space Weather\", NATO-ASI Book on Space Storms and Space Weather Hazards, edited by I.A. Daglis, Kluwer Academic Publishers, pg 335-361, 2001.\n3-4b\nJohn G. Kappenman, Great Geomagnetic Storms and Extreme Impulsive\nGeomagnetic Field Disturbance Events - An Analysis of Observational Evidence\nincluding the Great Storm of May 1921, Paper in Press for 35th COSPAR\nAssembly publication in Advances in Space Research, August 2005 Published by Elsevier Ltd on behalf of COSPAR.doi:10.1016/j.asr.2005.08.055\n\n3-4c\nJ. G. Kappenman, Chapter 16 - \" Geomagnetic Disturbances and Impacts Upon\nPower System Operations\", The Electric Power Engineering Handbook, 2nd Edition, edited by Leonard L. Grigsby, CRC Press/IEEE Press, pages 16-1 through16-22, published 2007. 3-5\nAnderson, C.W., L.J. Lanzerrotti, C.G. Maclennan, \"Outage of the L-4 System\nand the Geomagnetic Disturbances of August 4, 1972\", Bell System Technology\nJournal, 53, 1817, 1974. 3-6\nD.H. Boteler, J.G. Van Beek, \"Mapping the March 13, 1989 Magnetic\nDisturbance its Consequences across North America\", Solar Terrestrial Predictions IV, Proceedings of a Workshop at Ottawa, Canada May 18-22, 1992, Volume 3, pages 57-70. 3-7\nV.D. Albertson, J.M. Thorson, \"Power System Disturbances During a K-8\nGeomagnetic Storm: August 4, 1972\", IEEE PES Transactions Paper T 73 369-6, IEEE PES Summer Meeting, Vancouver, B.C., July 15-20, 1973. 3-8\nW.F. Davidson, \"The Magnetic Storm of March 24, 1940 - Effects in Power\nSystems\", EEI Bulletin, May 7, 1940. 3-9\nA.G. McNish, \"Magnetic Storms\", EEI Bulletin, May 7, 1940. 3-10\n\"Project UHV, Transmission Line Reference Book, 345kV and Above\", EPRI,\n1987. 3-11\nSwedish Railway Authority measurements from July 13-14, 1982. Personal\ncommunication from Sture Lindahl, May 22. 2002. 3-12\nJ. Elovaara, et. al., \"Geomagnetically Induced Currents in the Nordic Power\nSystem and their Effects on Equipment, Control, Protection and Operation\", CIGRE Paper 36-301, 1992 Session. 3-13\nJ.G. Kappenman, V.D. Albertson, \"Bracing for the Geomagnetic Storms\", IEEE\nSpectrum Magazine, March 1990, pages 27-33. 3-14\nGeological Survey of Canada, \"Spaceweather - 150 Years of Geomagnetic\nEffects\", Natural Resources Canada. 3-15\nG.L. Siscoe, \"A Quasi-Self-Consistent Axially Symmetric Model for the Growth\nof a Ring Current through Earthward Motion from a Pre-Storm Configuration\",\nPlanet. Space Sci., pp 285-295, Vol. 27, 1979 3-16\nJ. G. Kappenman, et al., \"Application of Modeling Techniques to Assess\nGeomagnetically Induced Current Risks on the NGC Transmission System\", CIGRE, Session 2002, paper 39-304.\nSection 4\nAn Assessment of Geomagnetic Storm-Related At-Risk EHV Transformers and Potential Damage Estimates\n\nThe previous sections of this report focused upon the mechanisms for power system collapse due to geomagnetic storm disturbance environments, but also briefly discussed the possible permanent equipment damage that may result from these disturbances.  In regards to this analysis, the ability to assess disturbance conditions that can trigger widespread power system collapse is at a higher level of certainty than the analysis of what permanent damage these environments may cause to the equipment itself.  This discussion will attempt to provide perspectives, through experience of actual power system collapses, on both the nature of the initiating causes of the collapses and the potential level of damage that may be possible to the infrastructure.  Section 3 indicated that in worst case situations, these types of disturbances could instantly create a loss of over 70 percent of the nation's electrical service.  This could be a blackout several times larger than the previously largest, the North American blackout of 14 August 2003.  The most troubling aspect of the analysis is the possibility of an extremely slow pace of restoration from such a large outage and the multiplying effects that could cripple other infrastructures such as water, transportation, and communications due to the prolonged loss of the electric power grid supply.  This extended recovery would be due to permanent damage to key power grid components caused by the unique nature of the electromagnetic upset.  The recovery could plausibly extend into months in many parts of the impacted regions.  Also other space weather environment interactions can lead to loss of, or permanent damage to, satellites, communications, and other infrastructures, as has been widely reported in the space weather community.  In both cases, the concerns become one of highly correlated multipoint failures that can adversely affect the entire infrastructure and the numerous and complex interdependencies that these systems may have with each other. The onset of important power system problems can be assessed in part by experience from contemporary geomagnetic storms.  At geomagnetic field disturbance levels as low as 60100 nT/min (a measure of the rate of change in the magnetic field flux density over the Earth's surface), power system operators have noted system upset events such as relay malfunction, the offline tripping of key assets, and even high levels of transformer internal heating due to stray flux in the transformer from GIC-caused half-cycle saturation of the transformer magnetic core.  Reports of equipment damage have also included large electric generators and capacitor banks.  Power networks are operated using what is termed an \"N1\" operation criterion.  That is, the system must always be operated to withstand the next credible disturbance contingency without causing a cascading collapse of the system as a whole.  This criterion normally works very well for the well-understood terrestrial environment challenges, which usually propagate more slowly and are more geographically confined.  When a routine weather-related singlepoint failure occurs, the system needs to be rapidly adjusted (requirements typically allow a 1030 minute response time after the first incident) and positioned to survive the next possible contingency.  Both HEMP and space weather disturbances, however, can have a sudden onset and cover large geographic regions.  They therefore cause nearsimultaneous, correlated, multipoint failures in power system infrastructures, allowing little or no time for meaningful human interventions that are intended within the framework of the N1 criterion.  This is the situation that triggered the collapse of the Hydro Quebec power grid on 13 March 1989, when their system went from normal conditions to a situation where they sustained seven contingencies (i.e., N7) in an elapsed time of 57 seconds.  The province-wide blackout rapidly followed, with a total elapsed time of 92 seconds from normal conditions to a complete collapse of the grid. For perspective, this occurred at a disturbance intensity of approximately ~480 nT/min over the region.  As previously discussed, an examination by Metatech of historically large disturbance intensities indicated that disturbance levels greater than 2000 nT/min have been observed even in contemporary storms on at least three occasions over the past\n30 years at geomagnetic latitudes of concern for the North American power grid infrastructure and most other similar world locations; on August 1972, July 1982, and March 1989.  Anecdotal information from older storms suggests that disturbance levels may have reached nearly 5000 nT/min.  Both observations and simulations indicate that as the intensity of the disturbance increases, the relative levels of GICs and related power system impacts will also proportionately increase.  Under these scenarios, the scale and speed of problems that could occur on exposed power grids will hit system operators unlike anything they have ever experienced or even imagined in their careers.  Therefore, as storm environments reach higher intensity levels, it becomes more likely that these events will precipitate widespread blackouts to exposed power grid infrastructures.  The possible power system collapse from a 4800-nT/min geomagnetic storm is as shown in Figure 4-1.\n\nThe more difficult aspect of this threat is the determination of permanent damage to power grid assets and how that will impede the restoration process.  As previously mentioned, transformer damage is the most likely outcome (although other key assets on the grid are also at risk).  In particular, transformers experience excessive levels of internal heating brought on by stray flux when GICs cause the transformer's magnetic core to saturate and to spill flux outside the normal core steel magnetic circuit.  Previous well-documented cases have noted heating failures that caused melting and burn-through of large-amperage copper windings and leads in these transformers.  These multi-ton apparatus generally cannot be repaired in the field, and if damaged in this manner, they need to be replaced with new units, which have manufacture lead times of 12 months or more in the world market.  In addition, each transformer design (even from the same manufacturer) can contain numerous subtle design variations.  These variations complicate the calculation of how and at what density the stray flux can impinge on internal structures in the transformer.  Therefore, the ability to assess existing transformer vulnerability or even to design new transformers to be tolerant of saturated operation is not readily achievable, except in extensive case-by-case investigations.  Again, the experience from contemporary space weather events is revealing and potentially paints an ominous outcome for historically large storms that are yet to occur on today's infrastructure.  As a case in point, Eskom, the power utility that operates the power grid in South Africa (geomagnetic latitudes 27 to 34), reported damage and loss of 15 large, high-voltage transformers (400kV operating voltage) due to the geomagnetic storms of late October 2003 (Reference 4-1).  This damage occurred at peak disturbance levels of less than 100 nT/min in the region. While damage assessment is important in order to evaluate the restoration of the power grid, several factors also contribute to vulnerability of the power grid to EHV transformer damage.  In addition to the concern about the ability of the GIC to damage these components, the condition of this infrastructure due to advancing age may be an important compounding factor.  Analysis on EHV transformer population demographics provides some details on the trend in EHV transformer condition, growth trends, age, etc.\nOnly limited data is publicly available on the age and condition of the transmission network apparatus and infrastructure, but the data that is available also suggests looming concerns.  In 1999, the ECAR Region published a report titled \"How Aging of Major Equipment Impacts Reliability\".  From this report, Metatech has been able to assess the age statistics on EHV transformers for approximately 20% of the U.S. Grid.  Figure 4-2 shows the age distribution for installed EHV transformers (345kV and above) for the ECAR region.  This also indicates that weighted average age for these facilities is greater than 30 years (out of a ~40 year economic life).  The age of this infrastructure is rapidly approaching old-age.  As previously mentioned, these key assets are at risk due to large GIC flows caused by both the E3 and severe geomagnetic storm threats that are possible.\nThe failure of these devices will impair the transmission network and the ability to provide rapid restoration of electric power to regions.\n\n## 4.1 Transformer Internal Heating - Empirical And Analytical Data\n\nWhile there is some uncertainty as to the threshold level of GIC that will cause transformer failure, there is both empirical evidence and engineering analysis that provide basic guidance as to overall trends and vulnerability issues.  As previously noted, the Eskom network of South Africa experienced a large number of GIC-caused transformer failures due to storms in late October and early November of 2003 (Reference 4-1).\nThese failures are suspected by them to have occurred at relatively low levels of GIC exposure.  Their analysis also indicated that even 3-legged core form transformers were susceptible to half-cycle saturation at levels as low as 2 amps/phase.  Price, in his analysis of transformer saturation, had determined that tank shunting is important in 3-legged core form transformers and that local heating is affected by the construction details (Reference 4-2).  As both of these analysis efforts note, without adequate control of the flux under saturation conditions, local heating in parts of the transformer may not be cooled effectively.  In turn, this leads to rapid temperature increase in some cases in small but sensitive areas.  The intensity of overheating depends on the level of GIC but is also a function of various design parameters of the transformer itself.  These include the saturation flux paths, cooling flow, and the thermal condition or loading of the transformer.  When overheating occurs, it causes the breakdown of oil and paper insulation in the hot spot regions.\n\nObservations from monitoring and field tests also empirically illustrate the concerns about internal heating and damage potential this could cause.  In Section 2, Figure 2-35\nshowed the rise of monitored external tank hotspot on the Meadowbrook transformer during a minor storm on May 10, 1992.  This same illustration is provided here as Figure\n4-3.  As measured, there is a very fast response (on the order of 2-4 minutes) between the onset of a large GIC spike and the sudden and sharp temperature rise at the known hotspot on this transformer tank wall.  Since this transformer is located very close to the Fredericksburg Magnetic Observatory, the corresponding rate of change (dB/dt) of the regional geomagnetic field can also be described.  Figure 4-4 provides a plot of the observed dB/dt in UT time (5 hour difference between local time used in Figure 4-3).\nThe dB/dt responsible for the ~60 amp neutral GIC observed in the Pennsylvania transformer in Figure 4-3 reached a peak dB/dt of only ~55 nT/min.  As previously noted, extreme storm scenarios can produce up to 5000 nT/min disturbance levels.  This would be a level ~100 times larger.  It is expected that this larger dB/dt could also produce ~100\ntimes larger GIC levels in this same transformer.\n\nUS Mid-Atlantic RGIC - May 10, 1992\n60\n50 40 30\nRGIC Intensity (nT/min)\n20\n10\n0\n0:00\n1:00\n2:00\n3:00\n4:00\n5:00\n6:00\n7:00\n8:00\n9:00\n10:00\n11:00\n12:00\n13:00\n14:00\n15:00\n16:00\n17:00\n18:00\n19:00\n20:00\n21:00\n22:00\n23:00\nTime UT\nIn Section 2, Figure 2-36 showed the results of measured temperature rises for DC testing of a transformer, which is also shown here as Figure 4-5.  As clearly demonstrated by these tests (Reference 4-3), the intensity of the GIC plays an important role in both the level of internal heating and the rate of rise of this heating.  Note that when the DC injection is suddenly increased from 12 amps to 75 amps, the temperature (top of tie plate) experiences a sudden increase over a time span of only three minutes. Other reports also correlate sudden storm commencement (SSC) geomagnetic disturbances with incidents of transformer failures.  Figure 4-6 provides a plot from a paper noting observations of the sudden onset of a geomagnetic storm with a transformer failure in New Zealand which occurred on Nov. 6, 2001 (Reference 4-4).  The SSC has an onset and rise time very similar (though much smaller in GIC intensity) to that posed by an E3 HEMP threat scenario.  This indicates that even brief duration GIC events can lead to transformer failures. Further analysis of the failure of the Salem Nuclear Plant GSU transformer also provides insights on possible large intensity but short duration GIC events and the potential for transformer  failure.  Figure 4-7 provides a plot of the dB/dt observed at Fredericksburg (FRD) which is nearby the Salem plant.  As noted, several of the most energetic substorm intervals were simulated on the U.S. Power Grid Model to estimate GIC levels.  It is also shown that the peak dB/dt of ~470nT/min was observed at 21:44 UT.  As previously shown in Figure 2-34, the GIC in the Salem transformer was plotted over all four of the important substorm intervals, with the highest GIC occurring around 21:44 UT.  The GIC reached a peak of ~90 amps/phase around the 21:44 UT peak dB/dt.  Figure 4-8 provides a more expanded scale plot of the Salem GIC for the substorm time interval from 21:20\nto 22:30 UT.  As shown in this plot, the duration of the peak GIC levels are very brief (less than 2 minutes), yet were able to cause permanent and extensive damage to this large GSU transformer. Subsequent analysis was undertaken by Girgis (Reference 4-5), providing analytical examinations of a transformer of this design, as well as another transformer that has design features that make it somewhat more tolerant of GIC exposure.  Figure 4-9 provides a plot of the GIC level and load level that can be tolerated on a transformer of design like that at Salem.  It should be noted that for a neutral GIC of as little as 90 amps (or equivalent to 30 amps/phase), the transformer can no longer have any load or there is risk of permanent damage.  This situation would be particularly problematic for large baseload GSU transformers, as loading on these apparatus are nearly always operated at nameplate MVA rating. Other analytical examinations of GIC thresholds came to similar conclusions.  In their transformer design analysis (Reference 4-6), the authors Hurbert and Berthereau provide an equivalent of a short-time emergency overload guide to determine the amount of time that a transformer can withstand GIC.  This overload guide is provided in Figure 4-10 and has DC current exposure limit results for the un-optimized transformer design similar to that noted by Girgis, et.al.  The work by Hurlet also indicates that even optimized designs have limited time durations of GIC exposure, though with higher thresholds.  Therefore if a storm occurs which produces 10 to 100 times higher GIC levels, then damage potential is plausible for these more robust transformer designs as well.  It should further be noted that this work covers only a few of the multiple design variations that exist for these transformers and that this work also contained other limitations in the analysis on the scope of the problem.  However, the summary of both empirical experience and various analytical determinations provides a basis for estimating potential at-risk transformers for large and severe storm events that are yet to occur on today's power grid infrastructure.\n\n4.2\nOverview of Potential Impacts to EHV Transformers due to High GIC\nLevels Very large GICs from extremely intense geomagnetic storms could pose the concern of large-scale and geographically widespread failures and permanent loss of the EHV\ntransformers on the network.  If enough of these key assets are lost, the restoration of the EHV power grid could also be considerably delayed.  Because there is considerable uncertainty as to the threshold level of GIC that will cause transformer failure, two levels of minimum GIC (30 amps per phase and 90 amps per phase) were considered as the screening level for possible transformer failure for the severe geomagnetic storm\n4800nT/min threat environment.  For evaluations that were reported to the National Academy of Sciences and for the economic impact analysis performed for FEMA, a damage level threshold of 90 amps/phase was utilized, which makes overall estimates of damage levels more conservative.  In contrast, a 30 amp/phase level is the approximate GIC withstand threshold for the Salem nuclear plant GSU transformer and possibly for others of similar less robust design in the legacy population of U.S. EHV transformers. Also, it is also important to note that other transformer failures have been observed at much lower thresholds and that other transformers have been exposed to levels higher than 30 amps/phase without indication of permanent damage.  These variations largely stem from the diversity of design of the internal core and coil assemblies of large EHV transformers. In this analysis, a determination is only being offered at this time for the 4800 nT/min storm scenario at 50 degree geomagnetic latitude for all 345, 500 and 765kV transformers in the U.S. Power Grid.  Figure 4-20 provides a map of the location of all exposed EHV transformers with GIC of 30 amps per phase or greater in the eastern portion of the U.S., where generally the greatest levels of GIC occur and the at-risk transformer population is concentrated.  The relative intensity of the GIC flow is also shown in this figure. To provide further perspectives on the intensity of the 4800 nT/min threat scenario, Figure 4-12 provides a comparison of GIC levels estimated for the peak conditions of the March 13, 1989 storm versus this more severe storm event.  As displayed in this figure, the top 200 EHV transformer GIC flows are ranked for both of these storms.  Because the\n4800nT/min threat environment is ~10 times larger than the peak March 1989 storm environment, this comparison also indicates that resulting GIC peaks will also in general be nearly 10 times larger as well.  For the March 1989 storm, peak GICs of less than 200\namps/phase were estimated, while the peak GIC levels are as much as 1800 amps/phase for the severe storm threat scenario.\n\n\n\nTable 4-1 provides a summary for both a 90 amp (left hand side) and 30 amp at-risk thresholds.  The left hand side of Table 4-1 provides a summary of the at-risk 345kV transformers for each state using a 90 amps/phase GIC threshold.  The quantities provided are the at-risk MVA of 345kV transformer capacity for each state, the at-risk number 345kV transformers and the percent of the total 345kV transformer capacity atrisk for each state.  The right hand side of Table 4-1 provides a similar summary for each state of the at-risk 345kV transformers only using a lower 30 amps/phase GIC damage threshold.  In all cases, substantially greater percentages of the 345kV transformer infrastructure would be considered at-risk and permanently damaged due to this lower GIC threshold criteria.  A summary is provided at the bottom of each threshold level that indicates that the lower GIC level could increase the damage by a factor of 2 or more. Table 4-2 provides a similar state-by-state summary for the 500kV transformers that would be considered at-risk depending upon the current 90 amp GIC threshold or the lower 30 amp GIC threshold.  This comparison also indicates that an approximate doubling of the at-risk 500kV transformers would occur using the lower 30 amp threshold.  Table 4-3 provides the comparison summary for the 765kV transformers.\nThis also shows a trend similar to that for the 345 and 500kV infrastructures which would place a much higher percentage of this infrastructure at-risk using the lower GIC\nthresholds. These at-risk transformers also represent a diverse population of function and high and low side kV and MVA ratings.  The at-risk populations are made up of auto and non-auto transformer types with a variety of primary and secondary voltage ratings and MVA capacity ratings that were designed specific to their grid location purposes.  This diversity underscores the problems of providing spare equipment for such large scale infrastructure failures.  Also from a world market manufacturing perspective, these numbers of failures exceeds the annual production in the world of transformers of this kV rating and MVA size class.  Normally, only a handful of transformers of this size are purchased for U.S. locations on an annual basis.  Therefore the immediate replacement of such a large scale failure of the infrastructure could pose serious challenges and add considerable delays to the restoration process for the power grid. Of particular concern would be the permanent loss of large GSU (generator step-up) transformers at power plants in the northeastern region of the U.S. (i.e. NE Quad).  The loss of these transformers causes a compounding of difficulties, in that the EHV\ntransmission network is impaired along with the loss of output of vital and usually baseload nuclear, coal, and hydro-electric generation resources for the power grid.  There are a considerable number of the large GSU transformers \"at-risk\" due to GICs of at least\n30 amps per phase in these units.  Approximately 128,000 MVA of GSU transformer capacity would be at-risk, which is ~63% of all large power plant GSU's in the NE Quad. In total there is ~430,000 MVA of generation capacity in the NE Quad, which means that nearly 50% of the generating capacity in the NE Quad are numerous smaller capacity units which connect into the power grid at 161kV and lower operating voltage levels.  In general, it is likely that most of these smaller generating units would not be baseload, but would more likely be peaking units that would typically operate for a limited number of hours on an annual basis.  It is also possible that these smaller generators may not be fully staffed or have sufficient fuel resources available to provide meaningful continuous operation during an emergency.  From this larger base of generation, the large-size at-risk GSUs and associated generators constitute ~30% of all NE Quad generation resources.  It would also be expected that these are predominantly baseload generators which are vital to operation of a stable interconnected grid.  Figure 4-13 provides a graphic summary of the fuel types for the generators that are associated with the at-risk GSU transformers.  As shown in this summary, ~82% of the generators at-risk are the large nuclear and coal fired power plants.  The loss is particularly important for the nuclear capacity since ~92%\nof all nuclear generation in the NE Quad would be out of service long-term. An analysis of at-risk GSU transformers was also carried out using the higher 90 amp per phase GIC threshold.  As in the previous analysis of all at-risk transformers, the percentages decrease at this higher threshold, but still indicate potentially severe recovery problems for the NE Quad due to loss of these GSU transformers.  A total of 94 GSU\ntransformers are at-risk with a combined MVA capacity of ~64,000 MVA (~15% of total NE Quad generation capacity).  Again this at-risk population would generally represent the largest and most important of the baseload generation in the NE Quad.  Figure 4-14\nprovides a similar summary of the amount of at-risk generators by fuel type.  Similar to the analysis performed at the 30 amp threshold, ~77% of the at-risk generators are coal and nuclear fuel types for the 90 amp threshold.\n\n## Gsu Failures And Fuel Types For 30 A/Phase Gic Levels Gsu Failures And Plant Fuel Types For 90 A/Phase Gic Levels\n\n 4.3\nOverview of Emergency Replacement of EHV Transformers The failure of many large EHV transformers and the need to suddenly replace a large number of them has not been previously contemplated by the U.S. electric power industry.  Under normal conditions, the purchase placement of a single EHV transformer order in the 300-400MVA class has normally been quoted as taking up to 15 months for manufacture and test.  For larger sizes of transformers and transformers with special reactance or tap-changer requirements, several months may need to be added to the above mentioned figure, and the suitability of qualified manufacturers may be more limited. Of course, manufacturing and testing the equipment does not mean the story ends there.\nThe equipment will then need to be transported to site and commissioned before being put into service.  The size and weight of large EHV transformers precludes the concept of airlifting from an overseas destination for emergency replacements, even if a suitable spare is readily available.  This means at least several weeks of ocean transport for apparatus of foreign source.  When such heavy equipment arrives at the border or port, it almost always requires permission from municipalities and highway/transport authorities, as they are slow moving and heavy.  For example, it may take one week to move a 250MVA transformer a short distance in major metropolitan areas (larger ones up to 1000 MVA in size are even more problematic).  Even the distance of a few miles may take an entire weekend, as a number of traffic lights have to be removed and reinstated as the load is moved at snail's pace in special trailers and the route taken has to be fully surveyed for load bearing capability by civil engineers and certified.  In normal times, it is not unusual for some 6 months of notice being requested for the movement of such loads to coordinate all the certification details with each impacted local, state and federal unit of government involved in transportation and logistic details such as these.  (Figure\n4-15 provides a photo of several transformers being moved using specialty moving trailers).  Once the transformer is at the site, then affixing oil radiators, installing bushings, filling with specialty transformer oil (heated if a cold-weather situation), drawing vacuum on the transformer before sealing to the atmosphere, installing oil circulating pumps, and various relay and control auxiliaries is required.  An installation process can take several days with a large trained crew in the best of circumstances.  If the replacement transformer is from an in-service unit, moved from an different location to a the existing location, then even more preparation steps are necessary to disassemble and prepare the unit for shipment; this includes the draining of oil, removal of bushings, radiators, and auxiliaries.  The matter of compatible foundations and oil-containment substructures is also a site-specific challenge, along with various EHV bus re-configurations due to differing heights and layouts of connections at primary and secondary voltage levels.\n\n## Large Power Transformer Logistics\n\n Shipment of large MVA transformers may also require specialty railcars (Schnabel cars for instance), to meet height/weight limitations on most corridors in North America. Also specialty high axle trailers and heavy lift cranes to transport units may be needed from the nearest available rail siding to actual substation location. Of course, in modern utilities there is always some heavy electrical equipment surplus due to requirements or retired equipment that is out of service.  For example, a typical utility may have a few 40-year old transformers in the 115 to 230kV class and circuit breakers and capacitors that are not connected but have been left at the site at which they were originally installed.  Moving these items in an emergency will inevitably cause further disruption and of course there is no full guarantee that the equipment which has not been energized for a long time will instantaneously work.  Such equipment will still need to be rigorously checked and tested before being put into service.  At EHV levels, the standard approach to spares has been to purchase an extra single phase transformer for a three phase bank.  The transmission network at these voltage levels is generally designed to be somewhat redundant.  However, with high utilization of the transmission network brought on by increased wholesale market activities, generally high rates of transmission network congestion and utilization are becoming the norm in the U.S.  For large GSU (generator step-up unit) transformers, a pooling arrangement is generally done for spares, where one unit can be used to serve as a spare at as many as 6 different plant locations.  This works conceptually if there is no wide spread rate of failures.  Com Ed\n(Chicago area) experienced 4 large GSU transformer failures in a month in 1994, possibly due to recurrent low level geomagnetic storm activity, and as a result had to arrange to borrow spares outside their system when they could no longer recover from the outages with their own inventory of spare GSU transformers. With such long lead times for most transmission assets, and in order to be able to adequately respond to incident recovery, it has been essential that utilities develop strategies for asset procurement, the holding of strategic spares, and the way the system can be used to provide redundancy.  However, not all systems can boast having the luxury of adequate redundancy for such eventualities.  NERC has facilitated some coordination of spare parts and equipment inventories under their STEP program.  While the details are not publicly available, this program does not include EHV GSU transformers, rather only bulk auto and non-auto transformers on the 500, 345, and 230kV portions of the network.  Since only a few electric utilities own 765kV equipment, this kV rating is not included in the STEP program.  About 170 spare or working transformers are committed to this program, but details as to size and winding configuration specifics are not publicly available. Spare transformers on a loan basis is also problematic and the concept has limited utility due to the large diversity of kV and MVA ratings that are common in many custom built transformers.  For example, as shown in Figure 4-16, transformers across the New York, New England, and Pennsylvania region have differing designs and cannot be readily substitutable in any specific location.  Further, a large catastrophic event would cause simultaneous needs to develop in many locations for the limited spares that would be available for EHV apparatus. Along these lines but not related to severe geomagnetic storm scenarios, a rapid recovery option had been explored to deal with potential damage to large transformers and other transmission line equipment.  This is the approach of buying and pre-positioning equipment (primarily small but transportable extra high voltage transformers) over a period of many years.  This approach was investigated by EPRI for the Department of Homeland Security as a response to coordinated physical terror attacks on major substations on the high voltage grid.  Because these transformers can take a year or more to replace, the impact of coordinated physical attacks could cause long-term disruption of power supply in one or more of the targeted major metropolitan areas (Reference 4-7). The benefit of this approach is that there may also be a partial option for rapid recovery due to a severe geomagnetic storm that would cause an even wider degree of transformer damage.  This program was conceived to cover terrorist damage to unmanned high voltage substation transformers (about one-half the population of key transformers).  This program could also offer mitigation assistance for GIC damage scenarios/concerns, but there are important limitations and gaps:\n- The spares are only intended to cover terrorist damage to unmanned high voltage substation transformers (about one-half the population of key transformers).\n\n- Important generator step-up (GSU) transformers, which are at manned stations\n(and therefore unlikely targets for a terrorist attack), are not being considered for a physical attack threat.\n\n- MVA size of the specially designed replacement transformers will be very limited, ~300 MVA without supplemental oil cooling equipment and may need to fit into +1000 MVA slots (requiring reduced/limited transfer levels).\n\n- Will be auto-transformer only design: non-auto, tap changers, and phase shifters which are important in some metropolitan regions are not being considered.\n\n- Because of a large number of diverse voltage configurations, even for autotransformers, a large number of devices need to be procured.\n\nImportant EHV generator step-up transformers, which are at manned stations, are not being considered for a physical attack threat but would be heavily exposed to GIC from severe geomagnetic storm scenarios.  Rapid recovery of the power grid without taking into consideration these key transformers would not be possible, furthermore, a small transportable transformer design may not be applicable to replace the very large capacity generator transformers.  However, there are potential benefits to incorporating this possible future set of resources into the analysis that will be needed to determine the optimal mix of GIC hardening and mitigation strategies. References\n\n4-1\nC. T Gaunt, G. Coetzee, \"Transformer failures in regions incorrectly considered\nto have low GIC-risk\", IEEE Power Tech 2007, 1-5 July 2007, Lausanne, Switzerland, Paper 445. 4-2\nP. R. Price \"Geomagnetically induced current effects on transformers\", IEEE\nTrans on Power Delivery, vol 17, no 4, October 2002, p1002-1008.\n4-3\nP. Picher, et.al., Discussion to Paper \"Study of the Acceptable DC Current Limit\nin Core-Form Power Transformers\", IEEE Winter Power Meeting, Baltimore\nMD. 4-4\nJ. Beland, K. Small, \"Chapter 15: Space Weather Effects on Power\nTransmission\",  Effects of Space Weather on Technology Infrastructure, edited by\nI. A. Daglis, Kluwer Acad., Norwell, Mass., pages 287-300, vol. 176, 2004. 4-5\nR.S. Girgis, C.D Ko, \"Calculation Techniques and Results of Effects of GIC\nCurrents as Applied to Two Large Power Transformers\", IEEE Transactions on Power Delivery, Vol. 7, No. 2, April 1992. 4-6\nP. Hurlet, F. Berthereau, \"Impact of geomagnetic induced currents on power\ntransformer design\", IEEE Conference MATPOST'07 - LYON (France), JST\nTransformateurs, France. 4-7\nCraig\nL.\nStiegemeier,\nRamsis\nGirgis,\n\"Rapidly\nDeployable\nrecovery\nTransformers\", IEEE Power and Energy, Vol 4, Number 2, March /April 2006, pp. 38-45.\nAppendix 1\nDisturbance Impact Criteria for the U.S. Power Grid Low voltage electric distribution systems are designed to operate radially and over geographically small subsystems.  Unlike the distribution system, which is compartmentalized to protect from widespread risks, the transmission network is tightly interconnected and every station has redundant feeds from a geographically widespread grid.  However, this design feature introduces new failure concerns in that a distinguishing characteristic of bulk transmission systems is that severe disturbances that occur in them can have a system-wide impact.  Because the transmission networks in the U.S. are tightly interconnected, the concern also becomes failure modes that can cascade a failure or collapse from one region into neighboring interconnected and unaffected regions as well. A1.1 Overview of U.S. Transmission Grid Design Criteria Because these bulk transmission systems are geographically widespread and critical infrastructures, it is not possible to physically test the reliability of the power grid to the multitude of probable and severe disturbances that can occur.  Rather, these networks have been designed by use of deterministic design criteria and, for the most part, tested through the application of large-scale network simulation models.  The design and operating criteria are aimed at limiting the risk of widespread shutdowns and blackouts, and require grids to be operated in a manner in which they are prepared to survive the most severe contingency.  The criteria are commonly called the N-1 design criteria and their application has generally required substantial redundancy in network design, to accommodate the loss of any single element under any probable operating condition.  The N-1 design criteria applies to real and reactive power capacity sources, as well as the delivering transmission lines and transformers.  The deterministic criteria for bulk power systems will typically include the following requirements:\n- Severe Disturbances which include 3 Phase Normal Clearing Faults (~4-5 cycles)\nand Single Phase Delayed Clearing Fault (~10-12 cycles).\n\n- System operated to withstand Generation Capacity Outage Contingency due to unanticipated loss of single largest generation plant in the pool or region, typically around 1000-1200 MW (Spinning Reserves).\n\n- Withstand extreme contingencies such as simultaneous outage of two parallel lines or entire substation.\n\nThese contingencies are tested in simulation through the application of large network models. This design approach has generally served the power industry very well and has in particular made the U.S. power grid highly reliable.  The conventional stresses contemplated above are very localized in nature.  This means there are limitations inherent in this design approach when stressed by simultaneous and geographically widespread disturbances, such as those associated with severe geomagnetic storms and HEMP E3 threats.  These threats pose a common-mode stress to the network, as these threats can cause simultaneous stresses to occur at multiple locations, and multiple outage events can arise from independent incident stresses.  There are three important failure progressions that are commonly considered in design of the power system: 1) Thermal overload of elements, causing protective systems to interrupt the line or apparatus; 2) Transient instability due to angular accelerations from an initiating disturbance; 3) Voltage instability, where widespread progressive drops in system voltage occur, initiating a complete system collapse.  Voltage instability is the most recent and most emergent of the three mechanisms for widespread system failures (Reference AP1-1). Several factors have contributed to this situation.  The building of new transmission capacity is more difficult and often delayed, while network loads continue to increase unabated.  NERC indicates that between 1990 and 2000 electric power demand in the U.S. increased by 29.4%, while the addition of transmission capacity (345kV and higher) has grown by only 4%. The increasingly heavy use of the transmission network to accommodate higher power transfers causes burdens on voltage regulation capability, as these power transfers in and of themselves consume considerable reactive power through I\n2X losses over the network lines and transformers.  To counter some of the concerns of voltage instability, additional design criteria have been adopted, which essentially require that systems provide adequate voltage regulation resources locally.  In response, the power industry has employed frequent use of shunt compensation to support voltage profiles on the network. This application of shunt compensation has had the effect of bringing the system instability point closer to normal voltage operating conditions.  In many cases, the failure thresholds are so close to normal operating conditions that relatively minor disturbances can and have propagated widespread failures across portions of the U.S. power pools. Figure A1-1 best illustrates these operating concerns.  In this figure is a plot of voltage versus power flow across an important transmission network interface between upstate and downstate New York on the New York power pool (Reference AP1-2).  This shows the relative sensitivity in this region to increased power flows.  Notice at certain transfer levels the voltage starts a steep decline.  In essence, the system has been operated over the edge of the cliff and complete voltage collapse is now occurring.  What is even more alarming is that this point of collapse is occurring at a network voltage of ~97% of normal, rather than the 70-80% levels that occurred in the past.  This sudden transition can, at times, limit the operator's ability to fully recognize when the network has entered a precarious operating posture.  Further, the two curves in this case are the system transfer capability, either with or without a 200 MVAR capacitor bank, at the EDIC\nstation being in-service.  This is a relatively small change in reactive supply and, as will be shown in the course of this study, sudden increases in system-wide reactive power demands across the state of New York can easily exceed 3000 MVARs due to GIC events, which essentially dwarfs the beneficial attributes of this single capacitor bank being analyzed. Restructuring is also raising concerns over the reliability of the nation's electricity grid, as evolution to a competitive market structure has created substantial new operating and planning challenges for reliability.  In this environment, operators are faced with large volumes of transactions, larger areas to control, new players, changing operational responsibilities, movement of power over long distances in response to market signals, shrinking and changing definitions for reserve margins, unpredictable system behavior, and finally, an environment of having to manage systems with operational tools that were designed for a centrally planned and controlled electric grid (Reference AP1-3).  Reactive power management is one of the more pressing and yet unmet needs for the power industry.  While existing and developing threats require precise knowledge of the available reactive power and voltage regulation reserves on the network, very limited knowledge, in practice, exists in most networks. These limited disturbance/voltage stability margins and ability to control the system heighten the concern about the capability of the today's network to withstand future probable and severe geomagnetic storm threats, and also increases the likelihood of wider failure footprints for E3 threats to the grid.  Until recent developments, power grid operators have generally not had a comprehensive understanding of the threat potentials that could be caused by probable and severe geomagnetic disturbances.  Much work has been done on power grids in other world locations (Reference AP1-3), but has not, until this study, been undertaken in large scale for the U.S. (Reference AP1-4).  For cases in which power grid operators have performed such analysis, the assessment of impact results indicate that a severe geomagnetic storm event may pose greater stress on the network than the conventional threats of the design criteria now in use (Reference AP1- 5). This expedited study of U.S. Power Grid infrastructure did not allow sufficient time and resources to perform the wide range of power flow and transient stability simulations of AC power system response due to impacts of storms threats.  From a practical standpoint, comprehensive studies of power system behavior under GIC threat conditions are not able to replicate all risk factors.  Load flow studies alone provide insights on the voltage regulation risks posed to the system by increased transformer reactive demands (Reference AP1-6).  However geomagnetic storms have dual threat concerns: voltage collapse caused by increased MVARs combined with disruptive affects of harmonics/waveform distortions on relay and protective systems, and resulting possibility of wide-spread common-mode failures of critical system elements (i.e. tripping of capacitor banks, when that device is needed for voltage support, can rapidly escalate decay of system integrity).  A comprehensive assessment of harmonic interactions would require, as a starting point, large-scale harmonic load flow calculations, which have not previously been performed on bulk transmission system models.  Still, such studies would not take into account relay malfunction impacts, and a review of all possible relay malfunctions is also beyond the scope of this effort.  As an appropriate screening guide for assessment of potential collapse, a disturbance energy function is derived from the deterministic design criteria and assessments of operational experience from prior storm threats.  This provides a means to assess the accumulated impacts of prospective widely spread increases in reactive power demands, and evaluate against a set of thresholds based upon more conventional threats that are likely to precipitate widespread failures of the system.  While this provides an estimated threshold for collapse in this study, it is conceivable that a collapse may actually initiate at lower levels because of the unusual nature of this common mode threat to the grid.\n\nA1.2 Disturbance Intensity and Energy Thresholds for System Failure An important aspect of assessing failure thresholds is having to take into consideration the ability of the system to meet an instantaneous large change in reactive demand.  This level of failure threshold can readily take into consideration relevant operating experience examples.  For instance, the Hydro Quebec collapse from the March 1989 geomagnetic storm has been estimated to have caused about a 1600 MVAR increase in reactive demand and related harmonic distortion impacts on the system.  This demand increase is at a level that is ~7% of the Hydro Quebec system load.  In a subsequent study and report to the NPCC, TransEnergie (the new name for Hydro Quebec), estimates that they have typical reactive reserves of ~ 3000 MVARs (Reference AP1-7).  While this network has gone to extraordinary efforts to develop fast response VAR resources, this capability is still only a level that is ~9% of 2002 peak load for the system.  National Grid (England/Wales) estimates that geomagnetic storm collapse could occur for 2000-3000 MVARs for their system, a level that is 4 - 6% of peak system demand (Reference AP1-\n4).  The DOE Power Outage Study Team Report and several other reports indicated a number of system events where extreme load demands and/or capacity shortages pushed systems very close to, or actually into, voltage collapse in regions such as the NEPOOL,\n\nPJM, SERC, and WECC power pools (References AP1-8, AP1-9, and AP1-10).\nRegional pools are also required to provide for a spinning reserve margin for contingency loss of real power capacity.  This reserve requirement generally falls in the range of 1000 to 1500 MW, and provides useful guidance as a surrogate bound for reactive power reserve margins as well, lacking any better information. In combination with the instantaneous demand of reactive power increases, the duration of the impulsive event needs to be considered.  A useful measure is a Disturbance Energy Estimate and Threshold, as adapted from Standard System Design Criteria.  This design criterion requires all systems to withstand creditable fault events.  Using this event criterion as a measurable threshold, a calculation of MVA-Seconds Disturbance Energy can be applied to the power grid in each state.  For example, on a 500kV system with a 3-\nPhase /60kA fault (a very high magnitude fault current) lasting 4 cycles (66.6msec), the total disturbance energy applied to a power grid would be 3464 MVA-sec.  Since all power grids of 500kV design would be expected to successfully survive this level of threat, a much larger disturbance needs to be set as the threshold for failure.  Most power grids would be expected to fail for such a fault extended to 30 cycles accompanied by simultaneous loss of key elements, which is analogous to the dual threat of GIC disturbances.  GIC from geomagnetic storms and E3 threats are not single-point disturbances, but widely scattered, causing smaller MVA increases at each affected transformer.  However, when accumulatively considered these events can be cumulatively very large disturbances to the network.  To allow for reasonable margins of uncertainty, a cumulative disturbance energy based upon a 3-Phase 30 cycle fault was used as a threshold applied to each state region as the basis to determine geographic boundaries and thresholds for likely power grid collapse.  For states with a predominant 765kV infrastructure, the threshold disturbance energy would be 39749 MVA-sec.  For regions with predominant 500kV or 345kV systems, the respective disturbance energy thresholds would be 25980 MVA-sec and 17926 MVA-sec.  Because there are several states that have sparse infrastructure, it is likely these regions will not have cumulative energy to meet these levels.  The criteria would then need to include evaluation of GIC\nlevels at available locations and assessment of neighboring regions that would collapse.\nUnder these conditions, it would be reasonable to expect a cascading collapse to these sparse regions.  Further, in application, both the instantaneous demand and disturbance energy thresholds must be exceeded. A1.3 System Operating State Considerations Stress calculations can be made for GIC threats, but there is considerable uncertainty, as the measurement of stress caused by a disturbance has to be weighed against the ability of the network to survive the stress.  System uncertainty primarily arises from the large variability that can occur in system loads or operating posture of the system as a whole.\nFigure A1-2 provides a comparison of the power demand on the NY-ISO pool on July 15, 2000, the day of one of the largest geomagnetic storms during Cycle 23, and the load demand on August 7, 2001, during an extreme heat wave.  As shown, the power demand for the region was effectively twice as high on August 7.  Adverse demand conditions on this day strained the capability of the system and every available resource and, public appeal to limit demand was employed.  While a moderately severe geomagnetic storm occurred on July 15, 2000, the NY-ISO had considerable available capacity, due to the much reduced network demand, and no important system upset events occurred.  The same storm scenario coincident with the system conditions of August 7, 2000 could have had much more serious consequences. Figure A1-3 provides a graphic illustration of these combined probability considerations.\nThe red curve represents a distribution of GIC disturbance impacts from geomagnetic storm conditions.  This curve shows a normal distribution of storm related stress to the power grid, such that a large number or probability of small storm events will produce limited amounts of stress to the exposed power grid.  As storm related intensity increases dramatically, these extreme storm events are far less probable.  The blue curve represents a distribution of power grid operating posture or reserves available to counter disturbance events.  The further to the right the system operating posture is, the greater the ability to withstand a stress environment such as that posed by a geomagnetic storm.  Both the previously illustrated conditions of adverse load demands, as well as the desire to maintain economic operations, prevent the system from being maintained continuously in a highly resistant operating posture, hence a gaussian type distribution is assumed for this example.  Where the stress and capability curves overlap, then network stress exceeds the ability of the network operating posture to successfully absorb that imposed stress, which indicates that failure would be expected. In this state-space depiction, Figure A1-4 illustrates how the system operating reserves can rapidly erode for sudden real or reactive demand changes on the grid, a scenario that is plausible under GIC threat events.  Also as previously discussed, the consensus viewpoint has been that the electric industry restructuring that is occurring has produced a secular change in the overall reliability and operating capability of the U.S. Power Grid. This decline in capability can be represented by the shifted system capability distribution that is shown in Figure A1-5.  While the operating state of the network is an important consideration in the assessment of network failure, there is also no practical means to assess the range of operating postures that could be present during severe GIC events, either from natural geomagnetic storm processes or from HEMP E3 threat scenarios.  In the prior discussed disturbance energy assessments, the underlying assumption in the threshold levels that were developed is that the network condition is robust and not overly weakened at the time of the GIC event. In the estimate of power system impacts due to severe geomagnetic storms, the primary concern is increased reactive power, as measured by cumulative estimates of increases of reactive power losses at individual exposed transformers, which will be widely distributed around the network.  There is the possibility of further AC power system responses that could act to compound the already large increase in reactive power demand.  As reactive power demand increases in saturated transformers, the supply of the reactive power will result in an incremental increase in AC current flow in exposed portions of the power grid.  This incremental current flow will also produce an incremental I\n2X reactive power loss in the network, which adds to the increased reactive power loss due to this GIC event.  In effect, this network response compounds the severity of the initial GIC event impacts even further.  In order to estimate these impacts, it would be necessary to identify all base AC current flows on the exposed network and to perform a set of comprehensive load flow studies.  Again, because of the limitations of this investigation, only a screening analysis can be considered, to establish creditable upper bounds on this impact adder. An example of the WECC system (Western U.S.) will be used to illustrate the potential magnitude of this I\n2X reactive demand adder.  As will be shown in the course of this study, there are creditable geomagnetic storm and E3 threats that are likely to cause an increase of reactive demand in the WECC system by 11,000 MVARs or greater.  Based upon the load and line flow conditions for the WECC Heavy Spring Load model, a calculation of I\n2X increases can be made.  The WECC load in this heavy spring model is\n109,123 MW.  Therefore, an 11,000 MVAR GIC-caused reactive demand increase represents an approximate 10% increase in net system demand.  While reactive load, in theory, needs to be supplied locally, in real systems substantial flows across the network will need to occur, as not all fast-response reactive sources are homogeneously distributed.  Given the uncertainty and lack of detailed information to compute all possible exact increases, a reasonable approximation can be made by assuming that all transmission line AC currents will increase by an average 10% from base conditions in response to the GIC event.  Using this assumption, it can be calculated for the WECC\nregion that the GIC-caused 11,000 MVAR increase will also result in an added I2X loss on transmission lines of an additional ~5800 MVARs, a 52% adder to increased MVARs. If AC current flows also increase in network transformers, this would add even further to incremental I\n2X losses.  For GIC threats of even larger magnitude as a percentage of system load, the percentage adder due to I\n2X response of the network could be even larger. While the I\n2X response adder is not specifically calculated in the GIC threat scenarios, due to lack of sufficient AC line flow data, it is reasonable to assume that a significant percentage increase will occur and that estimates of disturbance energy functions described previously are conservative estimates of grid failure, and that wider spread disturbances than estimated could actually result for any of the studied scenarios. A1.4 An Overview of GIC Threats and Relay Misoperation Concerns Relay malfunctions during GIC events are a primary source of system reliability threats as well.  This threat is usually caused by harmonic interactions with protective systems, but can also occur due to other causes, such as transformer current saturation or other secondary interactions (Reference AP1-11).  While a comprehensive review of this threat is beyond the scope of this investigation, a brief overview of some potential areas of concern can be provided.  In the U.S. it is estimated that there are ~40,000 transmission and distribution substations.  Of the very largest and most important substations, which operate at voltage levels of 345kV and above, there are over 2000 stations.  Figure A1-6 provides a schematic of a typical 500/230/138kV substation.  At this substation there are\n3 - 500kV lines entering, and 2 - 230kV lines and 2 - 138kV lines exiting.  There are also 4 large power transformers, 4 busses, and 11 large circuit breakers.  In addition, there is considerable other associated equipment, such as current transformers and potential transformers (CTs and PTs).  In general, each piece of apparatus, line exit and bus zone in this substation has redundant levels of protection to sense fault events and remove the faulted device from the network as soon as possible.  For a substation of this caliber, relay times are as fast as 70 msec for Primary Schemes (1-2 cycles to sense fault, 2-3 cycles for breaker to operate).  The Secondary Protection is in case of relay failure, breaker failure, CT failure, etc. and is generally set to operate and sense at lower thresholds than primary, with a delay in time in the range of 100-150 msec.  In cases of additional relay system malfunction, a more rudimentary backup protection is set to be very sensitive, but delayed a very long time, typically 0.5 seconds (30 cycles).  When called upon to operate, these backup schemes usually result in tripping of an entire station or portion of a network.  Relative to other conventional threats that relay systems are designed to address, GIC events last a very long time, many times longer than the slowest backup time delay for protection schemes.  Because of this, and harmonic interactions, GIC events have been shown to adversely effect nearly every type of relay system.  In this example substation, there could be over 45 different relays, up to 3 relays to protect each line, bus, and transformer at this one station alone, and with overlapping protection as well.  Any of these relays could malfunction due to GIC, and precipitate wider-spread system reliability problems in the process.\n\nA1.5 Capacitor Banks, General Relay and Overload Protection Concerns due to GIC For a Shunt Capacitor or SVC (simple schematic as shown in Figure A1-7), the primary protection of the capacitor is based on over-current sensing.  Since a capacitor is a highpass filter, harmonics from nearby GIC saturated transformers will inrush to the device and cause large increases in total current flow.  Some relays do not distinguish between fundamental and harmonic frequencies and can false-trip due to even a modest increase in harmonics current.  These systems in particular were the primary culprits of failure in storms during Solar Cycle 22.  Failure of these key fast response reactive sources is a significant loss to the system as a whole, as these capacitive devices are the key response to compensate for the increased reactive power demand from the GIC event itself.  Rapid erosion of power network integrity or voltage collapse can occur when compounded by these device failures.  More modern relays have the ability to differentiate between fundamental frequency and harmonics and, as a result, are less likely to malfunction. However, under extreme GIC events, the current rating of the capacitor can be exceeded. Figure A1-8 shows several cycles of AC current in a 500kV capacitor bank at the Three Mile Island station in Pennsylvania for a 1-in-30 geomagnetic storm threat scenario. Shown is both a normal capacitor bank current (blue curve), while the red curve shows the harmonic distorted capacitor bank current due to saturation of a nearby transformer from a GIC of 400 amps/phase.  This simulation result indicates that the substantial harmonic flow will cause a nearly 400% overload condition in total current flow in the capacitor bank, sufficient to initiate bank trip for any properly designed relay system. Another example of relay operation due to GIC is presented in Figure A1-9.  The two curves represent the GIC threat over a 40 second duration in the top graph.  The bottom graph is the envelope of the AC waveform of the exposed transformer as it is experiencing harmonic distortion from half-cycle saturation.  The transformer's normal ~600 amp peak AC waveform rapidly increases to a peak AC of ~2400 amps (a ~300% increase in current level).  This current will also flow from each transformer into the system and through each line, breaker, and the CTs that sense these large currents.  Since these over-currents last for many 10s of seconds, it is highly likely that either primary, secondary, or back-up protection systems on transmission lines, busses, transformers, and cap banks, will sense the disturbance and likely initiate a trip of some kind during this event.  Instantaneous relay trips will occur if current levels exceed trip settings.  But because of long duration, secondary and back-up systems are more likely to trip even if primary systems do not operate, as these back-up protection systems, while delayed by 100 milliseconds to 0.5 seconds, are set to trip at much lower over-current levels. Extreme levels of harmonic distortion are likely to cause relay malfunctions, as well as lead to scenarios of large-scale simultaneous tripping of devices outside of the high current overload zones.  If numerous transformers are exposed and begin operation simultaneously in this manner, widespread tripping of key assets across the transmission network will occur.  If these trips of key apparatus are sufficient in number or location, this can readily result in cascading collapse of the network as a whole.\n\nAppendix 1 References AP1-1 Thierry Van Cutsem, Voltage Instability: Phenomena, \"Countermeasures, and\nAnalysis Methods\", Proceedings of IEEE, Vol 88., No. 2, Feb 2000, pg 208-227. AP1-2 \"Central East Voltage Analysis - For Addition of 200MVAr Capacitor Bank at\nthe Eidc 345kV Substation\", NYISO Operations Engineering, March 2002. AP1-3 J. Eto, C. Martinez. et. al., \"Grid Management Tools\", IEEE Winter Power\nMeeting, January 28-31, 2001. AP1-4 J. G. Kappenman, et. al., \"Application of Modeling Techniques to Assess\nGeomagnetically Induced Current Risks on the NGC Transmission System\", CIGRE, Session 2002, paper 39-304. AP1-5  J.G. Kappenman, Chapter 13 - \"An Introduction to Power Grid Impacts and\nVulnerabilities from Space Weather\", NATO-ASI Book on Space Storms and Space Weather Hazards, edited by I.A. Daglis, Kluwer Academic Publishers, II Mathematics, Physics and Chemistry, Vol. 38, pg 335-361. AP1-6 V. D. Albertson, J. G. Kappenman, N. Mohan, G. A. Skarbakka, \"Load-Flow\nStudies in the Presence of Geomagnetically-Induced Currents\", IEEE PAS\nTransactions, Vol. PAS-100, February 1981, pp. 594-607. AP1-7 Antonio Dutil, \"Impact of Geomagnetic Storms on TransEnergie Transmission\nSystem- Situation at the Dawn of Year 2000\", Report to NPCC, January 2000. AP1-8 DOE, \"Consortium for Electric Reliability Technology Solutions - Grid of the\nFuture, White Paper on Review of Recent Reliability Issues and System Events. AP1-9 \"The Electric Power Outages in the Western United States, July 2-3, 1996\",\nReport to the President, U.S. Department of Energy, August 1996. AP1-10 Interim Report of the U.S. Department of Energy's Power Outage Study Team,\nFindings from the Summer of 1999, January 2000. AP1-11 J. G. Kappenman, V. D. Albertson, N. Mohan, \"Current Transformer and Relay\nPerformance in the Presence of Geomagnetically-Induced Currents\", IEEE PAS Transactions, Vol. PAS-100, March 1981, pp. 1078-1088.\n\nAppendix 2\nDetailed Summary of Power System Impacts from March 13-14, 1989 Geomagnetic Superstorm In this appendix, a summary of power system impacts observed across North America due to the March 13-14, 1989 superstorm is provided.  The bulk of the information contained here is primarily a chronological list of significant events and anomalies that were voluntarily reported shortly after this storm.  The North American Electric Reliability Council, at that time, would annually review significant system disturbances and provided a report on the most important of these system disturbances, in order to share information and insights on the disturbances and what lessons may be gained from these experiences.  The 1989 System Disturbances report included discussions on the San Francisco Bay Area Earthquake, the impacts of Hurricane Hugo, and several other disturbances, most of which were tied to extreme environment disturbances.  This report also provided a detailed discussion of the March 89 Geomagnetic Superstorm, which entailed ~50% of the entire 67 page report.  This provides an indication of the widespread impacts that were observed across the continent.  The events chronology list, provided here, is largely a verbatim recreation of the *Chronology of Reported Events* table from this report, which covered pages 57-60.  The only modification that has been made is the addition of new information in the first column, which provides an added assessment on the nature of the event reported. At the time that the 1989 NERC System Disturbances report was prepared, a less detailed understanding was available of some of the event causes and interactions on the power grid between primary and secondary effects of the storm.  This added commentary provides some guidance as to the likely nature of the event interaction that was reported.\nPower system impacts can result from both primary and secondary interactions of the space and geomagnetic field environments with the power grid infrastructure.\n\n- Primary interactions with the power grid are a direct result of the flow of GIC in power system transformers, causing half-cycle saturation and a resulting large increase in reactive power demand in the transformer.  Because many storms have a very geographically widespread footprint, GIC can be flowing at high levels in many transformers simultaneously.  This can lead to multiple correlated failures and/or voltage regulation problems that can be severe enough to threaten network collapse.\n\n- Secondary interactions arise from AC harmonics, from transformer saturation, that flow into other network devices or equipment and cause malfunctions of associated relay and protective systems, etc.  For example, shunt capacitor banks or SVCs that are needed for voltage regulation at many locations on the network become a high-pass filter for harmonics.  When the harmonics are present at very high levels, from severe transformer saturation, the large flow of harmonics in a capacitor bank can be sensed as an overload condition, causing protective relays to trip the device off.  The loss of key apparatus such as this, at the time of system voltage regulation stress caused by the storm, becomes a double impact and can rapidly degrade the reliability of the network.  Secondary interactions from geomagnetic storms have been observed with nearly every piece of apparatus on the power grid, involving capacitors, HVDC terminals, generators and all manner of relay and protective system.  Secondary interactions also include internal heating in transformers and generators, and possible long-duration outages that could result. The large volume of significant events reported provides appropriate perspective on the geographically widespread nature of the threat, and that large numbers of simultaneous impacts posed by geomagnetic disturbances are a significant power system reliability concern.\n\nMarch 13, 1989 Geomagnetic Disturbance Chronology of Reported North American Power Grid Events\n\n|                         |               |        | Time (EST)    | Area or      |        | Base            |\n|-------------------------|---------------|--------|---------------|--------------|--------|-----------------|\n| Voltage                 |               |        |               |              |        |                 |\n| Range                   |               |        |               |              |        |                 |\n|                         |               |        |               |              |        |                 |\n| System Impact           |               |        |               |              |        |                 |\n| Type                    |               |        |               |              |        |                 |\n| Event# Date             | At(From) (To) | System | Event         | kV MVAR Low  | High   | Comments        |\n| Primary System          |               |        |               |              |        |                 |\n| Impact                  |               |        |               |              |        |                 |\n| 1                       | 3/11/1989     | 727    | PJM           | Oscillograph |        |                 |\n| Brandon Shores voltage  |               |        |               |              |        |                 |\n| below 224 kV            |               |        |               |              |        |                 |\n| Primary System          |               |        |               |              |        |                 |\n| Impact                  |               |        |               |              |        |                 |\n| 2                       | 3/11/1989     | 744    | PJM           | Oscillograph |        |                 |\n| Brandon Shores voltage  |               |        |               |              |        |                 |\n| at 232                  |               |        |               |              |        |                 |\n| Primary System          |               |        |               |              |        |                 |\n| Impact                  |               |        |               |              |        |                 |\n| 3                       | 3/11/1989     | 1404   | PJM           | Oscillograph |        |                 |\n| Granite Substation      |               |        |               |              |        |                 |\n| Primary System          |               |        |               |              |        |                 |\n| Impact                  |               |        |               |              |        |                 |\n| 4                       | 3/11/1989     | 1422   | PJM           | Oscillograph |        |                 |\n| Brandon Shores          |               |        |               |              |        |                 |\n| Primary System          |               |        |               |              |        |                 |\n| Impact                  |               |        |               |              |        |                 |\n| 5                       | 3/12/1989     | NA     | SC Edison     | Noise        |        |                 |\n| 115/55 kV transformer   |               |        |               |              |        |                 |\n| near Bishop CA          |               |        |               |              |        |                 |\n| Permissive trip & pilot |               |        |               |              |        |                 |\n| relay alarms            |               |        |               |              |        |                 |\n| Primary System          |               |        |               |              |        |                 |\n| Impact                  |               |        |               |              |        |                 |\n| 6                       | 3/12/1989     | 3      | PJM           | Alarm        |        |                 |\n| Permissive trip monitor |               |        |               |              |        |                 |\n| Alarms reset            |               |        |               |              |        |                 |\n| Storm K Index           |               |        |               |              |        |                 |\n| 7                       | 3/12/1989     | 100    |               | K2           |        |                 |\n| Primary System          |               |        |               |              |        |                 |\n| Impact                  |               |        |               |              |        |                 |\n| 8                       | 3/12/1989     | 119    | PJM           | Alarm        |        |                 |\n| Backup permissive trip  |               |        |               |              |        |                 |\n| monitor alarms          |               |        |               |              |        |                 |\n| Alarms reset            |               |        |               |              |        |                 |\n| Primary System          |               |        |               |              |        |                 |\n| Impact                  |               |        |               |              |        |                 |\n| 9                       | 3/12/1989     | 138    | PJM           | Alarm        |        |                 |\n| Alarms reset            |               |        |               |              |        |                 |\n| Storm K Index           |               |        |               |              |        |                 |\n| 10                      | 3/12/1989     | 400    |               | K2           |        |                 |\n| Storm K Index           |               |        |               |              |        |                 |\n| 11                      | 3/12/1989     | 700    |               | K3           |        |                 |\n| Storm K Index           |               |        |               |              |        |                 |\n| 12                      | 3/12/1989     | 1000   |               | K3           |        |                 |\n| Storm K Index           |               |        |               |              |        |                 |\n| 13                      | 3/12/1989     | 1300   |               | K4           |        |                 |\n| Storm K Index           |               |        |               |              |        |                 |\n| 14                      | 3/12/1989     | 1600   |               | K3           |        |                 |\n| Storm K Index           |               |        |               |              |        |                 |\n| 15                      | 3/12/1989     | 1900   |               | K3           |        |                 |\n| Primary System          |               |        |               |              |        |                 |\n| Impact                  |               |        |               |              |        |                 |\n| 16                      | 3/12/1989     | 2029   | Man. Hydro    | Alarm        |        |                 |\n| Neg. seq. alarm at      |               |        |               |              |        |                 |\n| Dorsey station          |               |        |               |              |        |                 |\n| Storm K Index           |               |        |               |              |        |                 |\n| 17                      | 3/12/1989     | 2200   |               | K6           |        |                 |\n| Primary System          |               |        |               |              |        |                 |\n| Impact                  |               |        |               |              |        |                 |\n| 18                      | 3/12/1989     | 2215   | OH            | 0scillograph |        |                 |\n| Essa station            |               |        |               |              |        |                 |\n| Primary System          |               |        |               |              |        |                 |\n| Impact                  |               |        |               |              |        |                 |\n| 19                      | 3/13/1989     | 0-100  | PJM           | Noise        |        |                 |\n| Calvert Cliffs GSU      |               |        |               |              |        |                 |\n| transformer             |               |        |               |              |        |                 |\n| Storm K Index           |               |        |               |              |        |                 |\n| 20                      | 3/13/1989     | 100    |               | K7           |        |                 |\n| Primary System          |               |        |               |              |        |                 |\n| Impact                  |               |        |               |              |        |                 |\n| 21                      | 3/13/1989     | 119    | Minn. Power   | Capacitor    | 230 70 |                 |\n| Forbes substation.      |               |        |               |              |        |                 |\n| Tripped by neutral      |               |        |               |              |        |                 |\n| overcurrent relay       |               |        |               |              |        |                 |\n| Primary System          |               |        |               |              |        |                 |\n| Impact                  |               |        |               |              |        |                 |\n| 22                      | 3/13/1989     | 119    | Man. Hydro    | Alarm        |        |                 |\n| Negative sequence       |               |        |               |              |        |                 |\n| alarms at Dorsey        |               |        |               |              |        |                 |\n| Primary System          |               |        |               |              |        |                 |\n| Impact                  |               |        |               |              |        |                 |\n| 23                      | 3/13/1989     | 119    | NIMO          | Capacitor    |        |                 |\n| Reynolds Rd. capacitor  |               |        |               |              |        |                 |\n| trip                    |               |        |               |              |        |                 |\n| Primary System          |               |        |               |              |        |                 |\n| Impact                  |               |        |               |              |        |                 |\n| 24                      | 3/13/1989     | 200    | Man. Hydro    | Alarm        |        |                 |\n| Grand Rapids unit #1    |               |        |               |              |        |                 |\n| phase unbalance alarm   |               |        |               |              |        |                 |\n| Primary System          |               |        |               |              |        |                 |\n| 25                      | 3/13/1989     | 239    | Man. Hydro    | MVAR         |        |                 |\nImpact\ncondenser output varying\nPrimary System Impact\n26\n3/13/1989\n239 -247\nMan. Hydro\nVoltage\n\n\n-2.5\n\nWinnipeg voltage.  Freq. -0.04 Hz\nSecondary System Impact\n27\n3/13/1989\n243\nMinn. Power\nCapacitor\n\n\nNumerous banks switched on line\nPrimary System Impact\n28\n3/13/1989\n243\nMinn. Power\nVoltage\n235\n226\n\n\nSecondary System Impact\n29\n3/13/1989\n245\nMinn. Power\nCapacitor\n115 37\n\n\nLost capacitor bank at Nashwauk.  Neut overcurrent relay\nSecondary System Impact\n30\n3/13/1989\n245\nHQ\nSVC\n\n\nHydro-Quebec blackout\nPrimary System Impact\n31\n3/13/1989\n245\nPJM\nMVAR\n\n\nMVAR generation swing\nSecondary System Impact\n32\n3/13/1989\n245\nMan. Hydro\nGenerator\n\n\nBrandon station.  Ghost marks on #5 slip rings.\nSecondary System Impact\n33\n3/13/1989\n245\nOH\nGenerator\n\n\nHarmon Hydro trips on phase unbalance\nSecondary System Impact\n34\n3/13/1989\n245\nWAPA-Fargo\nSVC\n\n\nSVC trip\nSecondary System Impact\n35\n3/13/1989\n246 -255\nWAPA\nSVC\n\n\nTripped on harmonic unbalance\nSecondary System Impact\n36\n3/13/1989\n246\nOH\nGenerator\n\n\nHarmon phase unbalance\nPrimary System Impact\n37\n3/13/1989\n255\nWAPA-Fargo\nVoltage\n230\n-8\n14\nFargo bus\nPrimary System Impact\n38\n3/13/1989\n258 -303\nMan. Hydro\nMVAR\n\n\n-130\n\nDorsey synchronous condenser varying Dorsey synchronous condenser varying\nPrimary System Impact\n39\n3/13/1989\n335 -340\nMan. Hydro\nMVAR\n\n\n-125\n25\nDorsey synchronous condenser varying Dorsey synchronous condenser varying\nStorm K Index\n40\n3/13/1989\n400\n\nK9\n\n\nSecondary System Impact\n41\n3/13/1989\n458\nNYPP\nGenerator\n\n\nPoletti unit tripped (700 MVV)\nSecondary System Impact\n42\n3/13/1989\n458\nNYPP\nGenerator\n\n\nPoletti trips on lost exciter control\nSecondary System Impact\n43\n3/13/1989\n606\nNIMO\nCapacitor\n\n\nRotterdam capacitor trip\nSecondary System Impact\n44\n3/13/1989\n608\nCent. Hud.\nCapacitor\n69\n\n\nPulvers Corners capacitor trip\nPrimary System\nImpact\n45\n3/13/1989\n610 -630\nPJM\nVoltage\n500\n-6\n14\nVoltage swings at\nWhitpain\nSecondary System Impact\n46\n3/13/1989\n613\nNIMO\nCapacitor\n\n\nReynolds Rd. capacitor trip\nSecondary System Impact\n47\n3/13/1989\n615\nAPS\nCapacitor\n138 44\n\n7 Capacitors tripped\nSecondary System Impact\n48\n3/13/1989\n615\nVa. Pwr.\nCapacitor\n230 -162\n\n\nLoudoun\nPrimary System Impact\n49\n3/13/1989\n617\nPJM\nOscillograph\n\n\nPeach Bottom and Whitpain\nSecondary System Impact\n50\n3/13/1989\n618\nNIMO\nCapacitor\n\n\nCortland and Teall Ave. capacitor trip\nPrimary System Impact\n51\n3/13/1989\n618\nPJM\nRecorder\n\n\nAlburtis fault recorder\nPrimary System Impact\n52\n3/13/1989\n618\nPJM\nMW\n\n\nSafe Harbor and Brunner generation swings\nSecondary System Impact\n53\n3/13/1989\n618\nVa. Pwr.\nCapacitor\n230 162\n\n\nCarson\nSecondary System Impact\n54\n3/13/1989\n618\nVa. Pwr.\nCapacitor\n115 64\n\n\nVirginia Beach\nSecondary System Impact\n55\n3/13/1989\n619\nVa. Pwr.\nCapacitor\n230 117\n\n\nChuckatuck\nPrimary System Impact\n56\n3/13/1989\n619\nPJM\nRecorder\n\n\nWescosville fault recorder for no reason\nSecondary System Impact\n57\n3/13/1989\n619\nCent. Hud.\nCapacitor\n115\n\n\nHurley Ave. capacitor trip\nSecondary System Impact\n58\n3/13/1989\n620\nVa. Pwr.\nCapacitor\n230 117\n\n\nYadkin\nSecondary System Impact\n69\n3/13/1989\n624\nVa. Pwr.\nCapacitor\n230 164\n\n\nElmont\nSecondary System Impact\n60\n3/13/1989\n624\nVa. Pwr.\nCapacitor\n230 162\n\n\nDooms\nPrimary System Impact\n61\n3/13/1989\n624\nOH\nOscillograph\n\n\nEssa and Bruce A\nSecondary System Impact\n62\n3/13/1989\n625\nVa. Pwr.\nCapacitor\n\n\nValley\nPrimary System Impact\n63\n3/13/1989\n630\nAtl. Elec.\nMVAR\n\n\nIncrease In MVAR generation\n\n64\n3/13/1989\n700\nHQ\nRestoration\n\n\n25% load restored (5,000 MVV)\nStorm K Index\n65\n3/13/1989\n700\n\nK8\n\n\nPrimary System Impact\n66\n3/13/1989\n800 -1015 PJM\nNoise\n\n\nCalvert Cliffs GSU transformer\nPrimary System Impact\n67\n3/13/1989\n825\nVMPC\nRadio\n\n\nRadio problems\n\n68\n3/13/1989\n900\nHQ\nRestoration\n\n\n48% load restored (10,500 MW)\nSecondary System Impact\n69\n3/13/1989\n926\nMan. Hydro\nLine\n230\n\n\nRadisson-Churchill line trip by 5ON relay\nStorm K Index\n70\n3/13/1989\n1000\n\nK7\n\n\n71\n3/13/1989\n1100\nHQ\nRestoration\n\n\n64% load restored (14,200 MW)\nSecondary System Impact\n72\n3/13/1989\n1102\nMan. Hydro\nLine\n230\n\n\nRadisson-Churchill line trip by 5ON relay\nSecondary System Impact\n73\n3/13/1989\n1151\nMan. Hydro\nLine\n230\n\n\nRadisson-Churchill line trip by 5ON relay\nSecondary System Impact\n74\n3/13/1989\n1159\nMan. Hydro\nLine\n230\n\n\nRadisson-Churchill line trip by 5ON relay\nStorm K Index\n75\n3/13/1989\n1300\n\nK7\n\n\n76\n3/13/1989\n1300\nHQ\nRestoration\n\n\n83% load restored (17,500 MW)\nPrimary System Impact\n77\n3/13/1989\n1405\nPortland GE\nNoise\n\n\n360 Hz noise at Boardman\nSecondary System Impact\n78\n3/13/1989\n1528\nMan. Hydro\nLine\n230\n\n\nRadisson-Churchill line trip by 5ON relay\nSecondary System Impact\n79\n3/13/1989\n1545\nCent. Hud.\nCapacitor\n\n\nHurley Ave. capacitor trip\nPrimary System\nImpact\n80\n3/13/1989\n1600 -2200 Atl. Elec.\nVoltage\n\n\nStorm K Index\n81\n3/13/1989\n1600\n\nK8\n\n\nPrimary System Impact\n82\n3/13/1989\n1600 -2200 Atl. Elec.\nMVAR\n\n\nSecondary System Impact\n83\n3/13/1989\n1602\nVa. Pwr.\nCapacitor\n230 162\n\n\nValley\nPrimary System Impact\n84\n3/13/1989\n1610\nPJM\nNoise\n\n\nCalvert Cliffs GSU transformer\nSecondary System Impact\n85\n3/13/1989\n1615\nPJM\nGenerator\n\n\nMickleton CT trip (related to SMD?)\nPrimary System Impact\n86\n3/13/1989\n1625\nPJM\nOscillograph\n\n\nTMI oscillograph on 230 kV\nPrimary System Impact\n87\n3/13/1989\n1626\nPJM\nOscillograph\n\n\nWhitpain\nPrimary System Impact\n88\n3/13/1989\n1630\nSC Edison\nCurrent\n\n\nElevated neutral current at 220166 kV transformer\nPrimary System Impact\n89\n3/13/1989\n1630\nSC Edison\nCurrent\n\n\nNeutral current of 15-30 A at 500/220 transformer\nPrimary System\n90\n3/13/1989\n1630\nSC Edison\nNoise\n\n\n500/220 kV transformer\nImpact\nat Mira Loma\nPrimary System Impact\n91\n3/13/1989\n1640 -1700 PJM\nVoltage\n500\n-18\n18\nVVhitpain\nPrimary System Impact\n92\n3/13/1989\n1644\nPJM\nAlarm\n\n\nConastone substation general alarm\nPrimary System\nImpact\n93\n3/13/1989\n1644\nPJM\nCapacitor\n\n\nAll capacitors tripped at\nHosensack and TMI\nPrimary System Impact\n94\n3/13/1989\n1645 -2000 WPL\nVoltage\n138\n-2\n2\nVarious voltage problems. Regulators hunting\nPrimary System Impact\n95\n3/13/1989\n1649\nPJM\nRecorder\n\n\nAlburtis-Wescosville fault recorder\nSecondary System Impact\n96\n3/13/1989\n1651\nNIMO\nCapacitor\n\n\nCortland, Teall Ave, Porter caps. trip\nSecondary System Impact\n97\n3/13/1989\n1653\nNIMO\nCapacitor\n\n\nReynolds Rd. capacitor trip\nPrimary System Impact\n98\n3/13/1989\n1654\nPJM\nAlarm\n\n\nConastone substation general alarm\nPrimary System\nImpact\n99\n3/13/1989\n1655 -1715 Minn. Power\nVoltage\n230\n237\n240\nSystem voltage\nPrimary System Impact\n100\n3/13/1989\n1655\nAtI. Elec.\nVoltage\n69\n\n-2\n\n\nPrimary System Impact\n101\n3/13/1989\n1665\nAtl. Elec.\nMVAR\n\n\nPrimary System Impact\n102\n3/13/1989\n1658\nBC Hydro\nVoltage\n600\n-20\n20\n4% voltage fluctuation\nPrimary System Impact\n103\n3/13/1989\n1658\nOH\nDemand\n\n\nDemand fluctuating by 200 MW\nSecondary System Impact\n104\n3/13/1989\n1658 -1700 WAPA\nConverter\n\n\nMiles City converter tripped\nPrimary System Impact\n105\n3/13/1989\n1658\nBPA\nNoise\n\n\nRoss Substation (near Vancouver, WA)\nSecondary System Impact\n106\n3/13/1989\n1658\nWAPA\nLine\n\n\nMiles City-Custer. By neg. seq. relay\nPrimary System Impact\n107\n3/13/1989\n1658\nWKPL\nAlarm\n\n\nNegative sequence alarms\nSecondary System Impact\n108\n3/13/1989\n1658\nBPA\nCapacitor\n115\n\n\nTripped by neutral time ground at 4 substations\nPrimary System Impact\n109\n3/13/1989\n1658\nBPA\nTransformer\n\n\nHunting between taps 14 and 6\nPrimary System Impact\n111\n3/13/1989\n1700\nUPA\nVoltage\n230\n\n\nFluctuations at Willmar substation\nPrimary System Impact\n112\n3/13/1989\n1700\nLILCO\nVoltage\n\n\nVoltage fluctuations\nPrimary System\nImpact\n113\n3/13/1989\n1700\nIIGE\nVoltage\n\n\nMinor System\nFluctuations\nPrimary System Impact\n114\n3/13/1989\n1700 -2100 WEP\nNoise\n\n\nLow frequency noise at Point Beach Plant\nSecondary System Impact\n115\n3/13/1989\n1701\nPJM\nCapacitor\n500\n\n\nHosensack capacitors tripped\nSecondary System Impact\n118\n3/13/1989\n1701\nNIMO\nCapacitor\n\n\nCortland capacitor trip\nSecondary System Impact\n117\n3/13/1989\n1701\nVa. Pwr.\nCapacitor\n230 117\n\n\nChuckatuck\nSecondary System Impact\n118\n3/13/1989\n1701\nVa. Pwr.\nCapacitor\n230 162\n\n\nCarson\nPrimary System Impact\n119\n3/13/1989\n1701\nOH\nVoltage\n\n\nOvervoltage alarms on Waubaushene\nPrimary System Impact\n120\n3/13/1989\n1701\nOH\nOscilligraph\n\n\nEsssa station\nSecondary System Impact\n121\n3/13/1989\n1703\nVa. Pwr.\nCapacitor\n230 108\n\n\nIdylwood\nSecondary System Impact\n122\n3/13/1989\n1708\nUPA\nCapacitor\n\n\nCap at Milaca sub switched in automatically\nSecondary System Impact\n123\n3/13/1989\n1709 -1725 WAPA\nConverter\n\n\nMiles City converter tripped\nSecondary\n124\n3/13/1989\n1709\nWAPA\nTransformer\n\n\nTrip\nSystem Impact Primary System Impact\n125\n3/13/1989\n1709\nWAPA-Fargo\nVoltage\n230\n-8\n14\nFargo bus\nSecondary System Impact\n126\n3/13/1989\n1709\nWAPA\nLine\n\n\nMiles City-Custer. By neg. seq. relay\nSecondary\nSystem Impact\n127\n3/13/1989\n1709 -1827 WAPA\nRelay\n\n\nBole Substation isolated\nby diff relay\nSecondary System Impact\n128\n3/13/1989\n1711\nNIMO\nCapacitor\n\n\nPorter capacitor trip\nPrimary System Impact\n129\n3/13/1989\n1720\nUPA\nVoltage\n230\n\n\nSwings on Wilmer 230 kV system\nSecondary System Impact\n130\n3/13/1989\n1723\nVa. Pwr.\ncapacitor\n230 164\n\n\nElmont\nPrimary System Impact\n131\n3/13/1989\n1742\nPJM\nAlarm\n\n\n500 kV line carrier low signal alarm\nSecondary System Impact\n132\n3/13/1989\n1827\nVa. Pwr.\nCapacitor\n230 162\n\n\nCarson\nSecondary System Impact\n133\n3/13/1989\n1829\nVa. Flwr.\nCapacitor\n230 162\n\n\nYadkin\nPrimary System Impact\n134\n3/13/1989\n1830\nPE\nVoltage\n500\n-10\n\nPeach Bottom\nSecondary System Impact\n135\n3/13/1989\n1832\nNEPOOL\nCapacitor\n\n\nBlown fuse at Orrington\nPrimary System Impact\n136\n3/13/1989\n1840\nAlt. Elec.\nMVAR\n\n\nPrimary System Impact\n137\n3/13/1989\n1858\nNEPOOL\nOscillograph\n\n\nMaxcys substation\nStorm K Index\n138\n3/13/1989\n1900\n\nK9\n\n\nSecondary System Impact\n139\n3/13/1989\n1910\nVa. Pwr.\nCapacitor\n230 164\n\n\nElmont\nPrimary System Impact\n140\n3/13/1989\n2000\nNEPOOL\nMVAR\n\n\nConnecticut Yankee 50 MVAR increase\nPrimary System Impact\n141\n3/13/1989\n2010 -2024 NEPOOL\nMVAR\n\n\nMerrimack units MVAR swings\nPrimary System Impact\n142\n3/13/1989\n2010 -2020 NEPOOL\nVoltage\n230\n228\n234\nComerford 230 kV station voltage swing\nPrimary System Impact\n143\n3/13/1989\n2010 -2020 NEPOOL\nVoltage\n230\n232\n236\nMoore 230 kV station voltage swing\nPrimary System Impact\n144\n3/13/1989\n2010 -2024 NEPOOL\nMVAR\n\n\n100\n200\nNewington MVAR and voltage swing\nPrimary System Impact\n145\n3/13/1989\n2010 -2020 NEPOOL\nVoltage\n345\n351\n3.54\nVermont Yankee 345 kV voltage swing\nPrimary System Impact\n146\n3/13/1989\n2010 -2100 LILCO\nVoltage\n\n\nSevere voltage fluctuations\nPrimary System\nImpact\n147\n3/13/1989\n2010 -2030 NEPOOL\nMVAR\n\n\nSalem Harbor & New\nBoston minor swings\nPrimary System Impact\n148\n3/13/1989\n2010 -2020 INEPOOL\nMVAR\n\n\n4\n8\nSchiller station\nPrimary System Impact\n149\n3/13/1989\n2010 -2024 NEPOOL\nVoltage\n345\n350\n336\nMaine Yankee voltage drop\nPrimary System Impact\n160\n3/13/1989\n2010 -2030 NEPOOL\nVoltage\n345\n357\n360\nMystic 345 kV stations voltage swing\nSecondary System Impact\n151\n3/13/1989\n2011\nNIMO\nCapacitor\n\n\nReynolds Rd. capacitor trip\nSecondary System Impact\n152\n3/13/1989\n2011\nVa. Pwr.\nCapacitor\n230 162\n\n\nDooms\nPrimary System Impact\n153\n3/13/1989\n2012 -2020 NEPOOL\nVoltage\n\n\n111.6 109.8\nBennington voltage fluctuations\nPrimary System Impact\n154\n3/13/1989\n2012 -2016 NEPOOL\nVoltage\n\n\n355\n352\nLong Mountain voltage drop\nPrimary System Impact\n155\n3/13/1989\n2012 -2020 INEPOOL\nVoltage\n\n\n232\n227\nBear Swamp voltage fluctuations\nPrimary System Impact\n166\n3/13/1989\n2012 -2024 INEPOOL\nMVAR\n\n\n100\n300\nMaine Yankee MVAR output swing\nSecondary System Impact\n157\n3/13/1989\n2012 -2016 NEPOOL\nConverter\n\n\nComerfored filter bank tripped\nPrimary System Impact\n158\n3/13/1989\n2013\nNEPOOL\nMVAR\n\n\nMystic 100 MVAR swing\nPrimary System Impact\n159\n3/13/1989\n2014\nPJM\nRecorder\n\n\nAlburtis-Wescosville fault recorder\nPrimary System Impact\n160\n3/13/1989\n2014 -2028 NEPOOL\nVoltage\n\n\n355\n352\nBerkshire voltage drop\nPrimary System Impact\n161\n3/13/1989\n2014\nNYPP\nVoltage\n\n\nVoltage decline at Goethals, Flainey, Gilboa, Edic\nPrimary System Impact\n162\n3/13/1989\n2015 -2030 NEPOOL\nMW\n\n\nDeerfield generation swings\nPrimary System Impact\n163\n3/13/1989\n2016 -2030 NEPOOL\nMVAR\n\n\nBrayton Pt reactiv; output\nPrimary System Impact\n164\n3/13/1989\n2015 -2030 INEPOOL\nMVAR\n\n\nCanal Station 20 MVAR swing\nPrimary System Impact\n165\n3/13/1989\n2016\nPJM\nAlarm\n\n\nJuniata\nPrimary System Impact\n166\n3/13/1989\n2015 -2030 NEPOOL\nMVAR\n\n\n190\n325\nMillstone Unit 3 MVAR swings\nPrimary System Impact\n167\n3/13/1989\n2015 -2030 NEPOOL\nVoltage\n345\n358\n359.5\nMillstone Station voltage swings\nPrimary System Impact\n168\n3/13/1989\n2015 -2030 NEPOOL\nVoltage\n345\n350\n353\nBrayton Pt voltage dip\nPrimary System Impact\n169\n3/13/1989\n2016 -2030 NEPOOL\nVoltage\n\n\nWebster St. voltage dip and swings\nPrimary System Impact\n170\n3/13/1989\n2015 -2030 NEPOOL\nMVAR\n\n\nMiddletown #4 20 MVAR\nSecondary System Impact\n171\n3/13/1989\n2016\nOH\nGenerator\n\n\nPhase unbalance at Bruce Nuclear Generator\nSecondary System Impact\n172\n3/13/1989\n2016\nOH\nCapacitor\n\n32\n\n\nBelleville capacitors trip\nSecondary System Impact\n173\n3/13/1989\n2017\nNEPOOL\nConverter\n\n\nMadawaska dc tie runback\nPrimary System Impact\n174\n3/13/1989\n2017\nNEPOOL\nVoltage\n345\n-24\n\nVoltage on Orrington 346 kV bus\nSecondary System Impact\n175\n3/13/1989\n2017\nNEPOOL\nCapacitor\n115 67\n\n\nOrringion capacitors (1.2,&3) opened and would not close\nPrimary System Impact\n176\n3/13/1989\n2017\nNEPOOL\nVoltage\n\n\nGeneral voltage instability\nPrimary System Impact\n177\n3/13/1989\n2017\nNEPOOL\nMVAR\n\n\nYarmouth reactive output exceeded 300 MVAR\nSecondary System Impact\n178\n3/13/1989\n2018\nVa. Pwr.\nCapacitor\n230 162\n\n\nOx\nPrimary System\nImpact\n179\n3/13/1989\n2019\nWEP\nAlarm\n\n\nPoint Beach plant\nPrimary System Impact\n180\n3/13/1989\n2019\nUPA\nAlarms\n\n\nRush City MW and MVA@ alarms\nPrimary System Impact\n181\n3/13/1989\n2020 -2030 Atl. Elec.\nMVAR\n\n85\n\n\nSecondary System Impact\n182\n3/13/1989\n2020\nAPS\nTransformer\n\n\nAutotransformer at Meadowbrook damaged. 9.2 THD\nPrimary System Impact\n183\n3/13/1989\n2020 -2030 Atl. Elec.\nVoltage\n138 -2.5\n\n\nSecondary System Impact\n184\n3/13/1989\n2020\nOH\nGenerator\n\n\nChats Falls MW and MVAR fluctuations\nSecondary System Impact\n185\n3/13/1989\n2020\nUPA\nConverter\n\n\nCoal Creek pole #2 at 375 kV\nSecondary System Impact\n186\n3/13/1989\n2021\nPJM\nCapacitor\n\n\nTMI capacitors tripped. Returned at 2139\nSecondary System Impact\n187\n3/13/1989\n2022 -2024 UPA\nLine\n230\n\n\nBenton Co.-Milaca line opened\nPrimary System Impact\n188\n3/13/1989\n2022\nPJM\nAlarm\n\n\nConastone\nPrimary System\n189\n3/13/1989\n2024 -2064 CPA\nVoltage\n\n\nVoltage fluctuations\nImpact Secondary System Impact\n190\n3/13/1989\n2024 -2054 CPA\nCapacitor\n\n\nCapacitor banks switched on\nSecondary System Impact\n192\n3/13/1989\n2032\nPJM\nCapacitor\n69\n\n\nNazareth Capacitors tripped\nStorm K Index\n193\n3/13/1989\n2200\n\nK9\n\n\nPrimary System Impact\n194\n3/13/1989\n2300\nPE\nVoltage\n500\n-10\n\n\nStorm K Index\n195\n3/14/1989\n100\n\nK6\n\n\nPrimary System Impact\n196\n3/14/1989\n153\nNebraska\nAlarm\n\n\nUnexplalned frequency alarms\nPrimary System Impact\n197\n3/14/1989\n233\nNebraska\nAlarm\n\n\nUnexplained frequency alarms\nPrimary System Impact\n198\n3/14/1989\n240\nNebraska\nAlarm\n\n\nUnexplained frequency alarms\nPrimary System Impact\n199\n3/14/1989\n240 -250\nEast ND\nVoltage\n230\n-3\n15\n\nStorm K Index\n200\n3/14/1989\n400\n\nK8\n\n\nPrimary System\nImpact\n201\n3/14/1989\n628\nPJM\nRecorder\n\n\nWescosville fault\nrecorder\nStorm K Index\n202\n3/14/1989\n700\n\nK4\n\n\nPrimary System Impact\n203\n3/14/1989\n819\nPJM\nAlarm\n\n\nJuniata miscellaneous alarms\nStorm K Index\n204\n3/14/1989\n1000\n\nK4\n\n\nStorm K Index\n205\n3/14/1989\n1300\n\nK4\n\n\nStorm K Index\n206\n3/14/1989\n1600\n\nK6\n\n\nPrimary System Impact\n207\n3/14/1989\n1720 -1730 East ND\nVoltage\n230\n-3\n15\n\nStorm K Index\n208\n3/14/1989\n1900\n\nK7\n\n\nPrimary System Impact\n209\n3/14/1989\n2020 -2040 East ND\nVoltage\n\n\n-3\n15\n\nPrimary System Impact\n210\n3/14/1989\n2104\nMan. Hydro\nAlarm\n500\n\n\nSMD alarm at Dorsey station\nStorm K Index\n211\n3/14/1989\n2200\n\nK5\n\nAppendix 3\nGeomagnetic Storm Validation Simulations of U.S. Grid Model Geomagnetic storms have provided an ideal opportunity to validate the model components that will be used to assess the E3 threats to the U.S. Power Grid.  Storms are relatively frequent events, and observations of magnetic fields, electric fields, and GICs in power grids provide observation data that can be used to validate simulation models. Power system GIC flows and overall current flows are the most difficult data to obtain, as it requires the installation of special monitoring equipment by the concerned utility company to measure GIC flows, and because of the effort and expense, these measurements are very sparse relative to the size of the power grid.  In spite of these limitations, a relatively large number of observations and storms have been selected to perform validations.  In some cases, the validation confirms individual model components, such as the response of the ground conductivity model in terms of geoelectric field.  In many cases, validations are done of combined models, such as the ground model and the power circuit model, to validate the GIC flow in a particular set of transformers due to a geomagnetic field disturbance.  This introduces a small amount of uncertainty in that some benchmark storm events are approximately 10 to 20 years old and some minor changes have occurred to the transmission network in intervening years. In aggregate, the changes to the power grid have been small.  For example, NERC reports that between 1989 and 2000, only 192 miles of 345kV transmission have been added (0.4% increase in total miles) (Reference AP3-1).  Therefore, as a whole, the model of the present U.S. grid is reasonably close to the size of the grid at the time of most storms.\nThere is also the possibility of more significant changes of a local nature, which will mean some disagreement may be possible at specific sites, while valid at most other locations.  This could occur, for example, due to the addition of a second transformer at an old monitoring site that would now cause the GIC flow modeled in today's network to be shared between the two transformers. For many storm events, the ground model and Power Grid Model are confirmed simultaneously at many observation points across the U.S. power grid.  These confirmations indicate that all aspects of the complex and geographically widespread storm events and models are providing creditable results, and therefore can reliably predict disturbance events of a more severe nature that are to be investigated in this study.\nBecause there is uncertainty in both the ground model and in the Power Grid Model, agreement within a factor of two is a goal, though agreement in most cases is far better than this goal.  In Section 2 of the this report, several model validations were discussed for three storm events: a validation of the ground models in northern Minnesota (storm on Nov 4, 1993) and central Alaska (storm on Oct 3, 1981), along with the validation of both the ground model and Power Grid Model for the power system in Maine during a storm on May 4, 1998.  In addition to these cases, validations were also undertaken during storms on March 24, 1991, Oct 28, 1991, May 10, 1992, and Feb 21, 1994.  The results of each will be described in the following sections.\n\nA3.1 Benchmarking the U.S. Grid Model - Feb 21, 1994 Storm The storm on Feb 21, 1994, while relatively small in intensity and duration, was simultaneously observed at several locations.  Therefore, this storm presents a good opportunity for validation of the model components.  Figure A3-1 indicates the locations in the U.S. of storm observations that can be used to benchmark various models and regions of the U.S. model.  As shown in Figure A3-1, observations of GIC were made at the Rockport and Marysville substations on the AEP transmission system in Indiana and Ohio. Figure A3-2 shows a more detailed view of the power grid region of interest, which involves a region of extensive 765kV transmission development.  This region is also relatively remote and in a mid-point between 4 surrounding observatories, therefore this provides an opportunity to evaluate the performance of the geomagnetic storm specification model, the ground model, and the Power Grid Model components.  The modeled geomagnetic field environments at times 13:35 and 14:04 are shown respectively in Figures A3-3 and A3-4.  As shown, the intense electrojet regions are at very high latitudes, therefore storm conditions at the lower latitude regions of Ohio/Indiana will be significantly weaker, as expected.  The intensity (in nT/min) of the observed geomagnetic fields at two observatories east of the region (Fredericksburg, VA and Ottawa, Ontario) are shown in Figure A3-5.  These observations also confirm the relatively weak storm conditions over the time interval of interest.  In Figures A3-6 and A3-7 provide a comparison of the observed and simulated GIC at the Rockport and Marysville locations (Reference AP3-2).  In general, the agreement is very good in respect to both magnitude and overall wave shape.  In addition, it is evident that a timing error occurred in the observation of GIC at the Marysville location (a common occurrence given the experimental nature of these measurements). Other observations can be validated during this same storm.  Figure A3-8 shows very good agreement between measured and calculated GIC observed at the Forbes substation in northern Minnesota (Reference AP3-3).  Figure A3-9 shows the comparison of peak measured and peak calculated GIC at 10 locations around the U.S. during this storm. With the exception of the Moss Landing station in California, all sites generally provide calculated peak GIC within ~ 20% agreement to observed peak GIC values (References AP3-1 and AP3-4). A3.2 Benchmarking the U.S. Grid Model - Oct 28, 1991 Storm The Oct 28, 1991 storm also provides a good opportunity to validate the accuracy of the U.S. Power Grid Model.  This storm is more energetic than the Feb 21, 1994 storm and also has a sudden and very severe onset condition.  This onset, while relatively small in magnitude, mimics in smaller scale the severe disturbance environments that could occur for an E3 environment or a large impulsive electrojet disturbance from a 1-in-100 year storm scenario.  Because this was a more energetic storm event, larger levels of GIC have been observed compared to the prior storm.  Figure A3-10 provides a summary of the geomagnetic disturbance intensity (in units of nT/min).  At around 15:39 UT, a large impulsive disturbance is observed.  Figure A3-11 provides a detailed map of the groundlevel geomagnetic disturbance conditions at 15:39 UT.  As shown, the intense portion of the disturbance is located over a large mid-latitude portion of the eastern U.S.  The GIC flow was observed during this storm at a number of eastern U.S. monitoring sites, as detailed in Figure A3-12.  The South Canton 765kV station in Ohio provides a model validation opportunity for this storm.  Shown in Figure A3-13 is the observed GIC and the calculated GIC at this location during the most intense portion of the geomagnetic storm (Reference AP3-3).  Overall good agreement on wave shape and magnitudes of the GIC are confirmed at this location.  Observations at other sites are summarized in Figure A3-14.  These observations include two locations in Maine, a location at Pleasant Valley in the lower Hudson River Valley in New York, and also a location in Virginia (Reference AP3-4).  These comparisons between observed and calculated again indicate general agreement being within approximately 20%.\n\nA3.3 Benchmarking the U.S. Grid Model - May 10, 1992 Storm The storm on May 10, 1992 was a storm of moderate intensity and duration.  The peak intensities of the storm reached levels of approximately 350 nT/min, as observed at the Ottawa observatory, but remained less than 80 nT/min at the Fredericksburg,Virginia observatory.  This storm event also provides an opportunity to validate the performance of the model at a number of locations distributed North to South along the power grid in the Eastern U.S.  These sites cover the NEPOOL, NYISO, PJM, ECAR and SERC power pool regions.  Figures A3-15 and A3-16 provide details of the geomagnetic field disturbance at 9:10 UT and 9:43 UT.  As indicated, the most intense portions of the storm event are generally located along the U.S./Canada border throughout the storm duration.\nFigure A3-17 provides a comparison of peak observed and calculated GICs at eight different locations from the New England through mid-Atlantic regions of the eastern U.S. (Reference AP3-4).  These results also confirm general agreement between observed and calculated, with accuracies within ~20%.  Figure A3-18 provides a time plot of the observed GIC at these locations, to indicate the relative coherence in GIC intensification that occurs over this large region.\n\nA3.4 Benchmarking the U.S. Grid Model - March 24, 1991 SSC Event The storm event of interest on March 24, 1991 was a sudden storm commencement.  This particular geomagnetic disturbance mimics, at a much lower intensity, many of the characteristics of an E3 threat.  Therefore, the SSC event allows for the testing of the Grid Model for higher spectral content conditions, as the SSC presents an environment that also closely duplicates the spectral content of the late-time HEMP threat.  Because of the rapid onset and rate of change of the geomagnetic field, a higher cadence of magnetometer observation is needed to represent the fast transients.  For this disturbance, several sites with 2-second cadence are available (electrojet disturbances are simulated using one-minute cadence).  Figure A3-19 provides a plot of the observed geomagnetic field disturbance at Tuckerton, New Jersey during this brief SSC event.  SSCs present a less spatially complex disturbance environment.  Figure A3-20 provides an observation of simultaneous observations at Point Arena in California, Victoria British Columbia, Ottawa Ontario, and Tuckerton New Jersey.  This data, along with studies of many other SSC events, indicated that a plane-wave type disturbance developed over mid-latitude portions of North America.  Since the benchmark region of interest is also very close in proximity to the Tuckerton location, this approach is used for simulation of the disturbance environment.\n\nAgain, a number of measurements of power grid observations were captured during this March 24, 1991 brief disturbance, to indicate the importance of the power system reaction to the disturbance.  Figure A3-21 is a paper strip chart record of both GIC and AC observations made at the Limerick nuclear plant transformers near Philadelphia, Pennsylvania (Reference AP3-5).  These recordings indicate a very large full-scale spike of GIC observed, as well as a large spike in AC neutral current flow in the Limerick transformer at the time of the SSC event.  This confirms that the SSC and, in general, fast geomagnetic disturbances, can produce proportionately large geo-electric field and GIC\nresponses, and also that even these brief GICs will cause near immediate and severe halfcycle saturation response in exposed transformers.  Digital measurements were also available from one of the 500kV transformers at the Meadowbrook station in Virginia, though the sampling was only at a 20 second cadence, which limits spectral resolution of the fastest portion of the event (Reference AP3-6).  Figure A3-22 provides a comparison of the observed GIC and the calculated GIC for this disturbance.  The comparison illustrates that there is relatively good overall agreement, and very good agreement with regard to large-scale magnitude and timescale features, between observed and calculated. The calculation was performed using a 2 second cadence.  This likely explains some of the small-scale spectral content differences.  Figure A3-23 shows the observation of GIC\nand transformer AC 3\nrd harmonic neutral current response at the Pleasant Valley, New York station during the March 24, 1991 SSC event (Reference AP3-4).  The very large spike of GIC and observed AC harmonic at the very beginning of the plot are timecoincident with the SSC event.  This observation also confirms that large GICs and rapid transformer reaction will occur for these brief events.  Figure A3-24 provides a benchmark of the calculated GIC during the SSC at the Pleasant Valley station.  This again confirms generally good overall agreement between the model and observations. Figure A3-25 provides a comparison of observed and calculated Peak GICs at 11 different sites extending across Ohio, Pennsylvania, New York, and Virginia.  The model and simulation results again indicate very good overall agreement with the observed GICs event, with the higher spectral resolution simulations that are being performed.\n\n## Brief Ac & Gic Measurements To Full-Scale\n\nWhile these benchmarks have provided opportunities to rigorously evaluate the accuracy of the U.S. Power Grid Model over broad areas, there are some regions that opportunities for model validation are very limited or essentially unavailable using these direct simulation methods.  This is particularly true in the southern tier of states, though there have been verified power system impacts due to prior geomagnetic storm in many of these areas as well.  For example, during the March 13-14, 1989 superstorm, voltage regulation and large AC neutral current flows were confirmed in the transmission network in and around the Los Angeles area.  During the Oct 28, 1991 storm, a DC\ntransmission interconnection between the ERCOT and WECC pools tripped co-incident with the sudden onset of the storm.  Impacts were also observed in the TVA transmission network throughout their transmission areas of Tennessee, Mississippi, Alabama, and Georgia.  TVA also confirmed the trip of several high-voltage capacitor banks during the SSC event, and also during the main phase of a geomagnetic storm on July 15, 2000.\nSome of these events occurred as far south as central Mississippi.  In this case, TVA was able to provide GPS accurate timestamps, which verify the coincidence of these device failures to specific time stamps of geomagnetic disturbance intensifications (Reference AP3-7).  While these events are verified, in most respects they also lack the special measurements of GIC flows, etc., that are most useful for model benchmarking purposes. While the accuracy of these regions is not strictly available for verification, the same methodology was applied in developing the models for these regions as was used for the regions that have been rigorously benchmarked.\n\nA3.5: Quebec Transmission Network Model Benchmark Because an analysis was performed for the conditions that caused the collapse of the Hydro Quebec power grid during the March 13-14, 1989 superstorm, it was desired to perform a model validation of this network as well.  The Quebec system operates asynchronously from the U.S. and other Canadian power grids and is only tied via several DC interconnection points.  For purposes of GIC threat assessment, this system can be modeled as a separate network.  Very little information has been made publicly available on GIC measurements that would allow for independent validation of the network model. In January 2000, the TransEnergie Corp (the successor company to Hydro Quebec, responsible for operation of the transmission network) provided a report to the NPCC power pool, discussing the actions they have taken to prepare for geomagnetic storms during the present solar cycle 23 (Reference AP3-8).  This report mentioned the estimate of peak system-wide reactive demands during a small storm on Oct 22, 1999.  They acknowledge, \"There is not sufficient information available to calculate exactly the quantity of reactive power which the network had to provide to compensate for the saturation of power transformer.  One can however roughly estimate it as about 700\nMVARs\".  They also indicate that voltage at several locations on their 735kV\ntransmission network dropped about 2% from normal voltage levels.  They further note that the peak of activity occurred around 2:40 EDT or 6:40 UT.  Using this limited information, a simulation of the Quebec transmission model was undertaken during this time interval, and an evaluation was made of transmission-wide reactive demand increases that would have occurred on the network.  Figure A3-26 provides a plot of the simulated reactive demand on the network for this storm event.  Because this model validation includes all model components (the magnetic storm environment, ground model, Power Grid Model and transformer AC model), this provides an end-to-end validation.  As shown, the results indicate a peak reactive demand of approximately 1200\nMVARs, which is higher but still within the factor of 2 goal that was sought.  This analysis also needs to take into consideration the stated uncertainties on the part of the report authors.  The validation also confirmed that the time of peak intensity was 6:40 UT.  In relative terms, this model provides useful insights, as comparisons between various storm events will ultimately provide a delta change of stress of one storm event where the system survived compared to other storm events where system collapse occurred.  These comparisons would tend to remove any underlying model bias that may be present.\n\nAppendix 3 References AP3-1 NERC Electric Supply and Demand Database Software - Year 2001 Edition. AP3-2 E.E. Wilcox, \"AEP's GIC Monitoring Experience\", Report to EEI, 179\nth\nMeeting, Electrical System & Equipment Committee, Cleveland , Ohio, May 17, 1994. AP3-3 J.G. Kappenman, W.A. Radasky, J.L. Gilbert, I.A. Erinmez, \"Advanced\nGeomagnetic Storm Forecasting: A Risk Management Tool for Electric Power Operations\", IEEE Transactions on Plasma Science, Special Issue on Space Plasmas, Vol 28, No 6, December 2000, pp2114-2121. AP3-4 Electric Research & Management Inc, \"SUNBURST GIC Network - Phase II\nProgress Report\", December 1995. AP3-5 Plot distributed by Don Fagan, Philadelphia Electric. AP3-6 Report from Phil Gattens Allegheny Electric to EEI, \"The Effects of Solar\nMagnetic Disturbances on the Allegheny Power System\". AP3-7 Email from Fred Elmendorf, TVA, December 2000. AP3-8 Antonio Dutil, Impact of Geomagnetic Storms on TransEnergie Transmission\nSystem - Situation at the Dawn of the Year 2000, Report to NPCC, January 2000.\nAppendix 4\nValidation of Transformer and Power System Impact Modeling for GIC\n\nA4.1 Transformer Modeling Background and Validations\n\nA transformer with half-cycle saturation makes a rich source of even and odd harmonics and draws significant inductive VARs from the power system.  This potentially could create a variety of problems in the power system.  It is very important to estimate and evaluate the effect of GIC on transformers and the power system.  The modeling of the power system includes this aspect of transformer behavior under geomagnetic storm or other comparable threat conditions from HEMP E3 environments, in order to provide an accurate assessment of system impacts.  GIC monitoring of various levels of sophistication has been in operation in North American.  More importantly, detailed staged tests have been performed to closely study the harmonics and reactive power consumption during transformer saturation.  Several simulation methods have been developed to calculate harmonic currents and reactive power intake of transformers resulting from GIC.  These include the FEM based models (Reference AP4-1), and the magnetic circuit models (Reference AP4-2). Transformer core configuration is one of the primary design factors when considering the behavior of a transformer in the presence of GIC, and also needs to be incorporated into models as well.  It is less complicated to estimate harmonic currents for the single-phase transformer since it involves only one common main flux path that can be represented by the non-linear inductance (or the no-load V-I curve of the transformer).  An iteration algorithm can be used to obtain harmonic currents with a given value of GIC.  Once the harmonics currents are available, it is straightforward to calculate the reactive power.  For three-phase transformers, the key problem is in the construction of the equivalent nonlinear magnetizing curve for the entire transformer. As shown in the following case validations, the models for transformer half-cycle saturation generally produce results within a range of +/-15% over the range of GIC\nvalues tested.\n\nA4.2 Simulation Results A series of cases were developed, simulating each of the transformer models.  An extensive literature research was also undertaken to find specific cases of test examples for each design.  Models were then developed for each specific case, and the calculated results were compared with the measurement results to verify the feasibility of the method. Case 1: single-phase, core form transformer bank (Reference AP4-3, Table 1) Figure A4-1 shows the measured current waveform and the frequency spectrum for a GIC of 11.5 amp/phase (Reference AP4-3).  The calculations for the exciting current waveform and the frequency spectrum are the same, as seen in Figure A4-2. Case 2: 500/230kV, 360 MVA single phase shell form auto transformer (Reference AP4-\n4)\n\nFigure A4-3 shows the exciting current waveform and the frequency spectrum for a GIC\nof 75A in the neutral.  The peak of the fundamental frequency exciting current is 49.7A, and the peak of the exciting current is ~ 300A.  Compared with the test result in Figure A4-4, the measured fundamental frequency exciting current is about 47A (Reference.3, Figure 5-3), the deviation is 5.7%.  The measured peak of the exciting current is about 300 A.\n\n\n## Case 3: 230/115 Kv 200 Mva, 3-Phase, 3-Legged Core Form Auto-Transformer (Reference Ap4-4) Figure A4-5 Shows The Exciting Current Waveform And The Frequency Spectrum For A Gic Of 75A In The Neutral.  The Calculated Reactive Power Is 3.27 Mvar, The Second Harmonic Current Is 7.0A Rms, And The Peak Exciting Current Is 92A.  Compared With The Test Results In Figure A4-6, The Measured Second Harmonic Current Is About 6.72A Rms\n\n(the deviation is 4.2%) and the measured reactive power is 5 MVAR.  The simulated RMS value of second harmonics is 10.5A with GIC of 100A in neutral.  The simulated reactive power is 4.59 MVAR, the test result is 10.6A RMS, the deviation is 1%, and the measured reactive power is 8 MVAR. Case 4: 230/115 kV 200 MVA, 3-phase, shell form auto-transformer (Reference AP4-4)\n\nFigure A4-7 shows the calculated exciting current waveform and the frequency spectrum for a GIC of 75A in the neutral.  The reactive power is 4.67 MVA and the second harmonic current is 9.5A, and the maximum of the exciting current is 60.0A.  Compared with the test results in Figure A4-8, the measured second harmonic current is about 10.0A, and the deviation is 5%.  The simulated RMS value of second harmonics is 12.0A with a GIC of 100A in neutral.  The test result is 11A, and the deviation is 9.1%. Case 5: 400 kV, 400 MVA, 5-legged, three-phase, core form, Y-Y transformer (Reference AP4-6)\n\nFigure A4-9a shows the excitation current waveform and the frequency spectrum for a GIC from tests with 200A in the neutral from Finngrid tests.  Figure A4-9b provides a replication of B phase (or center phase) excitation current for this 5-legged core form transformer.  Good agreement is achieved on overall waveform and magnitudes of the excitation current.  Figure A4-10a provides a comparison of observed and calculated reactive demand increases (MVARs) for various levels of DC current from 0 to 200\namps.  Figure A4-10b provides a chart of the observed harmonics from the 5-legged core form transformer with 200 amps of GIC, while Figure A4-10c provides a comparison of observed and calculated harmonics for the same transformer.  In all cases deviations between observed and measured MVARs and harmonics are small.\n\n## Compare Fingrid Harmonics - Powercast Harmonics\n\nA4.3 Field Tests of Large Power Transformer Performance under DC Excitation Extensive tests were performed on the operation of large power transformers in the presence of GIC at Minnesota Power in the 1980's and early 1990's (Reference AP4-4). These tests provided much of the data and observation information needed to develop accurate models of transformer behavior in the presence of GIC.  The tests were important because they established some of the principle behavior patterns of transformers that are due to differing magnetic core type construction.  These tests were performed on the major U.S. transformer core types of single phase, 3-phase, 3-legged, and three-phase shell-form transformers.  Prior to these tests, it had been widely modeled and assumed that the 3-phase, 3-legged core type would be immune to GIC currents. Testing, however, determined these core types would readily saturate.  These tests were also essential to determine the degree of behavior of the other transformers in the presence of GIC, attributes that were essentially un-quantified before these tests were carried out.  These tests were also important in that they tested the behavior of large power transformers in their intended in-situ environment of the power grid, rather than tests in a laboratory environment.  This natural environment allowed the transformers to be operated at full high voltage, high power conditions.  This also allowed the ability to observe and test the response of the network as a whole to these conditions. These and other tests performed were primarily conducted for the purpose of understanding performance concerns due to naturally occurring GIC from geomagnetic storms.  The extremes of this environment had not at this time been well established.  As a result, the test levels for field tests were typically only conducted to GIC levels that were about 10% of rated current levels on most transformer designs, while extreme geomagnetic storms, as well as HEMP E3 threats, will likely cause much higher GIC levels.  In some cases, these levels of GIC can easily exceed the rated AC currents of the exposed transformers, levels that have not been tested (with the exception of small-scale low-voltage tests - Reference AP4-2).  The test data and models have been extended to estimate performance levels at these higher exposure levels, though some increase in uncertainty of model performance exists at these extreme exposure levels than at lower levels of GIC exposure.  Some of the field tests waveform observations are summarized to illustrate the degree of agreement that exists with models used in the U.S. Power Grid analysis at higher relative exposure levels of GIC. Figure A4-11 shows the high-side current on a 230/115kV 200MVA 3-phase 3-legged core form transformer with 33.3 amps/phase of GIC.  This level of GIC is only 6.5% of the rated AC current of the high-side windings of this transformer.  The blue waveform shows the normal load current flowing in the transformer, while the red waveform shows the same load current and the current distortions due to the saturation from the relatively small flow of GIC.  The distortion, caused by the saturation, is evident near the zero crossing as the excitation current lags the load current by 90 degrees in the sine wave. For this test condition, the transformer has an excitation current waveform as shown in Figure A4-12.\n\nThe excitation current from a field test of 33.3 amps of GIC per phase on a 230/115kV\n200 MVA 3-phase shell form transformer is shown in Figure A4-13.  As shown, the exciting current distortion for this transformer type is similar to that produced by the 3- legged core form transformer with identical ratings.  This indicates that both of these transformers will saturate at similar levels in the presence of GIC. A harmonic analysis of the excitation currents from these two transformer core types is shown in Figure A4-14.  There is an overall trend of decreasing amplitude as the harmonic order increases.  However, for the triplen harmonics (particularly 3rd, 6th, and\n9\nth), there are larger differences in the amplitudes of these constituents between the two core designs.  In a 3-phase balanced system, the triplen harmonics are zero sequence (or in phase rather than separated in phase by 120 degrees, as is the normal case at the fundamental frequency) and would add to higher magnitudes as a result.  Since these staged tests were only instrumented to fully analyze one phase and the neutral current quantities, an examination of the neutral currents is needed to further review the degree of phase imbalance that is occurring in the different core types. The Figures A4-15 and A4-16 show the AC neutral current for the 3-legged core form and 3-phase shell form transformer under conditions with a DC excitation of 33.3 amps/phase.  Simple inspection shows that the two neutral currents differ markedly in harmonic spectrum and amplitude.  As shown for the neutral current from the 3-legged core form transformer, this is predominantly made up of triplen harmonic constituents, an expected outcome for a transformer that is experiencing balanced saturation on all three phases in the presence of the DC current.  The neutral current for the shell form transformer, for identical DC excitation conditions, has a different mix of fundamental and harmonic constituents present.  This indicates a phase imbalance in the level of halfcycle saturation on each phase of the 3-phase transformer.\n\nFigure A4-17 shows the spectrum analysis of the two transformer neutral currents.  As shown, for the 3-legged core form, the neutral current consists only of triplen harmonics, while the neutral current for the shell form transformer has harmonic components at all frequencies.\n\n\n\nThe excitation currents for a series of DC excitation tests on a bank of 500kV singlephase transformers are shown (Figures A4-18, A4-19, and A4-20).  The excitation currents for DC excitations of 16.7 amps/phase, 25 amps/phase, and 33.3 amps/phase are equivalent to AC transformer currents that are 4%, 6%, and 8% respectively of rated.  As would be expected, these excitation currents exhibit higher degrees of distortion with growth in amplitudes in levels of DC excitation. A spectrum analysis of the three excitation currents for the 500 kV transformer are shown on the bar chart of Figure A4-21.  In all cases of increasing levels of DC excitation, the fundamental and 2nd harmonic components experience a monotonic increase in magnitude for increasing levels of DC excitation.  At higher harmonic orders and higher DC excitation levels, more variation in harmonic current constituencies is evident.  This fits well with the behavior patterns also projected in the transformer models.\n\nIn addition to measured distortions of current and power consumption on individual transformers, measurements were also made on the current flow in a major 500kV interconnection in Northern Minnesota during these staged field tests.  As shown in Figure A4-22, the 500kV interconnection current was highly distorted, due to the test condition where 25 amps/phase was injected into one of several 500kV transformers that were connected to this transmission line.  In addition to the normal fundamental frequency load current flowing on the line, a substantial amount of 3rd and 5th harmonic currents also flowed on the line, causing the distortions observed.  This is no longer recognizable as a 60 Hz waveform, due to the severe harmonic distortion present.  The total harmonic distortion (THD) for this condition is an extremely large 141.5%.  In contrast, the IEEE-519 guideline for maximum harmonic distortion is only 3% on a high voltage transmission line.\n\nFor perspective, this is a significant degree of distortion occurring in a major high voltage, high power facility due to the saturation from relatively low-levels of GIC-caused saturation in just one of many transformers connected to the network.  Under a true geomagnetic storm scenario, it is likely that many large transformers throughout the exposed region will experience this level, or substantially higher levels of GIC and GIC-caused half-cycle saturation simultaneously.  This would be likely to result in significantly higher levels of distortion than illustrated in this limited observation.  As mentioned in the beginning of this section, these tests were performed at very low levels of DC excitation compared to those that are expected to be possible due to the HEMP E3 threat environments or severe geomagnetic storm conditions to transformers in the U.S. power grid.  Though GIC levels up to 33.3 amp/phase were used, in relative terms, these DC excitation levels only approach about 8% of rated AC current for these various 500kV and 230kV transformers.  The levels of total GIC per phase are expected to be as much as, or even more than, 100% of the rated current for a number of transformers. In the calculation of reactive power demand, the most important component of increased reactive power demand in a transformer due to the presence of GIC is from the increase in excitation current during half-cycle saturation.  There can be a contribution to increased reactive power due to increased I2X losses.  However, this is usually ignored because it is a minor component and falls within the uncertainty of the model for transformer behavior.  In the case of large GICs from either an E3 threat or very large geomagnetic disturbance, the component of losses due to I2X is less certain.  Therefore, an effort was undertaken to analyze this further.  Figure A4-23 provides an example of the levels of GIC flow that could result from both a SSC event geomagnetic disturbance and that from a late-time or E3 HEMP in the same transformer.  As shown, the peak GIC for the SSC event is ~50 amps/phase while the GIC from the E3 threat is nearly 800 amps/phase.  Using the data from the Forbes 500 kV transformer, an estimate can be made of the reactive demand increases due to half-cycle saturation from these two GIC\nlevels, taking into account estimates of the I2X component of losses.\n\n\n\n## Iec E3 & Geomagnetic Ssc - Transformer Gic\n\nA4.4 Transformer Reactive Power Modeling for Severe GIC Environments To further analyze the behavior of transformers during this unusual half-cycle saturation mode of operation, it is helpful to develop an equivalent circuit representation of the transformer, as shown in Figure A4-24.  In this circuit, the excitation characteristics and the impedance characteristics of the transformer are shown as lumped elements on the high-voltage winding.  The impedance values shown are also those of the Forbes 500kV\ntransformer. In this example, we are further simplifying by assuming that all increased AC current flows in the transformer from half-cycle saturation due to GIC are supplied from the primary input and that normal primary AC load current is 1000 amps.  We will also assume that transformer saturation onset due to GIC is instantaneous and that system voltage remains at 100%.  As shown above, the flow of current is from the high voltage winding to the low-voltage winding, with the magnitude of current modified by the turns ration of the transformer and internal losses such as those of the excitation branch.  Under normal conditions, the current flow through the excitation branch is very small (less than\n1 amp in this case), but increases substantially under half-cycle saturation.  Reactive power increases arise from the (V)x(Iexc) product of increased excitation current flows in the transformer.  Increases in I2X losses also result from increased excitation current flows through the lumped impedance of the transformer as well.  The total reactive power losses for the SSC event, along with the fraction of losses due to increased excitation current and I2X, are shown in Figure A4-25.  As shown, the total reactive power increase due to the GIC from the SSC event was ~ 43 MVARs in this transformer.  Of this 43 MVARs total, approximately 85% was due to (V)x(Iexc) from increased excitation current, while only ~15% was due to I2X losses. Figure A4-26 shows the same transformer reactive power demand increases for the conditions with the large E3 GIC event.  For this event, the reactive power losses in the transformer are projected to increase to a level of ~1600 MVARs (it should be noted that system limiting factors and assumptions such as constant 100% voltage are not likely in real network scenarios at these extraordinarily high GIC levels).  As previously noted, models of transformer over-excitation due to GIC have only been experimentally verified for large power transformers for GIC levels up to about 25% of maximum rated AC current.  These levels of GIC far exceed previous experience.  In addition, due to extremely high reactive demand at this transformer and many other exposed transformers from HEMP E3 events, power grid voltage collapse is likely before these levels are reached.  While these totals have some uncertainty, the components due to increased excitation current and I2X reactive power losses continue to illustrate that ~75% of total losses will be due to the effects of increased excitation current and (V)x(Iexc) product. Voltage collapse in most power grids will typically occur between 80-90% of normal voltage.  Therefore, MVAR levels this high are not likely to actually occur before onset of system collapse.  For the reactive power calculations of Figure A4-26, the normal AC primary current was 1000 amps, while for lower AC current flows an exponential reduction will occur in the I2X component of losses.  Using an AC current flow of 300\namps, the losses can be re-calculated.  In this case, this portion of losses due to I2X\nreduces to ~15% of total increased MVARs, while losses due to Iexc are nominally unchanged.  Since AC current levels are usually quite variable and uncertain and tend to be a minor component of total losses, the I2X affects have not been included in analysis results.\n\n\n\nAppendix 4 References AP4-1 P. Price, \"Geomagnetically Induced Current Effects on Transformers\", IEEE\nTrans on Power Delivery, 2000 Winter Power Meeting. AP4-2 R.A. Walling, A.H.Khan, \"Characteristics of transformer exciting-current during\ngeomagnetic disturbances\", IEEE Trans. on Power Delivery, vol. 6, no. 4, 1991,\npp.1707-1714 . AP4-3 W. Xu, T.G. Martinich, J.H. Sawada, Y. Mansour, \"Harmonics from SVC\ntransformer saturation with direct current offset\", IEEE PES Summer Meeting,\n404-4 PWRD, 1993, pp.1-7. AP4-4 John G. Kappenman, \"Transformer DC excitation field test & results\", IEEE\nSpecial Panel Session Report, IEEE PES Summer Meeting, July 12, 1989, Long Beach, California, USA, pp.14-22. AP4-5 Xuzhu Dong, Yilu Liu, John G. Kappenman, \"Comparative Analysis of Exciting\nCurrent Harmonics and Reactive Power Consumption from GIC Saturated Transformers\", IEEE Trans on Power Delivery, 2000 Winter Power Meeting. AP4-6 M. Lahtien, J. Elovaara: \"GIC occurrences and GIC test for 400 kV system\ntransformer\", IEEE Trans on Power Delivery, vol17, no 2, April 2002, p555-561."
    },
    {
        "text": "# A Dossier On New Construction North Of Kashgar, Xinjiang, China 39.6 N, 76.1 E\n\nSummary: Beginning in the first half of 2011 and proceeding rapidly through that year and into 2012, a series of large structures of unknown purpose was built along the foot of a ridge 15 kilometers to the northeast of Kashgar. This dossier is intended to document that construction using available imagery in the hopes that its purpose can be determined.\n\n## Part I Googleearth Imagery\n\nNote: The dates of the images in this part are taken from GoogleEarth and should be checked.\n\n## Part Ii Browse Images From Digitalglobe And Geoeye\n\n Note the appearance of a north-south road on the left side of the frame\n\n# Part Iii New Road And Possibly Related Facility\n\nFacility immediately to the northwest of the Kashgar airport at the end of the existing road. The\nsinuous tracks are typical of training courses for drivers of heavy vehicles."
    },
    {
        "text": "# Expansion Of Foreign Intelligence Service Hq (Svr; Former Kgb First Main Directorate) Yasenevo, Moscow, Russia 55.584 N, 37.517 E Between 2007 And 2018 Version Of 2018-07-27\n\nhttp://photos.wikimapia.org/p/00/01/50/50/77_big.jpg Undated, probably first half of 2009\nhttp://photos.wikimapia.org/p/00/02/55/87/63_big.jpg via https://cryptome.org/2015-info/svr-yasenevo/svr-yasenevo.htm Undated, probably late 2009 - early 2010\nhttps://img-fotki.yandex.ru/get/6103/414616.2fe/0_c31b7_daaef4bd_orig.jpg via https://cryptome.org/2015-info/svr-yasenevo/svr-yasenevo.htm Undated, probably late 2010 to early 2014\nhttp://svr.gov.ru/svr_today/terra.htm -\nhttp://svr.gov.ru/svr_today/terra01.htm http://svr.gov.ru/svr_today/terra05.htm\n\n## Appendix Expansion Of Parking Areas"
    },
    {
        "text": "## Lawfulness Of **A Lethal Operation Directed Against A** U.S. Citizen Who Is A Senior Operational Leader Of Al-Qa'Ida Or An Associated Force\n\nThis white paper sets forth a legal framework for considering the circumstances in which the U.S. government could use lethal force in a foreign country outside the area of active hostilities against a U.S. citizen who is a senior operational leader of al-Qa'ida or an associated force 1 of al-Qa'ida-that is, an al-Qa'ida leader actively engaged in planning operations to kill Americans. The paper does not attempt to determine the minimum requirements necessary to render such an operation lawful; nor does it assess what might be required to render a lethal operation against a U.S. citizen lawful in other circumstances, including an operation against enemy forces on a traditional battlefield or an operation against a U.S. citizen who is not a senior operational leader of such forces.\n\nHere the Department of Justice concludes only that where the following three conditions are met, a U.S. operation using lethal force in a foreign country against a U.S. citizen who is a senior operational leader of al-Qa'ida or an associated force would be lawful:\n(1) an informed, high-level official of the U.S. government has determined that the targeted individual poses an imminent threat of violent attack against the United States;\n(2) capture is infeasible, and the United States continues to monitor whether capture becomes feasible; and (3) the operation would be conducted in a manner consistent with applicable law of war principles. This conclusion is reached with recognition of the extraordinary seriousness of a lethal operation by the United States against a U.S. citizen, and also of the extraordinary seriousness of the threat posed by senior operational al-\nQa'ida members and the loss of life that would result were their operations successful.\n\nThe President has authority to respond to the imminent threat posed by al-Qa'ida and its associated forces, arising from his constitutional responsibility to protect the country, the inherent right of the United States to national self defense under international law, Congress's authorization of the use of all necessary and appropriate military force against this enemy, and the existence of an armed conflict with al-Qa'ida under international law. Based on these authorities, the President may use force against al-\nQa'ida and its associated forces. As detailed in this white paper, in defined circumstances, a targeted killing of a U.S. citizen who has joined al-Qa'ida or its associated forces would be lawful under U.S. and international law. Targeting a member of an enemy force who poses an imminent threat ofviolent attack to the United States is not unlawful. It is a lawful act of national self defense. Nor would it violate otherwise applicable federal laws barring unlawful killings in Title 18 or the assassination ban in Executive Order No. 12333. Moreover, a lethal operation in a foreign nation would be consistent with international legal principles of sovereignty and neutrality if it were conducted, for example, with the consent of the host nation's government or after a determination that the host nation is unable or unwilling to suppress the threat posed by the individual targeted.\n\nWere thy target of a lethal operation a U.S. citizen who may have rights under the Due Process Clause and the Fourth Amendment, that individual's citizenship would not immunize him from a lethal operation. Under the traditional due process balancing analysis of Mathews v. *Eldridge,* we recognize that there is no private interest more weighty than a person's interest in his life. But that interest must be balanced against the United States' interest in forestalling the threat of violence and death to other Americans that arises from an individual who is a senior operational leader of al-Q'aida or an associated force of al-Q'aida and who is engaged in plotting against the United States.\n\nThe paper begins with a brief summary of the authority for the use of force in the situation described here, including the authority to target a U.S. citizen having the characteristics described above with lethal force outside the area of active hostilities. It continues with the constitutional questions, considering first whether a lethal operation against such a U.S. citizen would be consistent with the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause, U.S. Const. amend. V. As part of the due process analysis, the paper explains the concepts of \"imminence,\" feasibility of capture, and compliance with applicable law of war principles. The paper then discusses whether such an operation would be consistent with the Fourth Amendment's prohibition on unreasonable seizures, U.S. Const. amend.\n\nIV. It concludes that where certain conditions are met, a lethal operation against a U.S.\n\ncitizen who is a senior operational leader of al-Qa'ida or its associated forces-a terrorist organization engaged in constant plotting against the United States, as well as an enemy force with which the United States is in a congressionally authorized armed conflict-and who himself poses an imminent threat of violent attack against the United States, would not violate the Constitution. The paper also includes an analysis concluding that such an operation would not violate certain criminal provisions prohibiting the killing of U.S.\n\nnationals outside the United States; nor would it constitute either the commission of a war crime or an assassination prohibited by Executive Order 12333.\n\n## I.\n\nThe United States is in an armed conflict with al-Qa'ida and its associated forces, and Congress has authorized the President to use all necessary and appropriate force against those entities. *See* Authorization for Use of Military Force (\"AUMF\"), Pub. L.\n\nNo. 107-40,  2(a), 115 Stat. 224, 224 (2001). In addition to the authority arising from the AUMF, the President's use of force against al-Qa'ida and associated forces is lawful under other principles of U.S. and international law, including the President's constitutional responsibility to protect the nation and the inherent right to national selfdefense recognized in international law (see, *e.g.,* U.N. Charter art. 51). It was on these bases that the United States responded to the attacks of September 11, 2001, and \"[t]hese domestic and international legal authorities continue to this day.\" Harold Hongju Koh, Legal Adviser, U.S. Department of State, Address to the Annual Meeting ofthe American Society of International Law: The Obama Administration and International Law (Mar. 25, 2010) (\"2010 Koh ASIL Speech\").\n\nAny operation of the sort discussed here would be conducted in a foreign country against a senior operational leader of al-Qa'ida or its associated forces who poses an imminent threat of violent attack against the United States. A use of force under such circumstances would be justified as an act of national self-defense. In addition, such a person would be within the core of individuals against whom Congress has authorized the use of necessary and appropriate force. The fact that such a person would also be a U.S.\n\ncitizen would not alter this conclusion. The Supreme Court has held that the military may constitutionally use force against a U.S. citizen who is a part of enemy forces. See Hamdi, 542 U.S. 507, 518 (2004) (plurality opinion); *id.* at 587, 597 (Thomas, J., dissenting); *Ex Parte Quirin,* 317 U.S. at 37-38. Like the imposition of military detention, the use of lethal force against such enemy forces is an \"important incident of war.\" *Hamdi,* 542 U.S. at 518 (plurality opinion) (quotation omitted). *See, e.g.,* General Orders No. 100: Instructions for the Government of Armies ofthe United States in the Field~ 15 (Apr. 24, 1863) (\"[m]ilitary necessity admits of all direct destruction oflife or limb of armed enemies\") (emphasis omitted); International Committee of the Red Cross, Commentary on the Additional Protocols of 8 June 1977 to the Geneva Conventions of 12\nAug. 1949 and Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Additional Protocol II)  4789 (1987) (\"Those who belong to armed forces or armed groups may be attacked at any time.\"); Y oram Dinstein, The Conduct of Hostilities Under the Law of International Armed *Conflict* 94 (2004) (\"When a person takes up arms or merely dons a uniform as a member of the armed forces, he automatically exposes himself to enemy attack.\"). Accordingly, the Department does not believe that U.S.\n\ncitizenship would immunize a senior operational leader of al-Qa'ida or its associated forces from a use of force abroad authorized by the AUMF or in national self-defense.\n\nIn addition, the United States retains its authority to use force against al-Qa'ida and associated forces outside the area of active hostilities when it targets a senior operational leader of the enemy forces who is actively engaged in planning operations to kill Americans. The United States is currently in a non-international armed conflict with al-Qa'ida and its associated forces. See Hamdan v. *Rumsfeld,* 548 U.S. 557, 628-31\n(2006) (holding that a conflict between a nation and a transnational non-state actor, occurring outside the nation's territory, is an armed conflict \"not of an international character\" (quoting Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions) because it is not a\n\"clash between nations\"). Any U.S. operation would be part of this non-international armed conflict, even if it were to take place away from the zone of active hostilities. See John 0. Brennan, Assistant to the President for Homeland Security and Counterterrorism, Remarks at the Program on Law and Security, Harvard Law School: Strengthening Our Security by Adhering to Our Values and Laws (Sept. 16, 2011) (\"The United States does not view our authority to use military force against al-Qa'ida as being restricted solely to\n'hot' battlefields like Afghanistan.\"). For example, the AUMF itself does not set forth an express geographic limitation on the use of force it authorizes. *See Hamdan,* 548 U.S. at\n631 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (what makes a non-international armed conflict distinct from an international armed conflict is \"the legal status of the entities opposing each other\"). None of the three branches of the U.S. Government has identified a strict geographical limit on the permissible scope ofthe AUMF's authorization. See, e.g., Letter for the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the President Pro Tempore of the Senate from the President (June 15, 2010) (reporting that the armed forces, with the assistance of numerous international partners, continue to conduct operations \"against al-\nQa'ida terrorists,\" and that the United States has \"deployed combat-equipped forces to a number oflocations in the U.S. Central ... Command area[] of operation in support of those [overseas counter-terrorist] operations\"); Bensayah v. *Obama,* 610 F.3d 718, 720,\n724-25, 727 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (concluding that an individual turned over to the United States in Bosnia could be detained if the government demonstrates he was part of al-\nQa'ida); al-Adahi v. *Obama,* 613 F.3d 1102, 1003, **1111** (D.C. Cir. 2010) (noting authority under AUMF to detain individual apprehended by Pakistani authorities in Pakistan and then transferred to U.S. custody).\n\nClaiming that for purposes of international law, an armed conflict generally exists only when there is \"protracted armed violence between governmental authorities and organized armed groups,\" Prosecutor v. *Tadic,* Case No. IT-94-1AR72, Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, ,-r 70 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia, App. Chamber Oct. 2, 1995), some commenters have suggested that the conflict between the United States and al-Qa'ida cannot lawfully extend to nations outside Afghanistan in which the level of hostilities is less intense or prolonged than in Afghanistan itself. *See, e.g.,* Mary Ellen O'Connell, Combatants and the Combat Zone,\n43 U. Rich. L. Rev. 845, 857-59 (2009). There is little judicial or other authoritative precedent that speaks directly to the question of the geographic scope of a noninternational armed conflict in which one of the parties is a transnational, non-state actor and where the principal theater of operations is not within the territory of the nation that is a party to the conflict. Thus, in considering this potential issue, the Department looks to principles and statements from analogous contexts.\n\nThe Department has not found any authority for the proposition that when one of the parties to an armed conflict plans and excutes operations from a base in a new nation, an operation to engage the enemy in that location cannot be part of the original armed conflict, and thus subject to the laws of war governing that conflict, unless the hostilities become sufficiently intense and protracted in the new location. That does not appear to be the rule of the historical practice, for instance, even in a traditional international conflict. *See* John R. Stevenson, Legal Adviser, Department of State, United States Military Action in Cambodia: Questions of International Law, Address before the Hammarskjold Forum of the Association of the Bar of the City ofNew York\n(May 28, 1970), in 3 The Vietnam War and International Law: The Widening Context\n23, 28-30 (Richard A. Falk, ed. 1972) (arguing that in an international armed conflict, if a neutral state has been unable for any reason to prevent violations of its neutrality by the troops of one belligerent using its territory as a base of operations, the other belligerent has historically been justified in attacking those enemy forces in that state). Particularly in a non-international armed conflict, where terrorist organizations may move their base of operations from one country to another, the determination of whether a particular operation would be part of an ongoing armed conflict would require consideration of the particular facts and circumstances in each case, including the fact that transnational nonstate organizations such as al-Qa'ida may have no single site serving as their base of operations. *See also, e.g.,* Geoffrey S. Com & Eric Talbot Jensen, Untying the Gordian Knot: A Proposal for Determining Applicability of the Laws ofWar to the War on Terror, 81 Temp. L. Rev. 787, 799 (2008) (\"If ... the ultimate purpose ofthe drafters of the Geneva Conventions was to prevent 'law avoidance' by developing de facto law triggers-a purpose consistent with the humanitarian foundation of the treaties-then the myopic focus on the geographic nature of an armed conflict in the context of transnational counterterrorist combat operations serves to frustrate that purpose.\").2\nIf an operation of the kind discussed in this paper were to occur in a location where al-Qa'ida or an associated force has a significant and organized presence and from which al-Qa'ida or an associated force, including its senior operational leaders, plan attacks against U.S. persons and interests, the operation would be part of the noninternational armed conflict between the United States and al-Qa'ida that the Supreme Court recognized in *Hamdan.* Moreover, such an operation would be consistent with international legal principles of sovereignty and neutrality if it were conducted, for example, with the consent of the host nation's government or after a determination that the host nation is unable or unwilling to suppress the threat posed by the individual targeted. In such circumstances, targeting a U.S. citizen of the kind described in this paper would be authorized under the AUMF and the inherent right to national selfdefense. Given this authority, the question becomes whether and what further restrictions may limit its exercise.\n\n## Ii.\n\nThe Department assumes that the rights afforded by Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause, as well as the Fourth Amendment, attach to a U.S. citizen even while he is abroad. See Reid v. *Covert,* 354 U.S. 1, 5-6 (1957) (plurality opinion); United States v.\n\nVerdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259,269-70 (1990); see also In re Terrorist Bombings of US. Embassies in East Africa, 552 F.3d 157, 170 n.7 (2d Cir. 2008). The U.S.\n\ncitizenship of a leader of al-Qa'ida or its associated forces, however, does not give that person constitutional immunity from attack. This paper next considers whether and in what circumstances a lethal operation would violate any possible constitutional protections of a U.S. citizen.\n\n## A.\n\nThe Due Process Clause would not prohibit a lethal operation of the sort contemplated here. In *Hamdi,* a plurality of the Supreme Court used the Mathews v.\n\nEldridge balancing test to analyze the Fifth Amendment due process rights of a U.S.\n\ncitizen who had been captured on the battlefield in Afghanistan and detained in the United States, and who wished to challenge the government's assertion that he was part of enemy forces. The Court explained that the \"process due in any given instance is determined by weighing 'the private interest that will be affected by the official action'\nagainst the Government's asserted interest, 'including the function involved' and the burdens the Government would face in providing greater process.\" *Hamdi,* 542 U.S. at\n529 (plurality opinion) (quoting Mathews v. *Eldridge,* 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976)). The due process balancing analysis applied to determine the Fifth Amendment rights of a U.S.\n\ncitizen with respect to law-of-war detention supplies the framework for assessing the process due a U.S. citizen who is a senior operational leader of an enemy force planning violent attacks against Americans before he is subjected to lethal targeting.\n\nIn the circumstances considered here, the interests on both sides would be weighty. *See Hamdi,* 542 U.S. at 529 (plurality opinion) (\"It is beyond question that substantial interests lie on both sides of the scale in this case.\"). An individual's interest in avoiding erroneous deprivation of his life is \"uniquely compelling.\" See Ake v.\n\nOklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 178 (1985) (\"The private interest in the accuracy of a criminal proceeding that places an individual's life or liberty at risk is almost uniquely compelling.\"). No private interest is more substantial. At the same time, the government's interest in waging war, protecting its citizens, and removing the threat posed by members of enemy forces is also compelling. Cf *Hamdi,* 542 U.S. at 531\n(plurality opinion) (\"On the other side of the scale are the weighty and sensitive governmental interests in ensuring that those who have in fact fought with the enemy during a war do not return to battle against the United States.\"). As the *Hamdi* plurality observed, in the \"circumstances of war,\" \"the risk of erroneous deprivation of a citizen's liberty in the absence of sufficient process ... is very real,\" *id.* at 530 (plurality opinion), and, of course, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of a citizen's life is even more significant. But, \"the realities of combat\" render certain uses of force \"necessary and appropriate,\" including force against U.S. citizens who have joined enemy forces in the armed conflict against the United States and whose activities pose an imminent threat of violent attack against the United States-and \"due process analysis need not blink at those realities.\" *!d.* at 531 (plurality opinion). These same realities must also be considered in assessing \"the burdens the Government would face in providing greater process\" to a member of enemy forces. *!d.* at 529, 531 (plurality opinion).\n\nIn view of these interests and practical considerations, the United States would be able to use lethal force against a U.S. citizen, who is located outside the United States and is an operational leader continually planning attacks against U.S. persons and interests, in at least the following circumstances: (1) where an informed, high-level official of the U.S. government has determined that the targeted individual poses an imminent threat of violent attack against the United States; (2) where a capture operation would be infeasible-and where those conducting the operation continue to monitor whether capture becomes feasible; and (3) where such an operation would be conducted consistent with applicable law of war principles. In these circumstances, the \"realities\" of the conflict and the weight of the government's interest in protecting its citizens from an\n imminent attack are such that the Constitution would not require the government to provide further process to such a U.S. citizen before using lethal force. Cf *Hamdi,* 542\nU.S. at 535 (plurality opinion) (noting that the Court \"accord[s] the greatest respect and consideration to the judgments of military authorities in matters relating to the actual prosecution of war, and ... the scope of that discretion necessarily is wide\"); *id.* at 534\n(plurality opinion) (\"The parties agree that initial captures on the battlefield need not receive the process we have discussed here; that process is due only when the determination is made to continue to hold those who have been seized.\") (emphasis omitted).\n\nCertain aspects of this legal framework require additional explication. *First,* the condition that an operational leader present an \"imminent\" threat of violent attack against the United States does not require the United States to have clear evidence that a specific attack on U.S. persons and interests will take place in the immediate future. Given the nature of, for example, the terrorist attacks on September 11, in which civilian airliners were hijacked to strike the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, this definition of imminence, which would require the United States to refrain from action until preparations for an attack are concluded, would not allow the United States sufficient time to defend itself. The defensive options available to the United States may be reduced or eliminated if al-Qa'ida operatives disappear and cannot be found when the time of their attack approaches. Consequently, with respect to al-Qa'ida leaders who are continually planning attacks, the United States is likely to have only a limited window of opportunity within which to defend Americans in a manner that has both a high likelihood of success and sufficiently reduces the probabilities of civilian causalities. See Michael N. Schmitt, State-Sponsored Assassination in International and Domestic Law,\n17 Yale J. Int'l L. 609, 648 (1992). Furthermore, a \"terrorist 'war' does not consist of a massive attack across an international border, nor does it consist of one isolated incident that occurs and is then past. It is a drawn out, patient, sporadic pattern of attacks. It is very difficult to know when or where the next incident will occur.\" Gregory M. Travalio, Terrorism, International Law, and the Use of *Military Force,* 18 Wis. Int'l L.J. 145, 173\n(2000); *see also* Testimony of Attorney-General Lord Goldsmith, 660 Hansard. H.L. (April21, 2004) 370 (U.K.), available at http:/ /www.publications.parliament. uk/pa/ld200304/ldhansrd/vo0404 21 /text/404 21-\n07.htm (what constitutes an imminent threat \"will develop to meet new circumstances and new threats . . . . It must be right that states are able to act in self-defense in circumstances where there is evidence of further imminent attacks by terrorist groups, even if there is no specific evidence of where such an attack will take place or of the precise nature of the attack.\"). Delaying action against individuals continually planning to kill Americans until some theoretical end stage of the planning for a particular plot would create an unacceptably high risk that the action would fail and that American casualties would result.\n\nBy its nature, therefore, the threat posed by al-Qa'ida and its associated forces demands a broader concept of imminence in judging when a person continually planning terror attacks presents an imminent threat, making the use of force appropriate. In this context, imminence must incorporate considerations of the relevant window of opportunity, the possibility of reducing collateral damage to civilians, and the likelihood ofheading off future disastrous attacks on Americans. Thus, a decision maker determining whether an al-Qa'ida operational leader presents an imminent threat of violent attack against the United States must take into account that certain members of al-\nQa'ida (including any potential target of lethal force) are continually plotting attacks against the United States; that al-Qa'ida would engage in such attacks regularly to the extent it were able to do so; that the U.S. government may not be aware of all al-Qa'ida plots as they are developing and thus cannot be confident that none is about to occur; and that, in light of these predicates, the nation may have a limited window of opportunity within which to strike in a manner that both has a high likelihood of success and reduces the probability of American casualties.\n\nWith this understanding, a high-level official could conclude, for example, that an individual poses an \"imminent threat\" of violent attack against the United States where he is an operational leader of al-Qa'ida or an associated force and is personally and continually involved in planning terrorist attacks against the United States. Moreover, where the al-Qa'ida member in question has recently been involved in activities posing an imminent threat of violent attack against the United States, and there is no evidence suggesting that he has renounced or abandoned such activities, that member's involvement in al-Qa'ida's continuing terrorist campaign against the United States would support the conclusion that the member poses an imminent threat.\n\nSecond, regarding the feasibility of capture, capture would not be feasible if it could not be physically effectuated during the relevant window of opportunity or if the relevant country were to decline to consent to a capture operation. Other_ factors such as undue risk to U.S. personnel conducting a potential capture operation also could be relevant. Feasibility would be a highly fact-specific and potentially time-sensitive mqmry.\n\nThird, it is a premise here that any such lethal operation by the United States would comply with the four fundamental law-of-war principles governing the use of force: necessity, distinction, proportionality, and humanity (the avoidance of mmecessary suffering). *See, e.g.,* United States Air Force, Targeting, Air Force Doctrine Document 2-1.9, at 88 (June 8, 2006); Dinstein, Conduct of *Hostilities* at 16-20, 115-16,\n119-23; *see also 2010 Koh ASIL Speech.* For example, it would not be consistent with those principles to continue an operation if anticipated civilian casualties would be excessive in relation to the anticipated military advantage. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs ofStafflnstruction 5810.01D, Implementation of the DoD Law of War Program~ 4.a, at\n1 (Apr. 30, 2010). An operation consistent with the laws ofwar could not violate the prohibitions against treachery and perfidy, which address a breach of confidence by the assailant. *See, e.g.,* Hague Convention IV, Annex, art. 23(b), Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat.\n\n2277, 2301-02 (\"[I]t is especially forbidden ... [t]o kill or wound treacherously individuals belonging to the hostile nation or army .... \"). These prohibitions do not, however, categorically forbid the use of stealth or surprise, nor forbid attacks on identified individual soldiers or officers. *See* U.S. Army Field Manual27-10, The Law of Land Warfare,~ 31 (1956) (article 23(b) ofthe Annex to the Hague Convention IV does not \"preclude attacks on individual soldiers or officers of the enemy whether in the zone of hostilities, occupied territory, or else-where\"). And the Department is not aware of any other law-of-war grounds precluding use of such tactics. *See* Dinstein, Conduct of Hostilities at 94-95, 199; Abraham D. Sofaer, Terrorism, the Law, and the National Defense, 126 Mil. L. Rev. 89, 120-21 (1989). Relatedly, \"there is no prohibition under the laws of war on the use of technologically advanced weapons systems in armed conflict-such as pilotless aircraft or so-called smart bombs-as long as they are employed in conformity with applicable laws of war.\" *2010 Koh ASIL Speech.* Further, under this framework, the United States would also be required to accept a surrender if it were feasible to do so.\n\nIn sum, an operation in the circumstances and under the constraints described above would not result in a violation of any due process rights.\n\n## B.\n\nSimilarly, assuming that a lethal operation targeting a U.S. citizen abroad who is planning attacks against the United States would result in a \"seizure\" under the Fourth Amendment, such an operation would not violate that Amendment in the circumstances posited here. The Supreme Court has made clear that the constitutionality of a seizure is determined by \"balanc[ing] the nature and quality of the intrusion on the individual's Fourth Amendment interests against the importance of the governmental interests alleged to justify the intrusion.\" Tennessee v. *Garner,* 471 US. 1; 8 (1985) (internal quotation marks omitted); accord Scott v. *Harris,* 550 U.S. 372, 383 (2007). Even in domestic law enforcement operations, the Court has noted that \"[w]here the officer has probable cause to believe that the suspect poses a threat of serious physical harm, either to the officer or to others, it is not constitutionally unreasonable to prevent escape by using deadly force.\"\nGarner, 4 71 U.S. at 11. Thus, \"if the suspect threatens the officer with a weapon or there is probable cause to believe that he has committed a crime involving the infliction or threatened infliction of serious physical harm, deadly force may be used if necessary to prevent escape, and if, where feasible, some warning has been given.\" *ld.* at 11-12.\n\nThe Fourth Amendment \"reasonableness\" test is situation-dependent. Cf Scott,\n550 U.S. at 382 *(\"Garner* did not establish a magical on/off switch that triggers rigid preconditions whenever an officer's actions constitute 'deadly force.\"'). What would constitute a reasonable use of lethal force for purposes of domestic law enforcement operations differs substantially from what would be reasonable in the situation and circumstances discussed in this white paper. But at least in circumstances where the targeted person is an operational leader of an enemy force and an informed, high-level government official has determined that he poses an imminent threat of violent attack against the United States, and those conducting the operation would carry out the operation only if capture were infeasible, the use of lethal force would not violate the Fourth Amendment. Under such circumstances, the intrusion on any Fourth Amendment interests would be outweighed by the \"importance of the governmental interests [that]\njustify the intrusion,\" *Garner,* 471 U.S. at 8-the interests in protecting the lives of Americans.\n\nFinally, the Department notes that under the circumstances described in this paper, there exists no appropriate judicial forum to evaluate these constitutional considerations. It is well-established that \"[m]atters intimately related to foreign policy and national security are rarely proper subjects for judicial intervention,\" Haig v. Agee,\n453 U.S. 280, 292 (1981), because such matters \"frequently turn on standards that defy judicial application,\" or \"involve the exercise of a discretion demonstrably committed to the executive or legislature,\" Baker v. *Carr,* 369 U.S. 186, 211 (1962). Were a court to intervene here, it might be required inappropriately to issue an ex ante command to the President and officials responsible for operations with respect to their specific tactical judgment to mount a potential lethal operation against a senior operational leader of al-\nQa'ida or its associated forces. And judicial enforcement of such orders would require the Court to supervise inherently predictive judgments by the President and his national security advisors as to when and how to use force against a member of an enemy force against which Congress has authorized the use of force.\n\n## Iii.\n\nSection 1119(b) of title 18 provides that a \"person who, being a national of the United States, kills or attempts to kill a national of the United States while such national is outside the United States but within the jurisdiction of another country shall be punished as provided under sections 1111, 1112, and 1113.\" 18 U.S.C.  1119(b)\n(2006). 3 Because the person who would be the target of the kind of operation discussed here would be a U.S. citizen, it might be suggested that section 1119(b) would prohibit such an operation. Section 1119, however, incorporates the federal murder and manslaughter statutes, and thus its prohibition extends only to \"unlawful killing[s],\" 18\nU.S.C.  1111(a), 1112(a) (2006). Section 1119 is best construed to incorporate the\n\"public authority\" justification, which renders lethal action carried out by a government official lawful in some circumstances. As this paper explains below, a lethal operation of the kind discussed here would fall within the public authority exception under the circumstances and conditions posited because it would be conducted in a manner consistent with applicable law of war principles governing the non-international conflict between the United States and al-Qa'ida and its associated forces. It therefore would not result in an unlawful killing. 4\nAlthough section 1119(b) refers only to the \"punish[ments]\" provided under sections 1111, 1112, and 1113, courts have held that section 1119(b) incorporates the substantive elements of those cross-referenced provisions oftitle 18. See, e.g., United States v. *Wharton,* 320 F.3d 526, 533 (5th Cir. 2003); United States v. *White,* 51 F. Supp.\n\n2d 1008, 1013-14 (E.D. Cal. 1997). Section 1111 oftitle 18 sets forth criminal penalties for \"murder,\" and provides that\"[ m]urder is the unlawful killing of a human being with malice aforethought.\" 18 U.S.C.  llll(a). Section 1112 similarly provides criminal sanctions for \"[m]anslaughter,\" and states that \"[m]anslaughter is the unlawful killing of a human being without malice.\" *!d.*  1112(a). Section 1113 provides criminal penalties for \"attempts to commit murder or manslaughter.\" *!d.*  1113. It is therefore clear that section 1119(b) bars only \"unlawful killing.\"\nGuidance as to the meaning of the phrase \"unlawful killing\" in sections 1111 and\n1112-and thus for purposes of section 1119(b )-can be found in the historical understandings of murder and manslaughter. That history shows that states have long recognized justifications and excuses to statutes criminalizing \"unlawful\" killings. 5 One state court, for example, in construing that state's murder statute, explained that \"the word 'unlawful' is a term of art\" that \"connotes a homicide with the absence of factors of excuse or justification.\" People v. *Frye,* 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d 217, 221 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992).\n\nThat court further explained that the factors of excuse or justification in question include those that have traditionally been recognized. *!d.* at 221 n.2. Other authorities support the same conclusion. See, e.g., Mullaney v. *Wilbur,* 421 U.S. 684, 685 (1975)\n(requirement of\"unlawful\" killing in Maine murder statute meant that killing was\n\"neither justifiable nor excusable\"); cf *also* Rollin M. Perkins & Ronald N. Boyce, Criminal Law 56 (3d ed. 1982) (\"Innocent homicide is of two kinds, (1) justifiable and\n(2) excusable.\"). Accordingly, section 1119 does not proscribe killings covered by a justification traditionally recognized under the common law or state and federal murder statutes. \"Congress did not intend [section 1119] to criminalize justifiable or excusable killings.\" *White,* 51 F. Supp. 2d at 1013.\n\n## B.\n\nThe public authority justification is well-accepted, and it may be available even in cases where the particular criminal statute at issue does not expressly refer to a public\n5 The same is true with respect to other statutes, including federal laws, that modify a prohibited act other than murder or manslaughter with the term \"unlawfully.\" See, e.g., Territory v. *Gonzales,* 89 P.\n\n250, 252 (N.M. 1907) (construing the term \"unlawful\" in statute criminalizing assault with a deadly weapon as \"clearly equivalent\" to \"without excuse or justification\"). For example, 18 U.S.C.\n\n 2339C(a)(1) (2006) makes it unlawful, *inter alia,* to \"unlawfully and willfully provide[] or collect[]\nfunds\" with the intention that they may be used (or knowledge they are to be used) to carry out an act that is an offense within certain specified treaties, or to engage in certain other terrorist acts. The legislative history of section 2339C makes clear that \"[t]he term 'unlawfully' is intended to embody common law defenses.\" H.R. Rep. No. 107-307, at 12 (2001).\n\nauthority justification. Prosecutions where such a \"public authority\" justification is invoked are understandably rare, *see* American Law Institute Model Penal Code and Commentaries 3.03 Comment 1, at 23-24 (1985); cf *Visa Fraud Investigation,* 8 Op.\n\nO.L.C. 284,285 n.2, 286 (1984), and thus there is little case law in which courts have analyzed the scope of the justification with respect to the conduct of government officials. Nonetheless, discussions in the leading treatises and in the Model Penal Code demonstrate its legitimacy. *See* 2 Wayne R. LaFave, Substantive Criminal Law\n 10.2(b), at 135 (2d ed. 2003); Perkins & Boyce, *Criminal Law* at 1093 (\"Deeds which otherwise would be criminal, such as taking or destroying property, taking hold of a person by force and against his will, placing him in confinement, or even taking his life, are not crimes if done with proper public authority.\"); *see also* Model Penal Code\n 3.03(1)(a), (d), (e), at 22-23 (proposing codification of justification where conduct is\n\"required or authorized by,\" *inter alia,* \"the law defining the duties or functions of a public officer,\" \"the law governing the armed services or the lawful conduct of war,\" or\n\"any other provision of law imposing a public duty\"); National Commission on Reform of Federal Criminal Laws, A Proposed New Federal Criminal *Code* 602(1) (1971)\n(\"Conduct engaged in by a public servant in the course of his official duties is justified when it is required or authorized by law.\"). And the Department's Office of Legal Counsel (\"OLC\") has invoked analogous rationales when it has analyzed whether Congress intended a particular criminal statute to prohibit specific conduct that otherwise falls within a government agency's authorities. *See, e.g., Visa Fraud Investigation,* 8 Op.\n\nO.L.C. at 287-88 (concluding that a civil statute prohibiting issuance of visa to an alien known to be ineligible did not prohibit State Department from issuing such a visa where\n\"necessary\" to facilitate an important Immigration and Naturalization Service undercover operation carried out in a \"reasonable\" fashion).\n\nThe public authority justification would not excuse all conduct of public officials from all criminal prohibitions. The legislature may design some criminal prohibitions to place bounds on the kinds of governmental conduct that can be authorized by the Executive. Or the legislature may enact a criminal prohibition in order to limit the scope of the conduct that the legislature has otherwise authorized the Executive to undertake pursuant to another statute. See, e.g., Nardone v. *United States,* 302 U.S. 379, 384 (1937)\n(federal statute proscribed government wiretapping). But the generally recognized public authority justification reflects that it would not make sense to attribute to Congress the intent to criminalize all covered activities undertaken by public officials in the legitimate exercise of their otherwise lawful authorities, even if Congress clearly intends to make those same actions a crime when committed by persons not acting pursuant to public authority. In some instances, therefore, the best interpretation of a criminal prohibition is that Congress intended to distinguish persons who are acting pursuant to public authority from those who are not, even if the statute does not make that distinction express. Cf id.\n\nat 384 (federal criminal statutes should be construed to exclude authorized conduct of public officers where such a reading \"would work obvious absurdity as, for example, the application of a speed law to a policeman pursuing a criminal or the driver of a fire engine responding to an alarm\"). 6\nThe touchstone for the analysis whether section 1119 incorporates not only justifications generally, but also the public authority justification in particular, is the legislative intent underlying this statute. Here, the statute should be read to exclude from its prohibitory scope killings that are encompassed by traditional justifications, which include the public authority justification. The statutory incorporation of two other criminal statutes expressly referencing \"unlawful\" killings is one indication. *See supra* at Moreover, there are no indications that Congress had a contrary intention.\n\nNothing in the text or legislative history of sections 1111-1113 of title 18 suggests that Congress intended to exclude the established public authority justification from those justifications that Congress otherwise must be understood to have imported through the use of the modifier \"unlawful\" in those statutes. Nor is there anything in the text or legislative history of section 1119 itself to suggest that Congress intended to abrogate or otherwise affect the availability of this traditional justification for killings. On the contrary, the relevant legislative materials indicate that, in enacting section 1119, Congress was merely closing a gap in a field dealing with entirely different kinds of conduct from that at issue here. 7\nThe Department thus concludes that section 1119 incorporates the public authority justification. 8 This paper turns next to the question whether a lethal operation been committed abroad by a private individual-to ensure the possibility of prosecuting U.S. nationals who murdered other U.S. nationals in certain foreign countries that lacked the ability to lawfully secure the section 1119, the only federal statute expressly making it a crime to kill U.S. nationals abroad (outside the United States' special and maritime jurisdiction) reflected what appears to have been a particular concern with the protection of Americans from terrorist attacks. *See* 18 U.S.C.  2332(a), (d) (2006) (criminalizing unlawful killings of U.S. nationals abroad where the Attorney General or his subordinate certifies that the\n\"offense was intended to coerce, intimidate, or retaliate against a government or a civilian population\").\n\n8 18 U.S.C.  956(a)(l) (2006) makes it a crime to conspire within the jurisdiction ofthe United States \"to commit at any place outside the United States an act that would constitute the offense of murder, kidnapping, or maiming if committed in the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States\" if any conspirator acts within the United States to effect any object ofthe conspiracy. Like section\n1119(b), section 956(a) incorporates the public authority justification. In addition, the legislative history of section 956(a) indicates that the provision was \"not intended to apply to duly authorized actions undertaken on behalfofthe United States Government.\" 141 Cong. Rec. 4491,4507 (1995) (section-by-section analysis of bill submitted by Sen. Biden, who introduced the provision at the behest of the President); see also *id.* at 11,960 (section-by-section analysis ofbill submitted by Sen. Daschle, who introduced the identical provision in a different version of the anti-terrorism legislation a few months later). Thus, for the reasons that section 1119(b) does not prohibit the United States from conducting a lethal operation against a U.S. citizen, section 956(a) also does not prohibit such an operation.\n\ncould be encompassed by that justification and, in particular, whether that justification would apply when the target is a U.S. citizen. The analysis here leads to the conclusion that it would.\n\n## C.\n\nA lethal operation against an enemy leader undertaken in national self-defense or during an armed conflict that is authorized by an informed, high-level official and carried out in a manner that accords with applicable law of war principles would fall within a well established variant of the public authority justification and therefore would not be murder. *See, e.g.,* 2 Paul H. Robinson, *Criminal Law Defenses* 148(a), at 208 (1984)\n(conduct that would violate a criminal statute is justified and thus not unlawful \"[w]here the exercise of military authority relies upon the law governing the armed forces or upon the conduct of war\"); 2 LaFave, Substantive Criminal *Law* 10.2(c) at 136 (\"another aspect of the public duty defense is where the conduct was required or authorized by 'the law governing the armed services or the lawful conduct of war\"'); Perkins & Boyce, Criminal Law at 1 093 (noting that a \"typical instance[] in which even the extreme act of taking human life is done by public authority\" involves \"the killing of an enemy as an act of war and within the rules ofwar\").9\n.\n\nThe United States is currently in the midst of a congressionally authorized armed conflict with al-Qa'ida and associated forces, and may act in national self-defense to protect U.S. persons and interests who are under continual threat of violent attack by certain al-Q'aida operatives planning operations against them. The public authority justification would apply to a lethal operation of the kind discussed in this paper if it were conducted in accord with applicable law of war principles. As one legal commentator has explained, \"if a soldier intentionally kills an enemy combatant in time of war and within the rules of warfare, he is not guilty of murder,\" whereas, for example, if that soldier intentionally kills a prisoner of war-a violation of the laws of war-\"then he commits murder.\" 2 LaFave, Substantive Criminal *Law* 10.2(c), at 136; see also State v. *Gut,* 13 Minn. 341, 357 (1868) (\"That it is legal to kill an alien enemy in the heat and exercise of war, is undeniable; but to kill such an enemy after he has laid down his arms, and especially when he is confined in prison, is murder.\"); Perkins & Boyce, Criminal Law at 1093 (\"Even in time of war an alien enemy may not be killed needlessly after he has been disarmed and securely imprisoned .... \"). Moreover, without invoking the public authority justification by its terms, this Department's OLC has relied on the same notion in an opinion addressing the intended scope of a federal criminal statute that concerned the use of potentially lethal force. See United States Assistance to Countries that Shoot Down Civil Aircraft Involved in Drug Trafficking, 18 Op. O.L.C. 148, 164\n(1994) (concluding that the Aircraft Sabotage Act of 1984, 18 U.S.C.  32(b)(2) (2006), which prohibits the willful destruction of a civil aircraft and otherwise applies to U.S.\n\ngovernment conduct, should not be construed to have \"the surprising and almost certainly unintended effect of criminalizing actions by military personnel that are lawful under international law and the laws of armed conflict\").\n\nThe fact that an operation may target a U.S. citizen does not alter this conclusion.\n\nAs explained above, see supra the Supreme Court has held that the military may constitutionally use force against a U.S. citizen who is part of enemy forces. See Hamdi,\n542 U.S. at 518 (plurality opinion); *id.* at 587, 597 (Thomas, J., dissenting); Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. at 37-38 (\"Citizens who associate themselves with the military arm of the enemy government, and with its aid, guidance and direction enter [the United States]\nbent on hostile acts,\" may be treated as \"enemy belligerents\" under the law of war.).\n\nSimilarly, under the Constitution and the inherent right to national self-defense recognized in international law, the President may authorize the use of force against a U.S. citizen who is a member of al-Qa'ida or its associated forces and who poses an imminent threat of violent attack against the United States.\n\nIn light of these precedents, the Department believes that the use of lethal force addressed in this white paper would constitute a lawful killing under the public authority doctrine if conducted in a manner consistent with the fundamental law of war principles governing the use of force in a non-international armed conflict. Such an operation would not violate the assassination ban in Executive Order No. 12333. Section 2.11 of Executive Order No. 12333 provides that \"[n]o person employed by or acting on behalf of the United States Government shall engage in, or conspire to engage in, assassination.\"\n46 Fed. Reg. 59,941, 59, 952 (Dec. 4, 1981). A lawful killing in self-defense is not an assassination. In the Department's view, a lethal operation conducted against a U.S.\n\ncitizen whose conduct poses an imminent threat of violent attack against the United States would be a legitimate act of national self-defense that would not violate the assassination ban. Similarly, the use of lethal force, consistent with the laws of war, against an individual who is a legitimate military target would be lawful and would not violate the assassination ban.\n\n## Iv.\n\nThe War Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C.  2441 (2006) makes it a federal crime for a member of the Armed Forces or a national of the United States to \"commit[] a war crime.\" *!d.*  2441 (a). The only potentially applicable provision of section 2441 to operations of the type discussed herein makes it a war crime to commit a \"grave breach\"\nof Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions when that breach is committed \"in the context of and in association with an armed conflict not of an international character.\"10\n!d.  2441 ( c )(3 ). As defined by the statute, a \"grave breach\" of Common Article 3\nincludes \" [ m ]urder,\" described in pertinent part as \" [ t ]he act of a person who intentionally kills, or conspires or attempts to kill ... one or more persons taking no active part in the hostilities, including those placed out of combat by sickness, wounds, detention, or any other cause.\" *!d.*  2441(d)(1)(D).\n\nWhatever might be the outer bounds of this category of covered persons, Common Article 3 does not alter the fundamental law of war principle concerning a belligerent party's right in an armed conflict to target individuals who are part of an enemy's armed forces or eliminate a nation's authority to take legitimate action in national self-defense. The language of Common Article 3 \"makes clear that members of such armed forces [of both the state and non,-state parties to the conflict] ... are considered as 'taking no active part in the hostilities' only once they have disengaged from their fighting function ('have laid down their arms') or are placed hors de combat;\nmere suspension of combat is insufficient.\" International Committee of the Red Cross, Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities Under International Humanitarian Law 28 (2009). An operation against a senior operational leader of al-Qa'ida or its associated forces who poses an imminent threat of violent attack against the United States would target a person who is taking \"an active part in hostilities\" and therefore would not constitute a \"grave breach\" of Common Article 3.\n\n## V.\n\nIn conclusion, it would be lawful for the United States to conduct a lethal operation outside the United States against a U.S. citizen who is a senior, operational leader of al-Qa'ida or an associated force of al-Qa'ida without violating the Constitution or the federal statutes discussed in this white paper under the following conditions: (1)\nan informed, high-level official of the U.S. government has determined that the targeted individual poses an imminent threat of violent attack against the United States; (2)\ncapture is infeasible, and the United States continues to monitor whether capture becomes feasible; and (3) the operation is conducted in a manner consistent with the four fundamental principles of the laws of war governing the use of force. As stated earlier, this paper does not attempt to determine the minimum requirements necessary to render such an operation lawful, nor does it assess what might be required to render a lethal operation against a U.S. citizen lawful in other circumstances. It concludes only that the stated conditions would be sufficient to make lawful a lethal operation in a foreign country directed against a U.S. citizen with the characteristics described above."
    },
    {
        "text": "Technical Report 05-8\nApril 2005\n\n# Screening For Potential Terrorists In The Enlisted Military Accessions Process\n\nKelly R. Buck Defense Personnel Security Research Center Andree E. Rose Martin F. Wiskoff Kahlila M. Liverpool Northrop Grumman Mission Systems\n\nResearch Conducted by Defense Personnel Security Research Center Approved for Public Distribution: Distribution Unlimited\n\nScreening for Potential Terrorists in the Enlisted Military Accessions Process Kelly R. Buck Defense Personnel Security Research Center\n\nAndree E. Rose Martin F. Wiskoff Kahlila M. Liverpool Northrop Grumman Mission Systems Released by James A. Riedel Director Work Sponsored by:\n\nDoD Accession Policy Directorate\n\nand\n\nDefense Personnel Security Research Center\n99 Pacific Street, Suite 455-E\nMonterey, California 93940-2497\n\n## Report Documentation Page\n\n1999-2005\n\nPublic reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing this collection of information.  Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden to Department of Defense, Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports (0704-0188), 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA  22202- 4302.  Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to any penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number.  **PLEASE DO NOT RETURN YOUR FORM TO THE ABOVE ADDRESS.**\n1. REPORT DATE *(DD-MM-YYYY)*\n29-04-2005\n2. REPORT TYPE\nTechnical Report\n4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE\nScreening for Potential Terrorists in the Enlisted Military Accessions Process\n\n\n\n                                                                5b. GRANT NUMBER\n\n\n\n## 6. Author(S) Kelly R. Buck, Andree E. Rose, Martin F. Wiskoff, Kahlila M. Liverpool\n\n\n\n7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)\n\n8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT\n    NUMBER\n\n    TR 05-8\n\n\n\nDefense Personnel Security Research Center 99 Pacific Street, Suite 455-E Monterey, CA 93940-2497\n\n\n## 9. Sponsoring / Monitoring Agency Name(S) And Address(Es) 10. Sponsor/Monitor's Acronym(S)\n\nDefense Personnel Security Research Center Accession Policy Directorate PERSEREC\n99 Pacific Street, Suite 455-E\nOASD (FMP) (MPP)(AP)\nMonterey, CA 93940-2497\n4000 Defense Pentagon\n11. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S REPORT\n\nRoom 2B271\n      NUMBER(S)\n\nWashington, DC 20301-4000\n\n\n12. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT\n\nUnrestricted\n\n13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES\n\n\n14. ABSTRACT\nIn early 2004, PERSEREC was tasked and sponsored by the Office of the Secretary of Defense Accession Policy Directorate to identify\nwhat the Armed Forces are doing to screen for terrorists in the enlistment process. The authors (a) reviewed recent literature and\nintelligence reports to identify and understand active anti-American groups of concern for military enlistment, (b) reviewed all relevant\nexecutive orders, DoD directives, and Armed Forces instructions and regulations, and (c) visited recruiting and military entrance processing\nfacilities across the U.S., interviewing personnel at each. The report focuses primarily on individuals joining the enlisted ranks rather than\non those entering the U.S. Army's 09L Military Occupational Specialty (MOS), officers, and direct commissions (chaplains, nurses,\nlawyers, engineers, etc.). In many ways, however, findings from the study bear on these other groups as well. Findings in the report are\npresented within the following areas: arriving at a working definition of a terrorist; characterizing the threat; suspicion indicators of\npotential terrorist allegiances; policies; screening procedures; suspicious incident reporting procedures; and training and education. The\nresearch found some evidence of small numbers of persons enlisting in the Armed Forces who are sympathetic to or participants in terrorist\ngroups. At the same, the Armed Forces have implemented many policies and practices designed to specifically, or by default, enable\ndetection of and response to such individuals. Recommendations are made for improving information exchange between DoD, law\nenforcement, and the intelligence community and for enhancing the efficiency and effectiveness of relevant DoD accessions policies and\n\n## D 15. Subject Terms Terrorism, Terrorist, Counterterrorism, Enlistment, Recruiting, Military Entrance Processing, Usmepcom, Suspicion, Screening, Personnel Security, Translator, Waiver, Identification, Identity\n\n16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF:\n17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT\n18. NUMBER OF PAGES\n19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON\n\na. REPORT\nUNCLASSIFIED\nb. ABSTRACT\nUNCLASSIFIED\nc. THIS PAGE\nUNCLASSIFIED\n\n138\n19b. TELEPHONE NUMBER (include area\ncode)\n831-657-3000\n\n\nStandard Form 298 (Rev. 8-98) Prescribed by ANSI Std. Z39.18\n\nPreface\n\nIn early 2004, the Office of the Secretary of Defense Accession Policy Directorate asked the Defense Personnel Security Research Center (PERSEREC) to identify what the Armed Forces are doing to screen for terrorists in the enlistment process. The purpose of this report is to present the results of that effort, reflecting a comprehensive approach to many dimensions of personnel screening in the Armed Forces enlistment process. The report also provides recommendations for additional steps that could be taken to make enlistment screening either more efficient or effective. Some of these bear directly on counterterrorism issues. Others are recommendations formulated as byproducts of the study's intensive review of military enlistment procedures. All findings and recommendations have been vetted with Armed Forces Recruiting Commands, United States Military Entrance Processing Command, and basic training personnel throughout the life of the project. In fact, many of the findings and recommendations were provided by the Recruiting Commands and the United States Military Entrance Processing Command (USMEPCOM), who have been a great source of expertise in this effort.\n\nJames A. Riedel\n\nDirector Army Battalions Albany, NY Brooklyn, NY Syracuse, NY Navy Districts Denver, CO Seattle, WA Air Force Squadrons 313 Syracuse, NY 361 McChord AFB, WA Additional Facilities Marine Corps Recruiter's School, San Diego, CA Navy Recruiting Area 1, Scotia, NY\nNavy Recruit Training Command, Great Lakes, IL United States Military Entrance Processing Command (USMEPCOM), Great Lakes, IL\nAcknowledgements Facilities\n\nThe following locations facilitated our visits by making staff available for interviews, providing facility tours, or providing some other form of assistance that deserves special recognition. This study could not have been accomplished without the cooperation and expert contributions of the leadership and staff at all of these facilities.\n\n\nRecruiting Stations (RS) Air Force, Capitola, CA Air Force, Salinas, CA Coast Guard, San Jose, CA Marine Corps, Boulder, CO Marine Corps, Denver, CO Navy, Capitola, CA Navy, Daly City, CA Navy, Lakewood, CO Navy, Salinas, CA\n\nMilitary Entrance Processing Stations (MEPS) Albany, NY Albuquerque, NM Brooklyn, NY Denver, CO Detroit, MI Fort Dix, NJ Honolulu, HI Los Angeles, CA Portland, OR\nRaleigh, NC1\nSacramento, CA San Antonio, TX San Diego, CA San Jose, CA Seattle, WA Syracuse, NY\n\nRecruiting Commands Air Force, San Antonio, TX Army, Louisville, KY Marine Corps, Quantico, VA Navy, Millington, TN\n\nContributing Experts\n\nThe following individuals deserve special recognition for accommodating our visits, sharing expert advice, and for providing technical information during the course of our interviews. We sincerely regret if we have failed to recognize any individual's contribution to this body of work. We greatly appreciate the time and information offered by every person with whom we spoke.\n\n\nArmy Captain Tomiko Ballard Major Thomas Battles Mr. Blane Mr. Clark Sergeant Dance Major Thomas M. W. Downs Mr. Paul Drebitke Major Mark Entwisle Lt Col John W. Gillette Captain Grossman Major Bill Gumm Lt Col Timothy Kiely Major Mahaney Sergeant Melendez Sergeant Michaeles Major Hugo Morales Colonel James Palermo Major Todd Parker Sergeant First Class (Ret.) Kelly Parsons First Sergeant Dave Pickering Mr. Polk Master Sergeant Sanocki Frank Shaffery John J. Sheehy Captain Ray Shetzline Errol Smith Sheila Stewart Diana Svab Sergeant First Class Thomas Alexander \"Sasha\" Vorobiov Captain Mark Winkler Captain Woods Army National Guard Sergeant First Class Julio Apodaca Sr. Master Sergeant Carl Clark Sergeant First Class Edward Correa III\nSergeant First Class Dave Foland Staff Sergeant Carol A. Harrell Staff Sergeant Crystal J. Kim Sergeant First Class Phillip A. Maas Sergeant First Class Timothy J. McCool Master Sergeant Garnet J. Tyrell Sergeant First Class Drew Williams Navy CDR Annie Andrews John K. Austin CDR Layne Boone PNCS(SW/AW) Dee Budzinsky EPDS Joel Chewing LCDR Russ Delany Mr. Sylvester \"Sly\" Gaston, III FC1 Dan Hebert LCDR Ralita Hildebrande Mr. Ed Kearl CDR James Knapp Terry Laque CDR Donald Leingang CDR Ray Lewis LCDR Theresa Lewis Deputy Bill Lovejoy Chief Charles Montoya Ms. Kathy Morris Command Master Chief Denver Navarrete Lt. Newhalfen LCDR Richard Preston LCDR Ann H. Rennie Lt Jared Chiu-Rourman EPDS Jerry Scott LCDR Alison Tanaka Deputy CDR John Tomkovitch Lt Lori C. Works CAPT Ray Wynne MGySgt C.L. MacMillan Staff Sergeant Meyers Mr. Michael J. Styka LtCol Ken Thompson Captain Whited Mr. Steve Wittle LtCol Noel \"Scott\" Wood Coast Guard Carlos R. Rosario Petty Officer Val Teixeira USMEPCOM Captain Judith Ackerson Colonel John M. Atkins Mr. David O'Brien Master Sergeant Patrick J. Cameron Lt Col Tom Henson Mr. Kevin D. Moore, Sr. Major Ted Newman Mr. Dale Ostrowski Colonel Rocky Swearengin Ms. Dorothy Thomas Colonel Daniel C. Weaver Colonel Lon Yeary Military Law Enforcement & Intelligence Dave Gilbert, AFOSI Fallon Procter, Army INSCOM Personnel at IACP from CID, OSI, and NCIS\nAir Force Staff Sergeant Stephanie Coffee Lt Col Glen F. Copeland Colonel Bob East Lt Col Susan Emala Lt Col Laura Feldman Major Thomas Fredericks Staff Sergeant Thomas George Staff Sergeant Jason M. Gossman Staff Sergeant Christian Granda Master Sergeant Dana M. Hannon Technical Sergeant Hendrick Staff Sergeant Valerie James Staff Sergeant John KonKolics Staff Sergeant Mike Kuettel Major Cheryl Lee Master Sergeant Terry K. Lemmon Technical Sergeant Billie L. Lopez Master Sergeant Stephen A. Mataraza Lt Col Patrick E. McCormack Staff Sergeant Eric E. Neill Senior Master Sergeant Thomas M Nelligan Lt Col Jade Skinner Staff Sergeant Eric Ramos Major Mike Reyna Technical Sergeant Richard Rose Captain Edward L. Smalls Major Kenneth Smalls Master Sergeant Brian Smith Major Tangela Spencer Technical Sergeant Scott Thomison Captain David J. Wilson Lt Col Dan Woolever Marine Corps Master Sergeant J.T. Allan Master Sergeant Dean L. Bowers Captain Burgett Major Charles W. Dougherty Major Kyle D. East Staff Sergeant Joseph Ezit, III Master Sergeant Furness Major Griggs GySgt Terrance L. Haase Captain Hesseling\n\nExecutive Summary Purpose of the Study In early 2004, the Office of the Secretary of Defense Accession Policy Directorate asked the Defense Personnel Security Research Center (PERSEREC) to identify what the Armed Forces are doing to screen for terrorists in the enlistment process. The purpose of this report is to present the results of that effort.\n\nThe report identifies the many steps in the enlisted accessions process that have been implemented to help identify individuals who belong to or are sympathetic of groups that are disloyal and hostile toward the U.S. government. Overall, USMEPCOM and the Services have implemented many effective policies and screening procedures while respecting and protecting applicants' rights to freedom of speech, religion, and association. Building on the steps that have already been taken, additional measures are recommended that may improve the efficiency and/or effectiveness of the current screening process. Methodology An extensive review was conducted of Department of Defense (DoD), Armed Forces, and United States Military Entrance Processing Command (USMEPCOM) policies and procedures pertaining to the enlistment process. The objective was to identify components that would serve the purpose of helping to screen for potential terrorists. Reviews of these literatures were supplemented with visits and interviews at recruiting stations (RS), military entrance processing stations (MEPS), military Recruiting Commands, military training commands, and USMEPCOM. For a list of sites visited, refer to the acknowledgements section. Interviews were conducted in each of these locations and relevant documents were collected.\n\nThe report focuses on individuals joining the enlisted ranks, excluding those entering linguist positions, officers, and direct commissions (chaplains, nurses, lawyers, engineers, etc.). Nonetheless, many of the issues discussed in this report would apply to vetting of other than new enlisted rank personnel.\n\nTo understand the terrorist threat, contemporary literatures on groups associated with the attacks on the U.S. on September 11, 2001, were reviewed as well as literature pertaining to domestic terrorist groups. Military criminal investigations personnel were consulted and Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), state, local, and military law enforcement intelligence reports were monitored throughout the project to identify indications of terrorist activity by U.S. military enlisted personnel. Definition of Terrorist In our meetings with recruiting and USMEPCOM personnel, we found it effective to conceptually frame the \"terrorist\" in \"screening for terrorists\" as anyone who was\n\nsympathetic to, or a member of, a group that could be characterized as both disloyal and hostile toward the U.S. government. Effectively, anyone who is antagonistic toward the U.S. government and who would be willing in any way to support the efforts of a specific group in working against the U.S. government, its citizens, and entities would qualify as someone whom we are interested in detecting and excluding from military service and from possible access to sensitive information and facilities. Characterizing the Threat This section briefly describes the main foreign (Militant Jihadists) and domestic groups (White Supremacists, White Nationalists, and domestic militias) whose past and recent actions and current ideologies render them particularly hostile and disloyal toward the U.S. government. Several data sources were consulted and Recruiting Commands, MEPS, and military law enforcement personnel were interviewed to surface indications of attempted or actual enlistment of disloyal and hostile persons.\n\nThe sources accessed for this report did surface some currently or formerly enlisted persons with terrorist or extremist group associations. While their presence in the military is significant in its own right, the actual numbers are extremely small relative to the denominator representing the millions of personnel who have been enlisted in the Armed Forces. Smaller still is the number of personnel who enlisted specifically for purposes of furthering their extremist causes. Most intelligence, information, and history of events suggest that more significant is the threat from outsiders waging attacks against military personnel, some of whom may be employed at RS and MEPS. Additionally, the fact that the insider cases we did find were documented is indicative of the diligence the Recruiting Commands and USMEPCOM have towards these issues.\n\nTo the extent there is an insider threat, the opinion of active duty personnel and counterterrorism and counterintelligence experts and the evidence from case studies examined for this report suggest that it is not from new recruits. Rather, the threat derives from active duty persons being recruited or converting to radical ideologies out of religious conviction or after becoming disaffected with a commander, a fellow solider, an assignment, or military service in general (Mintz & Vistica, 2003). Or, the threat could be manifest in individuals who engage in bad conduct for purely self-interested reasons such as money, ego, addiction, or revenge and then attempt to dignify their actions, after the fact, as being motivated by some higher religious value.\n\nWhile the number of active duty personnel who can be categorized as insider threats or terrorists is believed to be nearly infinitesimal once the denominator of millions of military personnel is taken into account, the means available to persons who would, were all things known, be disqualified from enlisting are the same means that terrorists could use to enlist. In the enlistment process, this effectively boils down to how one represents one's identity, background, abilities, associations, and intentions. To the extent that optimal procedures are not in place to detect problems in how applicants represent their personal identifiers, background, abilities, associations, and intentions, terrorists and nonterrorists alike can exploit the weaknesses.\n\nPolicies and Regulations Restricting Extremism in Military Service The U.S. government, DoD, and the Armed Forces have established numerous policies defining and restricting participation in extremist organizations and activities, which would include participation in terrorist groups and activities. The DoD and Armed Forces have also established policies regarding how to define and respond to persons and activities that appear to be inconsistent with defense of national security. This section lists these policies, along with key components of them that directly and indirectly define and regulate participation of and response to military personnel in extremist and terrorist groups and activities. Screening Procedures that Help Detect Enlistees Who May be Disloyal and Hostile Toward the U.S. Government The Recruiting Commands and USMEPCOM have implemented many screening procedures that have the effect of detecting and deterring applicants and recruits who are enlisting with disloyal and hostile intentions. These procedures include identification checking and verification, criminal background checks, checks of the FBI's terrorist file (and thus checks of the Terrorist Screening Center databases), extremist tattoo screening, numerous questionnaires and interviews, credit checks, and, when appropriate, security clearance background checks. Policies and Procedures for Reporting and Documenting Suspicious Persons or Activities Under current procedures, observations of suspicious persons are often first reported through recruiting chains of command to commanders who are authorized to determine whether the information should be forwarded to law enforcement, force protection services, or antiterrorism officers. More formal means for reporting and sharing suspicious person and incident information are being developed. Training and Education All of the military services provide extremist group detection and response training to some segments of their services. This section provides information on military personnel training and education that address extremism, hate, discrimination, and conflict resolution.\n\nRecruiting, MEPS, and training personnel were asked at every location visited whether they received training on the recognition and reporting of individuals who may be hostile and disloyal toward the U.S. government. Based on their responses, it is clear that equal opportunity training is well understood and valued. Military Services also consistently receive force protection briefings and training for dealing with external threats.\n\nRecommendations We observed aspects of the enlistment process that conceivably could contribute to acceptance of persons whom the military would prefer not to enlist, if all things were known at the time they were processing them. The vulnerabilities in the enlistment process that otherwise disqualified people could intentionally use, or unintentionally benefit from, are the same vulnerabilities that terrorists could use to elude detection and infiltrate the military. Therefore, by addressing these vulnerabilities, the enlistment community can strengthen its screening against terrorists. In addition to making recommendations to address the effectiveness of screening practices, we also observed a few opportunities for improving the efficiency of existing screening practices.\n\nThis section presents recommendations that were developed over the course of the project. Some were derived from interviews with enlistment personnel. Others were the result of the authors' observations, based on their knowledge of personnel security systems. USD(P&R) should work with the Intelligence community and federal and local law enforcement to improve exchange of information between these entities and DoD regarding recruits who may be members of or have associations with extremist groups.\n\n\nWhen the DoD submits fingerprints for checks of the FBI's criminal record files, a check of the FBI's Violent Gangs and Terrorist Organization File (VGTOF) is also conducted. The VGTOF file is updated regularly with consolidated files of the Terrorist Screening Center. Hits on this file are not returned to the Recruiting Commands, however, but rather go to the submitting agency of the record found. It is at the discretion of these agencies to notify the Recruiting Commands that a person in VGTOF is attempting to enlist. Recruiting Commands do not report being notified nor would the law enforcement agencies aware of the case know whom to notify. Agreements and procedures are needed for more effective and timely exchange of this information in a way that does not compromise the investigations of law enforcement. USD(P&R) should work with other federal agencies such as the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS), Social Security Administration (SSA), and Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) to clarify and simplify procedures for USMEPCOM\nand Recruiting Command personnel to report suspicious persons and incidents.\n\nUSMEPCOM personnel have noted that it is not a simple matter to communicate suspicious persons or incidents to appropriate federal agencies outside of DoD. The networks of communication are not always user-friendly and it can be difficult to identify which government agencies, such as FBI, DHS, SSA, or USCIS, to notify. Even more difficult is knowing whom to contact within any of these agencies.\n\nUSD(P&R) should support development and/or implementation of training materials for recruiting and USMEPCOM personnel in the detection and response to individuals with potential terrorist and extremist group associations. Recruiting and USMEPCOM personnel interviewed during this study were not aware of having received systematic training on recognizing and responding to possible terrorists who try to enlist. Instructors and course developers assigned to address the subject matter reflected in this section should take advantage of information in this document and our efforts to catalogue relevant courses. The information provided should make it easier for them to locate and integrate into their classes relevant information and course materials being used in other instruction venues across the DoD. USD(P&R) should support USMEPCOM and the Recruiting Commands in developing and training on optimal DoD information sharing systems for suspicious persons and incidents.\n\nRecruiting Commands, MEPS, and basic training personnel need clear and easily implemented instructions for aggregating and sharing information about persons they detect who may have terrorist or extremist group associations. Information sharing among these groups does not appear to occur, and because of this, military personnel cannot evaluate the full extent to which problematic persons associated with particular groups are trying to enlist in the military and their apparent strategies for doing so. Personnel are unlikely to be able to detect anything beyond what would appear to be isolated incidents.\n\n Ensure Recruiting and MEPS personnel, recruits, and basic training personnel know when, how, and to whom within DoD to report suspicions of extremist associations of applicants, recruits, and other military personnel.\n\n\n Continue and accelerate development of the joint suspicious incident database via Area Security Coordinators or some other means for aggregating information about suspicious incidents and persons.\n\n Ensure suspicious incident and person reporting is integrated to include all entities involved in the accessions process from recruiting stations through basic military training.\n\n\nUSD(P&R) should improve methods for preventing, detecting, and responding to identification fraud. Misrepresentations of identity are common tactics of terrorists trying to gain entry where they would otherwise be prohibited. In the military enlistment context, extremists may attempt to show documents, such as alien registration cards or birth certificates, which meet eligibility requirements. Or they may present identification documents that dissociate them from military, criminal, or watch list records that would disqualify them\n\n\nfrom enlistment. USMEPCOM and the Recruiting Commands currently do not have systematic resources or procedures for protecting their organizations from this kind of fraud.\n- USD(P&R) and USD(I) should work together to develop and provide\ncomprehensive document fraud recognition training.\n\n- USD(P&R) should continue and accelerate support for USMEPCOM and\nrecruiting command progress toward paperless processing, which will enhance automated evaluation of identification information.\n\n- USD(P&R) should implement policy and procedures to increase the\nlikelihood that law enforcement detains and investigates applicants who\nengage in identification fraud.\n\n- USD(P&R) should continue development and implementation of\nUSMEPCOM's e-Signature and e-Security initiatives. Until these systems are in place, require recruiting station, MEPS, recruiting liaison, and basic\ntraining personnel all to review and validate original identification documents.\n\n- USD(P&R) should support and promote implementation of checks of the FBI\ncivil fingerprint file for all fingerprint submissions.\n\n- USD(P&R) should ensure that all identification information that can be\nvalidated against databases is appropriately requested and documented. USD(P&R) should ensure MEPS-type quality assurance is applied to all\noverseas recruits\nMEPS personnel play an important role in providing quality assurance to\napplicants for military service. Currently, with the exception of the Unites States Marine Corps (USMC), Recruiting Commands are not subjecting overseas applicants to the same quality assurance procedures used for domestic applicants. As such, enlistment via\nrecruiting stations in non-U.S. countries would be a softer target for someone wanting to\ninfiltrate the U.S. military. In fact, this may be one of the most vulnerable points for allowing hostile foreign nationals to infiltrate our military. Providing extra layers of screening beyond the recruiter, who has conflicting demands to recruit individuals, will provide a harder target for someone wanting to enlist for purposes of undermining or\nattacking the U.S. government.\nUSD(P&R) and DUSD(CI&S) should review policy and procedures to identify the best means for improving the completeness and accuracy of information used to populate security clearance applications (SF 86 / EPSQ / E-QIP, etc.).\n\nCurrently, the \"SF 86: Questionnaire for National Security Positions\" is completed by every applicant for military service in the United States. Its purpose is to collect information for background investigations of persons applying for security clearances. For military accessions and security clearance vetting, the SF 86 is the primary questionnaire for documenting potential indicators of hostile and disloyal associations and histories. The importance of the SF 86 may not be sufficiently understood or respected by some recruiting personnel. Recruiters often help applicants fill out the SF 86, sometimes incompletely and inaccurately, to meet paperwork requirements for enlistment. This same SF 86 is then also submitted as part of security clearance applications. As the DoD moves toward automated adjudication of security clearances, based to some extent on automated processing of information on the SF 86, without better quality, the military recruiting process will be responsible for infusing vulnerability into national security by contributing to clearance of individuals who pose a risk.\n\nUSD(P&R), DUSD(CI&S), the FBI, and OPM  should work together to ensure DoD is receiving full advantage of statutory authorizations to receive applicants' criminal history for national security clearance and military acceptance and retention purposes when appropriate.\n\nWe initially recommended that the USD(P&R) review procedures being used to assign the FBI purpose code to fingerprint submissions for FBI criminal record checks. USMEPCOM quickly and correctly determined that they do not have any control over how OPM forwards record check requests to the FBI. To restore the level of access to information enjoyed by DoD prior to the transfer of the PSI from DSS to OPM, the FBI, OPM, and the DoD will need to meet to determine how to submit criminal record checks from DoD for national security purposes and enlistment or retention in the military as authorized by USC Title 5, section 9101 (SCIA). According to the FBI, record checks for national security purposes may result in return of juvenile records and sealed records from states queried through FBI checks. Since the enlistment population has a much higher probability of having committed any crimes as juveniles and because juvenile records are often sealed, access to records as authorized by SCIA should be ensured.\n\n\nUSD(P&R) should support increased use of and training on the intelligence value in credit reports to validate information provided by applicants\n\nWith the exception of Army, currently, credit reports are being run on every applicant. The Army is expected to obtain credit reports on every applicant beginning in October 2005. Information was not available to indicate whether or how enlistment personnel are benefiting from the intelligence available in credit reports. For example, credit reports can provide the following types of information:\n\n\n Unlisted aliases  Amount and types of information inconsistent with age of applicant  Unlisted residences  Evidence of problematic finances USD(P&R) should identify how this information can most effectively be made available to decision makers in the accessions process who are determining whether individuals applying for military service are who they say they are and whether they should resolve financial issues before applying for security clearances.\n\nThe military Recruiting Commands should work together and with law enforcement to develop a joint services Digital and Searchable Tattoo Assessment Tool (TAT).\n\nTattoo screening was one of the most frequent practices that recruiting personnel indicated they used to identify individuals with indications of possible hostile and disloyal associations and intentions toward the U.S. government. Recruiting and basic training personnel consistently indicated concern with the completeness, accuracy, timeliness, and accessibility of intelligence for screening tattoos. The efficiency and effectiveness of information available in tattoo screening can be improved through development and implementation of a joint digital and searchable tattoo assessment tool\n(TAT).\n\nUSD(P&R) should update policies and procedures pertaining to prohibiting and detecting extremist association manifest in Internet behavior. The Internet has greatly expanded opportunities for people who are hostile and disloyal toward the U.S. government to meet each other, share information, and plan. In our study, the Internet provided the strongest evidence of active duty military personnel participating in extremist groups. The DoD and the Recruiting Commands should clarify prohibited participation in Web sites and Web forums that are sponsored by, or are online gathering places for, terrorists and extremist groups The DoD should also consider establishing procedures and assigning responsibility for monitoring extremist Web sites and forums for participation by members of the Armed Forces. USD(P&R) should standardize and implement question strategies that are more likely to engage applicants in conversations about potentially problematic associations.\n\nAs discussed earlier, indications are that questions currently being asked of applicants regarding associations with extremist groups do not yield many affirmative responses. This may be because, in actuality, virtually none of the persons filling out the SF 86 have had associations with extremist groups. At the same time, the questions asked may not effectively open discussions about the kinds of behaviors and attitudes that indicate sympathy for or involvement in\n\nextremist groups. Based on interviews with enlistment personnel, reviews of their questionnaires, and reviews of answers to the SF 86, we feel that a better set of questions could be made available to enlistment personnel to probe pertinent issues with applicants. They would specifically address the ways applicants and recruits can act to support groups hostile and disloyal to the U.S. government, to include Internet behavior. The proposed questions are as follows: The following questions pertain to your participation in extremist and terrorist organizations and activities. Note: First, define for each applicant what \"extremist or terrorist organizations or activities\" mean: People who support or agree with extremist organizations think it is OK to use force or violence or to discriminate against other people based on their race, ethnicity, religion,\ngender, sexual orientation, disability, national origin, or support for U.S. government policy. Or they may try to disrupt, sabotage, overthrow, or\ncommit espionage or terrorism against the U.S. government, or any of its State or local governments.\n\na. Have you ever advocated or practiced discrimination or committed acts\nof violence or terrorism against individuals based on their religion, ethnicity, race, sexual orientation, disability, gender, or loyalty to the U.S. government? (YES/NO) b. Have you posted or distributed literature or participated in public demonstrations to show your allegiance to or to promote an extremist\norganization or philosophy? (YES/NO) c. Have you ever provided labor, money, or other resources to extremist individuals or organizations? (YES/NO) d. Have you ever received training from or recruited or provided training for extremist organizations or causes? (YES/NO)\n\ne. Have you ever attended any meetings, participated in any Web sites or\non-line discussions, or exchanged information in any way with individuals\ninvolved in extremist organizations or causes? (YES/NO) f. Are there any groups (such as countries, political groups, or religious groups) who you would feel obligated to defend if they claimed they were under attack by the United States Government? (YES/NO) If you answered \"yes\" to any of question (a) through (f) above, please explain.\n\n\nTable of Contents Introduction___________________________________________________________ 1 Arriving at a Working Definition of Terrorism______________________________ 3 Characterizing the Threat _______________________________________________ 5\nRecent Groups Who Have Demonstrated Disloyalty and Hostility Toward U.S. Government __________________________________________________________ 5 Militant Jihadism as an Insider or Outsider Threat ____________________________ 7 Evidence Indicating Prevalence of Involvement of Hostile and Disloyal Groups in the Military at the Time of Enlistment _______________________________________ 10 Conclusions about the Threat of Terrorists Infiltrating the Military through the Enlisted\nAccessions Process ___________________________________________________ 14 Policies and Regulations Restricting Extremism in Military Service ___________ 16\nExecutive Orders and DoD Directives ____________________________________ 18 U.S. Army Regulations ________________________________________________ 24 U.S. Navy Instructions_________________________________________________ 25 U.S. Air Force Instructions _____________________________________________ 26 U.S. Marine Corps Orders______________________________________________ 27 Screening Procedures that Help Detect Enlistees Who May be Disloyal and Hostile\nToward the U.S. Government ___________________________________________ 29\nEstablishing Identity __________________________________________________ 29 Establishing Employment Eligibility______________________________________ 30 Automated Database Checks____________________________________________ 31 State and Local Criminal History Checks __________________________________ 34 Tattoo Screening _____________________________________________________ 34 Questionnaires and Interviews___________________________________________ 37 Credit Checks _______________________________________________________ 50 Security Clearance Restrictions__________________________________________ 50 Aptitude Testing _____________________________________________________ 51 Policies and Procedures for Reporting and Documenting Suspicious Persons or Activities_____________________________________________________________ 52\nFederal Department of Homeland Security System __________________________ 52 USMEPCOM Station Advisory Reporting Network (STARNET)_______________ 52 Armed Forces Recruiting Stations Operational Security Manual Procedures ______ 53 Army Regulations ____________________________________________________ 53 Training and Education ________________________________________________ 54\nU.S. Army __________________________________________________________ 54 U.S. Navy __________________________________________________________ 56 U.S. Air Force _______________________________________________________ 58\n\n\nU.S. Marine Corps (USMC) ____________________________________________ 60 All Services and the Security Community _________________________________ 61 Recommendations_____________________________________________________ 63 Appendices Appendix A: Examples of White Extremists in the Military on the Web ______ A-1 Appendix B: Indications of Extremists in Security Clearance Investigations ___ B-1\n\nAppendix C: U.S. Navy Military Applicant Security Screening (MASS) _______ F-1\n\nAppendix D: U.S. Army, TAPE-EPMD Form 169-R, Security Screening\nQuestionnaire _______________________________________________________ G-1\n\nAppendix E: U.S. Army, TAPE-EPMD Form 189-R, Personnel Reliability Program\nScreening Questionnaire ______________________________________________ H-1\n\n                                List of Tables\n\n1. Compendium of Concepts Used in Definitions of Terrorism and Terrorist _________ 3\n\nIntroduction In early 2004, the Office of the Secretary of Defense Accession Policy Directorate asked the Defense Personnel Security Research Center (PERSEREC) to identify what the Armed Forces are doing to screen for terrorists in the enlisted accessions process. The purpose of this report is to present the results of that effort.\n\nThe report focuses on individuals joining the enlisted ranks, excluding translators2, and officer, chaplain, and professional positions. Nonetheless, many of the issues discussed in this report would apply to vetting of those types of personnel.\n\nAt the heart of the research effort was a review of Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine regulations pertaining to activities conducted by recruiting stations (RS) and Military Entrance Processing Stations (MEPS). Reviews of these regulations were supplemented with visits to RS, MEPS, Recruiting Commands, and training facilities across the nation (see acknowledgements).\n\nAs a result of this work, we developed detailed flow charts of every step in the accessions process from the recruiting station through the end of basic training that involved an exchange of written, verbal, or visual information between military enlistment personnel3 and applicants. These information exchanges were then reviewed in light of whether they could constitute a screen for terrorists. Steps in the process that serve the purpose of screening for terrorists are summarized in the section detailing \"Screening Procedures that Help Detect Enlistees Who May be Disloyal and Hostile Toward the U.S. government.\"\n\n\nBefore assessing the value of each point of information exchange in screening for terrorists, however, we had to arrive at a working definition of the types of persons who may be trying to enlist in the military who could be categorized as \"terrorists.\" As one standards, with the exception of Armed Services Vocational Aptitude Battery (ASVAB) scores and possibly age thresholds. In taking the ASVAB, they must process through MEPS and cannot use Mobile Examination Team (MET) sites. They are all subjected to National Agency and Local Agency Checks (NACLC), must meet citizenship requirements of AR 601-20, and cannot be granted waivers above the minor nontraffic level. They cannot be processed on Saturdays, Service mission day, or extended hours processing support days - all times when they may not be subjected to the utmost scrutiny. They also undergo an Oral Proficiency Interview (OPI). Applicants enlisting in the 09L program enter under the Army Civilian Acquired Skills Program. (USAREC Operation Order 3-0007). The extra measures reflect that, in the current climate, the military services recognize this is a higher risk group for potentially enlisting persons who are hostile and disloyal to the U.S. government. This same climate entails acute demands for translators, however, and we trust the military commands have good reason for assuming more risk in order to meet their needs for people who speak the languages of people with whom we are in conflict.\n3 The term \"enlistment personnel\" refers to the following: all personnel under the commands of the Armed Forces Recruiting Commands, all personnel under the command of the United States Military Entrance Processing Command (USMEPCOM), and basic training personnel for all Services. will see in reviewing the section on \"Arriving at a Working Definition of Terrorism,\" applying a very literal definition of \"terrorist\" and \"terrorism\" was not realistic. Instead, we focused on aspects of the screening process that could surface indicators consistent with the identities or tactics of groups who have shown themselves to be disloyal and hostile toward the U.S. government. These types of groups are described in the section on \"Characterizing the Threat.\"\nWhen these indicators surface in the accessions process, it does not mean that the applicants with whom they are associated are necessarily disloyal and hostile toward the U.S. government. They are simply cues to accessions and security personnel to be alert, ask more questions, and act as much as possible and permissible to dispel any suspicion that the indicator at issue is in any way related to hostile intentions toward the U.S. government.\n\nThe conditions of possibility and permissibility referenced in the preceding sentence are very important to understanding the accessions process. Enlistment personnel are extremely vigilant of the civil rights and liberties of the individuals whom they are working to enlist. They have guidance on objective behavioral criteria that can be used to disqualify applicants. At the same time, these decisions are made in a climate that is respectful of individuals' fundamental rights to privacy and freedom of speech, association, and religion. Once one moves from disqualifying applicants based on clear criteria such as low test scores, poor medical health, impermissible tattoos, or serious criminal conduct to having to make decisions based on extremist intentions and associations, the task gets much tougher. Nonetheless, the Armed Forces have dealt effectively with these issues, and the results of their efforts are reviewed in the section on \"Policies and Regulations Restricting Extremism in Military Service.\"\nPolicies pertaining to extremism are ineffective unless individuals are aware of them, have common understandings of them, and actually implement them in the course of daily business. Therefore, as part of this research effort, we reviewed what is being done to train and educate enlistment personnel, new recruits, and their instructors to detect and respond to applicants and recruits who may be disloyal and hostile toward U.S.\n\ngovernment.\n\nFinally, we conclude with some recommendations of what we feel could be added or strengthened in the accessions process to increase the chances that individuals who are both disloyal and hostile toward U.S. government could be detected. Many of these recommendations do not reflect inadequacies in current systems; rather, they are prospects for enhancing systems to increase the likelihood of detecting persons who are engaging in deception in the accessions process, as terrorists would have to do in order to be enlisted.\n\nArriving at a Working Definition of Terrorism\n\nIn a project with the purpose of identifying what is being done to \"screen for terrorists\" in the enlisted military accessions process, working from any one official definition or one of the many available unofficial definitions of \"terrorists\" and \"terrorism\" was problematic, particularly with the frame of reference being enlisted military personnel. What do enlisted terrorists look like? What have they done or what do they intend to do that qualifies them as terrorists? Definitions from the U.S. Code, the Department of Homeland Security, the European Union, the Department of Defense (DoD), and Web sites of terrorism experts were culled. The resulting compendium of terms and conditions used in definitions of terrorism is shown in Table 1. This list shows an array of dimensions according to individuals' affiliations, their intentions, their targets, and characteristics of their real or possible acts.\n\nCompendium of Concepts Used in Definitions of Terrorism and Terrorist\n\n\npremeditated\n\n\npolitically motivated violence\n\nperpetrated by subnational groups or clandestine agents\n\nusually intended to influence an audience\n\ncalculated to terrorize the public or a particular section of it\n\nincludes threats as well as actual violence\n\nrandomly selects targets in order to terrorize the public at large\n\nexcludes attacks on soldiers, which would be warfare\n\ntargets noncombatants, which can include civilians and off-duty servicemen or\non-duty servicemen not actively engaged in hostilities\n\nexcludes states from being perpetrators of terrorism; states can only be\nsponsors of terrorism\n\nengaged in any violent revolutionary activity\n\nintentionally committed by an individual or a group against one or more\ncountries, their institutions or people\n\nhas the aim of intimidating one or more countries, their institutions or people\n\nhas the aim of seriously altering or destroying the political, economic or social\nstructures of countries\n\ncalculated use of violence or the threat of violence to inculcate fear\n\nintended to coerce or to intimidate governments or societies in the pursuit of\ngoals that are generally political, religious, or ideological\n\nentails destruction of people or property by people not acting on behalf of an\nestablished government\n\ncommitted for purpose of redressing a real or imaginary injustice attributed to\nan established government\n\naimed directly or indirectly at an established government\nIn holding ourselves to a literal interpretation of \"screening for terrorists,\" we would effectively be trying to identify policies and procedures in the enlistment process that reveal when the dimensions in Figure 1 are associated with applicants. For example, we would be attempting to identify how the Armed Forces are screening for individuals or members of subnational groups who are enlisting for the purpose of engaging in ideologically motivated violence or threats of violence against randomly selected targets that represent a particular government with the aim of intimidating or coercing the noncombatant population of that government, which includes off-duty soldiers and onduty soldiers not engaged in hostile actions. Putting the words to print shows the absurdity of taking the term \"terrorist\" literally when referring to policies and procedures to \"screen for terrorists\" in the enlistment process. In our meetings with recruiting and USMEPCOM personnel, we found it effective to conceptually frame the \"terrorist\" in \"screening for terrorists\" as anyone who was sympathetic to, or a member of, a group that could be characterized as both disloyal and hostile toward the U.S. government. Effectively, anyone who is antagonistic toward the U.S. government and who would be willing in any way to support the efforts of a specific group in working against the U.S. government, citizens, or entities would qualify as someone whom we are interested in detecting and excluding from military service and possible access to sensitive information and facilities. The advantage of this definition is that it enables us to take into account both domestic and foreign antagonists. It also allows us to rule out criminal gang associations that are not necessarily disloyal to the U.S. government. Someone can be a drug dealer or a gang member and have no desire to carry out an ideologically motivated agenda for committing or supporting violence against the government. The definition also excludes from being classified as terrorists those foreign nationals who enlist in the Armed Forces to learn military training, with the intention of returning to their home countries and our allies to use that training on behalf of their nations' defense and military actions. This is not an uncommon scenario in our military. The key with these soldiers, however, is that while not necessarily being loyal to the U.S. government, they are not hostile toward it either. Thus, we arrived at the following as the object of our analysis of \"what's being done to screen for terrorists\" in the enlisted accessions process: a person who has sympathy for, or is a member of, a group that is both disloyal and hostile toward the U.S. government.\n\n\n\nCharacterizing the Threat With disloyalty and hostility toward the U.S. government as the standard for excluding some applicants and recruits, it is possible to think strategically about groups who are active at this time and who meet both these criteria. In this section, the main foreign and domestic groups who would pose the greatest threat if they are attempting to infiltrate the military are described. Evidence is provided of their recent actions and current ideologies that render them hostile and disloyal toward the U.S. government. Following this section, evidence of any involvement by these groups in the military at the time of enlistment is discussed. Not all extremist groups are specifically referenced in this section. The focus is on those that were active at the time this report was prepared and whose ideology is anti-U.S. government and who advocate denying U.S. citizens their civil rights. Thereafter, steps in the accessions process that screen for possible members of these groups are listed.\n\n\nRecent Groups Who Have Demonstrated Disloyalty and Hostility Toward U.S. Government Militant Jihadists What we are calling \"Militant Jihadists\" are often referenced as Islamists, Islamic extremists, Jihadists, al-Qaeda, and other names that represent similar groups that are engaged in violence against the U.S. and its allies. These groups have been waging violence against U.S. assets and interests for decades, though they gained a prominent and permanent place in the U.S. public's consciousness with the 2001 hijacking and crashing of United and American Airlines flights in New York, Virginia, and Pennsylvania. Over time, variants of these groups dissolve and reassemble under different names. Their purposes, as described below, remain constant. For a recent list and description of these types of groups, one can refer to the Department of Homeland Security Terrorist Organization Reference Guide (2004) and the Department of State's list of Designated Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTOs).\n\nMilitant Jihadists engage in violence under the guises of avenging injustice against Muslims and/or instituting extremist Islamic Law, or Shari'ah Law, as defined by extremist Muslim religious leaders, in place of existing non-Islamic and/or democratic regimes (see, e.g, Al-Khilafa Publications, 1999). Due to the sensitivity of the topic in light of the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution's Bill of Rights, one cannot begin a discussion of Militant Jihadists and their relationship to Islam without clarifying that the term Militant Jihadism is not used to represent the religion of Islam. At most, it is a subset within a larger population representing all of the Islamic faith. Many Muslims, however, would disagree that Militant Jihadists belong in the same field as people of the Muslim faith. It is not the purpose of this report to address the place of Militant Jihadists in the religion of Islam. It is important for the reader to understand that references to Militant Jihadists in no way bear on the legitimacy, rights, divine guidance, and propriety of the Muslim faith in general.\n\nThe U.S. government needs to clearly establish the point that Militant Jihadism is a political ideology that often happens to be communicated using the rhetoric of religion. Militant Jihadism does not make a distinction between church and state. In fact, a fundamental tenet of the Militant Jihadist philosophy is that it would be a sin to purposefully in any way establish a separation of church and state. Democratic laws are illegitimate and evil because they are \"man-made\" laws expressing the will of the electorate rather than God. For the Militant Islamist, the State, in all things, should operate as a manifestation of and in obedience to Allah. Thus:\n\"At first glance, militant Islam appears to present a challenge unprecedented in the U.S. experience. The U.S. government - a determinedly secular entity - cannot formulate a policy toward a religion. But a closer look at militant Islam reveals the solution. Yes, Islam is indeed a faith, but its militant variant is a form of political ideology. Formulating a policy toward it is akin to a policy toward fascism or Marxism-Leninism.\" (Pipes, 2003) Militant Jihadists are openly hostile toward the United States and western values and mores. For many, their ultimate goal is to replace non-Islamist political systems with a Khilafa, i.e., Islamic State (e.g., see Al-Khilafa Publications, 1999). Western society especially is the enemy of Islam. Ayatollah Khomeini declared war on the west in 1979, and Militant Jihadists have engaged in anti-Western violence since at least 1983. The political ideology of the Militant Jihadist is totalitarian. Islamism is a ruling system, not a matter of personal faith. For example, it prescribes conduct in law, medicine, economics, engineering, social and family relations, and education. Militant Jihadism prescribes a complete program for regulating the day-to-day activities of everyday life. Militant Jihadists are anti-democratic (e.g., see Bin Abdul Aziz, n.d.), anticapitalist (Mariam &  Nawaz, 2003), anti-communist, and anti-socialist. At least national, and for some global, domination is a political objective. They are not willing to tolerate integrated, co-existence of Western and Militant Jihadist values and mores.\n\n\nFor the reasons listed above, the allegiance to the U.S. and the willingness to defend its Constitution must be questioned of anyone who materially supports or ideologically advocates the legitimacy of Militant Jihadism. As such, any involvement in anything pertaining to Militant Jihadism should be subject to question in military service, security clearance screening, and continuing evaluation. As stated by one author:\nMost Muslims, like everyone else, want to live their lives in peace. But that fact doesn't change or mitigate another fact: that terrorists and militants around the world today are using the Qur'an and the teachings of Islam to recruit and motivate terrorists, making principal use of the doctrines surrounding the concept of jihad (Spencer, 2003: xiii).\n\n\nDetermination of participation in or support or advocacy of Militant Jihadist groups and their ideologies should be grounds for denial of acceptance into the Armed Forces of the U.S. and denial of access to classified or sensitive information. The challenge comes in trying to explore these issues and establish these grounds without unconstitutional discrimination based on religion. The issues also need to be addressed without creating a basis for filing of civil rights and equal employment opportunity complaints against the U.S. government in the civil courts. Militant Jihadism as an Insider or Outsider Threat Available evidence suggests that the nature of Militant Jihadism as described above is such that adherents would be more likely to opt to attack the U.S. and its allies from the outside rather than through infiltration. As stated in one Fatwah found on the Web:\n....we warn the Muslims wherever they are, particularly those Muslims in Iraq, not to offer any support, morally or financially or militarily or physically in their onslaught against Islam and Muslims in the region, though they attempt to take the Muslims onto their side. But Allah (swt)4\ndesignated people in this Ummah that will direct others that go astray, and May Allah protect us all...Therefore we warn the Muslims wherever they are, particularly those Muslims in Iraq, not to offer any support, morally or financially or militarily or physically in their onslaught against Islam and Muslims in the region, though they attempt to take the Muslims onto their side. But Allah (swt) designated people in this Ummah that will direct others that go astray, and May Allah protect us all. (FATWA RELEASED BY THE SHARI'AH COURT OF THE UK, September 11, 2003) In May of 2004, the following message appeared on the Web: The torture of Muslim prisoners in Iraq in the \"rape rooms\" at the American Abu Ghraib prison confirms that the so-called American war on terror is really a war on Islam. George Bush has created a global gulag network of extra-legal and secret U.S. prisons with thousands of inmates. This Gulag stretches from Afghanistan to Iraq, to Guantanamo and secret CIA prisons around the world. This Gulag exclusively holds Muslim prisoners. In light of these revelations, Al- Masakin would like to take this opportunity to remind the American Muslim Mujahedin, and our allies in the revolutionary and anti-Imperialist left, that ROTC buildings, armed service recruiting centers, individual military personnel, and police officers are \"military targets.\" These institutions must be violently and covertly attacked. In fact, there are thousands of unarmed military targets walking around all over the U.S.. Outraged American citizens and American Muslims should have little difficulty making violent contact with recruits, cadets, marines, etc. We strongly recommend that such contact be made with a very sharp knife,\n\n4 \"swt\" is an acronym used by many Muslims following their written references to God to show respect. It stands for \"Subhanahu wa ta'ala\" meaning \"Allah is pure of having partners and He is exalted from having a son\" or \"be He glorified and exalted.\"\n\npepper spray, brass knuckles, baseball bats, firearms, explosives, or the bumper of a full sized automobile, truck or SUV. (Found in an FBI Law Enforcement Online BOLO and in Amant, 2004). In August of 2004, Recruiting Commands were targeted for retaliatory action for the war in Iraq. In an August 18th memo, Colonel Blakely (first name unknown) sent the following message to Army recruiting station chiefs: All - we have received a credible FBI report on a plan to possibly attack military recruiting stations across CONUS. This is based on information from a credible source and indicated that the planning may have taken place over the last 30 days. The motivation for the attacks is based on anger about the war in Iraq, and the plan called for the attackers to enter the station and shoot anyone that was inside the station. These attacks were planned over the next two months. Immediate action: Notify each recruiting station within your brigade today of this possible threat. The above incidents reflect Militant Jihadists as an external rather than internal threat. The logic of the situation of joining the military in the enlisted ranks would also lead one to reasonably believe that terrorists are more likely to pose an external rather than internal threat. The Militant Jihadists operating today plan and conduct missions in ways that maximize their control over when, where, and how their attacks occur.\n\nEnlistment in the military would not only subject them to great scrutiny from military peers and commanders, but would also present enormous uncertainty in when, where, and how they could support or carry out attacks against the U.S. government, its population, or allies. Recruits in the enlisted ranks often spend several years obtaining training to qualify for more sensitive duties. Their ability to meet qualification standards is uncertain. The amount of time it would take them to get into a position that would be of value for someone of a terrorist mind-set is uncertain. The continuity and existence of groups or support systems on whose behalf terrorists enlist in the military cannot be ensured over the span of time required for new recruits to use U.S. military resources to carry out terrorist missions or to get in positions to have information that would not otherwise be available. Some persons interviewed for this report felt terrorists would want to enlist to gain access to weapons and training on how to use them. The fact of the matter is that, especially for international terrorists, weapons and weapons training are available through more efficient means than a tour of duty with the U.S. military. Additionally, bribing active-duty military members for weapons or information would be a more efficient and effective means than serving a tour of enlistment to obtain these resources. In light of the multitude of contingencies that come with military service and the prevalence of alternatives for carrying out objectives, enlistment in the military for purposes of pursuing a terrorist agenda against the U.S. government does not seem logical.\n\nU.S. Domestic Terrorists The largest and most active domestic terrorist groups who are specifically anti-\nU.S. government are often characterized as white supremacists, white nationalists, and right-wing militias. These groups are likely to pose a greater threat through infiltration of the U.S. military than are Militant Jihadists (Axtman, 2003). Many of these domestic extremist groups operating today and their ideologies were well described in an earlier study that looked at screening for extremists in the military (Flacks & Wiskoff, 1998).\n\nThe essential ideologies of these groups have not changed since 1998, and the reader is encouraged to review Flacks and Wiskoff's work. The following excerpt, taken from a Web site, characterizes the extremist components of the White Nationalist ideology (for the full excerpt, refer to Appendix A):\nThe problem, as any White Nationalist knows, isn't in the Black Nationalists, who are really potential allies, but rather in the corrupt criminal regimeists [sic], who are the real enemies. Given their criminal nature, it is a waste of time to negotiate with them for our freedom, just as it is undesirable for us to leave them alive to corrupt our future White Nationalist nations. These regime criminals have usefully segregated themselves into professions such as lawyers, politicians, bankers, police. So now that they have made themselves known as oppressors to the people by their conduct, it is an easy thing to identify them for justice (see full excerpt from Lindstedt Web posting in Appendix A).\n\n\nSimilar sentiments to the above statement can be found in more recent postings on white supremacist Web sites. The following demonstrates the threat from the right-wing militia types in the U.S.:\nMr. [X], a 38-year-old who last made a living renting out snowmobiles here in this spectacularly beautiful nook of northwestern Montana had a terror plan that made Osama bin Laden's look rinky-dink. Not content merely to kill a few thousand people, Mr. [X]'s nine-member militia was planning a violent revolution and civil war to overthrow the entire U.S. government. The plan, according to Sheriff James Dupont, was for the militia to use its machine guns, pipe bombs and 30,000 rounds of ammunition to assassinate 26 local officials (including Mr. Dupont), and then wipe out the National Guard when it arrived. After the panicked authorities sent in NATO troops, true American patriots would rise up, a ferocious war would ensue, and the U.S. would end up back in the hands of white Christians (Kristof, 2002). The above news excerpt captures the essence of the right-wing militia movement in the U.S.; many of its supporters overlap with White Nationalists and Supremacists. Some members of these groups act on their beliefs merely through personal separatism, a benign form of protest. Other militia members have been indicted and convicted for planning to bomb federal buildings, attacking military bases, robbing armories, and igniting propane storage facilities. In Florida, a militia planned to destroy a nuclear power plant. Enlistment of individuals with these ambitions is justifiably of concern to the Armed Forces.\n\nThe common denominator in the Militant Jihadists and the above domestic groups is their advocacy of violence to achieve their anti-U.S. government ideological ends. As one author states:\nIn fact, militia members and Al-Qaeda members are remarkably similar. Both are galvanized by religious extremism (America's militias overlap with the Christian Identity movement, which preaches that Jews are the children of Satan and that people of color are sub-human), both see the U.S. government as utterly evil, and both are empowered by the information revolution that enables them to create networks, recruit disciples and trade recipes for bio- and chemical weapons (Nikols, 2002) Other Militant Activists Other militant activists such as the Environmental Liberation Front (ELF), the Animal Liberation Front (ALF), the Animal Rights Foundation (ARF), and anarchists engage in violence to achieve their particular objectives. For animal rights activists, common targets include factory farms, cosmetic manufacturers, and labs that use animals in scientific experiments. Anarchists may target Wal-Mart and other big chain stores. Environmental activists have been known to sabotage land developments and vandalize car dealerships and personal SUVs. The disqualifiers for military service for militants described in this paragraph would be their propensity for or history of criminal conduct, not their disloyalty and hostility toward the U.S. government. Since these groups are not targeting the U.S. government per se, they are not considered further in this report.\n\nEvidence Indicating Prevalence of Involvement of Hostile and Disloyal Groups in the Military at the Time of Enlistment To find evidence of involvement of hostile and disloyal groups in the military at the time of enlistment, the following sources were consulted: open-source digital newspaper articles, law enforcement sensitive intelligence reports available on the FBI's LEO-Online, postings on electronic message boards hosted by extremist groups, decisions of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces, \"yes\" responses to associations-related questions on the SF 86/EPSQ, reports of investigation (ROIs) for subjects under the age of 35 undergoing initial security clearance investigations, leadership in each of the Recruiting Commands, and personnel from the Army Criminal Investigation Division, the Navy Criminal Investigation Service, and the Air Force Office of Special Investigations. The following describes the findings from these sources. Restricted Access Intelligence Reports, Open Source News Articles, and Court Decisions After culling the sources referenced in intelligence reports, open source news articles, and court decisions, 13 cases occurring after September 11, 2001, were identified and no fewer than seven cases prior to September 11, 2001, were identified that indicate the enlistment of personnel with possible ties to organizations and ideologies that are definitely or possibly both disloyal and hostile toward the U.S. government. In the cases that are only deemed possibly relevant, the actions or alleged associations of individuals were consistent with what we understand to be indicative of problematic involvements and allegiances.\n\nA few additional cases were also evident in a study of domestic terrorism and its relation to the U.S. military (Presley, 1996). Due to the age of the articles referenced in the Presley article, however, they could not be retrieved electronically. There are certain to be other cases that have not been included. Their numbers do not change the overall impression that, relative to the denominator representing the millions of persons in the military over the last decade, the U.S. military does not have a marked pattern of terrorists infiltrating its ranks.\n\nOf the 13 cases post September 11, 2001, only eight were unambiguous cases of active or reserve duty military personnel engaging in actions that were specifically associated with groups and ideologies that are hostile and disloyal toward the U.S. government. Of the remaining five cases, one involved a naturalized civilian interpreter for U.S. military forces at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. Another case demonstrated the recruiting efforts targeted at active duty military personnel to support anti-American groups. The remaining three cases were individuals who had alleged ties to problematic groups or engaged in crimes that were of the same type engaged in by anti-American groups.\n\nIn none of the above cases was there clear evidence that the persons involved enlisted for the first time in the military for the express purpose of carrying out an anti- American agenda.\n\nMessage Boards Message board searches using terms associated with extremist groups and military enlistees yielded some of the strongest evidence of disloyal and hostile persons enlisting in the military, and, in some cases, possibly for the express purpose of carrying out an anti-American agenda. Almost all of these were white supremacists or nationalists, and most were found in www.stormfront.org forums. For a cross-section of the kind of rhetoric demonstrating both presence and intolerability of potentially disloyal and hostile persons in the accessions process, refer to Appendix A. Relative to the population of military enlistees, the numbers suggest the involvement of a handful of isolated cases, or at most, very small cadres. The presence of these individuals in the military does not necessarily indicate, however, grave deficiencies in the enlistment screening system process. It more likely reflects the ability of some individuals without derogatory records to both satisfy enlistment standards and withhold information about extremist ideologies and associations throughout the process. For example, the responses of some message board members to white supremacists contemplating enlistment indicate that some do enlist, but that many are separated once their white supremacist or white nationalist loyalties become known. Additionally, as seen in Appendix A, the relatively larger number of message board postings warning new recruits from revealing their extremist group associations exemplifies the presence of both military policy and action to disallow such activities in the Armed Forces. Effectively, the military has a \"don't ask, don't tell\" policy pertaining to extremism. If individuals can perform satisfactorily, without making their extremist opinions overt through words or actions that violate policy, reflect poorly on the Armed Forces, or disrupt the effectiveness and order of their units, they are likely to be able to complete their contracts. This reality demonstrates the balance the Armed Forces have achieved between screening for extremists while respecting privacy and preserving federally protected rights to freedom of speech, religion, and association. \"Yes\" Responses to Association Questions on the SF 86/EPSQ To identify other sources of evidence of potentially anti-American individuals enlisting in the military, we reviewed answers to questions about problematic associations for approximately 1.5 million SF 86: Questionnaires for National Security Positions (SF 86) completed between 1999 and 2003. The two questions as stated on the SF 86 are as follows:\n30. Your Association Record a. Have you been an officer or a member or made a contribution to an organization dedicated to the violent overthrow of the U.S. Government and which engages in illegal activities to that end, knowing that the organization engages in such activities with the specific intent to further such activities?  (YES/NO) b. Have you ever knowingly engaged in any acts or activities designed to overthrow the U.S. Government by force?  (YES/NO) If you answered \"Yes\" to a or b, explain in the space below: Out of these approximate 1.5 million questionnaires, we identified 28 respondents who appeared to intentionally answer \"yes\" to the above questions. While other respondents answered \"yes,\" the nature of their remarks indicated their responses were data entry errors and that they thought they were answering \"yes\" to different questions than the ones listed above.\n\n\n\nOf the 28 legitimate \"yes\" responses, only five were submitted by applicants under the age of 35. This indicates that most yes responders were not recent military enlistees. Of the five younger applicants, only three appeared to be military applicants, and only two of these appeared be new applicants, as the third was applying for a Secret-\nPeriodic Reinvestigation (PR). Of the two potential military enlistees, one indicated he at one time had been a member of the Ku Klux Klan; the other indicated only that \"my school went on stike\n[sic].\" For a full listing of \"yes\" responses to the SF 86 associations questions, regardless of military enlistment status, refer to Appendix B. The dearth of valid yes responses to the above SF 86/EPSQ questions may say less about the prevalence of enlistment of persons with extremist intentions than it does about the quality of the questions that are being asked. Later, we make recommendations for alternate questions that could be asked.\n\nReports of Investigation (ROIs) for Subjects Under the Age of 35 Undergoing Initial Security Clearance Investigations All ROIs stored in the Defense Security Service (DSS) Case Control Management System (CCMS) from 1999 through 2003 (approximating a million and a half cases) were searched for presence of terms that indicated that issues pertaining to extremism had surfaced in DoD security clearance background investigations. Examples of terms that yielded relevant cases are as follows:\n\nneo-nazi anti-american anti-establishment anti-government arabic aryan Bigot blacks brainwash confederate flag conspiracy theories converted david koresh disloyal extremist Fanatic forged driver fundamentalist hates the U.S.\n\nhitler islam\n\n| jews                                                                                       | KKK                                                                                | Militant    |\n|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------|\n| mosque                                                                                     | muslim                                                                             | Nazi        |\n| [racial slur]                                                                              | right wing                                                                         | Sabotage    |\n| semitic                                                                                    | Skin head                                                                          | Skinhead    |\n| supremacy                                                                                  | Swastika                                                                           | to forge    |\n| ultra conservative                                                                         | Vengeance                                                                          |             |\n|                                                                                            |                                                                                    |             |\n|                                                                                            | The terms were not case-sensitive. All cases containing these terms that pertained |             |\n| to military subjects under the age of 35 who were undergoing an initial security clearance |                                                                                    |             |\n| were reviewed. Whether these soldiers were officers or enlisted personnel was not          |                                                                                    |             |\n| known. Data were also not available to indicate how long subjects of these cases had       |                                                                                    |             |\n| been in the military. Nonetheless, they give some approximation of the extent, or lack of  |                                                                                    |             |\n| extent, of extremists in the military.                                                     |                                                                                    |             |\n|                                                                                            |                                                                                    |             |\n\n\nIt is important to not that the fact that these cases were documented indicates the seriousness with which these issues are addressed by security clearance investigators. In other words, while these cases represent possible enlistment of extremists, they also demonstrate that screening policies and procedures are in place to detect them.\n\nThe review found 131 cases where subjects or their references indicated that subjects had some association with or sympathy for extremist groups. Most of these were white supremacists, though there are some interesting cases of possible Militant Jihadist sympathizers. Appendix B provides summaries of issues in all relevant cases found.\n\nInterviews In further efforts to surface any anecdotes of applicants or recruits who were specifically identified as being both hostile and disloyal to the U.S. government, we made e-mail, phone, and in person queries with representatives of the Air Force Office of Special Investigations (OSI), the Army's Criminal Investigation Division (CID), and the Naval Criminal Investigative Service (NCIS). In addition, we interviewed personnel from each of the MEPS and Recruiting Commands that we visited. Criminal investigations personnel could not provide any information about cases over the last few years of known anti-American persons attempting to join the military in the enlisted ranks. It is not known if this is an indication of the lack of such cases or the unwillingness of criminal investigations personnel to share information. In several out of dozens of visits at RS and MEPS, personnel reported that they had contact with suspicious persons. In only a few cases, however, was information about these applicants forwarded to law enforcement for investigation. In most cases, the suspicious individuals departed without attempting to actually enlist. Further, if these individuals were hostile and disloyal toward the U.S. government, they could have as likely been casing the facilities for possible future attack rather than actually trying to enlist. In most of the cases where recruiters or MEPS personnel initially had suspicion, further screening alleviated any suspicions. Over all visits, we saw no indication of any widespread efforts to join the enlisted ranks by persons hostile and disloyal to the U.S. government. Conclusions about the Threat of Terrorists Infiltrating the Military through the Enlisted Accessions Process This section briefly describes the main foreign (Militant Jihadists) and domestic groups (White Supremacists, White Nationalists, and domestic militias) whose past and recent actions and current ideologies render them particularly hostile and disloyal toward the U.S. government. Several data sources were consulted and Recruiting Commands, MEPS, and military law enforcement personnel were interviewed to surface indications of attempted or actual enlistment of disloyal and hostile persons.\n\n\nThe sources accessed for this report did surface some currently or formerly enlisted persons with terrorist or extremist group associations. While their presence in the military is significant in its own right, the actual numbers are extremely small relative to the denominator representing the millions of personnel who have been enlisted in the Armed Forces. Smaller still is the number of personnel who enlisted specifically for purposes of furthering their extremist causes. Most intelligence, information, and history of events suggest that more significant is the threat from outsiders waging attacks against military personnel, some of whom may be employed at RS and MEPS.\n\nTo the extent there is an insider threat, the opinion of active duty personnel and counterterrorism and counterintelligence experts and the evidence from case studies described in this report suggest that it is not from new recruits. Rather, the threat derives from active duty persons being recruited or converting to radical ideologies out of religious conviction or after becoming disaffected with a commander, a fellow solider, an assignment, or military service in general (Mintz & Vistica, 2003). Or, the threat could be manifest in individuals who engage in bad conduct for purely self-interested reasons such as money, ego, addiction, or revenge and then attempt to dignify their actions, after the fact, as being motivated by some higher religious value.\n\nWhile the number of active duty personnel who can be categorized as insider threats or terrorists is believed to be nearly infinitesimal once the denominator of millions of military personnel is taken into account, the means available to persons who would, were all things known, be disqualified from enlisting are the same means that terrorists could use to enlist. In the enlistment process, this effectively boils down to how one represents one's identity, background, abilities, associations, and intentions. To the extent that optimal procedures are not in place to detect problems in how applicants represent their personal identifiers, background, abilities, associations, and intentions, terrorists and nonterrorists alike can exploit the weaknesses.\n\nThe following section examines how indications of misrepresentation of identity, background, abilities, associations, and intentions may be manifest in the accessions process in a way to justify suspicion by recruiting, MEPS, and initial training personnel. Then, we identify the steps in the enlisted accessions process that directly or indirectly bear on the detection of these qualities.\n\nPolicies and Regulations Restricting Extremism in Military Service The establishment of policy is a strong indication that an organization is acting to address a problem. Policies set the standards against which behavior is evaluated and authorize official response to misconduct. The U.S. government, DoD and the Armed Forces have established numerous policies defining and restricting participation in extremist organizations and activities, which would include terrorist groups and activities. For example, the Army contracted for a review and redesign of its policies pertaining to extremism several years ago (for a review, see Hudson, 1999). This section lists DoD and Armed Service policies, along with key components of them that directly and indirectly define and regulate participation of military personnel in extremist and terrorist groups and activities. Federal Law U.S. Bill of Rights All Recruiting and USMEPCOM personnel who contributed to this research effort emphasized the value they place on the Constitution and the civil liberty protections that it provides. Their decisions to exclude individuals from military service on the grounds of potentially extremist orientations are weighed carefully against the freedom of association and freedom of religion provisions of the First Amendment: Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the government for a redress of grievances. Privacy Act of 1974 (Implemented with DoD Directive 5400.11; DoD Privacy Program; December 13, 1999)\n\nThe Privacy Act of 1974, among other things, constrains the Armed Forces in the types of information they can legally request from applicants. That is, enlistment process policies for obtaining and storing information must be defensible as to their relevance and necessity for accomplishing the purpose of enlisting applicants into the military. Many enlistment personnel interpret this aspect of the Privacy Act as constraining the questions that can be asked about such things as ideology and religion. U.S.C. Title 18\nThis portion of the code defines Federal criminal conduct, including acts of the kind that may be committed by persons who are hostile and disloyal toward the U.S. government. U.S.C. Title 18 establishes authorization for detaining and prosecuting individuals. Among the offenses of greatest relevance to this report are:\n\nChapter 67, Military and Navy, Sec. 1381.- Enticing desertion and harboring deserters\n\nChapter 105, Sabotage\n\nSec. 2152. - Fortifications, harbor defenses, or defensive sea areas\nSec. 2153. - Destruction of war material, war premises, or war utilities\nSec. 2154. - Production of defective war material, war premises, or war utilities Sec. 2155. - Destruction of national-defense materials, national-defense premises,\nor national-defense utilities Sec. 2156. - Production of defective national-defense material, national-defense premises, or national-defense utilities\n\nChapter 113B, Terrorism Sec. 2332a. - Use of certain weapons of mass destruction Sec. 2332d. - Financial transactions Sec. 2339. - Harboring or concealing terrorists Sec. 2339A. - Providing material support to terrorists Sec. 2339B. - Providing material support or resources to designated foreign\nterrorist organizations Chapter 115 - Treason, Sedition, and Subversive Activities\nSec. 2381. Treason Sec. 2382. Misprision of treason Sec. 2383. Rebellion or insurrection Sec. 2384. Seditious conspiracy Sec. 2385. Advocating overthrow of Government Sec. 2386. Registration of certain organizations Sec. 2387. Activities affecting armed forces generally Sec. 2388. Activities affecting armed forces during war Sec. 2389. Recruiting for service against U.S. Sec. 2390. Enlistment to serve against U.S.\n\nUniformed Code of Military Justice (UCMJ)\nListed below are the offenses defined in the UCMJ that could be indications of\nsoldiers who are hostile and disloyal to the U.S. government: 883. Art. 83. Fraudulent enlistment, appointment, or separation\n884. Art. 84. Unlawful enlistment, appointment, or separation 885. Art. 85. Desertion 886. Art. 86. Absence without leave 894. Art. 94. Mutiny or sedition 904. Art. 104. Aiding the enemy 906. Art. 106. Spies 906a. Art. 106a. Espionage 907. Art. 107. False statements\n908. Art. 108. Military property of United States-loss, damage, destruction, or wrongful disposition 916. Art. 116. Riot or breach of peace 917. Art. 117. Provoking speeches or gestures 923. Art. 123. Forgery 932. Art. 132. Frauds against the United States Executive Orders and DoD Directives Executive Order 10450, Security Requirements for Government Employment; April 27, 1953. Executive Order 10450 authorizes and requires investigation of applicants for employment in the departments and agencies of the government. The standard is that they should be \"reliable, trustworthy, of good conduct and character, and of complete and unswerving loyalty to the U.S.\" If information is developed indicating that employment of any person is not clearly consistent with the interests of national security, then further investigation is required sufficient to enable the head of the department or agency concerned to determine whether employment or retention of such person is clearly consistent wit the interests of the national security. E.O. 10450 assigns responsibility to the head of each department and agency of the government to ensure that employment and retention of any employee is clearly within the interests of the national security. The scope of the investigation is based on\n\"the degree of adverse effect the occupant of the position sought to be filled could bring about, by virtue of the nature of the position, on the national security.\" It requires heads of any department or agency to designate as sensitive positions all those for which the occupant could \"bring about, by nature of the position, a material adverse effect on the national security.\" Sensitive positions require full field investigations. Relevant considerations in making determinations of whether employment is clearly consistent with the interests of national security include the following:\n\n- Any behavior, activities, or associations that tend to show that the individual is not reliable or trustworthy.\n\n- Any deliberate misrepresentations, falsifications, or omissions of material\nfacts.\n- Any criminal, infamous, dishonest, immoral, or notoriously disgraceful\nconduct, habitual use of intoxicants to excess, drug addiction, sexual perversion.\n- Any facts that furnish reason to believe that the individual may be vulnerable\nto coercion, influence, or pressure which may cause him to act in a manner\ncontrary to the best interests of the national security.\n- Commission of any act of sabotage, espionage, treason, or sedition, or\nattempts thereat or preparation therefore, or conspiring with, or aiding or\nabetting, another to commit or attempt to commit any act of sabotage, espionage, treason, or sedition.\n\n- Establishing or continuing a sympathetic association with a saboteur, spy,\ntraitor, seditionist, anarchist, or revolutionist, or with an espionage or other secret agent or representative of a foreign nation, or any representative of a foreign nation whose interests may be inimical to the interests of the U.S., or with any person who advocates the use of force or violence to overthrow the government of the U.S. or the alteration of the form of government of the U.S. by unconstitutional means.\n- Advocacy of use of force or violence to overthrow the government of the\nU.S., or of the alteration of the form of government of the U.S. by unconstitutional means.\n- Knowing membership with the specific intent of furthering the aims of, or\nadherence to and active participation in, any foreign or domestic organization,\nassociation, movement, group, or combination of persons (hereinafter referred to as organizations) that unlawfully advocates or practices the commission of acts of force or violence to prevent others from exercising their rights under\nthe Constitution or laws of the U.S. or of any state, or which seeks to overthrow the government of the U.S. or any state or subdivision thereof by\nunlawful means.\n- Performing or attempting to perform his duties, or otherwise acting, so as to serve the interests of another government in preference to the interests of the U.S.. DoD Directive 1334.1, \"Wearing of the Uniform,\" August 11, 1969, ASD(M&RA); Certified Current as of November 21, 2003\n\nDoDD 1334.1 prescribes limitations on wearing of the uniform by active duty and former members of the Armed Forces. Active duty members of the Armed Forces\n(including retired members and members of Reserve components) are prohibited from wearing the uniform at any meeting or demonstration that is a function of, or sponsored by an organization, association, movement, group, or combination of persons that the Attorney General of the U.S. has designated, pursuant to E.O. 10450, as totalitarian, fascist, communist, or subversive, or as having adopted a policy of advocating or approving the commission of acts of force or violence to deny others their rights under the Constitution of the U.S., or as seeking to alter the form of government of the U.S. by unconstitutional means. In general, members of the armed forces are prohibited from wearing the uniform in connection with any political, private, or commercial activities outside of official military functions when an inference of official sponsorship or sanction for the activity or interest could be drawn. Wearing of the uniform is further prohibited when it would tend to bring discredit upon the armed forces.\n\n\n\nExecutive Order 12333, \"United States Intelligence Activities,\" December 4, 1981\n\nE.O. 12333 defines goals, direction, duties, and responsibilities with respect to the National Intelligence Effort, articulates the conduct of intelligence activities, and provides for congressional oversight. Its scope is \"the protection of U.S. national interests from foreign security threats.\" For example, one of the provisions is that special emphasis should be given to detecting and countering espionage and other threats and activities directed by foreign intelligence services against the U.S. government, or U. S. corporations, establishments, or persons.\n\nDoD Regulation 5200.2-R, \"Personnel Security Program\"\n\nThe 5200.2-R effectively serves as a set of mandatory instructions for the DoD\npersonnel security program, to include acceptance and retention of DoD military, civilian, consultant, and contractor personnel and of granting such persons access to classified information or assignment to sensitive positions. Heads of DoD components are authorized to issue supplementary instructions whenever necessary to provide for internal administration of the 5200.2-R within their respective components.\n\nDoDD 5200.2-R defines the standards used in determining eligibility for access to classified information or assignment to sensitive duties and for enlistment, induction, or retention in the Armed Forces. Eligibility for access to classified information or assignment to sensitive duties is based on the Clearance and Sensitive Position Standard: \"whether, based on all available information, the person's loyalty, reliability, and trustworthiness are such that entrusting the person with classified information or assigning the person to sensitive duties is clearly consistent with the interests of national security.\" For enlistment, induction, or retention in the Armed Forces, the Military Service standard applies: \"based on all available information, there is no reasonable basis for doubting the person's loyalty to the government of the United States.\" The ultimate determination for granting access, assignments to sensitive duties, or enlistment, induction, or retention in the Armed Forces must be \"an overall common sense determination based upon all available facts.\"\n\nCriteria used in determining eligibility for access to classified information, assignment to sensitive duties, or enlistment, induction, or retention in the Armed Forces that pertain to terrorism and extremism include, but are not limited to the following:\n- Commission of any act of sabotage, espionage, treason, terrorism, anarchy, sedition, or attempts thereat or preparation therefore, or conspiring with or aiding or abetting another to commit or attempt to commit any such act.\n\n- Establishing or continuing a sympathetic association with a saboteur, spy,\ntraitor, seditionist, anarchist, terrorist, revolutionist, or with an espionage or other secret agent or similar representative of a foreign nation whose interests may be inimical to the interests of the United States, or with any person who advocates the use of force or violence to overthrow the government of the\nUnited States or to alter the form of government of the United States by unconstitutional means.\n\n- Advocacy or use of force or violence to overthrow the government of the\nUnited States or to alter the form of government of the United States by unconstitutional means.\n- Knowing membership with the specific intent of furthering the aims of, or\nadherence to and active participation in any foreign or domestic organization,\nassociation, movement, group or combination of persons (hereafter referred to as organizations), which unlawfully advocates or practices the commission of\nacts of force or violence to prevent others from exercising their rights under the Constitution or laws of the United States or of any state or which seeks to overthrow the government of the United States or any state or subdivision\nthereof by unlawful means.\n- Unauthorized disclosure to any person of classified information, or of other\ninformation, disclosure of which is prohibited by statute, executive order, or regulation.\n- Performing or attempting to perform one's duties, acceptance and active\nmaintenance of dual citizenship, or other acts conducted in a manner which serve or which could be expected to serve the interests of another government\nin reference to the interests of the United States.\n- Disregard of public law, statutes, executive orders, or regulations including\nviolation of security regulations or practices.\n- Criminal or dishonest conduct.\n- Acts of omission or commission that indicate poor judgment, unreliability or\nuntrustworthiness.\n- Vulnerability to coercion, influence, or pressure that may cause conduct\ncontrary to the national interest. This may be:\n The presence of immediate family members or other persons to whom the\napplicant is bonded by affection or obligation in a nation (or areas under its domination) whose interests may be inimical to those of the United States; or\n Any other circumstances that could cause the applicant to be vulnerable.\n Any knowing and willful falsification, cover up, concealment,\nmisrepresentation, or omission of a material fact from any written or oral\nstatement, document, form or other representation or device used by the\nDepartment of Defense or any other federal agency.\n Failing or refusing to answer or to authorize others to answer questions or\nprovide information required by a congressional committee, court, or agency in the course of an official inquiry whenever such answers or information concern relevant and material matters pertinent to an\nevaluation of the individual's trustworthiness, reliability, and judgment.\n\nInformation discovered in the course of screening that may be indicative of possible subversion is in the exclusive investigative domain of either the counterintelligence agencies of the Military Departments or the FBI. All allegations of this nature are to be referred immediately to either the FBI or to a Military Department counterintelligence agency as appropriate. DoD Directive 1304.26, \"Qualification Standards for Enlistment, Appointment, and Induction,\" December 21, 1993. (Administrative Reissuance Incorporating Change 1, March 4, 1994)\n\nThis directive establishes basic entrance qualification standards for enlistment, appointment, and induction into the Armed Forces. It establishes the age, citizenship, education, aptitude, physical fitness, dependency status, moral character, and other disqualifying conditions that are causes for rejection for military service, and authorizes prescription of other standards in the event of mobilization or national emergency. It \"sets standards designed to ensure that individuals under consideration for enlistment, appointment, or induction are able to perform military duties successfully, and to select those who are the most trainable and adaptable to Service life.\" DoD policy pertaining to qualification standards for enlistment, induction, and retention in the Armed Forces is to apply standards while avoiding inconsistencies and inequities based on gender, race, religion, or ethnicity in their application. The suitability of Service members is to be based on their adaptability, potential to perform, and conduct. Executive Order 12968, \"Access to Classified Information,\" August 2, 1995\n\nThis order establishes eligibility standards for access to classified information.\n\nExcept as provided for special circumstances, eligibility is to be granted only to employees who are U.S. citizens who have undergone an appropriate investigation and whose personal and professional history demonstrates loyalty to the United States, strength of character, trustworthiness, honesty, reliability, discretion, and sound judgment. Additionally, they cannot show conflicting allegiances or potential for coercion. They must demonstrate willingness and ability to abide by regulations governing the use, handling, and protection of classified information. Eligibility for access to classified information is granted by adjudicators who determine whether facts and circumstances presented from an investigation indicate access to classified information is clearly consistent with the national security interests of the U.S. government. The U.S. government does not discriminate on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, national origin, disability, or sexual orientation in granting access to classified information. DoD Directive 1325.6, \"Guidelines for Handling Dissident and Protest Activities Among Members of the Armed Forces,\" October 1, 1996\n\nThis directive establishes policy prohibiting participation in organizations that espouse supremacist causes or illegal discrimination and requires commanders to take action in such cases. The action commanders take is at their discretion based on their perceptions of the impact of prohibited conduct on their units. Commanders are authorized to take action in the following circumstances:\n Actual or intended distribution through unofficial channels of publications that pose a clear danger to the loyalty, discipline, or morale of their units.\n\n Visiting establishments that have been deemed off limits because activities\ntaking place there may include counseling members to refuse to perform duty or to desert; pose a significant adverse effect on Service members' health, morale, or welfare; or otherwise present a clear danger to the loyalty, discipline, or morale of a member or military unit.\n Publishing underground newspapers during duty hours or using U.S.\ngovernment property or publishing publications off-duty that contain language\npunishable under federal law.\n Demonstration or activity on the installation or facility that could result in\ninterference with or prevention of orderly accomplishment of the mission of\nthe installation or facility, or present a clear danger to loyalty, discipline, or morale of the troops.\n Participation in off-post demonstrations when soldiers are on-duty, in a\nforeign country, when their activities constitute a breach of law and order,\nwhen violence is likely to result, or when they are in uniform in violation of DoD Directive 1334.1 (reference (d)).\n Participation in organizations that espouse supremacist causes; attempt to\ncreate illegal discrimination based on race, creed, color, sex, religion, or national origin; advocate the use of force or violence; or otherwise engage in\nefforts to deprive individuals of their civil rights. Active participation, such as\npublicly demonstrating or rallying, fund raising, recruiting and training members, organizing or leading such organizations, or otherwise engaging in activities in relation to such organizations or in furtherance of the objectives of such organizations that are viewed by command to be detrimental to the good order, discipline, or mission accomplishment of the unit, is incompatible with military service, and is, therefore, prohibited. Commanders have authority to employ the full range of administrative procedures, including separation or appropriate disciplinary action, against military personnel who\nactively participate in such groups. Functions of command include vigilance about the existence of such activities; active use of investigative authority to include a prompt and fair complaint process; and use of administrative\npowers, such as counseling, reprimands, orders, and performance evaluations\nto deter such activities. Military departments shall ensure that this policy on\nprohibited activities is included in initial active duty training, precommissioning training, professional military education, commander training, and other appropriate service training programs.\n\nDoDI 5240.6, Counterintelligence (CI) Awareness and Briefing Program\n\nDoD personnel are required to report any contact information or circumstances\nthat could pose a threat to the security of U.S. personnel, DoD or other U.S. resources, and classified national security information, or controlled unclassified information under E.O. 12958, DoD Directive 5230.24, DoD Directive 5400.7-R, and DoD Directive 5210.83. DoD personnel are required to receive periodic briefings on the threats posed by\nforeign intelligence services, international terrorists, computer intruders, unauthorized disclosures, and individual reporting responsibilities. U.S. Army Regulations\nProhibiting participation in organizations that espouse supremacist causes or illegal discrimination\nArmy Regulation 525-13 Antiterrorism: \"Individuals must be of unquestioned allegiance to the United States. The willingness to safeguard classified information is in doubt if there is any reason to suspect an individual's allegiance to the United States.\" Army Regulation 600-20 and Department of the Army Pamphlet 600-15:\nThe purpose of this pamphlet is to disseminate information pertaining to the Army's stance on extremist organizations and activities: \"...Participation in extremist organizations or activities is inconsistent with the responsibilities of military service. Military personnel must reject extremism.\" Activities considered extremist are identified, strategies for reducing extremist behavior are provided, and possible sanctions for participating in extremist groups and activities, training ideas, and\nsolutions are outlined.\n\nAffirmative action/equal opportunity\n\nArmy Regulation 690-12: The purpose of this regulation is to develop,\nimplement, and evaluate affirmative action programs for minorities, women, and the disabled. Army Regulation 690-600: This regulation sets forth the \"policy, responsibilities, and procedures for counseling, filing, processing, investigating, settling, deciding, and acting on equal employment opportunity (EEO) complaints.\"\nU.S. Navy Instructions Prohibiting participation in organizations that espouse supremacist causes or illegal discrimination OPNAVINST 1620.1B, Guidelines for Handling Dissident and Protest Activities. This instruction implements DoD Directive 1325.6. Commanders are provided with direction on how to maintain order and discipline while respecting Navy service members' constitutional rights. Participation in groups or activities that advocate the use of violence or discrimination is prohibited, however membership in such groups is not necessarily prohibited. U.S.S CUSHING (DD-985) Command Policy on Extremist/Hate Groups. The purpose of this memorandum is to reiterate Navy policy\nprohibiting participation in groups or activities that advocate hate crime violence. Examples of actively supporting an extremist or hate group include: engaging in public demonstrations or rallies, fund raising activities, recruiting or training members, gaining or maintaining membership, distributing literature or information, and leading or organizing of groups seeking to deny basic Constitutional rights. MILPERSMAN 1910-160, Separation by reason of supremacist or extremist conduct: Members may be separated for any substantiated incident or misconduct resulting from participation in supremacist or extremist activities. Separations are processed under misconduct -\ncommission of a serious offense or best interest of the service (BIOTS).\n\nSeparations for supremacist or extremist conduct will usually involve at least one UCMJ violation.\n\nEqual Opportunity\n\nOPNAV Instruction 5354.1e, Navy E.O. Policy. This instruction prohibits unlawful discrimination and sexual harassment. Guidelines are provided for addressing and sanctioning equal opportunity violations. In addition, Navy personnel are prohibited from participating in organizations that advocate supremacist causes, violence, or depriving individuals of their civil rights.\n\nPersonal Appearance Policy\n\nNAVPERS 15665 U. S. Navy Uniform Regulations. Navy personal appearance policies prohibit tattoos, body art, or brands that are prejudicial to good order, discipline, and morale or bring discredit upon the Navy.\n\nThe Navy prohibits tattoos, body art, or brands that advocate or symbolize supremacist or extremist groups or discrimination based on sex, gender, racial, religious, ethnic, or national origin. The Navy defines extremists as persons who espouse supremacist causes; attempt to create illegal discrimination based on race, color, creed, sex, religion, or national origin;\nor advocate the use of force or violence, or otherwise engages in efforts to deprive individuals of their civil rights. The Navy defines supremacists as persons who maintain the ideology, quality, state of being, or position of being superior to all others in something. U.S. Air Force Instructions Prohibiting participation in organizations that espouse supremacist causes or illegal discrimination Air Force Instruction 51-903, Dissident and protest activities. This instruction implements DoD Directive 1325.6. Air Force commanders are assigned authority for taking action to maintain good order and discipline, to include prohibiting active participation extremist and supremacist groups. Air force members are prohibited from possession or distribution of prints materials advocating terrorist or supremacist groups. Mere membership per se is not prohibited, but can be used in evaluations of personnel. AFI 36-2701, Social Actions Operating Procedures. The USAF requires a work environment that is free from unlawful discrimination and sexual harassment. Equal opportunity is to be made available to all service members regardless of age, sex, race, color, national origin, ethnicity, religion or gender. In order to achieve these objectives, methods for dealing with discrimination and inequality are to be developed; lines of communication are be made available to members so they can lodge complaints without threat of retaliation; and when complaints are substantiated, commanders are required to remove the source of the complaint or face disciplinary action. AFI 36-2406, Officer and Enlisted Evaluation Systems. This Instruction sets forth policies for those evaluating service members' work performance. Subjects of evaluations must be informed of expectations of them, whether or not they are meeting these expectations, and ways in which they can improve their performance. Evaluators are expected to pay special attention to equal opportunity and treatment. \"The expectation is fair and equal treatment of all enforcement of the same behavior in subordinates.\" Evaluators must reflect when a service member has participated in serious or multiple instances of harassment or discrimination. Evaluators are also encouraged to record known cases of membership in groups that advocate discrimination and violence.\n\nAFJI 31-213. Armed Forces Disciplinary Control Boards and Off- Installation Liaison and Operations. This instruction authorizes Air Force commanders to declare establishments \"off limits\" if they are known to facilitate or advocate participation in terrorist or extremist activities or organizations.\n\n\nEqual opportunity AFI 36-2706, Military Equal Opportunity(MEO) and Maltreatment Program. Air Force policy prohibits unlawful discrimination and sexual harassment in the military and civilian workforce. The purpose of the MEO Program is to provide USAF personnel with a work environment\n\"free from personal, social, or institutional barriers,\" so that personnel can achieve unencumbered success. In order to achieve this objective, the MEO program opens lines of communication for reporting discrimination and harassment and impartial processing of complaints. In addition, MEO provides installation commanders with the authority to prohibit organizations that discriminate with access to the installation. U.S. Marine Corps Orders Orders that prohibit participation in organizations that espouse supremacist causes or illegal discrimination:\n\nMCO 5370.4, Guidelines for handling dissident and protest activities.\n\nThe purpose of this Order is to implement DoD Directive 1325.6. Commanders are provided with direction on how to maintain order and discipline while respecting USMC service members' constitutional rights. Participation in groups or activities that advocate the use of violence or discrimination is prohibited, however membership in such groups is not.\n\nMCO 5370.7B, Political activities. The purpose of this Order is to outline prohibited political activities for active duty service members. Members are prohibited from using their official authority for soliciting votes or campaign contributions; interfering with any aspect of an election; participate in political campaigns or conventions; or make financial contributions to another member of the Armed Forces or a federal government employee. In addition, restrictions are placed on running for an elected office or being appointed to a civil office. MP White Letter NO. 15-95 from Commandant of the Marine Corps:\nHate Groups. This white paper reiterates USMC policy prohibiting participation in groups or activities that advocate hate crime violence. USMC leaders are called upon to review DoD Directive 1325.6 and MCO 5370.4A and to use this information to evaluate their commands.\n\nOrders that protect equal opportunity\n\nMCO 5354.1D. MCO 5354.1D sets forth equal opportunity policies and standards under which all USMC personnel will be held accountable to. The USMC equal opportunity policy states that all military members will be treated equally and will be provided with the same opportunities to obtain success. Merit, fitness and ability are the only elements to be evaluated. The goal of this order is to achieve a combat ready force which is free from the effects of discrimination and prejudice. The following guidelines have been established in effort to achieve this goal:\n- Commanders will monitor all events that suggest conflict among service members\n\n- Commanders will disseminate the USMC equal opportunity policy to\nall service members\n- Commanders will engage in an active campaign in the military and\ncivilian communities which highlights historical and cultural events, and recognizes achievements in equal opportunity\n- All military service members are to receive training in equal\nopportunity, human relations, and sexual harassment\n- Military justice and administrative separation actions will occur\nwithout threat of discrimination\n- Commanders will investigate all instances of suspected discrimination - Commanders will follow guidelines set forth in this order when racial\nincidents do occur\n- Military service members must reject participation in groups that\npromote racial intolerance or discrimination; or encourage the use of violence\nScreening Procedures that Help Detect Enlistees Who May be Disloyal and Hostile Toward the U.S. Government Establishing Identity In the enlisted accessions process, review of identity documents is primarily the responsibility of recruiters and service liaisons. MEPS personnel are responsible for conducting some quality assurance, to include verifying social security numbers (SSNs) and alien registration numbers (ARNs) submitted by applicants via recruiters. In the case of problematic verification by MEPS, they refer the cases back to Recruiting Commands for resolution.\n\nRecruiters\n\nReview of Identification Documents. Recruiters ask applicants to provide the following identification documents, if available.\n\n\n Driver's license  State-issued identification card  Social security card  Birth certificate  High school identification card  Passport  I-551 Card: Alien Registration\n\nSignature Verification. Recruiters can compare signatures on SSN cards, driver's licenses, and state issued identification cards with signatures on military service forms, which ensures that the person at the recruiting station is the same person who obtained the identification documents being presented. Recruiters do not determine whether the identification documents presented were legitimately obtained.\n\n\nPersonal contact/recognition. The ongoing contact recruiters have with applicants helps them establish and validate the identity of the applicants. Examples of ongoing contact include visiting applicants at home, work, or school, driving them to MEPS for processing or shipping, monthly face-to-face contact and weekly telephonic contact during DEP.\n\nASVAB Administrators Administrators review applicants' signatures on testing documents and ask for a valid form of identification. If a valid identification cannot be presented, then a print of the right thumb is taken. This print is available to MEPS personnel for identity verification if needed.\n\n\n\nMEPS Personnel MEPS personnel at the MEPS operation desks may require new arrivals to show picture identification. It is not a requirement, but it is a practice at many. At the very least, MEPS personnel confirm that persons arriving at the MEPS are on lists of persons scheduled to arrive. This provides some assurance of continuity of the identity of the person trying to enlist. They may also review applicants' current signatures with signatures on documents that were previously completed. MEPS liaisons or guidance counselors review all enlistment documents and may conduct a secondary review of the following source documents:\n\n Driver's license  State issued identification card  Social security card  Birth certificate (may be a photocopy)  High school identification card  Passport (may be a photocopy)  I-551 Card: Alien Registration\n\nBoot Camp Personnel\n\n\nUpon arrival at boot camp, recruits' enlistment packages are reviewed to ensure that all enlistment forms have been completed. Either original or photocopied source documents are also reviewed. These document reviews are not necessarily geared toward detection of identity fraud, but to some extent do ensure continuity of the documentation provided by recruits.\n\nUSMEPCOM\n\nUSMEPCOM has launched important initiatives to prevent and detect identification fraud in the accessions process. These initiatives include e-Security and e- Signature projects. The e-Security and e-Signature projects will provide enlistment personnel with means to positively identify applicants who provide inconsistent or deceptive personal information during the process of enlistment, or who attempt to have different persons attempt to complete accessions processing steps for them. Once applicants' electronic identity is established, enlistment personnel will be able to track them throughout the process through electronic fingerprint and signature verification. Establishing Employment Eligibility Only those applicants who are eligible for employment in the United States may enlist in the Armed Forces. Eligibility extends to U.S. citizens, aliens with permanent residence, nationals of the United States, and citizens of the Federated States of Micronesia (FSM), Palua, and the Republic of the Marshall Islands (RMI). The following documents must be provided by applicants in order to prove employment eligibility:\n\n\nU.S. Citizens\n Birth certificate  Social Security Card  Naturalization certificate (only for naturalized U.S. citizens) U.S. Nationals, Citizens of FSM, Palua, and RMI\n Birth certificate  Social Security Card\n\n\nAliens with Permanent Residence\n\n Birth certificate  Social security card  Forms I-9 or OMB No. 1115-0136, Employment Eligibility Verification  Alien Registration Receipt Card (I-551)  Foreign passport stamped with \"Processed for I-551\" or attached I-94 card\nindicating unexpired employment authorization\n\nNote: The Air Force has instituted a strict policy on I-551 card standards. The\ncard must have at least a 10-year expiration, cards with childhood photographs are\nnot acceptable, and applicants who have been issued a card which has been lost or stolen must apply for a new card and cannot process until the new card has been received.\n\nAutomated Database Checks\nAll recruits entering into the Armed Forces are required to have no less than\nNational Agency Check (NAC) investigations. Increasingly, all recruits are required to\nundergo National Agency Checks, Local Agency Checks, and Credit Checks (NACLC) investigations. These investigations include checks of national databases as well as\ncriminal record checks of state and/or local agencies, where the choice between the latter depends on the availability of information from particular agencies. Checks that are conducted are described below.\nSocial Security Administration (SSA) Applicants' social security numbers (SSN) are sent through the Department of\nDefense Manpower Data Center (DMDC) to SSA for verification. The response time from SSA to the MEPS is about 48 hours. In the event of a \"Social Security Number (SSN) not found\" response, recruiting personnel cannot project, further process, enlist, or ship this applicant until specific source documentation has been verified by the MEPS and cleared. In the event of an \"SSN mismatch\" response, all processing must stop until\nthe mismatch is cleared by the MEPS Liaison.\n\nUnited States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) Alien registration numbers (ARNs) are sent to USCIS where the numbers are verified as authentic. Additionally, applicants' names and other personally identifying information are compared against ARN cardholders' names to verify that they match.\n\nARNs are validated within 48 hours of projection for enlistment or immediately after enlistment.\n\nFBI's Integrated Automated Fingerprint Identification System (IAFIS) and National Crime Information Center (NCIC)\n\nElectronic fingerprint images are submitted by MEPS to the Office of Personnel Management (OPM). OPM submits the prints to the FBI's Criminal Justice Information System (CJIS) for checks of criminal records. Files checked for every fingerprint submission include fingerprint-supported records accessed via the Integrated Automated Fingerprint Identification System (IAFIS), and name checks of the National Crime Information Center (NCIC), to include wants and warrants. Name checks of the NCIC now also include checks of the Violent Gang and Terrorist Organization File (VGTOF). According to FBI personnel interviewed, these checks are currently only searching the terrorist portion of VGTOF, which is updated daily from the Terrorist Screening Center. Information regarding positive matches with names in the VGTOF are returned to the Terrorism Watch and Warning Unit of the FBI or the Terrorist Screening Center, rather than USMEPCOM or the Recruiting Commands. The FBI reviews information and notifies the Recruiting Commands if appropriate.\n\n\nCurrently these prints are being submitted with an \"S\" code, which signifies to the FBI that the prints are authorized to be submitted for \"Non-criminal justice employment.\" Because all Navy, Air Force, and Marines undergo a National Agency Check with Local Agency Checks (NACLC) investigation, these checks could possibly be submitted with an \"X\" code, i.e., under the authority of the Security Clearance Information Act, which would provide the Recruiting Commands with criminal history records equivalent to what law enforcement can receive. Army applicants will all receive NACLCs beginning in 2005, at which time they also should submit all electronic fingerprints using the \"X\" code. In the interim, only those prints submitted for NACLC investigations should use the \"X\" code. CJIS personnel who were interviewed indicated that X code checks would yield more information than S code checks.\n\n\nFBI Electronic Civil Fingerprint File As of 2003, the FBI's electronic Civil File contained about 5 million noncriminal fingerprint records. The number grows every day. These fingerprint records are submitted by applicants for federal employment and military service and for alien registration and naturalization purposes. At least 2 million of the records in the Civil File pertain to military applicants (Active Duty, Reserves, and National Guard), DoD civilians, and\n\ncontractors applying for security clearances. (For more information, see Woodward, 2004). Searches of the Civil File will enable detection of identification fraud by individuals who do not have criminal records but who have civil fingerprints on file. Their fingerprint checks will come back either as showing at least two sets of personal identifiers being associated with one set of fingerprints or at least two sets of fingerprints being associated with one set of personal identifiers. For example, a solider dishonorably discharged but without a fingerprint-supported criminal record could reenlist using new identification documents. Individuals who at one time were registered aliens in the country could attempt to enlist using fraudulent documentation showing them to be U.S.\n\ncitizens. Checks of the Civil File will help detect these and many other types of persons who are attempting to commit identification fraud. Search capability of Civil File fingerprints is currently being piloted using fingerprints taken at the Los Angeles MEPS. These searches will help detect persons who are attempting to gain access to DoD security clearances or military appointments using assumed identities.\n\nOPM Suitability Investigations Index (SII) Database The SII contains records of all non-DoD Federal investigations conducted by OPM or other agencies other than the DoD. Data is limited to the last 15 years for favorable investigations and 25 years for investigations that contain derogatory information.\n\nDefense Manpower Database Center (DMDC) Databases\n\nDMDC collects and analyzes personnel data in an effort to support OUSD(P&R)\nand other DoD entities. The following databases can be found at DMDC and are used for screening purposes.\n\n\n Defense Clearance and Investigations Index (DCII)\n\nThis file contains information on subjects with prior DoD security or criminal incidents.\n\n\n **Active Duty Military Personnel Master File**\n\nThis file contains data on all individuals currently on active duty with the exception of reservists. Historical data is available as well. Types of information include name, date of birth, SSN, dependent information, termination date, etc. A search of this database allows military personnel to compare applicants against current and prior service members' identifying information (i.e., name, SSN, ARN, etc.), which can reveal attempts to enlist under assumed identities.\n\n\n **Reserve Duty Military Personnel File**\n\nThis file is similar to the Active Duty File as described above, but contains\ndata on reservists.\n\n **Prior Service Military Address File**\n\nThis file contains data on all prior service members who have separated from\nmilitary service within the last five years. Demographic, service history, separation, and address data are located in this file. A search of this database can detect individuals attempting to enlist with someone else's personal identifying information.\n\nUSAF Fraud file\n\nThe USAF fraud file is used to identify applicants who have been denied\nenlistment, commissioning, or appointment in the Air Force. Applicants are entered into\nthe file when they receive disapproved exceptions, receive an unfavorable eligibility determination, or have their waivers for moral violations, drugs, or dependency status rejected.\nState and Local Criminal History Checks\n\n *State Agency Checks.* To the extent that state repositories are available, state\ncriminal record repository checks may be conducted for subjects who admit to criminal conduct or who are submitted for NACLCs. For applicants\nundergoing NACLCs, state repositories may be checked in all states where\nthey have lived, worked, or gone to school for 6 months or more.\n\n *Local Agency Checks.* If subjects admit to criminal conduct, or federal or\nstate criminal repository checks find records, record checks of local law\nenforcement agencies are conducted. The locations of the local checks are\nspecific to where offenses are known to be committed for subjects not\nundergoing NACLCs. For NACLCs, the checks are conducted wherever the applicants have lived, worked, or gone to school for six months or more. Tattoo Screening All branches of the Armed Forces rely on tattoo screening to detect indications\nthat applicants may have extremist group ties. Tattooed applicants are subject to greater scrutiny in an effort to determine if the tattoos fall within the parameters of acceptable body art. Tattoos require recruiting command review and approval. Procedures for screening tattoos include the following:\n\nPre-screening oral interview with recruiter\n\n Do you have any tattoos?  Where are the tattoos located?  What do the tattoos mean to you?  When were you tattooed?  Why did you get a tattoo? United States Army Recruiting Command Tattoo Screening Form\n Mark tattoo/brand on body diagram.  Describe tattoo meaning. United States Navy Tattoo Screening Certificate\n The Navy asks the same tattoo screening questions as the Marine Corps. Air Force Tattoo Screening\n The Air Force does not use an official tattoo screening form.  Data about applicants' tattoos are annotated in the DD 1966, Record of\nMilitary Processing - Armed Forces of the United States. Marine Corps Tattoo Screening Form In addition to some of the questions listed above, this form also asks:\n\n Does the applicant have more than four body markings?  Are any of the tattoos, brands, or body ornamentations representative of a\ngang membership, advocating racial, ethnic, or religious discrimination, depicting sexism (express nudity), drug-related, obscene or are prejudicial to good order, discipline and morale or are of a nature to bring discredit upon the Marine Corps?\n Are any of the tattoos a result of a specific activity (i.e., specifically an illegal\nactivity, or a result of any violation of the law(s))?\n Has the applicant ever had a tattoo, brand, or body ornamentation removed?\n\n\nDocumentation of tattoos by medical personnel at MEPS\n Medical personnel at MEPS annotate tattoos on medical form DD-2808,\nReport of Medical Examination. This annotation consists of a description of the tattoo (size, location, color, type). The MEPS medical section makes no determination as to the acceptable or unacceptable nature of the tattoo. Medical personnel have not been provided with a formal or standard process to notify Recruiting Command personnel of any tattoos they consider\nsuspicious, nor do they receive training on the nature of suspicious tattoos. The Recruiting Commands have the responsibility of reviewing the medical documents to determine if applicants' tattoos violate Service policy.\n\nMedical screening at Basic Training Centers\n During the course of a medical review, recruits are screened for new or\nunnoticed tattoos. Applicants with such tattoos are interviewed by the Commanding Officer and are separated if their tattoos are deemed unacceptable. Additional screening, all services\n Applicants with problematic tattoos or body markings are interviewed, and\ntheir files are reviewed by Battalion, Squadron, and District commanders. Resources available to recruiting personnel for interpreting tattoos include:\n Unauthorized or Inappropriate Tattoos and Symbols, a Navy briefing on\ntattoos by ENCS (SW) Darrell C. Nolan. This briefing is often used to educate screening personnel about the historical meanings of tattoos and how to think about the meaning of tattoos.\n A Marine Corps hard copy binder of black and white photocopies of\nphotographs of tattoos. Possible group affiliations or meanings associated with\ndifferent tattoos are sometimes noted. The notebook can be found nationwide in recruiting stations and MEPS.\n Recruiting Commands have access to varying state and local law enforcement\nCD-ROMS and Web-based resources. Some of these resources include:\n Basic Criminal Street Gang Identification (v 1.0). A resource CD-ROM.  Gang Tattoos CD-ROM published by the Texas Department of\nCorrections and the National Major Gang Task Force\n United States Department of Justice National Hate Crime Training  Alaska State Troopers' Russian Criminal Tattoo Database\n Special Crimes Service - Texas Department Of Public Safety's Security\nGroup Threat on Tattoos\n XVIII ABN CORPS and FORT BRAGG, Office of the Provost Marshal:\nMilitary Police Investigations Section's Newcomer's Brief on Gangs, Extremists, and AFDBC\n Arizona Department of Corrections, Security Threats Groups:\nhttp://www.adc.state.az.us/STG/Tattoos.htm\n North Carolina Gang Investigators Web sites:\nhttp://www.ncgangcops.org/tattoos.htm and http://www.scdps.org/cja/csrtattoo.htm\n Virginia Gang Investigators Web sites: http://www.vgia.org/graffiti.html,\nhttp://userwww.sfsu.edu/~tamamail/tattoo.html, and http://www.mgia.org/resources/default.htm\n The following Web sites have been accessed by MEPS and recruiting\npersonnel during the course of tattoo evaluation:\n A Visual Database of Extremist Symbols, Logos and Tattoos, by the Anti-\nDefamation League: http://www.adl.org/hate_symbols/\n Occult tattoos links and resources, by Tim Boucher, Occult Investigator:\nhttp://www.timboucher.com/tattoos/occult_tattoo_links.html#satani\n Tattoos: Recognition and Interpretation, by Sergeant Ken Whitley:\nhttp://www.convictsandcops.com/tattoo.htm\n Gang Tattoos: http://www.gangtattoos.com\n\nQuestionnaires and Interviews\nRecruiters Initial Interview\n\nRecruiters conduct informal screening upon first contact with potential applicants.\nRecruiters evaluate the overall appearance of the applicants, attending to both verbal and nonverbal cues. In addition, recruiters engage potential applicants in an informal\ninterview in order to glean background information. Applicants' responses to these\nquestions provide recruiters with a general idea of potential security risks that may preclude them from receiving a security clearance, and also provide recruiters with a\ngeneral sense of applicants' motivations for enlisting. Recruiters use DoD and service forms to guide their oral interview, and some recruiters we have encountered also\nincorporate their own line of questioning to help elicit the most truthful and accurate responses. The following are a list of questions that have been asked during the course of the initial interview.\n\n\nArmy (USAREC Regulation 601-96, Guidance Counselor Procedures)\n\n Have you ever been arrested?  Have you ever been detained?  Have you ever been issued a summons, citation, or ticket by any law\nenforcement official?\n Have you ever been on probation?  Have you ever appeared in court as the accused?  Do you have any unpaid traffic tickets to include parking tickets?  Do you or have you ever had any offense expunged, set aside, or sealed by the\ncourt? Has anyone told you not to reveal this fact?\n Do you or have you ever in your lifetime been cited, arrested, or charged for\nany crime as a juvenile?\n Is there anything that you would like to discuss with me pertaining to your\npast criminal, juvenile, motor vehicle, or civil record?\n Have you ever been issued a restraining order or been detained for domestic\nviolence or abuse? Navy (SF 86 and DD 1966)\n\n Is any family member a non-U.S. citizen?  Are you a U.S. citizen by birth or naturalization? Air Force (Form SF 86, DD Form 1966, DD Form 369, AETC 1408, Job Screening Worksheet)\n\n What is your citizenship?  Where were you born?  Have you ever been fingerprinted?  Have you ever been involved with the police?  Please describe your credit history.\n\nMarines (USMC Prospect Applicant card)\n\n Where were you born?  Have you ever lived in a country deemed hostile to the U.S?  Have you ever visited a country deemed hostile to the U.S.?  Do you have friends or family who reside in a country deemed hostile to the\nU.S.?\n\nRecruiters Questionnaires\n\nOnce applicants have successfully passed the prescreening interview, they are\nasked to complete service-specific and DoD questionnaires. The following questionnaires gather biographical, educational, and criminal data, as well as information on foreign associations and allegiances. The information asked of applicants can help illuminate inconsistencies within applicants' backgrounds by highlighting gaps in employment,\neducation, and residences. Interviews are also used to fill in missing information that\nmost young Americans would likely possess (i.e., parents' names and addresses, SSN or ARN, date and place of birth, etc.). In addition, these forms may reveal problematic finances, or finances and credit that are inconsistent with the applicants' job status or age.\nStandard Form 86, Questionnaire for National Security Positions (SF 86)\n\n\nThe SF 86 is completed by all applicants in all branches of the Armed Forces. It\nserves two purposes in the accessions process. It provides a de facto standard procedure\nfor recording information about applicants and interviewing them during the application\nprocess. Its second, though original, function is to provide investigators who conduct security clearance investigations with leads that will help them obtain information about the background, moral character, foreign influence, and overall security risk of the person requesting a security clearance. The following screening questions can be found on this form:\n\n Name  Social security number  Current address  Previous addresses  Citizenship  Country of origin  Were you born abroad of U.S. citizens?  Naturalization or Citizenship Certificate Number  Citizenship of relatives and associates?  Are you now or were you a dual citizen of the U.S. and another county?  Do you currently hold or did you previously hold a U.S. passport?  If you are not a U.S. citizen, list:\n Mother's maiden name  Alien Registration Number  Date you entered the United States  City and state where you entered the United States  Country of citizenship\n\n Education  Employment activities  Have you ever been charged with or convicted of any felony offense?  Have you ever been charged with or convicted of a firearms or explosives\noffense?\n Are there currently any charges pending against you for any offense?  Have you ever been charged with or convicted of any offense(s) related to\nalcohol or drugs?\n In the last 7 years, have you been subject to court martial or other disciplinary\nproceedings under the Uniform Code of Military Justice?\n In the last 7 years, have you been arrested for, charged with, or convicted of\nany offense(s) not listed above?\n Do you have foreign property, business connections, or financial interests?\n Are you now or have you ever been employed by or acted as a consultant for a\nforeign government or agency?\n Have you ever had any contact with a foreign government, its establishments\n(embassies or consulates), or its representatives, whether inside or outside the United States, other than official U.S. government business? (Does not include routine visa applications and border crossing contacts.)\n Foreign countries visited  Have you ever been an officer or a member or made a contribution to an\norganization dedicated to the violent overthrow of the United States\nGovernment and which engages in illegal activities to that end, knowing that the organization engages in such activities with the specific intent to further such actions?\n Have you ever knowingly engaged in any acts or activities designed to\noverthrow the United States government by force?\n\nDD Form 1966, Record of Military Processing - Armed Forces of the United States The purpose of the DD 1966 is to standardize all information collected by the\nArmed Forces during the course of enlistment. In addition, the DD 1966 serves to collect\nand document necessary data to determine enlistment and program eligibility.\n\n Citizenship  Social security number  Date of birth  Data verification checklist: original source documents were reviewed by\nrecruiter\n\nDD Form 369, Police Record Check\n\nPolice record checks are sent to police or juvenile agencies in order to determine\nthe extent of applicants' criminal histories. However, not every applicant is subject to such a check. The policy on when to run a record check on an applicant varies from service to service. The Navy and Marine Corps' policy on record checks varies from district to district. For example, Navy recruiters in Salinas, CA, run police record checks only on those applicants who admit to a criminal record during the course of the prescreening interview, while Navy recruiters in Brooklyn, NY, run these checks on all applicants. Air Force and Army policies require all applicants to have record checks conducted in the city, county, or state of residence at time of enlistment, regardless of\ncharges revealed.\n\nWhen record checks are conducted at local law enforcement agencies, the\nfollowing information is requested:\n\n\n Does the applicant have a police or juvenile record?  Is the applicant undergoing court action of any kind?\n\nDD Form 370, Request for Reference\n\nApplicants provide the name and addresses of at least three individuals who are\nprepared to write a letter of reference for them. These reference checks afford an opportunity to surface any suspicions that applicants may have extremist or terrorist\ngroup loyalties. Questions asked of references include the following:\n\n Dates of school attendance  Dates of employment  Does the applicant possess the maturity, intellect, and moral qualifications\nneeded to be successful in the Armed Forces?\n Are there any reasons why you would not recommend this person?\n\nDD Form 372, Request for Verification of Birth\nRegardless of service, applicants will not be processed without proper\ndocumentation of birth. Therefore, applicants who are unable to produce a valid birth certificate or other official birth document must send for a \"Request for Verification of Birth\" to their birth state's office of Vital Statistics. Furthermore, some recruiting regions require this form be completed on all applicants, even if applicants are in possession of appropriate birth documentation.\n\n Name  Date of birth  Place of birth  Gender\n\nU.S. Navy Military Applicant Security Screening (MASS)\nMASS is a computer administered security questionnaire designed to prescreen\nNavy and Marine Corps applicants who are seeking a Navy SCI rating. Applicants whose\nresponses generate red flags are counseled and prevented from entering into certain\nsensitive fields. Questions associated with extremist or foreign group association are listed below. \"Yes\" responses to any of these questions would be cause for suspicion\nabout the possibility of enlisting terrorists or terrorist sympathizers.\n\"Yes\" responses to foreign association questions combined with current\nsignificant financial problems should also raise suspicion of the possibility of applicants having motivation for acting in support of terrorist causes. MASS also asks about\nfinancial problems covering seven years. These questions have not been repeated here, with the exception of questions about taxes. Questions about failure to pay taxes have\nbeen included because tax protests are one tactic used by anti-U.S. government entities.\n\nFor each \"yes\" answer, applicants are requested to provide detail about no more\nthan the two most recent incidents. Appendix C contains the questions showing the detail. In this section, only the main questions are listed.\n\n Have you ever been approached by agents or representatives of a foreign\ngovernment to engage in espionage, sabotage, or terrorism against the United\nStates?\n Have you ever engaged in espionage, sabotage, or terrorism against the United\nStates on your own initiative (i.e., without being ordered or directed to do so)?\n Have you ever been approached by agents or representatives of a foreign\ngovernment to give or sell any unclassified information that they were not authorized to receive?\n Have you ever been a member of an organization or group that advocated\nespionage, sabotage, terrorism, or the use of force or violence to overthrow the U.S. government or to act against the interests of the U.S.?\n Have you ever supported such an organization or group (without being a\nmember), that advocated espionage, sabotage, terrorism, or the use of force or violence to overthrow the U.S. government or to act against the interests of the U.S., by attending their meetings, subscribing to their publications, or donating money?\n Have you ever associated with any individual who was not a member of an\norganization or group that advocated espionage, sabotage, terrorism, or the use of force or violence to overthrow the U.S. government or to act against the interests of the U.S., but who did hold these views?\n Have you ever been a member of an organization or group that advocated\nsabotage, terrorism, or the use of illegal force or violence to deny others their constitutional rights or to protect their own constitutional rights (INCLUDING those with anti-Semitic or racist views)?\n Have you ever supported such an organization or group (without being a\nmember), that advocated sabotage, terrorism, or the use of illegal force or violence to deny others their constitutional rights or to protect their own constitutional rights (INCLUDING those with anti-Semitic or racist views), by attending their meetings, subscribing to their publications or donating money?\n Have you ever associated with any individual who was not a member an\norganization or group, that advocated sabotage, terrorism, or the use of illegal force or violence to deny others their constitutional rights or to protect their own constitutional rights (INCLUDING those with anti-Semitic or racist views), but who did hold these views?\n Are any of your immediate family or associates citizens of another country\n(INCLUDING your spouse, parents, parents-in-law, guardians, brothers, sisters, children plus other persons with whom you are bound by affection,\ninfluence or obligation)?\n Have you ever worked or received compensation from a business that is\nforeign owned or controlled?\n Have you ever had a business relationship with anyone who is a citizen of a\nforeign country?\n Have you ever owned foreign property (INCLUDING bank accounts) or had\nother financial interests in a foreign country?\n Have you ever served in the armed forces of another country?\n Have you ever given volunteer service or been employed by a foreign\ngovernment (EXCLUDING military service)?\n Have you ever had contact with a foreign government INCLUDING\nembassies, consulates, or representatives (EXCLUDING foreign military service or volunteer service or employment for a foreign government, or obtaining a visa)?\n Have you ever received benefits, financial assistance from a citizen of a\nforeign country or from a foreign government?\n Do you have a financial or other obligation to a citizen of a foreign country?  Are you married to or do you have any intent to marry a citizen of a foreign\ncountry?\n Have you ever had a close personal relationship with a citizen of a foreign\ncountry (EXCLUDING your current spouse or fiance(e))?\n Do you share living quarters with a citizen of a foreign country?  Have you ever sponsored the entry of an alien into the U.S.?  Have you ever failed to pay your taxes or failed to file your federal or state\nincome tax forms when required to by law?\n Have you ever had any trouble with federal (IRS) or state income tax agencies\nthat resulted in you having to pay additional taxes or a penalty?\n\nUnited States Navy Illicit Behavior Screening Certificate (Addendum to DD Form 1966/4)\n\nThe Illicit Behavior Screening Form is used to determine enlistment eligibility by\ngathering information on applicants' documented and undocumented previous illegal or morally questionable actions.\n\n I have been/am now a member of an organization that advocated the\ndegradation of cultures or human races other than my own\n I have participated in violent acts against a person of another race  I have been/am now a member of a gang  I have participated in an initiation to gain acceptance to a group or gang  I have committed illegal acts to gain acceptance to a group or a gang\n\nAETC Form 1408, U.S. Air Force Job Screening Worksheet\n\nThe Job Screening Worksheet is completed by applicants in order to collect\ndemographic information, determine eligibility to serve in the Air Force, and assess any potential threat the applicant may pose to national security.\n\n Are you a non-U.S. citizen?  Do you claim dual citizenship?  Is any member of your immediate family employed by or representing the\nforeign government, associated with any employee of the foreign intelligence service, have a financial interest in any foreign owned or operated business or\nengaged in any conduct that could make you vulnerable to coercion, exploitation or pressure by a foreign government?\n\nAir Force Enlisted Processing Worksheet 5\n\nThis form is used to determine enlistment eligibility by collecting demographic,\ncriminal, foreign influence, education, and employment data. The following questions may be considered screening for terrorists:\n\n SSN  Citizenship  Where have you lived?  Where have you gone to school?  Employment activities?  Give full name, date of birth, place of birth, and citizenship for your\nimmediate relatives, living or dead.\n Citizenship of your relatives and associates  Alien registration number of relatives and associates\n Naturalization certificate number of relatives and associates  Foreign countries visited?  Purpose of visit to foreign countries?  People who know you well and are willing to provide a reference for you U.S. Marine Corps Prospect Applicant Card\n\nThe purpose of the Prospect Applicant Card is to gather demographic information\non prospective applicants, determine if the applicant is eligible for enlistment in the Marine Corps, and assess any potential obstacles that may bar applicants from enlistment\nif they are not resolved.\n\n SSN  What is your citizenship?\n When and where were you born?  Social security number  Criminal background  Parents name and address  Birth certificate and social security card verification\n\nU.S. Marine Corps NAVMC 5002, Age Certificate The Age Certificate is used to establish applicants' age when no appropriate\ndocumentation is available to support applicants' assertion of date of birth. Secondary evidence must be provided, which includes:\n\n Hospital records  Primary school records  Family bible entries  Newspaper files\n\nDA 3072, Monthly Financial Statement; U.S.N Financial Statement; AETC 1325, Financial Statement; USMC Financial Statement\n\n\nAll services require these forms be completed by applicants. However, the Army\nrequires this information from only those applicants who must acquire a security\nclearance of secret or higher.\n\n Applicants must state monthly income and monthly bills\n\nMEPS Human Resources Assistants (HRA) HRAs review all service and DoD documents to ensure data are consistent from\ndocument to document. In addition, HRAs conduct one-on-one and group interviews with the applicants in order to obtain the most accurate and up-to-date information. A complete description of these interviews follows. Pre-Enlistment Interview Script\n\nThis interview is conducted one-on-one in a private or semi-private environment.\nThe following questions asked during the course of this interview that can be considered screening for terrorists include:\n\n When and where were you born?  Did someone assist you in taking the Armed Forces Vocational Aptitude\nBattery (ASVAB) test by giving you any answers to the test questions?\n Did anyone ever take the ASVAB for you?  Have you ever had any problems of any kind with a law enforcement agency?  Have you ever been arrested?  Have you ever been to court?  Do you have any court cases pending?  Has anyone told you to hide information or to lie about anything? USMEPCOM Form 601-23-5-R-E, Introductory Pre-Accession Interview\n\nApplicants participate in a group interview where they are asked to complete the\nPre-Accession form. Questions require a response of \"Yes\" or \"No,\" but applicants have\nthe option of checking a \"Let's Discuss\" box. When this box is checked, the HRA will privately discuss the question (s) at hand with the applicant. Questions found on this form that are relevant to screening for terrorists include:\n\n Have you told your service counselor everything about any problems you\nhave had with law enforcement agencies?\n Did anyone tell you to hide any information or lie about traffic tickets,\njuvenile or adult convictions, police records (sealed or stricken)?\n Review UCMJ Article 83 on fraudulent enlistment USMEPCOM Form 601-23-4-E, Restrictions on Personal Conduct in the\nArmed Forces\n\nThis form notifies new recruits that members of the Armed Forces may be\ninvoluntarily separated before their term of service ends for various reasons established by law and military regulations, such as:\n\n A member may be separated for a pattern of disciplinary infractions, a pattern\nof misconduct, commission of a serious offense, or a civilian conviction.\n A member may be separated for harassment or violence against another service member.\n\nPre-Oath Briefing\n\nApplicants are provided with a copy of UCMJ Article 83 - Fraudulent Enlistment, Article 85 - Desertion, and Article 86 - Absent Without Leave. Applicants are informed that this is their final opportunity prior to official enlistment to reveal any derogatory information. They are told that if any information they should have reported but did not surfaces after the pre-oath briefing, they may be prosecuted under the military justice system, particularly Article 83, Fraudulent Enlistment of the UCMJ, which may include a $10,000 fine, discharge from the military and possible imprisonment. MEPS Recruiting Command Security Interviewers Security interviewers conduct one-on-one interviews with applicants who require a security clearance for their specific job in the military. Security interviewers use the SF 86 as the primary source of their questioning; however, some security interviewers have\n\ncreated their own questions to get at truthful answers. During the course of our interviews\nwe uncovered the following additional questions that are asked of some applicants: 6\n\n Air Force, Albany, NY\n\n Have you ever been in handcuffs?  Have you ever been in the back of a police car?\n\n Army, Albany, NY\n\n Why do you want to join the military?  How much do you earn at your current job?  Will you be taking a cut in pay by joining the Army?  Do you want to continue on to higher education?\n\n Army, Syracuse, NY\n\n When you are in your country, with whom do you associate?  Who do you associate with in this country that is from your country of\norigin?\n Have you ever lived outside of the United States?  Do you have a passport from a country other than the United States?  Where have you traveled to?  Why did you travel to {X} country?  How long were you there for? MEPS Recruiting Command Security Interviewers Questionnaires U.S. Army TAPE-EPMD Form 169-R, Security Screening Questionnaire The 169-R is completed by applicants while meeting with the security interviewer\nat MEPS. The purpose of the form is to collect information for determining if applicants\nqualify for enlistment and for access to classified materials. The screening questions found on this form ask about citizenship, foreign travel, foreign influence, financial\ndifficulties, and organizational affiliations. For a more complete look at these questions, refer to Appendix D. U.S. Army TAPE-EPMD Form 189-R, Personnel Reliability Program Screening Questionnaire The 189-R is completed by Army applicants who are applying for a MOS within\nthe field of nuclear weapons. The purpose of this form is to determine if applicants have shown \"unswerving loyalty, integrity, trustworthiness and discretion of the highest order.\" Only those applicants who can demonstrate the above characteristics will be\nArmy.\nadmitted into a nuclear MOS. The relevant screening questions on this form ask about factors pertaining to loyalty, financial difficulties and law violations. The 189-R does not, however, contain any questions pertaining to loyalty or extremist group associations. For a more complete look at these questions, refer to Appendix E. U.S. Army Recruiting Command Form 1227, Security Clearance Questionnaire This form is completed by applicants who will be entering into a MOS that requires a secret security clearance or by applicants entering into the O9L Translator Aide Program. The purpose of the form is to gather information that will help the Army's security interviewer determine whether applicants meet basic qualifications to be granted a security clearance.\n\n Are you a U.S. citizen?\n\n Do you hold dual citizenship or allegiance to any country other than the U.S.?\n(If yes, do you maintain a foreign passport?)\n Have you ever had anything repossessed or turned over to a collection\nagency?\n Have you ever filed for bankruptcy? If yes, what steps are you taking to show\na good faith effort?\n Are you currently behind on any bills? If yes, what steps are you taking to\nshow a good faith effort?\n Have you ever had any charge-offs or bad debts? If yes, what steps are you\ntaking to show a good faith effort?\n Do you have anything else financially that may be a problem for you in trying\nto obtain a clearance?\n Have you ever had any criminal conduct (moving or nonmoving violations, shoplifting, DUIs, theft, or any other violation or warning from the police)? Please list all violations. Boot Camp Personnel When recruits arrive at boot camp, they are subject to additional screening that may include personal searches, additional forms to complete, and ability assessments. Recruits primarily interact with their training instructors who conduct the personal searches and assessments. During the first week of training, recruits interact with human resource specialists (civilian and military) who will ask them to complete additional forms pertaining to payroll and benefits.\n\n\nInitial search of persons and personal belongings, and regular dorm inspections with the intent to find the following:\n Contraband (i.e., gum, candy, cigarettes)\n Drugs\n Racist or hate group materials Assessment of mental health and general abilities\n Mental health issues: Training instructors who suspect adjustment problems in\nrecruits will first counsel them and, failing improvement, send them for\ncounseling or evaluation.\n Is the recruit a loner?  Is the recruit progressing the way s/he should be?  Is the recruit a disciplinary problem?  Does the recruit get along with other recruits?\n\n Command of the English language\n U.S. Army: Personal interaction and conversation are used to determine if\nthe recruit has English deficiencies. Those with deficiencies participate in ESL courses. Moment of Truth The Moment of Truth occurs immediately prior to shipping to basic training or\nduring basic training inprocessing soon after arrival. The Moment of Truth is the last\nopportunity to divulge required information they may have withheld in prior interviews\nand questionnaires. If they \"come clean\" at this point about anything they lied about or\nfailed to disclose, they are not likely to face criminal prosecution (court-martial), although they still may be discharged. Prior to swearing in and shipping, recruits are\ncounseled about the moment of truth and sign a document indicating that they are aware\nof penalties for withholding required information.\n\nDA Form 4986: Record of Personal Property. Taking inventory of recruits' property affords an opportunity to screen for\nliterature, flags, or other symbols of support for extremist or terrorist groups. DD Form 1172, Application for Uniformed Services Identification Card.\n\nInformation provided for this form should be compared with information provided\nin earlier forms to ensure continuity of the information used to identity the recruit. Information collected includes name, address, SSN, and any dependents' demographic data.\n\nDD For 1172-2, Application For Department of Defense Common Access Card. As with the DD Form 1172, information provided for this form should be compared with information provided in earlier forms to ensure continuity of the information used to identity the recruit. Information collected includes name, address, SSN, and any dependents' demographic data. DD Form 577, Signature Card. This form establishes a means for military personnel to compare subsequent signed documents from the enlisted personnel against a signature provided at initial training. This serves as a protection against unauthorized persons assuming the identity of active or reserve duty personnel. Information collected includes name and signature.\n\n\nCredit Checks Credit history checks provide information on applicants' financial background, have the potential of providing additional information that applicants did not share with their recruiters, and may serve as a source of data corroboration. The following information may surface when credit checks are conducted:\n\n Aliases  Problematic credit and finances  Unlisted residences  More extensive criminal record checks Security Clearance Restrictions Restricted to U.S. Citizens\n\nNon-U.S. citizens are not eligible for a security clearance and are therefore restricted to nonsensitive positions within the Armed Forces. Consequently, non-U.S.\n\ncitizens are also not subjected to an indepth background investigation. Adjudicated at a Central Adjudication Facility According to Adjudicative Guidelines The adjudicative guidelines require all individuals seeking a security clearance be subject to a background examination in an effort to determine potential security risks. A\nnumber of personal factors are taken into consideration when determining clearance eligibility but in the end, a whole-person concept is applied. Unfavorable information may not be disqualifying because mitigating factors can be considered. With respect to screening for terrorists, the following guidelines are applicable:\nGuideline A: Allegiance to the United States. \"An individual must be of unquestioned allegiance to the United States. The willingness to safeguard classified information is in doubt if there is any reason to suspect an individual's allegiance to the United States.\" Guideline B: Foreign Influence. \"A security risk may exist when an individual's immediate family, including cohabitants and other persons to whom he or she may be bound by affection, influence, or obligation are not citizens of the United States or may be subject to duress. These situations could create the potential for foreign influence that could result in the compromise of classified information.\n\nContacts with citizens of other countries or financial interests in other countries are also relevant to security determinations if they make an individual potentially vulnerable to coercion, exploitation, or pressure.\" Guideline C: Foreign Preference. \"When an individual acts in such a way as to indicate a preference for a foreign country over the United States, then he or she may be prone to provide information or make decisions that are harmful to the interests of the United States.\" Aptitude Testing Aptitude testing serves purposes other than determining applicants' mental abilities. With respect to screening for terrorists, this process is yet another way to establish continuity of applicants' identity. At testing, applicants are asked to present identification and if they cannot produce such identification they are required to leave a print of their right thumb. USMEPCOM noted, however, that no specific action is taken with these thumbprints. No comparisons are made with the thumbprints taken at testing with prints taken when applicants process at MEPS. USMEPCOM is aggressively working to address this issue, with plans to institute digital signature and digital fingerprint verification systems. In the mean time, MEPS\npersonnel do rely on comparisons of applicants' hardcopy signatures provided in front of testing administrators (TA) at test sessions and then in front of operations personnel at MEPS. On numerous occasions, signature comparison has caught individuals who had other individuals (ringers) take tests for them. The implementation of digital and biometric-based identity authentication systems (e-Security and e-Signature) will virtually eliminate the possibility of ringers taking part in processing. Aptitude testing also serves as a terrorist screening mechanism because it screens out individuals who have little command of the English language. While we recognize that most nonnative English speakers are not terrorists, the standard ASVAB score requirements would screen out foreign, disloyal and hostile people who were trying to enlist in the military without being open about their lack of English language abilities.\n\nPolicies and Procedures for Reporting and Documenting Suspicious Persons or Activities Recruiting, MEPS, and basic training personnel need effective mechanisms for reporting their suspicions that individuals may be extremists or terrorists if the military and the nation are to optimally protect themselves. Information about attempted or successful enlistment of extremists is needed to enable (1) all personnel to understand the characteristics of extremist persons who try to enlist so that they can recognize them and be vigilant screeners, (2) law enforcement to intervene as needed to apprehend or monitor extremists, (3) Recruiting Commands and policy directors to analyze trends, patterns, or prevalence in order to tailor regulations and instructions to counteract them.\n\nCombining reports of suspicious persons and incidents into a common database is important for enabling personnel to evaluate the extent to which problematic persons are trying to enlist in the military and their apparent strategies for doing so. Without reporting of information and combining of this information into a shared database, personnel are unlikely to be able to detect anything beyond what would appear to be isolated incidents.\n\nUnder current procedures, observations of suspicious persons are most often reported up enlistment personnel's chains of command until they arrive at the desks of commanders who determine whether the information should be forwarded to law enforcement, force protection services, or anti-terrorism officers. Some more formal means for reporting and sharing information about suspicious persons and incidents are available or under development. These are described below. Federal Department of Homeland Security System At one time, Department of Homeland Safety encouraged individuals to report suspicious or criminal activity to law enforcement or to DHS Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection watch offices. A Web link to this information now points to a site, however, that happens only to be used for reporting computer security breaches such as attempts (either failed or successful) to gain unauthorized access to a system or its data, unwanted disruption or denial of service, the unauthorized use of a system for the processing or storage of data, changes to system hardware, firmware, or software characteristics without the owner's knowledge, instruction, or consent. USMEPCOM Station Advisory Reporting Network (STARNET)\nSTARNET is an internal command communication network that enables rapid and efficient dissemination of important information to MEPS across the nation.\n\nSuspicious incidents and other types of reports could be shared among MEPS.\n\nArmed Forces Recruiting Stations Operational Security Manual Procedures The Air Force is working on a joint operational security plan for recruiting stations. As part of this plan, the Armed Forces will be working together to develop a joint suspicious incident database, with information populated by Area Security Coordinators (ASC). ASCs are appointed by each recruiting command and are the designated recipients of all suspicious activity reports (Section 4.6.9). If recruiters believe the suspicious activity is terrorism-related, they are also to submit reports to their Command Anti-Terrorism Officer (Section 4.8.2). This joint database will enable Recruiting Commands to recognize and analyze any patterns of potential enlistment by extremists.\n\nArmy Regulations Army Regulation 600-37: Prescribes when and how to document unfavorable information in a service member's personnel file\n\nArmy Regulation 381-20: Suspicious Incident Information Sharing. These pertain to Army Intelligence Information Reports (IIR) provided to a HQ INSCOM designated point of contact upon observation of types of events listed below. Personnel are advised to make reports, even when in doubt. If time is of the essence, personnel are instructed to notify the FBI or local law enforcement immediately, with the IIR to be written later. Types of events to be reported:\n\n Apparent surveillance of military installations  Theft of U.S. military uniforms and identification cards  Cash offers to purchase DoD registered, privately owned vehicles  Questioning by strangers of recruiting station and MEPS personnel concerning their activities, operations, and plans Training and Education In order for counterterror screening policies and procedures to be effective, training and education on these issues must occur. All service members, regardless of rank, must understand what constitutes an extremist group, what constitutes \"active\"\nparticipation, the penalties associated with such activities, and what one's responsibilities are upon detection of possible extremist associations or activities in their units. To identify training resources, Web searches were conducted. Recruiting, MEPS, and training personnel were also asked at every location visited whether they received training on the recognition and reporting of individuals who may be hostile and disloyal toward the U.S. government.\n\nAll of the military services provide extremist group detection and response training to some segments of their populations. This section provides information on military personnel training and education that address extremism, hate, discrimination, and conflict resolution. Other courses are also listed that may indirectly address issues related to terrorism and extremism. U.S. Army Basic Training. Basic training introduces recruits to skills such as physical training and marksmanship. In addition to these subjects, recruits are given instruction on the Army's core values, ethics and race relations. Basic Recruiter Course. In this course, recruiters learn who and how to recruit.\n\nThe following topics are covered that may provide recruiters with the knowledge and ability to screen for terrorists:\n Extremist group awareness  Applicant screening and enlistment eligibility  Moral waiver criteria\n\nGuidance Counselor Procedures. This course focuses on applicant requirements and processing. Specific topics covered include:\n\n Accuracy and completeness of enlistment packet  SF 86: Updating and validating data  Waiver criteria  Enlistment standards\n\nGuidance Counselor/Operations course, Phase I Non-resident Training Packet. This sub-course focuses on two areas, Guidance Counselor and Operation's NCO functions. Topics covered in this course that serve the purpose of screening for terrorists include:\n\n Applicant screening: Includes information on applicant standards and how to\nassess if the applicant meets these standards\n How to conduct a security interview\n\nFort Benning Drill Sergeant School. The courses taught in this school are\ndesigned to teach incoming drill instructors performance-oriented training, methods of recruit training, marksmanship and interpersonal courses such as:\n\n Army values and warrior ethos  Leadership  Human relations  Counseling\n\nOfficer Advanced Course; Warrant Officer Advanced Course; First\nSergeant Course. This course includes instruction and training on the Army's EO/EEO\nprograms and extremism for unit leaders. Specifically, unit leaders are instructed to teach their soldiers that the ideologies and actions of extremist organizations and hate groups\nare inconsistent with Army values. Participation or membership in such groups is prohibited. Participants are informed of their obligation to uphold the Constitution and to\nenforce Army policies regarding discrimination or actions that advocate supremacist\ncauses or encourage the use of violence to deprive others of their civil rights (Army Training Support Package 121-A-8032). Department of the Army Pamphlet 350-20: Unit Equal Opportunity Training\nGuide. This pamphlet addresses issues pertaining to sexual harassment, cultural awareness, equal opportunity, and discrimination, as well as procedural issues on filing\ncomplaints and appropriately addressing complaints with both the victim and the offender. In addition lesson plans on the following topics are provided:\n\n Cultural awareness  Discrimination based on race, gender, national origin, skin color and religion\n Equal opportunity violations subject to the Uniformed Code of Military\nJustice\n Enforcement of equal opportunity policy  Tools to assess the equal opportunity climate within the Army  Equal opportunity training techniques for leaders  Identification of Army equal opportunity issues\n\nFort George G. Meade Consideration of Others Program. This is a threetiered program that focuses on education, enforcement, and ownership. The format of this\ncourse includes small group discussions that focus on racism, gender, diversity, power and discrimination, and extremism. If necessary, the instructor will address additional relevant topics raised by members of the class. The overall goal of this program is to aid soldiers and command in recognizing and responding to all forms of discrimination.\n\nThe Consideration of Others Program handbook contains lesson plans on course\ntopics. Lesson Plan 8 instructs soldiers on whom and what constitute extremist groups and ideologies, prohibitions on participation, and the impact these groups have on the unit and the mission.\n\nSpecial Emphasis Program. This is an add-on course to the Consideration of\nOthers Program, with the goal of providing cultural and educational events to enhance cultural awareness and interest among those in the military community.\n\nFort Lewis Gang and Extremist Group Training for Company Commanders\nand First Sergeants. This training includes information on local area gangs and\nextremist/hate groups, as well as instruction on how to recognize gang and extremist\ngroup tattoos, ideologies, and attire.\n\nMilitary Justice Initial Entry Training. This course reviews standards of\nconduct for Armed Forces personnel, the Uniformed Code of Military Justice, homosexual behavior, victim/witness assistance, and extremist activities and organizations. With respect to the latter topic, definitions as to what constitutes extremist groups and activities are identified, and prohibitions on extremist and dissent activities\nare outlined.\n\nTraining and Doctrine Command Pamphlet 600-4. This pamphlet is the IET\nSoldier's Handbook and includes the following information for incoming recruits:\n Army core values  Uniformed Code of Military Justice with special mention of Article 15 - a\nnonjudicial punishment imposed by a commanding officer for a minor offense\n Standards of Conduct while on and off duty  Equal opportunity  Terrorism: the soldier as the target\n\nU.S. Navy\n\nNavy Recruit Training. This is this basic training for incoming recruits who\nlearn about seamanship. Swimming, water survival, and physical fitness. In addition to these fundamental subjects, recruits also receive training on:\n\n UCMJ  Navy core values and ethics  Equal opportunity  Terrorism preparedness\n Keep a low profile  Be unpredictable  Stay alert  Specific instructions on threat conditions and security measures\n\n\nEnlisted Navy Recruiter Training Orientation. This introductory training is designed to teach the basics on enlistment requirements, enlistment procedures, ethical behavior, applicant screening, and other recruiting methods. After completion of this training, a new recruiter should be able to identify both qualified and nonqualified applicants, and determine if nonqualified applicants are eligible for waivers.\n\nRecruiter-in-Charge Field Management Training. This training is intended to instruct experienced recruiters on how to manage and mentor junior level recruiters. A brief refresher on previous subjects covered in the Recruiter Training Orientation is also provided.\n\nEnlisted Processing Division Supervisor (EPDS) Training. This is the basic course for newly appointed EPDS. The primary focus of this training is on applicant processing. The following topics are covered that may screen for terrorists:\n\n Interpersonal relationships  Eligibility requirements\n\nRecruit Division Commander. This is the basic course for incoming drill instructors. At this time, there is no indication of education on extremism, Equal Employment Opportunity, or human relations.\n\n\nPersonal Applied Skills Screening. This is a one-week training and mentoring session. It focuses on anger management and social skill development with emphasis on racial, cultural and gender diversity. Only those recruits who display a lack of coping skills or present anger-related issues are placed in this program. Command Manage Equal Opportunity (CMEO) Manager's Course (A-500-\n0009). The CMEO program is designed to help disseminate the Navy's policy on equal opportunity, and assist all Navy personnel in recognizing equal opportunity issues. The purpose of this course is to provide program managers with the basic tools for administering and managing the CMEO program. Therefore, there are a number of topics covered in this training. Some of these topics include:\n\n- Extremist activities - Diversity - General policies and regulations\n- Formal and informal resolutions\n\nEqual Opportunity Correspondence Course. This online course is intended to enhance awareness and understanding of equal opportunity and diversity. The class is available to all Navy service members. Topics include:\n\n Valuing diversity  Equal opportunity\n\n\n Fraternization  Sexual harassment\n\nCommand Training Team Indoctrination Course (CTTIC A-050-0001):\nNavy Rights and Responsibilities (NR&R) workshop on Naval Citizenship. This\ncourse focuses on both Navy core values and equal opportunity with the goal of enhancing the Navy's Command training Team knowledge and skills in these areas. The following topics are covered:\n\n Valuing diversity  Fraternization  Sexual harassment  Grievance procedures U.S. Air Force Air Force Instruction 51-903, Dissident and Protest Activities. This instruction\noutlines appropriate and inappropriate activities by Air Force personnel. The following are components of the instruction:\n Limits distribution of printed materials on an Air Force installation, other than\nofficial government publications or base-regulated activity notices without prior approval from the installation's commander\n Allows for installation commanders to designate establishments as off-limits\nwhen the conduct occurring in such establishments creates harmful effects on the health, welfare and moral of military personnel\n Prohibits participation in groups that advocate discrimination or violence  Prohibits demonstrations or any other activity that can interfere with mission,\nor affects loyalty, discipline, or morale of military personnel\n Requires policy on prohibited activities to be included in initial active duty\ntraining, precommissioning training, professional military education, commander training, and other appropriate Air Force programs Air Force Recruiter School. Air Force recruiters are responsible for the quality\nof new recruits, and are the first line of defense against terrorists enlisting in the military. Recruiter school provides introductory training on subjects such as enlistment standards,\napplicant screening, enlistment procedures, waiver requirements, and other relevant processes. Protecting the military community from an enlisted terrorist is dependent upon the recruiter's training enhancing his awareness of possible threats.\n\nBasic Military Training (BMT). New recruits are taught basic skills such as\nphysical conditioning, obeying commands and orders, learning core values, and drill. In addition to these training areas, instruction has been developed to discuss the Air Force's\npolicies and procedures pertaining to:\n\n Human relations and Military Equal Opportunity (MEO) and treatment\n Stereotyping, prejudice, and discrimination  Unlawful discrimination  Dissident and Protest Activities (See AFI 51-903)  Roles and responsibilities of the MEO program\n\nMilitary Training Instructor (MTI). This course is designed to teach newly\nappointed training instructors methods of recruit training at BMT. In addition to the\nfundamental training areas of physical conditioning, soldiering, and instilling core values,\nthe following topics that may help screen for terrorists are covered:\n\n Identify nonprior service recruits who are incapable or not suited for military\nservice\n Counseling individuals with training issues  Questioning techniques  Group dynamics\n\nJudge Advocate Staff Officer Course. This course is designed to teach judge\nadvocates the roles and responsibilities of their profession. Participants complete three areas of concentration which include civil law, operations and international law, and\nmilitary justice. The following subtopics, which pertain to limiting and defending service member activity, are covered in this course:\n\n Limits imposed on a military member with regard to political expression  Limits imposed on a military member with regard to membership in groups,\nassociations, or other organizations that discriminate on the basis of race, ethnic origin, religion, etc.\n Defend limits imposed on a military member with regard to personal\nexpression, including:\n Tattoos  Words or phrases on clothing  Posters on walls in barracks\n Class participants are briefed on extremist organizational activity at the\nDefense Equal Opportunity Management Institute (DEOMI).\n\nProtecting Your Community. This course focuses on terrorism awareness and\nprovides participants with information on recognizing terrorist threats. Components\ninclude the following:\n\n Disadvantages of being a terrorist:\n Having to live among Americans without looking or acting suspiciously.  Terrorists require training and supplies that may be detected and arouse\nsuspicion.\n Overcoming stereotypes: Do not identify terrorists based on their looks, where\nthey are from or what they eat.\n Recognizing suspicious activities, such as unusual requests for information,\nunusual or excessive interest in high risk or symbolic targets, overdressed for the weather, people in places where they do not belong, or other atypical behavior.\n Recognizing documents that are fraudulently reproduced such as driver's\nlicenses and birth certificates.\n Providing an accurate report: Be accurate and timely and do not delay in\nreporting suspicious activity. U.S. Marine Corps (USMC)\nUCMC Recruit Depot Training. This training is provided to new recruits and\nincludes fundamental courses on physical fitness, combat training, and weaponry. In\naddition recruits are briefed on the Uniformed Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), core values and ethics, and race relations.\n\nUSMC Recruiters School. The purpose of this course is to acquaint future\nrecruiters with the enlistment process which includes standards for eligibility, the waiver process, interviewing techniques, and other relevant procedures. The following courses\nprovide recruiters with the necessary tools for enlisting only the most qualified\napplicants:\n\n Education Qualification\n Purpose of education screening is to ensure enlistment of qualified\napplicants\n Review education credential  Establishing contact with applicants' educational institutions in order to\nverify credentials\n\n Determine Prospect/Applicant Identity\n Enlistment requires the use of applicants' legal names  Names that appear differently on legal documents such as the social\nsecurity card, birth certificate, naturalization certificate, or education documents require applicants to apply for a replacement document through the appropriate agency.\n Verifying name and age  Verifying citizenship  Verifying alien status\n\n Moral screening\n Purpose is to ensure only the most qualified applicants enlist, to screen out\npotential disciplinary problems, and individuals who pose a threat to the\nUSMC, and to ensure other enlistees that they are not amongst criminals\n\n\n Question and interview procedures  Explanation of penalties for lying or intentionally withholding pertinent\ninformation\n\nFirst Sergeants Training Course. This course provides instruction on current\nissues pertaining to gangs and hate groups, as well as the impact such groups have on the\nUSMC. Additionally, this course covers the USMC policies on such groups and suggests solutions for reducing USMC service members' participation in such groups.\n USMC policies  Affiliations not consistent with core values  How to stay alert on indicators of gang and hate group affiliation  How to address extremist and hate group issues when they arise USMC Naval Reserve Officers Training Corps, Leadership & Ethics: Senior\nSeminar Lesson: 12B. This course covers the following equal opportunity topics:\n\n Definition, policy, and programs on equal opportunity, sexual harassment, and\nfraternization\n Definitions of minority, prejudice, discrimination, institutional discrimination,\naffirmative action, goals/milestones, and cultural diversity\n\nDrill Instructor School. This is the basic course for new drill instructors. Primary\nfocus is on recruit training; however, topics that may assist in screening for terrorists can\nbe found within the section *General Military Subjects*. These topics include:\n\n Equal opportunity  Core values of the USMC  Personal and professional values\n\nAll Services and the Security Community\nCounterintelligence (CI) Force Protection Countersubversion Training. This\ntraining has been developed by the Joint Counterintelligence Training Academy (JCITA) and DSSA. Comment on Implementation of Training\nThis section on training and education has shown that the DoD and the Armed\nForces have produced many training components that are designed to educate personnel\nabout extremist groups, unlawful discrimination, and terrorist threats. Recruiting, MEPS, and basic training personnel at every location visited for the study were asked whether\nthey received training on the recognition and reporting of individuals who may be hostile and disloyal toward the U.S. government. Based on their responses, it is clear that equal opportunity training is well understood and valued. Personnel also consistently receive\nforce protection briefings and training for dealing with external threats.\n\nIt was also found, however, that recruiting, MEPS, and basic training personnel do not appear to be receiving systematic, up-to-date training on recognizing and reporting possible insider threats. USMEPCOM authorities confirmed that observation at least for their personnel, and report that they would value more information in this area. For recruiting command and basic training personnel, insider threat training may be in place, but the people we talked to did not recognize that they had received it. This suggests that if training is available, the intended message may not be clearly understood by the personnel who receive it. It is hoped that instructors and course developers assigned to address the subject matter reflected in this section will take advantage of information in this document and our efforts to catalogue relevant courses. The information provided should make it easier for them to locate and integrate into their classes relevant information and course materials being used in other instruction venues across the DoD.\n\n\n\nRecommendations Earlier in this report, we noted that we have observed aspects of the enlistment process that can contribute to acceptance of persons whom the military would prefer not to enlist, if all things were known at the outset. Very few of these persons would qualify as terrorists. Yet, the vulnerabilities that ineligible non-terrorists could intentionally use to enlist, or unintentionally benefit from, are the same vulnerabilities that terrorists could use to elude detection and infiltrate the military. Therefore, by addressing these vulnerabilities, the accessions community will strengthen its screening against terrorists.\n\nThis section presents recommendations that have been developed over the course of the project. Some were derived from interviews with enlistment personnel. Others were the result of the authors' observations, based on their knowledge of personnel security systems. All recommendations have been vetted with the Recruiting Commands and USMEPCOM. USD(P&R) should work with the Intel community and federal and local law enforcement to improve exchange of information between these entities and DoD regarding recruits who may be members of or have associations with extremist groups.\n\n\n\nWhen the DoD submits fingerprints for checks of the FBI's criminal record files, a check of the FBI's Violent Gangs and Terrorist Organization File (VGTOF) is also conducted. The VGTOF file is updated regularly with consolidated files of the Terrorist Screening Center. Hits on this file are not returned to the Recruiting Commands, however, but rather go to the submitting agency of the record found. It is at the discretion of these agencies to notify the Recruiting Commands that a person in VGTOF is attempting to enlist. Recruiting Commands do not report being notified nor would the law enforcement agencies aware of the case know whom to notify. Agreements need to be made for more effective and timely exchange of this information in a way that does not compromise the investigations of law enforcement. USD(P&R) should work with other federal agencies such as the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS), Social Security Administration (SSA), and Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) to clarify and simplify procedures for USMEPCOM and Recruiting Command personnel to report suspicious persons and incidents.\n\nUSMEPCOM personnel have noted that it is not a simple matter to communicate suspicious persons or incidents to appropriate federal agencies outside of DoD. The networks of communication are not always user friendly and it can be difficult to identify which government agencies, such as FBI, DHS, SSA, or USCIS, to notify. Even more difficult is knowing whom to contact within any of these agencies.\n\nUSD(P&R) should support development of training materials for recruiting and USMEPCOM personnel in the detection and response to individuals with potential terrorist and extremist group associations. As mentioned above, recruiting and USMEPCOM personnel interviewed during this study were not aware of having received systematic training on recognizing and responding to possible terrorists who try to enlist. Instructors and course developers assigned to address the subject matter reflected in this section should take advantage of information in this document and our efforts to catalogue relevant courses. The information provided should make it easier for them to locate and integrate into their classes relevant information and course materials being used in other instruction venues across the DoD. USD(P&R) should support USMEPCOM and the Recruiting Commands in developing and training on optimal DoD information sharing systems regarding suspicious persons and incidents.\n\nRecruiting Commands, MEPS, and basic training personnel need clear and easily implemented instructions for aggregating and sharing information about persons they detect who may have terrorist or extremist group associations. Intelligence sharing among these groups does not appear to occur, and because of this, military personnel cannot evaluate the full extent to which problematic persons associated with particular groups are trying to enlist in the military and their apparent strategies for doing so. Personnel are unlikely to be able to detect anything beyond what would appear to be isolated incidents.\n\n Ensure Recruiting and MEPS personnel, recruits, and basic training personnel know when, how, and to whom within DoD to report suspicions of extremist associations of applicants, recruits, and other military personnel.\n\n Continue and accelerate development of the joint suspicious incident database\nvia Area Security Coordinators or some other means for aggregating information about suspicious incidents and persons.\n\n##  Ensure Suspicious Incident And Person Reporting Is Integrated To Include All Entities Involved In The Accessions Process From Recruiting Stations Through Basic Military Training. Usd(P&R) Should Improve Methods For Preventing, Detecting, And Responding To Identification Fraud. Usd(P&R) And Usd(I) Should Work Together To Develop And Provide Comprehensive Document Fraud Recognition Training. Department Of Motor Vehicle Employees And Law Enforcement Across The Nation Are Beginning To Receive Document Fraud Recognition Training. The Settings In Which These Personnel Review Identity Documents Often Afford Less Time For Fraud Detection Than Recruiting And Meps Personnel Have To Process Applicants. Because Recruiting, Meps, And Basic Training Personnel All Need To Review Identification, Their Commands Should\n\n collectively develop training to avoid redundant and thereby inefficient efforts. Furthermore, the types of training offered should be appropriate for the unique identification screening demands placed on different personnel. For example, enlistment personnel in states on national borders may need more training on fraudulent international documents than would enlistment personnel in Nebraska.\n\nUSD(P&R) should continue and accelerate support for USMEPCOM and recruiting command progress toward paperless processing.\n\nCurrently, much of the onus of verifying and validating consistency and completeness of information rests on humans. Automated systems will enable more reliable and comprehensive validation. To the extent that automated systems are in place, USMEPCOM and the Recruiting Commands should build automated document fraud recognition logic into automated information verification systems. USD(P&R) should implement policy and procedures to increase the likelihood that law enforcement detains and investigates applicants who engage in identification fraud. Currently, when recruiting and MEPS personnel detect that individuals are attempting to provide fraudulent identification documents, they do not consistently maintain control of the documents and are unlikely to summon law enforcement to investigate. Policy and procedures should be implemented to increase the likelihood that law enforcement will have the opportunity to investigate persons suspected of engaging in identification fraud. Implementing such policy can serve at least two purposes. First, it would enable law enforcement to close avenues to fraudulent documentation. These avenues undermine national security not only for the military community, but also for organizations and systems nationwide. Second, publicizing the policy of having identification fraud investigated and potentially prosecuted should have the effect of deterring individuals who otherwise have little incentive not to engage in identification fraud. Signs should be placed on walls, desks, and front doors. Recruiters and MEPS operations personnel should verbally warn applicants of consequences for presenting fraudulent documents.\n\nWhen individuals are caught presenting fraudulent documents, these instances should be recorded and publicized. All of this should have the effect of hardening the military entrance process against document fraud. P&R should continue development and implementation of USMEPCOM's e- Signature and e-Security initiatives. Until these systems are in place, require recruiting station, MEPS, recruiting liaison, and basic training personnel all to review and validate original identification documents. At present, systems are not in place to ensure that a person who shows up at the recruiting station is the same person who processes through MEPS, who in turn is the same person who shows up for military training. Furthermore, under current procedures,\n\nthe primary responsibility for review of identification documents is placed on recruiters. Until biometrics are collected and then used to verify that the same individual is participating in every stage of the accessions process, more care should be taken to review identification documents at MEPS and initial training.\n\nUSMPECOM and the Recruiting Commands should continue to participate in the civil fingerprint check pilot initiative with the FBI to enable detection of identity fraud. The Los Angeles MEPS has been participating with PERSEREC, the DoD\nBiometrics Office (DoD BMO), and the FBI to enable searches of the FBI's civil fingerprint file using electronic fingerprint submissions heretofore submitted for criminal record checks. These checks are being run at no additional cost to DoD. They will enable detection of individuals who do not have criminal records but who have submitted either the same fingerprints or personal identifier information (name, SSN, date of birth) to the FBI in the past. If individuals, such as persons dishonorably discharged or immigrants trying to infiltrate the military as U.S. citizens, attempt to change their identity following the initial submissions of prints, they would be detected by these checks. P&R and CI&S should ensure that all identification information that can be validated against databases is appropriately requested and documented. As the DoD moves toward electronic processing, it needs to ensure that the information collected supports optimal automated verification of information. Currently, the SF 86 questionnaire does not document important identification information, such as birth certificate, driver's license, state identification data, or in most cases, passports.\n\nApplicants may be asked to show these documents, but the numbers and codes on these documents that can be used to detect fraud are not recorded. Driver's license, passport, and state identification numbers can be evaluated by applying validation rules based on the unique systems that are used to generate the numbers. Likewise, if someone presents a birth certificate that indicates he or she was born on Tuesday, December 21, 1963, processors would have reason to suspect fraud or data entry error since December 21,\n1963, did not fall on a Tuesday. Important identification documents should be reviewed and all possible information that can signify authenticity should be documented in DoD systems. USD(P&R) should ensure MEPS quality assurance is applied to all overseas recruits MEPS personnel play an important role in providing quality assurance to applicants for military service. Currently, with the exception of the Unites States Marine Corps (USMC), Recruiting Commands are not subjecting overseas applicants to the same quality assurance procedures used for domestic applicants. As such, enlistment via recruiting stations in non-U.S. countries would be a softer target for someone wanting to infiltrate the U.S. military. In fact, this may be one of the most vulnerable points for allowing hostile foreign nationals to infiltrate our military. Providing extra layers of screening beyond the recruiter, who has conflicting demands to recruit individuals, will provide a harder target for someone wanting to enlist for purposes of undermining or attacking the U.S. government. USD(P&R) and DUSD(CI&S) should review policy and procedures to identify the best means for improving the completeness and accuracy of information used to populate security clearance applications (SF 86 / EPSQ / E-QIP, etc.).\n\nCurrently, the \"SF 86: Questionnaire for National Security Positions\" is completed by every applicant for military service in the United States. Its purpose is to collect information for background investigations of persons applying for security clearances. For military accessions and security clearance vetting, the SF 86 is the primary questionnaire for documenting potential indicators of hostile and disloyal associations and histories.\n\nThe importance of the SF 86 may not be sufficiently understood or respected by some recruiting personnel. They might see it as an administrative or bureaucratic nuisance in the process of getting applicants to commit to contracts. Recruiters often help applicants fill out the SF 86, sometimes incompletely and inaccurately, to meet paperwork requirements for enlistment. This same SF 86 is then also submitted as part of security clearance applications. As the DoD moves toward automated adjudication of security clearances, based to some extent on automated processing of information on the SF 86, without better quality, the military recruiting process will be responsible for infusing vulnerability into national security by contributing to clearance of individuals who pose a risk. Possible means for addressing this problem include:\n\n USD(P&R) and the Recruiting Commands should stress the significance of the SF 86 as the cornerstone of the security clearance system. RS and MEPS personnel need to be continuously drilled on the importance of accuracy. These personnel need to be continuously informed of the role of the SF 86 in vetting people who may have access to the nation's secrets.\n\n Recruits should be held solely accountable for the information on their own\nSF 86.\n Most recruits spend significant time in the Delayed Entry Program (DEP).\nConsider having them complete the SF 86 via OPM's e-QIP during this time. MEPS personnel, MEPS liaisons, or OPM personnel could be available to answer recruits' questions.\n The Recruiting Commands, USMEPCOM, DUSD(CI&S), and OPM should\nwork together to improve information collection, validation, and quality\nassurance standards and procedures for the SF 86. For example, if applicants indicate foreign travel to countries that require passports for entry, they should\nalso be required to provide information about the passport they used to gain\nentry. Currently, passport information is only required for U.S. citizens who were not born in the U.S. DoD and the Armed Forces should seek to have all passport information for all applicants with passports documented and validated. As another example, if applicants possess alien registration\nnumbers (ARNs), or are naturalized citizens with relatives in other countries, they should be expected to provide a reasonable amount of information about their friends, family, and other associates. Applicants should also do what is required to completely and accurately document personal reference, employment, and education contact information.\n\n If needed to communicate the extent of the problem, request a study of the\nquality and completeness of information provided by military service applicants on the SF 86. For example, compare the accuracy and completeness for the military enlistment population with that of civilian and contractor\npopulations.\n\nUSD(P&R), DUSD(CI&S), the FBI, and OPM  should work together to\nensure DoD is receiving full advantage of statutory authorizations to receive\napplicants' criminal history for national security clearance and military acceptance and retention purposes when appropriate.\nWe initially recommended that the USD(P&R) review procedures being used to\nassign the FBI purpose code to fingerprint submissions for FBI criminal record checks. USMEPCOM quickly and correctly determined that they do not have any control over how OPM forwards record check requests to the FBI. To restore the level of access to information enjoyed by DoD prior to the transfer of the PSI from DSS to OPM, the FBI, OPM, and the DoD will need to meet to determine how to submit criminal record checks from DoD for national security purposes and enlistment or retention in the military as authorized by USC Title 5, section 9101 (SCIA). According to the FBI, record checks for national security purposes may result in return of juvenile records and sealed records from states queried through FBI checks. Since the enlistment population has a much\nhigher probability of having committed any crimes as juveniles and because juvenile records are often sealed, access to records as authorized by SCIA should be ensured. USD(P&R) should support increased use of and training on the intelligence value in credit reports to validate information provided by applicants.\nWith the exception of Army, currently, credit reports are being run on every\napplicant. The Army is expected to obtain credit reports on every applicant beginning in\nOctober 2005. Information was not available to indicate whether or how enlistment\npersonnel are benefiting from the intelligence available in credit reports. For example, credit reports can provide the following types of information:\n\n Unlisted aliases  Amount and types of information inconsistent with age of applicant\n Unlisted residences  Evidence of problematic finances USD(P&R) should identify how this information can most effectively be made\navailable to decision makers in the accessions process who are determining whether\n individuals applying for military service are who they say they are and whether they should resolve financial issues before applying for security clearances. The military Recruiting Commands should work together and with law enforcement to develop a joint services Digital and Searchable Tattoo Assessment Tool (TAT).\n\nTattoo screening was one of the most frequent practices that recruiting personnel indicated they used to identify individuals with indications of possible hostile and disloyal associations and intentions toward the U.S. government. Recruiting and basic training personnel consistently indicated concern with the completeness, accuracy, timeliness, and accessibility of intelligence for screening tattoos. The efficiency and effectiveness of information available in tattoo screening can be improved.\n\nPERSEREC recommends that the Recruiting Commands participate in the development of a joint digital and searchable tattoo assessment tool (TAT). This recommendation echoes earlier recommendations from Flacks and Wiskoff (1998). The TAT database could be populated with existing photos and information stored in files on recruiting personnel's computers and be supplemented with photos and information available from law enforcement and Anti-Defamation League resources. These photos and information would be searchable using key words that describe prominent features of the tattoos.\n\nTAT could be kept up to date by designing procedures and instructions for recruiting personnel to add information about meanings of tattoos or uploading recent photos of new tattoos. TAT could also be accessible to law enforcement who could update the database with their tattoo intelligence as it becomes available. Integration of Armed Forces tattoo detection with law enforcement intelligence could be accomplished through a joint initiative coordinated through the International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP). USD(P&R) should update policies and procedures pertaining to prohibiting and detecting extremist association manifest in Internet behavior. The Internet has greatly expanded opportunities for people who are hostile and disloyal toward the U.S. government to meet each other, share information, and plan. In our study, the Internet provided the strongest evidence of active duty military personnel participating in extremist groups. The DoD and the Recruiting Commands should clarify prohibited participation in Web sites and Web forums that are sponsored by or are online gathering places for terrorists and extremist groups The DoD should also consider establishing procedures and assigning responsibility for monitoring extremist Web sites and forums for participation by members of the Armed Forces.\n\n\n\nUSD(P&R) should standardize and implement question strategies that are more likely to engage applicants in conversations about potentially problematic\nassociations.\nAs discussed earlier, indications are that questions currently being asked of\napplicants regarding associations with extremist groups do not yield many affirmative\nresponses. This may be because, in actuality, virtually none of the persons filling out the\nSF 86 have had associations with extremist groups. At the same time, the questions asked may not effectively open discussions about\nthe kinds of behaviors and attitudes that indicate sympathy for or involvement in\nextremist groups. Based on interviews with enlistment personnel, reviews of their questionnaires, and reviews of answers to the SF 86, we feel that a better set of questions could be made available to enlistment personnel to probe pertinent issues with applicants. They would specifically address the ways applicants and recruits can act to support groups hostile and disloyal to the U.S. government, to include Internet behavior. The proposed questions are as follows: The following questions pertain to your participation in extremist and terrorist organizations and activities. Note: First, define for each applicant what \"extremist or terrorist organizations or activities\" mean: People who support or agree with extremist organizations think it is OK to use force or violence or to discriminate against other people based on their race, ethnicity, religion,\ngender, sexual orientation, disability, national origin, or support for U.S. government policy. Or, they may try to disrupt, sabotage, overthrow, or commit espionage or terrorism against the United States Government, or any of its State or local governments.\n\na. Have you ever advocated or practiced discrimination or committed acts\nof violence or terrorism against individuals based on their religion, ethnicity, race, sexual orientation, disability, gender, or loyalty to the U.S. government? (YES/NO) b. Have you posted or distributed literature or participated in public demonstrations to show your allegiance to or to promote an extremist\norganization or philosophy? (YES/NO) c. Have you ever provided labor, money, or other resources to extremist individuals or organizations? (YES/NO) d. Have you ever received training from or recruited or provided training for extremist organizations or causes? (YES/NO)\n\n\ne. Have you ever attended any meetings, participated in any Web sites or on-line discussions, or exchanged information in any way with individuals involved in extremist organizations or causes? (YES/NO) f. Are there any groups (such as countries, political groups, or religious groups) who you would feel obligated to defend if they claimed they were under attack by the United States Government? (YES/NO) If you answered \"yes\" to any of question (a) through (f) above, please explain.\n\nReferences and Other Sources Al-Khilafa Publications. (1999). *The methodology of Hizb ut-Tahrir for change*. London,\nEngland: Al-Khilafa Publications. Ammant, N. (2004). Stay alert, officials warn: Web postings call for terrorist attacks in\nStates. Army Training and Doctrine Command. Retrieved April 29, 2005, from http://www.tradoc.army.mil/pao/TNSarchives/May04/054504.asp Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith. (2002), *Extremism in America: A guide*. New\nYork: Anti-Defamation League. Axtman, K. (2003 December 29). The terror threat at home, often overlooked. The\nChristian Science Monitor. Bailey, E. (2004 September 13). As trial nears, case against airman is marked by\nmissteps. *Los Angeles Times.* Bin Abdul Aziz, A.Q. (n.d.) The criticism of democracy and the illustration of its reality.\nTranslated from Arabic from Al-Jame'a Fi Talab El-Ilm-Esh-Sharif. Vol. 1, 146- 155. Budahn, P.J. (2000). What to expect in the military; A practical guide for young people,\nparents, and counselors. Westport, CT. Greenwood Press. Bureau of Naval Personnel, Naval Personnel Command. (2004, April). PERS-4832\nEnlisted Separations Branch briefing. Chameleon Group. 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(n.d.) *Army 101.* Retrieved January 6, 2004, from http://www.goarmy.com U.S. Army. (n.d.) *What do I bring to MEPS?* Retrieved January 6, 2004, from\nhttp://www.goarmy.com U.S. Army. (n.d.) *Basic training*. Retrieved April 7, 2004 from http://www.goarmy.com U.S. Army. (n.d.) *Electronic forms by range.* Army Headquarters. Retrieved April 20,\n2004, from http://www.army.mil/usapa/eforms/DA1920_to_DA2397-13- R_1.html U.S. Army Recruiting Battalion. (n.d.). *Family page*. Kansas City, MI. Retrieved January\n19, 2004, from http://www.usarec.army.mil/5thbde/4gbn/Directory/FSC/index_Fam.htm USAREC Operation Order 3-0007 (2003). Annex C (Policy and Procedures) to OPORD\n3-0007. USAREC Pamphlet 40-3. (1991). *A recruiter's guide to the medical process*. Louisville,\nKY: U.S. Army Recruiting Command. Retrieved January 21, 2004, from\nhttp://www.usarec.army.mil/im/formpub/REC_PUBS/p40_3.pdf USAREC Regulation 601-89. (1992). *Completion of the request for examination form*.\nLouisville, KY: U.S. Army Recruiting Command. Retrieved January 26, 2004,\nfrom http://www.usarec.army.mil/im/formpub/REC_PUBS/r601_89.pdf USAREC Regulation 601-210. (1995). Regular Army and Army reserve enlistment\nprogram. Louisville, KY: U.S. Army Recruiting Command. Retrieved January\n22, 2004, from http://usmilitary.about.com/gi/dynamic/offsite.htm?site=http://www.usapa.army.\nmil/pdffiles/r601%5F210.pdf USAREC Regulation 600-35. (1999). *Enlistment standards program.* Louisville, KY:\nU.S. Army Recruiting Command. Retrieved January 23, 2004 from www.usarec.army.mil/im/formpub/REC_PUBS/R600_35.pdf\n\nUSAREC Regulation 601-56. (1999). Waiver, delayed entry program separation, and\nvoid enlistment processing procedures. Louisville, KY: U.S. Army Recruiting\nCommand. Retrieved February 2, 2004, from www.usarec.army.mil/im/formpub/REC_PUBS/R601_56.pdf USAREC Regulation 601-270. (2000). Military Entrance Processing Station (MEPS).\nLouisville, KY: U.S. Army Recruiting Command. Retrieved January 19, 2004, from www.defenselink.mil/privacy/notices/ army/A0601-270_USMEPCOM.html USAREC Regulation 350-6. (2002). Recruiter production management system.\nLouisville, KY: U.S. Army Recruiting Command. Retrieved January 22, 2004, from http://www.usarec.army.mil/im/formpub/REC_PUBS/R350_6.pdf USAREC Regulation 350-7. (2002). Recruiting station production management system.\nLouisville, KY: U.S. Army Recruiting Command. Retrieved January 22, 2004, from http://www.usarec.army.mil/im/formpub/REC_PUBS/R350_7.pdf USAREC Regulation 350-9. (2002). Recruiting company production management\nsystem. Louisville, KY: U.S. Army Recruiting Command. Retrieved January 22,\n2004, from http://www.usarec.army.mil/im/formpub/REC_PUBS/R350_9.pdf USAREC Regulation 380-4. (2002). *Security program*. Louisville, KY: U.S. Army\nRecruiting Command. Retrieved January 23, 2004, from http://www.usarec.army.mil/im/formpub/REC_PUBS/R380_4.pdf\n\nUSAREC Regulation 601-95. (2002). *Delayed entry and delayed training program.*\nLouisville, KY: U.S. Army Recruiting Command. Retrieved December 3, 2004,\nfrom http://www.armybasic.homestead.com/regulations.html USAREC. (n.d.). *Recruiting manual.* Louisville, KY: U.S. Army Recruiting Command. USAREC. (n.d.). *USAREC electronic forms.* Louisville, KY: U.S. Army Recruiting\nCommand. Retrieved April 20, 2004, from http://www.usarec.army.mil/im/formpub/Forms.htm USAREUR Regulation 190-25 (2003). Safe neighborhood awareness program (SNAP).\nObservation and reporting procedures: Training. Retrieved on February 4, 2004,\nfrom https://www.aeaim.hqusareur.army.mil/library/default.htm USCG Auxiliary, District 13 (n.d.). Guide for reviewing applicant's questionnaire for\nnational security positions (SF-86). Washington, DC: U.S. Coast Guard Auxiliary. Retrieved January 21, 2004, from\nhttp://www.d13cgaux.org/d13web/security/ sf_86_checklist_for_reviewer.pdf U.S. Customs Service. (2002). Customs inspection anti-terrorism training:\n\n\nParticipant manual. TRAEN Number 071750. Washington, DC: Treasury Department, U.S. Customs Service.\nU.S. General Accounting Office. (1999). Military recruiting could improve criminal\nhistory screening. GAO/NSIAD-99-53. Washington, DC: U.S. General Accounting Office Retrieved January 19, 2004, from http://www.gao.gov/archive/1999/ns99053.pdf USMC. (n.d.). *The real Marine Corps*. Quantico, VA: U.S. Marine Corps. Retrieved\nJanuary 19, 2004, from http://www.marines.com/parents_advisors/default.asp USMCRC. (2000). *Guidebook for recruiters*. Quantico, VA: U.S. Marine Corps\nRecruiting Command. USMCRC. (2003). *United States Marine Corps recruiter school.* Quantico, VA: U.S.\nMarine Corps Recruiting Command. Retrieved February 2, 2004, from https://web.mcrc.usmc.mil/RS_Ops_Web/R_School/BRC/BRC/BRC%20Page.htm USMEPCOM Handbook 350-1-1. (2000). Mission essential qualification standards:\nMedical. North Chicago, IL: U.S. Military Entrance Processing Command.\nRetrieved January 19, 2004, from http://www.mepcom.army.mil/pubs/pubnform.asp?topic=Regulations&sort=pdfFi\nle USMEPCOM Handbook 350-1-4. (2000). Mission essential qualification standards:\nTesting. North Chicago, IL: U.S. Military Entrance Processing Command.\nRetrieved January 19, 2004, from www.mepcom.army.mil/pubs/pdf/hndbks/h-\n0350-001-04.pdf USMEPCOM Regulation 10.1. (2002). Organization and functions: United States Military\nEntrance Processing Command. North Chicago, IL: U.S. Military Entrance Processing Command. Retrieved January 21, 2004, from\nhttp://www.mepcom.army.mil/pubs/pubnform.asp?topic=Regulations&sort=pdfFile USMEPCOM Regulation 680-3. (2003). Personnel information system and integrated\nresource system (USMIRS). North Chicago, IL: U.S. Military Entrance Processing Command. Retrieved January 19, 2004, from http://www.mepcom.USAF.mil/pubs/pdf/regs/r-0680-003.pdf USMEPCOM Regulation 601-23. (2004). *Enlistment process*. North Chicago, IL: U.S.\nMilitary Entrance Processing Command. Retrieved January 21, 2004, from www.mepcom.USAF.mil/pubs/pdf/regs/r-0601-023.pdf USMEPCOM. (n.d.). *Publications and forms.* North Chicago, IL: U.S. Military Entrance\nProcessing Command. Retrieved January 21, 2004, from http://www.mepcom.army.mil/pubs/pubnform.asp?topic=Forms&sort=pdfFile USMEPCOM. (n.d.). *Your future begins now*. North Chicago, IL: U.S. Military Entrance\nProcessing Command. Retrieved January 13, 2004, from www.mepcom.USAF.mil/visitor-info.htm USNRC. (n.d.). *Navy careers*. Millington, TN: U.S. Navy Recruiting Command.\nRetrieved January 20, 2004, from http://www.navy.com\n\nUSNRC. (2002). *Navy recruiting manual-enlisted COMNAVCRUITCOMINST 1130.8F*.\nMillington, TN: U.S. Navy Recruiting Command. Wood, S., Crawford, K.S., and Lang, E. L. (in press). Reporting of counterintelligence\nand security indicators by supervisors and coworkers. Monterey, CA: Defense Personnel Security Research Center. Woodward, J. D. (2004, November.) The FBI's civil file: An untapped resource.\nArlington, VA: Department of Defense Biometrics Management Office.\n\n\nAppendix A\n\nExamples of White Extremists in the Military on the Web\nFrom Martin Lindstedt, Former Specialist Four, 1981-83, C Battery, 2/42 Field Artillery (Lance):\nThis is why I find any \"Black Dawn\" element among the Marines to be a foolish rumor. First of all, it is the wrong branch of the military to form any such White Nationalist element. Marines are an adjunct of the Navy. The current Navy is divided into carrier forces and nuclear submarines, in which the Marines act as ground forces for foreign overseas missions. Thus the Marines have no mission beyond their bases less than 75 miles away from the ocean. The Army/Air Force is related in the same way as the Navy/Marines. The Air Force used to be the Army Air Force until 1947 or thereabouts. The Air Force, with its high proportion of officers and the demands it makes for intelligent forces, is typically the 'whitest' of all the branches of services. Yet it is not the military service which will be all-important in the coming total civil war, but rather the Air Force will be engaged in service to the Regular Army forces, supposing that the racial nationalist guerrilla forces hang around in large enough numbers to justify an air strike.\n\nIt is the Army/National Guard which is the service of importance when this civil war heats up. It will be the Army which will be called upon by the criminal regime for counter-insurgency once the police are unable to maintain things, as happened in the LA riots. However, due to the necessity to keep the Army loyal, or at least neutral, the criminal regime is justly paranoid as to the loyalty of its white combat troops, few of which come from Washington or Jew York or even the state capitals across the land. The blacks are likely to become effective Black Nationalists who know how to use small arms. Even the Puerto Ricans are suspect as to tendencies toward racial nationalism. There is not much racial integration among groups eating in mess halls unless the soldiers are lifers or dopers. So given the likelihood of racial nationalists using their skills learned in the Army to subvert the Army's loyalty to the criminal regimeists, the CID (Criminal Investigation Division -- the Army's detectives) is always on the lookout for the dreaded White Nationalists forming cohesive groups. This is especially the case today, far more so than in the 1970s and 1980s. Even so, the loyalty of the Army cannot be assured. Given a racial civil war, white units cannot be counted on to fire on white civilians, blacks cannot be counted upon to fire on blacks, hispanics cannot be counted to fire upon hispanics. Given this reality, is it any wonder that the white criminal regimeists have cut down on the Army, trying to gauge its loyalty through UN 'peace-keeping missions'?\n\nSo it is extremely stupid to form an overt White Nationalist or Resistance group while in the Army, just as it is useful to have the sell-out Clinton generals seeing an armed-&-dangerous skinhead in every white recruit. It is useful to have young white men in the Army learning useful skills, such as how to fire an assault rifle, lay down a stream of machinegun fire, dig a foxhole, learn how to use communications and gather intelligence on an enemy force. The better element will learn to despise the criminal regimeist Army careerists who give them senseless orders while at the same time learning soldier skills implanted in basic infantry training. Some will learn military realities, learn what is capable with the armed forces and what is not. The Army has trained its opposing forces very very well. It behooves the White Resistance to take advantage of this useful military training. --Martin Lindstedt, Former Specialist Four, 1981-\n83, C Battery, 2/42 Field Artillery (Lance) From David Duke on Stormfront.org:\n \"Salute to Stormfront Army, Navy, Air Force & Marines:\" At a minimum several hundred Stormfront members are now in the armed forces. Many of those are in the Middle East right now. Although White Nationalists oppose any misuse of the American military by Zionist manipulators like Richard Perle and Paul Wolfowitz.....White Nationalists also support their kinsmen, wherever they are, including in the U. S. armed forces. I think that it would be a good idea to offer a thread that SALUTES OUR WHITE KINSMEN IN THE ARMED FORCES and thanks them for some of what they have accomplished, in spite of the attempt by ZOGsters to use the American military.\n\nFrom a Stormfront.org message from Forum member O'Brien, a Marine, May 2004 (found with search on \"I joined the Marines\"):\nMr. Duke, What do you think of the military's new standards on tattoos. [sic] When I joined the Marines they told me I would be automatically discualified [sic] if I had any rebel flag tattoos. However I was lucky enought not to have any. They did however question my Celtic Tribal tattoo and I've heard that they also wont [sic] allow people in who have celtic crosses. In my mind this is outrages that you can't have any form of tattoo that represnts [sic] your people or your heritage. I also can't believe that the military of all people would fall for such liberal lies that the south represented only the action of slavery and racism. To me it looks as if the Military is now basicaly [sic] stating that any tatoo [sic] that is white culture in general will be automaticaly [sic] qualified as a racist tattoo and to me this is unbelievable I can't believe in a republic such as our which stresses democracy can some how not only be ignorant to the facts but also be racist against white culture. I just dont [sic] understand how our military with in the past 5 years has been infected so much with liberalism and Jewish influence. I always saw the military as a more of a conservative organization. thanks for your time, John\n\nSubsequent posting by Mr. O'Brien:\n\nRe: Small city in Florida fighting hard to abolish MLK Street name Yes I was there as well the whole show was quite disgusting. It was good to know however that a few white patriots still stood up against the onslaught of uncivilized Negroes whose chants were simplistic and showing numerous forms of hostility. My friend and I who are National Alliance members were there to see what would be the final verdict in the battle to glorify this communist Negro. We wanted to show our appreciation for Mrs. King in her vote against keeping the sign but the media took up all her time with simplistic questions. My favorite speaker was the women who went on about her Jew loving mother who name was so honorably put on a road sign as well which had absolutely nothing to do with the problem at hand. If you live in the Zephyrhills area maybe you would like to meet up with us and help pass out Martin Luther King flyers we also have NA meetings once a month for our Tampa Chapter. If you would like to participate maybe we could set up a meeting. We will be getting a list of all those who spoke against the changing of the sign back to Martin Luther King Blvd. Such as the man with the American flag shirt. These few brave souls will receive some information from our organization. To reach me e-mail me at celticsaints21@netscape.net From a Stormfront.org Open Forum in Stormfront from 1488usmc2b:\nQuestion for any WP Marines: Oi White Brothers and Sisters, I just enlisted in the Marine Corps and I was wondering if any Marines go to any of the WP meetings in NC or CA? Just checking before I go to them. 14/88 2056\n\nCasper writes: I'd be wary of openly sharing your White Nationalist beliefs or attending events so early on in your enlistment. Could easily result in a Administrative Separation or if you have less than 180 days Entry Level Separation...Not even after basic. They'll view it as incompatibility with Military service; Warranting counseling in which case you can forget any increase in rate or responsibility; and depending on the circumstance be transferred to some stink hole. What's worse is suffering the indignity of carrying this mark permanently on your service record irregardless of future evaluations. Troy writes: Don't know your story, your age, or why you enlisted, but if you at all care about your service career use caution. The services do NOT look kindly on White Nationalsists, so keep your views to yourself. That's not to say be a coward and don't do anything to advance our cause, but be very discrete. Openly trying to recruit other service members is not a good career move and may very well get you booted. l0stsoul writes: Yes. Most recruiters will discharge you in a second if they know your beliefs. Keep it quiet for those first 180 days as someone else mentioned. When you go to boot, you will have a lot of minorities in your platoon and probably one or two minority drill instructors. Be prepared.\n\n\nFrom Kiyth: I just finished a six year enlistment in the Navy and openly claiming to be a White Nationalist would bring your career to an abrupt halt(Court Martial for being a racist). The waivers for tattoos are for people that have visible ones, such as on the neck or hands(mostly gang related), not for racist ones. Saxon_Man: The U.S. military is the last place you want the least amount of wn [white nationalists] in! The country will fall apart someday. When it does, we want our guys in there running deep: rank and file! Same goes with the police force. Suck it up, do your service, and create dissident within the ranks -- just like how SFC Steve Barry, U.S.A (Ret) did in the 90's with the SFU and their publication \"The Resister.\" You can still be active -- just use your head........ Davey Crockett: I agree with this post and the one after this one that makes the point that we cannot afford to let our military be taken over by those not in our interests. Our government today is filled with minorities that are intent on looting what is left of the white race, I know, I work in the area of \"civil wrongs.\" I wonder if I am the only wn that works for a civil rights organization? From AryanKingdom: When my group is formed, I will require that all persons fit for duty join the National Guard. Why you may ask... well that's simple national guardsmen are the first people they call in to fight an up rising i.e.... us. Second that two hundred dollars a month plus the training and the schooling goes a long way. If they go for lets say the medical field they can be an emergancy medical technition almost as soon as they get home from there training and earn a good wage. Or perhaps the go into the National Guard to become police officers we could use many more white and proud police officers and women. And if all goes well you enlistment is up you have a four year degree and you never had to go over seas. I would suggest joining in a state that is white like WY or some such other state. Please contact me if you have any other questions.\n\nNote: Another Stormfront string with comparable dialogue was found by searching on an offensive racial slur and the phrase \"I'm in the army.\"\n\n\n## Appendix B Indications Of Extremists In Security Clearance Investigations\n\nIndications of Possible or Definite Extremist Group Associations or Sympathies from Initial Security Clearance Investigations of Military Personnel Under the Age of 35 (N=131)\n\nArab subject with discrepancies in address possesses NJ driver's license, despite living in NY\n\nArab subject with strong Arab ties fails to list significant associations\n\nDeveloped reference reports subject has neo-Nazi tattoo and dog named Adolf\n\nFBI agent indicates subject is a member of white supremacist group\n\nInvestigator made a CI note re: subject's attendance of AZ mosque\n\nIranian subject claimed to know associates of bin Laden; reference questions subject's loyalty to the U.S.\n\nReference alleged subject was a member of the Aryan nation\n\nReference concerned whether subject can reconcile Muslim faith with military service\n\nReference describes pro-Arab, anti-U.S. attitudes of subject\n\nReference describes subject as militant type person\n\nReference had subject as student, described him as mean and nasty, associated him criminal conduct. Subject member of MSA; subject had unreported travel\n\nReference heard subject refer to self as Nazi, but later also say that calling self Nazi was stupid\n\nReference heard subject saying he didn't believe in this government\n\nReference indicates subject expresses anti-American sentiments; Subject terminates clearance when confronted with allegations of being anti-government\n\nReference indicates subject had expressed anti-American sentiments\n\nReference indicates subject is ultra-conservative and home schools his children\n\nReference not sure how subject would feel about going to war against other Muslims\n\nReference questions Islamic subject's loyalty to the U.S. (2)\n\nReference reports subject could possibly have conflict between loyalty to U.S. and Muslim faith\n\nReference reports subject drew Nazi symbol on another student's art work; Reference reports subject getting involved in white supremacy; Subject admits to drawing white supremacist symbols but denies involvement in groups; Subject suspended for possessing neo-Nazi painting\n\nReference reports subject sent anti-U.S. pro-Muslim emails\n\nReference reports subject traveled to Kuwait; strict Muslim who did not integrate with peers; Reference describes Muslim subject moving from Tampa FL to Rochester NY\n\nReference reports subject sympathizes with Islamic terrorists; Subject reported to EEO for racist comments\n\nReference saw subject in a picture with a Nazi flag; Subject says photo with Nazi flag relevant only\nto history of flag; subject not white supremacist or Nazi\n\nReference says subject involved in white supremacist group\n\nReference who is fellow soldier reports subject has extremist literature and has been heard making racist comments; subject brags about having friends in Oregon militia groups; other reference reports subject shows interest in extremist groups\n\nReference will not recommend subject for position of trust; uses claims of being Muslim not to work on Fridays; \"something about him\"\n\nReferences believe subject possesses a KKK membership card\n\nReferences report subject is involved with white supremacist skinhead organization\n\nSubject accused of using N word (21 subjects)\n\nSubject admires Rommel\n\nSubject associated with confederate flag and hacking, at least through bragging, not necessarily action\n\nSubject associated with white supremacist groups\n\nSubject believed to be susceptible to recruitment by KKK or other hate group\n\nSubject believed to be ultra-conservative and racist; Subjected showed racism in ROTC\n\nSubject brainwashed growing up in a cult\n\nSubject burned powder shaped like swastika\n\nSubject described as angry and anti-semitic\n\nSubject described as racist and was heard using N word\n\nSubject discovered after enlistment as having skinhead group tattoos, bumper stickers; shaved head in violation of military policy; subject was assigned to be a recruiter!\n\nSubject dismissed for taunting recruit with anti-semitic comments\n\nSubject displayed neo-Nazi banners and posters\n\nSubject dressed like skinhead or militia\n\nSubject drew swastika when autographing a girl's shirt\n\nSubject employed by supremacist\n\nSubject expressed sympathy and admiration for bin Laden\n\nSubject fails to disclose Arabic alias; potentially suspicious travel\n\nSubject fired and later issued Article 15 for use of N word\n\nSubject fired for racist slurs\n\nSubject had confederate flag tattoo covered up\n\nSubject had forged bank notes\n\nSubject has pending Article 15 for racist statement against white\n\nSubject has rebel flag on chest\n\nSubject has swastika tattoo; admits to being in white supremacist group several years before interview\n\nSubject has unlisted Arabic alias (2)\n\nSubject helped stuff envelopes for right-wing \"The Cause\" Organization, of which her father was a member\n\nSubject hung out with FMLN\n\nSubject hung out with KKK members without realizing it\n\nSubject implicated in racial slur vandalism\n\nSubject is member of anti-American Muslim sect; attempting to be discharged from Army to join mother in Saudi Arabia\n\nSubject is member of racially motivated militant group known as American Freedom Fighters\n\nSubject is skinhead with knuckles tattooed with \"skinhead\"\n\nSubject known to build pipe bombs\n\nSubject known to have attended KKK meetings, but didn't join\n\nSubject listed residence at a KKK camp\n\nSubject loyal to Puerto Rico; hates the U.S.\n\nSubject made comment \"we had it coming\" in response to 9-11 attacks\n\nSubject used a racial slur\n\nSubject observed by police officer at KKK rally\n\nSubject on mailing list of NSDAP\n\nSubject posted racist comments on Web site and accused of using N word\n\nSubject prayed at mosque also frequented by Muslims of America, a group actively recruited for militants to fight against U.S.; subject worked with FBI to identify extremists\n\nSubject put up racist Web site\n\nSubject perceived as racist (2)\n\nSubject received applications for KKK membership from a marine\n\nSubject received Article 15 for distributing extremist literature\n\nSubject received KKK materials from family member\n\nSubject received unsolicited mailing from KKK\n\nSubject reluctant to fight fellow Muslims\n\nSubject reported to Army CID for visting extremist Web sites on the Internet\n\nSubject reported to EEO for shaving head like a skinhead. Subject indicates head shaved because he was going bald; no observed racism\n\nSubject self-professed to being in KKK\n\nSubject skinhead racist and member of Church of the Creator\n\nSubject spoke out against government; Subject extreme anti-establishment\n\nSubject surfed Nazi skinhead website but does not subscribe to philosophy\n\nSubject suspected of sabotaging computers with viruses, may have only bragged about it.\n\nSubject suspected of sabotaging Navy plane\n\nSubject sympathizes with McVeigh, the Oklahoma City bomber\n\nSubject visited anti-American web site\n\nSubject visited anti-government anarchy website\n\nSubject was a nonviolent skinhead 12 to 13 years before interview\n\nSubject was approached to join KKK at amusement park; didn't join\n\nSubject was member of skinhead group\n\nSubject was militia member and Hitler sympathizer\n\nSubject associated with Nazi skinhead James Burmeister\n\nSubject wore Nazi costume as part of a film project\n\nSubject worked for Nation of Islam security services\n\nSubject wrote email talking about how to sabotage his plant; contained third reich references\n\nSubject wrote Nazi and ant-semitic words and drew Nazi symbols in multiple classes\n\nSubject, an Egyptian citizen, making new Arabic friends; receiving money from Arab women; \"prepared\" friend to go to Egypt\n\nSubject's section leader tried to give him materials on KKK\n\nSubject's use of n word reported to brigade commander\n\nThree references indicate subject was either or both a militia member and admirer of Hitler\n\nThree sources reports subject was observed carving KKK on desk; said to have done worse on behalf of KKK outside of school; believed to be a member\n\nTwo references feel Muslim subject is showing signs of extremism and putting religious loyalty over loyalty to military\n\nTwo references indicate subject is anti-American; observed wearing anti-American clothing\n\n\nAppendix C\n\nU.S. Navy Military Applicant Security Screening (MASS)\n\nU.S. Navy Military Applicant Security Screening (MASS)\nMASS is a computer administered security questionnaire designed to prescreen applicants who are seeking an SCI rating. Applicants whose responses generate red flags are counseled and prevented from entering into certain sensitive fields. Questions associated with extremist or foreign group association are listed below. \"Yes\" responses to any of these questions would be cause for suspicion about the possibility of enlisting terrorists or terrorist sympathizers.\n\n\"Yes\" responses to foreign association questions combined with current significant financial problems should also raise suspicion of the possibility of applicants having motivation for acting in support of terrorist causes. MASS also asks about financial problems covering 7 years. These questions have not been repeated here, with the exception of questions about taxes. Questions about failure to pay taxes have been included because tax protests are one tactic used by anti-U.S. government entities.\n\n\nFor each \"yes\" answer, applicants are requested to provide details about no more than the two most recent incidents.\n\n-\nHave you ever been approached by agents or representatives of a foreign government to engage in espionage, sabotage, or terrorism against the United States?\n\n\n How many times have you been approached by agents or representatives of a foreign government to engage in espionage, sabotage, or terrorism against the United States?\n\n\no When did this occur (approximately)? Year: Month: (1-12)\n\no What country did the person who approached you represent? o Did you agree to engage in espionage, sabotage, or terrorism against the\nUnited States?\no Describe exactly what you agreed to do. o Did you subsequently perform this action? o Did you report the incident? o To whom did you report the incident?\n\n-\nHave you ever engaged in espionage, sabotage, or terrorism against the United\nStates on your own initiative (i.e., without being ordered or directed to do so)?\n\no When did you engage in espionage, sabotage, or terrorism (approximately)?\nYear: Month: (1-12)\no What was the reason(s) that you engaged in espionage or sabotage? o Describe exactly what you did.\n\n-\nHave you ever been approached by agents or representatives of a foreign\ngovernment to give or sell any unclassified information which they were not authorized to receive?\n\n How many times have you been approached by agents or representatives of a\nforeign government to give or sell unclassified information which they were not\nauthorized to receive?\n\no When did you engage in espionage, sabotage, or terrorism (approximately)?\nYear: Month: (1-12)\no What country did the person who approached you represent? o Did you provide any unclassified material? o What type of information did you provide? o Did you report the incident? o To whom did you report the incident?\n\n-\nHave you ever been a member of an organization or group that advocated espionage, sabotage, terrorism, or the use of force or violence to overthrow the\nU.S. government or to act against the interests of the U.S.?\n\n In how many such organizations or groups have you been a member?\n\no What was the name of the organization? o Why did you decide to become a member? o When did you become a member (approximately)? Year: Month: (1-12)\no Are you still a member? o When did you end your membership (approximately)? Year: Month: (1-12)\no Why did you decide to end your membership? o Have you engaged in any activities which involved espionage, sabotage,\nterrorism, or the use of force or violence?\no How many times have you engaged in activities which involved espionage,\nsabotage, terrorism, or the use of force or violence?\no What was the period of time during which you engaged in these activities\n(approximately)?\no From: Year: Month: (1-12) o Until: Year: Month: (1-12) o Describe exactly what you did.\n-\nHave you ever supported such an organization or group (without being a member), that advocated espionage, sabotage, terrorism, or the use of force or violence to overthrow the U.S. government or to act against the interests of the U.S., by attending their meetings, subscribing to their publications or donating money?\n\n How many of these types of organizations or groups have you supported?\n\no What was the name of the organization? o What was your reason(s) for giving your support? o When did you begin supporting this organization (approximately)? Year:\nMonth: (1-12)\no Do you still support this organization? o When did you stop supporting this organization (approximately)? Year:\nMonth: (1-12)\no Why did you decide to cease your support?\n\n-\nHave you ever associated with any individual who was not a member of an organization or group, that advocated espionage, sabotage, terrorism, or the use\nof force or violence to overthrow the U.S. government or to act against the interests of the U.S., but who did hold these views?\n\n With how many such individuals have you been associated?\n\no What is or was the nature of your association with this person? o When did you begin to associate with this person (approximately)? Year:\nMonth: (1-12)\no Have you, at any time, shared this person's viewpoint concerning the\ncommission of espionage, sabotage, or terrorism, or the use of force or\nviolence to overthrow the U.S. government or to act against the interests of the U.S.?\no Do you still share this person's viewpoint? o Do you still associate with this person? o What was your reason for associating with this person? o Do you still associate with this person? o When did you stop associating with this person (approximately)? Year:\nMonth: (1-12)\no Why did you stop associating with this person?\n\n-\nHave you ever been a member of an organization or group that advocated sabotage, terrorism, or the use of illegal force or violence to deny others their constitutional rights or to protect their own constitutional rights (INCLUDING those with anti-Semitic or racist views)?\n\n In how many such organizations or groups have you been a member?\n\no What was the name of the organization? o Why did you decide to become a member? o When did you become a member (approximately)? o Year: Month: (1-12) o Are you still a member? o When did you end your membership (approximately)? Year: Month: (1-12) o Why did you decide to end your membership? o Have you engaged in any activities which involved sabotage, terrorism, or the\nuse of force or violence?\no How many times have you engaged in activities which involved sabotage,\nterrorism, or the use of force or violence?\no What was the period of time during which you engaged in these activities\n(approximately)?\no From: Year: Month: (1-12) o Until: Year: Month: (1-12) o Describe exactly what you did.\n\n-\nHave you ever supported such an organization or group (without being a member), that advocated sabotage, terrorism, or the use of illegal force or violence to deny others their constitutional rights or to protect their own constitutional rights (INCLUDING those with anti-Semitic or racist views), by\nattending their meetings, subscribing to their publications or donating money?\n\n How many of these types of organizations or groups have you supported?\n\no What was the name of the organization? o What was your reason(s) for giving your support? o When did you begin supporting this organization (approximately)? Year:\nMonth: (1-12)\no Do you still support this organization?\no When did you stop supporting this organization (approximately)? Year:\nMonth: (1-12)\no Why did you decide to cease your support?\n\n-\nHave you ever associated with any individual who was not a member an organization or group, that advocated sabotage, terrorism, or the use of illegal force or violence to deny others their constitutional rights or to protect their own constitutional rights (INCLUDING those with anti-Semitic or racist views), but\nwho did hold these views?\n\n With how many such individuals have you been associated?\n\no What is or was the nature of your association with this person?\no When did you begin to associate with this person (approximately)? Year:\nMonth: (1-12)\no Have you, at any time, shared this person's viewpoint concerning the\ncommission of sabotage, or terrorism, or the use of force or violence to deny others their constitutional rights or to protect your own constitutional rights?\no Do you still share this person's viewpoint? o Do you still associate with this person? o What was your reason for associating with this person? o Do you still associate with this person? o When did you stop associating with this person (approximately)? Year:\nMonth: (1-12)\no Why did you stop associating with this person?\n\n-\nAre any of your immediate family or associates citizens of another country\n(INCLUDING your spouse, parents, parents-in-law, guardians, brothers, sisters,\nchildren plus other persons with whom you are bound by affection, influence or obligation)?\n\n How many of your immediate family members or associates are citizens of\nanother country?\n\no What is this person's relationship to you? o Of what country is this person a citizen?\n\n-\nHave you ever worked or received compensation from a business that is foreign owned or controlled?\n\n How many businesses that are foreign owned or controlled have you worked for\nor received compensation from?\no What was the name of the business? o In what country was this business headquartered? o What type of work did you perform? o For what period of time did you work for or receive compensation from this\nbusiness (approximately)?\no From... Year: Month: (1-12) o Until... Year: Month: (1-12)\n\n-\nHave you ever had a business relationship with anyone who is a citizen of a foreign country?\n\n With how many citizens of foreign countries have you had a business\nrelationship?\n\no Of what country is this person a citizen? o What type of work does this person perform? o For what period of time have you had contact with this person\napproximately)?\no From... Year: Month: (1-12) o Until... Year: Month: (1-12)\n\n-\nHave you ever owned foreign property (INCLUDING bank accounts) or had other financial interests in a foreign country?\n\n In how many countries have you owned property or had other financial interests?\n\no What was the country in which you established a financial interest? o What type of financial interest or property did you own? o For what period of time (approximately) did you have this financial interest or\nproperty?\no From... Year: Month: (1-12) o Until... Year: Month: (1-12)\n\n-\nHave you ever served in the armed forces of another country?\n\no In what country's armed forces did you serve? o What was the period of time that you served (approximately)? o From... Year: Month: (1-12) o Until... Year: Month: (1-12)\no Would you be willing to support an armed conflict against that country? o Why would you be unwilling to support an armed conflict against that\ncountry?\n\n-\nHave you ever given volunteer service or been employed by a foreign government (EXCLUDING military service)?\n\n How many times have you given volunteer service or been employed by a foreign\ngovernment (EXCLUDING military service)?\n\no What was the country that you gave volunteer service to or were employed\nby?\no Was your service or work performed for an intelligence agency of that\ngovernment or its military?\no What type of service or work did you perform? o What was the period of time (approximately)?\no From... Year: Month: (1-12) o Until... Year: Month: (1-12) o Do you still have contact with anyone from that government? o What type of work does this person perform? o When did you meet this person (approximately)? Year: Month: (1-12)\n\n-\nHave you ever had contact with a foreign government INCLUDING embassies, consulates, or representatives (EXCLUDING foreign military service or volunteer service or employment for a foreign government, or obtaining a visa)?\n\n With how many foreign governments have you had contact INCLUDING\nembassies, consulates, or representatives (EXCLUDING foreign military service\nor volunteer service or employment for a foreign government, or obtaining a visa)?\n\no With what country's government did you have contact? o What was the reason for the contact? o For what period of time did you have contact with this government\n(approximately)?\no From... Year: Month: (1-12) o Until... Year: Month: (1-12)\n\n-\nHave you ever received benefits, financial assistance from a citizen of a foreign\ncountry or from a foreign government?\n\n How many times have you received benefits, financial assistance from a citizen of\na foreign country or from a foreign government?\n\n** For the following questions, the person will be asked about the two most recent times.\no From what country did you receive benefits, assistance, etc.? o What type of benefits, assistance, etc., did you receive? o What was the reason that these benefits, assistance, etc., were given to you?\no When did you receive these benefits, assistance, etc. (approximately)? Year:\nMonth: (1-12)\n\n-\nDo you have a financial or other obligation to a citizen of a foreign country?\n\n With how many citizens of foreign countries do you correspond, maintain\nfriendship or have an obligation?\n\no Of what country is this person a citizen? o How long have you known this person? o How did you become acquainted with this person? o Would you be willing to break off contact with this person while you are\nserving in the military?\n\n-\nAre you married to or do you have any intent to marry a citizen of a foreign\ncountry?\n\n Of what country is your spouse or future spouse a citizen?  How did you become acquainted with your spouse or future spouse?  When did you meet your spouse or future spouse (approximately)? Year: Month:\n(1-12)\n\n-\nHave you ever had a close personal relationship with a citizen of a foreign country (EXCLUDING your current spouse or fiance(e))?\n\n With how many citizens of foreign countries have you had a close personal\nrelationship (EXCLUDING your current spouse or fiance(e))?\n\no Of what country is this person a citizen? o How did you become acquainted with this person? o What was the period of time for this relationship (approximately)? o From... Year: Month: (1-12) o Until... Year: Month: (1-12) o Do you still have contact with this person? o Would you be willing to break off contact with this person while you are\nserving in the military?\n\n-\nDo you share living quarters with a citizen of a foreign country?\n\n With how many citizens of foreign countries are you sharing living quarters?\n\no Of what country is this person a citizen? o How did you become acquainted with this person? o When did you meet this person (approximately)? o Year: Month: (1-12)\n\n-\nHave you ever sponsored the entry of an alien into the U.S.?\n\n How many aliens have you sponsored for entry into the U.S.?\n\no Of what country was this person a citizen at the time you sponsored him or\nher for entry into the U.S.?\no How did you become acquainted with this person? o When did you meet this person (approximately)? Year: Month: (1-12) o When did you last have contact with this person (approximately)? Year:\nMonth: (1-12)\no Is this person now a U.S. citizen? o Do you still have contact with this person?\no Would you be willing to break off contact with this person while you are\nserving in the military?\n\n-\nHave you, within the past seven years, had a lien placed on your property for\nfailing to pay taxes or a creditor?\n\n How many times have you had a lien placed upon your property for failing to pay\ntaxes or a creditor?\n\no When did this occur (approximately)? Year: Month: (1-12) o What was the reason that you failed to pay taxes or the creditor? o What was the total amount that you owed which resulted in the lien? o Has the lien been removed?\n\n-\nHave you ever failed to pay your taxes or failed to file your federal or state\nincome tax forms when required to by law?\n\n In what years did you fail to pay your taxes or fail to file your federal or state\nincome tax forms when required by law?\n Why did you fail to pay your taxes or file your tax returns?\n\n-\nHave you ever had any trouble with federal (IRS) or state income tax agencies\nthat resulted in you having to pay additional taxes and/or a penalty?\n\n How many times have you had trouble with federal (IRS) or state income tax\nagencies that resulted in you having to pay additional taxes and/or a penalty?\n\no When did this occur (approximately)? Year: Month: (1-12) o What was the nature of the problem? o What was the total you had to pay in additional taxes, interest, and/or penalty?\n\n## Appendix D U.S. Army, Tape-Epmd Form 169-R, Security Screening Questionnaire\n\n\n-\nWhat is the status of your citizenship?\n\n-\nAre you married or engaged to someone who is not a U.S. citizen?\n\n-\nAre one or more of your close relatives or associates:\n\n Current citizens of a foreign country?  Naturalized citizens?  Former citizens of a foreign country?\n\n-\nIn the last seven years, have you or one or more of your close relatives or\nassociates:\n\n Traveled outside of the U.S.?  Lived outside of the U.S.?  Corresponded with, had a friendship with or had an obligation to someone in a\nforeign country?\n Do you have any foreign business contacts, financial interests or ownership of\nforeign property (including bank accounts)?\n Have you ever been a representative, consultant or employee of a foreign\ngovernment?\n Have you ever had any contact with a foreign government, its embassies or\nconsulates, or its representatives, or any reason other than via inquiries?\n In the last seven years, have you had a passport issued by a foreign government?\n Have you ever dated or had a close personal relationship with a citizen of a\nforeign country?\n Of what country is this person a citizen?\n\no What was the period of the relationship? o Do you still have a close association or strong feelings for this person? o Have you ever received financial assistance, gifts or cash from a citizen,\nfoundation, or a corporation of a foreign country or from the government of a foreign country?\n\n-\nIn the last seven years:\n\n Have you ever had anything repossessed?  Have you been sued by a creditor, had a judgment against you or had money\ninvoluntarily taken directly from your paycheck (garnishment) to repay a debt?\n Have you had any bills turned over to a collection agency?  Have you been refused credit?\n\n Have you filed for bankruptcy?  Have you had a credit card recalled because you were not living up to the\ncontract?\n Have you had any checks returned for insufficient funds?  Have you been evicted from a residence for failure to pay rent?  Have you left a residence owing money for utilities, rent or damages?  Have you been engaged in compulsive or habitual gambling?\n\n-\nIndicate whether any of the following apply to you or to one or more of your close relatives or associates:\n\n Ever been a member of an organization that advocates the use of force or violence\nto overthrow or alter the Constitutional form of Government?\n Ever established a sympathetic association with a spy, traitor, anarchist, terrorist,\nespionage or secret agent or representative of a foreign nation whose interests\nmay be contrary to the interests of the United States or with any person who advocates the use of force or violence to overthrow or alter the Constitutional form of government of the United States?\n Ever knowingly been a member of or established a sympathetic association with a\nmember of an organization or group which unlawfully advocates or practices the commission of acts of force or violence to prevent others from exercising their rights under the Constitution or overthrow or alter the form of government of the\nUnited States?\n Ever contributed money, services or support to an organization or group described\nabove?\nAppendix E\n\nU.S. Army, TAPE-EPMD Form 189-R,\n\n-\nHave you ever been detained, arrested, cited, convicted or accused by law\nenforcement officials for any of the following offenses, or have you ever committed any of the following offenses without being caught for which you may be arrested at some future time if the offense becomes known:\n\n Moving/nonmoving (traffic) violations?  Operating an improperly licensed/registered/inspected or unsafe vehicle or driving\nwithout a license?\n Driving while intoxicated (DWI), driving under the influence (DUI), open\ncontainer violation or any alcohol/drug related violation involving a vehicle?\n Minor property offenses such as: vandalism, trespassing, malicious mischief,\npoaching, shoplifting, bad checks?\n Major property offenses, such as: grand theft, arson, breaking and entering?\n Income tax evasion?  False report to police?  Conspiracy to commit a crime?  Disorderly conduct, such as: public intoxication, drunk and disorderly, disturbing\nthe peace?\n Illegal or violent demonstrations?  Minor sex-related offenses, such as: indecent exposure, lewd behavior, sex acts in\npublic, voyeurism or \"window peeping?\"\n Prostitution, soliciting for a prostitute or paying a prostitute?\n Other major sex- related offenses, such as: rape, statutory rape, child molestation?  Fighting, assault, battery, child/spouse abuse or any other offense involving\nphysical violence?\n Attempted homicide?  Homicide?  Any felony or misdemeanor not described above?\n\n-\nHave you ever had anything repossessed?\n-\nHave you been sued by a creditor, had a judgment against you or had money involuntarily taken directly from your paycheck (garnishment) to repay a debt?\n-\nHave you had any bills turned over to a collection agency?\n-\nHave you been refused credit?\n-\nDo you have any outstanding debts or bills that are late?\n-\nHave you filed for bankruptcy?\n-\nWithin the last three years, have you had any checks returned for insufficient funds?\n-\nHave you been evicted from a residence for failure to pay rent or mortgage?\n-\nHave you engaged in compulsive or habitual gambling?\n-\nList all of your current financial obligations (include car payment, student loans and unpaid checks)"
    },
    {
        "text": "U.S. DEPARTMENT of STATE\n\n# Gec Special Report: Pillars Of Russia's Disinformation And Propaganda Ecosystem August 2020\n\n## Table Of Contents\n\nIntroduction     ........    3 Background      ........   5 The Report        ........   7\nPillars of Russia's Disinformation and Propaganda Ecosystem        ........    8 Pillars of Russia's Disinformation and Propaganda Ecosystem Endnotes       ........    9 Media Multiplier Effect: How Russia's Disinformation and Propaganda Spreads       ........    10\nPreface for the Proxy Site Profiles         ........    11\nHighlights from the Proxy Site Profiles         ........    12 Proxy Site Profiles        ........    14\nThe Strategic Culture Foundation        ........    14 New Eastern Outlook        ........    20 Global Research        ........    25 News Front        ........    31 SouthFront        ........    37 Geopolitica.ru        ........    50 Katehon        ........    55\nDigital Media Analysis         ........    61 Twitter Analysis        ........   65\nReferences        ........    70\n\n## Introduction Understanding Russia's Disinformation And Propaganda Ecosystem\n\nAs the U.S. Government's dedicated center for countering foreign disinformation and propaganda, the Global Engagement Center (GEC) at the U.S. Department of State has a mandate to expose and counter threats from malign actors that utilize these tactics. In this field, Russia continues to be a leading threat. The Department works with interagency and global partners to meet this challenge, with the GEC playing a key role in coordinating efforts and helping lead a global response.\n\nA central part of this effort is exposing Russia's tactics so that partner and allied governments, civil society organizations, academia, the press, and the international public can conduct further analysis of their own and thereby increase collective resilience to disinformation and propaganda. In line with that goal, this report draws on publicly available reporting to provide an overview of Russia's disinformation and propaganda ecosystem. Russia's disinformation and propaganda ecosystem is the collection of official, proxy, and unattributed communication channels and platforms that Russia uses to create and amplify false narratives. The ecosystem consists of five main pillars: official government communications, state-funded global messaging, cultivation of proxy sources, weaponization of social media, and cyber-enabled disinformation. The Kremlin bears direct responsibility for cultivating these tactics and platforms as part of its approach to using information as a weapon.  It invests massively in its\n\"Russia's disinformation and propaganda ecosystem is the collection of official, proxy, and unattributed communication channels and platforms that Russia uses to create and amplify false narratives.\"\npropaganda channels, its intelligence services and its proxies to conduct malicious cyber activity to support their disinformation efforts, and it leverages outlets that masquerade as news sites or research institutions to spread these false and misleading narratives. This report also focuses specific attention on Russia's tactic of leveraging proxy voices that proliferate pro-Kremlin disinformation and propaganda. It includes profiles on a cross section of outlets playing this role within the broader ecosystem, and it explains how they serve as critical connective tissue to the other pillars within the broader ecosystem.\n\nThe GEC has developed the \"ecosystem\" concept and has broken the ecosystem down into five pillars as a way to contextualize the threat posed by Russia in this field. A common understanding is a necessary prerequisite to developing analytical tools to monitor the various threat vectors and crafting the policies and procedures that allow for countermeasures. While this effort continues, the issuance of this report aims to heighten awareness of the threat posed by disinformation and further the international dialogue among the nations, organizations, and individuals who are committed to countering these malign efforts. The disinformation and propaganda ecosystem that Russia continues to cultivate does not stand unopposed. A thriving counter-disinformation community comprised of governments, civil society, academia, the press, the private sector, and citizens around the world who refuse to tolerate these tactics is pushing back. This report is offered by the U.S. Department of State as a contribution to these joint efforts.\n\n## Background\n\nIn any analysis of Russia's disinformation and outlets, proxy websites, bots, false social media propaganda tactics, it is important to note there are personas, cyber-enabled disinformation operations, multiple terms and concepts that have been used etc.and the different tactics that these channels to describe the nature of this threat. \"Information use.\n\nConfrontation\" is the term used in Russian\n\nstrategic and military circles to describe their Russia's willingness to employ this approach approach to the use of information in both provides it with three perceived advantages. First, it peacetime and conflict. There is also a rich allows for the introduction of numerous variations public record of the use of \"Active Measures\" to of the same false narratives. This allows for the describe long-standing Russian political warfare different pillars of the ecosystem to fine tune their methods that utilize disinformation and propaganda disinformation narratives to suit different target as a core tool. These concepts speak to Russia's audiences because there is no need for consistency, strategic formulation that it is in a state of perpetual as there would be with attributed government conflict with its perceived adversaries.\ncommunications. Second, it provides plausible\n\ndeniability for Kremlin officials when proxy sites Russia's current disinformation and propaganda peddle blatant and dangerous disinformation, operations are an integrated tactical manifestation allowing them to deflect criticism while still of this strategic view. Analyzing this approach in introducing pernicious information. Third, it creates a manner that increases resiliency begins with a a media multiplier effect among the different recognition that there is no single media platform pillars of the ecosystem that boost their reach and where propaganda and disinformation are resonance.\ndistributed. Nor is there uniformity of messages\n\namong different sources.\n\nThe media multiplier effect can, at times, create\n\ndisinformation storms with potentially dangerous Rather, Russia has operationalized the concept effects for those Russia perceives as adversaries of perpetual adversarial competition in the at the international, national, and local level. In the information environment by encouraging the past, Russia has leveraged this dynamic to shield development of a disinformation and propaganda itself from criticism for its involvement in malign ecosystem that allows for varied and overlapping activity. This approach also allows Russia to be approaches that reinforce each other even when opportunistic, such as with COVID-19, where it individual messages within the system appear has used the global pandemic as a hook to push contradictory. This ecosystem reflects both the longstanding disinformation and propaganda sources of disinformation and propagandaofficial narratives.\n\ngovernment statements, state-funded media\n\nThis ecosystem approach is also well-suited to reinforce Russia's general aims of questioning the value of democratic institutions, and of weakening the international credibility and international cohesion of the United States and its allies and partners. Because some pillars of this ecosystem generate their own momentum, as opposed to waiting for specific orders from the Kremlin on every occasion, they can be responsive to distinct policy goals or developing situations, and then pivot back to their status quo of generally pouring scorn on Russia's perceived adversaries. The perpetual conflict that Russia sees in the information environment also means that officials and state media may take one side of an issue, while outlets with a measure of independence will adopt their own variations on similar overarching false narratives. The ecosystem approach is fitting for this dynamic because it does not require harmonization among the different pillars. By simultaneously furthering multiple versions of a given story, these actors muddy the waters of the information environment in order to confuse those trying to discern the truth.\n\n## The Report\n\nThis report provides a visual representation of the ecosystem described above, as well as an example of the media multiplier effect it enables. This serves to demonstrate how the different pillars of the ecosystem play distinct roles and feed off of and bolster each other. The report also includes brief profiles of select proxy sites and organizations that occupy an intermediate role between the pillars of the ecosystem with clear links to Russia and those that are meant to be fully deniable. The emphasis on these proxy sites is meant to highlight the important role they play, which can be overlooked given the attention paid to official Russian voices on one end of the spectrum, and the social media manipulation and cyber-enabled threats on the other.\n\nDisclaimer: The GEC cannot vouch for the security of the sites cited within this report.\n\n## Preface For The Proxy Site Profiles\n\nThe following profiles focus on some of the proxy outlets and institutions that proliferate Russia's disinformation and propaganda narratives. As the report notes, some of the individuals and institutions behind these sites benefit greatly from an association with the Kremlin.  Others strive to maintain a veneer of separation from Russia, but as our research and analysis show, they serve no other purpose but to push pro-Kremlin content. The GEC's goal in detailing the nature of these outlets is twofold: to promote a more complete understanding of how these outlets operate as an informal network; and to demonstrate how content produced and amplified by these sites enables the proliferation of disinformation and propaganda across other pillars of the ecosystem.\n\nThis collection of profiles is not meant to be exhaustive, nor does it reflect any sort of prioritization or ranking. Rather, it is a select cross section drawn from a multitude of similar operations and is meant to provide a broad representation of the type of outlets that Russia has cultivated to play an important role in its larger disinformation and propaganda ecosystem. They cover various geographies and have their own target audiences, though there is considerable overlap between some of them largely due to their online presence. While sharing similar practices, they have each developed their own styles. In a few cases, these outlets have published or republished articles authored by false personas attributed by Facebook to Russian military intelligence.\n\n## Highlights From The Proxy Site Profiles The Strategic Culture Foundation Global Research\n\nThe *Strategic Culture Foundation* is an online journal Global Research is a Canadian website that has registered in Russia that is directed by Russia's become deeply enmeshed in Russia's broader Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR) and closely disinformation and propaganda ecosystem. Its large affiliated with the Russian Ministry of Foreign roster of fringe authors and conspiracy theorists Affairs.\n\n1 One of its core tactics is to publish Western serves as a talent pool for Russian and Chinese fringe thinkers and conspiracy theorists, giving websites. Its publications also provide a Western them a broader platform, while trying to obscure voice that other elements of the ecosystem can the Russian origins of the journal. This tactic helps leverage to their advantage.\n\nthe site appear to be an organic voice within its target audience of Westerners.\n\n## News Front New Eastern Outlook\n\nNew Eastern Outlook is a pseudo-academic News Front is a Crimea-based disinformation and publication of the Russian Academy of Science's propaganda outlet with the self-proclaimed goal of Institute of Oriental Studies that promotes providing an \"alternative source of information\"\ndisinformation and propaganda focused for Western audiences. With reported ties to the primarily on the Middle East, Asia, and Africa.\n\nRussian security services and Kremlin funding, It combines pro-Kremlin views of Russian it is particularly focused on supporting Russiaacademics with anti-U.S. views of Western backed forces in Ukraine. *News Front*'s manipulative fringe voices and conspiracy theorists. New Eastern tactics to boost reach led to a near total dismantling Outlook appears to want to benefit from the veneer of its presence on social media in early 2020.\n\nof respectability offered by the Russian academics it features, while also obscuring its links to statefunded institutions.\n\n## Highlights From The Proxy Site Profiles Southfront Katehon\n\nSouthFront: Analysis and Intelligence\nKatehon is a Moscow-based quasi-think-tank\n(a.k.a. *SouthFront*), is a multilingual online that is a proliferator of virulent anti-Western disinformation site registered in Russia that disinformation and propaganda via its website, focuses on military and security issues. With which is active in five languages. It is led by flashy infographics, maps, and videos, *SouthFront*\nindividuals with clear links to the Russian state combines Kremlin talking points with detailed and the Russian intelligence services. Within knowledge of military systems and ongoing Russia's broader disinformation and propaganda conflicts. It attempts to appeal to military ecosystem, *Katehon* plays the role of providing enthusiasts, veterans, and conspiracy theorists, all supposedly independent, analytical material while going to great lengths to hide its connections aimed largely at European audiences, with content to Russia.\n\nallegedly dedicated to \"the creation and defense of a secure, democratic and just international system\".\n\n## Geopolitica.Ru\n\nGeopolitica.ru serves as a platform for Russian ultra-nationalists to spread disinformation and propaganda targeting Western and other audiences. Inspired by the Eurasianist ideology of the Russian philosopher and Eurasian imperialist Alexander Dugin, *Geopolitica.ru* views itself as caught in a perpetual information war against the Western ideals of democracy and liberalism. The website's cooperation with other outlets in Russia's disinformation and propaganda ecosystem broadens the reach of its messaging, which seeks to destabilize and weaken Western institutions.\n\n## Proxy Site Profiles The Strategic Culture Foundation\n\n An article on Strategic Culture Foundation's website promoting Russia's version of history.\n\n## Summary\n\nThe *Strategic Culture Foundation* is an online journal registered in Russia, directed by Russia's Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR), and closely affiliated with the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The outlet plays a central role among a group of linked websites that proliferate Russian disinformation and propaganda.\n\n2\nOne of its core tactics is to attract authors who are Western fringe thinkers and conspiracy theorists, giving them a broader platform and obscuring the Russian origins of the journal. This tactic helps the site appear to be an organic voice within its target audience of Westerners.\n\n## Introduction\n\nThe *Strategic Culture Foundation* (SCF) online journal is a prime example of long-standing Russian tactics to conceal direct state involvement in disinformation and propaganda outlets, and to cultivate local voices to serve as surrogate messengers. SCF finds obscure Western fringe thinkers and conspiracy theorists and gives their typically virulent anti-Western and anti-U.S. views a broad international platform. It does this while giving the misleading impression SCF is independent and unaffiliated with the Russian government. This approach has several advantages for Russia:\n\n-\nit gives increased circulation to what would otherwise be fringe voices that suit Russian propaganda goals;\n-\nRussia deflects responsibility by obscuring its sponsorship of the site; and\n-\nthe individuals and conspiracy theorists they publish communicate in local idioms and understand their home audiences well.\n\n## The *Strategic Culture Foundation* And The Russian State\n\nSCF was founded in 2005.\n\n3 Originally it only published its journal in Russian. In September 2010, the online journal began to also appear in English.\n\n4  This marked SCF's debut as an instrument for disinformation and propaganda on the international stage.\n\nWhile SCF's online journal makes every effort to appear independent, it is directed by Russia's Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR) and closely affiliated with the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs.\n\n5 There is no mention of this affiliation on SCF's English-language website, nor of any link to Russiaincluding the fact that SCF publishes in Russian.\n\n6 However, International Affairs, the flagship journal of the Russian Ministry of\n7\nForeign Affairs since 1922,  states on its website that SCF is its partner. SCF's president is Yuri Prokofiev, who was Moscow Party Chief from 1989 to 1991 and a Soviet Politburo Member.\n\n8 Prokofiev is also one of the founders of the \"Russian Organization for Assistance to Special Services and Law Enforcement Authorities\" (ROSSPO).\n\n9 According to its website, ROSSPO works closely with Russian security services to support the policies of the Russian state, facilitate cooperation between state institutions and civil society, and ensure the social protection of the employees of intelligence services and law enforcement authorities.\n\n10\n\nSCF's Director General is Vladimir Maximenko, who is also the director of the no-longer active Russian Unity Foundation, which was focused on promoting a \"positive image of Russia and Russian culture abroad,\" especially among the so-called Russian compatriots.\n\n11\n\n## Western Authors On Scf's Website\n\nWhile SCF made some efforts to attract Western authors when it launched its English-language website in 2010, its writers for years were mostly Russians. This is demonstrated by the preponderance of Russianauthored articles posted on the 2 May 2015 SCF homepage.\n\n12 Some examples include:\n\n -\nYuri Rubtsov (two articles)\n-\nPyotr Iskenderov\n-\nDmitry Minin\n-\nNil Nikandrov\n-\nNikolai Bobkin\n-\nAlexander Donetsky (two articles)\n-\nNatalia Meden\n-\nValentin Katasonov\n\nBy comparison, on that same day only three non-Russian authors, including Finian Cunningham and Pepe Escobar, had articles published on SCF homepage. Five years later, the English version of SCF's online journal has undergone a transformation. On the current SCF homepage, the Russian authors have disappearedreplaced by Westerners, although Cunningham and Escobar still remain.\n\n13 Finian Cunningham, who is originally from Belfast and has a background in agricultural chemistry, is the second-most prolific author for SCF, publishing more than 550 articles since 2012.\n\n14  In one SCF\narticle, he refers to the United States as a \"lawless rogue state.\"\n15 His other SCF articles include:\n\n\n16\n-\n Give North Korea some respect\n17\n-\n Putin Stands Out as a Real World Leader\n-\n Washington Choreographing All-Out War with Russia?\n18\n19\n-\n The Year US-led Capitalism Became Exposed as Root of Global Conflict.\n Cunningham's work also appears frequently on major Russian state-media outlets RT (237 results), Sputnik (330 results), and *RIA Novosti* (30 results).\n\n20 [Article counts compiled on 9 June 2020.] Retired Russian Colonel Andrei Akulov is the third most-published author on SCF's Englishlanguage website; however, his most recent article is from 2018. Similarly, longtime SCF Russian authors like Dmitry Minin, Valentin Katasonov, Pyotr Iskenderov, and Alexander Mezyaev are still published on the Russian-language website, but they stopped appearing on the English-language website in 2017 or 2018.\n\nSome of the current Western authors on SCF's English site are:\n\n-\nBrian Cloughley, a former Australian defense attache in Pakistan who has authored 243 articles.\n21\nTwo of his most recent are: \"The Facts About Crimea Should Be Recognised. And So Should Crimea\" and\n22\n\"Washington Wants an Arctic Circle of Confrontation.\" -\nMatthew Ehret, one of the newest Western SCF authors, has written 94 articles since April 2019.\n23\nHe is the founder of the *Canadian Patriot Review* and the Director of the Rising Tide Foundation.\n24\nBesides being an author for SCF, he also writes for other disinformation sites in Russia's ecosystem, including *Oriental Review* and *Geopolitica.ru*.\n25  Ehret and the *Canadian Patriot Review* are also ardent\nadvocates of China's Belt and Road Initiative, which they see as a \"force for global progress, poverty\n26\neradication, and peace.\"\n-\nCynthia Chung, President of the Rising Tide Foundation, is another new SCF author, writing 15 articles since October 2019. One of her recent articles is \"A 70-Year War on 'Propaganda'\nBuilt by the CIA.\"\n27\n\n## Russian Authors Removed From English-Language Site\n\nSCF has tried to make its English-language site seem entirely disconnected from Russia. As noted above, when it launched its current format in 2010, it combined the writings of Russian academics with Westerners, most of whom were those with fringe views or were conspiracy theorists. The inclusion of Russian academics was likely aimed at giving the online journal the appearance of academic respectability, although most of the Russian academics also took strong anti-Western positions.\n\nFor example, a frequent author through 2018, Moscow State Institute of International Finance professor Valentin Katasonov, wrote an article entitled, \"Anglo-American Money Owners Organized World War II.\"\n28 He argued:\n\n\nThe war was not unleashed by frenzied Fuhrer who happened to be ruling Germany at the time. WWII is a project created by world oligarchy or Anglo-American \"money owners\". Using such instruments as the US Federal Reserve System and the Bank of England they started to prepare for the next world conflict of global scale right after WWI. The USSR was the target.\n\nAnother prolific author through 2017 was Pyotr Iskenderov, senior researcher for the Institute for Slavic Studies at the Russian Academy of Sciences.\n\n29 Some of his articles included:\n\n-\n Modern Nazism as the Driving Force of Euro-Atlantic Integration\n30\n-\n The Czech Republic: Doomed without Russia\n31\n32\n-\n Estonia: Doomed Without Russia\n-\n Russia has enough gas for everyone\n33\n-\n Brussels and Kiev: a duo of blackmailers\n34\nIskenderov and Katasonov continue to write for the Russian-language version of SCF website, although they disappeared from the English-language version in 2017 and 2018, respectively.\n\n## Building A Disinformation Network\n\nIn 2010 and 2011, SCF formed explicit partnerships with *Global Research*, a Canadian website  detailed in a separate paper in this report, and  *The 4th Media*, an obscure, newly formed Chinese website in English that  described itself as  \"an independent media organization based in Beijing.\"\n35 Fringe voices and conspiracy theorists that had previously appeared on *Global Research* soon began to be published by SCF and *The 4th Media*, broadening the reach of their anti-Western views.\n\n## Cross-Fertilization Within The Network\n\n-\nGlobal Research has served as a source of \"talent\" for SCF, *The 4th Media*, and *The 21st Century*. In the first ten years of its operation between 2001 and 2011, *Global Research* developed a large pool of authors from which other websites could draw. The three currently operational websitesSCF, Global\nResearch, and The *21st Century* (a successor website to *The 4th Media*) appear to have formed a subnetwork within the broader array of disinformation and propaganda sites, although their connections have now been obscured.\n-\n SCF: from September 2010 through 8 March 2018, *Global Research* and *The 4th Media* were listed as its partners or at the bottom of its homepage. On 14 March 2018, no websites were listed. -\n *Global Research*: From 22 September 2012 through 17 February 2018, its \"Partner Websites\" included SCF and *The 4th Media*. On 18 February 2018, *The 21st Century* replaced *The 4th Media* on the Global\nResearch website as its only opinion website \"partner.\" -\n *The 4th Media*: From 5 August 2011 through 4 March 2019, *Global Research* and SCF were always among the preferred websites listed on its website. Now, *The 21st Century* has no links to other websites.\nThe reason for this apparently collaborative move to obscure the mutual ties within the network is unclear, but public reporting may have played a role. For further discussion on this topic, see the Global Research profile in this report.\n\n## Strategic Culture Foundation's Social Media Platforms As Of June 2020\n\nPlatform\nLanguage\nEngagement\nEnglish\n28,182 followers\nFacebook\nRussian\n13,187 followers\nEnglish\ndormant since 2019; active once on 8 May 2020\nTwitter\nRussian\n218 followers; dormant since 2019\nYouTube English\n491 subscribers\nVKontakte\nRussian\n2,590 followers\n\n## Proxy Site Profiles New Eastern Outlook Summary\n\nNew Eastern Outlook is a pseudo-academic publication of the Russian Academy of Science's Institute of Oriental Studies that promotes disinformation and propaganda focused primarily on the Middle East, Asia, and Africa. It combines pro-Kremlin views of Russian academics with anti- U.S. views of Western fringe voices and conspiracy theorists. *New Eastern Outlook*'s Englishlanguage website does not clearly state that it is a product of the Institute. The site appears to want to benefit from the veneer of respectability offered by the Russian academics it features, while also obscuring its links to state-funded institutions.\n\n## Introduction\n\nThe online journal *New Eastern Outlook* (NEO) first appeared in 2013. Its association with the Russian Academy of Science's Institute of Oriental Studies is not mentioned in NEO's About Us page.\n\n36 The logo of the Institute of Oriental Studies with Cyrillic letters (at left) does appear at the bottom of the NEO homepage. It is hyper-linked to the Russian language website of the Institute without any explanation of the connection between the two, even in Russian. The image and link to the website is the only sign of a connection between the organizations visible to visitors of the NEO English language site. Confirmation of the links between them can be found on\n37\nthe Institute's website, where NEO is listed as one of its periodical publications.\n\n## Neo's Partners\n\nNEO lists four \"partners\" on its homepage.\n\n38 None are academic institutions or academics--all  are  Western\nconspiracy theorists, fringe groups, or fringe thinkers. One NEO partner has a long history of endorsing bizarre anti-Semitic conspiracy theories while another has written glowingly about North Korea.\n\n## Neo's Western Authors\n\nThe Western authors published by NEO write highly anti-U.S. anti-Western articles. One such author, Canadian Christopher Black, has written 118 articles for NEO starting in November 2014.\n\n39 In February\n2020, he described a U.S. military exercise with NATO allies as a prelude to an attack on Russia, writing:\n\nI have written several times about the continuing NATO preparations for an attack on Russia, a second Operation Barbarossa, the code name for the Nazi invasion of the USSR in 1941. Circumstances prompt me to write about it again, for as of the last week in January the Americans and their gang of lieutenant nations in NATO have commenced the biggest military exercises in 25 years to take place in Europe. The code name for this operation is Defender-Europe 20 but we can interpret that as Attack-Russia 20; in effect a preparation for an attack on Russia comparable to the Nazi invasion in 1941.\nOther NEO articles by Black Include:\n\n-\nCuban Resistance: An Example for the World\n40;\n-\nParis and Volnovakha: The Brutal Face of Nato Terrorism\n41;\n-\nAmerica Aggression: A Threat To The World\n42;\n-\nThe Skripal Incident-Another Anti-Russian Provocation\n43;\n  and\n44\n-\nWar Against Venezuela Is War Against Us All.\nAnother author, Peter Koenig, is a Swiss contributor who has written 52 articles for NEO in the last two years.\n\n45 On his website, he says that he \"writes regularly for *Global Research*; ICH [Information Clearing House]; *RT; Sputnik; PressTV; The 21st Century; TeleSUR; The Saker Blog*, NEO; and other internet sites.\"\n\nIn a 28 February NEO article, Koenig advanced conspiracy theories about COVID-19:\n\nWith high probability the virus was man-made in one or several bio-warfare laboratories of which the Pentagon and CIA have about 400 around the world .... But such high-security bio-labs also exist in Canada, the UK, Israel, and Japan. Western media also are silent about the fact that the virus is directed specifically at the Chinese race, meaning, it targets specifically Chinese DNA.\n\nAlmost all the deaths or infected people in the 33 countries and territories to which the virus spread, are of Chinese origin. ... this is in whatever way you want to turn it, a bio-war against China.\n\n46\n\nAustralian NEO contributor James O'Neill has written 123 articles since 2015.\n\n47 Five of his first 15\narticles were on the topic of the downing of Malaysian Airlines Flight 17 in 2014. In these articles, O'Neill consistently gives credence to Russian denials of involvement while finding fault with the Dutch-led investigation.\n\nO'Neill also writes for the *American Herald Tribune*, a website that Facebook and Google officials have said is linked to Iranian state media, according to a CNN article.\n\n48 It disingenuously describes itself as\n\"genuinely independent online media outlet.\" *American Herald Tribune* also lists as authors Peter Koenig and other contributors at NEO, as well as and several contributors from the Russian-state-linked Strategic\n49\nCulture Foundation (SCF), including Finian Cunningham, Frederico Pieraccini, and Pepe Escobar.\n\nAnother frequent NEO author was until recently a member of the tiny, hardline communist Workers World Party (WWP). The WWP was \"created by the KGB,\" according to Lieutenant General Ion Mihai Pacepa, the former acting head of Romania's foreign intelligence service in the 1970s.\n\n50 Pacepa, who defected to the United States in 1978, writes:\nThe WWP was created by the Soviet KGB in 1957, with the initial task of helping the Kremlin create a The WWP was created by the Soviet KGB in 1957, with the initial task of helping the Kremlin create a favorable impression of the 1956 Soviet invasion of Hungary among the trade unions and \"colored\" population of the United States. It was run by a Soviet-style secretariat whose members were secretly indoctrinated and trained by the KGB, which also financed its day-to-day operation.\n\n51\n\n52\nThe WWP now supports the regimes in China, North Korea, Cuba, and Russia.\n\n## Reprints Of Neo Articles\n\nIn addition to the *American Herald Tribune*, NEO articles and authors appear in other publications, including:\n\n-\nQoshe, an online publication that says it seeks to provide \"diverse points of view and opinions\" from dozens of worldwide publications.\n53 Many are respectable publications but *RT, Sputnik, TASS, PressTV*,\n54\nand *China Daily* are also included, along with NEO authors such as Viktor Mikhin. -\nVijayvaani.com, an Indian English-language website that describes itself as \"[t]he complete opinions forum.\"\n55 It includes articles by:\n\n-\nJames O'Neill, an author at NEO since 2015, debuting on Vijayvaani.com on 18 May 2020 with the article, \"Devastating Revelations About the Truth Behind the Destruction of MH17,\" reprinted from NEO.\n56\n-\n Viktor Mikhin, including his February 28 2020 NEO article \"US Wages Biological Warfare against\n57\nChina.\"\n58\n-\n Pepe Escobar, who writes for SCF.\n-\nIsrael Shamir, \"a Swedish writer and journalist, known for promoting antisemitism and Holocaust\ndenial.\"\n59\n-\nNew Age, which describes itself as \"The Outspoken Daily\", is published in Bangladesh. It has published NEO articles by Yuriy Zinin, Vladimir Terehov, Viktor Mikhin, and others.\n60\n\n-\nThe Fringe News, which bills itself as \"Alternative News Gone Mainstream,\" republishes many NEO\narticles.\n61 The site contains no information about who runs it. The \"About Us\" section is completely\n62\nblank. There is also no contact information.\n\n63\n-\nCounterCurrents.org, a website in India founded in 2002. -\nOffGuardian, which reprints many articles from NEO authors, including 49 by Christopher Black or mentioning him, and James O'Neill.\n64 The publication takes its name from the fact that \"its founders had\nall been censored on and/or banned from the Guardian's 'Comment is Free' sections.\" -\nVeterans Today, whose managing editor said NEO has been a \"wonderful partner\" and described their\n65\ncooperation as \"a marriage made in heaven.\"\n\n\n## New Eastern Outlook's Social Media Platforms As Of June 2020\n\nThe BBC reported in July 2019 that NEO's \"Facebook and Twitter accounts have been suspended.\"\n66 NEO's other social media platforms are as follows:\n\nPlatform\nLanguage\nEngagement\nFacebook\nEnglish\n19,432 likes, account suspended.\nYouTube\nEnglish\n3,150 subscribers; 390,457 total views\nGAB English\n45 followers\nPinterest\nEnglish\n31 followers\nVKontakte\nEnglish\n575 followers\n\n## Proxy Site Profiles Global Research\n\nGlobal Research article falsely blaming the United States for creating COVID-19.\n\n## Summary\n\nGlobal Research is a home-grown Canadian website that has become deeply enmeshed in Russia's broader disinformation and propaganda ecosystem. Its large roster of fringe authors and conspiracy theorists serves as a talent pool for the Russian and Chinese websites with which *Global Research* has partnered since the early 2010s. Its publications also provide a Western voice that other elements of the ecosystem can leverage to their advantage.\n\n## Introduction\n\nGlobal Research is the name of the website of the Centre for Research on Globalization in Canada.\n\n67 It launched in August 2001 and has been a steady source of anti-U.S. and anti-Western disinformation and propaganda ever since. *The Economis*t referred to it as \"a hub for conspiracy theories and fake stories.\"\n68 Internet watchdog NewsGuard noted, \"[t]his website severely violates basic standards of credibility and transparency.\"\n69\n\nA 2006 article in the Western Standard titled \"Canada's Nuttiest Professors\" highlighted *Global Research*'s head Michel Chossudovsky:\n\nChossudovsky has manufactured a long list of eyebrow-raising accusations that often read more like wild-eyed conspiracy theories than serious political discourse: the U.S. had foreknowledge of the 9/11 attacks ...; \"Washington's New World Order weapons have the ability to trigger climate change\"; the U.S. knew in advance about the December 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami, but kept it to themselves (apparently so they could ride to the rescue of devastated coastal regions); big banking orchestrates the collapse of national economies.\n\nAs an example of *Global Research*'s work, its 9/11 Reader, edited by Chossudovsky, relies heavily on 9/11 \"truther\" claims, including those of French conspiracy theorist Thierry Meyssan.\n\nLiberation called Meyssan's 2002 book 9/11: The Big Lie \"a tissue of wild and irresponsible allegations,\n72\nentirely without foundation.\"\n\nAlthough the content featured on the site is fringe, *Global Research* has substantial reach. A 2017 article in Canada's *The Globe and Mail* noted:\n\nThe site has posted more than 40,000 of its own pieces since it was launched in 2001, according to one long-time contributor. But it does more: It picks up reports from other, often obscure websites, thus giving them a *Global Research* link. Those reports often get cross-posted on a series of other sites or aggressively spread across Facebook and Twitter by followers who actively share or retweet them, including a number of social botnets, or bots - automated accounts programmed to spread certain globalresearch.ca content.\n\n73\n\n## Michel Chossudovsky\n\nGlobal Research founder and head Michel Chossudovsky is a retired professor who runs the website from his \"upscale condo in Old Montreal.\"\n74  Chossudovsky has backed and embraced anti-Western world leaders.\n\nIn 2004, he volunteered to serve as a witness for former Yugoslav president Slobodan Milosevic at his trial for war crimes including genocide and crimes against humanity. team extended warm birthday greetings to \"Comandante Fidel\" Castro of Cuba, saying, \"You are the source of tremendous inspiration.\" After Chossudovsky met Castro in 2010, he said:\n\nI discovered a man of tremendous integrity, with an acute mind and sense of humor, committed in the minute detail of his speech to social progress and the advancement of humankind .... On a daily basis, Fidel spends several hours reading a large number of detailed international press reports (As he mentioned to me with a smile, \"I frequently consult articles from the *Global Research*\n76\nwebsite\" ...)\n70\n71 The French newspaper\n75 In 2011, he and the *Global Research*\nChossudovsky used to be a regular contributor to the Russian state-funded outlet RT, and Global Research often republishes RT's content.\n\n\n## Collaboration With Strategic Culture Foundation, The 4Th Media, And Southfront\n\nGlobal Research is deeply entwined with other outlets in Russia's disinformation and propaganda ecosystem. As described in the included profile on the *Strategic Culture Foundation* (SCF), *Global Research* has been a partner of SCF since 2011, and with the Chinese website *The 4th Media*, and its successor The 21st Century since 2012. In 2012, not long after *The 4th Media* had been formed, Chossudovsky was named\n77\nas a member of its international advisory board, becoming its chair in 2015. Global Research has served as an author talent pool for SCF, *The 4th Media*, and *The 21st Century*. In its first ten years of operation from 2001 to 2011, *Global Research* built a large cadre of authors. Some authors who started off writing for *Global Research* later moved to partner sites. For example, Finian Cunningham wrote 187 articles for *Global Research* from 6 January 2010 to 26 September 2012, close to six articles per month, when he suddenly stopped.\n\n78 Six weeks later, his first article for SCF was published, and he resumed this pace of production writing more than 550 articles through May 2020.\n\n79 Similarly, Pepe\n80\nEscobar began writing articles for *Global Research* in 2005 and ten years later became an SCF author. In addition, *Global Research* also republishes stories from its partner sites. For example, Federico Pieraccini became an SCF author on 23 July 2016.\n\n81 On the same day, his initial SCF article was republished by *Global Research*.\n\n82 About 100 of his SCF articles have since been republished by Global Research.\n\n83 In 2016 and 2017, these articles were identified as originating on SCF.\n\n84 Beginning in January 2018, however, his *Global Research* articles were no longer identified as being republished from SCF.\n\n85\n\nPieraccini's SCF articles have also appeared on other proxy websites  examined in this report, including *SouthFront* and *Geopolitica.ru*, as well in the Russian state-funded outlet *Sputnik*.\n\n86 He has also\n87\nwritten for *Global Times*, which is associated with the Chinese Communist Party's *People's Daily* newspaper. Global Research frequently publishes articles from other websites in Russia's disinformation and propaganda ecosystem as well. It has published more than 1,200 articles from *SouthFront*, beginning in April 2015 when *SouthFront* was officially formed. In May 2015, *SouthFront* began to list *Global Research* as one of\n88\nits partners.\n\n## Linkages Among Websites Obscured In 2018\n\nAs described in the SCF profile, after 17 February 2018, *Global Research* no longer listed SCF as a partner on its website. At exactly the same time, *The 21st Century*, which revealed no information about its origins, became *Global Research*'s partner, replacing *The 4th Media*, an anti-western blog with alleged links to China.\n\nAs discussed in the SCF profile, *The 21st Century* is a continuation of *The 4th Media*.\n\nThis may have been a collaborative effort  by members of the network to obscure their mutual ties. From September 2010 through 8 March 2018, SCF listed *Global Research* and *The 4th Media* as partners or featured them prominently at the bottom of its homepage.\n\n89 On 14 March 2018, no websites were listed.\n\n90\n\nSimilarly, on 5 August 2011 and on 4 March 2019, *The 4th Media* listed *Global Research* and SCF as preferred websites on its homepage. However, *The 21st Century,* successor to *The 4th Media*, did not link to other websites. Nevertheless, *Global Research* continued to list *The 21st Century* as a partner, indicating they maintained ties. Similarly, as discussed above, in January 2018 *Global Research* began to omit the fact that its articles by Federico Pieraccini originated from SCF, although they had acknowledged this before.\n\nAs noted in the profile of SCF, the reason for the apparently collaborative move to obscure the mutual ties within the network is unclear. However, two media articles looking into the links among the websites in November 2017 may have played a role.\n\n\nIn November 2017, Canada's *The Globe and Mail* asked *Global Research* head Michel Chossudovsky about its ties with Russia and Syria. They reported:\n\n\nMr. Chossudovsky didn't want to discuss that. He ... declined to speak about how globalresearch.ca\n91\nfunctions and whether it is aligned with Moscow or any other government.\n\nAfter the newspaper questioned Chossudovsky further:\n\n\nMr. Chossudovsky responded through a lawyer, Daniel Levesque. In a letter, Mr. Levesque said the Centre for Research on Globalization denies that it is part of a network of pro-Russia or pro-Assad\nsites or that it is \"affiliated with governmental organizations or benefits from their support.\"\n\nJust eight days after *The Globe and Mail* article was published, the Atlantic Council's Digital Forensic Research Lab (DFRLab) ran an article on *The 4th Media*, noting its ties with SCF and *Global Research*. It stated:\n\n[The] 4th Media is advertised on the website of a Moscow-based Strategic Culture Foundation (SCF) .... The advertisement features the logo of The 4th Media at the bottom of the site, along with the logo of GlobalResearch.ca, a media outlet which @DFRLab repeatedly reported on and remains involved in spreading pro-Kremlin disinformation. Similarly, at the bottom of The 4th Media website, several logos are featured including statesponsored media outlets, whose messaging routinely matches that of the governments which fund them, as well as the Moscow-based SCF. ... there is no publicly available information about the relationship between The 4th Media and SCF. However, The 4th Media reposts a significant amount of content verbatim from SCF.\n\n92\n\n## Disinformation On Covid-19\n\nGlobal Research attracted widespread attention on 12 March 2020 when in two tweets, Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokesman Zhao Lijian linked to two articles (now removed) which falsely blamed the United States for the COVID-19 outbreak.\n\n93 Given *Global Research*'s longstanding, openly proclaimed partnership with Chinese websites, it is perhaps no accident that two of their articles were selected by the Foreign Ministry spokesperson.\n\nThe author of the two articles, Lawrence Devlin (Larry) Romanoff, identified as a Canadian writer, has pushed false narratives about alleged U.S. bioweapons previously, along with strongly anti-Western views.\n\n94\nIn his *Global Research* article \"Understanding China\" he claimed, \"Westerners live in an illusionary black and white world framed for them by the programming from their Zionist media.\"\n95 He includes Japan as part of what he calls the \"Zionist West.\" Romanoff lives in Shanghai and says he is \"writing a series of ten books\n96\ngenerally related to China and the West.\" Global Research reacted to the appearance of COVID-19 by seeking to frame it as a Western conspiracy. Between 1 March and 10 April 2020, the most popular Global Research articles posted on their Twitter account, @CRG_CRM, speculated that the virus originated in the United States and that COVID-19\n97\nwas engineered by the global elite to take control of the world.\n\nChossudovsky has also written many articles on COVID-19. One of them is \"COVID-19 Coronavirus: A\nFake Pandemic? Who's Behind It? Global Economic, Social and Geopolitical Destabilization,\" published on the Global Research site on 1 March 2020.\n\n98 This article was republished or linked to by at least 70 different websites and publications, including:\n\n\n99\n-\nEconews Portal\n100\n-\nJamaica Peace Council\n101\n-\nTlaxcala\n102\n-\nThe Real Truth Blog\n103\n-\nAustralian National Review\n104\n-\nSouthFront\n\n## Gru Authors\n\nGlobal Research published or republished seven authors attributed by Facebook to be false online personas created by The Main Directorate of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, popularly known as the GRU. Sophie Mangal, Anna Jaunger, Milko Pejovic, Adomas Abromaitis, Mariam al-Hijab, Said al-Khalaki and Mehmet Ersoy were identified by Facebook as false online personas created by the GRU, as noted in Potemkin Pages & Personas: Assessing GRU Online Operations, 2014-2019 by\n105\nRenee DiResta and Shelby Grossman, published by the Stanford Internet Observatory in November 2019. Altogether, these seven GRU personas are responsible for 108 articles that appear on Global Research's website.\n\n## Global Research's Social Media Platforms As Of June 2020\n\nPlatform\nLanguage\nEngagement\nFacebook\nEnglish\n279,291 followers\nTwitter English\n37,300 followers\nYouTube English\n35,800 subscribers, 4,683,769 views\n\n## Proxy Site Profiles News Front Summary\n\nNews Front is a Crimea-based disinformation and propaganda outlet with the self-proclaimed goal of providing an \"alternative source of information\" for Western audiences, a branding technique common among actors in Russia's disinformation and propaganda ecosystem. With reported ties to the Russian security services and Kremlin funding, it is particularly focused on supporting Russian proxies in Ukraine. News Front is one of the most blatant Russian disinformation sites, and its manipulative tactics to boost reach led to a near total dismantling of its presence on social media in early 2020.\n\n## Introduction - On The Information Front Against Ukraine\n\nThe Crimea-based *News Front* information agency was registered with Roskomnadzor, the Russian state agency that oversees mass media, in June 2015.\n\n106  *News Front*'s parent company is Media Group News Front, co-founded by Konstantin Knyrik, the head of *News Front*.\n\n107 According to Knyrik, News Front was originally called *Crimean Front*, and was established to provide informational support for Russia's attempted annexation of the Ukrainian peninsula.\n\n108 Following the events of 2014, *Crimean Front* became South-Eastern Front and eventually evolved into *News Front*.\nNews Front operates a multi-lingual website, publishing content in Slovak, Georgian, Hungarian, French, Serbian, Spanish, German, Bulgarian, English, and Russian and claiming to have editorial branches in Bulgaria, Serbia, Germany, France, the UK, Georgia, and Hungary.\n\n109 According to a 2018\n110\narticle in Coda, *News Front* had ten employees and at least 100 contributors around the world. News Front's sources of funding remain opaque. Knyrik claimed that his organization was financed solely through \"donations from his family, friends and income from other business activities,\" but a former News Front staffer told German publication *Zeit* that Russian security services allocate funding that makes up\n\"a large part of the budget.\"\n111 The Russian independent media outlet *Znak* reported that in 2016, Global Information Technologies, a civil society group founded by Knyrik and *News Front*'s chief anchor Sergey Veselovskiy, received a 3 million ruble (approximately $43,070) Presidential Grant to finance *News Front*.\n\n112\nMedia Group News Front and Global Information Technologies are registered at the same address. Time magazine questioned Knyrik's self-proclaimed independence from \"government influence,\" pointing out that *News Front* reporters have \"been granted extraordinary access\" to the Russian military and are often embedded \"with Russian troops and paramilitaries fighting in Syria and eastern Ukraine.\"\n113 According to documents from Crimea occupation authority-owned V.I. Vernadsky Crimean Federal University, Media Group News Front is on its list of potential employee options for students graduating in computer\n114\nscience.\n\n## Disinformation And Social Media Manipulation\n\nNews Front purports to provide \"objective coverage,\" while Knyrik views the outlet as a \"volunteer participant\" in the information war against the West, claiming that *News Front* serves as \"an alternative source of information for people in Europe and the U.S.\"\n115 Various media outlets, however, have described News Front as leading \"the most aggressive information war against Ukraine,\" following a \"staunchly pro-\nKremlin line;\" \"rarely even\" pretending to \"uphold traditional journalistic standards;\" and inventing most of its content.\n\n116 The Atlantic Council's DFRLab noted *News Front*'s use of photoshopped content.\n\n117 A\nformer *News Front* employee told *Zeit* that \"certain topics...[for *News Front*'s content are] assigned directly\n118\nfrom the [Russian] presidential administration.\" The EU's counter-disinformation product EUvsDisinfo has documented numerous examples of disinformation and propaganda published on *News Front*'s multi-lingual website.\n\n119 Recent false narratives include:\n\n-\nThe United States created the coronavirus as a bioweapon, tested deadly viruses on humans in Ukraine and China, developed bacteriological weapons specifically aimed at certain ethnic groups, intentionally infected U.S.-based migrants with COVID-19, and transported the virus to China.\n120\n-\n Cooperation with Europe is a catastrophe for Ukraine. Ukraine has become a colony of the IMF and George Soros and its president is a CIA puppet. Ukraine cannot control the coronavirus, as more than 1,500 Ukrainian soldiers in Donbas are infected with COVID-19. Nazis are patrolling Kyiv's streets, and a Ukrainian army veteran drove a truck into demonstrators in Minneapolis.\n121\n\n-\nThe EU is dead, it cannot handle the COVID-19 pandemic, and has abandoned Ukraine. The\n122\nEU is inflaming the war in Donbas and is attempting to destabilize Belarus.\n-\nNATO did not provide any COVID-19 assistance to Spain, does not care about Montenegro, and spreads the coronavirus\n123\nin the EU.\n\n-\nBill Gates is linked to the COVID-19 outbreak and uses the pandemic to implant microchips \"in whole of humanity [sic].\" COVID-19 vaccines are a fraud spearheaded by Gates and Big Pharma.\n124\nA screenshot of a post from the suspended News Front's Facebook page.\n\nIn April 2020, Facebook removed a network of accounts, including accounts associated with *News Front*, for \"violating... [Facebook's] policy against foreign interference which is coordinated inauthentic behavior on behalf of a foreign entity.\"\n125 The network posted content in Russian, English, German, Spanish, French, Hungarian, Serbian, Georgian, Indonesian, and Farsi on \"topics such as the military conflict in Ukraine, the Syrian civil war, the annexation of Crimea, NATO, US elections, and more recently the coronavirus pandemic.\" Facebook stated that \"the individuals behind this activity relied on a combination of authentic, duplicate and fake accounts...posing as independent news entities in the regions they targeted.\"\n126 In addition to *News Front*, Facebook linked the network's \"coordinated inauthentic behavior\" to another Kremlin-aligned disinformation outlet, *SouthFront*, which according to Facebook is also based in Crimea.\n\n127\n(For more information on *SouthFront* and its connections to *News Front*, see the *SouthFront* profile in this report).\n\n## News Front's Youtube Takedown Elicits Response From Russian Mfa\n\nOn 20 May 2020, Knyrik announced on his Facebook page that *News Front*'s channels had been removed from YouTube.\n\n128 As of 7 April, *News Front*'s YouTube channels collectively had more than 484,000\nsubscribers and 479,591,989 total views. According to YouTube, the channels were \"terminated for a violation of YouTube's Terms of Service.\"\n129 Following the termination, the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs\n(MFA) issued a statement condemning YouTube's decision.\n\n130 Twitter also suspended *News Front*'s accounts\n131\nfor violating \"the Twitter Rules.\"\n\nDFRLab, which analyzed Facebook's takedown of pages and accounts affiliated with *News Front*, found that the agency's Spanish-language pages heavily amplified content from Russian state-controlled media outlets RT, Sputnik, *TASS*, and *RIA Novosti*. According to DFRLab, the fourth-most amplified source on News Front's Spanish-language web page between December 2019 and April 2020 was the Kremlin-aligned disinformation outlet *SouthFront*.\n\n132\nThe International Society for Fair Elections and Democracy (ISFED), a Georgian civil society group, concluded that *News Front*'s Facebook activity in the country included theft of platform users' identities. It detailed News Front's efforts \"instigating antagonism and aggression among Georgian Facebook users, dividing the society...creating political polarization\" and \"employing a range of tactics to spread anti-Western, pro-\n133\nRussian messages.\"\n\n## News Front Leadership: Ties To Russia-Backed Proxies In Ukraine And Russian Ultra-Nationalists\n\nNews Front previously stated that Knyrik was directly involved in the Russian operation to seize Crimea in violation of international law, including the organization of the illegitimate 2014 referendum. For his actions, he was reportedly awarded a medal from the Russian Ministry of Defense.\n\n134 The security services of the\n135\nself-proclaimed Russia-backed \"Luhansk People's Republic\" (LPR) awarded Knyrik a medal for cooperation. In a video published in 2014, *News Front* anchor Veselovskiy claimed that Knyrik was fighting on the front lines in the so-called LPR.\n\n136 Knyrik is reportedly banned from entering Germany for \"working for the Russia-\n137\nsupported rebels in eastern Ukraine.\"\n\nIn March 2014, Knyrik reportedly led a raid of Russia's proxy fighters in Crimea to take over the office of the \"the region's leading independent news source, the Crimean Center For Investigative Reporting,\" declaring\n138\nthat the building will now serve as the new headquarters of *Crimean Front*. Anton Shekhovtsov, a scholar of Russian and European far-right movements, documented Knyrik's ties to Russian philosopher and ultra-nationalist Alexander Dugin and the Eurasian Youth Union, both sanctioned by the United States for \"actively\" recruiting \"individuals with military and combat experience to fight on behalf of the self-proclaimed [Donetsk People's Republic] DPR.\"\n139 (For more information on Dugin see the *Geopolitica.ru* and *Katehon* profiles in this report). In a 2014 interview, Dugin said he had known Knyrik for more than ten years, describing him as a hero, the \"vanguard of the Russian spring in Crimea,\" and an advocate for the inclusion of Ukraine into the \"united Russian world.\"\n140 Knyrik stated that his priority was to \"focus on the creation of the empire; the first goal is to break\n141\nCrimea away from Ukraine. To join it to the empire first.\"\n\nKnyrik and other *News Front* leaders, including its General Director Yuriy Fedin and chief anchor Sergei Veselovsky, are affiliated with the Russian ultra-nationalist Rodina party, founded by the U.S.-\nsanctioned Russian politician Dmitriy Rogozin.\n\n142 Knyrik is the Committee Chairman of Rodina's regional branch. Sergei Veselovsky is the branch's Deputy Chairman. Yuriy Fedin ran on behalf of Rodina in local elections. Knyrik's page on the Russian social media platform VKontakte features many photographs of Knyrik and another U.S.-sanctioned Russian politician connected to Rodina, Sergey Glazyev, former advisor to President Putin\n143 (For more information on Glazyev, see the Katehon profiles in this report.) News Front's co-founder Mikhail Sinelin is Glazyev's brother-in-law, according to the Russian business daily Kommersant.\n\n144 RFE/RL reported that Sinelin was a former deputy chairman of the Russian state-owned bank Vnesheconombank, and worked for about ten years in the secretariats of the Russian vice prime\n145\nminister and prime minister.\n\n## News Front's Social Media Platforms As Of June 2020:\n\nPlatform\nLanguage\nEngagement\nEnglish\n1,140 members\nFrench\n1,248 followers\nBulgarian\n1,200 members\nRussian\n149,089 members\nVK\nGerman\n1,739 members\nSerbian\n1,091 members\nSpanish\n1,619 members\nRussian\n111 members\nFrench\n621 followers\nFrench\n516 followers\nEnglish\nAccount suspended\nFacebook\nGeorgian\nAccount suspended\nSpanish\nAccount suspended\nGerman\nAccount suspended\nBulgarian\nAccount suspended\nSerbian\nAccount suspended\nEnglish Bulgarian Russian\nTwitter\nAll accounts suspended\nGerman Serbian Spanish English\nAccount suspended\nRussian\n7.74K subscribers, last updated 3 years\nRussian\n1.63K subscribers, last updated 4 years ago\nGerman\nAccount suspended\nYouTube\nInternational\nAccount suspended\nBulgarian\nAccount suspended\nSerbian\nAccount suspended\nSpanish\nAccount suspended\nOdnoklassniki\nRussian\n14,282 members\nTelegram\nRussian\n9,995 members\n\n## Proxy Site Profiles Southfront Summary\n\nSouthFront: Analysis and Intelligence (a.k.a. *SouthFront*), is a multilingual online disinformation site registered in Russia that focuses on military and security issues. With flashy infographics, maps, and videos, *SouthFront* combines Kremlin talking points with detailed knowledge of military systems and ongoing conflicts. It attempts to appeal to military enthusiasts, veterans, and conspiracy theorists, all while going to great lengths to hide its connections to Russia. Evidence indicates that *SouthFront* has connections to *News Front*, another disinformation and propaganda outlet detailed in this report.\n\n## Introduction - Origins\n\nSouthFront: Analysis and Intelligence was first registered as a formal organization to the domain registration site Reg.ru on 30 April 2015 in Moscow.\n\n146 Currently, *SouthFront* is hosted in Amsterdam by KoDDoS, a Hong Kong-based offshore website hosting and anti-DDoS company.\n\n147 Its content is currently available in English, Russian, and German, with the website previously featuring content in Arabic, Czech, French, and Farsi at various periods in its history. Facebook accounts associated with *SouthFront* were removed by the platform in April 2020 for \"violating... [Facebook's] policy against foreign interference which is coordinated inauthentic behavior on behalf of a foreign entity.\"\n148 The network posted content on \"topics such as the military conflict in Ukraine, the Syrian civil war, the annexation of Crimea, NATO, US elections, and more recently the coronavirus pandemic\"\nin Russian, English, German, Spanish, French, Hungarian, Serbian, Georgian, Indonesian, and Farsi. Facebook stated that \"the individuals behind this activity relied on a combination of authentic, duplicate and fake accounts...posing as independent news entities in the regions they targeted.\"\n149\n\nIn addition to *SouthFront*, which Facebook claimed was based in Crimea, the company linked the network's \"coordinated inauthentic behavior\" to *News Front*, another Kremlin-aligned Crimea-based disinformation outlet covered in this report. While *SouthFront* claimed that it \"has no connection to *News Front* nor operations in Crimea,\" there are multiple indications to the contrary.\n\n150 In fact, evidence indicates that News Front and *SouthFront* at least began as sister organizations. According to *News Fron*t's founder and leader Konstantin Knyrik, *News Front* was originally called Crimean Front and was established to provide informational support for the Russian attempted annexation of\nCrimea.151 After 2014, *Crimean Front* became *South-Eastern Front* and then evolved into *News Front*. In a\n2015 online correspondence with one of its initial official partners, the now defunct pro-Russian, pro-\nAssad disinformation outlet Syrian Free Press, *SouthFront* claimed that YouTube removed its channel named\n152\nCrimean Front.\n\nAn archived 2014 page of the *Crimean Front* YouTube channel ( ) includes several links to its affiliated pages on other social media platforms, including a page on the Russian platform VKontakte titled \".   ' '\" (\"Events. Internet militia 'Crimea Front'\").\n\n153 The page features several photographs of Sergei Veselovksiy, *News Front*'s current chief anchor, suggesting that he was affiliated with *Crimean Front*. An archived page from *Crimean Front*'s website showcases Veselovkiy's program and promotes a YouTube channel named   (Southern Front)\n154\nunder the headline \"We are on YouTube.\" An archived 2014 VKontakte post from *Crimean Front*  promoted a post from another VKontakte page titled   (Southern Front), announcing the creation of a new \"internet-militia\" called Southern Front.\n\n155 According to the post, *Crimean Front*'s \"principles and ideas\" served as the \"ideological and spiritual platform for the warriors of *Southern Front*.\"\nSouthern Front's archived VKontakte page titled   |  ! (Donetsk Republic. A Russian summer!) lists its location as Donetsk, Ukraine and links to several social media\n156\naccounts, including a Twitter account still administered today by *SouthFront* (see below).\n\nAn examination of the archived pages of the *Crimean Front* YouTube account that *SouthFront* had claimed as its own demonstrates its transformation from   (*Crimean Front*) to   (Southern Front) to *SouthFront*. The names of the page change but the YouTube URL remains the same. A screenshot of the channel's 'About' page from 2016 confirms this evolution, showing the full SouthFront: Analysis and Intelligence name alongside the *Crimean Front* URL and a description very similar to the 'About' page on\n157\nSouthFront's current website.\n\nA screenshot of the archived YouTube page   (Crimean Front).\n\nA screenshot of the archived YouTube page   (Southern Front) showing via the circled URL that it is the same as the   (Crimean Front) page.\n\nA screenshot of the archived YouTube page South Front showing via the circled URL that it is the same as the previous   (Crimean Front) and   (Southern Front) pages.\n\nA screenshot of the channel's 'About' page showing the full SouthFront: Analysis and Intelligence name alongside the Crimean Front URL and a description very similar to the 'About' page on SouthFront's current website.\n\n## Denying Russian Links\n\nDespite the evidence of its true origins and its Moscow registration, *SouthFront* goes to great lengths to appear not to be Russian. The website's About page says, \"SouthFront: *Analysis & Intelligence* is a public analytical umbrella organization created and maintained by a team of experts and volunteers from the four corners of the Earth. ... Everybody can become a volunteer in our organization and share their own story and perspective with the world.\"\n158 *SouthFront*'s PayPal address has a .ru address. The anonymous submission of content and reliance on anonymous donations provide additional layers of concealment to the site's managers.\n\n159 There is no publicly-known owner or founder of *SouthFront*, though it has previously mentioned having a \"Steering Committee.\"\n160 Per a denial issued by *SouthFront* in reaction to a Bellingcat report on the outlet, \"*SouthFront*'s founder is another person and all members of *SouthFront*'s Steering Committee know very well who he is.\"\n161\n\nThe metadata for at least the first 20 articles published by the outlet indicate that the same user account, uchfka32, is responsible for uploading all of these initial articles as well as many of the articles published recently. In addition to user account uchfka32, four other primary accounts appear to be the most prolific content uploaders in *SouthFront*'s metadata: JJsd95, another_try, dim27348, and 9fjapsi_ EE. It is difficult to attribute these user accounts to any of the *SouthFront* authors given that many articles are uploaded without authors or republished from other outlets. One possibility is that these user accounts belong to the members of the aforementioned \"*SouthFront* Steering Committee,\" a group that is generally only mentioned in *SouthFront* articles pertaining to the 'censorship' of *SouthFront* social media properties\n162\nor exposes on the outlet.\n\nOne person who openly claims to be on the Steering Committee is *SouthFront* Press Officer Viktor Stoilov, a Bulgarian marketer who runs a digital advertising and strategy company based in Sofia.\n\n163 As of early June 2020, Stoilov had authored 82 articles for *SouthFront*, with his earliest article dating back to 16 June 2015. Other authors for *SouthFront* include J. Hawk, Daniel Deiss and Edwin Watson, who are often referred to as members of the \"SF Team.\"\n164 In addition to authoring articles on their own and in different group configurations, some of these authors also serve as translators. For example, J. Hawk is commonly credited as a translator from Russian to English for *SouthFront*.\n\n## Content\n\nSouthFront focuses primarily on issues of military conflict, military technology, and international relations, with more specific topics typically tracking Kremlin priorities.\n\nA selection of screenshots from SouthFront's website depicting the \"Hot Topics\" banner from\n2015 to present (progressing forward from 2015 at the top towards 2020 at the bottom).\n\nThe below list is a sample of *SouthFront*'s original content which directly aligns with Kremlin talking points and disinformation:\n\n -\n\"Distraction Tactics: Reports of Chinese and Iranian Hacking, Russians Behind Protests\"\n-\n\"How and Why the US Government Perpetrated the 2014 Coup in Ukraine\"\n-\n\"Documentary on MH17 Reveals 5-Year-Long String of Lies\"\n-\n\"Another Step Towards Ukraine-Like Scenario for Belarus\"\n-\n\"The Venezuela-Iran Axis of Unity and Resistance Stands the Test of Time\"\n-\n\"OPCW Manipulated Chemical Weapons Report On Syria's Douma by Removing Critical Details\"\n-\n\"Russia Comments on U.S. Accusations Over Aleppo Chemical Attack, Says Washington is Trying to\n171\nWhitewash Actions of Terrorists\"\n\nSouthFront also republishes official Russian government statements, as well as content from official Russian state media outlets, such as *TASS* and Sputnik. paper, *SouthFront* aims to build a brand that provides \"alternative viewpoints\" while consistently pushing pro-Kremlin disinformation and propaganda. *SouthFront* has previously responded to accusations from EUvsDisinfo alleging it is a Russian disinformation outlet by citing isolated examples of when it has been critical of the Russian governmentsuch as criticizing the Moscow government's \"draconian\" response to COVID-19as proof that it is not serving Russian interests. honest water in an ocean of Kremlin-aligned disinformation is a common practice among outlets that aim to hide their links to Russia.\n\n## Covid-19 Disinformation\n\nSouthFront's recent content includes disinformation and dangerous claims related to COVID-19. This includes posting articles authored by Peter Koenig of *Global Research*, an example of how sites in the ecosystem leverage each other's content. *SouthFront* defends Koenig's work as the product of an Accessed via the Internet Archive.\n\n165\n166\n167\n168\n169\n170\n172 By distancing itself from Russia on\n173 This tactic of dispensing a drop of seemingly individual with great professional experience, yet Koenig's writing is conspiracy-ridden and often rife with\n174\ncontroversial rhetoric and praise for authoritarian regimes. The below examples of additional COVID-19 disinformation include both *SouthFront*-produced content and republication of disinformation from other outlets:\n\n-\n\"Phenomena of Coronavirus Crisis:\" \"Financial circles and governments are using the coronavirus to\n175\nachieve own financial and political goals\" -\nCOVID-19 -- The Fight for a Cure: One Gigantic Western Pharma Rip-Off: \"The real question is - are vaccines - or a vaccine - even necessary? Maybe - maybe not. The production of vaccines is pushed for profit motives and for an important political agenda for a New World Order\"\n176\n\n-\nThe Coronavirus COVID-19 Pandemic: The Real Danger is 'Agenda ID2020:' \"There is not the slightest trace of a pandemic... If indeed force-vaccination will happen, another bonanza for Big Pharma, people really don't know what type of cocktail will be put into the vaccine, maybe a slow killer, that acts-up only in a few years - or a disease that hits only the next generation - or a brain debilitating agent, or a gene that renders women infertile .... all is possible - always with the aim of full population control and\n177\npopulation reduction.\" -\nUSA Plan: Militarized Control of Population. The 'National COVID-19 Testing Action Plan:'\" \"The 'pandemic response body' would above all have the task of controlling the population with military-like techniques, through digital tracking and identification systems, in work and study places, in residential areas, in public places and when travelling. Systems of this type - the Rockefeller Foundation recalls - are made by Apple, Google and Facebook.\"\n178\n\n-\nFinally! EU Blames 'Kremlin Disinformation' for Coronavirus Crisis: \"EU bureaucrats and affiliated propaganda bodies are doing something that all has expected a long time ago - blaming Russia for the\n179\ncrisis over the outbreak of coronavirus.\" -\nCOVID-19 Crisis in Russia: lockdown Craziness and Opposition Provocations: \"Summing up, it becomes obvious that anti-government Western-backed forces are trying to use the COVID-19 crisis to\n180\ndestabilize the situation in Russia.\"\n\n\n## Weak Lines Of Defense\n\nWhen *SouthFront* tries to refute claims it is proliferating Russian narratives, it generally falls back on two main arguments.\n\n181 The first is that *SouthFront* is an \"international team of authors and experts\" with no ties to any state. This fails to explain why *SouthFront* refuses to reveal its founder(s), Steering Committee members, and main authors. The second line of defense is that *SouthFront* republishes articles from many other likeminded outlets often written by people with \"advanced academic degrees.\" Leveraging people with \"advanced academic degrees\" is a common tactic used by many outlets in the Russia's disinformation and propaganda ecosystem, as detailed in this report.\n\n## Niche Graphics Capabilities\n\nSouthFront also produces professionally designed infographics, maps, detailed \"Military Situation\" updates, and videos focused on troop movements, weapons systems, and conflict zones. be found on *SouthFront*'s website under the header \"SF TV\" and on *SouthFront*'s new YouTube channel, iterations of which have been removed by the platform in the past. Native English-speaking voiceover actors\n183\nfrequently narrate videos.\n\n182 These videos can now\n\n## Partners In The Ecosystem\n\nFrom the beginning, *SouthFront* has officially partnered with other key players in the Russia's disinformation and propaganda ecosystem. As referenced in the profile on Global Research, *SouthFront* articles have been republished on *Global Research*'s website more than 1,200 times since mid-2015. As seen below, *SouthFront* once openly displayed its list of partners on its homepage and made frequent alterations to it. This changed sometime between 31 October 2018 and 6 November 2018 when the \"Partners\" column was removed from the website without explanation. In addition to its stated partnership with Global Research, *SouthFront* has republished content from many other disinformation outlets, including the *Strategic Culture Foundation* and *New Eastern Outlook*. In many cases, this republication of content is mutual.\n\n## Syrian Free Press - A Window Into Coordination\n\nIn an unusual instance of public coordination, *SouthFront* and one of its initial named partners, the Syrian Free Press site visible above, agreed on the latter's \"General-Contacts\" page to cooperate and \"better spread the real news from Ukraine and Novorossia.\"\n184 After this initial exchange from December\n2014 (pictured below), the *SouthFront* user follows up on 24 April 2015 (immediately before the official registration of *SouthFront*) to ask that *Syrian Free Press* appeal to YouTube on its behalf to restore its original \"SouthFront\" channel and visit its new channel, \"Crimean Front\" (referenced earlier for its connections to *News Front*).\n\n185 The *Syrian Free Press* editors reply, saying \"Job done. You will receive a private email from us.\"\n186\nA screenshot from Syrian Free Press*' website showing an exchange between* Syrian Free Press *and* SouthFront regarding potential cooperation.\n\n## Southfront's Social Media Platforms As Of June 2020\n\nPlatform\nLanguage\nEngagement\nHungarian\n11,483 followers\nFacebook\nMultiple Accounts\nRemoved April 2020\nEnglish\n27,500 followers\nTwitter\nGerman\n178 followers\nLive - created 5 May 2020 - 7.08K subscribers\nEnglish English, multiple languages\nSuspended 1 May 2020\nYouTube\n(*SouthFront* requested that the Russian Foreign\n187\nMinistry appeal on its behalf to no avail.)\n\n## Proxy Site Profiles Geopolitica.Ru Summary\n\nGeopolitica.ru serves as a platform for Russian ultra-nationalists to spread disinformation and propaganda targeting Western and other audiences. Inspired by the Eurasianist ideology of the Russian philosopher and ultranationalist Alexander Dugin, *Geopolitica.ru* views itself as caught in a perpetual information war against the Western ideals of democracy and liberalism. The website's cooperation with other outlets in the Russia's disinformation and propaganda ecosystem broadens the reach of its messaging, which seeks to destabilize and weaken Western institutions. It publishes in English, Russian, Spanish, Italian, Serbian, French, Polish, Arabic, and Urdu.\n\n## Introduction - \"Carthago Delenda Est\"\n\nGeopolitica.ru is an online portal based in Russia which serves as a megaphone for the 'Eurasianist' ideas of the prominent ultranationalist Russian philosopher Alexander Dugin.\n\n188 Dugin's ideology is based on the belief that \"there is an irresolvable confrontation between the Atlanticist world (principally the United States and the United Kingdom) and Eurasia (predominantly Russia, Central and Eastern Europe and Asia) that resists U.S.-led globalization and ethno-cultural universalization.\"\n189 This \"resistance\" is reflected in *Geopolitica.ru*'s slogan \"Carthago delenda est\" (Carthage must be destroyed), in which liberal democracies are perceived as the \"Eternal Carthage\" and Russia as the \"Eternal Rome.\"\n190\nDugin gained notoriety for propagating fascist views and was reportedly influential in Kremlin circles, until falling out of favor for criticizing Russian President Vladimir Putin.\n\n191 According to Anton Shekhovstov, a scholar of Russian and European far right movements, Dugin was dissatisfied because Putin did not turn the 2014 attempted annexation of Crimea into a full conquest of Ukraine.\n\n192\nTo realize its vision of weakening and eventually destroying the Western liberal world order that it posits as an enemy, *Geopolitca.ru* appears to follow the principles of the \"program of subversion, destabilization, and disinformation\" outlined by Dugin in his 1997 book *Foundations of Geopolitics*. He advocates using the Russian intelligence services \"to introduce geopolitical disorder into internal American activity, encouraging all kinds of separatism and ethnic, social and racial conflicts, actively supporting all dissident movementsextremist, racist, and sectarian groups, thus destabilizing internal political processes in the U.S.\"\n193\nGeopolitica.ru has connections with other sites and groups that also serve as proliferators of Russian disinformation and propaganda, especially Katehon, as detailed below.\n\n194\n\n## The \"Eurasianist\" Approach To A \"Multipolar World\"\n\nEstablished in 2008 as a Russian-language website, *Geopolitica.ru* launched an English-language page in 2012, and between 2017 and 2019 expanded to include versions in Spanish, Italian, Serbian, French, Polish, Arabic, and Urdu.\n\n195 The portal describes itself as \"a platform for...[the] monitoring of the geopolitical\n196\nsituation in the world\" following the \"Eurasian approach.\" Geopolitica.ru also claims to \"promote a multipolar world,\" while rejecting liberalism, communism, and fascism. The website's proclaimed objection to fascism is disingenuous, considering Dugin's reported praise for the projects of the Nazi paramilitary organization Schutzstaffel (SS) and its pseudo-research institute, the Ahnenerb.\n\n197 The concept of the \"multipolar world\" championed by *Geopolitica.ru* translates into a Dugin-envisioned world where Russia dominates its neighbors: divides Georgia; annexes Ukraine, Finland, Serbia, Romania, Bulgaria and Greece; and \"gives away\" Azerbaijan to Iran.\n\n198\nIn 2008, Dugin and his followers from the Eurasian Youth Union (a youth wing of Dugin's Eurasia Party)\n199\ntravelled to the Russian-occupied Georgian region of South Ossetia. In 2015, Dugin was sanctioned by the United States along with other leaders of the Eurasian Youth Union for \"actively [recruiting] individuals with military and combat experience to fight on behalf\" of Russia-backed\n200\nforces in Ukraine.\n\n## Geopolitica.Ru's Role In Russia's Disinformation And Propaganda Ecosystem\n\nSome of the partners listed by *Geopolitica.ru* include the International Eurasian Movement (IEM), the Center for Geopolitical Expertise, the Center for Conservative Studies, and \"some ex-members of the *Katehon* think tank,\" all of which are affiliated with Dugin.\n\n201 *Katehon*, where Dugin used to be a member of the supervisory board, is a pseudo-think tank with apparent links to the Russian state and intelligence services (see Katehon profile in this report). *Geopolitica.ru*'s listed physical address matched the same address occupied by *Katehon* until April 2019.\n\n202  Its chief editor, Leonid Savin, was formerly *Katehon*'s chief editor.\n\n203  Savin is affiliated with the IEM and is reportedly a member of the Military-Scientific Society of the Russian Ministry of Defense. Dugin is also an associate of *Katehon*'s sponsor, Konstantin Malofeyev.\n\n204  The United States sanctioned Malofeyev as \"one of the main sources of financing for Russians promoting separatism in\n205\nCrimea\" and bankrolling \"separatist activities in eastern Ukraine.\" Geopolitica.ru and other proxy sites that proliferate Russian disinformation and propaganda often republish each other's content. Savin, for example, is a regular contributor to the Strategic Culture Foundation (SCF).\n\n206 His articles are occasionally posted on *Global Research* and Fort Russ News. He has also been featured on *NewsFront* and on the Russian state-funded media outlets RT and *Sputnik*.\n\n207 Geopolitica.ru reprints articles from *Fort Russ News* including an article with disinformation that the 2016 ISIS\nterrorist attack in Brussels was a false flag operation carried out by the United States and NATO.\n\n208  It also publishes content from SCF, *Global Research*, and the *New Eastern Outlook*.\n\n209\nGeopolitica.ru published 21 articles written by Adomas Abromaitis,\n210 a false persona attributed by Facebook to Russian Military Intelligence (GRU).\n\nA sample of recent *Geopolitica.ru* articles on COVID-19 illustrates the false claims that it attempts to spread. They demonize the United States, promote anti-vaccine messaging, sow fear, and portray Europe as if it is in a state of collapse.\n\n\n\"Bill Gates, vaccinations, microchips, and patent 060606\" promotes a conspiracy theory attacking Bill Gates and the Microsoft Corporation for an alleged plot to control humans by inserting microchips into their bodies. The article suggests a possible link between the Microsoft's patent number\n211\nWO/2020/060606 and the \"number of the beast\" from the \"Book of Revelation.\"\n\n\"Russia and the coronavirus\" asserts that Western media spread disinformation about the number of COVID-19 related deaths in Russia and suggests that \"one of the reasons why COVID-19 mortality rates\n212\nare very low in Russia is that many Russians do not get flu vaccinations imported from the West.\"\n\n\"New Malthusianism and the misanthrope dynasties\" falsely claims that the U.S. government and Bill\n213\nGates aim to reduce the world's population, also alleging that Gates helped create the Zika virus.\n\n\"The Coronavirus and hybrid warfare\" speculates that COVID-19 is a part of a U.S. strategy \"aimed at undermining the economic growth of both China and other countries\" or a \"plot by transnational capital\n214\nagainst Donald Trump on the eve of the presidential election.\"\n\n\"Former Putin's aide: Coronavirus is the US biological weapon\" quotes Sergey Glazyev, a member of *Katehon*'s supervisory board member, an associate of Dugin, and a former advisor to President Putin, as claiming that the COVID-19 virus is a U.S. biological weapon targeting \"mostly people of the\n215\nyellow race\" and blaming Great Britain for provoking Hitler at the outbreak of World War II.\n\n\"Pandemic in the service of globalization\" blames the EU/Atlanticist/Globalist powers for intentionally inflating the threat posed by the COVID-19 pandemic to \"deepen the automation of society\" for the\n216\nbenefit of \"corporate capitalism\" and the \"world government.\"\n\n\"The Italian government at the time of the coronavirus\" argues that the coronavirus crisis in Italy demonstrates that \"the values of the Germany-dominated EU are not the values of the Italian\n217\npeople, and that the EU's economic recipes have been lethal for Italy.\n\n\"Pandemic and the survival policy: the horizons of a new form of dictatorship\" claims that COVID- 19-related restrictive measures in Western societies amount to \"total surveillance of the population\" and will \"gradually become permanent,\" spelling the \"end of liberal democracies and the establishments [sic] of dictatorships throughout the world.\" This looming \"dictatorship\" is described as potentially\n218\n\"harsher than Nazi and Soviet concentration camps.\"\nAs documented by EUvsDisinfo, a project of the European External Action Service's East StratCom Task Force, additional disinformation narratives promoted by *Geopolitca.ru* included depicting the Western world as \"dominated by a handful of perverts,\" alleging that genocide was committed against Russians in Ukraine, portraying immigrants in Europe as rapists, and trying to discredit Western NGOs by falsely accusing them of being CIA agents.\n\n219\n\n## Geopolitica.Ru's Social Media Platforms As Of June 2020\n\nPlatform\nLanguage\nEngagement\nEnglish\n1,535 followers\nRussian\n12,642 followers\nFrench\n1,331 followers\nFacebook\nSpanish\n1,557 followers\nPortuguese\n32 followers, dormant since 2019\nInstagram Russian\n55 followers\nFrench\n247 followers, dormant since 2019\nTwitter\nSpanish\n5000 followers 2.86K subscribers\nYouTube\nMultilingual\n485,335 views\nVKontakte Spanish\n239 subscribers\n\n## Proxy Site Profiles Katehon Summary\n\nBehind the facade of a think-tank operation, Moscow-based *Katehon* is a proliferator of virulent anti- Western disinformation and propaganda via its website, which is active in five languages. It is led by individuals with clear links to the Russian state. Within Russia's broader disinformation and propaganda ecosystem, *Katehon* plays the role of providing supposedly independent, analytical material aimed largely at European audiences, with content dedicated to \"the creation and defense of a secure, democratic and just international system\".\n\n## Introduction - Konstantin Malofeyev's Mouthpiece\n\nEstablished in 2016, the Analytical Center *Katehon* is a subsidiary of *Tsargrad*, a company founded by Konstantin Malofeyev and affiliated with Malofeyev's pro-Kremlin Tsargrad TV, Russia's self-described \"first conservative informational-analytical television channel\" and the \"voice of the Russian orthodox majority.\"\n220\nThe website publishes in five languages: English, Spanish, French, German, and Arabic.221 The website also used to publish in Russian but has not done so since 2017.\n\n222\nOften referred to as the \"Orthodox oligarch,\" Malofeyev runs one of Russia's largest private foundations, the St. Basil the Great Charitable Foundation.\n\n223 He is also the deputy head of the World Russia People's Council, an international organization led by the Russian Patriarch Kirill.\n\n224 Malofeyev is also the head of the\n\"pro-Putin monarchist society\" the Double-Headed Eagle; and serves on the Advisory Board of the Safe Internet League, a state-linked organization ostensibly dedicated to \"fighting dangerous Web content\" but accused by independent Russian media of \"frequently blacklisting socio-political content.\"\n225 The Chairman of the Safe Internet League's Advisory Board is Malofeyev's long-time associate and Putin aide Igor Shchegolev. Shchegolov is the Presidential Plenipotentiary Envoy to the Central Federal District and a\n226\nmember of the Security Council.\n\nAccording to independent Russian media outlet The Bell, Malofeyev is currently \"pursuing his ambition to lead a monarchist political party and build up a conservative media empire.\"\n227 In 2014, Malofeyev was sanctioned by the United States and the European Union for funding Russia-backed forces in Ukraine.\n\n228\nIn September 2019, Malofeyev established the International Agency for Sovereign Development (IASD), described by *Tsargrad TV* as the Russian attempt to \"de-colonize\" Africa and push the West out of the continent.229\n\n## State And Intelligence Ties\n\nWhile claiming to be an independent organization, *Katehon*'s leadership appears to have ties to both the Russian state and the Russian intelligence services. It is of note that the German, French and Arabic versions of *Katehon*'s website do not mention the individuals serving on its supervisory board, which in addition to Malofeyev include:\n230\n\n\n-\n Sergey Glazyev, President Vladimir Putin's former economic advisor and currently a Minister in charge\nof Integration and Macroeconomics at the Eurasian Economic Commission.\n231 Glazyev is under  U.S.\nsanctions related to Russia's hostile actions in Ukraine.\n232\n\n-\nAndrey Klimov, Deputy Chair of the Russian Federation Council Committee on Foreign Affairs and Head of the Council's Interim Committee for the Defense of State Sovereignty and the Prevention\n233\nof Interference in the Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation. -\nLeonid Reshetnikov, a retired Lieutenant-General of the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR), where he led the Analysis and Information Department.\n234 Until 2017, Reshetnikov was the head of\nthe Russian Institute for Strategic Studies (RISS), a Moscow-based think-tank that used to be a part of the SVR and now conducts research for the Kremlin.\n235 According to press reports, RISS research\nhas included plans for Russian interference in the 2016 U.S. presidential elections and proposals for the Bulgarian Socialist Party to \"plant fake news and promote exaggerated polling data\" in advance of that country's presidential elections the same year.\n236 In 2016, RISS and *Katehon* co-authored a report\n237\nallegedly analyzing U.S. ideology.\n\n238\n-\nAlexander Makarov, a retired Lieutenant General of the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB).\n\nSince February 2017, *Katehon* has been headed by General Director Mikhail Yakushev, a Middle East scholar and the Vice President of the *St. Basil the Great Charitable Foundation*.\n\n239 Yakushev's career included stints at a foundation run by Vladimir Yakunin, who is a U.S.-sanctioned Russian oligarch, former KGB officer, and former director of Russian Railways.\n\n240 Yakushev also held diplomatic posts in Israel and Tunisia, and was\n241\nChief of Staff  of the Russian Federation Council's Committee for Foreign Relations. Additionally, in 2018, Yakushev founded the obscure Center for *International Strategic Initiatives*.\n\n242  According to its English-language website, which appears to be no longer operational but still accessible through the Internet Archive, the mission of the *Center for International Strategic Initiatives* is \"to promote the realization of international initiatives in the interests of the public and private sector of Russia and developing Asia and Africa.\"\n243 The *Center* has received almost no coverage in Russian- and English-language press, but according to the a 2019 article in *Confidentiel Afrique*, its President Alexander Grachev, signed a memorandum of understanding with the President of the *Strategic Center of African Affairs*,  Abdelmounem Boussafita, \"for economic, social and political development between Russia and all African countries.\"\n244\nAlexander Grigoriyevich Grachev is listed as one of the *Center*'s leaders in the organization's registration documents and appears to have been Russia's former Consul General in Odessa, Ukraine and a Presidential Administration official responsible for interregional ties.\n\n245 In 2009, the *Kyiv Post* reported that the \"Ukrainian government had allegedly demanded\" Grachev's expulsion.\n\n246 According to the Ukrainian information agency *UNIAN*, Grachev was suspected of intelligence activities, including the recruitment of agents. *UNIAN*  cited an article from the British Times claiming  Grachev was financing pro-Russian groups in\n247\nUkraine.\n\n## Conspiratorial Views Of *Katehon*'S Leadership\n\nKatehon's leaders have promoted a variety of conspiracy theories:\n\n -\n Glazyev, for example, claimed that COVID-19 was a U.S.-produced biological weapon; that Ukraine's President Volodymyr Zelensky (in cooperation with the United States and Israel) planned to ethnically cleanse the Russian-speaking population of eastern Ukraine and replace it with Israeli Jews; that the United States and its European partners have been training supposed Ukrainian neo-Nazis for the past 15 years; and that \"sinister forces of the 'new world order' conspired against Russia in the 1990s to\n248\nbring about economic policies that amounted to 'genocide.'\"\n-\nReshetnikov's eccentric worldviews include the conviction that the United States is determined to destroy Russia and masterminded World War II through its transnational companies.\n249 He\nalso argued that the United States has created terrorist organizations and that its presidents have been selected by \"secret powers.\"\n250\n\n\n-\nKlimov, who has been obsessed with investigating \"foreign agents,\" sees a foreign hand in almost every domestic Russian affair that challenges the Kremlin's line.\n251 Recently, he accused U.S. diplomats,\nYouTube, and a Russian rapper who allegedly holds dual citizenship, of organizing protests against the Moscow Duma elections.\n252 While purporting to be a champion of Russian sovereignty, Klimov headed\na Cyprus-based company and ran a business with a British offshore company, according to a\n253\n2017 article from the independent Russian newspaper Novaya Gazeta.\n\n## Disinformation And Conspiracy Theories Promoted On *Katehon*'S Website\n\nKatehon is frequently cited as a source of disinformation in the EUvsDisinfo database, a product of the European External Action Service's East StratCom Task Force.\n\n254 It promotes false claims ranging from conspiracy theories attacking George Soros, the Rothschild family and the Pope, to disinformation and propaganda that seeks to undermine the EU, NATO, and trans-Atlantic solidarity. *Katehon*'s sites have also spread false allegations regarding COVID-19, including the below narratives catalogued in the EUvsDisinfo database:\n\n-\n the British House of Commons considers the coronavirus a blessing;\n-\n the coronavirus is a French-made virus transferred by the Americans;\n-\n the coronavirus is an ethnic biological weapon;\n-\n the coronavirus is a U.S. tool to disrupt Chinese production;\n-\n the United States owns the coronavirus and its cure;\n-\n the original source of the coronavirus is a U.S. military biological warfare laboratory;\n-\n the United States created coronavirus in 2015; and\n-\n science doubts the effectiveness of vaccines.\n Katehon also promotes messages aimed at undermining European solidarity, claiming that supposedly traditional values are under attack, including:\n\n-\n Europe is in danger because of Ukraine's gas;\n-\n Italy is being punished by the European Commission for supporting traditional values;\n-\n the EU has Nazi roots; and\n-\n Sweden's feminist government orders not to investigate rapes to protect the immigrants that committed them.\n Other disinformation that *Katehon* has promoted includes:\n\n-\n Pope Francis is a servant of George Soros and the global Zionist conspiracy;\n-\n George Soros' tentacles entangle politics and generate chaos around the world;\n-\n the Luciferian Zionist Rothchild crime family controls the Western mainstream media;\n-\n the Holocaust was instigated by the evil Rothschilds for creating their own nation state;\n-\n Rasputin was killed by the Anglo-Zionist empire; and\n-\n the fire at the Notre Dame was a satanic ritual.\nKatehon published 17 articles written by Adomas Abromaitis, a false persona attributed by Facebook to\n255\nRussian Military Intelligence (GRU).\n\n## Katehon As A Tool In Pro-Kremlin Campaigns\n\nKatehon appears to have been established to advance the Kremlin's influence abroad with a specific focus on gaining audiences among fringe European elements. Its website features content in Russian, English, Spanish, French, German, and Arabic.\n\n256 When the website first appeared online in 2015, it also included Italian, Portuguese, Greek, Serbian, and Slovenian pages.\n\n257\n\nAccording to media reports, Malofeyev has served as a proxy for Kremlin priorities in Europe, sponsoring meetings and conferences of ultra conservative parties, as well as directly funding politicians and opinion makers who criticize liberal values and support the Kremlin's policies.\n\n258  Reportedly, Malofeyev was involved in the purported annexation of Crimea, support for the Russian military-backed separatist militancy in Donbass, election meddling in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and media acquisition in Greece, Bulgaria, and Serbia. *Katehon* promotes these same overarching goals through its disinformation and propaganda activities.\n\n259\n\nAdditionally, *Bellingcat* found \"circumstantial evidence\" that Malofeyev was involved in the failed 2016 coup in Montenegro aimed to prevent that country from joining NATO.\n\n260 Montenegrin officials claimed that *Katehon* board member Leonid Reshetnikov also played a key role in the organization of the coup.\n\n261 In 2019, Bulgaria banned Malofeyev and Reshetnikov from entering the country for ten years in connection with espionage and money laundering charges against Nikolai Malinov, chairman of the pro- Kremlin Bulgarian National Movement of Russophiles and a recipient of the Order of Friendship award from President Putin.\n\n262\n\nA prominent Russian philosopher, ultranationalist, and the leader of the International Eurasian Movement, Alexander Dugin (see *Geopolitica.ru* case study) was a *Katehon* board member and the chief editor of  *Tsargrad TV* until 2017.\n\n263 Dugin has reportedly been one of the key drivers behind Malofeyev's strategy to establish a network of pro-Kremlin politicians among the ranks of European radicals.\n\n264 The U.S. Department of Treasury sanctioned Dugin for \"being responsible for or complicit in actions or policies that threaten the peace, security, stability, or sovereignty or territorial\n265\nintegrity of Ukraine.\" In 2014, a Russian hacking group Shaltay Boltay (also known as *Anonymous International*) published email correspondence of Georgi Gavrish, an associate of Dugin and former officer at the Russian embassy in Athens.\n\n266 The released materials included a memorandum, allegedly penned by Dugin, mapping out the European far-right into three broad factions: the Christian right, the Neo-Nazis, and the New Right.\n\n267\nDugin predicted that these actors would become \"an essential factor...in Russian-European relations,\" arguing that the \"extremely influential\" New Right factionconsisting of parties like the French National Front, the Austrian Freedom Party, the Italian Northern League, and the Alternative for Germanywould be the most suitable partner for Russia, as it \"has a sympathy for Orthodoxy, supports Russia and Putin, consistently stands on anti-American and anti Atlantist positions.\" Dugin also claimed that the CIA and the Mossad control the neo-Nazi movements in Europe, which are often led by Jews and homosexuals.\n\n268\n\nAnother insightful item from Gavrish's correspondence was a document containing a list of foreign contacts with whom Dugin supposedly discussed creating a pro-Russian \"information initiative.\"\n269 The list was composed largely of European but also South American, Middle Eastern, and Asian politicians and journalists. Christo Grozev and Anton Shekovstsov have suggested that Dugin's analysis led to the creation of *Katehon*, which began operating shortly after the memorandum was written, and features \"many authors\"\n270\nfrom the foreign contacts list.\n\n## Katehon's Social Media Platforms As Of June 2020\n\nPlatform\nLanguage\nEngagement\nEnglish\n12,155 followers\nSpanish\npage currently unavailable\nArabic\n49,863 followers\nFacebook\nFrench\npage currently unavailable\nGerman\npage currently unavailable\nRussian\n775 followers, not updated since 2016\nInstagram Katehon_news\n70 followers\nEnglish\nAccount suspended\nSpanish\nAccount suspended\nFrench\nAccount suspended\nTwitter\nArabic\n357 followers\nGerman\n33 followers, no new posts since 2017\nRussian\n828 followers, no new posts since 2016\nEnglish\n5.93K subscribers, 1,069,466 views, most recent video uploaded 2 years ago\nYouTube\nSerbian\n24 subscribers, most recent video uploaded 4 years ago\n\n## Digital Media Analysis Summary:\n\nBetween February and April 2020, the seven Kremlin-aligned disinformation proxy sites and organizations profiled in this report amplified narratives critical of the United States and favorable to Russian positions, particularly in relation to the COVID-19 outbreak. Four of the outletsGlobal Research, SouthFront, *New Eastern Outlook*, and Strategic Culture Foundation were observed publishing one another's content on 141 occasions, indicative of possible collaboration among them. Published content appeared in a variety of languages and was shared across multiple social media platforms.\n\n## Website Analytics\n\nThe Global Engagement Center (GEC) analyzed web traffic to seven Kremlin-aligned proxy sites and organizations and their sub-domains between 1 February and 30 April 2020.\n\n271 The table below displays the number of page visits, the number of articles published, and the average potential readership per article for each outlet during this period. As the table shows, Global Research, *News Front* and *SouthFront* received the most page visits and published the most articles over the three months; however, there were vast differences in the potential sizes of their readerships.\n\n272\nAt more than 350,000 potential readers per article, no other outlet had half as much reach as Global Research; in fact, despite authoring the greatest number of articles, *News Front* had only 12% of the number of potential readers per article (nearly 42,000), the third lowest overall. By contrast, *Geopolitica.ru* authored the second fewest articles but had the second highest potential readership per article; at more than 145,000, it was 41% the size of *Global Research*'s potential readership.\n\nSite\nNumber of Page\nA\nVisits\nNumber\nof Articles\nPublished\nGlobal Research\n12,370,000\n2,307\n351,247\n--\nNews Front\n8,950,000\n3,617\n41,895\n0.12\nSouthFront\n4,300,000\n1,546\n126,411\n0.36\nGeopolitica.ru\n1,480,000\n224\n145,304\n0.41\nStrategic Culture\n990,000\n420\n48,789\n0.14\nFoundation\nNew Eastern Outlook\n540,000\n402\n17,667\n0.05\nKatehon\n225,000\n26\n17,982\n0.05\n\nA Page visits data was retrieved from SimilarWeb on 1 July 2020 and includes outlets' main websites and sub-domains, where available.\n\nB SimilarWeb potential readership is defined as the number of people who potentially saw an article based on the number of unique visitors to the publication's website.\n\nC Values in this column represent the relative rate of potential readership, controlling for number of articles published, compared to Global Research, which had 351,247 potential readers per article published between 1 February and 30 April\n2020.\n\n## Amplification Of Russian Narratives\n\nDuring the period of analysis, the seven outlets consistently embraced positions reflective of the Russian government and state-funded media. They reposted or referenced RT content (92 mentions), reposted or referenced *Sputnik* content (78 mentions), and referenced Russian MFA Spokesperson Mariya Zakharova\n(35 times).\n\n273 These articles included opinion pieces, long-reads, and short articles, including some with links to videos. Senior Russian officials and pro-Russian media sought to capitalize on the fear and confusion surrounding the COVID-19 pandemic by actively promulgating conspiracy theories. For example, they promoted conspiracy theories centered around false U.S. bioweapon infrastructure. We observed five of the seven outlets promoting this narrative across 30 articles. On 20 February, *New Eastern Outlook*\npublished an article in both Russian and English claiming that the U.S. deployed a biological weapon\n274\nagainst China.\n\nRatio of Potential\nAverage Potential\nReaders/Article vs. Global\nB\nReadership per Article\nC\nResearch\n\nThen on 22 February, *News Front'*s Bulgarian language edition published an adapted version of the same article.\n\n275 On 5 March, RT published an article, titled \"Coronavirus May Be a Product of US Biological Attack Aimed at Iran and China, IRGC chief claims \" which was re-published by *Global Research* on 6 March and then by *News Front*'s German edition on 9 March.\n\n276 On 16 March, the narrative evolved to suggest the U.S. military had used a bioweapon in Cuba, and on 18 March, another *Global Research* article asserted that China considers the virus to be a bioweapon.\n\n277 On 20 March, *News Front* insinuated that a U.S. lab in Georgia was involved in the creation of the coronavirusa narrative *News Front* continued to promote\n278\nthroughout the period examined.\n\n## Cross-Platform Content Amplification\n\nAmong the seven media outlets, four were observed frequently re-posting one another's content. Specifically, among Global Research, New Eastern Outlook, *SouthFront*, and *Strategic Culture Foundation*, 141 articles were originally posted by one outlet and later re-posted by another during the three-month period of analysis. Of particular note, *Global Research* re-posted 50 videos originally published by *SouthFront*.\n\n279\nBecause of this pattern of cross-posting content, these four outlets formed an especially interconnected set of nodes within the broader network of the seven websites examined. Below is a sample of articles that were recycled from one outlet to another, which demonstrates the variety of sources that potentially collaborated, the range of topics that were covered, and the varying durations between original and republication dates:\nThese four outlets often re-published their own articles in more than one language. *Global Research* posted in Italian, French, and English,\n280 *New Eastern Outlook* in English and Russian,\n281 *News Front* in Bulgarian and German,\n282 and *SouthFront* in English and German.\n\n283 Although these outlets tended to post one another's content, they did not tend to post translated versions of another site's content; article translations were only observed within each site.\n\n## Content Engagement By Shares On Social Media\n\nAmong the 8,542 articles published by the seven outlets between 1 February and 30 April, 1,941 (23%) were shared on Twitter via 20,670 tweets. A *Global Research* article titled \"China's Coronavirus: A Shocking Update.\n\nDid the Virus Originate in the US?\" posted on 4 March was among the top-five most shared articles in the data set (424 tweets). The article has since been removed by *Global Research*, but it is still referenced on the social media platform Reddit and by fringe media sites.\n\n284 A *News Front* Spanish edition article titled \"Hell in New York: One Coronavirus Death Every 17 minutes: Doctors Can't Keep Up\" was shared via 388 tweets, propelling a narrative aimed at undermining public trust in the U.S. national healthcare system.285 The mostshared Russian-language article (shared via 221 tweets) was published by *News Front*, and speculated that\n286\nthe EU budget under negotiation would substantially decrease support to the Baltic countries.\n\nIn addition to Twitter, 137 articles (1.6%) were shared 15,052 times on Facebook. A *News Front* Bulgaria article praising Russia's assistance to Serbia during the coronavirus pandemic received the greatest number of Facebook sharesa total of 2,000.\n\n287 The second-most shared article (1,381 shares) was published by *News Front Bulgaria* and reported that, according to a survey published in Foreign Affairs, residents of Crimea were confident that Russia would withstand the pressure of sanctions imposed by the United States and other Western countries.\n\n288 The third-most shared article on Facebook was published by *SouthFront*, and reported on the killing of a senior al-Qa'ida commander in a Russian airstrike on 12 February in Western Aleppo.\n\n289\n\n## Twitter Analysis Summary\n\nThe GEC analyzed Twitter mentions of seven Kremlin-aligned\n\nOutlet\nMentions\n\nproxy sites and organizations: Global Research, *News Front*,\n\nGlobal Research\n85,055\n\nSouthFront, Strategic Culture Foundation, Geopolitica.ru, *Katehon*\n\nNews Front\n29,955\n\nand *New Eastern Outlook*. Twitter mentions included tweets\n\nSouthFront\n26,822\nStrategic Culture Foundation\n17,213\n\nand re-tweets that linked to articles published by these outlets,\n\nGeopolitica.ru\n6,989\n\neither from the outlets' Twitter accounts or from other users\n\nNew Eastern Outlook\n5,116\n\nlinking to the articles. Of these seven outlets, *Global Research*\n\nKatehon\n2,099\n\nand *SouthFront* have the largest presence on Twitter, as judged by the number of Twitter accounts they operate and the number of followers on each account. However, in terms of Twitter mentions, all seven outlets had their articles disseminated on the platform. Accounts tweeting these articles during the reporting period were geotagged to the UK (16%), Russia (9%), and Canada (7%). The most popular hashtags #covid19 and #coronavirus along with a manual analysis of most-shared content, suggest that COVID-19 was the primary focus.\n\n## Report\n\nFrom 1 April through 30 June 2020, the GEC identified 173,000 tweets and retweets that  included links to these outlets. The table displays the number of times each outlet was linked to (mentioned) on Twitter. Except for *Global Research* and *SouthFront*, the examined outlets have a relatively limited Twitter presence\nNews Front's Twitter accounts have all been suspended and *New Eastern Outlook* does not have an active Twitter account. Nevertheless, content from these outlets is still shared widely on the platform. Approximately 59,000 accounts globally, excluding those in the United States, shared articles from these outlets during the reporting period. However, most of this activity came from a concentrated group of active accounts. About 1% of all the accounts in the query tweeted more than 35% of tweets sharing these articles, while the top 0.1% of accounts tweeted almost 18% of the tweets in our sample.\n\n| Account           | Outlet          | Followers   | Last Active   |\n|-------------------|-----------------|-------------|---------------|\n| @CRG_CRM          | Global Research |             |               |\n| 37.4K             | Present         |             |               |\n| @southfronteng    | SouthFront      |             |               |\n| 27.8K             | Present         |             |               |\n| @GRTVnews         | Global Research |             |               |\n| 19.8K             | Nov 2018        |             |               |\n| @Strateg_Culture  |                 |             |               |\n| Strategic Culture |                 |             |               |\n| Foundation        |                 |             |               |\n| 5.6K              | May 2020        |             |               |\n| @Geopoliticaesp   | Geopolitica.ru  | 5.0K        | Present       |\n| @geopolitica_FR   | Geopolitica.ru  | 262         | May 2019      |\n| @KatehonA         | Katehon         | 368         | Present       |\n\nOf the 0.1% most active accounts, *News Front* was the sole outlet never tweeted by accounts tweeting articles from multiple outlets. *Global Research* and *New Eastern Outlook* were the two outlets that were most likely to be tweeted by the same account. Several of the most active accounts shared content from more than half of the outlets included in our analysis, where articles frequently spread sensationalized or questionable content, including outright disinformation. For more information regarding cross-platform content amplification among these outlets, please see the Digital Media Analysis section of this report. According to self-reported locations, accounts tweeting these articles were concentrated in the following top ten locations:\n\n1.  UK (16%) 2.  Russia (9%) 3.  Canada (7%) 4.  Japan (6%) 5.  France (5%) 6.  Spain (4%) 7.  Chile (4%) 8.  Venezuela (4%) 9.  Germany (3%) 10.  Australia (3%)\nGiven its prominence in the dataset, many of the overarching topics reflected the narratives promoted by Global Research. Across the entire dataset of tweets that amplified articles from the outlets included in this report, the most used hashtags were:\n\n1.  #covid19 (4,358 tweets) 2.  #coronavirus (2,265 tweets) 3.  #us (949 tweets) 4.  #billgates (867 tweets) 5.  #china (718 tweets)\nThe daily tweet volume was relatively stable across the period examined, except for a dramatic peak on 30 May. This peak was driven by extensive sharing of a *Strategic Culture Foundation* article claiming that a German official leaked a report denouncing COVID-19 as \"A Global False Alarm.\"\n290 This article, which contains misinformation downplaying the threat of COVID-19, was the most shared articletweeted more than 15,000 timesduring the reporting period. The report at the center of the article was denounced by the German government as the work of a lone employee who used the German Federal Ministry of the Interior (BMI)'s official letterhead to support the employee's private opinion.\n\n291 The Strategic Culture Foundation article also references an RT article that includes a press release defending the BMI employee and criticizing the German Federal Ministry.\n\n292 Although the central claims of the report have been refutedthe report was fact-checked by Health Feedback as \"unsupported\" and criticized by Der Spiegel\n293\nfor exaggerating and citing \"dubious blogs\"*Strategic Culture Foundation* endorsed the false claims.\n\nWhile the most widely shared article originated from the Strategic Culture Foundation, *Global Research* was the most prominent outlet, accounting for almost half of all the articles shared on Twitter. Most of Global Research's content included sensationalized coverage or disinformation about COVID-19 and vaccines, often featuring false claims about the U.S. government or Bill Gates. Although COVID-19 disinformation was the most prominent topic, conspiracy theories were mixed in, many of them making accusations against the United States or U.S. citizens. The most widely shared articles included:\n\n294\n-\n \"\"Greater Israel\": The Zionist Plan for the Middle East\" (2,656 tweets);\n-\n \"US Hospitals Getting Paid More to Label Cause of Death as 'Coronavirus'\" (2,427 tweets);\n295 and\n-\n \"'Mass Sterilization:' Kenyan Doctors Find Anti-fertility Agent in UN Tetanus Vaccine\" (2,127 tweets).\n296\nNews Front was the second-most shared outlet on Twitter during the reporting period. Popular content from this outlet focused on pro-Russian narratives and geopolitics related to the United States, Eastern Europe, and Latin America. Its most popular content was written in Russian and Spanish. The most widely shared articles included:\n\n297\n-\n\"Alexander Rogers: Those who betrayed their homeland lose their talent\" (1,223 tweets);\n-\n\"Swedish-Palestinian journalist dies just before exposing Soros and Aschberg\" (873 tweets);\n298  and\n-\n\"Supreme Court of Brazil asks to suspend Bolsonaro for 180 days due to its inefficiency against the\n299\ncoronavirus\"(434 tweets).\nThe most popular articles from *SouthFront*, the third-most shared outlet in this analysis, focused on conspiracy theories related to COVID-19, conflict in the Middle East, and criticism of the United States. Accounts sharing content from this outlet were concentrated in Japan and European nations. Most of the Japanese activity was from accounts associated with \"QAnon,\" a conspiracy theory focused on the \"deep state.\" The most widely shared articles included:\n\n-\n\"THE CORONAVIRUS COVID-19 PANDEMIC: THE REAL DANGER IS \"AGENDA ID2020\"\" (881 tweets);\n300\n-\n\"SOUTHFRONT'S YOUTUBE CHANNEL IS BANNED\" (760 tweets);\n301 and\n-\n\"U.S. USED $601M SEIZED FROM VENEZUELA TO FUND BORDER WALL WITH MEXICO\" (665\ntweets).\n302\nStrategic Culture Foundation was the fourth-most shared outlet in our analysis, with the majority of tweets linking to the article mentioned above. Other popular content from the outlet also focused on COVID-19- related disinformation that made references to the U.S. government and Bill Gates. The most widely shared articles included:\n\n303\n-\n\"German Official Leaks Report Denouncing Corona as 'A Global False Alarm'\" (15,020 tweets);\n-\n\"Is It Time to Launch an Investigation Into the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation for Possible 'Crimes Against Humanity'?\" (418 tweets);\n304 and\n-\n\"What Did U.S. Intel Really Know About the 'Chinese' Virus?\" (302 tweets).\n305\nGeopolitica.ru, the fifth-most shared outlet, was most popular among accounts in Spanish-speaking countries including Chile, Spain, and Venezuela. Popular content from the outlet highlighted criticism of the United States, George Soros, and the modern day Western anti-fascism movement. The most widely shared articles included:\n\n-\n\"PUTIN: 95% OF WORLD TERRORIST ATTACKS ARE MADE BY THE CIA\" (1,963 tweets);\n306\n-\n\"SOCIAL ENGINEERING: GLOBALIST SOROS WANTS ABORTIONS WORLDWIDE\" (676 tweets);\n307 and\n308\n-\n\"ANTI (FASCISTS): THE GLOBALISTS' ARMY OF TERROR\" (1,963 tweets).\nNew Eastern Outlook, the sixth-most shared outlet, focused on English-language articles related to COVID-19. These articles criticized the United States and \"big pharma.\" The most widely shared articles included:\n\n309\n-\n\"Why is Trump Drumbeating a 'New Cold War' with China?\" (1,078 tweets);\n-\n\"The Remarkable Doctor A. Fauci\" (286 tweets);\n310\nKatehon was the least-shared outlet on Twitter in our analysis. Most of the accounts sharing this content were located in Europe. Many of the popular topics focused on criticizing and exposing the global \"deep state.\" The most widely shared articles included:\n\n-\n \"WHO IS ENRICO SASSOON, GODFATHER OF \"CASALEGGIO ASSOCIATI\" AND \"5 STAR MOVEMENT\"?\"\n311\n(454 tweets);\n-\n\"THE HUB OF WORLD EVIL: THE BRITISH DEEP STATE\" (182 tweets);\n312 and\n-\n\"EUROPE: ON THE EVE OF THE CIVIL WAR?\" (43 tweets).\n313\n\n## References\n\n1https://www.nytimes.com/2020/07/28/us/politics/russia-disinformation-coronavirus.html 2https://www.nytimes.com/2020/07/28/us/politics/russia-disinformation-coronavirus.html 3https://www.rusprofile.ru/id/4627728 4https://web.archive.org/web/20100908070545/http:/www.strategic-culture.org/ 5https://www.nytimes.com/2020/07/28/us/politics/russia-disinformation-coronavirus.htmlttps://www.strategic-culture.org/ 6https://www.strategic-culture.org/ 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74https://web.archive.org/web/20171117193837/https:/www.theglobeandmail.com/news/world/canadian-website-in-natos-sights-for-spreading-disinformation/article37015521/ 75http://www.slobodan-milosevic.org/news/smorg091304.htm 76https://www.globalresearch.ca/happy-birthday-fidel-castro/26009 77https://web.archive.org/web/20121026130610/http:/www.4thmedia.org/aboutus/,\nhttps://web.archive.org/web/20150516032538/http:/www.4thmedia.org/aboutus/\n78https://www.globalresearch.ca/author/finian-cunningham\n79https://www.strategic-culture.org/news/2012/11/12/high-stakes-in-bahrain-repression/,\nhttps://www.strategic-culture.org/contributors/?letter=C\n80https://www.globalresearch.ca/author/pepe-escobar/page/5,\nhttps://www.strategic-culture.org/contributors/pepe-escobar/\n81https://www.strategic-culture.org/contributors/federico-pieraccini/ 82https://www.globalresearch.ca/failed-turkish-coup-sabotage-incompetence-or-deception/5537479 83https://www.globalresearch.ca/author/federico-pieraccini 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https://sputniknews.com/politics/201607251043602692-turkey-erdogan-military-coup/\n87http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/1133318.shtml,\nhttps://qz.com/745577/inside-the-global-times-chinas-hawkish-belligerent-state-tabloid/\n88https://www.globalresearch.ca/author/southfront/page/21,\nhttps://web.archive.org/web/20150628083839/http:/southfront.org/\n89https://web.archive.org/web/20180308143532/https:/www.strategic-culture.org/ 90https://web.archive.org/web/20180314230228/https:/www.strategic-culture.org/\n91https://web.archive.org/web/20171117193837/https:/www.theglobeandmail.com/news/world/canadian-website-in-natos-sights-for-spreading-disinformation/article37015521/\n114https://cfuv.ru/wp-content/uploads/2016/08/090203-opop-2017-o.pdf 115https://news-front.info/about/, https://news-front.info/2016/07/21/kak-dobrovolcy-nezavisimogo-agentstva-news-front-ispugali-professionalov-nemeckogo-gosudarstvennogo-telekanala-ard-konstantin-knyrik/, https://www.codastory.com/disinformation/armed-conflict/meet-the-kremlins-keyboard-warrior-in-crimea/\n116https://ru.krymr.com/a/27871931.html, https://www.codastory.com/disinformation/armed-conflict/meet-the-kremlins-keyboard-warrior-in-crimea/, https://time.com/4889471/germany-election-russia-fake-news-angela-merkel/, https://www.zeit.de/zustimmung?url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.zeit.de%2Fdigital%2Finternet%2F2017-02%2Fbundestag-elections-fake-news-manipulation-russia-hackercyberwar%2Fkomplettansicht\n117https://medium.com/dfrlab/facebook-removes-propaganda-outlets-linked-to-russian-security-services-51fbe2f6b841 118https://www.zeit.de/zustimmung?url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.zeit.de%2Fdigital%2Finternet%2F2017-02%2Fbundestag-elections-fake-news-manipulation-russia-hackercyberwar%2Fkomplettansicht\n119https://euvsdisinfo.eu/disinformation-cases/?text=News+Front&date=&offset=130 120https://euvsdisinfo.eu/report/coronavirus-was-spread-around-the-world-from-the-worldwide-us-biological-laboratories/, https://de.news-front.info/2020/01/25/massenepidemie-in-china-coronavirus-eine-neue-entwicklung-aus-den-biolaboren-des-pentagon/, https://news-front.info/2020/01/30/kitajskij-koronavirus-zastavil-vspomnit-o-sobytiyah-na-ukraine-desyatiletnej-davnosti/, https://euvsdisinfo.eu/report/us-tests-ethnic-weapons-against-slavs-in-its-biolabs-in-ukraine/, https://en.news-front.info/2020/04/06/us-staged-coronavirus-terror-for-illegal-immigrants-migrants-plead-for-deportation/, https://euvsdisinfo.eu/report/us-servicemen-imported-coronavirus-intentionally-into-china/\n121https://euvsdisinfo.eu/disinformation-cases/?text=News+Front&date=&offset=110, https://euvsdisinfo.eu/disinformation-cases/?text=News+Front&date=&offset=70, https://euvsdisinfo.eu/report/cia-ordered-puppet-zelenskyy-extend-sanctions-against-russian-social-media/, https://euvsdisinfo.eu/report/more-than-1500-ukrainian-soldiers-in-donbas-are-infected-with-a-coronavirus/, https://euvsdisinfo.eu/report/kiev-stops-public-transport-nazis-are-patrolling-the-streets/, https://euvsdisinfo.eu/report/an-ukrainian-terrorist-attack-was-perpetrated-in-the-us-a-situation-similar-to-the-2014-coup-in-kyiv/\n122https://euvsdisinfo.eu/report/eu-is-dead-it-is-incapable-to-take-control-over-the-coronavirus-crisis/, https://euvsdisinfo.eu/report/the-coronavirus-epidemic-proves-that-the-eu-has-abandoned-ukraine/, https://euvsdisinfo.eu/report/kievs-western-protectors-are-inflaming-war-in-the-donbass/, https://euvsdisinfo.eu/report/the-eu-provoked-a-civil-war-in-ukraine-now-it-destabilises-belarus/\n123https://euvsdisinfo.eu/report/nato-did-not-help-spain-fight-coronavirus/, https://euvsdisinfo.eu/report/nato-does-not-care-about-montenegro-amid-covid-19-pandemic/, https://euvsdisinfo.eu/report/nato-spreads-the-coronavirus-in-the-eu/%20%20%E2%80%A2\n124https://news-front.info/2020/03/22/v-ssha-znali-o-gryadushhej-epidemii-davno/, https://euvsdisinfo.eu/report/bill-gates-and-other-globalists-use-the-corona-pandemic-to-implant-microchips-in-the-whole-of-humanity/, https://euvsdisinfo.eu/report/coronavirus-vaccines-big-pharma-fraud-bill-gates/\n125https://about.fb.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/05/April-2020-CIB-Report.pdf 126https://about.fb.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/05/April-2020-CIB-Report.pdf 127https://about.fb.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/05/April-2020-CIB-Report.pdf 128https://www.facebook.com/konstantin.knyrik/posts/550798279162508 129https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCt94dhpYV06IMOTXcGXt3eQ 130https://www.mid.ru/en/diverse/-/asset_publisher/zwI2FuDbhJx9/content/ob-udalenii-video-hostingom-youtube-akkauntov-telekanala-krym-24-informagentstv-anna-news-inews-front-?_101_INSTANCE_zwI2FuDbhJx9_redirect=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.mid.ru%2Fen%2Fdiverse%3Fp_p_id%3D101_INSTANCE_zwI2FuDbhJx9%26p_p_lifecycle%3D0%26p_p_ state%3Dnormal%26p_p_mode%3Dview%26p_p_col_id%3Dcolumn-1%26p_p_col_pos%3D2%26p_p_col_count%3D6\n131https://twitter.com/News_Front_info/ 132https://medium.com/dfrlab/facebook-removes-propaganda-outlets-linked-to-russian-security-services-51fbe2f6b841 133https://isfed.ge/eng/blogi/saqartveloshi-politikuri-polarizatsiis-khelshemtskobi-rusuli-sainformatsio-operatsia-feisbuqze-da-masshi-chartuli-araavtenturi-angarishebi\n\n157https://southfront.org/about-southfront/ 158https://southfront.org/about-southfront/ 159https://southfront.org/donate/ 160https://southfront.org/appeal-of-southfront-steering-committee-regarding-censorship-on-youtube-and-facebook/ 161https://maps.southfront.org/bellingcats-five-star-investigation-reveals-identity-of-southfront-founder/,\nhttps://www.bellingcat.com/news/2019/09/30/pro-assad-lobby-group-rewards-bloggers-on-both-the-left-and-the-right/\n162https://southfront.org/appeal-of-southfront-steering-committee-regarding-censorship-on-youtube-and-facebook/ 163https://www.facebook.com/ViktorStoilovOfficial/ ,\nhttps://www.facebook.com/markademics\n164https://southfront.org/new-red-bloc-russian-chinese-alliance/ 165https://southfront.org/distraction-tactics-reports-of-chinese-and-iranian-hacking-russians-behind-protests/ 166https://southfront.org/how-and-why-the-us-government-perpetrated-the-2014-coup-in-ukraine/ 167https://southfront.org/documentary-on-mh17-reveals-5-year-long-string-of-lies/ 168https://southfront.org/another-step-towards-ukraine-like-scenario-for-belarus/ 169https://southfront.org/the-venezuela-iran-axis-of-unity-and-resistance-stands-the-test-of-time/ 170https://southfront.org/opcw-manipulated-chemical-weapons-report-on-syrias-douma-by-removing-critical-details/ 171https://southfront.org/russia-says-it-has-undeniable-evidence-that-militants-are-responsible-for-chemical-attack-on-aleppo/ 172https://southfront.org/russian-foreign-ministrys-comment-on-fifth-anniversary-of-crimeas-reunification-with-russia/\nhttps://southfront.org/turkey-activates-certain-elements-of-s-400-anti-aircraft-missile-systems/,\nhttps://southfront.org/two-new-disappointments-for-the-coup-planners-in-venezuela/\n173https://southfront.org/an-in-depth-look-behind-the-scenes-of-southfront-censorship/ ,\nhttps://euvsdisinfo.eu/south-front-russia-hiding-being-russian/ , https://southfront.org/self-isolation-sobyanin-style-moscow-authorities-introduce-virus-quarantine-passes-drastically-limiting-freedoms-of-residents/\n174https://southfront.org/an-in-depth-look-behind-the-scenes-of-southfront-censorship/ ,\nhttps://english.khamenei.ir/news/4740/Iran-is-a-bright-and-shining-light-for-other-countries-to-follow\n175https://southfront.org/phenomena-of-coronavirus-crisis/ 176https://southfront.org/covid-19-the-fight-for-a-cure-one-gigantic-western-pharma-rip-off 177https://southfront.org/the-coronavirus-covid-19-pandemic-the-real-danger-is-agenda-id2020/ 178https://southfront.org/usa-plan-militarized-control-of-population-the-national-covid-19-testing-action-plan/ 179https://southfront.org/finally-eu-blames-kremlin-disinformation-for-coronavirus-crisis/ 180https://southfront.org/covid-19-crisis-in-russia-lockdown-craziness-and-opposition-provocations/ 181https://southfront.org/an-in-depth-look-behind-the-scenes-of-southfront-censorship/ 182https://southfront.org/category/all-articles/products/maps/infographics/,\nhttps://southfront.org/category/all-articles/products/maps/page/1/, https://southfront.org/search/Military+Situation/, https://southfront.org/category/southfront-tv/\n183https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCEV64LEWBVF0h48eUDxI96Q/featured 184https://syrianfreepress.wordpress.com/about/#comment-27585 185https://syrianfreepress.wordpress.com/about/#comment-30479 186https://syrianfreepress.wordpress.com/about/#comment-30485 187https://southfront.org/russian-foreign-ministry-finally-reacted-to-censorship-on-youtube-and-facebook/ 188https://www.geopolitica.ru/ 189https://www.eurozine.com/putins-brain/ 190https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/russia-fsu/2014-03-31/putins-brain 191https://tec.fsi.stanford.edu/docs/aleksandr-dugins-foundations-geopolitics ,\nhttps://www.eurozine.com/putins-brain/\n192https://www.eurozine.com/putins-brain/ 193https://tec.fsi.stanford.edu/docs/aleksandr-dugins-foundations-geopolitics 194https://katehon.com/ 195https://rkn.gov.ru/mass-communications/reestr/media/p100/?id=337269&page=100,\nhttps://web.archive.org/web/20121120174521/http:/geopolitica.ru/, https://web.archive.org/web/20171225083859/https:/www.geopolitica.ru/\n196https://www.geopolitica.ru/en/mission 197https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/russia-fsu/2014-03-31/putins-brain 198https://foreignpolicy.com/2016/07/27/geopolitics-russia-mackinder-eurasia-heartland-dugin-ukraine-eurasianism-manifest-destiny-putin/ 199http://anton-shekhovtsov.blogspot.com/2014/02/pro-russian-network-behind-anti.html 200https://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/jl9993.aspx 201http://cge.evrazia.org/about.shtml,\nhttps://vk.com/neokons\n202https://www.geopolitica.ru/contact,\nhttps://www.rusprofile.ru/history/10349103\n203https://www.geopolitica.ru/en/person/leonid-savin 204https://www.rferl.org/a/greek-syriza-deep-ties-russian-eurasianist-dugin/26818523.html 205https://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/jl9729.aspx 206https://www.fondsk.ru/authors/leonid-savin-33.html 207https://www.globalresearch.ca/author/leonid-savin,\nhttps://rb.gy/x8nrdz, https://rb.gy/ylendv, https://rb.gy/vg0re8, https://rb.gy/gakiku\n208https://rb.gy/wulcke,\nhttps://www.geopolitica.ru/en/article/false-flag-operation-brussels ,\nhttps://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-35869985\n213https://www.geopolitica.ru/en/article/new-malthusianism-and-misanthrope-dynasties 214https://www.geopolitica.ru/en/article/coronavirus-and-hybrid-warfare 215https://www.geopolitica.ru/en/news/former-putins-aide-coronavirus-us-biological-weapon, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/mar/23/ukraine-crimea-what-putin-thinking-russia\n216https://www.geopolitica.ru/en/article/pandemic-service-globalization, 217https://www.geopolitica.ru/node/73750 218https://www.geopolitica.ru/en/article/pandemic-and-politics-survival-horizons-new-type-dictatorship 219https://euvsdisinfo.eu/disinformation-cases/?text=geopolitica.ru&date=&offset=0, https://euvsdisinfo.eu/report/the-western-world-is-dominated-by-a-handful-of-perverts-and-is-based-on-the-lies-of-woke-ideologies/ , https://euvsdisinfo.eu/report/the-genocide-of-the-russians-in-ukraine-began-in-2014-with-the-violation-of-the-rights-of-ukraines-russian-speaking-population/ , https://euvsdisinfo.eu/report/todays-western-males-are-feminized-semi-men-who-are-not-able-to-protect-their-women-raped-by-immigrants/, https://euvsdisinfo.eu/ disinformation-cases/?text=geopolitica.ru&date=&offset=70\n220https://www.rusprofile.ru/founders/10349103 , https://www.rusprofile.ru/founders/7548034, https://tsargrad.tv/pervyi_russkij\n221https://katehon.com/ 222https://katehon.com/ru 223https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/mar/06/russia-revolution-tsarist-school-moscow-nicholas-ii , https://tsargrad.tv/news/jeto-ne-piar-patriarh-kirill-nazval-blagotvoritelnost-vizitnoj-kartochkoj-cerkvi_215548\n224https://tsargrad.tv/news/jeto-ne-piar-patriarh-kirill-nazval-blagotvoritelnost-vizitnoj-kartochkoj-cerkvi_215548 225https://www.rbc.ru/rbcfreenews/553502619a79471f3e9554dd, http://ligainternet.ru/en/liga/about.php, https://meduza.io/en/feature/2017/07/27/the-kids-aren-t-alright\n226http://www.ligainternet.ru/upload/docs/liga-2016-v-17.pdf, https://novayagazeta.ru/articles/2013/02/27/53718-tsenzor-151-dohodnoe-mesto, http://en.kremlin.ru/catalog/persons/65/biography, http://www.scrf.gov.ru/council/composition/\n227https://thebell.io/en/russia-s-orthodox-tycoon-is-bankrolling-a-monarchist-movement-but-where-does-he-get-his-money/ 228https://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/jl9729.aspx , https://www.wsj.com/articles/eu-places-sanctions-on-russian-oligarchs-1406749975\n229https://tsargrad.tv/news/rossija-namerena-dekolonizirovat-afriku-zapad-vydavlivajut-s-chernogo-kontinenta_222972 230https://katehon.com/about-us 231https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-08-16/putin-s-iconoclastic-economics-guru-to-lose-kremlin-post, http://www.eurasiancommission.org/en/act/integr_i_makroec/Pages/default.aspx\n232https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/OFAC-Enforcement/Pages/20140317.aspx 233http://council.gov.ru/en/structure/persons/303/, http://council.gov.ru/structure/commissions/iccf_def/#personnel\n234https://riss.ru/profile/prime/ 235https://www.bbc.com/russian/features-39662290 , https://meduza.io/feature/2017/04/20/reuters-obvinil-rossiyskiy-institut-strategicheskih-issledovaniy-vo-vmeshatelstve-v-vybory-prezidenta-ssha-chem-etot-institut-zanimaetsya\n236https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-russia-election-exclusive-idUSKBN17L2N3?feedType=RSS&feedName=topNews&utm_source=twitter&utm_medium=Social , https://www.wsj.com/articles/how-does-russia-meddle-in-elections-look-at-bulgaria-1490282352\n237https://riss.ru/analitycs/26987/ 238https://www.fontanka.ru/2012/01/27/138/ 239https://www.rusprofile.ru/id/10349103, http://fondsvv.ru/about\n240https://dailystorm.ru/kultura/a-esli-ogon-ne-soydet, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/reviews/capsule-review/2018-08-13/treacherous-path-insiders-account-modern-russia\n241http://fondsvv.ru/media-article?slug=plita-groba-gospodna-novodel, http://jerusalem-ippo.org/about/autors/?id=42, https://katehon.com/person/mihail-yakushev\n242https://www.rusprofile.ru/id/11643625 243https://web.archive.org/web/20191222123628/http:/centrisi.com/en/home-2/ 244http://confidentielafrique.com/pouvoir-reseau/russie-afrique-centre-strategique-affaires-africaines-signe-protocole-centre-initiatives-strategique-international-de-moscou/ 245https://www.rusprofile.ru/person/grachev-ag-772270379404 , http://www.kremlin.ru/acts/bank/32687 , https://zatulin.ru/stenogramma-kruglogo-stola-komiteta-gosudarstvennoj-dumy-po-delam-sodruzhestva-nezavisimyx-gosudarstv-i-svyazyam-s-sootechestvennikami-24-marta-2-\n011g/\n246https://www.kyivpost.com/article/content/ukraine-politics/foreign-ministry-studying-reports-on-possible-expu-46152.html https://www.bellingcat.com/news/uk-and-europe/2017/03/04/kremlins-balkan-gambit-part/\n260https://www.bellingcat.com/news/uk-and-europe/2017/03/25/balkan-gambit-part-2-montenegro-zugzwang/, https://www.fpri.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/07/kraemer-rfp5.pdf\n261https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/20/world/europe/putin-trump-election-kremlin.html 262https://www.rferl.org/a/bulgaria-charges-former-lawmaker-with-spying-for-russia/30157289.html https://www.rferl.org/a/russian-oligarch-malofeyev-banned-bulgaria-10-years-spy-scandal/30159179.html, https://www.rferl.org/a/bulgarian-accused-of-spying-awarded-russia-s-order-of-friendship/30252738.html\n263https://www.geopolitica.ru/en/article/ideological-platform-eurasian-movement, https://archive.li/I6ijI, https://www.ft.com/content/27125702-71ec-11e5-ad6d-f4ed76f0900a\n264https://www.bellingcat.com/news/uk-and-europe/2019/09/03/lega-nords-bedfellows-russians-offering-illicit-funding-to-italian-far-right-party-identified/, https://theins.ru/politika/2113\n265https://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/jl9993.aspx 266https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/apr/07/anonymous-international-hackers-kremlin, https://cgrozev.wordpress.com/2017/01/02/would-you-like-fries-with-that-conspiracy/\n267https://cgrozev.files.wordpress.com/2017/01/the-extreme-right-in-europe.pdf 268https://cgrozev.wordpress.com/2017/01/02/would-you-like-fries-with-that-conspiracy/ 269https://theins.ru/politika/2113, http://argumentua.com/stati/instrumenty-kremlya-eksklyuzivnyi-spisok-agentov-rossiiskogo-vliyaniya-v-evropeiskikh-stranakh\n270https://cgrozev.wordpress.com/2017/01/02/would-you-like-fries-with-that-conspiracy/, https://books.google.com/books?id=1rA0DwAAQBAJ&pg=PT191&lpg=PT191&dq=Katehon+France&source=bl&ots=vfPDYo5h7R&sig=ACfU3U03L2qWXqM0SCv_ E0n9kmLWtsuAYg&hl=en&sa=X&ved=2ahUKEwjA_ZGE3cDpAhVjmHIEHcD-Cv84ChDoATADegQIChAB#v=onepage&q=Katehon%20France&f=false Culture Foundation (strategic-culture.org), New Eastern Outlook (journal-neo.org, ru.journal-neo.org), and Katehon (katehon.com).\n\nhttps://www.globalresearch.ca/russian-indian-oil-deal-unpleasant-surprise-iran-not-us/5703466, https://www.globalresearch.ca/leaked-docs-point-no-buk-missile-systems-around-mh17-crash-area-dutch-journo-reveals/5703997, https://www.globalresearch.ca/historic-constitutional-changes-russia/5717576, https://en.news-front.info/2020/03/19/ukraine-is-preparing-a-provocation-in-the-crimea-zakharova/\n274https://ru.journal-neo.org/2020/02/20/biologicheskaya-vojna-ssha-protiv-kitaya/, https://journal-neo.org/2020/02/20/us-wages-biological-war-against-china/\n275https://bgr.news-front.info/2020/02/22/biologichnata-vojna-na-sashh-sreshhu-kitaj/ 276https://www.rt.com/news/482405-iran-coronavirus-us-biological-weapon/, https://www.globalresearch.ca/%d1%81oronavirus-product-us-biological-attack-aimed-iran-china-irgc-chief-claims/5705747, https://de.news-front.info/2020/03/09/coronavirus-aus-den-weltweiten-us-biolaboren-in-die-welt-verbreitet/\n277https://www.globalresearch.ca/covid-19-wuhan-virus-cia-biological-warfare-cuba/5706466, https://www.globalresearch.ca/beijing-believes-covid-19-biological-weapon/5706558\n278https://bgr.news-front.info/2020/03/20/biolaboratoriyata-na-sashh-v-gruziya-zaplaha-za-koronavirusa-ili-za-horata/ 279https://www.globalresearch.ca/video-turkish-drones-falling-idlib-moderate-rebels-gas-themselves-mistake/5705709 280https://www.globalresearch.ca/30-mila-soldati-dagli-usa-in-europa-senza-mascherina/5705348, https://www.mondialisation.ca/30-mille-soldats-arrivent-des-usa-en-europe-sans-masque/5642335, https://www.globalresearch.ca/30000-u-s-soldiers-sent-into-europe-without-masks/5706084\n281https://journal-neo.org/2020/02/25/defexpo-india-2020-military-cooperation-between-russia-and-india-is-as-good-as-ever/, https://ru.journal-neo.org/2020/02/25/defexpo-india-2020-rossijsko-indijskoe-vts-ne-oslabevaet/\n282https://bgr.news-front.info/2020/03/21/der-standard-rusiya-dejstva-po-reshitelno-v-borbata-sreshhu-koronavirusa-otkolkoto-es/, https://de.news-front.info/2020/03/21/der-standard-russland-hat-wirksamer-auf-die-ausbreitung-des-coronavirus-als-europa-reagiert/\n283https://southfront.org/escalation-or-de-escalation-prospects-of-russian-turkish-idlib-agreement/, https://de.southfront.org/eskalation-oder-de-eskalation-perspektiven-des-russisch-turkischen-idlib-abkommens/\n284https://es.news-front.info/2020/03/29/infierno-en-nueva-york-una-muerte-por-coronavirus-cada-17-minutos-los-medicos-no-pueden-seguir-el-ritmo/, https://www.reddit.com/r/Hong_Kong/comments/fhu9ij/coronaviruscovid19_originated_outside_china/, https://theduran.com/chinas-coronavirus-a-shocking-update-did-the-virus-originate-in-the-us/\n285https://es.news-front.info/2020/03/29/infierno-en-nueva-york-una-muerte-por-coronavirus-cada-17-minutos-los-medicos-no-pueden-seguir-el-ritmo/\n\n## Gec Special Report:\n\n# Pillars Of Russia's Disinformation And Propaganda\n\n## Ecosystem"
    },
    {
        "text": "Interviewing With An Intelligence Agency\n(or, A Funny Thing Happened On The Way To Fort Meade)\n\nBy Ralph J. Perro (a pseudonym), November 2003\nUpdated:  January 2004\nralph_j_perro@yahoo.com\n\nAbstract:  A first-person narrative of an applicant interviewing and going through the clearance process with the National Security Agency\n\n\nLength:  17 pages, plus bibliography and appendix.\n\nThis document was first published online by the Federation of American Scientists at http://www.fas.org/irp/eprint/nsa-interview.pdf\n\nTable of Contents\nThe Story........ 3\nHow Did I Get Here? ........ 3\nPsychological Exam........ 7\nWhat Does My Mother Have To Do With National Security?........ 7 The Handwritten Questionnaire........ 7 The Computerized Test........ 8 The Interview........ 9 Analysis (or \"What, Me Worried?\")........ 9\nPolygraph........ 12\nThe Interview........ 12\nAnalysis (or, \"Lying? Nervous? Indigestion?\") ........ 13\nBackground Investigation........ 15\nConclusion........ 17\nBibliography........ 19\nAppendix........ 20\nA Little More On The Five Factor Model........ 20\nExcerpt From Academy Executive Summary Report On Polygraph........ 21\nSample Clearance Process Definition........ 23 Freedom of Information Act ........ 23\nDoD Security Adjudication Guidelines ........ 24\nB. Adjudicative Process........ 24\nDoD Security Adjudication Appeal Cases........ 32\nAfterword ........ 37\n\n## The Story\n\n\n\"Shhhh!  There is a test in progress\" We had been shushed by the test proctor.  And for the second time. This might not sound unusual, but I was at Friendship Annex (FANX) - the NSA facility near the Baltimore-Washington International (BWI) airport where applicant processing takes place -being interviewed by a division manager and several of his direct reports for a systems-development position.  We were sitting in a large room directly behind the computerized testing facility where there were a gaggle of applicants taking foreign language tests.  Naturally, I had assumed that the walls were all copper-lined to prevent inter-room electromagnetic emissions, slathered with Jello (on the inside), and insulated with bubble-wrap, with \"Tunes of the Amish\" piped-in to confuse any bug-planting Russkies.  The walls would be watertight too, in case they need to *Dog The Hatches* - although that might only be applicable on things that float and sail.  But in actuality, these were ordinary office-walls.  Our voices had carried through as in any ordinary office setting.  For the most part, this was a reasonably standard office building except for the guns, soldiers, barbed wire, and an abnormally high number of locked doors.  Welcome to the National Security Agency. It's a good sign when your hosts are making as much or more noise than you are, but I said \"Sorry, we'll keep it down.\"  On the shelves in our room I spied several foreign language dictionaries and thought \"I am having way more fun than the people in the next room.\"\n\n## How Did I Get Here?\n\n I was in a period of professional transition and I had a brainstorm that I wanted to work for the National Security Agency.  It was a little bit of a lot of things: from the pre-NSA World War II crypto successes that I read in my youth (e.g., \"AF is short of freshwater\") - being a history nut, recent developments in world-events (e.g., 9/11), to the simple fact that it is the largest intelligence agency in the world.  And the agency has historically measured computing resources in acres.  *Acres*!  One can only imagine the top-secret high-tech synthesis of agricultural and computer science phraseology:  \"Go out and data-mine the back-40.  Harvest the intelligence.  We had a problem with the combine on last night's batch job.\"  Awesome! But the agency had issues.  A late 1999 external management review cited a technological gap with commercial practice, a broken Requirement & Delivery process, and poor stakeholder relations (with quotes such as \"when people say the NSA doesn't get it, they just talk louder\").  Too insular, and by inference, too in-bred.  Ouch.  From the report there were, no doubt, large numbers of smart people in the organization, but perhaps not enough people just crazy enough to believe they can break through the bureaucracy and crank up whatever they do a notch or ten.\n\n\n\"Hey, I can help with that!\"  I thought.  \"Wouldn't it be cool to not only work there, but to help make it better!\" And I even managed to get an interview. But actually *getting* to the NSA isn't easy - in more ways than one. To become an NSA employee, one must follow a process that can be as involved as the most invasive medical procedure ending in  \"-oscopy.\" For experienced personnel, the first step is to have a pre-screen interview, which is usually conducted over the phone.  If that goes well, an \"operational interview\" is scheduled with a hiring manager and other members of the team.  Each staff position to be filled is referred to as a \"billet\" - in the private sector this would be referred to as a position, position requisition, etc.  The hiring manager interviews several applicants to fill the billet, and if the interview goes well, a Conditional Job Offer (CJO) may be issued.  The CJO will specify jobgrade and salary, however it will not contain a start-date - because it's very much a conditional offer based on clearance.\n\n\nSecurity forms are distributed and if the applicant decides to proceed the forms are returned.  The forms go through \"forms review\" to check completeness and once the forms are deemed \"complete\" the action begins (timing note:\neven this reasonably simple step can take several weeks.)  An important difference between the private sector and intelligence agencies is that multiple CJOs may be issued per billet.  The first to finish the clearance process gets the job. Some things can be explained but not completely appreciated unless they are personally experienced.  Interviewing with the NSA is one of those experiences.  Hunter S. Thompson probably said it best with this description of a different event:  \"There is no way to understand the public reaction to the sight of a Freak smashing a coconut with a hammer on the hood of a white Cadillac in a Safeway parking lot unless you actually do it... and I tell you it's tense.\" Hunter was on his way to Las Vegas, and he was trying to convince his publisher for an extra-large expense account for some outrageous mescaline-enhanced adventures.  Me?  No drugs, thanks.  But hopefully I would be off to Fort Meade, and I needed to convince the NSA that I was an OK Guy.\n\n\nWhere Are We Going? But first, I needed to get to the interview.  Like physically *be there*.  The NSA's travel agency booked me on a cross-country flight from San Francisco to JFK, with a 45-minute layover to catch a puddle-jumper to BWI.  I reread the itinerary:  \"45 minute layover at JFK.\"  It was an aggressive schedule for certain.  And naturally, the initial flight was 44 minutes late taking off.  Making my connection was *still* a mathematical possibility. But nobody just lands and parks at JFK.  When the wheels hit the tarmac on the way down there is the obligatory screeching-and-slowing-down period as is expected from any jet aircraft, but then only at JFK does the airliner truly double as an over-gown taxi as it *taxies* for about 20 minutes in an around the airport, past the Concorde with its swept-back wings, over several highways, past few more planes.  And of course, periodically sitting still behind other planes, emulating Manhattan traffic. After 5 hours in the air, losing 3 hours due to the coast-to-coast time-change, and a scenic plane-taxi tour, by the time I sprinted to the gate my flight to BWI had long since departed.  Or maybe it was on the tarmac, they weren't sure.  Regardless, they said I couldn't get on whether the plane was in the air or on the ground. \"Note to Self: should the need arise in the future, always double-check the NSA travel plans.\"  I had the biggest interview of my life the next morning, it was late, and I might be stuck in New York City. So I smiled as wide as I could and dropped my voice an octave or two and said \"I just missed my connection.  I need to get anywhere near Washington D.C. by tonight. I'll take care of the rest.\"  I gave her a knowing nod on the last part, because as far as I was concerned parachuting was an option.  The airline employee could also see that I had wheels on the bottom of my overnight bag and I wasn't afraid to use them.  So she handed me a ticket and said \"Get on that plane.\" I had no idea where I was going but I was flying somewhere.  And I almost missed *that* flight because they were in the process of closing the gates.  I was the last person to get on the plane.  Once seated, I had to turn to the passenger next to me - a tourist from Finland - and ask *\"Say...where is this plane going to land?\"* The answer: Reagan National. So I took a 35-mile cab ride from Reagan to the hotel near BWI for $60 after shopping around for the best price\n(these were my tax dollars at work and I had every intention of expensing this unexpected leg of the trip). *Whew*.  But I got there. Kiitos to my Finnish co-passenger.  But rest assured, we Americans aren't normally this confused when we travel.\n\n\nAgents In Training? Even before I flew out for my operational interview, secrecy was a part of the program - a hallmark of any intelligence agency, and particularly the NSA.  When I called the travel agency to schedule my flight, I was told that when I called I should not identify myself as a NSA applicant on the phone, but by a different acronym. Let's say \"XYZ applicant\" for the sake of discussion.  And when I flew out for my interview, all I had was a department code number.  I had absolutely no idea what the department did.  And in the morning of the interview, all the applicants (for all types of positions) were handed temporary badges and told very solemnly to shield this badge from prying eyes, and not advertise that we were interviewing with the NSA.\n\n\"Now this is what interviewing with an intelligence agency is supposed to be like!\"  I thought. But large enterprises are comprised of individuals, and as individuals can be as human as the next, a few parts of the interview process were unintentionally more *Get Smart* than *Mission: Impossible*.  For example, after calling up and booking my hotel and flight giving the alias organization name over the phone, my confirmation email stated my room-type as \"NSA\" in clear-text.  A minor oops.\n\n\nAt the hotel, the hostess greeted every person coming to breakfast with the question *\"Are you an XYZ applicant?\"*\nbecause she needed to know if she should charge for fruit & cereal (which were free for the applicants).  By itself, it doesn't seem that funny unless one were to sit back in the corner of the dining room watching 20 or so applicants nervously entering for breakfast responding with a tentative \"yes\" as if the hostess was going to rip off her disguise and reveal herself to be in the employ of the NSA.  The secret tunnel to Fort Meade is located behind the wafflemaker, single-file please. Periodically, businessmen would enter, shake their heads at the \"applicant\" question, and state that they just wanted coffee. Concurrent with my hotel and plane scheduling, when I received a confirming email of my interview schedule the email stated 4 times I should be at FANX at 7:30am.  Thus, I planned my arrival at the requested time.  However, the email *also* stated that my interview started at 12:30pm (which I did think was odd).  Still, I arrived at 7:30am because, on a percentage basis, the confirming email stated \"7:30am\" 4 times more often than my actual interview time of \"12:30pm\".  When I arrived, after passing through the metal-detector, and swiping my badge and punching my security code as I went through the turnstile, I was told that I was indeed really *early* but I could have a cup of tea if I liked.  The tea-maker in the waiting-area of FANX was a machine where the user placed plastic cartridges in a black chamber that swung out when a button was pressed.  At least I think it was automated, and it definitely looked like it was from the future.  While my tea brewed, I gazed around the room.  Through the 1-way glass on the other side of the room I could see the parking lot (and the razor wire beyond), and the white wall to the right of the window held 3' x 4' collages of the Washington, DC. area.  The royal blue and white wall I was standing in front of was decorated with signs of classic NSA professions (e.g., \"language\", \"signals intelligence\", \"mathematics\") set on black backgrounds.  The profession-text was white and capitalized, but compensated stylistically, as I recall, by being set on a 15-degree angle.  The mathematics sign had equations and symbols for effect - although no doubt declassified.  Behind me, next to the coat rack, was a recruitment poster that said \"For your eyes only...\" When my tea was finished I realized it was indeed from the future: a future where over-steeped, tepid, tea was freely available from quasi-futuristic machines.  I was thirsty, so I quaffed it.  I hoped that my future would be more appealing. On my return trip on the hotel shuttle I managed to hide my temporary badge from a couple of tired airline pilots. A Leap of Faith When I did have my operational interview, I was impressed.  Four people interviewed me at the same time, which I very much preferred, as the interviewers could play off each other's questions and not repeat each other.  Likewise, I got to speak to all of them at the same time.  Nothing is worse than having 4 back-to-back 1-hour interviews with each interviewer asking the same questions as the previous, and in fact, this was quite the opposite.  They asked thoughtful, probing questions, and they were, above all, nice people.\n\nAt the end of the day, they were prepared to make a CJO.  In one day?  Is this my government?  I couldn't believe it.\nIn addition, the interview went well enough that the division manager said he was going to hold the position for me and not interview anybody else for the billet, clearance pending, of course.\n\nIt's been said that working at the NSA is a leap of faith.  So I leaped.  I returned my carefully completed forms detailing the last 10 years of my existence on this planet, along with a notarized fingerprint card. One point that was oddly reassuring was submitting the expense check for my interview.  The expense forms were photocopies of photocopies of photocopies of forms originally produced in the late 70's or early 80's, stapled in a wad of paperwork to my travel orders, and paper-clipped (and probably additionally stapled) to a return envelope.\nThe address on the envelope was something big and vacuous like \"PO Box 123456789, Savage Road, Fort Meade.\" And *Savage* road?  Was that *really* necessary?  I remember chuckling *\"It'll be 6 months before I see this money\"*\nwhen I mailed it.  At the same time, I also turned in an expense report for my contracting gig.  That expense form was a fancy Excel spreadsheet with auto-calc-this and auto-sum-that.\n\n\nWhich expense check got paid first?  Take a guess.  The NSA paid first.  The NSA expense process was creaky, but mostly functional.\n\nMe (An Interlude) The first car I bought was a Plymouth Acclaim.  An authentic Iacoccan K-car.  Functional but affordable.  The airconditioner broke twice, and it leaked rainwater on the passenger side.  Sure, my friends made fun of it, but I loved it.  It was my car.  American, and proud of it!  It was the ultimate in automotive cognitive dissonance. Perhaps I was pre-destined for government work and didn't realize it at the time. I'd consider myself a hard working individual, and a reasonably level-headed Midwestern guy.  Goal setting, achieving, stuff like that.  I earned my master's part-time over 3 12 years while working full-time.  Professionally, I\nhave a decade of experience that includes mission-critical enterprise systems development at a Fortune 500\ncompany, as well as software development work in Silicon Valley.  I absolutely make no claims about being the next Don Knuth (or even his next *cousin,* professionally speaking), but I have a respectable resume. I never smashed anyone's mailbox when I was kid, nor did I kick anyone's dog.   Honesty es mi nombre, or at least the middle one.  Have I been a smartass at least once in my life?  Yes.  But that's not a crime, only a function of relatively infrequent poor judgement, and it's addressed with experience and maturity. Lest the reader think a too-rosy and goodie-goodie picture is being painted, honesty combined with a forward style of communication cuts both ways.  As electricity can be used to power kitchen appliances for dinner, it can also shock the bejeezus out of people.  These attributes, combined with the willingness to state things that I feel need to be said, means that a few extra amps are occasionally delivered with the metaphorical turkey tetrazini.  I do strive to be constructive, though, and I've found that honest direct communication works both professionally and personally much better than hidden agendas and BS, and direct-ness is preferred by most. I've never been convicted - let alone arrested  - of any misdemeanor or felony, I don't do drugs, and I don't even have any points on my driver's license (knock on wood).  Stable marriage, couple of kids.  Get along with the neighbors, etc. I thought \"Hey, I'm a decent person. Clearance should be pretty straightforward.  What could go wrong?\" P.J. O'Rourke posed the following question in his book Parliament of Whores:  \"Our Government: What the f#ck do they do all day, and why does it cost so godd@mned much money?\" The security clearance process is a partial answer to that question, and in-turn the government ponders a similar question about you. (Note:  P.J. O'Rourke used real curses.  The reader is free to read them as proxies or the actual profanity depending on the reader's exposure to truck stops, professional football games, or Quentin Tarantino films.  Or the book).\n6\n\n\n## Psychological Exam\n\nWhat Does My Mother Have To Do With National Security? When I flew in for my operational interview I had lunch with another applicant in an NSA cafeteria.  The other applicant was an engineering student from a state university in the Midwest and was interviewing for an internship. He had already had his psychological (psych) exam on a previous visit and was back for more processing.  So I asked him what the psych-exam was like in-between bites of my declassified pizza while I alternated glances across to my lunch-partner, down to my off-white cafeteria tray emblazoned with the National Security Agency emblem, and up at the signs hung from the ceiling that said *\"SHHH! No Work Talk!,\"* or some equivalent.  His reaction was hard to misinterpret: a cocked head, a look off into the distance, and an answer that trailed off at the end.  \"Kinda strange...\" he said.  *\"They asked about how I got along with my mother... and stuff like that.\"*  It was a description of a process that, while not necessarily painful, was a tad uncomfortable and bewildering.  It was also described as a black-hole evaluation process, where the applicant reveals all sorts of information but receives very little feedback\n(Evaluation Hawking Radiation?), save for \"continue\" or \"you're done.\" I think the single-most unnerving part is that the applicant has little idea how they are being evaluated.  In a language exam, it's vocabulary, verb conjugation, and competence in written and verbal communication, etc.  In computer science, its knowledge of core data structures, algorithms, and implementations.  Psychology?  Are they evaluating my sanity?  What's going on here? To the psychologically unwashed (me at the time), crazy people were... *Crazy*.  Crazy people jump on tables and cluck like chickens.  Those people are crazy.  Crazy people believe that they are receiving Special Orders from Outer Space.  Crazy people wear tin-foil, a lot of it, and badly.  People who are habitually violent are crazy.  I\nwasn't crazy.  No way.  That's about all I knew of psychology.  And how do they test craziness?  Crazometers? But the psychological examination process *does* have a structured collection process.  Here's what happens: First, a questionnaire approximately 10 pages in length is distributed to each applicant to fill out while waiting in the lobby.  The applicants are given about 30 minutes to fill them out by hand. Next, applicants will take a computerized psychological exam of 500+ true/false questions.  I recall mine having about 567 questions.  I am not certain whether the test is fixed in length, of if more questions get added based on certain conditions in test-answers, so consider \"567\" one of many possible data-points.  However, \"about 500\" seems to be a consistent response from others I've spoken with. While the applicants are in the testing facility taking the test (which can take anywhere from 1.5 to 2.5 hours), the psychologists are reviewing the handwritten answers and highlighting anything that looks \"interesting.\" Finally, there is a 1:1 interview with a psychologist to review the test results and the handwritten portion.\n\nThe Handwritten Questionnaire The handwritten questionnaire asks for a lot of information already supplied on the security forms, such as: Name, age, education, marital status, children (if any), etc. The more interesting questions were (as best I can recall): - Describe the relationship to your mother - Describe the relationship to your father\n- Describe your parent's relationship to each other\n\n- Have you ever had psychological counseling?  (when/how long, etc.)\n- Have any relatives ever had psychological counseling?\n\n- Have you ever attempted suicide? - Have you ever had a substance abuse problem?\n\n- Do you drink?  If so, how many drinks per week?  per day?\n\n- When was the first time you drank alcohol? - Have you ever had interpersonal issues at work?  (e.g., work relationships)\n- Have you ever had disciplinary issues at school/military?\n\n- Have you ever been convicted of a misdemeanor/felony?\n\n- Have you ever been questioned by the police/authorities?  (N.B., this would appear to be the catch-all, in case someone wasn't *convicted)*\n- Do you have any relatives that were in trouble with police/authorities?\n\n- Have you ever taken something that was not yours?  (This may have been worded as something slightly different. but this was the intent)\n- Have you ever committed computer abuse?  (N.B.:  whether deliberate or not, I recall the term 'abuse' being left unspecified, ostensibly leaving the door open for all sorts of self-reporting ranging from checking personal email at work, to having used Napster/Morpheus etc., to writing viruses, hacking websites and stealing credit cards numbers.) - Have you ever been the victim of a violent crime? - Have you ever clucked like a chicken?  If so, did you scratch backward or frontward?\n\n- Describe your relationships to chickens. The last page had about 20 sentences for the applicant to complete.  Some that I remember were... - Men should ____ - Women should ____ - I get angry when/because ____ - Chickens should ___ Given the theme, I would hazard a guess that the other sentences were ones that touched on potentially strong emotional reactions like \"I most regret,\" \"If I only could\", \"I won't\" and things like that.\n\nThe Computerized Test\n\nAs close as I can remember, these were some of the actual questions on the test.  (true/false) - I would like the job of a forest ranger - I hear voices in my head - I read the crime reports in the newspaper - I have a mortal fear of earthquakes - I have neck/hand pain - I usually know what's going on (with my circle of friends)\n- People are out to get me\n- I would like the job of a librarian/florist    (I can't remember which one it was, and it might have been both)\n- I often feel that I can't get out of bed - If someone has their possessions stolen from their unlocked car they had it coming.\n\n- I like/enjoy children\n\"Animal-relationship\"-type questions (e.g., \"I enjoy animals\", \"I don't enjoy animals\", \"I like hurting animals\", \"It bothers me when I hear about animals getting hurt\" etc.) - I am totally insane and like to stand on tables and cluck like a chicken\n\nA few previous questions might not have actually been on the exam or the handwritten portion, but you get the point.  The questions went on and on.\nThe Interview The psychological interview was conducted in the psychologist's office.  It lasted about 15 or 20 minutes and felt somewhat stiff.  Think of a really serious doctor visit but there's no couch like the stereotypical psychiatrist on TV and the lights are not dimmed and absent is a soothing *Enya* CD filling the room from a Bose-wave stereo placed discreetly behind a large potted plant.  The psychologist and I sat looking at each other from across the his wooden desk, while he lobbed personal questions across in monotone and I volleyed back honest-and-succinct personal answers. The interview began with the psychologist asking me to confirm the demographic information on the handwritten psychological forms (e.g., name, education, age, etc.).\n\nRegarding \"stiff\": Psychologist:  \"What is your name?\"\n(Psychologist glances up from other side of a big desk while holding notepad and applicant's handwritten forms) Applicant:  \"John Doe.\"\n(Psychologist looks down and scribbles answers on notepad) Wash.  Rinse.  Repeat.  The entire interview was pretty much like this. The psychologist then presented a printout of the results of the 500+ test questions.  A graph was briefly placed in front of me and stated *\"Based on the test results, you're low to medium risk.\"*  And then he circled some lines on the graph and made a few brief summary statements on my personality and emotional whatever.  He may have also told me that I was a Cocker Spaniel based on the test results, but most of my brain was trying to process what exactly the X and Y axis in the graph had to do with the price of the paper clip and my choice in dog food.  Woof. I left thinking *\"Well, I'm not really sure how that went.  Kinda strange...\"*\nAnalysis (or \"What, Me Worried?\") What appears to be never explained to the candidate is the method of evaluation.  And it remained a mystery to me for some time.  Until I saw The Picture.\n\n\nHere's how it happened... One of the favorite outings I have with my kids is to go to our favorite pizza joint and then visit the university medical bookstore a block down the street.  The bookstore contains all sorts of medical equipment, clothing, books, models, and other goodies.  A pipe dream of mine is to put on an in-store puppet show with the Skeleton, the Giant Eyeball, and the Brain.  What fun that would be!  But shopping decorum - and the hefty model pricetags - has so far prevented such theatre from taking place, so we have to admire-without-touching, and then move onto the tuning forks and rubber knee-whappers (aka Neural Reflex Hammers) which were fair game for hands-on enjoyment. But one day I browsed through the sizable stack of Psychology texts.  And then I saw it:\n\n\n## N E O A C N1 N2 N.. E1 E2 E.. O1 O2 O.. A1 A2 A.. C1 C2 C..\n\n\n\nVery High\n\n\nHigh\nx\n x\n x\n x\n\nx\n x\n\n x\nx\n x\nx\nx\n\nx\n\nx\n\nx\nx\nx\n x\n x\n\nx\n\n\nAverage\n\n\nLow\n\n\nVery Low\n\n\nIt looked a lot like the type of picture I saw in the office.  But what does it mean? It was a graphical representation of something called the Five Factor Model of Personality.   *Whoa!!*    I stood there dumbfounded, as if I had suddenly acquired the power to converse with whales like Aquaman or read Sanskrit like... well, someone that reads Sanskrit.  It was an *\"Ah-Ha!*\" moment, but not in the style of the similarly-named 80's Euro-band with Fabulous Hair, this was *actual understanding*. Ahhhh-HA! Each of the computerized test questions maps to one of the \"Five Factors\": Neuroticism (N), Extraversion (E), Openness to Experience (O), Agreeableness (A), and Conscientiousness (C).  Those are the bold N, E, O, A, C letters in the upper left-hand corner, and below each of these letters is the overall quasi-numerical ranking for that Factor.  The rest of the letters across the top are the facets for each factor, called respectively N1, N2, E1, E2, etc.\nBelow each facet is a data-point as well.  It's possible a percentage of the test questions are \"chaff\" and are not scored, however, the principle still remains the same.  Specifically, the each test question maps to a facet within a Factor, and the overall Factor rating is based - I assume - on the average of the Factor's facets. Factor Facets\n\"Too High\" Issues\n\"Too Low\" Issues\n\nNEUROTICISM (N) Level of emotional adjustment and instability\nAnxiety (N1)\nAngry Hostility (N2)\nDepression (N3) Self-consciousness (N4)\nImpulsiveness (N5)\nVulnerability (N6)\nEXTRAVERSION (E) Quantity and intensity of preferred interpersonal interactions\nWarmth (E1)\nGregariousness (E2)\nAssertiveness (E3)\nActivity (E4) Excitement Seeking (E5)\nPositive Emotions (E6)\nOPENNESS TO EXPERIENCE (O) Level of active seeking and appreciation of experiences for their own sake.\nFantasy (O1) Aesthetics (O2)\nFeelings (O3)\nActions (O4)\nIdeas (O5)\nValues (O6)\nLacks appropriate concern for potential problems in health or social adjustment,\nemotional blandness\nChronic negative affect, irritability, anger, dejection, difficulty inhibiting impulses,\nunrealistic expectations,\ndifficulty dealing with stress\nSocial isolation, lacks joy and zest for life, shy, reluctant to assert\n\nTalks excessively, inappropriate selfdisclosure, inability to spend time alone, attention seeking, overly dramatic\nPreoccupied with fantasy and daydreaming, lacks practicality, eccentric thinking, social rebelliousness that can\ninterfere with vocation\nDifficulty adapting to social or personal change, shows a low tolerance or understanding for different points of view, insensitive to art and beauty, excessively conforms to authority\nAGREEABLENESS (A) The kind of interactions that a\nperson prefers along a continuum\nof compassion to antagonism.\nTrust (A1)\nStraightforwardness (A2) Altruism (A3) Compliance (A4)\nModesty (A5) Tender-Mindedness (A6)\nGullible, indiscriminant trust of others, excessive candor and generosity to the\ndetriment of selfinterest, easily taken advantage of.\nCynical and paranoid thinking, inability to trust friends, is exploitative and\nmanipulative, rude and inconsiderate manner alienates friends, inflated and grandiose sense of self, arrogant\nCONSCIENTIOUSNESS (C) Degree of organization, persistence, and motivation in goal-oriented behavior\nCompetence (C1) Order (C2) Dutifulness (C3)\nAchievement Striving (C4) Self-Discipline (C5)\nDeliberation (C6)\n\nOverachieves, workaholic to the exclusion of family, social & personal interests, compulsive, rigid, overscrupulousness\nUnderachieves, does not fulfil intellectual or artistic potential, poor academic record, disregards rules and responsibilities, lacking\nin self-discipline\n\n\nThe handwritten portion bolsters or augments the model constructed from the computerized test.  With respect to this portion some relevant hypotheses are:\n-\nApplicants that have parents where the parent-child relationship was coercive and manipulative may have a tendency to be coercive and manipulative in relationships themselves.\n\n\n-\nApplicants whose parent's relationship (i.e., the parents to each other) is cool and distant may be themselves withdrawn and may have trouble forming emotional attachments.\n\n\n-\nThose that start drinking early (and often) are risk-takers and may have a poor self image\n\n-\nThose that are in a lot of fights or had trouble with the law may be low in A, or have a lot of unresolved anger (high N).\n\n\n-\nThose that have persistent workplace issues may be too high in C or too low in A The parent-child relationship is complex and has filled many a psychology book.  I don't pretend to do it justice with just a few bullet points, but if the reader find's themselves in such an interview consider all replies in the context of the model, likewise one's background. Balance is probably an important point to bring up.  Just because somebody is introverted (Low E), or conscientious\n(High C) doesn't mean they have terminal issues.  Someone slightly anxious doesn't necessarily need a lifetime supply of extra-strength Prozac.  But e*xcessive* anything seems to be the trigger, and reasonable one, for discussion -\neven NSA aside. In terms of interpretation, no single question should mark an applicant as one thing or another.  An example from my own experience was the question about \"liking children.\"  As a parent, I checked \"true\" without thinking about it.  But in the lobby after the test but before the interviews, I heard a few college-aged male applicants discussing whether if checking \"true\" would mark them in a category for a potential pedophile!  The person who said that might have been over-thinking a bit, but what is important from what I've read is the *pattern* of answers, not necessarily any specific answer. Should the reader ever find themselves in a similar interview, they would do well to remember the model in which they were being evaluated, which is not necessarily based on professional experience (i.e., work) but how one reacts to the experience.  Be very careful about what you say, but relax!  (if that makes any sense) Crazy people are still Crazy, but there are far more shades to crazy than I realized.  And according to the texts, it would seem that apparently *everybody* is crazy... it just depends on what type of crazy you're looking for.\n\n\nOn that note, Rosenhan's 1973 study *On Being Sane In Insane Places* is worth a mention.  8 pseudo-patients checked themselves into 12 hospitals complaining of faux psychiatric problems, and only once was admission refused.  Once admitted, they acted \"normally\" with the hopes of quickly being released.  The study found that while several patients and visitors got wise to the fact they were faking, no pseudo-patient was *ever* diagnosed as being \"sane\" by the staff, and quite a few normal behaviors were cited as being deviant.  While it shouldn't be taken as a general condemnation of psychiatry, it is a call for caution on looking for Crazy and expecting it everywhere. Anyone can become institutionalized.  In this case it was the staff. Check out the appendix for even more detail on testing Crazy.\n\n## Polygraph\n\nThe Interview\n\nThe polygraph examination was conducted in a small locked room.  At the NSA, it is done in the context of a hallway of locked rooms, each with a little sign that says \"interview in process\" that can be flipped out near the top of the door.  It would appear to be the intelligence version of a hotel's \"do not disturb.\"  A polygraph hotel, in this case. I sat across from the examiner (also called a polygrapher) in a sturdy black textured chair (at least mine was like this - who knows how often they change the furniture).  The arms of the chair were extra-wide and flat to accommodate the arms being stretched out and the palms being placed flat.  The chair felt heavy, had no wheels and did not swivel.  Like the psychological interview, the examiner is also sitting behind a desk, except in this case it was a regular cheap-o office desk. Also, unlike the psych-interview it wasn't the examiner's full-time office. The examiner first asked *\"Do you know how a polygraph works?\"*  He then explained that it measured certain physiological metrics such as blood pressure, breathing, and skin response.  He then explained that it measures the body's \"fight or flight\" response when the body responds to a lie.  From a process perspective, he explained that he will not be the one making the final determination but rather \"quality control\" will review all of the polygraphs and make a determination. Before being hooked up to the machine, the he reviewed my security forms, question by question, with me.  \"Is your name John Doe?\"  \"Is this your current address?\"  If it's about being questioned by the police, he asks for specific incidents.  Drug use?  How many times, smoked-but-not-inhaled, and when, etc.  And he seemed to particularly be interested in drug questions.  Buy it? Sell it? Transport it? Collate it? Stare at it? Stack it? Pack it? Train-track it?\n\nThe stated purpose of this preparatory interview is two-fold:\n-\nreduce question ambiguity for the applicant on the polygraph test\n-\ncollect additional information on the applicant Then the polygraph test starts. My chair is rotated 90 degrees to the right to face the door.  All I remember is that it was a really, really plain door. I'm not in the habit of staring at doors for long periods of time, but if I would begin such a habit this portal would not be at the top of the list.   The examiner was now on my left, approximately at 8:00 (i.e., if 12:00 is directly ahead).  Sensors are placed on my right hand (pointer and middle-finger), and two tubes are placed across my torso\n- one across the chest and another on the diaphragm.  A blood-pressure cuff is attached to my left arm. The polygraph test is divided into two sections: counter-intelligence and lifestyle.  Each section was repeated four times.  Counter-intelligence questions included whether I had ever had a security clearance before, ever passed confidential information to another party, ever worked for a foreign intelligence agency, etc.  Lifestyle basically includes the information from the applicant's security forms (e.g., \"were you born in the state of XXX?\", \"is your name John Doe?\")\n\nMy instructions were to keep my feet flat on the floor, and basically don't move because that would screw up the test. During the first round of my counter-intelligence questioning (which was the first of the two sections) my anxiety was through the roof.  I had read about the NSA's historically invasive polygraph questioning in Bamford's Body of Secrets, and I was a bit on-edge.  It must be said, though, that I found the pre-test interview much more straightforward than I had expected.  It was pretty much the information on the security forms and without any EPQs (embarrassing personal questions). After getting hooked up, examiner's instruction that I kept repeating in my head was \"don't move, because that could screw up the test.\"  I dutifully kept still.  I must have had a \"dentist's chair response\" because after the first round of questioning the examiner said \"look, something is really wrong here.   You didn't breathe for about 20 seconds.\"  To which I responded, quite truthfully, *\"but you told me to stay still!\"* So then I concentrated on regular breathing and *also* not moving. I didn't have any other advice from the examiner other than to be told that I was the most nervous person he had ever seen in the chair.  And please try to relax.  While I appreciated his candor, *that* didn't calm me down but I took his comment at face value. At the end of the examination, he left the room for several minutes to talk to someone (either his supervisor or someone in \"quality control\" - the group that will make the actual determination on the applicant's chart). While he said I didn't have any \"specific responses\" on any questions indicating \"deception,\" I was clearly more nervous than what he wanted to see, and asked me if there was anything else I would like to \"get off my chest or if anything else was eating my confidence.\"  I said *\"other than the fact that I'm having a polygraph, no.\"* The whole thing (pre-interview, plus hook-up) took somewhere between 2 to 2.5 hours.\n\nAnalysis (or, \"Lying? Nervous? Indigestion?\") What I learned after I began reading about the polygraph was that both of my actions - to be very still and not breathe (to satisfy the requirement of not moving), and breathing extremely slowly (to breathe but in a relaxed way and still not move) - are both considered polygraph countermeasures.  Doh!  The average individual breathes 13 to 18 times per minute, and breathing either over or under those limits can be viewed in a negative light by the examiner.\n\nI was so clueless about how the polygraph worked (and I mean *really* worked) and I was also largely oblivious as to how my actions to address my anxiety - and my earnest attempt to cooperate - were being interpreted by the examiner.  And in the back of my mind I think that I actually *believed* that machine was imbued with Special Powers.  Why, I don't know.  Chalk it up to nerves. There is an urban legend about cops putting a colander on a suspect's head and attaching a wire to a copy machine where it would magically print out \"He's Lying\" whenever they thought they heard something fishy.  I'm not *that*\nstupid, but I would estimate that it is a common belief that if people actively learn about the polygraph, they must be\n\"cheating,\" or have a desire to do same.  After all, it's a *Lie Detector*, isn't it?\n\nInformation From The Field In the spirit of the scientific method, after my exam I searched for information that explained how polygraphs work, and also for information both \"pro\" and \"against\" their effectiveness and usage.  I'm sure that the majority of polygraph examiners are hard-working, tax-paying, jury-duty-serving, home-and-yard-maintaining citizens, and the business of verifying an applicant's background is very serious indeed.  But there is a great deal written about the polygraph and very little of it supports its usage from a scientific standpoint.  Its effectiveness in an exam is significantly (and so far, intractably) linked to the examiner's performance, many an applicant's belief in the infallibility of the machine, and the fact that the machine scares the crap out of people and gets them to talk. But its record in counter-intelligence is unfortunately disappointing.  A statistic frequently cited is that no spy has ever been caught by a polygraph examination. An issue even larger than not necessarily being a deterrent to espionage is the result of \"false positives\" cast upon innocent examinees.  In addition, there exists the potential (I should stress *potential*) for abuse or manipulation by the examiner, and the result-interpretation is additionally subjective. One TES (Test for Espionage and Sabotage) laboratory experiment done at the Department of Defense Polygraph Institute showed an average false-positive rate of approximately 9.4%.  It should be noted that was a laboratory experiment, and the persons in the study had nothing to lose (e.g., their jobs).  It is a reasonable expectation that the false-positives would be higher in the field due to increased anxiety of the participants.  The National Academy of Sciences 2002 report on the polygraph states that confidence in a 90% accuracy rate is \"not warranted\" in practical applications, and *\"many committee members would place this upper bound considerably lower.\"*\nA 1997 statistic of FBI pre-employment applicants showed a 20% failure rate (i.e., the applicants were \"determined to be withholding pertinent information\").  A statistic from 2002 showed a failure rate of 50%.  And according to\n\"The Lie Behind The Lie Detector\" the consequences of failure are quite severe: the applicant is finished.  A 50% failure rate?  I found this distressing because the examinees are potential FBI employees who already received CJO's, not random individuals from the street or from the FBI's own Most Wanted List. The examiner has a variety of techniques at their disposal to elicit confessions, the first of which will be convincing the examinee of the machine's infallibility, and potentially bluffing, and/or \"jacking-up\" (stimulating and overstimulating) an applicant. In defense of the examiner, it's not like he did anything outrageous like threaten to bite the head off a parakeet if he thought I was lying, or when he was asking me the drug questions like putting a huge water bong in the middle of the table asking  \"*I can't remember how this thing works, can you help me?\"* with the intent of catching the onetoke-over-the-line applicant unawares.   Although he did say that 80% to 90% of the applicants had experimental drug usage in their background.  Hmmm.... Maybe that bong stunt *isn't* so outrageous.  But anyway, there are less outrageous things that can still affect an exam.  One person informed me that on their last NSA polygraph that the examiner started off the interview by saying: \"If you're telling the truth I'm your best friend.  If you're lying I'm your worst enemy.\"   This was, at best, a gratuitous use of the examiner's position.   And in the let's-see-what-kindof-blip-we-can-put-on-a-chart category, another told me that it was not uncommon for the examiner to ask in a loud voice *\"AND NOW, THIS IS THE MOST IMPORTANT QUESTION ON THE EXAM...\"*  What was important, I'm told, was not the actual answer but how one reacted.\n\nIntelligence agencies certainly have an affinity to the polygraph machine, though.  \"The Lie Behind The Lie Detector\" cites that in 1993 the NSA wrote to the White House \"over 95% of the information the NSA develops on individuals who do not meet federal security guidelines is derived via [voluntary admissions from] the polygraph process.\"  And the Joint Security Commission noted in a 1994 report content that many polygraph proponents are\"content that as long as the polygraph elicits admissions to screen out unsuitable applicants and actual security risks, the questions about the polygraph's validity remain academic.\"\nAdditionally, as has been cited by a former CIA polygrapher (and it would appear to be reasonable to make as a base-assumption for all polygraphers) \"our performance is evaluated on the number of admissions we obtain and the amount of information developed from those we test.\"  Quite literally, it is an examiner's job to get the interviewee to talk.\n\n\nI would highly recommend the reader check out at least the executive summary of the 2002 National Academy of Science's 420-page report on the polygraph, which casts the machine's usage for pre-employment screening in an unfavorable light based on its scientific underpinnings.  Likewise the paper \"The Lie Behind The Lie Detector\" available from antipolygraph.org.  It's all interesting, but especially the part on Countermeasures (e.g., how \"guilty\"\nand \"truthful\" people are expected to act, mind games the examiner may play, breathing and cardio/electrical countermeasures, etc.)   Lastly, the DoD's Polygraph Institute's manual on interrogation is worth a scan. Philosophically, I can't say that I support the use of countermeasures because using deception in a process based upon inconclusive science won't *really* keep America safer or a make it a better place to live.  But should the reader ever find themselves in a position to be polygraphed, I do think that it would be responsible to understand the common interrogation techniques and also response techniques that might be construed as potentially being deceptive.\n\n## Background Investigation\n\n The background investigation is where investigators will pore over the applicant's security forms and personally verify the authenticity of the information provided.  This investigation started after the polygraph and psychological examination.\n\n\nFriends, former managers, neighbors... everything is fair game.  As it probably should be for an investigation at this level. I had alerted nearly everybody on my forms that an investigator might be coming around so that nobody would think I did anything wrong or was in trouble.   I subsequently got progress reports from said individuals when investigators stopped by. Our neighbors were interviewed for approximately 10 minutes apiece (so they tell me, it's not like I was hiding in the bushes eavesdropping.) The most common questions were...\n-\nHow long have you known him?  Describe the relationship.  How often do you see him?\n\n-\nIs he happily married?  Any issues that you know of?\n-\nDoes he gamble?  Do drugs?  Have a drinking problem?  Any strange behavior lately?\n\n-\nWould you consider him trustworthy?\n\n-\nDoes he know any foreign nationals?  Who?  How often does he see them?\n\n-\nCan you provide a name (or two) of someone that might also think this way? Of the 5 neighboring houses in our cul-de-sac, the local investigator stopped by 4 of them for a chat.\n\nInterviews with work-relations (e.g., former managers) were a bit longer.  I'm told that the interviews were anywhere from 30 to 60 minutes. The background investigation collection-phase is capped with a Security Interview with the applicant.  I was working at home one day and someone identifying themselves as a DoD investigator called and said \"mind if I come over in an hour?\"  I said *\"sure.\"* The investigator invited me into her tan Cadillac, her \"office\" as she called it.  She sat in the driver's seat, and I sat in the passenger's seat.  I was expecting a K-car (like the K-car I used to have), but the security interview subsequently commenced in a General Motor's luxury automobile at the end of my driveway. We exchanged morning pleasantries, and I asked *\"how do you know it's really me?\"* as I tried to display as many non-verbal clues that I was really joking and not being deceptive.  The investigator answered \" We know.  I've been here before.  Now go get me two forms of ID.\"  So I got out of the car and ran into the house and came back with my driver's license and passport. The security interview is basically like a polygraph examination without a polygraph, and it must have taken at least 2 hours.  The investigator reviews all the information I provided in the forms, plus confirms any clarifications I\nstated in the polygraph examination, and then ostensibly anything else that turns up, either in the investigation or in Local or National Agency Check with authorities (e.g., local police or FBI).  The investigator also showed me a copy of my credit report and asked me to individually identify each card & account on the report.  It was actually quite impressive, as I had never seen a copy of my own credit report.  It even had the Banana Republic card I used exactly one time to get a 15% in-store discount on a shirt 3 years earlier (it's still in style, *honest*!) The interview-in-a-sedan was physically awkward.  The natural inclination of a body when sitting in the front-seat of an automobile is to sit back and look through the windshield.  However, if I kept my eyes to the front the investigator would be 90 degrees to my left ear and that would probably look *really* deceptive.  But if I kept my shoulders to the seat and only turned my head to the left I would probably look like a freak, if not an uncomfortable freak.  So I recall opting for rotating my body about 45 degrees counter-clockwise to the left, with my left elbow resting on the top of my seat, but not extended that my arm reached over to her seat, lest I look too friendly. The investigator had a stack of papers on her lap and in her hands.  She wrote on a pad of paper braced firmly against the steering wheel, and I wondered if one of my responses was going to cause her to press a little too hard and lay on the horn (like an *automotive* polygraph, where the stress levels are measured in decibels).  The tempo of the interview was in some ways like the psychological exam in that she was unable to maintain eye contact for very long, but different in that I was only about 18 inches from the questioner when answering. (investigator's head and eyes are forward reading the question)  *\"is this your current residence?\"* (investigator's head then turns 90 degrees to the right to see my response) The questions were mostly the same as the polygraph examination, but with a few new ones:\n\"Have I ever denied anyone their civil rights?\"  No.  But the mind races: if I did, which ones?  The 6th Amendment - The right to fair and speedy public trial?  The 9th - Excessive bail?   The 21st - The repeal of prohibition, by grabbing the last beer out the fridge at a party?  Pursuit of happiness?  But seriously, what they appeared to be most interested in this constitutionally sweeping question is bombing/over-the-line protesting at abortion clinics, which I concur is no laughing matter. \"Have I ever engaged in wife-swapping?\"  No. When she asked this question I thought \"I'm sitting in a Cadillac at the end of my driveway talking to a DoD\ninvestigator about whether I'm a swinger.  It simply cannot get any weirder than this.\" But in defense of the of the investigator's questioning, Robert Hanssen, the FBI spy who sold secrets to the Russians, was into some over-the-top sexual escapades.  It's probably a fair question given current events.\n\nThe only question that was mildly contentious was when she asked about foreign topics.  Appropriate foreign contacts are an obvious area of concern for an intelligence agency, and the concern is warranted.  Applicants must list all close-and-continuous foreign contacts and any foreign travel in the last 10 years in their security forms.\nHowever, instead of asking what I would consider a hard-to-misinterpret question in the polygraph examination that went something like \"have you ever supported an organization, financially or otherwise, that supports the armed overthrow of the United States Government?\", she asked:\n\n\"Do you have any foreign interests?\" I responded \"What exactly is a foreign interest?  A financial interest, like owning an international mutual fund? Having a desire to travel?\" Which I thought was a reasonable clarifying question.  The intent of my response was\n\"what specifically would you like to talk about?\"  She responded with:\n\"You're getting defensive...\"\nThat didn't go well.  So I said *\"yes\"* to foreign interests and that I owned an international mutual fund and I had an occasional desire to travel. And she didn't ask a follow-up question.  I think that was a blunt approach to a complex\n\nsubject, because as I lived in a highly internationalized area of the country unless the applicant was a xenophobe there would inevitably be some \"foreign interests.\"  What would have been more constructive, I thought, was to cite a few types up front, and of course add a *\"and anything else significant\"* or some other catch-all.\n\nBelow is a chart with foreign interests and a \"continuum of relevance\" of my own understanding.  This is how I was trying to frame my answer: Sample Foreign Interest Types Probably Benign Gray Area Probably Suspicious\n\n| Contacts                                 | Co-workers                                |\n|------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------|\n| Local Judo instructor                    |                                           |\n| Neighbors                                |                                           |\n|                                          |                                           |\n| ...                                        | Active members of foreign intelligence or |\n| military                                 |                                           |\n| Friends who are frequent travelers to    |                                           |\n| nations known to harbor terrorists       |                                           |\n| Equipment                                | Toyota Camrys                             |\n|                                          |                                           |\n| ...                                        | Chinese Anti-Aircraft Missiles            |\n| The                                      |                                           |\n| Purple                                   |                                           |\n|                                          |                                           |\n| Telly-Tubbie                             |                                           |\n| Terrorist Training and Recruitment Films |                                           |\n| Media                                    | Telly-Tubbies                             |\n| (they                                    |                                           |\n| are                                      |                                           |\n| English)                                 |                                           |\n|                                          |                                           |\n| ...                                        | Poppy fields In Thailand                  |\n| Cocaine processing plant in Columbia     |                                           |\n| Financial                                | International Mutual Funds                |\n| ADRs (American Depository                |                                           |\n| Receipts)                                |                                           |\n|                                          |                                           |\n| ...                                        | Taliban-era visits to Afghanistan         |\n| Travel                                   | Desire to see the                         |\n| Canadian                                 |                                           |\n| side                                     |                                           |\n| of Niagara Falls                         |                                           |\n|                                          |                                           |\n\n I don't mind any of this being up for discussion, but I'm either in the \"benign\" column or in the left side of the gray\n-scale.  And I'm *wayyy* left of the \"suspicious\" column.  And while Tinky-Winky does carry a snappy red handbag, that's his fashion choice and I respect it - although his hat does make him look like a lavender Flavor-Flav of the rap-band *Public Enemy*.  And the triangle on his head?  Hey, not that there's anything wrong with that... Additionally, one the interview questions was *\"how do I handle stress?\"* Then I remembered she was driving a Cadillac.  And Safeway was around the corner.  And I had a hammer in my garage.  Anybody have a coconut?  How do I handle stress, you asked?  'Scuze me while I jump on the hood. Wham! Wham! Wham!\n\n\nJust kidding.  That last part didn't actually happen.  But it certainly was a unique experience.\n\n## Conclusion\n\n Jump to the present.... after 3 12 months of clearance processing I was rejected by security.  Game over.  Thanks for playing. The most important lesson I learned was that for the purpose of life-planning the applicant should regard the CJO as a personal souvenir, nothing more.  That harsh reality must be recognized, and it is not stated with any disrespect to the agency, and it also does not mean that the hiring manager wouldn't want the applicant to start as soon as possible.  But the hiring manager has no control over the clearance process.  From the standpoint of checks-andbalances perhaps that's for the best (or at least the original intent), but those are the facts. There are scores of things that can go awry with the clearance process or at the very least slow it down to a crawl. One must be prepared to wait the process because the resulting answer might not be in the applicant's favor. With respect to my own process, I was caught in a catch-22 of my own making.  I was in a period of transition from my old job - the startup I was working for was running out of money and 1/3 of the company was laid off, me included. I turned down a private-sector full-time offer with a salary significantly higher than the NSA offer for a short-term contracting gig so that I could wait out my clearance.  I was going to Save The World, or at least the American part of it.  Based on the information I had at the time, it was a path that certainly wasn't risk-free, but it seemed an acceptable risk. Unfortunately, as the process dragged on I got more and more nervous because I had passed up full-time work to...to *wait*.  It didn't help that I was doing a lot of the contracting out of my house - by myself.  And in retrospect, the pressure I placed on myself during the polygraph & psychological examinations was immense.  I really wanted, and *needed*, them to go well.  And I would hazard a guess that my nervousness wasn't interpreted in ways conducive to my getting cleared.  It was - to invoke the overused phrase - The Perfect Storm. Then there was an additional delay after the psych/poly examinations.  I could see the end of my consulting contract approaching, and then I started getting feedback that there was a much greater possibility of bad news than I had previously believed.   I was seriously stressed.  \"*I turned down solid work over 3 months ago for this?\"* was a thought that went through my head with uncomfortable frequency.  In fairness to the NSA, it's stated quite clearly in the CJO that there is attrition in the clearance process.  My biggest strategic error was not in *acknowledging* riskareas, but in the ability to *quantify* them with appropriate probabilities.  But it's not like you can go to Vegas and get the odds.  And the applicant can't just call the security group and ask \"so, what's on your mind?\" Had I known in the beginning that rejections were up *significantly* from pre-9/11 clearances, or that the last 3-4-5\nconsecutive candidates to get CJOs had been rejected, there is no way in heck I would have taken the same path and waited.  But that wasn't information I had at the time.  The division I interviewed with had not actually hired anybody in 5 years (no budget), so the while the insights I received about the process were accurate, they were accurate for 5 years back.  And the division had no other current candidate experiences to share when I started the process.  It isn't *their* fault either, because that was the only information *they* had at the time, and the operational folks don't talk to security folks, etc. In absolute terms of *All Things Stressful* (not a National Public Radio program, but perhaps it should be), this experience is certainly less stressful than being shot at in anger in a war-zone, or having a rocket-propelled grenade targeted at your vehicle.  And also less stressful than being an emergency room doctor or nurse, or losing a spouse or child to cancer.  But given the circumstances surrounding my specific experience, I'd have to estimate it might be in the next tier or two not because of any single stressful incident but due to the aggregate stress over the period.  Being in-limbo takes its toll, and \"roller coaster\" only begins to describe it. For me, the NSA was the right idea but at the wrong time, and a lot like finding a coupon on the ground for \"50%\noff on any house in America\" only to realize that the coupon expired the day before. I took a leap of faith... and landed on my face.  But I had to try it.\n\n\nMy wife should get a Nobel Prize in the category of Eternal Patience and Understanding for letting me try this, living through it, and still wanting to stay married.  Thanks. Special thanks for the division manager for making this adventure possible on the other side of the fence.  You tried, and I appreciate it.  Thanks also for two people in NSA recruiting for not only tolerating my requests for information & status, but providing speedy responses.   You know who you are.\n\n\nHowever.... After the process was over, I was talking to one of my references - a veteran Silicon Valley software executive, and former manager of mine.  My reference commented on what transpired \"That's disappointing.  If they can't hire you, I have no idea who they can hire.  That process seems to be designed to retain only the most bland.\" The 'bland' comment might be a bit severe, however, considering the 1999 External Management report it would appear that the agency would appear to need creative thinkers & problem-solvers more than ever.\n\n## Bibliography\n\n\nTexts\n\nPersonality Disorders and the Five-Factor Model of Personality 2nd *Edition*, Costa & Widiger, American Psychological Association, 2002 Puzzle Palace, James Bamford, 1982 Body of Secrets, James Bamford, 2001 The Lie Behind The Lie Detector, PDF from antipolygraph.org\n\nContemporary Psychology, 1970 Fear and Loathing in America, Hunter S. Thompson, 2000 Parliament of Whores, P.J. O'Rourke, 1992\n\nWebsites (Federation of American Scientists)  www.fas.org\n(NSA External Management Review)  http://www.fas.org/irp/nsa/106handbk.pdf\n(NSA New Enterprise Recommendations)  http://www.fas.org/irp/nsa/new_enterprise.pdf\n(International Personality Item Pool - interesting 5-factor stuff)  http://ipip.ori.org/ipip/\n\n(National Academy of Sciences)  www.nas.edu\n(NAS Polygraph Report)  http://www4.nas.edu/news.nsf/isbn/0309084369?OpenDocument www.antipolygraph.org\n(\"Lie Behind The Lie Detector\")  http://antipolygraph.org/lie-behind-the-lie-detector.pdf\n (National Academy Polygraph executive summary)  http://antipolygraph.org/nas/exec.pdf\n(DoD Interrogation Manual)  http://antipolygraph.org/documents/dodpi-interrogation.pdf\n\nwww.stoppolygraph.com (Doug William's Site)  www.polygraph.com\n\n(DoD Polygraph Site)  http://www.dodpoly.army.mil/ (American Polygraph Association)  www.polygraph.org \"The Truth About Polygraphs\"  http://www.boston.com/globe/magazine/2003/0803/coverstory_entire.htm\n(Defense Security Service Adjudication Guidelines)  http://www.dss.mil/nf/adr/adjguid/adjguidF.htm (DoD Security Adjudication Appeal Cases)  http://www.defenselink.mil/dodgc/doha/industrial/ (Freedom of Information Act)  http://www.usdoj.gov/04foia/\n\n## Appendix\n\nA Little More On The Five Factor Model I would guess (or rather, hope) that there is no single \"right\" profile to work at the NSA.  But there are probably a few profiles that might raise a red-flag (one can only guess if the \"paranoid \" profile is *really* a liability at the NSA.)\nWhile I did not recall them initially, I recognize most of the questions on the right as being from the computerized test.  The associations of questions to ailments are cited from a psychological text.  Do not consider this an\nexhaustive list of potential profiles, as I just picked a few interesting ones. Profile\nSimplified Factor Attributes\nYou *might* be if all of these apply...\n(applicant's test answer in parentheses)\n(true) There are persons who are trying to steal my thoughts\nand ideas\n(true) I have often thought that strangers were looking at me critically (true) I feel that I have often been punished without cause\nLow A - especially\nTrust,\nStraightforwardness, Compliance High N - especially\nAngry Hostility.\nPARANOID\n\nPervasive pattern of distrust and suspiciousness of others such that their motives are interpreted as malevolent\n(false) I am not easily angered (true) I get mad easily and then get over it soon (true) I sometimes feel that I am about to go to pieces\nExcessive N (all facets), plus Low A -\nspecifically low Compliance, Trust.\nBORDERLINE Pervasive pattern of instability and interpersonal relationships, self-image, and marked impulsivity\n(true) I have strange and peculiar thoughts (true) I have had very strange and peculiar experiences\n(true) I often feel as if things were not real\nHigh N - especially Anxiety and Self- Consciousness\nSCHIZOTYPAL Pervasive pattern of detachment, plus cognitive or perceptual distortions\nLow E - especially Warmth.\n(false) I like parties and socials\n(false) I enjoy social gatherings just to be with people\n(false) I am a good mixer\nSCHIZOID Pervasive pattern of detachment NARCISSISTIC Pattern of grandiosity, need for admiration, lack\nof empathy\nLow A - especially\nModesty, tough mindedness Often high in Achievement striving (C).\n(false) When in a group of people I have trouble thinking of the right things to talk about (true) If given the chance, I would make a good leader of people (true) I have no dread of going into a room by myself where other people have already gathered and started talking\nPrimarily Excessive C (all facets)\n(true) I frequently find myself worrying about something\n(true) I must admit that I have at times been worried beyond reason over something that did not matter (true) I have met problems so full of possibilities that I have been unable to make up my mind about them\nCOMPULSIVE Preoccupation with orderliness and perfectionism at the expense of flexibility HISTRIONIC Excessive emotionality and attention seeking\nExtreme E.  Often combined with Extreme O - especially Fantasy\nfacet.\n(false) I find it hard to make small talk when I meet new people (true) While in trains, buses, etc., I often talk to strangers (true) I like to go to parties and other affairs where there is\n\nlots of loud fun\nANTISOCIAL Pervasive pattern of\ndisregard for the rights of others\n(true) In school, I was sometimes sent to the principal for cutting up (true) As a youngster, I was suspended one or more times for\ncutting up (true) If I could get into a movie without paying and be sure I would not be seen, I would probably do it.\nLow A - especially\nStraightforwardness, Altruism, Compliance,\nTender-Mindedness Low C - specifically\nDeliberation.\nPOULTROCLUCKO-\nPHOBIA Pervasive pattern of fearing that one will cluck like a chicken\nOutrageous C -\nespecially Crunchiness.\n(true) I sometimes feel that I am about to go to pieces -\nspecifically, pieces shaped like Chicken Tenders dipped in honey mustard sauce (false) I have no dread of going into a room by myself where other people have already gathered and started clucking (true) As a youngster, I was suspended one or more times for cutting up... chickens\n\n\nIf the reader has any questions on the above material, consult a textbook, website, or professional.  Don't take my word for it... look for yourself! After a process like this, I think anybody would be justified on answering 'true' to...\n\nI have had very strange and peculiar experiences ... but the $64,000 question is whether you would be Schizotypal if you thought this was a \"peculiar\" experience, or some other form of crazy if you didn't?  (But it's just one question, isn't it?)\nExcerpt From Academy Executive Summary Report On Polygraph\n\nThe following is what I consider a salient excerpt from the National Academy of Sciences report on the Polygraph.\n\n\nBasic Science Almost a century of research in scientific psychology and physiology provides little basis for the expectation that a polygraph test could have extremely high accuracy. Although psychological states often associated with deception (e.g., fear of being judged deceptive) do tend to affect the physiological responses that the polygraph measures, these same states can arise in the absence of deception. Moreover, many other psychological and physiological factors (e.g., anxiety about being tested) also affect those responses. Such phenomena make polygraph testing intrinsically susceptible to producing erroneous results. This inherent ambiguity of the physiological measures used in the polygraph suggests that further investments in improving polygraph technique and interpretation will bring only modest improvements in accuracy. Polygraph research has not developed and tested theories of the underlying factors that produce the observed responses. Factors other than truthfulness that affect the physiological responses being measured can vary substantially across settings in which polygraph tests are used. There is little knowledge about how much these factors influence the outcomes of polygraph tests in field settings. For example, there is evidence suggesting that truthful members of socially stigmatized groups and truthful examinees who are believed to be guilty or believed to have a high likelihood of being guilty may show emotional and physiological responses in polygraph test situations that mimic the responses that are expected of deceptive individuals. The lack of understanding of the processes that underlie polygraph responses makes it very difficult to generalize from the results obtained in specific research settings or with particular subject populations to other settings or populations, or from laboratory research studies to real-world applications. Evidence on Polygraph Accuracy Scientific evidence relevant to the accuracy of polygraph tests for employee or preemployment screening is extremely limited. Only one field study, which is flawed, provides evidence directly relevant to accuracy for preemployment screening. A few additional laboratory studies are relevant to preemployment or employee screening, but they are more analogous to specific-incident investigations than to screening because the deceptive examinee is given a precise recent incident about which to lie. Estimates of accuracy from these 57 studies are almost certainly higher than actual polygraph accuracy of specificincident testing in the field. Laboratory studies tend to overestimate accuracy because laboratory conditions involve much less variation in test implementation, in the characteristics of examinees, and in the nature and context of investigations than arises in typical field applications. Observational studies of polygraph testing in the field are plagued by selection and measurement biases, such as the inclusion of tests carried out by examiners with knowledge of the evidence and of cases whose outcomes are affected by the examination. In addition, they frequently lack a clear and independent determination of truth. Due to these inherent biases, observational field studies are also highly likely to overestimate real-world polygraph accuracy.\n\nCONCLUSION: Notwithstanding the limitations of the quality of the empirical research and the limited ability to generalize to real-world settings, we conclude that in populations of examinees such as those represented in the polygraph research literature, untrained in countermeasures, specific-incident polygraph tests can discriminate lying from truth telling at rates well above chance, though well below perfection. Because the studies of acceptable quality all focus on specific incidents, generalization from them to uses for screening is not justified. Because actual screening applications involve considerably more ambiguity for the examinee and in determining truth than arises in specific-incident studies, polygraph accuracy for screening purposes is almost certainly lower than what can be achieved by specific-incident polygraph tests in the field. The accuracy levels in the four screening simulations in our sample, which include a validation study of the Test for Espionage and Sabotage (TES) used in the employee security screening program of the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), are in the range reported for other specific-incident laboratory studies. The one field study of actual screening presents results consistent with the expectation that polygraph accuracy in true screening situations is lower.\n\n\nSample Clearance Process Definition\n\nBelow is a sample process definition for clearance of my own documentation.  Processes may vary by agency, so consider this a straw-man, but all intelligence careers involve some sort of clearance process.  A significant point to consider is that wherever there is a step that says \"wait\" the applicant should remember that the minimum unit of measure is \"weeks,\" and not \"days\" (unless one is willing to multiply by 7).  For some agencies it might be \"months.\"  For example, it might take 3-4 weeks to schedule a polygraph, and then 3-4 weeks to process the results. Going in with this expectation helps to reduce surprises. Notice the potential loop from steps 7 to step 11.  Based on the findings in the National Academy of Science's report on the polygraph, a polygraph examination is largely a non-deterministic (i.e., random) exercise.  Some people get a \"clean\" result on one try, others need 2, 3, 4, etc., even though the applicant says the exact same thing each time, and it can happen to anybody.  It's best to know this in advance and plan accordingly.  (I'd like to point out that I think honesty is the best policy, but honesty is not always polygraph compatible) 1. Submit Security Forms\n2. Wait for forms-complete\n3. If forms-complete, then proceed to 4, else goto 1 4. Schedule Psych\n5. Wait for Psych\n6. Do Psych 7. Schedule Polygraph\n8. Wait for Polygraph\n9. Do Poly 10. Wait for poly results 11. If not-clean, return to 7\n12. Conduct Background Investigation\n13. Wait on BI 14. Have Security Interview 15. Wait on BI 16. When BI is concluded, wait on Adjudication 17. Adjudication\n\nFreedom of Information Act One of the important aspects of the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) is that applicants are entitled to request obtain copies of their own background investigations.  It might take a while, but they are legally obligated to provide it.\n\nhttp://www.usdoj.gov/04foia/ This site contains FOIA contacts for all Federal agencies, such as the NSA, CIA, FBI, DIA, NRO, etc.\n\n\nDoD Security Adjudication Guidelines This is a very good document prepared by the Defense Security Service outlining adjudication guidelines.  This document is located at: http://www.dss.mil/nf/adr/adjguid/adjguidF.htm   (Also cited in Bibliography)\n\n Just in case this document is removed, I have included it for reference:\nB. Adjudicative Process\n\n1. The adjudicative process is an examination of a sufficient period of a person's life to make an affirmative determination that the person is eligible for a security clearance. Eligibility for access to classified information is\npredicated upon the individual meeting these personnel security guidelines. The adjudicative process is the careful\nweighing of a number of variables known as the whole person concept. Available, reliable information about the\nperson, past and present, favorable and unfavorable, should be considered in reaching a determination. In evaluating the relevance of an individual's conduct, the adjudicator should consider the following factors:\na. The nature, extent, and seriousness of the conduct; b. The circumstances surrounding the conduct, to include knowledgeable participation; c. The frequency and recency of the conduct; d. The individual's age and maturity at the time of the conduct; e. The voluntariness of participation; f. The presence or absence of rehabilitation and other pertinent behavioral changes; g. The motivation for the conduct; h. The potential for pressure, coercion, exploitation, or duress; and i. The likelihood of continuation or recurrence. 2. Each case must be judged on its own merits, and final determination remains the responsibility of the specific department or agency. Any doubt as to whether access to classified information is clearly consistent with national security will be resolved in favor of the national security. 3. The ultimate determination of whether the granting or continuing of eligibility for a security clearance is clearly consistent with the interests of national security must be an overall common sense determination based upon careful consideration of the following, each of which is to be evaluated in the context of the whole person, as explained further below:\n\na. Guideline A: Allegiance to the United States\nb. Guideline B: Foreign influence c. Guideline C: Foreign preference d. Guideline D: Sexual behavior e. Guideline E: Personal conduct f. Guideline F: Financial considerations\ng. Guideline G: Alcohol consumption\nh. Guideline H: Drug involvement\nj. Guideline J: Criminal conduct k. Guideline K: Security violations l. Guideline L: Outside activities\nm. Guideline M: Misuse of information technology systems\nconcept, pursuit of further investigation may be terminated by an appropriate adjudicative agency in the face of reliable, significant, disqualifying, adverse information. 5. When information of security concern becomes known about an individual who is currently eligible for access to classified information, the adjudicator should consider whether the person: a. Voluntarily reported the information; b. Was truthful and complete in responding to questions;\nc. Sought assistance and followed professional guidance, where appropriate;\nd. Resolved or appears likely to favorably resolve the security concern; e. Has demonstrated positive changes in behavior and employment; f. Should have his or her access temporarily suspended pending final adjudication of the information. 6. If after evaluating information of security concern, the adjudicator decides that the information is not serious enough to warrant a recommendation of disapproval or revocation of the security clearance, it may be appropriate to recommend approval with a warning that future incidents of a similar nature may result in revocation of access.\n\n## Guideline A Allegiance To The United States\n\nThe Concern. An individual must be of unquestioned allegiance to the United States. The willingness to safeguard classified information is in doubt if there is any reason to suspect an individual's allegiance to the United States.\n\n\nConditions that could raise a security concern and may be disqualifying include: a. Involvement in any act of sabotage, espionage, treason, terrorism, sedition, or other act whose aim is to overthrow the Government of the United States or alter the form of government by unconstitutional means; b. Association or sympathy with persons who are attempting to commit, or who are committing, any of the above acts; c. Association or sympathy with persons or organizations that advocate the overthrow of the United States Government, or any state or subdivision, by force or violence or by other unconstitutional means;\nd. Involvement in activities which unlawfully advocate or practice the commission of acts of force or violence to prevent others from exercising their rights under the Constitution or laws of the United States or of any state.\n\n\nConditions that could mitigate security concerns include: a. The individual was unaware of the unlawful aims of the individual or organization and severed ties upon learning of these;\nb. The individual's involvement was only with the lawful or humanitarian aspects of such an organization;\nc. Involvement in the above activities occurred for only a short period of time and was attributable to curiosity or academic interest; d. The person has had no recent involvement or association with such activities.\n\n## Guideline B Foreign Influence\n\nThe Concern. A security risk may exist when an individual's immediate family, including cohabitants, and other persons to whom he or she may be bound by affection, influence, or obligation are not citizens of the United States or may be subject to duress. These situations could create the potential for foreign influence that could result in the compromise of classified information. Contacts with citizens of other countries or financial interests in other countries are also relevant to security determinations if they make an individual potentially vulnerable to coercion, exploitation, or pressure.\n\n\nConditions that could raise a security concern and may be disqualifying include: a. An immediate family member, or a person to whom the individual has close ties of affection or obligation, is a citizen of, or resident or present in, a foreign country;\n25\n\nb. Sharing living quarters with a person or persons, regardless of their citizenship status, if the potential for adverse foreign influence or duress exists;\nc. Relatives, cohabitants, or associates who are connected with any foreign government; d. Failing to report, where required, associations with foreign nationals;\ne, Unauthorized association with a suspected or known collaborator or employee of a foreign intelligence service; f. Conduct which may make the individual vulnerable to coercion, exploitation, or pressure by a foreign government; g. Indications that representatives or nationals from a foreign country are acting to increase the vulnerability of the individual to possible future exploitation, coercion or pressure;\nh. A substantial financial interest in a country, or in any foreign owned or operated business that could make the individual vulnerable to foreign influence.\n\n\nConditions that could mitigate security concerns include: a. A determination that the immediate family member(s) (spouse, father, mother, sons, daughters, brothers, sisters), cohabitant, or associate(s) in question are not agents of a foreign power or in a position to be exploited by a foreign power in a way that could force the individual to choose between loyalty to the person(s) involved and the United States; b. Contacts with foreign citizens are the result of official U.S. Government business; c. Contact and correspondence with foreign citizens are casual and infrequent; d. The individual has promptly complied with existing agency requirements regarding the reporting of contacts, requests, or threats from persons or organizations from a foreign country; e. Foreign financial interests are minimal and not sufficient to affect the individual's security responsibilities.\n\n## Guideline C Foreign Preference\n\nThe Concern. When an individual acts in such a way as to indicate a preference for a foreign country over the\nUnited States, then he or she may be prone to provide information or make decisions that are harmful to the interests of the United States.\n\nConditions that could raise a security concern and may be disqualifying include: a. The exercise of dual citizenship; b. Possession and/or use of a foreign passport; c. Military service or a willingness to bear arms for a foreign country; d. Accepting educational, medical, or other benefits, such as retirement and social welfare, from a foreign country; f. Residence in a foreign country to meet citizenship requirements;\ng. Using foreign citizenship to protect financial or business interests in another country;\nh. Seeking or holding political office in the foreign country; h. Voting in foreign elections; and i. Performing or attempting to perform duties, or otherwise acting, so as to serve the interests of another government in preference to the interests of the United States.\n\nConditions that could mitigate security concerns include: a. Dual citizenship is based solely on parents' citizenship or birth in a foreign country; b. Indicators of possible foreign preference (e.g., foreign military service) occurred before obtaining United States citizenship; c. Activity is sanctioned by the United States; d. Individual has expressed a willingness to renounce dual citizenship.\n\n## Guideline D Sexual Behavior\n\nThe Concern. Sexual behavior is a security concern if it involves a criminal offense, indicates a personality or emotional disorder, subjects the individual to coercion, exploitation, or duress, or reflects lack of judgment or discretion. (see footnote) Sexual orientation or preference may not be used as a basis for or a disqualifying factor in determining a person's eligibility for a security clearance.\n\n\nConditions that could raise a security concern and may be disqualifying include: a. Sexual behavior of a criminal nature, whether or not the individual has been prosecuted; b. Compulsive or addictive sexual behavior when the person is unable to stop a pattern of self-destructive or highrisk behavior or which is symptomatic of a personality disorder; c. Sexual behavior that causes an individual to be vulnerable to coercion, exploitation or duress; d. Sexual behavior of a public nature and/or which reflects lack of discretion or judgment.\n\n\nConditions that could mitigate security concerns include: a. The behavior occurred during or prior to adolescence and there is no evidence of subsequent conduct of a similar nature;\nb. The behavior was not recent and there is no evidence of subsequent conduct of a similar nature; c. There is no other evidence of questionable judgment, irresponsibility, or emotional instability;\nd. The behavior no longer serves as a basis for coercion, exploitation, or duress.\n\nFootnote: The adjudicator should also consider guidelines pertaining to criminal conduct (Guideline J); or emotional, mental, and personality disorders (Guideline I), in determining how to resolve the security concerns raised by sexual behavior.\n\n## Guideline E Personal Conduct\n\nThe Concern. Conduct involving questionable judgment, untrustworthiness, unreliability, lack of candor, dishonesty, or unwillingness to comply with rules and regulations could indicate that the person may not properly safeguard classified information. The following will normally result in an unfavorable clearance action or administrative termination of further processing for clearance eligibility: a. Refusal to undergo or cooperate with required security processing, including medical and psychological testing; or b. Refusal to complete required security forms, releases, or provide full, frank and truthful answers to lawful questions of investigators, security officials or other official representatives in connection with a personnel security or trustworthiness determination.\n\n\nConditions that could raise a security concern and may be disqualifying also include: a. Reliable, unfavorable information provided by associates, employers, coworkers, neighbors, and other acquaintances;\nb. The deliberate omission, concealment, or falsification of relevant and material facts from any personnel security questionnaire, personal history statement, or similar form used to conduct investigations, determine employment qualifications, award benefits or status, determine security clearance eligibility or trustworthiness, or award fiduciary responsibilities; c. Deliberately providing false or misleading information concerning relevant and material matters to an investigator, security official, competent medical authority, or other official representative in connection with a personnel security or trustworthiness determination; d. Personal conduct or concealment of information that may increase an individual's vulnerability to coercion, exploitation or duress, such as engaging in activities which, if known, may affect the person's personal, professional, or community standing or render the person susceptible to blackmail; e. A pattern of dishonesty or rule violations, including violation of any written or recorded agreement made between the individual and the agency.\n\nf. Association with persons involved in criminal activity.\n\n\nConditions that could mitigate security concerns include: a. The information was unsubstantiated or not pertinent to a determination of judgment, trustworthiness, or reliability;\n\n\nb. The falsification was an isolated incident, was not recent, and the individual has subsequently provided correct information voluntarily;\nc. The individual made prompt, good-faith efforts to correct the falsification before being confronted with the facts;\nd. Omission of material facts was caused or significantly contributed to by improper or inadequate advice of\nauthorized personnel, and the previously omitted information was promptly and fully provided; e. The individual has taken positive steps to significantly reduce or eliminate vulnerability to coercion, exploitation, or duress; f. A refusal to cooperate was based on advice from legal counsel or other officials that the individual was not required to comply with security processing requirements and, upon being made aware of the requirement, fully and truthfully provided the requested information;\ng. Association with persons involved in criminal activities has ceased.\n\n## Guideline F Financial Considerations\n\nThe Concern. An individual who is financially overextended is at risk of having to engage in illegal acts to generate funds. Unexplained affluence is often linked to proceeds from financially profitable criminal acts.\n\n\nConditions that could raise a security concern and may be disqualifying include: a. A history of not meeting financial obligations; b. Deceptive or illegal financial practices such as embezzlement, employee theft, check fraud, income tax evasion, expense account fraud, filing deceptive loan statements, and other intentional financial breaches of trust;\nc. Inability or unwillingness to satisfy debts; d. Unexplained affluence; e. Financial problems that are linked to gambling, drug abuse, alcoholism, or other issues of security concern.\n\n\nConditions that could mitigate security concerns include: a. The behavior was not recent;\nb. It was an isolated incident;\nc. The conditions that resulted in the behavior were largely beyond the person's control (e.g., loss of employment, a business downturn, unexpected medical emergency, or a death, divorce or separation);\nd. The person has received or is receiving counseling for the problem and there are clear indications that the problem is being resolved or is under control; e. The affluence resulted from a legal source; and f. The individual initiated a good-faith effort to repay overdue creditors or otherwise resolve debts.\n\n## Guideline G Alcohol Consumption\n\nThe Concern. Excessive alcohol consumption often leads to the exercise of questionable judgment, unreliability, failure to control impulses, and increases the risk of unauthorized disclosure of classified information due to carelessness.\n\n\nConditions that could raise a security concern and may be disqualifying include: a. Alcohol-related incidents away from work, such as driving while under the influence, fighting, child or spouse abuse, or other criminal incidents related to alcohol use; b. Alcohol-related incidents at work, such as reporting for work or duty in an intoxicated or impaired condition, or drinking on the job; c. Diagnosis by a credentialed medical professional (e.g., physician, clinical psychologist, or psychiatrist) of alcohol abuse or alcohol dependence;\nd. Evaluation of alcohol abuse or alcohol dependence by a licensed clinical social worker who is a staff member of a recognized alcohol treatment program; e. Habitual or binge consumption of alcohol to the point of impaired judgment;\nf. Consumption of alcohol, subsequent to a diagnosis of alcoholism by a credentialed medical professional and following completion of an alcohol rehabilitation program\n\nConditions that could mitigate security concerns include: a. The alcohol related incidents do not indicate a pattern; b. The problem occurred a number of years ago and there is no indication of a recent problem; c. Positive changes in behavior supportive of sobriety;\nd. Following diagnosis of alcohol abuse or alcohol dependence, the individual has successfully completed inpatient or outpatient rehabilitation along with aftercare requirements, participates frequently in meetings of Alcoholics Anonymous or a similar organization, has abstained from alcohol for a period of at least 12 months, and received a favorable prognosis by a credentialed medical professional or a licensed clinical social worker who is a staff member of a recognized alcohol treatment program.\n\n## Guideline H Drug Involvement\n\nThe Concern.\na. Improper or illegal involvement with drugs, raises questions regarding an individual's willingness or ability to protect classified information. Drug abuse or dependence may impair social or occupational functioning, increasing the risk of an unauthorized disclosure of classified information. b. Drugs are defined as mood and behavior altering substances and include: (1) Drugs, materials, and other chemical compounds identified and listed in the Controlled Substances Act of 1970, as amended (e.g., marijuana or cannabis, depressants, narcotics, stimulants, and hallucinogens), and (2) Inhalants and other similar substances. c. Drug abuse is the illegal use of a drug or use of a legal drug in a manner that deviates from approved medical direction.\n\n\nConditions that could raise a security concern and may be disqualifying include: a. Any drug abuse (see above definition); b. Illegal drug possession, including cultivation, processing, manufacture, purchase, sale, or distribution; c. Diagnosis by a credentialed medical professional (e.g., physician, clinical psychologist, or psychiatrist) of drug abuse or drug dependence;\nd. Evaluation of drug abuse or drug dependence by a licensed clinical social worker who is a staff member of a recognized drug treatment program; e. Failure to successfully complete a drug treatment program prescribed by a credentialed medical professional. Recent drug involvement, especially following the granting of a security clearance, or an expressed intent not to discontinue use, will almost invariably result in an unfavorable determination.\n\n\nConditions that could mitigate security concerns include: a. The drug involvement was not recent; b. The drug involvement was an isolated or aberrational event; c. A demonstrated intent not to abuse any drugs in the future;\nd. Satisfactory completion of a prescribed drug treatment program, including rehabilitation and aftercare requirements, without recurrence of abuse, and a favorable prognosis by a credentialed medical professional.\n\n## Guideline I Emotional, Mental, And Personality Disorders\n\nThe Concern. Emotional, mental, and personality disorders can cause a significant deficit in an individual's psychological, social and occupational functioning. These disorders are of security concern because they may indicate a defect in judgment, reliability or stability. A credentialed mental health professional (e.g., clinical psychologist or psychiatrist), employed by, acceptable to, or approved by the government, should be utilized in evaluating potentially disqualifying and mitigating information fully and properly, and particularly for consultation with the individual's mental health care provider.\n\n29\n\n\nConditions that could raise a security concern and may be disqualifying include: a. An opinion by a credentialed mental health professional that the individual has a condition or treatment that may indicate a defect in judgment, reliability, or stability; b. Information that suggests that an individual has failed to follow appropriate medical advice relating to treatment of a condition, e.g. failure to take prescribed medication; c. A pattern of high-risk, irresponsible, aggressive, anti-social or emotionally unstable behavior;\nd. Information that suggests that the individual's current behavior indicates a defect in his or her judgment or reliability.\n\n\nConditions that could mitigate security concerns include: a. There is no indication of a current problem;\nb. Recent opinion by a credentialed mental health professional that an individual's previous emotional, mental, or personality disorder is cured, under control or in remission and has a low probability of recurrence or exacerbation;\nc. The past emotional instability was a temporary condition (e.g., one caused by a death, illness, or marital breakup), the situation has been resolved, and the individual is no longer emotionally unstable.\n\n## Guideline J Criminal Conduct\n\nThe Concern. A history or pattern of criminal activity creates doubt about a person's judgment, reliability and trustworthiness.\n\n\nConditions that could raise a security concern and may be disqualifying include: a. Allegations or admissions of criminal conduct, regardless of whether the person was formally charged; b. A single serious crime or multiple lesser offenses.\n\n\nConditions that could mitigate security concerns include: a. The criminal behavior was not recent; b. The crime was an isolated incident; c. The person was pressured or coerced into committing the act and those pressures are no longer present in that person's life; d. The person did not voluntarily commit the act and/or the factors leading to the violation are not likely to recur; e. Acquittal f. There is clear evidence of successful rehabilitation.\n\n## Guideline K Security Violations\n\nThe Concern: Noncompliance with security regulations raises doubt about an individual's trustworthiness, willingness, and ability to safeguard classified information.\n\n\nConditions that could raise a security concern and may be disqualifying include: a. Unauthorized disclosure of classified information; b. Violations that are deliberate or multiple or due to negligence.\n\n\nConditions that could mitigate security concerns include actions that: a. Were inadvertent;\nb. Were isolated or infrequent;\nc. Were due to improper or inadequate training; d. Demonstrate a positive attitude towards the discharge of security responsibilities.\n\n\n## Guideline L Outside Activities\n\nThe Concern. Involvement in certain types of outside employment or activities is of security concern if it poses a conflict with an individual's security responsibilities and could create an increased risk of unauthorized disclosure of classified information.\n\n\nConditions that could raise a security concern and may be disqualifying include:\nAny service, whether compensated, volunteer, or employment with: a. A foreign country;\nb. Any foreign national; c. A representative of any foreign interest;\nd. Any foreign, domestic, or international organization or person engaged in analysis, discussion, or publication of material on intelligence, defense, foreign affairs, or protected technology.\n\n\nConditions that could mitigate security concerns include: a. Evaluation of the outside employment or activity indicates that it does not pose a conflict with an individual's security responsibilities;\nb. The individual terminates the employment or discontinues the activity upon being notified that it is in conflict with his or her security responsibilities.\n\n## Guideline M Misuse Of Information Technology Systems\n\nThe Concern. Noncompliance with rules, procedures, guidelines or regulations pertaining to information technology systems may raise security concerns about an individual's trustworthiness, willingness, and ability to properly protect classified systems, networks, and information. Information Technology Systems include all related equipment used for the communication, transmission, processing, manipulation, and storage of classified or sensitive information.\n\n\nConditions that could raise a security concern and may be disqualifying include: a. Illegal or unauthorized entry into any information technology system; b. Illegal or unauthorized modification, destruction, manipulation, or denial of access to information residing on an information technology system;\nc. Removal (or use) of hardware, software or media from any information technology system without authorization, when specifically prohibited by rules, procedures, guidelines or regulations;\nd. Introduction of hardware, software or media into any information technology system without authorization, when specifically prohibited by rules, procedures, guidelines or regulations;\n\nConditions that could mitigate security concerns include: a. The misuse was not recent or significant; b. The conduct was unintentional or inadvertent; c. The introduction or removal of media was authorized;\nd. The misuse was an isolated event; e. The misuse was followed immediately by a prompt, good faith effort to correct the situation.\n\n\nDoD Security Adjudication Appeal Cases Selected 2003 cases are copied from the Defense Office of Hearings and Appeals:\nhttp://www.defenselink.mil/dodgc/doha/industrial/    (cited in Bibilography) These selected cases are from DoD contractors who got their clearances either revoked or denied, and their subsequent appeals.  There are many, many cases, and I selected an unscientific sample.  Most of the appeals are rejected, but the cases are worth scanning to see the previously stated Guidelines in practice.  My editorial comments are prefaced by [Editorial]\nCASE NUMBER: 01-02046.a1 Criminal Conduct; Emotional, Mental, and Personality Disorders 05/22/2003\n\nAn applicant's personal conduct may have security significance even though it occurs during off-duty or non-work hours. Security clearance decisions involve predictive judgments about whether an applicant poses a security risk. Administrative Judge analyzed certain exhibits in an arbitrary and capricious manner. Judge erred by discounting certain exhibits for arbitrary and capricious reasons. Favorable decision remanded with instructions. [Editorial] This one is interesting, as it is the one of the few that was in favor of the Applicant.  Note the phrase: \"Administrative Judge analyzed certain exhibits in an arbitrary and capricious manner. Judge erred by discounting certain exhibits for arbitrary and capricious reasons.\"   \"Arbitrary and capricious\" cited twice is disconcerting to read.\n\n\nCASE NUMBER: 02-30929.h1 Foreign Influence 06/30/2003 Applicant mitigated security concerns over foreign influence resulting from his relatives' citizenship in the Republic of Korea (Korea): he has parents, who live in Korea, and other relatives, including his wife, who are citizens of Korea but reside in the United States (U.S.), and he has traveled frequently to Korea. Given that these relatives have no ties to the government of Korea, I conclude that it is unlikely that they are foreign agents or in a position to be pressured. Further, there is no substantial likelihood that he would succumb to foreign influence if his family should be subject to duress. As Korea is an ally of the U.S., I think it unlikely that foreign pressure on his family could create a situation that could result in the compromise of classified information. Clearance is granted.\n\n[Editorial] This one is interesting: close relatives were not US citizens, but clearance was granted.  There are other cases in this appendix of close family members who live in allied foreign countries where clearance was rejected.\n\n\nCASE NUMBER: 02-12329.h1 Personal Conduct; Criminal Conduct; Information Technology 07/18/2003 Applicant and his wife have been unable to conceive a child of their own. His wife's only pregnancy resulted in miscarriage after seven months. The resulting psychological effects led Applicant to turn to pornography as an escape. In 1994, he misused his work computer to download and store pornography. Unbeknownst to him, a small percentage of the files he acquired in a large batch download included child pornography. Prosecution was declined due to lack of intent to possess child pornography in violation of federal laws. Applicant resigned in lieu of being fired, a fact he intentionally omitted from his EPSQ. However, the concerns raised by his personal conduct, criminal conduct, and misuse of technology are mitigated through the isolation, lack of recency, and by significant rehabilitation. Clearance is granted.\n\n\nCASE NUMBER: 02-08558.h1 Foreign Influence\n05/30/2003 The Applicant is a native-born American, not of Chinese ancestry. His wife of four years is Chinese, but she has filed the appropriate paperwork to begin the process of becoming an American citizen. Their marriage is not viewed well by her family, and they have been ostracized. The contacts with her family are infrequent, and her family are not agents of a foreign power, or in a position to be coerced by a foreign power. Adverse inference is overcome. Clearance is granted.\n\n\n[Editorial] Based on clearance case-law, the secret to marrying a foreigner would appear to be making certain that your in-laws absolutely despise you.\n\nCASE NUMBER: 01-26689.a1\n\nFinancial 07/09/2003 Board cannot consider new evidence on appeal. By failing to respond to the File of Relevant Material, Applicant waived his right to submit additional information for the Administrative Judge to consider in his case. It is irrelevant that an unfavorable security clearance decision may result in financial hardship for Applicant because the effect of an adverse security clearance decision does not change an applicant's suitability for a security clearance. There is no presumption of error below and the appealing party has the burden of raising claims of error with specificity and demonstrating factual or legal error that warrants remand or reversal. Because Applicant raised no claims of such error, the Board need not address the Judge's findings and conclusions. Adverse decision affirmed.\n\n[Editorial] This is an important phrase to remember:  \"It is irrelevant that an unfavorable security clearance decision may result in financial hardship for Applicant because the effect of an adverse security clearance decision does not change an applicant's suitability for a security clearance.\"  Like it or not, your personal problems are not the Government's problems.  Make sure you're on solid ground when going through the process.\n\n\nCASE NUMBER: 02-04237.a1 Foreign Preference; Foreign Influence 08/12/2003\nThe fact that Applicant has held a security clearance does not give him any vested right in retaining a security clearance. The federal government does not have to wait until a person commits a security violation before it can deny or revoke access to classified information. Whether Applicant is able to contribute to the national security is not relevant or material to assessing his security eligibility. The ASDC3I memorandum concerning foreign passports is legally binding on the Administrative Judge and the Board. Neither the Judge nor the Board can ignore, disregard or fail to apply the ASDC3I memorandum in cases where it is applicable. Neither the Judge nor the Board can review or pass judgment on the wisdom or desirability of the ASDC3I memorandum. Applicant's possession of a Greek passport falls within the scope of the ASDC3I memorandum. Adverse decision affirmed.\n\n[Editorial] Note the phrases \"The federal government does not have to wait until a person commits a security violation before it can deny or revoke access to classified information\" and \"Whether Applicant is able to contribute to the national security is not relevant or material to assessing his security eligibility.\"  Dual passport.\n\n\nCASE NUMBER: 02-06928.a1 Foreign Preference; Foreign Influence\n09/17/2003 The Administrative Judge is not bound by Applicant's opinion as to the meaning and significance of his conduct. Board cannot consider new evidence on appeal. When adjudicating a security clearance case, a Judge is evaluating the security significance of an applicant's conduct and circumstances, not ordering an applicant to make decisions about his or her personal life. However, Applicant's freedom to make decisions about his personal life does not preclude the federal government from deciding whether the choices Applicant makes raise security concerns. Applicant's disagreement with the Judge's weighing of the record evidence, standing alone, is not sufficient to demonstrate the Judge weighed it improperly. Given the record evidence in this case, the Judge articulated a rational basis for why he had unresolved doubts about the security significance of Applicant's overall conduct and ties with Israel. Adverse decision affirmed.\n\n\nCASE NUMBER: 02-15358.a1 Alcohol; Criminal Conduct 07/22/2003 A decision by a Hearing Office Administrative Judge is not legally binding precedent on other Hearing Office Judges or the Board. A Statement of Reasons (SOR) is an administrative pleading that is not measured against the strict requirements of a criminal indictment. The absence of an SOR allegation concerning an applicant's credibility is irrelevant to a Judge's inherent authority to assess an applicant's demeanor during testimony and make a determination as to the applicant's credibility. Alcohol abuse can have security significance even if there has been no diagnosis of alcoholism or alcohol dependence, no habitual or binge drinking, or no alcohol abuse during duty hours. An applicant's candor about his or her conduct and circumstances does not preclude a Judge from evaluating the security significance of the applicant's conduct and circumstances. Harmless errors by the Judge do not warrant remand or reversal. Adverse decision affirmed.\n\n\n[Editorial] I agree that alcohol can be a problem, but this one seems a bit odd.  There is no evidence of alcohol abuse, but alcohol is still a problem?  I hope there is more to this story.  Note the phrase:  \"An applicant's candor about his or her conduct and circumstances does not preclude a Judge from evaluating the security significance of the applicant's conduct and circumstances.\"\n\nCASE NUMBER: 02-15383.a1\n\nForeign Preference; Foreign Influence\n07/29/2003 A Statement of Reasons (SOR) is an administrative pleading that is not measured against the strict requirements of a criminal indictment. Applicant has not shown that the wording of the SOR prejudiced her in any discernable way. The particular reasons why an applicant needs a security clearance usually are not relevant or material to an assessment of the applicant's security eligibility. Harmless factual errors do not warrant remand or reversal. By obtaining and possessing a Spanish passport, Applicant exercised the rights and privileges of Spanish citizenship. There is a rebuttable presumption that the Judge considered all the record evidence unless the Judge specifically states otherwise. Adverse decision affirmed.\n\n\n[Editorial] Dual passport CASE NUMBER: 02-24479.a1\n\nFinancial 07/14/2003 Absent a showing that Department Counsel's conduct resulted in a denial of due process or unduly affected the substance of an Administrative Judge's decision in some way, the Board need not address Applicant's complaints about Department Counsel's conduct. Applicant waived any objection to the three-hour delay before his case was heard by the Judge. Given the record evidence in this case, it was reasonable for the Judge to find that Applicant's military character references were not aware of his financial problems. Government officials and employees were not obligated to give Applicant legal advice or guidance, or tell him how to best prepare for his hearing. Applicant was on notice of his obligation to prepare for the hearing and to present evidence on his behalf. Adverse decision affirmed.\n\n\nCASE NUMBER: 02-04344.a1 Foreign Influence; Foreign Preference; Personal Conduct 09/15/2003 Board does not have supervisory jurisdiction or authority over the conduct of Department Counsel or Hearing Office Administrative Judges. However, the Board can review claims that the conduct of a Department Counsel or a Judge violated or prejudiced an applicant's rights under Executive Order 10865 or the Directive. Nothing in record evidence supports Applicant's claim that Department Counsel led him to believe that he would be granted a security clearance if he surrendered his Israeli passport and renounced his Israeli citizenship. Given the record evidence in this case, the Judge's adverse conclusions under Guideline B are sustainable. Judge's finding that Applicant falsified a security clearance application is sustainable. Adverse decision affirmed.\n\n[Editorial] Dual passport.  However, in this case it looks like the applicant surrendered his 2nd citizenship and was still rejected, which seems a bit severe unless there is more to the story.  Note that Guideline C could be mitigated by \"d. Individual has expressed a willingness to renounce dual citizenship\", however the applicant was undone by Guideline B, and a claim that the security clearance application was falsified.\n\nCASE NUMBER: 01-23156.a1 Alcohol; Personal Conduct\n09/24/2003\n\nThere is a rebuttable presumption that an Administrative Judge considered all the record evidence unless the Judge specifically states otherwise. There is no requirement that a Judge specifically discuss every piece of record evidence when making a decision. The Judge's finding that Applicant falsified a security clearance application is sustainable. The Judge's finding that Applicant falsified a written statement is not sustainable. Nothing in Executive Order 10865 or the Directive entitles Applicant to be given the benefit of the doubt. To the contrary, in security clearance cases any doubts as to the security eligibility of an applicant must be resolved in favor of the national security, not in favor of the applicant. Adverse decision affirmed.\n\n[Editorial] Note the phrase:  \"Nothing in Executive Order 10865 or the Directive entitles Applicant to be given the benefit of the doubt. \"\n\nCASE NUMBER: 01-22693.a1 Foreign Preference; Foreign Influence 09/22/2003\nWithin the legal constraints of the Directive and basic concepts of due process, Administrative Judges have broad latitude and discretion in how they write their decisions. The Board does not find persuasive Applicant's contention that the Judge's decision was so deficient as to deny Applicant the possibility of an effective appeal. Harmless factual errors by the Judge do not warrant remand or reversal. The Judge properly applied the whole person concept in analyzing the facts and circumstances of Applicant's case. In general, the Judge's adverse conclusions under Guideline B and Guideline C are sustainable. The Judge's failure to apply Foreign Preference Mitigating Condition 1\nwas harmless error under the particular facts of this case. The Judge did not give undue weigh to the record evidence that Applicant moved to Israel in 1981 and worked about 10 months for a component of the Israeli Ministry of Defense. Adverse decision affirmed.\n\n[Editorial] Working for another country's defense industry CASE NUMBER: 01-13965.a1 Criminal Conduct\n07/29/2003\nAdministrative Judge properly concluded Applicant's 1979 felony conviction falls under 10 U.S.C. 986 and precludes a favorable security clearance decision. Adverse decision affirmed. Board does not recommend this case be considered further for a waiver under 10 U.S.C. 986.\n\n\n[Editorial] Note:  This felony was 24 years ago (from the appeal).  It seems that few things are\" too-long-ago,\"\nalthough it's a felony conviction.\n\n\nCASE NUMBER: 02-04786.a1 Foreign Preference; Foreign Influence 06/27/2003 An applicant with immediate family members living in a country hostile to the United States has a heavy burden to show those family ties do not pose a security risk. Official statements by U.S. State Department about foreign relations of United States are legislative facts that can be taken into consideration by Administrative Judges and the Board. Judge failed to articulate rational basis for his conclusion that Applicant's father was not vulnerable to pressure from the Iranian government. Guideline B is not limited to ties of affection, but includes consideration of ties of affection, influence or obligation. Applicant is not entitled to retain a security clearance merely because she was granted one in the past. The absence of a foreign preference does not preclude consideration of whether an applicant's foreign ties raise questions of vulnerability to foreign influence. Favorable decision reversed.\n\n\n[Editorial] It was not the Applicant, but the Applicant's Father.  Note the phrase \"The absence of a foreign preference does not preclude consideration of whether an applicant's foreign ties raise questions of vulnerability to foreign influence.\"\n\nCASE NUMBER: 01-16098.a1 Foreign Preference; Foreign Influence 05/29/2003 The Administrative Judge's findings of fact are sustainable. The Judge failed to explain why he concluded Applicant's brothers in Mexico did not raise a significant security concern under Guideline B, yet concluded those brothers raised security concerns under Guideline C. However, because the Judge's overall decision is sustainable, no purpose would be served by remanding the case to clarify this matter. Applicant waived her opportunity to have legal representation during the proceedings below. Adverse decision affirmed.\n\n[Editorial] It was not the Applicant, but the Applicant's brothers\n\n\n## Afterword\n\n When this document was initially published I was expecting it to be read by about 10 people.  Maybe 20.  I was just glad I finished it, as it was very much a cathartic experience.  My primary concern was really whether it was a quality paper.  After all, who wants to read about a guy that got rejected? Quite a few people, it turns out. I'd like to thank FAS for taking an interest in this story.  And I'd also like to thank the many reader comments that flowed in.  I was pleased that the feedback to date was that the paper was viewed to be highly respectful of the agency while still providing constructive commentary.  *Whew!*  That was very much the intent.   Particularly gratifying was feedback from other NSA applicants who had been rejected who wrote very much identifying with the stresses and the accuracy of the experience.\n\nSeveral wrote describing frustration with the polygraph process, including one that was so frustrated that she dropped out of the process after several \"not clean enough\" polygraph examinations.  This might be just another clearance statistic to the agency, but I found this profoundly sad and a waste of resources and talent.  It was another case of *\"I was really excited about career opportunities at the agency, but then...\"* and who have moved on to different jobs.  Feedback also came in from applicants from *other* government agencies (e.g., \"hey, that reminded me of the time I interviewed with <fill in blank>.  I wish I had read this before interviewing with them.\" Others feedback expressed frustration of clearance process in other agencies, including one person who's clearance investigation expired (2 year limit), and then he had to start the entire process over again.  The word \"intrusive\" came up several times - as did the word \"flawed\" - from people familiar with the clearance process in general (i.e., not necessarily specific to the agency.)  A question that came up from a few former applicants was \"do you know if I'll ever be eligible for a security clearance after getting rejected by the agency?\"  Good question, and I wondered the same thing.  Personally, I would estimate \"no\" for anything higher than guarding a trashcan by the Washington Monument.  It's the scarlet letter R.  In this event, you either get the Gold Medal or you go hurtling off the ramp like that 1970's *Agony of Defeat* ski-jumper on the *Wide World of Sports*, but without the notoriety or residual checks (I hope that ABC Sports paid that guy something because that crash had to hurt.)  But seriously, if anybody finds out anything to the contrary, let me know. The majority of readers were mostly in the category of *\"entertaining!\"* and *\"MAN, that was WEIRD!\"*  And I was surprised who came across the paper.  I got several emails along the lines of *\"a friend of mine emailed me this link,\"* but here's my favorite story to date:  a printed copy was left in a Bay Area airport where it was found by a bartender/waitress working at said facility.  She picked it up and read it, and emailed me saying she enjoyed it, and even passed it to a friend of hers who worked at a Naval installation who also read it and said same.  Thanks!\n\n\nAdditionally, some terrific feedback (and links) came from readers on the Freedom of Information Act, Security Adjudication Guidelines, and Security Adjudication Appeals.  I've updated the appendix to include information on all these subjects.  It became clear to be that I wasn't the only one who felt like being in high-seas in a rowboat while simultaneously under a giant microscope during the clearance process, so I've updated the document with this information.  The combination of those analogies seems nonsensical (e.g., if you're in a rowboat where does the giant microscope come from?), but believe me, it feels like that. To answer another question: before this was published online, I emailed this paper (under my real name) to the recruiting division at the agency and called the division chief (again, real name) to make sure it was received.  It was.  I let them sit on it for about 3 weeks.  No response.  Concurrently, I also asked recruiting for a copy of any applicable NDA they thought I was under.  They referred me to a person in legal.  So I emailed *that* person with the same request.  No response.  Other than renting a plane and towing a football-field-length banner over central Maryland I'm not sure how much more straightforward I could have been, or given them more of a chance to respond to the document.  Not giving them an opportunity to review, however, wouldn't have been suitable. To the readers who suggested I keep writing: thanks!  I just need to have *another* really crazy experience..."
    },
    {
        "text": "Independent Study Group Members Mr. Keith Hall Chairman Vice President, Booz Allen Hamilton Edward G. Anderson Jeff Baxter LTG US Army (Ret)\nIndependent Consultant Principal\n\nBooz Allen Hamilton Thomas W. Conroy Dr. Paul Gilman Vice President, Director, National Security Programs Oak Ridge Center for\nNorthrop Grumman/TASC\nAdvanced Studies Patrick M. Hughes Kemp Lear LTG US Army (Ret)\nAssociate Vice President, Homeland Security Booz Allen Hamilton L-3 Communications Kevin O'Connell Joseph D. Whitley, Esq.\n\nDirector, Alston & Bird, LLP\nCenter for Intelligence Research and Analysis Executive Secretariat:\nBooz Allen Hamilton:\nGovernment:\n\nMr. Greg Jay\n\n\nMr. Keith Elliot, USGS\n\nMr. Bob Evans\n\n\nMr. Marty Eckes, USGS\n\nMr. Chuck Symes\n\n\nMr. Randy Soderholm, ODNI\n\nMr. Ed Obloy\n\nMs. Robin Saenz\n\nINDEX\nExecutive Summary\n\n\np. 4\n\nChapter 1:  Introduction\np. 6\n\nChapter 2:  Findings and Recommendations\np. 10\n\na. **Finding Number 1**\n\n\np. 10\n\n\nLE & HLS lack a coherent process to\n\n\naccess IC capabilities.\n\nb. **The Model**\n\n\np. 13\ni. Governance\n\n\np. 14\nii. Policy and Legal\n\n\np. 18\niii. Requirements Flow\n\n\np. 19\niv. Metrics\n\n\np. 22\nv. Budget Authority\n\n\np. 22\nvi. Training and Education\n\n\np. 23\n\nc. **Finding Number 2**\n\n\np. 24\n\n\nCAC process should serve as a model for\n\n\na future process.\n\nd. **Finding Number 3**\n\n\np. 26\n\n\nMany domestic users are unsure how to use\n\n\nIC capabilities.\n\ne. **Finding Number 4**\n\n\np. 26\n\n\nDomestic user's requirements must be addressed\n\n\nin any future acquisition process.\n\nf. **Finding Number 5**\n\n\np. 29\n\n\nIC domestic use policies reflect pre-9/11\n\n\nenvironment.\n\ng. **Finding Number 6**\n\n\np. 32\n\n\nDomestic use of geospatial data is impeded by\n\n\npolicy/classification barriers.\n\nh. **Finding Number 7**\n\n\np. 35\n\n\nOverlapping jurisdictions complicates support\n\n\nto domestic users.\n\ni. **Finding Number 8**\n\n\np. 37\n\n\nDomestic information use is complicated by\n\n\nspecial handling rules.\n\nj. **Finding Number 9**\n\n\np. 39\n\nCivil agency archives are extensive,\n\nuncoordinated and a potentially\n\nimportant source of data for domestic users.\n\nk. **Finding Number 10**\n\n\np. 40\n\n\nNeed to change reporting procedure\n\n\nfor U.S. persons.\n\nl. **Finding Number 11**\n\n\np. 41\n\n\nNeed for balanced discussion of domestic\n\n\nuse of IC capabilities.\n\nChapter 3:  Other Models Considered\n\n\np. 43\n\nChapter 4:  Next Steps\np. 47 (Distributed on CD only) Appendix I\n\nTerms of Reference\nAppendix II\n\nISG and SSG Members\nAppendix III\nStudy Methodology\nAppendix IV\nThe CAC Charter and History\nAppendix V\n\nISG Agendas\nAppendix VI\nISG Briefings to the SSG\nAppendix VII\nGlossary Classified: Appendix VIII\nBriefings given to the ISG\n\n\nClassified Discussion of Finding #6\n(Distributed on a separate CD, by request only; call Mr. Randy Soderholm, ODNI, 703.482.5709 or Marty Eckes, USGS, 703.648.5746.)\n\n\nExecutive Summary Recognizing a growing need for use of domestic information collected by the Intelligence Community, in May of 2005, the DDNI/Collection and the Director, U.S. Geological Survey, chartered an Independent Study Group (ISG) to review the current operation and future role of the Civil Applications Committee (CAC) and study the current state of Intelligence Community support to homeland security and law enforcement entities. The ISG concluded there is an urgent need for action because opportunities to better protect the nation are being missed.  They unanimously agreed on 11 significant findings and 27\nrecommendations.  The ISG found that although the civil domestic users are well supported through the CAC, homeland security and law enforcement users lack a coherent, organized, and focused process to access IC capabilities. Most of these users do not understand how intelligence capabilities can be applied to support their missions and functions.  Likewise, the IC lacks a comprehensive understanding of the needs of those users.  For these and other reasons, the ISG\nconcluded a new management and process model is needed to effectively employ IC capabilities for domestic uses. To better support domestic users, the ISG recommends establishment of a Domestic Applications Program, funded by the DNI.  Within that program the Department of Homeland Security, as executive agent of the Director of National Intelligence, would house a Domestic Applications Office (DAO) to provide a focal point and act as a facilitator to the IC on behalf of civil, homeland security and law enforcement users. Oversight would be provided by a Domestic Applications Executive Committee composed of elements from the IC and other significant stakeholders.  The DAO would be informed by working groups from each of the domestic user domains: civil, homeland security and law enforcement.  This process would be modeled after the successful operations of the CAC. This new management and process model for the domestic users will necessarily evolve overtime.  To aid in this *process of discovery*, the ISG also recommends a Domestic Applications of National Capabilities (DANCAP) Program be established to promote greater use and understanding of IC capabilities and their application to solve the needs of the domestic user. An effective and growing use of IC capabilities for domestic needs will have significant implications for R&D, acquisition and Tasking, Collection, Processing, Exploitation and Dissemination (TCPED).  Although the ISG concluded expanded access to current IC collection and processing capabilities by domestic users can be accommodated without major impact, exploitation and dissemination requirements could be extensive and more difficult to accommodate.  Today, most domestic users are absent from DNI, IC and DOD requirements and systems development forums.  This must be corrected.  The ISG recommends the domestic users be given a \"seat at the table\" to influence policy, R&D and acquisition decisions. The current lack of understanding between the users and providers concerning domestic information makes imperative a need for training and education.  Domestic users need to know\n\nand understand what the IC can and cannot do in supporting their requirements.  Conversely, the IC needs to better understand the domestic user's requirements.  This can best be addressed through a sustained and comprehensive training and education program, sponsored by the DNI.\n\n\nThe study also found significant change is needed in policy regimes regulating domestic use of IC capabilities.  The root of the problem is a lack of a clearly articulated comprehensive policy on the use of IC capabilities for domestic needs. Today, policies and practices governing the use of IC capabilities, many of which pre-date 9/11, discourage rather than encourage use by domestic users especially law enforcement.  As a consequence, access is often governed on a case-by-case basis through a risk averse rather than risk management lens.  Support to domestic users often appears more like a \"pick-up game\" rather than a well coordinated, focused and repeatable process, despite commendable efforts by all involved to make the system work. The ultimate effect is missed opportunities to collect, exploit and disseminate domestic information critical to fighting the war on terrorism, preparing for, responding to, and recovering from disasters, natural and man-made.  To address these shortfalls, the ISG recommends convening a study to comprehensively review the laws, policies and practices concerning classification of information, limits on information collection, storage and dissemination, and to reconcile the need to use domestic information with the keystone requirement to protect the civil liberties and privacy of US persons. Finally, the ISG noted other matters that must be addressed:\n- Timely and efficient provision of geospatial intelligence support to domestic users is impeded by policy barriers, classification issues and culture; and,\n\n- Effective IC support to federal, state, tribal, local and private sector authorities is\ncomplicate by overlapping jurisdictions and barriers to information sharing; and,\n- Exploitation, fusion, storage and sharing of \"domestic information\" is complicated because\ncurrent rules require extensive special handling protections; and,\n- Civil agency archival holdings are extensive, but uncoordinated; and,\n- There is a need for change in the procedures for reporting U.S. person data including more\nrapid transmission of identity in specific threat situations; and,\n-  A concerted effort to assure a balanced discussion of the benefits and risks associated\nwith expanded use of intelligence capabilities for domestic purposes will be needed.\nThis report provides the first comprehensive review of the role IC capabilities currently play in supporting domestic information needs of civil, homeland security and law enforcement users since the establishment of the CAC in 1975.  The ISG concluded dramatic change is required. This report and the recommendations it makes represent a unique opportunity to better protect the nation.\n\n## Chapter 1:  Introduction\n\n\nIn late May 2005, the Deputy Director of National Intelligence for Collection and the Director of the United States Geological Survey commissioned Booz Allen Hamilton to lead a Civil Applications Committee (CAC) Blue Ribbon Study.  The objective, as stated in the Terms of Reference, was to:\n\n\n         \"Conduct an independent review of the future role of the CAC for the facilitation,\nmanagement and oversight of remote sensing for applications that are civil and/or\ndomestic in nature and involve the use of Intelligence Community (IC) capabilities and products.  This study is predicated upon the realization that many of these\napplications have taken on increased importance and the CAC construct that was\nput in place several years ago may no longer be well suited for meeting current and\nfuture needs.  In addition to applications where the CAC has traditionally been\ninvolved, which include natural disaster recovery, environmental applications and\nsupport of civil agency special requirements, the study will address management and processes associated with leveraging Intelligence Community capabilities against homeland security and law enforcement missions.  Recommendations will\nbe developed to improve the effectiveness, timeliness and efficiency of the Intelligence Community support to civil, homeland security and law enforcement users and will address the future role of the CAC in the process.\"\n\nThe study was conducted by an Independent Study Group (ISG) composed of eight former senior government/military officials and consultants and led by Mr. Keith Hall of Booz Allen Hamilton (see Appendix II for a list of members).  The study was conducted under the oversight and guidance of a government Senior Steering Group (SSG) co-chaired by Mrs. Mary Margaret Graham, DDNI for Collection and Dr. Patrick Leahy, Acting Director, USGS (see Appendix II for SSG membership). Federal civil agency access to classified remote sensing data for scientific purposes was facilitated from the beginning of national technical programs through the involvement of President Eisenhower's Science Adviser, James Killian.  Through 1972, the use of national overhead systems data for civil, scientific and environmental purposes was accommodated through the offices President's Science Advisory Committee (PSAC) under the Science Adviser. In January 1973, President Nixon abolished both the PSAC and the position of presidential science adviser in response to Committee opposition to the administration's anti-ballistic missile system initiatives.  The lack of federal oversight complicated civil access to classified systems data and products. In January 1974, responding to Congressional examination of allegations that classified U.S. intelligence collection systems were being used to spy on U.S. citizens, President Ford established a Presidential Commission, chaired by Vice President Rockefeller, to examine CIA operations within the US. One of the Rockefeller Commission's tasks was a review of the entire range of classified overhead remote sensing capabilities targeted at domestic areas.  While failing to substantiate any illegal use of classified imagery, the Commission's report noted that the\n\ndemise of the PSAC and the Science Adviser positions eliminated oversight authority for managing legitimate civil activities involving access to classified remote sensing resources.1 A key Rockefeller Commission recommendation urged establishment of an interagency committee of Federal civil agencies to facilitate appropriate use of overhead remote sensing technology and allay concerns about the potential for improper use of intelligence assets for domestic purposes.  The Committee for Civil Applications of Classified Overhead Remotely Sensed Data, also known as the Civil Applications Committee or CAC, was chartered in 1975\nthrough a joint memorandum signed by the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, the Director of the Office of Management and Budget, and the Director of Central Intelligence. The CAC, with membership of 11 departments and independent agencies, is chaired by the Director, U.S. Geological Survey, and meets monthly as a technology and information exchange forum.  The CAC has an Executive Steering Group of senior agency officials, chaired by the Deputy Secretary of Interior, who meet biannually to address policy issues of common interest in the DoD, intelligence, and civil communities. In addition, the monthly CAC and the Executive Steering Group are supported by a secretariat hosted by the U.S. Geological Survey.  The Secretariat is the principal means of interaction between the civilian agencies and Intelligence and Defense agencies. The CAC provides a means for communication between the civil users of intelligence community capabilities and the providers.  Technology developments and novel applications are shared, support for response to hazards is facilitated and the staff of the CAC\ncoordinates training for the civil community.  In addition, the CAC oversees requests for information from the civil users to ensure that it conforms to the charter of the CAC and cannot be otherwise obtained in a timely fashion.  Technical support for the acquisition, receipt, archiving, and dissemination of data is provided to the CAC through the USGS National Civil Applications Program (NCAP). The attacks of September 11, 2001 have had a significant impact on the policies, roles, missions and structure of the U. S. government.  The need to share information across the government, and between federal, state, tribal and local jurisdictions, is slowly taking hold and the benefits are starting to be realized.  With the exception of the Civil Applications Committee effort, Intelligence Community capabilities have traditionally supported national security and foreign policy elements of the government.  As noted above, limited resources were devoted to domestic civil agencies support and then only on a low priority, resources available basis.   Today, the threats to the Nation have changed and there is growing interest in making available the special capabilities of the Intelligence Community to all parts of the government, to include homeland security and law enforcement entities and on a higher priority basis.  The American people expect their government to use all available resources to protect them. This study considers how the civil, homeland security and law enforcement communities of the United States can access intelligence capabilities while at the same time protecting the civil liberties of U.S. citizens and the sensitive sources and methods of the intelligence community.\n\n\n\nDefinition of Terms A short clarification of terms is necessary so that their use will be interpreted in the manner\nintended by the Study Group.  During the study we used the term \"Domestic User\" to indicate all civil, homeland security and law enforcement domains.  The word \"Domain\" refers to a\ncustomer community that might use intelligence capabilities in support of their respective\nmissions. There are three such domains:  Civil, Homeland Security, and Law Enforcement.\n\n- The \"Civil Domain\" (Civil) involves government activities involved in scientific or\nenvironmental research to include monitoring and recovery from natural disasters and related hazards.  This domain includes the current members of the Civil Applications Committee as well as other relevant elements of the government (e.g., General Services\nAdministration, Department of Health and Human Services, etc.).\n- The \"Homeland Security Domain\" (HLS) encompasses those elements of the government\ninvolved in the preparation, prevention, response and recovery to attacks on the homeland. This domain includes the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and its various subcomponents, and other federal, state, local and tribal elements involved in these activities.\n- The \"Law Enforcement Domain\" (LE) includes Federal, State, Local, and Tribal activities\naimed at investigation, arrest and prosecution of criminal activity, including regulatory\nenforcement.\nThe use of domain definitions for functions eliminated the organizational complexity of the many roles performed by most government organizations; with many having functions in two or even three domains.  For example, the Department of Homeland Security also includes FEMA (which has the Civil Domain responsibility to respond to natural disasters), as well as the Customs and Border Protection element which has a significant homeland security and law enforcement role.  The FBI has a long standing law enforcement role, but also has responsibilities for the prevention of terrorist attacks (a homeland security role).  The Environmental Protection Agency has an environmental monitoring role in the Civil Domain, but a regulatory enforcement role which for purposes of this study is considered a Law Enforcement role. Intelligence Capabilities (as used in this report) includes: national satellite sensors; technical collection capabilities (archival, current & future) of the DoD; airborne sensors; NSA worldwide assets; military and other MASINT sensors; and sophisticated exploitation/analytic capabilities.\n\n\nFactors Affecting Domestic Use of Intelligence Capabilities During the conduct of the study, it became clear that there are several factors that currently affect the domestic use of intelligence capabilities.  This group of factors has both limiting and facilitating impacts on a customer's access to IC capabilities.  First is the degree of familiarity with IC capabilities.  CAC members over thirty years have developed an extensive knowledge of IC capabilities and therefore are successful in using those capabilities to support their requirements.  The law enforcement domain is at the opposite end of the spectrum. They are for\n\nthe most part unfamiliar with the IC's capabilities and the type of support they could obtain.  The knowledge of the homeland security domain is evolving as DHS matures.  Awareness of the IC's capabilities is a major factor in gaining support.\n\n\nSecond, the availability of a means for accessing IC capabilities varies greatly.  For 30 years the civil domain has used and improved the CAC process.  It is well established, known in the IC\nand civil communities and has been successful in providing support.  DHS has access by virtue of its membership in the IC and the CAC. While the law enforcement domain, in theory, has access via DHS and FBI, it is clear these access paths do not have an established process, and where paths do exist, they are not widely known within their domains.  Therefore, support is minimal to the LE domain but improving in the case of the homeland security domain. Third, there is a wide misperception that domestic information collection requests cannot compete with foreign collection priorities and therefore will be given a low priority and take months to satisfy if at all.  The consequence in most cases is customers are discouraged from trying to access information that may be valuable to them.  The reality is although many domestic collection requests do not impinge on foreign collection requirements, exploitation and dissemination capabilities may indeed be impacted.  The lesson is clear: knowledge of IC capabilities improves access and support. Fourth, the extent to which domestic users have established relationships with IC agencies has a positive impact on their ability to get domestic support.  In particular, those agencies served with an IC agency liaison officer are more likely to receive valuable support from the IC.  Support by NGA and NSA to the Department of Homeland Security has been particularly aided by the presence of liaison officers at DHS. Fifth, the problems associated with handling different classification levels and categories of information impacts support.  Even though a few State and local officials are being given security clearances and more and more information is being sanitized for release at the unclassified level, access and storage is a continuing and growing barrier to information flow. Related to this issue is the degree of interoperability and connectivity between federal, state and local communities.  There is no single system that allows information to flow quickly between these entities.  Therefore, even if the information is available at an appropriate classification level, there may not be a fast, convenient communications network available to get the information to the user in time. Sixth, decisions are made and policies written regarding access and use of information and capabilities of the IC using a risk avoidance vice a risk management philosophy unnecessarily restricting the uses of domestic information.  Further, requests of the IC for domestic information are treated as an exception to the rule and as such, cause a slow bureaucratic process to carefully ensure there is no compromise of the system, its' capabilities or the civil liberties of U.S.\n\ncitizens.  The process sets unnecessarily high standards for most domestic requests.  In the case of law enforcement domain support, in addition to the barriers described, a further barrier is imposed regarding protection of sources and methods.  Since prosecution is the principal purpose of most law enforcement activities, the potential for information being made public during the discovery process and trial, contributes to the reluctance of the IC to support the law enforcement domain. Finally, the limited availability and capacity of exploitation/analytic resources inside and outside the IC impacts the ability of domestic customers to get their requests satisfied.  The ability to exploit information is much more limited than the ability to collect it.  Many customers do not request information because they can't exploit the data themselves or they can't find someone else to exploit it for them.  This in no way degrades their need for the data.  This is an age-old problem that the IC continues to struggle with.  There is no easy answer.  However, now that\n\"National Intelligence\"2 includes information gathered within or outside the United States irrespective of the source from which it is derived, the playing field should be level when it comes to establishing relative priorities for domestic requirements.\n\n\nCHAPTER 2:  FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS\nThe ISG developed 11 findings, if acted upon, will make dramatic improvements in the process to use IC capabilities in support of domestic applications and in the security of the Nation.  The following chapter outlines the problems encountered and explains the ISG's solutions. During the course of the study, no one said that they were failing at their mission due to the lack of access to IC capabilities.  There was no \"Burning Bridge\" identified by the participating agencies and stakeholders. However, there were many areas where the process was shown to be broken and where efficiencies in the process can be realized to greatly increase the timeliness and relevance of the information provided.  The current system operates in a risk-averse vice risk-management environment where protection of sources and methods and individual civil liberties, while important concerns to be carefully considered and taken into account, are the predominant concerns unreasonably operating to limit appropriate support to the defense of the homeland.  Dedicated government employees are finding ways around the system to support the civil, homeland security and law enforcement communities.  Such work-arounds are confusing, usually a \"one off\" process and at best delay support and at worst, prevent support.  The process should not be that hard when it comes to supporting the defense of a nation that is involved in a global war on terrorism.\n\nFinding #1:\n- At present, HLS and LE users lack a coherent, organized, efficient process to access IC\ncapabilities.  As a result, opportunities to provide critical support are being missed\n\nRecommendation:\n- Establish a Domestic Applications Office (DAO) employing a \"CAC Like\" process with\nthe Department of Homeland Security as Executive Agent for access to Intelligence Capabilities by Civil, HLS and LE users. Discussion:\nThe ISG noted a number of reasons prompting this finding:\n- Until 9/11 the role of law enforcement was almost completely focused on arrest and\nprosecution.\n- The use of NTM and other US intelligence assets was and is not well understood by the LE\ncommunity.\n- The IC and the LE domain were and to some extent, still are separated by legal boundaries,\ncultural differences and operational priorities.\n- The IC has been wary of involvement with LE because of the role.\n- discovery plays in prosecution and the possibility that sources and methods could be\ncompromised.\nDuring the past 30 years, most civil requirements for access to NTM were met through the Civil Applications Committee (CAC) process.  The CAC charter did not extend, however, to LE and for the most part, any local or state LE requests for use of and information from NTM and, indeed, from the IC have been handled through a single conduit, the FBI: specifically the Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF).  As a result of issues identified by US Government, US Government sponsored and independent studies, as well as perceived cultural differences between the FBI and State and local LE, DHS was created to help foster better relations between all facets of LE and the IC, as well as to facilitate the collection and movement of terrorismrelated intelligence and information in ways not previously considered pre 9/11.  Regardless of the intended unifying role of DHS, redundant responsibilities for the collection, analysis and dissemination of intelligence to and from LE are a troubling reality and competition for authority and assets has resulted in a less than ideal situation. The DNI must take the lead in pulling together the relevant agencies and other entities to bring expertise and solutions to the problem.  All persons involved in this endeavor must be from the senior leadership of the relevant agencies to ensure that the results are implemented and receive the highest support.  Engage and advise the Executive Branch and Congress in addressing and solving problems related to overlapping authority, funding and clarification of responsibilities as well as the legal issues associated with interfacing IC and LE assets, capabilities and the 2-way flow of information, data and analytical product.  It is imperative that redundancy of authority be dealt with.  If not, the existing situation and the problems it causes, (dilution of funding and resources, energy wasted on turf battles, confusion and disconnection in information and intelligence sharing), will negate any improvements.\nInformation sharing and access to relevant data must include State and local entities such as fire and medical.  95% of US infrastructure is in the hands of the private sector and any consideration of constructing an architecture to move information and data needs to consider these realities.\n\nDevelop a training and awareness program to broaden understanding of capabilities, share available information, and foster an atmosphere of trust and teamwork is vital to a successful process.  The following elements are essential to this program:\n- Identify and instruct all members of LE as to the usefulness and relevance of IC\ncapabilities to their new mission vis-a-vis the war on terrorism.\n\n- Educate the IC and LE as to the standards relating to sharing information and capabilities\nas well as promoting understanding mission focus.  The results from training LE in basic tradecraft have been very positive and successful.  LE has traditionally focused on arrest\nand prosecution and the IC on disruption and prevention. These mission foci are blurring\nand common training can be extremely helpful in making this a \"feature\" as opposed to a \"flaw\".\n- Foster a \"purple\" culture among members of the IC and LE.  Trust has always been and\nwill remain the basis of constructive relationships and common training and experience promotes and nurtures this bonding.\n- Identify a successful model or models that LE can use to better integrate with the IC.  The\nLAPD ATD/MCD, (Anti-Terrorist Division/Major Crimes Division) model is one example where these departments have been doing intelligence analysis for over 30 years and are modeled after the CIA.  For interaction between the IC and LE, the CAC model stands out because of its experience and successful track record.  This is a goal of the Law Enforcement Working Group (LEWG).  Further consideration should be given to having\nthe CAC be a part of DHS, especially as DHS is unique in its legal authority to connect\nState and local with Federal assets regarding matters of homeland security and terrorism.\nThere are now a number of members of the LE who are cleared at the SCI level and above and, combined with training in and exposure to the capabilities and analytical skills once residing only in the IC, they could make a real contribution to the overall US capability by applying analytical skills to regional and local situations, creating a cadre of IC-capable analysts giving depth to US analytical capabilities, providing a surge capability in a situation where international priorities stress the IC community and finally, being able to inject knowledgeable people immediately into the IC/LE mainstream. Most people would agree that the best intelligence from a given area would come from those most familiar with that area and it is imperative that those members of LE and the first responder community have the skills to receive and create relevant intelligence from inside our national borders.  It is not an easy task, especially because it must be done with consideration for privacy and preservation of personal and national freedoms.  As we examine and implement new methods and relationships for doing intelligence, we have the opportunity to consider and codify the necessary safeguards to promote the trust and participation of all parties, vital to the success of any implementation of modernizing, improving and adapting a new intelligence paradigm.\n\n\n\nIn light of this recommendation, the ISG considered 5 different process models that arguably\ncould address the issues identified and improve the status quo.  Most of the models considered would work given appropriate domain experts at key points in the process and detailed guidance\non procedures and boundaries was available.  The challenge was to find a process that could\nsupport a diverse set of customers, keep bureaucracy to a minimum, be sustainable and be easy\nto use.  The ISG evaluated the models against the following thirteen characteristics of an\neffective process:\n- Ensures an opportunity for access to the full range of civil, homeland security and law\nenforcement users\n- Creates a culture where information sharing is the rule, not the exception\n- Supports routine, ad hoc and crisis requirements\n- Ensures visibility, flexibility and ease of use\n- Assures timely legal and policy adjudication - Processes \"sensitive\" requirements discreetly - Delegates decision making authority to the lowest level - Domain experts are at critical points throughout the process - Provides efficient, effective and sustained infrastructure support\n- Provides clear delineation of budgetary authority\n- Leverages exploitation, product generation and dissemination capabilities\n- Promotes interoperability through two-way training and standardization (within the IC and\nDomestic communities)\n- Uses metrics to monitor performance and improve the system With these characteristics in mind the ISG then developed the following factors used in deciding\non the recommended process model:\n- Do no harm\n- Positive public perception\n- Ease of transition\n- Budget sustainment\n- Opportunity for user access\n- Protection of civil liberties\n- Protection of sources and methods\n- Community wide education and training process\n- Low degree of process complexity\n- Ability to foster cross-fertilization\nThe Model: In deciding on a process model, the ISG realized what they are recommending is the first step in a \"Process of Discovery\".  Time and operational experience will evolve the model into the most effective, efficient and sustainable program.\nAfter extensive discussion of the benefits and limitations of five models, the ISG decided on a process model that employs a centralized broker situated outside what is \"generally perceived\"\nas the Intelligence Community. (**Figure 1**)  They also agreed that the Director of National Intelligence was best suited to be the overall owner of the program.  The centralized broker model was chosen because it encourages a multi-INT solution to requests; it has the ability to leverage all of the IC's capabilities; it provides a single consistent process; and the requestor does not need to have a detailed knowledge of the IC and it's capabilities to acquire information.\n\n\n## The Recommended Model\n\nRationale\n- Places the user community (Civil, Homeland Security, and Law Enforcement)\nat the forefront of the solution in a \"coalition of the willing.\"\n- Provides a streamlined, organized and workable approach (CAC Model) that\ncan address the needs of users.\n- Incorporates domain \"buy-in\" to create a more invested environment. - Provides for training and education and employs a \"TENCAP-like\" discovery\nprocess.\n\nGovernance: The DNI, as the owner of the Domestic Applications Program (DAP) and the principle provider of national technical capabilities, should ensure funding, provide oversight and a community training and education program for the DAP. (**Figure 2**.)\n\n\n## Roles Of Dod, Dni, And Dhs\n\n An \"Executive Agent\" construct is proposed to ensure a clear line of program authority and an unambiguous budget process.  The ISG felt that an identifiable budget program was required to ensure that the domestic access process would be sustained and improved over time.  The ISG believes that this process is best implemented as part of the Department of Homeland Security, which is uniquely situated, to look across the entire National Intelligence process (foreign and domestic) and has extensive ties from the cabinet level right down to the local government level. The ISG recommends that the DNI reach an agreement with the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security to establish and define the \"Executive Agent\" for Domestic Applications of IC capabilities.  The Secretary of DHS would provide a service of common concern for the government and as the Domestic Applications Program Functional Manager, be responsible for budget planning and execution, training and education, and implementing domestic policies and procedure.  The ISG specifically recommends the Executive Agency model to ensure that DHS has: authority to lead, coordinate and integrate the domestic uses of IC capabilities; budgetary responsibility to include recommending planning and programming guidance and to be the proponent for the civil, homeland security and law enforcement communities in the IC requirements development and acquisition process.\n\nUnclassified To help the DNI and the Secretary of DHS administer this process, we recommend the establishment of a Domestic Applications Executive Committee (**Figures 2 & 3**).  This group would be co-chaired by the Director of National Intelligence and the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security.  I would be a community forum of producers and consumers to advise the DNI and DHS, monitor and advocate the program, be an initial multi-agency program funding resolution forum and foster cross-fertilization and innovation in the application of IC capabilities to solving domestic problems.  The Committee would be composed of representatives from the National Security Agency, the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, the National Reconnaissance Office, the Department of Defense, the Department of Justice, the Federal Bureau of Investigations, the Department of Interior, the Civil Domain Working Group chairman, the Homeland Security Domain Working Group chairman and the Law Enforcement Domain Working Group chairman.  The co-chairs could have advisors (such as the DNI Civil Liberties Protection Officer and the DNI General Counsel, to assist the committee as they choose.\n\n## Governance\n\nWithin the Department of Homeland Security we recommend the creation of the Domestic Applications Office (DAO).  Charged with the day-to-day operations of the program, this office would be composed of at least a Chief, a deputy, an administrative support staff, a budget officer, Unclassified a legal advisor and several civil, homeland security and law enforcement domain experts to process requirements.  Staffing and resources for this office would not come out of DHS\nresources, rather would be resourced by the DNI.  It would be the heart of the program with the domain experts responsible for the day-to-day adjudication of requirements and the integration and cross-fertilization of ideas (**Figure 3**).  The DHS over time would have to determine if this function is needed on a 24/7 bases.  Finally, the office would provide support to the Domestic Applications Executive Committee. Advising the Domestic Applications Office would be the civil, homeland security and law enforcement domain working groups.  These domain forums of producers and users would advocate the use of IC capabilities, foster cross-fertilization of ideas and techniques, promote best practices, recommend broad domain priorities to the DAO and foster the innovation of new experimental uses for IC capabilities through a \"TENCAP\" like program.  Primary membership would be domain specific and include the DAO domain experts.  However, attendance by representatives from other domains should be encouraged to improve cross-fertilization\n(**Figure 4**).\n\nUnclassified DHS should take advantage of existing facilities and experts in the USGS Advance System Center (ASC) to help those agencies who lack the secure facilities or equipment to process, exploit and publish classified data.  DHS, in conjunction with the Department of Interior, should designate the ASC as a service of common concern for the domestic user community.  As well as facilitating current programs, the center could act as a focal point for innovative applications of IC capabilities.\n\nPolicy and Legal: At the core of IC support to the domestic community is clear, timely legal and policy documentation and decisions.  Currently, the environment is one of risk avoidance vice risk management.  Although there has been some effort to update policies since 9/11, the ISG noted some significant policies and corresponding documents do not or inadequately take into account the threat to the U.S. homeland.  The legal regime governing the use of IC capabilities domestically is unsettled, due to a number of factors to include the lack of case law compounded by a slow, laborious process to acquire definitive legal positions.  The ISG believes a timely, responsive legal and policy guidance process must be put in place to permit the Model to function optimally. The Department of Justice in coordination with the General Counsels of the DNI, DOD and DHS, should establish a \"fast track\" process to provide for the timely adjudication of domestic legal issues.  The DHS/DAO legal advisor would have the authority to raise issues to this group for the community. (**Figure 5**.) The use of IC capabilities for domestic purposes should be governed by a set of guidelines that collectors, producers and users of IC capabilities can easily understand and based on the premise that most uses of IC capabilities are lawful rather than treating *any use* as an exception to the rule requiring a case-by-case adjudication.\n\nRequirements Flow: The ISG vision for IC support to the domestic community is based on the concept of risk management, a set of clear legal and policy guidelines to operate within and the concept that sharing is possible and necessary in order to maintain the security of the United States.  The requirements flow is designed to be simple, flexible and responsive (**Figure 6**).  A statement of need would come to the DAO domain adjudication expert via phone, fax or e-mail.  The adjudication officer would discuss the requirement with the customer and get a good sense of the requirement and determine if it is possible for IC capabilities to help; at a high level, if the requirement is within policy and legal guidelines and what priority the customer gives the requirement.  The adjudication officer would then make a decision as to which agency or agencies are best suited to support the request and forward the requirement to the supporting agency(s) for production.\nThe supporting agency(s) would take the request and through discussions with the customer agree upon the information/data required and a completion date.  Throughout this whole process there is continuous feedback between the customer, the producer and the DAO as to the status of the project and deliverables.  Once the product is produced, it is disseminated to the customer and an information copy is sent to the DAO to ensure awareness.  With this in mind, let's look at how a requirement from each of the three domains would be processed in the new environment.\n\nIn the civil domain a requirement would be sent from the customer to the civil domain expert in the Department of Homeland Security/Domestic Applications Office (DHS/DAO) for adjudication.  For the civil example, let's say the requirement is to image damage caused by a hurricane, to image the everglades to monitor water levels and to monitor glacier movements in Alaska.  The officer would discuss the requirement with the customer and get a good sense of the requirement and determine if it is possible for IC capabilities to help; if the requirement is within policy and legal guidelines and what priority the customer gives the requirement. In this new environment, legal and policy guidelines have been pre-established which foster the use and sharing of domestic information.  These guidelines are widely available to all collectors, producers and users of domestic information.  Each agency and individual has the responsibility to be aware of the policies and to follow them.  The DNI will maintain oversight responsibility and appoint an officer with responsibility for Domestic Applications compliance.  Imaging of the United States, by government satellites, for purpose other than specific law or regulatory enforcement, is permitted without case-by-case review and approval.  Law enforcement and regulatory enforcement will have much more stringent rules to ensure civil liberties are not abused. The civil example is clearly within the established guidelines. To help the civil domain adjudication officer establish a first cut at the priority of the requirement, the Civil Domain Working Group has the responsibility on a yearly bases to develop a domain approved list of relative priorities for civil requirements.  After discussions with the requester and consulting the civil priorities list, the civil adjudication officer makes a priority recommendation.  This process is an effort to ameliorate the common customer belief that \"my requirement is very important and therefore a priority one\".  Not all requirements can be priority one. Next the adjudication officer reviews the requirement to determine what agency or agencies are best suited to satisfy the customer's needs.  They then pass the requirement to the collection and production agency or agencies clearly identifying the lead agency that has responsibility to produce the final product.  The production agency calls the requestor to ensure that they understand the requirement, the type of data required and agree upon a completion dated based on the priority, the producing agency's workload and the customer's need for the information. Throughout this whole process there is a continuous feedback process to ensure that the customer, the supporting agency and the DAO are all aware of the status of the requirement.  The DAO will keep metrics to aid in resources justifications, improve system performance, and perform customer segmentation analysis.  Once the product is produced it is disseminated to the customer, an info copy is sent to the DAO and finally it is stored in the database archives for the community to access if they have the need to know and are properly cleared.\n\nIn the homeland security domain a requirement would be sent from the customer to the homeland security domain expert in the Department of Homeland Security/Domestic Applications Office (DHS/DAO) for adjudication.  For the homeland security example, let's say the requirement is to use all IC technical capabilities over a remote area of Minnesota where officials have reason to believe a possible radical group is training for an attack on a federal government office building.  The request is for immediate collection and exploitation of the data to monitor activity at the farm.  Information indicates the attacks are to take place within two months.  The officer would discuss the requirement with the customer and get a good sense of the requirement and determine what IC capabilities can help; if the requirement is within established policy and legal guidelines and what priority the customer gives the requirement. In this case, the homeland security domain adjudication officer raises a red flag when the customer requests to use all IC technical capabilities available to monitor the ranch.  The requirement does not meet the current legal guidelines for support so he/she requests guidance from the DAO legal advisor.  The DAO legal advisor concludes that the request was not clearly within the current guidelines and immediately calls DOJ for guidance.   The DOJ would convene a meeting with the DNI General Counsel, DoD General Counsel and relevant Agency General Counsels to address the issue.  This group would expeditiously make a decision and the DOJ\nwould issue a legal opinion on the request. If the request were denied due to the legal restrictions the request would stop.  If it was approved or partially approved the requirement would continue through the process.  As this is a time sensitive request, the adjudication officer would immediately call the collection/production agency and task the requirement.  Paperwork would be accomplished when time permitted.  The collection/ production agency would contact the requestor and discuss the details of the requirement and set in place a process for immediate collection, exploitation and dissemination of the data.  Status updates are conveyed routinely between the requestor, DAO and the supporting agency.  Due to the sensitivity of the information, dissemination is made only to the customer and DAO. The IC and domestic user communities need to integrate current existing restricted data base archives to ensure that domestic information collected and produced is available to those with a need to know but restricted from the general user community.\n\nIn the law enforcement domain a requirement would be sent from the customer to the law enforcement domain expert in the Department of Homeland Security/Domestic Applications Office (DHS/DAO) for adjudication.  For the law enforcement scenario, a group of individuals are staying in a home with very limited access and visibility from the streets.  Law enforcement units are ready to arrest the group and need better information about the house and the surrounding area to ensure the operation is successful and the potential for loss of life is reduces as much as possible.  The requirement is \"highly sensitive\" and the police want only necessary individuals aware of the operation.  A strict set of legal and protection of civil liberties guidelines would be followed.  If it were determined by the DAO legal advisor to be appropriate, the requirement would proceed.\n\nIn this case, in order to maintain operational security, the concept of \"trusted agents\" would be used.  Law enforcement officials would call the law enforcement domain expert in the DAO. This person would be a \"trusted agent\".  The officer would discuss the requirement with the customer and get a good sense of the requirement and determine what IC capabilities can help; if the requirement is within established policy and legal guidelines and what priority the customer gives the requirement. Because this is a \"highly sensitive\" operation, only the law enforcement adjudication officer and the DAO legal advisor would be aware of the specifics.  No specific details would be available in the normal reporting channels.  The DAO \"trusted agent\" would call directly to a \"trusted agent\" in the supporting agency.  Details of the requirement would be discussed and the production agency POC would be put in direct contact with the requestor.  From here on out only the requestor and the producing agency POC would be aware of the specific details of the requirement.  DAO would be kept informed as to the status only.  The objective of a \"Sensitive\"\nrequirement is keep to a minimum the numbers of people who are aware of specific details and ensure that all the information is keep in data bases not accessible by the general user.\n\nMetrics: Throughout this process, it is important for the DAO to maintain a set of metrics to be able to judge the effectiveness of the effort, understand where the system can be improved and aid the community in budget justifications.    The process should not be overly cumbersome or maintain statistics just because it can be done.  The process should focus on who the customers are, the volume of requests, the types of information needed and when there was a short fall in support capabilities.\n\nThe Budget Authority: Critical to the success of the program is the ability to have a healthy, sustained budget for the DAO.  As indicated earlier, the DNI is the owner of the Domestic Applications Program.  In addition, he/she provides national collection capabilities; some exploitation services (based on volume and priorities), pays the cost of the DAO and has oversight of the program.  The Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security is the Program Functional Manager with oversight of the total U.S. government domestic applications program and the responsibility to advocate for the community any new requests for resources.  Once new resources are obtained they become part of the operational agencies budget. The ISG believes that the creation of a Domestic Applications of National Capabilities Program\n(DANCAP), modeled after the \"TENCAP\" program, for the domestic community is vital to help insinuate domestic applications in the domains and ensure future evolution and development of systems and procedures and techniques. (**Figure 7.)**  The purpose of DANCAP is to foster new and innovative ideas for the use of IC capabilities in solving civil, homeland security and law enforcement domain problems.  This program would be initially funded by the DNI and executed by the DHS/DAO.  Over a period of 10 years the program dollars would be reduced at the DNI\n\n## Unclassified Resources Process\n\n level and increased at the execution/Agency level and sustained at the Agency level thereafter.\nAn agency in each Domain would be appointed as the focal point for the program.  The ISG\nrecommends that DHS be the lead for the homeland security domain, the FBI be the lead for the law enforcement domain and that DOI be the lead for the civil domain. The DAO would be responsible for the administration of DANCAP.  Each year it would solicit candidate projects from the three domain focal points and select the winners.  The domain focal points would be responsible for soliciting ideas from their domain, prioritizing them and monitoring the funding of successful ideas in their domain.  They would also be responsible for moving successful prototypes to an operational status.\n\nTraining and Education: An initial finding of the ISG was the clear need for a training and education program in the domestic domains and the Intelligence Community.  There are three reasons why the domestic community does not use the capabilities of the IC: first they don't know what exists, second, they\n\ndon't know how to request support and finally, a very high policy and legal hurdle has to be overcome to achieve support. An extensive education program will help the users understand what is possible and the producers understand what users need and why they need it.  The U. S. Marshals Service is a good case in point.  If you asked anyone in the IC right now to provide support to the Marshal Service the answer would most likely be a quick \"NO\".   They are law enforcement and we can't do it because of the protection of sources and methods and the slippery slope of discovery.  However, a careful analysis of the matter would compel a different result. One of the primary jobs of the Marshals Service is to execute Federal warrants by apprehending people that have evaded the U.S. legal system. This situation presents a very low probability the IC's involvement would be subject to a judicial proceeding.  Generally, there should be no problem for the IC to support this type of activity. A coordinated training and education program lead by the Office of the DNI and executed at all levels of the domestic community can go a long way to resolving this problem.  It must be a community effort that is focused on intelligence discipline integration and multi-INT solutions not on individual agency or intelligence discipline's capabilities.  The DNI should have overall responsibility for the program.  Each Functional Manager clearly has the expertise and operational examples to facilitate training, but only through DNI leadership can a Community program be effective.  The DNI needs to work closely with the DOD to ensure that DOD has not only the standard training materials but can adapt these materials to the unique needs of military units. The ISG believes that the model selected provides a clear entry point and process for all domestic users; a clear funding responsibility and stream of money; organizational sponsorship for the program; domain experts to facilitate requirements; and has the necessary protections for individual civil liberties and sources and methods, all operating in an environment of information sharing vice one of risk avoidance.  This process establishes the foundation for the government to effectively use IC capabilities to support domestic requirements.\n\nFinding #2:\n\n- The CAC has provided an efficient and effective means to meet civil users' needs and should serve as a model for other domain processes and procedures.\n\n\nRecommendations:\n\na. The CAC's experience and expertise should form the basis for standup of the DAO.\n\nb. The DNI oversee the establishment of a training and education program to ensure\ndomestic users of IC capabilities are aware of the capabilities, security guidelines,\nexamples of uses and the process to access these capabilities. (Build on the CAC\nsuccess in training)\nDiscussion: In 1975, as the result of a Church Commission recommendation, the Civil Applications Committee was formed.  The charter of the Committee provides that it is to \"facilitate the appropriate civil uses of overhead remote sensing technology and data collected by classified military and intelligence overhead systems and provide to Federal civil agencies\".  The committee is composed of 11 federal civil departments and independent agencies.  The CAC is chaired by the Director, U.S. Geological Survey, and meets monthly as a technology and information exchange forum.  An Executive Steering Group of senior government agency officials, chaired by the Deputy Secretary of Interior,  meet biannually to address policy issues of common interest in the DoD, intelligence, and civil communities. The CAC provides a means for communication between the civil users of IC capabilities and the providers.  Capabilities of the intelligence community, new technology developments and novel applications of data and sensors are shared.  The staff of the CAC coordinates training for the civil community to better understand how to use and protect this information.  Under the CAC's leadership, working groups on Global Fiducials, Thermal Event Sensing, Imagery Derived Product, Emergency Response, Security, and Requirements have been established.  These groups have fostered innovative solutions to unique civil problems and provide a base of scientific experts to help solve other challenging problems. Over the years, membership has changed and eroded.  The Department of State and the Department of Energy have left the organization as voting members and now access the IC's capabilities as members of the Intelligence Community.  With the creation of the Department of Homeland Security in 2002, FEMA, the U.S. Coast Guard and parts of HHS and DOT are now under the umbrella of DHS.  They are currently still members of the CAC, but because DHS is part of the IC also, they have direct access to intelligence capabilities.  In 2003, after the Columbia disaster, NASA signed an MOA with the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency for direct support of its manned space flights.  Although NASA is still a member of the CAC, it has not used their services since signing the MOA with NGA. If the CAC structure is to support the additional responsibilities of homeland security and law enforcement, it will need major augmentation of resources, people, budget authority and a new charter to capture the new environment in which it would operate.  It would also need new management authorities to have influence over IC and domestic user's exploitation capabilities to effectively be able to respond in time dominant situations. Even in this changing environment, it should be noted that the CAC has served the civil community very well for 30 years.  It provides otherwise unavailable data to member agencies and performs a vital role in educating civil agencies about the potential applications of data derived through intelligence systems.  It is worth noting that the technical and training support provided through the CAC adds significant value to the civil agencies' use of these data.  The ISG believes that any new process should build on the positive aspects of the CAC.   The working group activities which foster cross-fertilization, the skilled secretariat as well as the training and education function performed by the CAC are a necessary component of any future process to support civil, homeland security and law enforcement domains.\n\n\nFinding #3:\n\n- Potential Law Enforcement users, and to a lesser extent, Homeland Security users do\nnot understand how intelligence capabilities might be applied to further their missions\nand functions.\nRecommendations:\n\n- The ISG recommends that a Domestic Application of National Capabilities (DANCAP)\nProgram be established to facilitate a \"process of discovery\" for domestic users to enhance their missions and functions.\n\nDiscussion: The ISG believes that the creation of a Domestic Applications of National Capabilities Program\n(DANCAP), modeled after the \"TENCAP\" program, for the domestic community is vital to help insinuate domestic applications in the domains and ensure future evolution and development of systems and procedures and techniques.  The purpose of DANCAP is to foster new and innovative ideas for the use of IC capabilities in solving civil, homeland security and law enforcement domain problems.  This program would be initially funded by the DNI and executed by the DHS/DAO.  Over a period of 10 years the program dollars would be reduced at the DNI\nlevel and increased at the execution/Agency level and sustained at the Agency level thereafter. An agency in each domain would be appointed as the focal point for the program.  The ISG recommends that DHS be the lead for the homeland security domain, the FBI be the lead for the law enforcement domain and that DOI be the lead for the civil domain.\n\nThe DAO would be responsible for the administration of DANCAP.  Each year it would solicit candidate projects from the three domain focal points and select the winners.  The domain focal points would be responsible for soliciting ideas from their domain, prioritizing them and monitoring the funding of successful ideas in their domain.  They would also be responsible for moving successful prototypes to an operational status.\n\n\nFinding #4:\n\n- Implications for R&D, acquisition, and Tasking, Collection, Processing, Exploitation and Dissemination (TCPED) resulting from expanded IC support to civil, LE and HLS domains must be addressed in any solution.\n\n\nRecommendations:\n\na. DNI should place a higher priority on the needs of domestic users in the allocation of resources in existing and future TCPED architectures.\n\n\nb. System requirements development process should provide a \"seat at the table\" for domestic users to influence R&D, acquisition of new systems and policy. Discussion: The Civil Applications Committee (CAC) has been functioning effectively for over 30 years. It is housed in and sustained by US Geological Survey (USGS) within the Department of Interior\n(DOI). They host the Committee and they devote approximately 10 people to manage the infrastructure and administer the community of users meetings, educational forums, and technical exchanges necessary to gather and represent requirements. When information is collected in response to the CAC's requirements, the Intelligence Community (IC) has not always had the necessary processing and exploitation tools, techniques, and personnel to meet the needs of the civil community. To assure results are achieved that meet civil user's needs, the USGS has invested in development of its own extensive classified information technology and communications infrastructure to allow them to ingest and exploit the collected information. This model has required significant commitment and persistent support over many years by DOI and this experience serves as a useful reference in planning for a much-expanded set of customers. With the post-9/11 creation of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the national attention given to the mission of protecting the homeland, the nation's intelligence agencies have become proactive in reaching out to this agency to establish effective working relationships. Both the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA) and the National Security Agency\n(NSA) have established liaison positions at DHS and each is representing DHS requirements back through the resources of their agencies while working to understand and respond to identified needs. They are also \"pushing\" information to DHS that may be useful as they explore their growing relationship and discover new ways to cooperate. CIA is similarly playing a significant supporting role with the provision of senior officers with analytic backgrounds to aid in the process of exploiting and using intelligence information to help DHS. In contrast, the \"law enforcement\" community has virtually no significant engagement with the IC for the use of NTM collection resources. They are viewed by the IC as a major risk to\n\"sources and methods\" during the discovery process inherent in prosecutions and trials. They are also constrained by extremely limited budgets, and they generally focus on criminal activity post event rather than preventing an event. These attributes make them unappealing to the IC as a customer and partner. In cases where important and useful IC information is provided, the highly classified nature of the sources and methods involved are either placed in jeopardy in the discovery process leading up to prosecution, or the prosecution is jeopardized by potential IC\ndecisions to not allow their information to be so used. This conflict of interests and objectives is a classic prescription for dysfunction, and has led the IC and LE communities to generally treat each other with extreme caution. NTM systems are sophisticated and highly technical collection platforms controlled by an extensive ground infrastructure to allocate and focus collection and to process and deliver useful products in a form amenable to exploitation. The process of effectively using these systems is frequently referred to TCPED, which stands for Tasking, Collection, Processing, Exploitation, and Dissemination. To use the collectors effectively there are mature processes to \"task\" the resource to collect specifically identified information from some location on the globe. In this process, alternative uses of the resource are considered in light of established \"priorities\" and the resource is allocated to deliver the greatest return by collecting and processing the highest priority objective. The same is true for the PED portions of the process, and processing, exploitation, and dissemination resources are similarly prioritized against community-vetted requirements. This prioritization and the consequent allocation of resources must be adapted to encompass the new domestic security missions, i.e., civil, homeland security, and law enforcement. Absent adjustment, foreign intelligence and support to established IC and DOD\npriorities will almost always overwhelm domestic security requirements. Beyond expanding the TCPED process to enable and encourage the inclusion of domestic security requirements, complex legal and policy questions must be addressed to support the law enforcement roles of all three domestic security user communities. In particular, changes are essential to prevent the compromise of sensitive sources and methods. Information derived from NTM must be protected while simultaneously freeing it to contribute to preventative law enforcement activities and criminal arrests and prosecutions without risking its compromise. Under current conditions, defense attorneys press for access to national security sources and methods as a means to pressure the government into abandoning prosecution. New policies and approaches to litigation are needed to harmonize these competing interests to enable the use of NTM in the civil, homeland security, and law enforcement communities. Beyond allowing existing NTM processes to work on behalf of the domestic security community, there must be a concurrent investment in developing the techniques, knowledge, and in military parlance \"doctrine\" to achieve proficiency. This will require education, experimentation, discovery, and development of techniques and systems tailored to this new mission. It will take sustained funding to perform research and development and to conduct experiments that explore new uses and applications. This investment is comparable to that made by the military under the TENCAP program which stood for Tactical Exploitation of National Capabilities. This program was first established by the Army in 1973 and it was expanded to all the services at the direction of Congress in 1977. It was a highly successful effort that helped the NTM systems become fully integrated into military training, exercising, operations, and planning. A similar investment will be essential to achieve comparable integration of NTM\ncapabilities in the mission and doctrine of domestic security users.\n\nFinding #5:\n- Current policies governing use of intelligence capabilities to support domestic users have\nnot been updated to reflect Post 9/11 priorities, new legislation and threats to the Nation. These policies and inconsistent interpretation of these policies continue to promote use of national assets only as a last resort with a highly risk averse approach to approval.\n\n\nRecommendations:\n\na. DNI promptly convene a policy review, including the legal basis for policy, across all\nagencies with the eye towards promoting a more efficient and effective use of intelligence capabilities for domestic support.\n\nb. Specific attention needs to be provided to any executive orders that in the view of the\nDNI prevent needed change and if appropriate seek changes in those executive orders.\n\nc. If necessary, amend E.O.12333 to provide clear guidance on the role of the IC in\nsupport of domestic users.\n-\nProvide Executive guidance to encourage effective use of intelligence capabilities for civil, homeland security and law enforcement purposes and enable flow-down of this guidance through departmental directives.\n\nd. DNI, in coordination with the DOJ, DOD and DHS, establish a fast-track process for\nauthoritative legal guidance and policy review.\n\ne. DNI should publish policy governing access and use of domestic IMINT and MASINT.\n\nf. DNI should delegate approval authority for domestic user imagery tasking, collection,\nprocessing, exploitation and dissemination to the D/NGA.\n\nDiscussion:\n \"*We agree on essentially all areas...except for those where we disagree.\"*\n\n\n- lawyer During the course of the study, and in particular as a result of presentations by lawyers from the intelligence community, the ISG was advised of the uncertainty and conflicting opinions regarding lawful application and use of imagery, imagery intelligence (IMINT) and measures and signatures intelligence (MASINT) for domestic purposes.  This conflict and resulting\nuncertainty also surfaced in the development and application of relevant policy.3\n For example, although the courts have permitted warrantless aerial searches of private property, there are no cases involving the use of satellite technology.4 Consequently, legal opinions are based on interpretations of cases similar in subject matter and policy is written relying on these opinions.  The ISG has observed the result of this approach is that the legal and policy communities have adopted a risk averse rather than a risk management philosophy.  This is especially evident when the IC is considering whether to proceed in matters not clearly governed by settled case law. A further complication is rapidly changing technology in both public and private sectors. Its profound impact on data collection is not met with concomitant changes in policies to accommodate new technology. The U.S. Supreme Court's 2001 decision in Kyllo v. United States, 5 holding the use of a hand-held thermal imaging device to scan a private residence to determine if the amount of heat emanating from it was consistent with high intensity lamps typically used for indoor marijuana growth constituted an unlawful warrantless search has caused much debate and uncertainty within the IC legal community.  Although this decision has placed in question the continued viability of past settled practice of the IC within the domestic domain, to date we are not aware of any clear authoritative guidance issued on the impact, if any, of this decision.  Further, *Kyllo* may impact the use of domestic MASINT as well.  There is little if any policy guidance or procedures regarding the collection, exploitation and dissemination of domestic MASINT. The cumulative affect of the risk-averse approach now taken in the IC to address difficult and complex legal and policy issues causes delay, uncertainty and may result in missed opportunities to collect, exploit and disseminate information critical to the anti-terrorism, homeland security and law enforcement missions. In the mid 1970's, Congress examined allegations that classified imaging collecting systems were being used to illegally spy on U.S. citizens.  To address these allegations, President Ford established the Rockefeller Commission to review the entire range of classified overhead photographic sensor capabilities that were being used for imaging domestic areas.  The Commission did not substantiate the allegations of illegal uses of these capabilities, rather, it concluded the use of these systems by Federal civil agencies was appropriate and desirable uses of costly nationally funded classified resources.  However, the Commission did point out there was a lack of oversight authority for these activities. The President responded by directing the formation of a Civil Applications Committee (CAC) to allay concerns about improper or illegal uses of such systems. The ISG believes that as more IC capabilities are used to support domestic civil, homeland security and law enforcement missions the same concerns which gave rise to the CAC are likely\n\nto emerge again.  Although the tragic events of 9/11 and continued efforts to fight the global war on terror have created an environment quite different from that of the mid-1970's, the ISG believes appropriate safeguards to ensure the capabilities of the IC are used lawfully and with full consideration of the rights of U.S. persons are needed.  In response to many factors, including the Report of the 9/11 Commission, Congress passed the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, (IRTPA).6  The IRTPA establishes the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board in addition to charging each agency to establish a civil liberties office. The ISG believes this Board may provide an appropriate means to assure the US public that IC\ncapabilities are being used lawfully and in a manner sensitive to the civil and privacy rights of US persons. In addition to the IRTPA, Congress responded to 9/11 by passing The Homeland Security Act of\n2002,7 and the USA PATRIOT ACT.8  The ISG noted that many administrative authorities such as directives and policies of the federal government, and in particular the IC, have not been revised or amended since 9/11.  While the ISG did not attempt a comprehensive review and cataloging of all such documents, some fundamental policies need to be addressed. The first is Executive Order 12333, United States Intelligence Activities, (1981).  During the study, it became clear to the ISG that despite a reluctance on the part of the IC to review this executive order with a view to amend it, such a review is necessary.9  The ISG heard any number of instances in which domestic requirements for IC resources were either very difficult to satisfy, or justifications were strained in order to meet policy requirements.  For example, geospatial information obtained from imagery taken over the United States should be recognized as a class of information, which, by its very nature should seldom be subjected to a rigorous pre-collection, exploitation and dissemination process, as other data sets or requests for collection rightly should be.  E.O. 12333 should be amended to permit as unfettered an operational environment for the collection, exploitation and dissemination as is reasonably possible. It is time to clearly articulate national policy and rules for employing IC capabilities in a robust manner to meet domestic civil user's needs. Additionally, the ISG noted the decisional authority for the use of domestic imagery does not rest with the IC functional manager for imagery, the Director of the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency. The Director of Central Intelligence Directive setting the policy for imagery should be reviewed and amended to align authority with responsibility.10 The cumulative impact of the presentations to the ISG made clear there is an urgent need for a top-down, Executive Branch review of all laws and policies affecting use of intelligence capabilities for domestic purposes.  The product of this review should be a legal and policy\n\nframework that promotes a more efficient and effective use of intelligence capabilities but tempered and guided by appropriate concern for the privacy and civil liberties of US persons.11\nFinding # 6:\n\n- The timely and efficient provision of geospatial intelligence support to domestic users is impeded by policy barriers, classification issues and culture.\n\n\nRecommendations:\n\na. Set threshold resolution of Imagery Derived Products at 0.5 meters.\n\nb. DNI develop the ability to provide NTM imagery at 0.5 meter resolution without the\nburden of classified handling to the domestic users community.\n\n\nDiscussion:  (See classified Appendix VIII for a detailed analysis)\nA recurring theme in ISG interviews with stakeholder agencies and organizations interested in\ncivil, homeland security, and law enforcement applications centered on timely and efficient\naccess to classified imagery data.  Three key factors are perceived to influence the timely and\nefficient provision of classified imagery and advance geospatial intelligence (AGI) data to\ncustomers in the Homeland Security, Civil, and Law Enforcement domains:\n- A cultural aversion toward collection of domestic imagery based on concerns involving the\npotential for congressional oversight sanctions centering around 4th Amendment rights.\n- Policies that pose hurdles to the timely and efficient dissemination and exploitation of\nclassified data from national sources.\n- Security constraints posed by data classification.\n\nThese factors are curiously intertwined in a complex and dynamic operating environment where the imagery community deals with domestic imagery collection and dissemination of the resulting data and products as an exception to policy. That environment may prove to be a formidable hurdle in trying to support homeland defense, civil, and law enforcement activities that are largely domestic in nature.\n\n\nCULTURE The domestic imagery environment has its roots in the mid-1970s amidst a power struggle between the legislative and executive branches over US intelligence activities.  Two events during this period had direct and lasting impact on the imagery community:\n\n- In 1975, the Civil Applications Committee (CAC) was chartered to oversee appropriate and desirable uses of classified imagery by Federal civil agencies.\n\n- President Ford issued E.O. 11905 in February 1976, dealing with concerns on domestic\nspying and establishing the parameters within which US intelligence organizations could operate.  E.O. 11905 was superceded by E.O. 12333, which remains in effect.\nThe imagery community practices a self-policing approach toward domestic collection requiring detailed documentation and a legal review of requests for tasking national imagery assets. Any agency or organization requiring domestic imagery collection12 from classified national systems or from commercial sources acquired by the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA)\nsubmits an annual Proper Use Memorandum (PUM) that defines their requirements, intended use, and an acknowledgement of awareness of the legal and policy restrictions regarding use of domestic imagery.  A high-level legal review is conducted to ensure that appropriate measures are being followed when collection activity is undertaken.   This collection by exception to policy approach is hardly supportive of the homeland security, civil, and law enforcement communities where the greatest emphasis is on domestic collection. POLICY Policy governing use of classified satellite imagery reconnaissance data is anchored in a complex web of law, National Security Policy and Presidential executive orders, DNI/DCI and DOD Directives, Interagency Agreements, and imagery-specific policy developed, coordinated, promulgated and maintained by the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency implementing these higher authorities. The IC manages and adjusts policy associated with the imagery release and disclosure process supporting non-IC access to classified imagery and imagery data, weighing national security interests against the need for greater openness.  Within the last decade, policy strides have been made in making imagery and imagery-derived data accessible at the level of classification appropriate for the specific user.  Data can be disseminated at the UNCLASSIFIED level in support of demonstrated needs for users that do not normally have access to classified materials. The fundamental policy approach to broader imagery sharing across the homeland security, civil, and law enforcement domains seeks to answer the question:\n\n\nWhat degree of protection is necessary and appropriate in a complex, dynamic operating environment with demands for wider dissemination of imagery and imagery-derived resources?\n\nOrganizations with missions and responsibilities that have traditionally required access to imagery and products from classified systems may be well-grounded and even participate in developing the policies supporting acquisition, exploitation, and dissemination of classified national satellite imagery data.  Federal civil agencies and organizations that have CAC representation have had a means for embracing national policy since 1975.  Establishing familiarity with the policy chain for non-CAC civil agencies, and non-federal consumers will be a challenge if the IC is to broaden access to national assets.\n\nCLASSIFICATION\nSecurity constraints based on classification can impede the use of national imagery data by non-\nIC personnel. At many locations in the homeland security, civil, and legal domains, the problem is magnified when customer organizations have no security mechanism to facilitate access to and exploitation of classified imagery assets.  Protection of sensitive intelligence sources and methods is the fundamental reason underlying classification of national satellite imagery and products derived from that data.  This \"armor of security\" has been maintained for more than four decades because the investment in satellite reconnaissance has been high, the benefits enormous, and the Intelligence Community remains convinced that wide dissemination of the intelligence product increases the probability of a compromise that could result in neutralizing the investment. It is rare that any single factor renders an image, set of images, or data derived from that imagery classified. The IC has established a classification regime that seeks to maximize data availability without exposing national satellite imagery reconnaissance capabilities to an extent that would facilitate the development of incurable countermeasures. In practice, however, the classification of national imagery and imagery products is generally an across-the-board application of a SECRET level marking in an effort to protect sources and methods and serve as a hedge against uncertainty.  That approach is captured in Executive Order 12951, which mandates that all imagery except from systems declassified by Presidential order in 1995 shall be kept Secret in the interests of national defense and foreign policy.13 The perceived necessity to safeguard sources and methods precludes declassification of most PIR\nsource material.14  Decisions to declassify and release data are predicated on a number of security concerns. For example, if a release of classified imagery reveals information on the strategies and sensitive capabilities used for effective collection, an adversary could use that information to negate the collection capability.  Denial or limitation of access to previously accessible observations used to support U.S. policymakers can have serious consequences, including the possible compromise of U.S. military actions.\n\n As technology and policy expand the boundaries of what types of imagery and imagery products are accessible by the public, the guidelines for classifying imagery on the basis of source alone should shift in a corresponding way. Decisions on retaining classification simply on the basis of resolution will no longer be valid; impacts from other criteria, e.g. the metric accuracy of a particular imaging sensor must be used.  The rationale for maintaining a stricter classification regime for imagery and products from current national programs may well be challenged by future commercial endeavors. In an environment, where 0.5-meter resolution panchromatic electro-optical satellite imagery is commercially available, classification decisions should be predicated on protecting capabilities that are *unique* to the USG assets.  Arguments that the availability of high-resolution commercial imagery justifies declassification of some classes of national systems data, particularly the electro-optical data, face the counter argument that the availability of high resolution commercial imagery provides a data source that should be exploited instead of considering declassification of the national source, removing the requirement to jeopardize other unique capabilities. Perhaps the most perplexing and insurmountable issue surrounding the declassification of satellite imagery centers on the implications of Freedom and Information Act (FOIA) requests from the public. If the IC released information and imagery derived directly from classified systems, could it still protect technology, imagery, and intelligence reports from compelled release pursuant to the FOIA. In addressing the issues associated with access to classified imagery information at all levels\n(including State, local, and tribal governments where security clearances for national data are rare), the IC will have to consider whether to work largely in the current environment, or move to a large-scale declassification regime requiring new legislation or high-level policy to ensure the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) will have the tools and authority to protect the remaining sensitive reconnaissance sources.  Concurrently, the imagery community will be required to address resource implications for conducting classification reviews and responding to an increasing number of Freedom of Information Act requests. Finally, the real key to success is to make the classification system understandable and emphasize better education on the needs for proper security.\n\nFinding #7:\n\n- Effective IC support to federal, state, tribal, local and private sector authorities is complicated by overlapping jurisdictions and barriers to information sharing.\n\n\nRecommendations:\n\na. DHS information sharing authorities be exploited to their fullest.\n\nb. The IC must provide information and data in a form that permits sharing with state,\ntribal and local law enforcement entities, i.e., \"write for release.\"\n\n\nDiscussion:\n\nThe ISG concluded that there are many organizations with overlapping responsibilities in the Homeland Security and Law Enforcement domains.  These overlaps exist both within the domains as well as between the domains.  Certainly the ISG recognizes that some overlap may be necessary due to the unique responsibilities of an organization.  It could also be posited that we need many organizations looking at these complex domains because it provides a richer and more thorough assessment from a multitude of perspectives.  That could be true if information sharing were a fundamental requirement for all of the organizations.  What in fact seems to happen is that each organization claims \"ownership\" of the information.  Many of the organizations that briefed the ISG reported that \"ownership\" of info was a significant impediment to the sharing of info.  The 3rd party rule, ORCON and LIMDIS are but three examples of ownership that impedes the sharing of information by requiring specific approval from the originating organization before further release is permitted.  Another consequence of this situation of overlapping responsibilities is that it is difficult to determine who is in charge--- or, everyone thinks they are in charge.  This overlap complicates the effective access to technical IC capabilities. Border protection is an example where several federal organizations have overlapping responsibilities.  DHS has the responsibility to secure the majority of our borders and exercises those responsibilities through the Customs and Border Patrol (CBP).  But that responsibility does not extend to areas where the Bureau of Land Management (BLM) or the Department of Interior (US Forest Service) \"owns\" the land on the border.  To fulfill their responsibilities, each of these organizations has its own law enforcement element, and its own intelligence/ information requirements.  Access to technical IC capabilities by these organizations to meet these intelligence/information requirements is very limited, if at all, and not coordinated.  CBP could access these technical IC capabilities through DHS.  DOI and BLM are members of the CAC, but have limited or no access to technical IC capabilities for homeland security (HLS)/law enforcement (LE) needs.  Therefore, the application of technical IC capabilities to border protection for this Nation is very complicated and extremely limited, in part due to overlapping responsibilities. Overlapping roles within the law enforcement domain complicate the effective use of technical IC capabilities.  The FBI is the Nation's lead federal law enforcement organization.  However, the DHS is a unique organization with both HLS and LE responsibilities embedded in its elements, such as CBP, ICE, Secret Service, USCG--- which in some cases overlaps FBI LE responsibilities.  NOAA, BLM, DOI, EPA and others also have organic law enforcement responsibilities and capabilities.  Each organization has its own process for accessing technical IC capabilities, if they choose to do that, which in many cases they do not.  And when they do, it is frequently done in a reactionary context rather than as a proactive application.  In many cases, the organization will go directly to the provider, such as NGA.  In other cases, they may go to the CAC.  There is no single source for the LE requirements---they may come from a multitude of players.  Nor is there a single process to access the capabilities provider as the CAC is not charter to support the law enforcement domain.  All of this leads to ineffective access to technical IC capabilities. Federal support to state and local governments is another example of where considerable overlap exists.  The FBI using the JTTFs, DHS using the Homeland Security Operations Center and the Homeland Security Information Network (HSIN), the US Marshals Service through its Technical Operations Group (TOG), the National Guard through each states' Adjutant General, NGA and NSA and others have all developed processes for providing support to state and local governments.  This is certainly a critical and commendable effort.  However, due to the overlap that is created by the multitude of means available, state and local governments do not have effective access to technical IC capabilities. The Department of Homeland Security has broad information sharing authorities.  Sections 201\nand 202 of The Homeland Security Act requires that all Homeland Security information will be given to DHS, and will be disseminated by DHS.  An Information Sharing MOU dated March 4, 2003 is a sweeping interagency agreement which is binding on DHS, Intelligence Community, DOD, Treasury and all  Federal LE agencies and specifically defines the types of information that are required to be reported from those organizations.  HSPD 7 provides the authority to the Secretary of DHS to look government-wide to satisfy GEO-INT HLS requirements.\n\nFinding #8:\n\n- The exploitation, fusion, storage and sharing of \"domestic information\" is complicated because current rules require extensive special handling protections.\n\n\n\nRecommendations:\n\na. DNI in conjunction with the Attorney General promulgate guidelines to promote as\nappropriate the effective exploitation, fusion, storage and sharing of domestic information.\nb. Assess the need for legislative solutions to ensure a rational policy framework is\nimplemented to meet the requirements of a post 9/11 environment.\n\nc. Issue a DNI Directive for the emergency disclosure of classified intelligence\ninformation consistent with the provisions of E.O. 12958.\n\n\nDiscussion:\nOnce information is developed from national technical means (or from any national intelligence or information gathering function), the presence, content, meaning and handling of that information are of professional concern. The reasons for this are painfully obvious to even the casual observer. Protection of the sensor, source and method is a critical requirement. Indeed,\nprotection of the technology and the methodology used to develop certain technical detail is sometimes so sensitive that the information itself must be highly classified in order to protect the capability.\n\nHowever, in the domestic context, there is another level of concern requiring technical, procedural and legal monitoring. It is possible to violate, even in the best of conditions and with the best of intent, the constitutional and legal rights of our citizens. In the fight against terrorism and against crime with national (homeland) security implications, in the domestic context, it is imperative that we address not merely the technical facts surrounding such collection but also their broader and deeper meaning in the context of our citizenry and their right to privacy and freedom from excessive governmental intrusion into their lives. In short, we need to engage in these activities under the rule of law.\n\nThings have changed since the act of terrorism on 11 September 2001 that created broad destruction and generated mass casualties here in the United States.  Suffice to say that the rights of free access and open transportation (and other elements of our pre-9-11 society) enjoyed before those pivotal events have now been abridged at least in practice if not in law. We have come to refer to this change in its totality as the \"new normal\" since we have achieved over time a national homeland security condition less restrictive than that which resulted immediately after the attack but still far different - more restrictive and more controlling -- from that which existed before the attack. In some cases this \"new normal\" condition is passive and defensive, albeit expectant of another attempt or another attack. In other cases the \"new normal\" is active and offensive and seeks to preclude or to interdict another attack.  We see it as a government imperative to clarify the legal, policy and procedural context in which the \"new normal\" can be effectively achieved without violating generally accepted societal and cultural norms. The question is very simple: How do we protect our citizenry while preserving our culture and guaranteeing their constitutional rights? The answer, seemingly, is very complex. Every part of the intelligence information system applied to the problems posed by terrorism, crime with national (homeland) security implications, and even disasters and other forms of instability, is affected by this circumstance. Thus in ISG deliberations great care was taken to include legal, policy and procedural ideas in our discussion and much effort was made to inquire into the legal conditions under which domestic information gathering and intelligence activities related to national technical means are undertaken. Our findings indicate that the collection, exploitation, integration, storage, sharing and application of information in the domestic context is complicated for all the reasons noted above and will require special handling and specific policy and legal protections. Another feature of the challenges we face is the inclusion of law enforcement support - currently generally excluded under the CAC portfolio as it is now put into practice. Should the law enforcement community, including the federal, state, local, tribal and private sector, be supported by NTM through the CAC? There is no easy answer, but consider the possibility that information derived from NTM could be critical in empowering law enforcement action to interdict or preclude a terrorist activity from occurring. Could we legitimately say - especially in the weapons with mass effects context - that information that might have been acquirable or even\n\navailable could not be provided to law enforcement because our legal and procedural structure did not provide for it? The ISG believes strongly that the legalities and procedural mechanisms needed to facilitate, limit and otherwise control the gathering and application of information and intelligence by national technical means, should be rapidly developed and promulgated throughout the policy and operational elements of the various parts of the homeland security, law enforcement and civil communities. It seems paramount to establish the boundaries and methodology, in their legal context, before we do anything else. Without that supporting structure upon which to base our actions we have little to guide us and less to substantiate our views and beliefs (or to change our views and beliefs). In some cases we have - in the present context of the Department of Homeland Security and in the activities of the Federal Bureau of Investigation - already begun to deal with the handling of domestic information similar in sensitivity and meaning to that gathered through NTM. There is a growing body of legal decision and Congressional action that seems to provide the potential for relevant interpretation and applicable case law. There are a host of Presidential memoranda and executive branch decisions that direct certain actions and events that are germane. But even in the face of all these possibilities we still cannot say what the law allows or does not allow with certainty.  The problem as the ISG sees it is that nowhere can we find an interpretation and firm contextual description of the substance of this new post-9-11 condition.\n\nFinding #9:\n\n- Civil agency archival holdings are extensive, but uncoordinated. They may represent an important source of data for research and potential new applications within the civil, law enforcement and homeland security domains.\n\n\nRecommendations:\n\na. DOI create a master list of remote sensing holdings\n\nb. DHS spearhead a multi-disciplinary effort to understand the holdings, identify uses,\nand develop methods to demonstrate utility of the holdings\n\nc. DNI, DOD, and civil agencies should collaborate to better optimize national collection\nholdings for improving domestic use.\nDiscussion: The United States is one of the few remaining countries that segregates its space program into\nnational security, civil, and commercial space, with thick and complex bureaucratic boundaries\nbetween them, and creating great inefficiencies in the overall national remote sensing program. The homeland security mission offers one opportunity to improve upon that. The ISG heard testimony about the extensive remote sensing holdings within the U.S. civil and scientific community.  Remote sensing data is not only collected by government organizations like NOAA and NASA, by also by the U.S. Geological Survey and the Department of Agriculture.  In fact, the CAC model, as described to the ISG, has always operated on a \"not to interfere\" basis with U.S. intelligence requirements, in part because of the availability of substitute or complementary data to support civil agency missions. Fulfillment of the data and exploitation needs of the domestic information requirement have the potential, over time, of being an extensive resource drain on the national intelligence system, with some implication for the foreign intelligence mission.  (The ISG does not see such an extensive resource competition at this time, however).  First consideration of the extensive civil holdings may limit the amount of resources required from the more costly intelligence system. Of course, the ultimate value proposition may relate much more to timeliness of access, ability to exploit, precise nature of the source, or other criteria. Of concern to the ISG is the fact that very little of this civil agency data - gathered under substantially different legal authorities and with few sources and methods sensitivities - appears to be used, even experimentally within the law enforcement and homeland security communities, in particular.  While also resource constrained, the U.S. civil and scientific community represents a potentially important source of knowledge and data from which to stimulate experimentation in the use of remote sensing data for domestic applications.  Moreover, collaboration between the civil agencies and the law enforcement and homeland security communities appears to be potentially less sensitive than a similar relationship with intelligence. As the nation searches for methods to improve information and intelligence sharing for homeland security, the ISG believes that geospatial information - often, but not exclusively, maps and map products - are a compelling tool for sharing information.  While localities and police services may differ in their sophistication with remote sensing data and technology, virtually everyone has familiarity with maps and map products as decision aids.  This is an area where both the Intelligence Community and the civil agencies have extensive experience providing information, even information derived from sensitive sources. Finding #10:\n- There is a need for examining the procedures for reporting of U.S. person data including more rapid transmission of identity in specific threat situations.\n\n\nRecommendations:\n\na. The ISG recommends that careful thought and design be given to a U.S. person information template that includes an assured identification of the person, an explanation of the context in which the information has been collected and processed, and the limits on distribution and use of the information.\n\nb. If allowable by statute, and not prohibited by the FISA process, a unique identification number to permit tracking of an individual should be assigned when the provision of the identity is not appropriate.\n\nDiscussion:\n\nIn our discussion with DEA, NSA, NCTC and DHS, the issue of quickly transmitting personal identification information to appropriate law enforcement organizations in a timely manner is a serious problem.  Under current guidelines, when information is acquired about an illegal activity taking place in the United States that may include U.S. persons, the information is sanitized before it is disseminated to government agencies.  For example, person A and person B\nare meeting next week at a hotel in St. Paul, Minnesota for the probable purpose of transacting a drug deal.  If DEA or any other agency wants to know the specific details about who the people are, when and where the meeting is to take place so that they can take action, they must request it from the producing agency.  The producing agency then retrieves the raw information and transmits it to the requestor for action.  This time delay can have a serious impact on the ability to apprehend criminals in situations where time is vital to the success of a mission. When collected information provides vital information about the commission of a crime in the U.S., the complete report should be transmitted immediately to the appropriate law enforcement organizations for action.  Those agencies need to have the authority to determine if the personal data needs to be retained and how best to protect that data under current legal guidelines. Another issue was raised with the ISG concerning effective tracking of individuals.  A need was identified to assign a unique identifier to a person or organization so that their activities can be tracked over time. No need for specific person identification is seen, just a means to associate disparate activities in time and place with the same actor(s).\n\nFinding # 11:\n\n- Although the ISG has not identified the need to change any laws, it is inevitable that certain recommendations will cause concern among some segments of the body politic.\nA concerted effort is needed to assure a balanced discussion of the benefits and risks associated with expanded domestic use of IC capabilities.\n\n\nRecommendation:\na. The DNI, senior leaders of the intelligence community and others in the Executive Branch, should look for opportunities to inform the public on the intelligence challenges associated with the war on terror.\n\n\nb. Provide for the oversight of domestic uses of IC capabilities by the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board, established in the IRTPA (potential amendment to E.O.12333).\n\n\nc. Domestic Applications Executive Committee should include the DNI Civil Liberties Protection Officer as an advisor.\n\n\n\nDiscussion: This section deals with the political implications of using technical IC capabilities within the US, and the critical need for the DNI, in concert with the Administration and Congressional officials, to make the case to the American people for using such technical means - including constraints and oversight - associated with doing so. Historically, since the earliest days of the Republic, the American people have held a high suspicion of standing armies and the functions that support it, especially intelligence.  Americans have always preferred the concept of intelligence as a function that supports warfighters in wartime, and as something that is done overseas, vice at home.   Within this longer view, the Cold War reality of a large, prominent, and permanent U.S. intelligence community was an exception to the rule, rather than the preferred case.   Both the Cold War mission and the abuses investigated by the Church and Pike Committees, and the Rockefeller Commission, reaffirmed and even strengthened this notion within the American psyche. This uniquely American view of intelligence exists today, and may even be returning to a more historical view of a diminished intelligence community.   Even given the events of 9/11 and more extensive evidence of a threat - perhaps existential - to our homeland, initiatives designed to improve intelligence have met with strong, and often uninformed public reaction.  While there are perils in the comparison, one needs to look only at the response to the Patriot Act to understand the potential reaction to a broadening of Intelligence Community activities in the homeland. Based upon the testimony given to this ISG, there are some real ironies associated with this, and some very important work to be done.  First, while the Intelligence Community's reaction to domestic scrutiny in the 1970's was appropriate, and understandable, it is clear that those events created a hyper-conservative view of what can be done, as laid out in policy, regulation and practice, and one that continues today.  Practices like the CAC's avoidance of law enforcement support and NSA minimization, on the one hand, reflect the serious attention that Intelligence Community leaders give to avoiding even an appearance of impropriety, yet there seems to be\n\nlittle creativity for providing intelligence support except in cases where the threat appears to be compelling, such as an imminent terrorist threat. Intelligence managers and overseers should not look for \"black and white\" distinctions in thinking about providing intelligence support for the homeland.   A period of considerable experimentation and discovery should take place, as much within the consumer communities - law enforcement, homeland security, and the civil and scientific communities - as driven from within the Intelligence Community.  Distinctions based on phenomena - SIGINT, GEOINT, and MASINT - experience of the user, and even the context of the intelligence support should be carefully considered in order to optimize support while maintaining a thoughtful perspective on the real and perceived impacts of these actions on the legitimate rights of American citizens.   As is the case with the PATRIOT Act, consideration should be given to discovery periods - one, two, or three years - within which intelligence capabilities should be used experimentally, with ongoing dialogue between the IC, user, and oversight committees.  All communities, but especially the user community, should be sensitized to both the potentially intrusive nature of these capabilities and the sensitivity of the sources and methods.  These discovery periods should be used to inform both legal and policy regimes as they evolve, more thoughtfully and inevitably slowly. Finally, to return to the initial theme, the public debate about the future of U.S. intelligence is well underway.  While it has been catalyzed by the 9/11 Commission, the WMD Commission, and a slate of other activities, it often appears to be a debate with only one voice, often illinformed and sometimes completely uninformed.  The Administration, the Congress, and the Intelligence Community must inform this debate, credibly, on the challenges of intelligence support in the war on terror, and especially on the methods taken to protect the legitimate rights of American citizens.\n\nCHAPTER 3:  OTHER MODELS CONSIDERED There were four other models that the ISG gave detailed consideration to but did not select.  The first model was referred to as the enhanced CAC model (**Figure 8**).  This model expanded the current CAC structure and process to include the homeland security and law enforcement domains.  The ISG felt that a committee structure was not the most efficient process and that without multi-department level support and dedicated resources it would not be sustainable. Finally, access to a robust IT infrastructure to support a digital end-to-end environment would not be readily available.\n\n## Models Under Consideration Option:  A (Centralized Broker - Committee)\n\nThe second model considered (**Figure 9**) was identical to the selected model with the exception that it was located within one of the traditional Intelligence Community agencies such as NGA.  .\n\nThe primary factor against this model was the belief that public perception would be that the U.\n\nS. government i.e. the Intelligence Community, was spying on Americans.  Therefore, avoiding even the appearance of the IC being in direct day-to-day control of the domestic information activities of the DAO is critical to a successful implementation of the new model.  There was also a concern that domestic collection requirements would not compete well against foreign requirements in this model because the IC controlled the process.\n\nUNCLASSIFIED\n\n## Models Under Consideration\n\nOPTION:  C  (Centralized Broker - Executive Agent inside IC)\n\n## Dni & Dod Assets\n\nThe third model used a dual track to process requirements (**Figure 10**).  Civil and homeland security domain requirements would be processed in DHS and all law enforcement domain requests would use the FBI as a focal point.  The obvious shortcoming of this model is the duplicate centers, which unnecessarily increase the cost of the program and systemically creates an environment for more duplication throughout the process and limits sharing of information, lessons learned and lowers the chance for multi-int solutions.  Because each of the three domains has law enforcement responsibilities there is no clear requirements path.  In fact, the model encourages the use of whatever path will offer success.  Finally, that the model may still promote a pre 9/11 view of roles and responsibilities and therefore further reduce information sharing.\n\n## Models Under Consideration Option:    D  (Dhs/Fbi Model)\n\n\n\nThe final model was a distributed model (**Figure 11**).  Each of the domains had their own focal point for access into the IC.  Since this model requires: start-up funding for three separate processes; three processes each with its' own priorities; three budget sustainment process; and overall, presents a strong potential for duplication, this model was eliminated without debate. Also, this model presented a strong pre 9/11 image of non-integration and limited information sharing.\n\n## Unclassified Models Under Consideration Option:    E  (Distributed Brokers)\n\n\n\n## Chapter 4:  Next Steps Immediate: The Isg Believes The Following Actions Need To Be Implemented To Make An Immediate Impact On The Country's Ability To Support Domestic Applications Of Ic Capabilities: - Dni Approve Isg Plan To Improve Support The Domestic Community.\n\n- Establish an Executive Agent agreement between DNI and DHS to establish the Domestic\nApplications Office.\n- DNI appoint an Implementation Program Manager (Senior Executive or Flag rank) to\nensure successful transition to a new paradigm.\n- DOJ, DNI and DOD jointly establish a legal fast track decision process to provide\nguidance regarding domestic applications of IC capabilities.\n- DNI update policy directives relating to the use of IC capabilities for domestic uses. An\nimportant precept of the new guidance would be a program of risk management focusing\non sharing of information and addressing technical collection capabilities legal limitations\nwhile at the same time protecting the civil liberties of U.S. persons.\n- DNI address the issue of release of literal IDPs at .5 meter resolution and declassifying\nNTM at the .5 meter resolution.\n- DNI address the issue of \"ownership of information\" which is hampering the sharing of\ninformation for the successful execution of Agency missions.\n- The Department of Interior undertake a 90 day effort to compile a master list of\ngovernment remote sensing holdings.\n\n## Near Term: The Following Additional Actions, Implemented With In The Next 12 Months, Will Put In Place A Robust, Viable Program: Dni Actions: - Create An Fy 06 Funding Line For The Domestic Applications Program To Include People, Program Dollars And Seed Money For A Domestic Exploitation Of National Capabilities Program.  Ensure Current Capabilities Address Support To Domestic User Needs.\n\n- DNI should delegate authority to the D/NGA over domestic imagery tasking, exploitation,\nretention and dissemination.\n- Work with DHS to establish the Domestic Applications Executive Committee.\n- Establish a training and education program for customers to better understand how IC\ncapabilities may be applied in a domestic environment.\n- DNI add Domestic Community representative to the Mission requirements board (MRB).\n\n## Dhs Actions: - Create A Domestic Applications Implementation Team.\n\n- Stand up the Domestic Applications Office within one year.\n- Determine how DHS unique information sharing authorities can facilitate the use of IC\ncapabilities in the domestic context.\n- Work in parallel with the CAC for one year or as mutually agreed to before accepting full\ncivil domain responsibilities.\n\n## Cac Actions: - Work In Parallel With Dhs For One Year To Ensure A Seamless Transition.\n\n- Migrate the CAC to the Civil Domain Working Group after one year.\n\nGeneral Actions:\n- Amend E.O. 12333 to articulate national policy on the domestic use of IC capabilities\nparticularly in support of homeland security and law enforcement.\n- Amend E.O. 12333 to provide for the oversight of domestic uses of IC capabilities by the\nPrivacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board."
    },
    {
        "text": "A\nL\nR\nO\nI\nS\n\nU\nE\nM\n\nC\nA\nC\nP\nO\nS\nR\nM\nE\nM\nB\nI\nY\nS\nS\nC\n\nI\n.\n\nS\nO\n.\n\nN\nU\n\nSenator Angus King (I-Maine) Representative Mike Gallagher (R-Wisconsin)\nMARCH 2020\n\n## A Warning From Tomorrow\n\nBy Peter Singer and August Cole You spend your whole career on Capitol Hill hoping for an office with a window.\n\nThen when you finally get it, all you want to do is look away. They set up our emergency offsite for essential Senate staff in vacant offices once belonging to one of the contractors that lobbied us before they went belly-up last year. The offices are in a high-rise in Rosslyn, with a literal million-dollar view; looking across the Potomac River, you can see past the National Mall and the monuments all the way into downtown DC. And it just breaks your heart. The rainbow of colors in the window paints how everything went so wrong, so fast. The water in the Potomac still has that red tint from when the treatment plants upstream were hacked, their automated systems tricked into flushing out the wrong mix of chemicals. By comparison, the water in the Lincoln Memorial Reflecting Pool has a purple glint to it. They've pumped out the floodwaters that covered Washington's low-lying areas after the region's reservoirs were hit in a cascade of sensor hacks. But the surge left behind an oily sludge that will linger for who knows how long. That's what you get from deciding in the\n18th century to put your capital city in low-lying swampland and then in the 21st century wiring up all its infrastructure to an insecure network. All around the Mall you can see the black smudges of the delivery drones and air taxis that were remotely hijacked to crash into crowds of innocents like fiery meteors. And in the open spaces and parks beyond, tiny dots of bright colors smear together like some kind of tragic pointillist painting. These are the camping tents and makeshift shelters of the refugees who fled the toxic railroad accident caused by the control system failure in Baltimore. FEMA says it's safe to go back, now that the chemical cloud has dissipated. But with all the churn and disinfo on social media, no one knows who or what to trust. Last night, the orange of their campfires was like a vigil of the obstinate, waiting for everything to just return to the way it was. But it won't.\n\nA knock on the door shakes me out of it. It's the legislative director, checking back in. She's anxious because the boss promised that we'd get a draft of the bill out tonight to all the other committees that touch on cybersecurity. No cars are online and nobody wants to risk the Metro after what happened on the Blue Line, though, so it'll mean hours of walking from office to office. At least the irony of backpacking around paper printouts of new cybersecurity laws will be lost on no one. I tell her that I'll get it done and turn back to wordsmithing the preamble. I mostly mined the language from old legislation that someone just like me wrote after the 9/11 attacks. I know some online troll or talking head on the news will end up calling it lazy, but it's the closest anyone can think of as a parallel. Of course, with the servers down, our poor intern had to run down a paper copy from the Library of Congress. Whereas, for as long as the United States has been the nation that invented and then became dependent on the Internet, it has faced online threats; and Whereas, as these threats grew in scale and frequency, we grew too accustomed to digital interference in our society, economy, and even elections; and Whereas, AI and automation changed these networks from use not just for communications but to connect and operate the \"things\" that run our physical world; and Whereas, a new type of vulnerability thus emerged, where software could be not just a means of theft, but a weapon of disruption and even physical destruction; and Whereas, our government and industry failed to keep pace with this change of technology and threat, being ill-organized and ill-prepared; and Whereas, these vulnerabilities have just been exploited in extraordinary acts of treacherous violence that caused massive loss of life and effectively held the nation hostage; and Whereas, such acts continue to pose a threat to the national security and very way of life of the United States; Now, therefore, be it Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, that the government of the United States must...1 \"*Must*\" what? What can we really do? No matter what legislation we pass now, after everything that's happened, we're too late.\n\n## Contents\n\n| EXECUTIVE SUMMARY                          |   1 |\n|--------------------------------------------|-----|\n| THE CHALLENGE                              |   8 |\n| The Threat                              8  |     |\n| Where Are We Now?                    14    |     |\n| Where Are We Headed?                 17    |     |\n| An Inflection Point                     19 |     |\n| HISTORICAL LEGACY AND                      |     |\n| METHODOLOGY                                |  20 |\n| Historical Legacy                       20 |     |\n| Methodology                           21   |     |\n| STRATEGIC APPROACH:                        |     |\n| LAYERED CYBER DETERRENCE                   |  23 |\n| The Strategic Logic Of Deterrence       26 |     |\n| Defend Forward And Layered                 |     |\n| Cyber Deterrence                       28  |     |\n| The Implementation Of Layered              |     |\n| Cyber Deterrence                      29   |     |\nPILLARS AND KEY RECOMMENDATIONS\nReform the U S  Government's Structure and Organization for Cyberspace        31 Strengthen Norms and Non-military Tools                     46 Promote National Resilience           54\nReshape the Cyber Ecosystem toward Greater Security                71 Operationalize Cybersecurity Collaboration with the Private Sector   96 Preserve and Employ the Military Instrument of Power                  110\n\n## Appendices\n\nAppendix A: Roll-Up of Recommendations                    123 Appendix B: Legislative Proposals     127 Appendix C: Glossary                 130 Appendix D: Abbreviations           140 Appendix E: Government Structure for Cybersecurity            142 Appendix F: Situating Layered Cyber Deterrence                     144\nAppendix G: Engagements            146 Appendix H: Commissioners          149 Appendix I: Staff List                 151 Appendix J: Solarium Event Support                              154\n\n## Chairmen's Letter\n\nO\nur country is at risk, not only from a catastrophic cyberattack but from millions of daily intrusions disrupting everything from financial transactions to the inner workings of our electoral system. Capturing the complexity of this challenge is hard. Even the man credited with inventing the term \"cyberspace,\" the science fiction author William Gibson, would later criticize it as an \"evocative and essentially meaningless\" buzzword.2\nIn studying this issue, it is easy to descend into a morass of classification, acronyms, jargon, and obscure government organization charts. To avoid that, we tried something different: an unclassified report that we hope will be found readable by the very people who are affected by cyber insecurity*everyone*. This report is also aimed squarely at **action**; it has numerous recommendations addressing organizational, policy, and technical issues, and we included an appendix with draft bills that Congress can rapidly act upon to put these ideas into practice and make America more secure. The reality is that we are dangerously insecure in cyber. Your entire lifeyour paycheck, your health care, your electricityincreasingly relies on networks of digital devices that store, process, and analyze data. These networks are vulnerable, if not already compromised. Our country has lost hundreds of billions of dollars to nation-state-sponsored intellectual property theft using cyber espionage. A major cyberattack on the nation's critical infrastructure and economic system would create chaos and lasting damage exceeding that wreaked by fires in California, floods in the Midwest, and hurricanes in the Southeast. To prevent this from happening, our report outlines a new cyber strategy and provides more than 75 recommendations for action across the public and private sectors. Here are some big ideas to get the conversation started. First, **deterrence is possible in cyberspace**. Today most cyber actors feel undeterred, if not emboldened, to target our personal data and public infrastructure. In other words, through our inability or unwillingness to identify and punish our cyber adversaries, we are signaling that interfering in American elections or stealing billions in U.S. intellectual property is acceptable. The federal government and the private sector must defend themselves and strike back with **speed and agility**. This is difficult because the government is not optimized to be quick or agile, but we simply must be faster than our adversaries in order to prevent them from destroying our networks and, by extension, our way of life. Our strategy of layered cyber deterrence is designed with this goal in mind. It combines enhanced resilience with enhanced attribution capabilities and a clearer signaling strategy with collective action by our partners and allies. It is a simple framework laying out how we evolve into a hard target, a good ally, and a bad enemy. Second, **deterrence relies on a resilient economy**. During the Cold War, our best minds were tasked with developing Continuity of Government plans to ensure that the government could survive and the nation recover after a nuclear strike. We need similar planning today to ensure that we can reconstitute in the aftermath of a national-level cyberattack. We also need to ensure that our economy continues to run. We recommend that the government institute a Continuity of the Economy plan to ensure that we can rapidly restore critical functions across corporations and industry sectors, and get the economy back up and running after a catastrophic cyberattack. Such a plan is a fundamental pillar of deterrencea way to tell our adversaries that we, as a society, will survive to defeat them with **speed and agility** if they launch a major cyberattack against us.\n\nThird, **deterrence requires government reform.** We need to elevate and empower existing cyber agencies, particularly the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), and create new focal points for coordinating cybersecurity in the executive branch and Congress. To that end, we recommend the creation of a National Cyber Director with oversight from new congressional Cybersecurity Committees, but our goal is not to create more bureaucracy with new and duplicative roles and organizations. Rather, we propose giving existing organizations the tools they need to act with **speed and agility** to defend our networks and impose costs on our adversaries. The key is CISA, which we have tried to empower as the lead agency for federal cybersecurity and the private sector's preferred partner. We want working at CISA to become so appealing to young professionals interested in national service that it competes with the NSA, the FBI, Google, and Facebook for toplevel talent (and wins). Fourth, **deterrence will require private-sector entities to step up and strengthen their security posture**. Most of our critical infrastructure is owned by the private sector. That is why we make certain recommendations, such as establishing a cloud security certification or modernizing corporate accountability reporting requirements. We do not want to saddle the private sector with onerous and counterproductive regulations, nor do we want to force companies to hand over their data to the federal government. We are not the Chinese Communist Party, and indeed our best path to beating our adversaries is to stay free and innovative. But we need C-suite executives to take cyber seriously since they are on the front lines. With support from the federal government, private-sector entities must be able to act with **speed and agility** to stop cyberattackers from breaking out in their networks and the larger array of networks on which the nation relies. Fifth, **election security must become a priority**. The American people still do not have the assurance that our election systems are secure from foreign manipulation. If we don't get election security right, deterrence will fail and future generations will look back with longing and regret on the once powerful American Republic and wonder how we screwed the whole thing up. We believe we need to continue appropriations to fund election infrastructure modernization at the state and local levels. At the same time, states and localities need to pay their fair share to secure elections, and they can draw on useful resourcessuch as nonprofits that can act with greater **speed and agility** across all 50 statesto secure elections from the bottom up rather than waiting for top-down direction and funding. We also need to ensure that regardless of the method of casting a vote, paper or electronic, a paper audit trail exists (and yes, we recognize the irony of a cyber commission recommending a paper trail).\n\nWe didn't solve everything in this report. We didn't even agree on everything. There are areas, such as balancing maximum encryption versus mandatory lawful access to devices, where the best we could do was provide a common statement of principles. Yet every single Commissioner was willing to make compromises in the course of our work because we were all united by the recognition that the status quo is not getting the job done. The status quo is inviting attacks on America every second of every day. The status quo is a slow surrender of American power and responsibility. We all want that to stop. So please do us, and your fellow Americans, a favor. Read this report and then demand that your government and the private sector act with **speed and agility** to secure our cyber future.\n\nSenator Angus King (I-Maine)\nRepresentative Mike Gallagher (R-Wisconsin)\n\nCo-Chairman Co-Chairman\n\nCyberspace Solarium Commission Cyberspace Solarium Commission\n\n## Executive Summary\n\nAN URGENT CALL TO ACTION\nFor over 20 years, nation-states and non-state actors have used cyberspace to subvert American power, American security, and the American way of life. Despite numerous criminal indictments, economic sanctions, and the development of robust cyber and non-cyber military capabilities, the attacks against the United States have continued. The perpetrators saw that their onslaught damaged the United States without triggering a significant retaliation. Chinese cyber operators stole hundreds of billions of dollars in intellectual property to accelerate China's military and economic rise and undermine U.S. military dominance.3 Russian operators and their proxies damaged public trust in the integrity of American elections and democratic institutions.4 China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea all probed U.S. critical infrastructure with impunity.\n\nCriminals leveraged globally connected networks to steal assets from individuals, companies, and governments. Extremist groups used these networks to raise funds and recruit followers, increasing transnational threats and insecurity. American restraint was met with unchecked predation.5\nThe digital connectivity that has brought economic growth, technological dominance, and an improved quality of life to nearly every American has also created a strategic dilemma. The more digital connections people make and data they exchange, the more opportunities adversaries have to destroy private lives, disrupt critical infrastructure, and damage our economic and democratic institutions. The United States now operates in a cyber landscape that requires a level of data security, resilience, and trustworthiness that neither the U.S. government nor the private sector alone is currently equipped to provide. Moreover, shortfalls in agility, technical expertise, and unity of effort, both within the U.S. government and between the public and private sectors, are growing. The 2019 National Defense Authorization Act chartered the U.S. Cyberspace Solarium Commission to address this challenge. The President and Congress tasked the Commission to answer two fundamental questions: What strategic approach will defend the United States against cyberattacks of significant consequences? And what policies and legislation are required to implement that strategy?\n\nTHE STRATEGY\nAfter conducting an extensive study including over 300 interviews, a competitive strategy event modeled after the original Project Solarium in the Eisenhower administration, and stress tests by external red teams, the Commission advocates a new strategic approach to cybersecurity: **layered cyber deterrence**. The desired end state of layered cyber deterrence is a reduced probability and impact of cyberattacks of significant consequence. The strategy outlines three ways to achieve this end state:\n\n1. *Shape behavior*  The United States must work with allies and partners to promote responsible behavior in cyberspace. 2. *Deny benefits*  The United States must deny benefits to adversaries who have long exploited cyberspace to their advantage, to American disadvantage, and at little cost to themselves. This new approach requires securing critical networks in collaboration with the private sector to promote national resilience and increase the security of the cyber ecosystem.\n3. *Impose costs*  The United States must maintain the capability, capacity, and credibility needed to retaliate against actors\nwho target America in and through cyberspace.\n\n## Executive Summary\n\nEach of the three ways described above involves a deterrent layer that increases American public- and private-sector security by altering how adversaries perceive the costs and benefits of using cyberspace to attack American interests. These three deterrent layers are supported by six policy pillars that organize more than 75 recommendations. These pillars represent the means to implement layered cyber deterrence. While deterrence is an enduring American strategy, there are two factors that make layered cyber deterrence bold and distinct. First, the approach prioritizes deterrence by denial, specifically by increasing the defense and security of cyberspace through resilience and public- and private-sector collaboration. Reducing the vulnerabilities adversaries can target denies them opportunities to attack American interests through cyberspace. Second, the strategy incorporates the concept of\n\"defend forward\" to reduce the frequency and severity of attacks in cyberspace that do not rise to a level that would warrant the full spectrum of retaliatory responses, including military responses. Though the concept originated in the Department of Defense, the Commission integrates defend forward into a national strategy for securing cyberspace using all the instruments of power. Defend forward posits that to disrupt and defeat ongoing adversary campaigns, the United States must proactively observe, pursue, and counter adversaries' operations and impose costs short of armed conflict. This posture signals to adversaries that the U.S. government will respond to cyberattacks, even those below the level of armed conflict that do not cause physical destruction or death, with all the tools at its disposal and consistent with international law.\n\n## The Implementation\n\nFoundation: Government Reform The three layers of cyber deterrence rest on a common foundation: the need to reform how the U.S. government is organized to secure cyberspace and respond to attacks. The U.S. government is currently not designed to act with the speed and agility necessary to defend the country in cyberspace. We must get faster and smarter, improving the government's ability to organize concurrent, continuous, and collaborative efforts to build resilience, respond to cyber threats, and preserve military options that signal a capability and willingness to impose costs on adversaries. Reformed government oversight and organization that is properly resourced and staffed, in alignment with a strategy of layered cyber deterrence, will enable the United States to reduce the probability, magnitude, and effects of significant attacks on its networks.\n\nPillar: *Reform the U S  Government's Structure and Organization for Cyberspace*  While cyberspace has transformed the American economy and society, the government has not kept up. Existing government structures and jurisdictional boundaries fracture cyber policymaking processes, limit opportunities for government action, and impede cyber operations. Rapid, comprehensive improvements at all levels of government are necessary to change these dynamics and ensure that the U.S. government can protect the American people, their way of life, and America's status as a global leader. Major recommendations in this pillar are:\n\n-\nThe executive branch should **issue an updated National Cyber Strategy (1.1)** that reflects the strategic approach of layered cyber deterrence and emphasizes resilience, public-private collaboration, and defend forward as key elements.\n-\nCongress should **establish House Permanent Select and Senate Select Committees on Cybersecurity (1.2)** to provide integrated oversight of the cybersecurity efforts dispersed across the federal government.\n-\nCongress should **establish a Senate-confirmed National Cyber Director (NCD) (1.3)**, supported by an Office of the\nNCD, within the Executive Office of the President. The NCD will be the President's principal advisor for cybersecurity-related issues, as well as lead national-level coordination of cybersecurity strategy and policy, both within government and with the private sector.\n-\nCongress should **strengthen the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) (1.4)** in its mission to ensure the national resilience of critical infrastructure, promote a more secure cyber ecosystem, and serve as the central coordinating element to support and integrate federal, state and local, and private-sector cybersecurity efforts. Congress must invest significant resources in CISA and provide it with clear authorities to realize its full potential.\n-\nCongress and the executive branch should pass legislation and implement policies designed to better recruit, develop, and retain cyber talent (1.5) while acting to deepen the pool of candidates for cyber work in the federal government.\nLayer 1: Shape Behavior In the first layer, the strategy calls for shaping responsible behavior and encouraging restraint in cyberspace by strengthening norms and non-military instruments. Effective norms will not emerge without American leadership. For this reason, the United States needs to build a coalition of partners and allies to secure its shared interests and values in cyberspace. Pillar: *Strengthen Norms and Non-military Tools*  A system of norms, built through international engagement and cooperation, promotes responsible behavior and, over time, dissuades adversaries from using cyber operations to undermine any nation's interests. The United States and others have agreed to norms of responsible behavior for cyberspace, but they go largely unenforced today. The United States can strengthen the current system of cyber norms by using non-military tools, including law enforcement actions, sanctions, diplomacy, and information sharing, to more effectively persuade states to conform to these norms and punish those who violate them. Such punishment requires developing the ability to quickly and accurately attribute cyberattacks. Building a coalition of like-minded allies and partners willing to collectively use these instruments to support a rules-based international order in cyberspace will better hold malign actors accountable. The major recommendations in this pillar are:\n\n-\nCongress should **create an Assistant Secretary of State (2.1)** in the Department of State, with a new Bureau of Cyberspace Security and Emerging Technologies, who will lead the U.S. government effort to develop and reinforce international norms in cyberspace. This will help promote international norms that support and reflect U.S. interests and values while creating benefits for responsible state behavior through engagement with allies and partners.\n-\nThe executive branch should engage actively and effectively in forums setting international information and communications technology standards (2.1.2). Specifically, the National Institute of Standards and Technology should facilitate robust and integrated participation by the federal government, academia, professional societies, and industry.\n-\nCongress should take steps to improve international tools for law enforcement activities in cyberspace (2.1.4), including streamlining the Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty and Mutual Legal Assistance Agreement process and increasing the number of FBI Cyber Assistant Legal Attaches.\nLayer 2: Deny Benefits In the second layer, the strategy calls for denying benefits to adversaries by promoting national resilience, reshaping the cyber ecosystem, and advancing the government's relationship with the private sector to establish an enhanced level of common situational awareness and joint collaboration. The United States needs a whole-of-nation approach to secure its interests and institutions in cyberspace. Pillar: *Promote National Resilience*  Resiliencethe capacity to withstand and quickly recover from attacks that could cause harm or coerce, deter, restrain, or otherwise shape U.S. behavioris key to denying adversaries the benefits of their operations and reducing confidence in their ability to achieve their strategic ends. National resilience efforts rely on the ability of the United States, in both the public and private sectors, to accurately identify, assess, and mitigate risk across all elements of critical infrastructure. The nation must be sufficiently prepared to respond to and recover from an attack, sustain critical functions even under degraded conditions, and, in some cases, restart critical functionality after disruption. Major recommendations in this pillar are:\n\n-\nCongress should **codify responsibilities and ensure sufficient resources (3.1)** for the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency and sector-specific agencies in the identification, assessment, and management of national and sector-specific risk.\n-\nCongress should direct the U.S. government to **develop and maintain Continuity of the Economy planning (3.2)** in consultation with the private sector to ensure continuous operation of critical functions of the economy in the event of a significant cyber disruption.\n-\nCongress should **codify a Cyber State of Distress** tied to a **Cyber Response and Recovery Fund (3.3)** to ensure sufficient resources and capacity to respond rapidly to significant cyber incidents.\n-\nCongress should **improve the structure and sustain the funding of the Election Assistance Commission (3.4)**, enabling it to increase its operational capacity to support states and localities in defense of the digital election infrastructure that\nunderpins federal elections and to ensure the widest use of voter-verifiable, auditable, and paper-based voting systems.\n-\nThe U.S. government should **promote digital literacy, civics education, and public awareness (3.5)** to build societal resilience to foreign, malign cyber-enabled information operations.\nPillar: *Reshape the Cyber Ecosystem toward Greater Security*  Raising the baseline level of security across the cyber ecosystem the people, processes, data, and technology that constitute and depend on cyberspacewill constrain and limit adversaries' activities. Over time, this will reduce the frequency, scope, and scale of their cyber operations. Because the vast majority of this ecosystem is owned and operated by the private sector, scaling up security means partnering with the private sector and adjusting incentives to produce positive outcomes. In some cases, that requires aligning market forces. In other cases, where those forces either are not present or do not adequately address risk, the U.S. government must explore legislation, regulation, executive action, and public- as well as private-sector investments. Major recommendations in this pillar are:\n\n-\nCongress should **establish and fund a National Cybersecurity Certification and Labeling Authority (4.1)** empowered to **establish and manage a program on security certifications and labeling** of information and communications technology products.\n-\nCongress should pass a law establishing that final goods assemblers of software, hardware, and firmware are liable for damages from incidents that exploit known and unpatched vulnerabilities (4.2) for as long as they support a product or service.\n-\nCongress should **establish a Bureau of Cyber Statistics (4.3)** charged with collecting and providing statistical data\non cybersecurity and the cyber ecosystem to inform policymaking and government programs.\n-\nCongress should resource and direct the Department of Homeland Security to fund a federally funded research and development center (4.4) to work with state-level regulators to develop certifications for cybersecurity insurance products.\n-\nThe National Cybersecurity Certification and Labeling Authority should **develop a cloud security certification (4.5)**, in consultation with the National Institute of Standards and Technology, the Office of Management and Budget, and the Department of Homeland Security.\n-\nCongress should direct the U.S. government to develop and implement an industrial base strategy for information and communications technology to ensure trusted supply chains (4.6) and the availability of critical information and communications technologies.\n-\nCongress should **pass a national data security and privacy protection law (4.7)** establishing and standardizing requirements for the collection, retention, and sharing of user data.\nPillar: *Operationalize Cybersecurity Collaboration with the Private Sector*  Unlike in other physical domains, in cyberspace the government is often not the primary actor. Instead, it must support and enable the private sector. The government must build and communicate a better understanding of threats, with the specific aim of informing private-sector security operations, directing government operational efforts to counter malicious cyber activities, and ensuring better common situational awareness for collaborative action with the private sector. Further, while recognizing that private-sector entities have primary responsibility for the defense and security of their networks, the U.S. government must bring to bear its unique authorities, resources, and intelligence capabilities to support these actors in their defensive efforts. Major recommendations in this pillar are:\n\n-\nCongress should **codify the concept of \"systemically important critical infrastructure\" (5.1)**, whereby entities responsible for systems and assets that underpin national critical functions are ensured the full support of the U.S. government and shoulder additional security requirements befitting their unique status and importance.\n-\nCongress should **establish and fund a Joint Collaborative Environment (5.2)**, a common and interoperable environment for **sharing and fusing threat information, insights, and other relevant data** across the federal government and between the public and private sectors.\n-\nCongress should direct the executive branch to **strengthen a public-private, integrated cyber center in CISA (5.3)** to\nsupport its critical infrastructure security and resilience mission and to conduct a one-year, comprehensive systems analysis review of federal cyber and cybersecurity centers.\n-\nThe executive branch should establish a **Joint Cyber Planning Cell (5.4)** under CISA to coordinate cybersecurity planning and readiness across the federal government and between the public and private sectors.\nLayer 3: Impose Costs In the final layer, the strategy outlines how to impose costs to deter future malicious behavior and reduce ongoing adversary activities short of armed conflict through the employment of all instruments of power in the defense of cyberspace, including systemically important critical infrastructure. A key, but not the only, element of cost imposition is the military instrument of power. Therefore, the United States must maintain the capacity, resilience, and readiness to employ cyber and non-cyber capabilities across the spectrum of engagement from competition to crisis and conflict. The United States needs ready and resilient capabilities to thwart and respond to adversary action. Pillar: *Preserve and Employ the Military Instrument of Powerand All Other Options to Deter Cyberattacks at Any Level* Cyberspace is already an arena of strategic competition, where states project power, protect their interests, and punish their adversaries. Future contingencies and conflicts will almost certainly contain a cyber component. In this environment, the United States must defend forward to limit malicious adversary behavior below the level of armed attack, deter conflict, and, if necessary, prevail by employing the full spectrum of its capabilities, using all the instruments of national power. Examples of adversary actions below armed attack include cyber-enabled attacks on the U.S. election systems or cyber-enabled intellectual property theft. To achieve these ends, the U.S. government must demonstrate its ability to impose costs, while establishing a clear declaratory policy that signals to rival states the costs and risks associated with attacking the United States in cyberspace. Furthermore, conventional weapons and nuclear capabilities require cybersecurity and resilience to ensure that the United States preserves credible deterrence and the full range of military response options. The United States must be confident that its military capabilities will work as intended. Finally, across the spectrum of engagement from competition to crisis and conflict, the United States must ensure that it has sufficient cyber forces to accomplish strategic objectives in and through cyberspace. This demands sufficient capacity, capabilities, and streamlined decision-making processes to enable rapid and effective cyber response options to impose costs against adversaries. Major recommendations in this pillar include:\n\n-\nCongress should direct the Department of Defense to conduct a force structure assessment of the Cyber Mission Force (6.1) to ensure that the United States has the appropriate force structure and capabilities in light of growing mission requirements and increasing expectations, in both scope and scale. This should include an assessment of the resource implications for the National Security Agency in its combat support agency role.\n-\nCongress should direct the Department of Defense to conduct a cybersecurity vulnerability assessment of all segments of the nuclear control systems and continually assess weapon systems' cyber vulnerabilities (6.2).\n-\nCongress should require Defense Industrial Base (DIB) participation in threat intelligence sharing programs (6.2.1) and threat hunting on DIB networks (6.2.2).\nTHE WAY FORWARD\nThe status quo in cyberspace is unacceptable. The current state of affairs invites aggression and establishes a dangerous pattern of actors attacking the United States without fear of reprisal. Adversaries are increasing their cyber capabilities while U.S. vulnerabilities continue to grow. There is much that the U.S. government can do to improve its defenses and reduce the risk of a significant attack, but it is clear that government action alone is not enough. Most of the critical infrastructure that drives the American economy, spurs technological innovation, and supports the U.S. military resides in the private sector. If the U.S. government cannot find a way to seamlessly collaborate with the private sector to build a resilient cyber ecosystem, the nation will never be secure. And, eventually, a massive cyberattack could lead to large-scale physical destruction, sparking a response of haphazard government overreach that stifles innovation in the digital economy and further erodes American strength.\n\nTo avoid these outcomes, the U.S. government must move to adopt the new strategy detailed in this reportlayered cyber deterrenceand the more than 75 recommendations designed to make this approach a reality. The executive branch and Congress should give these recommendations and the associated legislative proposals close consideration. Congress should also consider ways to monitor, assess, and report on the implementation of this report's recommendations over the next two years.\n\n## Layered Cyber Deterrence End State The Challenge The Threat\n\nThe NotPetya attack illustrates the changing character of cyber threats. The chaos started in battle-torn Ukraine.6 In June 2017 Russian cyber operators launched destructive malware adapted from a series of widespread vulnerabilities common to unpatched Windows operating systems. Because it exploited operating system vulnerabilities in wide use across innumerable private- and public-sector applications, the NotPetya attack quickly spread from targeted Ukrainian banks, payment systems, and federal agencies to power plants, hospitals, and other life-critical systems worldwide. The attack even affected the Windowsbased radiation-monitoring systems in the Chernobyl nuclear power plant.7 Global companies from Maerska shipping and logistics firmand FedEx's European subsidiary to pharmaceutical companies found their systems offline, with losses estimated as high as $10 billion. In an ironic twist of fate, the reckless nature of the malware allowed the infection to spread to Russia, where it hit Rosneft, the leading Kremlin-linked oil and gas producer.8 NotPetya affected tens of thousands of individuals, organizations, and businesses around the world. Yet most Americans were completely unaware of the damage.\n\nNotPetya, while far from the first cyberattack, exemplifies the potential chaos that major cyberattacks can cause. Like an infection in the bloodstream, the malware spread along global supply chains. From China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea to extremist groups and criminals, a broad array of threat actors are exploiting global connectivity to achieve their objectives. These objectives range from undermining American economic and military power to suppressing political rivals to stealing money and seeking illicit gain. Even if the United States is not the intended target, the interconnected nature of cyberspace may still render the nation a victim. Without\n\n## Major U.S. Public-Sector Cyber Threats\n\n- Attacks on election processes and other democratic institutions designed to damage American\nlegitimacy and weaken the nation.\n- Espionage efforts intended to undermine\nboth U.S. military capability and the Defense Industrial Base.\n- Targeting of civilian agencies for intelligence\ncollection and to obtain other advantages over the United States.\n- Loss of leadership in research and development\nof key technologies.\n\nAbsent significant reform, adversaries will continue to\ntarget U S  elections and erode U S  military advan-\ntages through cyber operations designed to steal sensitive\ndata, while U S  technical leadership in research and\ndevelopment will continue to decline\n\na new strategy to secure cyberspace, a more connected\nworld will be a more vulnerable world.\n\nCyber operations offer adversariesincluding non-state\nactorsinstruments of coercion, sabotage, espionage,\nand extortion optimized for the 21st century.9 These new\ntools take advantage of the terrain, exploiting the inherent\nvulnerability of the digital networks on which the United\nStates and other countries rely.10 As more people and\ndevices connect to each other, the power and reach of cyber\noperations grow. Great powers can pressure rivals without\ncommitting military forces and declaring their intentfor\nexample, by holding their critical infrastructure at risk with\nthreats of blackouts and disruption.11 Regional powers\ntarget critical commercial networks, from the financial\nsystem to the global energy supply chain, to raise the\ncosts and risks associated with U.S. military operations.\nExtremist groups rely on social networks for recruitment\n\n## Major U.S. Private-Sector Cyber Threats\n\n- Cybercrime and ransomware that exploit\npeople, processes, and systems for individual financial gain or to fund criminal enterprises.\n- Intellectual property (IP) theft that hinders\nlong-term growth and prosperity and jeopardizes U.S. leadership in key technologies.\n- Holding private-sector critical infrastructure\nat risk to influence the decision making of\nAmerican leaders at times of conflict or heightened tension.\n\nAbsent significant reform, adversaries will continue\nstealing hundreds of billions of dollars from businesses\nand individuals, conducting widespread theft of U S\ntechnologies, and accessing the electrical grid, water\ntreatment facilities, financial institutions, and other\ncritical infrastructure\n\nand radicalization. Criminals plunder individuals, companies, and even states by exploiting network vulnerabilities. Unless there is a significant change in how the United States and other free nations approach cybersecurity, these trends will only get worse and jeopardize the connectivity on which the world depends.\n\nOur modern way of life depends on the integrity, confidentiality, and availability of data. From medical records, financial information, and our most personal communications to modern military operations, the individual and the state rely on data. But as we increase our reliance on data, our adversaries have developed new tools that hold data and essential information systems at risk. The entire system through which data flows into products, devices, and services is vulnerable. This threat is compounded by new technologies that enable more sophisticated cyberattacks at greater scale for lower cost, and by a host of capable adversaries who have demonstrated a willingness and ability to adapt to U.S. prevention and response measures. These adversaries have moved beyond simple denial-of-service and website defacement campaigns to conducting intelligence collection, ransomware attacks, and destructive operations, as well as disruptive attacks on critical infrastructure. Increasingly these attacks revolve around compromising the technological systems used to collect, process, and analyze data.\n\nState Cyber Threats Every state with a modern military possesses cyber capability. Great powers like China and Russia use cyber operations to enable their warfighting capabilities, advance their interests short of armed conflict, and undermine American economic strength, political will, and military might.12\nChina uses cyberspace to accelerate its economic rise, undermine U.S. comparative strength, and suppress political opponents at home and abroad.13 Chinese advanced persistent threat (APT) groups steal intellectual property and sensitive national security information. Beijing wages cyber-enabled economic warfare to fuel its rise while simultaneously undercutting U.S. economic and military superiority. Chinese cyber campaigns have enabled the theft of trillions of dollars in intellectual property.14 At the same time, Chinese APTs' aggressive cyber-enabled intelligence collection operations provide Chinese officials with improved intelligence information to use against the United States and its allies. Chinese operators constantly scan U.S. government and private-sector networks to identify vulnerabilities they can later exploit in a crisis. Targeting America's weapons and Defense Industrial Base enables Beijing to undermine opponents from within: for example, by threatening the U.S. Defense Industrial Base or driving a wedge between America and its allies.15 Taken to the extreme, China has the ability to launch cyberattacks in the United States that could cause localized, temporary disruptive effects on critical infrastructuresuch as disruption of a natural gas pipelinefor days to weeks.16\nMoreover, the Chinese Communist Party routinely harasses foreign and domestic dissidents in cyberspace while state-linked firms build a global mass-surveillance capability connecting information and communications equipment, surveillance cameras, facial recognition software, and massive data sets of private citizens. China is exporting these intrusive practices and technologies abroad, fueling a trend toward digital authoritarianism that threatens democracy at a global scale.17 Chinese national companies like Huawei are part of an integrated strategy to use predatory pricing to dominate and eventually monopolize key information and communications technology supply chains. The goal is to drive non-Chinese alternatives out of business, leaving the Chinese Communist Party and its business allies with a stranglehold on the global supply chain. As China exports this equipment, it becomes the central hub of a new network of authoritarian states that use mass surveillance and technologies of control, such as social credit, to suppress fundamental human rights. Unchecked, Chinese economic warfare, espionage, and repression of civil liberties are likely to continue. Without a new whole-of-nation strategy and significant changes to how the United States defends its networks in cyberspace, Chinese operations will continue to threaten long-term American economic prosperity and national security. Revelations of high-profile security failures of information will undermine confidence in the U.S. government's ability to protect its citizens and businesses. Along with the loss in national power, trust in American institutions will wither. In the minds of regional allies, perceptions of unchallenged Chinese operations will reduce the credibility of American security guarantees. Exfiltration of private-sector intellectual property could compel investors to question the viability of the U.S. economy as a hub of technological innovation. Breaches could also yield intelligence coups that threaten the United States' clandestine personnel and advance Beijing's diplomatic and economic goals. Stolen U.S. military technology will enable the production of capable facsimiles and support the design of People's Liberation Army weapon systems that exploit newly identified vulnerabilities in U.S. counterparts. Compromised supply chains could undermine American military operations in future wars.18 China is seeking to monopolize how people around the world interact, pay\n\n## Major Cyber Operations Publicly Attributed To China: 20062019\n\n- 200618: APT10 conducts a systematic\ncyber espionage campaign stealing intellectual property and compromising computer systems containing personally identifiable information on over 100,000 U.S. Navy personnel.19\n- 2008: Operators exfiltrate terabytes of data\nand schematics from the F-35 and F-22 stealth\nfighter jet programs.20\n- 2012: China compromises computers in a\nnew African Union headquarters it helped build in Ethiopia with malware that exports massive amounts of data nightly to servers in Shanghai.21\n- 2012: Chinese groups target oil and natural gas\npipelines in the United States.22\n- 2013: *IP Commission Report* highlights Chinese\nefforts at intellectual property theft efforts linked to an estimated $300 billion in business losses a year.23\n- 2014: Cloud Hopper campaign attacks managed\nservice providers to access their client networks, including those of leading international technology companies, and steal their clients' intellectual property.24\n- 201415: The Office of Personnel Management\nis breached, exposing sensitive information used for security background checks on 21 million federal employees.25\n- 2017: Chinese military hackers breach the networks of Equifax, an American credit reporting agency, stealing the personal information of over 145 million Americans.26\n- 2018: Hackers breach servers of Marriott\nInternational, extracting information on 500 million guests.27\n- 2019: Operators compromise iPhones in a\ndomestic spying campaign targeting Uighurs, a Muslim minority in China.28\nfor goods, and relate to their governments. As Chinesebuilt networks and applications mediate interactions, Beijing gains unprecedented power to surveil and control the lives of individuals worldwide. Civil liberties and open markets will struggle to survive in this new era of cyber repression. China presents a persistent cyber espionage threat and a growing attack threat to our core military and critical infrastructure systems. China remains the most active strategic competitor responsible for cyber espionage against the U.S.\n\ngovernment, corporations, and allies. It is improving its cyberattack capabilities and altering information online, shaping Chinese views and potentially the views of U.S. citizens.29\nRussia, a revanchist power, turns to cyber operations to undermine U.S. and allied interests. A mix of spies and criminal networks often masks Moscow's role. Across multiple operations, from elections to public referendums, the Kremlin has combined cyber intrusions and propaganda to distort democratic processes, weaken trust in institutions, and sow chaos in liberal democratic societies. Leading into the 2016 and 2018 elections, Russian online trolls whipped into a digital frenzy the factions the Federalist Papers cautioned against more than 230 years ago. The resulting breakdown in political will and social cohesion limits the ability of Western nations to check Russia's advances in states that formerly belonged to the Soviet Union.30\nDuring recent armed conflicts, Russia used cyber capabilities both to enhance military operations and to conduct information operations campaigns designed to isolate their opponents.31 In peacetime competition, Russian operators signal the risk of escalation by probing critical infrastructure across NATO member states.32 The openness, connectivity, and commitment to shared international norms of liberal democracies are a threat to Russia's interests.33 By subverting these ideas, exploiting cracks in international alliance networks, and subtly encouraging domestic instability, the Kremlin hopes to achieve its strategic objectives without risking all-out war.\n\n## Major Cyber Operations Publicly Attributed To Russia: 20072019\n\n- 2007: Using distributed denial-of-service\nattacks, Russian hackers target the websites of Estonian government entities, banks, and media properties in one of the first sophisticated and wide-scale cyberattacks in support of strategic objectives.34\n- 2008: During the Russo-Georgian War, a series\nof cyberattacks disable and deface the websites of Georgian government and private-sector entities.35\n- 2015: As war rages in eastern Ukraine, Russian\nhackers cripple three Ukrainian energy companies, disrupting power for millions of customers.36\n- 2016: During the 2016 U.S. presidential campaign, Russian operatives use cyber operations to collect on political parties and candidates and conduct influence operations using social media.37\n- 2017: NotPetya attack spills out of Ukraine,\naffecting businesses globally.38\n- 2017: Russia-linked groups target nuclear\npower plants in the United States, gaining access to business and administrative\nnetworks.39\n- 201718: Russia-linked groups target critical\ninfrastructure ranging from electricity to health care systems, and compromise router traffic globally.40\nLeft unchecked, Russian cyber operations will continue to increase in sophistication and frequency. Moscow will target democratic institutions, military assets, and critical infrastructure in the United States and its liberal democratic allies, as well as the smaller neighbors Russia views as modern-day tributary states (its near abroad). Russian interference in U.S. elections in 2016 and 2018, as well as in elections in Europe, was part of a longer, larger campaign to undermine democracy and its institutions. It was also an indicator of future operations that will target voting systems and the broader information environment in new and dangerous ways.41 A key priority of Russian cyber operations will be to degrade the strategic cohesion of Western alliance and security cooperation networks, especially NATO.42 And if these structures decline, Russia's neighbors will be increasingly vulnerable to sophisticated cyber and influence operations, resulting in a network of central and eastern European states subservient to Moscow.\n\nUnencumbered by international norms and empowered by new technologies, the Kremlin will further refine its use of cyber operations to advance its strategic objectives at the expense of the United States and its allies and partners. Regional powers increasingly exploit cyberspace to advance revisionist interests. These cyber-enabled rogue states are often more willing to accept risk and more brazen than China and Russia, launching large-scale cyberattacks against commercial firms and suppressing dissidents. Lacking conventional tools sufficient to achieve their political and economic objectives, these states exploit their newfound cyber capabilities to steal funds for illicit purposes, disrupt international commerce, and threaten their adversaries. Iran uses cyber operations to undermine the U.S. deterrent posture and network of alliances in the Middle East.\n\nIn place of a nuclear deterrent, Tehran relies on the threat of cyber intrusions, proxy groups, terrorists, and ballistic missiles to hold other states at risk.43 Iranian cyber operations focus on the commercial networks of energy and finance entities of particular importance to the global economy. They leverage the inherent difficulties of coordinating cyber defenses between public and private partnerships and sovereign states. Unless it faces a more robust deterrent, Iran will continue to view cyber operations as a low-cost means of ensuring regime survival and achieving regional goals. Like other autocratic states, Iran is becoming a digital authoritarian. Groups linked to the Iranian regime turn\n\n## Major Cyber Operations Publicly Attributed To Iran: 20112019\n\n- 201113: Iran targets 46 U.S. financial\ninstitutions and companies and a dam in Rye, New York, with distributed denial-of-service attacks.44\n- 2012: Iran conducts destructive attacks against\nthe Saudi Arabian state-owned oil firm, Saudi\nAramco, with the Shamoon malware, which\nresult in 30,000 computers being taken offline and rendered unusable.45\n- 2013: Through computer intrusions Iranianbased Mabna Institute actors commit wire fraud, unauthorized access of a computer, and aggravated identity theft, stealing more than 30 terabytes of academic data and intellectual property valued at $3.4 billion.46\n- 2014: Iranian hackers attack the Sands Casino,\ninfecting multiple systems and wiping hard drives.47\n- 2017: Iran launches Shamoon 2, affecting 15\ngovernment agencies and organizations in Saudi Arabia.48\n- 2018: Shamoon 2 hits an Italian oil services\ncompany, taking hundreds of servers and computers offline.49\n- 2019: APT39, an Iranian-linked group, is implicated in a widespread cyber espionage campaign targeting the personal information of citizens in the United States and Middle East and striving to establish a foothold, escalate privileges, and conduct reconnaissance in support of future operations.50\nto cyberspace to suppress dissidents and undermine democratic institutions around the world. These operations harass activists at home and abroad.51 Like Russia, Iran even extends its cyber-enabled political warfare campaign to the free media and electoral institutions. Iranian groups have been caught using fake social media accounts to spread disinformation52 and attempting to hack the\n2020 U.S. presidential campaigns.53\nNorth Korea views cyber operations as a tool of coercion and source of illicit financing via cyber criminal activities. North Korean front companies operating abroad provide opportunities for North Korea to expand the scope and reach of its operations, despite the limited connectivity at home.54 From these safe havens, North Korean cyber operators probe the networks of the United States and its allies, seeking to steal military plans, technology, and weapon system information while identifying vulnerabilities in critical infrastructure for Pyongyang to exploit in a future crisis.55 When dissidents or foreign companies oppose the regime, North Korean operators retaliate online.56\n\n## Major Cyber Operations Publicly Attributed To North Korea: 20142019\n\n- 2014: North Korea conducts destructive\nattack against U.S.-based Sony Pictures Entertainment.57\n- 2015: North Koreanlinked groups use 5,986\nphishing emails containing malicious code to gain access to noncritical systems at a South Korean nuclear power plant.58\n- 2016: North Korean groups are linked to\nan estimated $81 million cyber heist of Bangladesh's central bank account at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York.59\n- 2017: North Korea launches the WannaCry\nransomware attack that infects over 300,000 computers in 150 countries; its effects include temporarily knocking some U.K. hospitals offline.60\n- 2019: A UN report concludes that North Korea\nused cyberattacks against financial institutions and cryptocurrency exchanges to steal an estimated $2 billion it used to fund its weapons of mass destruction program.61\nThe regime extracts illicit gains from the modern global economy by conducting attacks against systems critical to financial institutions' wire transfers.62 These operations give North Korean leadership a funding lifeline in the face of otherwise crippling economic sanctions.63 Left unchallenged, North Korea will only grow bolder, complicating diplomatic efforts to check its nuclear ambitions. Without a new U.S. strategic approach, revisionist regional powers will seek new opportunities to use increasingly powerful yet inexpensive cyber operations to undermine U.S. economic, diplomatic, and military power. They will challenge the U.S.-led system of alliances designed to limit major wars and use the resulting chaos to ensure the safety of corrupt elites.\n\nNon-state Cyber Threats Though we are in an era of great power competition, one need not be a great power to have a great impact in the cyber domain. Cyber capabilities, unlike nuclear capabilities, can be built or obtained without access to national resources and power. From extremist groups to criminals and illicit businesses, new threat actors take advantage of modern connectivity to undermine the integrity of open societies. Sophisticated criminal enterprise and cybercrime groups now target some of the world's largest businesses and municipalities, stealing money and encrypting critical data for ransom.64 Internet-enabled social connectivity provides extremist groups new ways of conducting targeted recruitment unimaginable just a generation ago. The so-called Islamic State is an omen of 21st-century terror movements. The group has demonstrated a sophisticated understanding of how mobile applications, web content, and online forums can be used to support operations.65\nThe growing demand for cyber capabilities to spy on and coerce rivals has created entirely new types of businesses and marketplaces for state and non-state actors.66 Former cyber operators from multiple countries can sell their skills to the highest bidder.67 Left unchecked, these actors could turn the connectivity our world relies on into a chaotic, fragmented space where states, businesses, and individuals lose trust and confidence in formal institutions.\n\n## Major Cyber Operations Publicly Attributed To Non-State Actors: 20112019\n\n- 2011present: Cybercrime group Evil Corp\nuses Dridex malware to infect computers and harvest credentials from banks and financial institutions in over 40 countries, causing more than $100 million in theft.68\n- 2011: The GameOver Zeus malware, created by the Russian cybercriminal Evgeniy\nMikhailovich Bogachev, infects more than 1 million devices worldwide and causes damages in excess of $100 million.69\n- 2013: Cryptolocker ransomware infects more\nthan 234,000 computers and actors obtain more than $27 million in ransom payments.70\n- 2014: Four hackers breach the servers of\nJPMorgan Chase, compromising the data of 76 million households and 7 million small businesses in one of the biggest data breaches in history.71\n- 2015: Members of the Islamist hacker group the\nCyber Caliphate gain control of U.S. Central Command's Twitter and YouTube accounts and post numerous propaganda videos.72\n- 2015: GozNym malware is used by a transnational organized cybercrime network to steal\nan estimated $100 million from unsuspecting\nvictims in the United States and around the\nworld.73\n- 2016: Self-declared affiliates of the groups\nAnonymous and New World Hackers disrupt internet service across North America using a botnet composed of numerous Internet of Things (IoT) devices.74\n- 2018: After a sophisticated ransomware attack\nshut down several critical municipal websites, the city of Atlanta declines to pay a $52,000 ransom demanded by hackers, instead opting to spend $2.6 million to rebuild its systems.75\n- 2019: More than 20 Texas towns and the city\nof Baltimore are hit with ransomware attacks, disrupting critical municipal services.76\nIncreasingly, cybercriminals are migrating toward the\n\"crime-as-a-service\" model in which threat groups purchase and exchange malicious code on the dark web.77\nBusinesses across the globe could lose $5.2 trillion to these criminal enterprises by 2024.78 In addition, criminals can use cyber operations to target state and local government through ransomware attacks. Many of these thefts are masked through techniques that make attribution and prosecution difficult.\n\nCriminal groups are expanding their cyber operations. Ransomware attacks are on the rise and increasing in sophistication. In 2019, ransomware incidents grew over\n300 percent compared to 2018.79 The onslaught was so severe that the Federal Bureau of Investigation released a public service announcement warning of the risks of targeted attacks against \"health care organizations, industrial companies, and the transportation sector.\"80 These attacks target not just businesses and individuals, but increasingly American cities. In 2019 ransomware attacks hit more than 40 municipalities across the United States.81\nWHERE ARE WE NOW?\n\nThe United States is struggling to address the changing character of cyber threats. The government still lacks clear, coordinated response mechanisms that build security into the cyber ecosystem and deter attacks of significant consequence. The public and private sectors struggle to coordinate cyber defenses, leaving gaps that decrease national resilience and create systemic risk. New technology continues to emerge that further compounds these challenges.\n\nUnclear Strategy The United States lacks a clear, comprehensive, publicly declared doctrine that incorporates all of the instruments of power to address less-than-catastrophic attacks on public and private networks in cyberspace. Despite U.S. progress in shifting to a more aggressive posture in cyberspace, adversarial states and non-state actors find cyber operations ideal low-cost, high-payoff methods for eroding U.S. power that do not risk direct counterattacks. To date, the United States has not sufficiently changed the cost-benefit calculus made by adversaries\n\n## Issues Americans Perceive As A Major Threat\n\nwhen determining whether or not to attack in cyberspace below the level of armed conflict. Just as cost-benefit analysis highlights the ease of cyber operations, the balance of risk is similarly skewed. Adversaries suspect that the U.S. government would retaliate for turning off the power in a major city but doubt American resolve to respond to intellectual property theft, the implanting of malware in critical infrastructure, and election interference. They know they can achieve their objectives on the cheap. Both state and non-state actors know that in the current environment, new vulnerabilities that they can exploit emerge every day across the private sector while government and private-sector responses will be uncoordinated and sporadic at best.\n\nPoorly Positioned to Lead The U.S. government is currently poorly positioned to act with the speed and agility required to secure its interests in cyberspace. The nation that brought the digital era into being is weighed down by an industrial-era bureaucracy and a labyrinth of outdated rules, laws, and regulations that limit America's ability to defend cyberspace. While the U.S. government has taken a more proactive role over the past four years and started to use multiple instruments of power to respond to threats, these responses still fall short. Technological change is outpacing the U.S. government's ability to adapt. Innumerable barriers to private- and public-sector collaboration compound the problem. With each new innovation, the legacy structures and approaches amended by the federal government to govern cyberspace become less and less relevant to the growing range of activities that take place there. This growing irrelevance is partly a result of the character of innovation and of cyberspace technologies. In previous eras, the federal government was a significant driver of technological advancementincluding the development of the internetthrough its national laboratories, funding of scientific research, and defense-driven research initiatives.82 Over time, as technological innovation began to overtake manufacturing and resource extraction as the primary means of generating corporate advantage, the private sector began to outspend the government in cutting-edge research. As the U.S. government sought to manage how technology shaped society, it developed a wide range of programs. From congressional oversight bodies to new departments, the government expanded. Many of these new efforts have had significant impact (e.g., U.S.\n\nCyber Command, the National Cyber Investigative Joint Task Force, the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency), but the overall federal effort has failed to comprehensively address the inherent vulnerabilities associated with increased connectivity. There is still not a clear unity of effort or theory of victory driving the federal government's approach to protecting and securing cyberspace.\n\nTo make matters worse, the U.S. government lacks the number of cyber professionals needed to secure its own networks, much less support private-sector partners or treaty allies, who also operate cyber systems that the U.S. government relies on. There are over 33,000 unfilled cybersecurity positions in the U.S. government and\n500,000 unfilled positions throughout the United States.83\nMoreover, a 2015 survey of information technology executives from the United States, United Kingdom, Israel, Germany, France, Japan, Australia, and Mexico found that 76 percent of respondents believed that their governments are not investing enough money in cybersecurity talent.84\nThe military services are adapting to recruit and train their\n\n## How Can Artificial Intelligence And Machine Learning Affect Cybersecurity?\n\nAdvances in artificial intelligence and machine learning (AI/ML) are creating both opportunities and challenges in cyberspace.\n\nOn the one hand, these technologies can increase cybersecurity. For example, the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) tested AI/ML capabilities during its 2016 Cyber Grand Challenge pitting teams of supercomputers hunting vulnerabilities against one another.86 Competitors relied on supercomputers to write self-healing code to rapidly search for flaws and write corrections in real time. Each supercomputer sought to protect itself while searching for and exploiting gaps in the other competitors. The competition illustrated that an AI/ML-enabled cyber defense was able to detect, and even repair, vulnerabilities significantly more quickly than humans alone ever could. On the other hand, AI/ML risks creating a new arms race. China is aggressively investing in AI/ML applications with military, domestic surveillance, and economic implications.87 Other countries, such as Russia, and even violent extremist organizations are exploring how to adapt free and widely available AI/ML algorithms to attack U.S. interests.88\nAs a result, the United States must ensure that its research and development investments in AI/ML and other possible breakthrough technologies match those technologies' potential consequences for national security. The National Security Commission on Artificial Intelligence is doing critical research to inform this competition, but this much is already clear: in the future cyberspace environment, the advantage will not necessarily go to the most powerful among nations, but to the actors that field the best algorithms or technologies.\n\nown cyber warriors, but they anticipate difficulties recruiting and retaining sufficient top-flight talent.85\nUncoordinated Public and Private Sectors Because the majority of the critical infrastructure, hardware, and software that powers the information age resides in the private sector, there is a unique requirement to build a public-private partnership to protect the nation. However, businesses are often reluctant to let governments onto private, commercial networks without a clear understanding of their shared interests and responsibilities. Afraid of creating moral hazard, the federal government invests little in protecting the cybersecurity of commercial infrastructure or key systems controlled by states and local municipalities. This lack of accountability for managing risk leads to blind spots. Who is responsible for setting priorities (and providing funding) when it is necessary to \"turn the lights back on\" following a major cyberattack? Who coordinates continuity of the economy during a series of large-scale attacks on American financial institutions and transportation infrastructure? How do local hospitals, water treatment facilities, and municipal offices ask the federal government for assistance during a sustained ransomware campaign? Who is responsible for establishing the minimum-security standards, providing vulnerability assessments, and proactively managing the funding processes required to prepare for and prevent major cyber incidents? How can the public and private sectors collaborate to create a joined picture of the threat landscape?\n\nAs a result, everyone is left to independently balance risk, make investments, and take ad hoc responsibility for increasingly vulnerable networks, thereby producing dangerous security gaps. Public- and private-sector responses are left uncoordinated and the nation's critical infrastructure is left unprotected and vulnerable to adversaries who can, and will, exploit this opportunity.\n\nWHERE ARE WE HEADED?\n\nTwo trends are fundamentally reshaping cyberspace: (1) increasing connectivity and (2) new technology that helps users make sense ofand derive value fromvast quantities of data. These trends can be harnessed with equal ease by state and non-state actors. The speed and accessibility of digital connectivity only continue to improve. When the first smartphone was released, mobile internet speeds barely supported the transmission of images. Today, high-definition video streaming, real-time GPS tracking, and wirelessly accessible cloud computing have launched new economic sectors. Fifth-generation (5G) mobile networking is poised to further advance this trend toward faster and more reliable telecommunications. Satellite-based mesh communications networkswith nodes connected directly to each other rather than through a hierarchy will bring the internet to every point on the globe. Together, these advancements will enable the massive deployment of smart sensorsan Internet of Things that autonomously gather, analyze, and act on data underpinning almost every facet of human life. Advanced approaches to connectivity promise global internet coverage free of constraints imposed by traditional geography, infrastructure, or even governments. Driven by miniaturization and 5G networks, the so-called Internet of Things will create new networks of communication, data collection, and autonomous action connecting medical devices, streetlights, cars, sensors, and even common household appliances. These devices will allow the internet of our future access to new sources of vast amounts of information, from the personal (e.g., our sleeping habits, dietary patterns, or exercise routines) to the logistic (e.g., micropatterns in traffic or granular weather information). As the private lives of citizens become further enmeshed within networks, new vulnerabilities will be created. Authoritarian states will take advantage of preferred relationships with technology firms to build in backdoors for government access that allow them to surveil the private lives of citizens and political opponents at home and abroad. In addition to advertising, propaganda will be micro-targeted and tailored to an individual based on personal data and search history. As networks connect individuals to transportation and electrical grids, public works, telecommunications, and the financial system, new vulnerabilities will become available for adversaries to exploit. Botnets could hijack billions of devices to disrupt entire regions, creating new national security challenges. A connected world is also prone to cyber weapons spilling into the wild. Such spillage, associated with both great power competition and a black market for malware, creates new risk vectors. As states spy on each other, they release malware into the wild that can be repurposed to attack commercial interests, support authoritarian domestic spying campaigns, and compromise individual privacy. Research and development by non-state cyber weapon developers accelerate this trend, adding new vulnerabilities. While it might be difficult to buy sophisticated kinetic weapons on the black market, for both states and criminal groups it is easy to buy malware to support\n\n## Are We Losing The International Standards Race?\n\nAt its inception, advocates proclaimed that cyberspace was a force for good, inherently promoting freedom and democracy. They heralded the growing presence in China of the interneta free and open medium invented and dominated by American entitiesas proof that political and economic liberalization would be just around the corner.89 Today, technical and international initiatives by countries like China and Russia have made it clear that digital connectivityand the power it affords to selectively target, amplify, or isolate audiences ranging in size from one to billionsis a tool, like any other, that can be wielded for good or bad. Because the networks that connect us all in cyberspace eclipse nation-state geographical boundaries and sovereignty, they create unique challenges for governance. No single nation-state can standardize cyberspace. As a result, standards are developed by decentralized international bodies primarily driven by academia and the private sector. Even when such bodies include nation-state representation, like the International Telecommunications Union (ITU), the United States tends to encourage a bottom-up, private-sector-driven process, while China and Russia send full diplomatic delegations and take a more active role in these bodies.90\nThis dynamic is at play in the rollout of 5G networks. In 2013, the Chinese government committed resources and attention across three ministries to actively coordinate with industry on early 5G development standards.91 This effort was combined with state support of companies like Huawei to speed research and development toward early patents, which can often inform the foundations of subsequent technical standards. As a result, by early 2019, Huawei led the world with 1,529 of these\n\"standards-essential patents\" for 5G technology.92 In addition, China has invested in international standards-making bodies, frequently sending large delegations to working meetings and paying bonuses to their representatives who secure leadership positions.93\nAs Chinese technologies increasingly inform international technical standards, so do the values and policies accompanying Beijing's vision for the use of those technologies. China is exporting these technologies around the world, particularly to Africa and Southeast Asia, where too often invasive surveillance regimes and repressive censorship laws soon follow.94 As China helps design and deploy the foundational infrastructure over which the world's data flows, it is ensuring that the same level of authoritarian control is available to those governments that wish to purchase it. While the United States and its partners champion a nascent framework for \"secure-by-design\" standards, including mandatory cybersecurity measures and open, auditable, and interoperable telecommunications equipment, China is writing a digital future of proprietary technologies in which \"surveillance by design\" can too easily become the default. The global standards governing the connectivity of cyberspace and its enabling technologies are too important to be left to authoritarian nation-states that do not value open, free expression or democratic institutions. For the internet to fulfill its original promise, the United States and its network of democratic allies must engage with standards-making bodies and have well-researched agendas informed by a clear-eyed understanding of both technological and geopolitical trends. While the original vision for the internet and digital connectivity is an attractive one, the U.S. government is now only one of many actors defining the rules for cyberspace. The United States must collaborate with its partnersboth government and private-sector entitiesto ensure that our most critical technologies are designed using standards that align with American values.\n\nbrazen cyberattacks. Because cyber weapons are not in the exclusive control of nation-states, traditional arms control methods are difficult to coordinate, much less enforce.\n\nAN INFLECTION POINT\nThe United States thus stands at a strategic inflection point. While America looks forward to the potential of cyberspace and associated technologies to improve the quality of human life, threats continue to grow at an accelerating pace. America is facing adversary nationstates, extremists, and criminals that are leveraging emerging technologies to an unprecedented degree. Authoritarian states seek to control every aspect of life in their societies and export this style of government, in which surveillance trumps liberty, to the rest of the world. There is no public square, only black boxes proliferating propaganda and organizing economic activity to benefit the few at the expense of the many. Rogue states, extremists, and criminals thrive on the dark web, taking advantage of insecure network connections and a market for malware to prey on victims. In a world where the United States fails to check the spread of surveillance technologies beloved by dictators and fails to champion a new strategy to secure the connectivity on which societies around the world rely, democracy withers. Chinese technology exports could help Beijing censor topics that it, or despot clients, deems taboo, and the free world would have no way of knowing the facts. The security of global networks would be corrupted from the inside out, handing the Chinese Communist Party compromising personal information on people around the world. At the same time, China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea will use cyber operations to interfere with elections in free countries, bringing the legitimacy of the democratic process into question. These nations, along with extremist groups, will further weaponize social media, distorting public discourse and deepening polarization in societies around the world. The world is on the brink of a second information revolution.\n\nIf democracies do not devise a new strategy to provide confidentiality, integrity, and availability of information in cyberspace, they are unlikely to be the leading beneficiaries or guarantors of this new, connected world. Technological trends are creating markets and practices that challenge the U.S. government's ability to provide the stability required for freedom and prosperity to flourish. Today, the private sector is the hub for technological innovation, with the government at times struggling to import that innovation back into its own systems and processes.95 This shift is further magnified by private-sector ownership of most of the physical and logical layers of cyberspace.96 The result is an unprecedented reversal of dependencies: while the U.S. government has traditionally provided for the collective defense, it now requires enhanced cooperation and partnership with the private sector. Across American history, the Republic has weathered large-scale change and strategic inflections by forging new strategies and partnerships. Democracies adapt, powered by open debate and an ability to build bridges between the public and private sectors that take advantage of new opportunities and mitigate emergent risks. The opportunities and vulnerabilities associated with growing connectivity and the reach of cyberspace into all of our lives is no different. The United States needs a new strategic posture to defend its interest in cyberspace. Because the domain relies disproportionately on private-sector networks, this strategy must incentivize public- and private-sector collaboration and deny adversaries the ability to hold America hostage in cyberspace. This strategy must combine non-military instruments of power with defensive mechanisms to secure critical infrastructure backed by a credible capability and capacity to impose costs through cyber and non-cyber military operations at time and place of the nation's choosingboth to shape competition beneath the level of armed conflict and to win in armed conflict.\n\n## Historical Legacy And Methodology\n\nHISTORICAL LEGACY\nThe Cyberspace Solarium Commission draws its inspiration from President Dwight D. Eisenhower's 1953\nProject Solarium.97 With the Soviet Union looming as an existential threat, Eisenhower tasked his national security team with designing a long-term competitive strategy that would outlast his presidency.98 Project Solarium pitted three teams, each developing a different strategic framework, against each other over the course of six weeks working at the National War College and a daylong debate at the White House. Their work eventually culminated in NSC 162/2Eisenhower's \"New Look\" grand strategya sustainable variant of containment that laid the foundation for success against the Soviet Union.99\nThis whole-of-nation strategy called upon the talents of citizens, corporations, academia, and government alike.100\nThe United States' extended competition with the Soviet Union would yield, among other things, arguably the most consequential technological innovation of the postwar period: the internet.101\nSimilar to the original Solarium effort, the world is now living through a period of strategic adjustment.\n\nThe United States is struggling to defend its interests in cyberspace and leverage its comparative advantages: technological prowess, an innovative workforce, an open society, and a free market. For the past 25 years, each presidential administration has reached out to academics, business leaders, and innovators to develop new ideas to solve this problem but has consistently fallen short. There are enduring challenges at the heart of securing American interests in cyberspace. In the early 1960s, computer scientists and national security experts began to identify the inherent vulnerabilities and threats associated with the increasing connectivity afforded by computers. At the RAND Corporation, Willis Ware began to conceptualize a gathering threat unique to emerging computer networks.102 While his colleague Paul Baran argued that the decentralization of computer systems would reduce the risk of destruction or disruption, Ware worried that decentralization would also increase the risk of error and intrusion.103 Recognizing that the advance of computer networkingparticularly in service of national securitywas unstoppable, Ware set about creating a theory of security in the cyber domain. In 1970, working at the behest of the Defense Science Board, Ware published \"Security Controls for Computer Systems,\" later known as the \"Ware Report.\" This analysis took a holistic view of network security, arguing that information must be secured through a comprehensive set of \"hardware, software, communication, physical, personnel, and administrative-procedural safeguards.\"104 Many of the vulnerabilities foreseen by the Ware Reportincluding user and administrator errors, insider subversion, weak authentication, and persistent threatsremain fundamental concerns in cybersecurity 50 years later. The concept of cybersecurity (if not yet the word itself) entered American pop culture in 1983 with the release of the film *WarGames*, a production on which Ware consulted.105 The buzz surrounding the film, which features a teenager hacking into national defense systems and nearly causing a nuclear exchange with the Soviet Union, caught the attention of the Reagan administration. After a private viewing of the film at Camp David, President Ronald Reagan tasked his national security team with determining the real-world plausibility of such an incident.106 In 1984, President Reagan signed National Security Decision Directive 145, \"National Policy on Telecommunications and Automated Information Systems Security.\"107 NSDD-145 would be the first in a long line of presidential directives, congressional bills, commissions, and national strategies all aimed at protecting the United States from the hazards of its revolutionary creation.\n\nThere have been some successes in organizing the nation for resilience. Since 1997, the U.S. government has established numerous cybersecurity and critical infrastructure commissions that have each released noteworthy plans for improvement,108 and the federal government has also stood up new organizations to coordinate policies and operations in cyberspace such as the National Cyber Investigative Joint Task Force in 2008, U.S. Cyber Command in 2009, the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency in 2018, and the National Security Agency's new Cybersecurity Directorate, created in\n2019.109 Cyberspace commissions, reports, and directives have helped shape laws such as the 1986 Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, the 1999 Financial Services Modernization Act, the 2002 Federal Information Security Management Act, and the 2015 Cybersecurity Information Sharing Act.110\nYet despite these efforts, new threats and vulnerabilities appear daily for many of the same reasons highlighted by the Ware Report. This phenomenon has not been lost on previous reports and commissions. In 1996, the Defense Science Board's Information Warfare-Defense report noted with apparent frustration that it was \"the third consecutive year a DSB Summer Study or Task Force [had] made similar recommendations.\" The 2009 Cyberspace Policy Review echoed many of the same recommendations offered by similar strategic reviews in the 1990s and in 2003.111 There are many more examples of such efforts from the past 50 years that produced overwhelming expert consensus but limited policy action. This effort seeks to avoid this fate by developing both a coherent strategy for securing cyberspace and concrete policy recommendations the executive branch and Congress can act on without delay.\n\nMETHODOLOGY\nThe Cyberspace Solarium Commission used a multimethod approach combining interviews with subject matter experts, red teaming, stress tests, and quantitative analysis to develop a strategy for defending American interests. Like the original Solarium eventwhich used strategic concepts such as containment, rollback, and massive retaliation to calibrate a strategic approach to competing with the Soviet Unionthe Cyberspace Solarium Commission adapted strategic approaches optimized for the complex connectivity of cyberspace and assigned them to its three Task Forces. Each Task Force used one of these approachesactive disruption and cost imposition, denial and defense, and entanglement through normsbased regimes that encourage responsible behavior in cyberspace112to articulate key lines of effort, or pillars, paired with key recommendations. First, each Task Force conducted independent research. This research focused on interviewing subject matter experts from government, academia, and industry in more than 300 sessions over five months, as well as conducting a literature review. These sessions enabled the Task Forces to build a collaborative research network to test emerging ideas and existing approaches to securing cyberspace. Attendees at these meetings included full-time staff, part-time subject matter experts, and Commissioners themselves.\n\n## Task Force Engagements\n\n- 200+ meetings with industry experts\n- 25+ meetings with academics\n- 50+ meetings with federal, state, and local\nofficials\n- 10+ seminars/roundtables hosted by think tanks - 20+ meetings with officials from international\norganizations/foreign countries\nThe research phase produced independent task force reports outlining alternative strategies and policy approaches for securing America's vital networks in cyberspace. Each Task Force had a different theory of victory, independently describing the core challenge to securing cyberspace and how best to apply instruments of national power to defend American interests.\n\nSecond, the Task Forces turned to a series of red teams to assess their strategies. As external, independent groups, the red teams challenged the theories of victory and key recommendations, providing both verbal and written feedback to each Task Force. This feedback was then used by the teams to fine-tune each approach and supporting recommendations. Third, the Commission stress-tested each Task Force strategic approach. As was done during the original Eisenhower Solarium project, an event was held at Fort McNair in partnership with the National Defense University.113 Unlike the original Solarium event, the 2019 forum adapted key concepts from stress tests and red team techniques to help the Commissioners evaluate the inherent strengths and weaknesses of each approach. The stress tests used complex scenarios involving the widespread use of cyber operations against a hypothetical country and its allies.114 These attacks targeted a complex mix of political institutions, military forces, the Defense Industrial Base, and economic targets ranging from financial institutions to critical infrastructure. During the Solarium event, each Task Force responded to questions from Commissioners and red team members on how their strategy would address the crises outlined in the scenarios.\n\nFourth, following the Solarium event, the Commissioners assessed each strategy and its supporting policy recommendations, providing formal feedback. The staff tabulated this feedback and used the insights and guidance gained to further refine the recommendations. Unlike the original Solarium, this was not a top-secret process driven by the President. Instead, it was an open process created by Congress in collaboration with the executive branch. This process enabled the Commission to evaluate competing perspectives and recommend a strategy that defines the core objectives and priorities required to secure American interests in cyberspace.\n\n## Strategic Approach: Layered Cyber Deterrence S\n\nince 1960, pockets of scientists, military officers, academics, technology innovators, and government officials have all wrestled with a dilemma: as connectivity expands, it creates both increasing opportunities and greater vulnerabilities. Every new device connected, and line of code added, presents adversaries with new attack surfaces they can use to undermine American security and prosperity. These devices and applications, as well as the communications infrastructure on which they rely, are overwhelmingly controlled by the private sector.115 To defend cyberspace thus requires significant coordination across the public and private sectors. In this dilemma reside the seeds of a new strategy: layered cyber deterrence. Layered cyber deterrence combines a number of traditional deterrence mechanisms and extends them beyond the government to develop a whole-of-nation approach. Since America relies on critical infrastructure that is primarily owned and operated by the private sector, the government cannot defend the nation alone. The public and private sectors, along with key international partners, must collaborate to build national resilience and reshape the cyber ecosystem in a manner that increases its security, while imposing costs against malicious actors and preventing attacks of significant consequence. First, the approach combines traditional methods of altering the cost-benefit calculus of adversaries (e.g., denial and cost imposition) with forms of influence optimized for a connected era, such as promoting norms that encourage restraint and incentivize responsible behavior in cyberspace. Strategic discussions all too often prioritize narrow definitions of deterrence that fail to consider how technology is changing society. In a connected world, those states that harness the power of cooperative, networked relationships gain a position of advantage and inherent leverage.116 The more connected a state is to Whole-of-Nation Framework others and the more resilient its infrastructure, the more powerful it becomes. This power requires secure connections and stable expectations between leading states about what is and is not acceptable behavior in cyberspace. It requires shaping adversary behavior not just by threatening costs but also by changing the ecosystem in which competition occurs. It requires international engagement and collaborating with the private sector. Second, layered cyber deterrence emphasizes working with the private sector to efficiently coordinate how the nation responds with speed and agility to emerging threats. The federal government alone cannot fund or solve the challenge of adversaries attacking the networks on which America and its allies and partners rely. It requires collaboration with state and local authorities, leading business sectors, and international partners, all within the rule of law established by the Constitution that protects the rights of individuals. This strategy also contemplates the planning needed to ensure the continuity of the economy and the ability of the United States to\n\n## Whole-Of-Nation Framework\n\nrebound in the aftermath of a major, nationwide cyberattack of significant consequence. Such planning adds depth to deterrence by assuring the American people, allies, and even our adversaries that the United States will have both the will and capability to respond to an attack on its interests, no matter how devastating. Third, the strategy builds on the defend forward concept, originally articulated in the Department of Defense\n(DoD) Cyber Strategy, to include all of the instruments of national power. It integrates defend forward into a whole-of-nation approach for securing American interests in cyberspace. Defend forward is a proactive, rather than reactive, approach to adversary cyber threats. Specifically, it addresses the fact that the United States has not created credible and sufficient costs against malicious adversary behavior below the level of armed attackeven as the United States has prevented cyberattacks of significant consequences.117 Therefore, defend forward posits that the United States must shift from responding to malicious behavior after it has already occurred to proactively observing, pursuing, and countering adversary operations and imposing costs to change adversary behavior. By shaping the strategic environment and creating meaningful costs for malicious behavior, defend forward aims to disrupt and defeat ongoing malicious adversary cyber campaigns, deter future campaigns, and reinforce favorable international norms of behavior. This posture implies persistent engagement118 with adversaries as part of an overall integrated effort to apply every authority, access, and capability possible (e.g., laws, financial regulation, diplomacy, education) to the defense of cyberspace in a manner consistent with international law. Layered cyber deterrence combines different ways to shape adversaries' decision making. The central idea is simple: increase the costs and decrease the benefits that adversaries anticipate when planning cyberattacks against American interests. This can be achieved by employing multiple deterrent mechanisms concurrently, continuously, and collaboratively across the public and private sectors. If deterrence fails, the United States retains a multitude of options that comply with international law. In the first layer, the United States together with our partners and allies collectively develops and implements cyber norms based on our shared interests and values. These norms have the potential to shape behavior, largely by encouraging restraint and incentivizing responsible behavior. Actions in this layer include, but are not limited to, diplomacy, law enforcement cooperation, and intelligence sharing on emerging and persistent threat vectors and vulnerabilities. Over time, growing coalitions of like-minded partners and allies can limit the number of targets that adversaries can attack through capacity building and can increase the costs of malign behavior through collective action. This approach will not eliminate state-sponsored cyber operations or cybercrime, but consistently enforced consequences and rewards can begin to erode the incentives for bad behavior. In the second layer, the U.S. government collaborates with the private sector to reduce vulnerabilities and deny benefits to adversaries. The strategy for this layer of deterrence is to force adversaries to make difficult choices regarding resources, access, and capabilities. When U.S. vulnerabilities are reduced and adversaries are forced to expend more resources, burn sensitive accesses, or utilize unique and expensive cyber weapons to achieve their desired results, cyberattacks will be reduced. Actions in this layer include, but are not limited to, expanding operational collaboration between government and private sector, prioritizing support to systemically important critical infrastructure, exercising local authorities and the private sector's ability to respond to significant cyberattacks through such mechanisms as Continuity of the Economy (COTE) planning, pooling public and private data on cyber intrusions, incentivizing companies and individuals to reduce systemic vulnerabilities, and ensuring that the intelligence resources of the U.S. government are effectively brought to bear in supporting the private sector's own cybersecurity efforts.119 Over time, these activities make it harder for adversaries to find easy attack vectors and hold at risk American networks in cyberspace. The U.S. government must find ways to collaborate with private-sector vendors and state as well as local governments to use red teams to anticipate possible cyberattacks against critical infrastructure. In the worstcase scenario of a major, nationwide cyberattack, properly exercised COTE plans will help ensure the reconstitution of the country's critical economic drivers.\n\nIn the third layer, the United States is prepared to impose costs to deter conflict, limit malicious adversary behavior below the level of armed conflict, and, if necessary, prevail in war by employing the full spectrum of its capabilities. Deterrence must extend to limiting attacks on the U.S. election system and preventing largescale intellectual property theft. To that end, the U.S. government must demonstrate its ability to impose costs using all instruments of power, while establishing a clear declaratory policy that signals to rival states the costs and risks associated with attacking America in cyberspace. Defend forward is an important part of the cost imposition layer. The original defend forward concept put forth by DoD focuses on the military instrument of power to impose costs to \"disrupt or halt malicious cyber activity at its source, including activity that falls below the level of armed conflict.\"120 Reimagined as a key element of layered cyber deterrence, defend forward in this context comprises the proactive and integrated employment of all of the instruments of power. Defend forward requires the United States to have the capability and capacity for sustained engagement in cyberspace to impose costs on adversaries for engaging in malicious cyber activity. The cost imposition layer also demands that the U.S. government protect its ability to respond with military force at a time and place of its choosing. A key aspect of this ability is ensuring the security and resilience of critical weapons systems and functions in cyberspace.\n\nTHE STRATEGIC LOGIC OF DETERRENCE\nLayered cyber deterrence adapts an enduring strategy to defend American interests in cyberspace.121 Over the past seven decades, deterrence has been the foundation of U.S. strategy.122 As a strategic concept for managing great power competition, deterrence played a pivotal role in U.S.\n\nforeign policy during the Cold War.123\nScholars define deterrence as \"dissuading someone from doing something by making them believe the costs to them will exceed their expected benefit.\"124The deterrence literature distinguishes between a number of different deterrence strategies, including denial, punishment, entanglement, and normative taboos. These strategies take on unique attributes in cyberspace. Deterrence by punishment, which gained prominence during the nuclear age, rests on the credible threat to harm a target's civilian population or economy, thereby making the perceived costs of an action unacceptably high (\"countervalue\" targeting).125 In cyberspace, deterrence by punishment entails the threat of latent violence against the non-military assets that a target holds dear. America's commitment to international law appropriately places constraints on its willingness to implement deterrence by punishment in cyberspace. In addition, scholars of cyber strategy debate the extent to which cyber capabilities offer a feasible punishment mechanism, or whether punishment requires lethal capabilities.126\nTherefore, in cyberspace the preferred punishment strategy for democratic nations is to impose costs on adversaries through targeting keyoften government or illicit, as opposed to commercial and civiliannetworks and infrastructure used to conduct cyber campaigns. Deterrence by denial entails threatening to physically impede, reduce the impact of, or increase the costs of an adversary's ability to successfully attack American interests.127 Traditionally, this form of deterrence works by targeting the adversary's military capabilities (\"counterforce\" targeting) and/or by shoring up one's own defenses to such an extent that offensive operations by the attacking state are perceived to be inordinately costly.128 In cyberspace, deterrence by denial works by increasing the costs to the attackerbeyond just financial costsof breaching the deterring state's defenses. When the government and private sector collaborate to build security into connected systems, they reduce the number of vulnerabilities adversaries can exploit. This form of denial is especially important for deterring non-state actors, such as extremists and criminals. In addition to punishment and denial, deterrence can be achieved through entanglement and normative taboos.129\nEntanglement can deter under conditions of mutual interdependence, when an attack would create meaningful costs for the attacker as well as the defender.130\nEntanglement implies shared risk. For example, two states may be interconnected through mutually beneficial economic relationships.131 In cyberspace, we all rely on the same networks and underlying infrastructure that supports global connectivity. Cyber operations threaten this connectivity and create shared risks. Norms can also contribute to deterrence by \"imposing reputational costs that can damage an actor's soft power beyond the value gained from a given attack.\"132 In cyberspace, these reputational costs can amplify the threat of punishment and denial-based activities that deter extreme attacks by states, helping to discourage espionage and subterfuge beneath the threshold of armed conflict. The success of deterrence typically rests on four factors. First, the deterring state must clearly communicate the terms of a threat so that the target understands the behavior expected of it and the potential consequences of ignoring the threat. Second, the deterrer should ensure that the threatened costs inflicted on the adversary outweigh the latter's perceived benefits from conducting the undesired action. Third, deterrent threats must be credible: the deterrer must possess both the capability to carry out the terms of a threat and the resolve or political will to do so. Importantly, and related to the first point, the target of deterrence must perceive that costs will actually be imposed, which means that a deterring state has to develop mechanisms for signaling credibility to the target. Finally, deterrent threats should be coupled with some form of reassurance to the target that if it complies and does not act, the deterrer will refrain from carrying out the threatened response.\n\nThese criteria illustrate some of the fundamental challenges associated with successfully implementing deterrence in cyberspace. Rather than clearly communicating an ultimatum to a target, which may tie their hands and create politically infeasible \"red lines,\" states may prefer to retain strategic ambiguity and flexibility. Communication and signaling could also be complicated by the potential for misperception. These dynamics are compounded in cyberspace, where states initially conceal their attacks and often seek to obscure the source through misattribution, false flags, and proxies. For example, challenges in establishing timely and accurate attribution can weaken cyber deterrence by generating doubt about the identity of the perpetrator of a cyberattack and undermining the credibility of response options.133\nIn addition, credibility is a central challenge of deterrence, which is why in his seminal work on the topic, Arms and Influence, Thomas Schelling devotes considerable energy to this problem and the various means by which states could enhance the credibility of their threats (e.g., what he calls hand-tying, brinkmanship, or the art of commitment).134 In the domain of cyberspace, states must signal credible commitments not just by making threats but by taking actions that demonstrate their willingness and ability to respond to cyber threats. Signaling, which includes statements or actions that are meant to communicate information to a target,135 is especially difficult in cyberspace. The target may simply not perceive the threatened cyber costs to be high enough to affect its calculus, or the target may be willing to gambleknowing that cyber operations and effects are often unpredictable and fleetingthat a threatened action may not produce the effect intended by the deterring state.136 Furthermore, cyber signaling about capability may be ineffective, misinterpreted, or misperceived.137 Conversely, a deterring state may be loath to reveal certain cyber capabilities that would enhance the credibility of deterrence because the act of revealing them may render them ineffective.138\nFinally, measuring the success of deterrence can be a trying enterprise, because a positive outcome is something that does not happen and effects are often uncertain. Uncertainty surrounding the effects of cyber capabilitiesboth anticipating their likely impact in advance and measuring the actual harm they causecan muddle the battle damage assessments that are essential for any deterrence calculus.139 In the absence of unique intelligence collection against adversary decision making, it can be difficult to determine whether a target chose not to act mainly because the deterrent threat worked or for unrelated reasons. In cyberspace, this dynamic implies a need to support operations designed to deter an adversary with extensive, all-source intelligence about adversary decision making that can be used to calibrate the response. Deterrence is more likely to succeed when situated within the strategic context and refined to focus on specific types of behavior or specific adversaries, rather than on cyber activities in general.140\nDeterrence is an enduring American strategy, but it must be adapted to address how adversaries leverage new technology and connectivity to attack the United States. Cyber operations have become a weapon of choice for adversaries seeking to hold the U.S. economy and national security at risk.141 Therefore, the concept of deterrence must evolve to address this new strategic landscape. Following nearly two decades in which the U.S. government prioritized counterterrorism and counterinsurgency, great power competition has resurfaced as America's central strategic challenge.142 The United States now faces emerging peer competitors, particularly as China and Russia reassert their influence regionally and globally, often through cyber and influence operations that undermine American power below the level of armed conflict.143 Reducing the scope and severity of these adversary cyber operations and campaigns requires adopting the strategy of layered cyber deterrence.\n\nDEFEND FORWARD AND LAYERED CYBER DETERRENCE\nLayered cyber deterrence places the U.S. Department of Defense's concept of defend forward in a larger, wholeof-nation framework that uses multiple instruments of power to secure American networks in cyberspace.144\nSince the end of World War II, the United States has used forward-deployed military forces to advance American interests. This strategic posture was an integral component of the grand strategy of containment for the United States and NATO. Cold War forward defense involved\n\n## Why Is Cyberspace An Odd Domain?\n\nCyberspace is a fundamentally new, novel, and odd domain for human activity. Unlike the traditional (and more tangible) domains of land, sea, air, and space, cyberspace is entirely human-made and has existed for only a few decades. Application of the laws, norms, and expectations of the traditional domainsthe fundamental \"physics\" that has governed the course of human relationsis challenged by and in cyberspace. In the four traditional domains, strategic competition is shaped by governments; cyberspace is shaped primarily by market forces. Cyberspace exists almost entirely on privately owned and operated information and communications technology (ICT) infrastructure, making it at least as much a good or service as a domain. As a domain of conflict, cyberspace is a \"gray zone\" where malicious actors get away with acts of theft, disruption, and even war that would not be permissible in a traditional domain.145 Outside of cyberspace, hundreds of years of legal tradition and iterative jurisprudence have produced commonly accepted principlesprinciples that slowly formed the foundations on which states built their domestic laws and guided their relations with other nations. Many existing laws still apply in cyberspace, but as technology continues to evolve, there can be uncertainty about how those laws pertain to this changing landscape, which is altering the relationship between governments and their citizens.146 As an emerging legal frontier, cyberspace imposes new and different expectations on the public and private sectors to engage with one another in the defense of the nation. Since the creation of cyberspace, the U.S. government, the private sector, and individual Americans have collectively struggled to secure it. Its existence defies millennia of human precedents and traditions. Cyberspace is an odd domain.\n\nboth projecting power by positioning U.S. and allied forces on the front lines of the potential battlefields of the next world war, and leveraging multiple instruments of power. These forward-deployed forces served several purposes: deterrence and signaling U.S. resolve and capabilities to the Soviet Union; enabling rapid response from a more advantageous position if conflict should break out; a source of intelligence and early warning; and a form of credible commitment to allies.\n\nThe connectivity and global reach of cyberspace make forward defense even more essential today. During the Cold War, the United States could anticipate where the front lines would likely be. In cyberspace, it is difficult to anticipate the battlefield or identify clear front lines. As NotPetya illustrates, cyberattacks often spill beyond their initial targets and infect other networks. This complication creates an imperative to defend forward and counter adversaries' use of cyber operations.147\nLayered cyber deterrence builds on the original DoD defend forward concept. First, like the DoD concept, it operates as a general strategic principle during day-today competition, in which the U.S. government \"will defend forward to disrupt or halt malicious cyber activity at its source, including activity that falls below the level of armed conflict.\"148 This posture includes operating in \"gray\" and \"red\" space in a manner consistent with international law.149 Second, it plays a role in ensuring that the U.S. government retains the ability to apply all instruments of power to respond to crisis or conflict. Applied to military power, this includes ensuring \"the cybersecurity and resilience of DoD, DCI [Defense Critical Infrastructure], and DIB [Defense Industrial Base] networks and systems.\"150 Finally, cyber layered deterrence, like defend forward, secures critical infrastructure and safeguards American networks by finding ways \"to stop threats before they reach their targets.\"151\nChanges to law in the FY2019 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA)152 and the issuance of National Security Presidential Memorandum (NSPM) 13153 enable the U.S. government to adopt a defend forward posture. This posture was an integral part of the overall U.S. effort to counter Russian election interference in the 2018\nmidterm elections.154 As the Commander of U.S. Cyber Command, General Paul Nakasone, testified in February 2019, \"Working together under my command, U.S. Cyber Command and the National Security Agency (NSA) undertook an initiative known as the Russia Small Group to protect the elections from foreign interference and influence. By enabling our fellow combatant commands and other partners, U.S. Cyber Command assisted the collective intelligence and defense effort that demonstrated persistent engagement in practice.\"155 These initiatives are continuing as part of the interagency effort to defend the 2020 presidential elections.156\nHowever, additional improvements to existing law and policy would further support defend forward and address some of the challenges that have emerged in the early phases of its implementation. Most importantly, defend forward should be integrated at the national level as part of a U.S. national cyber strategy that incorporates all of the instruments of power. Including defend forward as a key element of layered cyber deterrence to counter malicious campaigns below the level of armed conflict addresses this issue and articulates how these activities support efforts to shape adversary behavior, deny benefits, and reinforce norms of responsible behavior.\n\nTHE IMPLEMENTATION OF LAYERED CYBER DETERRENCE\nLayered cyber deterrence calls for reconceptualizing how the U.S. government coordinates cyber policy and the organizations and authorities aligned to defend American interests. To date, the U.S. government has built and operated a number of organizations specifically to support this mission set (e.g., the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency, the National Cyber Investigative Joint Task Force, the Cyber Threat Intelligence Integration Center, U.S. Cyber Command, and the National Security Agency's Cybersecurity Directorate). Yet the creation of more organizations, congressional committees, and study groups makes it difficult to achieve the unity of effort required to conduct layered cyber deterrence and build the type of systemic resilience that changes the cost-benefit calculus in cyberspace. As a result, the United States finds it difficult to collaborate with the private sector and conduct cyber operations as part of whole-of-nation campaigns. Despite the new authorities outlined in the 2019 NDAA and NSPM- 13 designed to improve government cyber campaign planning and to conduct offensive cyber operations, as well as multiple executive orders on securing critical infrastructure and promoting information sharing, the U.S. government is still struggling to secure its interests in cyberspace.\n\nLayered cyber deterrence is the blueprint that the government and American public need to build bridges across government agencies, international partners, and most importantly the private sector in order to secure American networks in cyberspace. It is the best way for the government to implement new authorities and take appropriate proportional action that builds national resilience as well as disrupts, defeats, and deters active cyber campaigns, including those targeting critical economic and political institutions like election systems.157\n\n## Layered Cyber Deterrence\n\n| CURRENT STATE           |\n|-------------------------|\n| Strengthen              |\n| Norms and Non-          |\n| military Tools          |\n| Deny                    |\n| Benefits                |\n| Promote National        |\n| Resilience              |\n| Shape                   |\n| Behavior                |\n| Foundation:             |\n| Reform                  |\n| the U.S.                |\n| Government              |\n| Structure               |\n| and                     |\n| Organization            |\n| for                     |\n| Cyberspace              |\n| Reshape the             |\n| Cyber Ecosystem         |\n| toward Greater          |\n| Security                |\n| Adversaries are         |\n| conducting cyber        |\n| campaigns that tar-     |\n| get U.S. networks       |\n| in cyberspace and       |\n| threaten American       |\n| safety and security,    |\n| economic interests,     |\n| political institutions, |\n| and ability to proj-    |\n| ect military power.     |\n| Operationalize          |\n| Cybersecurity           |\n| Collaboration           |\n| with the Private        |\n| Sector                  |\n| Impose                  |\n| Costs                   |\n| Preserve                |\n| and Employ              |\n| the Military            |\n| Instrument of           |\n| Power                   |\n\nThe U.S. gov-\nernment has the\nauthorities but\nlacks the optimal\nstructure and\nrelationships with\nthe private sector\nand other partners\nto achieve a unity\nof effort at the scale\nrequired to defend\nforward.\n\nTo translate layered deterrence into action requires three lines of effort organized into six pillars and more than 75 supporting recommendations that enhance the ability of the U.S. government to shape adversary behavior, deny benefits, and impose costs. Defend forward spans all three lines of effort to identify, isolate, and counter threats consistent with existing authorities and legal frameworks.\n\nA digital environment that is safe and sta-\nble, promotes continued innovation and\neconomic growth, protects personal privacy,\nensures national security, and does so by\nbuilding:\n\n- An international community that observes\nand enforces norms of responsible state behavior\n- Critical elements of national power and\ninfrastructure that are secure, resilient, and supported by a defensible digital ecosystem\n- Public-private partnerships based on a\nshared situational awareness, combined action, and full support of the U.S. government in defense of the private sector\n- An agile, proactive U.S. government\norganized to rapidly and concurrently employ every instrument of national power in defense of cyberspace and to generate deterrent options tailored to each adversary\n- A cyber force equipped with the resources,\ncapabilities, and processes to maneuver and rapidly engage adversaries in and through cyberspace\n\n## Reform The U.S. Government's Structure And Organization For Cyberspace I\n\nn democratic governance, structure is policy. To achieve the outcomes the United States requires to be more secure and prosperous in cyberspacethe outcomes this report seeks to realizethe U.S. government must be structured properly to realize them. Because cyberspace increasingly pervades every aspect of our government, economy, and society, however, this is a uniquely challenging problem. An effective government for the digital era means a government that has the right authorities, a coherent strategy, the critical partnerships, and the best talent. To realize this modern vision of policy requires a modern structure of government. The U.S. government has taken necessary and significant steps to deter and disrupt threats from cyberspace, but they nonetheless remain insufficient to the scale of the problem. Governmental action has too often been piecemeal and independent of private-sector insights and interests, too much information remains over-classified or narrowly distributed, and a lack of strategic coherence continues to hinder attempts at improving systemic national cybersecurity.\n\nThe legislative and executive branches must each better align their authorities and capabilities to produce the speed and agility of action required to defend America in cyberspace. There needs to be greater collaboration between the public and private sectors in the defense of critical infrastructure and better integration in the planning, resourcing, and employment of government cyber resources. The recommendations in this pillar are intended to provide the U.S. government with the strategic continuity and unity of effort necessary to support the other pillars and recommendations of this report in achieving layered cyber deterrence and defending U.S.\n\ncritical infrastructure against cyberattacks of significant consequence.\n\nFirst, the executive branch should issue a new national cyber strategy bringing coherence to the federal government's efforts. That strategy should be based on this Commission's framework of layered cyber deterrence, emphasize resilience and public-private collaboration, build on the Department of Defense's (DoD) concept of defend forward as a government-wide effort, and prioritize a bias for action. Second, Congress must improve its oversight of cybersecurity by reorganizing and centralizing its committee structure and jurisdiction. Responsibility for cybersecurity is currently dispersed throughout numerous committees and subcommittees, hamstringing legislative authority, muddling oversight, and impeding Congress's ability to act with the speed and vision necessary for a domain so critical to national security and the modern economy.\n\nThird, the executive branch must be organized to achieve the agility and coherence necessary to effectively plan, support, and employ government cyber resources. There PILLARS AND KEY RECOMMENDATIONS\nis no single voice charged and empowered with harmonizing the executive branch's policies, budgets, and responsibilities in cyberspace; instead, many departments and agencies, with different responsibilities for and interests in cybersecurity, compete for resources and authority. Fourth, the federal government must reform how it recruits, trains, and educates its workforce to ensure that\n\n## Strategic Objective #1: Align U.S. Government Strategy With Layered Cyber Deterrence\n\nThe executive branch should develop and issue a new national cyber strategy reflecting the strategic approach of layered cyber deterrence, emphasizing resilience and public-private collaboration, and including the concept of defend forward, to raise the costs and lower the benefits for malicious cyber activity. Today various departments and agencies constitute critical but separate components of an effective national cyber strategy that should be better integrated into a coherent national strategy. This approach will enable the U.S. government to achieve speed and agility, a bias for action, and effectiveness in cyberspace.\n\n## Key Recommendation 1.1 The Executive Branch Should Issue An Updated National Cyber Strategy.\n\nThe executive branch should issue an updated National Cyber Strategy that embraces the concept of layered cyber deterrence, with an emphasis on resilience, publicand private-sector collaboration, and defend forward as key elements. Any effective strategy for cyberspace will require a coordinated effort across the multiple stakeholders within the federal government, state and local governments, and the private sector that are all responsible for securing and defending the United States in this domain. Therefore, the strategy must explicitly align and synchronize stakeholder strategic objectives, identify lines of effort to put the strategy into operation, clarify what priority should be given to various efforts, and articulate common principles of risk.\n\nit has the necessary cybersecurity talent. Shortages in such talent are widespread in both the public and private sectors, and the federal government has a role to play (in partnership with academia and industry) to \"grow the pie\" of qualified cybersecurity workers, make certain that existing sources of talent are not overlooked, and build the pipelines and career paths that put the right people in the right places for confronting threats from cyberspace.\n\nImportantly, the National Cyber Strategy should include key concepts of layered cyber deterrence. The first is deterrence, which has been a long-standing strategic posture of the United States. Deterrence seeks to prevent an adversary from taking an undesired action by making a credible threat to impose costs, deny gains, or shape behavior. Second, it should prioritize deterrence by denial, which, in cyberspace, must include increasing the defense and security of cyberspace through resilience and public- and private-sector collaboration. As more and more of our critical systemsincluding those that underpin our national security, economy, public health and safety, and electionscome to rely on technology, ensuring the resilience of these technological systems becomes synonymous with ensuring the resilience of the nation as a whole. A resilient nation deters adversaries by denying them the gains they seek from attacking the United States. Furthermore, as the majority of U.S. systems and assets are owned and operated by the private sector, ensuring resilience and defense should be a responsibility shared between government and industry. Working together with the private sector to reduce the vulnerabilities adversaries can target, and mitigating the consequences even if vulnerabilities are successfully exploited, the United States can deny them opportunities to attack American interests through cyberspace. Third, defend forward, which currently anchors the DoD's 2018 Cyber Strategy, should be integrated into the broader framework of how the government employs authorities that bear on cyber defense in support of overall layered cyber deterrence goals. Defend forward posits that to disrupt and defeat adversaries' ongoing malicious cyber campaigns, deter future campaigns, and reinforce favorable international norms of behavior, the United States must proactively observe, pursue, and counter adversary operations and impose costs in day-to-day competition. The strategy should clearly express that defend forward is an integral part of a comprehensive approach that encompasses all of the instruments of national power beyond the employment of strictly military capabilities; these include trade and economic efforts, law enforcement activities, and diplomatic tools.\n\nIn describing its defend forward component, the National Cyber Strategy must clarify a number of points:\n- Defend forward is an inherently defensive strategy\nthat seeks to defend the United States in cyberspace. However, there are offensive components at the tactical and operational levels. This is because to achieve defensive strategic objectives in cyberspace, forces and capabilities must be forward-positioned, both geographically and virtually. Such positioning is consistent with defensive strategic objectives of analogous historical strategies of forward defense.\n- Defend forward is consistent with norms of acceptable behavior defined by the United States and\nlike-minded nations with a shared global interest in a stable cyberspace. At the same time, the National Cyber Strategy should acknowledge that norms of acceptable behavior will not emerge unless the United States is willing to act, in concert with allies whenever possible, to impose meaningful costs on bad actors in cyberspace to change their behavior.\n\n- To induce adversaries to change their behavior, the United States must create costs below the threshold at which the full spectrum of credible retaliatory response options may be triggered. In doing so, the United States must ensure that effective policies and processes are in place to guide such actions consistent with the rule of law and adequate risk assessments.\n\nFinally, the National Cyber Strategy should articulate a framework for how the U.S. government should put the approach into operation that is organized around six pillars: reform the U.S. government's structure and organization for cyberspace, strengthen norms and non-military tools, promote national resilience, reshape the cyber ecosystem toward greater security, operationalize cybersecurity collaboration with the private sector, and preserve and employ the military instrument of power.\n\n1.1.1 Develop a Multitiered Signaling Strategy A key objective of defend forward, as a component of layered cyber deterrence, is to create costs for adversaries in order to change their behavior, while minimizing the risks of escalation. However, the logic of defend forward (as detailed in the 2018 DoD Cyber Strategy) is missing an explicit discussion of signaling. To change adversaries' behavior, it is not sufficient to simply counter their campaigns and impose costs. Rather, the United States must signal capability and resolve, as well as communicate how it seeks to change adversary behavior and shape the strategic environment. Signaling is also essential for escalation management so that actions taken in support of defend forward are not unintentionally perceived as escalatory. Cyber operations and campaigns that are not PILLARS AND KEY RECOMMENDATIONS\ncombined with deliberate signaling, so that adversaries understand what the United States seeks to achieve, will not always be sufficient to change adversary behavior. Signaling should entail coordinated employment of various instruments of power.\n\nTherefore, the U.S. government should develop a multitiered signaling strategy aimed at altering adversaries' decision calculus and addressing risks of escalation. This\nsignaling strategy should also effectively communicate to\nallies and partners U.S. goals and intent.\n- The strategic level of signaling should involve overt,\npublic diplomatic signaling through traditional mechanisms that have already been established for other domains, as well as private diplomatic communications through mechanisms such as hotlines and other nonpublic channels (including third-party channels in instances in which the United States may lack robust diplomatic relationships).\n- The operational and tactical levels should involve\nclandestine, protected, and covert signaling (including through non-cyber means) that is deliberately coupled with cyber operations. An example of this type of signaling is tailored messaging preceding or running concurrently with defend forward cyber operations.\nA signaling strategy should also include a framework to guide when and under what conditions the U.S. government will voluntarily self-attribute cyber operations and campaigns for the purposes of signaling capability and intent to various audiences.\n\n1.1.2 Promulgate a New Declaratory Policy When buttressed with clear and consistent action, a declaratory policy is essential for deterrence because it can credibly convey resolve. The United States' declaratory policy regarding cyberspace now is organized around a\n\nuse-of-force thresholdwhich is deliberately politically\nand legally ambiguousand reserves the right for the United States to respond to a cyberattack in a time, place, and manner of its choosing. There are two notable challenges with the current stance.\n- First, the existing declaratory policy does not sufficiently communicate resolve or articulate a compelling logic of consequences. Therefore, the U.S. government should promulgate a new declaratory\npolicy around a use-of-force threshold. Specifically,\nthe U.S. government should publicly convey that it will respond using swift, costly, and, where possible, transparent consequences against cyber activities that constitute what the United States defines as a use of force. This would reinforce deterrence of strategic cyberattacks.\n- Second, our adversaries are clearly exploiting the\ncurrent threshold to conduct a range of malicious activities that do not rise to a level warranting a major retaliatory response. Examples include cyber-enabled large-scale theft of intellectual property and cyber-enabled influence operations. Therefore, the U.S. government should announce a second declaratory policy. This policy should clearly state that the United States will respond using cyber and non-cyber capabilities to counter and impose costs against adversary cyber campaigns\nbelow a use-of-force threshold. These responses\nwould create sufficient costs to alter the adversary's calculus, but they would be different from responses to adversary actions above the use-offorce threshold in their means (e.g., conventional vs. unconventional military capabilities) and their magnitude, consistent with international law. Essentially, the U.S. government should publicly declare that it will defend forward, and couple its declaration with decisive and consistent action across all elements of national power.\n\n## Strategic Objective #2: Streamline Congressional Oversight And Authority Over Cybersecurity Issues\n\nCongress should establish clear oversight responsibility and authority over cyberspace within the legislative branch of the U.S. government. Responsibility for cyberspace is currently dispersed throughout Congress, and the large number of committees and subcommittees claiming some form of jurisdiction impedes action and clarity of oversight. By centralizing responsibility in the new House Permanent Select and Senate Select Committees on Cybersecurity, Congress will be empowered to provide coherent oversight to government strategy and activity in cyberspace.\n\n1.2 Congress should create House Permanent Select and Senate Select Committees on Cybersecurity to consolidate budgetary and legislative jurisdiction over cybersecurity issues, as well as traditional oversight authority.\n\nCurrently, and in both chambers of Congress, legislative and budgetary jurisdiction and oversight for cybersecurity are dispersed across numerous committees and subcommittees. This congressional structure on cybersecurity prevents Congress from effectively providing strategic oversight of the executive branch's cybersecurity efforts or exerting its traditional oversight authority for executive action and policy in cyberspace. Congress has previously faced a comparable challenge.\n\nWhen the 94th Congress (197577) investigated allegations of abuses of authority, illegal activity, and improprieties by members of what we now refer to as the intelligence community, Congress substantiated many of the claims and found them to have been enabled by poor congressional oversight. Congress addressed this problem by establishing the House Permanent Select and Senate Select Committees on Intelligence.158\nTo consolidate oversight and ensure the implementation of effective cybersecurity strategy and policy, the Commission recommends establishing a Permanent Select Committee on Cybersecurity in the House and a Select Committee on Cybersecurity in the Senate. These committees would have legislative jurisdiction over the broad integration of systemic cybersecurity strategy and policy both within government and between the government and the private sector. They would also have oversight responsibilities for executive branch responses to domestic and foreign cybersecurity threats, government organization or reorganization to deal with cybersecurity threats, the protection of federal networks, the confirmation of relevant Senate-confirmed cybersecurity officials, and the consolidation of federal reporting requirements for cyber initiatives and relevant data. Membership and Structure: Like the Select Committees on Intelligence, these committees should be structured in a bipartisan manner while prioritizing expertise. Committee membership, including chair and ranking member roles, should be determined by congressional leadership as conventional committee assignments, while the chairs and ranking members of other cyber-relevant committees (as determined by congressional leadership) should also serve as ex-officio members of this committee. Also, like the Select Committees on Intelligence, these committees should have a membership structure designed to encourage cross-committee collaboration PILLARS AND KEY RECOMMENDATIONS\nand the sharing of best practices. The final committee composition should be proportionate to each party's composition of the House, and one more seat given to the majority party in the Senate; to promote institutional knowledge, committee members should be exempt from any term limits. Jurisdiction and Authorities: The House Permanent Select and Senate Select Committees on Cybersecurity would consider legislation, hold hearings, subpoena witnesses, and consider nominations relevant to improving the United States' public and private systemic cybersecurity against domestic and foreign risks (including state-sponsored threats); they would oversee development and implementation of national cybersecurity strategies and policies, oversight of the compliance of components of federal agencies charged with cybersecurity policy and defensive operations, the organization or reorganization of agencies related to cybersecurity threats or incidents, and authorizations for appropriations relating to protecting against cybersecurity threats and relevant incidents or actions. These committees would also receive recurring briefings on national-level risk management assessments, national-level tabletop exercises, and other federal reporting requirements for cyber initiatives and relevant data. This jurisdiction is designed to emphasize advancing national systemic cybersecurity, strengthening the digital ecosystem, and improving whole-of-nation cybersecurity resilience. It is not intended to include activities already overseen by the House and Senate Armed Services Committees or the two chambers' committees on intelligence (such as Title 10 or Title 50 activities, or counterintelligence activities carried out under Title 18), or to be excessively duplicative of existing executive branch oversight channels.\n\n1.2.1 Reestablish the Office of Technology Assessment Congress should reestablish and fund the Office of Technology Assessment (OTA), or another similar agency, to advise both chambers on cyber and technology policy issues. Before it was dissolved in 1995, OTA produced over 750 reports in nearly a quarter century of operations for both congressional and public consumption, ensuring that the legislative branch was fully informed on technology-related legislative issues that fell within its purview.159 Other congressional efforts to build capacity in this area, such as charging the Government Accountability Office with responsibility for technical assessment, have not been able to satisfactorily fill the gap left by the loss of OTA. The scientific and technology challenges facing policymakers are only becoming more complex, and Congress would benefit from the agility, depth, breadth, and objectivity of insight and analysis provided by an office focused on technology.\n\n## Strategic Objective #3: Reform The Executive Branch To Be More Agile And Effective In Cyberspace\n\nThe executive branch should be restructured and streamlined in order that clear responsibilities and authorities over cyberspace can be established while it is empowered to proactively develop, implement, and execute its strategy for cyberspace. Many departments and agencies, with different responsibilities for and interests in securing cyberspace, compete for resources and power, resulting in conflicting efforts sometimes carried out at cross-purposes. More consolidated accountability for harmonizing the executive branch's policies, budgets, and responsibilities in cyberspace while it implements strategic guidance from the President and Congress is needed to achieve coherence in the planning, resourcing, and employing of government cyber resources.\n\n1.3 Congress should establish a National Cyber Director (NCD), within the Executive Office of the President, who is Senate-confirmed and supported by the Office of the National Cyber Director. The NCD would serve as the President's principal advisor for cybersecurity and associated emerging technology issues; the lead for national-level coordination for cyber strategy, policy, and defensive cyber operations; and the chief U.S. representative and spokesperson on cybersecurity issues.\n\nThe NCD would be appointed by and report directly to the President, be Senate-confirmed, and be supported by a concurrently established Office of the National Cyber Director inside the Executive Office of the President (EOP). (It thus would be positioned similarly to the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative.) The NCD nomination to the Senate would be considered by both the Armed Services and Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committees, until and unless a Select Committee on Cybersecurity (recommendation 1.2) is established, at which time the latter committee should assume primary jurisdiction over the NCD nomination and office. Numerous commissions, initiatives, and studies have recommended a more robust and institutionalized national-level mechanism for coordinating cybersecurity and associated emerging technology issues, and for overseeing the executive branch's development and implementation of an integrated national cybersecurity strategy. As emerging technology- and cyberspace-related issues become more complex, and consequently a greater threat to U.S. national security, the President's need for sound advice and timely options will be increasingly critical.\n\nThe NCD would not direct or manage day-to-day cybersecurity policy or the operations of any one federal agency, but instead will be responsible for the integration of cybersecurity policy and operations across the executive branch. Specifically, the NCD would (1) be the President's principal advisor on cybersecurity and associated emerging technology issues and the lead national-level coordinator for cyber strategy and policy; (2) oversee and coordinate federal government activities to defend against adversary cyber operations inside the United States; (3) with concurrence from the National Security Advisor or the National Economic Advisor, would convene Cabinet-level or National Security PILLARS AND KEY RECOMMENDATIONS\nCouncil (NSC) Principals Committeelevel meetings and associated preparatory meetings; and (4) would provide budgetary review of designated agency cybersecurity budgets. Structure and Responsibilities: The NCD, supported by the Office of the National Cyber Director within the White House's EOP, would report directly to the President. The NCD would serve on the NSC for relevant (cybersecurity and associated emerging technology) issues. The NCD\nwould lead the development and coordination of national-level cyber strategy, cyber policy, and defensive cyber operations, including working through the NSC process to set national-level priorities and produce the National Cyber Strategy of the United States. The NCD would also lead White House efforts to support and develop the private-public collaboration needed to defend our national critical infrastructure and provide coordination on emerging cross-cutting technology and security challenges, such as intellectual property theft, 5G infrastructure policy, and internet governance. Authorities: The NCD would be added to the statutory list of National Security Council regular attendees. With concurrence from the National Security Advisor or the National Economic Advisor, the NCD would have the capability to convene Cabinet or NSC Principals Committee meetings and the numerous associated preparatory meetings to address cybersecurity and emerging technology issues. Further, the NCD would oversee the compliance of executive departments and agencies with national-level guidance on cybersecurity priorities, strategies, policies, and resource allocations. The NCD will coordinate interagency efforts to defend against adversary cyber operations against domestic U.S. interests; this will not impinge on DoD responsibility for Title 10\nactivities, Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) responsibility for Title 50 activities, or the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) and Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) responsibility for counterintelligence activities, but the NCD would be kept fully apprised of those activities. The NCD would have budgetary oversight over the cybersecurity community, which is defined as including those areas within the executive branch whose work is critical to the success of the National Cyber Strategy. In the executive branch, each program manager, agency head, and department head with responsibilities under the National Cyber Strategy shall transmit the cyber budget request of the program, agency, or department to the NCD prior to sending it to the Office of Management and Budget (OMB). If the NCD determines that the budget proposed is not in alignment with the National Cyber Strategy, then he or she will recommend appropriate revisions. The NCD's passback revisions must be addressed in the proposed budget and submitted to OMB along with a statement describing the impact of the required budgetary changes on the ability of that program, agency, or department to perform its mission, or, if they cannot be implemented under reasonable circumstances or timelines, what obstacles must be overcome in order to do so. Any significant changes by OMB to the cybersecurity budget of any agency or department would require the concurrence of the NCD. Resources: The Office of the National Cyber Director would be staffed at a size similar to that of comparable EOP institutions (approximately 50 persons).160\n\n1.4 Congress should strengthen the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) in its mission to ensure national resilience of critical infrastructure, to promote a more secure cyber ecosystem, and to serve as the central civilian cybersecurity authority to support federal, state and local, and private-sector cybersecurity efforts.\n\nCongress and successive administrations have worked diligently to establish CISA, creating a new agency that can leverage broad authorities to receive and share information, provide technical assistance to operators, and partner with stakeholders across the executive branch, state and local communities, and private sector. CISA has the mission of ensuring the security and resilience of critical infrastructure and is intended to be a keystone of national cybersecurity efforts. CISA, through partnering with the private sector and coordinating across government, is charged with securing the critical infrastructure and functions on which the American government and economy rely and ensuring a coordinated civilian response to cyber threats. While CISA has worked aggressively to carry out these significant duties, it has not been adequately resourced or empowered to do so. The agency's convening power, though a critical tool in public-private collaboration, is not widely understood or consistently recognized. In addition, the agency lacks the analytic capacity to assess, plan for, and lead efforts to mitigate national systemic cyber risk; nor does it have the dedicated resources to extend its activities sufficiently beyond federal information technology (IT) practices to capture a nationwide perspective on cybersecurity risk and resilience. The establishment of CISA has not effectively centralized federal civilian responsibilities; rather, uncertainty and ambiguity about the roles of sector-specific agencies and other federal agencies continue. To realize policymakers' ambitions for CISA to improve the nation's cybersecurity, it must be strengthened and resourced appropriately for its growing role and status as an operational agency within DHS.\n\nStrengthen the Director Position: Congress should give the Director of CISA a five-year term and elevate the position to level II of the Executive Schedule, or equivalent to a Deputy Secretary and to Military Service Secretaries.\n\nCongress should also consider making the posts of Assistant Director career positions to provide greater consistency and continuity. Program and Support Resources: Congress should increase CISA's funding for administrative and programs support, so that it can enhance current operations and transition from being a headquarters element to an operational agency within DHS. Resources are particularly needed to underwrite personnel recruitment, development, and retention as well as analytic and big data processing to support current programs. Expanded Budget: Congress should review CISA's budget and consider giving proportionally greater resources to projects and programs intended to support private-sector cybersecurity, to promote public-private integration, and to increase situational awareness of threat. Nearly 60\npercent of CISA's budget is dedicated to federal cybersecurity, with only 15 percent committed to initiatives supporting the private sector. In addition, Congress should consider providing stable multiyear funding to ensure the flexibility necessary to build lasting analytical capability across multiple budget years. Appropriate Facilities: In developing the resources and support model, the executive branch and Congress should examine current CISA facilities and assess their suitability to fully support current and projected mission requirements nationally and regionally. The General Services Administration should provide a report to Congress including recommendations for further\n\n## Pillars And Key Recommendations\n\nPILLARS AND KEY RECOMMENDATIONS\nresources to procure or build a new facility or augment existing facilities to ensure sufficient size and accommodations for the integration of personnel from the private sector and other departments and agencies to meet the goals of this report. Incident Management and Recovery: Congress and the U.S. government should strengthen CISA's ability to aid the public and private sectors in recovering from a significant cyber incident. The agency should be sufficiently funded and empowered to coordinate whole-of-government efforts in managing incidents that are not met with an \"emergency declaration,\" and to seamlessly integrate with the Federal Emergency Management Agency when they are. CISA must be prepared to use new authorities and funds detailed in the \"Promote National Resilience\" pillar, such as the Cyber State of Distress and Cyber Response and Recovery Fund (recommendation 3.3), and ensure that they are integrated into updates of the National Cyber Incident Response Plan and a national cyber response doctrine. Further, additional resources are needed to conduct cross-agency and jurisdictional cybersecurity tabletop exercises and to support CISA's hunt and incident response team. National Risk Management: Congress should recognize and provide sufficient resources to support CISA's emergent efforts to identify and mitigate risks to national critical functions and to serve as the primary federal entity responsible for organizing and coordinating whole-of-government, public-private activities to identify, assess, and manage national risk. As detailed in the \"Promote National Resilience\" pillar, Congress should codify CISA responsibilities and ensure sufficient resources for its national risk management programs, including its support to sector-specific agencies, its critical role in Continuity of the Economy planning (recommendation 3.2), and its identification of systemically important critical infrastructure (recommendation 5.1). Cyber Defense and Security Collaboration: Congress and the U.S. government should strengthen CISA's operational capabilities by equipping it with the resources, tools, and authorities necessary to fully integrate the government's and the private sector's understanding of cyber threat into a cohesive, national picture and coordinated action. To support these efforts, further detailed below in the \"Operationalize Cybersecurity Collaboration with the Private Sector\" pillar, Congress should increase government support to systemically important critical infrastructure (recommendation 5.1), establish and fund a Joint Collaborative Environment (recommendation 5.2), increase integration among federal cyber centers and CISA (recommendation 5.3), and establish a Joint Cyber Planning Cell (recommendation 5.4). Cybersecurity Advisory Committee: The Secretary of Homeland Security should establish a Cybersecurity Advisory Committee to advise, consult, and make recommendations to CISA on policies, programs, and rulemakings, among other items, to account for non-federal interests. The committee should be exempt from the requirements of the Federal Advisory Committee Act and be composed of state, local, and private-sector representatives from across the 16 critical infrastructure sectors.161 Continuous Threat Hunting: Congress should strengthen CISA's ability to conduct continuous threat hunting across .gov networks, which will enhance CISA's ability to both protect federal civilian networks and provide useful threat intelligence to critical infrastructure. Continuous threat hunting on the .gov domain will enable CISA to quickly detect, identify, and mitigate threats to federal networks. Resulting information on malware, indicators of compromise, and adversary tactics, techniques, and procedures can be shared with public and private critical infrastructure, which may be similarly targeted by these actors, to bolster their defenses.\n\n1.4.1 Codify and Strengthen the Cyber Threat Intelligence Integration Center The Office of the Director of National Intelligence, through its Cyber Threat Intelligence Integration Center, plays a critical role in generating a whole-of-government understanding of significant cyber threats affecting the United States and could assist in providing analysis and coordination necessary for rapid and accurate attribution. In the 2015 Presidential Memorandum that establishes it, CTIIC is charged with acting as the primary federal integration point for all-source analysis, production, and dissemination of intelligence on significant malicious cyber activityto inform both U.S. government and private-sector decision makers. However, CTIIC needs to be fully resourced to carry out the entire scope of its mission, including sufficient funding, manpower, and analytical resources to fully support federal departments and agencies in their operations and the intelligence products that these agencies provide to private-sector and international partners. To ensure adequate resources, Congress should codify and establish CTIIC through legislation, using as a model the 2015 Presidential Memorandum that created the center, and strengthen CTIIC's ability to carry out its PILLARS AND KEY RECOMMENDATIONS\n\nresponsibilities, especially in enhancing the quality and\nspeed of attribution.\n- Congress should appropriate the resources necessary\nfor CTIIC to carry out all mission areas enumerated in the 2015 Presidential Memorandum.\n- Congress should appropriate all necessary funds to\nensure that CTIIC can reliably provide reimbursement to departments and agencies for detailees.\n- ODNI should continue existing efforts to improve\nand expand the office's cyber mission, including\noperational and organizational improvements to CTIIC.\n1.4.2 Strengthen the FBI's Cyber Mission and the National Cyber Investigative Joint Task Force The cyber threat presents a unique challengeit typically involves foreign-based actors making use of domestic infrastructure to obscure their true origin before victimizing U.S. organizations and individuals. Therefore, understanding the cyber threat requires domestic intelligence gathering, evidence collection, technical and human operations, and the cooperation of victims and third-party providers to support investigative efforts. The FBI has a unique dual responsibility: to prevent harm to national security as the nation's domestic intelligence agency and to enforce federal laws as the nation's primary federal law enforcement agency. Both roles are essential to investigating and countering the cyber threat, and are critical in supporting whole-of-government campaigns supporting layered cyber deterrence. FBI's cyber missionsynthesized through the multiagency National Cyber Investigative Joint Task Force (NCIJTF) and a nationwide network of field offices and Cyber Task Forceshas long participated in these coordinated cyber campaigns. Officially established in 2008 under National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD) 54, the NCIJTF is composed of over 20 partnering agencies from across law enforcement, the intelligence community, and the Department of Defense to coordinate, integrate, and share information to support cyber threat investigations. Additional resources for FBI and NCIJTF, in combination with complementary recommendations to strengthen CISA and ODNI's CTIIC, will ensure that they each can support the other and carry out their respective missions.\n\nCongress and the executive branch should take steps\nto ensure that the FBI is properly resourced to carry out its cyber mission, perform attribution, strengthen whole-of-government counter-threat campaigns, and enable other agencies' missions in support of national strategic objectives. Specifically:\n- *Enhance investigative and analytical personnel* - FBI\ninvestigators, analysts, and computer scientists are located throughout the country to conduct the investigations and analysis necessary to attribute attacks to and impose consequences on malicious cyber actors.\n- *Expand technical capability* - The FBI's responses to\ncyber incidents require sophisticated tools and platforms to collect and analyze essential evidence and enable investigative techniques. These technologies are used by cyber investigators throughout the field and by the FBI's elite Cyber Action Team, deployed worldwide as needed.\n- *Empower interagency collaboration* - To ensure that all\nrelevant agencies, such as U.S. Secret Service, are able to participate in the NCIJTF, additional resources are needed to adequately fund personnel-related expenses.\n- *Support joint operational resources* - NCIJTF operates\nthe 24/7 CyWatch and the CyNERGY platform for coordinating targeted entity (or victim) notifications. These capabilities must be scaled up to meet the requirements identified by CISA and other stakeholders, including sector-specific agencies.\n\n## Strategic Objective #4: Recruit, Develop, And Retain A Stronger Federal Cyber Workforce\n\nThe U.S. government should recruit, develop, and retain a cyber workforce capable of building a defensible digital ecosystem and enabling the agile, effective deployment of all tools of national power in cyberspace. Doing so will require designing innovative programs and partnerships to develop the workforce, supporting and expanding good programs where they are already in place, and connecting with a diverse pool of promising talent. Sometimes success in building a robust federal workforce depends on elements outside of the federal government. In those cases, the U.S. government can and should play a supporting role by providing its partners in workforce development the tools needed to accelerate the increase in cyber personnel.\n\n1.5 Congress and the executive branch should pass legislation and implement policies designed to better recruit, develop, and retain cyber talent while acting to deepen and diversify the pool of candidates for cyber work in the federal government.\n\nThe challenge of achieving effective security and defense in cyberspace depends on people as much as it does on technology or policy. Today, the U.S. government suffers from a significant shortage in its cyber workforce. Across the public sector more broadly, one in three positions\n(more than 33,000) remains unfilled.162 These shortages are driven by a need for personnel that have specific cybersecurity skills and experience, but they are complicated by government hiring, training, and development pathways that are not well-suited to recruit and retain those personnel.\n\nCommit to Recruiting beyond Conventional Pathways into Government: The good news is that today's cybersecurity skills and experiences can be gained with unusual ease outside standard channels of education and training. That means, however, that the government must more effectively take advantage of those unconventional pathways, especially when they do not include typical college education or prior government experience. Overall government approaches to successfully deepen and diversify this candidate pool should include:\n\n- Developing programs to bring in new employees via\napprenticeships, promoting cooperative study, and expanding training programs so that existing workers can enhance their career trajectories.\n- Researching and implementing measures of competency alongside more commonly used certifications.\n- Streamlining processes and reducing institutional\nbarriers to onboarding cyber talent quickly.\n- Identifying opportunities and building hiring pathways for members of underrepresented communities,\nincluding the neurodiverse,163 women, and people of\ncolor.\nProvide Policy and Legislative Tools to Grow the Cyber Workforce: To achieve these objectives for recruiting today's cybersecurity talent into public service, the government should pursue the following:\n- Congress should fund research into the current state of the cyber workforce, paths to entry, and demographics in coordination with the ongoing work at the Office of Personnel Management (OPM), DHS, the National Science Foundation (NSF), and PILLARS AND KEY RECOMMENDATIONS\n\nthe National Institute of Standards and Technology\n(NIST). This research should align with and/or build on NIST's National Initiative on Cybersecurity Education (NICE) Cybersecurity Workforce Framework, which outlines cybersecurity work roles and the knowledge, skills, abilities, and tasks involved in each role. New research should also build on emerging work from NICE and others on career paths and certifications.\n- Congress should resource recruiting programs specifically designed to target cyber talent and expand current programs that have made demonstrated progress in innovating recruitment.\n- Congress and the executive branch should reinforce\nand authorize the role of the NICE in coordinating U.S. government efforts to advance cybersecurity workforce development nationwide, and resource the office sufficiently for this role.\n- Congress should require the Government\nAccountability Office (GAO) to issue a report within one year: (1) estimating how frequently candidates are deterred from pursuing government careers because of delays in issuing security clearances; (2) assessing the effectiveness of current clearance processes at striking a balance between the national security risk of insider threats, and the national security risk of leaving cyber jobs vacant; and (3)\nrecommending a lead agency for developing and\nimplementing a plan for addressing any shortcomings discovered.\nDevelop and Retain Cybersecurity Talent: Upon entering government, cybersecurity personnel should have rewarding career paths and the education and training opportunities necessary to keep their skills relevant and up-to-date in a rapidly changing field. To meet these objectives, Congress should:\n- Fund DHS, NSF, and OPM to expand the existing CyberCorps: Scholarship for Service program. Since its inception in 2001, this proven program has graduated 3,600 students. The program should be\n\nresourced to grow steadily and eventually reach as\nmany as 2,000 students per year.\n- Direct and fund CISA to design a process for one- to\nthree-year exchange assignments of cyber experts from both CISA and the private sector. If successful, this model should be expanded to other agencies as well.\n- Direct OPM, NICE, and DoD to design cybersecurity-specific upskilling and transition assistance programs for veterans and transitioning military service\nmembers to move into federal civilian cybersecurity jobs.\n- Direct OPM to require departments and agencies to\ndevelop training for managers to cultivate practices that foster a more diverse cyber workforce and more inclusive work environment.\n- Require federal cyber contractors to implement\nknown best-practice workplace policies in order to improve employee retention on federal contracts.\n- Direct OPM, in partnership with federal departments and agencies including NIST and DHS, to issue a report evaluating the potential for a new Civil Service Cyber: a system of established cyber career paths that allows movement between departments and agencies and into senior leadership positions. In order to facilitate movement between different departments and agencies, this plan should:\n u Establish greater standardization and demonstrated equivalences across the government.\n u Incorporate competence-based metrics, workbased learning programs, andafter rigorous assessment of their utility and impactcyber aptitude tests.\n u Include standardization tools such as the NICE\nCybersecurity Workforce Framework and the Cyber Talent Management System (CTMS). The new CTMSto be launched at DHS starting in FY2020will establish a new DHS cybersecurity service, composed of civilian employees hired using streamlined processes, new assessments, and market-sensitive compensation. If CTMS is\nsuccessful at DHS, it should be considered for aggressive expansion federal governmentwide.\n\n1.5.1 Improve Cyber-Oriented Education In almost every industry and discipline, future careers will require both a basic and ongoing education in cyber. It is increasingly vital that schools teach students to value cybersecurity in their own decisions and to start cultivating the skills needed for a career in the field. Accordingly, the federal government should provide resources, tools, and incentives to encourage and aid local decision makers in implementing improved cyber education in their school systems. The U.S. government should:\n- Develop a secure online clearinghouse for K-12\nclassroom resources on cybersecurity.\n\n- Develop work-based learning programs and apprenticeships to supplement classroom learning.\n\n- Support cybersecurity clinics at colleges and universities to serve as educational hands-on training opportunities for students while serving as a valuable resource to their community.\n- Expand the existing Centers of Academic Excellence\nprogram to encourage cyber coursework in fields such as business, law, and health care.\n- Incorporate cybersecurity into safety curricula for\ncareer and technical education programs focused on\noperational technology users, maintainers, and installers, particularly in critical infrastructure fields.164\n- Promote professional development programs for\nK-12 teachers that encourage them to model safe, secure, and privacy-aware internet practices in classrooms (outside of specific cybersecurity instruction).\n- Further explore ways to expand programs such as the\nFBI Cyber STEM program and CISA's Cybersecurity Education Training Assistance Program on a national scale.\n\n## How Can Public-Private Partnerships Help Build The Nation's Cybersecurity Workforce?\n\nWith more than 470,000 U.S. cybersecurity job vacancies in the private sector alone,165 simply expanding government recruitment efforts is not sufficient to provide the cybersecurity workforce needed to protect national security. Rather, the nation's cybersecurity workforce development ecosystem must grow as a whole. Currently, innovative programs are taking the first steps toward addressing this need by building partnerships between educators, government, and industry. For example:\nThe Cybersecurity Apprenticeship Program in North Carolina: The state of North Carolina is working with Innovative Systems Group, a local IT contracting firm, to train cybersecurity apprentices. The firm selects candidatesmost of whom are veteransand places them in an immersive training program. Afterward, the apprentices work alongside mentors at the North Carolina Department of Information Technology.166\nCyber Talent Initiative: The Cyber Talent Initiative, a public-private partnership between Mastercard, Microsoft, Workday, the nonprofit Partnership for Public Service, and the U.S. government, provides recent cybersecurity graduates with a job in the federal government for two years and a chance to work for the partnering private-sector companies thereafter. Those who take private-sector jobs receive $75,000 in student loan support.167 By drawing on different resources from across academia, industry, and government, these programs increase the pool of skilled workers available throughout the ecosystem while reducing or eliminating the cost of learning to individuals in the programs. The federal government cannot focus merely on cutting itself a bigger slice of the cybersecurity workforce pie. Rather, by using tools like these partnershipsand carefully evaluating progressthe government must support growing the whole pie of talent needed throughout the nation.\n\n## Strengthen Norms And Non-Military Tools L\n\nayered cyber deterrence includes shaping the behavior of cyber actors through strengthened norms of responsible state behavior and strengthened non-military tools. Norms, which are \"collective expectations for the proper behavior of actors with a given identity,\"168 already exist in cyberspace but can be bolstered by building on the United States' network of international allies and partners and their shared commitment to enforcing those expectations. Together, like-minded states with a common vision of an open, free, and stable cyberspace can better shape behavior through the attribution of malign actors and the application of the full range of government powers in a cooperative and consistent manner. Nonmilitary tools of state power such as law enforcement, sanctions, diplomatic engagement, and capacity building are among the options for generating credible costs and benefits for norms enforcement, and they are more effective when applied in concert with international partners and allies. While unilateral activity can provide the greatest shortterm flexibility, norms-based multilateral engagement provides a more effective means to reduce the likelihood and effectiveness of cyberattacks for three reasons.\n\nFirst, norms change an adversary's decision calculus. When malicious actors know that rule breaking will be confronted by a global community of allies and partnersrather than a small group of individual states they anticipate that bad behavior is likely to be more severely punished. Second, a system of norms enforced by multiple actors is a relatively cost-effective means of bringing greater stability to cyberspace because it reduces the burden on any one nation to reinforce the system of norms. The costs and effort associated with activities such as intelligence collection and analysis, attribution, and response actions can be shared and the activities more effectively carried out by the coalition. Third, frameworks of norms are stickyonce a pattern of behavior is set, the framework becomes hard to dislodge. The United States and its allies would therefore benefit from being the first to establish the norms agenda.169 These three arguments for effectiveness underscore not that a norms-based system is infallible, but rather that it is well-suited to serve as a first layer of deterrence, complemented by other layers. Accordingly, maximizing the effectiveness of norms and non-military tools of statecraft leads to a more stable and secure cyberspace. The United States is confronted with a challenge in building a community of like-minded states. A small coalition of its closest allies offers agility and trust because the members share principles and goals. However, engagement with a large and diverse community of partners builds broader support for an open, free, and stable cyberspace. Such an inclusive approach is especially important currently because U.S. adversaries are engaging diplomatically with non-aligned states to erode this common vision for the internet.170 The United States has begun to address the task of striking the right balance between agility and inclusivity both through the U.S. State Department's Cyber Deterrence Initiative, which is designed to bring together like-minded partners and allies to deter malicious behavior, and through other diplomatic outreach. Though this is an important start, to be truly effective the State Department's efforts in cyberspace diplomacy must be adequately supported and resourced. Having a community of like-minded states can better strengthen norms and shape behavior through the collective imposition of non-military tools of state power, including sanctions, law enforcement, and intelligence sharing. These partners can, on a voluntary basis, add their voices to public statements and attributions, and participate in other consequences outside of the cyber domain. They may also engage in exercises to demonstrate joint capacity and preparedness to adversaries. Ultimately, a coalition can be effective in enforcing rules only if rules exist and align with the U.S. vision for an open, interoperable, reliable, and secure internet. Preserving a secure and open internet is not just a diplomatic challenge; it is also a technical one. An internet that prioritizes the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of information for all users depends on shared implementation of secure protocols and standards. By participating in standards-setting bodies and building a reputation for making contributions to the global body of best practices, the U.S. technical community, particularly the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST)together\n\n## Strategic Objective: Expand Efforts Through International Engagement To Strengthen And Reinforce Norms In Cyberspace\n\nThe United States should create a broad like-minded community of allies and partners to maintain and reinforce norms that underpin a favorable cyber landscape. International norms are the framework upon which all measures for shaping behavior in cyberspace are built. Aligning this framework with U.S. interests and values is critical. Moreover, if the international community does not generally agree to or understand what the United States considers acceptable behavior, then efforts to punish bad behavior and reward responsible behavior may be ineffective or misinterpreted.\n\n2.1 Congress should create and adequately resource, within the U.S. Department of State, the Bureau of Cyberspace Security and Emerging Technologies (CSET), led by an Assistant Secretary of State.\n\nExpectations for behaviornormsalready exist in cyberspace, but some state and non-state actors defy them, eroding their effectiveness. The United States can reinforce these expectations by assembling a coalition with like-minded state and non-state contributorscan serve as a defense against adversaries who would steer the internet toward greater surveillance and fragmentation. The recommendations supporting this pillar emphasize strengthening norms and non-military tools of state power. Creating within the U.S. Department of State the Bureau of Cyberspace Security and Emerging Technologies, led by an Assistant Secretary of State, will bring leadership and focus to this effort. Enhanced tools, including cyber capacity building, international cyber law enforcement, sanctions and trade enforcement, attribution capability, and confidence-building measures as part of the non-military component of defend forward, can be used by the United States, along with its partners and allies, to impose costs, encourage responsible state behavior, and promote a stable cyberspace.\n\nof allies and like-minded partners to collectively incentivize responsible state behavior in cyberspace and hold states accountable for bad behavior. Responses to malign behavior are more effective when carried out by multiple PILLARS AND KEY RECOMMENDATIONS\ngovernments acting in concert. Building this coalition in the face of competing efforts from China and Russia takes leadership, resources, and personnel, however. To enable the U.S. State Department to form such a coalition, Congress should create the Bureau of Cyberspace Security and Emerging Technologies (CSET), led by an Assistant Secretary reporting to the Under Secretary for Political Affairs or someone of higher rank.\n\nIn addition to guiding the formation of a coalition of likeminded partners and allies, the bureau should be responsible for a range of mission sets required to implement layered cyber deterrence. These areas should include advocating for norms of responsible state behavior in cyberspace and confidence-building measures, responding diplomatically with the international community to cyber threats, advocating for internet freedom, ensuring a secure digital economy, building capacity in our partners and allies to combat cybercrime, and any other mission areas that the Secretary of State assigns to the bureau. Collectively, these elements work together as part of defending forward. CSET will not replace the overseas work of other agencies, but rather will ensure the coherence of U.S. efforts abroad and ensure the alignment of those efforts with U.S. national strategy. The head of this bureau should be Senateconfirmed and hold the rank and status of ambassador. He or she should coordinate international issues with the National Cyber Director, and both would testify before the newly formed Select Cybersecurity Committees. Congress should provide additional funding to this new bureau for its personnel and programs needed to carry out its international cyber mission, especially the mission of building a robust coalition. The mandate for the new CSET bureau is particularly critical because like-minded partners and allies who support a rules-based international order in cyberspace expand the capacity for enforcing such rules while reducing the expense to any one government of holding bad actors accountable for violating them. The U.S. government has already begun work to build a coalition of like-minded partners and allies,171 and these efforts should be resourced to expand to the fullest scale possible. This coalition building is the primary focus of the Department of State's emerging Cyber Deterrence Initiative (CDI). The U.S. government should maximize the utility of this approach by strengthening existing bilateral and multilateral relationships, such as the Five Eyes (the intelligence alliance comprising Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, and the United States) and NATO, and by bringing new nations into the coalition.\n\nPartners and allies contribute to the coalition in a variety of ways. A highly capable and committed core of closely aligned allies is essential, but cultivating new partners even among less closely aligned or technically capable states remains valuable. These partners can, on a voluntary basis, add their voices to public statements and attributions, and participate in other consequences outside of the cyber domain (e.g., sanctions). They may also engage in exercises to demonstrate to adversaries the coalition's joint capacity and preparedness. Over time, the coalition could expand its focus from guaranteeing clear and credible consequences for bad behavior to preventing and constraining such behavior before it happens. Commitments with aligned allies and partners should not preclude broader international engagement. Coordinating with the international community writ large to harmonize policies and practices is a crucial first step toward creating a rules-based order in cyberspace. Ultimately, long-term change in norms enforcement requires engagement from the larger international communitya process that starts with appropriate leadership, resources, and personnel within the Department of State.\n\n2.1.1 Strengthen Norms of Responsible State Behavior in Cyberspace The international community has agreed to cyber norms in several forums, including the United Nations. However, these norms have been unevenly implemented and enforced. Furthermore, our adversaries are using these bodies to advance alternative visions for the future\n\n- Engage in both inclusive and exclusive forums:\nExpand engagement in the United Nations Group of Governmental Experts on Developments in the Field of Information and Telecommunications in the Context of International Security (UN GGE) and the Open-Ended Working Group (OEWG), the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), and other forums. These organizations provide important venues in which to reinforce\nrules that support the U.S. vision for an open,\ninteroperable, reliable, and secure internet.\nSince 2009, the UN GGE has been a productive venue for the United States. Although the group was unable\n\nof cyberspace. Smart engagement with the international community there will strengthen existing norms and ensure countries' continued alignment with the U.S. vision for a free and open future of the internet. Therefore, the U.S. government, led by CSET, should:\n- Take a sector-by-sector approach to norms implementation: Prioritize norms against malicious cyber activity targeting elements of critical infrastructure that underpin shared global stability, such as the financial\nservices sector, building on the existing norm against\nattacking critical infrastructure (CI).\n- *Discuss norms at head-of-state levels:* Seek to address,\nwhere practical, cyberspace policy in venues in which heads of state participate, such as the G7 and G20.\n\n## Why Is International Engagement So Critical To Securing Cyberspace?\n\nIf the United States does not proactively advocate for an open, interoperable, reliable, and secure internet, then those with an alternative authoritarian vision will win the day in international forums, harming both U.S. national security and U.S. economic interests. Achieving layered cyber deterrence against this authoritarian vision will require a resourced and effective Department of State to coordinate diplomatic efforts and reinforce free and open cyber norms. Unfortunately, efforts to expand authoritarian norms have already begun. The United Nations in 2018 adopted a Russian- and Chinese-supported resolution that would fundamentally change efforts against cybercrime. It could eventually lead to a fragmented internet, undermining international cybercrime investigations and allowing greater state control of cyberspace infrastructure to suppress dissent.172 The Russian- and Chinese-supported resolution threatens to normalize actions by authoritarian governments to exert greater control over online speech, block websites critical of their rule, and coordinate with other governments to isolate, undermine, and oppress dissidents abroad.173\nOur competitors understand what is at stake and are investing heavily in shaping the diplomatic environment for this authoritarian vision of cyberspaceall while the United States' investments in cyberspace diplomacy have lagged. After significant increases, China is now the second-largest contributor to the UN budget, and it is seeking to maximize its influence in that body.174 Outside the UN, analysts estimate that Chinese spending on public diplomacy and propaganda outpaces the U.S.\n\nDepartment of State's spending by about 17 times.175 For the first time in decades, the United States no longer leads the world in the number of diplomatic postsChina is now the most-networked great power.176 As Russia and China work together to challenge the U.S. vision of cyberspace, China's increasing diplomatic presence puts weight behind the strategic aims of Russia's UN proposal. Governance of cyberspace is complex, and the domain cannot be kept free and open without widespread support. Without well-resourced and persistent diplomatic efforts, the United States will be unable to effectively advocate for and defend its values in international forums, leaving our adversaries to use cyberspace diplomacy as a means to promote their authoritarian interests and cause permanent damage to cyberspace and the internet's fundamental principles.\n\nPILLARS AND KEY RECOMMENDATIONS\nto produce a consensus report after its 201617\nmeeting,177 it continues to serve as a gathering point for states to establish shared understandings of acceptable behavior in cyberspace. U.S. foreign policy can draw on those understandings to build consensus around the imposition of costsfor example, by using sanctions, indictments, diplomatic signaling,178 and other mechanisms to punish rule breaking. But while the United States has focused on like-minded states to preserve the effectiveness of the UN GGE in the face of Russian and Chinese efforts to derail progress, Russia has recently initiated the OEWG, a parallel multilateral process that engages a much broader set of actors.179 This larger OEWG risks taking the norms conversation in a direction that may not benefit the United States in the long term. However, the OEWG simultaneously provides the United States with an opportunity to engage with states that could be persuaded to embrace a more like-minded viewpoint on norms in cyberspace. In order to bring more states into the fold, the United States should continue to enter all such forums to discuss responsible state behavior with a diverse group of nations. In addition, the U.S. government should take a multi-stakeholder approach to strengthening norms.\n\nWhile the ultimate authority to establish rules for responsible state behavior should be left to states themselves, non-state actors ideally should be included in a consultative capacity whenever possible. Because entities in the private sector and other non-state actors own and operate much of the internet's infrastructure, their involvement adds potentially valuable information and technical capabilities (e.g., taking down malicious infrastructure) to strengthen norms of behavior in cyberspace.\n\n## 2.1.2 Engage Actively And Effectively In Forums Setting International Information And Communications Technology Standards The U.S. Government Should More Actively And Effectively Participate In Forums Setting International Information\n\nand communications technology (ICT) standards. U.S. values, interests, and security are strengthened when ICT standards are developed and set with active American participation. Yet compared to its adversaries, the United States is not participating as much or as effectively in these forums, putting it at a distinct disadvantage. U.S. adversaries are currently sending a wide range of experts who are drawing on their technical depth, negotiating capability, and commercial expertise to shape international ICT standards in their favor.\n\nCongress should empower and sufficiently resource the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) in alignment with the complementary recommendation 4.1.2, Expand and Support the National Institute of Standards and Technology Security Workto facilitate robust and integrated U.S. participation from the federal government, academia, professional societies, and industry in forums setting ICT standards. To participate more effectively, the U.S. government should send not only technical and standards experts but also diplomats. Government and the private sector can work together to promote U.S. values in the face of standards that would otherwise advance authoritarian ideals. The proposed National Cyber Director (NCD) should serve as the central coordination point among U.S.-based actors contributing to standards bodies. To preserve the integrity of the standards process, each actorpublic, private, academic, and so onmust represent only their own opinion, but the NCD can help align those opinions to advocate for standards that promote a free and open internet. The NCD should consider encouraging U.S. business leaders to participate and collaborate in ICT standards forums to ensure the unified promotion of the most technically secure standards in the private sector. Contributions to standards forums can be effective and meaningful only when members trust that all are contributing technically sound proposals in good faith. The best demonstration of good faith that the United States can give is to implement at home the agreed-on international standards. Accordingly, executive branch departments and agencies should, as a matter of regular practice, seek out and whenever practicable implement internationally agreed-on standards rather than those developed domestically.\n\n2.1.3 Improve Cyber Capacity Building and Consolidate the Funding of Cyber Foreign Assistance The U.S. government should assist allied and partner countries and organizations to build their cyber capacities. U.S. national security is improved if the capacity of our allies and partners to prevent, manage, and recover from cyberattacks is improved. Moreover, U.S. adversaries are using U.S. partner countries as test beds for cyber operations that could be used against the United States in the future. Bolstering the capacity of these partners helps stymie adversaries seeking to test and refine cyber weapons. Capacity-building efforts should involve the Department of State as well as the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), Department of Justice (DOJ), Department of the Treasury, International Development Finance Corporation (DFC), Department of Homeland Security (DHS), and other relevant U.S. government entities. Combating cybercrime, which is almost never an exclusively domestic issue, would particularly benefit from building cyber capacity. Cooperation between countries and agencies is critical to effectively combating the threat. The U.S. government should facilitate additional partnerships with foreign law enforcement agencies and better incorporate interagency investigative teams within the overall U.S. strategic approach. Partnerships, such as that between the U.S. Secret Service, the Dutch National High Tech Crime Unit, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation's (FBI) Five Eyes cyber task force, should be fully supported and provided with additional resources. In addition, the U.S. government should expand its training programs for foreign law enforcement partners, such as through the Department of State's International Law Enforcement Academy (ILEA). These types of training programs dramatically enhance the capabilities of indispensable partners and allow for the kind of joint investigations necessary to combat a fundamentally transnational adversary. Congress should consolidate the Department of State's foreign assistance funding to facilitate these efforts. A new funding line in the State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs (SFOPS) appropriations legislation should be created specifically dedicated to building cyber capacity. The creation of this line item would have no initial impact on the Department of State's budget, as funding would be reallocated from other accounts. However, Congress should also consider increasing the budget for building cyber capacity, especially to countries that are being targeted by our adversaries.\n\n2.1.4 Improve International Tools for Law Enforcement Activities in Cyberspace Law enforcement tools like criminal indictments and international extraditions contribute to layered cyber deterrence by signaling the difference between responsible and unacceptable behavior in cyberspace, thereby helping PILLARS AND KEY RECOMMENDATIONS\nto reinforce norms. Law enforcement activities also provide fruitful ground on which to work with international partners and allies to hold adversaries accountable. Improving the United States' ability to support other governments' law enforcement efforts enhances the overall effectiveness of norms in cyberspace. Improve the MLAT/MLAA Process: Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties (MLATs) and Mutual Legal Assistance Agreements (MLAAs) are tools that enable U.S. law enforcement to prosecute cybercriminals. Having a streamlined MLAT/MLAA process assists with tasks such as attribution and extradition. Stronger U.S. alliances in cyberspace and more efficient MLATs/MLAAs help reduce the number of safe havens from which malicious cyber actors can act with impunity. To make the MLAT/MLAA process more efficient, Congress should take several actions. It should provide DOJ's Office of International Affairs with administrative subpoena authority, which would expedite MLAT/MLAA processing by bypassing the need to execute hundreds of court orders to obtain basic subscriber information. In addition, Congress should provide funding to the FBI to help automate the execution of MLAT/MLAA-related search warrants. In fiscal year 2019, the FBI executed 461 communication service provider (CSP) search warrants. These warrant executions required reviewing and filtering\n834 accounts and, in 95 cases, the translation of materials from a total of 28 different languages.180\nIncrease the Number of FBI Cyber ALATs: Congress should create and fund 12 additional FBI Cyber Assistant Legal Attaches (ALATs) to facilitate intelligence sharing and help coordinate joint cyber operations. There are currently 10 ALATs; increasing the total number to 22 will help meet the required demand. These technically trained agents can also assist foreign counterparts by demonstrating investigative best practices in cyber cases. ALATs' overseas position gives them unique insight into emerging threats and the tactics, techniques, and procedures of particular adversaries. Congress should also consider increasing funding for other federal law enforcement agencies to coordinate with foreign law enforcement on cyber investigations.\n\n2.1.5 Leverage Sanctions and Trade Enforcement Actions The U.S. government can better punish cyber aggressors and signal U.S. intent toward potential attackers when it leverages its tools of economic statecraft as a component of a multipronged enforcement strategy. However, the efficacy of sanctions depends heavily on a number of factors, including their target and timeline, the degree of international coordination, and the path to lifting them. The European Union (EU) has already begun to bolster its commitment to using sanctions to deter and respond to cyberattacks through the 2019 EU cyber sanctions regime, which includes banning violators from traveling to the EU and freezing their assets.181 With this framework in mind, the United States should join the international community in strengthening its dedication to using economic sanctions, when possible and appropriate, against those who conduct cyberattacks on the U.S. electoral process and infrastructure. Congress should codify into law Executive Order 13848, \"Executive Order on Imposing Certain Sanctions in the Event of Foreign Interference in a United States Election.\" Congress has already codified Executive Order 13694, \"Blocking the Property of Certain Persons Engaging in Significant Malicious Cyber-Enabled Activities,\" as a part of the Countering America's Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA). Furthermore, in cases dealing with unfair trade practices carried out via cyber means, the Office of the United States Trade Representative should consider taking action under Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974, and the Department of Commerce should consider using the Entity Listpart of the Export Administration Regulationsto impose further requirements. Special care should be taken to ensure that designation under Section 301 is not used in response to cases unrelated to trade.\n\n2.1.6 Improve Attribution Analysis and the Attribution-Decision Rubric Accurate and timely attribution of a cyber incident enables U.S. leaders to make the most informed decisions to protect the country through consideration of appropriate response actions in order to enforce norms of accountability in cyberspace. The Office of the Director of National Intelligence\n(ODNI), in partnership with the private sector through DHS and the FBI, should improve attribution analysis. This can be achieved by (1) standardizing ODNI's Attribution Guidelines and assessment timeline; (2) establishing an attribution analysis working group (not standing but designated), which should include key private-sector analysis and data to accelerate the federal government's response; and (3) advancing analytic capabilities by applying emerging technologies and diversifying data sources to overcome evolving technical challenges. Recommendation 1.4.1, \"Codify and Strengthen the Cyber Threat Intelligence Integration Center,\" further supports this recommendation by strengthening the aggregation and deconfliction entity for assessing attribution. In addition, the National Security Council and the NCD, in consultation with the ODNI, should develop an attribution-decision rubric. The purpose of the rubric is to clarify available responses that should be made based on attribution at some *minimally required* level of confidence. The NSC should appoint an entity to implement the rubric. Even when a cyber incident lacks high-confidence attribution, the rubric will enable the U.S. government to reduce vulnerabilities and take appropriate actions by matching attribution levels to deliverable non-military instruments of state power. When necessary, the U.S. government must be comfortable responding with appropriate actions (i.e., policy decisions) without requiring that a specific level of confidence be present.\n\n2.1.7 Reinvigorate Efforts to Develop Cyber Confidence-Building Measures (CBMs)\nThe Department of State should reinvigorate the development and exercise of bilateral and multilateral cyber confidence-building measures (CBMs). Cyber CBMs are nonbinding, cooperative arrangements and actions that reassure allies, signal adversaries, and demonstrate intent, such as maintaining appropriate points of contact for incident response and emergency hotlines.\n\nCyber CBMs can and should be implemented in concert with the updated National Cyber Strategy. In their current format, CBMs can be used to mitigate risks that relationships between cyber actors will become unstable, thereby helping to avoid crises. Over time, CBMs can also be used as a foundation for the future development of arms-control regimes. Moreover, CBMs can help bolster the development of norms. Recommendation 1.1.1, \"Develop a Multitiered Signaling Strategy,\" is an example of how a CBM can be applied, by providing clarity to adversaries, partners, and allies on how the United States intends to act. The Department of State should continue to develop and implement both regional and global cyber CBMs, together with non-state stakeholders such as private-sector entities.182 Specifically, the Department of State should build on the CBMs enumerated in the 2015 Report of the UN GGE and Decision Document No. 1202 (2016) of the OSCE in the Field of Information and Telecommunications in the Context of International Security.183 The U.S. government should actively implement CBMs, coordinated by the National Cyber Director, that account for the unique attributes and dynamics of the cyber domain. These CBMs can help actors share information, mitigate uncertainty, create lines of communication that can restrain unwanted escalation in emergencies and crises, and facilitate crisis management, thereby promoting stability between states.\n\n## Promote National Resilience R\n\nesiliencethe capacity to withstand and quickly recover from attacks that could compel, deter, or otherwise shape U.S. behavioris a foundational element of layered cyber deterrence, ensuring that critical functions and the full extent of U.S. power remain available in peacetime and are preserved in crisis. It denies adversaries benefits by reducing the chances that their attacks can achieve strategic objectives or have strategic consequences.184 National security, economic security, public health and safety, and the integrity of our political system are all elements of national strength and stability that must be preserved. However, as the United States has become more technologically advanced, the systems and assetsor critical infrastructurethat support these elements of national power have come under increasing risk of cyberattack, placing their continued function in jeopardy.185 To enhance the nation's overall resilience, this pillar focuses on three strategic objectives. First, national resilience efforts fundamentally depend on the ability of the United States to accurately and comprehensively understand, assess, and manage risk across the critical infrastructure ecosystem.186 To better understand risk at a national level, the United States should clarify and codify the roles played by sector-specific agencies and the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency in working together and with the private sector to gather and assess risk information on an ongoing basis. However, addressing national risk cannot stop there. The U.S. government must also institutionalize and routinize a process to regularly build an understanding of how the risks of different sectors come together and to translate this understanding into a multiyear strategy, priorities, and a budget for U.S. government and private-sector efforts. By understanding, assessing, and managing national risk, the United States will be in a better position to diminish both the incidences and the consequences of attempts by adversaries to erode the integrity of the elements of America's national strength.\n\nSecond, national resilience requires sufficient national capacity and preparedness to respond to and recover from attacks when they do happen, ensuring continuity of critical functions where possible and quickly restarting where not. The United States has well-established mechanisms and processes to respond to physical and natural disasters. The same rigor has not yet been applied to understanding and responding to cyber states of distress and disasters. Doing so requires planning and exercising to guarantee that the U.S. government and private sector are coordinated in response to significant and potentially catastrophic cyber incidents. It also means ensuring that the U.S. government is equipped with the requisite authorities, capabilities, and resources to meaningfully aid in response and recovery should the time come that they are required. Third, Americans' trust in the political system, and in the democratic institutions that underpin it, remains a foundational element of national resilience. Our recent past has shown that our democratic institutions represent a soft and attractive target for malicious actors seeking to undermine the American peoples' trust in the integrity of our democracy. Building a truly resilient America in the face of growing cyber threats means ensuring that the cornerstones of our democracy are impervious to these threats. To do so, we must update the way we both approach the security of our election systems and campaigns and harden the American people against the malign influence of adversaries who wish to subvert them.\n\n## Strategic Objective #1: Understand, Assess, And Manage National Risk\n\nThe U.S. government should build the necessary structures and processes to continuously understand, assess, and manage national-level cyber risk across the critical infrastructure ecosystem. Owners and operators of critical infrastructure are not always fully aware of the risk they inherit, the risk they own, the risk they pass on, and, more relevant to the federal government, the risk they bear for national security, economic security, and public health and safety. Creating an accurate picture of \"national risk\" has thus far eluded the U.S. government and the private sector working independently, and the United States should focus on strengthening the public-private mechanisms for both understanding and mitigating national risk in areas where such mitigation is most critical.\n\n3.1 Congress should codify responsibilities and ensure sufficient resources for the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) and sector-specific agencies (SSAs) in the identification, assessment, and management of national and sector-specific risk.\n\nLed by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), critical infrastructure resilience and national risk management rely on a complex system of partnerships with the private sector and a number of agencies across the federal government. While empowering CISA is a critical step in building national resilience, the executive branch must also take steps to strengthen sector-specific agencies (SSAs). As defined in Presidential Policy Directive 21, SSAs manage much of the day-today engagement between the federal government and private-sector entities within a given critical infrastructure sector. National resilience requires that each of these agencies is able to identify, assess, and support the private sector in managing risks within the sector under its charge and to contribute to managing risks at the national level, where cross-sector risksboth physical and cybercan be identified and controlled over time. However, there are significant imbalances and inconsistencies in both the capacity and the willingness of these agencies to manage sector-specific risks and participate in government-wide efforts. In addition, the lack of clarity and consistency concerning the responsibilities and requirements for these agencies, both within their sectors and in their relations with CISA, continues to cause confusion, redundancy, and gaps in resilience efforts. It also confounds the efforts of Congress, or overseeing departments and agencies, to hold these agencies accountable. These features reveal significant limitations in the U.S. government's ability to comprehensively understand and mitigate national risk.\n\nCongress should codify SSAs into law as \"Sector Risk Management Agencies\"; establish responsibilities and requirements for identifying, assessing, and assisting in managing risk for the critical infrastructure sectors under their purview; and appropriate the respective agency's funds necessary to carry out these responsibilities.187 As a corresponding measure, Congress should recognize CISA's lead role in national risk management and the functions of the National Risk Management Center. This legislation should clarify roles and responsibilities between these agencies assisting in managing sector-specific risks and CISA. To alleviate the issue of inconsistent maturity, this codification should provide the resources necessary for both agencies assisting in managing PILLARS AND KEY RECOMMENDATIONS\nsector-specific risks and CISA to implement their responsibilities for their sectors and act as mature, steadfast partners in overall national resilience efforts. The ability of the federal government to scale up its efforts and advance a deeper collaboration with the private sector on cybersecurity and resilience fundamentally depends on guiding SSAs to maturity, ensuring their consistency across sectors, and empowering them to represent their sectors and fully integrate with national risk management efforts led by CISA, with the supporting efforts of the U.S. intelligence community. Designation of Sector Risk Management Agencies: As part of this codification, Congress should direct the U.S. government, in a process led by DHS, to review the current critical infrastructure model, propose revisions based on an updated understanding of risk, and revise the National Infrastructure Protection Plan in accordance with proposed changes. The updated model should form the basis for one or more presidential determinations that designate a primary Sector Risk Management Agency aligned with each sector. This presidential determination would act as the mechanism by which newly codified responsibilities and authorities are assigned or delegated to departments and agencies with commensurate funds to fulfill those duties. Risk Identification and Assessment: In a process led by CISA and codified in a \"National Risk Management Cycle\" (recommendation 3.1.1), Sector Risk Management Agencies should have the responsibility and be empowered to identify and assess risk within their critical infrastructure sectors, both to inform their own programs and to participate in the more general work of CISA's cross-sector risk identification and assessment. Congress should ensure that the information necessary to inform this process, such as common interdependencies and vulnerabilities, is protected from public disclosure. Intelligence Needs Identification and Assessment: In a process led by the Office of Director of National Intelligence and CISA, as suggested in recommendation 5.1.1, Sector Risk Management Agencies should have the responsibility and be empowered to work with industry, including sector-coordinating councils, and information sharing and analysis centers to identify common intelligence gaps and areas of critical risk or vulnerability so that the intelligence community can provide actionable, focused intelligence.\n\nSector Risk Management Agency Audit and Scorecard:\nCongress should additionally direct the Office of Management and Budget, in coordination with CISA, to establish a process to evaluate the performance of each Sector Risk Management Agency in driving down the risk in its respective sector. This assessment will include, but not be limited to, how each agency implements the \"Critical Infrastructure Resilience Strategy\" (described in recommendation 3.1.1) and participates in activities prescribed by CISA in the National Risk Management Cycle. This assessment should include the perspective of the private sector and sector-coordinating councils, and be made available to Congress yearly. Each agency head will be responsible for providing a report on the adequacy and effectiveness of its programs and activities in fulfilling the strategy and priorities, as well as any other relevant information requested by the Directors of the Office of Management and Budget and CISA. Cyber Incident Response, Management, and Coordination: Government agencies mounting incident response and technical assistance efforts, such as CISA, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), and, within its authority, the Department of Defense (DoD), should be required to notify Sector Risk Management Agencies when cyber incidents affect an entity within their sector, unless precluded from doing so by a legal constraint or by considerations of operational sensitivity. This process ensures that such efforts can benefit from the unique insight and expertise that Sector Risk Management Agencies provide, as well as ensure that each Sector Risk Management Agency maintains situational awareness of its sector. This requirement should be protected from public disclosure, with penalties associated with inappropriate disclosure to regulatory or non-federal entities.\n\nCentralized Programmatic Support to Sector-Specific Agencies: Congress should, in coordination with the Office of Management and Budget and relevant departments and agencies, appropriate funds for shared-service programs to enable CISA to support Sector Risk Management Agencies. These would include shared services, common programs, and foundational tools used by Sector Risk Management Agencies and provided or managed by CISA. This approach will help enable these agencies in their mission, provide consistent private sectorfocused programs and approaches across the federal government, reduce redundancy, and ensure that certain services, like information sharing, can benefit from economies of scale and best practices.\n\n## Enabling Recommendations 3.1.1 Establish A Five-Year National Risk Management Cycle Culminating In A Critical Infrastructure Resilience Strategy\n\nCritical infrastructure resilience requires the United States to be able to develop a comprehensive understanding of national risk and to translate that understanding into resources to manage or minimize that risk over time. These activities should be cyclical, mutually supporting, and routinely exercised, so that the government gains an ever-evolving understanding of a shifting risk landscape and adjusts its programs and priorities to follow suit.\n\nWhile the U.S. government has made great strides at understanding national risk by concentrating on how national critical functions work and applying that understanding to its priorities and programs, significant limitations remain. The U.S. government still lacks rigorous, codified, and routinely exercised processes for identifying, assessing, and prioritizing critical infrastructure risks across the federal government and between the public and private sectors. In areas where critical infrastructure risks have been identified, risk management efforts have been further limited by annual funding of programs rather than the stable, multiyear funding necessary to fully minimize that risk over time.\n\nTo address this shortcoming, Congress should direct\nthe executive branch to establish a five-year National Risk Management Cycle that culminates in a Critical Infrastructure Resilience Strategy. This strategy would then be implemented, and adjusted as necessary, in the following five-year cycle. Through this five-year risk management cycle, the federal government would identify and assess national risk, implement plans for managing or mitigating that risk, and update national critical functions. Specifically:\n- Congress should direct the executive branch to\nconduct an initial two-year risk identification and assessment of critical infrastructure based on currently defined national critical functions. The results would inform the first Critical Infrastructure Resilience Strategy, to be delivered in the initial two years and every five years thereafter.\n- Congress should also direct the executive branch\nto establish processes and procedures to establish a five-year National Risk Management Cycle, including defining procedures for identifying, assessing, and prioritizing risks and translating this understanding into strategy, budget, and programmatic priorities for relevant departments and agencies. These processes and procedures should be made in consultation with private industries, posted publicly and made available for public comment, and be\nadaptive and iterative to account for lessons learned\nfrom previous cycles.\n- Risk identification and assessments formed in the\ncycle should directly inform and culminate in a Critical Infrastructure Resilience Strategy, which will set programmatic and budgetary priorities to be implemented in the following five-year National Risk Management Cycle.\n- These activities should provide quantitative and\nqualitative data to inform the National Cybersecurity Assistance Fund (recommendation 3.1.2), Continuity of the Economy planning (recommendation 3.2), and the U.S. government's resilience and preparedness programs and should be informed,\nPILLARS AND KEY RECOMMENDATIONS\nguided, and updated through regular exercises, such as the Biennial National Cyber Tabletop Exercise (recommendation 3.3.5).\n\n3.1.2 Establish a National Cybersecurity Assistance Fund to Ensure Consistent and Timely Funding for Initiatives That Underpin National Resilience While the Homeland Security Grant Program and resourcing for national preparedness under the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) are well-established,188 the U.S. government has no equivalent for cybersecurity preparation or prevention. The lack of a consistent, resourced fund for investing in resilience in key areas inhibits the U.S. government from conveying its understanding of risk into strategy, planning, and action in furtherance of core objectives for the security and resilience of critical infrastructure. To address this shortcoming, Congress should pass a law establishing a National Cybersecurity Assistance Fund for projects and programs aimed at systematically increasing the resilience of public and private entities, thereby increasing the overall resilience of the United States. Grant programs organized under this fund would be, depending on purpose, available to public or private entities.\n\n- The fund should be used only for solutions, projects,\nand programs for which (1) there is a clearly defined, critical risk to be mitigated, (2) market forces do not provide sufficient private-sector incentives to mitigate the risk without government investment, and (3) there is clear federal need, role, and responsibility to mitigate the risk.\n- The fund would be administered by FEMA and\ndirected by CISA in coordination with Sector Risk\nManagement Agencies, and would be authorized and\nappropriated for 10 years.\n- DHS would be required to submit a yearly report\nupdating Congress on new programs established under the fund and on the progress of existing programs.\n- The fund should have sufficient flexibility to be used\nin instances in which timely resilience or security investment would neutralize or substantially mitigate an overriding, serious threat to national security, economic security, or public health and safety.\n- Grants provided to state, local, tribal, and territorial\n(SLTT) entities under this fund should require 10 percent matching funds in the first year of its establishment, to be increased every subsequent year by 10 percent until 50 percent matching funds are required. Grants would require 50 percent matching funds every year thereafter to minimize moral hazard.\n\n## Strategic Objective #2: Ensure National Capacity To Respond To And Recover From A Significant Cyber Incident\n\nThe United States should establish a national capacity to respond to and recover from a significant cyber event, and provide the government with the authorities necessary to ensure economic continuity and cyber resiliencein partnership with the owners and operators of public- and private-sector critical infrastructure. National resilience requires the nation to be sufficiently prepared to respond to and recover from attacks, sustain critical functions even under degraded conditions, and, in some cases, restart critical functionality after disruptionman-made or not. While the U.S. government maintains robust processes and mechanisms to respond to and recover from physical disasters or national emergencies through Continuity of Operations, Continuity of Government, and FEMA operations, there are gaps in other areas. The 2017 National Security Strategy identifies economic security as national security, but there are no comparably robust continuity mechanisms and planning efforts in place to ensure a rapid restart and recovery of the national economy in the event of a truly catastrophic disruption. In addition, the U.S. government faces both institutional and resource limitations in its ability to assist the private sector and SLTT governments in the prevention of, response to, and recovery from a significant cyber incident that falls below the level that would elicit an emergency declaration.\n\n3.2 Congress should direct the executive branch to develop and maintain Continuity of the Economy planning in consultation with the private sector to ensure the continuous operation of critical functions of the economy in the event of a significant cyber disruption.\n\nWhile Continuity of Operations and Continuity of Government have long been cornerstones of government contingency planning, no equivalent effort exists to ensure the rapid restart and recovery of the U.S. economy after a major disruption.189 Such disruptions could include an attack on major stock exchanges, an electronic-magnetic pulse event, a regional disruption of power, or any other attack that compromises the national conveyance of goods or services. In developing and conducting Continuity of the Economy planning, the United States should focus its efforts on maintaining the continuity of national- or international-level distribution or exchange of goods and services, on which U.S. economic strength and public confidence are founded. While disruption of these regional or local mechanisms may have consequences of their own, existing resilience and recovery efforts can often account for, respond to, and mitigate localized effects. However, disruption of upstream, national-level mechanisms in many sectorsincluding bulk power distribution, stock exchanges, wholesale payments, medicine, telecommunications, and trade or logisticswould have cascading effects downstream, creating further failures at regional and local levels and causing shortages that would hamper U.S. response, recovery, and mobilization efforts. Should a significant cyber event occur during wartime, military readiness and mobilization would be significantly hindered. Moreover, long-term disruptions to core economic functions would undermine the United States' international standing, credibility, and appeal in an increasingly competitive global marketplace. Creating and exercising a Continuity of the Economy plan will serve as a deterrent to adversaries by demonstrating that the United States PILLARS AND KEY RECOMMENDATIONS\nhas the wherewithal to respond and remain resilient to a significant cyberattack. Congress should direct the executive branch to develop and maintain Continuity of the Economy planning to ensure continuous operation of critical functions of the economy in the event of a significant cyber disruption. The planning process should include the Department of Homeland Security, Department of Defense, Department of Commerce, Department of the Treasury, Department of Energy, and any other departments or agencies as determined by the President. The executive branch should report back to Congress on the status of its planning effort within one year and provide updates to Congress on a yearly basis thereafter. As part of the planning process, the executive branch should determine any additional authorities or resources that would be required to implement plans in the case of a disaster or for the establishment of programs that support and maintain department and agency planning capabilities for Continuity of the Economy efforts. In forming or updating Continuity of the Economy planning, the executive branch should draw on insights from the National Risk Management Cycle and planning should inform the Critical Infrastructure Resilience Strategy (recommendation 3.1.1). Analyze National Critical Functions: A Continuity of the Economy plan should focus on the national-level distribution of goods and services necessary for the reliable economic functioning of the United States. Leveraging work on the national critical functions already in development, the plan should outline the key private-sector entities that constitute or are integral to these distribution mechanisms and bear primary responsibility in maintaining and operating them for sectors, regions, or the economy as a whole. These key mechanisms include, but are not limited to, the following:\n- Bulk power and electric distribution systems. - National or international financial exchanges, including wholesale payments, stocks, monetary exchanges, and payment clearing and settlement systems.\n\n- National or international communications networks, data hosting, and cloud services.\n\n- Interstate oil and natural gas pipelines.\n- National-level trade and logistics, including maritime\nshipping, interstate railways, and airline cargo.\nPrioritize Response and Recovery: The plan should establish a framework for rapidly restarting and recovering core functions in a crisis. Using a schema for setting priorities similar to those used for Continuity of Operations and Continuity of Government, the plan should give precedence to functions whose disruption could cause catastrophic economic loss, lead to runaway loss of public confidence, imperil human life on a national scale, or undermine response, recovery, or mobilization efforts in a crisis. The plan should also outline standard operating procedures for plan activation, execution, and implementation. Identify Areas for Investments in Resilience: Continuity of the Economy planning should identify areas where risk of disruption is so catastrophic that establishment of secure, separate critical systems, including analog or retro systems, would be an effective use of resources. Continuity of the Economy planning should further review the feasibility of \"disconnecting,\" or air gapping, critical services or specific industrial control networks if national security concerns overwhelm the need for internet connectivity. Finally, this work should emphasize the importance of developing plans to mitigate the consequences of successful cyberattacks.\n\nIdentify Areas for Preserving Data: Continuity of the Economy planning should identify critical segments of the economy where particular data, preserved in a protected, verified, and uncorrupted format, would be required to quickly restart the economy in the face of disruption or significant cyberattack. The United States should further explore options to store backup, protected data across borders with allies or partners, particularly in areas where economic disruption in either country could have cascading effects on the global economy. Identify Key Materials, Goods, and Services: The executive branch should consider whether to include a list of raw materials, industrial goods, and key services whose absence would significantly undermine the ability of the United States to avoid or recover from an economic collapse and a recommendation as to whether the United States should maintain a strategic reserve of those materials, goods, and services. Extend Credit: The executive branch should also consider mechanisms, when presented with a declaration of national emergency by the President, to ensure the extension of credit to key participants in the national economy when such credit would be necessary to avoid catastrophic economic collapse or would allow the recovery from such a collapse. Such mechanisms could include authorizing the Department of the Treasury or the Federal Open Market Committee to extend the credit of the United States to these entities for their rapid recovery.\n\n3.3 Congress should codify a \"Cyber State of Distress\" tied to a \"Cyber Response and Recovery Fund\" to ensure sufficient resources and capacity to respond to significant cyber incidents.\n\nThough FEMA mechanisms may be available to aid response to and recovery from a cyber incident that approaches the level of a natural disaster, few cyber incidents are likely to cross that threshold.190 Current mechanisms for cyber incident response, outlined under Presidential Policy Directive 41 and detailed in the National Cyber Incident Response Plan, do not empower federal agencies with additional authority, funding, or resources to respond to or aid non-federal entities even when a \"significant cyber incident\" designation has been made. The absence of such empowerment remains a key check on the U.S. government's ability to ensure appropriate capacity, support, and organization in its response to cyber incidents. To address this shortcoming, Congress should pass a law codifying a \"Cyber State of Distress\"a federal declaration that would trigger the availability of additional resources through a \"Cyber Response and Recovery Fund\"to assist SLTT governments and the private sector beyond what Expand Education and Readiness of the General Public:\nBy its very nature, Continuity of the Economy planning will prioritize the most essential functions of our countryand their localesboth to enable a rapid recovery from a devastating cyberattack and to preserve the strength and will to quickly punish the attacker. Many industries will not be included in this planning, and most citizens will not be able to rely on government assistance in the period following such an attack.\n\nBut as is also true of natural disaster preparedness, the American people do not need to be helpless. DHS and other relevant agencies should expand citizen preparedness efforts and public awareness mechanisms to be ready for such an event.\n\nis available through conventional technical assistance and cyber incident response programs. The declaration would be used exclusively for responding to, or preemptively preparing for, cyber incidents whose significance is above \"routine\" but below what would trigger an emergency declaration and for incidents that exceed or are expected to exceed the capacity of federal civilian authorities to effectively support critical infrastructure in response and recovery. The fund would be used to augment or scale up government technical assistance and incident response efforts in support of public and private critical infrastructure. A key provision is the inclusion of preemptive action and preparation, which accounts for instances when the federal government has a reasonable expectation that a significant cyber incident is likely to occur and preemptive action and preparation would reduce potential consequences of disruption or compromise. Threshold for State of Distress Declaration: The declaration should be made in response to or in anticipation of a PILLARS AND KEY RECOMMENDATIONS\nthe Secretary of Homeland Security as principal federal official responsible for coordinating incident response, recovery, and management efforts on behalf of the entire federal government. In addition to covering response and recovery efforts, this coordination would need to account for, and protect, law enforcement interests, including the preservation of forensic data necessary to attribute the attack and enable subsequent investigations by law enforcement agencies. This coordination role should not supersede other existing department and agency authorities or direct law enforcement activity.\n\n\"significant cyber incident,\" or one that is (or group of related cyber incidents that together are) likely to result in demonstrable harm to the national security interests, foreign relations, or economy of the United States or to the public confidence, civil liberties, or public health and safety of the American people. Such cyber incidents could include a coordinated campaign of multiple, individual incidents occurring over time that are not significant on their own but collectively yield significant consequences. A\nmajor consideration for making this declaration should be when an incident or series of incidents exceeds the capacity of civil authorities to effectively aid the private sector and SLTT in preparation, response, or recovery.\n\nDisbursement of a Cyber Response and Recovery Fund:\nCongress should establish and appropriate funds to maintain a Cyber Response and Recovery Fund, administered by FEMA and directed by CISA. Disbursement would be Incident Response Coordination and Management: The declaration would invoke current authority that establishes\n\n## Is Our Water Supply (Cyber) Secure?\n\nEvery American, every day, depends on a supply of clean water. Yet most Americans would be surprised to learn that even though water is critical in our daily lives, and even though our water supply is known to be a target for malign actors, water utilities remain largely ill-prepared to defend their networks from cyber-enabled disruption.191 The U.S. water supply is operated by nearly 70,000 utilities192 that are turning to digital networks to manage real-world physical processes critical to water treatment and distributionbut these utilities are approaching this transition with dramatic variations in capacity and sophistication. Like our electoral system, this distributed network can provide a measure of resilience. Also like our electoral system, it can limit the effectiveness of federal action and slow the deployment of best practices or the responsible incorporation of secure technologies. Gaps in utilities' network configurations, insecure remote access systems, and outdated training regimes are just a few of the vectors through which Americans' water infrastructure is vulnerable to cyber-enabled exploitation.193 Malign actors have already attempted to breach water infrastructure systems, and they could eventually exploit these vulnerabilities to disrupt or contaminate the American water supply.194\nCompounding these problems, municipal utilities often lack the resources or capacity to address these weaknesses. In partnership with the Department of Homeland Security, federal sector-specific agencies (SSAs) and state and local governments are currently responsible for managing and securing American utilities. For water, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)\nis the principal federal agency responsible for cyber risk management.195 In practice, however, SSA responsibilities are unclear, and that uncertainty contributes to insufficient coordination between the EPA and other stakeholders in water utilities' security, as well as to cybersecurity funding requests that lack the resources and buy-in necessary for success. These shortcomings imperil the cybersecurity that is vital to the water infrastructure, which in turn is vital to our lives. Codifying SSA responsibilities, ensuring that SSAs such as the EPA conduct their risk management assignments effectively, and better enabling state and local governments are all critical steps toward improving the capacity of water utilities to prevent and mitigate the growing threats they face from cyberspace.\n\ntriggered when a Cyber State of Distress is declared. The funds would not be used for direct financial assistance to affected entities but to increase, scale up, or augment the capabilities of federal civil authorities to provide technical assistance and incident response. This would include enabling standby contracts with private-sector cybersecurity services or incident responders and funding DoD personnel operating under Defense Support to Civil Authorities.\n\n3.3.1 Designate Responsibilities for Cybersecurity Services under the Defense Production Act The Defense Production Act provides the U.S. government with expansive authorities to prioritize resources in the event of a natural or man-made disaster, military conflict, or act of terrorism within the United States. However, the most recent executive order pertaining to the act, Executive Order 13603, neither accounts for nor designates responsibilities for \"cybersecurity services,\" including private-sector incident response. These authorities can be better leveraged to provide a more optimal allocation of resources to ensure sufficient capacity for protection against, response to, and recovery from a significant cyber incident. This would empower the United States to better understand and allocate resources for private-sector reserve capacity and procure standby contracts that could be triggered by a significant cyber incident or by an incident that exceeds the federal government's capacity to respond. To take full advantage of the Defense Production Act for cybersecurity issues, the President should issue or amend an executive order that prioritizes and designates responsibility for \"cybersecurity services.\" This would enhance the U.S. government's ability to rapidly mobilize the private sector in response to a significant cyber incident. This order should ensure that the U.S. government makes all necessary preparations to understand and address gaps in private-sector incident response capacity and prioritization in assisting critical infrastructure in responding to and recovering from a significant cyber incident.\n\n- The executive order should designate DHS as the lead\nagency to identify cybersecurity-related services that are essential to national security and assess the capacity of these services to support national security needs.\n- Under Title VII of the Defense Production Act, the\nU.S. government should convene the cybersecurity incident response industry to understand the full capacity of their services in steady-state as compared to the capacity that would be required for significant\ncyber incidents and catastrophic scenarios that have\nreal-world consequences.\n- Using this information, the U.S. government can\nprocure standby contracts with cybersecurity incident responders under Title III of the Defense Production Act, which would be triggered for additional assistance in cyber response and recovery efforts in response to a significant or catastrophic cyber incident.\n3.3.2 Clarify Liability for Federally Directed Mitigation, Response, and Recovery Efforts If the United States were to suffer a significant cyber incident, the federal government would undoubtedly require the assistance of private-sector partners in response and recovery. Existing laws to facilitate these activities, such as the Defense Production Act and Federal Power Act, are limited in their ability to provide reliable liability protections for private-sector entities or public utilities that take action, or refrain from taking action, at the direction of the federal government. Because of this lack of protection, private-sector entities or public utilities fearing legal liability and lawsuits may be reluctant to cooperate with the government. To address this concern, Congress should pass a law specifying that entities taking, or refraining from taking, action at the duly authorized direction of any agency head, or any other federal official authorized by law, should be insulated from legal liability. Covered actions should include any request or order by relevant federal agencies issued to protect against or respond to an emergency or threat relating to a cybersecurity incident impacting national security.\n\nPILLARS AND KEY RECOMMENDATIONS\n3.3.3 Improve and Expand Planning Capacity and Readiness for Cyber Incident Response and Recovery Efforts Prior planning is critical for government readiness in responding to and recovering from a significant cyber event. Congress should increase planning capacity within DHS to enable the preparation, review, and updating of key planning documents, standard operating procedures, standby contracts, and nondisclosure agreements necessary for putting into operation plans for cyber incident response and recovery. This planning should allow for immediate execution of response plans and mechanisms during a crisis; take into account national, regional, and SLTT implications; and incorporate and empower Cyber State of Distress declarations, the Cyber Response and Recovery Fund (recommendation 3.3), and Continuity of the Economy planning (recommendation 3.2). Planning should encompass entities that are critical to response and recovery efforts (e.g., private-sector entities, sector-specific agencies, SLTT governments, and international partners).196\nThese planning efforts should also include the following steps:\n- The federal government should revise the National Cyber Incident Response Plan (NCIRP)the plan that details how federal, SLTT, and private entities should respond to and recover from significant cyber incidents impacting critical infrastructure197by adding scenario-specific and sector-specific annexes drafted together with sector-specific agencies and Sector Coordinating Councils.\n\n- The annexes of the NCIRP should account for options to mobilize additional resources to augment the government's response, including private-sector incident responders, the DoD under Defense Support to Civil Authorities, the National Guard, and other SLTT assets.\n\n- Planning efforts should be integrated and interoperable with existing emergency response and disaster recovery mechanisms and programs operated by federal and SLTT entities.\n\n3.3.4 Expand Coordinated Cyber Exercises, Gaming, and Simulation Preparedness planning leads to defined response mechanisms, public awareness, and improved response. In practice, however, plans can be rendered ineffective by unforeseen challenges and limitations.198 Exercises build understanding of how complex systems will react in a time of disruption or crisis, building cohesion among disparate entities coordinating the response and promoting unity of effort that can translate to seamless integration when an incident does occur. Congress should support and fund FEMA and CISA in implementing expanded and coordinated cross-sector cyber exercises, gaming, and simulation, as well as sector-specific agencies in smaller, sector-specific exercises.\n\nThe existing cohort of exercises, including GridEx,199\nHamilton,200 and Cyber Storm,201 cover a portion of what is necessary for overall national cybersecurity, but they should be enhanced and expanded to include joint exercises among the private sector, the federal government, SLTT entities, and, when and where possible, international partners. These exercises should also be used as the primary mechanism by which the U.S. government exercises Continuity of the Economy planning. Such exercises should also emphasize the importance of ensuring resilient communications among key stakeholders and continuous engagement with the general public.\n\n3.3.5 Establish a Biennial National Cyber Tabletop Exercise Exercises that account for and incorporate all elements of national power are critical both in demonstrating and ensuring the United States' ability to respond to and recover from cyber disruption and in reducing adversaries' confidence that attacks are able to achieve strategic objectives and shape U.S. behavior. While various departments and agencies in the U.S. government regularly conduct exercises on cyber incident response, the United States lacks a persistent senior-level exercise that incorporates the whole-of-government and whole-of-nation approach necessary for effective response and recovery.\n\nparticipants with training on industry network infrastructure and cyber protection best practices.\n\nCongress therefore should direct the U.S.\ngovernment to plan and execute on a biennial basis a national-level cyber tabletop exercise that involves senior leaders from the executive branch, Congress, state governments, and the private sector, as well as international partners, where appropriate.\n- This \"National Cyber Tabletop\nExercise\" should be organized and\nled by the National Cyber Director (recommendation 1.3) with the support of the DHS, FBI, and DoD, in coordination with sector-specific agencies, state governments, and private-sector partners.\n- The exercise should be used as an\nopportunity to operationalize, troubleshoot, and inform preparedness programs such as Continuity of the Economy planning and to test the effectiveness of response and recovery measures such as the Cyber State of Distress and the Cyber Response\nand Recovery Fund.\n- The exercise should also be used as an opportunity\nto improve, inform, and guide resilience measures,\nsuch as the National Cybersecurity Assistance Fund\n(recommendation 3.1.2) and other efforts that fall within the National Risk Management Cycle and the National Critical Infrastructure Resilience Strategy (recommendation 3.1.1).\n3.3.6 Clarify the Cyber Capabilities and Strengthen the Interoperability of the National Guard States have increasingly relied on National Guard units under state active duty and Title 32 of the U.S. Code to prepare for, respond to, and recover from cybersecurity incidents that overwhelm state and local assets.202 While Title 32 has been interpreted to allow for these activities, Department of Defense guidelines leave ambiguities\n\nabout what activities the National Guard can conduct and\nbe reimbursed for with federal funding.203 In addition,\nit is unclear how state cyber incident response forces, including the National Guard in state active-duty status, would integrate with federal personnel and processes when\nresponding to a significant cyber incident, and current federal cyber incident response planning does not sufficiently account for or integrate the role of the National Guard.\n- Congress should direct DoD to update existing\npolicies to consider National Guard activities that could be performed and reimbursed under Title 32\nof the U.S. Code.204\n- The National Guard Bureau should promulgate\nguidance to its constituent cyber units on CISA's and the FBI's cyber roles and responsibilities, the agencies' local presence and capabilities, ways to collaborate during times of stability (e.g., through local multiagency task forces and information-sharing groups), and incident response planning and exercises.\nPILLARS AND KEY RECOMMENDATIONS\n\n- The Department of Homeland Security should more\nregularly integrate state cyber incident response forces, including the National Guard in state activeduty status, as part of response and recovery planning and exercises and should define mechanisms to ensure interoperability at times of crisis.\n\n## Strategic Objective #3: Ensure The Security Of Our Elections And Resilience Of Our Democracy\n\nThe U.S. government should ensure the security of our elections and resilience of our democracy. Americans' trust and confidence in their democratic system remain foundational elements of national resilienceand an attractive target for malicious actors. The network of institutions, tools, and personnel that compose our electoral system depend on connectivity and data, introducing new vectors to disrupt the U.S. political system, including at and beyond the ballot box. The federal institutions charged with protecting our electoral process require organizational reform, enduring funding streams, and modern mandates to ensure that states and other partners in our political system, including political parties and campaigns, can improve and maintain their cybersecurity capacityand ensure that our electoral systems retain a verifiable, auditable paper trail and paper-based balloting backbone. Going beyond elections, the U.S. government must also seek to better understand and counter broader cyber threats targeting our democratic institutions.\n\n3.4 Congress should improve the structure and enhance funding of the Election Assistance Commission (EAC), enabling it to increase its operational capacity to support states and localities in defense of the digital infrastructure underpinning federal electionsincluding ensuring the widest possible employment of voter-verifiable, auditable, paper-based voting systems.\n\nTrust is the lifeblood of American democracy. The American people depend on government institutions, infrastructure, tools, and personnel to provide a fair, open, and safe electoral system in which every vote counts and election results reflect the will of the American voter. The election system's increasing reliance on digital connectivity and data makes it vulnerable to cyberattacks and cyber-enabled information operations such as those seen in 2016 and 2018 and likely already under way in 2020.205\n\n- The role of the National Guard should be assessed\nand where appropriate incorporated into DHS and executive branch cyber response planning efforts, including the update to the National Cyber Incident Response Plan and annexes.\nDefending against attempts to undermine the American people's trust in their democracy requires improving institutional capacity at the federal, state, local, tribal, and territorial levels and ensuring that our elections utilize a voter-verifiable, auditable, paper-based voting system. States need assistance in the form of enduring, targeted funding to secure and maintain their election infrastructure, and the federal institutions administering such assistance require additional funds and structural reform to do so at the scale and speed of the threat. Election officials should also be resourced with the tools and expertise to develop and rehearse plans for Election Day contingencies, including postponements and recounts. Such contingency plans should be developed in consultation with federal cybersecurity experts from CISA and should include clear criteria established well in advance.\n\nEnhance Support to the Election Assistance Commission to Carry Out Its Mission: The EAC suffers from chronic funding shortages and requires a more robust staff to better execute its responsibilities for improving SLTT election cybersecurity capacity. Further, the EAC commissioners require more technical expertise to enact urgent reforms to protect the integrity of voting systems against malicious cyber activity. By increasing the EAC's capacity and adding a limited but crucial \"cybersecurity vote,\" policymakers will ensure that evolving threats to the integrity of our electoral process are better understood and prioritized. Specifically:\n- Congress should amend the Help America Vote Act to create a fifth nonpartisan commissioner with an established cybersecurity background in order to vote exclusively on issues of or relating to cybersecurity.\n\n- Congress should increase the EAC's annual operating budget to enable the hiring of new staff to improve the performance of core responsibilities.\n\n- The EAC should finalize and release its long-delayed update to the Voluntary Voting System Guidelines and increase the breadth and frequency of its recommendations and guidance concerning voting systems and processes.\n\nStreamline and Modernize Sustained Grant Funding for States to Improve Election Systems: While Congress has appropriated funds to improve SLTT election systems, the episodic nature of such funding has prevented states from making plans that rely on it. Congressional grant funding for election security should occur predictably and regularly, and the EAC should disburse those funds and monitor their expenditure. At a minimum, grant funds should be used to ensure that states implement voter-verifiable and paperbased voting systems, as well as post-election audits. Funds should also be used to ensure that election administrators\n\nhave sufficient provisional ballots for their eligible voting populations to reduce or eliminate the effect of interference\nwith the voter registration rolls. The federal government has\na responsibility to resource its requirements, but states must also share in their financial ownership of election administration. Specifically, the U.S. government should:\n- Appropriate election security grants sufficient to\nenable state, local, tribal, and territorial governments to implement voter-verifiable, auditable voting systems, including by replacing outdated voting equipment, building local capacity, and adopting a paper-based backbone.\n- Sustain an annual grant appropriation to provide for\nsufficient provisional ballots, the implementation of post-election audits, and the ongoing maintenance of systems into the future.\nPILLARS AND KEY RECOMMENDATIONS\n\n- Require states to match federal election grant funds\nat a 7030 percent federal-state split and engage in long-term planning for their election infrastructure upgrades, including best practices recommended by organizations like the Center for Internet Security.\n3.4.1 Modernize Campaign Regulations to Promote Cybersecurity Nation-state adversaries have repeatedly attempted to hack U.S. political campaigns for the dual purposes of gathering intelligence and sowing political discord through the selective disclosure of otherwise private, campaign-specific information.206 Campaign organizations need more resources to protect themselves, but federal campaign finance law (1) limits the financial support that\n\n## What Is A Malign Influence Campaign?\n\nOn May 21, 2016, two groups of demonstrators encountered one another outside an Islamic center in Houston, Texas. One group was attending a gathering called \"Stop Islamification [sic] of Texas,\" while the other had shown up for a \"Save Islamic Knowledge\" event. Verbal insults and physical confrontations ensued.207\nBoth groups had been drawn to the Islamic center by two sets of social media advertisements purchased for $200 by a Russian information operations cell or \"troll farm\" called the Internet Research Agency (IRA).208 During the 2016 election cycle more than 3,000 different advertisements purchased by the IRA made their way into the social media feeds of everyday Americans.209\nThese citizens were microtargeted with the same methods used by mainstream consumer advertisers.210\nThe modern digital economy is built on a model of directing consumers to tailored advertisements after observing their behavior. Disturbingly, our adversaries use the very same approach against us and even do so legally. A growing sector of Russian \"Manipulation Service Providers\" like the IRA create fake accounts on popular social media websites to influence online discourse. These fake accounts can drive the comments, clicks, likes, and shares that social media algorithms interpret as popularity.211 Other authoritarians are learning from Russia's example; China is rapidly honing its own efforts to influence democratic societies, most brazenly during Taiwan's recent election cycles.212\nCombating this kind of disinformation will require coordination between the public and private sectors to identify and shut down fake accounts, but the threat will continue to far exceed our capacity to respond. A sustainable solution will require equipping Americans with the media and digital literacy necessary to recognize untrustworthy online content. Such a resilient publicone that understands the value of democracy, the role of its institutions, and the ways in which individuals can help hold those institutions accountablewill find it easier to resist disguised pernicious disinformation intended to undermine trust and lead to disengagement.\n\nnational political parties can provide to campaigns, and\n(2) broadly prohibits corporate contributions to campaigns. While these limitations have been imposed for good reasons and should remain in place, an unintended consequence is that they have functionally limited the cybersecurity support available to campaigns. In the past few years, the Federal Election Commission has issued several advisory opinions authorizing certain corporations to provide cybersecurity assistance to campaigns. These opinions are narrowly tailored, however, and fail to provide sufficient assurance that similar (or expanded) requests will be approved in the future. By contrast, a statutory amendment would provide muchneeded clarity and flexibility regarding this vital issue. Congress therefore should amend the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 (FECA) to allow corporations to provide free and reduced-cost cybersecurity assistance to political campaigns, so long as such assistance is offered\n\n3.5 The U.S. government should promote digital literacy, civics education, and public awareness to build societal resilience to foreign malign cyber-enabled information operations.\n\nLike American democracy, a safe and secure cyberspace environment depends on the trust and educated stakeholdership of its users. While service providers and product manufacturers are working to develop security frameworks that do not overburden end users, individual Americans are still the most important guarantors of their individual and collective cybersecurity. A third of all breaches still stem from a malign actor's success in persuading individuals to open phishing emails, one of the simplest forms of social engineering.214\nSimilarly, cyber-enabled information operations are increasingly taking their assaults on trust beyond cyberspace and into our broader society. Therefore, we should respond beyond cyberspace, because \"[t]he defense of democracy in an age of cyber information war cannot rely on technology alone.\"215 Americans must become better equipped to recognize such operations, so that they can mitigate their damage. These information operations endanger our national security by threatening to undermine trust and confidence in American democracy and its institutionsincluding but also extending beyond our elections.216 Such operations have previously taken the form of hack-and-release attacks and disinformation campaigns on social media and other outlets.217\nThese campaigns seek to convince Americans that their democracy is irrevocably broken, leading them to conflict out of anger or to disengagement out of despair.218\nImproving digital literacy is one way to counter these threats, but alone it is insufficient. Because the intent of so many cyber-enabled information operations is to cause Americans to distrust or lose faith in democracy and its on a nonpartisan basis as assessed by neutral and objective criteria.213\ninstitutions, digital literacy should be coupled with civics education explaining what democracy is, how individuals can hold their leadership accountable, and why democracy must be nurtured and protected. For these reasons, the U.S. government must ensure that individual Americans have both the digital literacy tools and the civics education they need to secure their networks and their democracy from cyber-enabled information operations. Promote Digital Literacy and Modernize Civic Education: By promoting modern civics education and digital literacy programs, the U.S. government can assist in enhancing the average American's ability to discern the trustworthiness of online content, and thereby reduce the impact of malicious foreign cyber-enabled information campaigns, without running afoul of concerns about regulating speech. Congress should enable the Department of Education by authorizing a grant program funding nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), private-sector entities, and SLTT education agencies both to study how best to improve digital citizenship and to incorporate effective digital literacy curricula in American classrooms at the K-12 level and beyond. This program should run in tandem with DHS programs and with the collaboration of subject matter experts to develop content on cyber-enabled information operations and other topics of which citizens should be aware. Such curricula should incorporate critical thinking and problem-solving skills, information on implicit vs. explicit messaging, and technology concepts.\n\nPILLARS AND KEY RECOMMENDATIONS\nEvaluate and Strengthen Efforts to Raise Public Awareness of Cyber Threats: Congress should (1) direct the Government Accountability Office (GAO) to evaluate the effectiveness of government spending on cybersecurity awareness efforts, including the \"Stop. Think. Connect.\" campaign, and (2) authorize and fund DHS, in coordination with the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) and the National Science Foundation (NSF), to establish a grant program seeking research and proposals for effective mechanisms to improve, develop, and implement a public awareness and education initiative on cybersecurity. Successful grantees should prioritize:\n- Actionable, consistent public messaging on cybersecurity threats and responses with very specific desired outcomes.\n\n- Wide propagation of cybersecurity warnings among information technology (IT) professionals.\n\n- Modern, vetted, and continually updated \"train-thetrainer\" resources for academic institutions, trade schools, and other organizations seeking to provide cybersecurity education to the public.\n\n- Demonstrably effective methods for bringing specific and actionable cyber threat information to the attention of the general public.\n\n## Multi-Factor Authentication\n\nAccording to the SANS Institute, single-factor authentication (e.g., passwords) is a major threat vector that malicious actors exploit to breach seemingly secure systems. One of the best methods to prevent these types of attacks is multi-factor authentication, or a system that requires a password and an additional method, such as a text or an \"authenticator\" application, for users to authenticate their identity when logging into a system. Researchers at Google found that even the most basic multi-factor verification methods prevent 96 percent of bulk phishing attacks and more than three-quarters of targeted attacks.220 Both consumers and businesses should take full advantage of multi-factor authentication to protect their networks, their accounts, and their information.\n\n3.5.1 Reform Online Political Advertising to Defend against Foreign Influence in Elections Although foreign nationals are banned from contributing to U.S. political campaigns, they are still allowed to purchase U.S. political advertisements online, making the internet a fertile environment for conducting a malign influence campaign to undermine American elections. In advance of the 2016 U.S. federal elections, Russia launched just such a campaign and purchased thousands of online political ads targeting U.S. elections.219 That action was and still is possible because the FECA, which establishes rules for transparency in television, radio, and print media political advertising, has not been amended to extend the same political advertising requirements to internet platforms. Applying these standards across all media of communication would, among other things, increase transparency of funding for political advertisements, which would in turn strengthen regulators' ability to reduce improper foreign influence in our elections. There are pending legislative proposals on this critical issue, and Congress should seek to find a consensus.\n\n## Reshape The Cyber Ecosystem Toward Greater Security D\n\nenying adversaries benefits is crucial for successful layered cyber deterrence. Whereas building resilience denies adversaries benefits by managing the consequences of attacks, reshaping the cyber ecosystem toward greater security drives down cyber vulnerability at national scale, lowering the likelihood of successful attacks in the first place. In cyber conflict, the cyber ecosystem is the battlefield. Unlike more conventional battlefields, the cyber ecosystem is entirely humanmade and therefore can be manipulated in ways other domains may not be. This feature provides a unique opportunity for the United States to shape its cyber ecosystem in ways that make it more difficult for adversaries to achieve their goals and that deny them the benefits of their operations. Today, the cyber ecosystem is more than the technologyinformation, network, and operational technologythat constitutes the internet. The ecosystem is also the people, processes, and organizations that plug into the technology and the data they combine to produce. This ecosystem has increased the speed of our communications as well as efficiency, functionality, and growth in the economy. But while it is central to the functioning of the nation, it has also introduced significant challengescausing vulnerability across the United States. Adversaries leverage vulnerabilities in this ecosystem and its expansive reach into our society to gain an asymmetric advantage, developing capabilities to hold our critical infrastructure at risk, disrupt our elections, and spy on and target the American people. This pillar attempts to drive down vulnerability across the ecosystem by shifting the burden of security away from end users to owners and operators, developers, and manufacturers who can more effectively implement security solutions at the appropriate scale. In some cases, scaling up security means aligning market forces. Where those market forces either are not present or do not adequately address risk, the U.S. government must explore executive action, investment, legislation, and regulation. Specifically, this pillar focuses on five strategic objectives.\n\nFirst, this pillar seeks to promote the creation of more secure technologyboth by incentivizing product manufacturers to scrap a \"first to market\" mentality in favor of a \"secure to market\" approach and by ensuring that they have access to trusted suppliers. Technology companies are under intense market pressure to prioritize \"first to market\" over security, thereby passing on risk to companies and individuals. The aggregated vulnerability assumed by these companies and individuals has created a significant national concern: rampant insecurity that passes costs of billions of dollars to downstream consumers and that has the potential both to disrupt our day-today life and to undermine public confidence in and the effectiveness of key institutions. Second, this pillar endeavors to change behavior, encouraging more secure practices by users and organizations. Standards bodies and regulators in key sectors have developed numerous standards and best practices for organizations' behavior. However, with some notable exceptions, commitment to these standards and practices is largely voluntary. Incentivizing better practicesincluding those that would shape or offset the behavior of individual employeesmeans both crafting financial incentives for better behavior, through a vibrant insurance market, and holding bad behavior to account. Third, this pillar seeks to better leverage large-scale information and communications technology enablersboth by empowering companies that can deploy security across the ecosystem and by encouraging them to deploy it. While the U.S. government's ability to directly influence the ecosystem is limited, companies that provide services and infrastructure essential to the functioning of the PILLARS AND KEY RECOMMENDATIONS\ninternet could have outsized impact on its security. For these entities, some forms of securitywhat is required to ensure that the services they provide are always availableare already incentivized. The financial benefit of other aspects of securityensuring the integrity and confidentiality of the data they hold and the networks they administeris often less obvious, but no less important for managing national vulnerability.\n\nFourth, as technology supply chains have become more complex and global, the United States has grown more dependent on suppliers susceptible to malign influence, a possibility that creates new vectors to introduce vulnerabilities into the ecosystem. In shaping its cyber ecosystem, the United States must identify industries and technologies critical to national and economic security and take steps to reduce vulnerability at a macroeconomic level (e.g., industrial strategy and market exclusions) and at a microeconomic level (e.g., supply chain risk management).\n\n## Strategic Objective #1: Incentivize Greater Security In The Markets For Technology\n\nThe U.S. government should incentivize the creation of more secure technology. Currently, technology companies are under intense market pressure to prioritize being \"first to market\" over security, an approach that in turn passes risk on to other companies and individuals.221 Moving the markets for technologies toward greater security requires delineating clearer expectations and standards for what constitutes secure technology development and maintenance, presenting that information to consumers in an accessible form to help them make informed decisions, and incentivizing suppliers to build security into the development lifecycle of the products they sell.\n\n4.1 Congress should establish and fund a National Cybersecurity Certification and Labeling Authority empowered to establish and manage a program for voluntary security certifications and labeling of information and communications technology products.\n\nWhile agreed-on security standards and best practices are useful in reducing vulnerability in information technology products, they can be employed more effectively to move Fifth, this pillar attempts to build better data security at the systemic level. New industries are being created that rely on the concentration and analysis of private data, but they are emerging in an ecosystem with few norms and complex, and at times even conflicting, laws governing the appropriate use and security of that data. At the same time, breaches of private data offer malicious actors a treasure trove of information. The information stolen from American entrepreneurs, public officials, industry leaders, everyday citizens, and even clandestine operatives is fueling social engineering and espionage campaigns against U.S. firms and agencies. This entanglement of private data security and national security reveals the need for legal and technical norms to protect the information of individuals and firms, minimize the likelihood of their loss or manipulation, and make the \"big data\" economy safe for everyday Americans.\n\nproduct developers to use security as a product differentiator. Without accessible and transparent mechanisms, such as certifications (e.g., Energy Star, Underwriters Laboratory, or Certified Organic products) and labels (e.g., nutrition labels), to compare security between products, critical infrastructure owners and operators cannot easily price security into their purchasing decisions.222 The lack of differentiation leads to a lack of demand for more secure products; as a result, product developers have little market incentive to make established security standards or security best practices a primary consideration in designing, testing, and developing their products. Short of regulation, the U.S. government is institutionally and legally limited in its ability to attest and certify that products adhere to security standards, and third-party efforts to fill this gap lack sufficient scale, funding, and maturity to enact meaningful change in the marketplace.223\nTo address this gap, Congress should pass a law directing the Department of Commerce, in coordination with the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the Department of Defense (DoD), to hold a competitive bid for a nonprofit, nongovernmental organization to be designated and funded as the National Cybersecurity Certification and Labeling Authority. This organization would be charged with establishing and managing a voluntary cybersecurity certification and labeling program for information and communication technologies.224 This designation should last five years and carry with it sufficient funding for its operational costs and the programmatic activities necessary to carry out its mission. The National Cybersecurity Certification and Labeling Authority should be overseen by a committee chaired by the Department of Commerce and DHS, with membership from DoD, the Department of Energy, and the Federal Trade Commission (FTC). The law should also empower the FTC to set and levy fines if it is found that companies are falsely attesting to a standard for certification, are intentionally mislabeling products, or have failed to maintain the standard to which they have attested. In order to keep pace with rapidly changing technology and good practices in secure technology development, the National Cybersecurity Certification and Labeling Authority must be supported by empirical efforts both to test products and to continually identify good practices in secure product development. Any certification and labeling work should build on existing endeavors in and outside of government, including such efforts as the Critical Technology Security Centers (recommendation 4.1.1), the Cyber Independent Testing Laboratory, the Digital Standard, and the Software Bills of Material work at the National Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA).225\nProduct Certification and Attestation: The National Cybersecurity Certification and Labeling Authority should be established and empowered to publicly certify products that vendors have attested meet and comply with secure product development best practices and other cybersecurity standards identified by the authority. Issued certifications should be publicly accessible and manufacturers should be encouraged to display certification marks on product packaging. For industrial control systems, network technology, and open-source code projects, the proposed Critical Technology Security Centers could serve as testing centers in support of the National Cybersecurity Certification and Labeling Authority. Accredited Certifying Agents: Like the organics certifying program run by the U.S. Department of Agriculture, the National Cybersecurity Certification and Labeling Program should be empowered to define criteria and a process for accrediting nongovernmental organizations as certifying agents. Agents should be accredited to certify individual classes of products. For example, an entity could apply to be a certifying agent that specifically reviews connected industrial control systems, internet of things (IoT) devices, operating systems, cloud service offerings (recommendation 4.5), or voting machines, among other things. Comparative Security Scoring: In coordination with the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) and subject matter experts across the federal government, academia, relevant nongovernmental organizations, and the private sector, the National Cybersecurity PILLARS AND KEY RECOMMENDATIONS\ninformation on the characteristics and constituent components of a software or hardware product, including those that contribute to the security of a product or service. The authority should also establish a mechanism by which product developers can educate users about these characteristics and components, providing this information for both product labeling and public posting.226\nCertification and Labeling Authority should be charged with defining and establishing a set of metrics for quantifying and scoring the security of hardware and software. This scoring regime should differentiate between product type and intended operating environment, setting higher scoring metrics for products that have systemic industrial applications. Partnership on Product Labeling: The National Cybersecurity Certification and Labeling Authority should work with the private sector to standardize language and develop a labeling regime to provide transparent Integration with Ongoing Efforts: The National Cybersecurity Certification and Labeling Authority should identify and integrate ongoing public, private, and international efforts to develop security standards, frameworks,\n\n## Can The 5G Deployment Be Made Fundamentally Secure?\n\nA recurring finding from this Commission's research has been the misalignment of market forces that place profit and cybersecurity in opposition. The deployment of 5G systems will increase the urgency of a national conversation on the cybersecurity responsibilities that private-sector entities owe to their customers, and the Commission hopes it will also demonstrate how misaligned incentives can be corrected to produce outcomes that are good both for business and for security. The deployment of 5G systems will dramatically increase the \"attack surface,\" or the exposed routes through which malicious actors can threaten our networks. An exponential increase in connected devices will more deeply embed the internet in our lives and may, in turn, lead to a rise in the everyday leakage of private data. Worse still, security vulnerabilities will spread into sectors not traditionally associated with cyberspace (e.g., transportation, agriculture, or health care) and thereby increase the risk of catastrophic systemic failures. Given the cascading risks that will accompany widespread 5G deployment, the U.S. government has a responsibility to set clear cybersecurity standards in the marketplace. These standards should shape cyberspace hardware and software development toward being both \"secure-by-design\" and \"secure-by-default.\" A secure-by-design system has security baked into its fundamental constructionand not simply added as a feature when a given product is ready to hit the market. A secureby-default system would similarly not require consumers to \"turn on\" any included security features in order to realize their benefits; a consumer would not have to know they're there to trust that they're working.227 Prioritizing critical cybersecurity design principles like these should be seen by the private sector as a means to profit rather than as a burden. With this in mind, the U.S. government should push firms (particularly service providers) to create and use trusted 5G components and vendors. It should also work with and incentivize support for small and medium-sized telecom providers, as well as state, local, territorial, and tribal governments, to upgrade outdated and vulnerable cellular infrastructure. Finally, digital products must provide clear, easy-to-digest information on their security features and capabilities; consumers' resulting decisions about purchases would raise the quality of products made available in the marketplace. By pointing the way to a secure 5G future, the United States can illuminate the path connecting cybersecurity with profitability.\n\nand certifications. This work should build on, but not be limited to, existing efforts at the Department of Commerce to develop software bills of material and the DoD's Cybersecurity Maturity Model Certification.\n\nUpdate to Federal Procurement Regulations and Guidelines:\nWithin five years the executive branch should consider updating federal procurement regulations and guidelines, including the Federal Acquisition Regulations, to require National Cybersecurity Certification and Labeling Authority certifications and labeling for certain information technology products and services procured by the federal government. The executive branch should be required to report to Congress on its decision to require National Cybersecurity Certification and Labeling Authority certifications and labeling under Federal Acquisition Regulations, the extent of these requirements, or an explanation if no action was taken.\n\n4.1.1 Create or Designate Critical Technology Security Centers While various public and private entities currently provide security evaluations and testing, the U.S. government lacks trusted, centralized entities to perform these functions. Congress should direct and appropriate fund for DHS, in partnership with the Department of Commerce, Department of Energy, Office of the Director of National Intelligence, and DoD, to competitively select, designate, and fund up to three Critical Technology Security Centers in order to centralize efforts directed toward evaluating and testing the security of devices and technologies that underpin our networks and critical infrastructure.228 These Centers would provide the U.S. government with the capacity to test the security of critical technologies and, when appropriate, assist in identifying vulnerabilities, developing mitigation techniques with relevant original equipment manufacturers, and supporting new and ongoing efforts to certify technologies as secure. The Centers could also play an important role as project managers and, in some cases, would provide funding for the broader research community already working toward similar ends. To the greatest extent possible, these centers should be designated from existing efforts and institutions, such as ongoing industrial control system work at the Idaho National Lab, rather than created as new entities.\n\nThe Centers should be focused on technologies critical to the security of the national cyber ecosystem and of critical infrastructure. This initial list of Centers could be\nexpanded in the future to focus on other critical technologies, including IoT devices:\n- A *Center for Network Technology Security* to test the\nsecurity of hardware and software that underpins our cyber ecosystem, including routers, radio equipment, modems, switches, and other core network technology.\n- A Center for Connected Industrial Control Systems\nSecurity to test the security of connected programmable logic controllers, supervisory control and data acquisition servers and systems, and other connected industrial equipment.\n- A *Center for Open-Source Software Security* to systematically identify critical open-source libraries and test and fix vulnerabilities in open-source software repositories, which provide the basis for most software in use today.229\n4.1.2 Expand and Support the National Institute of Standards and Technology Security Work The U.S. government is uniquely placed to identify and legitimize standards and best practices. In cybersecurity, standards are crucial for helping regulators understand how to regulate, helping companies understand the state of the art, and helping developers understand security expectations. NIST, which is within the Department of Commerce, is the body through which the U.S. governmentoften in collaboration or consultation with the private sectoridentifies, harmonizes, and develops technology standards, guidelines, tools, and measurement capabilities. As the rapid pace of technological change poses new security challenges, the role of NIST will PILLARS AND KEY RECOMMENDATIONS\ncontinue to grow. While NIST employs some of the U.S. government's leading experts in cyber and emerging technologies, it lacks the resources necessary to meet the increasing demands on its staff and support expanding mission requirements. Failure to invest in and grow NIST's capacity runs the risk of impeding the development of both U.S. government and private-sector security initiatives.\n\nCongress should increase funding in support of NIST's work on cybersecurity. Specifically, NIST should be appropriately resourced to:\n\n4.2 Congress should pass a law establishing that final goods assemblers of software, hardware, and firmware are liable for damages from incidents that exploit known and unpatched vulnerabilities Software vulnerabilities present cracks in systems that our adversaries seek to exploit. Shortening the lifecycle of vulnerabilities by ensuring that patches are created and implemented in a timely manner would limit their availability to those who seek to exploit them, driving up adversaries' operating costs and denying them the benefits that successful exploitation could bring.231 However, the discovery and responsible disclosure of vulnerabilities does little to inhibit their use for malicious purposes unless the vulnerabilities are patched. Patch development and distributionthe processes whereby the developer of the software creates a fix to a vulnerability and distributes it to users so that they can update their systemsis key to eliminating the risk that a given vulnerability can pose across the ecosystem. When a software vulnerability is found, users of that software have little recourse to mitigate their inherited vulnerability beyond taking the vulnerable system offlinean unworkable solution that in many cases would result in business interruption. In these cases, users are entirely reliant on the software vendor to develop and issue a patch. Large-sample empirical\n\n- Routinely update industry-wide frameworks and standards, including the NIST Cybersecurity Framework.\n- Develop and harmonize standards for secure technology development, building on ongoing work on the\nsecure software development lifecycle.230\n- Develop and harmonize standards for specific\nprocesses, including standards for vulnerability and patch management, and provide lasting institutional support for the National Vulnerability Database,\nCommon Vulnerabilities and Exposures program,\nand the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency's (CISA) vulnerability disclosure work.\nresearch has found that 50 percent of vulnerabilities remain without a patch for more than 438 days after disclosure, that a quarter of vulnerabilities remain without a committed patch beyond three years, and that there is no correlation between a vulnerability's severity and the length of its lifespan.232\nTo date, there has not been a clearly defined duty of care for final goods assemblers in their repsonsibilities for developing and issuing patches for known vulnerabilities in their products and services, the timeliness of those patches, and maintaining a vulnerability disclosure policy.233 To encourage final goods assemblers to shorten the vulnerability lifecycle by more quickly developing and issuing patches, the U.S. government should establish a duty of care in law. Congress should therefore enact legislation establishing that final goods assemblers of software, hardware, and firmware are liable for damages from incidents that exploit vulnerabilities that were known at the time of shipment or discovered and not fixed within a reasonable amount of time. The law should establish expectations that final goods assemblers are responsible for producing security patches for as long as the product or service is supported (as disclosed at the time of sale)\nor for a year after the last function-enhancing patch is released, whichever is later.234 As part of these measures's implementation, Congress should direct the Federal Trade Commission to establish a regulation mandating transparency from final goods assemblers. This regulation should levy requirements that make it easier for the end users or purchaser to understand how a final goods assembler finds, logs, discloses, and retains vulnerabilities. The regulation should also require disclosure of known, unpatched vulnerabilities in a good or service at the time of sale. Definition of \"Known Vulnerability\": The regulation should account for common methods by which a vulnerability would be made known to a software or hardware developer or manufacturerincluding vulnerabilities publicly disclosed through existing public databases, such as the National Vulnerability Database and Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures program;235 vulnerabilities reported to the software or hardware developer by a third party; and vulnerabilities discovered by the software or hardware developer themselves. Definition of \"Final Goods Assembler\": The final goods assembler should be the entity that enters into an end user licence agreement with the user of the product or service and is most responsible for the placement of a product or service into the stream of commerce. Products and services can include not just objects such as smartphones and laptops but also operating systems, applications, and connected industrial control systems. There is one final goods assembler for each product or service, and the definition of final goods assembler should not include resellers who repackage products without modifying them. Vulnerability Disclosure and Retention: The regulation should require that final goods assemblers, as well as the software and hardware component developers and manufacturers, establish a publicly accessible process for vulnerability reporting, retain records documenting when a vulnerability was made known to or discovered by the company, and maintain a vulnerability disclosure and patching policy for their products that conforms to the requirements set out under this regulation. The regulation should therefore acknowledge and encourage the concept of coordinated vulnerability disclosure the process by which the discoverer of a vulnerability reports it directly to the vendor responsible for the software's maintenancebuilding on earlier work by CISA and the NTIA.236\n\n4.2.1 Incentivize Timely Patch Implementation In 2015, the Verizon *Data Breach Investigations Report* found that 99.9 percent of vulnerabilities in use by attackers had been known for more than a year, most with a patch available.237 Vulnerability discovery, vulnerability disclosure, and patch development do little to shrink the supply of vulnerabilities available to adversaries if the patches go unimplemented by users. With some exceptions, when a vendor or assembler of software issues a method of remediating a vulnerability, the onus of implementing that remediation falls on the user of that software or hardware. When implementing a security update poses a challenge to the configuration of the user's environment, possibly leading to downtime or the need to reconfigure a system entirely, these patches can often go unimplemented.\n\nShort of regulation, there is likely no one way to incentivize companies to better patch their systems. Instead, the U.S. government should study the potential effectiveness of several actions, including:\n- Directing NIST to develop guidance or expectations\nabout how quickly patches should be implemented once released.\n- Placing a cap, via standards or certifications of insurance products, on insurance payouts for incidents that involve unpatched systems.\nPILLARS AND KEY RECOMMENDATIONS\n\n## Strategic Objective #2: Incentivize Better Organizational Cybersecurity\n\nThe U.S. government should endeavor to change private-sector cybersecurity behavior, encouraging more secure practices by users and organizations. Whereas measures to incentivize greater security in the marketplace for technologies seek to drive down technical vulnerability, incentivizing better organizational cybersecurity behavior seeks to address the human and organizational aspects of national vulnerability.\n\nTo achieve this, the U.S. government needs to build a greater statistical capacity to develop, test, and understand the effectiveness of good practices and standards. Armed with a greater understanding of good practices, the U.S. government should use all available instruments to craft incentives to change behavior at large scale, including shaping market forces like the insurance market, crafting regulations, and changing federal procurement practices.\n\n4.3 Congress should establish a Bureau of Cyber Statistics charged with collecting and providing statistical data on cybersecurity and the cyber ecosystem to inform policymaking and government programs.\n\nWhile there is broad consensus that cyberattacks on U.S. citizens and businesses are increasing in frequency and severity, the U.S. government and broader marketplace lack sufficient clarity about the nature and scope of these attacks to develop nuanced and effective policy responses. Compounding this problem is a fundamental lack of clarity about what security measures are effective in reducing risk in the technologies, in business enterprises, and even at the level of national policymaking. This confusion limits the ability of the government to evaluate the effectiveness of its cybersecurity programs and prevents private enterprises and insurance providers from being able to adequately price, model, and understand cyber risk. Existing data sets are incomplete and provide only a superficial or cursory understanding of evolving trends in cybersecurity and cyberspace. To address similar gaps in other policy areas, the United States established statistical agencies to inform both public policymaking and private decision making. These agencies, like the Bureau of Labor Statistics, established the metrics and reporting by which government policy and private-sector efforts are measured and report those assessments. One of the great successes of many of these statistical agencies has been in delivering useful information to improve the lives of everyday Americans, while anonymizing that information and protecting privacy. The U.S. government should adopt this model for cyberspace.\n\nCongress should establish a Bureau of Cyber Statistics within the Department of Commerce, or another department or agency, that would act as the government statistical agency that collects, processes, analyzes, and disseminates essential statistical data on cybersecurity, cyber incidents, and the cyber ecosystem to the American public, Congress, other federal agencies, state and local governments, and the private sector. Statistical analysis provided by the Bureau would be useful for informing national risk (recommendations 3.1 and 3.1.1), helping the insurance industry create more accurate risk models (recommendation 4.4.1), and helping the U.S. government craft more effective cybersecurity policy and programs.\n\nThe Definition and Promulgation of Cybersecurity Metrics:\nIn partnership with NIST, the Bureau would be charged with identifying and establishing meaningful metrics and data necessary to measure cybersecurity and risk reduction in cyberspace. As part of this task, the Bureau would develop, in collaboration with departments and agencies, metrics that would enable better evaluation of the adoption, reach, and effectiveness of federal cybersecurity programs. This information would also be made available to the Office of Management and Budget (OMB)\nto guide decision making on budgets and priorities for programs. Data Collection and Aggregation: The Bureau should be empowered and sufficiently funded to establish programs and make purchases required to collect the data necessary to inform its analysis. These tasks include collecting and aggregating open-source data, purchasing private or proprietary data repositories, and conducting surveys. Departments and agencies should assist the Bureau in its work, making available data sets as needed, and to the greatest extent practicable, in furtherance of its work. Cyber Incident Reporting: In the authorizing legislation, Congress should mandate that relevant departments and agencies, as well as companies that regularly collect cyber incident data as a part of their business, are required to provide aggregated, anonymized, minimized data on cyber incidents to inform statistical analysis on\n\n4.4 Congress should resource and direct the Department of Homeland Security to resource a federally funded research and development center to work with state-level regulators in developing certifications for cybersecurity insurance products.\n\nA robust and functioning market for insurance products can have the same positive effect on the risk management behavior of firms as do regulatory interventions. Although the insurance industry plays an important role in enabling organizations to transfer a small portion a yearly basis.238 The law would authorize the Bureau of Cyber Statistics to define key data points, a standardized format, timelines, and mechanisms for complying with these requirements, unless departments and agencies are precluded by a legal constraint or by considerations of operational sensitivity.239 The law should also insulate these private companies from liability associated with disclosing minimized, anonymized, and aggregated data to the Bureau.\n\nData Privacy and Protection: Authorizing legislation should ensure that the aggregated and anonymized data collected is insulated from public disclosure, the collection and retention of personally identifiable information is minimized, and, in the case of cyber incidents, the identity of victims is protected. In addition, legislation should establish safeguards against or punitive measures for the disclosure of raw data to regulatory agencies or non-federal entities. Academic and Private-Sector Exchanges: The Bureau should be funded and equipped to host academics as well as private-sector and independent security researchers as a part of extended exchanges. The purpose of this program should be to ensure that the Bureau can benefit from new methods and techniques of data and statistical analysis and that academia and the public can benefit from the public-interest research sourced from its data sets.\n\nof their cyber risk, it is falling short of achieving the public policy objective of driving better practices of risk management in the private sector more generally. The reasons for this failure are varied but largely come down to an inability on the part of the insurance industry to PILLARS AND KEY RECOMMENDATIONS\ncomprehensively understand and price risk, due in part to a lack of talented underwriters and claims adjusters and the absence of standards and frameworks for how cyber risk should be priced. This has had the combined effect of creating an opaque environment for enterprises attempting to purchase coverage and undermining the effectiveness of insurance as an incentive to push enterprises toward better security behavior.\n\nBecause insurance falls under the purview of state regulators, the federal government can do little to directly affect change in the market for insurance specific to a given industry, short of creating large-scale programs akin to the crop insurance program instituted by the Federal Crop Insurance Act. Thus, to bring to maturity and improve the market for cybersecurity insurance, Congress should appropriate funds and direct DHS to resource a Federally Funded Research and Development Center (FFRDC) to develop models for underwriter and claims adjuster training and certification. In addition, the program should develop certification frameworks for cybersecurity insurance products in consultation and coordination with state insurance regulators. Underwriter Training and Certification: For underwriters to effectively evaluate and analyze risk in a given industry, they must understand it. Certification is available for underwriters in other areas of insurance, including homeowners, flood, life, and health. The FFRDC should work with insurers, state regulators, and experts in cybersecurity risk management to develop curricula and training courses for cyber insurance underwriters required under a cyber insurance underwriter certification. Claims Adjuster Training and Certification: Like underwriters, claims adjusters are crucial in ensuring that insurance policies can adapt to changing conditions. Like underwriting, other areas of insurance have training and certification available for claims adjusters. The FFRDC should work with insurers, state regulators, and cybersecurity risk management experts to develop training and certification models for cyber claims adjusters.\n\nCyber Insurance Product Certification: State insurance regulators can and often do set minimum standards that insurance products must meet in order to be offered in their state, thereby \"ensuring that insurance policy provisions comply with state law, are reasonable and fair, and do not contain major gaps in coverage that might be misunderstood by consumers and leave them unprotected.\"240 Working with state insurance regulators and the public-private working group on pricing and modeling cyber risk (recommendation 4.4.1), the FFRDC should develop cybersecurity product certifications based on a common lexicon and security standards.\n\n4.4.1 Establish a Public-Private Partnership on Modeling Cyber Risk For insurance to act as a de facto regulator of organizational behavior, the market for insurance must accurately price risk. Premiums and limits on insurance products must also drive firms that have bought insurance to invest in improving their cyber risk posture. Today, insurance companies lack quality data sets and models to understand, price, and mitigate cyber risk.241 Although bad or incomplete data is a major barrier to accurately pricing cyber risk, insurers are not incentivized to pool and aggregate their data to build more robust and accurate pricing models.242\nThe executive branch should establish a public-private working group at DHS to convene insurance companies and cyber risk modeling companies to collaborate in pooling and leveraging available statistics and data that can inform innovations in cyber risk modeling. Drawing on insights gained by the defunct Cyber Incident Data and Analysis Working Group at DHS, and informed by the work of the Bureau of Cyber Statistics (recommendation 4.3), this effort should identify areas of common interest so that these entities can benefit from one another's risk modeling efforts, particularly with regard to dependency mapping and the consequences of cyber disruptions. One applicable use-case would be the work of the National Risk Management Center as it intersects\n4.4.2 Explore the Need for a Government Reinsurance Program to Cover Catastrophic Cyber Events In December 2016, the U.S. Department of Treasury issued guidance clarifying that cyber events could trigger Terrorism Risk Insurance Act (TRIA) protections. However, the U.S. government is in a position to do more to further define what types of cyber events fall under the TRIA umbrella and what types of events should remain covered by insurance companies themselves. Currently, TRIA coverage is activated only for a \"certified act of terrorism.\" The Further Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2020243 directs the Comptroller\n\nwith the work of the cybersecurity insurance industry.\nThe working group should:\n- Develop frameworks and research methodologies for\nunderstanding and accurately pricing cyber risk.\n- Conduct research on the applicability and utility of\ncommon frameworks, controls, and \"essentials\" as baseline requirements for reducing premiums in pricing insurance risk, such as the NIST Cybersecurity Framework and the International Organization\nfor Standardization/International Electrotechnical\nCommission (ISO/IEC) 27000 standards family.\n- Identify common areas of interest for pooling\nanonymized data from which to derive better, more accurate risk models.\n\n## Can Modern Insurance Improve Cybersecurity?\n\nInsurance can provide financial incentives for individuals and organizations to better manage their risk. From incentivizing the use of seatbelts and airbags in the automotive industry to pushing for fire suppression systems as a part of building codes, the insurance industry has played an important role in identifying risk management standards for individual consumers and large corporations alike. A robust and functioning market for cyber insurance could play a similar role in identifying and regulating behavior to improve cyber risk management.244 Today, the market for cyber insurance is failing to deliver on this potential. The reasons for this failure are varied. Insurers struggle to find underwriters and claims adjusters, the individuals charged with pricing and adjusting the price of risk, who understand cyber risk. Where talent exists, insufficient or inconsistent models for risk persist. Confounding these factors is the notion of silent cyber riskthe cyber risk inherited from other insurance offerings, such as general corporate liability or property and casualty coverage. All of these issues lead to a hesitancy on the part of insurers to assume meaningful amounts of risk that would define a healthy cyber insurance market.\n\nCurrently, the estimated worldwide value of cyber insurance premiums sits at $7.5 billion.245 For context, in 2017 property and casualty insurance premiums were worth $275.5 billion in the United States alone.246 Because insurers can either assume their inherited cyber risk with little threat to their overall solvency or pass this risk along to reinsurers in the form of derivatives, they have little incentive to push the entities they insure to manage that risk. For the insurance industry to effectively serve as a lever to scale up risk management, the industry must mature to supply products aligned with the demands of those seeking to buy them and must increase overall premiums to take on a meaningful amount of risk. Some of this maturation will come with time, but the U.S. government is well placed to play the same role it has taken with other emerging insurance industries throughout history, facilitating collaboration to develop mature and effective risk assessment models and expertise. Cyber insurance is not a silver bullet to solve the nation's cybersecurity challenges. Indeed, a robust and functioning market for cybersecurity insurance is not an end in and of itself, but a means to improve the cybersecurity of the U.S. private sector and the security of the nation as a whole in cyberspace.\n\nPILLARS AND KEY RECOMMENDATIONS\nGeneral at the Government Accountability Office (GAO)\nto assess the current state of insurance for cyber-related incidents. The Commission supports the need to study the cyber insurance market and encourages the GAO to work closely with relevant departments and agencies, including the Department of Commerce, DHS, and Department of the Treasury.\n\nIn addition to the aspects of the study outlined in the\nlaw, the study should explore:\n- Current exemptions for casualty and property insurance policies, including act of war exemptions, and complications of including them in cyber insurance policies.\n- The existing scoping of the TRIA to assess whether\nit is sufficiently broad to cover cyber events perpetrated by nation-states, which most general property and casualty insurance policies currently exclude or attempt to exclude.\n- If the triggering threshold for the TRIAa loss of\n$200 million, as of the 2020 reauthorizationis the appropriate size to trigger a similar backstop for catastrophic cyber events.\n- Comparative models of federal share percentage of a\ncyber insurancerelated backstop.\n- What types of cyber events constitute \"certified acts\nof terrorism\" and whether this provides a sufficient\nbackstop for insurers, as many major cyber events\nparticularly those perpetrated by nation-statesmay not fit squarely under the definition of \"certified act of terrorism.\"\n- What events and which entities would be covered\nby a backstop, given that terror attacks generally take place in and affect a confined area, while some cyber incidents are not bounded by geography. For example, the study should address whether a cyberattack on an American company affecting only assets in another jurisdiction would qualify.\n4.4.3 Incentivize Information Technology Security through Federal Acquisition Regulations and Federal Information Security Management Act Authorities The U.S. government is in a powerful position to help develop and generate more sustainable requirements for cybersecurity best practices, as requirements placed on government contractors can become de facto industry standards.247 Requiring vendors to adhere to standards when doing business with the federal government will compel them to produce product or service offerings that meet those standards, potentially making those more secure offerings available to the broader public.248\nThe executive branch should direct the Federal Acquisition Regulation Council and the Office of Management and Budget to update its cybersecurity regulations in the Federal Acquisition Regulations and cybersecurity guidance under Federal Information Security Management Act at least every five years, to account for changing cybersecurity standards, and explore ways to integrate and fully account for existing models and frameworks, such as the Cybersecurity Maturity Model Certification, in Federal Acquisition Regulations. In addition, the Federal Acquisition Regulation Council should be directed to update Federal Acquisition Regulations to require that:\n- Federal civilian agency contractors adhere to the contractor-exclusive Binding Operational Directive issued by DHS.249\n\n- Federally procured information technology fully\naccounts for identified good security practices for building secure software and systems, such as those offered by NIST's Secure Software Development\nFramework250 and the ISO/IEC 27000 standards\nfamily.251\n- When developing requirements, the council should\ntake into account lessons learned with NIST Special Publication 800.171, comments from DoD's\nCybersecurity Maturity Model Certification, rulings\nor comments of the Federal Acquisition Security Council, and the ISO/IEC 27000 standards.\n- Providers of information technology submit software\ntransparency and software bills of materials for the systems they provide in support of government missions in line with the certifications and labels developed by the National Cybersecurity Certification and\nLabeling Authority (recommendation 4.1).252\n- Upon the development of cybersecurity insurance\npolicy certifications (recommendation 4.4), U.S. government contractors maintain a certified level of cybersecurity insurance and explore whether the Cybersecurity Maturity Model Certification should be updated to require cybersecurity insurance.\n4.4.4 Amend the Sarbanes-Oxley Act to Include Cybersecurity Reporting Requirements In today's cyber-based business environment, the cybersecurity of a publicly traded company is a critical component of its financial condition. In short, cyber risk is a business risk. A company's ability to rapidly detect, investigate, and remediate network intrusions is a useful indicator of the maturity of its security operations, in its ability both to defend against cyberattacks and to mitigate the types of cybersecurity risks that could harm its business operations and financial conditions.\n\nThe Sarbanes-Oxley Act253 was passed in 2002 to improve corporate accountability and oversight in response to a series of corporate failures. The law sets out requirements, enforced through the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), for all publicly traded U.S. companies, including stricter disclosure rules and a mandate that senior corporate officers certify the validity of periodic financial reports, in addition to criminalizing efforts by corporate personnel to improperly influence auditors. In 2018, the SEC issued interpretive guidance of existing regulations, stating that \"although no existing disclosure requirement explicitly refers to cybersecurity risks and cyber incidents, companies nonetheless may be obligated to disclose such risks and incidents,\" including the requirements under Sarbanes-Oxley.254\n\nTo harmonize and clarify cybersecurity oversight and\nreporting requirements for publicly traded companies,\nCongress should amend the Sarbanes-Oxley Act to explicitly account for cybersecurity. Specifically, the amendment should:\n- Add a definition of an \"information system,\" to\nmean \"a set of activities, involving people, processes, data, or technology, that enable the issuer to obtain, generate, use, and communicate transactions and information to maintain accountability and measure and review the issuer's performance or progress toward the achievement of objectives.\"\n- Specify corporate responsibility requirements for\nthe security of information systems, including the metrics and records publicly traded companies must keep regarding risk assessments, determinations, and decisions; cyber hygiene; and penetration testing and red-teaming results, including a record of metrics relating to the speed of their detection, investigation,\nand remediation.255\n- Mandate that public companies maintain, as part of\nthis requirement, internal records of cyber risk assessments, so that a full evaluation of cybersecurity risks can be judged in acquisition or in legal or regulatory action.\n- Require management assessments and attestation of\nplans to manage risk from information systems and data.\nPILLARS AND KEY RECOMMENDATIONS\n\n## Strategic Objective #3: Empower Ict Enablers To Deploy Security Across The Ecosystem\n\nThe U.S. government should undertake efforts to better leverage the scale of information and communications technology (ICT) enablers in cybersecurityboth by empowering companies that can deploy security across the ecosystem and by incentivizing the adoption of the scalable security solutions they offer. While the U.S. government's ability to directly influence the ecosystem is limited, companies that provide services and infrastructure essential to the functioning of the internet could have an outsized impact on its security. For these entities, some forms of securityensuring the continuous availability of the services they provideis already incentivized. The financial benefit of other aspects of security ensuring the integrity and confidentiality of the data they hold and the networks they administeris often less obvious, but no less important for managing national vulnerability.\n\n4.5 The National Cybersecurity Certification and Labeling Authority, in consultation with the National Institute of Standards and Technology, the Office of Management and Budget, and the Department of Homeland Security, should develop a cloud security certification.\n\nTraditional forms of data storage can generate a number of vulnerabilities. First, hosting data on-site opens the entity to the risk of a catastrophic event wiping out its primary and backup data. Such an event could take the form of a fire, an electrical surge, or water damage, as well as a cyberattack. Traditional on-site data storage models not only fail to meet the needs of an increasingly flexible and disparate office culture but also offer a vulnerable target for cyberattack. Cloud-based services256 offer a more economical and secure alternative to traditional forms of data storage and computing. In addition to eliminating the costs for the business of purchasing hardware, software, and other data center infrastructure, cloud computing providers leverage a set of technologies and policies that bolster the user's security posture.257 In doing so, cloud services could potentially provide maximum levels of security by operating at scale. With sufficient resources, cloud computing service providers house their data on a worldwide network of regularly updated data centers, maximizing the security of that data.258 Similarly, large cloud service providers' size and scale enable them to provide more sophisticated security features (from end-to-end encryption to security key authentication) than would be practical for smaller organizations to implement individually. Unless they invest significant resources into securing their cloud data centers, small to medium-sized data-hosting service providers risk opening their customers to the vulnerabilities of misconfiguration. Today, nearly two hundred thousand insecure cloud configurations are in use. More than 43 percent of cloud databases are not encrypted, and 40 percent of cloud storage services have logging disabled.259\nAs various branches of government and the broader economy increasingly adopt cloud services to strengthen their data security, cloud infrastructure is becoming critically important for the country. In the same way that large distributors provide safer and more reliable sources of drinking water than does a family well, large cloud service providers often serve as a more dependable and resilient source of data hosting and, in some cases, infrastructure. Migration to cloud services therefore stands to drive down risk for small and medium-sized enterprises, but it also serves to concentrate national risk in a relatively small number of entities. As of 2019, 90\npercent of companies were on the cloud.260 In an age when every company is a technology company, cloud service providers that remotely manage a business's IT and networksand often store large portions or all of an entity's datahold a vast amount of public trust. This concentration represents an opportunity for policymakers to affect the security of the ecosystem through economies of scale by holding entities that provide cloud services to a higher security standard.\n\nTo fully realize the security and economic benefits of the migration to the cloud, the U.S. government needs to ensure that those services are able to provide security value commensurate with the risk they hold in the ecosystem.261 To accomplish this, DHS, in consultation with NIST and OMB, should work with the National Cybersecurity Certification and Labeling Authority (recommendation 4.1) to develop a secure cloud certification. In developing this certification, the U.S. government should engage with and take lessons from the European Union Agency for Cybersecurity, which is currently in the early stages of developing certifications.262\nCertifying Agent: The National Cybersecurity Certification and Labeling Authority should serve as the certifying agent for the cloud security certification. In the event that the Authority does not exist, DHS, in consultation with NIST, should serve as the certifying agent. Entities eligible for certification should include any cloud service provider or entity that operates cloud services, with a focus on entities that provide infrastructure as a service and platform as a service. The cloud security certification should last two years, and the National Cybersecurity Certification and Labeling Authority, or authorized certifying agent, should be empowered to conduct initial and subsequent audits of entities that apply for and meet the requirements for certification. Standards Development: Congress should direct NIST to lead, in coordination with the National Cybersecurity and Certification and Labeling Authority and DHS, a public-private standards-making process for a secure cloud standard. This process should include major cloud service providers and small sector-specific cloud service providers. Initial efforts should focus on standards for general business enterprise IT environments, with subsequent efforts focusing on the application of cloud services in different industrial contexts, environments, and sectors. Security and Transparency: As part of its certification development process, the National Cybersecurity Certification and Labeling Authority should work with NIST to develop metrics for security offered by which cloud services can be compared to allow users to more easily differentiate between more and less secure offerings, and more clearly communicate what aspects of security are the responsibility of the user rather than the provider. When certifying the security of cloud services, the certifying agent should account for cloud security standards and best practices as well as factors such as extrajudicial state pressure that may be applied to a company to hand over user data or information. Update FedRAMP: Within five years, the executive branch should consider updating and simplifying the Federal Risk and Authorization Management Program (FedRAMP) requirements to require that all non-national security cloud services procured by the federal government meet the identified standards and possess the cloud security certification. The executive branch should be required to report to Congress on its decision to require National Cybersecurity Certification and Labeling Authority cloud security certifications under FedRAMP, on the extent of these requirements, or an explanation if no action was taken.\n\n## Enabling Recommendations 4.5.1 Incentivize The Uptake Of Secure Cloud Services For Small And Medium-Sized Businesses And State, Local, Tribal, And Territorial Governments The Benefits Of Cloud Computing For Small And Medium-Sized Enterprises And State, Local, Tribal, And Territorial\n\nPILLARS AND KEY RECOMMENDATIONS\n(SLTT) governments are well documented.263 In addition to providing greater flexibility and scalability for businesses, cloud service providers enable these entitieswhich may lack the financial and human capital to invest in strong security controls or modernize their information technologyto outsource their security to an entity that, under the above regulation, would be held to a higher cybersecurity standard.\n\nThe cloud security certification may have the adverse effect of eliminating less expensive providers that do not meet that standard. To ensure the continued availability of affordable cloud services to smaller and medium-sized businesses as well as SLTT governments, the U.S. government may need to provide financial incentives. Congress should direct the Department of Commerce, Small Business Administration, and DHS to conduct a sixmonth study to define the method of incentivizing the adoption of these services, and report their findings and recommendations to Congress. The ultimate goal would be to move, to the greatest extent practicable, small and medium-sized businesses and SLTT governments to cost-effective cloud services.\n\nThe report should:\n- Identify barriers or challenges for small and medium-sized business and SLTT governments in purchasing or acquiring secure cloud services.\n- Assess market availability, market pricing, and\naffordability for small and medium-sized businesses and SLTT governments, with particular attention to identifying high-risk and underserved sectors or regions.\n- Estimate the timeline and cost of tax breaks for small\nand medium-sized businesses and grants for SLTT governments necessary to incentivize the adoption of secure cloud services, as determined by the certified secure assessment.\n- In conducting this study, the U.S. government\nshould focus on the incentivization and adoption of services that meet the certifications and requirements outlined in the recommendation above.\n4.5.2 Develop a Strategy to Secure Foundational Internet Protocols and Email The internet and related technologies were not designed with security as a priority.264 For example, there are no enforced routing authentication standards underlying Border Gateway Protocol (BGP), a foundational mechanism that enables the internet to function. Likewise, there is no security designed into the Domain Name System (DNS), the internet's address book, which ensures that users get the intended address they request.\n\nThese flaws allow DNS and BGP hijacking, common ways for attackers to redirect traffic to websites that host malware or collect personal information like passwords. In addition, email represents a common vector for initial compromise leading to cyber incidents. The Domain-based Message Authentication, Reporting, and Conformance (DMARC) standard ensures that email coming from fraudulent domains is blocked, diminishing the rate of success of phishing, spoofing, and spam email. There have been a variety of attempts to address these issues, including at the Federal Communications Commission via their Communications Security Reliability and Interoperability Council, by the NTIA, and by industry itself in standards bodies such as the Internet Engineering Task Force. Despite these efforts, there remain significant concerns over the security of these mechanisms and their potential to be exploited.\n\nTo encourage broader implementation of security\nmeasures,265 Congress should pass a law that does the\nfollowing:\n- Requires the NTIA and DHS to develop a strategy\nand recommendations, in consultation with internet service providers and civil society and academic experts, to define common, implementable guidance for securing the DNS and BGP.\n- Requires DHS to develop a strategy and recommendations, in consultation with the information technology sector to implement DMARC at scale, across all U.S.-based email providers.\n- Requires DHS and the NTIA to report back to\nCongress within one year with a plan to implement security across the DNS, BGP, and email.\n4.5.3 Strengthen the U.S. Government's Ability to Take Down Botnets\n\"Robot networks,\" or botnets, are networks of computers hijacked by criminals and nation-states to promulgate their malicious activity. Criminals use botnets to spread spam and phishing emails, to impersonate users, and to carry out distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks.266\nIt is estimated that as much as 30 percent of all internet traffic could be attributable to botnets, and most of that traffic is from DDoS attacks.267 Currently, law enforcement, working with the private sector, can dismantle botnets when they are used to perpetrate fraud or illegal\n\n## How Do You Defeat A Botnet? (It Takes A Village)\n\nFrom December 2015 to October 2018, a cybercriminal ring used malware known as \"Kovter\" to infect and access more than 1.7 million computers worldwide and used hidden browsers on those computers to download fake web pages. Ads were then loaded onto those pages to falsify billions of ad views, resulting in businesses paying over $29 million for ads they believed were viewed by actual human users. The botnet was part of a sophisticated infrastructure of command-and-control servers that also monitored whether individually infected computers had been detected by cybersecurity companies as involved in fraud. The botnet was controlled by three Russian nationals located abroad.270\nThe Department of Justice (DoJ) and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) worked with the nonprofit National Cyber- Forensics and Training Alliance (NCFTA) to bring together multiple private-sector and nonprofit organizations to dismantle the botnet.271 The NCFTA played a key role by providing a collaborative information-sharing platform that enabled partners to share cyber threat indicators, develop an operational strategy, and coordinate sequenced actions.272\nFollowing the arrest of one of the suspects, the FBI worked with private-sector companies to reroute or \"sinkhole\" traffic to prevent further victimization, executed seizure warrants to take control of 23 internet domains used by the criminals, and worked with server-hosting companies in six countries to preserve and then take down 89 servers used to operate the scheme.273 The DoJ and the FBI, including several FBI Legal Attaches stationed overseas, also worked closely with foreign partnersspecifically, Malaysian, Bulgarian, Estonian, German, French, Dutch, British, and Swiss authorities and Europolto assist with aspects of the investigation and with apprehending three indicted subjects for arrest and extradition. Within hours, a criminal cyber infrastructure that had been generating millions of fraudulent electronic bid requests per minute went completely dark. Eight defendants were indicted for their role in orchestrating the botnet and another fraudulent digital advertising scheme, and to date several have appeared and entered guilty pleas in U.S. courts.\n\nwiretapping; however, botnets are often used for other nefarious purposes, such as harvesting email accounts and executing DDoS attacks against websites or other computers. In these latter types of cases, the courts may lack the statutory authority to issue an injunction to disrupt the botnet. As the techniques of adversaries adapt (i.e., moving to greater use of virtual private servers), addressing the challenge of dismantling adversary botnets becomes even more complex. To enable the U.S. government to better work with private industry and international partners, action is needed. In consultation with the Department of Justice, Congress should enact Section 4\nof the International Cybercrime Prevention Act.268 This legislation would provide broader authority to disrupt all types of illegal botnets, not just those used in fraud.269\nPILLARS AND KEY RECOMMENDATIONS\n\n## Strategic Objective #4: Reduce Critical Dependencies On Untrusted Information And Communications Technology\n\nThe United States should identify industries and technologies critical to national and economic security and take steps to reduce vulnerability at a macroeconomic level (e.g., industrial strategy) and at a microeconomic level (e.g., supply chain risk management). Of particular importance, as technology supply chains become more complex and global, the United States has developed a growing dependence on suppliers that may come under malign influence, introducing vulnerability into the ecosystem. To better manage these risks, the United States should develop a more robust capacity to identify and protect against untrusted suppliers while ensuring the presence of viable alternative suppliers for critical technologies through strategic investment.\n\n4.6 Congress should direct the U.S. government to develop and implement an information and communications technology industrial base strategy to ensure more trusted supply chains and the availability of critical information and communications technologies.\n\nThe United States participates in a global marketplace. Merely limiting the access of untrusted firms and their technologies to our cyber ecosystem not only will be inadequate to contain their risks but, in the absence of suitable alternatives, could instead stifle our economic growth and deprive core aspects of the U.S. economy of access to potentially transformative technologies. Nowhere is this truer than in technologies like 5G, which are pursued by strategic competitors, such as China, that bolster their companies' market share and subsidize their growth as a matter of national policyeffectively dominating a global market without having to respond to market forces. While existing authorities under the Defense Production Act274 empower the U.S. government to allocate resources and ensure domestic capacity in industries that directly serve national defense and security, they are limited in addressing areas where the lack of domestic or trusted industrial capacity itself constitutes a national security and economic security risk. U.S. government mechanisms to implement Defense Production Act authorities are similarly limited in resourcing and funding, and they provide no clear mandate to address these problems.\n\nCongress should direct the U.S. government to assess the United States' information and communications technology (ICT) supply chain and develop and implement an ICT industrial base strategy to reduce dependency and ensure greater security and availability of these critical technologies. This strategy should focus on ensuring the availability and integrity of trusted components, products, and materials necessary for the manufacture and development of ICTs deemed most critical to national and economic security. As part of this effort, the U.S. government should assess the ability of its current structure, resources, and authorities to inform, develop, and execute such a strategy and provide recommendations to strengthen them. Given the global, interconnected nature of trade and supply chains, the strategy should be formed in coordination with trusted partners and allies. In addition, the strategy should fully utilize the authorities available to the federal government, including but not limited to the Defense Production Act. Identify and Assess Critical Dependencies: In forming the strategy, the U.S. government should conduct an in-depth analysis of market conditions to\n\ncomprehensively assess foreign dependencies affecting\ncritical information and communication technologies. This assessment should:\n- Clearly identify critical technologies, components,\nand materials that the industrial base strategy seeks to protect.\n- Identify domestic and allied ICT industrial capacity. - Identify key areas of risk where a foreign adversary\ncould restrict supply of a critical technology or introduce supply chain compromise at large scale.\n- Identify barriers to a market-based solution.\nDirect Investments for ICT Industrial Capacity and Trusted Supply: The strategy should clearly outline national strategic priorities and estimate what federal resources need to be allocated to address and reduce dependencies on untrusted foreign technology and bolster domestic or allied production to ensure viable alternatives. The strategy should define lines of effort, assign responsibilities, and issue accompanying executive orders or presidential determinations necessary to carry it out. Further, the executive branch should work with Congress to identify additional resources and programmatic, legislative, or structural changes necessary for its implementation. Direct Strategic Investments in Research and Development: The strategy must identify and address areas where strategic investment in research and development must now be undertaken today to prevent future overreliance on foreign, untrusted technology in high-tech areas. This requires the U.S. government to examine provisions and mechanisms for strategic investment in research and development, identifying any areas in need of updates to meet current needs. As part of strategic research and development investment, and in addition to providing funding, the U.S. government will play an important role in overcoming the understandable reluctance of industry competitors to share space and knowledge.\n\nAmend the Defense Production Act to Enable an ICT\nIndustrial Base Strategy: In addition to the amendments recommended above, Congress should amend the Defense Production Act to clarify and expand the definition of \"national defense\" to include mitigating potential dependencies on foreign-sourced information and communications technology. In addition, Congress should consider expanding the definition of \"industrial resources\" to include those needed to maintain a modern domestic industrial base. These amendments would empower the President to shape domestic production under Title III of the Defense Production Act.\n\n## Enabling Recommendations 4.6.1 Increase Support To Supply Chain Risk Management Efforts\n\nSoftware, hardware, and information technology service supply chains are major means through which foreign actors, particularly China, can seek to introduce vulnerability and risk into the U.S. ecosystem in ways that can neither be accounted for nor mitigated through standard cybersecurity practices. Increasing reliance on foreign-owned or -controlled companies introduces new vulnerabilities into our nation's supply chains.275\nAt a national level, the United States can elect to limit market access to untrusted or high-risk vendors where the risk of supply chain compromise is unacceptable, such as through entities list designations, through the International Emergency Economic Powers Act, or by limits on inbound investment through the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States. At a more tactical level, the U.S. government and the private sector can utilize supply chain risk management techniques to reduce their risk and minimize vulnerability. Those undertaking both efforts require robust intelligence, both classified and open-source, to inform their work, alert them to adversary plans and intentions, and enable them to assess risk when making decisions. However, while the United States has strengthened mechanisms to address supply chain risk over the past few years, there must be a commensurate increase in resources for intelligence organizations that support and enable those mechanisms. To start correcting this gap, the 2020 National Defense Authorization Act laid the groundwork for strengthening PILLARS AND KEY RECOMMENDATIONS\n\ncounterintelligence risk assessments with public and\nprivate partners, and serve as the central and shared knowledge resource for threats to supply chain\nactivities or supply chain integrity.279\n- Understanding and defining additional measures\nthe U.S. government can adopt in making greater use of publicly available and proprietary sources in informing supply chain and foreign investment risk assessments.\n\n## 4.6.2 Commit Significant And Consistent Funding Toward Research And Development In Emerging Technologies The Federal Government Has A Long, Storied History Of Spurring Technological Revolutions By Funding And Engaging In Basic And Applied Research. By Pursuing Discoveries In\n\nthe U.S. intelligence community's capacity to provide\nbetter supply chain intelligence: it established a Supply Chain and Counterintelligence Risk Management Task Force within ODNI to improve supply chain intelligence\nfor U.S. government acquisition.276 The supply chain task\nforce should explore additional avenues to expand this support to critical infrastructure, including:\n- Leveraging the ongoing work and findings of the\nDHS-led ICT Supply Chain Risk Management Task\nForce277 to work with the private sector in order\nto identify both its needs and its mechanisms to improve information sharing on supply chain risk.\n- Determining appropriate funding, resourcing, and\nauthorities for U.S. intelligence community efforts to aggregate all-source information relating to supply\nchains,278 share strategic supply chain warning and\n\n## Should The United States Have A High-Tech Industrial Strategy?\n\nIn the 1980s, the U.S. semiconductor industry faced fierce competition from Japan. Growing dependence on Japanesesourced semiconductors, and the United States' diminishing industrial capacity, alarmed U.S. officials who understood the fundamental importance of maintaining this capability for both national competitiveness and national defense. Recognizing the need to regain competitiveness, more than a dozen U.S.-based computer chip manufacturers established a consortium called Sematech in partnership with the Reagan administration. With the objective of leapfrogging Japanese chip makers by the 1990s,280 the Reagan administration successfully supported the effort with public subsidies, over five years appropriating\n$500 million in funding from the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency and the Department of Defense (approximately $1.125 billion today, adjusted for inflation). Today, the United States faces an even greater challenge to its industrial might. Countries like China are growing increasingly dominant in the production and assembly of critical current and next-generation telecommunications equipment. But whereas the Japanese semiconductor industry grew out of genuine free market innovation, Chinese tech giants have benefited significantly from Chinese government support to build their massive market share. In other words, the playing field is uneven and global markets are neither free nor fair. While the Chinese tech giants have provided a wake-up call that might normally spur the competitors in the telecommunications industry, both U.S. companies and, with some exceptions, those of our trusted allies and partners have fallen so far behind industry leaders that regaining competitiveness may prove impossible without government support. As technology supply chains become more complex and global, the U.S. government must work with partners to ensure that trusted industry can provide the United States and its allies with trusted supply of critical technologies now and into the future.\n\nscience and technology well before a path toward commercial viability is certain or even understood, federally backed research is able to drive innovation in the absence of the nearer-term returns on investment traditionally required for commercial R&Dwith the internet itself being perhaps the most notable breakthrough. Emerging technologies such as artificial intelligence and quantum information science (quantum computing, quantum key encryption, etc.) pose both opportunities and risks, but we have yet to fully understand how to exploit and prepare for them, much less commercialize or deploy them, without further research. The federal government can best aid both the public and private sectors in their research endeavors through the application of consistent, significant funding to both fuel their efforts and protect them from theft.\n\n## Huawei And Zte: International Presence Confirmed Network/Vendor Mou / Testing With Huawei Huawei Ban Confirmed\n\n(Yash Mishra, \"Here Are the Countries That Allowed Huawei to Build 5G,\" Huawei Central, August 30, 2019, https://www huaweicentral com/here-are-the-countries-that-allowed-huawei-to-build-5g-list/ )\nNote: Data as of August 2019. Danish carriers have not selected Huawei or ZTE.\n\nIn 2016, a federal interagency working group found that one of the barriers to advanced, high-performance computing breakthroughs was a broad lack of consistent funding.281 In 2019, the National Security Commission on Artificial Intelligence determined that \"Federal R&D funding for AI has not kept pace with the revolutionary potential it holds or with aggressive investments by competitors.\"282The long-term, multiyear nature of this research requires institutions to carefully plan research and development campaigns across time.\n\nTo ensure continuity of effort, Congress should appropriate consistent funding and task the executive branch, including the National Science Foundation, the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, and the Intelligence PILLARS AND KEY RECOMMENDATIONS\nAdvanced Research Projects Agency, to develop and implement the Office of Science and Technology Policy's 2021 research and development priorities:283\n\n- Building and leveraging a diverse, highly skilled\nAmerican workforce.\n- Creating and supporting research environments that\nreflect American values.\n- Supporting transformative research of high-risk and\npotentially high-reward technologies.\n- Leveraging the power of data.\n- Building, strengthening, and expanding strategic\nmultisector partnerships.\n4.6.3 Strengthen the Capacity of the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States The U.S. government must consider and implement acceptable measures to ensure the resilience of the supply of technologies deemed critical to national security and economic prosperity. This requires taking disparate measures to both stem the flow of foreign investment into U.S. companies and stop the loss of technologies to competitors through state-sponsored industrial espionage. The Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS) is the primary mechanism through which the U.S. government combats these threats. While recent reforms enacted in the Foreign Investment Risk Review Modernization Act\n(FIRRMA) bolstered the Committee, the executive branch should do more to help it achieve its goals.\n\nSpecifically, the executive branch should:\n- Direct the Committee to more aggressively review\nbankruptcy buyouts and restructuring, as well as early-stage venture capital and private equity investment.\n- Direct departments and agencies to identify inconsistencies, gaps, or redundancies in programs across the federal government meant to support department and agency CFIUS reviews and compliance work, and identify areas where FIRRMA funds can be used to centralize or consolidate programs as managed services to fill gaps and reduce redundancies.\n- Direct departments and agencies to conduct a\ncomprehensive review of budgetary shortfalls for programs and work envisioned under FIRRMA and work with Congress to ensure that departments and agencies have funding sufficient to carry out their respective CFIUS programs.\n4.6.4 Invest in the National Cyber Moonshot Initiative In 2018, the President's National Security Telecommunications Advisory Committee determined that \"[t]he United States is at an inflection point: simultaneously faced with a progressively worsening cybersecurity threat environment and an ever-increasing dependence on Internet technologies fundamental to public safety, economic prosperity, and overall way of life. Our national security is now inexorably linked to cybersecurity.\" The committee called for a \"moonshot\" initiative to emphasize the \"national prioritization, collective action, and accelerated innovation\" required to solve this grand challenge, akin to putting a human on the moon.284\nWhile the National Cyber Moonshot Team is making progress on the 10-year plan with its six pillars and grand challenges, its success ultimately depends on consistent and enduring attention and support. The initial Cybersecurity Moonshot report reinforces this point, stating that \"the level of U.S. Government funding and investment in cybersecurity should exceed current levels by orders of magnitude and must be sustained at wartime-like levels for the decade timespan of the initiative.\"285 However, the federal government's fiscal year 2019 and proposed 2020 budgets failed to appropriate funds commensurate with the needs of the National Cyber Moonshot efforts. Congress and the executive branch must therefore actively engage with the National Cyber Moonshot Council to identify and appropriate the funds necessary to achieve the goals of the Moonshot initiative, and to identify and implement methods to permit and encourage private-sector participation at an effective level.\n\n## Strategic Objective #5: Strengthen National Systemic Data Security\n\nThe security and privacy of Americans' data should be substantially and systemically improved, especially as data becomes increasingly central to the modern digital economy and our everyday lives. In our current ecosystem, there is insufficient legal consensus on the appropriate use and security of personal and sensitive data, even as data breaches are increasingly delivering a treasure trove of information to malicious actors. The information stolen from American entrepreneurs, public officials, industry leaders, everyday citizens, and even clandestine operatives is fueling social engineering and espionage campaigns against U.S. firms and agencies. This entanglement of private data security and national security reveals the need to establish clear and consistent legal and technical frameworks to protect the information of individuals and firms, minimize the likelihood of their loss or manipulation, and make the \"big data\" economy safe for everyday Americans.\n\n4.7 Congress should pass a national data security and privacy protection law establishing and standardizing requirements for the collection, retention, and sharing of user data.\n\nThe creation, storage, transmission, and analysis of data are core components of the modern economy. Seven of the United States' 15 most profitable firms are software or telecommunications companies, and the technology industry as a whole represents more than\n10 percent of overall economic output.286 The private information and behavior of individual consumers and businesses are fueling this industry and powering a new wave of data-centric commerce. This concentration and monetization of Americans' personal and business data is creating new industries and valuebut also new opportunities for the unintentional mishandling or the malicious misuse of that data. The loss or exposure of sensitive information is becoming more common and more severe, and each instance provides malign actors with additional opportunities for exploitation, espionage, or attack. These dynamics have spurred advanced economies around the world into action, from Europe's General Data Protection Regulation to Japan's Act on the Protection of Personal Information to California's Consumer Privacy Act. In the absence of congressional leadership, these competing frameworks threaten to splinter the digital economy, confuse efforts to secure users' personal data, and imperil the ability of American companies to compete globally. Congress should pass legislation standardizing requirements that are enduring for the safe and appropriate handling of personal data. This is a necessary step to make the modern data-driven economy safe yet flexible for all Americans, provide the regulatory certainty needed for U.S. companies' continued innovation and prosperity, and ensure that the global digital marketplace remains open, interoperable, reliable, and secure.\n\nSpecifically, this legislation should establish:\n- National minimum common standards for the collection, retention, analysis, and third-party sharing of personal data.\n- Definitions of personal data, to include that which\ncan be linked, directly or indirectly, to individuals or households.\n- Thresholds for what entities are covered by this\nlegislation.\n- Timelines for deleting, correcting, or porting personal data upon request by the appropriate persons.\n- A clear mandate for the Federal Trade Commission\nto enforce these standards with civil penalties.\nPILLARS AND KEY RECOMMENDATIONS\nAny legislation should also explicitly create the expectation that covered entities will exert reasonable care and security regarding the protection of all relevant data they hold. Data security is a necessary first step for data privacy, because if the security of data is not guaranteed, its privacy cannot be either. Legislative proposals on this critical issue are pending, and Congress should seek to find a consensus.\n\n4.7.1 Pass a National Breach Notification Law Data breach notification laws require an entity that has been subject to a data breachregardless of causeto notify its customers and other parties and take steps to remediate injuries caused by the breach.287 While such laws have been adopted in some form by all 50 states, the District of Columbia, Guam, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands, there is no national standard for such notification.288 As a result, Americans' data is subject to a patchwork of varying protections. A national framework is needed to standardize consumers' expectations and provide regulatory certainty to American businesses engaging in interstate and global commerce.\n\nCongress should pass a national breach notification law that:\n- Preempts the 54 existing state, district, and territorial\ndata breach notification laws.\n- Establishes a threshold for what would be considered\na covered \"breach.\"\n- Requires the notification and transmission of\nrelevant forensic data to the appropriate law enforcement and cybersecurity authorities and other relevant anonymized data to authorized data-gathering bodies, such as the Bureau of Cyber Statistics proposed above (recommendation 4.3).\n- Sets standards and timelines for notifying victims. - Sets criteria that determine when victims should\nreceive free credit monitoring or other data and identity protections.\n- Deconflicts with existing federal regulation for\nprivate-sector and other non-federal entities.\n\n## Benefits And Challenges Of End-To-End Encryption\n\nThere is broad consensus across industry and the government on the importance of strong encryption. Advanced encryption of data in motion (i.e., as it is being transmitted) and at rest (i.e., as it is stored) should be a cornerstone of responsible data security. This includes, for example, using mature, well-researched protocols such as Transport Layer Security (TLS) to shield email, web browsing, and other important internet traffic from interception or modification by malicious actors. Strong encryption helps prevent or limit data breaches, and when data is breached it mitigates the harm to businesses, the government, and individuals. One particular implementation of encryption, known as \"end-to-end,\" is the subject of considerable debate. End-to-end encryption enables the transmission of data in such a way that only the communicating parties have the ability to access the data being securedintermediaries, such as the company that provides the communication system, do not. Broad implementation of this form of encryption could improve the systemic data security of the overall cyber ecosystem, though it may also conceal the activities of criminals and shield them from government action. The debate over balancing these concerns has run for decades, but recently it has been energized by the rapid adoption of end-to-end encrypted communications. Between WhatsApp, Signal, Telegram, and iMessage, numerous companies around the world are now offering end-to-end encrypted messaging services to more than 100 million Americans and 1.5 billion global citizens.289\nOne reason the debate over end-to-end encryption has been so difficult is that its benefits and costs are so hard to compare. As end-to-end encryption is more comprehensively adopted, and beyond the domestic data security benefit described above, it helps protect democratic values around the globe by making unfettered surveillance more difficult in certain repressive nations where such values are under siege. The United Nations' Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights has observed that end-to-end encryption is becoming an important tool for pushing back against a rising tide of increasingly lethal high-tech illiberalism and for protecting global freedom of expression.290 In this way, end-to-end encryption is currently making repression more difficult and less effective, imposing persistent costs on authoritarian governments. This form of encryption is a double-edged sword, however, as it also challenges democratically authorized and judicially circumscribed access to data that law enforcement agencies require for public safety and security. End-to-end encryption is currently impeding the government's ability to obtain lawful access to electronic evidence in investigations ranging from cyber intrusions and attacks to crimes threatening serious harms, like child exploitation, gang violence and drug trafficking, and domestic and international terrorism. For example, attributing responsibility for malicious cyber activity to particular actorsa necessary precursor to many law enforcement responsescan be difficult and slow without access to relevant encrypted data content. The quest for solutions to these issues should be informed by the core values that unite citizens of free and open societies. All government access to data should be, as it is in the United States, tightly circumscribed by protections like those in our Fourth Amendment. The United States requires infrastructure that enables citizens to confidently and securely conduct their affairs without unwarranted infringement of their essential liberties and that incorporates methods to protect them from harm. While the Commission does not express a position on the growing adoption of end-to-end encryption, the Commission does assert that both the government and the private sector should look to the future with a dual mandate on which all agree: strong encryption can and must underpin the essential functions of a free, open, interoperable, secure, and resilient global internet, but appropriately authorized and publicly accountable government officials must also be able to pursue criminal elements exploiting the internet to prey upon innocent persons. This debate is difficult, but the U.S. government should rely on these principles to engage with the trade-offs of end-to-end encryption honestlywhile recognizing that market forces and other countries (democratic and not) are rapidly shaping the encryption reality.\n\n## Operationalize Cybersecurity Collaboration With The Private Sector L\n\nayered cyber deterrence requires reshaping how the U.S. government coordinates with the private sector to address systemic cyber risk and counter growing cyber threats. The majority of assets, functions, and entities in the cyber domain that are attractive targets for adversaries are owned and operated by the private sector. As a consequence, cyber defense, while a shared responsibility, will depend significantly on the underlying efforts of the owners and operators of private networks and infrastructure. National defense therefore takes a very different shape in cyberspace, where the government mainly plays a supporting and enabling role in security and defense and is not the primary actor. The U.S. government and industry thus must arrive at a new social contract of shared responsibility to secure the nation in cyberspace. This \"collective defense\" in cyberspace requires that the public and private sectors work from a place of truly shared situational awareness and that each leverages its unique comparative advantages for the common defense. This pillar attempts to operationalize cybersecurity collaboration with the private sector by organizing and focusing U.S. government efforts on areas where they can have an outsized impact. Doing so requires improving the integration of public and private cyber defense efforts as well as ruthlessly prioritizing support to private entities and concentrating on areas where the U.S. government has an asymmetric advantage. Specifically, this pillar focuses on three strategic objectives. First, this pillar creates a framework for improving and prioritizing U.S. government cybersecurity support to critical elements of the private sector. Because the federal government's resources and capabilities are limited, it must prioritize its contributions to the defense of systemically important critical infrastructurethat is, critical infrastructure entities that manage systems and assets whose disruption could have cascading, destabilizing effects on U.S. national security, economic security, and public health and safety. While private-sector entities are responsible for the defense and security of their networks, the U.S.\n\ngovernment must bring to bear its unique authorities and resources, as well as diplomatic, economic, military, law enforcement, and intelligence capabilities, to support these actors in their defense efforts. Second, this pillar sets out a plan to focus U.S. government efforts on areas where it can add the most value: namely, on building better situational awareness of cyber threats. Information sharing is an important part of public-private collaboration, but it is not an end in and of itself. It is a means of building better situational awareness of cyber threats, which can then inform the actions of both the private sector and the government. Here the U.S. government has a unique capacity to take in information from disparate sources, including the intelligence community, and integrate that information to produce a more holistic picture of and better insights into the national collective understanding of threats.\n\nThird, this pillar identifies the need for the U.S. government to better integrate its own cyber defense security efforts with those of the private sector. To confront this challenge, the U.S. government must both better understand the system of centers and missions within the federal government and how they can be more fully integrated into the execution of the national cybersecurity mission and facilitate better joint, coordinated campaign planning that includes the private sector. To those ends, the U.S. government should conduct a comprehensive systems analysis review of federal cyber defense and security centers and missions, with a view toward diminishing barriers to collaboration across the federal government and between the public and private sectors.\n\n## Strategic Objective #1: Improve Government Support To Private-Sector Operations\n\nThe U.S. government should improve government support to private-sector cyber defensive operations. However, the federal government has limited resources and capabilities, and should prioritize the defense of systemically important critical infrastructurethe critical infrastructure entities that manage systems and assets whose disruption could have cascading, destabilizing effects on U.S. national security, economic security, or public health and safety. While the U.S. government has taken steps to assist these high-risk entities through Section 9 of Executive Order 13636, that effort falls short of codifying or fully implementing the social contract of shared responsibility and partnership in cybersecurityand it also does not empower the U.S. government with the resources and authorities necessary to defend them.\n\n5.1 Congress should codify the concept of \"systemically important critical infrastructure,\" whereby entities responsible for systems and assets that underpin national critical functions are ensured the full support of the U.S. government and shoulder additional security requirements consistent with their unique status and importance.\n\nThrough Section 9 of Executive Order 13636, the Obama administration took vital steps to recognize that not all critical infrastructure is of equal importance to the preservation of public health and safety, economic security, or national security.291 The systemically important critical infrastructure (SICI) entities, and their most vital systems and assets, are focal points of leverage for nation-state adversaries, allowing them to scale up the effects of cyber campaigns and thus the risk they can pose to the United States in peacetime and in crisis.292 Both the private sector and the U.S. government have a vested interest in protecting these systems and assets and have unique responsibilities for their security and resilience. The U.S. government must be assured that these companies are taking their security responsibilities seriously, honoring the public trust that appertains to the services and functions they provide, and participating in fully collaborative joint security efforts. Private-sector entities should likewise trust that the U.S. government is fully leveraging its unique authorities and resources to support their security operations, both in fulfillment of its responsibility to defend against and respond to nation-state attacks and in recognition of their unique national security importanceand the public good they provide. While Section 9 of Executive Order 13636 recognizes this relationship and acknowledges the social contract that underlies it, it does not endow the U.S. government with any new requirements, resources, or authorities to support SICI; nor does Section 9 designation place any additional expectations on the entities that receive it.\n\nTo address this gap, Congress should codify into law the concept of \"systemically important critical infrastructure,\" whereby entities responsible for systemically critical systems and assets are granted special assistance from the U.S. government and shoulder additional security and information-sharing requirements befitting their unique status and importance. While these entities are ultimately responsible for the defense and security of their networks, the U.S. government can and should bring to bear its unique authorities, resources, and intelligence capabilities to support these entities in their defense and assume greater responsibility in instances in which they are directly threatened by nation-states, designated PILLARS AND KEY RECOMMENDATIONS\ntransnational criminal groups, or terrorist organizations.\n\nSeparate, distinct designation and requirements should be established for sectors that have a unique relationship with the federal government, such as the Defense Industrial Base. Identification and Designation: Congress should direct the executive branch, through the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and in consultation with the appropriate sector-specific agencies, to develop a process to identify key systems and assets underpinning certain critical functions and designate the entities responsible for their management, operations, and security as \"systemically important critical infrastructure.\" These designations should be reviewed and updated as part of the regularly occurring National Risk Management Cycle led by DHS (recommendation 3.2.2). Designated entities should be codified in an unclassified determination issued by the President, while the specific systems and assets that led to the designation should be classified.\n\nIn defining the critical functions by which to designate systemically important critical infrastructure, the U.S. government should focus on national critical functions that:\n- Directly support or underpin national security\nprograms or government or military operations.\n- Constitute essential economic functions or underpin\nthe national distribution of goods and services.\n- Support or underpin public health and safety or are\nso foundational that their disruption could endanger human life on a massive scale.\nInsulation from Liability: Entities designated as systemically important critical infrastructure would be shielded from liability in instances when covered systems and assets are targeted, attacked, compromised, or disrupted through a cyberattack by a nation-state, designated transnational criminal group, or terrorist organization. To qualify, designated entities would need to have demonstrated good-faith compliance with all requirements set as a consequence of their designation.\n\nGovernment Program Requirements: Congress should direct the executive branch to define government programs in which entities designated as systemically important critical infrastructure would be required to participate as a consequence of their designation; this list should be updated regularly. These programs should include federal government information-sharing programs, national risk identification and assessment efforts, and other relevant federal programs meant to assist the private sector in cyber defense and security.\n\nSecurity Certification: Congress should direct the executive branch to develop a \"Security Certification\" for systemically important critical infrastructure and a mechanism, devised in consultation with the private sector, for SICI entities to certify their compliance on a consistent basis. DHS and the Department of Defense (DoD), in coordination with sector-specific agencies, should establish common and sector-specific standards and expectations for the governance and execution of security operations for this certification. In establishing these certifications, the executive branch should seek to reduce redundancy and regulatory burden by looking to existing regulatory requirements or existing security regimes rather than establishing new ones. Prioritized Federal Assistance: The executive branch should define a process by which designated entities can, through DHS, request expedited federal assistance in instances when they have been compromised or attacked by a malicious cyber actor. This process should define the information required to submit a request, the timeline for response, and the criteria used by federal departments and agencies to evaluate and approve requests.\n\nIndications and Warning and Intelligence Support:\nCongress should explicitly establish in law that sharing intelligence with U.S.-owned entities designated as SICI does not constitute unlawful favoring of one entity over another. In addition, Congress should direct the executive branch to define mechanisms and procedures, through DHS and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence and in consultation with sector-specific agencies, for enhanced collaboration among designated entities, sector-specific agencies, and the U.S. intelligence community.\n\n5.1.1 Review and Update Intelligence Authorities to Increase Intelligence Support to the Broader Private Sector The U.S. intelligence community is not currently resourced to fully support the private sector in cyber defense and security. While the intelligence community is formidable in informing security operations in instances when the U.S. government is the defender, it lacks appropriate policies and processes to do so when primary responsibility falls outside of the U.S. government. Intelligence policies and procedures remain outdated; they have not been sufficiently modernized to account for the unique challenges of cyberspace or the flexibility and ingenuity of malicious foreign actors. As a result, the intelligence community continues to be significantly limited in its ability to maintain awareness of evolving cyber threats and provide warning to U.S. entities when they are being targeted. While codifying systemically important critical infrastructure will ensure stronger intelligence support and indications and warning for the most critical systems and assets, the intelligence community will still be limited in its ability to support critical infrastructure that falls outside of that designation. Thus the U.S. government must address more general limitations in its ability to provide intelligence support to all private sector stakeholders and associated organizations, such as information sharing and analysis centers (ISACs) and the Financial Systemic Analysis and Resilience Center (FSARC). To that end, Congress should direct the executive branch to conduct a six-month comprehensive review of intelligence policies, procedures, and resources to\n\nidentify and address key limitations in the ability of the\nintelligence community to provide intelligence support to the private sector. The executive branch should report its findings to Congress upon conclusion of its review, which should include specific recommendations or plans to address challenges identified in the report. The review should:\n- Examine U.S. foreign intelligence surveillance\nauthorities to identify and address limitations in\ncollection for cyber defense missions supporting\nprivate-sector stakeholders.\n- Review policies to identify limitations in the intelligence community's ability to share threat intelligence information with the private sector, including accounting for instances when national security outweighs concerns over preferential treatment.\n- Review downgrade and declassification procedures\nfor cyber threat intelligence to improve the speed and timeliness of its release; consider defining criteria and procedures for expedited declassification and release of certain types of intelligence.\n- Examine current and projected mission requirements of the National Security Agency's (NSA) Cybersecurity Directorate, identify current funding gaps, and recommend budgetary changes needed to ensure that NSA meets expectations for increased support to the nation's cybersecurity effort.\n- Review cyber-related information-sharing consent\nprocesses, including consent to monitor agreements, and assess gaps and opportunities for greater standardization and simplification while ensuring privacy and civil liberty protections.\n- Review existing statutes governing \"national security\nsystems\"including National Security Directive 42, which establishes executive policy on the security of national security telecommunications and information systemsand assess their ability to provide the National Security Agency with sufficient authority to conduct its mission in protecting systems and assets that are critical to national security.\nPILLARS AND KEY RECOMMENDATIONS\n5.1.2 Strengthen and Codify Processes for Identifying Broader Private-Sector Cybersecurity Intelligence Needs and Priorities Understanding the intelligence needs and gaps of private-sector entities is critical in ensuring that the U.S. government is able to provide focused, actionable intelligence in support of their cybersecurity operations. While the preceding recommendations focus on removing barriers to or limitations in the collection or production of intelligence and its distribution to the private sector, they will be fundamentally hindered if the U.S. government lacks the processes to best serve the private sector and answer its security requirements. However, existing processes to solicit private-sector input into U.S. intelligence needs and collection requirements are inconsistent, too narrow in scope, and lack sufficient detail. For instance, existing processes compile self-identified intelligence gaps but do not account for common vulnerabilities, such as common technology or third-party services, that would be targeted by an intelligent nation-state adversary. This information, if specific enough, can be used to provide indications and warnings and focused intelligence to private-sector entities if and when the intelligence community detects they are being or will be targeted by a malicious actor.\n\nCongress should therefore direct and resource the federal government to establish a formal process to solicit and\ncompile private-sector input to inform national intelligence priorities, collection requirements, and more focused U.S. intelligence support to private-sector cybersecurity operations. This process should:\n- Be led by the Office of the Director of National\nIntelligence and DHS, in coordination with DoD and other sector-specific agencies.\n- Identify common technologies or interdependenciesareas of high risk that are likely to be targeted by intelligent nation-state adversaries.\n- Seek to identify intelligence gaps, priorities, and\nneeds across the private sector and state, local, tribal, and territorial entities.\n- Run parallel with and be tied to National Risk\nManagement Cycle (recommendation 3.1.1) processes for risk identification and assessment, as the same information that informs sector-specific and cross-sector risk can be used to guide U.S. intelligence efforts to provide indications and warnings and more focused intelligence.\n- Empower sector-specific agencies and make them\naccountable to work with their sectors, including\nsector-coordinating councils and ISACs, to identify\nspecific critical lines of businesses, technologies, and processes and work directly with the intelligence community to convey specific details.\n- Codify legal protections for the types of information\nthat would be routinely shared as part of this process, ensuring that such information is protected and insulated from public disclosure.\n5.1.3 Empower Departments and Agencies to Serve Administrative Subpoenas in Support of Threat and Asset Response Activities While the U.S. government has a unique understanding of threat and vulnerability, there are limits to its ability to systematically identify those who are vulnerable or compromised, notify them, and assist them in mitigating or reducing vulnerability. In particular, the inability to identify the owners and operators of known vulnerable or compromised online systems hinders the U.S. government's efforts to notify and, upon request, assist private-sector entities in their security operations. Current authorities are limited exclusively to certain criminal contexts, where evidence of a compromise exists, and do not address instances in which systems are merely vulnerable. To address this gap, Congress should consider granting certain departments and agencies subpoena authority in support of their threat and asset response activities, while ensuring appropriate liability protections for cooperating private-sector network owners.\n\nCongress should extend existing law enforcement administrative subpoena authority, currently defined under 18 U.S. Code  3486, for the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the United States Secret Service to include violations of the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 18 U.S. Code  1030.\n\n## Strategic Objective #2: Improve Combined Situational Awareness Of Cyber Threats\n\nThe U.S. government should improve combined situational awareness of cyber threats to better support its own and private-sector cyber defensive efforts. For the better part of a decade, expanding public-private collaboration in cybersecurity was synonymous with sharing threat information. Information sharing is an important part of public-private collaboration, certainly, but it is not an end in and of itself. Rather it enables better situational awareness of cyber threats, which can then inform the actions of both the private sector and the government. Truly shared situational awareness is the foundation on which operational collaboration is built and enabled. The U.S. government should leverage its unique, comparative advantages to improve the national collective understanding of the threat, including the information available to the intelligence community and a capacity to integrate information from disparate sources both public and private. Similarly, the U.S. government must create the structures and processes to work with private-sector entities that have unique insights of their own and a different, and in some cases more comprehensive, view of threats impacting domestic critical infrastructure.\n\n5.2 Congress should establish and fund a Joint Collaborative Environment, a common and interoperable environment for the sharing and fusing of threat information, insight, and other relevant data across the federal government and between the public and private sectors.\n\nWhile the U.S. government has taken a number of steps to develop situational awareness in cyberspace, there continue to be significant limitations on its ability to develop a comprehensive picture of the threat. Federal departments and agencies each maintain a number of programs that can provide insight into threats affecting U.S. government networks and critical infrastructure. However, the data or information is not routinely shared or Congress should pass the Cybersecurity Vulnerability Identification and Notification Act of 2019 to grant tailored authority to the Director of the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) to serve administrative subpoenas so that the owners of online systems with known vulnerabilities can be identified, enabling asset response activities and preventing future intrusion.\n\ncross-correlated at the speed and scale necessary for rapid detection and identification. This fragmented approach presents further challenges in integrating with the private sector, both as a contributor to and as a beneficiary of U.S. government insight, causing confusion and adding significant burden for the private sector in public-private information-sharing efforts. The U.S. government must take steps to shift the burden of integration onto itself, PILLARS AND KEY RECOMMENDATIONS\nestablishing the mechanisms and enforceable procedures to build the situational awareness necessary for its own operations and for forging true operational collaboration with the private sector. To that end, Congress should establish a \"Joint Collaborative Environment\", a common, cloud-based environment in which the federal government's unclassified and classified cyber threat information, malware forensics, and network data from monitoring programs are made commonly available for query and analysisto the greatest extent possible.293 Initial stages will focus on the integration of programs across the federal government and with owners and operators of systemically important critical infrastructure, while subsequent phases will focus on extending this environment to larger constituencies of critical infrastructure, including ISACs. This program would make real the promise of a \"whole-of-government\" and public-private approach to cybersecurity, ensuring that network data, cyber threat intelligence, and malware forensics from each department or agency and the private sector are available at machine speed for comprehensive detection and analysis. The Joint Collaborative Environment should support federal cyber centers, an integrated cyber center at CISA (recommendation 5.3), and a planning cell under CISA (recommendation 5.4).\n\nDesign, Development, and Planning: Given the complexity of such a program, Congress should allow for a multiyear design and development cycle that proceeds in phases. Initial phases should focus on designing appropriate interoperable standards, affording for integration of all covered data programs, and ensuring that disparate databases or centers can be compatible and interoperable at machine speed and scale. Subsequent phases should focus on sharing high-level insights and more exquisite dataas well as addressing challenges introduced by wider inclusion of private-sector partners. Program Management: Congress should designate DHS and the NSA to act as the primary program managers and lead agencies charged with developing and maintaining the environment in unclassified and classified space, respectively. Where feasible, unclassified data should be routinely mirrored to a classified environment, and integrated with classified data, to provide enrichment, to broaden context, and to inform and enable indications and warning. Analytic tools should be deployed across classification levels to leverage all relevant data sets as appropriate.\n\nDesignation of Programs: Congress should direct the executive branch to designate, as part of the environment's development process and on a routine basis after it is fully operational, federal programs required to participate, feed into, and/or be interoperable with the environment. These federal programs should include any programs that generate, collect, or disseminate data or information in the detection, identification, analysis, and monitoring of cyber threats, such as:\n- Government network-monitoring and intrusion detection programs.\n\n- Cyber threat indicatorsharing programs. - Government-sponsored network sensors or network-monitoring programs for the private sector or for state, local, tribal, and territorial governments.\n\n- Incident response and cybersecurity technical assistance programs.\n\n- Malware forensics and reverse-engineering programs.\n\nInformation-Sharing Protections: The law should direct that any private-sector information-sharing programs participating in the Joint Collaborative Environment are extended protections analogous to those afforded by the Cybersecurity Information Sharing Act of 2015. The availability of data within this environment is contingent on these protections. When appropriate, the environment will share raw, anonymized data to inform the work of the Bureau of Cyber Statistics (recommendation 4.3), in compliance with that bureau's charter. Data Standardization and Interoperability: Congress should direct the executive branch to establish an interagency council, chaired by the program managers, that sets data standards and requirements for program participation and interoperability. Data standards and interoperability requirements should be formed in a public-private process to ensure the full inclusion of the private sector in program design. Membership should include any department or agency that oversees participating, designated programs. The council would be empowered to recommend budgetary changes necessary for programs to make technical or operational adjustments required for integration and interoperability, to establish and maintain the environment, and to ensure that the environment has adequate security to prevent breaches and to guard against and detect false data insertion. Modules and Tooling: Congress should appropriate necessary funds to DHS and the NSA to develop, purchase, and deploy tools and analytical software that can be applied and shared to manipulate, transform, and display data and other identified needs. Data Governance and Privacy: In developing the program, the federal government should establish the procedures and data governance structures necessary to protect the sensitivity of data, comply with federal regulations and statutes, and respect existing consent agreements with the private sector and other non-federal entities. The federal government should take steps to make preexisting and all future consent agreements compliant with inclusion into the environment and bring preexisting agreements and programs into compliance with the program. Public-Private Partnership: The environment should be designed with the goal of including the participation of the private sector and information sharing and analysis organizations/centers, both to feed into and to benefit from the data and analytical insight the environment would provide. Initially, elements of systemically important critical infrastructure, as part of their designation, will be encouraged to share cyber threat indicators, malware forensics, and data from network sensor programs.\n\n## Enabling Recommendations 5.2.1 Expand And Standardize Voluntary Threat Detection Programs\n\nCurrent voluntary network monitoring and threat detection programs294 are essential in advancing a better understanding of threats affecting U.S. critical infrastructure. These voluntary programs, through which the U.S. government provides sensors or funding to monitor private-sector networks, can enable the rapid detection and identification of cyber threatswhether they are isolated incidents or part of a larger, coordinated campaign. While programs like DHS's Enhanced Cybersecurity Services Program and the Department of Energy's Cyber Risk Information Sharing Program show great promise, their usefulness has been hindered by a limited scale of deployment and insufficient coverage. In addition, coverage and deployment have not been centrally planned or coordinated to reflect strategic assessment of risk and need. Properly implemented and deployed at sufficient scale, these programs could form the foundation of a virtual \"early warning network\" in cyberspace, providing a vital missing piece in U.S. government and private-sector situational awareness. To achieve this goal, the U.S. government should take steps, through the Joint Collaborative Environment's interagency council, to expand and more centrally fund, manage, and deploy these programs and ensure their interoperability with broader federal cyber threatsharing and integration efforts. In addition, Congress should identify programs that should be excluded from or have special handling in this expansion and standardization, such as law enforcement and domestic counterintelligence collection efforts.\n\n5.2.2 Pass a National Cyber Incident Reporting Law The government's cyber incident situational awareness, its ability to detect coordinated cyber campaigns, and its risk identification and assessment efforts rely on comprehensive data. However, there are insufficient PILLARS AND KEY RECOMMENDATIONS\nfederal and state laws and policies requiring companies to report incidents that impact or threaten to impact business operations. While mandated reporting for regulatory purposes and voluntary information-sharing protections exist, the federal government lacks a mandate to systematically collect cyber incident information reliably and at the scale necessary to inform situational awareness.\n\nTo address this shortcoming, Congress should authorize\nDHS and Department of Justice (DOJ) to establish requirements for critical infrastructure entities to report cyber incidents to the federal government. In crafting this requirement, DHS and DOJ should collaborate with public- and private-sector entities to identify the types of critical infrastructure entities to which it should apply. This information should be minimized, anonymized, and shared as statistical data with the Bureau of Cyber Statistics (recommendation 4.3).\n- DHS and DOJ should, in coordination with sector-specific agencies and the private sector, define the thresholds and types of cyber incidents that would be required to be reported under this law.\n- DHS and DOJ should define clear mechanisms,\nprocesses, the format, and information required in reporting such an incident. These specifications should include processes necessary to protect privacy\nand minimize personally identifiable information.\n- Reported incidents may not be used to inform or\ndrive punitive measures taken by regulatory agencies; however, reporting under this requirement does not trigger, or obviate, reporting requirements under existing regulationsnor does it shield covered\nentities from regulatory action if violations are\ndiscovered through other means.\n- As the relevant sector-specific agency and contracting\nparty, DoD may define additional mechanisms, process, format, and reporting information and regulations required for the Defense Industrial Base.\n5.2.3 Amend the Pen Register Trap and Trace (PRTT) Statute to Enable Better Identification of Malicious Actors Current electronic surveillance laws do not allow companies to engage in defensive measures to fully identify actors or infrastructure that is being used to target or attack them. This information is often transitory, and immediate action may be needed to ensure that identifying information is preserved. Current ambiguities center on certain cybersecurity techniques such as establishing a \"honeypot\"that is, direct action taken by an entity outside of its own network, such as following an actor after a compromise of its own system. Amending PRTT to include existing exemptions to the Wiretap Act found at 18 U.S. Code  2511(2) would allow an avenue for defenders to receive information about attackers that is currently restricted to \"Electronic Communication Providers.\" To reduce ambiguity and allow the private sector a broader range of defensive techniques, Congress should amend 18 U.S. Code  3121, referred to as the Pen Register and Trap and Trace statute, to help enable certain \"active defense\" activities. Amending the PRTT statute would allow cybersecurity companies, or companies with the necessary resources and expertise, to conduct more effective identifying activities on behalf of their companies or customers.\n\n## Strategic Objective #3: Integrate Public- And Private-Sector Cyber Defense Efforts\n\nThe U.S. government should improve its capacity to better coordinate its own cyber defense planning and operations and integrate its operations with the private sector. Current federal government operations to defend against cyberattacks are decentralized and tend to be uncoordinated, leading to inefficiencies and the lack of a coherent, strategic approach to defend the nation. Therefore, the interests of critical infrastructure providers and parts of the private sector that are key to cyber defense are not always adequately incorporated into these defensive operations because of a lack of institutionalized processes and procedures for collaboration with federal agencies and a dearth of threat information.\n\n5.3 Congress should direct the executive branch to strengthen a public-private, integrated cyber center within CISA in support of the critical infrastructure security and resilience mission and to conduct a one-year, comprehensive systems analysis review of federal cyber and cybersecurity centers, including plans to develop and improve integration.\n\nOver the past decade, the U.S. government has stood up a number of missions, centers, and programs across the federal government to strengthen U.S. cybersecurity. As the number of agencies involved in the cybersecurity mission has expanded, however, there have been difficulties in integrating their operations for coordinated action, common situational awareness, and joint analysis, and the risk of fragmented, uncoordinated efforts has grown. U.S. public-private cybersecurity efforts will continue to be undermined without effective, meaningful cooperation across federal departments and agencies. While the recommendations in this report that call for investment in programs that support and enable joint planning, coordinated action, and shared information and analysisall vital parts of operational collaborationcan do much to address these issues, they are insufficient if underlying structural procedural issues remain unaddressed. More importantly, these recommendations are no substitute for human-to-human collaboration and close, trusted relationships. For the United States, seamless collaboration means diminishing barriers between agencies and between the public and private sectors with a focus on relationshipsunderpinned and served by a strong technical foundation like the Joint Collaborative Environment (recommendation 5.2). CISA is already a key component in coordinating the cyber defense and security efforts of federal departments and agencies and integrating these efforts with the private sector. Initially conceptualized through a national cybersecurity and communications integration center\n(NCCIC), the vision for CISA's cyber mission is to be the U.S. government's primary coordinating body charged with forging whole-of-government, public-private collaboration in cybersecurity. However, CISA has been institutionally limited in its ability to fully carry out this mission, hindered by inadequate facilities, insufficient resources, lack of buy-in from other federal departments and agencies, ambiguity from Congress on its role and position in relation to other agencies, and inconsistent support to and integration with the private sector. To truly operationalize cybersecurity collaboration with the private sector, the U.S. government must strengthen an integrated cyber center within CISA, improve its connectivity with other key cyber and cybersecurity centers including the FBI's National Cyber Investigative Joint PILLARS AND KEY RECOMMENDATIONS\nTask Force (NCIJTF), ODNI's Cyber Threat Intelligence Integration Center (CTIIC), DOD's Integrated Cyber Center and Joint Operations Center (ICC/JOC), and NSA's Cybersecurity Directorate (CSD)and ensure that the systems, processes, and *human element* of collaboration and integration are fully brought to bear in support of the critical infrastructure cybersecurity and resilience mission.\n\nCongress should direct the executive branch to immediately begin to strengthen a public-private, integrated cyber center within CISA in support of the critical infrastructure cybersecurity and resilience mission and in coordination with centers in the FBI, ODNI, and DoD. While this is under way, the executive branch should conduct a one-year, comprehensive systems analysis review of federal cyber and cybersecurity centers, which should include developing plans to better integrate the centers. The review should identify challenges and solutions to more effectively integrate elements of federal cyber centers, the private sector, and CISA with a view toward reinforcing human-to-human collaboration, reducing procedural or technical barriers to integration, implementing other recommendations within this report, and, to the greatest extent possible, increasing meaningful integration of cybersecurity stakeholders. This process should be undertaken by the National Cyber Director\n(recommendation 1.5), or, in lieu of a National Cyber Director, a working group led by DHS, in coordination with DoD, DOJ, FBI, and ODNI. In particular, this review should address the following actions.\n\nStrengthening CISA's Public-Private Integrated Cyber Center: CISA's role as the primary interface between the federal government and critical infrastructure for cybersecurity places it in a unique position to operationalize the type of public-private collaboration necessary to secure and defend cyberspace and the critical infrastructure that relies on it. In strengthening a public-private integrated cyber center within CISA, the executive branch should identify continuing gaps and shortcomings in CISA's current capacity, structure, funding, and integration of its work with sector-specific agencies that prevent it from fulfilling its role as the central coordinator among federal centers for critical infrastructure cybersecurity and resilience. Identifying Areas of Integration and Collocation: The executive branch should assess areas where existing federal cyber centers, or portions of a center's mission, would benefit from greater integration or collocation to support cybersecurity collaboration with critical infrastructure.\n\nThe review should identify and acknowledge continuing gaps and shortcomings in associated capacity and funding of the FBI and ODNI, identify methods to better integrate efforts with CISA in support of its mission to ensure the security and resilience of critical infrastructure, and identify where federal agencies have distinct statutory authorities (i.e., those of law enforcement, counterintelligence, military, and intelligence operations) best kept distinct and separate from these efforts.\n\nSupporting the National Security Agency's Cybersecurity Directorate (CSD): The executive branch review of federal cyber centers should include a particular focus on NSA's new Cybersecurity Directorate. Sustaining and strengthening the CSD's collaboration with and support to other federal departments and agencies, particularly CISA, is critical in ensuring that the U.S. government's technical expertise and intelligence resources are fully brought to bear in supporting both federal and public-private cybersecurity efforts. The executive branch should identify continuing gaps and opportunities for greater integration of CSD with CISA, other federal cyber centers, and, as needed, the private sector in its role of securing national security systems.\n\nAssessing Centralized, Collocated Public-Private Collaboration: The U.S. government should identify lessons from the United Kingdom's National Cybersecurity Center model, which maintains collocated classified and unclassified environments for private-sector cybersecurity integration. The review should assess whether an integrated cyber center within CISA should be similarly organized into two environments: an unclassified side, which handles general cybersecurity coordination and cooperation with the private sector, and a classified side with appropriate support from CSD, which handles deeper collaboration with systemically important critical infrastructure and the intelligence community on systemic cyber security and resilience and cyber defense operations. The executive branch should assess continuing gaps and limitations in its ability to provide for greater centralization of public-private cybersecurity efforts similar to the NCSC model within a CISA integrated cyber center. Increasing Public- and Private-Sector Integration: The executive branch review should also recommend procedures and criteria for increasing and expanding the participation and integration of public- and private-sector personnel into U.S. government cyber defense and security efforts. This review should identify continuing limitations or hurdles in the security clearance program for private\n\n5.4 The executive branch should establish a Joint Cyber Planning Cell under the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency to coordinate cybersecurity planning and readiness across the federal government and between the public and private sectors for significant cyber incidents and malicious cyber campaigns.\n\nSuccessfully defending against malicious cyber incidents, mitigating their consequences, and countering adversary cyber campaigns requires the United States to be able to mount its own coordinated, timely, whole-of-government, public-private cyber defense and security campaigns. Planning is a critical element in fulfilling this mandate. Effective cyber planning ensures that the government both aligns and readies the full range of U.S. government tools in cyberspace and coordinates jointly with private-sector entities, so that they can be employed and integrated seamlessly in response to or in advance of a crisis. Elements of the U.S. government and the private sector, working within their respective sectors sector partners and in integrating private sector partners into a CISA integrated cyber center, including integrating private sector organizations like information sharing and analysis centers (ISAC) and the Financial Systemic Analysis and Resilience Center (FSARC). Within one year and upon the conclusion of its review, the executive branch should report its findings to Congress and provide recommendations on additional resources or authorities required to implement its plans and to address gaps the review has identified. The executive branch will conduct an annual review thereafter, providing a yearly report to Congress on the status of its efforts, any revised findings or additional resources or authorities required, and its progress in addressing the areas identified in this recommendation. Future reports should include updates on the progress of the Joint Collaborative Environment (recommendation 5.2) in enabling greater federal agency and public-private integration, after the environment comes online.\n\nor as individual firms or agencies, often lack the power to independently counter and mitigate a coordinated nation-state cyber campaign. Given this reality, planning is fundamental to enabling and strengthening feedback loops for identifying an effective division of effort and preparing individual agencies and firms to execute responses quickly and with a common understanding of roles, responsibilities, and courses of action. But efforts to date have not adequately included private-sector stakeholders, and they have been reactive to individual incidents rather than being comprehensive and forward-looking. This inadequate response is largely PILLARS AND KEY RECOMMENDATIONS\ndue to insufficient coordination of the U.S. government's cyber capabilities, authorities, and expertisewhich remain distributed across a variety of agenciesand questions on how to appropriately integrate private-sector participation. Furthermore, these agencies have not engaged in the collaborative planning necessary to overcome jurisdictional hurdles, identify gaps, align whole-of-government capabilities, build private-sector buy-in, or institutionalize learning through combined exercises. As a result, when an adversary cyber campaign is identified or an incident does occur, coordinated and comprehensive operations in defense of critical infrastructure are unlikely to be timely or effective. To address this shortcoming, the executive branch, with the support of Congress, should establish a Joint Cyber Planning Cell (\"the Cell\") under CISA. The Cell should be composed of a central planning staff and representatives from the federal agencies that wield operational cyber capabilities and/or authorities in defense of critical infrastructure. The Cell will facilitate comprehensive planning of defensive, non-intelligence cybersecurity campaigns across agencies. It will integrate these planning efforts with the private sector, particularly with systemically important critical infrastructure (recommendation 5.1) and in areas where the ability of the private sector to deploy security mitigating a threat rivals or exceeds that of the U.S. government (recommendation 5.4.2). The Cell will be managed and hosted by CISA and informed by the Joint Collaborative Environment (recommendation 5.2). The plans should not include consequence imposition options, but should instead focus on limiting and mitigating malicious cyber campaigns once they have been identified. Centralized Planning Resources and Support: As part of the Cell's establishment, Congress should ensure that it has sufficient resources both to carry out its mission and to provide support to other agencies that possess relevant equities but do not have adequate operational planning capacity. Cyber Campaign Planning: The Cell will be charged with coordinating planning for campaigns and operations to respond to and recover from a significant cyber incident or limit, mitigate, or defend against a coordinated, malicious cyber campaign targeting U.S. critical infrastructure. These plans should be developed through a deliberate planning process, accounting for all participating federal agency cyber capabilities and authorities. The planning will integrate representatives from the NCIJTF Office of Campaign Coordination and from the private sector to identify comparative advantages, develop unity of purpose, and understand needs or limitations of government or private-sector action in protecting critical infrastructure. Planning Procedures: The executive branch should establish procedures for identifying and prioritizing scenarios and contingencies around which the Cell will develop whole-of-government and public-private plans. The executive branch should assign roles and responsibilities to federal agencies necessary to carry out this requirement and establish further directives on how plans will be formed, coordinated, maintained, updated, and routinely exercised. Execution of Plans: When an adversary campaign is identified or a significant cyber incident occurs, the Cell's deliberate plans would help inform courses of action to be approved through a National Security Council (NSC) decision-making process. As appropriate, the Cell would coordinate the execution of these plans with existing cyber centers, which oversee contributing operations by responsible agencies. Agency elements of plans should be prepared and submitted through a predetermined approval process to appropriate authorities for rapidand, if required, sustainedexecution in response to an attack. Integration with Consequence Imposition Options: The Cell's planning efforts would integrate with, and be one element of, broader NSC-led options levied against an adversary in response to a malicious cyber campaign. These would include public attribution, criminal charges (such as indictments), sanctions, and other executive actions designed to impose consequences and deter future malicious behavior.\n\n5.4.1 Institutionalize Department of Defense Participation in Public-Private Cybersecurity Initiatives Building better public-private collaboration will require more active and deeper collaboration between DoD and other federal departments and agencies and private-sector stakeholders, including owners and operators of systemically important critical infrastructure. DoD\nbrings considerable resources, expertise, and advanced capabilities that, when integrated appropriately with new or existing public-private initiatives, can substantially increase the timeliness and effectiveness of U.S. cyber defense and security efforts. An example is the Pathfinder initiative,295 which grew out of a 2017 pilot program, Project Indigo, between the U.S. government and the financial sector. These projects enabled the increased sharing of threat data and greater joint collaboration between firms and government stakeholders. A second Pathfinder initiative has since been created for the energy sector.296 The Pathfinder initiative is a key proof of concept of collaboration between the private sector and critical infrastructure in support of the U.S. cyber defense and security mission. Developing institutional support for Pathfinder-type initiatives not only creates opportunities for increased collaboration across critical sectors, as prioritized by federal departments and agencies, but will also buttress and accelerate nascent efforts and increase their chances of success. These initiatives will also enable these programs to move beyond threat information sharing toward better human-to-human collaboration in developing sector-specific concepts of operations and joint exercises. Congress should request in the FY2021 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) an assessment of the impact of the current Pathfinder initiative, prospects for making existing Pathfinder pilots more robust, and whether and how to expand Pathfinder or similar models of public-private collaboration to other critical infrastructure sectors, particularly systemically important critical infrastructure. The review should also:\n\n- Examine additional comparative models for ensuring dedicated, long-term support to public-private cybersecurity initiatives led by civilian departments and agencies, such as the FBI and CISA.\n- Examine DoD support to existing federal cyber centers and assess the need for establishing a meaningfully permanent presence of personnel to encourage greater integration with public- and private-sector cybersecurity efforts.\n5.4.2 Expand Cyber Defense Collaboration with Information and Communications Technology (ICT) Enablers Telecommunications and information technology sectors are likely to hold systemically important critical infrastructure assets, because the disruption of their assets could cause cascading or catastrophic effects. As providers, owners, and operators of core services and of infrastructure key to the functioning of the cyber ecosystem, internet service providers, cloud service providers, information technology software and hardware producers, and cybersecurity companies are uniquely placed to have an outsized impact on national cybersecurity efforts. Currently, U.S. government efforts to provide more and more actionable information to enable ICT enabler security operations have been limited in scope and duration. Likewise, the U.S. government is limited in its capacity to receive information from these enablers. To leverage the reach of these companies, the U.S. government should invest more resources in:\n- Providing better support to ICT enablers, including better and more actionable information and classified indicators, and increasing collaboration on broader cyber defense efforts.\n\n- Building institutional mechanisms to better identify, accept, and integrate key cybersecurity information and indicators with information and indicators from other government sources.\n\n- Operationalizing public-private initiatives, like the Enduring Security Framework, between the U.S. government and critical technology enablers such as internet service providers and information technology companies.\n\n## Preserve And Employ The Military Instrument Of Power\n\nT\no best implement layered cyber deterrence, the United States must be prepared to impose costs to deter and, if necessary, fight and win in conflict, as well as counter and reduce malicious adversary behavior below the level of armed conflict. Therefore, this pillar comprises implementing defend forward in day-to-day competition to counter adversary cyber campaigns and impose costs, as well as being prepared to prevail in crisis and conflict. Importantly, the military instrument of cyber power is intended to complement, rather than supplant, other instruments. The result is the coordinated employment of all instruments of national power. Thus far, the United States has successfully deterred strategic cyberattacks that would rise to the level of an armed attack. However, below that threshold, there is a significant set of adversary behavior that the United States has not prevented. That is why, critical to this pillar is the defend forward concept, originally articulated in the 2018 Department of Defense Cyber Strategy.297 This approach addresses the set of malicious adversary action that exists on a spectrum between routine activities that states tacitly accept (e.g., espionage) and strategic cyberattacks that would constitute an armed attack. The Commission reimagines and expands the core logic of DoD's concept of defend forward to incorporate both military and non-military instruments of power. Defend forward follows from the recognition that organizing U.S. cyber forces around simply reacting to adversary activity has been ineffective in preventing adversary cyber campaigns; and initiatives that rely solely on non-military instruments of power have been insufficient to alter adversaries' cost-benefit and risk calculus. Therefore, the United States must ensure that it is organized, resourced, and postured to position and employ forces forwardgeographically and virtuallyto counter adversary campaigns, pursue adversaries as they maneuver, and impose costs. An urgent concern is the ability to defend and surge when adversaries utilize cyber capabilities to attack U.S.\n\nmilitary systems and functions. To accomplish objectives in support of defend forward, credible deterrence, and the ability to win if deterrence fails, the U.S. government must maintain ready and resilient military capabilities. These include cyber tools to be employed as an independent military capability and as enablers of conventional operations and campaigns. The same technologically advanced military capabilities that form the bedrock of the United States' military advantage also create cyber vulnerabilities that adversaries can and will use to their strategic advantage. In this way, vulnerabilities that adversaries are able to exploit in routine competition below the level of war have potentially dangerous implications for the United States' ability to deter and prevail in conflict above that threshold. Adversary cyber threats to the U.S. military and the defense industrial base (DIB) continue to cause the loss of national security information and intellectual property.\n\nThey also generate the risk that, through cyber means, U.S. military systems could be rendered ineffective or their intended uses distorted. Actions such as improving detection and mitigation of adversary cyber threats to the DIB are critical to providing for the proper functioning and resilience of key military systems and functions. These strategic realities create an imperative for the United States to preserve and employ the military instrument of power in and through cyberspace, including the intersection of cyberspace with conventional and nuclear military capabilities, while deliberately managing potential escalation risks. This pillar focuses on two key aspects of this mission: implementing the military component\n\n## Desired End States Desired End States\n\nPreserve and Employ the\nMilitary Instrument of Power\nImmediate Strategic\nObjectives\nLayered Cyber\nDeterrence End States\nConduct a force structure\nassessment of the Cyber Mission Force\nGrow CMF capacity to meet\nthe scope of the threat and growing mission requirements\nConduct cyber vulnerability assessments of all major DoD weapons systems, including NC3 and NLCC\nEnsure the security and\nresilience of critical conventional and nuclear weapons systems and functions\n\nof defend forward, and securing the resilience of key weapons systems and functions. Focusing on the military instrument of power, this pillar lays out how to implement the military elements of defend forward, which represents a keythough not the onlyelement of its whole-of-government implementation. This implementation draws on the central tenets of the Department of Defense's defend forward concept as set forth in the 2018 DoD Cyber Strategy, as well as U.S. Cyber Command's implementation of it through persistent engagement. In February 2019 testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee, General Paul Nakasone described how U.S. Cyber Command conducts \"persistent engagement, which includes partnering with other US Government elements to build resilience into US networks and systems, defending against malicious cyberspace activities as far forward as possible, and contesting adversary attempts to disrupt our nation's key government and military functions.\"298 This entails\n\"acting\"conducting cyber operations to gain access, pursue adversaries where they operate and, when warranted, deliver effects against adversary infrastructure and\n\nReduce the magnitude and effects of malicious adversary\nbehavior below the use-offorce threshold Reduce the probability of cyber attacks of significant consequences above the use-of-force threshold\n\ncapabilitiesand \"enabling\"providing early warning to partners, sharing threat information and, when requested, surging to provide support in the form of personnel and capabilities for contingencies or crises.299\nOperationalizing defend forward and persistent engagement within the military pillar of the Commission's strategic approach requires three key actions.\n\nFirst, the United States must plan, resource, and conduct cyber operations and standing campaigns to counter adversaries. This includes countering adversaries' offensive cyber capabilities and infrastructure, organizations that support their cyber operations and campaigns, and the locus of their decision making. Such actions impose direct and indirect costs on adversaries. Direct costs include those that impact adversaries' ability to conduct cyber operations and campaigns. Indirect costs involve forcing adversaries to shift to secondary and tertiary lines of effort and divert resources from other areas. These actions are designed to affect an adversary's overall perception of the costs, risks, and benefits of targeting the United States.\n\nSecond, the United States must have capabilities and processes within the cyber force to rapidly respond to emerging geopolitical situations, and ensure that these cyber capabilities can be easily integrated with other military and non-military tools. Specifically, DoD should develop the capacity to provide decision makers with cyber options, including options to support crisis bargaining and response that are independent of and do not rely on existing cyber campaign plans and the forces already committed to them. For U.S. warfighting, in particular, cyber options enable the Joint Force to gain an information advantage, exercise global command and control, and execute strikes at long range.300 Third, the United States must operate in cyberspace to provide early warning; gain situational awareness of evolving adversary tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs), capabilities, and personas; and conduct operational preparation of the environment (OPE). The cyber domain is dynamic, opportunities are fleeting, and our adversaries are agile and adaptive. A prerequisite to keeping pace with them and anticipating their behavior, rather than simply reacting and responding to it, is gaining and maintaining access against defined targets and pursuing adversaries as they maneuver.\n\nWhen these three elements are combined, the military component of defend forward can be integrated as part of a whole-of-government effort with other instruments of national power. These include diplomacy, information, the military, economic and financial tools, intelligence, and law enforcement. The recommendations supporting this pillar focus on ensuring that the United States protects its ability to employ the military instrument of power, alongside other instruments, across the spectrum of engagement from competition to crisis and conflict. Two recommendations are key: (1) growing the Cyber Mission Force (CMF) capacity commensurate with the scale of the threat and the scope of mission requirements, and (2) promoting the cybersecurity and resilience of critical military systems and functions. Achieving the former requires assessing the force size and mixture of the CMF, and succeeding at the latter demands recurring reporting on the cyber vulnerabilities of all major weapons systems and a cybersecurity and vulnerability assessment of all segments of the nuclear command, control, and communications (NC3) enterprise and of National Leadership Command Capabilities (NLCC).\n\n## Strategic Objective #1: Grow The Capacity Of The Cyber Mission Force (Cmf) To Meet The Scope Of The Threat And Growing Mission Requirements\n\nThe United States should achieve appropriate resourcing, force size, and mix of its cyber forces as well as streamlined decision-making processes to ensure rapid maneuver and flexibility. The CMF, under U.S. Cyber Command, is the locus of the Department of Defense's efforts to counter, disrupt, and impose costs against malicious adversary behavior in cyberspace. Planning and executing cyber operations and campaigns demand a significant investment in time, skill, resources, and human capital. These operations and campaigns also necessitate flexibility in decision making and delegated authority to enable rapid response and maneuver, intelligence capabilities that enable gaining and maintaining access, and a decision-making and operational environment that supports long-term campaigning.\n\n6.1 Congress should direct the Department of Defense to conduct a force structure assessment of the Cyber Mission Force (CMF).\n\nAs part of the FY2021 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), Congress should direct the Department of Defense to conduct a force structure assessment of the U.S. Cyber Command's Cyber Mission Force in light of growing mission requirements and expectations, in terms of both scope and scale. This assessment should include resource and capability implications for the National Security Agency (NSA) in its combat support agency role.\n\nThe CMF is currently considered at full operational capability, with 133 teams comprising a total of approximately 6,200 individuals. However, these requirements were defined in 2013, well before the United States experienced or observed some of the key events that have shaped the U.S. government's understanding of the urgency and salience of the cyber threat posed by adversaries, as well as before the development of DoD's defend forward strategy. Today, the teams that make up the CMF are responsible for a range of distinct DoD cyber missions, including defending the DoD information network (DoDIN), providing support to military operations through the geographic combatant commands, and defending the nation to counter malicious adversary behavior in day-to-day competition. This represents an expansion of the scope of the CMF's mission set (operating off DoDIN) and the scale of its operations (increasing operations in response to a more dangerous threat environment), even though its force structure goal has remained constant. The FY2020 NDAA made important progress toward the needed assessment, though work remains to be done.\n\nNotably, Section 1652 requires a zero-based review of DoD cyber and information technology personnel, while Sections 1655 and 1656 require studies on future DoD cyber warfighting capabilities given existing cyber architecture and acquisition programs, as well as a study on the structure of the Joint Force Cyber Organizations. However, Congress must also ensure that the CMF, in particular, conducts a force structure assessment and troop-to-task analysis that takes into account the increasing scope and scale of CMF missions compared to previous fiscal years and projected into the future. In addition, in its capacity as a combat support agency, the National Security Agency provides critical intelligence support to Title 10 cyberspace operations, particularly at the tactical PILLARS AND KEY RECOMMENDATIONS\nand operational level. Therefore, an assessment must also be conducted that includes resource requirements in support of this aspect of its mission. To conduct these missions at scale, as well as ensure that the CMF has sufficient capacity to maintain steady-state operations while surging to respond to an emerging crisis, Congress should request in the next Cyber Posture Review, and quadrennially thereafter, that DoD provide an assessment of the requirements to grow the CMF, including projected force size and mixture necessary to sustain all DoD missions in cyberspace as determined by the department. Key concerns that should be addressed include ensuring that the CMF is appropriately sized, given the requirements of the diverse and significant mission sets it supports, and ensuring that the allocation of teams within the CMF is matched to the prioritization of strategic objectives. The results of this assessment should drive resource allocation, force size and mix, and continued congressional oversight of these efforts. The realities of the current and anticipated future threat and operational environments demand that the CMF and NSA be given resources commensurate with the nature of the challenge faced by the United States.\n\n6.1.1 Direct the Department of Defense to Create a Major Force Program (MFP) Funding Category for U.S. Cyber Command To enhance the flexibility and agility of U.S. Cyber Command in a dynamic operating environment, Congress should direct in the FY2021 NDAA that the Department of Defense submit a budget justification display that includes a Major Force Program (MFP) category for the training, manning, and equipping of U.S.\n\nCyber Command. According to 10 U.S. Code  238, DoD is required to submit to Congress a budget justification display that includes an MFP category for the Cyber Mission Force. However, this law was enacted in 2014, before U.S. Cyber Command was elevated to a unified combatant command. Therefore, there is a need for a new budget justification display that establishes an MFP category for U.S. Cyber Command. A new MFP funding category for U.S. Cyber Command would provide it with acquisition authorities over goods and services unique to the command's needs. It should also provide a process to expeditiously resolve Combatant Command/Service funding disputes, consistent with the intent of DoD\nDirective 5100.03.301 This would be analogous to the MFP funding category for U.S. Special Operations Command, which was created to support comparable needs for operational adaptability.\n\n6.1.2 Expand Current Malware Inoculation Initiatives As part of defend forward and persistent engagement, as well as in support of broader DoD missions, DoD/U.S.\n\nCyber Command conducts threat hunting to discover, among other things, adversary malware. Working with the Department of the Treasury, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), NSA, and the private sector, U.S. Cyber Command has participated in recent efforts to expose adversary malware by making it public in information-sharing venues such as VirusTotal.302 To contribute to the readiness of U.S. defense and critical infrastructure, efforts should be made to accelerate sharing of the most recent malicious code captured in the wild through appropriate interagency channels, including through the Joint Collaborative Environment (recommendation 5.2). Doing so allows the private sector an opportunity to develop response plans and potentially inoculate their systems to avoid harm. While the private sector has created a number of malware reporting venues available to the public, federal entities have begun to participate only in the past few years. U.S. Cyber Command has unique capabilities and authorities for threat hunting, making its input to these databases critical for national security. In addition, NSA plays an essential role in malware analysis in support of this initiative. These malware inoculation efforts have made important contributions to reducing vulnerabilities. However, the timing and sequencing of their public release have often been met with frustration from the private sector, given the lack of coordination between the two entities. These efforts should continue and be accelerated, and U.S. Cyber Command should ensure coordination with DHS, the FBI, and stakeholders in the private sector in the release of information, particularly with owners and operators of systemically important critical infrastructure (SICI; recommendation 5.1). Improvements in the timing, granularity, and actionability of information should be synchronized with existing efforts across interagency partners and with the new enhanced coordination mechanisms proposed elsewhere in this report so that the private sector can be confident that it has a shared picture of the threat landscape. Without a coherent framework for the release of threat information across agencies, the private sector will be forced to de-duplicate, rationalize, and reconcile the disparate outputs of the various federal stakeholders. There should also be a bias toward action to get perishable data out to victims in the private sector as quickly as reasonably possible, rather than waiting to complete a slow process of coordination prior to release.\n\n6.1.3 Review the Delegation of Authorities for Cyber Operations To enable support for more streamlined decision-making processes, and flexible and rapid maneuver, Congress should request that DoD provide in the next Cyber Posture Review an analysis of and recommendations for the conditions under which further delegation of cyber-related authorities is appropriate to U.S. Cyber Command, as well as to other DoD components including NSA, the Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA), and the DoD Cyber Crime Center (DC3). The pace of cyberspace operations may require delegated authorities and seamless decision making to pursue and deliver effects against adversary targets. A number of cyber-related authorities currently exist within DoD, but not all are delegated to a single organization. Relevant authorities within the scope of Title 10 for conducting counter-cyber operations include not only authorities to deliver offensive cyber effects but also those that support planning and executing these operations. These encompass information operations (IO), which include authorities to create, procure, and deploy personas; military information support operations (MISO); military deception (MILDEC); and counterintelligence. Currently, cyber-related authorities are diffused across different elements of DoD (functional combatant commands, geographic combatant commands, and the various services). DoD should also review the option of further delegating information warfare authorities to U.S. Cyber Command and the specific conditions under which such delegation would be appropriate. The purpose of this assessment PILLARS AND KEY RECOMMENDATIONS\nis to prevent both unnecessary friction that might delay rapid and cohesive action to implement defend forward and inappropriate constraints on U.S. Cyber Command's ability to quickly respond to and thwart adversary behavior in day-to-day competition. U.S. Cyber Command operations would still be subject to rigorous oversight and approval processes. Relevant authorities to review for delegation to NSA\nshould include those authorities that enable the agency to rapidly tip relevant foreign intelligence collection to private entities that constitute the Defense Industrial Base and their service providers to support the latter's own defensive operations.\n\n6.1.4 Reassess and Amend Standing Rules of Engagement (SROE) and Standing Rules for Use of Force (SRUF) for U.S. Forces DoD, as part of the next Cyber Posture Review, should produce a study that assesses and provides recommendations for amendments as necessary to the Standing Rules of Engagement (SROE) and Standing Rules for Use of Force (SRUF) for U.S. forces, as these rules are more than a decade old. This study should be context-specific, taking into account the forces' assigned mission sets. Given the unique aspects of operating in cyberspace, particularly below a use-of-force threshold, it is imperative that SROE/SRUF guidance be relevant to actions in and through cyberspace. Specific issues that could be addressed as part of this study include the fact that there are no \"high seas\" in cyberspace; the need to conform to current DoD structure and organization (e.g., the Unified Campaign Plan); the reassignment of authorities delegated to U.S. Strategic Command to U.S. Cyber Command in the case of cyberspace activities; the applicability of the default and restrictive nature of SROE/SRUF as applied to actions in cyberspace above and below the threshold of armed conflict; the delineation of authority between geographic combatant commands and functional combatant commands with respect to supplemental rules for actions in and through cyberspace; and the definitions within the context of cyberspace of such terms as territory, authority to pursue, and *hostile intent*.\n\n6.1.5 Cooperate with Allies and Partners to Defend Forward Allies and partners are essential to the effective implementation of layered cyber deterrence and the concept of defend forward. At the strategic level, they are a key source of U.S. comparative advantage. At the operational and tactical levels, implementing defend forward requires operating in allied and partner cyberspace (part of \"gray\" space).303 The United States will, whenever possible, get support from allies and partners for this effort. While DoD is already collaborating closely with allies and partners, this effort should include other interagency stakeholders. Therefore, DoD, the Department of State, and other relevant interagency partners should continue and expand efforts with allies and partners to gain permission (when practical) to implement defend forwardparticularly in undertaking hunt forward activities, in which U.S. cyber forces are able to conduct threat hunting and pursue adversaries on allied and partner networks, but also in conducting deceptive countermeasures, enabling early warning, and providing resources to support hardening defenses. The Department of State should focus on the traditional diplomatic channels in support of defend forward, while DoD should lead through military-to-military relationships. In addition, given the preexisting and deep intelligence-sharing partnership among Five Eyes allies (Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, and the United States), DoD (including the NSA) and the intelligence community should further collaborate with these Five Eyes allies, supplementing the signals intelligence architecture and mission with one supporting military cyber operations. Doing so would increase the scale of the infrastructure that could support defend forward, as well as enable the United States to leverage any unique capabilities of its allies to conduct certain types of operations and missions.\n\n6.1.6 Require the Department of Defense to Define Reporting Metrics In light of DoD's expanding mission set, it is imperative to assess the extent to which cyber campaigns and operations conducted in support of the defend forward strategy are achieving their intended effects. The FY2020 NDAA made important progress in this effort, with Section 1634 requiring DoD to report on quantitative and qualitative metrics. However, key recommendations on metrics remain, the most critical of which includes ensuring that DoD is measuring defend forward outcomes across strategic, operational, and tactical levelsnot just the number of operations conducted or their immediate tactical effects. Therefore, DoD should ensure that when modifying its reporting system pursuant to Section 1634 of the FY2020 NDAA, the department defines and reports to Congress department-specific metrics to measure defend forward outcomes across strategic, operational, and tactical levels and includes this data in the existing quarterly briefings to appropriate congressional committees. These measures should include the direct and indirect costs imposed on adversaries, the impact of defend forward operations and campaigns on adversary behavior, how adversary cyber operations have quantifiably affected DoD's ability to conduct or succeed across cyber and non-cyber missions, and DoD's assessment of the ability of adversary cyber operations to impact future campaigns.\n\n6.1.7 Assess the Establishment of a Military Cyber Reserve Congress should request in the FY2021 NDAA an assessment from DoD on the need for, and requirements of, a military cyber reserve, its possible composition, and its structure (i.e., a retainer model, a nontraditional reserve, a strategic technological reserve, or other models). The purpose of this military cyber reserve would be to play a central role in mobilizing a surge capacity, utilizing preexisting links between the private sector (particularly SICI) and DoD.\n\nA DoD military cyber reserve assessment should contain\na number of key elements, including the following:\n- Explore how different types of reserve models,\nincluding less traditional models with more flexible requirements, could address broader issues of talent management (e.g., retaining talent transitioning from active duty into the reserve).\n- Assess how a cyber reserve could deliberately recruit\nkey people in the private sector to participate,\nenabling DoD to call on cyber talent that currently\nresides in the private sector as a surge capacity in times of crisis.\n- Examine ways to facilitate recruiting and retaining\ncivilian talent with no prior military expertise who are interested in serving.\n- Assess the impact a cyber reserve would have on\ndrawing civilian talent from the private sector and any similar non-DoD governmental capacity.\n- Address how DoD might use existing mechanisms to\nbring in technical expertise when needed to respond to a crisis and identify shortcomings in cyber expertise that might be addressed through more targeted hiring practices.\n6.1.8 Establish Title 10 Professors in Cyber Security and Information Operations The Department of Defense should establish a Title\n10 Professor in Cyber Security and Information Operations, housed at the Senior Education Professional Military Education (PME) institutions within each service branch and at the National Defense University (NDU), to communicate and investigate cyber strategy and policy at the national level as it affects the armed forces. A foundational strength of the U.S. armed forces is their education in operations as a professional military force. In response to the evolution of the cyber mission in contingency planning, PME institutions must evolve to meet the challenge of operating in the information environment. Cyber security and information operations are increasingly vital to military planning and guidance: therefore, this senior faculty position is key to adapting service PME to the changing landscape.\n\nPILLARS AND KEY RECOMMENDATIONS\nThese professors would be responsible for establishing and implementing the curriculum for both cyber and information warfare national strategy at the Command, Staff, and Planners Colleges of each service branch. They would also play a crucial role in institutionalizing\n\n## Strategic Objective #2: Ensure The Security And Resilience Of Critical Conventional And Nuclear Weapons Systems And Functions\n\nAs adversaries' cyber threats become more sophisticated, the United States should be able to address the challenges in protecting its essential military systems and functions. While continued automation and connectivity are essential to DoD's military capabilities, they also present numerous access points for adversaries' cyber intrusions and attacks. The scope and the challenge of securing critical military networks and systems are immense. It goes beyond protecting the cybersecurity of the DoDIN to include defending the Defense Industrial Base (DIB) against adversary efforts to steal national security intellectual property and securing critical conventional and nuclear weapons systems and functions.\n\n## Key Recommendation 6.2 Congress Should Direct The Department Of Defense To Conduct A Cybersecurity Vulnerability Assessment Of All Segments Of The Nc3 And Nlcc Systems And Continually Assess Weapon Systems Cyber Vulnerabilities.\n\nCongress should include language in the FY2021\nNDAA that requires the DoD to conduct a cybersecurity vulnerability assessment of all segments of the nuclear command, control, and communications enterprise and National Leadership Command Capabilities. Following this assessment, DoD should begin to report annually to Congress on the status of the ongoing cyber vulnerability assessments of all DoD major weapon systems and NC3 and NLCC enterprises. This report must include assessments of legacy platforms and cyber vulnerabilities *across* networked systems in broader mission areas. DoD has recently taken critical steps to improve weapons systems cybersecurity. Moreover, as directed by Congress and coordinating cyber and information warfare education across each service branch, including through distance education. These positions should not replace existing programs of cyber education within the PME or NDU systems. in the FY2016 NDAA, the department has begun to assess the cyber vulnerabilities of each major weapon system. While this effort represents important steps, barriers to effective cybersecurity still remain, such as the lack of a permanent process to periodically assess the cybersecurity of fielded systems. Further, even as current efforts focus on the vulnerabilities of individual weapons platforms, it is crucial to also evaluate how a cyber intrusion or attack on one system could affect the entire mission. The process of identifying interdependent vulnerabilities should go beyond assessing technical vulnerabilities to also taking a risk management approach that seeks to improve the overall resilience of the system as well as to identify secondary and tertiary dependencies, with a focus on rapid remediation of identified vulnerabilities.\n\nWith DoD systems more connected than ever before, cybersecurity measures must take a more integrated approach and take into account the impacts of cyber vulnerabilities across systems. Routine testing should be conducted to stress-test mission critical systems and processes in light of an evolving threat environment, and the results should be communicated to Congress. In addition to assessing vulnerabilities of fielded systems, DoD must enforce cybersecurity requirements for systems that are in development early in the acquisition lifecycle, ensuring that they remain baked into the front end of this process and are not \"bolted on\" later.304 The 2018 Government Accountability Office report on DoD's efforts thus far concluded that to \"improve the state of weapon systems cybersecurity, it is essential that DOD sustain its momentum in developing and implementing key initiatives.\"305 Thus, Congress should direct DoD to institutionalize a continuous assessment process and annually report these vulnerabilities to sustain its momentum in implementing key initiatives. Even more concerning is the potential cyber threat to the U.S. nuclear deterrent and the survivability and resilience of NC3 systems and NLCC programs facing the full spectrum of cyber threats. These threats are particularly alarming because they can undermine the stability of nuclear deterrence and create the conditions for inadvertent nuclear war. The greatest risk is that precisely because cyber interactions take place below the threshold of armed conflict, the combination of cyber risks and NC3 systems can, in effect, lower that threshold. With this in mind, Congress should direct DoD to routinely assess every segment of the NC3 and NLCC enterprise for adherence to cybersecurity best practices, vulnerabilities, and evidence of compromise. Further, this analysis should not be limited to technical penetrations and vulnerabilities. Attention should also be given to influence operations that aim to distort decision making while leaving NC3 proper intact.\n\n6.2.1 Require Defense Industrial Base Participation in a Threat Intelligence Sharing Program A shared picture of the threat environment within the DIB is essential to proactively and comprehensively address cyber threats and vulnerabilities to this key sector.306 Information sharing programs exist, but are insufficient. For example, the DoD Cyber Crime Center and the DIB Cybersecurity Program are largely voluntary, although DIB entities have mandatory reporting requirements. The NSA's newly created Cybersecurity Directorate mission includes an important role in protecting the DIB.307\nThe companies most capable of participating in existing information sharing programs are large prime contractors; however, DoD also relies on small to medium-sized companies, as well as subcontractors. This gives rise to two issues. First, DoD lacks a complete view of its supply chain. Therefore, prime contractors should be incentivized to disclose their subcontractors to DoD. Second, smaller entities with fewer resources to devote to cybersecurity may provide an opening for adversaries to access information paramount to national security. Drawing on DoD's Cyber Maturity Model Certification (CMMC) regulation, the requirements associated with participation in a threat intelligence sharing program should be tied to a firm's level of maturity. In addition, the government should communicateparticularly to small and medium-sized companiesthe incentives for participation. Congress should legislatively require companies that make up the Defense Industrial Base, as part of the terms of their contract with DoD, to participate in a threat intelligence sharing program that would be housed at the DoD component level. A DIB threat intelligence sharing program should contain a number of key elements, including:\n- Incentives for certain types of specifically delineated information sharing, such as incident reporting.\n\nPILLARS AND KEY RECOMMENDATIONS\n\n- A shared and real-time picture of the threat environment; joint, collaborative, and co-located analytics; and investments in technology and capabilities to support automated detection and analysis.\n- Consent by DIB entities for the NSA to query in\nforeign intelligence collection databases on DIB entities and provide focused threat intelligence to them, as well as enable all elements of DoD, including the NSA, to directly tip intelligence to the affected\nentity.\n- Further empowerment of and resources to the NSA's\nCybersecurity Directorate, given that it is a new entity with a critical mission.\n- Coordinated intelligence sharing with relevant\ndomestic law enforcement and counterintelligence agencies, including the FBI, Air Force Office of Special Investigations, Naval Criminal Investigative Service, U.S. Army Counterintelligence, and DoD Cyber Crime Center.\nThe program's ideal end state is to leverage U.S. government intelligence collection to create a better understanding of adversaries' intelligence collection requirements. This action would help DoD and the intelligence community anticipate where adversaries will seek to collect against DIB targets, and then communicate that information to DIB network owners and operators so that they can proactively defend against impending adversary activities.\n\n6.2.2 Require Threat Hunting on Defense Industrial Base Networks Improving the detection and mitigation of adversary cyber threats to the DIB is imperative to ensuring that key military systems and functions are resilient and can be employed during times of crisis and conflict. Congress should therefore direct regulatory action that the executive branch should pursue in order to require companies that make up the Defense Industrial Base, as part of the terms of their contract with DoD, to create a mechanism for mandatory threat hunting on DIB networks. Malicious code, indicators of compromise, and insights on the evolving threat landscape should be shared with companies when operationally feasible. This program could be modeled as a Pathfinder program with different options for implementing threat hunting, such as allowing DoD to conduct threat hunting on DIB networks with prior notification and coordination with DIB network owners, or incentivizing the DIB to seek out DoD-approved third-party entities to conduct threat hunting. These options should also take into account variations in maturity across the DIB, leveraging DoD's CMMC security requirements.\n\nA program for threat hunting on DIB networks should also include the following:\n- DoD threat assessment programs on DIB networks. - Incentives for companies to feed data collected and\ngenerated from threat hunting activities on DIB networks to DoD and the NSA's Cybersecurity Directorate.\n- Coordination of DoD efforts with DHS and the FBI\nin furtherance of the latter's domestic cybersecurity and counterintelligence responsibilities.\n6.2.3 Designate a Threat-Hunting Capability across the Department of Defense Information Network Given the high consequence of cyber threats for the entire DoD Information Network (DoDIN), including NC3 and NLCC, as well as across the combatant commands, a dedicated threat-hunting capability is key to ensuring the security and resilience of these systems. In addition, because the NSA is the enterprise security architect and builds the cryptographyfundamental to the security of the U.S. military enterprisethat underlies these networks and systems, particularly NC3, its role in this capacity should be formalized. Therefore, DoD should provide for a force structure element to conduct threat hunting and related activities across the entire DoDIN, covering the full range of non-nuclear to nuclear force employment. Specifically, DoD should develop a campaign plan for a threat-hunting capability that takes a risk-based approach and that analyzes threat intelligence as well as assessments of likely U.S. and allied targets of adversary interest. Based on this analysis, the threat-hunting capability should proactively conduct threat hunting against those identified networks and assets to seek evidence of compromise, identify vulnerabilities, and deploy countermeasures to enable early warning and thwart adversary action. Given the potentially high consequence of cyber threats to NC3 and NLCC, priority should be assigned to identifying threats to these networks and systems, and threat hunting on them should recur with a frequency commensurate with the risk.\n\n## How Will The Future Age Of Quantum Computing Change Cybersecurity?\n\nOn October 23, 2019, Google announced that its Sycamore processor had achieved \"quantum supremacy,\" the point at which a quantum computer can verifiably outperform a classical computer as predicted hypothetically. Sycamore surpassed this milestone by performing a computation in about 200 seconds that would take \"a state-of-the-art classical supercomputer\"\nabout 10,000 years.308 It was a historic achievement, but also another step along the long road to a quantum computer capable of practical applications. In the future, researchers will use practical quantum computers to develop exotic chemicals, materials, and pharmaceuticals. They will expand our understanding of biology, physics, and the universe itself. Quantum computers will also revolutionize how we use encryption. In cyberspace encryption is an essential tool, critical to securing modern commerce, communications, and even classified national security information. Popular encryption schemes today underpin the ability of people and organizations to establish confidence in identities and the authenticity of software; information is encoded before being stored or transmitted to another party, to be decoded only if an authorized user or recipient has the correct \"key\" to unlock the encryption scheme. Today, classical computers working together and testing 1 trillion keys per second to break that same encryption key would need as much as 10.79 quintillion years, or 785 million times the age of the known universe. However, a quantum computer could perform the same task in about six months.309\nThe United States needs to start preparing itself for the day when quantum computing becomes practical enough to unlock promising new opportunitiesas well as all the secrets we have ever encrypted against mere classical computers. The federal government has a central role to play in ensuring that U.S. research remains ahead of that of other countries, particularly China. Both the public and private sectors will need a long-term plan to not only reap the benefits of quantum computing but also fortify an internet of classical computing devices to survive an era of quantum threats.\n\nIt is important to note that many threats will traverse the boundaries of combatant commands, including U.S. Cyber Command, U.S. Strategic Command, and the geographic combatant commands. To ensure seamless and flexible maneuver of this force structure element, DoD should develop a process to reconcile the authorities and permissions to enable threat hunting across all DoDIN networks, systems, and programs owned and operated by multiple DoD stakeholders.\n\nPILLARS AND KEY RECOMMENDATIONS\n6.2.4 Assess and Address the Risk to National Security Systems Posed by Quantum Computing The United States should continue to invest in quantum information science, which offers immense opportunities to improve U.S. military operational capabilities. At the same time, it must also defend itself from the development of these technologies by a foreign adversary. For instance, quantum technologies may present significant risks to U.S. national security systems.310 Quantum computing, in particular, has the potential to outperform even the most powerful modern supercomputers in specific tasks. If sufficiently powerful quantum computing can be applied to the decryption of encoded messages, the encryption and authentication protocols currently in use by all sensitive military and national security systems could potentially be broken. Using this technology, a foreign adversary could neutralize critical security measures used to protect the United States' most sensitive communications, systems, and assets. In part to pursue these applications, a number of nations across the globe, including China, have invested significant resources in both public and private efforts to develop a viable quantum computer. However, while the United States has begun to take initial steps to develop \"quantum-resistant\" encryption that would safeguard its sensitive systems, it has yet to fully and comprehensively assess the risks of quantum computing to national security systems or estimate costs associated with upgrades or replacement.\n\nTo fully understand and prepare to counter the risks of quantum computing to national security systems, Congress should include language in the FY2021 NDAA that requires DoD (NSA) to comprehensively assess the threats and risks posed by quantum technologies to national security systems and develop a plan to secure\nthose systems. This assessment should include the\nfollowing:\n- Specific recommendations for addressing identified\nrisks and anticipated resource requirements.\n- A proposed framework for how to prioritize the\ndefense of different national security systems and a timeline for implementation.\n- An assessment of ongoing efforts to develop quantum-resistant cryptographic standards, including expected timelines for that development, budget shortfalls in public-private efforts to reach such a standard, and the feasibility of alternate quantum-resistant models, such as quantum cryptography.\nAfter the initial assessment, Congress should require an annual report from DoD on the status of ongoing assessments and efforts to address identified risks.\n\n## Appendix A Roll-Up Of Recommendations Pillar 1: Reform The U.S. Government's Structure And Organization For Cyberspace Key Recommendation 1.1: Issue An Updated National Cyber Strategy\n\nEnabling Recommendation 1.1.1: Develop a Multitiered Signaling Strategy\nEnabling Recommendation 1.1.2: Promulgate a New Declaratory Policy\n\n## Key Recommendation 1.2: Create House Permanent Select And Senate Select Committees On Cybersecurity\n\nEnabling Recommendation 1.2.1: Reestablish the Office of Technology Assessment\n\n## Key Recommendation 1.3: Establish A National Cyber Director Key Recommendation 1.4: Strengthen The Cybersecurity And Infrastructure Security Agency\n\nEnabling Recommendation 1.4.1: Codify and Strengthen the Cyber Threat Intelligence Integration Center Enabling Recommendation 1.4.2: Strengthen the FBI's Cyber Mission and the National Cyber Investigative Joint Task Force\n\n## Key Recommendation 1.5: Diversify And Strengthen The Federal Cyberspace Workforce\n\nEnabling Recommendation 1.5.1: Improve Cyber-Oriented Education\n\n## Pillar 2: Strengthen Norms And Non-Military Tools Key Recommendation 2.1: Create A Cyber Bureau And Assistant Secretary At The U.S. Department Of State\n\nEnabling Recommendation 2.1.1: Strengthen Norms of Responsible State Behavior in Cyberspace Enabling Recommendation 2.1.2: Engage Actively and Effectively in Forums Setting International Information and\nCommunications Technology Standards\nEnabling Recommendation 2.1.3: Improve Cyber Capacity Building and Consolidate the Funding of Cyber Foreign Assistance Enabling Recommendation 2.1.4: Improve International Tools for Law Enforcement Activities in Cyberspace\n\nEnabling Recommendation 2.1.5: Leverage Sanctions and Trade Enforcement Actions Enabling Recommendation 2.1.6: Improve Attribution Analysis and the Attribution-Decision Rubric Enabling Recommendation 2.1.7: Reinvigorate Efforts to Develop Cyber Confidence-Building Measures\n\n## Pillar 3: Promote National Resilience Key Recommendation 3.1: Codify Sector-Specific Agencies Into Law As \"Sector Risk Management Agencies\" And Strengthen Their Ability To Manage Critical Infrastructure Risk\n\nEnabling Recommendation 3.1.1: Establish a Five-Year National Risk Management Cycle Culminating in a Critical Infrastructure Resilience Strategy\nEnabling Recommendation 3.1.2: Establish a National Cybersecurity Assistance Fund to Ensure Consistent and Timely Funding for Initiatives That Underpin National Resilience\n\n## Key Recommendation 3.2: Develop And Maintain Continuity Of The Economy Planning Key Recommendation 3.3: Codify A \"Cyber State Of Distress\" Tied To A \"Cyber Response And Recovery Fund\"\n\nEnabling Recommendation 3.3.1: Designate Responsibilities for Cybersecurity Services under the Defense Production Act Enabling Recommendation 3.3.2: Clarify Liability for Federally Directed Mitigation, Response, and Recovery Efforts Enabling Recommendation 3.3.3: Improve and Expand Planning Capacity and Readiness for Cyber Incident Response and Recovery Efforts Enabling Recommendation 3.3.4: Expand Coordinated Cyber Exercises, Gaming, and Simulation Enabling Recommendation 3.3.5: Establish a Biennial National Cyber Tabletop Exercise Enabling Recommendation 3.3.6: Clarify the Cyber Capabilities and Strengthen the Interoperability of the National Guard\n\n## Key Recommendation 3.4: Improve The Structure And Enhance Funding Of The Election Assistance Commission\n\nEnabling Recommendation 3.4.1: Modernize Campaign Regulations to Promote Cybersecurity\n\n## Key Recommendation 3.5: Build Societal Resilience To Foreign Malign Cyber-Enabled Information Operations\n\nEnabling Recommendation 3.5.1: Reform Online Political Advertising to Defend against Foreign Influence in Elections\n\n## Pillar 4: Reshape The Cyber Ecosystem Toward Greater Security Key Recommendation 4.1: Establish And Fund A National Cybersecurity Certification And Labeling Authority\n\nEnabling Recommendation 4.1.1: Create or Designate Critical Technology Security Centers Enabling Recommendation 4.1.2: Expand and Support the National Institute of Standards and Technology Security Work\n\n## Key Recommendation 4.2: Establish Liability For Final Goods Assemblers\n\nEnabling Recommendation 4.2.1: Incentivize Timely Patch Implementation\n\n## Key Recommendation 4.3: Establish A Bureau Of Cyber Statistics Key Recommendation 4.4: Resource A Federally Funded Research And Development Center To Develop Cybersecurity Insurance Certifications\n\nEnabling Recommendation 4.4.1: Establish a Public-Private Partnership on Modeling Cyber Risk Enabling Recommendation 4.4.2: Explore the Need for a Government Reinsurance Program to Cover Catastrophic Cyber Events Enabling Recommendation 4.4.3: Incentivize Information Technology Security through Federal Acquisition Regulations and Federal Information Security Management Act Authorities Enabling Recommendation 4.4.4: Amend the Sarbanes-Oxley Act to Include Cybersecurity Reporting Requirements\n\n## Key Recommendation 4.5: Develop A Cloud Security Certification\n\nEnabling Recommendation 4.5.1: Incentivize the Uptake of Secure Cloud Services for Small and Medium-Sized Businesses and State, Local, Tribal, and Territorial Governments Enabling Recommendation 4.5.2: Develop a Strategy to Secure Foundational Internet Protocols and Email Enabling Recommendation 4.5.3: Strengthen the U.S. Government's Ability to Take Down Botnets\n\n## Key Recommendation 4.6: Develop And Implement An Information And Communications Technology Industrial Base Strategy\n\nEnabling Recommendation 4.6.1: Increase Support to Supply Chain Risk Management Efforts Enabling Recommendation 4.6.2: Commit Significant and Consistent Funding toward Research and Development in Emerging Technologies Enabling Recommendation 4.6.3: Strengthen the Capacity of the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States Enabling Recommendation 4.6.4: Invest in the National Cyber Moonshot Initiative\n\n## Key Recommendation 4.7: Pass A National Data Security And Privacy Protection Law\n\nEnabling Recommendation 4.7.1: Pass a National Breach Notification Law\n\n## Pillar 5: Operationalize Cybersecurity Collaboration With The Private Sector Key Recommendation 5.1: Codify The Concept Of \"Systemically Important Critical Infrastructure\"\n\nEnabling Recommendation 5.1.1: Review and Update Intelligence Authorities to Increase Intelligence Support to the Broader Private Sector Enabling Recommendation 5.1.2: Strengthen and Codify Processes for Identifying Broader Private-Sector Cybersecurity Intelligence Needs and Priorities Enabling Recommendation 5.1.3: Empower Departments and Agencies to Serve Administrative Subpoenas in Support of Threat and Asset Response Activities\n\n## Key Recommendation 5.2: Establish And Fund A Joint Collaborative Environment For Sharing And Fusing Threat Information\n\nEnabling Recommendation 5.2.1: Expand and Standardize Voluntary Threat Detection Programs Enabling Recommendation 5.2.2: Pass a National Cyber Incident Reporting Law Enabling Recommendation 5.2.3: Amend the Pen Register Trap and Trace Statute to Enable Better Identification of Malicious Actors\n\n## Key Recommendation 5.3: Strengthen An Integrated Cyber Center Within Cisa And Promote The Integration Of Federal Cyber Centers Key Recommendation 5.4: Establish A Joint Cyber Planning Cell Under The Cybersecurity And Infrastructure Security Agency\n\nEnabling Recommendation 5.4.1: Institutionalize Department of Defense Participation in Public-Private Cybersecurity Initiatives Enabling Recommendation 5.4.2: Expand Cyber Defense Collaboration with Information and Communications Technology Enablers\n\n## Pillar 6: Preserve And Employ The Military Instrument Of Power Key Recommendation 6.1: Direct The Department Of Defense To Conduct A Force Structure Assessment Of The Cyber Mission Force\n\nEnabling Recommendation 6.1.1: Direct the Department of Defense to Create a Major Force Program Funding Category for U.S. Cyber Command Enabling Recommendation 6.1.2: Expand Current Malware Inoculation Initiatives Enabling Recommendation 6.1.3: Review the Delegation of Authorities for Cyber Operations Enabling Recommendation 6.1.4: Reassess and Amend Standing Rules of Engagement and Standing Rules for Use of Force for U.S. Forces Enabling Recommendation 6.1.5: Cooperate with Allies and Partners to Defend Forward Enabling Recommendation 6.1.6: Require the Department of Defense to Define Reporting Metrics Enabling Recommendation 6.1.7: Assess the Establishment of a Military Cyber Reserve Enabling Recommendation 6.1.8: Establish Title 10 Professors in Cyber Security and Information Operations\n\n## Key Recommendation 6.2: Conduct A Cybersecurity Vulnerability Assessment Of All Segments Of The Nc3 And Nlcc Systems And Continually Assess Weapon Systems' Cyber Vulnerabilities\n\nEnabling Recommendation 6.2.1: Require Defense Industrial Base Participation in a Threat Intelligence Sharing Program Enabling Recommendation 6.2.2: Require Threat Hunting on Defense Industrial Base Networks Enabling Recommendation 6.2.3: Designate a Threat-Hunting Capability across the Department of Defense Information Network Enabling Recommendation 6.2.4: Assess and Address the Risk to National Security Systems Posed by Quantum Computing\n\n## Appendix B Legislative Proposals\n\nListed below are the recommendations of the Commission that have corresponding draft legislative proposals. These legislative proposals reflect the Commission staff's best effort to capture the spirit of the Commission recommendations. The proposals have not been adopted by the Commission, and are not representative of any Commissioner's views. The proposals represent one possible manner of implementing the Commission's recommendations. Legislative proposals are available online at www.solarium.gov\n\n## Pillar 1: Reform The U.S. Government's Structure And Organization For Cyberspace\n\nRecommendation 1.2: Create House Permanent Select and Senate Select Committees on Cybersecurity Recommendation 1.3: Establish a National Cyber Director Recommendation 1.4.1: Codify and Strengthen the Cyber Threat Intelligence Integration Center Recommendation 1.5: Diversify and Strengthen the Federal Cyberspace Workforce\n\n## Pillar 2: Strengthen Norms And Non-Military Instruments Of Power\n\nRecommendation 2.1: Create a Cyber Bureau and Assistant Secretary at the U.S. Department of State Recommendation 2.1.4: Improve International Tools for Law Enforcement Activities in Cyberspace [Provide MLAT Subpoena Authority and Increase FBI Cyber ALATs] Recommendation 2.1.5: Leverage Sanctions and Trade Enforcement Actions [Codify Executive Order 13848]\n\n## Pillar 3: Promote National Resilience\n\nRecommendation 3.1: Codify Sector-specific Agencies into Law as \"Sector Risk Management Agencies\" and Strengthen\nTheir Ability to Manage Critical Infrastructure Risk\nRecommendation 3.1.1: Establish a Five-Year National Risk Management Cycle Culminating in a Critical Infrastructure Resilience Strategy Recommendation 3.1.2: Establish a National Cybersecurity Assistance Fund to Ensure Consistent and Timely Funding for Initiatives That Underpin National Resilience Recommendation 3.2: Develop and Maintain Continuity of the Economy Planning Recommendation 3.3: Codify a \"Cyber State of Distress\" Tied to a \"Cyber Response and Recovery Fund\" Recommendation 3.3.2: Clarify Liability for Federally Directed Mitigation, Response, and Recovery Efforts Recommendation 3.3.5: Establish a Biennial National Cyber Tabletop Exercise Recommendation 3.3.6: Clarify the Cyber Capabilities and Strengthen the Interoperability of the National Guard Recommendation 3.4: Improve the Structure and Enhance Funding of the Election Assistance Commission Recommendation 3.4.1: Modernize Campaign Regulations to Promote Cybersecurity\nRecommendation 3.5: Build Societal Resilience to Cyber-Enabled Information Operations [Educational and Awareness\nGrant Programs] Recommendation 3.5.1: Reform Online Political Advertising to Defend against Foreign Influence in Elections\n\n## Pillar 4: Reshape The Cyber Ecosystem Toward Greater Security\n\nRecommendation 4.1: Establish and Fund a National Cybersecurity Certification and Labeling Authority Recommendation 4.1.1: Create or Designate Critical Technology Security Centers Recommendation 4.2: Establish Liability for Final Goods Assemblers\nRecommendation 4.3: Establish a Bureau of Cyber Statistics\nRecommendation 4.4: Resource a Federally Funded Research and Development Center to Develop Cybersecurity Insurance Certifications Recommendation 4.4.4: Amend the Sarbanes-Oxley Act to Include Cybersecurity Reporting Requirements Recommendation 4.5: Develop a Cloud Security Certification Recommendation 4.5.1: Incentivize the Uptake of Secure Cloud Services for Small and Medium-Sized Businesses and State, Local, Tribal, and Territorial Governments Recommendation 4.5.2: Develop a Strategy to Secure Foundational Internet Protocols and Email Recommendation 4.5.3: Strengthen the U.S. Government's Ability to Take Down Botnets Recommendation 4.6: Develop and Implement an Information and Communications Technology Industrial Base Strategy Recommendation 4.7: Pass a National Data Security and Privacy Protection Law Recommendation 4.7.1: Pass a National Breach Notification Law\n\n## Pillar 5: Operationalize Cybersecurity Collaboration With The Private Sector\n\nRecommendation 5.1: Codify the Concept of \"Systemically Important Critical Infrastructure\" Recommendation 5.1.1: Review and Update Intelligence Authorities to Increase Intelligence Support to the Broader Private\nSector Recommendation 5.1.2: Strengthen and Codify Processes for Identifying Broader Private-Sector Cybersecurity Intelligence Needs and Priorities Recommendation 5.1.3: Empower Departments and Agencies to Serve Administrative Subpoenas in Support of Threat and Asset Response Activities Recommendation 5.2: Establish and Fund a Joint Collaborative Environment for Sharing and Fusing Threat Information Recommendation 5.2.2: Pass a National Cyber Incident Reporting Law Recommendation 5.2.3: Amend the Pen Register Trap and Trace Statute to Enable Better Identification of Malicious Actors Recommendation 5.3: Strengthen an Integrated Cyber Center within CISA and Promote the Integration of Federal Cyber Centers Recommendation 5.4.1: Institutionalize Department of Defense Participation in Public-Private Cybersecurity Initiatives\n\n## Pillar 6: Preserve And Employ The Military Instruments Of Power\n\nRecommendations 6.1 & 6.1.3: Direct the Department of Defense to Conduct a Force Structure Assessment of the Cyber Mission Force / Review the Delegation of Authorities for Cyber Operations Recommendation 6.1.1: Direct the Department of Defense to Create a Major Force Program Funding Category for U.S. Cyber Command Recommendation 6.1.7: Assess the Establishment of a Military Cyber Reserve Recommendation 6.2: Conduct a Cybersecurity Vulnerability Assessment of All Segments of the NC3 and NLCC Systems and Continually Assess Weapon Systems Cyber Vulnerabilities Recommendation 6.2.1: Require Defense Industrial Base Participation in a Threat Intelligence Sharing Program Recommendation 6.2.2: Require Threat Hunting on Defense Industrial Base Networks Recommendation 6.2.4: Assess and Address the Risk to National Security Systems Posed by Quantum Computing\n\n## Executive Summary:\n\nEstablish a Means to Monitor and Support Implementation of Report Recommendations\n\n## Appendix C Glossary\n\nEditor's note: Many of the terms and definitions listed below are context dependent. Therefore, the definitions provided capture only the understanding of the Commissioners in the scope of their deliberations and this report; they are not intended to provide legal or political interpretations or technical standards.\n\naccess\nEntry into an information or operational technology system.\nadvanced persistent\nthreat (APT)\nA sophisticated adversary that (i) pursues its objectives repeatedly over an extended period of time, (ii) adapts to defenders' efforts to resist it, and (iii) is determined to maintain the level of interaction needed to execute its objectives.\nartificial intelligence\n(AI)\nThe theory, development, and simulation of computer systems able to perform tasks normally requiring human intelligence.\nattack vector\nMechanism or method used by an attacker to gain access to a target's computer system and/or deliver an effect.\nattribute\nAny distinctive feature, characteristic, or property of an object that can be identified or isolated quantitatively or qualitatively by either human or automated means.\nattribution\nIdentification of technical evidence of a cyber event and/or the assignment of responsibility for a cyber event. The technical source may be different from the responsible actor.\nbackdoor\nAn intentionally designed vulnerability that enables access to a computer system.\nBorder Gateway\nProtocol\nA protocol designed to optimize routing of information exchanged through the internet.\nbot\nA computer that has been compromised with malware to perform activities under the remote command and control of an administrator.\nbotnet\nA network of compromised computers (or bots) under unified command and control.\nbusiness continuity\nThe documentation of a predetermined set of instructions or procedures that describes how an organization's mission/business processes will be sustained during and after a significant disruption.\nbyte\nA unit of digital information consisting of 8 bits (binary digits: each bit corresponds to a\nchoice between two alternatives).\nclient\nA remote application or system that is used to connect to a server.\ncloud computing\nA model for enabling ubiquitous, convenient, on-demand network access to a shared pool of configurable computing resources (e.g., networks, servers, storage, applications, and services) that can be rapidly provided to users with minimal management effort or service provider interaction.\n\nU.S. government's interagency committee authorized to review certain transactions involving foreign investment in the United States and certain real estate transactions, in order to determine the effect of such transactions on the national security of the United States.\n\nCommittee on\nForeign Investment in\nthe United States\ncompromise\nUnauthorized access to a computer, network, data, or system. A group of individuals, usually consisting of security analysts, organized to develop, recommend, and coordinate immediate mitigation actions for containment, eradication, and recovery resulting from computer security incidents. Often a government entity.\ncomputer emergency/\nincident response\nteam (CERT/CIRT)\ncomputer network\nattack (CNA)\nActions taken through the use of computer networks to disrupt, deny, degrade, or destroy information resident in computers and computer networks, or in transit, or the computers and networks themselves.\ncomputer network\ndefense (CND)\nActions taken to defend against unauthorized activity within computer networks. CND includes monitoring, detection, analysis, and response and restoration activities.\ncomputer network\nexploitation (CNE)\nEnabling operations and intelligence collection capabilities conducted through the use of computer networks to gather data from target or adversary information systems or networks.\nconfidentiality\nThe preservation of authorized restrictions on information access and disclosure, including means for protecting personal privacy and proprietary information.\nContinuity of\nGovernment (COG)\nAn effort to establish executive branch preparedness for and resilience to threats to the National Capital Region.\nContinuity of\nOperations (COOP)\nAn effort within individual executive departments and agencies to ensure that Primary Mission Essential Functions (PMEFs) continue to be performed during a wide range of emergencies, including localized acts of nature, accidents, and technological or attack-related emergencies.\nContinuity of the\nEconomy (COTE)\nAn effort to ensure that critical data and technology would be available, with priority for critical functions across corporations and industry sectors, to get the economy back up and running after a catastrophic event.\ncritical infrastructure\nSystems and assets, physical and virtual, so vital to the United States that their incapacitation or destruction would have a debilitating impact on security, national economic security, national public health or safety, or any combination of those matters.\nCritical Infrastructure\nResilience Strategy\nA proposed strategy that will set programmatic and budgetary priorities for a five-year national risk management cycle.\nCritical Technology\nSecurity Centers\nProposed entities/programs that provide the U.S. government with the capacity to test the security of critical technologies and, when appropriate, assist in identifying vulnerabilities, as well as developing and pushing mitigation techniques with relevant original equipment manufacturers.\ncryptocurrency\nA type of digital currency in which encryption techniques are used to secure transactions and control the creation of additional units while operating independently of a central bank.\ncyber\nRelating to, involving, or characteristic of computers, computer networks, information and communications technology (ICT), virtual systems, or computer-enabled control of physical components.\ncyber actor/cyber\noperator\nA person who employs the functions of computer networks, systems, devices, or services.\ncyberattack\nAction taken in cyberspace that creates noticeable denial effects (i.e., degradation, disruption, or destruction) in cyberspace or manipulation that leads to denial that appears in a physical domain.\ncyber campaign\nA cyber operation or series of cyber operations conducted by a single responsible party with the intention of achieving a strategic objective.\ncybercrime\nA cyber operation that is primarily motivated by reasons other than national security or geopolitical objectives.\ncyber disruption\nAn event that is likely to cause or is causing the temporary loss of normal cyber operations or services.\ncyber effect\nThe manipulation, disruption, denial, degradation, or destruction of data, computers, information or communication systems, networks, physical or virtual infrastructure controlled by computers or information systems, or information resident on them or in transit.\ncyber espionage\nCyber operation whose primary purpose is to steal information for national security or commercial purposes.\nCyber Response and\nRecovery Fund\nA new fund, administered by the Federal Emergency Management Agency but directed by the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency. Cyber Recovery Fund disbursement would be triggered by a \"cyber state of distress\" declaration. The funds could be used for a variety of purposes, including direct assistance to entities through purchases of equipment and services for their rapid response and recovery.\ncyber risk\nRisk of financial loss, legal liability, reputational damage, regulatory action, operational disruption, or damage from the failure of the digital technologies employed for informational and/or operational functions introduced to a manufacturing system via electronic means from the unauthorized access, use, disclosure, disruption, modification, or destruction of the manufacturing system.\ncybersecurity\nPrevention of damage to, protection of, and restoration of computers, electronic communications systems, electronic communications services, wire communication, and electronic communication. This includes ensuring the availability, integrity, authentication, confidentiality, and nonrepudiation of the information contained therein.\ncyberspace\nA global domain within the information environment consisting of the interdependent networks of information technology infrastructures and resident data, including the internet, telecommunications networks, computer systems, and embedded processors and controllers.\ncyber state of distress\nA proposed federal declaration that would trigger additional financial and material assistance. The declaration would be used exclusively for responding to, or preemptively preparing for, cyber incidents that are more serious than \"routine\" but do not warrant an emergency declaration.\ncyber threat\nA capability and intent that intentionally compromises the confidentiality, integrity, reliability, or availability of digital devices, systems, networks, or data in transit or at rest.\ndatabase\nA structured repository of data that is organized to provide efficient retrieval.\ndata breach\nThe unauthorized movement or disclosure of sensitive information to a party, usually outside the organization, that is not authorized to have or see that information.\ndata hosting\nThe activity or business of providing hardware, systems, software, and infrastructure to store and manage access to data.\ndata governance\nA set of processes or rules that ensure the integrity of data and that data management best practices are met.\ndata/data set\nQuantitative or qualitative raw material used to represent information, or from which information can be derived.\ndecryption\nThe process of transforming cipher text into readable text using a cryptographic algorithm and key.\ndeepfake\nA digital picture or video that has been maliciously edited using an algorithm in a way that makes the video appear authentic.\ndefend forward\nThe proactive observing, pursuing, and countering of adversary operations and imposing of costs in day-to-day competition to disrupt and defeat ongoing malicious adversary cyber campaigns, deter future campaigns, and reinforce favorable international norms of behavior, using all of the instruments of national power. This is a reimagining and expansion of the defend forward concept as initially conceived of in the 2018 DoD Cyber Strategy, which focuses solely on the military instrument.\ndefensive cyber\ncampaign\nA coordinated set of actions across the U.S. government, utilizing any or all available instruments of U.S. national power, to respond to an adversary cyber campaign, mitigate its potential effects, and impose consequences.\ndefensive cyber\noperations\nMissions to preserve the ability to utilize one's own network capabilities and protect data, computers, cyberspace-enabled devices, and other designated systems by defeating ongoing or imminent malicious cyberspace activity. Also called DCO. A type of cyber action designed to prevent users from accessing a network-connected service by sending legitimate requests from one source to overload a network's resources.\ndenial-of-service\nattack (*see also:*\ndistributed denial-ofservice attack)\ndeterrence\nDissuading someone from doing something by making them believe that the costs to them will exceed their expected benefit.\ndigital citizenship\nThe position or status of being an internet user, particularly as it pertains to knowledge of responsible behaviors pertaining to internet use, including internet safety, digital footprint, online media balance, cyberbullying, online privacy and communication, information literacy, creative credit and copyright, and other related topics.\ndigital literacy\nThe ability to use information and communication technologies to find, evaluate, create, and communicate information, requiring both cognitive and technical skills.\ndirect recording\nelectronic (DRE)\nvoting machine\nA device that records votes by means of a ballot display provided with mechanical or electro-optical components that can be activated by the voter (typically buttons or a touchscreen), that processes data by means of a computer program, and that records voting data and ballot images in memory components.\ndisinformation\nFalse information deliberately spread to deceive. A denial of service technique that uses numerous hosts to perform the attack.\ndistributed denialof-service attack\n(*see also:* denial-ofservice attack)\nAn email authentication, policy, and reporting protocol that verifies the authenticity of the sender of an email and blocks and reports fraudulent accounts.\nDomain-based\nMessage\nAuthentication,\nReporting &\nConformance\ndomain name\nA unique name composed of alphanumeric characters that identifies a website and appears in the address bar of the web browser.\nDomain Name System\nA system that stores information associated with domain names in a distributed database on networks.\nelection infrastructure\nInformation and communications technology and systems used by or on behalf of the federal government or a state or local government in managing the election process, including voter registration databases, voting machines, voting tabulation equipment, and equipment for the secure transmission of election results.\nencryption\nA procedure to convert plain text into cipher text.\nend-to-end encryption\nCommunications encryption in which data is encrypted when being passed through a network, but routing information remains visible.\nexfiltration\nThe transfer of data from an information system.\nexploit\nSoftware that takes advantage of a vulnerability to undermine a computer's security.\nexploitation\nThe act of extracting and gathering intelligence data.\nfifth-generation\nwireless network (5G)\nA set of wireless software and hardware technologies that will produce a significant improvement in data speed, volume, and latency (delay in data transfer) over fourth-generation (4G and 4G LTE) networks.\nfinal goods assembler\nThe entity that is most responsible for the placement of a product or service into the stream of commerce.\nfirewall\nDevices or systems that act as a protective barrier controlling the flow of network traffic between networks or between a host and a network.\nfirmware\nSoftware programmed into read-only memory (ROM).\ngateway\nA node that attaches to two (or more) computer networks that have similar functions but dissimilar implementations and that enables either one-way or two-way communication between the networks.\nhacker\nUnauthorized user who attempts to gain or successfully gains access to an information system.\nhardware\nThe physical components of an information system.\nhoneypot\nA computer security mechanism to detect, deflect, or counteract unauthorized access to computer systems by acting as a decoy to attract or bait internet users seeking to obtain unauthorized access.\nHunt and Incident\nResponse Team\nA set of teams within the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency that provides onsite incident response, free of charge, to organizations that require immediate investigation and resolution of cyberattacks.\nhunt forward\nU.S. efforts with allies and partners to conduct threat hunting and pursue adversaries on allied and partner networks.\nimplant\nHardware or software designed to enable unauthorized functions on a compromised computer system.\nindustrial control\nsystem (ICS)\nAn information system, both hardware and software, specifically designed to control industrial processes such as manufacturing, product handling, production, and distribution.\ninformation\noperations\nThe integrated employment of the core capabilities of electronic warfare, computer network operations, psychological operations, military deception, and operations security, in concert with specified supporting and related capabilities, to influence, disrupt, corrupt, or usurp adversarial human and automated decision-making process, information, and information systems.\ninformation security\n(INFOSEC)\nThe protection of information and information systems from unauthorized access, use, disclosure, disruption, modification, or destruction in order to provide confidentiality, integrity, and availability.\ninformation system\n(IS)\nA discrete set of information resources organized for the collection, processing, maintenance, use, sharing, dissemination, or disposition of information.\ninformation\ntechnology (IT)\nAll categories of ubiquitous technology used for the gathering, storing, transmitting, retrieving, or processing of information (e.g., microelectronics, printed circuit boards, computing systems, software, signal processors, mobile telephony, satellite communications,\nand networks).\ninnovation base of the\nUnited States\nThe American network of knowledge, capabilities, and peopleincluding those in academia, National Laboratories, and the private sectorthat turns ideas into innovations, transforms discoveries into successful commercial products and companies, and protects and enhances the American way of life.\ninsider threat\nThe threat that an insider will use their authorized access, wittingly or unwittingly, to do harm to the organization.\nintegrity\nThe guard against improper information modification or destruction, including assurance of information nonrepudiation and authenticity.\ninternet\nThe single, interconnected, worldwide system of commercial, governmental, educational, and other computer networks that share (i) the protocol suite specified by the Internet Architecture Board (IAB) and (ii) the name and address spaces managed by the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN).\nInternet of Things\n(IoT)\nA concept that describes everyday physical objects being connected to the internet and identifying themselves to other devices.\nin the wild\nA term that can be used to describe malware in general use (thereby making attribution difficult) or an unpatched or unknown vulnerability discovered in an information system.\nintrusion\nA computer system compromise, in which an intruder gains, or attempts to gain, access to a system or system resource without having authorization to do so.\nintrusion detection\nsystem (IDS)\nA software application that can be implemented on host operating systems or as network devices to monitor activity that is associated with intrusions or insider misuse, or both.\nJoint Cyber Planning\nCell\nA proposed cell within the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency that would facilitate comprehensive operational planning of defensive, non-intelligence cybersecurity campaigns across agencies.\nmachine learning\nA subfield of computer science in which computers learn without being explicitly programmed and automate analytic model building.\nmalicious code\nSoftware or firmware intended to perform an unauthorized process that will have adverse impact on the confidentiality, integrity, or availability of an information system.\nmalware\nA computer program that is clandestinely placed onto a computer with the intent to compromise the privacy, accuracy, or reliability of the computer's data, applications, or operating system.\nmulti-factor\nauthentication\nAuthentication using two or more factors to achieve authentication. Factors include something you know, something you have, or something you are.\nnational critical\nfunctions\nThe functions of government and the private sector that are so vital to the United States that their disruption, corruption, or dysfunction would have a debilitating effect on security, national economic security, national public health or safety, or any combination of these elements.\nNational\nCybersecurity\nAssistance Fund\nA proposed fund administered by the Federal Emergency Management Agency that would distribute grants to public and private entities for solutions, projects, and programs\nwhere a) there is a clearly defined, critical risk to be mitigated, b) market forces do not provide sufficient private sector incentives to mitigate the risk without government investment, and c) there is clear federal need, role, and responsibility in mitigating the risk A proposed organization that would be charged with certifying critical information technologies against frameworks based on identified and vetted security standards and with supporting and endorsing product labeling, building on existing work on Software Bills of Material at the National Telecommunications and Information Administration.\nNational\nCybersecurity\nCertification and\nLabeling Authority\nnational security\nindustrial sector\nThe worldwide industrial complex that enables research and development, as well as the design, production, delivery, and maintenance of military weapons systems, subsystems, and components or parts, to meet U.S. military requirements (also referred to as the defense industrial base).\nnetwork resilience\nA computing infrastructure that provides continuous business operation, rapid recovery if failure does occur, and the ability to scale up to meet rapid or unpredictable demands.\nnonrepudiation\nAssurance that the sender is provided with proof of delivery and that the recipient is provided with proof of the sender's identity so that neither can later deny having processed the data.\nnon-state actor\nAn organization or individual that is not affiliated with a nation-state.\nnorm\nA collective expectation for the proper behavior of actors with a given identity.\noffensive cyber\noperations\nCyberspace operations intended to project power by the application of force in or through cyberspace.\noperational\ntechnology\nHardware and software that detects or causes a change through the direct monitoring and/ or control of physical devices, processes, and events in the enterprise.\npacket\nThe logical unit of network communications produced by the transport layer.\npatch\nA software component that, when installed, directly modifies files or device settings related to a different software component without changing the version number or release details for the related software component.\npenetration testing\nSecurity testing in which evaluators mimic real-world attacks in an attempt to identify ways to exploit, gain unauthorized access, or circumvent an application, system, or network.\npersistent\nengagement\nThe concept by which U.S. Cyber Command implements defend forward. It is based on the idea that adversaries are in constant contact in cyberspace. Its elements are enabling partners and acting as far forward as possible.\nphishing\nA technique for attempting to acquire sensitive data through a fraudulent solicitation in email or on a web site, in which the perpetrator masquerades as a legitimate, reputable, or known-to-the-user person or business.\npost-election audit\nAny review conducted after polls close for the purpose of determining whether the votes were counted accurately (a results audit) or whether proper procedures were followed (a process audit), or both.\nprotocol\nA set of rules to implement and control some type of association between systems.\npublic key\ninfrastructure (PKI)\nA software-based system designed to provide confidentiality, integrity, and authenticity in communications; it relies on asymmetric cryptography.\nquantum computer\nA collection of interacting quantum mechanical systems, such as superconductors or trapped ions, that can be manipulated to process information.\nransomware\nMalware installed on a victim's device that mounts either an extortion attack that holds the victim's data hostage or threatens to publish the victim's data until a ransom is paid.\nreconnaissance\nAn action to discover malicious tools or vulnerabilities in a targeted system or network.\nred team\nA group of people authorized and organized to emulate a potential adversary's attack or exploitation capabilities against an enterprise's security posture.\nresilience\nThe capacity to withstand and quickly recover from attacks that could compel, deter, restrain, or otherwise shape U.S. behavior.\nrouter\nA device that determines the best path for forwarding a data packet toward its destination.\nsandbox\nA system that allows an untrusted application to run in a highly controlled environment where the application's permissions are restricted to an essential set of computer permissions.\nsector risk\nmanagement agency\nA proposed designation for a federal agency that codifies the minimum roles and responsibilities of a sector-specific agency.\nsector-specific\nagencies\nFederal agencies that have institutional knowledge and specialized expertise about a critical infrastructure sector.\nsignificant\nconsequences\nEffects that may include loss of life, significant damage to property, significant national security consequences, or significant economic impact on the United States.\nsignificant cyber\nincident\nA cyber incident that is (or group of related cyber incidents that together are) likely to result in demonstrable harm to the national security interests, foreign relations, or economy of the United States or to the public confidence, civil liberties, or public health and safety of the American people.\nsocial engineering\nThe practice of manipulating legitimate users to allow increased access to a system by an illegitimate user.\nsoftware\nA computer program written in a computing language.\nspam\nElectronic junk mail or the abuse of electronic messaging systems to indiscriminately send unsolicited messages.\nspoofing\nA fraudulent or malicious practice in which communication is sent from an unknown source disguised as a source known to the receiver. A generic name for a computerized system that is capable of gathering and processing data and applying operational controls over long distances.\nsupervisory control\nand data acquisition\n(SCADA)\nsupply chain\nA system of organizations, people, activities, information, and resources, possibly international in scope, that provides products or services to consumers.\nsupply chain\ncompromise\nAn occurrence within the supply chain whereby an adversary jeopardizes the confidentiality, integrity, or availability of a system or the information that the system processes, stores, or transmits.\nsupply chain\nmanagement\nA cross-functional approach to procuring, producing, and delivering products and services to customers.\nsupply chain risk\nmanagement\nA systematic process for managing supply chain risk by identifying susceptibilities, vulnerabilities, and threats throughout the supply chain and developing mitigation strategies to combat those threats whether presented by the supplier, the product and its subcomponents, or the supply chain itself (e.g., initial production, packaging, handling, storage, transport, mission operation, and disposal). A proposed designation of critical infrastructure entities that manage systems and assets whose disruption could have cascading, destabilizing effects on U.S. national security, economic security, and public health and safety.\nsystemically important\ncritical infrastructure\n(SICI)\nthreat\nAn event or condition that has the potential for causing harm.\ntrojan horse\nA computer program that appears to have a useful function, but also has a hidden and potentially malicious function that evades security mechanisms, sometimes by exploiting legitimate authorizations of a system entity that invokes the program.\ntroll\nA person or group of people that invites discord on the internet by starting arguments or posting inflammatory, extraneous, or off-topic messages in an online community with the deliberate intent of provoking readers into an emotional response or otherwise disrupting normal on-topic discussion.\nunauthorized access\nLogical or physical access gained without permission to a network, system, application, data, or other resources.\nvirus\nCode that runs on a computer without the user's knowledge, infecting the computer when the code is accessed and executed. It spreads via interaction.\nvoter-verifiable paper\naudit trail (VVPAT)\nHardware, added to an existing DRE voting machine, that provides a physical record of a voter's electronic selection. *See also:* direct recording electronic voting machine.\nwhole-ofgovernment\nU.S. government agencies working across boundaries and through interagency cooperation to achieve shared goals and/or an integrated government response.\nwhole-of-nation\nConcerted and cooperative efforts among partners across agencies and the private sector to facilitate ease of operation and/or reach common goals.\nzero-day attack\nA cyber exploit that relies on exploiting an unknown or undisclosed vulnerability in the design or implementation of a system to violate its security.\n\nMany of the definitions in this glossary are taken or adapted from the following sources:\n\n- Defense Innovation Board, *The 5G Ecosystem: Risks & Opportunities for DoD* (April 2019)\n- \"Glossary,\" ISACA, 2020, https://www.isaca.org/resources/glossary - Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, *DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Term*s (January 2020) - \"Explore Terms: A Glossary of Common Cybersecurity Terminology,\" National Initiative for Cybersecurity Careers\nand Studies, November 28, 2018, https://niccs.us-cert.gov/about-niccs/glossary\n- \"Glossary,\" National Institute of Standards and Technology, Computer Security Resource Center,\nhttps://csrc.nist.gov/glossary\n- \"Glossary of Security Terms,\" SANS, 2020, https://www.sans.org/security-resources/glossary-of-terms/\nOther U.S. government sources were also consulted.\n\n## Appendix D Abbreviations\n\n| 5G                  | fifth-generation                          |\n|---------------------|-------------------------------------------|\n| AI                  | artificial intelligence                   |\n| ALAT                | Assistant Legal Attache                   |\n| APT                 | advanced persistent threat                |\n| BGP                 | Border Gateway Protocol                   |\n| CAATSA              | Countering America's Adversaries Through  |\n| Sanctions Act       |                                           |\n| CBMs                | confidence-building measures              |\n| CDI                 | Cyber Deterrence Initiative               |\n| CFIUS               | Committee on Foreign Investment in the    |\n| United States       |                                           |\n| CI                  | critical infrastructure                   |\n| CIDAWG              | Cyber Incident Data and Analysis Working  |\n| Group               |                                           |\n| CISA                | Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security |\n| Agency              |                                           |\n| CITF                | Cyber Instability Task Force              |\n| CMF                 | Cyber Mission Force                       |\n| CMMC                | Cyber Maturity Model Certification        |\n| COTE                | Continuity of the Economy                 |\n| CSD                 | Cybersecurity Directorate                 |\n| CSET                | Cyberspace Security and Emerging          |\n| Technologies        |                                           |\n| CSP                 | communication service provider            |\n| CTIIC               | Cyber Threat Intelligence Integration     |\n| Center              |                                           |\n| CTMS                | Cyber Talent Management System            |\n| DARPA               | Defense Advanced Research Projects        |\n| Agency              |                                           |\n| DC3                 | Department of Defense Cyber Crime         |\n| Center              |                                           |\n| DDoS                | distributed denial-of-service             |\n| DFC                 | United States International Development   |\n| Finance Corporation |                                           |\n| DHS                 | Department of Homeland Security           |\n| DIB                | Defense Industrial Base                    |\n|--------------------|--------------------------------------------|\n| DISA               | Defense Information Systems Agency         |\n| DNS                | Domain Name System                         |\n| DoD                | Department of Defense                      |\n| DoDIN              | Department of Defense Information          |\n| Network            |                                            |\n| DOJ                | Department of Justice                      |\n| DSB                | Defense Science Board                      |\n| EAC                | Election Assistance Commission             |\n| EOP                | Executive Office of the President          |\n| EU                 | European Union                             |\n| FBI                | Federal Bureau of Investigation            |\n| FECA               | Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971      |\n| FedRAMP            | Federal Risk and Authorization             |\n| Management Program |                                            |\n| FEMA               | Federal Emergency Management Agency        |\n| FFRDC              | Federally Funded Research and              |\n| Development Center |                                            |\n| FIRRMA             | Foreign Investment Risk Review             |\n| Modernization Act  |                                            |\n| FSARC              | Financial Systemic Analysis and Resilience |\n| Center             |                                            |\n| FY                 | fiscal year                                |\n| GAO                | Government Accountability Office           |\n| GPS                | Global Positioning System                  |\n| G7                 | Group of Seven                             |\n| G20                | Group of Twenty                            |\n| ICC/JOC            | Integrated Cyber Center and Joint          |\n| Operations Center  |                                            |\n| ICT                | information and communications             |\n| technology         |                                            |\n| ILEA               | International Law Enforcement Academy      |\n| INL                | Idaho National Lab                         |\n| IO                 | information operations                     |\n| IoT                               | Internet of Things                      |\n|-----------------------------------|-----------------------------------------|\n| IP                                | intellectual property                   |\n| IRA                               | Internet Research Agency                |\n| ISAC                              | information sharing and analysis center |\n| IT                                | information technology                  |\n| ITU                               | International Telecommunications Union  |\n| JCPC                              | Joint Cyber Planning Cell               |\n| MFP                               | Major Force Program                     |\n| MILDEC                            | military deception                      |\n| MISO                              | Military Information Support Operations |\n| ML                                | machine learning                        |\n| MLAA                              | Mutual Legal Assistance Agreement       |\n| MLAT                              | Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty          |\n| MOU                               | memorandum of understanding             |\n| NATO                              | North Atlantic Treaty Organization      |\n| NCCIC                             | National Cybersecurity and              |\n| Communications Integration Center |                                         |\n| NCD                               | National Cyber Director                 |\n| NCFTA                             | National Cyber-Forensics and Training   |\n| Alliance                          |                                         |\n| NCIJTF                            | National Cyber Investigative Joint Task |\n| Force                             |                                         |\n| NC3                               | nuclear command, control, and           |\n| communications                    |                                         |\n| NDAA                              | National Defense Authorization Act      |\n| NGO                               | nongovernmental organization            |\n| NICE                              | National Initiative on Cybersecurity    |\n| Education                         |                                         |\n| NIST                              | National Institute of Standards and     |\n| Technology                        |                                         |\n| NLCC                              | National Leadership Command             |\n| Capabilities                      |                                         |\n| NSA                               | National Security Agency                |\n| NSC                               | National Security Council               |\n| NSDD                              | National Security Decision Directive    |\n| NSF                               | National Science Foundation             |\n| NSPM                              | National Security Presidential          |\n| Memorandum                        |                                         |\n| NSTAC                                   | National Security Telecommunications    |\n|-----------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------|\n| Advisory Committee                      |                                         |\n| NTIA                                    | National Telecommunications and         |\n| Information Agency                      |                                         |\n| ODNI                                    | Office of the Director of National      |\n| Intelligence                            |                                         |\n| OEWG                                    | Open-Ended Working Group                |\n| OPE                                     | operational preparation of the          |\n| environment                             |                                         |\n| OMB                                     | Office of Management and Budget         |\n| OSCE                                    | Organization for Security and           |\n| Co-operation in Europe                  |                                         |\n| OTA                                     | Office of Technology Assessment         |\n| PLA                                     | People's Liberation Army                |\n| PME                                     | Professional Military Education         |\n| PRTT                                    | Pen Register Trap and Trace             |\n| R&D                                     | research and development                |\n| SFOPS                                   | State, Foreign Operations, and Related  |\n| Programs                                |                                         |\n| SICI                                    | systemically important critical         |\n| infrastructure                          |                                         |\n| SLTT                                    | state, local, tribal, and territorial   |\n| SROE                                    | Standing Rules of Engagement            |\n| SRUF                                    | Standing Rules for Use of Force         |\n| SSA                                     | sector-specific agency                  |\n| STEM                                    | science, technology, engineering, and   |\n| mathematics                             |                                         |\n| TLS                                     | Transport Layer Security                |\n| TTPs                                    | tactics, techniques, and procedures     |\n| U.K.                                    | United Kingdom                          |\n| UN                                      | United Nations                          |\n| UN GGE                                  | United Nations Group of Governmental    |\n| Experts on Developments in the Field of |                                         |\n| Information and Telecommunications in   |                                         |\n| the Context of International Security   |                                         |\n| U.S.                                    | United States                           |\n| USAID                                   | United States Agency for International  |\n| Development                             |                                         |\n\n## Appendix E Government Structure For Cybersecurity Relationship Of Commission Recommenda Relationship Of Commission Recommend Ndations To Existing Cyber Organizations Ndations To Existing Cyber Organizations Appendix F Situating Layered Cyber Deterrence\n\nLayered deterrence builds on studies published over the past five years that explore how to secure American interests in cyberspace. It draws on these reports and studies and adds important new elements to provide a comprehensive blueprint for reducing the severity and frequency of cyberattacks. Two elements make the strategy distinct. First, layered cyber deterrence integrates multiple deterrent mechanisms (i.e., layers) to change the cost-benefit calculus of adversaries. It incorporates the Department of Defense (DoD) concept of defend forward, while managing escalation risks. Second, layered cyber deterrence's whole-of-nation approach surpasses previous attempts to expand the deterrent capabilities available to the nation.\n\nThe strategy encourages a collaborative, persistent, mutually beneficial deterrent posture that defends American society.\n\n| STUDY                                       |\n|---------------------------------------------|\n| WHAT IS DIFFERENT IN                        |\n| LAYERED CYBER DETERRENCE                    |\n| 2019 National Infrastructure                |\n| Advisory Council's                          |\n| Transforming U.S. Cyber                     |\n| Threat Partnership                          |\n| Describes the need to partner with the      |\n| owners and operators of the most critical   |\n| infrastructure and improve intelligence     |\n| sharing between government and              |\n| industry.                                   |\n| 2018 U.S. National Cyber                    |\n| Strategy                                    |\n| Defines the threat as state and non-state   |\n| and describes how it affects the whole of   |\n| American society.                           |\n| 2018 Department of                          |\n| Defense Cyber Strategy                      |\n| Defines \"defend forward\" as a proactive     |\n| approach to addressing malicious adver-     |\n| sary behavior.                              |\n| 2018 United States Cyber                    |\n| Command Vision                              |\n| Defines \"defend forward\" as operating as    |\n| closely as possible to the origin of adver- |\n| sary activity and persistently contesting   |\n| malicious actors consistent with interna-   |\n| tional law.                                 |\n| 2018 Department of                          |\n| Homeland Security                           |\n| Cybersecurity Strategy                      |\n| Focuses on a prioritized and compre-        |\n| hensive risk-based approach to securing     |\n| critical systems.                           |\nPlaces greater emphasis on the private-sector role in supporting the government.\nCombines multiple deterrent and compellent logics while emphasizing public-private collaboration and integrating defend forward.\nBroadens the range of strategic options available (i.e., multiple instruments of power) and describes how to approach securing cyberspace through a whole-ofnation framework.\nAdopts a whole-of-nation approach, rather than focusing solely on persistent engagement.\n\nIntegrates national resilience and pro-\ntecting critical infrastructure into a larger\nframework that builds on multiple deter-\nrent and compellent logics and maps\nhow to create incentives for public-pri-\nvate collaboration.\n\n| STUDY                                       | WHAT IS SIMILAR                           |\n|---------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------|\n| WHAT IS DIFFERENT IN                        |                                           |\n| LAYERED CYBER DETERRENCE                    |                                           |\n| Discusses the cyber threat as it relates    |                                           |\n| not just to offensive capabilities but      |                                           |\n| also to weaponized social media and         |                                           |\n| disinformation.                             |                                           |\n| 2018 Defense Science                        |                                           |\n| Board's Task Force on                       |                                           |\n| Cyber as a Strategic                        |                                           |\n| Capability                                  |                                           |\n| Highlights the need to unify efforts across |                                           |\n| the government and create new exec-         |                                           |\n| utive bodies to oversee cybersecurity       |                                           |\n| initiatives.                                |                                           |\n| 2018 National Security                      |                                           |\n| Telecommunications                          |                                           |\n| Advisory Committee                          |                                           |\n| (NSTAC) Report on a Cyber                   |                                           |\n| Moonshot                                    |                                           |\n| Emphasizes great power competition.         | Describes how to secure U.S. networks     |\n| during great power competition.             |                                           |\n| 2017 National Defense                       |                                           |\n| Strategy and National                       |                                           |\n| Security Strategy                           |                                           |\n| 2017 Defense Science                        |                                           |\n| Board Task Force on Cyber                   |                                           |\n| Deterrence                                  |                                           |\n| Prioritizes ensuring the resilience of      |                                           |\n| key weapon systems as part of a larger      |                                           |\n| deterrent strategy.                         |                                           |\n| 2016 Commission on                          |                                           |\n| Enhancing National                          |                                           |\n| Cybersecurity                               |                                           |\n| Calls for incentivizing behaviors in the    |                                           |\n| private sector that increase overall        |                                           |\n| cybersecurity.                              |                                           |\n| 2015 DoD Cyber Strategy                     | Advocates creating international partner- |\n| ships and \"building bridges to the private  |                                           |\n| sector\" as key components of generating     |                                           |\n| options to defend American interests in     |                                           |\n| cyberspace.                                 |                                           |\nFocuses on a broader array of threat actors and ways to defend American interests in cyberspace.\nCreates a strategic logic (i.e., ends, ways, means) that prioritizes and coordinates policy recommendations addressing challenges highlighted in the NSTAC report.\nIntegrates multiple deterrent layers combining different instruments of powerincluding non-military means and describes how to mobilize the larger society to reduce attack surfaces (i.e., deny benefits).\nDescribes how to increase collaboration between the public and private sectors.\nIntegrates a broad range of deterrent and compellent options (i.e., three layers) and describes how to increase national resilience and reshape the cyber ecosystem through private-sector collaboration.\n\n## Appendix G Engagements Academia\n\nInternet Policy Research Initiative Purdue University American University School of International Service Stanford University Center for Security Studies Auburn University McCrary Institute Tel Aviv University Ben Gurion University University of California, Berkeley Center for Long Term Cybersecurity University of California, San Diego\n\nColumbia University\n    Columbia Law School\n    School of International and\n    Public Affairs (SIPA)\n\nUniversity of Cincinnati University of Michigan University of Oxford\n\nGeorge Mason University\n   Antonin Scalia Law School,\n   National Security Law &\n   Policy Program\n\nGeorge Washington University University of Texas at Austin The University of Texas School of Law University of Toronto Georgetown University Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University Georgia Institute of Technology\n\n## U.S. Government\n\nCentral Intelligence Agency Harvard University Belfer Center Harvard Kennedy School City and County of San Francisco City of Austin, Texas Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies City of New York, Cyber Command King's College London (KCL)\nCommonwealth of Pennsylvania London School of Economics and Political Science\n\nExecutive Office of the President\n    National Security Council\n    Office of the U.S. Trade\n    Representative\n\nMassachusetts Institute of\n    Technology\n    Computer Science & Artificial\n    Intelligence Laboratory\n    Lincoln Laboratory\n\nFederal Bureau of Investigation\n    (FBI)\n    New York Field Office\n\nLawrence Livermore National Laboratory National Cyber Investigative Joint Task Force National Defense Cyber Alliance National Security Agency\n\nOffice of the Director of National\n    Intelligence\n    Cyber Threat Intelligence and\n    Integration Center\n    Office of National Intelligence\n    Manager for Cyber\n\nState of Colorado\n    Colorado National Guard\n    Department of Public Safety\n\nState of Tennessee\n    Bureau of Investigation\n\nState of Texas\n    Department of Information\n    Resources\n    Texas National Guard\n\nState of Washington\n    Washington National Guard\n\nU.S. Department of Commerce\nNational Institute of Standards and Technology National Telecommunications and Information Administration\nU.S. Department of Defense\nArmy Cyber Command Army Futures Command Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency Defense Innovation Unit Defense Science Board\n\nFleet Cyber Command\nU.S. Cyber Command\nUnited States Naval War\nCollege\n\nU.S. Department of Energy\n\nForeign and Commonwealth\nOffice\nMinistry of Defense\nNational Cyber Security\nCentre\nNational Security Directorate\nParliament, House of\nCommons, Foreign Affairs\nCommittee\n\nNorth Atlantic Treaty Organization\n    (NATO)\n\nU.S. Department of Homeland\n   Security\n   Cybersecurity and\n   Infrastructure Security Agency\n   Federal Emergency\n   Management Agency\n\nU.S. Secret Service U.S. Department of Justice NATO Cooperative Cyber Defense Center of Excellence (CCDCOE)\nU.S. Department of State U.S. Department of the Treasury\n\n## International Government\n\nEmbassy of the Czech Republic\n\nRepublic of Estonia\n    Information System Authority\n    (RIA)\n    Ministry of Defense\n    Ministry of Economic Affairs\n    and Communications (MKM)\n    Ministry of Foreign Affairs\n    Government Office\n\nEmbassy of the Kingdom of the\n    Netherlands\n\nEmbassy of Ukraine Embassy of the United Kingdom\n\n## Corporate And Nongovernmental Organization (Ngo)\n\nAdaptive Strategies, LLC\nEuropean Commission, Directorate-General for Migration and Home Affairs\n\n## Aecom\n\nAmerican Gas Association American Petroleum Institute European Union Institute for Security Studies (EUISS) EU Cyber Direct American Public Power Association European Union, European External Action Service (EEAS)\nThe Aspen Institute\n\nGovernment of Israel, National\nCyber Directorate\nAssociation of State Criminal Investigative Agencies (ASCIA)\nAtlantic Council Auto Alliance (Alliance of Automobile Manufacturers)\n\nGovernment of the United\n   Kingdom\n   Cabinet Office\n   Department for Digital,\n   Culture, Media & Sport\n\nAutomotive Information Sharing and Analysis Center (Auto-ISAC)\nBank of America Bayshore Networks Beazley PLC Bloomberg BluVector Brendler Consulting Business Roundtable BSA | The Software Alliance Carnegie Endowment for International Peace Cato Institute Center for a New American Security (CNAS)\nCenter for Internet Security Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)\nCentrify CenturyLink Chatham House Claroty Comcast Consumer Technology Association Council on Foreign Relations Coveware CrowdStrike Cyber Tech Accord Cyber Threat Alliance CyberCube Cybereason CyberPeace Institute Cytegic Defending Digital Campaigns\n\n## Appendix G: Engagements\n\nIOActive\n\n## Digitaleurope\n\nJigsaw DiploFoundation JPMorgan Chase DLL Group Kleiner Perkins Caufield & Byers DLT Solutions Liberty Ventures Luta Security Downstream Natural Gas Information Sharing and Analysis Center M&T Bank Dragos MassMutual EastWest Institute MassCyberCenter Expanse Expel Mazda North American Operations Micro Focus Financial Crimes Enforcement Network Microsoft The MITRE Corporation Center for National Security Financial Services Information Sharing and Analysis Center (FS-ISAC)\nMorgan Stanley Financial Systemic Analysis &\nResilience Center (FS-ARC)\nNational Association of Insurance Commissioners ForeScout Technologies ForgePoint Capital National Association of Secretaries of State German Marshall Fund of the United States National Association of State Chief Information Officers Grimm (SMFS, Inc.) Gula Tech Adventures National Association of State Election Directors National Governors Association The Hague Centre for Strategic Studies Hathaway Global Strategies LLC\nNational Rural Electric Cooperative Association New America Health Information Sharing and Analysis Center Next Peak LLC\nHewlett Packard Hogan Lovells Nippon Telegraph and Telephone Corporation HSBC\nPalantir I Am the Cavalry Palo Alto Networks Pavisade Information Technology Industry Council PricewaterhouseCoopers (PWC) Proofpoint Institute for Critical Infrastructure Technology R Street Institute RAND Corporation Pardee RAND Graduate School Rapid7 Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies (RUSI)\nScythe SIGA OT Solutions Software & Information Industry Association Sovereign Ventures Splunk Square Team8 techUK Third Way Threat Warrior Trail of Bits TruSTAR U.S. Chamber of Commerce Verified Voting Vidder, Inc.\n\nWater Information Sharing and Analysis Center Wells Fargo West Wing Advisory Services White & Case LLP Wickr The William and Flora Hewlett Foundation The Wilson Center\n\n## Appendix H Commissioners Co-Chairmen\n\nDirector of Auburn University's Charles D. McCrary Institute for Cyber and Critical Infrastructure Security Chairman, President, and Chief Executive Officer of Southern Company Wisconsin's 8th District\n\nAndrew Hallman\nPrincipal Executive of the Office\nof the Director of National\nIntelligence performing the duties\nof the Principal Deputy Director of\nNational Intelligence\n\nJohn C. \"Chris\" Inglis\nU.S. Naval Academy Looker\nProfessor for Cyber Security\nStudies and Former Deputy\nDirector of the National Security\nAgency\n\nU.S. Representative for Rhode Island's 2nd District Patrick J. Murphy Former Acting Secretary and Under Secretary of the U.S. Army & Former U.S. Representative for Pennsylvania's 8th District David L. Norquist Deputy Secretary of Defense Administrator of the Transportation Security Administration & Senior Official Performing the Duties of the Deputy Secretary of Homeland Security The executive branch Commissioners contributed superb assessments, insights, and recommendations to the report and actively participated in the Commission's deliberations, but, in accordance with executive branch legal guidance, abstained from its final approval.\n\nSamantha F. Ravich\nChair of the Center on Cyber\nand Technology Innovation at\nthe Foundation for Defense of\nDemocracies\n\nBenjamin E. \"Ben\" Sasse\nU.S. Senator for Nebraska\n\nSuzanne E. Spaulding\nSenior Adviser for Homeland\nSecurity at the Center for Strategic\nand International Studies and\nformer Under Secretary for the\nNational Protection and Programs\nDirectorate at the Department of\nHomeland Security\n\nChristopher Wray\nDirector of the Federal Bureau of\nInvestigation\n\n## Appendix I Staff List\n\nExecutive Team\nMark Montgomery, Executive Director\n\nDeborah Grays, Chief of Staff\n\nSenior Leadership\nErica Borghard, Senior Director and Task Force One Lead\n\nJohn Costello, Senior Director and Task Force Two Lead\nVal Cofield, Senior Director and Task Force Three Lead Cory Simpson, Senior Director and Directorate Four Lead Benjamin Jensen, Senior Research Director and Lead Writer\nFull-Time Staff\nLaura Bate, Director for Cyber Engagement Phoebe Benich, Cyber Strategy and Policy Analyst Tatyana Bolton, Policy Director Gregory Buck, Deputy Chief of Staff Madison Creery, Cyber Strategy and Policy Analyst Matthew Ferren, Cyber Strategy and Policy Analyst Chris Forshey, Facility Security Officer Michael Garcia, Director of External Engagement and Outreach Charles Garzoni, Director for Defensive Strategy Karrie Jefferson, Director for Cyber Engagement\nAinsley Katz, Cyber Strategy and Policy Analyst Alison King, Strategic Communications and Congressional Advisor Timothy Kocher, Cyber Strategist Noah Komnick, Cyber Strategist Harry Krejsa, Director and Deputy Team Lead Sang Lee, Director for Cyber Engagement Robert Morgus, Director for Research and Analysis Diane Pinto, Cyber Strategy and Policy Analyst Matthew Smith, Cyber Strategist Brandon Valeriano, Senior Advisor Dave Zikusoka, Policy Director\n\nLegal Advisors\nStefan Wolfe, General Counsel\nCorey Bradley, Deputy General Counsel Cody Cheek, Legal Advisor David Simon, Chief Counsel for Cybersecurity and National Security Veronica Glick, Deputy Chief Counsel for Cybersecurity and National Security Joshua Silverstein, Deputy Chief Counsel for Cybersecurity and National Security\n\nProduction\nSupport\nAlice Falk, Editor\nLaurel Prucha Moran, Graphic Designer\n\nSenior Advisors\n(Part-Time)\nSteven Chabinsky\nFrank DiGiovanni Thomas Donahue Michael Fischerkeller Jason Healey Jackie Kerr Nina Kollars Jon Lindsay Shawn Lonergan Christopher Painter Mark Raymond Phil Reitinger Harvey Rishikof Christopher Schell Jacquelyn Schneider Bobbie Stempfley Evan Wolff JD Work Melissa Bunney\n\n## Contributing Experts Robert Bair\n\nEugene Burrell Ronald Banks Clark Cully Amy Bianchino Brett Fetterly Aaron Brantly Kelly Gaffney Bob Butler Matthew Gorham Bobby Chesney\n\nThe Commission\n   would like to\nacknowledge the\n critical support\n of the following\n     agency and\n  Commissioner\n  Staff Members\n\nMichele Guido\n\nPeter Dombrowski Amy Hess Martha Finnemore Steven Kelly Stephen Flynn Christopher Krebs David Forscey Nick Leiserson Jane Fountain Trevor Logan Kara Frederick Thomas McDermott Heidi Gardner Charles Morrison Lindsey Gorman Thomas Muir Neil Jenkins Devi Nair Alexander Klimburg David Radcliffe Robert Knake Kenneth Rapuano Herb Lin Steve Smith Austin Long Samuel Spector Ryan Maness Bryan Ware Zane Markel Burke \"Ed\" Wilson Joseph Nye Thomas Wingfield Jonathan Reiber Josh Rovner Benjamin Schechter Lindsey Sheppard Rebecca Slayton Jessica \"Zhanna\" Malekos Smith Josephine Wolff\n\n## Appendix J Solarium Event Support Red Team Members Keith Alexander\n\nDmitri Alperovitch Ann Barron-DiCamillo Edward Cardon Steven Chabinsky Richard Clarke J. Michael Daniel Jen Easterly Richard Harknett Jamil Jaffer Catherine Lotrionte John Mallery Jim Miller Lisa Monaco John Nagengast Christopher Painter Greg Rattray Laura Rosenberger Robert \"Rooster\" Schmidle\n\n## Notes Executive Summary\n\n1\nLanguage inspired by House Report on the Homeland Security Act of 2002, legislation passed after the attacks of September 11; https://www.congress.gov/107/crpt/hrpt609/CRPT-107hrpt609.pdf.\n2\nSee the documentary *No Maps for These Territories*, directed by Mark Neale (Vancouver, CA: Docurama, 2000).\n3\nThe White House, \"National Cyber Strategy of the United States of America\" (September 2018), https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/ uploads/2018/09/National-Cyber-Strategy.pdf.\n4\nBenjamin Jensen, Brandon Valeriano, and Ryan Maness, \"Fancy Bears and Digital Trolls: Cyber Strategy with a Russian Twist,\" Journal of\nStrategic Studies, no. 42 (2019): 21234.\n5\nDavid Alexander, \"Hagel, Ahead of China Trip, Urges Military Restraint in Cyberspace,\" *Reuters,* March 28, 2014, https://www.reuters.com/ article/us-usa-defense-cybersecurity/hagel-ahead-of-china-trip-urges-military-restraint-in-cyberspace-idUSBREA2R1ZH20140328.\n\n## The Challenge\n\n6\n\"Alert (TA17-181A): Petya Ransomware,\" U.S. Department of Homeland Security - Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency, July 1, 2017, https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA17-181A.\n7\n\"Global Ransomware Attack Causes Turmoil,\" *BBC News*, June 28, 2017, https://www.bbc.com/news/technology-40416611.\n8\nPolina Devitt, Jack Stubbs, and Oksana Kobzeva, \"Russia's Rosneft Says Hit by Cyber Attack, Oil Production Unaffected,\" *Reuters*, June 27, 2017, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-russia-rosneft-cyberattack-idUSKBN19I1N9.\n9\nBenjamin Jensen, \"The Cyber Character of Political Warfare,\" *Brown Journal of World Affairs* 24, no. 1 (2017): 15971.\n10 On thinking of strategic competition in terms of networks, see Charles Cleveland, Benjamin Jensen, Arnel David and Susan Bryant,\nMilitary Strategy in the 21st Century: People, Connectivity and Competition (New York: Cambria Press, 2018); Anne-Marie Slaughter, \"How to Succeed in the Networked World: A Grand Strategy for the Digital Age,\" *Foreign Affairs*, December 2016, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/world/2016-10-04/how-succeed-networked-world; Zeev Maoz, Networks of Nations: The Evolution, Structure, and Impact of International Networks, 1816*2001*, Structural Analysis in the Social Sciences 32 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010).\n11 Major works that see cyber operations as a modern source of coercion and political warfare include Jensen, \"The Cyber Character of\nPolitical Warfare\"; Erica D. Borghard and Shawn W. Lonergan, \"The Logic of Coercion in Cyberspace,\" *Security Studies* 26, no. 3 (2017): 45281; Jon R. Lindsay and Erik Gartzke, \"Coercion through Cyberspace: The Stability-Instability Paradox Revisited,\" in Coercion: The Power to Hurt in International Politics, ed. Kelly M. Greenhill and Peter Krause (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), 179203; Erik Gartzke and Jon R. Lindsay, \"Weaving Tangled Webs: Offense, Defense, and Deception in Cyberspace,\" *Journal of Security Studies* 24, no. 2 (2015): 31648; Brandon Valeriano, Benjamin Jensen, and Ryan C. Maness, *Cyber Strategy: The Evolving Character of Power and Coercion* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018); Joseph S. Nye Jr., \"Deterrence and Dissuasion in Cyberspace,\" *International Security* 42, no. 3 (2017): 4471, https://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdf/10.1162/ISEC_a_00266.\n12 Lindsay and Gartzke, \"Coercion through Cyberspace.\"\n15 Lisa Ferdinando, \"DoD Officials: Chinese Actions Threaten U.S. Technological, Industrial Base,\" U.S.\nDepartment of Defense, June 21, 2018, https://www.defense.gov/Newsroom/News/Article/Article/1557188/ dod-officials-chinese-actions-threaten-us-technological-industrial-base/.\n16 Daniel R. Coats, \"Statement for the Record: Worldwide Threat Assessment of the US Intelligence Community\" (Office of the Director of\nNational Intelligence, January 29, 2019), https://www.odni.gov/files/ODNI/documents/2019-ATA-SFR---SSCI.pdf.\n17 For an overview of cyber operations attributed to China along these lines, see Citizen Lab reporting: https://citizenlab.ca/tag/china/. 18 Justin Sherman and Robert Morgus, \"Authoritarians Are Exporting Surveillance Tech, and with It Their Vision for the Internet,\" Council on\nForeign Relations, December 5, 2018, https://www.cfr.org/blog/authoritarians-are-exporting-surveillance-tech-and-it-their-vision-internet.\n19 Brian Barrett, \"How China's Elite APT10 Hackers Stole the World's Secrets,\" *Wired*, December 20, 2018, https://www.wired.com/story/\ndoj-indictment-chinese-hackers-apt10/.\n20 Plea Agreement, *United States v  Su Bin*, No. SA CR 14-131 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 22, 2016), https://www.justice.gov/opa/file/834936/\ndownload.\n21 John Aglionby, Emily Feng, and Yuan Yang, \"African Union Accuses China of Hacking Headquarters,\" *Financial Times*, January 29, 2018,\nhttps://www.ft.com/content/c26a9214-04f2-11e8-9650-9c0ad2d7c5b5.\n22 Mark Clayton, \"Exclusive: Cyberattack Leaves Natural Gas Pipelines Vulnerable to Sabotage,\" *Christian Science Monitor*, February 27, 2013,\nhttps://www.csmonitor.com/Environment/2013/0227/Exclusive-Cyberattack-leaves-natural-gas-pipelines-vulnerable-to-sabotage.\n23 *The IP Commission Report: The Report of the Commission on the Theft of American Intellectual Property* (National Bureau of Asian Research,\nMay 2013), http://www.ipcommission.org/report/ip_commission_report_052213.pdf.\n24 Rob Barry and Dustin Volz, \"Ghosts in the Clouds: Inside China's Major Corporate Hack,\" *Wall Street Journal*, December 30, 2019,\nhttps://www.wsj.com/articles/ghosts-in-the-clouds-inside-chinas-major-corporate-hack-11577729061?mod=searchresults&page=1&pos=2.\n25 Ben Sasse, \"Senator Sasse: The OPM Hack May Have Given China a Spy Recruiting Database,\" *Wired*, July 9, 2015,\nhttps://www.wired.com/2015/07/senator-sasse-washington-still-isnt-taking-opm-breach-seriously/.\n26 \"Attorney General William P. Barr Announces Indictment of Four Members of China's Military for Hacking into Equifax,\" U.S.\nDepartment of Justice, February 10, 2020, https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/attorney-general-william-p-barr-announcesindictment-four-members-china-s-military.\n27 \"The Marriott Data Breach,\" Consumer Information, December 4, 2018, https://www.consumer.ftc.gov/blog/2018/12/marriott-data-breach.\n28 Zach Whittaker, \"Sources Say China Used iPhone Hacks to Target Uyghur Muslims,\" *Tech Crunch*, August 31, 2019,\nhttps://techcrunch.com/2019/08/31/china-google-iphone-uyghur/.\n29 Daniel R. Coats, \"Statement for the Record: Worldwide Threat Assessment of the US Intelligence Community\" (Office of the Director of\nNational Intelligence, January 29, 2019), 5, 7, https://www.odni.gov/files/ODNI/documents/2019-ATA-SFR---SSCI.pdf.\n30 Keir Giles, \"Russia's 'New' Tools for Confronting the West: Continuity and Innovation in Moscow's Exercise of Power\" (Chatham House,\nMarch 2016), https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/publications/2016-03-russia-new-tools-giles.pdf.\n31 Kenneth Geers, *Cyber War in Perspective: Russian Aggression against Ukraine* (CCDCOE, NATO Cooperative Cyber Defense Centre of\nExcellence, 2015), https://ccdcoe.org/uploads/2018/10/CyberWarinPerspective_full_book.pdf; Benjamin Jensen, Brandon Valeriano, and Ryan Maness, \"Fancy Bears and Digital Trolls: Cyber Strategy with a Russian Twist,\" *Journal of Strategic Studies* 42, no. 2 (2019): 21234; Aaron F. Brantly, Nerea M. Cal, and Devlin P. Winkelstein, \"Defending the Borderland: Ukrainian Military Experiences with IO, Cyber, and EW\" (Army Cyber Institute at West Point, 2017), https://cyberdefensereview.army.mil/Portals/6/Documents/UA%20Report% 20Final%20AB.pdf.\n32 Coats, \"Worldwide Threat Assessment of the US Intelligence Community\" (2019), 56. 33 Garrett M. Graff, \"A Guide to Russia's High Tech Tool Box for Subverting US Democracy,\" *Wired*, August 13, 2017,\nhttps://www.wired.com/story/a-guide-to-russias-high-tech-tool-box-for-subverting-us-democracy/.\n34 Emily Tamkin, \"10 Years After the Landmark Attack on Estonia, Is the World Better Prepared for Cyber Threats?,\" *Foreign Policy*, April 27,\n2017, https://foreignpolicy.com/2017/04/27/10-years-after-the-landmark-attack-on-estonia-is-the-world-better-prepared-for-cyber-threats/.\n35 John Markoff, \"Before the Gunfire, Cyberattacks,\" *New York Times*, August 12, 2008, https://www.nytimes.com/2008/08/13/technology/\n13cyber.html.\n36 Robert M. Lee, Michael J. Assante, and Tim Conway, \"Analysis of the Cyber Attack on the Ukrainian Power Grid\" (Electricity Information\nSharing and Assistance Center (E-ISAC), March 18, 2016), https://www.nerc.com/pa/CI/ESISAC/Documents/E-ISAC_SANS_Ukraine_ DUC_18Mar2016.pdf.\n37 Ellen Nakashima and Shane Harris, \"How the Russians Hacked the DNC and Passed Its Emails to WikiLeaks,\" *Washington Post*,\nJuly 13, 2018, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/how-the-russians-hacked-the-dnc-and-passed-its-emails-towikileaks/2018/07/13/af19a828-86c3-11e8-8553-a3ce89036c78_story.html.\n38 Ellen Nakashima, \"Russian Military Was behind 'NotPetya' Cyberattack in Ukraine, CIA Concludes,\" *Washington Post*, January 12, 2018,\nhttps://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/russian-military-was-behind-notpetya-cyberattack-in-ukraine-ciaconcludes/2018/01/12/048d8506-f7ca-11e7-b34a-b85626af34ef_story.html.\n39 Michael Riley, Jennifer A. Dlouhy, and Bryan Gruley, \"Russians Are Suspects in Nuclear Site Hackings, Sources Say,\" *Bloomberg*, July 6,\n2017, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-07-07/russians-are-said-to-be-suspects-in-hacks-involving-nuclear-site.\n40 Rebecca Smith, \"Russian Hackers Reach U.S. Utility Control Rooms, Homeland Security Officials Say,\" *Wall Street Journal*, July 23, 2018,\nhttps://www.wsj.com/articles/russian-hackers-reach-u-s-utility-control-rooms-homeland-security-officials-say-1532388110.\n41 On Russian efforts to manipulate the 2018 election, see Donie O'Sullivan, \"Russians Targeted Senate and Conservative Think Tanks,\nMicrosoft Says,\" CNN, August 22, 2018, https://www.cnn.com/2018/08/21/politics/microsoft-russia-american-politicians/index.html.\n42 Eugene Rumer, \"The Primakov (Not Gerasimov) Doctrine in Action,\" Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, June 5, 2019,\nhttps://carnegieendowment.org/2019/06/05/primakov-not-gerasimov-doctrine-in-action-pub-79254.\n43 *Foreign Cyber Threats to the United States: Hearing before the U S  Senate Committee on Armed Services*, 115th Cong., 1st sess., 2017,\nhttps://www.armed-services.senate.gov/hearings/17-01-05-foreign-cyber-threats-to-the-united-states.\n44 \"Nine Iranians Charged with Conducting Massive Cyber Theft Campaign on Behalf of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps,\" U.S.\nDepartment of Justice, March 23, 2018, https://www.justice.gov/usao-sdny/pr/nine-iranians-charged-conducting-massive-cyber-theftcampaign-behalf-islamic; Eamon Javers, \"US Charges Iranians with Cyber Attacks on Banks and Dam,\" CNBC, March 24, 2016, https://www.cnbc.com/2016/03/24/us-charges-iranians-with-cyber-attacks-on-banks-and-dam.html.\n45 John Leyden, \"Hack on Saudi Aramco Hit 30,000 Workstations, Oil Firm Admits,\" *The Register*, August 29, 2012,\nhttps://www.theregister.co.uk/2012/08/29/saudi_aramco_malware_attack_analysis/.\n46 U.S. Department of Justice, \"Nine Iranians Charged with Conducting Massive Cyber Theft Campaign.\" 47 Ben Elgin and Michael Riley, \"Now at the Sands Casino: An Iranian Hacker in Every Server,\" *Bloomberg*, December 12, 2014,\nhttps://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2014-12-11/iranian-hackers-hit-sheldon-adelsons-sands-casino-in-las-vegas.\n48 Ms. Smith, \"Saudi Arabia Again Hit with Disk-Wiping Malware Shamoon 2,\" CSO, January 24, 2017,\nhttps://www.csoonline.com/article/3161146/saudi-arabia-again-hit-with-disk-wiping-malware-shamoon-2.html.\n49 Zaid Shoorbajee, \"Shamoon Resurfaces, Targeting Italian Oil Company,\" *CyberScoop*, December 14, 2018,\nhttps://www.cyberscoop.com/shamoon-saipem-palo-alto-networks/.\n50 Sarah Hawley, Ben Read, Cristiana Brafman-Kittner, Nalani Fraser, Andrew Thompson, Yuri Rozhansky and Sanaz Yashar, \"APT39: An\nIranian Cyber Espionage Group Focused on Personal Information,\" FireEye, January 29, 2019, https://www.fireeye.com/blog/ threat-research/2019/01/apt39-iranian-cyber-espionage-group-focused-on-personal-information.html.\n51 Lorenzo Franceschi-Bicchierai, \"The Iranian Hacking Campaign to Break into Activists' Gmail Accounts,\" *Vice*, August 27, 2015,\n\n## Notes\n\n52 Lily Hay Newman, \"Facebook Removes a Fresh Batch of Iran-Linked Fake Accounts,\" *Wired*, May 28, 2019, https://www.wired.com/story/\niran-linked-fake-accounts-facebook-twitter/.\n53 Jay Greene, Tony Romm, and Ellen Nakashima, \"Iranians Tried to Hack U.S. Presidential Campaign in Effort That Targeted\nHundreds, Microsoft Says,\" *Washington Post*, October 4, 2019, https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2019/10/04/ iran-tried-hack-us-presidential-candidates-journalists-effort-that-targeted-hundreds-microsoft-finds/.\n54 Nalani Fraser, Jacqueline O'Leary, Vincent Cannon and Fred Plan, \"APT38: Details on New North Korean Regime-Backed Threat Group,\"\nFireEye, October 3, 2018, https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2018/10/apt38-details-on-new-north-korean-regime-backedthreat-group.html; Jay Rosenberg and Christiaan Beek, \"Examining Code Reuse Reveals Undiscovered Links Among North Korea's Malware Families,\" McAfee, August 9, 2018, https://securingtomorrow.mcafee.com/other-blogs/mcafee-labs/examining-code-reuse-revealsundiscovered-links-among-north-koreas-malware-families/; Ryan Sherstobitoff and Asheer Malhotra, \"Analyzing Operation GhostSecret,\" McAfee, April 24, 2018, https://securingtomorrow.mcafee.com/other-blogs/mcafee-labs/analyzing-operation-ghostsecretattack-seeks-to-steal-data-worldwide/; Sergei Shevchenko, Hirman Muhammad bin Abu Bakar, and James Wong, \"Taiwan Heist: Lazarus Tools and Ransomware,\" BAE Systems, October 16, 2017, https://baesystemsai.blogspot.com/2017/10/taiwan-heist-lazarus-tools.html.\n55 Choe Sang-Hun, \"North Korean Hackers Stole U.S.-South Korean Military Plans, Lawmaker Says,\" *New York Times*, October 10, 2017,\nhttps://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/10/world/asia/north-korea-hack-war-plans.html; Hyeong-wook Boo, \"An Assessment of North Korean Cyber Threats,\" *Journal of East Asian Affairs* 31, no. 1 (2017): 97117; Kong Ji Young, Lim Jong In, and Kim Kyoung Gon, \"The All- Purpose Sword: North Korea's Cyber Operations and Strategies,\" in 2019 11th International Conference on Cyber Conflict: Silent Battle, CyCon 2019, ed. Massimiliano Signoretti et al. (Tallinn: NATO CCD COE Publications, 2019), 120.\n56 Ian Talley and Dustin Volz, \"U.S. Targets Korean Hacking as Rising National-Security Threat,\" *Wall Street Journal*, September 16, 2019,\nhttps://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-targets-north-korean-hacking-as-rising-national-security-threat-11568545202; Carol Morella and Ellen Nakashima, \"U.S. Imposes Sanctions on North Korean Hackers Accused in Sony Attack, Dozens of Other Incidents,\" *Washington Post*, September 13, 2019, https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/us-sanctions-north-korean-hackers-accused-in-sony-attackdozens-of-other-incidents/2019/09/13/ac6b0070-d633-11e9-9610-fb56c5522e1c_story.html.\n57 David E. Sanger and Nicole Perlroth, \"U.S. Said to Find North Korea Ordered Cyberattack on Sony,\" *New York Times*, December 17, 2014,\nhttps://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/18/world/asia/us-links-north-korea-to-sony-hacking.html.\n58 Ju-min Park and Meeyoung Cho, \"South Korea Blames North Korea for December Hack on Nuclear Operator,\" *Reuters*, March 17, 2015,\nhttps://www.reuters.com/article/us-nuclear-southkorea-northkorea/south-korea-blames-north-korea-for-december-hack-onnuclear-operator-idUSKBN0MD0GR20150317\n59 Krishna N. Das and Jonathan Spicer, \"How the New York Fed Fumbled over the Bangladesh Bank Cyber-Heist,\" *Reuters*, July 21, 2016,\nhttps://www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/cyber-heist-federal/.\n60 Ellen Nakashima and Phillip Rucker, \"U.S. Declares North Korea Carried Out Massive WannaCry Cyberattack,\" *Washington Post*,\nDecember 19, 2017, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/us-set-to-declare-north-korea-carried-out-massivewannacry-cyber-attack/2017/12/18/509deb1c-e446-11e7-a65d-1ac0fd7f097e_story.html.\n61 Michelle Nichols, \"North Korea Took $2 Billion in Cyberattacks to Fund Weapons Program:\nU.N. Report,\" *Reuters*, August 5, 2019, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-northkorea-cyber-un/ north-korea-took-2-billion-in-cyberattacks-to-fund-weapons-program-u-n-report-idUSKCN1UV1ZX.\n62 Darien Huss, \"North Korea Bitten by Bitcoin Bug,\" Proofpoint, December 2017, https://www.proofpoint.com/sites/default/files/pfpt-uswp-north-korea-bitten-by-bitcoin-bug-180129.pdf; Luke McNamara, \"Why Is North Korea So Interested in Bitcoin?,\" FireEye, September 2017, https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/09/north-korea-interested-in-bitcoin.html.\n63 Michelle Nichols, \"North Korea Took $2 Billion in Cyberattacks to Fund Weapons Program: U.S. Report,\" *Reuters*, August 5, 2019,\nhttps://www.reuters.com/article/us-northkorea-cyber-un/north-korea-took-2-billion-in-cyberattacks-to-fund-weaponsprogram-u-n-report-idUSKCN1UV1ZX.\n65 \"ISIL Now 'A Covert Global Network' Despite Significant Losses, United Nations Counter-Terrorism Head Tells Security Council,\" United\nNations Meetings Coverage, August 2018, https://www.un.org/press/en/2018/sc13463.doc.htm; Coats, \"Worldwide Threat Assessment of the US Intelligence Community\" (2019).\n66 Christopher Bing and Joel Schectman, \"Special Report: Inside the UAE's Secret Hacking Team of U.S. Mercenaries,\" *Reuters*, January 30,\n2019, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-spying-raven-specialreport/special-report-inside-the-uaes-secret-hacking-team-of-u-s-mercenaries-idUSKCN1PO19O; Jon Gambrell, \"UAE Cyber Firm DarkMatter Slowly Steps out of the Shadows,\" *Bloomberg*, February 1, 2018, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-02-01/uae-cyber-firm-darkmatter-slowly-steps-out-of-the-shadows.\n67 Ibid; Lorenzo Franceschi-Bicchierai, \"Controversial Government Spyware Crops Up in 21 Countries, Report Says,\" *Mashable*,\nFebruary 18, 2014, https://mashable.com/2014/02/18/controversial-government-spyware-hacking-team/#3Z120eTa8Eqj; Bill Marczak, John Scott-Railton, Sarah McKune, Bahr Abdul Razzak, and Ron Deibert, \"Hide and Seek: Tracking NSO Group's Pegasus Spyware to Operations in 45 Countries,\" *The Citizen Lab*, September 18, 2018, https://citizenlab.ca/2018/09/\nhide-and-seek-tracking-nso-groups-pegasus-spyware-to-operations-in-45-countries/.\n68 \"Treasury Sanctions Evil Corp, the Russia-Based Cybercriminal Group behind Dridex Malware,\" U.S. Department of the Treasury,\nDecember 5, 2019, https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sm845.\n69 \"GameOver Zeus Botnet Disrupted: Collaborative Effort among International Partners,\" U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation, June 2,\n2014, https://www.fbi.gov/news/stories/gameover-zeus-botnet-disrupted.\n70 \"U.S. Leads Multi-National Action against 'Gameover Zeus' Botnet and 'Cryptolocker' Ransomware, Charges Botnet Administrator,\"\nU.S. Department of Justice, June 2, 2014, https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/us-leads-multi-national-action-against-gameover-zeus-botnetand-cryptolocker-ransomware.\n71 \"JPMorgan Hack Exposed Data of 83 Million, among Biggest Breaches in History,\" *Reuters*, October 2, 2014,\nhttps://www.reuters.com/article/us-jpmorgan-cybersecurity/jpmorgan-hack-exposed-data-of-83-million-among-biggest-breaches-inhistory-idUSKCN0HR23T20141003.\n72 Joseph Marks, \"ISIL Aims to Launch Cyberattacks on U.S.,\" *Politico*, December 29, 2015, https://www.politico.com/story/2015/12/\nisil-terrorism-cyber-attacks-217179.\n73 \"GozNym Cyber-Criminal Network Operating out of Europe Targeting American Entities Dismantled in International Operation,\" U.S.\nDepartment of Justice, May 16, 2019, https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/goznym-cyber-criminal-network-operating-out-europetargeting-american-entities-dismantled.\n74 \"DDoS Attack That Disrupted Internet Was Largest of Its Kind in History, Experts Say,\" *The Guardian*, October 26, 2016,\nhttps://www.theguardian.com/technology/2016/oct/26/ddos-attack-dyn-mirai-botnet.\n75 Lily Hay Newman, \"Atlanta Spent $2.6M to Recover from a $52,000 Ransomware Scare,\" *Wired Magazine*, April 23, 2018,\nhttps://www.wired.com/story/atlanta-spent-26m-recover-from-ransomware-scare/.\n76 Manny Fernandez, Mihir Zaveri, and Emily S. Rueb, \"Ransomware Attack Hits 22 Texas Towns, Authorities Say,\" *New York Times*, August\n2019, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/08/20/us/texas-ransomware.html; Luke Broadwater, \"Baltimore Transfers $6 Million to Pay for Ransomware Attack; City Considers Insurance against Hacks,\" *Baltimore Sun*, August 2019, https://www.baltimoresun.com/politics/ bs-md-ci-ransomware-expenses-20190828-njgznd7dsfaxbbaglnvnbkgjhe-story.html.\n77 Keman Huang, Michael Siegel, and Stuart Madnick, \"Cybercrime-as-a-Service: Identifying Control Points to Disrupt\" (MIT Management\nSloan School, November 2017), https://cams.mit.edu/wp-content/uploads/2017-17.pdf; Robert Wainwright and Frank Cilluffo, \"Responding to Cybercrime at Scale: Operation AvalancheA Case Study\" (Center for Cyber and Homeland Security, March 2017), http://www.iaem.com/documents/Responding-to-Cybercrime-at-Scale-Mar2017.pdf.\n78 Omar Abbosh and Kelly Bissell, \"Securing the Digital Economy: Reinventing the Internet for Trust\" (Accenture, 2019), 16,\nhttps://www.accenture.com/us-en/insights/cybersecurity/_acnmedia/Thought-Leadership-Assets/PDF/Accenture-Securing-the-Digital- Economy-Reinventing-the-Internet-for-Trust.pdf.\n79 \"Cybercrime Tactics and Techniques: Ransomware Retrospective\" (Malwarebytes, August 2019), https://resources.malwarebytes.com/\nfiles/2019/08/CTNT-2019-Ransomware_August_FINAL.pdf.\n80 \"High-Impact Ransomware Attacks Threaten U.S. Businesses and Organizations,\" U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation, October 2, 2019,\nhttps://www.ic3.gov/media/2019/191002.aspx.\n81 Fernandez, Sanger, and Trahan Martinez, \"Ransomware Attacks Are Testing Resolve of Cities across America.\" 82 For analyses of the balance of public and private innovation ecosystems, see Maryann P. Feldman and Richard Florida, \"The Geographic\nSources of Innovation: Technological Infrastructure and Product Innovation in the United States,\" Annals of the Association of American Geographers 84, no. 2 (June 1994): 21029; Richard R. Nelson, ed., *National Innovation Systems: A Comparative Analysis* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993).\n83 \"Cybersecurity Supply/Demand Heat Map,\" CyberSeek, Burning Glass, CompTIA, and the National Initiative for Cybersecurity\nEducation, accessed February 18, 2020, https://www.cyberseek.org/heatmap.html.\n84 \"Hacking the Skills Shortage: A Study of the International Shortage in Cybersecurity Skills\" (McAfee and Center for International and\nStrategic Studies, July 2016), https://www.mcafee.com/enterprise/en-us/assets/reports/rp-hacking-skills-shortage.pdf.\n85 Lauren C. Williams, \"Shanahan: 'We Get Out-Recruited' for Cyber Talent,\" FCW, May 8, 2019, https://fcw.com/articles/2019/05/08/\nshanahan-cyber-talent-sasc.aspx.\n86 Dustin Fraze, \"Cyber Grand Challenge (CGC) (Archived),\" Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, https://www.darpa.mil/program/\ncyber-grand-challenge.\n87 Paul Mozur, \"Beijing Wants A.I. to Be Made in China by 2030,\" *New York Times*, July 20, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/20/\nbusiness/china-artificial-intelligence.html.\n88 Alina Polyakova, \"Weapons of the Weak: Russia and AI-Driven Asymmetric Warfare,\" The Brookings Institution, November 15, 2018,\nhttps://www.brookings.edu/research/weapons-of-the-weak-russia-and-ai-driven-asymmetric-warfare/.\n89 \"Clinton's Words on China: Trade Is the Smart Thing,\" *New York Times*, March 9, 2000, https://www.nytimes.com/2000/03/09/world/\nclinton-s-words-on-china-trade-is-the-smart-thing.html.\n90 Hilary McGeachy, \"U.S.-China Technology Competition: Impacting a Rules-Based Order\" (United States Studies Centre, May 2, 2019),\navailable at https://www.ussc.edu.au/analysis/us-china-technology-competition-impacting-a-rules-based-order.\n91 Eurasia Group, \"Eurasia Group White Paper: The Geopolitics of 5G (November 15, 2018), https://www.eurasiagroup.net/siteFiles/Media/\nfiles/1811-14%205G%20special%20report%20public(1).pdf.\n92 Dan Strumpf, \"Where China Dominates in 5G Technology,\" *Wall Street Journal*, February 26, 2019, https://www.wsj.com/articles/\nwhere-china-dominates-in-5g-technology-11551236701.\n93 McGeachy, \"U.S.-China Technology Competition.\" 94 Steven Fieldstein, \"The Global Expansion of AI Surveillance\" (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, September 17, 2019), available\nat https://carnegieendowment.org/2019/09/17/global-expansion-of-ai-surveillance-pub-79847; \"Vietnam: Withdraw Problematic Cyber Security Law,\" Human Rights Watch, June 7, 2018, https://www.hrw.org/news/2018/06/07/vietnam-withdraw-problematic-cybersecurity-law; \"Vietnam: Big Brother Is Watching Everyone,\" Human Rights Watch, December 20, 2018, https://www.hrw.org/news/2018/12/20/vietnam-big-brother-watching-everyone; Abdi Latif Dahir, \"China Is Exporting Its Digital Surveillance Methods to African Governments,\" *Quartz Africa*, November 1, 2018, https://qz.com/africa/1447015/ china-is-helping-african-countries-control-the-internet/.\n96 Shane Greenstein, *How the Internet Became Commercial* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2015).\n\n## Historical Legacy And Methodology\n\n97 William B. Pickett, ed., *George F  Kennan and the Origins of Eisenhower's New Look: An Oral History of Project Solarium*, Monograph Series 1\n(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2004).\n98 Michele A. Flournoy and Shawn W. Brimley, \"Strategic Planning for National Security: A New Project Solarium,\" *Joint Forces Quarterly* 41,\nno. 2 (2006): 8086, https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/6252/45e247df30b3ba835021c6b1271c9653f1c5.pdf.\n99 Raymond Millen, \"Eisenhower and US Grand Strategy,\" *Parameters* 44, no. 2 (Summer 2014): 3547, https://publications.armywarcollege.\nedu/pubs/3715.pdf; Robert H. Bowie and Richard H. Immerman, *Waging Peace: How Eisenhower Shaped an Enduring Cold War Strategy* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998).\n100 John Lewis Gaddis, *Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of American National Security Policy during the Cold War* (New York:\nOxford University Press, 2005); Steven Metz, \"Eisenhower and the Planning of American Grand Strategy,\" *Journal of Strategic Studies* 14,\nno. 1 (March 1991): 4971, https://doi.org/10.1080/01402399108437439.\n101 \"Paul Baran and the Origins of the Internet,\" RAND Corporation, accessed November 6, 2019, https://www.rand.org/about/history/\nbaran.html.\n102 Charles Cleveland et al., *Military Strategy in the 21st Century: People, Connectivity and Competition* (New York: Cambria Press, 2018). 103 Paul Baran, *On Distributed Communications* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 1964), available at https://www.rand.org/pubs/\nresearch_memoranda/RM3767.html; Willis H. Ware, Security Controls for Computer Systems: Report of Defense Science Board Task Force on Computer Security (1970; reprint, Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 1979), available at https://www.rand.org/pubs/reports/ R609-1.html.\n104 Ware, *Security Controls for Computer Systems*, vi. 105 Fred Kaplan, \"*WarGames* and Cybersecurity's Debt to a Hollywood Hack,\" *New York Times*, February 19, 2016,\nhttps://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/21/movies/wargames-and-cybersecuritys-debt-to-a-hollywood-hack.html.\n106 \"Films Viewed by President and Mrs. Reagan,\" Ronald Reagan Presidential Library & Museum, https://www.reaganlibrary.gov/sreference/\nfilms-viewed-by-president-and-mrs-reagan.\n107 National Security Decision Directive Number 145, \"National Policy on Telecommunications and Automated Information Systems\nSecurity\" (The White House, September 17, 1984), https://www.reaganlibrary.gov/sites/default/files/archives/reference/scanned-nsdds/ nsdd145.pdf.\n108 *Critical Foundations: Protecting America's Infrastructures: The Report of the President's Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection* (October\n1997), https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=986.\n109 \"U.S. Cyber Command History,\" United States Cyber Command, accessed November 6, 2019, https://www.cybercom.mil/About/History/;\n\"About CISA,\" Cyber Security and Infrastructure Agency, https://www.cisa.gov/about-cisa.\n110 Computer Fraud and Abuse Act of 1986, 18 U.S. Code  1030 (1986); Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999, 15 U.S. Code  6801 (1999);\nFederal Information Security Management Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-347 (2002); Cybersecurity and Information Sharing Act of 2015, Pub L. No. 114-113 (2015).\n111 \"Cyberspace Policy Review: Assuring a Trusted and Resilient Information and Communications Infrastructure\" ([The White House,\nNovember 2009]), https://fas.org/irp/eprint/cyber-review.pdf; \"The National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace\" (The White House, February\n\n## Notes\n\n114 On the concept of stress testing, see Nassim N. Taleb, Elie Canetti, Tidiane Kinda, Elena Loukoianova and Christian Schmieder, \"A New\nHeuristic Measure of Fragility and Tail Risks: Application to Stress Testing\" (IMF Working Paper, International Monetary Fund, 2012), https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2012/wp12216.pdf.\n\n## Strategic Approach: Layered Cyber Deterrence\n\n115 \"Critical Infrastructure Protection, Information Sharing and Cyber Security,\" U.S. Chamber of Commerce, accessed January 23, 2020,\nhttps://www.uschamber.com/issue-brief/critical-infrastructure-protection-information-sharing-and-cyber-security.\n116 Anne-Marie Slaughter, *The Chessboard and the Web: Strategies of Connection in a Networked World* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2017);\nZeev Maoz, Networks of Nations: The Evolution, Structure, and Impact of International Networks, 1816*2001*, Structural Analysis in the Social Sciences 32 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010); Charles Cleveland et al., Military Strategy in the 21st Century: People,\nConnectivity and Competition (New York: Cambria Press, 2018).\n117 Emily Goldman and Michael Warner, \"History of Persistent Engagement and Defend Forward\" (Minutes of U.S. Cyberspace\nSolarium Commission meeting, September 23, 2019); Michael Fischerkeller and Richard Harknett, \"Persistent Engagement, Agreed Competition, Cyberspace Interaction Dynamics, and Escalation\" (Institute for Defense Analyses, May 2018), https://www.ida.org/-/ media/feature/publications/p/pe/persistent-engagement-agreed-competition-cyberspace-interaction-dynamics-and-escalation/d-9076. ashx; Michael Fischerkeller and Richard Harknett, \"What Is Agreed Competition in Cyberspace?,\" *Lawfare*, February 19, 2019, https:// www.lawfareblog.com/what-agreed-competition-cyberspace; Michael Fischerkeller and Richard Harknett, \"Persistent Engagement and Tacit Bargaining: A Path toward Constructing Norms in Cyberspace,\" *Lawfare*, November 9, 2018, https://www.lawfareblog.com/ persistent-engagement-and-tacit-bargaining-path-toward-constructing-norms-cyberspace.\n118 Persistent engagement is how U.S. Cyber Command implements defend forward. It is based on the notion of being in \"constant contact\" with adversaries. It is defined by enabling partners across agencies, as well as in the private sector and international partners, and by acting by defending forward outside of DoD networks. United States Special Operations Command and United States Cyber Command: Hearing before the Senate Armed Services Committee, 116th Congress, 4, 6 (February 14, 2019) (statement of General Paul M. Nakasone, Commander United States Cyber Command); William T. Eliason, \"An Interview with Paul M. Nakasone,\" *Joint Force Quarterly* 92 (1st Quarter 2019): 67.\n119 Continuity of the Economy is an effort to ensure that the critical data and technology would be available, with priority for critical functions\nacross corporations and industry sectors, to get the economy back up and running after a catastrophic event.\n120 U.S. Department of Defense, \"Summary: Department of Defense Cyber Strategy\" (2018), 1, https://media.defense.gov/2018/\nSep/18/2002041658/-1/-1/1/CYBER_STRATEGY_SUMMARY_FINAL.PDF.\n121 Early cyber deterrence literature focused more on within-domain dynamics: see Robert Jervis, \"Some Thoughts on Deterrence in the Cyber\nEra,\" *Journal of Information Warfare* 15, no. 2 (2016): 6673; Nye, \"Deterrence and Dissuasion in Cyberspace,\" 4471; Martin Libicki, Cyberspace in Peace and War (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2016); Aaron Brantly, \"The Cyber Deterrence Problem,\" in CyCon X: Maximising Effects, ed. T. Minarik, R. Jakschis, and L. Lindstrom, 10th International Conference on Cyber Conflict (CyCon) (Tallinn: NATO CCD COE Publications, 2018), 3154; and Thomas Rid, *Cyber War Will Not Take Place* (London: Hurst, 2013). More recent literature focuses on coercion broadly defined and on cross-domain dynamics. For examples, see Erica Borghard and Shawn Lonergan, \"The Logic of Coercion in Cyberspace,\" *Security Studies* 26, no. 3 (2017): 45281; Brandon Valeriano, Benjamin Jensen, and Ryan Maness, Cyber Strategy: The Evolving Character of Power and Coercion (New York: Oxford University Press, 2018); and Erik Gartzke and Jon R. Lindsay,\nConflict (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1980); Thomas C. Schelling, *Arms and Influence* (New Haven: Yale University Press,\n1966).\n125 It is important to note that the notion of deterrence by punishment existed before the nuclear age. See George H. Quester, Deterrence before\nHiroshima: *The Airpower Background of Modern Strategy* (1966; reprint, Piscataway, NJ: Transaction Books, 1986).\n126 For an overview of these debates on the viability of cyber operations as a form of cost imposition, see Valeriano, Jensen, and Maness, Cyber\nStrategy, and Borghard and Lonergan, \"The Logic of Coercion.\"\n127 Snyder, *Deterrence and Defense*, 1415. Also see Daniel Byman and Matthew Waxman, The Dynamics of Coercion: American Foreign Policy\nand the Limits of Military Might (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), and Robert Pape, Bombing to Win: Air Power and Coercion in War (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1996).\n128 John J. Mearsheimer, *Conventional Deterrence* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1985).\n129 Nye, \"Deterrence and Dissuasion in Cyberspace,\" 55. 130 Nye, \"Deterrence and Dissuasion in Cyberspace,\" 58. 131 But see Farrell and Newman for how economic interdependence can become weaponized and support a coercion strategy: Henry Farrell and\nAbraham Newman, \"Domestic Institutions beyond the Nation-State: Charting the New Interdependence Approach,\" *World Politics* 66, no. 2 (2014): 33163.\n132 Nye, \"Deterrence and Dissuasion in Cyberspace,\" 60. See Tannenwald on the nuclear taboo or Price on the chemical weapons taboo: Nina\nTannenwald, *The Nuclear Taboo: The United States and the Non-Use of Nuclear Weapons Since 1945* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007); Richard Price, *The Chemical Weapons Taboo* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2018). Also refer to Tannenwald's more recent work on the strength of the nuclear taboo: Nina Tannenwald, \"How Strong Is the Nuclear Taboo Today?,\" *Washington Quarterly* 41, no. 3 (2018): 89109.\n133 Martin Libicki, *Cyberdeterrence and Cyberwar* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2009), 4142; Jon Lindsay, \"Tipping the Scales: The Attribution\nProblem and the Feasibility of Deterrence against Cyberattack,\" *Journal of Cybersecurity* 1, no. 1 (2015): 5367; Nye, \"Deterrence and Dissuasion in Cyberspace,\" 4952.\n134 Schelling, *Arms and Influence*. 135 Robert Jervis, *The Logic of Images in International Relations* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1970), 18. 136 Borghard and Lonergan, \"The Logic of Coercion\"; Valeriano, Jensen, and Maness, *Cyber Strategy*; Eliason, \"An Interview with Paul M.\nNakasone,\" 4.\n137 Nye, \"Deterrence and Dissuasion in Cyberspace,\" 4950. 138 Brantly, \"The Cyber Deterrence Problem\"; Borghard and Lonergan, \"The Logic of Coercion.\" 139 Libicki, *Cyberdeterrence and Cyberwar*, 56.\n140 Jacquelyn Schneider, \"Deterrence in and through Cyberspace,\" in Gartzke and Lindsay, *Cross-Domain Deterrence*, 95120.\n141 The White House, \"National Security Strategy of the United States of America\" (December 2017), 2, https://www.whitehouse.gov/\nwp-content/uploads/2017/12/NSS-Final-12-18-2017-0905.pdf.\n142 U.S. Department of Defense, \"Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy of the United States of America: Sharpening the American\nMilitary's Competitive Edge\" (January 2018), https://dod.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/2018-National-Defense-Strategy-Sum-\n143 Daniel R. Coats, \"Worldwide Threat Assessment of the US Intelligence Community\" (Office of the Director of National Intelligence,\nFebruary 2018), https://www.dni.gov/files/documents/Newsroom/Testimonies/2018-ATA---Unclassified-SSCI.pdf.\n144 U.S. Cyber Command, \"Achieve and Maintain Cyberspace Superiority: Command Vision for US Cyber Command\" (March 23, 2018),\nhttps://nsarchive2.gwu.edu//dc.html?doc=4421219-United-States-Cyber-Command-Achieve-and-Maintain; DoD, \"Summary: Department of Defense Cyber Strategy\" (2018).\n145 Michael N. Schmitt, \"'Virtual' Disenfranchisement: Cyber Election Meddling in the Grey Zones of International Law,\" Chicago Journal of\nInternational Law 19 (2018): 3067, available at https://ssrn.com/abstract=3180631.\n146 While the term \"gray zone\" is generally associated with conflict, it also applies to the space between the \"black and white\" of traditional\nlegal frameworks, both international and domestic. See Gary P. Corn, \"Cyber National Security: Navigating Gray-Zone Challenges in and through Cyberspace,\" in *Complex Battlespaces: The Law of Armed Conflict and the Dynamics of Modern Warfare*, ed. Winston S. Williams and Christopher M. Ford (New York: Oxford University Press, 2018), 345428.\n147 Michael P. Fischerkeller and Richard J. Harknett, \"Persistent Engagement, Agreed Competition, Cyberspace Interaction Dynamics, and\nEscalation\" (Institute for Defense Analyses, May 2018), https://www.ida.org/-/media/feature/publications/p/pe/persistentengagement-agreed-competition-cyberspace-interaction-dynamics-and-escalation/d-9076.ashx.\n148 DoD, \"Summary: Department of Defense Cyber Strategy\" (2018), 1. 149 As defined in Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Cyberspace Operations*, Joint Publication 3-12 (June 8, 2018), \"The term\n'blue cyberspace' denotes areas in cyberspace protected by the US, its mission partners, and other areas DOD may be ordered to protect,\" while \"'red cyberspace' refers to those portions of cyberspace owned or controlled by an adversary or enemy.\" Finally, \"all cyberspace that does not meet the description of either 'blue' or 'red' is referred to as 'gray' cyberspace\" (I-4, I-5). Prior to the 2018 strategy, defending its networks had been DoD's primary focus; see U.S. Department of Defense, \"Department of Defense Cyber Strategy\" (April 2015), https://archive.defense.gov/home/features/2015/0415_cyber-strategy/final_2015_dod_cyber_strategy_for_web.pdf.\n150 DoD, \"Summary: Department of Defense Cyber Strategy\" (2018), 2. 151 DoD, \"Summary: Department of Defense Cyber Strategy\" (2018), 2. Cyber Command's \"Command Vision\" provides a similar explanation: \"Defending forward as close as possible to the origin of adversary activity extends our reach to expose adversaries' weaknesses, learn their intentions and capabilities, and counter attacks close to their origins\" (6).\n152 John S. McCain National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019, Pub. L. No. 115-232 (hereafter FY2019 NDAA), 132 Stat. 1636\n(2018). Key changes in the FY2019 NDAA include Section 1632, which defines cyber operations as \"traditional military activity,\" and Section 1642, which pre-delegates authority to U.S. Cyber Command to take proportional action in response to active, systematic, and ongoing campaigns by Russian, Chinese, Iranian, and North Korean cyberattacks, as determined by the National Command Authority, and defines these responses as constituting traditional military activities.\n153 For new authorities outlined in NSPM-13, see Hearing to Conduct a Confirmation Hearing on the Expected Nomination of: Honorable Mark\nT  Esper to Be Secretary of Defense, 116th Cong. 3738 (2019) (testimony of the Honorable Mark T. Esper), https://www.armed-services.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/19-59_07-16-19.pdf.\n154 Ellen Nakashima, \"NSA and Cyber Command to Coordinate Actions to Counter Russian Election Interference in 2018 Amid Absence of\nWhite House Guidance,\" *Washington Post*, July 17, 2018, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/nsa-and-\n\n## Reform The U.S. Government's Structure And Organization For Cyberspace\n\n158 Frederick M. Kaiser, *Legislative History of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence* (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service,\nAugust 16, 1978), 2, https://fas.org/sgp/crs/intel/ssci-leghist.pdf.\n159 \"Technology Assessment and Congress,\" Office of Technology Assessment Archive: Provided by the Federation of American Scientists,\n2018, https://ota.fas.org/technology_assessment_and_congress/. Princeton University maintains an Office of Technology Assessment archive that captures and expands upon much of OTA's original work. See \"The OTA Legacy,\" Princeton University, https://www.princeton.edu/~ota/.\n160 The Office of Science and Technology Policy had 58 staff members as of April 2019. The Office of the United States Trade Representative\nhas a staff of over 200 employees. In the 2017 budget, the White House requested 65 employees for the Office of National Drug Control Policy. John F. Sargent Jr. and Dana A. Shea, *Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP): History and Overview*, CRS Report No. R43935\n(Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, updated October 8, 2019), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R43935.pdf; \"About Us,\" Office of the United States Trade Representative, https://ustr.gov/about-us; Robert O'Harrow Jr., \"Meet the 24-Year-Old Trump Campaign Worker Appointed to Help Lead the Government's Drug Policy Office,\" *Washington Post*, January 14, 2018, https://www.washingtonpost.com/investigations/meet-the-24-years-old-trump-campaign-worker-appointed-to-help-lead-the-governmentsdrug-policy-office/2018/01/13/abdada34-f64e-11e7-91af-31ac729add94_story.html.\n161 \"NTSC Supports Bipartisan Legislation to Establish the Cybersecurity Advisory Committee,\" National Technology Security Coalition,\nMarch 28, 2019, https://www.ntsc.org/about-ntsc/press-releases/ntsc-supports-bipartisan-legislation-to-establish-the-cybersecurityadvisory-committee.html.\n162 \"Cybersecurity Supply/Demand Heat Map,\" CyberSeek, Burning Glass, CompTIA, and the National Initiative for Cybersecurity\nEducation, accessed February 18, 2020, https://www.cyberseek.org/heatmap.html.\n163 Kevin Pelphrey, \"Autistic People Can Solve Our Cybersecurity Crisis,\" *Wired*, November 25, 2016, https://www.wired.com/2016/11/\nautistic-people-can-solve-cybersecurity-crisis/.\n164 Exec. Order No. 13870, \"America's Cybersecurity Workforce,\" 84 Fed. Reg. 20523 (May 2, 2019), https://www.federalregister.gov/\ndocuments/2019/05/09/2019-09750/americas-cybersecurity-workforce; Cybersecurity Skills Integration Act of 2019, H.R.1592, 116th Cong. (2019), https://www.congress.gov/bill/116t%C3%A5h-congress/house-bill/1592.\n\n## 165 \"Cybersecurity Supply/Demand Heat Map.\"\n\n166 \"Five Veterans Graduate from Cybersecurity Apprenticeship; 10 Vets to Join Program,\" North Carolina Department of Information\nTechnology, November 15, 2018, https://it.nc.gov/blog/2018/11/15/five-veterans-graduate-cybersecurity-apprenticeship-10-vets-join-program.\n167 \"11 Federal Agencies Help Start Cybersecurity Talent Initiative,\" *FedScoop*, April 9, 2019, https://www.fedscoop.com/\nfederal-cybersecurity-talent-initiative/.\n\n## Strengthen Norms And Non-Military Tools\n\n168 Peter J. Katzenstein, \"Introduction: Alternative Perspectives on National Security,\" in The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in\nWorld Politics, ed. Katzenstein (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), 5. Current widely accepted norms for responsible state behavior in cyberspace are outlined in the 2015 report of the United Nations Group of Governmental Experts on Developments in the Field (July 2016): 447, https://jstor.org/stable/10.5305/amerjintelaw.110.3.0425.\n171 For example, 27 countries signed the Joint Statement on Advancing Responsible State Behavior in Cyberspace, agreeing that \"[t]here must\nbe consequences for bad behavior in cyberspace.\" See \"Joint Statement on Advancing Responsible State Behavior in Cyberspace,\" U.S. Department of State, September 23, 2019, https://www.state.gov/joint-statement-on-advancing-responsible-state-behavior-in-cyberspace/.\n172 Keith Alexander and Jamil Jaffer, \"UN's Cybercrime 'Law' Helps Dictators and Criminals, Not Their Victims,\" *The Hill*, November 26,\n2019, https://thehill.com/opinion/cybersecurity/471897-uns-cybercrime-law-helps-dictators-and-criminals-not-their-victims; Allison Peters, \"Russia and China Are Trying to Set the U.N.'s Rules on Cybercrime,\" *Foreign Policy*, September 16, 2019, https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/09/16/russia-and-china-are-trying-to-set-the-u-n-s-rules-on-cybercrime/.\n173 Ellen Nakashima, \"U.N. Votes to Advance Russian-Led Resolution on a Cybercrime Treaty,\" *Washington Post*, November 19, 2019,\nhttps://washingtonpost.com/national-security/un-votes-to-advance-russian-led-resolution-on-a-cybercrime-treaty/2019/11/19/ fb6a633e-0b06-11ea-97ac-a7ccc8dd1ebc_story.html.\n174 \"In the UN, China Uses Threats and Cajolery to Promote Its Worldview,\" *The Economist*, December 7, 2019, https://www.economist.com/\nchina/2019/12/07/in-the-un-china-uses-threats-and-cajolery-to-promote-its-worldview.\n175 While exact numbers are rare, research published in 2015 estimated the budget for Chinese \"external propaganda\" at $10 billion\nannually, compared to $666 million that the U.S. State Department spent on public diplomacy in FY2014. See David Shambaugh, \"China's Soft-Power Push: The Search for Respect,\" *Foreign Affairs* 94, no. 4 (July/August 2015), https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/ china/2015-06-16/china-s-soft-power-push.\n176 Bonnie Bley, \"The New Geography of Global Diplomacy: China Advances as the United States Retreats,\" *Foreign Affairs*, November 27,\n2019, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2019-11-27/new-geography-global-diplomacy.\n177 Garrett Hinck, \"Private-Sector Initiatives for Cyber Norms: A Summary,\" *Lawfare*, June 25, 2018, https://www.lawfareblog.com/\nprivate-sector-cyber-norm-initiatives-summary.\n178 \"Joint Statement on Advancing Responsible State Behavior in Cyberspace.\"\n\n179 General Assembly Resolution 73/27, \"Developments in the Field of Information and Telecommunications.\" 180 Federal Bureau of Investigation, interviewed by the U.S. Cyberspace Solarium Commission, October 2, 2019. 181 \"Cyber-attacks: Council Is Now Able to Impose Sanctions,\" European Council: Council of the European Union online, May 17, 2019,\nhttps://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2019/05/17/cyber-attacks-council-is-now-able-to-impose-sanctions/.\n182 Jason Healey, John C. Mallery, Klara Tothova Jordan, and Nathaniel V. Youd, \"Confidence-Building Measures in Cyberspace: A\nMultistakeholder Approach for Stability and Security,\" Atlantic Council, November 5, 2014, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/\nin-depth-research-reports/report/confidence-building-measures-in-cyberspace-a-multistakeholder-approach-for-stability-and-security/.\n183 General Assembly Resolution 70/174, \"Group of Governmental Experts on Developments in the Field of Information and\nTelecommunications\"; \"Decision No. 1202: OSCE Confidence-Building Measures to Reduce the Risks of Conflict Stemming from the Use of Information and Communications Technologies,\" Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe Permanent Council, March 10, 2016, available at https://www.osce.org/pc/227281?.\n\n## Promote National Resilience\n\n184 Richard Clarke and Robert Knake, *The Fifth Domain: Defending Our Country, Our Companies, and Ourselves in the Age of Cyber Threats*\n(New York: Penguin Random House, 2019).\n185 Cyber Threats to Our Nation's Critical Infrastructure: Hearing before the Senate Subcommittee on Crime and Terrorism, Committee on the\nJudiciary, 115th Cong. (2018) (statement of Sujit Raman, Associate Deputy Attorney General, Department of Justice), https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/download/08-21-18-raman-testimony.\nCommittee, *DHS Risk Lexicon: 2010 Edition* (U.S. Department of Homeland Security, September 2010), 27,\nhttps://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/dhs-risk-lexicon-2010.pdf.\n\n187 Some sector-specific agenciesand their responsibilities and authoritieshave been codified in law, such as the Department of Energy's in\nthe Fixing America's Surface Transportation Act of 2015, Pub. L. No. 114-94, 129 Stat. 1312 (2015), https://www.congress.gov/114/plaws/publ94/PLAW-114publ94.pdf.\n188 \"DHS Announces Funding Opportunity for Fiscal Year 2019 Preparedness Grants,\" U.S. Department of Homeland Security, April 12,\n2019, https://www.dhs.gov/news/2019/04/12/dhs-announces-funding-opportunity-fiscal-year-2019-preparedness-grants.\n189 See \"Continuity of Operations\" (Federal Emergency Management Agency, accessed October 14, 2019), https://www.fema.gov/pdf/about/\norg/ncp/coop_brochure.pdf, and \"National Security Presidential Directive/NSPD - 51, Homeland Security Presidential Directive/HSPD - 20,\" Federal Emergency Management Agency, May 4, 2007, https://www.fema.gov/txt/about/org/ncp/nspd_51.txt.\n190 Christopher Bailey, \"Networking Emergency Response: Empowering FEMA in the Age of Convergence and Cyber Critical Infrastructure,\"\nNebraska Law Review 96, no. 2 (2017): 50943, https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=3123&context=nlr.\n191 For cyber risk posed by malign actors to water infrastructure that is known by water utility companies, see Judith H. Germano,\n\"Cybersecurity Risk & Responsibility in the Water Sector\" (American Water Works Association, 2019), 79, https://www.awwa.org/ Portals/0/AWWA/Government/AWWACybersecurityRiskandResponsibility.pdf?ver=2018-12-05-123319-013. For current network defense limitations of water utilities, see Robert M. Clark, Srinivas Panguluri, Trent D. Nelson, and Richard P. Wyman, \"Protecting drinking water utilities from cyberthreats\" (Idaho National Labs, February 2, 2017), 1315, https://www.osti.gov/servlets/purl/1372266.\n192 Blake Sobczak, \"Hackers Force Water Utilities to Sink or Swim,\" E&E News, March 28, 2019, https://www.eenews.net/\nstories/1060131769.\n193 Clark, Srinivas, Nelson, and Wyman, \"Protecting Drinking Water Utilities from Cyberthreats,\" 1315. 194 For attempted breaches by Russia: \"Alert (TA18-074A): Russian Government Cyber Activity Targeting Energy and Other Critical\nInfrastructure Sectors,\" U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency, March 15, 2018, https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA18-074A. For attempted breaches by others: Germano, \"Cybersecurity Risk & Responsibility in the Water Sector,\" 79.\n195 See \"Homeland Security Presidential Directive 7: Critical Infrastructure Identification, Prioritization, and Protection,\" U.S.\nDepartment of Homeland Security, Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency, December 17, 2003, https://www.cisa.gov/ homeland-security-presidential-directive-7.\n196 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, \"National Cyber Incident Response Plan\" (December 2016), https://www.us-cert.gov/sites/default/\nfiles/ncirp/National_Cyber_Incident_Response_Plan.pdf.\n197 DHS, \"National Cyber Incident Response Plan.\" 198 A primary lesson learned from the ransomware attack that impacted Colorado's Department of Transportation was the need to exercise\npreestablished response plans. \"CDOT Cyber Incident: After-Action Report\" (Colorado Division of Homeland Security and Emergency Management, July 17, 2018), available at https://www.colorado.gov/pacific/dhsem/news/after-action-report-released-cdot-cyber-incident.\n203 Information gleaned from interviews with National Guard units and from Monica M. Ruiz and David Forscey, \"The Hybrid Benefits of the\nNational Guard,\" *Lawfare*, July 23, 2019, https://www.lawfareblog.com/hybrid-benefits-national-guard.\n204 One Guardsman told us that in the midst of responding to a cyber incident, lawyers halted his unit's activities until all members could sign\nmemorandums of understanding (MOUs) with the affected entities to clarify liability exemptions.\n205 Daniel R. Coats, \"Statement for the Record: Worldwide Threat Assessment of the US Intelligence Community,\" Office of the Director\nof National Intelligence, January 29, 2019, https://www.odni.gov/files/ODNI/documents/2019-ATA-SFR---SSCI.pdf; David E. Sanger, \"'Chaos Is the Point': Russian Hackers and Trolls Grow Stealthier in 2020,\" *New York Times*, January 10, 2020, https://www.nytimes.com/ 2020/01/10/us/politics/russia-hacking-disinformation-election.html.\n206 Robby Mook, Matt Rhoades, and Eric Rosenbach, \"Cybersecurity Campaign Playbook,\" Belfer Center for Science and International\nAffairs, Harvard Kennedy School, November 2017, https://www.belfercenter.org/CyberPlaybook#vulnerable; Nicole Perlroth and David\nSanger, \"Iranian Hackers Target Trump Campaign as Threats to 2020 Mount,\" *New York Times*, October 4, 2019, https://www.nytimes. com/2019/10/04/technology/iranian-campaign-hackers-microsoft.html.\n207 Claire Allbright, \"A Russian Facebook Page Organized a Protest in Texas: A Different Russian Page Launched\nthe Counterprotest,\" *Texas Tribune*, November 1, 2017, https://www.texastribune.org/2017/11/01/ russian-facebook-page-organized-protest-texas-different-russian-page-l/.\n208 Allbright, \"A Russian Facebook Page Organized a Protest in Texas.\" 209 \"Exposing Russia's Effort to Sow Discord Online: The Internet Research Agency and Advertisements,\" U.S. House of Representatives\nPermanent Select Committee on Intelligence, accessed December 11, 2019, https://intelligence.house.gov/social-media-content/.\n210 Natasha Singer, \"'Weaponized Ad Technology': Facebook's Moneymaker Gets a Critical Eye,\" *New York Times*, August 16, 2018,\nhttps://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/16/technology/facebook-microtargeting-advertising.html.\n211 \"How Social Media Companies Are Failing to Combat Inauthentic Behaviour Online | StratCom,\" accessed December 11, 2019,\nhttps://www.stratcomcoe.org/how-social-media-companies-are-failing-combat-inauthentic-behaviour-online.\n212 Rush Doshi, \"China Steps Up Its Information War in Taiwan,\" *Foreign Affairs*, January 9, 2019, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/\nchina/2020-01-09/china-steps-its-information-war-taiwan; Emily Feng, \"Taiwan Gets Tough on Disinformation Suspected from China Ahead of Elections,\" National Public Radio, December 6, 2019, https://www.npr.org/2019/12/06/784191852/taiwan-gets-tough-ondisinformation-suspected-from-china-ahead-of-elections; Harry Krejsa, \"Under Pressure: The Growing Reach of Chinese Influence Campaigns in Democratic Societies\" (Center for a New American Security, April 27, 2018), available at https://www.cnas.org/publications/ reports/under-pressure.\n213 Herbert Lin, Alex Stamos, Nate Persily, and Andrew Grotto, \"Increasing the Security of the U.S. Election Infrastructure,\" in Securing\nAmerican Elections: Prescriptions for Enhancing the Integrity and Independence of the 2020 U S  Presidential Election and Beyond, ed. Michael McFaul (Stanford: Stanford Cyber Policy Center, Freeman Spogli Institute, June 6, 2019), 1726, available at https://fsi.stanford.edu/news/ securing-american-elections-report-offers-policy-road-map.\n218 Suzanne Spaulding, Devi Nair, and Arthur Nelson, \"Beyond the Ballot: How the Kremlin Works to Undermine the U.S. Justice System\"\n(Center for Strategic and International Studies, May 2019), 4, https://csis-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/publication/190430_ RussiaUSJusticeSystem_v3_WEB_FULL.pdf.\n\n## 219 \"Exposing Russia's Effort To Sow Discord Online.\"\n\n220 Kurt Thomas and Angelika Moscicki, \"New Research: How Effective Is Basic Account Hygiene at Preventing Hacking,\" Google Security\nBlog, May 17, 2019, https://security.googleblog.com/2019/05/new-research-how-effective-is-basic.html.\n\n## Reshape The Cyber Ecosystem Towards Greater Security\n\n221 The early markets for internet and connected technologies rewarded first movers and did not punish insecurity in products, giving rise to\na deeply ingrained culture of prioritizing speed to market over securitya misalignment of market incentives that persists today. See, for\nexample, Craig Timberg, \"A Flaw in the Design: The Internet's Founders Saw Its Promise But Didn't Foresee Users Attacking One Another,\" Washington Post, May 30, 2015, https://www.washingtonpost.com/sf/business/2015/05/30/net-of-insecurity-part-1/ ?utm_term=.55c95fc02ab8, and Commission on Enhancing National Cybersecurity, *Report on Securing and Growing the Digital Economy* (December 1, 2016), 7, 2526, https://www.nist.gov/system/files/documents/2016/12/02/cybersecurity-commission-report-final-post.pdf.\n222 \"Implementing a certification and labeling program that follows a consensus security capabilities baseline represents a single government\naction that can simultaneously build awareness about secure products, foster innovation, and improve security throughout the internet ecosystem, without the need for direct regulation.\" Mark Peterson, \"Creating a Cybersecurity 'Energy Star,'\" *Public Knowledge*, July 20, 2018, https://www.publicknowledge.org/blog/creating-a-cybersecurity-energy-star/.\n223 Several nongovernmental initiatives, such as Digital Standard and the Cyber Independent Testing Laboratory, are aimed at testing and\nproviding security information for consumer IT and IoT devices. NIST, under Section 401 of the Cybersecurity Enhancement Act of 2014, is tasked with coordinating the development and dissemination of standards and best practices for cybersecurity.\n224 Certifications are review processes that certify that a product meets the standards to which it is tested; labels are clear, visual, and easy to\nunderstand symbols that convey specific information about a product's attributes, characteristics, functionality, components, or other features.\n225 Allan Friedman, \"Moving toward a More Transparent Software Supply Chain,\" U.S. Department of Commerce, National\nTelecommunications and Information Administration, September 30, 2019, https://www.ntia.doc.gov/blog/2019/ moving-toward-more-transparent-software-supply-chain.\n226 U.S. Department of Commerce, NTIA [National Telecommunications and Information Administration] Standards and Formats Working\nGroup, \"Draft White Paper\" [on Software Bill of Materials Standards] (June 25, 2019), https://www.ntia.doc.gov/files/ntia/publications/ ntia_sbom_formats_draft_whitepaper_06.25.pdf.\n227 \"Secure by Default,\" U.K. National Cyber Security Centre, March 7, 2018, https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/information/secure-default. 228 The President's National Infrastructure Advisory Council made a similar recommendation to test the security of critical technologies.\nPresident's National Infrastructure Advisory Council, \"Transforming the U.S. Cyber Threat Partnership\" (December 12, 2019), 11, https://www.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/publications/NIAC-Working-Group-Report-DRAFT-508.pdf.\n229 Open-source software forms the basis for most software written and deployed today. One survey found that 96 percent of applications contain open-source components (Zeljka Zorz, \"The Percentage of Open Source Code in Proprietary Apps Is Rising,\" Help Net Security, May\n231 Trey Herr, \"Countering the Proliferation of Malware: Targeting the Vulnerability Lifecycle\" (Belfer Center for Science and\nInternational Affairs, Harvard Kennedy School, June 2017), https://www.belfercenter.org/sites/default/files/files/publication/ CounteringProliferationofMalware.pdf.\n232 Frank Li and Vern Paxson, \"A Large-Scale Empirical Study of Security Patches\" (University of California, Berkeley, and International\nComputer Science Institute, 2017), https://www.icir.org/vern/papers/patch-study.ccs17.pdf.\n233 Karen Mercedes Goertzel, \"Legal Liability for Bad Software,\" CrossTalk, 2016, https://www.researchgate.net/publication/\n310674753_Legal_liability_for_bad_software.\n234 For example, as long as a vendor or assembler is providing usability updates and bug fixes for a given product or service, it must also provide\nsecurity updates.\n235 See \"The National Vulnerability Database,\" National Institute of Standards and Technology, updated December 2019, https://nvd.nist.gov/;\n\"Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures,\" MITRE, updated December 17, 2019, https://cve.mitre.org/.\n236 See NTIA Safety Working Group, \"Coordinated Vulnerability Disclosure 'Early Stage' Template and Discussion\" (November 14, 2016),\nhttps://www.ntia.doc.gov/files/ntia/publications/safetywg_draft_11-04-16_clean.pdf, and Allen D. Householder, Garret Wassermann, Art Manion, and Chris King, *The CERT Guide to Coordinated Vulnerability Disclosure* (Carnegie Mellon University, Software Engineering Institute, August 2017), https://resources.sei.cmu.edu/asset_files/SpecialReport/2017_003_001_503340.pdf.\n237 Verizon, *2015 Data Breach Investigations Report* (April 15, 2015), 15, https://cybersecurity.idaho.gov/wp-content/uploads/sites/87/2019/04/\ndata-breach-investigation-report_2015.pdf.\n238 The required information on cyber incidents could include the type of incident, method of compromise, bill of materials of affected\nsystems, vulnerability or vulnerabilities revealed by the incident (if applicable), and the consequences of the incident.\n239 \"Cyber incidents\" should be defined to include events that result in a significant loss of data, system availability, or control of systems;\nimpact a large number of victims; indicate unauthorized access to, or malicious software present on, critical information technology systems; affect critical infrastructure or core government functions; or threaten national security, economic security, or public health and safety.\n240 National Association of Insurance Commissioners, \"State Insurance Regulation: History, Purpose and Structure\" (accessed September 10,\n2019), 3, https://www.naic.org/documents/consumer_state_reg_brief.pdf.\n241 Sasha Romanosky, Lillian Ablon, Andreas Kuehn, and Therese Jones, \"Content Analysis of Cyber Insurance Policies: How Do Carriers Price\nCyber Risk?,\" *Journal of Cybersecurity* 5, no. 1 (2019): 13, https://academic.oup.com/cybersecurity/article/5/1/tyz002/5366419.\n242 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Cyber Incident Data and Analysis Working Group, \"Overcoming Perceived Obstacles to\nSharing into a Cyber Incident Data Repository\" (December 2015), https://www.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/publications/Overcoming%20 Perceived%20Obstacles%20White%20Paper_1.pdf.\n243 Further Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2020, Pub. L. No. 116-94 (2019), https://www.congress.gov/bill/116th-congress/\nhouse-bill/1865/text.\n244 \"Cybersecurity Insurance,\" Department of Homeland Security, February 17, 2016, https://www.dhs.gov/cybersecurity-insurance. 245 \"Estimated Value of Cyber Insurance Premiums Written Worldwide from 2014 to 2020,\" Statista, August 9, 2019,\nhttps://www.statista.com/statistics/533314/estimated-cyber-insurance-premiums/.\n246 \"Global Commercial Insurance Market to Grow $170B in P/C Premium by 2021: Aon Inpoint,\" *Insurance Journal*, June 18, 2018,\n249 The Binding Operational Directives (BODs) identify requirements for federal agencies in the executive branch. Each BOD prescribes a set\nof actions that agency chief information security officers or their equivalents must take to manage their enterprise networks.\n250 Donna Dodson, Murgiah Soppaya, and Karen Scarfone, \"Mitigating the Risk of Software Vulnerabilities by Adopting a Secure Software\nDevelopment Framework\" (National Institute of Standards and Technology, 2019), https://csrc.nist.gov/CSRC/media/Publications/ white-paper/2019/06/07/mitigating-risk-of-software-vulnerabilities-with-ssdf/draft/documents/ssdf-for-mitigating-risk-of-softwarevulns-draft.pdf.\n251 International Organization for Standardization, \"ISO/IEC 27001 Information Security Management\" International Organization for\nStandardization, https://www.iso.org/isoiec-27001-information-security.html\n252 \"NTIA Software Component Transparency,\" National Telecommunications and Information Administration, September 5, 2019,\nhttps://www.ntia.doc.gov/SoftwareTransparency.\n253 Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002), https://www.congress.gov/107/plaws/publ204/\nPLAW-107publ204.pdf.\n254 Securities and Exchange Commission, \"Commission Statement and Guidance on Public Company Cybersecurity Disclosures\" (February\n26, 2018), https://www.sec.gov/rules/interp/2018/33-10459.pdf.\n255 The desired metric (in minutes) for the detection, investigation, and remediation of cyber breaches is 1-10-60. For more information, see\nRobert Lemos, \"Most Companies Lag Behind '1-10-60' Benchmark for Breach Response,\" Dark Reading, November 19, 2019, https://www.darkreading.com/threat-intelligence/most-companies-lag-behind-1-10-60-benchmark-for-breach-response/d/d-id/1336401.\n256 Cloud-based services deliver computing services over the internet (\"the cloud\") through a third-party provider rather than through capital\ninvestment in building and maintaining data centers. According to NIST, \"Cloud computing is a model for enabling convenient, on-demand network access to a shared pool of configurable computing resources (e.g., networks, servers, storage, applications, and services) that can be rapidly provisioned and released with minimal management effort or service provider interaction\"; \"NIST Cloud Computing Program - NCCP,\" NIST, updated July 9, 2019, https://www.nist.gov/programs-projects/nist-cloud-computing-program-nccp. For more information, see Navdeep Aggarwal, Parshant Tyagi, Bhanu P. Dubey, and Emmanuel S. Pilli, \"Cloud Computing: Data Storage Security Analysis and Its Challenges,\" *International Journal of Computer Applications* 70, no. 24 (May 2013): 3337, https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/\n4c74/46c1b97ff8947166e02cf3f465022a4d13c3.pdf; \"What Is Cloud Computing? A Beginner's Guide,\" Microsoft Azure, 2020, https:// azure.microsoft.com/en-us/overview/what-is-cloud-computing/; and \"What Is Cloud Computing?,\" Google Cloud, accessed February 3, 2020, https://cloud.google.com/what-is-cloud-computing/.\n257 For example, cloud computing strengthens data backup and lessens the impact of disaster recovery because data is stored independently on\nthe third-party provider's data center.\n258 \"What Is Cloud Computing,\" Microsoft Azure. 259 Palo Alto Networks, \"Cloud Threat Report: Putting the Sec in DevOps,\" Palo Alto Networks, 2020, https://start.paloaltonetworks.com/\nunit-42-cloud-threat-report?CampaignId=7010g000001J2yiAAC&referer=null&utm_medium=direct-mail&utm_source= Unit+42+Cloud+Threat+Risk+Report%3A+Cloudy+with+a+Chance+of+Entropy. Research, November 27, 2017), https://451research.com/images/Marketing/press_releases/Pre_Re-Invent_2018_press_release_final_11_22.pdf.\n264 Timberg, \"A Flaw in the Design.\"\n265 The President's National Infrastructure Advisory Council made a similar recommendation to encourage broader implementation of security\nmeasures. President's National Infrastructure Advisory Council, \"Transforming the U.S. Cyber Threat Partnership,\" 10.\n266 Jason Healey and Robert Knake, \"Zero Botnets,\" *Council on Foreign Relations* (2018), https://www.cfr.org/sites/default/files/report_pdf/\nCSR83_HealeyKnake_Botnets_0.pdf.\n267 Joy Ma and Tim Matthews, \"The Underground Bot Economy: How Bots Impact the Global Economy,\" *Imperva Incapsula*, 2016,\nhttp://incapsula.com/blog/how-bots-impact-global-economy.html.\n268 International Cybercrime Prevention Act of 2018, S. 3288, 115th Cong. (2018), https://www.congress.gov/bill/115th-congress/\nsenate-bill/3288/text.\n269 U.S. Department of Justice, *Report of the Attorney General's Cyber Digital Task Force* (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice, July 2,\n2018), 124, https://www.justice.gov/ag/page/file/1076696/download.\n270 \"Two International Cybercriminal Rings Dismantled and Eight Defendants Indicted for Causing Tens of Millions of Dollars in Losses in\nDigital Advertising Fraud,\" press release, United States Attorney's Office, Eastern District of New York, November 27, 2018, https://www.justice.gov/usao-edny/pr/two-international-cybercriminal-rings-dismantled-and-eight-defendants-indicted-causing.\n271 \"Two International Cybercriminal Rings Dismantled.\" 272 \"About Us,\" National Cyber-Forensics and Training Alliance, accessed January 20, 2020, https://www.ncfta.net/home-2/about-us/. 273 \"Two International Cybercriminal Rings Dismantled.\" 274 Jared T. Brown and Moshe Schwartz, \"The Defense Production Act of 1950: History, Authorities, and Considerations for Congress\"\n(Congressional Research Service, updated November 20, 2018), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R43767.pdf.\n275 The Office of the Director of National Intelligence noted this vulnerability and made addressing it a strategic objective in \"National\nCounterintelligence Strategy of the United States of America, 20202022\" (February 2020), 7, https://www.dni.gov/files/NCSC/ documents/features/20200205-National_CI_Strategy_2020_2022.pdf.\n276 National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2020, Pub. L. No. 116-92 (2019), https://www.congress.gov/bill/116th-congress/\nsenate-bill/1790/text.\n277 \"Information and Communications Technology Supply Chain Risk Management Task Force,\" Department of Homeland Security, accessed\nJanuary 10, 2020, https://www.cisa.gov/information-and-communications-technology-ict-supply-chain-risk-management-scrm-task-force.\n278 This aggregated information relating to supply chains would include classified and unclassified information, threat information, and proprietary and sensitive information (e.g., software transparency and software bill of materials).\n279 In the 2020 National Defense Authorization Act, Congress created a Supply Chain and Counterintelligence Risk Management Task Force\nto \"standardize information sharing between the intelligence community and the acquisition community of the United States Government with respect to the supply chain and counterintelligence risks\" ( 6306(b)).\n280 Robert D. Hof, \"Lessons from Sematech,\" *MIT Technology Review*, July 25, 2011, https://www.technologyreview.com/s/424786/\nlessons-from-sematech/.\n281 Altaf H. (Tof) Carim, William T. (Tim) Polk, and Erin Szulman, \"Realizing the Potential of Quantum Information Science and\nAdvancing High-Performance Computing,\" The White House, July 26, 2016, https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/blog/2016/07/26/ realizing-potential-quantum-information-science-and-advancing-high-performance.\n284 National Security Telecommunications Advisory Committee (NSTAC), \"NSTAC Report to the President on a Cybersecurity Moonshot\"\n(November 14, 2018), ES-1, ES-2, https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/NSTAC_CyberMoonshotReport_508c.pdf.\n285 NSTAC, \"NSTAC Report to the President,\" 10. 286 \"Most Profitable,\" *Fortune*, accessed September 30, 2019, https://fortune.com/fortune500/2019/search/; \"Cyberstates,\" CompTIA, accessed\nOctober 2, 2019, https://www.cyberstates.org/.\n287 The requirements of a data breach notification law are not to be confused with statistical data gathering associated with the cyber incident\nreporting discussed earlier in this section or those of the \"National Cyber Incident Reporting Law\" advocated in the following pillar (recommendation 5.2.2).\n288 \"2019 Security Breach Legislation,\" National Conference of State Legislatures, July 26, 2019, http://www.ncsl.org/research/\ntelecommunications-and-information-technology/2019-security-breach-legislation.aspx.\n289 Arne Holst, \"Number of iPhone Users in the United States from 2012 to 2021,\" Statista, September 13, 2019, https://www.statista.com/\nstatistics/232790/forecast-of-apple-users-in-the-us/; J. Clement, \"Number of Daily Active WhatsApp Status Users from 1st Quarter 2017 to 1st Quarter 2019,\" Statista, August 9, 2019, https://www.statista.com/statistics/730306/whatsapp-status-dau/.\n290 David Kaye, \"Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of the Right to Freedom of Opinion and Expression,\"\nUN Human Rights Council, A/HRC/29/32 (May 22, 2015), available at https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/798709?ln=en.\n\n## Operationalize Cybersecurity Collaboration With The Private Sector\n\n291 \"Exec. Order No. 13636: Improving Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity,\" 78 Fed. Reg. 11739, 11740 (Feb. 12, 2013),\nhttps://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2013/02/19/2013-03915/improving-critical-infrastructure-cybersecurity.\n292 The U.S. government recognizes critical entities through a process designated under Section 9 of Executive Order 13636, but this designation neither affords the U.S. government new responsibilities, authorities, resources, or funding to assist these entities nor establishes requirements for such entities in light of their criticality to U.S. national security, economic security, and public health and safety.\n293 The President's National Infrastructure Advisory Council detailed a similar recommendation to make cyber intelligence more actionable.\nPresident's National Infrastructure Advisory Council, \"Transforming the U.S. Cyber Threat Partnership\" (December 12, 2019), 8, https:// www.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/publications/NIAC-Working-Group-Report-DRAFT-508.pdf.\n294 Examples of current voluntary network monitoring and threat detection programs include the Department of Energy's Cybersecurity Risk\nInformation Sharing Program, Cyber Analytics Tools and Techniques Pilot, the Department of Homeland Security's CyberSentry, and law\nenforcement consent and monitoring programs.\n295 Working with the DoD Chief Information Officer and NSA, U.S. Cyber Command developed the Pathfinder initiative alongside DHS,\nsector-specific agencies, and select critical infrastructure partners to share threat information, conduct collaborative analysis of vulnerabilities and threats, and mitigate those risks. U.S. Cyber Command's efforts in this field occur at the request of and in collaboration with federal government partners, particularly DHS and the FBI.\n296 \"U.S. Department of Energy, U.S. Department of Homeland Security, and U.S. Department of Defense Announce Pathfinder\nInitiative to Protect U.S. Energy Critical Infrastructure,\" U.S. Department of Energy, February 2020, https://www.energy.gov/articles/ us-department-energy-us-department-homeland-security-and-us-department-defense-announce.\n\n## Preserve And Employ The Military Instruments Of Power\n\n297 Defend forward, as the Commission defines it, entails proactively observing, pursuing, and countering adversary operations and imposing costs in day-to-day competition to disrupt and defeat ongoing malicious adversary cyber campaigns, deter future campaigns, and reinforce favorable international norms of behavior, using all of the instruments of national power. This is a reimagining and expansion of the defend forward concept as initially conceived of in the 2018 DoD Cyber Strategy, which focuses solely on the military\ninstrument. U.S. Department of Defense, \"Summary: Department of Defense Cyber Strategy\" (2018), https://media.defense.gov/2018/\nSep/18/2002041658/-1/-1/1/CYBER_STRATEGY_SUMMARY_FINAL.PDF.\n\n298 *United States Special Operations Command and United States Cyber Command: Hearing before the Senate Armed Services Committee*, 116th\nCongress, 4 (February 14, 2019) (statement of General Paul M. Nakasone, Commander United States Cyber Command).\n299 William T. Eliason, \"An Interview with Paul M. Nakasone,\" *Joint Forces Quarterly* 92 (1st Quarter 2019): 67. 300 DoD, \"Summary: Department of Defense Cyber Strategy\" (2018), 1. 301 U.S. Department of Defense Directive 5100.03, \"Support of the Headquarters of Combatant and Subordinate Unified Commands\"\n(February 9, 2011; incorporating Change 1, September 7, 2017), https://www.esd.whs.mil/Portals/54/Documents/DD/issuances/ dodd/510003p.pdf.\n302 \"U.S. Cyber Command Shares 11 New Malware Samples,\" *CISA,* September 8, 2019, https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/currentactivity/2019/09/08/us-cyber-command-shares-11-new-malware-samples; \"@CYBERCOM_Malware_Alert,\" VirusTotal, accessed February 12, 2020, https://www.virustotal.com/en/user/CYBERCOM_Malware_Alert/.\n303 As defined in Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Cyberspace Operations*, Joint Publication 3-12 (June 8, 2018), \"The term\n'blue cyberspace' denotes areas in cyberspace protected by the US, its mission partners, and other areas DOD may be ordered to protect,\" while \"'red cyberspace' refers to those portions of cyberspace owned or controlled by an adversary or enemy.\" Finally, \"all cyberspace that does not meet the description of either 'blue' or 'red' is referred to as 'gray' cyberspace\" (I-4, I-5). These are distinctly U.S. terms of reference; as part of an effective defend forward strategy in the future, the United States must come to a shared understanding of blue, gray, and red space with allied and partner countries.\n304 As DoD begins to use and incorporate emerging technology, such as artificial intelligence (AI), into its weapon platforms and systems,\ncybersecurity will also need to be incorporated into the early stages of the acquisition process.\n305 \"Weapon Systems Cybersecurity: DOD Just Beginning to Grapple with Scale of Vulnerabilities,\" GAO-19-128 (U.S. Government\nAccountability Office, October 2018), 28, https://www.gao.gov/assets/700/694913.pdf.\n306 This recommendation applies to the DIB, defined as \"[t]he Department of Defense, government, and private sector worldwide industrial\ncomplex with capabilities to perform research and development and design, produce, and maintain military weapon systems, subsystems, components, or parts to meet military requirements.\" This recommendation does not include entities such as Defense Critical Infrastructure (DCI), defined as \"Department of Defense and non-Department of Defense networked assets and facilities essential to project, support, and sustain military forces and operations worldwide.\" Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms (January 2020), 59, https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/pubs/dictionary.pdf.\n307 \"Strengthening the Front Line: NSA Launches New Cybersecurity Directorate,\" National Security Agency/Central\nSecurity Service, October 1, 2019, https://www.nsa.gov/News-Features/News-Stories/Article-View/Article/1973871/ strengthening-the-front-line-nsa-launches-new-cybersecurity-directorate/.\n308 Frank Arute et al., \"Quantum Supremacy Using a Programmable Superconducting Processor,\" *Nature* 574 (October 24, 2019): 505,\nhttps://www.nature.com/articles/s41586-019-1666-5.pdf.\n309 Lamont Wood, \"The Clock Is Ticking for Encryption,\" Computerworld, March 21, 2011,\nhttps://www.computerworld.com/article/2550008/the-clock-is-ticking-for-encryption.html.\n310 Elsa B. Kania and John K. Costello, \"Quantum Hegemony? China's Ambitions and the Challenge to U.S. Innovation Leadership\" (Center\nfor a New American Security, September 2018), available at https://www.cnas.org/publications/reports/quantum-hegemony."
    },
    {
        "text": "# The Cia Midwest Depot And The U.S. Army Camp Stanley Storage Activity Version Of 2022-01-04\n\nSummary:  The U.S. Army operates an arms depot near San Antonio, Texas called the Camp Stanley Storage Activity (CSSA).  In 2011, it emerged that the CIA had a presence there.  There are some indications, though not conclusive ones, that CSSA may be the site of a facility called Midwest Depot that the CIA has used for clandestine accumulation and dissemination of arms and other materiel to various parties from at least the early 1960s through 2001, probably through 2015 and likely later.  The facilities at Camp Stanley underwent steady expansion in the first twenty years of this century, adding a variety of new buildings totaling over 15, 000 square meters (160,000 square feet) in floor space. Comment: If the CSSA, established in 1949, has always been the cover for Midwest Depot, then the covert facility dates to the earliest days of the CIA and, speculatively, may have been created to provide an arms channel to resistance groups in Soviet-occupied Eastern Europe and elsewhere.  See, e.g.,  The Use of Covert Paramilitary Activity as a Policy Tool: An Analysis of Operations Conducted by the United States Central Intelligence Agency, 1949-1951 by Major D. H. Berger, USMC (www.fas.org/irp/eprint/berger.htm)\n\n## Midwest Depot And Cia Presence At Camp Stanley\n\nComment: The limited amount of material available and  presented below never refers to \"the\" Midwest Depot, but rather to \"a\" Midwest depot or, at most, Midwest Depot.  This terminology causes a certain amount of ambiguity as to whether there is one or possibly several depots.  Assuming that there is only one, the ambiguity may have been introduced deliberately as a part of the facility's cover plan.\n\n# (Sanitized) Airborne Tests At Midwest Depot\n\nDocument Type: CREST [1] Collection:   General CIA Records [2] Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78-03642A001200010020-5 Release Decision: RIPPUB Original Classification: S Document Page Count: 1 Document Creation Date:  December 22, 2016 Document Release Date:  May 9, 2011 Sequence Number: 20 Case Number: Publication Date: January 17, 1959 Content Type: MEMO File:\n\nAttachment\nSize\n\n CIA-RDP78-03642A001200010020-5.pdf [3] 46.8 KB\nBody: Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/09: CIA-RDP78-03642A001200010020-5 WA%MNMI CONFIDENTIAL\"' ~' - ~8 a A- `,LsRPr ~~Iprii 1 iii I} Y M1NIr root Dlraetsr ag t.i1M . IQS?ZCTs 11V7 25X1 1. Tb. D s*stia is bo&t .sUbft0bwd $ 00 25X1 tt dsria; Aug\" \"f1 aad, after that qon. sold PION W 110 WOONAW\" air ssppsrrt de aerial \"very tests. The lt?M test 25X1 Source URL: https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/document/cia-rdp78-03642a001200010020-5 Links [1] https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/document-type/crest [2] https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/collection/general-cia-records [3] https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP78-03642A001200010020-5.pdf Comment: The term \"Midwest Depot\" has apparently been redacted from the actual document (next page). Note: Other declassified CIA documents indicate that ED-188B was equipment for air-drop delivery of materiel by cargo aircraft.  Airborne delivery of materiel is an activity that has been associated with Camp Stanley at least through 2015. On October 26, 1967, Donovan Pratt of *[the CIA's]* CI R&A *[Counter-Intelligence Research & Analysis]* sent a Memorandum to C/WH/COG *[Chief, Western Hemisphere Division]* (Cuban Operation Group) the Subject of which was \"Garrison Investigation: Belle Chasse Training Camp: \"A recently published booklet concerning the Garrison case and entitled Plot or Politics? was written by States-Item reporters Rosemary James and Jack Wardlaw. The following appears on page 49: 'Meanwhile, Executive Assistant DA Alvin Oser...came across a third training camp near Belle Chasse, Louisiana.\" Pratt wanted to know everything about this site. This memo was routed to DAVID PHILLIPS who drafted this reply: WH/C 67-336 MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, CI/R & A SUBJECT: Garrison Investigation: Belle Chasse Training Camp REFERENCE: CI/ R & A Memorandum Dated October 26, 1967 1. Listed below us the information pertaining to the Belle Chasse training camp which was requested in reference memorandum. a. The training site was activated on February 18, 1961 and the first group of trainees arrived on February 18, 1961. b. The site was located eight miles from New Orleans at the U.S. Naval Ammunition Depot which had been inactive for five years. c. The site covered 3,500 acres of marshlands adjoining the Mississippi River. The depot consisted of ammunition magazines storage areas, warehouses, various frame and brick buildings, many miles of interlocking railroad tracks and both hard surface and improved roads and the entire site was enclosed by a chain link fence. Since much of the terrain was unaccessible and unsuitable for training purposes, due to the marshy ground and poisonous reptiles, a limited area was used for actual training purposes. This area was located where the activity could neither be heard no observed.\n\n## The Base Closed On April 21, 1961, And The Training Site Was Completely Sterilized By Base And Cleared Navy Personnel After All Demolition, Ammunition, Ordnance Items, And Field Equipment Was Sterilized And Air-Lifted To A Midwest Depot. Material On Loan From The Military Was Restored To Original Condition And Returned To The Appropriate Military Component.\n\ne. Approximately 300 Cubans were trained at the site over a six week period. The only known list of trainees which was available at Headquarters has not been located to date. A search has been initiated for this list. [deletia] h. The training camp was entirely Agency controlled and the training was conducted by Agency personnel. [deletia] Signed DAVID PHILLIPS Chief, WH/COG\n\n[pages 2 and 3 omitted]\n\n[Comment: The capitalized use of \"Base\" and the title \"Base Chief\" may indicate that the Belle Chasse facility had the organizational status of CIA Bases in foreign countries.  These entities, headed by a Chief of Base, are at an administrative level below CIA Stations and are most often used for logistical and general support of Agency operations.  At least one Base has existed on US territory, in New York City(*).  Of possible relevance to Camp Stanley is the fact that former CIA officer Kevin Shipp refers to it as \"the base\" and his superior there as \"the chief of the base.\" See deposition excerpts below. (*) http://www.foia.cia.gov/sites/default/files/document_conversions/1705143/AERODYNAMIC %20%20%20VOL.%2032%20%20%28OPERATIONS%29_0042.pdf Deputy Director of Special Projects (DDSP) Department of Defense (DOD) - Camp Stanley Storage Activity (CSSA) Jun 2001 - Sep 2004  3 years 4 months\n\n## Boerne\n\nDeputy Director of Special Projects, Camp Stanley Storage Activity, Boerne, Texas. Assumed position in June 2001. Deputy Senior Civilian Manager of the facility. Responsible for day to day oversight of Base operational activity and requirements. Served as the Base Chief Operating Officer (COO). Base is a U.S. Army Ammunition/Armament Storage Depot supporting world-wide ordnance requirements in the battle against terrorism and other Department of Defense objectives. Instrumental in leading and supporting the prosecution of the War on Terrorism after 09/11 C/Logistics\n\n## Government\n\n1989 - 2004  15 years https://www.whitepages.com/name/Jason-Embry/TX\n[Accessed 2021-10-22]\n]\nhttps://s3.amazonaws.com/s3.documentcloud.org/documents/1150048/cia-c4memo.pdf Comment: It seems possible that \"Mr. Rodriguez\" was Felix Rodriguez. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/F%C3%A9lix_Rodr%C3%ADguez_%28soldier%29 Comment: 300,000 2 12 lb blocks of C-4 amount to 375 tons of the explosive. C-4, pound for pound, is about 1/3 more powerful than TNT, so the explosive power of  C-4 at Midwest Depot in late 1963 was about half a kiloton TNT equivalent The War Business The International Trade in Armaments By George Thayer New York: Simon & Schuster 1970 In 1962 Interarms and AFAC were together included in a mysterious episode involving the return to Finland of 32 million rounds of Soviet 7.62 mm and 7.92 mm ammunition. The entire incident was hushed up: the story found its way into only two local country newspapers. It appears that in December 1961, Interarms had imported this material through the port of Baltimore and had it shipped to the \"American Firearms Corp.\" of San Antonio for (as one newspaper reported it) \"possible sale to sportsmen.\" Several points should be clarified here. First, the San Antonio telephone directory listed no American Firearms Corporation nor an American Firearms and Ammunition Corporation for 1961-67. No company that wants to sell 32 million rounds of ammunition to sportsmen hides its light under a bushel. Second, newspaper reports stated that the ammunition was also to be used for the U. S. Army M-1 and M-14 rifles; but anyone in the gun business will quickly point out that Russian 7.62 mm and 7.92 mm ammunition does not fit American weapons. Third, most of the crates had \"Made in Russia\" stamped on them along with the notation \"5- 4-46,\" which would indicate that the material was of postwar origin and thus technically ineligible for importation for commercial purposes. Fourth, U.S. Customs agents were reported to have tested the ammunition and found it in good condition; yet the reason given for returning the material was that it was \"defective.\" It so happens that military standards for ammunition are higher than commercial standards; Customs' judgment, therefore, was based on the assumption that it was for commercial use: it would not ordinarily pass judgment on ammunition imported for military use. Along the way, however, the material became \"defective,\" which would indicate that it did not meet U.S. military standards. This material was almost certainly destined to be used in Soviet weapons owned by the U.S. government. In any event, all 32 million rounds22 boxcar loadswere shipped to Brownsville, Texas, in December 1962 and unloaded at Pier 3 at the port. To Interarms' and AFAC's embarrassment, the material sat there for several weeks because the ship destined to return the ammunition to Finlanda Swedish freighter called the Bernard Ingelssonwas late in arriving. An enterprising reporter took pictures of the cargo, and the story was played up in the local papers. Senator John Tower, after having conferred with State Department officials, attempted to explain away the shipment by saying, \"It was a speculation on the part of the International Armament Corporation of Alexandria, Virginia.  They found out, however, that the bullets could not be sold to U.S. customers.\" 15\n     Cummings would have known that before he imported the material.\n\nhttp://jfk.hood.edu/Collection/White%20%20Files/Security-CIA/CIA%200562.pdf A Shy Ex-Spy Talks About the CIA... By Morton Kondracke Chicago Sun-Times Service S.F. Examiner Thursday, April 20, 1972 Page 24 [EXCERPTS] Victor Marchetti does not look, act or talk like a top spy. He looks like an overweight bureaucrat and speaks quietly.\n\n## [Deletia]\n\nThe CIA also maintains, he *[Marchetti]* said, a major arsenal known as Midwest Depot \"out around Kansas City somewhere,\" where it stores a \"huge inventory\" of untraceable weaponry for arming CIA-supported movements overseas.\n\n http://www.spartacus.schoolnet.co.uk/JFKmarchetti.htm Victor Marchetti was born in 1930. He joined the United States Army and in 1952 he was sent to the European Command's School at Oberammergau to study Russian. Later he was involved in intelligence work concerning East Germany. After leaving the military Marchetti studied history at Penn State University. While at university Marchetti was secretly recruited by the Central Intelligence Agency. He officially joined the organization in 1955. Marchetti became a Soviet military specialist and was the CIA's leading expert on aid given to Third World countries. This included Soviet military supplies to Cuba in the early 1960s. In 1966 he became special assistant to the Chief of Planning, Programming, and Budgeting. The following year he was special assistant to Richard Helms. Marchetti became disillusioned with the \"agency's policies and practices\" and in 1969 resigned from the CIA. From Under the Counter and Over the Border Aspects of the Contemporary Trade in Illicit Arms ISBN 978-94-015-9335-9\nApparently from \"In Search of Enemies: A CIA Story\" by John Stockwell, Norton, 1978, ISBN 0-393-05705-4\nInside the shadow network by William L. Chaze U.S. News & World Report Dec 15, 1986 Even more important to the resupply effort [to the Nicaraguan contras] is another retired general, Maj. Gen. Richard Secord, who accompanied McFarlane on his Iran mission.  Secord's main contribution to the contra cause has been weapons.  U.S.  News has learned that his involvement began as early as 1982, when Secord was in charge of a secret operation--authorized by the Pentagon--in which Israel shipped tons of weapons captured during its invasion of Lebanon to a CIA arms depot in San Antonio.  From Texas, the guns were shipped to the contras. https://archive.org/stream/ReportOnTheIranContraAffair/Declaration-of-Plaintiffs-Counsel_Avirgan-v- Hull_djvu.txt Title: Declaration of Plaintiffs' Counsel, Tony Avirgan and Martha Honey v. John Hull, Rene Corbo, et al. UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA CIVIL ACTION NO. 86-1146-CIV-KING AND CIVIL ACTION NO. 87-1545-CIV-KING [EXCERPT]\n\n## Supplying The Contras: Nsc Staff Members Begin To Violate The Law\n\nIn February of 1982, Robert McFarlane, then deputy National Security Advisor, set up a secret military cooperation program to hide the paramilitary and supply activities of Casey and his associates in Central America from Congress which both utilized the Enterprise and foreshadowed its later activities. McFarlane went to David Kimche, then director general of the Israeli Foreign Ministry and set in motion the relationship that would lead to the Iran-contra scandal. In 1982, Israel began selling millions of dollars' worth of military equipment to Honduras, Guatemala and Costa Rica, some of which was passed through to the contras and providing trainers for the Honduran and Guatemalan governments. In return, the White House agreed to increase aid to Israel to offset the costs Israel had accrued. In addition, Israel provided the contras with millions of dollars' worth of Soviet-made weapons that it had captured from the Palestine Liberation Organization when it invaded Lebanon in 1982 in exchange for favorable prices on American-built fighter planes. Defendant Secord, then deputy assistant secretary of defense for international security affairs in the Near East, Africa and South Asia, was the person who, in his private capacity, made sure the weapons reached the contras. The weapons were shipped to the CIA warehouse in San Antonio, where the serial numbers were removed, and then went on to the contras. The Dirty Secrets of George Bush The Vice President's illegal operations By Howard Kohn & Vicki Monks November 3, 1988 12:00PM ET\n\n## [Excerpts]\n\n[Vice President] Bush and Gregg were, in fact, deeply involved in a previously undisclosed weapons-smuggling operation to arm the contras that began in 1982, two years before the much publicized Iran-contra operation run by marine lieutenant colonel Oliver North and financed by the sale of missiles to Iran. This earlier operation, known as Black Eagle, went on for three years, overlapping North's operation. The idea of both operations was to circumvent congressional restrictions on the CIA and the Pentagon. Although conceived by William Casey, the late CIA director, these operations were not sanctioned officially by the CIA or other government agencies. [deletia] While Rodriguez was practicing his unique blend of logistics and shuttle diplomacy, Panama's General Noriega was becoming more and more involved in Black Eagle. A bizarre mistake had led to Noriega's entry into the operation in the spring of 1983. During the first phase of Black Eagle, in late 1982 and early 1983, Mossad agents - whose cooperation Casey had gained by bartering copies of coveted satellite photographs - had been shipping weapons to the contras **through San Antonio, Texas.** But then, inexplicably, the words CIA Warehouse had been stamped on some crates of weapons, alerting U.S. customs agents and compromising the route. The mistake was apparently the fault of the Israelis, but Casey chose to overlook it; he still needed the Mossad to cover for the Americans in the operation. Casey asked the Israelis to change the smuggling route's central transfer point from San Antonio to El Salvador and Panama. In El Salvador the government, mired in its own civil war, was hugely indebted to the U.S. for military aid, and in Panama it was clear Noriega was eager to do business with arms traffickers. You are instructed that the United States has admitted for purposes of this trial the following facts to be true: 1. In 1983, DCI Casey asked Secretary of Defense Weinberger if the Department of Defense (\"DoD\") could obtain infantry weapons that Israel had confiscated from PLO forces.  Following discussions between Major General Meron of Israel and Retired Major General Richard Secord of the United States government (\"USG\") Israel secretly provided several hundred tons of weapons to the DoD on a grant bas in May 1983.  This was known as Operation TIPPED KETTLE.  In February 1984, the CIA again asked DoD if it could obtain additional PLO weapons from Israel at little or no cost for CIA operational use.  After negotiations between March 1984 and July 1984, Israel secretly provided the additional weapons to DoD in Operation TIPPED KETTLE II. The DoD then transferred the weapons to the CIA.  Although CIA advised Congress that the weapons would be used for various purposes, in fact many of them were provided to the Nicaraguan Resistance as appropriated funds ran out.  (The effort to funnel materiel to the Contras at a time when there were limits on the amount of funds the USG could spend to  support the Resistance also found expression in 1984 in Project ELEPHANT HERD, under which the CIA was to stockpile weapons and materiel provided by DoD at the lowest possible cost under the Economy Act.)  DoD assured Israel that, in exchange for the weapons, the U.S. Government would be as flexible as possible in its approach to Israeli military and economic needs, and that it would find a way to compensate Israel for its assistance within the restraints of the law and U.S. policy. [remainder omitted]\nhttp://www.thereaganfiles.com/operation-recovery-timeline.pdf also https://s3.amazonaws.com/s3.documentcloud.org/documents/1150050/operation-recovery-timeline.pdf\n[The \"Copp\" referred to in this document was the cover name of General Richard Secord.]\n[Note the references to Midwest depot, Texas]\n[Apparently the TOWs shipped to Midwest depot, Texas were conveniently close to Kelly AFB, San Antonio] Note on the above memo at  www.thereaganfiles.com : January 24th, 1986, memo from Oliver North to John Poindexter: \"Operation Recovery.\" The memo has \"Please destroy after reading\" written on the top and bottom of each page, and describes in detail the arms sales to the Iranians, including the transfer of weapons to Afghanistan, the release of 50 Hezbollah prisoners held by the Southern Lebanese Army, and of course, the release of the American hostages.\n\n## The Document, Originally Published By The National Security Archive In The Book, \"The Iran-Contra Scandal: The Declassified History,\" (1993), Had The Following Redactions Which Are Now Declassified:\n\n1. On the cover memo, the redaction between \"Clair George\" and \"Dewey Clarridge\" reads \"Tom Twetten\". 2. The last action for Sunday, January 26th now reads: \"Nir provides list of 50 Hizballah prisoners being held by Lahad to Gorba in London.\"\n\n## 3. Thursday, January 30. Both Redactions Now Read: \"To Midwest Depot, Texas.\"\n\n4. February 25. The second line now  reads: \"The 20 of 200 TOWs and first 2 of 20 launchers provided to Afghan resistance by Iranians.\" http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB210/15-Reagan%20Finding%201-17-86%20(IC %2002181).pdf http://www.foia.cia.gov/sites/default/files/document_conversions/89801/DOC_0000258609.pdf\n\nhttp://blog.al.com/bn/2007/08/irancontra_hearings_made_olive.html\n\n## [Excerpt]\n\nSome incredible things were unveiled during the *[Iran-Contra]* hearings. For example, the arms traded to Iran for the hostages came out of U.S. military stocks -- Army TOW missiles from Anniston Army Depot, shipped through Huntsville's Missile Command to a CIA facility, the name of which is classified, through Israel to Iran. John D. Saxon, a Birmingham lawyer, was associate counsel and, briefly, staff director to the U.S. Senate Iran- Contra Committee. Between February and November 1986, the Army shipped a total of 2,008 TOWs from the Anniston Army Depot to the Redstone Arsenal in Alabama. The first transfer of 1,000 MOIC-modified Basic TOWs was made on February 13, 1986; and the third transfer of 500 down-graded ITOWs was made on November 3, 1986. Although about 500 additional MOIC-modified Basic TOWs were available at the time of the third transfer, the CIA specifically requested that the newer downgraded ITOWs be provided. For the most part, MICOM used its normal procedures in making these transfers. According to TOW Project Office officials, the major differences were that fewer individuals were involved in preparing and shipping the missiles and that shipments were scheduled at night, which was not usual.  MICOM documents showed these transactions to be Army-to-Army transfers from Anniston Depot to Redstone Arsenal. Title was transferred from the Army to the CIA at Redstone Arsenal. In each case, the Shipped the TOWs from Redstone to Texas via a commercial trucking firm. Subsequently, the TOWS were flown out of Kelly Air Force Base (AFB). According to Air Force records maintained at Kelly, the first 1,0000 TOWs were shipped from Kelly on two Sounthern Air Transport (SAT) Boeing 707 cargo jets on February 15, 1986. On May 22 and 23, 1986, the same two SAT aircraft transported 508 boxes of rocket ammunition with explosive projectiles (presumably 508 TOWs and inert cargo (presumably Hawk spare parts). The last shipment is somewhat different from the others in that an Air Force aircraft was used.  On November 6, 19986, a Military Airlift Command (MAC) C-141 cargo jet transported 12 aircraft pallets of rocket ammunition with explosive projectiles (presumably 500 TOWs) from Kelly to Ramstein Air Base in the Federal Republic of Germany.  According to Air Force officials, about 5 hours later a commercial Boeing 707 cargo picked up the cargo and flew it to Ben Gurion International Airport, Israel.  MAC billed the CIA $63,857 for the C-141 flight.\n\n## [Excerpts]\n\n1. the following is an excerpt from an interview conducted with L. Fletcher Prouty on May 6, 1989, regarding his book *The Secret Team, The CIA and Its Allies in Control of the United States and the World*, Prentice Hall, 1973. This segment recounts Prouty's experience when he found out that some things he had been doing for years in support of the CIA had not been known by the senior military officer in the armed forces -- the chairman of the JCS -- and that they had been done, most likely, in response to other authority. A transcript of this interview will be published in 1998 by rat haus reality press as the book *Understanding Special Operations*. [deletia] Prouty:   Well, his kind of thing, on an established basis -- the units are there -- when I said there are 605 units, those are operating units- -now, some of them may only be telephone drops, because that's their function, they don't need a whole lot of people, they're just handling supplies, or something like that. But put this in present terms. When Colonel North believed that he had been ordered to take 2,008 Toe *[sic -- should be TOW]* missiles and deliver them to Iran -- see? -- there has to be some way that the supply system can let those go. You can't just drive down there with a truck to San Antonio at the warehouse, and say, \"I want 2,008 missiles.\" You have to have authority. And 2,008 Toe *[sic]* missiles -- I don't know what one of them costs, but it's an awful lot of money, and somebody had to prepare the paperwork for the authorization to let the supply officer release those. And I'm sure they went to a cover unit that North was using for that purpose. But it appears from what we've heard from this that, unlike the way we used to run the cover operations, when these things got to Iran, these characters sold them them for money. In fact, they sold them for almost four times the listed value of these things.\n\n## Https://En.Wikipedia.Org/Wiki/L._Fletcher_Prouty\n\nL. Fletcher Prouty [EXCERPTS] Leroy Fletcher Prouty (January 24, 1917 - June 5, 2001) served as Chief of Special Operations for the Joint Chiefs of Staff under President John F. Kennedy. A former colonel in the United States Air Force, he retired from military service to become a bank executive, and subsequently became a critic of U.S. foreign policy, particularly the covert activities of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) about which he had considerable inside knowledge. [deletia] From 19551964 he was assigned to U.S. Air Force Headquarters where he directed the creation of an Air Force worldwide system for \"Military Support of the Clandestine Operations of the CIA\", as required by a new National Security Council Directive, 5412 of March, 1954. As a result of a CIA Commendation for this work he was awarded the Legion of Merit by the US Air Force, and was promoted to Colonel being assigned to the Office of the Secretary of Defense. With the creation of the Defense Intelligence Agency by Secretary McNamara and the abolishment of the OSO, he was transferred to the Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to create a similar, worldwide office and was the Chief of Special Operations, with the Joint Staff all during 19621963.\n\nhttp://spioenkop.blogspot.com/\nBasic TOW in launcher http://216.12.139.91/docs/DOC_0001101506/DOC_0001101506.pdf also http://www.foia.cia.gov/sites/default/files/document_conversions/89801/DOC_0001101506.pdf Note the reference to Midwest Depot in the final paragraph on page 2.\n\n## Interrogation Inc.\n\nWASHINGTON - In March 2003, two C.I.A. officials surprised Kyle D. Foggo, then the chief of the agency's main European supply base, with an unusual request. They wanted his help building secret prisons to hold some of the world's most threatening terrorists. Mr. Foggo, nicknamed Dusty, was known inside the agency as a cigar-waving, bourbon-drinking operator, someone who could get a cargo plane flying anywhere in the world or quickly obtain weapons, food, money - whatever the C.I.A. needed. His unit in Frankfurt, Germany, was strained by the spy agency's operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, but Mr. Foggo agreed to the assignment.\n\n## [Deletia] From Fringes To Spotlight\n\nThe demands of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan had transformed Mr. Foggo from a fringe player into the C.I.A.'s indispensable man. Before the 9/11 attacks, the Frankfurt base was a relatively sleepy resupply center, running one or two flights a month to outlying stations. Within days of the attacks, Mr. Foggo had a budget of $7 million, which quickly tripled. He managed dozens of employees, directing nearly daily flights of cargo planes loaded with pallets of supplies, including saddles, bridles and horse feed for the mounted tribal forces that the spy agency recruited. Within weeks, he emptied the C.I.A.'s stockpile of AK-47s and ammunition at a Midwest depot. [deletia] Ex-C.I.A. Agent Goes Public With Story of Mistreatment on the Job By CHARLIE SAVAGE Published: February 10, 2011 WASHINGTON - In many ways, the personal injury lawsuit looked routine: In late 2001, a government employee and his family sued the agency he worked for, saying it had placed them in a mold-contaminated home that made them sick and required nearly all their possessions to be destroyed. But this was no ordinary case. The employee, Kevin M. Shipp, was a veteran Central Intelligence Agency officer. His home was at Camp Stanley, an Army weapons depot just north of San Antonio, in an area where the drinking water was polluted with toxic chemicals. The post includes a secret C.I.A. facility. Declaring that its need to protect state secrets outweighed the Shipps' right to a day in court, the government persuaded a judge to seal the case and order the family and their lawyers not to discuss it, and to later dismiss the lawsuit without any hearing on the merits, Mr. Shipp said. More than half a decade later, Mr. Shipp is going public with his story. He contends that the events broke up his marriage and destroyed his career, and that C.I.A. officials abused the State Secrets Privilege doctrine in an effort to cover up their own negligence. Jennifer Youngblood, a C.I.A. spokeswoman, denied any wrongdoing by the agency. \"The C.I.A. takes great care to help protect the health and welfare of its employees,\" she said. Mr. Shipp recently completed a memoir filled with unclassified documents that he said backed up his assertions. He says that he submitted the manuscript to the agency for the required prepublication review but that it blacked out swaths of information, like accounts of his children's nosebleeds, strange rashes, vomiting, severe asthma and memory loss. Citing a confidentiality agreement he signed with the government, Mr. Shipp would not discuss where the secret facility was located, what its purpose was, which agency he worked for or what his duties were. Still, he said, he was free to say that he worked at C.I.A. headquarters in Langley, Va., both before and after his stint at the facility. And public documents from a separate lawsuit, which he filed against his insurance carrier over a claim for his family's destroyed belongings, make clear that he was stationed at Camp Stanley. Mr. Shipp's ex-wife, Lorena Shipp, and one of his sons, Joel Shipp, now 28, said in interviews that the C.I.A. had assigned Mr. Shipp to a high-ranking job at the facility to uncover suspected security breaches. The family moved to an Army-owned house at Camp Stanley in June 1999 and left in May 2001. It is not clear what took place at the C.I.A. facility. But the camp had been used as a weapons depot for generations. Joel and Lorena Shipp described bunkers and many old weapons, including Soviet weaponry. They also said that they occasionally saw officials performing tactical drills, and that sometimes items were burned or buried there. \"The house that our family was moved into was planted on top of a lot of buried ammunition,\" Joel Shipp said. \"One time me and my little brother dug up a mustard gas shell.\" [deletia]\nhttp://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2011/02/10/AR2011021007100.html Ex-CIA staffer alleges agency coverup in toxin exposure case By Jeff Stein Washington Post Staff Writer Friday, February 11, 2011; 12:00 AM A former CIA security officer is alleging that the agency is unjustifiably invoking a \"state secrets\" claim to cover up evidence that he and his family suffered illnesses as a result of exposure to environmental contamination at an agency facility. Kevin Shipp, 55, a counterterrorism consultant now employed by a firm with government contracts, said that the agency also has sought to prevent him from publicizing his ordeal by heavily redacting the manuscript he hopes to publish. The book describes what the family experienced during and after their exposure: illness, alcoholism, marital discord, and a campaign of harassment and surveillance that Shipp says was carried out by the CIA. 'Suffered horribly'\n\n## The Facility Where The Shipps Lived Is In The Southwestern United States And Has Served As A Weapons Depot And Disposal Site. The Washington Post Has Agreed To The Agency's Request Not To Name The Facility Or Describe Its Location More Precisely.\n\nIn interviews, Shipp said he was motivated to speak out, possibly in violation of a judge's orders not to discuss the case, because he believes the CIA is hiding misdeeds. In 2003 the government agreed to pay $400,000 to settle a lawsuit filed by Shipp, but the CIA later backed out of the deal. In February 2004 U.S. District Court Judge Orlando Garcia granted the agency's request to dismiss the matter as a state secret, a decision that effectively made permanent a gag order he had imposed two years earlier. \"This is about the Constitution and their grave violation of it,\" said Shipp, who won several commendations for his work over a 17-year career. \"We suffered horribly. People need to know what they did.\"\n\n## [Deletia]\n\nIn 2010 the Army Corps of Engineers solicited bids for clean-up work at the facility, according to a public notice which said \"trichloroethene (TCE) and tetrachloroethene (PCE) are a significant part of the remediation.\"\n\n## The Corps Cautioned That Those Selected For The Contract Would Need \"At Least A Secret Security Clearance,\" Because \"The Installation . . . Has Sensitive Missions.\"\n\n[deletia]\n\n## [Excerpts]\n\n[Mr. Shipp].  ... the chief of the base made the decision to evacuate us out of the house in September 2000. [Mr. Shipp].  The base maintenance crew repaired *[damaged areas in the house]*. [Mr. Shipp].  Then we moved the family to the base in August of  '99. [Note: \"the chief of the base\" may actually have been the person's title, \"Chief of Base\" in accordance with CIA practice.]\n\n## Camp Stanley Storage Activity\n\nGeneral Information Job descriptions, equipment, clearances etc.\n\nhttps://denix.osd.mil/cr/archives/historic/historic-structures-districts-and-landscapes-cold-war-historicproperties-archives/reports/\n\n## [Excerpts] 2.1 Camp Stanley Storage Activity\n\nCSSA consists of 4,004 acres of varying terrain. The boundary of CSSA is generally rectangular with approximately 3 miles north to south and 2 miles east to west. Camp Stanley became part of the Red River Arsenal as CSSA in 1949. In addition to ammunitions storage, the installation had responsibility to test and overhaul ammunition components. In 1953, approximately 2,040 acres were transferred from Camp Bullis to CSSA. An additional 204 acres were assigned to CSSA in 1970 to bring total acreage to its current 4,004 acres. CSSA is a sub-installation of the U.S. Army Material Command's Red River Army Depot (RRAD), located in Texarkana, Texas. The primary mission of CSSA is receipt, storage, and issuance of ordnance material as well as quality assurance testing of military weapons and ammunition. A secondary mission, weapons training and qualifying also occurs at CSSA. F--Environmental Program Support, Site Investigation, and Treatment Studies for Camp Stanley Storage Activity, Boerne Texas Solicitation Number: W9126G-XX-XXXX Agency: Department of the Army Office: U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Location: USACE District, Fort Worth Synopsis: Added: Mar 01, 2010 4:07 pm Modified: Mar 03, 2010 5:34 pm [EXCERPTS] Detailed Explanation of Specialized Tasks: Trichloroethene (TCE) and tetrachloroethene (PCE) are a significant part of the remediation at Camp Stanley. TCE and PCE containing chemicals were used at Camp Stanley primarily as a degreasing agent for metal and electronic parts and two groundwater plumes extend off of the installation into several dozen private water wells. [deletia] Camp Stanley also requires unexploded ordnance disposal services as part of many of its remediation sites. While only small arms (and some grenade and rocket) use is conducted now, historically, many different munitions had been used at Camp Stanley, such as Stokes mortars and a wide range of artillery shells. Finding 37 mm and 75 mm rounds at remediation sites is not uncommon.\n\n## Lastly, Another Specialized Need Is For All Fulltime Personnel And Project Managers To Have At Least A Secret Security Clearance. The Installation Stores Large Quantities Of Arms And Ammunition And Has Sensitive Missions, Thus Access To The Installation And Security Clearance Requirements For Long-Term Personnel Are Much More Restrictive Than Most Military Installations.\n\nJob Title: Explosives Operator (Driver) Department: Department of the Army Agency: U.S. Army Joint Munitions Command Job Announcement Number: NCFR12958607722038 SALARY RANGE:\n$17.96 to $20.95 / Per Hour OPEN PERIOD:\nFriday, August 10, 2012 to Sunday, August 19, 2012\nSERIES & GRADE:\nWG-6502-08\nPOSITION INFORMATION:\nFull Time - Permanent DUTY LOCATIONS:\n3 vacancies in the following location: San Antonio, TX United States WHO MAY APPLY:\nStatus Candidates (Merit Promotion)\n\n## Job Summary:\n\nCivilian employees serve a vital role in supporting the Army mission.  They provide the skills that are not readily available in the military, but crucial to support military operations.  The Army integrates the talents and skills of its military and civilian members to form a Total Army. About the Position: Performs duties involving the renovation, demilitarization, modification and normal maintenance of a variety of ammunition and explosives; destruction of munitions and components; and assembly of ammunition and explosives, including the unpacking inspecting, and repacking for shipment. Camp Stanley is located approximately 25 miles north of downtown San Antonio, TX off interstate 10. The spirit of Texas is captured in San Antonio retaining its sense of history and tradition, blending sounds/flavors from Old Mexico to the Deep South. The Alamo is located in downtown San Antonio. The River Walk offers much to the tourist; side walk cafes, restaurants, as well as the nightclubs and hotels. Children can enjoy San Antonio's Children's Museum, Magik Theater, and Brackenridge Park. Who May Apply:\n\n- All Federal employees serving on a career or career conditional appointment. - Department of Defense employees serving on a career or career conditional appointment. - Current Army employees with competitive status (includes Army Employees serving on career or Career conditional appointments) - ICTAP - 30% Disabled Veteran - NAF/AAFES Interchange eligibles - Veterans Employment Opportunity Act (VEOA) - Veterans Recruitment Appointment (VRA)\n\n## Key Requirements\n\n    Must be able to obtain and maintain a Secret security clearance Must comply with Drug Abuse Testing Program Requirements This positions requires a Pre-employment Physical Examination Payment of moving expenses is not authorized This position is subject to the Lautenberg Amendment to the Gun Control Act This position requires a CDL valid License with HAZMAT endorsment\n\n## Duties:\n\nPerforms duties involving the renovation, demilitarization, modification and normal maintenance of a variety of ammunition and explosives; destruction of munitions and components; and assembly of ammunition and explosives, including the unpacking inspecting, and repacking for shipment.  Disassembles and breaks down ammunition such as artillery shells ranging from 57MM to 76MM by operating pull-apart or breakdown machines to separate projectile from case.  Individually or as member of crew on assembly line, without protective barricades removes boosters' primers, cartridges or other assemblies or components from items such as artillery shells, rockets, mortars, grenades, and re-installs or inserts new assemblies or components. Sorts disassembled components or completely renovated items into trays, tote boxes or other receptacles for transfer to storage, shipment operations or demolition. When required, performs warehouseman duties in connection with the receipt, storage, and maintenance in storage of General Supply and/or ammunition items. This involves tasks such as loading trucks, vans, and railroad cars [*], inventory, packing, weighing, marking, strapping, repacking, palletizing and inspection of items.  Operates 20- ton truck tractor with semi-trailer or full-trailer transporting ammunition, explosives and general supplies intra-state and inter-state as well as various points in and around San Antonio as well as on the installation. Operates from 12 passenger vehicle transporting personnel to and from various points around San Antonio.  Operates truck tractor and trailer picking up and delivering heavy construction equipment (front-end loader, grader, dozer and backhoe) as well as supplies. Assists in ammunition destroying operations by burning and/or detonation.  Disassembles and assembles weapons including rifles, carbines, mortars, pistols, revolvers, and machine guns up to .50 caliber.\n\n## Qualifications Required:\n\nAbility To Do The Work Of The Position Without More Than Normal Supervision PHYSICAL EFFORT:  Position is required to reach, bend, turn or move hands, arms, feet and legs to operate hand and foot controls. Long periods of sitting are necessary while operating the vehicles. Frequently lifts objects up to 80 pounds. While working on production lines, the incumbent must frequently stand for extended periods, and work with a rhythmic set pace, reaching, bending, and manipulating parts. Careful attention is required in eye-hand coordinating, and in setting and attaching detonating and/or initiating devices to explosives. WORKING CONDITIONS:  Work is performed inside and outside in a variety of weather conditions and on various terrains. Drives in all types of traffic and weather. Exposed to the possibility of serious accidents and is subject to cuts, bruises and broken bones. Incumbent is required to wear protective clothing such as safety shoes. Since ammunition and explosives which are being renovated, modified, demilitarized or destroyed are almost always in an unserviceable condition, the incumbent is exposed to accident and explosions, which could cause serious injury, dismemberment, and/or loss of life to himself and/or his co-workers. Also subject to hazards of working with industrial and production type equipment, power conveyors, powered hand tools. Occasionally is subject to health hazards from dust or fumes from paint or lacquers. Also exposed to hazardous noise level. Wears hearing protective devices during noise hazardous operations. Receives routine periodic hearing evaluation at installation medical facility. [*] As of 2012, there were no railroads running into Camp Stanley. If the position description is accurate, operations involving railroad cars would have been performed elsewhere. POSITION DUTIES:\n\n## Major Duties:\n\nServes as the assistant security specialist in the management of the Camp Stanley Storage Activity (CSSA) personnel, operations, information, and special access programs in accordance with Army regulations and directives. Administers command policies, directives and regulations for CSSA and tenant activities including liaison activities with higher headquarters and other federal, state and local agencies. Provides administrative support to the Installation Manager. Interfaces with the Command Staff, senior management, visitors, dignitaries, etc, on a regular basis. 1. Assists Installation Security Manager with established multi-discipline security programs. These security programs consist of Information Security, Personnel Security, **Special Access Programs**, Computer Security, Industrial Security, and their related education and training. Performs routine aspects of all security assistance specialties in assigned functional areas. Assignments entail application of regulations, policy, and procedural guides. Assist in training individuals or groups on security related matters as assigned by the Security Manager. Assists in maintenance and coordination of classified document control. Assist with security education, briefings and awareness. Organizes and conducts security education awareness and training courses such as new employee orientations, annual training of employees in basic security responsibilities, Subversion and Espionage Directed Against the U.S. Army (SAEDA), crime prevention, etc a. Verifies personnel security clearances utilizing the Joint Personnel Adjudication System (JPAS) for civilian, military and contractors assigned to the department. Conducts personnel security in/out processing. Provides personnel security clearance awareness and program overview at newcomer orientation briefings. Maintains the department Security Clearance Access Roster (SCAR) assuring the roster is current. Identifies individuals on roster who require periodic reinvestigations; coordinates and advises appropriate personnel of the reinvestigation requirements; and maintains suspense file. Provides information to the supervisor on all matters relating to personnel security. Maintains and updates Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) and policies for the department personnel security program. b. Enters subject's investigation through Personnel Security Investigation, Center of Excellence (PSI-CoE) Portal. Requests fingerprints for individuals requiring prints for investigations. Reviews results of personnel security investigations received from the PSI CoE, summarizes unfavorable information, and recommends a suitability determination to the Installation Security Manager if warranted. Responsible for the handling of personnel security records with the highest degree of discretion. c. Accesses Department of Defense Consolidated Adjudication Facility (DoD CAF) portal as needed for Potential Derogatory Information (PDI). Inputs Request Recertification and various other transactions. When a Request for Information, Letter of Intent or Statement of Reasons comes in from the DoD CAF, briefs the individual and supervisor what is needed and work with them through the whole process to assist the individual in maintaining and retaining their security clearance. d. Assists in the preparation of supplemental data to ensure clarity and accuracy in program management and reporting. Writes security memorandums announcing new or changed security requirements; writes and publishes reminders on continuing requirements based on cyclical schedules or as determined necessary based on an assessment of ongoing issues/events. Reviews program products to ensure proper application of appropriate security classification markings and caveats. Determines special processing measures and assists with ensuring implementation of policy and procedures concerning proper labeling and use. 50% 2. Facilitates the Installation Drug Testing Program (DTP). Randomly selects employees from database for testing; maintains chain of custody during testing; sends samples to testing facility; reports results and maintains records. Conducts training as needed with the DTP alternate. When necessary updates the installation of any updates to the overall program requirements. 20% 3. Assists with the implementation of the Camp Stanley Storage Activity Access Control and Badging Program in accordance with local policy and directives. Incumbent executes local policy and provides program oversight while deploying program support to CSSA tenant organizations, all visiting organizations and persons requiring access to CSSA. Incumbent supports contingency access for groups and special events, demonstrations and media events and coordinates plans and actions with the Installation Security Manager. Maintains reserve badging equipment in an operational status ready to replace failed or inconsistency equipment. Ensures that required subject badge documentation is provided, completed and retained for review and inspection. Maintains record of issued badges and deletes expired, inactive or lost badges from the database. Ensures all persons receiving a access badge are briefed on access policy. Maintains accountable records relating to badge and ID card control. Briefs and debriefs personnel as required. 15% 4. Maintains the Installation Manager's calendar. Reminds him/her of appointments, briefs him/her on the topic, and provides associated material (e.g., related correspondence, reports, regulations, etc.). Utilizing own initiative, schedules or reschedules mutually convenient times for appointments based upon personal knowledge of Installation Manager's activities, commitments, and current issues of importance. Arranges for conferences and meetings, including such matters as location, dates, attendance list, invitations, and room reservations, and notifies attendees of agenda. Coordinates and sets-up video teleconferencing equipment. Anticipates need for information and systematically prepares or summarizes background material for manager. Attends conferences and proceedings, takes notes, and initiates follow-up on tasking and commitments. Coordinates travel arrangements for Installation Manager and inputs data into the appropriate automated travel system such as Defense Travel System (DTS). Provides complete itineraries, points of contact, lodging arrangements, and similar travel information. Revise travel arrangements as necessary, often on short notice, coordinating all resulting changes to schedules and meetings. Coordinates submissions from all staff elements, reviews, and prepares background information for trips as necessary. 15% Performs other duties as assigned.\n\n## This Position Requires A Secret Clearance At The Time Of Hire And Selectee Must Obtain Top Secret Clearance Within One Year Of Hire And Maintain It For The Duration Of Employment In This Position Based On An Sbi With Eligibility For Sensitive Compartmented Information (Sci). Position Evaluation:\n\nCurrent Delegated Classification Authority (DCA) is JASON SHIRLEY, Installation Manager, Camp Stanley Storage Activity (CSSA). PD reviewed/certified and duties validated by CSSA-HRB, 1/18/2018. kpw POSITION DUTIES: MAJOR DUTIES: 1. Serves as Ammunition Program Manager of the Munition Storage Maintenance Brach (MSMB) with responsibility for interpreting higher authority guidance and developing local projects to implement requirements. Incumbent plans, coordinates and executes the ammunition management program: determines and advises on long range plans, goals and objectives. Determines the need and develops and recommends plans for organizational/operational changes which may have considerable impact on operating costs, division structure, or installation ammunition support operations. Maintains continuous monitoring of the ammunition program, performing analytical review to improve established policies and procedures. Develops, implements and maintains Camp Stanley Storage Activity's (CSSA) Integrated Ammunition Program. Performs acquisition functions relevant to munition maintenance to include; identify new sources of supply, develop Statements of Work, and receive bids to establish and institute purchase requests/contracts. Ensures that all elements of acquisition documentation and formal closed-loop accountability are properly administered. Reviews and analyzes regulations, bulletins, and directives from higher authority relative to the ammunition program. Develops and plans maintenance projects for nonstandard material based on customer and mission requirements. Knowledgeable in respects to design and modification of packaging and unitization of non-standard material to effectively meet DOT, DA, DoD and POP certification standards. Administers the periodic review of ammunition stocks for justification of retention. Accountable items fall within a variety of complexity such as unique, nonstandard, research and development, difficult to procure, subject to design changes, unique design to performance standards, hazardous in nature, sensitive type, and acceptance test items from non-hazardous to very hazardous, and from non-sensitive to sensitive. Determines policy and procedures from interpreting and supplementing higher headquarters regulations which are used in the ammunition accounting function. Coordinates implementation of new guidance from higher headquarters. Have numerous personal contacts with representatives of different organizations and branches of service to determine and coordinate maintenance and supply needs. Assures that directives, special instructions; etc., pertaining to ammunition stockpile maintenance and management are implemented. Analyzes reports and statistics, investigates problems identified through analysis of performance reports on findings and observations, recommends corrective actions, and follow-up actions. (50%) 2. Evaluates the effectiveness of maintenance operations in terms of mission accomplishment, standards of quality and quantity met, procedural, policy and regulatory compliance, and technical competence are met, and streamlines and corrects mission requirements as necessary. Recommends changes in internal procedures, workflow, and standard operating procedures to improve efficiency of operations, provide better control and reduce accidents. Serves as the technical advisor for ammunition management, representing the director in meetings and conferences concerning the receipt, storage, issue, shipment, and requisitioning of ammunition and explosives. Subject Matter Expert (SME) for the CSSA and provides technical advice, guidance, and assistance on customer supply operations to agency personnel. Prepares and conducts training for personnel at CSSA to explain new/revised ammunition supply procedures and requirements. Prepares and reviews correspondence and reports pertaining to the operation of the activities ammunition supply program. Prepares fact sheets, briefings and periodic progress reports, as required, explaining status, problems, etc., of the program. Coordinates with representatives of other organizational elements to facilitate changes and solve stockpile management problems. Understands and applies detailed knowledge of DOT, DA and DOD regulations pertaining to transportation for a large variety of ammunition and explosives. Provides expertise and technical guidance to various Command elements regarding location and capability. Identify, create and maintain detailed electronic records, and provides Hazard Classification and space utilization information and requirements for munition shipments based on the mode of transportation. Continually updates and maintains a complete and current technical library and extensive database for all munitions. Incumbent possesses technical knowledge/utilization of computers, software, Web base development and is experienced with the munition process and logistical support planning in the area of responsibility (e.g., supply, management, inventory, storage, inspection, receiving and transportation). Incumbent analyzes subject matter in the areas of responsibility to design, develop and maintain supporting application programs, databases, spreadsheets and informational website(s). Incumbent also provides support for new technologies to improve local automation. (35%)\n\n## 3. First Line Supervisor Of The Munition Storage Maintenance Branch (Msmb) Personnel, Exercising Responsibility Over Work Operations Of 10 Employees Involved In The Packing, Shipping, Maintenance, And Storage Of Various Types Of Standard And Non Standard Munitions. (15%) Factor Level Descriptions: Factor 1. Knowledge Required By The Position. Level 1-7, 1250 Points Thorough And In-Depth Experience And Knowledge Of Policies Pertaining To The Management And Maintenance Of A Very Diverse Ammunition Stockpile With Unique And Unusual Requirements.\n\nAbility to gather, analyze, and evaluate information independently as it applies to the activity ammunition program. Knowledge of a broad range of ammunition maintenance and supply program relationships. Knowledge of specialized methods and techniques to analyze and evaluate the effectiveness and efficiency of ammunition maintenance and supply programs and/or operations. In-depth knowledge developed from specialized training and extensive experience in maintenance, demil, and supply operations. Ability to analyze independently and resolve difficult issues and problems in the assigned area of responsibility involving, for example, ammunition maintenance processes, work methods, supply data management, and day to day operational procedures.\n\n## Knowledge Of Interrelated Maintenance And Supply Processes To Coordinate The Objectives Of Two Or More Specialized Ammunition Programs (Ammunition Maintenance And Ammunition Accountability).\n\nThis level of knowledge is used in a variety of technical ammunition supply operations to perform work independently, such as planning maintenance and resolving issues in an ammunition management function. Extensive knowledge of safety limitations, risk assessments, writing Standard Operating Procedures, protective equipment and clothing to assure safe completion of work assignments performed at sites where ammunition is located.\n\n## Factor 3. Guidelines. Fl3-4, 450 Pts\n\nTechnical guidelines are general in nature, ranging from readily available published product literature and industry publications to information embedded in field manuals and bulletins that may be difficult to acquire. Often, technical problems and challenges encountered are unique in nature because of the non standard munitions requiring that judgment be utilized in both interpreting and applying available guidelines and policy statements related to accomplishing mission tasks. The employee also uses initiative and resourcefulness to make sound decisions and take appropriate actions when supervisory and written guidance is limited or unavailable.\n\n## Factor 4. Complexity. Level 4-5, 325 Points\n\nIncumbent performs assignments consisting of a variety of ammunition maintenance, supply, shipping and receiving duties involving many different and unrelated processes and methods in unique areas of ammunition maintenance, supply, and shipping/receiving planning and administration. Typically, the work requires analysis and testing of a variety of innovative techniques and methods to evaluate alternatives and arrive at decisions, conclusions or recommendations. Programs and projects may be funded by or under the cognizance of different organizations with differing supply requirements or variations in ability to fund acquisitions or implement systems. Requirements to follow established ammunition maintenance and supply policies, practices, procedures and techniques often have to be modified for a number of locations or situations to assure compatibility with existing systems and demands on available resources. In deciding what is to be done the incumbent typically assesses situations complicated by conflicting or insufficient data wherein changes must be made on the spot. Information must be analyzed to determine the applicability of established methods, the need to digress from normal methods and techniques, the need to waive prescribed standards, and/or whether specific kinds of waivers are justifiable.\n\n## Factor 5. Scope And Effect. Level 5-3, 150 Points\n\nThe work involves planning, investigating, analyzing, and resolving a variety of conventional ammunition maintenance and supply problems for various ammunition programs. Incumbent monitors unconventional maintenance and supply systems and programs, performs independent reviews, and recommends actions involving unique criteria, methods, techniques and procedures. Employee's work products, advice and assistance affect the efficiency of ammunition maintenance and supply operations or specialized programs and contributes to the effectiveness of newly introduced programs requiring ammunition maintenance and supply support. The effect of the work is part of a network of facilities or nationwide program of operations with interdependent maintenance and supply requirements impacting the battlefield operation of ammunition in a wide range of activities to include tactical units supported.\n\n## Factor 6/7. Personal Contacts/Purpose Of Contacts. Level 6-3/7-3, 180 Points Contacts Are With Individuals Or Groups From Outside The Employing Agency In Structured And Unstructured Settings. Other Contacts Are With Customers In Various Testing And Commodity Commands Outside The Immediate Organization. Persons Contacted Generally Are Engaged In Different Functions, Missions And Other Kinds Of Ammunition Supply Work Or Are Representatives From Various Levels Within Other Agencies Or Other Operating Offices In Outside Organizations. Contacts With Above Parties Are Not Established On A Routine Basis And The Purpose And Extent Of Each Contact Is Unique.\n\nThe purpose of these contacts is to communicate status of key ammunition projects/shipments, determine technical problems (if there are any) with ammo programs, and offer solutions as required. Therefore, the incumbent must be adaptable in approaching the individual or group in order to obtain the desired effect, such as gaining approval of proposals, coordinate actions, resolve issues, and improving readiness of the organization, the customer, and their field units. Must be able to obtain and maintain a SECRET security clearance.\n\n## Major Duties:\n\nServes as the General Attorney for Camp Stanley Storage Activity and the environmental attorney for retained Army functions at Ft Sam Houston and Camp Bullis through an installation support agreement. Provides legal advice to the CSSA and retained Army functions at Fort Sam Houston and Camp Bullis through a support agreement to resolve novel, difficult and complex legal topics covering a wide range of environmental, contract, labor and administrative law issues to successfully accomplish the CSSA, Army North, and AMEDD mission. Responsibilities include the planning and accomplishment of diversified legal work pertaining to environmental, administrative, labor and contract legal matters arising out of Army and Army installation activities. Incumbent's work involves complex legal and factual issues in developing areas of law that relate to the protection of environmental, legal, contractual, financial, and administrative policy interests of the Army. 1. Environmental Law. Reviews, researches, and responds to questions pertaining to the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act, Clean Air Act, Clean Water Act, Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, Toxic Substances Control Act, Endangered Species Act, and other varied Federal statutes or regulations that govern substantive environmental control. Drafts and coordinates Army comments to proposed environmental legislation and regulations. Upon appointment, acts as the primary representative and spokesperson for CSSA and retained Army functions at Fort Sam Houston and Camp Bullis on environmental concerns to Federal, State, and local officials. Works with environmental attorneys and technical experts to resolve a number of specific environmental regulation issues, such as plans, fees, fines, and restoration efforts, particularly as these relate to Army training ranges. Incumbent receives and responds to requests for the release of information by determining the legality of release within the statute and Army Regulations. Works directly with the Texas legislature, city council and zoning and planning commissions of the city of San Antonio, and Bexar County Commissioners Court for the purpose of assisting in the preparation of draft legislation and regulations. Drafts proposed legislation and rules and staffs them with the Army Regional Environmental Office in Kansas City and other military services before submitting them to the legislature. Meets with Department of Justice and public interest groups, as appropriate, to discuss DOD positions on proposed legislation and rules. Frequently works and negotiates with attorneys and high government officials. Advisor for the Army Compatibility Use Buffer Cooperative (ACUB) Agreements with The Nature Conservancy (TNC) and Texas Parks and Wildlife Dept (TPWD) which have a total of over $7 million in funding. Works with environmental attorneys and technical experts to resolve a number of specific environmental regulation issues, such as plans, fees, fines, and restoration efforts, particularly as these relate to Army training ranges. Develops factual and legal positions on environmental litigation matters. Advises on policy and legal direction of negotiations with Federal U.S. Environmental Protection Agency officials, private industry, state environmental and local governments regarding environmental problems including multi-million dollar cleanups of hazardous waste. Participates in the negotiations as required and serves as an interface between the parties to the negotiations for CSSA and if requested for retained Army functions at Fort Sam Houston and Camp Bullis through a support agreement. Prepares legal language for agreements, environmental assessments, environmental impact statements and records of decision. (60%) 2. Contracts Law. As a staff legal advisor, provides advisory and consultant services to contracting officers, procurement specialists, program officials, staff officers, and other persons having procurement or related duties. Develops oral and written legal opinions on complex problems arising during all phases of contracting, e.g., negotiation, award, administration, and termination of contracts. Provides legal review of and business counsel for large projects that are advertised nationally and which attract bids or proposals from nationwide or international firms. Example includes a large multi-year environmental contract for $49.9 million. Problems vary in degree of difficulty and complexity of factual and legal issues involved, and in the existence or limited usefulness of precedents or similar cases. Determines the acceptability of solicitation and contract format and content for conformance to the DoD and DA regulations and policy, and drafts special clauses to insert into contracts when circumstances warrant. Reviews solicitations and contracts, and renders legal opinions on procurement related issues. Represents CCC at meetings and conferences with top procurement officials and the legal counsel of contractors. Serves as a member of various boards or committees reviewing proposed solicitations, awards, and settlements. Prepares and reviews final decisions rendered under the Contract Disputes Act of 1978. Advises on claims of all types rising from CCC operations, e.g., equitable adjustment; Public Law 95-804 claims for unusual relief, unilateral and mutual mistake; formalization of informal commitments, contract terminations, allocability of costs and breach of contract claims. Develops and provides oral and written legal opinions, counsel, and advice in the field of property, bankruptcy and liability law, and other contractually related matters. Represents CCC before the General Accounting Office in bid protests, including preparing the bid protest administrative reports, writing the legal opinion, preparing witnesses, and representation at hearings. Provides consultation on substantive matters of law and coordinates investigation of cases with Army Litigation Division and Department of Justice trial attorneys on bid protest matters before the U.S. Federal Claims Court and Federal District Courts, including the preparation of legal opinions, affidavits, and discovery related materials. Advises on and prepares litigation report files including the preparation of written legal opinions, in contract disputes before the U.S. Federal Claims Court, the Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals, the United States District Courts, and the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. Assists OTJAG Litigation Division and DOJ on responding to FOIA/PA litigation requirements. (20%) 3. Labor Law. Provides oral and written advice concerning civilian personnel law, employment discrimination law and all labor relations matters. Reviews proposed command activity regulations for legal sufficiency, and impact on other regulations, and on programs, procedures and methods of operation. Practices preventive law by informing management of the impact of changes in civilian personnel and labor law and regulations; advising managers and supervisors on informal resolution of grievances and providing advice to line management and EEO officer on resolving informal discrimination complaints. (10%) 4. Administrative Law. Serves as a legal advisor in administrative law matters not within the province of more clearly defined fields of law. Functions as an ethics official. Provides required annual training to review and distribute materials regarding the Joint Ethics Regulations. Compiles statistics on training for submission to higher Headquarters. Prepares ethics opinions upon receiving valid written requests. Drafts legal opinions and provides advice regarding investigations, inter-agency agreements, contracts, activities of private associations, Reports of Survey, federal fiscal law, and other areas of administrative law. Reviews Reports of Investigations for legal sufficiency, assisting Investigating Officers in their preparation. Furnishes legal counsel on the Privacy Act and Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), reviewing proposed responses to FOIA requestors for legal sufficiency. (10%)\n\n## Conditions Of Employment: Incumbent Must Be Able To Obtain And Maintain A Secret Security Clearance. Position Evaluation:\n\nCurrent Delegated Classification Authority (DCA) is JASON SHIRLEY, Installation Manager, Camp Stanley Storage Activity (CSSA). PD reviewed/certified and duties validated by CSSA-HRB, 3/29/2019.\n\n## Position Duties: Major Duties:\n\n1. Serves as the Installation Physical Security Officer. The Installation Manager and tenant agencies primary physical security adviser on the Physical Security Program. Conducts and maintains risk analysis surveys of headquarters arms room and designated mission essential vulnerable areas (MEVA's), reviews and approves subordinate commands risk analysis surveys. Manages the headquarters Access Control and Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS). Provides guidance, recommendations, and assistance to supervisors and employees, concerning security systems, physical protection devices, security guard force, and personnel access controls. Schedules and independently performs a variety of physical security inspections of designated mission essential and vulnerable activities. Applies a large and varied body of statutory and regulatory requirements to the performance of inspections of areas that include: arms, ammunition and explosives storage, sensitive manufacturing areas, petroleum storage, motor pool, data processing and communications, procurement, utilities, warehousing and storage facilities, etc. Documents findings, prepares reports, briefs responsible management officials, reviews reports of corrective actions and performs follow-up inspections as appropriate. Schedules and performs risk analyses to identify the risk of loss or misuse, and theft of government owned resources for all organizational elements and tenant activities. Monitors all intrusion detection systems, duress alarms and access control devices. Performs a variety of duties in support of the installation Crime Prevention Program. Serves as a member of the installation's Crime Prevention Council, develops the statistical database used by the Council and prepares Security Information Bulletins for distribution to all employees. Responsible for the installation of the intrusion detection system to include troubleshooting malfunctions of the system components, maintenance, operation, training of guard operators and repair. Inspects and maintains intrusion detection alarm systems and reviews control documents to ensure that periodic operating checks have been accomplished. Reviews requests for installation of intrusion detection alarm systems to determine need, adequacy of proposed system and to ensure components meet acceptable standards. Assist in research and making recommendations for upgrades with security equipment and procedures for the new use. (40%) 2. Serves as Antiterrorism/Force Protection/Weapons of Mass Destruction Security Officer for Camp Stanley Storage Activity. Advises the Commander and the Force Protection/Weapons of Mass Destruction Committee on the threat, and courses of action to take to deter attacks by extremist groups, international terrorist organizations, and other criminal elements on Camp Stanley Storage Activity facilities, civilian employees, family members, and equipment. Obtains and analyzes threat information provided by external agencies to determine if it a future threat may exist to the installation. Provides, establishes, plans, prepares, and supervises the Force Protection/Weapons of Mass Destruction Working Group's monthly meetings. Plan and prepare Force Protection/Weapons of Mass Destruction program guidance, Force Protection/Weapons of Mass Destruction sections of operations and contingency plans. Researches Force Protection/Weapons of Mass Destruction threat statements. Ensure rapid dissemination of threat information throughout the Garrison. Plan and exercise a viable THREATCON system for the Garrison, tenants, and units co-located on Camp Stanley. Establishes, implements, and exercise an emergency communications system, and the Random Antiterrorist Measures Program. Establish a liaison with local, state, and federal law enforcement and intelligence agencies. Monitor, train, and support Force Protection/Weapons of Mass Destruction Programs of Camp Stanley Storage Activity, and tenant units. Conduct Level 1, Force Protection/Weapons of Mass Destruction training in support of the installation, Army civilian employees, and family members deploying OCONUS. Provides training and develops exercise programs and plans to evaluate and critique procedures. Investigates and analyzes security problems and conditions including those that are complex in nature. Participates in planning efforts regarding initiatives to combat terrorism. Prepares assessments of current plans in the absence of a current plan writes and implements one. Provides input during the development and review of disaster and contingency plans for Camp Stanley Storage Activity area of responsibility. Reviews and develops Force Protection/Weapons of Mass Destruction and antiterrorism plans for the Camp Stanley Storage Activity. Makes an authoritative recommendation for increasing the physical security of sites and personnel. Executes the Force Protection standards as outlined in AR 525-13. (35%) 3. As Chief of Guard Forces, plans and coordinates the activities of three shifts of security guards, through subordinate supervisors to insure the maintenance of stringent physical security standards; enforcement of federal, state and local laws and official orders and regulations; protection of Activity personnel and property; control and movement of personnel and vehicles; support of the implementation of emergency plans; and the patrolling of restricted and limited access areas. Develops training courses based on regulation requirements and supervises necessary training for guard personnel in the use of weapons; protection against espionage, sabotage and other organized subversive actions; suppression of riots, demonstrations; traffic and crowd control; used of deadly force; the enforcement of appropriate laws as they apply to jurisdictional areas within the activity; use of and response to sophisticated electronic intrusion detection systems; search and seizure; enforcing personnel identification and control systems; and the performance of escort duties for sensitive items on and off the Activity. Performs managerial and administrative duties relating to the security guard force. Sets employee standards for performance and prepares performance evaluations. Takes appropriate disciplinary action for minor violations or makes recommendations in cases involving more serious infractions. Makes personnel adjustments to reflect workload changes. Recommends employees for training and awards as appropriate. (25%) [deletia]\n\n## Factor 5. Scope And Effect, Level 5-4, 225 Pts\n\nThe work involves evaluating security programs for Camp Stanley. The incumbent resolves a variety of problems, situations, or questions arising in the area of Physical Security and Antiterrorism. Work requires implementing and evaluating all phases of a units Physical Security program. The effect of the work is primarily to provide protection for people, property and information on Camp Stanley. Provides advice, guidance and procedures in relation to the safeguarding of personnel, property, facilities, information and operational details which affect the full scope of the organization's mission, multiple installation activities, state and federal law enforcement agencies, intelligence agency activities, public safety, international laws and National Security of the United States. The work involves developing practices, procedures and providing guidance that assures the safeguarding of national security information, intelligence sources and products, safeguarding of controlled weapons and ammunition, high dollar value property, vehicles, equipment storage areas, controlled chemical and biological substances, classified operating systems, and personnel. The incumbent conducts risk analysis surveys and vulnerability assessments of organizational activities, facilities and operations to determine the priority of funding and courses of actions required to preclude, eliminate and mitigate safety and security concerns. The specialist must analyze and evaluate new developments in procedures and systems to determine the impact to ongoing operations and procedures in assigned areas throughout an organization spread geographically over multiple states and overseas deployment areas. The purpose of the work of incumbent as the organizations security specialist is to interpret, enforce, and provide organizational guidance to existing national policies, guidance and regulations that govern the Information, Physical and Personnel Security Programs. Areas encompassed include special compartmented information and facilities, top secret control procedures, crime prevention controls, personnel security reliability and suitability, classified operating systems and accreditations, classified data transmission systems, communication security assurance, storage and safeguarding of controlled and classified material, and emergency response, operations and reporting for threats, loss and compromise to classified material and systems.\n\n## Factor 6. Personal Contacts, Level 6-3, 60 Pts\n\nContacts are with subordinates, Camp Stanley staff and Fort Sam Houston. Liaison with CID, Federal, State and local law enforcement and intelligence agencies is maintained on a routine basis. The incumbent also has contacts with individuals at tenant activities and other services, which may be co-located on the installation. Contacts that are not maintained on a routine basis are sometimes made at seminars, conferences and training courses. Factor 7. Purpose of Contacts, Level 7-3, 120 pts Contacts are for the purpose of resolving security issues, providing security information and guidance to subordinate units, and coordinating security matters with departments and other agencies. Other contacts involve investigating incidents, performing site assessments, resolving security support issues and problems, and to provide training. The purpose of contacts is to persuade program managers and other decision-making officials, with widely differing goals and interests, to follow a recommended course of action consistent with established security policies, objectives, and regulations. This level is exemplified by contacts with managers, often in an advisory relationship, for the purpose of briefing them on program plans and levels of spending or to change program plans so that security systems may be applied to greater advantage. Also covered at this level are contacts such as hearings and interviews to discuss and resolve derogatory or potentially derogatory information that may affect the ability to grant security clearances. At this level, persuasion and negotiation are necessary due to the presence of conflicting security, budgetary, and program objectives which must be resolved. Some employees present, explain, and defend controversial security policies and regulations at meetings and conferences with officials at higher levels of security program responsibility, and/or with officials from other agencies and private companies. [deletia]\n\n## Classifier's Notes:\n\nPer NC region guidance, mandatory use of signature blocks updated with a CURSORY review only in order to accommodate immediate recruitment. PD was originally classified by KEVIN P. WOLF, 6/1/2015. Original supervisory review: JASON D. SHIRLEY, 3/17/2015. kpw PD SUBJECT TO COMPREHENSIVE POSITION REVIEW BY CPAC TO VALIDATE CLASSIFICATION ACCURACY. Kpw [deletia]\n\n## Conditions Of Employment:\n\nPosition covered by the Lautenberg Amendment. This position authorizes the incumbent to carry a firearm. Any person who has been convicted of a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence cannot lawfully possess a firearm or ammunition (Title 18, U.S.C., Section 922(g)(91)). Candidates who have been convicted of a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence are not qualified for this position. Candidates under consideration will be required to certify whether they have ever been convicted of such an offense. False or fraudulent information provided by candidates is criminally punishable by fine or imprisonment (Title 18, U.S.C., Section 1001).\n\n## Qualifies And Trains With Special Weapons, Must Be Willing And Able To Qualify With The 9Mm Semi-Automatic Pistol. A Top Secret Security Clearance Must Be Obtained And Maintained.\n\nDrug Testing is required.\n\n## This Position Has Been Designated \"Mission Essential\". In The Event Of Severe Weather Conditions Or Other Such Emergency Type Situations (Natural Or Man-Made Disaster) The Incumbent Is Required To Report To Work Or Remain At Work As Scheduled To Support Mission Operations.\n\nIn accordance with AR 690-11, this position has been designated as \"Key\" and shall not be vacated during a national emergency or mobilization as doing so would seriously impair the capability of the organization to function effectively. The incumbent must be exempted from recall to active duty and will receive training to ensure mission accomplishment of sustaining base operations during mobilization. This position requires the completion of a pre-employment Physical Examination/Agility Test and an annual examination/test thereafter to ensure the continued, required level of physical health & ability or fitness to perform the duties of the position. [deletia]\nhttp://www.fornetjob.com/view.php?\n\njob_id=21985&printit=yes&auth_sess=37bb586e55d0a3a5bf49b7a40e20d062&ref=986eef28249e379cf3d862fe4\n\n## Job Title: Small Arms Repairer\n\nJob Category: Job description: Vacancy No.: NCFR137752431006150 Department: U.S. Army Joint Munitions Command Salary: $20.43 to $23.85 Grade: 10 to 10 Perm/Temp: Permanent FT/PT: Full-time\n\n## Open Date: 12/5/2013 Close Date: 12/14/2013\n\nJob Title: Small Arms Repairer Department: Department of the Army Agency: U.S. Army Joint Munitions Command Job Announcement Number: NCFR137752431006150 SALARY RANGE: $20.43 to $23.85 / Per Hour OPEN PERIOD: Thursday, December 05, 2013 to Saturday, December 14, 2013 SERIES & GRADE: WG-6610-10 POSITION INFORMATION: Full Time - Permanent DUTY LOCATIONS: 1 vacancy in the following location: San Antonio, TX WHO MAY APPLY: Status Candidates (Merit Promotion and VEOA Eligibles) SECURITY CLEARANCE: Not Applicable [but see below] SUPERVISORY STATUS: No JOB SUMMARY: Civilian employees serve a vital role in supporting the Army mission. They provide the skills that are not readily available in the military, but crucial to support military operations. The Army integrates the talents and skills of its military and civilian members to form a Total Army. About the Position: The position is located at Camp Stanley located approximately 25 miles north of downtown San Antonio, TX off of Interstate 10. Work involves the full range of the maintenance, adjustment, overhaul, disassembly, rebuild, modification and repair of small arms and artillery. Adherence to safety rules, regulations and procedures. Testing and evaluating new equipment. Responsible for issue, accountability, storage and security of weapons and ammunition. Work involves lifting 15 to 20 pounds, and often carrying items weighing up to 50 pounds. Requires walking, bending, and long periods of standing ability to operate heavy vehicles. DUTIES: You will perform the full range of the maintenance, adjustment, overhaul, disassembly, rebuild, modification and repair of small arms and artillery. Receive guidance in making initial diagnosis and locates mechanical deficiencies and malfunction in automatic pistols, revolvers, shotguns, carbines, automatic rifles, submachine and machine guns, mortars, recoilless rifles, rocket launchers, M107 and M122 rocket launchers [*], etc. Examine for defects, mechanical misalignment and malfunctions; replace barrels, stocks and other parts and assemblies; modifies small weapons by replacing obsolete parts and/or assemblies; uses hand and machine tools, precision gages and test instruments, land jigs and alignment devices in making repairs modifications, and adjustments; applies acids and/or other bluing or finishing agents safely properly. Observe all safety rules, regulations and procedures. Test and evaluate new equipment. Responsible for issue, accountability, storage and security of weapons and ammunition. Work involves lifting 15 to 20 pounds, and often carrying items weighing up to 50 pounds. Requires walking, bending, andlong periods of standing ability to operate heavy vehicles. QUALIFICATIONS REQUIRED: Ability to perform the Small Arms Repair position without more than normal supervision. Knowledge of Equipment Assembly, Installation, Repair etc. Technical Practices (theoretical, precise, artistic) Use of Measuring Instruments Ability to Interpret Instructions, Specification, etc (Includes reading blueprints) Ability to use and maintain Tools and Equipment Trouble shooting Frequently lift subassemblies or small weapons weighing 7 to 9kilograms (15 to 20 pounds). They often carry large assemblies or weapons weighing up to 23 kilograms (50 pounds). Work requires walking, bending, andlong periods of standing. Stand on concrete floors or other hard surfaces for long periods. They are exposed to oil, grease, and solvents when cleaning and lubricating weapons. They are frequently exposed to the possibility of minor cuts and bruises from tools or sharp edges of metal. They are subject to noise when test firing weapons. Other Requirements: Click here forexpanded definitions.  Male applicants born after December 31, 1959 must complete a Pre-Employment Certification Statement for Selective Service Registration.  You will be required to provide proof of U.S. Citizenship.  One year trial/probationary period may be required.  Direct Deposit of Pay is Required.  This position is covered by the civilian drug abuse testing program.  This position is covered by the  Lautenberg Amendment to the Gun Control Act of 1968.  This position requires the incumbent to obtain and maintain a Secret security clearance. AGENCY CONTACT INFO: Central Resume Processing Center Phone: (410)306-0137 Email: USARMY.APG.CHRA-NE.MBX.APPLICANTHELP@MAIL.MIL Agency Information: W39003 Camp Stanley Sup Stor Actv 25800 Ralph Fair Road Boerne, TX 78015 [*] Comment: \"M107 and M122 rocket launchers\" may mean launchers for the ubiquitous 107mm and 122mm artillery rockets. In the context of the other weapons specified, these launchers would probably be in the single-tube or at most double-tube (for the 107 mm launcher) versions. 107mm launcher                                                                                                           122mm launcher\nJob Description Armament Equipment Repairer Department of the Army U.S. Army Joint Munitions Command Camp Stanley Storage Activity ##### Open & closing dates 09/13/2019 to 09/23/2019 ##### Pay scale & grade WG 11 ##### Salary $23.85 to $27.83 per hour 1 vacancy in the following location: - Boerne, TX About the Position: The incumbent of this position will serve as a Armament Equipment Repairer at Camp Stanley Boerne, TX. Testing and inspecting a wide variety of standard and non-standard weapons. Applies a high degree of skill in precision fitting and finishing of new and modified components to very close tolerance. Redesigns and modifies components of weapons until firing function has accomplished the degree of performance desired.\n\n## Responsibilities\n\n    Perform full range of work involved in the complete rebuild, modification, repair, inspection, and testing for all types of small arms and artillery systems. Plan and lay out work making drawings and indicating tolerances for the making of parts that are to be fabricated in the Machine Shop.\n\n    Conduct inventories of weapons and ammunition in accordance with regulations.\n    Identify proper shooting posture and balance of weapons to lay out wooden stocks and handgrips to the personal specification of the user. Take weapon to firing range and test fires for evaluation of performance. Occasionally drives 1/2 to 5-ton truck to transport supplies.\n\n## Travel Required\n\n50% or less - You may be expected to travel for this position. #### Job family (Series) 6601 Miscellaneous Armament Work Conditions of Employment Position requires a Secret Security Clearance. This position requires the completion of a pre-employment Physical Examination and an annual examination thereafter to ensure the continued, required level of physical health and ability or fitness to perform the duties of the position. The duties of this position require the incumbent to possess or obtain and maintain a valid state Driver's License.\n\n## Position Requires Travel Up To 50% Of The Time. Must Be Willing To Travel Overseas. This Position Requires The Ability To Obtain And Maintain An Official Us Passport.\n\n    This position requires specific immunizations for foreign travel.\n\n## Physical Effort: Work Involves Lifting Subassemblies Or Small Weapons Weighing 15 To 20 Pounds, And Often Carrying Large Assemblies And Weapons Weighing Up To 50 Pounds. Work Requires Walking, Bending, And Long Periods Of Standing.\n\n    Working Conditions: Work is performed for a preponderance of time in well-lighted and ventilated shops with occasional trips to firing ranges; shop floors are usually of cement construction. Exposure to excessive noise from test firing weapons; possible injury due to handling tools and weapons; contact with dirt, grease, dust, and fumes; and more serious injury when unloading jammed or misfired weapons, ricochet bullets, and acids.\n\n## Education\n\nThis job does not have an education qualification requirement.\n\nJob Title:  Munitions Inspector Leader Department:  Department of the Army Agency:  U.S. Army Joint Munitions Command Hiring Organization:  Camp Stanley Job Announcement Number:  NCFR142104881197030 SALARY RANGE: $22.48 to $26.23 / Per Hour OPEN PERIOD: Wednesday, August 27, 2014 to Sunday, September 7, 2014 SERIES & GRADE: WL-6501-10 POSITION INFORMATION: Full Time - Permanent DUTY LOCATIONS: 1 vacancy in the following location: San Antonio, TX [deletia] SECURITY CLEARANCE: Secret SUPERVISORY STATUS: No JOB SUMMARY:Civilian employees serve a vital role in supporting the Army mission. They provide the skills that are not readily available in the military, but crucial to support military operations. The Army integrates the talents and skills of its military and civilian members to form a Total Army. About the Position: The position is located at Camp Stanley and is approximately 25 miles north of downtown San Antonio, TX off of Interstate 10. [deletia] DUTIES: You will work as part of the crews and check work in progress and, when finished; check for compliance with the Quality Assurance Specialist (Ammunition Surveillance) (QASAS) instructions on work sequence, procedures, methods, and deadlines. The leader monitor and work with the munitions inspectors in completing periodic inspections (PI), storage monitoring inspections (SMI) and special inspections (SIS) and any related testing. The leader may assist the QASAS in reassembling and re-packing ammunition items. The information will be properly documented and provided to the QASAS. As the leader you will also monitor and work with the munitions inspectors in completing function testing of non-standard ammunition and components. The leader monitor and work with the munitions inspectors in conducting inspection of ammunition operations and shipping operations to assure they are conducted in accordance with approved operating procedures; the leader will also monitor and work with the munitions inspectors to assure proper storage of ammunition and explosives as conducted by the munitions storage and movement branch (MSMB).\n\n## Qualifications Required:\n\nScreen Out Element: Ability to Do the Work of a Munitions Inspector Leader without More Than Normal Supervision K,S,A,Cs:\n\n1. Knowledge of Equipment Assembly, Installation, Repair etc. 2. Technical Practices (theoretical, precise, artistic) 3. Use of Measuring Instruments 4. Ability to Interpret Instruction, Specifications, etc. (other than blueprints) 5. Knowledge of Materials 6. Dexterity and Safety\nPHYSICAL EFFORT: Work involves lifting and carrying of items weighing up to 40 pounds; loading and unloading items, etc. Work involves standing, reaching, bending, stooping, etc., and using machines and hand tools. WORKING CONDITIONS: Works inside and outside and is subject to extreme weather conditions and exposure to dirt, grease, and noise from machinery. Works with and in close proximity to unusually hazardous materials; may require use of a respirator due to odor or fumes. Must exercise extreme care to prevent fires, explosions, etc. that could result in serious injury, dismemberment, and/or loss of life to self and/or other workers. Is required to wear protective clothing that is specially made and treated for working on and around explosives (safety shoes, glasses, gas masks, coveralls, etc.) [deletia]\njob_id=83291&type=search&auth_sess=8b87f3ac713f19ddd0ea2e6be56d0c71&ref=4f968413599b2aa551ec5a293\nJob details Explosives Operator Driver:Gov Job description: Vacancy No.: NCFR144639341292285 Department: U.S. Army Joint Munitions Command Salary: $18.14 to $21.16 Grade: 08 to 08 Perm/Temp: Permanent FT/PT: Full-time\n\n## Open Date: 12/31/2014 Close Date: 1/11/2015\n\nJob Title:Explosives Operator (Driver) Department:Department of the Army Agency:U.S. Army Joint Munitions Command Job Announcement Number:NCFR144639341292285 SALARY RANGE: $18.14 to $21.16 / Per Hour OPEN PERIOD: Wednesday, December 31, 2014 to Sunday, January 11, 2015 SERIES & GRADE: WG-6502-08 POSITION INFORMATION: Full Time - Permanent DUTY LOCATIONS: 1 vacancy in the following location: San Antonio, TX WHO MAY APPLY: See \"Who May Apply\" section [omitted] SECURITY CLEARANCE: Secret SUPERVISORY STATUS: No JOB SUMMARY: Civilian employees serve a vital role in supporting the Army mission. They provide the skills that are not readily available in the military, but crucial to support military operations. The Army integrates the talents and skills of its military and civilian members to form a Total Army. About the Position: The position is located at Camp Stanley and is approximately 25 miles north ofdowntown San Antonio, TX off of Interstate 10. Work involves performing duties involving the renovation, demilitarization, modification and normal maintenance of a variety of ammunition and explosives; destruction of munitions and components; and assembly of ammunition and explosives, including the unpacking inspecting, and repacking for shipment. [deletia] DUTIES: You will perform duties involving the renovation, demilitarization, modification and normal maintenance of a variety of ammunition and explosives; destruction of munitions and components; and assembly of ammunition and explosives, including the unpacking inspecting, and repacking for shipment. Disassemble and break down ammunition such as artillery shells ranging from 57MM to 76MM by operating pull-apart or breakdown machines to separate projectile from case. Removes fuses by unscrewing, pulling or drilling. Operates behind barricade by manipulating remote control devices, tools and jigs. Refuse by installing new fuse from barricade by remote control equipment. Individually or as member of crew on assembly line, without protective barricades removes boosters' primers, cartridges or other assemblies or components from items such as artillery shells, rockets, mortars, grenades, and re-installs or inserts new assemblies or components. Occasionally required to seal fuse, projectile or other component with casing, using sealing compounds. Exercise extreme care in performing the which above operations to prevent accident or explosions could result in serious injury and/or loss of life to self or co-workers as the items have been declared unusable and/or unserviceable prior to the operations described, and are unusually hazardous. Sorts disassembled components or completely renovated items into trays, tote boxes or other receptacles for transfer to storage, shipment operations or demolition. Performs normal maintenance on a variety of items. When required, performs warehouseman duties in connection with the receipt, storage, and maintenance in storage of General Supply and/or ammunition items. Assist in ammunition destroying operations by burning and/or detonation. Places bulk, boxed, or washed out powders and explosives and various caliber of small arms ammunition and components such-as fuses, primers, boosters, and detonators in burning pit. Prepare items such as rocket heads, mines, bombs, and artillery shells for detonation. QUALIFICATIONS REQUIRED: Experience refers to paid and unpaid experience, including volunteer work done through National Service programs (e.g., Peace Corps, AmeriCorps) and other organizations (e.g., professional; philanthropic; religious; spiritual; community; student; social). You will receive credit for all qualifying experience, including volunteer experience.\n\nAbility to do the work of an Explosives Operator (driver) position without more than normal supervision K,S,A,Cs: 1. Knowledge of machines used in explosive operations 2. Skill in operating tractor trailer or truck and full trailer combinations 3. Knowledge of ammunition and explosives 4. Knowledge of warehouseman duties\nPhysical effort:Position is required to reach, bend, turn or move hands, arms, feet and legs to operate hand and foot controls. Long periods of sitting are necessary while operating the vehicles. Frequently lifts objects up to 80 pounds. While working on production lines, the incumbent must frequently stand for extended periods, and work with a rhythmic set pace, reaching, bending, and manipulating parts. Careful attention is required in eye-hand coordinating, and in setting and attaching detonating and/or initiating devices to explosives. Working Conditions: Work is performed inside and outside in a variety of weather conditions and on various terrains. Drives in all types of traffic and weather. Exposed to the possibility of serious accidents and is subject to cuts, bruises and broken bones. Incumbent is required to wear protective clothing such as safety shoes. Since ammunition and explosives which are being renovated, modified, demilitarized or destroyed are almost always in an unserviceable condition, the incumbent is exposed to accident and explosions, which could cause serious injury, dismemberment, and/or loss of life to himself and/or his co-workers. Also subject to hazards of working with industrial and production type equipment, power conveyors, powered hand tools. Occasionally is subject to health hazards from dust or fumes from paint or lacquers. Also exposed to hazardous noise level. Wears hearing protective devices during noise hazardous operations. Receives routine periodic hearing evaluation at installation medical facility. Other Requirements: Click here forexpanded definitions.  Male applicants born after December 31, 1959 must complete a Pre-Employment Certification Statement for Selective Service Registration.  You will be required to provide proof of U.S. Citizenship.  One year trial/probationary period may be required.  Direct Deposit of Pay is Required.  A valid CDL driver's license with HAZMAT endorsement is required  Incumbent is subject to physical examination  This position requires a Secret clearance. Must obtain/maintain a Secret security clearance  This position is covered by the civilian drug abuse testing program. Incumbent is required to sign a DA Form 5019-R, Condition of Employment for certain civilian positions identified as critical under the Drug Abuse Testing Program  This position is covered by the 1996 Lautenberg Amendment to the Gun Control Act of 1968. Persons convicted of a misdemeanor or felony crime of domestic violence are not eligible for the position  Duties of this position require the incumbent to obtain and retain a valid state commercial driver's license to operate vehicles exceeding 26001 pounds of gross weight rating, vehicles used to transport 15 or more passengers, and or any vehicles on which placards are required per 49 CFR, Part 172, Subpart F, used to transport hazardous materials. [deletia] AGENCY CONTACT INFO: Central Resume Processing Center Phone: (410)306-0137 TDD: (410)306-0137 Email: USARMY.APG.CHRA-NE.MBX.APPLICANTHELP@MAIL.MIL Agency Information: W39003 Camp Stanley Sup Stor Actv 25800 Ralph Fair Road Boerne, TX 78015 [deletia]\nCamp Bullis Joint Land Use Study City of San Antonio Office of Economic Adjustment Department of Defense Adopted by San Antonio City Council on June 18, 2009 [EXCERPT] Camp Bullis and Camp Stanley are contiguous Army facilities located approximately 21 miles northeast of downtown San Antonio. They were once managed as one installation, known as the Leon Springs Military Reservation; however, they are now separate facilities, each with their own mission and managed by separate commands (see Figure 22). Camp Stanley is not a field training facility; rather, it is a weapons and munitions supply, maintenance, test, and storage facility. The site includes 4,000 acres with 630,000 square feet of storage space and supports many military activities. Camp Stanley's workforce has no active duty military personnel, so is supported by civil service employees and contractors. Camp Stanley has industrial buildings, ammunition storage structures, and small arms ranges to facilitate weapons and ammunition testing for quality assurance purposes.\n\nhttp://lubbockonline.com/stories/082701/sta_0827010072.shtml Army passes out bottled water to offset tainted wells Published: Monday, August 27, 2001 Associated Press SAN ANTONIO {AP} Because of chemical contamination, the Army has distributed bottled water and filtered wells for residents near Camp Stanley.\n\n## [Deletia]\n\nSo far, five off-site wells - the most heavily contaminated of which is less than a half mile from the facility - have tested positive for degreasing solvents such as perchloroethene (PCE) and trichloroethene (TCE), said Lt. Col. Jason Shirley, the installation commander.\n\n## [Deletia]\n\nFormally known as Camp Stanley Storage Activity, the 4,004-acre post is part of the Army's Tank-Automotive and Armaments Command.\n\n## The Facility Tests, Fires And Overhauls Ammunition And Weapons, Shirley Said. \"They'Ve Been Conducting Maintenance Operations On This Installation Since The 1950S,\" He Said.\n\nIn 1995, Stanley stopped using the chlorinated solvents that now have drifted beyond the post's boundaries, replacing them with an environmentally friendly citrus-based solvent.\n\nhttps://www.usaopps.com/government_contractors/contractor-5327686-JC-S-ENVIRONMENTAL- TECHNOLOGIES.htm\n\n## Contracts\n\n13--7.62x39 BALL, 7.62x39 BLANK and 9x18mm BALL Non-Standard Ammunition. Solicitation Number: W15QKN13T8515 Agency: Department of the Army Office: Army Contracting Command Location: ACC - New Jersey Solicitation Number: W15QKN13T8515 Notice Type: Combined Synopsis/Solicitation Synopsis: Added: Jul 18, 2013 8:16 am This is a combined synopsis/solicitation for commercial items prepared in accordance with the format in Subpart 12.6, as supplemented with additional information included in this notice. This announcement constitutes the only solicitation; proposals are being requested and a written solicitation will not be issued.\n\n## The U. S. Army Contracting Command - New Jersey, Picatinny Arsenal, Nj, In Support Of Pd Non-Standard Ammunition (Pd-Nsa), Intends To Issue A Solicitation To All Existing Basic Ordering Agreement (Boa) Holders For Acquisition Of Non Standard Ammuntion, Ammunition Related Items & Mortar Weapon Systems To Procure The Following:\n\n1. 2,000,000 each 7.62x39mm Ball, delivered to Camp Stanley in Boerne, TX 2. 550,000 each 7.62x39mm Ball, delivered to Blue Grass Army Depot 3. 575,000 each 7.62x39mm Blank, delivered to Blue Grass Army Depot 4. 425,000 each 9x18mm Ball, delivered to Blue Grass Army Depot\nPlease note that only contractors that have received previously established Basic Ordering Agreements (BOAs) under W15QKN-12-X-C004 will be issued a solicitation. If you believe you are capable of supplying the abovementioned Non- Standard Ammunition (NSA), please respond to the Government's open and continuous sources sought notice, W15QKN- 12-X-C008 and follow the detailed instructions. Responses to the sources sought notice will be assessed to determine the contractor's capabilities, and if determined capable, the contractor will be awarded a BOA. The proposed contract action is for supplies for which the Government intends to solicit under the authority of FAR 16.703. The Government expects to award a Firm Fixed Price contract to the offeror that provides the best value to the Government. This notice of intent is not a request for competitive proposals. In addition, the Government will not pay for any information provided under this notice. The point of contact for this requirement is Mr. Donald Gurry, Contract Specialist, ACC-NJ-MA, Bldg 10, Picatinny Arsenal, NJ 07806-5000; Email: donald.h.gurry.civ@mail.mil. Contracting Office Address: ACC - New Jersey, Center for Contracting and Commerce, Building 10 Phipps RD, Picatinny Arsenal, NJ 07806-5000 Place of Performance: ACC - New Jersey Center for Contracting and Commerce, Building 10 Phipps RD Picatinny Arsenal NJ 07806-5000 US Point of Contact(s): Donald Gurry, 973-724-4267 ACC - New Jersey [Comment: 7.62x39mm ammunition is used by the AK-47 and other Soviet-era weapons. 9x18mm is used by Makarov pistols and various submachine guns.]\nComment: The above solicitation for 2,550,000 7.68x39mm rounds may be related to the below solicitation for AK magazines. Note, however, that the quantity of rounds is much too small to correspond to the total magazine capacity. 10--AK Rifle Magazines Solicitation Number: W15QKN13T8513 Agency: Department of the Army Office: Army Contracting Command Location: ACC - New Jersey Solicitation Number: W15QKN13T8513 Notice Type: Combined Synopsis/Solicitation Synopsis: Added: Jul 29, 2013 9:07 am This is a combined synopsis/solicitation for commercial items prepared in accordance with the format in Subpart 12.6, as supplemented with additional information included in this notice. This announcement constitutes the only solicitation; proposals are being requested and a written solicitation will not be issued. The U. S. Army Contracting Command - New Jersey, Picatinny Arsenal, NJ, in support of the U.S. Army Research Development Engineering Command Armament Research Development and Engineering Center (RDECOM-ARDEC) and Several Program Offices, intends to issue a solicitation to all Basic Ordering Agreement (BOA) holders to procure the following:\n\n## 1. 592,825 (Approx) Ak Rifle Magazines: 7.62X39Mm Caliber, New Production, Steel, 30 Round Capacity\n\nJob Title:Management and Program Assistant (Office Automation) Department:Department of the Army Agency:U.S. Army Joint Munitions Command Hiring Organization:Camp Stanley Storage Activity Job Announcement Number:NCFR141396271171405 SALARY RANGE:\n$43,389.00 to $56,406.00 / Per Year OPEN PERIOD: Tuesday, July 22, 2014 to Thursday, July 31, 2014 SERIES & GRADE:\nGS-0344-08\nPOSITION INFORMATION:\nFull Time - Permanent DUTY LOCATIONS:\n1 vacancy in the following location: San Antonio, TX\nSECURITY CLEARANCE:\nSecret SUPERVISORY STATUS:\nNo JOB SUMMARY: [deletia]\n\n## Serves As The Primary Assistant To The Chief, Logistics Division, Camp Stanley Storage Activity, Providing Support For Both The Logistics And Operation In The Areas Of Program Assistance, Financial And Administrative Services, Functions And Office Administration\n\n[deletia]\n\n## Travel Required Not Required\n\nRELOCATION AUTHORIZED No\n\n## Key Requirements\n\n    This position requires a Secret Security Clearance You must be a qualified typist and be able to type at least 40 WPM This position requires compliance with the Lautenberg Amendment This position requires initial and random drug testing\n\n## Duties:\n\nAs the Management and Program Assistant (OA) you will review administrative regulations, procedures and policy directives to determine applicability to the Divisions. Maintain the Division's internal and external SOPs. Assist in conducting studies, compiling data for problem analysis, and administrative improvement within the Divisions. Maintains, gathers, and compiles records of information. Prepares charts, graphs, and narrative information, and interviews personnel to collect information. Analyze the fiscal year operating budget for the divisions. Controls or monitors various continuing or periodic programs for the Divisions. Perform a variety of duties to assist 2 Division Chiefs in accomplishing Division responsibilities. Make the disposition on calls and callers for the Divisions and other division personnel, as necessary. Assist in providing logistical and administrative support for any Division training or conference events. Work with the Training Officer for training attendance of Division personnel.\n\n## Qualifications Required:\n\nIn order to qualify, you must meet the experience requirements described below.  Your resume must clearly describe your relevant experience.  Additional information about transcripts is in this document. Experience required: To qualify based on your work experience, your resume must describe at least one year of experience which prepared you to do the work in this job.  Specialized experience is defined as: experience in managing automated systems and software, apply appropriate software, databases, spreadsheets, calendars, etc; ability to integrate multiple software types into a single documents, retrieve data, and address automation issues; operate programs, missions, objectives and requirements, and functions of subordinate organizations in order to track progress in meeting hiring or contract action/approvals and goals; use basic math in order to review and evaluate the quality of data using acquired knowledge and basic statistical techniques. Experience in data gathering methods, such as standard interviewing or surveying techniques, to collect various types of factual information such as management and performance indicators as they relate to the strategic planning process. This definition of specialized experience is typical of work performed at the next lower grade/level position in the federal service (GS-07). You will be evaluated on the basis of your level of competency (knowledge, skills, abilities) in the following areas:\n\n    Knowledge of various office automation software, programs, and techniques Ability to research data Ability to communicate orally Ability to communicate in writing\nTime in Grade Requirement: Applicants who have held a General Schedule (GS) position within the last 52 weeks must have 52 weeks of Federal service at the next lower grade (or equivalent). [deletia] AGENCY CONTACT INFO: Central Resume Processing Center Phone: (410)306-0137 TDD: (410)306-0137 Email: USARMY.APG.CHRA-NE.MBX.APPLICANTHELP@MAIL.MIL Agency Information: DA NCR Fort Sam Houston Fort Sam Houston Civilian Personnel Advisory Center 2438 Stanley Rd Bldg 144 Fort Sam Houston, TX 78234-5022\n\n## Position Duties: Supervisory Controls:\n\nChief of Public Works, responsible for all staff and work related to Installation maintenance. Works under the general supervision of the Chief, Logistics Support Division. Receives assignments in the form of general objectives to be achieved. Discusses matters of precedent or policy with supervisor, but generally plans and conducts programs on own initiative. Confers with the Chief on overall organization and planning for accomplishment of work. Informs supervisor of status of contract modifications, engineering construction, and design problems. Work is reviewed and evaluated by periodic discussion or program accomplishments, review of completed documents, soundness of decisions and recommendations made, and adherence to administrative policy.\n\n## Major Duties:\n\nUtilizing a broad subject matter knowledge of construction management theories and practices, as well as a practical knowledge of construction methods, equipment and materials, serves as a construction representative with overall responsibility for maintaining long-term and day-to-day surveillance over the full range of office and field activities associated with contract construction activities for a large number of projects . Projects under contract are large dollar volume contracts containing numerous separate or subcontracts, and normally involve complex and diverse construction for administrative and technical buildings. The work is made more complex by fast track requirements to meet user dates. Directs a staff of construction engineers, technicians, and construction representatives in support of the wide-scoped and diverse construction function. The proper sequencing of projects and contracts often requires large fluctuations in manpower and other construction resources, requiring stringent management oversight. Weather conditions are seasonally extreme, complicating personnel issues and necessitating specialized or state-of-art construction technology. Directs a staff of technicians in support of the region and a wide-scope of diverse public work facility maintenance functions. Ensures the proper sequencing of projects and contracts, often requiring large fluctuations in manpower, contract execution and other construction resources, requiring stringent management oversight. 1. Actively participates in extensive construction and engineering management decisions relative to the military and civil construction missions. Performs and/or directs the full range of field construction and engineering functions. Schedules and coordinates the work of lower graded engineers and technicians. Interprets and conforms established policies, regulatory guides and accepted construction management practices. Recommends approval for design changes, or substitutions of equipment and materials. Coordinates work with the using agency and other elements of the district. Resolves differences of opinions with contractors. Ensures deadlines are met. Spot checks work in progress and makes follow-up assignments. Personally performs the more complex and controversial assignments. a. Directs the full range of field and office engineering functions, delegating responsibility to subordinate project leaders. Provides advice and guidance to lower graded surveillance and technical personnel on construction engineering, maintenance, and administrative problems. Responsible and accountable for the following functions: participating in design review conferences with customers, the District Office, and private A-E firms design engineers, to discuss construction aspects of design and foreseeable problems; from the construction standpoint, provides expert advice and assistance in solving complex and critical design problems; reviewing project plans and specifications prior to contract advertisement to determine such things as practicability from a construction viewpoint, whether physical obstructions or other construction difficulties have been anticipated, and whether materials selected are readily available; conducting pre-bid opening conferences and site visits to discuss and clarify principal construction features, and inform contractors of requirements concerning construction scheduling, progress reporting, safety measures, wage and hour law observance, labor relations, payroll records, and quality control procedures; conducts pre-construction conferences on new contracts, purchase orders, etc., to clarify principle construction features, start-up administrative and contract technical requirements, and to identify interface and coordination requirements among the customer, contractor, and Resident; exercising overall coordination of construction planning and scheduling with contractors, and other agencies involved; and, observing, investigating, and inspecting construction sites at all stages to identify major problems, and taking timely corrective action to ensure construction remains on schedule. b. Coordinates approval of contractors construction schedules, safety program, quality control procedures, identify and record regional facilities infrastructure layouts, and road systems; making controlling interpretations of intent of plans and specifications, and final engineering determinations on whether methods and materials employed meet requirements of contract specifications, and results in sound and safe structures; determining that contractor's operations comply with wage and hour, equal employment opportunity, or other labor laws and regulations; determining that contractors are properly recording work accomplished, and materials used. Exercises surveillance to assure the Contractor is conducting quality control operations to produce work in conformance with plans and specifications. Ascertains that quality assurance reports, required quality tests, and activities are consistent with the project Quality Assurance Plan. Coordinates and directs Contract Construction Management Services (CMS) personnel to achieve the same Resident Office objectives as that of all Government personnel. Integrates CMS hires into the everyday administration of the contract. Forecasts future workload and recommends to the Resident Engineer necessary staff changes to meet future needs. Brings any deficiency to the attention of the Contractor and extracts compliance. When non-compliance occurs, initiates and authorizes stop work orders. Reviews contract changes proposed by contractor and recommended by subordinates; approves Government estimates on changes; and negotiates with contractor on terms and prices. Negotiates and prepares modifications of unlimited dollar value, and submits same for Contracting Officers signature. Recommend contract payments and provides documentation and information to support final payments. Prepares final decisions of the Contracting Officer for processing. Approves contract program payments, including final payments. Makes final inspections of completed projects, and makes recommendation to the contracting officer, assists in the preparation of acceptance certificates relieving contractor of further obligations. c. Extensive knowledge of contracting methods, procedures, monitoring, and documentation, as related to accomplishment of facilities and infrastructure duties. d. Serves as an expert and advisor to director, managers, supervisor and other agency personnel. Functions require extensive coordination with regional, installation, and tenants, environmental regulatory requirements, and other activities or services to discuss program concepts and details, changes in requirements or controversial matters relating to projects. Makes decisions and commitments within assigned mission responsibility. Negotiates satisfactory solutions to critical issues. 75% 2. Manages and plans work to be accomplished through approximately 20 subordinates, set priorities, schedules work phases, and makes work assignments based on urgency of the work and subordinates' capabilities to technical and skilled employees. Sets performance standards and evaluates subordinate work against these standards. Instructs, advises, and/or counsels employees on both technical and administrative matters. Hears and resolves complaints, referring more serious complaints to the Division Chief. Reviews position descriptions and ensures accuracy; participates in interviews for candidates for jobs; makes selection and/or recommendations for appointments, promotions, or reassignments. Identifies training requirements, and ensures that proper training of employees is accomplished within the constraints of monetary limitations. Ensures that subordinates comply with applicable safety standards and practices. 25%\n\n## Position Evaluation:\n\n**DCA override applicable for recruitment action of A/N Ticket 45549.23 May 2017.RECRUIT only. Do not use PD for any other purpose. PD will be archived upon vacancy.**\n\n## Evaulation Statement Supv Construction Control Rep, Gs-0809-13 Camp Stanley Storage Activity\n\n1. References. OPM PCS Technical Work Engineering and Architecture Group, May 2007; Administrative Analysis Grade Evaluation Guide, TS-98 August 1990; and General Schedule Supervisory Guide, HRCD-5 June 1998, April 1998. [deletia] 4. Summary. [deletia] Final Classification Determination: Supv Construction Control Representative, GS-0809-12. Kevin P. Wolf Chief, Classification Branch Fort Sam Houston Civilian Personnel Advisory Center (CPAC) ******************* MAACP-K MEMORANDUM FOR FORT SAM HOUSTON, CPAC, Mr. Kevin Wolf SUBJECT: Application of Delegated Classification Authority for Supervisory Construction Control Representative, GS- 0809-13, Camp Stanley Storage Activity 1. The Fort Sam Houston CPAC issued a classification advisory regarding the Supervisory Construction Control Representative position that was submitted for Camp Stanley Storage Activity. The CPAC's application of the Job Grading Standards Guide against the draft position description (PD) submitted by Camp Stanley Storage Activity, resulted in agreement on seven of the nine factors. The CPAC's lowering of the levels in disagreement of resulted in an assignment of GS-12 rather than GS-13. CPAC is in agreement with the below six factors. [deletia] 6. The position meets the point requirements for the GS-13. I understand that as the Camp Stanley's DCA authority designee, I have the responsibility and accountability for determining final classification of this position. I approve the position description as submitted and classify it as a Supervisory Construction Control Representative, GS-0809-13. JASON D. SHIRLEY GS-15 Installation Manager\n\n## Major Duties:\n\nServes as a Guard, assigned to the Support Division, Camp Stanley Storage Activity, a medium sized ammunition storage installation with restricted access. This position is responsible for the protection of government personnel, property and technologies against such hazards as: sabotage, espionage, theft, accidental or willful damage and destruction. 1. Stands guard at a variety of fixed posts, and patrol assignments within the installation, exercising those stringent security measures necessary to monitor and provide appropriate level of control of the personnel and vehicles on the installation. Restricts admission during 1st, 2nd and 3rd shift operation to persons who have displayed proper identification and or been verified by CSSA Management. Controls access to highly sensitive restricted areas where there is potential for significant breach of national security, or danger to public safety or public health. Directs and restricts visitors to appropriate destinations. Checks truck cargo to insure that only authorized materials enter or leave the post. Operates state of the art traffic control devices to regulate the flow of traffic entering and leaving the installation. Incumbent is actively involved in Anti-Terrorism/Force Protection Measures. Initiates Random Anti-Terrorism Measures as directed by the Installation Manager. Must be aware of recent terrorist activities in the local area. Conducts MEVA security/safety checks to include restricted and classified areas. Guards and protects Federally owned property, buildings and equipment against trespass, theft, fire, and accidental or willful damage or destruction. Monitors access to premises by verifying authorization using locally established several badging systems that act as checks and balances on one another that eliminate breach opportunity. Badge spot checks, Random Vehicle Inspections, checks on out-going equipment verified by authorized property passes, ensure compliance with mandatory procedures. Preliminary investigations are accomplished on rules and policy violations as well as vehicle accidents. Closely observes a vast perimeter to prevent the possibility of attempts at espionage, sabotage or unlawful intrusion. Responds to emergency situations, skillfully applying seasoned knowledge of security procedures, jurisdiction, search and seizure, weapons, bombs, incendiary devices, and methods for the preservation of evidence. Routinely responds to calls of unexploded ordinance found around the camp. Qualifies and trains with the 9mm Semi-Automatic Pistol and familiarizes with the shotgun. Remains current and cognizant of Federal and State Laws, rules, regulations and techniques common to all security functions and necessary to protection of property, personnel and technologies at this installation. Advises and assists lower graded security personnel in the performance of their duties. Keeps the shift supervisor informed of progress regarding on-going assignments. (45%) 2. Provides armed guard services for protection of employees, visitors, contractors and VIPs and government property within the CSSA highly restricted areas. Performs foot patrols, insuring the interior security of the installation buildings. Utilizes knowledge of deployed security measures to detect faulty equipment and identify potential security problems. Inspects areas containing documents, equipment and technologies that are sensitive to the security of Camp Stanley Storage Activity, its tenants and the national security. Patrols all areas responsible for checking and securing external doors and windows, turns off all unnecessary lighting, check for security violations such as unsecured sensitive material. Patrols CSSA grounds by vehicle applying sound knowledge of the principles, methods and techniques of security. Detains violators and transfers custody to the appropriate law enforcement agency with jurisdiction in the particular instance. Performs armed escort duty for weapons and/or ammunition on and off premises. Uses seasoned experience to provide input and assist the supervisor in the development and refinement of local procedures regarding security matters. Performs other duties as assigned. (30%) 3. Monitors personnel access into restricted areas (e.g., munition storage, SCIFs, etc.) using manual and electronic methods i.e., door access control, intrusion detection systems (IDS). Alerts patrols and supervisors of suspicious activities, unauthorized entry, fires, or other hazards. Tactfully challenges individuals not displaying a properly issued CSSA identification badge and/or in response to IDS alarms. Reports personnel without proper identification to proper authorities. Tactfully challenges individuals not displaying CSSA identification badges. Detains individuals involved in alarm situations and releases to appropriate agencies. Ensures incident or accident scenes are safeguarded until released to proper authorities. Provided initial report data concerning the situation to the on-duty supervisor. Maintains a personal log to pass on correct information. Will perform duties as static post guard and patrol duties: Directs visitors, vendors, and contractors to the appropriate sponsoring office when needed. Conducts periodic parcel, package, container, and equipment checks following prescribed special procedures to ensure only authorized property is brought into or removed from the facility. Conducts communications checks following prescribed schedule and procedures. Secures found property, weapons or contraband until it can be released to appropriate agency. Provides security during VIP visits or during sensitive equipment or supply movements. Follows prescribed special procedures to ensure the safety of personnel and protection of government property in the event of an emergency (i.e., military conflict, fire, and/bomb threat, or severe inclement weather). This may include assigned weapon use, staffing posts to control building entry, effecting orderly evacuation, alarm activation, and use of fire extinguisher. Assist with enforcing parking policies. (25%) [Note: SCIF = Sensitive Compartmented Information Facility. See, e.g., https://fas.org/irp/dni/icd/icd-705.pdf ] POSITION DUTIES: MAJOR DUTIES: 1. As the Accountable Property Officer, incumbent administers, plans, and directs the property accountability program for Camp Stanley Storage Activity, Boerne, TX. Incumbent has delegated authority as Property Book Officer (PBO), which also entails the management of the records for all base property, and the management of the records for all equipment transferred into and out of the Property Book. Requests, receives and issues nonexpendable property items to Primary Hand Receipt Holders or designated representatives. Assures all requisitions for the purchase of equipment, personal property, and supplies are properly reviewed for authorization and processed according to all applicable Army Regulations. Challenges requisitions on the basis of economy and supply discipline. Returns unjustified requests for further justifications to originating elements and rejects requests that cannot be justified in light of the operating element mission, funds, or other available alternatives. Clears all requisitions for source of supply, assisting in the processing of requisition to DoD and GSA using the MILSTRIP/FEDSTRIP Code System. Screens lists of excess property and supplies for the purpose of redistributing such items. Applies document numbers, priorities designators, etc., as set forth in applicable regulations. Assures all property acquired by whatever means, either on-site or off-site, is properly managed. Assigns property to Primary Hand Receipt Holders (PHRH), property hand receipts according to paragraph 2-10, AR 710-2. Prepares inventory lists, assists Hand Receipt Holders as required in conducting inventories, and adjusts property records as required to ensure accuracy. Works with management and personnel to settle problems of a special, controversial, or technical nature, as they occur, regarding all phases of property management. Prepares and assures the execution of an annual inventory schedule of accounts, reporting problems and discrepancies as required. (45%) 2. Processes Financial Liability Investigation of Property Loss (FLIOPL), DD Form 200, investigations, and collection vouchers in a timely and efficient manner, complying with processing timelines as determined by regulation. Advises Hand Receipt Holders and upper level management personnel on the proper management of property and the procedures for processing FLIOPL, DD Form 200, Survey, investigations, and other regulatory means used to affix responsibility for property lost, stolen, or destroyed. Ensures conformity of property management to applicable Army Regulations, Federal Property Management Regulations, Supply Updates, and Department of the Army Pamphlets and Standard Operating Procedures. (15%) 3. Serves as point of contact and advisor for auditors, inspectors, and investigators, by explaining and justifying overall local policies and procedures used to account for property. Provides information for investigations and is accountable for accuracy of information provided as to the circumstances involved in individual property transactions. Is responsible for coordinating replies to audit reports and investigations to assure corrective action is taken as required. (5%) 4. Property Book Accountable Officer is responsible for all Government Furnished Property (GFP) requests, receipts, and transfers of and determines and coordinates property transfer records. Provides general guidance and policies to the Government Property Administrator regarding property management procedures for Government Furnished Property. (15%) 5. Serves as Inventory Management Specialist with responsibility for providing materiel support to depot maintenance production programs, other depot customers and tenant activities. Coordinate and regulate assigned Federal Supply Groups (FSG) of items such as engine and transmission assemblies, accessories, and internal parts, common hardware, tools and equipment, artillery, small arms, electronic parts, etc., involving materiel from Army, Defense Logistics Agency, and General Services Administration Inventory Control Points. Responsible for review, analysis, and corrective action necessary to provide continuity of supply support, assure accountable records are correct. Coordinates with Branch Maintenance Chief in assuring that critical repair parts shortages are resolved favorably. Reviews and approves Purchase Request and Commitment, AMC Form 2110, giving authority for local procurement. Reviews operational reports, Reports of Discrepancy (ROD), work schedules, and planning requirement to advise on compatibility of planned support programs. Researches information and prepares written reports/fact sheets on special studies or reviews. Recommends corrective action to alleviate immediate existing or anticipated problems. Request inquiry on material, research files, review documents or correct stock/document numbers and conduct special supply studies. Physically inventories items located in warehouses. (10%) 6. Serves as a central point of contact as the Property Book Officer. Provides guidance and as required training to employees in supply materiel management. Assists employees in establishing and maintaining authorized stockage list based on demand criteria, mission essentiality, or standby requirements; purifying stocks to identify and declare excess materiel and taking action to reclassify on-hand materiel for other requirements; reviewing due-out data and correcting discrepancies as required; maintaining adequate Depot Property stock on hand by timely replenishment; avoiding undue accumulation of excesses: providing technical supply support pertaining to retail supply and advising possible substitution, fabrication, or feasibility of local procurement for unavailable items. (10%) Must be able to obtain and maintain a SECRET security clearance.\n\nhttp://www.epa.gov/earth1r6/6pd/rcra_c/ca/camp-stanley-sob.pdf http://fiberbasenms.com/solutions/enterprise-es/\nhttps://govtribe.com/project/71-spacesaver-activrac-16p-mobilized-pallet-rack-storage-system/activity Wed, Sep 19, 2012 5:29 PM Awarded Awarded to:        Southwest Solutions Group, Inc. ($2,364,883.90) Fri, Aug 10, 2012 3:36 PM Presolicitation Added a solicitation number:    W52P1J12R3052 Added a synopsis: Federal Supply Class (FSC) 7125, North American Industry Classification System (NAICS) Code 337215. The Army Contracting Command - Rock Island intends to issue a full and open Request for Proposal W52P1J- 12-R-3052 for Mobile Storage Systems. This will be a Firm-Fixed Price contract, FOB: Destination, Camp Stanley Storage Activity, Boerne, TX. All contractors who provide goods/services to the Department of Defense (DoD) must be registered in the Central Contractors Register (CCR). If you are not registered in CCR, you cannot be awarded a DoD Contract. The Internet site for registering in the CCR is http://www.ccr.gov/. You may also contact the CCR Registration Assistance Center at 1-888-227-2423, customer service, and request the registration form and assistance packet for completion. The solicitation shall be issued on or about 15 August 2012 with an opening date of approximately 30 days after issuance via the internet at https://acquisition.army.mil/asfi/ and http://www.fbo.gov. Any changes to the solicitation shall also be posted to these websites. It is the contractor's responsibility to check these websites daily for any posted changes...  Direct any questions prior to the applicable opening date in writing to: Army Contracting Command - Rock Island ATTN: CCRC-ID/Mattie Martin, 1 Rock Island Arsenal Rock Island, IL 61299-8000 or mattie.k.martin.civ@mail.mil http://www.valla-inc.com/government_construction.html\n[Accessed 2016-03-28]\n\n## Valla Construction, Inc. Camp Stanley\n\n-    Provide and Install a Kardex/Remstar Vertical Lift Module and Spacesaver ActivRac Mobile Shelving\nSystems at Building 300 and 604\n-   Provide and Install a Spacesaver High Density ActivRac Mobile Pallet Rack System at Building 210 -    Provide and Install a Spacesaver High Density ActivRac 16 Mobile Pallet Rack System and Double Faced\nFixed Row of Adjustable Pallet Rack, Building W96\nhttps://www.quora.com/Is-there-any-way-to-preserve-military-hardware-aircrafts-ground-vehicles-firearms-fora-couple-of-hundred-years-and-still-be-operational [Question]: Is there any way to preserve military hardware (aircrafts, ground vehicles, firearms) for a couple of hundred years and still be operational? [Answer from] Miles Fortis, Retired military gunsmith[:] Possibly. For firearms and smaller artillery, this is a lot easier to answer.\n\n## The U.S. Army Camp Stanley Storage Activity At Boerne, Texas Has, As One Of It's Tasks, The Storage And Preservation Of Examples Of Almost All Modern U.S. Military Weapons. Some Of The Smallarms Go Back To 19Th Century Models. From Time To Time, To Determine That The Preservation Is Still Successful, Samples Are Removed From Storage And Tested. From The Information I Had Access To, Every Firearm, Even The Oldest, Was Perfectly Preserved And Worked Just Fine.\n\nWhat is used is both the time tested preservative oil/grease/barrier method and newer vesicant \"air killer\" within sealed containers. Written 2 May [2016?] Explosives Operator U.S. Army Joint Munitions Command Work Schedule is Full Time - Permanent Opened Wednesday 3/22/2017 (15 day(s) ago) Closed Tuesday 4/4/2017 (2 day(s) ago) Salary Range    $38,776.00 to $45,225.00 / Per Year Series & Grade    WG-6502-08/08 Promotion Potential    08 Supervisory Status   No Control Number    463261900 Job Announcement Number    NCFR173824981903927R About the Position: The position is located at Camp Stanley and is approximately 25 miles north of downtown San Antonio, TX off of Interstate 10... [deletia]\n\n## Duties\n\nYou will work on renovation, demilitarization, modification and normal maintenance of a variety of ammunition and explosives, including the unpacking, inspecting and repacking for shipment; disassemble and break down ammunition; perform normal maintenance on a variety of items such as cleaning, re-packing, painting, de-rust, remove corrosion on items such as small arms, rockets, rounds, artillery shells, mortars, mines.\n\n## Travel Required    Not Required Relocation Authorized    No Job Requirements\n\n Must be able to obtain and maintain a SECRET security clearance. This position is covered by the 1996 Lautenberg Amendment This position is covered by the drug testing program\n\n## Qualifications\n\nExperience refers to paid and unpaid experience, including volunteer work done through National Service programs (e.g., Peace Corps, AmeriCorps) and other organizations (e.g., professional; philanthropic; religious; spiritual; community; student; social).  You will receive credit for all qualifying experience, including volunteer experience. Screen Out Element: Ability to do the work of a Explosives Operator position without more than normal supervision\n\n## K,S,A,Cs:\n\nKnowledge of machines used in explosive operations Knowledge of ammunition and explosives Knowledge of warehouseman duties\n\n## Physical Effort\n\nWork involves lifting, carrying, and handling moderately heavy objects weighing 25 to 40 pounds for approximately 20%-50% of job cycle, and lifting heavier items weighing in excess of 40 pounds for a small portion of the time, normally less than 2%. While working on production lines where relative light (less than 10 pounds) components are handled, the incumbent must frequently stand for extended periods, and work with a rhythmic set pace, reaching, bending, and manipulating parts. Careful attention is required in eye-hand coordinating, and in setting and attaching detonating and/or initiating devices to explosives.\n\n## Working Conditions:\n\nWork is occasionally performed outside while moving between buildings, on ramps, and work is such that occasional assignments expose incumbent to dirt and grease and inclement weather conditions. Required to wear protective clothing such as safety shoes and goes for some operations. Since ammunition and explosives which are being renovated, modified, demilitarized or destroyed are almost always in an unserviceable condition, the incumbent is exposed to accident and explosions, which could cause serious injury, dismemberment, and/or loss of life to himself and/or his co-workers. Also subject to hazards of working with industrial and production type equipment, power conveyors, powered hand tools, which could cause mashed fingers, cuts, abrasions, and other accidents. Occasionally is subject to health hazards from dust or fumes from paint or lacquers. Also exposed to hazardous noise level. Wears hearing protective devices during noise hazardous operations. Receives routine periodic hearing evaluation at installation medical facility.\n\nhttps://www.tceq.texas.gov/drinkingwater/trot/droughtw.html\n[EXCERPTS] Overview\n\n    Opening and closing dates 12/03/2018 to 12/13/2018 GS 12 Salary    $73,375 to $95,388 per year Appointment type    Permanent Work schedule    Full-Time\nLocation 1 vacancy in the following location:  Boerne, TX Announcement number NCFR182546230910 Duties Summary About the Position: Serves as Ammunition Program Manager of the Munition Storage Maintenance Brach (MSMB) with responsibility for Responsibilities Maintains continuous monitoring of the ammunition program, performing analytical review to improve established policies and procedures. Develops, implements and maintains Camp Stanley Storage Activity's (CSSA) Integrated Ammunition Program. Determines the need and develops and recommends plans for organizational/operational changes which may have considerable impact on operating costs, division structure, or installation ammunition support operations. Performs acquisition functions relevant to munition maintenance to include; identify new sources of supply, develop Statements of Work, and receive bids to establish and institute purchase requests/contracts. Ensures that all elements of acquisition documentation and formal closed-loop accountability are properly administered. Reviews and analyzes regulations, bulletins, and directives from higher authority relative to the ammunition program. Travel Required    Not required Supervisory status    Yes Conditions of Employment Incumbent must possess and maintain a SECRET security clearance. This position is covered by the 1996 Lautenberg Amendment to the Gun Control Act of 1968. Persons convicted of a misdemeanor or felony crime of domestic violence are not eligible for the position; this position requires annual firearms testing. This position is covered by the civilian drug abuse-testing program. Subject to pre-employment and random drug testing. Pre-employment physical is required. Qualifications Who May Apply: Only applicants who meet one of the employment authority categories below are eligible to apply for this job. You will be asked to identify which category or categories you meet, and to provide documents which prove you meet the category or categories you selected. See Proof of Eligibility for an extensive list of document requirements for all employment authorities.\n\n        30 Percent or More Disabled Veterans Current Department of Army Civilian Employees Current Permanent Department of Defense (DOD) Civilian Employee (non-Army) Executive Order (E.O.) 12721 Interagency Career Transition Assistance Plan Military Spouses, under Executive Order (E.O.) 13473 Non-Department of Defense (DoD) Transfer Office of Personnel Management (OPM) Interchange Agreement Eligible People with Disabilities, Schedule A Priority Placement Program (PPP), Program S (Military Spouse) registrant Reinstatement Veterans Employment Opportunity Act (VEOA) of 1998\n    Specialized Experience: One year of specialized experience which includes evaluating munitions maintenance operations to ensure procedural, policy and regulatory requirements are met concerning receipt, storage, issue, shipment, and requisitioning of ammunition and explosives. Provides technical advice, guidance, and assistance on customer supply operations to agency personnel. Prepares and conducts training for personnel to explain new/revised ammunition supply procedures and requirements. Prepares and reviews correspondence and reports pertaining to the operation of the activities ammunition supply program. This definition of specialized experience is typical of work performed at the next lower grade/level position in the federal service (GS-11 or above). Some federal jobs allow you to substitute your education for the required experience in order to qualify. For this job, you must meet the qualification requirement using experience alone--no substitution of education for experience is permitted.\n\n    You will be evaluated on the basis of your level of competency in the following areas: Ammunition and Explosives Transportation Inventory Management Legal, Government, and Jurisprudence Oral Communication Supply Planning\n    Time in Grade Requirement: Applicants who have held a General Schedule (GS) position within the last 52 weeks must have 52 weeks of Federal service at the next lower grade or equivalent (GS-11). Background checks and security clearance Security clearance     Secret Drug test required     Yes City of Fair Oaks Ranch, TX August 6  FAIR OAKS RANCH POLICE: Notice of ordinance disposal from Camp Stanley. Camp Stanley personnel will be performing emergency controlled disposal on August 6, 2019. The timeframe will be from 3pm to 4pm. Contact Jason Shirley Installation Manager 210-295-7416 with any questions. ========================== [Comment from REDACTED] Thanks for the alert sometimes we hear the booms and have to make guesses Armament Equipment Repairer Department of the Army U.S. Army Joint Munitions Command Camp Stanley Storage Activity\n\n## Overview\n\n Open & closing dates: 09/13/2019 to 09/23/2019 Service: Competitive Pay scale & grade: WG 11 Salary: $23.85 to $27.83 per hour Appointment type: Permanent Work schedule: Full-Time\n\n## Duties Summary\n\nAbout the Position: The incumbent of this position will serve as a Armament Equipment Repairer at Camp Stanley Boerne, TX. Testing and inspecting a wide variety of standard and non-standard weapons. Applies a high degree of skill in precision fitting and finishing of new and modified components to very close tolerance. Redesigns and modifies components of weapons until firing function has accomplished the degree of performance desired.\n\n## Responsibilities\n\n    Perform full range of work involved in the complete rebuild, modification, repair, inspection, and testing for all types of small arms and artillery systems. Plan and lay out work making drawings and indicating tolerances for the making of parts that are to be fabricated in the Machine Shop. Conduct inventories of weapons and ammunition in accordance with regulations. Identify proper shooting posture and balance of weapons to lay out wooden stocks and handgrips to the personal specification of the user. Take weapon to firing range and test fires for evaluation of performance. Occasionally drives 1/2 to 5-ton truck to transport supplies. Travel Required 50% or less - You may be expected to travel for this position. Supervisory status: No Promotion Potential: None\n\n## Requirements Conditions Of Employment\n\nPosition requires a Secret Security Clearance. [deletia] Position requires travel up to 50% of the time. Must be willing to travel overseas. This position requires the ability to obtain and maintain an Official US Passport. This position requires specific immunizations for foreign travel. Explosives Operator U.S. Army Joint Munitions Command Boerne, TX [EXCERPTS] Job Description: Explosives Operator Department of the Army U.S. Army Joint Munitions Command Camp Stanley Storage Activity Open & closing dates: 10/30/2019 to 11/12/2019 Pay scale & grade WG 8 Salary: $19.83 to $23.12 per hour About the Position:\nThe position is located at Camp Stanley and is approximately 25 miles north of downtown San Antonio, TX. The incumbent of this position will be responsible for the making adjustments to machine controls to assure quality products. Exercising extreme care in performing refusing or fusing of any explosives. Responsibilities:\nDisassemble and break down ammunition in connection with the receipt, storage, and maintenance in storage of ammunition items.\n\nRenovation, demilitarization, modification and normal maintenance of a variety of ammunition and explosives.\n\nPerform normal maintenance on a variety of items such as cleaning, re-packing, painting, de-rust, removing corrosion on items such as small arms, rockets, rounds, artillery shells, mortars, mines.\n\nPerform refusing or fusing of any explosives, cartridges, rockets, mortars, grenades and other types of high explosive ammunition. Conditions of Employment:\nThis position requires the incumbent to be able to obtain and maintain a Secret level security clearance.\n\nPhysical Efforts: Work involves lifting, carrying, and handling moderately heavy objects weighing 25 to 40 pounds for approximately 20%-50% of job cycle, and lifting heavier items weighing in excess of 40 pounds for a small portion of the time, normally less than 2%. While working on production lines where relative light (less than 10 pounds) components are handled, the incumbent must frequently stand for extended periods, and work with a rhythmic set pace, reaching, bending, and manipulating parts. Careful attention is required in eye-hand coordinating, and in setting and attaching detonating and/or initiating devices to explosives. Working Conditions:  Work is occasionally performed outside while moving between buildings, on ramps, and work is such that occasional assignments expose incumbent to dirt and grease and inclement weather conditions. Required to wear protective clothing such as safety shoes and goes for some operations. Since ammunition and explosives which are being renovated, modified, demilitarized or destroyed are almost always in an unserviceable condition, the incumbent is exposed to accident and explosions, which could cause serious injury, dismemberment, and/or loss of life to himself and/or his co-workers. Also subject to hazards of working with industrial and production type equipment, power conveyors, powered hand tools, which could cause mashed fingers, cuts, abrasions, and other accidents. Occasionally is subject to health hazards from dust or fumes from paint or lacquers. Also exposed to hazardous noise level. Wears hearing protective devices during noise hazardous operations. Receives routine periodic hearing evaluation at installation medical facility. Explosives Operator Department of the Army U.S. Army Joint Munitions Command USA AFSC, McAlester Army Ammo Plant, Camp Stanley Storage Activity Overview Open & closing dates: 05/21/2020 to 06/01/2020 Service: Competitive Pay scale & grade: GS 8 Salary: $19.83 to $23.12 per hour Appointment type: Permanent Work schedule: Full-Time Location: 1 vacancy in the following location: Boerne, TX Responsibilities +    Renovation, demilitarization, modification and normal maintenance of a variety of ammunition and explosives, including the unpacking, inspecting and repacking for shipment. +Perform normal maintenance on a variety of items such as cleaning, re-packing, painting, de-rust, removing corrosion on items such as small arms, rockets, rounds, artillery shells, mortars, mines. +Disassemble and break down ammunition in connection with the receipt, storage, and maintenance in storage of ammunition items. +Perform refusing or fusing of any explosives, cartridges, rockets, mortars, grenades and other types of high explosive ammunition. Travel Required: Not required Supervisory status: No Promotion Potential: None - USE OF MEASURING INSTRUMENTS (MECHANICAL, ELECTRICAL, ELECTRONIC, AS APPROPRIATE TO LINE OF WORK) - Physical Efforts: Work involves lifting, carrying, and handling moderately heavy objects weighing 25 to 40 pounds for approximately 20%-50% of job cycle, and lifting heavier items weighing in excess of 40 pounds for a small portion of the time, normally less than 2%. While working on production lines where relative light (less than 10 pounds) components are handled, the incumbent must frequently stand for extended periods, and work with a rhythmic set pace, reaching, bending, and manipulating parts. Careful attention is required in eye-hand coordinating, and in setting and attaching detonating and/or initiating devices to explosives. - Working Conditions: Work is occasionally performed outside while moving between buildings, on ramps, and work is such that occasional assignments expose incumbent to dirt and grease and inclement weather conditions. Required to wear protective clothing such as safety shoes and goes for some operations. Since ammunition and explosives which are being renovated, modified, demilitarized or destroyed are almost always in an unserviceable condition, the incumbent is exposed to accident and explosions, which could cause serious injury, dismemberment, and/or loss of life to himself and/or his co-workers. Also subject to hazards of working with industrial and production type equipment, power conveyors, powered hand tools, which could cause mashed fingers, cuts, abrasions, and other accidents. Occasionally is subject to health hazards from dust or fumes from paint or lacquers. Also exposed to hazardous noise level. Wears hearing protective devices during noise hazardous operations. Receives routine periodic hearing evaluation at installation medical facility. Benefits: A career with the U.S. Government provides employees with a comprehensive benefits package. As a federal employee, you and your family will have access to a range of benefits that are designed to make your federal career very rewarding. fcp=zutpk3eFRtaToL2jp8RGuam0buidbYOamqhYhGC7hLBpZoWYl6U%3D Reviewed Date: 10/15/2020 POSITION DUTIES:\n\n## Major Duties:\n\n1. Serves as a Quality Assurance Specialist (Ammunition) for Camp Stanley Storage Activity (CSSA) with duty station in Miesau, Germany and responsible for interpreting higher authority guidance and developing local projects to implement requirements. Works independently and reports directly to the Chief, Stockpile Reliability Branch at CSSA. Receives mission requirements/support from the OIC/Operations Officer, Program Management Directorate - Europe. Incumbent is the technical authority and consultant in QA matters relating to operations. Incumbent plans, coordinates and executes the ammunition management program: determines and advises on long range plans, goals and objectives. Exercises critical judgment in recognizing trends in process variability's that could lead to serious deficiencies and consequent delay in production. As a senior action officer/technical specialist/consultant, exercises quality assurance responsibilities for assigned organizations and/or functions. Designs, schedules, monitors, evaluates, interprets, leads, and personally conducts inspections of ammunition and explosives for serviceability, rate of deterioration, and proper loading and blocking on vehicles. Exercises comparable responsibilities for inspections of associated facilities and environments for adequacy of buildings, containers, conveyances, and explosive safety measures and barriers to protect workers and the public. Maintains continuous monitoring of the ammunition program, performing analytical review to improve established policies and procedures. Develops, implements, maintains and integrates data for the stockpile at Miesau Army Depot into the Camp Stanley Storage Activity's (CSSA) Integrated Ammunition Program. Performs acquisition functions relevant to munition maintenance to include; identify new sources of supply, develop Statements of Work, and perform/review Acceptance Inspection of new procurement. Develops and plans maintenance projects for nonstandard material based on customer and mission requirements. Knowledgeable in respects to design and modification of packaging and unitization of non-standard material to effectively meet DOT, DA, DOD and POP certification standards. Administers the periodic review of ammunition stocks for justification of retention. Determines policy and procedures from interpreting and supplementing higher headquarters regulations which are used in the ammunition accounting function. Assures that directives, special instructions; etc., pertaining to ammunition stockpile maintenance and management are implemented. Analyzes reports and statistics, investigates problems identified through analysis of performance reports on findings and observations, recommends corrective actions, and follow-up actions. (50%) 2. Evaluates the effectiveness of maintenance operations in terms of mission accomplishment, standards of quality and quantity met, procedural, policy and regulatory compliance, and technical competence are met, and streamlines and corrects mission requirements as necessary. Assures hazardous material (ammunition/explosives) is properly prepared for shipment and trucks are loaded, blocked, and braced in accordance with regulatory guidelines. Develops installation policies to ensure effective inspection systems are in place and are continually refined. Reads and interprets new and revised procedures and regulations requiring implementation into operations, and ensures all personnel are aware of their influence on work assignments. Responsible for certifications that materials are stored, moved, shipped, and demilitarized in full compliance with applicable Federal, State, installation, and local country laws, regulations, and policies and that they meet required standards and specifications. Assures that prompt suspension, restriction, and release actions are issued and incorporated into appropriate publications. Suspends the use and shipment of defective materials and work operations that violate safety standards. Serves as the technical advisor for ammunition management, concerning the receipt, storage, issue, shipment, and requisitioning of ammunition and explosives. Subject Matter Expert (SME) for CSSA and provides technical advice, guidance, and assistance on customer supply operations to `managers, employees and contractors concerning quality assurance requirements and inspection criteria. Recommends changes in work methods to enhance quality assurance. Identify, create and maintain detailed electronic records, and provides Hazard Classification and space utilization information and requirements for munition shipments based on the mode of transportation. Continually updates and maintains a complete and current technical library and extensive database for all munitions. Incumbent possesses technical knowledge/utilization of computers, software and Web base development and is experienced with the munition process and logistical support planning in the area of responsibility (e.g., supply, management, inventory, storage, inspection, receiving and transportation). (35%)\n\n## 3. Has Oversight And Provides Guidance To Contractor Personnel And Local Nationals, Exercising Responsibility Over Work Operations Of Employees Involved In Ammunition And Quality Assurance Duties, Which Include Packing, Shipping, Maintenance, And Storage Of Various Types Of Standard And Non-Standard Munitions.\n\nPlans work to be accomplished by subordinates; sets and adjusts priorities and prepares schedules for completion of work. Assigns work based on priorities, selective consideration of the difficulty and requirements of the assignment and the capabilities of employees; evaluates completed work. Develops employee performance standards and makes formal and informal appraisal of work, giving advice, counsel and/or instructions to employees as required. (15%) Performs other duties as assigned. FACTOR LEVEL DESCRIPTIONS:\n\n## Factor 1. Knowledge Required By The Position. Level 1-7, 1250 Points Broad Knowledge Of The Concepts And Techniques Of Quality Assurance. Comprehensive Knowledge Of Standard And Non-Standard Ammunition: Explosive Safety, Product Specifications, Standards, Production Methods, And Associated Requirements For Preservation, Packing, Shipping And Storage To Ensure Product Quality, Safety And Protection Of The Environment.\n\nThorough and detailed knowledge of the techniques for inspecting ammunition and associated facilities and environments. Skill in using knowledge delineated above and techniques of statistical analysis to identify quality trends and resolve complex quality problems in the role of a technical specialist and consultant to managers and other employees. Knowledge of a broad range of ammunition maintenance and supply program relationships. Knowledge of specialized methods and techniques to analyze and evaluate the effectiveness and efficiency of ammunition maintenance and supply programs and/or operations. In-depth knowledge developed from specialized training and extensive experience in maintenance, demil, transportation, and supply operations. Ability to analyze independently and resolve difficult issues and problems in the assigned area of responsibility involving, for example, ammunition maintenance processes, work methods, supply data management, and day to day operational procedures. Knowledge of interrelated maintenance and supply processes to coordinate the objectives of two or more specialized ammunition programs (ammunition maintenance and ammunition accountability). This level of knowledge is used in a variety of technical ammunition supply operations to perform work independently, such as planning maintenance and resolving issues in an ammunition management function. Extensive knowledge of safety limitations, risk assessments, writing Standard Operating Procedures, protective equipment and clothing to assure safe completion of work assignments performed at sites where ammunition is located.\n\n## Factor 2. Supervisory Controls. Level 2-4, 450 Points\n\nThe supervisor sets the overall objectives. The employee develops guidelines, projects and work to be done. Work is performed on an independent basis after receiving general guidance on program mission and envisioned results. The employee independently plans, schedules and executes tasks aimed at successfully completing assigned missions. Recommendations made by the incumbent are usually accepted without significant review or change. When possible, controversial issues are discussed with the supervisor prior to taking action. However, the incumbent commitments or decisions are often required to be made independently while in the field, away from supervisor and at times TDY out of country as required. Work is reviewed for adequacy of planning coordination and execution; through accomplishments and resulting documentation; and by feedback from peers, contractors and customer activities.\n\n## Factor 3. Guidelines. Fl 3-4, 450 Points\n\nGuidelines consist of numerous Federal Laws, and DOD, DA, AMC, regulations, policies, and procedures. These guidelines are general in nature and cover major functional areas, but because of the wide variations in program requirements and the complexity of ECA operations, the specialist must use initiative, extensive experience, and broad knowledge of QA principles and practices to assure compliance. Often, technical problems and challenges encountered are unique in nature because of the non-standard munitions requiring that judgment be utilized in both interpreting and applying available guidelines and policy statements related to accomplishing mission tasks. The employee also uses initiative and resourcefulness to make sound decisions and take appropriate actions when supervisory and written guidance is limited or unavailable.\n\n## Factor 4. Complexity. Level 4-5, 325 Points\n\nIncumbent performs assignments consisting of a variety of ammunition maintenance, supply, and shipping and receiving duties involving many different and unrelated processes and methods in unique areas of ammunition maintenance, supply, and shipping/receiving planning and administration. Typically, the work requires analysis and testing of a variety of innovative techniques and methods to evaluate alternatives and arrive at decisions, conclusions or recommendations. Programs and projects may be funded by or under the cognizance of different organizations with differing supply requirements or variations in ability to fund acquisitions or implement systems. In deciding what is to be done the incumbent typically assesses situations complicated by conflicting or insufficient data wherein changes must be made on the spot. Information must be analyzed to determine the applicability of established methods, the need to digress from normal methods and techniques, the need to waive prescribed standards, and/or whether specific kinds of waivers are justifiable. Incumbent analyzes and interprets numerous technical directives and documentation from higher organizational echelons, lateral command, and supporting organizations, contractors, and field activities to determine impact and interface with existing quality assurance programs and systems. Implements and integrates Higher HQ, DA, and DOD Explosive Safety policies and directives, in the form of Audit and Inspection Reports, Staff Briefings, and formal classroom training. Incumbent analyzes and interprets numerous technical directives and documentation from higher organizational echelons, lateral command, and supporting organizations, contractors, and field activities to determine impact and interface with existing quality assurance programs and systems. Implements and integrates Higher HQ, DA, and DOD Explosive Safety policies and directives, in the form of Audit and Inspection Reports, Staff Briefings, and formal classroom training The incumbent plans the work, develops recommendations, and refines the methods and techniques to be used. Employee takes actions involving the interpretation of considerable data; application of developed supply methods, equipment, techniques and objectives to a variety of unique situations and requirements. Incumbent must make decisions concerning complex procedures on explosive handling requirements to include characteristics of explosive materials, storage and transportation of hazardous materials, and ensure all safety requirements and security requirements have been met. Work involves originating new supply techniques, establishing criteria, developing new information and approaches to problem solutions, and/or developing and interpreting broad supply policies and regulations.\n\n## Factor 5. Scope And Effect. Level 5-3, 150 Points\n\nAssignments are as technical specialist for ammunition and other highly specialized products requiring exacting manufacturing, storage, shipping and handling techniques. Results of work affect national and allied defense activities in other locations, for defective ammunition may explode or become unusable. Adverse environmental impact, major property damage, injury, loss of life, and negative publicity could result from misjudgments/noncompliance with correct procedures. An unwarranted suspended work order could adversely impact force readiness and organization's finances. Incumbent provides training to insure safe handling, storage and disposal of ammunition and provides support and assistance to the Safety Office. Also work involves planning, investigating, analyzing, and resolving a variety of conventional ammunition maintenance and supply problems for various ammunition programs. Incumbent monitors unconventional maintenance and supply systems and programs, performs independent reviews, and recommends actions involving unique criteria, methods, techniques and procedures. Employee's work products, advice and assistance affect the efficiency of ammunition maintenance and supply operations or specialized programs and contributes to the effectiveness of newly introduced programs requiring ammunition maintenance and supply support. The effect of the work is part of a network of facilities or nationwide program of operations with interdependent maintenance and supply requirements impacting the battlefield operation of ammunition in a wide range of activities to include tactical units supported.\n\n## Factor 6/7. Personal Contacts/Purpose Of Contacts. Level 6/7-3C, 180 Points\n\nEmployee has regular personal contacts with other employees and managers within the installation and with those of other Federal agencies, State agencies, and private firms. Personal contacts in other agencies and in private firms often require the employee to identify and locate the appropriate person with whom to establish working relationships. Contacts with installation and contractor officials require considerable skill of the incumbent to influence/motivate individuals to correct deficiencies that would otherwise result in unacceptable products. Employee deals with officials, who have a meager understanding of quality requirements, may dispute the nature of requirements, or not be cooperative. Employee exercises a high degree of technical skill and judgment in discussing and explaining requirements and deficiencies. Considerable tact and persuasion are required to motivate officials who are reluctant to take corrective actions because of adverse impact on deliver schedules or costs. Contacts with officials of other U.S. and State agencies are difficult because of different perspectives and perceptions of dangerous operations.\n\n## Factor 8. Physical Demands. Level 8-2, 20 Points\n\nDuties entail frequent walking, bending, kneeling, crawling, and stooping to inspect materials; prolonged standing while monitoring operations; and frequent carrying of items for cyclic ammunition inspections. Must be able to lift items weighing up to 40 pounds.\n\n## Factor 9. Work Environment. Level 9-2, 20 Points\n\nWork is performed in various location involving a wide range of risks from normal office environment to work site involving hazardous materials. These varying locations require everything from normal safety precautions to working around moving machinery, MHE, and ammunition/explosives. Duties require knowledge and application of special safety devices/equipment and adherence to strict procedures and safety' precautions to avoid hazards such as those pertaining to known toxic environments and investigations of detonation failures TOTAL POINTS: 2845 GS-12 POINT RANGE: 2755 - 3150 FINAL CLASSIFICATION DETERMINATION: GS-1910-12\n\n## Position Duties: Major Duties:\n\n1. Serves as a Quality Assurance Specialist (Ammunition) for Camp Stanley Storage Activity (CSSA) with duty station in Miesau, Germany and responsible for interpreting higher authority guidance and developing local projects to implement requirements. Works independently and reports directly to the Chief, Stockpile Reliability Branch at CSSA. Receives mission requirements/support from the OIC/Operations Officer, Program Management Directorate - Europe. Incumbent is the technical authority and consultant in QA matters relating to operations. Incumbent plans, coordinates and executes the ammunition management program: determines and advises on long range plans, goals and objectives. Exercises critical judgment in recognizing trends in process variability's that could lead to serious deficiencies and consequent delay in production. As a senior action officer/technical specialist/consultant, exercises quality assurance responsibilities for assigned organizations and/or functions. Designs, schedules, monitors, evaluates, interprets, leads, and personally conducts inspections of ammunition and explosives for serviceability, rate of deterioration, and proper loading and blocking on vehicles. Exercises comparable responsibilities for inspections of associated facilities and environments for adequacy of buildings, containers, conveyances, and explosive safety measures and barriers to protect workers and the public. Maintains continuous monitoring of the ammunition program, performing analytical review to improve established policies and procedures. Develops, implements, maintains and integrates data for the stockpile at Miesau Army Depot into the Camp Stanley Storage Activity's (CSSA) Integrated Ammunition Program. Performs acquisition functions relevant to munition maintenance to include; identify new sources of supply, develop Statements of Work, and perform/review Acceptance Inspection of new procurement. Develops and plans maintenance projects for nonstandard material based on customer and mission requirements. Knowledgeable in respects to design and modification of packaging and unitization of non-standard material to effectively meet DOT, DA, DOD and POP certification standards. Administers the periodic review of ammunition stocks for justification of retention. Determines policy and procedures from interpreting and supplementing higher headquarters regulations which are used in the ammunition accounting function. Assures that directives, special instructions; etc., pertaining to ammunition stockpile maintenance and management are implemented. Analyzes reports and statistics, investigates problems identified through analysis of performance reports on findings and observations, recommends corrective actions, and follow-up actions. (50%) 2. Evaluates the effectiveness of maintenance operations in terms of mission accomplishment, standards of quality and quantity met, procedural, policy and regulatory compliance, and technical competence are met, and streamlines and corrects mission requirements as necessary. Assures hazardous material (ammunition/explosives) is properly prepared for shipment and trucks are loaded, blocked, and braced in accordance with regulatory guidelines. Develops installation policies to ensure effective inspection systems are in place and are continually refined. Reads and interprets new and revised procedures and regulations requiring implementation into operations, and ensures all personnel are aware of their influence on work assignments. Responsible for certifications that materials are stored, moved, shipped, and demilitarized in full compliance with applicable Federal, State, installation, and local country laws, regulations, and policies and that they meet required standards and specifications. Assures that prompt suspension, restriction, and release actions are issued and incorporated into appropriate publications. Suspends the use and shipment of defective materials and work operations that violate safety standards. Serves as the technical advisor for ammunition management, concerning the receipt, storage, issue, shipment, and requisitioning of ammunition and explosives. Subject Matter Expert (SME) for CSSA and provides technical advice, guidance, and assistance on customer supply operations to `managers, employees and contractors concerning quality assurance requirements and inspection criteria. Recommends changes in work methods to enhance quality assurance. Identify, create and maintain detailed electronic records, and provides Hazard Classification and space utilization information and requirements for munition shipments based on the mode of transportation. Continually updates and maintains a complete and current technical library and extensive database for all munitions. Incumbent possesses technical knowledge/utilization of computers, software and Web base development and is experienced with the munition process and logistical support planning in the area of responsibility (e.g., supply, management, inventory, storage, inspection, receiving and transportation). (35%) 3. Has oversight and provides guidance to contractor personnel and local nationals, exercising responsibility over work operations of employees involved in ammunition and quality assurance duties, which include packing, shipping, maintenance, and storage of various types of standard and non-standard munitions. Plans work to be accomplished by subordinates; sets and adjusts priorities and prepares schedules for completion of work. Assigns work based on priorities, selective consideration of the difficulty and requirements of the assignment and the capabilities of employees; evaluates completed work. Develops employee performance standards and makes formal and informal appraisal of work, giving advice, counsel and/or instructions to employees as required. (15%) Performs other duties as assigned.\n\n## Factor Level Descriptions: Factor 1. Knowledge Required By The Position. Level 1-7, 1250 Points\n\nBroad knowledge of the concepts and techniques of quality assurance. Comprehensive knowledge of standard and non-standard ammunition: explosive safety, product specifications, standards, production methods, and associated requirements for preservation, packing, shipping and storage to ensure product quality, safety and protection of the environment. Thorough and detailed knowledge of the techniques for inspecting ammunition and associated facilities and environments. Skill in using knowledge delineated above and techniques of statistical analysis to identify quality trends and resolve complex quality problems in the role of a technical specialist and consultant to managers and other employees. Expert knowledge of Army policies and operational methods and procedures to review and interpret program directives and technical documentation. Applies this knowledge in establishing interface and coordination, developing the necessary changes to existing activity programs, preparing procedural guides and instructions, and coordinating implementation efforts. Thorough and in-depth experience and knowledge of policies pertaining to the management and maintenance of a very diverse ammunition stockpile with unique and unusual requirements. Ability to gather, analyze, and evaluate information independently as it applies to the activity ammunition program. Knowledge of a broad range of ammunition maintenance and supply program relationships. Knowledge of specialized methods and techniques to analyze and evaluate the effectiveness and efficiency of ammunition maintenance and supply programs and/or operations. In-depth knowledge developed from specialized training and extensive experience in maintenance, demil, transportation, and supply operations. Ability to analyze independently and resolve difficult issues and problems in the assigned area of responsibility involving, for example, ammunition maintenance processes, work methods, supply data management, and day to day operational procedures. Knowledge of interrelated maintenance and supply processes to coordinate the objectives of two or more specialized ammunition programs (ammunition maintenance and ammunition accountability). This level of knowledge is used in a variety of technical ammunition supply operations to perform work independently, such as planning maintenance and resolving issues in an ammunition management function. Extensive knowledge of safety limitations, risk assessments, writing Standard Operating Procedures, protective equipment and clothing to assure safe completion of work assignments performed at sites where ammunition is located.\n\n## Factor 2. Supervisory Controls. Level 2-4, 450 Points\n\nThe supervisor sets the overall objectives. The employee develops guidelines, projects and work to be done. Work is performed on an independent basis after receiving general guidance on program mission and envisioned results. The employee independently plans, schedules and executes tasks aimed at successfully completing assigned missions. Recommendations made by the incumbent are usually accepted without significant review or change. When possible, controversial issues are discussed with the supervisor prior to taking action. However, the incumbent commitments or decisions are often required to be made independently while in the field, away from supervisor and at times TDY out of country as required. Work is reviewed for adequacy of planning coordination and execution; through accomplishments and resulting documentation; and by feedback from peers, contractors and customer activities.\n\n## Factor 3. Guidelines. Fl 3-4, 450 Points\n\nGuidelines consist of numerous Federal Laws, and DOD, DA, AMC, regulations, policies, and procedures. These guidelines are general in nature and cover major functional areas, but because of the wide variations in program requirements and the complexity of ECA operations, the specialist must use initiative, extensive experience, and broad knowledge of QA principles and practices to assure compliance. Often, technical problems and challenges encountered are unique in nature because of the non-standard munitions requiring that judgment be utilized in both interpreting and applying available guidelines and policy statements related to accomplishing mission tasks. The employee also uses initiative and resourcefulness to make sound decisions and take appropriate actions when supervisory and written guidance is limited or unavailable.\n\n## Factor 4. Complexity. Level 4-5, 325 Points\n\nIncumbent performs assignments consisting of a variety of ammunition maintenance, supply, and shipping and receiving duties involving many different and unrelated processes and methods in unique areas of ammunition maintenance, supply, and shipping/receiving planning and administration. Typically, the work requires analysis and testing of a variety of innovative techniques and methods to evaluate alternatives and arrive at decisions, conclusions or recommendations. Programs and projects may be funded by or under the cognizance of different organizations with differing supply requirements or variations in ability to fund acquisitions or implement systems. In deciding what is to be done the incumbent typically assesses situations complicated by conflicting or insufficient data wherein changes must be made on the spot. Information must be analyzed to determine the applicability of established methods, the need to digress from normal methods and techniques, the need to waive prescribed standards, and/or whether specific kinds of waivers are justifiable. Incumbent analyzes and interprets numerous technical directives and documentation from higher organizational echelons, lateral command, and supporting organizations, contractors, and field activities to determine impact and interface with existing quality assurance programs and systems. Implements and integrates Higher HQ, DA, and DOD Explosive Safety policies and directives, in the form of Audit and Inspection Reports, Staff Briefings, and formal classroom training. Incumbent analyzes and interprets numerous technical directives and documentation from higher organizational echelons, lateral command, and supporting organizations, contractors, and field activities to determine impact and interface with existing quality assurance programs and systems. Implements and integrates Higher HQ, DA, and DOD Explosive Safety policies and directives, in the form of Audit and Inspection Reports, Staff Briefings, and formal classroom training The incumbent plans the work, develops recommendations, and refines the methods and techniques to be used. Employee takes actions involving the interpretation of considerable data; application of developed supply methods, equipment, techniques and objectives to a variety of unique situations and requirements. Incumbent must make decisions concerning complex procedures on explosive handling requirements to include characteristics of explosive materials, storage and transportation of hazardous materials, and ensure all safety requirements and security requirements have been met. Work involves originating new supply techniques, establishing criteria, developing new information and approaches to problem solutions, and/or developing and interpreting broad supply policies and regulations.\n\n## Factor 5. Scope And Effect. Level 5-3, 150 Points\n\nAssignments are as technical specialist for ammunition and other highly specialized products requiring exacting manufacturing, storage, shipping and handling techniques. Results of work affect national and allied defense activities in other locations, for defective ammunition may explode or become unusable. Adverse environmental impact, major property damage, injury, loss of life, and negative publicity could result from misjudgments/noncompliance with correct procedures. An unwarranted suspended work order could adversely impact force readiness and organization's finances. Incumbent provides training to insure safe handling, storage and disposal of ammunition and provides support and assistance to the Safety Office. Also work involves planning, investigating, analyzing, and resolving a variety of conventional ammunition maintenance and supply problems for various ammunition programs. Incumbent monitors unconventional maintenance and supply systems and programs, performs independent reviews, and recommends actions involving unique criteria, methods, techniques and procedures. Employee's work products, advice and assistance affect the efficiency of ammunition maintenance and supply operations or specialized programs and contributes to the effectiveness of newly introduced programs requiring ammunition maintenance and supply support. The effect of the work is part of a network of facilities or nationwide program of operations with interdependent maintenance and supply requirements impacting the battlefield operation of ammunition in a wide range of activities to include tactical units supported.\n\n## Factor 6/7. Personal Contacts/Purpose Of Contacts. Level 6/7-3C, 180 Points\n\nEmployee has regular personal contacts with other employees and managers within the installation and with those of other Federal agencies, State agencies, and private firms. Personal contacts in other agencies and in private firms often require the employee to identify and locate the appropriate person with whom to establish working relationships. Contacts with installation and contractor officials require considerable skill of the incumbent to influence/motivate individuals to correct deficiencies that would otherwise result in unacceptable products. Employee deals with officials, who have a meager understanding of quality requirements, may dispute the nature of requirements, or not be cooperative. Employee exercises a high degree of technical skill and judgment in discussing and explaining requirements and deficiencies. Considerable tact and persuasion are required to motivate officials who are reluctant to take corrective actions because of adverse impact on deliver schedules or costs. Contacts with officials of other U.S. and State agencies are difficult because of different perspectives and perceptions of dangerous operations.\n\n## Factor 8. Physical Demands. Level 8-2, 20 Points\n\nDuties entail frequent walking, bending, kneeling, crawling, and stooping to inspect materials; prolonged standing while monitoring operations; and frequent carrying of items for cyclic ammunition inspections. Must be able to lift items weighing up to 40 pounds.\n\n## Factor 9. Work Environment. Level 9-2, 20 Points\n\nWork is performed in various location involving a wide range of risks from normal office environment to work site involving hazardous materials. These varying locations require everything from normal safety precautions to working around moving machinery, MHE, and ammunition/explosives. Duties require knowledge and application of special safety devices/equipment and adherence to strict procedures and safety' precautions to avoid hazards such as those pertaining to known toxic environments and investigations of detonation failures TOTAL POINTS: 2845 GS-12 POINT RANGE: 2755 - 3150 FINAL CLASSIFICATION DETERMINATION: GS-1910-12 Maintenance Mechanic Department of the Army U.S. Army Joint Munitions Command Camp Stanley Storage Activity\n\n## Open & Closing Dates 05/14/2021 To 05/27/2021\n\nPay scale & grade WG 10 Salary $23.28 to $27.17 per hour 1 vacancy in the following location:    Boerne, TX About the Position: The primary duty of this position is to perform a full range of journeyman level plumbing tasks in facilities and Camp infrastructure. The ability to perform plumbing tasks is of paramount importance to this position. See Responsibilities section below for more information on what is required for this position.\n\n## Responsibilities\n\n[deletia]\n\n## + Drive Up To And Including A 5 Ton Truck To Transport Personnel, Articles And Materials Throughout The Activity And Occasionally On Public Roads And Highways. Travel Required Occasional Travel - You May Be Expected To Travel Occasionally For This Position. Requirements\n\n    Appointment may be subject to a suitability or fitness determination, as determined by a completed background investigation.\n\n## Must Be Able To Obtain And Maintain A Secret Security Clearance.\n\nExplosives Operator Department of the Army U.S. Army Joint Munitions Command Camp Stanley Storage Activity Open & closing dates: 12/06/2021 to 12/15/2021 Salary: $20.68 - $24.11 per hour Pay scale & grade: WG 8 Location: 1 vacancy in the following location: Boerne, TX\n\n## Duties\n\nDisassembles and breaks down ammunition. Performs normal maintenance on a variety of items. Performs warehouseman duties in connection with the receipt, storage, and maintenance. Assists in ammunition destroying operations by burning and/or detonation. Disassembles and assembles weapons including rifles, carbines, mortars, pistols, revolvers, and machine guns.\n\n## Requirements Conditions Of Employment\n\n    This position requires the incumbent to be able to obtain and maintain a Secret level security clearance. Physical Efforts: Work involves lifting, carrying, and handling moderately heavy objects weighing 25 to 40 pounds for approximately 20%-50% of job cycle, and lifting heavier items weighing in excess of 40 pounds for a small portion of the time, normally less than 2%. While working on production lines where relative light (less than 10 pounds) components are handled, the incumbent must frequently stand for extended periods, and work with a rhythmic set pace, reaching, bending, and manipulating parts. Careful attention is required in eye-hand coordinating, and in setting and attaching detonating and/or initiating devices to explosives. Working Conditions: Work is occasionally performed outside while moving between buildings, on ramps, and work is such that occasional assignments expose incumbent to dirt and grease and inclement weather conditions. Required to wear protective clothing such as safety shoes and goes for some operations. Since ammunition and explosives which are being renovated, modified, demilitarized or destroyed are almost always in an unserviceable condition, the incumbent is exposed to accident and explosions, which could cause serious injury, dismemberment, and/or loss of life to himself and/or his co-workers. Also subject to hazards of working with industrial and production type equipment, power conveyors, powered hand tools, which could cause mashed fingers, cuts, abrasions, and other accidents. Occasionally is subject to health hazards from dust or fumes from paint or lacquers. Also exposed to hazardous noise level. Wears hearing protective devices during noise hazardous operations. Receives routine periodic hearing evaluation at installation medical facility. Agency contact information FR-APF-W39003 CAMP STANLEY SUP STOR ACTV DO NOT MAIL Fort Sam Houston, TX 78234 US Munitions Inspector Department of the Army U.S. Army Joint Munitions Command Camp Stanley, Storage Activity Open & closing dates: 12/22/2021 to 01/04/2022 Salary: $23.52 - $27.45 per hour Pay scale & grade: WG 10 Location: 2 vacancies in the following location: Boerne, TX\n\n## Summary\n\nAbout the Position: The incumbent of this position will work as a Munitions Inspector with Camp Stanley Storage Activity, in Boerne, TX, performing a variety of routine and special inspections of conventional, improved conventional and non-standard ammunition.\n\n## Duties\n\n    Performs quality monitoring of maintenance operations, area inspections and magazine storage inspections. Assists QASAS during Quantity Distance Surveys and SOP preparation and in maintaining a variety of publications, regulations and files pertaining to work of the unit. Performs periodic, storage and special inspections and tests to determine quality, safety and condition of a wide variety of ammunition.\n\n## Inspects Such Items As Small Arms Ammunition, Artillery And Mortar Ammunition, Rockets, Missiles, Mines, Grenades, Bulk High Explosives, Propellants And Propelling Charges.\n\nIdentifies items using the appropriate references, documents, item markings and through personal knowledge and experience. Requirements Conditions of Employment [deletia]\n\n## Must Be Able To Obtain And Maintain A Secret Clearance.\n\n[deletia] Minimum Qualifications (Screen Out Element): Ability to do the work of an Munitions Inspector without more than normal supervision. Applicants must meet this screen out element to be considered further. To meet the screen out element applicants should document experience in the following: detailed knowledge of the characteristics and hazards in handling many different types of ammunition (both standard and nonstandard), the functioning of fuses, hand grenades, primers, cartridges, demolition devices, warheads, guided missiles, rocket\n\n## Motors And Other Related Materials.\n\n[deletia]\n\n## Physical Effort\n\nWork performance requires heavy lifting (50 lbs), good eyesight, and considerable standing, kneeling, squatting and bending.\n\n## Working Conditions\n\nWorks both inside and outside, exposed to dirt, grease, cleaning solvents, sharp metal strapping, high explosives and propellants, bare boostering explosives, chemical smoke devices, flammable solids (i.e., WP, RP, powdered metals, etc.,) electro statically initiated ammunition, materials sensitive to static sparks and nonstandard materials. Works in areas where hearing and eye protection is required. Agency contact information FR-APF-W39003 CAMP STANLEY SUP STOR ACTV DO NOT MAIL Fort Sam Houston, TX 78234 US\n\n## Airborne Delivery Of Materiel\n\nNotice of Intent to Issue a Sole Source - Airborne Systems Firefly Canopies Solicitation Number: W45PVN-11-Q3029 Agency: Department of the Army Office: Army Contracting Command Location: ACC - Camp Stanley Office (ACC-RI-Camp Stanley) Solicitation Number: W45PVN-11-Q3029 Notice Type: Presolicitation Synopsis: Added: Sep 08, 2011 11:53 am Pursuant to FAR Subpart 13.106-1(b)(1), the U.S. Army Camp Stanley Storage Activity intends to award a firm fixed price purchase order on a sole source basis to Airborne Systems North America of NJ Inc., 5800 Magnolia Ave, Pennsauken NJ 08109-1399. THIS IS NOT A REQUEST FOR PROPOSALS. No solicitation document is available. FAR 13.106-1(b)(1) only one responsible source and no other supplies or services will satisfy agency requirements. The item to be procured from Airborne Systems is 10 Each Firefly Canopies approved under the DoD 2K JPADS Program. Contracting Office Address: ACC - Camp Stanley Office (ACC-RI-Camp Stanley), 25800 Ralph Fair Road, Boerne, TX 78015 Place of Performance: ACC - Camp Stanley Office (ACC-RI-Camp Stanley) 25800 Ralph Fair Road, Boerne TX 78015 US\nhttp://www.airborne-sys.com/pages/view/firefly\n [EXCERPTS]\nThe FireFly was selected by the U.S. DoD as the system of choice for the U.S. 2,000 lb Joint Precision Aerial Delivery System (2K JPADS) program.  The system's guidance, navigation and control software analyzes its environment in real time, ensuring accurate payload delivery. Its long-distance capability increases safety for the aircrew and the receiving unit, reducing the need for ground logistics. It is currently being used in operational theater to reliably deliver supplies and equipment to U.S. forces in remote locations.\n\n    Lands on target or up to 150 meters maximum of the designated impact point Continually adjusts for wind conditions until the final flare to land\nhttps://www.fbo.gov/index?s=opportunity&mode=form&tab=core&id=bdd3ea39c52243d6d9dcdba6d4b3a344\n83--NOTICE OF INTENT TO ISSUES SOLE SOURCE PURCHASE ORDER - JPADS 2KM Cargo Delivery System Solicitation Number: W45PVN-14-Q3000 Agency: Department of the Army Office: Army Contracting Command Location: ACC - Camp Stanley Office (ACC-RI-Camp Stanley) Solicitation Number: W45PVN-14-Q3000 Notice Type: Presolicitation\n\n## Synopsis: Added: Aug 29, 2014 3:08 Pm\n\nNOTICE OF INTENT TO ISSUE A SOLE SOURCE PURCHASE ORDER - To Airborne Systems North America, 5800 Magnolia Avenue, Pennsauken NJ 08109 for a JPADS 2KM Cargo Delivery System (P/N 11-1-7840), 2K JPADS Parachute System (P/N 11-1- 9032-1) and V5 Harness Assembly, 2K (P/N 11-1-7853-1). Quantity is one each. Contracting Office Address: ACC - Camp Stanley Office (ACC-RI-Camp Stanley), 25800 Ralph Fair Road, Boerne, TX 78015 Place of Performance: ACC - Camp Stanley Office (ACC-RI-Camp Stanley) 25800 Ralph Fair Road, Boerne TX\n\n# Notice Of Intent To Issue A Purchase Order As A Sole Source -\n\n*\n      JPADS 4K Firefly Split Confluence\n      Solicitation Number: W45PVN-16-Q1202\n      Agency: Department of the Army\n      Office: Army Contracting Command, MICC\n      Location: MICC - Fort Sam Houston (JBSA)\n\n## I 1 L Notice Details | Packages Q] Original Synopsis | Return To Opportunities List || Watch This Opportunity\n\nMar 01, 2016\n2:56 pm\n\n| Solicitation     | Number:         | Notice    | Type:    | Posted    | Date:    |\n|------------------|-----------------|-----------|----------|-----------|----------|\n| WA45PVN-16-Q1202 | Presolicitation | March     | 1,       | 2016      |          |\n| Response         | Date:           |           |          |           |          |\n| Synopsis:        | Apr             | 04,       | 2016     | 4:00      | pm       |\n| Added:           | Mar             | 01,       | 2016     | 2:56      | pm       |\n\nNOTICE OF INTENT TO ISSUE A PURCHASE ORDER AS ASOLE\nAmhM'_'g -\n\n                                                                                    i\n                                                                                                                                                                                                                                             X\n                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          i\n                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                               Automatic, 15 days after response\nSOURCE - To Airborne Systems North America, 5800 Magnolia Ave,\n                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                              date\n\nPennsauken, NJ 08109 for JPADS 4K Firefly Split Confluence, 4 each.\n                                                                        Archive Date:\n\nContracting Office Address:\n                                                                               April 19, 2016\n\n2205 Infantry Post Road, Bldg. 603\n                                                                             Original Set Aside:\n\nFort Sam Houston, Texas 78234-1361\n                                                                                                      N/A\n\nUnited States\n                                                                                     Set Aside:\n\n                                                                                                N/A\nPlace of Performance:\nCamp Stanley Storage Activity\n                                                                                               Classification Code:\n25800 Ralph Fair Road\n                                                                                                LS I\n\nNAICS Code:\n\nBoerne, Texas 78015\n\n334 - Computer\n                  and Electronic\n\nUnited States\n\nP\n    e\n        Ml\n                kel\n                      NN ArAA\n\nhttp://www.dgmarket.com/tenders/np-notice.do?noticeId=1290677\n\nCountry:  United States Notice/Contract Number:   fbo:w45pvn-06-q0031 Publication Date:   May 16, 2006 Deadline   Jun 11, 2006 Funding Agency:   Department of the Army Goods, Works and Services\n\n## Gas Compressors\n\n\nNOTICE OF INTENT TO SOLICIT AND NEGOTIATE WITH ONLY ONE SOURCE - CSSA intends to solicit on a sole source basis with Para-Flight, Inc. Pennsauken, NJ for some 6-Man and 2-Man OXCON Systems consisting of the following: 4 each 6-Man OXCON System P/N 605400-0 4 each 2-Man OXCON Assembly P/N 605200-0 8 each Hose Assembly P/N 605115-0 4 each Hose Assembly P/N 605115-3 4 each Oxygen Charging Assembly P/N 603700-0 4 each Purge Valve Assembly P/N 603750-0 The proposed contract action is for supplies for which the Government intends to solicit and negotiate with only one source under the authority of FAR 6.302. Interested persons may identify their interest and capability to respond to the requirement or submit proposals. This notice of intent is not a request for competitive proposals. However, all proposals received prior to the response date of this synopsis will be considered by the Government. A determination by the Government not to compete with this proposed contract based upon responses to this notice is solely within the discretion of the Government. Information received will normally be considered solely for the purpose of determining whether to conduct a competitive procurement. Set-aside code: N/A Place of performance:  Camp Stanley Storage Activity 25800 Ralph Fair Road, Boerne TX 78015  US Contact: Steven Honeck, (210) 295-7433 http://www.fbo.gov/spg/USA/USAMC/W45PVN/W45PVN-06-Q0031/listing.html Email: Camp Stanley Storage Activity (steven.honeck@samhouston.army.mil) Updated on 2006/05/16\nhttps://acpol2.army.mil/fasclass/search_fs/search_fs_output.asp? fcp=zutpk3eFRtaToL2jp8RGuam0buidbYKcmKZViGC7hLBoYoOWlaM%3D https://acpol2.army.mil/fasclass/search_fs/search_fs_output.asp? fcp=zutpk3eFRtaToL2jp8RGuam0buidbYKcmKZViGC7hLBoYoOWlaM%3D\n\n## Position Duties: Major Duties:\n\nServes as an Equipment Specialist within the Special Equipment Branch (SEB) in support of specialized Department of the Army programs. As an Equipment Specialist the incumbent must have knowledge/expertise in various equipment systems and new R&D technologies in a wide variety of special purpose airdrop systems such as low velocity airdrop systems, high velocity airdrop systems, dual row, gravity airdrop systems, container delivery systems, two stage deployment systems, GPS guided parachute systems, low cost parachute systems parachute release systems and personnel airdrop systems. Knowledge related to pre-production, production and field use of cargo and personnel airdrop and other equipment. Assignments require application of an intensive and practical knowledge of the purpose, function, limitation and operational requirements of a wide range of cargo and personnel airdrop related components, equipment and systems. This position requires additional technical knowledge in manufacturing and fabrication techniques and processes in order to evaluate and assess the suitability of cargo/personnel airdrop and other related components, equipment and systems for functional operation and user safety. Responsible for identification, analysis, evaluation and resolution of user related cargo and personnel airdrop problems and deficiencies. Uses experience and knowledge of cargo and personnel airdrop equipment and procedures to identify and resolve material or procedural deficiencies. Investigates malfunction reports to identify trends and develop corrective actions. 1. Technical Support and Consultation. Serves as a consultant in the design, performance, troubleshooting and failure modes of various airdrop systems, including specialized in-house R&D prototype airdrop systems and all DoD fielded airdrop systems. Works with supervisor to provide coordination with users and customers directly to investigate and solve technical, safety and logistics related problems. Plans, coordinates and conducts activities relating to special projects under the oversight and/or direction of the Equipment Specialist Supervisor. Under the oversight of the Equipment Specialist Supervisor, conducts cargo and personnel airdrop related testing and analysis of resulting data. Participates in the writing of technical reports, correspondence and project documentation. Incumbent will work with supervisor in reviewing prototype system designs, evaluating performance, and recommending redesigns. Contributes to the Development of sketches and directs shop personnel to fabricate components. Participates in the preparation of test setups and assists with conducting standard and specialized testing. Installs, operates, and maintains the varied and unique systems that are developed by SEB. Incumbent is required to continually work on the improvement of expert Equipment Specialist knowledge, skills and abilities by periodically participating in focused seminars and broad-based technology training. Utilizes a thorough knowledge of facilities, equipment, personnel, supplies, and transport requirements to help coordinate and support special and contingency airdrop operations and exercises with DoD, OGA, and non-government organizations. At the SEB supervisor's discretion performs duties as Drop Zone Safety Officer and/or Malfunction Officer for airdrop or personnel jumps. Conducts Joint Airdrop inspection of loads prior to airdrop. (30%) 2. Packs, rigs and recovers a wide array of aerial delivery, personnel and other types of experimental parachute and cargo systems for which there is no technical precedent available in terms of appropriate packing procedures, canopy types, stowing methods, and rigging techniques. Reviews instructions and examines pack, packing container, platform or other items to determine configuration of and space available for packing and rigging purposes. Applies practical knowledge of operational characteristics of parachutes along with the packing/rigging procedures and works out those procedures and stowing methods. Performs a variety of sequential tasks after establishing the appropriate method and technique to achieve a complete and compact parachute system. Examines, assembles, and packs complex parachute systems that require the execution of numerous mechanical assembly and fabric packing procedures; the performance of equipment tests; and adherence to numerous mechanical assembly and fabric packing procedures. Examines, assembles, tests, aligns and connects mechanical components to rigid specifications. Assembles and links numerous subsystems. Repairs and modifies parachutes and other aerial delivery items per manufacturer's instruction. Performs major fabric repairs such as but not limited to replacing canopy fabric sections, risers, and suspension lines as needed. Utilizes knowledge of sewing machines and repair procedures to manufacture items of a non-aerial delivery nature ie: holsters, harness work etc. (50%) 3. May operate a variety of equipment in maintaining remote training sites, operation of training at various sites and recovery of equipment from remote areas. Equipment to be operated includes but is not limited to pickup trucks, ATV's, K- Loaders, loaders, road graders, water trucks, rollers, forklifts, tractors and fuel trucks. (10%) 4. Help maintain a variety of survival flight equipment to include but not limited to oxygen masks, oxygen console systems and hoses and various other flight survival equipment. (10%) Performs other duties as assigned.\n\n## Factor Level Descriptions:\n\nFactor 1. Knowledge Required by the Position, Level 1-6, 950 Points Knowledge of the application of a wide range of airdrop technologies that make up systems used in low velocity airdrop systems, high velocity airdrop systems, dual row, gravity airdrop systems, container delivery systems, two stage deployment systems, GPS guided parachute systems, Low cost parachute systems parachute release systems and static line, HALO, and HAHO personnel airdrop systems. Understanding of DoD operational requirements for Airdrop Systems on the battlefield and the ability to apply and evaluate Airdrop Technologies to determine the extent that DoD requirements have been technically and programmatically satisfied. This will include evaluating new or modified DoD operational requirements to determine the ability of new and existing technology to satisfy these requirements. Knowledge of the workings and interrelations of components in the entire range of airdrop systems to include parachutes, airdrop platforms, parachute releases, extraction systems, extraction force transfer couplings and other airdrop related components. Knowledge of design, development, fabrication, testing and field unit evaluation of a wide range of Airdrop Systems for evaluating prototype systems, and for analyzing designs and making recommendations for changes to support program objective and goals. Knowledge of military command structure, missions, programs and organizational relationships plus a thorough knowledge of the Army Life Cycle System to develop working relationships for staffing new or substantially altered requirements for airdrop systems for the battlefield. Knowledge of systems engineering, mechanical and aerospace technologies, and textile sciences, applicable to airdrop systems to independently analyze and resolve difficult design or operational system problems. Knowledge of a wide variety of materials, processes and techniques used in the production of airdrop equipment. Experience and extensive knowledge of air delivery systems and equipment to evaluate and solve operational, maintenance, manufacturing or repair problems. W orking knowledge of equipment that routinely interfaces with USAF and Other Services transport and aerial delivery aircraft, (e.g. C-17, C-141, C-5, C-130, C-23, rotary aircraft and others) roller and restraint systems, and material handling equipment (e.g. K-loaders). Knowledge of wide range of concepts and principles as required and extended specialized training and experience to support field operations and demonstration of airdrop systems.\n\n## Factor 2. Supervisory Controls, Level 2-3, 275 Points\n\nThe supervisor sets the overall objectives. Work is performed on an independent basis after receiving general guidance on program mission and envisioned results. When possible, controversial issues are discussed with the supervisor prior to taking action. However, the incumbent commitments or decisions are often required to be made independently while in the field and away from supervisor. Work is reviewed for adequacy of planning, coordination and execution; through accomplishments and resulting documentation; and by feedback from peers, contractors and customer activities.\n\n## Factor 3. Guidelines, Level 3-3, 275 Points\n\nTechnical guidelines are general in nature, ranging from readily available published product literature and industry publications to information embedded in field manuals and bulletins that may be difficult to acquire. Often, technical problems and challenges encountered are unique in nature (cargo airdrop has no commercial or civilian counterpart) requiring that judgment be utilized in both interpreting and applying available guidelines and policy statements related to accomplishing mission tasks. The employee also uses judgment, initiative and resourcefulness to make sound decisions in deviating from established methods and in taking appropriate actions when supervisory and written guidance is limited or unavailable. The employee will propose new policies and significantly modify equipment with supervisor's approval.\n\n## Factor 4. Complexity, Level 4-3, 150 Points\n\nAssignments involve various projects, studies or evaluations requiring the application of many different and unrelated processes. The employee is responsible for supporting the entire range of subsystems, which comprise the full spectrum of cargo airdrop equipment, including parachutes, parachute releases, extraction systems, extraction force transfer couplings and other cargo airdrop related components. This responsibility includes life-cycle decisions from concept design to disposal, which include procurement pre-award surveys, first article tests, in-process contractor visits, production and delivery schedules, user acceptance, operational use, maintenance and repair. In the conduct of the job, the employee makes design or redesign recommendations to engineers or contractors and initiates changes to maintenance procedures, training manuals and tool kits. Uses experience and extensive knowledge of air delivery systems and equipment to evaluate and solve operational, maintenance, manufacturing or repair problems. Conducts exploratory testing and evaluation of Non- Developmental Items and prototypes under consideration for use in the cargo airdrop environment. Recommends design and feature changes based on test results. Incorporates user input into all recommendations for changes.\n\n## Factor 5. Scope And Effect, Level 5-3, 150 Points\n\nThe work involves investigating, problem solving and analyzing a variety of unique systems, mechanical, aerospace and textile science problems related to Airdrop Systems to ensure reliability and safety, or enhance the quality of sustainment provided to the troops in the battlefield. The incumbent is responsible/involved with applying experimental theories to new and improved airdrop technologies. Results of technical efforts provide solutions prior to any degradation of field unit readiness and assist in improving mission readiness. The purpose of the work is to correct deficiencies with fielded airdrop systems and provide on-site assistance to DoD organizations and Army units participating in Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation (RDT&E) and evaluation and early fielding of advance Airdrop Technologies. Uses extensive experience and knowledge of airdrop systems, equipment, and procedures to identify and resolve material or procedural deficiencies. Investigates quality deficiency reports and malfunction reports to identify trends and develop corrective actions. Employee conducts efforts to maintain a high level of readiness by implementing new field evaluations and quality deficiency reviews based on experimental theories to resolve technical problems and by providing detailed feedback of showstopper problems. Work conducted effects a wide range of agency concerns to include battlefield operations of airdrop systems in a variety of activities to include tactical units supported.\n\n## Factors 6/7. Personal Contacts/Purpose Of Contacts, Level 6-3/7-2, 110 Points\n\nContacts are with individuals and/or groups from outside the employing agency in structured and unstructured settings. Typical contacts are senior level military decision makers, Product Managers, Parachute Riggers and Test Officers and soldiers of supported troop units. Other typical contacts are with contractors performing RD&E work on the organizations airdrop development programs. Contacts with above parties are not established on a routine basis and the purpose and extent of each contact is generally unique. The purpose of these contacts is to communicate status of key RDT&E Programs, determine technical problems with airdrop systems and prototypes, and communicate possible solutions. The interaction among persons contacted is to provide information, guidance, coordinate actions, resolve issues and assist in obtaining acceptance/implementation of recommendations. Employee must be skilled in approaching various contacts to obtain desired results. Ultimately, the employee's interface establishes, maintains, and improves upon the readiness partnership of the Agency, the customer, and their field units.\n\n## Factor 8. Physical Demands, Level 8-3, 50 Points\n\nThe work requires considerable and strenuous physical exertion, such as frequent climbing onto/under airdrop loads or reaching and crawling into restrictive areas of various military equipment being rigged for airdrop, while in hot, confined aircraft cargo spaces. The lifting of airdrop equipment weighing over 50 pounds and working in extreme environmental conditions such a 110 - 140 F is required.\n\n## Factor 9. Work Environment, Level 9-3, 50 Points\n\nWork involves regular and recurring exposure to moderate risks and discomforts associated with working in and around military and civilian aircraft and field environments as well as production and maintenance areas. Risks and discomforts encountered include exposure to high noise levels, wind, blowing debris, rain, snow, and extremes in cold and hot temperature environments. Risks also include dangers associated with falling objects which result from cargo airdrop testing and dangers from parachute jumping. These conditions require unique procedures and safety precautions.\n\n## Conditions Of Employment: Position Requires A Secret Security Clearance.\n\nPosition requires travel up to 50% of the time. Must be willing to travel overseas. Position is subject to pre-employment physical. This position requires the ability to obtain and maintain an Official US Passport. Must be able to obtain and maintain FAA Master Rigger Certification.\n\n## Position Evaluation:\n\nOriginal supervisory review: JASON SHIRLEY, 4/20/2016; original Classification review: KEVIN P. WOLF, 4/26/2016. kpw Current Delegated Classification Authority (DCA) is JASON SHIRLEY, Installation Manager, Camp Stanley Storage Activity (CSSA). PD reviewed/certified and duties validated by CSSA-HRB, 10/11/2017. kpw http://www.texasbids.net/bid-opportunities/2015/06/09/6363069-Twin-Volume-Oxygen-Storage-System-TVOSS.html http://www.osen-hunter.com/index.php/advanced-life-support http://www.masterlineinc.com/\n16--Military Freefall Parachutist Oxygen System Equipment Solicitation Number: W45PVN-15-QRFI1 Agency: Department of the Army Office: Army Contracting Command, MICC Location: MICC - (W45PVN) CAmp Stanley Office Solicitation Number: W45PVN-15-QRFI1 Notice Type: Sources Sought Synopsis: Added: Aug 06, 2015 11:53 am THIS REQUEST FOR INFORMATION (RFI) NOTICE IS NOT A REQUEST FOR QUOTE. THIS RFI IS FOR FEEDBACK COMMENTS, QUESTIONS AND CAPABILITIES STATEMENTS. No special format is required. Capabilities statements are limited to 3 pages, not including the cover page or catalog cuts with enough information on the specifications. Capabilities statement and/or catalog cuts are due by 21 August 2015 by 4:00 PM CST. This notice is a market research tool (FAR Part 10) being used to determine the potential firms capable of providing the equipment described herein prior to determining the method of acquisition and issuance of a Request for Quote. The comments, questions and the capabilities statements/catalog cuts should be sent to the contract specialist. Mission Installation Contracting Command - Fort Sam Houston/Camp Stanley Storage Activity (MICC-FSH-CSSA) is seeking information on sources to determine capability to provide Military Freefall Parachutist Oxygen System Equipment. The System includes Oxygen Mask/Regulator, Jump Bottle System, High Capacity Portable Oxygen Console, Console Hose & Manifold Kit, and Upgrade Kit. See attachment for Cobham PHANTOM System or equal specifications and salient characteristics. The government's determination on how to compete the proposed requirement will be based on market research and responses to the notice; and is at the discretion of the Contracting Officer. Since the current capabilities of industry, to include large and small businesses must be confirmed, all eligible large and small businesses are encouraged to respond. The Government is not obligated to and will not pay for any information received from potential sources as a result of this notice. Point of Contact: Steven E. Honeck, (210) 295-7433. Email your questions to the Contract Specialist at steven.e.honeck.civ@mail.mil.\n\n## Micc Advocate For Competition And Ombudsman:\n\nPlease contact Mr. Dean Carsello at email: dean.m.carsello.civ@mail.mil or phone: (210) 466-2419 if you feel the requirement is unreasonably restrictive. Contracting Office Address: ACC - Camp Stanley Office (ACC-RI-Camp Stanley), 25800 Ralph Fair Road, Boerne, TX 78015 Place of Performance: ACC - Camp Stanley Office (ACC-RI-Camp Stanley) 25800 Ralph Fair Road, Boerne TX 78015US Point of Contact(s): Steven E . Honeck, (210) 295-7433\nhttps://www.fbo.gov/index?s=opportunity&mode=form&tab=core&id=fd2dc3718f6250c6f494c129d00ede75\n16--Parachute Bailout System Solicitation Number: W45PVN15Q2029 Agency: Department of the Army Office: Army Contracting Command, MICC Location: MICC - (W45PVN) CAmp Stanley Office Solicitation Number: W45PVN15Q2029 Notice Type: Justification and Approval (J&A) J&A Statutory Authority: Contract Award Date: September 25, 2015 Contract Award Number: W45PVN15C0084 Synopsis: Added: Sep 11, 2015 11:03 am Modified: Oct 27, 2015 11:57 am Track Changes J&A Posting\n\n## Appendix A Google Earth And Bing Maps Imagery Of Camp Stanley Storage Activity\n\nNote that the bunkers and roads appear to be well maintained.\n\nRetrieved 2014-01-01.\n\nbuilding, Building 91, to the left, perhaps containing an overhead crane for handling heavy objects.\nThe purpose of the two elevated lines to the tall structure and to Building 90 (lower right) is unknown, as is that of the small building to which they connect.\n\n## Appendix B New Construction Post-911 At Cssa\n\nBetween 2004 and 2015, Camp Stanley saw the construction of many new buildings, several quite large. The total area under roof grew by approximately 14,500 square meters (156,000 square feet), not counting new staff homes and some isolated facilities.\n\n## Chronology\n\nAreas under roof were measured in Google Earth Pro imagery using the polygon tool and are approximate.\n\nGeographic coordinates are those given by Google Earth Pro.\n\n2003 -  36 m  x 2.5 m structure, possibly made of intermodal shipping containers, built on bed of previously existing railroad ( 29.69637 - 98.62230).\n\n2004  -  New, isolated area with  a  50 m^2 shed apparently notched into the base of  Schasse Hill (29.68408 -98.61988). Subsequently expanded with additional sheds/buildings in 2014. 2005/2006  -  Five buildings along Plant Road, expansion of one building on Tompkins Dr.  Total area > 3000 m^2 (29.6949 -98.6256). 2007  -  Four new houses along Rd No. U-28  (29.6946 -98.6303).\n\n2007 - Reconstruction of house, possibly for mold remediation of residence occupied by Kevin Shipp, at 29.6952 -98.6307\n2007  -   First two buildings at warehouse training area. These appear to be a 605 m^2 bunkhouse (29.71723 -98.61975) and a 1430 m^2 training warehouse (29.7167 -98.6200).\n\n2007  -  1000 m^2 building on Central Road (29.6911 -98.6226) 2007  -  Installation of first emergency generator (29.68713 -98.63020). 2008  -  900 m^2 building off Plant Rd U-27 (29.6966 -98.6264). 2010  -  2750 m^2 warehouse on Rd No. w-2  (29.6779 -98.6303). 2010/2011  -  Installation of second emergency generator next to first. 2010/2011  -  Upgrade to presumed explosives truck loading area (29.71084 -98.61075). 2013  -   Two new buildings in warehouse training area (29.7157 -98.6215). Total area 925 m^2. 2014  -  Three larger sheds in isolated area with small sheds off of Rd No. F-1 (29.68408 -98.61988).\n2015  -  2900 m^2 building at Finke Dr and Moyer Rd (29.6977 -98.6168). Based on lightning protection, perhaps an expansion of existing explosives handling area.\n\n2015  -  1000 m^2 building on Tompkins Rd  (29.6931 -98.6259). 2019 - 1600 m^2 building with loading docks at Central Road and Road H22 (29.7062 -98.6233) 2020 - Tall square (~ 10x10 m tower built adjacent existing large building (29.6803 -98.6292)\nhttp://www.michaelwruth.com/\n[Accessed 2018-01-16]\n[EXCERPTS] Michael W. Ruth, CCP, LEED AP (BD+C), VMA 34 Atherton Road Timonium, MD 21093 (443) 722-7622\n\n## Michael W. Ruth Work History (Present Through 1988)\n\nCamp Stanley Storage Armory, San Antonio, TX: As Cost Estimator, provided a 100% design stage submission cost estimate. The project involved a storage armory at Camp Stanley, a weapons and munitions supply, maintenance, test, and storage facility. The post is on 4,000 acres with 630,000 square feet of storage space. The total construction value was $11 million. 6/23/08 - 6/26/08\nhttp://fbodaily.com/archive/2009/04-April/16-Apr-2009/FBO-01792533.htm FBO DAILY ISSUE OF APRIL 16, 2009 FBO #2698 SOLICITATION NOTICE [EXCERPTS]\n\n## Y -- Construction Of The Camp Stanley Storage Activity Armory Project, Boerne, Tx\n\nNotice Type Presolicitation Contracting Office Department of the Army, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Baltimore, US Army Corps of Engineers, Baltimore, 10 South Howard Street, Baltimore, MD 21203 Solicitation Number W912DR-09-R-0039 Archive Date 7/28/2009 Point of Contact Marianne Stakem, 410-854-0738 Small Business Set-Aside N/A Description This proposed procurement is unrestricted, NAICS 236220, small business size standard $33,500,000.00. Estimated cost of construction is between $10,000,000.00 and $25,000,000.00. Completion no later than 270 calendar days. The project will require construction of a one story building covering approximately 42,506 square feet. The building is 452 feet long and encircled by an asphalt road about 28 feet wide with parking spaces, sidewalk and seeded landscaped areas between the road and the building. All responsible sources may submit a proposal which shall be considered by the agency. Contractors must be U.S. Citizens. Issuance on or about 28 April 2009, receipt of proposals on or about 28 May 2009. Comment: If the building were of rectangular floor plan, its width would be 42,506/452 = 94 feet. Estimated cost per square foot is between $235 and $588.  The five already existing long buildings in the southwest corner of CSSA measure 600x70 feet, or 42,000 square feet in area.\n\n## Www.Fbo.Gov\n\nY--Construction of New Armory Building, Camp Stanley Storage Activity, Boerne, TX Solicitation Number: W912DR-09-R-0039 Agency: Department of the Army Office: U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Location: USACE District, Baltimore Solicitation Number: W912DR-09-R-0039 Notice Type: Award Contract Award Date: September 29, 2009 Contract Award Number: W912DR-09-C-0080 Contract Award Dollar Amount: 7,395,000.00 Contract Line Item Number: N/A Contractor Awardee: Journeyman Construction, Inc. 601 NW Loop 410, Suite 210 San Antonio, TX 78216 Synopsis: Added: Apr 14, 2009 2:58 pm Modified: Sep 30, 2009 10:04 amTrack Changes Award of contract for Camp Stanley Storage Activity, Boerne, TX Added: Aug 10, 2009 10:29 am Amendment 3, issued 10 August 2009 Added: Aug 14, 2009 3:39 pm Amendment 4, issued 14 August 2009 Added: Aug 26, 2009 11:18 am Amendment 3, issued 10 August 2009, changed performance time period to 360 calendar days in lieu of 270 calendar days. [Comment: The award dollar amount is somewhat smaller than that estimated in the presolicitation. Assuming that the square feet under contract remains the 42,506 given in the presolicitation, the cost per square foot is $174. ]\nhttp://www.defense.gov/contracts/contract.aspx?contractid=4133\nNo: 768-09 October 05, 2009\n\n## Contracts Army\n\n   Journeyman Construction, Inc., San Antonio, Texas., was awarded on Sep. 29, 2009 a $7,395,000 firm-fixedprice contract for the amory *[sic]* building,  Camp Stanley storage activity, Boerne, Texas.,  Work is to be performed in Boerne, Texas, with an estimated completion date of Oct. 10, 2010 Bids were solicited on the World Wide Web with 10 bids received.  U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Baltimore District, Real Property Services Field Office, Baltimore, Md., is the contracting activity (W912DR-09-C-0080).\n\nhttp://www.reedconstructiondata.com/rsmeans/models/warehouse/texas/san-antonio/\n\n## [Illustrative Warehouse Construction Costs]\n\nComment: This may not include electricity, HVAC, plumbing, cranes and other special equipment, security systems, parking space etc.\n\nSouthwest corner of CSSA, 2012-04-21.\n\nThe new long building, apparently called \"Building 95\", is externally complete.\nAs measured in Google Earth, the dimensions of the area under roof are 445x67 feet, for a total of 29,815 square feet.\n\nThis is considerably less than the 42,506 square feet  in the presolicitation notice above.\n\nHowever, if this is the \"New Armory Building\", the cost per square foot is  $7,395,000/29,815 = $248 per square foot, somewhat consistent with the estimate  in the presolitication notice.\n\nResidential area, 2008-01-31.\n\nNote the appearance of six new houses, three on Circle Drive and three on Road No. U-28.\n\nThis brought the number of single-family houses at CSSA to fourteen, a number that did not change through early 2014\nS--HUB Zone Set Aside - Minor Grounds Maintanence, Improved Areas Solicitation Number: W45PVN-14-Q2437 Agency: Department of the Army Office: Army Contracting Command Location: ACC - Camp Stanley Office (ACC-RI-Camp Stanley) Synopsis: Added: Jul 07, 2014 11:22 am Ground Maintenance of Improved Grounds for the period of 1 Aug 14 thru 31 Jul 15. Areas consist of 14 residential units, 1 temporary unit, two command buildings and small area at front gate. Also included is maitaining decorative plant beds. This is requirement is set aside for Hub Zone Certified. Request for quote will be provided by request only. It will not be published on-line. Contracting Office Address: ACC - Camp Stanley Office (ACC-RI-Camp Stanley), 25800 Ralph Fair Road, Boerne, TX 78015 Place of Performance: ACC - Camp Stanley Office (ACC-RI-Camp Stanley) 25800 Ralph Fair Road, Boerne TX 78015 US Point of Contact(s): Steven E . Honeck, (210) 295-7433 [Comment: Perhaps coincidentally, 204 acres was the amount of land added to Camp Stanley in 1970 to bring it to its present size:\nhttp://www.stanley.army.mil/Volume1-3/AOC73/ReleaseInvestigationReport.pdf\n\n## Area Of Concern 73 - Camp Stanley Storage Activity September 2008 [Excerpts]\n\nAn additional 204 acres were assigned to Camp Stanley in December 1970; this is now the northernmost portion of CSSA (Boyd et al., 1990). Boyd et al., 1990. Archaeological and historical investigations at Camp Bullis, Bexar and Comal Counties, Texas: The 1989 season. D.K. Boyd, I.K. Cox, and H.G. Uecker, on file, Texas Historical Commission, Austin, Texas.]\nNew construction appears in outer cantonment, 2008-01-31.\n\nConstruction occurred during 2007.\n\nNo new construction in outer cantonment 2006-12-25.\n\nComment: The building in the foreground appears to be office space repurposed from a warehouse next to a previously exiting railroad.\n\nhttp://www.txtransportationmuseum.org/history-rr-military.php When the Southern Pacific abandoned most of its line to Kerrville in 1971, its new terminus became Camp Stanley. As late as the first Gulf War to liberate Kuwait, the army was still using trains to move material from its storage facilities there. Often these trains went directly to Corpus Christi which has always been, and still remains, a significant military port facility. The tracks into Camp Stanley were finally removed around 2001 bringing to an end the once vital contributions made by the rail networks to all the branches of the military in and around San Antonio.\n\nThis railway line, ultimately between San Antonio and Kerrville, was built by the San Antonio and Aransas Pass Railroad in 1887. The Southern Pacific Railroad gained control of the SA&AP in 1925, and eventually merged it into its Texas and New Orleans Railway subsidiary in 1934. Southern Pacific filed to abandon the line in 1969.\n\nTwo generator sets with fuel tanks, 2012-04-21.\n\nAs measured in Google Earth, the fuel tanks are 5 meters long by 2.5 meters in diameter, corresponding to a capacity of about 6,000 gallons each.\n\nAt typical generator outputs, 6,000 gallons of fuel would last one generator several days to a few weeks, depending on circumstances.\n\nhttp://www.dieselserviceandsupply.com/Diesel_Fuel_Consumption.aspx\n\n## View Of Tower From Ralph Fair Road\n\nNote: A very rough calculation based on the length of the tower's shadow in the 2020-12-16 indicates that it is about 45 to 50 meters tall.\n\nAppearance of facility, 2015. The large circle is a typical provision for turning long vehicles.\n\nThe poles adjacent to the rectangular parking areas are possibly for lightning protection.\n\n2500 ft radius of facility. The area within that range appears to be mostly uninhabited.\n\nPossible explosives warehouse, 2015-01-19.\n\nNote the three tall masts along the north and south sides of the building.\n\nClose-up of masts on north side of building.\nFaint lines, possibly overhead ground wires, extend from the masts toward the building.\n\nThe configuration shown in [b] may be relevant for the Camp Stanley building and masts.\n\n2500 foot radius of the building in 2015.\n\nConsidering the recent construction of residential areas to the west of Ralph Fair Road, it seems unlikely that, if the building is actually used for explosives storage, more than one truck-load, perhaps 20 - 25 tons, will be contained at a time.\n\nSmall Facility next to Schasse Hill in Camp Stanley\n29.68407 -98.61986\nThe largest structure, built in 2003, appears to be set into a notch cut into a steep slope with retaining walls toward the  back of the building. The function of the five square pads in front of it is unknown.\n\nhttp://www.topozone.com/texas/bexar-tx/summit/schasse-hill/\nTopographic setting. The site of the facility is labeled \"Borrow Pit.\"\nAppearance of the facility in early 2018. The additional structures connecting existing buildings were constructed in the second half of 2017. Shadows of the structures perpendicular to the upper and lower buildings suggest they may be wedge-shaped, perhaps ramps.\n\n## Expansion Of Possible Explosives Handling Facility Close-Up Of Large Residence\n\n                                   Before                                                                          After Comment and speculation: This is the second-largest residence at Camp Stanley, suggesting it was assigned to the second in command or Deputy Chief of Base (D/COB). The reconstruction suggests that it is the residence where Kevin Shipp lived:  the reconstruction may have been associated with mold remediation.\n\n## Vehicle Count On 2016-11-15\n\n         6-8                                           29-30                                     33 16                                           5-6\nTaking into account other individual vehicles on roads and leaving aside cargo trucks, there were about 100 cars, SUVs, vans and pickups. This appears to be consistent with about 100 - 200 people present."
    },
    {
        "text": "This document was prepared as an account of work sponsored by an agency of the United States government. Neither the United States government nor Lawrence Livermore National Security, LLC, nor any of their employees makes any warranty, expressed or implied, or assumes any legal liability or responsibility for the accuracy, completeness, or usefulness of any information, apparatus, product, or process disclosed, or represents that its use would not infringe privately owned rights. Reference herein to any specific commercial product, process, or service by trade name, trademark, manufacturer, or otherwise does not necessarily constitute or imply its endorsement, recommendation, or favoring by the United States government or Lawrence Livermore National Security, LLC. The views and opinions of authors expressed herein do not necessarily state or reflect those of the United States government or Lawrence Livermore National Security, LLC, and shall not be used for advertising or product endorsement purposes. This work performed under the auspices of the U.S. Department of Energy by Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory under Contract DE-AC52-07NA27344\n\n \t\n\n\t\n\n\t\n\n\n## Executive\t\n  Summary\n\nThis report describes a path forward for implementing information barriers in a future generic biological arms-control verification regime. Information barriers have become a staple of discussion in the area of arms control verification approaches for nuclear weapons and components. Information barriers when used with a measurement system allow for the determination that an item has sensitive characteristics without releasing any of the sensitive information. Over the last 15 years the United States (with the Russian Federation) has led on the development of information barriers in the area of the verification of nuclear weapons and nuclear components. The work of the US and the Russian Federation has prompted other states (e.g., UK and Norway) to consider the merits of information barriers for possible verification regimes. In the context of a biological weapons control verification regime, the dual-use nature of the biotechnology will require protection of sensitive information while allowing for the verification of treaty commitments. A major question that has arisen is whetherin a biological weapons verification regime the presence or absence of a weapon pathogen can be determined without revealing any information about possible sensitive or proprietary information contained in the genetic materials being declared under a verification regime. This study indicates that a verification regime could be constructed using a small number of pathogens that spans the range of known biological weapons agents. Since the number of possible pathogens is small it is possible and prudent to treat these pathogens as analogies to attributes in a nuclear verification regime. This study has determined that there may be some information that needs to be protected in a biological weapons control verification regime. To protect this information, the study concludes that the Lawrence Livermore Microbial Detection Array may be a suitable technology for the detection of the genetic information associated with the various pathogens. In addition, it has been determined that a suitable information barrier could be applied to this technology when the verification regime has been defined. Finally, the report posits a path forward for additional development of information barriers in a biological weapons verification regime. This path forward has shown that a new analysis approach coined as Information Loss Analysis might need to be pursued so that a numerical understanding of how information can be lost in specific measurement systems can be achieved.\n\n\t\n\n\t\n\n\t\n  \t\n\n\t\n\n\t\n\n\n## Introduction\n\nMostif not allweapons control treaties or agreements that involve technical verification demand some sort of protection of the data that could be obtained in the measurement process. [1, 2] In most of these agreements, the methodology to safeguard the possible sensitive data relied upon physical control of the data that has been obtained. In the late eighties and early nineties it was envisaged that protection of sensitive data could go beyond simple administrative controls. It was conceived that a methodology could be developed to use hardware and software controls, in addition to administrative controls, to protect sensitive information. This systems-level thinking led to the concept of the information barrier. An information barrier is an integrated system that protects information that has been determined to be sensitive by a host party from an inspecting party, while also providing the inspecting party with certain agreed upon, nonsensitive information. Traditionally, the system provides a green, red, or *yellow* light that qualitatively supplies verification information without releasing any sensitive technical details. The various *lights* indicate whether the verification measurement is consistent with, inconsistent with, or indeterminate with the declaration of the monitored party, respectively. A challenge for the next generation of arms-control verification regimes is to determine the natureand the necessityof information barriers that might be used as part of a verification measurement regime. Information barriers must be produced in the context of measurements and a specific regime. A possible misapprehension* is that an information barrier is a genericfor lack of a better termdevice that can be placed upon a measurement system to protect some generic sensitive data; much like a shroud\napplied to an object to prevent its visual examination. In practice, the characteristics of an information barrier depend strongly on the specific regime, type of information that is being protected, and how the measurement is being performed. Designing an effective information barrier requires:\n\n-\nA detailed understanding of the information that is contained in the measurement data.\n-\nAn assessment of risk associated with the loss of any possible sensitive data.\n-\nA detailed loss analysis to understand the associated sensitive information loss mechanisms for each specific measurement.\n-\nDevelopment of an information barrier methodology that mitigates each loss mechanism.\n-\nA comprehensive red team assessment of the developed measurement system with information barrier.\n Establishing an information barrier for a biological weapons verification regime is in some respects premature because the details of a strict verification regime have yet to be defined. The text of the original BWC dealt little with verification or compliance related to an agreement on verification. However, in the 2nd Review Conference for the BWC there was some discussion concerning the Declaration of past activities in offensive and/or defensive biological research and development programmes (CBM F) [2] This consideration as well as recent discussion of the possible compliance regime in the 7th Review Conference [3], indicates that the time might be ripe for discussion of a comprehensive verification regime that could resemble the CWC regime.[1] Much of the discussion considered in this report is forward thinking and speculative. However, by considering the possible details and configuration of a regime beforehand, it may help guide policy makers (and technology providers) as to how the technical basis of a verification regime might be constructed. This report assumes that a verification regime will be entered into *voluntarily* by at least two state parties. In addition, this report assumes that one of the participants in the verification regime has declared that it has performed research and development using one of a set of *subject* pathogens. These subject pathogens are contained in a schedule of genetic materials that have the capability to be used as an offensive (or defensive) biological weapon. A possible verification regime would be for a monitoring party to monitor the presence of various pathogens that a monitored partysay a research laboratoryis using for legitimate research. The charge of the monitoring party is to ensure that only certain malicious pathogens are present, which the monitored party has voluntarily declared. [4] The monitoring party has the rightunder a verification protocolto confirm that the inspected party is indeed using the *controlled* pathogens but has no right to ascertain how the pathogen is being used in the legitimate research and development in order to protect sensitive or proprietary information.\n\n## Implementation\t\n  Of\t\n  Information\t\n  Barriers\t\n  In\t\n  A\t\n  Verification\t\n  Regime\n\nThe protection of sensitive host party information from a monitoring party, during a verification measurement, is the primary purpose of an Information Barrier. The determination of the identity of sensitive information is governed by the host party and may take many forms, from information that is of importance to the national security to proprietary information with intellectual property value. An information barrier is a combination of hardware, software, controls, and procedures that offers assurance to the host party that its sensitive data are being securely held. Ideally, the implementation of an information barrier incorporates a layered approach instead of a monolithic one. With an effective layered approach, it is possible for the host party to ensure that data are protected even if a single layer might fail. In general, the host party implements the measurement instrumentation within its own facility, and is in control of the measurement equipment at all times. The measurement system that includes the information barrier must conform to the environmental, safety, health, and security requirements of all facilities in the host country. The monitoring party (or sometimes the *inspecting party*, depending on the nature of the agreement that controls the measurement process) is present to ensure that measurements of the subject materials are consistent with declarations and/or agreements. The monitoring partydepending on the nature of agreementmay have little or no control of the measurement system after it has been implemented. Therefore, a very important issue for the monitoring party is authentication of the measurement system. This gives the monitoring party high confidence that the measurements being performed behind the information barrier are consistent with the design specifications. In other words, the monitoring party must have confidence that the host party is not spoofing the measurement outcome by some sort of hidden switch or similar operation. The design of the measurement system that includes an information barrier must be certified before use in the host's facilities, and ensure high-fidelity measurements without operator interaction, to minimize both false positives and false negatives. False negatives may lead to a situation where the monitoring party does not trust the declaration of the host party, and false positives call into question the integrity of the measurement process. Meeting these distinct host-party and monitoring-party constraints requires a great deal of cooperation and negotiation in establishing the proper information barrier methodology for any regime. It is clear that an acceptance of the information barrier by the monitoring party must require a combination of joint development and joint experimentation on known samples to ensure that the information barrier can be trusted from the point of view of the monitoring party.\n\n\t\n  \t\n\n\t\n\n\t\n\n\t\n\nHost\t\n  Party\t\n  Point\t\n  of\t\n  View\t\n\nFrom the perspective of the host party, the overriding information barrier requirement is that its sensitive information *must* be protected at any cost. There cannotand should notbe any compromise in this position. Any regime that a host party enters into voluntarily will have to satisfy its concerns in this regard. While the most direct way to prevent access to sensitive information during a measurement would be to allow no measurement at all, this would not satisfy the requirement to provide the monitoring party with some adequate basis for confidence in the declaration of the host party. Confidence building proceduressuch as measurementsare almost certain to be required for any arms control regime. Two general approaches have been taken for measurement systems employing information barriers:\n\n-\nAttribute measurements: a measurement system is designed to determine the value of some particular attribute (or attributes), which is compared to an agreed-on nonsensitive threshold or falls within an agreed, nonsensitive range. In this case, the measurement system employing an information barrier can provide a simple yes/no indication to the monitoring party.\n-\nTemplate measurements: a measurement system is constructed that compares data from measurement of a monitored item not to pre-agreed attribute threshold values but rather to internally stored templates that have been derived in advance from measurements of known items. As in the attribute-based approach, the template-matching approach would provide to the monitoring party only a yes/no answer, not the underlying sensitive data that would remain behind the information barrier. Such a scheme would clearly have to be regime (and item) dependent.\n The other major host party requirement is the need to certify all equipment to be used in its facilities. The host party certification process* is why, in general, any equipment used in a host party facility is most likely to be developed by and provided by the host. The host party can expedite the certification process by designing the information barrier equipment and/or software to be as simple as possible, with the caveat that *simple* is a dynamic term and should be considered on a case-by-case basis. It is clear, however, that if a system is designed to be easily certifiable, it is in general much easier to be accepted by the facility for use (and possibly easier to be authenticated by the monitoring party).\n\nMonitoring\t\n  Party\t\n  Point\t\n  of\t\n  View\t\n\nIn direct contrast to the information-protection mind-set of the host party, the priority of the monitoring party is to obtain enough information to gain reasonable confidence in the host-party declaration. Ideally, the monitoring party would like unfettered access to the item under consideration to verify the nature of the declared item. However, this desire cannot be accommodated because of the requirement imposed by the host party to ensure that the monitoring party cannot access information that has been deemed sensitive. Therefore the monitoring party must rely upon confidence-building measures to confirm the declaration of the host party. By nature these confidence-building measures do not provide certainty; they simply provide a degree of confidence as to the veracity of the host party declaration. The confidence level may be increased if the monitoring party is granted necessary access so that the authentication requirements of the system can be established and is allowed to be involved in acceptance testing of the verification system. The idea of authentication has a long history in the area of nonproliferation. There is a large breadth of opinion on the nature of authentication of equipment (both software and hardware) and on how to implement the authentication process. It is clear, however, that it is in the best interest of the monitoring party to have a solid approach to authentication that is commensurate with the level of confidence required for the type and context of agreement. In general, from an authentication point of viewas was the case for certification by the host partyit is necessary that the information barrier system be as simple as possible. Authentication is important at several stages in the development and implementation process. Ideally both parties participate in designing the system that does not contain any functionality that is not consistent with the operation for which the information barrier system was designed. This process can be very time consuming, given that the idea of an information barrier is rather dynamic. Authentication also is an issue during evaluation and acceptance testing of information barrier system performance, where the entire dynamic range of the information barrier is tested against known standards, which have the same characteristics of the agreement relevant item and have been certified and agreed upon by both parties. The extent that the information barrier system is exercised during the course of a regime is open to negotiation. However, the information barrier system must be exercised fully before it is accepted.\nAcceptance testing provides the baseline for any future evaluation of the information barrier system. Ideally, from a monitoring party point of view, acceptance testing would be jointly performed by both of the parties. Acceptance testing would allow for measurements to be made both without and with the use of the information barrier to assure the monitoring party of the veracity of the measurement process. In acceptance testing, the dynamic range of the measurement system would be exercised fully in that all of the possible permutations of the information barrier would be completely determined.\n\n## Short\t\n  History\t\n  Of\t\n  Information\t\n  Barrier\t\n  Thinking\n\nMost information barrier implementation over the last 20 years has been initiated by the US and the Russian Federation.* The short history of information barrier thinking presented here has been written from the perspective of the United States. Other activities, such as a U.K.-Norway-VERTIC project, have not been included because it was a simulated exercise and did not involve *real* sensitive information.\nIn addition, the history concentrates on US-Russian Federation interactions because it is in those interactions that the majority of information barrier contemplation has resided. A timeline, presented in Figure 1, shows the development of various measurement systems that have employed some sort of information barrier approaches. The early discussion of information barriers [5-8] for use in nuclear verification centered around two approaches:\n\n-\nAttribute measurements that involve determining specific characteristics of items under consideration.\n-\nTemplate measurements that involve determining global characteristics of items under consideration.\n These different approaches were championed by different experts and applied in the various projects described below.\n\n\t\n\n\nControlled\t\n  Intrusiveness\t\n  Verification\t\n  Technology\t\n  System\t\n  (CIVET)\t\n\nThe earliest technical solution to the protection of sensitive information in the nuclear weapons arena was CIVET [9, 10]. CIVET was developed at BNL and was in many ways very forward thinking CIVET was a single-function multichannel analyzer (MCA) that could be used with a high-purity germanium detector to determine the value of enrichment of a sample of uranium. The idea was visionary but suffered from at least two shortcomings. The first shortcoming was that the instrument was designed without the benefit of being designed for a specific regime. As will be discussed below, the design of a measurement system with an information barrier, but without a specific regime, is in many ways counterproductive. Second, the technology available at the time was not conducive to designing an instrument that could be authenticated. Clearly the chipset count in the instrument would make the authentication process difficult. The technology when CIVET was conceived could not support the vision of its implementation. However, as technology progressed, what CIVET envisioned could be implemented.\n\nMutual\t\n  Reciprocal\t\n  Inspections\t\n  (MRI)\t\n\nThe JOINT STATEMENT ON INSPECTION OF FACILITIES CONTAINING FISSILE MATERIALS REMOVED FROM NUCLEAR WEAPON, which was agreed to by Secretary Hazel O'Leary and Minister Viktor Mikhailov, established the framework for the interaction involving technical experts from the United States and the Russian Federation to consider the measurement of the characteristics of weapons-quality plutonium [11, 12]. These cooperative experiments were instigated to understand what measurements could be made jointly between the United States and Russian Federation and how these measurements could be implemented in an agreement between the two parties. These interactions, however, did not lead to development of an information barrier. The joint measurements were important because these interactions did test some ideas that would be considered later in the history of the development of information barriers. Two of the major ideas that were tested were the limitation on how much data are taken during a gamma ray spectrometry measurement and smearing out the resolution in an imaging measurement. The first of these approaches has been used in several areas, mainly in developing the measurement process known is Pu600. The imaging approach has not been considered as yet, and this is not likely to be a productive direction because the sensitive information can be protected. In addition, it is always beneficial to make the best possible measurements and avoid possible incorrect conclusions.\n\n\nTri\t\n  Lateral\t\n  Initiative\t\n  (Tri\t\n  LAT)\t\n\nThe Tri Lateral Initiative [13-18] was initiated by a joint statement by the United States, Russian Federation, and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in 1996 to investigate technical, legal, and financial issues associated with IAEA verification of weapon-origin fissile material in the Russian Federation and the United States. Under a bilateral agreement with the IAEA, experts from the United States developed a system for the measurement of various characteristics of plutonium that could be put under IAEA Safeguards. This system was demonstrated to experts from the IAEA and the Russian Federation to prove that measurements of fissile material could be made behind an information barrier. The Tri-lateral Initiative (Tri Lat) was important in the short history of information barriers. The Tri Lat was the first time that a measurement system was developed for an actual agreement. During the course of developing the system, attributes for plutonium were chosen and in some ways canonized the thresholds associated with these characteristics. Finally, the measurement system developed during the Tri Lat indicated that it was possible to make high-quality measurements behind an information barrier, as well as exercise novel hardware solutions for information barriers that were the basis of future information barrier designs.\n\nFissile\t\n  Material\t\n  Technology\t\n  Transparency\t\n  Demonstration\t\n  (FMTTD)\t\n\nThe Fissile Material Transparency Technology Demonstration (FMTTD) [19-24], performed at Los Alamos National Laboratory on August 14-17, 2000, had two major objectives. The first was to demonstrate to the Russian delegation that a six-attribute measurement system with information barrier (AMS/IB) could be built with sufficient protection to allow measurement of classified components without revealing classified information. The second was to construct this AMS/IB in such a manner as to convince the Russian delegation that it would be possible for a monitoring party to fully authenticate the operation of the system. The six attributes that were chosen for this demonstration were:\n\n-\nPresence of plutonium.\n-\nPresence of weapons-grade plutonium.\n-\nPlutonium mass.\n-\nPlutonium age.\n-\nAbsence of plutonium oxide.\n-\nSymmetry of the plutonium source.\n The demonstration was successful in showing that measurements could be made on sensitive items without the release of any sensitive information. However, the demonstration did not lead to the use of the technology developed in a verification regime between the United States and Russian Federation.\n\n## Recent\t\n  Work\n\nAttribute\t\n  Verification\t\n  System\t\n  Neutrons\t\n  Gammas\t\n  (AVNG)\t\n\nThe AVNG attribute measurement system [25-30] was designed and built at the All Russian Scientific Institute of Experimental Physics (VNIIEF) in Russia to make measurements of potentially classified plutonium items and display previously agreed upon characteristics of the item in an unclassified form. Detailed measurements of an item under consideration were made behind an information barrier, and unclassified *attributes* based on these measurements were displayed outside the information barrier. The attributes were derived by comparing measurement results to thresholds, and only reporting whether the result was above or below the threshold (e.g., mass of plutonium> 2kg). A measurement system such as the AVNG could be used to verify a declaration made concerning a treaty-limited plutonium item. A monitoring party could use displayed attributes as well as any procedures before, during, or after the\n\t\n  \t\n\n\t\n\n\t\n\n\t\n\nmeasurement to gain confidence that the item's properties were consistent with the declared properties. A primary design criterion of an AVNG-like system is that classified information cannot be released. This criterion is often in conflict with the desire of monitoring party to obtain as much information as possible for authentication of the system and measurements.\nNext\t\n  Generation\t\n  Attribute\t\n  Measurement\t\n  System\t\n  \t\n\nThe goal of the Next Generation Attribute Measurement System (NG-AMS) was to develop a system that was designed from the ground up to be both certifiable and authenticatable [31-33]. The NG-AMS was developed and built exclusively at Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL). The attribute measurement system could make measurements on sealed canisters of plutonium. As designed, the NG-AMS system determined the value of three attributes from the detection of neutrons and gamma rays emitted from a sample. These three attributes are the mass of the plutonium, the 240Pu/239Pu ratio, and the date on which the 241Am was last separated from the plutonium. The system was designed with enough flexibility to allow for the determination of different attributes as might be needed in the future.\nThe development of the NG-AMS sought to understand the issues that affect authentication. The major issue that the developers discoveredas others hadis the limited information displayed due to the restriction of potentially sensitive measurements. This is the driving force for continued development of information barriers, and cannot be relaxed, restricting the LANL developers to conclude that certification of the AMS is paramount for the host party; just as authentication is of the utmost importance to the monitoring party. The conclusion is important because it indicates that joint development may ease the concerns of both parties.\n\nThird\t\n  Generation\t\n  Attribute\t\n  Measurement\t\n  System\t\n  (3G-AMS)\t\n\nIn 2011, the NNSA instituted the development of the Third Generation Attribute Measurement System. The purpose of this effort is to design and build a modular system capable of identifying attributes of a nuclear weapon or weapon components. The effort is being coordinated between the national laboratories and PANTEX Corporation. The Third Generation Attribute Measurement System differs from previous attribute measurement system development by defining three unique goals that govern the design of the system.\n\n1. Authentication - for the first time the designers are attempting to take into account the\nauthentication of the system as a design constraint.\n2. Measurement on a full warhead - most of the previous attribute measurement systems focused\nmainly on determining the attributes of weapons components.\n3. Demonstration performed in a nuclear weapons facility, which is challenging technology\nproviders to produce an instrument that is ready for prime-time, rather than a pieced-together laboratory system.\n This project is still in the very early stages of development, so there is little documentation available at this time. However, the emphasis of the DOE on this project indicates the commitment by the DOE to continue work in the advancement of information barrier thinking.\n\nImplications\t\n  of\t\n  attribute\t\n  v.\t\n  template\t\n  discussion\t\n  on\t\n  information\t\n  barrier\t\n  thought\t\n\nIn an attribute measurement approach, the measurement system focuses on determining specific characteristics of the item under consideration. In the case of a nuclear measurement regime, these attributes might be plutonium mass, plutonium isotopics, uranium enrichment, etc. Template measurements focus on determining a global characteristic of an item under consideration and comparing that global characteristic with a measurement that was obtained on a *control item*. At the conclusion of these initial discussions, it was determined that templates would be appropriate in a monitoring regime that involved the measurement of numerous items of the *same* type, while attribute\n\t\n\n\t\n\nmeasurements would be most appropriate if the regime involved items not of the same type but with similar features.* Attribute measurement systems allow for the development of measurement systems that are more general in nature, without the necessity to store sensitive information as part of the measurement system. Advocates of the attribute measurement approach concluded that attributes, in general, had fewer concerns with sensitive data because no sensitive data would be stored with the system. However, this concept may be incorrect because the existence of *transient* sensitive data presents an information security threat that is at least equivalent to the risk associated with *permanent* sensitive data. One of the design constraints of any measurement system is that the false alarm rate must be kept to a minimum. False alarms contribute to the peril of the yellow light in a measurement system. In an attribute measurement system the last thing that either party wants is a yellow light. Red lights can be accounted for and treated in the protocol; yellow lights are difficult to deal with because there can be many situations that contribute to a yellow light. In practical matters all yellow lights are added to the red light for the system. When the red light rate is too high it calls into question the appropriateness of the measurement system.\n\nMeasuring attributes allows for the design of measurement systems that can be as good as can be designed [34, 35]. This is an advantage for the attribute measurement approach in that it allows for the best possible measurements to be performedfrom the point of view of experimental errorso that statistical variations of the measurements are kept to a minimum. These *optimal* measurements, along with appropriately chosen threshold values, allow for the false alarm rates to be kept to as low as possible. In the case of a template measurement approach, defining the false alarm rate is a little trickier. There has been little work done on how to quantify the false alarm ratefrom a statistical point of viewin a template measurement scenario. Clearly, the false alarm rate is a function of the overall fit to the template. However, the constraint on the goodness of the fit has *n - 1* parameters, and there is no assurance that the goodness of fit is reflective of a poor measurement. The difficulty in quantifying false alarm rates was one of the reasons contributing to the outcome that attribute measurements were considered more appropriate for a verification regime.\n\n## Information\t\n  Barriers\t\n  In\t\n  A\t\n  Biological\t\n  Weapons\t\n  Control\t\n  Regime\n\nThe use of an information barrier in a measurement system relevant for biological weapons has not been seriously broached to date. The reasons are twofold. First, a verification regime has not been defined for the BWC (or for a BWC-like treaty) that requires the protection of any sensitive information. Second, the exact nature of what could be considered sensitive information in a biological weapons verification regime has yet to be defined. However, recent discussions about the importance of the dual-use *dilemma* [36-41] in biotechnology indicates that use of an information barrier on a measurement system in a biological weapons verification regime may be inevitable. The dual-use aspects of biotechnology could make verification under a biological weapons control regime daunting from the point of view of protecting sensitive information. The issue revolves aroundas it usually doesthe amount of information that may be shared in a verification regime versus assurance of the veracity of a measurement of the nature of a treaty-relevant item.\n\t\n\n\t\n\n\t\n\nThe application of information barriers to a biological weapons regime can be regarded as somewhat parallel to their use in a nuclear weapons control regime. The elements of biological weapons truly have dual-use concerns. These dual-use issues center on the fact that techniques and genetic building blocks that are used for the development of biological weapons have direct uses in various nonweapons applications. In addition, attenuated strains of biological agents may be used as vaccines or as controls for diagnostics development. This is less the case in nuclear weapons development. There are fewer defined uses of special nuclear materials and technology that might be found in nuclear weapons. These similarities and differences will need to be considered as the development of information barriers in a biological weapons regime matures. Though differences exist between the science (and engineering) aspects surrounding the development and implementation of a measurement system for nuclear and biological weapons, there are some parallels that may be useful for the design of a verification regime. The pros and cons of using attribute and template measurement information barrier systems, as discussed earlier in this paper with respect to nuclear weapons, could also be considered for the case of biological weapons.\n\nAs mentioned in the introduction, a possible verification regime would be for a monitoring party to monitor the presence of various pathogens that a monitored party has a use for in legitimate biotechnological research. The mission of the monitoring party would be to ensure that only certain malicious pathogens are present, which have been *voluntarily* declared by the monitored party.[4] Given complete access to an item that is declared by a monitored party it is possible in principle to fully map out the DNA sequence of that item. However, given the usual access and time constraints associated with any verification regime, this is probably not the most prudent avenue to be considered. Some of the information obtained from a complete genetic analysis of an item could be regarded as sensitive or proprietary depending on the nature of the regime. Knowledge of the complete sequence of a biological sample is analogous to having all the information about a nuclear weapon. The possession of this information by the monitoring party could pose a definite risk to the monitored party; the extent of this risk depends on the nature of the measurement process and the nature of the inspection regime.*\nIt is clear that a detailed sequence could in theory be determined for each *item* that could be voluntarily declared in a regime. The sequencing information of the declared item could be regarded as the equivalent of a template in a nuclear regime. The obtained sequence could be compared to all of the possible sequences of all the possible biological agents that could be present in the verification regime to determine whether or not the declared item was consistent with the declaration. A disadvantage of a measurement system if designed in this manner is that highly detailed and potentially sensitive information would exist within the system that would need to be rigorously protected from disclosure. It is therefore wise to search for a measurement methodology that would not require the storage of potentially sensitive information with (or on) the measurement system because it makes the implementation of an information barrier much more straightforward. One possible approach would be to seek the equivalent of attributes in the biological realm. This could be accomplished by looking only at portions of the genetic material available for measurement, portions that still would give sufficient confidence that presence of the declared material is being confirmed. This methodology is the equivalent of producing an attribute measurement system in a nuclear verification regime. This approach limits the amount of possible sensitive information that needs to be protected and allows for the seamless implementation of an information barrier.\n\nExamination\t\n  of\t\n  Observables\t\n  \t\n\nIn the age of recombinant DNA research, it is impossible to fully span the space of possible pathogens that could be considered as a biological weapon. However, if one is defining a verification regime that is voluntarily entered into by two (or more) parties, it is possible to define a limited set of biological agents that could be included in a verification regime. For the purposes of this discussion, the items listed in Table 1 could be chosen for the initial biological agents to be considered for a biological weapons control regime.[42]\n\n##\n\n| Bacillus\t\n  anthracis\t\n  (Anthrax)\t\n     | Burkholderia\t\n  mallei\t\n  (Glanders)\t\n     |\n|---|---|\n| Brucella\t\n  melitensis\t\n  (Brucellosis)   | Chlamydia\t\n  psittaci\t\n  (Ornithosis)   |\n| Burkholderia\t\n  pseudomallei\t\n  (Melioidosis)   | Clostridium\t\n  perfringens   |\n| Clostridium\t\n  botulinum\t\n  (Botulism)   | Enterohaemorrhagic\t\n  Escherichia\t\n  coli   |\n| Coxiella\t\n  burnetti\t\n  (Q\t\n  fever)   | Rickettsia\t\n  mooseri\t\n  (Typhus)   |\n| Francisella\t\n  tularensis\t\n  (Tularemia)   | Rickettsia\t\n  rickettsii\t\n  (Rocky\t\n  Mountain\t\n  spotted\t\n  fever)   |\n| Rickettsia\t\n  prowasecki\t\n  (Typhus)   | Salmonella\t\n  typhi\t\n  (Typhoid)   |\n| Rickettsia\t\n  tsutsugamushii\t\n  (Scrub\t\n  typhus)   | Vibrio\t\n  cholerae\t\n  (Cholera)   |\n| Shigella\t\n  dysenteriae\t\n  (Dysentery)   | Yersinia\t\n  pestis\t\n  (Plague)   |\n\n In this initial statement of possible malicious biological agents, only bacterial species are identified as those to be considered for the initial items for a verification regime. The purpose of this exercise is to form a hypothetically agreed set of pathogens that defines a biological weapon* so that we can evaluate possible technologies that could be used to determine the nature of the items that are being considered. The *natures of the items* are the observables that define the biological agents under consideration. These observablesmore than likelywill be genetic sequences to be determined that establish the item under consideration as confirming its declaration. The genomes that define the pathogens are somewhat well known and well characterized so that they can be determined with relative ease. The advantage of limiting the original regime to a small set of observables is that a thorough risk and consequence analysis can be performed on any measurement approaches. There has been considerable advancement in the area of biological agent detection so that almost real-time measurements can be achieved with a little more work.\n\nPossible\t\n  Technologies\t\n  for\t\n  a\t\n  Verification\t\n  Regime\t\n\nThe characteristics that are important for a detector of biological weapons are presented in Ivnitski et al. [43] Their characteristics are modified and are presented in **Figure 2**. The characteristics in Figure 2 are important, but an additional characteristic that is not usually considered in the development of a measurement system is authentication. This will not be considered until the discussion below.* Though all ten of the characteristics of an ideal measurement system shown in the figure are important; two characteristics are *not vital* for a measurement system that is used in a verification regime, namely unattended operation and fieldablity. There will little need for a measurement system to be operated in an unattended fashion; in fact, it would not be prudent for a measurement system to have this characteristic because of the opportunity for deception. There are then eight remaining characteristics of a biological weapons detection system that need to be considered when down-selecting an appropriate technology.\n\n-\nSensitivity and Specificity - are required so that the best possible measurement can be made. False alarm rates increase when the measurement sensitivity is reduced and if the instrument does not detect the species of interest. This is one of the areas where a biological regime is distinct from a nuclear regime because the detection of a *specific* biological component is required. The consequences of yellow lights, from a policy point of view, are difficult to negotiate, particularly if the false alarm rate is too great.\n\t\n\n\t\n\n\n-\nSimplicity - the system has to be simple to operate with a very simple interface and operating procedure.\n-\nMultiple species monitoring - the measurement system should be able to detect all species that are included as part of the regime.\n-\nMeasurement time - the time to perform a complete analysis must be significantly less than an hour. A time of 15 minutes is probably ideal, with a time of 30 minutes being reasonable. This, however, may not be possible with the present technology in the case of biological measurements. In the biological realm, time to perform an acceptable experiment is a strong function of how much material is available for testing.* Time must always be balanced against the quality of measurement.\n-\nAutomated processing - all of the data analysis after introduction of the sample needs to be performed automatically, and most likely electronically. Although a desired quality for arms control measurements, this may be questionable in the case of biological weapons because of the\nconstraints of sample preparation.\n-\nInternal calibration - all of the calibration should be internal to the measurement instrument with the possible exception of authentication sources that might be necessary to make sure that the measurement system operates as designed.\n-\nLong mean time until failure - monitoring events are in most cases rare events, so the mean time\nuntil failure must be long because the measurement systems will be unused much of the time.\n-\nModular construction - this makes it easier to swap out spare components when something goes wrong with the instrument.\n In addition, technologies that are able to determine the sequence of a specific pathogen may require a preliminary step, *amplification* of the genetic signatures. Amplification of the signatures proceeds as shown in **Figure 3**. The three major steps for amplification are:\n\n1. Selection of the sequence of the gene(s) or other region(s) of interest. 2. Preparation of the sequences for replication via specific primers. 3. Replication of the selected sequences.\n Details of each of these steps depend on the analysis method that is chosen, but the overall description is instructive because it brings up issues that will have to be considered in detail as a follow-on to this work.\n\n##\n\n\n In step (a) in Figure 3 the specific sequence to be amplified is selected. This will have to be determined via bioinformatics analyses for each pathogen under consideration. In some sense, this is analogous to cutting the DNA sequence out of the entire DNA sequence of the pathogen. In step (b), a suitable pair of primers to cut the sequence under consideration is chosen. These primers define the endpoints of the sequence by binding to the ends of the sequence under consideration. The primers then function to guide the replication of the DNA sequence. [44] Within step (b), enzymes are attached to the DNA sequence under consideration that allow for the replication of the DNA. Finally, in step (c) the sequence under consideration is allowed to replicate exponentially. The number of generations necessary in step (c) is a function of the detection methodology. Steps (b) and (c) are important from the point of view of the negotiation of a verification regime because in these two steps continuity of knowledge (COK) of the original sample can be compromised. The introduction of primers of DNA polymerization and enzymes for the replication of the DNA sequence could call into question whether the sample that will be analyzed later has any relation to the original sample. The *amount* of loss of continuity of knowledge depends on the nature of the agreement. If the verification regime were constructed like the CWC and there were a list of pathogens such as that given in Table 1 that were subject to random detection, the COK of the sample is less of an issue. If, however, a monitored party declared a sample to contain a certain pathogen, the COK issue is now forefront for step (b). The issues involved with the COK in this case will have to be considered in detail as the work on information barriers for biological weapons agreements continues. Similarly, step (c) introduces\n\t\n\n\t\n\ncontinuity of knowledge issues. It is not clear if the level of uncertainty is a function of the number of replication cycles.* This will have to be considered in the future. There are three possible approaches for the presence of regime-relevant pathogens in a declared sample:\nPolymerase Chain Reaction (PCR), sequencing, and microarrays. [45] The diagram in **Figure 4** shows a pictorial representation of the strengths of these three methods as a function of cost and time to obtain results. As this diagram indicates there are certain areas of application space where each of these methods could be applied. Clearly any one of these techniques *could* be used in a verification regime, but each of these methods has limitations that prevent their consideration for a measurement technology. These will be discussed below.\n\n\n\nPolymerase\t\n  Chain\t\n  Reaction\t\n  (PCR)\t\n\nThe PCR methodology (alone) [46-50] from a standpoint of verification regime has some very positive attributes, such as low cost and fairly rapid turnaround. The sensitivity of the methodology may relegate the method as less useful in a bioweapons regime. The other shortfall of this method is the limited application of the method to a wide number of pathogens at one time. However, given that a perceived verification regime only focuses on at the most 20 pathogens, this methodology might be applied. However, since it is desirable to have a number of signatures (say six to reduce the false positives) for each bacterial pathogen the number of signals clearly stretches the capabilities of this methodology. That being said, it is not clear that even for a small number of pathogens being considered that PCR alone will be a suitable solution for the measurement approach. This is unfortunate because the PCR approach is the gold standard for pathogen detection in terms of sensitivity, particularly if the amount of material to be examined is small. The PCR methodology in essence is a means to amplify the amount of DNA that is being analyzed so that the signal might be increased. The general features of the amplification process were described above. The polymerase primers are chosen specifically for the genome sequence that is being measured. This process is not usable in the case of unknown biological agents, but in the case of determining whether something known is present in the sample. This approach is quite feasible. The problem arises because the primers are very species-specific and will require multiplexing reactions if many species are being considered. [45] Again this is not a showstopper, but there are limits to optimize the reaction process if identification of large numbers of pathogens is being sought. After the amplification has been accomplished, the resultant DNA is tagged* so that the sequences can be determined by a suitable spectral method. Determination of the sequence involves analysis of the spectral data and the identification of which signatures are present by several possible methodologies.\nDNA\t\n  Sequencing\t\n\nClearly the best way to determine the nature of a declared pathogen under a bioweapons verification regime is the complete sequencing [51, 52] of all of the genetic material in a sample. This methodology has at least four shortcomings. The first is the time it would take to perform the analysis itself. The time involved would be at least on the order of days. This timescale is not acceptable for a verification regime. Second, the cost would be prohibitive for any kind of realistic measurement scenario. Even though the time and cost of this analysis is decreasing rapidly, there still is no fully automated sample-in/analysis-out sequencer available at this time. Third, it would be difficult to assure continuity of knowledge of the sample during the analysis process. Fourth, measurement (e.g., sequence analysis) protocols would have to be constructed very carefully. The procedures may need to be so detailed that they might reveal information about the items under consideration. The approach to *complete* DNA sequencing of a purified microbial organism is somewhat similar to the PCR process described above. The entire DNA chain is cut into pieces. Amplification of the DNA is employed using random primers, and the procedure is completed as above. The fragments are all analyzed, and a sequence is constructed, a process that is rather time and computationally expensive. An even more complex case is the *metagenomic sequencing* of a complex (nonpurified) sample that might contain DNA from a very large number of organisms. Typically the DNA fragments from this kind of sequencing cannot be re-assembled, but instead each short DNA read is mapped to known genomes. Determining what organisms are likely present is a complex (and as-yet not fully solved) research problem, as many genes are common across wide swaths of bacterial organisms.\n\nMicroarrays\t\n  \t\n\nThe microarray detection approach[45, 53-63] takes advantage of random amplification and uses specific templates (called *probes*) for the target sequence. Basically, the microarrays lay out the complementary sequences to the sequences that are being sought. DNA from the sample is fragmented and optionally may be amplified using either specific or random amplification, depending on how many total genomic regions are being targeted. The fragments from the specific pathogens that are present (if present) attach\n\t\n  \t\n\n\t\n\nthemselves to probes on the array that have been designed for the specific regions of interest. An artist's rendition of this process is shown in **Figure  5**.[45] The array is analyzed and compared to the analysis of all potential genomes being exposed to the array to determine which genetic species have bound themselves to the array. The array can be constructed for any number of specific regions of any number of specific pathogens so that it is a very sensitive methodology for the detection of a set of possible pathogens.\n\nMicrobial\t\n  Detection\t\n  Array\t\n  as\t\n  a\t\n  Possible\t\n  Solution\t\n\nAs was indicated above, MDA techniques [45, 53-63] could be a solution to the determination of attributes analogous to nuclear weapons. It would be possible to construct an array* that was sensitive to all eighteen pathogens indicated in Table 1. McLoughlin [45] discusses several approaches that might be ways to design arrays that might be used for a possible regime. In the first step, the complements to the samples to be considered are laid out on a blank array. It is this array that is used for detection of the specific sequences. The sample is processed by random amplification, if amplification is necessary. The genetic material is extracted and labeled (usually) with fluorescent dye, and the labeled genetic material is allowed to interact with the array (hybridization). The genetic material with specific characteristics matching the probes on the array is bound to its complements on the target array. The array is placed in a fluorescence scanner, and the resultant signal is recorded. The image is analyzed and compared to both a control and a combination of all possible pathogens. This analysis may prove to be rather involved if the number of pathogens (or targets) for the regime grows too large. Development of the analysis methodology may require joint development by all parties involved in the verification regime.[28] The description by McLoughlin [45] of the Lawrence Livermore microbial detection array (LLMDA) [45, 57-59] indicates that it might be a solution to consider as part of a future instrument for a biological weapons regime. The design of the LLMDA is more than adequate for a regime that is considering only 19 pathogens. The necessity for only a having known pathogens makes the design of the array itself much simpler than a generic *detection* array. The analysis is simplified, as well, since all of the possible results for all 19 pathogens could be local. The analysis is somewhat analogous to template analysis in the discussion above. As opposed to the nuclear case, information about the sequences of the 19 pathogens would not be sensitive. Any sensitive material in all likelihood would have been stripped off during the probe design process, so it could not be detected via the microarray.\n\nRisk\t\n  Assessment\t\n\nIn defining the biological weapons control verification regime, it is useful to remember that a risk factor must be assigned for the information being protected. In the case of nuclear weaponsat least from the point of view of the United Statesthe information being protected is defined under The Atomic Energy Act of 1954 and Executive Order 12958. This is still being defined for a biological regime. The value of the information must be considered on a case-by-case basis. For the sake of argument, assume that a proprietary backbone exists in the genome that is declared under the agreement. The genetic backbone would be discovered if the genetic material from the declared material were fully sequenced. The risk associated with the loss of this information depends on the preciousness factor of the information. More than likely, in the case of biological weapons this preciousness factor would be based on financial loss. There may be proprietary methods that involve BW-significant materials that are used by the companies that have a legitimate need to possess questionable pathogens. Defining the preciousness factor will have to be determined for each regime and for each material to be declared.\n\nNote that this question is almost exactly analogous to one currently being faced by those charged with regulating *Select Agents* in the United States: What, exactly, defines the difference between a Select Agent and an organism that is similar, but not subject to, the same regulation? The current Select Agent definition is organism-based and is clearly inadequate for the 21st century.  (Modern genetic engineering could put all the nasty bits of a pathogen into a nonpathogen chassis.) A recent National Academy panel examined the question of what scientific advances are needed to turn this definition into one based on gene-resolution instead of organism-resolution. It is likely advisable to ensure that the mechanism used to implement information barriers for BWC compliance verification be congruent with the evolution path of Select Agent legal definition.[64] When considering the risk of loss of information, it is necessary to understand the consequences of loss of the information by the host party. This issue is similar to the broader issue of *dual-use* in biotechnology and was addressed in an NRC report in 2004.[39] In this report the authors examined three important questions to be considered before releasing information to the public domain. [39]\n\n-\nWhat categories of genome data present the greatest concern?\n-\nWhat are the pros and cons of unlimited vs. restricted access to such data, including threats posed to the scientific community or to national security?\n-\nWhat are some options for making decisions about release to the public domain?\n These three questions are also important to risk analysis of information in any treaty regime. The first of these questions must be answered when a regime has been defined. However, as was discussed above, there is undoubtedly proprietary information based on how the pathogens have been prepared and how they are used in legitimate applications. Genomics has become significantly advanced so that a great deal of information can be obtained from a complete genetic sequence. To define the effect of loss of proprietary information, there will need to be coordination among several governmental agencies and interaction among the companies involved in the production of the various genetic materials. The model for this might be something like the Chemical Weapons Convention, but the problem is less defined than the CWC schedule of chemicals. In fact, there is some probability that a schedule of genetic backbones may be sensitive as well. However, this would have to be worked out within the structure of any agreement with the full cooperation of the companies involved. Such a public/private interaction would be rather unprecedented. The national security portion of the second of these questions is more than likely not a concern in this discussion. However, as work continues in this realm, national security aspects of any of the pathogens being considered may become more important. The release to the scientific community, in general, has some interesting aspects. One of the most important aspects is the peaceful use of questionable pathogens\n\t\n\n\t\n\nin, say, the pharmaceutical regime. These issues will have to be considered on a case-by-case basis as they arise in the future. The last of the three questions is interesting, but has no bearing to the risk assessment of the loss of material. The disclosure of the use of dangerous pathogens in peaceful applications may cause more stir than anything risky. Several approaches to risk assessment have been described in many different venues [65-71]. The bottom line of these approaches is that there has not been*\n\"...\t\n  found\t\n  a\t\n  single\t\n  formula\t\n  or\t\n  application\t\n  that\t\n  will\t\n  cover\t\n  the\t\n  security\t\n  needs\t\n  of\t\n  all organizations\t\n  for\t\n  all\t\n  situations.\"\t\n  \t\n\nThis statement can be extended to verification regimes as well. There is no single solution for all possible biological regimes. By definition risk assessment is\n\"...\t\n  a\t\n  formal\t\n  and\t\n  systematic\t\n  analysis\t\n  to\t\n  identify\t\n  or\t\n  quantify\t\n  frequencies\t\n  or probabilities\t\n  and\t\n  the\t\n  magnitude\t\n  of\t\n  losses\t\n  to\t\n  recipients\t\n  due\t\n  to\t\n  hazards\t\n  (physical, chemical,\t\n  or\t\n  microbial\t\n  agents)\t\n  from\t\n  failures\t\n  ...\"\t\n\nTo understand if and how an information barrier may be applied to a measurement system, it is necessary to understand how, with what probability, and with what consequence the loss of information can occur. These considerations are related to the three questions that Kaplan et al. [72] pose concerning risk analysis:\n\n1. What can happen? 2. How likely is it that this will happen? 3. If it does happen, what are the consequences?\n In terms of the present discussion, these questions are translated to the following three questions:\n\n1. What information can be lost? 2. What is the probability of loss? 3. What - if any - are the consequences of the loss of information?\n The most important point of contention is to understand what information can be lost and, as a caveat, where that information can be lost in the measurement process. This is clearly a function of the nature of the type of data being considered and the measurement system itself. The nature of the data is important because it defines how the data are handled. Examples of the characteristics of the data might be as follows:\n\n-\nAre the data under consideration in scalar or vector format?\n-\nAre the raw data relevant, or is only the processed data of importance?\n These questions must be considered when determining how data might be lost. The importance of the measurement system is that it defines how the information is handled. In addition, it defines how design features might be implemented to control the possible loss of information.\n\n\t\n\n\t\n\n\t\n\nIt should be noted that even when these questions are considered fully, some individuals might express the following opinion:*\n\"A\t\n  risk\t\n  analysis\t\n  is\t\n  essentially\t\n  a\t\n  listing\t\n  of\t\n  scenarios.\t\n  In\t\n  reality,\t\n  the\t\n  list\t\n  is\t\n  infinite. Your\t\n  analysis,\t\n  and\t\n  any\t\n  analysis,\t\n  is\t\n  perforce\t\n  finite,\t\n  hence\t\n  incomplete.\t\n  Therefore\t\n  no\t\n\nmatter\t\n  how\t\n  thoroughly\t\n  and\t\n  carefully\t\n  you\t\n  have\t\n  done\t\n  your\t\n  work,\t\n  I\t\n  am\t\n  not\t\n  going\t\n  to trust\t\n  your\t\n  results.\t\n  I'm\t\n  not\t\n  worried\t\n  about\t\n  the\t\n  scenarios\t\n  you\t\n  have\t\n  identified,\t\n  but about\t\n  those\t\n  you\t\n  haven't\t\n  thought\t\n  of.\t\n  Thus\t\n  I\t\n  am\t\n  never\t\n  going\t\n  to\t\n  be\t\n  satisfied.\"\t\n\nThis viewpoint was expressed when risks were evaluated during development of information barriers for several demonstrations involving nuclear weapons and components. However, it is important to distinguish between the idea of uncertainty of loss of information and the consequences of loss of information. In the development of information barriers, and after all risks have been considered, there remains a vanishingly small probability that information will be lost, and that small probability of loss may be unacceptable to some individuals. The idea of information loss analysis is analogous to standard probabilistic risk analysis (PRA). Kaplan and his collaborators [72] discuss PRA in terms of a *set of triplets* where the triplets are si, pi*, and x*i that correspond to the scenario, probability pi that scenario si will occur, and the consequence xi of scenario si. This formalism allows for the determination of the risk of each event (scenario) and allows for the construction of the total risk for a given system. This approach takes advantage of the opportunity to understand and define each scenario completely. The probability of the occurrence can be individually determined, so a probability for the absolute risk can be assigned based on Bayesian formulation. The understanding of information loss is distinct from classical PRA because the assessment of any information loss must be determined **before** the system can be built. In principle, if the measurement system is made up of components, the information loss probability could be assessed for each component. However, there is some *gestalt* aspect to the performance of a system of components. This being the case, the idea of a joint probability of occurrence and consequence must be contemplated. This implies that designers of the measurement system and information barrier need to work in concert to understand the probability and consequence of occurrence of information loss at any point of the measurement process. In many ways, this will be more of an art than empirically based. How this methodology will be applied to the idea of an information barrier in a biological weapons regime will have to be studied in detail as a measurement protocol for such a regime has been defined. To construct an appropriate information barrier, an analysis of information loss would proceed in an analogous manner to PRA:\n\n1. Level 1, systems analysis. 2. Level 2, systems plus consequence analysis. 3. Level 3, systems, consequence, and containment analysis.\n In the level 1 analysis, the overall nature of the measurement system and protocol would need to be considered. At this level of analysis the nature and the mechanism for information loss would need to be determined. This is what Kaplan *et al.* [72] call the scenarios. How these scenarios might be described and determined in a biological weapons regime is introduced in the next section entitled Loss Analysis.* Level 2 analyses involve understanding the consequences of information loss within the confines of the protocol being considered. It is clear that when the nature of the information that could be lost is determined, the consequences must also be determined. Analysis levels 2 and 3 are reversed in information loss analysis versus PRA. The reason for this is evident because, though information might be lost, there may not be any consequences that matter to any of the parties in a given agreement. If there are no *grave* consequences to loss of material, then it is not necessary to perform a level 3 analyses for that particular event. In PRA all events have some consequences that matter to the system as a whole. Therefore, mitigation of events must be considered before consequences are defined. A qualitative measure of the *preciousness* for loss of information must be defined at this point in the analysis. In the case of nuclear information, the qualitative *preciousness* factors are defined in the various classification guides developed by the DOE and DOD. The *preciousness factors* for information that is not explicitly stated in the guides must be derived at the highest levels of the Interagency. It is not clear that analogous guidance exists for biological information. Data need to be systemized before an information barrier for a measurement system can be considered. If the consequences of the loss of information warrant mitigation, then a level 3 analyses must be performed on the event to understand how to contain that information loss. This is the point that the information barrier is actually conceived for the system under consideration. This analysis will necessarily involve the developers of the measurement system, representatives of the agencies involved in the development of the agreement, and representatives of the private sector with vested interest in the information being considered. The scientific basis for Information Loss Analysis (ILA) is at its infancy. A great deal of work needs to be performed in this area as the need for the development of information barriers increases.\n\nLoss\t\n  Analysis\t\n  \t\n\nWhere and how information can be lost in the measurement process depends greatly on the measurement system being considered and the information that is being obtained. In general, there will be multiple potential points of information loss for a given piece of data. The determination of loss points aids in the understanding how an information barrier may be implemented. Since, in the present discussion, a regime and/or measurement system has not been defined, it is useful to consider a simple example of what a measurement procedure might look like for a biological weapons verification regime. In a measurement regime, two kinds of losses are important:\n\n-\nThe actual loss of information, which is directly related to the information barrier.\n-\nLoss of information concerning the fidelity of the sample. Though this is not directly related to the information barrier, it is important in understanding the fidelity of the measurement process. This is really the expression of the loss of continuity of knowledge of the sample's identity in the measurement process.\n Both of these issues are important in the construction of any kind of measurement system. Even though the second issue is not directly related to data protection, it is important in constructing a measurement system that is useful for the performance of a measurement system.\n\nTo understand where information can be lost within a measurement system, the system must be thoroughly studied. In a generic sense, this is nearly impossible to accomplish. It is useful to look at a concrete example to understand the possible areas where information can be compromised. Consider the model measurement system shown in Figure 6. The process for the measurement has six distinct steps:*\n\na. The material to be considered by the inspecting party is declared by the inspected party. In most\ncases this is just a formal step undertaken by the inspected party because in a vast majority of cases the measurement system is under host control. The inspecting party in this step ensures that the container, which contains the agreement relevant material, is consistent with the declaration. It is not clear what this means in the context of a biological weapons verification regime. There are no preliminary tests that the inspecting party can perform to ensure the hint of compliance by the inspected party. This step will need to be negotiated on a case-by-case basis by the agreement partners.\nb. The material that is given over for verification is isolated and amplified as necessary by some sort\nof PCR process. If the number of required signatures is small, then specific PCR amplification can be applied. This limits the possible primer-primer interactions that occur when a large number of signatures is considered. This step has inherent issues concerning data integrity.\nFigure 7 shows a sketch of a system that could avoid these issues. This step allows for the breaking down of the initial material under consideration. In addition, the step can involve amplification of the genetic material. The amplification and isolation of genetic material involves the introduction of other agents (primers and enzymes) that allow for this step to be completed. Care must be taken that the inspecting party understands the intimate details of this process because continuity of knowledge may be compromised. The detailed information involved in this step indicates that joint development may be prudent.\n\nc. This step involves the introduction of additional material to the materials that are being verified.\nThis is an authentication nightmare. The process is somewhat sublime because the step simply involves the attachment of a label to the individual bases. These markers are relatively standard; however, the nature of the labeling molecules will have to be understood by all the parties involved in the agreement.\nd. This step involves the hybridization of the labeled sample so that it can be allowed to attach itself\nto the suitable MDA array. Though not considered explicitly in this discussion, the DNA arrays\nwill have to be authenticated by the inspecting party. This could possibly be done by the use of pathogen standards. Once again, the sample is subjected to external stimuli that allows for the material to be prepared for further use.\ne. This step involves exposure of the MDA array to the suitable photonic sources, collection of the\nscattered light data on a suitable detectortypically some CCDand analysis of the image. The analyzed image results are compared to all of the signals that could be obtained if there were any of the pathogens or a combination of any of the pathogens present in the sample.\nf. Results of analysis are given as a red light/green light response to the presence of any of the\npathogens that might be present in the sample. It is important remember that there only be a red light/green light response to the measurement.* Whether the result is consistent with the declaration will be outside the privy of the measurement system.\nWithout a detailed study of the measurement procedure, it seems that steps (b) and (e) are the points of the measurement process that have the highest probability for the release of sensitive information. Even though in step (b) a specific portion of the DNA has been targeted for amplification, there is a chance that information about the entire sequence might be lost. This could arise from the type of primers and enzymes chosen for the process. If all of these materials are shared among all of the agreement partners, the monitoring party may be able to ascertain some of the details about the entire sequence of the genetic material. In addition, there is a chance that some information could be lost in step (e). The image of the MDA exposed to a suitable photonic source has more information than just the sequence information about the pathogens under consideration. If the image were analyzed fully, it could reveal more information about the original sequence. It is clear that a great deal of work is needed to understand the measurement process when a technology has been chosen and a verification regime has been defined. This work will lead to quantities similar to the pi in PRA that defines the probability for the release of information. It may also be possible to construct a *probability of information loss*. Whether this can occur or not will depend on continued work.\n\nPath\t\n  Forward\t\n  for\t\n  Information\t\n  Barrier\t\n  Development\t\n\nThe Microbial Detection Array may be a way to implement a biological weapons control verification regime. Some work still needs to be done however. The first is to decrease the time for the PCR process from hours to minutes. The second is that the time for hybridization must be decreased as well if possible because it is the *rate-determining* step in the analysis process. Recent work by Wheeler *et al.* [50] addresses a methodology that has reduced PCR to the minute timeframe, but this implementation is still not usable for a verification regime. However, increasing the rate of the hybridization process has not been addressed. In addition, a great deal of work needs to be done in the design of suitable MDAs for a verification regime that involves all of the pathogens considered in Table 1. The suggested path forward for information barrier development in a biological weapons regime is as follows:\n\n1. Systemization of what information is regarded as sensitive. In addition, what are the categories of\ngenetic information that might be considered sensitive? For example, what is the genetic starting material that is considered sensitive?\n2. Continued development of PCR technology that drives the time of amplification down to the\nminute timeframe with instrumentation that is fieldable in a verification regime context. Fieldable in a *verification regime* has a multi-faceted meaning. The system must be self-contained. All of the analysis must be able to be performed in the presence of the monitoring party. The system should be, at most, a tabletop system. In addition, the system must be as simple as possible and authenticatable\n3. Considerable work needs to be done to understand the degree of amplification versus false alarm\nrate for a given measurement and for each pathogen under consideration.\n4. Continued development of MDA arrays that can be used with the small set of pathogens\nconsidered in this paper.\n5. Continued development of reducing the time of array hybridization from hours to minutes. 6. Integration of the latest PCR technology with the appropriate MDA arrays to understand system\nperformance issues and information loss mechanisms.\n7. Examination of the authentication issues related to the integrated instrumentation. 8. Development of databases that can be used locally for analysis of the sequencing data. 9. Development of a single-purpose electronics package that could result in analysis on a chip.*\n Finally, an instrument like the one shown in Figure 7, conceived by Jaing in [58], might prove to be an ideal technical foundation for the measurement system in a biological weapons verification regime.\n\n\n\n## Summary\n\nInformation barriers may play a vital role in any future biological-weapons-control verification regime. There is sufficient evidence that sensitive and/or proprietary information exists in the biotechnology associated with the determination of the genetic structure of weapons pathogens. This information could be either in the area of financial loss or national security. The nature of the information will have to be determined as details of a verification regime unfold. The Lawrence Livermore Microbial Detection Array (LLMDA) is a possible technical solution to any future verification regime that requires measurement of a small set of pathogens related to biological weapons. A great deal of progress has been made in PCR reaction processing, which makes real-time determination of the presence of defined pathogens a reality. This report provides a path forward for the development of information barriers in a biological weapons control regime. The report has defined a methodology by which information barriers might be implemented using biological detection. The report introduces the idea of Information Loss Analysis (ILA) that could be thought of as an analogy to Probabilistic Risk Analysis. The formulation of ILA will occur as the mathematical basis for information loss is pursued. Continued work in the development of information barriers will be greatly helped with a detailed understanding of ILA. Finally, the examination of information barriers in different contexts is very important. This discussion will become more fruitful as the verification regimes become more defined. The use and necessity of information barriers in a future biological weapons regime seems likely but will be crystalized when a biological weapons verification regime has been established.\n\n\t\n\n\t\n\n\t\n\n\n## References\n\n1.\nUnited States. 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    },
    {
        "text": "# Secret Legal Barriers To Information Sharing: The Erection Of A Wall Between Intelligence And Law Enforcement Investigations Commission On Terrorist Attacks Upon The United States Staff Monograph\n\nD47 1-fir. iJ/ 2 01201 ,1\nis Al ;ofZl ~ iy Barbara A. Grewe Senior Counsel for Special Projects August 20, 2004\nAs the threat of terrorism from radical Islamic groups developed, the FBI had both law enforcement and intelligence responsibilities in response to the threat. And it had different tools to use depending on whether its investigation was designated as an intelligence matter or a criminal matter. For criminal matters it could apply for and use traditional criminal warrants. For intelligence matters it could apply to a special court, known as the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC), for warrants pursuant to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) of 1978.' This law governs electronic surveillance and physical searches of foreign powers and their agents within the United States. This divergence in purposes for the respective types of investigations and concerns about using intelligence techniques to advance law enforcement interests led to information sharing barriers being erected between the investigations. This paper will describe the history and development of the various barriers and their impact on the 9/11\nstory.\n\n## The History Of Tensions Between Intelligence And Criminal Investigations.\n\nIssues regarding the sharing of information between intelligence and criminal investigations did not arise suddenly in the summer of 2001. There was a long history of concerns about how the FBI collected intelligence activities within the United States and what was done with the information that it gathered.\n\nThe FBI's domestic intelligence gathering dates from the 1930s. With World War II\nlooming FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover, at President Franklin Roosevelt's direction, added to the FBI's duties investigation of possible espionage, sabotage, or subversion. After the war, foreign intelligence duties were assigned to the newly established Central Intelligence Agency. The CIA was expressly precluded from engaging in domestic law enforcement activities.' Domestic intelligence responsibilities remained with the FBI.\n\nThus, the FBI was in the unique position of having dual intelligence and law enforcement responsibilities.\n\nUnder Hoover the FBI's domestic intelligence activities expanded greatly. The FBI\nestablished a covert action program that operated from 1956 to 1971 against domestic organizations and, eventually, domestic dissidents. The FBI spied on numerous political figures, especially ones Hoover sought to discredit, and authorized unlawful wiretaps and surveillance. Two years after Hoover's death in 1972, congressional and news media investigations of the Watergate scandals of the Nixon administration evolved into general congressional investigations of foreign and domestic intelligence by the Church and Pike committees.' As a result, the FBI's Domestic Intelligence Division was dissolved and reforms were recommended that were \"designed to build a wall between federal law enforcement and the nation's intelligence community.\"'\nTo protect individual rights and guard against abuse, the attorney general was given authority over domestic intelligence-gathering activities. In 1976, Attorney General Edward Levi adopted domestic security guidelines to regulate intelligence collection in the United States. The FBI's domestic intelligence activities were governed by these guidelines. These guidelines were periodically modified by subsequent attorneys general but their basic purpose remained the same.'\nOver time, the attorney general's authority to approve intelligence surveillance and searches also changed. Traditional criminal search warrants or electronic surveillance require a federal judge's approval and a finding that there is probable cause that a crime was being or had been committed. For many years, however, the attorney general could authorize surveillance and physical searches of foreign powers and agents of foreign powers without any court review or approval. 6  Perceived abuses of this authority led to calls for reform. Some suggested that this authority should be eliminated and only traditional criminal warrants should be permitted.\n\nIn 1978 Congress passed the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA). This law regulated intelligence collection directed at foreign powers and agents of foreign powers in the United States. It was a compromise. FISA did not require traditional court approval The Attorney General's authority to issue electronic surveillance or physical searches was contained in Executive Order 12333. The Supreme Court, while holding that electronic surveillance within the United States to protect national security against domestic threats requires a warrant, noted its holding did not extend to electronic surveillance that protects national security from foreign threats. See United States  v.\n\nKeith 407 U.S. 297 (1972).\n\nof a warrant, but established a special new court, the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC), to review requests for surveillance pursuant to this law. The Department of Justice created an Office of Intelligence Policy and Review (OIPR). OIPR would be responsible, *inter alia,* for presenting surveillance applications to the FISA court.'\nBecause of longstanding concerns regarding the use of non-criminal warrants to obtain evidence for criminal matters the 1978 act was interpreted by the courts, the Congress, and the Justice Department, to require that a search be approved only if its \"primary purpose\" was to obtain foreign intelligence information.' The FISA application process required a certification from a high-ranking Executive Branch official, such as the Director of the FBI, that the **purpose** of the desired surveillance was to obtain foreign intelligence information.' In other words, the FISA process could not be_use-d-te circumvent traditional criminal warrants to build a criminal case or to spy upon domestic targets unrelated to foreign powers. If a prosecution became or was perceived to have become the primary purpose of FISA coverage, the FISA court could terminate the surveillance and the criminal court could suppress any of the information obtained or derived from the FISA coverage. The Justice Department interpreted these rulings to mean that criminal prosecutors could be briefed on FISA-related information but could not direct or control its collection.' There was, however, some recognition that evidence collected via a FISA warrant could be used in subsequent criminal proceedings. How and when it could be used was the subject of significant debate.\" Through the 1980s and early 1990s informal information reach individuals whose activities are essentially a domestic law enforcement problem, the Justice Department should use criminal surveillance tools when it is clear that the main concern with respect to a terrorist group is criminal prosecution). For Department of Justice interpretation see DOJ Memorandum to Vatis from Dellinger, \"Standards for Searches Under Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act,\" Feb. 14, 1995.\n\nIn October 2001, the USA PATRIOT Act amended FISA by replacing \"the purpose\" with a \"significant purpose.\" See \"Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001\" (USA Patriot Act), Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (Oct. 26, 2001)\nSection 218\nimposing information sharing procedures for FISA material. As a result, OIPR became the gatekeeper for the flow of FISA information to criminal prosecutors. The FBI was not permitted to brief criminal prosecutors on information gathered from FISA surveillance without OIPR's approval.'\nScruggs believed that these procedures should be formalized to protect the FISA process and forestall the possibility that the FISC would deny surveillance warrants or that the criminal courts would suppress FISA information. In June 1994 he sent a memorandum to FBI General Counsel Howard Shapiro proposing an addition to the attorney general guidelines governing the conduct of foreign intelligence investigations. Scruggs's proposal would require that any questions regarding possible criminal prosecutions arising out of foreign intelligence investigations first be referred to OIPR. OIPR would coordinate any necessary responses with the Criminal Division of the Department of Justice or any of the United States Attorney's Offices (USAO). His proposal barred FBI\nHeadquarters or any FBI field agents from contacting the Criminal Division or any USAO without prior consultation with 01PR. 17\nThat same month Scruggs sent a memorandum with a more detailed proposal to the principal deputy attorney general, the Office of Legal Counsel, the chief of the Criminal Division, chiefs of several sections within the Criminal Division, Shapiro, and FBI Deputy Director Robert \"Bear\" Bryant. Scruggs proposed that there be a \"Chinese wall\" to divide attorneys as well as investigators who were working on intelligence from those working on criminal investigations. This is the first known proposal to create an internal wall between agents within the FBI. OIPR would work with the FBI on any foreign intelligence or foreign counter intelligence matters. None of the investigators or attorneys working on the intelligence matters could institute criminal process. Rather any information relevant to a criminal matter would have to be passed to prosecutors and criminal agents for instituting criminal process.\" This proposal led to more than a year's debate over the nature of appropriate procedures.\n\nScruggs circulated several proposals in 1994 but failed to reach concurrence on any set of procedures. In December 1994 Deputy Attorney General Gorelick asked Michael Vatis, who was head of the Executive Office for National Security (EONS), to set up a working group to develop procedures.' The selection of EONS to lead the effort was significant because EONS would not be affected by the procedures and thus could be a neutral arbiter among competing interests.\" One of the first tasks of the working group was to ask the Office of Legal Counsel (OLC)\nfor an opinion on the necessity of the primary purpose standard.\" On January 19, 1995, OLC issued a draft opinion indicating that although the law did not clearly require a primary purpose standard, courts were likely to apply such a standard anyway. Therefore, it was necessary for the Department to be prepared to defend its FISA warrants under such a standard. OLC recommended that an appropriate internal process be established to insure that FISA certifications are consistent with the \"primary purpose\" test.' The FBI, the Criminal Division, and OIPR weighed in on their respective views regarding possible procedures. None quarreled with the use of the primary purpose standard. The FBI argued that it still should be able to seek advice and guidance from prosecutors although it proposed language that any contacts between the FBI and the Criminal Division should not \"inadvertently result in the fact or appearance of the Criminal Division controlling the intelligence investigation.\" The FBI and the Criminal Division objected to OIPR being the gatekeeper for information sharing with the Criminal Division. The Criminal Division complained that OIPR appeared to be adopting a view that a case is either entirely an intelligence matter or entirely a criminal matter. The FBI agreed that both OIPR and the Criminal Division should approve any FBI contacts with the United States Attorney's Offices (USAOs) because the necessary sensitivity to the issues and experience \"treading this fine line\" will often be absent in those offices.' Drafts of what would become the Attorney General's procedures were circulated beginning in February 1995. 24  The procedures had two governing principles: first, there was a duty to share relevant information with the Criminal Division and second, there Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act,\" Feb. 14, 1995.\n\n23 See FBI Memorandum to Deputy Director Executive Office on National Security from General Counsel Federal Bureau of Investigation, \"Access to Criminal Division Attorneys by FBI Counterintelligence Agents, \" Jan. 30, 1995; DOJ Memorandum to Vatis from Reynolds, \"Procedures for Contacts Between FBI\nand Criminal Division During Foreign Intelligence and Counterintelligence Investigations,\" Feb. 7, 1995;\nFBI Memorandum to Vatis from Shapiro, \"Procedures for Contacts Between FBI and Criminal Division During Foreign Intelligence and Counterintelligence Investigations,\" Feb. 7, 1995.\n\n24 See DOJ Memorandum to Bryant, et. al. from Vatis, \"Procedures for Contacts Between FBI and Criminal Division During Foreign Intelligence and Counterintelligence Investigations,\" Feb. 3, 1995; DOJ Memorandum to Bryant, et. al. from Vatis, \"Procedures for Contacts Between FBI and Criminal Division During Foreign Intelligence and Counterintelligence Investigations,\" Feb. 10, 1995.\n\nhad to be an appropriate process to govern such sharing so that there was no improper direction and control by prosecutors. In mid-April, Vatis sent a memorandum to the Attorney General, through the Deputy Attorney General, with draft procedures attached. He indicated that all of the affected components had concurred in the procedures.'\nGorelick responded by asking for the comments of Mary Jo White, United States Attorney for the Southern District of New York.' White raised two objections. First, she requested that whenever the FBI notified the Criminal Division about foreign intelligence information, it should at the same time notify the relevant USAO. Second, she wanted to ensure that the specific procedures that had already been worked out and issued as instructions by the Deputy Attorney General should remain in effect.'\nThe FBI, **OIPR,** and the Criminal Division all objected to the proposal that notification be given to the USAO at the same time it was given to the Criminal Division. The FBI\nargued that policy decisions regarding whether a case should be handled as an intelligence matter or a law enforcement matter needed to be made at headquarters level.\n\nIt also argued that most USAOs had little experience in handling intelligence matters and that, unlike the Criminal Division, the USAO's sole equity in the process was to bring criminal prosecutions. This would, it argued, upset the delicate balance between intelligence and law enforcement concerns. Finally, it noted that the level of consultations with the USAO in the Ames case was a significant factor in determining there was a need for procedures. The Criminal Division argued that the FBI needed a single point of contact to ensure that any contacts with criminal prosecutors were properly documented. It also noted that early on in an investigation venue may not be clear so that deciding which USAO to contact would be unclear.'\nthe views of Michael Stiles, the United States Attorney for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. White provided comments on behalf of Stiles as well.\n\nThere are 96 USAOs in the United States, one for each federal district court. Each USA() may only handle matters for which they have venue - meaning that the courts would determine the matter to be sufficiently linked to that geographic area to permit a prosecution to be brought there. The Criminal Division, however, has nationwide jurisdiction and may handle matters in any federal district court.\n\nOIPR still was not satisfied. In addition to rejecting White's suggestions, Scruggs complained that the procedures still provided too much opportunity for the FBI to meet with the Criminal Division. He argued the FBI wanted to meet with the Criminal Division on the \"most mundane issues\" and the Criminal Division exhibited no willingness to defer such meetings despite the potential legal issues created by the meetings. He complained that the Criminal Division welcomed such meetings on its \"overly optimistic\" view of the law. Scruggs argued that the only way to ensure that such contacts between the FBI and the Criminal Division did not create legal issues for OIPR\nwas for OIPR to decline to forward to the attorney general any FISA applications where OIPR believed the FBI and the Criminal Division had had too many contacts.\" In late May Vatis rejected OIPR's complaints and declined to make OIPR the gatekeeper. He noted that if OIPR believed there were too many contacts in any particular case, it could come to the deputy attorney general to resolve the matter. 3\nIn mid-June White made one last set of comments to the procedures in a memorandum addressed to Reno.' White said that she believed Vatis and her staff \"had worked out acceptable instructions\" for foreign intelligence and foreign counterintelligence investigations in the SDNY. She noted, however, that it was \"hard to be totally comfortable with instructions prohibiting the FBI from contacting the USAO when such prohibitions were not legally required. She argued that if it was legally permissible for the FBI to contact the Criminal Division, it was legally permissible for it to contact the USAO. She conceded, however, that she understood that tighter controls reduced the risk of improper contacts and DOJ not wanting the FBI to automatically contact USAOs. 32\nOn July 14 Vatis forwarded a final draft to Gorelick through her principal deputy Merrick Garland. This version incorporated some minor changes proposed by White, including a provision that would permit the Attorney General to exempt particular investigations from the procedures. He also agreed at White's request to draft a separate memorandum that indicated these procedures did not supersede the procedures already in place for the SDNY as a result of the March memorandum. He rejected White's request to bring the USAOs into the process earlier in cases where there was no FISA warrant in place because if the USAO was involved in the matter prior to a FISA application, it would be very difficult to assure the FISC that the FISA's primary purpose was intelligence as opposed to criminal. He defended the procedures, arguing that there cannot be a separate set of procedures for one USAO. 33  Garland recommended that Gorelick approve the procedures and forward them to Reno for approval. Gorelick concurred and forwarded them to Reno.\"\nOn July 19, 1995, the.\"Procedures for Contacts Between the FBI and the Criminal Division Concerning Foreign Intelligence and Foreign Counterintelligence Investigations\" were issued by the Attorney General. The procedures required that the Criminal Division be notified when a foreign counterintelligence (FCI) or foreign intelligence (FI) investigation developed facts or circumstances that \"reasonably indicate that a significant federal crime has been, is being, or may be committed.\" The FISA court officially incorporated these procedures in future FISA orders as accepted procedures to govern information sharing.\n\nIt is important to understand what these procedures did and did not do. First, these procedures only applied to information gathered by the FBI as part of an intelligence\ninvestigation. They did not control information gathered by the CIA or the NSA!\n\n\n1\n Thus, information from the CIA and NSA could be shared with criminal investigators and/or prosecutors without complying with these procedures and any notice to or involvement by OIPR.\n\nSecond, despite OIPR's proposals to the contrary, these procedures said nothing about information sharing within the FBI. FBI agents working intelligence matters could freely share information with agents working on parallel criminal matters. The only controls were on information sharing between the FBI and criminal prosecutors.\n\nThird, the procedures compelled information sharing when there was evidence of a significant criminal offense. Both the FBI and OIPR had an independent obligation to notify the Criminal Division when this threshold was met. The procedures clearly rejected OIPR's view that it should have the gatekeeper role in deciding what intelligence information should or could be shared with criminal prosecutors. They did not ban information sharing under any circumstances.\n\nFinally, the limits on information sharing were solely on the advice-giving role of prosecutors, not the sharing itself The procedures specifically endeavored to prevent even the appearance of direction and control. They limited the type of advice that the criminal prosecutors could give to agents working on the intelligence matters. Such advice could preserve the possibility of a criminal prosecution but could not direct activities so as to enhance such a prosecution.\n\ngoing to open a criminal matter, the court held the primary purpose was no longer intelligence and all information gathered after that point was suppressed. 38  The Truong case became the foundation for subsequent cases holding that the primary purpose standard also applied to surveillance authorized under FISA.\n\nBecause the New York case was already a criminal matter and criminal surveillance had already been conducted, **OIPR** worried that the FISC would conclude that a FISA\napplication at this point would be an effort to conduct an end run around the criminal process. Moreover, because the SDNY was involved in the request for the FISA\nsurveillance, there was a serious risk that the court would believe that the SDNY was directing and controlling the intelligence investigation. Thus, any such application would be rejected by the court. In OIPR's view, these facts presented the worst case scenario for a FISA application. Certainly such a request was unprecedented in the 17-year history of FISA.39 Recognizing the seriousness of the matter, however, Scruggs and his deputy, Allan Kornblum, flew to New York to meet with White and her staff to discuss how to proceed.\n\nScruggs said that while he was in New York, he and White's staff negotiated a possible memorandum to attach to the FISA application to persuade the court that the primary purpose of this particular surveillance was collection of intelligence information regarding the possible plot to kill individuals involved in the criminal matter.' Scruggs recalled that the resulting memorandum was drafted by one of White's attorneys.\n\nnot have viewed Gorelick as a sympathetic listener. As there is no contemporaneous evidence of Gorelick's views on conducting parallel investigations, we cannot say whether White's beliefs were grounded in fact.\n\nThere is evidence, however, that Reno shared Scruggs' view and required intelligence investigations to be terminated once a case moved to a grand jury. Gorelick said she was not consulted by White or her staff regarding the March memorandum and was not involved in its drafting or formulation. Commission interview Mary Jo White (May 17, 2004); Commission interview Jamie Gorelick (June 4, 2004). Scruggs confirmed that Gorelick had no role in drafting the March procedures. Commission interview Richard Scruggs (May 26, 2004). Scruggs did not recall Kornblum being present at the meeting where the disagreements were hammered out.\n\nThis suggests that there may have been two separate trips to New York, the first one that Kornblum attended and a second one that he did not. Scruggs had a distinct recollection of an all-day meeting where the terms of the memorandum were debated and finally agreed upon.\n\nThe memorandum had two primary limits on coordination: neither the SDNY nor the Criminal Division could exercise any direction or control over the intelligence investigation and the intelligence investigators could only share portions of their investigative memoranda without approval from FBI headquarters and **OIPR.** It also contained sharing requirements. If intelligence investigators developed information that \"reasonably indicated\" the commission of a \"significant federal crime,\" they were required to notify criminal investigators.\n\nAs the terms of this agreement offered the SDNY access to all of the intelligence gathered pursuant to the FISA surveillance and provided no role for OIPR in the process, it is not surprising that the SDNY requested that these provisions remain in effect when the Attorney General's procedures were issued in July. The memorandum only related, however, to the two specific matters identified within. It had no applicability to any other cases going forward and thus, as will be seen later, had no role in the events in the summer of 2001.\n\n## Reports Of Problems With The July 1995 Procedures And Efforts At Reform\n\nThe July 1995 procedures were intended to permit a reasonable degree of information sharing between FBI agents conducting intelligence investigations and Criminal Division prosecutors. They were also intended, however, to ensure that the FBI would be able to obtain continuing FISA coverage and later be able to use the fruits of such coverage in criminal cases. If the FISA court or a subsequent criminal court held that the primary purpose was something other than intelligence collection, renewal of coverage could be denied or evidence could be suppressed. As all parties to the procedures agreed, this could be a very delicate balance with substantial risks to national security if the process was not adequately managed. All agreed that some management was required. They disagreed as to how this management should be exercised. As a result the procedures were widely misunderstood and misapplied. This resulted in far less information sharing and coordination between the FBI and the Criminal Division in practice than was allowed in theory under the July 1995 procedures.\n\nOIPR' s leadership was very risk averse and thus took a very conservative approach as to how much information sharing could take place and when. It believed that the earlier and the more frequent the contact between the FBI and the Criminal Division, the more likely that the court would find that the primary purpose standard was not met. 44  During the debate over the procedures OIPR argued that information sharing should be minimized\n\" See Commission interview Alan Kornblum (May 19, 2004). All the parties agreed that the primary purpose test governed the process. Even the SDNY, which would later question some of the procedures, did not dispute the applicability of the primary purpose test. See SDNY Memorandum to White from Fitzgerald and Khuzami, \"Clarification of FISA rules in Case of Ongoing Counterterrorism Investigations,\" Apr. 22,\n1996. The dispute was over what the test meant when it came to information sharing. Even different OIPR\ncounsel did not agree on the implication of the test. Scruggs noted that when Jim McAdams became head of OIPR, McAdams believed that Scruggs had been too conservative and loosened the controls somewhat. Commission interview Richard Scruggs (May 26, 2004).\n\nand worried that the FBI and the Criminal Division wanted to meet more often than OIPR deemed wise. 4' Over time OIPR, and eventually the FISC itself, began to see mere contacts between the FBI and the Criminal Division as a proxy for improper direction and control. Significantly, OIPR viewed its role primarily as an officer of the FISA court and therefore responsible for stewardship of the court's responsibilities. It viewed its role as an advocate for its institutional clients as secondary. 46  This would materially affect how OIPR handled the subsequent problems that arose regarding FISA applications.\n\nAlthough OIPR had been unsuccessful at persuading the working group to make it the gatekeeper in the July 1995 procedures, OIPR continued the role it had adopted during the months preceding the issuance of the procedures. The FBI went along with this approach. The agents working the intelligence matter would first approach the FBI's Office of General Counsel (OGC) attorneys for advice on whether information should be shared with the Criminal Division. The OGC attorneys would refer the agents to OIPR.\n\nOIPR would more often than not recommend that the agents not contact the Criminal Division.' This approach was reinforced by Deputy FBI Director Bryant's declaration that too much information sharing could be a career stopper for an FBI agent. As a result, the information flow between the FBI and the Criminal Division on foreign intelligence matters withered.\n\n## The Procedures And The Southern District Of New York\n\nIn December 1995 White forwarded to Reno, then a few days later to Gorelick, a memorandum written by her staff regarding perceived problems with addressing terrorism as an intelligence matter versus as a criminal matter. The New York prosecutors argued that terrorism should be addressed using criminal processes as opposed to intelligence techniques.\" White added some comments to the end of the Deputy Counsel Komblum believed that FCI goals of an investigation \"should be completed, or very nearly so, before the Criminal Division is notified\" of a possible criminal case. Under this view, no notification should occur until the FBI was prepared to end its FISA coverage. AGRT Report at 723. See also DOJ Memorandum to Vatis from Scruggs, \"Comments on Procedures for Contacts Between FBI and Criminal Division During Foreign Intelligence and Counterintelligence Investigations,\" May 25, 1995.\n\nAlthough this linear view of cases being intelligence and then moving toward criminal might have been palatable in ordinary espionage cases, this model did not fit terrorism cases. Intelligence regarding possible terrorism always is evidence of a criminal offense. Moreover, because of the dangers posed by terrorists, waiting to initiate criminal proceedings until after an intelligence investigation was completed is neither practical nor wise. When the 1995 procedures were created, however, they were developed with FCI\ninvestigations in mind. The special needs and requirements of counterterrorism cases were not considered.\n\nCommission interview Larry Parkinson (Feb. 24, 2004).\n\n46 James McAdams testimony, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Dec. 9, 1995.\n\nof the October 16, 1997, Meeting of the DOJ Working Group on Sharing of FI and FCI Information,\" Oct. 20, 1997.\n\nthe prosecutors had no authority to direct intelligence techniques but had such authority in criminal matters.\n\nThus, for them to be involved in the direction and control of terrorism matters they had to be handled as memorandum in which she echoed the view that terrorism should be approached as a criminal, not intelligence, issue. She argued that by using a criminal approach there would not be unnecessary walls. She argued that the July procedures concerning communications built unnecessary walls and that there was no need to keep prosecutors in the dark or to prohibit them from giving advice.' She did not, however, provide any evidence that information relevant to the SDNY had not made its way to the SDNY attorneys because of the July 1995 procedures. In response to this memorandum, on the same day White's memorandum was sent to Gorelick, a deputy counsel in OIPR sent a memorandum to Principal Deputy Attorney General Garland analyzing White's comments. The counsel argued that most of White's difficulties stemmed from \"a fundamental lack of understanding\" of the purpose of intelligence investigations. He claimed that many of the examples of issues raised by White had previously been resolved by the Joint Intelligence Community Law Enforcement (JICLE) working group and the July 1995 procedures. 5  There is no evidence that any action was taken in response to the SDNY memorandum at this time. In April 1996 two SDNY attorneys wrote to White suggesting that there be a clarification of the FISA rules in the case of ongoing counterterrorism cases. They argued that although the March 1995 memorandum was somewhat more flexible than the July 1995\nprocedures, they believed the March memorandum unnecessarily limited the dissemination of non-FISA human source information. The memorandum did not distinguish between information gathered via FISA surveillance or other non-FISA\ntechniques.'\nThe authors indicated that they agreed with OLC's analysis and conclusions regarding the application of the primary purpose standard. They also noted that the July procedures did not address agent-to-agent contact and suggested that appropriate \"Chinese walls\" be put in place between squads investigating intelligence cases and those handling criminal cases. In addition to proposed additions to the procedures, they proposed adding language that \"the procedures outlined below go beyond what is legally required.\"' Attached to the memorandum was a series of questions regarding the meaning of the 1995 procedures and suggested answers. The intent was to provide guidance to agents in the field regarding the meaning of the procedures.\n\nIn June 1996 a memorandum was drafted for the Attorney General to issue explaining the July 1995 procedures. The draft indicated that it had come to her attention that the July procedures had been construed to prohibit communications between intelligence and criminal investigations of a common target. That draft said such a conclusion \"was incorrect.\" The memorandum insisted that timely information sharing was required and that it was only \"uncoordinated and unnecessary\" communications that had to be avoided. The memorandum apparently was never issued.\"\nLater that same month, Jim McAdams, then head of OIPR, sent a memorandum to White in response to the April memorandum from her staff. McAdams told White that she and her staff had construed the Attorney General's procedures to be far more prohibitive as to communications between intelligence and criminal agents on parallel investigations than they were intended to be. He contended that although the original procedures caused angst at the outset, they created far fewer problems than anticipated by some. He believed that most of the problems relating to the procedures stemmed from misunderstanding them. He also provided edited answers to the questions proposed by the New York prosecutors. He argued that there were many ways to have contact between the FBI and prosecutors without violating the procedures.'\nIn October, White sent a memorandum to McAdams, thanking him for his work on arriving at a consensus on the meaning of the July 1995 procedures. She indicated that her staff realized in meeting with relevant parties that in many instances they had been talking past each other. She noted that when they worked through concrete examples they realized that they \"could by and large accomplish what we think needs to be accomplished.\" She added, however, that they still had concerns about Part B of the procedures (which govern information sharing in cases where no FISA surveillance was yet in place).\"\nThe next month White and some of her staff met with the Attorney General and the Deputy Attorney General to discuss remaining concerns with the July 1995 procedures.\n\nIn a memorandum to Reno and Gorelick in advance of the meeting, McAdams offered his opinion that many of the SDNY's concerns were due to misunderstandings regarding similar memorandum was proposed in late 1997, it was suggested that issuing a memorandum that essentially echoed the original memorandum but suggested this time the Attorney General really meant it would not be terribly effective.\n\nthe procedures. He said other concerns merely reflected the SDNY's \"angst\" over DOJ\ncontrol over FISA and FISA-derived information that might be relevant to a SDNY case.\n\nHe concluded that there were no disagreements among the parties regarding Part A of the procedures but there were still issues regarding Part B.' The meeting led to extended discussions regarding the application of Part B of the procedures to the SDNY.\n\nFinally in July 1997 the Attorney General authorized an exception to Part B of the procedures for the SDNY. Under this \"annex\" to the 1995 procedures, FBI agents working on intelligence matters where no FISA warrant was in place could contact the national security coordinator in the SDNY without obtaining prior approval from the Criminal Division. This annex was good for one year and could be renewed. It was renewed annually thereafter. This apparently resolved the SDNY's concerns as there is no evidence of further complaints regarding the procedures.'\n\n## Broader Complaints Regarding Application Of The Procedures\n\nGeneral concerns about the application of the procedures persisted, however, so that in October 1997 the Attorney General announced that she wanted to improve information sharing between the FBI and the Criminal Division in foreign intelligence matters. She established a working group consisting of OIPR, the FBI, and the Criminal Division to recommend changes. It was chaired by Daniel Seikaly, Deputy Director of EONS.\n\nDuring the working group meetings the FBI conceded that its agents were going to OIPR to ask permission to approach the Criminal Division rather than contacting the Criminal Division directly as mandated by the 1995 procedures. The Criminal Division complained that the FBI Office of General Counsel and OIPR had opined that mere contacts between investigators and the criminal Division created an appearance of improper direction and control. It also complained that it had heard that if too much contact occurred that OIPR would refuse to present any further FISA applications in the particular case. Seikaly concluded that the Attorney General's memorandum was being\n\"ignored\" by both the FBI and OIPR. 58\nOIPR was asked to explain why it was recommending that the FBI not immediately notify the Criminal Division when it obtained information relevant to a possible criminal investigation. Allan Kornblum responded that immediate notification might lead the FISC to conclude that the purpose of the warrant was actually criminal, not foreign intelligence. Although it was suggested that there be some modification to the certification regarding the purpose of the surveillance, Kornblum objected because they had been using the same form for 19 years and he was concerned that the court would object to any changes. The working group disbanded without any change in the procedures or how they were applied. 59\nIn July 1999 the Department of Justice Office of Inspector General (OIG) issued a report regarding the handling of information in the Department's campaign finance investigation. The OIG report found that the 1995 procedures were \"largely misunderstood and often misapplied, resulting in undue reluctance among FCI agents to provide information to criminal investigators and prosecutors.\"' The report noted further that despite the fact that the procedures that were adopted rejected Scruggs' original proposal that the FBI not provide information to the Criminal Division without OIPR's approval, the FBI operated as if that proposal had been adopted. Even FBI Deputy Director Bryant incorrectly believed that the procedures required OIPR approval before the FBI could provide intelligence information, whether from human sources or FISA-\nderived, to the Criminal Division. As a result, FBI agents internalized the message that sharing intelligence information of any kind might engender criticism. This approach\n\"needlessly chilled\" information sharing between the FBI and the Criminal Division. The OIG found that the FBI and OIPR simply ignored the information sharing requirements of the 1995 procedures.'\nThe OIG also indicated that the 1995 procedures were vaguely written and thus recommended that they be rewritten to make clear what a reasonable indication that \" a significant criminal offense\" was or will be committed means.\n\nIn August 1999, in response to the OIG findings, Deputy Attorney General Eric Holder established a working group to address intelligence sharing problems between agents and prosecutors. 62  No reforms were ever developed as a result of this group.\n\nIn October 1999, Randy Bellows, who was leading the Department's investigation into the handling of the Los Alamos Laboratory investigation, wrote to Reno to warn that the the Attorney General \"reassert the validity of the Procedures but it was concluded that it did not make sense for the Attorney General to issue a memorandum that said \"And I really mean it this time.\" AGRT Report at 722.\n\neo Department of Justice Office of Inspector General report, \"The Handling of FBI Intelligence Information Related to the Justice Department's Campaign Finance Investigation,\" July 1999, at 256.\n\nTimetables, to Resolve Outstanding Issues Related to Intelligence Matters,\" Aug. 3, 1999. Gorelick left the Department of Justice in May 1997. Holder became the new Deputy Attorney General in July that year.\n\ninvestigators. The issue was whether the Criminal Division could only provide advice to protect possible criminal investigations or whether it could also provide advice designed to *enhance* a criminal investigation. OIPR contended that the only appropriate purpose for advice was to protect a possible criminal investigation.\" The others believed that enhancing advice could be given as long as the Criminal Division did not direct that such actions be taken. The proposal forwarded to the Attorney General rejected OIPR's position and advised that enhancing advice was permissible.\n\nThe proponents of the reforms believed that the Attorney General was prepared to approve the proposal as formulated. But at an October 6 meeting with the Attorney General, she rejected the proposal and told the parties to go back and develop a plan that all, including OIPR, would agree on.\"\nWhile the Department of Justice was considering reforms to the 1995 procedures to increase information sharing, the FISA court - with OIPR's concurrence - imposed additional restrictions. Over the course of 2000 OIPR had informed the FISA court of numerous errors in prior FISA applications, particularly as to the existence and nature of any parallel criminal investigations. The court reacted by imposing additional restrictions on information sharing. For all Bin Ladin-related FISAs the court ordered that no information obtained from such FISAs could be shared with criminal prosecutors\n(including the United States Attorney's Office in New York or anyone in the Criminal Division) or FBI agents working on any related criminal matter without the court's permission.' In November 2000 the court added a requirement that no one in the FBI or the Department of Justice, including persons working solely on intelligence investigations, could see any FISA material before signing a form acknowledging that they understood the restrictions on sharing any of the information they obtained.\" One attorney in the FBI's National Security Law Unit reported at the time that, based on his discussions with did not adopt the proposal. He noted that they had received indications that she intended to approve the changes. But when the Attorney General came to the meeting she came accompanied by Fran Fragos Townsend, then head of OIPR. The participants believed that Townsend had lobbied Reno prior to the meeting and convinced her that OIPR's position was correct. Commission interview David Kris (May 19,\n2004); Commission interview James Baker (June 17, 2004).\n\nOIPR, he believed the FISA court would no longer permit criminal prosecutors to give any advice to the FBI agents working on intelligence matters. The attorney also believed that the court's wall was about to be applied to more FISA applications and thus supersede the 1995 procedures entirely.'\nThe parties returned in December that year with slight modifications but still no unanimity on reform. OIPR continued to insist that Criminal Division advice had to be restricted. The Attorney General again rejected the proposal on the grounds that it was not unanimous.\"\nThe December reform attempt also suffered from the court's unhappiness with the numerous factual errors in the applications it had received, including erroneous descriptions of the walls between intelligence and criminal investigations. Reform proponents recognized that even if the Attorney General had approved the reforms, the FISA court would also have had to approve the new procedures. The reform proponents recognized that the court would be unlikely to approve any changes that sought to increase information sharing, let alone expand the type of advice the prosecutors could provide to intelligence agents. Thus, achieving reform would likely require an appeal to the FISC court of review. This was considered particularly risky because the court of review had never before convened. Moreover, one of its judges had previously indicated doubts about the constitutionality of the FISA statute. Thus an appeal could risk the ability to obtain future FISA warrants.'\nThe problems with errors in FISA applications continued. On March 9, 2001, Chief Judge Lamberth of the FISA court wrote to Attorney General John Ashcroft that because of the continued errors on a series of FISA applications, the FISA court was banning a supervisory FBI agent who had been involved in preparing the particular applications.'\nA few days later an Assistant Deputy Attorney General forwarded to the Attorney General a proposal for reform of the 1995 procedures that was virtually identical to the proposal presented to Reno in December 2000. It is unclear what happened to the proposal. Although the proponent believes he had been told that the memorandum had been forwarded to Ashcroft, there is no record that it ever made it past the Deputy Attorney General's office. In any event, no action was taken on the proposal. The difficulty of achieving court agreement to reform had only magnified as the application errors continued.' In July 2001 the General Accounting Office (GAO) issued a report criticizing the FBI\nand OIPR for not complying with the information-sharing requirements of the 1995\n71 See email from Ainora to Parkinson, \"FYI-Special Session of the FISC,\" Nov. 17, 2000.\n\nprocedures.\" This was the third report by a government agency in as many years that indicated that the 1995 procedures were not working as planned. But again, the timing for any reform aimed at increasing information sharing was poor. On August 6, 2001, Deputy Attorney General Larry Thompson issued a memorandum affirming the 1995 procedures but clarifying that evidence of \"any federal felony\" was to be immediately reported by the FBI to the Criminal Division.' Prior to issuing the memorandum Thompson had met with the FISA court judges to ensure that the court would not start rejecting FISA applications because it disapproved of the proposed modifications. After receiving the necessary assurances, he issued the memorandum.' In light of the additional barriers to information sharing imposed by the court over the prior two years, these modifications were unlikely to have any measurable impact on information sharing. Agents had already become extreme leery about sharing any intelligence information with agents working on criminal matters. The 1995 procedures remained in effect until after September 11, 2001. 79\n\n## The Erection Of Internal Fbi Walls\n\nBy the Summer of 2001, internal walls between **FBI** agents working on intelligence matters and FBI agents working on criminal matters were in place, at least in matters relating to Bin Ladin. These walls did not preclude information sharing between the agents but governed the circumstances and means by which the information could be shared. We sought to determine when and why such procedures were implemented.\n\nThe July 1995 procedures were silent on the issue of information sharing within the FBI.\n\nWe found no witnesses who recalled when internal FBI information sharing procedures were first instituted. Jim Baker, head of OIPR since 2001, said he was not aware of any documents establishing internal FBI walls. He believed the concept was already in place when he arrived in 1996. 8  Former FBI General Counsel Larry Parkinson believed that of the key reforms. See, *In Re All Matters Submitted to Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court,* 218\nF.Supp.2d 611 (FISC May 17, 2002). As predicted, the first-ever appeal to the FISA Court of Review was needed to obtain complete reform. See *In re Sealed Case,* supra,  310 F.3d 717. Some have suggested that in the absence of the USA Patriot Act, convincing the FISA Court of Review to accept the reforms would have been difficult. Convincing the court that despite a nearly 20-year long, essentially unanimous interpretation of the FISA statute to impose a primary purpose standard, it should suddenly hold otherwise would have been challenging. Thus, it is unclear that any real reform would have been possible prior to\n9/11.\n\n80 Commission interview James Baker (Mar. 1, 2004).\n\nthe absence of such procedures was an oversight.\" Given the fact that Scruggs had originally proposed such walls prior to the creation of the July 1995 procedures and the March 1995 memorandum included them, it appears more likely that the parties to the July 1995 procedures intentionally rejected internal FBI walls. We found no documents reporting any discussion of such walls during the development of the July 1995 procedures.\n\nThe absence of discussion may also be a reflection that there was no perceived need for internal FBI walls to satisfy the primary purpose standard. Although the FBI had different designations for investigations depending on whether they were an intelligence or criminal matter - terrorism intelligence investigations were designated as 199 cases and criminal terrorism investigations were designated as 265 cases - the FBI did not distinguish between agents. All agents attended the same academy and received most of their training in how to conduct criminal cases. Any agent on a counterterrorism squad could work both 199 and 265 cases. These separate designations for different types of investigations were an internal administrative matter for the FBI and had no impact on whether criminal charges could be instituted. 82\nMore significantly perhaps, FBI agents had no authority to actually institute criminal proceedings. Only Department of Justice prosecutors could open a case in a grand jury, present witnesses, and obtain an indictment. Applications for criminal warrants and the filing of criminal charges in the district court required approval of a prosecutor. The series of cases applying the primary purpose standard routinely found that cases became criminal when prosecutors became involved. They did not consider what internal designation the FBI used to file its cases and did not look to see whether an agent wore an intelligence or criminal hat. It was solely the presence of prosecutors that changed the nature of the cases in the courts' eyes. Thus, while prosecutors could not direct or control the FISA process, any FBI agent could do so.\" Another significant factor was that OIPR did not believe that there should or could be parallel intelligence and criminal cases. Both Scruggs and Kornblum had argued that once a criminal case was instituted, the FISA coverage needed to be terminated.\" Many of the court cases appeared to share this sequential view of intelligence and criminal the skill sets of the relevant parties. Thus, Larry Parkinson, at the time FBI Deputy General Counsel, could provide any advice to the intelligence agents conducting the espionage investigation against Earl Pitts without raising OIPR's concerns about running afoul of the primary purpose standard. This is despite the fact that Parkinson had previously been an Assistant United States Attorney and thus would have been very knowledgeable about what would be helpful to any future criminal investigation. This same advice from someone sitting across the street in DOJ's Criminal Division would have been considered troublesome.\n\n84Commission interview James Baker (Mar. 1, 2004); Commission interview Richard Scruggs (May 26,\n2004); AGRT Report at 723.\n\ncases. Because the central concern was not information sharing but rather direction and control, agents who gathered information via a FISA warrant could use the information in a subsequent criminal case. And because the FISA coverage would have been terminated, there were no direction and control concerns. This would prevent the need to keep agents separate. Indeed, in one of its memoranda commenting on the proposed 1995 procedures, the SDNY mentioned that OIPR apparently had no objection to the same agent who had worked on the intelligence matter and obtained FISA material working on the subsequent criminal case.\" This linear approach - first intelligence case and then criminal case - worked fairly well in traditional FCI matters. An investigation of a potential spy was first an intelligence investigation to determine who and what were involved. When this information was gathered criminal charges could be instituted, the individual would be arrested, his access to sensitive materials would end, and the criminal case could proceed.\n\nAs the respective parties would come to realize, terrorism cases were not so neat. There could be multiple plots and overlapping participants, and bringing criminal charges against one set of individuals did not end the need for ongoing intelligence. This was clearly demonstrated with regard to Bin Ladin. He was first indicted in June 1998 but he was not apprehended and he continued to plan and execute more terrorist acts. In August\n1998 he directed the East Africa embassy bombings and a superseding indictment was brought. Concerns about additional plots around the Millennium required extensive intelligence gathering about possible future acts while Bin Ladin remained criminally charged for prior acts. These scenarios altered the traditional view of sequential investigations. 86\nThus, it is clear why an internal FBI wall was in place in the March 1995 memorandum but not the July 1995 procedures. In the cases covered by the March memorandum the sequence of cases had been reversed - the criminal case preceded the intelligence case.\n\nThus, OIPR was concerned that agents who were working on an active criminal case - and thus working closely with and often at the direction of criminal prosecutors - could be perceived to be directing FISA coverage for the ongoing criminal case. The July procedures, however, implicitly presumed sequential cases.' While the Inspector General's report on campaign finance, the AGRT report on the handling of the Wen Ho Lee case, and GAO's report on information sharing were critical of how the July 1995 procedures were being applied, none mentioned any internal FBI\nwalls. The issues in those matters focused solely on information sharing between the FBI\nand prosecutors. Indeed, we found no evidence of internal FBI walls between the March\n1995 memorandum that covered the two discrete SDNY cases and December 1999. 88\nIn December 1999 there was overwhelming concern about possible terrorist attacks scheduled to coincide with the Millennium. Record numbers of FISA applications were being filed with the court. Many of these applications provided for coverage of individuals and facilities believed to be related to Bin Ladin. The problem was that there was already a criminal indictment returned against Bin Ladin. This posed a dilemma for OIPR. Normally once a criminal case was opened OIPR would no longer present applications for FISA coverage. 89  Here, however, Bin Ladin was not in custody and there was fear that he was planning further attacks. Thus, there was an acute need for additional intelligence collection and it needed to be approved quickly. OIPR and the FISA court resolved this dilemma by making the court the wall and specifying that information gathered pursuant to these particular FISA warrants could not be shared with criminal prosecutors or FBI agents working on the Bin Ladin-related criminal cases without first obtaining the court's permission. Thus, a distinction was made between agents collecting new intelligence and those assigned to particular criminal investigations.'\nThe first evidence of official FBI requirements for an internal wall between agents working on an intelligence investigation and criminal agents did not appear until December 2000. On December 7, 2000, a supervisor in the FBI's New York Field Office issued an order that in light of the FISA court's new procedures for Bin Ladin-related FISAs, his squad would have a designated intelligence agent. This agent could review any of the information collected from the relevant FISA surveillances. He could not, however, share any such information with fellow agents or attorneys at the SDNY prior to obtaining approval from the New York Field Office's legal unit, the FBI Office of General Counsel, OIPR, and the FISA court.\"\n88 The DOJ OIG found that there were internal walls in some FISA applications where there was a parallel court indicated that it would require such provisions before approving these applications. Because of the extremely close relationship between OIPR and the FISA court, it is likely that there was some discussion regarding these provisions prior to their insertion in the FISA applications. Notably these restrictions did not differentiate between intelligence and criminal agents generally but merely walled off agents working specific criminal cases. This demonstrates that the concern centered on the fact of the parallel criminal case as opposed to arbitrary categories of agents. In March 2000 OIPR moved to have the court wall removed because these particular surveillances had been terminated so that any risk of improper direction and control had been eliminated. Any information collected from this coverage could thus be freely shared among fellow agents.\n\n91 FBI electronic communication to New York Field Office from New York Squad 1-49, \"Instructions re FBI FISA policy,\" Dec. 7, 2000. Once again the internal wall appeared to be limited to the Bin Ladinrelated matters. We did not locate any general procedures that extended the information sharing controls in\n(continued...)\nThese procedures were the direct result of the FISA court's concern regarding numerous factual errors contained in a series of FISA applications, most notably the Bin Ladinrelated FISAs. These applications contained errors regarding the existence and nature of parallel criminal investigations. Because the court was concerned that there was not adequate separation between intelligence and criminal investigations, it held a meeting with representatives from OIPR, the Criminal Division, FBI headquarters, and the FBI\nNew York Field Office. The court insisted that there be a strict separation between the specific ongoing intelligence and criminal matters and that its procedures had to be strictly followed.'\nBecause of the court's dissatisfaction with the lax manner in which information had been shared, it began requiring that all persons within the FBI and the Department of Justice who received information from this FISA coverage sign a certification that they understood the court's limits on how and when such information could be shared.\"\nAlthough the additional restrictions applied only to specific FISA warrants, it is apparent that the FBI began applying these additional restrictions to its handling of other unrelated FISA coverage. Thus, by late November 2000 the incentive to share information with fellow agents all but disappeared.\n\n## The Nsa Caveats\n\nThe National Security Agency (NSA) also placed restrictions on the sharing and use of information it collected. Initially these restrictions merely governed the use of its reporting in criminal matters. In December 1999, however, the NSA began placing new, more restrictive caveats on its Bin Ladin-related reporting. These caveats precluded sharing the information contained in these NSA reports with criminal prosecutors or investigators without obtaining OIPR's permission. These new caveats were the result of NSA's and the Department of Justice's overabundance of caution. During the Millennium crisis the Attorney General authorized electronic surveillance of three individuals overseas. Because these searches were not within the United States, no FISA warrant was required. The Attorney General could authorize these searches pursuant to Executive Order 12333. The information that led to these targets, however, had initially been obtained from FISA-authorized surveillances.\n\nThus, in an abundance of caution, the Attorney General conditioned these surveillances on a requirement that any reporting from these surveillances bear caveats preventing the sharing of any of the reporting with criminal investigators or prosecutors without first obtaining OIPR's permission.'\nBecause of the complexity of determining which Bin Ladin-related reporting was derived from these particular authorizations, NSA decided to place identical caveats on all Bin Ladin-related reporting, not just that authorized by the Attorney General. These caveats were added to NSA's Bin Ladin-related reporting on December 30, 1999. 95\nIn May 2000 it was brought to Reno's attention that these caveats prevented attorneys in the Terrorism and Violent Crime Section (TVCS) of the Criminal Division from reading relevant reporting. Reno contacted NSA Director, Lieutenant General Michael Hayden, to discuss the issues caused by the caveats. After discussions with NSA and determining that certain TVCS attorneys served primarily in a policy, as opposed to an operational, role, the caveats were modified to permit the reporting to be shared with particular named TVCS attorneys. Several months later two attorneys in the SDNY were added to list of attorneys permitted to review the reporting without first obtaining OIPR's permission. 96\nIn November 2000 the caveats were modified once more. As a result of the FISA court's added restrictions on sharing FISA information, NSA determined that its FISA and FISA-derived reporting was subject to the court's wall procedures. NSA concluded, however, that there was no administratively easy method to determine which of its reports were from FISA-based collections. Thus, caveats were added to all NSA counterterrorism reporting that precluded sharing the contents of the reports with criminal investigators or prosecutors without first obtaining permission from NSA's general counsel.\"\n\n## The Wall In The Summer Of 2001\n\nAttorney General John Ashcroft testified to the Commission that specific information sharing failures in the summer of 2001 arose from Attorney General Reno's July 1995\nprocedures and specifically from the March 1995 memorandum signed by Deputy Attorney General Gorelick.\" A review of the facts surrounding the information sharing failures, however, demonstrate that the Attorney General's testimony did not fairly and accurately reflect the significance of the 1995 documents and their relevance to the 2001 discussions.\n\nGuidance,\" Dec. 30, 1999.\n\nThere were three occasions in the summer of 2001 when questions were raised regarding what information could be shared and with whom. One occasion involved decisions whether to seek a criminal warrant or a FISA warrant for Zacarias Moussaoui's laptop computer and other possessions. The other two of these occasions related to information gathered by the NSA in December 1999 regarding Khalid al Mihdhar and Nawaf al Hazmi. We examined these incidents to determine what, if any, role the July 1995\nprocedures had on the failure to share relevant information.\n\n## The Moussaoui Investigation\n\nOn August 15, 2001, the Minneapolis FBI Field Office received information that an individual named Zacarias Moussaoui was taking flight lessons at the Pan Am International Flight Academy in Eagan, Minnesota. Moussaoui had attracted the attention of the academy's flight instructors because, among other factors, despite having little knowledge of flying he wanted to learn how to \"take off and land\" a Boeing 747. The Minneapolis FBI agent assigned to investigate further was extremely suspicious of Moussaoui's intentions and believed he might be intending to hijack a plane.\" Because it was not clear that there was sufficient information of a criminal plot, the agent opened an intelligence investigation. The agent went promptly to work on gathering information regarding Moussaoui's intentions. Minneapolis and FBI Headquarters debated whether Moussaoui should be arrested immediately or surveilled to obtain further information. Because it was not clear that Moussaoui could be imprisoned for criminal charges, the FBI case agent decided the most important thing to do was to prevent Moussaoui from obtaining any further training he could later use to carry out a potential attack. As a French national who had overstayed his visa, Moussaoui could be detained immediately by the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS). The INS arrested Moussaoui on the immigration violation on August 16. A deportation order was signed on August 17, 2001.'\nUpon arresting Moussaoui it was determined that he had a laptop computer and a bag containing numerous papers and other materials. The **FBI** case agent believed that whatever Moussaoui had planned might be described in either the laptop or the other papers. The agent could not examine these materials, however, without obtaining a search warrant. The agent contacted the Minneapolis USAO and gave some hypothetical information similar to the Moussaoui facts to determine whether there was sufficient information to obtain a criminal search warrant. The Assistant United States Attorney told the agent they were close to having sufficient information. The agent did not ask for a final opinion on a criminal warrant and did not present an application for such a warrant to the USA0. 11\nThe case agent conferred with agents in the Radical Fundamentalist Unit at FBI\nHeadquarters about how to proceed. The agents at FBI Headquarters believed there was insufficient probable cause that a crime was about to be committed and thus believed that a criminal warrant could not be obtained. Relying on this advice, the Minneapolis Field Office decided to seek a FISA warrant instead of a criminal warrant.' 2\nTo obtain a FISA warrant, however, the FBI needed to demonstrate probable cause that Moussaoui was an agent of a foreign power, a showing that was not required to obtain a criminal warrant. The case agent did not have sufficient information to connect Moussaoui to a \"foreign power,\" so he reached out for help in the United States and overseas. This set off a flurry of activity at FBI Headquarters, several FBI Legal Attache offices in Europe, and the CIA to obtain information linking Moussaoui to a foreign power. 13  Because this process did not involve sharing information with the Criminal Division, it was not governed by the July 1995 procedures.\n\nAt one point the Minneapolis Field Office indicated that it wanted to open a parallel criminal investigation of Moussaoui on the belief that he was planning to conduct a hijacking. FBI Headquarters ordered Minneapolis not to open a criminal case because it believed that the existence of a parallel criminal case might have a negative impact of the FISA court's willingness to authorize a FISA warrant.'\" There was nothing in the law or the July 1995 procedures that precluded opening a parallel criminal case. Headquarters's decision was based solely on its and OIPR's beliefs about possible reactions of the FISA court, not on actual rules governing the circumstances.\n\nOn August 18, the Minneapolis Field Office asked FBI Headquarters to obtain OIPR's permission for the Field Office to contact the Minneapolis USAO about a possible criminal case. The Field Office incorrectly believed that under Part B of the 1995\nprocedures (the portion covering situations where no FISA coverage exists), it needed OIPR's permission to contact a USAO in a case where an intelligence investigation was opened. Actually the procedures specified that the FBI needed the Criminal Division's, not OIPR's permission. In any event, FBI Headquarters did not inform the Field Office of its mistake and made no effort to obtain either OIPR's or the Criminal Division's permission. The Field Office did not press the issue. Thus, we do not know what the Criminal Division's position would have been and whether it would have granted permission. Moreover, no permission was needed to contact the Criminal Division and obtain its advice regarding the possibility of a criminal case. Neither the Field Office nor Headquarters apparently considered such an option.'\nEventually FBI Headquarters determined that there was insufficient information linking Moussaoui to a foreign power to obtain a FISA warrant and decided not to send an application to OIPR for its consideration. FBI Headquarters decided to deport Moussaoui without obtaining a FISA warrant to search his belongings.\"\nOnce the decision was made not to seek a FISA warrant, there was no barrier preventing the Field Office from returning to the USA() in Minneapolis to seek a possible criminal warrant. The concern of Part B about retaining the possibility of a future FISA warrant was no longer relevant once any idea of obtaining a FISA warrant had been abandoned.\n\nThe witnesses all said, however, that they just did not think about that option at the time.\n\nOnce the idea of obtaining a criminal warrant had been abandoned in favor of trying to obtain a FISA warrant, no one gave a criminal warrant another thought. In sum, the central question of whether a FISA warrant should have been applied for or could have been obtained was not governed by the July 1995 procedures. The sole issue in the Moussaoui matter that the procedures governed was the circumstances under which the Field Office could have contacted the local USA() to discuss a possible criminal case once an intelligence case had already been opened. As FBI Headquarters never pursued obtaining the required permission, we cannot say whether it would have been granted.\n\n## The Mihdhar And Hazmi Information\n\nIn December 1999 NSA had picked up the movements of Khalid al Mihdhar and an individual then only identified as Nawaf Mihdhar was linked him to a terrorist facility in the Middle East. He was tracked to Kuala Lumpur where he met with other then unidentified individuals. Some photographs were taken of these individuals on the streets of Kuala Lumpur. The surveillance trailed off when three of the individuals moved on to Bangkok on January 8, 2000. The NSA reporting regarding the links to the facility and Mihdhar's travel was disseminated to the intelligence community, including the FBI. The reports, however, bore caveats that precluded sharing the contents with FBI criminal investigators without first obtaining OIPR's permission. The CIA reports regarding the surveillance were not disseminated outside CIA.'\nIn late May and early June 2001 an FBI analyst assigned to the investigation of the October 2000 bombing of the *USS Cole* was investigating an individual involved in the Cole attack named Fand al Quso. The analyst knew that Quso had traveled to Bangkok in January 2000 to give money to Tawfiq bin Attash, aka Khallad. Khallad was believed to have been a liaison between the attackers and Usama bin Ladin. A CIA analyst who had been working on Cole-related issues suggested showing some photographs to FBI agents in New York who were working on the *Cole* case and had interviewed Quso. 18\nThe FBI analyst was given three surveillance photographs from the January 2000 Kuala Lumpur meeting to show to the New York agents. She was told one of the individuals was named Khalid al Mihdhar. She was not told why the photographs had been taken or why the Kuala Lumpur travel might have been significant. When the FBI analyst did some research of past intelligence reports, she found the original NSA reports on the planning for the Kuala Lumpur meeting. Because the CIA had not disseminated its reporting, the analyst did not locate any of its reports on the meeting.'\nOn June 11, 2001, the FBI analyst, an FBI analyst on detail to the CIA, and the CIA\nanalyst who had suggested showing the photographs to the agents, went to New York to meet with the *Cole* investigators. At one point in the meeting, the FBI analyst showed the three photographs to the agents and asked whether they recognized Quso in any of them.\n\nThe agents asked questions about the photographs - Why were they taken? Why were these people being followed? Where are the rest of the photographs? 11\nThe only information the FBI analyst had regarding the meeting - other than the photographs - were the NSA reports that she had found. These reports, however, contained caveats that their contents could not be shared with criminal investigators without OIPR's permission. Therefore, the analyst concluded she could not pass the information contained in these reports to the agents. She did not ask OIPR for permission to share these reports. She did not explain to the agents about the caveats but merely said she could not share the information due to \"the wall.'\" The CIA analyst at the meeting knew much more about the Kuala Lumpur meeting. No one at the meeting asked him what he knew; he did not volunteer anything. He later told investigators that as a CIA analyst he was not authorized to answer FBI questions regarding CIA information. The FBI analyst said that she assumed that if the CIA analyst had the answers to the agents' questions, he would have volunteered them.'\nThus, the New York agents left the meeting without learning that Mihdhar had a U.S.\n\nvisa, that Mihdhar's visa application indicated that he planned to travel to New York, that Mihdhar's colleague Nawaf al Hazmi had traveled to the United States in January 2000, or that in January 2001 a source put Mihdhar in the company of Khallad at the Kuala Lumpur meeting.'\"\nAlthough the analyst blamed the generic \"wall\" for her inability to give the agents more information at the meeting, the fact that none of this information was shared with the agents was not due to the July 1995 procedures. The sole reason the analyst felt she could not share the information was the presence of the caveats on the NSA reports. But the fact that these particular reports contained these caveats was not due to the 1995\nprocedures. Indeed these reports were not even governed by the procedures. As noted previously, the attorney general had ordered such caveats on certain reports around the Millennium because of concerns that such reports might conceivably be considered FISA-derived. None of the reports on Mihdhar and his travel were covered by the attorney general's order, however. The decision to place these caveats on additional reports was NSA's unilateral determination that trying to separate out which reports should bear the caveats and which did not need them was administratively too difficult.\n\nNSA determined that it would just be simpler to place caveats on all Bin Ladin-related reports and let individuals make requests to pass whatever reports they felt needed to be shared. The fact that the 1995 procedures did not govern the information involved is also evident from the terms of the procedures themselves. Neither the NSA nor the CIA information regarding Mihdhar and the Kuala Lumpur meeting had been generated as part of an FBI intelligence investigation. The 1995 procedures by their terms governed only information collected by the FBI in the course of its intelligence investigations. Thus, the procedures were not applicable to sharing information gathered by the NSA and CIA. Indeed, the photographs that were shared were from the CIA and there was no need to obtain special permission to share them with the criminal agents.\n\nSecond, the issue at the June 11 meeting was whether the information could be shared with FBI agents, not criminal prosecutors. Again, the July 1995 procedures were silent on the issue of sharing among FBI agents and thus had no application to the information in question. Although there were internal FBI walls contained in some particular FISA orders, none of this information had been generated pursuant to such FISAs. Thus, even those internal walls did not apply.\n\nThus, the analyst could have shared the NSA information by asking OIPR' s permission either prior to the meeting or sometime after the meeting. She did not, however, make any request to share the information until late August. Moreover, none of the CIA information bore any such caveats. The CIA analyst could have shared all of the information he had about Mihdhar's visa and travels without consideration of the July\n1995 procedures. He merely believed it was not his role to share such information. He did not go back and ask his superiors for permission to share the information. The lost opportunity for information sharing in June 2001 was due to the failures of the two respective analysts to seek ways to share the information, not the July 1995 procedures.\n\nA second opportunity to share this information arose in August 2001. On August 22 the FBI analyst and her colleague who was detailed to the CIA learned that Mihdhar had entered the United States on January 15, 2000, and again on July 4, 2001. They decided he should be found. The analyst detailed to the CIA asked the CIA to draft a cable requesting that Mihdhar and Hazmi be placed on the TIPOFF watchlist. Both were added to the list on August 24. 114\nThe FBI analyst took responsibility for the search within the United States. As the information indicated that Mihdhar had last arrived in New York, she began drafting what is known as a lead for the FBI's New York Field Office. A lead relays information from one part of the FBI to another and requests that a particular action be taken. Her lead was sent on August 28. Because the lead contained information from the NSA\nreports that bore caveats regarding sharing with criminal investigators, the analyst included in the lead was not cleared for sharing with agents working on criminal matters.\n\nShe sent the lead to a designated intelligence agent on the relevant squad. The lead suggested that the goal of the investigation was to locate Mihdhar, determine his contacts and reason for being in the United States, and possibly conduct an interview.' 15\nThe agent who received the lead forwarded it to his squad supervisor. That same day the supervisor forwarded the lead to another designated intelligence agent and requested that he open an intelligence case. The supervisor also sent the lead to the case agents investigating the *Cole* attack. One of the *Cole* case agents read the lead with interest and contacted the analyst to obtain more information. The analyst argued, however, that because the agent was a designated criminal FBI agent, not an FBI intelligence agent, the wall kept him from participating in any search for Mihdhar. In fact, she felt he had to destroy his copy of the lead because it contained NSA information from reports that bore the sharing caveats. The agent asked the analyst to get an opinion from the FBI's National Security Law Unit (NSLU) on whether he could open a criminal case on Mihdhar. 116\nSubsequently, the analyst sent an email to the *Cole* case agent explaining that according to the NSLU, the case could only be opened as an intelligence matter, and that if Mihdhar was found, only designated intelligence agents could conduct or even be present at any interview. The case agent angrily responded that there seems to be some confusion regarding the wall because in his view it only applied to FISA information. The analyst replied that she was not making up the rules; she claimed they were in the relevant manual and \"ordered by the [FISA] Court and every office in the FBI is required to follow them including FBI NY.\" What she did not tell the agent was that she had sought and received permission to share the NSA information with criminal agents. Thus, there was no reason for her continued insistence that the New York agent could not keep a copy of the lead.' It is now clear that everyone was confused about the rules governing the sharing and use of information gathered in intelligence channels. Because Mihdhar was being sought for his possible connection to or knowledge of the *Cole* bombing, he could have been investigated or tracked under the existing *Cole criminal* case. No new criminal case was needed for the criminal agent to begin searching for Mihdhar using all available investigative tools. 118\nMoreover, because NSA had given permission to share the 1999 report information, he could use all available information. The information from the INS and the State Department regarding Mihdhar's visa - including his visa application - and his two entries into the United States was available for his use as well because there were no restrictions on sharing such information with criminal agents. The information from the CIA regarding Mihdhar's meeting with Khallad in Kuala Lumpur also was not limited as to which agents could see and use such information to investigate and search for Mihdhar. 119\nAgain, the July 1995 procedures were inapplicable. None of the relevant information had been gathered by the FBI as part of an intelligence investigation. Indeed, it was all gathered prior to the intelligence investigation being opened. Furthermore, there was no issue of sharing information with criminal prosecutors. As in June, the issue was solely which agents could have access to the information. Because all internal FBI walls were solely the result of specific FISA orders and no FISA information was involved in this case, there were no applicable internal FBI walls. There was no legal barrier to the criminal agent receiving all of the information and using it to conduct a search for Mihdhar.\n\n## Conclusion\n\nAs the review of the facts demonstrates, whatever the merits of the March 1995 Gorelick memorandum and the Attorney General's July 1995 procedures on information sharing, they did not control the decisions that were made in the summer of 2001. The Gorelick memorandum applied to only two specific cases, neither of which was involved (or even still existed) in the summer of 2001. The July 1995 procedures did not govern the sharing of information gathered by NSA, CIA, the State Department, or INS and thus did not apply to the information regarding Hazmi and Mihdhar that the analyst had to share with\n117 Id. at 271, 538 en. 82."
    },
    {
        "text": "## The Emergence Of The Internet And Africa\n\nLes Cottrell SLAC SLAC Colloquium, May 6th, 2013\n\n## Agenda\n\n- Brief history of the Internet and its goals,\n- how it has grown,\n- today's major challenges, - and future research.\n- The impact of the Internet on development,\n- Africa\n- How Africa has lagged the world,\n- Why does it matter? - Is the performance for Africa improving, will it catch up?\n\n## 1961 Vision From The Bell Phone System Ad From June 1961 *Boys' Life* Magazine\n\nSomeday there will be as much communication between business machines as between people You mean two business machines thousands of mile apart actually talk to each other by telephone\n\n## The Start Of The Internet As We Know It Today\n\n\n1965: Larry Roberts and Thomas Marill create the first\nwide area connection **via telephone lines**, turns out to\nbe inefficient and costly.\n\nKleinrock predicts that\npacket switching (developed by Baran,\nDavies, Kleinrock\net. al.) more promising\n1969: the original Internet created and had 4 nodes, UCLA, Stanford Research Institute, MIT, Utah,\n50kbit backbone (today scaled up a billion times)\nEarly days\n1972\n1983 400 nodes,\nNow 750M (many more hidden behind Firewalls and home router/Network Address Translation devices (NAT) etc.)\n\n## Design Goals Slide 1\n\n- Built as a **collaboration of global proportions**,\n\nindependent stand on own, self managed autonomous\nsystems, decentralized (chaotic, no central\ncontrol/management cf. phone system),\n- **Best effort**, no guarantees, recovery from losses,\npipelining host flow control, checksums\n- **non-proprietary** (c.f. IBM's System Network\nArchitecture, Digital Equipment's network, Xerox\nNetwork Services, phone system ...),\n- Little focus on security\n- (if had: might never have happened),\n\n\n- **simple black boxes** (routers\nconnect nets)\ndo not retain information about the\nindividual flows,\n\n - packets inside envelopes,\nlayering\n(independent of each other, i.e. middle layers\ndon't know if lower layers are wireless, satellite, copper, fibre, upper layer independent of applications cf. purpose designed TV broadcast networks, cable networks, telephone network, only end device knows what contents mean).\n\n## Growth: Users Factor Of 6 In 10 Years\n\nMost future user growth from developing nations\n\n## Growth: Devices August 2010: 12.5Billion Devices Plugged In To Internet In 10 Years Factor 100 Growth\n\n- cell phones & other new classes of consumer electronics\n(eBooks, tablets, Internet TV, digital picture frames ...), Internet\nof things, 99% of todays electronic devices are not on the Internet\n- **Even bigger is machine to machine** (Internet of Things)\n- smart grids for energy management, smart cities, surveillance\n& public safety, traffic & parking control, cars, and sensor nets\n...).\n\n## Growth: Bandwidth\n\n1997: Multiplex multiple colors over single fibre\n\n## International Internet Bandwidth Growth 2005-2010\n\nAnnual growth > 50% in last few years i.e. as much capacity added in 2012 as was available in\n2008\n\nFrom Telegeography\n\n## Compare Today With 50 Years Ago\n\nIf we compare the IBM Stretch supercomputer  of the early 1960's with today's smartphone we can see we have come a long way:\n\n- Smartphone is much smaller, i.e. it fits in the hand versus 2500 sq\nfeet;\n- Smartphone weighs 5 oz. versus 40,000lbs;\n- Smartphone uses 10,000 times less power;\n- Smartphone ~ 3000 times more compute power - Stretch $8M, smartphone few hundred $\n\n## Growth In Connectivity Amazing Scalability Success\n\n\nThe Internet has successfully scaled from a few users\nto over a billion and speed increases of seven orders\nof magnitude (56kbps=>100Gbps backbone)\n\nFrom a research and education\nnetwork to a commercial network used worldwide\n\n## However There Are Challenges... Challenge: Demands For Adddress Space\n\n- Internet users in developing world\n- **Devices per person** (smart phones, tablets,\nwearable devices...)\n- **Monitoring** of equipment,\nhumans (e.g. medical),  animals\n- **Machine to machine** (typical\ncar today has 16 IP addresses)\n- Smart homes, smart cities, traffic,\nsurveillance, safety, security, power grids ...\n- 99% of **electronics** in the world today still not\nconnected to the internet.\nChallenge: Internet growth\n8 orders of magnitude growth in devices in 50 years\n\n\n## Population: Wikipedia Internet Users: Internet World Stats Devices/User: Cisco Internet Devices: Cisco Challenge: Mobility Computers Used To Be Big And Did Not Move\n\nAs move need to change IP addresses\n- Topology can change\nNeed persistence across links going up &\ndown - Delay & disruption tolerance (e.g. for space\nflights)\n Mesh, sensor nets, self-organizing networks\n- Bad guy may join, e.g. military position overrun,\nenemy gets  device, pretends to be friend\n\n## Challenges: Trust - Slide 1\n\nInitial trust relationship badly broken\n- Not everyone has everyone else's best interest in mind\n- Organized crime, state sponsored intelligence gathering,\ncyber-warfare\n- Akamai observed  (3Q12) attack  traffic originating from\n180 unique countries/regions. China top ~33%, followed\nby US (13%) & Russia (5% traffic)\nThis is compounded with:\n\nNaive OS', unpatched systems, browsers, users\n\nRouting mistakes (e.g. black holes)\n\n\n## Challenges: Trust - Slide 3\n\nFreedom of information vs privacy (e.g. wikileaks)\n- Google/Yahoo ... (has your emails), Facebook have a good\nidea of  who your friends are where you live, work, spend your free time, your health, love life, political leaning\n- Branching  out into your realtime (Global Position System) to\ngive your  location\n- Nowhere to hide anymore\n\n\n## Lack Of Tools For Strong Authentication Needed For Grids & Cloud Computing Prevalence Of Viruses, Worms, Malware, Trojan Horses, Denial Of Service Challenge: Spam Unsolicited Pitches For Things Such As Drugs (> 60%), Dating, Stocks, Malware (Few %)  ... Us Leads As Source Of Spam Sent By Botnets\n\nNetworks of compromised computers, millions worldwide Located mainly in Europe (esp East), Russia, US and India\n\n## 88% Of All Email, 150B Emails/Day (Cisco)\n\nDue to spam filters only 20% of mail received by users is spam Huge Annual losses due to viruses for a typical 1,000-\nuser organization will amount to over $158,000 (Radicati Group).\n\n## Challenges: Capacity And Net Neutrality\n\nInternet video\n\n## What Are The Drivers? Can Capacity Keep Up With Demand\n\nFile sharing\n\n\nDoes this lead to\nISP inspecting and limiting traffic by customer\n\nLeading to loss of\nnet neutrality\n\nprinciple that Internet service providers and governments should treat all data on the Internet equally, not discriminating or charging differentially by user, content, site, platform, application, type of attached equipment, and modes of communication- Wikipedia\n\n## Challenge: How To Change It\n\nDespite the new Internet Protocol (version 6 or IPv6) being > 15 years old, it carries < 2%\ntraffic How to redo a functioning production network critical to the global economy while it continues to run\n\n\n- \"Creation was completed in 6 days, but no installed\nuser base\"\n- The Internet has been smoothly taking over from the\nphone network\n- How does it happen next time?\n\n## Internet Ng - Slide 1\n\nTo borrow from John Lennon: \"Imagine there's no latency, no spam or phishing, a community of trust. Imagine all the people, able to get online from anywhere at any time\".\n\n## The Goal Is Audacious:\n\n- To create an Internet **without so many security breaches**, with better\ntrust and built-in identity management.\n- Researchers are trying to build an Internet that's more reliable, higher\nperforming and better able to manage **exabytes** of content.\n- And they're hoping to build an Internet that extends connectivity to the\nmost remote regions of the world, perhaps to other planets.\n\n## Internet Ng - Slide 2 Future Internet Design (Find) Funded By Nsf To Get And Implement A Vision For 2020\n\nLaunched 50 projects ($0.5-1M) in 2006, now\n(2010) being narrowed down to 2-4 with up to\n$9M\nSimilar initiative from Europe\n\n## Internet's Impact On Development\n\n- Brief history of the Internet and its goals,\n- how it has grown, - today's major challenges,\n- and future research.\n\n## - The Impact Of The Internet On Development,\n\n- Africa\n- How Africa has lagged the world, - Why does it matter?\n- Is the performance for Africa improving, will it catch up?\n\n## How Does The Internet Assist Development?\n\n\nInvestment in information technology plays the role of\na **\"facilitator\"** that allows other innovations to take\nplace. http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m1093/is_3_45/ai_86517828/\n\nWorld Bank / IFC report: for every 10% increase in high-speed Internet connections there is an increase\nin economic growth of 1.3 percentage\npoints.  http://www.infodev.org/en/Article.522.html\n\nExample: Uganda 15% increase in price of maize\nbased on improved farmer  bargaining power.\nwww.itu.int/ITU-D/.../S1-01-NG-ICT_Indicators-Tim_Kelly.pptx\n- A study reported by  Akamai showed that 80 new jobs are\ncreated for every 1,000 new broadband connections\n\n## Human Development Index (Hdi)\n\n- HDI from United Nations (UN) International Telecommunications\nUnion (ITU)\n- composite statistic of life expectancy, education, and income\n\n## Africa\n\n- Brief history of the Internet and its goals,\n- how it has grown, - today's major challenges,\n- and future research.\n- The impact of the Internet on development,\n- Africa\n- How Africa has lagged the world,\n- Why does it matter?\n- What has soccer got to do with it?\n- Is the performance for Africa improving,\nwill it catch up?\n\n## Why Does It Matter To Africa\n\n- African scientists isolated\n- Lack critical mass\n- Need **network** to\ncollaborate but it is terrible\nInternet Users 2002\n\nSo we have: Brain drain\nInstead we need:\n\nBrain **gain**, tap diaspora\n\nBlend in distance learning\nTertiary Education from http://www.worldmapper.org/\n\n\nProvide leadership, train trainers\nCartograms from:\nwww.geog.qmw.ac.uk/gbhgis/conference/cartogram.html\n\n## Why Is Africa Important? Africa Is Huge ~ 1B People, Over 1000 Languages,Multi Climates Developed World Market Saturated, Africa Big Opportunity\n\nAfrican technology industry is growing at ~\n20% annually. Africa demonstrates massive consumer appetite for technology, e.g. mobile users set to reach 735 million by the end of 2012\n(GSMA.)\n\n## Science Opportunities: Square Kilometre Array (Ska)\n\n\"...equivalent to ten times the\nglobal internet traffic today\"\n\"...equivalent to ten times the\nglobal internet traffic today\"\n- Build in Sub-Saharan states with cores in South Africa\nand Australia,\n- 1.5 billion, construction start 2016, initial\nobservations 2019\n\n## Examples Of Other Scientific Opportunities\n\n\nAug 30, 2012: CERN donated 220 computer servers\nfrom CERN to the Kwame Nkrumah University of\nScience and Technology in Ghana.\n\nStrategic plan for a synchrotron light source in\nsouthern Africa championed by SLAC's own Herman\nWinick\n\nDrugs from rain-forest, environment studies, geophysics\n\nSix **HEP International Conferences in Madaga**scar\n\n## Measurement Mechanism: Pinger\n\nUses ubiquitous ping Monitor Host NUST\n\n## Repositories\n\nMeasure Round Trip Time & Loss Internet\n\nRemote\nHost\n(typically\nweb server)\n\nJoint Techs: I2 & ESnet,\nStanford\n\n## Deployment Of Pinger Hosts Monitors > 90 In 23 Countries, 4 In Africa\n\n\n- Beacons monitored by most monitors (~100)\n- Remote sites monitored by some monitors (~750)\n\n## African Submarine Cables\n\nhttp://manypossibilities.net/african-undersea-cables/\n\n## 2001-2008 1 Cable, W Coast Only, No Competition (340Gb/S)\n\nFuture Cables promise\nmore connectivity:\n Cable capacity increase from\n0.34Tb/s in 2008 to 87.5 Tb/s by 2014 (factor ~300)\nWorld Cup S Africa 2010 led to many submarine cables connecting Africa to rest of the world More Capacity, shorter RTT, competition Still worst off continent\n\n Investment of $6T\n\n##\n\nNote the countries that have gone from GEOS to terrestrial\nIntra Africa Optical Fibre Network\n\nJust as important as the submarine cables serving the coasts, are the tens if not hundreds of millions of dollars being invested in new terrestrial fiber to move this capacity inland.\n\n\n\nhttp://www.ubuntunet.net/fibre-map\n\n## How To Reach The Rest Of Africa\n\nWiFI & Mobile to the rescue,\noverlay cell network with\nfibre net\n\nMobile phones huge in developing world.\n\n##\n\nAlso O3B\n- Refers to population of world without broadband\n- Constellation of 8 Medium Earth Orbit satellites at altitude\n8000km\n- Min RTTs factor of 4 less than GEOS\n- ~125ms, similar to inter-continent land lines\n- Backed by SES World Skies, HSBC, Google...\n- Launch 2013\n# Africa Was 19 Yrs Behind Europe In 2009 Developed Nations In Black, Russia, S. E. Asia  Catching Up, Africa Worst\n\nSource:  SLAC led PingER project\n\n## Africa Might Catch Up With Europe In 20 Years At Current Rate Of Improvement\n\n- Broadband use in Africa growing quickly\n- However still way behind developed nations\n- In 2011 used capacity to whole of Africa less\nthan that of Norway\n- 30 times < N. America\n70 times worse\n 26 years behind  Europe Source:  SLAC led PingER project\n\n## Africa Broadband Costs Vs Rest Of The World Prices And Governance\n\nBy 2011 prices had dropped only factor of 2\n- Alternative fibre often owned by electricity companies,\npipelines and not allowed to sell, lease or operate -\nneeds deregulation and is happening\n- Business model: Internet Service Providers sell to large\ncorporations, governments, education, NGOs\n- Need to move to serving multitude of small customers to\nrecover costs from the move from high => low prices\n\n## National Research And Education Networks\n\nNational Research and Education Networks (NRENS) provide:  leadership, training, and\n leverage in contract negotiation\nN. Africa connected via EUMED to Europe.\nAlso Arab States Research and\nEducation Network formed 2011\nWith connection to GEANT going live end 2012, UbuntuNet will provide sub-Saharan Africa with infrastructure for global, and regional research collaboration and e-learning\n\n## Traceroutes Within Africa 2009\n\nDespite having NRENs\n& terrestrial fibres along both East & West coasts of Africa  connecting to most maritime countries, still most inter-African routes went via Europe and N America Not only did this add large delays, but also resulted in costly intercontinental rates connectivity Connections between African countries no longer via Europe or USA. Much reduced Round Trip Times\n\n## Demonstration\n\nInteractive demonstrations of the data mining capabilities of public data sources provided by organizations such as the United Nations and the International Telecommunications Union coupled with monitoring data from PingER\nhttp://www-iepm.slac.stanford.edu/pinger/explorer.html\n\n\n## That's It Folks, Questions"
    },
    {
        "text": "# Rapid Exploitation And Analysis Of Documents\n\nD. J. Buttler, D. Andrzejewski, K. D. Stevens, D. Anastasiu, B. Gao December 2, 2011\nDisclaimer\n\nThis document was prepared as an account of work sponsored by an agency of the United States government. Neither the United States government nor Lawrence Livermore National Security, LLC, nor any of their employees makes any warranty, expressed or implied, or assumes any legal liability or responsibility for the accuracy, completeness, or usefulness of any information, apparatus, product, or process disclosed, or represents that its use would not infringe privately owned rights. Reference herein to any specific commercial product, process, or service by trade name, trademark, manufacturer, or otherwise does not necessarily constitute or imply its endorsement, recommendation, or favoring by the United States government or Lawrence Livermore National Security, LLC. The views and opinions of authors expressed herein do not necessarily state or reflect those of the United States government or Lawrence Livermore National Security, LLC, and shall not be used for advertising or product endorsement purposes.\n\n\nThis work performed under the auspices of the U.S. Department of Energy by Lawrence Livermore\nNational Laboratory under Contract DE-AC52-07NA27344.\n\n\n## Rapid Exploitation And Analysis Of Documents\n\n| David Buttler   | David Andrzejewski   | Keith Stevens   | David Anastasiu   | Byron Gao   |\n|-----------------|----------------------|-----------------|-------------------|-------------|\n\nABSTRACT\nAnalysts are overwhelmed with information. They have large archives of historical data, both structured and unstructured, and continuous streams of relevant messages and documents that they need to match to current tasks, digest, and incorporate into their analysis.\n\nThe purpose of the READ project is to develop technologies to make it easier to catalog, classify, and locate relevant information. We approached this task from multiple angles. First, we tackle the issue of processing large quantities of information in reasonable time. Second, we provide mechanisms that allow users to customize their queries based on latent topics exposed from corpus statistics. Third, we assist users in organizing query results, adding localized expert structure over results. Forth, we use word sense disambiguation techniques to increase the precision of matching user generated keyword lists with terms and concepts in the corpus. Fifth, we enhance co-occurence statistics with latent topic attribution, to aid entity relationship discovery. Finally we quantitatively analyze the quality of three popoular latent modeling techniques to examine under which circumstances each is useful.\n\n1.\n\nOVERVIEW\nThe analysis of unstructured and structured text documents is a fundamental part of both government and business intelligence. Most of the information analysts need to process information is represented as text, including newspapers and web sites, scientific articles in journals, and proprietary messages and analysis. The amount of such information is staggering, with hundreds of millions of individual documents. Unfortunately, most analysts have very few tools to evaluate this vast amount of unstructured data.\n\nWhile there has been significant advances for new types of analytic tools, such as Palantir 1, the most common tool used today by most analysts is simple Boolean keyword search. The project described here extends the capability of the the user interfaces that analysts are accustomed to, enabling analysts to assess the relevance of individual documents and find interesting documents from a massive document set.\n\n1http://www.palantirtech.com/\nThere are several aspects of the project, each of which is described below. The main theme is tying together multiple components to create a unified interface that takes advantage of the latest in information retrieval research and systems software. We attempt to address the following analyst problems: managing large number of documents, and keeping everything accessible via search; coming up with the right keywords to find targeted concepts or actors; organizing search results so that they are comprehensible; precisely identifying concepts of interest without having to wade through masses of unrelated terms; and searching by entity networks rather than document sets. Finally we also examine some of the conceptual underpinnigs of our approach, measuring various alternatives that can have a huge impact on the quality of the statistical summary information we both present to analysts to help them understand a corpus and the various mechanisms we use to help them in their search.\n\nInfrastructure Managing large corpora of documents is a difficult task. However, recent years have seen significant advances in open-source software infrastructure that makes the problem more tractable. The major improvements include information retrieval software - specifically Lucene and Solr - and simplified distributed processing systems, such as the Hadoop Map/Reduce implementation. Solr provides the infrastructure for querying large numbers of documents; it includes faceted search to allow users to refine their search by different aspects of the corpus. However, the facets must be generated and placed there by operators of the system. Creating those facets is often a processing intensive task requiring both a global view of the corpus and the information in the text of the local document. We use Map/Reduce to distribute the processing load across a cluster to make the processing time tractable.\n\nEnhanced Keyword Search Another issue that comes up is assisting the user in understanding a specialized and unfamiliar corpus. Typical search terms may be less useful, and there are fewer standard external resources (concept hierarchies, user query logs, links to wikipedia, etc.), that can be leveraged to provide search guidance in internal information systems. In these cases we exploit statistical structure in the corpus to enhance query strings, and to provide an overal gist for the corpus.\n\nClusteringWiki As soon as a query is submitted, there are several things that can be done to improve the result lists. Updated facet counts provide one digested view of the results. Re-ranked documents, specialized for a task, provide another view. Relevant latent topic themes give another viewpoint. What these techniques lack is a user manipulatable means to organize the search results. The main mechanism that user feedback has been incorporated in the Internet is through user tagging, creating a folksonomy - a user created taxonomy with no ridgid semantic rules. However, tagging individual documents can be a cumbersome process that users will only participate in given sufficient intrinsic incentive. I.e. users must obtain some value for the effort they invest. Our mechanism, ClusteringWiki, allows users to tag groups of documents that either naturally cluster together, or are explicitly marked by users. The system tries to find relevant similarities in query results, choosing frequent phrases as the default label. By interacting with the default clustering, by renaming clusters, moving items between clusters, or deleting items, users are implicitly making a large number of taggings that can be re-used by others, or the same user, at a later date. The incremental interactions of the users accrete over time to provide a unique user-generated facet for the data. While this type of content is an easy target for spam, and irrelevant noise in a open Internet setting, it becomes much more relevant internal to an organization, where limiting input to a small group of experts and interested users alleviates many of these challenges.\n\nWord Sense Disambiguation While clustering results is one way of attacking polysemy, users often want to approach data from the other direction. Analysts spend considerable time developing keyword lists, and other knowledge artifacts that describe their domain of interests. These keyword lists may be used to generate Boolean queries to search engines, or they may be used in grep-like fashion to find relevant documents. The main problem with this approach is that domain-specific words have unrelated generic meanings.\n\nThere are at least 72 unique acronyms for the letters \"or\"; \"lead\" has a very popular common meaning (e.g. \"He is a leader of men\"), as well as a useful scientific meaning (\"The atomic number of lead, Pb, is 82\"). While these examples may seem contrived, this comes up frequently in practice. Any list that contains a term with a common meaning becomes instantly less valuable. It is possible to remove terms with common meanings, but this simply removes the possibily of finding targeted usage of the desired terms. By examining the mechanics of word sense disambiguation, we hope to provide a robust search mechanism that provides fine-grained control - allowing the user to more reliably detect specific meanings of terms, and provide control to the user (or system administrator) for the remaining trade-off between precision and recall.\n\nTopic Enhanced Entity Co-occurence An alternate mechanism for exploring the information available is to focus purely on the entities that occur in documents. Often the ultimate goal is to find individuals or institutions that match some search criteria (such as a person who is expert in a particular field, or an organization involved in a particular activity). Analysts often have a good idea for a starting point, and what they need to do is develop a network of contacts and associations to help them generate a broader understanding of how a particular actor fits into the larger picture.\n\nQuantitative Comparisons of Topic Modeling Approaches Topic modeling has become a popular way to discover themes and structure in a corpus using unsupervised techniques. The basic idea is not new: it is essentially a dimension reduction. Topic models learn bags of similar words from a collection of documents. What has happened over the past decade is that there are now several different mechanisms to create these latent topics, include LSA using SVD or NMF, and LDA. Recently researchers have come up with a user-validated mechanism to measure the semantic coherence of LDA models algorithmicly. These coherence measures score individual topics so they can be ranked based on the semantic similarity of topic words. As topic models play an increasingly large role in enhanced information retrieval systems, particularly in the techniques described above, understanding which topic models are most appropriate for different tasks has become increasingly important. We apply two such metrics to three distinct topic modeling approaches, and explore the differences. These new results have significant implications for how we exploit the other techniques described in this paper going forward.\n\n2.\n\nINFRASTRUCTURE DEVELOPMENT AND\nDEPLOYMENT\nTraditionally, natural language processing systems were not designed with any concern for scale. This comes from two understandable viewpoints: first, it is very expensive to develop ground truth to validate various algorithms (named-entity recognition, relationship extraction, coreference resolution, etc.), resulting in small training and test sets. Second, since the results were extremely poor, there did not seem to be a need to scale the systems until they could be deemed to be reliable enough for use. Coincidentally, there are two major developments that have rendered those concerns moot. First, the web has developed in such a way as to present us with an enormous quantity of data; concurrently, researchers and industry have leveraged this data to dramatically improve the results of many types of algorithms. As a single example, Google has shown stunningly accurate machine translation results based on their collection and collation of billions of web pages in different languages. Several open source projects have started to take advantage of the concurrent explosion in data and ideas for leveraging that data for useful purposes. One of the earliest examples is the Lucene2 (and later Solr3) search projects. Lucene provides an indexing and search implementation; Solr extends that capabilities by providing faceted capabilities and a web application container for the core search features.\n\nA second development has been the commoditization of Map/Reduce distributed processing [28], and large-scale distributed file system\n[38] by Hadoop4. The HBase5 project provides a large NoSQL keyvalue storage system for the Hadoop file system that provides fast access to hundreds of millions of records. The Map/Reduce paradigm makes it trivial process hundreds of millions of documents with methods designed for a limited set of documents. We have taken several open source data processing projects and changed their interfaces to operate over a single document object presented in memory. These API's can then be plugged into Hadoop as simple map operators, and become flexible building blocks for the larger system. Prior to adopting Hadoop, we used a standard NFS filesystem, on\n2http://lucene.apache.org 3http://lucene.apache.org/solr/ 4http://hadoop.apache.org\n5httpd://hbase.apache.org a NetApp6 appliance, for our coreference [108] project. One of the tasks we wanted to do is process the New York Times corpus [101] for coreferent mentions. The first computer we tried running the pipeline on was able to process a sentence at approximately the same rate that the New York Times was publishing new sentences. In addition, we used a fairly naive file format that worked very well for a distributed team working on different system components, targeted at standard test sets containing on the order of 1000 documents. Scaling up to the 1.8 million documents in the New York Times corpus added a host of new issues, where a collection of six to ten files per document became a serious impediment. While we had a large cluster of over 100 machines to process the articles, they were all kept in a single shared NFS mount. Launching processing on each of the cluster nodes brought the file system to a standstill - other users were outraged that they could not even list files in a directory. This experience led us to adopting HBase, which is based on BigTable[21], as our storage architecture for the document set. HBase provides a horizontally partitioned keyspace, automatically distributed and balanced over the cluster. Each key can be associated with an arbitrary set of columns. For convenience we restricted our columns to the text of the documents and annotations over that text. This allows us to incrementally process documents, with simple well defined processes to add individual annotations, building up more complex results at each stage. This simple architecture is very powerful, and allows arbitrarily complex processing to be broken down into a sequence of simple steps. On a relatively new cluster of only 6 machines, we have been able to process articles from 20 years of the New York Times corpus in just a few hours. The architecture is also very flexible. Each of the processing components is designed to operate on a generic document record; this means that to add a new source only requires a translation step to convert documents from the orginal source into the generic record format. Open source components, like Apache Tika 7 handle converting standard document types into plain text and associated metadata. The only remaining requirement is data extraction for custom sources (like ProMED mail 8), which must be dealt with by every data management platform.\n\nIn summary, we are able to handle hundreds of millions of records, and tens of terabytes on a small cluster. As with any Hadoop or Solr cluster, there is a well defined and simple plan for expanding, simply by adding more nodes to the cluster. The software handles scaling to pretty much any conceivable size (FaceBook has a cluster that manages over 21PB of data on 2000 machines [111,\n16] 9). Solr provides a search platform to match the size of the data, with the capability to distribute the index over the entire cluster. It provides features, such as faceting, which we can exploit to provide unique capabilities described elsewhere in this report. Just getting these two capabilities working on relevant data allows huge advances over the previous state of the art - capabilities that many groups could profitably leverage. The remaining sections are excerpts from published conference papers that address each of the problems listed above. Section 3 covers enhanced keyword search; Section 4 covers clustering search results; Section 5 covers techniques in word sense disambiguation; Section 6 covers clustering entities and their relationships by topic; finally, Section 7 discusses the choice of topic modeling approach, a key component of many of the algorithms and technques discussed earlier.\n\n3.\n\nENHANCED KEYWORD SEARCH\nWe consider the problem of a user navigating an unfamiliar corpus of text documents where document metadata is limited or unavailable, the domain is specialized, and the user base is small. These challenging conditions may hold, for example, within an organization such as a business or government agency. We propose to augment standard keyword search with user feedback on latent topics. These topics are automatically learned from the corpus in an unsupervised manner and presented alongside search results. User feedback is then used to reformulate the original query, resulting in improved information retrieval performance in our experiments.\n\n3.1\nIntroduction This work addresses the problem of *ad hoc* information retrieval and text corpus navigation under the following conditions. First, document metadata may be limited, unreliable, or nonexistent. Second, the domain of the text documents is specialized, using vocabulary ill-covered by general web documents or lexical resources such as WordNet [79]. Finally, while the text corpus itself may be large, the set of users accessing the corpus is not. This is an important problem because these conditions can preclude the use of effective information retrieval techniques such as faceted search or query log mining. These conditions are different from those encountered in general web or e-commerce search, but are realistic *within* organizations which are trying make sense of large quantities of text, such as private enterprises or government agencies. A central problem in *ad hoc* information retrieval is that users may not be able to formulate the \"right\" keyword combination in order to retrieve the most relevant documents. Techniques such as realtime query expansion [119] have been developed to directly attack this problem, but often rely upon a dataset of previously submitted queries, which may be sparse without a large user base. Another approach is to solicit alternative types of user input. Faceted document navigation [106] allows users to select documents based on different attributes (e.g., publication venues or hierarchical subject categories) and has emerged as a powerful complement to traditional keyword search. However, the standard assumption is that the facets are manually defined, and that facet values for each document are known. Because of the challenging scenario we have defined, it is important to exploit all available data. Latent topic models such as Latent Dirichlet Allocation (LDA) [13] provide a means to take advantage of the statistical structure of the corpus itself. LDA assumes that observed documents have been generated by weighted mixtures of unobserved (latent) topics. These topics are learned from the documents and often correspond to meaningful semantic themes present in the corpus. LDA and its extensions have found interesting applications in fields such as natural language processing, computer vision, and social networks analysis [10]. The contribution of this work is a new method for obtaining and exploiting user feedback at the *latent topic* level. Our approach is to learn latent topics from the corpus and construct meaningful representations of these topics. At query time, we then decide *which* latent topics are potentially relevant and present the appropriate topic representations alongside keyword search results. When a user selects a latent topic, the vocabulary terms most strongly associated with that topic are then used to augment the original query. Our experiments with simulated user feedback show improved information retrieval performance. The presentation of relevant topics alongside search results also has the additional benefit of helping the user to understand corpus themes related to the original keyword query.\n\n3.2\nRelated work Our approach is partially motivated by the successes of faceted search [123]. Castanet [106] and related systems [27] aim to automatically construct facet hierarchies, but these techniques depend crucially on the existence of a rich lexical resource such as Word- Net [79]. While specialized ontologies or controlled vocabularies have been constructed for some domains such as Gene Ontology (GO) [110] and Medical Subject Headings (MeSH) [15], the constraints of our setting prohibit us from assuming the existence of such a resource. In light of this issue, topic models such as LDA have the advantage of relying upon corpus statistics alone. Indeed, previous analysis [81] of the digital library of the Open Content Alliance (OCA) directly posited the analogy between latent topics and faceted subjects, although specific mechanisms for exploiting this insight were not explored. The Rexa academic search engine10 also displays relevant latent topics as tags for a given research article, allowing further investigation of the topics themselves. Another interesting topic modeling approach uses seed words to learn facetoriented topics which can then be used to construct informative summaries [70]. LDA has previously been used in information retrieval for both document language model smoothing [118, 72] and query expansion [88]. These techniques both exploit the dimensionality reduction provided by LDA \"behind the scenes\" in order to improve performance, but do not leverage explicit user feedback in the way that our approach does. The approach we propose in this work can be viewed as complementary to these existing enhancements. The BYU Topic Browser [37] provides an environment for rich explorations of learned LDA topics and how they relate to words and documents within a corpus. However, the tasks supported are more appropriate for advanced analysis by a relatively sophisticated user, as opposed to a general search setting.\n\n3.3\nOur approach We propose to present automatically learned topics alongside keyword search results, allowing the user to provide feedback at the latent topic level. While it is well-known that we can learn latent topics with LDA, incorporating these topics into an information retrieval system requires us to address several questions. First, how should these topics be presented? Previous user studies [106] have found that users can become frustrated by raw LDA output. Second, which topics should be presented for a given query? To avoid overwhelming the user, we clearly cannot present all latent topics (potentially hundreds or greater) for every query. Furthermore, not all learned topics truly correspond to meaningful semantic concepts, and the presence of these incoherent topics will not be ap-\n10http://rexa.info/\npreciated by users either. Third, how can we incorporate user latent topic feedback into search results? Ideally, the mechanism used should be simple and easy to integrate with existing search technologies. Finally, can this type of feedback improve information retrieval performance, as measured by standard metrics? We now describe our approach, beginning with a brief review of latent topic modeling concepts and moving on to address the above questions. All examples shown are actual learned topics from the experimental datasets described in Table 5. In Section 3.4, experimental results demonstrate that our approach can indeed achieve performance gains.\n\n3.3.1\nLatent Dirichlet Allocation (LDA)\nIn LDA [13], it is assumed that observed words in each document are generated by a document-specific mixture of corpus-wide latent topics. We define our corpus of length N with the flat word vector w = w1 *. . . w*N. At corpus position i, the element di in d = d1 *. . . d*N designates the document containing observed word wi. Similarly, the vector z = z1 *. . . z*N defines the hidden topic assignments of each observed word. The number of latent topics is fixed to some T, and each topic t = 1 *. . . T* is associated with a topic-word multinomial t over the W-word vocabulary. Each\n multinomial is generated by a conjugate Dirichlet prior with parameter . Each document j = 1 *. . . D* is associated with a multinomial j over T topics, which is also generated by a conjugate Dirichlet prior with parameter . The full generative model is then given by\n\n$P(\\mathbf{w},\\mathbf{z},\\phi,\\theta\\mid\\alpha,\\beta,\\mathbf{d})\\propto$\n\n$$\\left(\\prod_{t}^{T}p(\\phi_{t}|\\beta)\\right)\\left(\\prod_{j}^{D}p(\\theta_{j}|\\alpha )\\right)\\left(\\prod_{i}^{N}\\phi_{z_{i}}(w_{i})\\theta_{d_{i}}(\\bar{z}_{i}) \\right),$$\nwhere zi(wi) is the wi-th element in vector zi, and di(zi) is the zi-th element in vector di. Given an observed corpus (w, d)\nand model hyperparameters (*, *), the typical modeling goal is to infer the latent variables (z*, , *).\n\nWhile exact LDA inference is intractable, a variety of approximate schemes have been developed [82, 13, 109]. In this work, we use Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) inference, specifically collapsed Gibbs sampling [40]. This approach iteratively re-samples a new value for each latent topic assignment zi, conditioned on the current values of all other z values. After running this chain for a fixed number of iterations, we estimate the topic-word multinomials  and the document-topic mixture weights  from the final z sample, using the means of their posteriors given by\n\nt(w)  ntw +  j(t)  njt +\nwhere ntw is the number of times word w is assigned to topic t, and njt is the number of times topic t is used in document j, with both counts being taken with respect to the final sample z. The topic-word multinomials t for each topic t are our learned topics;\neach document-topic multinomial d represents the prevalence of topics within document d.\n\n| FT - Topic 1   | WSJ - Topic 8   | LA - Topic 94   |\n|----------------|-----------------|-----------------|\n| Word           |                 |                 |\n| w              | P               | (               |\n| |              |                 |                 |\n| z              | )               |                 |\n| Word           |                 |                 |\n| w              | P               | (               |\n| |              |                 |                 |\n| z              | )               |                 |\n| Word           |                 |                 |\n| w              | P               | (               |\n| |              |                 |                 |\n| z              | )               |                 |\n| court          | 0.080           | technology      |\n| case           | 0.025           | research        |\n| legal          | 0.024           | high            |\n| ruling         | 0.018           | development     |\n| appeal         | 0.018           | cray            |\n| Description      | Score   |\n|------------------|---------|\n| Word probability |         |\n| f                |         |\n| 1                |         |\n| (                | w       |\n| |                |         |\n| z                | =       |\n| Topic posterior  |         |\n| f                |         |\n| 2                |         |\n| (                | w       |\n| |                |         |\n| w                | )       |\n| PMI              |         |\n| f                |         |\n| 3                |         |\n| (                | w       |\n|                  | P       |\n| w                |         |\n|                 |         |\n|                 |         |\n| W                |         |\n| t                |         |\n| \\                |         |\n| w                |         |\n|                  | P       |\n|                 |         |\n| |                |         |\n| w                | )       |\n| w                |         |\n|                 |         |\n|                 |         |\n| W                |         |\n| t                |         |\n| \\                |         |\n| w                |         |\n|                  | PMI     |\n|                 |         |\n| )                |         |\n| Conditional 1    |         |\n| f                |         |\n| 4                |         |\n| (                | w       |\n|                  | P       |\n| w                |         |\n|                 |         |\n|                 |         |\n| W                |         |\n| t                |         |\n| \\                |         |\n| w                |         |\n|                  | P       |\n| |                |         |\n| w                |         |\n|                 |         |\n| )                |         |\n| Conditional 2    |         |\n| f                |         |\n| 5                |         |\n| (                | w       |\n|                  | P       |\n\n3.3.2\nTopic representation Typically, each learned topic-word multinomial t is presented as a\n\"Top N\" list of the most probable words for that topic, as shown for three example learned topics in Table 1. We define the k-argmax operator to yield the k arguments which result in the k largest values for the given function. We use this operator to define the ten most probable words for topic t as Wt, given by the following expression with k = 10\n\nWt = k-argmax w t(w)\nWe apply techniques from recent topic modeling research to improve on this basic representation. Our post-processing of the learned topics has three components: label generation, n-gram identification, and capitalization recovery. For topic labeling, we assume the availability of a reference corpus containing themes similar to the target retrieval corpus. Since only raw text is required, this should be considerably easier to obtain than a full ontology, even for specialized domains. For example, a user exploring a corpus related infectious disease outbreaks could obtain a suitable reference corpus by crawling web resources from the United States Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. Since our experiments use general newswire corpora for evaluation, we use Wikipedia11 as our reference corpus.\n\nWe label each topic using a simplified variant of the \"Best Topic Word\" [62] method. For a given topic t, this method selects a single word label from the top ten most probable words Wt, using features designed to test how representative each word is of the topic as a whole. We deviate slightly from Lau et al. to avoid relying upon WordNet, selecting the label word by majority vote\n11http://www.wikipedia.org among five features shown in Table 2 where each feature fi casts its vote for the highest scoring word and ties are broken arbitrarily. Several of these features are computed from co-occurrence frequencies among words in Wt, counted within ten-word sliding windows taken over the reference corpus. Specifically, we compute the pointwise mutual information (PMI) and conditional occurrence probabilities between each pair of words (*w, w*) as\n\nPMI(*w, w*) = log P(*w, w*) P(w)P(w) P(w|w) =P(*w, w*) P(w)\nwhere P(*w, w*) is the probability of jointly observing w and w\nwithin a given sliding window, and P(w) is the probability of observing w within a sliding window. Several example labels can be seen in the \"label\" column of Table 3. We then identify statistically significant bigrams and trigrams (e.g., \"White House\", \"President Barack Obama\") for each topic using an approach based on the Turbo Topics [11] algorithm. This approach considers adjacent word pairs (wi, wi+1) occurring in the same document and assigned to the same topic (i.e., di = di+1\nand zi = zi+1) and identifies pairs which occur much more often than we would expect by chance alone, proceeding similarly for trigrams. For each topic, we show the topic label along with the most significant trigram, the two most significant bigrams and the four most probable unigrams. Example latent topic representations are shown in Table 3. Finally, we restore capitalization to the topic n-grams before presenting them to the user. As a pre-processing step, all text is converted to lower-case before doing LDA inference. However, the information conveyed by capitalization can ease user interpretation of topics (e.g., by making proper names obvious). For each n-gram, we simply count all occurrences of each possible capitalization occurring in the original documents, and present the most frequent version to the user.\n\n| PMI                                    | Label     |\n|----------------------------------------|-----------|\n| n                                      |           |\n| -grams                                 |           |\n| 3.09                                   | jurors    |\n| cross examination, closing arguments   |           |\n| trial, jury, case, testified           |           |\n| 1.68                                   | Petroleum |\n| North Sea, natural gas                 |           |\n| production, exploration, field, energy |           |\n| -0.09                                  | things    |\n| pretty good, years ago                 |           |\n| ve, ll, time, don                      |           |\n| -0.03                                  | sales     |\n| year earlier, Feb Feb                  |           |\n| December, March, month, rose           |           |\n\n3.3.3\nTopic selection It will typically be necessary to learn at least hundreds of latent topics in order to get suitably fine-grained topics for user feedback. This makes it impractical to present all topics to the user after every query; we therefore must decide which topics to present. We use the idea of pseudo-relevance feedback [19] by assuming that the top two documents returned by the original query q, which we call Dq, are relevant. For each of these documents, we consider the top k = 2 topics as determined by the topic weights  to be enriched topics for the user query. This constitutes a natural set of candidates for latent topic feedback, and can be defined as\n\ndDq t d(t). E = [\nHowever, we also show the user topics that are *related* to the enriched topic set E, but which may themselves not be present in the highly ranked documents. We identify related topics by looking for topics highly likely to co-occur with the enriched topics E, using the T  T topic covariance matrix  of the estimated D  T\ndocument-topic  matrix. Letting (t1, t2) be the covariance between P(z = t1|d) and P(z = t2|d) computed over all documents d = 1*, . . . , D*, we take the k = 2 topics with the highest covariance with each of our enriched topics in E. We define this related topic set as\n\ntE t / E (t, t). R = [\nThe candidate topics for feedback are the union of the enriched and related topics E R, but we perform a final filter before presenting these topics to the user. One hazard of presenting automatically discovered latent topics to the user is the threat of incoherent \"junk\" topics which do not seem to have a single clear theme. We filter out these topics using a recently developed topic evaluation method [85, 84] which has been shown to predict human topic quality judgments at nearly the interannotator agreement rate. Similar to the topic labeling technique, this method uses PMI values computed over a reference corpus (again, we use Wikipedia), except that we now apply these scores to the topics themselves. We compute the PMI score of a topic t as the average PMI between all pairs of words within the top k = 10 most probable words Wt\n\n$\\begin{array}{c}\\mbox{PMI}(t)=\\frac{1}{k(k}=1)\\sum_{\\{u,u^{\\prime}\\}\\in W_{t} }\\mbox{PMI}(w,w^{\\prime}).\\end{array}$\nTable 3 shows example high-PMI (coherent) and low-PMI (incoherent) latent topics. We can use these PMI values to avoid confusing users with incoherent topics. Letting *PMI*25 be the 25th percentile PMI score among all learned topics, we define our set of \"dropped\" topics D as\n\n$D=\\{\\mathbf{t}|t\\in E\\cup R\\mbox{ and }PMI(t)<PMI_{25}\\}$.\n\nWe present the topics in {E  R} \\ D to the user alongside the returned documents for the original keywords query q. Note that the union operations and final filtering mean that the number of topics actually presented to the user may vary from query to query. Since we consider the top two topics within the top two documents, along with each of their top two related topics, we will present a maximum of (22)+(222) = 12 topics, minus set overlaps and PMI-filtered topics.\n\n3.3.4\nQuery expansion If the user selects a topic as relevant, we reformulate the query by combining the top ten most probable words Wt for that topic with the original query q. To preserve the intent of the original query, we use the Indri [77] #weight() operator to form a weighted combination of the original query keywords and the highly probable latent topic words. The weight parameter   [0, 1] controls the trade-off between the original query keywords and the latent topic words. A larger  value places more weight on the new latent topic words, while setting  = 0 is equivalent to the original keyword query.\n\nEach of the Nq words in the original query is given weight (1\n)/Nq and each new topic t word w is given weight    t(w), where   is the re-normalized topic-word probability\n\n$$\\tilde{\\phi}_{t}(w)=\\frac{\\phi_{t}(w)}{\\sum_{w^{\\prime}\\in W_{t}}\\phi_{t}(w^{ \\prime})}.$$\n\nWhile our implementation uses the Indri query language, it would be straightforward to achieve similar results in other information retrieval systems and frameworks (e.g., by using term boosting in Apache Lucene[12]).\n\n## 3.3.5 Example\n\n12http://lucene.apache.org/\n\n| Enriched topic                        | Terms                              |\n|---------------------------------------|------------------------------------|\n| 196 (debate)                          | Tory Euro sceptics                 |\n| social chapter, Liberal Democrat      |                                    |\n| mps, Labour, bill, Commons            |                                    |\n| 404 (ratification)                    | ratification Maastricht treaty     |\n| Poul Schluter, Poul Rasmussen         |                                    |\n| Danish, vote, Denmark, ec             |                                    |\n| 466 (business)                        | PERSONAL FILE Born                 |\n| years ago, past years                 |                                    |\n| man, time, job, career                |                                    |\n| (a) Enriched topics                   |                                    |\n| E                                     |                                    |\n| .                                     |                                    |\n| Related topic                         | Terms                              |\n| 79 (Emu)                              |                                    |\n| economic monetary union               |                                    |\n| Maastricht treaty, member states      |                                    |\n| European, Europe, Community, Emu      |                                    |\n| 377 (George)                          | President George Bush, White House |\n| Mr Clinton, administration            |                                    |\n| Democratic, Republican, Washington    |                                    |\n| 115 (powers)                          | de regulation bill                 |\n| Sunday trading, Queen Speech          |                                    |\n| law, legislation, government, act     |                                    |\n| 446 (years)                           | chairman chief executive           |\n| managing director, finance director   |                                    |\n| Sir, board, group, company            |                                    |\n| 431 (cabinet)                         | Mr John Major                      |\n| prime minister, Mr Major              |                                    |\n| party, tory, government, Conservative |                                    |\n| (b) Related topics                    |                                    |\n| R                                     |                                    |\n| .                                     |                                    |\n\nWe now walk through an example query for a corpus of news articles from the Financial Times (FT). The query is \"euro opposition\", and it targets documents discussing opposition to the introduction of the single European currency. The corpus, query, and relevance judgments used here are drawn from our experimental dataset which will be used in Section 3.4. The number of topics used is T = 500.\n\nThe *enriched* topics E shown in Table 5a consist of three distinct topics: two topics related to the euro debate within the United Kingdom and Denmark, and a confusing topic vaguely centered around \"business\" which is *dropped* by our PMI filtering. Within this topic, the interesting trigram \"PERSONAL FILE Born\" arises from brief biographies sometimes found at the bottom of the articles. High  covariance with topics in E is then used to identify the five related topics R shown in Table 5b, which deal with various aspects of business and politics. However the appearance of \"economic monetary union\" and \"Europe\" in the topic 79 representation appear highly related to the euro currency union, and indeed selecting this topic as feedback improves retrieval results. Selecting topic 79 as user feedback and setting the feedback weight  = 0.25, our approach produces an expanded query containing the most probable words from topic 79\n#weight(0.375 euro, 0.375 opposition,\n0.031 European, ..., 0.015 Emu).\n\nUsing ground truth document relevance judgments, we can see that documents returned by this expanded query have superior performance on standard information retrieval measures as described in the caption of Table 4. Figure 1 shows the receiver operating characteristic (ROC) curves for the baseline query (dotted) and the expanded topic 79 query (solid). Points on the ROC curve correspond we consider the true positive (TP) set to be the union of relevant documents found within the top 500 documents returned by both queries. This plot visually depicts a clear improvement in the ranking of relevant documents. An additional benefit is that users are given the opportunity to see and explore different aspects of \"euro opposition\" such as the political dimension with respect to the United Kingdom.\n\n3.4\nExperiments To our knowledge there has been no attempt to use latent topics as a user feedback mechanism in the way we have described. To determine whether our approach could be genuinely useful in practice, we must answer several questions. First, can query expansion with latent topic feedback improve the results of actual queries? While previous work has found that latent topics align well with existing document subject categories [81], it may be that these categories are more \"topically coherent\" than the relevant result sets for *ad hoc* queries, and therefore more suitable for topic modeling. Second, assuming that for a given query there exists some latent topic which would improve retrieval results, will the topic selection approach described in Section 3.3.3 present it to the user?\n\n| Corpus              | Abbrev   |\n|---------------------|----------|\n| D                   | Q        |\n| TREC topics         |          |\n| Associated Press    | AP       |\n| Financial Times     | FT       |\n| Los Angeles Times   | LA       |\n| Wall Street Journal | WSJ      |\n| 151-200             |          |\n| Federal Register    | FR       |\n| Foreign Broadcast   | FBIS     |\n| Information Service |          |\n\nFinally, there is a third question which we do not address in this work: if presented with a helpful topic, will a user actually select it? For the following experiments we make the simplifying assumption that the user will always select the most helpful topic (with respect to the information retrieval measure of interest) among those presented. If no topic feedback will improve the set of returned documents, we assume the user will not provide topic feedback.\n\n3.4.1\nExperiment setup While the ultimate goal of this work is to improve search and navigation under the specialized conditions described in Section 3.1, we evaluate our approach by conducting information retrieval experiments on several benchmark datasets from the Text REtrieval Conference (TREC) [114], using Wikipedia as a reference corpus. Each datasets consists of a corpus of text documents, a set of queries, and relevance judgments for each query. For each query, the individual words in the the title field are used as the baseline keyword query (e.g., \"Industrial Espionage\" is broken up into \"Industrial\", \"Espionage\"). Table 5 shows dataset details. For each corpus, we first apply the LDA model to learn a set of latent topics, using the MALLET topic modeling toolkit [76]. We pre-process documents by downcasing, removing numbers and punctuation, applying a standard stopword list, and finally filtering out rarely occurring terms to yield vocabulary sizes of between 10,000\nand 20,000 terms. We run parallelized collapsed Gibbs inference for 1,000 samples, re-estimating the document-topic hyperparameter  every 25 samples. We learn T = 500 topics for each corpus in our experimental dataset, except T = 250 for the significantly smaller Federal Register (FR) corpus. For all queries, we use the Galago [26] information retrieval system with default settings to retrieve 500 documents. Galago uses a query language and retrieval model based on Indri [77]. For the topic-expanded queries we set  = 0.25, based on trial-and-error experimentation on held-aside preliminary development datasets.\n\n3.4.2\nResults We calculate improvement over the baseline query with respect to three information retrieval measures [26]: mean average precision (MAP), normalized discounted cumulative gain (NDCG), and NDCG calculated with the first 15 results only (NDCG15). These quantitative results are shown in Table 6, along with the average number of feedback candidate topics shown to the user by our topic selection technique (fewer than eight topics per query).\n\nWe now return to the experimental questions we had set out to answer. These results demonstrate that latent topic feedback can indeed improve information retrieval results. Across evaluation measures, the results of approximately 40% of queries can be improved by latent topic feedback. However, these gains are irrelevant if we cannot identify potentially helpful topics and present them to the user. Again across measures, we see that our topic selection approach is able present a helpful topic for more than 40% of the queries for which there exists at least one helpful topic. Doing the rough arithmetic, this means that for about 16% of the queries in our experiment the user would be presented with at least one latent topic which would improve the relevance of the returned documents. Furthermore, we stress that even for the \"missed\" queries where presented topics do not provide quantitative relevance improvement, the corpus theme information conveyed may still be beneficial. To give a better feel for the nature of these results, Figure 2 shows six queries along with helpful topics which were selected for presentation by our approach. In all cases, the connection between the topic and the query is fairly clear, resulting in gains across retrieval performance measures and visible improvement on ROC curves.\n\n3.4.3\nAnalysis First, we observe that for most queries (roughly 60%), there did not exist a single latent topic for which feedback would enhance information retrieval results. From manual inspection, this can occur because either no learned topic is well-aligned with the relevant documents, or because the results of the original query are good and difficult to improve upon. Second, for queries where there exists one or more topics which would improve results, roughly 60% of the time our topic selection approach fails to select them. Minor variations on our topic selection method (i.e., showing more topics) did not correct this - many of the \"missed\" topics are not even close to making the cutoff. Manual investigations reveal that, interestingly, these topics often appear to be helpful *because* they are somewhat \"distant\" from the original query and the top few baseline documents returned. Attempts to predict topic feedback gain using linear or logistic regression and features such as P(query|t) were unsuccessful, although more sophisticated approaches or richer features could possibly be applied. It is also instructive to further examine the impact of two key aspects of our topic selection procedure: the inclusion of related topics and the exclusion of incoherent topics. For simplicity we will discuss NDCG15 measurements, but similar results hold for MAP and NDCG. Our selection approach recovers helpful topics for 133 out of 850 queries (15.6%) while presenting an average of 7.76 topics to the user for each query. If we do *not* use PMI to filter out topics suspected of being incoherent, the number of topics shown per query rises to 9.79, but the number of queries for which helpful topics are presented only increases to 143 out of 850 (16.8%). The presence of incoherent topics may also impose cognitive burdens on the user, and it is uncertain whether users would be able to successfully identify incoherent topics for feedback.\n\n| NCDG15    | NCDG   | MAP   |\n|-----------|--------|-------|\n| Corpus    |        |       |\n| Q         |        |       |\n| avg shown | imprv  | found |\n| AP        | 100    | 7.79  |\n| FT        | 200    | 7.47  |\n| LA        | 150    | 8.65  |\n| WSJ       | 100    | 7.73  |\n| FR        | 150    | 7.22  |\n| FBIS      | 150    | 7.78  |\n\nIf we were to omit the related topics R, it would decrease the average number of topics shown to 2.70, but it would decrease substantially the number of queries for which a helpful topic is presented, down to 93 out of 850 (10.9%). Also, we note that the presentation of related topics is potentially useful for exploratory corpus search, giving the user information about corpus themes \"adjacent\" to the topics present in returned documents. Taken together, these findings suggest that our topic selection procedure is reasonable. The inclusion of related topics considerably increases the number of queries for which we present helpful topics while presenting novel and possibly interesting corpus themes. The filtering of suspect low-PMI topics does not discard many helpful topics, and should spare users the ordeal of interpreting ill-defined topics.\n\n3.5\nDiscussion In this work we have developed a novel technique for improving text corpus search and navigation in difficult settings where we do not have access to metadata, rich lexical resources, or large user populations. This is an important problem because these conditions make information retrieval more difficult, and are applicable within organizations that have large quantities of *internal* text documents which they wish to explore, analyze, and exploit.\n\nTo enhance search and exploration capabilities in this scenario, we have developed an approach that gives users the ability to provide feedback at the latent topic level. We leverage recent advances in latent topic modeling in order to construct meaningful representations of latent topics while filtering out incoherent \"junk topics\". We propose a mechanism for deciding on a manageably small set of topics to present to the user, as well as a method for constructing expanded queries based on user topic feedback. Quantitative results on benchmark TREC datasets show that this technique can result in major improvements for a non-trivial proportion of queries. Furthermore, the presentation of enriched and related topics alongside search results can help to deliver insights about corpus themes, which may be beneficial for knowledge discovery as well. One potential obstacle to this approach is the scalability bottleneck presented by LDA topic inference.\n\nHowever, two factors act to ameliorate these concerns. First, topics can be inferred \"offline\" in advance; we do not need to do any expensive inference at query-time. Second, there have been significant recent advances along multiple fronts in scalable LDA inference.\n\nA distributed system developed at Yahoo! is reported to process 42,000 documents per hour [103]. Alternatively, an online inference algorithm for LDA [47] promises both improved scalability and a principled means of updating topics to reflect new documents. In practice, a hybrid system could update topics in an online fashion as documents are received, periodically performing distributed batch inference to refresh the learned topics.\n\n3.6\nFuture work There are several promising directions in which to extend this approach. Two obvious areas for improvement are increasing the proportion of queries for which a helpful topic exists and improving the selection method for presenting helpful topics to the user. It may be possible to improve the alignment between learned topics and user queries by the use of more sophisticated topic models such as the Pachinko Allocation Model (PAM) [67]. While these models were *not* found to be helpful for document smoothing [124], rich hierarchical topics may be beneficial when combined with the explicit user feedback present in our approach. Our approach could also exploit prior information such as predefined concepts by using topic model variants which can incorporate domain knowledge [24, 5]. However, learning finer-grained topics can only increase the importance of carefully choosing which topics to show the user. Here it may be instructive to consider the large body of research on \"learning to rank\" [71], as well as recent work in facet selection [68, 57]. The query expansion mechanism is another potential target for extension. If our underlying information retrieval system supports phrase search terms (e.g., \"White House\"), it may be helpful to directly use discovered n-grams as well. Further work could also compare the use of topics for explicit feedback in this work versus the implicit use of topics to improve document language models in prior work [118]. It may be that the two techniques could be combined profitably, with some topics being more suitable for explicit feedback while others are better used for smoothing. Finally, another important step is to validate our user model assumptions. One approach may be to directly evaluate information retrieval performance using actual user feedback, for example via Amazon Mechanical Turk [128]. It may also be interesting to explore the relationship between topic presentation (e.g., topic labeling strategies, whether to display n-grams) and user behavior.\n\n## 4. A Framework For Personalized And Collaborative Clustering Of Search Results The Way Search Results Are Organized And Presented Has A Direct And Significant Impact On The Utility Of Search Engines. The Common Strategy Has Been Using A Flat Ranked List, Which Works Fine For Homogeneous Search Results.\n\nHowever, queries are inherently ambiguous and search results are often diverse with multiple senses. With a list presentation, the results on different sub-topics of a query will be mixed together. The user has to sift through many irrelevant results to locate those relevant ones. With the rapid growth in the scale of the Web, queries have become more ambiguous than ever. For example, there are more than 20 entries in Wikipedia for different well-known individuals under the name of Jim Gray 13 and 74 entries for Michael Smith 14.\n\nConsequently, the diversity of search results has increased to the point that we must consider alternative presentations, providing additional structure to flat lists so as to effectively minimize browsing effort and alleviate information overload [45, 91, 125, 20]. Over the years clustering has been accepted as the most promising alternative. Clustering is the process of organizing objects into groups or clusters that exhibit internal cohesion and external isolation. Based on the common observation that it is much easier to scan a few topiccoherent groups than many individual documents, clustering can be used to categorize a long list of disparate search results into a few clusters such that each cluster represents a homogeneous sub-topic of the query. Meaningfully labeled, these clusters form a topicwise non-predefined, faceted search interface, allowing the user to quickly locate relevant and interesting results. There is good evidence that clustering improves user experience and search result quality [74]. Given the significant potential benefits, search result clustering has received increasing attention in recent years from the communities of information retrieval, Web search and data mining. Many clustering algorithms have been proposed [45, 91, 125, 126, 127, 59, 117, 65]. In the industry, well-known cluster-based commercial search engines include Clusty15, iBoogie16 and CarrotSearch17.\n\nDespite the high promise of the approach and a decade of endeavor, cluster-based search engines have not gained prominent popularity, evident by Clusty's Alexa rank [48]. This is because clustering is known to be a hard problem, and search result clustering is particularly hard due to its high dimensionality, complex semantics and unique additional requirements beyond traditional clustering. As emphasized in [117] and [20], the primary focus of search result clustering is NOT to produce optimal clusters, an objective that has been pursued for decades for traditional clustering with many successful automatic algorithms. Search result clustering is a highly user-centric task with *two unique additional requirements*. First, clusters must form interesting sub-topics or facets from the user's perspective. Second, clusters must be assigned informative, expressive, meaningful and concise labels. Automatic algorithms often fail to fulfill the human factors in the objectives of search result clustering, generating meaningless, awkward or nonsense cluster labels [20]. In this paper, we explore a completely different direction in tackling the problem of clustering search results, utilizing the power of direct user intervention and mass-collaboration. We introduce ClusteringWiki, the first prototype and framework for personalized clustering that allows direct *user* editing of the clustering results. This is in sharp contrast with existing approaches that innovate on the *automatic* algorithmic *clustering procedure*.\n\nIn ClusteringWiki, the user can edit and annotate the membership, structure and labels of clusters through a Wiki interface to personalize her search result presentation. Edits and annotations can be implicitly shared among users as a mass-collaborative way of improving search result organization and search engine utility. This approach is in the same spirit of the current trends in the Web, like Web 2.0, semantic web, personalization, social tagging and mass collaboration. Clustering algorithms fall into two categories: partitioning and hierarchical. Regarding clustering results, however, a hierarchical presentation generalizes a flat partition. Based on this observation, ClusteringWiki handles both clustering methods smoothly by providing editing facilities for cluster hierarchies and treating partitions as a special case. In practice, hierarchical methods are advantageous in clustering search results because they construct a topic hierarchy that allows the user to easily navigate search results at different levels of granularity.\n\nFigure 3 shows a snapshot of ClusteringWiki18. The left-hand label panel presents a hierarchy of cluster labels. The right-hand result panel presents search results for a chosen cluster label. A logged-in user can edit the current clusters by creating, deleting, modifying, moving or copying nodes in the cluster tree. Each edit will be validated against a set of predefined consistency constraints before being stored.\n\nDesigning and implementing ClusteringWiki poses non-trivial technical challenges. User edits represent user preferences or constraints that should be respected and enforced next time the same query is issued. Query processing is time-critical, thus efficiency must be given high priority in maintaining and enforcing user preferences. Moreover, complications also come from the dynamic nature of search results that constantly change over time. Cluster editing takes user effort. It is essential that such user effort can be properly reused. ClusteringWiki considers two kinds of reuse scenarios, *preference transfer* and *preference sharing*. The former transfers user preferences from one query to similar ones, e.g., from \"David J. Dewitt\" to \"David Dewitt\". The latter aggregates and shares clustering preferences among users. Proper aggregation allows users to collaborate at a mass scale and \"vote\" for the best search result clustering presentation.\n\n18dmlab.cs.txstate.edu/ClusteringWiki/index.html.\n\nFBIS query 426 \"law enforcement dogs\"\n\n## Fbis Query 450 \"King Hussein, Peace\"\n\nTopic 293 (Amman) Majesty King Husayn al Aqabah, peace process Jordan, Jordanian, Amman, Arab\n\"Possible Contributions of British journal Nature immune system, genetically engineered cells, research, researchers, scientists In social tagging, or collaborative tagging, users annotate Web objects, and such personal annotations can be used to collectively classify and find information. ClusteringWiki extends conventional tagging by allowing tagging of structured objects, which are clusters of search results organized in a hierarchy.\n\n## Wsj Query 86 \"Bank Failures\"\n\nTopic 444 (FDIC) Federal Deposit Insurance William Seidman, Insurance Corp banks, bank, FDIC, banking\n\n## Ap Query 113 \"New Space Satellite Applications\"\n\nAir Force, Cape Canaveral satellite, launch, rocket, satellites\n\n## Contributions.\n\n- We introduce ClusteringWiki, the first framework for personalized clustering in the context of search result organization. Unlike existing methods that innovate on the automatic clustering procedure, it allows direct user editing of the clustering re-\nsults through a Wiki interface.\n\n- In ClusteringWiki, user preferences are reused among similar queries. They are also aggregated and shared among users as a mass-collaborative way of improving search result organization and search engine utility.\n- We implement a prototype for ClusteringWiki, perform experimental evaluation and a user study, and maintain the prototype as a public Web service.\n\n## 4.1 Related Work\n\nClustering. Clustering is the process of organizing objects into groups or clusters so that objects in the same cluster are as similar as possible, and objects in different clusters are as dissimilar as possible. Clustering algorithms fall into two main categories, partitioning and hierarchical. Partitioning algorithms, such as kmeans [73], produce a flat partition of objects without any explicit structure that relate clusters to each other. Hierarchical algorithms, on the other hand, produce a more informative hierarchy of clusters called a dendrogram. Hierarchical algorithms are either agglomerative (bottom-up) such as AGNES [55], or divisive (top-down) such as DIANA [55].\n\nClustering in IR. As a common data analysis technique, clustering has a wide array of applications in machine learning, data mining, pattern recognition, information retrieval, image analysis and bioinformatics [49, 32]. In information retrieval and Web search, document clustering was initially proposed to improve search performance by validating the *cluster hypothesis*, which states that documents in the same cluster behave similarly with respect to relevance to information needs [97]. In recent years, clustering has been used to organize search results, creating a cluster-based search interface as an alternative presentation to the ranked list interface. The list interface works fine for most navigational queries, but is less effective for informational queries, which account for the majority of Web queries [17, 98]. In addition, the growing scale of the Web and diversity of search results have rendered the list interface increasingly inadequate. Research has shown that the cluster interface improves user experience and search result quality [45, 126, 112, 53].\n\nSearch result clustering. One way of creating a cluster interface is to construct a static, off-line, pre-retrieval clustering of the entire document collection. However, this approach is ineffective because it is based on features that are frequent in the entire collection but irrelevant to the particular query [39, 100, 20]. It has been shown that query-specific, on-line, post-retrieval clustering, i.e., clustering search results, produces much superior results [45]. Scatter/Gather [45, 91] was an early cluster-based document browsing method that performs post-retrieval clustering on top-ranked documents returned from a traditional information retrieval system. The Grouper system [125, 126] (retired in 2000) introduced the well-known Suffix Tree Clustering (STC) algorithm that groups Web search results into clusters labeled by phrases extracted from snippets. It was also shown that using snippets is as effective as using whole documents. Carrot2 (www.carrot2.org) is an open source search result clustering engine that embeds STC as well as Lingo [87], a clustering algorithm based on singular value decomposition. Other related work from the Web, IR and data mining communities exists. [127] explored supervised learning for extracting meaningful phrases from snippets, which are then used to group search results. [59] proposed a monothetic algorithm, where a single feature is used to assign documents to clusters and generate cluster labels. [117] investigated using past query history in order to better organize search results for future queries. [65] studied search result clustering for object-level search engines that automatically extract and integrate information on Web objects. [20] surveyed Web clustering engines and algorithms. While all these methods focus on improvement in the automatic algorithmic procedure of clustering, ClusteringWiki employs a Wiki interface that allows direct user editing of the clustering results.\n\nClustering with user intervention. In machine learning, clustering is referred to as unsupervised learning. However, similar to ClusteringWiki, there are a few clustering frameworks that involve an active user role, in particular, semi-supervised clustering [8, 25] and interactive clustering [115, 50, 9] These frameworks are also motivated by the fact that clustering is too complex, and it is necessary to open the \"black box\" of the clustering procedure for easy understanding, steering and focusing. However, they differ from ClusteringWiki in that their focus is still on the clustering procedure, where they adopt a constraint clustering approach by transforming user feedback and domain knowledge into constraints (e.g., must-links and cannot-links) that are incorporated into the clustering procedure.\n\nSearch result annotation. Prototypes that allow user editing and annotation of search results exist. For example, U Rank by Microsoft 19 and Searchwiki by Google 20. Rants [36] implemented a prototype with additional interesting features including the incorporation of both absolute and relative user preferences. Similar to ClusteringWiki, these works pursue personalization as well as a mass-collaborative way of improving search engine utility. The difference is that they use the traditional flat list, instead of clusterbased, search interface.\n\nTagging and social search. Social tagging, or collaborative tagging, allows users to create and associate objects with tags as a means of annotating and categorizing content. While users are primarily interested in tagging for their personal use, tags in a community collection tend to stabilize into power law distributions [43]. Collaborative tagging systems leverage this property to derive folksonomies and improve search [121]. In ClusteringWiki users tag clusters to organize search results, and the tags can be shared and utilized in the same way as in collaborative tagging. Since clusters are organized in a hierarchy, ClusteringWiki extends conventional tagging by allowing tagging of structured objects. Similar to tag suggestion in social tagging, the base clustering algorithm in ClusteringWiki provides suggested phrases for tagging clusters. Social search is a mass-collaborative way of improving search performance. In contrast to established algorithmic or machine-based approaches, social search determines the relevance of search results by considering the content created or touched by users in the social graph. Example forms of user contributions include shared bookmarks or tagging of content with descriptive labels. Currently there are more than 40 such people-powered or community-powered social search engines, including Eurekster Swiki 21, Mahalo 22, Wikia 23, and Google social search 24. Mass collaboration, or crowdsourcing, systems on the Web are categorized and discussed in [30].\n\n4.2\nOverview In this section, we overview the main architecture and design principles of ClusteringWiki. Figure 4 shows the two key modules. The *query processing module* takes a query q and a set of stored user preferences as input to produce a cluster tree T that respects the preferences. The *cluster editing module* takes a cluster tree T and a user edit e as input to create/update a set of stored user preferences. Each user editing session usually involves a series of edits. The processing-editing cycle recurs over time.\n\nQuery processing. ClusteringWiki takes a query q from a\n19research.microsoft.com/en-us/projects/urank\n20googleblog.blogspot.com/2008/11/searchwiki-make-searchyour-own.html\n21www.eurekster.com\n22www.mahalo.com\n23answers.wikia.com/wiki/Wikianswers 24googleblog.blogspot.com/2009/10/introducing-google-socialsearch-i.html user u and retrieves the search results R from a data source (e.g., Google). Then, it clusters R with a default clustering algorithm\n(e.g., frequent phrase hierarchical) to produce an initial cluster tree T*init*. Then, it applies P, an applicable set of stored user preferences, to T*init* and presents a modified cluster tree T that respects P.\n\nNote that ClusteringWiki performs clustering. The modification should not alter R, the input data. If the user u is logged-in, P will be set to Pq,u, a set of preferences for q previously specified by u. In case Pq,u = , Pq,u will be used on condition that q is sufficiently close to q. If the user u is not logged-in, P will be set to Pq,U, a set of aggregated preferences for q previously specified by all users. In case Pq,U = , Pq,U will be used on condition that q is sufficiently close to q.\n\nIn the cluster tree T, the internal nodes, i.e., non-leaf nodes, contain cluster labels and are presented on the left-hand *label panel*. Each label is a set of keywords. The leaf nodes contain search results, and the leaf nodes for a selected label are presented on the righthand *result panel*. A search result can appear multiple times in T. The root of T represents the query q itself and is always labeled with *All*. When it is chosen, all search results will be presented on the result panel. Labels other than *All* represent the various, possibly overlapping, sub-topics of q. When there is no ambiguity, internal node, label node, *cluster label* and *label* are used interchangeably in the paper. Similarly, leaf node, result node, search result and *result* are used interchangeably.\n\nCluster editing. If logged-in, a user u can edit the cluster tree T\nfor query q by creating, deleting, modifying, moving or copying nodes. User edits will be validated against a set C of consistency constraints before being written to Pq,u. The set C contains predefined constraints that are specified on, for example, the size of clusters, the height of the tree and the length of labels. These constraints exist to maintain a favorable user interface for fast and intuitive navigation. The cluster tree T is *consistent* if it satisfies all the constraints in C.\n\nBy combining preferences in Pq,u for all users who have edited the cluster tree T for query q, we obtain Pq,U, a set of aggregated preferences for query q. We use Pu to denote the collection of clustering preferences by user u for all queries, which is a set of sets of preferences such that q, Pq,u  Pu. We also use PU to denote the collection of aggregated preferences by all users for all queries, which is a set of sets of aggregated preferences such that\nq, Pq,U  PU. Pu and PU are maintained over time and used by ClusteringWiki in processing queries for the user u.\n\nDesign principles. In a search result clustering engine, there are significant uncertainties from the data to the clustering algorithm. Wiki-facilitated personalization further adds substantial complications. Simplicity should be a key principle in designing such a complex system. ClusteringWiki adopts a simple yet powerful *path approach*. With this approach, a cluster tree T is decomposed into a set of root-to-leaf *paths* that serve as independent editing components. A path always starts with *All* (root) and ends with some search result (leaf). In ClusteringWiki, maintenance, aggregation and enforcement of user preferences are based on simple path arithmetic. Moreover, the path approach is sufficiently powerful, being able to handle the finest user preference for a cluster tree. In particular, each edit of T can be interpreted as operations on one or more paths. There are two primitive operations on a path p, insertion of p and *deletion* of p. A modification of p to p is simply a deletion of p followed by an insertion of p.\n\nFor each user u and each query q, ClusteringWiki maintains a set of paths Pq,u representing the user edits from u for query q.\n\nEach path p  Pq,u can be either positive or *negative*. A positive path p represents an insertion of p, meaning that the user prefers to have p in T. A negative path p represents a deletion of p, meaning that the user prefers not to have p in T. Two *opposite* paths p and\np will cancel each other out. The paths in Pq,u may be added from multiple editing sessions at different times. To aggregate user preferences for query q, ClusteringWiki first combines the paths in all Pq,u, u  U, where U is the set of users who have edited the cluster tree of q. Then, certain statistically significant paths are selected and stored in Pq,U.\n\nSuppose in processing query q, P is identified as the applicable set of paths to enforce. ClusteringWiki first combines the paths in P and the paths in T*init*, where T*init* is the initial cluster tree.\n\nThen, it presents the combined paths as a tree, which is the cluster tree T. The combination is straightforward. For each positive p\nP, if p / T*init*, add p to T*init*. For each negative p  P, if p  T*init*, remove p from T*init*.\n\nReproducibility. It is easy to verify that ClusteringWiki has the property of reproducing edited cluster trees. In particular, after a series of user edits on T*init* to produce T, if T*init* remains the same in a subsequent query, exactly the same T will be produced after enforcing the stored user preferences generated from the user edits on T*init*.\n\n4.3\nFramework In this section, we introduce the ClusteringWiki framework in detail. In particular, we present the algorithms for the query processing and cluster editing modules and explain their main components.\n\n4.3.1\nQuery Processing Algorithm 1 presents the pseudocode for the query processing algorithm of ClusteringWiki. In the input, Pu and PU are used instead of Pq,u and Pq,U for preference transfer purposes. In processing query q, it is likely that Pq,u =  or Pq,U = ; then some applicable Pq,u  Pu or Pq,U  PU can be used. The creation and maintenance of such user preferences will be discussed in Sec-\n\nAlgorithm 1 Query processing\nindent = 1em\nInput: q, u, C, Pu and PU: q is a query. u is a user. C is a set\nof consistency constraints. Pu is a collection of preferences by\nuser u for all queries, where q, Pq,u  Pu. PU is a collection\nof aggregated preferences for all queries, where q, Pq,U\nPU.\nOutput: T: a consistent cluster tree for the search results of query\nq.\n1: retrieve a set R of search results for query q; 2: cluster R to obtain an initial cluster tree T*init*;\n3: P * *; //P is the set of paths to be enforced on Tinit\n4: if (u is logged-in) then\n5:\nq  Trans(*q, u*);\n6:\nif (q = *NULL*) then\n7:\nP  Pq,u; //use applicable personal preferences\n8:\nend if\n9: else\n10:\nq  Trans(*q, U*);\n11:\nif (q = *NULL*) then\n12:\nP  Pq,U; //use applicable aggregated preferences\n13:\nend if\n14: end if\n15: T  T*init*; //initialize T, the cluster tree to present 16: clean P; //remove p  P if its result node is not in R\n17: **for each** p  P\n18:\nif (p is positive) then\n19:\nT  T * {*p}; //add a preferred path\n20:\nelse\n21:\nT  T * {*p}; //remove a non-preferred path\n22:\nend if\n23: end for\n24: trim(*T, C*); //make T consistent 25: *present*(T); //present the set of paths in T as a tree\ntion 4.3.2. The output of the algorithm is a consistent cluster tree T.\n\nRetrieving search results. Line 1 retrieves a set R of search results for query q from a chosen data source. The size of R is set to 50\nby default and adjustable to up to 500. The available data sources include Google and Yahoo! Search APIs among others (see Section 4.4 for details). ClusteringWiki retrieves the results via multithreaded parallel requests, which are much faster than sequential requests. The combined titles and snippets of search results retrieved from the sources are preprocessed. In order to extract phrases, we implemented our own tokenizer that identifies whether a token is a word, numeric, punctuation mark, capitalized, all caps, etc. We then remove non-textual tokens and stop words, using the stop word list from the Apache Snowball package 25. The tokens are then stemmed using the Porter 26 algorithm and indexed as terms. For each term, document frequency and collection frequency are computed and stored. A numeric id is also assigned to each term in the document collection in order to efficiently calculate document similarity, identify frequent phrases, etc.\n\n25www.docjar.com/html/api/org/apache/lucene/analysis/snowball/SnowballAn\n26tartarus.org/ martin/PorterStemmer/\nBuilding initial tree. Line 2 builds an initial cluster tree Tinit with a built-in clustering algorithm. ClusteringWiki provides 4 such algorithms: k-means flat, k-means hierarchical, frequent phrase flat and frequent phrase hierarchical. The hierarchical algorithms recursively apply their flat counterparts in a top-down manner to large clusters. The k-means algorithms follow a strategy that generates clusters before labels. They use a simple approach to generate cluster labels from titles of search results that are the closest to cluster centers. In order to produce stable clusters, the typical randomness in k-means due to the random selection of initial cluster centers is removed. The parameter k is heuristically determined based on the size of the input. The frequent phrase algorithms follow a strategy that generates labels before clusters. They first identify frequent phrases using a suffix tree built in linear time by Ukkonen's algorithm. Then they select labels from the frequent phrases using a greedy set cover heuristic, where at each step a frequent phrase covering the most uncovered search results is selected until the whole cluster is covered or no frequent phrases remain. Then they assign each search result r to a label L if r contains the keywords in L. Uncovered search results are added to a special cluster labeled *Other*. These algorithms are able to generate very meaningful cluster labels with a couple of heuristics. For example, a sublabel cannot be a subset of a superlabel, in which case the sublabel is redundant. ClusteringWiki smoothly handles flat clustering by treating partitions as a special case of trees. The built-in clustering algorithms are meant to serve their basic functions. The focus of the paper is not to produce, but to modify, the initial cluster trees.\n\nDetermining applicable preferences. Lines 3  14 determine P, a set of applicable paths to be enforced on T*init*. Two cases are considered. If the user u is logged-in, P will use some set from Pu representing personal preferences of u (lines 4  8). Otherwise, P will use some set from PU representing aggregated preferences\n(lines 9  14). The subroutine *Trans*() determines the actual set to use if any. The pseudocode of Trans(*q, u*) is presented in Algorithm 2. Given a user u and a query q, it returns a query q, whose preferences stored in Pq,u are applicable to query q. In the subroutine, two similarity measures are used. Term similarity, termSim(*q, q*), is the Jaccard coefficient that compares the terms of q and q. Result similarity, resultSim(*q, q*), is the Jaccard coefficient that compares the URLs of the top k (e.g., k = 10) results of q and q.\n\nThis calculation requires that the URLs of the top k results for q\nbe stored.\n\nTo validate q, both similarity values need to pass their respective thresholds ts and rs. Obviously, the bigger the thresholds, the more conservative the transfer. Setting the thresholds to 1 shuts down preference transfer. Instead of thresholding, another reasonable way of validation is to provide a ranked list of similar queries and ask the user for confirmation.\n\nThe subroutine in Algorithm 2 first checks if Pq,u exists (line 1).\n\nIf it does, preference transfer is not needed and q is returned (line\n2). In this case, u has already edited the cluster tree for query q and stored the preferences in Pq,u.\n\nAlgorithm 2 Trans(q, u)\nindent = 1em\nInput: q, u and Pu: q is a query. u is a user. Pu is a collection of\npreferences by user u for all queries, where q, Pq,u  Pu.\nOutput: q: a query such that Pq,u is applicable for q.\n1: if (Pq,u exists) then\n2:\nreturn q; //u has edited the cluster tree of q\n3: else\n4:\nfind q s.t. Pq,u  Pu  termSim(*q, q*) is the largest;\n5:\nif termSim(*q, q*)  ts **then** //ts is a threshold\n6:\nif resultSim(*q, q*)  rs **then** //rs is a threshold\n7:\nPq,u  Pq,u; //copy preferences from q to q\n8:\nreturn q;\n9:\nend if\n10:\nend if\n11: end if\n12: return *NULL*;\nOtherwise, the subroutine tries to find q such that Pq,u is applicable (lines 4  11). To do so, it first finds q such that Pq,u exists and termSim(*q, q*) is the largest (line 4). Then, it continues to validate the applicability of q by checking if termSim(*q, q*) and resultSim(*q, q*) have passed their respective thresholds (lines 5\nsim 6). If so, user preferences for q will be copied to q (line 7), and q will be returned (line 8). Otherwise, *NULL* will be returned\n(line 11), indicating no applicable preferences exist for query q.\n\nThe preference copying (line 7) is important for the correctness of ClusteringWiki. Otherwise, suppose there is a preference transfer from q to q, where Pq,u =  and Pq,u has been applied on T*init* to produce T. Then, after some editing from u, T becomes T\nand the corresponding edits are stored in Pq,u. Then, this Pq,u will be used the next time the same query q is issued by u. However, Pq,u will not be able to bring an identical T*init* to the expected T . It is easy to verify that line 7 fixes the problem and ensures reproducibility. Trans(*q, U*) works in the same way. Preference transfer is an important component of ClusteringWiki. Cluster editing takes user effort and there are an infinite number of queries. It is essential that such user effort can be properly reused.\n\nEnforcing applicable preferences. Back to Algorithm 1, lines 15\n 23 enforce the paths of P on T*init* to produce the cluster tree T.\n\nThe enforcement is straightforward. First P is cleaned by removing those paths whose result nodes are not in the search result set R (line 16). Recall that ClusteringWiki performs clustering. It should not alter the input data R. Then, the positive paths in P are the ones u prefers to see in T, thus they are added to T (lines 18\n19). The negative paths in P are the ones u prefers not to see in T, thus they are removed from T (lines 20  21). If P = , there are no applicable preferences and T*init* will not be modified.\n\nTrimming and Presenting T. The cluster tree T must satisfy a set C of predefined constraints. Some constraints maybe violated after applying P to T*init*. For example, adding or removing paths may result in small clusters that violate constraints on the size of clusters. In line 24, subroutine trim(*T, C*) is responsible for making T consistent, e.g., by re-distributing the paths in the small clusters. We will discuss the constraint set C in detail in Section 4.3.2.\n\nIn line 25, subroutine *present*(T) presents the set of paths in T as a cluster tree on the search interface. The labels can be expanded or collapsed. The search results for a chosen label are presented in the result panel in their original order when retrieved from the source. Relevant terms corresponding to current and ancestor labels in search results are highlighted. Sibling cluster labels in the label panel are ordered by lexicographically comparing the lists of original ranks of their associated search results. For example, let A and D be two sibling labels as in Figure 5, where A contains P1, P2, P3 and P4 and D contains P1 and P5. Suppose that i in Pi indicates the original rank of Pi from the source. By comparing two lists < 1, 2, 3, 4 > and < 1, 5 >, we put A in front of D. \"Other\" is a special label that is always listed at the end behind all its siblings.\n\nDiscussion. As [54] suggested, the subset of web pages visited by employees in an Enterprise is centered around the company's business objectives. Additionally, employees share a common vocabulary describing the objects and tasks encountered in day to day activities. ClusteringWiki can be even more effective in this environment as user preferences can be better aggregated and utilized.\n\n4.3.2\nCluster Editing Before explaining the algorithm handling user edits, we first introduce the essential consistency constraints for cluster trees and the primitive user edits.\n\nEssential consistency constraints. Predefined consistency constraints exist to maintain a favorable user interface for fast and intuitive navigation. They can be specified on any structural component of the cluster tree T. In the following, we list the essential ones.\n\n- *Path constraint*: Each path of cluster tree T must start with the\nroot labeled *All* and end with a leaf node that is a search result.\nIn case there are no search results returned, T is empty without\npaths.\n- *Presence constraint*: Each initial search result must be present in\nT. It implies that deletion of paths should not result in absence\nof any search result in T.\n- *Homogeneity constraint*: A label node in T must not have heterogeneous children that combine cluster labels with search results. This constraint is also used in other clustering engines such as Clusty and Carrot2.\n- *Height constraint*: The height of T must be equal or less than a\nthreshold, e.g., 4.\n- *Label length constraint*: The length of each label in T must be\nequal or less than a threshold.\n- *Branching constraint*: We call a label node a bottom label node\nif it directly connects to search results. Each non-bottom label\nnode must have at least Tn children. Each non-special bottom\nlabel node must have at least Tm children. *Other* is a special\nbottom label node that may have less than Tm children. *All*,\nwhen being a bottom label, could also have less than Tm children\nin case there are insufficient search results. By default both Tn\nand Tm are set to 2 in ClusteringWiki as in Clusty.\nPrimitive user edits. ClusteringWiki implements the following categories of atomic primitive edits that a logged-in user can initiate in the process of tree editing. Each edit e is associated with Pe and NPe, the set of paths to be inserted to the tree and the set of paths to be deleted from the tree after e.\n\n- e1: copy a label node to another non-bottom label node as its\nchild. Note that it is allowed to copy a parent label node to a child label node.\nExample: in Figure 5, we can copy D to A. For this edit, Pe =\n{All  A  D  P1*, All*  A  D  P5}. NPe =  for any edit of this type.\n\n- e2: copy a result node to a bottom label node.\nExample: in Figure 5, we can copy P3 to D, but not to A, which\nis not a bottom label node. For this edit, Pe = {All  D\nP3}. NPe =  for any edit of this type.\n- e3: modify a non-root label node.\nExample: in Figure 5, we can modify D to E. For this edit, Pe = {All  E  P1*, All*  E  P5} and NPe = {All\nD  P1*, All*  D  P5}.\n\n- e4: delete a non-root node, which can be either a label node or a\nresult node.\nExample: in Figure 5, we can delete P5. For this edit, NPe =\n{All  D  P5}. Pe =  for any edit of this type.\n- e5: create a label node, which can be either a non-bottom or bottom label node. In particular, recursive creation of non-bottom labels is a way to add levels to cluster trees. Example: in Figure 5, we can add E as parent of D. For this\nedit, Pe = {All  E  D  P1*, All*  E  D  P5} and\nNPe = {All  D  P1*, All*  D  P5}.\nThe editing framework results in several *favorable properties*. Firstly, the primitive user edits are such that, with a series of edits, a user can produce *any* consistent cluster tree. Secondly, since e1 only allows a label node to be placed under a non-bottom node and e2\nonly allows a result node to be placed under a bottom node, the homogeneity constraint will not be violated after any edit given the consistency of T before the edit. Thirdly, the framework uses eager validation, where validation is performed right after each edit, compared to *lazy* validation, where validation is performed in the end of the editing process. Eager validation is more user-friendly and less error-prone in implementation. Note that, user editing can possibly generate *empty labels*, i.e., labels that do not contain any search results and thus not on any path. Such labels will be trimmed.\n\nAlgorithm 3 Cluster editing\nindent = 1em\nInput: q, u, T, C, Pq,u, Pq,U and e: q is a query. u is a user. T is\na cluster tree for q. C is a set of consistency constraints for T.\nPq,u is a set of paths representing the preferences by u for q.\nPq,U is a set of paths representing the aggregated preferences\nfor q. e is an edit by u on T.\nOutput: updated T, Pq,u and Pq,U\n1: if (pre-validation fail) then\n2:\nreturn;\n3: end if\n4: identify Pe; 5: identify NPe;\n6: if (validation fail) then\n7:\nreturn;\n8: end if\n9: update T;\n10: add Pe as positive paths to Pq,u;\n11: add NPe as negative paths to Pq,u;\n12: update Pq,U;\nTo add convenience, ClusteringWiki also implements several other types of edits. For example, move (instead of copy as in e1)\na label node to another non-bottom label node as its child, or move (instead of copy as in e2) a result node to a bottom label node. Such a move edit can be considered as a copy edit followed by a delete edit.\n\nEditing algorithm. Algorithm 3 presents the pseudocode of the cluster editing algorithm in ClusteringWiki for a single edit e, where e can be any type of edit from e1 to e4.\n\nLines 1  3 perform pre-validation of e to see if it is in violation of consistency constraints. Violations can be caught early for certain constraints on certain edits, for example, the label length constraint on e1 type of edits. If pre-validation fails, the algorithm returns immediately.\n\nOtherwise, the algorithm continues with lines 4  5 that identify Pe and NPe. Then, lines 6  8 perform full validation of e against C, the set of consistency constraints. If the validation fails, the algorithm returns immediately. Otherwise, e is a valid edit and T is updated (line 9). Then, the personal user preferences are stored by adding Pe and NPe to Pq,u as positive paths and negative paths respectively (lines 10  11). In adding these paths, the opposite paths in Pq,u cancel each other out. In line 12, the aggregated preferences stored in Pq,U are updated.\n\nWe further discuss preference aggregation in the following.\n\nPreference sharing. Preference sharing in ClusteringWiki is in line with the many social-powered search engines as a masscollaborative way of improving search utility. In ClusteringWiki, U is considered as a special user and Pq,U stores the aggregated user preferences.\n\nIn particular, we use P 0\nq,U to record the paths specified for query q by all users. Each path p  P 0\nq,U has a *count* attribute, recording the total number of times that p appears in any Pq,u. All paths in P 0\nq,U are grouped by leaf nodes. In other words, all paths that end with the same search result are in the same group. For each group, we keep track of two *best* paths: a positive one with the most count and a negative one with the most count. We mark a best path if its count passes a predefined threshold. All the marked paths constitute Pq,U, the set of aggregated paths that are used in query processing. Note that, here ClusteringWiki adopts a conservative approach, making use of at most one positive path and one negative path for each search result.\n\nEditing interface. Cluster editing in ClusteringWiki is primarily available through context menus attached to label and result nodes. Context menus are context aware, displaying only those operations that are valid for the selected node. For example, the paste result operation will not be displayed unless the selected node is a bottom label node and a result node was previously copied or cut. This effectively implements pre-validation of cluster edit operations by not allowing the user to choose invalid tasks. Users can drag and drop a result node or cluster label in addition to cutting/copying and pasting to perform a move/copy operation. A label node will be tagged with an icon if the item being dragged can be pasted within that node. An item that is dropped outside a label node in which it could be pasted simply returns to its original location.\n\n4.4\nEvaluation ClusteringWiki was implemented as an AJAX-enabled Java Enterprise Edition 1.5 application. The prototype is maintained on an average PC with Intel Pentium 4 3.4 GHz CPU and 4Gb RAM running Apache Tomcat 6.\n\n4.4.1\nMethodology and Metrics We performed two series of experiments: system evaluation and utility evaluation. The former focused on the correctness and efficiency of our implemented prototype. The latter, our main experiments, focused on the effectiveness of ClusteringWiki in improving search performance.\n\nData sources.\n\nMultiple data sources were used in our empirical evaluation, including Google AJAX Search API 27, Yahoo! Search API 28, and local Lucene indexes built on top of the New York Times Annotated Corpus [102] and several datasets from the TIPSTER (disks\n1-3) and TREC (disks 4-5) collections 29. The Google API can retrieve a maximum of 8 results per request and a total of 64 results per query. The Yahoo! API can retrieve a maximum of 100 results per request and a total of 1000 results per query. Due to user licence agreements, the New York Times, TIPSTER and TREC datasets are not available publicly.\n\nSystem evaluation methodology.\n\nFor system evaluation of ClusteringWiki, we focused on correctness and *efficiency*. We tested the correctness by manually executing a number of functional and system tests designed to test every aspect of application functionality. These tests included cluster reproducibility, edit operation pre-validations, cluster editing operations, convenience features, applying preferences, preference transfer, preference aggregation, etc.\n\n27code.google.com/apis/ajaxsearc 28developer.yahoo.com/search/web/webSearch.html\n29www.nist.gov/tac/data/data_desc.html In order to have repeatable search results for same queries, we used the stable New York Times data source. We chose queries that returned at least 200 results. We evaluated system efficiency by monitoring query processing time in various settings. In particular, we considered:\n\n- 2 data sources: Yahoo! and New York Times - 5 different numbers of retrieved search results: 100, 200, 300,\n400, 500\n- 2 types of clusterings: flat (F) and hierarchical (H)\nFor each of the combinations, we executed 5 queries, each twice. The queries were chosen such that at least 500 search results would be returned. For each query, we monitored 6 portions of execution that constitute the total query response time:\n\n- Retrieving search results\n- Preprocessing retrieved search results - Initial clustering by a built-in algorithm - Applying preferences to the initial cluster tree - Presenting the final cluster tree - Other (e.g., data transfer time between server and browser)\nFor the New York Times data source, the index was loaded into memory to simulate the server side search engine behavior. The time spent on applying preferences depends on the number of applicable stored paths. For each query, we made sure that at least half the number of retrieved results existed in a modified path, which is a practical upper-bound on the number of user edits on the clusters of a query.\n\nUtility evaluation methodology.\n\nFor utility evaluation, we focused on the *effectiveness* of ClusteringWiki in improving search performance, in particular, the time users spent to locate a certain number of relevant results. The experiments were conducted through a user study with 22 *paid* participants. The participants were primarily undergraduate, with a few graduate, colleage students. We compared 4 different search result presentations:\n\n- Ranked list (RL): search results were not clustered and presented\nas a traditional ranked list.\n- Initial clustering (IC): search results were clustered by a default\nbuilt-in algorithm (frequent phrase hierarchical).\n- Personalized clustering (PC): search result clustering was personalized by a logged-in user after a series of edits, taking on average 1 and no more than 2 minutes per query.\n- Aggregated clustering (AC): search result clustering was based\non aggregated edits from on average 10 users.\nNavigational queries seek the website or home page of a single entity that the user has in mind. The more common [17, 98] informational queries seek general information on a broad topic. The ranked list interface works fine for the former in general but is less effective for the latter, which is where clustering can be helpful [74]. In practice, a user may explore a varied number (e.g., 5 or\n10) of relevant results for an informational query. Thus, we considered 2 types of informational queries. In addition, we argue that for some *deep* navigational queries where the desired page \"hides\"\ndeep in a ranked list, clustering can still be helpful by skipping irrelevant results. Thus, we also considered such queries:\n\n- R10: Informational. To locate any 10 relevant results. - R5: Informational. To locate any 5 relevant results.\n- R1: Navigational. To locate 1 pre-specified result.\nFor each query type, 10 queries were executed, 5 on Google results and 5 on the AP Newswire dataset from disk 1 of the TIPSTER corpus. The AP Newswire queries were chosen from TREC topics 50-150, ensuring that they returned at least 15 relevant results within the first 50 results. For R1 queries, the topic descriptions were modified to direct the user to a single result that is relatively low-ranked to make the queries \"deep\". Google queries were chosen from topics that participants were familiar with. All queries returned at least 50 results. These queries and their descriptions and narratives can be found at [3]. Each user was given 15 queries, 5 for each query type. Each query was executed 4 times for the 4 presentations being compared. Thus, in total each user executed 154 = 60 queries. For each execution, the user exploration effort was computed. User effort was the metric we used to measure the search result exploration effort exerted by a user in fulfilling her information need. [58] used a similar metric under a probabilistic model instead of user study. Assuming both search results and cluster labels are scanned and examined in a top-down manner, user effort  can be computed as follows:\n\n- Add 1 point to  for each examined search result. - Add 0.25 point to  for each examined cluster label. This is\nbecause labels are much shorter than snippets.\n- Add 0.25 point to  for each *uncertain result*. Based on our\nassumption, all results before a tagged relevant result are examined. However, results after the last tagged result remain uncertain. For linked list presentation, there is no uncertainty because the exploration ends at a tagged result due to the way the queries are chosen (more relevant results than needed).\nUncertainty could occur for results within a chosen cluster C.\n\nAs an effective way of utilizing cluster labels, most users would partially examine a few results in C to evaluate the relevance of C itself. If they think C is relevant, they must have found and tagged some relevant results in C. If they think C is irrelevant, they would ignore the cluster and quickly move to the next label. Thus, each uncertain result has a probability of being examined. Based on our observation for this particular user study, we empirically used 0.25 for this probability.\n\n## 4.4.2 System Evaluation Results\n\nFor correctness, all functional and system tests were executed successfully. A detailed description of these tests can be found at [3]. In the following, we focus on the efficiency evaluation results. We recorded and averaged (over 10 queries) the runtime in seconds for all 6 portions of total response time. In addition, we also computed the average *total execution time*, which includes preprocessing, initial clustering, applying preferences and presenting the final tree. This is the time that our prototype is responsible for. The remaining time is irrelevant to the way our prototype is designed and implemented. While the details are reported in [3], Figure 6 shows the trends of the average total execution time (Exec in the figure) and response time (Resp) for both flat (F) and hierarchical (H) presentations over 2 sources of Yahoo! (Yahoo!) and New York Times (NYT). From the figure we can see that:\n\n- Response and execution time trends are linear, testifying to the\nscalability of our prototype. In particular, for both flat and hierarchical clustering, the total execution time is about 1 second for 500 results and 0.4 second for 200 results from either source.\nNote that most existing clustering search engines, e.g., iBoogie 30\nand CarrotSearch 31, cluster 100 results by default and 200 at\nmaximum. Clusty 32 clusters 200 results by default and 500 at\nmaximum.\n- Hierarchical presentation (H) takes comparable times to flat presentation (F), showing that recursive generation of hierarchies does not add significant cost to efficiency.\n- There is a bigger discrepancy between response and execution\ntimes for the Yahoo! data source compared to New York Times, suggesting a significant efficiency improvement by integrating our prototype with the data sources.\n- Execution times for Yahoo! are shorter than New York Times\ndue to the shorter titles and snippets.\nIn addition, we observe (and report in [3] with supporting data) that applying preferences takes less than 1/10 second in all test cases, which certifies the efficiency of our \"path approach\" for managing preferences. Moreover, presenting the final tree takes the majority (roughly 80%) of the total execution time, which can be improved by using alternate user interface technologies.\n\n4.4.3\nUtility Evaluation Results Figure 7 shows the averaged user effort (over 225 = 110 queries)\nfor each of the 4 presentations (RL, IL, PC, AC) and each of the query types (R1, R5, R10) on the Google data source. Similar trends can be observed from the AP Newswire data source (see [3] for details). From the figure we can see that:\n\n30www.iboogie.com 31carrotsearch.com\n32www.clusty.com\n- Clustering saves user effort in informational and deep navigational queries, with personalized clustering the most effective, saving up to 50% of user effort.\n- Aggregated clustering also significantly benefits, although it is\nnot as effective as personalized clustering. However, it is \"free\" in the sense that it does not take user editing effort, and it does not require user login.\nIn evaluating aggregated clustering, we made sure that the users using the aggregated clusters were not the ones who edited them.\n\n- The effectiveness of clustering is related to how \"deep\" the relevant results are. The lower they are ranked, the more effective clustering is because more irrelevant results can be skipped.\nThe hierarchy of cluster labels plays a central role in the effectiveness of clustering search engines. From the data we have collected as well as the user feedback, we observe that:\n\n- Cluster labels should be short and in the range of 1 to 4 terms,\nwith 2 and 3 the best. The total levels of the hierarchy should be limited to 3 or 4.\n- There are two types of cluster edits, (1) assigning search results\nto labels and (2) editing the hierarchy of labels. Both types are effective for personalized clustering. However, they respond differently for aggregated clustering. For type 1 edits, there is a\nground truth (in a loose sense) for each assignment that users\ntend to agree on. Such edits are easy to aggregate and be collaboratively utilized. For type 2 edits, it can be challenging (and a legitimate research topic) to aggregate hierarchies because many edited hierarchies can be good but in diverse ways. A good initial clustering (e.g., frequent phrase hierarchical) can alleviate the problem by reducing the diversity.\nAs part of the user study, we also surveyed on the effectiveness of general, personalized and aggregated clustering in helping with search result exploration. On a scale of 1 to 10 with 10 as the best, users responded with an average rating of 8.21. Most users found ClusteringWiki efficient and useful in reducing their search effort.\n\n4.5\nConclusion Search engine utility has been significantly hampered due to the ever-increasing information overload. Clustering has been considered a promising alternative to ranked lists in improving search result organization. Given the unique human factor in search result clustering, traditional automatic algorithms often fail to generate clusters and labels that are interesting and meaningful from the user's perspective. In this paper, we introduced ClusteringWiki, the first prototype and framework for personalized clustering, utilizing the power of direct user intervention and mass-collaboration. Through a Wiki interface, the user can edit the membership, structure and labels of clusters. Such edits can be aggregated and shared among users to improve search result organization and search engine utility. There are many interesting directions for future work, from fundamental semantics and functionalities of the framework to convenience features, user interface and scalability. For example, in line with social browsing, social network can be utilized in preference aggregation.\n\n5.\n\nWORD SENSE DISAMBIGUATION\nWord sense disambiguation (WSD) is the process of using automated tools to distinguish different usages for the same term. This often, although not always, lines up with different dictionary senses of a wordl However, dictionary alignment is not necessary for many important uses of word sense disambiguation, such as locating an uncommon usage for a common term. There are many different techniques to do WSD, but often the ultimate goal is to produce a fine-grained understanding of a the terms in a specific corpus. Given the exisiting resources, it often makes more sense to create algorithms and tools to customize existing resources, rather than trying to generate a new resource purely algorithmicly. Here, we present the C-Cat Wordnet package, an open source library for using and modifying Wordnet. Later projects intend to leverage this work to provide a complete WSD package with integrated corpus-specific concept hierarchies. The package includes four key features: an API for modifying Synsets; implementations of standard similarity metrics, implementations of well-known Word Sense Disambiguation algorithms, and an implementation of the Castanet algorithm. The library is easily extendible and usable in many runtime environments. We demonstrate it's use on two standard Word Sense Disambiguation tasks and apply the Castanet algorithm to a corpus.\n\n5.1\nIntroduction Wordnet [33] is a hierarchical lexical database that provides a fine grained semantic interpretation of a word. Wordnet forms a diverse semantic network by first collecting similar words into synonym sets (*Synset*), for example \"drink\" and \"imbibe\" are connected under the verb *Synset* defined as \"take in liquids.\" Then, Synsets are connected by relational links, with the IS-A link being the most well known. Applications typically access Wordnet through one or more libraries. Every popular programming language has at least one library: the original for C++, JWNL 33 for Java, and WordNet::QueryData 34\nfor Perl are just a few examples. While these libraries are robust and provide many features, they cannot be easily applied to two new use cases: direct modification and serialization of the database and use in a parallel processing framework, such the Hadoop 35\nframework. The first has become a popular research topic in recent years, with [104] providing a well known method for adding new lexical mappings to Wordnet, and the second will increasingly become important as Wordnet applications are applied to massive web-scale datasets. We developed the C-Cat Wordnet package to address these use cases as part of a larger information extraction and retrieval system that requires word sense information for new, domain specific terms and novel composite senses on web-scale corpora. One example includes adding new lexical mappings harvested from New York Times articles. Without support for saving additions to Wordnet and parallel processing, we would be unable to leverage existing valuable sense information. Our package solves these issues with a new API focused on modifying the database and by storing the entire Wordnet database in memory. We designed the package to be a flexible library for any Wordnet application. It is written in Java and defines a standard Java interface for core data structures and algorithms.\n\nAll code has been heavily documented with details on performance trade-offs and unit tested to ensure reliable behavior. While other Wordnet libraries exist, we hope that the release of ours facilitates the development of new, customized Wordnets and the use of Wordnet in large highly parallelized systems.\n\nThe toolkit is available at http://github.com/fozziethebeat/C-Cat, which include a wiki detailing the structure of the package, javadocs, and a mailing list.\n\n5.2\nThe C-Cat Wordnet Framework Fundamentally, Wordnet acts as a mapping from word forms to possible word senses. Terms with similar senses are collapsed into a single *Synset*. The *Synset* network is then formed by linking a *Synset* to others via semantic links such as IS-A, PART-OF, and SIMILAR-TO. Our package makes two significant contributions: a collection a standardized reference implementations of well known algorithms and a new API for directly modifying and serializing the Synset network. In addition, it provides features found in comparable libraries such as JWNL. The C-Cat library is split up into four packages:\n1. The Core Api contains data format readers, writers, and *Synsets*;\n\n2. Similarity Metrics; 3. Word Sense Disambiguation algorithms; 4. and Castanet [107], a method for automatically learning document facets using Wordnet.\n5.2.1\nCore Api The core API is centered around two interfaces: an OntologyReader and a *Synset*. The *OntologyReader* is responsible for parsing a Wordnet file format, building a linked *Synset* network, and returning *Synsets* based on query terms and parts of speech. The Synset maintains all of the information for a particular word sense, such as it's definitions, examples, and links to other *Synsets*. Both interfaces provide mechanisms for modifying the sense information, *Synset* links, and lexical mappings.\n\nWe store this entire structure in memory due to the minimal size of Wordnet, for example, version 3.0 is only 37 Megabytes on disk, and so that users\n35http://hadoop.apache.org/\nOntologyReader reader = ...\n\nSynset cat = reader.getSynset(\"cat.n.1\"); for (Synset rel : cat.allRelations())\ncat.merge(rel);\nSystem.out.println(cat);\ncan use Wordnet on novel distributed file systems, such as Hadoop, that do not use standard file system APIs.\n\nSynsets. are defined by three sets of values: word forms, links to other *Synsets*, and a part of speech. Each *Synset* may have multiple word forms and multiple links, but only one part of speech. We use both standard Wordnet relations and arbitrary relations to label a directed link between two *Synsets*, with the relation being stored in only the source *Synset*. We provide several methods for accessing relations and related Synsets: *getKnownRelationTypes*(), allRelations(), and *getRelations*(). In addition, each Synset can have a set of example sentences and a definition. To modify each *Synset*, the interface includes additive methods for relations, word forms, and examples. Furthermore, we provide a *merge*()\nmethod that takes all information from one *Synset* and adds it to another *Synset*. Figure 8 provides a simple example using this merge API; after the code has been run, \"cat.n.1\" will contain all of the information from it's related *Synsets*. Lastly, the interface also permits arbitrary objects, such as ranking values, feature vectors, or additional meta data, to be attached to any *Synset* as an Attribute. Any *Attributes* are also merged on a call to *merge*.\n\nOntologyReader. defines an interface that maps word forms to Synsets. Implementations are designed to be initialized once and then used ubiquitously throughout an application. The interface provides methods for getting all *Synset*s for a word or a specific sense, for example, the query \"cat.n.1\" in figure 8 retrieves the first noun *Synset* for the term \"cat\". To modify the sense network, we provide two key methods: addSynset(new) and removeSynset(old). addSynset(new) adds a mapping from each of *new*'s word forms to new. removeSynset(old) removes all mappings from *old*'s word forms to *old*, thus removing it from the lexical mapping completely.\n\n5.2.2\nSimilarity Metrics While the semantic network of Wordnet is interesting on it's own, many applications require sense similarity measures. As such, we provide the *SynsetSimilarity* interface that returns a similarity score between two *Sysnet*s. This is, in short, a Java based implementation of the Wordnet::Similarity package [90], which is in Perl. Figure 9 provides a naive, but short, code sample of our API that computes the similarity between all noun *Synset*s using multiple metrics. Below, we briefly summarize the measures from [90] that we implemented.\n\nSeveral measures utilize the Lowest Common Subsumer (LCS), i.e. the deepest parent common to two *Synset*s using IS-A relations. Each measure takes in two *Synset*s, A and B, as arguments and returns a double value, typically between 0 and 1.\n\nPath Based Methods. measure the similarity based on a path connecting A and B. *Path* simply returns the inverse length of the shortest path between A and B. Leacock&*Chodorow* [63] returns the length of the shortest path scaled by the deepest depth in the hierarchy. Wu&*Palmer* [120] returns the depth of the LCS\nscaled by the cumulative depth of A and B. Hirst&*St.Onge* [46]\nuses all links in the hierarchy and measures the length of the path that is both short and has very few link types.\n\nLexical methods. measure the amount of lexical overlap between A and B. *Lesk* [66] returns the number of words overlapping in A and B's glosses. *ExtendedLesk* [7] extends Lesk by also comparing the glosses between any *Synset*s related to A or B.\n\nInformation based Methods. utilize the Information Content\n(IC) of a *Synset*, which measures the specificity of the terms in a Synset as measured in a sense tagged corpus. *Resnick* [94] returns the IC of the LCS. Jiang&*Conrath* [51] returns the inverse difference between the total IC of A and B and the IC of their LCS.\n\nLin [69] returns the IC of the LCS scaled by the total IC of A and B. In addition to the raw similarity metrics, we provide a utility classes that return meta information about a pair of *Sysnets* such as their shortest path, their LCS, and several other helpful methods.\n\n5.2.3\nWord Sense Disambiguation Word Sense Disambiguation is perhaps the most standard application of Wordnet.\n\nDisambiguation models attempt to select a Synset for a given word that best matches a given context. For example, an algorithm might select the river bank *Synset* of \"bank\" for the context \"he sat on the bank of the river\" rather than the financial institution *Synset*. We provide a WordSenseDisambiguation interface that applies word sense labels to tokenized sentences. Currently, we only provide a small number of unsupervised algorithms, but plan on adding more. Below, we briefly describe each algorithm.\n\nLexical Methods. rely on lexical information in Wordnet to disambiguate words. *Lesk* [66] selects the *Synset* that has the highest total Lesk similarity to the *Synset*s for other context words. ExtendedLesk [7] extends Lesk by using the Extended Lesk similarity metric for all comparisons. *MostFrequentSense* selects the first *Synset* returned by Wordnet for a given term. This serves as a canonnical baseline which is often challenging to outperform.\n\nGraphical Methods. treat the network as a graph and disambiguate using a number of measurements. PersonalizedPageRank [1] (PPR) runs the PageRank algorithm over an undirected graph composed from the entire Wordnet network. Words needing disambiguation are given \"artificial\" nodes that link to their possible Synsets. For each ambiguous word, the algorithm selects the highest ranking Synset. *DegreeCentrality* [83] (DC) forms a subgraph from the Wordnet network composed of ambiguous content words in a sentence and the *Synset*s that connect their possible Synsets. It assigns to each word the target *Synset* with the highest degree in the subgraph. *PageRankCentrality* [83] (PRC)\n\nOntologyReader reader = WordNetCorpusReader.initialize(...);\nSet<Sysnet> nouns = reader.allSynsets(PartsOfSpeech.NOUN);\nSynsetSimilarity sims[] = {new PathSimilarity(), new LeskSimilarity(), ...};\nfor (Synset s1 : nouns)\n for (Synset s2 : nouns)\n    for (SynsetSimilarity sim : sims)\n      System.out.printf(\"%s %s %f\\n\", s1, s2, sim.similarity(s1, s2));\n\ncomposes the same subgraph as *DegreeCentrality*, but performs PageRank on this subgraph and selects the *Synset* with the highest rank for each ambiguous word.\n\n5.2.4\nCastanet Amazon.com and other online retailers often display manually crafted facets, or categories, for product navigation. A customer can start browsing from the Book category and dive down into more specific categories such as Fiction, Entertainment, or Politics. These facets form a hierarchy of categories and each category is subdivided until a narrow set of interesting items are found. Unfortunately, not all datasets have well structued meta data. The Castanet algorithm automatically learns this hierarchical facted meta data (HFC) for a set of documents by using discriminative keywords [107], making structured navigation possible for abritrary document sets. Castanet takes advantage of Wordnet's IS-A hierarchy to automatically create HFC. Castanet first extracts keywords from the set of documents (we use term-frequency inverse document frequency, TF-IDF, by default, but our API allows for other methods). For each extracted keyword, Castanet then creates a chain of words that lead from the root of the hierarchy to the keyword's *Synsets*. Each keyword chain is then merged together to form a \"backbone\" tree which is later reduced by eliminating redundant or non-discriminative nodes, such as those with one child. Our Castanet API is both simple and flexible. To create a Castanet tree, one calls *Castanet.buildTree*() with a directory path to a set of text documents. Our implementation will automatically extract keywords, extract the backbone tree, and finally index each document under it's learned facets. The returned result allows users to fully navigate the documents via the learned facets. We also provide an example Java web service for exploring the hierarchy in a browser.\n\n5.3\nBenchmark To evaluate our library, we apply our six WSD implementations against two standard evaluations: the all words disambiguation tasks from SenseEval 3 [105] and SemEval 2007 [92], these use Wordnet version 1.7.1 and 2.1 respectively. We answer all test instances except those that do not have any mapping in Wordnet. Before processing, we apply part of speech tags to each token using the Open NLP MaxEnt Tagger ver 1.5.036. We use the original databases as a baseline, called Base, in our experiments and test our modification API by adding the eXtended Wordnet (XWN) relations [78] to each database and disambiguate using these extended Wordnets37.\n\nTable 7 presents the F1 score for each algorithm using the original\n36http://opennlp.sourceforge.net/models-1.5/\n37Note that we added XWN 1.7 relations to Wordnet 1.7.1 and XWN 2.0 relations to Wordnet 2.1, some links were discarded due to updates in Wordnet.\n\n| Model   | Ver   |   SenseEval-3 |   SemEval-07 |\n|---------|-------|---------------|--------------|\n| MFS     | Base  |          59.8 |         49.4 |\n| Lesk    | Base  |          35.2 |         27.7 |\n| E-Lesk  | Base  |          47.8 |              |\n| 37.6    |       |               |              |\n| PPR     | Base  |          42.9 |         32.8 |\n| DC      | Base  |          43.2 |         33.3 |\n| PRC     | Base  |          31.7 |         22.7 |\n| Lesk    | XWN   |          35.2 |         27.7 |\n| E-Lesk  | XWN   |          39.9 |         33.9 |\n| PPR     | XWN   |               |              |\n| 50.3    |       |               |              |\n| 36.7    |       |               |              |\n| DC      | XWN   |          47.3 |         37.1 |\n| PRC     | XWN   |          33   |         24   |\n\nand extended databases. As expected, the MFS baseline outperforms each unsupervised algorithm. Although our scores do not match exactly with previous publications of these algorithms, we still see similar trends and the expected gains from adding new relations to the hierarchy. For *DegreeCentrality* and *PageRankCentrality*, our different results are likely due to a implementation difference: when extracting a subgraph from Wordnet, we only use directed links as opposed to undirected links for computational efficiency. Other variations are possibly due to different methods of handling multi-word expressions and our part of speech tags. Still, DC gains about 4% points with WXN relations and *PPR* gains about 7% points on Senseval-3. Unexpectedly, *ExtendedLesk* actually does worse with the additional relations. We also performed a visual test of our Castanet implementation. We ran the algorithm over 1,021 articles extracted from the BBC World News using Wordnet 3.0. The articles came from a diverse set of categories including world, business, technology, and environmental news. Figures 10 and 11 show snapshots of our Castanet web application. Figure 10 displays the top level facets displayed to a new user. The top bar of this screen can break down the facets alphabetically to facilitate facet selection. Figure 11 shows a snapshot of several documents found after selecting several facets. It displays the selected facets, document titles, document text, and interesting key words. While this is only a simple interface, it provides an example of what our implementation can accomplish and how to use our API.\n\n5.4\nFuture Work We have presented our Java Wordnet library that provides two new key features: maintenance of an in memory database and an API centered around modifying the network directly. Additionally, we've provided implementations of several well known similarity metrics, disambiguation algorithms, and the Castanet information retrieval algorithm. All code is unit tested, heavily documented, and released under the GPL Version 2 license. We are currently working to extend our newest APIs, such as those for WSD and Castanet, to handle more interesting use cases. In the future work we hope to expand this library with an evaluation framework for customized Wordnets, such as those generated by [104].\n\n6.\n\nMIXED-CONTEXT ENTITY CO-OCCURRENCE\nMODELING (MC-ECO)\n6.1\nIntroduction The work described in this section aims to facilitate browsing and discovery of *mixed-type* entity contexts. For example, a pair of prominent individuals could be connected by both *business* and politics. We achieve this by applying latent topic models to contexts in which pairs of entities co-occur, giving the user a concise summary of entity co-occurrence. This representation could also be used to cluster relationships across different entity pairs.\n\n6.2\nEntity Co-Occurrence (ECO)\nGiven an appropriately annotated text corpus (e.g., the New York Times), the Entity Co-Occurrence (ECO) browser [42] allows the user to perform several useful tasks:\n\n- given an entity (e.g., \"George Bush\"), find entities that frequently co-occur in the same context (e.g., Saddam Hussein)\n- given a pair of entities (e.g., \"Bush\" and \"Hussein\"), examine\nthe actual contexts in which they co-occur\n- given a pair of entities (e.g., \"Bush\" \"Hussein\"), examine the\ntf-idf [75] representation of the aggregate of all contexts in which they co-occur\nWe refer to a single context in which a pair of entities co-occur as a *co-context*. An example choice of context might be the sentence, but different choices are possible (e.g., within a ten-token window).\n\n6.3\nAdding context types A natural extension of this idea is to use these co-contexts to assign a type or *label* to each context. For example, \"Bush\" and \"Hussein\"\ncould be said to have a *politics* context, while the context between\n\"Larry Page\" and \"Sergey Brin\" could be categorized as *business*.\n\nEven without provided ground truth labels, this could be achieved using *unsupervised* machine learning techniques [31]. For example we could simply apply k-means clustering to the *tf-idf* representations of the co-contexts of each entity pair. Clustering entity pairs by context in this way [44] would enhance user browsing capabilities; for example the user could choose to see only the entities which co-occur in *business* contexts with a given entity.\n\n6.4\nMixed-context modeling However this extension raises the issue of handling contexts that do not fall neatly into a single category. For example, the context between \"Putin\" and \"Khodorkovsky\" cannot neatly be categorized as either business or *politics*, but must be considered to be a mixture of both aspects.\n\n6.5\nRelated work Early work on this problem [44] clustered pairs of named entities by co-context cosine similarity. The resulting clusters were labeled and evaluated against manually labeled entity pairs. The Semantic Network Extractor (SNE) [56] is based on Markov Logic Networks (MLN) [95] and extracts tuples of the form (relation, arg1*, arg*2).\n\n| Goal             | Atom            | Explanation       |\n|------------------|-----------------|-------------------|\n| Edge label (mix) | (Entity,Entity) | Relation browsing |\n| Node label (mix) | Entity          | Entity browsing   |\n\nThe specific MLN is similar to co-clustering - arguments are clustered by their relation slots and relations are clustered by their arguments. Results are evaluated against manual gold standard relations. The Mixed-Membership Stochastic Blockmodel (MMSB) [2] models graph data. Each node has a distribution  over latent roles z. For each candidate edge (*i, j*), each node samples latent roles\n(zi, zj). The edge is generated with probability (zi,zj), and is absent otherwise. Nubbi [23] models two types of text: entity contexts and entity pair co-contexts. An entity context is formed by concatenating all contexts in which an entity is mentioned, and is modeled similar to an LDA document. An entity pair co-context is formed similarly from contexts in which the entities co-occur, and is modeled with a special \"switching\" variant of LDA that selects between entity1\ntopics, *entity2* topics, and *entity pair* topics. BlockLDA [6] combines LDA with ideas from MMSB, and also allows the generation of different data types associated with a given document such as words, entities, or tags. Recent work on modeling relations *without* labeled text [96] leverages the use of *distant supervision*, where individual entity mentions are *not* labeled with the presence or absence of a given relation. Instead, distant supervision provides a KB of entity relations (from Freebase) and a text collection of entity mentions (from the New York Times) which *may or may not* discuss the relation. A constrained graphical model is then used to learn from this supervision. Follow-on work [122] improves performance further by joint inference of entity *types* and relation preferences with respect to those types. For example, isCitizenOf(*x, y*) only makes sense where x is a *person* and y is a *country*.\n\nRelational Topic Models (RTM) [22] builds on Supervised LDA\n(SLDA) [12], predicting the presence or absence of inter-document edges (e.g., citations). As in SLDA, a link between documents i and j depends on the empirical topic frequencies  zi and  zj via an element-wise product within a link prediction function (T (  zi\n zj)).\n\nThe concept of *link homophily* refers to the tendency for two edges with a common endpoint to be similar. This tendency can be exploited to characterize computer network traffic [35], even in the presence of packet obfuscation. Using topic models over relations to assist in discovering new relations has been explored in [116]. That work leverages a large catalog of existing relations from Wikipedia to learn a background model, and leverages that to improve the extraction of new relations.\n\n## 6.6 Goals\n\n(a) Co-occurring entities.\n(b) Co-occurrence contexts.\nBrief summaries of different desired system outputs are shown in Table 8.\n\n6.7\nOur approach Our approach is to use LDA to model the co-occurrence contexts of entity pairs, treating individual sentences as the unit of context. That is, we first run LDA over the entire corpus. The final sample z then assigns each token in the corpus to a particular latent topic z. We can then combine these topic assignments with the entity pair co-occurrence sentences in order to identify topics associated with the entity pair. We have implemented a prototype of this system as a web application, which we use generate the results for the following example. Say that we are a historian examining New York Times articles from 2003 and we are interested in the entity \"Bush\". We first query the web interface to get entities which often co-occur with Bush (Figure 12a). We would then see \"Tony Blair\" as a commonly co-occurring entity, and we could directly examine the sentences in which they co-occur (Figure 12b).\n\nAs in ECO, we can examine the tf-idf representation of their contexts, taken in aggregate over all sentences in which they co-occur (Figure 13a). By applying LDA topic modeling, we can also examine the prevalent topics from their co-occurrences (Figure 13b). By grouping related words together, the latent topics give us a more informative summary than the tf-idf representation alone. Furthermore, the topics themselves are also associated with weights which can be used for entity-relationship clustering.\n\n6.8\nFuture extensions Because we are modeling the contexts in which a pair of entities co-occur, it is very important that these contexts are as complete and correct as possible. That is, we would like to resolve different references to the same entity (e.g., \"Saddam Hussein\" and \"Hussein\"). A further challenge is that we require these mentions to be identified as referring to the same entity even if the mentions occur in different documents. This problem is known as cross-document\n\n(a) tf-idf of co-occurring contexts.\n(b) Prominent topics of co-occurring contexts.\ntf-idf and LDA representations of Bush-Blair cooccurrence contexts.\n\ncoreference resolution, and there exist highly scalable streaming algorithms for this purpose [93]. Beyond this practical concern, there are a variety of exciting theoretical directions in which to extend this approach.\n\n- **Distant supervision:** labels at a coarser granularity than the\nlevel considered by our target task. For example, we may know that a relation exists between two entities, but not which mentions refer to that relation. This kind of knowledge may\nbe effectively exploited with different types of **constraints**.\n- **Partial supervision:** use an essentially unsupervised technique with some \"seed\" instances. For example some prototypical mentions could be hard-forced into a given cluster.\n- **Non-parametric Bayes:** the number of underlying relations\nis probably not clear *a priori*, so explicitly modeling this uncertainty may be advantageous.\n- **Hierarchical Bayes:** many entities appear only in a single\nrelation, leading to a data sparsity challenge. This problem may benefit from the evidence sharing effects induced by\nhierarchical Bayesian models, e.g., pooling word contexts\nacross many mentions via a latent parameter variable may reveal useful patterns. This formulation would also naturally\nencode a notion of **link homophily**.\n- **Sparsity:** a parsimonious representation of a given co-context\ntype or cluster has obvious advantages, both computational and cognitive. Tools from sparse dictionary learning work may be useful.\n7.\n\nEXPLORING TOPIC COHERENCE OVER\nMANY MODELS AND MANY TOPICS\nTopic models learn bags of related words from large corpora without any supervision. Based on the words used within a document, they mine topic level relations by assuming that a single document covers a small set of concise topics. Once learned, these topics should correlate well with human concepts, for example, one model might produce topics that cover ideas such as government affairs, sports, and movies. With these unsupervised methods, we can utilize useful semantic information in a variety of tasks that depend on identifying unique topics or concepts, such as distributional semantics [52], word sense induction [113, 18], and information retrieval [4]. When using a topic model, we are primarily concerned with the degree to which the learned topics match human judgements and help us differentiate between ideas. But until recently, the evaluation of these models has been ad hoc and application specific. In some cases a single approach has been compared to human judgements of semantic similarity or relatedness, see [52] for one set of evaluations. But these evaluations are costly to generate for domain specific topics. In other cases, automated intrinsic measures such as perplexity have been used, but it's been noted that improving the perplexity of a model may not correlate with learning more semantically coherent topics. Furthermore, few evaluations have used the same metrics to compare distinct approaches such as Latent Dirichlet Allocation [14], Latent Semantic Analysis [60], and Non-negative Matrix Factorization [64]. This has made it difficult to know which method is most useful and which parameters should be used.\n\nWe now provide a comprehensive evaluation of these three unique base models for automatically learning semantic topics.\n\nWhile these base models are not always used, they represent the core differences between each approach to modeling topics. For our evaluation, we use two recent automated metrics originally designed for LDA that try to bridge the gap between comparisons to human judgements and intrinsic measures such as perplexity [80, 86]. Using these metrics, we consider several key questions, such as\n\n1. How many topics should be learned? 2. How many learned topics are useful? 3. How do these topics relate to often used semantic tests? 4. How well do these topics identify similar documents?\nWe first begin by summarizing the three topic models and highlight their key differences. We then describe the two metrics. Afterwards, we focus on a series of experiments that address our four key questions and finally conclude with some overall remarks.\n\n## 7.1 Topic Models We Evaluate Three Latent Factor Models That Have Seen Widespread Usage:\n\n1. Latent Dirichlet Allocation 2. Latent Semantic Analysis with Singular Value Decomposition 3. Latent Semantic Analysis with Non-negative Matrix Factorization\nEach of these models have been designed with different goals and are supported by different statistical theories. And while the two forms of LSA have not typically been referred to as Topic Models, they have been used in a variety of similar contexts such as distributional similarity [52], word sense induction [113, 18], and information retrieval [4]. Based on these similar use cases, we consider it useful to compare these models with a consistent evaluation that matches well with our overall goal: latent factors should bring together similar words and separate unrelated words and latent factors should help distinguish between documents covering distinct topics.\n\nTo focus on our two goals, we are interested in two sets of relations that are learned by each model: how words interact with topics and how topics interact with documents. We generalize these two sets of relations as two distinct matrices: (1) W, a word by topic matrix that indicates the strength each word has in each topic, and (2) H, a document by topic matrix that indicates the strength each topic has in each document. In two of the models (LDA and NMF), these matrices can represent the relations as probabilities, while the SVD uses eigen vectors to represent these relations.\n\n7.1.1\nLatent Dirichlet Allocation Latent Dirichlet Allocation [14] learns the relationships between words, topics, and documents by making an assumption on how documents are generated. It first assumes that there are a fixed set of topics that are used throughout a corpus and each topic can use all observed words. Then, each document, Di is generated by the following process\n\n1. Choose i  *Dir*(), a topic distribution for Di 2. For each word wj  Di:\n(a) Select a topic zj  i\n(b) Choose zj  *Dir*(), a word distribution for a topic\n(c) Select the word wj  zj\nIn this model, the  distributions represent the probability of each topic appearing in each document and the  distributions represent the probability of words being used for each topic. These two sets of distributions match exactly with our H and W matrices, respectively. The model uses one parameter, the number of topics, and two hyper parameters that guide the distributions,  and . While the process above is a generative model, we use collapsed Gibbs sampling to infer these distributions [41].\n\n7.1.2\nLatent Semantic Analysis Latent Semantic Analysis [60, 61] attempts to find descriptive latent factors that can compactly represent word distributions in observed in documents. The model first represents the data set as a large term by document matrix M that simply records how many times each word occurs in each document. It then smooths the counts so that frequent, but uninformative, words, such as determiners and conjunctions, are given less weight while simultaneously boosting the weight of less frequent, but more informative words38. LSA then uses one of various dimensionality reduction techniques to learn a smaller sub-space that generalizes observed relations between word and documents. Traditionally, LSA has used the Singular Value Decomposition, but we also consider Nonnegative Matrix Factorization as we've seen NMF applied in similar situations [89] and others have found a connection between NMF and Probabilistic Latent Semantic Analysis [29], an extension to LSA. We later refer to these two LSA models simply as SVD and NMF to signify the difference in factorization method.\n\nSingular Value Decomposition. decomposes M into three smaller matrices\n\nM = UV T\n38Based on the original LSA model, we use the Log-Entropy transform for this smoothing such that M can be reconstructed with minimal noise. Interestingly, the decomposition is agnostic to the number of desired dimensions. Instead, the rows and columns in U and V T are ordered based on their descriptive power, i.e. how well they remove noise, which is encoded by . As such, reduction is done by simply removing lower ranked rows and columns from U and V T . For our generalization, we use W = U and H = V T . We note that values in U and V T can be both negative and positive, preventing them from being directly interpreted as probabilities.\n\nNon-negative Matrix Factorization. factorizes M with different constraints. It attempts to find two latent topic matrices that minimizes the euclidean least squares difference while only using non-negative values. In this respect, we can consider it to be learning probability distributions over topics. We use the original Euclidean least squares definition of NMF, but we note that the alternative KL-Divergence form of NMF has been directly linked to PLSA [29]. Formally, NMF is defined as\n\nM = WH\nWhere H and W map directly onto our generalization. We learn these probabilities by initializing each set of probabilities at random and update them according to the following iterative update rules\n\nW = W MHT WHHT H = H W T M W T WH\n7.2\nCoherence Metrics Topic Coherence metrics score a single topic by measuring the degree of semantic similarity between high scoring words in the topic. These measurements help distinguish between topics that are semantically interpretable topics and topics that are artifacts of statistical inference. For example consider the sets of topics in Tables 7.2\nand 7.2. For our evaluations, we consider two new coherence metrics designed for LDA, both of which have been shown to match well with human judgements of topic quality:\n\n1. The UCI metric [86] 2. The UMass metric [80]\nSince both metrics compare distributional similarity between the top N words in a topic, we generalize the two metrics to compute the coherence of a topic W as follows\n\n\\(\\begin{array}{c}\\mbox{$\\begin{array}{c}\\mbox{\\small coherence}(W)=\\sum_{\\mbox{ \\scriptsize$\\begin{array}{c}\\mbox{\\small$\\begin{array}{c}\\mbox{\\small$ \\begin{array}{c}\\mbox{\\small$\\begin{array}{c}\\mbox{\\small$\\begin{array}{c}\n\nWhere  indicates a smoothing factor which guarantees that score returns real numbers.\n\nThe UCI metric. defines a word pair's score to be the point wise mutual information between two words, i.e.\n\n$\\begin{array}{l}\\mbox{score}(u_{i},u_{j},\\epsilon)=\\mbox{log}\\frac{p(u_{i},u_{j}) -\\epsilon}{p(u_{i})p(u_{j})}\\end{array}$\nThe word probabilities are computed by counting word co-occurrence frequencies in a sliding window over an external corpus, such as Wikipedia. To some degree, this metric can be thought of as an external comparison to known semantic evaluations.\n\nThe UMass metric. defines the score to be based on document co-occurrence:\n\n$\\text{score}(u_{i},u_{j},\\epsilon)=log\\frac{D(u_{1},u_{j})-\\epsilon}{D(u_{j})}$\nWhere D(*x, y*) counts the number of documents containing words x and y and D(x) counts the number of documents containing x. Significantly, the UMass metric computes these counts over the original corpus used to train the topic models, rather than an external corpus. This metric is more intrinsic in nature; it attempts to confirm that the models learned data known to be in the corpus.\n\n| Model                      | Metric                     |\n|----------------------------|----------------------------|\n|                           |                            |\n| Top Words                  |                            |\n| UMASS                      |                            |\n| 1.0                        | told                       |\n| thought time               |                            |\n| LDA                        |                            |\n| 10                         |                            |\n|                           |                            |\n| 12                         |                            |\n| told                       | asked                      |\n| thought time               |                            |\n| UCI                        |                            |\n| 1.0                        | restaurant                 |\n| food dishes                |                            |\n| 10                         |                            |\n|                           |                            |\n| 12                         |                            |\n| vaccine health smallpox    |                            |\n| flu vaccines               |                            |\n| UMASS                      |                            |\n| 1.0                        | browned servings table-    |\n| spoons garlic oven         |                            |\n| NMF                        |                            |\n| 10                         |                            |\n|                           |                            |\n| 12                         |                            |\n| browned servings table-    |                            |\n| spoons garlic oven         |                            |\n| UCI                        |                            |\n| 1.0                        | kitchen dining fireplace   |\n| 1-bath 3-bedroom           |                            |\n| 10                         |                            |\n|                           |                            |\n| 12                         |                            |\n| loans                      | borrowers                  |\n| nance borrower refinanc-   |                            |\n| ing                        |                            |\n| UMASS                      |                            |\n| 1.0                        | sister struggling property |\n| welfare decade             |                            |\n| SVD                        |                            |\n| 10                         |                            |\n|                           |                            |\n| 12                         |                            |\n| sister struggling property |                            |\n| welfare decade             |                            |\n| UCI                        |                            |\n| 1.0                        | gains                      |\n| ronmentalist organizing    |                            |\n| tricks                     |                            |\n| 10                         |                            |\n|                           |                            |\n| 12                         |                            |\n| explain power rush noon    |                            |\n| shelter                    |                            |\n\n7.3\nEvaluation We have designed four sets of experiments to evaluate how each of these models perform, with a focus on ow the models vary based on the number of requested topics and how the models vary with respect to each other. We also take into consideration the  value for the two metrics. We apply both metrics, and aggregate versions of each metric, to each learned model.\n\n| Model                   | Metric                    |\n|-------------------------|---------------------------|\n|                        |                           |\n| Top Words               |                           |\n| UMASS                   |                           |\n| 1.0                     | front page 27 28 20       |\n| 10                      |                           |\n|                        |                           |\n| 12                      |                           |\n| front page 27 28 20     |                           |\n| LDA                     |                           |\n| UCI                     |                           |\n| 1.0                     | show                      |\n| tographs 6 objects      |                           |\n| 10                      |                           |\n|                        |                           |\n| 12                      |                           |\n| hours                   | day                       |\n| days                    |                           |\n| UMASS                   |                           |\n| 1.0                     | lists 6 witchcraft murder |\n| 7                       |                           |\n| NMF                     |                           |\n| 10                      |                           |\n|                        |                           |\n| 12                      |                           |\n| 27 21 d5 f5 cd          |                           |\n| UCI                     |                           |\n| 1.0                     | officials inside chemical |\n| game field              |                           |\n| 10                      |                           |\n|                        |                           |\n| 12                      |                           |\n| renovated               | 2-bath                    |\n| deductible              | exposures                 |\n| doormen                 |                           |\n| UMASS                   |                           |\n| 1.0                     | taxes                     |\n| summoned approached     |                           |\n| SVD                     |                           |\n| 10                      |                           |\n|                        |                           |\n| 12                      |                           |\n| gains                   | diagramed                 |\n| ronmentalist organizing |                           |\n| tricks                  |                           |\n| UCI                     |                           |\n| 1.0                     | pop                       |\n| chaos grande            |                           |\n| 10                      |                           |\n|                        |                           |\n| 12                      |                           |\n| gains                   | diagramed                 |\n| ronmentalist organizing |                           |\n| tricks                  |                           |\n\nWe trained all models on 92,600 New York Times articles from 2003 [101]. For all articles, we removed stop words and any words that occurred less than 200 times in the corpus, which left 35,836 tokens. All documents were tokenized based on whitespace. For the UCI metric, we used the UkWac Wikipedia corpus and considered all terms in Wikipedia while computing the sliding window with 10 words before and after the focus word. In all experiments, we used the top 10 words from each topic that had the highest weight, in terms of LDA and NMF this corresponds with a high probability of the term describing the topic but for SVD there is no clear semantic interpretation.\n\n## In Our Experiments We\n\n1. explore several views of topic coherence such as average coherence,\nbest coherence, and coherence entropy;\n2. explore topic uniqueness metrics to evaluate how distinct each model\nbecomes;\n3. compare average topic coherence to previous semantic similarity\nevaluations;\n4. compare topic coherence with classification strength.\n7.3.1\nTopic Coherence Views Before we can compare topics models against one another, we require a coherence metric for complete models, rather than individual topics. We consider four possible aggregates: the coherence of the best topic for a model, the coherence of the median topic, the average coherence of all topics, and the entropy of the coherence for all topics. Each aggregate method gives us slightly different information, in particular the entropy can cleanly differentiate between two interesting cases that the others cannot: cases where all topics have relatively similar scores and cases where some topics are highly rated but others are poorly rated.\n\nFigures 14, 15, and 16 show the scores for the average coherence, best coherence, and entropy, respectively, when setting  = 1.0\nfor the smoothing factor39. The average and best scores indicate a simple relationship between the three models: the SVD is constantly worse than LDA and NMF, and the NMF is often times better than LDA. Surprisingly though, with the UCI metric, the entropy shows an unexpected variation: the NMF has distinctly nonuniform scores. Based on a manual inspection of the topics, we noticed that some of the high scoring topics appeared incoherent and composed of rare words. We further explored the impact of the smoothing factor and set\n = 1012 and then re-evaluated the models. Figures 18 and 17\nshow the average and median coherence scores for the modified metrics. Interestingly, these plots show a starkly different relationship between NMF and LDA: under both metrics, the average NMF score is regularly less than the average LDA score and the median NMF score for both metrics begins to degrade as more topics are requested. Also of equal interest, we see that the SVD performs terribly, generating scores well below NMF and LDA. Even more interestingly, if we focus on the best 10% topics, we see the original relationship: NMF appears to generate better topics than the other two models. We further explore this performance variation by focusing on a single set of models trained for 300 topics. Figures 22 and 23 show the spread of all topic scores for each model when setting  to 1.0\nand 1012, respectively. In all cases, LDA has a reasonably narrow range. The SVD again has a narrow range when using a high  and a wide range of poor scores for a low . The NMF plots confirm our suspicion: the model continues to generate a set of high quality topics, but the majority of the topics learned have a wide range of low scores. We similarly see this variation in Figure 25, which plots the variation when taking the average over a subset of the best topics.\n\n7.3.2\nTopic Uniqueness As our second experiment, wanted to evaluate whether or not the models are successfully learning new distinct topics as we request more. While the coherence metrics were initially designed to evaluate coherence, the first experiment indicated that they can similarly be used to evaluate incoherence. With that in mind, we developed a simple metric that rates the semantic disagreement between sets of topics. This is simply defined as\n\n$\\begin{array}{c}\\mbox{$\\mu_{i}$}\\in W,\\mbox{$\\mu_{j}$}\\not\\in W\\end{array}$$score(w_{i},w_{j},\\epsilon)$\nThis measures the similarity between words in a topic and words in other topics. Ideally, each topic should have a low uniqueness score, which indicates that each topic is semantically distinct. For complete models, we would expect the total *uniqueness* over all topics to decrease as we request more topics until we reach a point of topic saturation, i.e. the model is no longer able to discover more unique topics. Figure 26 reports the total *uniqueness* scores for each model. Surprisingly, we see no saturation point for any model, indicating that\n39To the best of our knowledge, the original metrics used this same smoothing factor we could learn well over 500 topics and still extract new information. The SVD provides good justification that this metric makes sense, since each new topic returned by the SVD is guaranteed to be orthogonal and distinct from previous topics, the total uniqueness decreases steadily. Both LDA and SVD similarly show a steady decrease with some variation that is likely due to random starting points.\n\n7.3.3\nWord Similarity Tasks As our third experiment, we wished to compare the coherence scores to two standard word similarity tests, the [99] semantic similarity task and the [34] relatedness task. Both tasks were created by giving human judges a set of word pairs. Evaluators were asked to determine the similarity or relatedness of a word pair. The rubenstein65wordsim task used 65 word pairs while Finklestein et. al used 353 word pairs. Both have been used as a standard metric of distributional word spaces, jurgens10sspace provide a good collection of how traditional distributional semantic models fare on this task.\n\nFor each learned model, we use the W word by topic matrix as a reduced representation of each word. For each test word pair, we use the cosine similarity between the reduced representations of each word and record the correlation between the similarity scores and the known human evaluations. A high correlation between similarity scores and human judgements indicate that the word by topic distributions closely model human expectations. Figure 27 displays the results. Surprisingly, NMF and LDA both outperform SVD by a wide margin. Also, LDA does slightly better, especially as we request more topics, than NMF, which matches well with our observations from the first experiment.\n\nWith the Rubenstein & Goodenough test, we see regular improvement in performance as we request more topics, while performance on the Finklestein et. al test levels out after about 100 topics, and even starts to degrade for NMF after 100 topics.\n\n7.4\nDiscussion Through our experiments, we made several interesting discoveries. First, we discovered that the coherence metrics depend heavily on the smoothing factor . The original value used by the creators of the metric, 1.0 created a positive bias towards NMF models from both metrics, even when NMF generated incoherent topics. Our manual investigation suggests that the metrics do not accurately compare two words that are both rare and unrelated. A smaller  correctly scores these cases and appears to have little affect on the common case, and so we recommend using a small smoothing factor. We also see that the SVD underperformed in all experiments, indicating that both LDA and NMF provide a better representation of semantics. Second, we note that while fewer topics are faster to create, we have not exhausted the ability of automated methods to extract semantically coherent topics from a single year of the New York Times corpus, even with a relatively large number of topics (500) for a fairly small corpus. However, the quantity of low quality topics increases much more rapidly, and the computational cost increases dramatically as well. Overall, it appears that LDA maintains a edge over NMF, and holds the promise of much more semantically motivated tuning. 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    },
    {
        "text": "Office of the Director of National Intelligence Washington, DC 20511\nMr. Steven Aftergood Federation of American Scientists\n1725 DeSales Street, NW, Suite 600\nWashington, DC 20036\nReference: FOIA Request DF-2010-00031\nDear Mr. Aftergood:\nThis is in reference to a letter sent to you by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)\n(Enclosure 1), in response to our referral to FBI. The referral was made pursuant to your\n23 December 2009 email to the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI), in which you requested, under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), copies of two ODNI SHARP\n(Summer Hard Problem Program) reports from July 2009 (Enclosure 2). ODNI provided you with the document on Nuclear Attribution on 19 September 2014.\n\nFBI indicated in their letter that they had not identified any FBI equities in the document, and administratively closed the request. However, as the document is responsive to your request, ODNI is providing it to you (Enclosure 3).\n\nODNI has determined that material must be withheld pursuant to the following FOIA\nexemptions:\n\n-\n(b)(3), which applies to information exempt by statutes, specifically 50 U.S.C.\n3024(m)(1), which protects, among other things, the names and identifying information\nof ODNI personnel; and\n-\n(b )(7)(E), which affords protection to all law enforcement information that \"would\ndisclose investigative techniques and procedures.\nIf you wish to appeal ODNI's determination on this request, please explain the basis of your appeal and forward to the address below within 45 days of the date of this letter.\n\nOffice of the Director of National Intelligence Information Management Office Washington D.C. 20511\nIf you have any questions regarding the denial of ODNI information, email our Requester Service Center at DNI-FOIA@dni.gov or call us at (703) 874-8500.\n\n~ennifer Hudson Director, Information Management Division Enclosures\n1/lN.V ENFEIAEEMENT 5fN5ffl'i'f\n\n## Isi-11\\Rpi\n\nA COMPUTER IN EVERY POCKET:\nMixed Reality, Geolocation & Smart Phones\n1/I:AW ENF9AEEMENT SENSITI't'\nUNCl-ASSIFIED\n\n(U) Letter from the Director\n(U} Executive Summary & Key Findings\n(U} ScqJe~.\n(U)MyNetwork ~-$~~r J.han Your~\n(U} The Hive\n(U} How WiD MR. Atfec:t Societies Wortdwlde?\n(U} MR, Cognition and Information Operations\n(U} Crowdsourcing\n(U) Editorial: Privacy in Mixed Reality\n(U} Law Enforcement Issues\n(U} Money Mastery: Mixed Reality and the Global Economic Landsca~; ''.:\n(U) Alternate PefSP.8Ctive on Information Security\n(U} Keeping the IC One Step Ahead\n(U} Endnotes\nOffice of the D~~tor ofNationallntelligence Deputy Director of National Intelligence for Analysis Wahington, DC 2051 J\n(U/t'Ft>Ut>) On behalf of the DirKtor of National Intelligence, I am pleucd to abare with you an interesting report titled, A Computer in Every Pocket: Mixed Reality, Geolocation. and Smart Phones, produced by our Summer Hard problem Program (SHARP).\n\n(U) Each summer a remarbble even occurs. Over the course offour weeks, professionals from the US Government, academia, the private sector, and state and local law enforcement gather to study, debate, and analyze what has been judged to be a particularly thorny national security problem. The group meets in a sccludcd'location that takes them away from the demands of their offices, so they can think expansively and boldly about hard challenges and pradical solutions.\n\n(U) Participants are encouraged to collaborate extensively with one another and to draw upon their experience while seeking new approaches to the problem being studied. SHARP seeks to catapult the discovery of new analytic insights while promoting two over arching goals: to plant the seeds of cultural change within the analytic community by exposing them to new tradecraft and diverse thinking, and to facilitate the building of networks among analysts and operators from varied backgrounds both internal and external to the intelligence community. The report in intended to stimulate discussion.\n\nThe information in this document is intended FOR OF:FICIAL USE ONLY. It represents the thinking, expertise, and research of a selecr group of individuals, not of the Director of National Intelligence or the Intelligence Community, per se.\n\n(b)(3)\n(U) I would like to thank Direc:tor ofCyber Information Operations and Strategic Studies at the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence (OUSD(I)), for serving as topic champion and advocate of the SHARP Mixed Reality session. Without her leadership, inspiration, and commitment of time, a successful study that would not have been possible.\n\n(U) I hope you will enjoy reading this report and discover, as I have, the boundless creativity that is unleashed when diverse professionals come together wi~\nsolving problems of national importance. For more information. please contact~\nSHARP\nProgram Manager j(b)(3)\nSincerely,\n-~\nPeter Lavoy\n\n## (U) Executive Summary & Key Findings\n\n(U) In 182 word~;~-~~l.e:~.s ...\n\n-\n'J-i\n-.;  .. _, .. -~\n.. . . ..\n1. (Ur~i~~'e.~ii~l{~if.;.~~~s:tifeinterweaving of physical reality and virtual\n-: ~\n.. ~ ...... \\: ..... ,..\n, .t,. - . . -\n, '.. . .\n. ;\nreality to the extent they are perceived as one.\n2. (U) MR is uniquely shaped by the individuars degree of investment and\nengagement In social networks, the degree of online immersion, and competing\nsocio-cultural elements.\n3. (U) The adoption worldwide of mobile, wireless technology is leading to\nunprecedented Information sharing among individuals -\nIn real time and across\ninternational borders. These advances enable users to Individually and collectively\naffect polit1cal, economic, and cultural dynamics within nearly any nation state.\n4. (U} A forward-looking understanding of MR's capabilities and &Jabal implications\nwill help the US Intelligence Community (IC) gain competitive advantage ln ...\n(U) Anticipating changes in state and qon-state actor awareness, orientation, Intents,\nand behaviors\n(U) Driving rapid evolution in IC collection, data visualization, collaboration, analysis,\nand dissemination processes\n5. (U) Conversely, constraints caused by the IC's security needs and culture of\nInformation control wiU challenge the community's ability to adopt MR or even\nrecruit future employees who have grown up relying on palmtop computers and\ncrowdsourcing.\n\n## (U) What Is \"Mixed Re~Lity?\"\n\n(U) The acc:elerated worldwide conwrsion of mobile phones Into mobile internet devices Is transforming both human society and the Internet itSelf. As of 2008, there were 1.6 billion Internet users &lobally and 4 billion mobile phone users. 2 Over 1 billion mobile Internet users a~ projected Jlobally by 2011.1 The number of alobal Internet users and mobile phone users wiH converse rapidly In the cominJ years as all new mobile phones become Internet-enabled.\n\n(U) As people lntesrate the use of the internet more deeply into their daily lives -\nwhenever they choose and wherever they are -\nthe virtual world of the internet and the real world will besin to rnerp toward a point at which they will be perceived to operate as one. This is\n.,Mixed Reality.\n(U) The advent of MR is transformative and is increasingly affecting all aspects of life. People's behavior is already chansJnl, propelling us doser to a dependency on uninterrupted, persistent connectedness.\n\n- (U) The Increasingly common habit of\n\nsharing what you're thinking (Twitter), what\nyou're readlns (StumbleUpon), your finances\n(Wesabe), your everything (the Web) is\nbecoming a foundation of our culture.\n- {U) More and more people will share their\ninformation (ideas, intentions, content,\npreferences, 'friend' networks, real-time\nlocations, etc.) to get something beneficial in\nreturn.\n- (U) If you are interesting enouch or generate\n(U) Emerging MR technologies make It possible for the first time to use the full resources of the Internet in real time, virtually anywhere, on a Jlobal scale. As a result, individuals and small groups at the rilht time and the right plcKe have a much greater ability to influence political, economic, and cultural developments. Two recent examples: The use of Twitter to provide first..ftand reports from the scene of the summer\n2009 post-presidential election riots in tran, and the use of Twitter by onlookers to share warning information during the November 2008 Mumbai\n.attacks.\n\nenough value (whether socially, throUJh\nyour keen Insights, or throueh other\nqualities), whatever you create online will be\nmined and exposed .\n(U) Many examples of MR technoiOSY can seem like science flc;tlon, such as the use of electronic visors to see thr~imensional computer-generated objects Interact with a real environment. However, some of the seemingly mundane elements of MR technology (i.e., ubiquitous, sensor-filled, GP5-enabled mobile devices like Apple's iPhone) are already dramatically c:hanaJns the Wll'f people live, communicate, do business, and shape socio\npolitical conditions. Such changes can be as prosaic as people adjustlns driving habits based on reaf..time, precise location and traffic:\ninformation, and as profound as the emef'llnl ability to traclc practtcally anyone anywhere.1\n(U) While locative tec:hnoiolies are relattvely cheap, efficient, and attracttve for commercial developers,and an inc:reasinaly expected norm for consumers, the deeper intesration of these technologies Into daily life will alter perspectives on the relationships between personal location, privacy, and trust.\n\n## (U) Why Does Mixed Reality Matter?\n\n(U) Competttlve advantage-economic. miUtary, and even artistic- in every advance of these pei'Vfslve technologies is so powerful thatfalllnt to participate In and .......,. this new reaHty blinds us and helps our adversaries achieve a dedsiw information advantap. The availability of millons of networked mobile sensors on Smartphones and other mobile devices presents the United StateS, Its allies, competitors, and adversaries with unprecedented intelllpnce collection opportunities and unprecedented security vulnerablllttes. Adaptln& to this chanse Is not an option -\nit is a necessity for US and allied national security.\n\n(U) The United States lags behind many other nations in MR. Further, the US Intelligence Community at large is la&&inc behind the country, preventlns itself from seizing the information advantage available with mixed reality technolo&ies. Havins a broad base of inteNisence officers who are personally conversant and Immersed in the laJlluase and use of mixed reality Is a key prerequisite for advancins us Interests. Adoptlns the anyttme, anywhere\" . mixed reality workplace paracli&m inside the lntellf&ence Community will empower us to i-espond to global challenses ahead of our adversaries.\n\n## (U) Galnlns A Better Understandins Of Mixed Reality's Opportunities And Vulnerabilities\n\n(U) The following bullets provide a quick look at the breadth of topics examined during the summer 2009 Summer Hard Problem session:\n\n- (U) We are at the cusp of a new lnteUi&ence\n'type': crowdsourced intelligence (CROWD\nINTJ. The intelligence community has a unique opportunity to engase the public to help filter and solve a multitude of difficult tasks. As \"brands,\" the various government agencies have the ability to mobilize their citizens to complete tasks for the common good. The wealth of a nation wtll be derived from its networked population, which will translate into that nation's ability to .moblli~e intellectual property, information technology, and other virtual\n\nresources to promote and defend its own\nInterests. Further, there is the potential\nfor a networked population to not only\nconduct information collection I processing\n1 validation tasks (\"sensory and mind\"\ntasks of the hive), but also to coordinate\ncollective action (\"hands and feet\" tasks\nof the. hive) in multiple realities (physical,\nvirtual, and mixed). So what? Thousands\nof eyes and hands can be summoned\nwith rapidly decreasing need for notice or\nadvance planning. Applications here will\nspan from state control to non-state group\ninfluence to macro-Scale \"neighborhood\nwatch\", from criminal activities to the law\nenforcement community's investigations and\nprosecutions, and beyond!\n\n(U) The permeation of MR throughout societies\nworldwide\n                will\n                        present\n                                    game-changing\n\nopportuoities for the strategic influence and\ninformatiOn operations communities. Getting\nahead and staying ahead of MR's evolution is\na necessity for US and allied national security,\n\nas it will not just be the US and our allies that will seek to gain an advantage via MR-enabled awareness and capabilities.\n\n(U) The concept of privacy has undergone a\nmassive change; many do not realize this fact.\nTechnological development has outpaced the\nlegal community's ability to keep up. Private\ncorporations now define the legal lanes with the\nuse of End User License Agreements (EULAs).\nWhile laws in the past were established to\nregulate US government intrusions into an\nindividual's privacy, to what extent are private\ncorporations (and their owners) limited from\ncollecting an individual's, EULA-granted data?\n(These data can include real-time location,\nrelationships, appearance, interests, physical\nworld and online trends, and so forth.) The\ncurrent lack of protection will surprise and\nshock.\n\n(U) The ability to anticipate future problems\nin the global economic and financial systems\nis crucial to safeguarding our American ideals.\n             These\n                       are\n                               highly\n                                         challenging\n\n\"targets\"\n            for\n                  the\n                         lnteUigence\n\nCommunity to better understand,\ncalling for a new, robust kind of\nanalysis. MR-enabled capabilities\npotentially hold the key for the\nIntelligence Community to help\nthwart future crises.\n\n(U) A competitive advantage for\nUS and allied intelligence can be\ngained through the use of real-\ntime MR simulation and modeling\ntools for analysis and collaboration.\nAdvancements In immersive multi-\nmodal displays and telepresence\nhave\n        already shown\n                              increased\nbenefits for complex collaborative\ndecision\n            m;iking\n                        in\n                              medicine\nand. military training and lend\nthemselves well to intelligence\nanalysis and operational planning.\n\n(U) Further, the commercial world's leadingedge recommendation enetnes and cootent analysis generators hold potential to be adapted to help the intelligence community to betterprocess the exponential growth of data that will be available with the increased use of MR technoJocies worldwide. Of particular note, a prerequisite to realizing the benefits of these emetBins capabilities is to cultivate an intelligence officer workforce that is conversant and familiar with the languqe and use of MR.\n\nOnce the Intelligence community is on track to develop and challenge such a workforce, MR 'capabilities wiU become a dramatic force multiplier.\n\n(U) At the end of this document, please take time to read a futuristic, fictional epilogue describing the very distinct journeys of two new employees - one within the walls of the IC, and the other within corporate America. The story illustrates the growing divetBence between IC\nand Industry cultures and technical capabilities,\n-\nassuming the IC remains on a traditionally cloistered track.\n\n(U) In summer 2009, the Deputy Director of National Intelligence for Analysis challenged a select aroup of thinkers in Phoenix, Arizona to assess the future afobal impacts of rapidly advancing, increasingly available, mobile Internet devices. During the four week session, this diverse group considered the implications of how that complex technology is fostering the emergence of \"Mixed Reality\" -\na phenomenon in which virtual and real worlds merge, &enerating a force for cultural transformation driven by acceleratin& technololical advancement.\n\n(U) The 26 innovative thinkers representins the Intelligence communities of the United States and the United Kingdom, US law enforcement organizations, the lepl profession, and private sector entrepreneurs convened in a nearly continuous brainstorming session, exchanging information and perspectives to interpret the Impact of Milled Reality within and across their specialized areas of Interest.\n\n(U) This convergence of different fields and cultures created what the author, Frans Johansson, describes as \"The Medici Effect,\" or Breakthrough Insights at the Intersection of Ideas, Concepts, and Cultures.\"\nJohansson claims that Innovators are changing the world ~V steppin& into the Intersection: a place where ideas from different fields and cultures meet and collide, ultimately f&nlting an explosion of extraordinary new dlscoveries.5 TNe to *the* author's description, the insights produced through the intersection in Phoenix a rapidly movinl phenomenon that portends Inevitable chanae -\nwith potential for both are varied and reflect multiple perspectives on the impact of Mixed Reality within several disciplines that share a common interest In national security.\n\ngood and ill - but which the United States and Allied intelligence communltfes can Ignore only at their perU.\n\n(U)\nBecause of the numerous relevant\n(U) So, pull up your favorite interface device, sit back. and let's mix some realities!\n\nperspectives that came forth from this Mixed Reality session of the DNI Summer Hard Problem pqram (SHARP), a decision was made to capture the ideas of the session in a collection of articles. Although unified by the theme of Mixed Reality, the individual articles also stand alone in offerina a unique point of view on the topic. Some of these reports assume the appearance of a conventional assessment, while others use storytellina to convey special insi1hts into the Impact of Mixed Reality on human society, culture, national and alobal security In the present and In the not too distant future.\n\nMost importantly, this collection challenges the reader to participate in a continuina effort to understand and interpret the significance of\n<(\nIll)\nUJ\n\"OK, now help me relate to this Mixed Reality thing . \"\n\n0\n(U) This will help to jp'OUnd the discussion: In June-July 09, mobile, wireless technologies\n<n\namo111 populations in and outside Iran, combined with the functionality of the web-based\nTwitter mlaobloai\"' software and facebook social networkina software, empowered\nindividuals across International borders to share on-scene reports of the unrest in the\naftermath of Iran's presidential election. This Information sharina pnerated a Mixed Reality\n(MR) experience amons participants inside and outside Iran as their collectively-enhanced,\nonline-enabled awareness of activities Inside Iran enabled them to tale coordinated actions\nthat challenaecf the lqitlmac:y of the Iranian reclme.\n(U) This experience, popularly referred to in the press as a \"'Twitter Revolution, ... represents Just the nascent belfnnlna of what MR Is and how MR wiD dramatically chanae the human experience In societies worldwide.\n\n## (U) My Network Is Smarter Than Your Analyst\n\n(U) For the intelligence community to survive it will need to find ways to engage the larger Internet community to help analyze and solve difficult challenges as our enemies become more and more fragmented. One method of doing this is to engage the collective community in a form of crowdsourcing.\"\n(U)In the current state of the intelligence community, experts are located in distinct'-\nINT' silos.7 Useful intelligence is sequestered into classification leyels and compartments.\n\nInformation classified to protect sources and methods is often available through emergent open sources. These classification firewalls are creating stagnant pools of information which, at the end of the day are only as useful as the collective intelligence of the few who see it.\n\n                                                                    (U)Onthelnternet,newenablerssuchasopen\n                                                                    Application Programming Interfaces (APis),\n                                                                    collaborative tools such as Wikipedia, and\n                                                                    communication protocols like Twitter create\n                                                                    a broader network of social connections and\n                                                                    combined interests that result in a new face\n                                                                    of human intelligence. This open-source,\n                                                                    crowd-sourced intelligence, or 'CROWDINT,'\n                                                                    enabled by millions of participants around\n                                                                    the world, represents an information filtering\n                                                                    and processing capability potentially far\n                                                                    better than experts in silos. More and more\n                                                                    people are processing and \"mashing up,.\n                                                                    information in their spare time for various\n                                                                    motivations, but ultimately the combined\n                                                                    effort could exceed the capability and\n                                                                    reliability of any closed community.\n-\n\n## (U)What Is Crowdsourcing?\n\n(U) The term \"crowdsourdn& is the brin&inl topther of the user and the producer to aeate newer and better results. The term has come to describe the Practice of givins a wide croup of people the opportunity to provide Innovative, user-driven ideas or products, and drivina them Into production, often with the support of a larJer company. - Jeff Howe, author of the bestselling book, \"Crowdsourclns:\nWhy the Power of the Crowd is Drivins the Future of Business; defines the term as \"the transition from professional production to community production.\"'\n(U) Accordina to Howe, crowdsourcinsls leveragina 'spare cycles,' or what author Clay Shirky cans\n.. cosnitlve surplus.\" The sanie way SEnOhome taps spare cycles on people's computers to search for extraterrestrlat life, crowdsourcins projects are leveralins people's spare cycles.10\n(U) Crowdsourcins is not a new concept. In 1714, the British sovernment offered a prize of 20,000\npounds to anyone who could come up with a method to determine a ship's lonsitude at sea. Thousands tried, but the money went to John Harrison, an Enalish dockrnaker, rather than a scientist or seaman. u In effect, crowdsourcina is an attempt to find the dockmakers to solve problems, not by ustna experts In silos.\n\n## (.U) Enablers Of Crowdsourcing (U) Examples Of Crowdsourcing\n\n(U) In an attempt to find Steve Fossett after\nhis plane disappeared over the Nevada desert\nin September, 2007, over 50,000 people\nparticipated in an online search and rescue\nattempt usine GoosJe Maps and Amazon's\nMechanical Turk. Althou&h they were unable to\nlocate the aircraft, the community discovered\nsix previously unknown aircraft crash sites and\ncovered a 10,()00-square mile search area at\nleast once.1l\n\n(U) Today, crowdsourcina is enabled by a\nnumber of internet-based tools, includina social\nnetworks, sharing networks, and commercial\nnetworks. Even a legal framework, Creative\nCommons Licensln& establishes ownership\nof Ideas and other Intellectual property and\noutlines rules for sharing those ideas. The\nunderlylna protocol structures of the Internet\nUke TCP/IP are de5i&ned to fadlitate open\nsharing of data on all levels.\n\nSocial Networks -\n                     Facebook, Twitter, Unkedln,\n\nLoopt\nSharins Networks -\n                   Flickr, VouTube, Yelp\n\nCOmmercial Networks -Amazon's Mechanical Turk Creative Commons Licenslna\n(U) Netfllx, the world's taraest online movie rental service spannlns 100,000 DVD titles, launched an open competition invitfna users to find ways to improve their existina movie recommendation ratina system Cinematch\n-\na service that analyzes the mCJYie..viewina habits of the company's 8. 7 million users and\n\nelection violence in Kenya in late 2007 and early 2008.\nThe software has been deployed in South Africa to help\ngather stories of xenophobic attacks in May and is now\nin use in the Congo and other regions.15\n\nrecommends other titles they might enjoy.\nIn 2008, over 35,000 user teams from 180\ncountries participated, and the company\nawarded\n         a\n            second\n                   annual\n                           progress\nprize of $50,000 to a team with a 9.44%\nimprovement. u\n\n(U) Gwap, which stands for \"Games With a Purpose,\"\nis a web site with several games designed to help\ncomputers with tasks they can't do autort:~atically. For\nexample, ESP is a game in which opposing players are\nshown a picture and try to guess what words the other\nplayer will use to_ describe the image. The aim of the\ngame is to help improve image searches on the Internet\nby creating descriptions of un-captioned images. ESP\nhas been licensed by Google as Google Image Labeler.11\n\n## (U) Crowdsourcing Scientific Problems Is Gaining Momentum:17\n\n(U) When 22 senators started working\nover the first health care overhaul bill\non June 17, 2009, NPR's photographer\ntook photos of the 200 attendees during\nthe Senate committee meeting. When it\nturned out to be difficult to identify the\nlobbyists in the crowd, journalists engaged\nthe NPR audience to help. The response\nfrom the community was enthusiastic,\nand useful information was provided to\nthe journalists, some from high-level Hill\nstaffers, and even from other lobbyists.1\n\n- People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals (PETA) is\nusing crowdsourcing to find a way to create artificial\nmeat.11\n- Howard Hughes Medical Institute and the University\nof Washington target computer gamers to find\nthe optimal solution for in silico protein folding\nproblems using a computer game called \"Foldit.\"19\n- The X Prize Foundation has issued a lunar Lander\nChallenge with Northrop Grumman.20\n\n(U) Ushahidi, Swahili for \"testimony,\" is\nfree web software to which eyewitnesses\nof war and crisis in out-of-reach places\ncan send news by e-mail or mobile text\nmessages and have it attached to a Google\nmap. Ushahidi grew out of a citizen\njournalism effort that Ory Okolloh, a native\nof KenYa, helped lead during the post-\n\n- Even the National Research Council has\n. recommended that the National Science\nFoundation provide funding inducements to\ncrowdsource scientific innovation.u\n\n(U) In 2007, a study was conducted by a group\nfrom the Massachusetts Institute ofTechnology,\npartnering with lnnocentive, to examine the\nefficacy of crowdsourcing for solving scientific\nproblems. They followed 166 discrete scientific\nproblems from 26 different firms, and sourced\nsolutions from a diverse group of over 80,000\nscientists from more than 150 countries. The\nstudy found that 29.5% of problems that had\nremained unsolved at the various firms were\nsolved through crowdsourcing. Furthermore,\nin assessing the probability of any person to\n\nbecome a successful solver, the researchers found that \"the further the focal problem was from the solvers' field of expertise, the more likely they were to solve it. zz u Post, \"Kundra has introduced popular consumer\n. tools to bureaucratic processes, runs his. office like a tech start-up and works by the mantra that cittzen5 are 'co-creators rather than subjects.' lfB\n\n## (U) Motivat.Ing The Crowd\n\n(U) As the size of the task increases, so do the financial incentives. Even when. there is little or\n no financial benefit to completing a task, the person may still process the task because it Is quick, relatively easy, fun and/or the \"right\"\nthing to do.\n\n(U) The concept of crowdsourdng Is not entirety new for Government. In October 2008, the ClO of Washington D.C., Vlvek Kundra\n(current Federal chief Information Officer}, led an initiative known as \"Apps for Democracy\".\n\nApps for Democracy created a contest to crowdsource the creation of applications utilizing public data. The project yielded 47\nweb, !Phone, and Facebook apps in 30 days for a total cast of $50,000 a~ estimates that the contest delivered $2,300,000 In value to the city. 14 According to an artide in the Washington There is no need to provide a ftnanciaf Incentive for a task that is considered as contributing\n. for the common good. In fact, this can be\n\n## Mechanical Turk Cr \"\" Lxi Uj 0\n\n1/)\n(U) *Vta* Mechanical Turk, Amazon has estabUshed a marketplace where firms- .known online as\nrequesters - can post tasks that they want crowdsourced. A vast pool of about 200,000 ready\nand willi\"' people (called 'twters') look to these 'human intelllpnce tasks' (HITS) to make\nsmall amounts of money -\nsay 10 cents apiea!. Amazon collects a percentap from each\ntransaction. 11\n(U) The name Mec:hanical Turt refers to a chess-playing machine in the 18th century that turned out to be a trick uslrt~ a hidden human. 27\n(U) A typical task posted by a requester at Mechanical Turk Is somethlna that's hard for computers to do, but easy for humans to complete in a few minutes. Often these are Image-related tasks.\n\nFor example, current automatic scanning and computing technology can't accurately distinguish between a baby's flesh and pomCJ1raphlc skin tones. a\n(U) Other sites uslfll crowdsourclng have put out calls for tnformat:IQn and photos about events, or answers to vexing questions. Mechanical Turk Is the best known among those that pay for online tasks. a\n(U) Given where this Industry Is today, Income doesn't seem to be a prime motivator. Studies found that most people use the site casuafly, not as a full-time job. Averaae earnings are about\n$2 to $5 a week; but. some people earn $SO to $100 or more. A typical hourly wage can ranee from $1 to about $3.311\n{U) The experience's entertainment value may be part of what makes people willing to wort for less. Chris Van Pelt of San Francisco-based Dolores Labs said he believes potential turkers are attracted because the HITs haw! a lower lewl of responsibility and time commitment, allowing people to start and stop when they want, even allowing for HIT work to be done while doing other things In the baclrpound.11\n\nCrowdsourclna will start with the most\nprovocative Ideas and slowly trickle down to the\n\"long tait of topics as smaller Interest groups\nachieve critical mass.\n\na disincentive for the crowd. Tasks for the\ncommon sood include political transparency for\nsites using Ushahidi, Stannina satellite ima&erv\nin the search for Steve Fossett, and revealing\nfalse Information on controversial news.u\n\n## (U) Who Looked At My Data?\n\nSmall tasks completed as games can also .\nmotivate users to complete usuaUy mundane\ntasks. Sites, like Rmbr.com for example. create\na pme around tauins photos, a task that Is\nbetter handled by humans. Users feel rewarded\nwith both hteh seores and virtual currency; thus,\nsocial elements are at work here to stimulate\nand sustain crowdsourced efforts.\n\n## (U)Trends\n\nI U) The line between data sourced by the crowd\nor processed by computers will continue to\nblur. More scandals like SpinVox (see below)\nwill occur as applications and systems include a\nhuman component.\n\n(U)\n      Since\n               tools\n                        like\n                               Mechanical\n                                               Turk\n\n(U) The data are only as sood as the size of your\nnetwork. Some sovemment asencies will not\nhave the critical mass to make crowdsourdna\neffective when restrictins the crowd Inside\ntheir asendes. Instead, they will be forced to\nopen significant portions of their mindshare to\nthe IC colleeti.ve Inside a certain classification\nlevel, and will embrace crowdsourcins outside\nof that classification via the sodal networks of\nindividuals.\n\nMobile applications will Increase the speed of\ncrowdsourcln& since access to the crowd will be\nimmediate, not dependent upon a non-moving\naccess point.\n\noompartmentallze tasks Into HITs, the user\ncompletins the tasks doesn't know who or why\nthe tasks are assi&ned to them. Government\nagencies are likely to use these tools both inside\nand outside their aaencies to help process and\nfilter the Increasing amounts of data on the\nInternet.\n\nThere will be increasin& ways to physically\nmobilize\n          crowds\n                  due to locatlon-sharins\n\ntechnolosies, whether to passively monitor or\nact in the physical world.\n\n(U) The increasingly common habit of sharing\nwhat you're thinkins (Twitter), what you're\nreading (StumbleUpon), your finances (Wesabe),\nand Your everything (the Web) is becoming a\nfoundation of our culture.'\"\n\nMore communities will achieve a critical\nmass required to create timely and accurate\nInformation about a topic of Interest, thoush\ncommunities will crosspolllnate throush soclal\nnetworks and communities of competing\nopinions .and micronlches.\n\n(U) More and more people will share their\ninformation to get something beneficial In\nreturn. For example, every public health care\nexpert declared confidently that sharing was\nfine for photos, but no one would share their\nmedical records. But PatientsUkeMe, where\n\npatients pool results of treatments to better their own care, prove that collective action can trump both doctors and privacy scares. M\ncrowd, as well as ways for the crowd to self\nvalidate. These 'reputation systems will improve as crowdsourctns becomes more popular.\n\n(U) I!\" the future, more crowdsourclng wiD be\n. oraanic, caused by a catalyst and executed through a loose collection of connected tools and people. The catalyst, in the form of a provocative ~\narticle, b!Og post, or image,\n(U) If you are lnterestina enoUJh or generate enough value (either socially,. in Insight, etc.), whatever you create online will be mined and exposed. (Please see article entitled, \"Privacy in Mixed Reality\" for further provocative discussion.)\nwill provoke the network. to compete for information to provide a better picture.\n\n## (U) Everything Will Be A Game\n\n(U) 'Knowledge Wars' between differing\n. belief systems may create a common ground and therefore a more accurate picture about various topics. However there may be negative consequences when one opinion can shout over the others.\n\n(U) The nne between aames and applications will blur as more applications are designed to work like games. More and more sames will be designed to complete tasks by humans that are difficult for computers to do. Those playin& the game will not know what the resultins data are used for and won't care:\n(U) Individuals wUI crowdsource their own social araph -\ntheir connections of friends on sites like Unkedln, Facebook and MySpace. Everyone will be a conclerse service for each other -\na symbiotic relationship to make all of our fives easier and more productive.\n\n(U) Reputation systems for crowdsourdng will cross-pollinate between web sites and\n(U) Game pqrammers will continue to leave their 'traditionar industry to create crowdsourcing sames in the suise of casual gaming. Althoush the pmes are free to the user, the resulting work will be mined for useful data for both tile aovernment and private sector.\n\nSome veterans are leavina the Industry and brlnslng their knowledge of game mechanics\n-\nwhich is really about how to keep someone Interested for the next 10 seconds - to different industries.J5\n\n. companies to provide a more detailed reputation\nfor users. This will help to validate submissions\nby these reputable (or disreputable)' users. This\nwill also be used \"witt1in the walls\" to evaluate\nworker performance.\n\n## (U) Crowdsourcing Intelligence- Crow Dint\n\n(U) Aside from crowdsoUtdna, more and more application developers will apply game thinking to non-game applications. Newer generations will even expect aamin& elements for mundane tasks like banking.\n\n## (U) Culture Changes\n\n(U) The intelligence community has a unique opportunity to engage the public to help filter and solve a multitude of difficult tas~. As brands, the various government agencies have the ability to mobilize their citizens to complete tasks for the common aood. The wealth of\n. a nation will be derived from its networked\n(U) Trust and' credibility will be increasingly Important as .more tasks are completed with crowdsourclng. Reputation systems will be important to reduce fraudulent Input from the population, which will translate into that nation's ability to mobilize Intellectual property, Information technolasy, and feet on the ~ound in its own interest.\n\n(U) For example, consider a citizen-driven Presidential Dally Brief and Its potential to enable truly democratic communication to the highest levels in the United States.\nto prevent software applications frcim creatins email accounts for senerattna spam. Spammers have been able to defeat this by creatins pornasraphic web sites that can only be viewed after enterlna the text displayed in CAPTCHA.\n\nThe text lmap displayed on the porn pre-entry pqe is the Same text imap presented to create an account on another site.J6\n(U) Homeland Security missions could be served by crowt,lsourclna mundane tasks, such .\n\nas remote monitorin& of our borders with the assisunce of web-cameras as part of a larp scale neiahborhood watch\" activity, as it were.\n\n## (U) Crowdsourcing Deception\n\n(U) The biaest scandal involvlns crowdsourcing to date is at Splnvox, a company that provides volcemail transcription services, claiminc that state-of-the-art s~ch recognition technology was the basis of its service. 17 Althou&h Spinvox had always maintained that humans only played a minor role in converting voice meSSil&es into text, it was exposed in July 2009 that Spinvox had at least five call centers responsible for transcription services with over 8,000 human agents. In fact, some insiders indicated that less than 2% of messaces were handled by automated translation services.\n(U) When larp totsks are decomposed Into\nsmall, compartmentalized tasks, the people completina them often are unaware who Is asklna for the data or understand its intended use. Additionally, Internet-based services miaht not be completed by computers even when the task seems nearly instantaneous.\n\n(U) One example is the use of spammers to defeat CAPTCHA, a system tha~ cenerates text in an ima&e that Is only recoenlzable for humans. Many free email tools use this system\n\n## (U) What Is A Hive?\n\n(U)The Hive Gives the Intelligence Community New Operating Capabilities:\n(U) A remotely directed Hive could perform collections in denied areas, as evidenced by Goosle's \"MapMaker\"'\ncollection of street level data on Pakistan in early 2009, for which Google did not have a license to acquire by officially sanctioned means ....\n\n(U) An MR-connected, instrumented, ar\\d social networked human Hive can be compared to a hive of honey bees. In such a Hive community, ad hoc groups (or 'adhocracies')\nof varyinJ scale are created and dissolved on an as-needed, taskoriented basis. Each adhocracy works within the community's doctrinal and communications framework, which allows members to contribute to the common good with a minimum of management.~\n5\n(U) A Hive can take virtual action -\nand tantamount to kinetic action -\neven if the individual actions of each of its members are independently iMocuous, as evidenced by the Iranian electrical grid overload protests. It is worth noting that this particular action appeared to be internal to Iran and srass-roots, but this kind of action could easily be directed externally. (See related sidebar, \"lranEiectrical Grid Attack.'\")\n(U) It has become commonplace to discuss the \"Hive Mind,'\" but a Hive is much more than just a mind.\" The\n.Hive has arms, legs, eyes, and ears, and this is of great impOrtance to the Intelligence Community.*\n(U) A Hive could be used to take deniable action as participants In alternate reaUty games, based on flash mobs' demonstrated willingness to participate in complex mass actions In the physical world with little or no qualification of their controllers. 41\n(U) The geatest strength of the Hive Is that it Is fundamentaUy a meritocracy.\n\n(U) A Hive can unwittingly be used to perform clandestine coUection, as evidenced by Microsoft's Photosynth 3D\nmodels of various world landmarks assembled from photos taken by unassociated tour,ists.42 As mobile devices gain ever more sensor capabilities and MR interfaces become commonplace, It will be easier and easier to assemble highly detailed, multifaceted, and close to realtime pictures of Intelligence targets. 41\n(U) A key aspect of the Hive Is the ability of parts to \"hive off\" -\nto temport~rlly (t~nd sometimes Permilnenttv) split\n~pie motivated by altruism or social reputation contribute to solving a problem. The contributions are filtered and edited by others who have shared Interests and expertise. Adhocracles are often self directed and rarely stable. They also are small and task oriented because they are driven by niche Interests. They can, however, be harnessed into larger communities.\n\nWikipedia is an example of activity of a la11er community.41\noff from the main group to accomplish some wk or goal.\n\nThe Hive learns t~bout the world and takes actions in the world throuah subJroups.44 In this way It Is very much like a set of terrorist cells. In tasking the Hive, it is imPortant to take into account its streneths:\n\n- The Hive is best at di~e or decomposable tasks\n- The nature of Hive activity is not Innately serial. Tasks\ncan be done in parallel.\n- Hive tasks can be addressed predominantly by\n(U) Pervasive data networks, attached to mobile devices with rich interfaces and multiple sensors, enable the Hive to. take real-world collective action.\n\nCombined with sodal software, cloud resources, and mobile services, the effectiveness of hives can be multiplied.\n\ngeneralists\n\n. Some Hive members will h<lve some\nconnection to non-adjacent members\nand with others outside their primary\ncommunity.\n- Hives are flat organizational structures, while\n(U) The first aspects of the \"Hive Body\" have been seen in recent phenomena as diverse as\n\"Tweetups,\" the role of mobility and social software In the Iran election protests, flash mobs, alternate reality games, and crowdsourced mapping of denied areas. 41\n\nother forms tend to be more hierarchical,\nparticularly as they grow.\n- Tasks are performed by self-selecting sub-\n....  ...\n\n~ .. ~ '>:\n.. :~:: .. ;to:~ .. !.;:~ .. ~:;~~\":-~ *....* ;. .. ~\n\nteams that form and disband as needed. 51\n~:\n~ tbO~i..-d.,\\i~!)l'i:;--~;\nby .. a nu\"'IM!t of.ih'(iividtlal$-i~l)ii~\"i~f\n\n## (U) Requirements For A Good,\n\n. i ~in6rr eau5e. ~,.~~was,cciJited.::\n\n## . Strong Hive\n\na~-~~\noi;fwitter.i.~&JC;~i~ p6p~~~~:\n~mtc'to ~ngappllc:atio'n. ; ... ~~: . ;. .\n\n.-~.:'~:. < :'.-\nr:.\n\n~-~-. ; ... .~ ~- :- ..  -~ *........* ) ~\":~. t' . : ~ .~\n\n## (U)Why Hives Form\n\n(U) It Is essential that a Hive be based on weak\nbonds or loose connections. If members all\nget to know l!ach other well, strong bonds\nwill form, and the community will take on\nthe characteristics of what network theory\ndescribes as a fully connected or cHque network.\nThis kind of network tends to be self-relnfordn'&\n\n exclusionary, and prone to group think. This is\n not aood at solvina novel problems, and not\n expansive by nature.5l\n\n(U) A lafle enough community (at a minimum,\n150 people -\n               the maximum number of people\n\n(U) Members of a Hive community choose to\ntake part In task-specific, temporary sub-Hives\nfor many reasons, but it generaUy boils down\nto their havins somethins to gain: motivation\nto partidpate In a taskHive tends to be for\npersonal amusement, enhancement of one's\nreputation in  the community, occasionally\nsheer altruism, and sometimes, money. In\nthe last case, money, task-Hives aeneraHy take\non the form of contests or 'Mechanical Turks,'\nas discussed in the previous section, \"My\nNetwork is Smarter than Your Ailalyst.\"' In the\nworld of online and online/offline communities,\nreputation has very real benefits in terms of\nprofessional opportunities, commerce (e.g.\neBay), and entertainment. 50\n\n a normal person is capable of remembering\n. to a material desreeil) senerally becomes a\n scale-free network. Scale-free networks are\n characterized by connections that appear to\n be random, bu~ with some members actina as\n bridges or hubs, such that the network sraph\n has sub networks.54 Note that this presents\n\n~portunlties for exploitation by both sinister\nand sincere parties.\n\n(U) The most significant differences between a\nHive and a team, company, dub, or most other\nforms of social or productive organizations are\nthat:\n\n- Hives are composed, for the most part, of\nsenerallsts.\n- Mem~rs of Hives have a proclivity to\n\n(U) The importance of a community being\nof sufficient size to be scale-free Is that its\nmembers will connect with other communities\nand draw in new members. They will form\nloose bonds, in network theory parlance, which\ncauses networks to have a tendency to form and\nreform subnets based on changing conditions.\n\nconnect with each other, and tend to\nconnect most with other me~bers who are\nadjacent (In network terms).\n Sizable\nscale-free\nnetworks tend toward\ndemocratic I adhocratlc self-governance, and\nwill have enouah members to effectively form\n.. hived off\" task 'groups. 55\n\n## (U) How To Control A Hive\n\none-one-one cannot typically take place In the task's area of operations, and is necessarily serial, elimlnatinc the necessity of this reduces the Hive's time to action.\"\n(U) ~\nlatency determines ~w\n(U) You don't. Hives are bv nature distributed.\n\nInstead, you can influence a hive, largely.\n\nthrough constructtvely participating In it and/\nor setting the stage such that its community doctrine and Interface influences the way It operates. 51\n(U) A hived off 'task Hive' can be self-rnanaaed, take explicit dir~n from without, or take implicit direction by means of interface and\ndesign. 57\nmuch pre-planning and rehearsal a Hive needs.\n\nIf messages travel by carrier pigeon, real-time control and feedback Is impossible and task Hive members must rehearse in advance, and have contingency actions prepared. If all members of the task Hive, and their remote controllers\n(if there are any) are connected in real-time with rich,  MR sensing and communications lnterfKa, then the members can be controlled with fine granularity in near real-tlme.111\n(l,l) Finally, If ntiOUI'C4IS are required that task Hive members do not typk:aHy have on their persons, they will need to acquire them and bring them.to the ta11et area.\"\n(U) Hives can often act faster than stable, hierarchical organizational structures, but a few\nfactors determine just how fast a task Hive can form and take action. A prerequisite to task Hive formation is the existence of a community Hive: .\n\nmembers must share common doctrine, and/\nor a common interface, and must have their Interests and capabilities be known to, or easily discoverable by other members. If a community .\n\ndoes not already exist, one must be formed, significantly lengthening the lead time for any action to be taken. 51\n(U) Even if a community Hive already exists, the timeline from strategy formation through tactical planning to Implementation is determined by the below listed factors, each of which can substitute for the others to some degree:\n(U) Real World Hive Examples\n(U) Flash mobs have the appearance of s~\ntaneity. However, for the most part, mobs with complex purposes require some degree of preplanning and resource placement. In contrast, a simple flash mob can work with little or no pre-planning. For example, a flash mob that exists to take pictures of a location, or one which gets participants to say something or take some trivial physical action - like freezing In place\n- do not require much pre-planning. All they need is a sufficient number of members of a community to act out the task at that location andtime.12\n\n- (U) bandwidth\n- (U) communications latency\n- (U) interface richness\n- (U) resource requirements\n(U) More complex flash mob actions, such as the San Francisco Pillow Fight,U or the Antwerp Central Station DanceM\nrequire\n(U) Bandwfdttl is the main determinate of how complex Instructions can be. Face to face, one-on-one communication, with appropriate visual and other sensory aids is extremely high bandwidth, and to the extent this can be replicated over a communications medium, physical proximity of Hive members prior to action is less necessary. Because inperson communication with large numbers of people participants to bring resources to the 'area of operations; or reCtulre rehearsals in advance.\n\nTo the extent that community members have greater resources at hand and/or have higher bandwidth communications, the need for preplanning decreases. In a world of high bandwidth ubiquitous networkl111, geolocation,\n(U) A small scale, but nevertheless instructive\n\n. example of a crime that Involved the unwitting\nMR interfaces, and ubiquitous/mobile sensors, the latency of flash mobtype actions decreases dramatically. COmplex chO~If'aphy and local sensor-based data acquisition can be directed in real time. 15\n\npartldpation of a Hive was an armored car\nrobbery that took place on October 1, 2008\nin\nMonroe, washiflston. The perpetrator\nused Craig's Ust to recruit would-be road\n . maintenance workers to come to a location near .\nthe scene of the planned crime, all dressed in\nhardhats, reflective vests, and dust masks. He\n. robbed the armored car, dressed in the same\noutfit as his unwlttlnl accomplices, and escaped\nin the confusion.\n(U) Althouah flash mobs can be entertainment, the first flash mob-style attack on real world assets took place in the wake of the June 09\nIran presidential elections. As street protests became less and less practical, Iranian citizens took to means such as synchronized use of electrical appliances in order to overload the power srld. Please see related'sidebar..\n\n(U) A larger scale example of a Hive undertaking a complex action was the alternate reality pme \"Why So Serious?\" that was run over 15\nmonths, concluding in July 2008. This pme\n\n was a promotional tool for the movie, The Dark\nIU) Hive operations do not need. to be confined to sinale instance actions, and can be orpnlzed to undertake complex campaicns aver extended periods of time, sometimes without the fully witting knowledge of participants. The best examples of these kinds of actions have occurred In crime and in alternate reality pmes.\n\nKnl&ht Of note, ten million players partiCipated in the pme and took actions that included conYefllng, in joker disauise, on real locations across the world to commit mock crimes.111 It Is worth noting that the people who create and operate alternate reality pmes, by industry\n\n. convention, are called \"Puppet Masters.\"n\n\n## (U) Iranian Grid Attack Protesters Coordinate Electrical Grid Attack In Iran\n\na:\n<(\nm\n(U) \"Tuesday (July 21. 2009) thousands of disaruntled Tehranls tried to brins down the w o electrical &rid at 9 p.m. by simultaneously tumina on household appliances like irons, water\n\niii\nheaters and toasters. Streets lights In the eastern suburb of Tehran Pars reportedly went off\nshortly after this, but electricity was not Interrupted In central Tehran.\"'1\n\n(U) This attack was coordinated while the Iranian aovernment was shuttina down mobile networks and even severtna the internet connectivity for the country. And yet, as it Is deslped to do. the network routed around this damaae\" enou&h to allow protesters to create a threat to the electrical grld.11 lmaalne what could be achieved with unfettered access to community coordination tools both online and via mobile devices -\nfor both those seekins to create productive or destructive effects .\n\n## (U) How Deeply The Ic Can Embed Itself\n\na:\n<(\n0)\nw\n0\n;n\n\n(U) How deeply can the IC embed itself in MR communities while maintaining credibility\nand protecting national interests?\n(U) Self-organizing networks operate on fluctuating, tacit rule sets -\nby cultural norms that evolve cohesively and In response to their environment. Mixed reality communities\n(like crowds and Hives previously discussed) are good examples of such networks, in which people may participate in a massive alternate reality game one moment, contribute to crowdsourced research efforts the next, and lead small-group restaurant coordination the next. By participating in all of these groups, each individual expresses a variety d roles, the rights, regulations, and restrictions of which are implicit, loosely joined, and subject to change.\n\n(U) This Is the nature of being human. It's no different from being expected to know how to act at your grandma's birthday party, at the bar with some friends, or in a meeting with your CEO. What this means for the IC is that it must find a way to allow Its members to participate fluidly and flexibly with those groups that affect theirinterests, over the long term, and in a natural, comfortable way.\n\n(U) The best possible way to do this Is to retain staff who are either already participating in such groups or regularly participate in similar groups. Attempting to integrate an individual Into a new culture group is unlikely to occur in an hour's time -\nteaming the unspoken rules, vocabulary, and behaviors takes an extensive period of time. Those tacit norms are the group's self-defense mechanism against unwelcome Intruders.\n\n(U) The other critical element is for the IC to make sure its members are up-to-date and participating in new mediums and new technologically-abetted social structures - as they occur. By being at the forefront of these emerging technologies {and by making this status an IC norm), JC members are empowered to take action in th~ IC's interest in a timely manner.\n\n(U) Of course; this requires flexible thinking, independent analysis, and a healthy amount of trust in one's employees. But without such training, the IC will remain permanently understaffed, undereducated, and out-classed in Its efforts to protect national interests.\n\nOnly through engaging can one Interact with MR communities: Acquire new information, understanding and perspective; and, share information and shape other's understanding and perspective.\n\n## (U) Crowdsourcing Residency\n\n(U) '\"Tribewanted is a unique community tourism project that is simultaneously based on Vorovoro ISland, Fiji and online.\"72The project allows anyone to slsn up to 10 to the Island and help build up Its Infrastructure. In exchange, they pt the opportunity to partidpatein a unique community and exchange ideas. This sort of culture exchance was previously limited to the weD-heeled, who could travel international~ or to the virtual world but now playinc citizen to a foreicn nation is as easy as a mousedick. 75\n(U} In Trtbewanted, members select a Otief f!Very month. Tl:tey then vote on the Items to resolve that month. Based on an online community they build a method to covem themselves; and use the online/virtual world to affect real world Impact. Over the last two years they have brouaht electricity, ptumbinc, sewer, a water reservoir, community and private houslni,' and Wlfl networks to Vorovoro Island. They have lf!Veraged skills in their online community to build this infrastructure from cround up. They have proved that microniche communities in the virtual are actionable special interest croups in the real . .,.\n\n(U) PhotoFiyThrough\n(U) All the photos on the internet create a fly-throu&h of the world.\n\nc:\n<(\nIll\nw\n0\niii\n\n(U) Crowdsourcing and Hive concepts will come tocether with the agreption of aeotaaed lrnaces, still photos, and video to create 30 vlrtualizatlons of any geographic space on earth. Microsoft's .,Photosynth\" is just the beginning of this.15\n(U) Brin&lns this c.pablllty to the mainstream consumer will present valuable rehearsal potential for Improved scenario-based emercency responder training, civil-military operations pr~ratlon, and . realistic, geo-aware rehearsals for terrorists.\n\ncr\n~\n(U) 4Chan vs.\" Scientology\nlu\n0\nu:;\n(U) 4chan.org, a popular site for trivia from around the web, spawned an organization,\nAnonymous, to attack the Church of ScientoJosy. Anonymous decided to protest the church's\npenchant for sulns anyone who published neptive commentary about the church. Once\nAnonymous launched its campal&n. Scientoloey.com suffered distributed denial of service\n(DDoS} and Gl&aloader attacks. Many ScientOlogy call centers were called with the music\nof Rick Astley (called RickroHinl). Many Anonymous members also \"mistakenly\" ordered\npizzas and taxis for SclentoJocy *staff:* In other cases black pieces of paper were fallll!d to\nScientolOgy offices, a known exploit that forces a fax machine to print lndeflnitely.11\n(U) The Church of Sclentolo&Y attempted to sue the source of the DDoS attacks, only to learn\nthat they had mistaken the source of the attack. In retaliation for their lepl attemPts, more\nthan 9,000 people dressed In Guy Fawkes masks protested in front of Sclentoloey centers\naround the United States. Along the way, over 9,000 SclentoJosy documents and videos\nwere leaked to the Internet, includin& an Incriminating video of Scientolocist misbehavior. As\na result of these protests, thousands of news articles, reports, and public statements were\nIssued, almost universally stroncly anti-Scientolo&Y.\"\n\n## (U) How Will Mr Affect Societies Worldwide? Key Points\n\n(U) Society is changing. Society Is chanalna technoloev. Technoloav is changina.\n\n\"fechnoloev is changins society. Adapt, repeat.\n\n(U) The inaeased sJtarlng of individual personal time/space and human-to-human connection Information - a major driver of mobile-accessible mixed reality (MR)\n- has brouiht about new privacy vulnerabilities.\n\n(U) The capability to influence the perception of another via MR wHI affect current\nday, cultural conventions of behavior, beliefs, personal relationships, and the\nconcept of identity.\n\n(U) As MR's impact on societies worldwide will vary from case to case, poUcymakers and analysts must be vigilant against mfrror-imacina their perspective on MR onto other societies.\n\n## (U)The Mixing Of Society And Technology\n\n each other at any time they wish. One of these\nis the micronlche -\na grouping of Individuals\n(U) Digital Natives\nBecome the IC,\nCustomers and Partners\nsharinc a common, usually very focused interest.\nThese social structures are beins enabled by the\nability to find people holding similar Interests\nand to communicate with them in real-tfrne.\nThese types of trends will result in significant\n. c:l\\allenges and changes to social norms. 11\n(U) Users of these technolo&ies can be classified\nas either digital natives or digital immigrants.10\n(U) A key assumption about the operatins environment of the IC In\n2025 Is. that the digital natives who constitute the IC. its customers, and partners will have a sipificantly different set of expec;tations of the IC.\"71\nWhile not an exact match to a person's age, this dassiflcation has more to do with age\n(di&ital natives were bom with access to these technologies) than is appropriate for describing\n\n the broad stratification of use across the mixed\nreality technologies.\n(U) In contrast, stratifyins society into six layers\n-\noutsiders, touchers, explorers. mashers, creators, hackers -\nbased on the depth with which individuals interact with cyberspace\n(U) The evolution of tools that make content creation and sharing accessible to all users is enabling the internet to assume a more prominent role in society. With these chanses in technolosv comes a concomitant evolution of participating societies. The internet, enhanced by technologies tJ:aat make real-time feedback and participation possible, has now become an enslne for social, economic, and political chanse.\n\n. provides a useful approach to analyze various\npotential ways that mbied reality will affect\nsociety. Additionally, because there are often\na variety of reasons and motivations for the\ndepth of en1aaement, there are additional\nimplications for the adoption of mixed reality by\na user based on that depth.11\n(U) Mobile devices (e.a., !Phones, Blackberry, handheld GPS units, Nlntendo DSi) that operate on Wifl, WiMax, and cell phone infrastructures enable users to take the internet with them In their pocket and allow persistent connectivity.\n\nPreviously Isolated re,ions are pining connectivity as the supporting infrastructure expands. AppHcations runnins on these devices are rapidly providin& new ways for humans to interact with information, the environment, and\n\n## (U) Understanding Society's Stratification\n\n(U) Outsiders\n(U) Outsiders comprise those who do not touch the internet. By choice or due to lack of access, .\n\nthese individuals do not directly or actively participate in this part of the modern world.\n\nDependin& on the reasons and motivations behind inclusion in this sroup, phone use also may be absent.m\n(U) Many touchers are only touchers because they are unable to engage with the internet in ways that are intuitive or suitable for their needs.\n\nAs mbred reality changes the complexion of the\n. user experience, these touchers will be able to increase their depth of contact. Other touchers, especially those who are time--challenged, will find a variety of timesaving applications and devic!!S, maldna it easier to become more enpgecl. Those who limit themselves to be touchers because they favor the human interaction afforded by physical reality may always remain touchers. Improvements in the sense of presence afforded by mixed reality may motivate their transition to Increasing use of the technologies and movement Into the next layer.\n(U) Even In the future of a more ubiquitous mobilization of the internet, outsiders by\nchoice likely will remain as outsiders, shunning new technolosies as they have in the past ..\n\nOutsiders eventually will be presented with the opportunity to move to another layer of interaction with cyberspace. Such a move will be the most challenslng for these individuals as the move will encompass new technologies, new policies and laws, new communication\nchannels, and new societal norms.\n\n## (U) Touchers\n\n(U) Explorers\n(U) Explorers, also described as \"power users,.... do advanced online searches and rely on information they can locate to answer their questions. They make use of both web-based applications and smart phone applications. If they have need for an application to perform a task they will hunt for it. These individuals participate fully in the information sharing future of the internet, freely contributing data, observations, and opinions via a multitude of applications. Truly connected, explorers are eaaer to apply the new channels of communication ~all aspects of their lives.17\n(U) Touchers have casual contact with the internet and interface technologies. They use\nemail, can do simple browsing, and simple.\n\nsearches. Individuals at this depth are either reluctant to use the technoloBY, unable to interface well with the technology, unwilling to learn, or too busy. This group uses a smart phone as just a telephone. The more advanced touchers are able to accomplish more technical .\n\ntasks when provided with specific guidance ...\n\n(U) Explorers will be excited by the new data streams that will become available throueh ubiquitous, persistent connectedness. These users will find themselves always apprised of things they are interested in -\nbe it topics on which information is being published or people theY are observing- and wat contribute new Information via their applications. The new interfaces provided by mil\"!d reality will further encourage their exploration and have the potential to expand greatly the number and depth of the things they track. Deeper exploration of a wider variety of novel subjects could allow users to make unintended discovery and Innovation, a phenomenon popularized as the\n\"Medici EffectH by Frans Johansson. 11 Advances in content-creation technololles will provide these individuals with new ways to Interact with society. 11\n\na: :i\n\"Internet ofThings\"IJO.ll'\nw\n0\niii\n(U) This term refers to the ability to encumber all objects with tl:le ability to be an active node\non the internet. Future opportunities and risks will arise as people develop ways in which\nthese Items can be controlled, located, and monitOred.\nThe objects themselves could become monitors as well providing a potentially rich networked sensor array never before possible.\n\n\nthose who pay for the creator's products and expertise. This group encompasses many skill sets and often is divided by ~mpetencles. 95\n(U) Mashers\n(U) Due to advances in information sharing software, a new category of users emersed recently. This group combines Information in new, useful, and often unexpected ways. The result of their work is referred to as mash-ups.11\nThese users are much more opportunistic than goal-driven and prefer to utilize data that others produce and maintain.\"'\n(U) Mixed reality will provide new challenges to the creators in developing content. The access to data to personalize applications will be used (and misused) In a wide variety of ways, from customizing gameplay style to anticipating the need for information based on travel or interaction patterns. Microadvertising Is a commercial avenue that\n(U) Mashers wiU benefit greatly from the explosion of information afforded by the persistent connectedness -\nboth the variety and volume -\nthat mixed reality applications will provide. This group is the future's wild card.\n\nIt is difficult to predict what will be produced next by this sroup, as their focus Is on providing novel views, usages, and Insights from other data streams.\"'\n\n highlights the creative use of various aspects\nof the types of information these technofosles\nwill make available.\" Creators will encounter\nconsiderable challenges as they develop\nand deploy new information visualization\nInterfaces to feed users in all societal layers.\nPrivacy issues will be forced to the forefront\nof these challenges as people strugle with\ndetermining what personal information should\nnot be shared even though it provides a richer,\nMR experience.\"'\n(U) Creators\n(U) As creators and publishers of ~w content, this societal layer develops applications, web sites, and data stores. Their creations are the applications that explorers use to share content with their social network and mashers use to combine. Creators make information available to users and interfaces, often with a single purpose in mind. This group of users often looks for ways to make information easier to both find and use as well as to enhance the experience of the user -\nand to further the bottom line of\n\n## A::\n\n~\nNew Creators of Content\nw\n0\niii\n(U) All users of these technologies are\ncreators of content, often unknowin&lv.\nApplications and web  sites capture\ninformation about the activity of\nthe user. Known as metadata, this\ninformation is collected, agregated,\nand analyzed for usage statistics\nby third-party commercial entities.\nToday, privacy and anonymity while\nweb browsing from a workstation\n. are achievable, but not commonly\navailable for smart phone applications.\n\n## (U) Hackers\n\n(U) This category involves the deepest level\nof MR engagement Hackers are users who .\nredirect information for various reasons.911.This\ncan include misappropriation of data not meant\nto be widely shared, or collection of seemingly\ninnocuous data that can be repurposed. The\nclassification \"hacker\" is divided widely by\nskill and there is sub-categorization based on\nintent.\"\n\n(U) The volume of information produced by\nthe new mixed reality technologies will provide\ncopious opportunities for hackers. Included in\nthis information are unprecedented levels of\npersonal data that often are recorded without\nthe user's knowledge and stored in ways\nthat circumvent US laws. This rich source of .\ninformation will provide many opportunities for\nmisappropriation and repurposing.100\n\n(U) One of the benefits of mixing realities is the\nalteration of the user's perception. This raises\nperplexing questions that shade the definition\nof the world in which hackers reside. If each user\nhas a perception of reality that is personalized via\nmixing realities, the alteration of that perception\nconstitutes a \"hack.\" As with other hacks, the\nability to change someone's perception of\nreality could be used to hide danger, obscure\nthe identity of an individual committing a crime,\ncause a particular behavior, or even provide an\nexperience not unlike a hallucinogen. Denial of\naccess to information and .services, a common\nmethod employed by hackers to cause impact,\ncould become a much more serious crime as the\nimmediate consequences wi!l be more directly\ntied to the victim's hacked reality.101\n\n(U) Coevolution\n(U) The concept of coevolution is the influence\nof two systems on each other as each evolves.\nIn our world, one system is technology, the\nother is sodety. As innovations and inventions\nare introduced into the technological system,\nthe various strata of the social system will try\nto influence their use and adoption. Once the\n\nne~ technology becomes available, the societal\nneed that drove the innovation is satisfied.\nSociety, or one aspect of it, evolves and\neventually generates new needs, which further\ndrive evolution in technology. Innovations and\ninventions that are not adopted soon after\nintroduction fail because they do not satisfy a\nsocietal need; put another way, the need they\nsatisfY has not yet been articulated by any facet\nof society. Of note, the particulars of these\nsociety dynamics vary worldwide and from case\nto case.102\n\n(U) Historically, the evolution of technology has\nbeen driven by the evolving needs of various\nuser communities. The pornography industry\nhas driven the development of ffle sharing,\nweb cameras\n                   (webcams),\n                                   and\n                                          security.l03\n\nThe gaming industry, and more recently Wall Street, have driven advancements in graphics resolution to provide richer environments and\n\nillustrations. They also have demanded ever\nincreasing processing speed to display these\ngraphics more efficiently.* Society's Increased\ndemand for mixed reality applications will drive\nthe development of a wide variety of human-\ncomputer Interfaces that enable humans to\ninterpret computer output throu&h all of the\nsenses and provide input to the computer\nthrouah a variety of movements and contacts.I.CIS\nThe desire to connect more intimately with other\nIndividuals and grow a social network will be the\nmajor driver of mixed reality technologies.\"'\n\na powerful model for research and !~formation\nfinding. Other examples Include Wildpedia\n(http:/ /www.wikipedia.org) and Jove (http://\nwww.jove.com). Social media such as Facebook\n(http://www.facebook.com), Twitter. (http://\ntwltter.com), Yammer\n                        (http://www.yammer.\ncom), and IRC {http:/ /www.mirc.com) are being\nused this way as well.1011\n\n(U) Impacts\n(U) Mixed reality can Impact each of these\nstrata of society In a different way, and can\naffect one group in multiple ways depending\non the underlying intention of individuals In a\nparticular group. Through the new technologies,\nespecially those of interfaces, major changes\nwill occur in the way individuals interact with\neach other and Interact with Information. The\nubiquitous nature of mobile devices will impact\neveryone -\n          even outsiders and touchers.- in\n\nevery aspect of their lives.\n\n(U) Access, Power and Jobs\n(U) There is a growing trend to move services\nto the internet. Many governmental agencies\n(e.g., Social Security Administration, http://\nsocialsecurity.gov) and companies (e.g., GEICO,\nhttp:J/www.geico.com) now announce on their\ntelephone greeting their web site and encourage\nits use instead of the phone. As government and\ncommerce move to the internet and downsize\ntheir brick-and-mortar footprints, online access\nwill have to be provided for all users. The ability\nto access the lntemet will become viewed as a\nright -\n      so,nething required to participate fully\n\n(U) Relationships\n(U) One currently emerging impact on society Is\nthe redefinition of personal relatton~hlps. The\nability to follow friends at Increasing levels of\ndetail about their daily life can eliminate the need\nto meet and \"catch up.\"1111 The improvements In\ninterfaces that make encounters more reaii$Uc\n-\n  with sound, sights, smells, and touch -\nmake physical proximity less important.1111\n\nIn society. Similarly, there will be a need for more\nelectricity to power the various access devices\nand accessories. Skill sets for jobs will change\ntoo, and will undoubtedly require familiarity\nwith technoloiies that will mix the realities of\nindividuals. uo If comprehensive equitable access\nto the internet and various interface devices\nis not provided aaoss populations, then it will\nbecome increasingly difficult for have-nots to\ncompete in the job market.\n\nVoyeurism will become an acceptable and even\nencouraged practice, at lea.st to friends and\nrelatives. Determining who else is watching\nmight not be so easy. With the Information and\naccess available, it Is hard to determine when\ncyber-voyeurism would become stalking.\n\n(U) Economies and Education\n(U) Historically, economic status has been a\ndefining element of societal stratiflcation.111 The\nvarious mixed reality enablng devices l~ly will\nbe available only to those who can afford them,\nhardening this stratification. The opportunity\nwill then exist for various devices to become\n\n(U) The group, or network, to which a person\nbelongs provides them support, encouragement,\nand can be a source of information and advice.\nThe persistent connectedness afforded by\nubiquitous small scale disital devices changes\n\nthe way in which people enpge these groups.\nThe ability tci simultaneously reach hundreds,\nthousands, or even mi!lions of people and solicit\ntheir input is enabled by these technologies.\nCrowdsourdng -\n                   the practice of asking a\n\nque$Uon or posing a challenge to a large group\nof people for Innovative solution -\n                               is becoming\n\nstatus symbols. If they are readily detachable from one's person, It Is likely that those devices also will become targets for real crimes such as theft. That the \"have notS\" prey on the \"haves\" has long been true in societies. This technology is not a solution for resolving economic disparity. The proliferation of a wide variety. of devices likely will continue the economic stratification within each of the six user catesories discussed above.\n\n(U) The field of education is one of the early .idopters of these tech~IOBies and has demonstrated the powerful application of persistent connectedness and immersive perception. Adoption of these technologies in education introduces a potential additional c_ontributor to the direct Impact of economic status on scholastic achievement.111 If economic disparity aoverns access, the impact of these technolosles to education could be disastrous. Yet, assuming access for all students, mixed reality could have a significant positive impact on education. There will be an increasing need to educate the classical mind -\nthe qical, reasoning mind -\nand the creative mind. Education will not have to be so concerned with teaching \"how; but will once apin be able to tum to the more philosophical and artistic pursuits similar to that of the Renalssance.1u\n\n## (U) Tech301 Technology Boote Amp\n\na::\n>C(\nto\n....\n0\niii\n\n(U) An immersion training that provides analysts with an immersive, hands-on experience with\nvarious enablers of mixed reality devices and applications. Designed to provide context to those\nincorporating mixed reality data in their analysis, experienced users of these technologies\nare encouraged to attend to understand the privacy and security issues these devices and\napplicat1ons can raise. Coune can be repeated periodically as needed to stay abreast of\nupgrades, updates, and new.developments. Contact Instructor for more Information.\n- (U) Duration: 40 hours\n- (U) location: TBD\n- (U) Dates: ... needed ASAP I\n(U) Jobs that require the understanding of these technologies, such as Information analysis, will have a necessary requirement to have experience with their use. The integration of the technolosles Into the mainStream of life provides a. rich experience with the perspective required to fully analyze information ob~ained from them. Examination of such pervasive technologies will require this context and will not be adequate if done only in a laboratory.11'\n(U) Location\n(U) Locative information is perhaps the most difficult aspect of mixed reality to come to grips with. On the one hand, being able to track and locate many things would be useful -\nproducts, family members, friends, known criminals, car keys, and so forth. On the other hand, many will see the broadcast of their physical location as a clear violation of their personal privacy. It may be possible with future technology to be\n\n(U) Memory and Perception\n(U) Memories retained by humans are a\nselective in who could receive your locative information but the ability to hide, or di51uise one's location, may well become impossible. 115\n\n. result of an experience some time in the past.\nDevelopment of memories Is governed by\nthe senses and the stre~ of a memory can\nbe. tightly correlated with the strength of the\nsensual Input during the experience. Despite\nthis, a memory is a perception of an experience.\nIt is entirely possible to induce a memory based\non a recounting of an experience without\n ever having the ~ctual experience. Many early\nchildhood memories are constructed by parents\nand relatives in this fashion, where the memory\nis not a result of actual experience but is a part\nof cultural conditioning.111\n(U) In mixed reality, where perception can be altered. the ability to influence memory will be enhanced. Mixed reality will be able to supply not only the description of an experience, but stimulate the sensory inputs of the body as well. In this way, mixed reality technologies will affect the ability of the human mind to discern the real from the unreal. The abHity to Influence perception has significant consequences to\n. society and law enforcement.111\n(U) As location-aware technology continues to be seamlessly Integrated into devices, it will become an a&sUmed part of the mixed reality. Location awareness will be perpetual and passive, requirina no action or permissir;m by the user. While geo-locatfon detection and position sharing currently requires user consent, the convenience and functionality of locatton wiH trump user privacy concerns. Users will eventually take for granted the sharing of their location. The sharing of one's locatton can pose physical risks to the individual, especially when combined with the stream of various activity records and other personal data. Today's cultural understandina of privacy is in the midst of redefinition. (Please see this product's persuasive aftfde entitled \"Privacy in MR.\")\nStudies show that even anonymill!d location sharing reveals all, as analystS have been able to determine home/work addresses, business connections, poUttcal affiliations, even medical conditions by clustering anonymous GPS tracks\n-linking identity to location.11'\n(U) Identity in other than the physical world poses additional Issues. In many of the emerging mixed realities, as in virtual world realities, the virtual component of the self is represented by an abstraction -\nan. avatar. It is difficult to determine the real world identity behind an\n avatar. Extendlngtheavatarconcepttothe ability to influence perception provides new avenues for obfuscation of identity that will be leveraged by various criminal and other nefarious actors.\n\nThis will make the identification of perpetrators increasingly difficult. The means by which Identity Is deter~ined in a mixed reality is vastly\n. different from the means currently used in the physical wortd.120\n(U) Privacy and Vulnerability\n(U)lhevarioususersinthestratadiscussedabove have widely varying views of privacy depending on their Immersion level and experience~ People who know, or have experienced, cyber stalking and other crimes of mixed reality, are much more likely to be as concerned with the sharing of persbnal information as those whose jobs make them aware of the personal Information available through these technoiCJSies. Hser\ndriven modifications to the type of Information that can be gathered and the uses to which It can be put are likely in the near future. These changing viewpoints, regulations, and laws will significantly Impact the utility of these technologies to the intelligence community. m\n... ..\n\nc\n%\n\"'\n\n## (U) Microniches\n\nmembers to hide and discoVer hidden caches at gee-referenced positions in urban areas as well as remote locations worldwide.\n\n(U) Large scale social networks. social media sharin&\nand geosraphically-aware mobite computina, empower individuals to form both weak and stronr sroup affiliations around spedal interests. These technolosies are enabling the formation of thCese groups to form virtually as wen as geographlcalty to share Interests, media, information and preferences. These\naffiliations encourage social bondins but also are dividing societies in an increasingly granular and often divisiVe manner. The wide array of social, mobile, and geo-referenced devices and applications these groups use to communicate make it easy to form quickly and organize for fun, education, political activlsm, as well as ror criminal and terrorist-related activities.\n\n(U} 5harinc and Recmmendlnc. Individuals seek contact with others who share their taste in art, music, literature, and movies, alont with common values that go to the core of an Individual's Identity (for example, religion}.\n\nVarious capabilities exist that enable this type of niche formation. lmase sharin& on the Internet allows an individual to publish pictures to the world that formerly would have been only accessible to a select few. Music sharing, brought to general public awareness by Napster, is another source of social niche formation. iTunes aUows the purchase of music flies and supports user recommendations. Amazon (www.amazon.\n\ncom) allows users to post lists of their favorite books and reviews and to rqlster interest in the lists of others. YouTube (www.youtube.com}\nallows the sharing of user-created video clips and Frlendster (www.friendster.com) allows niche formation around movie preferences. AH\nof the media sharing sites provide a way for a user to comment on the. works or contributions of another. This ability to communicate helps form the social bonding necessary to form a niche. Additional niches form around various aames and entertainment enabled by these technoJosles.\n\n(U) Sacllll Networklna and Graphs. Analogous to the bulletin boards of the earfy Internet, a wide variety of social networking applications are available. Certain of them, such as Linkedln\n(www.linkedin.com), serve a particular\n(U) Frlenck and Places. Facebook has become the premiere *social* networking site with over\n250 million profiles worldwide.~ Facebook opened its .API (Application Prosramming Interface) to allow development of plug-in applications as well as simple methods to form online. groups with minimal privacy settings.\n\nMany other social applications make use of the API, aaining access to the sodal network of a Facebook user. Users allow this type of invasion Into their social network because it is convenient: they do not want to have to reenter all of their contacts each time they adopt a new application. Some applications that use Facebook \"frlencr networks Include www.\n\nloopt.com, www.foursquare.com, www.twitter.\n\ncom, and www.heythere.com. Micronlches can also form around seo-referenced data instead of a contact list. Geocaching (www.aeocaching.\n\ncom} Is a special interest group that enables its demosraphic which su11ests, but does not restrict, the types of niches found within. These sites allow for extensive media sharina, social networking, and group formation. Other sites a11resate niche interests in a variety of hobbies touching every taste and interest. These sites encourage the recruitment of friends and assodates to the same application. Many applications can diSplay a visual representation of one's social network graph, and some provide rewards to the members with the largest network of friends.\n\nto then auto-invite your friends, Oil your behalf,\nto join you In the applk:atlon accounts for some of the exponential growth seen in the user base.\n\n(U) When considering participation in the social networks enabled by these technologies, It is essential that users understand what about themselves they reveal in their data. Merely by usifll the application, they Implicitly agree .\n\nto share their data. Many of these applications don't even offer the flimsy protection of an End User Licensing Agreement (EULA).\n\n(U)Gettlngpersonallyinvolvedlnceo-referenced social networks Is much easier with the recent convention of instantly lmporttna an existing contact (Le., friend\") list from another source.\n\nThis list is a social graph and brin&s individuals within it into the network; Most applications ask the user to approve the use of a Jli)rticular contact list; however, some use an accessible list without asking. The ability of these applications\n(U) There Is an onaolng cost of joinin11n the persistent connectivity native to mixed reality:\nYour actions, communications, location, and movement ~r time will be recorded. Mobile, online device Information -\naU time/date, and increasingly, location stamped -\nwill be analyzed. And you may never know.\n\n(U) In order to understand the impact of this Information ptherin&let's take a close look at a popular !Phone pme, Parallel Klnplom. This pme uses geolocatlon to move your ln-pme character to a point on the pme map that corresponds to your physical location (via the\n!Phone's poloc:ation functions). The pme board Is Gooife Maps. The information that the Parallel Kifll(lom company has access to for each user Includes:\n(U) 01aracter name, character gender;\n(U) Date/time character created;\n(U) Email address, PIC account paSsword, phone number;\n(U) Contact list (made available to the application if you select Invite Friend);\n(U) Last login date/time, last IOBOut date/time;\n(U) nme in game;\n(U) Character inventory;\n(U) Location In pme (recorded each time the character mCM!S);\n(U) Actual physlcallociltion (coordinates recorded each time you select Relocate);\n(U) Movement (date/time, method, permissions);\n(U) Chal Joss;\n(U) Actions taken within pme with date/time/location stamps;\n(U) The only Information the same needs to collect to support play is the character name, eender (for rendering the character), invento~, and current location in game (without the date/time stamp). The other information is collected for some unknown reason but on the surface seems to be rather innocuous. The game has a site on the internet (www.\n\nparallelkingdom.com) where some of the data is presented. Various graphs of movements are shown illustrating both continental and transcontinental movements of characters. While it is not displayed on the gra~h, data exist to establish whether travel was undertaken in the physical world.or just in the game.\n\n(U) Movement within the game is allowed by a random movement function, movement to an owned in-pme property, permitted movement to another player's property, or by pressing\nthe Relocate button. When taken in combination with other data pthered, such as chat logs, social networks can be constructed. Analysis over time of these data could reveal personal information such as travel patterns. This sort of information could be valuable to piecing together real identities.\n\n(U} When considering participation in the social networks enabled by these technologies, it Is essential that users understand what about themselves they reveal in their data. Merely by using the application, they implicitly agree to share their data. Many of these applications don't even offer the flimsy protection of an End User Ucensing Agreement (EULA).\n\n## Iii <( ~ (U) International Clashes Of Culturer 0\n\n(U) Given the rapid global growth and interconnectlvity of mixed reality capabilities, culturebased clashes will arise. Lone-standing assumptions regarding control and legitimacy (state authority, tribal allegiance, ethnic heritages, cultural norms, and/or religious doctrine) will be challenged as the nature and availability of mixed reality perceptions of alternatives are shaped by crowds. Some cultures may be structured to flex and adapt to the risky, ensuing chaos. There will be those who cannot. The inability to adapt will cause tension and discontent within the culture.\n\n(U) For cultures that allow mixed reality capabilities to empower individuals and interest groups, the adaptability within those cultures could help them to collectively deal with and overcome grave societal problems such as ethnic strife, resource competition; and natural disasters. Leveraging the social networking real-time communication inherent with these capabilities could enable these cultures to collectively work through these types of threatening problems.\n\n## (U) People Herding\n\n(U) Authoritarian covernments wUI easerlv seek to leverase the rich location data that is permeatfns the sJobe. Consider the potential for these pemments to use mixed reality capabilities to \"'herd\" selected individuals. croups or senerat populations to desired locations\n- either to shape their collective awareness or to achieve a speclflc desired effect under a plse, such as lurinl out dissidents and trappina them. Other national states also may seek to manipulate their respective populaces with these technololles In a variety of situations.\n\nMixed reality capabilltfes will also empower resistance aroups to varytna dqrees within authoritarian states - potentially tumlna the tables on those aovemments and herdina population ,roups to believe and act upon an alternate definition of reality.\n\n(U) Could we be seetns the Initial manifestations of people herdina in the mandate of the People's Republic of China to filter web search results provided to their population?\n\n## Ii. < :!! (U) Social Nets And Conflicting Allegiances 0\n\n(U) The richness of mixed reality-enabled experiences wUI join people to their social networks at a more immersive level. In many cases, these experiences will enable people to meet physloloaical needs of a~ptance and understandina, alons with believina they are contributing to the collective pursuit of the particular social net's self-identified worthwhile ldeals.122\n(U) Parallels In understandlna this dynamic *mav* be draw~ to the formation and sustainment of street pnas. Gana member identtty Is the core, deflnina element In a street sana member's r.fe. Allegiance Is to the PI - other alleatances (like those sprinalna from state citizenship)\nare lnslanJflcant.w\n(U) Similarly, mixed reality-connectedness may enable the srowth of social nets that enpnder a similar level of group mutual commitment and alleeiance spanning across physical and virtual spaces. Just as street pnp mark physical borders of their influence and take hostile action aplnst threats, future social nets could mark Idea or value borders\" and marshal cross-medium action aplnst threats. What happens when the state aovemment Intrudes on the Idea/value borders of these future social nets7uo\n(U) Further. given that geoloc:atlon is part of the foundation of mixed reality, and given the street pnsmetaphor, It seems likely that future social nets wiU not only seek to establish idea/value borders but also to associate those borders with physical borders. Mixed reality could help boost the arowlna Influence of non-state actors (relative to state actors) that seek to hold ttahtly to both deflnln&ldeas/values and physical space (I.e., Lebanese Hizbollah). To what extent will these social nets lay daim to and defend sole ownership of virtual spaces?115\n\n## (U) Mr, Cognition And Information Operations Lui Key Judgments\n\n(U) The permeation of MiJied Reality throughout societies worldwide will present pme-changlns opportunities for the Information Operations (10)\ncommunity. Gettin& ahead and staying ahead of this evolution is not an option\n- it is a necessity for US and alrled national security.\n\n(U) Mixed Reality wiU increase the influence that a soci<il network has on the coanltive mindset of its members, which presents a targeting opportunity.\n\n(U)PinpointingldentitvwiU continue to beac:'haUenge. Moreover, crowd sourcing offer.s another ~aver of plausible deniabJiity.\n\n(U) lAs Mixed ReaJJty. further mera~theivlrtual and real WOt:lds, there willbe .a.:_\ng~ater spllovero~cyberspace-based events into the real world,.as.il!~st~tec(.\n\n'in.the:~O~ssla-Geoi:gia conflict.\n\n\n## [Uj Introduction (Uj The Evolving Lnfonnatlon Environment\n\n(U) The evolution and adoption of Mixed Reality that Is transpiring throushout societies worldwide will have a seismic Impact on 10 that the US and its allies can !snore only at their peril.\n\n(U) Mobile devices are becoming an lncreasinalv popular method for accessing information and social networks on the internet resulting in a more dynamic, intense, and personal interaction between the user and the Information. Mixed Reality strengthens social networks by enabling contlnuf?US, seamless information exchanae across physical and virtual spaces. Over time, the influence on the cognitive mindset of members of stronaer, trusted social networks Is going to increase.\n\n- (U) Flaure 1 shows a cross section of the\nmodem information environment, this\nincludes:\n(U} The information we consume shapes our perception of the world. Our information environment has expanded from traditional news and  media outlets  to encompass decentralized social networks (both real and virtual), blogs, email, text meSsaging, entertainment and aggrepted news sources online and in print. Information has changed from static to experiential; It is becoming personalized, unique to the individual and accessible anywhere at anytime.\n\n- (U)Intemet/lntranet -\nInformation and\nnews from aU sources, video, audio, both\naccessible on public and private networks.\n- (U) Social-Networks -The technoloiv that\nexists on the internet to fadhtate social\nnetworkine, as well as the information and\nideas that flow freely between people.\n(U} Mixed Reality is creating a rapidly expanding, tal'letrich environment for a new order of Information Operations aplnst unaware taf'lets.\n\nThe information environment consists of three dimensions: physical connectivity, informational content, and human cognition 1. Mixed Reality capabilities are active in and spreading tf.trough all dimensions of the information environment.\n\nAt any moment, location-aware  mobile\n\n- (U) Media -\nIncludes the large corporate-\napplications exchanae real-time, precision\ntailored, crbwdsourced Information responding to a given user's decision (I.e., cognitive) needs.\n\nowned conventional broadcast media\nforums to sodal media forums empowering\nthe enthusiastic Individual\n- (U) Social Environment- The \"reality of the\nsocial network.\n(U} This spreadlna phenomenon presents both powerful influence opportunities for the 10\ncommunity and debilitating  vulne~llties for their unaware taf'lets. As a community, we must understand the opportUnities and vulnerabilities of how mixed reality is affecting the Information environment. If we do not address the implications, we risk faDing behind and becoming targets .\n\n(U) Mixed Reality technologies enable Information from these sources to be closer in cognitive proximity to the user than traditional media delivery platforms. Smartphones, mobile computers, netbooks, surface computers, and remotely stored personal profiles ensure that the information presented. is tailored to the user's preferences. In time, the sheer volume of both user-generated and auto-generated information available through these channels will likely create a significant, valuable critical mass,\"\nenabling crowdsourced information to take on an even higher level of credibility than ever before.\n\n## Lui Understanding The Audience\n\n(U) To successfully conduct 10, we must know our audience and how it consumes information. Collecting market survey data on an audience facilitates understanding the types of devices that It is using and the services to which it subscribes. Technologies and services that are popular in one country or region may not be popular In another. Even as Internet access spreads to the developing world, there are distinct differences in behavior and the mQde and quality of connectivity.\n\n(U) The evolving information environment facilitates discussion, debate, and exchange of ideas between individuals on a global scale. More people have access to global information at any time and in any location, which enables them to become a part of an emerging group culture and remain updated, in real time, on events unfolding either down the street or across the globe. This environment is facilitating the establishment of self-organized, decentralized groups that share similar interests, regardless of the members' physical location. It is conceivable that these groups could challenge and compete with the influence of nation states (2).\n\n## (Uj 10 Opportunities And Challenges Lui Shaping Operations\n\n(U) The uptake of these technologies pre5lmts new opportunities to shape the Information environment in order to achieve Stratqlc diplomatic and military asendas of the us and Its Allies. Mixed Reality is enablint us to reach audiences differently, by targeting and interactin& with their networks and the information they consume. To accomplish this, we must understand the audience and understand their network.\n\n(U) Understandin& the network involves ooderstanding how information flows.\n\nInformation introduced Into a social network can proliferate as long as each user has social capital. Information from an unverified source on the traditional internet has far less weight than information that comes from a contact within one's own social network or crowd.\" Milled Reality technology can draw people deeper In the sodal network, creating advantages to actors who wish to inftuence specific poups and/or individuals.\n\n(U) In order to understand the audience, we must not only-understand what Information they consume, but we also must understand how they use and internalize that information ~ form their perception of reality.\n\nKnowing where the audience obtains -information as well as how they Interact with others in their network provides insight into what information sources and individuals they value and trust. We can also use the information they disseminate to provide lnsi&ht Into the audience's thouaht processes and biases. After we have pined insiaht into who the audience is, we must understand how the network works.\n\n(U) Researching the audience and the network is imperative to communicating messages that the network will trust and propagate. By pining credibility and understanding the internal workings of the audience, 10 operators can communicate messages that will have a deep and lasting Impact on the audience.\n\n## (Uj Case Study: Chinese Information Control\n\n. (U) Mixed Reality will;ahte ,..n ~es-and ~-~actors ariot~{~~~~:~~bl ..\n\nInformation. China, ror example; already, shapes lnfoFritatton that:IS i(nporte~ln~ !~\n-~pOjted. '.\n\n out of Chi,.a..h.O~h.lntemet access c:ontrots and pminl cOntel)trestnctto~s~ :-:~\n.  '\n~,. .   :\n\n'\n.\n\n.\n\n.\n\n(U).eurre.,ttv. ~tte cn1~ ~ment ~\n~~1\n. .0.1~ tO.~,;Scir-the-.l~fttei:\n. Tflis ..,Great F.JrewaU of. Chlnar..bl~ objeCtic;riable ~\ncn:Content'thalis~deemed ~thre'*-to ; .\n\nthe:aovem~nt.'siich as~P,.Y,~10k!~e - ...X.~t'talk that.'~Derises ~~~~n~ .\n\nsovemmei'!~ . .BI~d-web ~.l~ude You~~; Bider, afld~ikii*la.D.:'  .\n\n.   .. .\n\n:.\n\n(U) The ~Ina t~a(the.~l~-~n!M\"~~PioYsto restrict ~~~~erit).S.<!aiblst:io'~-\nand in~nsi~t which leads. tO ~.pc,pibtiori ~lng ttlel~.lntemet ~\n.. If,~ ~;)$.\n\nbiGcked 'due .to ~te~ ~\niJser is not told' the *reason:* Addlt~oiuai.!Y.:stte$ ~nd: eon~t a~ nOt' :.\n. . . . .\n\n.\n\n.\n\n.\n\n'\n. : . ........ , .. -~ : .: ::: ~ *.:* .... / ... ~\nblocked consistently. Some days a resident can reach all BBC News arttcles and .other days they .\n\ncannot. According to a Chinese software engineer interViewed by a reporter from The Atlantic, it is the unpred~bility of the firewall that makes the censoring m~re effeC:Uve. It forces the Chinese population to always be on guard because they do not know what the system is looking for~~-w\n.\n\n(U) Not only has China been able to control information flow through the use of technolosv, but also they have been able tQ enlist companies providing ser.vices to them. Yahoo and Google have both been criticized for supporting the Chinese government's Internet censori~g. ln2005, Yahoo was accused of supplying information to China that led to the jailing of ~journalist who was founCI\nguilty of sending foreJan-ba~ web sites the text of an internal Communlst.Party messag~,ui\nGoocle, on the other hand; operates a separate web site, Google.cn, that it self-Censors to satisfy\n Chinese ~trictions. m\n\n(U) The Chinese government Is also able to influence video gaming comp.anies to .. a~er aamlni\ncontent In order to meet their standardS. World of Warcraft, a massively multiplayer .online roleplaying game (MMORPG), developed by the American company Blizza~ Entertainment, has 11.5\nmillion players worldwide - S million of those players .reside in China. In November 2008, Bliuard released an expailsion that has not yet been released in China. Blizzard has failed twice to g!lin the Chinese sovemment's approval on the expansion even though Blizzard has made software revisions In an effort to remove the unapproved content. ua Neither Blizzard, nor. the Chinese sovernment, have released a description of.the objeCUonable CO!'Itent.\n\n(U) China is also involved in developing virtual world technoJoaY. Xu Hui developedHiPilii, which has been described as the Chinese version of Secondlife. HiPiHi, however, models and reflects the\nChinese ~lture: red banners drape the orientation area entrance, and \"newbies .. are encouraged to \"build aharmonious world.\"01 HiP.iHi, as part of its global stratesv, is exploring the possibility ,\nof developing standards that would enable intetoperabtiity betweei'i it and other major 3D virtual worlds, such as Seconduie.p;z If they successfully market and. export HiPIHi, or if they are able to integrate It wlth SecondUfe, HiPiHi developers will !Jridoubtedly be able to export Chinese culture .\n\nand ideals. UJ .\n\n-\n(U) Even with all of the ~nsoring and restriction, m~ people in Chlfia feel.freer ~han any other .\n\nChinese population in history. Perhaps ~hat is a. testament to how effective and clever a job the government is doing in expanding the discussion space for topics that donot threaten its survivai.D4\n\n## (I) Ciowisoiicing Dynamics Pioyide Loth Oppoitinitiu And Challenges To 10. '\"Help Israel Wl1\"\n\n(U) Crowdsourcing can be an effective manner to propapte a message. In December 2008\n- January *2009,* while Israeli Defense Forces were executing 10 during the Jsraei-Hamas conflict in Gaza, a group of Israeli students banded together to form an ad hoc activist group named '\"Help Israel Win. The students developed a software program named \"Patriot\"\nthat they used to conduct distributed denial of service (DDoS) attadcs against pro-Hamas/\nanti-Israel web sites. One of the sroup's organizers stated that, \"we couldn't join the real combat, so we decided to flsht Hamas in the cyber arena: 1J5.1M.07\n{U) Crowdsourcing can, however, adversely affect how operations and deception operations are shaped. With every device and application becoming a sensor in the real world, aU\nreal world Information is being stored In the virtual world. COnsequently, hundreds of thousands of people can revieW and analyze this information. This heightened situational awareness is likely to empower the crowd to detect, assess, and reject a clumsy effort to seed information, defeating the purpose of the information operations.uuJt\n(U) Sourcing witting or unwitting actors may appeal both to states and non-state actors who wish to remain detached from the executiOn of their stated goals in an effort to gain deniabllity while passively supporting and enjoying the strategic benefits of the sourced actions. lAO\n\n! ! ' i i I\n\n## Estonia, **May** 2007\n\nfirms specializing in communications.141 In this attack, the computers forming the botnet became unwitting actors In the cyberattack.142\n(U) One illustration of such activity Is the events in Estonia. Despite the protestS of Russia and ethnic Russians living in Estonia, Estonia removed the Bronze Soldier SOviet war memorial in Tallinn. Shortly thereafter, Estonia fell under a masslw DDoS attack. Prior to the attack, hackers had already infiltrated computers around the world and installed malicious software on them.\n\nAttackers leve. this giant botr)et to flood targlolet web sites belonglna to the Estonian government, news organizations, banks, and\n(U) Estonia accused the Russian government of orchestrating the attacks; but. Tallinn was not able to substantiate that claim. Even though investigative teams found that several IP addresses contributing to the attack traced back to computers located within Russian state institutions, there was enough plausible\n\ndeniabillty that the investigators were not\nable to definitively attribute the attacks to the\nRu,sslan government. Regardless, the hacktivists\ndisrupted Estonian services and employed\nmillions of unwitting participants' computers to\nconduct the attack.10\n\n(U) Incidentally, the only Individual fined in\nconnection with the attacks was a 2D-year old\nEstonian man of Russian descent who confessed\nto attacking an Estonian political party web site.\nHe claimed the attack was an act of protest\nagainst a political figure who had become a\nhated figure for Estonia's Russian minority., ... Of\nnote, this crowd-sourced cyberattack of Estonia\nservers demonstrated the elusive, difficult-to-\nattribute nature of such cyber activity.\n\n## I (U) Cy_Berspace Remixed\n\n(U) The more Mixed Reality\npermeates our society and\nconverges the real and virtual\nworlds, the more people will\nbecome networked tosether.\nThe\n       numbers of devices\n\nconnected\n            to\n                cyberspace\n\nwill grow; yet, cyberspace will become more about the people interfacing with it.\n\n(U) Currently, legal and 10\ncommunities\n                 are\n                        debating\n\nwhat defines a hostile act . in cyberspace. In\norder to classify a hostile act, we must know the\nactor's identity and intent. Today, attribution is\na difficult problem as those intending malicious\nattacks upon US Interests are taking necessary\nsteps to conceal their identlties.1.s Intent also\nis an lmP.Ortant part of classifying a hostile act,\nbut the mixed cyberspace and physical effects\nof a cyber attack may not tie strongly to the\nsource's intent. Thus, determining intent and\naffixing it to a specific actor are elusive. -With the\nproliferation of Mixed Reality technologies, our\nphysical and virtual world identities will continue\nto merge, making discernment of attribution\n\nUl\n\nand intent even more challenaina. As we live\nmore of our lives on the net, we will be expected\nto determine not only when a hostile act occurs,\nbut also In what environment (physical or virtual)\nIt occurs so that we can determine appropriate\nproportional responses. 146\n\n(U) ~ber warfare can become a powerful\ncourse of action in the future as more of our\nlives in the real world are dependent on what\nhappens in the virtual world. We are beginning\nto observe attacks in cyberspace supporting\nactivities in the real world to achieve chilling\neffects. One recent example of such an attack\noccurred during the Russian-Georgia dispute\nover South Ossetia.147\n\n(U) The Russia-Georgia conflict in July-August\n2008 demonstrated this mixed physical and\ncyberspace synergy. During the conflict, the\n\nworld witnessed a cyberattack against Georgia's\nonline aSsets in coordination with Russian\ntroops crossing into Georgia's disputed territory,\nSouth Ossetia.141 The cyberspace-based attack\nagainst Georgian banking and communications\ninfrastructure and key government web sites\ncomprised web site defacement, web-based\npsychological\n                operations,\n                              a\n                                   propaganda\ncampaign, and a DOoS attack. Georgia accused\nthe Russian government of the cyberspace\nattacks, but Moscow denied any Involvement.\n\n(U) The cyberspace ilttacks quickly spilled over into the real world. Cellular communications had been shut down. The attackers struck hard at Georela's bankinc system; the financial sites could not distinguish the lqltima~e traffic: from the fraudulent traffic. In an effort to mitipte the threat that the attacks would spill over into the global realm, major international banks shut down their online connection with Georgia.\n\nThese service disruptions left Geol'lia Isolated and silent, which was one of the principal aims of the cyberspace attacks. w. uo\n(U) This coordinated virtual and physical attack caUJht the attention of many in the United States and left them ponderJns the Mure of cyber warfare. Traditional news outlets, the blogosphere, BI.W.m and US politicians, Including then Presidential candidates Barack Obama and John McCain, IM.w all ~iscussed this cyber warfare.\n\n(U) The cyberspace attacks on Georaia helped expand people's ~rceptlon that cyber warfare is more than just bots, rootlcits, and malware.\n\nThe permeation of MiXed Reality throughout societies worldwide will present pme-changins opportunities for the 10 community. Getting ahead and stayi\"' ahead of this evolution Is not an option -\nit is a necessity for US and allied national security.\n\n## (U) Editorial: Privacy In Mixed Reality\n\n(U) Privacy as we once knew it is dead.\n\nIn the next few years, we will increasingly gather real-time data, including location, appearance, interests, relationships, speech, text, audio, and video on everyone, all the time. Our notions of privacy must adapt. The traditional concept of privacy is that government is regulated to ensure privacy. But this pales in comparison with the scope and extent of private data collection by\n\ncorporate -\n             and criminal -\n                             interests.\nThe collection, sale, and use of private\n\ninformation by private parties have not\n\nbeen similarly regulated.l56\n\n## (U) Scena;Io: So, Sergei ...\n\n{U) So Sergei, how were you able to sell reol-time location and acmnty information about hundreds of members of rhe Unired Stares Intelligence Community and their families compldely legally?\n\n(U) Do you know how many Smartphones there are in the US? 90 million. All of them support downloading and installing applications. So we hired anonymous, free/once developers via E-Lonce.com to code a little app that lets people know where their friends and family members are. It also scrapes real-time location and contacts data from each phone -- we know who our users ore, whO they know, where they've been. and where'they're going. Every day. All the time. The best thing? Under the EULA, it's totally legit-- and nobody reads those things. We thought we were going to catch o few celebrities, for instance sell Britney Spears' location to the paparazzi. But some guys I knew from the old days were a lot more interested in Blackberry users in Langley, Virginia. And the companies they visited. And their kids, and who they knew, what they were talking about and where they went when.\n\nrdlng privacy governs the\n(U)\nLaw r n the government and hflhest technolosical. risk to\n\nrelationship\ncitizenry. The\nprivacy Is\nprivate lnd\ncollected data.\n\nsovemment collection, but\nfailures that permit captUre of\nIs article therefore proceeds In\n\nmines the different privacy\nbile and private - that pem\n\nrUSiaw.\n- s.ctlon 1\nreglmespriva'Yu\nusses privacy under the private\nrivacy polcies, contracts, and\nnse Agreements.\n- Section 3 di usses privacy under a public\nlaw reaime, ncluding the public law.\nimpact of 1\ntion trackin& reasonable\nexpectatl\nof privacy, ilnd the impact of\nbulk data\nssing on the reputation of\nand its citizenry.\nin its current fonn, It may m~mgeR.~rep~ted es and understandif18$ of the ns of digital natives.\n\n[Hiro]'s eEm putting together a lot more mphasis on his auxiliary emergen y backup job: freelance stringer the CIC, the Central lntelligen e Corporation of Langley, Virginia.\n\n(U) In the ne r future, Intelligence pthering wiU necessaril move from being speciflcally t:argeted by ernments to beinc ubiquitously applied by d zens. A blanket processing of mounts of data collected by\n bout Itself, for itself. to power ands, will be typical. Everyone wiN collect Information about everyone eR, all the time, voluntarily, in order to facilitate findlnc their friends, documenting their dally lives, and sharmg thefr interests. Cell phone cameras will increasingly capture nearly~ry event of human Importance. Networks will have more and more localized information. This hyper-localized\nInformation will include information about where .an individual's friends are, about what they are Interested in, and about who knows who else in any given context. Corporations will gather unprecedented amounts of data from their customers In order to advertise, market, and determine new viable business models.ts7\nThe business is a simple one. Hiro gets information. It may be gossip ...\n\na fragment of a computer disk. It can even be a joke based on the latest highly publicized disaster.\n\nNeal Stephenson, Snow Crash\n(U) Mixed reality will usher in this worldwide lnformatloo overload and the IC wiU not be immune. In order to keep up, resources must move from Information collection to Information analysis. One way this can be done Is to leverage the public analytic output in lieu of requiring that all analysis originate in the IC. A chaltence for the IC wiU continue to be understanding publicly provided Information, and Integrating It usefully with secretly pthered information.158\n(U) Most future mtelligence collection will be open source. The real world is unclassified and recorded. Theoietlcally, the alobal brain knows everything -\nthat is recorded). This means that the relative wel&ht of secret processing\nis reduced compared to the importilnce of understanding what the world knows.\n\nMixed reality wiD only Increase this trend, as objects become seamlessly linked to internet environments. KnowlnC wUt we know will be more Important than .flndlna out what we don't lcnow.151\nHe uploads it to the CIC Database ...\n\nMillions of other CIC stringers are uploading millions of other fragments at the same time.\n\nNeal Stephenson, Snow Crash\n(U) The bulk of this lnforrn4Jtton will be obtained from private data collectors. Standards of probable cause or of appropriate targetina of US persons pnder FISA ar.e ,enerally understood to limit full-scale IC data minifll. But the government can purchase In the priVate market information It could not itself Collect -\nor.\n\nmore importantly, it can encourage the cultural disseminatiOn of information by the populace itself in support of US interests. An example would be sovernment use of ChoicePoint, or doabd purehases of C:ommerciaUy available databases. 110\n(U) There are three currently accepted models of sovemment access to private information.\n\nFirst, access pursuant to legal process: a search warrant, administrative subpoena-, or national security letter. Second, access through outreach to companies, which may choose to voluntarily disclose data as permitted by the End User UcenseA&~ments they have entered Into with their users.\n\n(U) Third, access thi'OUih the purchase of data in a commercial database by the aovernment, acting as a private enttty.161\n(U) A fourth (proposed) model may strike a legislative balance between privaC:v and need. In the past, institutions that stand at the crossroads of critical Information technoloeies have been required by law to adopt spedfic standards for retention of records and access pursuant to lepl process. This Is a model European lawmakers have used with success. Europe has adopt~ a two-year retention requirement tor internet senrice providers. to assist in law enforcement. 112 However, this retention rule is set In the context of the european Data Privacy Direcilve, which radically limits what private companies can do with information they collect.\n\nThis protects privacy, but limits the uses to which companies can put information.\n\n(U) Conversely, American industry has adopted disposal policies, rather than use limitations, to protect privacy. For Internet service providers, disposal after a set period is an industry custom that leaders (including Google) have self-adopted. For example; Goosle anonymlzes search results after nine months.\n\n(U) Law succeeds when It adopts welltested rules. Thus, a retention law must be accompanied by a disposal law. Under proposed reform, companies would retain the records for law enforcement. but also would dispose of or completely anonymlze them after the statutory pertod.18\n_\n(U) Additionajly, policyrnakers could profitably support formation of a national oo Not Track registry. The national Do Not Call list\n_ has been a popular success. It permits citizens to meaninafully exercise consent reprding tarpted advertising over telephone nnes. In theory, a national Do Not Track reslstrv would permit dtizens to meanlnsfully opt out of pervasive and controversial location  trackinc.\n\nIf citizens desire limited use of polocation (for example, for mappins applications), the Do Not Track reatstrv could require a scrubblns of the database after a set period of time (this also Is modeled on the Do Not Call list requirements, in which telemarketers must periodically scrub databases).*\n(U) The current.lepJ paradJcm for intelligence ptherlnc Is top-down. But most Information Is aenerated peer-to-peer, and most intelllaence is created from the bottom-up. The Constitution, federal statutes, and executiw orders restrict the aovemrnent's ability to collect information concernins US persons. But this law Is no lonaer usefully . applied because peer-to-peer Information ptherin& is governed by private\nlawEULAs.\n\n.\n\n(U) There are also non-lepl solutions that educate the user. These include fosterlnt development of consumer-grade free software that identifies for the novice what the Smartphone isdoins; publlcadverttslng to advise Smartphone users of the risks of disclosing their location Information; and development of standard summaries for contract terms. similar to product warnings, for Smartphone apps.\n\nThe right ofthe people to be secure\nin their persons, houses, papers,\nand effects, against unreasonable\nsearches and seizures, shall no~ be\nviolated.\n\n4th Amendment, US Constitution\n\n## Ii. In Googlewetrust\n\n(U) The Google EUlA has areater implk:ations for lntellipnce collection than the United States Constitution.\n\nNon-Disclosure Aareements\n(NDAs) trump the First Amendment. Permission .\n\nto disclose data to the JC)Vemlftent trumps the Fourth Amendment. Private actors gather the most information in US society, and private law contracts aovem aH of those transactions. 18\n(U) Private corporatiOns can and do pther any information that the end user aarees to in the EULA. Thus, private companies are gatherins:\nInformation on every aspect of us persons'\nlives. This presents a threat to national security, as terabytes of personal Information become available to anyone wUiin& to buy it or able to access it. (For example, forelcn BOWmrnents ownlnc sl&nlficant portions of top social networkin& sites, or orpnized alme ta~&etin& US corporate databases.)\n\nWhen logged on to the CARS\nsystem,\n         your\n               computer\n                          is\nconsidered a Federal computer\nsystem and is the property of the\nUS Government. Any or all uses\nof this system and all files may be\nintercepted, monitored, recorded,\ncopied, audited, inspected, and\ndisclosed to authorized CARS, DoT,\nand law enforcement personal,\nas well as authorized officials of\nother agencies, both domestic and\nforeign.\n\n## Cash For Clunkers Dealers' Eula\n\n(U) The. prlvatlzed nature of information collection also presents an opportunity for US\ndata collection. American corporations pther enormous world-wide databases on purchasin&\n\n## Reputation Economics\n\npatterns, preferences, search terms, physical locations, communities, networks, and lnterds.\n\nUnder present law, this information often can be obtained with an administrative subpoena rather than a search warrant. Further, the information may almost always. be voluntarily disclosed under the Stored Communications Act if a service provider has induded In the contract a provision that permits them to do so - and all do in order to ~main competitive.\n\n## Ill. Privacy And National  Security\n\nYou give Google a perpetual, irrevocable, worldwide, royaltyfree, and non-exclusive license to\n(U) A reputation economy !s a shJft from money to fnsi&ht as the currency of exChange.\n\nFor a 14 year-old *girl,* twittering about her cat Is a form cf Insight for her peer group -\nbut that currency Is not fuftlible to a group of corporate lawyers. Social networks depend on reputation economies to drive adoption, mainmn cohesion, and produce value for their membei's. The currency of Facebook Is friends'\ncomments and their participation In each other's online lives. The currency of eBay is a seller's history. Reputatlonal capital creates the ability to mabHize social networks on large and small scales. Those networks, once mobilized, actualize In the real world through Mbced Reality technoloSies.\n\nreproduce~ adapt, modify, translate, publish, publicly perform, . publicly display and distribute any Content which you submit, post or display on or through, the Services.\n\na:\nInitial Google EULA for Chrome Browser\n\n~ (U)Whuffie\nUJ\nCl\niii\nWhuffte is the colloquial term. for\nreputational\ncurrency.\n1W]huffle\nrecaptured the true essence of money:\nIn the old days, If yc)u were broke but\nrespected, you wouldn't starve.\"\nCory Doctorow, Down and Out in the MaP: Kingdom\n(U) In the global market of ideas, privacy and freedom are core American values. But these principles are threatened by mixed reality. OUr constitutional society secures rights apinst the government. It does not secure peer-to-peer rilhts or rights waived tbroush obfuscated lepl\n. agreements. The rlaht to privacy th8t applies aplnst the pwernment does not apply to neilhbors. service providers, or lurch etllfne operators. 111\n(U) For example, Ashton Kutcher. a Hollywood actor and one of the most followed users on\n\"Twitter,\" c:Ould inspire as many as 3,038,929\nusers to gather on short notice, throush\n\"tweetups\" and social standing. This compares favorably to the 885,548 followers of the White House offidat account. w7\n(U) The United States' reputation will lncreasiniiY become a directly monetlzable asset. Twitter thought leaders can currently make or break markets -or political C9\\IPS. The\n(U) The mixed reality future paints a seductive view of data linked not only to computers but to people, places, and thlnp. US actors need to act with restraint to mitigate threats to the Constitutional order such that First and Fourth Amendment interests are adequately protected.\n\nThis is not solely a matter of law, but of principle and Ideals. Principles matter more In a Mixed Relllty world because reputation Is the primary c..-rency of excbanae few this technoiOIY\nnumbers of IC employees, thus leading by example and reputational Investment, and not .\n\nby bureaucracy and autocracy.*\nAnonymous 1roup within online radical freespeech coalition was able to quickly orpnlze larae poups of people In multiple ~ntrles and across multiple internet technolocies to taraet Scientotoav. Application creators, social platform participants. and thoulht leaders will be able to mobilize silnlflcant populations very quickly, intentionally or otherwise.\n\n## The Moral Hip Ground\n\n(U} The effectiveness of the lntelllpnce community In ~ra;inlsodal networks and mixed rullty will depelid on the amount of podwtll1ftatlntelll&ence actors can orpni~e, either overtly or coveltly. Suppose that Intelligence actors not only lurked In networks, but actively ensa~ed such that they were able to generate on-the-spot, real-time Information about locations a~ere in the world. Cell phone users in Pakistan, voters In Iran, rioters In China *..:..* and all may provide lntelli1ence to US actors, if those US actors can command their trust.\n\n(U) The inteU~&ence community has repeatedly Identified the need to seize the moral high around. IC recruits must feel that IC)Vernment service Is worth the risk and lack of pay as compared to the private sector. Regular citi~ns\nwith critical information must feel that reporting the Information will be safe and beneficial to them personally.\n\n\"By measuring the thing that money really represented - your person~l capital with your friends and neighbors -you more accurately gauged your success.H\nCory Ooctorow, Down and Out in the Magic Kingdom\n(U) This combination of moral will and moral skill wiH allow the US to conduct more effective Information Operations in military theaters and elsewhere. OUr ability to mobilize latp numbers of people and affect their decision makln1 process is limited primarily by our ability to influence their information environment -\nwhich is a social space. In the coming mixed reality world, that Influence can only be effective throu1h trust in the social network. ut\n(U) In a Mixed RMUty futi:n, trust will become a primary currency of exchanp for the lntellltence community. The effectiveness of an Intelligence actor will depend largely on the network she can command -\njust as it is, increaslnsly, In the private sector.\n\n(U) Trust sells. Social networks can provide .\n\nmeans to senerate, organize, and mobiHze that trust. However, the trust can only be 1enerated by participation In and contribution to the JIOUps. This requires a chan&e of paradigm from clandestine Information capture to participation in sroups which then cari be leverased for valuable purposes.\n\nDigital natives, also termed Millennials, have demonstrated different- not lesser- standards of privacy.\n\n(U) In order to leverase the moral advantase, the IC needs to celebrate moral exemplars. A\nculture of ethical behavior and morality can be bred using mixed reality technology by aUowinl those moral leaders to communicate and share knowledge quickly and transparently to larse\n\n## Iv. The World After Privacy\n\n(U) Courts tiave already expressed concern that constant location tradcln& violates expectations of privacy. Hidden, continuous, indiSCtimlntJte, *and lnti'IISiw* surveillance Is considered by aU courts to raise red flags about the warrantless use of the technique.tn Thus, electronic eavesdroppins presents \"inherent dansers'\" and requires more procedural protection than do everyday conventional searches.';.\n\nThis sec:tton analyzes what a reasonable expectation of privacy will look like in a Mixed Reality future. The first subpart addresses the current teglme IQVernins reasonable expectations of privacy as a constitutional law standard. The second sec:tton addresses shiftina gene~tlonal expectations of privacy.\n\n## Reasonable Expectations Of Privacy In Mixed Reality\n\n(U) The constitutional baseline Is the Fourth Amendment standard governinl reasonableness of searches and\n(U] Therefare. a majority Of courts havti held that realtime triiCidns of people vfa their cell phones requires a wannt supported by probable cause.11'studies show that a wide majority of those polled do not desire or expect warrantless access to t~ location data. 1M A minority of courts have permitted real-time cell phone trackin& without a warrant. However, the practice of permittin& retention of historic CtSI {cell-site location information) qs with an administrative subpoena, on the standard of \"'relevance\"\nrather than probable cause, remains widespread. 177\nseizures. This ana~ls often becomes one of determining what is a reoSOIJGI*\n~on of *prillflcy.* This standard is both subjective and objective: it depends on what privacy ~ens actuaRy do expect. and on what privacy is actually available to them.1\"\"\n(U) Privacy an.tvsls protects people, not piKes. 1he question 11 not \"\n~\nKtors can access the data, but whether they should, IMn the prtvecy interest at still& 171\n(U) For cell phones, as for regular telephones, l.t is not dispositive that the data are routed throu1h a third party.\n\nThe Supreme Court has ~\nto create a broad \"third party exception\"\nfor telephone ~noJosies, recognizins that the value of telecommunications technoiOIV to a democratic society is sufficiently important to provide Fourth Amendment protection to telephone calls.\n\nNevertheless, true business records disclosed to a third party may be subject to a case-by-case exception under the fourth Amendment. 172\n' i\n(U) This stand11rd is in flux. A recent highprofile feder11l court decision . extended the Fourth Amendment probilble cause stilndard to historic as well as real-time geolocation data. The court voicec:l concerns that even historic location data woukl permit tr..clcil'll of citizens as they go to church, abortion clinics, X-Rated movies, political ptherings, or other dally activities. Further, the court expressed concem over government claims that CSU I GPS technolotY was not accurate enoUJh to identify the person's location with precision.\n\nThis argument is decreasinsfy accurate, given sub-meter GPS predslon (see section on law Enforcement).111 However, other COL!rts have dlsqreed, holdil'll that cell phone location data are no different from other business records, and can be recovered without a warrant. 111\n\n## Chan&Lna Expectations In A Mbred Realty World\n\n(U) Expectations have changed with culture.\n\nGenerational, technoloslcal, and cultural shifts In privacy have resulted in a new approach to personal information.\n\n (U) For Mnnlals, tontrolls prlvKy and the\nexpectations of privacy are measured by control.\nWhen you take control out of their hands,\nyou have vioa.ted their privacy. Millennial\nexpectations of privacy thus conflict with\ntraditional law enforcement and intelligence\ncommunity conceptions. Law enforcement and\nthe IC understand private information as what Is\n\"offline, in the house, and public as beil'll what\nis \"out there: or online, A millennia! expects\ninformation over which she exercises control to\nbe private; and information over which she does\nnot to be public.\n(U) Privacy In the future will be arbitrilted rather than absolute. Expectations of privacy will be a matter of Friends settfnp, not FISA. There is a very real risk that government ac:tol's will de...-mine that an dlgltaHy aVailable Information is posted without an expectation of privacy -\n(U) The standard account assumes that privacy vanishes as technology progresses. This is inaccurate. HistorieaUy, as. privacy. becomes technoJoeically lmpracttcable (due, for example, to overcrowdil'll), social norms Increase privacy to compensate.\n\n(U) Followina this trend, expectations of privacy will be different, not less. Priwcy concerns will Increase when mt.ed reality pushes Internet tradcJns down Into real space. Citizens who have been unconcerned at being tracked across the internet will react neptiw!ly to beins tracked as they go about their real space lives. This phenomenon has been documented when, for-example, the FTC blocked the merser of online marketer DoubleCiick with offline companies that. tracked real-world credit card purchase histories. This merger would have allowed online surflna and purchasing to be linked with real-world movements and buying decisions.\n\n## Participation Is Not Optional\n\n(U) Every day, people often join sadal networks only to find thet their identities have already been usurped, and that misinfotrnatlon about them is prevalent. F.Uure to participate pnerates neptive social currency and creates a void to be filled by Identity entrepreneurs.\n\nPoliticians who do not join Twitter have their names twitterjacked.\"\n(U) Millennlals are aware of privacy concerns;\nthey merely come to different condusions reprdins the risk versus reward of postins information on different channels. The standard account is that disital natives are Insufficiently mature to understand the downstream effects of behavior; for example, sexttns (the intentional production and distribution of sexually explicit tmases of one's self via tell phone). MHiennlals do not have a lesser lepl expectation of privacy, but they expect privacy less often and in different circumstances.\n\n(U) Lack of participation will be more obvious than ensaaement. Social networks reject anonymized newcomers. People who de-lurk;''\nor come from noWhere, are assumed to have anonymized for a reason and thus will be l&nored at best. Reputatlonal currwncy requires historic patldpatfon In the reputation economy.\n\n(U) IC actors must determine how to build rwputation on social networks without compromfsfcW security.\n\n(U) Mlllennials craft rather than conceal. The privacy expectation of a Millennia! is not in the decision to post content, but In the process of manacfnc the messap of the content. In order to be in the online world, inhabitants must participate. Because dieital natives place a hilh value in participation in the culture, they manage risk (or attempt tot, rather than avoid it altogether.\n\n(U) Interestingly, ImposterS often are embraced by social networks. There Is a devetoptns sense of online \"fair use of ldenttty.\" Popular social network personalities are often mocked and their identities adopted. This becomes even easier when the real entity or person has failed to enpae a social network.\n\n(U) Part of the brand Identity that disital natives select is that they are older and more sexually experienced than theY really ar~. Thus, the decision to post sexually explicit messaaes is not a determlnatiOt:'l that privacy does not matter, but rather a cost........,.l analysl$ applied to a sodalseltinc.\n\n## Evelyn's Story\n\n(U) With Mbced Reality, the home Is back. Courts have senerally tended to draw a hard line at the door to the home. Thus, warrantless ceU phone trackina -\neven If permitted by courts - ousht to be limited so as to automatically terminate at the door to the home. To do otherwise Is to risk blanket Invalidation on the srounds that the technology unconstitutionally penetrates spaces not open to public scrutiny.\n\nEvelyn is a model, successful but new in her career. She delayed creating a Facebook page. When she finally began, she found 12\ndiffereAt pages discussing her, many in negative ways. Evelyn learned that the only way to manage her personal brand was to opt in, not opt out.\n\n(U) This creates a void that entrepreneurs, Intelligence community actors, or insuraents can exploit. Thus, privacy will lncreaslr!IIY be a matter of manaains partkipaUon, rather than lurking, or restrlctini access to the te~hnoloav.\n\n## You Will Be Represelbd\n\n(U) If you don't represent yourself, someone will represent you, and not necessarily in a positive\n-\nway. Late joiners ftt!d that early adopters have already claimed  their identity. For example, several hish-profile politicians discovered that their names were beinJ used on Twitter without their knowlec:f&e or consent. Althqh the social networlt rapidly detected the imposters, the social networlt was not able to ascertain the true Identity of the Intruder. The resultiOJ\nconversation and publicity was very neiative for the politklans.\n\n(U)Thlslsnot unhkethepractlceofcybersquat.ting prevalent in the early days of the commercial internet. Then, entrepreneurs squatted on realworld companies' trademar.lcs to leverap their reputation. Now, entrepreneurs are taldng realworld identities to do the same. Establishing a personal brand is therefore a hiJher priority than hidlnJ identities from social networks -\n... ;.\n\n:z:\nIll\n\n## (U) Law Enforcement IssueS\n\nBY CHARLES COHEN\n\n## ( U) Overview\n\n(U)\nMixed Ruaty: (MR)\ndevices and applications have fundanKintalfy and their activities in ways that the LE community is ill prepared to interdict. However, MR\ntechnologies -\nif widely adopted by criminal organizations -\nwould increase the ability or properly trained and equipped LE elements to observe, surveil, and collect Information on criminals lqally.\n\nIrrevocably chanpd the LE environment. Upon widespread adoption, MR PreSents new risks and opportunities for the lE community. MR\naffords criminals the ability to communicate with one another, as wen as coordinate\n\n## <.\" Key Points\n\n(U) Mixed Reality technolosv has fundamentally and Irrevocably chanpd the Law Enforcement environment.\n\n(U) As Mixed ReaHty technololles become increasinllv ublqultcws, they wiH continue to act as a vector for a Browil'll number of offenders seeldn& to exploit the chasms that exist in current Law Enforcement structures.\n\n:;\n,.\n(U) The level of complexity of both the corporate orpntzation, afona with the orpnlution of\nthe physical infrastructure behind the companies developina Mixed Reality applications, places\nresoun:es of almost alllE a&encies in the United States.\n(U) The current state of knowledae, at least amona the LE community, Is insufficient to address these Issues in any meaninlful *Wt!fi.* In fact. the c:.pabdhy to conduct any sllniftcant forensic examinations on SmaB Scale DiCJta1 Devices falls outside the competence of most small to medium law aaendes.\n\n(U) Alona with the challenps posed by Mixed Reillity technotosles to investlptors, come helpful aspects for those trained to talce advantaae.\n\ntaaed Is another area of interest as it can aid In lrwesttpttOns and simultaneously identify c!anefesttne Law Enforcement assets.\n\n(U) The challenae presented here is nOt derived from a specific application or technolosv. Rather, the ability to use multiple technoloaieS to produce superior results is our cause for concern. Currently, domestic and foreign criminal actors routinely use available technoloaies as vectOrs for their activities\n(to lndude those associated with entities wlshtna to do stratestc harm to the United States and its interests, e.g., terrorists and/or non-state threat actors). It is therefore Direly that MR technololies wtll be adapted for use by criminal elements. -\n(U) A **Case** Scenario\n(U) The following scenario Is a factual case In point use of MR by criminal entities between April 2008\nand January of 2009.\n\n## (B)(7)(E) J(B)(7)(E) (B)(7)(E)\n\n(U) This scenario illustrates that while a sinsJe MR technofo&y may pose a specific risk to LE operations, the ability of criminal actors to use multiple technologies certainly does .\n\n(U) Many people now carry devices that are commonly described as Smartphones. This description does not completely capture the\n essence of these devices because, In many instances, voice communication is incidental to their common use. A better descriptive term is Smll Scale DfiiUI Devices (SSDD) that also happen to .have telephonic capabilities.\n\nThe ubiquity of SSDD use, combined with the myriad types of data that passes throush them Additionally, cross-jurisdk:.tlonal constraints result in acute. chalk!nJeS, especially when investiption-relevant information Is sousf\\t from an MR service provider outside the United States.\n\n(U) Criminal Tradecraft\n(U) Skilled offenders regularly exploit the jurisdictional and functional pps that exist between federal, state, local, and tribal LE\ncommunities (in addition to those of the military and LE communities); For example persons engaaed in online fraud regularly exclude from the prospective victim pool those people lfvln& within the same jurlsdlc:tton. Many skilled offenders solely tai'IP!t persons living In different cou~es in order to further mitipte the risk of investigation and prosecution. As MR\ntechnoloties become fnc:reaslnlly ubiquitous, they will continue act as a vector for a 1~\nnumber of offenders seeldn.l to exploit the chums that u1st In the current LE structure. 1111\n(U) Risk Vs. Reward\n(U) Alone with the chalt.nps posed by MR\ntechnolo&Y to lnvestlptors come helpful aspects for those trained to take adwntqe. LE\npersonnel wlshins to exploit MR technolosfes for investfgative purposes need to understand the myriad of available technoloaJes and how to find information of evidentiary value. In order for investlptors _to be able to take advantage of the data that are produced by people who use MR technofosies, they must be able to recover that data In a forensically sound and lawful manner.w\n(and resides on them), make them ripe for LE\ninvestigative exploitatlon.111\n\n(U) Investigative Implications\n(U) From a LE perspective, a day can be imagined\nin the near future in which an individual's SSDD\ncould play an integral part in a sexual assault\ninvestigation. Many SSDD's have sub-meter\n\nGPS apability, an accelerometer, an internal\ncomP..ss. and various applications that routinely\nping mobile phone towers. Additionally, many\napplications loaded on SSDDs have the ability\nto capture data streams in the normal course of\noperation that is in addition to their expected\nfunction. Armed with this data (which resides\non the SSDD itself or on a server) an investigator\nconceivably could recreate the whereabouts\nand actions of an individual in time and place.111\n\n(U) For example, the location of the device\nover time can be tracked and by extension,\nthe logtion of the individual over time may be\ninferred (data are tied to the individual). Further,\nthe internal accelerometer and compass allow\nthe orientation of th~ device to not only be\n\ndetermined (on three axes) but to be correlated\nto the logtion of the person who possesses the\ndevice as well. Together, these data can indicate\nthe orientation of the suspect's body at various\npoints in time. Finally, the accelerometer also\ncan provid~ the relative motion information of\nthe phone, and by extension, the suspect.\n\n(U) Combined, these disparate pieces of\ninformation conceivably could reveal that the\nsuspect was 1. at the logtion of the assault\nat the time of the assault; 2. that his body was\nhorizontal at the time of the assault; 3. that the\nsuspect was repeatedly moving back and forth\nalong an axis within a specific range of motion\nwhile at a specific angle of incline relative to\nthe earth. Additional information scraped from\nthe internal memory of the SSDD and remote\nservers might show the true interests and\nactivities of the suspect pre-, para-, and post-\nassault. Even the elevation of the suspect over\ntime will be available.\n\n(U) As this kind of forensic information moves\ninto the courts, Issues related to the \"chain\n\nof custody'\" are certain to be raised: Was the accused actually In possession of the device at the time the assault occurred? Other MR data mav be used to resolve such questions: Was something spedftcally traceable to the accused, such as a posting on Facebook, made at a specific time from a specific locatioil? Such nuances of MR and the law wiU be in play for years:\n\n## (B)(7)(E)\n\n worse, as will be described below, the use of\nthis appllcatlpn puts all information traveling\nthrough a victim's SSDD within the purview of\nthe Syrian Arab RepubHc (which hosts some of\nFlf!Jdspy's serverS). This product works on SSDD\nbrands including Blackberry, Nokia, !Phone, and\nWin MobUe OS devices.112\n(U) Vulnerabilities (hardware)\n(U) Many of the applications lnvestipted at SHARP 2009 either capture, or have the ability to capture, large volumes of personal ldentifyins.\n\nkinesthetic, and business informatfbn. An area that should be of immediate concern, to both the lntelllsence and LE communities, Is who creates these applications and what information they collect. The Intelligence and lE communities should. proactively develop relationships with the creators of applications and SSDD hardware whenever and ~erever possible. When mutually beneficial relationships are not feasible, it will be important tp mitigate risk and exploit opportunities. The current state of knowledge, at least within the LE community, is insufficient t6 address tf1ese Issues in any meaningful way. This should be expanded to consider what additio.nal information could be collected that. is not already beinc collected in order to anticipate future vulnerabilities and opportunlties.111\n(U) In addition. to the risks associated with the collection of data acquired lesitfmately\n(I.e., services in which the user has knowingly participated), lE Is tasked with lnvestipting occurrences of information collection for nefarious purposes in dandestine ways\n(spyware). The diversity and\n~ume of Information that Is collected via an SSDD makes it extremely lucrlltive for criminal orpnizations.\n\n(U) One example of a product speciflcally designed to covertly coUect from SSDDs is found at www.flexispy.com. This product is commercially avaUable for between $140.00\nUSD and $355.00 USD per year, depending on the number of ~ploits In which one is interested and the spedflc: SSDD model that is being exploited. Flexlspy allows anyone with access to the tatJeted ssoo (for about fifteen minutes) to collect a myriad of MR-related information. Once installed on the device, it works unobtrusively In the backJround and is difficult to detect by the user. The application allows covert remote listening, remote control of the victim's phone via SMS, SMS and email logging, call history loging, geo-location tracking, can lnterceptfon, and remote real-time GPS tracking. Even\n(U) The low price point for the Flexispy application and the ease of its Implementation, make it attractive for most criminal enterprises .\n\nConversely, it is outside the ability of most LE aaendes within the us to identify the implemenQtlon of the application, much less attribute its ktstallation to a criminal suspect in a forensically sound maMer.ln fact,1he capaiMiity toconcluctanysipiflcal.ltforenslceamlnations on SSDOs fills outside the competence of most small to medium lAw .,.ncles. Those\naaencies that do have the capability to enpp SSDD forensics mostly lack the expertise and equipment to conduct examinations at a level of sophistication necessary for the lnvestiption of this and similar appfltations. The three most common LE SSDD forensic tool providers\n(Cellebrite, Paraben, and Susteen) do not detect the existence of Flelcispy.\n\n(U) If the presence of an application like Flexispy were to be detected by l.E, the next challense would be foUowlns the requisite iepl processes to obtain the secondary and tertiary evidence necessary to prosecute the responsible party.\n\nFlexispy, Ltd. owns www.flexispy.com, which is incorporated in the Seychelles. Flexispy, Ltd. was spun off from Ventata Co111pany, Ud., which is incorporated In Bangkok, Thailand. The administrative contact for www.flexispy.com is in Switzerland, and the servers throush which the data from a victim's SSDD travels to the criminal are located in the Syrian Arab Republic.\n\nThe level of complexity, of both the corporate orpniutlon of the c:omPMies behind this application, and the technical orpnlzation of the Infrastructure pa.ces It beyond the IIM!I\\fptlve resou~of almost aU LEqendes In the us.sue-.m\n(U) Vulnerabilities (Applications)\n(U) SSDDs are not the only aspect of MR\nthat represents a paradicm shift for the LE\ncommunity. The prevalence of lmaps on the Internet and frequency with which those lmaps ate po-taged Is another area of lntendt. For point of reference, www.facebook.\n\ncom has about 250 million recular users {as of the writins of this assessment) with 120 million unique users loainc in each day. As of April,\n2009, Facebook housed 15 billion photographs with 850 mUiion new photographs added per month. While no statistics exist, anecdotally a majority of those photocraphs on Facebook depict at least one person. Trends in digital cameras mean that an inc,..aslng number of photos contain geosraphical, date, time, and other metadata. As SSDDs have evolved, most now lndude a camera and software that facilitate the uploadiOJ of Images and video to online social networkinJ sites in real time.\n\nThis represents an opportUnity for LE to place a subject of Interest at a sPedfic location, at a spedftc ttme - .,...... In specific aCttvittes, with specific Individuals.\n(U) AS with all technologies, MR Is neutral. In the same way that the increasins volume of lma,es on the *,Vieb* represents an opportunity for L, It also represents a risk. As .an example, www.\n\nface.com offers facial recognition capabilities for images loaded on Facebook. lE can use this appHc:atton to identify associations among criminal actors and locate subjects. Because www.face.com is a PUblicly available appliQtion, it also can also help criminals identify potential or intended victims (as well as LE personnel).\n\nlmqine the ability of an abusive former spouH to crawl the W.b far lrnaps of a former sflniflcint other uslne this technolo&Y. Also.\n\nimqine the abHity of a afminal orPnlzation to crawl the Web for lmaps of a suspected unden:over officer Wtthln their lfDUP. -\n(U) The nature of the techn~, (such as that used bv www.face.com) is such that It o(ten falls outside ability of LE to serve lepl process to obtain any records kept in the normal course of business, and information related to Individuals who use the technolosy. For example, Face.com Is owned by Vlzi Labs, Inc., an Israeli company that does not have a physical presence in the US. This means that the ability to serve lepl process on this companY is beyond the ability of aH but a few US Law Enforcement asendes.-..z\n\n## Recommendations\n\n(U) The .implications of widespread MR adoption by criminal orsanlzations (aiding actions that\n::.\n\nwould result in criminal prosecution) are such that they demand immediate attention from the LE community. To that end, the following are specific steps that can be undertaken now to help\n_, all levels of the .LE community address these implications:\n\n- Establish a coordinated program to determine what information is collected (overtly or\n. -:\ncovertly) by MR applications used by citizens of the US. Non-US LE and pseudo-l:E entities\nshould be leveraged to add value. Organizations, such as InterPol and EuroPol, along\nwith other NGOs would be of benefit In this endeavor. Further. it must be determined\nwhat information is kept on client devices versus what information is retained on servers\n(and where); what companies produce the applications; what companies r!!taln serverside informa~on; the locatlon(s) of those servers; the retention periods for the retained\ninformation; what risks ~1st due to the nature of the Information or company retaining the\nInformation; and by what process the information can lawfully be obtained in the course of\na criminal Investigation .\n. - Develop and distribute forensic tools that have the abHity to recover all data from MR\ndevices (and applications contained thereon) In a forensically sound manner for use by\nLE at the federal, state, local, and tribal levels. Currently, few federal facilities have the\ncapabHity to conduct such examinations for matters leading to criminal prosecution.\nConsequently, they no longer meet the capacity of need. Consider that there were 53\nmillion Smartphones sold In the U. S. in 2008. Sales in 2009 are projected to increase by\n25\".-\n- Revise and update those federal and state statutes that address matters related to the\nretention, preservation, and release of the business records of MR technology companies\n(applications or hardware), as well as personal information stored by MR companies, in\norder to keep pace with advances in technology.\n- Revise and update those federal and state statutes that address the lawful-and judicially\napproved interception of communication for the purpose of criminal Investigations in order\nto keep pace with advances in technology.\n- Establish a coordinated and systemic training program to Inform appropriate LE personnel\nhow to best Integrate MR data of potential forensic value (gleaned from MR devices and\napplications) with other investigative techniques.\n(U) Each of the five recommendations above Illustrates both a current wlnerabilky to and an opportunity for US LE. Adoption of these recommendations will provide LE with an information advantage over sophisticated criminal enterprises. The potential risks (nd conversely, the potentim rewards) for LE related to MR are comparable to those faced by LE with respect to DNA 15 years qo.\n\n## (U) Money Mastery: Mixed Reality And The Global Economic Landscape\n\n(U) The intelliJence community must .\n\nact to reorpnize, adapt, and change to face the significant global economic threats of the future. Economic policy makers must have the abiUty to make informed and Insightful decisions.\n\nThe widespread adoption of MR\ntechnoloaies, along with the-capability to analyze the new information that\nit provides, will supply policy makers with this decision advantage.\n\n\n1/ tAW f:NPOftt:!M!N I SENSIIIVE\nUNCLASSIFIED.\n\nII lAW ENFORCEMEN I SENSfl fvE\n\n##  (U) Alternate Perspective On Information Security\n\nUNCLASSIFIED// bW' ENF9REMENf SENSifl't'f\n.\n\n(U) Time and technolosv are not on\nour side, and choosing not to engage\nthe emerging real-time Web only\nmakes us irrelevant and more prone\nto intelligence failure.\n\nformal media outlets ignores the fact that in fast breaking\nsituations, all reporting is prone to error. Such inherent\nerrors and unreliability require analytic caution, but are\nnot sufficient grot.!nds for ignoring this nelll( media. Analysts\nhave learned to as5ess and weight new Information\nsources, such as CNN, as they have developed, and history\nhas shown that analysis benefits from a broader spectrum\nof intellisence.\n\n(U) We need a fundamental re-examination of our security\nneeds to survive in this world. Such an examination must\nbegin by asking wha.t we hope to accomplish and by\nacknowledging that risk is a necessary component of any\nsecurity system. We are not alone in this need: a recent\nsurvey of private sector employees in 10 countries found\nthat three out of four IT professionals believed their security\npolicies needed updating, and the top reason users gave for\ncircumventing their security policy was their view that the\npolicy was incompatible with their job demands. 2117\n\n(U) The recent political crisis in Iran\nillustrates\n             the\n                    consequences\n                                     of\nlimiting IC access to the internet.\nTwitter, which allows anyone with a\nmobile phone to report anything to\na mass audience, became a critical\nsource of information on breaking\ndevelopments in Tehran because\njournalists and diplomats were often\nconfined to their homes and offices.\nBecause some agencies block access\nto Twitter, some officers found\nthemselves having to go to their cars\nand access the latest developments\non the crisis from their personal\nmobile phones. Others found they\ncould ~over the crisis more effectively\nfrom home with unfettered internet\naccess that they are denied at work.\n(U) The\n            argument that Twitter.\n\nblogs; and other outlets for \"citizen journalism\" are not as reliable as\n\n(U) One alternative to the current system is to come out\nfrom behind the walls of our fortress and defend ourselves\nthrough the agility to be gained by active engagement with\nthe rest of the world. This system would be light and nimble,\nworking with the global hive to spot emerging threats early\nand responding to imminent threats ~ore quickly. The\nsecurity managers of the future would be well known to the\nhive, feeding the reputation system to ensure that security\nconstantly improves by fixing flaws.\n\n(U) The other key factor is personnel security. An emerging\ntheme In the discussion of security In the private sector is\nthat \"technology does not equal security,\" as noted recently\nby Cisco's senior security adviser.2111 Indeed, major IT\nleaders such as Google and Apple, while embracing sharply\ndifferent corporate cultures, both embrace a focus on\npersonal rather than structural or. technologiCal solutions\nfor security. 209110\n\nlJNCLASSifiEO /I *LAW* &NFiilMiiUOIT fi(Nt:RVE\n\n## (U) Keeping The Ic One Step Ahead (U) When Pull Comes To Push (U) Summary Statement\n\n(U) Commercial recomiMftdlltlon erwlnes. semantic analysis systems, content analysis pneratan, and sentiment aMiysls should be leverqed by the lntelllpnce Community (IC) to a...,nent CQ~nltlan, sltutloul..,.reness, analysis processes. and products.\n\n## (U) Key Points\n\n1. (U) The exponential increase in open source information means that\nan effective IC analytic body without automated augmentation from\nexternal sources is difficult to imagine.\n\n2. (U) Attention paid to IC analysis (classified and otherwise) metadata,\ntaxonomy can reap large dividends downstream. Allowing analysts\nto \"tag\" products as well as sources, and create folksonomies (userderived taxonomies), will accelerate the analysis process -with little\nincremental overhead.\n3. (U) User rating and review of IC products and traffic could yield\nexcellent benefits as analysts struggle to keep up with as well as find\nthe most timely and relevant content.\n4. (U) Geo-referenced \"Push'\" technologies could benefit an_!Jiysts and\nIC personnel by aggregating and automatically displaying relevant\ncontent.\n5. (U) \"Scraping\" textual data from the web and using it to estimate\nwidespread beliefs and attitudes utilizing semantic along with\nsentiment analysis could alert the IC to threats and changes in near\nreal-time.\n\n## (U) Introduction\n\n(U) The IC can benefit by applying evolvinl recommendation engines, made possible by location-aware software and hardware, to aupnent c:osnttton and raise situational awareness. These technoloBJes are robust enoush to warrant serious consideration, and are beins vicorously pursued for consumer applications. Underlying technoJoeies include collaborative filtering. semantic analysis, and the semantic web.DUu.nJ\n(U) Computational linguistics and semantic analysis are already staples of IC research efforts.\n\nThe community would do weft to consider tallorins such efforts to improve productivity of scarce analyttc resources through a self-~aininc capability apinst Internal IC datasets and the internet. Specifically, this genre of tools would\n\"intuit\" potential items of Interest from both internal and open sources. This would occur in an automated fashion throuch observation of how analysts use those sources.\n\n(U) Information awareness lessons can be learned from the commercial Internet. Much time, research, and money has been spent to autom~ally pther, parse, and further disseminate relative information, la,.ely for better markettns strategies for commercial entities. These strateales Include; contextual analysis, semantic analysis, collaborative\n(U) The transparent observation task, which would run in the badc&round without the user's intervention, would. infer the context of the analyst's activities. The analyst's response to this menu of Items would then provide performance feedback to the software, continually improving lt. The end result would be a focused daily\n\"newsfeed~. (Note that the ataorlthms'\nfiltering.\n\n. seo-referencins, metadata enhancement via taging. and the automation of bqround processes that push relevant content to the user.\n\ncapability to self-train would be dependent upon access to both 1) internal IC sources and\n2) external open source material.) Lessons can be learned from consumer focused Internet technologies evolvins a recommendation\nlayer that emphasizes \"Push\" versus the '\"Pull'\"\nof traditional research. The realization of the so-called \"Semantic Web\" will speed this trend by addinc more robust metadata to web pages, including ontoloay and tlliOnomy, which in tum will aid in search and dJscoverability\". In effect, these systems \"hover\" around user activities, learning from them, and continually seekinc out relevant content based on their flndinp.\n\n(U) Technofoty currently offers (or soon will)\nvirtuallntellicent assistants that politely \"push'\"\nranked, rated, and relevant messaae traffic, links, btos posts, Tweets, videos, photos and other resources (dasslfled or otherwise) to the analyst desktop, based on near real-time awareness of Information of Interest. The resource pool for this Information should be sourced from within IC repositories and Knowledge Management systems, alons with the open Internet. Consumer examples are dted herein, that, with some lmasination, could readily be adapted to IC use cases. With the exponential increase In open SCHHCe lnfarmatlon, it Is dllllcuit to lmqine an efMc:tive IC analytic body without automated aupnentatlan from external sources.\n\n... g\n\"'\n... -\n~\n\"'\n\n## (U) Examples From The Commercial Internet (U)The Digital Music Space\n\n(U) One Uama LLC began at the University of Illinois within the NCSA\nApplied Learning Group D2K (Data to Knowledge) initiative. One Uama uses a combination of semantic analysis collaborative filtering techniques to arrive at its recommendations. Although not really \"push,\" it is still worthy of what can be done by a small te;~m using mostly open source algorithms and software platforms. One Uama (http://\nwww.onellama.com) scours thousands of Internet radio stream playlists storing over a billion artist-track pairs.\n\nAn artist name or track name displays a ranked order of related stations. In another example, One Uama uses a\n\"Semantic Tree to cluster similar tunes around a \"seed .. tune allowing for the IU) Music has been a fertile field for the development of recommendation systems. The crash of CD sales and music retailing has created a necessity for digital marketing and discovery. Music has metadata built in, provided by commercial metadata providers like Gracenote (http:l/www.gracenote.com) and All Music Guide (http://www.allmusic.com). These two services have proprietary taxonomies and ontologies. For example, Gracenote divides music into over 1,600\ngenres with genre maps changing by territory and specialization/\" Similarly, attention paid to IC analysis metadata, taxonomy, and ontolocv can reap larp dividends downstream. Aftowlng analysts to tag\nproducts as well as sources. and aeate folksonomies\n(user-derived taxonomies), can accelerate the process with little Incremental overheH.\n\n(U) Apple's !Tunes recently added a \"Genius\" feature.\n\nWhen activated, the user's iTunes music collection is sorted and analyzed for content. Thereafter, a sidebar suggests related tunes while a virtual O.J. \"suggests\nwhich tunes to play next. Oicking an icon causes Genius to instantly create a playlist around the \"seed\" song.\n\n## (U) Media\n\nexploration of the branches (http://company.\n\nonellama.com/sec:tlon/labs/dlscover/).\n\nOne Uama derives its data from open sources lncludina blop, independent rattnas, and reviews of music. Similarly, user rattna and review of IC products and trafllc caulcl yield excellent benefits as allllyst:s struafe ta keep up and find the most timely and relevant content.\n\n(U) YouTube (http://www.YouTube.com) added its \"News Near You\" Feature in July of 2009.\n\nUpon use~ naviptlon to ChanneiPNews &\nPolitics, YouTube records your IP address and therefore your location In order to display timely news video dips with &eOJraphic relevance.\n\nGeo-refetencecl Push could simllarty benefit Analysts and IC personnel bv ~\nand autDIMtlcally dlsplaylnc relevant content.\n\n(U) One of the most successful examples of\n\"Push\" from the consumer mu51c world is Pandora\n(http://www.pandora.com).\n\nWith\n(U) Beyond BroadcastMedla(www.bbcastmedia.\n\ncom) was spun out of Northwestern University's lntellip!nt Information laboratory (http://\ninfolab.northwestem.edu).\n\nThe Lab has developed \"Context Aware\" systems that\n\"shadow\" a user and push relevant content by alsorithmically understanding the context of a giVen broadcast stream or body of text.\n\nDemonstrations include News at Seven, (http://\nnewsatseven.com), which assembles\" a news broadcast deUvered automatfcaHy by avatars, and \"Brussels\", a contextually aware '\"rich interface\" news tracker, which is de$c:rlbed as using:\n': .. models of situations called \"scripts\" to roughly 10 million visitors per month, Pandora Is a personalized, lnter.ICtive Internet radio service that competes with LastFM (www.last.fm), Slacker (www.slacker.com), and the subscription services Rhapsody and Napster. Users begin with a \"seed\" sona or artist that the system builds a personalized \"station\" around based on semintfc and algorithmic similarity. Metadata Is manually added to tracks by Pandora \"musicologists\" at the rate of about 12,000 tracks a month, each taged based on about 150 criteria. m Over its\n5 year history, Pandora has refined its clustering and similarity al&orlthms to create playU.sts related by multifactorial correlations. These correlations are in larse part responsible for spawning miUions of dedicated fans.\n\n(U) Finally, Amazon and Netflix politely push recommendations based upon purchases\n\nanD/yze the artide you're reading, extract\ninformation and retrieve other articles to fill In\nthe details of the situation summary. From the\n'blrd's eye' view of the situation summarl' you\ncan inspect the participants and events to see\nthe sentences and articles that describe them.\"\n\nand wish Usts. Subscribers to the digital video\nrecorder service TiVo receive recommendations\nbased on viewing history and the taains of\nshows that viewers are assumed to be interested\nin recordina in the future.\n\n(U) The lnfolab's \"Super Happy Fun Ball\" is\nanother proof-of-concept, which is described as\nfollow:\n\n\"While you ore browsing the web or ploying\nmusic, Super Happy Fun Boll scours the Internet\nand finds fun and intemtinQ ~b sites and\nmedia related to you and your interests.\"\n\n## (U) Content Analysis. Sentiment Analysis~ And Global Media Trend Tracking\n\n(U) Althouah not strictly within the purview of\n\"push\", there are a growing number of open source systems for global media trend tracking and sentiment analysis. These systems take advanta~e of the Internet's arowth in both commercial and user aeneratecl open sources that can be '\"crawlecr., \"scraped\" and connected-to.\n\n(U) This is an approach that was Inspired by techniques used In Ustenina Post, a wonderful project by Ben Rubin and Mark Hansen. Once a sentence containing \"I feet\" or \"I am feelins'\"\nis found, the system looks backward to the beliMin& of the sentence, and forward to the end of the sentence, and then saves the full sentence ln a database. '\"Scraping'\" textual data from the web and usinl It to estimate widespread beliefs and attitudes usin& semantic and sentiment analysis could alert the IC to relevant changes and threats in near real-time.\n\n(U) Medlacloud (http:/ /www.mediacloud.org), created at the Berkman Center for Internet And Society at Harvard ~\ncreates visualizations of key terms by their frequency of use, source, and &eoaraphy. Hinard Law Professor Yochai Benkler was quoted in the New York Times:\n\n\"If youn reOI/y trying to mop where an ideo\nstarts and how It mows thro11gh the public\nsphere, you need a database like we're\ndeveloping, with time-stamped data. \".:!11\n\n(U) He explained that Gooale and Lexls/Nexis\nwere not as comprehensive. Memetradcer\n(http://www.memetracker.org)\n                                      is\n                                            another\nexample, developed at Cornell University, that\nmines the worldwide web for content trends In\nnear real-time.\n\n(U) We Feel Fine (http://www.wefeelflne.ors)\napplies \"Sentiment\" analysis to visualize the\n\"mood\" of people on the global Internet by\nmlnin& the blogosphere:\n\n\"At the core of We Feel Fine is a data collection\nengine that outomaticolly scours the Internet\nevery ten minutes, haiWsting human feelings\nfrom o large number of blogs. 8log data comes\nfrom a variety of online sources, including\nLiveJournol, MSN Spaces, MySpoce, Blogger,\nFlldcr, Technorati, Feedster, Ice Rocket, and\nGoogle. We Feel Fine scans blog posts for\noccurrences of the phrases \"'I feel\" and \"I om\nfeeling.\n\n## End Notes\n\n1 (U) R8l8lRh Report I Molgan Slanlly Re&eard'l NcxtJ Amatic:a I o.te of Pub1cation : 25 Mardi 20091\"Apple. Inc. t.ong..\nTerm !Phone Growth Unclerappraclat Upgrade ID OWirwei!tlt\"\n2 (U) Web site liST. RE~caml\n\"SmMphones seen edging nelbooks for mobile surfals\" I Dated\nPublicaion: 5 June 20091 Date or Access 4 August 20091 Major news org&lizalion\n3 (U) Web site I Mobile Mixed Really l htlp://1'118du1okia.comllilellinsighUNTI_MARA__June_2009.pdf I Date of\nPublic:allon:19 Feb 2010 I.M12009; Date of access I Nokia Relewch Center\n4 (U) \"Cogntton In Natlnl Envifonmenls: Usi~ Simulaled Scanariolln CoqJiex Decilian-Maldng\" Charies E. Hughes,\nGla1n Hlmison, Slave Flore, Elllab8t Rutstrom, Eleln Smill. Chrisklpher B. StapleDI, Me 2004; \"DeveeiiPIWII appllcalions\nwithin the AiX8d Really Conllrwm: Hughes, C. E. & Stapleton, C. B., - The Shared Imagination: Oaative Collaboration in\nAugmented Virllallty, HCCI Confelencl2006.\n5 (U) Book I Frans Johansson I The Medici Eflacl: What ElepharMs and Epidlmics Can Teach Us about Innovation I Octobar\n20061 HaMIId Business Press I Book jacket\n6 (U)Websitei ..\n:Jiwww.~~17JDI2009061702232.hhl\n7 (U) *'-!NT* refars to a colleclion disclplila wti1 the 1n1a111gance enaarpriae. Examples include SIGtlr (signals Intelligence).\nHUMINT (human lnteligence~ GEOINT (geospalial intilllligence) and MASINT (III88SIIItlnlll and slgnalure Intelligence).\n8 (Ul Newspaper 1 Jonathan Dodd 1 The Nalonal Business review (N8w Zealand) 1 \"Himllling the Power of Networtcect\nBrains\"! Date of Pubicalion: 08 May 20091 Dale of Al:cesa: 30 *Jilt* 20091 News Public:alion\n9 (U) Newspaper I Philp Annetta I Sautll China Morning Post I Date of Publication: Seplembar 28 *2006* I pg&l Date of Access:\n30July2009\n10 (U) Web BIOg 1\n\"hhlp:Hwww.topcoder.~174\"1 Dale of Aa:ess: 30 Jutt 2009\n11 (U) Magazine I Roger Parry I Management Today I \"What colleciMsm can do for cajlitaiMI\"I Date of Publication: ot\nSeptember20081 Page 30 I Dale of Aaless: 30 July 2009\n12 (U) Newspaper I Mat ScoU-Nash !\"Fossett search llllire any either\" I Dale of PubiCIIIon: 27 Seplamber 20071 Page 802\nI Date of Access: 30 July 2009\n13 (U) Newspaper 1 Jonathan Dodd I The National Businau miaw (New z.aland) 1 ~\n111e Power of Networked\nBrains\" I Daa of Pubblion: 08 *May* 20091 Date of keels; 30 JLq 20091 News Publcallon\n14 (U) Web site 1 National Plelic Radio I\"TuminQ the Camera Around: Health care stakeholdels\"l '111lp:Jiwww.npr.Qiljnew&/\n~I\nDale of Access: 30Jutt2009\n15 (U) Uagazine I FOibe& I \"Ciilzan Voices\" I Oats of Publicalon: 08 Dec:ember 20081 Page 83 I Dale of Acca11: 30 July 2009\n16 (U) New:Mre I Jennifer Vales I Associatld Press I \"PPIIIugh Researcher Crealas Game Web Site Will a Purpose I Dale\nof Publicatian: 14 May 20081 Date of Ar.cess: 30 Jliy 2009\n17 (U) Web sile I The New York T111181I.~Wy 22, 20081 Canllia Dean I If You Have a Pto&Hm. Ask Everyone I hllp:JJwww.\nnytimes.c:oml2008107122/sc:iencef22.hlml\n18 (U) Web site I PETA *Olrat* $1 Million Reward to Fnt to Malle In ViW Meat I PETA.org I date unkn1Mn I htlp:l.lwww.peta.orgl\nfeat..Jn_vilro_conleslasp\n19 (U) Web site I Solve Puzzles For Science I Filldll Bel8j htlp:llfold.lflportalll dale unknown\n20 (U) Web s1t1t I Nol1hlop Grumman l.LIIw lander Challage I X PRIZE Foundation I data unknown I hltp:l/spac8lxprizelo\nlunar-lander-challenge\n21 (U) Web site (Innovation Inducement Prizes at hi Nalicnal Science Foundation (2007( Nalional Academies PAISS I http://\nww.nap.edulcatalog.php?racord_icf:11816\n22 (U) Web site I Karim R.l..akhani, Lars Bo Jeppesen, Peter A.J..ohse, .UA Panella I HlmW Busiless School I The Value of\n()peMas in Sc:ienlllic: Problem Solving I http:llwww.hbs.eduftesellrdlfp7.()50.pdf\n23 (U) Olher referance& tor crowdsourced ICience include: diybio.org, bbf.openwelwafe.or and jove.com.\n24 (U) Web site I hllp:llwww.appsfordemoaacy.org\n25 (U) Web site I Kim Hart I WashingiDn Poll( \"D.C.'s 1<1ne11c Tech Czar\" I oaea of Posting 05 Jan 2009 I http://www.\nwaft1glcnpost.~~11041ARZ009010401235.hbn1 I Date of Aa:ess 04 Aug 2009 I Online\nNIWIPIIII\n26 (U) Newspaper I Nicholas Oiakopoulos I \"Mecharicaa Turk rnak:hes worlulls, small bUs online; /IW\\1.~ SITE .FOCUSES\nON JOBS ONLY HUMANS CAN DO\" I Date of Publication: 28 July 2009( Page 88J Date of /ll:l:asa: 30 July 2009\n27 (U) Newspaper I Nichalas CiaJcopoulos I \"Mechanicaa Turk rnaiChas workels. small t8Bics online; */tW.Z.CM* SITE FOCUSES\nON JOBS CML Y HUMANS CAN DO\" I Date of Publication: 28July 20091 Page 881 Dale of Access: 30 July 2009\n28 (U) Newspaper I Nicholas Olakopoulos I \"Mec:hanicaa Turk maiChes worlcln, srnaH Iaski online; *INAl.CM* SITE FOCUSES\nON JOBS CMLY HUMANS CAN. DO\" I Date of Public:alion: 28 July 20091 Page 881 Date of Access: 30 July 2009\n29 (U) Newspaper I Nidtolas Diallopoulos I \"Mechanic:aa Turk malches workers. small tasks online; *INAl.CM* SITE FOCUSES\n.ON JOBS ONLY HUMANS CAN DO\" I Dale of Publlc:alion: 28 July .2009 J Page 881 Date of Access: 30 July 2009\n30 (U) N8w&paper I Ncholas Oiakopoulos I '\\fec:hlllical Turk ma1ct1es wodcels, small taslcs online; *NAAZCM* SITE FOCUSES\nON JOBS CMLY HUMANS CAN DO\"( Date of Publication: 28 July 20091 Page 881 Date of Ac:c:els: 30 July 2009\n31 (U) Newspaper I Nicholas Olalropoulos I 'Mec:hanlcal Turk matches work81s. smallasks online; *AMAZ.CM* SITE FOCUSES\nON JOBS ONLY HUMANS CAN DO\" I Date of Publication: 28 July 20091 Page 88J Data of Access: 30 July 2009\n32 (U) The blog '111leg~ioolballl.com\" became hlC;tJy popular in Aug 06 during the tsraeJ.Hezbollah war when the blog\nbecame a forum for revealing manipulated Reutars pltolographs talcen of the war eclivity. The blag continues today as a\nforum 'Atlere manipulated photographs are idenlfied end publicized.\n33 (U) Magam.J Kevin Kely I Wired I \"The New Sociaiam\"l Date of Publication: June 20091 Page 116( Dale of Aa:eM: 30\nJuly2009\n34 M Magazil:ll Kevin Kelly I Wired I \"The New Socieism.l Date of Publicallon: June 2009 ! Page 118.1 Dale of Access: 30\n.llq2009\n35 (U) Web lite( J8IISie Scanlon I Bulinass Weak Online I \"Rlits d the Game; 'Funware' brin1Js gaming features m c:onsumer\napplicallons Ike phokHharing and IOCi8l nei.Woltlnt I Date of Publication: 29 January 2008 I ,_:llwww.buslnessweelt.\nClll'lll1n~id20080128_\n-487869.htm\"J Dala of Access: 30 .hiy2009\n36 (U) Web Slog I Coding Honor I htfp:llwww.codinghonot.CIOIWbloglan:hivellll00712.f*nl I Date of Access: 30 JIAy 2009\n37 (U) Web site I Rory CaJian.JoniS I BBC News rHumans central il spnvox patents\" I Dale of Posting 29 July 20091 \"hhlp:/1\nnews.bbc.co.uki2Jhilledlnol8174721.alm\" 1 Date of Aa:aas: 30 J~Ay 20091 Ma;or Online News Organization\n38 (U) Web Publication I Andrew Orlowski I The Register I \"SppnVox: The Inside *Slaty\"* I Date of Pubtication: 29 July 20091\n\"hllp:l.lwww.lheregislar.co.lltci20ClMJ7/291spinvox_mechanic81_Ukf' I Date of Access: 30 ~\n2009\n39 (U) Web tile(lnventonlpo!J Does Social Mecla Produce Giouplhink? I ACcessed 22 Feb 2010 I hllp:IJirwen1orspot.coml\narticlesldoes_sodal_media.JIIO(Iuce_g!OUplhi\"-30660\n40 (U) Web Blog I Tech Lahont I hllp:Jitechlatlole.WORipreu .. coml2009105/30411kltmni-USIIs-oufdo.illll-otMnl;.in.contributi:~g\ndata-to-google-mapmaker/J Dale of Access: 04 Aug 2009\n41 (U) Web site Jlnvanlorspall Does Social Media Proc1loe Grouplhink? I Accessed 22 Feb 201 o I hltp:/Arwentorspot.coml\nartldasldoes_soc:lal_~_groupln_30660\n42 (U) For further lnfolmallon on pholosynlh. please Alference http://phol.olydh.netl\n43 (U) Web lite I Wall Stl8et .bmall Layar's Augmenlad RMIIIy Dnlams Come True! Acce8led 22 Feb 2010, 16 Feb 2010 I\nhtlp:l/blogs.wsj.ccmlsouR:el201002/16/layarwwgmlllled-leality-CIIeaniiS-Qime-lrue\n44 (U) Web site I Kevin Kely I hltp:llwww.kk.~_bollom_is_n.php I Date of Access: 04 Aug\n2009\n45 (U) Web site Jlnvantorspoll Does Social Media Produoe Groupltink? I Aa:essad 22 Feb 2010 I hUp:Hinventorspotcoml\nartk:lasldoes_social_mecia_produce_groupllilk_30660\n46 (U) Web lite JlnveniDrspot I Does Social Media Produce ~?\nI Accesled 22 Feb 2010 I hllp:Hinventorspot.coml\narticlllldoes_social_mecla_produce_gmupthink_30660\n47 (U) Web site I Kevin Kelly I http:ltwww.~_botDn_is_n.php I Date of Access: 04Aug\n2009\n48 (U) Web lite Jlnvenkxlpot I Does Social Media Produce Gnluplhink? 1 Acc:essad 22 Feb 201 o 1 htlp:HiiMntonlpOt.coml\narticlesldoel_soclal_media_produce~30660\n49 (U) Web site Jlillp\"JJwww.~.org/t.agll1lpiDII Dale of Access: 04 Aug 2009\n50 (U) MaQuine I J.C. Herz fRelease1.0 HamessinG the Hive: How Onine Gamel 0r1wt Networked Innovation val. 20, no. 9\n118 Octdler 2002\n51 (U) Web site I Clay Shirky's Writings .About the lntemell www.shirky.com\n52 (U) Professional Journal I Mark Granowe1ter I Sodological Thuy, val. 1 I \"The Sl/qll of Weak i~a: A Network Theory\nRevisiled,\"l19831 pp. 201-233.\n53 Web lile 188S Online 1 hltp:llwww.bblanline.org/PrepriniiiOidAJcll.dunbar.hlml. Thll number o1 lndlvkiiiMI is known\nas Dunbar's runber.\n54 (U) Professional Joumal I Reka Albert and Albert-l.a8zlo Barabas~ I Reviews of uooem Phy$ics, vol. 74 I \"Stalistlcal\nMechanic:s of Corr1llex Networb.\"l Jaooary 20112.\n55 (U) Web site llnventorspotl Does Social Media Produce Grouplhlnk?l Accessed 22 Feb 2010 I http:HiiMifiiOrlpot.co\narticlesldoes_socild_mecla.,JIRiduce_gruupllink_30660\n56 (U) Web &lie JllweniDrspot I Does Social Media Produce Groulllhi*? I Acosssed 22 Feb 201 o I hllp:llinvenlotspol.com/\nartidlsldoes_IOCial_media_produce_grouplllnk_30660\n57 (U) Web sitellnvanlorlpoll Does Social Madia Produce Groupltink? 1 AcclsHd 22 Feb 2010 1 http://invenlorlpol.com/\nartic:ltlldoa8_10Ciaf._media..JIR)duce_gouptlink_30660\n58 (U) Web site I ~nvantar~po~l Does Social Media Produce Grouplhink? I Aa:essad 22 Feb 2010 I hllp:/linventorspot.coml\nartic:lesldoes_social_madia_produce_grouplhlnk_30660\n59 (U) Web site I Human Interface Tectmlogy Laboralory; Collabonllive Mixed Reality I Accessed 22 Feb 2010, 19 Mar 1999 f\nhltp:llwwwM.~edulpublicallontlr-98-36\n60 (U) Web tile I Asian Technology lriormation Pn1sJam I ATIP01.021: MiJCBd Reality (lsr.lf01&MiRai'01) I Accessed 22 Feb\n2010, 2 May 2001 I htlp:l/www.alip.~bi'!CaliontlatiJHepor11/2001P473-alip01.021-ftlixed.raallt-iann01-mira01.\nhtml\n61 (U) No additional sourcing infonnallon\n62 (U) Webat.jhltp:l~1131lrrozen.grlnd-c\n63 (U) Website! ~~c;gi?f=lclai200111031091BM0169H59.DTL\n64 (U) Web &ite I htVJIIhowhp.comMdadop_zoek...na_maria_clllns_in_heL~-stalion-vanl\n65 (U) Web site I CNN I Day of lhe smart mobs I hllp:llwww.am.com120031ALI.POLITICSI03.smart.mobs.tm I\nAccessed 22 feb 2010, 2 Mar 2003\n66 (U) W8b tile I ~~U.Uihlian.newa.com.aullloryAl,25197,25762092-15064,00.html\n67\n(U) Magune I Time Maguine I Staff Writer I T111e, Wedneaday, Jul. 22, 2009 I htlp:/lwww.llme.comllimelworldl\nartidtl0.8599,1912112.00lltmll Date of Acc:esiAupl 3 2009\n68\n(U) Magazine I Tme Magazine I Sial Writer 111me. Wednesday, Jul. 22, 2009 I http:/lwww.time.comllimalwoddl\nal'ticlll0,8599,1912112,00.hlmll Date of *Aa:IJiss* Aupt 3 2009\n69 (U) Web site I hllp:/lwww.lqS.comi'IDpsloriel\n70 NW_100108WAB_monroe_mbber_llaaling_escape_ TP.C83930ct.hlml\n71 (U)Webslesjhllp:llwwwauters.~S212237+~728;hllp:tlwww.yaukC8.\ncomlwalch?v=1pd741t-yVo\n72 (U) for further inbmatian, .. Jane Mc:Gonigal's ISUy, 'The Puppet &Iaiiier Problem: o.sign for Ra-World, Miseion-\nBased Gaming\" in Second Pei&OII, WT Press, Jarury 2007.\n73 {U} Web aile I tribawanted.com I hllp:l/www.lribewanlad.com I Dale of Access August 3 2000\n74 (U) Web site I tribewanled.com I hllp:liwww.lribewenllld.com I Datil of Accai&August 3 2009\n75 (U) Web site I tribewanlld.com I http:llwww.llllewalllild.com I Dale of Access August 3 2009\n76 (U) Web al phoDynth.com I htlp'J/pllotoaynth.com I Dale of Access August 3 2009. FRJm lhe web aile: \"Photoeynlh\nBlows you lo tab a lulch of photQa of lhe same scene or object n automatically stitch them aM together into one big\ninllwadive 3D viewing experience !hal you 13'1 share with anyone on the web.\n77 (U) Web lilellll.metblogs.com.l http:lna.melblllgs.conV2009Al7~Jn.aacalll Dale of Acceas.August\n3 2009 ; Web site I niSic:mac:hinel.com I -JIIIIUIIicmac:tli~~ I Dale of\nAcceiS Augusl3 2009\n78 (U) Web - I lamelblogu:om I htlp:/lla.nlelbClOIJ!o'200M!7~chlwt-in-loeaL' 1 Date of Aa:es& August\n3 2009: Web site II'NISicmachilery.~ 1 ~lrnusic:mllc:hi.cornf2009i0411~ I Date or\nAccess August 3 2009\n79 (U) WebsleiT~~~~tl Scoutllg Micro Social Nelworlca 1 hllp:flwWw.tJme.cornllimelbuliarlidei0.8599,18080n,oo.htmll\nAcceatecl on 22 Feb 2010; May 2008\n80 (U) Nationallnltlligencl Council2025 Global Trendl f'tnal Report\n81 (U) Book I Marc Pransky I On The Horlmn I MCB Universily p,...j Oct 2001\n82 (U) Amidlai-Harnllurger, Yair; ad.: 2005. The Social Net Understanding Human Behavior in Cyberlpal;e.\n83 (U) Web site I Pew 1n1emet I Barriers to Broadbend Adoption: What keeps non-inlarnet U181S oflline? I .111'1 20091 hllp:J/\nwww.ll8Winlemel.org1Repctts12D011J.Home.Broadba-Mlpllon-~oni4-What-keeps\nnoninlemet-users-olfln.aapx?r=11 Acceued on 22 feb 2010\n84 (U) Web site I Pew lntlm8t I Barriers ID Broadband Acloplan; What lr8eps non-inllmat UMIS ofline? I Jun 20091 http://\nwww.~10-Ho~J~e.Broac\nWhal-keepsnonintemet-UII8I1HIIIIile.aspx?r=11 Acc8l8ed on 22 Feb 2010\nas (Ul ProfesSiol tal Joumetl Robart Lamse. Dana Masllo, and Matthews. Easin 1 Soc:ia1 Sciance Compuler Review 1 Volume\n18, Number 4, 2001. (U) Understanding lnlemet Usage: A~\nAflproach to Uses and Glatificalions.\n86 (U) Web silltl hllp:l/en.wilcipedla.orglwiki/Power_user I Last acceued; 04 Aug 2008\n87 (U) Web 11181 Wikipedia I Power User I hllp:l/en.wikipedla.orglwlkiiPower_user IAcc:naed 22 Feb 2010\n88 (U) Web sltef The Medid Effect I hllp:Nwww.themecicieff8ct\n89 (U) Professional Jolimall Robert Larose. Oana Mastro, and Mabw S. Eastin I Soda! Science Compua Review I Volume\n18, Number 4, 2001. (U) Undelltlndftg lntlmet Usage: A~liveApproach to Uaea and GrBtificationa.\n90 (U) ~menl I SRI Conlullng 8ulinela lnldigence I Nallonal lmelllgence Council I CR 2008-071 Afl 2008 I \"Six\nTec:hnalogiu wllfl Polanliallmpacls on US lnlnltl aut to *'JJYJS'* I DitiUptive Civilian Tec:hnolcgies\n91 (U) Interview I Or. Mauraen Rudzik by Karl Lippert I 02 Aug 2009\n92 (U}Web siael PC Magazine I htlp:/lwww.panag.comlencydopedia_lemii0;542.1Ilasl aal8118d: 04 Aug 2009\n93 (U) Professional Journal I Robertl...alo8e. Dana Mastro, and Mallhew s. Eallin I Social Science Computer Review I\nVobne 18. Number 4, 2001. (U) Undetstanding Internet Usage: A ScJciai.Colp'tive Apploai:tl to Uses and Gra1ific:alions.\n94 (U) Web sit81 WiiUpedia t Mbrec1 Realty 1\nhttp://en.wiki~.JNiiiY>. Acoassed 22 fe!l2010\n95 (U) Web sit!tl Wiqledia; Onine Parlic:ipa1ion I bltp:l/en.wikipedia.OIVIwikifOnlna_JIIIficipalion I Accalted 22 Feb 2010\n96 (U) Web site I fllllrJiwabadvan&aga.naCiwebadbloglmadvertlsllg-1451 Last accessed: 04 Aua 2009\n97 (U) Web site I Wildpecia I Mixed Reality I hllp:lten.wildpadia.~reality I Accessed 22 Feb 2010 98 (U) Web site I hllp:l/en.wildpedla.orglwlkiiHadlat_(c:omptAing) I Last aocessect: 04 Aug 2009\n99 (U) (U) Web site! Wlllipedia I Hacker (computing) I htlp:/fan.wiq)edia.cxglwild/Hacker_~ I Accessect 22\nFeb2010\n100 (U) Web site! Wiklpedla I Mixed Raalily I hllp:llen.~\nIAc:ca&&ed 22 Feb 2010\n101 (U) Web sltaf Wlldpedla; Hacker (compuling) hllp:Hen.\\illlpedl8.orglwlldl\nHac:ker_%28c:omputing%29>, Acc:eSI8d 22 Feb 2010\n102 (UJ Professional Journal I James Stewat and Robin Wiliams I Social Science Computer Review I Volume 16, Number 3,\n.1998. (U) The Coevdulion of Society and Multimedia Technology: Issues in Pradicllng the Fube lnnovalian and Use of a\nUlliqlilou$ Tachnology.\n103 (U) Website I hllp:liww.guardlan.c:o.~obselvelfoc:usl Last accesaed: 04Aug2009\n104 (U)Weblita I hap:Rwww.walllhllalldlec:h~showArticle~208700219l Lastaccasted:\n04Aug2008\n105 (U) Web Mil hllp:/llwowWIII8IIIcllnlif.com110.1108100012530710817&18! Last 8CICISI8d: 04 Aug 2009\n108 (U) Web site I Wlkipedia I Soc:ial Network I hllp:llen.wlkipedla.arg/Wi~cl~Socia I Al:casled 22 Feb 2010\n107 (U) Book I Marc Prensky I On The Horizon I MCB Univarsly Press I Oct 2001\n108 (U) Book I Ben Schneiderman, et al. I 2009 I ~\nlhe User lnlerface: Sltalegies for Elective Human-Computer\nlnlefaclion; 5th ad.\n109 (U) Book I James S&xowiecki I The W!sclom or lhe Clowds 12004\n110 (U) Web site I hllp:Uwww.elanoe.cam 1 Last accused: 04 Aug 2009\n111 (U) Web &ita I hllp:llwww.unsl.adlikeeWOtOiec:onslra.hlrnll Last ICCl8SSad: 04 Aug 2009\n112 (U) Websilelhltp:llwww~111J81l-speakef'Cii\"ICUIII8&<11CC1111011iel-iln!lecklf.educalii0n-8'17271\nI Last aa:essad: 04 Aug 2009\n113 (U) Web site! hllp:llwww.siBIIpC.~ent.php 1 Last accasaect. 04 Aug 2009\n11-4 (U) Document I Hughes. C.E., Staplem, C.B., Hughes, O.E . and Smilh, E.M.I Mlud Reality In Education, EntertaiMient,\nil1d Training\" I Cor11!:Mer Grapla and Applic;atiolta, IEEE I Vol25, No 61 NoviDec 20051 p 24-30\n115 (U) Di&cussion basad on author's background and analysis.\n11& (U) Rese.dl Paper I Philippe Galle and Kurt Partridge I \"'n ttw Anonymly of Homei'Mirk Location Pairs\" I DMe of\nPubllcalion: May 20091 Dale of Ac:r.tu: 31 Ju12009l Palo Alto ReMarc:h Cenler (PARC)\n-\n117 (U) Web Bile I MSNBC llnllmet privacy concerns rimg, sludy suggeats: Findngs come amid a record fUtlber of data\nbfeac:hes in 20071 hltp://www,IMflbc.mln.c:omlldi2288551S I AcalsHd 23 Feb 2010; 18 Jan 2008\n118 (U) Document I Aldous Huxley I \"CuuU'e and the Individual\" I Playboy I \\ti 10, No 111 Oc:l1963\n119 (U) Book I Neal Cchen and Howard Elchenbaum I From condltianing to consciaus reco11ec:aon: memory system$ tithe\nblainj2004\n120 (U) Web site I The Enginea-1 Reality Check I ._.,lwww.tllelngineer.co.uk/newslrealily-chac:ki267S83.artcle 111 .11112004\nI Accessed 23 Feb 2010\n121 (U) Web. I Facellook I hllp:l/wwwJacebd com/\n122 (U) Cybelpsychology &, Behavior, Volume 12, Nm1ber 6, 2009. (U) Being Immersed in Social Networkilg Environment\n. Facebook Gloups, Uses and Glalilicalions, and Socill Oulcomes. Aa:esud rine on 18 Feb 2010.\n.\n123 (U) flnn..Aage Esbenlan, L.arty K. Gaines, Stephen G. TilbeUs; 2004; American Youth Gangs at the MUiemium.\n12-4 (U) SliM Benford, at al. ACM Transadions on Compuler-Human lnteraclion (TOCHI). Voh.me S.lslue 3, 1998. (\\J)\nUnder!landing and constrllCtqJ shanld spaces wilh nUed-really boulllarles.\n125 (U) Chlltaro. Luca, ed.; 2003; Human-computer lnlaraction will moblledavic:es and aaNicas: 5tl intemalionlll symposium,\nMabie HCI 2003, Udine, hilly, Seplemb 8-11, 2003.\n126 (Web lite I Randy James I \"A Brief History of Qlinese 1ntemet History 1.18 Mar 20091 \"hUp:llwww.time.comllinltlwolfd\natliclel0.11599.1885981,00.hhl\"l Date of Aa:els 5 Aug 2009)\n121 (Web site I James Fallows I \"Tha Connedion Hal Been Reset\" I Mar 2008 I \"hhlpJJwww.lhtallanlc.comldocJ200803\nchinese-firewar I Date of Aci:us SAug 2009)\n128 [Web site I \"Yahoo helped Ja1 China wriler\" 17 5ep os J'hllp:Jinaws.bbc.c:o.u1c121Was&paclfict4221538.slm\"l Dale of\nAccess 5 Aug 2009]\n129 (Web lite I Randy Jamal I\"A Brief History of~\nlntemet Histoty 118 Mar 20CJ91\"hUp:/lwww.lime.comllimelworldl\narticlel0,8599,1885961.00.hi!N\" I Data ti Access 5 Aug 20091\n130 (Web *I~\nModine I \"World of Waraalt (sort of) returns to Chlna\"l22 Jul20091\n131 \"hhlp'J/www.lhMgislef.co.uk12.011MJ1122Idlina_allow_wow_back.Jiort.orr I Date of Access 5 Aug 2009)\n132 (Web site I Wegner James AIJ I\"A Fist-Hand Look at a Chinese Second ur.. HiPiHi\" J25 Aug 20071\"http://gigaom.\ncomi2007QS12511iplhi\"l Date of Access s Aug 20091\n133 (Web site I\"HiPiHi Announcas Global Slr.lllgy\" 120 Aug 20071 \"ttllp:/~.conV200710&'hilli'!-announce.html\"\n1 Dale of Access 5 Aug 20091\n134 (Web site I James Fallows I \"The Connection Has Been Reser I Mar 2008 I \"hffp:llwww.lhaatlanlic.comlclocl200803\nchlneae-fiawal\" I Date of Access s Aug 20091\n135 Joint Publication 313/\"lnformation Operations\"l13 Feb 2006\n138 Nationallntllligence COuncil I Global Tnmds 2025: A TFansfonned World I Nov 20081 NIC 2008-003\n137 Web site I Noah Shachlman I \"Wage Cybelwar Against Hames, SuiT8flder Yr:AX PC\" 18 Jan 091 \"hlp:/Jwww.wiled.comf\ndangelloorni2005W1/iarael~ I Date of Ac:r.tu: 1 Aug 2009\n138 Web lite I \"Project Gray Goose Phase II Repofl\" 120 Mar 20091 '111tp:l/www.scribd.ecmfc1ocl1344~\nPhaae-11-Report\" I Date of Aa:ess: 1 Aug 2009\n139 Web silt I \"Project Gray Goose Phalle I *Report'* 117 Oct 20081 \"http'Jiwww.BCtibd.comldociii867393JProjact.Gray-Gaose-\n;!;\nPhue-1-Rtporf I Data of Acce11: 1 Aug 2009\n\n~\n.. ..\n-c\n:z:\n\"'\n\n1 '0 Web aiel \"RUUIiil Georgia Cyber Wat: Project Glwy Gaose\"l18 Oct 20081 \"hllp:J/www.1'811101i1Wiewe .nul?pa6030\"1 Dale\nof kens: 1 Aug 2008\n141 Websilei\"EiklniafinaeManfor'CyberWar'\"IDaleofPosting25Jan20081\"hhlp:llnews.bbc.co.~208511.\nstm\" I Dale of Acr:esl: 2 Aug 2009]\n142 Web silef Jan Tmynor I\"RulsiaAccusldof lJnlealhing Cybelwar 10 Diaallle Enlnia\"l Dale ot Polling 1i May 2007 I \"http://\nwww.guardlan.co.uklworldl'2007/may/17llopalorla3.1U8Sia\"l Dale of Al:cess: 2Aug 2009\n143 Web life I Malt Lancler, John Marlrolf, Slaven Lee ,.,_ I \"Digllal F88fl Emerge At.r Data Siege in Eslonie I Dale of\nPosling 24 May 2007 l \"hltp\"Jiwww.nytimes.~7Al5129ftechno1ol29ellonia.hlml\" 1 Date of Access: 2 Aug 2009\n144 Websilitf\"EstaniaFinlsManfor'CyberWar'\"IDaleaiPosting25Jan2008l\"hhlp:J/news.bbc.co.~11.\nstm\"l Date of Accels: 2 Aug 21109]\n.\n145 LTG Keilh AleiCander te&lmony kllhe Temxism, Unconvenllonal Tlnals and Capabilities Sullcommltlee on CyiMnpace\nas a W8ffighting Domain: Poley, Mal18gemerl and Technical Chalenges on Mis8lon Asswance 15 May 20091 \"http://\narmediiMc:es.tdgeboes.~.wvx\" I DateaiAccels: 5Aug 2009\n'\n146 Web silel Kenneth Corbin I \"leelons From the Russia-Gaoq;a CybeiW\" I Dale d Posting 12 Mar 20091 '1lllp:/Jwww.\nintemelnew&..coMphp/3810011\"1 OateofAt.cess; 2Aug 2009\n147 Website I Kevin Coleman I \"CyberW8r2.0- Russia v. Georgia I DataofPoltllg 13Aug 2008J'hlfp:/lwww.defansetedl.orgl\n~1\nDateofAa:ess: 2Aug2009\n1'8 Web lite I Jon swaine J\"Geoq;a: Russia 'concluding qber war\"' I Date of Posting 11 Aug 20081 \"hllp;//www.telagtaph.\nco.\n57~-war.html'\nI Dale of Access: 2 Aug 2009\n149 Web site I Kenneth Corbiii\"Leaons From the Ruui&-Georgia Cybelwal\" I Dale of Posting 12 Mer 20091 '1\\llp://www.\n~10011\"1DeteofAQ:esa:2AuiJ2009\n150 Web silal \"Tranaallt of the Sllualion Room: Georgia-Russia Ceale-h; Posaible V.P. Clues i1 Convenlion Lineup; Dems\nTarget lndlana\"f13 Aug 20081 \"hhlp:JJIranscpls.cnn.CXIIWTRANSCRIPT131s11roam.02.hhl\" I Dale of Access: 5 Aug\n2009]\n151 (Web site I Sean Michal Kamer I \"The Ru18ia-Geo1Da c~\nI Dale ot Poslng.15Aug 20081\"htlp1/blogJntemebtew&.\nconilbmer~.hlnt' I Dale of Access: 5Aug2009)\n152 (Web silel Aaron Manne&I\"Rullia-Geolgia CybeiWir Aseessmanr 1 Dale of Posting 22 Aug 20081 \"http:/~c:ant~rtenonsm.\n~-cybarwar_assessm,php\"f Date of Access 5Aug2009)\n153 (Web site I Dan Eggen, Kalen DeYoung tMsf WarniriiJBID Mosoow, US Has Few Options\" I Date of Posting ~4 AUIJ 2008\nJ\"htlp:tlwww.~aric1e1'200Mt81131AR2008081303752.htrnr 1 Date ~Access sAug 20091\n154Web s11e I Kevin Coleman I\"CyberWar2.D- Russia v. Georgia 1 Date of Posting 13Aug 2008J\"http:llwww.defensetech.orgt\narchiva&I004363.hfml\" I Date of Access: 2 Aug 2009\n155 (Web site I Dan Eggen, Karan De\\'olrlg I\"AfterWamings 10 Moscow. us Has Few Options\" I Dale of Posting 14Aug 2008\nJ\"http:llwww.~~13/AR2008081303752.htmrJDateofAcc8&s5Aug2009J\n156 Web site I Brock N. Meeks I MSNBC Jls PtMcy Poaible in lie DiglalAge? P 11 htlp::/llnw.msnbc.m~~t~.comlld/3078854/:\n(quoting Scoll Mc:Nealy, Sun Ycralyslams CEO).\n157 Doalneft I Richard Belt. Alfrld Cumming I CRS Repolt for Congr-.s I Open SouR:e lntellgence: Issues ror Congress i\nDec.5, 2007\n158 Book I AMn Tofller I Fulure Shock 3111 (Random House 1970) (describing conc:ep~ of information overload~\n159 Ooa.rnent I ~\nBest. Alfred Cumming I CRS Report tor Congreas I Open Soun:e lnleligenca: Issues tor Congf8SS I\nDec.5,2007\n160 Joshua Fairfield. 118 Yale l.J. Foc:kelPart 131 (2008), availableathtlp:/~41/141.\n161 See Stonld Communicallons NJ., 18 USC. 2702 (permltilg companies to RMIII inbrnaflan as long 11 QISiomlr COI1HIIIs);\n2703 (pennitllng government 1o axnpel CXJq~~~liel to dlscloae records); Fed. R. Crim. P. 41.\n162 Francesca Bignami, 8 Chi. J.lnt'l law, 233, 234 tn.2 (2007}, citing Counc:l OiractiYe 2006124/EC, 2006 OJ (l. 105) 54.\n163 Web site I Google I Googte Privacy Poley Change on AnonynUalion I http-Jigoogleblog blogspot com1200B1091anosrep.1o-plo1ed-uslr-privacy.l*nl\n164 Rodney Smola, The\"DoNotCalllist\" CoMwarsy:AParableofPrivac:yand Speech, 38CreightonL Rev. 743(2005).\n165 Sandra D. Joftlan, Clallilied lnformalion and Qlnlllds in Independent Counsel Prosecutions: Balancing 1he Scales of\nJustice After Iran-Contra, 91 Cobn. L. Rev. 1651, 1688 (1991) (Signing the nondisclosura agl8llll8ft is, in effect, a waiver\nof the penon's F~ Amendment right 10 he speech); Michael Keasler, Criminal Proc:adure: Confessions, Searches. and\nSeizures, 59 SMU L Rev. 1167 (2006); see also 68AnL Jur. 2d Seerches and Seizures Section 135 (2006~\n166 See, e.g:, Lugar v. Edmonson Oil Co., 457 US 922, 938 (1982) (\"Caiefuuacllllnnee to lht 'stale action' Alqllirlment\npreseMII an area of lndMdual fraedom by limiting lhe reacn of federal law and fadlraljudicial power.j.\n167 Web site I Twillar I www.twllter mm,last ac:cassed August 3, 2009.\n168 BatTy Schwartz. The Real Crisis? We Slopped Being Wile, TED Talk, htlp:llwww.yoolube.ccm'wak:h?vziA..zdh_bQSo\n(disaJssing psychology of moral exemplarS and leChniqual for inculcating virtue).\n169 ld.\n170 United States v. Katz, 389 US 347 {1987).\n171 ld.\n347 (1967) (telephOne c:onversatlonl p!Oiadldby FouriiAmenchentdelplfe !hid partyacx:ess ~telecom provider); Quon\nv. An:h Winlllss, 529 F .3d 892 (911 cr. 2008) {text messages prulecled by FOUI1h Amendmlf'lt deSpila access by ta1ecom\nprovider). Cf. Uniled Stalls v. MJer. 425 us~ (1976) (access to bank I8COids pennisslllewithoutsean:h wamml); Smitt\nv. Mayland, 442 US 735 (1979); see also Patricia Bella & Susan Freiwald, Fourth Amlncinent Protlc:tion for Storad E-Mail,\n2008 u. Chi. L. Forum 121 (~\nthat Uller does no1 eslllbish a broad third party rule).\n173 Ulited Slatas v. Tones, 751 F.2d 875, 882-84 {711 Cir. 1984), Posner, J. (11]1 is inalguable that tetevlsion survallance Is\nexr.eectiiVY inlnlsive ... and inherenlly ildisa'lmilale, iWid lhat it CXlldd be grossly abused -lo ellminale pet'IOIIal pfivacy II\nundefltOod in modem western nations.\").\n17.4 Bergarv. New York, 3a8 US.C1. 60(1967): see also Susan Freiwald, Online Surveillance: Ramambaring the lesson& of the\nWindap Ad. 56 Ala. l Rev. 9, 789-80 (2004); see al8o Brief of Amicus Curiae Susan Fraiwald it Support of Allirmance of\nthe Dlslrict Court. No. 08-4227. filed March 16, 2009\n175 See Lenilan Order, 534 F. Supp. 2d at 599 & n.39. -40. (listing cases and noting lhai\"Airt contention that the Gowlmment\nmight obtai1 cell lower site location informalion ... aolely under the auspices of the (Pen Register Statui&) appears to have\nbeen put to bed. In a series of published ()ders and Opinions over the past tl0 yen, a t9lificant majol1ly d Coutls have\nalso rejecled the Govemmerts coolanlion that ruJ.IIme. or proapactiYe, movement J localioll inbmation may be obtained\nunder a hybrid theory which purports to comiXne the aulhorilies of the PRS and the SCA ... \").\n178 See Jemifer Kmg and Chris Hoornagle, ASupermajorily of Callfornia1s Supporls Lini1s on Law EnrorcamantAccess 10 Cell\nPhone Loc:alion luformalon, available at_.Jfssm.c:oniabslrlct=1137988\n177 Sae 18 USC. 2703(d); In Re Unilld Statea for an Order lwlhorlzing The Use ol Two Pen RegiiW & Trap & Trace Devices,\n178 See In the Malter d the Appliallion of the Unlld Statas of America ilr an Order Dncting a Provider of Electronic\nCommunic:alon Service 1o Discloae Records to the Government, 534 F. Supp. 2d 585 (W. D. Pa . .2008}.\n179 See, e.g., In Re Unilld States for an Order Authorizing The Use of Two Pen Register & Trap & Trace O.vices, 2008 US Disl\nLEXIS 97359 (E.D.N.V. Nov. 22, 2008).\n180 NewapapetJ Steve Lolv I The New York Times I \"Smal1phone Rises Fast Fro~~~ Gadget to *N8CIIS8it(* I Data of Publicallon:\n9 .lU1e 20091 Hyperfink hllp:/Avww.~ccm1200Q10611Qitedlnologyl10phone.hlmll Dale d Aasis\" 3 August 20091\nMajor us News Publication\n\n## L(B)(?)(E)\n\n181 FBIJ D0P 23 February 20091 (W\n-\n\n## L(B)(?)(E) L<B)(3)\n\n184 FBI I DOP 7 May 20091 (lJNLiSJ\n\n## L(B)(?)(E)\n\n185 Web sits I Kevin Poulsen I wired.com I \"Teenage Bomb ThiN! Suspecl was Internet Prank-Cal Stal\" I Date of Publcallon:\n7 May 20091 Dale of Acceu July 29, 2009 I Major cnine news Olgalization\n186 BadfQround and Analysis !.Charles L Cohen.l.ieutenart Indiana Stale Pob I Commander, Speciallnvesligafions &\nlnlllligence Sections 1 Appointad: 04 December 1994llntlmalional cansubnt and ninllr on matters related to c:yber aime\nand sldlled criminal oflendenl Retrieved from \"htlp'.llaharp.govtwlkifllllu.phpllaw_EnforcemenUssues\"\n187 Baclcground and Analysis I Charles L Cohen, Lieulel'1ad. Indiana Stale PGic:e I Commlndar, Spec:iallnlo1881iga110ns &\nllltllligenc:e Secliona 1 Appointed: 04 December 1994Jintamational ccnau11ant and hiner on matlillrs related to cyber aime\nand skied aiminal ollandln Retrieved from \"htlp;/llllarp.govlwikilindex.phpllaw_Enforcemenl.IIIIU8S\"\n188 Acadenic Journal I David Chri&lopher Harril and Richald P. t.tslan I Smal Sc:ale Digilal Oellice Faransics Joumaii\"A SmaR\nScale Digital Davlce Forensics ontology\" IJU1e 2007\n189 Bal:kground and Amis I Charles L Cohen. l.iellleiM. Indiana Stale Poice I Commender, SpeciallnvestigallciM &\nlntlligenca Sec:lions I Appointed: 04 December 1994 llnlemalional consullant and ninar on matleiS related to cyber aime\n and skiled ainlnal ollandln ReiJiavad from \"http://~.pllpJl.aw-Enb1:18menUssues\"\n190 Baciground and Analy&i& I Charles L Cohen, Liaulanant. Indiana State Poice I Commander, Spedalllwesligalions &\nIntelligence Sections I AppoirHd: 04 Oecambar 1994llnlamalional condant and llain!N on maltels related to cyber crime\nand skilled criminal otrenders Retrieved rrom \"http://lhalp.govlwlkililldexplaw _Enforoemenl.lssues\"\n191 Background and Anllylis I Charles L Cohen. 1.ieu18nant. Indiana State Poke I Commander, Special In~\n&\nlnlelligence Sections 1 Appointed: 04 December 1994Jinlemational c:oniiAtant and nner on matlets related to cyber crime\nand sldlled criminal offenders Retrieved flom \"http://sllalp.govWIIdex.phJrJL.aw_Enbt:ement_lauel\"\n192 Web silel'tlltp:/llleUpy.c:oml Date of Access: 30 *Jutt* 2009\n193 Web., 'bllp://llexispy.c:om\"l Dated Access: 30 *Jlly* 2009\n194 Web slle 1 \"hllp:/ltoww~xllpy.com\"l Dale of Access: JO July2009\n195 Web site I '1lllp:/ltoww. Y8Mit8.c:omlcontac:tus.htm\" I Date of ktJ8sa: JO July 2009\n196 Web slle I \"hllp:lltoww.vervata.comllex.htm\"l Date of Access: JO .1u1y 2009"
    },
    {
        "text": "NAVAL\nPOSTGRADUATE\nSCHOOL\n\nMONTEREY, CALIFORNIA\nTHESIS\n\n\n## An Examination Of State And Local Fusion Centers And Data Collection Methods\n\n\nby\n\nMilton Nenneman\n\nMarch 2008\n\n Thesis Advisor:\nRobert Simeral Second Reader:\nChris Bellavita Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited\n\n\n## This Page Intentionally Left Blank\n\nPublic reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instruction, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA\n22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project (0704-0188) Washington DC 20503.\n\n## 11. Supplementary Notes  The Views Expressed In This Thesis Are Those Of The Author And Do Not Reflect The Official Policy Or Position Of The Department Of Defense Or The U.S. Government. 12A. Distribution / Availability Statement Approved For Public Release; Distribution Is Unlimited\n\n13. ABSTRACT (maximum 200 words)\nThis research will focus on fusion centers, particularly the expectation of state and local fusion centers and their role. How will fusion centers add to the national effort to protect the Homeland, while also providing a benefit to their local communities?   This effort will seek to determine what role the state and local fusion centers should be concerned with and how they might add local value.\nWith the increasing prevalence of fusion centers it will be important to determine how those fusion centers\nwill be used and how they will collect the information that they will fuse, or analyze, and turn into an intelligence product.  There are several questions before fusion centers such as, who are your customers, what is your product,\nhow do you collect and analyze your data, how do you get information from emergency responders and actionable intelligence back to them?\nIf the fusion centers can produce a timely, locally actionable, and relevant product to its customers in the\nform of strategic analysis to policy makers, tactical analysis to counter terrorism, tactical analysis to major criminal investigations, and situational awareness and reporting mechanisms to the emergency responder community then they\nwill have established their value.\n\nFusion centers, intelligence, data collection, emergency responders, terrorism liaison\n\nStandard Form 298 (Rev. 2-89)\nPrescribed by ANSI Std. 239-18\n\n## This Page Intentionally Left Blank\n\nApproved for public release; distribution is unlimited\nAN EXAMINATION OF STATE AND LOCAL FUSION CENTERS AND DATA\nCOLLECTION METHODS\n\nMilton W. Nenneman\nLieutenant, Sacramento Police Department\nB.A., California State University, Humboldt, 1986\nM.S., California State University of Long Beach, 2005\nSubmitted in partial fulfillment of the\nrequirements for the degree of\nMASTER OF ARTS IN SECURITY STUDIES\n(HOMELAND AND SECURITY DEFENSE\nfrom the\nNAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL\nMarch 2008\nAuthor:\n\nMilton W. Nenneman\nApproved by:\nCAPT Robert Simeral\n\n\nThesis Advisor\nChris Bellavita, PhD. Second Reader\n\n\nHarold A. Trinkunas, PhD.\n\n\nChairman, Department of National Security Affairs\n\n## This Page Intentionally Left Blank Abstract\n\nThis research will focus on fusion centers, particularly the expectation of state and local fusion centers and their role.  How will fusion centers add to the national effort to protect the Homeland, while also providing a benefit to their local communities?   This effort will seek to determine what role the state and local fusion centers should be concerned with and how they might add local value.\nWith the increasing prevalence of fusion centers it will be important to determine how those fusion centers will be used and how they will collect the information that they will fuse, or analyze, and turn into an intelligence product.  There are several questions before fusion centers such as, who are your customers, what is your product, how do you collect and analyze your data, how do you get information from emergency responders and actionable intelligence back to them?\n\nIf the fusion centers can produce a timely, locally actionable, and relevant product to its customers in the form of strategic analysis to policy makers, tactical analysis to counter terrorism, tactical analysis to major criminal investigations, and situational awareness and reporting mechanisms to the emergency responder community then they will have established their value.\n\n## This Page Intentionally Left Blank List Of Figures\n\n| Figure 1.    | Fusion product consumers.(From STTAC/RTTAC Survey) 26                     |\n|--------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------|\n| Figure 2.    | Criminal focus of all crimes fusion centers.  From STTAC/RTTAC survey..27 |\n| Figure 3.    | Role of the TLOs. (From STTAC/RTTAC survey) 32                            |\n|              |                                                                           |\n\nTHIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK\n\n## List Of Acronyms And Abbreviations\n\nACAMS - Automated Critical Asset Management System NCISP - National Criminal Intelligence Sharing Plan DHS - Department of Homeland Security FCG - Fusion Center Guidelines\nHSAC - Homeland Security Advisory Councils\nER - emergency responder\nICS - Incident Command System NC - Northern California LE - law enforcement LASD - Los Angeles Sheriff's Department LAPD - Los Angeles Police Department FBI - Federal Bureau of Investigation IC - Intelligence Community RTTAC - Regional Terrorism Threat Assessment Center STTAC - State Terrorism Threat Assessment Center TLO - Terrorism Liaison Officer\n\n## This Page Intentionally Left Blank Acknowledgments\n\nI would like to first acknowledge my wife for her unconditional support throughout the process of not only writing this thesis but through the past eighteen months of course work.  She was always encouraging and available to proofread my papers.  She not only tolerated my pre-occupation, but never let me feel bad about it. Victoria, I love you and owe you a debt of gratitude that is humbling.\nIt is with great pleasure that I acknowledge and thank my thesis advisors, Robert Simeral and Chris Bellavita, who helped organize my thoughts and gave me guidance when I needed it most.  The entire staff at the Naval Postgraduate School contributed to my success and the success of everyone who has participated.  Their commitment and support is incomparable.  The professionalism of all of the instructors makes one strive to excel.  I would particularly like to note Greta Marlatt for her research tips and Lauren Wollman for instilling an appropriate amount of trepidation on documentation and timelines.\nI would also like to acknowledge my Chief of Police Rick Braziel, first for encouraging me to apply to NPS and secondly for his support during my time in the program.  Finally, I would like to acknowledge those that gave up their time to participate in my survey or allowed me to interview them. I am indebted to them for their cooperation and frank input.  I would like to specifically thank Sacramento Sheriff's Lt. Tim Johnstone.  He was instrumental in helping me gain access to many of the managers and staff of the fusion centers throughout the state.\n\nTHIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK\n\n\n## I. Introduction A. Problem Statement\n\nState and local fusion centers have emerged in a rather rapid manner throughout the country.  This is a natural reaction to the unexpected attack of 9/11.  Local officials wanted more intelligence to prepare them to protect their communities against any such unimagined attack in their jurisdiction.  Many officials also felt they were not being provided sufficient information from the federal intelligence community to protect their communities1 and that some information was being withheld (it has not been demonstrated that this information actually exists).2  However, with the recent influx of fusion centers has come a wide range of applications and expectations, and more than a little dissatisfaction, with the outcome of the fusion center efforts.\nThis thesis will not measure the effectiveness of the fusion centers, but will attempt to identify what local value they can provide to state and local jurisdictions and how that value may be increased.  As the centers are relatively new, there are very few performance measures or metrics upon which to measure them.  This thesis will simply accept the fact that they exist and that a significant amount of resources in time, money and personnel have been expended to stand them up.  The intent of this thesis is to examine how the fusion centers operate and to try to identify whether there are some practices that could optimize their value at the state and local level, which will perhaps enhance their future value.\nThis research will focus on fusion centers, particularly the expectation of state and local fusion centers and their role. How will fusion centers add to the national effort to protect the homeland and at the same time provide a benefit to their local communities? Is replicating the federal model the best course of action for state and local fusion centers, or is there an alternative?  This effort will seek to determine what role the state and local fusion centers should be concerned with, and how they might add local value to the process.\nWith the ever-increasing prevalence of fusion centers, it will be important to determine how those fusion centers will be used and how they will collect the information that they will fuse, or analyze, and turn into an intelligence product.  There are several questions before fusion centers such as: Who are your customers, what is your product, and how do you collect and analyze your data?   Another central issue before the fusion centers is how they get information from emergency responders and actionable intelligence back to them.   There are many references to utilizing emergency responders as intelligence gatherers.  What is missing, however, are direct citations or models as to how these emergency responders are utilized to collect information and relay that information to the fusion center.\nThere are also frequent references to community-oriented policing and, to a lesser extent, to Terrorism Liaison Officers (TLO).  Again, the proponents are conspicuously vague as to how to enact or implement a program that will successfully engage emergency responders. Nor are there any widely distributed reported successes by community-oriented policing efforts in interdicting foreign or domestic terrorism.\nAdmittedly, some successes may go unreported or undiscovered.\nA further problem with the regional fusion centers and information collection is that there is, more often than not, insufficient purely \"terrorist\" activity to support a multi-jurisdictional and multi-governmental level fusion center that exclusively processes terrorist activity.  If a fusion center (outside of perhaps NY, LA or DC) were to rely solely on terrorist data to process, I would argue the analysts' skills would atrophy, as would their interest, from a lack of relevant work.  Additionally, due to the paucity of strictly terrorist information, the emergency responder community would soon forget the how or why of reporting information to the fusion center, regardless of any marketing or promotional campaigns to garner interest and participation.  Fusion centers must consider analyzing or processing other criminal activity, in addition to terrorist activity, in order to maintain the skills and interest of the analysts, as well as the participation and data collection of the emergency responder community.\nThe Sacramento Regional Terrorism Threat Assessment Center (RTTAC) has responsibility for thirty-four counties in California and has trained hundreds of TLO officers in its TLO program.  At the time this project was started, early 2007, the RTTAC\nhad received very limited information, leads, or tips from the TLO officers, and even less from the emergency responder community as a whole (one year later, the tips and leads have increased, due to an aggressive TLO campaign, but are still far short of what is hoped for).3 That lack of anticipated response begs the question of \"why?\"  Are other agencies having the same lack of response?   It is my suspicion that many fusion centers have the same problem as Sacramento in collecting information from not only the law enforcement rank and file, but from the other emergency responder disciplines as well.\n\n## B. Research Question\n\nFusion centers are getting a lot of attention right now, and deservedly so, as a step in the right direction for information and intelligence integration between federal, state, and local agencies.  However, they may be missing out on an opportunity to capitalize on a largely untapped data source by failing to aggressively engage emergency and front-line responders to collect and forward potentially helpful information.  Information that would be particularly useful in detecting and deterring domestically generated terrorist plots.\nThe research questions I will be asking are:\n\n1) What is the mission of the state and local fusion centers?  Do they have a national\nvalue? Do they have a local value?\n2) What can be done to improve the effectiveness of state and local fusion centers?\nMy research will address the following issues as well:\n1)  How do we enhance our local data collection capabilities?  Are we effectively getting intelligence/information from the emergency responders to the fusion centers?\n2)  Is it beneficial for the maximum effectiveness of fusion centers to have a conduit from regional front-line responders to the center itself?  If so, how can we streamline the process to get usable information to the front-line responders, actionable intelligence to the law enforcement operations and how do we get the information from the front-line responders to the fusion center?\n\n## C. Specific Research Objective\n\nThe specific research objective is to identify effective methods for fusion centers to operate so as to provide value to the national effort to protect the homeland and the local effort to protect their citizens; and, to determine how or if the use of locally collected information produced by or facilitated by emergency responders will materially assist in that effort.\n\n## D. Significance Of Research\n\n-\nLiterature: the significance of this research will prove the viability of fusion centers by utilizing local information collection methods and producing localized, timely and relevant intelligence.  Little has been\nwritten in this area and this thesis will add to the existing body of work.\n-\nFuture\nresearch\nefforts:\nfuture\nresearch\nefforts\nwould\ninclude\ncorroboration of thesis' findings and extensions of these concepts into other communities and professions.  Future research efforts to measure the effectiveness of fusions centers should be done once they have had sufficient time to mature and performance metrics can be established. Additional future research efforts should be done after an assessment of any gaps or shortcomings associated with this thesis or conclusions that\nare later found to be not supported or require further review.\n-\nImmediate consumer: immediate consumer for this thesis would be the Sacramento Regional Terrorism Threat Center, the Sacramento Regional\nOffice of Homeland Security and the Sacramento Terrorism Liaison Officer program.\n-\nHS practitioners: it is the anticipation and hope that any information or\nrecommendations derived from this thesis would be useful not only to the Sacramento Regional Office of Homeland Security, but to any other\nregional organizations engaged in the collection and dissemination of\ninformation and intelligence in terrorist/criminal activities.\n\n## E. Review Of Relevant Literature 1. Fusion Centers\n\nFusion centers have begun to spread throughout the nation as an emergent response to a need for more local intelligence by regional responder communities.  In response to this perceived need, state and local entities began to create their own fusion centers in an attempt to gain information that they felt that they were not getting from the federal government.\nThe United States Department of Justice and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) have defined fusion centers as: \"a collaborative effort of two or more agencies that provide resources, expertise, and/or information to the center with the goal of maximizing the ability to detect, prevent, investigate, apprehend, and respond to criminal and terrorist activity.\"4  The federal government recognized the potential benefit to not only the state and local entities, but to the federal government as well. It has facilitated the development of local and state fusion centers by providing funding, resource augmentation and technical support.\n\n## A. Funding\n\nThe federal government, through the DHS, has been very supportive of fusion centers and has provided a great deal of funding for this effort.  Unfortunately, there are mixed reviews on the level of funding support, and the effectiveness of the funds being expended for the value of return or return on investment.  In his keynote address to the 2007 National Fusion Center Conference, DHS Secretary Chertoff said that fusion center funding should not be seen as sustainment, \"we are not signing up to fund fusion centers in perpetuity,\" and that the centers will have to look to local support for continued funding.  This will necessitate recognition by local officials of a local value for these centers to gain needed financial support.5\nThe need for funding to sustain the fusion centers is highlighted in the National Criminal Intelligence Sharing Plan (NCISP), which states, \"Without adequate funding, many of the recommendations, including improved training and technical infrastructure, will not implemented, and the country will remain at risk.\" The same recommendation calls for a petition to Congress for financial support.6  The need for an identified and long-term funding is highlighted by the GAO report, Homeland Security, Federal Efforts are Helping to Alleviate Some Challenges Encountered by State and Local Information Fusion Centers.  The report states that fifty-four of the fifty-eight fusion centers reported challenges in obtaining and maintaining funding.  Grant administration restrictions on fusion centers, in addition to navigating the grant system, were cited as a problem.  The report also called on the Information Sharing Environment plans to rely on a nationwide network of state and local fusion centers, but no long-term funding for such an undertaking has been identified.  This lack of commitment is making it hard on local efforts to commit fully to the fusion center concept.7\n\nIn contrast, the joint publication by the Departments of Justice and Homeland Security report, Fusion Center Guidelines, Developing and Sharing Information and Intelligence in a New Era (FCG), specifically places responsibility on local centers' administration to seek out funding sources for long-term continuity.8\nMatt Bettenhausen, Director of the California State Office of Homeland Security, identified the lack of sustained funding as the biggest obstacle to the continuing operation of state and local fusion centers.  He argues that counterterrorism has always, first and foremost, been a federal obligation, and that the state and local fusion centers enhance that mission in a material way.  His position is that sustained funding for fusion centers is a minor cost with a significant potential benefit.9\n\n## B. Resource Augmentation\n\nThe federal government resource augmentation for fusion centers has come primarily from two agencies, the FBI and the DHS.  The FBI has provided support to the fusion center effort by co-locating staff in the fusion centers, facilitating the security clearance process and assisting in rent payments in joint occupancy fusion centers.10\nAs an example of the support and the growing importance of fusion centers, the DHS, in addition to providing direct support in the form of grant dollars, is committing to putting a DHS analyst in all state and local fusion centers.11  Participation in the fusion center process assists local government policy makers and those responsible for the protection of the community with not only pertinent intelligence with a local application; it provides an opportunity to develop networks and relationships that will be critical in any future catastrophic event.  This concept was a central theme in the Improving Information report from LEAP:\nState, local, and tribal law enforcement participation in state and local fusion centers advances the cause of intelligence-led policing by involving officers in the intelligence process on a daily basis; helping them build relationships across every level and discipline of government and the private sector; and ensuring that law enforcement intelligence and other information is shared with their home communities.12\nFusion centers emerged almost spontaneously in response to a need by state and local law enforcement for useful and usable intelligence related to the evolving terrorist threat.  This position was reinforced when Norman Beasley testified before the House of Representatives:\nOne of the chief complaints of state and local officials is the lack of actionable information from the National Intelligence Community. This is exactly why state/local fusion centers were implemented.13\n\n## C. Technical Support\n\nThe fusion centers started independently and spontaneously with little regard for standardization, intelligence collection and production methods, analytical production requirements, analytical staff training, roles and responsibilities, or a defined mission. Further, there is little integration or information sharing from one fusion center to another.  The goals of the fusion centers, as stated in the CRS report summary, is that the various strains of information flowing into the fusion center need to be \"translated into protective action.\"14\nHistorically, local law enforcement has had very little, if any, influence or role in the intelligence community.  What little influence or participation the law enforcement community has had is in the form of the federal law enforcement community, principally, the Federal Bureau of Investigation.  Absent that, there has been very limited involvement by state or local law enforcement in the intelligence collection, analysis, or production for counterterrorist activity.\nThe staff that the FBI and DHS have assigned to the state and local fusion centers, in addition to being a resource augmentation, is a significant form a technical assistance.  The FBI is also using its senior analysts to train the local analysts, and they are using their staff to provide assistance and guidance in the development of the fusion process at the centers.15   While conducting the research for this thesis, several people throughout the Sate of California and outside of California were interviewed, on and off the record.  There was not one person who had any relevant association with fusion centers who was not wholly and completely pleased with the FBI's commitment to state and local fusion centers.  No one felt excluded or anything less than a full partner. All four of the California FBI field offices have clearly embraced the \"information sharing environment\" and have been instrumental in assisting state and local fusion centers in their development.  The DHS Intelligence and Analysis staff detailed to the fusion centers were also well regarded, although they are much newer to the centers and there are far fewer of them than the FBI resources.\nThe federal government has also produced several reports and documents to help guide the development and professionalism of the fusions centers. A sample of these reports include the National Criminal Intelligence Sharing Plan and the Fusion Center Guidelines, Developing and Sharing Information and Intelligence in a New Era.\nThe Department of Homeland Security is taking several steps to address the lack of standardization, uniformity, mission and training, in addition to providing onsite staff to assist in the development of the centers.  The DHS has created seven different technical assistance programs that respond directly to these identified shortcomings and has addressed the issue in national conferences.16\nmillion-dollar grant to provide standardized training to fusion analysts, which was awarded to the Sacramento Region in 2007.\n\nThe FBI and DHS have also made available their classified databases to trained and qualified (cleared) personnel.  In addition, both agencies have made efforts to increase the number of clearances to local and state personnel but are taking steps to improve the process.  Even with the support that the federal government has given fusion centers there are issues or obstacles that remain before state and local fusion centers can be as productive and relevant as had been anticipated.\n\n## D. Fusion Process\n\nThe fusion process, as described by the Fusion Center Guidelines, Developing and Sharing Information and Intelligence in a New Era (FCG), is a six-stage process.  The FCG based their to fusion process on the Homeland Security Advisory Council's (HSAC) Intelligence and Information Sharing Initiative: Homeland Security Intelligence and Information Fusion.  The process in the FCG is described as:\n\n-\nthe first stage, management and governance, establishes the foundation of the fusion center\n-\nthe second stage, planning and requirements, establishes what type of information will be collected\n-\nthe third stage, collection, is the actual collection of information from a\nvariety of sources\n-\nthe fourth stage, analysis, is where information is turned into actionable\nintelligence\n-\nthe fifth stage, dissemination, tasking and archiving, is where information is disseminated to stakeholders\n-\nthe sixth stage is reevaluation, where the fusion center and stakeholders\nensure that what is being collected, analyzed and disseminated is factual,\ntimely and relevant\n-\nthe seventh stage is modification where, if there are changes during the\nreevaluation, they are implemented here17\n\nThe intelligence cycle has a generally accepted process with a few modifications or variances from entity to entity.  A generally accepted model is presented below from Mark Lowenthal's (Lowenthal is a recognized expert cited by the CRS) book Intelligence from Secrets to Policy.\nThis process is often accepted to consist of:\n\n-\nrequirements, which is an identification of need and priority, long term and immediate\n-\ncollection, which is the method, amount and source of information\n-\nprocessing and exploitation, which is a process of rendering technical data\ninto usable format\n-\nanalysis and production, which is the process of analysis and the creation\nof the written product\n-\ndissemination and consumption, which is the distribution and assimilation\nof the product\n-\nfeedback, which is information from the policymakers concerning how\neffective the product fits their needs.18\nThese two processes are very similar but there are two subtle distinctions that potentially become issues.  The first is the dissemination step in the Fusion Center Guidelines.  In Lowenthal's book, he identifies this step as dissemination and consumption.  It is not enough to get the product to the proper consumers, it must come in a form that will be used and assimilated.  The second is what the Fusion Center Guidelines refer to as the reevaluation step, which is basically for accuracy and relevance; whereas, in Lownethal's model, he identifies a feedback step, which is ostensibly analogous to the reevaluation step.  However, the feedback step clearly articulates the need to have the *final consumer* provide input on the usefulness of the product.\n\n## E. Administration\n\nThe Fusion Center Guideline number three recommends that each fusion center establish a governance board comprised of high-level officials from law enforcement, public safety and the private sector.  One of the relevant issues for consideration is that a governance board should ensure \"defining the management structure to include what entity oversees the centers, manages the operations, and coordinates daily activities.\"19  There are no recommendations as to what that management structure should look like.\nThe literature is very weak or silent on the issue of who should lead fusion centers.  The BJA guidelines state that fusion centers should have a governance board of some type but they do not get into the nuances of actual leadership.  The NCISP states, in the first recommendation, that the agency chief executive officer and the manager of intelligence functions should define the management and supervision of the center. This concept is virtually covered in a bullet point.20\n\n\n## F. Mission\n\nThe mission of each fusion center should be something directly related to the center's intended goals.  What will be as, or more, important as the mission, is how, or by what process, that mission is derived.  The FCG list several issues for consideration such as: developing the mission statement in a collaborative process; identifying the center customers and their needs, and defining center priorities prior to drafting the mission statement; and, prioritize the intelligence function to address threats in the local jurisdictions.21\nThe California State Terrorism Threat Assessment System, comprised of the State Terrorist Threat Assessment Center (STTAC) and the four Regional Terrorist Threat Assessment Centers (RTTAC), collaborated on a concept of operations plan as a guiding principle for all five of the threat assessment centers, which also function as fusion centers.  As part of that concept of operations, a mission statement and a vision statement is included.  The mission statement is:\nThe mission of the state terrorism threat assessment system is to foster a collaborative effort to collect and analyze criminal information, employ cutting-edge analytical tools and methodologies to produce and share timely and actionable Homeland Security intelligence, thereby enhancing the safety of the citizens of California.22\n\n## G. All Crime Vs Strictly Counterterrorism\n\nThe vast majority of fusion centers, however, have taken an all-crimes approach to fusion analysis within their jurisdictions (all crimes rarely means \"all crimes,\" but is usually meant to be certain organized crimes or major crimes such as narcotics, crimes of violence and gangs, or crimes that may be used to support terrorism efforts here or abroad such as financial crimes or fraud. Strictly counterterrorism is meant to be, for this thesis, crimes that are terrorist acts or those in which the association to terrorism is apparent at face value).  The CRS report for Congress, Fusion Centers: Issues and Options for Congress, reported that less than 15 percent of current fusion centers operate with a solely counterterrorism posture.  The report identified some of the reasons for this as a national trend, need for local and non-law enforcement buy-in, and the need for resources.23  The same report also stated that \"most police departments and public sector agencies are more concerned with issues such as gangs, narcotics, and street crime, which are more relevant to their communities.\"24\nA GAO report published in October 2007 also reported the vast majority of fusion centers - forty-one of the forty-three that were contacted - stated that they operated as \"broader than solely focusing on counterterrorism.\"  Twenty-two of the center officials stated they included criminal activity in their mission, and nineteen said they included an all-hazards focus in addition to counterterrorism.  It was unclear whether the all-hazards fusion centers included a criminal perspective as well.  The reasons cited for including the criminal mission were basically the position that there is a nexus between criminal conduct and terrorist behavior, and that one may uncover the other.  A second reason cited was to gain more support and stakeholders such as law enforcement.25\n\n## H. Strategic Vs Tactical Analysis\n\nThe fact that these terms need to be defined underscores a large problem with fusion centers and their mission.  There is no commonly understood and universally accepted definition for the term strategic analysis or *tactical analysis*. As described by a career intelligence analyst, the absence of an accepted term is \"part of the problem.\"  This analyst prefers the term \"all source analyst\" over \"true\" intelligence analyst when referring to strategic analysis as the term \"true\" can be unintentionally pejorative.26   For the purposes of this thesis, strategic analysis is analysis of disparate data sources, identification of intelligence gaps, pro-active collection of intelligence, and predicative analysis of an act or occurrence with recommendations or sufficient substance to guide policy.  The strategic analyst must rely on his or her expertise and thorough knowledge of their respective domain to fill knowledge gaps.  Tactical analysis is research and analysis on events that have already occurred and are not predictive; it is predominantly investigative case support or an analytical assessment of a variety of data inputs.\nDavid Carter, in his book Law Enforcement Intelligence: a Guide for State, Local, and Tribal Law Enforcement Agencies, offers a definition for strategic and tactical law enforcement intelligence.  He describes *strategic* as having a planning and resource allocation function that provides information to decision makers about the changing nature of threats and the characteristics and methodologies of threats for the purpose of developing response strategies and resource allocation.   *Tactical* intelligence is described as having a preventive function to gain information to apprehend offenders, harden targets, and use strategies that will eliminate or mitigate the threat.27\nBoth the National Criminal Intelligence Sharing Plan and the Fusion Center Guidelines, Developing and Sharing Information and Intelligence in a New Era, skirt the distinction between tactical and strategic analysts and do not offer a definition of the two entities.  The Fusion Center Guidelines make a recommendation that a center provide both tactical and strategic products.  The Fusion Center Guidelines recommend that the center should have a strategic capability as well as a tactical capability and that intelligence functions should prioritize their efforts based on threats specific to the center's area of concern.28\nThe majority of fusion centers operate exclusively in an analytical capacity rather than as having any response or operational capacity.  Those few fusion centers that do have a response capability were generally found to be fusion centers that were state-controlled, single entity, and largely staffed by law enforcement personnel. The scope of analysis that the fusion centers focus their efforts on has a great range of variability.  Again, the majority of fusion centers that conducted their analysis for the purposes of prevention considered their responsibilities to be information sharing, assessments and analysis, and to facilitate preparedness efforts.\nTo accomplish this, fusion centers operate as \"filtering stations\" to pass along information, but some fusion centers add local information to enhance the product. Some fusion centers added analytic value while others provided case support to law enforcement agencies.  None of the fusion centers appeared to be using all of the steps in the intelligence cycle29\n\n## I. Analysts\n\nThe Fusion Center Guidelines, in guideline number eleven, recommend hiring staff that can perform both tactical and strategic analytical functions.  Under \"issues for consideration\" of the same guideline, the report recommends that consideration be given to establishing a permanent, full-time civilian presence to provide continuity and consistency.  The guideline also recommends requiring a minimum term commitment for full-time personnel and recommends that the center obtain the appropriate clearance requirements as needed for staff to do their job.30\nThe NCISP stated that there is a need to develop standards of training, not only for the analysts and those assigned to the fusion center, but also for those who are associated with it.  In fact, the NCISP recommended minimum training standards in its recommendation section.  The NCISP has highlighted the need for the analytical function of the fusion centers to follow the intelligence cycle and, further, it calls for \"appropriate training for all personnel assigned to or impacted by the intelligence process.\"31  The NCISP established a six-level intelligence training standard: level 1 is for law enforcement officers; level 2 is for law enforcement executives; level 3 is for intelligence commanders/supervisors; level 4 is for intelligence officers/collectors; level 5 is for intelligence analysts; and, level 6 is for train the trainer.\nLevel 5 training objectives, are in part: the intelligence process; handling of criminal intelligence information; critical thinking and inference development; collection and analytical plans; legal, privacy and ethical issues; research methods; and methodologies of analysis.  The standard requires a minimum of forty hours of training that should be delivered in a classroom environment.32  The NCISP further supports the need for standardized training, calling for the IALEIA to develop minimum standards for analysts in recommendation number twelve.\n\n## J. Dissemination\n\nDissemination of any intelligence product is quite possibly the most critical piece of the process, but one that can easily be overlooked by assuming \"it\" will just happen.  According to the NCISP, \"dissemination is also a vital step in the process.\nWithout disseminating intelligence developed it is pointless to collect it.  The intelligence disseminated must be timely and credible to be useful.\"33  It was further recommended, as part of recommendation number one, that all fusion centers \"implement a method/system for dissemination of information to appropriate components/entities.\"34\nThe topic of dissemination has had several different authorities weigh in on the topic such as the following quote from Intelligence-Led Policing: The New Intelligence Architecture: \"Information sharing must become a policy, not an informal practice.  Most important, intelligence must be contingent on quality analysis of data.\"35\nProbably the most authoritative citation comes from the *9/11 Commission Report*: \"The biggest impediment to all-source analysis - to a greater likelihood of connecting the dots - is the human or systemic resistance to sharing information.\"36\nDissemination of information and intelligence product is not only an extremely necessary part of the intelligence process, it is also one that is not without controversy.  One area of potential conflict is the level at which different emergency responder groups should receive information.  One of the few resources to address this directly is the Fusion Center Guidelines released in August of 2006, which states that, even though fusion centers will have many different partners, not all partners need nor should receive dissemination of information and intelligence at the same level, stating\n\"each discipline will not need the same level of detail.\"37\n\n## 2. Data Collection\n\nA great deal of support, politically and financially, has been directed toward the fusion center concept; it is not only prudent but an obligation to make every effort to maximize our opportunities for success.  The tremendous expenditure, in both money and resources that have been put into fusion centers, begs the question: How do we maximize the value of fusion centers?  Many have made the proposition that law enforcement and the emergency responder community as a whole can make a significant contribution to protecting the homeland by becoming a source for information collection.\nIt has been widely held and acknowledged that America's emergency responders have a great capacity for interacting with the public they serve - much more intimately than their federal counterparts.  What has been less well understood, until recently, is their potential for contribution to the counterterrorism effort.  This point is concisely illustrated in the Markle report:\nMost of the real frontlines of homeland security are outside of Washington D.C. Likely terrorists are often encountered, and the targets they might attack are protected, by local officials - a cop hearing a complaint from a landlord, an airport official who hears about a plane some pilot trainee left on the runway, an FBI agent puzzled by an odd flight school student in Arizona, or an emergency room resident trying to treat patients stricken by an unusual illness.38\nMaximizing our opportunity for a successful interdiction of a terrorist plot may well lie in making better use of the large number of emergency responders with close ties and information links to their communities.  Brian Jenkins made the point in his seminal work, *Unconquerable Nation*.\n\nClearly, we need to enhance the intelligence capabilities of local police, not just those of the FBI. The more than 600,000 sworn police officers in the United States are in the best position to monitor potential homegrown terrorists. An entire terrorist plot may proceed under the radar of national intelligence services. Therefore, it is necessary to enhance domestic intelligence collection and analysis capabilities.39\nEqually important to the sheer numbers of emergency responders is the knowledge of the \"beat\" or area they work and their developed ability to see the abnormal.  Jenkins reflects on this idea as well:\nThey know their territory. Recruited locally, they are likely to be ethnically closer to the communities they serve, they are more aware of local changes, and they are more acceptable to local community leaders. Unlike federal agents, local police do not rotate to another city every few years. They are in the best position to identify \"hot spots\" for terrorist recruiting, talk to local merchants and community leaders, and develop local sources of intelligence. As we have seen in many cases, local police, through routine criminal investigations, community policing, or dedicated intelligence efforts, may be the first to pick up leads to terrorist plots.40 A great deal has been written about fusion centers and the need to involve our emergency responder community, particularly law enforcement.  Much less has been written about how we are actually going to engage this community of responders.  The CRS report on Homeland Security Intelligence reinforces this point when it states that the need for equal information sharing is critical between federal and local partners but:\nYet such an approach also implies a level of information sharing between federal, state, local, tribal, and private sector information collection entities that does not appear to exist currently.41\nThe value of information coming from the emergency responder (ER)\ncommunity, or as would be identified by the CRS report - nontraditional source data - is illustrated by the fact that the CRS report lists as one of the four fusion center value propositions:\nState, local and tribal law enforcement and public-sector agencies are in a unique position to make observations and collect information that may be central to the type of threat assessment referenced above [comprehensive threat picture].42\n\nHowever, as important as getting information from the local ER community, or the nontraditional source data, to the fusion center has been identified, it remains an elusive objective at many locations, and in any substantial way.  This is supported by the CRS report \"moreover, the development of a process for gathering information according to clearly defined information requirements and fusion centers remains nascent.\"43\nOne method of field data collection that is being used with some degree of positive results is the Terrorism Liaison Officer (TLO) program.  There has not, as yet, been very much scholarly research conducted on TLOs; however, the program will be reported on later in this thesis.\n\n## A. Community-Oriented Policing (Cop)\n\nCOP has evolved over the past twenty years and has many different definitions and applications.  The COP and Problem Solving division of the California Attorney General's Office defines COP as: \"philosophy, management style, and organizational design that promotes proactive problem-solving and police-community partnerships to address the causes of crime and fear as well as other community issues.\"44\nThis philosophy, as espoused by the Attorney General's office, places great emphasis on problem-solving and community partnerships with the philosophy of the supportive law enforcement management.\n\nScheider and Chapman offer an efficient definition of COP:\nThere is no one commonly recognized definition of community policing.\nHere we offer one possible definition that we will then apply to preventing and responding to terrorist events.  Community policing can be defined as a philosophy that, through the delivery of police services, focuses on crime and social disorder; the philosophy includes aspects of traditional law enforcement as well as prevention, problem-solving tactics, and partnerships.45\nScheider and Chapman also make a concise and accurate assessment of the COP philosophy, which they describe as having three interrelated elements of:\n\"organizational change, problem-solving, and external partnerships.\"46  A new organizational structure will help the rank-and-file officers if it allows them the freedom to take self-initiated activity and act on their observations of potentially suspicious behavior.  Acting on the officers' developed powers of observation for what is \"not right,\" enhanced with awareness level training, will ultimately lead to increased investigative tips and leads.     Problem solving, which was the forerunner of COP and a cornerstone of the tactical effectiveness of COP, has helped both line-level officer and detectives to think more analytically, with an end toward finding a solution to a problem, rather than making a short-term fix with an arrest.\nWhile problem solving yielded the greatest tactical benefits, forming external relationships forged huge inroads in establishing links with the community.  The public relations capital and support for law enforcement was unprecedented.  How do we trade on the community capital of good will created by COP, and how do we make that work in the collection of information useful to counter terrorist action?\nWhat is the role of community-oriented policing in homeland security and the prevention of domestic terrorism?  Docobo presented this question in his article Community Policing as the Primary Process and Strategy for Homeland Security at the Local Law Enforcement Level by stating: \"while some have suggested that community policing fit into the overall national strategy for homeland security, little research specifically identifies community policing strategies and their direct application to the national strategy for homeland security.\"47  Many are fond of saying that COP is a valuable tool in counterterrorism but few have made the case.\n\n## B. Hypothesis\n\nIf no action is taken to assist fusion centers in producing locally relevant intelligence products, they will eventually lose support from the local law enforcement community, which will ultimately negatively affect the value of their product.  This will, in turn, create even more funding challenges to continue federal support for the fusion centers.  If the intelligence product produced by the local fusion centers is not locally actionable, the fusion centers will be relegated to being little more than local mouthpieces for generic, federally produced trends.\n\nIt is anticipated that this would create a loss of support from the sponsoring agencies, of which the majority are state and local law enforcement agencies. If the fusion centers prove themselves to be less than full and valued members of the intelligence community, the partnerships established in the fusion centers will likely break apart, unwilling to expend valuable resources with little return.  The multi-agency and multi-levels of governments that are currently participating will re-allocate their resources, relegating the host agency to a crime analysis center rather than an intelligence fusion center.  This distinction would render their counterterrorist potential moot, particularly if the FBI were to disengage.\n\n## C. Methodology And Resources\n\nThe methodology for this thesis is a program of evaluation, utilizing a formative approach to review, evaluate, and suggest improvements for fusion centers and TLO programs in general and the Sacramento region in particular.  The questions were:\nwhat are the strengths and weaknesses of fusion centers, particularly those associated\nwith the California State Terrorism Threat Assessment System, as well as other existing programs and, just as importantly, what can be done to improve those programs? My methodology will be as outlined below.\nMuch of the analysis portion of this thesis will focus on the California State Terrorism Threat Assessment System, which consists of the State Terrorism Threat Assessment Center (STTAC) and the four regional terrorism threat assessment centers (RTTAC).  The four RTTACs are the Northern California RTTAC located in the San Francisco Bay Area, the Sacramento RTTAC, the Los Angeles RTTAC and the San Diego RTTAC.  The four RTTACs are geographically aligned with the FBI field offices and, consequently, the U.S. Attorney's office.\n\n## D. Literature Review\n\nThe first step of the methodology for this thesis will be to continue the literature review.  Specifically, the research will continue to investigate, in greater depth and on a broader range, what variety of intelligence collection methods are being used by what agencies, and in what capacity and with what degree of success.  Further, review will focus on fusion centers and their local or regional operational procedures as well as their intelligence production, examining the end product and its regional application, and the relevant usefulness of this information to the local emergency responder community and administrators.  The research will cover anything relating to fusion centers and local information/intelligence gathering, particularly as it relates to any terrorism nexus.\n\n## E. Survey\n\nSurveys are the second component of the methodology and will be conducted in conjunction with the interview and observation portion of my research.  I\nhave surveyed the STTAC and all four RTTACs.  Commanders of the respective centers completed the surveys. Questions raised and answered in the survey are:\n\n1)\nWho are your consumers?\n2)\nWhat is the primary function of each fusion center? Should they be all crimes or purely counterterrorist?\n3)\nIs their mission tactical or strategic?\n4)\nBy what methods do they receive taskings and from whom?\n5)\nHow do they disseminate information and to what purpose?\n6)\nHow do the fusion centers collect information from their emergency responder community and are those processes satisfactory?\nIn some cases, respondents did not answer one or more of the survey questions.  This seemed to occur with greater frequency later in the survey, it is unknown if this was survey fatigue or if it had to do with the individual question.  No particular fusion center had a pattern of skipping questions.  Eight questions had one skip, one question had two skips and one question had three skips.  A total of twenty-eight questions were asked.  The survey was conducted via SurveyMonkey with the four RTTACs and the STTAC (herein after referred to as survey).\n\nThe respondents were advised that their individual responses would be kept confidential unless they specifically indicated the responses could be attributed. This was done to encourage as complete a disclosure as possible.  A copy of the survey is attached in Attachment A.\n\n## F. Interviews\n\nThe interviews included the director of the California State Office of Homeland Security, five RTTAC commanders (two from LA), TLO coordinators from the RTTACs, and a variety of law enforcement administrators. The objective was to determine their expectations of the fusion centers and tasking, as well as their understanding of the current system and their expectations.  Interviews were also conducted with educators in the field and practicing analysts.  The interviews were qualitative and unstructured, following basic thematic lines; each respondent represented a different area of expertise.\n\n## Ii. Survey Results\n\nFusion center managers work in a classified environment where few others have access. They know what information is available from the federal classified databases, open sources, classified human intelligence, and local information sources.  The fusion center managers also know what cases are being investigated, and what type and quality of information is needed to fill their threat assessment gaps - as well as assist their investigative capacity.  For this reason, the respective RTTAC commanders, or comanagers, were chosen as the survey respondents.  In the case of the STTAC, the respondent was a designee.  All respondents identified their organizations as fusion centers.\nThe survey revealed that most fusion center respondents believe that law enforcement and investigators are their primary customers, but that they will provide strategic assessment to policy makers as need.  The majority also has an all-crimes perspective and felt that to do otherwise would minimize their value to their customer base.  They also felt that the emergency responder community had valuable information to share and that, in fact, the largest source of local data that they relied on came from law enforcement and TLOs.  The fusion centers also reported that they had developed appropriate reporting mechanisms, but that the emergency responders were not reporting up to expectations.  Community-oriented policing contributed very little to the counterterrorism effort.\nAll of the fusion centers had a TLO program with both fire and law enforcement.\nLaw TLOs provided more tips and information collection, while fire TLOs provided more administrative support and line-level education.\n\n## A. Survey Responses 1. Who Are Your Consumers?\n\nIn response to the question, \"who are the primary consumers of your product,\" the survey overwhelmingly identified investigators and law-enforcement as their primary customer.    Fifty percent of those responding to this survey question identified law-\n\nenforcement and investigators as \"always\" the primary consumer of their product. Whereas 75 percent of the respondents indicated that policymakers were \"often\" consumers of their product.  Non-law-enforcement emergency responders had a range of responses, from 25 percent saying that they were \"seldom\" consumers of their product, to 50 percent identifying the non-law enforcement responder community as \"often\" a consumer, and 25 percent identifying them as consumers \"most of the time\" (one respondent skipped this question).   Two-thirds of the respondents identified elected officials as \"seldom\" a consumer of their product (two respondents skipped this portion of the question).\n\n## 2. What Is The Primary Function Of Each Fusion Center?  Should They Be All Crimes Or Purely Counterterrorist?\n\nThe survey indicates that the majority of the centers, 60 percent, engage in an all crimes perspective for fusion center operations.  One of the exclusively counter terrorist perspectives was Los Angeles (noted with permission), which investigates and analyzes counterterrorist activity but also considers criminal activity with a terrorist nexus such as\n\nfinancial crimes (they maintain connectivity via the TLO program with officers in the various investigative units).  For the fusion centers that have an all crimes perspective, 75 percent of the respondents identified financial crimes and gangs as crimes that they conduct analysis on.  Narcotics, crimes of violence, and counterfeiting (other than money) were all identified 50 percent of the time as crimes that the fusion centers worked.  One respondent skipped this question.\nFor the all crime fusion centers, only 50 percent had a policy that guided the decision on what crime or case would be analyzed.  The remaining centers relied on the supervisor, director or analysts to make the decision.  The response to the question (which provided for a narrative response) of whether there was sufficient purely counterterrorist activity to consistently support a fully staffed fusion center was mixed. Two responded yes, one responded no, the fourth replied that fusion centers should be all crimes, and one skipped the question.\nThe survey data also suggests that useable intelligence product would be lost if their center were to focus exclusively on counterterrorist activity.  Fifty percent of the reporting fusion centers stated that \"usually\" or \"almost always\" would there be a loss of intelligence data.  Fifty percent also felt that value to consumers would \"usually\" or \"almost always\" be reduced and 25 percent felt that \"sometimes\" the value to consumer would be reduced.\n\n## 3. Is Their Mission Tactical Or Strategic?\n\nThe data from the survey indicates that 60 percent of the fusion centers had both a strategic and a tactical capability with two respondents skipping the question.  This finding was supported by the interviews from the commanders of the four RTTACs.  The Bay Area RTTAC and the Sacramento RTTAC primarily do investigative tactical case support, but they do some strategic analysis on request or when they deem such a need exists.  The LA RTTAC does some investigative case support but primarily provides strategic analysis. While the San Diego RTTAC does purely strategic support.\n\n## 4. By What Methods Do They Receive Taskings And From Whom?\n\nThis question was posed requiring a narrative response of which four of the five centers responded.  None of the respondents cited a policy guiding tasking requirements, but all of them were receptive to external taskings.  One response indicated any ranking member of the department could initiate a tasking, another stated any of the main stakeholders could do so.  The two remaining centers stated that either local or federal agencies could initiate a request.\nThe survey data also found that 100 percent of the fusion centers felt they could\n\"task\" the emergency responder community with requests for information in the form of information bulletins advising the ER community to be alert for whatever specific information was needed.\n\n## 5. How Do They Disseminate Information And To What Purpose?\n\nTwo of the five fusion centers disseminate between 25 and 50 percent of their product at the Law Enforcement Sensitive (LES) level and a third fusion center disseminated 50 to 75 percent of its product at the LES level.  The remaining two fusion centers disseminated between 10 and 25 percent of their product at the LES level.  All five of the fusion centers disseminated less than 10 percent of their product at the secret or top secret level.  The survey also revealed that three of the five fusion centers disseminate between 25 and 50 percent of their product at the FOUO level and the remaining two fusion centers disseminate between 50 and 75 percent of their product at the FOUO level.\nThe survey indicated that FOUO information was disseminated 40 percent of the time by e-mail and 60 percent of the time by a secure electronic communication. LES information was disseminated in the same manner.  Secret and top secret intelligence was disseminated 80 percent of the time in person and 20 percent the time by \"other.\"  Sixty percent of the fusion centers had an internal method to disseminate intelligence to field or line level emergency responders and 60 percent relied on liaisons between the fusion center and the line personnel to disseminate intelligence.  One center had both methods of dissemination.\n\n## 6 How Do The Fusion Centers Collect Information From Their Emergency Responder Community And Are Those Processes Satisfactory?  Also, What Are Their Collection Methods And The Scope Of Their Collection Process?\n\nThe results from the survey show that four out of five of the fusion centers receive between 25 and 50 percent of their source data from local agencies, which was the single largest source for data that analysts use at the state and local fusion centers.  The survey also showed that two of the five fusion centers received less than 10 percent of their source data from the federal government and four out of five fusion centers said that they received less than 10 percent of their source data from the state government.  This survey clearly indicates not only the value, but the usefulness of local data as a source of analysis for state and local fusion centers.\n\nOf the local data sources two of the five fusion centers identified law enforcement as providing between 50 and 75 percent of the their data with a third reporting law enforcement as the source of between 75 and 100 percent of the source data.  Terrorism Liaison Officers (TLO) were the source of 50 to 75 percent of local data for two fusion centers and between 75 and 100 percent for two more.  Sixty percent of the fusion centers reported receiving less than 10 percent of their local data from fire personnel, and two fusion centers reported receiving between 10 and 25 percent of their data from the fire service.  All five fusion centers reported receiving less than 10 percent (this was the lowest rating on the scale) of their local source data from each of the categories of: pubic health, emergency medical services, and public works.\nThe survey also reported that 80 percent of the fusion centers felt that the emergency responder community is not being appropriately utilized as a data source. There was a wide range of variability in response to the question: Do you think that, as a source, the line level emergency responder community has access to potentially valuable information.  The response was: one fusion center reported \"sometimes,\" a second reported, \"often\" a third reported \"usually,\" a fourth reported \"almost always\" and the fifth reported \"always.\"  This range may represent a philosophical approach to the unused potential of the ER community or it may reflect how much each of the fusion centers uses the ER community in their sphere of influence.  There are many other potential explanations for the variance but the data is insufficient to be able to try to interpret the variance in response.  Nonetheless, 80 percent of the fusion centers felt that the emergency responder community had access to potentially valuable information between \"often\" and \"always.\"  This is clearly a sufficient intelligence potential in the emergency responder community for the fusion centers to attempt to acquire this information.\n\nThe surveys point to a perceived lack of situational awareness by the ER\ncommunity as a problem.  Although the managers of the fusion centers felt that, by and large, the emergency responder community had access to potentially valuable information only one of the fusion centers reported that the ER community \"usually\" knew what to look for.  Two of the fusion centers felt that the ER community \"often\" knew what to look for and another two others felt that the ER community only\n\"sometimes\" knew what to look for.  Three of the five fusion centers felt that they\n\"usually\" had appropriate reporting mechanisms for the emergency responder community to report suspected terrorist activity.  The remaining two fusion centers reported that they thought the emergency responder community \"sometimes\" and \"often\" had appropriate reporting mechanisms.  Sixty percent of the fusion centers thought the reporting mechanisms were either \"almost always\" or \"always\" available and user friendly and yet 60 percent of the fusion centers felt that the emergency responder community was only\n\"sometimes \" taking advantage of reporting opportunities.  This data seems to suggest that, according to the respondents, the emergency responder community generally has access to useful information, has appropriate reporting mechanisms that are available and user friendly; and, yet are not reporting information as might be expected.\nA frequently cited source of potential data is community oriented policing (COP).\nThe survey results state quite convincingly that this is currently not the case.  Three of the five fusion centers reported that they get less than 5 percent of their tips or leads from COP.  The fourth fusion center reported receiving 5 to 10 percent of their tips or leads from COP.  Three of four respondents reported COP as an under utilized resource with one center skipping the question.\nOne hundred percent of the fusion centers felt it was important to acknowledge the emergency responders that provide tips or leads.  Two of the centers did so by phone with two more doing so by e mail.  One center made the acknowledgement in person. None of the centers had an automatic acknowledgement system and all made the effort on an individual basis to respond to the tip.\nResults from the survey showed that all of the fusion centers have a TLO liaison with law enforcement and fire; and, 80 percent had a liaison with emergency medical services as well as public health.  Only 20 percent of the fusion centers had a liaison with public works.  The role the TLO varies according to which discipline and emergency responder community that the TLO is interacting with.  In the law-enforcement discipline all five fusion centers reported the role of the TLO was to collect information and to facilitate the program.  Three out of five fusion centers reported educating line personnel was an additional role for law enforcement TLOs.  Two of the five fusion centers reported educating administrators and investigating tips was also a role for law enforcement TLOs.\nLaw enforcement and fire reported to have the biggest roles in the TLO program.\nThe biggest difference being that fire TLOs provided more administrative support and law enforcement TLOs were reported to have more of a role in collecting information and providing tips.\n\n## B. Sacramento Joint Powers Authority (Jpa) Survey\n\nComparisons between fusion centers are difficult because there are no standardized definitions for the types of analysts and what their product is or should be. Sacramento received a grant from the DHS to provide fusion analyst training on a nationwide scale.  As part of developing curriculum, the Sacramento Joint Powers Authority, responsible for the program, conducted an informal phone survey of fusion centers across the country.  Thirty six fusion centers were identified as operational; of the thirty six, twenty-one agreed to participate in the interview.  The interviews were conducted by phone and the respondents' answers were recorded by staff.\nOne of the questions on the phone survey was: How are your fusion center analysts different from crime analysts?  Of the twenty-one responses, five stated there was little or no difference, twelve described their analysts function as tactical, because they also conducted counter terrorism support.  Only four gave responses that may indicate that strategic analysis was being conducted.  Another question was: What percentage of your analysts' time is spent on terrorist threat analysis?  Eleven fusion centers responded low or very low with given percentages ranging from 10 to 30 percent.\nSome respondents did not give an approximate percentage and identified the level of threat assessment activity as minimal or very low.  Five fusion centers gave a mid-range level of time spent on threat assessments, rating themselves as being between 50 and 70 percent.  Four fusion centers rated their percentage of terrorist threat assessment as high or very high, between 80 and 100 percent.48\nIn the informal survey conducted by the Sacramento Joint Powers Authority, the twenty-one fusion centers that responded to the survey identified analytical skills and writing skills as the area where their analysts needed the most improvement.  Eighteen of the twenty-one centers stated that their analysts had received some training in analytical thinking and analytical tools.  Training identified as most needed included analytical skills, terrorism fundamentals, and report and analytical writing.  Other identified training needs were: identifying reportable intelligence, intelligence methodologies, open source exploitation, anticipating law enforcement needs, advanced research skills, and analytic tools.49\n\n## C. Summary Of The California Fusion Centers Survey\n\n-\nLaw enforcement and investigators are the primary customers of fusion\ncenters as identified by fusion center commanders\n-\nPolicy makers are secondary customers of fusion centers\n-\nA modest majority of the fusion centers have an all crime perspective\n-\nOf the fusion centers that do have an all crime orientation the crimes most often targeted are financial crime and gang activity\n-\nHalf of the reporting fusion centers stated their value to consumers would\nbe diminished if they did not include an all crime perspective\n-\nMost of the fusion centers (60 percent) have a strategic and a tactical\ncapability\n-\nThe fusion centers are receptive to taking tasking requests from almost\nanyone in authority\n-\nA significant amount of intelligence product is disseminated at the LES\nlevel\n-\nThe majority of intelligence product is disseminated at the FOUO level\n-\nLocal agencies were the single largest source of data for the fusion centers\n-\nLaw enforcement and TLOs provided the majority of local source data\n-\nThe vast majority of the fusion centers felt that the emergency responder\ncommunity was not being appropriately utilized as a data source\n-\nSituational awareness seems to be lacking in the emergency responder\ncommunity\n-\nCommunity-oriented policing is largely ineffective in providing information to the fusion centers\n-\nThe vast majority of fusion centers felt COP was under-utilized as a potential data source\n-\nAll of the fusion centers have a TLO liaison with both law and fire\n-\nLaw TLOs provided more tips and information collection than did fire\nTLOs\n-\nFire TLOs provide more administrative support and line level education to\ntheir agency than law TLOs\n\n## D. Summary Of The Sacramento Joint Powers Authority (Jpa) Survey\n\n-\nOf the twenty one responses on the national survey, only four gave\nresponses  that gave an indication of conducting strategic analysis in their fusion centers\n-\nHalf of the fusion  centers spent little or very little of their time on terrorist threat analysis\n-\nAlmost 90  percent of the fusion center analysts had received some training in analytic thinking and analytic tools\n-\nTraining that the fusion centers identified as most needed was analytical\nskills, terrorism fundamentals, report and analytical writing\n\n##\n\nTHIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK\n\n## Iii. Analysis Of Current Practice For Fusion Centers\n\nPrevention is the first of the four goals of the National Strategy for Homeland Security.50  It can be argued that fusion centers provide an excellent opportunity to provide that prevention.  This thesis will not attempt to justify or validate the effectiveness or usefulness of fusion centers.  The performance measures and metrics for such an assessment are lacking and will be left to future studies.  While this thesis will not measure the effectiveness of the fusion centers, it remains critically important that fusion centers are, or become, effective.  This thesis accepts the fact that significant resources, both in money and personnel, have been dedicated to fusion centers.  This thesis will focus on what practices may provide the greatest value for the jurisdictions that support them and thereby improve their potential usefulness for future assessments.\nFusion centers evolved because of a perceived need at the local level.  This need must be met if fusion centers are to become, or remain, viable.  In testimony before Congress, Norman Beasley, Counterterrorism Coordinator for Arizona, spoke in reference to fusion centers:\nTheir ultimate goal is to support their consumers with beneficial information. But, the consumers also have a critical role in the production of information and ultimately intelligence.51\nThe \"consumers\" Norm Beasley is referring to are the local policymakers and emergency responder community.\n\n## A. Management Of The Fusion Center\n\nFor the fusion centers to run efficiently and effectively, they will need to have a clear mission, internal organization, a strategic purpose, and adequate resources to fulfill their duties.  If fusion centers are to be effective and relevant at the local level, they need to meet the needs of the local ER community.  To do this, they must produce timely, relevant, locally actionable intelligence that can be used either by local policymakers for situational awareness, resource deployment or protection efforts, or for investigation or preemption at a local level.\n\n## 1. Mission\n\nTo meet the most basic of concepts for a fusion center, developing a mission statement, the center must identify who their customers are and what products they want.\nAs stated in the Fusion Center Guidelines, guideline number two, fusion centers should develop a mission statement via a collaborative process.52  The guidelines also state that the governance board should define a management structure to include what entity will oversee the center's operations and daily activities.  There is no recommendation on how that should be accomplished; instead, it is left up to the individual fusion centers to develop a system that works best for them.\n\nThe nature, role, staffing and mission of state and local fusion centers varies widely throughout the nation and even from center to center in California.   Jerry Murphy, director of homeland security issues for the Police Executive Research Forum (PERF), is undertaking a national study of fusion centers for DHS. He notes that the goal of DHS is not to create cookie-cutter molds for fusion centers, but to respond to the local needs.  Trying to figure out what is the best model - and what are the appropriate divisions of labor for local agencies in the investigation of the crime of terrorism - is a complex issue.  Murphy makes the observation that the FBI clearly has the lead in any terrorist investigation; establishing the role of state and local government in the counterterrorism world will determine, to a large extent, what happens in a local fusion center.  He believes the future of fusion centers may be a movement away from the true intelligence community interpretation for a fusion center to one that is more relevant locally.  What is the payback for local law enforcement for their commitment of time and resources?53  The mission of any fusion center needs to identify its role and its customer, and to produce a product of value to be sustainable.\nNorm Beasley describes the process of refining one's mission into written form as a critical step, delineating the roles and responsibilities of everyone associated with the fusion center.  A written mission statement or a concept of operations lets your customers know who you are and what you do, as well as those who may be concerned about the abuse of civil rights.  A written code of conduct and method of operations will provide guidance and protections.  Having a documented operating procedure will help protect the organization from challenges of excess.54\nThe STTAC and the four RTTACs collaborated on a concept of operations plan as a guiding principle for all five of the threat assessment centers that also function as fusion centers.  As part of that concept of operations, a mission statement and a vision statement is included.  The mission statement is:\nThe mission of the state terrorism threat assessment system is to foster a collaborative effort to collect and analyze criminal information, employ cutting-edge analytical tools and methodologies to produce and share timely and actionable Homeland Security intelligence, thereby enhancing the safety of the citizens of California.55\nFor any fusion center to function in a coherent, let alone efficient, manner, it must have a mission that is a collaborative derivative of the governance board and the senior members of the fusion center.  That mission will have to be more than a platitude on page two of some document that no one reads.  The mission will have to be conveyed and\nreinforced in deed and action.  The question becomes whose mission statement gets adopted and to what purpose.  To answer that question, one must identify \"who\" is the customer or customers of the fusion center.\n\n## A. Customer Identification\n\nIn the survey conducted with the four RTTACs and the STTAC, the fusion centers overwhelmingly identified investigators and law-enforcement as their primary customer. However, the question remains: Does this fit in with their mission statement? Congruence between mission statement, customer identification, and product output is critical to the usefulness and cohesion of a fusion center, and will promote sustainability. If the majority of the fusion center's customer base is law enforcement, what products are being produced for them to consume?  If one considers law enforcement a primary customer, are there sub-customer groups within that category?  One could logically argue that law enforcement administrators are customers, as well as rank-and-file law enforcement officers, and investigators could be a third set of customers within the law enforcement domain.   Fusion centers have many other customers to consider besides law enforcement, such as policy makers, fire, EMS, etc.\nA lack of organizational customer identification will often translate throughout the fusion center with the result that product delivery may be accurate but it may also be erratic and inconsistent.  During a recent training seminar in Monterey, sponsored by the STTAC for the RTTAC and STTAC analysts, there was a definite lack of clarity amongst the analysts as to who their customers were.  There was very little consensus of who was the customer and what the customer wanted in the way of a product.  The analysts had received very little feedback that could guide their requirements.  This lack of clarity, by the analysts who write the product, can only have a negative impact on the usefulness and assimilation of their written product.56\nThis lack of customer identification, by a large segment of the analyst pool, supports the absolute need to identify, specifically, who the customer is for what intelligence product.  It may well be that there can be multiple customers.  For example, executives and elected officials may be customers for strategic threat assessments and situational awareness; JTTF task force members could be customers for terrorism investigative case support; and criminal investigators or law enforcement officers could be customers for major criminal case support.\n\nIn addition to identifying all of your customers, one must consider at what level they will consume.  What level of detail or how much information is required for each customer?  Do you have consumers that want to consume your product, do they consume it, or are they more interested in crime trends rather than emerging threats in the Middle East that may or may not arrive in their back yard?.  In addition to identifying your customers, fusion centers need to identify what consumers want in a product, and balance that with other obligations of the fusion center.57\nLocal fusion centers need to assume the responsibility to reach out to local administrators to find out precisely what information or intelligence products are desired. Norm Beasley makes the point that it is paramount to a fusion centers' success to discover that need and provide it.  He also makes the point that the local administrators and consumers have an absolute responsibility to tell the fusion centers what they want and, just as importantly, what they do not want.58  Will a local chief of police read a twenty-five-page brief on gangs?\nThe interviews generally seem to bear out the finding of the survey, which identified law enforcement and investigators as the primary customer of the fusion centers. In an interview with Roseville Fire Chief Ken Wagner, he stated that he felt that the fusion centers were primarily a law enforcement tool, but that they did have a definite capability for the fire department.  He added that he relied on the fusion center to provide him with the information that he needed as an administrator for situational awareness. He also relied on his battalion chief, assigned to the Sacramento Regional Office of Homeland Security, to relay information that was relevant to the firefighters for either their safety or as a tasking requirement in the form of a request for information.59\nLaw enforcement administrators did feel that LE should be the primary focus, but noted that they would like to see more emphasis on major crimes and better situational awareness for administrators.  Sacramento Chief of Police Rick Braziel observed that fusion centers are most effective when they engage the law enforcement community more in a preventive posture - and not just for counterterrorism, but for major crimes.  As an example of a requirement, he would propose addressing regional crime issues, such as gangs, regionally, rather than pushing it back and forth across a jurisdictional boundary.60  This sentiment was echoed by Sacramento County Sheriff McGinness who took the position that the fusion center mission could include anything that would make the community, or officers working in the community, safer.61\nCare must be taken to ensure that there is congruency between who the fusion center believes its customer to be and who the governing board believes the customer should be.  An involved and active governance board should be aware of the standing requirements and the identification of the primary and secondary customers of the fusion center, and ensure that those needs are being met.  In the event of a conflict, skillful leadership with a collaborative and network-oriented approach will be required to reach a compromise amongst the varying jurisdictions and disciplines.  The regional partners in the governance board must be able to set the requirements, or the objectives, of the fusion center.\n\n## B. Tasking\n\nA clear and definitive set of standing tasking requirements, along with clear identification of who the customer is for those particular tasking requirements, will add to the quality and ultimate usefulness of the end product.  This was an issue discussed in the recent analyst training in Monterey, and was an issue that was widespread throughout the ranks of the analysts represented at the training.62  One of the biggest problems facing fusion centers is getting law enforcement administrators to establish standing requirements.  Law enforcement administrators cannot become efficient consumers of intelligence if they do not take an active part in establishing what requirements are established or why.  The standing requirements of a fusion center should not be established in an ad hoc fashion.63  For the fusion centers to have value to the ER\ncommunity the ER administrators should have input as to the priorities of what product is produced.  ER administrators will have to be educated on the intelligence process and how to become effective consumers of intelligence.\nThe LA RTTAC does not have a written standing tasking requirement, partly due to the co-management of the organization between LASO, LAPD and the FBI.\nTasking is done by the manger on duty as the need of the situation presents itself.64  The tasking assignments to analysts in the Northern California RTTAC and the Sacramento RTTAC are done by the supervisors.\n\nJust as the regional partners can task the fusion center by establishing the appropriate standing requirements for the fusion center, the fusion center must be able to task the ER community for new, additional, or supplemental information.  A robust mechanism for this tasking must be established.  The survey data found this to be the case.\nAll of the fusion centers were flexible in who could task the center with a request for an intelligence product; anyone with an administrative association would be able to make such a request.   This collaborative approach is salutary.  An unanswered question is who takes advantage of this capability, and how often.\nAn additional point on tasking is made by Norm Beasley.  He suggests that, in addition to having local administrators assist in establishing standing requirements for state and local fusion centers, a national network of fusion centers should be established with federal guidelines on standing requirements from the federal government to the state and local fusion centers.  This is not a task the government will be anxious to do as it may give the appearance of trying to take over the local fusion centers. But a network is just that, an exchange of information with two-way tasking at all levels.  Local centers could task the federal government for intelligence gaps on local threat activity and the federal agencies could task the locals with their greater number of assets and community contacts.  This will be a rather delicate undertaking but nonetheless a worthwhile one.65\nFinally, once the mission and customer identification has occurred, the center will need to determine at what level each customer will be supported.  Is the primary mission of the center to support counterterrorist efforts, criminal case support, or situational awareness?  Most will have all three and an equitable (based on identified need) distribution of resources and product will go a long way to crystallizing the mission, meeting expectations and gaining customer satisfaction.\n\nTo accomplish this, the fusion centers will be required to develop a method of prioritization for resource allocation, which should be based on the local threat picture.  This concept is supported by the Fusion Center Guidelines, guideline number two,66 which calls for a prioritization of intelligence functions to address local threats.\nThis point is central to one of the major themes of this thesis, which is intelligence products that are produced by the local fusion centers must not only be timely, but must be locally actionable if they are to provide the preventive value that should be expected of fusion centers.\n\n## 2. Philosophy\n\nHow fusion center professionals approach their job and how the decisions are made about the operational functions of the fusion center are perhaps just as important as what those operational functions become.  If partners are made to feel excluded or denigrated, cooperation and collaboration will be relegated to catch phrases, and the potential benefits of true collaboration and networking will be lost.  It is important that leaders in fusion centers have an understanding and embrace a collaborative and inclusive environment when making decisions on standing requirements and the operational posture of the fusion center.  To do that, fusion center leaders need to come to an agreement on what the basic operating principles of the center are and how they will be addressed.  Among issues that should be considered are the value of prevention, risk management, what is the local threat, strategic vs. tactical support, all crimes vs. strictly counterterrorist perspective, prioritization, and standing tasking requirements.\n\n## A. Prevention\n\nThe threat of a terrorist attack has dramatically shifted the focus of local law enforcement.  Much has been written about the need for local law enforcement to take an active role in not only preparing to respond to an attack, but more importantly, being a major player in preventing an attack.  This is a new role for domestic law enforcement and the major sticking point is how best to accomplish this obvious but elusive goal.\nAlmost every jurisdiction that chooses to address the issue (and not all do), has a different approach with varying degrees of success.  One comes up against the requiem: How do you measure what has not happened?  The Director of the California State Office of Homeland Security, Matt Bettenhausen, illustrates this problem stating, \"The more successful you are, the less you have to show for it.\"  He adds that \"prevention is our first goal, and prosecution comes next.  If prosecution were our first priority, it would be better to allow some of these groups to develop more, but the stakes are too high.\"67\nThe range of operational responses varies dramatically from state to state and from jurisdiction to jurisdiction.  Some jurisdictions (or administrators) feel that \"it won't happen to us\" and put very little effort into prevention.  Instead, they focus much of their homeland security resources into a response capability, which they may be able to use in events other than a domestic terror attack.  However, a significant number of jurisdictions are beginning to recognize the value of prevention over that of response, realizing that if we need to respond to a domestic terrorist attack we have, to a certain extent, already lost.\n\nIf fusion centers are to be seen as valuable enterprises, worthy of their funding and resource expenditure, the governance board and the management of the fusion centers must adopt a philosophical acceptance that prevention is key to homeland security, and be able to convey that message to the local political and administrative leadership.  The shift of identifying homeland security protection from response equipment procurement to intelligence-inspired prevention is one that will require support and evidence.  Homeland security dollars are moving away from response and into prevention.  There are constituent groups that will be resistant to this shift.  For some years, response capacity has been the major benefactor of grant dollars with the purchase of costly response equipment.  Many local administrators will be loathe to give up their big-ticket equipment items, previously paid for by grants in exchange for information or intelligence that may or may not prevent an attack that may or may  not happen.\nFusion center advocates will need to demonstrate that intelligence, tailored to the sphere of influence of each individual fusion center, is an approach that can provide protection for the homeland if fusion centers are to gain acceptance from the local emergency responder community, and more importantly, their administrators.  To this end, fusion centers may well need to include threats other than terrorists.\nThe CRS report reinforces the point that fusion centers can enhance protection with the observation: \"Creating a fusion center is a tangible action that seeks to enhance state and/or regional coordination and cooperation to prevent and mitigate, and in some cases, respond and recover from homeland security threats.\"  The report continues the argument for a common adoption of the prevention philosophy stating,\nIf fusion center constituent agencies don't buy into a common fusion and prevention philosophy that arguably needs to accompany fusion centers\n(i.e., responsibility for security, a proactive approach, and need for understanding their environment to discern potential threats), can fusion centers be effective?68\nAn educational marketing campaign on the value of prevention and the potential of the fusion center to promote that prevention should be a combined message, presented by an influential coalition.\nA final point that will undoubtedly generate controversy: What is the risk management strategy that will be supported by the fusion center?  Should the standing requirements of the fusion center give priority to the less likely but potentially devastating WMD attack, or should the more likely, less catastrophic conventional attack with perhaps a VBIED, be the priority of the fusion center?  These issues will not be answered in this thesis. For the efficient operation of fusion centers, however, they will need to be addressed by the governance board, emergency responder senior executives and elected officials.  Brian Jenkins weighs in on this point in his testimony before Congress, stating,\nallocation of resources must be based upon assessments of risk - we are moving in this direction.  The choice lies between focusing on the most likely events in the lower registers of violence or on the less likely events that would have the greatest consequences.69\n\n## B. Establish A Local Threat\n\nIn order to form a cohesive prevention posture, adopted by administrators and line personnel, the fusion centers will have to identify what it is that they are trying to prevent; identifying a local threat will aid in this effort.  The National Intelligence Estimate: The Terrorist Threat to the U.S. Homeland, released in July 2007, states:\nWe assess that the spread of radical - especially Salafi - Internet sites, increasingly aggressive anti-U.S. rhetoric and actions, and the growing number of radical, self-generating cells in Western countries indicate that the radical and violent segment of the West's Muslim population is expanding, including in the United States.70\nThe estimate goes on to say that: We assess that globalization trends and recent technological advances will continue to enable even small numbers of alienated people to find and connect with one another, justify and intensify their anger, and mobilize resources to attackall without requiring a centralized terrorist organization, training camp, or leader.\n\nThe ability to detect broader and more diverse terrorist plotting in this environment will challenge current U.S. defensive efforts and the tools we use to detect and disrupt plots. It will also require greater understanding of how suspect activities at the local level relate to strategic threat information and how best to identify indicators of terrorist activity in the midst of legitimate interactions.71\nThe 2008 Annual Threat Assessment from the Director of National Intelligence reiterates the threat potential on our domestic front:\nWhile the threat from such homegrown extremists is greater in Europe, the U.S. is not immune. The threat here is likely to be fueled in part by propaganda and mischaracterizations of U.S. foreign policy as harmful to Muslims, rather than by any formal assistance from al-Qa'ida or other recognized groups. The al-Qa'ida-propagated narrative of an \"us versus them\" struggle serves both as a platform and a potential catalyst for radicalization of Muslims alienated from the mainstream U.S. population.72\nGiven the uncertainty of the environment - and the relative ease of operation with which disaffected and hostile individuals can anonymously engage with and reinforce one another - it is impossible to determine, with any degree of certainty, the extent of our threat in any locale.  To illustrate the point, consider the jihadist terrorist cell uncovered in June 2005 in the rural farming community of Lodi, California. The discovery resulted in one conviction for providing material support for terrorism, a twenty-four-year prison sentence and the deportation of two local Imams.  Prior to the discovery of the cell, few people would have chosen Lodi as the location of an emerging jihadist terrorist cell.  The potential for these cells and other domestic single-issue terrorist groups to spring forth without warning is a byproduct of our technological and interconnected world.\nAmong the countervailing points of view is the notion that the domestic terrorist threat is not as dire or imminent as we have been led to believe.   Proponents of this argument believe that the United States will be able to absorb any such attack in stride.  A lack of successful jihadist terrorist attacks in the intervening years since 9/11 is frequently cited as evidence for the position.  This is a compelling argument, although several attempts throughout the country have been disrupted before the terrorists could implement their attacks.  Those arguing the position that the domestic threat is not significant will point out that these attempts were so ill-formed that they were never able to be initiated.\nDirector Bettenhausen gives context to this argument during his interview.\nHis position was that many of the domestic plots that have been uncovered nationwide were unsophisticated, and considered to have minimal potential by some.  Who would have thought, however, that nineteen guys with box cutters could have done what they did prior to 9/11?  Much of our success is due to interdicting potential threats at the lowest level of discovery.  We do not allow the enterprise to grow; our best course of action may be deportation or exposure.73\nThe mere threat of becoming a victim of a terrorist attack can have a severe impact on a community, including the mental-health of its residents and the way they conduct their daily lives.  As an example, consider the DC sniper attacks and how they affected that community.  These were two unsophisticated and unsupported lone\n\nwolf criminals - not ideologically motivated terrorists, pursuing what they believed to be a just cause.  A few such individuals could easily wreak that level of havoc on any community in our country.  It is not unreasonable to believe that a small group of dedicated and motivated terrorists could, while not significantly disrupting the infrastructure of this country, have a significant impact on the national psychology and economy.\nIt is a reasonable perception that a police officer or firefighter is unlikely to uncover a planned transnational terrorist plot or encounter and document a contact with one of its cell members.  That position does little to counter the converse of the argument, that a local ER will have a far greater chance of encountering a terrorist plot or action emanating from within our borders.  The threat posed by radicalized prisoners, single-issue terrorists - such as ELF or ALF, and more importantly local jihadists that have a sympathetic ideological link with Al Qaeda and similar groups - will more likely be discovered or encountered by local ERs.\nWhile these attacks may lack the feared WMD capability, there should be no doubt that a group of serious and motivated individuals could produce an attack that is not only physically, but psychologically, catastrophic.  You need go no further than the Oklahoma bombing to reinforce this point.  Finally, many experts make the case that counterterrorism is more appropriately a police mission rather than relying primarily on the military.  In a paper authored by Bruce Hoffman and Seth Jones (draft, cited with permission) they make the case that police have better training and more experience in responding to terrorist organizations and, historically, have greater success against them. The paper continues to say that the government should enhance police capacity to respond to the threat (specifically al Qaeda) much more robustly than has been done.74\nAn awareness of our local threat will assist us in focusing our prevention efforts and create a need for intelligence and data collection.\n\n\n## C. Strategic Vs. Tactical\n\nOne additional perspective fusion centers have to consider is the type of analytical support that they provide.  The question has arisen: Should fusion centers provide strategic analysis in the form of threat assessments or situational awareness for local executives and elected officials as the customer, or should they concern themselves with tactical case support for developing or ongoing investigations?\nThe data from the survey indicates that 60 percent of the fusion centers had both a strategic and a tactical capability.  This finding was supported by the interviews from the commanders of the four RTTACs.  The Bay Area RTTAC and the Sacramento RTTAC primarily do investigative tactical case support, but they do some strategic analysis on request or when they deem such a need exists.  The LA RTTAC does some investigative case support but primarily provides strategic analysis, while the San Diego RTTAC does purely strategic support.\n\nComparisons between fusion centers are difficult, as there are no standardized definitions for the types of analysts and what their product is or should be. In the phone survey conducted by the Sacramento Joint Powers Authority one of the questions on the survey: How are your fusion center analysts different from crime analysts?  Only four gave responses that may indicate that strategic analysis was being conducted.  Another question: What percentage of your analysts' time is spent on terrorist threat analysis?  Eleven of the twenty three fusion centers responded low or very low.75\nThe Arizona Counter Terrorism Information Center (AcTIC) has separate analyst components that perform the distinctly different functions of tactical investigative case support analysis and strategic trend or threat awareness analysis.  The tactical analyst unit has three analysts that perform analysis on active cases.  Also in the AcTIC, the Arizona Department of Public Safety has a strategic analysis component (with two analysts and plans for two additional analysts) that focuses on national and world events and trends, and how they may affect Arizona.  The AcTIC also houses the FBI's Field Investigative Group (FIG) and their strategic analysis unit.76\nThis data would suggest that identification of customer and customer needs is extremely important to determine not only the end product but the value of that product to the customer.  Needs identification will undoubtedly help focus mission and resource allocation within the fusion center as well as producing a usable product that will be of value to the identified customers. Note that the product need not be limited to strategic or tactical, and clearly can be both.  To assist in prioritization of work product and resource allocation, however, it would be important to know what was the primary expectation.\nMany of the fusion centers' employees who were interviewed for this thesis repeated the complaint that they were short-staffed and that without federal funding the fusion effort would be in jeopardy.  It would seem prudent to make a concerted effort to seek out the emergency responder administrators and elected officials to give them regular threat assessments and situational awareness briefings to demonstrate the value and capability of the unit.  They should also be made aware of, and encouraged to use, the tasking capability to have a strategic product prepared that is within the purview of the fusion center and is of concern to local officials.  This level of customer service and interaction will not only help educate administrators as to the usefulness of the fusion center, but also establish contacts and the beginnings of a network.  This increased interaction could lead to increased support and funding.\n\n## D. All Crimes Vs. Strictly Counterterrorist\n\nOne of the most topical issues related to fusion centers is the question of whether fusion centers should focus exclusively on terrorism, as opposed to engaging in a broader scope of all crimes and terrorism. (All crimes rarely means \"all crimes\" but is usually meant to be certain organized crimes or major crimes such as narcotics, crimes of violence and gangs, or crimes that may be used to support terrorism efforts here or abroad, such as financial crimes or fraud).  The original intent of fusion centers, as they first began to emerge after 9/11, was to focus explicitly on the threat of terrorism.  Since that time, the immediacy of the threat has faded and the trend has started to shift to an allcrimes approach.\nJerry Murphy, Director for Homeland Security at the Police Executive Research Foundation (PERF), asserts that, in part, the shift is driven by relevance and workload; there is just not enough purely terrorist actionable intelligence to justify all of the fusion centers that are in operation.  He also believes that a purely terrorist orientation would lead the centers to become irrelevant to local law enforcement, since the FBI has the primary counterterrorism role.77  With the exception of New York City, he would anticipate all of the other fusion centers to begin a shift toward an all-crimes approach.\nOther supporters of a purely terrorist orientation for fusion centers come from those fusion centers located in mega-communities with a high iconic value such as New York City and Los Angeles.  The survey of the four California RTTACs and the California State Terrorism Threat Assessment Center (STTAC) indicates that the majority of those centers, 60 percent, engage in an all-crimes perspective for fusion center operations.  One of the exclusively counterterrorist perspectives was Los Angeles, (noted with permission), which investigates and analyzes counterterrorist activity but also considers criminal activity with a terrorist nexus such as financial crimes (they maintain connectivity via the TLO program with officers in the various investigative units).  Due to their increased risk of attack and what is very likely a large volume of intelligence, it may be prudent for those mega communities to focus exclusively on counterterrorism. In something of a contradiction, which is an indication of the complexities associated with this question, 80 percent of the fusion centers identified themselves as \"all crimes\"\nin the interviews.\nA partial explanation may come from FBI Special Agent Oda, one of three co-managers of the LA RTTAC.  He objects to the GAO report, citing only a small number of fusion centers are focused on counterterrorism.  Oda notes that the Fusion\n\nCenter Guidelines recommend fusion centers consider an all-crimes perspective in order to more fully appreciate and gain information on the counterterrorism mission.  While the LA RTTAC does not supplant other investigative units' area of responsibility to investigate crime, they do consider a terrorist nexus to criminal activity.  They rely on interagency cooperation to provide them needed information.  Oda continues to say that LA RTTAC's mission is counterterrorism, complemented by reviews of other criminal activity.  Oda illustrates the point by stating that the vast majority of successful cases did not start out as a terrorist event but evolved from other criminal activity.78\nThe San Francisco Bay Area RTTAC operates an all-crimes fusion center, as does the Sacramento RTTAC.  The San Diego RTTAC does not operate in an allcrimes mode; it is a member of a fusion center that consists of the RTTAC, a Law Enforcement Coordination Center (LECC), and the FBI's Joint Terrorism Task Force. These three organizations form the fusion center.  The LECC main function is the operation of four intelligence teams that focus on narcotics, gangs, border issues, and financial crimes.  The LECC does not have a formal concept of operations or formalized information exchange mechanism with the RTTAC, but that is an identified problem that will be developed as the center matures.   The San Diego model will be worthwhile to observe as it develops.\nA consideration for determining whether a fusion center should be all crime, or purely counterterrorist, should be predicated on the immediate threat picture in which the fusion center is operating.  A majority of the state and local fusion centers have an all-crime perspective or mission in their fusion centers.  Twenty-three of thirty-six operational fusion centers that provided mission statements to the GAO had missions that involved collecting, analyzing and disseminating criminal as well as terrorism-related information.79  According to the GAO report, more than half of the fusion centers have an all-crime mission.\n\nPhil Bodenhorn, supervisor of the Sacramento FIG, takes the position that law enforcement has the mission to protect its citizens from harm.  He believes that local fusion center intelligence requirements can be written for local crime requirements, as well as for national security counterterrorism.  This will undoubtedly create a large list of requirements that must be distilled into a more precise list.  He believes that local law enforcement could manage this with training, written guides, and the use of terrorism liaison officers as a resource for officers in the field.80\nThe counterargument to the purely terrorism position is varied and robust.\nMost jurisdictions do not have enough activity that can be readily identified as exclusively terrorist to sustain a fully staffed fusion center.81  The survey data of California's fusion centers supported this assertion; 50 percent of the fusion centers felt that there was not enough purely counterterrorist activity to consistently support a fully staffed fusion center.  Only the most at-risk agencies would consider their jurisdiction to be sufficiently at risk of a terrorist attack that they would dedicate scarce resources to the sole effort of intelligence collection and analysis of a purely terrorist nature. Director Bettenhausen would agree that, in his opinion, there is not enough work in the fusion centers for strictly counterterrorism.  He adds that everyday crimes can turn up information, especially crimes that can support terrorist operations.  The public derives a benefit from the dual mission of conducting all crimes and counterterrorist analysis.82\nSheriff McGinness took the position that fusion centers should be allcrimes centers, noting that terrorist activity would be included in that category and clearly would be a priority.  He added that numerous high-profile crime and terrorist incidents had been solved by happenstance uniformed officer contacts; these contacts in general could potentially yield a significant amount of information.83  Chief Braziel weighed in on the issue unequivocally when he discussed the topic, saying that for local administrators to\ncontinue to support fusion centers, particularly when funding for them starts to disappear, they will have to fight crime, specifically major crimes or crimes that can have a terrorist nexus.84\nThe survey data also suggests that useable intelligence product would be lost if their center were to focus exclusively on counterterrorist activity.  Of the reporting fusion centers, half stated that there would \"usually\" or \"almost always\" be a loss of intelligence data.  Half of the respondents also felt that value to consumers would \"usually\" or \"almost always\" be reduced, and 25 percent felt that \"sometimes\" the value to consumer would be reduced.\nAnother potential hazard of following a purely terrorist approach is that if there were an insufficient level of meaningful work and analysts were not being challenged, not only would their skills erode but they might seek other opportunities.  It is already very difficult for fusion centers to meet their staffing requirements; analysts often leave if they find the work unrewarding.85   Chief Braziel made the observations that there was a need to keep analysts busy with real crime problems that are active in their area so their skills will remain sharp.  He offered prison gangs a one potential area of investigation.\nMany terrorists allegedly sustain themselves by petty criminal activity, which may be uncovered by officers on a routine contact.  It has been reported that many terrorist organizations support themselves through a variety of crimes including, but not limited to: identity theft, counterfeiting, financial crimes, fraud and narcotics.  If a fusion center were purely counterterrorist-oriented, many connections to criminal activity with a potential terrorist nexus would likely go uncovered or unreported; seemingly innocuous bits of information may go unrecognized.\nA counterargument to the terrorist as a petty criminal is presented by the work of Marc Sageman. He makes the case that the evidence does not support the frequent proclamation that terrorists (specifically what he terms global Salafi terrorists) engage in criminal activity to advance their cause.86\n\nMost large and midsize state and local fusion centers are supported by local law enforcement who will expect some intelligence product that is locally actionable as part of a quid pro quo.  In the survey, the fusion centers reported that they felt that support from parent agencies would \"sometimes\" be reduced if the fusion center did not have an all-crime perspective.  If fusion centers are to be self-sustaining, they will need to demonstrate value to local officials and gain their goodwill and support.\nProducing a product that is timely, relevant and locally actionable will advance this cause.\nThe crimes that these fusion centers tend to focus on outside of terrorism are those that are serious or organized criminal enterprises.  The most prevalent are narcotics, money laundering, counterfeiting, financial crimes, crimes of violence and gangs.  Financial crimes and gang activity were investigated at a significantly higher level than the other crimes.\nAddressing serious crime problems will help the fusion center garner support in the event of a need for local funding, or even sustained federal funding.  Brian Banning takes the position that one way for fusion centers to show value is to \"catch a bad guy.\"   This could be done with small investigative teams that would work tips the JTTF could not get to in a timely fashion or had passed on.  These may be terrorist threats or major criminal cases.  This team would work these cases as far as they could go.  He feels some locally generated successes will go a long way to gain local and federal support for the fusion centers.  He would also argue for a computer forensic capability within each fusion center.  It is impossible to know if any terrorist intent exists in many criminal cases without opening up a computer.87\n\n\n## E. Prioritization\n\nIn addition to prioritizing what level or amount of work is to be done between the strategic analysis and tactical case support categories, the fusion centers must have a system of prioritizing or triaging tips and leads.  All of the tips and leads should get some level of at least a cursory review; however, the degree to which each tip or lead is pursued should undergo some sort of evaluative process. Indeed, without some sort of screening process or triage, fusion center intake could become overwhelmed and wholly ineffective.\nOne system of triaging tips and leads to ascertain a weighted score for investigation priority was advanced by Raphael Brinner, an analyst for the U.S. Coast Guard.  Brinner presented his model to the RTTAC Analyst Training Conference in Monterey California.      In a brief overview of his model, as yet unpublished (presented here with permission), Brinner highlights the relationship between threats, vulnerabilities and incidents with individual domains in Venn diagrams.  A full treatment of the model is beyond the scope of this thesis, but is presented as an area that should be addressed by fusion centers.  The USCG approach is to measure suspicion using their MEDS\n(Minimal, Elevated, Demonstrated, Strong) threat rating system using the objectives of:\n1. highlight anomalies; 2. keep routine activity in perspective; 3. apply rigor to a subjective process.  Key issues are to recognize your biases, set the activity in the local contexts, individual incidents are poor metrics (the sample size is too small), and local trends are more important that national trends (except for the aviation industry).  Finally, triage, objective language, and investigation will give data context and meaning.88\nWith a triaging system in place, priority investigations can be targeted at the tips that are associated with known vulnerabilities, linked to suspected threats and involve incidents that are suspicious anomalies.\n\n\n## 3. Leadership\n\nAs has already been stated the literature is very weak or silent on the issue of who should lead fusion centers.  This may be because the federal government is sensitive to the concerns of local control and is unwilling to enter into a political arena that may be fraught with controversy; or it may be that - due to the varying needs and organizational structure of the state and local fusion centers - management, or more importantly leadership, is not fully developed in the aforementioned documents.  In all likelihood, it is a combination of the two.  As has been documented in numerous studies, however, the success or failure of any new venture, particularly a collaboration of different entities with different cultures, requires strong (not autocratic) leadership.  The leader must be able to instill a vision and have the ability to translate that vision into several different dialects, if you will, to be able to talk to fire, law, public health etc.\n\nA leader taking on this type of challenge must be able to not only build and maintain relationships but intuit what relationships are necessary but do not, as yet, exist. This will necessitate establishing common modes of communication, but more importantly, creating a common desire or identification of a need to communicate -\nwhich will be made more even more difficult in light of the phenomena of the fading threat created by the length of time since we were successfully attacked.  Such a leader will require an abundance of trust, competence and credibility.  Successfully managing a fusion center into the future will require more than an intelligence professional or a skillful manager, it will require a leader with excellent networking skills.\nThe vast majority of fusion centers have statewide responsibility. According to the CRS July 2007 report, many were originally state police agencies that were given an additional task of intelligence production, making them the fusion center.  It is not a great deductive leap to make the conjecture that state intelligence centers or state law enforcement centers would be hierarchical in nature and lead with a top-down perspective.  The regional fusion centers, which were less than 20 percent of the total number of fusion centers, were generally those that were located in UASI cities.  The CRS report found that these regional fusion centers were more likely than the state counterparts to have multiple agencies \"involved in their development in day-to-day operational management.\"89  If leadership, guided by networked relationships, is truly beneficial, the regional fusion centers that were forced into collaborative relationships in the developmental stages of their emergence may well prove to be the beneficiaries of necessity.\nIt will be the burden of state agencies to move from the comfort of the known and entrenched style of leadership to adopt a truly collaborative and inclusive leadership style that will embrace a network philosophy.  It will not be easy to give up total control but, in a catastrophic event, no one will have control and no single entity will have a chance of responding adequately.  A diverse and reflexive network will be a necessity to respond to the threats of the future.\n\n## B. Analysts\n\nStaffing the fusion center is a critical function that is often overlooked or not adequately considered.  The analysts selected to work in the fusion center must be selected on the basis of ability, capability and the mission of the center.  Basically, two categories of analyst are assigned to fusion centers. The first is crime analysts (tactical) who generally have a law enforcement background. The second is intelligence analysts (strategic) who generally have a background in either the military or a federal intelligence service.  Both require a level of training, education and expertise, but have distinctly different orientations in their approach and expertise.  Intelligence analysts frequently have a higher level of formal education and perform predictive strategic assessments;\ncrime analysts generally have more experience in case support and link analysis, and perform tactical or case support.\nFrom the IC's perspective, a strategic analyst, as described by Phil Bodenhorn, is one who has a level of subject matter expertise that has been gained with years of experience.  Strategic analysts must work from a basis of hypothesis and very often must rely on sketchy information that must be qualified by their domain of expertise and knowledge of all aspects of the threat.  This level of knowledge is required to make predications and assign degrees of confidence, which can take on the quality of peering into a \"crystal ball.\" This level of experience gives them the moral courage to make assessments - and stand by them. Conversely, some analysts do research on after-thefact crimes or an incident; this is investigative research, not intelligence analysis.90\nFrequently, sworn law enforcement officers and firefighters are chosen to function as fusion analysts.  Often, these officers have little training or background for this position.  The type of personality that is drawn into the field of law enforcement or firefighting is not generally consistent with the type of personality that is willing to sit at a desk all day and read copious amounts of material from disparate sources, recognizing patterns and integrating them into a potential threat pattern.  That is a special skill that requires aptitude and training.  We need to recognize and hire staff to that end.   That is not to say that certain law enforcement officers, fire fighters or other emergency responders cannot make good analysts, just that the ability to be a professional intelligence analyst has a special skill set, experience and aptitude.  Robert Galarneau, comanager of the LA RTTAC, gives his perspective on the issue of law enforcement analysts stating, \"The more difficult analyst to work with is the law enforcement analysts. Cops as analysts are in an uncommon role and the transition is often difficult.  Cops want to do things.\"91\nAnother perspective on the issue is presented by Sheriff McGinness.  Having specially trained analysts to provide continuity and historical perspective is useful and necessary; however, Sheriff McGinness also takes the position that having a law enforcement presence in the analyst pool adds value to the fusion process - and to the organization when the officer returns to his or her agency.  The knowledge and skill gained in that assignment can have a beneficial effect on the organization.92\nUnlike some fusion centers, the Arizona AcTIC does not use any law enforcement or other emergency responder personnel as analysts.  The analyst role is strictly a civilian position with its own career path.  All of the analysts in the tactical analyst section of AcTIC have a minimum of a BA. Degree and, as part of the hiring process, candidates are tested on analytical thinking.93\nCrime analysts require a professional background and training that cannot be accomplished with a two-year rotation common to many sworn law enforcement and firefighter analysts assigned to fusion centers.  Further exacerbating the problem, of having rotating analysts, is the issue of clearances.  To be effective, one must have access to classified databases. These are generally controlled by the FBI, who has the jurisdiction to investigate crimes of terrorism.  Access to these databases cannot be granted without a top-secret, secure, compartmentalized information (TS SCI) clearance. From the date of application, it takes approximately one to two years to gain this clearance (it has been reported that this timeframe is being driven down to as fast as nine months in some jurisdictions).94  Given the time it takes to select, train and obtain a clearance for an analyst, if a fusion center were to rely on sworn officers or anyone else that must rotate on a two- to three-year basis, one can be certain that the effectiveness of the analytical capability of that fusion center will be significantly degraded.  If a fusion center has a rotation or retention issue with analytical staff, they will perpetually be in training, pending a clearance, and lacking any historical perspective.\n\nTo illustrate the point the LA RTTAC has approximately nineteen analysts.  Ten of them are from LASO or LAPD.  They have lost nine analysts in the past year-and-ahalf due to turnover.  It takes about nine months to get an analyst a top-secret clearance, and then they have to train them on the databases and the process of intelligence.  They are perpetually in the training mode.95  As reported in the survey data, of the five California fusion centers, two of them had less than 50 percent of their staff with\n\nclearances to access classified databases, and two more had between 50 and 75 percent of their staff with access to classified databases.\nA confidential source, with ten years of experience in the intelligence analysis field, gave the opinion that the vast majority of the analysts in the fusion centers in the RTTAC and the STTAC were crime analysts and lacked the experience, education and skill set of an intelligence analyst.  This was chiefly borne out in their product, which lacked both quality and quantity.  The significant issue was that the products reported observations but did not produce an analysis of the observations or predictions.  The products were too few and lacked recommendations that could direct policy.  The source praised the fusion center analysts, which were primarily criminal analysts, for their criminal or tactical case support.  It was felt that much more experience and education was needed before these criminal analysts could be considered intelligence analysts.  It was also acknowledged that there was less call for \"strategic\" analysts by the current caseload.  The majority of the analytical work was accomplished at the tactical case support level, which was where the majority of the analysts had their greatest strengths. The sources also mentioned that a lack of threat data inhibited the depth of their work product.\nThe question was also raised as to whether there was enough demonstrated benefit to sustain the fusion centers if they did not produce some material benefit for an identified customer base, considering the high cost of operation.96\n\n## 1. Training\n\nAccording to the survey, three of the five fusion centers had over 76 percent of their staff trained in intelligence analysis.  One of the fusion centers only had 26-50 percent of staff trained in intelligence analysis, but it is still in the developmental stages. The most commonly reported training that the analysts received was the Foundations of Intelligence Analysis Training (FIAT) from the International Association of Law Enforcement Intelligence Analysts (IALEIA), which is a non-profit professional organization dedicated to advance law enforcement intelligence analysis.  The other major provider of analyst training is the Law Enforcement Intelligence Unit (LEIU). LEIU is an association formed to promote criminal intelligence analysis; as laudable as their goal, they have no mandate to enforce or sanction for a lack of standards.\nThe issue of requirements for training is dependent on the type of analyst one is considering.  The educational requirements that the intelligence community in the FBI or DHS considers qualified for an intelligence analyst is at a bare minimum, a bachelor's degree in a targeted major and most likely a masters degree or Ph.D., with some work experience, and possibly language abilities or cultural experience.  Training programs for these individuals exist within the FBI and CIA, but these programs focus on honing existing skills.  Analytical training for criminal analysts would require much less formal education, but many of the same skills in critical thinking; these requirements are in addition to the ability to conduct tactical case support utilizing link analysis and other investigative tools.\n\nIn the informal phone survey conducted by the Sacramento Joint Powers Authority, the twenty-one fusion centers that responded to the survey identified analytical skills and writing skills as the area where their analysts needed the most improvement. Eighteen of the twenty-one centers stated that their analysts had received some training in analytical thinking and analytical tools.  The training that was identified as most needed included: analytical skills, terrorism fundamentals, report and analytical writing.  Other identified training needs included identifying reportable intelligence, intelligence methodologies, open-source exploitation, anticipating law enforcement needs,\nadvanced research skills, and analytic tools.97\nWhat is lacking is a government-sanctioned analyst training program to standardize training regimen and requirements (this comment is not to infer in any way that either of the above organizations is anything other than professional).  However,\nthese professional organizations would benefit from having the support of a government agency with adequate funding, rather than relying on nonprofit status or other means to support this necessary training.\nThis sentiment is reinforced by RTTAC co-manager FBI Special Agent Steve Oda when he makes the observation that we do not have a robust national training program to take people from an undergraduate degree to a trained analyst.  The FBI and DHS have training that can take an existing analyst with a master's degree or Ph.D. and develop those skills. But no program currently exists to take someone from undergraduate to analyst of a standard recognized by the intelligence community.  Steve Oda went on to say that one or two quality analysts make a tremendous impact within the fusion center.98\nBrian Banning, the former Deputy Commander of the Sacramento RTTAC, felt that the crime or tactical analysts were very well-trained; in fact, he described them as the most trained group he has ever worked around.  He added that the training lacked standardization, but that efforts appeared to be underway between the major providers to establish formal standards.  Banning took the same position as others in identifying two distinct groups of analysts - the tactical versus the intelligence or strategic analyst.  He identified the intelligence analyst as being capable of looking at geopolitical trends and applying that perspective to our region to make predictions on local potential for groups or individuals.  He noted that there is a difference in the product between the two groups of analysts.99\nThe confidential source also felt as though there was plenty of good criminal analyst training available, there was very little \"all source\" strategic analyst training available, outside of Washington DC.  The source felt that there is no identifiable vehicle for local analysts to gain the necessary training to become a strategic, all-source\nintelligence analyst.  It was recommended that perhaps mobile training teams from accredited training facilities in Washington, DC, provide the necessary training to upgrade local analysts' skills.100\nAnalysts, strategic analysis in particular, must be able to articulate how likely they think a thing is and to what degree they have confidence in their assessment.  In other words, they need to be able to say something along the lines of, \"We think it is very likely that this is going to happen,\" with a high degree of confidence, or say that \"we feel that this is very unlikely, but we have a low degree of confidence.\"  Strategic analysts need to be able to have confidence in the accuracy of their opinions.  This is so because their assessments are judgments, not fact, and they need to be able to withstand political pressure to manipulate the outcome of their assessments.  Analysts need to have the courage of their convictions and the character to stand by them, even when pressured to\n\"re-evaluate\" their assessment.  Appropriate education, not just training, will help provide the needed confidence.\nOne complaint - commonly brought up throughout all the interviews related to analysts and their training - was the accessibility of databases.  It is not unusual for an analyst to have to run over fifty different databases to complete an investigative check on a tip or a lead.  There are efforts underway (Cop Link) to integrate the various jurisdictions' record management systems so that one query could run all the databases. Everyone queried on this point energetically supported this concept.  It was also discovered that a civilian contract analyst retired from law enforcement  with a top-secret, secure compartmentalized information clearance (TS SCI) could not access the California law enforcement teletype system (CLETS), but a entry-level clerk in any law enforcement agency would have unrestricted access to the same database.101\n\n## C. Intelligence Dissemination\n\nDissemination has two distinct and very important components. The first is who it is disseminated to, the second is how it is disseminated.  Possession of intelligence has no value unless that intelligence gets to people who can put it to use.  Therefore, it is important for intelligence to reach as wide a range of personnel as possible without compromising the integrity of that information, particularly sources and methods.  There is some controversy in the emergency responder community about the dissemination of unclassified information.\nMany documents are prepared and released at the Law Enforcement Sensitive level (LES) while others are prepared and released at the For Official Use Only level\n(FOUO).  The distinction is that firefighters and other non-law enforcement emergency responder partners will be unable to receive LES distributions, while all in the ER community should be clear to receive FOUO information. The release of material at the LES level has caused some dissension between the fire and law communities.\nThree main issues are raised in the FOUO/LES controversy.   The first issue is need to know; the producers of some intelligence product feel some information that they produce should be restricted to law enforcement on a need-to-know basis to protect aspects of the inquiry or investigation.  The counterargument is that LES distribution is so widely disseminated, with no true legal controls, that this information is compromised as soon as it is disseminated.\nThe second issue is one of cultural differences between law enforcement and fire personnel.  The argument goes that law enforcement is more familiar with investigations and the need for secrecy and confidentiality, whereas fire personnel who have not been exposed to the cultural need for secrecy are less concerned with controlling the access of information to unauthorized recipients.  This position is generally supported by anecdotal reports, which can cite violations in either camp.  An illustration is the position held by Tim Johnstone, Sacramento RTTAC Commander, when he said that we needed to vet the product to the audience.  Cops will continue to get a higher degree of information and intelligence, and there will be a need to scrub intelligence for fire to get what they need without worrying about the loss of secrets.  He also noted that it was just a function of education and time before the fire personnel were where they needed to be on information security and control.   He also cited an incident in which a fire department employee released a FOUO document to the local press, which caused some concern and tension.  The problem was addressed and has not recurred.102\nThe third issue is created by what is called *originator control*.  This is the principle that if an agency or entity produces and disseminates information or intelligence at a certain level, that information or intelligence cannot be disseminated at a lower level.\nTherefore, if a local agency receives information at the LES level, they have no recourse but to honor that level of classification and disseminate at the same level.  It is possible to go back to the originator for permission to re-class.  This is a timely process, however, and a rare occurrence, as most information is time-sensitive.\n\nGreg Ladas, TLO administrator for the Sacramento RTTAC, agrees that these issues cause problems with dissemination.  The Sacramento RTTAC Fire and Law TLOs currently receive e-mail distributions of intelligence, but they are on different lists to respect the handling caveats associated with different distribution levels, specifically LES and FOUO.  Ladas stated that even though there are not legal sanctions the intelligence community is one of trust, and if a center does not respect the handling caveats they will be shut off from further intelligence.  A common problem with dissemination, most frequently associated with federal documents (although the problem is widespread), is the dual labeling of a document with LES and FOUO.  This dual labeling precludes the dissemination of this product to anyone other than law enforcement, which restricts the audience and potential effectiveness.\nAnother related problem that is frequently cited is that of over-classification of documents.  Ladas mentioned that this is a common problem, which he attributes to misunderstanding the need or audience; also, a fear of classifying a document too low leads some to automatically classify at the higher level.103\n\nThe survey data gives weight to the need to resolve this controversy.  Two of the five fusion centers produce between 25 and 50 percent of their product at the LES level, and a third fusion center produced 50 to 75 percent of their product at the LES level.  The remaining two fusion centers produce between 10 and 25 percent of their product at the LES level.  It is clear that a great deal of information is being produced and disseminated at the LES level.  It would be in the best interest of an \"information sharing environment\" to minimize LES dissemination unless it is absolutely called for.   While there is a need for LES products, guidelines for the decision to disseminate at the LES level vs. the FOUO level should be developed and enforced so that this classification is not being used out of habit or out of cultural bias.\n\n## This Page Intentionally Left Blank Iv. Analysis Of Current Practices For Data Collection\n\nA great deal has been written about fusion centers and the need to involve our emergency responder community, particularly law enforcement.  Much less has been written about how we are actually going to engage this community of responders.  What is clear is that for local fusion centers to produce locally relevant and actionable product, they will need to gain as complete a picture as possible, which will require the collection of information by local emergency responders.  This information may be the result of a vehicle stop, a community contact, a building inspection, or an emergency medical response.  The ER community needs to be aware that it has the \"duty as assigned\" to be observant for \"indicators,\" and then relay that information.\nThe majority of recent attempts by radical jihadist terrorists were the result of a domestic cell.  These threats come in many forms, such as radicalized prisoners, homegrown jihadists motivated by the al Qaeda ideology, environmental terrorists, and a host of single-issue terrorists such as Timothy McVeigh.  Both the federal partners and the state and local partners have significant contributions to make toward providing for the collective security of the homeland.  These partnerships will be optimized by personal networks and collaborative partnerships that reduce and/or eliminate duplication, and, by relying on each other's strengths, produce a far better prevention posture than that which could be accomplished independently.\n\nWhile there are hundreds of thousands of law enforcement officers across the country, we must not be blinded to the potential contribution of the rest of the emergency responder community, particularly fire, EMS and public health.  Also, law enforcement must overcome the bias that they alone have the absolute responsibility and obligation for the domestic protection of the nation.  The fire service particularly, but also the medical field, public health and the many other disciplines within the emergency responder community possess a wide variety of opportunities for interaction and intelligence collection.  It will take more than inclusion by the law enforcement community to exploit these resources.  The culture of many of these resources is geared toward patient privacy and is counter to intelligence or information collection.  This area requires attention and education.\n\n## A. Emergency Responders\n\nData collection for emergency responders is an under-appreciated and underutilized resource.  Homeland Security strategies are resplendent with references for the need to have law enforcement and other responder disciplines collect information, but there is little concrete or readily available data to show where or how that is being done. That this is important, there can be little doubt; what is in doubt is how to achieve this end and what results have been garnered with what programs.\nIf one accepts the premise that data collection for ERs, from either an all crimes or purely terrorist (transnational or domestic) perspective can support the protection of our country or materially assist in a prevention mode, then one must look to what methods are best utilized to collect this data.  Law enforcement has the distinction of generally having primacy in the role of managing fusion centers, as well as participating in other aspects of the counterterrorist effort on the domestic home front.  Even with that perspective, law enforcement still faces the challenge of reporting relevant information in a timely fashion that may lead to the interdiction or disruption of a terrorist act or plot.\nTo rectify the situation, the ER community needs to be sold on the *value* of local fusion centers and the value added potential that they posses, as well as the *need* to be observant, have sufficient *situational awareness* to be aware of what to report and have appropriate *reporting mechanisms*.  A re-occurring theme, that has played itself out several times, is to create a need amongst the emergency responder community that their input has value, and indeed, may be necessary.  Many sources have cited terrorism fatigue - or the long gap in time since our last domestic attack - as a potential causal factor for the ER community to be less than diligent in their observations of potential terrorist activity and/or reporting it.\n\n\n\n## 1. Value Of Er Data Collection\n\nThe results from survey clearly show that fusion centers receive the majority of their source data from local agencies.  The survey also reported that 80 percent of the fusion centers felt that the ER community is not being appropriately utilized as a data source. FBI's Steve Oda, LA RTTAC co-manager, supports these conclusions stating that the value of the ER data collection is huge and that to collect local ER data, the LA RTTAC utilizes the TLO program, which is a big priority within the RTTAC.  Oda feels the TLO program was very much a work-in-progress as were, probably, most others.  He believes that the RTTAC was undoubtedly missing out on intelligence and that to counter that they are engaging in a vigorous education program, attempting to recruit and train more TLOs, formalizing the training, creating more outreach, particularly outside the county of LA, and finally, redoubling their efforts to ensure feedback to those reporting information.  One way they have done this has been to assign every tip a tracking number to ensure feedback and to enhance the ability to connect follow-up tips.104\nThe value of ER data collection was also underscored in the recent analyst training in Monterey.  The group consensus of the analysts attending the training was that the analysts assigned to the RTTAC and the STTAC could not produce an intelligence estimate for California because they lack sufficient threat data.  One of the key areas that they felt they were lacking was data from the field.  The non-reported incidents were felt to be a significant area that created a hole in the threat picture.105\nPhil Bodenhorn, FBI FIG supervisor, reinforces the need for first responders to collect data that he describes as \"crucial.\" He goes on to describe first responders more as \"first preventers\" who need to be made aware of standing intelligence requirements in order to maximize the opportunity to gain as much information as possible, declaiming\n\"our net work must be theirs.\"106\n\n## 2. Establishing A Need\n\nThere is the appearance of a sense of complacency that has settled over the country, due in part to the gap in attacks, and also, in many respects, to the fact that local administrators, and the ER community as a whole, may feel that a terrorist event will not occur in their jurisdiction.  Even in the law enforcement community, which is arguably more prone to supporting and reporting terrorist-related activity, there has been a deficit in any feeling or understanding of the *need* to report terrorist activity.  In fact, many chief executives of law enforcement agencies have expressed the desire for greater\nintelligence on criminal gang activity in their jurisdiction rather than that of counterterrorist information.107\nThat a threat continues to exist is, as some have called it, a predictable surprise.\nThe eventuality of an attack is almost certain, but the where and the how are unknown. This position is supported by Brian Jenkins, in his testimony before the House of Representatives when he said:\nBut, we have not prevented jihadist leaders from communicating, blunted their message, or effectively countered their ability to radicalize and recruit angry young men.  Our attention must the shift to local conspiracies, which may operate below our intelligence radar.  This increases the importance of domestic intelligence-collection and the role of local police.108\nTo establish an acceptable level of \"need\" within the ER community, homeland security professionals will have to educate the public, administrators and the ER\ncommunity without creating a sense of fear or foreboding.  This education should also incorporate a realistic expectation of homeland security prevention and not entrap the protection mission with the myth of being able to stop all attacks.  Everything is subject to prioritization and we cannot let terrorists bankrupt our economies or our way of life by trying to prevent every foreseeable eventuality.\nIt is also appropriate to recognize and address the need for ER administrators to enhance their information sharing and investigative capabilities in regional threats such as gangs, narcotics, financial crimes and other major types of crime impacting local communities.  Chief Braziel expands on this by offering known threats that have a regional base of operations and are a physical threat to the community.  He feels that a regional and targeted gang analysis, by the fusion center, would generate a sense of need and involvement from the line-level law enforcement officers and their administrators.\nThis base of support and success could be used to further counter terrorist efforts by demonstrating a locally actionable product.109\n\n## 3. Situational Awareness\n\nOne way to demonstrate the need described above is to educate elected officials, ER administrators and the ER community on situational awareness.    Hand-in-hand with developing a need to report is knowing *what* to report.  Having too much data reported can be as bad, and maybe worse, than not enough data.  It would be counter-productive to create a suspicious atmosphere, in place of an informed one, that encouraged stereotypical reporting.  Ill-informed reporting may not only overwhelm the system, but alienate those that have done no wrong, creating fear and mistrust in those we want most to trust us.  The ER community needs to be educated about what pre-incident indicators are, with examples, and gain an overall situational perspective on terrorist operational methodology so that they may be alert for behavior, literature, or items of interest.\nThe vast majority of ERs will notice whether something is amiss; we just need to provide them enough education to give context or form to what they are seeing.   The level of education that we are speaking about will not require a significant amount of time; what is required is enough information to give the emergency responder community confidence to report suspicious behavior.  The ER community, particularly the non law enforcement community, needs to recognize that forwarding a tip is not an indictment, and that no onus is attached if an observation turns out to be merely innocent behavior. Situational awareness training can be provided in one-day classes, seminars, roll-call training or online, and need not be done all at one time.  Indeed, this education should be considered a perishable skill and refreshed, perhaps annually.  The training could be reinforced with the use of terrorism liaison officers, which will be discussed below.\n\nAs has been reported the evidence from the survey indicates that the lack of situational awareness by the ER community is a problem.   Lt. Johnstone, Sacramento RTTAC commanders' observations on his assessment of the regions situational awareness are evident in his comment: the situational awareness for law enforcement is at a bare-bones level.  And it's even worse for the emergency responder community.110\n\n## 4. Reporting Mechanism\n\nIt is interesting to note that the responders to the survey stated that reporting mechanisms are available and user-friendly, and that there is potentially valuable information residing in the ER community, but that the ER community seems to be failing to take advantage of reporting opportunities.  It is quite possible that the reporting system is not as user-friendly, available or widely known as the fusion center managers had hoped. (It is also likely that poor situational awareness has contributed to the underreporting).\nOnce a member of the ER community has information that he or she feels should be reported, he or she can use one of several methods to report potential terrorist activity. Currently, most tips can be reported on 800 numbers, fusion center-sponsored websites, terrorism liaison officers (if one exists in your agency), a terrorism early warning group (if one is available to you), via the normal reporting procedure in your local law enforcement agency, or directly to any FBI field office or agent.\nDue to the specialized nature of terrorism, many of the earlier versions or methods of reporting terrorism were conducted along the lines of social networks.  While social networks are critical, they need to be bolstered with sufficient technology to ensure rapid and seamless reporting that does not rely on an individual, which may become a single point of failure in the reporting chain.  During the course of conducting interviews for this thesis, it was reported that a tip from a TLO was left on a desk and was not acted on until after the subject, who was on a watch list, left the country.\nTwo of the fusion centers, the Los Angeles JRIC (RTTAC) and the Northern California RTTAC both have websites that have a link to a tip and lead form that can be filled out online and sent in to the fusion center.  This method appears to be working well and has great promise and capability, including the capability for the public to send in tips or leads.  One problem with this is that the local TLO officer will very likely not have any information on activity that may be happening and reported on in his or her area of responsibility.\nThe Sacramento RTTAC currently uses the TLO program as their primary means of conducting education and awareness about the program, as well as relaying tips and leads from the field to the fusion center.  One problem with this is, as stated above, this can create a single point of failure.  If the TLO that the officers are used to working with is on vacation, takes days off, or transfers, that information may not be relayed in a timely fashion, or at all.  The Sacramento RTTAC is exploring a website reporting systems similar to the Northern California and the LA RTTAC's system.\nAnother problem common to most reporting mechanisms is how does one report suspicious activity to one's own investigative unit as well as to the fusion center?  If the tip is not obviously terrorism, merely suspicious, but is clearly a violation of the law, a\nfinancial crime for example, how would one report that information so that both agencies remain aware of the potential crime? Also, how does one remove the conflict for the potential for duplication of investigations and interfering with each other's investigation?\nAn additional problem is that law enforcement officers and others in the ER community may reduce their level of reporting if they have to report the same information multiple times to different entities.\n\nClosing the loop on reporting tips and leads to the RTTAC is feedback from the RTTAC to the tipster.  Each of the RTTAC commanders that were interviewed felt strongly about getting feedback to the emergency responder (generally fire or law) that made the referral.  While not all had a formal process, it was a matter of standard operating procedure to acknowledge those who provided information.  The LA RTTAC has a unit whose responsibility it is to perform this function, the Investigative Liaison Unit.  The LA RTTAC also publishes a weekly \"Tips and Leads\" sheet that shows what tips have come in as a way to share information and generate interest, as well as acknowledgement.111\n\n## B. Data Collection 1. Terrorism Liaison Officer (Tlo) Programs\n\nIf fusion centers are to operate as effectively as they can, they will need to have timely data that is collected locally.  One method would be to use the law enforcement or emergency responder community as data collectors.  That raises the question: How do you train an entire police force, nationwide, on pre-incident indicators? How do you keep those perishable skills current in an environment that will rarely allow the officer to practice what he or she has been taught?  One answer is the TLO program, which provides for a few officers to receive in-depth and recurring training to function as a resource or a point of contact for other officers in his or her department.\n\n## A. Overview Of Sacramento Rttac Tlos\n\nThe Sacramento Regional Office of Homeland Security (SROHS) and the Sacramento RTTAC facilitated a forty-hour training course for TLOs within the RTTACs region (34 counties & 88,000 square miles) that hundreds of officers attended.  One year after the program, the RTTAC was still receiving a minimal number of tips or leads from the officers that had undergone the training.  A complete review of the training and program was conducted.  The training course itself was judged to be superior (although some modest changes were made to the course). The training program consisted of a fiveday overview and situational awareness of domestic and transnational terrorist methodologies and ideology.  The course content was thorough, well received and well rated.\nAn objective review of the program revealed several shortcomings.  First, the TLO training was rolled out ahead of the TLO program itself.  Secondly, agency administrators within the RTTAC region were largely unaware of the program, did not know the benefits of the program or what the expectation for their participation might be, or, what level of commitment would be expected.  Third, the training was announced via the normal training announcement system, and officers self-selected to go to the training without administrative support or time commitments.  Fourth, what was not included in the curriculum was how the TLOs were to operate within their own agencies or in relation to the RTTAC.  What had been done gave the officers a fine orientation on terrorism and then sent them back to their agencies without adequate support or operational instruction.  According to Tim Johnstone, the RTTAC Commander, training had been provided to 475 TLOs without adequate forethought, as a knee jerk response to the need to provide and collect intelligence.  A re-organization was in order.\nThe Sacramento RTTAC collaborated with the U.S. Attorney's Office training coordinator for the U. S. Eastern District for California, Jim Day.  Jim Day had spent the majority of his career in the thirty-four counties of the RTTAC jurisdiction and knew almost every chief of police and sheriff in that region.  With his assistance, the RTTAC, represented by Lt. Tim Johnstone, Sergeant Greg Ladas, and Jim Day scheduled appointments to meet with the chiefs of police and sheriffs in virtually every jurisdiction within thirty-four counties to explain the program, its potential benefits and the level of commitment (which was minimal) that would be required for their agency to participate.\nBecause of this level of personal outreach, the program was well received and a much greater degree of commitment and involvement was gained from the law enforcement executives.  The head of each law enforcement agency that was participating in the TLO\nprogram was asked to nominate a candidate.   This way, it was felt, the TLO program would have a greater buy-in from the agencies, since they had a direct hand in selecting the personnel that would become the TLO officers and represent their agency.  And, perhaps more importantly, it was expected that agency heads would nominate a candidate that they had confidence in, and they would be able to fulfill the role of liaison to the agency's administrators, in addition to acting as a point of contact and reference for frontline officers.  In support of this, Greg Ladas stated that agency heads would often say something similar to: I didn't know this person was a TLO; he is not a good fit for our agency.  Once personal contact was made, and expectations and commitments were made clear, the program support increased appreciably.\nThe original TLO training course was forty hours.  The course was shortened to twenty-four hours and a separate, stand-alone one-day course was added to the program.  The one-day course consisted of an orientation to the TLO program and it trained the officers on how to function as a TLO.  The roles and responsibilities of the position were outlined and they were given guidance in how to liaison with their administrators, how to interact with the line level officers, and how to interact with the RTTAC.  The TLOs received training in the handling of sensitive information and in reporting tips and leads.  The role of the Sacramento TLO was to be a point of contact and a resource for the line officers, conduct roll call training, be a conduit to relay tips and leads from the officers to the TLO coordinator (who in turn relays that information to the RTTAC), and act as a liaison to their agency in matters regarding terrorism.  Prior to the training, the RTTAC had sent out a form for each agency executive to nominate the TLO; these had to be provided to RTTAC at the time of TLO training.  The TLOs were also required to sign a nondisclosure agreement stating that they would handle the FOUO and Law Enforcement Sensitive (LES) information as had been instructed in class.\n\nThe reporting system for tips and leads in the Sacramento RTTAC\nconsists of officers or line-level personnel who discover information that does not require an immediate response to report that information to the TLO. (Each county will have at least one TLO coordinator and several TLOs).  The TLO will report tips and leads to the TLO coordinator who will then relay that information to the RTTAC.\n\nTLOs were also encouraged to establish terrorism early-warning groups\n(TEWG) within their counties.  They received basic information on the TEWG concept, with more training scheduled for the future.  TLOs were also encouraged to attend, and offered priority reservations, for training in the Automated Critical Asset Management System (ACAMS) and the Enhanced Threat and Risk Assessment (ETRA) class.  Once the TLOs receive this training, they will be encouraged to conduct ACAMS assessments in their jurisdictions on critical infrastructure.  The RTTAC maintains a list of critical infrastructure locations that will help TLOs identify and prioritize sites that need assessments.\nThe Sacramento RTTAC TLO program is approximately six months into this re-organization.  While the program still has some hurdles to overcome, there has been a noticeable increase, not only in the quality, but in the quantity of tips and leads.112\nThe Sacramento RTTAC has a re-vitalized Fire TLO program underway as well.  Sacramento Metro Fire Bn Chief Mark Wells and Captain Scott Cockrum have formed a working group to determine what information fire administrators and firefighters need, and how best to relay that information.  The group is also developing a reporting format for firefighters to forward tips and leads to the RTTAC.  Currently, the system is informal and handled on a case-by-case basis.  By involving the fire community in identifying their own needs and procedures, a greater degree of involvement and support is anticipated.  They are also reviewing the consumption potential for the firefighters and administrators. At what rate, and how much intelligence is needed, and how will it best be assimilated are the issues they are dealing with.113  Most fire departments also have HIPPA issues, as many of their personnel are also EMS and have additional reporting restrictions (which will be discussed below).\nThe Public Health Department, which has representatives co-located in the same facility as the RTTAC, is in the very beginning stages of developing a TLO\nprogram in the public health EMS/medical field.  This program will establish a TEWG within the public health/medical community.\nOne of the identified shortcomings of the Sacramento TLO program is the reliance on the TLOs as a conduit for the tips and leads from the officers making observations to the TLO coordinator and to the RTTAC.  First, information is fourth hand by the time it gets to the RTTAC.  Secondly, the reporting system is a single chain of individuals with no redundant or back-up reporting mechanism.  Any point in the chain could be a point of failure and the information would not be received.  In the event a TLO or TLO coordinator was on vacation, had days off, was unmotivated or overloaded with other duties, the potential for a tip or lead to be delayed, misplaced or simply not forwarded is quite likely.  Third, turnover of TLOs, due to rotation of assignments and promotions, will make it difficult for the line officers to know exactly who their TLO is at any given time.  The turnover issue will also make it difficult to keep an adequate number of TLOs to facilitate the unimpeded flow of information.\n\nA recognized potential solution would be a web-based reporting system similar to that which the Los Angeles RTTAC (LA JRIC) and the Bay Area RTTAC\ncurrently use.  Both systems are widely available, not only to the ER community, but also to the public, and are quite simple to use.\n\n## B. Overview Of The La Tlo Program\n\nThe Los Angeles TLO program is operated out of the LA RTTAC or the LA JRIC (the LA fusion center was originally called the Joint Regional Intelligence Center, JRIC and the terms have become synonymous).  Prior to the TLO program, information-sharing relating to terrorism was conducted on a personal relationship oneto-one basis, which is clearly not efficient in a jurisdiction the size and complexity of Los Angeles.  The TLO program has expanded from Los Angeles County to include a total of seven counties; in addition to LA County, the RTTAC represents Orange County, Santa Barbara County, Riverside County, San Bernardino County, San Luis Obispo County, and Ventura County.  There are over 200 TLOs in the Los Angeles PD and Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department.  The LA RTTAC supports approximately 500 TLOs.\nWith only one law enforcement TLO coordinator for the entire RTTAC, individual personal contact is severely limited and restricts the role of the LA RTTAC TLO coordinator from facilitator to one of administrator.  This lack of personal contact is being mitigated by establishing lead TLOs for each of the eight mutual aid regions within the jurisdiction of the RTTAC to act as local coordinators.  Each county within the RTTAC has also designated TLO coordinators to facilitate the program.  These TLO coordinators facilitate the program and give local agencies a local contact that is seen as one of their own and not a remote figure from a \"parent\" agency.   The dissemination of information from the RTTAC to the TLO is conducted via e-mail groups. It is the responsibility of each individual TLO to serve as a point of contact and/or reference to officers in his or her department.\nReporting back to the RTTAC is done via the website www.tlo.org.  The website has graduated access from public domain to restricted to TLOs requiring a log-in. There is also a link for public reporting.114\nTo minimize any potential loss of intelligence, the LA RTTAC has tried to establish TLOs in most significant investigative units, generally the detective sergeant or the lead detective.  The intent is that as they review incoming reports, they can make note of information that may be relevant to the RTTAC and forward that information.115  As with many other agencies, and exacerbated in a program the size of LA's, maintaining a knowledgeable and trained cadre of TLOs will be an ongoing challenge.  The turnover and lack of training was apparent in a forum sponsored by the Police Executive Research Forum at the LA RTTAC, which was attended by TLOs in the LA region.  Many of the\n\nTLOs that attended the meeting had not yet received any specialized training and several TLOs had just been given the job with very little understanding of what the job was or how to do it.116\n\n## C. Overview Of The Northern California (Nc) Tlo Program\n\nThe Northern California (Greater San Francisco Bay Area) TLO program is organized in a fashion similar to the LA and Sacramento programs.  In the NC TLO program, officers volunteer for the position and get approval from their chain of command.  Briefing information and bulletins are made by way of postings to their website, which requires a log-on for different levels of access.  The website, www.ncrttac.org, also serves as a reporting mechanism for tips and leads from the TLOs as well as the public.  However, the NC RTTAC TLOs do not receive bulletins or briefing information via e-mail as San Francisco police officers do not have e-mail accounts.  In order to mitigate this obstacle, the NC RTTAC utilizes an alerting network, Roam Secure alert network.  This commercial system sends out paging notifications on emerging events or other bulletins.\nThe NC RTTAC is experiencing the same problem with TLO turnover as the other jurisdictions.  They are finding a need to constantly train TLOs.  The RTTAC, according to Commander Mike Sena, feels that they are losing information as there are break-downs in the system, particularly with so many different responder jurisdictions and disciplines, each with their own distinct cultures.\nThe role of the NC RTTAC TLO is to act as an intelligence liaison officer;\nthe goal is to create informant networks.  Getting the ER community to respond has been slow but it is a necessary task.  Sena feels that the lack of recent successful attacks has minimized the priority for observance and reporting in the mind of the public and the ER\ncommunity, stating, \"We need to educate without terrifying them.\"117\n\n## D. Overview Of The San Diego Tlo Program\n\nThe San Diego TLO program falls under the purview of the RTTAC along with critical infrastructure protection and analytical strategic support for the region.  The program is currently under reorganization.  A year ago, the program was very disjointed and not very well structured.  The San Diego RTTAC is now assuming responsibility for organizing the program and is focusing first on law enforcement, and will then direct its efforts toward fire, EMS, public health and finally, the public sector.  Virtually every law enforcement agency in the San Diego RTTAC jurisdiction has a representative in the TLO program.\n\nOne of the main functions of the RTTAC is to support the TLO program and the TLOs.  This support is in the form of providing information and intelligence to the TLO officers who, in turn, are expected to provide that information to the officers within his or her department.  Information comes in the form of bulletins with specific information and strategic pieces of intelligence that describe trends and more generalized intelligence.\n\nTLOs are not expected to be investigators or even information collectors per se, but are expected to \"push and pull\" information between the field and the RTTAC.  Their role is to be the facilitators of the program demonstrating a need to collect information, and to operate as a point of contact or reference for officers in the field needing extra information or guidance.  Currently, all tips and leads go directly to the Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF).  The JTTF has a link on most departments' interdepartmental websites and also has the ability to receive information by phone.\n\nOnce the TLO program is stabilized in the law enforcement community, the intention of the RTTAC is to extend the program to the other emergency responder communities.118\n\n## E. Overview Of The Arizona Tlo Program\n\nThe Arizona TLO program is a much more robust and involved program than the others that have been described heretofore.  There are two levels of TLO in Arizona and they receive different levels of training, equipment and support.  Level A TLOs receive a vehicle, a phone and a laptop computer with secure connectivity equipment and are required to dedicate forty hours a month to the program.  Level B TLOs receive the same equipment but no vehicle.  They are required to contribute twenty hours a month to the program.\nBoth levels of TLO are responders with a mandate to respond to any major fire or law incident and perform the intelligence branch function in the Incident Command System (ICS).  This system has been in operation for three years and it has been one of the best marketing tools for the TLO program.  Local emergency responders are able to regularly see the value of the TLOs as they provide on-scene connectivity and intelligence.  There were 212 TLOs in Arizona at last count.  They are dispersed throughout Arizona and respond to major incidents, terrorist or otherwise, and act as a liaison to the Arizona Counter Terrorism Information Center.  A significant amount of their response capability is geared toward incidents or crimes other than terrorism.\nHowever, they are always observant of any nexus to potential terrorist activity.  In addition, by making themselves useful, they have created social networks that have encouraged information sharing, which will enhance their ability to receive and pass on information.  Finally, they are delivering an immediate and observable service to the emergency responder community within which they operate.119\n\n## 2. Terrorism Early Warning Groups (Tewg)\n\nTerrorism early warning groups, as originally conceived in the Los Angeles model120 have, for all practical intents and purposes, been subsumed by the RTTACs or the State Terrorism Threat Assessment System.  A more basic and perhaps more commonly used version of the TEWG, and one that is used by the Sacramento RTTAC, is the identification of terrorism early-warning groups as communities of specialized knowledge or interest that may be in a position to make observations of potential terrorist activity or be the subject of interest from terrorist groups.   The Sacramento RTTAC uses liaison officers as a conduit between the \"group\" and the RTTAC.  In the case of the more traditional ER communities, the liaison officers are referred to as terrorism liaison officers (TLOs), which generally liaise with members of their own organization, in either law enforcement or fire.  However, TLOs are being encouraged to develop TEWGs in their geographic area of responsibility with groups that they and their local administrators deem appropriate.\n\nOne group, that the Sacramento RTTAC is currently in the process of establishing a TEWG and TLOs with, is the public health department, which will be expanded to the larger medical community.  There are an infinite number of groups that could be created as terrorism early-warning groups, such as public works, non-law enforcement government agencies, postal workers, schools, agriculture, community organizations, and the private sector, particularly those that have vulnerability or may be at risk for a potential terrorist attack.\n\nAn additional group that the Sacramento RTTAC is developing as a terrorism early warning group collaborates with the FBI's InfraGard121 program.  InfraGard is an association of private sector companies that share information regarding threats, vulnerabilities and mitigation strategies, which is run by the FBI.  Because membership in the organization requires a limited background check, members are allowed to receive Law Enforcement Sensitive (LES) bulletins.  The Los Angeles and the Sacramento Infraguard organizations were reported to be robust and beneficial to the respective RTTACs.122\nThe Sacramento RTTAC is encouraging all of the TLOs in its thirty-four counties to establish TEWGs in their respective jurisdictions.  The type and number of TEWGs each TLO establishes will be dependent on the threat picture in that jurisdiction, the infrastructure that may be at risk, and the availability of groups of interest that may be of value in collecting potentially useful intelligence.  Each county will be able to assess for itself the needs of its particular jurisdiction, as well as its capability to establish relationships and act as conduits of information between the TEWG and the RTTAC.\n\nOnce the TEWG is established, separate group lists can be created to disseminate relevant information to different groups via e-mail.  The bias should be a need to share while protecting any necessary confidentiality.  The TLO will also have to establish an effective reporting mechanism.   Members of the TEWG will need to realize some benefit for their participation and this will most likely come in the form of information that is exchanged between members, the TLO and the RTTAC.   This may require the TLO to go to the group to give presentations and assist in security assessments, ACAMS, or other types of awareness training.\nThe LA RTTAC and the NC RTTAC have extensive standing TEWGs within their jurisdictions.  Some terrorism early-warning groups have their own analytical and dissemination systems such as the East Bay terrorism early warning group.  A concern here is the potential for stove-piping and duplication of efforts.123\nFor fusion centers that are strictly counterterrorism, it is very important to establish a TEWG with each of the multiple investigative units in their area of responsibility so that they can be apprised of information of interest as it develops.  One way for the law enforcement community to gain information from the investigators, or from law enforcement in general, is to establish terrorism early-warning groups with liaisons from members of each of the significant investigative groups from each of the major jurisdictions.  For example, the financial crimes unit, or the gang unit, should have liaisons with the fusion centers.  In this way, if an investigative unit is working a case and it seems that there is some potential terrorist nexus, the terrorism early-warning group liaison officer should relay that information to the fusion center.  This is essentially the role of a TLO.  Correspondingly, if the fusion center receives information that may be terrorism, and initial investigation determines it to be purely criminal, then it should be the obligation of the fusion center to relay that information to the appropriate investigative unit via the same liaison officer or other method.\n\n## 3. Special Considerations For Other Er Communities\n\nIt has been widely held and acknowledged that America's emergency responders have a great capacity for interacting with the public they serve much more intimately than their federal counterparts interact.  What has been less well understood, until recently, is their potential for contribution to the counterterrorism effort. Engaging the emergency responder community will take outreach, education and networking.  Most of the ER\ndisciplines will need the same education as law enforcement on developing a need, demonstrating value, providing situational awareness and making reporting accessible. As many areas are just getting their law enforcement agencies oriented to providing tips and leads, it is understandable that engaging the other disciplines has not been fully engaged or, in some cases, even appreciably underway.  It will be prudent, though, to ensure that steps are taken to include the input from the rest of the ER community.\n\nEngaging the medically oriented responder disciplines is an area that needs further study and attention.  The greater medical community consisting of fire, Emergency Medical Services (EMS), public health and medical facilities, are not normally disposed to reporting suspicious behavior.  They are mandatory reporters, by law, for certain specified crimes, but it requires the force of law to gain compliance.  To get the medical community to observe and report on suspicious behavior will be difficult, but it is a worthwhile endeavor.  It will require a substantial amount of education to convince this community of the need and value of reporting.  Even more education will be required to make them comfortable with the ethics and legalities of reporting.\n\nThis is even more so with EMS, which does not have mandatory reporting requirements and is even prevented from some types of reporting (in California).  EMS personnel respond to the scene of the incident and are in a position to see not only the victim, but the environment that created the injury, often before it has been sanitized.\nThe rules for EMS reporting medical information on suspicious incidents are very restrictive, even more so than for doctors or other medical personnel.  However, EMS can report on what Petrie describes as \"incident indicators\" but can not report medical information.   There is great value in having EMS report incident indicators but the distinction requires education and the legal ramifications will make many, if not most, EMS personnel uncomfortable.124  The ethical considerations will exacerbate the reporting reluctance as well as the disinclination of many of the helping professions to \"intrude\" in a patient's privacy.  With that said, the potential for useful information makes the effort worthwhile and justifies the reporting attempts.\n\n## 4. Community-Oriented Policing\n\nOne commonly agreed method of prevention is the need for intelligence.\nIntelligence is a derivative of information, and one of the best sources of information for domestic counterintelligence is, arguably, Human Intelligence (HUMINT).  A potential source of human intelligence is Community Oriented Policing (COP); however, this has proven to be an under-utilized tool.  To support this, the survey data reported that 60 percent of the fusion centers stated that they received less than 5 percent of tips and leads from COP efforts, with an additional 20 percent stating they received 5 to 10 percent of their tips or leads from COP.  Seventy-five percent of the reporting fusion centers stated that COP was an under-utilized information source.  How do we trade on the community capital of goodwill created by COP and how do we make that work in the collection of information useful to counterterrorist action?\nThe Sacramento Urban Area, and indeed the nation as a whole, has made little attempt to engage the Muslim community in targeted COP programs.  There are exceptions, such as Southeastern Michigan, Boston and Southern California,125 but as a whole the law enforcement community has relied on COP in general to engage the Muslim community.  In defense of law enforcement, limited outreach to the Muslim community is a consequence, in part due to the fact that the Muslim community, in much of the country, does not reside in ethnic enclaves as they do in Europe.  Muslims are connected by a religion and often by an ethnicity, but are dispersed throughout our community, and as such, have been difficult to engage with the COP program.\n\nThis is due to the consistent and common theme throughout almost all of the literature and practice regarding COP: the interpretation of community as having a definite geographic orientation or boundary.  COP in the United States is almost exclusively geographic-centric within well-defined and tightly controlled boundaries determined by jurisdictional, environmental, and economic or social groupings.\nGiven the geographic dispersal of the majority of the Muslim community, an effective COP program must make a paradigm shift from a geographic-centric orientation to an ideological-centric orientation.  Daniel Flynn, in a white paper for the Police Executive Research Forum, discusses the concept of community and non-traditional communities in depth.  His paper accurately describes the need to be flexible in identifying a community so as to be able to include groups that share a common character or identity with a common concern or problem.  Flynn describes a nontraditional community as:\nThe non-traditional community is more than a special interest group or group formed around one issue.  The non-traditional community is systemic and consists of a collection or set of groups that share the characteristics of the community.  It is not restricted to being residential or residential/business and it need not be located in areas beset with deepseated chronic high crime rates.126\nTherefore, a COP program with the aim of ameliorating alienation and disaffection for the Muslim community from the larger community as a whole, and developing contacts that could potentially lead to useful information, will require a new conceptualization of \"community.\"  This is a rather radical departure from the common and current practice and there will be many challenges.  However, there is a great need to reach out to the Muslim community, which has its religion and culture inextricably woven together.  A re-assessment of community and a fresh set of strategies will help us gain a connection with the Muslim community.  It is critical that the primary motivation is to recognize them as valued members of our community and ease the feelings of alienation and the sense of being disconnected from the larger community.\nThe creation, development and implementation of such a program will be a significant undertaking.  The desire to immediately try to turn members of the Muslim community into informants may be tempting, but should be avoided.  Information exchanges of that kind requires trust and mutually beneficial relationships (either financial or common cause), particularly when the consequences of providing information could be costly to yourself and your family.\n\nWhen a COP program is rolled out to the community, we need to make sure that we are providing an environment that creates relationships with the Muslim community that are seen as altruistic and  mutually beneficial.  Some potential areas to explore would include: 1) a Muslim citizens' academy; 2) political action groups of some type that would have a community voice and access to administrators and the law enforcement community, as well as local government; 3) the development of youth programs and activities that do not isolate Muslim youth but engage them with other members of the community; 4) using the media to recognize positive Muslim events or citizen activities; 5) establish educational forums for the public and law enforcement about the Muslim community in an attempt to try to establish understanding and positive community relations; and, 6) in recognition of the Muslim culture's religious requirement to contribute to charity, a committee could be established to identify charities that have no demonstrable links to terrorism.\n\nOnce we have created contacts and relationships built on mutually beneficial activities, the bonds of trust necessary to engage in information sharing will have been established.  Potentially useful information will flow, in time, with confidence and trust.\nIf the intelligence collection process is started too soon, our efforts will be seen as thinly disguised self-serving opportunities and will not be well received.\n\n## This Page Intentionally Left Blank V. Recommendations For Fusion Center Operation\n\nPrevention is the first goal in the National Strategy for Homeland Security.  It can be argued that fusion centers provide an excellent opportunity to for that prevention.  For fusion centers to be effective, it will be necessary for elected officials, emergency responders, administrators, and the rank and file emergency responder community to know the value that fusion centers provide.  There are many secrets in fusion centers; the value of the fusion center must not be kept secret.  The following are recommendations based on the findings of this thesis, grouped by fusion center functions:\n\n## A. Management 1. Mission\n\nThe management of the fusion center should not be left to develop in a haphazard manner with little forethought as to an ultimate strategic plan to achieve the goal of how best to detect or deter a terrorist attack.  This was perhaps acceptable in the immediate aftermath of 9/11. However, with time for reflection and thought, it is important to assess the role, function, and responsibilities of fusion centers and to determine how they are managed and what they should produce.  Fusion centers will require guidance to accomplish that objective.\n\nOne of the first steps should be the development of a governance board.  The board should have a cross representation of federal, state and local members, as well as representation from different emergency responder disciplines.  Suggested representation should include FBI and U.S. Attorneys' Offices, lead law enforcement executives in the region, and at least one non-law enforcement executive from the emergency responder community.  This governance board would ensure a regional approach, collaboration and network with all partners (rather than a parochial orientation directed at one particular agency's priorities), create a network of interdependent jurisdictions and disciplines with a common and acceptable tasking requirement for the fusion center.  The centers are essentially law enforcement organizations, but they serve a greater mission that incorporates the sphere of all the emergency responders and their input will prove valuable, enhancing the intelligence product.\nThe board should adopt a written memorandum of understanding or similar agreement with a written mission statement.  This thesis reaffirms the recommendations found in the FCG guideline three regarding the above recommendations for a governance board; however, it is also recommended that further steps be taken. One of the most important actions the board should take - in addition to determining who the customers of the fusion center are - is to determine the degree of support each customer should be allocated.  The common customers of a fusion center are tactical investigative case support (generally for the FBI Joint Terrorism Task Force); criminal case support for major criminal enterprises; general situational awareness for emergency responders; and, strategic situational awareness reports on regional threat assessments for policy makers. The range of support for these different customers' groups is huge, with some working almost exclusively strategic support and some working almost exclusively in support of the JTTF.  There is not a right or wrong to any of these approaches, but they should be based on an identified need, supported by a regional threat picture, and authorized by the direction of an involved governance board, reinforced by the mission statement.  The scope of work should not be directed simply by \"it's what we've always done.\"\nIn order to accomplish these goals, the board must have an accurate situational awareness of the threat picture in their area of operation, as well as any particular vulnerability that their region may possess.  This will require high-level briefings by qualified personnel.\nThe board should agree to meet on a regular basis to keep informed and maintain connection with the fusion center and other board members.  The board should also recognize that fusion centers are a relatively new phenomenon for domestic law enforcement, keeping in mind the need to be flexible and responsive to changes.   Finally, the board needs to ensure that the fusion center is familiar with the mission and is, in fact, adhering to that mission.\nAgency heads of law enforcement and fire departments should obtain secret clearances, available through the Department of Homeland Security, so that they may be briefed properly and gain confidence that everything that can or should be shared is being shared.\n\n## 2. Philosophy\n\nThe threat of a terrorist attack has dramatically shifted the focus of local law enforcement.  The investigation of terrorism, and the collection and analysis of intelligence to aid in prevention, is a new role for domestic law enforcement; this newness is a major sticking point as to how best to accomplish this obvious but elusive goal.\n\n## 3. Prevention\n\nIt can be argued that prevention may well be the best way to protect one's community.  In the immediate aftermath of 9/11, the vast majority of resources were dedicated to strengthening our response capabilities.  Prevention as an active goal is a relatively new philosophical position.  The benefits of prevention can be demonstrated by illustrating the values of strategic situational awareness for policymakers, tactical case support for counterterrorist efforts, and criminal case support for major crimes that present a real and visible threat to local communities.  It is a recommendation of this thesis that educating administrators on the value and benefits of prevention become a specific goal; this is a recommendation that is missing from the FCG.\nAs part of prevention, a risk management policy needs to be adopted.  While this thesis cannot recommend what is the best risk management policy, it is recommended that the issue be addressed, debated and resolved.  The issue is: what is an acceptable level of risk within one's community and how does one most effectively and efficiently buy down that risk with the dollars allocated to prevention?  The answer to that question is your risk management policy.  What must be considered is not only your community's tolerance for risk, but what risks are considered.  Will your risk management policy focus exclusively on the prevention and response to the remote threat of a WMD or will you address the more likely conventional terrorist attack of an improvised explosive device, a vehicle borne improvised explosive device, or a firearm.\nWhatever prevention model and risk management positions are taken, they need to be predicated on the threat picture that the fusion center is operating under. Recognizing the local threat picture, keeping aware of the emergent tends as well as investigating and interdicting these threats whenever possible, is a job where the fusion center can make a significant contribution.  These threats will necessarily include jihadist ideologies, both the transnational and, more likely, the locally generated homegrown jihadist, but will also include other domestic concerns such as radicalized prisoners, environmental terrorists, right-wing terrorists and other single-issue groups.\n\n## 4. Tactical Vs. Strategic\n\nIt is the recommendation of this thesis that the next iteration of the Fusion Center Guidelines addresses and agrees upon the definitions and roles of strategic analyst, strategic analysis, tactical analyst, tactical analysis, criminal analyst and criminal analysis, as there is no current distinction between what is tactical and what strategic. The FCG have a heavy bias toward the tactical, which is not surprising, as the majority of the work in state and local fusion centers is currently being done at the tactical level.\nHowever, there is a need for strategic analysis and it should be clearly identified as to what it is and who might be the potential customer.\n\nThe staff of the fusion center should reflect the mission and customer support allocations established by the governance board and the director of the fusion center.   As it stands, the majority of fusion centers provide more tactical mission support than strategic assessments (tactical as in case support through research, database searches, and link analysis activities, not field operations).  Most centers would likely get by with one or two strategic analysts, and as they are much more difficult and expensive to engage and retain, a fusion center should not try to over-staff with expensive personnel that will not be utilized properly.  The majority of the analytic support staff ought to be geared toward the greater workload, tactical case support.  If a center starts to make more use of strategic analysis, then the staffing should be adjusted accordingly.\nThe information revealed in this thesis indicates that the overwhelming majority of fusion centers should have some type of all-crime perspective.  It should go without saying that any active counterterrorism investigative support should always have a primary role in the fusion center.  Most fusion centers already incorporate some type of all-crime posture in their fusion centers.\n\nElected officials and administrators should also be encouraged to use the tasking capability to have strategic products prepared that are of concern to local officials.  This level of customer service and interaction will not only help educate administrators as to the usefulness of the fusion center, but also establish contacts and the beginnings of a network.  This increased interaction could lead to increased support and funding.\n\n## 5. Prioritization\n\nThere should be some system or process, either from the governance board or the director, that identifies the prioritization of work to be done.  This can be accomplished in the crafting of the standing requirements for the fusion center.  There should also be prioritization for case assignment for incoming tips.  Not all tips are alike and they should not be treated as such.  Some form of metrics should be established to determine the extent of investigation accorded each tip or lead; otherwise, we may well find ourselves doing exhaustive investigations on tips that are months old while neglecting more promising leads on current tips.  This concept is generally refereed to in FCG guideline two, but should be called out more specifically in future iterations.\n\n## 6. Leadership\n\nTo carry out the mission of the fusion center, the governance board should designate a director who will be responsible and accountable for the operation of the fusion center.  The FCG guideline number three states that the governance board should define a management structure to include what entity will oversee the center's operations and daily activities.  There is no recommendation on how that should be accomplished; however, consideration should be given to the need for a director to have a wide range of experience in intelligence, law enforcement and the fusion process.  More importantly, the director should have the ability to establish and maintain networks, provide leadership in the fusion center, guide intelligence production, and maintain the standards that are critical to continued and effective intelligence operations.  Without the appropriate guidance and leadership, the fusion centers risk misdirection and misapplication of their mission and focus, and could end up producing intelligence products that are irrelevant or inapplicable to their environment.  The management style and networking abilities of a director will be at least as important as technical knowledge, which needs to be recognized.\nIn the emergent and evolving world of counterterrorism, autocratic and hierarchal management styles will be not only ineffective but counter-productive.  To operate effectively, the centers will need to be able to operate in a network, sharing information and situational information with various levels of government, jurisdictions, and disciplines, which will not be answerable to each other, requiring a cooperative networked approach to management.  It will take a skillful communicator with a recognized degree of credibility and competence to garner the trust necessary to interact with these divergent groups.\nThere will be some difficulties, especially in locales where there are competing law enforcement jurisdictions vying for control, in deciding who the director will be and from what agency.  It will be up to the board to find a person acceptable to all and up to the director to show impartiality in the administration of his or her office.\n\n## B. Analysts\n\nFusion center managers need to make the distinction between strategic analysts and tactical analysts.  The strategic analysts are generally persons with graduate degrees and years of experience, able to make predictive assessments from a broad range of domain expertise.  Tactical analysts conduct post-event research and assist with casesupport functions.  Both are valuable and necessary skills sets but serve very different missions.  The center needs to staff appropriately so that each category of analyst is performing the function it is trained and qualified to conduct.\nStrategic analysts will almost certainly be civilian employees.  Tactical analysts can be civilian or they can be law enforcement officers, and occasionally from other ER disciplines.  However, it takes training and the correct aptitude to be a tactical analyst; it is not a plug-and-play operation at which all law enforcement personnel will be adept. Additionally, sworn officer analysts will rotate for career development or promotions.  A high analyst turnover will almost guarantee a constant state of training and diminished capacity as staff will not only have to be trained in job functions, but wait for top secret clearances before they can work on any significant projects.  The turnover will also affect historical continuity.  For these reasons, a fusion center should have a high percentage of its analyst staff as career civilian employees.  Requiring and enforcing a minimum term, as recommended by the NCISP, is another good idea to maintain a qualified analytical pool.\nIt is noteworthy to observe, however, that the training that most analysts have received has been from professional organizations dedicated to the profession of law enforcement criminal intelligence.  It is also noteworthy to observe that the Fusion Center Guidelines are based on the *criminal intelligence process*.  It is therefore not surprising when the CRS report notes that most fusion centers are not operating as true intelligence fusion centers127 but as criminal analyst centers.  It may well be the case that this is so because the greater need is for tactical analysis versus strategic analysis in the state and local fusion centers.\n\n## C. Dissemination\n\nIn order to facilitate the dissemination of information on as wide a distribution level as possible, the fusion center needs to write their proprietary product at a \"for official use only\" (FOUO) tear line.  This will ensure the widest possible distribution to the greatest number of emergency responder disciplines as well as individual responders.\nWherever possible, the fusion center should avoid writing product that is classified as secret or higher.  The classification \"law enforcement sensitive\" (LES) should be used very judiciously, and should have written protocols to use as guidelines to prevent routine use of LES.  The classification distinction between \"for official use only\" and \"law enforcement sensitive\" is, in many respects, one of semantics.  However, what it does is restrict the access of information to fire personnel and all the other emergency responder disciplines.  This classification should be avoided unless there is information that would compromise a criminal investigation, in which case distribution would be severely limited at whatever classification.  The law enforcement sensitive classification restricts potential distribution and the resultant potential return of information and creates a contentious relationship with our partners.  The center should also encourage originators of products received to avoid LES where possible; this is an issue not addressed by the FCG.\nTo continue and expand the flow of information, the fusion center needs to acknowledge the individual emergency responder when he or she provides a tip or lead. It is imperative to acknowledge this information whether or not it is ultimately proven to be useful.  In fact, the center should not wait until it determines the value of the tip before the contribution is acknowledged.  This acknowledgment should be automatic upon information being provided and the tipster should receive a reply from the fusion center with some generic information as to the outcome of the tip.  It can be as innocuous as: this information supports an ongoing investigation, this information is filed at this time, or this information is being reviewed.\nThe center does not need to reveal sources or methods to acknowledge those that are assisting by providing information. An effort on the part of the fusion center to involve and acknowledge the emergency responder community will greatly enhance the participation of that group in the collection of raw data to be analyzed.\n\nThe most common and effective means of distributing information bulletins to the emergency responder community seems to be e-mail.  All jurisdictions should make every effort to insure that their personnel have access to e-mail.\n\nThe FCGs identify the need for dissemination in both the intelligence process and the fusion process but the issue of consumption is not addressed.  Production of intelligence product needs to take into consideration who the end user will be for what product, and what will be the best form to convey that information to maximize assimilation.  Another issue not addressed by the FCGs is the need for the end user of each category of product to provide feedback to the analysts and the fusion center management.\n\n## D. Summary Of Fusion Center Recommendations\n\n-\nGovernance board should determine who the customers are\n-\nGovernance board should direct, with fusion center manager input, the\nlevel of support for each customer, i.e. tactical case support vs. strategic\nsituational awareness\n-\nIdentify the workload for strategic vs. tactical analysts\n-\nEducate local ER administrators on the value of prevention\n-\nProvide situational  awareness to ER administrators so that an objective\nrisk management policy can be adopted\n-\nThe next iteration of the Fusion Center Guidelines should define and\ndevelop specific roles for strategic analyst, tactical analyst and crime analyst\n-\nIn the interim fusion centers should define the duties and role of strategic,\ntactical and crime analysts within their own organizations\n-\nProvide analyst training relevant to their role and future development\n-\nMaintain a high percentage of civilian analysts\n-\nProvide sufficient situational awareness to the ER community so that they\nwill recognize and report terrorist pre incident indicators when they are\nobserved\n-\nProvide and advertise tip and lead reporting mechanisms that are available\nand user friendly\n-\nProvide an all crimes perspective, while recognizing the counter  terrorism\nmission is primary\n-\nEncourage ER administrators to use their tasking capability to have\nstrategic products prepared that are of concern to local officials\n-\nAn objective system of prioritization should be established to determine\nthe extent of investigation accorded each tip or lead\n-\nEach fusion center should have a director; the management style and\nnetworking abilities of a director will be at least as important as technical knowledge\n-\nWrite and disseminate intelligence product, to the extent possible, at \"for\nofficial use only\" (FOUO)\n-\nThe classification \"law enforcement sensitive\" (LES) should be used very\njudiciously, and should have written protocols\n-\nThe Fusion Center Guidelines should include the issue of intelligence\nconsumption when discussing dissemination\n-\nThe Fusion Center Guidelines should include end user feedback for all\nintelligence products in the next iteration\n\n\n## Vi. Recommendation For Data Collection\n\nAs often repeated throughout this thesis, if fusion centers are to become valuable to local elected officials, emergency responder administrators, and emergency responder line-personnel, they must produce timely, relevant and locally actionable intelligence product.  To produce locally actionable intelligence, the fusion center will have to not only analyze data from a variety of classified databases and a huge glut of open source data, but also integrate information collected locally from the regional emergency responders to synthesize a final product.\n\n## A. Terrorism Liaison Officers\n\nOne of the best ways to gather this intelligence is with the creation and development of a robust terrorism liaison officer (TLO) program.  These programs most generally start with law enforcement and move into the other emergency responder disciplines addressing the unique issues of each discipline in turn.  Prior to initiating a TLO program, those responsible for implementing it should contact the ER administrators in the region explaining the program benefits and the amount of resources those administrators can be expected to contribute; this is normally a nominal amount of resources.\nOnce administrators have agreed to commit to the program, they should recommend which officers to nominate as TLOs, particularly the TLO coordinator, should a coordinator be designated for that agency.  The TLOs must have access to the management of their individual organizations as well as credibility with and access to the rank-and-file of their respective organizations.  TLOs should receive training in basic situational awareness of terrorist methods of operation and pre-incident indicators.  TLOs should also receive training on how to facilitate the TLO program back in their jurisdiction.\n\nThe roles and responsibilities for TLOs must be established and clearly articulated so that people understand what their jobs are, and equally important, what they are not.\nMost TLO programs have established the role of the TLO to be a point of reference and a contact for his or her fellow officers or firefighters.  Some, as in the case of Arizona, are responders, which is a much more expensive proposition.  Whichever route is taken, the role of the TLO must be very clear in the mind of the TLOs themselves, their administrators and the rank-and-file.\n\nOnce the law enforcement TLO program has been stood up, the fusion center should turn their attention to developing TLO programs within the other emergency responder disciplines.  As with the law enforcement TLOs, it will be important to develop a need to report observations as well as establish a value to reporting such information.\nThis will be even more so in the other emergency responder disciplines as they are not naturally geared toward investigation, observation and reporting of behavior.  This will be particularly true for the medical professions who are confronted with issues of patients' privacy.  The information that these responders can provide could be very valuable, and certainly will be worth the effort to educate all involved in the process of legally and ethically providing this information to the fusion centers.  However, great care must be taken to ensure that all laws are followed and that the ERs are educated to a level that makes them comfortable with reporting information that is permissible.\n\n## B. Terrorism Early Warning Group (Tewg)\n\nThe establishment of terrorism early warning groups is an excellent way for the fusion centers to gain information on sector-specific information or information derived from particular areas of concern.  Examples include the agriculture industry, chemical industry, transportation, and school administrators.  The TLOs, in conjunction with the fusion center and local ER administrators, should identify which terrorism early-warning groups would be beneficial to their individual regions, and together, should identify a list of who should or could be involved in this activity.\n\nThese groups will require some form of quid pro quo; generally, useful information will be sufficient currency for their involvement.  There are many ways to start these programs; most often, the easiest is to start with existing groups or organizations.  Often there are industry associations that meet on a regular basis.  In addition, emergency response planning meetings are often used as a catalyst to initiate a TEWG.  One useful program that has been successful in some jurisdictions is the FBI's InfraGard program.  Once these programs or TEWGs are established, however, they cannot be abandoned.  It will take a concerted effort and regular interaction to maintain the relationships that will promote the useful exchange of information.  Administrators also need to be mindful of the possibility of TLOs becoming over-extended and unable to make all the requested commitments.  Most TLOs take on the job as an \"other duty as assigned,\" and not a full-time job.\nIn the event an agency chooses a purely terrorist orientation for the fusion center, as opposed to an all-crimes approach, it would be valuable for those agencies to establish a TEWG with the criminal investigative units of the region's law enforcement agencies.\n\n## C. Community-Oriented Policing\n\nOne final method of data collection for the emergency responder community is community oriented policing (COP).  This approach would be by far the most laborintensive of those discussed.  The benefit potential is significant and the concept deserves some attention.  A properly developed COP program can engage local Muslim communities to enhance their sense of belonging and comfort and, at the same time, minimize any feelings of alienation, mistrust or disaffection.  A second benefit - one that will come in due course if the program is established with honest intentions and not a thinly veiled attempt to create immediate informants - is the establishment of relationships and trust.  Once these are ingrained, the increased confidence level in the \"system\" may lead to increased reporting of suspicious behaviors that members of the Muslim community may become aware of or actually witness.\nAs many in the Muslim community do not live in tight geographic confines, as is often the case in Europe, a successful COP program would have to interpret *community* as larger or different from the common geographic consideration.  *Community* will have to be perceived in more of an ideological context rather than a neighborhood concern. Acting now, to build positive relationships by involving and engaging the Muslim community, will not only provide a rich and useful source of future information, it will, more importantly, have the capability of preventing future attacks by removing potential terrorists from the ranks of recruits for radicalized jihadist ideology.  This relationship must be based on fair, reasonable and reciprocal relationships that are respectful of each other's rights, needs and objectives.\n\n## D. Summary Of Data Collection Recommendations\n\n-\nEach fusion center should develop a TLO program in their area of\nresponsibility\n-\nLocal administrators should be engaged and educated for support\n-\nLocal administrators need to select their TLOs\n-\nThe fusion centers should provide/facilitate training for the TLOs\n-\nTLOs need to be trained on the organizational and administrative responsibilities of their role\n-\nThe fusion center should provide regular intelligence products to the TLOs\n-\nThe fusion centers ought to provide a support network to sustain the TLOs\n-\nTLOs are encouraged to develop TEWGs as they are able and as need exists\n-\nLocal agencies should assist in maintaining a cadre of trained TLOs to respond to staff turnover issues\n-\nA COP program in the Muslim community should consider community as a non geographic concept and define it more ideologically\n\n\n## Vii. Conclusion\n\nNo one can know what our threat potential is in the current environment.  As a country and as local public servants, we need to be prepared without over-reacting, protect both our citizens and our rights, and be proactive in providing intelligence to deter and mitigate, within a reasonable budget with reasonable risks.  Fusion centers have the capability of assisting in these efforts.  They also have the capability to fail.  It is the responsibility of those in fusion center governance and management positions to ensure that fusion centers succeed.  Success can and should be defined locally; the criterion for success needs to be clearly articulated.\n\nThis thesis started by asking the questions: What is the mission of the state and local fusion centers?  Do they have a national value? Do they have a local value?  I believe the evidence presented herein has demonstrated that state and local fusion centers do indeed have a real mission in the protection of our homeland, and in the process can contribute both a national and a local value.  To do this, however, fusion centers will have to respond the second research question: What can be done to improve the effectiveness of state and local fusion centers?\n\nFusion centers can accomplish this by identifying their mission and their customers, at what level of analytic product they will produce, and to whom.  Not all fusion centers will need the same amount of strategic analysis or tactical analysis, but, in order to determine what to produce, they will have to understand their customers' needs and ensure they are educated so they understand the difference between the two products.\nFusion centers will also need to determine how they will integrate the emergency responder community.  A TLO program is one method that shows promise and is easily adaptable.\nIt is the responsibility of those in fusion center governance positions and management positions to ensure that fusion centers succeed.  If the fusion centers can produce a timely, locally actionable and relevant product to its customers - in the form of strategic analysis to policy makers; tactical analysis to counter terrorism; tactical analysis to major criminal investigations; and, situational awareness and reporting mechanisms to the emergency responder community - they will have established their value.\nBy implementing the key recommendations of this thesis, fusion centers will progress into becoming significant assets in our counterterrorism fight.  If fusion centers fail to prove their relevance and local worth, they face the danger of losing support, not only from federal funding sources, but also from local agencies, which sponsor a great deal of the state and local fusion  center resources.\nThis thesis has also left many unanswered questions that future efforts could research.  Some issues for future researchers to consider are:\n\n-\nDo these results reflect trends in other fusion centers or are they specific to\nCalifornia?\n-\nThe development of a uniform definition and role for strategic, tactical and criminal analysts.\n-\nThe development of a process for consumer intelligence requirements and product delivery.\n-\nThe role and impact of leadership on fusion centers.\n-\nThe impact of information sharing at multi-government levels.\n-\nFurther research on TLO programs and their effectiveness.\n-\nThe use of community-oriented policing as a counterterrorism tool (or its\nlack of effective use).\n-\nThe issue of situational awareness of terrorist threat in the emergency responder community.\n-\nWhat parameters or influences guide the level of strategic analysis that is needed at the state and local level?\n\n## Appendix List Of References\n\nAllen, Charles. DHS Director of Intelligence. Testimony before Senate Select\nCommittee, September 7, 2006.\nBeasley, Norman. Testimony before the U.S. Maricopa County (Arizona) Sheriff's\nOffice, before the U.S. House of Representatives House Committee on Homeland\nSecurity Subcommittee on Intelligence,  Information Sharing and Terrorism Risk\nAssessment, \"The Way Forward with Fusion Centers: Challenges and Strategies for Change,\" September 27, 2007. https://www.hsdl.org/homesec/docs/testimony/nps33-092707-\n04.pdf&code=7035620d98ed78e74b136023c2dd3c1b (last accessed November\n12, 2007).\nCarter, David, L.  Law Enforcement Intelligence: A Guide for State, Local, and Tribal\nLaw Enforcement Agencies, U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Community Oriented Policing, Cooperative Agreement #2003-CK-WX-0455, November\n2004.\n\"Community Oriented Policing and Problem Solving, Definitions and Principles,\" Crime\nand Violence Prevention Center, Office of the Attorney General, California\nDepartment of Justice, third edition, A16-5057, October 1999.\nCovey, Stephen, R. *The Speed of Trust*, New York: Free Press, 2006. Docobo, Jose.  \"Community Policing as the Primary Prevention Strategy for Homeland\nSecurity at the Local Law Enforcement Level,\" *Homeland Security Affairs* 1, no.\n1, summer 2005.\n\"Federal Efforts are Helping to Alleviate Some Challenges Encountered by State and\nLocal Information Fusion Centers.\" GAO Report to Congressional Committees,\nGAO-08-38, October 2007.\nFlynn, Daniel W.  \"Defining the Community in Community Policing\" Police Executive\nResearch Forum, 1998.\nhttp://www.policeforum.org/upload/cp_570119206_12292005152452.pdf, last\naccessed March 21, 2008.\nForsyth, William, A.  \"State and Local Intelligence Fusion Centers: An Evaluative\nApproach in Modeling a State Fusion Center, Naval Postgraduate School (U.S.) Center for Homeland Defense and Security, September 2005.\nhttp://www.nps.edu/Library/index.aspx.pdf, last accessed March 13, 2008.\nFusion Center Guidelines. Developing and Sharing Information and Intelligence In a\nNew Era, United States Department Justice, United States Department of Homeland Security, 2006.\nHoffman, Bruce, and Seth Jones. *Countering a Resurgent al Qaeda* (draft), cited with\npermission, May 22, 2007. https://www.chds.us/courses/mod/forum/discuss.php?d=8174, last accessed March 3, 2008.\nHomeland Security. Federal Efforts are Helping to Alleviate Some Challenges\nEncountered by State and Local Information Fusion Centers, United States Government Accountability Office, GAO-08-35, October 2007.\nInfraGard. http://www.infragard.net, last accessed March 19, 2008.\nJenkins, Brian Michael. Testimony before the Committee on Appropriations\nSubcommittee on Homeland Security, United States House of Representatives,\nJanuary 30, 2007.\n . *An Unconquerable Nation*, Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation, 2006,\nhttp://rand.org/pubs/monographs/MG454/, last accessed March 21, 2008.\nLarence, Eileen R.  Director of Homeland Security and Justice Issues, GAO testimony\nbefore the Subcommittee on Intelligence Information Sharing and Terrorism Risk\nAssessment, Committee on Homeland Security, House of Representatives, space\nGAO -07-1241T, United States Government Accountability Office, September 27, 2007.\nLowenthal, Mark M.  *Intelligence, From Secrets to Policy*, Washington, DC: CQ Press,\n2006.\nMarcus, Leonard J., Barry C. Dorn, Joseph, M. Henderson. \"Meta-Leadership and\nNational Emergency Preparedness, Strategies to Build Government\nConnectivity,\" Working Paper, Center for Public Leadership,\nhttp://www.ccl.org/leadership/landing/crisisForum.aspx (last accessed .March 21,\n2008)\nMarkle Foundation Task Force. \"Protecting America's Freedom in The Information\nAge,\" A Report of the Markle Foundation Task Force (New York: Markle Foundation, October 2002) 10.\nMasse, Todd, Siobhan O'Neil, and John Rollins.  CRS  Report for Congress, \"Fusion\nCenters: Issues and Options for Congress,\"  Order Code RL34070July 2007, 10.\n\n  CRS report for Congress*, Fusion* Law Enforcement Assistance and Partnership\nStrategy, Improving Information Sharing between the Intelligence Community and State, Local, and Tribal Law Enforcement, 2,\nhttp://epic.org/privacy/fusion/leap.pdf, last accessed February 29, 2008.\nMcConnell, Michael, J. Director of National Intelligence, Annual Threat Assessment of\nthe Intelligence Community for the House Permanent Select Committee on\nIntelligence, February 5, 2008, 9.\nhttp://www.tsa.gov/assets/pdf/02052008_dni_testimony.pdf, last accessed,\nFebruary 26, 2008.\nNational Governor's Association. Center for Best Practices, 2006 State Homeland\nSecurity Directors Survey, April 3, 2006, as reported in: Todd Masse, CRS Report\nfor Congress, \"HLS Intelligence: Perceptions, Statutory Definitions, and\nApproaches,\" August 18, 2006, 17-18.\nNational Intelligence Estimate, the Terrorist Threat to the U.S. Homeland, Office of the\nDirector of National Intelligence.\nhttp://dni.gov/press_releases/20070717_release.pdf. last accessed January 17,\n2008.\nNational Strategy for Homeland Security. Homeland Security Council, October 2007.\nhttp://www.whitehouse.gov/infocus/homeland/nshs/NSHS.pdf, last accessed\nMarch 24, 2008.\nPetrie, Michael. \"The Use of EMS Personnel as Intelligence Sensors: Critical Issues and\nRecommended Practices.\" *Homeland Security Affairs* III, no. 3 (September 2007)\nhttp://www.hsaj.org/?article=3.3.6, last accessed February 11, 2008.\nRamirez, Deborah, Sasha C. O'Connell, and Rabia Zafar. Developing Partnerships\nbetween Law Enforcement and American Muslim Arab and Sikh Communities: A\nPromising Practices Guide, The Partnering for Prevention and Community Safety\nInitiative, Northeastern University, 2004, http://www.ace.neu.edu, last retrieved\nSeptember 20, 2007.\nSageman, Marc. \"Understanding Jihadi Networks,\" *Strategic Insight* IV, Issue 4 (April\n2005) Center for Contemporary Conflict, www.ccc.nps.navy.mil, last accessed\nJanuary 4, 2008.\nScheider, Matthew C., and Robert Chapman. \"Community Policing and Terrorism.\"\nJournal of Homeland Security, Homeland Security Institute, http://www.homelandsecurity.org/journal/articles/Scheider-Chapman.html, April\n2003, last accessed September 27, 2007.\nNational Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, The 9/11\nCommission Report; Final Report of the National Commission of Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States. New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2004.\nThe National Criminal Intelligence Sharing Plan, U. S. Department of Justice, Bureau of\nJustice Assistance and Global Justice Information Sharing Initiative, October\n2003.\nU.S. Department of Justice, Intelligence-Led Policing: The New Intelligence\nArchitecture. U.S. DOJ website, www.ojp.usdoj.gov, September 2005, last\naccessed, March 19, 2008.\n\n\n## Initial Distribution List\n\n1.\nDefense Technical Information Center Ft. Belvoir, Virginia\n2.\nDudley Knox Library Naval Postgraduate School Monterey, California"
    },
    {
        "text": "## Contents\n\nINTRODUCTION ...outiiiitieiteiteteie sttt ettt ertetesbestesbasbesseasaestessessessessessessaseassessassessensessensensenns 1\n\n## Commercial Satellite Imagery Threat ......C.Oooiiiiee E 2\n\nTATEEUIE ..ttt ettt ettt et ettt et et et ea b eabeebbe b ee st ea st es b ehbeebbe b eeaten bt enbeesbeebeens e st enae 4\nSUIPDIISE. .ttt eue ettt ettt et ettt ea e et b e et et et es e eabeehbe b ees b et es e eabeebbe bt st enseenbeeabesbbe b eenbenneenseanbeas 4\nTHE PERSIAN GULF - THEN AND NOW. ..ottt eie e sire e sibe e e bbe e 5\nOPERATION DESERT STORM = 1990 ...uoiiiieiiieeiieteiet ettt ettt e sr e v 5\nOPERATION SON OF STORM - 2005 ...cutiietiieetiieeiieteienteiesteieereeieesteseessesaesessensesseene 7\nTRADITIONAL COUNTERSPACE SOLUTIONS ......oootiiiriieetiee ettt sree v 10\nDIPLOMIALIC ..ottt et e et e b et et eabeeabeeb e e bt st e bt esbeesbeebbesbeestenseenbeeabeesaensen 10\nEICOMOMMIC. 1.ttt ettt et e et e h ettt et e s eabeebte b et et enbeeabeebaensen 10\nIVELEEAIY ettt ettt ettt et ea e et eh et et et ea e ea e eb b e bt e st e st en bt eabeehbenbee b et enne 11\nSPACE BLOCKADE.......cotiititiiteiteteitet ettt ettt et este st esbesbesbesbasesbaeseessessesbessensessansessenns 12\n\nBlockade DeClaration. ........eeeeteeterieeieeiieetient\nettt sttt et et esbesabesb e b et enieenbeeabeebaensen 13\nDEPLOY FOICES ittt\nettt ettt ettt et et\neb et et et esbeeabeeb b e bt et et enbeeabeebaensen 13\nVoluntary COMPLANCE ...cc.verrietieieieeie ettt ettt sttt ettt\neabe bt e b et et enbeeabeebaensen 14\nReversible ENfOrcemENt .. ..co.uivtiriiriiieiieetiet ettt\nst\neb ettt e\ne\nebae s 15\nLethal EnfOrCemMENT. ....c.ueiiiitieieieeie\nettt\nettt ettt eb ettt e e e\nebae s s 16\nCONCLUSTON ..ottt etteteie sttt ettt estestesbe st esbeebeseabaestesbestesbessesseabasseassensassessansessersessensens 17\nBIBLIOGRAPHY ..ottt ettt ettt ettt ettt ettt es et bbb eb e sbae e esbensanbe b enbesbesseasanens 20\n\n## Appendix I - Possible Treaty Limitations On A Space Blockade........Ccoeveeiiieiiniiennnenne 23\n\nOuter Space Treaty Of 1967 ..ottt\nettt ettt sb et\ne e 23\nStrategic Arms Reduction TIEAIES .....ccueeueriertieriieteieeieeiteettert\net et enbeeabesrte e e s eseebeeare s 23\nABM TTEALY ..ttt\nettt et et e bt\ns e et et\nb e\ne\ne\ns 23\nMy worry is that I may end up watching CNN as an entire Marine battalion landing team is wiped out on some foreign landing zone solely because I was unable to deny the enemy intelligence and imagery garnered from space-based assets.\n\nGeneral Charles A. Horner USCINCSPACE, 1993\n\n## Introduction\n\nSince the early 1990s, there has been an explosion in the commercial space sector.\n\nRapid growth has made a wide array of services once reserved for world superpowers available to anyone with ready cash. Over the past several conflicts, from the Gulf War to the current action in Afghanistan, joint force commanders have learned how these commercial assets can augment U.S. space systems and provide meaningful support to their actions.\n\nHowever, these systems are not just available to friendly forces. They are commercially available across the globe.\n\nIn particular, satellite imagery has made incredible advances in recent years and is now able to provide even a minor opponent with first-class imagery.\n\nThis potential imagery \"edge\" creates a serious force protection issue for the joint force commander.\n\nSatellite imagery would allow an adversary to locate and classify high value targets behind friendly lines, as well as allowing him to strike U.S. forces with standoff weapons such as ballistic missiles and cruise missiles. Commercial imagery could also allow the adversary to see friendly preparations for action and to plan a counter move before friendly forces can act.\n\nThis loss of surprise would also increase friendly casualties.\n\nTraditionally, efforts to counter space systems have been diplomatic, economic, or military. However, because commercial satellites are not part of the adversary's forces, but are outside of U.S. control, none of these is likely to be effective alone.\n\nStill, this is not a new problem.\n\nHistorically, nations have used naval blockades to deny access to commercial support through a neutral medium. Faced with a similar situation in space, there is no reason not to look back on military history and update the concept.\n\nLike the naval blockade before it, the space blockade is the best way for a joint force commander to deny an adversary the benefits of commercial space services. By applying the well-accepted framework of the naval blockade to integrated diplomatic, economic, and military space denial efforts, a space blockade provides the joint force commander with effective force protection against satellite imagery.\n\n## Commercial Satellite Imagery Threat\n\nAlong with mission accomplishment, the joint force commander's primary responsibility is the safety of his forces. Two major parts of this force protection are protecting friendly forces from attack, and preventing the adversary from gaining knowledge of friendly activities.\"\nThe advent of commercial satellite imagery has made both these tasks more difficult in recent years.\n\nFor decades, satellite imagery was the domain of the superpowers. During that period, the U.S. and the Soviet Union primarily used satellite imagery to conduct strategic surveillance on each other's nuclear arsenals.\"\nTt served as a means of maintaining the balance of power between them rather than as a tactical or operational tool.> Adversary access to satellite imagery was considered a national-strategic level issue and outside the purview of a theater commander.\n\nThis is no longer the case.\n\nSatellite imagery has become a useful tool in many nonmilitary pursuits and, as a result, space access has grown. Many nations have or are developing their own satellite imagery capability. Japan, China, India, Israel, Brazil, Canada, Great Britain, and France have all joined the United States and Russia in the field of satellite imagery. *\nOf even greater import to the theater commander, though, is the rise of nongovernmental satellite imagery businesses. These companies include EarthWatch Inc. (USA), Orbimage (USA), Space Imaging (USA), Terraserver.com (USA), SPOT Image Corporation\n(France),\" ImageSat International (Israel), and Sovinformsputnik (Russia).\" They typically operate on a fee-for-service arrangement, selling images on request to any paying customer.\n\nSome will even sell ground control stations and the right to directly task their satellites.\nWhile U.S. satellite imaging companies grant the U.S. government the right to censor their images during times of war, no such standing agreements exist with foreign companies.'\nIn addition, some legal experts believe that the U.S. rules may be unconstitutional and will certainly be subject to legal challenge if employed.' This makes satellite imagery available to even third-world nations, and dramatically increases the likelihood of a future adversary using imagery against the U.S.\n\nSatellite imagery now has tactical and operational value in conventional conflicts.'!\n\nWhile the details of NRO activities in the Gulf War remain classitied, what is widely known is the role played by commercial imagery purchased from the French SPOT imagery satellite.\n\nAmerican forces used these commercial images to draw up more accurate maps and for mission planning. '\nSince that time, commercial imagery systems have only become more militarily effective. Advertised as \"The New Way To Win!\" in military conflicts,' the SPOT satellite used in the Gulf War had a resolution of 10 meters.'* (Each individual pixel in the image was 10\nmeters across.) As of early 2002, the commercial standard was 1 meter, with some systems planned to achieve .5 meters in the near future.\n\nAt 10 m resolution, imagery can detect large features like roads, terrain, and buildings.\n\nAt 1 m, imagery analysts can precisely identify troop movements, aircraft, C2 systems, and mine fields. At .5 m, one can precisely identify Surface-to-Air Missile sites and surface ships, and can give a more general identification of different types of vehicles (tanks, armored personnel carriers, mobile artillery, etc.), supply dumps, and artillery emplacements. '\nNow, instead of getting a simple overview of the terrain, an adversary can positively identify force bed downs and potential high value targets. This is a significant advance and should be of great concern to the joint force commander.\n\nAdversary access to advanced commercial satellite imagery has two related effects on joint force commander's force protection concerns.\n\nFirst, it aids an adversary in targeting the commander's forces by detailing friendly force deployments.\n\nSecond, availability of commercial imagery eliminates or greatly reduces our ability to achieve operational surprise;\nlack of surprise will likely increase friendly casualties.\n\n## Targeting\n\nAvailable commercial imagery allows an adversary's planners to see concentrations of U.S. and allied forces and aids them in identifying weaknesses or choke points for strike. This allows the adversary commander to concentrate his efforts, directly or indirectly, on what he perceives to be the joint force's centers of gravity. Given the spread of ballistic and cruise missiles throughout the third-world, a space-savvy adversary would find these concentrations irresistible targets for his missile fleet. This in turn would force a greater dispersal of U.S. forces and hinder the ability to mass combat power. The more precise targeting available from space imagery would threaten even these dispersed bases, slowing movement and forcing U.S. forces to base further back from the fight, making the massing of effects more difficult.\n\n## Surprise\n\nHistorically, surprise has been a large factor in America's military victories and has served to reduce U.S. casualties. A recent National Defense University study looked at the\n16 major conflicts the U.S. has been involved in during the 20th century. The study showed that with surprise, the U.S. had an average casualty ratio of 1 U.S. soldier killed or wounded to 14.5 enemy soldiers. Without surprise, the average fell to\n1 to 1.7.'\nWhile these are chilling figures, a better picture of the impact of adversary access to commercial satellite imagery on force protection can be made by a concrete comparison.\n\nIn the next pages we will examine the events of the Gulf War and compare them to a scenario of a similar conflict carried out with current space systems.\n\n## The Persian Gulf - Then And Now Operation Desert Storm - 1990\n\nThe Gulf War was, by all measures, a triumph of American military art. Facing a numerically superior force in entrenched positions, U.S forces relied on air power operating largely from bases outside of Iraq's vision to prepare the battlefield; they then used maneuver to create surprise, further shifting the odds in the U.S.'s favor.\n\nAmerican units were superior man for man, but their Iraqi opponents had built extensive defensive positions along the Kuwaiti border.!\"\nClassical military force ratios call for at least a 3 to\n1 advantage when attacking prepared defenses.' The surprise generated by the allies' 'left hook' attack plan and the devastation wrought by the preliminary air campaign went a long way towards achieving that ratio.\n\nThe ground campaign's need for surprise meant the allies needed to control Iraq's perception of the battlefield.'\" This was accomplished by preventing Iraq's observations of ground force movements in the initial 'left hook\" assault while allowing them to see the Marine feint of an amphibious landing in order to drive the Iraqis to mass their forces within Kuwait.\n\nThis operational surprise allowed U.S. forces to outflank nearly the entire Iraqi force in the theater of operations.\n\nIt served as a force multiplier to shift the odds to favor the U.S.\n\nand coalition forces.\n\nSurprise also induced panic and a sense of shock in the Iraqi regular forces, which, in turn, led to large-scale surrender and retreat.\n\nAll of this resulted in vastly fewer allied casualties than had been predicted.? Had Saddam Hussein been able to observe the forces moving north, he might have shifted his forces, particularly his elite Republican Guard, to block the allied advance.\n\nThis would have led back to the force-on-force situation that initially faced the allies and would have resulted in significantly more allied casualties.\n\nEven apart from the issue of surprise, it was essential for operational protection to keep Iraq in the dark about the details of allied troop deployments during the build-up and initial air war. While Saddam's air force was largely unable to conduct offensive strikes at allied bases and logistics depots, that was not true of his missile fleet. SCUD short-range ballistic missiles were launched at targets in Saudi Arabia and Israel throughout the war.\n\nGeneral Schwarzkopf noted in his autobiography that, due to airfield congestion, a single Iraqi plane reaching the base could have \"wreaked havoc,\" largely due to secondary explosions from aircraft and munitions stored too closely together. >'\nA successful SCUD\nattack on those fields could have produced similar results.\n\nInstead, Saddam's SCUDs were largely ineffective and unable to break coalition operational protection.\n\nThis was more due to the SCUD's inaccuracy and Iraq's lack of firm targeting data than through any effort by the Patriot anti-aircraft batteries pressed into service as anti-missile systems. With no real idea where allied forces were concentrated, > Saddam had to content himself with political targets.*\nThus, allied information dominance served to enhance force protection.\n\nIt allowed allied forces to operate unseen while simultaneously denying Iraq targets for their missiles.\n\nIn doing so, it minimized allied casualties, both from Iraqi missile assaults and from an entrenched enemy on the ground. This dominance was primarily accomplished through air supremacy. The allies established control over friendly airspace almost immediately and then seized control of Iraqi airspace.\n\nWhat is less well known than allied air supremacy is that diplomatic efforts were used to secure space supremacy over Iraq as well. At the time, Iraq had access to two sources of satellite imagery: Russian military reconnaissance satellites and the French SPOT commercial imager.>* The United States took swift action during the build-up of Desert Shield to cut Iraq off from both sources through diplomatic means, including a U.N.-mandated embargo on satellite imagery sales to Iraq.>> As a result, America and her allies enjoyed a monopoly on satellite imagery. Saddam Hussein and his forces were largely blinded to the details of allied operations and positioning, leading, at least in part, to the one-sided victory of Desert Storm.\n\nIt is logical to assume that the rest of the world watched...and learned.\n\n## Operation Son Of Storm - 2005\n\nToday, editorial headlines speculate on the probability of another war against Iraq.\n\nThis time, it is said, we will 'finish the job' and topple the Iraqi government and end its sponsorship of terrorist organizations.\" With that in mind, it is reasonable to examine what Saddam might do in today's imagery-rich environment.\n\nWe know Saddam has retained at least a portion of his arsenal of ballistic missiles.\n\nEstimates range from 85 to 100 SCUDs left from the Gulf War.\n\nIn addition, Iraq is currently working to develop a new, more modern, short-range ballistic missile called the Ababil\n100.%7\nTt is safe to assume that Iraqi ballistic missiles will remain a threat in 2005, For the purposes of this analysis, we will assume that the same factors that deterred Saddam from using weapons of mass destruction in the original Gulf War will continue to deter him. While this is admittedly an assumption open to challenge, the use of WMD against U.S. and allied forces opens too many variables, which would make it impossible to assess the impact of satellite imagery.\n\nWhat, then, would be a reasonable course of action for Iraq to take? Saddam could attempt to carry out one of four courses of action.\n\nFirst, he might attempt a diplomatic settlement without combat.\n\nIf so, while force protection will remain an issue for the theater commander, satellite imagery would not likely be a threat. Second, Saddam could hunker down in a defensive posture and try to make the cost of toppling him too high. Third, he could actively strike U.S.\n\nand allied troop and equipment concentrations in an effort to deny us greater access to the region.\n\nFourth, he could pursue both two and three, either in parallel or serial.\n\nUnless a peaceful settlement could be reached, the joint force commander opposing Iraq would have to be concerned about Iraqi access to satellite imagery.\n\nThe joint force commander would, like his predecessor in 1990/91, still need to maintain OPSEC for both security and surprise.\n\nIraqi access to commercial imagery would greatly exacerbate the challenge for the joint force commander, no matter which option the Iragis might choose.\n\nWould Iraq be able to gain access to satellite imagery?\n\nEfforts to control commercial satellite imagery by buying exclusive rights to the images in the recent war in Afghanistan received a great deal of publicity within the space community. What did not receive notice was that the agreement with Ikonos, a U.S.-based imagery company, left many other providers untouched.*\nIt is equally important to note that even during the Gulf War, SPOT's deputy directorgeneral was quoted as saying that his company would have broken the UN embargo, if another company had been willing to provide Iraq with imagery.?' He would have sold Iraq militarily useful imagery rather than let a competitor get Iraq's business.\n\nAlthough in the Gulf War another company did not offer Iraq imagery, eliminating the commercial issue for SPOT, in 2005 (or even 2002) there are many companies likely to provide such imagery to Iraq.\n\nIn the Schriever 2001 space war game, a 'green cell' of actual representatives from the commercial space industry provided realistic commercial responses to war game actions. The cell was not given a script and was told to respond as they would in a real conflict.\n\nIn the game, the cell refused to deny service to the adversary nation and cited their need to comply with existing contract commitments as their reason for doing so.*'\nThese two items, combined with the profusion of imagery sources available, imply that Iraq would likely have access to one-meter resolution imagery. Instead of being able to maneuver unseen to achieve surprise, U.S. forces would face an adversary aware of their movements and ready for their assault. The rapid roll-up of Iraqi forces seen in the Gulf War would transform into a force-on-force slugging match. While the U.S. would still retain a significant edge in both equipment and training, it is obvious that the casualties would be higher.\n\nArmed with an increased knowledge of U.S. force deployments, Iraqi missiles would likely target any heavy concentrations of U.S. forces with multiple salvos.\n\nThis would greatly increase the likelihood of major damage.\n\nNew anti-missile systems are being developed and fielded. However, the ultimately dismal performance of the Patriot (in a role it was not designed for) and the inability of air forces to find and kill Iraq's mobile SCUDs in the Gulf War, imply that massed SCUD\nsalvos on specific targets would likely get through and strike with some effect.'\nBoth of these results, the loss of surprise and the vulnerability to missile attack, would result in increased losses of both personnel and equipment. While there are potential solutions such as the dispersal of forces to avoid providing attractive missile targets, fielding improved theater missile defenses, and offensive strategies that do not require surprise, none of these come without cost in time, troops, and treasure.\n\n## Traditional Counterspace Solutions\n\nA better solution, perhaps, would be to address the source of the problem, access to satellite imagery. This could be done by a variety of methods. Access might be denied through diplomatic means, as was done in the Gulf War, through economic means, as was done with Ikonos in the recent operations in Afghanistan, or through military means.\n\n## Diplomatic\n\nDiplomacy has worked in the past. The diplomatic efforts to deny Iraq access to SPOT and Russian imagery during the Gulf War serve as a case in point for this method.\n\nHowever, diplomacy can be slow and may not always be reliable.\n\nIt depends on the neutral nation deciding that it is in its own best interests to stop providing imagery to the adversary.\n\nAs imagery capability proliferates, more and more nations would have to come to the same conclusion.\n\nAll it takes is one nation to disagree for imagery to get through. *?\n\nEven when common interests do exist, diplomacy can be a slow tool. For example, during OPERATION ALLIED FORCE in Kosovo, over three months of diplomatic maneuvers were necessary to convince Eutelsat, an international consortium made largely of our allies in the conflict, to cut off Serbian satellite television propaganda broadcasts.>*\n\n## Economic\n\nEconomic measures have also met with limited success. These can be broken down into two types: regulatory and fiscal. Regulatory measures involve requiring a company to grant the U.S. the right to declare certain images off limits during times of emergency. These\n'shutter control' clauses already exist for all U.S. satellite-imaging firms. However, they do nothing to deter a non-American company from providing data to an adversary.\n\nIn essence, this merely undercuts the commercial competitiveness of U.S. imagery firms and ensures any potential adversary will not 'buy American.'\nThe second type of measure, fiscal, was used by the United States during the recent Afghanistan conflict. Instead of trying to prevent a company from imaging the battlefield, the U.S. merely bought all rights to their images.** However, given the large number of commercial imagery sources, both corporate and national, this quickly becomes cost prohibitive.\n\nIn addition, it is predicated on trust that the company will not simply sell additional copies to the adversary.\n\nAs with diplomacy, the growing number of sources increases the likelihood of this happening.\n\n## Military\n\nMilitary measures may be broken into two types; attacks on the ground infrastructure and attacks on the satellite. Only the first has ever been used in combat. However, when dealing with third-party providers like commercial satellite imaging firms, this may not be a viable option.\n\nThe ground station may not be in the theater of operations.\n\nInstead, it is likely to be in a neutral third country.\n\nThis effectively renders it immune to attack.\n\nEven if the ground station is located within the theater, it may not be a politically viable target. As a commercial firm, it may be staffed entirely by civilians. During OPERATION ALLIED FORCE, the U.S. was accused of war crimes for the deaths of civilian employees during coalition attacks on a Serbian uplink station to Eutelsat.*\"\nAttacks on satellites carry potential pitfalls. Much like ships in international waters, satellites are considered to be sovereign territory.> An attack on a neutral nation's satellites could be considered an act of war.\n\nAgain, the large number of nations and firms that fly imagery satellites makes this a daunting task.\n\nOne commonly raised concern with attacking satellites, however, is not truly an issue for the joint force commander. While many people both in and out of the military believe that attacks on satellites are forbidden by treaty, this is not the case.\n\nA more detailed review of current treaty limitations on a space blockade may be found in Appendix I.\n\nIn summary, diplomatic and economic means may be of limited value when multiple national and commercial organizations provide imagery. Military denial is also fraught with problems, particularly when an ostensibly neutral third party is providing the imagery. By themselves, none of these measures provide the joint force commander the assurance he needs for force protection.\n\n## Space Blockade''\n\nA better approach, combining all three methods, can be found by extending an analogy from naval warfare: the blockade. Historically, combatants used a blockade to prevent an adversary from gaining military advantage from neutral vessels.*\nIn a more general sense, it is\n\"the closure of an area, as a city or harbor, by hostile forces so as to prevent entrance and exist of traffic and communication.TM This can include both military and commercial traffic.*'\nThis is exactly the problem facing the joint commander with satellite imagery. He must prevent an adversary from getting support from third parties, military, civil, and commercial. This concept can be readily expanded to space as well. Historically, the definition and application of blockades has often been subject to evolution to fit changing times.*'\nBy extrapolation, a space blockade is a belligerent operation to prevent access to space services, neutral and enemy, within an area under enemy control. **\nUnlike naval blockades, orbital mechanics make it nearly impossible to stop a satellite from over-flying a specific area without destroying it. While it is possible to turn an aircraft or ship around and force it to leave the blockaded area, little short of destruction can stop a satellite from continuing on its orbit. Extensive orbital maneuvers can delay overflight for a time, but at significant cost to the satellite's usable lifespan. However, unlike terrestrial blockades, denial of space services does not necessarily require preventing physical movement. An imagery satellite whose shutter remains closed (or is blinded) provides an adversary no more support than one that has been destroyed. The goal, then, of a space blockade, is not to bar physical passage, but to deny an adversary any information from the system.\n\nHow would a space blockade operate? Regardless of medium, blockades have several steps in common.\n\nA space blockade would run in five, sometimes overlapping, phases:\n\n1. Blockade Declaration\n(Tell 'em)\n2. Deployment of Forces\n(Weigh Anchor)\n3. Voluntary Compliance\n (Watch For Blockade Runners)\n4. Reversible Enforcement\n(Board and Turn Back)\n5. Lethal Enforcement\n(Sink 'em)\n\n## Blockade Declaration\n\nAs in any blockade, before enforcement can begin, it must be announced.\n\nHistorically, the announcement also contains the information necessary to remain clear of the blockade; start date, geographic area covered, and any exceptions or variations to a total blockade.* This allows third parties the opportunity to remove themselves from the blockaded area and remain neutral.\n\nIn a space blockade, this announcement must include what sorts of systems are covered (a ban on high-resolution systems vs. a total imagery blockade), and what would be an acceptable means of showing inactivity (shutters closed, optics turned away from the Earth, no transmissions into the blockaded area, etc.).\n\n## Deploy Forces\n\nAlong with declaring the blockade, the United States would have to deploy forces to enforce it. Unenforceable, or 'paper' blockades have long been considered invalid.**\nTt is not sufficient for the U.S. to simply demand that neutral parties cease providing space services to an adversary simply because the U.S. wishes it so. The U.S. must field forces to enforce the blockade.\n\nThese forces need not be space-based themselves.\n\nIn fact, a breadth of different systems for different situations would be preferable. These systems should range from reversible, non-damaging systems, such as jammers and dazzlers, to the capability to destroy both space and ground segments. The U.S. already has the capability to destroy ground sites within adversary territory through airpower. Air Force Space Command's (AFSPC) Strategic Master Plan, which outlines AFSPC's acquisition and modernization plans for the next 25 years, includes several systems which would be good candidates for the remaining capabilities needed to conduct a space blockade:\n\n|              |       |        | ISR    | COMM    | NAV    |\n|--------------|-------|--------|--------|---------|--------|\n| REV          | D     | REV    | D      | REV     | D      |\n| Mobile       | RF    | Jammer | X      |         |        |\n| Laser        |       |        |        |         |        |\n| Blinder      |       |        |        |         |        |\n| X            |       |        |        |         |        |\n| REV          |       |        |        |         |        |\n| =            |       |        |        |         |        |\n| Navigation   |       |        |        |         |        |\n| Jammer       |       |        |        |         |        |\n| X            |       |        |        |         |        |\n| Reversible   |       |        |        |         |        |\n| Downlink     |       |        |        |         |        |\n| Mission      |       |        |        |         |        |\n| Data         |       |        |        |         |        |\n| Jammer       |       |        |        |         |        |\n| b            |       |        |        |         |        |\n| Counterspace |       |        |        |         |        |\n| Microsats    |       |        |        |         |        |\n| X            |       |        |        |         |        |\n| X            |       |        |        |         |        |\n| X            |       |        |        |         |        |\n| Destructive  |       |        |        |         |        |\n| Space-Based  | Laser | X      | X      | X       |        |\n\n## Voluntary Compliance\n\nLike a naval blockade, the best outcome would be one of voluntary compliance, albeit compliance backed by a threat. Voluntary compliance could be pursued through diplomatic or economic (regulatory and fiscal) means depending on the ownership of the system in question.\n\nThe effectiveness of diplomatic and economic methods of denial would be greatly enhanced by the presence of fielded forces capable of conducting military operations to enforce the blockade. The presence of this 'stick' would strengthen the U.S.'s hand for negotiations and add a sense of urgency currently missing in such deliberations.\n\n## Reversible Enforcement\n\nLethal force is rarely the first option used when enforcing a naval blockade.\n\nIn naval blockades, the first response is to attempt to turn back or capture the breaching party. While this is exceedingly difficult to do physically in space, the use of reversible counterspace means followed by a warning to the parties involved could be an acceptable substitute.\n\nThe key to this phase is proportionality. Lethal force is withheld when there are less harmful means of enforcement. Since a satellite cannot be stopped or captured easily, another means of non-lethal enforcement should be used where possible. Since this phase presupposes that efforts to obtain voluntary enforcement have failed, all that remains is military enforcement.\n\nOnce U.S. space surveillance or intelligence systems detected a breach of the blockade, reversible systems could be employed. Reversible counterspace weapons are those that do no lasting damage to the satellite. Once the service has been temporarily disabled, then the U.S. would issue a warning to the party committing the breach, emphasizing the U.S.'s resolution to enforce the blockade and warning of more lethal enforcement if they continue to try to breach the blockade. This reversible attack serves as a 'shot across the bow' to warn the satellite operator that the U.S. intends to enforce the blockade.\n\nReversible space control systems, like those listed in Table 1, would give the U.S. a means to enforce a space blockade through temporary denial. This capability to 'turn back' blockade violators without destroying or permanently damaging their extremely expensive space systems would allow the U.S. to show its intent to enforce its blockade without necessarily creating a major international incident. However, if a party failed to heed the 'warning shot,'\nmore destructive methods against the satellite or ground stations might be required.\n\n## Lethal Enforcement\n\nThis transition from declaration, to reversible enforcement, to lethal enforcement provides the joint force commander with a series of graduated options to deal with the force protection problems generated by adversary access to third-party satellite imagery. It also provides a commercial provider with an incentive to break existing contracts (the threat of permanent damage to his satellite) without requiring significant loss to prove it.\n\nIn a space blockade, lethal enforcement would likely involve the physical destruction of the satellite. Attacking the satellite instead of a ground site is more attractive to the theater commander for two reasons.\n\nProportionality:\nIt is far preferable to strike an unmanned satellite in orbit than to risk killing civilians in a strike on ground facilities. At the end of OPERATION ALLIED\nFORCE, Human Rights Watch accused the U.S. and its allies of war crimes in the bombing of Serbian satellite television transmitters to stop propaganda broadcasts. They claim the deaths of the civilian personnel working there were not justified by the military utility of the target.*> Attacks on satellites do not risk human lives, civilian or military.\n\nGround Site Location: For many third parties imagery systems, the ground site is located in allied or neutral territory. Physical destruction of such a site could be construed as an act of war against their host country. This would likely embroil the U.S. in additional conflicts or diplomatic emergencies that it neither needed nor wanted.\n\n## Conclusion\n\nSatellite imagery has grown over the past few decades from a strategic tool of superpowers to a widespread commercial utility.\n\nThis increase in both availability and capability means that even minor adversaries now have the capability to use militarily relevant satellite imagery against U.S. forces.\n\nAdversary access to readily available satellite imagery poses a significant threat to the safety and security of the joint force. Access to imagery makes it feasible for an adversary to strike at U.S. troop deployments and equipment concentrations with readily available standoff weapons. At the same time it removes the element of surprise that has been a common force multiplier in American combat actions. Both effects serve to increase the vulnerability and casualty rate of U.S. forces. The joint force commander cannot allow this to happen.\n\nTraditional methods of denying adversary access to satellite imagery are not sufficient when an adversary has multiple commercial sources from which to choose. Only a space blockade, encompassing elements all three methods (diplomatic, economic, and military) provides a high likelihood of success.\n\nIn the interests of force protection, joint force commanders should consider the merits of a space blockade as part of operational plans.\n\nBy including the concept in deliberate plans well before any crisis, the myriad approvals and support arrangements needed to execute this concept could be obtained in advance. This would allow the joint force commander to conduct the blockade in a timely fashion and thereby protect his force from the effects of satellite imagery.\n\n## Notes\n\n! Joint Chiefs of Staff, Doctrine for Joint Operations, Joint Pub 3.0 (Washington, DC: 10 September 2001) pp.\n\n111-31-32 2 Cynthia A. S. McKinley, \"When The Enemy Has Our Eyes,\" in Beyond the Paths of Heaven: The Emergence of Space Power Thought, ed. Bruce M. DeBlois, (Maxwell AFB, AL: Air University Press, Sept 1999), pp. 307-\n315\n? Ibid. pp. 309-315\n* Ibid. pp. 327-328\n3 \"Commercial Satellite Operators,\" Aviation Week and Space Technology, (17 Jan 2000), pp. 248-250\n6 \"Press Releases,\" Lkd. ImageSat International web site. <http://imagesatintl.com> [25 January 2002] \" Ann M. Florini and Yahya Dehgazada, \"Commercial Satellite Imagery Comes of Age,\" Issues in Science and Technology, Fall 1999, p. 45\n \"Satellite Operating Partner (SOP),\" Lkd. ImageSat International web site. <http://imagesatintl.com> [25\nJanuary 2002] In addition, the author has seen, but cannot document, Space Imaging's similar offer for a transportable ground station and processing facility.\n\n Vernon Loeb, \"U.S. Is Relaxing Rules On Sales Of Satellite Photos,\" Washington Post, 16 December 2000, sec. 1,p. 3\nY9 Florini, op. cit, p. 50\n' Thomas S. Moorman, Jr., \"Space: A New Strategic Frontier,\" Air Power Journal (Spring 1992), pp. 14-23\n12 McKinley, op. cit., pp. 317 - 318\nfi \"SPOT a New Way to Win,\" advertisement, Defense Electronics (November 1988), p. 68.\n\nIbid, p. 315\n'S James G. Lee, \"Counterspace Operations for Information Dominance,\" in Beyond the Paths of Heaven: The Emergence of Space Power Thought, ed. Bruce M. DeBlois, (Maxwell AFB, AL: Air University Press, Sept\n1999), p. 266\n' Michael Sheehan, Sean J ersey, & Meridith Linn, Aggressor Space Applications Project: The Military Impact of Commercial Satellite Imagery Final Out-Brief (Kirtland AFB, NM: Air Force Research Laboratory/DEPI,\n1999)\n7 Michael R.Gordon and Bernard E. Trainor, The Generals' War (New York: Little, Brown and Company,\n1995), p. 163\n'8 Naval War College, Commander's Estimate of the Situation Workbook, NWC 4111D (Newport, RI: 13\nNovember 2001), p. B-3\n1% Joint Chiefs of Staff, Doctrine for Joint Operations, Joint Pub 3.0 (Washington, DC: 10 September 2001), p.\n\n111-36 20 Donald J. Kutyna, \"Spacecom: We Lead Today, But What About Tomorrow?,\" Defense 91 (July/August\n1991), p. 27\n' H. Norman Schwartzkopf, It Doesn't Take a Hero, (New York: Bantam Books, Oct 1992), pp. 350-351\n2 David Taylor, \"Emerging Satellite Imaging Capabilities And Its Impact On U.S. Military Operations,\"\n(Unpublished Research Paper: U.S. Naval War College, Newport, RI: 1998) pp. 10-11\n3 The political, rather than military nature, of these strikes is borne out by the way in which they were launched. With a circular error probable (CEP) of 900 meters and a fairly small 250 kg warhead, individually launched SCUDs did major damage only by chance. As a terror weapons, that was all they needed to do.\n\nIf Saddam had better targeting data available, multiple salvos could have been used to ensure that specific targets were struck.\n\nSee William C. Story, Jr., \"Third World Traps and Pitfalls: Ballistic Missiles, Cruise Missiles, and Land-Based Air Power,\" (Unpublished Research Paper: U.S. Air University. School of Advanced Airpower Studies, Maxwell AFB, AL: 1994) for more information on Iraqi SCUD capabilities.\n\n24 McKinley, op cit. p. 303\n25 Essays on Air and Space Power. Vol. I (Maxwell AFB, AL: Air University Press, 1997), p. 117\n26 Richard Perle, \"The U.S. Must Strike At Saddam Hussein,\" New York Times, 28 December 2000, Late\n28 Pamela Hess, \"Defense Deal To Keep Satellite Images Secret\", Washington Times, 14 October 2001, sec. A,\n2\n}?9 McKinley, op. cit., p. 319\n3\nThomas E. Ricks, \"Space Is Playing Field For Newest War Game,\" The Washington Post, 29 January 2001, sec. A, p.\n\n1\n31 Story, op. cit., p. 72-73\n32 Joseph C. Anselmo, \"Shutter Control: How Far Will Uncle Sam Go ?,\" Aviation Week and Space Technology, (31 January 2000) pp. 55-56 3 \"Eutelsat Blocks Service To Yugoslavian Station\", Space News, 7 Jun 1999, p.2\n3 Pamela Hess, \"Defense Deal To Keep Satellite Images Secret\", Washington Times, 14 October, 2001, sec. A,\n2\n5)5 \"NATO Rejects War Crime Allegations In Kosovo Campaign\", CNN.com 7 Jun 2000.\n\n<http://www.cnn.com/2000/WORLD/europe/06/07/nato.amnesty.02/> [29 January 2002] 3 Peter T. Breier, \"Legal Proscriptions Pertaining To The Use Of Force In Outer Space\" (Unpublished Research Paper: SAIC, Washington, DC: January 2000), p. 57\n> Much of the author's thoughts on the conduct of a space blockade were formed while serving as Chief of Space Control Strategy, Policy, and Doctrine for Air Force Space Command. See Robert A. Fabian and Tom Riebe, A Space Blockade: Flexible and Responsive Denial of Adversary Use of Space, Space 2000 Symposium Papers (Kansas City, MO: American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics, 2000) for an earlier version of the space blockade concept.\n\n% Michael N. Schmitt, \"Aerial Blockades in Historical, Legal, and Practical Perspective\", USAFA Journal of Legal Studies, Vol. 2 (1991), p. 21\n39 \"Blockade,\" Webster's II New Riverside University Dictionary, 1984 Ed.\n\nOpT, Jack, \"Studies in Economic Warfare,\" in Modern Developments in International Law, 1940, p. 58\n1 Schmitt, op cit., p. 23\n2 See Peter Axup, \"Space Control For The Theater Commander: Naval Blockade As A Precedent\"\n(Unpublished Research Paper: U.S. Naval War College, Newport, RI: 17 May 1999) for another take on the sg)ace blockade analogy focused on reversible attacks and the legal precedents of blockades.\n\n*\nSchmitt, op. cit., p. 41\n4 Jack, op. cit., pp. 58-59\n45 \"NATO Rejects War Crime Allegations In Kosovo Campaign\", CNN.com, 7 Jun 2000.\n\n<http://www.cnn.com/2000/WORLD/europe/06/07/nato.amnesty.02/> [29 January 2002]\n\n## Bibliography\n\nAnselmo, Joseph C. \"Shutter Control: How Far Will Uncle Sam Go?\" Aviation Week and\nSpace Technology, 31 January 2000: 55-56.\nAxup, Peter, \"Space Control For The Theater Commander: Naval Blockade As A Precedent.\"\nUnpublished Research Paper, U.S. Naval War College, Newport, RI: 1999.\nBanks, Brian, \"Spy In The Sky.\" Canadian Business (10 January 2000): 31-33. Breier, Peter T., \"Legal Proscriptions Pertaining To The Use Of Force In Outer Space.\"\nUnpublished White Paper: SAIC, Washington, DC: January 2000.\nCenter for Defense and International Security Studies, \"National Briefings: Iraq.\" National\nBriefings, <http://www.cdiss.org/iraq_b.htm> [25 January 2002]\n\"Commercial Satellite Operators.\" Aviation Week and Space Technology 17 (Jan 2000):\n248-250.\nEssays on Air and Space Power, Vol. 1I. Maxwell AFB, AL: Air University Press, 1997.\n\nFabian, Robert A. and Tom Riebe, A Space Blockade:; Flexible and Responsive Denial of\nAdversary Use of Space. Space 2000 Symposium Papers, Kansas City, MO:\nAmerican Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics, 2000.\nFlorini, Ann M. and Yahya Dehqazada. \"Commercial Satellite Imagery Comes of Age.\"\nIssues in Science and Technology, Fall 1999: 45-52.\nGordon, Michael R. and Bernard E. Trainor. The Generals' War. New York: Little, Brown\nand Company, 1995.\nGrinter, Lawrence E. and Barry R. Schneider. \"On Twenty-first Century Warfare.\" in\nBattlefield of the Future, 21% Century Warfare Issues, edited by Barry R. Schneider and\nLawrence E. Grinter, 267-274. Maxwell AFB, AL: Air University Press, Sept 1998.\nHorner, Charles A. \"New-Era Warfare.\" in Battlefield of the Future, 21% Century Warfare\nIssues, edited by Barry R. Schneider and Lawrence E. Grinter, 47-63. Maxwell AFB, AL: Air University Press, Sept 1998.\nJack, D.T., \"Studies in Economic Warfare,\" Modern Developments in International Law. 1940.\nKutyna, Donald J. \"Spacecom: We Lead Today, but What About Tomorrow?\" Defense 91\n(July/August 1991).\nLee, James G. \"Counterspace Operations for Information Dominance.\" in Beyond the Paths\nof Heaven; The Emergence of Space Power Thought, edited by Bruce M. DeBlois,\n249-301. Maxwell AFB, AL: Air University Press, Sept 1999.\nLupton, David E., On Space Warfare: A Space Power Doctrine. Maxwell AFB, AL: Air\nUniversity Press, 1988.\nMcKinley, Cynthia A. S. \"When The Enemy Has Our Eyes.\" in Beyond the Paths of Heaven;\nThe Emergence of Space Power Thought, edited by Bruce M. DeBlois, 303-362.\nMaxwell AFB, AL: Air University Press, Sept 1999.\nMeyer, Donald A., \"Space Countersurveillance: A Requisite For Theater Defense Planning.\"\nUnpublished Research Paper, U.S. Naval War College, Newport, RI: 1993.\nMoorman, Thomas S. Jr. \"Space: A New Strategic Frontier.\" Air Power Journal (Spring\n1992): 14-23.\n\"NATO Rejects War Crime Allegations In Kosovo Campaign.\" CNN.com 7 Jun 2000\n<http://www.cnn.com/2000/WORLD/europe/06/07/nato.amnesty.02/> [29 January 2002]\nNaval War College. Commander's Estimate of the Situation Workbook. NWC 4111D\nNewport, RI: 13 November 2001.\n\nNewberry, Robert D., Space Doctrine for the Twenty-first Century. Maxwell AFB, AL: Air\nUniversity Press, 1998.\nOberg, Jim, Space Power Theory. Colorado Springs, CO: U.S. Air Force Academy, 1999.\n\n\"Press Releases\" Lkd. ImageSat International web site. <http://imagesatintl.com> [25 January\n2002]\n\"Satellite Operating Partner (SOP),\" Lkd. ImageSat International web site.\n\n<http://imagesatintl.com> [25 January 2002].\n\nSchmitt, Michael N., \"Aerial Blockades in Historical, Legal, and Practical Perspective.\"\nUSAFA Journal of Legal Studies, Vol. 2, 1991.\nSchwartzkopf, H. Norman. It Doesn't Take a Hero New York: Bantam Books, Oct 1992. Scneider, Barry R. \"Principles of War for the Battlefield of the Future.\" in Battlefield of the\nFuture, 21* Century Warfare Issues, edited by Barry R. Schneider and Lawrence E.\nGrinter, 5-42. Maxwell AFB, AL: Air University Press, Sept 1998.\nSheehan, Michael, Sean Jersey, & Meridith Linn. Aggressor Space Applications Project: The\nMilitary Impact of Commercial Satellite Imagery Final Qut-Brief Kirtland AFB,\nNM: Air Force Research Laboratory/DEPI, 1999.\nSpacy, William L., II, Does the United States Need Space-Based Weapons? Maxwell AFB,\nAL: Air University Press, 1999.\n\"Spot a New Way to Win\" advertisement, Defense Electronics (November 1988): 68.\n\nStory, William C. Jr., \"Third World Traps and Pitfalls: Ballistic Missiles, Cruise Missiles,\nand Land-Based Air Power.\" Unpublished Research Paper: U.S. Air University.\nSchool of Advanced Airpower Studies, Maxwell AFB, AL: 1994.\nSummers, Harry G., On Strategy II: A Critical Analysis of the Gulf War. New York: Dell\nPublishing, 1992.\nTaylor, David. \"Emerging Satellite Imaging Capabilities And Its Impact On U.S. Military\nOperations.\" Unpublished Research Paper, U.S. Naval War College, Newport, RI:\n1998.\nU.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff. Doctrine for Joint Operations, Joint Pub 3.0. Washington, DC: 10\nSeptember 2001."
    },
    {
        "text": "#\n\n SANDIA REPORT\nSAND2012-10177 Unlimited Release Printed November 2012\n\n\nProactive Defense for Evolving Cyber Threats Richard Colbaugh and Kristin Glass Prepared by Sandia National Laboratories Albuquerque, New Mexico  87185 and Livermore, California  94550\n\nSandia National Laboratories is a multi-program laboratory managed and operated by Sandia Corporation, a wholly owned subsidiary of Lockheed Martin Corporation, for the U.S. Department of Energy's National Nuclear Security Administration under contract DE-AC04-94AL85000. Approved for public release; further dissemination unlimited.\n\n\n\n                        Issued by Sandia National Laboratories, operated for the United St ates Department of Energy\n                        by Sandia Corporation.\n\n                        NOTICE:  This report was pr epared as an account of work sponsored b y an agency of the\n                        United States Government.  Neither the United States Government, nor any agency thereof,\n                        nor any of their employees, nor any of their co ntractors, subcontractors, or their emplo yees,\n                       make any warranty, express or implied, or assume any legal liability or responsibility for the\n                       accuracy, completeness, or usefulness of an y information, apparatus, product, or process\n                       disclosed, or represent that its use would not infringe privately owned rights. Reference herein\n                       to any specific commercial p\n                                                                roduct, process, or service b\n                                                                                                       y trade name, trademark,\n                       manufacturer, or otherwise, do es not necessa rily constitute or imply its en dorsement,\n                       recommendation, or favoring by the United States Government, any agency thereof, or any of\n                       their contractors or subcontractors.  The views and opinions expr essed herein do not\n                       necessarily state or reflect those of the United States Government, any agency thereof, or any\n                       of their contractors.\n\n                       Printed in the United States of America. This report has been reproduced directly from the best\n                       available copy.\n\n                       Available to DOE and DOE contractors from\n\n                             U.S. Department of Energy\n\n                             Office of Scientific and Technical Information\n\n                             P.O. Box 62\n\n                             Oak Ridge, TN  37831\n\n                             Telephone:\n                                                    (865) 576-8401\n\n                             Facsimile:\n                                                    (865) 576-5728\n\n                             E-Mail:\n                                                    reports@adonis.osti.gov\n\n\nOnline ordering: http://www.osti.gov/bridge Available to the public from\nU.S. Department of Commerce\n\nNational Technical Information Service\n\n5285 Port Royal Rd.\n\nSpringfield, VA  22161\nTelephone:\n(800) 553-6847\n\nFacsimile:\n(703) 605-6900\n\nE-Mail:\norders@ntis.fedworld.gov\n\nOnline order:\nhttp://www.ntis.gov/help/ordermethods.asp?loc=7-4-0#online\n\n                             SAND2012-10177\n                              Unlimited Release\n                             Printed November 2012\n\n  Proactive Defense for Evolving Cyber Threats\n\n                              Richard Colbaugh\n                          Analytics and Cryptography\n\n                                Kristin Glass\n                         Cyber Research and Education\n\n                          Sandia National Laboratories\n                               P.O. Box 5800\n                   Albuquerque, New Mexico  87185-MSXXXX\n\n                                 Abstract\n\nThere is great interest to develop proactive methods of cyber defense, in which future attack strategies are\nanticipated and these insights are incorporated into defense designs; however, little has been done to place\nthis ambitious objective on a sound scientific foundation. Indeed, even fundamental issues associated with\nhow the \"arms race\" between attackers and defenders actually leads to predictability in attacker activity,\nor how to effectively and scalably detect this predictability in the relational/temporal data streams\ngenerated by attacker/defender adaptation, haven't been resolved. This LDRD project addressed many of\nthese challenges and the results are briefly summarized here.\nWe have characterized the predictability of attacker/defender coevolution and have leveraged our findings\nto create a framework for designing proactive defenses for large (organizational) networks. More\nspecifically, this project applied rigorous predictability-based analytics to two central and complementary\naspects of the network defense problem - attack strategies of the adversaries and vulnerabilities of the\ndefenders' systems - and used the results to develop a scientifically-grounded, practically-implementable\nmethodology for designing proactive cyber defense systems. Briefly, predictive analysis of attack\nstrategies involved first conducting predictability assessments to characterize attacker adaptation patterns\nin given domains, and then used these patterns to \"train\" adaptive defense systems capable of providing\nrobust performance against both current and (near) future threats.\nThe problem of identifying and prioritizing defender system vulnerabilities was addressed using statistical\nand machine learning to analyze a broad range of data (e.g., cyber, social media) on recently detected\nsystem vulnerabilities to \"learn\" classifiers that predict how likely it is that, and how soon, new\nvulnerabilities will be exploited. A variety of cyber threat case studies were developed and investigated\nthroughout the project, one selected from the cyber security research community and one that is more\ncomprehensive and of higher priority to SNL and to external national security partners.\nA sample of research results and application of this methodology are included in this report (as a series of\npeer-reviewed publications). For ease of reference the title and SAND number are included below.\n\n\n\nCONTENTS\n\n[1]\nEarly warning analysis for social diffusion events, *Security Informatics*, Vol. 1, 2012, SAND 2010-\n5334C.\n[2]\nProactive cyber defense, Chapter in *Springer Integrated Series on Intelligent Systems*, 2012\nDocument No. 5299122, SAND 2011-8794P).\n[3]\nPredictability-oriented defense against adaptive adversaries, Proc. IEEE International Conference\non Systems, Man, and Cybernetics, Seoul, Korea, October 2012. [or Predictive moving target defense, *Proc. 2012 National Symposium on Moving Target Research*, Annapolis, MD, June\n2012.], SAND 2012-4007C.\n[4]\nLeveraging sociological models for prediction I: Inferring adversarial relationships, and II: Early\nwarning for complex contagions, Proc. IEEE International Conference on Intelligence and Security Informatics, Washington, DC, June 2012 [Winner of the 2012 Best Paper Award, IEEE ISI], SAND\n2012-6729C.\n[5]\nPredictive defense against evolving adversaries, Proc. IEEE International Conference on Intelligence and Security Informatics, Washington, DC, June 2012, SAND 2012-4007C.\n[6]\nProactive defense for evolving cyber threats, Proc. IEEE International Conference on Intelligence\nand Security Informatics, Beijing, China, July 2011 [Winner of the 2011 Best Paper Award, IEEE\nISI], SAND 2011-2445C.\n# Early Warning Analysis For Social Diffusion Events\n\nRichard Colbaugh1 and Kristin Glass2\n\n1 Analytics and Cryptography Department, Sandia National Laboratories, Albuquerque, USA\n2Cyber Research and Education Department, Sandia National Laboratories, Albuquerque, USA\n\nRC: colbaugh@comcast.net KG: kglass609@comcast.net\n (corresponding author)\n\nAbstract  -- There is considerable interest in developing predictive capabilities for social diffusion processes, for instance to permit early identification of emerging contentious situations, rapid detection of disease outbreaks, or accurate forecasting of the ultimate reach of potentially \"viral\" ideas or behaviors. This paper proposes a new approach to this predictive analytics problem, in which analysis of meso-scale network dynamics is leveraged to generate useful predictions for complex social phenomena. We begin by deriving a stochastic hybrid dynamical systems (S-HDS) model for diffusion processes taking place over social networks with realistic topologies; this modeling approach is inspired by recent work in biology demonstrating that S-HDS offer a useful mathematical formalism with which to represent complex, multi-scale biological network dynamics. We then perform formal stochastic reachability analysis with this S-HDS model and conclude that the outcomes of social diffusion processes may depend crucially upon the way the early dynamics of the process interacts with the underlying network's community structure and *core-periphery structure*. This theoretical finding  provides the foundations for developing a machine learning algorithm that enables accurate early warning analysis for social diffusion events. The utility of the warning algorithm, and the power of network-based predictive metrics, are demonstrated through an empirical investigation of the propagation of political \"memes\" over social media networks. Additionally, we illustrate the potential of the approach for security informatics applications through case studies involving early warning analysis of large-scale protests events and politically-motivated cyber attacks.\nKeywords: social dynamics, predictive analysis, early warning, protest and mobilization, cyber security, security informatics.\n\nUnderstanding the way information, behaviors, innovations, and diseases propagate over social networks is of great importance in a wide variety of domains [e.g., 1-4], including national security [e.g., 5-13]. Of particular interest are predictive capabilities for social diffusion, for instance to enable early warning concerning the emergence of a violent conflict or outbreak of an epidemic. As a consequence, vast resources are devoted to the task of predicting the outcomes of diffusion processes, but the quality of such predictions is often poor. It is tempting to conclude that the problem is one of insufficient information. Clearly diffusion phenomena which \"go viral\" are qualitatively different from those that don't or they wouldn't be so dominant, the conventional wisdom goes, so in order to make good predictions we must collect enough data to allow these crucial differences to be identified.\nRecent research calls into question this intuitively plausible premise and, indeed, indicates that intuition can be an unreliable guide to constructing successful prediction methods. For example, studies of the predictability of popular culture indicate that the *intrinsic* attributes commonly believed to be important when assessing the likelihood of adoption of cultural products, such as the quality of the product itself, do not possess much predictive power [14-16]. This research offers evidence that, when individuals are influenced by the actions of others, it may not be possible to obtain reliable predictions using methods which focus on intrinsics alone; instead, it may be necessary to incorporate aspects of *social influence* into the prediction process. Very recently a handful of investigations have shown the value of considering even simple and indirect measures of social influence, such as early social media \"buzz\", when forming predictions. This work has produced useful prediction algorithms for an array of social phenomena, including markets [16-21], political and social movements [17,22], mobilization and protest behavior\n[23,24], epidemics [17,25], social media dynamics [26,27], and the evolution of cyber threats [28].\nRecognizing the importance of accounting for social influence, this paper proposes a predictive methodology which explicitly considers the way individuals influence one another through their social networks. It is expected that prediction algorithms which are based, in part, on network dynamics metrics will outperform existing methods and be applicable to a wider range of diffusion systems. We begin by developing a stochastic hybrid dynamical systems (S-HDS) model for diffusion processes taking place over social networks with realistic topologies. This modeling approach is inspired by recent work in biology demonstrating that S-HDS offer a useful mathematical formalism with which to represent multi-scale biological network dynamics [29-33]. An S-HDS is a feedback interconnection of a discrete-state stochastic process, such as a Markov chain, with a family of continuous-state stochastic dynamical systems [34].\n\nCombining discrete and continuous dynamics in this way provides a rigorous, expressive, and computationally-tractable framework for modeling the dynamics of the complex, highly-evolved networks that are ubiquitous in biological systems [35], and we show in this paper that the S-HDS framework is also wellsuited to the task of modeling the network dynamics which underlie social diffusion.\nWith the S-HDS model in hand, we then perform formal stochastic reachability analysis and conclude that the outcomes of social diffusion processes may depend crucially upon the way the early dynamics of the process propagates with respect to the underlying network's 1.) *community structure*, that is, densely connected groupings of individuals which have only relatively few links to other groups [36], and 2.) *core-periphery structure*, reflecting the presence of a small group of \"core\" individuals that are densely connected to each other and are also close to the remainder of the network [36]. This theoretical finding leads to the identification of novel metrics for the community and core-periphery dynamics which should be useful early indicators of which diffusion events will propagate widely, ultimately affecting a substantial portion of the population of interest, and which will not. Prediction is accomplished with a machine learning algorithm [37] which is based, in part, on these network dynamics metrics.\nThe paper makes three main contributions. First, we present a new S-HDS-based framework for modeling social diffusion on networks of real-world scale and complexity, enabling these dynamics to be appropriately represented as multi-scale phenomena. Second, we formulate predictive analysis problems as questions concerning the reachability of diffusion events, and present a novel \"altitude function\" method for assessing reachability *without simulating system trajectories*. The altitude function technique is both mathematically rigorous and computationally tractable, thereby permitting the derivation of provably-correct assessments for complex, large-scale systems. Third, the S-HDS model and altitude function analytics are used to characterize the importance of *meso-scale* network features, specifically network community and core-periphery structures, for understanding diffusion processes and predicting their fates.\n\nThis characterization, in turn, forms the foundation for developing a new machine learning-based classification algorithm which employs these network dynamics features for accurate early warning analysis.\n\nAdditionally, we evaluate the efficacy of this early warning algorithm through three empirical case studies investigating: 1.) the propagation of political \"memes\" [38] over social media networks, 2.) warning analysis for large-scale mobilization and protest events, and 3.) early warning for politically-motivated cyber attacks. These empirical studies illustrate the effectiveness of the proposed early warning methodology and demonstrate the significant predictive power of meso-scale network metrics for social diffusion processes. Moreover, the results indicate that the proposed algorithm provides a readily-implementable Web-based tool for early warning analysis for important classes of security-relevant diffusion events.\n\n## 2. Early Warning Methodology\n\nThis section begins by defining the class of early warning problems of interest, then presents a brief, intuitive summary of the proposed social diffusion modeling and predictive analysis procedure, and finally describes the early warning indicators identified through this analytic procedure and the warning algorithm that is derived based on these results. A detailed mathematical presentation of the modeling and analysis methods is provided in Appendices One and Two. 2.1 Problem Formulation\nThe objective of this paper is to develop a scientifically-rigorous, practically-implementable methodology for performing early warning analysis for social diffusion events. Roughly speaking, we suppose that some \"triggering event\" has taken place or contentious issue is emerging, and we wish to determine, as early as possible, whether this event or issue will ultimately generate a large, self-sustaining reaction, involving the diffusion of discussions and actions through a substantial segment of a population, or will instead quickly dissipate. An illustrative example of the basic idea is provided by the contrasting reactions to 1.) the publication in September 2005 of cartoons depicting Mohammad in the Danish newspaper Jyllands-Posten, and 2.) the lecture given by Pope Benedict XVI in September 2006 quoting controversial material concerning Islam. While each event appeared at the outset to have the potential to trigger significant protests, the \"Danish cartoons\" incident ultimately led to substantial Muslim mobilization, including massive protests and considerable violence, while outrage triggered by the pope lecture quickly subsided with essentially no violence. It would obviously be very useful to have the capability to distinguish these two types of reaction as early in the event lifecycle as possible.\nIn order to state the early warning problem more precisely, we make a few assumptions:\n\n-\nWe suppose that the triggering event or emerging situation is given. Note that this is often the case in national security settings, and that additionally there exist techniques for *discovering* such events or issues in an automated or semi-automated manner [e.g., 24,27].\n-\nIt is assumed that data are available which provide a view of the early reaction of a relevant population to the trigger or issue of interest. These data can be only indirectly related to the event; for example, in this paper the primary data source is social media discussions (e.g., blog posts) while the\nevents of interest are \"real-world\" activities such as protests.\n-\nIt is expected that the \"customer\" for the analysis provides at least qualitative definitions of the population of interest and the scale of reaction for which a warning is desired. Thus, for instance, in the\nexample above, it might be of interest to anticipate Muslim reaction to the triggering incident, and to obtain a warning alert if the reaction is likely to eventually include self-sustaining, violent protests.\nWe formulate the early warning problem as a classification task. More specifically, given a triggering incident, one or more information sources which reflect (perhaps indirectly) the reaction to this trigger by a population of interest (e.g., social media discussions, intelligence reporting), and a definition for what constitutes an \"alarming\" reaction, the goal is to design a classifier which accurately predicts, as early as possible, whether or not reaction to the event will ultimately become alarming. Note that a more mathematically precise statement of this warning problem is given in Appendix Two. Observe that this type of warning analysis is both important in applications and \"easier\" to accomplish than more standard prediction or forecasting goals. Consider, as a familiar non-security example, the case of movie success. It is shown in [14-16] that it is likely to be impossible to predict movie revenues, even very roughly, based on the intrinsic information available concerning the movie ex ante (e.g., personnel, genre, critic reviews).\n\nHowever, we have demonstrated that it is possible to identify early indicators of movie success, such as temporal patterns in pre-release \"buzz\", and to use these indicators to accurately predict ultimate box office revenues [39]. Recent research indicates that this result holds more generally, so that it may be more scientifically-sensible in many domains to pursue early warning rather than ex ante prediction goals [14-\n28]. 2.2 S-HDS Social Diffusion Model\nIn social diffusion, individuals are affected by what others do. This is easy to visualize in the case of disease transmission, with infections being passed from person to person. Information, innovations, behaviors, and so on can also propagate through a population, as individuals become aware of a new piece of information or an activity and are persuaded of its relevance and utility through their social and information networks. The dynamics of social diffusion can therefore depend upon the topological features of the pertinent networks, such as the presence of highly connected blogs in a social media network (see, e.g., [4]). Indeed, social scientists have developed extensive theories explaining the role of social networks in the dynamics of social diffusion and mobilization (see the books [2-4] and the references therein, and also Appendix One, for discussions of this work). This dependence suggests that, in order to understand the predictability of social diffusion phenomena and in particular to identify features which possess predictive power, it is necessary to conduct the analysis using social and information network models with realistic topologies.\nThe social diffusion models examined in this study possess networks with three topological properties that are ubiquitous in real-world social and information networks and which have the potential to impact diffusion dynamics [36]:\n\n-\ntransitivity - the property that the network neighbors of a given individual have a heightened probability of being connected to one another;\n-\ncommunity structure - the presence of densely connected groupings of individuals which have only\nrelatively few links to other groups;\n-\ncore-periphery structure - the presence of a small group of \"core\" individuals which are densely connected to each other and are also close to the other individuals in the network.\nAdditionally, we permit our network models to possess *right-skewed degree distributions,* in which most individuals have only a few network neighbors while a few individuals have a great many neighbors, as such networks are common in online settings. The manner in which the communities and the core-periphery are arranged will be said to define the network's *meso-scale* structure. For convenience of exposition, the subsets of individuals specified by a partitioning of the network into communities and into a core and periphery will sometimes be referred to as the *partition elements*, and the collection of these\n(community and core-periphery) subsets will be called the *network partition*.\nIn order to deal effectively with networks possessing realistic topologies, and in particular to represent and analyze the way social dynamics is affected by the meso-scale structure, we model social diffusion in a manner which explicitly separates the individual, or \"micro\", dynamics from the collective dynamics. More specifically, we adopt a multi-scale modeling framework consisting of three network scales:\n\n\n-\na *micro-scale*, for modeling the behavior of individuals;\n-\na *meso-scale*, which represents the interaction dynamics of individuals within the same network partition element (community or core/periphery);\n-\na *macro-scale*, which characterizes the interaction between partition elements.\nThe micro-scale quantifies the way individuals combine their own inherent preferences or attributes with the influences of others to arrive at their chosen courses of action. It is shown in Appendix One that separating the micro-scale dynamics from the meso- and macro-scale activity permits the dependence of this decision-making process on the social network to be characterized in a surprisingly straightforward way. The meso- and macro-scale components of the proposed modeling framework together quantify the way the decision-making processes of individuals interact to produce collective behavior at the population level. The role of the meso-scale model is to quantify and illuminate the manner in which behaviors within each network partition element (communities, core or periphery), while the macro-scale model captures the interactions *between* these elements. The primary assumptions are that interactions between individuals belonging to the same network partition element can be modeled more simply than those between individuals from distinct partition elements, and that the latter interactions are constrained by the \"metanetwork\" which defines the dependencies between the partition elements.\nThis perspective offers a number of advantages. For example, at the micro-scale it is possible to unify behaviors which appear different phenomenologically but actually possess equivalent dynamics. We show in Appendix One that the social dynamics associated with classical \"utility-maximizing\" behavior and those arising from individuals attempting to infer information by observing the actions of others can be represented with the *same* micro-scale model. Additionally, separating the individual and collective dynamics supports efficient and flexible model building and simplifies the process of estimating model components from empirical data [39]. Dividing the collective dynamics into meso- and macro-scales also provides a mathematically-tractable, sociologically-sensible means of representing complex social network dynamics. For instance, because network communities are topological structures corresponding to localized social settings in the real world, determined by workplace, family, physical neighborhood, and so on, it is natural both mathematically and sociologically to model the interactions of individuals *within* communities as qualitatively different (e.g., more frequent and homogeneous) than those *between* communities.\nDeveloping a mathematically-rigorous, expressive, scalable, and computationally-tractable framework within which multi-scale social network diffusion models can be constructed is, of course, a challenging undertaking. Recent work in systems biology has demonstrated that stochastic hybrid dynamical systems (S-HDS) provide a useful mathematical formalism with which to represent biological network dynamics that possess multiple temporal and spatial scales [29-33]. An S-HDS is a feedback interconnection of a discrete-state stochastic process, such as a Markov chain, with a family of continuous-state stochastic dynamical systems [34]. Thus the discrete system dynamics depends on the continuous system state, perhaps because different regions of the continuous state space are associated with different matrices of Markov state transition probabilities, and the particular continuous system which is \"active\" at a given time depends on the discrete system state. Combining discrete and continuous dynamics in this way provides an effective framework for modeling the dynamics of the complex, highly-evolved networks that are ubiquitous in biological systems [35]. For example, the rigorous yet tractable integration of switching behavior with continuous dynamics enabled by the S-HDS model allows accurate and efficient representation of biological phenomena evolving over disparate temporal scales [29-31] and spatial scales [32,33].\nInspired by this work, in this paper we apply the S-HDS framework to social diffusion dynamics evolving over multiple *network* scales. Appendix One provides a detailed discussion of the proposed S-\nHDS social diffusion model and demonstrates the effectiveness with which this formalism captures multiscale network dynamics. As an intuitive illustration of the way S-HDS enable complex network phenomena to be efficiently represented, consider the task of modeling diffusion on a network that possesses community structure. As shown in Figure 1, this diffusion consists of two components: 1.) intracommunity dynamics, involving frequent interactions between individuals within the same community and the resulting gradual change in the concentrations of \"infected\" (red) individuals, and 2.) intercommunity dynamics, in which the \"infection\" jumps from one community to another, for instance because an infected individual \"visits\" a new community. S-HDS models offer a natural framework for representing these dynamics, with the S-HDS continuous system modeling the intra-community dynamics\n(e.g., via stochastic differential equations), the discrete system capturing the inter-community dynamics\n(e.g., using a Markov chain), and the interplay between these dynamics being represented by the S-HDS\nfeedback structure. A detailed description of the manner in which S-HDS models can be used to capture social diffusion on networks with realistic topologies is given in Appendix One.\ni i j j inputs inputs k k inputs inputs\n\n\n\n2.3 Predictability Assessment One hallmark of social diffusion processes is their ostensible unpredictability: phenomena from hits and flops in cultural markets to financial system bubbles and crashes to political upheavals appear resistant to predictive analysis (although there is no shortage of ex post explanations for their occurrence!). It is not difficult to gain an intuitive understanding of the basis for this unpredictability. Individual preferences and susceptibilities are mapped to collective outcomes through an intricate, dynamical process in which people react individually to an environment consisting largely of others who are reacting likewise. Because of this feedback dynamics, the collective outcome can be quite different from one implied by a simple aggregation of individual preferences; standard prediction methods, which typically are based on such aggregation ideas, do not capture these dynamics and therefore are often unsuccessful.\nThis section provides a brief, intuitive introduction to a systematic approach to assessing the predictability of social diffusion processes and identifying process observables which have exploitable predictive power (see Appendix Two, and also [17,39], for the mathematical details). Consider a simple model for product adoption, in which individuals combine their own preferences and opinions regarding the available options with their observations of the actions of others to arrive at their decisions about which product to adopt. As discussed above, it can be quite difficult to determine which characteristics of the process by which adoption decisions propagate, if any, are predictive of things like the speed or ultimate reach of the propagation [15-17]. In Appendix Two we propose a mathematically rigorous approach to predictability assessment which, among other things, permits identification of features of social dynamics which should have predictive power. We now summarize this assessment methodology.\nThe basic idea behind the proposed approach to predictability analysis is simple and natural: we assess predictability by answering questions about the reachability of diffusion events. To obtain a mathematical formulation of this strategy, the behavior about which predictions are to be made is used to define the system *state space subsets of interest* (SSI), while the particular set of candidate measurables under consideration allows identification of the *candidate starting set* (CSS), that is, the set of states and system parameter values which represent initializations that are consistent with, and equivalent under, the presumed observational capability. As a simple example, consider an online market with two products, A and B, and suppose the system state variables consist of the current market share for A, ms(A), and the rate of change of this market share, r(A) (ms(B) and r(B) are not independent state variables because ms(A) +\nms(B) = 1 and r(A) + r(B) = 0); let the parameters be the advertising budgets for the products, bud(A) and bud(B). The producer of item A might find it useful to define the SSI to reflect market share dominance by A, that is, the subset of the two-dimensional state space where ms(A) exceeds a specified threshold (and r(A) can take any value). If only market share and advertising budgets can be measured then the CSS is the one-dimensional subset of state-parameter space consisting of the initial magnitudes for ms(A), bud(A), and bud(B), with r(A) unspecified (the one-dimensional \"uncertainty\" in the CSS reflects the fact that r(A) is not measurable).\nRoughly speaking, the proposed approach to predictability assessment involves determining how probable it is to reach the SSI from a CSS and deciding if these reachability properties are compatible with the prediction goals. If a system's reachability characteristics are incompatible with the given prediction question - if, say, \"hit\" and \"flop\" states in the online market example are both fairly likely to be reached from the CSS - then the situation is deemed unpredictable. This setup permits the identification of candidate predictive measurables: these are the measurable states and/or parameters for which predictability is most sensitive (see Appendix Two). Continuing with the online market example, if trajectories with positive early market share rates r(A) are much more likely to yield market share dominance for A\nthan are trajectories with negative early r(A), then the situation is unpredictable (because the outcome depends sensitively on r(A) and this quantity is not measured). Moreover, this analysis suggests that market share rate is likely to possess predictive power, so it may be possible to increase predictability by adding the capacity to measure this quantity.\nA key element of this approach to predictability assessment is the proposed method of estimating the probability of reaching the SSI from a CSS. Note that in a typical assessment such estimates must be computed for several CSS in order to adequately explore the space of candidate predictive features, so that it is crucial to perform these estimates efficiently. In Appendix Two we develop an \"altitude function\" approach to this reachability problem, in which we seek a scalar function of the system state that permits conclusions to be made regarding reachability *without computing system trajectories*. We refer to these as altitude functions to provide an intuitive sense of their analytic role: if some measure of \"altitude\" is low on the CSS and high on an SSI, and if the expected rate of change of altitude along system trajectories is nonincreasing, then it is unlikely for trajectories to reach this SSI from the CSS. Moreover, the difference in altitudes between the CSS and SSI gives a measure of the probability of reaching the latter from the former. Because the reach probability is computed for *sets* of states without simulating system trajectories, the altitude function method offers an extremely efficient way to explore the space of candidate predictive features.\nWe have applied the predictability assessment methodology summarized above to the social diffusion prediction problem, and we now summarize the main conclusions of this study; a more complete discussion of this investigation is given in Appendix Two. The analysis uses the mathematically rigorous predictability assessment procedure summarized above, in combination with empirically-grounded S- HDS models for social dynamics, to characterize the predictability of social diffusion on networks with realistic degree distributions, transitivity, community structure, and core-periphery structure. The main finding of the study, from the perspective of the present paper, is that the predictability of these diffusion models depends crucially upon social and information network topology, and in particular on the community and core-periphery structures of these networks.\n\nIn order to describe these theoretical results more quantitatively and leverage them for prediction, it is necessary to specify mathematical definitions for network communities and core-periphery structure.\n\nThere exist several qualitative and quantitative definitions for the concept of community structure in networks. Here we adopt the *modularity-based* definition proposed in [40], whereby a good partitioning of a network's vertices into communities is one for which the number of edges between putative communities is smaller than would be expected in a random partitioning. To be concrete, a modularity-based partitioning of a network into two communities maximizes the modularity Q, defined as\n\nQ = sT B s / 4m,\nwhere m is the total number of edges in the network, the partition is specified with the elements of vector s by setting si = 1 if vertex i belongs to community 1 and si = 1 if it belongs to community 2, and the matrix B has elements Bij = Aij  kikj / 2m, with Aij and ki denoting the network adjacency matrix and degree of vertex i, respectively. Partitions of the network into more than two communities can be constructed recursively [40]. Note that modularity-based community partitions can be efficiently computed for large social networks, and can be constructed even with incomplete network topology data [39].\nWith this definition in hand, we are in a position to present the first candidate predictive feature nominated by the theoretical predictability assessment: the presence of early diffusion activity in numerous distinct network communities should be a reliable predictor that the ultimate reach of the diffusion will be large (see Appendix Two). In what follows, propagation dynamics which possess this characteristic will be said to exhibit *significant early dispersion across network communities.* Note that this measure should be more predictive than the early volume of diffusion activity (the latter has recently become a fairly standard measure [e.g., 19,20]). A cartoon illustrating the basic idea behind this result is given in Figure 2.\n\n Analogously to the situation with network communities, there exists a wide range of qualitative and\nquantitative descriptions of the core-periphery structure found in real-world networks. Here we adopt the characterization of network core-periphery which results from *k-shell decomposition*, a well-established technique in graph theory that is summarized in, for instance, [41]. To partition a network into its k-shells,\none first removes all vertices with degree one, repeating this step if necessary until all remaining vertices have degree two or higher; the removed vertices constitute the 1-shell. Continuing in the same way, all\nvertices with degree two (or less) are recursively removed, creating the 2-shell. This process is repeated\nuntil all vertices have been assigned to a k-shell. The shell with the highest index, the kmax-shell, is\ndeemed to be the core of the network.\nGiven this definition, we are in a position to report the second candidate predictive feature nominated by our theoretical predictability assessment: early diffusion activity within the network kmax-shell should be a reliable predictor that the ultimate reach of the diffusion will be significant (see Appendix Two). In particular, this measure should be more predictive than the early volume of diffusion activity. An intuitive illustration of this result is depicted in Figure 3.\n\n\n2.4 Early Warning Method\nWe are now in a position to present an early warning method which is capable of accurately predicting, very early in the lifecycle of a diffusion process of interest, whether or not the process will propagate widely. We adopt a machine learning-based classification approach to this problem: given a triggering incident, one or more information sources which reflect the reaction to this trigger by a population of interest, and a definition for what constitutes an \"alarming\" reaction, the goal is to learn classifier that accurately predicts, as early as possible, whether or not reaction to the event will ultimately become alarming. The classifier used in the empirical studies described in this paper is the Avatar ensembles of decision trees (A-EDT) algorithm [42]. Other classification algorithm were also explored to allow the robustness of the proposed early warning approach to be evaluated, and these alternative methods produced qualitatively similar results [39]. Prediction accuracy in all tests is estimated using standard N-fold crossvalidation, in which the set of diffusion events of interest is randomly partitioned into N subsets of equal size, and the A-EDT algorithm is successively \"trained\" on N1 of the subsets and \"tested\" on the heldout subset in such a way that each of the N subsets is used as the test set exactly once.\nA key aspect of the proposed approach to early warning analysis is determining which characteristics of the social diffusion event of interest, if any, possess exploitable predictive power. We consider three classes of features:\n\n-\nintrinsics-based features - measures of the inherent properties and attributes of the \"object\" being\ndiffused;\n-\nsimple dynamics-based features - metrics which capturing simple properties of the diffusion dynamics, such as the early extent of the diffusion and the rate at which the diffusion is propagating;\n-\nnetwork dynamics-based features - measures that characterize the way the early diffusion is progressing relative to topological properties of the underlying social and information networks (e.g., community structure).\nConsider, as an illustrative example, the diffusion of \"memes\", that is, short textual phrases which propagate relatively unchanged online (e.g., 'lipstick on a pig'). Suppose it is of interest to predict which memes will \"go viral\", appearing in thousands of blog posts, and which will not. In this case, intrinsicbased features could include language measures, such as the sentiment or emotion expressed in the text surrounding the memes in blog posts or news articles. Simple dynamics-based features for memes might measure the cumulative number of posts or articles mentioning the meme of interest at some early time\nand the rate at which this volume is increasing. Network dynamics-based features might count the cumulative number of network communities in a blog graph GB that contain at least one post which mentions the meme by time  and the number of blogs in the kmax-shell of GB that, by time , contain at least one post mentioning the meme. Alternatively, in the case of an epidemic, the intrinsic-based features could include the infectivity of the pathogen, simple dynamics-based features might capture the number of individuals infected by the disease in the early stages of the outbreak, and network dynamics-based features could include metrics that characterize the way the epidemic is progressing over the communities of relevant social and transportation networks.\nThe proposed approach to early warning analysis is to collect features from these classes for the event of interest, input the feature values to the (trained) A-EDT classifier, and then run the classifier to generate the warning prediction (i.e., a forecast that the event is expected to become 'alarming' or remain\n'not alarming'). In the algorithm presented below this procedure in specified in general terms; more specific instantiations of the procedure are presented in the discussions of the three case studies in Section 3.\n\nIn what follows it is assumed that the primary source of information concerning the event of interest is social media, as that is emerging as a very useful data source for predictive analysis [e.g., 17-24,26,27].\n\nHowever, the analytic process is quite similar when other data sources (e.g., intelligence reporting) are employed [24].\nThus we have the following early warning algorithm:\nAlgorithm EW Given: a triggering incident, a definition for what constitutes an 'alarming' reaction, and a set of social media sites (e.g., blogs) B which are relevant to early warning task.\nInitialization: train the A-EDT classifier on a set of events which are qualitatively similar to the triggering event of interest and are labeled as 'alarming' or 'not alarming' according to the definition given above\n(see the case study discussions for additional details on this training process).\n\nProcedure:\n1. Assemble a lexicon of keywords L that pertain to the triggering event under study.\n2. Conduct a sequence of blog graph crawls and construct a time series of blog graphs GB(t). For the\nlexicon L and each time period t, label each blog in GB(t) as 'active' if it contains a post mentioning\nany of the keywords in L and 'inactive' otherwise.\n3. Form the union GB = tGB(t), partition GB into network communities and into k-shells, and map the\npartition element structure of GB back to each of the graphs GB(t).\n4. Compute the values of appropriate measures for the intrinsics, simple dynamics, and network dynamics features for each of the graphs GB(t).\n5. Apply the A-EDT classifier to the available time series of features, that is, the features obtained from\nthe sequence of blog graphs {GB(t0), ..., GB(tp)}, where t0 and tp are the triggering event time and present time, respectively. Issue an early warning alert if the classifier output is 'alarming'.\nWe now offer additional details concerning this procedure; more application-specific discussions of\nthe methodology are provided in the case studies in Section 3. Identifying appropriate keywords in Step 1\ncan be accomplished with the help of subject matter experts and also through various automated means\n(e.g., via meme analysis [38,27]). Step 2 is by now standard, and various tools exist which can perform these tasks [e.g., 43]. In Step 3, blog network communities are identified with a modularity-based community extraction algorithm applied to the blog graph [40], while the decomposition of the graph into its k-shells is achieved through standard methods [41]. The particular choices of metrics for the intrinsics, simple dynamics, and network dynamics features computed in Step 4 tend to be problem specific, and typical examples are given in the case studies below. It is worth noting, however, that we have found it useful in a range of applications to quantify the dispersion of activity over the communities of GB(t) using a blog entropy measure BE:\n\nBE(t) = i fi(t) log(fi(t)),\nwhere fi(t) is the fraction of total posts containing one or more keywords and made during interval t which occur in community i. Finally, in Step 5 the feature values obtained in Step 4 serve as inputs to the A-\nEDT classifier and the output is used to decide whether an alert should be issued.\n\n## 3. Case Studies\n\nThis section applies Algorithm EW to three early warning case studies involving social phenomena that have proved to be both practically important and challenging to analyze: 1.) diffusion of information through social media, 2.) mobilization/protest events response to \"triggering\" incidents, and 3.) planning/coordination/execution of politically-motivated cyber attacks.\n3.1 Case Study One: Meme Diffusion\nThe goal of this case study is to apply Algorithm EW to the task of predicting whether or not a given \"meme\", that is, a short textual phrase which propagates relatively unchanged online, will \"go viral\". Our main source of data on meme dynamics is the publicly available datasets archived at http://memetracker.org [44] by the authors of [38]. Briefly, the archive [44] contains time series data characterizing the diffusion of ~70 000 memes through social media and other online sites during the five month period between 1 August and 31 December 2008. We are interested in using Algorithm EW to distinguish successful and unsuccessful memes early in their lifecycle. More precisely, the task of interest is to classify memes into two groups - those which will ultimately be successful (acquire more than S posts) and those that will be unsuccessful (attract fewer than U posts) - very early in the meme lifecycle.\nTo support an empirical evaluation of the utility of Algorithm EW for this problems, we downloaded from [44] the time series data for slightly more than 70 000 memes. These data contain, for each meme M, a sequence of pairs (t1, URL1)M, (t2, URL2)M, ..., (tT, URLT)M, where tk is the time of appearance of the kth blog post or news article that contains at least one mention of meme M, URLk is the URL of the blog or news site on which that post/article was published, and T is the total number of posts that mention meme M. From this set of time series we randomly selected 100 \"successful\" meme trajectories, defined as those corresponding to memes which attracted at least 1000 posts during their lifetimes, and 100 \"unsuccessful\" meme trajectories, defined as those whose memes acquired no more than 100 total posts. It is worth noting that, in assembling the data in [44], all memes which received fewer than 15 total posts were deleted, and that ~50% of the remaining memes have <50 posts; thus the large majority of memes are unsuccessful by our definition (as well as according to the criteria of most applications [38,27]).\nTwo other forms of data were collected for this study: 1.) a large Web graph which includes websites\n(URLs) that appear in the meme time series, and 2.) samples of the text surrounding the memes in the posts which contain them. More specifically, we sampled the URLs appearing in the time series for our set of 200 successful and unsuccessful memes and performed a Web crawl that employed these URLs as\n\"seeds\". This procedure generated a Web graph, denoted GB, that consists of approximately 550 000 vertices/websites and 1.4 million edges/hyperlinks, and includes essentially all of the websites which appear in the meme time series. To obtain samples of text surrounding memes in posts, we randomly selected ten posts for each meme and then extracted from each post the paragraph which contains the first mention of the meme.\n\nRecall that Algorithm EW employs three types of features: intrinsics-based, simple dynamics-based, and network dynamics-based. We now describe the instantiation of each of these feature classes for the meme problem. Consider first the intrinsics-based features, which for the meme application become language-based measures. Each \"document\" of text surrounding a meme in its (sample) posts is represented by a simple \"bag of words\" feature vector xR|V|, where the entries of x are the frequencies with which the words in the vocabulary set V appear in the document. A very simple way to quantify the sentiment or emotion of a document is through the use of appropriate lexicons. Let sR|V| denote a lexicon vector, in which each entry of s is a numerical \"score\" quantifying the sentiment/emotion intensity of the corresponding word in the vocabulary V. The aggregate sentiment/emotion score of document x can be computed as\n\nscore(x) = sTx / sT1,\nwhere 1 is a vector of ones. Thus score(.) estimates the sentiment or emotion of a document as a weighted average of the sentiment or emotion scores for the words comprising the document. (Note that if no sentiment or emotion information is available for a particular word in V then the corresponding entry of s is set to zero.)\nTo characterize the emotion content of a document we use the Affective Norms for English Words\n(ANEW) lexicon, which consists of 1034 words that were assigned numerical scores with respect to three emotional \"axes\" - happiness, arousal, and dominance - by human subjects [45]. Previous work had identified this set of words to bear meaningful emotional content [45]. Positive or negative sentiment is quantified by employing the \"IBM lexicon\", a collection of 2968 words that were assigned {positive, negative} sentiment labels by human subjects [46]. This simple approach generates four language features for each meme: the happiness, arousal, dominance, and positive/negative sentiment of the text surrounding that meme in the (sample) posts containing it. As a preliminary test, we computed the mean emotion and sentiment of content surrounding the 100 successful and 100 unsuccessful memes in our dataset. On average the text surrounding successful memes is happier, more active, more dominant, and more positive than that surrounding unsuccessful memes, and this difference is statistically significant (p<0.0001). Thus it is at least plausible that these four language features may possess some predictive power regarding meme success.\n\nConsider next two simple dynamics-based features, defined to capture the basic characteristics of the\nearly evolution of meme post volume:\n-\n#posts() - the cumulative number of posts mentioning the given meme by time  (where  is small\nrelative to the typical lifespan of memes);\n-\npost rate() - a simple estimate of the rate of accumulation of such posts at time .\nHere we adopt a simple finite difference definition for post rate given by post rate() = (#posts()\n#posts(/2)) / (/2); of course, more robust rate estimates could be used.\n\nThe simple dynamics-based measures of early meme diffusion defined above, while potentially useful, do not characterize the manner in which a meme propagates over the underlying social or information networks. Recall that the predictability assessment summarized in Section 2.3 suggests that both early\ndispersion of diffusion activity across network communities and early diffusion activity within the network core ought to be predictive of meme success. The insights offered by this theoretical analysis motivate the definition of two network dynamics-based features for meme prediction:\n-\ncommunity dispersion() - the cumulative number of network communities in the blog graph GB that,\nby time , contain at least one post which mentions the meme;\n-\n#k-core blogs() - the cumulative number of blogs in the kmax-shell of blog graph GB that, by time ,\ncontain at least one post which mentions the meme.\nThese quantities can be efficiently computed using fast algorithms for partitioning a graph into its communities and for identifying a graph's kmax-shell [39]. Thus these features are readily computable even for very large graphs.\nWe now summarize the results of this case study. First, using only the four language features with the A-EDT classifier to predict which memes will be successful yields a prediction accuracy of 66.5%\n(ten-fold cross-validation). Since simply guessing \"successful\" for all memes gives an accuracy of 50%, it can be seen that these simple language intrinsics are not very predictive. For completeness it is mentioned that the ANEW score for \"arousal\" and the IBM measure of sentiment are the most predictive of these four features. In contrast, the features characterizing the early network dynamics of memes possess significant predictive power, and in fact are useful even if only very limited early time series is available for use in prediction. More quantitatively, applying Algorithm EW with the four meme dynamics features produces the following results (ten-fold cross-validation):\n-\n = 12hr, accuracy = 84%, most predictive features: 1.) community dispersion, 2.) #k-core blogs, 3.)\n#posts;\n\n-\n = 24hr, accuracy = 92%, most predictive features: 1.) community dispersion, 2.) post rate, 3.)\n#posts;\n-\n = 48hr, accuracy = 94%, most predictive features: 1.) community dispersion, 2.) post rate, 3.)\n#posts.\nThese results show that useful predictions can be obtained *within the first twelve hours* after a meme is detected (this corresponds to 0.5% of the average meme lifespan), and that accurate prediction is possible after about a day or two. Note also that, as has been found with other social dynamics phenomena [e.g.,\n16-18], dynamics features appear to be more predictive than \"intrinsics\", at least for the features employed here.\nIt is worth mentioning that the fact that a particular meme goes viral does not imply that it will influence behavior in the real world. The next two case studies focus on the important issue of behavioral consequences of information diffusion.\n3.2 Case Study Two: Mobilization and Protest\nThere is considerable interest to develop methods for distinguishing successful mobilization and protest events, that is, mobilizations that become large and self-sustaining, from unsuccessful ones early in their lifecycle. It is natural to pose this question as an early warning problem and to approach it using Algorithm EW. In order to examine the efficacy of this approach, we collected together fourteen recent events, each of which appeared at the outset to have the potential to trigger significant protests. This set of events contains seven triggering incidents which ultimately led to substantial mobilization, including massive protests and significant violence, and seven triggers with reactions that subsided quickly with essentially no violence. Taken together, these events provide a useful setting for testing the applicability of Algorithm EW to mobilization/protest phenomena.\nThe events employed in this study are listed below.\nTriggers leading to significant mobilization/protest:\n\n-\nQuran desecration, May 2005;\n-\nfirst Danish cartoons, September 2005 to March 2006;\n-\nEgypt DVD release, October 2005;\n-\nFrance riots, October and November 2005;\n-\nanti-Ahmadiyya protests, June and July 2008;\n-\nU.S Republican National Convention, September 2008;\n-\nIsrael/Gaza event, December 2008 to January 2009.\nTriggers not leading to significant mobilization/protest:\n\n-\nAbu Ghraib news release, April and May 2004;\n-\nPope lecture, September 2006;\n-\nSalman Rushdie knighting, June 2007;\n-\nsecond Danish cartoons, February 2008;\n-\nU.S. Democratic National Convention, August 2008,\n-\nBali bombers execution, November 2008;\n-\nJakarta bombings/NM Top blog post, July 2009.\nThis list is intended merely to identify the fourteen events under study; additional information concerning each incident is given in [39] and the references therein.\nAs a preliminary examination of the possibility to obtain useful early warning indicators from analysis of social media discussions of these events, we performed Steps 1-4 of Algorithm EW and then plotted the time series for two quantities: 1.) the volume of blog posts mentioning keywords relevant to the events (these keywords were obtained through a simple news search [39]), and 2.) the blog entropy measure BE(t) = i fi(t) log(fi(t)) associated with the way online mentions of the keywords diffused over the blog graph. Illustrative time series plots are shown in Figure 4. Observe that in the case of the first Danish cartoons event (plot at right) the BE of relevant discussions (blue curve) experiences a dramatic increase a few weeks before the corresponding increase in volume of blog discussions (red curve); this latter increase, in turn, takes place before any violence. In contrast, in the case of the pope event (plot at left), BE\nof blog discussions is small relative to the cartoons event, and any increase in this measure lags discussion volume. Similar time series plots are obtained for the other twelve events, suggesting that network dynamics-based features, such as dispersion of discussions across blog network communities, may be a useful early indicator for large mobilization events.\nTo examine this possibility more carefully, we applied Algorithm EW to the task of distinguishing triggers which led to large protests from those that did not. For simplicity, in this case study we did not use any intrinsics-based features (e.g., language metrics) in the A-EDT classifier, and instead relied upon the four dynamics-based features defined in Case Study One. In the case of the seven triggering events which led to protest behavior, the blog data made available to Algorithm EW was limited to posts made during the eight week period which ended two weeks before the protests began. For the seven triggers which did not lead to protests, the blog data included all posts collected during the eight week period immediately following the triggering event.\nblog activity blog activity date date Because the set of events in this case study included only fourteen incidents, we applied Algorithm EW with two-fold cross-validation. More specifically, the set of incidents was randomly partitioned into two equal subsets, the algorithm was trained on one subset of seven incidents and tested on the other subset, and then the roles of the two data sets were switched. In this evaluation Algorithm EW achieved perfect accuracy, correctly distinguishing the 'protest' and 'non-protest' triggers. An examination of the predictive power of the four features used as inputs to the A-EDT classifier reveals that, as suggested by Figure 4, the community dispersion feature was the most predictive measure.\n\n3.2 Case Study Three: Cyber Attack Early Warning\nThis case study explores the ability of Algorithm EW to provide reliable early warning for politicallymotivated distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks. Toward this end, we first identified a set of Internet \"disturbances\" that included examples from three distinct classes of events:\n1. successful politically-motivated DDoS attacks - these are the events for which Algorithm EW is intended to give warning with sufficient lead time to allow mitigating actions to be taken;\n2. natural events which disrupt Internet service - these are disturbances, such as earthquakes and electric\npower outages, that impact the Internet but for which it is known that no early warning signal exists in social media;\n3. quiet periods - these are periods during which there is social media \"chatter\" concerning impending\nDDoS attacks but ultimately no (successful) attacks occurred.\nIncluding in the case study events selected from these three classes is intended to afford a fairly comprehensive test of Algorithm EW. For instance, these classes correspond to 1.) the domain of interest (DDoS attacks), 2.) a set of disruptions which impact the Internet but have no social media warning signal, and\n3.) a set of \"non-events\" which do not impact the Internet but do possess putative social media warning\nsignals (online discussion of DDoS attacks).\nWe selected twenty events from these three classes:\n\nPolitically-motivated DDoS attacks:\n\n-\nEstonia event in April 2007;\n-\nCNN/China incident in April 2008;\n-\nIsrael/Palestine conflict event in January 2009;\n-\nDDoS associated with Iranian elections in June 2009;\n-\nWikiLeaks event in November 2010;\n-\nAnonymous v. PayPal, etc. attack in December 2010;\n-\nAnonymous v. HBGary attack in February 2011.\nNatural disturbances:\n\n-\nEuropean power outage in November 2006;\n-\nTaiwan earthquake in December 2006;\n-\nHurricane Ike in September 2008;\n-\nMediterranean cable cut in January 2009;\n-\nTaiwan earthquake in March 2010;\n-\nJapan earthquake in March 2011.\nQuiet periods:\nSeven periods, from March 2005 through March 2011, during which there were discussions in social media of DDoS attacks on various U.S. government agencies but no (successful) attacks occurred.\nFor brevity a detailed discussion of these twenty events is not given here; the interested reader is referred to [39] and the references therein for additional information on these disruptions.\nWe collected two forms of data for each of the twenty events: *cyber data* and *social data*. The cyber data consist of time series of routing updates which were issued by Internet routers during a one month period surrounding each event. More precisely, these data are the Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) routing updates exchanged between gateway hosts in the Autonomous System network of the Internet. The data was downloaded from the publicly-accessible RIPE collection site [47] using the process described in\n[48] (see [48] for additional details and background information on BGP routing dynamics). The temporal evolution of the volume of BGP routing updates (e.g., withdrawal messages) gives a coarse-grained measure of the timing and magnitude of large Internet disruptions and thus offers a simple and objective way to characterize the impact of each of the events in our collection. The social data consist of time series of social media mentions of cyber attack-related keywords and memes detected during a one month period surrounding each of the twenty events. These data were collected using the procedure specified in Algorithm EW.\nAs in the preceding case study, we performed a preliminary examination of the possibility to obtain useful early warning indicators from analysis of social media discussions by completing Steps 1-4 of Algorithm EW and plotting the time series for two quantities: 1.) the volume of blog posts mentioning keywords relevant to the events (these keywords were obtained through a simple news search [39]), and 2.)\nthe blog entropy measure BE(t) = i fi(t) log(fi(t)) associated with the way online mentions of the keywords diffused over the blog graph. Illustrative time series plots corresponding to two events in the case study, the WikiLeaks DDoS attack in November 2010 and Japan earthquake in March 2011, are shown in Figure 5. Observe that the time series of BGP routing updates are similar for the two events, with each experiencing a large \"spike\" at the time of the event. The time series of blog post volume are also similar across the two events, with each showing modest volume prior to the event and displaying a large spike in activity at event time. However, the time series for blog entropy are quite distinct for the two events. Specifically, in the case of the WikiLeaks DDoS the blog entropy (blue curve in Figure 5) experiences a dramatic increase several days before the event, while in the case of the Japan earthquake blog entropy is small for the entire collection period. Similar social media behavior is observed for all events in the case study, suggesting that network dynamics-based features, such as dispersion of discussions across blog network communities, may be a useful early indicator for large mobilization events.\n\n To examine this possibility more carefully, we applied Algorithm EW to the task of distinguishing\nthe seven DDoS attacks from the thirteen other events in the set. For simplicity, in this case study we did not use any intrinsics-based features (e.g., language metrics) in the A-EDT classifier, and instead relied upon the four dynamics-based features defined in Case Study One. Because the set of events in this case\nstudy included only twenty incidents, we applied Algorithm EW with two-fold cross-validation, exactly as described in Case Study Two. In the case of DDoS events, the blog data made available to Algorithm EW was limited to posts made during the five week period which ended one week before the attack. For the six natural disturbances, the blog data included all posts collected during the six week period immediately prior to the event, while in the case of the seven non-events, the blog data included the posts collected during a six week interval which spanned discussions of DDoS attacks on U.S. government agencies.\nIn this evaluation, Algorithm EW achieved *perfect* accuracy, correctly distinguishing the 'attack' and\n'non-attack' events. If the test is made more difficult, so that the blog data made available to Algorithm EW for attack events is limited to a four week period that ends two weeks before the attack, the proposed approach still achieves 95% accuracy, An examination of the predictive power of the four features used as inputs to the A-EDT classifier reveals that, as suggested by Figure 5, the community dispersion feature was the most predictive measure. It is worth emphasizing that, in this case study, accurately distinguishing 'attack' from 'non-attack' events is equivalent to providing practically-useful early warning for attack events, because the data which serves as input to Algorithm EW reflects online discussions that took place *prior to* the events under investigation.\n\n## 4. Conclusions\n\nThis paper presents a new approach to early warning analysis for social diffusion events. We begin by introducing a biologically-inspired S-HDS model for social dynamics on multi-scale networks, and then perform stochastic reachability analysis with this model to show that the outcomes of social diffusion processes may depend crucially upon the way the early dynamics of the process interacts with the underlying network's meso-scale topological structures. This theoretical finding provides the foundations for developing a machine learning algorithm that enables accurate early warning analysis for diffusion events. The utility of the warning algorithm, and the power of network-based predictive metrics, are demonstrated through empirical case studies involving meme propagation, large-scale protests events, and politically-motivated cyber attacks.\n\nThis research was supported by the U.S. Department of Defense, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, The Boeing Company, and the Laboratory Directed Research and Development program at Sandia National Laboratories. Fruitful discussions regarding aspects of this work with Curtis Johnson of Sandia National Laboratories, Paul Ormerod of Volterra Partners, and Anne Kao of Boeing are gratefully acknowledged.\n\n## 6. References\n\n[1] Anderson, R. and R. May, *Infectious Diseases of Humans*, Oxford University Press, 1992. [2] Rogers, E., *Diffusion of Innovations*, Fifth Ed., Free Press, NY, 2003. [3] Della Porta, D. and M. Diani, *Social Movement*, Second Ed., Blackwell, Oxford, UK, 2006. [4] Easley, D. and J. 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National Academy of\nSciences USA, in press.\n[36] Newman, M., \"The structure and function of complex networks\", *SIAM Review*, Vol. 45, pp. 167-256,\n2003.\n[37] Hastie, T., R. Tibshirani, and J. Friedman, *The Elements of Statistical Learning*, Second Edition,\nSpringer, New York, 2009.\n[38] Leskovec, J., L. Backstrom, and J. Kleinberg, \"Meme-tracking and the dynamics of the news cycle\",\nProc. 15th ACM International Conference on Knowledge Discovery and Data Mining, Paris, France,\nJune 2009.\n[39] Colbaugh, R. and K. Glass, \"Prediction of social dynamics via social media analytics\", Sandia\nNational Laboratories SAND Report, January 2011.\n[40] Newman, M., \"Modularity and community structure in networks\", Proc. National Academy of\nSciences USA, Vol. 103, pp. 8577-8582, 2006.\n[41] Carmi, S., S. Havlin, S. Kirkpatrick, Y. Shavitt, and E. Shir, \"A model of Internet topology using the\nk-shell decomposition\", *Proc. 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IEEE International Conference on Intelligence and Security Informatics*, Vancouver,\nCanada, May 2010.\n[49] Hedstrom, P., \"Explaining the growth patterns of social movements\", Understanding Choice,\nExplaining Behavior, Oslo University Press, 2006.\n[50] Hedstrom, P., R. Sandell, and C. Stern, \"Mesolevel networks and the diffusion of social movements:\nThe case of the Swedish Social Democratic Party\", *American J. Sociology*, Vol. 106, pp. 145 -172,\n2000.\n[51] Bettencourt, L., A. Cintron-Arias, D. Kaiser, and C. Castillo-Chavez, \"The power of a good idea:\nQuantitative modeling of the spread of ideas from epidemiological models\", *Physica A*, Vol. 364, pp.\n513-536, 2006.\n[52] Candia, J. and K. Mazzitello, \"Mass media influence spreading in social networks with community\nstructure\", *J. Statistical Mechanics*, Vol. 7, P07007, 2008.\n[53] Kushner, H.*, Stochastic Stability and Control*, Academic Press, NY, 1967. [54] Papachristodoulou, A., Personal communication, November 2008. [55] Parrilo, P., Structured Semidefinite Programs and Semialgebraic Geometry Methods in Robustness\nand Optimization, PhD dissertation, California Institute of Technology, 2000.\n[56] http://www.cds.caltech.edu/sostools/, accessed July 2007.\n\n\n## A1. Appendix One: S-Hds Social Diffusion Model\n\nIn this Appendix we propose a multi-scale structure for modeling social network dynamics, establish a few facts concerning this representation, and introduce an S-HDS formulation of the model that is wellsuited for predictive analysis.\nA1.1 Multi-Scale Social Dynamics Model\nIn many social situations, people are influenced by the behavior of others, for instance because they seek to obtain the benefits of coordinated actions, infer otherwise inaccessible information, or manage complexity in decision-making. Processes in which observing a certain behavior increases an individual's probability of adopting that behavior are often referred to as *positive externality processes* (PEP), and we use that term here. PEP have been widely studied in the social and behavioral sciences and, more recently, by the informatics and physical sciences communities [e.g., 4]. In particular, social scientists have constructed theories which qualitatively and quantitatively explain these processes and their dependence on social networks [e.g., 2-4, 6, 18, 36, 49-52]. One result of this research is a recognition that the process by which preferences and opinions of individuals become the collective outcome for a group can be complex and subtle, and thus challenging to model and predict. People arrive at their decisions by reacting individually to an environment consisting largely of others who are reacting likewise, and one consequence of this feedback dynamics is that the collective outcome can be quite different from one implied by a simple aggregation of individual preferences.\n\nWe model PEP in a manner which explicitly separates the individual, or \"micro\", dynamics from the\ncollective dynamics. More specifically, we adopt a modeling framework consisting of three modeling scales:\n-\na *micro-scale*, for modeling the behavior of individuals;\n-\na *meso-scale*, which represents the interaction dynamics of individuals within the same network partition element (community or core/periphery);\n-\na *macro-scale*, which characterizes the interaction between partition elements.\nWe now derive a few properties of the multi-scale model. The micro-scale quantifies the way individuals combine their own inherent preferences regarding the available options with their observations of the behaviors of others to arrive at their chosen courses of action. Interestingly, the dependence of this decisionmaking process on the social network admits a straightforward characterization. Consider the common and important binary choice setting, in which N agents choose from a set O = {0,1} of options based in part on the choices made by others. Let oi  {0,1} denote the selection of agent i and o = [o1 ... oN]T  ON\nrepresent the vector of choices made by the group. It is reasonable to suppose that agent i chooses between the options probabilistically according to some map POi: Ai  ON  [0,1], where POi is the probability that agent i chooses option 1, Ai measures i's inherent preference for option 1, and POi is nondecreasing in Ai. In positive externality situations POi should also be \"nondecreasing in o\" in some sense, and we now make this notion precise. (For notational simplicity in what follows we suppress the dependence of POi on Ai.)\nBecause it is defined in such general terms it may appear that the map POi could be a very complicated function of the choices of the other agents. In fact, Theorem 1 indicates that this map must be tractable.\nTheorem 1: Given any POi there exists a vector wi = [wi1 ... wiN]T  RN, with wij  0 and j wij = bi, and a scalar function ri: [0, bi]  [0,1] such that POi(o) = ri(oTwi).\nProof: It is enough to prove that the wij can be chosen so oTwi: ON  [0, bi] is injective, since then ri can be constructed to recover any POi. One such choice for wi is wi = [20 21 ... 2N1]T, as then oTwi provides a unique (binary number) representation for each o.\nWe call ri the *agent decision function* and si = oTwi agent i's *social signal*, and interpret the wij as defining a weighted social network for the group of N agents. Observe that Theorem 1 quantifies the way social influence is transmitted to an agent by her neighbors and highlights the importance of this signal in the decision-making process. The result also allows a simple characterization of positive externality agent behavior: for such behavior, ri is nondecreasing in si.\nThe micro-scale model structure allows PEP behaviors which appear to be distinct to be represented within a unified setting. For example, the basic model readily accommodates two of the most common sources of PEP: 1.) *utility-oriented externalities*, in which the utility or value of an option is a direct function of the number of others choosing it, and 2.) *information externalities*, which arise from inferences made by an individual about decision-relevant information possessed by others.\nExample A1.1: utility-oriented externalities. Suppose each agent i has a utility function ui: O  [0, bi]\n R+ which depends explicitly on i's social signal si. The standard, albeit dated, example here is the fax machine, with the utility of owning a fax machine increasing with the number of others who own one.\n\nThe key quantity considered by agent i when selecting between options 0 and 1 is the utility difference between the options, ui(si) = ui(1,si)  ui(0,si). In positive externality situations ui is increasing in si, and there exists a *threshold* social signal value s*, possibly with s* < 0 or s* > bi, such that a utility maximizing agent will choose option 0 if si < s* and option 1 if si  s*.\nExample A1.2: information externalities. Suppose the utility to agent i of each option is independent of the number of other agents choosing that option but there exists uncertainty regarding this utility. To be concrete, assume that agent i's utility depends on the \"state of world\" w  {w0, w1}, so that ui = ui(oi,w), and there exists uncertainty regarding w. In this case, agent i may observe others' decisions in order to infer w and then choose the option which maximizes his utility for this world state (as when a tourist chooses a crowded restaurant over an empty one in an unfamiliar city). Consider, for instance, the decision of whether to adopt an innovation of uncertain quality, and let the world state w1 signify that innovation quality is such that adopting maximizes utility. In this situation it is reasonable for agent i to maximize *expected* utility and choose the option (adopt or not) oi* = argmaxoO wW P(w | si) ui(oi,w). If agent i uses Bayesian inference to estimate P(w1 | si) then we have a positive externality decision process and there exists a threshold value s* for the social signal such that agent i will choose option 0 if si < s* and option 1 if si  s* [17].\nIt can be seen that in these examples, different positive externality \"drivers\" lead to equivalent (threshold)\nmicro-scale models.\nTaken together, the meso- and macro-scale components of the proposed modeling framework quantify the way agent decision functions interact to produce collective behavior at the population level. For convenience of exposition, in this Appendix we focus on network communities as the meso-scale structure of interest; however, all of the modeling results derived here also hold for the case of core-periphery structure . The role of the meso-scale model is to quantify and illuminate the manner in which agent decision functions interact *within* social network communities, while the macro-scale model characterizes the interactions of agents *between* communities. The primary assumption is that interactions between individuals within social network communities can be modeled as \"fully-mixed\" - all pairwise interactions between individuals within a network community are equally likely - while interactions between communities are constrained by the network defining the relationships between the communities. We argue below that this assumption is reasonable and useful.\nOne advantage of identifying a scale at which agent interaction is (approximately) homogeneous is that this enables the leveraging of an extensive literature on collective dynamics. To be concrete, we derive two examples. Consider first the social movement model proposed in [49,50]. In this model, each individual can be in one of three states: member (of the movement), potential member, and ex-member.\n\nIndividuals interact in a fully-mixed way, with each interaction between a potential member and a member resulting in the potential member becoming a member with probability , and each interaction between a member and an ex-member resulting in the member becoming an ex-member with probability 1;\nmembers also \"spontaneously\" become ex-members with probability 2. The connection between this representation and standard epidemiological models [1] is clear.\nUnder the assumption of fully-mixed interactions at the meso-scale, standard manipulations yield the following representation for the social dynamics within network communities:\n                                          dP/dt  =  PM(PM)1/21(t),\nH:                                            dM/dt  =  PM+(PM)1/21(t)1ME(1ME)1/22(t) 2M(2M)1/23(t),\n                                          dE/dt  =  1ME+(1ME)1/22(t)+2M+(2M)1/23(t), where P, M, and E denote the fractions of potential members, members, and ex-members in the community population, , 1, and 2 are nonnegative constants related to the probabilities , 1, and 2 defined above, and the i(t) are appropriate random processes [e.g., 17]. The deterministic version of this basic model (i.e., with 1(t)=2(t)=3(t)0) is discussed by Hedstrom and coauthors in [49,50], and therefore we denote the model H. The deterministic version is shown in [49] to provide a useful description for the local growth of a real world social movement.\nThe second example incorporates the fact that innovations often have both enthusiasts and skeptics, each of whom may actively attempt to recruit the uncommitted. The model H can be modified to account for this competition in recruitment:\n                                                       dP/dt = 1PM1  2PM2,\nB:                                                       dM1/dt = 1PM1  1M1,\n                                                     dM2/dt = 2PM2  2M2,\n                                                       dE/dt = 1M1 + 2M2, where P and E denote the fractions of potential members and ex-members, as before, M1 and M2 are members of the competing groups or movements, and 1, 2, 1, and 1 are nonnegative constants. A\nmodel of this basic form is proposed in Bettencourt and coworkers in [51] and thus we label it B. The model can be fitted, with good agreement, to empirical data for the diffusion of Feynman diagrams (an innovation in physics) in the post World War II era [51]. Developing a stochastic version of B, analogous to the representation H, is straightforward [39].\nThe meso-scale model describes the way individual agent decision functions interact to produce collective behavior within social network communities. Individuals also interact with people from other communities, of course, and receive information from channels that transmit to many communities simultaneously (e.g., mass media). These inter-community interactions and \"global\" social signals are quantified at the macro-scale level of the multi-scale modeling framework. The basic idea is simple and natural:\nwe model interdependence between social network communities with a graph Gsc = {Vsc, Esc}, where Vsc and Esc are the vertex and edge sets, respectively, |Vsc| = K, each vertex v  Vsc is a community, and each directed edge e = (v,v)  Esc represents a potential inter-community interaction. More specifically, an edge (v,v) indicates that an agent in community v can receive decision-relevant information from one in community v. The way agents act upon this information is specified by their decision functions ri. The broadcast of global social signals to individuals is modeled as a community-dependent input uv to each individual in community v. Thus Gsc and the uv define the macro-scale model structure.\nA key task in deriving a macro-scale model is specifying the topology of Gsc, as this graph encodes the social network structure for the phenomenon of interest. The most direct approach to constructing Gsc is to infer communities directly from social network data, by partitioning the network so as to maximizing the graph modularity Qm. The main challenge with this method for building social community graphs is obtaining the requisite social network data. While this task is certainly nontrivial, availability of such data has increased dramatically over the past decade. For instance, social relationships and interactions increasingly leave \"fingerprints\" in electronic databases (e.g., communication via email and cell phones, financial transactions), making convenient the acquisition, manipulation, storage, and analysis of these records [e.g., 4].\nAlternatively, demographics data can sometimes be used to define both the communities themselves\n(e.g., families, physical neighborhoods) and their proximity. The basic idea is familiar: individuals belong to social groups, which in turn belong to \"groups of groups\", and so on, giving rise to a hierarchical organization of communities. For instance, in academics, research groups often belong to academic departments, which are organized into colleges, which in turn form universities, and so on. The proximity of two communities is specified by their relationship within the hierarchy, and this distance defines the likelihood that individuals from the two communities will interact. The probability of inter-community interaction, in turn, can be used to define the network community graph Gsc [39].\nA1.2 S-HDS Model Formulation\nWe now show that the stochastic hybrid dynamical system formalism provides a rigorous, tractable, and expressive framework within which to represent multi-scale social dynamics models. Consider the following Definition A1.1: A *stochastic hybrid dynamical system* (S-HDS) is a feedback interconnection of a continuous-time, continuous state-dependent Markov chain {Q, (x)} and a collection of stochastic differential equations indexed by the Markov chain state q:\n                                                                  {Q, (x)},\nS-HDS:                                                  dx = fq(x,p)dt + Gq(x,p)dw, where qQ is the discrete state, xXRn is the continuous state, pRp is a vector of system parameters,\n{fq} and {Gq} are sets of vector and matrix fields characterizing the continuous system dynamics, w is an m-valued Weiner process, and (x) is the matrix of (x-dependent) Markov chain transition rates; the entries of (x) satisfy qq(x)  0 if q = q and q qq(x) = 0 q, and are related to the standard Markov state transition probabilities as follows [e.g., 34]:\n\n$${\\rm P}\\{{\\rm q}({\\rm t}+\\Delta)={\\rm q}^{\\prime}|\\,{\\rm q}({\\rm t})={\\rm q}\\}= \\left\\{\\begin{array}{ll}\\lambda_{\\rm qq^{\\prime}}({\\rm x}({\\rm t}))\\Delta+{\\rm o }(\\Delta)&\\quad\\mbox{if ${\\rm q}\\neq{\\rm q}^{\\prime}$}\\\\ 1+\\lambda_{\\rm qq}\\left({\\rm x}({\\rm t})\\right)\\Delta+{\\rm o}(\\Delta)&\\quad \\mbox{if ${\\rm q}={\\rm q}^{\\prime}$}.\\end{array}\\right.$$\nA general discussion of S-HDS theory and applications is beyond the scope of this paper and may be found in, for instance, [34] and the references therein.\n\nWe now develop an S-HDS representation for multi-scale social diffusion processes. It is assumed\nthat:\n-\nthe social system consists of N individuals distributed over K network communities;\n-\nindividuals can influence each other via positive externalities;\n-\nintra-community interactions are fully-mixed;\n-\ninter-community interactions involve the (possibly temporary) migration of individuals from one\ncommunity to another.\nThe phenomenon of interest is the diffusion of innovations, in which an innovation of some kind (e.g., a new technology or idea) is introduced into a social system, and individuals may learn about the innovation from others and decide to adopt it [e.g., 2]. By definition an innovation is \"new\", and therefore it is supposed that initially only a few of the network communities have been exposed to it. An important task in applications is to be able to characterize the likelihood that the innovation will spread to a significant fraction of the population [17].\nWe model social diffusion as follows:\nDefinition A1.2: The *multi-scale S-HDS diffusion model* is a tuple\n\n$\\Sigma_{\\rm S\\_HDS,\\ diff}=\\{{\\rm G_{sc}},{\\rm Q\\times X},\\{{\\rm f_{q}(x),G_{q}(x),H_{q}(x)}\\}_{q \\in Q},{\\rm Par,\\ W,\\ U,\\{{\\rm Q,\\Lambda(x)}\\}}\\}$\nwhere\n-\nGsc = {Vsc, Esc} is the social network community graph;\n-\nQX is the system state set, with Q and X  Rn denoting the (finite) discrete and (bounded) continuous state sets, respectively;\n-\n{fq(x),Gq(x),Hq(x)}qQ, Par, W, U is the S-HDS continuous system, a family of stochastic differential\nequations which characterizes the intra-community dynamics via vector field/ matrix families\n{fq},{Gq},{Hq}, system parameter vector pParRp, and system inputs wWRm, uURr;\n-\n{Q, (x)} is the S-HDS discrete system, a continuous-time Markov chain which defines intercommunity interactions via state set Q and transition rate matrix (x).\nThe social community graph Gsc defines the feasible community-community innovation diffusion pathways: if (v,v)  Esc then it is not possible for the innovation to spread directly from community v to community v. The discrete state set Q = {0,1}K specifies which communities contain at least one adopter of the innovation by labeling such communities with a '1' (and a '0' otherwise). Thus, for example, state q = [1  0  0  ... ]T indicates that community 1 has at least one adopter, community 2 and 3 do not, and so on. The continuous state space X has coordinates xij  [0,1], where xij is the ith state variable for the continuous system dynamics evolving in community j. For consistency we use the first coordinate for each community, x1j, to refer to the fraction of adopters for that community. The continuous system dynamics is defined by a family of q-indexed stochastic differential equations {cs, q}qQ, with\ncs, q:                                           dx = fq(x,p)dt + Gq(x,p)dw + Hq(x,p)du, where wW is a standard Weiner process and uU is the exogenous input. Ordinarily w is interpreted as a stochastic \"disturbance\", while u is employed to represent influences from \"global\" sources such as mass media. These dynamics quantify intra-community diffusion of the innovation of interest, for instance through models of the form H. The Markov chain matrix (x) specifies the transition rates for discrete state transitions q  q and depends on both Gsc and x (e.g., the rate at which community v will\n\"infect\" other communities depends upon the fraction of adopters in v). It is worth noting that the model\nS-HDS, diff naturally accommodates both probabilistic (via w and the Markov chain dynamics) and setbounded (through parameter set Par) uncertainty descriptions, as this expressiveness is desirable in applications. A1.3 A Simple Example\nWe now demonstrate the implementation of the proposed multi-scale S-HDS diffusion modeling framework, and illustrate its efficacy, through a simple example; a more complex example, with more interesting analytic goals, is investigated in Appendix Two below. Consider a social network consisting of two communities and a social movement process playing out on this network. We construct the social network using the method given in [52]. Briefly, a collection of N vertices is divided into two communities of equal size, denoted L and R (for 'left' and 'right', see Figure 6). For all vertex pairs, if both vertices belong to the same community then an edge is placed between them with probability pi, and if the vertices belong to different communities then they are connected with probability pe < pi. Increasing the ratio pi /\npe makes the resulting network more \"community-like\" by increasing the relative intra-community edge density. Figure 6 shows two small example networks built in this way, with the network on the left corresponding to a larger pi / pe ratio.\nThe social movement dynamics evolving on this network is a \"network version\" of the model proposed in [49]. Thus each individual can be in one of three states - member, potential member, and exmember - and individuals can change states in one of three ways: 1.) members persuade potential members to whom they are linked to become members with probability , 2.) ex-members likewise influence neighboring members to become ex-members with probability 1, and 3.) members can spontaneously become ex-members with probability 2. For convenience of reference this \"agent-based\" system representation is denoted ABM.\n\nIt is straightforward to derive an S-HDS version of the social movement model ABM. Consider the diffusion model S-HDS, diff = {Gsc, QX, {fq(x), Gq(x), Hq(x)}qQ, Par, W, U, {Q, (x)}} specified in Definition A1.2. Note first that in this case the social network community graph Gsc is very simple, consisting of two vertices corresponding to communities L and R and an undirected edge connecting them. The continuous system state is x = [PL  ML  PR  MR]TX, where the subscripts indicate communities (note that the concentrations of ex-members, EL and ER, are not independent states because the total concentration sums to one on each community). We approximate the agent-based social movement dynamics *within* each network community with the fully-mixed model H, that is, with a set of stochastic differential equations governing the evolution of the concentrations of members M and potential members P.\nIt can be seen that H together with the preceding discussion defines the model components X,\n{fq(x),Gq(x),Hq(x)}qQ, Par, W, U that make up the continuous system portion of S-HDS, diff. Thus all that remains is to specify the discrete system {Q, (x)}. The discrete state set Q = {00, 10, 01, 11} indicates which communities contain at least one movement member, so that for instance state q = 10 indicates that community L has at least one member and community R has no members. The Markov chain matrix (x)\nspecifies the transition rates for discrete state transitions q  q. These rates depend on the continuous system state x because the likelihood that one community will \"infect\" the other depends upon the current concentrations of members, potential members, and ex-members in that community.\n\n\n\n       We examine the utility of the S-HDS social diffusion model constructed above by using this model\nto estimate the probability that a small set of \"seed\" members introduced into community L will lead to\nthe movement growing and eventually propagating to community R. Because the model S-HDS, diff is de-\nrived from ABM, ABM is taken to be ground truth and S-HDS, diff is deemed a useful approximation if the\ncascade probability estimates obtained using the S-HDS representation are in good agreement with those\ncomputed based on ABM. The following parameter values are chosen for ABM: N = 2000,  = 0.5, 1 =\n0.01, 2 = 0.1 (the results reported are not sensitive to variation in these values). We build 50 random re-\n\n\n29\n\nalizations of the social network for each of 15 pi / pe ratios. The values for pi / pe are selected to generate a\ncollection of 15 network sets whose topologies interpolate smoothly between networks with essentially\ndisconnected communities (large pi / pe) and networks whose two communities are tightly coupled (small\npi / pe). A \"global\" cascade is said to occur if an initial seed set of five movement members in community\nR, chosen at random, results in the diffusion of the movement to community L. The probability of global\ncascade at a given pi / pe ratio is computed by running 20 simulations on each of the 50 social network\nrealizations associated with that pi / pe, and counting up those for which the innovation propagates to\ncommunity L. The results of this simulation study are presented in the plot at the bottom of Figure 6, with\nthe blue curve showing the probability estimates as a function of pi / pe ratio and the error bars corre-\nsponding to  2 standard errors.\n\n    We now investigate the efficacy of the S-HDS social diffusion model by using this model to estimate\nthe probability of global cascade. The social diffusion model S-HDS, diff is instantiated to be equivalent to\nthe agent-based representation ABM described above. Note that, in particular, there are no free parameters\navailable to permit the response of S-HDS, diff to be \"tuned\" to match ABM. For instance, the ABM parame-\nters , 1, 2 uniquely define S-HDS, diff parameters , 1, 2, and specifying values for the pi / pe ratios\ngives corresponding values for the S-HDS transition matrices (x) (to within a single \"offset\" parameter,\nsee [39]). A Matlab program implementing the resulting model S-HDS, diff is given in [39].\n\n    In order to compute the probability of global cascade using the S-HDS model S-HDS, diff, we employ\nthe \"altitude function\" method described in Appendix Two below. This method calculates provably-\ncorrect upper bounds on the probability of the social movement propagating to community L. The results\nof this analysis are given at the plot of the bottom of Figure 6 (red curve). Observe that the global cascade\nprobability estimates obtained using the two models ABM and S-HDS, diff are in close agreement. As it is\nchallenging to model \"discontinuous\" phenomena such as diffusion across social network communities,\nthis agreement represents important evidence that the S-HDS provides a useful characterization of social\ndiffusion on networks.\n\n    While the models ABM and S-HDS, diff generate similar results in this example, the S-HDS representa-\ntion is much more efficient computationally. For instance, estimating the desired global cascade proba-\nbilities using the S-HDS model requires less than one percent of the computer time needed to obtain these\nestimates with the equivalent agent-based model. Moreover, this difference on efficiency increases with\nnetwork size, which is important because realistic social networks have hundreds or thousands of com-\nmunities rather than just two. This computational tractability hints at a more general, and more signifi-\ncant, mathematical tractability enjoyed by the S-HDS framework, a property we now leverage to develop\na rigorous predictive analysis methodology for social diffusion events.\n\n\n\n30\n\n## A2. Appendix Two: Predictive Analysis\n\nIn this Appendix we formulate the predictive analysis problem in terms of reachability assessment, show that these reachability questions can be addressed through an \"altitude function\" analysis without computing system trajectories, and apply this theoretical framework to demonstrate that predictability of a broad class of social diffusion models depends crucially upon the meso-scale topological structures of the underlying networks. For convenience of exposition, in this Appendix we focus on network communities as a representative meso-scale structure; however, all results derived here are also applicable to the more general case in which the \"network partition\" (see Section 2.2) includes both community and coreperiphery structures.\nA2.1 Predictive Analysis as Reachability Assessment\nWe propose that accurate prediction requires careful consideration of the interplay between the intrinsics of a process and the social dynamics which are its realization. We therefore adopt an inherently dynamical approach to predictive analysis: given a social process, a set of measurables, and the behavior of interest, we formulate prediction problems as questions about the reachability properties of the system. Toward that end, the behavior about which predictions are to be made is used to define the system state space subsets of interest (SSI), while the particular set of candidate measurables under consideration allows identification of the *candidate starting set* (CSS), that is, the set of states and system parameter values which represent initializations that are equivalent under the assumed observational capability. This setup permits predictability assessment, and the related task of identifying useful measurables, to be performed in a systematic manner. Roughly speaking, the proposed approach to predictability assessment involves determining how probable it is to reach the SSI from a CSS and deciding if these reachability properties are compatible with the prediction goals. If a system's reachability characteristics are incompatible with the given prediction question - if, say, \"hit\" and \"flop\" in a cultural market are both likely to be reached from the CSS - then the prediction objectives should be refined in some way. Possible refinements include relaxing the level of detail to be predicted or introducing additional measurables.\nWe now make these notions more precise. Consider the multi-scale S-HDS social diffusion model\nS-HDS, diff specified in Definition A1.2. Let P0 be a subset of the parameter set Par and X0, Xs1, Xs2 be subsets of the (bounded) continuous system state space X. Suppose X0  P0 and {Xs1, Xs2} are the CSS and SSI, respectively, corresponding to the prediction question. Let a specification  > 0 be given for the minimum acceptable level of variation in system behavior relative to {Xs1, Xs2}. Consider the following\nDefinition A2.1: A situation is *eventual state (ES) predictable* if |1  2| > , where 1 and 2 are the probabilities of S-HDS, diff reaching Xs1 and Xs2, respectively, and is *ES unpredictable* otherwise.\nNote that in ES predictability problems it is expected that the two sets {Xs1, Xs2} represent qualitatively different system behaviors (e.g., hit and flop in a cultural market), so that if the probabilities of reaching each from X0  P0 are similar then system behavior is unpredictable in a sense that is meaningful for many applications. Other useful forms of predictability are defined and investigated in [39].\nThe notion of predictability forms the basis for our definition of useful measurables:\nDefinition A2.2: Let the components of the vectors (x0, p0)  X0  P0 which comprise the CSS be denoted x0 = [x01 ... x0n]T and p0 = [p01 ... p0p]T. The *measurables with most predictive power* are those state variables x0j and/or parameters p0k for which predictability is most sensitive.\nIntuitively, those measurables for which predictability is most sensitive are likely to be the ones that can most dramatically affect the predictability of a given problem. Note that we do not specify a particular measure of sensitivity to be used when identifying measurables with maximum predictive power, as such considerations are ordinarily application-dependent (see [39] for some useful specifications). Definitions A2.1 and A2.2 focus on the role played by *initial* states in the predictability of social processes. In some cases it is useful to expand this formulation to allow consideration of states other than initial states. For instance, we show in [18] that very early time series are often predictive for PEP, suggesting that it can be valuable to consider initial state *trajectory segments*, rather than just initial states, when assessing predictability. This extension can be naturally accomplished by redefining the CSS, for instance by augmenting the state space X with an explicit time coordinate [18].\nWe now turn our attention to the \"early warning\" problem.\nDefinition A2.3: Let the event of interest be specified in terms of S-HDS, diff reaching or escaping some SSI Xs, and suppose a warning signal is to be issued only if the probability of event occurrence exceeds some specified threshold . *Reach warning analysis* involves identifying a state set Xw, where Xs  Xw necessarily, with the property that if the system trajectory enters Xw then the probability that S-HDS, diff will eventually reach Xs is at least . Analogously, *escape warning analysis* involves identifying a state set Xw, where X \\ Xw  Xs necessarily, with the property that if the system trajectory enters Xw then the probability that S-HDS, diff will eventually escape from Xs is at least .\nA2.2 Stochastic Reachability Assessment\nThe previous section formulates predictive analysis problems as reachability questions. Here we show that these reachability questions can be addressed through an \"altitude function\" analysis, in which we seek a scalar function of the system state that permits conclusions to be made regarding reachability without computing system trajectories. We refer to these as altitude functions to provide an intuitive sense of their analytic role: if some measure of \"altitude\" is low on the CSS and high on an SSI, and if the expected rate of change of altitude along system trajectories is nonincreasing, then it is unlikely for trajectories to reach this SSI from the CSS.\nConsider the S-HDS social diffusion model S-HDS, diff evolving on a bounded state space Q  X. We quantify the uncertainty associated with S-HDS, diff by specifying bounds on the possible values for some system parameters and perturbations and giving probabilistic descriptions for other uncertain system elements and disturbances. Given this representation, it is natural to seek a probabilistic assessment of system reachability.\nWe begin with an investigation of probabilistic reachability on *infinite* time horizons. The following\n\"supermartingale lemma\" is proved in [53] and is instrumental in our development:\nLemma SM: Consider a stochastic process s with bounded state space X, and let x(t) denote the\n\"stopped\" process associated with s (i.e., x(t) is the trajectory of s which starts at x0 and is stopped if it encounters the boundary of X). If A(x(t)) is a nonnegative supermartingale then for any x0 and  > 0\n\nP{sup A(x(t))   | x(0) = x0}  A(x0) / .\nDenote by X0  X and Xs  X the initial state set and SSI, respectively, for the continuous system component of S-HDS, diff, and assume that X and the parameter set Par  Rp are both bounded. Thus, for instance, the SSI is a subset of the continuous system state space X alone; this is typically the case in applications and is easily extended if necessary. We are now in a position to state our first stochastic reachability result:\nTheorem 2:  is an upper bound on the probability of trajectories of S-HDS, diff reaching Xs from X0, while remaining in Q  X, if there is a family of differentiable functions {Aq(x)}qQ such that\n-\nAq(x)   xX0, qQ;\n\n\n-\nAq(x)  1 xXs, qQ;\n-\nAq(x)  0 xX, qQ;\n-\n(Aq/x) (fq + Hq u) + (1/2) tr [Gq\nT (2Aq/x2) Gq] + qQ qq Aq  0 xX, qQ, uU, pPar.\n\nProof: Note first that BAq(x) = (Aq/x) (fq + Hq u) + (1/2) tr [Gq\n                                                         T (2Aq/x2) Gq] + qQ qq Aq is the\ninfinitesimal generator for S-HDS, diff, and therefore quantifies the evolution of the expectation of Aq(x)\n[53,34]. As a consequence, the third and fourth conditions of the theorem imply that A(q(t),x(t)) is a\nnonnegative supermartingale [53]. Thus, from Lemma SM, we can conclude that P{x(t)Xs for some t}\nP{sup A(q(t),x(t))  1 | x(0)=x0}  A(q,x0)   x0X0, qQ, uU, pPar.\n\n\n    The preceding result characterizes reachability of S-HDS on infinite time horizons. In some situa-\ntions, including important applications involving social systems, it is of interest to study system behavior\non finite time horizons. The following result is useful for such analysis:\nTheorem 3:  is an upper bound on the probability of trajectories of S-HDS, diff reaching Xs from X0 during\ntime interval [0,T], while remaining in Q  X, if there exists a family of differentiable functions\n{Aq(x,t)}qQ such that\n-\n    Aq(x,t)   (x,t)X00, qQ;\n\n-\nAq(x,t)  1 (x,t)Xs[0,T], qQ;\n-\nAq(x,t)  0 (x,t)XR+, qQ;\n-\nBAq(x,t)  0 (x,t)XR+, qQ, uU, pPar.\nProof: The proof follows immediately from that of Theorem 2 once it is observed that P{x(t)Xs for some t[0,T]} = P{(x(t),t)Xs[0,T]}.\nThe idea for the proof of Theorem 3 was suggested in [54].\nHaving formulated predictability assessment for social processes in terms of system reachability and presented a new theoretical methodology for assessing reachability, we are now in a position to give our approach to deciding predictability. Observe first that Theorems 2 and 3 are of direct practical interest only if it is possible to efficiently compute a tight probability bound  and associated altitude function A(x) which satisfy the theorem conditions. Toward that end, observe that the theorems specify *convex*\nconditions to be satisfied by altitude functions: if A1 and A2 satisfy the theorem conditions then any convex combination of A1 and A2 will also satisfy the conditions. Thus the search for altitude functions can be formulated as a convex programming problem [55]. Moreover, if the system of interest admits a polynomial description (e.g., the system vector and matrix fields are polynomials) and we search to polynomial altitude functions, then the search can be carried out using sum-of-squares (SOS) optimization [56].\nSOS optimization is a convex relaxation framework based on SOS decomposition of the relevant polynomials and semidefinite programming. SOS relaxation involves replacing the nonnegative and nonpositive conditions to be satisfied by the altitude functions with SOS conditions. For example, the conditions for Aq(x) given in Theorem 2 can be relaxed as follows:\n                               A(x)   xX0                     A(x)  0\nT(x) g0(x) is SOS\n                              A(x)  1 xXs                   A(x)  1  s T(x) gs(x) is SOS\n                                    A(x)  0 xX              A(x)  X1\nT(x) gX1(x) is SOS\nBA(x)  0 xX, pPar            BA(x)X2\nT(x) gX2(x)P\nT(p) gP(p) is SOS\nwhere the entries of the vector functions 0, s, X1, X2, P are SOS, the vector functions g0, gs, gX1, gX2, gP satisfy g()  0 (entry-wise) whenever xX or pPar, respectively, and we assume |Q| = 1 for notational convenience. The conditions on Aq(x,t) specified in Theorem 3 can be relaxed in exactly the same manner. The relaxed SOS conditions are clearly sufficient and in practice are typically not overlyconservative [56,39].\nOnce the set of conditions to be satisfied by A(x) are relaxed in this way, SOS programming can be used to compute min, the minimum value for the probability bound , and A(x), the associated altitude function which certifies the correctness of this bound. Software for solving SOS programs is available as the third-party Matlab toolbox SOSTOOLS [56], and example SOS programs are given in [39]. Importantly, the approach is tractable: for fixed polynomial degrees, the computational complexity of the associated SOS program grows polynomially in the dimension of the continuous state space, the cardinality of the discrete state set, and the dimension of the parameter space.\nFor completeness, we outline an algorithm for computing the pair (min, A(x)):\n\n## Algorithm A2.1: Altitude Functions Via Sos Programming (Outline)\n\n1. Parameterize A as A(x) = k ck ak(x), where {a1, ..., aB} are monomials up to a desired degree bound\nand {c1, ..., cB} are to-be-determined coefficients.\n2. Relax all A(x) criteria in the relevant theorem to SOS conditions.\n3. Formulate an SOS program with decision variables , {c1, ..., cB}, where the desired bound on altitude function polynomial degree is reflected in the specification of the set {c1, ..., cB}. Compute the\nminimum probability bound min and values for the coefficients {c1, ..., cB} that define A(x) using\nSOSTOOLS.\nIt is emphasized that, although the computation of (min, A(x)) is performed numerically, the resulting function A(x) is guaranteed to satisfy the conditions of the relevant theorem and therefore represents a proof of the correctness of the probability upper bound min. Note also that the probability estimate is obtained without computing system trajectories, and is valid for entire sets of initial states X0, parameter values Par, and exogenous inputs U.\nHaving given a method for efficiently computing pairs (min, A(x)), and thereby characterizing reachability, we are now in a position to sketch an algorithm for assessing ES predictability:\n\n## Algorithm A2.2: Es Predictability (Outline)\n\nGiven: social diffusion process of interest is S-HDS, diff, CSS = X0  P0, SSI = {Xs1, Xs2}, and minimum\nacceptable level of variation = .\nProcedure:\n1. compute (upper bound for) probability 1 of S-HDS, diff reaching Xs1 from X0  P0;\n2. compute (upper bound for) probability 2 of S-HDS, diff reaching Xs2 from X0  P0;\n3. if |1  2| >  then problem is ES predictable, else problem is ES unpredictable.\nNote: 1, 2 can be computed using Theorem 2 (infinite time horizon) or Theorem 3 (finite time horizon)\ntogether with Algorithm3.1 and SOSTOOLS [56].\nA2.3 Application to Social Diffusion\nThe theoretical framework developed in the preceding sections is now used, in combination with empirically-grounded models for social diffusion [e.g., 17,49-51], to demonstrate that predictability of this class of diffusion models depends crucially upon network community structure. We investigate the following predictability question: Is the diffusion of social movements and mobilizations ES predictable and, if so, which measurable quantities have predictive power?\nWe adopt a specific version of the S-HDS social diffusion model proposed in Definition 2.2:\n\n\nS-HDS, diff = {Gsc, QX, {fq(x),Gq(x)}qQ, Par, W, {Q, (x)}}\nwhere\n-\nthe social network community graph Gsc consists of K communities (so |Vsc| = K), connected together\nwith an Erdos-Renyi random graph topology, with community size drawn from a power law distribution [36];\n-\neach continuous system cs, q: dx = fq(x,p)dt + Gq(x,p)dw, qQ, is given by the meso-scale social\nmovement model H or B with appropriate parameter vector p and system \"noise\" w;\n-\nthe discrete system {Q, (x)} is a Markov chain that defines inter-community interactions in the\nmanner described in Definition A1.2.\nA Matlab instantiation of this S-HDS diffusion model is given in [39] and is available upon request.\nThe behavior of the model can be shown to be consistent with empirical observations of several historical\nsocial movements (e.g., various movements in Sweden) [39].\nIn order to assess ES predictability, SSI = {Xs1, Xs2} is defined so that Xs1, Xs2 are state sets corresponding to *global* (affecting a significant fraction of the population) and *local* (remaining confined to a small fraction of the population) movement events, respectively. We then employ Algorithm A2.2 iteratively to search for a definition for CSS = X0  P0 which ensures that the probabilities of reaching Xs1 and Xs2 from X0  P0 are sufficiently different to yield an ES predictable situation. We use two models of the form S-HDS, diff for this analysis, corresponding to the two definitions for the continuous system H and B.\n\nEach model is composed of K = 10 communities connected together with an Erdos-Renyi random graph topology. (Using different realizations of the Erdos-Renyi random graph does not affect the conclusions reported below.)\nES predictability analysis yields two main results. First, both the intra-community and intercommunity dynamics exhibit *threshold* behavior: small changes in either the intra-community \"infectivity\" or inter-community interaction rate around their threshold values lead to large variations in the probability that the movement will propagate \"globally\". More quantitatively, for the diffusion model S-HDS, diff with continuous system dynamics H, threshold behavior is obtained when varying 1.) the generalized reproduction number R =  / 2 and 2.) the rate  at which inter-community interactions between individuals take place. Thus in order for a social movement to propagate to a significant fraction of the population, the threshold conditions R1 and 0 must be satisfied simultaneously. An analogous conclusion holds when H is replaced with the diffusion model B in the S-HDS representation. This finding is reminiscent of and extends well-known results for epidemic thresholds in disease propagation models [1].\nThis threshold behavior is illustrated in the plot at the top right of Figure 7, which shows the way probability of global propagation increases with inter-community interaction rate when the intracommunity diffusion is sufficiently infective (i.e.,  R1). The probabilities which make up this plot represents provably-correct (upper bound) estimates computed using Theorem 2 and Algorithm A2.1. A similar threshold response is observed when varying intra-community infectivity R, provided the intercommunity interaction rate satisfies 0. Importantly, the inter-community interaction threshold 0 is seen to be quite small, indicating that even a few links between network communities enables rapid diffusion of the movement to otherwise disparate regions of the social network. This result suggests that a useful predictor of movement activity in a given community is the level of movement activity among that community's neighbors in Gsc.\n\nR0 R0\n0 0 The second main ES predictability result characterizes the way probability of global propagation varies with the number of network communities across which a *fixed* set of \"seed\" movement members is distributed. To quantify this dependence, the social movement model S-HDS, diff is initialized so that a small fraction of individuals in the population are movement members and the remainder of the population consists solely of potential members. We then vary the way this initial seed set of movement members is distributed across the K network communities, at one extreme assigning all seeds to the same community and at the other spreading the seeds uniformly over all K communities. For each distribution of seed movement members, the probability of global movement propagation is computed using Theorem\n2 and Algorithm A2.1. Other than initialization strategy, the model is specified exactly as in the preceding analysis.\nThe results of this portion of the ES predictability assessment are summarized in the two plots at the bottom of Figure 7. It is seen that for both choices of meso-scale social movement dynamics, H and B, the probability of global movement propagation increases approximately linearly with the number of network communities across which the fixed set of seed members is distributed (here the number of initial members is set to one percent of the total population).\n\n## 1 Proactive Cyber Defense\n\nThere is great interest to develop proactive approaches to cyber defense, in which future attack strategies are anticipated and these insights are incorporated into defense designs. This chapter considers the problem of protecting computer networks against intrusions and other disruptions in a proactive manner. We begin by leveraging the coevolutionary relationship between attackers and defenders to derive two new *proactive filter-based methods* for network defense. The first of these filters is a bipartite graph-based machine learning algorithm which enables information concerning previous attacks to be \"transferred\" for application against novel attacks, thereby substantially increasing the rate at which defense systems can successfully respond to new attacks. The second approach involves exploiting basic threat information (obtained from, e.g., network security analysts) to generate \"synthetic\" attack data for use in learning appropriate defense actions, resulting in network defenses that are effective against both current and (near) future attacks. The utility of these two filter-based methods is demonstrated by showing that they outperform standard techniques for the task of detecting malicious network activity in two publicly-available cyber datasets. We then consider the problem of anticipating and characterizing impending attack events with sufficient specificity and timeliness to enable mitigating defensive actions to be taken, and propose a novel *early warning method* as a solution to this problem. The warning method is based upon the fact that certain classes of attacks require the attackers to coordinate their actions, and exploits signatures of this coordination to provide effective attack warning. The potential of the warning-based approach to cyber defense is illustrated through a case study involving politically-motivated Internet attacks.\n\nRapidly advancing technologies and evolving operational practices and requirements increasingly drive both private and public sector enterprises toward highly\n    Colbaugh and Glass\n2\ninterconnected and technologically convergent information networks. Proprietary information processing solutions and stove-piped databases are giving way to unified, integrated systems, thereby dramatically increasing the potential impact of even a single well-planned network intrusion, data theft, or denial-of-service\n(DoS) attack. It is therefore essential that commercial and government organizations develop network defenses which are able to respond rapidly to, or even foresee, new attack strategies and tactics.\nRecognizing these trends and challenges, some cyber security researchers and practitioners are focusing their efforts on developing *proactive* methods of cyber defense, in which future attack strategies are anticipated and these insights are incorporated into defense designs [e.g., 1-5]. However, despite this attention, much remains to be done to place the objective of proactive defense on a rigorous and quantitative foundation. Fundamental issues associated with the dynamics and predictability of the coevolutionary \"arms race\" between attackers and defenders are yet to be resolved. For instance, although recent work has demonstrated that previous attacker actions and defender responses provide predictive information about future attacker behavior [3-5], not much is known about which measurables have predictive power or how to exploit these to form useful predictions. Moreover, even if these predictability and prediction issues were resolved, it is still an open question how to incorporate such predictive analytics into the design of practically-useful cyber defense systems.\nThis chapter considers the problem of protecting enterprise-scale computer networks against intrusions and other disruptions. We begin by leveraging the coevolutionary relationship between attackers and defenders to develop two proactive filter-based methods for network defense. Each of these methods formulates the filtering task as one of behavior classification, in which innocent and malicious network activities are to be distinguished, and each assumes that only very limited prior information is available regarding exemplar attacks or attack attributes. The first method models the data as a bipartite graph of instances of network activities and the features or attributes that characterize these instances. The bipartite graph data model is used to derive a machine learning algorithm which accurately classifies a given instance as either innocent or malicious based upon its behavioral features. The algorithm enables information concerning previous attacks to be \"transferred\" for use against novel attacks; crucially, it is assumed that previous attacks are drawn from a distribution of attack instances which is related *but not identical* to that associated with the new malicious behaviors. This transfer learning algorithm offers a simple, effective way to extrapolate attacker behavior into the future, and thus significantly increases the speed with which defense systems can successfully respond to new attacks.\nThe second classifier-based approach to proactive network defense represents attacker-defender coevolution as a hybrid dynamical system (HDS) [6,7], with the HDS discrete system modeling the \"modes\" of attack (e.g., types of DoS or data exfiltration procedures) and the HDS continuous system generating particular attack instances corresponding to the attack mode presently \"active\". Our algorithm takes as input potential near-future modes of attack, obtained for example from the insights of cyber analysts, and generates synthetic attack data for these modes of malicious activity; these data are then combined with recently observed attacks to train a simple classifier to be effective against both current and (near) future attacks. The utility of these proactive filter-based methods is demonstrated by showing that they outperform standard techniques for the task of distinguishing innocent and malicious network behaviors in analyses of two publicly-available cyber datasets.\nAn alternative approach to proactive network defense is to consider the problem of anticipating and characterizing impending attack events with enough specificity and lead time to allow mitigating defensive actions to be taken. We also explore this approach in the chapter, proposing a novel *early warning method* as a solution to this problem. The proposed warning method is based upon the fact that certain classes of attacks require the attackers to coordinate their actions, often through social media or other observable channels, and exploits signatures generated by this coordination to provide effective attack warning. Interestingly, the most useful early warning indicator identified in this exploratory study is not one of the standard metrics for social media activity, but instead is a subtle measure of the way attack coordination interacts with the *topology* of relevant online social networks. The potential of the early warning approach to proactive cyber defense is illustrated through a case study involving politically-motivated Internet-scale attacks.\n\n## 1.2  Proactive Filters\n\nIn this section we propose two filter-based methods for proactive network defense and demonstrate their utility through analysis of publicly-available computer network security-related datasets.\n\n## 1.2.1  Preliminaries\n\nWe approach the task of protecting computer networks from attack as a classification problem, in which the objective is to distinguish innocent and malicious network activity. Each instance of network activity is represented as a feature vector x|F|, where entry xi of x is the value of feature i for instance x and F is the set of instance features or attributes of interest (x may be normalized in various ways [7]). Instances can belong to one of two classes: positive / innocent and negative / malicious; generalizing to more than two classes is straightforward. We wish to learn a vector c|F| such that the classifier orient  sign(cTx) accurately estimates the class label of behavior x, returning 1 (1) for innocent (malicious) activity.\nKnowledge-based classifiers leverage prior domain information to construct\n    Colbaugh and Glass\n4\nthe vector c. One way to obtain such a classifier is to assemble a \"lexicon\" of innocent / positive features FF and malicious / negative features FF, and to set ci 1 if feature i belongs to F, ci 1 if i is in F, and ci0 otherwise; this classifier simply sums the positive and negative feature values in the instance and assigns instance class accordingly. Unfortunately this sort of scheme is unable to improve its performance or adapt to new domains, and consequently is usually not very useful in cyber security applications.\nAlternatively, learning-based methods attempt to generate the classifier vector c from examples of innocent and malicious network activity. To obtain a learning classifier, one can begin by assembling a set of nl *labeled* instances {(xi, di)}, where di{1, 1} is the class label for instance i. The vector c is then learned through training with the set {(xi, di)}, for example by solving the following set of equations for c:\n\n[XTX  I|F|] c  XT d,                      (1)\nwhere matrix Xnl|F| has instance feature vectors for rows, dnl is the vector of instance labels, I|F| denotes the |F||F| identity matrix, and 0 is a constant; this corresponds to regularized least squares (RLS) learning [8]. Many other learning strategies can be used to compute c [8]. Learning-based classifiers have the potential to improve their performance and adapt to new situations, but realizing these capabilities typically requires that large training sets of labeled attacks be obtained. This latter characteristic represents a significant drawback for cyber security applications, where it is desirable to be able to recognize new attacks given only a few (or even no) examples.\nIn this section we present two new learning-based approaches to cyber defense which are able to perform well with only very modest levels of prior knowledge regarding the attack classes of interest. The basic idea is to leverage \"auxiliary\" information which is readily available in cyber security applications. More specifically, the first proposed method is a transfer learning algorithm [e.g., 9] which permits the information present in data from previous attacks to be transferred for implementation against new attacks. The second approach uses prior knowledge concerning attack \"modes\" to generate synthetic attack data for use in training defense systems, resulting in networks defenses which are effective against both current and (near) future attacks.\n\n## 1.2.2  Algorithm One: Transfer Learning\n\nWe begin by deriving a bipartite graph-based transfer learning algorithm for distinguishing innocent and malicious network behaviors, and then demonstrate the algorithm's effectiveness through a case study using publicly-available network intrusion data obtained from the KDD Cup archive [10]. The basic hypothesis is simple and natural: because attacker / defender behavior coevolves, previous activity should provide some indication of future behavior, and transfer learning is one way to quantify and operationalize this intuition.\n\n## Proposed Algorithm\n\nThe development of the proposed algorithm begins by modeling the problem data as a bipartite graph Gb, in which instances of network activity are connected to their features (see Figure 1.1). It is easy to see that the adjacency matrix A for graph Gb is given by\n\n  0 X   X 0 A T\ninstances instances where matrix Xn|F| is constructed by stacking the n instance feature vectors as rows, and each '0' is a matrix of zeros. In the proposed algorithm, the bipartite graph model Gb is used to exploit the relationships between instances and features by assuming that, in Gb, positive / negative instances will tend to be connected to positive / negative features. Note that, as shown below, the learning algorithm can incorporate both instance labels and feature labels (if available). In the case of the latter it is assumed that the feature labels are used to build vector w|F|, where the entries of w are set to 1 (innocent), 1 (malicious), or 0 (unknown) according to the polarity of the corresponding features.\nfeatures features Many cyber security applications are characterized by the presence of limited labeled data for the attack class of interest but ample labeled information for a related class of malicious activity. For example, an analyst may be interested in detecting a new class of attacks, and may have in hand a large set of labeled examples of normal network behavior as well as attacks which have been experienced in the recent past. In this setting it is natural to adopt a transfer learning approach, in which knowledge concerning previously observed instances of inno-\n\n## Colbaugh And Glass 6\n\ncent / malicious behavior, the so-called *source* data, is transferred to permit classification of new *target* data. In what follows we present a new bipartite graph-based approach to transfer learning that is well-suited to cyber defense applications.\n\nAssume that the initial problem data consists of a collection of n = nT  nS\nnetwork events, where nT is the (small) number of labeled instances available for the target domain, that is, examples of network activity of current interest, and nS\n nT is the number of labeled instances from some related source domain, say reflecting recent innocent and malicious activity; suppose also that a modest lexicon Fl of labeled features is known (this set can be empty). Let this label data be used to encode vectors dTnT, dSnS, and w|F|, respectively. Denote by dT,estnT, dS,estnS, and c|F| the vectors of estimated class labels for the target and source instances and the features, and define the *augmented classifier* caug\n [dS,est T  dT,est T  cT]T  n|F|. Note that the quantity caug is introduced for notational convenience in the subsequent development and is not directly employed for classification.\nWe derive an algorithm for learning caug, and therefore c, by solving an optimization problem involving the labeled source and target training data, and then use c to estimate the class label of any new instance of network activity via the simple linear classifier orient  sign(cTx). This classifier is referred to as transfer learning-based because c is learned, in part, by transferring knowledge about the way innocent and malicious network behavior is manifested in a domain which is related to (but need not be identical to) the domain of interest.\nWe wish to learn an augmented classifier caug with the following four properties: 1.) if a source instance is labeled, then the corresponding entry of dS,est should be close to this 1 label; 2.) if a target instance is labeled, then the corresponding entry of dT,est should be close to this 1 label, and the information encoded in dT\nshould be emphasized relative to that in the source labels dS,; 3.) if a feature is in the lexicon Fl, then the corresponding entry of c should be close to this 1 label;\nand 4.) if there is an edge Xij of Gb which connects an instance i and a feature j, and Xij possesses significant weight, then the estimated class labels for i and j should be similar.\nThe four objectives listed above may be realized by solving the following optimization problem:\n\n$$\\min_{\\rm c_{\\rm age}}\\ \\ \\ {\\rm c_{\\rm aug}^{\\rm T}\\,Lc_{\\rm aug}\\ +\\beta_{1}\\left\\|{\\rm d _{\\rm S,est}\\ -\\,k_{\\rm S}d_{\\rm S}}\\right\\|^{2}+\\beta_{2}\\left\\|{\\rm d_{\\rm T,est}\\ -\\,k_{\\rm T}d_{\\rm T}}\\right\\|^{2}\\ +\\beta_{3}\\left\\|{\\rm c -\\ w}\\right\\|^{2} \\tag{3}$$\nwhere L  D  A is the graph Laplacian matrix for Gb, with D the diagonal degree matrix for A (i.e., Dii  j Aij), and 1, 2, 3, kS, and kT are nonnegative constants.\n\nMinimizing (3) enforces the four properties we seek for caug. More specifically, the second, third, and fourth terms penalize \"errors\" in the first three properties, and choosing 2  1 and kT  kS favors target label data over source labels. To see that the first term enforces the fourth property, note that this expression is a sum of components of the form Xij (dT,est,i  cj)2 and Xij (dS,est,i  cj)2. The constants 1, 2,\n3 can be used to balance the relative importance of the four properties.\nThe caug which minimizes the objective function (3) can be obtained by solving the following set of linear equations:\n\n$$\\left[\\begin{array}{ccc}\\rm{L}_{{}_{11}}+\\beta_{{}_{1}}\\rm{I}_{{}_{nS}}&\\rm{L}_{{}_ {12}}&\\rm{L}_{{}_{13}}\\\\ \\rm{L}_{{}_{21}}&\\rm{L}_{{}_{22}}+\\beta_{{}_{2}}\\rm{I}_{{}_{nT}}&\\rm{L}_{{}_{23 }}\\\\ \\rm{L}_{{}_{31}}&\\rm{L}_{{}_{32}}&\\rm{L}_{{}_{33}}+\\beta_{{}_{3}}\\rm{I}_{{}_{|F }}\\end{array}\\right]\\rm{c}_{{}_{mag}}=\\left[\\begin{array}{c}\\beta_{{}_{1}}\\rm {k}_{{}_{S}}\\rm{d}_{{}_{S}}\\\\ \\beta_{{}_{2}}\\rm{k}_{{}_{T}}\\rm{d}_{{}_{T}}\\\\ \\beta_{{}_{3}}\\rm{w}\\end{array}\\right] \\tag{4}$$\nwhere the Lij are matrix blocks of L of appropriate dimension. The system (4) is sparse because the data matrix X is sparse, and therefore large-scale problems can be solved efficiently. Note that in situations where the set of available labeled target instances and features is *very* limited, classifier performance can be improved by replacing L in (4) with the normalized Laplacian LnD1/2LD1/2, or with a power of this matrix Ln k (for k a positive integer).\nWe summarize the above discussion by sketching an algorithm for constructing the proposed transfer learning classifier:\nAlgorithm TL (Transfer Learning):\n\n1. Assemble the set of equations (4), possibly by replacing the graph Laplacian\nL with Ln\nk.\n2. Solve equations (4) for caug  [dS,est\nT  dT,est\nT  cT]T (e.g., using the Conjugate\nGradient method).\n3. Estimate the class label (innocent or malicious) of any new network activity x\nof interest as: orient  sign(cTx).\n\n## Algorithm Evaluation\n\nWe now examine the performance of Algorithm TL for the problem of distinguishing innocent and malicious network activity in the KDD Cup 99 dataset, a publicly-available collection of network data consisting of both normal activities and attacks of various kinds [10]. For this study we randomly selected 1000 Normal connections (N), 1000 denial-of-service attacks (DoS), and 1000 unauthorized remote-access events (R2L) to serve as our test data. Additionally, small sets of each of these classes of activity were chosen at random from [10] to be used for training Algorithm TL, and a lexicon of four features, two positive and two negative, was constructed manually and employed to form the lexicon vector w.\nWe defined two tasks with which to explore the utility of Algorithm TL. In the first, the goal is to distinguish N and DoS instances, and it is assumed that the following data is available to train Algorithm TL: 1.) a set of dS/2 labeled N and dS/2\nlabeled R2L instances (source data), 2.) a set of dT/2 labeled N and dT/2 labeled DoS instances (target data), and 3.) the four lexicon features. Thus the source domain consists of N and R2L activities and the target domain is composed of N and DoS instances. In the second task the situation is reversed - the objective is to distinguish N and R2L activities, the source domain is made up of dS (total) labeled N and DoS instances, and the target domain consists of dT (total) N and R2L\ninstances. In all tests the number of labeled source instances is dS  50, while the number of target instances dT is varied to explore the way classifier performance depends on this key parameter. Of particular interest is determining if it is possible to obtain good performance with only limited target data, as this outcome would suggest both that useful information concerning a given attack class is present in other attacks and that Algorithm TL is able to extract this information.\nThis study compared the classification accuracy of Algorithm TL with that of a well-tuned version of the RLS algorithm (1) and a standard naive Bayes (NB) algorithm [11]; as the accuracies obtained with the RLS and NB methods were quite similar, we report only the RLS results. Algorithm TL was implemented with the following parameter values: 1  1.0, 2  3.0, 3  5.0, kS  0.5, kT  1.0, and k  5. We examined training sets which incorporated the following numbers of target instances: nT  5, 10, 20, 30, 40, 50, 60. As in previous studies (see, for example, [10]), only the 34 \"continuous features\" were used for learning the classifiers. Sample results from this study are depicted in Figure 1.2. Each data point in the plots represents the average of 100 trials. It can be seen that Algorithm TL\noutperforms the RLS classifier (and also the standard NB algorithm, not shown), and that the difference in accuracy of the methods increases substantially as the volume of training data from the target domain becomes small. The performance of Algorithm TL for this task is also superior to that reported for other learning methods tested on these data [e.g., 12]. The ability of Algorithm TL to accurately identify a novel attack after seeing only a very few examples of it, which is a direct consequence of its ability to transfer useful knowledge from related data, is expected to be of considerable value for a range of cyber security applications.\n\nFinally, it is interesting to observe that the bipartite graph formulation of Algorithm TL permits useful information to be extracted from network data even if no labeled instances are available. More specifically, we repeated the above study for the case in which dT  dS  0, that is, when no labeled instances are available in either the target or source domains. The knowledge reflected in the lexicon vector w is still made available to Algorithm TL. As shown in Figure 1.3, employing a \"lexicon only\" classifier, in which the vector w is used to build a knowledge-based scheme as described in Section 1.2.1, yields a classification accuracy which is not much better than the 50 baseline achievable with random guessing.\n\nHowever, using this lexicon information together with Algorithm TL enables useful classification accuracy to be obtained (see Figure 1.3). This somewhat surprising result can be explained as follows: the \"clustering\" property of Algorithm TL\nencoded in objective function (3) allows the domain knowledge in the lexicon to leverage latent information present in the *unlabeled* target and source instances, thereby boosting classifier accuracy.\n\n## 1.2.3  Algorithm Two: Synthetic Attack Generation\n\nIn this section we derive our second filter-based algorithm for distinguishing normal and malicious network activity and demonstrate its effectiveness through a case study using the publicly-available Ling-Spam dataset [13]. Again the intuition is that attacker / defender coevolution should make previous activity somewhat indicative of future behavior, and in the present case we operationalize this notion by generating \"predicted\" attack data and using this synthetic data for classifier training.\n\n## Proposed Algorithm\n\ninputs inputs inputs inputs\n\nThe development of the second approach to proactive filter-based defense begins by modeling attacker / defender interaction as a stochastic hybrid dynamical system (S-HDS). Here we present a brief, intuitive overview of the basic idea; a comprehensive description of the modeling procedure is given in [7]. An S-HDS\n(see Figure 1.4) is a feedback interconnection of a discrete-state stochastic process, such as a Markov chain, with a family of continuous-state stochastic dynamical systems [6,14]. Combining discrete and continuous dynamics within a unified,\ncomputationally tractable framework offers an expressive, scalable modeling environment that is amenable to formal mathematical analysis. In particular, S-HDS models can be used to efficiently represent and analyze dynamical phenomena which evolve on multiple time scales [14], a property of considerable value in the\npresent application.\nAs a simple illustration of the way the S-HDS formalism enables effective, efficient mathematical representation of cyber phenomena, consider the task of\nmodeling the coevolution of Spam attack methods and Spam filters. At an abstract but still useful level, one can think of Spam-Spam filter dynamics as evolving on two timescales:\n\n\nthe *slow timescale*, which captures the evolution of attack strategies; as an\nexample, consider the way early Spam filters learned to detect Spam by identifying words that were consistently associated with Spam, and how Spammers responded by systematically modifying the wording of their messages, for instance via \"add-word\" (AW) and \"synonym\" attacks [15];\n\nthe *fast timescale*, which corresponds to the generation of particular attack\ninstances for a given \"mode\" of attack (for example, the synthesis of Spam\nmessages according to a specific AW attack method).\nWe show in [7] that a range of adversarial behavior can be represented within the S-HDS framework, and derive simple but reasonable models for Spam-Spam filter dynamics and for basic classes of network intrusion attacks.\nIn [14] we develop a mathematically-rigorous procedure for predictive analysis for general classes of S-HDS. Among other capabilities, this analytic methodology enables the predictability of a given dynamics to be assessed and the predictive measurables (if any) to be identified. Applying this predictability assessment process to the adversarial S-HDS models constructed in [7] reveals that, for many of these models, the most predictive measurable is the *mode* of attack, that is, the state variable for the discrete system component of the S-HDS (see [7] for a detailed description of this analysis). Observe that this result is intuitively sensible.\nThis analytic finding suggests the following *synthetic data learning* (SDL) approach to proactive defense. First, identify the mode(s) of attack of interest. For attacks which are already underway, [7] offers an S-HDS discrete-system state estimation method that allows the mode to be inferred using only modest amounts of measured data. Alternatively, and of more interest in the present application, it is often possible to identify likely future attack modes through analysis of auxiliary information sources (e.g., the subject matter knowledge possessed by domain experts or \"non-cyber\" data such as that found in social media [16-18]).\nOnce a candidate attack mode has been identified, synthetic attack data corresponding to the mode can be generated by employing one of the S-HDS models derived in [7]. The synthetic data take the form of a set of K network attack instance vectors, denoted AS  {xS1, ..., xSK}. The set AS can then be combined with\n(actual) measurements of L normal network activity instances, NM  {xNM1, ..., xNML}, and P (recently) observed attacks, AM  {xM1, ..., xMP}, yielding the training dataset TR  NM  AM  AS of real and synthetic data. Note that one effective way to generate a set AS of synthetic attacks is to use the S-HDS formalism to appropriately *transform* attack instances sampled from the observed attack set AM, rather than to attempt to construct synthetic attacks \"from scratch\". It is hypothesized that training classifiers with dataset TR may offer a mechanism for deriving defenses which are effective against both current and near future malicious activity.\n\nWe summarize the above discussion by sketching a procedure for constructing the proposed SDL classifier:\nAlgorithm SDL (Synthetic Data Learning):\n\n1. Identify the mode(s) of attack of interest (e.g., via domain experts or auxiliary\ndata).\n2. Assemble sets of measured normal network activity NM and measured attack\nactivity AM for the network under study.\n3. Generate a set of synthetic attack instances AS corresponding to the attack\nmode(s) identified in Step 1 (for instance by transforming attacks in AM).\n4. Train a classifier (e.g., RLS, NB) using the training data TR  NM  AM  AS.\nEstimate the class label (innocent or malicious) of any new network activity x with the classifier trained using data TR.\n\n## Algorithm Evaluation\n\nWe now examine the performance of Algorithm SDL for the problem of distinguishing legitimate and Spam emails in the Ling-Spam dataset [13], a corpus of 2412 non-Spam emails collected from a linguistics mailing list and 481 Spam emails received by the list. After data cleaning and random sub-sampling of the non-Spam messages we are left with 468 Spam and 526 non-Spam messages for training and testing purposes; this set of 994 emails will be referred to as the nominal Spam corpus. (Note that all email was preprocessed using the *ifile* tool\n[19].)\nWe considered three scenarios in this study:\n\n1. NB classifier / nominal Spam: for each of ten runs, the nominal Spam corpus\nwas randomly divided into equal-sized training and testing sets and the class label for each message in the test set was estimated with a naive Bayes (NB) algorithm [11] learned on the training set;\n2. NB classifier / nominal plus attack Spam: for each of ten runs, the nominal\nSpam corpus was randomly divided into equal-sized training and testing sets\nand the test set was then augmented with 263 additional non-Spam messages\n(taken from the Ling-Spam dataset) and 234 Spam messages generated via a standard add-word (AW) attack methodology [15]; the class labels for the test messages were estimated with an NB algorithm [11] learned on the nominal Spam training set;\n3. Algorithm SDL / nominal plus attack Spam: for each of ten runs, the training\nand test corpora were constructed exactly as in Scenario 2 and the class labels\nfor the test messages were estimated with Algorithm SDL.\n\n## Nb Algorithm: Nominal Spam\n\nNB Algorithm: Nominal Spam class\\truth       non-Spam       Spam class\\truth       non-Spam       Spam non-Spam             262                19\nSpam                         1               215\nnon-Spam             262                19\nSpam                         1               215\n\n## Nb Algorithm: Nominal And Attack Spam\n\nNB Algorithm: Nominal and Attack Spam class\\truth       non-Spam       Spam class\\truth       non-Spam       Spam non-Spam             524               253\nSpam                         2               215\nnon-Spam             524               253\nSpam                         2               215\n\n## Algorithm Sdl: Nominal And Attack Spam\n\nAlgorithm SDL: Nominal and Attack Spam class\\truth       non-Spam       Spam class\\truth       non-Spam       Spam non-Spam             524                40 Spam                         2               428 non-Spam             524                40 Spam                         2               428\n\nIn generating the AW attacks in Scenarios 2 and 3, we assume that the attacker knows to construct AW Spam to defeat an NB filter but does not have knowledge of the specific filter involved [15]. The synthetic AW attacks generated in Scenario 3 (using Step 3 of Algorithm SDL) are computed with no knowledge of the attacker's methodology beyond the mode of attack (i.e., AW).\nSample results from this study are displayed in Figure 1.5. In each case the\n\"confusion matrix\" [8] reports the (rounded) average performance over the ten runs. It can be seen that, as expected, the NB filter does well against the nominal Spam but poorly against the AW Spam (in fact, the NB filter does not detect a single instance of AW Spam). In contrast, Algorithm SDL performs well against\nboth nominal Spam and AW Spam, achieving ~96 classification accuracy with a\nlow false positive rate. It is emphasized that this result is obtained using only the\n(synthetic) estimate of AW Spam generated in Step 3 of Algorithm SDL.\n\n## 1.3  Early Warning\n\nIn this section we develop an early warning capability for an important class of computer network attacks and illustrate its potential through a case study involving politically-motivated DoS attacks.\n\n## 1.3.1  Preliminaries\n\nComputer network attacks take many forms, including system compromises, information theft, and denial-of-service attacks intended to disrupt services. In what follows we focus on deriving an early warning capability for distributed denial-ofservice (DDoS) attacks, that it, coordinated efforts in which computers are instructed to flood a victim with traffic designed to overwhelm services or consume bandwidth. In particular, we concentrate on politically-motivated DDoS attacks, for three main reasons: 1.) this class of attacks is an important and growing threat [17], 2.) the class is representative of other threats of interest, and 3.) it is expected that in the case of politically-motivated attacks the coordination among attackers may take place, in part, via social media, thereby enabling an analysis employing only publicly-available data.\nConsider the task of detecting social media signatures associated with attackers coordinating a politically-motivated DDoS. A classic example of the kind of attack of interest is the sequence of DDoS which were launched against government and commercial sites in Estonia beginning in late April 2007. Interestingly, a retrospective study of these events reveals that there was significant planning and coordination among attackers through web forums and blogs prior to the actual attacks [17], supporting the hypothesis that it may be possible to detect early warning indicators in social media *in advance* of such attacks.\nOf course, detecting early warning indicators of an impending DDoS attack in social media is a daunting undertaking. Challenges associated with this task include the vast volume of discussions taking place online, the need to distinguish credible threats from irrelevant chatter, and the necessity to identify reliable attack indicators early enough to be useful (e.g., at least a few days in advance of the attack). Recently we have developed a general framework within which to study this class of early warning problem [14,18,20]. The basic premise is that generating useful predictions about social processes, such as the planning and coordination of a DDoS event, requires careful consideration of the way individuals interact through their social networks. The proposed warning methodology therefore exploits information about social network interactions to forecast which nascent online discussions will ultimately lead to real world attack events, and which will fade into obscurity. Interestingly, the features found to possess exploitable predictive power turn out to be subtle measures of the network dynamics associated with the evolution of early attack-related discussions [14,18,20].\nWe now briefly summarize the early warning framework presented in\n[14,18,20] and its application to the DDoS warning problem, and then illustrate the implementation and performance of the warning method through a case study involving politically-motivated Internet attacks.\n\n## 1.3.2  Early Warning Method\n\nIn social dynamics, individuals are often affected by what others do. As a consequence, social phenomena can depend upon the topological features of the underlying social network, for instance the degree distribution or presence of small world structure, and aspects of this dependence have been characterized (see [21] for a recent review). We show in [14,18,20] that, for a wide range of social phenomena, useful prediction requires consideration of the way the behavior of individuals interacts with *social network communities*, that is, densely connected groupings of individuals that have only relatively few links to other groups. The concept of network community structure is illustrated in Figure 1.6 and is defined more carefully below. This dependence suggests that in order to derive useful early warning methods for social phenomena, one should consider the topology of the underlying social network; however, standard prediction algorithms do not include such features.\n\n\n\nWhile community structure is widely appreciated to be an important topological property in real world social networks, there is not a similar consensus regarding qualitative or quantitative definitions for this concept. Here we adopt the modularity-based definition proposed in [23], whereby a good partitioning of a network's vertices into communities is one for which the number of edges between putative communities is smaller than would be expected in a random partitioning.\n\nTo be concrete, a modularity-based partitioning of a network into two communities maximizes the modularity Q, defined as\n\nQ  sT B s / 4m                              (5)\nwhere m is the total number of edges in the network, the partition is specified with the elements of vector s by setting si  1 if vertex i belongs to community 1 and si\n 1 if it belongs to community 2, and matrix B has elements Bij  Aij  kikj / 2m, with Aij and ki denoting the network adjacency matrix and degree of vertex i, respectively. Partitions of the network into more than two communities can be constructed recursively [23]. Note that modularity-based community partitions can be efficiently computed for large social networks and require only network topology data for their construction.\nDespite the fact that community structure is ubiquitous in real social networks, little has been done to incorporate considerations of communities into social prediction methods. In [14,18,20] we present theoretical and empirical evidence that the predictability of social dynamics often depends crucially upon network community structure. More specifically, we show that early dispersion of a social dynamics \"activity\" across network communities is a reliable early indicator that the ultimate extent of the activity will be significant. (Perhaps surprisingly, this measure is more predictive than the early magnitude of the activity.)\nIn the context of early warning for politically-motivated cyber attacks, the social activity of interest is communication associated with planning and coordinating the attack. Thus it is of interest to collect data that enables quantification of the extent to which early communications of this type are dispersed across network communities. Such data should therefore include social network information sufficient to allow the identification of network communities as well as the detection of attack-related discussions among individuals in the network. One way to address this challenge is to adopt *online* social activity as a proxy for real world attack-related discussion and information exchange. More specifically, we use blog posts as our primary data set. The blog network is modeled as a graph in which the vertices are blogs and the edges represent links between blogs, with two blogs being linked if a post in one hyperlinks to a post in the other. Among other things, this blog graph model enables the identification of blog communities: these are the groups of blogs corresponding to the blog graph partition which maximizes the modularity Q for the graph (see (5)); these groups of blogs serve as our proxy for social network communities.\nWe are now in a position to specify an early warning algorithm for politicallymotivated DDoS attacks. The algorithm operationalizes the \"early dispersion of attack-related discussions\" indicator, computing a measure of the magnitude of this dispersion and issuing an alert if and only if the dispersion is \"large\".\nAlgorithm EW (Early Warning):\nInitialization: Identify a (large) set of cyber security-relevant blogs and forums B to be continually monitored; B should include sites contributed to and frequented by both attackers (e.g., hacker forums) and defenders (e.g., security blogs).\n\n## Procedure:\n\n1. Perform *meme detection* with the blogs in B to identify all \"memes\" which\nare potentially related to politically-motivated DDoS attacks. Characterize the discussion topic(s) associated with each meme.\n2. Conduct a sequence of blog graph crawls and construct a time series of blog\ngraphs GB(t). For each meme / topic M of interest and each time period t, label the blogs in GB(t) as 'active' if they contain a post containing M and 'inactive' otherwise.\n3. Form the union GB = tGB(t), partition GB into network communities, and\nmap the communities structure of GB back to each of the graphs GB(t).\n4. Compute the post volume time series and the post / community entropy (PCE)\ntime series for each meme / topic.\n5. Construct a synthetic ensemble of PCE time series from the post volume dynamics for each meme / topic.\n6. Compare the actual PCE time series to the synthetic ensemble series for each\nmeme / topic M to determine if the observed early dispersion of activity across communities is \"large\" for topic M.\nWe now offer additional details concerning this procedure; a more comprehensive discussion of the methodology is provided in [7]. Step 1 is performed using the algorithm described in [24,20]. Observe that 'memes' in this context are distinctive phrases which propagate relatively unchanged online and act as \"tracers\" for topics of discussion. It is shown in [24,20] that detecting memes in social media is a useful and general way to discover emerging topics and trends, and we demonstrate in [7] that meme analysis allows the detection of discussions concerning the planning and coordination of politically-motivated DDoS within a day or two of the initiation of these discussions.\nStep 2 is by now standard, and various tools exist which can perform these tasks [e.g., 25]. In Step 3, blog network communities are identified with a modularity-based community extraction algorithm applied to the blog graph [23]. In Step 4, the post volume for a given meme / topic M, community i, and sampling interval t is obtained by counting the number of posts containing M made to the blogs comprising community i during interval t. PCE for a particular meme / topic M and sampling interval t is defined as follows:\n\n$\\rm PCE_{M}(t)=-\\Sigma_{i}\\,f_{M,i}(t)$ log($\\rm f_{M,i}(t)$) (6)\nwhere fM,i(t) is the fraction of total posts containing M and made during interval t which occur in community i. Given the post volume time series obtained in Step 4, Step 5 involves construction of an ensemble of PCE time series that would be expected under \"normal circumstances\", that is, if meme M propagated from a small seed set of initiators according to standard models of social diffusion [18,20]. Observe that this step enables us to quantify the expected dispersion for PCEM(t), so that we can recognize \"large\" dispersion. Step 6 is carried out by searching for memes M and time periods t during which PCEM(t) exceeds the mean of the synthetic PCE ensemble by a user-defined threshold (e.g., two standard deviations).\n\n## 1.3.3  Case Study: Politically-Motivated Ddos\n\nThis subsection reports the results of a case study aimed at exploring the ability of Algorithm EW to provide reliable early warning for DDoS attacks. Toward this end, we first identified a set of Internet \"disturbances\" that included examples from three distinct classes of events:\n\n1. successful politically-motivated DDoS attacks - these are the events for\nwhich Algorithm EW is intended to provide warning with sufficient lead time\nto allow mitigating actions to be taken;\n2. natural events which disrupt Internet service - these are disturbances, such as\nearthquakes and electric power outages, that impact the Internet but for which\nit is known that no early warning signal exists in social media;\n3. quiet periods - these are periods during which there is social media \"chatter\"\nconcerning impending DDoS attacks but ultimately no (successful) attacks occurred.\nIncluding in the case study events selected from these three classes is intended to provide a fairly comprehensive test of Algorithm EW. For instance, these classes correspond to 1.) the domain of interest (DDoS attacks), 2.) a set of disruptions which impact the Internet but have no social media warning signal, and 3.) a set of\n\"non-events\" which do not impact the Internet but do possess putative social media warning signals (discussion of DDoS attacks).\nWe selected twenty events from these three classes:\nPolitically-motivated DDoS attacks:\n\n\nEstonia event in April 2007;\n\nCNN / China incident in April 2008;\n\nIsrael / Palestine conflict event in January 2009;\n\nDDoS associated with Iranian elections in June 2009;\n\nWikiLeaks event in November 2010;\n\nAnonymous v. PayPal, etc. attack in December 2010;\n\nAnonymous v. HBGary attack in February 2011.\nNatural disturbances:\n\n\nEuropean power outage in November 2006;\n\nTaiwan earthquake in December 2006;\n\nHurricane Ike in September 2008;\n\nMediterranean cable cut in January 2009;\n\nTaiwan earthquake in March 2010;\n\nJapan earthquake in March 2011.\nQuiet periods:\nSeven periods, from March 2005 through March 2011, during which there were discussions in social media of DDoS attacks on various U.S. government agencies but no (successful) attacks occurred.\nFor brevity, a detailed discussion of these twenty events is not given here; the interested reader is referred to [7] for additional information on these disruptions.\nWe collected two forms of data for each of the twenty events: *cyber data* and social data. The cyber data consist of time series of routing updates which were issued by Internet routers during a one month period surrounding each event. More precisely, these data are the Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) routing updates exchanged between gateway hosts in the Autonomous System network of the Internet. The data was downloaded from the publicly-accessible RIPE collection site [26] using the process described in [27] (see [27] for additional details and background information on BGP routing dynamics). The temporal evolution of the volume of BGP routing updates (e.g., withdrawal messages) gives a coarse-grained measure of the timing and magnitude of large Internet disruptions and thus offers a simple and objective way to characterize the impact of each of the events in our collection. The social data consist of time series of social media mentions of cyber-related memes detected during a one month period surrounding each of the twenty events. These data were collected using the procedure specified in Algorithm EW.\nIllustrative time series plots corresponding to two events in the case study, the WikiLeaks DDoS attack in November 2010 and Japan earthquake in March 2011, are shown in Figure 1.7. Observe that the time series of BGP routing updates are similar for the two events, with each experiencing a large \"spike\" at the time of the event. The time series of blog post volume are also similar across the two events, with each showing modest volume prior to the event and displaying a large spike in activity at event time. However, the time series for blog entropy are quite distinct for the two events. Specifically, in the case of the WikiLeaks DDoS the blog entropy (dashed curve in Figure 1.7) experiences a dramatic increase several days before the event (and leads post volume), while in the case of the Japan earthquake blog entropy is small for the entire collection period (and lags post volume). Similar social media behavior is observed for all events in the case study, suggesting that: 1.) early dispersion of discussions across blog network communities may be a useful early warning indicator for politically-motivated DDoS attacks, and 2.) the post volume associated with these discussions does not appear to be a useful early indicator for these attacks.\nTo investigate this possibility more carefully, we evaluated the predictive performance of two candidate early warning signals on the twenty events in our test set: 1.) the \"early dispersion\" PCE indicator computed in Algorithm EW, and 2.) a simple volume-based indicator, in which the presence or absence of significant post volume is used as a signal that a DDoS attack is imminent. We find that the PCE indicator performs well, correctly classifying all twenty events (seven attacks and thirteen non-attacks) and providing an average lead time of sixteen days for attack warning. In contrast, blog volume is not found to be useful for early warning, exhibiting essentially identical behavior for DDoS attacks and natural disturbances and spiking slightly *after* the occurrence of the disruption for all events.\n\n## 1.4 Concluding Remarks\n\nThis chapter considers the problem of protecting computer networks against intrusions and other disruptions in a proactive manner. We begin by deriving two new proactive filter-based methods for network defense: 1.) a bipartite graph-based transfer learning algorithm which enables information concerning previous attacks to be transferred for application against novel attacks, thereby substantially increasing the rate with which defense systems can successfully respond to new attacks, and 2.) a synthetic data learning method that exploits basic threat information to generate attack data for use in learning appropriate defense actions, resulting in network defenses that are effective against both current and (near) future attacks. The utility of these two filter-based methods is demonstrated by showing that they outperform standard techniques for the task of detecting malicious network activity in two publicly-available cyber datasets. We then present an early warning method as a solution to the problem of anticipating and characterizing impending attack events with sufficient specificity and timeliness to enable mitigating defensive actions to be taken. The warning method is based upon the fact that certain classes of attacks require the attackers to coordinate their actions, and exploits signatures of this coordination to provide effective attack warning. The potential of the warning-based approach to cyber defense is illustrated through a case study involving politically-motivated Internet attacks.\nFuture work will include application of the proposed proactive defense methods to additional threats, including non-cyber threats which involve attacker-defender coevolution (e.g., counterterrorism), as well as the development of new proactive defense strategies. As an example of one approach toward the latter goal, we have recently shown that adversary activity can be accurately predicted and countered in certain settings by appropriately combining data analysis methods (e.g., machine learning) with behavioral models for adversarial dynamics (e.g., incremental game models) [28].\n\nThis work was supported by the Laboratory Directed Research and Development Program at Sandia National Laboratories. We thank Chip Willard of the U.S. Department of Defense for numerous helpful discussions on aspects of this research.\n\n## References\n\n[1] Byers, S. and S. Yang, \"Real-time fusion and projection of network intrusion\nactivity\", *Proc. ISIF/IEEE International Conference on Information Fusion*,\n\n## Colbaugh And Glass 22\n\nCologne, Germany, July 2008.\n[2] Armstrong, R., J. Mayo, and F. Siebenlist, \"Complexity science challenges in\ncybersecurity\", Sandia National Laboratories SAND Report, March 2009.\n[3] Colbaugh, R., \"Does coevolution in malware adaptation enable predictive\nanalysis?\", *IFA Workshop: Exploring Malware Adaptation Patterns*, San\nFrancisco, CA, May 2010.\n[4] Mashevsky, Y., Y. Namestnikov, N. Denishchenko, and P. Zelensky, \"Method and system for detection and prediction of computer virus-related epidemics\", US Patent 7,743,419, June 2010.\n[5] Bozorgi, M., L. Saul, S. Savage, and G. Voelker, \"Beyond heuristics: Learning to classify vulnerabilities and predict exploits\", Proc. ACM International\nConference on Knowledge Discovery and Data Mining, Washington DC, July 2010.\n[6] Majumdar, R. and P. Tabuada, *Hybrid Systems: Computation and Control*,\nLNCS 5469, Springer, Berlin, 2009.\n[7] Colbaugh, R. and K. Glass, \"Proactive defense for evolving cyber threats\",\nSandia National Laboratories SAND Report, September 2011.\n[8] Hastie, T., R. Tibshirani, and J. Friedman, The Elements of Statistical Learning, Second Edition, Springer, New York, 2009.\n[9] Pan, S. and Q. Yang, \"A survey on transfer learning\", IEEE Trans. Knowledge and Data Engineering, Vol. 22, pp. 1345-1359, 2010.\n[10] http://kdd.ics.uci.edu/databases/kddcup99/; last accessed December 2010.\n[11] http://www.borgelt.net/bayes.html; last accessed July 2010.\n[12] He, J., Y. Liu, and R. Lawrence, \"Graph-based transfer learning\", Proc. ACM\nConference on Information and Knowledge Management, Hong Kong, November 2009.\n[13] http://labs-repos.iit.demokritos.gr/skel/i-config/downloads/;\nlast\naccessed\nJuly 2010.\n[14] Colbaugh, R. and K. Glass, \"Predictive analysis for social processes I: Multiscale hybrid system modeling, and II: Predictability and warning analysis\",\nProc. IEEE International Multi-Conference on Systems and Control, Saint\nPetersburg, Russia, July 2009.\n[15] Lowd, D. and C. Meeks, \"Good word attacks on statistical Spam filters\",\nProc. 2005 Conference on Email and Anti-Spam, Palo Alto, CA, July 2005.\n[16] Cao, L., P. Yu, C. Zhang, H. Zhang, F. Tsai, and K. Chan, \"Blog data mining\nfor cyber security threats\", *Data Mining for Business Applications*, Springer\nUS, 2009.\n[17] Nazario, J., \"Politically motivated denial of service attacks\", in The Virtual\nBattlefield: Perspectives on Cyber Warfare, IOS Press, Amsterdam, 2009.\n[18] Colbaugh, R. and K. Glass, \"Early warning analysis for social diffusion\nevents\", Proc. IEEE International Conference on Intelligence and Security\nInformatics, Vancouver, Canada, May 2010.\n[19] http://www.nongnu.org/ifile/; last accessed July 2010.\n[20] Colbaugh, R. and K. Glass, \"Emerging topic detection for business intelligence via predictive analysis of 'meme' dynamics\", Proc. AAAI 2011 Spring\nSymposium, Palo Alto, CA, March 2011.\n[21] Easley, D. and J. Kleinberg, Networks, Crowds, and Markets: Reasoning\nAbout a Highly Connected World, Cambridge University Press, 2010.\n[22] Adamic, L. and N. Glance, \"The political blogosphere and the 2004 U.S.\nelection: Divided they blog\", Proc. ACM International Conference on\nKnowledge Discovery and Data Mining, Chicago, August 2005.\n[23] Newman, M., \"Modularity and community structure in networks\", Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences USA, Vol. 103, pp. 8577-8582,\n2006.\n[24] Leskovec, J., L. Backstrom, and J. Kleinberg, \"Meme-tracking and the dynamics of the news cycle\", Proc. ACM International Conference on Knowledge Discovery and Data Mining, Paris, France, June 2009.\n[25] Glass, K. and R. Colbaugh, \"Web analytics for security informatics\", Proc.\nEuropean Intelligence and Security Informatics Conference, Athens, Greece,\nSeptember 2011.\n[26] http://data.ris.ripe.net/; last accessed July 2011.\n[27] Glass, K., R. Colbaugh, and M. Planck, \"Automatically identifying the\nsources of large Internet events\", Proc. IEEE International Conference on\nIntelligence and Security Informatics, Vancouver, Canada, May 2010.\n[28] Colbaugh, R., \"Monsoons, movies, memes, and genes: Combining KD and\nM&S for prediction\", Keynote Talk, KDMS Workshop, ACM International\nConference on Knowledge Discovery and Data Mining, San Diego, CA, August 2011.\n# Predictability-Oriented Defense Against Adaptive Adversaries\n\nRichard Colbaugh Sandia National Laboratories Albuquerque, NM USA\ncolbaugh@comcast.net Kristin Glass New Mexico Institute of Mining and Technology Socorro, NM USA\nkglass@icasa.nmt.edu\n\n\n\nAbstractThere are substantial potential benefits to considering\npredictability when designing defenses against adaptive adversar-\nies, including increasing the ability of defense systems to predict\nnew attacker behavior and reducing the capacity of adversaries\nto anticipate defensive actions. This paper adopts such a perspec-\ntive, leveraging the coevolutionary relationship between attackers\nand defenders to derive methods for predicting and countering\nattacks and for limiting the extent to which adversaries can learn\nabout defense strategies. The proposed approach combines game\ntheory with machine learning to model adversary adaptation in\nthe learner's feature space, thereby producing classes of predic-\ntive and \"moving target\" defenses which are scientifically-\ngrounded and applicable to problems of real-world scale and\ncomplexity. Case studies with large cyber security datasets dem-\nonstrate that the proposed algorithms outperform gold-standard\ntechniques, offering effective and robust defense against evolving\nadversaries.\n\nKeywords-predictive defense, moving target defense, game theory,\nmachine learning, adaptive adversaries, cyber security.\n\nAdaptive adversaries are a principal concern in many security domains, including cyber defense, border security, counterterrorism, and crime prevention [e.g. 1-3]. Consequently, there is great interest in developing defenses which maintain their effectiveness despite evolving adversary strategies and tactics. A potentially powerful approach to pursuing such goals is to explicitly consider system *predictability,* for instance in order to design defenses which are able to anticipate adversary behavior and/or decrease their own predictability. Studies that employ predictability assessment in a security context include [4,5].\nThe coevolving \"arms race\" between Spammers and Spam filters provides an illustrative example of the phenomenon of interest [e.g. 6,7]. Spam filter designers would like to produce filters that work well against both present and future Spam, and one way to accomplish this goal is to develop techniques for predicting the way Spammers will adapt to currently-deployed filters and to account for these expected adaptations during the filter design process. Spammers, on the other hand, are motivated to \"reverse-engineer\" existing Spam filters as quickly as possible, so they can generate Spam which circumvents these filters. Spam filter developers are therefore interested in both sides of the predictability question: they wish to construct filters that can predict (and defeat) new Spammer techniques while remaining unpredictable themselves. Many other security problems involve adaptive adversaries and coevolutionary dynamics, and we propose that valuable insights can be obtained by examining these dynamics through the lens of predictability; Spam is merely a simple, familiar example of such systems.\nBecause predictability-based defense design includes strategic considerations, it is natural to approach this design problem as a game [8], in which defense attempts to predict and counter adversary behaviors while reducing its own predictability. Unfortunately, previous attempts to apply game-theoretic methods to adversary defense [e.g. 9-15] have encountered a number of challenges, and we mention two that have been especially daunting. First, the set of possible attacker actions is typically very large in real-world settings, and because the complexity of most game models increases exponentially with the number of actions available to the players, this has often made these models intractable in practice. And second, it has proved difficult to derive models that capture evolving attacker behavior in any but the most idealized situations.\nIn this paper we overcome these challenges by developing our game-based models for attack-defend interaction within a machine learning (ML) framework [16], enabling the design of robust defenses for practical applications. We formulate the defense task as one of behavior classification, in which innocent and malicious activities are to be distinguished, and assume only limited information is available regarding prior attacker behavior or attack attributes. The defense's classifiers model attacker actions in ML *feature space,* that is, in the space of variables the ML algorithms use for learning and decisionmaking. Formulating attack prediction/defense synthesis in this \"compressed\" and abstract space enables derivation of algorithms that can be applied to practical, large-scale problems.\nThe first of the proposed defense systems explicitly attempts to predict and counter adversary adaptation as a means of providing effective defense against both current and future attacks. A key step in the approach is modeling the way attackers *adapt* their behaviors rather than modeling the behaviors themselves. Crucially, the proposed approach seeks to design optimal defenses for evolving attacks, rather than to predict new attacks perfectly, and therefore enjoys robust performance in the presence of (inevitable) prediction errors. To permit the performance of this predictive defense method to be evaluated, we have assembled for this investigation a large collection of Spam and non-Spam emails reflecting the evolution of Spammer tactics over an eight year period. A case study with this dataset demonstrates that the proposed defense significantly outperforms a gold-standard Spam filter.\nAn important consideration when applying classifier-based defense techniques, even predictive ones, is the extent to which adversaries can reverse-engineer the learning algorithm and use this knowledge to circumvent the defense. The goal of the second proposed defense is thus to reduce defense system predictability and increase the difficulty of the adversary's reverseengineering task. We adopt a \"moving target\" (MT) perspective, in which the defense presents a dynamic posture to the adversaries as a way of increasing the adversaries' uncertainty concerning defense operation [17]. By leveraging recent advances in the theory of repeated, incomplete information games [18,19], we derive a simple MT defense procedure which can be shown to be optimal for an important class of adversarial dynamics; interestingly, the optimal MT schedule can be specified independently of the details of the adversaries' strategies. The efficacy of the proposed MT defense is evaluated via case studies with the set of Spam and non-Spam emails mentioned above and also with a well-known publicly-available network intrusion dataset. These tests reveal that the MT defense substantially outperforms well-tuned static classifiers against adaptive adversaries.\n\n## Ii. Predictive Defense\n\nA. Problem Formulation\nThere are significant potential benefits to developing *predictive*\nmethods of defending against adaptive adversaries, in which opponents' evolving strategies are anticipated and these insights are employed to counter novel attacks. This section considers the following concrete instantiation of the predictive defense problem: given some history of attacker actions, design a defense system which performs well against both current and future attacks. It is reasonable to expect that concepts and techniques from game theory might be helpful in understanding adversary adaptation, and indeed such approaches have been explored in a variety of domains [e.g. 9-15]. However, as indicated in the Introduction, these investigations have encountered scalability and complexity challenges which have limited their practical utility. In this section we address these challenges by deriving our game-based model within an ML framework, enabling effective defense in realistic settings. (See [20] for a general discussion of the value of combining behavioral modeling with data mining algorithms for discovery and prediction applications.)\nWe approach the task of countering adversarial behavior as an ML classification problem, in which the objective is to distinguish innocent and malicious activity. Each instance of activity is represented as a feature vector x|F|, where entry xi of x is the value of feature i for this instance and F is the set of instance features. In what follows, F is a set of \"reduced\" features, obtained by projecting measured feature vectors into a lower-dimensional space. While feature reduction is standard practice in ML [16], we show below that *aggressive* reduction allows us to efficiently manage the complexity of our game models. Behavior instances x belong to one of two classes: positive/malicious and negative/innocent (generalizing to more than two behavior classes is straightforward [16]). The goal is to learn a vector w|F| such that classifier orient  sign(wTx)\naccurately estimates the class of behavior x, returning 1 (1)\nfor malicious (innocent) activity.\nAs indicated above, it is useful to assess the predictability of a phenomenon before attempting to predict its evolution; for example, such an analysis permits identification of measurables which possess predictive power [21]. There has been limited theoretical work assessing predictability of adversarial dynamics, but existing studies suggest attack-defend coevolution often generates predictable dynamics. For instance, although [22] finds that certain player strategies lead to chaos in a simple repeated game, [20] shows that large sets of player strategies and repeated games exhibit predictable adversarial dynamics. Here we supplement this theoretical work by conducting an empirical investigation of predictability, and select as our case study a cyber security problem - Spam filtering - which possesses attributes that are representative of many adversarial domains.\nTo conduct this investigation, we first obtained a large collection of emails from various publicly-available sources for the period 1999-2006, and added to this corpus a set of Spam emails acquired from B. Guenter's Spam trap for the same time period. Following standard practice, each email is modeled as a\n\"bag of words\" feature vector x|F|, where the entries of x are the frequencies with which the words in vocabulary F appear in the message. The resulting dataset consists of ~128,000 emails composed of more than 250,000 features. We extracted from this collection of Spam and non-Spam emails the set of messages sent during the 30 month period between January 2001 and July 2003 (email in other periods exhibit very similar evolutionary dynamics). Finally, the dimension of the email feature space was reduced via a singular value decomposition (SVD) analysis [16], yielding a reduction in feature space dimension of four orders of magnitude (from ~250K to 20).\nWe wish to examine, in a simple but meaningful way, the predictability of Spam adaptation, and propose two intuitively reasonable criteria with which to empirically evaluate predictability: *sensibility* and *regularity* (a comprehensive theoretical framework for defining and assessing predictability is given in [21]). More specifically, and in the context of Spam, it would be *sensible* for Spammers to adapt their messages over time in such a way that Spam feature vectors xS come to resemble the feature vectors xNS of legitimate emails, and *regularity* in this adaptation might imply that the values of the individual elements of xS approach those of xNS in a fairly monotonic way.\nTo permit convenient examination of the evolution of feature vectors xS and xNS during the 30 month period under study, the emails were first binned by quarter. Next, the average values for each of the 20 (reduced) features was computed for all the Spam emails and all the non-Spam emails (separately) for each quarter. Figure 1 illustrates the feature space dynamics of Spam and non-Spam messages for one representative coordinate (F1) of this reduced feature space. It can be seen in the plot that the value of feature F1 for Spam approaches the value of this feature for non-Spam, and this increasing similarity is a consequence of changes in the composition of Spam messages (the value of F1 for non-Spam emails is essentially constant). The dynamics of the other feature values are analogous.\nObserve that the Spam dynamics illustrated in Figure 1 reflect *sensible* adaptation on the part of Spammers: the features of Spam email messages evolve to appear more like those of non-Spam email, making Spam more difficult to detect. Additionally, this evolution is *regular*, with feature values for Spam approaching those for non-Spam in a nearly-monotonic fashion. Thus this empirical analysis indicates that coevolving Spammer-Spam filter dynamics possesses some degree of predictability, and that the features employed in Spam analysis may have predictive power; this result is in general agreement with the conclusions of the theoretical predictability analysis reported in [20]. Moreover, because many of the characteristics of Spam-Spam defense coevolution are shared by other adversarial systems, this result suggests these other systems may have exploitable levels of predictability as well.\n\n\nB. Predictive Defense Algorithm\nThe proposed approach to designing a predictive defense system which works well against both current and future attacks is to combine ML with a simple game-based model for adversary behavior. In order to apply game-theoretic methods, it is necessary to overcome the complexity and model-realism challenges mentioned above. We address problem complexity by modeling adversary actions directly in an aggressively-reduced ML feature space, so that the (effective) space of possible adversary actions which must be considered is dramatically decreased. The difficulty of deriving realistic representations for attacker behavior is overcome by recognizing that the actions of attackers can be modeled as attempts to *transform* data (i.e., feature vectors x) in such a way that malicious and innocent activities are indistinguishable. (This is in contrast to trying to model the attack instances \"from scratch\"). It is possible to model attacker actions as transformations of data because, within an ML problem formulation, historical attack data are available in the form of training instances.\nWe model adversarial coevolution as a sequential game, in which the attacker and defender iteratively optimize the following objective function:\n\n$$\\min_{\\rm w}\\ \\max_{\\rm a}\\left[-\\alpha\\big{\\|}{\\rm a}\\big{\\|}^{3}+\\beta \\big{\\|}{\\rm w}\\big{\\|}^{3}+\\sum_{\\rm i}{\\rm loss}\\Big{(}{\\rm y}_{\\rm i},{\\rm w}^ {\\rm T}({\\rm x}_{\\rm i}+{\\rm a})\\Big{)}\\right] \\tag{1}$$\nIn (1), the loss function represents the misclassification rate for the defense system, where {yi, xi}n i=1 denotes pairs of \"nominal\" activity instances xi and labels yi, and vector w parameterizes the defense (recall that the defense attempts to distinguish malicious and innocent activity using the classifier orient\nsign(wTx)). The attacker attempts to circumvent the defense by transforming the data through vector a|F|, and the defender's goal is to counter this attack by appropriately specifying classifier vector w|F|. The terms ||a||3 and ||w||3 define \"regularizations\" imposed on attacker and defender actions, respectively, as discussed below.\nNote that (1) models the attacker as acting to increase the misclassification rate with vector a, subject to the need to limit the magnitude of this vector (large a is penalized via the term\n||a||3). This model thus captures in a simple way the fact that the actions of the attacker are in reality always constrained by the goals of the attack. For instance, in the case of Spam email attacks, the Spammer tries to manipulate message x in such a way that it \"looks like\" legitimate email and evades the Spam filter w. However, transformed message xa must still communicate the desired information to the recipient or the attacker's goal will not be realized, and so the transformation vector a cannot be chosen arbitrarily.\nThe defender attempts to reduce the misclassification rate with an optimal choice for vector w, and avoids \"over-fitting\"\nthrough regularization with the ||w||3 term [16]. Notice that the formulation (1) permits the attacker's goal to be modeled as counter to, but not exactly the opposite of, the defender's goal, and this is consistent with many real-world settings. Returning to the Spam example, the Spammer's objective of delivering messages which induce profitable user responses is not the inverse of an email service provider's goal of achieving high Spam recognition with a very low false-positive rate.\nThe preceding development can be summarized by stating the following predictive defense (PD) algorithm:\n\n## Algorithm Pd\n\n1. Collect historical data {yi, xi}n\ni=1 which reflects past behavior of the attacker as well as past legitimate behavior.\n2. Optimize objective function (1) to obtain the predicted\nactions a* of the attacker and the optimal defense w* to counter this attack.\n3. Estimate the status of any new activity x as either malicious (1) or innocent (1) via orient  sign(xTw*).\nObserve that Step 2 of this algorithm can be interpreted as first predicting the attacker strategy through computation of attack vector a*, and then learning an appropriate countermeasure w*\nby applying ML to the \"transformed\" data {yi, xia*}n i=1.\nC. Algorithm Evaluation\nThis case study examines the performance of Algorithm PD for the Spam filtering problem. We use the Spam/non-Spam email dataset introduced above, consisting of ~128,000 messages that were sent during the period 1999-2006. The study compares the effectiveness of Algorithm PD, implemented as a Spam filter, with that of a well-tuned naive Bayes (NB) Spam filter\n[5]. Because NB filters are widely used and work very well in Spam applications, this filter is referred to as the gold-standard algorithm. We extract from our dataset the 1000 oldest legitimate emails and 1000 oldest Spam messages for use in training both Algorithm PD and the gold-standard algorithm. The email messages sent during the four year period immediately following the date of the last training email are used as test data. More specifically, these emails are binned by quarter and then randomly sub-sampled to create balanced datasets of Spam and legitimate emails for each of the 16 quarters in the test period.\nRecall that Algorithm PD employs aggressive feature space dimension reduction to manage the complexity of the gamebased modeling process. This dimension reduction is accomplished here through SVD analysis, which reduces the dimension |F| of feature vectors from ~250K to 20) [16]. (The orthogonal basis used for this reduction is derived by performing SVD analysis using the 1000 non-Spam and 1000 Spam training emails.) Note that good classification accuracy can be obtained with a wide range of (reduced) feature space dimensions. For example, a filtering accuracy of ~97% is achieved with the training data when using an NB classifier implemented with feature dimension ranging from |F|100,000 to |F|5.\n\n\nThe gold-standard strategy is applied as described in [5].\n\nAlgorithm PD is implemented with parameter values   0.001 and   0.1, and with a sum-of-squares loss function. To evaluate the utility of the defenses against evolving adversaries, we train Algorithm PD and the gold-standard algorithm *once*, using the 1000 non-Spam/1000 Spam dataset, and then apply the filters without retraining to the four years of emails that follow these 2000 emails.\nSample results from this study are depicted in Figure 2.\nEach data point in the plots represents the average accuracy over ten trials (two-fold cross-validation). It  can be seen that the filter based upon Algorithm PD significantly outperforms the gold-standard method: the predictive defense experiences almost no degradation in accuracy over the four years of the study, while the gold-standard method suffers a substantial drop in accuracy during this period. These results suggest that combining ML with simple game-based models offers an effective means of defending against evolving adversaries.\n\n## Iii. Moving Target Defense\n\nA. Problem Formulation\nA defining characteristic of classification-based defense is the fact that adversaries continually attempt to reverse-engineer the classifier and use this knowledge to make informed adjustments to their behavior and circumvent the defense. One way to increase the difficulty of the adversary's reverse-engineering task is to employ moving target (MT) ideas, in which the defense adopts a time-varying posture in order to increase adversary uncertainty concerning defense operation [17]. In this section we derive an MT defense procedure which minimizes the predictability of defensive actions from the perspective of the attacker.\nWe investigate MT defense within the framework provided by two-player repeated games with incomplete information [18,19]. In these games one player, the *informed* player, has access to information that is unavailable to the other, uninformed, player. The informed player must weigh the relative benefits of exploiting her private information to achieve shortterm advantage against the possibility that this exploitation may reveal information which results in the sacrifice of future gains. Because repeated incomplete information games explicitly account for the payoff-predictability tradeoff, they afford a convenient setting for deriving and comparing MT strategies.\nConsider the following defense problem. Suppose the task of countering adversarial behavior is formulated as one of ML classification, in which the objective is to distinguish innocent and malicious activity. Each instance of activity is represented as a feature vector x|F|, where F is the set of ML features.\n\nBehavior instances x belong to one of two classes, positive/malicious and negative/innocent, and the goal is to learn a vector w|F| such that classifier class  sign(wTx) accurately estimates the class of behavior x.\nA plausible way to reduce the degree to which adversaries can predict, and then adapt to and evade, the actions of a classifier is to introduce randomness into the way the ML features F are selected and used. One simple way to accomplish this is delineated in the following three steps: 1.) divide the original feature set F into K randomly-selected, possibly overlapping subsets {F1, ..., FK}, where | Fi |m  i; 2.) train one classifier for each feature subset Fi, yielding a collection of K classifiers\n{w1, ..., wK}; 3.) during operation, alternate between the classifiers wi according to some randomized scheduling policy. In order to implement this MT defense, it is necessary to define a procedure for selecting which classifier is to be \"active\" at each time period. Thus the MT defense problem of interest can be stated: given a collection of classifiers W{w1, ..., wK}, specify a policy for switching among classifiers which minimizes defense predictability (from the point of view of the attacker).\n\n## B. Moving Target Scheduling Policy A Classifier Schedule Which Minimizes Defense Predictability Is Sketched In The Following Theorem. Perhaps Surprisingly, The Optimal Schedule Is Very Simple To Implement.\n\nTheorem MT: Suppose we are given a collection of K classifiers W  {w1, ..., wK} associated with randomly-selected feature subsets {F1, ..., FK}, an ecology of adversaries that wish to reverse-engineer the defense, and a sequence of times t1, t2, ...\nat which it is permissible to switch classifiers. Under mild assumptions regarding the accuracy of the classifiers W prior to adversary reverse-engineering and the effectiveness of the reverse-engineering methods, defense performance is optimized if, at each time ti, the active classifier wa is selected uniformly at random from the set W.\nProof: The proof is given in [23].\nWe now provide a concise, intuitively-accessible summary of the proof of Theorem MT. Additionally, we describe empirical tests of the theorem's conclusions in Section IIIC below. Readers interested in the technical details of the proof are referred to the report [23]. We model the interaction between an MT defense and an ecology of adversaries as a hidden mode hybrid dynamical system (HM-HDS) (see, for instance, [19] for background on this class of dynamical systems). More precisely, the MT defense model is\n\nHM-HDS  {C(w,a), W, P(w,a)}                    (2)\nwhere\n\n\nthe *continuous system* C(w,a) evolves according to sequential attack-defend game dynamics (such as (1));\n\nthe *discrete system* {W,P(w,a)} evolves as a Markov chain\nwith state set W (the set of candidate classifiers) and state\ntransition probability matrix P(w,a); note that, in general,\nstate transition probabilities may depend upon the continuous system state variables (w,a);\n\nthe *hidden mode* is the discrete system state, that is, the\ncurrently active classifier waW.\nA schematic of this HM-HDS model is depicted in Figure 3.\nThe dynamics of the HM-HDS (2) evolve as follows. The discrete system specifies the currently active classifier wa, and this information is communicated to the defender (but not the attacker) in the continuous system game. The attacker attempts to infer which classifier is active by observing defense actions, and computes attack vector a based on this estimate. The discrete system has access to continuous system state (w,a) and may use this information when choosing the next active classifier.\nWe interpret these dynamics as a repeated incomplete information game, in which the discrete system is the informed player and the attacker dynamics is the uninformed player [18]. (This formulation, although less intuitive than the two-player game model adopted in Section II, facilitates analysis of MT dynamics.) The payoff to the discrete system is defined to be the negative of the misclassification rate, so that maximizing this payoff is equivalent to maximizing the performance of the defense.\ninputs inputs Now suppose: 1.) each classifier wiW is effective against nominal, \"pre-reverse-engineering\" attacks (they need not be equally effective), and 2.) the attackers collectively have good reverse-engineering capabilities (i.e., reverse-engineering produces a substantial drop in classifier accuracy for each wiW);\nthese conditions are defined more quantitatively in [23]. Under these assumptions, HM-HDS (2) belongs to a class of HM-HDS\nwhich is studied in [19]. In that paper, the control of such HM- HDS is formulated as an incomplete information game between a \"controller\" (the uninformed player) and a \"disturbance\" (the informed player), where the actions of the disturbance can reveal to the controller exploitable information about the current value of the discrete mode. It is shown in [19] that, in this setting, the best strategy for the disturbance is to maximize the controller's uncertainty regarding the (hidden) discrete mode. This result in turn implies that, in the case of MT defense system (2), the optimal scheduling policy for discrete system {W, P(w,a)} is to select the active classifier wa uniformly at random from the set W at each time ti.\nObserve that the optimal choice of a new wa does not depend upon the currently active classifier or the continuous state variables (w,a), basically because any such dependence has the potential to be exploited by the attacker. Additionally, and perhaps counterintuitively, each of the classifiers wi has an equal probability of being selected to be active, even though some may be more accurate that others. Roughly, if classifier w* is implemented with greater frequency than the others, say because it is especially accurate, the attackers will have increased opportunity to successfully reverse-engineer it, rendering w* less effective than the others in the long run.\nC. Algorithm Evaluation: Spam\nIn this section we evaluate the effectiveness of the MT defense strategy summarized in Theorem MT by employing the Spam filtering data and task introduced in Section II. To facilitate convenient comparison with gold-standard defense systems and to reduce complications in the assessment, a few simplifications are made:\n\n\nstandard NB Spam filters are used for the classifiers {w1,\n..., wK} (rather than using, say, the predictive filters generated by solving (1));\n\nonly K2 classifiers/feature subsets are used;\n\nattack vector a is computed in an optimal manner via (1), so that the adversary possesses strong reverse-engineering\ncapabilities.\nTo enable the efficacy of the proposed MT defense to be quantified, its performance is compared to that of a well-tuned static NB filter trained using the full set of (reduced-dimension) features F. We examine a range of attack \"strengths\" by varying the parameter  in the optimization (1) (recall that the term\n||a||3 governs the magnitude of attack vector a). Attacks are normalized by assigning an attack strength of AS1 to attacks with magnitude ||a|| equal to the largest attack observed in the (real-world) Spam dataset.\nWe apply the static NB filter and the optimal two-mode\n(K2) MT filter to the 2000 email training dataset described in Section IIC. Additionally, to allow the results of Theorem MT to be tested, we implement a suboptimal MT filter obtained by favoring the more accurate of the two classifiers in the random scheduling process; specifically, the more accurate of the two filters is selected to be active with 2/3 probability (with the less accurate filter then being selected 1/3 of the time). Feature set F is taken to be the collection of 20 features with largest singular values (see Section IIC), and feature subsets F1 and F2 are constructed by randomly sampling F (with replacement) until each subset contains 10 features. The filters are \"attacked\" by solving (1) for the optimal attack a* and then transforming Spam instances x according to the formula xa*. To allow exploration of a range of attack strengths, (1) is solved for different values of , yielding the following AS values: AS0, 0.25, 0.5, 0.75, 1.0, 1.25, 1.5 (thus attacks vary in strength from 'no attack' to attacks with magnitude 1.5 times larger than any seen in the Spam dataset).\nSample results are displayed in Figure 4. Each data point in the plots represents the average accuracy over ten trials (twofold cross-validation). It can be seen that the filter based upon Theorem MT (red curve) significantly outperforms the static NB filter (magenta curve). For instance, MT defense achieves a classification accuracy of ~90% when subjected to attacks of strength AS1, compared with the ~65% accuracy obtained with the static filter. Under attacks of magnitude AS1.5 the optimal MT defense provides an accuracy of ~80%, while the static filter is only slightly more effective than random guessing in this case (accuracy  54%).\nMoreover, this empirical study offers support for the conclusions of Theorem MT. As can be seen from Figure 4, the filter which schedules the more accurate classifier with greater probability (blue curve) does not perform as well as the optimal (according to Theorem MT) MT filter, particularly when the filters are subjected to fairly strong attacks corresponding to effective adversary reverse-engineering. These results suggest that the proposed MT defense is capable of substantially increasing the difficulty of reverse-engineering tasks, even for highly effective (e.g., optimal) attackers.\n\n\ncase study. The plot shows how filter accuracy (vertical axis) varies with attack strength (horizontal axis) for the optimally scheduled MT filter (red), a suboptimally scheduled MT filter (blue), and the static NB filter (magenta).\n\nD. Algorithm Evaluation: Network Intrusion\nWe now examine the performance of the MT defense strategy summarized in Theorem MT for the problem of distinguishing innocent and malicious computer network activity. The empirical data used for this case study is the KDD Cup 99 dataset, a publicly-available collection of network data consisting of both normal activities and attacks of various kinds [24]. For this study we randomly selected 1000 Normal connections (N) and\n1000 denial-of-service attacks (DoS) to serve as our test data.\nTo enable the efficacy of the proposed MT defense to be quantified, its performance is compared to that of a well-tuned static NB classifier [5]. This NB classifier uses the full set of 30 \"continuous\" features adopted in previous studies (see, e.g., [5] for a discussion). The optimal two-mode (K2) MT classifier employs feature subsets F1 and F2 constructed by randomly sampling F (with replacement) until each subset contains 15 features. The classifiers are attacked by solving (1) for the optimal attack a* and then transforming DoS network activity instances x according to the formula xa*. As in the preceding case study, we obtain a range of attack strengths by solving (1)\nfor different values of  (recall ||a||3 governs the magnitude of attack vector a).\nSample results are displayed in Figure 5. Each data point in the plots represents the average accuracy over ten trials (twofold cross-validation). It can be seen that the classifier based upon Theorem MT (blue curve) significantly outperforms the static NB classifier (red curve). For instance, the accuracy of the MT defense system never goes below 90%, even when subjected to large attacks, while the accuracy of the static defense quickly falls to 50% as attack strength is increased (this corresponds to random guessing, as the dataset is balanced). Note that this case study illustrates the ease with which the proposed approach can be implemented in different adversarial settings.\n\nThis work was supported by the Laboratory Directed Research and Development Program at Sandia National Laboratories. We thank Chip Willard and Curtis Johnson for numerous helpful discussions on aspects of this research.\n\nREFERENCES\n[1] Proc. 2010 IEEE International Conference on Intelligence and\nSecurity Informatics, Vancouver, BC Canada, May 2010.\n[2] Proc. 2011 IEEE International Conference on Intelligence and\nSecurity Informatics, Beijing, China, July 2011.\n[3] Proc. 2012 IEEE International Conference on Intelligence and\nSecurity Informatics, Washington, DC USA, June 2012.\n[4] Colbaugh, R., \"Does coevolution in malware adaptation enable\npredictive defense?\", IFA Workshop Series: Exploring Malware Adaptation Patterns, San Francisco, CA, May 2010.\n[5] Colbaugh, R. and K. Glass, \"Proactive defense for evolving\ncyber threats\", *Proc. 2011 IEEE ISI*, Beijing, China, July 2011.\n[6] Cormack, G., \"Email Spam filtering: A systematic review\",\nFoundations and Trends in Information Retrieval, Vol. 1, pp.\n335-455, 2008.\n[7] Guzella, T. and W. Caminhas, \"A review of machine learning\napproaches to Spam filtering\", *Expert Systems with Application*, Vol. 36, pp. 10206-10222, 2009.\n[8] Peters, H., *Game Theory*, Springer, Berlin, 2008. [9] Dalvi, N. et al., \"Adversarial classification\", Proc. ACM KDD\n'04, Seattle, WA, August 2004.\n[10] Roy, S. et al., \"A survey of game theory as applied to network\nsecurity\", *Proc. HICSS 2010,* Honolulu, HI, January 2010.\n[11] Williams, E., Surveillance and Interdiction Models: A Game\nTheoretic Approach to Defend Against VBIED, Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, June 2010.\n[12] Parameswaran, M., H. Rui, and S. Sayin, \"A game theoretic\nmodel and empirical analysis of Spammer strategies\", Proc.\nCEAS 2010, Redmond, WA, July 2010.\n[13] Gkonis, K. and H. Psaraftis, \"Container transportation as an\ninterdependent security problem\", *J. Transportation Security*,\nVol. 3, pp. 197-211, 2010.\n[14] Pita, J. et al., \"GUARDS: Game theoretic security allocation on\na national scale\", *Proc. AAMAS '11*, Taipei, Taiwan, May 2011.\n[15] Manshaei, M. et al., \"Game theory meets network security and\nprivacy\", *ACM Computing Surveys,* December 2011.\n[16] Hastie, T., R. Tibshirani, and J. Friedman, The Elements of\nStatistical Learning, Second Edition, Springer, New York, 2009.\n[17] Trustworthy Cyberspace: Strategic Plan for the Federal Cybersecurity Research and Development Program, December 2011.\n[18] Sandholme, T., \"State of solving large incomplete information\ngames, and application to poker\", *AI Magazine,* pp. 13-32, 2010.\n[19] Verma, R. and D. Del Vecchio, \"Safety control of hidden mode\nhybrid systems\", *IEEE Trans. Automatic Control,* Vol. 57, pp.\n62-77, 2012.\n[20] Colbaugh, R., \"Arctic ice, George Clooney, lipstick on a pig,\nand insomniac fruit flies: Combining kd and m&s for predictive analysis\", *Proc. ACM KDD '11*, San Diego, CA, August 2011.\n[21] Colbaugh, R. and K. Glass, \"Predictive analysis for social\nprocesses I: Multi-scale hybrid system modeling, and II: Predictability and warning analysis\", *Proc. 2009 IEEE MSC*, Saint Petersburg, Russia, July 2009.\n[22] Sato, Y., E. Akiyama, and J.D. Farmer, \"Chaos in learning a\nsimple two-person game\", Proc. National Academy of Sciences\nUSA, Vol. 99, pp. 4748-4751, 2002.\n[23] Colbaugh, R. and K. Glass, \"Predictive dynamic defense against\nadaptive adversaries\", Sandia National Laboratories Technical Report, April 2012.\n[24] http://kdd.ics.uci.edu/databases/kddcup99/; accessed Dec. 2010.\n# Leveraging Sociological Models For Prediction I: Inferring Adversarial Relationships\n\n\nRichard Colbaugh Sandia National Laboratories Albuquerque, NM USA\ncolbaugh@comcast.net\n\n\nAbstractThere is considerable interest in developing techniques\nfor predicting human behavior, for instance to enable emerging\ncontentious situations to be anticipated or permit the nature of\nongoing but \"hidden\" activities to be inferred. A promising ap-\nproach to this problem is to collect appropriate empirical data\nand then apply machine learning methods to the data to generate\nthe predictions. This two-part paper shows that the performance\nof such learning algorithms often can be improved substantially\nby leveraging sociological models in their development and im-\nplementation. In particular, we demonstrate that sociologically-\ngrounded learning algorithms outperform gold-standard meth-\nods in two important and challenging tasks: 1.) inferring the (un-\nobserved) nature of relationships in adversarial social networks,\nand 2.) predicting whether nascent social diffusion events will \"go\nviral\". Significantly, the new algorithms perform well even when\nthere is limited data available for their training and execution.\n\nKeywordspredictive analysis, sociological models, social networks,\nmachine learning.\n\nThere is great interest in developing techniques for accurately predicting human behavior. For example, forecasting the eventual outcomes of social processes is a central concern in domains ranging from popular culture to public policy to national security [1]. The task of inferring the existence and nature of activities which are presently underway but not directly observable, sometimes referred to as \"predicting the present\" [2], is also of crucial importance in many applications. A promising approach to obtaining such predictions is to identify and collect empirical data which appropriately characterize the phenomenon of interest and then to analyze these data using machine learning (ML) methods [3]. Roughly speaking, ML algorithms automatically \"learn\" relationships between observed variables from examples presented in the form of training data; the learned relationships are then used to generate predictions in new situations. ML's capacity to learn from examples, scale to large datasets, and adapt to new or changing conditions make this an attractive approach to predictive analysis.\nThe work reported in [4-12] illustrates some of the ways ML can be used for forecasting, and in particular how these techniques can be applied to online (Web) data in order to predict the outcomes of a broad range of social processes (e.g., social movements, political elections and protests, and markets of various kinds). Alternatively, the papers [13-19] derive ML\nKristin Glass New Mexico Institute of Mining and Technology Socorro, NM USA\nkglass@icasa.nmt.edu techniques for predicting the present, for instance enabling the existence of hidden links in social networks to be inferred, the sentiment of informal communications to be estimated, and the spread of various health-related phenomena to be remotely monitored and assessed.\nExisting ML methods, although very useful, face at least two key challenges. First, the prediction accuracy obtainable with even state-of-the-art algorithms is sometimes insufficient for the task at hand, such as when the predictions are to be used to inform high-consequence decisions (e.g., pertaining to national security or human health). Second, applying ML techniques typically requires that significant quantities of data be collected and \"labeled\". For example, deriving an ML scheme for estimating sentiment polarity of blog posts usually involves collecting, processing, and manually labeling hundreds of example posts expressing positive and negative sentiment [14]. Employing ML for forecasting ordinarily entails assembling extensive time series traces, implying that such methods may not be responsive enough to generate useful predictions about rapidly emerging events [12]. Additionally, realizing good performance with standard ML usually necessitates frequent retraining to permit algorithms to adapt to evolving conditions, which limits usefulness in many domains (e.g., in adversarial settings in which opponents adapt their behaviors expressly to defeat learning algorithms [20]).\nThis two-part paper proposes that the challenges of predicting human behavior using ML often can be overcome by leveraging sociological models in the development and implementation of the learning algorithms. This proposal is motivated by our recent research which shows that including sociologicallymeaningful measures of network dynamics as features in ML algorithms permits predictions regarding social dynamics that are substantially more accurate than those based on standard features [21]. The present two-part paper initiates a more systematic exploration of the utility of combining ML with sociological models for social prediction. In Part One, we consider the problem of predicting the \"signs\" of relationships in social networks, where positive and negative edges reflect friendly and antagonistic social ties, respectively, and derive a novel ML algorithm for edge-sign prediction which leverages structural balance theory [22-24]. The proposed algorithm outperforms a \"gold-standard\" method in empirical tests with two large-scale online social networks, with the boost in prediction accuracy being especially significant in situations where only limited training date are available. Interestingly, the inferred edge-signs are also shown to be useful when predicting the way adversarial networks will fracture under stress.\nPart Two of the paper [25] examines the problem of forecasting the ultimate reach of \"complex contagion\" events [26]. Predictability assessment of such contagions indicates that the metrics which should be predictive of a contagion's reach are subtle measures of the network dynamics associated with very early diffusion activity. These results are used to derive an ML algorithm for predicting which complex contagions will eventually \"go viral\" and which won't, and it is demonstrated that the algorithm outperforms standard methods in an empirical investigation of online meme propagation [27]. Significantly, the new algorithm performs well even when only limited time series data are available for analysis, permitting reliable prediction early in the contagion lifecycle. It is also shown that the proposed algorithm enables effective early warning analysis for an important class of cyber threats.\n\n## Ii. Predicting Link-Signs\n\nA. Problem Formulation Social networks may contain both positive and negative relationships - people form ties of friendship and support but also of animosity or disapproval. These two types of social ties can be modeled by placing signs on the links or edges of the social network, with 1 and 1 reflecting friendly and antagonistic relationships, respectively. We wish to study the problem of predicting the signs of certain edges of interest by observing the signs and connectivity patterns of the neighboring edges.\n\nMore specifically, for a directed social network Gs = (V, E)\nwith signed edges, where V and E are the vertex and edge sets, we consider the following edge-sign prediction problem: given an edge (u,v)E that is of interest but for which the edge-sign is \"hidden\", infer the sign of (u,v) using information contained in the remainder of the network.\nIt is natural to suspect that *structural balance theory* (SBT)\nmay be useful for edge-sign prediction. Briefly, SBT posits that if wV forms a *triad* (i.e., edge triangle) with edge (u,v), then the sign of (u,v) should be such that the resulting signed triad possessing an odd number of positive edges; this encodes the common principle that \"the friend of my friend is my friend\", \"the enemy of my friend is my enemy\", and so on [22,23]. Thus SBT suggests that knowledge of the signs of the edges connecting (u,v) to its neighbors may be useful in predicting the sign of (u,v).\nB. Prediction Algorithm\nWe approach the task of predicting the sign of a given edge (u, v) in the social network Gs as an ML classification problem.\n\nThe first step is to define, for a given edge, a collection of features which may be predictive of the sign of that edge. To allow a comparison with the (gold-standard) prediction method given in [24], we adopt the same two sets of features used in that study. For a given edge (u,v), the first set of features defined in [24] characterize the various triads to which (u,v) belongs. Because triads are directed and signed, there are sixteen distinct types (e.g., the triad composed of positive edge (u,w)\nand negative edge (w,v), together with (u,v), is one type). Thus the first sixteen features for edge (u,v) are the counts of each of the various triad types to which (u,v) belongs. Including these features is directly motivated by SBT. For example, if (u,v) belongs to many triads with one positive and one negative edge, it may be likely that the sign of (u,v) is negative, since then these triads would possess an odd number of positive edges and therefore be \"balanced\".\nThe second set of features defined in [24] measure characteristics of the degrees of the endpoint vertices u and v of the given edge (u,v). There are five of these features, quantifying the positive and negative out-degrees of u, the positive and negative in-degrees of v, and the total number of neighbors u and v have in common (interpreted in an undirected sense). Combining these five measures with the sixteen triad-related features results in a feature vector x21 for each edge of interest (see [24] for a more thorough discussion of these features and the motivation for selecting them). The feature vector x associated with an edge (u,v) will form the basis for predicting the sign of that  edge.\nWe wish to learn a vector c21 such that the classifier orient  sign(cTx) accurately estimates the sign of the edge whose features are encoded in vector x. Vector c is learned, in part, from labeled examples of positive and negative edges. Additionally, the proposed learning algorithm leverages the insights of SBT. A simple way to incorporate SBT is to assemble sets V and V of positive and negative features, that is, sets of features which according to SBT ought to be associated with positive and negative edges, respectively. The triads to which (u,v) belongs in which the other two edges are positive are predicted by SBT to \"contribute\" to (u,v) being positive; thus the four features corresponding to triads with two positive labeled edges are candidates for membership in V (there are four such features because Gs is directed). Analogously, SBT posits that the eight features indexing triads in which exactly one of the two edges that neighbor (u,v) is positive are candidates for membership in V. (Note that the remaining four triad features index triads in which both of the edges neighboring (u,v) are negative, and as there is less empirical support for SBT in this case\n[24] these features are not assigned to either V or V.)\nWe now derive an ML algorithm for edge-sign prediction which is capable of leveraging SBT in its learning process. The development begins by modeling the problem data as a bipartite graph Gb of edge-sign instances and features (see Figure 1).\n\nIf there are n edges and 21 features, it can be seen that the adjacency matrix A for graph Gb is given by\n\nX 0 A T                                  (1)    0 X\nwhere matrix Xn21 is constructed by stacking the n feature vectors xi as rows, and each '0' is a matrix of zeros.\n\nAssume the initial problem data consists of a set of n edges, of which nl  n are labeled, and a set of labeled features Vl\nVV, and suppose this label information is encoded as vectors dnl and w|Vl|, respectively. Let destn be the vector of estimated signs for the edges in the dataset, and define the\n\"augmented\" classifier caug  [dest T   cT]Tn21 that estimates the polarity of both edges and features. Note that the quantity caug is introduced for notational convenience and is not directly employed for classification. More specifically, in the proposed methodology we learn caug, and therefore c, by solving an optimization problem involving the labeled and unlabeled training data, and then use c to estimate the sign of any new edge of interest with the simple classifier orientsign(cTx). Assume for ease of notation that the instances and features are indexed so the first nl elements of dest and |Vl| elements of c correspond to labeled data.\ninstances features\n\nWe wish to learn an augmented classifier caug with the following three properties: 1.) if an edge is labeled, then the corresponding entry of dest should be close to this 1 label; 2.) if a feature is in the set Vl  VV, then the corresponding entry of c should be close to this 1 polarity; and 3.) if there is an edge Xij of Gb that connects an edge x and a feature f and Xij possesses significant weight, then the estimated polarities of x and f should be similar. These objectives are encoded in the following optimization problem:\n\n$$\\min_{\\rm c_{aug}}c_{\\rm aug}^{\\rm T}{\\rm Lc_{aug}}+\\beta_{\\rm i}\\sum_{\\rm i=1}^{ \\rm i}({\\rm d_{est,i}-d_{i}})^{2}+\\beta_{2}\\sum_{\\rm i=1}^{\\rm i}({\\rm c_{i}-w_{i }})^{2} \\tag{2}$$\nwhere L  D  A is the graph Laplacian matrix for Gb, with D\nthe diagonal degree matrix for A (i.e., Dii  j Aij), and 1, 2\nare nonnegative constants. Minimizing (2) enforces the three properties we seek for caug, with the second and third terms penalizing \"errors\" in the first two properties. To see that the first term enforces the third property, observe that this expression is a sum of components of the form Xij(dest,i  cj)2. The constants 1, 2 are used to balance the relative importance of the three properties. Note that in situations where the set of available labeled instances is very limited, classifier performance often can be improved by replacing L in (2) with the normalized Laplacian LnD1/2LD1/2, or with a power of this matrix Ln k (for k a positive integer); this modification serves to\n\"smooth\" the polarity estimates assigned to the vertices of Gb.\nThe caug that minimizes objective function (2) can be obtained by solving the following set of linear equations:\n\n$$\\begin{array}{cccc|cccc|}\\hline{\\rm L}_{11}+\\beta_{1}{\\rm L}_{\\rm ni}&{\\rm L}_{12}&{ \\rm L}_{13}&{\\rm L}_{14}\\\\ {\\rm L}_{21}&{\\rm L}_{22}&{\\rm L}_{23}&{\\rm L}_{24}\\\\ {\\rm L}_{31}&{\\rm L}_{32}&{\\rm L}_{33}+\\beta_{2}{\\rm I}_{|{\\rm v}_{|}|}&{\\rm L }_{34}\\\\ {\\rm L}_{41}&{\\rm L}_{42}&{\\rm L}_{43}&{\\rm L}_{44}\\\\ \\hline\\end{array} \\tag{3}$$\nwhere the Lij are matrix blocks of L of appropriate dimension.\nWe summarize this discussion by sketching an algorithm for learning the proposed edge-sign prediction (ESP) classifier:\n\n## Algorithm Esp\n\n1. Construct the set of equations (3).\n2. Solve equations (3) for caug  [ dest\nT   cT ]T  (for instance\nusing the Conjugate Gradient method).\n3. Estimate the sign of any new edge x of interest as: orient\n sign(cTx).\nThe utility of Algorithm ESP is now examined through a case study involving edge-sign estimation for two social networks extracted from the Wikipedia online encyclopedia.\nC. Wikipedia Case Study\nThis case study examines the performance of Algorithm ESP for the problem of estimating the signs of the edges in two social networks extracted from Wikipedia (WP), a collectivelyauthored online encyclopedia with an active user community. We consider the following WP social networks: 1.) the graph of 103,747 edges corresponding to votes cast by WP users in elections for promoting individuals to the role of 'admin' [24], and 2.) the graph of 740,397 edges characterizing editor interactions in WP [28]. In each network, the majority of the edges (80) are positive. Thus we follow [24] and create balanced datasets consisting of 20K positive and 20K negative edges for the \"voting\" network [24], and 50K positive and 50K negative edges for the \"interaction\" network [28].\nThis study compares the edge-sign prediction accuracy of Algorithm ESP with that of the impressive gold-standard logistic regression classifier given in [24]. The gold-standard algorithm is applied exactly as described in [24]. Algorithm ESP is implemented with parameter values 1  0.1 and 2  0.5, and with vector w constructed using the four \"positive triad\" features V and eight \"negative triad\" features V defined above.\n\nAs a focus of the investigation is evaluating the extent to which good prediction performance can be achieved even when only a limited number of labeled edges are available for training, we examine training sets which incorporate a range of numbers of labeled edges: nl  0, 10, 20, 50, 100, 200.\nSample results from this study are depicted in Figures 2 and\n3. Each data point in the plots represents the average of ten trials. In each trial, the edges are randomly split into equal-size training and testing sets, and a randomly selected subset of the training edges of size nl is \"labeled\" (i.e., the labels for these edges are made available to the learning algorithms). It can be seen that Algorithm ESP outperforms the gold-standard method on both datasets, and that the improved accuracy obtained with the proposed \"SBT-informed\" algorithm is particularly significantly when the number of labeled training instances is small. An interesting open question is the extent to which this ability to provide good performance with limited labeled data implies a similar robustness to erroneously labeled data. The accuracy of the proposed algorithm does not depend sensitively on parameters 1, 2, so that the method is convenient to apply.\n\n\n\n##\n\nD. Network Fracture Case Study Recently it has been proposed that structural balance theory can be used to predict the way a network of entities (e.g., individuals, countries) will split if subjected to stress [29], a capability of relevance in many security applications. Briefly, [29] models the polarity and intensity of relationships between the entities of interest as a completely connected network with weighted adjacency matrix ZZTnn, where matrix element zij represents the strength of the friendliness or unfriendliness between entities i and j. Note that this network model is somewhat more general than the one introduced above, in that each edge relating two individuals possesses both a sign and an intensity.\nSBT is a \"static\" theory, positing what a stable configuration of edge-signs in a social network should look like. However, underlying the theory is a dynamical idea of how unbalanced network triads ought to resolve themselves to become balanced. A model which captures this underlying dynamics is given by the simple matrix differential equation [29]\n\ndZ/dt  Z2,   Z(0)Z0.                             (4)\nTo see the connection between these dynamics and SBT, observe that (4) specifies the following dynamics for entry zij:\n\ndzij/dt k zik zkj.\nThus if triad {i,j,k} is such that zik and zkj have the same sign, the participation of zij in this triad will drive zij in the positive direction, while if they have opposite signs then zij will be driven in the negative direction. These dynamics therefore favor triads with an odd number of positive edge-signs, consistent with SBT [22].\nThe paper [29] proves that, for generic initial conditions Z0, system (4) evolves to a balanced pattern of edge-signs in finite time; the balanced configuration is guaranteed to be composed of either all positive edges or two all-positive cliques connected entirely by negative edges. These configurations can be interpreted as predictions of the way a social network described by Z0 will fracture if subjected to sufficient stress. More precisely, given a model Z0 for a signed social network, model (4) can be used as the basis for the following two-step procedure for predicting the way the network will fracture: 1.) integrate (4) forward in time until it reaches singularity Zs (this singularity will be reached in finite time), and 2.) interpret Zs as defining a split of the network into two groups, where each group has all positive intra-group edges and the inter-group edges are all negative (and where one of the groups could be empty). See Figure 4 for an illustration of the dynamics of system (4).\nRemarkably, [29] shows that predictions obtained in this manner are in excellent agreement with two real-world cases of group fracture for which there is empirical data: the division of countries into Allied and Axis powers in World War II [30], and the split of the well-studied Zachary Karate Club into two smaller clubs [31]. However, the analysis presented in [29]\nrequires that matrix  Z0 be completely known, that is, that all of the \"initial\" relationships zij(0) between entities be measurable.\n\nSuch comprehensive data are not always available in practical applications.\nWe have found that the requirement that relationship matrix Z0 be perfectly known can be relaxed through the use of Algorithm ESP. More specifically, given a subset of the relationship data, the remaining weighted edge-signs can be estimated using Algorithm ESP, and these estimates Z0 can be used in place of Z0 when initializing (4). We have tested this procedure using the relationship network proposed in [30] for 17 key countries involved in World War II. This investigation demonstrates that accurate prediction of which countries would eventually join the Allied forces and which would become Axis members can be made with less than 15% of the edge-signs known in advance. For example, data for only the relationships maintained by Germany and the USSR is sufficient to enable correct prediction of the ultimate alignment of all countries except Portugal  (see Figure 4). Similar results hold for analysis of the split of the Zachary Karate Club [31].\n\n## Iii. Summary\n\nThis two-part paper proposes that predictive analysis methods often can be improved by leveraging sociological models, and explores this possibility by considering two challenging prediction tasks: 1.) inferring signs (friendly or antagonistic) of ties in social networks, and 2.) predicting whether an emerging social diffusion event will propagate widely or quickly dissipate. In this first part of the paper, we derive a novel ML algorithm for edge-sign prediction which leverages structural balance theory\n[22-24]. The proposed algorithm outperforms a gold-standard method in empirical tests with large-scale online social networks, and the inferred edge-signs are shown to be useful when predicting the way adversarial networks are likely to fracture under stress.\nPart Two of the paper examines the problem of forecasting the ultimate reach of \"complex contagion\" events [25,26], and develops a new \"sociology-aware\" ML algorithm for predicting which complex contagion events will ultimately propagate widely and which will quickly dissipate. Taken together, these results suggest that incorporating simple models from sociology can substantially improve the performance of prediction methods, particularly in applications in which there is limited data available for training and implementing the algorithms.\n\nThis work was supported by the U.S. Department of Defense, The Boeing Company, and the Laboratory Directed Research and Development Program at Sandia National Laboratories. We thank Curtis Johnson and Travis Bauer of Sandia and Anne Kao of Boeing for numerous helpful discussions on aspects of this research.\n\nREFERENCES\n[1] Colbaugh, R. and K. Glass, \"Predictive analysis for social\nprocesses I: Multi-scale hybrid system modeling, and II: Predictability and warning analysis\", Proc. 2009 IEEE Multi- Conference on Systems and Control, Saint Petersburg, Russia, July 2009.\n[2] Choi, H. and H. Varian, \"Predicting the present with Google\nTrends\", SSRN Preprint, April 2009.\n[3] Hastie, T., R. Tibshirani, and J. Friedman, The Elements of\nStatistical Learning, Second Edition, Springer, New York, 2009.\n[4] Colbaugh, R., K. Glass, and P. Ormerod, \"Predictability of\n'unpredictable' cultural markets\", 105th Annual Meeting of the American Sociological Association, Atlanta, GA, August 2010.\n[5] Asur, S. and B. Huberman, \"Predicting the future with social\nmedia\", Proc. IEEE/WIC/ACM International Conference on Web Intelligence and Intelligent Agent Technology, Toronto, Ontario, Canada, September 2010.\n[6] Goel, S., J. Hofman, S. Lahaie, D. Pennock, and D. Watts,\n\"Predicting consumer behavior with Web search\", Proc. National Academy of Sciences USA, Vol. 107, pp. 17486-17490, 2010.\n[7] Lerman, K. and T. Hogg, \"Using stochastic models to describe\nand predict social dynamics of Web users\", arXiv preprint, October 2010.\n[8] Bollen, J., H. Mao, and X. Zeng, \"Twitter mood predicts the\nstock market\", *J. Computational Science*, Vol. 2, pp. 1-8, 2011.\n[9] Colbaugh, R. and K. Glass, \"Detecting emerging topics and\ntrends via predictive analysis of 'meme' dynamics\", Proc. 2011\nAAAI Spring Symposium Series, Palo Alto, CA, March 2011.\n[10] Lui, C., P. Metaxas, and E. Mustafaraj, \"On the predictability of\nthe U.S. elections through search volume activity\", Proc. IADIS e-Society Conference, Avila, Spain, March 2011.\n[11] Amodea, G., R. Blanco, and U. Brefeld, \"Hybrid models for\nfuture event prediction\", *Proc. CIKM '11*, Glasgow, Scotland,\nOctober 2011.\n[12] Colbaugh, R. and K. Glass, \"Early warning analysis for social\ndiffusion events\", *Security Informatics*, accepted for publication.\n[13] Clauset, A., C. Moore, and M. Newman, \"Hierarchical structure\nand the prediction of missing links in networks\", *Nature*, Vol.\n453, pp. 98-101, 2008.\n[14] Pang, B. and L. Lee, \"Opinion mining and sentiment analysis\",\nFoundations and Trends in Information Retrieval, Vol. 2 , pp. 1-\n135, 2008.\n[15] Abbasi, A., H. Chen, and A. Salem, \"Sentiment analysis in\nmultiple languages: Feature selection for opinion classification in Web forums\", *ACM Transactions on Information Systems*,\nVol. 26, pp. 1-34, 2008.\n[16] Lampos, V., T. De Bie, and N. Cristianini, \"Flu detector -\nTracking epidemics on Twitter, *ECML PKDD 2010*, Springer\nLNAI 6323, 2010.\n[17] Christakis, N. and J. Fowler, \"Social network sensors for early\ndetection of contagious outbreaks\", *PLoS ONE*, Vol. 5, e12948,\n2010.\n[18] Ayers, J., K. Ribisi, and J. Brownstein, \"Tracking the rise in\npopularity of electronic nicotine delivery systems using search query surveillance\", *American J. Preventative Medicine*, Vol.\n41, pp. 1-6, 2011.\n[25] Colbaugh, R. and K. Glass, \"Leveraging sociological models for\nprediction II: Early warning for complex contagions\", Proc.\n2012 IEEE International Conference on Intelligence and\nSecurity Informatics, Washington, DC USA, June 2012.\n[26] Centola, D., \"The spread of behavior in an online social network\nexperiment\", *Science*, Vol. 329, pp. 1194-1197, 2010.\n[27] Leskovec, J., L. Backstrom, and J. Kleinberg, \"Meme-tracking\nand the dynamics of the news cycle\", *Proc. ACM KDD '09*,\nParis, France, June 2009.\n[28] Maniu, S., B. Cautis, and T. Abdessalem, \"Building a signed\nnetwork from interactions in Wikipedia\", *Proc. DBsocial '11*, Athens, Greece, June 2011.\n[29] Marvel, S., J. Kleinberg, R. Kleinberg, and S. Strogatz,\n\"Continuous-time model of structural balance\", Proc. National\nAcademy of Sciences USA, Vol. 108, pp. 1771-1776, 2011.\n[30] Axelrod, R. and D. Bennett, \"Landscape theory of aggregation\",\nBritish J. Political Science, Vol. 23, pp. 211-233, 1993.\n[31] Zachary, W., \"Information flow model for conflict and fission\",\nJ. Anthropological Research, Vol. 33, pp. 452-473, 1977.\n[19] Glass, K. and R. Colbaugh, \"Estimating the sentiment of social\nmedia content for security informatics applications\", Security\nInformatics, Vol. 1, No. 3, pp. 1-16, 2012.\n[20] Colbaugh, R. and K. Glass, \"Proactive defense for evolving\ncyber threats\", Proc. 2011 IEEE International Conference on\nIntelligence and Security Informatics, Beijing, China, July 2011.\n[21] Colbaugh, R., \"Arctic ice, George Clooney, lipstick on a pig,\nand insomniac fruit flies: Combining kd and m&s for predictive\nanalysis\", *Proc. ACM KDD '11*, San Diego, CA, August 2011.\n[22] Heider, F., \"Attitude and cognitive organization\", *J. Psychology*,\nVol. 21, pp. 107-112, 1946.\n[23] Cartwright, D. and F. Harary, \"Structural balance: A\ngeneralization of Heider's theory\", *Psychological Review*, Vol. 63, pp. 277-293, 1956.\n[24] Leskovec, J., D. Huttenlocher, and J. Kleinberg, \"Predicting\npositive and negative links in online social networks\", Proc WWW 2010, Raleigh, NC, April 2010.\n# Leveraging Sociological Models For Prediction Ii: Early Warning For Complex Contagions\n\n\nRichard Colbaugh Sandia National Laboratories Albuquerque, NM USA\ncolbaugh@comcast.net\n\n\nAbstractThere is considerable interest in developing techniques\nfor predicting human behavior, and a promising approach to this\nproblem is to collect phenomenon-relevant empirical data and\nthen apply machine learning methods to these data to form pre-\ndictions. This two-part paper shows that the performance of such\nlearning algorithms often can be improved substantially by lev-\neraging sociological models in their development and implemen-\ntation. In this paper, the second of the two parts, we demonstrate\nthat a sociologically-grounded learning algorithm outperforms a\ngold-standard method for the task of predicting whether nascent\nsocial diffusion events will \"go viral\". Significantly, the proposed\nalgorithm performs well even when there is only limited time\nseries data available for analysis.\n\nKeywordspredictive analysis, sociological models, social networks,\nmachine learning.\n\nThere is great interest in developing techniques for accurately predicting human behavior. For example, forecasting the eventual outcomes of social processes is a central concern in domains ranging from popular culture to public policy to national security [1]. The task of inferring the existence and nature of activities which are presently underway but not directly observable, sometimes referred to as \"predicting the present\" [2], is also of crucial importance in many applications. A promising approach to obtaining such predictions is to collect empirical data which appropriately characterize the phenomenon of interest and then to analyze these data using machine learning (ML)\nmethods [3]. Existing ML techniques, although useful, face at least two key challenges: 1.) the prediction accuracy obtainable even with state-of-the-art algorithms is sometimes insufficient for the task at hand, such as when the predictions are to be used to inform high-consequence decisions, and 2.) applying ML methods typically requires that significant quantities of data be collected and \"labeled\" for use in algorithm training.\nThis two-part paper proposes that the challenges of predicting human behavior using ML often can be overcome by leveraging sociological models in the development and implementation of the learning algorithms. Part One of the paper considers the problem of predicting the \"signs\" of relationships in social networks, where positive and negative edges reflect friendly and antagonistic social ties, respectively, and derives a novel ML algorithm for edge-sign prediction that is based in part on structural balance theory [4]. In the present paper, the second of Kristin Glass New Mexico Institute of Mining and Technology Socorro, NM USA\nkglass@icasa.nmt.edu the two parts, we examine the problem of forecasting the ultimate reach of \"complex contagion\" events [5,6]. Predictability assessment of complex contagion dynamics indicates that the metrics which should be predictive of the contagion's reach are fairly subtle measures of the network dynamics associated with early diffusion activity. These results are used to derive an ML algorithm for predicting which complex contagions will ultimately \"go viral\" and which won't, and it is demonstrated that the algorithm outperforms gold-standard methods in an empirical investigation of online meme propagation [7]. Significantly, the new algorithm performs well even when only limited time series data are available for analysis, permitting reliable predictions early in the contagion lifecycle. We also show that the proposed algorithm enables effective early warning analysis for an important class of cyber threats.\n\n## Ii. Early Warning For Complex Contagions\n\nA. Problem Formulation There is significant interest in developing predictive capabilities for social diffusion processes, for instance to permit early identification of emerging contentious situations or accurate forecasting of the eventual reach of potentially \"viral\" behaviors. This section considers the following early warning problem: we suppose some sort of triggering event has taken place and wish to determine, as early as possible, whether this event will ultimately generate a large, self-sustaining reaction, involving the propagation of behavioral changes through a substantial portion of a population, or will instead quickly dissipate. Of particular interest is propagation of behaviors that are costly or controversial, or about which there is uncertainty, as these activities often have large security-relevant impacts [4].\nRecent research has shown that such behaviors may spread as *complex contagions*, requiring social affirmation or reinforcement from multiple sources in order to propagate [5,6]. Because the diffusion dynamics for complex contagions are different than those of \"simple\" contagions like disease epidemics, it is natural to suspect that developing effective early warning algorithms for complex contagions may require careful consideration of these more complex dynamics. In this section we explore this possibility by deriving an early warning method for complex contagions which explicitly leverages a mathematical model for these diffusion events. We adopt the contagion model proposed in [6], implemented on a class of social networks which possess realistic topologies, and analyze this model to identify features of the contagion that are likely to be predictive of diffusion reach. These features are then used as the basis for an ML algorithm which distinguishes complex contagions that will propagate widely from those which will quickly dissipate.\nB. Predictability Assessment Here we briefly describe the results of applying the predictability assessment procedure presented in [1] to the task of identifying measurables that should be predictive of complex contagion success. The discussion begins with short, intuitive reviews of our predictability assessment process and network diffusion modeling framework, and then summarizes the main results obtained via this theoretical analysis.\nPredictability. The basic idea behind the proposed approach to predictability analysis is simple and natural: we assess predictability by answering questions about the reachability of diffusion events. To obtain a mathematical formulation of this strategy, the behavior about which predictions are to be made is used to define the system *state space subsets of interest* (SSI), while the particular set of candidate measurables under consideration allows identification of the *candidate starting set*\n(CSS), that is, the set of states and system parameter values which represent initializations that are consistent with, and equivalent under, the presumed observational capability. As a simple example, consider an online market with two products, A and B, and suppose the system state variables consist of the current market share for A, ms(A), and the rate of change of this market share, r(A) (ms(B) and r(B) are not independent state variables because ms(A)  ms(B)  1 and r(A)  r(B)  0);\nlet the parameters be the advertising budgets for the products, b(A) and b(B). The producer of A might find it useful to define the SSI to reflect market share dominance by A, that is, the subset of the two-dimensional state space where ms(A) exceeds a specified threshold. If only market share and the advertising budgets can be measured then the CSS is the one-dimensional subset of state-parameter space consisting of the initial magnitudes for ms(A), b(A), and b(B), with r(A) unspecified.\nRoughly speaking, the approach to predictability assessment proposed in [1] involves determining how probable it is to reach the SSI from a CSS and deciding if these reachability properties are compatible with the prediction goals. If a system's reachability characteristics are compatible with the prediction objectives the situation is deemed predictable, and otherwise it is unpredictable. This setup permits the identification of candidate predictive measurables: these are the measurable states and/or parameters which most strongly affect the predictability properties [1]. Continuing with the online market example, if trajectories with positive early market share rates r(A) are much more likely to yield market share dominance for A than are trajectories with negative early r(A), independent of the early values for ms(A), then the situation is unpredictable (because r(A) is not measured). Adding the capacity to measure r(A) would then increase system predictability, and depending upon the task requirements this new measurement ability could result in a predictable situation. A quantitative, mathematicallyrigorous presentation of this predictability assessment framework can be found in [1].\nModel. In complex contagion events, the probability of adopting a controversial or unproven behavior or idea increases with the number of other adopting *individuals*, and not merely the number of exposures to the contagion (so that multiple interactions with the same adopting individual do not increase the likelihood of adoption, as it does in simple contagions) [5,6].\n\nRecently the authors of [6] proposed an empirically-grounded model for complex contagions in which individuals interact via a social network of arbitrary topology, and the probability that individual A adopts a given activity or idea is a function of the number of A's adopting neighbors; the functional form of this adoption \"influence curve\" is obtained empirically (see [6] for a detailed description of the model).\nThe dynamics of contagion may depend upon the topological structure of the underlying social network. This dependence suggests that, in order to identify the features of complex contagions which have predictive power, it is necessary to assess predictability using social network models with realistic topologies. Therefore in this study we implement the complex contagion model [6] with social networks that possess four topological properties which are ubiquitous in the real-world [1]: right-skewed degree distribution, transitivity, community structure, and core-periphery structure.\nIt is shown in [1] that *stochastic hybrid dynamical systems*\n(S-HDS) provide a useful mathematical formalism with which to represent social contagions on realistic networks (see Figure 1). An S-HDS is a feedback interconnection of a discrete-state stochastic process, such as a Markov chain, with a family of continuous-state stochastic dynamical systems [1]. Combining discrete and continuous dynamics within a unified, computationally tractable framework offers an expressive, scalable modeling environment that is amenable to formal mathematical analysis. In particular, S-HDS models can be used to efficiently represent and analyze social contagion on large-scale networks with the four topological properties listed above [1].\nAs an intuitive illustration of the way S-HDS enable effective, tractable representation of complex contagion phenomena, consider the task of modeling contagion on a network possessing community structure. As shown in Figure 1, the contagion proceeds in two ways: 1.) *intra-community diffusion*, involving frequent interactions between individuals within the same community and the resulting gradual change in the concentrations of adopting (red) individuals, and 2.) inter-community diffusion, in which the \"infection\" jumps from one community to another, for instance because an adopting individual encounters a new community. S-HDS models offer a natural framework for representing these dynamics, with the S-HDS continuous system modeling the intra-community dynamics (e.g., via stochastic differential equations), the discrete system capturing inter-community dynamics (e.g., using a Markov chain), and the interplay between these dynamics being encoded in the S-HDS feedback structure (e.g., the transition probabilities of the discrete system Markov chain may depend upon the state of the continuous system) [1].\nResults. We applied the predictability assessment methodology summarized above to a \"realistic network\" version of the complex contagion model given in [6] (i.e., the model obtained by implementing the dynamics specified in [6] on a class of networks possessing the four topological properties summarized above). The main finding of this study is that the predictability of the reach of complex contagions depends crucially upon the social network's community and core-periphery structures. These findings are now summarized more quantitatively.\ninputs inputs inputs inputs i i j j k k\n\n\nWe adopt a modularity-based definition for network community structure [8], whereby a good partitioning of a network's vertices into communities is one for which the number of edges between putative communities is smaller than would be expected in a random partitioning. To be concrete, a modularity-based partitioning of a network into two communities maximizes the modularity Q  sT B s / 4m, where m is the total number of edges in the network, the partition is specified with the elements of vector s by setting si  1 if vertex i belongs to community 1 and si  1 if it belongs to community 2, and the matrix B has elements Bij  Aij  kikj / 2m, with Aij and ki denoting the network adjacency matrix and degree of vertex i, respectively. Partitions of the network into more than two communities can be constructed recursively [8]. This definition enables the specification of the first candidate predictive feature nominated by our predictability assessment: early dispersion of a complex contagion process across network communities should be a reliable predictor that the ultimate reach of the contagion will be significant.\nWe characterize network core-periphery structure in terms of the k-shell decomposition [9]. To partition a network into its k-shells, one first removes all vertices with degree one, repeating this step if necessary until all remaining vertices have degree two or higher; the removed vertices constitute the 1-shell. Continuing in the same way, all vertices with degree two (or less) are recursively removed, creating the 2-shell. This process is repeated until all vertices have been assigned to a k-shell, and the shell with the highest index, the kmax-shell, is deemed to be the core of the network. This definition permits us to state the second candidate predictive feature nominated via theoretical predictability assessment: early contagion activity within the network kmax-shell should be a reliable predictor that the reach of the diffusion will be significant.\nC. Prediction Algorithm\nConsider the problem of predicting, very early in the lifecycle of a complex contagion event, whether or not the contagion will propagate widely. We adopt an ML approach to this early warning task: given a triggering incident, one or more information sources which reflect the reaction to this trigger by a population of interest, and a specification for what constitutes an \"alarming\" reaction, the goal is to learn a classifier that accurately predicts, as early as possible, whether or not reaction to the event will eventually become alarming. The ML classifier used in this investigation is the Avatar ensembles of decision trees (A-EDT) algorithm [10]; qualitatively similar results were obtained in tests with other, less sophisticated classifiers [3].\nA key step in early warning analysis is determining which characteristics of the phenomenon of interest, if any, possess exploitable predictive power. Based on the results of the preceding predictability assessment study, we consider three general classes of features: 1.) *intrinsics-based features* - measures of the inherent properties and attributes of the \"object\" being diffused, 2.) *simple dynamics-based features* - metrics which capturing simple properties of the diffusion dynamics (e.g., the rate at which the diffusion is propagating), 3.) network dynamics-based features - measures that characterize the way the early diffusion is progressing relative to the network's community and core-periphery structures. Precise definitions for the features in these classes are, of course, application dependent.\nThe proposed approach to early warning analysis is to identify and collect features from these classes for the event of interest, input the feature values to the A-EDT classifier, and then run the classifier to generate a warning prediction (i.e., a forecast that the event is expected to become 'alarming' or remain 'not alarming'). The algorithm presented below specifies this procedure in general terms, and illustrative instantiations of the process are given in the case studies discussed in Sections IID and IIE. It is assumed that social media data form the primary source of information concerning events of interest [11]. However, the analysis is very similar when alternative sources of data are employed [1].\nConsider the following early warning algorithm:\n\n## Algorithm Ew\n\nGiven: a triggering incident, a definition for what constitutes an 'alarming' reaction, and a set of social media sites (e.g., blogs) B which are relevant to the early warning task.\nInitialization: train the A-EDT classifier on a set of events that are qualitatively similar to the triggering event of interest and are labeled as 'alarming' or 'not alarming'.\n\nProcedure:\n1. Assemble a lexicon of keywords L that pertain to the triggering event under study.\n2. Conduct a sequence of Web crawls and construct a time\nseries of blog graphs GB(t). For each time period t, label\neach blog in GB(t) as 'active' if it contains a post mentioning any of the keyword in L and 'inactive' otherwise.\n3. Form the union GB = tGB(t), partition GB into network\ncommunities and into k-shells, and map the partition element structure of GB back to each of the graphs GB(t).\n4. For each graph GB(t), compute the values for all features\n(intrinsics, simple dynamics, and network dynamics).\n5. Apply the A-EDT classifier to the time series of features,\ni.e., the features obtained for the sequence of blog graphs\n{GB(t0), ..., GB(tp)}, where t0 and tp are the triggering event\ntime and present time, respectively. Issue a warning alert if\nthe classifier output is 'alarming'.\nWe now offer a few remarks concerning Algorithm EW.\n\nThe keywords in Step 1 can be identified with the help of subject matter experts and also through computational means (e.g., via meme analysis [1]). Step 2 is by now standard, and a variety of tools exist which can perform these tasks [11]. In Step 3, the blog network can be partitioned into communities and kshells using modularity-based community extraction [8] and standard k-shell decomposition [9], respectively. The particular choices of metrics for the intrinsics, simple dynamics, and network dynamics features computed in Step 4 tend to be problem specific, and typical examples are given in the case studies below. Finally, in Step 5 the feature values obtained in Step 4 serve as inputs to the A-EDT classifier, and the output of the classifier is used to decide whether an alert should be issued.\nD. Meme  Case Study\nThe goal of this case study is to apply Algorithm EW to the task of predicting whether or not a given *meme* (i.e., short textual phrase which propagates relatively unchanged online) will \"go viral\". Although it may seem that meme diffusion is not sufficiently costly or controversial to qualify as a complex contagion, [6] shows that *political* memes appear to propagate in this way. Our main source of data on meme dynamics is the dataset archived at the site http://memetracker.org [12] by the authors of [7]. Briefly, the archive [12] contains time series data characterizing the online diffusion of ~70,000 memes during the period between 1 August and 31 December 2008. We are interested in using Algorithm EW to distinguish successful and unsuccessful political memes early in their lifecycle. More precisely, the prediction task is to classify memes into two groups - those which will ultimately be successful (acquire more than S posts) and those that will be unsuccessful (attract fewer than U posts) - very early in the meme lifecycle.\nTo support an empirical evaluation of the utility of Algorithm EW for this problem, we downloaded from [12] the time series data for slightly more than 70,000 memes. These data contain, for each meme M, a sequence of pairs (t1, URL1)M, (t2, URL2)M, ..., (tT, URLT)M, where tk is the time of appearance of the kth blog post or news article that contains at least one mention of meme M, URLk is the URL of the blog or news site on which that post/article was published, and T is the total number of posts that mention meme M. From this set of time series we randomly selected 100 \"successful\" political meme trajectories, defined as those corresponding to memes which attracted at least 1000 posts during their lifetimes, and 100 \"unsuccessful\" political meme trajectories, defined as those whose memes acquired no more than 100 total posts.\nTwo other forms of data were collected for this study: 1.) a large Web graph which includes websites (URLs) that appear in the meme time series, and 2.) samples of the text surrounding the memes in the posts which contain them. More specifically, we sampled the URLs appearing in the time series for our set of 200 successful and unsuccessful memes and performed a Web crawl that employed these URLs as \"seeds\". This procedure generated a Web graph, denoted GB, that consists of approximately 550,000 vertices (websites) and 1.4 million edges (hyperlinks), and includes essentially all of the websites which appear in the meme time series. To obtain samples of text surrounding memes in posts, we randomly selected ten posts for each meme and then extracted from each post the paragraph which contains the first mention of the meme.\nAlgorithm EW employs three types of features: intrinsics, simple dynamics-based, and network dynamics-based. We now describe the instantiation of each of these feature classes for the meme problem. Consider first the intrinsics features, which for the meme application become language-based measures. Each \"document\" of text surrounding a meme in its (sample) posts is represented by a simple \"bag of words\" feature vector x|V|, where the entries of x are the frequencies with which the words in the vocabulary V appear in the document. A language-based feature which might reasonably be expected to be predictive of meme propagation is the sentiment or emotion of documents containing the meme. A simple way to quantify a document's sentiment/emotion is through the use of appropriate lexicons.\n\nLet s|V| denote a lexicon vector, in which each entry of s is a numerical \"score\" quantifying the sentiment/emotion intensity of the corresponding word in vocabulary V. The aggregate sentiment/emotion score of document x can then be computed as score(x)  sTx / sT1, where 1 is a vector of ones. Thus score(.)\nestimates document sentiment or emotion as a weighted average of the sentiment or emotion scores for the words comprising the document. (Note that if no sentiment or emotion information is available for a particular word in V then the corresponding entry of s is set to zero.)\nTo characterize the emotion content of a document we use the Affective Norms for English Words (ANEW) lexicon [13], while positive or negative sentiment is quantified via the \"IBM lexicon\" [14]. This approach generates four language features for each meme: the happiness, arousal, dominance, and positive/negative sentiment of the sample text surrounding that meme. As a preliminary test, we computed the mean emotion and sentiment of text surrounding the 100 successful and 100 unsuccessful memes in our dataset. On average the text surrounding successful memes is happier, more active, more dominant, and more positive than that surrounding unsuccessful memes (p0.0001), so it is at least plausible that the language features may possess some predictive power.\nConsider next two simple dynamics-based features, defined to capture basic characteristics of the early evolution of meme post volume: 1.) #posts() - the cumulative number of posts mentioning the given meme by time  (where  is small relative to the typical meme lifespan), and 2.) post rate() - a simple estimate of the rate of accumulation of these posts at time . Recall that predictability assessment suggests that both early dispersion of contagion activity across network communities and early contagion activity within the network core ought to be predictive of meme success. These insights motivate the definition of two network dynamics-based features for meme prediction: 1.) community dispersion() - the cumulative number of network communities in the blog graph GB that, by time\n, contain at least one post which mentions the meme, and 2.)\n#k-core blogs() - the cumulative number of blogs in the kmaxshell of blog graph GB that, by time , contain at least one post which mentions the meme.\nThis case study compares the meme early warning accuracy of Algorithm EW, as applied to meme prediction, with that of two other prediction methods: a language-based (LB) strategy and a standard-dynamics (SD) scheme. The LB predictor uses the four language features noted above with the A-EDT classifier to try to distinguish successful and unsuccessful memes, and achieves a prediction accuracy of 66.5% (ten-fold crossvalidation). Since simply guessing 'successful' for all memes gives an accuracy of 50%, it is seen that the language intrinsics, when used alone, possess relatively limited predictive power.\nNext we compare the predictive performance of the SD\nclassifier with that of Algorithm EW. The SD predictor combines the four language features with the two simple dynamics features, #posts() and post rate(), within the A-EDT classifier. Because this is representative of state-of-the-art prediction schemes, this approach is referred to as the gold-standard algorithm. The application of Algorithm EW to meme prediction combines the language features with four dynamics measures: #posts(), post rate(), community dispersion(), and #k-core blogs(). Sample results from this empirical test are depicted in Figure 2. Each data point represents the average accuracy over ten trials (ten-fold cross-validation). It can be seen from Figure 2 that Algorithm EW outperforms the gold-standard method, especially in the important situation in which it is desired to form predictions soon after the meme is detected. Indeed, these results show that useful predictions can be obtained with Algorithm EW *within the first twelve hours* after a meme is detected\n(this corresponds to 0.5% of the average meme lifespan). Interestingly, analysis of feature predictive power [3] shows that the most predictive features are, in decreasing order, 1.) community dispersion, 2.) #k-core blogs, 3.) #posts, and 4.) post rate, which supports the conclusions of the complex contagionbased predictability assessment.\nE. Cyber Early Warning Case Study\nThis case study explores the ability of Algorithm EW to provide reliable early warning for politically-motivated distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks, an important class of cyber threats. In particular, we are interested in exploring the utility of Algorithm EW when using social media as an information source. Toward this end, we first identified a set of Internet disruptions which included examples from three distinct classes of activity: 1.) successful DDoS attacks (the events for which we seek early warning; 2.) natural events which disrupt Internet service but for which it is known that no early warning signal exists in social media (e.g., earthquakes); 3.) quiet periods during which there is social media \"chatter\" concerning impending DDoS attacks but no successful attacks actually occurred. Including events selected from these three classes is intended to provide a fairly comprehensive test, as these classes correspond to 1.) the domain of interest, 2.) a set of disruptions which impact the Internet but have no social media warning signal, and\n3.) a set of \"non-events\" which do not impact the Internet but do possess putative social media warning signals.\nWe selected twenty events from these three classes:\n\nPolitically-motivated DDoS attacks:\n-\nEstonia event in April 2007;\n-\nCNN/China incident in April 2008;\n-\nIsrael/Palestine conflict event in January 2009;\n-\nDDoS associated with Iranian elections in June 2009;\n-\nWikiLeaks event in November 2010;\n-\nAnonymous v. PayPal, etc. attack in December 2010;\n-\nAnonymous v. HBGary attack in February 2011.\nNatural disturbances:\n-\nEuropean power outage in November 2006;\n-\nTaiwan earthquake in December 2006;\n-\nHurricane Ike in September 2008;\n-\nMediterranean cable cut in January 2009;\n-\nTaiwan earthquake in March 2010;\n-\nJapan earthquake in March 2011.\nQuiet periods: Seven periods, from 2005 through 2011, during which there were discussions in social media of DDoS attacks on various U.S. government agencies but no successful attacks took place.\nWe collected two forms of data for each of these twenty events: *cyber data* and *social data*. The cyber data consist of time series of routing updates which were issued by Internet routers during a one month period surrounding each event. More precisely, these data are the Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) routing updates exchanged between gateway hosts in the Autonomous System network of the Internet. The data were downloaded from the publicly-accessible RIPE collection site [15] using the process described in [16]. The temporal evolution of the volume of BGP routing updates (e.g., withdrawal messages) gives a coarse-grained measure of the timing and magnitude of large Internet disruptions and thus offers a simple and objective way to characterize the impact of each of the events in our collection. The social data consist of time series of social media mentions of cyber attack-related keywords and Internet disruption-related keywords that were detected during a two month period surrounding each of the twenty events (in each case, event time was inferred from BGP data [16]). These data were gathered using the procedure specified in Algorithm EW.\nWe apply Algorithm EW to the task of distinguishing the seven DDoS attacks from the thirteen other events in the event set. For simplicity, in this case study we do not use any intrinsics-based features (e.g., language metrics) in the A-EDT classifier, and instead rely upon the four dynamics-based features defined in the meme study. We estimate the accuracy of Algorithm EW with two-fold cross-validation. In the case of DDoS events, the blog data made available to Algorithm EW is limited to posts made during the five week period which ended one week before the attack. For the six natural disturbances, the blog data includes all posts collected during the six week period immediately prior to the event, while in the case of the seven non-events, the blog data includes the posts gathered during a six week interval which spans discussions of DDoS attacks on U.S. government agencies.\nIn this evaluation, Algorithm EW achieves *perfect* accuracy, correctly identifying all 'attack' and 'non-attack' events. If the test is made more difficult, so that the blog data made available to Algorithm EW for attack events is limited to a four week period that ends two weeks before each attack, the proposed approach still achieves 95% accuracy, An examination of the predictive power of the four features used as inputs to the A-EDT classifier reveals that community dispersion is the most predictive measure.\n\n## Iii. Summary\n\nThis two-part paper considers the challenging problem of predicting human behavior, and shows that incorporating simple models from sociology can substantially improve the performance of machine learning prediction methods, particularly in applications for which there is limited data available for training and implementing the algorithms. Future work will include investigating the predictability of the actions of opponents in adversarial settings through a combination of ML and sociologically-grounded game-theoretic models.\n\nThis work was supported by the U.S. Department of Defense, The Boeing Company, and the Laboratory Directed Research and Development Program at Sandia National Laboratories. We thank Curtis Johnson of Sandia and Anne Kao of Boeing for numerous helpful discussions on aspects of this research.\n\n## References\n\n[1] Colbaugh, R. and K. Glass, \"Early warning analysis for social\ndiffusion events\", *Security Informatics*, accepted for publication.\n[2] Choi, H. and H. Varian, \"Predicting the present with Google\nTrends\", SSRN Preprint, April 2009.\n[3] Hastie, T., R. Tibshirani, and J. Friedman, The Elements of\nStatistical Learning, Second Edition, Springer, New York, 2009.\n[4] Colbaugh, R. and K. Glass, \"Leveraging sociological models for\nprediction I: Inferring adversarial relationships\", Proc. 2012\nIEEE International Conference on Intelligence and Security\nInformatics, Washington, DC USA, June 2012.\n[5] Centola, D., \"The spread of behavior in an online social network\nexperiment\", *Science*, Vol. 329, pp. 1194-1197, 2010.\n[6] Romero, D., B. Meeder, and J. Kleinberg, \"Differences in the\nmechanics of information diffusion across topics: Idioms, political hashtags, and complex contagion on Twitter\", Proc WWW 2011, Hyderabad, India, March 2011.\n[7] Leskovec, J., L. Backstrom, and J. Kleinberg, \"Meme-tracking\nand the dynamics of the news cycle\", *Proc. ACM KDD '09*, Paris, France, June 2009.\n[8] Newman, M., \"Modularity and community structure in\nnetworks\", *Proc. National Academy of Sciences USA*, Vol. 103, pp. 8577-8582, 2006.\n[9] Carmi, S., S. Havlin, S. Kirkpatrick, Y. Shavitt, and E. Shir, \"A\nmodel of Internet topology using the k-shell decomposition\", Proc. National Academy of Sciences USA, Vol. 104, pp. 11150- 11154, 2007.\n[10] http://www.sandia.gov/avatar/, accessed July 2010.\n[11] Glass, K. and R. Colbaugh, \"Web analytics for security\ninformatics\", Proc. 2011 European Intelligence and Security Informatics Conference, Athens, Greece, September 2011.\n[12] http://memetracker.org, accessed January 2010. [13] Bradley, M. and P. Lang, \"Affective norms for English words\n(ANEW): Stimuli, instruction manual, and affective ratings\", Technical Report C1, University of Florida, 1999.\n[14] Ramakrishnan, G., A. Jadhav, A. Joshi, S. Chakrabarti, and P.\nBhattacharyya, \"Question answering via Bayesian inference on lexical relations\", Proc. Annual Meeting of the Association for Computational Linguistics, Sapporo, Japan, July 2003.\n[15] http://data.ris.ripe.net/, last accessed July 2011.\n[16] Glass, K., R. Colbaugh, and M. Planck, \"Automatically\nidentifying the sources of large Internet events\", Proc. IEEE\nInternational\nConference\non\nIntelligence\nand\nSecurity\nInformatics, Vancouver, BC Canada, May 2010.\n\n## Predictive Defense Against Evolving Adversaries\n\n\nRichard Colbaugh Sandia National Laboratories Albuquerque, NM USA\ncolbaugh@comcast.net\n\n                                                                                   Kristin Glass\n                                                                   New Mexico Institute of Mining and Technology\n                                                                                 Socorro, NM USA\n                                                                               kglass@icasa.nmt.edu\n\nAbstractAdaptive adversaries are a primary concern in several\ndomains, including cyber defense, border security, counterterror-\nism, and fraud prevention, and consequently there is great inter-\nest in developing defenses that maintain their effectiveness in the\npresence of evolving adversary strategies and tactics. This paper\nleverages the coevolutionary relationship between attackers and\ndefenders to derive two new approaches to predictive defense, in\nwhich future attack techniques are anticipated and these insights\nare incorporated into defense designs. The first method combines\ngame theory with machine learning to model and predict future\nadversary actions in the learner's \"feature space\"; these predic-\ntions form the basis for synthesizing robust defenses. The second\napproach to predictive defense involves extrapolating the evolu-\ntion of defense configurations forward in time, in the space of\ndefense parameterizations, as a way of generating defenses which\nwork well against evolving threats. Case studies with a large cy-\nber security dataset assembled for this investigation demonstrate\nthat each method provides effective, scalable defense against cur-\nrent and future attacks, outperforming gold-standard techniques.\nAdditionally, preliminary tests indicate that a simple variant of\nthe proposed design methodology yields defenses which are diffi-\ncult for adversaries to reverse-engineer.\n\nKeywords-predictive analytics, adversarial coevolution, machine\nlearning, game theory, cyber security, security informatics.\n\nAdaptive adversaries are a primary concern in many domains, including cyber defense, border security, counterterrorism, and crime prevention [e.g. 1-3]. For instance, emerging technologies and operational practices in these domains are increasingly moving toward highly interconnected architectures with small numbers of widely-shared protocols, thereby dramatically increasing the potential impact of even a single unanticipated attack. It is therefore essential that security professionals develop defenses which are able to respond rapidly to, or even foresee, evolving attack strategies and tactics.\nRecognizing these trends and challenges, several researchers have recently proposed defenses which incorporate models of adversary behavior in order to increase defense system reliability and responsiveness against adaptive opponents; applications receiving attention include cyber defense [e.g. 4-7], border and transportation security [e.g. 8-10], and improvised explosive device defense [11,12]. However, while these modelinformed methods represent an important advance over standard techniques, they continue to produce reactive defense designs and thus are limited in their ability to defend against new attacks.\nVery recently, security researchers have begun working to develop *predictive* defenses, in which future attack strategies are explicitly anticipated and preemptively countered [13-16]. Despite this attention, much remains to be done to place the objective of predictive defense on a scientifically-grounded and practically-implementable foundation. Fundamental issues associated with the dynamics and predictability of coevolutionary \"arms races\" between attackers and defenders have yet to be resolved. For instance, although the work [13-15] has demonstrated that previous attacker actions and defender responses provide predictive information about future attacker behavior, little is known about which system characteristics have predictive power or how to employ these features to form useful predictions. Moreover, even in settings where these predictability and prediction issues have been resolved, it often remains an open question how to incorporate such predictive analytics into the design of practical real-world defense systems.\nThis paper leverages the coevolutionary relationship between attackers and defenders to derive two predictive defense algorithms which are effective against both current and future attacks strategies. We formulate the defense task as one of behavior classification, in which innocent and malicious activities are to be distinguished, and assume only limited historical information is available regarding prior attacker behavior or attack attributes. The first method combines game theory [17] with machine learning (ML) [18] to model and predict adversary actions in \"feature space\", that is, in the space of observable variables that the ML algorithm uses for learning; these predictions form the basis for synthesizing robust defenses. The second predictive defense strategy involves extrapolating the evolution of defense system configurations forward in time, in the space of defense parameterizations, as a way of generating defenses which work well against evolving threats. Interestingly, formulating the attack prediction/defense synthesis problem in an abstract space (of ML features or defense parameters) enables the development of algorithms that are scalable to applications of real-world size and complexity.\nTo permit the performance of these methods to be evaluated, we have assembled a large collection of non-Spam and Spam emails reflecting the evolution of Spammer tactics over an eight year period. Case studies with this dataset demonstrate that each of the proposed predictive methods provides robust, scalable defense, outperforming gold-standard Spam filters. Additionally, preliminary tests suggest that a simple \"randomized feature\" variant of the proposed design methodology generates defenses which are difficult for adversaries to reverseengineer.\n\n## Ii. Predictive Defense Via Game-Based Learning\n\nA. Problem Formulation\nAs indicated in the Introduction, there is significant interest in developing *predictive* approaches to defending against adaptive adversaries, in which opponents' evolving strategies are anticipated and these insights are employed to counter new attacks.\n\nThis section considers the following concrete instantiation of the predictive defense problem: given some history of attacker actions, design a defense system which performs well against both current and future attacks.\nIt is reasonable to expect that concepts and techniques from game theory might be helpful in understanding adversary coevolution, and indeed such approaches have been explored in a variety of domains [5,10,19]. These investigations have revealed several challenges to successfully using game-theoretic methods for predictive defense, and we mention two that have been particularly daunting. First, the space of possible attacker actions is typically very large in realistic environments, and because the complexity of most game models increases exponentially with the number of actions available to players, this has often made these models intractable in practice [19]. Second, it has proved difficult to derive models that capture evolving attacker behavior in any but the most idealized situations.\nWe overcome these two challenges by developing a gamebased model for adversary adaptation within an ML framework, enabling effective defense in realistic settings. Crucially, the proposed approach seeks to derive the optimal defense for new attacks, rather than to predict these attacks perfectly, and therefore enjoys robust performance in the presence of (inevitable) prediction errors. We approach the task of countering adversarial behavior as an ML classification problem, in which the objective is to distinguish innocent and malicious activity. Each instance of activity is represented as a feature vector x|F|, where entry xi of x is the value of feature i for this instance and F is the set of instance features. In what follows, F is a set of \"reduced\" features, obtained by projecting measured feature vectors into a lower-dimensional space. While feature reduction is standard practice in ML [18], we show below that aggressive reduction allows us to efficiently manage the complexity of our game models. Behavior instances x belong to one of two classes: positive/malicious and negative/innocent (generalizing to more than two behavior classes is straightforward\n[18]). The goal is to learn a vector w|F| such that classifier orient  sign(wTx) accurately estimates the class of behavior x, returning 1 (1) for malicious (innocent) activity.\nIt is useful to assess the predictability of a phenomenon before attempting to predict its evolution; for example, such an analysis permits identification of measurables that possess predictive power [20]. There has been limited theoretical work assessing predictability of adversarial dynamics, but existing studies suggest attack-defend coevolution often generates predictable dynamics. For instance, although [21] finds that certain player strategies lead to chaos in a simple repeated game, [22] shows that large sets of player strategies and repeated games exhibit predictable adversarial dynamics. Here we supplement this theoretical work by conducting an empirical investigation of predictability, and select as our case study a cyber security problem - Spam filtering - which possesses attributes that are representative of many adversarial domains.\nTo conduct this investigation, we first obtained a large collection of emails from various publicly-available sources for the period 1999-2006, and added to this corpus a set of Spam emails acquired from B. Guenter's Spam trap for the same time period. Following standard practice, each email is modeled as a\n\"bag of words\" feature vector x|F|, where the entries of x are the frequencies with which the words in vocabulary F appear in the message. The resulting dataset consists of ~128,000 emails composed of more than 250,000 features. We extracted from this collection of Spam and non-Spam emails the set of messages sent during the 30 month period between January 2001 and July 2003 (email in other periods exhibit very similar evolutionary dynamics). Finally, the dimension of the email feature space was reduced via a singular value decomposition (SVD) analysis [18], yielding a reduction in feature space dimension of four orders of magnitude (from ~250K to 20).\nWe wish to examine, in a simple but meaningful way, the predictability of Spam adaptation, and propose two intuitively reasonable criteria with which to empirically evaluate predictability: *sensibility* and *regularity* (obviously more comprehensive, mathematically-rigorous frameworks can be derived for defining and assessing predictability [e.g.,20]). More specifically, and in the context of Spam, it would be *sensible* for Spammers to adapt their messages over time in such a way that Spam feature vectors xS come to resemble the feature vectors xNS of legitimate emails, and *regularity* in this adaptation might imply that the values of the individual elements of xS approach those of xNS in a fairly monotonic fashion.\nTo permit convenient examination of the evolution of feature vectors xS and xNS during the 30 month period under study, the emails were first binned by quarter. Next, the average values for each of the 20 (reduced) features was computed for all the Spam emails and all the non-Spam emails (separately) for each quarter. Figure 1 illustrates the feature space dynamics of Spam and non-Spam messages for one representative element (F1) of this reduced feature space. As seen in the plot, the value of feature F1 for Spam approaches the value of this feature for non-Spam, and this increasing similarity is a consequence of changes in the composition of Spam messages (the value of F1\nfor non-Spam emails is essentially constant). The dynamics of the other feature values (not shown) are analogous.\nObserve that the Spam dynamics illustrated in Figure 1 reflect *sensible* adaptation on the part of Spammers: the features of Spam email messages evolve to appear more like those of non-Spam email, making Spam more difficult to detect. Additionally, this evolution is *regular*, with feature values for Spam approaching those for non-Spam in a nearly-monotonic fashion. Thus this empirical analysis indicates that coevolving Spammer-Spam filter dynamics possesses some degree of predictability, and that the features employed in Spam analysis may have predictive power; this result is in general agreement with the conclusions of the theoretical predictability analysis reported in [22]. Moreover, because many of the characteristics of Spam-Spam defense coevolution are shared by other adversarial systems, this result suggests these other systems may have exploitable levels of predictability as well.\nB. Predictive Defense Algorithm\nThe proposed approach to designing a predictive defense system which works well against both current and future attacks is to combine ML with a simple game-based model for adversary behavior. In order to apply game-theoretic methods, it is necessary to overcome the complexity and model-realism challenges mentioned above. We address problem complexity by modeling adversary actions directly in an aggressively-reduced ML feature space, so that the (effective) space of possible adversary actions which must be considered is dramatically decreased. The difficulty of deriving realistic representations for attacker behavior is overcome by recognizing that the actions of attackers can be modeled as attempts to *transform* data (i.e., feature vectors x) in such a way that malicious and innocent activities are indistinguishable. (This is in contrast to trying to model the attack instances \"from scratch\"). It is possible to model attacker actions as transformations of data because, within an ML problem formulation, historical attack data are available in the form of training instances.\nWe model adversarial coevolution as a sequential game, in which the attacker and defender iteratively optimize the following objective function:\n\n$$\\min_{\\rm w}\\ \\max_{\\rm a}\\left[-\\alpha\\big{\\|}{\\rm a}\\big{\\|}^{3}+\\beta \\big{\\|}{\\rm w}\\big{\\|}^{3}+\\sum_{\\rm i}{\\rm loss}\\Big{(}{\\rm y}_{\\rm i},{\\rm w}^ {\\rm T}({\\rm x}_{\\rm i}+{\\rm a})\\Big{)}\\right] \\tag{1}$$\nIn (1), the loss function represents the misclassification rate for the defense system, where {yi, xi}n i=1 denotes pairs of currentlyobserved activity instances xi and their labels yi and w parameterizes the defense (recall the defense attempts to distinguish malicious and innocent activities using the classifier orient\nsign(wTx)). The attacker attempts to circumvent the defense by transforming the data through vector a|F|, and the defender's goal is to optimally counter this attack through specification of the appropriate classifier vector w|F|. The terms ||a||3 and\n||w||3 define \"regularizations\" imposed on attacker and defender actions, respectively, as discussed below.\nObserve that (1) models the attacker as acting to increase the misclassification rate with vector a, subject to the need to limit the magnitude of this vector (large a is penalized via the term ||a||3). This model thus captures in a simple way the fact that the actions of the attacker are in reality always constrained by the goals of the attack. For instance, in the case of Spam, the Spammer tries to manipulate message x in such a way that it\n\"looks\" enough like legitimate email to evade the Spam filter. However, the transformed message xa must still communicate the desired information to the recipient or the attacker's goal will not be realized, and so the transformation vector a cannot be chosen arbitrarily.\nThe defender attempts to reduce the misclassification rate with an optimal choice for vector w, and avoids \"over-fitting\"\nthrough regularization with the ||w||3 term [18]. Notice that the formulation (1) permits the attacker's goal to be modeled as counter to, but not exactly the opposite of, the defender's goal, and this is consistent with many real-world settings. Returning to the Spam example, the Spammer's objective of delivering messages which induce profitable user responses is not the inverse of an email service provider's goal of achieving high Spam recognition with a very low false-positive rate.\nThe preceding development can be summarized by stating the following predictive defense (PD) algorithm:\n\n## Algorithm Pd\n\n1. Collect historical data {yi, xi}n\ni=1 which reflects past behavior of the attacker and past legitimate behavior.\n2. Optimize objective function (1) to obtain the predicted\nactions a* of the attacker and the optimal defense w* to counter this attack.\n3. Estimate the status of any new activity x as either malicious (1) or innocent (1) via orient  sign(xTw*).\nObserve that Step 2 of this algorithm can be interpreted as first predicting the attacker strategy through computation of attack vector a*, and then learning an appropriate countermeasure w*\nby applying ML to the \"transformed\" data {yi, xia*}n i=1.\nC. Algorithm Evaluation\nThis case study examines the performance of Algorithm PD for the Spam filtering problem. We use the Spam/non-Spam email dataset introduced above, consisting of ~128,000 messages that were sent during the period 1999-2006. The study compares the effectiveness of Algorithm PD, implemented as a Spam filter, with that of a well-tuned naive Bayes (NB) Spam filter [15]. Because NB filters are widely used and work very well in Spam applications, this filter is referred to as the gold-standard algorithm. We extract from our dataset the 1000 oldest legitimate emails and 1000 oldest Spam messages for use in training both Algorithm PD and the gold-standard algorithm. The email messages sent during the four year period immediately following the date of the last training email are used as test data. More specifically, these emails are binned by quarter and then randomly sub-sampled to create balanced datasets of Spam and legitimate emails for each of the 16 quarters in the test period.\nRecall that Algorithm PD employs aggressive feature space dimension reduction to manage the complexity of the gamebased modeling process. This dimension reduction is accomplished here through SVD analysis, which reduces the dimension |F| of feature vectors from ~250K to 20) [18]. (The orthogonal basis used for this reduction is derived by performing SVD analysis using the 1000 non-Spam and 1000 Spam training emails.) We have found that good classification accuracy can be obtained with a wide range of (reduced) feature space dimensions. For example, we achieve a filtering accuracy of ~97% with the training data when using an NB classifier implemented with feature dimension ranging from |F|100,000 to\n|F|5.\nThe gold-standard strategy is applied as described in [15].\n\nAlgorithm PD is implemented with parameter values   0.001 and   0.1, and with a sum-of-squares loss function. To evaluate the utility of these defenses against evolving adversaries, we train Algorithm PD and the gold-standard algorithm *once*, using the (oldest) 1000 non-Spam/1000 Spam dataset, and then apply the filters without retraining to the four years of emails that follow these 2000 messages.\nSample results from this study are depicted in Figure 2.\nEach data point in the plots represents the average accuracy over ten trials (two-fold cross-validation). It can be seen that the Spam filter based upon Algorithm PD significantly outperforms the gold-standard method: the predictive defense experiences almost no degradation in accuracy over the four years of the study, while the gold-standard method suffers a substantial drop in accuracy during this period. These results suggest that combining ML with simple game-based models offers an effective means of defending against adaptive adversaries .\n\n## D. Randomized Feature Learning An Important Consideration When Applying Ml Techniques In Adversarial Settings Is The Extent To Which Adversaries Can Reverse-Engineer The Learning Algorithm And Use This Knowledge\n\nto circumvent the classifier [3]. One way to increase the difficulty of the adversary's reverse-engineering task is to employ\n\"randomized feature\" learning [23]. Here we explore a very simple three-step implementation of this idea: 1.) divide the set of available features into randomly-selected, possibly overlapping subsets; 2.) train one classifier for each subset of features;\nand 3.) alternate between classifiers in a random fashion during operation. The fact that good classifier performance is often obtainable with only a few features (see the Spam example above) suggests the feasibility of employing multiple small subsets of randomly-selected features in a suite of classifiers.\nTo test the effectiveness of this strategy, we use a variant of the optimization process specified in (1). More specifically, we first use training data {yi, xi}n i=1 to computed the classifier vector w in two ways: 1.) using the full set of (reduced-dimension) features F, 2.) using two subsets of features randomly selected from set F; the resulting classifier vectors are denoted wF and\n{wF1, wF2}. (1) is then employed to compute the optimal attack against classifier vector wF, denoted aF, and to compute the optimal attack against the defense consisting of randomly alternating classifiers wF1 and wF2, denoted aF12.\nApplying this evaluation process to the 2000 email training dataset described in Section IIC suggests that randomized feature leaning may be an effective way to reduce the efficacy of adversary reverse-engineering methods. We define F to be the set of 20 features with largest singular values (in the SVD reduction process), and build sets F1 and F2 by randomly sampling F (with replacement) until each subset contains 10 features. The classification accuracy of wF against *nominal* data\n(i.e., with a0) is superior to that provided by a classifier which randomly alternates between classifiers wF1 and wF2, but the difference is modest - the respective accuracies are 98.4% and 96.2% (two-fold cross-validation). Crucially, however, the randomized feature classifier is substantially more robust against attack data (i.e., data corresponding to aaF or aaF12). Indeed, the accuracy of classifier wF is only 66.1% against attack data, while the accuracy of filter {wF1,wF2} is 86.8%, in the attack setting (two-fold cross-validation, see Figure 3).\n\n## Iii. Predictive Defense Via Extrapolative Learning\n\nA. Problem Formulation\nThe previous section derives a predictive defense system in the \"feature space\" of observable variables that characterize adversary activity. In this section we adopt a complementary perspective, proposing a simple technique for developing proactive defenses in \"defense space\", that is, in the space of defense system parameterizations. The specific problem of interest may be stated as follows: given a (possibly limited) history of defense system configurations, design a new defense which performs well against both current and future attacks.\nAs noted above, it is useful to examine the predictability of a phenomenon of interest before attempting to predict its evolution [20]. Here we conduct an empirical investigation of the predictability of defense system dynamics through a case study which employs the same Spam/non-Spam email dataset introduced in Section II. The present study focuses on those messages sent during the three year period 2001-2004 (other periods exhibit very similar behavior). We assess defense system predictability in terms of the *sensibility* and *regularity* of the observed dynamics. More specifically, and in the context of Spam defense, it is *sensible* for a Spam filter to adapt to compensate for the way Spammers modify their messages over time, and in a *regular* adaptation the values of defense system parameters might change approximately monotonically.\nTo examine the dynamics of Spam filter configurations associated with our dataset, we first binned the messages by quarter and performed aggressive feature-space dimension reduction via SVD analysis, retaining the five features with largest singular values. Next, separate NB filters were trained for each quarter, and the filter weights {w1, w2, w3, w4, w5} corresponding to features F1-F5 were recorded. Figure 4 depicts the values of the NB filter weights for quarters 1, 5, 9, and 13 (filter weights for the other quarters are consistent with those shown in the plot and are suppressed for clarity).\n\n\nInspecting the evolution of filter weights depicted in Figure\n4 reveals that defense adaptation is sensible. For example, by comparing Figures 1 and 4 it is seen that, as feature F1 evolves to become less predictive of Spam (Figure 1), the Spam filter places less emphasis on this feature (Figure 4); similar behavior is observed for the other weights. Additionally, the dynamics of the feature weights is regular, with most of the weights exhibiting monotonic adaptation. Thus the empirical analysis indicates that Spam filter dynamics possesses some degree of predictability, and that filter parameters may have predictive power. These results suggest the possibility that defenses in other domains may have exploitable levels of predictability as well.\nB. Extrapolative Defense Algorithm\nThe proposed approach to designing a predictive classifier that works well against both current and future attacks is to simply extrapolate the sequence of observed defense systems forward in time. Note that this strategy is motivated by the results of the empirical predictability analysis summarized above. Sequences of defense system parameterizations can often be obtained directly, for example from the system \"owners\". Alternatively, if historical attack data are available, these data can be used to learn associated defense sequences (as illustrated above).\nThere are many ways to extrapolate a given sequence of defense system parameterizations {w1, w2, ..., wp} into the future, and thereby generate predictions for useful future defenses. We adopt the following linear strategy:\n\n$\\mathbf{W_{\\rm PT}=\\Sigma^{P}_{i=1}\\ \\hat{B}_{i}\\ w_{i}}$ (22)\nwhere the wi and i are defense parameterizations and extrapolation coefficients, respectively, and T is the time horizon for which a prediction is desired. The coefficients i are ordinarily specified so that |i|  |j| if i  j, so more recent observations are emphasized. Appropriate values for the i can be estimated in various ways, including statistical inference from historical data [18] or consultation with domain experts [15].\nThe preceding discussion can be summarize by sketching an algorithm for predicting a classifier vector wpT which may be expected to be useful at future time tpT:\n\n## Algorithm Ed (Extrapolative Defense)\n\n1. Collect a sequence of defense system parameterizations\n{w1, w2, ..., wp} (e.g., from historical defense data or by\nlearning appropriate defenses from historical attack data).\n2. Estimate the coefficients i in (2) (e.g., using ML).\n3. Compute classifier vector wpT from (2), and estimate the\nstatus of any new activity as either malicious (1) or innocent (1) via orient  sign(xTwpT).\nC. Algorithm Evaluation\nThis case study examines the performance of Algorithm ED for the Spam filtering problem. We use the Spam/non-Spam email dataset described above, consisting of all emails sent during the 54 month period from early 2001 to mid-2005. The study compares the effectiveness of Algorithm ED, implemented as a Spam filter, with that of two NB Spam filters trained in different ways. As in the previous case studies, we first binned the emails by quarter, and then randomly sampled each quarter to create balanced datasets for all 18 quarters in the study period.\nTo provide a demanding test, we extracted from our dataset the emails sent during quarters Q1, Q5, and Q9 for use in training Algorithm ED. This procedure is intended to reflect the common situation in which opportunities for observation may arise only sporadically. The messages sent during the 18 month period from quarters Q13 to Q18 serve as test data. (The quarters closest to the training period, Q10 through Q12, are not included in the test set to increase the difficulty of the task.)\nAlgorithm ED is implemented by first training NB filters on data from quarters Q1, Q5, and Q9, yielding defense parameterizations {w1, w5, w9}, and then using (2) to extrapolate these defenses. More specifically, we compute predicted defense w*\nusing (2) with 1  0,  5  1, and 9  2 (a simple Euler-like extrapolation). The first NB filter used for comparison employs w9, that is, the filter derived from the most recent training data.\n\nThe second NB filter examined in this case study is permitted to use \"future\" data during training: when attempting to distinguish Spam and non-Spam emails in quarter Qm, for m{13,\n14, ..., 18}, this filter is trained on Qm data. Because the latter NB filter has access to future data, which is unavailable to the other defense systems, the performance of this filter is expected to be an upper bound for that of a predictive filter, and we refer to this NB filter as the gold-standard. All three filters - Algorithm ED, nominal NB, and gold-standard - are applied using an aggressively-reduced feature space of dimension |F|5.\n\n\nFigure 5. Results for the extrapolative defense case study.\nThe plot shows how Spam filter accuracy (vertical axis) varies with time (horizontal axis) for the nominal NB filter, (red), gold-standard NB filter (green), and Algorithm ED filter (blue).\n\nSample results from this study are shown in Figure 5.  Each data point in the plots represents the average accuracy over ten trials (two-fold cross-validation). It is seen that the filter based upon Algorithm ED significantly outperforms the nominal NB method. Moreover, the accuracy of Algorithm ED is comparable to that achieved by the gold-standard NB method, despite the fact that the latter filter is trained on \"future\" data not available to Algorithm ED. These results suggest that simple defense system extrapolation offers an effective means of defending against evolving adversary behavior.\n\nThis work was supported by the Laboratory Directed Research and Development Program at Sandia National Laboratories.\n\nWe thank Chip Willard and Curtis Johnson for numerous helpful discussions on aspects of this research.\n\nREFERENCES\n[1] *Proc. 2010 IEEE ISI*, Vancouver, BC Canada, May 2010. [2] *Proc. 2011 IEEE ISI*, Beijing, China, July 2011. [3] \"Machine learning in adversarial environments\", P. Laskov, R.\nLippmann, Eds, Special Issue, *Machine Learning,* Vol. 81, 2010.\n[4] Zhang, Q., D. Man, and W. Yang, \"Using HMM for intent\nrecognition in cyber security situational awareness\", Proc. IEEE\nKAM, Wuhan, China, November 2009.\n[5] Parameswaran, M., H. Rui, and S. Sayin, \"A game theoretic\nmodel and empirical analysis of Spammer strategies\", Proc. CEAS 2010, Redmond, WA, July 2010.\n[6] Ahmadinejad, S., S. Jalili, and M. Abadi, \"A hybrid model for\ncorrelating alerts of known and unknown attack scenarios and updating attack graphs\", *Computer Networks*, Vol. 55, pp. 2221- 2240, 2011.\n[7] Zakrzewska, A. and E. Ferragut, \"Modeling cyber conflicts\nusing an extended Petri Net formalism\", *Proc. IEEE CICS*,\nParis, France, April 2011.\n[8] Kaza, S., Y. Wang, and H. Chen, \"Enhancing border security:\nMutual information analysis to identify suspect vehicles\", Decision Support Systems, Vol. 43, pp. 199-210, 2007.\n[9] Gkonis, K. and H. Psaraftis, \"Container transportation as an\ninterdependent security problem\", *J. Transportation Security*, Vol. 3, pp. 197-211, 2010.\n[10] Pita, J. et al., \"GUARDS: Game theoretic security allocation on\na national scale\", *Proc. AAMAS '11*, Taipei, Taiwan, May 2011.\n[11] Williams, E., Surveillance and Interdiction Models: A Game\nTheoretic Approach to Defend Against VBIED, Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, June 2010.\n[12] Smith, A., \"Improvised explosive devices in Iraq, 2003-09\", The\nLetort Papers, US Army War College, April 2011.\n[13] Colbaugh, R., \"Does coevolution in malware adaptation enable\npredictive analysis?\", IFA Workshop: Exploring Malware Adaptation Patterns, San Francisco, CA, May 2010.\n[14] Bozorgi, M., L. Saul, S. Savage, and G. Voelker, \"Beyond\nheuristics: Learning to classify vulnerabilities and predict exploits\", *Proc. ACM KDD '10*, Washington DC, July 2010.\n[15] Colbaugh, R. and K. Glass, \"Proactive defense for evolving\ncyber threats\", *Proc. 2011 IEEE ISI*, Beijing, China, July 2011.\n[16] Cipriano, C. et al., \"NEXAT: History-based approach to predict\nattacker actions\", *Proc. ACSAC*, Orlando, FL, December 2011.\n[17] Peters, H., *Game Theory*, Springer, Berlin, 2008. [18] Hastie, T., R. Tibshirani, and J. Friedman, The Elements of\nStatistical Learning, Second Edition, Springer, New York, 2009.\n[19] Dalvi, N. et al., \"Adversarial classification\", Proc. ACM KDD\n'09, Seattle, WA, August 2004.\n[20] Colbaugh, R. and K. Glass, \"Predictive analysis for social\nprocesses I: Multi-scale hybrid system modeling, and II: Predictability and warning analysis\", *Proc. 2009 IEEE MSC*,\nSaint Petersburg, Russia, July 2009.\n[21] Sato, Y., E. Akiyama, and J.D. Farmer, \"Chaos in learning a\nsimple two-person game\", Proc. National Academy of Sciences\nUSA, Vol. 99, pp. 4748-4751, 2002.\n[22] Colbaugh, R., \"Arctic ice, George Clooney, lipstick on a pig,\nand insomniac fruit flies: Combining kd and m&s for predictive analysis\", *Proc. ACM KDD '11*, San Diego, CA, August 2011.\n[23] Johnson, C., Personal communication, December 2011.\n# Proactive Defense For Evolving Cyber Threats\n\n##\n\nRichard Colbaugh Sandia National Laboratories New Mexico Institute of Mining and Technology Albuquerque, NM USA\ncolbaugh@comcast.net\n\n\nAbstractThere is significant interest to develop proactive ap-\nproaches to cyber defense, in which future attack strategies are\nanticipated and these insights are incorporated into defense de-\nsigns. This paper considers the problem of protecting computer\nnetworks against intrusions and other attacks, and leverages the\ncoevolutionary relationship between attackers and defenders to\nderive two new methods for proactive network defense. The first\nmethod is a bipartite graph-based machine learning algorithm\nwhich enables information concerning previous attacks to be\n\"transferred\" for application against novel attacks, thereby sub-\nstantially increasing the rate with which defense systems can suc-\ncessfully respond to new attacks. The second approach involves\nexploiting basic threat information (e.g., from cyber security ana-\nlysts) to generate \"synthetic\" attack data for use in training de-\nfense systems, resulting in networks defenses that are effective\nagainst both current and (near) future attacks. The utility of the\nproposed methods is demonstrated by showing that they outper-\nform standard techniques for the task of detecting malicious net-\nwork activity in two publicly-available cyber datasets.\n\nKeywords-cyber security, proactive defense, predictive analysis,\nmachine learning, security informatics.\n\nRapidly advancing technologies and evolving operational practices and requirements increasingly drive both private and public sector enterprises toward highly interconnected and technologically convergent information networks. Proprietary information processing solutions and stove-piped databases are giving way to unified, integrated systems, thereby dramatically increasing the potential impact of even a single well-planned network intrusion, data theft, or denial-of-service attack. It is therefore essential that commercial and government organizations develop network defenses which are able to respond rapidly to, or even foresee, new attack strategies and tactics.\nRecognizing these trends and challenges, some cyber security researchers and practitioners are focusing their efforts on developing *proactive* methods of cyber defense, in which future attack strategies are anticipated and these insights are incorporated into defense designs [e.g., 1-5]. However, despite this attention, much remains to be done to place the objective of proactive defense on a rigorous and quantitative foundation. Fundamental issues associated with the dynamics and predictability of the coevolutionary \"arms race\" between attackers and defenders have yet to be resolved. For instance, although recent work has demonstrated that previous attacker actions and defender responses provide predictive information about future Kristin Glass New Mexico Institute of Mining and Technology Socorro, NM USA\nkglass@icasa.nmt.edu attacker behavior [3-5], not much is known about which measurables have predictive power or how to exploit these to form useful predictions. Moreover, even if these predictability and prediction issues were resolved, it is still an open question how to incorporate such predictive analytics into the design of practically-useful cyber defense systems.\nThis paper considers the problem of protecting enterprisescale computer networks against intrusions and other attacks, and explicitly leverages the coevolutionary relationship between attackers and defenders to develop two new methods for proactive network defense. Each method formulates the task as one of behavior classification, in which innocent and malicious network activities are to be distinguished, and each assumes that only very limited prior information is available regarding exemplar attacks or attack attributes. The first method models the data as a bipartite graph of *instances* of network activities and the *features* or attributes that characterize these instances. The bipartite graph data model is used to derive a machine learning algorithm which accurately classifies a given instance as either innocent or malicious based upon its behavioral features. The algorithm enables information concerning previous attacks to be \"transferred\" for use against novel attacks; crucially, it is assumed that previous attacks are drawn from a distribution of attack instances which is related *but not identical* to that associated with the new malicious behaviors. This transfer learning algorithm provides a simple, effective way to extrapolate attacker behavior into the future, and thus significantly increases the rate with which defense systems can successfully respond to new attacks.\nThe second approach to proactive network defense proposed in this paper represents attacker-defender coevolution as a hybrid dynamical system (HDS) [6,7], with the HDS discrete system modeling the \"modes\" of attack (e.g., a particular class of DoS or data exfiltration procedures) and the HDS continuous system generating particular attack instances corresponding to the attack mode presently \"active\". Our algorithm takes as input the mode of attack, obtained for example from the insights of cyber analysts, and generates synthetic attack data for this mode of malicious activity; these data are then combined with actually observed attacks to train a learning-based classifier to be effective against both current and (near) future attacks. The utility of the proposed methods is demonstrated by showing that they outperform standard techniques for the task of distinguishing innocent and malicious network behaviors in analyses of two publicly-available cyber datasets.\n\n## Ii. Preliminaries\n\nWe approach the task of protecting computer networks from attack as a classification problem, in which the objective is to distinguish innocent and malicious network activity. Each instance of network activity is represented as a feature vector x|F|, where entry xi of x is the value of feature i for instance x and F is the set of instance features or attributes of interest (x may be normalized in various ways [7]). Instances can belong to one of two classes: positive / innocent and negative / malicious; generalizing to more than two classes is straightforward.\n\nWe wish to learn a vector c|F| such that the classifier orient\n sign(cTx) accurately estimates the class label of behavior x, returning 1 (1) for innocent (malicious) activity.\nKnowledge-based classifiers leverage prior domain information to construct the vector c. One way to obtain such a classifier is to assemble a \"lexicon\" of positive / innocent features FF and malicious / negative features FF, and to set ci 1\nif feature i belongs to F, ci 1 if i is in F, and ci0 otherwise;\nthis classifier simply sums the positive and negative feature values in the instance and assigns instance class accordingly. Unfortunately this sort of scheme is unable to improve its performance or adapt to new domains, and consequently is usually not very useful in cyber security applications.\nAlternatively, learning-based methods attempt to generate the classifier vector c from examples of positive and negative network activity. To obtain a learning-based classifier, one can begin by assembling a set of nl *labeled* instances {(xi, di)}, where di{1, 1} is the class label for instance i. The vector c is then learned through training with the set {(xi, di)}, for example by solving the following set of equations for c:\n\n                           [XTX  I|F|] c  XT d,                            (1)\nwhere matrix Xnl|F| has instance feature vectors for rows, dnl is the vector of instance labels, I|F| denotes the |F||F|\nidentity matrix, and 0 is a constant; this corresponds to regularized least squares (RLS) learning [8]. Many other learning strategies can be used to compute c [8]. Learning-based classifiers have the potential to improve their performance and adapt to new situations, but realizing these capabilities typically requires that large training sets of labeled attacks be obtained. This latter characteristic represents a significant drawback for cyber security applications, where it is desirable to be able to recognize new attacks given only a few (or no) examples.\nIn what follows we present two new learning-based approaches to cyber defense which are able to perform well with only very modest levels of prior knowledge regarding the attack classes of interest. The basic idea is to leverage \"auxiliary\" information which is readily available in cyber security applications. More specifically, the first proposed method is a transfer learning algorithm [e.g., 9] which permits the knowledge present in data on previous attacks to be transferred for implementation against new attacks. The second approach uses prior knowledge concerning attack \"modes\" to generate synthetic attack data for use in training defense systems, resulting in networks defenses which are effective against both current and (near) future attacks.\n\n## Iii. Method One: Transfer Learning\n\nIn this section we first derive a bipartite graph-based transfer learning algorithm for distinguishing innocent and malicious network behaviors, and then demonstrate the algorithm's effectiveness through a case study using publicly-available network intrusion data obtained from the KDD Cup archive [10].\n\nThe basic hypothesis is simple and natural: because attacker /\ndefender behavior coevolves, previous activity should provide some indication of future behavior, and transfer learning is one way to quantify and operationalizes this intuition.\nA. Proposed Algorithm\nThe development of the proposed algorithm begins by modeling the problem data as a bipartite graph Gb, in which instances of network activity are connected to their features (see Figure 1). It is easy to see that the adjacency matrix A for graph Gb is given by\n\n  * [22]\nwhere matrix Xn|F| is constructed by stacking the n instance feature vectors as rows, and each '0' is a matrix of zeros. In the proposed algorithm, integration of labeled and \"auxiliary\" data is accomplished by exploiting the relationships between instances and features encoded in the bipartite graph model. The basic idea is to assume that, in Gb, positive / negative instances will tend to be connected to positive / negative features. Note that, as shown below, the learning algorithm can incorporate a lexicon of labeled features (if available). It is assumed that this lexicon is used to build vector w|F|, where the entries of w are set to 1 (innocent), 1 (malicious), or 0 (unknown) according to the polarity of the corresponding features.\ninstances features Many cyber security applications are characterized by the presence of limited labeled data for the attack class of interest but ample labeled information for a related class of malicious activity. For example, an analyst may be interested in detecting a new class of attacks, and may have in hand a large set of labeled examples of normal network behavior as well as attacks which have been experienced in the recent past. In this setting it is natural to adopt a transfer learning approach, in which knowledge concerning previously observed instances of innocent / malicious behavior, the so-called *source* data, is transferred to permit classification of new *target* data. In what follows we present a new bipartite graph-based approach to transfer learning that is well-suited to cyber defense applications.\nAssume that the initial problem data consists of a collection of n = nT  nS network events, where nT is the (small) number of labeled instances available for the target domain, that is, examples of network activity of current interest, and nS  nT is the number of labeled instances from some related source domain, say reflecting recent activity; suppose also that a modest lexicon Fl of labeled features is known (this set can be empty).\n\nLet this label data be used to encode vectors dTnT, dSnS, and w|F|, respectively. Denote by dT,estnT, dS,estnS, and c|F| the vectors of estimated class labels for the target and source instances and the features, and define the augmented classifier caug  [dS,est T  dT,est T  cT]T  n|F|. Note that the quantity caug is introduced for notational convenience in the subsequent development and is not directly employed for classification.\nWe derive an algorithm for learning caug, and therefore c, by solving an optimization problem involving the labeled source and target training data, and then use c to estimate the class label of any new instance of network activity via the simple linear classifier orient  sign(cTx). This classifier is referred to as *transfer learning-based* because c is learned, in part, by transferring knowledge about the way innocent and malicious network behavior is manifested in a domain which is related to (but need not be identical to) the domain of interest.\nWe wish to learn an augmented classifier caug with the following four properties: 1.) if a source instance is labeled, then the corresponding entry of dS,est should be close to this 1 label;\n2.) if a target instance is labeled, then the corresponding entry of dT,est should be close to this 1 label, and the information encoded in dT should be emphasized relative to that in the source labels dS,; 3.) if a feature is in the lexicon Fl, then the corresponding entry of c should be close to this 1 label; and\n4.) if there is an edge Xij of Gb which connects an instance i and a feature j, and Xij possesses significant weight, then the estimated class labels for i and j should be similar.\nThe four objectives listed above may be realized by solving the following minimization problem:\n\n$$\\min_{c_{\\rm aug}}\\ {\\rm c}_{\\rm aug}^{\\rm T}{\\rm L}c_{\\rm aug}\\ +\\beta_{1}\\left|{\\rm d}_{\\rm S,est}\\ -{\\rm k}_{\\rm S}{\\rm d}_{\\rm S}\\right|^{2}+\\beta_{2}\\left|{\\rm d}_{\\rm T,est}\\ -{\\rm k}_{\\rm T}{\\rm d}_{\\rm T}\\right|^{2}$$ $$\\ +\\beta_{3}\\left|{\\rm c}={\\rm w}\\right|^{2} \\tag{3}$$\nwhere L  D  A is the graph Laplacian matrix for Gb, with D\nthe diagonal degree matrix for A (i.e., Dii  j Aij), and 1, 2,\n3, kS, and kT are nonnegative constants. Minimizing (3) enforces the four properties we seek for caug. More specifically, the second, third, and fourth terms penalize \"errors\" in the first three properties, and choosing 2  1 and kT  kS favors target label data over source labels. To see that the first term enforces the fourth property, note that this expression is a sum of components of the form Xij (dT,est,i  cj)2 and Xij (dS,est,i  cj)2. The constants 1, 2, 3 can be used to balance the relative importance of the four properties.\nThe caug which minimizes the objective function (3) can be obtained by solving the following set of linear equations:\n\n$$\\left[\\begin{array}{cccc}\\mbox{L}_{11}+\\beta_{1}\\mbox{I}_{\\mbox{\\scriptsize ns }}&\\mbox{L}_{12}&\\mbox{L}_{13}\\\\ \\mbox{L}_{21}&\\mbox{L}_{22}+\\beta_{2}\\mbox{I}_{\\mbox{\\scriptsize nT}}&\\mbox{L}_ {23}\\\\ \\mbox{L}_{31}&\\mbox{L}_{32}&\\mbox{L}_{33}+\\beta_{3}\\mbox{I}_{|\\mbox{\\scriptsize F }|}\\end{array}\\right]\\mbox{c}_{\\mbox{\\scriptsize aug}}=\\left[\\begin{array}{ c}\\beta_{1}\\mbox{k}_{\\mbox{\\scriptsize s}}\\mbox{d}_{\\mbox{\\scriptsize s}}\\\\ \\beta_{2}\\mbox{k}_{\\mbox{\\scriptsize T}}\\mbox{d}_{\\mbox{\\scriptsize T}}\\\\ \\beta_{3}\\mbox{w}\\end{array}\\right] \\tag{4}$$\nwhere the Lij are matrix blocks of L of appropriate dimension.\n\nThe system (4) is sparse because the data matrix X is sparse, and therefore large-scale problems can be solved efficiently. Note that in situations where the set of available labeled instances and features is *very* limited, classifier performance can be improved by replacing L in (4) with the normalized Laplacian LnD1/2LD1/2, or with a power of this matrix Ln k (for k a positive integer).\nWe summarize the above discussion by sketching an algorithm for constructing the proposed transfer learning classifier:\n\n## Algorithm Tl (Transfer Learning):\n\n1. Assemble the set of equations (4), possibly by replacing\nthe graph Laplacian L with Ln\nk.\n2. Solve equations (4) for caug  [dS,est\nT   dT,est\nT    cT]T (for instance using the Conjugate Gradient method).\n3. Estimate the class label (innocent or malicious) of any new\nactivity x of interest as: orient  sign(cTx).\nB. Algorithm Evaluation\nWe now examine the performance of Algorithm TL for the problem of distinguishing innocent and malicious network activity in the KDD Cup 99 dataset, a publicly-available collection of network data consisting of both normal activities and attacks of various kinds [10]. For this study we randomly selected 1000 Normal connections (N), 1000 denial-of-service attacks (DoS), and 1000 unauthorized remote-access events (R2L) to serve as our test data. Additionally, small sets of each of these classes of activity were chosen at random from [10] to be used for training Algorithm TL, and a lexicon of four features, two positive and two negative, was constructed manually and employed to form the lexicon vector w.\nWe defined two tasks with which to explore the utility of Algorithm TL. In the first, the goal is to distinguish N and DoS instances, and it is assumed that the following data is available to train Algorithm TL: 1.) a set of dS/2  labeled N and dS/2 labeled R2L instances (source data), 2.) a set of dT/2 labeled N\nand dT/2 labeled DoS instances (target data), and 3.) the four lexicon features. Thus the source domain consists of N and R2L activities and the target domain is composed of N and DoS instances. In the second task the situation is reversed - the objective is to distinguish N and R2L activities, the source domain is made up of dS (total) labeled N and DoS instances, and the target domain consists of dT (total) N and R2L instances. In all tests the number of labeled source instances is dS  50, while the number of target instances dT is varied to explore the way classifier performance depends on this key parameter. Of particular interest is determining if it is possible to obtain good performance with only limited target data, as this outcome would suggest both that useful information concerning a given attack class is present in other attacks and that Algorithm TL is able to extract this information.\nThis study compared the classification accuracy of Algorithm TL with that of a well-tuned version of the RLS algorithm (1) and a standard naive Bayes (NB) algorithm [11]; as the performance of the RLS and NB methods were quite similar, we report only the RLS results. Algorithm TL is implemented with the following parameter values: 1  1.0, 2  3.0,\n3  5.0, kS  0.5, kT  1.0, and k  5. We examined training sets which incorporated the following numbers of target instances: nT  2, 5, 10, 20, 30, 40, 50, 60. As in previous studies\n(see, for example, [10]), only the 34 \"continuous features\" were used for learning the classifiers.\nSample results from this study are depicted in Figure 2.\n\nEach data point in the plots represents the average of 100 trials. It can be seen that Algorithm TL outperforms the RLS classifier (and also the standard NB algorithm), and that the difference in accuracy of the methods increases substantially as the volume of training data from the target domain becomes small. The performance of Algorithm TL for this task is also superior to that reported for other learning methods tested on these data [e.g., 12]. The ability of Algorithm TL to accurately identify a novel attack after seeing only a very few examples of it, which is a direct consequence of its ability to transfer useful knowledge from related data, is expected to be of considerable value for a range of cyber security applications.\n\n\n\nFinally, it is interesting to observe that the bipartite graph formulation of Algorithm TL permits useful information to be extracted from network data even if no labeled instances are available. More specifically, we repeated the above study for the case in which dT  dS  0, that is, when no labeled instances are available in either the target or source domains. The knowledge reflected in the lexicon vector w is still made available to Algorithm TL. As shown in Figure 3, employing a \"lexicon only\" classifier, as described in Section II, yields classification accuracy which is not much better than the 50 baseline achievable with random guessing. However, using this lexicon information together with Algorithm TL enables useful classification accuracy to be obtained (see Figure 3). This somewhat surprising result can be explained as follows: the \"clustering\" property of Algorithm TL encoded in objective function (3) allows the domain knowledge in the lexicon to leverage latent information present in the *unlabeled* target and source instances, thereby boosting classifier accuracy.\n\n## Iv. Method Two: Synthetic Attack Generation\n\nIn this section we derive our second algorithm for distinguishing normal and malicious network activity and demonstrate its effectiveness through a case study using the publicly-available Ling-Spam dataset [13]. Again the intuition is that attacker / defender coevolution should make previous activity somewhat indicative of future behavior, and in the present case we exploit this notion by generating \"predicted\" attack data and using this synthetic data for classifier training.\nA. Proposed Algorithm\nThe development of the second approach to proactive defense begins by modeling attacker / defender interaction as a stochastic hybrid dynamical system (S-HDS). Here we present a brief, intuitive overview of the basic idea; a comprehensive description of the modeling procedure is detailed in [7]. An S- HDS (see Figure 4) is a feedback interconnection of a discretestate stochastic process, such as a Markov chain, with a family of continuous-state stochastic dynamical systems [6,14]. Combining discrete and continuous dynamics within a unified, computationally tractable framework offers an expressive, scalable modeling environment that is amenable to formal mathematical analysis. In particular, S-HDS models can be used to efficiently represent dynamical phenomena which evolve on a broad range of time scales, a property of considerable value in the present application [14].\n\ninputs inputs inputs inputs\n\n\nAs a simple illustration of the way the S-HDS formalism enables effective, efficient mathematical representation of cyber phenomena, consider the task of modeling the coevolution of Spam attack methods and Spam filters. At an abstract but still useful level, one can think of Spam-Spam filter dynamics as evolving on two timescales:\n\n\nthe *slow timescale*, which captures the evolution of attack strategies; as an example, consider the way early Spam filters learned to detect Spam by identifying words that were consistently associated with Spam, and how Spammers responded by systematically modifying the wording of their messages, for instance via \"add-word\" (AW) and \"synonym\" attacks [15];\n\nthe *fast timescale*, which corresponds to the generation of\nparticular attack instances for a given \"mode\" of attack\n(for example, the synthesis of Spam messages according to a specific AW attack method).\nWe show in [7] that a range of adversarial behavior can be represented within the S-HDS framework, and derive simple but reasonable models for Spam-Spam filter dynamics and for basic classes of network intrusion attacks.\nIn [14] we develop a mathematically-rigorous procedure for predictive analysis for general classes of S-HDS. Among other capabilities, this analytic methodology enables the predictability of a given dynamics to be assessed and the predictive measurables (if any) to be identified. Applying this predictability assessment process to the adversarial S-HDS models constructed in [7] reveals that, for many such systems, the most predictive measurable is the *mode* of attack, that is, the state variable for the discrete system component of the S-HDS (see [7] for a detailed description of this analysis). Observe that this result is intuitively sensible.\nThis analytic finding suggests the following synthetic data learning (SDL) approach to proactive defense. First, identify the mode(s) of attack of interest. For attacks which are already underway, [7] offers an S-HDS discrete-system state estimation method that allows the mode to inferred using only modest amounts of measured data. Alternatively, and of more interest in the present application, it is often possible to identify likely future attack modes through analysis of auxiliary information sources (e.g., the subject matter knowledge possessed by domain experts or \"non-cyber\" data such as that found in social media [16,17]).\nOnce a candidate attack mode has been identified, synthetic attack data corresponding to the mode can be generated by employing one of the S-HDS models derived in [7]. The synthetic data take the form of a set of K network attack instance vectors, denoted AS  {xS1, ..., xSK}. The set AS can then be combined with (actual) measurements of L normal network activity instances, NM  {xNM1, ..., xNML}, and P (recently) observed attacks, AM  {xM1, ..., xMP}, yielding the training dataset TR\nNM  AM  AS of real and synthetic data. It is hypothesized that training classifiers with the augmented set TR may offer a mechanism for deriving defenses which are effective against both current and near future malicious activity.\nWe summarize the above discussion by sketching a procedure for constructing the new SDL classifier:\n\n## Algorithm Sdl:\n\n1. Identify the mode(s) of attack of interest (e.g., via domain\nexperts or auxiliary data).\n2. Generate a set of synthetic attack instances AS corresponding to the attack mode identified in Step 1.\n3. Assemble sets of normal network activity N and measured\nattack activity AM for the network under study.\n4. Train a classifier (e.g., RLS, NB) using the training data\nTR  NM  AM  AS. Estimate the class label (innocent or\nmalicious) of any network activity x with the formula: orient(x)  sign(cTx).\nB. Algorithm Evaluation\nWe now examine the performance of Algorithm SDL for the problem of distinguishing legitimate and Spam emails in the Ling-Spam dataset [13], a corpus of 2412 non-Spam emails collected from a linguistics mailing list and 481 Spam emails received by the list. After data cleaning and random subsampling of the non-Spam messages we are left with 468 Spam and 526 non-Spam messages for training and testing purposes; this set of 994 emails will be referred to as the *nominal Spam*\ncorpus. (Note that all email was preprocessed using the *ifile* tool [18].)\nWe considered three scenarios in this study:\n\n1. NB classifier / nominal Spam: for each of ten runs, the\nnominal Spam corpus was randomly divided into equalsized training and testing sets and the class label for each message in the test set was estimated with a trained naive Bayes (NB) algorithm [11];\n2. NB classifier / nominal plus attack Spam: for each of ten\nruns, the nominal Spam corpus was randomly divided into\nequal-sized training and testing sets and the test set was then augmented with 263 additional non-Spam messages (taken from the Ling-Spam dataset) and 234 Spam messages generated via a standard add-word (AW) attack\nmethodology [15]; the class labels for the test messages\nwere estimated with the NB algorithm [11] trained on the nominal Spam training set;\n3. Algorithm SDL / nominal plus attack Spam: for each of\nten runs, the training and test corpora were constructed exactly as in Scenario 2 and the class labels for the test messages were estimated with Algorithm SDL.\nIn generating the AW attacks in Scenarios 2. and 3., we assume that the attacker knows to construct AW Spam to defeat an NB filter but does not have knowledge of the specific filter involved [15]. Analogously, the synthetic AW attacks generated in Scenario 3 (using Step 2 of Algorithm SDL) are computed with no knowledge of the attacker's methodology beyond the mode of attack (i.e., AW).\n\n\nNB Algorithm: Nominal Spam\nNB Algorithm: Nominal Spam\n\n\nclass\\truth       non-Spam       Spam\nclass\\truth       non-Spam       Spam\n\n\nnon-Spam             262                19 Spam                         1               215 non-Spam             262                19 Spam                         1               215\nNB Algorithm: Nominal and Attack Spam\nNB Algorithm: Nominal and Attack Spam\n\n\nclass\\truth       non-Spam       Spam\nclass\\truth       non-Spam       Spam\n\n\nnon-Spam             524               253 Spam                         2               215 non-Spam             524               253 Spam                         2               215\nAlgorithm SDL: Nominal and Attack Spam\nAlgorithm SDL: Nominal and Attack Spam\n\n\nclass\\truth       non-Spam       Spam\nclass\\truth       non-Spam       Spam\n\n\nnon-Spam             524                40\nSpam                         2               428\nnon-Spam             524                40\nSpam                         2               428\nFigure 5. Performance of Algorithm SDL on Spam dataset.\nEach confusion matrix shows number of non-Spam messages classified as non-Spam and Spam (left column) and number of Spam messages classified as non-Spam and\nSpam (right column). The three matrices, from top to bottom, report the results for: NB against nominal Spam, NB against Spam which contains add-word attacks, and Algorithm SDL against Spam which contains add-word attacks.\n\nSample results from this study are displayed in Figure 5. In each case the \"confusion matrix\" [8] reports the (rounded) average performance over the ten runs. It can be seen that, as expected, the NB filter does well against the nominal Spam but poorly against the AW Spam (in fact, the NB filter does not detect a single instance of AW Spam). In contrast, Algorithm SDL performs well against both nominal Spam and AW Spam, achieving ~96 classification accuracy with a low false positive rate. It is emphasized that this result is obtained using only the (synthetic) estimate of AW Spam generated in Step 2 of Algorithm SDL.\n\nThis work was supported by the Laboratory Directed Research and Development Program at Sandia National Laboratories. We thank Chip Willard of the U.S. Department of Defense for numerous helpful discussions on aspects of this research.\n\n## References\n\n[1] Byers, S. and S. Yang, \"Real-time fusion and projection of\nnetwork intrusion activity\", Proc. ISIF/IEEE Intern. Conference on Information Fusion, Cologne, Germany, July 2008.\n[2] Armstrong, R., J. Mayo, and F. Siebenlist, \"Complexity science\nchallenges in cybersecurity\", Sandia National Laboratories\nSAND Report, March 2009.\n[3] Colbaugh, R., \"Does coevolution in malware adaptation enable\npredictive analysis?\", IFA Workshop: Exploring Malware Adaptation Patterns, San Francisco, CA, May 2010.\n[4] Mashevsky, Y., Y. Namestnikov, N. Denishchenko, and P.\nZelensky, \"Method and system for detection and prediction of computer virus-related epidemics\", US Patent 7,743,419, June 2010.\n[5] Bozorgi, M., L. Saul, S. Savage, and G. Voelker, \"Beyond\nheuristics: Learning to classify vulnerabilities and predict exploits\", *Proc. ACM SIGKDD Conference*, Washington DC, July 2010.\n[6] Majumdar, R. and P. Tabuada, Hybrid Systems: Computation\nand Control, LNCS 5469, Springer, Berlin, 2009.\n[7] Colbaugh, R. and K. Glass, \"Proactive defense for evolving\ncyber threats\", Sandia National Laboratories SAND Report, March 2011.\n[8] Hastie, T., R. Tibshirani, and J. Friedman, The Elements of\nStatistical Learning, Second Edition, Springer, New York, 2009.\n[9] Pan, S. and Q. Yang, \"A survey on transfer learning\", IEEE\nTrans. Knowledge and Data Engineering, Vol. 22, pp. 1345- 1359, 2010.\n[10] http://kdd.ics.uci.edu/databases/kddcup99/; accessed Dec. 2010.\n[11] http://www.borgelt.net/bayes.html; accessed July 2010.\n[12] He, J., Y. Liu, and R. Lawrence, \"Graph-based transfer\nlearning\", Proc. 18th ACM Conference on Information and Knowledge Management, Hong Kong, November 2009.\n[13] http://labs-repos.iit.demokritos.gr/skel/i-config/downloads/;\naccessed July 2010.\n[14] Colbaugh, R. and K. Glass, \"Predictive analysis for dynamical\nprocesses I: Multi-scale hybrid system modeling, and II: Predictability and warning analysis\", Proc. 2009 IEEE Intern.\nMulti-Conference on Systems and Control, Saint Petersburg, Russia, July 2009.\n[15] Lowd, D. and C. Meeks, \"Good word attacks on statistical Spam\nfilters\", *Proc. Second Conference on Email and Anti-Spam*, Palo\nAlto, CA, July 2005.\n[16] Cao, L., P. Yu, C. Zhang, H. Zhang, F. Tsai, and K. Chan, \"Blog\ndata mining for cyber security threats\", Data Mining for Business Applications, Springer US, 2009.\n[17] Colbaugh, R. and K. Glass, \"Emerging topic detection for business intelligence via predictive analysis of 'meme' dynamics\", Proc. AAAI 2011 Spring Symposium, Palo Alto, CA, March 2011.\n[18] http://www.nongnu.org/ifile/; accessed July 2010.\n\n## Distribution\n\n 1\nMS0899\nTechnical Library\n9536 (electronic copy) 1\nMS0359\nD. Chavez, LDRD Office\n1911"
    },
    {
        "text": "Design and Development of the U-2\nDesign and Development of the U-2\nUnlimited Horizons Unlimited Horizons Design and Development of the U-2\nUnlimited Horizons\n\n## Library Of Congress Cataloging-In-Publication Data\n\nMerlin, Peter W., 1964 Unlimited horizons : design and development of the U-2 / Peter W. Merlin.\n\n       pages cm. -  (NASA aeronautics book series) Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 978-1-62683-025-7 1.  U-2 (Reconnaissance aircraft)History. 2.  U-2 (Reconnaissance aircraft)Design and construction.  I. Title. UG1242.R4M4675 2015 623.74'67dc23 2014045191\nCopyright  2015 by the National Aeronautics and Space Administration.\n\nThe opinions expressed in this volume are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the official positions of the United States Government or of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration.\n\nThis publication is available as a free download at http://www.nasa.gov/ebooks National Aeronautics and Space Administration Washington, DC\n\n## Table Of Contents\n\n| Introduction: A Cold War Necessity               | v   |\n|--------------------------------------------------|-----|\n| Chapter 1: Designing for High Flight 1           |     |\n| Chapter 2: Aquatone and Oilstone 27              |     |\n| Chapter 3: Design Evolution 53                   |     |\n| Chapter 4: The Stuff Dreams Are Made Of 101      |     |\n| Chapter 5: Life Above 50,000 Feet 129            |     |\n| Chapter 6: Flight Operations and Performance 153 |     |\n| Chapter 7: The NACA and the U-2 167              |     |\n| Chapter 8: NASA and the U-2 179                  |     |\n| Chapter 9: ER-2 Expands NASA Horizons 197        |     |\n|                                                  |     |\n| Conclusions                                      | 209 |\n| Appendix 1: Aircraft Specifications              | 212 |\n| Appendix 2: Production Summary                   | 216 |\n| Appendix 3: U-2 Timeline                         | 238 |\n| Appendix 4: U-2 Space Shuttle Photography        | 240 |\n| Appendix 5: The Skunk Works Method               | 242 |\n| Bibliography                                     | 254 |\n| Acknowledgments                                  | 263 |\n| About the Author                                 | 264 |\n| Index                                            |     |\n\n## Introduction A Cold War Necessity\n\n\"There is a certain feeling of courage and hope when you work in the field of the air. You instinctively look up, not down. You look ahead, not back. You look ahead where the horizons are absolutely unlimited.\"\n- Robert E. Gross, Lockheed Chairman/CEO 19321961\nOn a summer day in 1955, ominous clouds darkened the skies over a remote desert valley in the Western United States, reflecting international tensions between the U.S. and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. In what had become known as the Cold War, the two superpowers vied for supremacy in the wake of World War II, waging a high-stakes game of brinksmanship as each strove to discover the other's strengths and weaknesses through overt and covert means. The next bold step for the U.S. involved a spindly silver airplane, innocuously designated U-2, undergoing preparations for its maiden flight in the skies above central Nevada. Although this event took place without fanfare and in utter obscurity, it heralded the beginning of an aeronautical technology program that spanned more than six decades and showcased innovative aircraft design and manufacturing techniques. Little did anyone realize at the time that what had begun as a tool of Cold War necessity would evolve into a versatile reconnaissance and research aircraft.\n\nThe U-2 program originated with a national requirement, an unsolicited proposal, and studies championed by a panel of notable scientists tasked with advising President Dwight D. Eisenhower on how the Nation might defend itself against the threat of a surprise Soviet nuclear attack. To do this required as much intelligence as possible on Soviet capabilities, but the Russian-dominated USSR was a closed society that was virtually inaccessible to the outside world.1\nBritish Prime Minister Winston Churchill once described Russia as \"a riddle, wrapped in a mystery, inside an enigma.\"2\n\nThe most promising avenue toward solving this riddle was through observation from high above. In a November 1954 memorandum to Allen W. Dulles, director of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), Dr. Edwin Land, founder of the Polaroid Company, advocated for development of a reconnaissance aircraft to be operated by the CIA with Air Force support. The vehicle, already under development by Lockheed Aircraft Company, was described as essentially a powered glider. It would accommodate a single pilot and require a range of 3,000 nautical miles. It would carry a camera capable of resolving objects as small as an individual person. To ensure survivability against Soviet surface-toair missiles, the airplane would need to attain altitudes above 70,000 feet. Such a platform, he suggested, could provide locations of military and industrial installations, allow for a more accurate assessment of the Soviet order of battle, and allow estimates of Soviet ability to produce and deliver nuclear weapons.\n\nLand recognized that the airplane's apparent invulnerability was limited. \"The opportunity for safe overflight may last only a few years,\" he wrote, \"because the Russians will develop radars and interceptors or guided missile defenses for the 70,000-foot region.\"3\nDesigned as a stopgap measure to provide overhead reconnaissance capability during the early years of the Cold War, the versatile U-2 has since evolved to meet changing requirements well into the 21st century. Though many authors have documented the airplane's operational history, few have made more than a cursory examination of its technical aspects or its role as a NASA research platform. This volume includes an overview of the origin and development of the Lockheed U-2 family of aircraft with early National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics (NACA) and National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) involvement, construction and materials challenges faced by designers and builders, releasable performance characteristics and capabilities, use of U-2 and ER-2 airplanes as research platforms, and technical and programmatic lessons learned.\n\nThe Martin RB-57D was based on the B-57 light, twin-engine bomber, but with improved engines and a longer wingspan. (U.S. Air Force)\n\n## Chapter 1 Designing For High Flight\n\nAir Force officials had been pursuing the idea of high-altitude reconnaissance since January 1953, when Bill Lamar and engine specialist Maj. John Seaberg of the Wright Air Development Center (WADC) in Ohio drafted a request for a design study to develop a highly specialized aircraft that would be produced in small numbers. Surprisingly, they recommended bypassing such prominent aircraft manufacturers as Lockheed, Boeing, and Convair and instead focusing on Bell Aircraft Corporation and Fairchild Engine and Airplane Corporation. Their superiors at Air Research and Development Command (ARDC) headquarters agreed that because a relatively small production run was envisioned, these smaller companies would likely give the project a higher priority. In order to provide an interim, near-term option, they also asked officials at the Martin Company to study the possibility of modifying the manufacturer's B-57 light jet bomber with a longer wingspan and improved engines. The three companies were asked to submit results by the end of the year. The study project, dubbed Bald Eagle, called for a subsonic aircraft with an operational radius of 1,500 nautical miles that would be capable of attaining an altitude of 70,000 feet and carrying a single crewmember and a payload of between 100 and 700 pounds. It was to be equipped with available production engines (modified, if necessary) and have as low a gross weight as possible.1\nAll three companies had submitted their respective studies by January 1954.\n\nMartin's modified B-57 (designated Model 294) featured lengthened wings, accommodations for cameras and sensors, and uprated twin engines. Fairchild's M-195 design was powered by a single engine and featured an over-the-fuselage intake and stub-boom mounting for the vertical and horizontal tail surfaces. Bell offered a delicate-looking, lightweight, twin-engine airplane called the Model 67.2\n\n## Martin Model 294\n\nIn order to expedite construction and testing of an interim reconnaissance platform, the Model 294 was built using the standard Martin B-57 light, twin-engine bomber as a starting point. Under project Black Knight, designers at Martin replaced the stock J65-W-5 engines with two 10,000-pound-thrust Pratt & Whitney J57-P-9 turbojets. The airplane's wingspan was extended from 64 feet to 106 feet, expanding the gross wing area to 1,500 square feet. By April 1955, the Model 294 had been officially designated the RB-57D and an initial order for six airframes had been increased to 20. Three versions were built, including the first 13 airframes as a single-seat model equipped with several cameras and additional sensor gear located in a bay behind the pilot's station. Martin also built a single RB-57D-1 capable of carrying the AN/\nAPQ-56 high-resolution, side-looking radar for both daylight and nighttime radar-mapping reconnaissance. The final six airframes, designated RB-57D-2, carried a second crewmember to operate sensors for gathering electronic intelligence (ELINT) and signals intelligence (SIGINT) data.3\nMartin engineers designed an innovative aluminum honeycomb wing structure that was both strong and lightweight. Unfortunately, it proved vulnerable to water seepage and wing stress. An accelerated flight-test program in 1955 and 1956 revealed that the wing spar and some of the skin panels were prone to cracking and needed strengthening. The spar was not designed for long service life of high dynamic loads, and engineers initially estimated the fatigue life of the RB-57D to be fewer than 1,000 flight hours. In fact, several aircraft were retired after their wings separated following landing. Fortunately, no such incident occurred in flight.4\n\n## Fairchild M-195\n\nDuring the General Configuration Study, designers at Fairchild initially considered a wide variety of possible configurations, from subsonic turboprop-powered airplanes with high-aspect-ratio wings to supersonic rocket and ramjet-powered vehicles. The supersonic configurations were quickly eliminated due to the projected length of time required for design and development. In a preliminary analysis, Fairchild engineers narrowed wing loading to between 10 and 30 pounds per square foot, and they studied configurations powered by two J57, J67, or J73 engines. This resulted in designs with straight, high-aspect-ratio wings and an operational ceiling between 65,000 and 67,200 feet.5\nTaking into consideration overall structural weight versus aerodynamic gains, the design team ultimately chose a single-engine, J57-powered configuration. It was to be constructed from aluminum using conventional methods and as many off-the-shelf components as possible for use with internal electrical and environmental control systems. The M-195 featured a pressurized cockpit equipped with an ejection seat. A sensor bay was designed to accommodate two 36-inch equivalent-focal-length (EFL) oblique cameras and two 6-inch EFL oblique cameras. The two main landing gear wheels retracted into the wing roots in typical fashion, but instead of a nose wheel, the airplane was equipped with a steerable tail wheel. The wings, set low on the fuselage, were equipped with a gust relief system to elevate the flaps and ailerons when necessary. The powerplant installation was highly unconventional for the time, incorporating a dorsal inlet just behind and above the cockpit. This arrangement minimized intake and exhaust duct lengths to maximize use of available thrust, and at the same time, it permitted short pressurization ducts to the cockpit and sensor bay, reducing weight and improving efficiency.6\nWeight remained a critical factor. Fairchild engineers estimated the empty weight of the airframe, including payload and powerplant, to be 10,943 pounds. Including crew, fuel, and lubricants, the total gross takeoff weight was approximately 19,000 pounds. This would allow the M-195 to follow a mission profile that called for initial ascent to 61,100 feet at 150 knots indicated airspeed over a distance of 139 miles. The pilot would then climb to an operational cruising altitude of 65,000 feet over a distance of 161 miles. After leveling off and setting a cruise speed of 390 knots true airspeed, the airplane would have a range of 1,200 miles to its target. The return trip would be at cruising altitude, followed by a spiraling descent as close to home base as desired. The landing weight was projected to be approximately 12,106 pounds.7\n\n## Bell Model 67\n\nThe third entry in the design study was Bell's Model 67, which eventually came to be known as the X-16. Though the Martin RB-57D offered a rapid, low-risk response to the need for high-altitude reconnaissance, it was only intended to fill the gap until a more capable new design could be fielded. Fairchild's M-195 met the proposed requirements, but it was neither as capable as Bell's entry nor less risky than the RB-57D. The X-16 soon emerged as the leader of the pack.\n\nFollowing official approval by the Air Force in May 1954 and the signing of a contract in September, Bell prepared to complete a prototype within 18 months, followed by production of 27 additional airframes. Led by the company's chief project engineer, Richard Smith, the Bell team designed the X-16 to cruise at 70,000 feet with an unrefueled range of 3,300 miles. A payload of two 12-inch EFL cameras or two 36-inch EFL cameras would permit photography of everything along a flight path 50 miles wide and up to 795 miles long. The extremely lightweight airframe featured high-aspect-ratio wings and was powered by two Pratt & Whitney J57-P-31 turbojet engines modified for enhanced performance at high altitudes. To reduce weight, the airplane had a centerline bicycle landing gear configuration with outrigger wheels to provide balance on takeoff and landing. Weight restrictions necessary to support altitude and range requirements further resulted in an extremely flexible airframe. This meant that the X-16 had an extremely low structural-dynamic envelope that was rated between +3 g's and 1 g during maneuvering flight. Due to structural flexibility, engineers predicted that the wingsspanning nearly 115 feetwould suffer aeroelastic divergence as they reached critical Mach number.8 The designers attempted to mitigate this concern by giving the wings a quarter-chord sweep angle of 15 degrees and moving the ailerons inboard from the wingtips. The pressurized cockpit was equipped with standard instruments, an ejection seat, a periscopic sextant for navigation, a control stick like in a fighter plane, and all necessary equipment for operating the reconnaissance systems. Empty weight was expected to be 23,330 pounds, with a gross takeoff weight of 36,200 pounds fully fueled.9\nConstruction of the X-16 prototype progressed smoothly for the first 12\nmonths, but events in Washington, DC, and Burbank, CA, were about to have a profound effect on the airplane's future and that of Bell. First, CIA officials had learned of the Air Force study and argued that clandestine reconnaissance over denied territory should be a function of a civilian intelligence agency rather than of a military service. Second, Lockheed chief designer Clarence L. \"Kelly\" Johnson had also learned of the project and decided to submit an unsolicited proposal of his own.10\n\n## Lockheed Cl-282\n\nShortly after Lamar and Seaberg drafted their request, someone at the Pentagon informed Johnson of the Air Force study and Lockheed's exclusion from it. He managed to get a copy of the program requirements and quickly developed a concept for an airplane capable of attaining a maximum altitude of 73,000 feet with an operating radius of 1,400 miles from the beginning of a cruise climb starting at about 65,000 feet. Gross takeoff weight was to be just 13,768 pounds, including a 600-pound camera payload. To reduce weight, the airplane would have no undercarriage, taking off from a ground cart and landing on a skid attached to the lower fuselage. In December 1953, Johnson assigned engineers Phil Coleman and Gene Frost to develop procedures for lightening the airframe and increasing its wing area for maximum altitude capability.11\nThey were soon joined by Henry Combs, a talented structural engineer and accomplished sailplane pilot.12\nJohnson's new design, called the CL-282, was based on his XF-104 fighter interceptor. Although the fighter was optimized for high-speed flight in the Mach 2 range, Johnson realized that he could save time and expense by maximizing use of the original XF-104 design and manufacturing experience. He simply eliminated all unnecessary requirements such as fighter load factor, armament, and landing gear, while retaining the general fuselage and tail configuration. Johnson completely redesigned the wings and shortened the fuselage, but this resulted in only minor local changes to the loft lines, and it was possible to reuse all of the basic XF-104 tooling jigs as well as most of the detail jigs.13\nThe greatest challenge was reducing overall structural weight in order to allow the airplane to perform the desired mission while carrying a 600-pound, non-jettisonable payload. Structurally, the CL-282 fuselage was virtually identical to that of the XF-104 except for the deletion of a 62-inch section of the fuselage behind the cockpit. Since the CL-282 was designed for a maneuvering load factor of 2.5 g's as compared to 7.33 g's on the XF-104, fuselage strength requirements were reduced, allowing for reduced material gauges (i.e., aircraft\n\ndesigner's personal diary of activities during design and development of the U-2. All information is from the author's copy, retyped from a copy in the Chris Pocock collection.\n12. Pocock, *50 Years of the U-2*, pp. 1112.\n13. Jay Miller, *Lockheed Skunk Works: The First Fifty Years* (Arlington, TX: Aerofax, 1993), p. 213.\nAppendix I of Miller's book contains the entire text of Kelly Johnson's \"CL-282 High Altitude Aircraft,\" Lockheed Report LR-9732, 1954.\nskin and structural members could be manufactured from thinner aluminum stock). Shortening the fuselage eliminated 3,990 pounds of fuel weight and, along with the removal of armament, necessitated moving the engine forward 562 inches to compensate for the change in the center of gravity. With the powerplant located in line with the wings (which also contained the fuel load), the 1-g bending moments of the fuselage were well below those of the XF-104, and tail loads were reduced. Elimination of landing gear bays also made it easier to shift the engine forward, but it was necessary to alter the shape and position of the inlet ducts to accommodate the change in engine position and improve airflow efficiency at lower airspeeds. The forward bulkhead of a 75-gallon sump tank between the inlet ducts also served to transfer fuselage shear loading to the outside contour of the duct assemblies. Basic fuselage joints, including those for mating the wings and tail, remained the same as on the XF-104, and the CL-282 retained the fighter's T-tail empennage configuration. The speed brakes were also retained. In place of landing gear, the airplane was equipped with an abrasion-resistant scuff strip approximately 15 inches wide and extending the full length of the bottom of the fuselage.\n\nIn the forward fuselage, the crew accommodations were radically revised.\n\nThe original XF-104 cockpit included a downward ejection seat that, in the event of an emergency, could be jettisoned through an escape hatch. Because bailout velocities were expected to be low for the CL-282, the ejection seat and escape hatch were eliminated altogether and replaced with a simple bucket seat. This meant that the pilot would have to open the hinged canopy and climb out. The cockpit was pressurized to provide an equivalent pressure altitude of 25,000 feet when the airplane was operating above 70,000 feet.\n\nPressurization was supplied by bleed air from the engine. Since a cockpit altitude of 25,000 feet necessitated the pilot's use of a pressure-demand oxygen system throughout the flight, the pilot was equipped with a partial-pressure suit and a 7-hour supply of oxygen.14\nJohnson conducted a limited study of wing configurations in search of the optimum planform. While considering the airplane's overall weight and balance characteristics, he sought to determine the minimum area and aspect ratio necessary for achieving a maximum altitude of 75,000 feet. The result was a configuration featuring thin, straight, high-aspect-ratio wings spanning\n70 feet, with a total area of 500 square feet. Unlike in most conventional designs, the wings lacked a carry-through structure and were simply bolted onto the fuselage ring frames. This limited the airplane's maneuver load factor considerably, but Johnson included an innovative span-load distribution control system. When flying at higher speeds or in turbulent conditions at altitudes up to 35,000 feet, the wing control surfaces could be raised (4 degrees for flaps and 10 degrees for ailerons) to reduce bending moments and tail loads by moving the wing's center of pressure inboard. Otherwise, the wing was of a conventional two-cell construction with the beam located at approximately 48 percent of chord. It was designed to resist bending moment in each surface by way of spanwise stringers originating at the main fuselage frame joints. A structural rib in the wing root distributed wing torsion to the fuselage frames. The wings also contained nylon bladder fuel tanks with internal ties to prevent deformation of the airfoil with changes in vapor pressure. Small, replaceable wingtip skids provided protection for the ends of the wings, and the ailerons, during landing.\n\nThree engine candidates were considered in lieu of the stock General Electric J79 turbojet. The General Electric J73-X-52 weighed 3,150 pounds and produced 8,920 pounds of thrust at sea level, with a specific fuel consumption (pounds per hour/pounds of thrust) of 0.917. At 75,000 feet and Mach 0.75, it would have provided 398 pounds of thrust and a specific fuel consumption of 1.377, giving the airplane a maximum speed of 495 knots at cruise altitude. The Rolls Royce Avon RA.14 weighed 2,897 pounds and produced 9,500 pounds of thrust at sea level, with a specific fuel consumption of 0.840. At maximum cruise conditions, it would have provided 385 pounds of thrust and a specific fuel consumption of 1.372. Finally, the Wright TJ3B1 weighed 2,720 pounds and produced 7,800 pounds of thrust at sea level, with a specific fuel consumption of 0.880. At cruise, it would have provided 339 pounds of thrust and a specific fuel consumption of 1.340. Although the Rolls Royce engine demonstrated superior performance on the basis of sea level static ratings, Johnson selected the J73-X-52 because of its superior performance at altitude and ease of adaptation to the XF-104 fuselage.15\nJohnson submitted his CL-282 design study to Col. Bernard Schriever at the Pentagon in March 1954. Schriever expressed great interest and requested a more specific proposal. A month later Johnson met with senior Pentagon officials, including several Air Force generals who were not particularly enthusiastic. ARDC Commander Lt. Gen. Donald Putt and his staff had completed an evaluation of industry studies that had been generated by the Bald Eagle project, and they agreed with Maj. Seaberg's recommendation that the proposed airplane be equipped with two engines. The CL-282 had only one, as did the Fairchild M-195. Shortly after the April meeting, Martin was given immediate approval to proceed with the RB-57D. In early June 1954, despite lobbying by advocates within the Air Force Development and Advanced Planning office, Air Force Headquarters rejected the Lockheed proposal because it was too unconventional and had only a single engine, and they were already committed to the Martin program.16\nAll was not lost, however. Trevor Gardner, assistant secretary of the Air Force for Research and Development, had been most impressed with Johnson's CL-282 presentation. In May 1954, Gardener and two colleagues briefed leading CIA intelligence analyst Philip Strong on the CL-282 and the Bald Eagle designs. They asked him if the CIA might be interested in the CL-282 even if the Air Force was not. Strong subsequently discussed the idea with members of the Intelligence Systems Panel of the Air Force Scientific Advisory Board, some of whom thought the RB-57D was too heavy and that a lighter, singleengine design might be better suited to the proposed mission. With Cold War tensions high, the Eisenhower administration commissioned a panel of top-level experts to study the Soviet threat. The intelligence subpanel chaired by Edwin Land included Jim Baker of Harvard University Observatory and physics Nobel Laureate Ed Purcell from Harvard. Strong briefed the Land Panel on the CL-282 and soon found allies.17\n\nIn September, Bell Aircraft received a contract to build the X-16. During a visit to the Bell plant, Baker and Allen Donovan from Cornell Aeronautical Laboratory were not impressed. Donovan felt that, by comparison, the Lockheed design offered the same or better overall performance at almost onethird the gross weight. Meanwhile, Land lobbied aggressively for the CL-282 while encouraging innovative ideas for reducing payload weight. Every extra pound meant 2 feet of altitude lost.18\nDonovan briefed members of the Intelligence Systems Panel on the merits of the CL-282 and defined three requirements for a high-altitude spy plane: a single engine, a sailplane-type wing, and low structural load factors. Air Force proponents of the X-16 had argued that a second engine would allow the pilot to keep the plane aloft in the event of a single engine failure, but Donovan argued that it could only do so at an altitude that made it vulnerable to hostile ground fire. Single-engine aircraft were both lighter and historically more reliable than multi-engine aircraft. Stressing the absolute need to fly above 70,000 feet in order to avoid intercept, he noted that in the thin upper atmosphere, the power curve of a jet engine would fall off to about 6 percent of its sea-level thrust. The solution, he said, was to incorporate a high-aspect-ratio, low-induced-drag wing of the type used on sailplanes. Finally, he added that low structural load factors would reduce the airplane's overall gross weight. Donovan explained that aircraft built to military standards were engineered for combat maneuvers. Strengthening wings and other structures to withstand high speeds and sharp turns would add extra weight to the airframe and would be unnecessary considering the proposed mission profile. In short, a successful design required a delicate balance of thrust, lift, and weight. The Air Force study had resulted in designs that were altogether too conventional to meet the necessary requirements. The only viable candidate, Donovan insisted, was Lockheed's CL-282.19\nDonovan's arguments won support for the CL-282, but that did not generate funds for Lockheed to pursue the concept. The Air Force was already committed to the Martin and Bell programs, so funding for Lockheed had to come from another source. The Land Panel offered a solution.20\nLand and Gardner met with CIA Director Allen Dulles in late October in an effort to convince him that not only was it imperative that the CL-282 be built, but that its development and operation should not be entrusted to the Air Force. Dulles was initially skeptical that the agency should involve itself with such a major technical development effort, but Land insisted that the CIA had a right to pioneer scientific techniques for intelligence collection. Further, he emphasized that the civilian agency would be better suited to conducting covert reconnaissance missions. Land noted the urgency of proceeding swiftly, since \"the opportunity for safe overflight may last only a few years, because the Russians will develop radars and interceptors or guided missile defenses for the 70,000-foot region.\"21\nNext, Land and Presidential science advisor James Killian met with President Eisenhower. Despite knowing of the Air Force commitments, the president approved development of the CL-282. Eisenhower agreed that the new reconnaissance program should be controlled by the CIA and stipulated that it should be handled in an unconventional way so as to avoid bureaucratic entanglements and interservice rivalries. The strong advocacy of Killian and the distinguished scientists of the various advisory committees, combined with Eisenhower's support, ultimately won over Dulles, but some Air Force officials feared the decision to build the CL-282 put both the RB-57 and X-16 in jeopardy. The Air Force had already rejected Lockheed's design because of its single engine and because the X-16 offered a more conventional configuration as well as a more versatile platform that could be used in multiple military roles. Following additional discussions with Allen Donovan, Gen. Putt met with 15 scientists from the Technological Capabilities Panel and Maj. Seaberg from WADC, who briefed the group on all four aircraft proposals. Comparing their capabilities, Seaberg noted that the Bell, Fairchild, and Lockheed designs were comparable aerodynamically and that Martin's modified airframe was somewhat less capable overall. He stated that in his opinion, the CL-282's General Electric J73 engine would be insufficient for attaining the necessary altitude. Replacing the J73 with the Pratt & Whitney J57, however, would make the CL-282 competitive with both the Bell and Fairchild entries. One significant advantage of Lockheed's design was that Kelly Johnson had promised that his airplane would be flying by August 1955. Bell was not expected to deliver the first X-16 until the spring of 1956. Ultimately, Johnson was authorized to go ahead with the CL-282, but the Air Force did not abandon the X-16 until Lockheed's airplane completed its first flight.22\n\n## Building The Team\n\nOn November 26, 1954, Allen Dulles assigned his special assistant, Richard Bissell, to take charge of the CL-282 development effort, which was designated Project Aquatone. Among Bissell's first tasks were arranging for money from the CIA's Contingency Reserve Fund to get the project started and finding ways to divert Air Force materiel to the program. Because security was paramount, he made the Aquatone project staff self-sufficient with its own contract management, administrative, financial, logistical, communications, and security personnel. Col. Osmond J. Ritland was assigned as Air Force liaison to the project and worked closely with Bissell. With Ritland's help, a number of J57 engines procured by the Air Force for use in the B-52, KC-135, F-100, and RB-57 were diverted for use in the CL-282 in order to prevent a separate contract with Pratt & Whitney from jeopardizing program security.23 Kelly Johnson had promised Bissell that he could deliver the first airplane in just 8 months, but he had also been pressured into making significant design changes. The final configuration had been scaled up from the original CL-282 and now included landing gear. The sharply pointed XF-104 nose had been blunted and the XF-104's T-tail replaced with a more conventional arrangement. The new design eventually received a deceptive designation identifying it as a utility aircraft: U-2.24\nIn early December, Johnson began assembling a team of engineers and manufacturing personnel. He assigned Dick Boehme to assist him as project engineer and supervisor, and together they selected two dozen engineers for specialized design work. The task was made more difficult because they had to pull these workers from other Lockheed projects without being able to tell their former supervisors why.25 Each worker was selected for a particular specialty. Chan Engelbry worked out the aerodynamics while Carl Allmon and Alvin Jensen drafted the airplane's loft lines. Henry Combs, Ray McHenry, and Richard Hruda were tasked with calculating stress, and Lorne Cass calculated loads. Bob Wiele, Bill Bissell, Robert Kelly, and Royal Dow designed the wing structure. Two men were assigned to design the tail assembly, Herb Nystrom (vertical stabilizer) and Rod Kreimendahl (horizontal stabilizer). Ed Baldwin, Leroy English, Jack Painter, and Ray Kirkham designed various parts of the fuselage with additional help from Dave Robertson, who also developed the fuel system. Dan Zuck designed the cockpit. Cornelius Gardner designed the airplane's unique landing gear. The systems group included Vern Bremberg (hydraulics), Cliff Rockel and Sam Murphy (electrical), Vic Sorenson and George Ellison (controls), Ed Martin (reconnaissance systems), Doug Cone (air conditioning), and Elmer Gath (propulsion). Pete Gurin, John Henning, and Richard Lutz performed static testing. Leon Gavette designed various ground handling equipment, and Bob Charlton wrote the first technical manuals. Art Vierick was in charge of the manufacturing group, which included assembly foreman John Wanamaker, Bob Hunter, Charles Van Der Zee, and Tommy McCoy.26 Johnson's team initially toiled 45 hours per week, but even after the staff grew to more than 80 people, work increased to 65 hours per week.27\nDue to the need for extreme secrecy, the original U-2 manufacturing team worked within Lockheed's Advanced Development Projects division, informally known as the Skunk Works.28 This elite organization had been established during World War II to develop the P-80 Shooting Star, one of the Nation's first jet aircraft, and eventually served as the company's rapid prototyping and development unit. Its early success was due in large part to Kelly Johnson's insistence that his engineers and draftsmen be located not more than 50 feet from the assembly floor. Construction difficulties and other problems could then be immediately brought to the attention of the appropriate design or manufacturing personnel. Paperwork was kept to a minimum, with no emphasis on neatly typed memorandums. In order to keep the project moving quickly, engineers simply made pencil notations directly on their original drawings. As a result,\n\n26. Henry G. Combs, \"U-2 Design and Fabrication,\" in *Proceedings of the U-2 Development Panel*,\nthe U-2 History Symposium, National Defense University, Fort McNair, DC, September 1998, pp. 35.\n27. Pedlow and Welzenbach, *The CIA and the U-2 Program*, p. 43.\n28. The Skunk Works was named after the Kickapoo Joy Juice factory known as the Skonk Works in\nAl Capp's *Lil' Abner* cartoon strip. The nickname, coined by Lockheed engineer Irv Culver, was\naltered slightly to avoid copyright infringement.\nKelly Johnson, center, believed that managers, engineers, and shop personnel should interact as closely as possible in order to solve problems quickly. (Lockheed Martin)\nManufacturing crews assemble U-2 components. For security reasons, staffing was kept to a minimum. (Lockheed Martin)\nproblems could be resolved in a matter of hours rather than days or weeks.29\nThis management technique was ideally suited to the U-2 design effort and became a hallmark of Lockheed's future programs.\n\nPerformance and payload were the driving factors behind the U-2 design.\n\nTo ensure that the airplane would meet required specifications, for example, Al Robinson had to address challenges of reducing airframe and equipment weight. The U-2 configuration's higher gross weight compared to that of the original CL-282 threatened altitude performance. Lamenting this problem, Johnson once told his engineering staff that he would trade his grandmother for a 10-pound weight reduction. Subsequently, Robinson and the other engineers started referring to pounds as \"grandmothers,\" as they struggled to eliminate unnecessary weight from the airframe and systems.30 The desired gross weight needed to be 1.5 times the weight of the powerplant. Ultimately, even with the addition of a drag chute for landing, a 300 percent increase in the oxygen supply capacity, improved brakes, and an autopilot, the final gross takeoff weight was within 10 pounds of the original proposal.31\nHenry Combs was impressed by the skill and efficiency demonstrated by various team members. To keep things moving, estimates were used when firm data were unavailable. As soon as more accurate data became available, work based on the estimates was modified as necessary. Staffing was kept to the absolute minimum necessary to accomplish any given task, and workers were allowed to do their jobs with as little interference as possible. Combs also admired the supervisory skills of Johnson's \"backup genius,\" Dick Boehme, noting that his \"engineering judgment was excellent and his ability to keep everyone in harmony with Kelly was extremely important.\"32\n\n## Building The Plane\n\nHaving promised delivery of 20 flyable airframes to the CIA at a cost of $22.5 million, Johnson next addressed challenges posed by the need for secrecy and the logistics involved in constructing the revolutionary airplane. Program security was ensured through various means. First, the original U-2 manufacturing\n\nInternationale collection.\n32. Combs, \"U-2 Design and Fabrication,\" pp. 35.\nand development team was segregated in a remote corner of the Lockheed plant in Burbank, CA. Production facilities there were limited, so when the Air Force ordered 25 airframes, a second manufacturing plant was established at Oildale, near Bakersfield. Security constraints meant that normal subcontracting procedures were virtually impossible. Procurement of materials involved using sterilized drawings (with certain information redacted) and purchase orders; deliveries were routed to various inconspicuous locations.33 Financing was handled under a special account separate from normal Lockheed channels. Dummy company names were established for use when dealing with outside vendors. Depending on what was being purchased, vendors might sign a contract with C&J Manufacturing Company (using Kelly Johnson's initials), J.E. Ramsey Company (named for Lockheed's purchasing manager), or B.V. Ward (named for Dick Boehme, Art Vierick, and George Welty). Only a senior executive from each vendor had been briefed to know the real identity of the customer. Specially cleared drivers picked up items from vendors using unmarked trucks, delivering them to Burbank or Oildale. Correspondence was handled through a post office box outside of Burbank, and all communications with the customer took place via secure comlink.34\nApproximately 87 percent of each airframe built in Burbank was fabricated within a single building. Metal components were fed through the company's main presses at night and on Sundays, then hidden from day-shift workers not cleared into the program. At peak production of the first 50 airframes, only 600 people were involved at both the Burbank and Oildale plants.35 The designers and builders employed unorthodox methods with regard to engineering drawings and procedures. Typical company standards were abandonedsometimes resulting in oversize drawings more than 20 feet longand military specifications (Mil-Spec) served only as a design guide, but were not strictly followed. If a part had to be sent to an outside machine shop, accompanying drawings were sanitized of any information revealing the airplane's configuration. Personnel had access only to the minimum knowledge necessary to do their jobs. At the lowest level, vendor employees knew only that they were building an airplane, but they knew nothing about its configuration or mission. The midlevel included those who assembled partial or complete airframes and saw them loaded aboard cargo planes bound for unknown destinations. At the highest access level, there were only a few people who knew the identity of the customer, the test location, operational capabilities, and the overall mission. Workers were briefed to tell no one, not even family members, what they were doing. At Johnson's direction, no paperwork or blueprints were ever marked SECRET lest the label call attention to the documents in the event they fell into the hands of unauthorized persons. According to one former worker, \"Kelly said that marking a document Top Secret was telling the enemy exactly what was most important to steal. Documents and drawings had no company or security markings. Everything was done within physically secured areas. We never talked about the program away from work.\"36\nEvery morning, Johnson met with each member of his team to discuss any problems from the previous day and take any necessary corrective action.37 In order to streamline manufacturing operations, there was no formal configuration control board. Engineering drawings were released directly to assembly or functional system supervisors who were responsible for planning any necessary\n34. Ray Passon, \"The Early Days of the U-2: How They Did It,\" *Star Dusters Newsletter*, September\n\n2003, p. 9.\n35. Downie and Jarboe, *The Inquisitive Angel*.\n36. Passon, \"The Early Days of the U-2: How They Did It,\" pp. 910.\n37. Downie and Jarboe, *The Inquisitive Angel*.\nwork and making a bill of material (a list of raw materials, subassemblies, intermediate assemblies, subcomponents, parts, and quantities of each needed to manufacture an end product). Each supervisor followed the design process from the beginning and maintained close contact with designers, thus ensuring that each component or assembly could be produced in volume (known as a producibility function) and providing greater opportunity to review or check engineering drawings before final release. As a result of schedule pressure and philosophical differences, engineering and manufacturing personnel often engaged in heated discussions, but always with mutual respect. Tooling and assembly supervisors coordinated an informal system for tool design. Throughout the manufacturing process, mockup and development mechanics were responsible for fabricating parts as well as assembling them. One noted that, \"Some may say that this can only work for a prototype or small number of aircraft, but this was successful for production of more than 50 of the original U-2s.\"38\nJohnson's U-2 design, finalized by January 1955, was a model of simplicity and innovation. The airframe was constructed primarily of aluminum alloys machined to the thinnest gauges allowable within structural strength requirements. Skin thickness varied from just 0.020 to 0.063 of an inch. Structural stiffening consisted of the fewest possible number of ribs, stringers, and doubler plates. All skin panels were flush riveted and the control surfaces aerodynamically balanced, with virtually no gaps at any of the hinge points. All aerodynamic control surfaces were cable operated. To further reduce weight, the hydraulic system was simplified and none of the primary flight controls were hydromechanically boosted. Johnson spent 2 days designing lightweight landing gear consisting of a bicycle arrangement with a double-wheel main gear and a small tail wheel, both mounted along the centerline.39 The landing gear assembly weighed just\n257 pounds. By comparison, conventional tricycle gear on a comparable aircraft would typically weigh about 750 pounds and occupy valuable space inside the wings that, on the U-2, was used to increase fuel capacity. This careful engineering of weight and space considerations resulted in an extra 1,500 feet of altitude capability and an additional 100 miles of cruising radius.40 To maintain lateral balance during takeoff, the wingtips were equipped with mid-span outriggers, or pogossmall rubber wheels on the ends of curved steel legs that dropped away as soon as the plane became airborne. Skid plates on the wingtips protected the airfoils during landing.\n\nThe single J57 engine received air through a bifurcated inlet system. With the engine located at midwing chord for balance, the main gear well had to be placed between the air intake ducts, which was further forward than desirable. Engineers faced a challenge in designing the ducts because at cruise altitude the engine needed near perfect ram-air distribution in order to function. After trying a variety of options, the final duct configuration provided airflow comparable to that of a ground-based engine test cell.41\nTo expedite flight testing, early U-2 flights were made with a 10,500-poundthrust J57-P-37 engine designed for use in the B-52. Pratt & Whitney engineers spent 12 months developing the 11,500-pound-thrust J57-P-31 specifically for the U-2 in an accelerated program that normally would have taken up to\n3 years. The new engine had a 16-stage compressor and operated at full power for the duration of flight. Fuel consumption was 9,000 pounds per hour at sea level, dropping to 700 pounds per hour at 70,000 feet cruising altitude. The J57-P-31 was designed to operate at up to nearly 74,600 feet before succumbing to oxygen starvation. With the earlier J57-P-37, the U-2 sometimes experienced as many as six flameouts at cruise altitude in a single flight. Louis Setter, one of the first U-2 instructor pilots, recalled that, \"There were literally hundreds of high-altitude flameouts with the P-37 engine during early test and pilot training flights, but nearly all of these culminated in successful airstarts.\"\nSetter also observed that on one memorable day, \"I had two students coming in with flameouts and one Lockheed test pilot still at altitude with a flameout, all at the same time.\"42\nWith the improved fuel system and turbine design of the J57-P-31, the flameout problem virtually ceased. An improved ignition system also allowed for restart at high altitude, eliminating the need to descend to a lower altitude, where the U-2 would be vulnerable to hostile fire. Even with the J57-P-37, there were only two forced landings due to engine failure in the first 20 months (more than 5,000 flight hours) of U-2 operations.43\nThe fuselage interior was plain and uncluttered. A pressurized compartment just forward of the main gear, known as the Q-bay, contained reconnaissance equipment. Ed Martin devised a system for installing and removing payloads using pallets mounted on interchangeable hatches that fitted flush to the bottom of the Q-bay. A second hatch on top of the Q-bay allowed access for maintenance and installation/removal activities. With the Q-bay consisting largely of empty space, only the mid-fuselage spar supported the cockpit and nose section. The small, cramped crew station looked like a fighter cockpita holdover from the XF-104/CL-282 designbut featured a control yoke of the type used in bombers and transports. Cables and pulleys linked the yoke to the ailerons, and a similar arrangement connected the rudder to two pedals. The instrument panel contained an assortment of conventional dials and switches, but it was dominated in the center by a hooded driftsighta downward-looking periscope that allowed the pilot to see beneath the aircraft.44 Designed by James Baker and built by Walter Baird of Baird Associates, this optical system served as a navigational aid, enabling pilots to spot and recognize landmarks on the ground.45 By turning a knob on the instrument panel, the pilot could flip a mirror and convert the periscope to a sextant, viewing the sky through a small glass hemisphere on the airplane's nose, just ahead of the cockpit. Celestial navigation was routinely used by U-2 pilots and was quite accurate at high altitudes, as long as the autopilot was operational.46 The lightweight canopy\n(stressed to handle a pressure differential of 5 pounds per square inch [psi]) was hinged on the left side and operated manually. There was no ejection seat or canopy jettison system. In the event of emergency, the pilot was expected to manually unlatch the canopy and bail out. The airplane's empennage was built as a single unit that included the aft fuselage, vertical tail with rudder, and two horizontal stabilizers. For ease of assembly, the entire setup was joined to the forward fuselage using just three 5/8-inch tension bolts.47\nWhen Johnson calculated new specifications for the wings, including a\n2.5-g load limit and an aspect ratio of 10.67, it resulted in a wingspan of 80\nfeet and a total area of 600 square feet, a 20-percent increase over the original CL-282 specifications. The new wing featured three-spar construction and retained Johnson's gust control feature, but Bob Wiele replaced conventional rib stiffeners with an unusual latticework of aluminum tubing. The gust control system, which allowed the flaps to tilt upward 4 degrees and the ailerons to tilt 10 degrees, was designed to reduce tail loads and wing bending in turbulent conditions by completely changing the airfoil characteristics.48 The long, thin wings were among the most efficient in the world, with a lift-to-drag ratio of 25.6:1, better than many competition sailplanes. From an altitude of 70,000 feet, the U-2 could glide approximately 300 miles.49\nFour integral fuel tankstwo leak-proof compartments in each wing\ncarried a total of 1,335 gallons, which fed into a fuselage sump tank before reaching the engine. The outer 6 feet of wing was not used for fuel storage. In 1957, the U-2 was equipped with two 100-gallon slipper tanks that could be installed on the wings when a mission called for additional range capability. Weight and balance during flight were among the most important considerations when designing the fuel system. A complex system of feed lines and valves enabled the pilot to transfer fuel to maintain aircraft trim as fuel was consumed. Unfortunately, this made it impossible to provide the pilot with a standard full-to-empty type of quantity gauge in the cockpit. Instead, the first 49 U-2 aircraft came equipped with a mechanical fuel totalizer/counter. Prior to engine start, counters were set to indicate the amount of fuel in each wing, and a flow meter then subtracted the actual number of gallons of fuel consumed during the flight. A warning light came on when the quantity was down to 50 gallons in the sump tank. As standard practice, the pilot maintained a plot of fuel and oxygen remaining versus elapsed time.50\nProper fuel was also critical. Ordinary jet fuel, JP-4, had such a low vapor pressure that it would boil off during operation at high altitudes. Fortunately, help came from retired Air Force Lt. Gen. Jimmy Doolittle, a vice president of Shell Oil Company and also a member of the Technological Capabilities Panel. Thanks to Doolittle's intervention, Shell set to work to develop a low-volatility, low-vapor-pressure, kerosene-based fuel that met specifications.51 The result, known variously as LF-1A and as JP-TS, was a broad mixture of aliphatic and aromatic hydrocarbon compounds with an initial boiling point of 315 degrees Fahrenheit (F) at sea level and a freezing point of 164 F.52 Production of LF-1A had an unintended consequence to U.S.\n\nconsumers in the spring and summer of 1955. Manufacturing the special fuel required the use of petroleum products that Shell normally used to make the company's Flit insect repellent spray. In order to supply the U-2 program with several hundred thousand gallons of LF-1A, Shell had to limit production of Flit, causing a nationwide shortage.53\nThe tendency of liquids to boil at high altitudes also had a significant effect on the design of life-support systems for the U-2. Fluids in the human body will vaporize at altitudes above 63,000 feet unless the body is kept under pressure. Without special life-support garments, reduced atmospheric pressure at typical cruise altitudes also threatened to place considerable stress on the pilot's cardiovascular system and prevent adequate oxygenation of the blood. During cruise, the U-2 cockpit was pressurized to the equivalent of 28,000 feet above sea level. Since symptoms of hypoxia can be experienced when as low as 12,000 feet, the pilot was required to wear a partial-pressure suit (i.e., a garment that only pressurizes certain critical parts of the body) that provided oxygen to the helmet at all times and inflated if cockpit pressure altitude increased to above 28,000 feet.54\nBy the third week of May 1955, the fuselage assembly was out of the jigs, but the wings were way behind schedule. Johnson was worried about instability due to bending, and Bob Kelly had not yet completed his design for the ailerons. In an effort to make up for lost time, Johnson drove his people harder than ever and had shifts working round the clock. By early June, the static test article was complete. Stress analysis of the fuselage, landing gear, and wings indicated that predicted critical load limits were fairly accurate. The horizontal tail required strengthening, but otherwise Johnson's design had passed the first test. In July, after the wings were completed and installed, Johnson spent 3 days inspecting the prototype, which was known simply as Article 341.55 Workers then removed the wings and tail, carefully packed the various components, and loaded them into a C-124 transport.56 The Article was nearly ready to fly.\n\nAfter being completely reassembled, Article 341 was ready for testing. (Lockheed Martin)\n\n## Chapter 2 Aquatone And Oilstone\n\nWhile the airplane was being built, key personnel sought to establish a secure test site. In April 1955, Lockheed test pilot Tony LeVier flew Johnson, Richard Bissell, and Ritland to a dry lakebed adjacent to the Atomic Energy Commission's (AEC) proving ground north of Las Vegas, NV. With its remote location, excellent year-round flying weather, and the fact that the airspace overhead was already governed by AEC security restrictions, it was ideally suited to the U-2 project. Upon returning to Washington, Bissell and Ritland took immediate steps to have the lakebed and its environs added to the proving ground. Johnson drew up a plan for a small, temporary facility with a 5,000- foot asphalt runway, a control tower, three hangars, an aircraft parking apron, miscellaneous support facilities, and rudimentary personnel accommodations. Construction of what became known as Watertown Airstrip began the following month and, shortly thereafter, Lockheed, CIA, and Air Force personnel began moving in. Arrangements were made to acquire a C-47 transport and two T-33 jet trainers as support aircraft.1\nEarly development and operation of the U-2 was a joint effort. Lockheed was exclusively responsible for construction and developmental testing. The CIA had overall control of the program, which was codenamed Aquatone, as well as responsibility for developing security protocols and paying for airframes and camera equipment. The Air Force provided support in myriad ways, including supplying engines, ground support equipment, maintenance and training personnel, air traffic controllers, and transportation for workers to the test site. Air Force officials chose to name their part of the program Oilstone.2 This was but a foreshadowing of the future. Throughout its service life, the U-2 program would have many different nicknames and codenames.\n\n## First Flights\n\nKelly Johnson assigned Skunk Works foreman Dorsey Kammerer to oversee preparations at the test site and Frank \"Red\" Harvey to supervise the various personnel. Ernie Joiner served as chief of flight testing, assisted by flight-test engineer Glen Fulkerson. Others included instrumentation specialist Paul Deal, analysis engineers Mich Yoshii and Bob Klinger, and radio technician Jack Reedy. Tony LeVier was the first test pilot assigned to the project. Maintenance personnel responsible for Article 341 included crew chief Fritz Frye, mechanics Leroy Flynn and Bob Murphy, and electrician Vernon Buckner. If any special components needed to be manufactured, the test site had a metal shop staffed by Carl Herman, Bob Johnson, and Pop Christman. Any work on the airplane was thoroughly checked by inspectors Dick Padjet and Pete Wilkerson. Radioman Frank Cruz was in charge of communications. Gene Cuthbert oversaw supply stock. Paul Smith did double duty as both clerk and photographer. Utility electrician Dick Hough and painter Frank Harvey rounded out the shop personnel.3\nAs Johnson had promised, the disassembled components of the first U-2\narrived at the test site on July 25, less than 8 months after Lockheed received a go-ahead on the contract. After reassembly, the airplane was subjected to ground vibration testing to measure structural modes and frequencies for three different fuel load configurations. To undergo these tests, Article 341 was mounted on a ground transport dolly and shaken at various frequencies, some as low as a half-cycle per second. To prevent deformation of engine bearings during ground vibration tests, the engine was motored by blowing compressed air directly onto the front compressor with a hose and by blowing air into the starter to turn the rear compressor. The results were satisfactory and no problems were noted with coupling of structural modes.4 Next, technicians prepared the prototype for its first engine run. At first, the J57 would not start with the special fuel, so the ground crew improvised. Someone found several 5-gallon drums of conventional JP-4, linked them together, and ran a hose to a fuel valve on the J57. Technicians got the engine running with the JP-4, then disconnected the hose and ran the remainder of the test using LF-1A.\n\nMechanics later traced the problem to the spark plugs, which were too short.5\n\n 3. \"Original U-2 Flight Test Crews - 1955,\" Nevada Aerospace Hall of Fame historical collection,\ncourtesy of author.\n 4. Robert T. Klinger, \"Flight Test Development of the Lockheed U-2 Airplane,\" Lockheed Aircraft\nCorp. paper SP-109, November 4, 1958, p. 29.\n 5. Pocock, *50 Years of the U-2*, p. 25.\nOnce this discrepancy was corrected, the Lockheed crew was able to complete engine testing and prepare for taxi trials.\n\nOn August 1, 1955, Article 341 was towed onto the dry lakebed. Tony LeVier got the engine running well on his second attempt then began a lowspeed taxi run to the north. At about 45 miles per hour (mph), the wingtips began to lift but the pogos were locked into place and remained attached, although they were no longer touching the ground. LeVier found that he needed to apply a little rudder to keep the nose straight. He noted that the pogo wheels trailed satisfactorily and absorbed small lateral loads very smoothly. Maximum speed was about 50 knots, just sufficient to make the ailerons slightly effective. LeVier found the performance of the wheel brakes to be very poor. At the end of the 2-mile run, he made full 90-degree deflections of the tail-wheel steering system in both directions before turning 180 degrees and coming to a stop.6\nErnie Joiner inspected the brakes prior to the second taxi test. This time, LeVier made his run to the southaccelerating to 70 knots in about a quarter mileand then pulled the throttle to idle. \"It was at this point that I became aware of being airborne,\" he wrote in his post-test report, \"which left me with utter amazement, as I had no intentions whatsoever of flying.\"7 He immediately started back toward the ground but had difficulty judging his altitude because there were no markings on the lakebed. LeVier gunned the throttle in an effort to accelerate and avoid stalling, but the J57 engine was slow to respond. From a height of approximately 35 feet, the U-2 dropped and made contact with the ground in a 10-degree left bank. The impact was hard enough that Article 341 bounced back into the air. The second touchdown was gentler, allowing LeVier to regain control, but he found the brakes ineffective in slowing the aircraft. After rolling for some distance and finally veering to the left, the U-2 came to a stop with the main wheel tires on fire directly beneath the fuel sump tank. The chase crew promptly extinguished the blaze. LeVier later noted that it would have been best to remain airborne, but with the throttle in idle, he felt that he probably would not have been able to accelerate to full power in time to avert the hard landing.8 The unplanned flight hinted at the plane's airworthiness, foreshadowing its tendency at low speeds to remain in ground effect while gliding for great distances above the runway.\n\nTo prevent delays, the brakes and tires were replaced that same afternoon.\n\nAn inspection revealed no significant damage from the fire so another taxi test was scheduled for the following day. In the meantime, LeVier and Bob Murphy painted some black stripes on the lakebed surface north of the asphalt runway to provide a visual reference. \"Although this runway was far from adequate in regards to markings,\" LeVier noted, \"it was a big improvement.\"9\nIn the morning, Article 341 was towed back onto the lakebed and LeVier climbed into the cockpit. \"Engine start, OK.\" A few minutes later, he radioed, \"Rolling.\" To preclude a repetition of the inadvertent takeoff, he held the control yoke forward and attempted to raise the tail. At 55 knots, the tail wheel lifted off the ground, and he completed a 1-mile run to evaluate directional and lateral control. The results were satisfactory, and with the tail up, the airplane reached 85 knots without taking off. LeVier eased off a bit on the yoke, and felt the airplane become very light, and it might well have lifted off had he not pulled the throttle to idle. He then activated the gust controls, allowing the tail to settle back to the ground. As the airplane slowed to 70 knots, he applied light wheel braking with little or no effect. Approximately 3 miles down the runway, rapidly approaching the edge of the lakebed, he chopped the power and the U-2 rolled to a stop. The brakes were extremely hot and might have caught fire again if not for quick action by the chase crew.10\nWhile allowing the brakes to cool down, LeVier told Ernie Joiner that he had been bothered by unsatisfactory reflections on the windscreen from some light-colored material forward of the instrument panel. He felt it might have contributed to the visibility problems he experienced during previous tests. He also noted that the cockpit was extremely hot and recommended installing some sort of sunshade inside the canopy. After the ground crew had turned the airplane around, he made a low-speed run to the south with the flaps set at 35 degrees. This time the U-2 attained a maximum speed of 50 knots, and LeVier didn't bother with the wheel brakes. He simply allowed the airplane to coast to a stop. Afterward, he concluded that tail-wheel steering was of little use and might even be prone to inducing a ground loop. He and Kelly Johnson both agreed that the wheel brakes should not be used at speeds above 30 knots until the airplane's overall gross weight had been considerably reduced. LeVier's final comment in the postflight debriefing was, \"I believe the aircraft is ready for flight.\"11\nThe test team spent the morning and early afternoon of August 4 preparing for the maiden flight. Johnson kept a close watch as Ernie Joiner, Glen Fulkerson, Bob Murphy, and several others readied the airplane while LeVier checked his test plan. In earlier conversations with the test pilot, Johnson insisted that the U-2 should be landed with the main gear making initial contact with the runway, followed by the tail wheel. \"I disagreed,\" LeVier later recalled, \"and told him it should be stalled-in with the tail wheel touching first.\"12 Otherwise, he believed, the airplane would bounce. Johnson, however, felt that the U-2's high-aspect-ratio wing would have a significant effect on its landing characteristics, differentiating it from other bicycle-gear-equipped airplanes like the B-47. LeVier had, in fact, interviewed a number of B-47 pilots in preparation for his U-2 flight, but he agreed to make the first attempt using Johnson's suggested method.\n\nFor the final preparations, Article 341 was towed to the north end of the lakebed and aligned with the runway. As during taxi tests, the pogos were locked in place to provide balance during touchdown. There was a flurry of activity as support personnel and equipment were moved into place. LeVier\nusing call sign Angel 1climbed into the cockpit and began preflight checks.\n\nBob Matye took off in the C-47 with Johnson and Henry Combs on board as observers. Their first task was to check local weather conditions and winds aloft because a storm was moving in. Ernie Joiner (call sign Ground Hog) prepared to monitor the test from his position on the lakebed. Apparently no one had thought to secure the airspace in advance of the test flight. A few minutes after the C-47 departed, he observed an Air Force F-86 making a fairly close gunnery pass overhead. Ray Goudey took off in a T-33 to serve as safety chase, and a fire truck was positioned 1 mile to the south, adjacent to the runway. All of the months of preparation had led to this moment. LeVier initiated engine start. Nothing happened.13\nAfter two failed attempts to start the engine with LF-1A, Joiner decided they should refuel the airplane with JP-4 and try again. Nearly an hour was lost during this delay, and the observation and chase airplanes had to land to conserve fuel. Rain was already falling north of the lakebed and a crosswind blew in from the southwest, forcing LeVier to taxi the U-2 to a new starting point further to the east than originally planned. Finally, it was time, and he began his takeoff roll using approximately 85 percent revolutions per minute\n(rpm). He held the nose down until the airplane reached 100 knots, at which point it lifted off the ground. \"The initial climb out felt very good,\" he reported later, \"with what appeared to be satisfactory longitudinal stability and control.\" He noted that the right wing felt heavy, and Johnson told him to hold the wing up to balance the fuel. As he circled the lakebed at an altitude of 5,000 feet and a speed of around 160 knots with the landing gear still down, LeVier declared, \"This thing flies like a baby buggy.\"14\n\"Try gear up if you want,\" Johnson suggested. LeVier raised the gear, climbed to 8,000 feet, and continued to explore the airplane's handling qualities through a variety of gentle maneuvers, including stalls. \"Yaws right slightly, very sensitive at 100 knots. Right wing still heavy at 90. Aileron input at 85 knots. Lots of stall warning. Recovering.\" LeVier activated the speed brakes at approximately 140 knots, resulting in moderate tail buffet. He made six stalls, beginning in a clean (flaps up) configuration and gradually increasing the flap angle. He concluded that the airplane had normal buffet characteristics prior to full stall, with a very mild downward pitch. He noted that the wings were bowed slightly upward and that he was picking up a little bit of rain on the windscreen. After 15 minutes of flight, he descended, lowered the gear and flaps, and started his landing approach from 5,000 feet. \"It wasn't difficult to realize that this was no ordinary aircraft,\" he later recalled. \"With the power lever in almost idle, the wing flaps partially down and dive brakes extended, the aircraft had a very flat glide angle and a long float on flaring out.\"15\nAttempting to touch the main wheels down first while pushing forward on the control yoke to lower the nose produced an erratic and uncontrollable porpoise maneuver. As the U-2 bounced into the air, Johnson yelled, \"Go around!\" LeVier added power and circled around for another attempt. He made a shallower approach this time, but the airplane just floated in ground effect approximately 10 feet above the lakebed. \"Boy, for more drag,\" he lamented. After several more approaches and go-arounds with similar results, LeVier finally achieved a two-point landing with both the main gear and tail wheel touching down simultaneously. He also activated the gust control system to further reduce lift.16 Johnson was forced to agree that LeVier had been right.\n\nIt was best to land with the tail wheel touching the ground at the same time or just ahead of the main gear. The entire flight lasted less than 40 minutes. The storm broke 10 minutes later, flooding the lakebed with 2 inches of water.17\nLeVier worked to perfect his landing technique during a second flight 2\ndays later, with Bob Matye flying chase in a T-33. Rolling north across the lakebed, the U-2 lifted off at 70 knots and immediately began to porpoise. LeVier added power and pulled up, resulting in a mild stall buffet, but this was less alarming than the porpoising. Matye thought a slight tailwind might have been a factor. After climbing to nearly 7,000 feet, LeVier began the first of several touch-and-go landings. His first approach was long and shallow, but he aborted when it began to seem hazardous. On the second approach, he employed the speed brakes and 10 degrees of flap, with the engine at 70 percent rpm. At 5 feet above the ground, he established the landing attitude in mild stall buffet and let the airplane settle in. This resulted in a two-point touchdown with a forward lunge and mild porpoising. He later described this second attempt as \"successful and a reasonably good landing. I used the gust control and except for being awful slow, it certainly is a useful aid to [flying] this aircraft.\" LeVier then raised the flaps, set power to 85 percent rpm, and held the control yoke forward. The plane started porpoising again on takeoff, and he attributed this motion to low pressure in the main landing gear shock strut.18 The third and final landing was about the same.\n\nFollowing the flight, LeVier had several recommendations. First, he suggested adjusting the shock strut pressure. He also speculated that using the gust controls during takeoff might reduce the porpoise motion, as well as pitching and stall buffet during the initial climb. He further recommended that some method be devised to allow the pilot to establish a proper landing attitude that would result in a two-point touchdown every time. Finally, he recommended fitting the seat with a back cushion. \"I'm still using a regular bed pillow,\" he fumed. \"I believe we should make up a few slightly tapered back cushions of two or three-inch thickness.\"19\nHaving proven the basic airworthiness of the U-2, and having solved the difficult challenge of developing a successful landing technique, Johnson scheduled the official first flight for August 8. This time, representatives of the CIA and Air Force had been invited, along with high-ranking Lockheed executives. After briefing his guests on the day's schedule, Johnson donned a parachute and climbed into the back of Matye's T-33.20 The U-2 was readied for flight, remaining in the same configuration as during the previous tests, with the pogos locked into the wings.\n\nMatye and Johnson took off first, circling the lakebed while LeVier taxied into position for departure to the north. They caught up as the U-2 started its roll. Takeoff was smooth this time, probably as a result of adjustments mechanics had made to shock strut pressure. LeVier made a gentle climb to the left, raising the gear when he had attained a speed of 130 knots. He brought the plane around in a wide circle and made a pass at moderate altitudearound 8,000 feetover the spectators before starting a series of planned test maneuvers. Johnson recorded airspeed calibration data during a climb to 30,500 feet, but Matye had difficulty keeping up with the U-2\neven though LeVier reported that his engine was practically idling. Soon, the U-2 was nearly 1,000 feet above the T-33. During the climb, LeVier noted that his cabin pressure fluctuated as much as 500 feet in 2-second cycles. After leveling off, he accelerated to 260 knots and detected some aileron buzz and possibly a slight rumble in the air intake ducts. The roughness was noticeable even with the engine in idle, so LeVier increased rpm, lowered the landing gear, and extended the wing flaps. Johnson informed him that the right pogo was shaking a little and advised terminating the speed run.21\nThe tail wheel failed to come down on the first attempt. Descending at a rate of 1,500 feet per minute, LeVier took a moment to perform a stall using 30 degrees of flap. He began to feel slight buffeting at around 80 knots, and the airplane stalled at 72 knots, pitching down and to the left. \"It sort of crabs around,\" he noted. \"You can feel it.\" He recovered quickly and actuated the speed brakes, at which time the tail wheel finally extended. The duct rumble began to ease at 20,000 feet. He had no difficulty setting up his approach angle, but judging the airplane's height above the lakebed remained a problem. As touchdown seemed imminent, he actuated the gust control mechanism and set power to idle, but he was still a bit too high. The aileron lost effectiveness, causing the left wing to drop suddenly. LeVier realized too late that he should have waited until touchdown to activate the gust controls. The left wingtip struck the ground fairly hard, but with sparing application of the wheel brakes, he managed to bring the airplane to a halt directly in front of the viewing area.22 The VIP guests were then allowed to inspect the airplane, and Johnson declared that he had successfully achieved his self-imposed 8-month deadline.23\n\n## Developmental Testing\n\nOver the next several weeks LeVier completed 16 additional flights, exploring the airplane's stall characteristics, taking the U-2 to its maximum stress limits (+2.5 g's and 1.5 g's) and expanding the performance envelope. He flew the U-2 to its maximum speed of Mach 0.85, or around 560 miles per hour (487 knots), and in preparation for cruising at altitudes never previously reached in sustained flight, the 42-year-old LeVier became the oldest test pilot to complete Air Force partial-pressure-suit training. He expanded the low and medium altitude flight envelopes and by August 16, he had reached an altitude of 52,000 feet. He then left Project Aquatone and returned to Burbank to serve as the company's director of flying.24 Before LeVier left, he checked out two more pilots, Bob Matye and Ray Goudey, who began making at least one flight nearly every day. As the pace of testing increased, Robert Sieker and Robert Schumacher joined the team to help expand the airplane's performance capabilities and test the reconnaissance systems. Goudey performed in-flight structural tests, and Schumacher was instrumental in clearing the U-2 for maximum altitude operation as well as for testing sensor systems. Kelly Johnson paid Sieker a $25,000 bonus for performing an intentional deadstick landing during one test flight.25 By September 8, the U-2 had been flown to 65,600\nfeet (approximately 12 miles above the ground), but engine flameouts at high altitude were becoming a significant problem.\n\nThe second and third airframes were delivered in September and October, and the test program was proceeding fairly smoothly. On December 1, Johnson noted, \"We have built four flying airplanes, have the ninth airplane in the jig, and have flown over our design altitude any number of times.\"26 By March 31,\n1956, the U-2 fleet consisted of nine airplanes with a combined total of 1,042 flight hours. The pilots were routinely flying at altitudes that would have been considered incredible in 1955. Three consecutive flights by Matye exceeded, by significant margins, the world altitude record of 65,890 feet that had been set\n\n22. Ibid. 23. Johnson, \"Log for Project X.\"\n24. Pedlow & Welzenbach, *The CIA and the U-2 Program*, p. 71.\n25. Miller, *Skunk Works*, p. 80.\n26. Ibid.\nin August 1955 by British pilot Walter Gibb in an English Electric Canberra (the original version of the Martin B-57).27 The test pilots devoted a great deal of effort to studying the problems of engine performance. The J57-P-31 powerplant was still not available, and the J57-P-37 had significantly poorer combustion characteristics and a tendency to flame out at cruising altitude. Combustion problems most often manifested at altitudes between 57,000 and 65,000 feet, within a portion of the performance envelope that the pilots called the \"badlands.\" In one typical example, the airplane was cruising at 64,000 feet when flameout occurred. The pilot briefly restarted the engine, but it quit again at 60,000 feet. He was ultimately forced to descend to 35,000 feet before regaining successful engine operation.28 During a test flight this was merely an inconvenience, but if a similar event occurred in the course of an operational mission over hostile territory it would place the pilot in deadly peril.\n\nAs engineers struggled with the flameout problem, logistical difficulties threatened to slow Lockheed's production progress. Pratt & Whitney announced that the J57-P-31 engines would not be available until the spring of 1956, and even the interim J57-P-37 was becoming scarce because the company had committed its full production capacity for these engines to the Air Force for use in F-100 fighters and KC-135 tankers. In order to keep U-2 production on schedule, Col. Leo Geary (who had replaced Ritland) arranged for the diversion of a number of engines that had been destined for Boeing's KC-135 production line to the U-2 production line.29 This kept the program running until the first J57-P-31 engines arrived, at which point the airplane's performance increased significantly. The new engine had greater thrust, lower weight, and consumed very little oil. Most important, flameout at altitude was almost impossible.30 By June 1, 1956, the J57-P-31 engine had propelled the U-2 to 74,500 feet.31\nStructural demonstrations, initially conducted with the aircraft restricted to 80 percent of design limit loads, included wind-up turns to 3 g's. A camera mounted atop the fuselage was used to measure wingtip deflections. Flight data were then correlated with static test data prior to extending static testing to ultimate loads using the ground-test article. Ray Goudey tested the structural limit loads in an orderly fashion despite schedule pressures, and Lockheed engineers were pleased to learn that the airframe proved stronger than many had thought. Although Lockheed engineers measured ultimate loads of as much as 4 g's, flight limit loads remained at 2.5 g's, as originally specified, so as not to overstress any of the airplanes.32\nSince the beginning of the project, the U-2 prototype had served as the flagship of the test fleet, and it was the most extensively instrumented airframe. Technicians installed strain gages in Article 341, using the same locations where measurements had been taken on the structural test article. The developmental test program lasted 7 months and included basic aircraft and engine performance assessments, stability and control evaluations, structural demonstrations, and operational testing of aircraft systems. By February 29, 1956, Article 341 had made 83 flights and logged 150 flight hours. Subsequently, this airplane was used primarily for testing modifications to the J57-P-37 engine and development of the improved J57-P-31 engine, as well as for other miscellaneous tests. Article 342 was also instrumented for testing, although not as extensively as Article 341, and was primarily dedicated to testing various reconnaissance camera systems. This airplane was flown 22 times (logging 33 flight hours) during this demonstration then released for use in the pilot training program. Instrumentation used in Article 342 was transferred to Article 344, and the majority of camera testing was accomplished with the latter. Article 344 was also used for autopilot development testing and weather research flights, eventually accruing 250 flight hours over the span of 85 sorties before being released for use in pilot training. A fourth airplane, Article 351, was used for testing System I, a radar detection and recording system; System II, an advanced high-frequency navigation and communication system; System III, a VHF radio transmission recording system; and the AN/APQ-56 radar mapping system, as well as the J57-P-31 engine.33\nLockheed engineers in Burbank subjected the ground-test article to static loading to destruction in order to establish safe flight limitations for a series of structural demonstrations. During five sorties with Article 341, the airplane underwent pull-ups, pushovers, stalls, and roll and yaw maneuvers at gross weights between 15,900 and 16,800 pounds. Tests were conducted with gust controls and flaps faired and extended, landing gear down, and speed brakes retracted and extended. The pilot performed the aileron roll test by starting from a 45-degree left bank and rolling into a 45-degree right bank at a speed of 150 knots. Wingtip deflection was measured during level and maneuvering flight, and researchers found that upward deflection could be reduced as much as 5 inches by shifting the flaps and ailerons up for gust control. The most difficult aspect of measuring wing deflection turned out to be the need for very precise piloting technique. It was found that g-loading had to be increased as gradually as possible while maintaining the planned test airspeed. Otherwise, if g-loading increased too rapidly, dynamic overswing resulted in erroneous measurements, particularly at high negative-g conditions where pilots had a tendency to maneuver rapidly.34\nPrior to in-flight structural demonstrations, technicians made reinforcements to portions of the airplane's structure. These changes were based on the results of the ultimate static load tests performed earlier. Subsequent flight-testing proved these modifications airworthy and all U-2 airplanes were strengthened accordingly. Other reinforcements were implemented in response to incidents that occurred during flight-test and training operations. During one sortie with Article 342, the pilot slowed the airplane by extending the speed brakes in level flight at 260 knots. As the plane decelerated to 250 knots (Mach 0.56) at 20,000 feet, an elevator tab support bracket failed and tore loose from the web of the rear stabilizer beam. To prevent reoccurrence of this type of failure, the bracket was redesigned to be tied into the top and bottom beam caps. This modification was incorporated into the entire U-2 fleet and no further trouble was experienced. Another modification resulted from discovery of fuselage skin wrinkles at the aft end of the tail wheel well. These wrinkles were only evident when the airplanes were sitting on the ground with a heavy fuel load. Although this was not considered a flight hazard, doubler plates were installed to alleviate load concentration while on the ground.35\nLockheed engineer Robert T. Klinger remarked in a November 1958 report that \"The U-2 project was unique in practically all aspects; the design, testing, production, pilot training and service deployment [were] conducted on a 'crash' basis, by a relatively few number of people, while maintaining the highest order of security.\" In fact, the entire developmental flight-test program was conducted by just four engineers and five test pilots, assisted by a small cadre of about 20 maintenance, supply, and administrative personnel. Unlike in conventional aircraft procurement programs, the U-2 was not subjected to the formal eight-phase test program then in use by the Air Force. Instead, the airplane's operational suitability, reliability, and other factors were evaluated concurrently with the developmental testing and pilot training programs.36\nIn the spring of 1957, two decades before the advent of what has come to be known as low observableor stealthtechnology, the CIA sought to make the U-2 less vulnerable to radar detection. For this pioneering effort, known as Project Rainbow, Lockheed engineers Luther McDonald, Mel George, and Ed Lovick teamed up with Harvard physics professor Ed Purcell and Frank Rodgers, associate head of the Radar Division at MIT's Lincoln Laboratory, to reduce the airplane's radar signature through two vastly different approaches. One method, nicknamed \"trapeze,\" involved stringing copper-plated steel wires with ferrite beads across the aircraft's outer skin at specific distances from the fuselage, wings, and tail. As applied to Article 343, the wires were strung across laminated wood stand-offs that bristled from the fuselage, tail, and the leading and trailing edges of the wings.37 In the second approach, Article 341 received a coating of high-frequency radar-absorbent material (RAM) on the underside of the fuselage. The RAM, varying in thickness from a quarter-inch to about 1 inch, consisted of a fiberglass honeycomb topped by layers of Salisbury Screen, a conductive graphite grid on canvas sheets. It was nicknamed \"wallpaper\" because of the circuit grid pattern on its surface. Additionally, the RAM coating prevented the dissipation of engine heat through the aircraft's skin, earning it the nickname \"thermos.\" With the addition of RAM or wires, the U-2 suffered from excess weight and drag, making it aerodynamically \"unclean.\" Hence Article 343 and Article 341 were known as \"Dirty Birds.\" These modifications reduced the airplane's maximum altitude by as much as 5,000 feet and cut its range by 20 percent.38\nDuring one of Robert Sieker's Rainbow test flights in Article 341, the insulating properties of the coating surrounding the engine bay caused the hydraulic system to overheat and reduce pressure to the fuel boost pump motor. The result was a flameout at 72,000 feet and loss of cabin pressure. Ordinarily, this would not have been a serious problem because the pilot was wearing his partial-pressure suit. Unfortunately, as his suit inflated, the clasp on his faceplate failed, causing loss of consciousness when the air rushed out of his helmet. The airplane stalled and entered a flat spin. Descending into the lower atmosphere, Sieker finally regained his senses and attempted to bail out. It took search teams several days to locate the wreckage, which was\n\n36. Ibid., pp. 67.\n37. Pocock, *50 Years of the U-2*, p. 50.\n38. Peter W. Merlin and Tony Moore, *X-Plane Crashes* (North Branch, MN: Specialty Press,\n2008), p. 84.\nEngineers attempted two very different approaches to reducing the airplane's radar signature. One involved stringing ferrite beads on wires along the fuselage and wings while the other required coating parts of the aircraft with radar-absorbent material. (CIA)\nlargely intact. Sieker's body was found nearby with his parachute only partially deployed.39 Investigators determined that had his life-support system not malfunctioned, he would have most likely been able to bring the plane home safely. Kelly Johnson called for a redesign of the faceplate latch, a dual oxygen regulator, and an ejection seat that could be used interchangeably with the existing bucket seat.40\nTesting continued despite the loss of Article 341 and a valued member of the team. Several months later, the entire test operation was moved to the North Base auxiliary airfield at the edge of Rogers Dry Lake on Edwards Air Force Base. \"I hesitate to say that this was an easy flight test program,\" recalled Ernie Joiner during a presentation in 1998, \"for there were some challenging elements. It must be said, though, that the U-2 program was unique in that we overlapped flight test development with training and with deployment.\n\nThis was historic and would have been impossible without a good airplane and a reliable engine.\"41\n\n## Pilot Training\n\nEven as developmental testing continued, the time had come to begin training CIA and Air Force U-2 pilots. Members of the Air Force training cadre began arriving in early November 1955. Col. William R. Yancey, handpicked by Gen. Curtis Lemay, chief of Strategic Air Command (SAC), was tasked with representing SAC's interests in the program. He had been specifically instructed to evaluate the Lockheed flight-test effort, verify that the airplane and reconnaissance equipment performed as expected, and report his findings directly to Lemay as soon as possible. Should the results prove satisfactory, Yancey was to train a specified number of pilots for operational missions. Shortly after delivery of the third U-2, the Air Force activated the 4070th Support Wing with Yancey as commander. His staff included deputy commander Col. Herbert Shingler, navigator and classroom instructor Maj. Robert E. Mullin, navigation officer and mission planner Jack Delap, logistics and supply officer Maj. Art Lien, development and flight-test officers Maj. Louis A. Garvin and Lt. Col. Phillip O. Robertson, flight instructors Capt. Hank Meierdierck and Capt. Louis Setter, and three airmen. Ray Goudey and Bob Matye gave the pilots ground instruction and checkout before allowing them to make familiarization and proficiency flights around the local area.42\nTeaching Yancey's group how to fly the U-2 was particularly challenging because there was as yet no two-seat model of the U-2. The unique handling characteristics of the single-seat plane could only be experienced firsthand in solo flight. The student pilot first underwent extensive ground training, as well as practice in the T-33. For his initial U-2 flights, the student took off with an instructor pilot flying chase in the T-33 and providing instructions and encouragement over the radio. Each U-2 was built by hand, and slight variations in construction contributed to differences in aircraft behavior. This was especially noticeable when stalling the airplane during landing approach. One airplane might regularly fall off to the right and another to the left. Lockheed flight-test engineers took note of this and added small fixed metal strips to the leading inboard edge of the wing to modify the airplane's stall characteristics as necessary.43\nAll CIA and Air Force U-2 pilots were initially selected from veterans of SAC\nF-84 fighter squadrons scheduled to be disbanded and to have their personnel reassigned. Those chosen for the CIA program had to resign their Air Force commissions, effectively becoming civilians for the duration of their assignment. The selection process was rigorous. Because U-2 pilots were expected to endure the stress of flying at extremely high altitudes for extended periods of time, every effort was made to exclude those who might be unable to handle the claustrophobic conditions of the pressure suit and the airplane's cramped cockpit. In preparation for high-altitude operations, each man underwent thorough physical and psychological examinations at the Lovelace Clinic in Albuquerque and fitting for partial-pressure suits at the David Clark Company in Worcester, MA. Another challenge involved teaching the pilots the proper way to handle the delicate U-2. Former fighter pilots accustomed to flying fast and making abrupt maneuvers needed to understand the limitations of a lightweight airframe not designed to handle the stresses of loops, barrel rolls, or even a hard pull-up.44\nThe first group of pilot trainees arrived at Watertown Airstrip on January\n11, 1956. Two more classes soon followed, resulting in a total of 28 student pilots. Yancey's flight instructors devised a syllabus consisting of ground school and flight checkout. Before being allowed to solo in the U-2, each student first flew a number of analog sorties in the T-33 to simulate high-altitude flameouts and restarts, practice U-2 landing approach techniques, and demonstrate near-stall landings. An instructor pilot shadowed the U-2 when each student made his first solo, a flight to 20,000 feet followed by five practice landings on the lakebed. Students didn't wear the pressure garment until the third solo flight, which was typically a 3-hour flight to 60,000 feet. The next nine sorties introduced trainees to high-altitude navigation and photography, long-duration flight (upward of 8 hours), night flying, and landings on the paved airstrip. Each pilot was declared mission qualified after logging at least\n58 flight hours in the U-2 and completing a final 8-hour check ride.45 Francis G. \"Frank\" Powers, who was assigned to the second group of trainees, was most impressed by the attention paid to the flying portion of the syllabus. \"While at Watertown we flew the U-2 far more than we would have if we'd been in the Air Force and checking out in a new aircraft,\" he wrote in his memoir. \"As a result, on completing our training we had the utmost confidence in its reliability.\"46\nOnce a sufficient number of pilots had completed training, they were tasked with an operational checkout of the U-2, including the planes, ground and flight crews, navigation systems, life-support systems, cameras, and other\n\n1970), p. 36.\nequipment. During a 5-day training exercise in April 1956, U-2s took off from Watertown on eight cross-country sorties for the purpose of testing various camera systems. The entire exercise was conducted in the manner of a standard Air Force Operational Readiness Inspection, with Col. Yancey and his detachment serving as observers. They carefully examined all aspects of the U-2 unit's performance, including that of maintenance personnel, flight crews, camera technicians, and mission planners. When the exercise was over, Yancey reported that the detachment was ready for deployment. He then briefed a high-level Pentagon panel that included the Secretary of the Air Force and the Chief of Air Staff. These officials concurred with Yancey's determination that the U-2\nwas ready to become operational.47 As the CIA detachments began departing for overseas duty, Air Force pilot training began in earnest.\n\nBy mid-1956, the U-2 had been flown on several missions lasting more than\n10 hours and covering over 5,000 statute miles. Airplanes equipped with the J57-P-31 engine had attained altitudes up to 74,500 feet.48 Not surprisingly, the intensive training program resulted in a number of mishaps, some fatal. In his March 21, 1956, diary entry, Kelly Johnson noted that Article 342 had been \"wrecked\" when Carmine Vito made a rough landing.49 This apparently sounded much worse than it actually was, as the airplane was soon repaired and flying. But there were more serious mishaps to come.\n\nOne incident with deadly results was a consequence of the unusual landing gear arrangement. As originally designed, the pogo outriggers were to be dropped during or shortly after takeoff using a manual release system. \"We soon learned that any delay by the pilot in dropping them would often cause them to hang up,\" Ernie Joiner recalled. \"When that happened, it was wise to stay clear of the airplane's flight path.\" On May 15, CIA pilot Wilburn S. \"Billy\" Rose had just taken off for a training flight in Article 345 when he noticed that one of the outriggers had failed to separate. He tried to shake it loose while flying low over the lakebed but the airplane, heavy with fuel, stalled and crashed. Rose became the first CIA fatality of the program. To prevent a reoccurrence of the problem, the pilot actuation system was removed so that the pogos would fall away automatically as soon as the wings started to lift, while the airplane was still on the runway. A spring was installed on the upper end of the pogo to push it away from the wing as soon as the weight of the aircraft was lifted.50\nThe trainees continued to suffer a variety of landing mishaps. On June 1, Bill Strickland somehow allowed Article 344 to run out of fuel. He landed 392 yards short of the lakebed, miraculously without damaging the airplane. Another pilot was not so lucky, damaging Article 355 in a rough landing just shy of 8 weeks after the airplane had been delivered. Fortunately, it was repairable.51\nTakeoff could be equally hazardous. During a night training flight in Article\n354 on August 31, Frank G. Grace, Jr., tried to climb too steeply during takeoff. Apparently failing to maintain a proper climb angle, he stalled with insufficient altitude for recovery. Grace died when his airplane plummeted 50 feet to the ground, cartwheeled on its left wing, and struck a power pole near the runway.52\nOn September 17, 1956, Article 346 lost part of its right wing shortly after Howard Carey took off from Lindsey Air Force Base in Wiesbaden, Germany. The aircraft disintegrated in flight, killing the pilot. The exact cause was never determined. Kelly Johnson believed it resulted from overpressure in the wing tanks during a steep climb, but it was also noted that the U-2 might have been caught in the jet wash from a flight of four Canadian F-86 fighters that had just passed by. The U-2 airframe was not stressed to withstand severe turbulence.\n\nOne of Carey's fellow pilots theorized that the accident could have been caused by an unintentional extension of the flaps. The flap switch was located alongside the throttle, where it could be easily bumped to the down position during the climb. As long as the gust alleviation system was activatedas it routinely was during takeoffthis would have no adverse effect, but once the pilot deactivated the gust controls, the flaps would revert to the commanded position.53\nThe loss of Article 357 on December 19, 1956, resulted from pilot hypoxia after Robert Ericson took off from Watertown on a cross-country flight over northern Arizona. As the U-2 climbed to altitude, a small leak slowly depleted his oxygen supply. Hypoxia gradually set in, impairing the pilot's judgment. As his reaction time slowed and he lost track of the aircraft's speed, the U-2\nexceeded the placarded 190-knot maximum. The delicate airframe quickly approached its load limits and finally disintegrated when it reached 270 knots. Ericson somehow managed to jettison the canopy and was sucked out of the aircraft at an altitude of 28,000 feet. Fortunately, his chute opened automatically at 15,000 feet, and he touched down without injury.54 The aircraft was a total loss, its wreckage strewn across part of the Navajo Indian Reservation south of Ganado.\n\nTraining continued unabated despite these mishaps. The first operational mission occurred just 18 months after program go-ahead and was conducted over Soviet-occupied Eastern Europe on June 20, 1956. By mid-June 1957, three CIA detachments had been deployed around the world, Air Force U-2 personnel were assigned to the 4080th Strategic Reconnaissance Wing and based in Del Rio, TX, and test operations were transferred to Edwards Air Force Base. As director of Project Aquatone, Richard Bissell was very pleased with the outcome. \"The active participation and support of the Air Force continued throughout the life of the program,\" he wrote in his memoirs, \"and without its many contributions the project could not have been carried through.\"55\nThe U-2C had fluted inlets to accommodate increased airflow to the J75 engine and a dorsal spine housing additional equipment. Note the 100-gallon slipper tanks on each wing. (Lockheed Martin)\n\n## Chapter 3 Design Evolution\n\nOver the years, the U-2 family of aircraft spawned two major design variants and a host of specialized models. These changes enhanced survivability and increased operational effectiveness. The basic design parameters and performance characteristics have remained largely unchanged except for those resulting from improvements in propulsion and avionics technology. Despite its planned short-term obsolescence, the airplane's versatility ensured that descendants of the original U-2 would remain in service well into the 21st century.\n\n## The First Upgrade\n\nBeginning in late 1958, Lockheed embarked on a program to retrofit the CIA fleet with more powerful engines to increase operational altitudes. This first major upgrade to the airplane was dubbed U-2C. It featured a new powerplant and larger inlets for improved performance. Kelly Johnson selected Article 342 to serve as the prototype, and Lockheed technicians replaced its J57-P-31 engine with a Pratt & Whitney J75-P-13 axial-flow turbojet weighing 4,900 pounds and providing 15,800 pounds of thrust at sea level. Seven years later, the U-2C fleet would be equipped with more powerful J75-P-13B engines with a 17,000-pound-thrust rating. In order to improve airflow to the engine's compressor face, the inlets were widened and fluted, allowing a greater mass of air to enter.1 Greater thrust meant that the airplane reached operational altitudes more quickly and reduced time spent in the tropopause (the atmospheric band between 45,000 and 55,0000 feet), where contrails typically formed. This reduced the chances of visual detection. Use of the more powerful J75 also enabled the U-2 to carry a larger payload. The J75 engines were in short supply in 1959 due to Pratt & Whitney's commitments to the Air Force for F-105 production, but the CIA managed to obtain an initial supply of 12 engines. The Air Force never equipped its U-2 fleet with the J75.2\n\nDevelopmental testing of the U-2C was expedited to meet operational requirements for the airplane. Article 342 was thoroughly instrumented for airplane and powerplant performance evaluations, autopilot development, stability and control, and operational systems testing. Ray Goudey made the maiden flight of the U-2C on May 13, 1959, at Edwards. Soon thereafter, Article 358 and Article 351 joined the program as the second and third U-2C models. These airframes were used primarily for testing aircraft systems and reconnaissance equipment. All three were used for accelerated service testing to demonstrate operational reliability and collect cruise performance data. All testing was complete by July 24, 1959, just 10 weeks after the first flight. The three airplanes completed 106 sorties totaling 381 flight hours. Articles 351 and 358 were deployed with an operational detachment on August 12, but Article 342 remained at Edwards for further performance testing and development of an electrical power system and the System IX Granger Deceptive Repeater installation.3\nDesigners made a number of significant changes to the basic airplane. The U-2C was approximately 1,450 pounds heavier than the U-2A, with the new J75 engine accounting for 1,100 pounds of the increase. The landing gear and associated structure had to be strengthened, and heavy-duty tires installed, to accommodate the heavier gross takeoff weight. The fuselage sump tank was slightly larger, holding 95 to 100 gallons of fuelabout a 10-pound increase.\n\nThe total area of the engine air inlets was increased to accommodate the greater airflow requirements of the new powerplant. Lockheed engineers redesigned the leading edge of the horizontal stabilizer, making it more rounded and increasing the camber. The operating speed of the gust control system was reduced 50 percent to provide a smoother response. Numerous internal systems were modified to improve engine and hydraulic oil cooling, autopilot performance, fuel flow, electrical power, and environmental controls. Much attention was devoted to improving heat shielding around the engine to provide adequate aircraft structural cooling.4\nBased on lessons learned with the U-2A, Lockheed engineers made several changes to improve U-2C controllability. The elevator trim tab operating speed was doubled, downward elevator travel was increased from 11.5 to 20 degrees to offset a nose-up pitching tendency resulting from a rapid increase in power, and gust control system response was slowed by half to decrease the rate of change in elevator stick force. The modified airplane demonstrated improved\n\n 4. Ibid., pp. 1418.\naltitude performance, but its center-of-gravity limits were significantly narrower. On one early test flight, Bob Schumacher reported that the center of gravity was so far forward that the airplane might become uncontrollable if the autopilot disconnected before the fuel supply from auxiliary slipper tanks on the wings was exhausted. In order to mitigate this problem, the horizontal stabilizers were subsequently modified to balance the aerodynamic load with increased camber and more rounded leading edges. For most operational configurations, ballast had to be added to the tail. The U-2C upgrade initially raised the airplane's maximum altitude to more than 74,600 feet (and later to 75,000 feet with the J75-P-13B) and improved the compressor stall margin. Unfortunately, increased altitude capability corresponded with a decrease in range from 4,000 to 3,300 nautical miles when the pilot flew a maximumpower cruise profile. Mission planners favored this profile because the U-2C\nentered cruise climb at 67,000 feet, and nearly two-thirds of the entire mission was flown at altitudes above 70,000 feet.5\nA combination of higher thrust and greater compressor stall margin gave the U-2C more operational flexibility at high altitudes than had the U-2A. The engine could be operated anywhere between minimum fuel flow and maximum power, increasing maximum altitude capability and providing the pilot with a wide range of reduced power cruise altitudes as desired. Range could be increased with the addition of two 100-gallon slipper tanks on the wings, but the additional weight resulted in an altitude penalty of 500 to 1,200 feet. At maximum power, use of slipper tanks gave the U-2C a range of 3,350 nautical miles to zero fuel. The U-2 pilot could achieve a more economical relationship between gross weight and altitude by leveling off and cruising at constant altitude and airspeed. For a level 70,000-foot-cruise mission with slipper tanks, the range was 3,800 nautical miles. Reducing the level cruising altitude to 68,000 feet increased the range to 4,050 miles, and the maximum slipper tank range was estimated to be 4,600 nautical miles.6\n\n## A U-2 Built For Two\n\nIn early 1957, Lockheed received a contract to modify a U-2A with an infrared sensor mounted in one of two configurations. When installed below the fuselage just aft of the cockpit, it could be used to detect the heat signatures of jet aircraft flying at lower altitudes. From atop the fuselage, it would be used to scan for rocket and missile exhaust plumes. The sensor, designated AN/AAS-8, was co-developed by Lockheed and Baird Atomic. In December 1957, the sensor package was installed on the lower fuselage of Article 389 in what became known as the AIRSearch configuration. The equipment was housed in a rotating barrel that was pressurized by nitrogen gas. Immediately aft of this cylindrical assembly, an aerodynamic fairing was installed to smooth the airflow around the sensor package. The cylinder contained mirrors that could be tilted as necessary to focus the infrared energy onto a lead sulfide detector. The optical path for the navigational sextant was modified to include an infrared oscilloscope, combining one display into two so that additional instruments did not need to be added to the already cramped cockpit. In order to allow the U-2 pilot to identify aircraft detected at lower altitudes, driftsight magnification was doubled. The modified airplane was delivered to Edwards in March 1958. As originally envisioned, this technology would have supplemented airborne early warning aircraft and ground-based Ballistic Missile Early Warning System (BMEWS) radar stations in detecting inbound enemy aircraft. But U-2 reconnaissance missions over the Soviet Union had produced information that diminished fears that Russian long-range bomber fleets posed a significant threat. On the other hand, the Soviets were making great progress in the development of intercontinental ballistic missiles. Fears of a U.S.-Soviet \"missile gap\" spurred military leaders at the Pentagon to develop plans for a Missile Defense and Alarm System (MIDAS) early warning satellite, but it was not expected to be operational before 1961 at the earliest.7\nThe AN/AAS-8 was first tested in the spring of 1958 during Project Low Card. Capt. Hugh \"Pat\" Hunerwadel flew Article 389 to Ramey Air Force Base, Puerto Rico, to assess the sensor's performance during observations of test launches of U.S. ballistic missiles from Cape Canaveral, FL. These tests ended prematurely in early June when the U-2 ran off the runway, badly damaging the downward protruding sensor. Article 389 was airlifted back to Edwards for repairs and since the priority had shifted to missile detection, the sensor package was moved to the upper fuselage. Project Low Card resumed in September with another pilot. By the end of this deployment, the AN/AAS-8 had been used to track 11 of 12 launches over the Atlantic Missile Range between April and November, despite the 4-month interruption caused by the runway mishap.8\nIn light of the spectacular success of the AN/AAS-8, which detected missile plumes at ranges in excess of 1,000 miles, Lockheed and Baird Atomic housing between the canopies. (Lockheed Martin)\nproduced two separate reports. Kelly Johnson and Walter Baird presented these documents at the Pentagon along with a proposal that a fleet of as many as 15 sensor-equipped U-2 aircraft should be kept on constant airborne patrol around the borders of the Soviet Union to provide early warning of missile attacks against the U.S. or its allies. Johnson recommended building 84 additional U-2 airframes with provisions for the AN/AAS-8 as well as a second crew position behind the cockpit. The new model, designated U-2B, would have been equipped with an astroinertial navigation system and a UHF data link for line-of-sight communication between the aircraft and monitoring stations on the ground. The U-2B was expected to be at least 1,500 pounds heavier than the standard U-2A, cutting the airplane's range by 25 percent but without significantly reducing altitude capability. To mitigate the risk of losing an airplane due to engine failure, Johnson provided an option to install a small Pratt & Whitney JT12 turbojet for emergency return-to-base capability if the primary engine could not be restarted. The inlet and exhaust ducts for the JT12 were to have been covered by jettisonable aerodynamic fairings when not in use. A final notification called for replacing the bicycle landing gear with a conventional tricycle arrangement. Although this added 884 pounds to the airframe, Lockheed's reported noted, \"the expected gain in overall operations by lessening landing accidents outweighs this.\"9\nAlthough Pentagon officials liked the concept, they had doubts about the reliability of the communications links and navigational accuracy, especially since the aircraft would be operating within the Arctic Circle. Johnson was subsequently authorized to modify three additional prototypes for further testing. Capitalizing on lessons learned from project Low Card, Skunk Works engineers designed a compartment behind the cockpit to accommodate a sensor operator. It had become clear that the pilot could not effectively fly the airplane and operate the sensor equipment simultaneously. The first airframe to receive this modification was Article 377. Technicians converted the Q-bay into a crew station with sensor control panels, an entry hatch on top of the fuselage, and a downward ejection seat similar to those used in early model F-104\nStarfighters. The sensor barrel was mounted between the pilot's canopy and the observer's hatch, which itself was topped with the aerodynamic fairing that fit just behind the sensor. Bob Schumacher made the maiden flight on January 7, 1958, with flight-test engineer Glen Fulkerson in the observer's seat. Unfortunately, this airplane was lost 8 months later in a crash that took the life of Pat Hunerwadel. A second prototype was ready by early 1959. Article 394 was the first U-2 purpose-built in the two-seat configuration. In an improvement over the first version, the downward ejection seat was replaced with a more conventional upward-firing escape system.10\nAs the early warning panel of the Presidents Science Advisory Committee\n(PSAC) reviewed progress on MIDAS and BMEWS, it was clear that operational deployment of a satellite system was still a long way off. Johnson had promised to have the three squadrons of U-2B aircraft operational within 2 years, with the first in service just 18 months after start of production. The PSAC panel recommended immediate procurement of the U-2B as a complement to the BMEWS, but critics were skeptical that the Soviets were indeed planning to launch a preemptive nuclear strike against the U.S. and felt that there were already other, more reliable technologies for early detection of missile launches. The U-2B proposal did not immediately receive approval as Johnson had hoped, but testing of the infrared sensor system continued with a second two-place airframe, Article 388, which joined the test fleet in late 1959. In time, senior Government officials downgraded the Soviet missile threat, and the BMEWS radar sites became operational. Johnson's U-2B proposal was eventually discarded, but the two test bed aircraft, officially designated U-2D in 1961, continued to be used for sensor technology development and a variety of other test projects. In at least one instance, the U-2D was flown parallel to the flightpath of NASA's X-15 in order to track the rocket plane's exhaust plume as it soared to the edge of space.11 Article\n394 was eventually converted into a single-seat U-2C and transferred to SAC. Article 388 remained at Edwards until its retirement in 1978.12\n\n## Increased Range\n\nAnticipation of long-duration sorties highlighted the need to increase the airplane's operational range beyond that which could be obtained with the addition of external fuel tanks. The logical solution was to give the U-2 in-flight refueling capability. This merely required the addition of a dorsal receptacle to accommodate the extendable refueling boom of a KC-135 Stratotanker. Although this modification promised a useful capability, many feared it could An aerial refueling receptacle was installed in a dorsal spine on U-2E and U-2F models.\n\n(U.S. Air Force)\nnot significantly extend overall mission length, which was a function of human endurance. For operational purposes, pilot fatigue constraints limited mission duration to a maximum of approximately 10 hours. Upon approval of the project in May 1961, Lockheed began modifying six CIA airframes into what became known as the U-2F configuration.13 Air Force interest in the U-2F resulted in a decision to convert six SAC airplanes for refueling. This order was eventually reduced to three, which were delivered in the fall of 1962 under the designation U-2E.14\nArticle 342 was once again selected to serve as prototype for a new configuration. It was equipped with a pressurized dorsal fairing atop the mid fuselage to house the refueling receptacle along with a 400-watt single-side-band radio that permitted voice communications at ranges of more than 3,000 miles. Bob Schumacher conducted the first simulated refueling trials, easing in behind a KC-135 and closing to the requisite distance without actually hooking up. Initial tests indicated that refueling rendezvous could be easily accomplished at an altitude of 35,000 feet and indicated air speed of 220 knots. For the lowaltitude rendezvous trial, Schumacher had been wearing a standard flight suit and helmet. Later pilots discovered that wearing the partial-pressure suit and its specialized helmet resulted in significantly reduced visibility while maneuvering toward the refueling boom. Another challenge was posed by the fact that the in-flight refueling capability meant missions could be extended beyond the imposed 10-hour limit. Even without concern for pilot fatigue, practical mission endurance was inherently limited by the onboard oxygen supply. Eventually, an extra oxygen bottle was added, extending the pilot's air supply for a 14-hour mission if required.15\nRefueling trials began with dry hook-ups followed by the first transfer of fuel from the KC-135 to the U-2. Testing was completed over the span of several weeks, and two more airframes were already undergoing modification. Soon, operational pilots began practicing the delicate art of in-flight refueling. The KC-135 could transfer as much as 900 gallons to the U-2 in just 5 minutes.\n\nThe main tanks were fed first, followed by sump tanks, and finally the slipper tanks (if attached). Center-of-gravity requirements necessitated development of a cross-transfer system between the tanks. This consisted of a series of motorized and solenoid-operated valves that operated automatically. A manual override was provided and the pilot had to keep an eye on transfer rates and valve operations so as to prevent structural failure resulting from overpressure of displaced air if the tanks filled too fast. This, however, was only one of the potential hazards of in-flight refueling.16\nOrdinarily, the aircraft receiving fuel closes on the tanker from behind, but because the U-2 had such a narrow speed envelope, the KC-135 had to make adjustments during rendezvous. First, the U-2 pilot stabilized his aircraft at the proper altitude and airspeed. It was then overtaken by the tanker about a quarter-mile off the right side and at the same altitude. After passing the U-2, the KC-135 pilot reduced speed as the U-2 moved down and left to take its position below the refueling boom. After the boom was lowered, the U-2 pilot slowly climbed into final position, careful to avoid the tanker's wake vortex or jet-wash from the tanker's engines, either of which could flip the U-2 into a deadly roll. After refueling, the pilot had to reset the fuel counter and delicately disengage from the tanker. The U-2 pilot achieved separation by decreasing power and descending approximately 100 feet below the tanker before sliding away to the left or right. Only when completely clear of the tanker's vortices was it safe to climb away.17 These hazards were not to be taken lightly. On March\n1, 1962, Capt. John Campbell perished during a nighttime refueling mission over Edwards. As he maneuvered his U-2F behind the KC-135 at an altitude of 35,000 feet, it flipped and tumbled out of control. Campbell apparently attempted to eject, but his seat never left the plane. Aerial refueling operations were suspended as Lockheed engineers once again evaluated the loads imposed on the U-2 airframe while maneuvering behind the KC-135. Some suggested that if jetwash were the problem, it might be safer to refuel from the prop-driven KC-97, though this would require rendezvous at lower altitudes and slower speeds. The KC-135 was ultimately retained as the primary tanker for the U-2.18\n\n## The U-2 Goes To Sea\n\nEarly in the development program, some had suggested operating the U-2 from an aircraft carrier to provide additional mission flexibility. This idea was even briefed to President Eisenhower in May 1957, but critics rejected the idea because the carrier capability would add little to the coverage of Soviet Bloc countries reachable by the U-2 from land bases. Acting CIA Director Lt. Gen. Charles P. Cabell acknowledged that flexibility and independence of foreign jurisdiction would generally enhance U.S. reconnaissance capability with respect to areas outside the Soviet Bloc, but he felt the benefits would be too limited to justify the expense of modifying the aircraft. Additionally, since the CIA and Air Force jointly administered the U-2 program, any such modification required the concurrence of both for final approval. The Air Force chief of staff decided that there was no need to develop a carrier capability, and he disapproved of the proposal. Navy officials attempted on several occasions over the next 3 years to obtain a joint agreement between the CIA and Air Force, but development of a carrier-based U-2 did not gain impetus until 1963, when deputy CIA Director Lt. Gen. Marshall S. Carter became interested in the idea.19\nCarter discussed the concept with Kelly Johnson, who assured him that the aircraft could be modified with relatively minor engineering changes and at reasonable cost. Carter then directed Col. Jack Ledford, assistant director of the Office of Special Activities, to investigate the feasibility of U-2 carrier operations and determine how to implement such a program. To begin, Ledford's deputy, James A. Cunningham, Jr., assembled a team of representatives from Lockheed and the office of the Chief of Naval Operations to visit several aircraft carriers and naval air stations. The purpose of these survey trips was to identify and resolve any potential problems that might affect development and operational deployment of the U-2G. Cunningham then assembled the team's findings and recommendations into a report for Gen. Carter in which he addressed the question of whether the U-2G could be economically adapted to operate from carriers within acceptable safety parameters, with sufficient frequency to be effective, and without adversely affecting the Navy's operational commitments. Cunningham concluded that \"present engineering analyses confirm that the aircraft can be so operated theoretically as to produce a viable carrier capability for reconnaissance purposes.\"20\nAs soon as Carter approved Cunningham's recommendations, on July 23,\n1963, Lockheed began working to modify the first of several airframes to the new configuration. Adapting the U-2 to its new environment posed multiple challenges. The types of aircraft typically flown from carriers required a catapult to launch from the deck and arresting gear to bring the aircraft to a halt upon landing. These operations imposed structural stresses on the airframe and landing gear beyond those the U-2 had been designed to withstand. Necessary changes to the U-2 would undoubtedly affect the airplane's range and altitude characteristics. The addition of an arresting hook, beefed up landing gear, and other equipment promised unavoidable weight penalties, but there were no significant aerodynamic changes. Concurrently, the CIA coordinated with the Navy to arrange for U-2 carrier suitability tests and to develop a pilot training program. There were a great many questions regarding the airplane's behavior during approach and landing. The U-2 normally landed tail-high, which would make snagging the arresting cable with the hook nearly impossible without a skillful power-on approach just above stall speed. Additionally, wind patterns over the stern of a fast-moving carrier typically produced a downdraft immediately to the rear of the stern, followed by an updraft from 1,000 to 1,500 feet aft of the carrier. Specialized landing techniques had to be developed to overcome the adverse effects of these phenomena.21\nIn designing the U-2G, Lockheed engineers made several major changes to the basic airframe. The most obvious external difference was the addition of an arresting hook installed beneath the aft fuselage and covered with a plastic aerodynamic fairing that would be jettisoned in preparation for landing. A reinforced main landing gear strut more than doubled the original design specification for maximum deceleration speed. The tail wheel strut was also reinforced and protected by the addition of a metal plate to deflect the arresting cable. Engineers added thicker pressure bulkheads in the landing gear bay and augmented longerons in the fuselage at the wing's trailing edge to enable the aircraft to withstand the added stresses of arresting-hook engagement. With a full fuel load, the U-2G would necessarily be above its maximum gross landing weight at takeoff. In order to quickly reduce aircraft weight in the event of an emergency requiring immediate landing, the U-2G was equipped with a mechanically operated fuel jettison system. Because of the critical need to reduce lift at touchdown, mechanical spoilers were added to the outboard trailing edge of the wings. Activated by a simple switch on the throttle quadrant at touchdown, these caused the wing to stall almost immediately, enabling the pilot to make a precision landing. For obvious structural reasons, catapult launch of the U-2G was not feasible, but the airplane's normal takeoff characteristics were deemed more than sufficient.22\nThere were, of course, logistical challenges involved in loading the U-2\naboard a carrier and handling the airplane on deck. Using a standard fuselagehandling cart as a starting point, Lockheed manufactured a special sling for lifting the airplane to place it on board or remove it from the ship. The hangar deck offered adequate space for maintenance work or fueling, but moving the airplane up to the flight deck required Lockheed engineers to design a specialized handling cart because the ship's elevator was not large enough to easily accommodate the U-2.23 James Cunningham noted that \"the handling, launching, and retrieval will always be a special operation, requiring considerable technical skill from both ground support personnel and pilots.\"24\nCarrier suitability trials began in August 1963. These preliminary tests, dubbed Project Whale Tale, used an unmodified U-2C flown by Bob Schumacher from the USS *Kitty Hawk* approximately 50 miles off the coast of California. Although security was considered paramount, it was impossible to conceal the airplane from the multitude of personnel at the Navy port in San Diego and onboard the carrier itself. Schumacher had flown Article 352 into Naval Air Station North Island under cover of darkness, and the U-2 was hoisted aboard the *Kitty Hawk* after midnight. Navy personnel involved in the loading operation included firefighters, security guards, crane operators, and numerous others.25 Despite the most stringent precautions by both Navy and CIA security personnel to prevent unwitting persons gaining knowledge of the operation, Kelly Johnson was horrified to see unexpected crowds of spectators. As he later noted in his diary, \"I don't think more than 2,000 or 3,000 people saw the aircraft go aboard, as they kept coming back all night from a carnival that was held adjacent to the loading docks!\"26\nAfter dawn, the *Kitty Hawk* steamed westward into the Pacific Ocean to a point approximately 20 miles south of San Clemente Island. The ship was under way at 20 knots into a 10-knot headwind. The combined 30-knot wind across the flight deck posed a challenge for the deck crew as they positioned the lightweight airplane for takeoff. When given clearance, Schumacher advanced the throttle and began rolling down the deck. He was airborne within a mere 321 feet, the pogos dropped to the deck, and by the time the U-2 cleared the carrier's bow it had already climbed 1,000 feet. After initially making a steep climb, Schumacher circled around and made several low approaches to the flight deck at speeds between 75 and 78 knots to evaluate the airplane's handling qualities in the crosswinds and turbulence surrounding the carrier. On the third approach, he briefly touched down but bounced, striking the right wingtip against the steel deck plating before reapplying power and going around. After a final pass that allowed observers to check for damage, Schumacher flew the U-2 to Lockheed's facility in Burbank. The test was considered a complete success that furnished Lockheed engineers with valuable data for use in further developing the U-2G design changes.27\nKelly Johnson and his team mulled over many questions still not fully answered. They briefly considered using a parachute and speed brakes to arrest the airplane on landing instead of the tailhook and cable system, because repeated arrested landings might overstress the tail-mounting bolts. There was concern that shock effects of carrier landings and associated twisting moments might eventually cause wing fatigue or fuel leaks or even damage sensitive reconnaissance and navigational equipment. Most carrier-based aircraft were designed for landing deceleration speeds of 15 to 20 feet per second, but Johnson was only confident that he could beef up the landing gear to withstand a 10-foot-per-second deceleration. All the while, Johnson worked to keep modification costs as low as possible. One cost-saving innovation was his recommendation to transfer two Air Force U-2A airframes to the project since they had already been scheduled for overhaul and conversion to U-2C standards. Accordingly, articles 348 and 362 were converted to G models along with articles 382 and 385. After Article 362 was lost in July 1964, it was replaced with Article 349, which had been transferred from the Air Force. Originally built as a U-2A, Article 349 now received the J75 engine, the carrier landing modifications, and in-flight refueling capability, and it was designated the sole U-2H model. It seemed like the perfect combination of characteristics for mission flexibility. Unfortunately, the excess weight considerably reduced maximum altitude. Consequently, the refueling receptacle was removed less than a year later, returning the airplane to the standard U-2G configuration.28\nFor the arresting gear, Johnson ultimately settled on a modified version of the tailhook used on the T-2A. On the U-2, it was mounted ahead of the tail wheel and attached to the same structural framework that included the wing attach points and engine mounts. Small fairings surrounded the hook to reduce aerodynamic drag, and although the jettisonable fairing had been eliminated, there was provision for a plastic cover to hide the hook from view when it was not in use. A shield assembly ahead of the tail-wheel doors was installed to deflect the arresting cable in the event that the hook failed to connect. Johnson studied several lift-reduction systems before settling on the spoilers. Fixed slots in the flaps offered the simplest solution and the least weight penalty but would have required a much steeper angle of attack on final approach. A proposed leading-edge slat would have required borrowing space from the fuel tanks to accommodate actuators, resulting in a 400-nautical-mile loss in range. With the addition of the spoilers and fuel-dump system, the total weight penalty resulting from the modifications was around 350 pounds.29\nCIA project staff and Naval Training Command personnel formulated a three-phase training syllabus known as Whale Tale II. Phase One of the short but comprehensive carrier qualification course included initial flight checkout in the Navy's T-2A and simulated carrier landings under the supervision of a highly qualified landing signals officer (LSO) at Naval Air Station Monterey, CA. In Phase Two, trainees completed additional practice landings at Naval Air Station Pensacola, FL, followed by actual carrier landings aboard the USS *Lexington* in the Gulf of Mexico. Phase Three consisted of carrier-type approaches and landings in the U-2G on a specially prepared lakebed runway at Edwards and, finally, actual carrier landings in the U-2.30\nThe first four pilots began Phase One training in November 1963 under the supervision of Lt. Cdr. John Huber. After 2 weeks, the group moved to Pensacola for Phase Two and completed initial carrier qualification. A second group of four CIA pilots plus Schumacher and Detachment G Comm. Bill Gregory began training in January 1964 and completed Phase Two on February 15. Phase Three commenced with the delivery of the first U-2G to the Edwards detachment. Bob Schumacher tested the spoiler system during initial field carrier-landing practice sorties, discovering a variety of minor problems that included airframe buffeting, tail vibration, and a rolling tendency at stall. Once these minor problems were resolved, each detachment pilot had the opportunity to fly numerous practice sorties. In developing landing techniques based on experience with both the T-2A and U-2G, they agreed that an ideal carrier landing required approximately 40 knots wind speed across the deck. Since the U-2 typically landed at 70 knots this resulted in an actual touchdown speed of about 30 knots. The ultimate key to success was complete trust in the LSO. Observing from the deck, Huber signaled the U-2 pilot with regard to last-minute altitude adjustments and the precise moment for chopping the throttle to idle.31\nWith simulated carrier-landing practice completed, the stage was now set for Whale Tale III deployment aboard the USS *Ranger*. Like the previous training project, this effort was divided into three parts. Phase One was devoted exclusively to Lockheed testing of U-2G carrier-landing characteristics and operational suitability. As soon as these tests were completed, the airplane was turned over to Detachment G personnel for Phase Two, which consisted entirely of carrier takeoff and landing practice. In Phase Three, the Edwards detachment evaluated the airplane's operational capabilities. The results provided valuable lessons with regard to piloting techniques and operational procedures.32\nOn February 29, 1964, Bob Schumacher began Phase One with a series of touch-and-go landings in Article 362, which had been specially instrumented for the tests. This part of the testing went well, but he reported turbulence on approach requiring significant throttle adjustments. When Schumacher attempted his first arrested landing, he approached too fast and a little high. The airplane bounced and the hook engaged the cable while the U-2G was still airborne, causing it to slam back to the deck and nose over. Minor damage to the nose section was easily repaired aboard ship, but afterward Schumacher flew the plane to Burbank so engineers could study the instrument readings and add a steel skid beneath the forward fuselage to prevent a similar mishap. Once carrier-landing techniques had been perfected, this additional modification was no longer required. In order to solve the turbulence problem, the carrier's speed had to be reduced until the wind over the deck dropped to 25 knots and the updraft behind the ship flattened out below the U-2's approach path.33\nSchumacher returned on March 2 in Article 348 and completed Phase One with four successful arrested landings. The airplane was then turned over to Gregory's detachment for Phase Two. That same day, Robert Ericson made several touch-and-go landings but was unable to successfully perform an arrested landing. His plane ran short of fuel while the USS *Ranger* maneuvered away from a foreign vessel that had entered the operational area, and he eventually had to land at North Island. Jim Barnes flew Article 348 back to the carrier on March 3, but on his first touch-and-go, he allowed the right wing to drop. The right wing skid became entangled with the arresting cable and tore off. Barnes gunned the throttle, gained some altitude, and flew the airplane to Edwards for repairs. These incidents delayed completion of Phase Two by another week, which allowed project pilots to refine their approach techniques based on experience gained up to that point. Once flight operations resumed, all pilots qualified for carrier operations without further incident. The end of Phase Three signaled the detachment's operational readiness.34\nThe U-2's carrier capability was put to the test a few months later during Operation Fishhawk. This called for a flight over the French nuclear test site at Mururoa Atoll in the middle of the Pacific Ocean. So remote was the test site that the USS *Ranger* and her escort had to sail more than 3,000 miles just to get within range for the U-2 mission. All necessary support equipment and personnel and one of three pilots were aboard the carrier when it departed San Diego. On May 12, two additional pilots ferried their U-2G aircraft to the ship from Edwards via Hawaii. One week later, when the *Ranger* was within 800 nautical miles of Mururoa, one of the airplanes took off on a maximum-range sortie covering more than 1,000 miles. Since additional photographic coverage was required, a second mission was launched on May 22.35\nDetachment G pilots continued to receive carrier qualification in the T-2A\nand perform practice touchdowns in the U-2 at Edwards. Over time, the pilots discovered that each of the airplanes had unique flying qualities. Article 382, for example had a tendency to drop off to the left in a stall. On April 26, 1965, Buster Edens, a 9-year veteran of the U-2 program, was briefed on this phenomenon before taking the airplane up for a series of simulated carrier landings. After taking off and climbing to 13,000 feet to check stall characteristics, which appeared normal, he returned to the landing pattern and made an approach to the runway. At touchdown, the left wing dropped, dragging the skid for about 50 feet as Edens added power and struggled to get aloft. He managed to level the wings and become airborne, making a left turn to reenter the downwind leg. A ground observer advised him to check the wing balance again, which he apparently did at an altitude of 3,000 feet. At this point, the airplane dipped to the left into a descending spiral. Edens extended the speed brakes to arrest the spin but never regained control. He ejected at extremely low altitude and was killed because his parachute did not fully open.36\nAccident investigators recommended that in the future, stall checks be conducted with sufficient altitude available for spin recovery or, at the very least, safe egress. They also suggested that efforts be made to ensure symmetrical stall characteristics for all U-2 aircraft and that necessary modifications be made to prevent fuel from moving from one wing to the other when the pump was not operating.37 In his diary, Kelly Johnson lamented the stall and trim problems and the stall strips on the wings that had to be hand tailored for each aircraft individually. \"If we put the stall strips where they give us good landing and takeoff characteristics,\" he wrote, \"then we run into buffeting and pitching at altitude.\"38\nAlthough the overall results of the Whale Tale effort were highly successful, there was substantial Navy opposition to conducting additional U-2 carrier missions. Operation and deployment of an aircraft carrier was extremely expensive and required an entire flotilla of support vessels. Moving an entire carrier battle group quickly or in secret was virtually impossible, and senior Navy leadership complained that the U-2 operation was interfering with other fleet priorities.39 In 1969, all surviving U-2G airframes were placed in flyable storage, but this was not the end of U-2 operations at sea.\n\n## The First Trainer\n\nOther than the U-2D, there had never been a two-seat U-2. Unlike most military airplanes, there was no trainer model with provisions for an instructor pilot and trainee. Student pilots received instruction and checkout in the T-33\nbefore making their first solo flight in the U-2. Although the idea of building a U-2 trainer had been raised many times, the idea failed to gain traction until the early 1970s. In the wake of several landing accidents, 15th Air Force commander Gen. Paul K. Carlton sent the SAC U-2 unit operations officer, Col. Tony Martinez, to Lockheed to discuss the possibility of modifying one of the damaged airframes into a two-place trainer. Kelly Johnson offered to rebuild the U-2C for $1 million but estimated it would cost $5 million to $6 million to convert it into a trainer. Air Force officials approved the expenditure and Johnson assigned Ed Baldwin to lead the conversion team at the Skunk Works facility in Palmdale, CA. Maj. George Worley of the 100th Strategic Reconnaissance Wing advised Baldwin on what controls and instruments would be needed for the instructor's cockpit.40\nBaldwin began with Article 393, which had been badly damaged during a landing accident in May 1972. Using parts of other crashed airframes, his team installed a second cockpit for the instructor pilot above and directly behind the student's cockpit. The conversion was completed just 5 months after receiving the go-ahead. Lockheed chief test pilot Bill Park made the maiden flight of the U-2CT on February 13, 1973. He found that the oddlooking configuration handled well and apparently had no adverse effect on the airplane's aerodynamics. Eleven days later, after the U-2CT had been painted gloss white with SAC markings, Worley flew the trainer to Davis- Monthan Air Force Base near Tucson, AZ. Crew chief TSgt. Jose Ortiz rode in the front cockpit during the ferry flight, becoming the first enlisted crewman to fly in a U-2.41\nBased on a new training syllabus written by Worley, new U-2 pilots first received an hour of taildragger experience in a Bellanca Decathlon. They would then need to make five flights with an instructor in the U-2CT before being allowed to solo. The new trainer soon proved its worth and was very popular with student pilots. A second U-2CT was built from Article 359 in the summer of 1975 and delivered in January 1976. Both trainers remained in service until 1987.42\n\n## Second Generation\n\nThe number of U-2s operated by the CIA fluctuated over the course of the airplane's first decade of service. By 1963, nearly half of the 55 airframes built had been lost to attrition and others were swapped back and forth between the agency and the Air Force. Although Kelly Johnson recognized the need to put the U-2 back into production, he was reluctant because the Government was already heavily invested in the airplane's successor, the A-12, and variants including the YF-12 and R-12 (later redesignated SR-71). So, rather than restart the production line, Johnson assigned several of his engineers to develop a simple modification to improve the U-2's capabilities. Merv Heal and his team proposed adding two 30-inch fuselage plugs, one aft of the Q-bay and one aft of the wings, adding 60 inches to the airframe. This would give the airplane more room for equipment, a refueling receptacle, and carrier arresting gear. Johnson was so enthusiastic about the improved capabilities that in September 1963 he recommended building a new batch of 25 aircraft, designated U-2L, at a cost of approximately $1 million apiece.43\nAir Force and Navy officials expressed interest in the basic U-2L, but the CIA requested a capability for installing an upward-facing optical sensor to take images of Soviet satellites. Johnson subsequently sought a 240-inch focal length camera that could fit in the nose of the U-2, pointed upward. He then proposed a rotating nose assembly that would allow the camera to take pictures of the ground as well. This version of the airplane was dubbed U-2M.\n\nBut getting approval for production was no longer as easy as it once had been.\n\nThe National Reconnaissance Office (NRO), established in 1960, now had procurement approval authority for all overhead reconnaissance programs, and despite the fact that the NRO was a joint organization between the CIA and military services, there was a significant amount of bureaucratic infighting. In September 1964, the NRO rejected Lockheed's U-2L and U-2M proposals in favor of less costly upgrades to the existing fleet.44\nIn March 1965, NRO Director Brockway McMillan directed the Air Force and CIA to study future requirements for the U-2. He also asked for comparison of U-2 intelligence collection capabilities versus the A-12/SR-71 and reconnaissance satellites, as well as an estimate of the future role of airborne reconnaissance platforms in the face of improved hostile air defense systems. Three months later, McMillan received a recommendation to procure more U-2 airplanes. This gave Kelly Johnson the opportunity to propose yet another improvement. Up to this point, he had yet to alter the U-2's wing configuration, but he began investigating new high-lift NASA airfoils, swept wings, and changes in aspect ratio. In July, he pitched a proposal for building 27 U-2N airframes with a longer wingspan and increased lifting surface. Unimpressed, McMillan rejected the proposal on the basis that \"Although a new version would have somewhat improved performance, it would still be highly vulnerable to both ground and air missiles.\"45\nJohnson's team continued to work despite this setback. In an effort to improve the wing configuration, Lockheed spent $250,000 on designing and wind tunnel testing a new wing with a NASA-developed flap, designed by Richard Whitcomb of Langley Research Center, that would increase critical Mach number, the lowest Mach number at which airflow over some point of the aircraft reaches the speed of sound. Initial test results were disappointing. Although the new flap arrangement delayed the onset of transonic drag rise, the airplane's overall profile drag increased by 30 percent. As Johnson noted in his diary, \"When we combined this with the extremely heavy weight of the new wing and its controls we obtained a very discouraging outcome.\"46\nIn the meantime, Pratt & Whitney engineers were working on improvements to boost climb performance. The result was the J75-P-13B with 17,000\npounds of thrust at sea level. The NRO ordered 24 of the new engines to upgrade the existing U-2 fleet, but flight testing demonstrated a clear need for widening the air inlet to optimize performance. Johnson saw this as an opportunity to press his case for a wholly revised U-2 design, and he directed Merv Heal to conduct another design study. The U-2R featured an enlarged fuselage with additional equipment space and provisions for interchangeable nose assemblies to carry a variety of cameras and sensors, depending on mission requirements.47 As Johnson later wrote, \"We made a complete circle and ended up merely enlarging the present U-2 to take advantage of a 20 percent power increase... . Going back to the original concept, where we can fly with a lift coefficient of 0.6 to 0.7, gives us an airplane with a 7,000 mile range unrefueled and a few thousand feet more altitude.\"48 As it turned out, Johnson's range estimate was overly optimistic, but there was significant improvement.\n\nHe pitched his proposal in January 1966, offering to build the first two aircraft for just $12.5 million. The Air Force expressed little interest at the time, giving higher priority to the SR-71 program, but the CIA funded a 3-month study contract for basic engineering. Lockheed spent a nearly equivalent sum of company money on wind tunnelmodel testing. Additional testing was undertaken to determine the airplane's vulnerability to radar tracking and surface-to-air missiles.49 By August 1966, the original U-2 fleet had dwindled to 15, and several of these were undergoing repairs at Lockheed. To increase the number of available aircraft and lengthen the fleet's service life, Director of Central Intelligence Richard Helms initially approved an order for eight airframes. Within 6 months, he and Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara jointly placed an order for another four.50\nJohnson assigned Ed Baldwin and Fred Cavanaugh to spearhead the engineering effort, and he gave their 30-person team 12 months to refine the design, build the aircraft, and fly the prototype. Apart from enhanced performance, design goals included a better electrical system along with improved maintainability and servicing provisions. The enlarged fuselage not only offered substantially increased internal volume for additional equipment but also achieved better overall weight distribution. Other improvements included the elimination of protruding oil cooler intakes (to reduce drag), enlarged horizontal and vertical tail surfaces, hydraulically actuated roll and lift spoilers, enlarged retractable leading-edge stall strips, strengthened landing gear, a zerozero ejection seat, proper stressing for arresting gear, and folding wingtips for ease of storage on the ground or inside an aircraft carrier. A mockup review on November 29, 1966, resulted in very few recommendations for design changes.\n\nJohnson's engineering team had taken thorough advantage of prior experience and lessons learned from the earlier U-2 production program. One problem\n\n47. Ibid., pp. 237238.\n48. Miller, *Lockheed Skunk Works: The First Fifty Years*, p. 89.\n49. Pocock, *50 Years of the U-2*, p. 238.\n50. Pedlow & Welzenbach, *The CIA and the U-2 Program*, p. 251.\nthat had been addressed was that the first-generation U-2 had become so heavy that the margin between stall buffet and compressibility at high altitudes was only 6 knots. With improved wings and engine, the U-2R had a comparatively generous 20-knot window, greatly improving the airplane's flying qualities.51\nThe original U-2 had an 80-foot span with 600 square feet of wing area.\n\nBy contrast, the U-2R had a 103-foot span with 1,000 square feet of lifting surface. Bob Wiele, who led the wing design team, retained the original NACA 64A airfoil and reduced wing loading to the values attained with the U-2A. The airplane's lift-to-drag ratio was 27:1, its lift coefficient was 0.6 to 0.7, and the aspect ratio was 10.667. The unconventional wing structure weighed just 3 pounds per square foot and included planks (eight per wing) milled from large aluminum billets, rather than being built up using riveted sheet metal, I-beams, and U-channels. The larger wing also gave the U-2R increased internal fuel capacity, and the fuel tank arrangement was altered. In the early U-2 models, having the main tank forward and the auxiliary tank aft resulted in considerable changes in center of gravity as fuel was consumed. This problem was eliminated in the U-2R by placing the 1,169-gallon main tanks inboard and the 239-gallon auxiliaries outboard. Fuel from the main tanks was exhausted first so that the weight of the remaining fuel in the auxiliary tanks helped dampen wing bending and torsional loads. An additional 99 gallons in the sump tank gave the U-2R a total capacity of 2,915 gallons, enough to remain airborne for 15 hours, though it was impractical to expect a pilot to endure flying solo in a pressure suit for such an extended length of time.52\nHerb Nystrom led the team that designed the empennage and tail assembly.\n\nFollowing a series of engineering studies, he opted to include an all-moving tailplane similar to the one Kelly Johnson developed for the Lockheed JetStar. This configuration most effectively distributed pitch forces across the entire horizontal stabilizer assembly, widened the airplane's center-of-gravity limits, and eliminated the need for both ballast and trim tabs.53\nEd Baldwin's team was responsible for designing the fuselage assembly.\n\nWith wide, flaring inlets, it had a Coke bottle shape and was wider and 25 percent longer than that of earlier models. A surplus of internal volume accommodated navigation and communications equipment, defensive avionics, and other items. Mission equipment occupied both the enlarged Q-bay and the nose compartment. Total payload capacity was 1,050 pounds. The cockpit was 45 percent larger than that of the U-2C, allowing the partial-pressure suit to be abandoned in favor of bulkier but more comfortable full-pressure suits. It also accommodated a new ejection seat that could be safely used at even extremely low altitude. Seven experienced U-2 pilots contributed to the design of the cockpit arrangement. Fitted with pressure suits, they took turns sitting in the mockup and evaluating visibility instrument placement and operability of controls and switches.54\nAlthough the remaining U-2C airframes had been equipped with the new J75-P-13B engine, the U-2R was powered by an upgraded model that had improved dependability and increased thrust, allowing it to achieve speeds up to 410 knots (Mach 0.72), or about 12 knots faster than the U-2C. Although the U-2R could exceed 74,000 feet, it had a shorter range at maximum altitude than the U-2C. One significant improvement was that in the event that the P-13B engine quit during flight, it could be restarted at 54,000 feet, roughly 10,000 feet higher than the earlier P-13A.55\nAssembly of the first U-2R began in early 1967. Johnson was very satisfied with his team's workmanship, but by mid-March 1967, he was concerned that construction of the prototype was progressing slowly. \"This is basically because I have insisted on much better tooling than on prior models,\" he wrote in his diary, \"and, while it will take us longer to get started, we will get much better airplanes.\" By April 19, the wings were taking shape and the forward fuselage and cockpit structure were nearly complete. Johnson marveled at the size of the U-2R and lamented that the airframe was about 800 pounds heavier than originally specified, about half of which was due to added customer equipment.56\nIn accordance with Kelly Johnson's schedule, the completed prototype, known as Article 051, was delivered to Edwards in August. Following static ground testing and taxi trials, the unpainted U-2R was prepared for its maiden flight. On August 28, with Bob Schumacher and Johnson flying chase in a Beech Twin Bonanza, Bill Park took off from Rogers Dry Lake and soared into the sky. He found the airplane generally similar to its predecessors. As testing continued over the ensuing months, Park and other test pilots gained an appreciation for the various design improvements. Larger control surfaces and an increased critical Mach number significantly improved the overall flying qualities. Improved margins between stall and Mach buffet at cruising altitudes allowed more reliable autopilot control, and the U-2R had better longitudinal pitch trim than earlier models.57\nA second U-2R was delivered in December. Results of flight testing indicated that range and altitude performance was as desired. Maximum altitude was a function of gross takeoff weight and outside air temperature, but a U-2R with a gross takeoff weight of 34,750 pounds (including 12,250 pounds of fuel and a 3,000-pound payload) could fly a 7.5-hour, 3,000-nautical-mile mission, with most of the flight above 70,000 feet. The test team discovered a number of small problems with the air conditioning system, engine oil cooling, fuel-feed system, and tail vibration, but these were easily fixed. A more serious problem was the airplane's tendency to veer to the left during takeoff roll due to nonaxisymmetric thrust. Testing had to be delayed 2 months while Lockheed engineers devised a solution. Their first attempt involved adding a\n5-inch extension to the tailpipe, but this caused serious vibration. Ultimately, the original U-2R tailpipe was extended 12 inches and bypass doors were added adjacent to the engine compressor face. These doors provided cooling air to the engine compartment and secondary airflow to the exhaust ejector. During ground operations, when nacelle pressure was higher than at the compressor face, they remained closed to prevent the compressor from drawing air away from the ejector. During flight, the doors opened when pressure at the engine face was higher.58\nProduction airframes rolled off the assembly line at the rate of approximately one per month. By the end of May 1968, five airplanes were flying and two of those were being used for operational pilot training. The U-2R proved to be a very stable platform for reconnaissance sensors and featured better camera-window glass than had been previously used. Kelly Johnson presented test results and touted the airplane's enhanced capabilities in the hope of attracting customers and keeping the U-2R production line open beyond the 12-unit initial run. He emphasized the reliability and flexibility that built upon prior experience with a family of aircraft that had logged more than 135,000 flight hours since its introduction in 1955. The J75 engine, already in use throughout the fleet, was well proven and capable of enduring 1,200 hours of operation before requiring overhaul. With a multitude of built-in access panels, the U-2R had been designed for ease of maintenance and servicing. It also had a comprehensive suite of communication and navigation equipment, as well as multiple backups for the electrical power system.59\nJohnson succeeded in impressing senior Air Force leadership, though not as he had intended. Instead of placing a new order that would keep the production line running, they instead tried to acquire all 12 of the existing airframes for use by SAC. For a while, this pitted Director of Central Intelligence Richard Helms against Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara. Eventually, they came to an agreement to split the disposition of the U-2R production between the CIA and Air Force. In November 1968, 1 month prior to the delivery of the last U-2R, the NRO Executive Committee ordered most of the remaining U-2C and U-2G airframes placed in flyable storage to be used later for replacement of any U-2R models lost to attrition.\n\nAfter the new model was declared operational in January 1969, pilots who had previously flown the U-2C underwent a 20-hour conversion course while transitioning to the U-2R. For reconnaissance sorties, the airplane could be equipped with a variety of different cameras, but with a 24-inch-focal-length stereo design and 12-inch resolution, the Itek IRIS II became the sensor of choice. This panoramic camera had a 140-degree scan angle and carried 10,500 feet of film to cover a 60-mile swath from 70,000 feet. An optical bar system in which the entire mirror-lens assembly rotated continuously eliminated vibration problems that reduced resolution in cameras with reciprocating shutters and lenses.60\nDevelopmental and experimental testing at Edwards continued as the U-2R\nwas placed into service elsewhere. Some of these experiments were quite innovative if not terribly successful. One of these, dubbed Chameleon, involved the application of paint that changed color as temperature varied with altitude. It was hoped that paint that appeared light blue at low altitudes would change to dark blue in the cold upper atmosphere, and then back again during descent, to better camouflage the airplane throughout the course of a mission. Wailing Wall was an experiment to determine whether specially designed intake duct linings and various exhaust nozzle shapes would reduce the airplane's acoustic signature, preventing detection during missions at low altitudes. Lockheed engineers hoped to make the U-2 inaudible as low as 500 feet above the ground, but the effort failed. For additional mission flexibility, one proposal involved development of a probe-and-drogue buddy refueling capability that would allow one U-2 to refuel another in flight. There was also a study to develop a night-vision driftsight to allow the pilot to navigate from high altitudes using terrain features after dark. By far the most practical effort involved an attempt to provide the U-2R with a high-altitude engine restart capability. This worked consistently at 50,000 feet, 10,000 feet above the normal J75-P-13B relight altitude, but worked only occasionally at 56,000 to 58,000 feet. Some test projects were almost surreal. One involved a method for dropping propaganda leaflets from 70,000 feet. Another, called Fortune Cookie, called for launching modified AQM-37 supersonic drones from wing pylons. Under the initial concept, the rocket-powered drone would be equipped with a camera and recovered at the end of its flight. Later, it was proposed that an expendable drone would collect electronic intelligence data, which could then be relayed to the U-2 or another airborne platform within range. Although test results were promising, no operational missions were undertaken.61 Kelly Johnson also pursued the concept of arming the U-2 with bombs and missiles. This would have required the addition of hard-points on the wings for attaching weapon pylons and replacing the original landing gear with a tricycle arrangement consisting of two main gear in mid-wing pods and a nose wheel. This concept never went beyond testing of a wind tunnel model.62\nIn the summer of 1969, despite continuing Navy opposition, the U-2R\nwas scheduled for carrier trials under project Blue Gull. Things went a little smoother this time because the U-2R had been designed to accommodate removable arresting gear and the outermost 6 feet of each wing folded upward, allowing the airplane to fit more easily onto the carrier's elevator and inside the hangar deck. The first phase of testing involved 2 days of practice using a mock carrier runway at Naval Air Station Lakehurst, NJ. Thanks to the improved flap configuration and a more responsive throttle, pilots found the carrier landing characteristics of the U-2R much more benign than those of the U-2G. Next, Lockheed test pilot Bill Park, along with two American and two British pilots assigned to the U-2 project, underwent carrier qualification in the T-2B at Pensacola. This time, Lt. Cdr. Lonnie McClung served as the project's resident LSO.63\nIn November 1969, following additional landing practice in the U-2R at Edwards, the team headed east for Blue Gull V carrier trials aboard the USS America. Two U-2R aircraft were ferried to NASA's Wallops Island facility on Virginia's Eastern Shore, and on November 21, Park flew out to the carrier. He made his first approach at a speed of 72 knots with a 20-knot wind over the deck but had to abort when the tailhook failed to deploy. He returned to shore where it was found that someone had forgotten to remove the locking pin prior to takeoff. His second and third attempts resulted in successful full-stop landings on the carrier deck. Park also demonstrated lightweight and heavyweight takeoffs. Overall, he was very satisfied with the airplane's handling characteristics, and he remarked that he scarcely needed to use the arresting gear at all.64\nEach of the four remaining pilots earned their carrier qualifications in the U-2R, but debate still raged as to whether the Navy would permit operational missions to be carried out. The Blue Gull V exercise had demonstrated that the airplane fit onto the elevator and could be easily moved from hangar deck to flight deck and that flight operations could be easily accomplished with repeated success. Besides the obvious reconnaissance applications, there had been some interest in using the U-2R as a high-altitude communications relay for the carrier air group. Some high-ranking Navy officials, however, still felt that these were not sufficient reasons to take up valuable deck and hangar space and that it was simply too expensive to commit a carrier deployment to what would likely be a single U-2 sortie.65\nThis didn't stop Kelly Johnson from pursuing other potential naval applications for the U-2R, particularly in the field of maritime surveillance. Up to this point, any airborne platform that relied on photographic means for obtaining imagery was constrained by inclement weather and limited daylight. By the early 1970s, significant advancements in high-speed integrated solidstate circuits made it possible to digitally process radar imaging signals in real time. The resulting increase in coverage and resolution this afforded spurred a revolution in the development of such sensors as synthetic-aperture radar (SAR), in which the airplane's flightpath was used to make a relatively small antenna perform like an extremely large antenna electronically. Collected data could then be processed to generate high-resolution imagery. In 1971, the NRO sponsored Project Senior Lanceflight tests of a prototype imaging radar built by Goodyear Aerospace in Phoenix. When installed in the nose of the U-2R, the sensor provided a commanding view from high altitude. Targets as far as 100 miles away could be identified in all weather conditions, day or night, even when concealed beneath foliage or camouflage netting. Flights made over the ocean provided imagery in which the wakes of individual ships were distinguishable even at great distances.66\nIn the initial phase of testing, Article 061 was equipped with a radar sensor that simply collected and stored all data for later processing. In March 1972, a data link was installed in the airplane so that radar returns could be transmitted to the ground for immediate processing and then sent as quickly as possible to military commanders to provide vital, current intelligence. A 3-month test of this capability, dubbed Senior Dagger, took place at McCoy Air Force Base, FL, that summer, with U-2 radar imagery being downlinked to a ground station at Rome Air Force Base, NY. Following completion of these tests, Article 061 was bailed to the Navy for a 6-month, $5.5 million program to evaluate a configuration called Electronics Patrol Experimental (EP-X). Under Project Highboy, the U-2R was equipped with forward-looking radar in the nose compartment and wing pods to contain additional sensors. The nose-mounted system was a variant of the AN/ APS-116 X-band weather radar, modified to detect surface vessels or submarine periscopes protruding above the waves.67 The left pod contained a return-beam vidicon camera, a high-performance electronic imaging sensor capable of making continuous or discrete exposures with performance matching or exceeding that of film, particularly with low-contrast imagery. An AN/ALQ-110 radar signal receiver was installed in the right pod along with a tracker camera that would normally have been mounted in the nose.68\nDuring EP-X tests in early 1973, the U-2R was flown off the coast of California to provide near-real-time information on shipping. The sensors were controlled from the ground and all data were downlinked to analysts at Lockheed's facility in Sunnyvale, CA. In another test, dubbed Outlaw Hawk, sensors aboard the U-2R were downlinked to surface ships including the USS *Kitty Hawk*. In this exercise, the U-2R was flown from Palmdale while the carrier group sailed from San Diego to Pearl Harbor, HI. Despite promising results, the EP-X concept was ultimately abandoned in favor of a combination of more conventional aircraft, such as the EP-3E, and ocean surveillance satellites.69\nKelly Johnson's hopes for restarting the U-2R production line under Navy contract were dashed when NRO leadership recommended terminating the CIA portion of the U-2 program. Under this plan, the U-2R fleet would be consolidated within SAC and two airframes could be loaned to the Navy for further EP-X testing. Johnson continued to propose new ideas for his beloved U-2, including a capability to carry two laser-guided bombs\n\n69. Norman Polmar, \"When the U-2 Went to Sea,\" *Air Force Magazine* 84, no. 2 (February 2001): 62.\nor anti-ship missiles and a U-2RL with a lengthened Q-bay and a refueling probe mounted at the tip of the vertical tail fin. Unfortunately, by this time a series of bribery scandals, as well as developmental and financial problems involving the L-1011 Tristar, threatened to bankrupt the company. The Navy showed no further interest in EP-X, and in 1974, the CIA put an end to the agency's U-2 operation. Johnson retired the following year to be replaced by his deputy, Ben Rich.70\nOver the next several years, the Air Force sought expanded capabilities for the U-2R, including improved cameras and the Advanced Synthetic Aperture Radar System (ASARS), which had resolution comparable to that of film cameras. Use of interchangeable nose assemblies, the Q-bay, and wing pods made it possible to conduct multisensor missions for simultaneous collection of both imagery and signals intelligence (SIGINT). Lockheed eventually contracted with Texas-based E-Systems to combine multiple SIGINT sensors within two 24-foot-long superpods mounted at midspan on each wing. Each superpod was capable of containing 800 pounds of equipment and was three times larger than the instrument pods used during the EP-X trials. As in the early days of the U-2, the airplane could also be fitted with particulate samplers for collecting debris from foreign nuclear tests; although such tests took place underground, radionuclides were sometimes vented into the atmosphere.71 This capability was also put to use after a nuclear-powered Soviet ocean surveillance satellite reentered Earth's atmosphere and disintegrated over Canada's Northwestern Territories in January 1978. Five U-2 high-altitude aerial sampling sorties were flown during a joint U.S.-Canadian search-and-recovery effort known as Operation Morning Light.72 The SAC U-2 fleet was also occasionally called upon to assist with flood control and tornado-damage assessment, hurricane surveillance, and geothermal-energy monitoring. Many such missions were accommodated during routine training sorties.73\nBy the mid-1970s, the Air Force had recognized the value of remotely piloted vehicles (RPVs) for airborne reconnaissance and was seriously considering investing in an extremely long-duration, high-altitude RPV. Drones used during the war in Vietnam produced imagery and other intelligence comparable in quality to that collected by crewed platforms but at considerably lower risk. In a fighter-sized RPV, space normally used for crews and life-support systems could be allocated to additional fuel and sensor equipment. Alternatively, such an airframe might be built with a strong, lightweight structure for improved altitude and range. Funding of engineering studies and testing of prototypes bled funding from other programs, including the U-2R. In one such effort, called Compass Cope, both Boeing and Teledyne-Ryan submitted competing designs for a high-altitude, long-range RPV designed for long-endurance photographic reconnaissance and electronic surveillance missions. Sensing an opportunity, Ben Rich proposed that Lockheed develop a remotely piloted version of the U-2R. He argued that since it was based on proven technology, the RPV would be less expensive to produce and be available sooner that either the Boeing or Teledyne-Ryan entries. Moreover, it would have equal or better performance and payload capabilities. It became a moot point when the Compass Cope program was canceled in July 1977\nbecause of difficulties in developing sensor payloads for the aircraft and because Air Force officials apparently had no interest in a U-2 RPV.74\n\n## New Production\n\nTo the surprise of many, Kelly Johnson's dream of restarting the U-2 production line eventually came true with congressional approval of the fiscal year 1979\ndefense budget. In 1977, Lockheed proposed upgrading the U-2R to carry side-looking radar and the latest ASARS, sensor packages considered ideal for the type of standoff tactical reconnaissance mission that military planners considered vital for future conflicts. Upon accepting this proposal, the Air Force signed an initial $10.2 million contract with Lockheed to refurbish the original U-2R tooling that had been in storage since 1969 and to create whatever new tooling might be required for constructing the new airframe. This was followed with a $42.4 million production contract to build the first three airframes, two trainers for the Air Force and a single-seat model for NASA to be used as an Earth resources science platform. By the time full-scale production ended, a total of 37 new airframes had been built, including another for NASA and an additional trainer. In keeping with the airplane's new tactical reconnaissance role, the Air Force changed the designation from U-2R to TR-1A for the singleseat model and TR-1B for the trainer.75 The NASA plane was initially called the ER-1 but was later redesignated ER-2, perhaps to further distinguish the research plane from its military counterpart.\n\nAfter 12 years of dormancy, restarting the assembly line proved more difficult than anticipated. Lack of experienced labor necessitated enticing some earlier U-2 production veterans out of retirement to augment the less-experienced workforce. The learning curve was steeper than it should have been but shot up dramatically over the first 2 years. Delays resulted from the need for Lockheed to reestablish relationships with vendors and subcontractors. Documentation became a nightmare. Whereas before the Skunk Works team had been able to streamline and minimize paperwork, the Air Force now demanded strict adherence to military specifications (better known as Mil-Spec) that governed procedures and processes. Throughout earlier production runs, Lockheed frequently disregarded Mil-Spec in order to meet the unique design requirements of the U-2, such as the need to minimize structural weight. With the new production, Air Force officials insisted on conformation to regulations. Eventually, the company and the Government reached a compromise that allowed Lockheed to work to the intention, rather than to the letter, of Mil-Spec regulations. There were also a few turf battles. A bureaucratic tug-of-war erupted between the Air Force's Aeronautical Systems Division (ASD) and Air Force Logistics Command (AFLC) over which organization should have overall responsibility for program management; it was settled only after AFLC successfully pressed the argument that the TR-1 was essentially a continuation of the earlier U-2R\nprogram. Then, the general in charge of Tactical Air Command sought to wrest ownership of the TR-1 from SAC, since it was at least nominally to be used for tactical reconnaissance rather than strategic reconnaissance. SAC commander Gen. Richard H. Ellis prevailed, contending, \"There is absolutely no reason why SAC cannot continue to support the tasking requested by theater commanders.\"76\nIt took 3 long years before TR-1 production began coming in under budget and ahead of schedule. This eventual success was largely due to the program's greatest asset: strong teamwork among Lockheed, ASD, AFLC, and the TR-1 System Program Office. According to ASD commander Lt. Gen. J. Michael Loh during an acceptance ceremony for the final airframe, \"Each successive year we got smarter about writing incentives for the TR-1 contracts, Lockheed got better at building it, and AFLC got better at integrating subsystems.\" This teamwork ultimately resulted in a $26 million savings on budget over the final 6 years of production.77\nFirst to roll off the assembly line was the NASA ER-2. Lockheed test pilot Art Peterson made the first flight on May 11, 1981, and NASA pilot Marty Knutson delivered it to Ames Research Center at Moffett Field, CA, on June\n10.78 This occurred with surprisingly little fanfare compared to the subsequent debut of the TR-1. Unlike its predecessors, which had been born in secrecy, the first TR-1A was unveiled publicly during a media event at Lockheed's Palmdale facility in July 1981. Company test pilot Ken Weir made the first flight on August 1, and by April 1982, six aircraft were flying. Low-rate production continued until the final delivery in early October 1989.79\nSeveral airframes were delivered under the designation U-2R and the second trainer as a U-2RT. In October 1991, the TR-1 designation was dropped altogether and the airplanes were once again all referred to as U-2s. By the time the final airframe rolled off the assembly line, the U-2R had evolved into a flexible, multipurpose platform for electro-optical, SIGINT, and radar reconnaissance. It was also considerably less expensive to maintain and operate than its putative successor, the SR-71. Sensor payloads included the ASARS-2 improved imaging radar and the Senior Year Electro-optical Reconnaissance System (SYERS). Both payloads could be installed in the interchangeable nose sections. In addition, the U-2R was capable of serving as a data relay and, when called for, could still carry high-resolution film cameras that were considerably more flexible and reliable than those used in the early days of the program. To further enhance its capabilities, the airplane was equipped with a data link to provide reconnaissance products in near real time. Early versions required the transmitter to be within 200 to 250 miles of a ground station for the line-of-sight downlink to work, otherwise data had to be recorded onboard until the U-2 was within range of the receiver. To escape this limitation, a satellite communications system was developed for the U-2R. Known as Senior Span, it consisted of a steerable\n30-inch parabolic antenna housed in an unpressurized dorsal radome. Skunk Works engineers faced the challenge of designing the 17-foot-long antenna dome so that it would not add excessive weight to the airframe or affect the center of gravity. The result was one of the most unusual looking U-2 configurations yet.80\n\n## Into The 21St Century\n\nIn the 1990s, the U-2 fleet received the first of several significant upgrades that modernized the airplane for a new era. Preproduction testing began in 1991 in preparation for retrofitting the fleet with General Electric F118-GE-101 nonafterburning turbofan engines; the antiquated J75-P-13B turbojet engines were becoming increasingly costly to maintain. Evaluation of the new powerplant included engine-airframe integration, basic operation, and demonstration of the airstart system. The new engine was rated at 18,300 pounds of thrust, and flight-test results indicated it would provide the U-2 with a weight savings of 1,300 pounds and use an average of 16 percent less fuel than the J75. The engine's size (39 inches shorter than the J75) and weight improved the airplane's center of gravity. Digital engine controls ensured linear thrust throughout the flight envelope and virtually eliminated the chance of compressor stalls and flameouts.81 In addition to being 30 percent lighter than the old engine, the F118 was more fuel efficient, more reliable, and easier to maintain, only requiring overhaul every 2,500 hours instead of every 800. The new engine increased the airplane's range by 1,220 nautical miles and increased altitude performance by about 3,000 feet.82 Production modifications began in 1994, and the entire fleet was retrofitted over the course of scheduled major overhauls that were due every 3,400 hours of operation. As each U-2R was modified, it was redesignated a U-2S, and the final engine installation took place in 1998.83\nThe F118 was not immune to problems. One U-2 was lost after a bearing failed, causing the engine to seize and rendering the restart system useless; subsequent dual battery failure and loss of altitude through inclement weather doomed the airplane. Another U-2 suffered repeated malfunctions, causing momentary power loss and severe engine vibrations, forcing the pilot to make an emergency landing.84\nIn 2000, Lockheed embarked on a 6-year, $140-million effort called the Power-EMI upgrade that called for equipping the U-2S with an updated electrical system that produced less electromagnetic interference. At the same time, the airplane was equipped with improved GPS navigational capability, a singlepiece windscreen for better visibility and de-icing capability, and provisions for integrating an improved SIGINT package. As with engine installation, these improvements were added during scheduled depot maintenance.85\nThere was some consideration given to redesigning the SYERS package to fit inside the Q-bay, thus allowing the U-2S to carry both it and the ASARS-2 sensors simultaneously. This proved impractical, so instead, efforts were focused on upgrading the SYERS multispectral capabilities. The SYERS-2 had seven collection wavebands compared to two with SYERS-1. The sensor now detected three visible, two shortwave infrared, and four medium-wave infrared wavebands, making it easier to detect and identify targets in daylight or at night, even through layers of haze. Improved data links enabled transmission of the increased data streaming from the sensor.86\nUp to this point, the U-2S was still equipped with a control panel characterized by round dials and a multitude of switches and knobs, just as it had been since 1967. A new so-called \"glass cockpit\" was introduced in December 2000, replacing conventional analog instruments with electronic displays. Difficulty maintaining and replacing older components and the need to establish a better interface with modern equipment and sensors drove the $93 million U-2 Reconnaissance Avionics Maintainability Program (RAMP). Antiquated cockpit panels crowded with approximately two-dozen gauges were replaced by\n\n84. Ibid., p. 329.\n85. Ibid., p. 324. 86. Ibid., p. 325.\nthree 8- by 6-inch flat-panel, multifunction color screens. An avionics processor converted analog signals to digital. Vital switches were conveniently grouped together on an upfront display panel within easy reach of the pilot. Many of the old-style switches were replaced with touch controls that were spaced so that they could be easily operated while wearing bulky pressure suit gloves. Such attention to the human-machine interface was a major breakthrough over the old cockpit configuration in which some radio and navigation controls were located in awkward, out-of-the-way places, and critical information such as fuel quantity was not accurately portrayed. The new cockpit layout, along with such features as an angle-of-attack indicator that provided aural as well as visual warnings, provided the U-2 pilot with substantially improved situational awareness.87\nAs the U-2 entered the 21st century, defense planners began preparations to retire the fleet and replace it with the RQ-4 Global Hawk in an effort to expand the use of remotely piloted and autonomous platforms. The Global Hawk had no need for onboard crew accommodations or life-support systems and could remain aloft for more than 30 hours. Unfortunately, it also had a smaller payload than that of the U-2, less electrical power to operate the sensors, and a lower operational ceiling. Nevertheless, by August 2011, the Air Force was ready to announce that the U-2 would cease flying within 4 years. In a statement at the National Press Club, Global Hawk program manager Lt. Col. Rick Thomas expressed confidence that the RQ-4 would soon be able to match the capabilities of the U-2. In order to do this, engineers had to find a way to successfully integrate the U-2's massive Optical Bar Camera (OBC) with the Global Hawk's composite airframe. This was easier said than done, as it became clear that it would require substantial modifications to both the airplane and sensor package. Another stumbling block to the fleet replacement schedule was proposed congressional legislation that would require the Department of Defense to certify that sustainment costs for the Global Hawk were less than those of maintaining the U-2. At the time, it cost just $31,000 per U-2 flight hour compared to $35,000 for the RQ-4, though Thomas promised that operating costs for the Global Hawk were dropping. Critics acknowledged the Global Hawk's endurance capabilities but lamented that sensors carried by the autonomous aircraft provided less range, less resolution, and less collection capability than those of the U-2.88\nOnce it became clear that the Global Hawk would not be a viable replacement for the U-2 in the near term, the Air Force embarked on another series of upgrades for the venerable platform. Most of the proposed improvements involved sensors carried by the U-2, starting with the OBC, which was upgraded to provide better resolution at lower altitudes. Additionally, the U-2 was to be equipped with a hyperspectral sensor package called the Spectral Infrared Remote Imaging Transition Testbed (SPIRITT), which had been previously tested on NASA's WB-57F. The SPIRITT package was designed to fit into the U-2's Q-bay in place of the OBC, and it could be carried simultaneously with the nose-mounted SYERS-2 high-resolution digital camera. As with other sensor packages, the SPIRITT would be controlled remotely via a data link from a Distributed Common Ground System intelligence analysis station. Other U-2 upgrades included the Cabin Altitude Reduction Effort (CARE), designed to increase air pressure inside the U-2 cockpit to mimic pressures at lower altitudes. Aerospace medical specialists hoped that CARE would reduce instances of decompression sickness and shorten a pilot's recuperation time between sorties. Increased operational tempo due to operations in southwest Asia had resulted in greater numbers of reports of altitude sickness. Even under the best of circumstances, a U-2\npilot was required to spend 3 to 4 days recuperating between flights. With the increased cabin pressure provided by CARE, the same pilots could fly every other day, increasing squadron capabilities. Finally, defense planners began looking into the possibility of replacing the U-2's special fuel with less expensive JP-8, which had become standard for all other Air Force aircraft. To do so would require modifying the kerosene-based JP-8 with an additive to prevent the fuel from freezing at temperatures below 80 F;\nstandard JP-8 freezes at around 50 F. Fortunately, such an additive had already been developed.89\nAccording to Maj. Bill Evans, U-2 program element monitor at Air Combat Command Headquarters, Hampton Roads, VA, the only foreseeable problem is parts obsolescence that eventually plagues all aircraft. Although the current fleet was built in the 1980s, from a structural standpoint, the U-2 is in excellent shape. \"Right now, the airframe itself is viable though 2040,\" Evans said. \"Structurally, the aircraft is sound for the next 30 years, at least.\"90\nThe U-2 is divided into several major assemblies. (U.S. Air Force)\n\n## Chapter 4 The Stuff Dreams Are Made Of\n\nAlthough the overall design configuration of the U-2 was extremely innovative, the materials and construction methods used to build it were fairly conventional. In its outward appearance, the airplane looked like a typical jet, with the exception of its long, thin wings and bicycle landing gear. Most of the airframe was made from ordinary aluminum alloys, with titanium used sparingly in areas that required additional strength or which were subject to higher temperatures. What set it apart from other craft was Kelly Johnson's elegantly simple design that maximized fuel and payload capacity while minimizing gross weight. The airplane's major assemblies included the forward fuselage, wings and mid-fuselage, tail group, landing gear, and powerplant.\n\nMost of the airframe was constructed from aluminum alloys. With the exception of welded assemblies, extrusions, and machined fittings, all aluminum sheet metal parts were manufactured from clad material. These included 2024 or 7075 sheet varying in thickness from 0.005 to 0.190 inches. Machine parts were typically made from 2024 or 7075 aluminum plate or bar stock. Extruded parts were made using both 2024 and 7075 aluminum. Other components were constructed from 6061-T4 or T6 using a fusion welding process. Wherever necessary, components requiring additional strength were fashioned from stainless steel or carbon steel of varying hardness. For protection against corrosion, aluminum parts were coated with zinc chromate primer or a similar equivalent. Carbon steel components were cadmium plated, but stainless steel parts needed no additional paints or coatings.1 The airplane included small amounts of titanium alloys in selected areas. Forward flap edges, exhaust ejector skin panels, and miscellaneous fittings and details were made from A110 AT. Parts of the empennage support ring, longeron, other fittings, the main gear piston, and the cylinder consisted of B120 VCA, and the wing-to-fuselage attach bolts were machined from C120 AV.2\n\n## Forward Fuselage\n\nThe forward fuselage included the nose, cockpit, and a space for camera and sensor payloads known as the Q-bay. Many features were common to all U-2 variants while some were specific to certain models. To reduce weight while retaining structural strength, components were machined to the thinnest gauges allowable. Builders used the minimum possible number of ribs and stringers, and flush-riveted skin panels were a mere 0.020- to 0.063-inches thick.3 Engine air inlet scoops were located on the sides of the fuselage just aft of the cockpit. These scoops featured built-in boundary-layer bleed ducts.\n\nAir from the left-hand duct cooled the D.C. generator, and air from the right-hand duct was routed through the air conditioning refrigerator to cool cabin air bled from the engine compressor.4 Article 341 was originally built using 75-ST aluminum sheet for inlet duct interiors. This material was hand formed, a process that included hammering the thin sheets into the proper shape. Maintenance crews found that the aluminum skin started to crack after about 90 hours of operation. As a result, later airplanes used 24-ST stretch-formed aluminum skin that was less susceptible to cracking. Even so, it was recommended that high-power static ground runs be limited to about\n2 minutes to avoid putting too much stress on the inlet skin.5\nThe nose assembly on the early U-2 models had a slender ogival cross section. Internal space was extremely limited and typically served to accommodate various antennas and electronic gear. A special nose assembly was installed during the High-Altitude Sampling Program (HASP). It featured a circular aperture at the tip, with filters to collect airborne particulates. Later U-2R/S and ER-2 models were equipped with a variety of interchangeable nose assemblies capable of carrying a variety of cameras and sensors. Attached to the fuselage with four quick-release latches, the standard nose cone provided a payload volume of 47.8 cubic feet. The 101-inch-long nose compartment was built to accept payloads of up to 650 pounds on custom-built racks. Other nose cones of varying size were available for specialized payloads. Due to forebody weight limits, payloads in the nose section reduced payload weight in the Q-bay on a pound-for-pound basis. At cruise altitudes, the environment inside the nose area was maintained at 27,000 to 30,000 feet pressure altitude. A pilot-operated valve controlled pressurized air in the nose compartment, but the rate of air exchange was solely regulated by the leakage rate of the nose structure, as there were no overboard dump valves. Temperatures inside the nose compartment during flight varied between 68 and 40 F.6\nThe cockpit compartment was separated from the nose section by a bulkhead and was pressurized to approximately 25,000 feet pressure altitude.\n\nThe pilot's control panel had a conventional layout with many standard instruments to provide fundamental information of aircraft systems, speed, altitude, and navigation. Engine power was controlled by a single throttle lever of the same type used in contemporary single-engine jet fighters such as the F-100.7 Unlike in a fighter, the U-2 pilot used a yoke rather than a stick to make flight control inputs. Otherwise, the controls were conventional. All surfaces (ailerons, rudder, etc.)\nwere directly connected to the yoke and pedals by cables with no hydraulic boost power. An electrically driven system provided trim in pitch and roll. Although there was no provision for directional trim from the cockpit, the autopilot effectively provided yaw trim when operating.8 Conventional pedals controlled the rudder, permitting 30 degrees of travel in either direction. These pedals were adjustable fore and aft to accommodate pilots with differing leg lengths; but more importantly, the upper portion of each pedal could be rotated to a horizontal position. This feature allowed the pilot to extend and stretch his legs, thus reducing fatigue during long flights.9 The most unique flight control system feature was the gust alleviation system. This device made it possible to raise both ailerons up 10 degrees while simultaneously raising both wing flaps by 4 degrees, thus reducing structural loads on the wings and tail assembly. Use of the gust controls was necessary when flying in turbulent air or when flying at higher speeds in smooth air.10 Because cloud cover below the airplane's flightpath often prevented the pilot from locating navigational points on the ground through the driftsight periscope, the U-2 was also equipped with a small sextant for making celestial navigation. When clouds were not a factor, however, the driftsight proved highly accurate, and pilots found that they could navigate by dead reckoning with an error of less than 1 nautical mile over a 1,000-nautical-mile course.11 Much later U-2 models were equipped with an angle-of-attack indicator, which provided the pilot with a visual and aural warning of approach-to-stall. Because the U-2\nwas designed to operate very close to stall during most phases of flight, this instrument greatly increased pilot safety. Lack of stall warning on earlier variants was indicated as a possible contributing factor in several mishaps.12\nThe cockpit was enclosed beneath a lightweight canopy, hinged on the left side. The uppermost portion of the canopy was coated with either white or black paint to provide a sun shield. Although this feature enhanced crew comfort, it also somewhat reduced visibility. In an emergency, the pilot pulled a handle to jettison the canopy and fire a rocket-propelled ejection seat that was qualified for use in zero-speed/zero-altitude ejections. A spur-and-cable arrangement restrained the pilot's legs during ejection to prevent flailing. Life-support equipment included dual normal oxygen systems, an emergency oxygen system, and a pressure garment. Primary breathing air came from a pair of 2.6-gallon liquid-oxygen converters, each providing gaseous oxygen to the pilot's helmet through independent supply lines and pressure regulators. The emergency oxygen system consisted of two gaseous oxygen cylinders located in the survival kit and was used only in the event of ejection or malfunction of the two primary oxygen sources. Activated automatically, the emergency system provided suit pressurization and 15 minutes of breathing oxygen.13\nThe environmental control system (ECS) delivered pressurized and environmentally controlled air to the cockpit, nose, Q-bay, and (on NASA aircraft only) the forward two-thirds of the wing pods. Air in the payload areas and cockpit remained unprocessed below 7,900 feet pressure altitude. As the aircraft climbed higher, the ECS switched to an isobaric control mode, maintaining a pressure altitude of 7,500 feet. Once the U-2 climbed above 18,300 feet, the ECS established a pressure differential of 3.88 pounds per square inch between the ambient atmospheric pressure and that of the cockpit and payload areas. This resulted in a cockpit pressure altitude of approximately 28,500 feet at an aircraft altitude of 70,000 feet. Engine bleed air for pressurization was passed through a heat exchanger, mixing muff, and a turbine, though at altitudes above 25,000 feet, the turbine was bypassed. Fans with or without additional heat were used in the cockpit and payload areas to circulate air for the dual purpose of reducing condensation from windows or optics, and to distribute heat. Although relative humidity was low at stratospheric cruise altitudes, relative humidity could reach 100 percent during descent and landing, allowing condensation to form on surfaces that had been coldsoaked at altitude.14\nThe pressurized equipment bay, or Q-bay, just behind the cockpit, was designed to be the principal location for special equipment packages. Top and bottom access hatches, removable by means of external latches, made it possible to install and remove delicate cameras and sensors quickly and easily. Typically, instrumentation and other equipment was installed on rack assemblies, hoisted upward, and secured to several mounting points. In early model U-2 aircraft, the Q-bay was 67 inches long and 55 inches high, varying in width from top to bottom. This space accommodated payloads weighing between 500 and 750 pounds. Additional equipment could be carried in wing-mounted pods (up to 300 pounds each) and inside a dorsal fairing with a 100-pound capacity.15 Later model airframes were capable of carrying up to 2,550 pounds of equipment distributed between the Q-bay, nose, and wing pods. Weight distribution between payload areas affected the center of gravity of the aircraft, resulting in reduced allowable payload in some areas. Aside from these primary areas, provisions for instruments were available in several smaller areas, including the aft fuselage, tailcone, wingtips, and spaces on the left and right sides of the forward fuselage. Instrument integration required evaluation of all payloads for weight and balance concerns, aerodynamic effects that might alter the airplane's stability characteristics, and total electrical power consumption.16 In the U-2R/S and ER-2, the Q-bay provided 64.6 cubic feet of volume and, like earlier models, featured removable upper and lower hatches. Hatches for all models could be configured to accommodate a wide variety of specialized sensors. The combined weight carried in the forward fuselage area (Q-bay and nose assembly) was normally limited to 1,300 pounds including payload mounting racks, electrical interface panels, and the payload itself.17\nPayloads carried by the U-2 were subjected to a range of environmental conditions resulting from the airplane's extremely high cruising altitudes. Two regulator valves, located at the bottom of the cockpit aft pressure bulkhead, allowed pressurized air to enter the Q-bay. Available airflow was dependent upon the amount of air bled from the engine's compressor stages, but it typically varied from 0.5 pounds per minute at idle to 3.0 pounds per minute at cruise power settings. Though the compartment's pressure altitude was normally maintained at around 30,000 feet, safety considerations required that payloads be designed to withstand pressure altitudes of up to 70,000 feet in the event of a pressurization system failure. Bleed air from the engine was cooled by a heat exchanger to a nominal temperature of 60 F. Actual temperatures within the Q-bay depended upon the incoming air temperature, ambient temperature, amount of insulation used on the equipment package, air circulation inside the Q-bay, cockpit controlled heaters and blowers, and the instrument's heat output. At cruise altitude, air temperatures inside the compartment could vary from 10 F to\n50 F, though in the summer temperatures could rise above 120 F during ground operation prior to takeoff.18\n\n## Wings And Wing Pods\n\nDue to requirements for high aspect ratio and low drag ratio, the wings proved to be among the most challenging design features of the entire airplane. For optimum lift, they needed to be long and narrow with a thin airfoil. They had to be extremely lightweight to reduce overall aircraft gross weight, but for mission endurance, they needed to be capable of carrying most of the airplane's fuel supply. The wings were attached to the rearmost portion of the forward fuselage, at the airplane's center of gravity. In order to meet weight restrictions, the U-2 designers chose an unusual arrangement for attaching the wings to the fuselage. Unlike on conventional airplanes, the U-2's main wing spar did not pass through the fuselage to give the wings continuity and strength. Instead, each wing assembly was entirely separate, attached to the sides of the fuselage with tension bolts as on a sailplane. Absence of a carrythrough wing spar left room inside the fuselage for the Q-bay between the cockpit and the engine compartment, improving the aircraft's center of gravity and contributing to overall weight reduction.19\nAs originally designed, the wings were configured with integral fuel tanks extending from the leading edge to the beam at the 48-percent chord line. Spanwise, each main tank extended from the wing root to wing station 440. Auxiliary wing tanks were located from 48 to 65 percent of the chord and extended from the root to wing station 300. The trailing edges consisted of flaps and ailerons that were only unconventional in that they also served to alleviate structural loads on the wings and tail in turbulent air and at high speeds. The gust alleviation system worked by raising the flaps upward 4 degrees while simultaneously shifting the neutral point of the ailerons 10 degrees up. This moved the spanwise center of pressure inboard, reducing the wing's bending moment. This also effectively reduced the wing camber, which reduced the required balancing tail load.20\nThe wing had a mean aerodynamic chord of 100.8 inches. Designers selected an NACA 63A409 airfoil with 9 percent thickness-to-chord ratio for the wing root and an NACA 63A406 airfoil with a 6 percent thickness-to-chord ratio for the tip. Incidence varied from 4 degrees at the root to 2 degrees at the tip. The dihedral was 0 degrees, and sweepback at 25 percent chord was 6 degrees. The ailerons had a total area of 35.2 square feet, and the flaps had a combined area of 97.5 square feet.21\nThe wings on the original U-2 spanned 80 feet with 600 square feet of wing area. By contrast, the larger U-2R had a 103-foot span with 1,000 square feet of lifting surface. Bob Wiele, leader of the U-2R wing design team, ensured that the wing structure did not exceed 3 pounds per square foot. For maximum performance, he retained the original NACA airfoils while reducing wing loading for the heavier airframe to the same values attained with the U-2A. The resulting lift-to-drag ratio was 27:1, with a lift coefficient of 0.6 to 0.7 and aspect ratio of 10.667. Larger wings allowed for a greater internal fuel capacity, and the fuel tank arrangement had to be altered. Pilots of the early U-2 models discovered that having the main tank forward and the auxiliary tank aft resulted in considerable center-of-gravity changes as fuel was consumed during flight. Wiele and his team eliminated this problem in the U-2R by placing the 1,169-gallon main tanks inboard and the 239-gallon auxiliaries outboard. This allowed fuel from the main tanks to be exhausted first so that the weight of the remaining fuel in the auxiliary tanks helped dampen wing bending and torsional loads.22\nWing pods for the TR-1/U-2R and ER-2 provided approximately 86 cubic feet of payload capacity. Each pod accommodated payloads up to a maximum weight of 600 pounds. The pod structure consisted of five individual segments:\nMost of the wing interior spaces were occupied by integral fuel tanks. External wing-mounted tanks, or pods, provided additional space for mission equipment. (Lockheed Martin)\nnose cone, forward pod, mid-body, aft pod, and tail cone. Latches at the forward and aft ends of the pod mid-body provided easy access for equipment servicing and installation. For the ER-2, the forward two-thirds of each pod was pressurized, but as in the aircraft nose area, there were no overboard dump valves in the pods; the rate of air exchange was a function of the leak rate of the structure and associated pressure sealing. Interior temperatures inside the empty wing pods varied from 40 F to 20 F at cruise altitudes. Internal heat sources were normally installed in the pods to produce warmer local temperatures for sensitive equipment. Aeroelastic effects caused the wings to deflect upward during flight. Deflection of the pods was measured to as much as 0.86 degrees from horizontal, though deflection angles tended to vary slightly with altitude, payload weight, fuel load, and atmospheric conditions.23\nSmaller pods, or tanks, could be pylon-mounted on the wings or along the fuselage centerline, aft of the main landing gear. Unpressurized and lacking temperature control, each tank offered a payload volume of 14 cubic feet and a maximum weight of 350 pounds. Instruments in these tanks were subjected to greater vibrations and more extreme temperatures than elsewhere on the airframe. Centerline installation provided an unobstructed nadir view, but viewports required protection from debris, water, or ice thrown up by the main gear during takeoff and landing. When attached to wing pylons in symmetrical pairs, the tanks were not susceptible to debris from the landing gear. Additional instruments could be accommodated in a fairing called the System 20 pod on the right wing, as well as within the left wingtip, but instrument weight had to be carefully evaluated for its effect on the aircraft's trim condition.24\n\n## Tail Group\n\nHerb Nystrom and Rod Kreimendahl designed the original U-2A tail assembly. This included the aft fuselage, vertical stabilizer and rudder, and horizontal stabilizer airfoils. These components were constructed almost entirely of aluminum alloys and assembled using the minimum number of parts required for structural strength. The most unusual feature of the tail group was the fact that the aft fuselage was joined to the forward fuselage using just three tension bolts, thus reducing weight and easing assembly.25\nThe tail-fuselage interface was designed for ease of assembly and maintenance. (Laughlin Heritage Foundation)\nAs with the fuselage and wings, the U-2 empennage was constructed from lightweight aluminum alloys. (U.S. Air Force)\nThe fixed horizontal tail had a total area of 90 square feet, the elevators totaled 20 square feet, and the vertical tail had an area of 49 square feet plus a 9.5-square-foot rudder. As originally configured, the horizontal stabilizer had zero incidence, but this was later increased to 1.5 degrees.26\nOn later models such as the U-2R, the tail group retained the basic configuration, but it was enlarged as necessary to match the new airframe. The tail assembly, or empennage, primarily accommodated the stabilizer airfoils and housed the engine exhaust duct. There was also room for ballast to trim the airplane's center of gravity, and additional space within the fuselage aft cavity and the tail cone to carry small instrument packages.27 Two speed brakes, each about 7 square feet in area, were installed just aft of the fuselage break. These hydraulically actuated drag devices were used to slow the aircraft. They were hinged at the forward end and capable of opening to approximately 50\ndegrees. For additional landing deceleration, a 16-foot-diameter ribbon chute was housed in a compartment at the top aft end of the fuselage, at the base of the vertical tail fin.28\n\n## Landing Gear\n\nThe airplane's hydraulically actuated, bicycle-type landing gear consisted of a single oleo strut with two lightweight wheels toward the front of the airplane and two small solid-mount wheels under the tail. Both sets of wheels retracted forward and upward into the gear wells. The entire assembly weighed just 208 pounds yet was capable of withstanding touchdown forces imparted by the 7-ton airframe during landing. The gear was hydraulically operated, but an alternate cable-operated free-fall system was provided in case the normal gearextension mechanism malfunctioned. For braking, the pilot applied hydraulic pressure equally to both main wheels through toe pressure to the rudder pedals. There was no differential braking. In the event of normal hydraulic system malfunction, an emergency-brake accumulator supplied sufficient pressure for up to five applications of the brakes.29\nSeveral landing gear deficiencies were corrected during early testing.\n\nOriginally, Article 341 was equipped with two brake pads, one on the inboard side of each main wheel; but pilots found this configuration provided unsatisfactory braking and caused the brake mechanism to overheat. To resolve the problem, an additional brake pad was installed on the outboard side of each wheel. Another problem was the tendency of the airplane to porpoise when the pilot touched down on the main gear first. To prevent the U-2 from bouncing, technicians installed a valve in the main gear strut with two orifices of different sizes for metering the hydraulic fluid. The larger orifice helped absorb shock loads while the smaller one prevented rapid springback. This solution proved very effective. Finally, the tail-wheel steering was found to be deficient in early tests. In the original configuration, the steering cables were attached to the rudder horn and then routed to the tail wheel. The design called for 6 degrees of travel in either direction, but due to cable stretch, the most steering that could be obtained was between 3 and 4 degrees. To correct this, the system was revised so that the steering cables were attached directly to the rudder cables and then routed to a bell crank at the tail wheel.30\nThe two wingtip pogo outriggers used for lateral balance during takeoff were made from flat steel bars, curved like the leaf spring on an automobile to absorb shocks during takeoff roll. The lower end of each pogo was equipped with two small wheels with solid rubber tires.31 These auxiliary gears were originally designed to be released electrically during the takeoff roll. If released early enough, this method proved fairly reliable, but if the pilot waited until airspeed had increased to 60 or 70 knots, the pogos hung on due to air loads. This created a hazardous situation; in fact, one airplane was lost in a fatal accident while the pilot tried to shake loose a hung pogo. Lockheed designers tried several methods to allow the auxiliary gear to drop at higher airspeeds, including springs, external kickers, and olive-shaped rollers instead of round rollers in the release mechanism. None proved satisfactory. Eventually, they adopted a free-fall system that allowed the pogos to drop out as the wings lifted during the takeoff roll. For training flights where it was desired to retain the pogos to be used for lateral balance during landing, safety pins could be installed to lock the gear in place. The modified system proved highly successful. Occasional subsequent instances of hung pogos were traced to rough or battered pogo heads that hung up in the sockets.32\n\n## Powerplant\n\nThe U-2A was powered by a single J57-type non-afterburning engine featuring an axial flow, twin-spool compressor, and a three-stage turbine. The forward compressor was a nine-stage, low-pressure unit connected to the second and third stage turbine wheels by a through-shaft. The seven-stage aft (high-pressure) compressor was mechanically independent of the forward compressor and was connected by a hollow shaft to the first-stage turbine wheel. This arrangement permitted the low-pressure rotor to turn at its most efficient speed and allowed high compression ratios. Engine performance varied depending on which model of the engine was installed. The J57-P- 31 developed 11,200 pounds of static thrust at sea level and weighed 3,820 pounds, providing a power-to-weight ratio of 2.9:1. Until the J57-P-31 engines were available, the first U-2 aircraft used J57-P-37 engines, which were 415 pounds heavier and delivered only 10,500 pounds of thrust at sea level, resulting in a power-to-weight ratio of 2.5:1, almost 15 percent less efficient than the P-31. Because the P-31 engine had been designed specifically for high-altitude operation, it offered better thrust and fuel consumption than the P-37, as well as wider operating margins.33\nThe engine received air through a bifurcated inlet system; two external ducts opened on either side of the fuselage just behind the cockpit and merged into a single internal duct at the compressor face. For weight and balance purposes, the engine was installed at midwing chord. Fuel consumption varied from 9,000 pounds per hour at sea level to 700 pounds per hour at cruising altitudes.34 As Lockheed engineers refined airframe-powerplant integration during the first year of flight testing, it was only necessary to make a few small changes to the aircraft design. As Ernie Joiner recalled, \"The engine tailpipe operated inside an ejector in order to induce cooling air low through the aft fuselage. We were robbing the engine thrust because the jet stream was striking the ejector lip. Cutting one inch off the ejector lip solved this.\" Another change involved engine oil coolers. \"We started with one fuel-oil cooler and two airoil coolers,\" Joiner noted, \"but we found it possible to eliminate one of the air-oil coolers and its outside scoop.\"35\nRemoving the oil-cooler scoop decreased cooling airflow on the left side of the airplane. This necessitated installation of heat shields inside the fuselage to prevent electrical wiring and hydraulic system components from overheating. Additionally, with the J57-P-31 engine installed, there was overheating of bulkheads at fuselage stations 495 and 504 on the left side and high temperatures at the rear engine mount. The highest temperatures were in the vicinity of the engine turbine nozzle where the exhaust gas temperature was hottest. On the J57-P-31 engine, this area was covered with a single layer of skin that permitted greater thermal radiation than on the J57-P-37, which had a double skin layer in the same area. Lockheed technicians installed an engine-mounted heat shield that lowered temperatures within the aft fuselage to acceptable levels.36\nTo improve performance, the U-2C was equipped with the J75-P-13\npowerplant, a 15-stage axial-flow, non-afterburning turbojet that provided 15,800 pounds of thrust at sea level. Larger, fluted air inlets improved airflow to the compressor face.37 Eventually, the U-2C fleet was equipped with more powerful J75-P-13B engines rated to 17,000 pound of thrust. The U-2R was powered by an upgraded model of the P-13B that improved dependability and increased thrust under climb and cruise conditions. Engine performance was enhanced through changes to turbine vanes, improved turbine disks and compressor blades, and enlargement of the compressor inlet case to increase airflow.38 An engine-driven fuel pump supplied pressure for both normal and emergency fuel systems. This pump supplied sufficient fuel to maintain flight even if the normal and auxiliary boost pumps failed.39\nIn 1984, the U-2R/TR-1 fleet was grounded following a series of accidents involving the engine exhaust system. In the first mishap, on May 22, Capt. David Bonsi had just taken off in a U-2R when he heard and felt an explosion behind him, and the entire tail section separated from the airframe. Bonsi ejected safely, and although accident investigators were uncertain of the exact cause, they suggested that the explosion might have resulted from a small\n\n37. Pocock, *50 Years of the U-2*, p. 399.\n38. Koziol, \"The U-2 Aircraft Engine,\" pp. 910.\n39. U.S. Air Force, \"Flight Manual, Models U-2C and U-2F Aircraft,\" p. I-4.\nfuel leak inside the engine compartment. Less than 2 months later, a similar accident occurred in which the tail section of a TR-1 crumpled immediately after takeoff. Capt. Todd Hubbard escaped unharmed after being forced to eject at low altitude. This time, investigators suspected a hydraulic leak, but on October 8 another U-2R was lost. Capt. Tom Dettmer ejected as his airplane broke apart just 1,500 feet above the ground. By now, an inescapable pattern was emerging, and investigators turned their attention to the long cylindrical duct connecting the engine to the exhaust ejector. The duct comprised a forward adaptor section (approximately 4 feet long) that connected the J75 engine to the 12-foot-long tailpipe. The adaptor/tailpipe link, consisting of a U-shaped clamp and two 14-inch bolts, had apparently come loose and allowed the tailpipe to slip out of alignment. When subjected to increased pressure from takeoff thrust, the tailpipe crumpled, and trapped exhaust gases blew the tail assembly off at its mounts. To fix the problem, Lockheed engineers devised a new clamp and added more bolts to secure it in place. Speculation remained as to why this problem had only manifested after many years of trouble-free operation. Some thought that engine modifications to improve fuel consumption had resulted in more compressor surges, putting added strain on the tailpipe connection. Others suspected inadequate maintenance or assembly procedures.40\nBy the late 1980s, Lockheed was considering potential replacements for the antiquated J75 engines. The leading candidate was General Electric's F101- GE-F29 bypass ratio (0.8:1) mixed-flow turbofan featuring aerodynamically coupled low- and high-pressure rotors. The low-pressure compressor section consisted of a three-stage fan, driven by a two-stage low-pressure turbine. The high-pressure section was composed of a nine-stage compressor; annular combustion chamber; and a single-stage, air-cooled high-pressure turbine. The engine control system combined electronic and hydromechanical elements to achieve stall-free operation throughout the flight envelope regardless of the pilot's throttle input. It was designed for completely automatic operation from start to shutdown.41\nThis engine was redesignated F118-GE-101 prior to the start of preproduction testing in late 1991. The F118 was rated at 18,300 pounds static sea level thrust, which represented a significant improvement over the J75. It was easier to install and remove than older powerplants, hydraulic components were easier to access, and the new gearbox was mounted on the airframe. Known as an airframe-mounted accessory drive (AMAD), this gearbox drove the airplane's secondary power accessories such as alternating current (ac) and direct current (dc) generators, hydraulic pump, and air turbine starter. The engine powered the AMAD mechanically through a flexible power transmission shaft. A dedicated oil system independent of the engine oil system provided lubrication and cooling for the AMAD and associated accessories, gears, and bearings.42\nTo ease engine maintenance, General Electric developed improved troubleshooting capabilities and provided sophisticated new test equipment. One of the greatest advantages was that the airplane's hydraulic and electrical systems could still be operated with the engine removed. The F118 suffered one notable disadvantage, however. Up to this time, U-2 pilots had responded to a flameout by using a procedure called a windmill restart, a maneuver that takes advantage of the airplane's kinetic energy to force enough air into the engine inlets to spin the rotors and create sufficient pneumatic pressure for ignition. Unlike the J75 turbojet, the new turbofan could not be restarted in flight by windmilling. To remedy this deficiency, Lockheed engineers devised an emergency airstart system that ignited a mixture of compressed air and jet fuel in a two-stage compressor. Because this system imposed a significant weight penalty, it was replaced with a lighter, hydrazine-fueled system capable of spooling the engine up to 45 percent core rpm. Use of hydrazine, which is colorless, odorless, and highly toxic, necessitated introduction of special handling procedures.43\n\n## Life-Support And Environmental Control Systems\n\nThe pilot's life-support systems included dual normal oxygen systems, an emergency oxygen system, and a pressure suit. Two independent systems, each supplied by a 10-liter liquid-oxygen converter, provided breathing air to the pilot in the form of 100-percent oxygen. Gaseous oxygen was delivered to the pilot's helmet through independent supply lines and pressure regulators. An emergency oxygen system provided oxygen to the pilot in case of ejection or malfunction of the dual normal system. The emergency system (supplied by dual-redundant, gaseous-oxygen cylinders located in the survival kit) was designed to maintain pressure in the pilot's suit after ejection and provide breathing oxygen for approximately 15 minutes during descent to the ground. Each U-2 pilot wore a pressure suit capable of providing a safe environment regardless of cockpit pressure conditions. A dual pressure/breathing regulator provided breathing oxygen upon demand in the helmet and automatically pressurized the suit in the event of cabin-pressure loss. A fire-retardant outer coverall and harness was worn over the pressure suit and contained a life preserver and fasteners for the parachute release latches.44\nThe environmental control system provided pressurization to the cockpit, equipment bays, and nose section. Engine bleed air passed through a heat exchanger, a mixing muff, andbelow 25,000 feeta turbine. Above 25,000 feet, the turbine was bypassed. At altitude, cabin pressure was maintained at 3.88 psi above atmospheric pressure. This produced a cabin-pressure altitude of approximately 28,500 feet at an aircraft altitude of 70,000 feet. The pilot used a refrigerator bypass valve to regulate cockpit air temperature. An adjustment lever could be used to mix cold outside air and cockpit pressurization air to regulate suit temperature. The cockpit was also equipped with a duct to provide warm air for defogging the canopy and windshield. On later models, windshield defrosting was augmented with an electrically heated element.45\nThe heated-air defroster originally consisted of a single manifold built into the forward end of the canopy. The manifold was perforated with forwardfacing holes to defrost the windshield and aft-facing holes to defrost the canopy. This arrangement proved unsatisfactory, particularly for windshield defrosting. In an effort to improve system performance, a second manifold was added along the base of the windshield, and another was later installed at the top of the windshield where it joined the canopy. This system provided much more efficient distribution of heated air for defrosting both the windshield and canopy. An auxiliary defrosting system consisted of a small, rubber-bladed fan on the left-hand cockpit sill to circulate warm air. This was especially useful during engine-out descents, when the normal source of hot air for defrosting was unavailable.46\nCockpit temperature distribution in early model U-2 airplanes was quite inefficient. The pilot's feet became very cold while the head and upper parts of the body were too warm. Eventually, floor-level heat outlets were added directing warm air at the rudder pedalsas foot warmers. The pilot could reduce heating at head level only by restricting use of the defroster or using the auxiliary fan to improve air circulation in the cockpit.47\nTemperature control within the equipment bay was also critical. During early high-altitude testing, the Q-bay became too cold, with interior air temperature dropping to 4 F. The glass in the camera windows sometimes dropped to as low as 29 F and quickly frosted over if there was any moisture in the air. Lockheed engineers experimented with blowers, various types of insulation, and baffle curtains to control airflow within the Q-bay. A combination of curtains and insulation eventually yielded aft lower equipment bay temperatures of around 32 F, which was deemed satisfactory. Window defrosting presented a more difficult problem. Liquid solutions caused blurring and deterioration of the optical qualities of the glass. Electrofilm heaters installed along the edges of the windows warmed the glass inefficiently and had a tendency to short out, resulting in a potential fire hazard. Eventually, a hot-air defrosting system was installed, but it was only used during the climb phase and turned off before operating the cameras. The camera window heater provided a secondary benefit by improving equipment-bay temperature distribution.48\n\n## Fuel System\n\nFuel flowed from the four integrally sealed tanks, one inboard and one outboard in each wing, and through a sump tank within the fuselage before reaching the engine. Bleed air from the engine provided pressurization for the wing tanks and, along with gravity, assured fuel flow from the wings into the sump. The engine consumed fuel from the inboard tanks first, leaving the weight of remaining fuel in the outboard tanks to alleviate wing bending. Two boost pumps fed fuel from the sump tank into the engine. To minimize structural weight, the U-2 designers did not include a single-point refueling system for ground servicing. Instead, each individual tank was equipped with its own filler cap. During flight, a cross-transfer system provided the pilot with a means to correct a lateral imbalance of wing-tank fuel. The transfer pumps allowed fuel to be moved between inboard and outboard tanks or to increase the rate of flow to the sump tank. In an emergency, the pilot could dump fuel from the inboard tanks at a rate of 90 gallons per minute or from the outboard tanks at a rate of 60 gallons per minute. Standpipes in the outboard tanks retained 150 gallons each. Later-model U-2 and ER-2 aircraft were designed to carry up to 19,175 pounds of fuel in the wing and sump tanks.49\nOne interesting characteristic of long-range endurance flights was the apparent ability of the U-2 to manufacture fuel. Robert Schumacher discovered this illusion in Article 344 during a February 1956 flight that lasted more than 912 hours. In preparation for the test, the airplane was fueled to full capacity (1,362 gallons) and the totalizer instrument was set to 1,335 gallons in order to provide a safety margin. Schumacher's U-2 departed the runway with a gross weight of 19,900 pounds, but this dropped to 11,155 pounds by the end of the 9.58-hour sortie. Based on calculations from the totalizer, the airplane had consumed 1,386 gallons of fuel, 24 more gallons than had been loaded aboard prior to takeoff. More surprising, the mechanics drained an additional 15 gallons from the fuel tanks after landing. The mystery was solved when Lockheed engineers determined that the fuel, which had been cold-soaked for hours, expanded due to heating as it passed through\n\nthe fuel-oil heat exchanger, causing the gauge to indicate a larger volume. A subsequent series of tests consistently revealed an average increase in volume of approximately 3 percent during similar long-range flights.50\nAlthough the special low-vapor-pressure LF-1A was selected as the standard fuel for the U-2, two alternate fuels were also evaluated. At the time, most U.S. military aircraft were fueled with JP-4, a 50-50 kerosene-gasoline blend. U-2 operations with JP-4 were restricted to 50,000 feet maximum altitude and 2,000 feet per minute maximum climb rate. Exceeding these limits risked damaging the airplane with excessive wing-tank pressures or possibly losing fuel through the vent system. Consequently, use of JP-4 was restricted to ferry missions or emergency operation when LF-1A was not available. Tests were also conducted using JP-1, a pure kerosene fuel with a high flash point and a low freezing point. Tank pressures were comparable between LF-1A and JP-1, range and fuel consumption were about the same, and both fuels were considered satisfactory for operational use.51\n\n## Miscellaneous Systems\n\nFor electrical power, the U-2 was equipped with a three-phase, 115/200-volt, 400-Hertz ac system and a 28-volt dc system. These provided automatic, in-depth redundancy for flight and mission-critical power requirements. Two 50-ampere-hour silver-zinc batteries were installed to provide backup power to flight instruments and communications equipment and for engine restart capability, in case the main dc generator and transformer rectifier were offline. These batteries could supply power to the essential and emergency dc buses for approximately 1 hour and 20 minutes, along with power to the emergency ac invertor.52\nA single engine-driven pump supplied pressure to the hydraulic system. A\nnormal pressure of 3,000 psi was used to actuate the wing flaps, speed brakes, roll and lift spoilers, wheel brakes, stabilizer trim system, and standby ac generator, as well as for extension and retraction of the landing gear.53\nThe U-2 was equipped with a variety of communication and navigation systems. Two-way voice communication during flight was accomplished via several installed UHF and VHF radio systems. An interphone system was available for communicating with ground-crew personnel during preflight or postflight activities. For navigation, the aircraft was equipped with a standard military Tactical Air Navigation (TACAN) ultrahigh-frequency system to provide continuous indication of bearing and distance from a transmitting station, as well as an automatic direction finder (ADF) radio navigation system. Depending on mission requirements, greater accuracy could be achieved using inertial navigation systems (INS), astroinertial navigation systems (ANS), or global positioning systems (GPS). The INS steered the aircraft toward each destination point through the autopilot. The ANS employed a highly accurate star tracker to limit position error, and it could be used in daylight and at night. GPS navigation was designed for near-pinpoint accuracy using transmissions from small groups of orbiting satellites. On approach to airfields equipped with ground-based instrument landing systems (ILS), the U-2 pilot simply homed in on a localizer near the runway; ILS receivers in the aircraft guided the U-2 along the proper glideslope to touchdown.54\n\n## Chapter 5 Life Above 50,000 Feet\n\nAmong the greatest challenges of flying the U-2 was simply surviving the hostile environment of the stratosphere, the highest layer of Earth's atmosphere in which aircraft can still fly using conventional aerodynamic surfaces. The unprotected human body cannot withstand the combination of extremely low ambient air pressures, diminishing with increasing altitude, and temperatures that drop as low as 112 F. The human respiratory system is optimized for operation at elevations ranging from sea level to 10,000 feet. Supplemental oxygen or cabin pressurization systems are necessary for flight at higher altitudes, where humans are subject to hypoxia. Above 15,000 feet without such measures, one may experience such physiological symptoms as fatigue, headache, euphoria, decreased visual acuity, impaired memory, and faulty judgment. More extensive protection is required in the space-equivalent zone that extends from 50,000 feet to the outer fringes of the atmosphere. Here, unprotected exposure quickly results in death. Crossing the Armstrong Limit at around 63,000 feet exposes humans to barometric pressure so low that water boils at normal body temperature. As dramatic as this sounds, only superficial bodily fluids are immediately affected, resulting in swelling of exposed tissues as water within the body changes into a gaseous vapor. Therefore, hypoxia and decompression sickness are greater concerns.1 In order to survive this hostile realm, U-2 pilots were equipped with pressurized garments that protected them during normal operations, as well as in such instances when it became necessary to eject at high altitudes.\n\n## Partial-Pressure Suits\n\nWhen CIA officials needed advice on equipment for high-altitude survival, they turned to Air Force medical experts Col. Donald D. Flickenger, ARDC director of human factors, and Col. W. Randolph Lovelace II. A graduate of Harvard Medical School, Lovelace had been studying high-altitude flight since 1938 and he helped develop an oxygen mask that had become standard throughout the Air Force. He and Flickenger also conducted a number of high-altitude parachute jumps from B-47 bombers to test pilot-survival gear under extreme conditions. When it came to developing environmental protection equipment for Project Aquatone, Lovelace and Flickenger suggested the David Clark Company of Worcester, MA, which had previously produced the MC-1 partial-pressure suit for use in the RB-36. Having developed the U-2 cockpit pressurization system, the Firewel Company of Buffalo, NY, provided oxygen regulators, valves, and other equipment, and made the company's altitude chamber facilities available for testing the suit.2\nDavid Clark's Joe Ruseckas drew the first patterns for the new partial-pressure suit that came to be known as the MC-3. Assisted by John Flagg and about a half-dozen designers, pattern makers, and technicians, he strove to create a suit that would not only protect the U-2 pilot from the stratospheric environment but be sufficiently comfortable to be worn for prolonged periods and allow the pilot enough freedom of movement to control his airplane. When completed, the MC-3 represented a substantial improvement over earlier suits. As in the MC-1 and other early models, capstans provided mechanical counter-pressure on the limbs in the MC-3, but it was also fitted with a full-torso inflatable bladder extending from the shoulders to mid-thigh, completely surrounding the chest, abdomen, hips, and upper thighs. Instead of using separate hoses, as in all earlier suits, pressure leads to the torso bladder and capstans were simply an extension of the bladder system. Lacing, extending up the inner thigh and across the chest and small of the back, provided control of the torso bladder and allowed for more variation in circumferential fit than on previous suits. There were numerous zippers at the ankles, wrists, back, and across the chest from waist to neck. A zipper at the shoulder made the MC-3 easier to don and doff. Cords were sewn into heavy seams to break the continuity of waist and groin bladders, when inflated, to make it easier for the pilot to bend and sit. The suit included nylon pressure gloves with leather palms that had the pressure lead on the thumb side, using positive-lock bayonet connections. Laces on the back of the hand could be used to adjust the fit. The pilot wore standard flight boots because the feet were not included in the pressurization scheme. Breathing oxygen was fed into a Type MA-2 helmet, manufactured by ILC Dover, of Frederica, DE.3\nSince the suits were individually customized, each pilot made two trips to Worcester for fitting. During the first visit, each pilot was carefully measured so that Ruseckas could tailor the initial pattern for a comfortable fit. After the suit was completed, the pilot returned to try it on and determine whether alterations were necessary. Once it was confirmed that the suit was properly tailored, the pilot then journeyed to Buffalo to try it on in Firewel's altitude chamber. After pilots complained that the restraint fabric connecting the helmet to the suit made it difficult to turn their heads, the David Clark Company developed a new Link-Net fabric for the neck section that allowed greater range of motion. Ultimately, the MC-3 became available in 12 standard sizes, as well as in custom-fitted models. The suit was often worn with a protective outer layer to shield the capstans and laces against becoming entangled with switches or other objects in the cramped U-2 cockpit.4\nThe MC-3 served as the predecessor to a family of partial-pressure suits that included the MC-3A, MC-4, and S-100.\n\nLockheed officials contacted David Clark in early 1970 to ask for an improved partial-pressure suit for use with first-generation U-2 airplanes that were still in service. By this time, U-2R crews were wearing full-pressure suits, and although flight testing had proven that a pilot wearing such a garment would fit in the cockpit of a U-2C after certain modifications had been made, the Air Force was hesitant to make those changes. Joe Ruseckas agreed to develop a better partial-pressure suit based on the MC-3A suit and hardware but with a helmet from the A/P22S-6 full-pressure suit. The neck ring required for attaching the new helmet made the shoulder-zipper entry used on most partial-pressure suits impractical, so a rear-entry system was developed for the new suit, by now designated S-100. Integration of the A/ P22S-6 helmet with the S-100 suit considerably improved pilot comfort and mobility, which also helped reduce stress and fatigue during long missions.5\nDavid Clark eventually fabricated 142 of the new suits for the Air Force and NASA. The S-100 consisted of a coverall much like that of the MC-3, with a restraint assembly, breathing bladder, and capstans extending down the back and along the arms and legs to provide counter pressure. Slide fasteners on the wrists and ankles and at the center of the back facilitated donning, and laces along the arms, legs, chest, and back permitted individual size adjustments. Pressure bladders at the waist and groin were designed to crease in order to facilitate sitting and standing. Wrapped completely around the torso, the breathing bladder was integrated with the neck seal and neck ring and included a perforated inner liner that vented airflow around the wearer. For added protection and utility, a fire-resistant Nomex exterior cover could be worn over the suit, providing pockets and Velcro pads for checklists and other items. The partial-pressure gloves had suede leather palms, elastic cuffs, and lacings on the back of the hand to allow for personal adjustments. The helmet consisted of a Fiberglas shell with a movable visor and separate sunshade, oxygen regulator system, anti-suffocation valve, cushion assembly, and communication equipment. Channels distributed vent air around the pilot's head, and a spray bar around the inner edge of the visor opening delivered breathing oxygen and prevented visor fogging. A rubber face seal divided the breathing space from the rest of the helmet, and a spring-loaded valve allowed exhaled air to be exhausted from the breathing space to the pressure-suit breathing-bladder assembly. The system was designed to maintain pressure in the face area slightly higher than the suit pressure in order to provide the pilot with 100-percent oxygen at all times. The helmet was also equipped with a self-sealing drinking and feeding port through which a tube could be inserted to enable the pilot to consume liquids and semi-solid foods. Air Force and NASA pilots began using the S-100 in 1972 and continued to do so until the last U-2C was retired in 1989.6\n 6. Ibid., pp. 319322.\n\n## Full-Pressure Suits\n\nWith significantly more available cockpit space in the U-2R and subsequent models, it was finally possible to equip pilots with full-pressure suits. Officials from the Air Force, CIA, David Clark, Firewel, and Lockheed met in Burbank in May 1967 to discuss the final configuration of the U-2R cockpit, pressurization system, escape system, and pressure suit. The David Clark Company was contracted to produce the S1010 full-pressure suit, but the first unit would not be ready until September. In the interim, several S901J suits of the type used in the A-12 were modified for use in the U-2R. When the S1010 finally became available, it was very similar to the S901J but with oxygen and electrical connections tailored for the U-2 cockpit. In the event of emergency egress, it included a fully integrated parachute harness, automatic water-activated flotation system, and an optional inflatable thermal-protective garment. For crew comfort during long-duration missions, it had a urine-collection system. In order to minimize pilot stress and fatigue during long sorties, the company designed an entirely new helmet, making every attempt to reduce the amount of weight supported by the pilot's head. The designers achieved this by removing the breathing regulator and oxygen-supply system from the helmet and relocating them within the coverall garment, and by integrating the helmet-disconnect bearing assembly with the helmet via a soft neck section at the base of the Fiberglas shell. They also enlarged and reshaped the S1010 helmet shell to increase headroom over that of the S901J helmet assembly.7\nAt just 31 pounds, the S1010 was surprisingly lightweight; the suit and gloves weighed just 14 pounds, the exterior cover and harness 10 pounds, and the helmet 7 pounds. Without the helmet, the entire suit could be folded into a 2.7-cubic-foot package. Although the coverall and gloves were custom tailored for each pilot, the helmet came in only one size. Interior cushions were used to accommodate individual head sizes. As with earlier David Clark suits, U-2 pilots traveled to Worcester to be measured and fitted. The company produced the suit in two variants. On the S1010A, the oxygen regulator, communication gear, parachute harness, and flotation device were integrally mounted. For the S1010B, designers moved the regulator and communication equipment into the helmet and put the parachute and flotation gear into a separate harness worn over the suit.8\nIn 1978, the David Clark Company began development of a new helmet to replace the S1010 units when they reached the anticipated end of their service lives 3 years later. In a continuing effort to minimize helmet-induced stress and fatigue, designers introduced a nonconformal dome helmet that completely eliminated head-borne weight and provided greater freedom of head movement within the helmet. The S1010D helmet provided excellent visibility and greatly reduced the rotational torque associated with neck stress. Instead of the usual conformal padding, the pilot now wore a skullcap that contained a microphone and earphones for the communication system. Testing yielded mixed results; although the helmet was more comfortable, pilots complained that foam cushionsinside the coverall, underneath the helmet neck ringinterfered with the parachute risers and shoulder harness and provided inadequate front-to-back stability for the helmet.9\nThis problem was solved within 3 years. The S1031 was nearly identical to the S1030 developed for the SR-71 except for the placement of oxygen and electrical interfaces, as dictated by each aircraft. In addition, special care was taken to limit bulk on the front of the chest to minimize interference with the U-2 pilot's control yoke; this had not been a problem in the SR-71, which features a standard control stick. The S1031 came in 12 standard sizes and weighed about 35 pounds. It began replacing the S1010 in late 1982 and remained in use until 1996. Starting in 1991, some S1030 and S1031 suits were replaced with the S1031C, a common pressure suit that could be used interchangeably in either the U-2 or SR-71, thus reducing ground support and maintenance requirements. Such improvements and a desire to further improve wearer comfort eventually led to development of the S1034, an entirely new design based on lessons learned from years of crewmember and maintainer experience with earlier suits. For the S1034, designers studied myriad factors that affected crew performance, including comfort, mobility, visibility, tactility and dexterity, oxygen systems, altitude and thermal protection, drinking and feeding necessities, durability, maintainability, and survival characteristics in the event of emergency. The result was a suit with a bladder manufactured from Gore-Tex, a lightweight fabric that allowed perspiration to pass through in the form of water vapor while retaining air pressure. The S1034 was more comfortable and less bulky than earlier full-pressure suits and more durable and easier to maintain. It was easier to don and doff and had better mobility than the S1031. New gloves offered improved comfort, mobility, and dexterity, as well as improved gripping power and wear protection. The helmet was functionally identical to that of the S1031 but made of lighter materials. In 2002, the David Clark Company began development of an improved helmet called the S1034E that was slightly larger and more comfortable to wear. This model was put into production in 2006 to replace earlier helmets as they reached the end of their service lives.10\n\n## Physiological Support\n\nFlying the U-2 would have been impossible without the assistance of a team of specialized physiological support technicians to help the pilot don and doff his pressure suit and ensure the proper attachment and operation of life-support equipment. With the exception of the specific types of personal equipment worn by flightcrews, the process of preparing for a U-2 flight has remained essentially unchanged since 1955.\n\nTo avoid decompression sickness during flight, U-2 pilots had to don their pressure suits and begin breathing pure oxygen at least an hour prior to takeoff so that their bodies would have sufficient time to dissipate nitrogen in the bloodstream. This procedure was known as pre-breathing. During high-altitude cruise, the cabin-pressure altitude was maintained between 28,000 and 30,000 feet. The pilot's suit automatically pressurized to 3 psi because breathing pure oxygen at 3 psi at 29,000 feet is equivalent to breathing ambient air at sea level. Without pressurized oxygen, the time of useful consciousness at 70,000 feet is only a few seconds. Typically, the pilot arrived at the ready room about an hour and a half before the flight for a quick examination by a flight surgeon. The preflight physical consisted of checking blood pressure, respiration, pulse, and recent diet. Only low-residue foods were consumed prior to a mission because gas expansion during ascent could cause gastrointestinal distress. Once the examination was complete, two suit technicians and a supervisor provided technical assistance as the pilot donned his suit coverall over long underwear and pulled on boots and gloves. The pilot then lay down for an hour prior to takeoff to pre-breathe pure oxygen for denitrogenation of his blood. This downtime also provided an opportunity for the technicians to integrate and inflate the suit, check out all systems and hardware, and check for leaks. Before leaving the ready room for the crew transport van, the pilot was connected to a portable oxygen system so as not to break the breathing cycle. At the aircraft, the pilot's pressure suit was hooked up to the onboard oxygen system.11\nOnce cocooned within the pressure suit, simple tasks such as eating, drinking, and urination became major problems. To prevent pilots from becoming The pre-breathing ritual was the same regardless of whether the partial-pressure or fullpressure garment was worn. In upper photo, a life-support technician checks oxygen levels for Lockheed test pilot Robert Schumacher in 1957. In lower photo, TSgt. Shawn Hansen performs a similar task for Lt. Col. Brian Dickinson in 2008. (U.S. Air Force)\ndesiccated during long missionsa condition aggravated by having to breathe pure oxygenprovisions were made to allow the pilot to drink sweetened water by way of a tube inserted through a small self-sealing hole in the facemask. Ready-to-eat foods in squeezable containers were also provided. Despite all precautions, U-2 pilots often lost as much as 3 to 6 pounds of body weight through dehydration during an 8-hour mission. To reduce waste elimination, pilots ate a low-bulk, high-protein diet on the day before and the morning of each mission. Early pressure suits made no provision for urination, but a subsequent model required the pilot to be catheterized before donning his flying suit. This method to permit urination during flight proved very uncomfortable and was eventually replaced with an external bladder arrangement that made the catheter unnecessary.12\nRyan Ragsdale, a physiological support technician with more than 35 years of experience, started working with both partial- and full-pressure suits at Beale Air Force Base in 1979. He immediately noticed that there was a big difference between the cockpits of the U-2C and U-2R (the C cockpit was about 25 percent smaller than that of the R) and the types of pressure suits worn in each model. At that time, the Air Force was employing a variety of suit configurations for use with the U-2C, U-2R, and SR-71, all aircraft that were stationed at Beale. \"The U-2C at that time was not flying operational missions; it was only being used for initial training,\" he recalled. \"We had so few U-2R models that when a pilot came into the program we would first configure him with a partial-pressure suit to fly in the U-2CT trainer for initial certification and acceptance flights, and then for his solo flights in the single-seat U-2C. Once he got through that phase, we would transition him into the S1010 full-pressure suit assembly so he could start flying the U-2R.\"13\nRagsdale first worked with the hybrid S-100 before being trained on the S1010 full-pressure suits. The oxygen regulator for the S1010 was mounted underneath the neck ring inside the suit, and oxygen entered through openings in the neck ring and passed into the helmet's face cavity. \"This was problematic,\" said Ragsdale, \"because the neck ring is a movable fixture, so now you had a movable fixture with seals that your oxygen system is going through. We spent a lot of time overhauling, continuously working to keep those suits functioning.\" The later S1010B, with the regulator located inside the helmet instead of the suit, was a big improvement. But there were always new challenges, including the vexing problem of faceplate fogging. \"There was a wire grid within the visor glass, a heating element for defogging. We tried battery power packs, rechargeable power packs; it wasn't very effective.\" Alternatively, the pilot could insert a food probe into the helmet's feeding port; the pressure change activated the regulator, causing oxygen to flow across the faceplate and evaporate any moisture on the glass. Ragsdale eventually mastered the art of assisting the U-2 pilot through the lengthy process of donning the pressure garment, pre-breathing, and integrating the suit with the airplane's life-support systems. Doffing the suit after a mission was a quicker process as long as all of the systems functioned properly, but the pilot had to be observed for any signs of decompression sickness.14\nOver the past three decades, suit designers and technicians have learned many lessons. As a result, pressure garments have been made lighter, with increased mobility, and have become easier and more comfortable to wear.\n\nNeoprene rubber suit bladders have been replaced with Gore-Tex assemblies that wick moisture away from the pilot's body. \"The pilots are coming back much drier than they used to, and the suits are more sustainable because acidic sweat had previously caused the suits to deteriorate faster.\" There have been surprisingly few improvements in manual dexterity of the gloves, however. \"The early partial-pressure suit gloves were better,\" according to Ragsdale, \"because they were thin and fit more tightly. Once you have to encase the entire hand in air, you can't have the glove be a snug fit like that. They have tried Velcro on the palms and fingertips, and metal bars across the palms, but there hasn't been a perfect solution.\" When he first arrived at Beale, Ragsdale was told that he might not be trained to work with the U-2 because it was expected to be phased out of service. \"Now here we are more than 30 years later, the SR-71 was retired not once but twice, and the U-2 is still going strong.\"15\n\n## High Cuisine\n\nRequirements for long-duration reconnaissance and research flights resulted in the development of special foods and equipment to deliver nourishment and liquid refreshment to the U-2 flightcrews. Pilots wearing bulky, fully pressurized suits have a limited range of motion for feeding themselves and cannot break the integrity of their pressurized environment by opening their helmet visors. In order to overcome this dilemma, the Air Force turned to the expert chefs and nutritionists at the Department of Defense Combat Feeding Directorate (CFD) at the Army's Natick Soldier Research, Development and Engineering Center, Natick, MA. The result was \"tube food\"meals in the form of a paste with the consistency of baby food. U-2 pilots are supplied with metallicfoil containers, similar in size to a large tube of toothpaste, each fitted with a plastic straw designed to slip through a sealed port on the pilot's helmet. Breaching this port, which is also used for hydration, does not affect the suit's internal pressure. The CFD has been supplying tube foods to U-2 pilots for more than half a century and has produced approximately 28,000 tubes annually for a community\n15. Ibid.\n\nof only about 100 pilots. Each has a shelf life of approximately 3 years if stored at a maximum temperature of 80 F. \"We've been making these for years and years,\" said Dan Nattress, a CFD food technologist, \"and constantly adding new flavors.\"16\nPilots usually consume one tube per hour. Although eating peach cobbler, Key lime pie, Chicken a la King, or truffle macaroni and cheese from a tube doesn't compare to a home-cooked meal, U-2 pilots say they enjoy the tube meals while flying long missions. They typically request their favorites while being assisted into their pressure suits. \"Depending on the duration of the flight, each pilot is different,\" said suit technician SSgt. Suzzett Stalesky of the 9th Physiological Support Squadron. \"It just depends on the pilot preference. Some pilots take the same thing every flight, and some newer ones are still trying to find what agrees with their body during a flight.\" While classic flavors such as beef stew or applesauce are popular, there are also more exciting options like chocolate pudding with enough caffeine to satisfy any coffee addict.17 Since some missions can last as long as 12 hours, caffeine is a popular ingredient among U-2 pilots. \"The aircraft itself is very difficult to fly, and it's actually very difficult to land,\" Nattress said. \"[The pilots] want to be very alert when they land. Fairly soon before they're landing, they'll open up a caffeinated product.\"18\nIn 2010, Air Force officials decided the tube food menu needed a boost and asked the CFD to bring its products into the 21st century. \"Things change,\"\nsaid Nattress. \"In the 1970s, expectations were different. We had no direct communication with the user prior to 2010.\" To rectify that, Nattress and Deborah Haley, chef and physical science technician with CFD, visited Beale Air Force Base to gain a firsthand understanding of what the U-2 crews experience. \"Things are a lot more difficult,\" Haley said. \"Once you're fully suited and under pressure and connected to oxygen, there's no movement inside the helmet, except when you breathe in and breathe out, so swallowing is a conscious effort. You have to actually think about that, because there's no air movement. It's a lot different sort of feeling to it.\"19\n\n16. Shawn Nickel, \"Fueling the high flyersU-2 tube food calms cravings in the cockpit,\" Air Combat Command News, February 8, 2013, http://www.acc.af.mil/news/story. asp?id=123335478, accessed August 30, 2013.\n17. Ibid.\n18. Bob Reinert, \"Natick tube foods keep U-2 pilots flying high,\" *Army News Archives*, January 18,\n2013, *http://www.army.mil/article/94301/Natick_tube_foods_keep_U_2_pilots_flying_high/*,\naccessed August 30, 2013.\n19. Ibid.\nAfter surveying a number of U-2 pilots, Air Force officials asked the CFD\nto produce four popularly requested flavors including Peach Melba, Beef Stroganoff, Key Lime Pie, and a breakfast item, which became bacon with hash browns. These were added to a revamped 15-item menu, all made with fresh ingredients. \"They didn't want us to completely revise all of the products,\" said Haley, \"but we knew that there were things we could do to improve them that wouldn't be major.\" CFD technicians suggested developing layers of flavors to improve the meal experience. \"Now the pilots are getting really excited about the food. It's so much better.\"20\nDeveloping high cuisine for high-altitude flyers is not as easy as it sounds.\n\nThere have been occasional failures and missteps along the way. In the early stages of developing the Peach Melba, for example, Nattress recalled that it had a \"dirty sock kind of taste.\" Eventually, after some additional tweaking, it became one of the more successful flavors. \"It takes a while to find just the right balance,\" said Haley, \"so that when it comes out of the tube, you've hit just the right flavor profile.\"21\n20. Ibid. 21. Ibid.\n\n## Hazards Of High Flight\n\nU-2 pilots have been subjected to a variety of hazards related to high-altitude flying, especially hypoxia (oxygen deficiency) and dysbarism (medical conditions resulting from changes in ambient air pressure). These phenomena were not merely confined to the early days of the program and the use of partial-pressure suits but continued into the 21st century despite advances in aerospace physiology and the development of improved technology for personal survival equipment.\n\nTwo fatal U-2 accidents on successive days in July 1958 resulted from hypoxia. The first, on July 8, occurred 6 hours into a high-altitude navigation training flight when Squadron Leader Chris Walker, a British exchange pilot, reported that his aircraft was descending out of control. Although he ejected at a safe altitude, Walker never separated from his seat and perished. The following day, Capt. Al Chapin, Jr., was killed during a similar training sortie. Both were highly qualified pilots. Walker was fully qualified in the U-2 and had hundreds of hours of flight experience in the Canberra (British forerunner to the B-57). Chapin had been awarded the Distinguished Flying Cross for safely landing a disabled U-2 1 year earlier, after a power failure and loss of pressurization at high altitude. The U-2 fleet was grounded following Walker's and Chapin's accidents, while investigators initially focused on suspicions that autopilot failures led to loss of control. This line of thought was abandoned after excessive moisture was discovered in the oxygen systems of other U-2s, leading to the conclusion that ice may have formed in the oxygen systems of the two mishap aircraft. The commander of SAC restricted U-2 operations to a maximum altitude of 20,000 feet until corrective actions were implemented.22\nThat same year, Col. Jack Nole suffered hypoxia while attempting a highaltitude bailout after his U-2 broke apart following inadvertent extension of the wing flaps. As his airplane dove toward the ground, Nole extended the landing gear and speed brakes and reduced engine power to idle, but it was no use. Airframe stresses eventually snapped the bolts holding the tail assembly in place and Nole was battered about inside the cockpit as the plane tumbled end over end. Struggling mightily, he released his harness and was immediately slammed into the canopy, which came loose and sailed away. Nole's survival pack snagged on something, and he found himself pinned halfway out of the cockpit, bent backward against the tumbling fuselage by the powerful slipstream. He eventually wrenched free but soon came to the realization that he had failed to initiate his emergency oxygen feed. As he depleted his remaining air, Nole felt the onset of hypoxia and determined that he had two choices. \"The first,\" he later recalled, \"was to let myself fall until my parachute opened automatically at the preset 14,000 feet. But it would take more than two minutes to free-fall those seven and a half miles; by that time, there was a good chance I'd have suffocated.\"23\nHis second choice was to immediately open his parachute and hope he could find and activate his emergency oxygen bottle. Tempting though this was, it carried a number of risks. The first stemmed from the fact that a human body could accelerate to as much as 375 miles per hour in the thin atmosphere. Even if his shroud lines did not become tangled, the force of the parachute snapping open at such speed could shred the fabric or cause great bodily harm due to sudden deceleration. Successful chute deployment did not guarantee survival either since it might take up to a half-hour to descend to the ground from 53,000 feet. Nole decided to chance it and pulled his ripcord. He was pleasantly surprised when the parachute opened gently, without the slightest shock, possibly as a result of his being propelled upward during egress and, by chance, opening the chute while at the apex of his arc. Nole managed to activate his emergency oxygen but then had to contend with wild oscillations beneath the parachute canopy, exacerbated by the thin air, which provided little resistance. \"Each time I swung, I was afraid that air would spill from the chute's high side, and that it would collapse, dropping me like a stone.\" At 20,000 feet and still swinging wildly, he opened his faceplate and was violently airsick. Finally, 22 minutes after exiting the cockpit, he touched down safely on a gently rolling Texas prairie. He later learned that his descent should have lasted at least another 10 minutes, but air spillage during his oscillations sped his fall, allowing him to more quickly reach warmer, thicker air before his emergency supply ran out.24\nIn another incident, Capt. Pat Halloran suffered oxygen deprivation due to faulty connection of his life-support equipment by technicians prior to takeoff. After his oxygen hose came loose during cruise at around 64,000 feet, Halloran began to feel warning signs of hypoxia, including flushing and hyperventilation. His helmet bladder collapsed around his head and he had difficulty breathing as the pressurized oxygen feed suddenly ceased. He was now breathing only the ambient cockpit air, which was pressurized to around 30,000 feet pressure altitude. His vision dimming, he checked the airplane's oxygen controls and found nothing amiss, but when he looked in a rearview mirror, he noticed the hose dangling loose from its connector. Working quickly, he re-established the proper connection and felt immediate relief as oxygen began to flow into his helmet. The ensuing investigation resulted in modifications to prevent accidental disconnection during flight.25\nLater U-2 pilots equipped with full-pressure suits were likewise vulnerable to the vicissitudes of high-altitude flight. In 2006, a 47-year-old pilot began feeling various aches and pains 212 hours into a long-endurance sortie. He tried to alleviate discomfort in his knees and ankles by adjusting his rudder pedals and then by increasing the pressure in his suit. The situation became increasingly worse over the next 2 hours as he experienced confusion, headache, fatigue, and degraded ability to concentrate. Eating, drinking, and adjusting his oxygen supply gave no relief, and only after another 4 hours had passed did he report his problems to ground control. He was immediately instructed to return to base, but he almost did not make it. He was sick in his helmet several times, and his mental and physical capacities (including hearing and vision) deteriorated until he could no longer communicate via the radio. Upon arrival at his home base, he attempted to land on the wrong runway three times before finally touching down safely. Following a thorough physical examination, the pilot was diagnosed with severe decompression sickness with neurological symptoms and incipient cardiovascular collapse. Although investigators found no technical problems with the airplane's environmental systems, the pilot's symptoms had apparently been brought on by the pressure changing from that experienced on the airfield before takeoff to that of the minimum ambient pressure in the cabin of the U-2 in cruise. Decompression sickness, known to divers as the bends, results from the formation of tiny bubbles from gases (mainly nitrogen) dissolved in body tissues due to a reduction in the environmental pressure. It can strike aviators exposed to altitudes above 18,000 feet or so, and the symptoms can range from a mild case of the bends to serious neurological problems. In this case, the U-2 pilot seemed to recover within a few months, but he was eventually found to have suffered permanent brain damage severe enough to end his flying career.26\nIn the first decade of the 21st century, according to Lt Col. Edward\n\"Tadd\" Sholtis, the Air Force's deputy director of public affairs at Air Combat Command Headquarters, a higher operations tempo for the U-2 coincided with an increased number of pilots suffering from neurologic decompression sickness (NDCS). In fact, between 2006 and 2010, the number of reported NDCS incidents increased from 0.076 percent to 0.23 percent of missions flown. \"By late 2010, officials believed there was enough cause for concern to initiate a study,\" said Sholtis in an interview with *Air Force Times*. \"What we knew or suspected about the problem was briefed to decision makers in early 2011, and the study was authorized in March 2011.\" By October 2012, the Air Force had conducted magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) tests on more than 100 U-2 pilots, ranging in age from 26 to 50, said Dr. Stephen McGuire, a neurologist and retired Air Force colonel who led the study. Of those pilots examined, 75 percent had more brain lesions than they should have for their age and health status. McGuire noted that these were the same type of lesions normally associated with repeated head trauma.27\nThe study, published in *Neurology* in August 2013, compared MRI images from 102 Air Force pilots assigned to U-2 squadrons with 91 brain scans from a control group matched by age, health, and education. Citing previous research from other scientists, McGuire and his colleagues showed that high-altitude pilots' exposure to low-air-pressure environments can lead to NDCS, affecting the central nervous system. Symptoms include slowed thought processes,\n\naccessed August 30, 2013.\nanomia (impaired ability to name things), confusion, unresponsiveness, and permanent cognitive decline. The researchers who performed the study found a link between clinical NDCS and white-matter hyperintensity brain lesions, possibly related to microbubbles of predominantly nitrogen gas formed during high-altitude flying. In testing whether the entire U-2 pilot population might exhibit significantly more lesions than members of the control group, they discovered a 375 percent increase in the volume of lesions among the pilots and a 295 percent rise in the number of white-matter hyperintensities. Lesion volume and count are important markers of cerebral integrity and have been previously used to measure age-related cognitive decline as indicated by declines in executive functioning, processing speed, and general cognitive ability. Brain scans of the U-2 pilots indicated white-matter damage different from that occurring in normal aging, further bolstering the hypothesis that the pilots' lesions resulted from microemboli (tiny gas bubbles) in the brain tissue.28\nInterestingly, pilots with the most U-2 flight time did not always have the highest number of brain lesions. Instead, the main contributing factors to lesion formation included the amount of nitrogen the pilots were able to get out of their system while breathing 100 percent oxygen before flying, mission duration, and the amount of recovery time pilots were given before making another high-altitude sortie. In order to alleviate the risks of NDCS, the Air Force took steps to improve cockpit pressurization in the U-2 and minimize hypobaric exposure. The Cabin Altitude Reduction Effort reduced the pressure altitude U-2 pilots were exposed to during operational missions from 29,000 to 15,000 feet. This was a significant improvement as research has shown that the risk of developing decompression sickness becomes virtually nonexistent below 18,000 feet. \"What we've done is bring the pilots down below what is commonly thought to be the threshold for DCS and we think that will prevent any further occurrence of lesions,\" McGuire subsequently reported. Technicians completed CARE upgrades to the fleet in June 2013 along with other cockpit modifications, including reinforcement of frames, bulkheads, and the canopy. McGuire acknowledged that it is unknown whether U-2 pilots would be at greater risk of having health problems later in life as a result of hypobaric expose. \"In all other neurological disease, these types of lesions are associated with cognitive impairment,\" he said. \"We have not seen any clinical impairment in any of our U-2 pilots, and they are all still flying. But, being conservative, the commanders rightly made the decision [to implement CARE], 'Let's not push the envelope; let's protect our pilots.'\"29 As an additional precaution, according to Sholtis, \"The Air Force is in the process of reviewing flight operations guidance to potentially increase downtime between high flights longer than nine hours, as well as limiting the length of deployments.\"30\nEven flight at lower altitudes can carry the risk of hypoxia. In December\n2011, veteran U-2 and ER-2 pilot Denis Steele was flying a NASA sortie from Palmdale when his oxygen regulator failed. Since the maximum planned cruise altitude for the mission was only 45,000 feet, Steele was not wearing a pressure suit. His oxygen supply was delivered through a standard mask and regulator of the type used in fighter-type aircraft such as the F-15 and F-18. Typically, regulator failure results from a rupture of one of two diaphragms within the assembly. The regulator is designed to fail in the full open position, providing a continuous flow of oxygen. According to Ryan Ragsdale, \"It's going to be uncomfortable breathing because now it's going to be equivalent to pressure breathing, but at least you still have oxygen, which gives you time so you can safely descend to a lower altitude.\" Steele's incident was unusual in that his regulator ceased to function, leaving him with no oxygen flow whatsoever. He could not even activate his emergency oxygen,\" Ragsdale said, \"because it all went through the\n29. Schogol, \"Air Force re-pressurizes U-2 cabin to prevent brain lesions in pilots.\" 30. MacGill, \"Mental-decline brain lesions found in high-flying military pilots.\"\nsame regulator.\"31 At that point in the flight, the ER-2's cockpit had a pressure altitude of 23,000 feet, which gave the pilot approximately 3 minutes of useful consciousness before he was unable to fly the airplane. Steele needed to reduce his altitude quickly before he succumbed to hypoxia, but he had to be careful not to descend too quickly and risk overstressing the airframe. He declared an emergency, engaged the autopilot, and attempted to balance his need to get down quickly enough to remain conscious with a requirement to descend slowly enough to keep his airplane intact. During his long descent, he felt the onset of hypoxia and worried that he might become so cognitively impaired that he would lose control of the airplane. As his symptoms worsened, he even considered the possibility that he might have to eject. Frustration mounted as air-traffic controllers tried to convince Steele to descend more slowly in order to avoid commercial air traffic in the flight corridor above Palmdale. They did not seem to grasp the severity of his predicament. Somehow, he managed to retain control of the airplane and remain conscious long enough to reach a lower altitude, where his hypoxic symptoms subsided and he was able to safely land the airplane. For these actions, Steel was later awarded the NASA Exceptional Bravery Medal. Investigators determined that the faulty regulator had been used well past its service life.32\nAnother hazard of high-altitude flight comes from ionizing radiation. Earth's atmosphere shields humans and other life forms living at ground level from galactic cosmic rays (GCR); the denser the atmosphere, the greater the protection. The intensity of atmospheric background radiation levels varies with altitude, latitude, and phase of the solar cycle, which ranges from minimum to maximum about every 11 years. When solar activity is at a minimum GCR, levels are at their highest, and vice versa. GCR consist of energetic nuclei of all naturally occurring elements, interacting with atmospheric constituents, primarily through atomic and nuclear collisions. At flight altitudes above 10,000 feet, the dominant contributor to the effective dose comes from secondary neutrons. GCR exposure approximately doubles with every 6,000 feet of increased altitude. At sea level, the exposure rate is a miniscule 0.03 microsieverts per hour (Sv/h). At altitudes of 30,000 to 40,000 feet, typical of those used for commercial airline traffic, the exposure rates increase to approximately 5 to 10\nSv/h. At typical operating altitudes for the U-2, and those of proposed future high-speed commercial passenger aircraft (59,00065,000 feet), the estimated dose equivalent rates range from 10 to 20 Sv/h. As an example, measurements\n\nDryden Flight Research Center, August 6, 2013.\ntaken aboard the Concorde supersonic transport in October 1996 averaged 14.1 Sv/h. In the future, commercial aircraft may be developed that fly higher, faster, and farther than currently possible. This will result in increased effective doses of atmospheric radiation for aircrews and passengers.33\nIn order to more accurately characterize radiation levels at high altitudes, scientists from the NASA High Speed Research Project Office at Langley Research Center conducted a study in 1997 with assistance from Johnson Space Center, Ames Research Center, the Department of Energy's Environmental Measurements Laboratory, Canadian Defense Research Establishment, U.K. National Radiological Protection Board, Boeing Company, and several researchers from domestic and foreign universities. For the Atmospheric Ionizing Radiation (AIR) project, a NASA ER-2 aircraft conducted five high-altitude sorties from Moffett Field to measure galactic cosmic radiation during a solar minimum. On flights ranging over the Pacific Ocean, southwestern U.S., and western Canada, the ER-2 carried 14 different instruments in the nose, Q-bay, and wing pods. These included a multisphere neutron spectrometer, ionization chamber, scintillation counters, two spherical tissue-equivalent proportional counters, and two particle telescopes. Data from the AIR program are potentially useful in developing not only more accurate radiation models for highaltitude flight but also for planning human exploration of the planet Mars, which has a radiation environment very similar to that of Earth's atmosphere at 70,000 feet.34\nFlight operations in the stratosphere have proven challenging and hazardous to U-2 flightcrews but have immeasurably increased knowledge of aerospace physiology and aided in the development of improved life-support systems. Many lessons came at a high cost, but despite heavy losses in the early days of the U-2 program, Air Force officials are quick to point out that the airplane has a pretty good overall safety record. According to Sholtis in an August 2013 interview, \"[During] U-2 operations since 1963, for every 100,000 hours flown there were eight mishaps that resulted in the death of the pilot.\" Analysis of these mishaps resulted in a variety of procedural, educational, and technological changes made to improve safety. \"We have reduced the fatality rate to 0.1 per 100,000 hours over the past 10 years.\"35\n\n33. Lawrence W. Townsend, \"Radiation exposures of aircrew in high altitude flight,\" Journal of\nRadiological Protection 21, no. 1 (March 2001): pp. 58.\n34. Susan Bailey, \"Air crew radiation exposureAn overview,\" *Nuclear News*, January 2000,\npp. 3240.\n35. MacGill, \"Mental-decline brain lesions found in high-flying military pilots.\"\nPilots learn to fly the U-2ST trainer before going solo. (U.S. Air Force)\n\n## Chapter 6 Flight Operations And Performance\n\nThe U-2 has always been a difficult airplane to fly, challenging even the best pilots. Lightweight construction and long, thin wings give it terrific soaring ability but also make it hard to land. As the airplane approaches the ground, it floats on a cushion of airknown as ground effectthat causes the U-2 to remain airborne even at idle. The pilot almost has to force it down using spoilers to extinguish any remaining lift. A safe touchdown is further complicated by the unusual landing gear configuration. Near or on the ground, the U-2 appears to be a clumsy beast. The mysterious Dragon Lady seems at ease only when soaring to altitude or cruising through the stratosphere. Even there, danger lurks within the thin margin between Mach buffet and stall speed, the dreaded \"coffin corner\" of the flight envelope. Technological improvements have eased such problems as high-altitude engine flameouts and balky autopilots, but only a select few can hope to admire Earth's curvature from more than 12 miles above the surface in what has been dubbed the Near-Space Plane.\n\n## Crew Selection And Training\n\nU-2 pilots come from every type of military flying backgroundfighters, bombers, tankers, transports, and trainersand have included inter-service transfer officers from the Navy, Marines, and Coast Guard. Candidates for crew selection must submit an extensive application package. Finalists undergo a formal interview with several commanders at Beale Air Force Base, home of the 9th Reconnaissance Wing.\n\nThose selected for interview generally possess a strong flight-evaluation history and solid officer-performance evaluations and exceed minimum flight experience requirements. Because the U-2 does not meet military specifications for handling qualities, selectees must also pass a demanding three-sortie profile in the two-seat U-2ST to determine their suitability for further training. If all goes well, they are soon inducted into a very select community. Trainee pilots are initially assigned to the 1st Reconnaissance Squadron, a unit that traces its origins to the earliest days of military aviation. Training lasts approximately 10 months, including about 3 months for inprocessing and qualification in the supersonic T-38. This is followed by a 22-sortie U-2 training syllabus that includes Basic Qualification and Mission Qualification prior to operational assignment. Line pilots typically alternate between 2-month deployments flying operational missions and 2 to 3 months at Beale for continuation training.1\nPilots fly the T-38 to maintain basic qualifications and proficiency in aerobatic maneuvering and instrument flying. The trainer is less expensive to operate than the U-2 and does not require use of a pressure suit. Operational pilots typically fly the T-38 twice a week and the U-2 two to three times per month. Flying the U-2, even during training flights, is largely a solitary affair. According to Capt. Neal Hinson, a U-2 pilot assigned to the 99th Reconnaissance Squadron, \"You train mostly on your own after the initial solo flight and instructors monitor the pilot's objectives using GPS.\"2\n\n## Flying The Mission\n\nFlying the U-2 requires a great deal of teamwork and coordination. While pilots are honing their flying skills, life-support technicians prepare pressure suits and survival gear, and maintainers keep the airplanes flyable, and the mission planners develop all the necessary material required to complete each mission. This group consists of about a dozen inactive pilots who use their flying experience to create flight route plans and other information for the current U-2 pilots prior to each sortie. Among the products they create are items such as navigation plans, fuel-consumption tables, and radio frequency communication cards mounted on cardboard so they can be handled more easily by a pressure-suited pilot. After a flight is completed, charts and flight plans are collected and stored for possible use in future missions. \"Mission planners,\" said 99th RS Mission Planning Flight Commander Lt. Col. Eddie Efsic, \"are hired to transform distributed ground systems products into something pilots can use to efficiently and safely collect [imaging] targets.\"3\n\nNews, April 3, 2009, *http://www.acc.af.mil/news/story.asp?id=123142867*, accessed August\n26, 2013.\n 3. Ibid.\nFollowing a mission briefing and preflight physical examination, the pilot is helped into the pressure suit and spends the next hour pre-breathing pure oxygen. Shortly prior to takeoff, the physiological support crew switches the pilot to a portable oxygen system and boards a van for transport to the flightline. Entering the cockpit is a difficult task while wearing a bulky pressure suit. Additional time is consumed with connecting the oxygen hoses, communications cables, seat harnesses, and boot stirrups. The pilot then taxies to the runway and pauses while the ground crew removes locking pins from the outrigger pogos.4\nA normal mission profile begins with a short takeoff roll followed by a steep initial climb angle in the first 25,000 feet and a high rate of climb to altitude. Depending upon total gross takeoff weight, the U-2 will usually attain an intermediate cruise altitude of 60,000 feet within 30 to 45 minutes. At this time, the pilot initiates cruise climb and engages the autopilot to hold a constant Mach number. Altitude increases as fuel is burned off and the weight of the aircraft decreases. Depending on payload weight, the U-2 may climb to cruising altitudes above 70,000 feet. Local air conditions can affect cruise climb performance; colder air allows a more rapid climb whereas warmer air reduces climb performance. In standard cruise climb, the U-2 normally flies at a zero pitch (level) angle, though this varies approximately 1 degree as the autopilot seeks a constant Mach number. Pitch attitudes during takeoff and climb can reach 20 degrees nose up, 10 degrees nose down during descent. Bank angles are a function of desired turn radius but are normally held to less than 30 degrees. At cruise altitude, the pilot holds the airplane at a constant Mach number of about 0.70, equivalent to a true airspeed of approximately\n410 knots. A normal 6.5-hour mission will cover a range of approximately\n2,400 nautical miles, spending about 5.5 hours at altitudes above 60,000 feet. An 8-hour mission can cover a distance of 3,000 nautical miles with about 7 hours time at altitude.5 The automatic flight control system provides stability augmentation in yaw, pitch, and roll and also incorporates autopilot functions including Mach hold and automatic navigation via the inertial navigation system (INS).6\nAccording to the flight plan, the pilot navigates between waypoints using any of several navigation systems. The INS operates by sensing accelerations from a gyro-stabilized, all-attitude platform and using a digital computer to integrate this information to provide an indication of present position (latitude and longitude), attitude data (pitch and roll), and course-line computation referenced to great circle routes. A control display in the cockpit allows the pilot to store navigation waypoints and to change the flight track en route. An update function allows for GPS updating of the INS with accuracy typically better than 20 meters. A backup or secondary navigation system allows for a safe return to base or to an alternate landing site should the primary INS fail. Additionally, the U-2 is equipped with several systems that enable navigation with respect to ground-based radio beacons, and the optical viewsight offers the pilot visual coverage of the terrain beneath the aircraft for navigation purposes.7\nApproximately 30 minutes prior to landing, the pilot initiates descent from high altitude by bringing the throttle to idle, opens the speed brakes, and extends the landing gear. This results in a descent rate of approximately\n2,000 feet per minute. Sometimes, several 360-degree turns may be required to bleed off altitude. At 1,500 feet, the pilot sets trim for landing. The U-2 crosses the runway threshold with a speed of approximately 75 knots.8\nNow comes the most challenging and difficult phase of flight: the landing. Typically, pilots are fatigued after long hours of flying in a pressure suit, so to make landing easier, a chase car follows the U-2 down the runway. Using a radio, a qualified U-2 pilot riding in the car communicates the plane's altitude during the last few feet before touchdown. As airspeed drops, the pilot works to keep the wings straight and level until the U-2 tilts to one side on its bicycle landing gear with one wingtip dragging on the ground. Ground crew then reinsert the pogo wheels so that the U-2 can taxi to a hangar. Chase cars, known as mobiles, have been used since the earliest days of U-2 operations. The Air Force initially used Chevy El Caminos then later switched to Ford Mustangs. More recently, these were replaced with the Chevy Camaro Z28. According to Capt. Spencer Thomas, a pilot who previously served as a U-2 crew chief, \"The driver is always a U-2 pilot. That ensures identical mindsets. When I'm not flying a mission, I'm 'mobiling.' \"9\n\n## Performance Characteristics\n\nFlying the U-2 has always been a challenge because its unusual handling qualities require precision and skill. In adapting to the airplane's peculiar flight characteristics at altitude, early U-2 test pilots developed several standard flight profiles. One of these, for reaching maximum altitude, required a stair-step approach. Following takeoff, the pilot began a rapid climb to 55,000 feet at a specified speed schedule. After slowly gaining another 10,000 feet, the pilot set power for a cruise climb for the remainder of the flight, with the airplane rising slowly higher as fuel was depleted. Maximum altitude depended on a number of variables, such as aircraft gross takeoff weight and outside air temperature.10\nEarly U-2 pilots routinely exceeded world altitude records but were unable to take credit for these feats due to secrecy concerns. A number of tests were conducted to obtain true altitude in order to calibrate the altimeter used in the U-2 and to collect data required for camera development. These checks were made by placing targets of known dimensions on a dry lakebed and photographing them from an indicated pressure altitude of 70,000 feet. The surveyed elevation of the lakebed was 4,440 feet above sea level. The airplane's true altitude above the ground was determined by two methods, first by scaling the target size from the pictures and then checking the altimeter reading by correcting for instrument error, static location error, and deviations from standard pressure and temperature. The agreement between these two independent methods proved quite good, differing only 200 feet between the true altitude as measured from the photographs and that calculated from the indicated pressure altitude.11\nAs altitude increased, the margin between the aircraft's stalling speed and its maximum speed quickly diminished. This created a hazardous situation because poor aerodynamic control-surface response in the thin upper atmosphere made stall recovery difficult. Excess speed could be a serious problem. The sleek U-2 had been designed to slice through the air with very little drag, but this beneficial characteristic could also pose a danger. At low altitudes, the early model U-2 airframes were restricted from exceeding 190 knots in smooth air or 150 knots in rough air. At operational cruising altitudes, where the atmosphere was less dense, later models of the airplane had a maximum cruising speed of 410 knots (Mach 0.72). Speeds in excess of these limits would subject the airplane to structural failure. U-2 pilots had to be extremely careful to keep the airplane in a slightly nose-up attitude when flying at operational altitudes. If the nose dropped as little as a few degrees into a nose-down attitude, the airplane gained speed at an alarming rate, exceeding the maximum permitted speed within a matter of seconds. Since there was no physical sensation of speed at 65,000 feet due to the lack of nearby objects to provide visual reference, the pilot had to pay close attention to the airspeed indicator. In fact, airspeed was such a critical factor that the difference between stall speed and never-to-exceed speed differed by only 6 knots at maximum altitude for the early U-2 models and 20 knots for later models. Pilots called this narrow range of acceptable airspeeds the \"coffin corner\" because it represented the point at which the U-2 was constantly on the brink of falling out of the sky. Too little speed could result in stalling, and the sudden drop might overstress the airframe to the point of structural failure. The same could happen at speeds high enough to induce Mach limit buffet.12 If a pilot turned too sharply, the airplane might be subjected to both conditions simultaneously as the inside wing entered stall buffet while the outside wing experienced Mach buffet. The fact that these two sources of buffet feel very much the same made it difficult for the pilot to make a proper corrective response.13\nOne example of exceeding the speed envelope occurred on February 25,\n1966, while Robert E. \"Deke\" Hall was flying Article 342 on an aerial-refueling training mission. Hall completed a series of nine dry hookups with a KC-135 tanker as planned, terminating the exercise with a practice emergency breakaway from the tanker. Flight conditions were smooth with no noticeable turbulence. After the final breakaway, Hall dropped back, then pulled up alongside the KC-135, about 200 to 300 feet off the tanker's right wingtip. He then retracted the U-2's speed brakes and began a steep, climbing turn to the right. As soon as he began the maneuver, Hall felt a slight shudder and heard a loud crunching noise. Crewmembers on board the tanker watched in horror as the U-2's left wing snapped off. Its right wing came off as well, and the airplane disintegrated into several pieces, including the cockpit and nose section, aft fuselage, tail, and engine. Hall managed to eject despite being battered inside the tumbling wreckage. He parachuted to safety while pieces of the U-2 fell around him.14\nThe demanding requirements of flying the U-2 made use of an autopilot almost a necessity, particularly during long flights. Without the benefit of an autopilot during initial flight trials, test pilots found flying the airplane excessively challenging. Lockheed eventually provided an autopilot that could hold the airspeed to within a few knots, but it was still incumbent on the pilot to ensure that the aircraft remained within the proper speed regime.15 Ernie Joiner recalled one of the first long-duration test flights, in which Ray Goudey was aloft for 6 hours: \"He didn't have an autopilot and was really tired when we helped him out of the cockpit.\"16 Flying without the autopilot was not advisable, according to test pilot Robert Schumacher: \"It was as difficult as hell, especially around 70,000 feet, where you are near the Mach and stall buffets and must fly precisely.\" On one occasion he flew the aircraft for 4 hours without using the autopilot and found it very challenging to control the airplane while simultaneously peering through the driftsight, activating the camera controls, and attempting to carry out a variety of other tasks. It was particularly difficult \"because your hands must be on the [control] column... you can't let it alone for a second.\"17\nFor operational purposes, the three most important flight characteristics were altitude, range, and endurance. The original J57-P-37 engine limited the U-2A to maximum operational altitudes between 65,000 and 73,000 feet. It had a range of 3,775 nautical miles and an endurance of about 9 hours. Improved performance with the J57-P-31 increased the altitude capability to around 72,500 feet with a 4,000-nautical-mile range and 10-hour endurance. The U-2C, equipped with the J75-P-13B engine and slipper tanks, had a maximum range of 4,600 nautical miles and could stay aloft for more than 11 hours at altitudes up to 76,000 feet. These early models of the U-2 had a maximum gross takeoff weight of between 20,000 and 24,000 pounds. The much heavier U-2R and TR-1 family weighed in somewhere between 35,000 and 40,000 pounds depending on aircraft configuration. The U-2R in a clean configuration (no wing tanks or pods) could climb above 75,000 feet and fly for 15 hours with a range of 6,300 nautical miles. The later TR-1, ER-2, and U-2S were all capable of exceeding 70,000 feet altitude; but with its GE-F118-GE-101 turbofan engine, the U-2S had a range of more than 7,000 nautical miles and a maximum flight duration exceeding 14 hours.18\nMaximum range was determined by conducting several test flights during which the pilot cruised at normal speeds until the low-fuel warning light came on. Airspeeds selected for maximum endurance flights were chosen for ease of flying and minimum fuel consumption. The J57-P-31 engine demonstrated a 10 percent improvement in fuel economy over the J57-P-37. It was possible to fly the airplane at idle above 40,000 feet with the P-37 and above 50,000\nfeet with the P-31.19 At high altitudes, the U-2 was capable of gliding for vast distances in the event of engine failure. During readiness exercises in the spring of 1956, a westward-bound U-2 experienced a flameout over the Mississippi River near the Tennessee border. After restarting the engine, the pilot reported a second flameout and violent engine vibrations that caused him to abort further attempts to start the engine. It was clear that he would be unable to return to the test site, so he began preparations for landing at a contingency airfield. By now, he was over Arkansas and, given the prevailing winds and the airplane's glide ratio, he believed that he could safely reach Albuquerque. Pentagon officials who had been monitoring the flight's progress called the commander of Kirtland Air Force Base, informing him that an airplane would make a deadstick landing at his airfield within abut 30 minutes and would require special security. After a half-hour passed, the base commander called the Pentagon to inquire as to the status of the crippled aircraft. As he was speaking, the U-2 glided silently to a landing on the Kirtland runway. Security police officers were startled to see what looked like a \"man from Mars\" emerging from the cockpit wearing a \"space suit.\" The pilot later reported that from the beginning of the first flameout through landing at Albuquerque, the U-2 had flown more than 900 miles, including more than 300 miles by gliding.20\n\n## Stability And Control\n\nEarly flight tests indicated that the U-2 had no inherent stability, control, or handling problems. The airplane's flight characteristics generally proved to be about as expected, though the U-2 was susceptible to the same tuck and buzz tendencies associated with most subsonic aircraft. Mach tuck results from an aft shift in the center of lift that causes the airplane's nose to pitch down. Usually not dangerous, aileron and rudder buzz is a very rapid oscillation encountered at certain critical airspeeds and often caused by shock-induced boundary layer separation. Tests of the U-2A were conducted in cruise condition with the gust controls both faired and shifted. The airplane's center of gravity was kept between 26 and 28 percent mean aerodynamic chord in accordance with design parameters for the primary mission: aerial photography. Lockheed engineers anticipated that equipment bay loading would range from a minimum of 450 pounds to a maximum of 760 pounds.21\nThe airplane configuration initially had a zero stabilizer incidence, but this was later changed to a positive 1.5-degree incidence to reduce elevator deflection at cruise speeds and altitudes, thus reducing trim drag. The airplane had positive stability with both settings, but with positive incidence, less downward elevator was required throughout the speed range. At high altitudes with gust controls faired, the elevator angle was close to neutral between 110 and 130 knots indicated airspeed. Test pilots also reported that the U-2 felt more stable at higher Mach numbers when the elevator had a positive incidence.22 Mach number characteristics were evaluated for both the faired and shifted configurations at various altitudes up to 70,000 feet. In order to obtain necessary data, the pilot gradually increased Mach number while maintaining approximately constant altitude. The maximum Mach number was determined by the severity of the tuck, buffet, or buzz phenomena encountered, and each test was terminated at the pilot's discretion before the condition became excessive.23\n\n22. Ibid., p. 125. 23. Ibid., p. 130.\nAt lower altitudes, between 35,000 and 50,000 feet with gust controls shifted, pilots noted excessive rudder buzz but only slight tuck at Mach numbers varying from 0.78 to 0.83. Fairing the gust controls and increasing speed to between 0.83 and 0.85 Mach number resulted in moderate tuck and buffet.\n\nAt altitudes between 60,000 and 65,000 feet and Mach numbers between 0.80 and 0.84, the airplane experienced moderate tuck and buffet and some aileron buzz, although fairing the gust controls resulted in milder tuck phenomena. Tests conducted at 70,000 feet at Mach numbers from 0.80 to 0.82 indicated better performance with the gust controls shifted. Some data were also obtained during high-speed descents. It was during such tests that the U-2A attained a maximum speed of Mach 0.87 at 62,000 feet. The pilot noted both excessive aileron buzz and Mach tuck under these conditions. Ultimately, the U-2A was placarded to a nominal Mach number of 0.80, though it was possible with some configurations to extend the maximum speed to Mach 0.85 with only moderately adverse effects. At altitudes below 35,000 feet, no difficulties due to Mach effects were experienced up to the placarded airspeed of 260 knots.24\n\n## Chapter 7 The Naca And The U-2\n\nUse of the U-2 as a civilian research platform had its dubious start in February 1956. Anticipating a surge in off-range training sorties and eventual deployment overseas, the CIA devised a cover story to explain the airplane's unique capabilities and disguise its true mission from the world. This necessary fiction did, however, contain elements of truth that served as a foundation for later research efforts.\n\nInitially, there was some debate as to whether the Air Force's Air Weather Service or the NACANASA's predecessorshould be named as the airplane's prime sponsor for cover purposes. Ultimately, Bissell felt it best to use the civilian agency and to paint the project aircraft in NACA markings.1 NACA\nofficials then drafted a press release at the request of CIA Headquarters, and on May 7, 1956, NACA director Hugh L. Dryden announced a program in which U-2 aircraft would conduct high-altitude weather research with Air Force support while operating from Watertown Strip, NV. In order to explain the presence of U-2 operations elsewhere, Dryden added that \"USAF facilities overseas will be used as the program gets underway, to enable gathering research information necessary to reflect accurately conditions along the high-altitude air routes of tomorrow in many parts of the world.\"2 This statement was timed to coincide with deployment of the U-2 to Europe and emphasized the use of civilian planes with civilian pilots conducting meteorological studies.\n\nIn June 1956, the initial operational detachment, masquerading as Weather Reconnaissance Squadron (Provisional) One, or WRSP-1, was deployed to Lakenheath, England, where its stated purpose was met with skepticism. Two sarcastic editorials in the British *Flight* magazine belittled the weather research cover story and questioned the excessive security surrounding the U-2\noperation.3 A spokesman for the NACA announced on July 9 that preliminary data-gathering flights had been made from Lakenheath. He also reported that the initial high-altitude weather data gathered by the U-2 had been processed and that it had proved the value of the aircraft as a research tool.4 The most significant element of the cover story was the fact that the airplanes actually carried NACA weather instrumentation during training and proficiency flights. Real data were being collected within a flight regime previously unattainable by conventional aircraft. Transferring these data to scientists would not only bolster the cover story but also yield a treasure trove of information applicable to civil and military aviation.\n\n## Turbulent Relationship\n\nNot everyone at the NACA seemed enthusiastic about supporting the U-2 cover story. In August, the Aquatone project cover officer expressed some concern to Richard Bissell over the need for publication of NACA research papers based on data collected at altitudes within the range that had been admitted. Such documents would serve as unimpeachable proof that the U-2 was being used in a research capacity. But Harry Press, chief aeronautical research scientist of NACA Langley Memorial Aeronautical Laboratory's Gust Loads Division, had shown a pronounced lack of enthusiasm with regard to publishing such material. The CIA officer recommended putting pressure on NACA Headquarters to \"emphasize to Mr. Press the need for his taking immediate action toward preparing our much needed research study with completion at a very early date.\" Agency officials subsequently drafted a letter for the NACA assistant director for research, Richard V. Rhode, to emphasize the need \"for a counterpropaganda weapon for use in the event of a compromise to one of our aircraft.\"5\nThe Aquatone Project assistant security officer met with Rhode on November\n16 to request that he expedite publication of NACA research studies being prepared with data obtained during U-2 weather research missions and to request additional instrumentation for use in project aircraft. The CIA provided Rhode\n\nApril 11, 2000.\nwith all weather data accumulated thus far by the various U-2 detachments for inclusion in the planned research papers. During the meeting, the project security officer also suggested that U-2 pilots \"should carry some NACA documentation else their story would not hold up when they are required to identify their association with NACA to friends, military establishments, etc.\"6\nThe NACA cover story was put to its first test when a deployed U-2 crashed near Wiesbaden, Germany, on September 17, but the incident caused little sensation in the media. When CIA pilot Robert J. Ericson was forced to bail out over Arizona 3 months later, he was identified to inquiring reporters as \"Robert J. Everett, a civilian pilot for NACA.\" As with the earlier Wiesbaden incident, an Air Force spokesman stated that the plane was owned by the NACA and was \"engaged in high altitude research jointly with the Air Force studying air turbulence and the jet stream.\"7\n\n## First Research Data\n\nIn January 1957, Richard Bissell and his staff coordinated plans to publicly surface the U-2 for the first time. This entailed the release of photos and publication of research data. After discussions with CIA officials, Hugh Dryden arranged for the first official picture to be released by the NACA in early February.8 In order to further support the cover story, the photo depicted the airplane with the tail number NACA 320 painted below a yellow and black band with the NACA's winged shield insignia. The following month, Langley gust loads researchers Thomas L. Coleman and Jack Funk published NACA Research Memorandum No. L57A11, \"Preliminary Measurements of Atmospheric Turbulence at High Altitude as Determined from Acceleration\n\n02415A000200390025-9 (November 19, 1956), declassified and released by the CIA\n 7. \"Research Plane Explodes; Altitude Pilot Bails Out,\" *The Washington Post and Times Herald*,\nDecember 20, 1956, p. A2, Clotaire Wood files, NASA Headquarters Historical Reference Collection.\n 8. Richard M. Bissell, Jr., Memorandum for Deputy Project Director, \"Arrangements with\nNACA and Kelly Johnson re Release of U-2 Photographs,\" SAPC-12313, CIA-RDP33- 02415A000200390023-1 (January 26, 1957), declassified and released by the CIA April 11, 2000.\nMeasurements on Lockheed U-2 Airplane.\"9 Several months later, Coleman wrote a second report with Emilie C. Coe, this time comparing turbulence data taken over the United States with that collected over England and Western Europe.10\nThese reports included an analysis of turbulence data obtained using velocity, gravity, and height (VGH) recorders carried aboard the U-2. Developed at Langley for collecting gust-loads data, these instruments provide timehistory records of airspeed (velocity, or v), acceleration (measured in g units), and altitude (indicated as height, or h) for continuous periods up to 100 hours. A strip of photographic paper moved through each VGH recorder at sufficient speed to permit statistical determination of gust distribution and also provide, on a condensed time scale, general operational data. VGH data collected during flights over England and Western Europe indicated a substantial reduction in the number and intensity of atmospheric gusts with increasing altitude. These results were in agreement with atmospheric turbulence models developed using data previously obtained with other airplanes and balloon-borne instrumentation.11\nUp to this point, the collection of detailed scientific information on atmospheric turbulence and other meteorological conditions had been limited by aircraft performance to altitudes below approximately 45,000 feet. Use of balloons permitted limited measurements up to about 60,000 feet. In addition to altitude limitations, previous methods (particularly balloon-borne instruments) were limited in regard to geographic areas covered and were largely confined to the United States. With the U-2, NACA scientists now had access to information on turbulent conditions around the world and at higher altitudes than previously available. Such data were useful for aircraft design studies and operational analysis, especially in regard to structural loads and stability and control problems.12 Unfortunately, as long as the U-2 was acknowledged to be capable of reaching only 55,000 feet, researchers were unable to use any data collected at the airplane's maximum cruising altitudes (upward of 70,000 feet).\n\nAltitudes Between 20,000 and 50,000 Feet Over the Western Part of the United States,\" NACA Research Memorandum L57G02 (August 1957).\n11. Ibid., p. 1.\n12. Ibid.\nInitial research missions had taken place over the United States during training flights, and then over England and Western Europe in conjunction with the first operational deployments. Data collected during these operations included measurements covering approximately 22,000 flight miles. VGH measurements were obtained on 17 flights between May and September 1956. A typical flight profile consisted of an initial climb to 45,000 feet followed by a slower ascent to higher altitudes as fuel load decreased, and then descent to landing. Research flight opportunities were dictated entirely by operational priorities, and no attempt was made to schedule flights to sample turbulence associated with specific meteorological conditions. U-2 pilots avoided adverse weather, such as heavy cumulus clouds or thunderstorms, meaning that the VGH data represented only clear-air turbulence. \"Although this sample is small,\" Coleman wrote, \"the initial results appear to be of sufficient interest to warrant publication.\"13\nThe U-2 not only provided a platform for gathering badly needed high-altitude meteorological data, but it also gave NACA and Air Force researchers the opportunity to test new, lightweight instrumentation packages under operational conditions. The NACA-developed VGH recorder took continuous readings of airspeed, altitude, and acceleration. Another\n\ninstrument traced peak acceleration values and a turn-meter recorded pitch and yaw rates. Instrumentation provided by the Air Force Wright Air Development Center included a turbulence recorder, a vortex temperature probe, temperature and humidity sensors, and an infrared hygrometer for accurate measurement of dew point.14\nThroughout the spring of 1957, NACA officials continued to promote the U-2's research capabilities. Dryden released a statement announcing publication of the first research paper and claiming that the Gust-Loads Research Panel of the NACA's Technical Subcommittee on Aircraft Loads had originally recommended using the high-altitude research program for statistical studies of turbulence. He explained that the primary goal was collection of data on turbulence associated with the jet stream, convective clouds, temperature variations at different altitudes, wind shear, and other weather phenomena. Such a program, he said, would not have been possible without substantial cooperation from the Air Weather Service, which had furnished state-of-the-art meteorological instrumentation, and the Geophysical Research Directorate, which would use the data for developing methods of forecasting meteorological phenomena important to high-altitude flight. Dryden also described expected future benefits to commercial air travel. \"Research which we are gaining on a global basis,\" he said, \"will make it reasonable for tomorrow's air traveler to expect degrees of speed, safety, and comfort beyond the capabilities of today's air transport.\"15\nIn July, Dryden and NACA Public Information Officer Walter T. Bonney met with CIA officials to discuss modifications to the U-2 cover story, which now included details of the High-Altitude Sampling Program (HASP). This effort, sponsored by Strategic Air Command and the Armed Forces Special Weapons Project (AFSWP), involved the collection of atmospheric particulate samples from radioactive fallout resulting from testing of nuclear weapons. The modified U-2 cover story stated that operationally ready facilities of NACA would be used for HASP activities. \"Rather than for HASP to establish their own facilities and organization in areas where NACA has been conducting its meteorological research, AFSWP has arranged for use of these facilities overseas to collect data as required for HASP. AWS will remain, as before, the executive agent. The pilots for the U-2 will continue to be civilians under contract with NACA, but will be reimbursed by AFSWP funds.\"16\nBonney had previously received a memo outlining a cover story for the unusual appearance of U-2 aircraft that bore the Project Rainbow anti-radar treatments, as some of those had been deployed despite the associated aerodynamic penalties. The unclassified nickname, Thermos, was to be used in lieu of the classified code word, Rainbow. If queried, Bonney was to say that the unusual configurations were part of \"a data gathering program...designed to measure...certain physical phenomena which could be affected by nuclear explosions.\" The high-frequency-band radar-absorbent material was described as a special impregnated, plasticized coating applied directly over various parts of the aircraft to reduce the effects of glare, blast, and radiation damage from nuclear explosions. The cover story accounted for the wires associated with the low-frequency-band anti-radar system by describing it as a unique antenna system to record thermal phenomena under varying conditions at high altitude. The project was said to be a joint effort involving participation by the ARDC, AFSWP, and NACA. Associating the project with ARDC\norganizations at Edwards Air Force Base served to explain the presence of the U-2 at the Edwards North Base facility. To explain the presence of the specially configured U-2 aircraft at overseas detachments, the Rainbow cover story also asserted that the location of overseas units afforded a wide range of climatological and other desirable environmental conditions for study.17\nDespite these and other misleading statements regarding the U-2's mission and capabilities, the airplane continued to serve as an occasional platform for bona fide meteorological research. On November 14, 1957, a CIA pilot assigned to Detachment C, known for cover purposes as the 3rd Weather Reconnaissance Squadron (Provisional), flew over the eye of Typhoon Kit in the western Pacific Ocean north of the Philippine island of Luzon. He used a Perkin-Elmer Model 501 tracking camera to photograph the storm, producing, for the first time, photos of a tropical cyclone from directly overhead. Lt.\n\nCol. Robert C. Bundgaard of the Air Weather Service publicized the results in a magazine article several months later.18\n\n## Breaking Cover\n\nThe U-2 cover story could not last forever and, in fact, began to erode as early as May 1957, when the North American Newspaper Alliance published a syndicated article stating that Lockheed U-2 aircraft routinely operated at ceilings above 65,000 feet and were being used by the U.S. Air Force to map large areas of Earth's surface for use in guided-missile warfare. This was the first reasonably accurate description of the airplane's capabilities published by the news media. The article's unnamed writer also claimed that the \"Air Force is reliably reported to be using the Lockheed U-2 in West Germany to monitor the stratosphere for evidence of Soviet nuclear tests, and presumably in the cartography project.\"19 By the end of the month, the *London Daily Express* had reported, \"Lockheed U-2 high-altitude aircraft of the U.S. Air Force have been flying at 65,000 feet, out of reach of Soviet interceptors, mapping large areas behind the Iron Curtain with revolutionary new aerial cameras. They are making mathematically precise maps essential to bombardment with missile\n\n1958): pp. 7983.\n19. North American Newspaper Alliance, \"U.S. Mapping World for Missile War,\" May 19, 1957, NASA\nHeadquarters historical reference collection.\nweapons.\" Despite this exposure, U.S. officials stubbornly refused to admit any connection between the U-2 and airborne reconnaissance.20\nAt CIA Headquarters, Aquatone administrative officer James Cunningham reacted strongly to suggestions that more information be made public regarding the airplane's altitude capabilities. \"I am inclined to believe,\" he wrote in one memo, \"that while having considerable value in theory, a move of this sort...would ultimately involve us in a series of inquiries which would be difficult to handle without giving away the fact that our capability was in excess of the announced record altitude figure.\" He noted with some alarm that Kelly Johnson had apparently told NACA officials at the Lewis Propulsion Laboratory in Cleveland that the U-2 was capable of reaching 70,000 feet. Cunningham further noted that releasing an altitude figure greater than previously admitted but less than the actual capability could lead to some embarrassment and might still not have the desired effect. Intelligence sources had suggested that the Soviet air defense radar was capable of tracking the U-2 with sufficient accuracy that the new cover altitude would fail to deceive \"the only opposition activity that we are basically attempting to defraud.\"21\nAnother matter under consideration was whether to make available to researchers any data collected at altitudes above 55,000 feet. Richard Bissell sent a memorandum to the Aquatone Project Cover Officer stating that he could not agree to the \"declassification or general dissemination of data obtained at altitudes from 55,000 to 70,000 feet or to the granting of Aquatone clearances to a wider circle of individuals who might be interested in having access to this data.\" He suggested instead downgrading the data from Top Secret to Secret and making the information available to a limited number of contractors who might make good use of it, providing that \"a suitable explanation can be devised of the way in which the data was collected which will attribute it to some source or sources other than the U-2.\" As an example, Bissell suggested a story in which a variety of NACA research aircraft were instrumented to collect turbulence data. This new story would make it clear that such data resulted from aircraft flights rather than from balloons or rockets; but stating that a number of different aircraft were involved \"would tend to divert attention away from speculation concerning what particular aircraft was used.\"22\nPropaganda and stories of the deception surrounding the U-2 operation tend to overshadow the very real scientific and technical accomplishments of the program. While officials in Washington debated how much information to release, U-2 pilots flying out of Atsugi, Japan, took advantage of opportunities to collect weather data and photos unlike any previously taken. In July 1958, several flights were made over Super Typhoon Winnie off the coast of Taiwan\n(then known as Formosa). Winnie's powerful winds exceeded 175 mph, causing severe damage to the western end of the island. From a perch high above the raging storm, a U-2 pilot took pictures as Winnie tore across the Taiwan Strait and struck the southeastern coast of mainland China. A few months later, while awaiting clear weather in which to conduct tactical reconnaissance coverage of Chinese troop movements and naval operations, additional missions were flown over Super Typhoons Ida and Helen. Photographs of spectacular cloud structures and the aircraft's capacity to look straight down into the eye of each storm bolstered the weather reconnaissance cover story while providing a credible reason for the presence of the U-2 in the region.23\n\n## Chapter 8 Nasa And The U-2\n\nAfter the NACA became the National Aeronautics and Space Administration in October 1958, the Agency continued to maintain the U-2 cover story. A NASA press release issued in June 1959 reaffirmed that the airplane was being used for weather research missions. In order to provide an explanation for U-2 operations in Turkey, which happened to be a CIA staging area for overflights of the Soviet Union, NASA published Memorandum No. 4-17-59L, \"Airplane Measurements of Atmospheric Turbulence for Altitudes Between 20,000 and 55,000 Feet for Four Geographic Areas,\" by Thomas Coleman and May T. Meadows. This report built upon the two previous NACA reports, adding data collected during missions flown from Japan and Turkey.1 The fact that U-2 missions had produced very real weather data fooled no one as to the airplane's true mission. George Carroll, aviation editor of the New York Journal-American, wrote in the November 1959 issue that the U-2 was being used for reconnaissance over Russia, and the following month an article in Soviet Aviation discussed U.S. strategic reconnaissance with the U-2 and gave some design details of the aircraft. But the worst was yet to come, as the cover story was soon to be irrevocably blown in one of the most infamous incidents of the Cold War.2\n\n## Secrets Exposed\n\nIn the spring of 1960, the CIA detachment at Incirlik, Turkey, attempted the most ambitious U-2 mission yet. Article 360 was deployed to Peshawar, Pakistan, to begin a nonstop flight over Afghanistan, the Hindu Kush, Aral Sea, Baikonur Cosmodrome (the primary Soviet space launch complex), Chelyabinsk, Sverdlosvk, Kirov, Arkhangelsk, the Kola Peninsula, Murmansk, and eventually land in Bod, Norway. With a planned duration of approximately 9 hours, the flightpath would cover some 3,800 miles, a true test of the airplane's range. Logistical and technical difficulties aside, there was also significant risk involved because more than three quarters of the route was over the Soviet Union.3\nFrank Powers flew the mission on Sunday, May 1, 1960. At first, all went as planned, but while making a turn southeast of Sverdlovsk, there was a bright flash and a dull thump, and the airplane lurched forward. Powers instinctively grabbed for the throttle and scanned his instruments. The engine was functioning normally and the ailerons seemed effective, but the nose began to drop precipitously. Aerodynamic loads increased until the wings snapped and the airplane began to tumble wildly, shedding parts. The pilot's suit inflated as the airplane's cabin depressurized, and Powers activated his emergency oxygen supply. The cockpit was now pointed upward and spinning. Centrifugal force made ejection nearly impossible because Powers could not completely retract his legs into escape position. Instead, he jettisoned the canopy manually and bailed out.4\nWhen the U-2 failed to arrive at Bod as expected, the recovery crew began to worry. After waiting 5 hours, they finally called CIA Headquarters to report that Powers was missing. It was assumed that the U-2 had crashed or been shot down over Russia, and by Monday morning, officials were scrambling to modify the cover story. The details were revised to make a convincing claim that a NASA weather reconnaissance mission had strayed off course after the pilot reported having difficulties with his oxygen system somewhere in the vicinity of Lake Van, Turkey. Officials backstopped the story by providing a flight plan for release to the media and by deploying search aircraft to the Lake Van area. Representatives of the CIA and Department of State also discussed preparing a question-and-answer brief, principally for use by NASA in the event of Soviet disclosure, but designed to be circulated to all affected parties. This consisted of answers to hypothetical questions that might be asked by the press regarding the airplane and the NASA upper atmosphere research program, and it also provided details supporting the cover story mission for Powers's flight.5 By Wednesday, the Soviets had yet to make any announcement acknowledging the incident.\n\n 3. Powers and Gentry, *Operation Overflight*, pp. 7374.\n 4. Ibid., pp. 8284. 5. Memo from Acting Deputy Director of Plans, \"Chronological Account of Handling of U-2\nIncident,\" CIA-RDP33-02415A000300300007-7 (August 10, 1960), declassified and released by the CIA August 21, 2000, pp. 15.\nThe following day, Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev announced that an unmarked American aircraft had crossed into Russian airspace and had been shot down. He gave no further details and did not mention the fate of the pilot. Afterward, CIA and State Department officials met and decided that President Eisenhower should not be personally involved and that the State Department would handle all publicity regarding the incident. White House Press Secretary James C. Hagerty had already drafted a release stating that Eisenhower had ordered an investigation of the entire matter, and he suggested to Walter Bonney that NASA hold a press conference as soon as possible. Unfortunately, notification that press relations were to be handled entirely by the State Department did not reach NASA in time to prevent the press conference from taking place. Bonney reiterated the cover story and included a brief description of the flight plan, the pilot's alleged oxygen problems, and the search for the missing plane. He also said that the remaining U-2 aircraft had been grounded for equipment checks, which subsequently resulted in emergency messages being sent to all U-2 detachments to stand down until further notice. In response to reporters' queries, Bonneyapparently unaware that Powers was flying an unmarked planedescribed the aircraft's NASA markings in great detail. With the airplane accounted for, the dummy air search was called off.6\nAs a result of arrangements made by the CIA with Lockheed to meet insistent press demands for detailed information on the plane and to further support the innocuous uses of the airplane, a U-2 assigned to the CIA was painted with a fictitious serial number and NASA markings and shown to news media representatives at the NASA Flight Research Center at Edwards on May 6. That same day, the State Department held two radio and press briefings. In one, State Department spokesman Lincoln White stated that there was \"absolutely no deliberate attempt to violate Soviet airspace, and there never has been.\"7\nThis seems to be precisely what Khrushchev had been waiting for. In a speech before the Supreme Soviet on May 7, he announced that the American pilot had been captured and had admitted his mission of spying on the Soviet Union. He also produced identifiable parts of the U-2 and the pilot's equipment, clearly exposing the true nature of Powers's mission. As CIA Director Allen Dulles later testified to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, the cover story had been masterfully outflanked.8 Under the circumstances, President Eisenhower decided to suspend U-2 fights over the Soviet Union indefinitely.\n\nAt a meeting of senior CIA, NASA, and State Department officials later that month, NASA Administrator T. Keith Glennan said that NASA \"would be well advised to disengage from the U-2 program as rapidly as possible.\"9\nDulles, however, in a statement to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, lauded the scientific value of the weather data collected with the airplane and justified NASA's interest. \"NASA was very much concerned with the scientific advances which operations of these U-2s could make towards greater knowledge of the upper atmosphere and for other scientific purposes.\" He asserted that the aircraft had \"undertaken many weather and related missions and their functions in this respect have been publicized by NASA, and this publicity has been distributed freely to the world.\"10\nNASA Deputy Administrator Hugh Dryden testified in executive session before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations regarding the NASA relationship to the U-2 program. \"In this program which began in 1956, there have been 200 weather flights of U-2 aircraft with NASA and Air Weather Service instrumentation covering flights extended over about 264,000 miles,\" he said. Dryden admitted knowledge of classified intelligence operations involving the U-2, but he said that the NACA (and later NASA) saw an opportunity to take advantage of technical capabilities that were not otherwise available to the agency.11 As might be expected, NASA subsequently received harsh criticism for its role in the U-2 affair. Robert Hotz, a senior editor of Aviation Week & Space Technology magazine, wrote that NASA researchers had \"their hard-won reputation for scientific integrity shredded overnight by exposure of their role as unwitting dupes of the Central Intelligence Agency.\" He further asserted that the \"damage to NASA's scientific integrity may count for little in the calloused calculations of CIA supersleuths, but it will do irreparable harm in the international scientific community... .\"12\n\n12. Robert Hotz, \"Lockheed U-2 Over Sverdlovsk: A Study in Fabrication,\" reprinted in Congressional\nRecord, Proceedings and Debates of the 86th Congress, Second Session, vol. 106, Part 9\n(Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, June 16, 1960), p. 11,976.\nSuch dire predictions proved unfounded, however, as NASA suffered no long-term consequences from the incident. Administrator Glennan and the Agency as a whole were spared intimate involvement in the U-2 affair by Dryden's assumption of full responsibility for his role in originating the cover story. Nor did the Powers debacle end the Agency's association with the U-2. In 1968 and 1969, U-2 aircraft were tasked with photographing portions of the Western United States for comparison with pictures taken by the Apollo astronauts, and eventually NASA would have its own small fleet of U-2 airplanes to conduct dedicated research missions.13\n\n## A U-2 For Nasa\n\nBy the late 1960s, Government officials were looking at ways to transfer U-2 technology to civil applications. Thus far, both CIA and Air Force U-2 airplanes had supported civilian agencies only occasionally, when schedules permitted. The CIA did sometimes provide a limited amount of classified overhead photography to other Government agencies, and in 1968 Arthur C. Lundahl, director of the National Photographic Interpretation Center, recommended creating a new center to provide declassified imagery for emergency management purposes.14 This idea gained further traction as it became apparent that the U-2R attrition rate was less than had been predicted. A number of older U-2C and U-2G models retained in storage for use as replacements were now considered surplus.15\nIn early 1970, two study groups chaired by Dr. F. Robert Naka, deputy director of the National Reconnaissance Office, reviewed requirements and utilization of the U-2R. These studies concluded that the existing fleet of 12 U-2R airframes was sufficient to meet both NRO and Air Force requirements. There were at that time a total of eight U-2C/G airframes in both flyable and nonflyable storage conditions. The annual cost for storing these aircraft was relatively low, but the analysts recognized that the Government had made a substantial investment with regard to acquisition of the early model U-2 aircraft, along with ground support equipment, spare parts, and miscellaneous hardware. Estimates from the maintenance depot indicated that there were\n\nReconnaissance Office, \"Subject: U-2C/G Aircraft,\" May 16, 1970, http://www.nro.gov/foia/ declass/NROStaffRecords/1055.pdf, accessed April 2, 2013.\nample stocks on hand to support the entire U-2C/G fleet for between 6 and 9 months without any additional purchases. At least one study indicated a potential requirement for two of the aircraft to be used for transitional training and test purposes in support of the U-2R fleet. Otherwise, they determined that there were no known NRO, CIA, or Air Force requirements with sufficiently high priority to warrant reactivating the stored aircraft in the near future. Based on the aircraft's unique capabilities, possibility of future utilization, low annual upkeep support costs, and the substantial investment in depot stocks, the study groups recommended exploring the possibility of transferring the airplanes and associated materiel \"to another agency such as NASA.\"16\nOn March 16, 1970, Col. Bernard Bailey, director of operations for NRO aerial reconnaissance programs, drafted a memo to be sent to NASA Headquarters by NRO Director John L. McLucas. The memo outlined the status of the U-2C/G fleet and suggested that by virtue of the airplane's unique altitude, airspeed, and loiter capabilities, the U-2 might serve as a valuable collection platform for the NASA Earth Resources program.17 NASA officials were eager to take advantage of the offer, and they drafted a plan to take responsibility for two of the aircraft. Carl Duckett, CIA deputy director for science and technology, reviewed the plan and found that it lacked a proper appreciation for how complicated it could be to conduct U-2 flight operations. He subsequently approached Marty Knutson, a 15-year veteran of the agency's U-2 program who had accumulated 4,000 hours of flight time, to request that he lend his expertise to the NASA project. Knutson had been planning to retire, but he was soon persuaded to sign on as project manager. He helped NASA officials redraft their plan and made arrangements for Lockheed to overhaul two U-2G models. Additionally, Lockheed was contracted to provide pilots and field maintenance, including physiological support. Kelly Johnson immediately hired three of Knutson's former colleagues, Jim Barnes, Bob Ericson, and Ivor \"Chunky\" Webster. Frank Powers also applied, but he was turned down due to his notoriety from the U-2 incident in 1960. Senior NASA officials wished to downplay the U-2's reputation as a spy plane as much as possible.18\nThe two airplanes, articles 348 and 349, were moved from storage at Edwards to Lockheed's Palmdale facility. There, technicians removed the special carrier landing modifications peculiar to the U-2G along with other unnecessary items, reducing the airplane's empty weight to 13,800 pounds. Now reconfigured as U-2C models, the Air Force serial numbers on the tails were replaced with civil registrations. Webster flew functional checkout flights on each airframe and then delivered them to Ames Research Center at Moffett Field, CA, in early June 1971. By midsummer, they were ready for operational missions and, following a number of familiarization sorties, the first data flight occurred on August 31.19\n By 1978, the two airplanes were flying an average of 100 sorties annually and had logged more than 4,000 flight hours. Although based at Ames, they routinely flew Earth Resources missions from NASA's facility at Wallops Island, VA, as well as being deployed to Hawaii, Alaska, Texas, Maine, South Dakota, and Panama. The versatile U-2 provided a wide range of capabilities including resource studies, disaster assessment, land-use surveys, sensor development, stratospheric sampling, and satellite support. For example, during drought years, the California Department of Water Resources used photos taken from the U-2 to measure water levels in rivers and reservoirs. Similarly, high-altitude\n19. Ibid.\n\naerial imagery of the San Francisco Bay aided the U.S. Geological Survey in a study of tidal patterns and water movement. Firefighters used infrared imagery for faster containment of wildfires, more efficient use of personnel and equipment, and protecting forest watersheds and wildlife habitat. Survey pictures of areas affected by floods and earthquakes were useful in assessing damage and assigning repair priorities. In another experiment, researchers used U-2 imagery to develop a land-use-management database for both the public and private sectors. Such data have been valuable for evaluating urban growth, traffic patterns, and pollution, as well as in preparing environmental impact statements. Sensors on board the U-2 were used to measure the distribution of gases and aerosol particles at altitudes up to 65,000 feet to develop a better understanding of the effects of natural and humanmade actions on the atmosphere's protective ozone layer. Additionally, comparison of U-2 imagery to that taken with NASA's Landsat satellites supported investigations in forestry, water management, coastal-zone processes, rangeland management, and land use.20\n\n## Sensor Platform\n\nNASA researchers routinely used the U-2 to carry a variety of sensors, including aerial mapping cameras, electronic scanners, and atmospheric sampling devices. Taking advantage of the airplane's original design characteristics, the NASA U-2 aircraft were also used extensively to carry out photographic missions. There were several different camera configurations, affording researchers the opportunity to employ a variety of focal lengths, film types and formats, and multispectral capabilities. Additionally, the U-2 could carry a range of nonphotographic sensors. Most equipment was palletized to allow technicians to easily switch payloads in or out of the aircraft or from one aircraft to the other.21\nDuring the 1970s, NASA maintained an inventory of cameras at Ames that had been used extensively in Earth observation studies. Much of this equipment had been used in support of satellite missions such as Landsat, which eventually became the longest-running enterprise for the acquisition of space-based Earth imagery. Ground coverage and resolution are functions of lens focal length and film format. Higher-resolution imagery was obtained using large-format (9- by 9-inch or 9- by 18-inch) film and 6-inch, 12-inch,\n24-inch, or 36-inch focal-length lenses. A single frame taken from an altitude of 63,000 feet with a Wild-Heerbrugg RC-10 camera using a 12-inch focal length lens covered 80 square miles at resolutions ranging from 59 to 157 inches. The highest resolution was provided by the Research Camera System, which was equipped with a 24-inch, 3.5 focal ratio lens capable of resolving objects significantly less than 40 inches across. Depending on the intended use of the resulting imagery, the cameras were equipped with standard or infrared color or black-and-white film. Infrared imagery highlights details that are beyond the range of human vision and effectively penetrates atmospheric haze by filtering out blue light. Color infrared film is sensitive to the green, red, and near-infrared portions of the spectrum, which makes it particularly useful for aerial and space photographic surveys for land-use and vegetation studies. Researchers used infrared images to distinguish between healthy vegetation and that which was diseased or stressed.22\nNonphotographic sensors were typically supplied and funded by outside researchers and organizations. All such equipment was installed in specific areas of the airplane subject to load factors, safety standards, and technical constraints (size, weight, materials, power requirements, etc.). Most of these sensors fit within several categories. NASA's Goddard Space Flight Center in Greenbelt, MD, and the University of California's Lawrence Berkeley Laboratory (LBL) sponsored astronomy and astrophysics research with the U-2. LBL physicists supplied two microwave radiometers for mapping the temperature of deep space and examining fundamental questions about the origin of the universe. Investigators at Goddard installed an instrument for measuring solar spectral radiance and its variation with the solar cycle. Scientists at Goddard and Ames used the U-2 as a workhorse for Earth observation studies and to evaluate instrumentation that would later be used on spacecraft. The Heat Capacity Mapping Radiometer was used to evaluate thermal pollution, wetlands environments, and soil moisture. An instrument called the Ocean Color Scanner, forerunner of the Nimbus satellite's Coastal Zone Color Scanner, was a multispectral imager for detecting subtle variations in upwelling spectral radiance of seawater.23\nA multispectral scanner made available through a cooperative agreement between NASA and the Environmental Protection Agency gave scientists an\n11-channel digital system with 10 channels in the visible to near-visible spectral region and 1 in the thermal infrared. This device was primarily used in support of Landsat investigations. Ames also supplied a thermal infrared roll-stabilized line-scanner video system and a line-scan camera visible-imaging system that provided real-time imagery to a ground receiving station via telemetry link for use in disaster response. Finally, the U-2 served as a platform for conducting stratospheric and atmospheric studies with a variety of sensors. The Ames Stratospheric Air Sampler used chemiluminescent reactions to measure seasonal variations in atmospheric gases. Another instrument contained four cryogenically cooled samplers plus two whole-air samplers for measuring ozone-depleting compounds such as halocarbons, nitrous oxide, and carbon tetrachloride. Other methods for measuring atmospheric pollutants included use of an infrared scanning spectrometer and a high-speed interferometer. Samples of halogen compounds and aerosols were also collected using a variety of filters exposed to the airstream by pilot command. Scientists from the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) analyzed data collected with a radiometer in order to determine the total amount of atmospheric water vapor above the U-2 at cruise altitude. A downward-looking infrared radiometer measured atmospheric non-uniformities in order to better understand convective instabilities and atmospheric mixing processes.24\nOne NASA research effort with the U-2C involved acquiring small-scale, low-resolution, multispectral photography over selected representative ecosystems to simulate the Return Beam Vidicon (RBV) data system then being developed for the Earth Resources Technology Satellite (ERTS, later named Landsat 1). Instrumentation technicians installed four 70-millimeter framing cameras in the airplane's Q-bay to take simultaneous images of the same target area on the ground. Three cameras were equipped with 1.75-inch-focal-length lenses and black-and-white emulsion film, spectrally filtered to image the green, red, and near-infrared portions of the electromagnetic spectrum. The fourth camera carried color infrared film. Researchers selected five target areas: Feather River Basin in Northern California was chosen as representative of western U.S.\n\nforests, mountainous, and agricultural areas; the San Francisco Bay region and Los Angeles Basin as representative of urbanized areas; Phoenix and Tucson in southern Arizona as characteristic of arid regions; and the Chesapeake Bay region, representing wetland ecosystems. Survey missions were flown over each target region every 18 days to simulate the ERTS's planned orbit cycle. In early 1972, the research team added a single 24-inch-focal-length, 9- by 18-inch Type A-1 film camera, along with an accompanying trimetragon array of 6-inch-focallength cameras. A multispectral scanner built at NASA's Goddard Space Flight Center was also integrated into the aircraft, providing complete ERTS sensor simulation capability. Concurrent integration of a Wild-Heerbrugg RC-10 film camera into the satellite simulation package resulted in a five-instrument system that saw extensive use on later research flights.25\nIn the summer of 1972, scientists at NASA and the United States Geological Survey (USGS) initiated a cooperative program with the state of Arizona to produce improved mapping imagery for developing a land-use-management database. The primary goal of the Arizona Land Use Experiment was the acquisition of cloud-free black-and-white panchromatic metric photography in addition to the standard ERTS simulation multispectral photography. The USGS used this imagery to produce 7.5-minute, 1:24,000-scale orthophoto quadrangle sheets. Unlike standard topographic maps that represent terrain elevation with contour lines and depict humanmade features with simple graphics, the orthophoto maps show land features using either black-and-white or color-enhanced photographic images that have been processed to show details in their true positions. Such imagery depicts terrain and cultural features in a more true-to-life manner than conventional line maps. This was the first demonstration of the use of high-altitude aircraft data for quadrangle map production over large areas. With the launch of ERTS-1 on July 23, 1972, investigators began requesting that the U-2 overfly specific target sites, often simultaneously with the satellite overpass. Most of these flights carried a Vinten/RC-10 system that provided small-scale satellite simulation data along with larger-scale, largerformat data. Throughout the remainder of the year, NASA expanded the scope of the U-2 project. Flights over the eastern and western regions of the United States were flown in support of crew training for the Skylab space station. Resulting imagery was used in the Skylab simulator in Houston. Additionally, the U-2 was flown for disaster-assessment missions, with data-collection flights over areas damaged by hurricane and wildfire.26\nIn early 1973, researchers equipped the U-2 with a trimetragon array of\n24-inch-focal-length, 9- by 18-inch film format cameras called the A-3 configuration. Mounted vertically, the A-3 provided a multi-emulsion, multispectral photographic capability. This system was employed over Roseville, CA, following a munitions train explosion in a railroad classification yard, as well as over a number of wilderness fires in support of firefighting efforts by the California Department of Forestry. Later that year, researchers embarked on the first systematic development of a global stratospheric model. In the summer of 1974, NASA deployed a U-2 equipped with two specialized instruments, the Stratospheric Air Sampler and the Aerosol Particulate Sampler, to Eielson Air Force Base, near Fairbanks, AK. From there, six flights were made over the northern polar region to collect air samples and to acquire high-altitude\n26. Ibid.\n\nphotographic data over a number of Arctic and sub-Arctic ecosystems in support of ERTS investigations. Additional stratospheric sampling missions took place near equatorial latitudes with a deployment to Hickam Air Force Base, HI, in October. These two deployments, along with local sampling flights over California, provided scientists with the first comprehensive sampling of stratospheric constituents in the northern hemisphere and aided in the development of latitudinal distribution models of the upper atmosphere. In late 1974, NASA acquired additional instrumentation for the U-2. This included an Itek Optical Bar Camera, a 120-degree-field-of-view, 24-inch-focal-length panoramic camera similar to the Lunar Mapper instrument carried aboard the Apollo spacecraft; a thermal scanner developed by HRB-Singer; and Goddard Space Flight Center's Heat Capacity Mapper. The following year, further stratospheric air-sampling deployments were conducted from Eielson and Hickam and from Wallops Island, VA. Sampling missions were expanded in 1976 to include deployments to Howard Air Force Base, Panama, and Loring Air Force Base, ME, further widening the database.27\nSensor development continued in 1977 with integration of the Aether Drift astrophysics experiment. The instrument package consisted of a pair of\n27. Ibid.\n\nupward-looking microwave antennae and associated processing and recording systems that were carried to altitudes well above terrestrial sources of radiation. During numerous missions flown over the span of 2 years, scientists observed background radiation differentials from the two antennae in order to validate or reject a catastrophic evolutionary (Big Bang) theory of the formation of the universe. The project entailed multiple deployments over several years, including flights from Lima, Peru, to collect data in the southern hemisphere.28\nIn 1978, the NASA U-2 aircraft took part in the Alaska High-Altitude Photography Program. Faced with responsibility for the administration, mapping, surveying, and conveyance of Federal lands to the state and to native corporations, a consortium of Federal and state agencies requested NASA's assistance in acquiring both black-and-white and color infrared imagery of the entire state of Alaska. This program spanned 8 years and resulted in 95-percent coverage of the state's total area. Most impressive was the fact that the imagery was accomplished with less than 10-percent cloud cover. Technicians at Ames integrated the Daedalus Multispectral Scanner onto one of the aircraft in 1979, providing the U-2 for the first time with a digitally recorded multispectral instrument. Stratospheric sampling continued in 1979 and 1980 from Ames, Alaska, and Panama, along with continued efforts in support of Landsat. Additionally, the NASA U-2 was used to collect photographic data for the National Wetlands Inventory. This covered the Prairie Potholes region within portions of Minnesota, Iowa, North Dakota, South Dakota, and Montana, an important breeding habitat for migratory birds and other wildlife.29 All imagery collected by the NASA\nU-2 was available for public inspection at Ames via a computerized data retrieval system, and anyone could purchase high-resolution prints of any frame through the USGS in Sioux Falls, SD. Not everyone was happy about this development. Images commissioned by the Coastal Conservation Commission for a wetlands survey also revealed unlicensed construction in the coastal zone. Citizens of the town of Bolinas, north of San Francisco, saw the U-2 imagery as an invasion of privacy. \"I do have this gut reaction to this eye in the sky able to look at all the little things in people's backyards,\" said one local attorney.30\nBy this point, NASA had been flying the U-2C for nearly a decade and would continue to do so until the late 1980s. But as soon as Lockheed received a contract to restart U-2 production, NASA officials were quick to order one of the new models.\n\n## Chapter 9 Er-2 Expands Nasa Horizons\n\nNASA's high-altitude capabilities expanded after Marty Knutson delivered the first ER-2 to Ames Research Center, on June 10, 1981. While technicians readied the new airplane to join the science fleet, the older models remained engaged in important work. For example, the U-2C was employed in a multiyear cooperative effort among NASA, the U.S. Forest Service, and several eastern seaboard states to detect and monitor Gypsy Moth caterpillar infestations in the northeast region of the country and assess the effectiveness of insecticide-spraying programs. Researchers used high-resolution color infrared photography to evaluate the severity of infestation from New York to North Carolina on an annual basis. Data had to be acquired within a narrow biological window dictated by latitude, elevation, and annual weather conditions in order to successfully discriminate the severity of defoliation attributable to the Gypsy Moth.1\nNASA U-2 and ER-2 aircraft also took part in a variety of missions in support of Department of Defense projects, most notably Teal Ruby, a satellite designed to detect and track aircraft from space by measuring their infrared signatures. The greatest challenge was separating these signatures from the normal background signal. In order to build a database of background measurements, the ER-2 was equipped with a multiwavelength infrared sensor similar to that to be carried by the spacecraft. Throughout the yearlong Highly Calibrated Airborne Measurements Program (Hi-CAMP), researchers used the special instrument to collect precise measurements of infrared background clutter caused by atmospheric, terrestrial, and oceanic phenomena. During a series of highly coordinated missions over the Western United States and Europe, they also tested the Hi-CAMP sensor's capabilities for tracking aircraft ranging in size from a T-38 trainer to a C-15 cargo transport.2 The results assisted engineers in developing data-processing algorithms and provided useful information for future programs. Unfortunately, following a string of management problems, cost overruns, and delays, the planned launch of the Teal Ruby satellite was postponed and eventually canceled altogether. In the absence of Teal Ruby, the Hi-CAMP database became the single most comprehensive source of infrared air-vehicle detection data for designing and testing detection algorithms, selecting spectral passbands, and sizing air or missile defense systems that operate within the relevant spectral regions.3\nA Hi-CAMP deployment to Alconbury, England, in 1985 was followed in early 1987 with a deployment to Darwin, Australia, for the Stratosphere- Troposphere Exchange Project (STEP), a continuation of earlier atmospheric sampling efforts using the U-2C. NASA and NOAA jointly funded STEP to obtain more data on the mechanisms and rate of transfer of particles, trace gases, and aerosols from the troposphere into the stratosphere. That same year, scientists from NASA's Jet Propulsion Laboratory in Pasadena, CA, oversaw engineering and integration test flights of the Airborne Visible and Infrared Imaging Spectrometer (AVIRIS). The ER-2 served as a convenient and costeffective platform for testing the instrument, a 224-band multispectral scanner designed primarily for use on satellites.4\nWith its unique capabilities, the ER-2 was ideally suited to play an important role in Earth Science research focused on the study of ozone depletion over Antarctica and the Arctic. In late summer 1987, the aircraft was deployed to South America for subpolar stratospheric sampling over the Antarctic continent while operating from Punta Arenas, Chile. The most significant data collected during these missions confirmed the existence of an \"ozone hole\" over the southern polar region and provided information suggesting that humanmade chemical compounds, specifically chlorofluorocarbons, were primarily responsible for ozone depletion over the Antarctic region. The data also repudiated long-held theoretical polar symmetry models of the upper atmosphere. Researchers moved their efforts to the opposite side of the globe in January 1989, when the ER-2 was deployed to Stavanger, Norway, in support of the Airborne Arctic Stratospheric Expedition. This stratospheric sampling program included multiple flights over northern Europe.5\nResearchers at Ames also employed the ER-2 in a continuing NASA effort to leverage high-altitude, long-range, and sensor capabilities for fighting wildfires. In 1988, wilderness fires devastated much of Yellowstone National Park as several different blazes merged into a single conflagration that became the\n\n 3. Richard H. Van Atta, Sidney G. Reed, and Seymour J. Deitchman, \"IR Surveillance: Teal Ruby/\nHi-CAMP,\" DARPA Technical Accomplishments Vol. II: An Historical Review of Selected DARPA Projects, chapter 9, Institute for Defense Analyses, April 1991, pp. 17.\n 4. NASA Fact Sheet, \"ER-2 Program History.\" 5. Ibid.\nwing and centerline pods. (NASA)\nlargest wildfire in U.S. history. In a groundbreaking moment in fire-management strategy, Chief Naturalist George Robinson requested that NASA provide high-altitude imagery of the region. In response, NASA tasked Landsat-4 to collect images from orbit while additional types of aerial surveillance were accomplished from high and medium altitudes using the ER-2 and C-130B aircraft. Both aircraft were equipped with infrared sensors capable of penetrating smoke and haze to assist in delineating and mapping the multiple fire complexes. Operating from Moffett Field, the aircraft flew multiple missions over the greater Yellowstone area, relaying thermal and near-infrared imagery data in real time to a ground receiving station in West Yellowstone, WY.6 Resulting data provided firefighters with their first comprehensive view of the multiple fire fronts and their interrelationships. Detailed information about the fire's location, size, rate of spread, and intensity allowed incident commanders to battle the blaze while simultaneously protecting firefighters on the ground from what had proved to be an aggressive and unpredictable fire. This effort served as the blueprint for future programs such as the Western States Fire Missions in 2006 and 2007, which employed NASA's Altair and Ikhana remotely piloted aircraft.\n\nAs the ER-2 received an expanded role on such vital missions, the two U-2C\nmodels were rapidly approaching the end of their 30-year flying careers. The first NASA U-2C was retired at Moffett Field in mid-1987 after logging 10,000\n 6. Ibid.\n\nhours of service. It was immediately replaced with a former TR-1A, on loan from the Air Force and temporarily converted to an ER-2. The second NASA U-2Cthat last of the original U-2 models still flyingwas retired in the spring of 1989, but not until Lockheed secured permission to attempt two last recordbreaking flights. Jerry Hoyt took off from Edwards on April 17, 1989, with only 395 gallons of fuel on board. Reaching 9,842 feet in 52 seconds, and eventually attaining 49,212 feet within 6 minutes 15 seconds, the U-2C easily broke previous world time-to-climb records and sustained altitude records for its weight category. This was three times faster than a previous record set with a Learjet that had ultimately topped out at 54,370 feet. Hoyt passed through 65,617 feet in a little over 12 minutes. A mere 16 minutes after takeoff, the U-2 reached a maximum altitude of 73,700 feet. The following day, Ron Williams broke records in a higher weight category, taking off with the aircraft fueled to a gross weight of 20,900 pounds. Observers from the Federation Aeronautique Internationale (FAI) verified the records, and the airplane was subsequently returned to Lockheed in Palmdale, where it was painted black for its final role as a museum exhibit. Shortly afterward, Doyle Krumrey flew the final sortie in an original U-2 while delivering the aircraft to Robins Air Force Base, GA, for permanent display.7\nMeanwhile, research missions with the Airborne Science fleet continued at a blistering pace. An ER-2 deployed to Alconbury in June 1991, bringing the AVIRIS, Thematic Mapper Simulator, and RC-10 Camera to Europe. Multiple sorties were flown over Iceland, Wales, England, France, Italy, Spain, Austria, Germany, and the Netherlands. After returning to the United States, the aircraft was used to conduct stratospheric sampling from Alaska to the North Pole.8 Next, the airplane was equipped with the Moderate-resolution Imaging Spectroradiometer (MODIS) Airborne Simulator (MAS), a modified Daedalus Wildfire scanning spectrometer designed to provide spectral information similar to that which was to be provided by the MODIS, then scheduled for launch aboard the EOS-AM satellite. Researchers conducted initial testing in coordination with other aircraft and satellites over Coffeyville, KS, and along the Texas and Louisiana coast in November 1991. The modified wildfire instrument was converted to MAS configuration in January 1992 and was then flown over portions of the Atlantic Ocean in the region of the Azores. Each mission combined coordinated satellite, airborne, and surface observations with modeling studies to investigate cloud properties and physical processes of cloud systems.9\nSeveral ER-2 research projects in 1992 and 1993 contributed to the development of commercial aeronautics. At the time, NASA was investigating whether emissions from future fleets of supersonic transports (SSTs) might deplete the ozone layer. During one project, an ER-2 carried instruments to measure known ozone depletion catalysts along projected air routes for the SST. In another, an ER-2 flew through the wake of an Air France Concorde to collect particulate samples. Researchers concluded that there would be little impact on the ozone layer as a result of additional SST traffic. In an unusual low-altitude mission for the ER-2, the aircraft was used to measure the effect of the world's growing fleet of subsonic airliners on cirrus cloud formation.10\nPerhaps ironically, the ER-2 was used to gather significant data for weather research. In early 1993, one aircraft was deployed to Townsville, Australia, to\n\nModerate Resolution Imaging Spectroradiometer (MODIS) Airborne Simulator (MAS) Langley\nDAAC Data Set Document,\" Atmospheric Data Science Center, October 1996, https://eosweb. larc.nasa.gov/sites/default/files/project/fire/guide/base_fire_ci2_er2_mas_dataset.pdf,\naccessed July 27, 2013.\n10. Pocock, *50 Years of the U-2*, p. 378.\ncarry a suite of nine sensors over a warm region of the Pacific Ocean northeast of Papua New Guinea where tropical storms frequently developed. Research results were intended for application in development of future satellite sensor systems for predicting storm formation and movement. In 1994, researchers at Ames equipped an ER-2 with the Lidar Atmospheric Sensing Experiment (LASE), a 1,000-pound instrument built by NASA Langley at a cost of $20 million. The LASE system fired a 20-megawatt burst of laser energy straight downward to analyze water vapor in the atmosphere. During sorties from Wallops Island, researchers conducted coordinated experiments using lidar instruments on the ER-2, the Space Shuttle, and aircraft at lower altitudes to characterize water vapor levels throughout the atmospheric cross section.11\nFor a time, NASA was operating three ER-2 aircraft simultaneously. One was returned to the Air Force in 1995 and the other two eventually received new F118 engines while undergoing routine maintenance over the next 2 years. Lockheed (now Lockheed Martin, following a March 1995 merger with Martin Marietta) provided four pilots under contract to NASA, along with maintainers and physiological support personnel. In 1998, as part of a cost-saving effort to consolidate NASA aircraft fleets, both remaining ER-2s were transferred to NASA Dryden Flight Research Center (now NASA Armstrong Flight Research Center) at Edwards. Later that same year, the ER-2 was used to set a new world altitude record in the mid-weight class, with a gross takeoff weight totaling between 26,455 and 35,274 pounds. The previous record of 62,500 feet had been set 10 years earlier using the Russian P-42, a stripped-down version of the Su-27 twin-engine jet fighter that had been built specifically to beat time-toclimb records. The new record was set on November 19, during a scheduled airborne science mission to measure water vapor, ozone, and other atmospheric particles. Although the ER-2 routinely operated at 70,000 feet and above, this flight to 68,700 feet was the first time the aircraft's performance was documented by the FAI and made public. While emphasizing that the science mission was the flight's primary goal, pilot Jim Barrilleaux expressed his opinion that \"achieving the world altitude record verifies all of the outstanding efforts by the people who have worked on the NASA ER-2s and U-2s throughout the yearsdesigners, builders, operators, maintainers and scientists.\"12\nThe following winter, the NASA Airborne Science team deployed an ER-2\nto Kiruna, Sweden, north of the Arctic Circle, as part of the SAGE III Ozone Loss and Validation Experiment (SOLVE). Besides investigating the processes that control polar and mid-latitude winter and spring ozone levels, scientists hoped to validate measurements from the satellite-based Stratospheric Aerosol and Gas Experiment (SAGE) instrument. Although SAGE III was not launched on schedule, researchers were able to take advantage of other satellite assets. Managed by the Upper Atmosphere Research Program of NASA's Office of Earth Science, the intensive effort also involved a DC-8 flying science platform and was the largest international field experiment ever conducted to measure ozone in the Arctic stratosphere. Scientists hoped that stratospheric measurements collected during the SOLVE campaign would provide a better understanding of the complicated chemistry involved with ozone loss. Unusually low levels of ozone over the Arctic during previous winters raised concerns that an ozone hole was developing just as in the Antarctic region. Research teams included more than\n350 scientists from the United States, Europe, Russia, Japan, and Canada.13\n\nThe first SOLVE mission was a flight from Kiruna to the North Pole and back, a dangerous feat in a single-engine plane over an extremely hostile environment. In order to reduce potential risks, the ER-2 was equipped with backup communications systems, and the JP-TS fuel was specially refined for extreme cold weather use. Arctic survival instructors assured pilot Dee Porter that if he had to eject at altitude, where the air temperature was expected to be approximately 117 F, survival would not be an issue because he would be frozen long before reaching the ground. Porter made the entire flight in total darkness, successfully accomplishing all science goals without experiencing any technical problems with the aircraft.14\nThe most unusual aspect of the SOLVE campaign was that it required multiple ER-2 sorties over Russia. Since this was to be the first flight of a U-2- type aircraft through Russian airspace since the downing of Frank Powers in\n1960, the missions were closely coordinated with Russian observers. While preparing for his first such flight Dee Porter asked a Russian Air Force general for assurance that all air traffic control centers and air defense sites along the planned route would be notified in advance. The general told him not to worry, insisting, \"There will not be a second incident.\"15\nPorter piloted the first 6-hour sortie across Russia on January 27, 2000, flying a straight line from the Finnish border southeast past Moscow to the Ukrainian border and back. Per prior agreement, he had to enter and exit Russian airspace at strictly defined navigational waypoints. The airplane was loaded with more than a ton of scientific instruments that would be used to perform 17 different environmental experiments. A second flight on February 5 lasted 8 hours and required a more complicated route across the Barents Sea and over northern Russia. Jan Nystrom piloted additional flights over Russia in March during the third and final phase of the campaign.16\nThe ER-2 team was deployed to warmer climes in the summer of 2000 for the Southern African Regional Science Initiative (SAFARI), based in Pietersburg, Republic of South Africa. This time, researchers used the MAS multispectral scanner in an effort to increase understanding of southern African ecological and climate systems. After returning to the U.S., the airplane prepared for deployment the following summer to Jacksonville, FL, for the Convection And Moisture EXperiment (CAMEX). This series of field research investigations focused on the study of tropical cyclone development, tracking, intensification, and landfall impacts. Measurements of cloud microphysics were aimed at\n\n16. Ibid., pp. 380381.\nimproving hurricane predictions. A similar campaign in July 2005 was based in Costa Rica, with the ER-2 carrying instruments to measure the buildup and behavior of tropical storm systems over Mexico and Central America, and in the eastern Pacific Ocean, Caribbean, and the Gulf of Mexico. During the course of CAMEX-4, researchers had the opportunity to fly the aircraft over several hurricanes, including Emily and Dennis, both violent Category 45 storms, and collect information on their entire vertical structures. Additional data were collected regarding the temperature, humidity, precipitation, and wind related to tropical cyclones and other phenomena that lead to the development of powerful storms at sea.17\nThe ER-2 also served as a test bed for direct detection Doppler lidar systems.\n\nIn September 2009, researchers at Dryden integrated the Tropospheric Wind Lidar Technology Experiment (TWiLiTE) into the ER-2 to measure vertical wind profiles. The primary objectives of the TWiLiTE program were to develop technologies and subsystems for a future space-based Global Wind Mission, conduct engineering flight tests of a fully autonomous airborne Doppler lidar, and demonstrate tropospheric wind profile measurements from a high-altitude, downward-looking, moving platform to simulate spaceborne measurements using similar instruments.18 The following December, the ER-2 carried the Multiple Altimeter Beam Experimental Lidar (MABEL) to simulate instruments to be carried by the second Ice, Cloud and land Elevation Satellite (ICESat-2). In a second series of tests, in March 2011, the MABEL instrument, developed at NASA's Goddard Space Flight Center, was again mounted in the airplane's nose for flights over a variety of different terrains. In April 2012, the ER-2 carried MABEL to study Greenland's ice sheet, glaciers, and sea ice. The deployment, based at Keflavik, Iceland, included more than 100 hours of flying during 16 sorties, including 14 data collection flights over Greenland and surrounding sea ice areas. Several missions were conducted concurrently and on the same flight tracks as flights of other NASA environmental science aircraft involved in the Arctic IceBridge campaign in order to compare data being recorded by the MABEL with instruments on the other aircraft. This challenging effort ended on April 27 with a lengthy transit flight from Keflavik to the Dryden Aircraft Operations Facility in Palmdale. Pilot Stu Broce landed\n\n17. NASA, \"ER-2 High Altitude Airborne Science Aircraft,\" NASA Fact Sheet FS-2007-4-046-DFRC,\n2007, *http://www.nasa.gov/centers/dryden/pdf/171831main_FS-2007-04-046-ER-2.pdf*,\naccessed July 27, 2013.\n18. Bruce Gentry et al., \"Flight Testing of the TWiLiTE Airborne Molecular Doppler Lidar,\" http://\nntrs.nasa.gov/archive/nasa/casi.ntrs.nasa.gov/20100026400_2010028473.pdf, accessed\nJuly 27, 2013.\nthe ER-2 in California after being airborne for nearly 10.5 hours, during which time he collected MABEL data over the broadleaf deciduous forests of Wisconsin.19\nIn a continuing effort to develop instruments for space-based platforms, the ER-2 was configured for the Polarimeter Definition Experiment (PODEX) in January 2013. The primary goal was the development of instruments for use with the Aerosol-Cloud-Ecosystem (ACE) satellite mission. During the course of seven flights over 3 weeks, research teams collected data using a new class of polarimeters, instruments that provide detailed information about clouds and their interaction with tiny airborne particles from a variety of sources, including automotive emissions, dust, and sea spray lofted by the wind. These aerosols can remain suspended in the atmosphere for up to a week, affecting human health, cloud formation, precipitation, and Earth's radiation budget.20\nSimilar particles and their behavior were investigated in the summer of\n2013. During the Studies of Emissions, Atmospheric Composition, Clouds and Climate Coupling by Regional Surveys (SEAC4RS) campaign, more than\n\n20. Kathryn Hansen, \"PODEX Experiment to Reshape Future of Atmospheric Science\" January 16,\n2013, *http://www.nasa.gov/topics/earth/features/qa-starr.html*, accessed July 29, 2013.\n250 scientists, engineers, and flight personnel examined the ways in which air pollution and natural emissions affect atmospheric composition and climate. ER-2 and DC-8 aircraft involved in SEAC4RS carried sensors to probe the atmosphere from top to bottom at a critical time of year when weather systems were sufficiently strong and regional air pollution and natural emissions were prolific enough to pump gases and particles high into the atmosphere. The results may provide new insights into the effects of gases and aerosol particles on Earth's atmosphere and climate. The mission targeted two major regional sources of summertime emissions: intense smoke from wildland fires in the Western United States and natural emissions of isoprene, a carbon compound, from forests in the Southeast.21\nOver the years, NASA U-2 and ER-2 aircraft have supported airborne research in the United States and around the globe. Worldwide deployments have made it possible to acquire extensive digital multispectral imagery and aerial photography from altitudes achievable by no other aircraft. U-2 and ER-2 missions tested prototype satellite-imaging sensors and acquired Earth resources data for application to projects sponsored by NASA and Federal agencies such as the Forest Service, the Environmental Protection Agency, Fish and Wildlife Service, and the Army Corps of Engineers. By using airplanes like the U-2 and ER-2 for high-altitude research, NASA scientists gained knowledge of advanced aircraft capabilities and technologies and aerospace physiology, and they expanded their understanding of how humans interact with the environment. Research results may yield improved weather forecasts, tools for managing agriculture and forests, information for fisheries and local planners, and the ability to predict how climate will change in the future. Additionally, engineers will use lessons learned in future designs for aircraft and aerospace vehicles.22\n\naccessed July 27, 2013.\nContrary to popular belief, the U-2 is not yet ready to fly off into the sunset. (U.S. Air Force)\n\n## Conclusions\n\nOver the span of more than six decades, the U-2 evolved from a relatively basic, high-altitude camera platform for performing clandestine reconnaissance missions into a complex, multisensor platform that has been adapted for a multitude of civil and military roles. Variants in more than a dozen configurations have been used for intelligence gathering, strategic and tactical reconnaissance, communications relay, battle-damage assessment, treaty monitoring and verification, disaster relief, environmental and Earth resources studies, and a wide variety of scientific research. Born of a Cold War necessity to maintain the balance of power between East and West, the U-2 now serves equally well as a high-altitude tool for tracking terrorists in the mountains of Afghanistan or for tracking the migration of destructive spruce bark beetles through the forests of Alaska.\n\nPerhaps most surprising is the seemingly unending span of the U-2's service life. Those who conceived of and designed the airplane anticipated that it would remain viable for only a few years at most, but it has surpassed expectations with relatively modest changes to the basic configuration. Since its earliest days, the U-2 was consistently characterized as a delicate aircraft, designed for minimal aerodynamic stress. The airframe had been manufactured for optimum altitude performance at the expense of strict adherence to military specifications. Surprisingly, up until the late 1990s, no systematic study had been made to determine the consequences of this engineering approach. So, to ascertain the fatigue life of the U-2S, strain gauges and accelerometers were installed in several aircraft. The astonishing results of these measurements indicated that the U-2S could likely withstand 750,000 hours of operation. At the time of the study, those airframes with the most flight time had less than 30,000 hours.\n\nThis meant that if the flight rate remained unchanged, the airplanes would be flyable for another 150 years. This low airframe wear can be attributed in part to the relatively benign high-altitude environment, where stresses from gusts and turbulence are minimal. But the most important factor ensuring the U-2's longevity may be its innovative design. Fred Carmody, a Lockheed field service manager who spent 25 years helping to maintain the U-2, said in 1994, \"The key is good initial design, maturity of the design, and proper maintenance.\"1\nAt one time, the Air Force slated the U-2 for retirement in 2015, but Department of Defense cutbacks and rising costs of its proposed replacement, the RQ-4, gave Kelly Johnson's angel a new lease on life. The Global Hawk's price tag had gradually risen to $176 million per airframe, according to Deputy Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter at a January 2012 news conference, and Pentagon analysts determined that continuing to operate the U-2 would be less expensive for the foreseeable future. Through the various upgrade programs (engine, electrical, cockpit, etc.), the Air Force has already invested a substantial sumat least $1.7 billion since 1994to modernize the U-2, so it makes sense to leverage this investment rather than spend money on a new platform.2\nNot surprisingly, officials from Northrop Grumman, builder of the Global Hawk, contested this decision, arguing that by flying into hostile airspace, the U-2 exposes pilots to danger, and that the airplane has limited mission endurance and limited sensor capacity. Nevertheless, U-2 pilots have flown more than 95,000 hours since 2003, providing vital intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance data to military planners and soldiers in the field. Each year, the Air Force trains approximately 18 new U-2 pilots and 60 new RQ-4\noperators. \"They might want to start training more U-2 pilots,\" said Lexington Institute defense policy analyst Dr. Loren B. Thompson in a 2012 interview with the *Los Angeles Times*. Thompson estimated that the U-2 would probably not be retired before 2023. \"There's still a lot of fight in that aircraft.\"3\nIndeed there is. Pentagon officials have expressed a desire to continue flying the U-2 beyond 2040, and, presumably, NASA will fly the ER-2 as long as possible. Six decades after its conception, the U-2 remains a viable reconnaissance and research platform, but it will inevitably succumb to obsolescence. Perhaps somewhere in a windowless building at Palmdale, Skunk Works engineers are brewing up the next high-altitude craft to probe the sky's unlimited horizons.\n\n## Appendix 1 Aircraft Specifications U-2A/C/G\n\nLength: 50 feet Span: 80 feet Wing Area: 600 square feet Height: 15 feet Zero-Fuel Weight: 13,07114,250 pounds Max. Gross Takeoff Weight: 22,54224,150 pounds Max. Unrefueled Range: 2,500 nautical miles Cruise Duration: 8.0 hours Operational Ceiling: above 70,000 feet Cruising Speed: 400 knots (460 mph) at 65,000 feet Early model U-2 general configuration. (U.S. Air Force)\n\n## U-2R/Tr-1/U-2S/Er-2\n\nLength: 62 feet Span: 103 feet Wing Area: 1,000 square feet Height: 15 feet Zero-Fuel Weight: 14,90017,800 pounds Max. Gross Takeoff Weight: 30,70041,000 pounds Max. Unrefueled Range: 4,270 nautical miles Cruise Duration: 10.4 hours Operational Ceiling: above 70,000 feet Cruising Speed: 413 knots (475 mph) at 65,000 feet Late model U-2 general configuration. (Lockheed Martin)\n\n## Appendix 2 Production Summary\n\nThe U-2 fleet was produced in several batches. The first production run was built for the CIA with 20 airframes constructed at Burbank, CA, under contract SP-1913. A second batch of 29 airframes was constructed at Oildale, CA, under contract SP-1914. An additional airframe was built as part of this batch, possibly using parts from crash-damaged airframes. Each U-2 airframe was identified by a three-digit Lockheed construction number, called an article number. Air Force serial numbers were assigned in 1956. The original prototype (Article 341) never received a U.S. Air Force serial number. Article 390 was allocated a serial number that had been previously assigned to Article 357, which was lost in a nonfatal accident. The Air Force ordered a supplementary batch of five airframes in 1958. In 1967 and 1968, the CIA and Air Force received 12 U-2R airframes, four of which survived to be converted to U-2S configuration. Between 1981 and 1989, a total of 37 new airframes were built under the designations TR-1A, TR-1B, U-2R, and ER-2. The TR-1 series aircraft were redesignated U-2R in October 1991 and later converted to U-2S.\n\n## Original Production Batch\n\n| Article No.                        | Serial No.   | Model    |\n|------------------------------------|--------------|----------|\n| 341                                |              |          |\n| N/A                                | U-2A         | Lockheed |\n| CIA                                |              |          |\n| Prototype was delivered to         |              |          |\n| the test site on July 25, 1955,    |              |          |\n| for test and development           |              |          |\n| flights. First flight on August 1, |              |          |\n| 1955. Crashed April 4, 1957,       |              |          |\n| killing Lockheed test pilot        |              |          |\n| Robert Sieker.                     |              |          |\n| Article No.                   | Serial No.   | Model   | User                          |\n|-------------------------------|--------------|---------|-------------------------------|\n| 342                           |              |         |                               |\n| 56-6675                       |              |         |                               |\n| N800X                         |              |         |                               |\n| Lockheed                      |              |         |                               |\n| CIA                           |              |         |                               |\n| U-2A                          |              |         |                               |\n| U-2C                          |              |         |                               |\n| U-2F                          |              |         |                               |\n| 343                           |              |         |                               |\n| 56-6676                       | U-2A         |         |                               |\n| U-2F                          |              |         |                               |\n| CIA                           |              |         |                               |\n| USAF                          |              |         |                               |\n| 344                           |              |         |                               |\n| 56-6677                       |              |         |                               |\n| N315X                         |              |         |                               |\n| U-2A                          |              |         |                               |\n| U-2F                          |              |         |                               |\n| CIA                           |              |         |                               |\n| USAF                          |              |         |                               |\n| 345                           |              |         |                               |\n| 56-6678                       | U-2A         | CIA     | Delivered to the test site on |\n| December 16, 1955. Crashed    |              |         |                               |\n| during training flight on May |              |         |                               |\n| 15, 1956, killing Wilburn     |              |         |                               |\n| \"Billy\" Rose.                 |              |         |                               |\nDelivered to test site on September 11, 1955. Used\nfor developmental testing.\nConverted to U-2C prototype and first flown in new configuration on May 13, 1959. Converted to U-2F prototype in May 1961. Deployed to CIA operating locations overseas and at Edwards Air Force Base. Crashed February 25, 1966, following refueling practice. CIA pilot Robert \"Deke\" Hall ejected safely. Delivered to test site on October 16, 1955. Used for training in 195657, and then for test and development. Converted to U-2F in 1961. Loaned to USAF during Cuban Missile Crisis and shot down over Cuba on October 27, 1962, killing Maj. Rudolph Anderson. Delivered to the test site on November 20, 1955. Used in test and development work though most of 1956. Converted to U-2F by October 1961. Crashed near Edwards AFB during refueling trials on March 1, 1962, killing Capt. John Campbell.\n| Article No.                    | Serial No.   | Model   | User                          |\n|--------------------------------|--------------|---------|-------------------------------|\n| 346                            |              |         |                               |\n| 56-6679                        | U-2A         | CIA     | Delivered to the test site on |\n| January 13, 1956. Deployed     |              |         |                               |\n| to Europe with Detachment      |              |         |                               |\n| A. Crashed near Wiesbaden,     |              |         |                               |\n| Germany, killing Howard Carey. |              |         |                               |\n| CIA                            |              |         |                               |\n| USAF                           |              |         |                               |\n| 347                            |              |         |                               |\n| 56-6680                        | U-2A         |         |                               |\n| U-2E                           |              |         |                               |\n| U-2F                           |              |         |                               |\n| U-2C                           |              |         |                               |\n| 348                            |              |         |                               |\n| N801X                          |              |         |                               |\n| 56-6681                        |              |         |                               |\n| N708NA                         |              |         |                               |\n| U-2A                           |              |         |                               |\n| U-2G                           |              |         |                               |\n| U-2C                           |              |         |                               |\n| CIA                            |              |         |                               |\n| USAF                           |              |         |                               |\n| Lockheed                       |              |         |                               |\n| NASA                           |              |         |                               |\nDelivered to the test site on February 8, 1956. Transferred to SAC in late 1957. Converted to U-2E in mid-1962. First SAC U-2 to be painted all black in 1964. Converted to U-2F in 1966. Placed in flyable storage in 1969. Converted to U-2C for Advanced Location Strike System project in 1972. Stored in 1980 and transferred to the National Air and Space Museum, Washington, DC, in 1985. Delivered to the test site on March 5, 1956. Deployed with Detachment A in April 1956. Returned to U.S. in November 1957. Transferred to SAC but retained by Lockheed for testing through January 1959. Returned to CIA in 1963 for conversion to U-2G. Placed in flyable storage in 1969. Transferred to NASA in 1971 and returned to U-2C configuration. Retired in August 1987. Initially displayed at Ames Research Center, Moffett Field,\nCA. Later transferred to Moffett\nField Historical Society Museum.\n| Article No.                  | Serial No.                        |\n|------------------------------|-----------------------------------|\n| 349                          |                                   |\n| 56-6682                      |                                   |\n| N709NA                       |                                   |\n| CIA                          |                                   |\n| USAF                         |                                   |\n| NASA                         |                                   |\n| U-2A                         |                                   |\n| U-2H                         |                                   |\n| U-2G                         |                                   |\n| U-2C                         |                                   |\n| 350                          |                                   |\n| 56-6683                      | U-2A                              |\n| U-2F                         |                                   |\n| CIA                          |                                   |\n| USAF                         |                                   |\n| 351                          |                                   |\n| 56-6684                      | U-2A                              |\n| U-2C                         |                                   |\n| CIA                          | Delivered to the test site on May |\n| 18, 1956. Converted to U-2C  |                                   |\n| by 1959. Crashed at Taoyuan, |                                   |\n| Taiwan, on March 19, 1961,   |                                   |\n| killing Maj. Yao-Hua Chih.   |                                   |\n| 352                          |                                   |\n| 56-6685                      |                                   |\n| N315X                        |                                   |\n| U-2A                         |                                   |\n| U-2C                         |                                   |\n| CIA                          |                                   |\n| Lockheed                     |                                   |\nDelivered to the test site on March 29, 1956. Damaged\nin April 1960 forced landing\nin Thailand. Repaired and transferred to Air Force Flight Test Center, Edwards AFB, CA. Returned to CIA in 1964 for conversion to U-2H. Converted to U-2G in August 1965. Placed in flyable storage in 1969. Transferred to NASA in 1971. Retired in April 1989 and transferred to Museum of Aviation, Robins AFB, GA. Delivered to the test site on April 24, 1956. Transferred to SAC in 1957. Used in flight-test activity in 1962. Returned to CIA in 1963 for conversion to U-2F. Loaned to SAC for Cuba reconnaissance. Crashed in the Gulf of Mexico on November 20, 1963, killing Capt. Joe Hyde, Jr. Delivered to the test site on June 13, 1956. Converted to U-2C by September 1959. Used for test and development by Lockheed and Detachment G at Edwards in 1963. Crashed near Taiwan on October 22, 1965, killing Maj. Cheng-Wen \"Pete\" Wang.\n| Article No.                         | Serial No.                    | Model   | User                               |\n|-------------------------------------|-------------------------------|---------|------------------------------------|\n| 353                                 |                               |         |                                    |\n| 56-6686                             | U-2A                          | CIA     | Delivered to the test site on July |\n| 6, 1956. Moved to Detachment        |                               |         |                                    |\n| G in June 1957. Destroyed in        |                               |         |                                    |\n| crash landing at Edwards on         |                               |         |                                    |\n| September 14, 1961. Buster          |                               |         |                                    |\n| Edens escaped unharmed.             |                               |         |                                    |\n| 354                                 |                               |         |                                    |\n| 56-6687                             | U-2A                          | CIA     | Delivered to the test site on July |\n| 27, 1956. Crashed on August         |                               |         |                                    |\n| 31, 1956, during a training flight, |                               |         |                                    |\n| killing Frank Grace.                |                               |         |                                    |\n| 355                                 |                               |         |                                    |\n| 56-6688                             | U-2A                          |         |                                    |\n| U-2C                                |                               |         |                                    |\n| CIA                                 | Delivered to the test site on |         |                                    |\n| August 16, 1956. Damaged in         |                               |         |                                    |\n| landing accident on August 30,      |                               |         |                                    |\n| 1956. Converted to U-2C by          |                               |         |                                    |\n| September 1962. Shot down over      |                               |         |                                    |\n| China on November 1, 1963. Maj.     |                               |         |                                    |\n| Chang-Di \"Robin\" Yeh survived.      |                               |         |                                    |\n| 356                                 |                               |         |                                    |\n| 56-6689                             | U-2A                          |         |                                    |\n| U-2F                                |                               |         |                                    |\n| CIA                                 |                               |         |                                    |\n| USAF                                |                               |         |                                    |\n| 357                                 |                               |         |                                    |\n| 56-6690                             | U-2A                          | CIA     | Delivered to the test site on      |\n| September 21, 1956. Crashed in      |                               |         |                                    |\n| Arizona on December 19, 1956.       |                               |         |                                    |\n| Robert Ericson survived.            |                               |         |                                    |\nDelivered to the test site on September 5, 1956. Transferred to SAC in November 1957. Damaged by typhoon at Guam in late 1962. Transferred to CIA for conversion to U-2F in 1963. Crashed in Taiwan Straits on March 23, 1964, killing Maj. Teh-Pei \"Sonny\" Liang.\n| Article No.                   | Serial No.                    |\n|-------------------------------|-------------------------------|\n| 358                           |                               |\n| 56-6691                       | U-2A                          |\n| U-2C                          |                               |\n| CIA                           | Delivered to the test site on |\n| October 8, 1956. Returned     |                               |\n| to Lockheed in September      |                               |\n| 1958 for conversion to U-2C   |                               |\n| and to be used in flight-test |                               |\n| and development activity.     |                               |\n| Returned to CIA in August     |                               |\n| 1959. Shot down over China    |                               |\n| on January 10, 1965. Maj.     |                               |\n| Li-Yi \"Jack\" Chang survived   |                               |\n| but was captured.             |                               |\n| CIA                           |                               |\n| USAF                          |                               |\n| Lockheed                      |                               |\n| 359                           |                               |\n| 56-6692                       | U-2A                          |\n| U-2F                          |                               |\n| U-2C                          |                               |\n| U-2CT                         |                               |\nDelivered to the test site on October 22, 1956. Transferred to SAC in December 1960. Returned to CIA in July 1962 for conversion to U-2F. Loaned to SAC for Cuba reconnaissance in 1963. Used for testing in support of U-2R development from 1965 to 1967. Transferred to Air Force Flight Test Center in July 1968. Modified for Project TRIM in 1972. Converted to U-2C configuration in 1974. Returned to Lockheed in 1975 for conversion to U-2CT trainer and redelivered to SAC in January 1976. Retired in December 1987. Used as battle-damage-repair training airframe at Royal Air Force (RAF) Alconbury, England, in 1988. Restored to U-2C configuration, and transferred to Imperial War Museum, Duxford, England in 1992.\n| Article No.                     | Serial No.                 |\n|---------------------------------|----------------------------|\n| 360                             |                            |\n| 56-6693                         | U-2A                       |\n| U-2C                            |                            |\n| CIA                             | Delivered the test site on |\n| November 5, 1956. Used for      |                            |\n| test and development activities |                            |\n| until May 1959. Converted       |                            |\n| to U-2C. Shot down near         |                            |\n| Sverdlovsk, Russia, on May 1,   |                            |\n| 1960. Frank Powers survived     |                            |\n| but was captured.               |                            |\n\n## Second Production Batch\n\n| Article No.                      | Serial No.   | Model   | User                          |\n|----------------------------------|--------------|---------|-------------------------------|\n| 361                              |              |         |                               |\n| 56-6694                          | U-2A         | USAF    | Delivered to the test site in |\n| September 1956. Moved            |              |         |                               |\n| to Laughlin AFB, TX, in          |              |         |                               |\n| June 1957. Crashed during        |              |         |                               |\n| maintenance flight on            |              |         |                               |\n| September 26, 1957. Col. Jack    |              |         |                               |\n| Nole bailed out.                 |              |         |                               |\n| 362                              |              |         |                               |\n| 56-6695                          | U-2A         |         |                               |\n| U-2G                             |              |         |                               |\n| USAF                             |              |         |                               |\n| CIA                              |              |         |                               |\n| 363                              |              |         |                               |\n| 56-6696                          | U-2A         | USAF    | Delivered to the test site in |\n| December 1956. Moved to          |              |         |                               |\n| Laughlin AFB in June 1957.       |              |         |                               |\n| Crashed near Tucson, AZ,         |              |         |                               |\n| on March 22, 1966. Capt.         |              |         |                               |\n| Huang-Di \"Andy\" Fan ejected.     |              |         |                               |\n| 364                              |              |         |                               |\n| 56-6697                          | U-2A         | USAF    | Delivered to the test site    |\n| in January 1957. Moved to        |              |         |                               |\n| Laughlin AFB in June 1957.       |              |         |                               |\n| Crashed near Del Rio, TX, on     |              |         |                               |\n| August 6, 1958, killing Lt. Paul |              |         |                               |\n| L. Haughland.                    |              |         |                               |\nDelivered to the test site in November 1956. Moved to Laughlin AFB in June 1957. Transferred to CIA in 1963 for conversion to U-2G. Shot down over Fujian, China, on July 7, 1964, killing Lt. Col. Nan-Ping \"Terry\" Lee.\n| Article No.                       | Serial No.                    | Model   | User                          |\n|-----------------------------------|-------------------------------|---------|-------------------------------|\n| 365                               |                               |         |                               |\n| 56-6698                           | U-2A                          | USAF    | Delivered to the test site    |\n| in January 1957. Moved to         |                               |         |                               |\n| Laughlin AFB in June 1957.        |                               |         |                               |\n| Crashed near Tucumcari, NM,       |                               |         |                               |\n| on July 9, 1958, killing Capt. Al |                               |         |                               |\n| Chapin, Jr.                       |                               |         |                               |\n| 366                               |                               |         |                               |\n| 56-6699                           | U-2A                          | USAF    | Delivered to the test site in |\n| February 1957. Moved to           |                               |         |                               |\n| Laughlin AFB in June 1957.        |                               |         |                               |\n| Crashed near Abilene, TX,         |                               |         |                               |\n| on June 28, 1957, killing Lt.     |                               |         |                               |\n| Leo Smith.                        |                               |         |                               |\n| 367                               |                               |         |                               |\n| 56-6700                           | U-2A                          |         |                               |\n| U-2C                              |                               |         |                               |\n| USAF                              |                               |         |                               |\n| CIA                               |                               |         |                               |\n| 368                               |                               |         |                               |\n| 56-6701                           | U-2A                          |         |                               |\n| U-2C                              |                               |         |                               |\n| USAF                              | Delivered to the test site in |         |                               |\n| March 1957. Transferred to        |                               |         |                               |\n| ARDC at Edwards in June           |                               |         |                               |\n| 1957, and then to SAC in          |                               |         |                               |\n| 1966. Converted to U-2C           |                               |         |                               |\n| by November 1966. Placed          |                               |         |                               |\n| in flyable storage in 1969.       |                               |         |                               |\n| Returned to flight status in      |                               |         |                               |\n| 1972 for ALSS project. Retired    |                               |         |                               |\n| to SAC Museum, Offutt AFB,        |                               |         |                               |\n| NE, in 1980.                      |                               |         |                               |\n| 369                               |                               |         |                               |\n| 56-6702                           | U-2A                          | USAF    | Delivered to the test site in |\n| March 1957. Moved to Laughlin     |                               |         |                               |\n| AFB in June 1957. Crashed near    |                               |         |                               |\n| Abilene, TX, on June 28, 1957,    |                               |         |                               |\n| killing Lt. Ford Lowcock.         |                               |         |                               |\nDelivered to the test site in February 1957. Transferred to the CIA in June 1957. Returned to SAC in 1960. Converted to U-2C in October 1966. Placed in flyable storage in 1969. Returned to flight status in 1972 for the Advanced Location Strike System (ALSS) project. Crashed May 29, 1975, near Winterberg, Germany. Capt. Robert T. \"Terry\" Rendelman escaped unharmed.\n| Article No.                      | Serial No.                 | Model   | User                          |\n|----------------------------------|----------------------------|---------|-------------------------------|\n| 370                              |                            |         |                               |\n| 56-6703                          | U-2A                       |         |                               |\n| U-2E                             |                            |         |                               |\n| USAF                             | Delivered to the test site |         |                               |\n| in April 1957. Moved to          |                            |         |                               |\n| Laughlin AFB in June 1957.       |                            |         |                               |\n| Modified for SIGINT mission      |                            |         |                               |\n| by mid-1959. Converted           |                            |         |                               |\n| to U-2E in August 1962.          |                            |         |                               |\n| Destroyed in crash landing       |                            |         |                               |\n| at Davis-Monthan AFB, AZ,        |                            |         |                               |\n| on September 18, 1964. Maj.      |                            |         |                               |\n| Robert L. Primrose perished.     |                            |         |                               |\n| 371                              |                            |         |                               |\n| 56-6704                          | U-2A                       | USAF    | Delivered to the test site in |\n| April 1957. Moved to Laughlin    |                            |         |                               |\n| AFB in June 1957. Crashed        |                            |         |                               |\n| near Del Rio, TX, on November    |                            |         |                               |\n| 28, 1957, killing Capt. Benedict |                            |         |                               |\n| A. Lacombe.                      |                            |         |                               |\n| 372                              |                            |         |                               |\n| 56-6705                          | U-2A                       |         |                               |\n| U-2F                             |                            |         |                               |\n| USAF                             |                            |         |                               |\n| CIA                              |                            |         |                               |\n| 373                              |                            |         |                               |\n| 56-6706                          | U-2A                       |         |                               |\n| U-2C                             |                            |         |                               |\n| USAF                             |                            |         |                               |\n| CIA                              |                            |         |                               |\nDelivered to the test site in April 1957. Moved to Laughlin AFB in June 1957. First U-2 equipped for High-Altitude Sampling Program. Transferred to CIA in 1964. Converted to U-2F by May 1965 and assigned to Detachment G. Transferred to Detachment H in November 1965. Crashed at Taichung, Taiwan, on February 17, 1966, killing Capt. Tse-Shi \"Charlie\" Wu. Delivered to test site in May 1957. Moved to Laughlin AFB in June 1957. Transferred to CIA in August 1966 and converted to U-2C. Shot down over China on September 9, 1967, killing Maj. Jung-Bei \"Denny\" Hwang.\n| Article No.                       | Serial No.                      | Model    |\n|-----------------------------------|---------------------------------|----------|\n| 374                               |                                 |          |\n| 56-6707                           | U-2A                            |          |\n| U-2E                              |                                 |          |\n| U-2F                              |                                 |          |\n| U-2C                              |                                 |          |\n| USAF                              | Delivered to test site in May   |          |\n| 1957. Moved to Laughlin AFB       |                                 |          |\n| in June 1957. Modified for        |                                 |          |\n| SIGINT mission by mid-1959.       |                                 |          |\n| Converted to U-2E in 1962.        |                                 |          |\n| Converted to U-2F by November     |                                 |          |\n| 1966. Placed in flyable storage   |                                 |          |\n| in 1969. Converted back to        |                                 |          |\n| U-2C for ALSS project in 1972.    |                                 |          |\n| Stored at Lockheed Palmdale       |                                 |          |\n| in 1980. Later transferred to     |                                 |          |\n| Laughlin AFB for static display.  |                                 |          |\n| 375                               |                                 |          |\n| 56-6708                           | U-2A                            |          |\n| U-2C                              |                                 |          |\n| USAF                              | Delivered to Laughlin AFB in    |          |\n| June 1957. Converted to U-2C      |                                 |          |\n| in March 1966. Crashed near       |                                 |          |\n| Pineville, LA, on July 1, 1967.   |                                 |          |\n| Capt. Sam Swart ejected.          |                                 |          |\n| 376                               |                                 |          |\n| 56-6709                           | U-2A                            | Lockheed |\n| USAF                              |                                 |          |\n| 377                               |                                 |          |\n| 56-6710                           | U-2A                            |          |\n| U-2D                              |                                 |          |\n| USAF                              | Delivered to ARDC in June 1957. |          |\n| Modified to U-2D by January       |                                 |          |\n| 1958. Crashed at Edwards on       |                                 |          |\n| September 11, 1958, killing       |                                 |          |\n| Capt. Hugh P. \"Pat\" Hunerwadel.   |                                 |          |\n| 378                               |                                 |          |\n| 56-6711                           | U-2A                            |          |\n| U-2C                              |                                 |          |\n| CIA                               | Delivered to Detachment G in    |          |\n| July 1957 and used for test       |                                 |          |\n| and development. Converted to     |                                 |          |\n| U-2C in 1962. Shot down over      |                                 |          |\n| China on September 9, 1962,       |                                 |          |\n| killing Lt. Col. Huai-Sheng Chen. |                                 |          |\nReady for delivery by June 1957 but retained at factory until November for SIGINT modifications. Crashed near Picayune, MS, on January 2, 1962. Capt. Charles Stratton ejected.\n| Article No.                      | Serial No.   | Model   | User                         |\n|----------------------------------|--------------|---------|------------------------------|\n| 379                              |              |         |                              |\n| 56-6712                          | U-2A         | USAF    | Delivered to Laughlin AFB in |\n| July 1957. Moved to Davis-       |              |         |                              |\n| Monthan AFB in 1963. Crashed     |              |         |                              |\n| on December 18, 1964, near       |              |         |                              |\n| Tucson after Capt. Shih-Li       |              |         |                              |\n| \"Steve\" Sheng ejected.           |              |         |                              |\n| 380                              |              |         |                              |\n| 56-6713                          | U-2A         | USAF    | Delivered to Laughlin AFB    |\n| in July 1957. Crashed July       |              |         |                              |\n| 8, 1958, near Wayside, TX,       |              |         |                              |\n| killing RAF Sq. Ldr. Christopher |              |         |                              |\n| H. Walker.                       |              |         |                              |\n| USAF                             |              |         |                              |\n| CIA                              |              |         |                              |\n| 381                              |              |         |                              |\n| 56-6714                          | U-2A         |         |                              |\n| U-2G                             |              |         |                              |\n| U-2C                             |              |         |                              |\n| 382                              |              |         |                              |\n| 56-6715                          | U-2A         |         |                              |\n| U-2G                             |              |         |                              |\n| USAF                             |              |         |                              |\n| CIA                              |              |         |                              |\n| 383                              |              |         |                              |\n| 56-6716                          |              |         |                              |\n| N805X                            |              |         |                              |\n| U-2A                             |              |         |                              |\n| U-2C                             |              |         |                              |\n| USAF                             |              |         |                              |\n| CIA                              |              |         |                              |\nDelivered to Laughlin AFB in August 1957. Transferred to CIA in 1965 and converted to U-2G. Later transferred to SAC and eventually placed in flyable storage in 1969. Converted to U-2C in 1972. Damaged beyond repair in crash near Oroville, CA, on January 31, 1980. Capt. Edward Beaumont survived. Aircraft was later rebuilt for display at Beale AFB. Delivered to Laughlin AFB in August 1957. Transferred to CIA in 1964 and converted to U-2G in 1965. Crashed near Edwards AFB on April 26, 1965, killing Buster E. Edens. Delivered to Laughlin AFB in September 1957. Transferred to CIA in June 1965 and converted to U-2C. Transferred to SAC in 1971. Placed in storage in May 1980. Later transferred to Davis-Monthan AFB for permanent display.\n| Article No.                        | Serial No.                   | Model   | User                          |\n|------------------------------------|------------------------------|---------|-------------------------------|\n| 384                                |                              |         |                               |\n| 56-6717                            | U-2A                         |         |                               |\n| U-2C                               |                              |         |                               |\n| USAF                               |                              |         |                               |\n| CIA                                |                              |         |                               |\n| 385                                |                              |         |                               |\n| 56-6718                            | U-2A                         |         |                               |\n| U-2G                               |                              |         |                               |\n| USAF                               |                              |         |                               |\n| CIA                                |                              |         |                               |\n| 386                                |                              |         |                               |\n| 56-6719                            | U-2A                         | USAF    | Delivered to Laughlin AFB     |\n| in October 1957. Crashed in        |                              |         |                               |\n| Bolivia on July 28, 1966, killing  |                              |         |                               |\n| Capt. Robert Hickman.              |                              |         |                               |\n| 387                                |                              |         |                               |\n| 56-6720                            | U-2A                         | USAF    | Delivered to Laughlin AFB in  |\n| October 1957. Crashed near         |                              |         |                               |\n| Uvalde, TX, on July 14, 1960.      |                              |         |                               |\n| Maj. Raleigh B.J. Myers ejected.   |                              |         |                               |\n| 388                                |                              |         |                               |\n| 56-6721                            | U-2A                         |         |                               |\n| U-2D                               |                              |         |                               |\n| USAF                               | Delivered to Laughlin AFB in |         |                               |\n| October 1957. Damaged in           |                              |         |                               |\n| forced landing at Cortez, CO,      |                              |         |                               |\n| on August 5, 1959. Repaired        |                              |         |                               |\n| and transferred to ARDC and        |                              |         |                               |\n| modified to U-2D. Delivered to     |                              |         |                               |\n| Edwards AFB in 1960. Retired       |                              |         |                               |\n| in 1978 and moved to March         |                              |         |                               |\n| Field Air Museum and later to      |                              |         |                               |\n| Blackbird Airpark in Palmdale,     |                              |         |                               |\n| CA, for display.                   |                              |         |                               |\n| 389                                |                              |         |                               |\n| 56-6722                            | U-2A                         | USAF    | Delivered to USAF in November |\n| 1957. Assigned to ARDC as          |                              |         |                               |\n| first aircraft to carry IR sensor. |                              |         |                               |\n| Used for numerous test and         |                              |         |                               |\n| development projects. Retired      |                              |         |                               |\n| in 1978 and moved to National      |                              |         |                               |\n| Museum of the U.S. Air Force at    |                              |         |                               |\n| Wright-Patterson AFB, OH.          |                              |         |                               |\nDelivered to Laughlin AFB in September 1957. Transferred\nto CIA in June 1964 and\nconverted to U-2C. Crashed near Taiwan on June 21, 1966, killing Maj. Ching-Chang \"Mickey\" Yu. Delivered to Laughlin AFB in September 1957. Transferred to CIA in August 1964 and converted to U-2G. Crashed into Yellow Sea on January 5, 1969, killing Maj. Hseih \"Billy\" Chang.\n| Article No.                    | Serial No.             |\n|--------------------------------|------------------------|\n| 390                            |                        |\n| 56-6690                        | U-2A                   |\n| U-2C                           |                        |\n| USAF                           | Assigned serial number |\n| previously used for another    |                        |\n| airframe that crashed.         |                        |\n| Delivered to Laughlin AFB in   |                        |\n| December 1957. Converted to    |                        |\n| U-2C in 1966. Crashed in South |                        |\n| Vietnam on October 8, 1966.    |                        |\n| Maj. Leo Stewart ejected.      |                        |\n\n## Supplementary Production Batch\n\n| Article No.                       | Serial No.                   | Model   | User                         |\n|-----------------------------------|------------------------------|---------|------------------------------|\n| 391                               |                              |         |                              |\n| 56-6951                           | U-2A                         | USAF    | Delivered to Laughlin AFB in |\n| December 1957. Crashed            |                              |         |                              |\n| at Davis-Monthan AFB on           |                              |         |                              |\n| October 17, 1966. Capt. Leslie    |                              |         |                              |\n| White survived.                   |                              |         |                              |\n| 392                               |                              |         |                              |\n| 56-6952                           | U-2A                         |         |                              |\n| U-2C                              |                              |         |                              |\n| USAF                              | Delivered to Laughlin AFB in |         |                              |\n| January 1958. Converted to        |                              |         |                              |\n| U-2C in 1966. Destroyed in crash  |                              |         |                              |\n| landing on November 18, 1971,     |                              |         |                              |\n| killing Capt. John Cunney.        |                              |         |                              |\n| 393                               |                              |         |                              |\n| 56-6953                           | U-2A                         |         |                              |\n| U-2C                              |                              |         |                              |\n| U-2CT                             |                              |         |                              |\n| USAF                              | Delivered to Laughlin AFB in |         |                              |\n| February 1959. Converted to       |                              |         |                              |\n| U-2C in 1966. Placed in flyable   |                              |         |                              |\n| storage in 1969. Reactivated      |                              |         |                              |\n| in 1971 as training aircraft.     |                              |         |                              |\n| Damaged in landing accident       |                              |         |                              |\n| in 1972. Rebuilt as U-2CT         |                              |         |                              |\n| trainer in 1973. Retired in 1987. |                              |         |                              |\n| Converted back to single-seat     |                              |         |                              |\n| U-2C and displayed in Cold        |                              |         |                              |\n| War Museum, Bod, Norway,         |                              |         |                              |\n| in 1994.                          |                              |         |                              |\n| 394                               |                              |         |                              |\n| 56-6954                           | U-2D                         |         |                              |\n| U-2C                              |                              |         |                              |\n| USAF                              | Delivered to Edwards AFB     |         |                              |\n| as U-2D in March 1959.            |                              |         |                              |\n| Transferred to SAC in 1966 and    |                              |         |                              |\n| converted to U-2C. Crashed        |                              |         |                              |\n| near Benson, AZ, on May 31,       |                              |         |                              |\n| 1968. Maj. Vic Milam ejected.     |                              |         |                              |\n| Article No.                    | Serial No.   | Model   | User                         |\n|--------------------------------|--------------|---------|------------------------------|\n| 395                            |              |         |                              |\n| 56-6955                        | U-2A         | USAF    | Delivered to Laughlin AFB in |\n| March 1959. Transferred to     |              |         |                              |\n| Davis-Monthan AFB in 1963.     |              |         |                              |\n| Crashed near Boise, ID, on     |              |         |                              |\n| August 14, 1964. Capt. Shih-Li |              |         |                              |\n| \"Steve\" Sheng ejected.         |              |         |                              |\n\n## Original U-2R Production\n\n| Article No.   | Serial No.   |\n|---------------|--------------|\n| 051           |              |\n| N803X         |              |\n| 68-10329      |              |\n| U-2R          |              |\n| U-2S          |              |\n| Lockheed      |              |\n| CIA           |              |\n| USAF          |              |\n| 052           |              |\n| N809X         |              |\n| 68-10330      |              |\n| U-2R          | USAF         |\n| Navy          |              |\n| 053           |              |\n| N800X         |              |\n| 68-10331      |              |\n| U-2R          |              |\n| U-2S          |              |\n| CIA           |              |\n| USAF          |              |\n| 054           |              |\n| N810X         |              |\n| 68-10332      |              |\n| U-2R          | CIA          |\n| USAF          |              |\nPrototype U-2R. First flight at Edwards AFB on August 28, 1967. Used for test and development. Configured to production standard and delivered to CIA in March 1969. Reallocated to flight testing in 1974. Transferred to Beale AFB in 1981. Converted to U-2S in 1995. First flight December 29, 1967. Delivered to Davis-Monthan AFB July 25, 1968. Test bed for Senior Lance and Navy EP-X trials. Transferred to Beale AFB in 1976. Crashed at Akrotiri, Cyprus, on December 7, 1977, killing Capt. Robert Henderson. First flight February 17, 1968. Delivered to CIA on November 22, 1968. Transferred to Davis- Monthan AFB in 1974 and to Beale AFB in 1976. Converted to U-2S in August 1996. First flight March 29, 1968, and subsequently delivered to CIA. Transferred to Davis-Monthan AFB in 1975 and to Beale AFB in 1976. Crashed off Korean coast on January 15, 1992, killing Capt. Marty McGregor.\n| Article No.                    | Serial No.                    | Model                            |\n|--------------------------------|-------------------------------|----------------------------------|\n| 055                            |                               |                                  |\n| N812X                          |                               |                                  |\n| 68-10333                       |                               |                                  |\n| U-2R                           | CIA                           |                                  |\n| USAF                           |                               |                                  |\n| 056                            |                               |                                  |\n| N814X                          |                               |                                  |\n| 68-10334                       |                               |                                  |\n| U-2R                           | USAF                          | First flight May 18, 1968.       |\n| Delivered to Davis-Monthan     |                               |                                  |\n| AFB on June 10, 1968.          |                               |                                  |\n| Crashed in Gulf of Thailand on |                               |                                  |\n| August 15, 1975. Capt. Jon     |                               |                                  |\n| Little survived.               |                               |                                  |\n| 057                            |                               |                                  |\n| N815X                          |                               |                                  |\n| 68-10335                       |                               |                                  |\n| U-2R                           | CIA                           |                                  |\n| USAF                           |                               |                                  |\n| 058                            |                               |                                  |\n| N816X                          |                               |                                  |\n| 68-10336                       |                               |                                  |\n| U-2R                           |                               |                                  |\n| U-2S                           |                               |                                  |\n| USAF                           | First flight August 20, 1968. |                                  |\n| Delivered to Davis-Monthan     |                               |                                  |\n| AFB on August 29, 1968,        |                               |                                  |\n| and to Beale AFB in 1976.      |                               |                                  |\n| Eventually transferred to      |                               |                                  |\n| test activities at Palmdale.   |                               |                                  |\n| Converted to U-2S in 1996.     |                               |                                  |\n| 059                            |                               |                                  |\n| N817X                          |                               |                                  |\n| 68-10337                       |                               |                                  |\n| U-2R                           |                               |                                  |\n| U-2S                           |                               |                                  |\n| USAF                           | First flight on September 9,  |                                  |\n| 1968. Delivered to Davis-      |                               |                                  |\n| Monthan AFB on September       |                               |                                  |\n| 21, 1968, and to Beale AFB in  |                               |                                  |\n| 1976. Converted to U-2S in     |                               |                                  |\n| June 1998.                     |                               |                                  |\n| 060                            |                               |                                  |\n| N818X                          |                               |                                  |\n| 68-10338                       |                               |                                  |\n| U-2R                           | USAF                          | First flight on October 2, 1968. |\n| Delivered to Davis-Monthan     |                               |                                  |\n| AFB on October 17, 1968,       |                               |                                  |\n| and to Beale AFB in 1976.      |                               |                                  |\n| Became first U-2 to reach      |                               |                                  |\n| 20,000 flight hours, in August |                               |                                  |\n| 1994. Crashed at Fairford,     |                               |                                  |\n| England, on August 29, 1995,   |                               |                                  |\n| killing Capt. David Hawkens.   |                               |                                  |\nFirst flight May 8, 1968, and subsequently delivered to CIA.\nTransferred to Davis-Monthan\nAFB in 1974 and to Beale AFB in 1976. Crashed at Osan, South Korea, on May 22, 1984. Capt. David Bonsi survived. First flight July 30, 1968. Delivered to CIA on August 29, 1968. Crashed at Taoyuan, Taiwan, on November 24, 1970, killing Maj. Chi-Hsien \"Denny\" Huang.\n| Article No.                  | Serial No.   | Model                           |\n|------------------------------|--------------|---------------------------------|\n| 061                          |              |                                 |\n| N819X                        |              |                                 |\n| 68-10339                     |              |                                 |\n| U-2R                         | USAF         | First flight October 22, 1968.  |\n| Retained at Palmdale for     |              |                                 |\n| testing until delivered to   |              |                                 |\n| Davis-Monthan AFB in 1972.   |              |                                 |\n| Transferred to Beale AFB in  |              |                                 |\n| 1976. Crashed at Beale on    |              |                                 |\n| December 13, 1993, killing   |              |                                 |\n| Capt. Rich Snyder.           |              |                                 |\n| 062                          |              |                                 |\n| N820X                        |              |                                 |\n| 68-10340                     |              |                                 |\n| U-2R                         | USAF         | First flight November 26, 1968. |\n| Delivered to Davis-Monthan   |              |                                 |\n| AFB on December 19, 1968.    |              |                                 |\n| Transferred to Beale AFB in  |              |                                 |\n| 1976. Crashed in Korea on    |              |                                 |\n| October 5, 1980. Capt. Cleve |              |                                 |\n| Wallace survived.            |              |                                 |\n\n## Later Production\n\n| Article No.                     | Serial No.             | Model                     |\n|---------------------------------|------------------------|---------------------------|\n| 063                             |                        |                           |\n| 80-1063                         |                        |                           |\n| N706NA                          |                        |                           |\n| N806NA                          |                        |                           |\n| ER-2                            | NASA                   | First flight May 1, 1981. |\n| Delivered to NASA Ames          |                        |                           |\n| Research Center in June 1981.   |                        |                           |\n| Transferred to NASA Dryden      |                        |                           |\n| Flight Research Center in 1998. |                        |                           |\n| 064                             |                        |                           |\n| 80-1064                         | TR-1B                  |                           |\n| U-2RT                           |                        |                           |\n| U-2ST                           |                        |                           |\n| USAF                            | Delivered to Beale AFB |                           |\n| as TR-1B in March 1983.         |                        |                           |\n| Redesignated U-2RT in           |                        |                           |\n| October 1991. Converted to      |                        |                           |\n| U-2ST in October 1994.          |                        |                           |\n| 065                             |                        |                           |\n| 80-1065                         | TR-1B                  |                           |\n| U-2RT                           |                        |                           |\n| U-2ST                           |                        |                           |\n| USAF                            | Delivered to Beale AFB |                           |\n| as TR-1B in May 1983.           |                        |                           |\n| Redesignated U-2RT in           |                        |                           |\n| October 1991. Converted to      |                        |                           |\n| U-2ST in August 1995.           |                        |                           |\n| Article No.                     | Serial No.                   |\n|---------------------------------|------------------------------|\n| 066                             |                              |\n| 80-1066                         | TR-1A                        |\n| U-2R                            |                              |\n| U-2S                            |                              |\n| USAF                            | First flight August 1, 1981. |\n| Delivered to Beale AFB as       |                              |\n| TR-1A in September 1981.        |                              |\n| Redesignated U-2RT in           |                              |\n| October 1991. Converted to      |                              |\n| U-2S in November 1997.          |                              |\n| 067                             |                              |\n| 80-1067                         | TR-1A                        |\n| U-2R                            |                              |\n| U-2S                            |                              |\n| USAF                            | Delivered to Beale AFB as    |\n| TR-1A in July 1982. Transferred |                              |\n| to flight test in Palmdale in   |                              |\n| 1989. Redesignated U-2R in      |                              |\n| October 1991. Converted to      |                              |\n| U-2S in 1998.                   |                              |\n| 068                             |                              |\n| 80-1068                         | TR-1A                        |\n| U-2R                            |                              |\n| U-2S                            |                              |\n| U-2ST                           |                              |\n| USAF                            | Delivered to Beale AFB       |\n| as TR-1A in July 1982.          |                              |\n| Transferred to RAF Alconbury,   |                              |\n| England, in February 1983 and   |                              |\n| to Beale AFB in April 1987.     |                              |\n| Redesignated U-2R in October    |                              |\n| 1991. Converted to U-2S in      |                              |\n| July 1998. Converted to U-2ST   |                              |\n| in 2004.                        |                              |\n| 069                             |                              |\n| 80-1069                         |                              |\n| N708NA                          |                              |\n| USAF                            |                              |\n| NASA                            |                              |\n| TR-1A                           |                              |\n| ER-2                            |                              |\n| U-2S                            |                              |\n| 070                             |                              |\n| 80-1070                         | TR-1A                        |\n| U-2R                            |                              |\n| U-2S                            |                              |\n| USAF                            | Delivered to Beale AFB as    |\n| TR-1A in October 1982.          |                              |\n| Transferred to Alconbury in     |                              |\n| February 1983. Returned         |                              |\n| to Beale AFB in May 1988.       |                              |\n| Redesignated U-2R in October    |                              |\n| 1991. Converted to U-2S in      |                              |\n| February 1995.                  |                              |\nDelivered to Beale AFB as TR-1A in July 1982. Transferred to Alconbury in July 1983 and damaged in ground accident 3 months later. Eventually repaired and loaned to NASA as ER-2 in March 1987. Returned to Beale AFB as U-2R in 1995. Converted to U-2S in September 1997.\n| Article No.                   | Serial No.                | Model   | User                      |\n|-------------------------------|---------------------------|---------|---------------------------|\n| 071                           |                           |         |                           |\n| 80-1071                       | U-2R                      |         |                           |\n| U-2S                          |                           |         |                           |\n| USAF                          | Delivered to Beale AFB as |         |                           |\n| U-2R in November 1983.        |                           |         |                           |\n| Transferred to flight test in |                           |         |                           |\n| Palmdale in 1985. Returned    |                           |         |                           |\n| to Beale AFB in 1988.         |                           |         |                           |\n| Redelivered as first U-2S     |                           |         |                           |\n| production conversion on      |                           |         |                           |\n| October 28, 1994.             |                           |         |                           |\n| 072                           |                           |         |                           |\n| 80-1072                       | TR-1A                     | USAF    | Delivered as TR-1A to     |\n| Alconbury in November 1983.   |                           |         |                           |\n| Transferred to Beale AFB in   |                           |         |                           |\n| March 1984. Crashed at Beale  |                           |         |                           |\n| on July 18, 1984. Capt. Tom   |                           |         |                           |\n| Hubbard survived.             |                           |         |                           |\n| 073                           |                           |         |                           |\n| 80-1073                       | TR-1A                     |         |                           |\n| U-2R                          |                           |         |                           |\n| U-2S                          |                           |         |                           |\n| USAF                          | Delivered to Beale AFB as |         |                           |\n| TR-1A in February 1984.       |                           |         |                           |\n| Transferred to Alconbury in   |                           |         |                           |\n| January 1991. Redesignated    |                           |         |                           |\n| U-2R in October 1991.         |                           |         |                           |\n| Transferred to Beale AFB in   |                           |         |                           |\n| September 1992. Converted to  |                           |         |                           |\n| U-2S in February 1996.        |                           |         |                           |\n| 074                           |                           |         |                           |\n| 80-1074                       | TR-1A                     |         |                           |\n| U-2R                          |                           |         |                           |\n| U-2S                          |                           |         |                           |\n| USAF                          | Delivered to Beale AFB as |         |                           |\n| TR-1A in February 1984.       |                           |         |                           |\n| Transferred to Alconbury in   |                           |         |                           |\n| December 1990. Redesignated   |                           |         |                           |\n| U-2R in October 1991.         |                           |         |                           |\n| Transferred to Beale AFB in   |                           |         |                           |\n| October 1992. Converted to    |                           |         |                           |\n| U-2S in May 1996.             |                           |         |                           |\n| 075                           |                           |         |                           |\n| 80-1075                       | U-2R                      | USAF    | Delivered to Beale AFB as |\n| U-2R in 1984. Crashed in      |                           |         |                           |\n| Korea on October 8, 1984.     |                           |         |                           |\n| Capt. Tom Dettmer survived.   |                           |         |                           |\n| 076                           |                           |         |                           |\n| 80-1076                       | U-2R                      | USAF    | Delivered to Beale AFB as |\n| U-2R in 1984. Converted to    |                           |         |                           |\n| U-2S in August 1997.          |                           |         |                           |\n| 077                           |                           |         |                           |\n| 80-1077                       | TR-1A                     |         |                           |\n| U-2R                          |                           |         |                           |\n| U-2S                          |                           |         |                           |\n| USAF                          | Delivered to Alconbury    |         |                           |\n| as TR-1A in March 1985.       |                           |         |                           |\n| Transferred to Beale AFB in   |                           |         |                           |\n| November 1989. Converted to   |                           |         |                           |\n| U-2S in June 1996.            |                           |         |                           | | Article No.                    | Serial No.                |\n|--------------------------------|---------------------------|\n| 078                            |                           |\n| 80-1078                        | TR-1A                     |\n| U-2ST                          |                           |\n| USAF                           | Delivered to Alconbury    |\n| as TR-1A in March 1985.        |                           |\n| Damaged on April 24, 1990,     |                           |\n| and returned to Palmdale for   |                           |\n| storage. Converted to U-2ST in |                           |\n| October 1994.                  |                           |\n| 079                            |                           |\n| 80-1079                        | TR-1A                     |\n| U-2R                           |                           |\n| U-2S                           |                           |\n| USAF                           | Delivered to Alconbury    |\n| as TR-1A in March 1985.        |                           |\n| Transferred to Beale AFB in    |                           |\n| January 1991. Redesignated     |                           |\n| U-2R in October 1991.          |                           |\n| Converted to U-2S in           |                           |\n| May 1997.                      |                           |\n| 080                            |                           |\n| 80-1080                        | TR-1A                     |\n| U-2R                           |                           |\n| U-2S                           |                           |\n| USAF                           | Delivered to Beale AFB    |\n| as TR-1A in May 1985.          |                           |\n| Redesignated U-2R in October   |                           |\n| 1991. Converted to U-2S in     |                           |\n| March 1997.                    |                           |\n| 081                            |                           |\n| 80-1081                        | TR-1A                     |\n| U-2R                           |                           |\n| U-2S                           |                           |\n| USAF                           | Delivered to Alconbury as |\n| TR-1A in October 1985.         |                           |\n| Transferred to Beale AFB in    |                           |\n| August 1991. Redesignated      |                           |\n| U-2R in October 1991.          |                           |\n| Converted to U-2S in           |                           |\n| October 1996.                  |                           |\n| 082                            |                           |\n| 80-1082                        | TR-1A                     |\n| U-2R                           |                           |\n| U-2S                           |                           |\n| USAF                           | Delivered to Beale AFB as |\n| TR-1A in November 1985.        |                           |\n| Redesignated U-2R in October   |                           |\n| 1991. Converted to U-2S in     |                           |\n| January 1997.                  |                           |\n| 083                            |                           |\n| 80-1083                        | TR-1A                     |\n| U-2R                           |                           |\n| U-2S                           |                           |\n| USAF                           | Delivered to Alconbury    |\n| as TR-1A in March 1986.        |                           |\n| Redesignated U-2R in October   |                           |\n| 1991. Transferred to Beale AFB |                           |\n| in December 1991. Converted    |                           |\n| to U-2S in September 1996.     |                           |\n| 084                            |                           |\n| 80-1084                        | TR-1A                     |\n| U-2R                           |                           |\n| U-2S                           |                           |\n| USAF                           | Delivered to Alconbury    |\n| as TR-1A in April 1986.        |                           |\n| Transferred to Beale AFB in    |                           |\n| 1988. Redesignated U-2R in     |                           |\n| October 1991. Converted to     |                           |\n| U-2S in March 1998.            |                           |\n| Article No.                     | Serial No.                 |\n|---------------------------------|----------------------------|\n| 085                             |                            |\n| 80-1085                         | TR-1A                      |\n| U-2R                            |                            |\n| U-2S                            |                            |\n| USAF                            | Delivered to Alconbury as  |\n| TR-1A in August 1986.           |                            |\n| Transferred to Beale AFB        |                            |\n| in February 1991.               |                            |\n| Redesignated U-2R in October    |                            |\n| 1991. Converted to U-2S in      |                            |\n| June 1997.                      |                            |\n| 086                             |                            |\n| 80-1086                         | TR-1A                      |\n| U-2R                            |                            |\n| U-2S                            |                            |\n| USAF                            | Delivered to Beale AFB as  |\n| TR-1A in 1986. Transferred      |                            |\n| to Alconbury in April 1987.     |                            |\n| Returned to Beale in August     |                            |\n| 1991. Redesignated U-2R in      |                            |\n| October 1991. Converted to      |                            |\n| U-2S in December 1997.          |                            |\n| 087                             |                            |\n| 80-1087                         | TR-1A                      |\n| U-2R                            |                            |\n| U-2S                            |                            |\n| USAF                            | Delivered to Beale AFB     |\n| as TR-1A in May 1987.           |                            |\n| Redesignated U-2R in October    |                            |\n| 1991. Converted to U-2S in      |                            |\n| February 1998.                  |                            |\n| 088                             |                            |\n| 80-1088                         | TR-1A                      |\n| U-2R                            |                            |\n| USAF                            | Delivered to Alconbury as  |\n| TR-1A in December 1987.         |                            |\n| Transferred to Beale AFB in     |                            |\n| August 1991. Crashed near       |                            |\n| Oroville, CA, on August 7,      |                            |\n| 1996, killing Capt. Randy Roby. |                            |\n| 089                             |                            |\n| 80-1089                         | U-2R                       |\n| U-2S                            |                            |\n| USAF                            | Delivered to Beale AFB as  |\n| U-2R in 1988. Converted to      |                            |\n| U-2S in December 1995.          |                            |\n| 090                             |                            |\n| 80-1090                         | TR-1A                      |\n| U-2R                            |                            |\n| U-2S                            |                            |\n| USAF                            | Built as TR-1A in 1988 and |\n| retained at Palmdale for test   |                            |\n| and development. Served as      |                            |\n| U-2S prototype in May 1989      |                            |\n| and subsequently delivered to   |                            |\n| Beale AFB.                      |                            |\n| 091                             |                            |\n| 80-1091                         | U-2RT                      |\n| U-2ST                           |                            |\n| USAF                            | Delivered to Beale AFB     |\n| as U-2RT in March 1988.         |                            |\n| Converted to U-2ST in           |                            |\n| December 1998.                  |                            |\n| Article No.                    | Serial No.                | Model                  | User                      |\n|--------------------------------|---------------------------|------------------------|---------------------------|\n| 092                            |                           |                        |                           |\n| 80-1092                        | TR-1A                     |                        |                           |\n| U-2R                           |                           |                        |                           |\n| U-2S                           |                           |                        |                           |\n| USAF                           | Delivered to Alconbury    |                        |                           |\n| as TR-1A in April 1988.        |                           |                        |                           |\n| Redesignated U-2R in October   |                           |                        |                           |\n| 1991. Transferred to Beale AFB |                           |                        |                           |\n| in December 1991. Converted    |                           |                        |                           |\n| to U-2S in September 1998.     |                           |                        |                           |\n| 093                            |                           |                        |                           |\n| 80-1093                        | TR-1A                     |                        |                           |\n| U-2R                           |                           |                        |                           |\n| U-2S                           |                           |                        |                           |\n| USAF                           | Delivered to Alconbury    |                        |                           |\n| as TR-1A in June 1988.         |                           |                        |                           |\n| Redesignated U-2R in October   |                           |                        |                           |\n| 1991. Transferred to Beale AFB |                           |                        |                           |\n| in April 1992. Converted to    |                           |                        |                           |\n| U-2S in June 1995.             |                           |                        |                           |\n| 094                            |                           |                        |                           |\n| 80-1094                        | TR-1B                     |                        |                           |\n| U-2S                           |                           |                        |                           |\n| USAF                           | Delivered to Alconbury as |                        |                           |\n| TR-1B in September 1988.       |                           |                        |                           |\n| Redesignated U-2R in October   |                           |                        |                           |\n| 1991. Transferred to Beale AFB |                           |                        |                           |\n| in December 1991. Converted    |                           |                        |                           |\n| to U-2S in June 1995.          |                           |                        |                           |\n| 095                            |                           |                        |                           |\n| 80-1095                        | U-2R                      |                        |                           |\n| U-2S                           |                           |                        |                           |\n| USAF                           | Delivered to Beale AFB as |                        |                           |\n| U-2R in 1988. Converted        |                           |                        |                           |\n| to U-2S in January 1996.       |                           |                        |                           |\n| Crashed near Seoul, South      |                           |                        |                           |\n| Korea, on January 26, 2003.    |                           |                        |                           |\n| The pilot ejected.             |                           |                        |                           |\n| 096                            |                           |                        |                           |\n| 80-1096                        | U-2R                      |                        |                           |\n| U-2S                           |                           |                        |                           |\n| USAF                           | Delivered to Beale AFB as |                        |                           |\n| U-2R in 1989. Converted to     |                           |                        |                           |\n| U-2S in April 1996.            |                           |                        |                           |\n| 097                            |                           |                        |                           |\n| 80-1097                        |                           |                        |                           |\n| N709NA                         |                           |                        |                           |\n| N806NA                         |                           |                        |                           |\n| ER-2                           | NASA                      | Delivered to NASA Ames |                           |\n| Research Center in 1989.       |                           |                        |                           |\n| Transferred to NASA Dryden     |                           |                        |                           |\n| Flight Research Center         |                           |                        |                           |\n| in 1998.                       |                           |                        |                           |\n| 098                            |                           |                        |                           |\n| 80-1098                        | U-2R                      | USAF                   | Delivered to Beale AFB as |\n| U-2R in 1989. Crashed on       |                           |                        |                           |\n| landing at Osan, South Korea,  |                           |                        |                           |\n| in August 1994. Capt. Cholene  |                           |                        |                           |\n| Espinoza survived.             |                           |                        |                           |\n| Article No.                 | Serial No.                |\n|-----------------------------|---------------------------|\n| 099                         |                           |\n| 80-1099                     | TR-1A                     |\n| U-2R                        |                           |\n| U-2S                        |                           |\n| USAF                        | Delivered to Beale AFB as |\n| TR-1A on October 3, 1989.   |                           |\n| Transferred to Alconbury in |                           |\n| March 1990. Redesignated    |                           |\n| U-2R in October 1991.       |                           |\n| Converted to U-2S in        |                           |\n| August 1995.                |                           |\n\n## Appendix 3 U-2 Timeline Milestone Dates In The History Of The U-2\n\n| Date                                                             |\n|------------------------------------------------------------------|\n| May 18, 1954                                                     |\n| Lockheed submits unsolicited proposal to Air Force for CL-282    |\n| June 7, 1954                                                     |\n| Lockheed notified that Air Force rejected the CL-282 proposal    |\n| November 19, 1954                                                |\n| Kelly Johnson discusses CL-282 with CIA                          |\n| November 24, 1954                                                |\n| U-2 project approved by President Eisenhower                     |\n| December 9, 1954                                                 |\n| Lockheed receives $54 million contract for U-2 production        |\n| (first 20 airframes)                                             |\n| June 10, 1955                                                    |\n| USAF and CIA sign agreement on Project Aquatone                  |\n| July 1955                                                        |\n| First U-2 (Article 341) delivered to test site                   |\n| August 1, 1955                                                   |\n| Unofficial first flight of U-2 to 35 feet altitude following     |\n| inadvertent takeoff during taxi test                             |\n| August 4, 1955                                                   |\n| First planned flight of U-2 to 8,000 feet                        |\n| August 8, 1955                                                   |\n| Official first flight for VIP visitors (third planned flight)    |\n| September 1955                                                   |\n| Second U-2 (Article 342) delivered to test site, Phase I         |\n| (Contractor) testing completed                                   |\n| October 18, 1955                                                 |\n| U-2 achieves design altitude of 73,000 feet                      |\n| December 1955                                                    |\n| Lockheed approved to build 30 additional airframes               |\n| May 7, 1956                                                      |\n| NACA director Hugh L. Dryden announces existence of U-2          |\n| aircraft, same date as first operational CIA detachment deployed |\n| June 20, 1956                                                    |\n| First flight over Eastern Bloc countries                         |\n| July 4, 1956                                                     |\n| First flight over Russia                                         |\n| August 20, 1956                                                  |\n| Second CIA detachment deployed                                   |\n| September 11, 1956                                               |\n| First U-2 flight over Middle East                                |\n| Date                                                           |\n|----------------------------------------------------------------|\n| February 1957                                                  |\n| Third CIA detachment deployed                                  |\n| June 11, 1957                                                  |\n| 4028th Strategic Reconnaissance Squadron receives first six    |\n| aircraft at Del Rio, TX                                        |\n| November 14, 1957                                              |\n| First high-altitude weather photos (Typhoon Kitt)              |\n| May 13, 1959                                                   |\n| First flight of U-2C                                           |\n| May 1, 1960                                                    |\n| Last flight over Russia, Frank Powers shot down in Article 360 |\n| October 26, 1960                                               |\n| First flight over Cuba                                         |\n| October 5, 1962                                                |\n| 50th and final CIA U-2 flight over Cuba                        |\n| May 20, 1964                                                   |\n| First operational mission from aircraft carrier                |\n| September 1966                                                 |\n| Lockheed receives order for 12 U-2R airframes                  |\n| August 28, 1967                                                |\n| First flight of U-2R                                           |\n| December 1968                                                  |\n| Final U-2R airframe delivered                                  |\n| June 3, 1971                                                   |\n| NASA receives first U-2C for Earth Resources research          |\n| August 1, 1974                                                 |\n| CIA U-2 program comes to an end. Remaining assets              |\n| transferred to USAF                                            |\n| November 16, 1979                                              |\n| Production line reopens to build ER-2, TR-1, and additional    |\n| U-2R airframes                                                 |\n| May 11, 1981                                                   |\n| First flight of ER-2 and delivery to NASA                      |\n| August 1, 1981                                                 |\n| First flight of TR-1                                           |\n| April 1989                                                     |\n| NASA retires U-2C                                              |\n| October 1991                                                   |\n| TR-1 is redesignated U-2R                                      |\n| August 12, 1994                                                |\n| First flight of U-2S (new engine)                              |\n| December 2000                                                  |\n| Reconnaissance Avionics Maintainability Program (RAMP)         |\n| upgrades initiated                                             |\n| April 15, 2002                                                 |\n| First RAMP U-2 delivered to Beale AFB                          |\n| June 2013                                                      |\n| Introduction of Cabin Altitude Reduction Effort (CARE)         |\n\n## U-2 Space Shuttle Photography\n\nThese two photos of the Space Shuttle Atlantis were among those taken from an Air Force U-2 reconnaissance aircraft flying high above Kennedy Space Center, FL, on May 4, 1989. The need for such pictures arose after the Shuttle suffered an unusual number of debris strikes during mission STS-27 in December 1988. After landing, technicians discovered more than 700 instances of damage to the orbiter's thermal protection tiles. Because this was approximately seven times the normal number of hits, NASA engineers wanted to know if the damage was unique to Atlantis or was part of a fleet-wide trend that began with STS-27. They needed to identify debris sources (ice, insulation from the external tank, ablative material falling off the solid rocket boosters, etc.), determine how much material was lost, and identify the point at which the damage occurred during flight. Residual material on the damaged tiles from STS-27 included traces of ablator and paint from the solid rocket booster (SRB) forward assemblies, but viewing the SRB nose caps during the first few minutes of flight was nearly impossible because ground-based tracking cameras were aimed only at the aft end and sides of the vehicle. In response to a NASA request, the Air Force provided a U-2 from a detachment at nearby Patrick Air Force Base to take high-resolution black-and-white photos during the first 2 minutes after liftoff. The first attempt was made during the launch of STS-29 on March 13, 1989. The pilot flew a racetrack circuit at an altitude of approximately 20,000 feet at a standoff distance of about 5 miles to keep clear of the Shuttle's flightpath. Timing was crucial because the spacecraft climbed very quickly following SRB ignition, and a wide-angle lens had to be used because there was no way for a telescopic camera to rapidly track the Shuttle. Due to a launch delay, the U-2 was not at the optimal point at liftoff and the photos were not very useful. A second attempt during STS-30 on May 4 was more successful. The U-2 pilot was able to achieve a better position and optimum slant angles for photography, but the resolution was still not sufficient to resolve enough detail to determine what was happening to the nose cones.1\nU-2 imagery of Space Shuttle Atlantis taken on May 4, 1989. The resolution was insufficient for determining the source of debris from the SRB nose caps. (U.S. Air Force)\n\n## Appendix 5 The Skunk Works Method\n\nSince the early 1940s, the Skunk Works (now a division of Lockheed Martin) has become synonymous with innovative aerospace design and manufacturing techniques. In the beginning, this was due in large part to Kelly Johnson's unique management approach. Designed to foster creativity and innovation, his method established principles for the development and production of highly complex aircraft in a relatively short time and at as low a cost as could be practically achieved. Johnson's successor, Ben Rich, and others who followed in their footsteps continued to use and refine the Skunk Works methods. Although not easily applied in the corporate world of the early 21st century, it is worthwhile to study this innovative business model. If implemented, it can be used to reduce development and life-cycle costs for acquisition programs involving rapid prototyping or low-rate production.\n\n## Kelly's Rules\n\nJohnson often summed up his method in just seven words: Be quick. Be quiet. Be on time. Eventually, however, he wrote a set of 14 rules addressing program management, organization, contractor/customer relationships, documentation, customer reporting, specifications, engineering drawings, funding, cost control, subcontractor inspection, testing, security, and management compensation. These became the Basic Operating Rules of the Skunk Works:\n\n1. The Skunk Works manager must be delegated practically complete control of his program in all aspects. He should report to a division president or higher. (It is essential that the program manager have authority to make decisions quickly regarding\ntechnical, finance, schedule, or operations matters.)\n2. Strong but small project offices must be provided, both by the\ncustomer and contractor. (The customer program manager must have similar authority to that of the contractor.)\n3. The number of people having any connection with the project\nmust be restricted in an almost vicious manner. Use a small number of good people: 10 to 25 percent compared to the socalled normal systems. (Bureaucracy makes unnecessary work and must be controlled brutally.)\n4. A very simple drawing and drawing release system with great\nflexibility for making changes must be provided. (This permits early work by manufacturing organizations, and schedule recovery if technical risks involve failures.)\n5.  There must be a minimum of reports required, but important\nwork must be recorded thoroughly. (Responsible management does not require massive technical and information systems.)\n6. There must be a monthly cost review covering not only what\nhas been spent and committed, but also projected costs to the conclusion of the program. Don't have the books 90 days late and don't surprise the customer with sudden overruns. (Responsible management does require operation within the resources available.)\n7. The contractor must be delegated and must assume more than\nnormal responsibility to get good vendor bids for the subcontract on the project. Commercial bid procedures are very often better than military ones. (Essential freedom to use the best\ntalent available and operate within the resources available.)\n8. The inspection system as currently used by the Skunk Works,\nwhich has been approved by both the Air Force and Navy, meets the intent of existing military requirements and should be used on new projects. Push more basic inspection responsibility back to subcontractors and vendors. Don't duplicate so much inspection. (Even the commercial world recognizes that quality is in design and responsible operations - not inspection.)\n9. The contractor must be delegated the authority to test his final\nproduct in flight. He can and must test it in the initial stages. If he doesn't, he rapidly loses his competency to design other vehicles. (Critical, if new technology and the attendant risks are to be rationally accommodated.)\n10. The specification applying to the hardware must be agreed\nto in advance of contracting. The Skunk Works practice of having a specification section stating clearly which important military specification items will not knowingly be complied with and reasons therefore is highly recommended. (Standard specifications inhibit new technology and innovation, and are frequently obsolete.)\n11. Funding a program must be timely so that the contractor\ndoesn't have to keep running to the bank to support government projects. (Rational management requires knowledge of, and freedom to use, the resources originally committed.)\n12. There must be mutual trust between the customer project\norganization and the contractor with very close cooperation and liaison on a day-to-day basis. This cuts down misunderstanding and correspondence to an absolute minimum. (The goals of the customer and producer should be the same - get the job done well.)\n13. Access by outsiders to the project and its personnel must be\nstrictly controlled by appropriate security measures. (This is a program manager's responsibility even if no program security demands are made - a cost avoidance measure.)\n14. Because only a few people will be used in engineering and\nmost other areas, ways must be provided to reward good performance by pay not based on the number of personnel supervised. (Responsible management must be rewarded, and responsible management does not permit the growth of bureaucracies.)1\nThis management approach offers a proven, efficient method for developing new technologies, executing engineering and manufacturing development programs, procuring limited production systems at low rates, and upgrading current systems.\n\n## Ben's Rules\n\nBen Rich became head of the Skunk Works in 1975. A highly capable engineer in the field of thermodynamics and propulsion, he had been with Lockheed since 1950. After joining the Skunk Works in 1954 as a senior design engineer on the U-2, he worked on the A-12 and SR-71 and oversaw pioneering development of stealth aircraft. Although Rich followed the Basic Operating Rules of the Skunk Works, he also developed his own management philosophy:2\n\n1. Strong leadership. Maintain awareness of the big picture. Rely\non key staff to describe the situation and alternatives. Ask appropriate questions, weigh the alternatives, and make a decision. (Be a benevolent dictator.)\n2. Teamwork. Select people who can work well together Assemble\nthe team and allow it to work with minimum interference.\n3. Learn to delegate both authority and responsibility. Give\npeople a job to do and then let them do it. (You'll be surprised at the results.)\n4. Manage by charisma; be flexible, and allow people to show\ntheir capability. Provide goals and objectives, not step-by-step procedures. Let workers have a say in what is going on.\n5. Be both practical and tolerant. Don't take too big a step. (Walk\nbefore you run.) Expect mistakes and learn from them when they occur. (Sometimes a mistake is just the wrong approach at the time.)\n6. Maintain a tight schedule because time is money. (Give yourself less time than you think you'll need.)\n7. Demand and expect results. Rely on people who know how to\nprioritize. Workaholics don't make the best employees. Hire people who can organize their work and communicate to subordinates how to make the most of their time. (You can't make up in time what you don't have in brains.)\n8. Always be ethical. Demand integrity of yourself and those who\nserve under you. (No one is smart enough to lie.)\n9. Always reward good performance, and never take credit for\nother people's work. (A boss who is not stingy with praise will have a team of loyal employees.)\n10. Don't tolerate mediocrity and non-performance. Don't tolerate unprofessionalism. Tell non-performers what they are doing wrong - you owe it to the rest of the team and to them. (Mistakes happen. Give people a chance, but if they repeat\ntheir errors, get rid of them.)\n11. Enjoy your work. Take satisfaction in the results of your labor.\nLearn not to take your work home. Take vacations to rejuvenate both mind and body. (If you work hard, play hard.)\nA comparison of the management styles of the first two Skunk Works chiefs reveals distinct similarities and differences. Kelly Johnson's strong leadership molded the Skunk Works into a lean, efficient organization. As a talented engineer, he was a technical leader as well as a manager. When engineering problems arose, Johnson took personal responsibility for addressing them. He motivated his staff through the strength of his personality, but he had a legendary temper and a tendency to micromanage. He succeeded because he encouraged creativity and rewarded accomplishments.3\nBen Rich was careful to preserve the essential character of Johnson's operating philosophy, but since he lacked Johnson's breadth of technical expertise, Rich tended to delegate more responsibility to his subordinates. Nevertheless, he had learned many things from his mentor. \"Kelly taught me that integrity was the most important thing in all my dealings with people,\" he said at his retirement from Lockheed in July 1991, \"don't do anything or build anything that you don't believe in, and communicate with everyone from top to bottom.\"4\nWisely, none of the later Skunk Works chiefs ever tried to mimic Johnson, who was truly one of a kind. Instead, successive new leaders have integrated personal perspectives with a healthy appreciation for the Skunk Works legacy. According to Al Romig, who led the Skunk Works from June 2011 through July 2013, \"The real secret to maintaining innovation is simple; it's the people.\" National imperatives of the Cold War spurred Kelly Johnson's genius and that of the people gathered around him to produce a unique culture that continues to resonate within the company. The unique management structure empowers engineers and fosters a willingness to take prudent risks. \"By allowing that creative culture to perpetuate, the Skunks of today have been indoctrinated by the generations that have preceded them,\" Romig acknowledged on the occasion of the Skunk Works' 70th anniversary. \"In a technical sense, our culture encourages doing things that have never been done before.\"5\n\n## Lessons Learned\n\nThe Skunk Works management approach offers a proven way to develop new technology quickly and efficiently, execute engineering and manufacturing\n\nMarino, CA, January 17, 1991, p. 2.\n 5. \"Interview with Al Romig, Chief Skunk,\" *Skunk Works Celebrates 70 Years of Innovation*,\nJuly 2013, *http://www.lockheedmartin.com/us/news/features/2013/roming-interview.html*,\naccessed July 30, 2013.\ndevelopment programs, procure production systems in limited quantities, and upgrade current systems. Any manufacturer can implement a Skunk Works management philosophy providing that both corporate leadership and the customer agree to abide by the rules. Otherwise, this approach will not work.\n\nSuccess of this method is dependent on establishing cost as the number one priority. Current fiscal realities demand that every acquisition dollar be spent as wisely and efficiently as possible. Program cost estimates should not be based on historical precedents. Demand for enhanced performance capabilities should not be allowed to drive costs upward as this will inevitably push the program over budget and behind schedule.6 Expenditures should be tightly controlled, and unexpected cost overruns should not be tolerated. In order to avoid unpleasant surprises, the customer should be immediately informed of any cost growth as it is discovered. Managers should always adhere to a strict schedule but plan for some flexibility. If delays occur, it is important to identify the cause and implement corrective action expediently. Honest, open, and early communication between the contractor and the customer regarding any potential delays will provide opportunities for joint problem solving and maintain trust between both parties.7\nAccording to Ben Rich, a successful engineering/production development program must have three things. First, the product must be able to perform the required mission. Second, it has to be delivered on schedule, as promised.\n\nFinally, the cost must stay within the anticipated funding. Aircraft performance requirements need to be well defined, reasonable, and stable. Constant changes can lead to failure by pushing the project behind schedule and driving up costs. Essential performance requirements must be separated from wish lists (i.e., those performance characteristics that are merely desirable, but not necessary). Any technical problems that arise should be identified as early as possible and solved quickly. Customer and contractor personnel should work together to find the best solution after examining any potential tradeoffs or alternatives.8\nPeople are the most important asset. Managers should put the most qualified available personnel on the program and keep the team as small as possible. The benefits of keeping both management and total personnel at a minimum include greater individual responsibility and satisfaction, improved communications, higher productivity, and reduced costs. According to Ben Rich, \"A\n\nSeptember 1998, pp. 67.\n 7. Ben R. Rich, \"The Skunk Works Approach,\" p. 8. 8. Ibid., p. 7.\nlarge part of the success of the Skunk Works comes in the ability to develop a team and an attitude which favors getting the job done by jointly overcoming problems as they arise.\"9\nIn order to give designers and managers as much freedom as possible, it is important for the manufacturer to tailor mission requirements, acquisition requirements, and manufacturing specifications. Only the most critical performance parameters should be specified as requirements. Whenever possible, peripheral standards and specifications should serve only as guidelines. Documentation should be streamlined and technical and program reviews kept to a minimum. Although held regularly, formal contractor-customer program reviews should be keyed to the pace of the program. Small program offices and close, regular communications minimize the need for formal reports, documentation, and more frequent reviews.10\nManufacturing personnel should influence the design from the very beginning. The manufacturing group should be responsible for material and process specifications, establishing tolerances, and adopting best commercial practices. The design should be as simple as practical with a minimum part count and minimum necessity for touch labor. Assembly processes that most frequently result in rejected parts (such as drilling holes) should be minimized if possible. Components should have left-hand/right-hand interchangeability or selflocating features for ease of installation. Room-temperature processes should be used as much as possible. Use of off-the-shelf components will reduce both acquisition and development costs.11\nAn aircraft should be designed for ease of maintainability. This includes sensible installation of equipment, adequate access panels, and a minimal requirement for unique tools. Designers should give consideration to future modifications and upgrades and provide easy access, extra volume (if possible), and growth power capability.12\nEarly design development can be achieved through the use of technology demonstrators or full-scale development (FSD) prototypes. A demonstrator may be a subscale version of the proposed design or a close approximation. Its sole purpose is to prove a concept or validate a critical system feature. FSD airframes more closely match the final production structural design and may be used to validate fabrication and assembly techniques and to verify structural weight and production costs.13\n\n## Keys To Success\n\nUnder the Skunk Works philosophy, a project should be organized around a manager who has total control of all aspects of the program, thus giving the manager the ability to control costs and meet rational milestones and objectives. Other functional organizations within the company such as human resources, information services, facilities, environmental health and safety, legal and other specialty areas provide on-demand support to the program manager.\n\nThe program's organizational structure should be as simple as possible and contain built-in checks and balances. Overall staffing must be kept to a minimum to provide clear lines of responsibility and maintain program security. The Skunk Works approach calls for the use of a small number of skilled personnel who are given broad responsibility and a substantial, but reasonable, workload. Keeping management and total staffing to a minimum results in greater individual responsibility and job satisfaction, improved communications, higher productivity, and reduced costs.14\nSuccess is dependent upon a cohesive team working closely together to achieve well-defined objectives. Tasks and responsibilities are clearly defined, and progress is measured and tracked using integrated plans and schedules. Managers of various subgroups must have a clear understanding of how their role contributes to the success of the overall program. Formal weekly program reviews track the program's progress while smaller meetings provide a forum for ironing out differences of opinion or improving operating procedures. If the program involves development of new or unique capabilities, participants must be willing to accept failures and incorporate changes based on lessons learned.\n\nThe Skunk Works approach works only if the customer is committed to working in a similar manner. This starts with a small, high-quality, highly responsive customer program office, and a small supporting organization as needed. Like the contractor program manager, the customer program manager must also be given singular authority and broad responsibilities, reporting to a senior decision-capable management level. The contractor and customer teams should maintain open communications on program issues in order to foster teamwork, rapid joint problem solving, and mutual trust, rather than adversarial relationships. Small program offices and regular communications minimize the need for formal reports, documentation, and frequent program reviews.15\nIf possible, contracts should be tailored to the specific procurements and eliminate restrictive and nonessential provisions while conforming to statutory and regulatory requirements. Increasing demands by Government agencies, however, for contract provisions requiring extensive reporting, prior Government approvals, and new administrative systems reduce a contractor's ability to tailor contracts in such a fashion.\n\nSpecifications should be as simple and brief as possible. Skunk Works practice emphasizes *what* is to be accomplished rather than how it is to be accomplished, specifying only critical performance parameters as requirements. The original U-2 specification document was just 35 pages long. The later SR-71 specification totaled 54 pages, relatively small and highly tailored compared to average procurement programs.\n\nManufacturing and quality assurance personnel should be involved early, working closely with design, structures, and materials engineers to ensure product criteria are met. An integrated product development process ensures the contractor will meet performance, quality, production, and affordability requirements. The engineering drawing system should readily accommodate change, and designers should be able to directly interface with manufacturers if changes are required. Modern computer-aided design techniques (not available when the U-2 was built) can reduce the need for full-scale mockups, and tooling should be kept to a minimum, especially for prototype programs. During fabrication and flight test, critical inspections verify compliance of processes with engineering requirements.16\nFlight-testing of prototype and full-scale development aircraft is conducted under the direction of a flight-test manager reporting directly to the program manager. Duties for this position include test planning, ground and flight testing, data acquisition and analysis, flight vehicle maintenance and support, and test-data documentation. The primary objective is to get test results as quickly as possible and apply lessons learned. The contractor is entirely responsible for testing prototype vehicles. During FSD testing, the work is accomplished by an integrated team of contractor and customer personnel.\n\nHistorically, Skunk Works programs have met very stringent security requirements. Development of the Blackbirds began as a covert special-access program, and only personnel with a strict need to know were briefed in. This policy not only protected national security but also prevented interference from outsiders and thereby increased productivity. A restrictive access policy can be similarly implemented on unclassified programs to improve efficiency and reduce costs.\n\nBy following these practices, the Skunk Works has consistently demonstrated the ability to design, develop, and produce highly advanced aircraft at low cost and in a minimal amount of time. The Skunk Works management principles allow a contractor to shorten the acquisition cycle and increase efficiency.17\nAny organization can apply these principles, but of course applying the principles does not guarantee success. Historically, Skunk Works projects succeeded through a combination of factors including personal leadership, strong Governmental support, organizational momentum, and a solid reputation based on a long history of achievement.\n\n## Growing Pains\n\nImplementing a classic Skunk Works management policy has become increasingly difficult. During a 1990 speech at the Air Force Academy, Ben Rich said, \"I don't honestly believe that you can take the Skunk Works approach and bottle it up and sell it as a cure-all for the acquisition problems of the DoD [Department of Defense]. I do believe that you can apply these basic principles in select acquisitions where all parties agree that the conditions are right. This is not limited, in my opinion, to covert programs. But, it does require a willingness to create a small team and keep it small; to choose the right people, give them clear, stable requirements, and a job to do; and to be willing to let them alone to do that job, and to provide them with stable funding.\"18\nSuch conditions are not easy to achieve. When Lockheed merged with Martin Marietta in March 1995, the new Lockheed Martin Corporation retained the Skunk Works as a company within a company in order to pursue innovative design and development work, but the once fiercely independent business unit had to adjust to a new corporate culture. Within the Skunk Works, there was movement away from simple, brief specifications, particularly whenever a program transitioned from the specialized management procedures used during the prototype/demonstrator phase to conventional production management procedures. This occasionally resulted in difficulties, as with the F-22 and F-35 fighter production programs. Alan Brown, former program manager and chief engineer on the F-117A, suggested that the time it takes to get from initial design to operational use of a new airplane is directly proportional to the size of the customer oversight committee responsible for guiding the design. \"For the F-117 the Air Force team was a colonel and six other experts. The corresponding team on the F-22 was 130, and if you ratio the 130 over seven, you'll get just about the ratio of the time it took from starting the airframes to getting them in service.\" Bob Murphy, who joined the Skunk Works in 1954, managed U-2 flight testing and was eventually promoted to deputy director of operations, laments the increased bureaucracy. \"Once you get all these organizations involved, all the different Air Force bases across the country and every contractor that makes a screw for the airplane, everybody comes to every meeting and nothing ever gets settled.\"19\nDespite these growing pains, the Skunk Works continues to develop some of the most innovative aircraft ever built. Lockheed Martin's Advanced Development Programs division has evolved from Kelly Johnson's small shop in Burbank to some 2,000 people working on more than 600 programs in the company's complex in Palmdale.20 Since approximately 90 percent of all work at the facility is classified, little is known about the group's recent accomplishments, but its legacy continues.\n\n## Bibliography Reports, Papers, Articles, And Presentations\n\nBailey, Susan. \"Air crew radiation exposureAn overview.\" *Nuclear News*\n(January 2000).\nBatey, Angus. \"Inside The Skunk Works.\" *Classic Aircraft* 45, no. 11\n(November 2012).\nBroadway, Chuck. \"A U-2 Dragon Lady Pilot: From interview to altitude.\"\nAir Combat Command News. April 3, 2009. http://www.acc.af.mil/news/ story.asp?id=123142867.\nBundgaard, Robert C. \"The First Flyover of a Tropical Cyclone.\" *Weatherwise*\n11, no. 3 (June 1958).\nBurrows, William E. \"The U-Deuce.\" *Air&Space/Smithsonian* (March 2005).\nCantella, Michael J. \"Application of the High Resolution Return Beam\nVidicon.\" *Optical Engineering* 16, no. 3 (June 1, 1977). http://dx.doi.\norg/10.1117/12.7972141.\nCombs, Henry G. \"U-2 Design and Fabrication.\" In Proceedings of the U-2\nDevelopment Panel. Washington, DC: National Reconnaissance Office, September 1998.\nDendy, John B., IV. \"Crouching Airmen, Hidden Dragon.\" *Airman* 46,\nno. 7 (July 2002).\nGates, Mahlon E., et al. \"Operation Morning Light: Northwest Territories,\nCanada, 1978: A Non-technical Summary of United States Participation.\" U.S. Department of Energy. NV-198 (1978).\nGentry, Bruce, Matthew McGill, Roman Machan, Daniel Reed, Ryan Cargo,\nDavid J. Wilkens, William Hart, John Yorks, Stan Scott, Shane Wake, Michael Hardesty, and Alan Brewer. \"Flight Testing of the TWiLiTE Airborne Molecular Doppler Lidar.\" http://ntrs.nasa.gov/archive/nasa/casi.\nntrs.nasa.gov/20100026400_2010028473.pdf.\nHennigan, William J. \"Skunk Works: Developing top-secret weapons in SoCal\nfor 70 years.\" *Los Angeles Times*, June 20, 2013.\nHennigan, William J. \"U-2 spy plane to linger overhead a bit longer.\" Los\nAngeles Times, January 28, 2012.\nHolm, Skip. \"Article Airborne.\" *Air Progress Aviation Review*, June 1986.\nHotz, Robert. \"Lockheed U-2 Over Sverdlovsk: A Study in Fabrication.\"\nReprinted in Congressional Record, Proceedings and Debates of the 86th\nCongress, Second Session, vol. 106, part 9. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, June 16, 1960.\nJoiner, Ernie L. \"Testing the U-2.\" In *Proceedings of the U-2 Development Panel*.\nWashington, DC: National Reconnaissance Office, September 1998.\nKing, Michael D., and Paul Menzel. \"First ISCCP Regional Experiment\n(FIRE) NASA ER-2 Moderate Resolution Imaging Spectroradiometer\n(MODIS) Airborne Simulator (MAS) Langley DAAC Data Set Document.\" Atmospheric Data Science Center. October 1996. https://eosweb.larc.nasa. gov/sites/default/files/project/fire/guide/base_fire_ci2_er2_mas_dataset.pdf.\nKinkead, E.R., C.L. Gaworski, C.D. Flemming et al. \"Tumorigenic\nEvaluation of Jet Fuels JP-TS and JP-7.\" Armstrong Laboratory. AL-TR- 1991-0020 (April 1991).\nKlinger, Robert T. \"Flight Test Development of the Lockheed U-2 Airplane.\"\nLockheed Aircraft Corp. SP-109 (November 4, 1958).\nKoziol, Benedict J. \"The U-2 Aircraft Engine.\" In Proceedings of the\nU-2 Development Panel. Washington, DC: National Reconnaissance Office, September 1998.\nMacGill, Markus. \"'Mental-decline brain lesions' found in high-flying military\npilots.\" *Medical News Today*. August 21, 2013. http://www.medicalnewstoday.com/articles/265036.php.\nMajumdar, Dave. \"Global Hawk to Replace U-2 in 2015.\" *Defense News*, Digital\nEdition. August 10, 2011. http://www.defensenews.com/article/20110810/ DEFSECT01/108100302/Global-Hawk-Replace-U-2-2015.\nMajumdar, Dave. \"Notebook: Plans for Reinvigorated U-2 Include\nHyperspectral Sensor.\" *Defense News*, Digital Edition. March 22, 2012.\nhttp://www.defensenews.com/article/20120322/C4ISR02/303220012/\nNotebook-Plans-Reinvigorated-U-2-Include-Hyperspectral-Sensor.\nNickel, Shawn. \"Fueling the high flyersU-2 tube food calms cravings in the\ncockpit.\" *Air Combat Command News.* February 8, 2013. http://www.acc. af.mil/news/story.asp?id=123335478.\nNicolai, Leland M. \"Skunk Works Lessons Learned.\" In Strategic Management\nof the Cost Problem of Future Weapon Systems. AGARD Conference Proceedings. AGARD-CP-602, September 1998.\nO'Leary, Jeremiah A. \"NASA Issued U-2 Cover Story on CIA Advice.\"\nWashington Star, June 1, 1960.\nPasson, Ray. \"The Early Days of the U-2: How They Did It.\" Star Dusters\nNewsletter, September 2003.\nPocock, Chris. \"Early History of the U-2 Dragon Lady.\" *Code One Online*.\nFebruary 2002. *http://www.codeonemagazine.com/article.html?item_id=103*.\nPolmar, Norman. \"When the U-2 Went to Sea.\" *Air Force Magazine* 84, no.\n2 (February 2001).\nReade, David. \"U-2 Spyplanes: What You Didn't Know About Them!\" http://\nwww.roadrunnersinternationale.com/u-2/u-2_science_3.html.\nReinert, Bob. \"Natick tube foods keep U-2 pilots flying high.\" Army\nNews Archives. January 18, 2013. http://www.army.mil/article/94301/\nNatick_tube_foods_keep_U_2_pilots_flying_high.\nSchogol, Jeff. \"Air Force re-pressurizes U-2 cabin to prevent brain\nlesions in pilots.\" *Air Force Times*. August 28, 2013. http://\nwww.airforcetimes.com/article/20130828/NEWS04/308280019/\nAir-Force-re-pressurizes-U-2-cabin-prevent-brain-lesions-pilots.\nTownsend, Lawrence W. \"Radiation exposures of aircrew in high altitude\nflight.\" *Journal of Radiological Protection* 21, no. 1 (March 2001).\nVan Atta, Richard H., Sidney G. Reed, and Seymour J. Deitchman. \"IR\nSurveillance: Teal Ruby/Hi-CAMP.\" In DARPA Technical Accomplishments Vol. II: An Historical Review of Selected DARPA Projects. Alexandria, VA: Institute for Defense Analyses, April 1991.\n\n## Books And Monographs\n\nAronstein, David C., and Albert C. Piccirillo. Have Blue and the F-117A:\nEvolution of the Stealth Fighter. Reston, VA: American Institute of\nAeronautics and Astronautics, 1997.\nBissell, Richard M., Jr., Jonathan E. Lewis, and Frances T. Pudlo. Reflections\nof a Cold Warrior: From Yalta to the Bay of Pigs. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1996.\nChurchill, Winston. *Maxims and Reflections*. Boston: Houghton Mifflin\nCompany, 1949.\nJenkins, Dennis R. Dressing for Altitude: U.S. Aviation Pressure SuitsWiley\nPost to Space Shuttle. Washington, DC: NASA SP-2011-595, 2012.\nMerlin, Peter W., and Tony Moore. *X-Plane Crashes*. North Branch, MN:\nSpecialty Press, 2008.\nMiller, Jay. *Lockheed Skunk Works: The First Fifty Years*. Arlington, TX:\nAerofax, 1993.\nMiller, Jay. *Lockheed U-2*. Austin, TX: Aerofax, 1983.\nMiller, Jay. *The X-Planes: X-1 to X-45*. Hinckley, U.K.: Midland Publishing, 2001.\nPedlow, Gregory W., and Donald E. Welzenbach. The CIA and the U-2 Program,\n19541974. Washington, DC: Central Intelligence Agency, 1998.\nPolmar, Norman. *Spyplane: The U-2 History Declassified*. Osceola, WI: MBI\nPublishing Company, 2001.\nPocock, Chris. *50 Years of the U-2*. Atglen, PA: Schiffer Military History, 2005. Pocock, Chris. *The U-2 Spyplane: Toward The Unknown*. Atglen, PA: Schiffer,\n2000.\nPowers, Francis Gary, and Curt Gentry. *Operation Overflight*. New York: Holt\nRinehart and Winston, 1970.\nSobester, Andras. *Stratospheric Flight: Aeronautics at the Limit*. New York:\nSpringer-Praxis, 2011.\n\n## Other Resources\n\nAlexander, Michael A. \"TR-1A/TR-1B/U-2R/ER-2 Handbook.\" U.S. Air\nForce, April 1986.\nBailey, Bernard L. Draft memo to NASA from John L. McLucas, Director,\nNational Reconnaissance Office. \"Subject: U-2C/G Aircraft.\" May 16, 1970. *http://www.nro.gov/foia/declass/NROStaffRecords/1055.pdf*.\nBissell, Richard M., Jr. Memorandum for Deputy Project Director.\n\"Arrangements with NACA and Kelly Johnson re Release of U-2\nPhotographs.\" CIA SAPC-12313, CIA-RDP33-02415A000200390023-1. January 26, 1957. Declassified and released by the CIA April 11, 2000.\nBissell, Richard M., Jr. Memorandum for Project Cover Officer. \"Release of\nNACA Top Secret Research Data to Select Contractors.\" CIA SAPC-25666, CIA-RDP33-02415A000200390014-1. March 25, 1958. Declassified and released by the CIA April 11, 2000.\nBrown, Alan, and Beth Hagenauer. \"NASA's ER-2 Completes MABEL\nValidation Deployment.\" May 1, 2012. http://www.nasa.gov/topics/earth/ features/ER-2_completes_MABEL_deployment.html.\nCIA. \"Aircraft Accident Investigation, U-2F N800X (342), 25 February\n1966.\" CIA-RDP74B00447R000100010064-1. March 1966. Approved for Release June 18, 2002.\nCIA. Chairman of the Planning Group. Memorandum for Project Director.\n\"Planning Group Report.\" CIA-RDP33-02415A000400040001-9. July 15, 1957.\nCIA. Memo from Acting Deputy Director of Plans. \"Chronological\nAccount of Handling of U-2 Incident, August 10, 1960.\" CIA-RDP33- 02415A000300300007-7. Declassified and released by the CIA August 21, 2000.\nCIA. Memorandum for Project Director. \"Cover Research Releases (NACA).\"\nSAPC-8675, CIA-RDP33-02415A000200390031-2. August 22, 1956. Declassified and released by the CIA April 11, 2000.\nCIA. Memorandum for Project Security Officer. \"Cover Meeting with AWS\nand NACA.\" CIA-RDP33-02415A000200390051-1. March 20, 1956. Declassified and released by the CIA April 11, 2000.\nCIA. Memorandum. \"Proposed NACA Press Release.\" CIA-RDP33-\n02415A000200390018-7. April 24, 1957. Declassified and released by\nthe CIA April 11, 2000.\nCIA. Memorandum for the Record. \"Cover Discussions with NACA.\" CIA-\nRDP33-02415A000200390025-9. November 19, 1956. Declassified and released by the CIA April 11, 2000.\nCIA. \"U-2 Aircraft Carrier Operation: Project Whale Tale.\" CIA-\nRDP75B00446R000100210015-3. December 1964. Approved for release September 30, 2003.\nCIA. \"U-2 Utility Flight Handbook.\" March 1, 1959.\nColeman, Thomas L., and Emilie C. Coe. \"Airplane Measurements of\nAtmospheric Turbulence for Altitudes Between 20,000 and 50,000 Feet Over the Western Part of the United States.\" NACA Research Memorandum No. L57G02, August 1957.\nColeman, Thomas L., and Jack Funk. \"Preliminary Measurements of\nAtmospheric Turbulence at High Altitude as Determined from Acceleration Measurements on Lockheed U-2 Airplane.\" NACA Research Memorandum No. L57A11, March 1957.\nColeman, Thomas L., and May T. Meadows. \"Airplane Measurements of\nAtmospheric Turbulence for Altitudes Between 20,000 and 55,000 Feet for Four Geographic Areas.\" NASA Memorandum No. 4-17-59L, June 1959.\nCunningham, James A. Memorandum for Project Director. \"Proposed Cover\nModifications.\" CIA SAPC-18216, CIA-RDP33-02415A000200390016-9. August 6, 1957. Declassified and released by the CIA April 11, 2000.\nDownie, Don, and Jim Jarboe. *The Inquisitive Angel*. A 16-millimeter film\ndocumentary produced by Hycon Mfg. Co. for the CIA. April 1957. Declassified in 2006. Roadrunners Internationale collection.\nDryden, Hugh L. \"NACA Announces Start of New Research Program.\" NASA\nHistorical Reference Collection, May 7, 1956.\nDulles, Allen W., Director of Central Intelligence. \"Statement to the Senate\nForeign Relations Committee.\" May 31, 1960. http://www.foia.cia.gov/sites/ default/files/document_conversions/89801/DOC_0000009190.pdf.\nHansen, Kathryn. \"PODEX Experiment to Reshape Future of Atmospheric\nScience.\" January 16, 2013. http://www.nasa.gov/topics/earth/features/ qa-starr.html.\nHartley, Frank W., Jr. Draft of memo to John L. McLucas, Director, National\nReconnaissance Office. \"Subject: U-2C/G Storage Costs.\" February 26, 1970. *http://www.nro.gov/foia/declass/NROStaffRecords/1056.pdf*.\nJohnson, Kelly. \"Log for Project X.\" Lockheed California Company, Advanced\nDevelopment Projects Division.\nLand, Edwin H. Project 3, Technological Capabilities Panel, Office of Defense\nMobilization, Executive Office of the President. Memorandum to Allen W. Dulles, Central Intelligence Agency. November 5, 1954. http://www.gwu. edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB74/U2-03.pdf.\nLockheed Martin. \"Interview with Al Romig, Chief Skunk.\" July 2013. http://\nwww.lockheedmartin.com/us/news/features/2013/roming-interview.html.\nLockheed Martin. \"U-2 Reconnaissance/Surveillance/Earth Resources System\nDescription.\" Lockheed Advanced Development Company, March 27, 1991.\nMerlin, Peter W. \"U-2 Cover Story Timeline.\" NASA Armstrong Flight\nResearch Center historical reference collection, July 2004.\nNASA. \"ER-2 Airborne Laboratory Experimenter Handbook.\" August 2002. NASA. \"ER-2 Program History.\" NASA Fact Sheet. Rich, Ben R. \"B.R. Rich\nRetirement Speech.\" Ben R. Rich Papers. The Huntington Library, San\nMarino, CA, January 17, 1991.\nNASA. Memorandum describing Project Rainbow cover story. Walter Bonney\nfiles. NASA Headquarters Historical Reference Collection. June 21, 1957.\nNASA. \"NASA Aircraft Sets New World Altitude Record.\" *Science Daily*. November\n24, 1998. *http://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/1998/11/981124064046.htm*.\nNASA Ames Research Center staff. *High Altitude Perspective*. NASA SP-427, 1978. NASA. \"NASA ER-2 Flies Over Russia on Ozone research Mission.\" News\nRelease 00-14. January 27, 2000. http://www.nasa.gov/centers/dryden/news/\nNewsReleases/2000/00-14.html.\nNASA. \"ER-2 High Altitude Airborne Science Aircraft.\" Fact Sheet FS-2007-\n4-046-DFRC, 2007. http://www.nasa.gov/centers/dryden/pdf/171831main_ FS-2007-04-046-ER-2.pdf.\nNASA. \"NASA SEAC4RS Mission Targets How Pollution, Storms And\nClimate Mix.\" June 6, 2013. http://www.nasa.gov/topics/earth/features/\nseac4rs_2013.html.\nNevada Aerospace Hall of Fame. \"Original U-2 Flight Test Crews1955.\"\nNevada Aerospace Hall of Fame historical collection.\nNorth American Newspaper Alliance. \"U.S. Mapping World for Missile War.\"\nNASA Headquarters Historical Reference Collection. May 19, 1957.\nRich, Ben R. \"The Skunk Works Approach.\" Ben R. Rich Papers. The\nHuntington Library, San Marino, CA, July 25, 1990.\nU.S. Air Force. \"Flight Manual, Models U-2C and U-2F Aircraft.\" U.S. Air\nForce AF(C)-1-1, May 10, 1967.\nU.S. Air Force. \"U-2 Pilot Application.\" June 14, 2012. http://www.beale.\naf.mil/library/factsheets/factsheet.asp?id=5077.\nYancey, William R. Undated letter (circa 2007) to Hank Meierdierck regarding early U-2 training operations. Roadrunners Internationale historical reference collection. http://www.nasa.gov/centers/dryden/research/AirSci/ ER-2/history.html.\n\"Research Plane Explodes; Altitude Pilot Bails Out,\" The Washington Post and\nTimes Herald, December 20, 1956, p. A2. Clotaire Wood files. NASA Headquarters Historical Reference Collection.\n\n## Acknowledgments\n\nThe author would like to thank the many people who helped us make this book possible. First of all, thanks to Tony Springer, NASA Aeronautics Research Mission Directorate, Office of Education and Communications, for sponsoring this project. I am grateful for the efforts of many people at NASA Armstrong Flight Research Center including Jim Sokolik, Steve Parcel, and others. Thanks to Barbara Bullock and Ben Weinstein at Media Fusion for preparing the manuscript for publication. Special thanks to the subject matter experts who reviewed the material for technical accuracyand, especially, to Sarah Merlin for copyediting the final manuscript.\n\n## About The Author\n\nPeter W. Merlin has been an aerospace historian under contract to NASA at Armstrong Flight Research Center, Edwards, CA, since 1997. He has authored a variety of books, including several NASA Special Publications on aeronautical research projects, as well as two volumes on aerospace safety. He served as co-author of research pilot Donald Mallick's autobiography, The Smell of Kerosene: A Test Pilot's Odyssey, and with Tony Moore co-wrote X-Plane CrashesExploring Experimental, Rocket Plane and Spycraft Incidents, Accidents and Crash Sites. He has also authored several technical papers for the American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics as well as numerous journal articles on aerospace history and technology. In addition, he serves as a contributing editor for historical publications at Armstrong and has appeared in more than a dozen documentary television programs for Discovery, the History Channel, National Geographic, and others. He holds a bachelor of science degree in aviation management from Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University.\n\n## Index\n\nPage numbers in **bold** indicate pages with illustrations.\n\n## Ailerons A\n\nA-12 aircraft, 74, 75 accidents and mishaps\n\nArticle 341 official first flight, 36\nCL-282 aircraft, 8\ngust control system, 23\nstructural limit loads testing, 4041\nU-2 design, 25, 110\n\naerial refueling mission, 63, 160\naircraft carrier operations, 70, 7172\nengine exhaust systemrelated accidents,\n\n12021\n\nAirborne Arctic Stratospheric Expedition, 198\nAirborne Visible and Infrared Imaging\n\nexcessive speed and structural failure, 49,\n\nSpectrometer (AVIRIS), 198, 200\n\n15960\n\nair conditioning system, 13\naircraft\n\nmaintenance, designing for ease of, 81, 249\ntime from design to operational use, 253\n\nhypoxia-related accidents, 49, 14445\nRainbow project flight, 42, 44, 44\nrate per flight hour flown, 151\nsafety improvements based on analysis of,\n\naircraft carriers\n\n151\n\naccidents and mishaps, 70, 7172\ncarrier suitability trials, 64, 6668, 6971\ncatapult launch and arresting hook landing\n\nserial numbers for aircraft and, 216\ntraining flights, 4750\nWiesbaden crashes, 48, 169, 218\n\nacoustic signature, experiments to reduce, 83\nAdvanced Location Strike System (ALSS), 218,\n\noperations, 6566, 67, 6869, 7072,\n70, 76, 8384, 83\n\n223, 225\n\nloading and handling of aircraft aboard, 66\nmodifications for carrier capabilities, 6566,\n\nAdvanced Synthetic Aperture Radar System\n\n6869\n\n(ASARS), 88, 89, 90\n\nAdvanced Synthetic Aperture Radar System-2\n\n(ASARS-2), 93, 95\n\naerial refueling capabilities and operations,\n\n5963, 60, 61, 62, 68, 160\n\noperational readiness, 71\noperation and deployment of, 72\npilot training for, 69, 8384\nsurvey for carrier capabilities, 6365\nU-2R Blue Gull carrier trials, 8284, 83,\n\naeroelastic divergence, 45, 5n8 Aerosol-Cloud-Ecosystem (ACE) satellite\n84, 85\nU-2R design for carrier capabilities, 76\nmission, 206\nAir Force, U.S.\n\nAeronautical Systems Division (ASD), 9092\nAerosol Particulate Sampler, 19394 Aether Drift astrophysics experiment, 19495\n\nturbulence and strength of, 4849 viability of, 99\nairframe-mounted accessory drive (AMAD), Article 341 official first flight, VIPs at, 3537 Bald Eagle project, 19 CL-282 development and operation, Land\n12122\nopinion about, 1011\nAir Research and Development Command\n(ARDC), 1, 17374, 223, 225, 227\nAIRSearch configuration, 5556 Air Weather Service (AWS), 167, 17273,\n\neight-phase test program, 4142\nLogistics Command (AFLC), 9092\nMil-Spec requirements, 90\nprogram management responsibilities,\n\n18283\n\n9092\n\nreconnaissance aircraft for, development\n\nof, vi\n\nAlaska High-Altitude Photography Program, 195\nAllmon, Carl, 13\nAltair, 199\naltitude\n\nbadlands, 38\nCL-282 aircraft, 6, 15\ndevelopmental testing flights and expansion\n\nRPVs, interest in, 8889\nStrategic Reconnaissance Wing, 4080th, 50\nsupport for U-2 program, 50\nSupport Wing, 4070th, 45\nU-2 program responsibilities, 27\n\nof flight envelope, 37, 39\n\nAir Force fleet effects on human body and need for lifesupport systems, 2425, 129\naircraft production for, 216 flood control and damage assessment engine restarts at high altitude, 21, 38, 78, missions, 88\n82, 12223, 16263\n\nJ75 engine upgrade and, 53\norder for aircraft for, 76\nproduction facility for, 16, 18\nserial numbers for, 216\nU-2F aerial refueling capabilities, 61\nU-2R aircraft for, 81, 8788\n\nAir Force Flight Test Center, 219, 221 Air Force Operational Readiness Inspection, 47 Air Force Scientific Advisory Board, Intelligence\n\nengine thrust and, 10\nhazards of high flight, 14451\nhigh-altitude engine flameouts, 21, 3739\nM-195 aircraft, 4\nmaximum altitude, 15863\npayload weight and, 10\npilot-training flights, 46, 47\nprofile of normal mission, 156\nradar and interceptor development by\n\nSystems Panel, 9, 10\n\nSoviets and, vi, 11, 175\n\nairframe radar signaturereduction research and, 43\nreconnaissance aircraft design study design and construction materials, 1819 excessive speed and structural failure, 49, requirement, 1\n15960\nrequirements for survivability of reconnaissance aircraft, vi, 10\nfatigue life of, 209 fighter pilot maneuvers and limitations of, 46 materials and construction methods, 101, stall checks, 7172 true altitude and calibration of altimeter,\n102\n15859\npilot hypoxia, speed, and load limits of, 49 strengthening based on structural load limits turbulence research, 16974, 171\nU-2 aircraft capabilities, 20, 16162\ntesting, 3941\nU-2 aircraft capabilities, release of information about, 17576\n\nU-2 weight and, 15\nU-2C aircraft, 5455\nU-2R aircraft, 75, 80\nU-2S aircraft, 9495\nworld altitude record flights, 3738, 158,\n\n200, 202\n\nX-16 aircraft, 4\n\nAmerica, 8384, 84, 85\nAmes Research Center\n\natmospheric radiation level research, 151\ndisplay of aircraft at, 218\nER-2 based at, 186\nER-2 delivery to, 92, 186, 197\nER-2 research programs, 195\ntesting and flight operations at, 231, 236\n\nAmes Stratospheric Air Sampler, 18990\nAN/AAS-8 infrared sensor, 5559, 57, 58\nAN/ALQ-110 radar signal receiver, 8687 AN/APQ-56 radar, 2, 40 AN/APS-116 X-band weather radar, 8687 Anderson, Rudolph, 217 AQM-37 drone, 82 Aquatone, Project, 12, 27, 50 Arizona Land Use Experiment, 19192 Armed Forces Special Weapons Project\n(AFSWP), 17274\nArmstrong Flight Research Center, 202 Armstrong Flight Research Center (Dryden Flight Research Center), 202, 236\nArmstrong Line, 129 Army Corps of Engineers, 207\nArticle 051\nconstruction of, 7879 history summary, 229 maiden flight, 7879\nArticle 052, 229 Article 053, 229 Article 054, 229\n\nArticle 055, 230\nArticle 056, 230\nArticle 057, 230\nArticle 058, 230\nArticle 059, 230\nArticle 060, 230\nArticle 061\n\nEP-X trials, 8688, 86\nhistory summary, 231\nradar system research, 8586\n\nArticle 062, 231\nArticle 063, 231\nArticle 064, 231\nArticle 065, 231\nArticle 066, 232\nArticle 067, 232\nArticle 068, 232\nArticle 069, 232\nArticle 070, 232\nArticle 071, 233\nArticle 072, 233\nArticle 073, 233\nArticle 074, 233\nArticle 075, 233\nArticle 076, 233\nArticle 077, 233\nArticle 078, 234\nArticle 079, 234\nArticle 080, 234\nArticle 081, 234\nArticle 082, 234\nArticle 083, 234\nArticle 084, 234\nArticle 085, 235\nArticle 086, 235\nArticle 087, 235\nArticle 088, 235\nArticle 089, 235\nArticle 090, 235\nArticle 091, 235\n\nreconnaissance systems testing, 40 U-2C upgrades to, 5355\nArticle 343, 42, 43, 217\nArticle 344\n\nautopilot developmental testing flights, 40\nhistory summary, 217\nnumber of flights and flight hours, 40\npilot training mishap with, 48\npilot-training program use of, 40\nreconnaissance systems testing, 40\n\nArticle 092, 236\nArticle 093, 236\nArticle 094, 236\nArticle 095, 236\nArticle 096, 236\nArticle 097, 236\nArticle 098, 236\nArticle 099, 237\nArticle 331, 219\nArticle 341\n\nArticle 345, 48, 217\nArticle 346, 4849, 218\nArticle 347, 218\nArticle 348\n\nassembly of, 25\nengine modifications, testing of, 3940\nengine testing, 28, 30\nfinal assemble and readiness for flight\n\ntesting, 26, 28, 29\n\ncarrier capability configuration, 68\ncarrier suitability trials, 71\nhistory summary, 218\nmodification to ER-2 platform, 18586\n\nArticle 349\n\nground vibration testing, 28\nhistory summary, 216\ninspection of, 25\nmaiden flight, 3134, 34\nnumber of flights and flight hours, 3940\nofficial first flight, 3537\nradar signaturereduction research, 42, 43\nRainbow project flight and loss of, 42, 44,\n\naerial refueling modifications, 68\ncarrier capability configuration, 68\nhistory summary, 219\nmodification to ER-2 platform, 18586\nU-2H configuration, 68\n\n44\n\nArticle 350, 219\nArticle 351\n\nstatic testing, 25\nstructural limit loads testing, 4041\ntakeoff and landing techniques, 32, 3435,\n\n3637\n\ncommunication system testing, 40\nnavigation system testing, 40\nreconnaissance systems testing, 40\nU-2C upgrades to, 5355\n\nArticle 352\n\ntaxi test, 3031\ntransport of in C-124 transport, 25, 25\nunplanned first flight, 30\nwheel brake and tire issues, 3031, 11516\n\ncarrier suitability trials, 6668\nhistory summary, 219\n\nArticle 342\n\nArticle 353, 220\nArticle 354, 48, 220\nArticle 355, 48, 220\nArticle 356, 220\nArticle 357, 49, 220\nArticle 358, 5355, 221\nArticle 359, 74, 221\n\naerial refueling mission mishap, 160\naerial refueling modifications, 6163\nelevator tab support bracket modification, 41\nhistory summary, 217\nnumber of flights and flight hours, 40\npilot training mishap with, 4748\npilot-training program use of, 40\n\nArticle 360, 222 Article 361, 222 Article 362, 68, 222 Article 363, 222 Article 364, 222 Article 365, 223 Article 366, 223 Article 367, 223 Article 368, 223 Article 369, 223 Article 370, 224 Article 371, 224 Article 372, 224 Article 373, 224\nArticle 374, 225 Article 375, 225 Article 376, 225 Article 377, 5859, 225 Article 378, 225 Article 379, 226 Article 380, 226 Article 381, 226 Article 382\ncarrier capability configuration, 68 carrier landing accident, 7172 history summary, 226\nArticle 383, 226 Article 384, 227 Article 385, 68, 227 Article 386, 227 Article 387, 227 Article 388, 59, 227 Article 389, 5556, 227\nArticle 390, 228 Article 391, 228 Article 392, 228 Article 393\naccident with, 73 history summary, 228 U-2CT trainer configuration, 73\nArticle 394\nconversion to single-seat U-2C, 59 history summary, 228 two-seat configuration, 59\nArticle 395, 229\nassembly and manufacturing of aircraft. See production of aircraft astroinertial navigation systems (ANS), 127\nAtlantis Space Shuttle, 240, 241\natmospheric and stratospheric sampling missions, 18991, 19394, 198, 200201, 2024, 2067\n\nAtmospheric Ionizing Radiation (AIR) project, 151\natmospheric radiation level research, 15051\nAtomic Energy Commission (AEC), 27\nautomatic direction finder (ADF) radio navigation\n\nsystem, 127\n\nautopilot, 15, 22, 40, 156, 16061\navionics\n\nglass cockpit, 9597, 96\nimprovements in, 53\nU-2R aircraft, 78\n\nAvon RA.14 engines, 89\n\n## B\n\nB-47 bombers, 32, 130\nB-52 bombers, 12, 21\nB-57 bomber, viii, 1, 2, 38\nBailey, Bernard, 185\nBaird, Walter, 22, 5657\nBaird Associates/Baird Atomic, 22, 5657\nBaker, James, 2122\nBaker, Jim, 910\nBald Eagle project, 19\nBaldwin, Ed\n\ntrainer conversion role, 73\nU-2 program role, 13\nU-2R engineering study role, 76\nU-2R fuselage design role, 78\n\nSkunk Works management philosophy, 243, Ballistic Missile Early Warning System (BMEWS)\n244, 248\nradar stations, 56, 59\nBarnes, Jim, 71, 133, 185\nBarrilleaux, Jim, 202 Beale Air Force Base (AFB)\ndisplay of aircraft at, 226 physiological support for pilots at, 13940,\n\nTR-1 aircraft, 92\ntrainer conversion costs, 73\nU-2 funding, 12\nU-2L costs, 74\nU-2 modernization costs, 210\nU-2 operating costs and cost per flight hour,\n\n14243\n\n97, 210\n\npilot selection activities at, 153\ntesting and flight operations at, 229,\n\n23037\n\nU-2R engineering study costs, 76\nU-2R maintenance and operating costs, 93\nwing design research costs, 75\n\nBundgaard, Robert C., 174\nB.V. Ward, 16\n\n## C\n\nC&J Manufacturing, 16\nC-47 transport, 27, 32\nC-124 transport, 25, 25\nC-130B aircraft, 199\nCabell, Charles P., 64\nCabin Altitude Reduction Effort (CARE), 98,\n\n14849, 149, 239\n\nCalifornia\n\natmospheric and stratospheric sampling\n\nmissions, 194\n\nBeaumont, Edward, 226 Beech Twin Bonanza aircraft, 79 Bell Aircraft Corporation, 1\nBellanca Decathlon, 74\nBell X-16 (Model 67) aircraft, 1, 45, 5, 10, 11\nBissell, Bill, 13\nBissell, Richard, 12, 12, 27, 50, 168, 176\nBlackbird aircraft, 25152 Blackbird Airpark, 227 Black Knight project, 2 Boehme, Dick, 12, 15, 16 Boeing, 1, 89, 151 Bonanza aircraft, 79 Bonney, Walter T., 17273, 181 Bonsi, David, 12021, 230 brakes emergency management and disaster-relief planning in, 193, 210\ndesign of, 15, 115 performance of wheel brakes, 30, 31\nriver and reservoir water level monitoring,\n186, 192\nSan Diego image, 193\ntidal and water movement research, 187\ncameras Bremberg, Vern, 13 Broce, Stu, 2056 Brown, Alan, 25253 Buckner, Vernon, 28\nbudgets, funding, and costs approval for production, changes in process for, 7475\nCIA aircraft, 15 CL-282 funding, 10 Global Hawk costs and cost per flight hour,\n97, 210\n\nCL-282 aircraft, 6\ndefroster for windows for, 12425\ndevelopmental testing flights, 40\nER-2 cameras, 18789, 188, 19294\nERTS cameras, 19192\ninstallation of, 108\ninterchangeable nose assemblies for, 76, 103\n\nM-195 aircraft, 3 operational checkout pilot-training flights,\n4647\n\nChih, Yao-Hua, 219\nChristman, Pop, 28\nChurchill, Winston, v\nCIA (Central Intelligence Agency)\n\nOptical Bar Camera (OBC), 9798, 194\noptical bar system and vibration issues,\n\n8182\n\nArticle 341 official first flight, VIPs at, 3537\nCL-282 aircraft, interest in, 911\nContingency Reserve Fund, 12\ndeployment of U-2 personnel, 50\nreconnaissance aircraft for, development\n\nof, vi\n\nreconnaissance operations, responsibility\n\nfor, 5, 11\n\nreconnaissance operations, suitability for\n\nRB-57D aircraft, 2\nRC-10 camera, 188, 200\nrequirements for reconnaissance aircraft, vi\nU-2R cameras, 8182, 93\nupward-facing camera, 74\nfor weather research, 174\nX-16 aircraft, 4\n\nconducting, 11\n\ntermination of role in U-2 program, 87, 88\nU-2 program responsibilities, 27\nweather research cover story, 16774, 171,\n\n17984, 182, 183\n\nCIA (Central Intelligence Agency) fleet\n\ncamouflage, 83\nCampbell, John, 63, 217 Canadian Defense Research Establishment, 151 Carey, Howard, 4849, 218 Carlton, Paul K., 73 Carmody, Fred, 20910 Carroll, George, 179 Carter, Ashton, 210 Carter, Marshall S., 64, 65 Cass, Lorne, 13 Cavanaugh, Fred, 76 celestial navigation, 22, 105 center of gravity\n\naircraft production for, 216\ncost of aircraft for, 15\nengine upgrade for, 53\nnumber of aircraft in, 74, 76\norder for aircraft for, 76\nproduction facility for, 1516, 16\nU-2F aerial refueling capabilities, 61\nU-2R aircraft for, 81\n\naerial refueling, cross-transfer system\n\nCL-282 aircraft\n\nbetween tanks, and, 6263\n\nadvantages of, 10\nAir Force role in development and operation,\n\nLand opinion about, 1011\n\nfuel usage and, 77\nU-2C aircraft, 55\nXF-104 conversion to CL-282 and, 7\n\napproval for development, 11\nassignment of U-2 designation, 12\nCIA interest in, 911\ndesign of and proposal for, 69, 6n11, 7, 21\nengine selection, 89, 11\nfunding for, 10\nLand Panel interest in and support for\n\ndevelopment of, 911\n\nrejection of proposal for, 69, 11\n\nChameleon experiment, 83 Chang, Hseih \"Billy,\" 227\nChang, Li-Yi \"Jack,\" 221 Chapin, Al, Jr., 144, 223 Charlton, Bob, 13\nchase cars (mobiles), 32, 158\nChen, Huai-Sheng, 225 Chevy Camaro Z-28, 158 Chevy El Camino, 158\n\nschedule for development and production, 11\nSee also U-2 aircraft design of, 12627 developmental testing flights, 40\nSenior Span, 9394, 94\nCoastal Conservation Commission, 195 Coastal Zone Color Scanner, 189 cockpits\n\nCompass Cope, 89\nConcorde, 151, 201\nCone, Doug, 13\ncontrol surfaces\n\ncable operation of, 19\nCL-282 wing control surfaces, 8\nstructural limit loads testing, 4041\n\nConvair, 1\nConvection And Moisture EXperiment (CAMEX),\n\n2045\n\ncooperation, trust, and goals of the project, 244,\n\n248, 25051\n\nCruz, Frank, 28\nCuba and Cuban Missile Crisis, 210, 217, 219,\n\n221\n\nback cushion for seat, 35\ncabin pressure fluctuations, 36\ncanopy design, 22, 31, 106, 106\nCL-282 aircraft, 78, 21\ncontrol panel and instruments, 1034\ndefroster for windshield, 124\ndesign and construction of, 1036\nglass cockpit, 9597, 96\nheat in, 31\nlayout of, update to, 97\nM-195 aircraft, 3\npilot bailout technique, 22\npressurized cockpits, 8, 24, 98, 103, 107,\n\n12324, 129, 137, 14849, 149\n\nCunney, John, 228\nCunningham, James A., Jr., 6465, 175\nCuthbert, Gene, 28\n\n## D\n\nDaedalus Multispectral Scanner, 195 David Clark Company, 46, 13037 Davis-Monthan Air Force Base (AFB)\ndisplay of aircraft at, 226 testing and flight operations at, 224, 226,\n\nSR-71 aircraft, 139\nteam for design and manufacturing, 13\ntemperature distribution in, 124\ntwo-seat configuration, 5759, 57, 58\nU-2C aircraft, 139\nU-2 design, 2122\nU-2R aircraft, 78, 139\nwindscreen and visibility issues, 31\nwindscreen upgrades, 95\nX-16 aircraft, 5\n\n22831\n\nU-2CT flight from, 7374\n\nDC-8 aircraft, 207\nDeal, Paul, 28\ndecompression sickness, 98, 129, 137, 140,\n\n14649, 146, 149\n\nCoe, Emilie C., 170 coffin corner of flight envelope, 153, 159 Cold War, vvi, 9 Cold War Museum, 228\nColeman, Phil, 6 Coleman, Thomas L., 16970, 171, 179 Combat Feeding Directorate (CFD), 14143 Combs, Henry, 13, 15, 32 commercial aeronautics, contributions to, 201 communication system data link communications, 93\n\ndehydration, 139\nDelap, Jack, 45\ndemonstrators, technology, 24950\nDettmer, Tom, 121, 233\nDickinson, Brian, 138\nDirty Birds, 42, 43\n\ndevelopment of, 54\nPower-EMI upgrade, 95\nteam for design and manufacturing, 13\nU-2R aircraft, 76\n\nelectromagnetic interference (EMI), 95\nelectronic intelligence (ELINT) data, 2\nElectronics Patrol Experimental (EP-X) trials,\n\nDistributed Common Ground System station, 98\nDonovan, Allen, 10, 11\nDoolittle, Jimmy, 23\nDow, Royal, 13\ndrag chute, 15, 50\nDragon Lady nickname, 153\ndrinks and food, 13334, 137, 139, 14143,\n\n## 8688, 86\n\n141, 143\ndrones, 82 Dryden, Hugh L., 167, 169, 172, 18284 Dryden Flight Research Center (Armstrong Flight aircraft for, 86, 86, 229\nASARS for, 88\nHighboy project, 8687, 87\nResearch Center), 202, 236\nDuckett, Carl, 185 Dulles, Allen W., vi, 1011, 12, 18182\ndysbarism, 144\n\n## E\n\nelectro-optical reconnaissance, 93\nelevator tab, 54\nelevator tab support bracket modification, 41\nEllis, Richard H., 9192\nEllison, George, 13\nEngelbry, Chan, 13\nengine air inlets\n\nEarth Resources Technology Satellite (ERTS)/\n\nLandsat, 187, 188, 189, 191, 192, 194, 195,\n199\n\nEdens, Buster E., 7172, 220, 226\nEdwards Air Force Base (AFB)\n\nCL-282 configuration, 7\nJ57-P-31 engines, 118\nfor J75-P-13B engines, 75\nfor J75-P-13 engines, 52, 53, 54\nU-2 configuration, 20\n\ntesting and flight operations at, 217, 219,\n\n220, 223, 225, 227, 229\n\nengine controls, digital, 94\nengine exhaust tailpipes, 24, 80, 8081,\n\n11921\n\ntest operations move to, 44, 50\nU-2R testing and training activities, 80\n\nengines\n\naltitude and thrust, 10\nBald Eagle project engine requirements, 1,\n\nEfsic, Eddie, 154\nEielson Air Force Base, 19394\nEisenhower administration and Dwight D.\n\n9, 11\n\nEisenhower, vvi, 9, 11, 6364, 18182\n\nejection seats/escape systems\n\nCL-282 engine placement, 7\nCL-282 engine selection, 89, 11\nhigh-altitude flameouts, 21, 3739\nrestarts at high altitude, 21, 38, 78, 82,\n\n12223, 16263\n\nsingle- versus multi-engine aircraft\n\nperformance and requirements, 10\n\nCL-282 aircraft, 78\nM-195 aircraft, 3\nRainbow project flight and call for use of, 44\ntwo-seat configuration, 58, 59\nU-2 nonuse of, 22\nU-2R aircraft, 76, 78\nX-16 aircraft, 5\n\nelectrical system\n\nspark plug problems, 28, 30\nU-2C aircraft, 53, 55, 78\nU-2C heat shielding around, 54\n\ndesign of, 126\n\nU-2 engine procurement, 12\nU-2 engines, 21, 24, 11723, 118, 119, 122\nU-2R aircraft, 75, 78, 81, 94\nwindmill restarts, 122\nSee also General Electric entries; Pratt &\n\nWhitney entries\n\nF-86 aircraft, 33\nF-100 fighters, 12, 39, 104\nF101-GE-F29 engines, 121\nF-104 Starfighters, 58\nF-105 fighters, 53\nF-117A aircraft program, 25253\nF118-GE-101 engines, 9495, 12123, 122,\n\n162\n\nEnglish, Leroy, 13\nenvironmental control systems (ECS), 1067,\n\n12325\n\nEnvironmental Measurements Laboratory,\n\nDepartment of Energy, 151\n\nFairchild Engine and Airplane Corporation, 1\nFairchild M-195 aircraft, 1, 24, 5, 9, 11\nFan, Huang-Di \"Andy,\" 222\nFederation Aeronautique Internationale (FAI), 200\nfire-management and wildfire research, 193,\n\n19899, 200\n\nEnvironmental Protection Agency, U.S., 189, 207\nER-1 aircraft, 90\nER-2 aircraft\n\nFirewel Company, 130, 131\nFish and Wildlife Service, U.S., 207\nFishhawk, Operation, 71\nFlickenger, Donald D., 12930\nflight controls\n\nautomatic system for mission flights,\n\n15657\n\ndesign of, 21, 1045\nsimplicity of, 19\nteam for design and manufacturing, 13\n\nflight testing\n\nbriefings before flights, 38\ndevelopmental testing, 3744\nEdwards AFB airfield, move of operations to,\n\naltitude, range, and mission duration, 162\natmospheric radiation level research, 151\ncameras for, 18789, 188, 19294\ndelivery of, 92, 186, 197\ndesign of, 90\nhypoxia-related incident, 14950\nlongevity and viability of, 211\nnumber of aircraft configured as, 202, 203\nnumber of flights and flight hours, 186, 190\npayload capabilities, 199\nphoto of, 196\nproduction of, 216\nproduction summary, 23132, 236\nscope of research missions, 18687,\n\n44, 50\n\n18995, 192, 193, 194, 197207\n\nmaiden flight, v\nnumber of aircraft available for, 37\nnumber of flight hours, 37\nnumber of personnel involved in\n\nSenior Span, 94\nsensors aboard, 18795, 188, 207\nspecifications, 214, 215\nworld altitude record flights, 202\n\ndevelopment flight-test program, 4142\n\nEricson, Robert J. \"Bob,\" 49, 71, 169, 185, 220\nEspinoza, Cholene, 236\nEvans, Bill, 99\n\n## F\n\nsecure test site acquisition, 27\nsecuring airspace for, 33\nSkunk Works management philosophy, 251\nstripes on lakebed for visual reference, 30, 31\nstructural limit loads testing, 3940\nstructure of program, 44\n\nF-22 fighter program, 25253 F-35 fighter program, 25253\n\ntypes of fuel, 2324, 9899, 126\nU-2C aircraft, 54\nU-2R aircraft, 7778\nweight and balance and, 23\n\ntest site preparations, 28\nU-2C developmental testing, 54\nU-2R maiden flight, 79\nU-2R testing and experiment activities,\n\n7981, 80, 8287, 83, 84, 85, 86, 87\n\nFulkerson, Glen, 28, 31, 5859\nfull-pressure suits\n\nWatertown Airstrip for, 27\n\nFlit insect repellent spray, 24 Flynn, Leroy, 28 food and drinks, 13334, 137, 139, 14143,\n141, 143\nFord Mustang, 158 Forest Service, U.S., 197, 207 Fortune Cookie experiment, 82 Frost, Gene, 6\nFrye, Fritz, 28 fuel and fuel system aerial refueling capabilities and operations,\n5963, 60, 61, 62, 68, 160\n\nA/P22S-6 suits, 131\ncomfort of, 78\ncustom fitting of for individual pilots, 135\nS901J suits, 135\nS1010A suits, 135\nS1010B suits, 135, 139\nS1010 suits, 13536, 139\nS1030 suits, 136\nS1031C suits, 136\nS1031 suits, 136\nS1034 suits, 134, 136\nU-2R cockpit and use of, 78\nuse of by pilots, 123\nweight of, 135\n\nfull-scale development (FSD) prototypes,\n\nCL-282 aircraft, 8\nCL-282 sump tank, 7\ncross-transfer system between tanks,\n\n24950\n\n6263\n\nFunk, Jack, 16970\nfuselage\n\ndesign of, 23, 12526\nfuel capacity, 20, 111\nfuel capacity and mission duration, 78\nfuel consumption rates, 21, 11819\nfuel expansion and apparent ability to\n\naerial refueling modifications, 61\nCL-282 design, 67\ndorsal spine on, 52\nforward fuselage design and construction,\n\nmanufacture fuel, 12526\n\n10210, 104, 105, 106, 108, 109\n\nfuel quantity, monitoring of, 23\nfuel transfer system, 23\nmovement of fuel from one wing to the\n\nother, 72\n\nprobe-and-drogue buddy refueling\n\ncapability, 83\n\nrunning our of fuel mishap, 48\nslipper tanks on wings, 23, 52, 55, 62, 162\ntanks and tank placement, 23, 110, 111,\n\n125\n\nlengthening of, 74\nQ-bay, 21\nskid for CL-282 landings, 6, 7\nskin panels, 1819, 41, 102\nskin wrinkles, 41\nteam for design and manufacturing, 13\ntwo-seat configuration, 5759, 57, 58\nU-2 design, 21\nU-2R design, 7576, 77, 78\nwing attachment to, arrangement for, 110\n\nteam for design and manufacturing, 13\n\nground handling equipment, team for design\n\n## G\n\nof, 13\nground vibration testing, 28 Gurin, Pete, 13 gust control system\n\ngalactic cosmic rays (GCR), 15051\nGardner, Cornelius, 13\nGardner, Trevor, 9, 1011\nGarvin, Louis A., 45\nGath, Elmer, 13\nGavette, Leon, 13\nGeary, Leo, 39\nGeneral Electric F101-GE-F29 engines, 121\nGeneral Electric F118-GE-101 engines, 9495,\n\nArticle 341 taxi test, 31\ndesign of, 23, 105, 110\nlanding technique and use of, 34, 35, 36\nstructural limit loads testing, 4041\ntakeoff technique and use of, 35, 49\nU-2C aircraft, 54\n\n12123, 122, 162\n\nGypsy Moth infestation research, 197\n\n## H\n\nHagerty, James C., 181\nHaley, Deborah, 14243\nHall, Robert E. \"Deke,\" 160, 217\nHalloran, Pat, 14546\nhandling characteristics\n\nbuffet characteristics, 33, 3435, 159\nchallenges of flying U-2 aircraft, 153,\n\nGeneral Electric J73-X-52 engines, 89, 11 General Electric J79 engine, 8 Geological Survey, U.S. (USGS), 187, 195\nGeophysical Research Directorate, 172 George, Mel, 42 Gibb, Walter, 38\nglass cockpit, 9597, 96\nGlennan, T. Keith, 18182 glide capabilities of U-2 design, 23, 33, 16263\nGlobal Hawk, 97, 98, 21011\nglobal positioning systems (GPS), 95, 127, 154,\n15863\n157\nfighter pilot maneuvers and limitations of airframe, 46\nglide capabilities, 23, 33, 16263 hand-built aircraft and aircraft behavior, 45,\n71\n\nGlobal Wind Mission, 205\ngloves, 97, 130, 132, 135, 136, 137, 14041\nGoddard Space Flight Center, 189, 194, 205\nGoodyear Aerospace, 85\nGoudey, Ray\n\npilot training in single-seat aircraft, 45\nporpoise maneuver, 3435\nstability and control, 16364\nU-2R modifications to improve, 77\n\nbriefings before flights, 38\ndevelopmental testing flights, 37\nfatigue and mission duration, 161\npilot training role, 45\nstructural limit loads testing, 40\nT-33 chase plane role, 33\ntest pilot role, 37\nU-2C flight testing, 54\n\nGrace, Frank G., Jr., 48, 220\nGreenland, 205, 206\nGregory, Bill, 69, 71\nground effect, 30, 153\n\nHansen, Shawn, 138\nHarvey, Frank \"Red,\" 28\nHaughland, Paul L., 222\nHawkens, David, 230\nhazards of high flight, 14451\nHeal, Merv, 74, 75\nHeat Capacity Mapping Radiometer, 189, 194\nheat signatures, 5559, 57, 58\nHelen, Super Typhoon, 177\n\n## Helmets I\n\nIce, Cloud and land Elevation Satellite (ICESat-2),\n205\n\nA/P22S-6 helmets, 131\nfaceplate fogging, 133, 13940\nS901J helmets, 135\nS1010D helmets, 13536\nS1010 helmets, 135\nS1034E helmets, 13637\nType MA-2 helmet, 130\n\nIda, Super Typhoon, 176, 177\nIkhana, 199\nILC Dover, 130\nImperial War Museum, 221\ninertial navigation systems (INS), 127, 157\ninstrument landing systems (ILS), 127\nintegrity, 246, 247\nintelligence\n\ncomparison of collection platform\n\ncapabilities, 75\n\nHelms, Richard, 76, 81\nHenderson, Robert, 229\nHenning, John, 13\nHerman, Carl, 28\nHickam Air Force Base, 194\nHickman, Robert, 227\nHigh-Altitude Sampling Program (HASP), 103,\n\n17273, 173, 224\n\nELINT data, 2\nreconnaissance operations to gather, vvi\nSIGINT data, 2, 88, 89, 93, 95\nSoviet missile threat to U.S., 56, 59\n\nHighboy, Project, 8687, 87\nHighly Calibrated Airborne Measurements Program (Hi-CAMP) project, 19798\nionizing radiation, 15051 Itek IRIS II sensor, 81\nHigh Speed Research Project Office, Langley Research Center, 151\n\n## J J57 Engines\n\nArticle 341 engine testing, 28, 30\navailability of engines, 3839\nCL-282 use of, 11\nengine failures, 21\nhigh-altitude flameouts, 21, 3739\nJ57-P-9 engines, 2\nJ57-P-31 engines, 4, 21, 3839, 40, 47,\n\n53, 11820, 162\n\nJ57-P-37 engines, 21, 3839, 40, 11820,\n\n16162\n\nHotz, Robert, 183\nHough, Dick, 28\nHoward Air Force Base, 194\nHoyt, Jerry, 200\nHRB-Singer, 194\nHruda, Richard, 13\nHuang, Chi-Hsien \"Denny,\" 230\nHubbard, Tom, 121, 233\nHuber, John, 69\nHunerwadel, Hugh P. \"Pat,\" 56, 59, 225\nHunter, Bob, 13\nHwang, Jung-Bei \"Denny,\" 224\nHyde, Joe, Jr., 219\nhydraulic system\n\ndesign of, 126\nsimplicity of, 19\nteam for design and manufacturing, 13\n\nM-195 use of, 23\nmodifications for, testing of, 3940\nrestarts at high altitude, 21, 38\nU-2 engine procurement, 12\nU-2 use of, 21, 11720, 118\nX-16 use of, 4\n\nhydrazine, 123\nhypoxia, 24, 49, 129, 14446, 14950\n\nJ65-W-5 engines, 2\nJ67 engines, 3\n\nmanagement style and Basic Operating Rules, 1315, 14, 24245, 24647\nmaritime surveillance capabilities, J73 engines, 3 J73-X-52 engines, 89, 11 J75-P-13/J75-P-13B engines development of, 85\nengine exhaust systemrelated accidents,\n12021\n\nNASA use of U-2, role in, 185\npersonality of, 247\nphotos of, 14, 178, 242\nRainbow project flight and modifications to\n\naircraft, 44\n\nrestarting production line, hope for, 74,\n\n8788, 90\n\nengine restarts at high altitude, 78, 82, 122\nmaintenance costs, 94\nperformance of, 120, 162\nreplacement of, 94\nU-2C aircraft, 53, 55, 78\nU-2R aircraft, 75, 78, 81, 82\n\nretirement of, 88\nRich as replacement for, 88, 242\nschedule for development and production,\n\n11, 12, 25, 28, 37\n\nJ79 engine, 8 Jensen, Alvin, 13 J.E. Ramsey Company, 16\nJet Propulsion Laboratory, 198 Johnson, Bob, 28 Johnson, Clarence L. \"Kelly\"\naircraft carrier modifications and trials, 64,\n67, 6869\naltitude capabilities, release of information about, 175\nArticle 341 official first flight, 3537 assembly and manufacturing processes,\n1718\nBald Eagle project, unsolicited proposal for,\n59\n\nsecret documents, opinion about, 17\nsecure test site acquisition, 27\nstall and trim problems, concern about, 72\nsuccess in meeting 8-month deadline, 37\ntail design development, 78\ntrainer configuration, 73\nturbulence and strength of airframe, 48\nU-2R maiden flight chase plane role, 79\nU-2 wing design, 2223\nwheel brakes, appropriate use of, 31\nwing design modification, 75\nwork week schedule, 13, 25\n\nC-47 observer fight, 32\nCL-282 design and development, 612,\n\nJohnson Space Center, 151\nJoiner, Ernie\n\n6n11\n\ndeadstick landing maneuver, 37\ndummy company name based on, 16\nevolution of design for changing\n\nrequirements, 76\n\ngrandmother, trading for reducing weigh of\n\naircraft, 15\n\ninfrared sensor system installation and two-\n\nArticle 341 maiden flight role, 3233\nautopilot and length of flights, 161\nflight test program, structure of, 44\nGround Hog call sign, 32\nmaiden flight preparations by, 31\npogo release and aircraft mishaps, 48\ntaxi test and brake inspection, 30\nU-2 program role, 28\n\nseat aircraft, 5759\n\nlanding technique, 32, 34\nmaiden flight preparations by, 3134\n\nJP-1 fuel, 126\nJP-4 fuel, 23, 28, 33, 126\nJP-8 fuel, 9899\n\nJP-TS (LF-1A) fuel, 2324, 28, 33, 126, 204 JT12 engines, 57\n\n## K\n\nU-2C aircraft, 54\nU-2R aircraft, 76\nweight of, 20\nwheel brake and tire issues, 3031, 11516\nX-16 aircraft, 4\n\nKammerer, Dorsey, 28 KC-97 aircraft, 63 KC-135 Stratotanker landings. See takeoffs and landings Land Panel, 911 Landsat/Earth Resources Technology Satellite aerial refueling operations, 59, 6163, 61,\n160\n(ERTS), 187, 188, 189, 191, 192, 194, 195, 199\nLangley Research Center engines for, 39 U-2 engine procurement, 12\nHigh Speed Research Project Office, 151,\n202\nLidar Atmospheric Sensing Experiment\n(LASE), 202\nLaughlin Air Force Base (AFB)\ndisplay of aircraft at, 225 testing and flight operations at, 22225,\n22629\nLawrence Berkeley Laboratory (LBL), University of California, 189\nKelly, Robert, 13, 25 Kennedy Space Center, 240 Khrushchev, Nikita, 181\nKillian, James, 11 Kirkham, Ray, 13 Kirtland Air Force Base, 16263 Kit, Typhoon, 174\nKitty Hawk, 64, 6668, 67, 87\nKlinger, Robert T. \"Bob,\" 28, 41\nKnutson, Marty, 92, 185, 186, 197\nKreimendahl, Rod, 13, 113 Krumrey, Doyle, 200\n\n## L\n\nleaflet drop capabilities, 82\nLedford, Jack, 64\nLee, Nan-Ping \"Terry,\" 222\nLemay, Curtis, 45\nLeVier, Tony\n\nL-1011 Tristar, 88 Lacombe, Benedict A., 224 Lakehurst Naval Air Station, 83 Lamar, Bill, 1, 6 Land, Edwin, vi, 911 landing gear arming U-2R with weapons, modifications for, 82\n\nAngel 1 call sign, 32\nArticle 341 maiden flight, 3134\nArticle 341 official first flight, 3537\nArticle 341 taxi test, 3031\ndevelopmental testing flights, 37\nlanding technique, 32, 3435\nLockheed director of flying role, 37\npartial-pressure-suit training, 37\nphoto of, 36\nsecure test site acquisition, 27\nstripes on lakebed for visual reference,\n\npainting of, 31\n\nchallenges of flying U-2 aircraft and, 153\nCL-282 design and elimination of, 6, 7\nM-195 aircraft, 3\nteam for design and manufacturing, 13\nU-2 aircraft, 12, 1920, 49, 11517, 116,\n\n117\n\ntest pilot assignment, 28\nunplanned first flight, 30\n\nU-2B aircraft, 5758\n\nwheel brakes, appropriate use of, 31\nLexington, 69\nLF-1A (JP-TS) fuel, 2324, 28, 33, 126, 204 Liang, Teh-Pei \"Sonny,\" 220 Lidar Atmospheric Sensing Experiment (LASE),\n202\nLien, Art, 45 life-support systems altitude effects on human body and need for,\n\nLoh, J. Michael, 92\nLoring Air Force Base, 194\nLovelace, W. Randolph, II, 12930\nLovelace Clinic, 46\nLovick, Ed, 42\nLow Card, Project, 5658\nLowcock, Ford, 223\nLunar Mapper instrument, 194\nLundahl, Arthur C., 184\nLutz, Richard, 13\n\n2425, 129\n\noperational checkout pilot-training flights,\n\n4647\n\n## M\n\nRainbow project flight and malfunction of,\n42, 44\nU-2 systems, 2425, 106, 123\nLink-Net fabric, 131 Little, Jon, 230 Lockheed Aircraft Company Advanced Development Projects division, 13\n(*see also* Skunk Works)\n\nM-195 aircraft, 1, 24, 5, 9, 11\nmaintenance, designing for ease of, 81, 249\nMarch Field Air Museum, 227\nMartin, Ed, 13, 21\nMartin B-57 bomber, viii, 1, 2, 38\nMartinez, Tony, 73\nMartin Marietta, 202, 252\nMartin RB-57D (Model 294) aircraft. See\n\nRB-57D (Model 294) aircraft\n\nArticle 341 official first flight, VIPs at, 3537\nBald Eagle project, unsolicited proposal for,\n\nMatye, Bob\n\n59\n\ncontract pilots for NASA, 185, 202\ninfrared sensor development, 5556\nmerger with Martin Marietta, 202, 252\nreconnaissance aircraft design study,\n\nArticle 341 chase plane role, 3436\nC-47 observer plane role, 32\npilot training role, 45\ntest pilot role, 37\nworld altitude record flights, 3738\n\nexclusion from request for, 1, 6\n\nrejection of CL-282 proposal, 9\nU-2 program responsibilities, 27\n\nLockheed CL-282 aircraft. See CL-282 aircraft Lockheed JetStar, 78 Lockheed L-1011 Tristar, 88\nLockheed Martin Corporation\n\nAdvanced Development Programs, 253\ncontract pilots for NASA, 202\nmerger and formation of, 202, 252\nsecurity of programs at, 253\n\nLockheed P-80 Shooting Star aircraft, 13 Lockheed XF-104 fighter, 69, 12, 21\n\nMcClung, Lonnie, 83\nMcCoy, Tommy, 13\nMcCoy Air Force Base, 86\nMcDonald, Luther, 42\nMcGregor, Marty, 229\nMcGuire, Stephen, 14749\nMcHenry, Ray, 13\nMcLucas, John L., 185\nMcMillan, Brockway, 75\nMcNamara, Robert, 76, 81\nMeadows, May T., 179\nMeierdierck, Hank, 45\nMihm, Jordan, 117\n\nMilam, Vic, 228 military specifications (Mil-Spec), 17, 90, 209,\n244\nNaka, F. Robert, 184 Natick Soldier Research, Development and Missile Defense and Alarm System (MIDAS)\nEngineering Center, 14143\nearly warning satellite, 56, 59\nNational Aeronautics and Space Administration missions and operations activities related to planning and flying,\n(NASA)/National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics (NACA)\n15458\nEarth Resources program, collection platform for, 90, 18486 (*see also* ER-2\naircraft)\nintegrity and reputation of following Powers incident, 18384\nOffice of Earth Science, 203 research papers based on data collection, publication of, 16871, 179\n\naerial refueling and mission duration, 6162\naltitude performance, 47\ndeployments for flying, 154\nduration of, 156, 16162\nfirst operational mission, 50\nfuel capacity and mission duration, 78\nnumber flight hours since 2003, 211\noperational checkout exercises and\n\noperational status of aircraft, 47\n\npilot fatigue and mission duration, 61, 62,\n\n161\n\nprofile of normal mission, 15657\n\nrole in U-2 research and development, vi\nturbulence research, 16974\nU-2 aircraft for, 18486, 186, 187\nUpper Atmosphere Research Program, 203\nweather research cover story, 16774, 171,\n\n17984, 182, 183\n\nNational Air and Space Museum, 218\nNational Museum of the U.S. Air Force, Wright-\n\nmobiles (chase cars), 32, 158 Model 67 (X-16) aircraft, 1, 45, 5, 10, 11\nModel 294 aircraft. See Martin RB-57D (Model\n294) aircraft Patterson Air Force Base, 227\nModerate-resolution Imaging Spectroradiometer National Oceanic and Atmospheric\n(MODIS) Airborne Simulator (MAS), 200201\nAdministration (NOAA), 190\nMoffett Field Historical Society Museum, 218 Morning Light, Operation, 88 Multiple Altimeter Beam Experimental Lidar National Photographic Interpretation Center, 184 National Radiological Protection Board, U.K., 151 National Reconnaissance Office (NRO), 7475,\n184\n(MABEL), 2056, 206\nNational Wetlands Inventory, 195 Nattress, Dan, 142, 143 navigation systems Murphy, Bob, 28, 31, 253 Murphy, Sam, 13 Mururoa Atoll, 71\nmuseum displays of aircraft, 200, 218, 219, design of and types of systems, 105,\n221, 223, 225, 226, 227, 228\n12627\nMuseum of Aviation, Robins Air Force Base,\n200, 219\nMyers, Raleigh B. J., 227\ndevelopmental testing flights, 40 navigational aids, 2122 operational checkout pilot-training flights,\n4647\n\nPowers flight and difficulties with, 180 Rainbow project flight and redesign of, 44 regulator failure, 14950\nprofile of normal mission and use of, 157 U-2R aircraft, 78 U-2S aircraft, 95\nozone layer research, 187, 190, 198, 2024\nNavy, U.S., 72, 84 Near-Space Plane, 153 neurologic decompression sickness (NDCS),\n\n## P\n\n14749\nnight-vision driftsight, 83 Nimbus satellite, Coastal Zone Color Scanner, P-80 Shooting Star aircraft, 13 Padjet, Dick, 28 paint and coatings\n189\ncamouflage schemes, 83 Chameleon experiment and color-changing paint, 83\nNole, Jack, 14445, 146, 222 Northrop Grumman RQ-4 Global Hawk, 97, 98,\n21011\nNACA paint scheme and markings, 166,\n167, 169\nNorway, 180, 198\nnose radar signaturereduction research, 42, 43,\n17374\ndesign and construction of, 103, 104\ninterchangeable nose assemblies, 76, 93, weather research cover story and fictitious\n104\nNASA markings, 181, 182\nrotating nose assembly, 74 U-2 design, 12\nnuclear weapons, atmospheric sample collection Painter, Jack, 13\nPark, Bill, 73, 79, 79, 8384\npartial-pressure suits to monitor radioactive fallout, 17273, 173,\n174\nNystrom, Herb, 13, 78, 113\nCL-282 pilot use of, 8 concept of, 2425 custom fitting of for individual pilots, 46,\n131, 132\n\n## O\n\ndevelopment of, 12930\nfaceplate latch failure, 42\nfaceplate latch redesign, 44\nfeatures of, 130, 13134\nhelmet and visibility while maneuvering,\n\n6162\n\nOcean Color Scanner, 189 Oilstone, Project, 27 Optical Bar Camera (OBC), 9798, 194 Ortiz, Jose, 7374 Outlaw Hawk test, 87 oxygen system altitude effects on human body and need for,\n2425, 129\n\nMC-1 suits, 130\nMC-3 suits, 128, 13031\nMC-3A suits, 131\nMC-4 suits, 131\npilot training for use of, 37\nRainbow project flight and malfunction of,\n\n42, 44\n\ncapacity of, 15\nCL-282 oxygen supply, 8\ndesign of, 106, 123\ndevelopment of, 130\nmission duration and oxygen supply, 62\noxygen quantity, monitoring of, 23\n\nrequirement for, 2425\nS-100 suits, 13134, 133, 139\n\ntesting of, 130, 131 U-2R cockpit design and switch to fullpressure suit, 78\nuse of by pilots, 123\n\nbriefings before flights, 38\nchase car driver roles, 158\nCIA pilots, 4546\ncontract pilots for NASA, 185, 202\ndecompression sickness, 98, 129, 137,\n\n140, 14649, 146, 149\n\nparts obsolescence, 99 Patrick Air Force Base, 240 payload\n\naltitude and weight of, 10\nCL-282 aircraft, 6\nER-2 capabilities, 199\nQ-bay capacity, 1079\nreconnaissance aircraft design study\n\nrequirement, 1\n\nfatigue and mission duration, 61, 62, 161\nhazards of high flight, 14451\nhypoxia, 24, 49, 129, 14446, 14950\nnumber trained each year, 211\npartial-pressure-suit training, 37\nphysical and psychological testing, 46\nphysiological support for, 13741, 138,\n\n140, 155\n\nrecuperation time between flights, 98\nselection of, 4546, 153\n\nU-2C upgrades and increase in, 53\nU-2R capacity, 78\nU-2 requirements, 15\n\npilot-survival gear\n\nperformance challenges of flying U-2 aircraft, 153,\n15863\ntesting of, 130\nSee also full-pressure suits; partial-pressure suits pilot training\n\nrequirements and specifications, 251\nrequirements and wish lists, 246\nstability and control, 16364\nU-2 requirements, 15\n\nperiscope, downward-looking, 2122, 105\nPerkins-Elmer Model 501 tracking camera, 174 photographs\n\naccidents and mishaps, 4750\naircraft carrier training, 69, 8384\naircraft for, 40\naltitude of training flights, 46, 47\ncontinuation training, 154\nfamiliarization and proficiency flights, 45\nground crew preparations for training flights,\n\navailability of NASA U-2 images, 195\nclassified overhead photography, 184\nemergency management use of, 184, 186,\n\n47\n\n187, 193\n\nland use planning and use of, 187, 19192\nscope of research using, 18687\n\nphysiological support for pilots, 13741, 138,\n140, 155\n\nlength of, 154\nlength of training flights, 46, 47\nlocation of, 46\noperational checkout exercises, 4647\norganization and personnel for, 45\nprogram for, 45\nqualifications and proficiency, flying to\n\nPhysiological Support Squadron, 9th, 14243 pilots maintain, 154\nAir Force pilots, 50 altitude effects on human body and need for,\n24, 129\nsingle-seat aircraft and, 45 solo flights, 46 squadron assignment for, 15354\nbackground and experience of, 153\n\nestimates and work modifications based on firm data, 15\nsyllabus for, 46, 69, 74, 154 T-38 aircraft for, 154 U-2R conversion course for transitioning to, 81\nU-2 training flights, 154\n\nfirst production batch summary, 21622\nlater model production summary, 23137\nmajor assemblies, 100, 101\nmaterials and construction methods, 101,\n\npogos on wingtips, 20, 30, 32, 36, 48, 11617,\n102\n117, 156, 158\nmilitary specifications (Mil-Spec), 17, 90,\n209, 244\nPolarimeter Definition Experiment (PODEX), 206 porpoise maneuver, 3435\nPorter, Dee, 134, 204\nPower-EMI upgrade, 95 Powers, Francis G. \"Frank\"\n\nnumber of personnel for, 17\noriginal U-2R production summary, 22931\nproduction facility, 1617, 16, 18\nrestarting production line, 74, 8788, 90,\n\n195\n\nMC-3 suit use by, 128\nNASA pilot, application to become, 185\nphoto of, 178\nshoot down and capture of, 17984, 204,\n\nsecond production batch summary, 22228\nsecurity surrounding, 1517\nSkunk Works management philosophy,\n\n222\n\ntraining of, 46\n\n1315, 14, 249, 251\n\nsupplementary production batch summary,\n\n22829\n\nPratt & Whitney J57 engines. See J57 engines Pratt & Whitney J75-P-13/J75-P-13B engines.\n\nSee J75-P-13/J75-P-13B engines tooling for new airframes, 90\nU-2 aircraft, 14, 1525, 20, 22, 24\nvendor relationships and communications,\n1617\nwork week schedule, 13, 25\nPratt & Whitney JT12 engines, 57\npre-breathing procedure, 137, 138, 155\nPress, Harry, 168 pressure suits propaganda leaflet drop capabilities, 82 propulsion advances in design and materials, 14041 altitude effects on human body and need for,\n2425, 129\nimprovements in, 53\nteam for design and manufacturing, 13 (see also engines)\ndonning and doffing, 137, 13940, 155\nuse of by pilots, 123\nSee also full-pressure suits; partial-pressure suits prototypes, 24950 Purcell, Ed, 9, 42 Putt, Donald, 9, 11\npressurized cockpits, 8, 24, 98, 103, 107,\n12324, 129, 137, 14849, 149\n\n## Q Q-Bay\n\nPrimrose, Robert L., 224 probe-and-drogue buddy refueling capability, 83 production of aircraft defroster for windows in, 12425 design of and uses for, 21, 102, 10710 environmental conditions in, 1067, article/construction numbers, 25n55, 216 CL-282 design and tooling and detail jigs, 6 contract numbers, 216\n10910, 12425\nRanger, 6971\nRB-57D (Model 294) aircraft\n\nfuselage redesign and, 74\ntemperature control in, 12425\ntwo-seat configuration use of, 58\nU-2R fuselage design, 78\n\n## R\n\nR-12 aircraft, 74. *See also* SR-71 aircraft radar\n\napproval for development, 9, 10\nBald Eagle project proposal, 1, 2\ncapabilities and performance of, 4, 9, 11\ndesign of, viii, 2\nRB-57D-1 aircraft, 2\nRB-57D-2 aircraft, 2\nU-2 engine procurement, 12\n\nAdvanced Synthetic Aperture Radar System\n\n(ASARS), 88, 89, 90\n\nRC-10 camera, 188, 200\nreconnaissance aircraft\n\nAdvanced Synthetic Aperture Radar\n\naltitude requirements for survivability of\n\nSystem-2 (ASARS-2), 93, 95\n\nreconnaissance aircraft, vi, 10\n\ndevelopment of, vi\nrange requirements for survivability of\n\nreconnaissance aircraft, vi\n\nforward-looking radar, 8687\nside-looking radar, 2, 90\nsynthetic-aperture radar (SAR), 8586\nU-2R platform for radar reconnaissance, 93\n\nrequest for design study to develop (Bald\n\nEagle project), 19\n\nradar-absorbent material (RAM), 42, 43\nradar signature, reduction of and Project requirements for high-altitude spy planes, Rainbow, 4244, 43, 17374\n10\nsize of production run, 1 structural load factors and weight of aircraft,\n10\nradiation levels at high altitudes, 15051 Ragsdale, Ryan, 13941, 14950\nRainbow, Project, 4244, 43, 17374\nrange\n\n## Reconnaissance Avionics Maintainability\n\naerial refueling capabilities, 5963, 60, 61, Program (RAMP), 9597\n\n## 62\n\nreconnaissance operations breaking cover story about, 17477 CIA suitability for conducting, 11 comparison of collection platform capabilities, 75\ndeclassification and dissemination of data,\n\nCL-282 aircraft, 6\ndetermination of, method for, 162\nglide capabilities, 23, 16263\nM-195 aircraft, 4\nradar signaturereduction research and, 43\nreconnaissance aircraft design study\n\n176\n\nrequirement, 1\n\nrequirements for survivability of\n\nreconnaissance aircraft, vi\n\nintelligence from, vvi\nmissions over Soviet Union, 17984\nnewspaper article about, 17576\nresponsibility for, 5, 11\nU-2 development for, vvi\nU-2R platform for, 93\nweather research cover story, 16774, 171,\n\nU-2 aircraft capabilities, 20, 16163\nU-2B aircraft, 5758\nU-2C aircraft, 55\nU-2R aircraft, 75, 76, 80\nU-2S aircraft, 94\nX-16 aircraft, 4\n\n175, 17984, 182, 183\n\nReconnaissance Squadron, 1st, 15354 reconnaissance systems SAGE III Ozone Loss and Validation Experiment\n(SOLVE), 2024\nsailplanes, 10, 23\nSalisbury Screen, 42, 43\nsatellites, reconnaissance operations with, 75.\n\ndevelopmental testing flights, 37, 40\nteam for design and manufacturing, 13\nU-2 design and components, 2122\nSee also sensors\n\nSee also Earth Resources Technology Satellite\n(ERTS)/Landsat\n\nSchriever, Bernard, 9\nSchumacher, Robert \"Bob\"\n\naerial refueling trials, 6162\naircraft carrier suitability trials, 6668,\n\n7071, 70\n\nReconnaissance Wing, 9th, 153 Reedy, Jack, 28\nremotely piloted vehicles (RPVs), 8889, 97, 98\nRendelman, Robert T. \"Terry,\" 223 Research Camera System, 18889 Return Beam Vidicon (RBV) data system, 191 Rhode, Richard V., 16869 Rich, Ben career and experience of, 245 management style and philosophy, 242,\n24547, 24849\n\naircraft carrier training, 69\nautopilot and length of flights, 161\ndevelopmental testing flights, 37\nfuel expansion and apparent ability to\n\nmanufacture fuel, 12526\n\nphoto of, 242\nreplacement of Johnson with, 88, 242\nRPV version of U-2R, proposal for, 89\n\npre-breathing procedure, 138\ntest pilot role, 37\ntwo-seat configuration maiden flight, 5859\nU-2C flight testing and center of gravity\n\nissues, 55\n\nRitland, Osmond J., 12, 27, 39 Robertson, Dave, 13 Robertson, Phillip O., 45 Robins Air Force Base, Museum of Aviation, U-2R maiden flight chase plane role, 79\n200, 219\nscientific and technical accomplishments of program, 17677\nSeaberg, John, 1, 6, 9, 11 security of programs, 1213, 245, 250,\n25152\n\nSenior Dagger program, 86\nSenior Lance program, 85, 229\nSenior Span, 9394, 94\nSenior Year Electro-optical Reconnaissance\n\nRobinson, George, 199 Roby, Randy, 235 Rockel, Cliff, 13 Rodgers, Frank, 42 Rolls Royce Avon RA.14 engines, 89 Rome Air Force Base, 86 Romig, Al, 247 Rose, Wilburn S. \"Billy,\" 48, 217\nRoyal Air Force (RAF) Alconbury, 198, 200, 221, System (SYERS), 93, 95\n23237\nSYERS-1, 95 SYERS-2, 95, 98\nRQ-4 Global Hawk, 97, 98, 21011\nRuseckas, Joe, 13031\n\n## Sensors\n\nAN/AAS-8 infrared sensor, 5559, 57, 58\naircraft for testing, 227\nER-2 aircraft, 18795, 188, 207\nlessons learned, 24750 nickname of, 13n28 organizational structure of programs, 1315, Global Hawk, 97 hyperspectral sensor package, 98 interchangeable nose assemblies for, 76,\n93, 103\n14, 25052\nreports, documentation, and reviews, 13, 15,\n1718, 90, 243, 249, 250, 25253\nrewards for performance of personnel, 245, TR-1 aircraft, 90 U-2R aircraft, 81, 93 U-2S aircraft, 95, 9798\n246\nRich management style and philosophy, 242,\n24547, 24849\nschedules for projects, 246, 248 security of programs at, 1213, 1517,\n245, 250, 25152\nspecifications and innovation, 90, 244, 251,\n252\nSetter, Louis, 21, 45 sextant, 22, 105 Shell Oil Company, 2324 Sheng, Shih-Li \"Steve,\" 226, 229 Shingler, Herbert, 45 shock strut pressure, 35 Sholtis, Edward \"Tadd,\" 147, 149, 151\nSieker, Robert staffing of programs, qualifications of personnel, and teamwork, 90, 243, 245, 246, 24849, 250, 252\nsuccess, keys to, 25052\n\ndeadstick landing maneuver, 37\ndeath of, 216\nRainbow project flight and death of, 42, 44\ntest pilot role, 37\n\nsignals intelligence (SIGINT)\n\nASARS for, 88, 89\nsensors for gathering, 2\nU-2R platform for, 93\nU-2S capabilities, 95\n\nSkylab space station, 193\nSmith, Leo, 223\nSmith, Paul, 28\nSmith, Richard, 4\nSnyder, Rich, 231\nSorenson, Vic, 13\nSouthern African Regional Science Initiative\n\nskin panels, 1819, 41, 102 Skunk Works\n(SAFARI), 204\nassembly and manufacturing processes, Soviet Union (USSR) and Russia\n1315, 14, 249, 251\ncontractor responsibilities, 244 cooperation, trust, and goals of the project,\n244, 248, 25051\n\nballistic missile threat to U.S., 56, 59\nChurchill description of, v\nintelligence on capabilities of, vvi\nLand Panel study of threat from, 9\nnuclear threat from, v\nradar and interceptor development and\n\nsurvivability of reconnaissance aircraft, vi,\n11, 175\n\nreconnaissance missions over, 17984\nshoot down and capture of Powers by,\n\nculture of innovation at, 24253\ndelegation of work at, 243, 246, 247\nefficiency of development programs at, 252\ngrowing pains and mergers, 25253\nhistory of, 13\ninspection system, 244\nJohnson management style and Basic\n\n17984, 204, 222\n\nSOLVE and flight through airspace over, 204\n\nOperating Rules, 1315, 14, 24245,\n24647\n\nSpace Shuttle Atlantis photos, 240, 241\ndebris hits on, 240\nsolid rocket booster and nose caps, 240, 241\n\nstall-warning system, 105\nsymmetrical stall characteristics, 7172\nU-2R modifications to improve, 77, 7980\nU-2R stall strips, 76\nwing modifications for, 45\n\nSpectral Infrared Remote Imaging Transition static testing Testbed (SPIRITT), 98\nspeed Article 341, 25 reinforcement of structure based on, 41 static loading to destruction demonstrations,\n40\ncoffin corner of flight envelope, 153, 159 developmental testing flights, 37 excessive speed and structural failure, 49,\n15960\nstructural limit loads testing, 40 team responsible for, 13\n\nstealth aircraft, 245\nSteele, Denis, 14950\nStewart, Leo, 228\nStrategic Air Command (SAC)\n\nM-195 aircraft, 4\nmaximum speed, 159, 164\npilot hypoxia and training mishap, 49\nprofile of normal mission, 156\nstall speed and maximum speed, margin\n\nbetween, 159\n\nHASP activities, 17273\nprogram management responsibilities,\n\nU-2R aircraft, 75\n\n9192\n\nspeed brakes U-2R aircraft for, 81\nStrategic Air Command F-84 fighter squadrons,\n45\nStrategic Air Command Museum, Offutt Air\n\nArticle 341 maiden flight use, 33\nCL-282 aircraft, 7\nprofile of normal mission and use of, 157\nstructural limit loads testing, 4041\n\nForce Base, 223\n\nSR-71 aircraft Stratosphere- Troposphere Exchange Project\n(STEP), 198\nStratospheric Aerosol and Gas Experiment\n(SAGE) instrument, 203\nStratospheric Air Sampler, 19394 stratospheric and atmospheric sampling\n\ndevelopment of, 74, 245\nintelligence collection capabilities, 75\nmaintenance and operating costs, 93\npressure suits for, 136\npriority of program, 76\nspecifications document, 251\n\nmissions, 18991, 19394, 198, 200201,\n2024, 2067\n\nstability and control, 16364\nStalesky, Suzzett, 142, 143\nstall characteristics\n\nStratton, Charles, 225\nStrickland, Bill, 48\nStrong, Philip, 9\nstructural limit loads testing, 3941\nStudies of Emissions, Atmospheric Composition,\n\nClouds and Climate Coupling by Regional\nSurveys (SEAC4RS) campaign, 2067\n\nconcerns about problems related to, 72\nflight testing for evaluation of, 33, 37\nhand-built aircraft and aircraft behavior, 45\nlanding technique and, 3435\nstall checks and carrier operations, 7172\nstall speed and maximum speed, margin\n\nsupersonic transport (SST), 201\nbetween, 159\npogos on wingtips for, 20, 30, 32, 36, 48,\n11617, 117, 156, 158\nSwart, Sam, 225 Sweden, 2024 synthetic-aperture radar (SAR), 8586 System IX Granger Deceptive Repeater, 54\n\nskid for CL-282 landings, 6, 7\nskid plates on wingtips for landings, 20\ntakeoff procedures, 15556\nU-2R veer to left during takeoff, problem\n\n## T\n\nwith and solution to, 8081\nT-2A aircraft, 68, 69 T-2B aircraft, 83 T-33 trainers taxi test, 3031 Teal Ruby project, 19798 technical and scientific accomplishments of program, 17677\n\nacquisition of to support program, 27\nArticle 341 chase plane role, 33, 3436\nchase plane role during pilot training, 45\npilot training in, 45, 72\n\nT-38 aircraft, 154\nTactical Air Command, 91 Tactical Air Navigation (TACAN) system, 127 tail\n\ntechnical manuals, 13\ntechnology demonstrators, 24950\nTeledyne-Ryan, 89\nThematic Mapper Simulator, 200\nThermos, 173\nThomas, Rick, 97\nThomas, Spencer, 158\nThompson, Loren B., 211\ntitanium alloys, 101, 102\nTJ3B1 engines, 9\nTR-1 aircraft\n\nall-moving tailplane, 78\nCL-282 design, 6, 7\nteam for design and manufacturing, 13\nU-2 design, 12, 22, 24, 25, 11315, 114\nU-2R design, 76, 78, 115\n\ntailpipes, 24, 80, 8081, 11921\ntail-wheel steering system, 30, 31 takeoffs and landings\n\naltitude, range, and mission duration, 162\ndesignation, dropping of, 93\ndesign of, 92\nengine exhaust systemrelated accidents,\n\naircraft carrier catapult launch and arresting\n\n12021\n\nhook landing operations, 6566, 67,\n6869, 7072, 70, 76, 8384, 83\n\nlength of production, 92\nproduction of, 91, 216\nproduction summary, 23137\nprogram management responsibilities,\n\n9092\n\nchallenges of flying U-2 aircraft, 153\nchase cars and landing procedures, 158\ndeadstick landing maneuver, 37\ndescent and landing procedures, 15758\ndrag chute for landing, 15, 50\nground cart for CL-282 takeoffs, 6\ngust control system use during, 34, 35, 36,\n\nspecifications, 214, 215\nsuccess of program, 92\nU-2R designation, reverting to, 93\nweight of, 162\n\n49\n\nTR-1A aircraft\ninstrument landing systems (ILS), 127 landing technique, 32, 3435, 3637 pilot training mishaps during, 48\ndelivery and unveiling of, 9293\ndesign of, 90, 92\nfinal delivery, 93\nNASA use of, 200 production of, 93, 216 production summary, 23237\n\nparts obsolescence as only problem for, 99\nreports, documentation, and reviews, 1718\nretirement of, 210\nschedule for development and production,\n\nTR-1B aircraft\n11, 12, 25, 28, 37\nscientific and technical accomplishments of program, 17677\ndesign of, 90, 93\nproduction of, 216 production summary, 231, 236\ntrainer configuration, 7274, 73\nTRIM, Project, 221 Tropospheric Wind Lidar Technology Experiment\n(TWiLiTE), 205\n\nsecond generation modifications, 7489\nsecurity of program, 1213, 1517\nspecifications, 209, 21215, 213, 215\nspecifications document, 17, 251\nteam for design and manufacturing, 1215,\n\ntrust, cooperation, and goals of the project, 244,\n248, 25051\n14\ntimeline of milestone dates in development of, 23839\nwork week schedule, 13, 25\n\n## U-2A Aircraft\n\ntube food, 14143, 141, 143\nturbulence research, 16974, 171\nTurkey, 179, 180\ntwo-seat configuration, 5759, 57, 58, 7274,\n73\n\n## U U-2 Aircraft\n\naltitude, range, and mission duration, 57, 162\nconversion to U-2C aircraft, 68\ndrag chute use by, 50\nflight testing, 39\nmaximum speed, 164\nphotos of, 160, 161\nproduction summary, 21629\nQ-bay camera installation, 108\nspecifications, 212\nweight of, 54, 57, 162\n\n## U-2B Aircraft, 5559 U-2C Aircraft\n\narticle/construction numbers, 25n55, 216\nassignment of U-2 designation, 12\nchallenges of flying, 153, 15863\ncivil applications for, 184\nCL-282 proposal and design, 612, 6n11, 7\ncodenames and nicknames of program, 27\ndesign of, 12, 1825, 19, 20910\nevolution of for changing requirements, vi,\n\n53, 76, 209\n\nfirst upgrade, 5363\nfunding for, 12\nhand-built aircraft and aircraft behavior, 45,\n\n71\n\nlongevity and viability of, 208, 20911\nnickname of, 153\nofficial picture of, release of, 169\noperational checkout exercises and\n\noperational status of, 47\n\naltitude, range, and mission duration, 162\nconversion of U-2A aircraft to, 68\ndevelopmental testing of, 54\nmodifications and upgrades, 52, 5355\nNASA use of, 18486, 186, 197, 201\nnumber of flights and flight hours, 199200\nphoto of, 196\nproduction summary, 21728\nrecordbreaking flights with, 200\nresearch missions with, 19798\nretirement of NASA aircraft, 199200\n\norigination of program, vvi\n\nspecifications, 212, 213\nstorage of, 81, 18485 weight of, 54, 162\n\nU-2CT aircraft\n\ncameras for, 8182\nconversion to U-2S aircraft, 9495, 216\ndesign of, 7578\ndevelopmental and experimental testing, 82\nengine exhaust systemrelated accidents,\n\n12021\n\nproduction summary, 221, 228\ntwo-seat trainer configuration, 7274, 73\n\nU-2D aircraft\nphoto of, 161\nproduction summary, 225, 227, 228 sensor technology research with, 5559,\n57, 58\ntwo-seat configuration, 5759, 57, 58, 72\n\nU-2E aircraft\n\nEP-X trials, 8688, 86\nfuselage design, 7576, 77, 78\nmaiden flight, 79\nmaintenance and operating costs, 93\npilot conversion course for transitioning to, 81\nproduction of, 81, 216\nproduction summary, 22937\nprototype construction, 7879\nradar system for maritime surveillance,\n\naerial refueling capabilities, 60, 61\nproduction summary, 218, 22425\n\nU-2F aircraft\n8588, 86, 87, 89\naerial refueling capabilities, 60, 61, 61\nproduction summary, 21721, 22425\n\nU-2G aircraft\ncarrier capability configuration, 6372, 64,\n67, 70, 18586\n\nreliability and flexibility of, 81\nRPV version of, proposal for, 89\nsatellite communications system for, 9394\nspecifications, 214, 215\nstall characteristics, 77, 7980\ntesting and training activities, 7981, 80,\n\n8287, 83, 84, 85, 86, 87\n\nupgrade of and modifications to, 90, 93\nveer to left during takeoff, problem with and\n\nNASA use of, 18486\nproduction summary, 21819, 222, 22627\nspecifications, 212\nstorage of, 72, 81, 18485\n\nsolution to, 8081\n\nU-2H aircraft\nweight of, 79, 80, 162\n\nU-2RT aircraft\nArticle 349, 68 production summary, 219\ndelivery of, 93 production summary, 231, 235\n\nU-2S aircraft\nU-2L aircraft, 7475 U-2M aircraft, 7475 U-2N aircraft, 75 U-2R aircraft altitude, range, and mission duration, 162\napproval for production, 76 arming with bombs and missiles, research on, 82\nattrition losses, aircraft to replace, 81,\n\naltitude, range, and mission duration, 162\nconversion of U-2R aircraft to, 9495, 216\nproduction summary, 22937\nreplacement of with Global Hawk, 97\nsensor technology installed in, 95, 9798\nspecifications, 214, 215\n\nU-2ST aircraft\n\n18485\n\npilot training in, 152\nproduction summary, 231, 232, 234, 235\n\nattrition rate, 184\nBlue Gull carrier trials, 8284, 83, 84, 85\n\nUniversity of California, Lawrence Berkeley Webster, Ivor \"Chunky,\" 185, 186 weight Laboratory (LBL), 189\nUpper Atmosphere Research Program, 203 urination, 137, 139\n\n## V\n\nVan Der Zee, Charles, 13 velocity, gravity, and height (VGH) recorders,\n17072\n\nCL-282 aircraft, 6, 7, 15\nfuel system, balance, and, 23\ngrandmothers as unit of, 15\ngross weight as ratio to powerplant, 15\nlanding gear weight, 20\nM-195 aircraft, 4\nradar-absorbent material and, 42\nRB-57D aircraft, 9\nreconnaissance aircraft design study\n\nVierick, Art, 13, 16 Vito, Carmine, 48\nrequirement, 1\nstructural load factors and weight of aircraft,\n\n## W\n\n10\n\nTR-1 aircraft, 162\nU-2A aircraft, 54, 57, 162\nU-2 altitude requirements and, 15\nU-2B aircraft, 5758\nU-2C aircraft, 54, 162\nU-2R aircraft, 79, 80, 162\nU-2 requirements, 15\nX-16 aircraft, 5\n\nWailing Wall experiment, 83\nWalker, Christopher H. \"Chris,\" 144, 226 Wallace, Cleve, 231 Wallops Island facility, 8384, 186, 194, 202 Wanamaker, John, 13 Wang, Cheng-Wen \"Pete,\" 219\nWatertown Airstrip, 27, 4647, 47, 167\nWB-57F aircraft, 98 weapons\n\narming U-2R with bombs and missiles,\nresearch on, 82\n\nnuclear weapons, atmospheric sample\ncollection to monitor radioactive fallout,\n17273, 173, 174\nweather publication of research papers and articles based on data collection, 16871, 174, 179\nresearch flights and data collection, 40, 175,\n\nWeir, Ken, 93\nWelty, George, 16\nWestern States Fire Missions, 199\nWhale Tale, 6672. See also aircraft carriers\nWhale Tale II, 69\nWhale Tale III, 6971\nWhitcomb, Richard, 75\nWhite, Leslie, 228\nWhite, Lincoln, 181\nWiele, Bob, 13, 23, 77, 111\nwildfire and fire-management research, 193,\n\n17677, 176, 179, 18283, 2012\n\n19899, 200\n\nvalue of data collection about, 182\nweather research cover story, 16774, 171,\n\n17984, 182, 183\n\nWeather Reconnaissance Squadron\n\n(Provisional), 3rd, 174\n\nWild-Heerbrugg RC-10 camera, 188, 200\nWilkerson, Pete, 28\nWilliams, Ron, 200\nwindscreen and visibility issues, 31\nwing flaps, 8, 23, 4041, 110\n\nWeather Reconnaissance Squadron (Provisional)\nOne (WRSP-1), 16768\n\n## Wings\n\nWinnie, Super Typhoon, 177 world altitude record flights, 3738, 158, 200,\n202\nWorley, George, 7374 Wright Air Development Center (WADC), 1, 11,\n\naltitude, engine thrust, and design of, 10 attachment to fuselage, arrangement for, 110 CL-282 wing design and construction, 6, 8\ndesign and construction of, 11013, 111,\n172\n\n112\nWright TJ3B1 engines, 9 Wu, Tse-Shi \"Charlie,\" 224\ndesign research costs, 75 developmental testing flights and structural loads, 3940\n\n## X\n\nX-15 rocket plane, 59\nX-16 (Model 67) aircraft, 1, 45, 5, 10, 11\nXF-104 fighter, 69, 12, 21\nhard-points for weapons pylons, 82 high-lift, swept wing design modification, 75 M-195 wing design, 3 modifications for stall characteristics, 45 pogos on wingtips, 20, 30, 32, 36, 48,\n11617, 117, 156, 158\n\n## Y\n\nYancey, William R., 45, 46, 47\nYeh, Chang-Di \"Robin,\" 220\nYellowstone National Park, 19899\nYF-12 aircraft, 74\nYoshii, Mich, 28\nYu, Ching-Chang \"Mickey,\" 227\n\n## Z\n\nZuck, Dan, 13\n\nRB-57D wing design and structure, 2\nskid plates on wingtips, 20\nspan-load distribution control system, 8\nteam for design and manufacturing, 13\nU-2R design, 7778, 77, 111\nU-2R folding wingtip design, 76\nU-2 wing design, 2223, 22, 25\nwing pods, 11113, 112\nwingtip deflection, 3941\nwingtip skids, 8\nX-16 wing design, 45\n\nNational Aeronautics and Space Administration Washington, DC\nNASA SP-2014-620"
    }
]